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Rationality and spatial structure : metaphysics and space in seventeenth century thought Staddon, Cædmon 1991

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to the required standardRationality and Spatial Structure: Physics, Metaphysics and Space inSeventeenth Century ThoughtbyCaedmon StaddonB.A. (First Class), Simon Fraser University, 1988THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Dept. of Geography)We accept this thesis as conformingTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember 1991© Caedmon Bertrand StaddonIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.Department of  C .:."6:C.CY'4--Aet-ijThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate  C3-4-■.) '..) 4121.9 _5DE-6 (2/88)Ab stractThe structuring of knowledge is related in complex ways to the political,social and economic geography of the period. The seventeenth century was aperiod of great social, political and economic turmoil in England and WesternEurope, throughout which intellectuals proposed various alternative models ofsocial, no less than scientific, certainty and stability. Of these disputes, the debatebetween Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle during the 1650s and 1660s over theinterpretation of Boyle's air pump trials is a prime example of the complex,multiply imbricated, terrain traversed in pursuit of "right method" and socialorder. By the century's end, a broadly syncretic philosophical position whichlargely favoured Newtonian modalities was conjoined with a politicalsettlement in a way which clearly set Western intellectual development onto anew developmental trajectory.Of particular importance to this thesis are the geographical correlates ofthese ostensibly universal scientific transformations. This general restructuringof theories of science and society also necessarily entailed aspatial restructuringat the abstract philosophical level. The ontological dispute between spatialabsolutists and spatial relativists drew on rival conceptions of substance andsubjectivity which were in turn employed to underwrite divergent ideas aboutthe spatial structure of knowledge production. Ultimately these spatialities weremapped into divergent conceptions of social and political order.These debates and social transformations resulted in the undermining ofsophisticated visions of a geographical discipline, such as that forwarded byBernhardus Varenius in his Geographia Generalis. Instead, geography wasestablished as the study of the relations between objects and their environmentsin a way which elided critical questions regarding the spatiality of manyontological and epistemological problems.In this thesis I will attempt to integrate an analysis of the spatial content ofseventeenth century ontological and epistemological theories with an analysis ofthe historico-geographical context within which they were elaborated anddiffused. One implication of this thesis is that the "project of modernity",i iinitiated during the "Scientific Revolution" also contained a corollary spatialdiscourse which must be recovered if modernity itself is to be more fullyunderstood. Suggestions about an "end" to the "project of modernity", and thedawn of a "postmodern" era, must consequently establish that modernity'sconstitutive spatial and geographical modalities have either been superceded orsignificantly transformed.111Table of ContentsPageAbstract^ i iTable of Contents^ i vList of Figures v iAcknowledgement v i iChapter 1 Modernity, Space and Human Geography1.1 Geography and Modernity^ 21.2 Historicism and Geographical Thought^81.3 Phenomenology and Human Geography 171.4 Philosophies of Space in the Seventeenth Century^26Plan of the Work Chapter 2 Into Modernity's Basement: An Historical Geographyof Seventeenth Century Philosophy2.1 Introduction^ 372.2 The Seventeenth Century Crisis of Confidence^402.3 Political Economic Aspects of Cartesianism 46and Baconianism2.4 Concluding Comments^ 58Chapter 3 Ontology and the Spatiality of Subjectivity:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 13.1 Ontologies of Self and Substance^ 613.2 Hobbes' and Descartes' Plenist Ontology^66Theories of Substance^66Theories of Causality and Motion^713.3 The Plenist Construction of Subjectivity 76Varieties of Seventeenth Century Dualism^76Hobbes' 'Limited' Dualism^813.4 Human and Physical Ontologies and their Spatiality^85Chapter 4 The Human Geographies of Seventeenth Century Philosophy:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 24.1 Self/Substance Ontologies and Political Geography^904.2 The Frontispiece to Leviathan: Hobbes' Political 91GeographyivTable of Contents (cont'd)Page 4.3 Hobbes, Boyle and the Air Pump Trials^99Technological Space^103Social Space^109The Spatiality of Hobbes' Objections to Boyle^1144.4 Spatiality and the Partition Between Physics and 118MetaphysicsChapter 5 Theories of Absolute versus Relational Space:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 35.1 The Latent Spatiality of Scientific Discourse^1215.2 The Logic of Relational Space^ 1255.3 The Triumph of Absolute Space 1315.4 Theories of Space and Seventeenth Century^136GeographyChapter 6 The Historical Geography of Modernity and the Prospectsfor a Postmodern Human Geography6.1 On the Historical Geography of Early Modern Thought^1456.2 On the Spatiality of Early Modern Thought^1486.3 Modernity, Postmodernity and Critical Human Geography 149Bibliography^ 152List of FiguresPageFigure 1^Integrated Historico-Geography of Spatial Thought^32Figure 2 Enclosures of Common Fields 1700-1800^42Figure 3 Frontispiece to Sprat's History of the Royal Society^47Figure 4 Social Composition of the Royal Society^50Figure 5 Hobbes' Classification of the Sciences 54Figure 6 The Ptolemaic Universe According to Robert Fludd (1619) 62Figure 7 Frontispiece to Hobbes' Leviathan^ 94Figure 8 Hollar's Engraved Portrait of Charles II (1650)^97Figure 9 Hooke's Diagram of a Flea^ 104Figure 10 Diagram of Boyle's Air Pump 106Figure 11 Sketch of Royal Society Proceedings Based on Magalotti^112and ShapinFigure 12 Frontispiece to Roberts' The Merchant's Map^140of CommerceFigure 13 Varenius' Plan for a Special Geography^143viviiAcknowledgementThis thesis is, I believe, a reflection of trends which are currently emergingin human geography and social theory. After decades of concern about space asan object of theoretical concern, geographers are discovering that not only arethe objects of research spatially constituted, but so too are the researchprogrammes themselves. Moreover, there is a complex, but critically important,interplay between the objects and programmes of social research. Oneimplication of such insights is that broad intellectual trajectories, such as the"project of modenity", suddenly take on new importance in the history ofgeography. Such understandings have helped usher in a period of remarkablyrich and sophisticated research.I thank my teachers, colleagues and friends for helping me to exploresome of the possibilities presented by such a complex and subtle viewpoint. TheDept. of Geography at the University of British Columbia provided me with aremarkably rich and sympathetic environment in which to struggle with theissues examined in this work.Special thanks are due to Derek Gregory for his gentle prodding (to get itdone), his excellent humour (as chapter deadlines were repeatedly missed) andfor his faith in the ideas upon which this work is based (especially at those timeswhen that same faith eluded me).Chapter 1"Modernity, Space and Human Geography"1.1 Geography and Modernity1.2 Historicism and Geographical Thought1.3 Phenomenology and Human Geography1.4 Philosophies of Space in the Seventeenth CenturyPlan of the Work11.1 Geography and ModernityThis thesis is an inquiry into the intersections between philosophicalconceptions of space, historico-geographical processes (events occurring withinspace and through time) and that cultural and intellectual complex wecommonly refer to as the "project of modernity". In particular I will argue thatquestions revolving around how conceptions of space have been implicated incurrent intellectual histories, at least those rooted in the European tradition,have been largely neglected. Rarely in the canon of western philosophy does onecome across a treatment of "the difference that space makes" to intellectualhistory. Even now the intersections between analyses of rationality and analysesof spatial structure are considered to be novel, at least within the purview of thehistoriography of science. 1 And where space is explicitly raised as aphilosophical issue, it is generally "solved" and subsequently tucked away fromfurther view. It is well known, for example, that Newton placed greatimportance upon the careful conceptualisation of space in his naturalphilosophy. Yet, he clearly considered his most explicit and thorough treatmentof space as a "scholium", or prologue, to his more central theorisations ofphysical dynamics. 2 Conversely, theories of time and temporal relations havenot been so readily dismissed, submerged or otherwise effaced. Indeed,philosophical problems of temporality have been much closer to the core ofmodernity's agenda since at least the late eighteenth-century. There is then anabiding asymmetry between space and time within the project of modernity notjust in terms of their respective conscious theorisations, but, and perhaps moresignificantly, in terms of their respective positions as relevant items onmodernity's agenda. Yet, following Harvey, it seems plausible to suggest thatthis apparent "annihilation of space through time" can only exist as a paradox ,because we 'moderns' have become inured to it by louder or more audible,claims. 3 In this thesis I try to recover some of the complexity and critical edge ofSimon Schaffer and Steven Shapin 1985: Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and theExperimental Life (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press) pp.332-333.2 See Milic Capek 1976: The Concepts of Space and Time: Their Structure and Development(Boston:D.Reidel Co.), Note also that Kant too seems to have dealt with space in a similarfashion as Newton, though it is important to remember that this is not totally equivalent to hisunderstanding of geography .3 David Harvey 1989: The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (London: Basil Blackwell) p.258. Harvey also says that "this leads us back to the most2human and physical spatiality as it was discussed and conceived at the outset ofthe so called 'Scientific Revolution'.It has become standard in much academic research to trace the origins ofour present intellectual trajectory back to the turn of the eighteenth-century andespecially the philosophical thought of David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant(1724-1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). 4 Hume and Kanthad recognised as the central problematic of Enlightenment was to effect theemancipation of the the independent rational human subject from thetranscendental theology in which Descartes and his contemporaries had left itmired. Descartes, who had first postulated the cogito ergo sums, had,unfortunately in Hume's view, been content to render transcendental thesubjectivity of the cogito by identifying it ultimately with the Christian God. Theinvocation of the Christian God, or, more precisely some historico-geographically specific conception of the Christian God, as the foundation of allrational thought unavoidably begged the question of the western intellectualtradition's relationship to its past. If Descartes dealt with the cogito's origin byrelating it to God as a transcendental principle, then the whole problematic ismerely shifted onto the grounds of the historico-geography of Christian theology.Paradoxically, Descartes' epistemologically modern rationalism seemed to Humeand Kant to be founded upon a decidedly premodern ontology. 6 At one and thesame time therefore, Descartes, and with him perhaps all of the champions ofserious dilemma of all: the fact that space can be conquered only through the production of space"by which he apparently means that the human experience of "Being" which is intrinsicallyspatial is superceded by the valorisation of multiple successive "Beings" in an historicalnarrative of "Becoming" cf. Harvey 1989 pp.213ff4 The common claim is that the 'project of modernity' within which we are today immersed wasinitiated in the philosophical works of Hegel and Nietzche and the literary works of Goethe,Flaubert and Baudelaire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See, for example, JurgenHabermas 1987: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Translated by Frederick Laurence andwth an Introduction by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press); Marshall Berman 1982:All That is Solid Melts into Air (New York: Penguin); Peter Gay 1969: The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson); Ernst Cassirer 1951 (1932): Philosophy ofthe Enlightenment (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press); and also Harvey 1989. As an aside I notethat geographers who have exmained the history of geography itself also tend to adopt aroughly convergent timeframe. See David Stoddart 1986: On Geography: and its History(London: Basil Blackwell); and Derek Gregory 1989: "The Crisis of Modernity?" draft paper Deptof Geography, Univ. of British Columbia, Spring 1989.5 The novelty was that human subjectivity was defined in terms of the activity of rational directedthought .6 A point made also by Marjorie Grene 1985: Descartes (Brighton: Harvester Press) p.3the seventeenth-century "Age of Reason", were simultaneously profoundlymodern and anti-modern! In their view what was required was a rectification ofthose areas where Descartes had 'gone wrong', betraying his rationalism withmetaphysical speculation. Hume and Kant set about freeing the Cartesiansubject from its backward looking historical shackles, largely through attempts atits objectification through reflective self consciousness.?Yet, it would appear as though there was still another importanttransformation to be negotiated prior to the dawning of a fully 'modern'intellectual era. As Habermas points out, Hegel was probably the firstcontinental philosopher to perceive that the resolution of this Cartesian paradoxtakes us well beyond Kant's reflections upon rationalism in and of itself:As modernity awakens to consciousness of itself , a need for self-reassurance arises, which Hegel understands as a need for philosophy.He sees philosophy as confronted with the task of grasping its owntime - and for him that means the modern age - in thought. Hegel wasconvinced that he could not possibly obtain philosophy's concept ofitself independently of the philosophical concept of modernity.8Kant and Hume had failed, on Hegel's view, by not seeing that theirappropriation of rationalism remained mired in much the same "positivity" 9 ofdoctrine, of "objective rationalism", as the "orthodoxy" they were trying torehabilitate. By emphasising the replacement of the Cartesian 'God of faith' withone of reason they had failed to see that the two could amount to pretty muchthe same thing: the continued submission of the present to the past via thecomplete rationalisation of an absolute subjectivity. For a solution to thisdifficulty Hegel returned to the classical distinction between self consciousness asan historical problem, and self knowledge as a philosophical one. 1 ° That the' Kant's formulation of the problem as one of "aufklarung" (enlightenment) is clearly explicatedin Michel Foucault 1984: "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader Edited by PaulRabinow (New York: Pantheon) pp.32-50. For Hume much the same sentiment is encapsulated inhis well known comment "Reason is, and only to be, the slave of the passions and can neverpretend to any other office but to serve and obey them" quoted in Gay 1969, p. 1888 Habermas 1987, p.169 By "positivity", at least in this context, Hegel appears to imply the creation of intellectualmodalities which subsequently influence, perhaps through the constraining of alternatives, thepossibilities for self knowledge.10 Stanley Rosen 1989: The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity (New Haven: YaleUniv. Press) p.84 and see also p.86 Fn #7 for a clear description of Hegel's thinking about therelationship between self consciousness and self knowledge.4two had not developed in tandem through the Enlightenment provided Hegelwith a new entre into both the Enlightenment's achievements as well as itsaporias. For Hegel the unmasking of the historical "positivity" of Kantianidealism was a profoundly philosophical issue, rooted in the dialecticalrelationship between "time consciousness" and "self consciousness".Immediately as it was posed in this fashion, however, Hegel feltcompelled to consider the implications of the aporia between historical andphilosophical self understanding for social and political order. This much wouldseem to follow since the corollary of the (dialectical) union of self knowledge andself consciousness at the individual subjective level at the level of theexternalised "Spirit" was at that time commonly taken to be the union of citizenand state. Both Rosen and Habermas have commented on this connection,especially in terms of its putative status as a dialectical corollary, rather thanmerely an analogy to his analysis of subjectivity. 11 In any event, Hegel's owntendency was to perceive that "the only source of [civil] normativity whichpresents itself is the principle of subjectivity from which the very timeconsciousness of modernity arose." This of course is similar, but the notidentical, to the problem of "Aufklarung" posed by Kant. Rather than seekingthe redemption of the Enlightenment promise in the historical tradition ofrationalism per se, Hegel argued that only "the philosophy of reflection, whichissues from the basic fact of self consciousness, adequately conceptualises thisprinciple". 