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William Vander Zalm to Rita Johnston : the 1991 leadership choice of the Social Credit Party of British… Schmidt, Kenneth J. 1993

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WILLIAM VANDER ZALM TO RITA JOHNSTON: THE 1991 LEADERSHIPCHOICE OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAbyKENNETH J. SCHMIDTA THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Political ScienceWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAAugust 1993© Kenneth J. Schmidt 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department ofAh IT- WI^-)Cte:HCz. The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate^(--1:4;,- 16, Yy-,3DE-6 (2/88)iiABSTRACTThe traditional objectives of leadership conventions havebeen two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second,the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well asunification of them behind the newly chosen leader.This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selectionprocess with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention.The study draws upon data and written material with respect tothe 1986 leadership convention, but primarily informationgathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes ofthe nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention aswell as newspapers and personal observation and interviews withattendees.It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed toachieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However,entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerousrifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership conventionand since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991leadership convention closed the party was more divided than whenthe year's leadership politics had begun.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT^  iiTABLE OF CONTENTS^ iiiLIST OF TABLES  vACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viiINTRODUCTION^  1CHAPTER ONESURVEY METHODOLOGY^  3CHAPTER TWOTHE CHOICE IN 1986  6CHAPTER THREETHE VANDER ZALM REGIME - A REGIME OF CONTROVERSY ANDDIVISION^  12- Premier Vander Zalm - Hero or Victim? ^ 15CHAPTER FOURTHE INTER-REGNUM OF RITA JOHNSTON^  18- A Divided Caucus Chooses  18- Interim Leader Selection  20- Chronology^  23- Leadership Convention or Universal ballot^ 24- Pre-leadership Campaign Jockeying by PotentialCandidates  26- The Early Campaign - A Phony War^ 30- Delegate Selection Meetings  32- The Real Campaign^  37CHAPTER FIVETHE 1991 CONVENTION  40- The Policy Forum^  42- The Candidates' Speeches^  45- Couvelier's Role in Selection of Leader^ 51- Socio-economic and Institutional Considerations ^ 52- Regional Support^  54- Gender Support  56- Support by Age  56- Level of Formal Education^  58- Duration of Membership  60- Role in Party^  60- Party Issues  62- Leadership Selection^  64- Government Social and Economic Spending^ 65- Determinants of Leadership Choice^ 67- Summary^ 69CHAPTER SIXCONCLUSION  70-A Last Word^  72ivBIBLIOGRAPHY^ 75APPENDIX 84- ATTITUDE SCALES ^ 84- 1991 SURVEY 87LIST OF TABLESTable 1-1^Leadership Choice of Respondents Compared to Thatof Convention Delegates.Table 5-10Table 5-111986 Social Credit Convention Results.Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice.Views on Abortion by Second Ballot Support.Activists' Perspective of Vander Zalm by Cause.Views on Interim Leader Issue by Second BallotSupport.Views on Universal Ballot by Second BallotSupport.Attendance of Delegate Voters at DelegateSelection Meetings.Delegates Chosen by Acclamation.First Ballot Votes of Undecided EnteringConvention.Events Which May Have Affected Change or Decisionin Vote.1991 Social Credit Convention Results by Ballot.Delegate Movement Between Ballots.Candidate Vote Based Upon Influence of Couvelier'sEndorsement of Johnston.Regional First Ballot Vote by Candidate.Regional Second Ballot Vote By Candidate.Gender Vote by Candidate - Second BallotCandidate Percentage of Total Vote by Age - SecondBallot.Candidate Percentage of Total Vote By FormalEducation - Second Ballot.Candidate Percentage of Total Vote by Duration ofMembership - Second Ballot.Table 2-1Table 2-2Table 3-1Table 3-2Table 4-1Table 4-2Table 4-3Table 4-4Table 5-1Table 5-2Table 5-3Table 5-4Table 5-5Table 5-6Table 5-7Table 5-8Table 5-9Table 5-12Table 5-13Table 5-14Table 5-15Table 5-16viVoting Patterns By Role In Party - Second Ballot.Party Issues by Second Ballot Vote."Very Important" Reasons For Supporting Candidate.- Second Ballot.Spending Attitudes By Leadership Choice - SecondBallot.Multiple Determinants of Leadership Choice -Second Ballot.vi iACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis thesis could not have been completed without theassistance of many others. First, I wish to thank William P.J.McCarthy for his advocacy role to obtain the support of theSocial Credit Party Board of Directors which enabled me to surveythe convention delegates.I would also like to thank the Department of PoliticalScience for their support and particularly the head, Donald Blakewhose advice and assistance which helped to make this thesisbetter than it would otherwise have been. My greatest debt ofgratitude is owed to my advisor Ken Carty gave assistanceunsparingly. He made the the printing and mailing of the surveypossible. He shared his experience, knowledge, time and offeredme critical suggestions and advice. I am fully aware that hisassistance went far beyond that called for by his role. I amgrateful beyond what I am able to express in these few words.Finally, I would like to thank my family: Gwen, Paul, Patand Mark for their support and understanding.1INTRODUCTION"A house divided against itself cannot stand."Abraham Lincoln, 1868.Those who follow British Columbia politics would generallyagree that the era in which William Vander Zalm served aspremier was charged with controversy. Many of thesecontroversies were rooted in the acts of the Premier and thecondoning of them by the caucus, the Social Credit partypresident and the board of directors. At times Vander Zalmseemed capable of asserting an unhealthy degree of control overall these groups and individuals.A limited degree of disagreement and tension was not a newphenomenon to the party which was, by its very genesis prone todisagreement. The Social Credit Party of British Columbia was adisparate coalition of right-of-centre constituents whose commonnexus was an ideological claim to represent the provincial freeenterprise vote and a commitment to thwarting the election ofthe Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and later the NewDemocratic Party (NDP). Playing on the consequences of aleft-wing NDP government had traditionally been a sufficientlypowerful force to bridge and assuage any differences which mighthave arisen within the Social Credit Party.The divisions within the party became both more numerousand more open with the election of Vander Zalm as party leaderand premier in 1986. Not even Vander Zaim's 1991 resignation,2followed by the reaffirmation of the interim leader as premierand leader at a subsequent leadership convention, was sufficientto unify the party. Rather, the forced resignation of VanderZalm, the subsequent leadership race and convention, with allthe attendant media coverage, exposed the party's divisions topublic scrutiny and exacerbated the underlying and overtdivisions.This turn in the party's character and fortunes aftereasily dominating B.C. politics for four decades poses questionswhich warrant study.Namely, with a record of unity spanning four decades duringwhich the party changed the leadership twice and won thirteen offourteen provincial elections, was the leadership conventionsuccessful in maintaining party unity? How did the Social CreditParty divide in choosing a new leader in 1991? Were thedivisions based upon ideological considerations? Was personalitya major factor in dictating the cleavages? Did the party dividealong regional or socio-economic lines or did the divisionscross the party organization?In search of solutions to these questions, we will turn toanalysis of delegate behavior utilizing survey data gathered inSocial Credit Party and Leadership Studies of the 1986 and 1991leadership conventions.3CHAPTER ONESURVEY METHODOLOGYThe 1991 B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study wasgenerated from data collected from a questionnaire mailed toevery delegate on the 1991 Social Credit Party of BritishColumbia delegate list. The questionnaire, mailed Sept 25th, wasaccompanied by an explanatory letter from the initiators as wellas a letter from the president of the Social Credit Partyadvocating its completion by delegates. The list of 1878delegates was comprised of up to 25 delegates from each of the75 constituencies plus an additional 28 delegates whorepresented 10 of the province's universities and juniorcolleges. A reminder notice was mailed on Oct. 28, urging anydelegates who had not yet completed and mailed their survey todo so. Twenty three of the questionnaires were returned asundeliverable or due to incorrect addresses. Thus of the totalsample numbering 1855, 749 questionnaires were completed andreturned for a response rate of 40.4%. A copy of the 1991questionnaire is included in the Appendix.The questionnaire replicated many of the questions of a1986 B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study carried outby D.E. Blake, R.K. Carty and Lynda Erickson. The survey resultsof that study was published in their book Grassroots Politicians: Party Activists in British Columbia.As Table 1-1 demonstrates, both the first and second ballotpreferences of the 1991 survey respondents closely replicate4TABLE 1-1Leadership Choice of RespondentsCompared To That of Convention DelegatesFirst BallotRespondents^All DelegatesSecond BallotRespondents^All DelegatesCouvelier 18.8% 139 17.9% 331Crandall 1.3% 10 1.9% 35Jacobsen 9.3% 69 9.2% 169Johnston 34.4% 256 35.3% 652 50.9% 374 51.6% 941McCarthy 36.2% 268 35.7% 659 49.1% 361 48.4% 881No Answer 8 14(N) 749 1,846 749 1,8225those of the convention delegates.In order to explore possible relationships between thevoting patterns of the delegates and variables, chi-square testof the independence of variables was used. Also, multipleregression was performed to determine the weighting thatsignificant variables had as determinants of the delegates'choices. In both the chi-square and regression the criticalvalue of less than .05 was considered to be significant.6CHAPTER TWOTHE CHOICE IN 1986 The 1986 convention was called because of the resignationof Premier William Bennett. Bennett announced that he wasresigning for personal reasons after serving as Premier foreleven years and leader of the party for nearly fourteen.Students of B.C. politics believed that Bennett had access topolls indicating that he would have a difficult time winningreelection in the aftermath of the severe restraint programwhich he implemented in the early 1980's.The 1986 convention's twelve candidates represented thelargest number in Canadian provincial political history. Sevenwere members of the existing cabinet or caucus namely, GraceMcCarthy, Cliff Michael, Jim Nielsen, John Reynolds, BillRitchie, Steven Rogers, and Brian Smith. Bob Wenman was aProgressive Conservative MP for the Fraser Valley who had servedas a Social Credit MLA during the W.A.C. Bennett years. BillVander Zalm had left provincial politics in 1983 to return toprivate business. Vander Zalm had served in three portfolios andleft government with a reputation for lacking 'team spirit'. KimCampbell and Bud Smith had served in the Premier's office andMel Couvelier had considerable exposure to civic politics.Despite the large number of candidates, it was apparentearly in the race that the contest would be fought betweenMcCarthy, the two Smiths and Vander Zalm.McCarthy ran as the savior of the party and was in thecampaign from the onset. Both Brian Smith and Bud Smith ran oncampaigns that identified them with the retiring premier. BrianSmith's appeal was that of the experienced cabinet minister andparty insider. Bud Smith portrayed himself as a man withknowledge in running government but with a new face in terms ofcontesting an election. Vander Zalm entered the leadership racejust five weeks before convention. He ran a populist campaignpromising simpler government, more consultation with people andreturn to basic values. His campaign, centered on his ownpersonality, had an anti-establishment cast designed to bypassparty elites and appeal directly to delegates. He was opposed bymost of the MLA's who were in the Smith camp on last ballot. 1The runoff from among twelve candidates necessitated fourballots and presented considerable opportunity for strategicvoting. The victorious Vander Zalm led on each ballot andquickly developed momentum which swept him to a win with 63.8%of the delegate votes (Table 2-1).While most of the minor candidates typically won supportfrom their home constituency, the support for each of three ofthe leading candidates was rooted in their home regions. Almostone-half (47.5%) of Brian Smith's first ballot support came fromVancouver Island; Grace McCarthy attracted 52.5% of her firstballot support from among delegates of the Lower Mainland, herhome region; Kamloops resident Bud Smith polled well amongInterior and North/Peace River delegates. The exception was'D.E. Blake, R.E. Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) Grassroots Politicians:Party Activists in BritishColumbia. pp. 100-102.8Table 2-11986 Social Credit Convention ResultsBallot Number1^2^3 4Candidate Votes^% Votes^% Votes % Votes^%Vander Ulm 367 28.4 457 35.7 625 49.1 801 63.8Brian Smith 196 15.1 255 19.9 342 26.9 454 36.2McCarthy 244 18.9 280 21.9 305 24.0Bud Smith 202 15.6 219 17.1Reynolds 54 4.2 39 3.0Nielsen 54 4.2 30 2.3Rogers 43 3.3Wenman 40 3.1Michael 32 2.5Ritchie 28 2.2Couvelier 20 1.5Campbell 14 1.1Total 1294 100.0 1280 100.0 1272 100.0 1255 100.0Source: D.E.Blake, R.N. Carty and Lynda Erickson (1991) p.101.9Vander Zalm. On the first ballot he drew support from nearlytwo-thirds of the constituencies. 2 Vander Zalm's lack of anydistinctive regional base allowed him to attract secondpreferences from all regions while Brian Smith and McCarthy'sgrowth potential was more restricted by the nature of theirdelegate support bases. 3In 1986, the Social Credit activists were clearly dividedalong ideological lines. On a series of ideological scales Blakeet. al. found that the differences were significant on everymeasurement score except continentalism. Vander Zalm's supporterswere more individualistic, more populist, more pro-restraint andmore anti-regulatory than the Smith supporters on the finalballot. 