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William Vander Zalm to Rita Johnston : the 1991 leadership choice of the Social Credit Party of British… Schmidt, Kenneth J. 1993

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WILLIAM VANDER ZALM TO RITA JOHNSTON: THE 1991 LEADERSHIP CHOICE OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA by KENNETH J. SCHMIDT A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1993  ©  Kenneth J. Schmidt 1993  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  A  Department of  h  IT-  WI^-)Cte:HCz.  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date^(--1:4;,-  DE-6 (2/88)  16, Yy-,3  ii  ABSTRACT The traditional objectives of leadership conventions have been two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second, the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well as unification of them behind the newly chosen leader. This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selection process with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention. The study draws upon data and written material with respect to the 1986 leadership convention, but primarily information gathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes of the nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention as well as newspapers and personal observation and interviews with attendees. It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed to achieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991 leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However, entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerous rifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership convention and since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991 leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991 leadership convention closed the party was more divided than when the year's leadership politics had begun.  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ^ TABLE OF CONTENTS ^ LIST OF TABLES ^ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ^  ii iii v vii  INTRODUCTION ^  1  CHAPTER ONE SURVEY METHODOLOGY ^  3  CHAPTER TWO THE CHOICE IN 1986 ^  6  CHAPTER THREE THE VANDER ZALM REGIME - A REGIME OF CONTROVERSY AND DIVISION ^ 12 - Premier Vander Zalm - Hero or Victim? ^ 15 CHAPTER FOUR THE INTER-REGNUM OF RITA JOHNSTON ^ - A Divided Caucus Chooses ^ - Interim Leader Selection ^ - Chronology ^ - Leadership Convention or Universal ballot ^ - Pre-leadership Campaign Jockeying by Potential Candidates ^ - The Early Campaign - A Phony War ^ - Delegate Selection Meetings ^ - The Real Campaign ^  26 30 32 37  CHAPTER FIVE THE 1991 CONVENTION ^ - The Policy Forum ^ - The Candidates' Speeches ^ - Couvelier's Role in Selection of Leader ^ - Socio-economic and Institutional Considerations ^ - Regional Support ^ - Gender Support ^ - Support by Age ^ - Level of Formal Education ^ - Duration of Membership ^ - Role in Party ^ - Party Issues ^ - Leadership Selection ^ - Government Social and Economic Spending ^ - Determinants of Leadership Choice ^ - Summary ^  40 42 45 51 52 54 56 56 58 60 60 62 64 65 67 69  CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION ^ -A Last Word ^  70 72  18 18 20 23 24  iv BIBLIOGRAPHY ^ APPENDIX ^ - ATTITUDE SCALES ^ - 1991 SURVEY ^  75 84 84 87  LIST OF TABLES Table 1-1^Leadership Choice of Respondents Compared to That of Convention Delegates. Table 2-1  1986 Social Credit Convention Results.  Table 2-2  Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice.  Table 3-1  Views on Abortion by Second Ballot Support.  Table 3-2  Activists' Perspective of Vander Zalm by Cause.  Table 4-1  Views on Interim Leader Issue by Second Ballot Support.  Table 4-2  Views on Universal Ballot by Second Ballot Support.  Table 4-3  Attendance of Delegate Voters at Delegate Selection Meetings.  Table 4-4  Delegates Chosen by Acclamation.  Table 5-1  First Ballot Votes of Undecided Entering Convention.  Table 5-2  Events Which May Have Affected Change or Decision in Vote.  Table 5-3  1991 Social Credit Convention Results by Ballot.  Table 5-4  Delegate Movement Between Ballots.  Table 5-5  Candidate Vote Based Upon Influence of Couvelier's Endorsement of Johnston.  Table 5-6  Regional First Ballot Vote by Candidate.  Table 5-7  Regional Second Ballot Vote By Candidate.  Table 5-8  Gender Vote by Candidate - Second Ballot  Table 5-9  Candidate Percentage of Total Vote by Age - Second Ballot.  Table 5-10  Candidate Percentage of Total Vote By Formal Education - Second Ballot.  Table 5-11  Candidate Percentage of Total Vote by Duration of Membership - Second Ballot.  vi Table 5-12  Voting Patterns By Role In Party - Second Ballot.  Table 5-13  Party Issues by Second Ballot Vote.  Table 5-14  "Very Important" Reasons For Supporting Candidate. - Second Ballot.  Table 5-15  Spending Attitudes By Leadership Choice - Second Ballot.  Table 5-16  Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice Second Ballot.  vi i  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of many others. First, I wish to thank William P.J. McCarthy for his advocacy role to obtain the support of the Social Credit Party Board of Directors which enabled me to survey the convention delegates. I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science for their support and particularly the head, Donald Blake whose advice and assistance which helped to make this thesis better than it would otherwise have been. My greatest debt of gratitude is owed to my advisor Ken Carty gave assistance unsparingly. He made the the printing and mailing of the survey  possible. He shared his experience, knowledge, time and offered me critical suggestions and advice. I am fully aware that his assistance went far beyond that called for by his role. I am grateful beyond what I am able to express in these few words. Finally, I would like to thank my family: Gwen, Paul, Pat and Mark for their support and understanding.  1  INTRODUCTION  "A house divided against itself cannot stand." Abraham Lincoln, 1868.  Those who follow British Columbia politics would generally agree that the era in which William Vander Zalm served as premier was charged with controversy. Many of these controversies were rooted in the acts of the Premier and the condoning of them by the caucus, the Social Credit party president and the board of directors. At times Vander Zalm seemed capable of asserting an unhealthy degree of control over all these groups and individuals. A limited degree of disagreement and tension was not a new phenomenon to the party which was, by its very genesis prone to disagreement. The Social Credit Party of British Columbia was a disparate coalition of right-of-centre constituents whose common nexus was an ideological claim to represent the provincial free enterprise vote and a commitment to thwarting the election of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and later the New Democratic Party (NDP). Playing on the consequences of a left-wing NDP government had traditionally been a sufficiently powerful force to bridge and assuage any differences which might have arisen within the Social Credit Party. The divisions within the party became both more numerous and more open with the election of Vander Zalm as party leader and premier in 1986. Not even Vander Zaim's 1991 resignation,  2  followed by the reaffirmation of the interim leader as premier and leader at a subsequent leadership convention, was sufficient to unify the party. Rather, the forced resignation of Vander Zalm, the subsequent leadership race and convention, with all the attendant media coverage, exposed the party's divisions to public scrutiny and exacerbated the underlying and overt divisions. This turn in the party's character and fortunes after easily dominating B.C. politics for four decades poses questions which warrant study. Namely, with a record of unity spanning four decades during which the party changed the leadership twice and won thirteen of fourteen provincial elections, was the leadership convention successful in maintaining party unity? How did the Social Credit Party divide in choosing a new leader in 1991? Were the divisions based upon ideological considerations? Was personality a major factor in dictating the cleavages? Did the party divide along regional or socio-economic lines or did the divisions cross the party organization? In search of solutions to these questions, we will turn to analysis of delegate behavior utilizing survey data gathered in Social Credit Party and Leadership Studies of the 1986 and 1991 leadership conventions.  3  CHAPTER ONE  SURVEY METHODOLOGY The 1991 B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study was generated from data collected from a questionnaire mailed to every delegate on the 1991 Social Credit Party of British Columbia delegate list. The questionnaire, mailed Sept 25th, was accompanied by an explanatory letter from the initiators as well as a letter from the president of the Social Credit Party advocating its completion by delegates. The list of 1878 delegates was comprised of up to 25 delegates from each of the 75 constituencies plus an additional 28 delegates who represented 10 of the province's universities and junior colleges. A reminder notice was mailed on Oct. 28, urging any delegates who had not yet completed and mailed their survey to do so. Twenty three of the questionnaires were returned as undeliverable or due to incorrect addresses. Thus of the total sample numbering 1855, 749 questionnaires were completed and returned for a response rate of 40.4%. A copy of the 1991 questionnaire is included in the Appendix. The questionnaire replicated many of the questions of a 1986 B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study carried out by D.E. Blake, R.K. Carty and Lynda Erickson. The survey results of that study was published in their book Grassroots Politicians: Party Activists in British Columbia. As Table 1-1 demonstrates, both the first and second ballot preferences of the 1991 survey respondents closely replicate  4  TABLE 1-1 Leadership Choice of Respondents Compared To That of Convention Delegates  Couvelier Crandall Jacobsen Johnston McCarthy No Answer (N)  First Ballot Second Ballot Respondents^All Delegates Respondents^All Delegates 18.8% 139 17.9% 331 1.3% 10 1.9% 35 69 9.3% 9.2% 169 34.4% 256 35.3% 374 652 50.9% 51.6% 941 36.2% 268 35.7% 659 49.1% 361 48.4% 881 8 14 749 1,846 749 1,822  5  those of the convention delegates. In order to explore possible relationships between the voting patterns of the delegates and variables, chi-square test of the independence of variables was used. Also, multiple regression was performed to determine the weighting that significant variables had as determinants of the delegates' choices. In both the chi-square and regression the critical value of less than .05 was considered to be significant.  6  CHAPTER TWO THE CHOICE IN 1986  The 1986 convention was called because of the resignation of Premier William Bennett. Bennett announced that he was resigning for personal reasons after serving as Premier for eleven years and leader of the party for nearly fourteen. Students of B.C. politics believed that Bennett had access to polls indicating that he would have a difficult time winning reelection in the aftermath of the severe restraint program which he implemented in the early 1980's. The 1986 convention's twelve candidates represented the largest number in Canadian provincial political history. Seven were members of the existing cabinet or caucus namely, Grace McCarthy, Cliff Michael, Jim Nielsen, John Reynolds, Bill Ritchie, Steven Rogers, and Brian Smith. Bob Wenman was a Progressive Conservative MP for the Fraser Valley who had served as a Social Credit MLA during the W.A.C. Bennett years. Bill Vander Zalm had left provincial politics in 1983 to return to private business. Vander Zalm had served in three portfolios and left government with a reputation for lacking 'team spirit'. Kim Campbell and Bud Smith had served in the Premier's office and Mel Couvelier had considerable exposure to civic politics. Despite the large number of candidates, it was apparent early in the race that the contest would be fought between McCarthy, the two Smiths and Vander Zalm. McCarthy ran as the savior of the party and was in the campaign from the onset. Both Brian Smith and Bud Smith ran on  campaigns that identified them with the retiring premier. Brian Smith's appeal was that of the experienced cabinet minister and party insider. Bud Smith portrayed himself as a man with knowledge in running government but with a new face in terms of contesting an election. Vander Zalm entered the leadership race just five weeks before convention. He ran a populist campaign promising simpler government, more consultation with people and return to basic values. His campaign, centered on his own personality, had an anti-establishment cast designed to bypass party elites and appeal directly to delegates. He was opposed by most of the MLA's who were in the Smith camp on last ballot.  1  The runoff from among twelve candidates necessitated four ballots and presented considerable opportunity for strategic voting. The victorious Vander Zalm led on each ballot and quickly developed momentum which swept him to a win with 63.8% of the delegate votes (Table 2-1). While most of the minor candidates typically won support from their home constituency, the support for each of three of the leading candidates was rooted in their home regions. Almost one-half (47.5%) of Brian Smith's first ballot support came from Vancouver Island; Grace McCarthy attracted 52.5% of her first ballot support from among delegates of the Lower Mainland, her home region; Kamloops resident Bud Smith polled well among Interior and North/Peace River delegates. The exception was  'D.E. Blake, R.E. Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) Grassroots Politicians:Party Activists in British Columbia. pp. 100-102.  8  Table 2-1 1986 Social Credit Convention Results Ballot Number Candidate Vander Ulm Brian Smith McCarthy Bud Smith Reynolds Nielsen Rogers Wenman Michael Ritchie Couvelier Campbell Total  1^2^3 Votes^% Votes^% Votes % 367 28.4 457 35.7 49.1 625 196 15.1 255 19.9 342 26.9 244 18.9 280 21.9 305 24.0 202 15.6 219 17.1 54 4.2 39 3.0 54 4.2 30 2.3 3.3 43 40 3.1 32 2.5 28 2.2 20 1.5 14 1.1 1294  100.0  1280  100.0  1272  100.0  Source: D.E.Blake, R.N. Carty and Lynda Erickson (1991) p.101.  4 Votes^% 801 63.8 454 36.2  1255  100.0  9 Vander Zalm. On the first ballot he drew support from nearly two-thirds of the constituencies.  2  Vander Zalm's lack of any  distinctive regional base allowed him to attract second preferences from all regions while Brian Smith and McCarthy's growth potential was more restricted by the nature of their delegate support bases.  3  In 1986, the Social Credit activists were clearly divided along ideological lines. On a series of ideological scales Blake et. al. found that the differences were significant on every measurement score except continentalism. Vander Zalm's supporters were more individualistic, more populist, more pro-restraint and more anti-regulatory than the Smith supporters on the final ballot. 4 Of these ideological differences only populism finally played a significant role in determining the delegates' choices. Table 2-2 summarizes a regression analysis indicating how much of the Brian Smith and Vander Zalm delegate characteristics were determinants of the third and fourth ballot outcomes. Smith's Vancouver Island base drew votes for him. As the duration of a delegate's membership in the party increased so did the likelihood that the delegate would support Vander Zalm.' Vander Zalm and his outsider supporters won the battle over the insiders grouped behind Brian Smith. Vander Zalm's populist  'Ibid., p.102. 