12 Though Hegel did not articulate it in these terms, it would seemthat, for Hegel, the only connection between microcosm and macrocosm, citizenand state, which typifies modernity would be the one which reunited knowledgeof the self as a conscious, knowing being, with its objectification as externalisedBeing. From this platform the movement into the more thoroughlyproductionist metaphysics of Marx in the nineteenth century and Heidegger inthe twentieth was comparatively straightforward11 Habermas 1987, p.37ff analyses this Hegelianism in terms of the further aporia between civilorder and the order of productive practices. Rosen, by contrast, rejects outright this synthesis,insofar as he appears to think that it requires that "...the subjective dimension of the state (thesatisfied, ethical citizen) initiated a unification of subjective and objective Spirit in Art,Religion and Philosophy" 1989, p.113.12 Habermas 1987, p.415But where does space fit into all of this? The development of modernityfrom Descartes, through Hume and Kant to Hegel has thus far been sketchedsolely in terms of the interpenetrations of time consciousness and westernsubjectivity. And yet it should be patently clear that concepts of what it means tobe "modern" cannot possibly avoid an engagement with spatial problematics.The relationship of time consciousness to self consciousness which preoccupiedEnlightenment thinking up to Kant and which was problematised as aphilosophical problem by Hegel necessarily carries with it important and largelyunexplored spatial baggage. The spatialisations of the self/other, micro-macro,private/public and other centrally important dichotomies, are de-emphasised inpursuit of the reconciliation within a post-Hegelian model of modernity ofhistorical and philosophical understandings. One especially ironic result hasbeen that the tradition of academic geography, though it has worked hard tofurther our understanding of human and physical relations in space, it has beenstructurally disinclined to interrogate its own concepts of what spatiality isbelieved to consist of, and what this means for the conduct of geographicalresearch. On this basis an argument will be made for the further development ofmodernity's project through the inclusion of both historico -geographical andhistorico-geographical elements. This involves the examination of not just thehistory of spatial philosophy, but, equally, the spatial history of philosophy aswell.A further comment needs to be made about this last claim: that the"difference that space makes" is manifest not just in the recovery of abstractphilosophical disputations about spatiality and geography (though I shallcertainly have cause to dig deeply into the philosophical literature), but also interms of the relations these abstract spatialities bear to material events andprocesses. Ideas survive, it seems to me, not merely through their encapsulationin pen and ink, but also through their diffusion through space and time. Myargument that modernity contains within it deeply entrenched spatial notionswhich constrain its possible avenues of development would be considerablydulled indeed if I were not able to show them in operation in social, political,economic and political contexts. Fortunately it is possible to demonstrate thatthe theories and concepts proffered by those philosophers I will be examiningwere both influenced by, and exerted an influence upon, the times and places inwhich these thinkers lived. More to the point there would seem to be much6merit in the argument that it is only through such contextual readings that onecan get a firm grasp the meaning of the ideas and concepts as originallyelaborated.My task then is one of locating and rendering explicit some of theconnections between the geography of , and the geography (latent) in , the projectof modernity. The historico-geographical context I have chosen to studyencompasses the western European philosophical landscape during roughly themiddle third of the seventeenth century. During this period the first trulyrecognisable formulations of "modern" philosophy were initiated. More to thepoint, during the seventeenth-century discussions of "the difference that spacemakes" were much more central to both the rational and experimentalphilosophical projects. Even if it is granted that the late eighteenth century workof Hume, Kant and others significantly recast seventeenth century problematics,it cannot be doubted that they themselves looked to the preceding century, andthe work of Descartes, Hobbes, Newton and Boyle for much in the way ofconcepts and inspiration. This period also witnessed what has been referred to asthe first "bourgeois" revolution (in England in 1688), following more than half acentury of turmoil in England as well as on the continent. My thesis is that thematerial historical geography of the period can be connected with novel changesin the spatial thought in that period's philosophy. Ultimately I contend that onecan derive from this analysis a better understanding of the possibilities as well asthe limitations on spatial thinking generally and the discipline of geographyspecifically and the relationship of both to the project of modernity. During theseventeenth century, certain spatially determinate philosophical distinctionswere established, such as those between "primary and secondary qualities", selfand substance, etc. The fact that many of these distinctions remain central to theproject of modernity even after Kant and Hegel implies that the roots ofmodernity must necessarily be traced back at least this far.Prior to embarking upon the investigation of the spatiality of philosophyand the philosophy of spatiality it is necessary to consider some basicmethodological points. In the remainder of this introductory chapter I willevaluate two of the major streams of research into the history and philosophy ofspace and spatial relations. First, I will consider the mainstream historiographyof geography which tends to take as its object, not spatial relations or spatiality7taken generally, but rather some partisan or otherwise particularistic version ofgeography. This sort of approach tends to lapse into the sort of "whiggish"historicism which sees the history of ideas as moving in relation to just thathypostatised perspective. Margarita Bowen's account of the relationship betweenphilosophy and geography in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is anespecially appropriate, and telling, example insofar as it combines just this sort ofhistoricism with an ambitious attempt to map into broader intellectual arenas ofphilosophy and natural science. The other sort of approach to the philosophy ofspace I wish to consider here derives its impetus from phenomenology, trying tounderstand spatial relations in terms of some transcendental model of "humanspatiality". While this approach, at least in its transcendental manifestation,conceives of spatial relations in a much more open ended fashion thanhistoricisms such as Bowen's, it nevertheless suffers from a number ofdrawbacks which threaten the validity of her project. In the final section of thischapter I will elaborate a methodology for this thesis which attempts to avoid thepitfalls identified in the above two streams of research while also incorporatingtheir respective strengths.1.2 Historicism in Geographical ThoughtThe most straightforward, and 'mainstream', program within thehistoriography of geography and spatial philosophy, assumes a linear path ofprogressive evolution of spatial and geographical ideas. This form of'historicism' is rooted in the assumption that intellectual development is bothdiscursive , that is to say that it develops intersubjectively, and that it isdiachronic , in that the relevant narrative relates present conditions to pastexperiences, often with a view to future oriented ideals. The history ofgeography, within this modality, is traced largely in terms of the stringingtogether like beads on a string of all those imputations which invoke specific,recognisable textual signifiers such as "Geography", "cosmology", "space" and"place". Undoubtedly part of the appeal of this sort of approach is the relativelyuncomplicated narrative it can provide, anchored in time and space by certaintouchstone personalities and texts. These personalities and texts, Eudoxus,Strabo, Ptolemy as well as Varenius' Geographia Generalis and Kant's8Geographical lectures to take just a few examples, then become iconographic waystations in the development of the geographical discipline. This undergraduateview of the history of Geography tends to run along at a jaunty pace; startingwith the Greek empiricists, moving then to Ptolemy and Strabo, through thelong and putatively backward silence of the "Dark Ages", resurfacing in theenvironmental determinisms of Campanella and Bodin, through Carpenter andVarenius in the seventeenth century, and on to the epic reformulations ofKant. 13 Subsequently the "geographical tradition" hives off into variousnational or regional schools, such as the German "chorographers" Humboldt,Ritter and Hettner; the later French "genres de vie" tradition of Vidal de laBlache 14; the British "imperial" tradition of MacKinder and others 15; and theAmerican regional and cultural traditions of Hartshorne and Sauer. 16 Of course,there are marked variations in emphasis and understanding from one history ofgeography to another, and each is as interesting for what it excludes as for what itincludes. However, all would seem to be historicist in the semantically orientedsense introduced above. Still, as a genre these simplistic chronologies arerelatively innocuous, even if they tend also to overlay their semantichistoricisms with the discursively 'unifying' theme that "progress" iscumulative when charted along the temporal axis. This latter of course isanother analytically distinguishable historicist thread present in contemporaryhistoriographies of geography.In addition to these basic conceptual and thematic historicisms, I note athird strand of historicism which generally pervades the narratives underinvestigation here. Rarely, it seems, have historians and philosophers ofgeography considered geographically the potential relationships betweenchanging political, social and cultural landscapes and the intellectual matrices13 See for example Preston James and Geoffrey Martin 1981: All Possible Worlds: A History ofGeographical Ideas ; and also J.N.L. Baker 1963: History of Geography (Oxford: BasilBlackwell), though it must be noted that the former maintains much less philosophical depththan the latter.14 The signal treatment of which, in English, is undoubtedly Anne Buttimer's 1971: Society and Mileau in the French Geographical Tradition (Chicago: Rand McNally)15 David N. Livingstone 1984: "The History of Science and the History of Geography: Interactionsand Implications" History of Science 22, p.29216 See Richard Hartshorne 1959: Perspective on the Nature of Geography (Chicago: RandMcNally); and Carl 0. Sauer 1974: Land and Life: A Selection of the the Writings of CarlOrtwin Sauer, Edited by John Leighly (Berkeley: Univ of California Press).9which both resulted from and also impinged upon them. For example, R. J.Johnston's Philosophy and Human Geography, while initiating thedevelopmental tracing of four epistemological themes in twentieth centurygeographical research, all too rarely stops to consider the reciprocal constitutiveinfluence of geographical events and processes on those selfsame epistemologicalthemes. 17 Why certain ideas appeal at some times and not others, and thedifference this undoubtedly makes for the trajectories of disciplinarydevelopment remains unaddressed in Johnston's work, and consequently thenarrative becomes rather ambiguous. Harvey's statement that "geographersinevitably practice politics while politicians just as inevitably engage ingeographical practices" is cited but not taken up, a move which serves to throwthis lacunae in Johnston's work into even sharper relief. 18 Fortunately, recentwork by Harley and others on cartography, by Livingstone on teleological themesin geography, and by Cosgrove and others on the social and political"iconographies of the landscape" are significant indicators that this prevailingtendency in the the literature is being challenged. 19 An important hallmark ofthe work of these geographers is their abiding interest in stretching theirnarratives 'horizontally', across social, political and other spaces, as well as'vertically' along the temporal axis. These geographers understands thatintellectual events abstracted from their material contexts are mute; unable totell us why and in what ways ideas - spatial and otherwise - really matter. In arecent paper on the relation between (geographical) science, magic and religionin the early modern period, Livingstone makes such and approach explicit: "Myapproach, while broadly chronological, is... more thematic in emphasis but infull recognition that these themes, far from being discrete entities, merge andintertwine in important ways."20 For the most part though, examinations of thehistory of geography have remained straightjacketed within a diachronic17 R.J. Johnston 1983: Philosophy and Human Geography: An Introduction to Contemporary Approaches (London: Edward Arnold)18 Johnston 1983 p.110 The citation of course comes from David Harvey 1973: Social Justice and theCity (Balimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press) and is all the more ironic for the fact that Johnstondeploys it as an example of an esoteric principle of "structuralist geography" rather than as theexoteric principle which Harvey obviously intends it to be!19 See the collection of articles in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels 1989: The Iconography ofLandscape (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press) and also Livingstone 1984,1988,1990.20 David Livingstone 1988: "Science, Magic and Religion: A Contextual Reassessment of Geographyin the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" History of Science 26 p.273.10historicist framework. Even where this has been recognised, its normativevalence has generally been confirmed, as in Hartshorne's classic statement:If we [geographers] wish to keep on track - or return to the propertrack...we must first look back of us to see in what direction that trackhas led. 21A related and more invidious trend in the historiography of geography, afourth historicist strand if you will, is exemplified by those treatments whichbegin with a preformed conception of geography which is subsequently projectedbackwards into their historical narratives. Such works are markedly different inimportant respects from the more straightforward historicisms of James andMartin and J.N.L. Baker. This stream of historicist research presents thesometimes compelling illusion that the path of disciplinary development hassomehow 'culminated' in one or another particularistic view. Of course the apriori selection of themes in this mode is conjoined with the 'second historiciststrand' identified above which assumes that intellectual development isprogressive and cumulative along the temporal axis. To take a recent example,in his history and philosophy of geography James Bird has fashioned a narrativewhich is designed to underwrite his own neo-positivist geographicalprogramme.22 The selectivity and canalising of material necessarily intrinsic tosuch a project should be so obvious as to hardly require much comment. WhileBird does claim to inquire into the implications of changing ideas aboutintellectual certainty for the discipline of geography, he nevertheless acceptsuncritically a naive realism which rests on the "importance of externalvalidation by correspondence with the real world [whatever that is], comparingconsequences with the output of our work." 23 The unfortunate result, for anaccount which promises a critical understanding of philosophical history, is toaccept rather uncritically a naive form of realism which, as other more thorough21 Hartshorne quoted in Stoddart 1986 p.2, though of course this citation does not necessarily entaila lockstep adherence to the tendencies of the past on Hartshorne's part. Stoddart has shownthough how such sentiments were indicative of the "power of evolutionary thinking" for boththe style and content of geographical research. See especially Stoddart 1986, Chapter 8.22 James Bird 1989: The Changing World of Geography: A Critical Guide to Concepts and Methods(Oxford: Clarendon Press) Incidentally, he refers to his revitalised geographical paradigm as"PAME" ("pragmatic, analytic, methodology, epistemology").23 Bird 1989, p.23611treatments have shown, is itself a social product. 24 After a fashion, the verytotality and positivistic confidence of his narrative effects its owndeconstruction! 25Margarita Bowen's account of "Geographical Thought from Francis Baconto Alexander von Humboldt" is probably a better known example of what Porterhas aptly called, "the Whig heresy of writing history backwards to justify someperceived orthodoxy". 