4Of these ideological differences only populism finallyplayed a significant role in determining the delegates' choices.Table 2-2 summarizes a regression analysis indicating how much ofthe Brian Smith and Vander Zalm delegate characteristics weredeterminants of the third and fourth ballot outcomes. Smith'sVancouver Island base drew votes for him. As the duration of adelegate's membership in the party increased so did thelikelihood that the delegate would support Vander Zalm.'Vander Zalm and his outsider supporters won the battle overthe insiders grouped behind Brian Smith. Vander Zalm's populist'Ibid., p.102.'Ibid., p.102.'Ibid., p.107.'Ibid., p.110.1 0Table 2-2Multiple Determinants of Leadership ChoiceVander Ulmvs.Brian SmithTHIRD BALLOTDuration of partymembership^ .08 (2.46)Populism .16 (3.55)Vancouver Island^ -.54 (5.51)Constant^ .14 (0.95)R2^ .35FOURTH BALLOTDuration of partymembership^ .08 (2.64)Populism .16 (3.81)Vancouver Island^ -.41 (4.54)Constant^ .12 (0.99)R2^ .30NOTE:Table entries are regression coefficients with absolute values of thet-ratio in parentheses. The dependent variable in each model is given in thecolumn heading with votes for the first candidate named scores '1' and theother candidate supporters scored '0'. All coefficients are significant at the.05 level, one tailed. Regional variables are dummy variables with the value'1' for all delegates from the designated region, '0' otherwise. Male vs.female is a dummy variable with males scored '1'. The populism andcontinentalism variables use scores from attitude scales described in theAppendix. The duration of membership is scored from 1 to 5 depending onwhether the delegate joined the party in 1986, 1980-5, 1975-9, 1972-5, orbefore 1972 respectively.Source: D.E. Blake, R.K Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) p.110.11approach promised a style of government with which many of theold-time members were familiar. Many found this style ofpolitics attractive, for it was the party norm during the W.A.C.Bennett era. 6However, in the interests of finding leadership which wouldbring immediate electoral success in the upcoming election, thedelegates pasted over ideological divisions only to have thedivisions resurface in the ensuing years.°Ibid., p.111.12CHAPTER THREETHE VANDER ZALM REGIME - A REGIME OF CONTROVERSY AND DIVISIONIn the autumn of 1986, Premier Vander Zalm followed hisleadership win by leading the party to a healthy majority in theprovincial election. However, it was not long until Vander Zalmstarted to become involved in controversial actions which placedstrains on the apparent unity demonstrated by the party duringthe election campaign.'Among the litany of controversies were his manner ofdealing with conflict of interest controversies of three membersof his Cabinet; his meddling to extend the bidding process onthe tender for the sale of Expo Lands to benefit a friend,culminating in the cabinet resignations of his two principalrivals in the 1986 leadership race, Attorney General Brian Smithand Grace McCarthy; the resignation of four backbenchers to sitas independent Social Credit MLA's citing unhappiness with thePremier's leadership; the overruling at the cabinet level ofEnvironment Minister John Reynolds' proposed pollutionrestrictions on the pulp and paper industry which led to hisresignation. Another controversial action involved Vander Zalmplacing his personal religious convictions and those of a smallgroup of his avid supporters (known in political circles as"Zalmoids") above the interests of the public at large.Specifically he disallowed government funding of therapeuticabortions. Vander Zalm eventually submitted to public pressureThe Vancouver Sun "Scandal, controversy dog premier's career" March 30, 1991 p.A.2.13and revoked the proposed ban on abortion funding. Vander Zaim'srevocation of the abortion ban silenced this vociferous, butsignificant, element of the Social Credit Party who viewed theparty as a vehicle to promote their anti-abortion views. Despitethe apparent silence and lack of overt conflict after thepremier's revocation of the ban, abortion policy continued to bea covert divisive consideration in the selection of the partyleader.The Social Credit Party and Leadership Study solicited theopinions of convention delegates to the statement "Abortion is amatter which should be decided solely between a woman and herdoctor". Table 3-1 provides an analysis of second ballotsupporters' views on the subject. Overall, the second ballotdelegates supported abortion rights by a seven to three margin.However the support for abortion rights among Johnston activistswas slightly more than three to two (59.65 to 36.0%) while theMcCarthy activists support was a margin in excess of four to one(78.0% to 17.8%). Although no longer a public issue, it can beconcluded from the survey results that, in the privacy of thevoting booth, abortion rights continued to be a basis for acleavage within the party.The fractious Vander Zalm governing era culminated in thePremier's personal involvement in conflict of interest actions.Vander Zalm used the power of the office of premier to assist inthe sale of his major real estate holding, Fantasy Gardens.Lacking an understanding of the nature of his conflict ofinterest, Vander Zalm asked former Justice E.N. Hughes to14Table 3-1Views on Abortion Rights by Second Ballot Support(vertical percentages)Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n)Agree^ 59.4% 78.0% 68.6%^502Disagree 36.0%^17.8%^27.0%^198No Opinion^4.6% 4.2% 4.4% 32^100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^732Sig. .0000(n)^372^360^73215investigate the allegations with respect to his involvement inthe sale. 8On March 28, four days before the scheduled publication ofthe Hughes Report, Premier Vander Zalm announced that he wouldbe asking the party, to hold a leadership convention. Whileindicating that he planned to consult with caucus and theexecutive of the party he also expressed an intention to serveas Premier until his successor was chosen. However, his formalresignation was deferred until the day the Hughes Report wasbrought down.Premier Vander Zalm - Hero or Victim? Despite his subsequent April 2 resignation, allegiances andperceptions of ex-Premier Vander Zalm continued to haunt anddivide the Social Credit Party. From Table 3-2 we can ascertainthe attitudes of activists both about the ex-premier's actionsprior to his resignation and the reasons for his resignation.Fully 77.3% of all activists felt that Vander Zalm'sproblems were of his own making. However, only 42.4% of theactivists who agreed with this statement were Johnstonsupporters as compared to 57.6% from the McCarthy camp. Therewas a strong sense among Johnston supporters that Vander Zalmwas a victim of both internal party forces and mediamisrepresentation. While only 17.9% of all the respondents feltPalmer, V., "Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat" The Vancouver Sun April 4, 1991 p.A.10.16that Vander Zalm had been undermined and had become a victim ofinternal party actions more than four-fifths (82.3%) of thosewho felt this way were Johnston second ballot supporters. Onlyslightly more than a quarter, or 27.3% of respondents, perceivedVander Zalm as a victim of media misrepresentation. However, anoverwhelming three-quarters (74.2%) of those who viewed VanderZalm as a media casualty were Johnston supporters with 25.8%supporting McCarthy. Rita Johnston's close association withVander Zalm was reflected in her supporters perspectives of him.The divisions engendered by the 1986 leadership contest andmore numerous controversies and rifts engendered by the VanderZalm leadership would become driving forces in the caucusselection of the interim leader and the subsequent leadershipconvention. The impact of these divisions on the leadershipselection will be explored more closely in Chapters Four andFive.17TABLE 3-2Activists' Perspective of Vander Zalm by CausePremier Vander Zalm was..Second BallotJohnston^McCarthy^A119 (n)..architect of own misfortune. 42.4% 57.6% 77.3% 561..casualty of disaffected internal party. 82.3% 17.7% 17.9% 130..victim of media misrepresentation. 74.2% 25.8% 27.3% 198...other. 45.0% 55.0% 2.8% 20Sig.N 504 408 909 .0000Percentages add to more than 100% because of multiple responses.18CHAPTER FOURTHE INTER-REGNUM OF RITA JOHNSTONA Divided Caucus Chooses The tabling of the Hughes Report on the morning of April 2set the process of leadership selection into motion. FormerJustice Hughes concluded unequivocally that Premier Vander Zalmwas in breach of the government conflict of interest guidelines.The Premier announced to the afternoon caucus meeting that hewas stepping down. Caucus promptly passed a resolution (whichhad been in preparation for weeks) to accept Vander Zalm'sresignation. This, in turn, was followed by the passing of aresolution declaring the leadership open. A third resolution wasadopted setting out the procedures for a secret ballot by thecaucus to choose a new party leader.At that stage there was a principled debate on an issuethat would subsequently divide the party throughout theleadership campaign. Some MLA's wanted a new leader to agree toserve only for the interim period until the convention. TheseMLA's also felt that to avoid any unfair advantage the interimleader should be precluded from running in the leadershipcampaign. Ultimately, the opposing view prevailed. The decisionwas predicated on the premise that caucus should not tie the newleader's hands with respect to calling an election given the fewmonths remaining in the government's mandate. In the unlikelyeventuality that prior to a leadership convention, events orconditions unfolded such that the party felt an election could19be called and won, the caucus was prepared to have the interimleader lead them into such a campaign.The voting patterns for the interim leader were indicativeof the opposing views within the caucus on the principle. RussFraser, an MLA who had openly disavowed any intention to seekthe leadership, and Rita Johnston who indicated that she was notprepared to rule herself out of seeking the leadership in theupcoming campaign, were the first two nominees. There were fourother nominees; namely Mel Couvelier, Elwood Veitch, NormJacobsen, and Claude Richmond. Veitch and Couvelier werecasualties of the first ballot drawing just two votes each. Withfour votes, Jacobsen was dropped on the second ballot. The thirdballot resulted in a near three way tie, but as low man, ClaudeRichmond dropped out leaving Fraser and Johnston. Voting on thefourth ballot revealed a division between Vander Zalm-critics,as represented by Fraser, and Vander Zalm-supporters gatheredbehind Rita Johnston. The balance of power in caucus wasrevealed with the results of the fourth ballot - Johnston 21,Fraser 17. 10The vote was verified and all members of the caucus signeda resolution committing themselves to support Mrs. Johnston andgiving their assurance that she would have the confidence of amajority of the legislature. Later that afternoon, the caucuschairman Nick Loenen met with Lieutenant Governor David Lam to'°Palmer, V., "Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat" The Vancouver Sun April 4, 1991 p.A.10.20provide him with the resolutions and a motion of endorsementfrom the Social Credit board of directors. Having receivedVander Zalm's resignation, as well as clear evidence thatJohnston had the support of the majority party in thelegislature, the Lieutenant Governor called upon Johnston toform a government. Early that evening, Rita Johnston took theoath of office as Premier of B.C. As the 28th premier of theprovince, she was also the first woman to hold the post ofpremier in Canadian history." The caucus alignments whichdeveloped in Johnston's selection as interim premier wouldbecome the basis of a broadened cleavage within the party as theleadership selection campaign unfolded.Interim Leader SelectionThe 1991 Study solicited the opinion of the conventiondelegates concerning the caucus decision to choose an interimleader. Table 4-1 provides an analysis of opinions of thedelegates in response to the statement "Any interim leaderselected by the caucus should be an MLA who has no intention ofseeking the leadership."The caucus's decision to choose Johnston over Fraser asinterim leader ultimately became a very divisive action withinthe party. Nearly seven in ten (69.4%) of the Johnston secondballot supporters felt the choice of an interim leader who wouldbe contesting the leadership was appropriate while a near equal"Ibid.,21percentage of 65.4% of the activists who supported McCarthy wereopposed to the decision. McCarthy supporters perceived thedecision as an action which provided Johnston with a position ofpower, financial benefits and exposure as premier, albeit on aninterim basis. Thus, Johnston was seen to have been placed intoan extremely advantageous position as compared to fellowcandidates.22Table 4-1Views on Interim Leader Issue by Second Ballot Support(vertical percentages)Johnston^McCarthy Total^NAgree^ 22.1% 65.4%^43.7%^312Disagree 69.4%^27.5%^48.6%^352No Opinion 8.5% 7.1% 7.7% 56^100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^720Sig. .0000(n)^367^353^72023ChronologyMarch 31, 1991 -Vander Zalm asks for leadership convention butimplies he will remain premier until convention.April 2, 1991 -The Hughes Report tabled.-Vander Zalm resigns.-Caucus chooses Rita Johnston interim premier.April 3, 1991 -Board of directors announce leadershipconvention for July 18-20.May 4, 1991^-Grace McCarthy announces her decision not tocontest Socred leadership.May 7, 1991^-Mel Couvelier resigns Finance Minister portfolioin Johnston cabinet.May 20, 1991 -Mel Couvelier announces candidacy.May 22, 1991 -Rita Johnston announces candidacy.May 30, 1991 -Claude Richmond declines to be candidate.June 3, 1991 -Constituency Delegate Selection Meetingscommence.June 5, 1991 -Duane Crandall announces candidacy.June 26, 1991 -Grace McCarthy announces candidacy.June 27, 1991 -Norm Jacobsen announces candidacy.-Last day for nominations.-Last day for delegate selection meetings.-John Reynolds declines to be candidate.July 18, 1991 -Convention registration and Policy Forum.July 19, 1991 -Candidates' Speeches.July 20, 1991 -Convention chooses Rita Johnston as leader onsecond ballot.24Leadership Convention or Universal Ballot The day after the choice of Rita Johnston as interimPremier, the Social Credit Party officials announced that aleadership convention would be held July 18-20 to determine whowould lead the party into the next election (see Chronology).Premier Johnston started to consolidate her hold on the positionof premier. She announced that vacant cabinet seats would befilled and plans for a sitting of the legislature would be madepublic in the next few days. She made public comments to theeffect that she hoped the events which led up to the Hughesreport would be forgotten in a few weeks. 12However, some of her cabinet ministers were not asoptimistic. Advanced Education Minister Bruce Strachan commented"that [loss of public trust] is something we are going to haveto deal with and we are going to have to convince the publicbetween now and election day that we are a good government". 13Carol Gran, the Minister for Women's Programs voiced the viewthat "the government members have a big job ahead of us toconvince the public of our integrity". 