'Ibid., p.102. 'Ibid., p.107. 'Ibid., p.110.  10  THIRD BALLOT  Table 2-2 Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice Vander Ulm vs. Brian Smith  Duration of party membership^ Populism^ Vancouver Island^ Constant^ R2^  .08 .16 -.54 .14 .35  (2.46) (3.55) (5.51) (0.95)  FOURTH BALLOT Duration of party membership^ Populism^ Vancouver Island^ Constant^ R2^  .08 .16 -.41 .12 .30  (2.64) (3.81) (4.54) (0.99)  NOTE:Table entries are regression coefficients with absolute values of the t-ratio in parentheses. The dependent variable in each model is given in the column heading with votes for the first candidate named scores '1' and the other candidate supporters scored '0'. All coefficients are significant at the .05 level, one tailed. Regional variables are dummy variables with the value '1' for all delegates from the designated region, '0' otherwise. Male vs. female is a dummy variable with males scored '1'. The populism and continentalism variables use scores from attitude scales described in the Appendix. The duration of membership is scored from 1 to 5 depending on whether the delegate joined the party in 1986, 1980-5, 1975-9, 1972-5, or before 1972 respectively. Source: D.E. Blake, R.K Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) p.110.  11  approach promised a style of government with which many of the old-time members were familiar. Many found this style of politics attractive, for it was the party norm during the W.A.C. Bennett era. 6 However, in the interests of finding leadership which would bring immediate electoral success in the upcoming election, the delegates pasted over ideological divisions only to have the divisions resurface in the ensuing years.  ° Ibid., p.111.  12  CHAPTER THREE THE VANDER ZALM REGIME - A REGIME OF CONTROVERSY AND DIVISION  In the autumn of 1986, Premier Vander Zalm followed his leadership win by leading the party to a healthy majority in the provincial election. However, it was not long until Vander Zalm started to become involved in controversial actions which placed strains on the apparent unity demonstrated by the party during the election campaign.' Among the litany of controversies were his manner of dealing with conflict of interest controversies of three members of his Cabinet; his meddling to extend the bidding process on the tender for the sale of Expo Lands to benefit a friend, culminating in the cabinet resignations of his two principal rivals in the 1986 leadership race, Attorney General Brian Smith and Grace McCarthy; the resignation of four backbenchers to sit as independent Social Credit MLA's citing unhappiness with the Premier's leadership; the overruling at the cabinet level of Environment Minister John Reynolds' proposed pollution restrictions on the pulp and paper industry which led to his resignation. Another controversial action involved Vander Zalm placing his personal religious convictions and those of a small group of his avid supporters (known in political circles as "Zalmoids") above the interests of the public at large. Specifically he disallowed government funding of therapeutic abortions. Vander Zalm eventually submitted to public pressure  The Vancouver Sun "Scandal, controversy dog premier's career" March 30, 1991 p.A.2.  13  and revoked the proposed ban on abortion funding. Vander Zaim's revocation of the abortion ban silenced this vociferous, but significant, element of the Social Credit Party who viewed the party as a vehicle to promote their anti-abortion views. Despite the apparent silence and lack of overt conflict after the premier's revocation of the ban, abortion policy continued to be a covert divisive consideration in the selection of the party leader. The Social Credit Party and Leadership Study solicited the opinions of convention delegates to the statement "Abortion is a matter which should be decided solely between a woman and her doctor". Table 3-1 provides an analysis of second ballot supporters' views on the subject. Overall, the second ballot delegates supported abortion rights by a seven to three margin. However the support for abortion rights among Johnston activists was slightly more than three to two (59.65 to 36.0%) while the McCarthy activists support was a margin in excess of four to one (78.0% to 17.8%). Although no longer a public issue, it can be concluded from the survey results that, in the privacy of the voting booth, abortion rights continued to be a basis for a cleavage within the party. The fractious Vander Zalm governing era culminated in the Premier's personal involvement in conflict of interest actions. Vander Zalm used the power of the office of premier to assist in the sale of his major real estate holding, Fantasy Gardens. Lacking an understanding of the nature of his conflict of interest, Vander Zalm asked former Justice E.N. Hughes to  ^  14  Table 3-1 Views on Abortion Rights by Second Ballot Support (vertical percentages) Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n) 59.4%^78.0%^68.6%^502 Agree^ Disagree^36.0%^17.8%^27.0%^198 No Opinion^4.6%^4.2%^4.4%^32 100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^732 Sig. .0000 (n)^372^360^732  15  investigate the allegations with respect to his involvement in the sale.  8  On March 28, four days before the scheduled publication of the Hughes Report, Premier Vander Zalm announced that he would be asking the party, to hold a leadership convention. While indicating that he planned to consult with caucus and the executive of the party he also expressed an intention to serve as Premier until his successor was chosen. However, his formal resignation was deferred until the day the Hughes Report was brought down.  Premier Vander Zalm - Hero or Victim? Despite his subsequent April 2 resignation, allegiances and perceptions of ex-Premier Vander Zalm continued to haunt and divide the Social Credit Party. From Table 3-2 we can ascertain the attitudes of activists both about the ex-premier's actions prior to his resignation and the reasons for his resignation. Fully 77.3% of all activists felt that Vander Zalm's problems were of his own making. However, only 42.4% of the activists who agreed with this statement were Johnston supporters as compared to 57.6% from the McCarthy camp. There was a strong sense among Johnston supporters that Vander Zalm was a victim of both internal party forces and media misrepresentation. While only 17.9% of all the respondents felt  Palmer, V., "Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat" The Vancouver Sun April 4, 1991 p.A.10.  16  that Vander Zalm had been undermined and had become a victim of internal party actions more than four-fifths (82.3%) of those who felt this way were Johnston second ballot supporters. Only slightly more than a quarter, or 27.3% of respondents, perceived Vander Zalm as a victim of media misrepresentation. However, an overwhelming three-quarters (74.2%) of those who viewed Vander Zalm as a media casualty were Johnston supporters with 25.8% supporting McCarthy. Rita Johnston's close association with Vander Zalm was reflected in her supporters perspectives of him. The divisions engendered by the 1986 leadership contest and more numerous controversies and rifts engendered by the Vander Zalm leadership would become driving forces in the caucus selection of the interim leader and the subsequent leadership convention. The impact of these divisions on the leadership selection will be explored more closely in Chapters Four and Five.  17  TABLE 3-2 Activists' Perspective of Vander Zalm by Cause Premier Vander Zalm was.. Second Ballot Johnston^McCarthy^A119 ..architect of own misfortune. 42.4% 57.6% 77.3%  (n) 561  ..casualty of disaffected internal party.  82.3%  17.7%  17.9%  130  ..victim of media misrepresentation.  74.2%  25.8%  27.3%  198  ...other.  45.0%  55.0%  2.8%  408  909  20 Sig. .0000  N  Percentages add to more than 100% because of multiple responses.  504  18  CHAPTER FOUR THE INTER-REGNUM OF RITA JOHNSTON  A Divided Caucus Chooses The tabling of the Hughes Report on the morning of April 2 set the process of leadership selection into motion. Former Justice Hughes concluded unequivocally that Premier Vander Zalm was in breach of the government conflict of interest guidelines. The Premier announced to the afternoon caucus meeting that he was stepping down. Caucus promptly passed a resolution (which had been in preparation for weeks) to accept Vander Zalm's resignation. This, in turn, was followed by the passing of a resolution declaring the leadership open. A third resolution was adopted setting out the procedures for a secret ballot by the caucus to choose a new party leader. At that stage there was a principled debate on an issue that would subsequently divide the party throughout the leadership campaign. Some MLA's wanted a new leader to agree to serve only for the interim period until the convention. These MLA's also felt that to avoid any unfair advantage the interim leader should be precluded from running in the leadership campaign. Ultimately, the opposing view prevailed. The decision was predicated on the premise that caucus should not tie the new leader's hands with respect to calling an election given the few months remaining in the government's mandate. In the unlikely eventuality that prior to a leadership convention, events or conditions unfolded such that the party felt an election could  19  be called and won, the caucus was prepared to have the interim leader lead them into such a campaign. The voting patterns for the interim leader were indicative of the opposing views within the caucus on the principle. Russ Fraser, an MLA who had openly disavowed any intention to seek the leadership, and Rita Johnston who indicated that she was not prepared to rule herself out of seeking the leadership in the upcoming campaign, were the first two nominees. There were four other nominees; namely Mel Couvelier, Elwood Veitch, Norm Jacobsen, and Claude Richmond. Veitch and Couvelier were casualties of the first ballot drawing just two votes each. With four votes, Jacobsen was dropped on the second ballot. The third ballot resulted in a near three way tie, but as low man, Claude Richmond dropped out leaving Fraser and Johnston. Voting on the fourth ballot revealed a division between Vander Zalm-critics, as represented by Fraser, and Vander Zalm-supporters gathered behind Rita Johnston. The balance of power in caucus was revealed with the results of the fourth ballot - Johnston 21, Fraser 17.  10  The vote was verified and all members of the caucus signed a resolution committing themselves to support Mrs. Johnston and giving their assurance that she would have the confidence of a majority of the legislature. Later that afternoon, the caucus chairman Nick Loenen met with Lieutenant Governor David Lam to  ' °Palmer, V., "Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat" The Vancouver Sun April 4, 1991 p.A.10.  20  provide him with the resolutions and a motion of endorsement from the Social Credit board of directors. Having received Vander Zalm's resignation, as well as clear evidence that Johnston had the support of the majority party in the legislature, the Lieutenant Governor called upon Johnston to form a government. Early that evening, Rita Johnston took the oath of office as Premier of B.C. As the 28th premier of the province, she was also the first woman to hold the post of premier in Canadian history." The caucus alignments which developed in Johnston's selection as interim premier would become the basis of a broadened cleavage within the party as the leadership selection campaign unfolded.  Interim Leader Selection The 1991 Study solicited the opinion of the convention delegates concerning the caucus decision to choose an interim leader. Table 4-1 provides an analysis of opinions of the delegates in response to the statement "Any interim leader selected by the caucus should be an MLA who has no intention of seeking the leadership." The caucus's decision to choose Johnston over Fraser as interim leader ultimately became a very divisive action within the party. Nearly seven in ten (69.4%) of the Johnston second ballot supporters felt the choice of an interim leader who would be contesting the leadership was appropriate while a near equal  "Ibid.,  21  percentage of 65.4% of the activists who supported McCarthy were opposed to the decision. McCarthy supporters perceived the decision as an action which provided Johnston with a position of power, financial benefits and exposure as premier, albeit on an interim basis. Thus, Johnston was seen to have been placed into an extremely advantageous position as compared to fellow candidates.  ^  22  Table 4-1 Views on Interim Leader Issue by Second Ballot Support (vertical percentages) Johnston^McCarthy Total^N 22.1%^65.4%^43.7%^312 Agree^ 69.4%^27.5%^48.6%^352 Disagree^ No Opinion^ 8.5%^7.1%^7.7%^56 100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^720 Sig. .0000 (n)^367^353^720  23  Chronology March 31, 1991 -Vander Zalm asks for leadership convention but implies he will remain premier until convention. April 2, 1991 -The Hughes Report tabled. -Vander Zalm resigns. -Caucus chooses Rita Johnston interim premier. April 3, 1991 -Board of directors announce leadership convention for July 18-20. May 4, 1991^-Grace McCarthy announces her decision not to contest Socred leadership. May 7, 1991^-Mel Couvelier resigns Finance Minister portfolio in Johnston cabinet. May 20, 1991 -Mel Couvelier announces candidacy. May 22, 1991 -Rita Johnston announces candidacy. May 30, 1991 -Claude Richmond declines to be candidate. June 3, 1991 -Constituency Delegate Selection Meetings commence. June 5, 1991 -Duane Crandall announces candidacy. June 26, 1991 -Grace McCarthy announces candidacy. June 27, 1991 -Norm Jacobsen announces candidacy. -Last day for nominations. -Last day for delegate selection meetings. -John Reynolds declines to be candidate. July 18, 1991 -Convention registration and Policy Forum. July 19, 1991 -Candidates' Speeches. July 20, 1991 -Convention chooses Rita Johnston as leader on second ballot.  24  Leadership Convention or Universal Ballot The day after the choice of Rita Johnston as interim Premier, the Social Credit Party officials announced that a leadership convention would be held July 18-20 to determine who would lead the party into the next election (see Chronology). Premier Johnston started to consolidate her hold on the position of premier. She announced that vacant cabinet seats would be filled and plans for a sitting of the legislature would be made public in the next few days. She made public comments to the effect that she hoped the events which led up to the Hughes report would be forgotten in a few weeks.  12  However, some of her cabinet ministers were not as optimistic. Advanced Education Minister Bruce Strachan commented "that [loss of public trust] is something we are going to have to deal with and we are going to have to convince the public between now and election day that we are a good government".  13  Carol Gran, the Minister for Women's Programs voiced the view that "the government members have a big job ahead of us to convince the public of our integrity".  