26 While her work, an unabashed attempt to portrayHumboldt as the primary agent of Geography's rescue from the "dark ages in thehistory of geography"27, has the virtue of a far better grounding in primaryphilosophical material than either Johnston or Bird, she nevertheless bothmisconstrues and even misses a great deal of material which is actually quitecentral to her project. In Bowen's work all four strands of historicism thus farintroduced converge to shape which is certainly as complex as it is contentious(judging from the vigour of the reactions to the book). Preconceived themesregarding the centrality of Humboldt's work for modern geography are joinedwith a semantically suspect fixation on the signifiers space, place etc in anarrative of progress and culmination which manages to avoid any meaningfulengagement with the material context of the works she examines. All of this isespecially ironic and disturbing given the high importance her intellectual hero,Humboldt, placed on questions of material context and social advocacy!In his critical review of her book, Joseph May dwells primarily upon theproblems engendered by Bowen's attempt to conceive of the seventeenth centuryDutch geographer Bernhardus Varenius as some sort of synthesiser of Baconianand Cartesian epistemologies. 28 His critical exploration of this claim rests on an24 Roy Bhaskar has referred to this sort of realism as "naive realism" which contrasts with hisown preferred brand of "transcendental realism" ; see Roy Bhaskar 1979: The Possibility ofNaturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Human Sciences  (Brighton: Harvester); and for adiscussion of realism in geography see Andrew Sayer 1985: "The Difference that Space Makes"in Derek Gregory and John Urry (Eds) Social Relations and Spatial Structures  (London:MacMillan) pp.49-65.25 How refreshing it would be to encounter historiographic narratives which trace the paths ofsignificant intellectual stitches dropped, rather than trading on the glib illusion that thepassing of time always correlates with positive progress made!26 quoted in Livingstone 1984 p.27127 Bowen 1980 p.1028 Joseph May 1983: "Philosophy and Geography in the Seventeenth Century: A Review" CanadianGeographer 27(1) pp.85-9512examination of a central epistemological passage in Varenius' GeographiaGeneralis and its relations to Bacon's and Descartes' mutually divergent notionsof "certainty" and "proof". May's substantive point is that, contra Bowen,Varenius cannot easily be portrayed as a synthesiser of Baconian and Cartesianepistemologies for the obvious reason that their notions of certainty are largelyexclusive and even oppositional. As far as it goes May's discussion is erudite andwell informed, though he oddly uses it to support his "...major misgiving thatthe approach adopted by Margarita Bowen...offers no control over thephilosophical material". 29 What is strange about this claim, of course, isprecisely that, far from offering no control, Bowen's approach actually imposesso much control that important voices, contrary and otherwise, are stifled!Indeed it seems, contra May, that it is precisely this preponderance of controlwhich causes Bowen to read the (dis)similarities between Bacon and Descartes inthe way that she does. To take just one instance that May does not himselfdiscuss, Bowen's historicist project blinds her to both Descartes' own highlyambivalent feelings about mind-body dualism, as well as his own writings onthe concept and study of space contained in his Principia Philosophaie (1644). 30As I will show in subsequent, Descartes' postulation of "relative space" actuallyflew in the face of the absolutist conceptions adopted by post-Baconianempiricists such as Boyle and Newton and which was recodified by Kant. Toignore Descartes' ontological thinking (especially much of it is explicitly spatial)can only be detrimental to Bowen's overall project, since Descartes himselfconceived of them as a whole with his epistemology. Moreover, since her casecould have been constructed following the thread from Bacon to Boyle andNewton, without even trying to (mis)construe Descartes as a rote empiricist, oneis left wondering why she evidently felt compelled to do so in the first place. Themost likely answer brings me back to my original point; namely, that it is thepreponderance of control, epistemological and methodological, exerted by herhistoricist project, rather than what May takes to be the lack of it, which resultsin the submergence of important claims and counterclaims, spatial andotherwise.29 May 1983, p.8530 This lacunae is doubly disturbing given that Bowen explicitly discusses Descartes' Principia. SeeBowen p.63. I treat Descartes' own formulation of ontological dualism in chapter 3.13These problems of historicism are, for the most part, as obvious as they arenumerous. Fortunately, few historians of geography have been as spectacularlywhiggish as Bowen, though historicism still manages to be difficult to banish inpractice. Seemingly ever present is the latent tendency to write historybackwards, from some preconceived point of historical culmination. Perhapspart of the irresistibility of this tendency lies in the very diachronic nature ofconsciousness embedded within the condition of modernity. Still, not allhistoriography follows the relatively obvious and blatant historicist formatcritiqued above. Rather than writing simply from the perspective of some staticpresent, scholars have sometimes (re)written their histories in terms of definedprocesses or structural dynamics. Derek Gregory has recently observed that eventhe more praxically committed variants of political economic approaches havehad little time for engaged historical geographies of human social and materialprocesses. 31 Hobsbawm, for example, has presented the "General Crisis of theSeventeenth Century", as an expression of the inexorable and spatially invariantunfolding of capitalistic development. And intellectuals aligned with the"Frankfurt School" have schematised the critical historical transformations ofthe seventeenth through twentieth centuries in terms of the progressiveascendance of a highly technologically oriented form of rationality. In theDialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno have claimed that:On the way from mythology to logistics, thought has lost the elementof self reflection, and today machinery disables men even as it nurturesthem.32In contradistinction Trevor-Roper and Hill take more functionalist approachesfocussing on the impact of Protestant individualism and bureaucratisationrespectively.3331 Derek Gregory 1989: "Areal Differentiation and Postmodern Human Geography" in DerekGregory and Rex Walford (Eds) Horizons in Human Geography  (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble)p.7132 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 1972 (1944) The Dialectic of Enlightenment Translated byJohn Cumming (London: Allen Lane)33 The debate over the "General Crisis" hypothesis which was begun by Eric Hobsbawm's paper"The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" in Past and Present in 1954 remains a milestonein seventeenth century studies. See the collection of essays in Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith(Eds) 1978: The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century  (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)and also the discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis.14The problem of reconstructing past theorisations of space is beset withdifficulties other than those of the specific forms of historicism thus faridentified. Foremost among them is the fact it is not possible a priori to be sureof just what to look for in attempts to elucidate the historical development ofgeography and spatial thought. In Europe at least, the institutionalised pursuit ofexplicitly geographical knowledge did not gain any sort of foothold in theburgeoning universities until the end of the eighteenth century. 34 Prior to this,geography as a recognisable institutionalised discipline was largely non-existent,with only rare and short lived periods of efflorescence and achievement. For themost part "geography", as such, was considered, prior to the nineteenth century,to be a kind of physicalist propaedeutic, to natural philosophy on the one hand,and civil philosophy on the other. 35 So a central methodological problem then isto develop a way of tracking the development of geographical thought prior toits canalisation into an institutionalised discipline with recognisable signs andpractitioners. Quite obviously one cannot be content to look for signs of ageographical imagination only in specific operationalisations of the term itself.An apparent proxy for geographical thinking in philosophy might befound in an analysis of those terms which concern or describe the process ofdistancing and spatial distinction, both social and physical, which are basic to anygeographical sensibility. However, words, signifiers, like "space", "place" and"extension" are used variously from one thinker to the next, without theirmeanings always being readily or completely apparent. Moreover, interpretivedifficulties are greatly exacerbated by the inter-referentiality of texts within theseventeenth century intellectual context. Elements of some philosophicalposition might be absorbed into new syntheses without explicit cognizance oftheir spatial content, thus creating intellectual 'Trojan Horses' for subsequentgenerations (A point which will be taken up in subsequent chapters). One wouldhave to be very careful therefore in attempting to chart the course of spatialthought in terms of the changing valence of spatial terms identified a priori oftheir highly unstable and contingent local expressions. I will address themethodological difficulties this raises in the final section of this chapter.34 Stoddart 1986, esp Chs. 2 and 3 where the history of geography chairs and departments atEuropean universities is traced.35 Both Locke and Rousseau held to this conception to geography as merely preliminery backgroundeducation for their idealised citizen. See Gay 1969 and Jean Jacques Rousseau 1968: The Social Contract  translated and with and introduction by Maurice Cranston (Harmondworth: Penguin).15My point in this rather polyglot enumeration of the different sorts ofhistoricism is to suggest that some form of historicism may actually beunavoidable in any historical account, even one concerning the intellectualhistory of geography. To some extent organising themes cannot but be selectedprior to the development of an historical narrative. Nevertheless I do notconcur with those who might suggest that a logical corollary of this principle, aPrinciple of Unavoidable Historicism' if you will, is that we must abandon allhope of producing a useful narrative. On the contrary, the recognition of thecomplexity of historicism, as a modality of theorising as well as a deeply rootedelement of our intellectual tradition itself, puts the onus on us to deploy aperspective which, while remaining open to contrary and competing voices, stillmanages to hold to some broad spatial themes of human intellectual, political,cultural, economic and social development which fundamentally unite thenarrative. At the very least of course, we should try to be as realistic as possibleabout our own diachronic prejudices and also those of others whom we interpretand utilise.36 Without doubt an approach which endeavours to operationalisesuch strictures will perforce be interdisciplinary in nature, drawing bothconceptual and empirical support from diverse human, and even perhapsphysical, sciences. In support of such an approach Clarence Glacken has writtenthat those whostay within the limit of [their] discipline sip a thin gruel because theseideas [of nature and space] are derived from broader enquiries like theorigin and nature of life, the nature of man [sic] and the physical andbiological characteristics of the earth. 371636 In part, this motive is operationalised by the "New Historicists" who are moving history closerto literary theory (and vice versa) in an effort to create new narratives which dissolve thedistinction between culture and history as "foreground and background" respectively. See AramVeeser (Ed) 1990: The New Historicism (New York: Routledge)37 Glacken cited in Livingstone 1984, p.2941.3 Phenomenology and Human GeographyIn many respects it can be maintained that the generalised tendency tooperationalise one or more of the above forms of historicism in the history ofgeography has led to a situation where discussants are merely talking past oneanother. After all, by privileging, epistemologically and/or ontologically, fromthe outset some particular conception of geography, the possibilities for engagedcritical debate about geography itself will no doubt be considerably foreclosedupon. Nevertheless it is also true that spatiality is an intrinsic and unavoidablecomponent of both the philosophical and material aspects of modernity. Theproblem then involves the possibility of adducing the spatiality of material andphilosophical processes without predetermining, a priori of the empiricalexperience, the results of that investigation. In this section I will discuss aperspective, Husserlian phenomenology, which appears to hold out thepossibility of achieving this largely inductive goal through its unique perspectiveon the human structuring of lifeworlds, within the context of a transcendentalview of human subjectivity, and also spatiality. Central to this discussion will bethe specifically geographical elaboration of these phenomenological ideas by JohnPickles.38Phenomenological approaches, as elaborated by philosophers such asHusserl, Merleau Ponty, and Schutz (ignoring for a moment their markeddifferences) explicitly hold out the possibility of striking the necessary balancebetween historicism and relativism talked about above. Their explicit purposehas been to provide a way of elucidating and critiquing the 'naturalness' of the"natural attitude" by disclosing "the world as it shows itself before scientificenquiry, as that which is pre-given and presupposed by the sciences." 39 In otherwords phenomenological approaches focus upon re -problematising those ideasabout the constitution of the lifeworld which have come to be "taken forgranted" within the human and physical sciences. They are thereforeontologically as well as epistemologically oriented, seeking to uncover the ways38 John Pickles 1985: Phenomenology, Science and Human Geography  (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press)39 Pickles 1985, p.3 This is a statement common to most versions of phenomenology, irrespective oftheir other differences. See David Ley 1978 and also the entry for "phenomenology" in R.J.Johnston, D. Gregory and D. Smith (Eds) 1986: The Dictionary of Human Geography, SecondEdition (London: Basil Blackwell)17in which the objects of any given science are conceived prior to scientificinvestigation itself. Of course such an approach will have an impact on thestructuring of academic disciplines. In the case of geography Pickles claims that:[Cartesian science] has distorted [geography's] own conception of itssubject matter and basic concepts. In particular [it has] resulted in aconception of spatiality most appropriate for the physical sciences... 40Moreover, this "distortion" - a term which hints at Husserl's foundationalproject - is perpetually reified by a geographical methodology whichepistemologically presupposes it. Spatial scientific models, such as Christaller'slocation theory, are often faulted for presuming, and valorising through thispresumption, a specific set of assumptions about the constitution of spaces, andthe spatiality of rational actors, themselves. It is this rather unique sensitivity toontologies as well as epistemologies which makes phenomenology an attractiveintellectual candidate for examining the history and philosophy of concepts ofspace. Few perspectives are as well positioned as phenomenology claims to be tooffer a window onto some of the ways in which our views about what exists inthe world influence our ideas about how to attain certain knowledge about it,and of course vice versa.The appropriation of phenomenological ideas, especially over the past twodecades, has inspired a rather wide variety of geographical perspectives. Somegeographers appear to have taken phenomenology merely as an inspiration andpoint of departure for the elaboration of "humanistic" epistemologies whichforeground, over and against the constitution of any 'objective' physical world,the instillation of that world with meaning . This focus on the instillation andmaintenance of 'meaning', it will be noted, shifts the epistemological groundaway from positivism's reliance on mathematical discursive modalities, asobjective lenses onto the 'real' world, towards a preoccupation with thesubjective construction of the "lifeworlds" of individuals and collectivities. 41Such a phenomenology claims to truly 'ground' science in the world ofsubjective experience, labelling positivism's claim to have rendered thisirrelevant long ago as ideology. Of central interest in such "constitutive"40 Pickles 1985 p.441 E.V. Walter has referred to this as the project of recovering the "expressive intelligibility ofspace" 1988: Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment  (Chapel Hill, University ofNorth Carolina Press)18phenomenologies are those mechanisms which mediate and shape relationsbetween subjects as 'world producers' and the objects they encounter as 'objects'.Thus David Ley's work has shown a marked predisposition towards empiricalsituations in which important elements of worldviews, or their symbolisations,are under pressure of change or challenge. 42 Instability and flux of meaningsand lifeworlds are key here; "coalitions rather communities" as Ley puts it,which reveal the human world as the result of the "complex interaction ofmeaning, activity and constraint". 