14Pressure from opposing elements of the party continuedunabated. Commencing with Vander Zalm's resignation, dissidentparty elements began their lobby against the traditionalleadership convention. Former MLA and unsuccessful 1986 SocredThe Globe and Mail. "Premier tries to avoid talk of Vander Zalm ' That book was closed yesterday'." April 4,1991 pp. A1.A6."Ibid.,'4Ibid.,25candidate, Jim Nielsen, called for selection of the new leaderby a universal ballot. He stated that a leadership conventionwould create a divided party and further suggested that theparty could ill afford the $2 million to $3 million cost of aleadership campaign.The party's board of directors sought to preempt the demandfrom some of the rank and file for a universal ballot byannouncing the formation of a committee to study it. Theyadvised, however, that given the required 60 days notice tochange the system, no change was possible for the upcomingleadership selection process. The dissidents reacted withcomments to the effect that the board of directors was hidingbehind the letter of the Constitution in suggesting that thebylaws made no provision for a one member - one ballot system ofselecting the leader. When John Reynolds suggested the way toincrease interest in the leadership race was a universal ballot,Hope Rust responded with a letter accusing him of promotingdisunity and made a pronouncement that there was little publicsupport for a universal ballot.' 5The delegates were asked for their opinions about auniversal ballot in the 1991 convention survey. Table 4-2provides an analysis of delegate responses to the statement "Theparty leader should be elected by a vote of all the members ofthe party, not just by convention delegates." Contrary to the15The Vancouver Sun. "Leadership race no 'bloodbath' Rust says: Socreds aware of October election deadline."April 4, 1991 p.B.3.26expressed opinion of the party president, the concept of auniversal ballot was favored by 58.4% of the delegates while35.5% were opposed to it (Table 4-2).More than two-thirds (68.1%) of McCarthy's second ballotsupporters and less than one-half (49.2%) of Johnston secondballot supporters agreed with the principle of the universalballot.It would appear that the Johnston camp favored the statusquo and felt that it was to their advantage to choose a leaderby the traditional delegate/convention process, rather than bymeans of a universal ballot. To be fair, it is doubtful whetherthere was sufficient time for the board to implement a universalballot. Clearly though, they misjudged the degree of supportamong delegates for a leadership selection process which wouldenfranchise all party members. The decision by the board todefer the universal ballot appears to have been perceived by thesupporters of candidates other than Johnston as another actionfavoring the Premier chosen by the caucus.Pre-Leadership Campaign Jockeying by Potential Candidates With the announcement of the date of the leadershipconvention, potential candidates began to test the wind andjockey for position while the media was full of speculationabout who might declare themselves ready to enter the race.Premier Johnston refused comment on her candidacy. Her bestknown potential rival Grace McCarthy, who had previouslyannounced her resignation from provincial politics after2 7Table 4-2Views on Universal Ballot by Second Ballot Support(vertical percentages)Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n)Agree^ 49.2% 68.1% 58.4%^422Disagree 43.8%^26.8%^35.5%^256No Opinion 7.0% 5.1% 6.1% 44^100.0%^100.0%^100.0%^722Sig. .0000(n)^368^354^72228quitting the Vander Zalm cabinet, hinted that she mightreconsider her options. John Reynolds and Forests MinisterClaude Richmond indicated that they were weighing thepossibility of seeking the leadership. Mel Couvelier who hadresigned March 6 as Finance Minister (allegedly over theex-premier's conduct) suggested that he would prefer to back amore "charismatic" leadership candidate than run himself.Vancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell, a party outsider, was alsoreferred to as a potential candidate.Premier Johnston continued to profess indecision aboutseeking the leadership. Meanwhile, she capitalized on thepublicity which she gained from her day to day activities asPremier. She was centre stage in the inaugural televising of theThrone Speech and introductory speeches of a new session of thelegislature. While the opposition was attacking her, Socredscould not mount their individual leadership campaigns withoutappearing disloyal to their leader and thus giving aid to theopposition. As Canada's first woman premier, "Premier Mom"represented a principle long advocated by the NDP opposition;namely, "women getting to the top". 16 While consistentlydeclaring her personal indecision over the possibility ofseeking the party leadership, Johnston continued her attempt toappear as "Premier". She gathered positive press through herattendance at the Western Premiers Conference and travelled toPalmer, "'Premier Mom' seems to be a frontrunner" The Vancouver Sun May 23, 1991 p.A.10.29Quebec City to visit Premier Bourassa, declaring she needed togain an understanding of Quebec's constitutional demands.A month after Johnston assumed the office of Premier, GraceMcCarthy, running second in the polls, announced her decisionnot to contest the Socred leadership. She indicated that shewould neither support nor oppose any candidate, but pointed tothe party's rejection of the universal ballot system for itsleadership selection as being one consideration in her decision.McCarthy then pronounced that "it was unfair" to allow aninterim premier to run for party leadership."Meanwhile, on April 29, Mel Couvelier hinted that he hadbeen urged by supporters to contest the party leadership andthat his backers were trying to gauge the level of his support.Less than a week later, charges of improprieties by Couvelier incommunicating information to former premier Vander Zalmsurfaced. It was alleged that Vander Zalm requested preferentialtreatment on an application for the licensing of a trustcompany, and that Couvelier had advised Vander Zalm that theapplication was not complete. Couvelier's reputation immediatelycame under a cloud. Initially, he did not resign as financeminister, the position to which he had been reappointed byJohnston, despite a ruling by the attorney general's ministrythat he had violated the confidentiality sections of theFinancial Institutions Act. On May 7, he submitted hisresignation when asked to by Premier Johnston. Couvelier"The Vancouver Sun."I won't run, McCarthy says, claiming rules unfair."May 3 1991 p.A1.30intimated that he may have been fired as Finance Ministerbecause Premier Johnston did not want him in the Socredleadership race. Johnston responded that the allegations werefalse and that she was disappointed that Couvelier would makesuch a charge. An attempt at resolution was achieved a weeklater when both agreed to refer the question to the Ombudsman.The Ombudsman refused to rule on an issue which he deemed to bepolitical. By mid-May Couvelier announced that he had exhaustedall options to clear his name and argued that despite his viewthat the Premier had received poor political advice, "theincident must no longer divide the party". 18The Early Campaign - A Phony War On May 20, Couvelier became the first candidate toofficially enter the leadership race, promising to restructurethe party and create a new coalition. In his platform Couvelierproposed fixed terms for governments, free votes in thelegislature on all legislation except money bills, provisions toenable a given percentage of the electorate to recall their MLAby petition, and disclosure of all leadership campaigncontributions and expenditures. 19Johnston ended weeks of speculation two days later on anddeclared her candidacy. With Forests Minister Claude Richmondand Provincial Secretary Elwood Veitch at her side, JohnstonThe Vancouver Sun. "Couvelier abandons bid to clear name". May 17, 1991 p.A.1.''The Vancouver Sun. "Couvelier announces platform Reforms key part of leadership plan May 28, 1991 p.D.8.31stated that she would be running on her record as Premier andwould be emphasizing two issues in her campaign: law and order,and reform of the parliamentary process. Johnston took one oftwo planks from Couvelier's campaign in declaring that shesupported disclosure of campaign expenditures but opposeddisclosure of campaign receipts. Health Minister Bruce Strachanand Government Management Services Minister Carol Gran quicklyannounced their support for Johnston in her bid for theleadership. 20On May 30, just a week after Johnston's declaration, ClaudeRichmond finally put to rest the diminishing newspaperspeculation about his candidacy and officially declined to be acandidate. Declaring his support for Johnston, Richmondindicated that it was his feeling that in her performance asPremier, Johnston had demonstrated the capacity to lead theparty to victory in the next election. Two other cabinetministers with leadership aspirations- Education Minister StanHagen and Transportation Minister Graham Bruce thought thebetter of spending the required funds in a futile effort againstthe well organized and well financed Premier who appeared to bewell on the way to a "Coronation". 21A surprise candidate entered the leadership race on June5th. Duane Crandall, the MLA for Columbia River, announced thathe would enter the race even though his candidacy was a longshot2'The Vancouver Sun. "Johnston's in; others wait Two Socred ministers mull leadership bid." May 23, 1991pp•A.1-2.21The Vancouver Sun. "Race? What race?" June 1, 1991 p.8.3.32at best. Crandall was one of four backbenchers, who were unhappywith Vander Zalm's leadership and had quit the caucus in theautumn of 1989 to sit as independent Social Credit MLA's. Thestated reason for Crandall's candidacy was the lack of asignificant number of other candidates and the need for an endto government interference in the private moral decisions ofindividuals. He pointed to Vander Zaim's ill-conceived abortionand AIDS education policies as examples of his concerns. 22Delegate Selection Meetings The first of the constituency delegate selection meetings,was scheduled for June 3, some six weeks prior to the July 18-20convention. The Constitution of the Social Credit Party of B.C.makes no provision for automatic delegate status for M.L.A.s orex-officio members. Each constituency is entitled to 25delegates. The youth are represented by 2 to 4 representativesfrom each of 10 colleges and universities in the province.Since the 1986 election, a radical realignment in theprovince's electoral map had been effected. The MLA numberswere increased from 68 to 75 and electoral districts from 52 to75; the latter achieved by eliminating 17 dual-member ridings.The Social Credit Party had originally started preparingfor an election in the spring of 1990 by electing constituencyexecutives and selecting candidates for the revised electoraldistricts. The subsequent realignment of electoral districtsThe Vancouver Sun. "Row, new candidate rev up Socred race." June 6, 1991 p.A2.33brought about conflict and difficult choices in thedetermination of candidates. Some sitting MLA's were forced toseek nominations in electoral districts controlled byconstituency associations which did not support them. In orderto ensure that all sitting MLA's would be delegates, the boardof directors passed a special resolution which made provision toafford any sitting Social Credit MLA ex-officio delegate statusat the leadership convention.Initially, the delegate selection campaign proceeded veryslowly. Three early selection meetings were held June 3. Of thethree, the two held in Delta-North and Coquitlam-Maillardvillewere poorly attended. Apathy dominated. This was a dramaticchange for a party with a history of loyal and active members.The Richmond Centre meeting, a Social Credit stronghold inthe middle of Vander Zalm's riding, failed to achieve a quorumand had to be rescheduled. Several meetings failed to drawsufficient attendees to choose a full slate of twenty-fivedelegates. In these constituencies, the remaining delegates werelater named by the constituency association executives.According to respondents to 1991 leadership study, morethan one-fifth (Table 4-3) of the meetings were attended byfewer than fifty party members, 41.5% were attended by between50 and 100. Thus in 1991, almost two-thirds (61.8%) of thedelegate selection meetings had less than 100 people attending.By comparison, only about one-half that many (35.4%) of thedelegate selection meetings in 1986 were attended by such smallnumbers. The selection of several delegations by acclamationTable 4-3Attendance of Delegate Voters at Delegate Selection Meetings1986^ 1991%^(n) %^(n)Less than 50 3.7% 12 21.3% 15450 - 100 31.7% 104 41.5% 300101 - 200 33.5% 110 28.4% 205201 - 300 18.6% 61 7.2% 52More than 300 12.5% 41 1.7% 12100.0% 328 100.0% 72335was a second striking feature of the 1991 delegate selectionmeetings.Nearly one-half (46.5%) of the delegates to the 1991convention were chosen by acclamation (Table 4-4). Again thisdiffered from the 22.2% selected by acclamation for the 1986convention. For a governing party this apparent lack of interestin the choice of a new leader indicated that the Social CreditParty was experiencing real organizational difficulty.Table 4-4Delegates Chosen By Acclamation%1986(n) %1991(n)Yes 22.2% 69 46.5% 336No 78.9% 258 53.5% 387100.0% 327 100.0% 723As the dispirited campaign limped along, Grace McCarthydecided to pursue a strategy which would see her enter the racelate, just as Vander Zalm had done five years earlier. Havingasserted twice that she would not be a candidate, she made itclear to supporters that she would only enter the campaign on thecrest of a "Draft McCarthy" movement. 23The McCarthy camp followed the strategy to the letter.Assisted by rank and file apathy towards the leadership optionsand the imminent coronation of Johnston as leader, many of theparty faithful waited anxiously for any indication that McCarthywould enter the leadership contest. On June 22 a Vancouver Sunpoll was published indicating that McCarthy was the overwhelming"V. Palmer, "Socred should thank Grace for draft." The Vancouver Sun June 11, 1991, p.A8.36public choice as the best candidate to be the Social Creditleader. Even though she was not a candidate, Grace McCarthybumper stickers suddenly appeared at a delegate selection meetingin Vancouver Quilchena. During the last week of June, McCarthyannounced her intent to run for the leadership. The June 26delegate selection meeting, held in the Vancouver Little Mountainconstituency she had represented for nearly two decades, was oneof the best attended in the province with over 600 peoplepresent. 24Norm Jacobsen, the MLA for Dewdney, declared hiscandidacy on June 27, the last day for nominations, and just twodays after having resigned as Social Services Minister. He statedthat he would release all the details of his campaignexpenditures and promised that his political positions wouldemerge during the campaign. When pressed for his views onabortion, he stated that abortion was a matter to be decided by awoman and her doctor. 