14  Pressure from opposing elements of the party continued unabated. Commencing with Vander Zalm's resignation, dissident party elements began their lobby against the traditional leadership convention. Former MLA and unsuccessful 1986 Socred  The Globe and Mail. "Premier tries to avoid talk of Vander Zalm ' That book was closed yesterday'." April 4,  1991 pp. A1.A6. "Ibid., '4Ibid.,  25  candidate, Jim Nielsen, called for selection of the new leader by a universal ballot. He stated that a leadership convention would create a divided party and further suggested that the party could ill afford the $2 million to $3 million cost of a leadership campaign. The party's board of directors sought to preempt the demand from some of the rank and file for a universal ballot by announcing the formation of a committee to study it. They advised, however, that given the required 60 days notice to change the system, no change was possible for the upcoming leadership selection process. The dissidents reacted with comments to the effect that the board of directors was hiding behind the letter of the Constitution in suggesting that the bylaws made no provision for a one member - one ballot system of selecting the leader. When John Reynolds suggested the way to increase interest in the leadership race was a universal ballot, Hope Rust responded with a letter accusing him of promoting disunity and made a pronouncement that there was little public support for a universal ballot.'  5  The delegates were asked for their opinions about a universal ballot in the 1991 convention survey. Table 4-2 provides an analysis of delegate responses to the statement "The party leader should be elected by a vote of all the members of the party, not just by convention delegates." Contrary to the  15 The Vancouver Sun. "Leadership race no 'bloodbath' Rust says: Socreds aware of October election deadline." April 4, 1991 p.B.3.  26  expressed opinion of the party president, the concept of a universal ballot was favored by 58.4% of the delegates while 35.5% were opposed to it (Table 4-2). More than two-thirds (68.1%) of McCarthy's second ballot supporters and less than one-half (49.2%) of Johnston second ballot supporters agreed with the principle of the universal ballot. It would appear that the Johnston camp favored the status quo and felt that it was to their advantage to choose a leader by the traditional delegate/convention process, rather than by means of a universal ballot. To be fair, it is doubtful whether there was sufficient time for the board to implement a universal ballot. Clearly though, they misjudged the degree of support among delegates for a leadership selection process which would enfranchise all party members. The decision by the board to defer the universal ballot appears to have been perceived by the supporters of candidates other than Johnston as another action favoring the Premier chosen by the caucus.  Pre-Leadership Campaign Jockeying by Potential Candidates With the announcement of the date of the leadership convention, potential candidates began to test the wind and jockey for position while the media was full of speculation about who might declare themselves ready to enter the race. Premier Johnston refused comment on her candidacy. Her best known potential rival Grace McCarthy, who had previously announced her resignation from provincial politics after  ^  27  Table 4-2 Views on Universal Ballot by Second Ballot Support (vertical percentages) Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n) Agree^ 49.2%^68.1%^58.4%^422 Disagree^ 43.8%^26.8%^35.5%^256 No Opinion^7.0%^5.1%^6.1%^44 100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^722 Sig. .0000 (n)^368^354^722  28  quitting the Vander Zalm cabinet, hinted that she might reconsider her options. John Reynolds and Forests Minister Claude Richmond indicated that they were weighing the possibility of seeking the leadership. Mel Couvelier who had resigned March 6 as Finance Minister (allegedly over the ex-premier's conduct) suggested that he would prefer to back a more "charismatic" leadership candidate than run himself. Vancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell, a party outsider, was also referred to as a potential candidate. Premier Johnston continued to profess indecision about seeking the leadership. Meanwhile, she capitalized on the publicity which she gained from her day to day activities as Premier. She was centre stage in the inaugural televising of the Throne Speech and introductory speeches of a new session of the legislature. While the opposition was attacking her, Socreds could not mount their individual leadership campaigns without appearing disloyal to their leader and thus giving aid to the opposition. As Canada's first woman premier, "Premier Mom" represented a principle long advocated by the NDP opposition; namely, "women getting to the top".  16  While consistently  declaring her personal indecision over the possibility of seeking the party leadership, Johnston continued her attempt to appear as "Premier". She gathered positive press through her attendance at the Western Premiers Conference and travelled to  Palmer, "'Premier Mom' seems to be a frontrunner" The Vancouver Sun May 23, 1991 p.A.10.  29  Quebec City to visit Premier Bourassa, declaring she needed to gain an understanding of Quebec's constitutional demands. A month after Johnston assumed the office of Premier, Grace McCarthy, running second in the polls, announced her decision not to contest the Socred leadership. She indicated that she would neither support nor oppose any candidate, but pointed to the party's rejection of the universal ballot system for its leadership selection as being one consideration in her decision. McCarthy then pronounced that "it was unfair" to allow an interim premier to run for party leadership." Meanwhile, on April 29, Mel Couvelier hinted that he had been urged by supporters to contest the party leadership and that his backers were trying to gauge the level of his support. Less than a week later, charges of improprieties by Couvelier in communicating information to former premier Vander Zalm surfaced. It was alleged that Vander Zalm requested preferential treatment on an application for the licensing of a trust company, and that Couvelier had advised Vander Zalm that the application was not complete. Couvelier's reputation immediately came under a cloud. Initially, he did not resign as finance minister, the position to which he had been reappointed by Johnston, despite a ruling by the attorney general's ministry that he had violated the confidentiality sections of the Financial Institutions Act. On May 7, he submitted his resignation when asked to by Premier Johnston. Couvelier  "The Vancouver Sun."I won't run, McCarthy says, claiming rules unfair."May 3 1991 p.A1.  30  intimated that he may have been fired as Finance Minister because Premier Johnston did not want him in the Socred leadership race. Johnston responded that the allegations were false and that she was disappointed that Couvelier would make such a charge. An attempt at resolution was achieved a week later when both agreed to refer the question to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman refused to rule on an issue which he deemed to be political. By mid-May Couvelier announced that he had exhausted all options to clear his name and argued that despite his view that the Premier had received poor political advice, "the incident must no longer divide the party".  18  The Early Campaign - A Phony War On May 20, Couvelier became the first candidate to officially enter the leadership race, promising to restructure the party and create a new coalition. In his platform Couvelier proposed fixed terms for governments, free votes in the legislature on all legislation except money bills, provisions to enable a given percentage of the electorate to recall their MLA by petition, and disclosure of all leadership campaign contributions and expenditures.  19  Johnston ended weeks of speculation two days later on and declared her candidacy. With Forests Minister Claude Richmond and Provincial Secretary Elwood Veitch at her side, Johnston  The Vancouver Sun. "Couvelier abandons bid to clear name". May 17, 1991 p.A.1. ''The Vancouver Sun. "Couvelier announces platform Reforms key part of leadership plan May 28, 1991 p.D.8.  31  stated that she would be running on her record as Premier and would be emphasizing two issues in her campaign: law and order, and reform of the parliamentary process. Johnston took one of two planks from Couvelier's campaign in declaring that she supported disclosure of campaign expenditures but opposed disclosure of campaign receipts. Health Minister Bruce Strachan and Government Management Services Minister Carol Gran quickly announced their support for Johnston in her bid for the leadership. 20 On May 30, just a week after Johnston's declaration, Claude Richmond finally put to rest the diminishing newspaper speculation about his candidacy and officially declined to be a candidate. Declaring his support for Johnston, Richmond indicated that it was his feeling that in her performance as Premier, Johnston had demonstrated the capacity to lead the party to victory in the next election. Two other cabinet ministers with leadership aspirations- Education Minister Stan Hagen and Transportation Minister Graham Bruce thought the better of spending the required funds in a futile effort against the well organized and well financed Premier who appeared to be well on the way to a "Coronation".  21  A surprise candidate entered the leadership race on June 5th. Duane Crandall, the MLA for Columbia River, announced that he would enter the race even though his candidacy was a longshot  2 'The Vancouver Sun. "Johnston's in; others wait Two Socred ministers mull leadership bid." May 23, 1991 pp•A.1-2. 21  The Vancouver Sun. "Race? What race?" June 1, 1991 p.8.3.  32  at best. Crandall was one of four backbenchers, who were unhappy with Vander Zalm's leadership and had quit the caucus in the autumn of 1989 to sit as independent Social Credit MLA's. The stated reason for Crandall's candidacy was the lack of a significant number of other candidates and the need for an end to government interference in the private moral decisions of individuals. He pointed to Vander Zaim's ill-conceived abortion and AIDS education policies as examples of his concerns.  22  Delegate Selection Meetings The first of the constituency delegate selection meetings, was scheduled for June 3, some six weeks prior to the July 18-20 convention. The Constitution of the Social Credit Party of B.C. makes no provision for automatic delegate status for M.L.A.s or ex-officio members. Each constituency is entitled to 25 delegates. The youth are represented by 2 to 4 representatives from each of 10 colleges and universities in the province. Since the 1986 election, a radical realignment in the province's electoral map had been effected. The MLA numbers were increased from 68 to 75 and electoral districts from 52 to 75; the latter achieved by eliminating 17 dual-member ridings. The Social Credit Party had originally started preparing for an election in the spring of 1990 by electing constituency executives and selecting candidates for the revised electoral districts. The subsequent realignment of electoral districts  The Vancouver Sun. "Row, new candidate rev up Socred race." June 6, 1991 p.A2.  33  brought about conflict and difficult choices in the determination of candidates. Some sitting MLA's were forced to seek nominations in electoral districts controlled by constituency associations which did not support them. In order to ensure that all sitting MLA's would be delegates, the board of directors passed a special resolution which made provision to afford any sitting Social Credit MLA ex-officio delegate status at the leadership convention. Initially, the delegate selection campaign proceeded very slowly. Three early selection meetings were held June 3. Of the three, the two held in Delta-North and Coquitlam-Maillardville were poorly attended. Apathy dominated. This was a dramatic change for a party with a history of loyal and active members. The Richmond Centre meeting, a Social Credit stronghold in the middle of Vander Zalm's riding, failed to achieve a quorum and had to be rescheduled. Several meetings failed to draw sufficient attendees to choose a full slate of twenty-five delegates. In these constituencies, the remaining delegates were later named by the constituency association executives. According to respondents to 1991 leadership study, more than one-fifth (Table 4-3) of the meetings were attended by fewer than fifty party members, 41.5% were attended by between 50 and 100. Thus in 1991, almost two-thirds (61.8%) of the delegate selection meetings had less than 100 people attending. By comparison, only about one-half that many (35.4%) of the delegate selection meetings in 1986 were attended by such small numbers. The selection of several delegations by acclamation  Table 4-3 Attendance of Delegate Voters at Delegate Selection Meetings 1986^ 1991 %^(n)^%^(n) Less than 50 3.7% 12 21.3% 154 50 - 100 31.7% 104 41.5% 300 101 - 200 33.5% 110 28.4% 205 201 - 300 18.6% 61 7.2% 52 More than 300 12.5% 41 1.7% 12 100.0% 328 100.0% 723  35  was a second striking feature of the 1991 delegate selection meetings. Nearly one-half (46.5%) of the delegates to the 1991 convention were chosen by acclamation (Table 4-4). Again this differed from the 22.2% selected by acclamation for the 1986 convention. For a governing party this apparent lack of interest in the choice of a new leader indicated that the Social Credit Party was experiencing real organizational difficulty.  Yes No  Table 4-4 Delegates Chosen By Acclamation 1991 1986 (n) % % 46.5% 22.2% 69 53.5% 78.9% 258 100.0% 100.0% 327  (n) 336 387 723  As the dispirited campaign limped along, Grace McCarthy decided to pursue a strategy which would see her enter the race late, just as Vander Zalm had done five years earlier. Having asserted twice that she would not be a candidate, she made it clear to supporters that she would only enter the campaign on the crest of a "Draft McCarthy" movement.  23  The McCarthy camp followed the strategy to the letter. Assisted by rank and file apathy towards the leadership options and the imminent coronation of Johnston as leader, many of the party faithful waited anxiously for any indication that McCarthy would enter the leadership contest. On June 22 a Vancouver Sun poll was published indicating that McCarthy was the overwhelming  "V. Palmer, "Socred should thank Grace for draft." The Vancouver Sun June 11, 1991, p.A8.  36  public choice as the best candidate to be the Social Credit leader. Even though she was not a candidate, Grace McCarthy bumper stickers suddenly appeared at a delegate selection meeting in Vancouver Quilchena. During the last week of June, McCarthy announced her intent to run for the leadership. The June 26 delegate selection meeting, held in the Vancouver Little Mountain constituency she had represented for nearly two decades, was one of the best attended in the province with over 600 people present.  24  Norm Jacobsen, the MLA for Dewdney, declared his candidacy on June 27, the last day for nominations, and just two days after having resigned as Social Services Minister. He stated that he would release all the details of his campaign expenditures and promised that his political positions would emerge during the campaign. When pressed for his views on abortion, he stated that abortion was a matter to be decided by a woman and her doctor. 25 The same day, Vander Zaim announced that he would not run because he believed that the media would launch personal attacks against him and John Reynolds ended speculation about his candidacy by announcing that he would not be a candidate. Instead, he endorsed Grace McCarthy.  The Vancouver Sun. "McCarthy 'kick starts' the Socred race. June 27, 1991 pp. A1-2. "The Vancouver Sun. "Five seeking Socred leadership Vander Zaim staying out; Jacobsen enters contest. " June 28, 1991 pp. B1-5.  