43 Ley, especially, inverts the positivistictendency to see social action as contained within an unchanging and universalphysical space arguing instead that:...humanistic geography is centrally concerned with a view ofphenomena as they are known in their essential meaningfulness ineveryday life.44As appropriated by Ley, Buttimer, Tuan and others, constitutivephenomenology has become a rationale for the development of humanisticapproaches in geography. These "geographical phenomenologies", in JohnPickles' opinion, celebrate the human capacity to create meaningful worldswithout bothering too much about any putative 'ontological' issues, at leastinsofar as these are taken to be in some sense foundational. In fact Husserl'sexplicit requirement, with which Pickles is identifying, that a thoroughgoingphenomenology must return to the ontological constitution of the "thingsthemselves" ("ding an sich") has been rejected in these "constitutive" circles asunreasonably foundational. According to Pickles, "geographicalphenomenology", rooted in the writings of Schutz and Merleau-Ponty ratherthan those of Husserl or Heidegger, "[has] treated phenomenology more as aguiding motivation rather than a methodological conception, and its evaluationproceeded in terms of already given categories ."45 Pickles further claims that therejection of an ontological component to phenomenological research ultimatelyresults in the inability to probe the constitution of the "natural attitude" itself.42 I am especially thinking Ley's work on American inner city neighbourhoods; 1974: The InnerCity as Frontier Outpost: Images of a Philadelphia Neighbourhood  (Washington, DC: AAGMonograph Series #7) and also with R.A. Cybriwsky 1974: "Urban Graffiti as TerritoryMarkers" Annals of the Amer Assn of Geogr.  64, 491-505.43 David Ley 1983: A Social Geography of the City (New York: Harper and Row) p.280,369 myitalics.44 Ley 1983, p. 13245 Pickles 1985, p. 4719Instead the "natural attitude" is left to its own devices, as it were, with theunfortunate result that much humanistic geography ironically runs the risk ofreifying positivistic ontologies! Behavioural studies, such as Downs' and Stea's"mental mapping" experiments, which seek to manipulate the interface between"objective reality" and "internal representations" of that "reality" are an obviouscase in point." 'Geographical phenomenologies', then, become to some degreetautological in that they repeatedly presume those deeply embedded spatialconcepts which they (sometimes) propose to treat critically. By downplaying thepossibility of transcendentally based human spatialities, geographicalphenomenology simply offers no solution to the critical dilemma caused by thefact that while objectification makes the human sciences possible, it, by definition, separates the researcher from a context of which s/he is unavoidably a part. 47In his critical appraisal of phenomenology and geography, Pickles hasargued for a much more strongly Husserlian transcendental approach. Such anapproach would interrogate our "natural attitude" about the world with a viewto showing how sciences ground themselves in their own "regional ontologies".Briefly put, the idea of a "regional ontology" would appear to indicate theoverall, and perhaps even largely inchoate, tendencies exhibited by the sciencesto impute or assume spatial attributes. As such the term "regional" is deployedboth figuratively, to represent the possibility of different ontologies withindifferent scientific "regions", and also literally, to point to the fact that anyscience must necessarily "spatialise" its objects. In so doing of course, theypresuppose , rather than discover, much of the form and substance of their ownactivities, at least insofar as problems of space are concerned. 48 The Husserlianapproach is meant to go considerably beyond the 'mere' concern for subjectiveworlds problematised in "geographical phenomenologies". To do so after allleaves intact the "genetic" and "eidetic" components of positivistic science.46 Roger M. Downs and Donald Stea 1977: Maps in Minds (New York:Harper and Row). Of coursethis is not a blanket condemnation of mental mapping studies, but rather their tendency to orientthemselves around implicit Archimedean points.47 This point is enunciated in Pickles 1985 p.125 as "Ricoeur's dilemma".48 Where Pickles talks about the a priori nature of all objectifications it seems that he stresses theidea that sciences ground themselves as objectively prior to the experiences they purport toanalyse. But it also seems that there is another more powerful claim to be made: that allobjectifications also necessarily impute the "directionality" of their own realm of possibleresults. I doubt that Pickles would disagree with this stronger claim, though it does not seem tobe stressed as much as the more general one. See for example Pickles 1985, p.128-13320Instead it is necessary to seek "an existential conception of science [itself]understanding science as a mode of man's [sic] being-in-the-world; a mode ofbeing which discovers or discloses either entities or their being as objects oftheoretical concern". 49 What is at stake in such distinctions is the elaboration ofa transcendental phenomenology which will recover the epistemologicalpromise of the empirical sciences by perpetually re-acquainting them with theirown necessarily metaphysical foundations.For present purposes it is not necessary to follow Pickles' argument all theway to its end point in its call for a universalist, foundational"phenomenological geography". Indeed it may be that such claims which smackof ontological universalism are no less debatable than the relativistichumanisms they are purported to replace. The assumption that the myriad"regional ontologies" which underlay the universe of partially overlapping andcontesting sciences can somehow be unified in a "transcendental subjectivity" isa strong one indeed. Pickles argues that the goal - his goal - of"phenomenological geography" is:...to attain a fundamental illumination - using phenomenology - of thebasic problems of [geography] as a positive human science by bringingout its inner structural relations . 513These "inner structural relations" would presumably include that spatialitywhich Pickles implies is a common unifying feature of all "regional ontologies".It is clear on the basis of this statement that Pickles' phenomenology doesindeed seek a universal ontological understanding (of spatiality) which canground a "revitalised" science of geography. But there are a number ofunanswered questions which are germane to the full and appropriate evaluationof this strong claim. First, it is worth pondering how a phenomenologicalgeography such as Pickles proposes could possibly escape the jaws of its ownincisive critique. If I am correct in summarising phenomenology as centrallyconcerned with (re)problematising the resolution of epistemological andontological boundary problems (spatial ones in this case), then how do its ownboundary demarcations, between the "regional" and the "transcendental" forexample, escape the same relativising critique? For the purposes of this work the49 Pickles 1985, p.127, italics in original.50 adapted from Heidegger, Pickles p. 14121most immediate example of this difficulty proceeds from the relation betweensubjects and objects. The directed and intentioned structuring of "objects", whichis primarily what phenomenology of the Husserlian variety seems to be designedto cast into sharp relief, is of course dialectically related to the structuring ofsubjects. It is unclear to me how one can possibly move from the elucidation of"regional ontologies" to a universal phenomenological spatiality, unless oneimplicitly assumes also a transcendental (scientific?) subjectivity. To claim that"space is not be found in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world 'as if'that world were in a space; but the 'subject', if well understood ontologically is"spatial" seems merely to beg the issue. 51 Defining the "subject" as somehowequivalent to the "spatial", "if properly understood", and then defining the"spatial" in terms of "regional ontologies" would seem merely to return one tothe problem of subjectivity, at the level of its putative 'regionality'(?) In light ofthe abiding post structuralist preoccupation with subject-object relations, it seemsclear that no current epistemological programme, let alone a phenomenologicalone such as Pickles proposes, can skirt these central problematics of subjectivity.Gregory has questioned the whole project by observing that "paradoxically it istheir very importance which ensures that [concepts of subjectivity] cannotprovide a constant foundation for the human sciences. They are theexplanandum , not the explanans ."52This objection is, as it turns out, intimately connected with Pickles' mostdetailed discussion of space and spatiality. In an isolated comment aboutsubjectivity, Pickles claims that "technologically determined space [such as thatdeployed by Isaac Newton] assumes a distinction between subjectivity andobjectivity, yet such a distinction is historically a modern one and ontologically aderived one."53 The purpose of the citation is to prepare the way for aHeideggerian concept of spatiality as "...a place cleared and freed for settlementand dwelling".54 The phenomenological project of developing a regionalontology of geographical science would presumably therefore entail a delineationof the ways in which subjects situate themselves spatially towards objects andtowards each other. Such a delineation may be fairly obvious in the case of the51 Pickles 1985, p.16852 Gregory 1989b, p.7053 Pickles 1985, p.15854 Pickles 1985, p.16522idealised Newtonian version Pickles briefly mentioned, though I will have causeto question even this idealisation in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Still, thecentral question of contextuality remains; a "place cleared and freed" for whom,by whom, and from what? The subject of such statements is left unclear orambiguous, a lacunae surely prone to lapsing back into prevailing discursivemodalites rather than exposing them. One rather paradoxical result is that thephenomenological programme proposed is silent about its ownphenomenology. More to the point, important questions regarding its ownmaterial and philosophical contextuality remain murky and ambiguous.This aporia surfaces unavoidably in the context of Pickles' appropriationof Heidegger's writings about spatiality and technology. Here Pickles seems toappropriate Heidegger's concept of spatiality as a "place freed for dwelling" inorder to provide a touchstone for his "phenomenological geography". Yet if oneconcurs that the distinction between subject and object is assumed in thedescription of Newtonian "technologically determined space", and is itself"historically modern", then Pickles' use of Heidegger becomes highlyproblematic. Heidegger's productionist metaphysics clearly traced thetechnological paradigm back to Greek classicism which was, he believed,responsible for the installation of the equation between the "Good" and the"True", where the "True" is defined as objectified, devivified experience. 55 Thehistory of philosophy down to Heidegger's day then was subsequently conceivedin terms of the progressive penetration of this technological logic into all spheresof human existence. In this Heidegger was merely echoing the discontent of theGerman intellectuals of his day with the dehumanising effects of technologicallogic and, in particular, its debilitating effects on the German "Geist". While hisphilosophical solution was, in some measure, an attempt to subvert the crudeteleology of the Nazism he politically embraced, it remains true that he believedthat the way forward, beyond the alienating productionist epoch, was to embracea fundamental authoritarianism. As Zimmerman claims:Heidegger argued that authentic individuation could only occur withinthe context of an entire generation willing to submit to its commondestiny. The explicitly political Heidegger sought to achieve his own55 Michael E. Zimmerman 1990: Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology. Politicsand Art (Bloomington:Indiana Univ. Press) p.22ff23authentic individuation by surrendering himself to what he believedwere the "powers of being" at work in National Socialism.56Clearly this is not the place to elaborate upon the highly charged and complicatedconnections between Heidegger and National Socialism, a topic well treated in anumber of recent works. 57 My point with respect to Pickles' phenomenologicalgeography, is that inadequate attention to the contextuality of subject-objectrelations may compromise the necessarily fine balance between "concernfulinvolvement" on the one hand, and the urge to transcendentalism on theother. 58 By not treating the historical contexts of the Heideggerian thought heappropriates, Pickles leaves open the possibility that they, like the proverbialTrojan Horse, could subvert his own stated goal of phenomenologicalunderstanding.There is another point touching on the problem of contextuality whichneeds to be raised in the critical evaluation of Pickles' Husserlianphenomenology. One thing which is quite striking about the whole enterprise ishow unempirical it actually is. Despite arguing for a phenomenological scienceover and against the more common attitude of anti-empiricism or anti-scientism, the work itself contains precious little empirical application. Thislacunae becomes most marked in the last chapter where the attempt is made todevelop a basic phenomenological understanding of "human spatiality":The task is to clarify the regional ontological structure of the'geographical', to provide a critique of the taken-for-grantedconceptions of space and the geographical, and to explicate a placecentered regional ontology of human spatiality.59This framework, which is admittedly only preliminary, is still developed in amanner completely abstracted from the study of "lifeworlds" or even of broader56 Zimmerman 1990, p.4557 In addition to Zimmerman's excellent work, see also Richard Wolin The Politics of Being: ThePolitical Thogh of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia Univ. Press); Phillippe Lacuoe-Labarthe 1987: La Fiction du Politique  (Paris: Christian Bourgois); Victor Farias 1989:Heidegger and Nazism  Edited by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore, Translated by PaulBurrell (from the French) and Gabriel R. Ricci (from the German) (Philadelphia: Temple Univ.Press). A much more general account of German reactionary modernism, in politics andphilosophy, is Jeffrey Herf 1984: Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich  (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press).58 Pickles 1985, pp.37,12859 Pickles 1985, p.16924historico-geographical processes. Phenomenologically speaking, it would seemto be contradictory to attempt to evaluate this claim solely on abstractphilosophical terms, yet there is no other option presented, an empiricalengagement of the framework not being included. Further, it may be argued thatthe conclusions contained in Pickles' last chapter are actually somewhatpremature and can only actually be epistemologically grounded inphenomenological examinations of real lifeworld processes and events. Oneneeds, I think, to leave aside the philosophical case for a Husserlian"transcendental subjectivity", at least for the moment, and engage in actualempirical research in a phenomenological mode. Certainly it is worth observingthat those geographers, such as Ley and Tuan, whose encounters withphenomenology have come through direct empirical fieldwork have tended toback away from such "grand theories".Whereas the standard tactics in the historiography of geography havetended to reify conceptions of the subject matter formulated prior to theempirical experience at the epistemological level, it may be that"phenomenological geography", such as proposed by Pickles, does so at theontological level. On the basis of this critique it remains unclear whether atranscendentally phenomenological approach could actually deliver anunderstanding rooted firmly in the experience of the "other". Moreover,questions raised about the historical and philosophical contextuality ofphenomenology itself suggests some of the ways in which it may itself beintentioned and historicised. Of course it remains true that these conclusions arebased upon only a small sampling of historiographic and phenomenologicalapproaches, though these have been selected in terms of their explicit attentionto questions of space. What is required, if one wishes to develop a more highlycontextual understanding of spatiality and spatial philosophy, is an approachwhich combines historiography's potential to unite ideas and material processeswith a broadly phenomenological sensitivity to ontological problems of "being inthe world". One possible reconciliation of these objectives is proposed in thefinal section of this chapter.251.4 Philosophy of Space in the Seventeenth CenturyIn the last two sections I have examined two possible approaches to thegenealogy of conceptions of space and spatial relations. The importance ofdeveloping an understanding of conceptions of space during this period stemsfrom the fact that they appear in the same historico-geographical context as doesmuch of what is commonly referred to as the "project of modernity". Since thetrajectory taken by the intellectual and cultural complex called modernity hasundoubtedly had significant impacts on the development, and indeed thepossibilities for development, of all physical and social sciences it is germane toour understanding both of modernity and of geography to examine theintellectual treatment of space during this period. Yet, as I have shown, much ofthe geographical research which takes a generally historiographic approachseems almost irresistibly to lapse into some form of historicism. At the veryleast, historical research may be fundamentally compromised in the project ofbetter understanding philosophical categories of time and space, by being deeplyrooted in the diachronic imagination of modernism. And, as I have also shown,research programmes which claim the ability to break the hegemony of thedominant "taken for granted" worldview are no less problematic.Transcendental phenomenologies, of the Husserlian sort championed by Pickles,are ultimately based on an as yet unwarranted, and perhaps even unwarrantable,assumption of a transcendental subjectivity. "Constitutive" phenomenologies,insofar as they generally shy away from the stronger claims to transcendentalism,may be a better alternative. Certainly their hermeneutic sensitivities can belauded, despite the fact that there appears to have been few if any attempts toapply such an approach to the genealogy of spatial ideas. This discussion willnow turn to the elaboration of the framework to be employed in this thesis.What is needed is the establishment of a clear and fine balance betweentoo much, and too little, control over the empirical material. In this work I willinvestigate the thesis that, despite all the grand universalising statements aboutthe objectives and methods of a despatialised, universal, objective science, - whatboth Morris Berman and Steven Toulmin have referred to as the seventeenthcentury flight from the "local" - the importance of time and space simply couldnot be obviated. The demonstration of this claim will take me back to the latterhalf of the seventeenth century, during which many basic epistemological andontological concepts were receiving their first recognisably "modern"elaborations. Galileo, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Newton and Boyle are among26those who wrested philosophy from its backward looking scholasticism and gaveit the imprint which it bears even to the present day. To take just one examplewhich will be elaborated in chapter 3 and 4, disputes over the Cartesiandistinction between res extensa and res cogitans had profound implications forthe structuring of spatially imbued categories such as public/private,subject/object and self/other. A geographically sensitive analysis will allow us tolook anew at the discontinuities and continuities of competing positions andperspectives. It may be found that, at the ontological level, they share much incommon, when viewed from the point of view of their spatial commitments.Such an analysis allows us to probe more deeply the distinction betweenModernity and its subvariants and the earlier tradition of the "ancients" fromwhich it most vociferously departed. In the light of this reintroduction of spaceinto philosophical debates, our own contemporary potential to be in some sense"postmodern" might be more adequately assessed.But it must be recognised that these ontological elements, which are theprimary focus of this thesis, were conceived in, and are related to, a particularhistorico-geographical context. Intellectual trajectories are far more likely toundergo radical transformations as part of generalised social, political, economicand cultural processes, than singly, as part of some internally driven andculturally isolable "scientific revolution". 60 It is surely disingenuous to considerit a mere 'accident', or of little empirical or theoretical importance, that theintellectual revolution which is arguably the foundation of Modernity wasinstitutionalised first in western Europe, and especially England, in the lateseventeenth century. 61 As Jacob has pointed out in The Cultural Meaning of theScientific Revolution, the development of natural scientific methodology wassupported by, and supported, the emergence of a new nexus of religious,economic, and political interests. 62 In a similar vein, Van Leeuwen has writtenon the parallels between attempts to resolve the seventeenth century Anglican60 Of course, this was, at least in part, precisely Kuhn's point, though he seems to havedownplayed the reciprocal impact of scientific ideas on non scientific arenas and also thesignificance of many scientists' roles outside the scientific community itself. See Thomas S. Kuhn1970: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second enlarged edition (Chicago: Univ. ofChicago Press)61 In the next chapter I will spell out more clearly the remarkable degree of historico-geographicalspecificity pertaining to the 'advances ' of the 'scientific revolution'.62 Margaret C. Jacob 1988: The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (New York: Alfred A.Knopf)27"Rule of Faith" controversy and the elaboration of experimental scientificmethod. 63 Others have indicated the even more obvious linkages between the"rise of modern science" and the technical requirements of pre-industrial, pre-capitalist European society. The point I want to stress is that, to adopt thevocabulary of historians of science, "externalist" views of scientific developmentcannot be held separate from "internalist" perspectives which focus primarily onthe putative linear progression from, say, Copernicus through Kepler, Galileoand Descartes, culminating in Hobbes. Instead, the integration of social, politicaland other processes with intellectual ones necessarily implies that there is anindentifiable and significant geography of the scientific revolution as will as in11 . 64In this way I hope to operationalise a "geographical imagination" which isnot just another element in the intellectual toolkit. After all, the deeply rootedposition of spatial issues in all aspects of scientific discourse discussed here pointsto the inestimable assistance a fully fledged geographical imagination may lendto a more complete understanding of human development in general. "Spacematters", to invoke a popular geographical battle cry, not just because putativelyaspatial discourses, such as the "scientific revolution" can be shown to havecommitted abstract 'hostages to fortune' of a spatial nature.65 Spatial conceptsdeeply implicated, ontologically as well as epistemologically, within disputationsabout physics and metaphysics can be shown to have had direct and indirectinfluence upon the developmental possibilities open to those discourses. Nordoes space matter only insofar as it can be shown that the seventeenth centurytrajectory taken by scientific discourse is related to a set of geographicallyconstituted human interests. However fruitful and important these perspectivesmay be, they are still only two of the 'trees' of which a larger critical-geographical'forest' is comprised. Where I propose geography might achieve its fullest63 Henry van Leeuwen 1963: The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff).64 The literature on the historiography of science is vast, though many have contended that it canbe classified as either "externalist" or "internalist" in perspective. See for example the essaysin Roger Stuewer (Ed) 1970: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Science, MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.5 (Minnesota: Univ. of Minn Press) and also DavidBloor 1982: "Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge"Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 13 pp.267-97.65 This geographical perspective hearkens to David Harvey's observation that the submergence ofspace in the human sciences entailed necessarily a specific spatial structuring. See Harvey 1989.28potential is in the elucidation of the relationships between the spaces 'in' itssubject matter and the spaces 'of' its subject matter. These two strands of thegeographical imagination can be united in a concept of spatiality which opens upthe possibility of tracking the dialectical co-development and co-dependence ofmodes of rationality and their intentionalities which in turn influence materialspace time events.One of the most complex and far reaching aspects of the intellectualprocess of drawing the partitions between science/non-science, fact/value,physical/metaphysical, etc, involves the way in which the very partitionsthemselves were rendered transparent to the analytic gaze. Part of the genius ofthe new system was that this partition process, once underway, included as partof basic matrix the denial and effacement of its own partitions as social andcultural creations. Galileo, Descartes and Newton did not adopt the distinctionbetween primary and secondary qualities simply because it was a fruitfulmetaphor. They adopted this ontological partition because they knew it to beTrue . Mathematical expressions of physical relationships, and conversely,physical relationships which could be fit into mathematical equations, were heldto be true because mathematics, and especially geometry, was believed to producethe highest level of epistemological certainty. 66 Moreover, as an artificialpartitioning of nature into computationally digestible chunks, this partition losesits identity as a partition once it is ideologically contrasted with the 'longphilosophical night' which preceded it. It is clear that the major philosophers ofthe day perceived of the preceding scholasticist and alchemic traditions asconfused partitionings of the 'true' nature of the world. Consequently their ownsystemic postulations were not to be taken as 'partitions' per se, which wouldhave been artificial, but rather as emancipatory rectifications of prior erroneousconflations, such as Hermeticism and Aristotelianism. This process has beenneatly aphorised by Pierre Bourdieu, in a more contemporary context, with themore general observation that "we tend to produce the naturalisation of ourown arbitrariness".6766 Starting with Francis Bacon natural philosophers recognised progressively more veraciouslevels of knowledge, each with their own methodology. On Bacon's account, mathematicaldeductivism, shorn of empirical content, was rejected for a more integrated emplacement ofmathematics on the "ladder of the intellect" See Francis Bacon 1960: The New Organon and Related Writings edited by Fulton H. Anderson (New York: Liberal Arts Press) p. xviii.67 Pierre Bourdieu 1984: Distinction: A Social Critique of the ludgement of Taste  (London)29Much about the spatiality of philosophy at the dawn of modernity is mostperspicuous and accessible at the locus of the fundamental partition betweenphysics and metaphysics established during the seventeenth century. Indeed,this partition is also complicit in the linguistic redefinition which distinguished,to the modern mind, the realms of the "philosophical" and the "scientific".More specifically, the partition between "physics", as a positive field ofknowledge about an objectively accessible world, and "metaphysics", as anephemeral, fundamentally subjective realm of 'mere speculation', has had amajor formative influence on western European philosophising in the modernperiod. This has had the effect of elevating "science" to a truly exalted statuseven as it has denigrated all those fields of study which could not easily conformto the new intellectual partitions, in a process which Morris Berman, echoingMax Weber, has referred to the "disenchantment of the world". 68 Asgeographers have increasingly come to realise, the objects of their study,"spatiality" or spatial relations, occupy a highly ambiguous position with respectto this partition. While, for example, Chemistry could locate itself quitecomfortably within the physical side of this conceptual surface, and Theologycould be squarely ensconced in the metaphysical half, geography, perhaps no lessthan history, problematically straddles this divide. As scientific institutions andpopular culture developed around this partition it became something of a selffulfilling prophesy, creating further problems of disciplinary autonomy andlegitimacy for Geography, and especially human geography. There can be littledoubt that, in part, it was fear of being relegated to the 'metaphysical' camp, withthe concomitant loss of institutional support and prestige, which compelledmany of the human sciences , including geography, to take the "quantitativerevolution" in the middle part of our own century.But, an important problem remains, which has so far been largely held inabeyance. If one accepts that the partition between physics and metaphysics iscentral to post seventeenth-century western science, then one is forced logically,also to accept their fundamental union . This follows irrespective of whether ornot one accedes to my claim that this partition is ideological, in the sense that ispart of a general set of ideas about the world which are conceived of as Truths68 Morris Berman 1981: The Reenchantment of the World  (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press). See alsoToulmin 1990: Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity  (New York: Free Press), chapter 1for a closely convergent interpretation.30rather than as (mere) ideas. This union also amounts to more than just sayingthat physical principles, in their existence as as special class beliefs, are alsonecessarily metaphysical. More prosaically, there is more to the union than theclaim that there is both a 'science of politics' as well as a 'politics of science'. Thiscommon claim, like most truisms, seems to me to reify the distinction its seeksto criticise by accepting the partition as a partition right from the outset. Afterall, it is fairly obvious that postulating the distinction between physical andmetaphysical discourses presupposes the reality of the distinction which cannotavoid losing its meaning outside of the dichotomy itself. Physical objects cannotexist as such without metaphysical objects against which to contrast them. In thecase of conceptions of space for example, Piaget has shown how children learnconcepts of abstract space through contrasting space "here", with spaces "there",spaces of comfort, with spaces of discomfort, etc. 69 Consequently the ideology oftheir radical separation, present from Galileo onwards, is in fact a backhandedassertion of their connection , both in the specific instance of Piaget's space andalso in terms of the broader bonds between physical and metaphysical realities.The adoption of the physical/metaphysical partition as an organisingtheme for the thesis is meant to augment the discussion of spatial issues at theontological and epistemological levels by focussing the analytic gaze on a sitewhere the "natural attitude" modern philosophy inculcates about questions ofspace and spatiality can easily be disclosed as problematic and highly charged. Byattempting to show some of the ways in which concepts of space stretch acrossthis basic partition I hope to reproblematise both those spatial issues and also thepartition upon which they are predicated. Likewise, the decision to concernmyself almost exclusively with the primarily philosophical and scientific texts ofthe seventeenth century is part of an overall strategy for recovering the latent orhidden spatiality of some of modernity's key early programmatic statements.Figure 1 (above) shows the intersection between analytic frameworks which Iplan to operationalise in this thesis. On one level I will attempt to let the69 Discussed in Robert Sack 1980: Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A GeographicalPerspective (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press) p.122ff31Geography of PhilosophyPhilosophy of Spaceand GeographyIntegrated Historical Geographyof PhilosophyHistory of PhilosophyFigure 1: Integrated Historico-Geography of Spatial Thoughtphilosophical material 'speak for itself' as far as is possible, in a manner notentirely unlike standard histories of philosophy. However, this strand will betempered by the attempt to conjoin with it a sensitivity to the significance ofmaterial events and the social and political biographies of those who workedwith philosophical and scientific ideas. With these two aspects united in a moreor less holistic account it should be possible to say something about the abstractphilosophies of space and spatial relations and (as well as distinct from) theinstitution of a geographical 'science'. Geography's possibilities, as well as itsconstraints in a modern or postmodern era can thereby also be brought moreclearly into view.32Plan of the WorkIn chapter 2 I will present a brief historical geography of seventeenthcentury philosophy. There I will try to locate the philosophical developmentswhich are signal to modernity in their appropriate space-time contexts. In somemeasure this will be recognised as a project of intellectual biography, that is tosay, placing the intellectual careers of important thinkers in historicalgeographical context. It cannot possibly be of little significance, after all, to ourunderstanding of the "scientific revolution" that Europe in the seventeenthcentury underwent marked political, social and economic turmoil. As StevenToulmin has recently observed with respect to precisely this period:The general crisis of the seventeenth century was, in short, not justeconomic and social, but also intellectual and spiritual: the breakdownof public confidence in the older cosmopolitical consensus. 7°In their attempts at systematicity and certainty seventeenth century thinkerswere in effect trying to come to terms with an ambiguity which was not justintellectual, but also social, political, economic and cultural. But I certainly donot wish to go overboard in the other direction either, suggesting in the mannerof much "externalist" historiography, that the thinkers and their ideas weresolely a product of their times. 