25The same day, Vander Zaim announced that he would not runbecause he believed that the media would launch personal attacksagainst him and John Reynolds ended speculation about hiscandidacy by announcing that he would not be a candidate.Instead, he endorsed Grace McCarthy.The Vancouver Sun. "McCarthy 'kick starts' the Socred race. June 27, 1991 pp. A1-2."The Vancouver Sun. "Five seeking Socred leadership Vander Zaim staying out; Jacobsen enters contest. "June 28, 1991 pp. B1-5.37The Real CampaignIn reality the campaign began in early July. Norm Jacobsenwas endorsed by four MLA's; namely, Women's Program MinisterCarol Gran, Caucus Chairman Nick Loenen, Cliff Michael, and Harryde Jong. Carol Gran had previously been one of the first MLA's toendorse Premier Johnston. Thus, her defection came as a surprise.In her speech endorsing Jacobsen, Gran indicated that she was notunhappy with the Premier but felt that "Jacobsen was the bestcandidate". 26In contrast to the four MLA's announcing their support forJacobsen, 17 MLA's - including 14 cabinet ministers declaredtheir support for Johnston. The cabinet members who signed adeclaration of support for Johnston were Larry Chalmers, HowardDirks, Peter Dueck, Russ Fraser, Stan Hagen, Lyall Hanson, JohnJansen, Dave Parker, Jim Rabbitt, Claude Richmond, John Savage,Bruce Strachan, Ivan Messmer and Elwood Veitch. The supportingbackbenchers were Harold Long, Dan Peterson, and Bill Reid.The two frontrunners, Johnston and McCarthy, chose tocampaign in two different styles, delivering two differentmessages. Johnston chose a rigorous campaign travelling in ajet airplane from riding to riding. She hoped to meet as manydelegates in person as she could to emphasize her message, partyunity and maintain the status quo. Conversely, McCarthyhusbanded her resources and sent a videotaped message to themeetings. She was already known personally by most of the"The Vancouver Sun. "Four MIA's boost Jacobsen's leadership campaign. "July 3, 1991 pp. A1-2.38potential delegates. McCarthy undertook a fund raising drive bytelephone, radio, and newspaper to persuade the lapsed Socredsto return to the fold. Well aware that most of the delegates hadbeen chosen, she attempted to recall the halcyon days of SocialCredit power when she helped rebuild the party. She emphasizedthe association of Johnston with Vander Zalm and obtained theendorsement of the backbench Okanagan South MLA Cliff Serwa.Serwa declared that McCarthy's resignation from the cabinet wasa principled move and commented favorably on McCarthy's pastcommitment to the party.Mel Couvelier campaigned on an institutional reformplatform with a thinly veiled criticism of party president HopeRust. He affirmed "I don't think the role of the party presidentis to report to the Premier...the role of the party is tochallenge and stimulate, not preserve and protect thegovernment,"" Couvelier advocated free votes, freedom ofinformation laws, disclosure of campaign funds, recall onpetition of 25% of constituents, and reduction of the Cabinetfrom 20 to 9 ministers. There was little debate about hisplatform because their was substantial agreement with hisdiagnosis and prescriptions for reform."Johnston reemphasized her "Law and Order" theme with apromise to increase the number of law enforcement officers. Shedemanded changes in the young offenders act and an expansion of"V. Palmer, "Couvelier's plan leaves little untouched." The Vancouver Sun July 10, 1991 p.Al2."Ibid.,39women's victim services. Without mentioning McCarthy by name,she directed a verbal shot at her for not committing herself torun in the next election. "I don't think you can be makingstatements I'll be boss or nothing," she said. 29A week before the convention Couvelier received a welcomeendorsement from Peace River MLA Jack Weisgerber. Weisgerbercited Couvelier's financial and constitutional experience andthe chance to unite the party as the reasons for hisendorsement.In the short span of two weeks the leadership race wastransformed from a dispirited campaign, in which the coronationof Johnston seemed to be inevitable, into a "horserace" in whichit had become difficult to predict a winner."The Vancouver Sun. "Face voters Johnston tells McCarthy Premier vows to stay on if she loses Socredrace." July 12, 1991 p.A4.40CHAPTER FIVETHE 1991 CONVENTIONThe party entered the July 18-20 convention with fivecandidates; two females, Johnston and McCarthy; and three malesnamely Couvelier, Crandall and Jacobsen.The two female candidates were perceived to be far in frontof all the male candidates in the race. Grace McCarthy was thecandidate whose entry into the race had created the mostenthusiasm. The 63-year-old matriarch of the Social Credit Partyand MLA for Vancouver Little Mountain since 1975, attempted toportray herself as the candidate who could be the savior of theparty. She would duplicate her actions as a key role player inthe party rebuilding and successful return to power in 1975following its 1972 election loss to the NDP. Unfortunately, shecarried the baggage of having been a dissident who never seemedto forget her 1986 leadership campaign loss. Her platformespoused education and a desire to change the system of hospitalboards since she opposed many of the boards' rigid anti-abortionstances."Perceived to be close, if not the leading candidate, wasPremier Rita Johnston, the MLA for Surrey-Newton and favorite ofthe "Zalmoids" and the establishment of the party. She enteredprovincial politics in 1986 after serving an apprenticeship"The Vancouver Sun. "The Frontrunners: McCarthy in last quest for elusive success." July 18, 1991pp.31,96.41under Vander Zalm in the rough and tumble of Surrey municipalpolitics. Her positives were her political shrewdness, herreputation for being a team player and her performance asinterim premier. Her negative was her close association andunwavering support for Vander Zalm. 31 Johnston campaignedemphasizing her role as "Premier Mom" and the candidate whocould best unite the party.Of the three male candidates, the strongest was consideredto be Couvelier, the MLA for Saanich and the Islands. He was aformer Mayor of Saanich, a former B.C. Liberal candidate andLiberal party president, the Minister of Finance in both theVander Zalm and Johnston governments and a candidate for theSocial Credit leadership in 1986. Couvelier ran on a platform offiscal responsibility and reform of political institutions,proposing recall, more citizen participation through referendaand disclosure of political campaign contributions andexpenditures.Running behind Couvelier was Norm Jacobsen, a 61 year-oldmillionaire and owner of a logging company, who had served as analderman and mayor of Maple Ridge before entering thelegislature in the 1986 election. He served as Minister ofLabor and Minister of Social Services in the Vander Zalm andJohnston governments respectively. An evangelical Christian, heemphasized ethics and morality in politics, was formally"The Vancouver Sun. The Frontrunners: Discipline, teamwork key to Johnston's campaign." July 18, 1991pp. 31, 36.42anti-abortion and expected to receive the backing of a fairnumber of the evangelical Christian members of the party, aswell as those searching for an alternative to Grace McCarthy andRita Johnston.The third male candidate was Duane Crandall, the 44year-old MLA from Columbia River and one of the four dissidentMLA's who left the Vander Zalm caucus to sit as an independentSocial Credit member. He regarded himself as a "darkhorsecandidate" and ran as a candidate of the new generation,criticizing the previous Social Credit regime for invading thepersonal lives of the people, particularly in the spheres ofabortion and AIDS education. Crandall seemed to generate littlesupport outside of his home constituency.The Policy ForumTraditionally, the Thursday evening of a leadershipconvention is set aside to fete the retiring leader. VanderZalm's decision to visit a sick friend in California during theconvention spared the party the embarrassment of having to paytribute to a disgraced ex-leader. Accordingly, the Thursdayafternoon was given over to a Policy Forum. This forum wasfollowed by an evening party. The party afforded the leadershipcandidates an opportunity to press the flesh and attempt to winover any undecided delegates.During the Policy Forum all the candidates were asked togive responses to the same six questions. These questions werechosen from questions delegates had deposited into a question43box. In responding, the candidates restated their campaignpositions; the curbing of government spending, the priorities ofhealth care and winning the next election.While there seemed to be little that was contentious orarousing in the responses, a split between McCarthy and Johnstonwas revealed. McCarthy was booed when she suggested that theSocial Credit Party would emerge from the convention united ifshe was the party leader. Johnston campaign workers jeered,indicating that they believed it was their candidate who couldand would unite the party. They perceived McCarthy as a traitorwho had abandoned Social Credit during tough times.Entering the convention there appeared to be a greaternumber of undecided delegates who were open to the influence ofthe power of personal interaction, and the messages of thePolicy Forum and candidates' speeches. Nearly one quarter,(23.5%), of the delegates claimed to have made their firstballot choice during the 1991 convention (Table 5-1). Thiscompares with 18.8% during the 1986 convention. 32Of survey respondents, 7.2% indicated that the Policy Foruminfluenced their voting decision (Table 5-2). On the firstballot, McCarthy was marginally the greatest beneficiary of thePolicy Forum, obtaining 2.3% of the vote as a consequence of it,as compared to 2.2% for Johnston, and 1.4% for both Couvelierand Jacobsen.' =The B.C. Social Credit Party and Leadership Study 1986.4 4TABLE 5-1First Ballot Votes of Undecided Entering ConventionCouvelier Crandall Jacobsen Johnston McCarthy Total (N)Decided 18.4% 1.6% 7.3% 34.6% 38.1% 76.5% 563Undecided 19.2% .4% 16.2% 34.0% 30.2% 23.5% 173Total 18.6% 1.4% 9.4% 34.5% 36.1% 100.0% 736Sig.N 137 10 69 254 266 736^.001145The Candidates' Speeches The candidates' speeches visibly aroused the delegates andaided the yet undecided. Fully 10.2% of the delegates claimedthat the speeches had a significant impact on their first ballotdecision (Table 5-2). Rita Johnston gave an excellent speech,slamming the New Democrats and emphasizing her promise of partyunity. Mel Couvelier's speech was based upon sound fiscalmanagement with little glitz. Grace McCarthy stressed her rolein rebuilding the Social Credit Party after the 1972 electionand asked the delegates to give her a chance to repeat the task.Duane Crandall suggested that the party should turn to a newgeneration for leadership. Norm Jacobsen gave a sound speech,emphasizing the need for strong leadership and ethics inpolitics. He pointed to his Christian roots stating"Christianity does not detract but adds to a politicians abilityto serve". 33On both the first and second ballots, Johnston received thegreatest benefit in terms of delegate decision as a consequenceof the candidates' speeches. On the first ballot, 4.0% ofrespondents indicated that Johnston's speech had affected theirvote as compared to 2.7% for McCarthy, and 1.6% for bothCouvelier and Jacobsen. Among second-ballot voters, 6.4% pointedto Johnston's speech as a determining factor in their votingdecision as compared to 3.7% who cited McCarthy's. Johnston's"The Vancouver Sun. "Frontrunners both have right stuff to be premier, analysts, delegates agree." July20, 1991 p.A7.4 6TABLE 5-2Events Which May Have Affected Change or Decision in VoteVote On First BallotTiming^Couvelier Crandall^Jacobsen^Johnston^McCarthy Total^(n)Decided Prior 14.1% 1.2%^5.6% 26.5% 29.1% 76.5%^553Policy Forum 1.4% 0.0%^1.4% 2.2% 2.3% 7.2%^53Candidates' Speech 1.6% 0.1%^1.6% 4.0% 2.7% 10.2%^74Other 1.5% 0.1%^0.8% 1.9% 2.0% 6.3%^46Total 18.6% 1.4%^9.4% 34.5% 36.1% 100.0%^736Sig.(n) 137 10^69 254 266 736^.0010Vote On Second BallotTiming Johnston^McCarthy^Total (n)Decided Prior 37.0% 39.3% 76.3% 563Policy Forum 3.9% 3.3% 7.2% 53Candidates' Speech 6.4% 3.7% 10.1% 74Other 3.5% 2.9% 6.4% 44Total 50.8% 49.2% 100.0% 734Sig.(n) 361 339 734 .000447gained a margin of 2.7% greater second ballot support among theundecided as a consequence of her speech. This seems to indicatethat her strong performance enhanced her position as the secondchoice of delegates and contributed to her victory.The conventional wisdom from the outset of the conventionwas that Johnston and McCarthy were the frontrunners and that itwould be either a one or two-ballot selection process.McCarthy's team had tried to position her to win on the firstballot or, at least, to be far enough ahead to assure asecond-ballot victory. Publicly McCarthy's organizers had sethigh expectations for her on the first ballot, estimating a leadof 100 votes.The first ballot results found McCarthy and Johnston in avirtual tie: McCarthy had 659, Johnston 652, Couvelier 331,Jacobsen 169 and Crandall 35 votes (Table 5-3). The anticipated100-vote lead for McCarthy never materialized and, accordingly,the momentum swung to Johnston. Following the first ballot,Jacobsen released his delegates and refused to commit to anycandidate. Then, after some deliberation and negotiations, andto the surprise and anger of many delegates in the Couvelier andMcCarthy camps, Couvelier threw his support behind Johnston.The questions which were yet to be answered by the secondballot were twofold: First, how much of Couvelier's first-ballotsupport could he influence to cross over to the Johnston camp?Second, how much of Couvelier's first-ballot support wouldultimately go to Johnston?Table 5-31991 Social Credit Convention ResultsByFirst(N)BallotBallot%Second Ballot(N)^%Johnston 652 35.3% 941 51.6%McCarthy 659 35.7% 881 48.4%Couvelier 331 17.9% - _Jacobsen 169 9.2% _ -Crandall 35 1.9%1846 100.0% 1822 100.0%49On the second ballot, there were 24 fewer ballots cast thanon the first ballot. Table 5-4 displays an estimate of thedelegate vote shifts on the two ballots based upon the surveyresults. After adjusting for the smaller number of second-ballotvotes, a projected 160 voters who supported Couvelier on thefirst-ballot vote, joined him in supporting Johnston on thesecond ballot. Just over one half (167) of Couvelier'sfirst-ballot support switched to McCarthy on the second ballot.As expected, two thirds of the Jacobsen first-ballot support of169 and a small percentage of Crandall's 35 first-ballot votesswung to Johnston. The balance of Jacobsen's first ballotsupport and 80% of Crandall's first-ballot vote supportedMcCarthy on the second ballot. Thus, Johnston polled 941 votesand was victorious by a margin of just 60 votes of the 1822second ballots cast. With only two candidates remaining on thesecond ballot, the race had become a zero-sum game. A swing of31 delegate votes to McCarthy would have meant victory for herrather than Johnston. Thus, for McCarthy supporters, the lossbecame more bitter and divisive once they realized that theywere so near to victory over an element of the party with whomthey maintained such ideological differences.Following convention Chairman Les Peterson's announcementof Rita Johnston's second ballot victory, Grace McCarthy gavethe traditional concession speech designed to congratulate thewinners, placate the losers and allow the party to go forth inunity. During the speech, the delegates from both second-ballotcamps were physically occupying two distinctly separate areas of9 FTV35McCarthy 8 FTV659Actual22^ Johnston 935 Projected( 941) Actual331Actual13 FTV28Couvelier^4 FMcCarthy-887 Projected( 881) ActualJacobsen169ActualCrandall35Actual50Table 5-4Delegate Movement Between BallotsFTV= Failed to Vote Numbers on lines are based on survey percentagesFINAL SHARES by ORIGINJohnston^McCarthyOrigin ( 935) ( 887)Johnston 67.9% 0.9%McCarthy 2.4% 70.9%Couvelier 17.1% 18.8%Jacobsen 11.9% 6.2%Crandall 0.7% 3.2%100.0% 100.0%51the convention floor with a noticeable demarcation line betweenthem. When McCarthy suggested that all unite behind their newleader, many delegates who had supported her, responded with anegative jeer. Later they refused to applaud the acceptancespeech of Johnston.Traditionally, the objective of leadership conventions hasbeen not only to choose a new leader but to create unity withinthe party to enable the party to win an upcoming election. In1991, a divided Social Credit Party entered the convention.Their hope for reconciliation was transformed to a fataldivision.Couvelier's Role in Selection of Leader Did Couvelier's decision to endorse Johnston influence asufficient number of delegates to switch their second-ballotvote to Johnston to bring about her victory in the closeleadership race. The convention study asked delegates anopen-ended question for their comments about the convention.Three-fifths of respondents chose to provide a variety ofresponses to the question. It is noteworthy that 8.2% of theresponses to the question took the form of negative commentsabout Couvelier's actions in crossing the floor to supportJohnston. It is reasonable to assume that the respondents whcexpressed negative feelings about Couvelier's action were arepresentative sample of all the delegates. Thus, approximately90 delegates had negative feelings about Couvelier's actions.52The leadership study also asked whether Couvelier'sendorsement of Johnston had any influence on respondents'second-ballot vote. A positive response was received from 7.4 %of the delegates. (Table 5-5). Among this group of respondents,two-thirds supported Johnston on the second ballot, representingnearly 10% of her total support. Given Johnston's total of 941votes on the second ballot, this result suggests that upwards of90 delegates claimed "Mel Couvelier's endorsement of RitaJohnston [had] an influence on [their] second ballot vote."Because Johnston won the leadership by a mere 60 votes,Couvelier's action was indeed a defining moment, both in theconvention and in the course of B.C. politics. In the very closeleadership convention Couvelier became the "queenmaker".Socio-economic and Institutional Considerations Vander Zalm's victory in 1986 could be explained in part byideological considerations and partially by socio-economic andinstitutional variables. The significant socio-economic variablewas duration of party membership; the significant ideologicalvariable was populism and the significant institutional variablewas the Vancouver Island region. The ideological, socio-economicand institutional variables which were relevant in the 1986Vander Zalm victory were analyzed to determine which of themwere of significance in Johnston's 1991 leadership selection. 34"D.E. Blake, R.R. Carty, and Lynda Erickson., (1991) Op. cit. pp.108-110.53TABLE 5-5Candidate Vote Based Upon Influence of Couvelier's Endorsement of Johnston.First BallotResponse^Couvelier Crandall^Jacobsen^Johnston^McCarthy Total^(N)Yes 4.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.5% 2.2% 7.4%^55No 14.5% 1.2% 8.9% 33.9% 34.1% 92.6%^68518.6% 1.4% 9.3% 34.5% 36.2% 100.0%^740Sig.N 138 10 69 255 268 685 .000054Regional Support Region of residence of both the delegates and thecandidates have historically been a significant variable indetermining delegate votes. Some delegates will vote for acandidate whom they believe to be most sensitive to the needs oftheir region. Often this translates into a vote for a 'favoriteson' candidate who is a resident of the delegate's home region.The 1991 leadership campaign featured two Lower Mainlandcandidates as second-ballot finalists. Did regional votingpatterns play a role in the leadership selection? The answer isan unequivocal yes.Table 5-6 demonstrates that the support for Couvelier,Jacobsen and Crandall was very much "favorite son" support fromtheir home regions of Victoria/Vancouver Island, FraserValley/Central Interior and Kootenay regions respectively.Johnston and McCarthy drew support from all regions. Table 5-7shows that it was the Central Interior, Okanagan, and NorthCoast regions which provided Johnston with her margin ofvictory. In these three regions, representing 21.5% of theconvention delegates, Johnston obtained the support of 278delegates (68.3%) as compared to McCarthy's 126 (32.7%). Thismargin was sufficient to overcome McCarthy's narrow lead in theLower Mainland and the Fraser Valley, and a somewhat largermargin of support from among the Vancouver Island delegates.With redistribution and the increase in the number ofconstituencies to 75, the Lower Mainland and Central FraserValley were represented by 1004 of the 1878 delegates. The votes55Table 5-6Regional First Ballot Support by Candidate(vertical percentages)Couvelier Crandall Jacobsen Johnston McCarthy Total (N)Peace River 6.9 - - 1.2 3.2 2.8 20North 6.9 - .3 2.0 .4 3.8 27Kootenay 2.3 60.0 4.4 8.5 6.8 7.1 50Victoria 19.1 - 2.9 .8 3.6 5.4 38Okanagan 8.4 - 1.5 8.9 6.8 7.2 51Vancouver Isle. 19.8 - 13.2 7.7 10.0 11.2 79Fraser Valley 5.3 10.0 27.9 9.3 10.0 10.6 75Central Interior 10.7 20.0 25.0 13.4 7.2 11.9 84Lower Mainland 20.6 10.0 23.5 44.3 51.2 39.9 281Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 705Sig.(N) 131 10 68 246 250 705 .0000Table 5-7Regional Second Ballot Support by Candidate(vertical percentages)Johnston^McCarthy^Total (N)Peace River 3.0 2.7 2.9 20North 5.8 1.8 3.9 27Kootenay 6.9 7.4 7.2 50Victoria 3.3 7.7 5.4 38Okanagan 9.1 5.0 7.2 50Vancouver Isle 9.1 13.3 11.2 78Fraser Valley 9.1 12.1 10.6 74Central Interior 15.5 8.0 11.9 83Lower Mainland 38.0 42.0 39.9 280Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 700Sig.(N) 361 339 700 .000156from these two regions were divided 524 to 480 (54.1% to 47.1%)in McCarthy's favor. This margin, when added to the McCarthy's30 vote favorable margin from among Vancouver Island votes, wasinsufficient to overcome the large margin built up by Johnstonamong the delegates from the Central Interior, Okanagan andNorth Coast regions.Gender Support On the third ballot of the 1986 leadership race, McCarthypolled a significantly higher proportion of the female vote thanher opponents. The female delegates have been outnumbered by themale delegates in the party, but their voting patterns haveoften differed from the males. Was McCarthy able to repeat in1991? The short answer is no.Scrutiny of voting patterns by gender (Table 5-8) reveals adecided majority support for Johnston among female voters. The56.4% of the second-ballot female vote which she garnered gaveher a 12.8% margin to outweigh McCarthy's 3.0% second-ballotmargin among male delegates who outnumbered females by a marginof more than two to one (68.4% versus 31.6%). Among females,"Premier Mom" apparently capitalized on her service as Canada'sfirst female Premier.Support by Age Between 1986 and 1991 the mean age of the conventiondelegates increased by approximately 5 years to age 50. This57TABLE 5-8Gender Vote By CandidateSecond BallotGender Johnston McCarthy^Total (n)Male 48.5% 51.5%^68.4% 491Female 56.4% 43.6%^31.6% 22751.0% 49.0%^100.0% 718Sig.N 366 351^717 .048558suggests that the party aged in the five year interval due tofailure to recruit younger new members. Age of the delegatesalso merited analysis to determine whether McCarthy's age andlengthy relationship with the party manifested themselves interms of voting support among the various age groupings ofdelegates?Age was not a major consideration in dictating votingpatterns (Table 5-9). Johnston won a slight majority of thesecond-ballot votes from among the more numerous 36 to 75 yearold delegates. McCarthy was the second ballot choice by a largermargin among the modest number of delegates who were under age35 and over age 75. The support for McCarthy from the under 35age group correlates with her support among the youth of theparty, and can be attributed to her support for education.Level of Formal EducationMcCarthy campaigned on a platform of increased spending oneducation. General observations of delegates at the conventionleft an impression that her supporters were among those with agreater level of education.The level of formal education was significant in thedelegates' second-ballot vote (Table 5-10). The party wasdivided in its voting patterns with those delegates lacking acollege education strongly favoring Johnston and thecollege-educated favoring McCarthy. Voting patterns based uponeducation correlate with Johnston's rural support base and anaffinity with her limited education from those delegates with59TABLE 5-9Candidate Percentage of Total Vote By AgeAge JohnstonSecond BallotMcCarthy^Total (n)17 - 25 46.9% 53.1% 4.5% 3226 - 35 44.1% 55.9% 8.4% 5936 - 45 53.6% 46.4% 20.0% 14046 - 55 53.2% 46.8% 29.0% 20356 - 65 49.4% 50.6% 25.1% 17666 - 75 55.4% 44.6% 10.6% 74Over 75 43.8 56.3% 2.3% 1651.3% 48.7% 100.0% 700Sig.N 359 341 700 .7860TABLECandidate Percentage of TotalSecond5-10Vote ByBallotFormal EducationLevel Johnston McCarthy Total (n)Elementary School 72.7% 27.3% 3.1% 22Some High School 67.6% 32.4% 10.3% 74High School Graduate 57.8% 42.2% 12.5% 90Post Secondary-Vocational 52.8% 47.2% 14.7% 106Some College-University 49.6% 50.4% 32.2% 232University Graduate. 39.8% 60.2% 16.4% 118Post Graduate Degree 39.7% 60.3% 10.8% 7851.3% 48.7% 100.0% 720Sig.N 367 353 720 .000560similar educational levels. Conversely, McCarthy's support basewas substantially urban and her platform emphasized educationalspending as a priority for the province.Duration of MembershipDuration of membership was a determinant of the 1986voting patterns of delegates. Grace McCarthy campaigned with anappeal to the long-term members. Hence an analysis by durationof membership was warranted to determine whether the 1986pattern was repeated.Contrary to expectations and the pattern of 1986, durationof membership made little difference to the 1991 leadership vote(Table 5-11). McCarthy was able to draw her highest level ofsupport from those members who joined the party from 1972 to1975, the years in which she had an instrumental role inrebuilding the party. However, Johnston out-polled McCarthyamong delegates joining the party in every other period, albeitby a small margin.Role in PartyThe constitution of the party makes provision for a board ofdirectors comprised of a maximum of twenty members. Theconvention study received returns from fourteen who acknowledgedcurrent membership on the board. Eleven (78.6%) of the fourteensupported Johnston on the second ballot, while McCarthy receivedthe support of just three (Table 5-12).61TABLE 5-11Candidate Percentage of Total Vote by Duration of MembershipSecond BallotDate Joined^Johnston^McCarthy^Total^(n)1991^58.6% 41.4% 4.0% 291986-1990^51.5% 48.5% 23.2% 1691980-1985 50.6% 49.4% 23.0% 1681976-1979^53.0% 47.0% 11.4% 831972-1975 45.6% 54.4% 14.1% 103Before 1972^52.2% 47.8% 24.4% 17851.1% 48.9% 100.0% 730Sig.N^373 357 730 .8307TABLE 5-12Voting Patterns by Role in Party----Second BallotRole Johnston McCarthy NProvincial Executive 78.6% 21.4% 14Constit.Assoc Executive 52.0% 48.0% 383Member Youth Assoc. 37.8% 62.2% 45Member Women's Auxiliary 69.7% 30.3% 33Other Party Capacity 46.1% 53.9% 76N 285 266 55162It is helpful to contrast the overwhelming second ballotsupport for Johnston from the small number on the provincialexecutive, with the voting patterns of party activists servingin other capacities. The members of the constituencyassociations paralleled the vote of the delegates-at-large, witha slight majority of 52.0% supporting Johnston on the secondballot and 48.0% supporting McCarthy. Members of the youthassociation leaned heavily toward McCarthy. The nearly 70% votefor Johnston by the members of the women's auxiliary correlateswith the strong female support for her on the second ballot. Italso reflects the anti-abortion views and evangelical Christiansupport of the right wing of the party.Party Issues The Leadership Study asked delegates for their opinion withrespect to the most important issue or issues faced by theSocial Credit Party. There was little disagreement betweenJohnston and McCarthy activists that the two major issues facingthe party were those of 'party image/credibility' and'honesty/integrity' (Table 5-13). The delegates were aware thatthe various crises of the Vander Zalm regime had strained theparty's credibility among the electorate and imprinted anegative perception with respect to the honesty and integrity ofthe party elites. After agreeing on the two most importantissues confronting the party the opinions of the two campsdiverged. Johnston supporters rated 'party unity' and concernfor the 'next election' as their third and fourth priorities6 3Table 5-13Party Issues by Second Ballot VoteResponse(verticalJohnston%^(n)percentages)' sMcCarthy%^(n)Total% (n)Party Image/Credibility 23.7% 85 28.4% 97 26.0% 182Honesty/Integrity 19.8% 71 22.7% 78 21.2% 149Party Unity 16.4% 59 10.0% 34 13.3% 93Leadership 8.3% 30 17.9% 61 13.0% 91Party Renewal 7.2% 26 17.0% 58 12.0% 84Next Election 10.9% 39 10.0% 34 10.4% 73Candidate Recruitment 5.0% 18 9.7% 33 7.3% 51Other (13 differing) 24.8% 89 26.7% 91 25.7% 180No Answer 29.2% 105 30.8% 81 26.6% 186N 359 341 700"Percentages add to more than 100% because of multiple responses.64respectively. However, McCarthy activists felt that their thirdand fourth priorities were 'leadership' and 'party renewal'. TheJohnston and McCarthy supporters' third and fourth prioritiesseemed to be a playback of the respective campaign messages ofeach camp.Leadership Selection Respondents were offered 10 possible reasons for theirsecond ballot choice and asked to rate which attributes were"very important" in the determination of their vote. TheJohnston and McCarthy supporters differed in prioritizing theattributes (Table 5-14). Of Johnston activists, 47.2% rated her'personal character' as very important in the determination oftheir vote. Johnston's 'policy positions' were felt to be veryimportant by 42.1%, with 41.0% citing the importance of her'ability to unify the party' and 39.3% indicating that theybelieved that Johnston's 'ability to win' the imminent electionwas very important in convincing them to vote for her. McCarthysupporters outlined different priorities in their reasons forvoting for their candidate. Of the McCarthy delegates, 45.4%felt that her 'ability to win' the next election was a veryimportant consideration in their voting for her. McCarthy's'personal character' was cited by 43.6% as being very importantfollowed by 40.3% holding a positive view of her 'experience'.McCarthy's 'ability to unify the party' was cited by 38.2% asbeing a very important reason for their support for theircandidate.65It would appear that because the delegates held aperception that the party needed credibility, honesty andintegrity, they placed a high priority on the positive personalcharacteristics of both Johnston and