37  The Real Campaign In reality the campaign began in early July. Norm Jacobsen was endorsed by four MLA's; namely, Women's Program Minister Carol Gran, Caucus Chairman Nick Loenen, Cliff Michael, and Harry de Jong. Carol Gran had previously been one of the first MLA's to endorse Premier Johnston. Thus, her defection came as a surprise. In her speech endorsing Jacobsen, Gran indicated that she was not unhappy with the Premier but felt that "Jacobsen was the best candidate".  26  In contrast to the four MLA's announcing their support for Jacobsen, 17 MLA's - including 14 cabinet ministers declared their support for Johnston. The cabinet members who signed a declaration of support for Johnston were Larry Chalmers, Howard Dirks, Peter Dueck, Russ Fraser, Stan Hagen, Lyall Hanson, John Jansen, Dave Parker, Jim Rabbitt, Claude Richmond, John Savage, Bruce Strachan, Ivan Messmer and Elwood Veitch. The supporting backbenchers were Harold Long, Dan Peterson, and Bill Reid. The two frontrunners, Johnston and McCarthy, chose to campaign in two different styles, delivering two different messages. Johnston chose a rigorous campaign travelling in a jet airplane from riding to riding. She hoped to meet as many delegates in person as she could to emphasize her message, party unity and maintain the status quo. Conversely, McCarthy husbanded her resources and sent a videotaped message to the meetings. She was already known personally by most of the  "The Vancouver Sun. "Four MIA's boost Jacobsen's leadership campaign. "July 3, 1991 pp. A1-2.  38  potential delegates. McCarthy undertook a fund raising drive by telephone, radio, and newspaper to persuade the lapsed Socreds to return to the fold. Well aware that most of the delegates had been chosen, she attempted to recall the halcyon days of Social Credit power when she helped rebuild the party. She emphasized the association of Johnston with Vander Zalm and obtained the endorsement of the backbench Okanagan South MLA Cliff Serwa. Serwa declared that McCarthy's resignation from the cabinet was a principled move and commented favorably on McCarthy's past commitment to the party. Mel Couvelier campaigned on an institutional reform platform with a thinly veiled criticism of party president Hope Rust. He affirmed "I don't think the role of the party president is to report to the Premier...the role of the party is to challenge and stimulate, not preserve and protect the government,"" Couvelier advocated free votes, freedom of information laws, disclosure of campaign funds, recall on petition of 25% of constituents, and reduction of the Cabinet from 20 to 9 ministers. There was little debate about his platform because their was substantial agreement with his diagnosis and prescriptions for reform." Johnston reemphasized her "Law and Order" theme with a promise to increase the number of law enforcement officers. She demanded changes in the young offenders act and an expansion of  "V. Palmer, "Couvelier's plan leaves little untouched." The Vancouver Sun July 10, 1991 p.Al2. "Ibid.,  39  women's victim services. Without mentioning McCarthy by name, she directed a verbal shot at her for not committing herself to run in the next election. "I don't think you can be making statements I'll be boss or nothing," she said.  29  A week before the convention Couvelier received a welcome endorsement from Peace River MLA Jack Weisgerber. Weisgerber cited Couvelier's financial and constitutional experience and the chance to unite the party as the reasons for his endorsement. In the short span of two weeks the leadership race was transformed from a dispirited campaign, in which the coronation of Johnston seemed to be inevitable, into a "horserace" in which it had become difficult to predict a winner.  "The Vancouver Sun. "Face voters Johnston tells McCarthy Premier vows to stay on if she loses Socred race." July 12, 1991 p.A4.  40  CHAPTER FIVE THE 1991 CONVENTION  The party entered the July 18-20 convention with five candidates; two females, Johnston and McCarthy; and three males namely Couvelier, Crandall and Jacobsen. The two female candidates were perceived to be far in front of all the male candidates in the race. Grace McCarthy was the candidate whose entry into the race had created the most enthusiasm. The 63-year-old matriarch of the Social Credit Party and MLA for Vancouver Little Mountain since 1975, attempted to portray herself as the candidate who could be the savior of the party. She would duplicate her actions as a key role player in the party rebuilding and successful return to power in 1975 following its 1972 election loss to the NDP. Unfortunately, she carried the baggage of having been a dissident who never seemed to forget her 1986 leadership campaign loss. Her platform espoused education and a desire to change the system of hospital boards since she opposed many of the boards' rigid anti-abortion stances." Perceived to be close, if not the leading candidate, was Premier Rita Johnston, the MLA for Surrey-Newton and favorite of the "Zalmoids" and the establishment of the party. She entered provincial politics in 1986 after serving an apprenticeship  "The Vancouver Sun. "The Frontrunners: McCarthy in last quest for elusive success." July 18, 1991 pp.31,96.  41  under Vander Zalm in the rough and tumble of Surrey municipal politics. Her positives were her political shrewdness, her reputation for being a team player and her performance as interim premier. Her negative was her close association and unwavering support for Vander Zalm.  31  Johnston campaigned  emphasizing her role as "Premier Mom" and the candidate who could best unite the party. Of the three male candidates, the strongest was considered to be Couvelier, the MLA for Saanich and the Islands. He was a former Mayor of Saanich, a former B.C. Liberal candidate and Liberal party president, the Minister of Finance in both the Vander Zalm and Johnston governments and a candidate for the Social Credit leadership in 1986. Couvelier ran on a platform of fiscal responsibility and reform of political institutions, proposing recall, more citizen participation through referenda and disclosure of political campaign contributions and expenditures. Running behind Couvelier was Norm Jacobsen, a 61 year-old millionaire and owner of a logging company, who had served as an alderman and mayor of Maple Ridge before entering the legislature in the 1986 election. He served as Minister of Labor and Minister of Social Services in the Vander Zalm and Johnston governments respectively. An evangelical Christian, he emphasized ethics and morality in politics, was formally  "The Vancouver Sun. The Frontrunners: Discipline, teamwork key to Johnston's campaign." July 18, 1991 pp. 31, 36.  42  anti-abortion and expected to receive the backing of a fair number of the evangelical Christian members of the party, as well as those searching for an alternative to Grace McCarthy and Rita Johnston. The third male candidate was Duane Crandall, the 44 year-old MLA from Columbia River and one of the four dissident MLA's who left the Vander Zalm caucus to sit as an independent Social Credit member. He regarded himself as a "darkhorse candidate" and ran as a candidate of the new generation, criticizing the previous Social Credit regime for invading the personal lives of the people, particularly in the spheres of abortion and AIDS education. Crandall seemed to generate little support outside of his home constituency.  The Policy Forum Traditionally, the Thursday evening of a leadership convention is set aside to fete the retiring leader. Vander Zalm's decision to visit a sick friend in California during the convention spared the party the embarrassment of having to pay tribute to a disgraced ex-leader. Accordingly, the Thursday afternoon was given over to a Policy Forum. This forum was followed by an evening party. The party afforded the leadership candidates an opportunity to press the flesh and attempt to win over any undecided delegates. During the Policy Forum all the candidates were asked to give responses to the same six questions. These questions were chosen from questions delegates had deposited into a question  43  box. In responding, the candidates restated their campaign positions; the curbing of government spending, the priorities of health care and winning the next election. While there seemed to be little that was contentious or arousing in the responses, a split between McCarthy and Johnston was revealed. McCarthy was booed when she suggested that the Social Credit Party would emerge from the convention united if she was the party leader. Johnston campaign workers jeered, indicating that they believed it was their candidate who could and would unite the party. They perceived McCarthy as a traitor who had abandoned Social Credit during tough times. Entering the convention there appeared to be a greater number of undecided delegates who were open to the influence of the power of personal interaction, and the messages of the Policy Forum and candidates' speeches. Nearly one quarter, (23.5%), of the delegates claimed to have made their first ballot choice during the 1991 convention (Table 5-1). This compares with 18.8% during the 1986 convention.  32  Of survey respondents, 7.2% indicated that the Policy Forum influenced their voting decision (Table 5-2). On the first ballot, McCarthy was marginally the greatest beneficiary of the Policy Forum, obtaining 2.3% of the vote as a consequence of it, as compared to 2.2% for Johnston, and 1.4% for both Couvelier and Jacobsen.  ' = The B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study 1986.  44  TABLE 5-1 First Ballot Votes of Undecided Entering Convention Couvelier Crandall Jacobsen Johnston McCarthy Total (N) Decided Undecided  18.4% 19.2%  1.6% .4%  7.3% 16.2%  34.6% 34.0%  38.1% 30.2%  76.5% 23.5%  Total  18.6%  1.4%  9.4%  34.5%  36.1%  137  10  69  254  266  100.0% 736 Sig. 736^.0011  N  563 173  45  The Candidates' Speeches  The candidates' speeches visibly aroused the delegates and aided the yet undecided. Fully 10.2% of the delegates claimed that the speeches had a significant impact on their first ballot decision (Table 5-2). Rita Johnston gave an excellent speech, slamming the New Democrats and emphasizing her promise of party unity. Mel Couvelier's speech was based upon sound fiscal management with little glitz. Grace McCarthy stressed her role in rebuilding the Social Credit Party after the 1972 election and asked the delegates to give her a chance to repeat the task. Duane Crandall suggested that the party should turn to a new generation for leadership. Norm Jacobsen gave a sound speech, emphasizing the need for strong leadership and ethics in politics. He pointed to his Christian roots stating "Christianity does not detract but adds to a politicians ability to serve".  33  On both the first and second ballots, Johnston received the greatest benefit in terms of delegate decision as a consequence of the candidates' speeches. On the first ballot, 4.0% of respondents indicated that Johnston's speech had affected their vote as compared to 2.7% for McCarthy, and 1.6% for both Couvelier and Jacobsen. Among second-ballot voters, 6.4% pointed to Johnston's speech as a determining factor in their voting decision as compared to 3.7% who cited McCarthy's. Johnston's  "The Vancouver Sun. "Frontrunners both have right stuff to be premier, analysts, delegates agree." July 20, 1991 p.A7.  46  TABLE 5-2 Events Which May Have Affected Change or Decision in Vote Vote On First Ballot Timing^Couvelier Crandall^Jacobsen^Johnston^McCarthy Total^(n) Decided Prior Policy Forum Candidates' Speech Other Total (n)  Timing Decided Prior Policy Forum Candidates' Speech Other Total (n)  14.1%  1.2%^5.6%  26.5%  29.1%  76.5%^553  1.4% 1.6% 1.5%  0.0%^1.4% 0.1%^1.6% 0.1%^0.8%  2.2% 4.0% 1.9%  2.3% 2.7% 2.0%  7.2%^53 10.2%^74 6.3%^46  18.6%  1.4%^9.4%  34.5%  36.1%  137  10^69  254  266  Vote On Second Ballot Johnston^McCarthy^Total  (n)  37.0%  39.3%  76.3%  563  3.9% 6.4% 3.5%  3.3% 3.7% 2.9%  7.2% 10.1% 6.4%  53 74 44  50.8%  49.2%  100.0%  361  339  734  734 Sig. .0004  100.0%^736 Sig. 736^.0010  47  gained a margin of 2.7% greater second ballot support among the undecided as a consequence of her speech. This seems to indicate that her strong performance enhanced her position as the second choice of delegates and contributed to her victory. The conventional wisdom from the outset of the convention was that Johnston and McCarthy were the frontrunners and that it would be either a one or two-ballot selection process. McCarthy's team had tried to position her to win on the first ballot or, at least, to be far enough ahead to assure a second-ballot victory. Publicly McCarthy's organizers had set high expectations for her on the first ballot, estimating a lead of 100 votes. The first ballot results found McCarthy and Johnston in a virtual tie: McCarthy had 659, Johnston 652, Couvelier 331, Jacobsen 169 and Crandall 35 votes (Table 5-3). The anticipated 100-vote lead for McCarthy never materialized and, accordingly, the momentum swung to Johnston. Following the first ballot, Jacobsen released his delegates and refused to commit to any candidate. Then, after some deliberation and negotiations, and to the surprise and anger of many delegates in the Couvelier and McCarthy camps, Couvelier threw his support behind Johnston. The questions which were yet to be answered by the second ballot were twofold: First, how much of Couvelier's first-ballot support could he influence to cross over to the Johnston camp? Second, how much of Couvelier's first-ballot support would ultimately go to Johnston?  Table 5-3 1991 Social Credit Convention Results By Ballot Second Ballot First Ballot (N)^% % (N) 51.6% 941 35.3% 652 Johnston 48.4% 881 35.7% 659 McCarthy 17.9% 331 Couvelier 9.2% 169 Jacobsen 35 1.9% Crandall  _  1846  100.0%  1822  _ -  100.0%  49  On the second ballot, there were 24 fewer ballots cast than on the first ballot. Table 5-4 displays an estimate of the delegate vote shifts on the two ballots based upon the survey results. After adjusting for the smaller number of second-ballot votes, a projected 160 voters who supported Couvelier on the first-ballot vote, joined him in supporting Johnston on the second ballot. Just over one half (167) of Couvelier's first-ballot support switched to McCarthy on the second ballot. As expected, two thirds of the Jacobsen first-ballot support of 169 and a small percentage of Crandall's 35 first-ballot votes swung to Johnston. The balance of Jacobsen's first ballot support and 80% of Crandall's first-ballot vote supported McCarthy on the second ballot. Thus, Johnston polled 941 votes and was victorious by a margin of just 60 votes of the 1822 second ballots cast. With only two candidates remaining on the second ballot, the race had become a zero-sum game. A swing of 31 delegate votes to McCarthy would have meant victory for her rather than Johnston. Thus, for McCarthy supporters, the loss became more bitter and divisive once they realized that they were so near to victory over an element of the party with whom they maintained such ideological differences. Following convention Chairman Les Peterson's announcement of Rita Johnston's second ballot victory, Grace McCarthy gave the traditional concession speech designed to congratulate the winners, placate the losers and allow the party to go forth in unity. During the speech, the delegates from both second-ballot camps were physically occupying two distinctly separate areas of  50  Table 5-4 Delegate Movement Between Ballots 9 FTV  35  22^ Johnston ^ 935 Projected ( 941) Actual  McCarthy 8 FTV 659 Actual Couvelier^4 F 331 Actual  Jacobsen  3 FTV  1  McCarthy887 Projected ( 881) Actual  169 Actual  28  Crandall 35 Actual FTV= Failed to Vote  Origin Johnston McCarthy Couvelier Jacobsen Crandall  Numbers on lines are based on survey percentages  FINAL SHARES by ORIGIN Johnston^McCarthy ( 935)^( 887) 67.9% 2.4% 17.1% 11.9% 0.7%  0.9% 70.9% 18.8% 6.2% 3.2%  100.0%  100.0%  51  the convention floor with a noticeable demarcation line between them. When McCarthy suggested that all unite behind their new leader, many delegates who had supported her, responded with a negative jeer. Later they refused to applaud the acceptance speech of Johnston. Traditionally, the objective of leadership conventions has been not only to choose a new leader but to create unity within the party to enable the party to win an upcoming election. In 1991, a divided Social Credit Party entered the convention. Their hope for reconciliation was transformed to a fatal division.  