71 The ideas developed during this period were inimportant respects individualistic responses to the practical as well asphilosophical situations they found themselves in. All of them imputed asocially as well as philosophically therapeutic role to their own formulations andthought of them as correctives to some generalised malaise. But oncearticulated, individual philosophies became part of broader social and culturalcontexts and could be interpreted and subtly reshaped by broader forces; whatToulmin has referred to as the "hidden agenda of modernity".In the third and fourth chapters I will work to respatialise criticalconnections between physics and metaphysics which were initially effaced in thethought of Newton and others connected with the Royal Society in England. Ofcourse, the severance of the relationship between physics and metaphysics wasToulmin 19901).7171 See the earlier discussion of "Historicism" above, and also the discussion of "internalism" and"externalism" in the historiography of ideas in Chapter 233only rendered complete with the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant atthe end of the next century. Still, the recovery of this connection in thishistorico-geographical context, so long buried that we now tend to consider itcounterintuitive, is of central importance for making sense of the divergentconceptions of space and spatiality which different intellectual groups putforward. In chapter 3 I will compare and contrast ontologies of self and substancein two very different systems of natural philosophy. Both Cartesian "plenism"and Newtonian "atomism" vied for recognition as the one 'true' description ofthe natural world. However, in so doing, both systems had to confront theknowing subject's relationship to the objects under study. As is well known, thisproblem involved some form of dualism which I will interpret in terms of thenascent partition between physics and metaphysics. Chapter 4 will take abasically similar analysis to a rather higher philosophical scale, seeking outconnections between the primarily physical scientific discussion elaborated inchapter 3 and corollary theories about the organisation of political and socialspace. Both of these chapters will, it is hoped, assist in the reconstruction of someof the critical and fascinating connections between theories of space and theconstitution of identifiably "modern" subjectivities.A concern with theories of space and and their relation to issues ofsubjectivity are central to the fifth chapter. This chapter starts with a discussionof the seventeenth century dispute between those, such as Descartes and Hobbes,who adopted a "relational" conception of space, and those, such as Newton andBoyle, who championed the more familiar (to us moderns) "absolutist" view ofspace. While these disputes were often carried out in explicitly physical, asopposed to metaphysical, terrain, especially in the work of Newton and the RoyalSociety, they can be shown to be fundamentally connected with a fairly specificand constrained conception of the individual knowing subject. For the most partsubjectivity was never explicitly theorised in these writers, and indeed thereinlies much of my interest in that issue. By the end of the seventeenth century aparticularistic conception of the subject, and his/her relation to objects in theworld and other subjects had been incorporated into the "natural order". Thecritical interrogation of this model of subjectivity has become a central feature ofcontemporary debate in the human sciences.34In the last chapter I attempt, in a preliminary fashion, to sum up some ofthe results of this analysis. Of particular interest here are the possibleimplications of my analysis for the development of an explicitly self consciousgeographical discipline. What impact might the entrenchment of particularmodalities of space and spatial relations in seventeenth century philosophy havehad on the potential configurations of a geographical discipline? It seems clear,even at the outset, that geography, like all the other disciplines, would have beenshaped and delimited in its possible configurations by those epistemological andontological models to which it looked for guidance and, more importantly,legitimacy . By extension, this examination of spatial thinking and geographycan be brought to bear on issues surrounding the putative "end" of modernityand possibilities for a truly postmodern succession.35Chapter 2Into Modernity's Basement:An Historical Geography of Seventeenth Century Philosophy362.1 Introduction2.2 The Seventeenth Century Crisis of Confidence2.3 Political Economic Aspects of Cartesianism and Baconianism2.4 Concluding Comments2.1 IntroductionRecent debates in the historiography of science have tended to revolvearound the problem of reconciling "internalist" and "externalist" perspectives. 1These days few researchers seem willing to defend the exclusivity of pasttendencies to see intellectual development either as unfolding according to some"internalist" logic or as mere passive responses to external processes of a social,political, economic or other nature. In a way the division between "internalism"and "externalism" in historiography is particularly acute in the area of thehistory of ideas, since the subject matter of this pursuit is oddly both tangible andephemeral at one and the same time. While ephemeral and almostinterminably fluid in interpretation, ideas, such as those about political andnatural order, are the undeniable substrate of all material practices. What actorsbelieve to be real, natural and desirable will have a profound impact on theformation of their actions. Even so, recent suggestions that epistemic facts, totake the argument a step further, are social and political facts have generated agreat deal of critical discussion. 2 However such debates are ultimately resolved itis important to remember that what is at issue are the means of ourcontemporary theorisation of past events, certainly not the 'events themselves'.The overriding historiographical problem, in the absense of any privileged pointof reference, perforce centers on how to fashion an understanding of past eventswhich links them with present conditions as we theorists in the 'here and now'perceive them. The 'events themselves', if taken as the pristine goal of "correct"historical understanding, will forever elude our efforts, since we cannot everknow, a priori , if our understanding is moving in the "right direction", or evenwhat that "right direction" might look like. 3 The notion of a "right direction" isan ontological as well as an epistemological undecidable. Of course the problemadmits of some circularity since to hold to a belief in the possibility of positivisticknowledge, about history or anything else, at some some point implies an apriori standard against which knowledge claims may subsequently be evaluated.1 Roger Steuwer (Ed) 1970: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Science, MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, 5 (Minnesota:Univ. Of Minnesota Press).2 David Bloor 1982: "Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology ofKnowledge" Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science  13 267-297, see also the subsequentdebate of Bloor's "Strong Programme" in the same journal.3 This point may be applied as a critique of Hartshorne's comment cited above.37And the prejudices this imposes on the empirical material were discussed in theintroductory chapter. Theoretically speaking, ends become conflated with meansand the whole intellectual project develops a subtly anti-hermeneutic closure.Still, there should be little cause for concern that historical theorisationsmay never achieve an 'undistorted' and/or 'comprehensive' picture ofwhatever period we're interested in. After all, in every time and place the actorsthemselves have perforce acted with only "partial", locally rooted, and oftenhighly idiosyncratic understandings of their situations and the potentialconsequences of the choices open to them. Since there is nothing preventingactors from acting on partial or even erroneous notions, then the whole idea ofcoherence in historical narrative is greatly complexified. In the seventeenthcentury intellectual context with which I am concerned this is no less true. Thephilosophical systems of Descartes, Hobbes, Newton, Boyle and others were selfconsciously developed by those individuals as responses to the historico-geographical context they perceived themselves to occupy . The divergentepistemological, political, and theological proposals of Hobbes, Descartes and the"rationalists" on the one hand and Boyle, Newton and the "experimentalists" onthe other were designed in the context of different experiences of the events thensweeping England and Western Europe. The personal biographies of these men(and they were almost always men, female intellectuals being rare and in anycase considered 'oddities') can be shown to dovetail with the material processeswithin which they were enmeshed in the delineation of their philosophicalframeworks. Thomas Hobbes, forced into self exile after 1640 by the politicalinstability of the English Civil War, worked out a careful system for analysingthe circumstances of political integration and disintegration. Robert Boyle alsodevoted much of his youthful attention to moral and political order, and in factwas first attracted to the ideas of the Greek atomists via their ethical discussions. 4Subsequently both men became convinced of the utility of closely articulatedmoral and natural philosophies. Despite these commonalities, the systems theydeveloped were markedly different, and were seen to be so by theircontemporaries. These connections, between ideas and context, are the subjectmatter of this chapter. These partial and highly variable interpretative4 J.R. Jacob , J.T. Harwood 1991: The Early Essays and Ethics of Robert Boyle  (Carbondale, Ill:Southern Illinois Univ. Press).38topologies will be crucial to any attempt to improve understanding ofintellectual change and its myriad relationships to material events and processes.In this chapter I will introduce some of the major seventeenth centuryphilosophical figures discussed in this thesis in terms of their relationships tothe times and places in which they lived and worked. It is my contention thatthe philosophical ideas, about ontology, epistemology and spatiality, examined inlater chapters can be more deeply understood if some attempt is made toelucidate the manner in which the practitioners themselves formulated andsought to deploy them. There is, to use the terms I have employed in theintroductory chapter, a geography of as well as a geography within seventeenthcentury intellectual ferment. Ideas about metaphysical and physical spaces areundoubtedly related to the time-space contexts of their introduction, deploymentand diffusion. Indeed, the whole notion of intellectual "discovery" can itself bereadily shown to have been implicated in the ascendance of new ideas abouttruth, error and proper methodology. In the next section of this chapter I willpresent some of the cultural, social, economic and political dimensions of thegeneralised turbulence and lack of cultural confidence which arguably typified atleast the first two thirds of the seventeenth century. Two very differentphilosophical responses can be shown to have developed by intellectualsworking within this historico-geographical context. About mid-century ReneDescartes and Thomas Hobbes proffered innovative, and highly iconoclastic,models of certain knowledge which were, somewhat paradoxically, used tounderwrite conceptions of political order which were profoundly conservativeand even reactionary. In the decades following the elaboration of "CartesianRationalism", as it has come to be known, other intellectuals, centred on OxfordUniversity and Gresham College in London, promoted an epistemology, which,if rather more conservative, was nevertheless conjoined with a much moreliberal ("Latitudinarian" is the term which was often applied, tellingly, at thetime) political perspective. 55 Micheal Hunter has speculated about the relationship between political and epistemologicalpreferences in seventeenth century England. He makes the intriguing observation thatCambridge University, which remained largely Royalist throughout the Civil War, tended toharbour many more adherents to Cartesianism than Oxford, which early on adopted theParliamentarian cause. Of course the connections are difficult to evaluate given the fact thatuniversity posts were often political sinecures, and that the political allegiances of officeholders would often shift markedly with changes in the political wind. See Micheal Hunter1981: Science and Society in Restoration England  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press).392.2 The Seventeenth Century Crisis of ConfidenceRegardless of the particular variant of the perennially popular "generalcrisis" model of the seventeenth century which one favours, it is fairly clear thatan atmosphere of generalised crisis did in fact prevail at the time. Toulmincontrasts this period to the relatively sanguine humanism of the sixteenthcentury, epitomised by the writings of Michel de Montaigne. 6 The metaphysicalpoet John Donne (c.1571-1635) was arguably speaking for this era of anxiety when,in a threnody tellingly entitled "An Anatomy of the World" (written for a youngwoman he apparently never met) he wrote:Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone:All just supply, and all relation:Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,For every man alone thinkes that he hath gotTo be a Phoenix, and that there can bee,None of that kinde of which he is, but hee. 7For Donne, the distemper of the age was as deeply rooted as it was intractable. Ashe wrote the poem not long before his ordination as a minister of the AnglicanChurch the controversies between Catholicism ("Popism") and Anglicism, andbetween the latter and the rapidly proliferating Protestant sects may haveweighed heavy upon him as he wrote. 8 More than mere hegemony was at stakeas the new Protestant sects managed to challenge nearly the entire corpus oftheological orthodoxy, thus undermining the dominant worldview andinstitutions. Issues of religious faith appear to have had an economic andpolitical role to play as many of those on the leading edge of these social and6 Steven Toulmin 1990: Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press)pp.36-417 As Toulmin points out, this poem is seldom included in selections of Donne's poetry in spite of itsstunning originality in comparison to his other works. This is doubly interesting given that thisvery poem has become an important touchstone of much contemporary history and philosophy ofscience. The full text of "An Anatomy of the World" can be found in H.J. Grierson (Ed.) 1979(1933): Donne's Poetical Works, London: Oxford University Press. This is a middle period poemfor Donne; composed when he was forced by his penury to write obsequious dirges for the elites ofhis day. Later poems, written after he was ordained a minister of the Anglican Church, are moreecclesiastical in subject matter and style.8 Donne, born to a Catholic family, received his early education and upbringing within England'ssmall but close knit Catholic community. Fired from his position as secretary to a minor noble,Donne lived in relative penury. His fortunes changed only when he renounced his Catholicismand took orders in the Church of England. This biographical transition is mirrored in his poetry.See Charles Coffin 1958(1937): John Donne and the New Philosophy (New York:HumanitiesPress).40economic changes rejected traditional theologies, both Catholic and Anglican,and embraced one of the upstart Protestant sects.Of course, these theological conflicts are but one aspect of the general crisisof the period. During the seventeenth century Europeans and the nations inwhich they lived were subjected to seemingly unprecedented turmoil,transformation and even wholesale destruction. In France the rivalry betweenthe houses of Bourbon and Valois divided the country politically, socially andreligiously, creating conditions for repeated and inconclusive factional conflictduring the first half of the seventeenth century. Of course this was as nothingcompared to the terrible human cost of the Thirty Years War, fought between theCatholic Holy Roman Empire and the Protestant states of northern Europe,during which it has been estimated that more than 25% of the Germanicpopulations of Northern Europe were exterminated. And England, having justconcluded what was even then seen by many as a "Golden Age" roughlycoincident with the long reign of Queen Elizabeth, was to experience during theseventeenth century repeated civil and political conflicts culminating in civilwar, first between Charles I and his Parliament in the 1640s, and then betweenthe Parliament and the protestant independents who controlled the army duringthe 1650s. During the century, five monarchs were coronated, of which one(Charles I) was beheaded, and another (James II) was driven from the throne inthe virtually bloodless coup d'etat of William of Orange, whose own monarchymanaged to close the century on a relatively peaceful note. 9But the point of the General Crisis hypothesis is blunted if it is interpretedsolely in terms of the political and military havoc and the ambiguous and ofteninchoate cultural instability of the period. To be sure an horrific amount ofblood was spilled over questions of religious and political power during thiscentury throughout Europe. But there were other processes unfolding whichwould ultimately impose a great deal more turmoil and change than these moreovert conflicts. Social and economic processes progressively undermined the9 Such a precis undoubtedly owes a debt to a great many sources. For general histories of the periodsee Will and Ariel Durant 1961: The Age of Reason Begins: A History of European Civilisation1558-1648 (New York: Simon and Schuster); Christopher Hill 1961: The Century of Revolution 1603-1714 (New York: Norton). H.R. Trevor Roper 1967: Religion, Restoration and Social Change(London:Macmillan) and Henri and Barbara van der Zee 1988: Revolution in the Family (London:Viking). Other sources are listed in the bibliography.41principle foundations of feudalism and laid the groundwork for a new politicaleconomy based on commodity exchange. The long Enclosure movement,underway in England since the middle ages, was rapidly reaching a point wherethe established social and economic order was deprived of the land base andtenure system needed to support it. 10,-) ENCLOSURE OF COMMON,..,,Yo FIELD. 