McCarthy. However, like thedelegates who chose Vander Zalm in 1986, the delegates from theMcCarthy camp felt that 'ability to win' the next election wasthe most important characteristic of their candidate.Government Social and Economic SpendingThere was a marked ideological division between theJohnston and McCarthy supporters with respect to their attitudestoward government spending, both in the social sphere and inoverall terms.The social spending index is a composite measurement ofspending in the spheres of education, welfare, health care andday-care. 36 A zero score demonstrates a view that overallspending in these spheres should remain at current levels. Anegative score indicates a desire for reduced spending and apositive score a desire for increased spending. Johnstonactivists displayed a clearer predisposition to decreased socialspending, with an index of -.1971 (Table 5-15). McCarthysupporters held a view that social spending should be maintainedat or near current levels scoring -.0646 on the social spendingindex."For details see Appendix6 6Table 5-14"Very Important" Reasons for Supporting CandidateJohnstonSecond BallotMcCarthyReason % (n) Reason % (n)Personal Character 47.2% 342 Able to Win Election 45.4% 328Policy Positions 42.1% 302 Personal Character 43.6% 316Able to Unify Party 41.0% 297 Experience 40.3% 291Able to Win Election 39.3% 284 Able to Unify Party 38.2% 277Service to Party 30.3% 218 Service to Party 36.7% 264Experience 28.8% 208 Policy Positions 36.6% 263Understands Region 22.7% 162 Understands Region 19.0% 136Charisma 11.2% 80 Charisma 18.0% 129Endorsement by MLA 10.9% 77 Friendship 7.1% 50Friendship 6.5% 46 Endorsement by MLA 3.3% 23Table 5-15Spending Attitudes by Leadership ChoiceSecond Ballot^Johnston^McCarthy^Total Population Sig.Mean^(n) Mean^(n)^Mean^(n)Social Spending -.1971 362 -.0646 351 -.1318 713 .0097IndexGovernment Spending .1079 350 .2258 338 .1659 688 .0067Index67The government spending index 37 provides a compositemeasurement of the attitudes to spending in nine categories ofgovernment spending; specifically in the spheres of education,welfare, health care, day-care, reforestation, job grants,highways, tourism and public service salaries. Overall the 1991government spending index was .1659 as compared to the 1986index of .2265. 38 While, both the 1986 and the 1991 activistsheld a positive view toward increased government spending, the1991 activists were somewhat less inclined in that direction.McCarthy activists demonstrated a disposition to greater overallgovernment spending than the Johnston activists, scoring .2258on the government spending index as compared to .1079 for theJohnston supporters.Determinants of Leadership Choice Table 5-16 moves beyond these bivariate analyses to amultivariate analysis which reveals the variables with asignificant independent impact. It points to both region andeducation as the critical fault lines in the party as it madeits final choice. It was the support from those in the North,Central Interior and the Okanagan as well as those with lowereducational levels which provided Johnston with her margin ofvictory.3 'D.E. Blake, R.K. Carty, and Lynda Erickson., Op. Cit. p.76."Ibid.,68Table 5-16Multiple Determinants of Leadership ChoiceSecond BallotJohnston vs. McCarthyLevel of Education -.048 (3.91)Okanagan .158 (2.05)Victoria -.170 (2.00)North .241 (2.36)Central Interior .156 (2.54)Constant .714 (6.64)R Square .064NOTE: Table entries are regression coefficients with absolute values of thet-ratio in parentheses. The dependent variable is given with the voters forJohnston scored '1' and McCarthy supporters scored '0'. All coefficients aresignificant at the .05 level, one tailed. Regional variables are dummyvariables with a value of '1' for all delegates from the designated region,otherwise '0'. Gender is a dummy variable with males scored '1'. The durationof membership was scored from 0 to 5 depending on whether the delegate joinedthe party in 1991, 1986 - 1990, 1980 - 1985, 1976 - 1979, 1972 - 1975, orbefore 1972 respectively. 3939Ibid., 9.110.69Unlike the 1986 leadership contest, duration of membershipwas not a significant variable. Age, gender and income levelswere also considered in the analysis but found not to besignificant variables.SummaryThe 1991 convention had similarities to and dissimilaritiesfrom the 1986 convention. Both conventions featured majorcandidates (McCarthy in 1991 and Vander Zalm in 1986) whocampaigned as outsiders against the party establishment on aplatform of party reform. Both entered the campaigns at a latedate and emphasized their ability to win the next election whiletheir opponents (Johnston in 1991 and Brian Smith in 1986)supported by the vast majority of the sitting MLA's, played toparty unity. However in 1986 the anti-establishment candidatewas victorious while the establishment candidate won in 1991.Ironically, the 1986 establishment repudiation became the 1991establishment ratification (ie. The same people won!) It leftSocial Credit as it had been in 1986 but with the riftsdeepened, and, perhaps, less prepared to lead the changed B.C..70CHAPTER SIXCONCLUSIONThe 1991 leadership contest which confirmed Rita Johnstonas Canada's first woman premier divided the Social Credit Partyof B.C. along multiple rifts. Ideological divisions were not aphenomenon which was new for party. Divisions commenced at the1986 leadership convention where the delegates were divided intheir attitudes to populism, individualism vs collectivism,government spending and government regulation. In the person ofVander Zalm, the delegates chose a leader who ran against therecord of the previous administration promising simplergovernment, more consultation with the people and a return tobasic values. What appeared to be his greatest appeal wasdepiction of his ability to win the next election. In theinterests of winning the autumn 1986 election, the party pastedover the ideological differences which were evident in VanderZalm's decisive convention leadership victory.Subsequent to the election, the party divisions resurfacedwith Vander Zalm's questionable behavior and sometimes arbitraryleadership. These actions perpetuated and deepened the partyrifts and culminated in the resignation of the two seniorministers, Brian Smith and Grace McCarthy, who represented oneideological position in the party. The actions also ultimatelyled to the resignation of Vander Zalm who represented theopposing ideological view. While the majority of partysupporters viewed Vander Zalm's resignation as being the logicalconsequence of his ill-conceived personal actions, a significant71number of Vander Zalm loyalists continued to see him as a heroas well as a victim of media misrepresentation. Others felt thathe was undermined by dissenting internal party forces.Like Vander Zalm, the board of directors of the partydemonstrated poor leadership during the period of Vander Zalm'sill-conceived actions by continuously stonewalling critics ofthe Premier.The decision of the caucus, by a small majority, to chooseRita Johnston to serve as interim leader despite her refusal togive a commitment that she would not be seeking the leadershipon a permanent basis became another cause for party division. Asinterim premier, Johnston was perceived both, to have apreferential position from which to contest the leadership andto be a protege of the disgraced ex-leader Vander Zalm.Grace McCarthy's late entry into the campaign not onlyprecluded a Johnston "coronation" but pitted two protagonistsone another. They represented the two opposing ideologicalperspectives which had divided the Social Credit party since the1986 convention.The leadership convention itself not only exposed partyrifts but became the underlying cause of others. The closenessof Johnston's victory was itself divisive. Couvelier's criticaldecision to cross the floor to throw his support behind Johnstonthus ensuring her victory in the close race became an alienatingfactor.Ideologically, the McCarthy supporters favored increasedpublic spending particularly in the social sphere while theJohnston camp favored the maintenance of public spending at72current levels with a decrease in spending in the socialspheres.Regionally, the activists were divided nearly equallybetween the two candidates in five of the nine provincialregions which were represented by just less than four-fifths(78.4%) of the delegates. Johnston's victory was won in theNorth, Central Interior and Okanagan regions, while McCarthyoutpolled Johnston among Victoria delegates.The level of education of the delegates represented a basisof division of the candidate support. The less-educatedsupported Johnston while the better-educated supported McCarthy.Rather than heal the party, the 1991 convention perpetuatedthe rifts which had become evident during the 1986 leadershiprace and had been exacerbated in the interim. Time had run outin their five-year mandate and the party no longer had theluxury of an extended period to again try to heal the divisions.The election campaign which would be fought in a couple ofmonths would determine whether the party could paste over theirdifferences in the interests of retaining power as they had donein 1986.A Last Word The political events which have transpired since the 1991Social Credit Party leadership convention now cast doubt on theparty's very existence. The scandal surrounding Vander Zaim'sresignation and the divisive leadership race left many of the73more moderate Social Credit supporters uncomfortable insupporting their party in the October 1991 election. The SocialCredit party election campaign was fraught with a series oforganizational and strategic errors.The NDP were well ensconced in first place in the earlypolls with a comfortable margin over the second-place SocialCredit party and a significant lead over the third-placeLiberals. A defining historical moment occurred during atelevision debate in which the Liberal leader, Gordon Wilson,established his party and himself as a legitimate alternative tothe two leading parties and their leaders. Many alienated formerSocial Credit supporters flocked to support the Liberal partyvaulting them into second place in the election won by the NDP.The Social Credit party was driven from power and relegated tothird party status. The once powerful governing party won justseven seats in the hinterland of the province. The Liberalsdisplaced them as the party of Lower Mainland and Victoriasuburbia and the middle class of the province.The once politically dominant Social Credit party has beenreduced to a right-wing rural based third party with limitedlegislative representation, encumbered by a debt of over onemillion dollars. Their party supporters will be subjected to thesame messages which the Social Credit party preached to theLiberal party supporters during the past four decades: "Theprovince only has room for one free enterprise party. A vote fora third party is a wasted vote that will help elect the NDP".The party's hope lies in its success in changing its bylaws to74make provision for the selection of their future leader by auniversal ballot and the remaining activist base estimated tonumber 15,000.What are the party's options? It can continue as arural-based third party. It would then be subjected to thepressures of losing MLA's to the Liberal party, eventually todisappear from the legislature. It could seek to rebuild thecoalition which governed the province for most of the last fortyyears by moderating some of its more right-wing ideologies andmerging with the Liberals under their banner or that of someother B.C.-based party. The party can plod along in the hopethat the Liberal party fails in opposition, thus allowing theSocial Credit party to displace them as the provincial party ofthe free enterprise voters. Party financing, debt and patternsof continually increasing Lower Mainland legislativerepresentation at the expense of rural representation militateagainst the last alternative.Realistically, the most viable option in the foreseeablefuture for the party is to rebuild the coalition. Thus theywould either assert the influence of the official opposition orthat of the governing party. For all intents and purposes, thecoalition known as the Social Credit Party of B.C. has reachedthe end of its era.75BIBLIOGRAPHYBlake, Donald E. (1985) Two Political Worlds: Parties and VotingIn British Columbia. Vancouver: University of BritishColumbia Press_, (1988). "Division and Cohesion: The Major Parties" GeorgePerlin, ed., Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Conventions. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice HallR.K. Carty, and Lynda Erickson (1991) Grassroots Politicians :Party Activists in British Columbia. Vancouver: Universityof British Columbia PressBoyd. Denny, It's Bill Vander Zalm's style to stick to denial tobitter end." The Vancouver Sun April 3, 1991 p.B.1.The Globe And Mail."B.C. conflict allegation brought ministersdown." March 30, 1991 p.A.5."B.C. leadership race could open old wounds ex-ministerwants Socreds to avoid pitfalls of 1986 convention April1, 1991 pp.A1-2."Canada gets first woman premier Johnston sworn in asVander Zalm resigns over land sale in B.C." April 3, 1991pp.A.1-2."Charismatic Premier dominated B.C. life Vander Zalmsurvived many crises, but defeated himself for not beingstraight with the people." March 30, 1991 pp.A.1,A.5."Commissioner dissects Vander Zalm's thinking" April 3,1991 pp.A1.A4."Controversy dogged Premier" March 30, 1991 p.A.5."Deputy Premier is elevated to top B.C. post." April 3,1991 p.A.4."Premier tries to avoid talk of Vander Zalm "That book wasclosed yesterday'." April 4, 1991 pp.A1.A6."Vander Zalm faces pressure from Socreds to quit nowRumblings turn to roar as caucus awaits conflict reportApril 2, 1991 pp.A.1-2."Vander Zalm stepping down Amid Fantasy Gardens probes,B.C. Premier calls for leadership convention." March 30,1991 pp.A.1-2.76Lamb, Jamie. "Vander Zalm's stone unlikely to be rolled awayagain." The Vancouver Sun March 30, 1991 p.Bl.Palmer, Vaughn. "A tale of two very different Socreds." TheVancouver Sun June 28, 1991 p.Al2.- "Couvelier's plan leaves little untouched." The VancouverSun July 10, 1991 p.Al2.• "Couvelier remembered McCarthy glitz." The Vancouver SunJuly 23, 1991 p.A10.• "First round crucial in Socred voting." The Vancouver SunJuly 9, 1991 p.Al2."Four-year-old flop teaches Socreds lesson." The VancouverSun June 7, 1991 p.A14."Honesty was no policy for Vander Zalm." The Vancouver SunApril 3, 1991 p.A.16."Insiders win preserves the status quo." The Vancouver SunJuly 22, 1991 p.A8."McCarthy launch puts new face on race." The Vancouver SunJune 27, 1991 p.A8."McCarthy missing as Johnston jets." The Vancouver Sun July4, 1991 p.A10."McCarthy's real story between the lines." The VancouverSun May 6, 1991 p.A10.- "Men trailing in Socred leadership race." The Vancouver SunJuly 5, 1991 p.A6.- "'Nostalgia' candidate won vision stakes." The VancouverSun July 8, 1991 p.A8.- "Over to the right is Rita J, the candidate." The VancouverSun June 17, 1991 p.A8.- "Premier, Couvelier both found wanting." The Vancouver SunMay 9, 1991 p.A.16.