Couvelier's Role in Selection of Leader Did Couvelier's decision to endorse Johnston influence a sufficient number of delegates to switch their second-ballot vote to Johnston to bring about her victory in the close leadership race. The convention study asked delegates an open-ended question for their comments about the convention. Three-fifths of respondents chose to provide a variety of responses to the question. It is noteworthy that 8.2% of the responses to the question took the form of negative comments about Couvelier's actions in crossing the floor to support Johnston. It is reasonable to assume that the respondents whc expressed negative feelings about Couvelier's action were a representative sample of all the delegates. Thus, approximately 90 delegates had negative feelings about Couvelier's actions.  52  The leadership study also asked whether Couvelier's endorsement of Johnston had any influence on respondents' second-ballot vote. A positive response was received from 7.4 % of the delegates. (Table 5-5). Among this group of respondents, two-thirds supported Johnston on the second ballot, representing nearly 10% of her total support. Given Johnston's total of 941 votes on the second ballot, this result suggests that upwards of 90 delegates claimed "Mel Couvelier's endorsement of Rita Johnston [had] an influence on [their] second ballot vote." Because Johnston won the leadership by a mere 60 votes, Couvelier's action was indeed a defining moment, both in the convention and in the course of B.C. politics. In the very close leadership convention Couvelier became the "queenmaker".  Socio-economic and Institutional Considerations Vander Zalm's victory in 1986 could be explained in part by ideological considerations and partially by socio-economic and institutional variables. The significant socio-economic variable was duration of party membership; the significant ideological variable was populism and the significant institutional variable was the Vancouver Island region. The ideological, socio-economic and institutional variables which were relevant in the 1986 Vander Zalm victory were analyzed to determine which of them were of significance in Johnston's 1991 leadership selection.  "D.E. Blake, R.R. Carty, and Lynda Erickson., (1991) Op. cit. pp.108-110.  34  53  TABLE 5-5 Candidate Vote Based Upon Influence of Couvelier's Endorsement of Johnston. First Ballot Total^(N) Crandall^Jacobsen^Johnston^McCarthy Response^Couvelier 2.2% 7.4%^55 0.4% 0.5% 4.2% 0.1% Yes 34.1% 92.6%^685 8.9% 33.9% 14.5% 1.2% No 18.6% N  138  1.4% 10  9.3%  34.5%  36.2%  69  255  268  100.0%^740 Sig. 685 .0000  54  Regional Support  Region of residence of both the delegates and the candidates have historically been a significant variable in determining delegate votes. Some delegates will vote for a candidate whom they believe to be most sensitive to the needs of their region. Often this translates into a vote for a 'favorite son' candidate who is a resident of the delegate's home region. The 1991 leadership campaign featured two Lower Mainland candidates as second-ballot finalists. Did regional voting patterns play a role in the leadership selection? The answer is an unequivocal yes. Table 5-6 demonstrates that the support for Couvelier, Jacobsen and Crandall was very much "favorite son" support from their home regions of Victoria/Vancouver Island, Fraser Valley/Central Interior and Kootenay regions respectively. Johnston and McCarthy drew support from all regions. Table 5-7 shows that it was the Central Interior, Okanagan, and North Coast regions which provided Johnston with her margin of victory. In these three regions, representing 21.5% of the convention delegates, Johnston obtained the support of 278 delegates (68.3%) as compared to McCarthy's 126 (32.7%). This margin was sufficient to overcome McCarthy's narrow lead in the Lower Mainland and the Fraser Valley, and a somewhat larger margin of support from among the Vancouver Island delegates. With redistribution and the increase in the number of constituencies to 75, the Lower Mainland and Central Fraser Valley were represented by 1004 of the 1878 delegates. The votes  55  Peace River North Kootenay Victoria Okanagan Vancouver Isle. Fraser Valley Central Interior Lower Mainland  Table 5-6 Regional First Ballot Support by Candidate (vertical percentages) Couvelier Crandall Jacobsen Johnston McCarthy Total 6.9 1.2 3.2 2.8 6.9 .3 2.0 .4 3.8 2.3 60.0 4.4 8.5 6.8 7.1 19.1 2.9 .8 3.6 5.4 8.4 1.5 8.9 6.8 7.2 19.8 13.2 7.7 10.0 11.2 5.3 10.0 27.9 9.3 10.0 10.6 10.7 20.0 25.0 13.4 7.2 11.9 20.6 10.0 23.5 44.3 51.2 39.9  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  131  10  68  246  250  705  (N)  Peace River North Kootenay Victoria Okanagan Vancouver Isle Fraser Valley Central Interior Lower Mainland Total (N)  Table 5-7 Regional Second Ballot Support by Candidate (vertical percentages) Johnston^McCarthy^Total (N) 3.0 2.7 2.9 20 5.8 1.8 3.9 27 6.9 7.4 7.2 50 3.3 7.7 5.4 38 9.1 5.0 7.2 50 9.1 13.3 11.2 78 9.1 12.1 10.6 74 15.5 8.0 11.9 83 38.0 42.0 39.9 280 100.0  100.0  100.0  361  339  700  700 Sig. .0001  (N) 20 27 50 38 51 79 75 84 281  705 Sig. .0000  56  from these two regions were divided 524 to 480 (54.1% to 47.1%) in McCarthy's favor. This margin, when added to the McCarthy's 30 vote favorable margin from among Vancouver Island votes, was insufficient to overcome the large margin built up by Johnston among the delegates from the Central Interior, Okanagan and North Coast regions.  Gender Support  On the third ballot of the 1986 leadership race, McCarthy polled a significantly higher proportion of the female vote than her opponents. The female delegates have been outnumbered by the male delegates in the party, but their voting patterns have often differed from the males. Was McCarthy able to repeat in 1991? The short answer is no. Scrutiny of voting patterns by gender (Table 5-8) reveals a decided majority support for Johnston among female voters. The 56.4% of the second-ballot female vote which she garnered gave her a 12.8% margin to outweigh McCarthy's 3.0% second-ballot margin among male delegates who outnumbered females by a margin of more than two to one (68.4% versus 31.6%). Among females, "Premier Mom" apparently capitalized on her service as Canada's first female Premier.  Support by Age  Between 1986 and 1991 the mean age of the convention delegates increased by approximately 5 years to age 50. This  57  Gender Male Female N  TABLE 5-8 Gender Vote By Candidate Second Ballot Johnston McCarthy^Total 48.5% 51.5%^68.4% 56.4% 43.6%^31.6% 51.0% 49.0%^100.0% 366  351^717  (n) 491 227 718 Sig. .0485  58  suggests that the party aged in the five year interval due to failure to recruit younger new members. Age of the delegates also merited analysis to determine whether McCarthy's age and lengthy relationship with the party manifested themselves in terms of voting support among the various age groupings of delegates? Age was not a major consideration in dictating voting patterns (Table 5-9). Johnston won a slight majority of the second-ballot votes from among the more numerous 36 to 75 year old delegates. McCarthy was the second ballot choice by a larger margin among the modest number of delegates who were under age 35 and over age 75. The support for McCarthy from the under 35 age group correlates with her support among the youth of the party, and can be attributed to her support for education.  Level of Formal Education McCarthy campaigned on a platform of increased spending on education. General observations of delegates at the convention left an impression that her supporters were among those with a greater level of education. The level of formal education was significant in the delegates' second-ballot vote (Table 5-10). The party was divided in its voting patterns with those delegates lacking a college education strongly favoring Johnston and the college-educated favoring McCarthy. Voting patterns based upon education correlate with Johnston's rural support base and an affinity with her limited education from those delegates with  59  Age 17 26 36 46 56 66 Over  25 35 45 55 65 75 75  TABLE 5-9 Candidate Percentage of Total Vote By Age Second Ballot Johnston McCarthy^Total (n) 46.9% 53.1% 4.5% 32 44.1% 55.9% 8.4% 59 53.6% 46.4% 20.0% 140 53.2% 46.8% 29.0% 203 49.4% 50.6% 25.1% 176 55.4% 44.6% 10.6% 74 43.8 56.3% 2.3% 16 51.3%  N  359  48.7% 341  100.0% Sig. 700  700 .7860  TABLE 5-10 Candidate Percentage of Total Vote By Formal Education Second Ballot Level McCarthy Total Johnston (n) Elementary School 72.7% 27.3% 3.1% 22 Some High School 67.6% 32.4% 10.3% 74 High School Graduate 57.8% 42.2% 12.5% 90 Post Secondary-Vocational 52.8% 47.2% 14.7% 106 Some College-University 49.6% 50.4% 32.2% 232 University Graduate. 39.8% 60.2% 16.4% 118 Post Graduate Degree 39.7% 60.3% 10.8% 78 51.3% 48.7% 100.0% 720 Sig. N 367 353 720 .0005  60  similar educational levels. Conversely, McCarthy's support base was substantially urban and her platform emphasized educational spending as a priority for the province.  Duration of Membership Duration of membership was a determinant of the 1986 voting patterns of delegates. Grace McCarthy campaigned with an appeal to the long-term members. Hence an analysis by duration of membership was warranted to determine whether the 1986 pattern was repeated. Contrary to expectations and the pattern of 1986, duration of membership made little difference to the 1991 leadership vote (Table 5-11). McCarthy was able to draw her highest level of support from those members who joined the party from 1972 to 1975, the years in which she had an instrumental role in rebuilding the party. However, Johnston out-polled McCarthy among delegates joining the party in every other period, albeit by a small margin.  Role in Party The constitution of the party makes provision for a board of directors comprised of a maximum of twenty members. The convention study received returns from fourteen who acknowledged current membership on the board. Eleven (78.6%) of the fourteen supported Johnston on the second ballot, while McCarthy received the support of just three (Table 5-12).  61  TABLE 5-11 Candidate Percentage of Total Vote by Duration of Membership Second Ballot Date Joined^Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n) 1991^58.6% 41.4% 4.0% 29 1986-1990^51.5% 48.5% 23.2% 169 1980-1985^50.6% 49.4% 23.0% 168 1976-1979^53.0% 47.0% 11.4% 83 1972-1975^45.6% 54.4% 14.1% 103 Before 1972^52.2% 47.8% 24.4% 178 51.1%  N^373  48.9% 357  100.0% 730  TABLE 5-12 Voting Patterns by Role in Party ----Second Ballot Role Johnston McCarthy Provincial Executive 78.6% 21.4% Constit.Assoc Executive 52.0% 48.0% Member Youth Assoc. 37.8% 62.2% Member Women's Auxiliary 69.7% 30.3% Other Party Capacity 46.1% 53.9%  N  285  266  730 Sig. .8307  N 14 383 45 33 76 551  62  It is helpful to contrast the overwhelming second ballot support for Johnston from the small number on the provincial executive, with the voting patterns of party activists serving in other capacities. The members of the constituency associations paralleled the vote of the delegates-at-large, with a slight majority of 52.0% supporting Johnston on the second ballot and 48.0% supporting McCarthy. Members of the youth association leaned heavily toward McCarthy. The nearly 70% vote for Johnston by the members of the women's auxiliary correlates with the strong female support for her on the second ballot. It also reflects the anti-abortion views and evangelical Christian support of the right wing of the party.  Party Issues  The Leadership Study asked delegates for their opinion with respect to the most important issue or issues faced by the Social Credit Party. There was little disagreement between Johnston and McCarthy activists that the two major issues facing the party were those of 'party image/credibility' and 'honesty/integrity' (Table 5-13). The delegates were aware that the various crises of the Vander Zalm regime had strained the party's credibility among the electorate and imprinted a negative perception with respect to the honesty and integrity of the party elites. After agreeing on the two most important issues confronting the party the opinions of the two camps diverged. Johnston supporters rated 'party unity' and concern for the 'next election' as their third and fourth priorities  63  Response Party Image/Credibility Honesty/Integrity Party Unity Leadership Party Renewal Next Election Candidate Recruitment Other (13 differing) No Answer  N  Table 5-13 Party Issues by Second Ballot Vote (vertical percentages)' s Total McCarthy Johnston (n) % %^(n) %^(n) 182 26.0% 97 28.4% 85 23.7% 149 21.2% 78 22.7% 71 19.8% 13.3% 93 34 10.0% 59 16.4% 91 13.0% 61 17.9% 30 8.3% 84 12.0% 58 17.0% 26 7.2% 10.4% 73 34 10.0% 39 10.9% 7.3% 51 33 5.0% 18 9.7% 180 25.7% 91 26.7% 89 24.8% 186 26.6% 81 30.8% 105 29.2% 359  "Percentages add to more than 100% because of multiple responses.  341  700  64  respectively. However, McCarthy activists felt that their third and fourth priorities were 'leadership' and 'party renewal'. The Johnston and McCarthy supporters' third and fourth priorities seemed to be a playback of the respective campaign messages of each camp.  Leadership Selection Respondents were offered 10 possible reasons for their second ballot choice and asked to rate which attributes were "very important" in the determination of their vote. The Johnston and McCarthy supporters differed in prioritizing the attributes (Table 5-14). Of Johnston activists, 47.2% rated her 'personal character' as very important in the determination of their vote. Johnston's 'policy positions' were felt to be very important by 42.1%, with 41.0% citing the importance of her 'ability to unify the party' and 39.3% indicating that they believed that Johnston's 'ability to win' the imminent election was very important in convincing them to vote for her. McCarthy supporters outlined different priorities in their reasons for voting for their candidate. Of the McCarthy delegates, 45.4% felt that her 'ability to win' the next election was a very important consideration in their voting for her. McCarthy's 'personal character' was cited by 43.6% as being very important followed by 40.3% holding a positive view of her 'experience'. McCarthy's 'ability to unify the party' was cited by 38.2% as being a very important reason for their support for their candidate.  65  It would appear that because the delegates held a perception that the party needed credibility, honesty and integrity, they placed a high priority on the positive personal characteristics of both Johnston and McCarthy. However, like the delegates who chose Vander Zalm in 1986, the delegates from the McCarthy camp felt that 'ability to win' the next election was the most important characteristic of their candidate.  