1700-1800.:^Enclosed by 1703i^e^..,^in^7,27.1 Over 70%f., Encicsed by Act betcre 1901%,...) 0buy 100 krns/// 'J () ,^p;:,,;(.1,^ A' / A. %.,^..../:^....^• 4„,,,, ,,.^.^410'/^W CV,^..0:C//-'-'^:!,/ 1/,,,,,,^ „ ^",„.;^ ..,4^'4%:/ /////^44 e^'2 :;/ V4v^ 40 61/ t 1;(4 i 00'" 4fs 4"' ^,./ ' /i';' '/ V-4 ^5 '/^.."/ A /74411.4TV'"^' 111'16 '^'<7/4i'^41:';',5•A ; .1.777..!./.•^/^. .' :^.^/.'> 4'' •/,^/^//,,,C4// • 2.24%, ";^■ 4^/t./ 4, /^////., r At^,, 0^,„,„,• *•Figure 2: Enclosures of Common Fields 1700-1800As this process gained momentum in the late seventeenth century, it had theeffect of foreclosing on the already meagre livelihoods of small holders andpeasants in many parts of the country. Large scale production of wool andagricultural products on the enclosed lands was rapidly becoming the dominantindustrial pattern. Fewer labourers were needed to work the land under the new10 H.C. Darby 1973: 'The Age of the Improver 1600-1800" in H.C. Darby (Ed) A New HistoricalGeography of England (London: Cambridge Univ. Press) contains some useful maps about theextent of enclosure during the early modern period. Figure I. come from p.323 of this text42conditions and, more importantly, these were increasingly employed not thebasis of reciprocal obligations between landholder and peasant, but rather on amore impersonal commodity basis. Perhaps, symbolic of the passing of thefeudal order in England was the passing of an Act just after the Restoration in1660 formally abolishing manorial obligations. 11 Ultimately many of thedisplaced peasants were driven from the land and into the burgeoning citieswhere their labour power was commodified just as the land they had previouslyworked had been. The towns and cities of England also began to acquire newfunctions as economic and political centres, increasingly highly specialised,within new regional and national hierarchies. As Hohenberg and Lees put it:Protoindustrialisation...flourished best not as town or country, butas a complementary system involving both rural and urban placesand the various elements of a regional urban hierarchy. 12The development of political economic complementarity was acted out at thelevel of the state as well, as the state become the locus for the administration andregulation of the body politic as well as for the circuit of capital circulation in thenascent commodity economy. 13The stanza from Donne's "Anatomy of the World" quoted above wouldappear to address all three levels of "general crisis" introduced in the last fewparagraphs. "All just supply and all relation: Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, arethings forgot" might refer to the immanent collapse of the feudal politicaleconomy as well as the threat then posed to orthodox theology by the battlesbetween Catholicism, Anglicism and Protestantism. And clearly the last threelines of the stanza, in which "Every man alone thinkes that he hath got to be aPhoenix" bespeaks a sense of the anarchy of a society swirling with alternativeworldviews, none yet strong enough to impose dominance, and the net productof which, as Donne surely realised, would have been to cheapen them all.Remember though, that Donne penned these lines in 1612, six years before the11 Christopher Hill 1980 Some Intellectual Consequences of the English Revolution (London:Weidenfeld and Nicholson) p.31.12 Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees 1985: The Making of Urban Europe 1000-1950 (Cambridge,Mass: Harvard Univ Press) p.13013 Though his discussion is primarily theoretical, Giddens has observed the shift from"traditional" states to "modern" ones in terms of the shift from a reliance on "authoritativeresources" to an increasing emphasis on "allocative" ones. See Anthony Giddens 1987: TheNation State and Capitalism (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press) pp.85; 142ff43outbreak of the Thirty Years War and almost thirty years before the English CivilWar, so one must be careful in casting him as anything more than a prescientobserver.Irrespective of my own interpretation of the poem, Donne himself in thesame poem located what he took to be a major contributing factor to the malaise:And New Philosophy calls all in doubt,The element of fire is quite put out:The sun is lost, and the earth, and no man's witCan well direct him where to look for it. (my italics)What seems to me to be uniquely MODERN about Donne's poem "An Anatomyof the World" is the fact that he locates the cause of the ennui in a "NewPhilosophy" which is surprising recognisable to contemporary eyes. Donne,according to Charles Coffin, expressed poetically what he took to be thereplacement of a more morally and aesthetically balanced epistemology with anew purely mechanistic and instrumental ethos. 14 The "element of fire" whichis "quite put out" is that which is central to both the Alchemic and Aristoteliantraditions, as a primal element also a means of elemental transmutation. Whilethe disavowal, so unavoidable after Copernicus and Kepler, of the Aristoteliancosmology of superimposed spheres leaves the cultural vacuum expressed in thelast two lines. 15 Donne expresses poetically a common seventeenth centurypreoccupation with the relationship, to put it in Aristotelian terms, between theparts and the whole of society in a situation of paradigmatic reformulation.So far I have interpreted Donne's poem as a regretful paean to a passingage. But Donne's poetry is not merely an expression of the seventeenth centurydoctrine of senescence; that is, of the millenarian notion that the post-diluvianworld was approaching its final cosmological judgement. 16 Donne in factstraddles the divide between the old and the new regimes, that is between the"Ancients" and the "Moderns". While adroitly integrating the developments ofthe "new philosophy" with cultural and social processes, he himself opted for14 Coffin, 1958 pp.9-1115 For more a brief sketch of the Aristotelian cosmology see the introductory section of chapter 3,and especially the diagram of Fludd's cosmology16 For a discussion of senescence theories as they relate to conceptions of nature and space seeClarence Glacken 1964: Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley, Calif: Univ. of California Press)pp.355-42844the comfort of the old regime, ending out his years as a scholastic clergymandeeply repentant of his youthful self. Despite this backward lookingconservatism Donne still managed to put his finger on one of the signalproblematics of the "new philosophy". In seeming anticipation of impendingdevelopments in natural philosophy Donne wrote in 1611:Our Bodies why do we forbeare?They'are ours, though they are not wee, Wee areThe intelligences, they the spheares. 17Moreover Donne homes right in on the very heart of seventeenth centuryontological debate sparked by Cartesian dualism when he marvels atThat subtile knot [linking "intelligences" and "spheares"; mind andbody] which makes us man [sic].Donne's primary concern, especially in his later poetry and sermons, is touncover the potential implications of this "subtile knot" for social and culturalsolidarity. The project of seventeenth century philosophy, whether in itsrationalist or experimentalist guises, was also centrally concerned with thereconciliation of this "subtile knot". And indeed, this thematic has preoccupiedmuch of the western philosophical tradition ever since. 18I have presented Donne as an astute commentator on his age, and in factas one of the first to perceive the order which was emerging out of the turmoil ofhis time and place. Donne was, however, one who's loyalties were deeplydivided between those aspects of the ancient regime whose passing he regretted,and the, as yet, unfulfilled promise of the new epoch. Thus it can be fairly said, Ithink, that Donne straddled the divide between the ancient Scholastic traditionand the nascent Project of Modernity. However, even as Donne wrote, otherswere constructing innovative new models about the possibility and proceduresfor procuring certain knowledge about a radically reconceived cosmos. Againstthe conservatism of Donne, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), for example, clearly tookthe side of the "moderns". Over the next few decades Thomas Hobbes, who hadserved as Bacon's amanuensis, Rene Descartes and Pierre Gassendi would17 Grierson 1979, "18 Richard Rorty's 1979: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press)contains one of the best summaries of philosophical attempts to deal with dualism. But see alsoGilbert Ryle 1949: The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth:Penguin).45elaborate quasi-Baconian programs into more complete physical andmetaphysical systems. Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and others would ensure thelasting intellectual hegemony of their rather different Baconian schema, byinstitutionalising it in the Royal Society of London.2.3 Political Economic Aspects of Cartesianism and BaconianismIn 1662 the "Royal Society of London" received its official charter from theonly recently restored Charles II. Counted among its charter members was adiverse assortment of clergy, "schoolmen", nobles, military men, andmerchants. 19 The poet Abraham Cowley, the experimenter Robert Boyle, themathematician and architect Christopher Wren, nobles such as Lord Broucknerand the Earl of Northampton, as well as theologians such as Henry More andJohn Wilkins were all early members. Though the Royal Society had, for allpractical purposes, existed for many years at Oxford University and GreshamCollege, its formal institutionalisation under Royal patronage was of highsignificance for the resolution of philosophical battles then raging. Under itsbanner clergymen, anxious about the apparent marginalisation of God inCartesian ontologies and epistemologies (as expressed in the "Rule of FaithControversy") 20, and new economic and political elites, interested in securingtheir lease on power and developing tools for exploiting the incipient bourgeoisspace economy, worked to develop a new system of knowledge production. Thisnew philosophical system, more an 'accommodation' of new and old intellectualparadigms in the context of a rapidly changing political and social landscape thana "revolution", very quickly became a powerful mechanism for shaping andlegitimising knowledge claims. Before the end of the seventeenth century thesanction of the Royal Society, or at least of prominent members of that Society,became almost mandatory for the acceptance of any claim to 'true' knowledge.Inability to secure such a sanction meant, in many cases, that one's knowledgeclaims would not be accepted as "true". More to the point, once certain19 The term "schoolmen" referred to those who worked within the established Aristotelianframework, especially with its reliance upon syllogistic logic. During the seventeenth centurythe moniker acquired a derogatory status as increasing numbers of intellectuals sought to distancethemselves from this paradigm.20 Henry van Leeuwen 1963: The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff)46OLVIiCI ETAL c,-tyA VTHOP. kTindividuals and institutions became representative of the "correct" processes ofintellectual discovery and justification, knowledge claims existing outside thenew structures could not be accepted.Figure 3: Frontispiece to Sprat's History of the Royal SocietyThe program of the Royal Society explicitly hearkened back to the visionof a "New Atlantis" promulgated by Francis Bacon at the beginning of the47seventeenth century. And in fact Bacon himself was adopted as the intellectualpatron of the Society (see Figure 3). 21 The adoption of Bacon as intellectualprogenitor of the Royal Society may well have been driven as much by hisaristocratic legitimacy as by his ostensible scientific achievements, given that themid seventeenth century harboured a profusion of similar scientificprogrammes. 22 To be sure his vision of a "Solomon's House" where naturalexperimentation would not only be supported, but that experimentersthemselves would be able to occupy positions of social prestige and stature musthave appealed to those working outside the Aristotelian tradition. But othergroups, such as that organised by Samuel Hartlib and John Dury promulgatedsimilar utopian visions. 23 And the programme of the Royal Society also borestrong resemblances to the Lincaean Academy established by Galileo at Turinwhich Hobbes, Boyle and others visited while on their "grand tours" of thecontinent during the middle decades of the century. Even more proximately intime and space, the Academie Francaise was established within a few years of theRoyal Society by Louis XIV's lieutenant Colbert. 24 During the seventeenthcentury there was a veritable efflorescence of ideas and plans for model scientificcommunities.Why then, given the broad range of similarly oriented alternativeprogrammes, did the Royal Society of London so rapidly become the veryembodiment of experimental rationality? Certainly the high esteem in which itwas held was widespread throughout the European continent as is suggested byCount Magalotti's description of a meeting of the Society:They observe the ceremony of speaking to the president, waitingfrom him for permission to be covered, and explaining their21 The engraving comes from Thomas Sprat's 1667: History of the Royal Society of London, For theImproving of Natural Knowledge,  reproduced from Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin 1985:Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton: PrincetonUniv. Press) p.3322 There has been considerable debate about Bacon's status as a scientist; see Rose Mary Sargeant1986 and Margaret Jacob 1988 for further discussion of this point.23 A member of the Hartlib Circle, Gabriel Plattes, published a manifesto of their program in ADescription of the Famous Kingdom of Macaria  (1641). See J.R. Jacob 1977: Robert Boyle and theEnglish Revolution (New York: Burt Franklin and Co.) p.1724 Margaret Jacob 1988: The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (New York: Alfred A.Knopf), p.61. The Academia Francaise was founded on the strength of the activity of theMontmor Academy which was itself a continuation of the work of the circle centred on AbbeMarin Mersenne in the 1620s and 30s.48sentiments in few words relevant to the subject under discussion; andto avoid confusion and disorder one does not begin before the otherhas ended his speech. Neither are opposite opinions maintainedwith obstinacy, but with temper, the language of civility andmoderation always being adopted among them, which rendersthem so much the more praiseworthy... 25Moreover, the hegemony of the Royal Society is also demonstrated by thenumerous scientific controversies which were invariably decided in favour of itsmembers.26 Surely, given the myriad potential alternatives, and the multipleintellectual groupings which opposed both Scholasticism and Cartesianism, it isof some interest and significance that the Royal Society should become, soquickly and completely, an internationally recognised arbiter of experimentalprogress and rationality. It was neither the largest nor the best established of thenew scientific societies during this period. Several of the Italian societies hadbeen operating since the early seventeenth century. More importantly the RoyalSociety, though Royally chartered, was not Royally patronised financially, animpediment which caused the Society to lurch from fiscal crisis to fiscal crisisthrough the end of the century. By contrast, as Heffernan has observed, theFrench "Academie" was well funded by the state (which recognised its value asan instrument of economic expansionism). 27The explanation of the Royal Society's rapid acquisition of intellectual hegemonycomes, I think, comes in two parts. First it is worthy of note that the structure ofthe Royal Society and its philosophical program was such that a number ofinterests could comfortably ensconce themselves within it. It is significant thatcharter members included among their number clergy, military officers, nobility,25 Count Lorenzo Magalotti on the Royal Society, 1669 in Andrew Browning (Ed) 1967: EnglishHistorical Documents, Vol. VIII 1660-1714 (London:Eyre and Spottiswoode) p.481, though theCount was not without reservations about the Society; see Chapter 4.26 The classic example of such a controversy is probably that between Leibniz and Newton over theinvention of the infinitesmal calculus. Though recent study has convincingly argued that thetwo men likely developed the method more or less simultaneously, Newton's claim was securedby the official and unofficial backing of the Royal Society. The Newton/Leibniz debate overthe constitution of space was similarly decided in Newton's favour, and on even more dubiousgrounds. See also the dispute between Boyle and Hobbes about Boyle's air pump trials discussedin Chapter 4.27 Mike Heffernan 1990: "From Knowledge to Power: The Geography of Geographical Knowledgein Late Nineteenth Century France" Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the AmericanAssn of Geographers.49and merchants as well as practicing experimental philosophers. Figure 4indicatesDistribution by Occupation of All British Fellows ElectedDuring Various Periods 1660-16991660-69#^%1670-79#^%1690-99#^%Total#^%Uncertain 8 3 3 5 3 4 14 3.4Ar istocrats 47 18 6 9 12 16 65 16( -;ourtlers/ Politicians 54 21 6 9 14 19 74 18Gentlemen 35 13 13 20 9 12 57 14Lawyers 12 5 2 3 2 3 16 3.9Divines 25 10 2 3 5 7 32 7.8Doctors 38 15 9 14 14 19 61 15cholars/Writers 21 8 14 22 8 11 43 11Civil Servants 11 4 3 5 0 0 14 3.4Merchants 10 4 7 11 6 8 23 5.6TOTAL 261 100 75 100^_ 73 100 409 100Figure 4: Social Composition of the Early Royal Societythe rather high preponderance of members of the society who were not on theface of things experimental philosophers. 