- "Premier has access to valuable assets." The Vancouver SunJune 6, 1991 p.A10."Premier leaves office in same manner as he governed." TheVancouver Sun March 30, 1991 p.A3."'Premier Mom' seems to be a frontrunner" The Vancouver SunMay 23, 1991 p.A.10.77-.^"Premier's visit, speech really ho-hum."  The Vancouver SunJune 18, 1991 p.A10.-^"Reynolds takes on party establishment." The Vancouver SunJune 14, 1991 p.Al2.- "Rural delegates in political hinterland." The VancouverSun July 3, 1991 p.Al2.- "Socred bonds not sacred in a scandal." The Vancouver SunMay 8, 1991 p.A.12.- "Socred Leadership recipe for rot." The Vancouver Sun June10, 1991 p.A10.-.^"Socred race shaping up as ho-hum affair." The VancouverSun June 4, 1991 p.Al2.-.^"Socreds hoping history doesn't repeat." The Vancouver SunApril 4, 1991 p.A.10.-.^"Socreds should thank Grace for draft." The Vancouver SunJune 11, 1991 p.A8.-.^"Survey finds fractures worry Socreds." The Vancouver SunJuly 12, 1992 p.A10.-.^"Threats, rumors and delegates circulate." The VancouverSun July 19, 1991 p.A10.-.^"Vote a make and break Socred affair." The Vancouver SunMay 1, 1991 p.A.12.The Vancouver Sun.,"Apathy out in front in Socred leader race."June 10, 1991 p.B3.-.^"Banning media from Socred vote session a surprise." June6, 1991 p.B6."B.C. premier's strongest allies finally urged him to stepdown." April 3, 1991 p.A.5.-.^"Candidates unveil ambitious policies during campaign."July 19, 1991 p.B6.-^"Christians mourn clause loss, but rally to party." July19, 1991 p.B8.- "Circling the bandwagons." July 13. 1991 p.B2.- "Conflict of interest idea traced to Plato's writings."April 4, 1991 p.B.3.-.^"Couvelier abandons bid to clear name". May 17, 1991 p.78A.1.• "Couvelier announces platform Reforms key part ofleadership plan May 28, 1991 p.D.8.• "Couvelier's bid to take case to ombudsmen fails." May 14,1991 p.B.1-2."Couvelier calls on party to 'turn page' on past." June20, 1991 p.B3."Couvelier defends move to Johnston." July 23, 1991 p.A7.▪ "Couvelier defends passing on Leung data." May 2, 1991 ppA1-2.• "Couvelier denies breaking any law." May 8, 1991 p. A.1,6."Couvelier levels criticism at Johnston's campaign." June7, 1991 p.A17."Couvelier questions firing Letter cites race forleadership." May 9, 1991 pp.A1-2.▪ "Couvelier Quits Breached act with memos, A-G rules."May 7, 1991 pp.A.1,12."Couvelier seeks Point Grey support: Only 34 Socreds showat delegate meeting." June 14, 1991 p. B4."Couvelier sees self as 'ideas' candidate." July 15, 1991p.B1.- "Couvelier vows he'd trim cabinet to nine members." July 8,1991. p.B2.- "Couvelier will hear plea to run." April 29, 1991 p.B.2."Crandall casts self as darkhorse." July 16, 1991 p.B1.- "Endorsements: much noise but little substance." July 13.1991 p.B2.- "Face voters Johnston tells McCarthy Premier vows to stayon if she Loses Socred race." July 12, 1991 p.A4.- "Five Candidates vie for hearts and minds of Socreddelegates." July 20, 1991 p.A7.- "Five seeking Socred leadership Vander Zalm staying out;Jacobsen enters contest." June 28, 1991 pp.Bl-5.- "Four MLA's boost Jacobsen's leadership campaign." July 3,1991 pp.Al-2.79"'Free vote' referendum promised Premier pledges to letpeople have their say." June 18, 1991 p.B1.- "From village to village, hopefuls hand out goodies." July19, 1991 p.B6.- "Frontrunners both have right stuff to be premier,analysts, delegates agree." July 20, 1991 p.A7.- "Johnston-McCarthy split revealed during policy forum."July 20, 1991 p.A9.- "Gardens issue dominated B.C. cabinet, Couvelier says." May9, 1991 p.A.14."Get in race, premier tells McCarthy: Backbench snipingsshow intentions, Johnston says." June 17, 1991 p.B1."Go now, Socreds tell Premier Some party members want thecaucus to intervene." March 30, 1991 p.A3."Gran confirms meeting was to support premier." July 10,1991 p.B2.• "Hired political guns gather for Saturday's big battle."July 19, 1991 pp.A1,2."Hughes paints 'devastating' portrait." April 3, 1991p.A.3.▪ "Hughes piqued by cover-up of call to Petro-Canada boss."April 3, 1991 p.A.3."Hughes threatened full probe." April 3, 1991 p.A.2."I won't run, McCarthy says, claiming rules unfair." May 3,1991 p A.1."Jacobsen organizer suggests McCarthy support has peaked."July 13, 1991 p.A9."Johnston called Socred error McCarthy criticizesappointment." May 4, 1991 p.A5.▪ "Johnston cheered by home folks Couvelier accuses premierof ducking call for TV debate." June 19, 1991 p.A.16.- "Johnston confident Couvelier blameless." May 4, 1991p.A.2."Johnston's in; others wait Two Socred ministers mullleadership bid." May 23, 1991 pp.A.1-2."Johnston plans to do a lot of listening." May 13, 1991 p.80A.13.- "Johnston says apology is up to Vander Zalm." April 4,1991 pp.A.1-2.- "Johnston says she's undecided about leadership." May 15,1991 p.A.16."Johnston says she will ask Bourassa to meet premiers" May14 1991 p.A.1."Johnston supporters get foothold: Three ridings electdelegates who support leadership bid." June 4, 1991 p.A1Johnston tries to heal party split." July 22, 1991pp.A1,2."Johnston unprepared for attack." May 10, 1991 pp.B.1-2."Johnston won't say whose jet she's using." July 10, 1991p.Al."Lam led down Gardens path, secretary says." May 4 1991p.A.5."Leadership candidate not looking for a fight." July 9,1991 p.B1."Leadership hopefuls to pay $9000 deposit." June 13, 1991p.A16."Leadership race no 'bloodbath' Rust says: Socreds aware ofOctober election deadline." April 4, 1991 p.B.3."Leung again credible, lawyer says." April 3, 1991 p.A.3.- "McCarthy bumper stickers debut at Quilchena meeting."June 26, 1992 p.83.- "McCarthy finally begins campaigning for leadership." July5, 1991 p.B2."McCarthy 'kick starts' the Socred race." June 27, 1991pp.A1-2.- "McCarthy rumors spice up the race." June 25, 1992 p.A2."McCarthy's poll gives her election nod over NDP." July 18,1991 p. B7.- "McCarthy Socreds' only hope, poll finds." June 22, 1991pp.A1-10.- "McCarthy takes a second look." June 22, 1991 p.A10.81- "McCarthy tour of the interior fails to generate strongshift." July 12, 1991 p.B4.- "McCarthy willing to be Opposition leader." July 16, 1991p.B2.- "Moss-covered log cabin is Jacobsen campaign symbol." July17, 1991 pp.B1,2.- "NDP vow to balance budget irks premier." June 3, 1991 p.B10."New leader had role model Johnston's political career tiedto Vander Zalm's from outset." April 3, 1991 p.A2."Nights and days of the long knives A stroll through thedarker side of the Socred convention floor." July 22, 1991pp.A6,7."No means no on leadership McCarthy says." June 11, 1991p.Al2."One-two political punch dropped McCarthy." July 22, 1991pp.A1,2."Petro-Canada confirms land not tendered." April 4, 1991p.B.1."Police probe of Vander Zalm dealings come first, A-G.says." April 4, 1991 p.B.l."Premier's actions-not media-at fault, Hughes says." April3, 1991 p.A.3."Premier, Couvelier reach pact on probe." May 10, 1991 p.A.1-2.▪ "Premier has his pockets of sympathy." March 30, 1991 p.A4."Premier Johnston bets on party loyalty." July 16, 1991p.A14."Premier mixed role as chief citizen with business, Hughesconcludes." April 3, 1991 p.A.4."Premier quits amid furore: MLA revolt looms over decisionto stay until leadership convention." March 30, 1991pp.A1,A6.- "Premier vows to beef up law and order." July 10, 1991p.Al."Public has right to know donors, Couvelier says." July 11,1991 p.85.82-.^"Queries focus on Tan Yu, timing and $20,000." April 3,1991 p.A.4.-.^"Race? What race?" June 1, 1991 p. B3- "Religious beliefs keep Crandall in Church." July 16, 1991p.Al.- "Row, new candidate rev up Socred race." June 6, 1991 p.A2.- "Scandal, controversy dog premier's career." March 30, 1991p.A2.-.^"Seeking unity to save kneecaps." June 1, 1991 p.B3-.^"Serwa supports McCarthy's bid." July 4, 1991 B.2.-.^"Small Socred turnouts blamed on apathy woes." June 11,1991. p.A1-2.-.^"Socred bonds won't hold if NDP elected Gran claims." June5, 1991 pp.A1-2.-.^"Socred cites meddling in morality." June 6, 1991. p.B6.-.^"Socred crystal ball remains cloudy." March 30, 1991 p.A7.-.^"Socred fund raiser draws big crowd in Prince George GraceMcCarthy makes video appearance while rival Rita Johnstonmakes promises." July 5, 1991 p.B2.-.^"Socred leadership delegates told to keep their mindsopen." June 22, 1991 p.A10.83"Speeches a key to candidates' chances." July 19, 1991p.B7.• "Style, charisma reduced to dirty words." June 29, 1991p.B2.• "Sun delegate poll gives McCarthy slight edge." July 18,1991 pp.A1,Al2."The Contenders" March 30, 1991 p.A3."The Frontrunners: McCarthy in last quest for elusivesuccess." July 18, 1991 pp.B1,B6."The Frontrunners: Discipline, teamwork key to Johnston'scampaign." July 18, 1991 pp.B1,B6."Vander Zalm inquisitor has gained wide respect." April 3,1991 p.A.4.- "Vander Zalm loyalist first woman premier Rita Johnstondefends Socreds' 5-year record." April 3, 1991 pp.A1-2."Vander Zalm, McCarthy urged to stay out of race." June 12,1991 p.B5."Undecided wait for the speeches." July 19, 1991 p.B7.• "Young Socreds find zest despite party apathy." June 17,1991 pp. A1-2.84APPENDIXATTITUDE SCALES The attitude scales utilized in this analysis were derivedfrom a large battery of 'agree/disagree' items plus Likert-typeitems measuring degree of support for spending increases ordecreases in a variety of policy areas and degree of support forincreases or decreases in government regulation. Some scalesare identical to those used in previous analysis of federalparty activists 4 ° or provincial voters 41The items used to construct each scale are given below.For 'agree/disagree' items, the answer corresponding to thedirection in which the scale is scored appears in parentheses.Where a scale item is based on the choice between a pair ofstatements, the choice corresponding to the direction of thescale is indicated. Those responding in the direction in whichthe scale was scored for a given item were given a score of 1,0otherwise. The total scale score for a respondent is the sum ofthese item scores. The category combinations corresponding tothe direction in which the scale was scored are given inparentheses. Further details of scale construction areavailable on request.Government Spending Index(scored in pro-spending direction)This scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2to respondents depending on whether they believed thatgovernment spending should be substantially reduced (-2),slightly reduced (-1), kept as now (o), slightly extended (+1),or substantially extended (+2). The scores were then summedacross nine policy areas then divided by nine to return to theoriginal measurement range. The policy areas were: education,welfare rates, health care, reforestation, job creation grants,highways, tourism, public service salaries, and day-care.Social Spending Index(scored in pro-spending direction)This scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2respondents depending on whether they believed that governmentspending in social policy areas should be substantiallyincreased (2), slightly increased (1), kept as now (0), slightlyreduced (-1), or substantially reduced (-2). The scores werethen summed across four policy areas then divided by four toreturn to the original measurement range. The policy areaswere: education, welfare rates, health care, and day-care.`'D.E. Blake., (1988). "Division and Cohesion: The Major Parties" George Perlin, ed. Party Democracy in CanadaBlake., Two Political Worlds: Parties and Voting In British Columbia, D.E. Blake, R.E. Carty and LyndaErickson., Op. Cit.85Populism(Scale scored in populist direction)1. In the long run, I'll put my trust in the simple,down-to-earth thinking of ordinary people rather than thetheories of experts and intellectuals. (Agree)2. We would probably solve most of our big national problems ifgovernment could actually be brought back to the people at thegrass roots.(Agree)3. What we need is government that gets the job done without allthis red tape. (Agree)Collective versus Individual Responsibility(Scale scored in individual responsibility direction)1. After a person has worked until 65, it is proper for thecommunity to support him or her. (Disagree)2. The government ought to make sure that everyone has a decentstandard of living. (Disagree)3. Let's face it, most unemployed people could find a job ifthey really wanted to. (Agree)4. Why should the government spend my tax dollars on sickpeople, my family always put aside something for a rainy day.(Agree)5. Government regulation stifles personal initiative. or Withoutgovernment regulation, some people will just take advantage ofthe rest of us. (Chose first statement)6. If I do my best, it is only right that the government shouldhelp me out when I get some bad breaks. OR Each individualshould accept the consequences of their own actions. (Chosesecond statement)Continentalism(scored in continentalist direction)1. Canada should have freer trade with the United States.(Agree)2. Canada's independence is threatened by the large percentageof foreign ownership in key sectors of our economy. (Disagree)3. We must ensure an independent Canada even if that were tomean a lower standard of living for Canadians. (Disagree)Antiregulation(scored in anti-regulation direction)The scale was created by assigning a score from -2 to +2 torespondents depending on whether they believed that governmentregulation should be substantially reduced (2), slightly reduced(1), kept as now (0), slightly extended (1), or substantiallyextended (-2). The scores were then summed across seven policyareas then divided by seven to return to the originalmeasurement range. The policy areas were: environmentalprotection, marketing of agricultural products, land use, saleof alcohol, shopping hours, and gambling.86Restraint(scale in pro-restraint direction)1. The size of government in BC even if this means a lower levelof public services. (Agree)2. There should be a law requiring the government to balance theprovincial budget. (Agree)3. Government Spending on public service salaries should be(slightly or substantially) decreased.4. Regulation of human rights should be (slightly orsubstantially reduced).5. Government spending on education should be (slightly orsubstantially decreased).6. Government spending on welfare rates should be (slightly orsubstantially decreased).7. The restraint program was well intentioned but not wellimplemented. OR Opponents of the restraint program just couldnot accept losing the 1985 election. (Chose second statement) 42'Ibid., pp.137-139.87BRITISH COLUMBIASOCIAL CREDITPARTY AND LEADERSHIPSTUDY-1991-For delegates to the convention to choose a new Social Credit leader and Premier.To preserve confidentiality please DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME on the questionaire.88( 1 )SECTION A: PROVINCIAL ISSUES AND POLICIESThe first set of questions deals with current issues in British Columbia. In answering these questions,please keep in mind that it is your opinion that is being asked. There are no right or wrong answers.1. What, In your opinion, Is the most Important Issue facing the province today?2. Should government spending be substantially Increased, slightly Increased, remain the same,slightly decreased or substantially decreased In the following areas?