Government Social and Economic Spending There was a marked ideological division between the Johnston and McCarthy supporters with respect to their attitudes toward government spending, both in the social sphere and in overall terms. The social spending index is a composite measurement of spending in the spheres of education, welfare, health care and day-care.  36  A zero score demonstrates a view that overall  spending in these spheres should remain at current levels. A negative score indicates a desire for reduced spending and a positive score a desire for increased spending. Johnston activists displayed a clearer predisposition to decreased social spending, with an index of -.1971 (Table 5-15). McCarthy supporters held a view that social spending should be maintained at or near current levels scoring -.0646 on the social spending index.  "For details see Appendix  ^  66  Table 5-14 "Very Important" Reasons for Supporting Candidate Second Ballot Johnston Reason  McCarthy %  (n)  Reason  %  (n)  Personal Character  47.2%  342  Able to Win Election  45.4%  328  Policy Positions  42.1%  302  Personal Character  43.6%  316  Able to Unify Party  41.0%  297  Experience  40.3%  291  Able to Win Election  39.3%  284  Able to Unify Party  38.2%  277  Service to Party  30.3%  218  Service to Party  36.7%  264  Experience  28.8%  208  Policy Positions  36.6%  263  Understands Region  22.7%  162  Understands Region  19.0%  136  Charisma  11.2%  80  Charisma  18.0%  129  Endorsement by MLA  10.9%  77  Friendship  7.1%  50  6.5%  46  Endorsement by MLA  3.3%  23  Friendship  Table 5-15 Spending Attitudes by Leadership Choice Second Ballot Johnston^McCarthy^Total Population Sig. Mean^(n)^Mean^(n)^Mean^(n) Social Spending Index  -.1971  362  -.0646  351  -.1318  713  .0097  Government Spending .1079 Index  350  .2258  338  .1659  688  .0067  67  The government spending index 37 provides a composite measurement of the attitudes to spending in nine categories of government spending; specifically in the spheres of education, welfare, health care, day-care, reforestation, job grants, highways, tourism and public service salaries. Overall the 1991 government spending index was .1659 as compared to the 1986 index of .2265.  38  While, both the 1986 and the 1991 activists  held a positive view toward increased government spending, the 1991 activists were somewhat less inclined in that direction. McCarthy activists demonstrated a disposition to greater overall government spending than the Johnston activists, scoring .2258 on the government spending index as compared to .1079 for the Johnston supporters.  Determinants of Leadership Choice  Table 5-16 moves beyond these bivariate analyses to a multivariate analysis which reveals the variables with a significant independent impact. It points to both region and education as the critical fault lines in the party as it made its final choice. It was the support from those in the North, Central Interior and the Okanagan as well as those with lower educational levels which provided Johnston with her margin of victory.  3  'D.E. Blake, R.K. Carty, and Lynda Erickson., Op. Cit. p.76.  "Ibid.,  68  Table 5-16 Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice Second Ballot Johnston vs. McCarthy Level of Education Okanagan Victoria North Central Interior Constant R Square  -.048 .158 -.170 .241 .156 .714  (3.91) (2.05) (2.00) (2.36) (2.54) (6.64)  .064  NOTE: Table entries are regression coefficients with absolute values of the t-ratio in parentheses. The dependent variable is given with the voters for Johnston scored '1' and McCarthy supporters scored '0'. All coefficients are significant at the .05 level, one tailed. Regional variables are dummy variables with a value of '1' for all delegates from the designated region, otherwise '0'. Gender is a dummy variable with males scored '1'. The duration of membership was scored from 0 to 5 depending on whether the delegate joined the party in 1991, 1986 - 1990, 1980 - 1985, 1976 - 1979, 1972 - 1975, or before 1972 respectively. 39  39  Ibid., 9.110.  69  Unlike the 1986 leadership contest, duration of membership was not a significant variable. Age, gender and income levels were also considered in the analysis but found not to be significant variables.  Summary  The 1991 convention had similarities to and dissimilarities from the 1986 convention. Both conventions featured major candidates (McCarthy in 1991 and Vander Zalm in 1986) who campaigned as outsiders against the party establishment on a platform of party reform. Both entered the campaigns at a late date and emphasized their ability to win the next election while their opponents (Johnston in 1991 and Brian Smith in 1986) supported by the vast majority of the sitting MLA's, played to party unity. However in 1986 the anti-establishment candidate was victorious while the establishment candidate won in 1991. Ironically, the 1986 establishment repudiation became the 1991 establishment ratification (ie. The same people won!) It left Social Credit as it had been in 1986 but with the rifts deepened, and, perhaps, less prepared to lead the changed B.C..  70  CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION The 1991 leadership contest which confirmed Rita Johnston as Canada's first woman premier divided the Social Credit Party of B.C. along multiple rifts. Ideological divisions were not a phenomenon which was new for party. Divisions commenced at the 1986 leadership convention where the delegates were divided in their attitudes to populism, individualism vs collectivism, government spending and government regulation. In the person of Vander Zalm, the delegates chose a leader who ran against the record of the previous administration promising simpler government, more consultation with the people and a return to basic values. What appeared to be his greatest appeal was depiction of his ability to win the next election. In the interests of winning the autumn 1986 election, the party pasted over the ideological differences which were evident in Vander Zalm's decisive convention leadership victory. Subsequent to the election, the party divisions resurfaced with Vander Zalm's questionable behavior and sometimes arbitrary leadership. These actions perpetuated and deepened the party rifts and culminated in the resignation of the two senior ministers, Brian Smith and Grace McCarthy, who represented one ideological position in the party. The actions also ultimately led to the resignation of Vander Zalm who represented the opposing ideological view. While the majority of party supporters viewed Vander Zalm's resignation as being the logical consequence of his ill-conceived personal actions, a significant  71  number of Vander Zalm loyalists continued to see him as a hero as well as a victim of media misrepresentation. Others felt that he was undermined by dissenting internal party forces. Like Vander Zalm, the board of directors of the party demonstrated poor leadership during the period of Vander Zalm's ill-conceived actions by continuously stonewalling critics of the Premier. The decision of the caucus, by a small majority, to choose Rita Johnston to serve as interim leader despite her refusal to give a commitment that she would not be seeking the leadership on a permanent basis became another cause for party division. As interim premier, Johnston was perceived both, to have a preferential position from which to contest the leadership and to be a protege of the disgraced ex-leader Vander Zalm. Grace McCarthy's late entry into the campaign not only precluded a Johnston "coronation" but pitted two protagonists one another. They represented the two opposing ideological perspectives which had divided the Social Credit party since the 1986 convention. The leadership convention itself not only exposed party rifts but became the underlying cause of others. The closeness of Johnston's victory was itself divisive. Couvelier's critical decision to cross the floor to throw his support behind Johnston thus ensuring her victory in the close race became an alienating factor. Ideologically, the McCarthy supporters favored increased public spending particularly in the social sphere while the Johnston camp favored the maintenance of public spending at  72  current levels with a decrease in spending in the social spheres. Regionally, the activists were divided nearly equally between the two candidates in five of the nine provincial regions which were represented by just less than four-fifths (78.4%) of the delegates. Johnston's victory was won in the North, Central Interior and Okanagan regions, while McCarthy outpolled Johnston among Victoria delegates. The level of education of the delegates represented a basis of division of the candidate support. The less-educated supported Johnston while the better-educated supported McCarthy. Rather than heal the party, the 1991 convention perpetuated the rifts which had become evident during the 1986 leadership race and had been exacerbated in the interim. Time had run out in their five-year mandate and the party no longer had the luxury of an extended period to again try to heal the divisions. The election campaign which would be fought in a couple of months would determine whether the party could paste over their differences in the interests of retaining power as they had done in 1986.  A Last Word  The political events which have transpired since the 1991 Social Credit Party leadership convention now cast doubt on the party's very existence. The scandal surrounding Vander Zaim's resignation and the divisive leadership race left many of the  73  more moderate Social Credit supporters uncomfortable in supporting their party in the October 1991 election. The Social Credit party election campaign was fraught with a series of organizational and strategic errors. The NDP were well ensconced in first place in the early polls with a comfortable margin over the second-place Social Credit party and a significant lead over the third-place Liberals. A defining historical moment occurred during a television debate in which the Liberal leader, Gordon Wilson, established his party and himself as a legitimate alternative to the two leading parties and their leaders. Many alienated former Social Credit supporters flocked to support the Liberal party vaulting them into second place in the election won by the NDP. The Social Credit party was driven from power and relegated to third party status. The once powerful governing party won just seven seats in the hinterland of the province. The Liberals displaced them as the party of Lower Mainland and Victoria suburbia and the middle class of the province. The once politically dominant Social Credit party has been reduced to a right-wing rural based third party with limited legislative representation, encumbered by a debt of over one million dollars. Their party supporters will be subjected to the same messages which the Social Credit party preached to the Liberal party supporters during the past four decades: "The province only has room for one free enterprise party. A vote for a third party is a wasted vote that will help elect the NDP". The party's hope lies in its success in changing its bylaws to  74  make provision for the selection of their future leader by a universal ballot and the remaining activist base estimated to number 15,000. What are the party's options? It can continue as a rural-based third party. It would then be subjected to the pressures of losing MLA's to the Liberal party, eventually to disappear from the legislature. It could seek to rebuild the coalition which governed the province for most of the last forty years by moderating some of its more right-wing ideologies and merging with the Liberals under their banner or that of some other B.C.-based party. The party can plod along in the hope that the Liberal party fails in opposition, thus allowing the Social Credit party to displace them as the provincial party of the free enterprise voters. Party financing, debt and patterns of continually increasing Lower Mainland legislative representation at the expense of rural representation militate against the last alternative. Realistically, the most viable option in the foreseeable future for the party is to rebuild the coalition. Thus they would either assert the influence of the official opposition or that of the governing party. For all intents and purposes, the coalition known as the Social Credit Party of B.C. has reached the end of its era.  75  BIBLIOGRAPHY Blake, Donald E. (1985) Two Political Worlds: Parties and Voting In British Columbia. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press _, (1988). "Division and Cohesion: The Major Parties" George Perlin, ed., Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Conventions. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall R.K. Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) Grassroots Politicians :Party Activists in British Columbia. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press Boyd. Denny, It's Bill Vander Zalm's style to stick to denial to bitter end." The Vancouver Sun April 3, 1991 p.B.1. The Globe And Mail."B.C. conflict allegation brought ministers down." March 30, 1991 p.A.5. "B.C. leadership race could open old wounds ex-minister wants Socreds to avoid pitfalls of 1986 convention April 1, 1991 pp.A1-2. "Canada gets first woman premier Johnston sworn in as Vander Zalm resigns over land sale in B.C." April 3, 1991 pp.A.1-2. "Charismatic Premier dominated B.C. life Vander Zalm survived many crises, but defeated himself for not being straight with the people." March 30, 1991 pp.A.1,A.5. "Commissioner dissects Vander Zalm's thinking" April 3, 1991 pp.A1.A4. "Controversy dogged Premier" March 30, 1991 p.A.5. "Deputy Premier is elevated to top B.C. post." April 3, 1991 p.A.4. "Premier tries to avoid talk of Vander Zalm "That book was closed yesterday'." April 4, 1991 pp.A1.A6. "Vander Zalm faces pressure from Socreds to quit now Rumblings turn to roar as caucus awaits conflict report April 2, 1991 pp.A.1-2. "Vander Zalm stepping down Amid Fantasy Gardens probes, B.C. Premier calls for leadership convention." March 30, 1991 pp.A.1-2.  76  Lamb, Jamie. "Vander Zalm's stone unlikely to be rolled away again." The Vancouver Sun March 30, 1991 p.Bl. Palmer, Vaughn. "A tale of two very different Socreds." The Vancouver Sun June 28, 1991 p.Al2. -  "Couvelier's plan leaves little untouched." The Vancouver Sun July 10, 1991 p.Al2. •  "Couvelier remembered McCarthy glitz." The Vancouver Sun July 23, 1991 p.A10.  •  "First round crucial in Socred voting." The Vancouver Sun July 9, 1991 p.Al2. "Four-year-old flop teaches Socreds lesson." The Vancouver Sun June 7, 1991 p.A14. "Honesty was no policy for Vander Zalm." The Vancouver Sun April 3, 1991 p.A.16. "Insiders win preserves the status quo." The Vancouver Sun July 22, 1991 p.A8. "McCarthy launch puts new face on race." The Vancouver Sun June 27, 1991 p.A8. "McCarthy missing as Johnston jets." The Vancouver Sun July 4, 1991 p.A10. "McCarthy's real story between the lines." The Vancouver Sun May 6, 1991 p.A10.  -  "Men trailing in Socred leadership race." The Vancouver Sun July 5, 1991 p.A6.  -  "'Nostalgia' candidate won vision stakes." The Vancouver Sun July 8, 1991 p.A8.  -  "Over to the right is Rita J, the candidate." The Vancouver Sun June 17, 1991 p.A8.  -  "Premier, Couvelier both found wanting." The Vancouver Sun May 9, 1991 p.A.16.  -  "Premier has access to valuable assets." The Vancouver Sun June 6, 1991 p.A10. "Premier leaves office in same manner as he governed." The Vancouver Sun March 30, 1991 p.A3. "'Premier Mom' seems to be a frontrunner" The Vancouver Sun May 23, 1991 p.A.10.  77  -.^"Premier's visit, speech really ho-hum." June 18, 1991 p.A10.  The Vancouver Sun  -^"Reynolds takes on party establishment." The Vancouver Sun June 14, 1991 p.Al2. -  "Rural delegates in political hinterland." The Vancouver Sun July 3, 1991 p.Al2.  -  "Socred bonds not sacred in a scandal." The Vancouver Sun May 8, 1991 p.A.12.  -  "Socred Leadership recipe for rot." The Vancouver Sun June 10, 1991 p.A10.  -.^"Socred race shaping up as ho-hum affair." The Vancouver Sun June 4, 1991 p.Al2. -.^"Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat." The Vancouver Sun April 4, 1991 p.A.10. -.^"Socreds should thank Grace for draft." The Vancouver Sun June 11, 1991 p.A8. -.^"Survey finds fractures worry Socreds." The Vancouver Sun July 12, 1992 p.A10. -.^"Threats, rumors and delegates circulate." The Vancouver Sun July 19, 1991 p.A10. -.^"Vote a make and break Socred affair." The Vancouver Sun May 1, 1991 p.A.12. The Vancouver Sun.,"Apathy out in front in Socred leader race." June 10, 1991 p.B3. -.^"Banning media from Socred vote session a surprise." June 6, 1991 p.B6. "B.C. premier's strongest allies finally urged him to step down." April 3, 1991 p.A.5. -.^"Candidates unveil ambitious policies during campaign." July 19, 1991 p.B6. -^"Christians mourn clause loss, but rally to party." July 19, 1991 p.B8. -  "Circling the bandwagons." July 13. 1991 p.B2.  -  "Conflict of interest idea traced to Plato's writings." April 4, 1991 p.B.3.  -.^"Couvelier abandons bid to clear name". May 17, 1991 p.  78  A.1. •  "Couvelier announces platform Reforms key part of leadership plan May 28, 1991 p.D.8.  •  "Couvelier's bid to take case to ombudsmen fails." May 14, 1991 p.B.1-2. "Couvelier calls on party to 'turn page' on past." June 20, 1991 p.B3. "Couvelier defends move to Johnston." July 23, 1991 p.A7.  ▪  "Couvelier defends passing on Leung data." May 2, 1991 pp A1-2.  •  "Couvelier denies breaking any law." May 8, 1991 p. A.1,6. "Couvelier levels criticism at Johnston's campaign." June 7, 1991 p.A17. "Couvelier questions firing Letter cites race for leadership." May 9, 1991 pp.A1-2.  ▪  "Couvelier Quits Breached act with memos, A-G rules." May 7, 1991 pp.A.1,12. "Couvelier seeks Point Grey support: Only 34 Socreds show at delegate meeting." June 14, 1991 p. B4. "Couvelier sees self as 'ideas' candidate." July 15, 1991 p.B1.  -  "Couvelier vows he'd trim cabinet to nine members." July 8, 1991. p.B2.  -  "Couvelier will hear plea to run." April 29, 1991 p.B.2. "Crandall casts self as darkhorse." July 16, 1991 p.B1.  -  "Endorsements: much noise but little substance." July 13. 1991 p.B2.  -  "Face voters Johnston tells McCarthy Premier vows to stay on if she Loses Socred race." July 12, 1991 p.A4.  -  "Five Candidates vie for hearts and minds of Socred delegates." July 20, 1991 p.A7.  -  "Five seeking Socred leadership Vander Zalm staying out; Jacobsen enters contest." June 28, 1991 pp.Bl-5.  -  "Four MLA's boost Jacobsen's leadership campaign." July 3, 1991 pp.Al-2.  79  "'Free vote' referendum promised Premier pledges to let people have their say." June 18, 1991 p.B1. -  "From village to village, hopefuls hand out goodies." July 19, 1991 p.B6.  -  "Frontrunners both have right stuff to be premier, analysts, delegates agree." July 20, 1991 p.A7.  -  "Johnston-McCarthy split revealed during policy forum." July 20, 1991 p.A9.  -  "Gardens issue dominated B.C. cabinet, Couvelier says." May 9, 1991 p.A.14. "Get in race, premier tells McCarthy: Backbench snipings show intentions, Johnston says." June 17, 1991 p.B1. "Go now, Socreds tell Premier Some party members want the caucus to intervene." March 30, 1991 p.A3. "Gran confirms meeting was to support premier." July 10, 1991 p.B2. •  "Hired political guns gather for Saturday's big battle." July 19, 1991 pp.A1,2. "Hughes paints 'devastating' portrait." April 3, 1991 p.A.3.  ▪  "Hughes piqued by cover-up of call to Petro-Canada boss." April 3, 1991 p.A.3. "Hughes threatened full probe." April 3, 1991 p.A.2. "I won't run, McCarthy says, claiming rules unfair." May 3, 1991 p A.1. "Jacobsen organizer suggests McCarthy support has peaked." July 13, 1991 p.A9. "Johnston called Socred error McCarthy criticizes appointment." May 4, 1991 p.A5.  ▪ -  "Johnston cheered by home folks Couvelier accuses premier of ducking call for TV debate." June 19, 1991 p.A.16. "Johnston confident Couvelier blameless." May 4, 1991 p.A.2. "Johnston's in; others wait Two Socred ministers mull leadership bid." May 23, 1991 pp.A.1-2. "Johnston plans to do a lot of listening." May 13, 1991 p.  80  A.13. -  "Johnston says apology is up to Vander Zalm." April 4, 1991 pp.A.1-2.  -  "Johnston says she's undecided about leadership." May 15, 1991 p.A.16. "Johnston says she will ask Bourassa to meet premiers" May 14 1991 p.A.1. "Johnston supporters get foothold: Three ridings elect delegates who support leadership bid." June 4, 1991 p.A1 Johnston tries to heal party split." July 22, 1991 pp.A1,2. "Johnston unprepared for attack." May 10, 1991 pp.B.1-2. "Johnston won't say whose jet she's using." July 10, 1991 p.Al. "Lam led down Gardens path, secretary says." May 4 1991 p.A.5. "Leadership candidate not looking for a fight." July 9, 1991 p.B1. "Leadership hopefuls to pay $9000 deposit." June 13, 1991 p.A16. "Leadership race no 'bloodbath' Rust says: Socreds aware of October election deadline." April 4, 1991 p.B.3. "Leung again credible, lawyer says." April 3, 1991 p.A.3.  -  "McCarthy bumper stickers debut at Quilchena meeting." June 26, 1992 p.83.  -  "McCarthy finally begins campaigning for leadership." July 5, 1991 p.B2. "McCarthy 'kick starts' the Socred race." June 27, 1991 pp.A1-2.  -  "McCarthy rumors spice up the race." June 25, 1992 p.A2. "McCarthy's poll gives her election nod over NDP." July 18, 1991 p. B7.  -  "McCarthy Socreds' only hope, poll finds." June 22, 1991 pp.A1-10.  -  "McCarthy takes a second look." June 22, 1991 p.A10.  81  -  "McCarthy tour of the interior fails to generate strong shift." July 12, 1991 p.B4.  -  "McCarthy willing to be Opposition leader." July 16, 1991 p.B2.  -  "Moss-covered log cabin is Jacobsen campaign symbol." July 17, 1991 pp.B1,2.  -  "NDP vow to balance budget irks premier." June 3, 1991 p. B10. "New leader had role model Johnston's political career tied to Vander Zalm's from outset." April 3, 1991 p.A2. "Nights and days of the long knives A stroll through the darker side of the Socred convention floor." July 22, 1991 pp.A6,7. "No means no on leadership McCarthy says." June 11, 1991 p.Al2. "One-two political punch dropped McCarthy." July 22, 1991 pp.A1,2. "Petro-Canada confirms land not tendered." April 4, 1991 p.B.1. "Police probe of Vander Zalm dealings come first, A-G. says." April 4, 1991 p.B.l. "Premier's actions-not media-at fault, Hughes says." April 3, 1991 p.A.3. "Premier, Couvelier reach pact on probe." May 10, 1991 p. A.1-2.  ▪  "Premier has his pockets of sympathy." March 30, 1991 p.A4. "Premier Johnston bets on party loyalty." July 16, 1991 p.A14. "Premier mixed role as chief citizen with business, Hughes concludes." April 3, 1991 p.A.4. "Premier quits amid furore: MLA revolt looms over decision to stay until leadership convention." March 30, 1991 pp.A1,A6.  -  "Premier vows to beef up law and order." July 10, 1991 p.Al. "Public has right to know donors, Couvelier says." July 11, 1991 p.85.  82  -.^"Queries focus on Tan Yu, timing and $20,000." April 3, 1991 p.A.4. -.^"Race? What race?" June 1, 1991 p. B3 -  "Religious beliefs keep Crandall in Church." July 16, 1991 p.Al.  -  "Row, new candidate rev up Socred race." June 6, 1991 p.A2.  -  "Scandal, controversy dog premier's career." March 30, 1991 p.A2.  -.^"Seeking unity to save kneecaps." June 1, 1991 p.B3 -.^"Serwa supports McCarthy's bid." July 4, 1991 B.2. -.^"Small Socred turnouts blamed on apathy woes." June 11, 1991. p.A1-2. -.^"Socred bonds won't hold if NDP elected Gran claims." June 5, 1991 pp.A1-2. -.^"Socred cites meddling in morality." June 6, 1991. p.B6. -.^"Socred crystal ball remains cloudy." March 30, 1991 p.A7. -.^"Socred fund raiser draws big crowd in Prince George Grace McCarthy makes video appearance while rival Rita Johnston makes promises." July 5, 1991 p.B2. -.^"Socred leadership delegates told to keep their minds open." June 22, 1991 p.A10.  83  "Speeches a key to candidates' chances." July 19, 1991 p.B7. •  "Style, charisma reduced to dirty words." June 29, 1991 p.B2.  •  "Sun delegate poll gives McCarthy slight edge." July 18, 1991 pp.A1,Al2. "The Contenders" March 30, 1991 p.A3. "The Frontrunners: McCarthy in last quest for elusive success." July 18, 1991 pp.B1,B6. "The Frontrunners: Discipline, teamwork key to Johnston's campaign." July 18, 1991 pp.B1,B6. "Vander Zalm inquisitor has gained wide respect." April 3, 1991 p.A.4.  -  "Vander Zalm loyalist first woman premier Rita Johnston defends Socreds' 5-year record." April 3, 1991 pp.A1-2. "Vander Zalm, McCarthy urged to stay out of race." June 12, 1991 p.B5. "Undecided wait for the speeches." July 19, 1991 p.B7. •  "Young Socreds find zest despite party apathy." June 17, 1991 pp. A1-2.  84  APPENDIX ATTITUDE SCALES The attitude scales utilized in this analysis were derived from a large battery of 'agree/disagree' items plus Likert-type items measuring degree of support for spending increases or decreases in a variety of policy areas and degree of support for increases or decreases in government regulation. Some scales are identical to those used in previous analysis of federal party activists 4 ° or provincial voters 41 The items used to construct each scale are given below. For 'agree/disagree' items, the answer corresponding to the direction in which the scale is scored appears in parentheses. Where a scale item is based on the choice between a pair of statements, the choice corresponding to the direction of the scale is indicated. Those responding in the direction in which the scale was scored for a given item were given a score of 1,0 otherwise. The total scale score for a respondent is the sum of these item scores. The category combinations corresponding to the direction in which the scale was scored are given in parentheses. Further details of scale construction are available on request. Government Spending Index (scored in pro-spending direction) This scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2 to respondents depending on whether they believed that government spending should be substantially reduced (-2), slightly reduced (-1), kept as now (o), slightly extended (+1), or substantially extended (+2). The scores were then summed across nine policy areas then divided by nine to return to the original measurement range. The policy areas were: education, welfare rates, health care, reforestation, job creation grants, highways, tourism, public service salaries, and day-care. Social Spending Index (scored in pro-spending direction) This scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2 respondents depending on whether they believed that government spending in social policy areas should be substantially increased (2), slightly increased (1), kept as now (0), slightly reduced (-1), or substantially reduced (-2). The scores were then summed across four policy areas then divided by four to return to the original measurement range. The policy areas were: education, welfare rates, health care, and day-care.  `'D.E. Blake., (1988). "Division and Cohesion: The Major Parties" George Perlin, ed. Party Democracy in Canada Blake., Two Political Worlds: Parties and Voting In British Columbia, D.E. Blake, R.E. Carty and Lynda Erickson., Op. Cit.  85  Populism (Scale scored in populist direction) 1. In the long run, I'll put my trust in the simple, down-to-earth thinking of ordinary people rather than the theories of experts and intellectuals. (Agree) 2. We would probably solve most of our big national problems if government could actually be brought back to the people at the grass roots.(Agree) 3. What we need is government that gets the job done without all this red tape. (Agree) Collective versus Individual Responsibility (Scale scored in individual responsibility direction) 1. After a person has worked until 65, it is proper for the community to support him or her. (Disagree) 2. The government ought to make sure that everyone has a decent standard of living. (Disagree) 3. Let's face it, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted to. (Agree) 4. Why should the government spend my tax dollars on sick people, my family always put aside something for a rainy day. (Agree) 5. Government regulation stifles personal initiative. or Without government regulation, some people will just take advantage of the rest of us. (Chose first statement) 6. If I do my best, it is only right that the government should help me out when I get some bad breaks. OR Each individual should accept the consequences of their own actions. (Chose second statement) Continentalism (scored in continentalist direction) 1. Canada should have freer trade with the United States. (Agree) 2. Canada's independence is threatened by the large percentage of foreign ownership in key sectors of our economy. (Disagree) 3. We must ensure an independent Canada even if that were to mean a lower standard of living for Canadians. (Disagree) Antiregulation (scored in anti-regulation direction) The scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2 to respondents depending on whether they believed that government regulation should be substantially reduced (2), slightly reduced (1), kept as now (0), slightly extended (1), or substantially extended (-2). The scores were then summed across seven policy areas then divided by seven to return to the original measurement range. The policy areas were: environmental protection, marketing of agricultural products, land use, sale of alcohol, shopping hours, and gambling.  86  Restraint (scale in pro-restraint direction) 1. The size of government in BC even if this means a lower level of public services. (Agree) 2. There should be a law requiring the government to balance the provincial budget. (Agree) 3. Government Spending on public service salaries should be (slightly or substantially) decreased. 4. Regulation of human rights should be (slightly or substantially reduced). 5. Government spending on education should be (slightly or substantially decreased). 6. Government spending on welfare rates should be (slightly or substantially decreased). 7. The restraint program was well intentioned but not well implemented. OR Opponents of the restraint program just could not accept losing the 1985 election. (Chose second statement) 42  'Ibid., pp.137-139.  87  BRITISH COLUMBIA  SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY AND LEADERSHIP STUDY  -1991-  For delegates to the convention to choose a new Social Credit leader and Premier. To preserve confidentiality please DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME on the questionaire.  88  ( 1)  SECTION A: PROVINCIAL ISSUES AND POLICIES The first set of questions deals with current issues in British Columbia. In answering these questions, please keep in mind that it is your opinion that is being asked. There are no right or wrong answers. 1. What, In your opinion, Is the most Important Issue facing the province today?  2. Should government spending be substantially Increased, slightly Increased, remain the same, slightly decreased or substantially decreased In the following areas?  (Please circle appropriate response.) Substantially increased  Slightly increased  Stay the same  Slightly decreased  Substantially decreased  education  DI  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  welfare rates  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  health care  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  reforestation  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  job creation grants  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  highways  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  tourism  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  public service salaries  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  daycare  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  SECTION B: GENERAL ISSUES AND POLICY CONCERNS This section contains a number of statements one sometimes hears about politics in B.C. and in Canada mcre generally. Please select the position which comes closest to your own opinion. 