(Please circle appropriate response.)SubstantiallyincreasedSlightlyincreasedStaythe sameSlightlydecreasedSubstantiallydecreasededucation DI [2] [3] [4] [5]welfare rates [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]health care [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]reforestation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]job creation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]grantshighways [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]tourism [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]public service [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]salariesdaycare [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]SECTION B: GENERAL ISSUES AND POLICY CONCERNSThis section contains a number of statements one sometimes hears about politics in B.C. and in Canadamcre generally. Please select the position which comes closest to your own opinion.1. Please Indicate whether you AGREE, DISAGREE, or have NO OPINION on the followingstatements:Agree^Disagree^No opinionThe government ought to make sure that^[1]^[2]^[3]everyone has a decent standard of living.In the long run, I'll put my trust in the simple,^[1]^[2]^[3]down-to-earth thinking of ordinary peoplerather than the theories of experts and intellectuals.Abortion is a matter which should be decided^[1]^[2]^[3]solely between a woman and her doctor.(2)Social security programs (like old agepensions and family allowances) shouldbe based on family income needs, andpeople who don't need this type ofassistance should not receive it.The government ought to make sure that everyonewho wants to work can find a job.Trade unions should be required toconduct a secret ballot before authorizingstrike action.The government should see thateveryone has adequate housing.Public Sector workers have a lot morejob security than private sector workers.During a strike, management shouldbe allowed to hire workers to take theplace of strikers.Let's face it, most unemployed peoplecould find a job if they really wanted to.We could probably solve most of our bigpolitical problems if government couldactually be brought back to people atthe grass roots.Why should the government spend mytax money on sick people; my familyalways put aside something for a rainy day.What we need is a government that getsthe job done without all this red tape.After a person has worked until 65, it is properfor the community to support him or her.B.C. companies should be given preferencefor provincial government contracts evenif the cost is higher.A lot of welfare and social securityprograms we have now are unnecessary.Trade unions have too much power inBritish Columbia.Agree^Disagree^No opinion[1] [2] [3][1] [2] (3][1] [2] (31[1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] (31[1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3]8990(3 )The size of government in B.C. should be maintainedeven if this means an increase in taxesCanada's independence is threatened by the largepercentage of foreign ownership in key sectorsof the economy.The Senate of Canada should be elected.The provincial government should negotiate withthe province's native population on land claims.There should be a law requiring the government tobalance the provincial budget.Agree Disagree No opinion[1] [2] [31[1] [2] [31[1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3]VII [2] [312. Indicate which position comes closest to representing your opinion :a. Considering the balance of power and responsibilities between the federal and provincialgovernments, do you think we should:[ ] maintain the present balance[ ] transfer more power to the provinces[ ] transfer more power to the federal governmentb. Do you believe that people in the various provinces should put lessemphasis on their distinctive regional identities and more emphasis ontheir common Canadian identity?[ ] Yes^[ ] Noc. In relation to other provinces, do you feel that British Columbiahas received equitable treatment from the federal government?[ ] Yes^[ ] No3 . Do you approve or disapprove of the following proposals to modify our system of politicalrepresentation?:a. Free votes in the Legislature.b. Fixed terms and election dates.c. Recall of an MLA upon petition of apercentage of constituents thusforcing a byelection.Approve^Disapprove^No opinion^[ 1^[ 1^I[1^[I^II^II91(4)4. Please check the statement in each of the following pairs which comes closest torepresenting your opinion?a. [ ] People who constantly argue against the logging of our forests justdon't understand this means fewer jobs and less investment .OR[ ] If preserving our forests means less money for me, then that's the way it has to be.b. [ ] Government regulation stifles personal initiative.OR[ ] Without government regulations, some people just take advantage of the rest of us.c. [ j If I do my best, it is only right that the government should help meout when I get some bad breaks.OR[ ] Each individual should accept the consequences of their own actions.d. [ ] Governments should make a concerted effort to improve the socialand economic position of women.OR[ ] Women should help themselves and should not expect governments tomake special efforts on their behalf.SECTION C: PARTY INVOLVEMENT1. What, In your opinion, is the most Important issue facing the Social Credit Party today?2. What Is your PRESENT Involvement in the Social Credit Party? (Please check as many as applyto you).[ ] member of the provincial executive[ j member of a constituency association executive[ ] member of the youth associationj member of the women's auxiliaryf party member[^other (please specify)3. Did you attend the B.C. Social Credit leadership convention In 1986 that choseBill Vander Zalm as leader?[ ] Yes^[ ] No4. If yes to 3, who did you vote for on the first ballot and the last ballot?First ballot^ Final ballot[ Kim Campbell[ ] Mel Couvelier[ ] Grace McCarthy[^Cliff Michael[ ] Jim Nielsen[ ] John Reynolds[ j Bill Ritchie[ ] Steven Rogers[ ] Brian Smith[ j Bud Smith[ ] Bill Vander Zaim[ ] Bob Wenman[ ] Brian Smith[ Bill Vander Zalm92( 5 )5. Which of the following have you EVER done? (please check as many as apply to you.)[ I served as member of the provincial executive[ ] served on a constituency association executive[ ] helped raise funds for the party[ ] worked in a campaign for a party candidate[ ] run for a Social Credit nomination[ ] been a Social Credit candidate in a provincial election[ ] served as a Social Credit M.L.A.[ j attended an annual party convention[ ] member of Social Credit youth organization[ ] member of Social Credit women's auxiliary[ ] previously active in another provincial party[ ] other (please6. Do you think of yourself as part of the party's central group In your constituency?[ ] Yes^[ ] No7. When did you Join the Social Credit Party?[ ] 1991[ ] 1986 - 1990[ 1980 - 1985[ ] 1976 - 1979[ ] 1972 - 1975[ ] before 19728. Did you work for the Social Credit campaign during the 1986 provincial election?[ ] Yes^[ ] No9. Are you a member of a federal political party?[ ] Yes^[ ] NoIf yes to 9, which one?[ ] Progressive Conservative[ ] Liberal[ ] Social Credit[ ] New Democratic Party[ ] Reform Party of Canada[ ] Christian Heritage Party[ ] Other (please specify)  10. Which party did you vote for In the 1988 federal election?[ ] Progressive Conservative[ ] Liberal[ ] Social Credit[ ] New Democratic Party[ ] Reform Party of Canada[ ] Christian Heritage Party[ ] Other (please specify) 11. Do you plan to work In the Social Credit campaign during the next provincial election?[ ] Yes^[ ] No93(6 )12. Did you work for the party you supported In the 1988 federal election?[ ] Yes^[ ] No13. If a federal election were held today, which party would you vote for?[ ] Progressive Conservative[ j Liberal[ ] Social Credit[ ] New Democratic Party[ ] Reform Party of Canada[ Christian Heritage Party[ ] Other (please specify)14. Please indicate your involvement in local politics.[ ] None[ ] Just interested] Actively involved[ ] Have been a candidate] Have held elected office15. If elected to serve in local office, to what position or governing body were you elected?(Please check as many as apply to you.)[ I Mayor of municipality or city[ ] Council of municipality or city[ ] Trustee of public school board[ j Trustee of hospital board[ ] Trustee of parks board[ ] Other (please specify)16. When were you elected to serve in local office? (Please check as many as apply to you.)[ ] During years 1990 - 1991[ ] 1985 - 1989[ j 1980 - 1984[ j 1975 - 1979[ ] 1970 - 1974[ j 1965 - 1969[ j Prior to 1965SECTION D: CONVENTION DELEGATES1. What constituency did you represent at the convention?2. Approximately how many people attended the meeting that chose you as a delegate to theconvention?[ ] less than 50[ ] 50 - 100[ ] 101 - 200[ ] 201 - 300[ ] more than 3003. Were the delegates for your constituency chosen by acclamation?[ ] Yes^[ ] No94(7)4. Who took the Initiative in your becoming a convention delegate?[ ] Local party officials[ ] My M.L.A.[ ] One of the candidate's supporters( ] Friends[ ] Myself5. Did you ask other people to vote for you?[ ] Yes^[ ] No6. Were you identified as supporting a particular candidate before you were elected?[ ] Yes^[ ] No7. If Yes to 6: Which one ?8. Did you run as part of a slate of delegates?[ j Yes^[ ] No9. Did you have any relatives also attending the convention as a delegate?[ ] Yes^[ j No10.1f Yes to 9: Please indicate the relationship(s).SECTION E: CANDIDATES AND THE CAMPAIGN1. Were you actively involved in the leadership campaign of one of the candidates ?[ ] Yes^[ ] No2. If Yes to 1: Which one?^3. Did you make a commitment to vote for the candidate you supported on the first ballot?[ j Yes^[^No4. If you made a commitment to vote for a specific candidate on the first ballot, to whom did youmake that commitment?[ ] The candidate personally[ ] Your local party organization] Your local M.L.A.[ ] A member of the party organization[ ] Other (please specify)^5. Was the commitment you made binding after the first ballot was over?[ ] Yes^[ ] No. 95( 8)6. Please rate how important the following were In determining your first choice?VeryimportantSomewhatimportantNotimportantCandidate's understanding of my regionof the province[11 [2] [3]Candidate's past service to the party [1] [2] [3]Candidate's policy positions [1] [2] [3]Candidate's ability to lead the party tovictory in the next election[1] [2] [31Endorsement of a minister or M.L.A. [1] [2] [3]Candidate's personal character andintegrity[1] [2] [3]Candidate's ability to keep the party united [1] [2] [3]Candidate's experience in elected office [1] [2] [3]Personal friendship for the candidate orsomeone working for her/him[1] [2] [3]Personal charisma of the candidate [1] [2] [3]7. When did you decide who to support on the first ballot?[ ] When his or her candidacy was announced[ ] When I was selected as a delegate[ ] Between the time of my selection as a delegate and the opening of the convention[ ] At the convention8. Did you make up your mind for whom to vote, or change your vote because ofthe candidates' responses at the Policy Forum held on the afternoon of Friday July 19?[ I Yes^[ ] No9. Did you make up your mind for whom to vote, or change your vote because ofthe candidates' main speeches to the convention given on the evening of Friday July 19?.[ ] Yes^[ ] No .10. The Leadership convention was called because of the resignation of Premier Vander Zalm.Various propositions have been advanced to account for the events that led to his resignation..(Choose the statement which most closely represents your opinion.)Premier Vander Zalm was.....[ I the architect of his own misfortune.[ ] the casualty of actions of dissaffected internal party forces.[ J the victim of media misrepresentation.[ I other. (please specify)^9 6( 9 )11. Please indicate whether you AGREE, DISAGREE, or have NO OPINION on thefollowing statements:Agree^Disagree^No opinionProfessional organizers weaken the roleof ordinary members in party affairs.There is too much emphasis on publicopinion polls and slick advertising inpolitics todayIn recent years the party leader hasbeen cut off too much from the opinionsof ordinary party membersThe party should require 50% of itscandidates for election to be womenThe party has to be careful not tomove too far to the rightThe party leader should be elected by avote of all members of the party, notjust by convention delegatesAny interim premier selected by thecaucus should be an M.L.A. who has nointention of seeking the party leadership.Constituency associations should beguaranteed a fixed percentage of alldonations to the party.[1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [31[2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3][1] [2] [3112. Should British Columbia enact laws governing party and election finance?^[ Yes^[ ] No13. Should any election expense legislation cover internal party matters likenomination contests and leadership conventions?^[ ] Yes^[ ] No14. Should provincial political parties require that all leadership candidates make public thefollowing:a. Names of contributors and value of all campaign contributions.^Yes^[ ] Nob. Statements of all campaign expenditures.[ ] Yes^[^No• 97(1o)SECTION F: BACKGROUND INFORMATION1. [ ] Male^J Female2. Year of Birth:3. Place of Birth:[ ] British Columbia[ ] Other Canadian province or territory[ ] Country other than Canada (please specify)4. Length of residence in British Columbia::[ ] Less than 1 year[ j 1 to 5 years[ ] 6 to 10 years[ j 11 to 15 years[ ] 16 to 20 years[ j over 20 years5. Employment status:[ ] self-employed[ ] employed full-time[ ] employed part-time[ j unemployed( J employed in the home/homemaker[ ] retired[ ] student[ ] other (please specify)6. Briefly, how would you describe your present or pre-retirement occupation?( For example: chartered accountant with a small logging company, or floormanager in a large department store.)7. What would you estimate your total before-tax household Income to be this year?[ ] less than 610,000^[ 1 50,000 to 74,999[ j 510,000 to 19,999 ] 75,000 to 99,999[ ] 20,000 to 34,999^[ ] $100,000 and over[ ] 35,000 to 49,9998. What is your religious affiliation?9. Amount of formal education:[^elementary school[ I some high school[ ] high school graduation[ ] post sec. technical/vocational[ I some college or university] university graduation[ ] post-graduate university degree. 98(11)SECTION G: THE LEADERSHIP CONVENTION1. What was the single most important factor in your decision for whom to vote on the first ballot?2. Which candidate did you vote for on the first ballot?[ ] Mel Couvelier[ ] Duane Crandall[ ] Norm Jacobsen[ ] Rita Johnston[ ] Grace McCarthy3. Which candidate did you vote for on the second ballot?[ ] Rita Johnston[ ] Grace McCarthy4. If you changed your vote between the first and second ballots, what was themain factor In your decision for whom to vote on the second ballot?5. Did Mel Couvelier's endorsement of Rita Johnston have any influence on yoursecond ballot vote?[ ] Yes^[ ] No6. Do you have any other comments about the convention?Thank you very much for your contribution to this study. Please return the questionnaire in thestamped envelope provided or mail directly to :Social Credit Leadership Campaign Survey,Department of Political Science,C472 - 1866 West Mall,University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 121

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