1. Please Indicate whether you AGREE, DISAGREE, or have NO OPINION on the following statements: Agree^Disagree^No opinion The government ought to make sure that ^[1]^[2]^[3] everyone has a decent standard of living. In the long run, I'll put my trust in the simple,^[1]^[2]^[3] down-to-earth thinking of ordinary people rather than the theories of experts and intellectuals. Abortion is a matter which should be decided^[1]^[2]^[3] solely between a woman and her doctor.  89  (2) Social security programs (like old age pensions and family allowances) should be based on family income needs, and people who don't need this type of assistance should not receive it.  Agree^Disagree^No opinion [2] [1] [3]  The government ought to make sure that everyone who wants to work can find a job.  [1]  [2]  (3]  Trade unions should be required to conduct a secret ballot before authorizing strike action.  [1]  [2]  (31  The government should see that everyone has adequate housing.  [1]  [2]  [3]  Public Sector workers have a lot more job security than private sector workers.  [1]  [2]  [3]  During a strike, management should  [1]  [2]  [3]  [2]  [3]  be allowed to hire workers to take the place of strikers. Let's face it, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted to. We could probably solve most of our big political problems if government could actually be brought back to people at the grass roots.  [1]  [2]  [3]  Why should the government spend my tax money on sick people; my family always put aside something for a rainy day.  [1]  [2]  [3]  What we need is a government that gets the job done without all this red tape.  [1]  [2]  (31  After a person has worked until 65, it is proper for the community to support him or her.  [1]  [2]  [3]  B.C. companies should be given preference for provincial government contracts even if the cost is higher.  [1]  [2]  [3]  A lot of welfare and social security programs we have now are unnecessary.  [1]  [2]  [3]  Trade unions have too much power in British Columbia.  [1]  [2]  [3]  ^ ^  90  (3 )  Agree [1]  The size of government in B.C. should be maintained even if this means an increase in taxes  Disagree [2]  No opinion [31  Canada's independence is threatened by the large percentage of foreign ownership in key sectors of the economy.  [1]  [2]  [31  The Senate of Canada should be elected.  [1]  [2]  [3]  The provincial government should negotiate with the province's native population on land claims.  [1]  [2]  [3]  There should be a law requiring the government to balance the provincial budget.  VII  [2]  [31  2. Indicate which position comes closest to representing your opinion : a. Considering the balance of power and responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments, do you think we should: [ ] maintain the present balance [ ] transfer more power to the provinces [ ] transfer more power to the federal government b. Do you believe that people in the various provinces should put less emphasis on their distinctive regional identities and more emphasis on their common Canadian identity? [ ] Yes^[ ] No c. In relation to other provinces, do you feel that British Columbia has received equitable treatment from the federal government? [ ] Yes^[ ] No  3 . Do you approve or disapprove of the following proposals to modify our system of political representation?: Approve^Disapprove^No opinion a. Free votes in the Legislature.  [ 1^[ 1^I  b. Fixed terms and election dates.  [1^[  c. Recall of an MLA upon petition of a percentage of constituents thus forcing a byelection.  I^II^II  91  (4) 4. Please check the statement in each of the following pairs which comes closest to representing your opinion? a. [ ] People who constantly argue against the logging of our forests just don't understand this means fewer jobs and less investment . OR [ ] If preserving our forests means less money for me, then that's the way it has to be. b. [ ] Government regulation stifles personal initiative. OR [ ] Without government regulations, some people just take advantage of the rest of us. c. [ j If I do my best, it is only right that the government should help me out when I get some bad breaks. OR [ ] Each individual should accept the consequences of their own actions. d. [ ] Governments should make a concerted effort to improve the social and economic position of women. OR [ ] Women should help themselves and should not expect governments to make special efforts on their behalf.  SECTION C: PARTY INVOLVEMENT 1. What, In your opinion, is the most Important issue facing the Social Credit Party today? 2. What Is your PRESENT Involvement in the Social Credit Party? (Please check as many as apply to you). [ ] member of the provincial executive [ j member of a constituency association executive [ ] member of the youth association j member of the women's auxiliary f party member [^other (please specify) 3. Did you attend the B.C. Social Credit leadership convention In 1986 that chose Bill Vander Zalm as leader? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 4. If yes to 3, who did you vote for on the first ballot and the last ballot? First ballot^ Final ballot [ Kim Campbell [ ] Mel Couvelier [ ] Grace McCarthy [^Cliff Michael [ ] Jim Nielsen [ ] John Reynolds  [ j Bill Ritchie [ ] Steven Rogers [ ] Brian Smith [ j Bud Smith [ ] Bill Vander Zaim [ ] Bob Wenman  [ ] Brian Smith [ Bill Vander Zalm  92  (5) 5. Which of the following have you EVER done? (please check as many as apply to you.) [ I served as member of the provincial executive [ ] served on a constituency association executive [ ] helped raise funds for the party [ ] worked in a campaign for a party candidate [ ] run for a Social Credit nomination [ ] been a Social Credit candidate in a provincial election [ ] served as a Social Credit M.L.A. [ j attended an annual party convention [ ] member of Social Credit youth organization [ ] member of Social Credit women's auxiliary [ ] previously active in another provincial party [ ] other (please 6. Do you think of yourself as part of the party's central group In your constituency? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 7. When did you Join the Social Credit Party? [ ] 1991 [ ] 1986 - 1990 [ 1980 - 1985 [ ] 1976 - 1979 [ ] 1972 - 1975 [ ] before 1972 8. Did you work for the Social Credit campaign during the 1986 provincial election? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 9. Are you a member of a federal political party? [ ] Yes^[ ] No If yes to 9, which one? [ ] Progressive Conservative [ ] Liberal [ ] Social Credit [ ] New Democratic Party [ ] Reform Party of Canada [ ] Christian Heritage Party [ ] Other (please specify) 10. Which party did you vote for In the 1988 federal election? [ ] Progressive Conservative [ ] Liberal [ ] Social Credit [ ] New Democratic Party [ ] Reform Party of Canada [ ] Christian Heritage Party [ ] Other (please specify) 11. Do you plan to work In the Social Credit campaign during the next provincial election? [ ] Yes^[ ] No  93  (6 ) 12. Did you work for the party you supported In the 1988 federal election?  [ ] Yes^[ ] No 13. If a federal election were held today, which party would you vote for? [ ] Progressive Conservative  [ j Liberal [ ] Social Credit [ ] New Democratic Party [ ] Reform Party of Canada [ Christian Heritage Party [ ] Other (please specify) 14. Please indicate your involvement in local politics. [ ] None  [ ] Just interested ] Actively involved [ ] Have been a candidate ] Have held elected office 15. If elected to serve in local office, to what position or governing body were you elected?  (Please check as many as apply to you.) [ I Mayor of municipality or city [ ] Council of municipality or city [ ] Trustee of public school board [ j Trustee of hospital board [ ] Trustee of parks board [ ] Other (please specify) 16. When were you elected to serve in local office? (Please check as many as apply to you.)  [ ] During years 1990 - 1991 [ ] 1985 - 1989 [ j 1980 - 1984 [ j 1975 - 1979 [ ] 1970 - 1974 [ j 1965 - 1969 [ j Prior to 1965  SECTION D: CONVENTION DELEGATES 1. What constituency did you represent at the convention?  2. Approximately how many people attended the meeting that chose you as a delegate to the convention? [ ] less than 50  [ ] 50 - 100 [ ] 101 - 200 [ ] 201 - 300 [ ] more than 300 3. Were the delegates for your constituency chosen by acclamation? [ ] Yes^[ ] No  94  (7) 4. Who took the Initiative in your becoming a convention delegate? [ [ [ ( [  ] Local party officials ] My M.L.A. ] One of the candidate's supporters ] Friends ] Myself  5. Did you ask other people to vote for you? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 6. Were you identified as supporting a particular candidate before you were elected? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 7. If Yes to 6: Which one ? 8. Did you run as part of a slate of delegates? [ j Yes^[ ] No 9. Did you have any relatives also attending the convention as a delegate? [ ] Yes^[ j No 10.1f Yes to 9: Please indicate the relationship(s).  SECTION E: CANDIDATES AND THE CAMPAIGN 1. Were you actively involved in the leadership campaign of one of the candidates ? [ ] Yes^[ ] No 2. If Yes to 1: Which one? ^ 3. Did you make a commitment to vote for the candidate you supported on the first ballot? [ j Yes^[^No 4. If you made a commitment to vote for a specific candidate on the first ballot, to whom did you make that commitment? [ ] The candidate personally [ ] Your local party organization ] Your local M.L.A. [ ] A member of the party organization [ ] Other (please specify) ^ 5. Was the commitment you made binding after the first ballot was over? [ ] Yes^[ ] No  . 95  ( 8) 6. Please rate how important the following were In determining your first choice? Not important [3]  Candidate's understanding of my region of the province  [11  Somewhat important [2]  Candidate's past service to the party  [1]  [2]  [3]  Candidate's policy positions  [1]  [2]  [3]  Candidate's ability to lead the party to victory in the next election  [1]  [2]  [31  Endorsement of a minister or M.L.A.  [1]  [2]  [3]  Candidate's personal character and integrity  [1]  [2]  [3]  Candidate's ability to keep the party united  [1]  [2]  [3]  Candidate's experience in elected office  [1]  [2]  [3]  Personal friendship for the candidate or someone working for her/him  [1]  [2]  [3]  Personal charisma of the candidate  [1]  [2]  [3]  Very important  7. When did you decide who to support on the first ballot? [ ] When his or her candidacy was announced [ ] When I was selected as a delegate [ ] Between the time of my selection as a delegate and the opening of the convention [ ] At the convention 8. Did you make up your mind for whom to vote, or change your vote because of the candidates' responses at the Policy Forum held on the afternoon of Friday July 19? [ I Yes^[ ] No 9. Did you make up your mind for whom to vote, or change your vote because of the candidates' main speeches to the convention given on the evening of Friday July 19?. [ ] Yes^[ ] No . 10. The Leadership convention was called because of the resignation of Premier Vander Zalm. Various propositions have been advanced to account for the events that led to his resignation..  (Choose the statement which most closely represents your opinion.) Premier Vander Zalm was..... [ I the architect of his own misfortune. [ ] the casualty of actions of dissaffected internal party forces. [ J the victim of media misrepresentation. [ I other. (please specify) ^  ^  ^[  96  (9) 11. Please indicate whether you AGREE, DISAGREE, or have NO OPINION on the following statements: Agree^Disagree^No opinion Professional organizers weaken the role [2] [1] [3] of ordinary members in party affairs. There is too much emphasis on public opinion polls and slick advertising in politics today  [1]  [2]  [3]  In recent years the party leader has been cut off too much from the opinions of ordinary party members  [1]  [2]  [31  [2]  [3]  The party should require 50% of its candidates for election to be women The party has to be careful not to move too far to the right  [1]  [2]  [3]  The party leader should be elected by a vote of all members of the party, not just by convention delegates  [1]  [2]  [3]  Any interim premier selected by the caucus should be an M.L.A. who has no intention of seeking the party leadership.  [1]  [2]  [3]  Constituency associations should be guaranteed a fixed percentage of all donations to the party.  [1]  [2]  [31  12. Should British Columbia enact laws governing party and election finance? [ Yes^[ ] No 13. Should any election expense legislation cover internal party matters like nomination contests and leadership conventions? ]  Yes^[ ] No  14. Should provincial political parties require that all leadership candidates make public the following: a. Names of contributors and value of all campaign contributions. ^Yes^[ ] No b. Statements of all campaign expenditures. [ ] Yes^[^No  • 97  (1o) SECTION F: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1. [ ] Male^J Female 2. Year of Birth: 3. Place of Birth: [ ] British Columbia [ ] Other Canadian province or territory [ ] Country other than Canada (please specify) 4. Length of residence in British Columbia:: [ ] Less than 1 year [ j 1 to 5 years [ ] 6 to 10 years [ j 11 to 15 years [ ] 16 to 20 years [ j over 20 years 5. Employment status: [ ] self-employed [ ] employed full-time [ ] employed part-time [ j unemployed ( J employed in the home/homemaker [ ] retired [ ] student [ ] other (please specify) 6. Briefly, how would you describe your present or pre-retirement occupation? ( For example: chartered accountant with a small logging company, or floor manager in a large department store.)  7. What would you estimate your total before-tax household Income to be this year?  ^ [ ] less than 610,000 [ 1 50,000 to 74,999 ^ [ j 510,000 to 19,999 ] 75,000 to 99,999 ^ [ ] 20,000 to 34,999 [ ] $100,000 and over [ ] 35,000 to 49,999 8. What is your religious affiliation?  9. Amount of formal education: [^elementary school [ I some high school [ ] high school graduation [ ] post sec. technical/vocational  [ I some college or university  ] university graduation [ ] post-graduate university degree  . 98  (11)  SECTION G: THE LEADERSHIP CONVENTION 1. What was the single most important factor in your decision for whom to vote on the first ballot?  2. Which candidate did you vote for on the first ballot? [ ] Mel Couvelier [ ] Duane Crandall [ ] Norm Jacobsen [ ] Rita Johnston [ ] Grace McCarthy 3. Which candidate did you vote for on the second ballot? [ ] Rita Johnston [ ] Grace McCarthy 4. If you changed your vote between the first and second ballots, what was the main factor In your decision for whom to vote on the second ballot?  5. Did Mel Couvelier's endorsement of Rita Johnston have any influence on your second ballot vote? [ ] Yes^[ ] No  6. Do you have any other comments about the convention?  Thank you very much for your contribution to this study. Please return the questionnaire in the stamped envelope provided or mail directly to :Social Credit Leadership Campaign Survey, Department of Political Science,C472 - 1866 West Mall, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 121  

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