28 Also interesting is the fact that this28 Micheal Hunter 1982: The Royal Society and its Fellows 1660-1700 (Chalfont St.Giles: BritishSociety for the History of Science); There are, it must be admitted, problems involved ininterpreting the classifications Hunter has adopted in his presentation of the social compositionof the Society. Robert Boyle, to take a prominent example, was both an important experimenterand also a member of the landed aristocracy (He was the youngest son of the Earl of Cork andmaintained estates at Stallbridge in Dorsetshire and in Ireland.) Hunter is not clear about howcategories were adduced. Still, the data collected by Hunter do give some sense at least, of the50social composition of the society survived virtually unchanged through the endof the seventeenth century. This social heterogeneity may have been importantinsofar as it afforded the Society entres into several different class grouping, forthe purposes of soliciting financial support and also disseminating results. 29Thomas Sprat, in his elegiac "history" of the Royal Society (1667) affirms thisheterogeneity as a positive check againsttwo corruptions of learning, which have been long complained butnever removed. The one, that Knowledge still degenerates toconsult present profit too soon; the other that philosophers havebeen always Masters and Scholars , some imposing and all theothers submitting... 30The former "corruption" occurs where intellectual work is too narrowly focusedupon parochial interests or "present profit". The phrase "present profit" isundoubtedly apt also given the explicitly pragmatic orientation which influencedthe work of the Society. A review of early editions of the Transactions of the Royal Society shows an emphasis on solving technical problems related to theproduction of agricultural commodities and industrial production. And thestatues of the Society drawn up by Robert Hooke, the Society's first "Curator ofExperiments" called on the society to "...improve the knowledge of naturalthings, and all useful arts, manufactures, mechanick practices, and inventions byexperiment... "31The latter "corruption" recognises as an enemy common to allexperimental philosophers the moribund Scholastic tradition, and alsoCartesianism as well. John Wilkins, and Joseph Glanvill both recognised thatthe empiricist preoccupation with "matters of fact" and direct epistemologicalaccess to natural phenomena could be reconciled with a religious doctrine whichstressed faith as a necessary correlate of epistemological certainty and a relativelyfree relationship between humanity and God. 32 Separate theological andsocial composition of the Society as the members themselves might have seen it, which iscritical if one wants to understand the relations between science and social rank in RestorationEngland.29 For example, Robert Hooke's Curatorship of Experiments for the Society was paid for by thespecific subscription of a local businessman.30 Thomas Sprat excerpted in Brian Vickers (Ed) 1987: English Science: Bacon to Newton (London:Cambridge Univ. Press) p.163. Emphasis in the original.31 This quotation is contained in Margarita Bowen 1980 p.102.32 van Leeuwen, 1963 Ch. 3.51experimental spheres of influence began to emerge which, rather thancompeting, actually augmented one another. Subsequently, to take just oneexample, Anglican theologians were able to mobilise the Society's guidingprinciple of "Nullius^Verba" ("Take the Word of No one") to elaborate anostensibly scientific solution to the "Rule of Faith" controversy. As vanLeeuwen has noted:The solution by English Protestantism to a theological problem as itwas expanded in the Royal Society...is integral to a completehistorical understanding of British philosophy. 33Parallelisms of these sorts, as might be expected, served to reciprocally strengthenboth the overall program of the Royal Society, as well as that of its constituentinterests.Even while occupying an intellectual and social space at the intersection ofmultiple interests, the program of the Royal Society also assimilated andinstitutionalised opposition to the alternative philosophical programs ofhermeticism, Scholasticism, and especially Cartesianism. The task of the RoyalSociety, as seen by its proponents, was to carve out a space for philosophicaldisputation which steered clear of alternatives which they associated with socialand political disorder. This implies that the social heterogeneity boasted by someof its members was not necessarily followed up with an equal heterogeneity inscientific or political ideology. Judging From such rudimentary measures as theprominence of certain persons in the Transactions, and as proposers of newmembers, the image develops of a society in fact dominated by a relatively small,much less 'heterogeneous' core of active persons. 34 Primarily these men soughtto foreclose on both political absolutism as well as renewed republican populismas potential solutions to the political turmoil of the middle third of the century.It is certainly not hard to believe that many, especially in the aftermath of theEnglish Civil War, harboured a profound anxiety towards anything which might33 van Leeuwen 1963 p.15234 The eight most frequent proposers of new members in the Royal Society (1660-1700) were, indescending order John Wilkins, Dean of Ripon and later Bishop of Chester who had steered theOxford Philosophical Society during the 1640s and 50s; Sir Robert Moray, Lord of the Exchequer;Earl of Northampton; Viscount Brouckner, mathematician, Chancellor to the Queen and firstpresident of the Royal Society (see Figure 2); Henry Oldenburg, philosopher and first secretaryof the Society; Paul Neile, courtier and astronomer; Robert Boyle, natural philosopher andyoungest son of the Earl of Cork; and Seth Ward, mathematician and Bishop of Exeter and laterSalisbury. Data derived from Hunter 1982.52threaten the tenuous peace of the Restoration. As Margaret Jacob informs us,even discussions about ostensibly abstract topics were highly charged:Natural philosophical and religious language informed discussionsabout the nature of political authority, the rights of the church,the relations between master and servant, husband and wife, andlord and commoner. 35Robert Boyle no less than Thomas Hobbes believed that the then current state ofanarchy, understood in terms reminiscent of Donne's "Anatomy of the World",could be resolved through an appeal to scientific reasoning and, in effect, an"ethical geometry". Consequently, the connection between 'right method' innatural philosophy and civil stability was a prominent feature of debate duringthis period.At another point on the intellectual landscape were those working tofoster the development of an intellectual infrastructure which could underwritea political absolutism perhaps similar to that achieved by Louis XIV in Franceafter 1661. Thomas Hobbes, to take perhaps the most prominent Englishexample, did not conceal the fact that the goal of all his philosophising, evenincluding his physical science, was absolutist monarchy:What public faith is there, when there is no public? What is itthat can be called public...without the King?36Like Rene Descartes and Pierre Gassendi in France, Hobbes believed that sciencewas essentially concerned with private applications of a "reductive-compositive" method, with experimentation playing only an adjunct, ratherthan constitutive, role. Perhaps from his early tenure as Bacon's amanuensis,Hobbes acquired a belief that experiment should augment, but not drive,scientific progress. John Aubrey relates as one of the signal moments of hisintellectual development, the story of Hobbes' discovery of geometric reasoning,35 M. Jacob 1988 p.7936 Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, facsimile edition with an introduction by Steven Holmes 1990(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press) p.113. And in fact Louis XIV's famous remark "L'etat?, c'estmoil" expresses succinctly Hobbes' idea of political order.53AssumeCootoqueoufrom mods,and quantitydramiod.Commeacmfrom the ma^ Mame ddu, zed Commum boa Mattsiss. Gommmadly of the madam of 1SDocWu A....WM. b modal Wads, and of oriard.^rumsligurs of body.^Nommen•made theof the qua-lids from^sumes from the nee of the atm. Os of US, sad the} sk....Woo of the sust. le^Mem ofCommences {ConConsequesee from tbe Irafeam of Mt me^ Ammanheed ba-ths, Wet.. 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NI.• seliais.Prams eaoureraquoweat^6041•'Oranstreaes km the seldomcomma to all hodies natural;which as mad% and missComquomfrom thequakdsbodies sr-rm.Contessancs frog qtasadty, sad miss insframiski whichbeing the Macipks or Int fouodUies d philat•phy, I calledf hamorm?AMMO PM.^ Pus.lOarseravOtammuss Illy PicasRom qua-lity, sad Nsdu deter-Med.^By Numbs:Co^o^sodmmas. from1the mdesqsatloy of W. IONINIFrb7:04'":: W.OVIlt Old OYU.Coommos ham the quali-tia d bodie. osaram suchse matethom appear, ma-dams vanish. MasektraCossequoushoes thequalities oflbs 111..Aetvaaarrt. Of mostmea kes the MUM ofCommumene, r dm marl. and AM ofitotp "disk er map.s. Of oomm•em from the sum to theMy sad tied al the ssideks.quodities of Figure 5: Hobbes' Classification of the Sciences37which Hobbes deemed useful precisely because it was a complete logical system"created by man" (sic).38 One offshoot of Hobbes' system was a reformulation ofa basically orthodox classification of the sciences (Figure 5). This privatisation ofscience however was conjoined with arguments for entrenching absolute royalprerogative over all intellectual activity (A point discussed in greater detail inChapter 4). Just as the sovereign would incorporate the body politic in theLeviathan state, so too must absolute authority over private intellects be allowedin order to cancel out any possible deleterious effects of improperly appliedphilosophical method. 3937 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan Edited by C.B. MacPherson 1969 (Harmondsworth:Penguin Books)p.149. Note especially the location accorded to the discipline of geography.38 John Aubrey 1957: Brief Lives Introduction by Oliver Dick (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press)147-159. It is generally accepted that the story probably came from Hobbes himself, whomaintained cordial relations with Aubrey, despite the latter's involvement with the RoyalSociety. It was Aubrey in fact who presented to the Society the well known portrait of Hobbes.See Richard Tuck 1989: Hobbes (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press)39 Hobbes, Leviathan p.23354While Hobbes championed the application of "modern" geometricalreasoning and experimentation in natural philosophy, he appears to havebelieved that this regime could underwrite an profoundly pre-modern social andpolitical order. Hobbes' dedication to the Royalist cause is well known, despitethe fact that it is interleaved with what was, for that time, a rather unorthodoxtheology. He often likened his Leviathan state to the authoritarian city-states ofmedieval Europe and even drew occasional comparisons with the early RomanEmpire. His employment, for much of his life, had been with the aristocraticCavendish family, and in fact many of his early mathematical forays may havebeen inspired by his patrons' interest in military applications.40 Just before theoutbreak of hostilities in England, Hobbes went into self imposed exile in France,eventually becoming acquainted with the circle of scientists centred on Mersenneas well as the court-in-exile of Charles II. It is interesting, and probably a directconsequence of his political conservativism, that Hobbes never interposedhimself directly in political machinations. Unlike Boyle, Newton and otherexperimental philosophers to whom he objected so strongly, Hobbes neveroccupied public offices and rather obsequiously sought to ingratiate himself withthose of higher social rank in the hopes of improving his sometimes precariouslivelihood. In this respect Hobbes appears to have lived his life consistently withhis philosophy that government rests solely and irrevocably with the sovereign.If Hobbes stands out today for his political philosophy, then it may fairly besaid that one of Rene Descartes' major achievements was to elaborate moreclearly the deductive rationality upon which Hobbes' politics was based, thoughnot explicitly. 41 Born into a family of minor prominence in 1590 Descartes waseducated at the Jesuit College de la Fleche. 42 There he received a basicallyScholastic education founded upon the texts of Aristotle and the writings ofAugustine, Aquinas and other Catholic intellectuals. Descartes was later tocompletely disavow the teachings he received at la Fleche for reasons he feltwere epitomised in a series of three dreams he had annually on the evenings of40 Tuck 1989, pp.l2ff41 Descartes of course never framed his work as an epistemological vindication of Hobbes' politics.What I am claiming instead is that there is an implicit, though no less strikingcomplementarity between their positions. Hobbes himself may have recognised this when hedepicted himself as a kind of "underlabourer" to Descartes during the late 1640s. Tuck 1989, p.42 For details of Descartes' life I am indebted primarily to Jack Rochford Vrooman 1970: ReneDescartes: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons).55Nov. 10, 1619, 1620, and 1621. 43 Interestingly, like Hobbes, Descartes escheweddirect political involvement choosing instead to absent himself from Francealmost entirely after about 1620. Though he served in both Catholic andProtestant armies during the early years of the Thirty Years' War it is debatablethat he ever saw any combat. 44 Instead he seems to have been engaged as a sortof 'gentleman soldier', an occupation which afforded him the chance to traveland study fairly independently. Later in life he retreated completely from eventhese commitments and lived a reclusive existence at various places inProtestant Holland.But if some intellectuals did continue to uphold the idea of absolutemonarchy, perhaps out of some revisionist nostalgia for an Elizabethan 'GoldenAge', it was also true that the times had passed them by, at least in England. Bythe time of the Restoration the long enclosure process, coupled with thedislocations of the Civil War and Republic had pretty well erased all vestiges ofthe feudal political economy. Commodity production, albeit of a decided proto-industrial nature, entailed the need for new and more keenly instrumental waysof thinking about human and technical problems. If the economic system wasincreasingly to be organised on a commodity basis then it would be necessary foreven its 'information content to be more in tune with the distinctive rhythms ofcapital circulation. Circles of scholars at Tew and Oxford, as well as that centredon Samuel Hartlib responded to this need by eschewing Cartesian attempts atgrand theory and the knowledge of ultimate causes as esoteric and groundless. 45Though specifics vary from group to group, all of them propounded some formof parliamentary monarchy and religious toleration which was generallysubsumed under the rubric of "Latitudinarianism". The pursuit of knowledgewould be directed towards the achievement of economically utilitarian goals andwould therefore be based firmly on the reality of the world as accessed throughthe human senses. As Robert Boyle put it, the only right subject for naturalphilosophy was the observation and verification of "matters of fact"; concrete43 For a treatment of Descartes' dreams as liminal experiences see Susan R. Bordo 1987: The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (New York: State Univ. of New York).Compare this to Vrooman's 1970 treatment.44 Some have wondered if Descartes might have been present at the Battle of the White Mountainin 1620 at which the fortunes of his future close friend Elizabeth of Bohemia were ruined. SeeVrooman 1970, p.167ff.45 J.R. Jacob 1977, Chapter 156visually accessible phenomena which could be repeatedly produced and observedunder carefully controlled experimental circumstances. 46 Unlike Hobbes andDescartes, under this regime experimentation was to become not merely anadjunct to knowledge, but a central constitutive element of it. 47 Moreover thecriteria for experimental adjudication were a product of ongoing publicnegotiation, as opposed to the more Cartesian preoccupation with the privateand the narrowly mathematical. This interest in concrete replicable,technologically oriented phenomena lent itself easily to problems of industrialand agricultural production (to which a sizable proportion of the Royal Society'searly proceedings were devoted) and also helps explain their preoccupation withdetails of methodology during the 1650s and 1660s.There is another major difference between the philosophers of the RoyalSociety, and the experimental programme more generally, and the of theCartesian epistemology. Whereas the latter maintained only a limited interest inthe world of practical technical affairs, the former group was almost entirelydefined by just such an interest. It is striking to observe how much of the workof the early Royal Society was devoted to problems of agricultural production,medicine and the development of machinery. This is not to say that themembers of the Royal Society devoted themselves, contra Sprat's protestations,overmuch to "present profit", but only that the "present profit" of such a diversegroup of members took a diverse range of forms. While there were wererelatively few merchants or businessmen among the early membership, manyearly members of the Society were themselves involved in various levels ofgovernment administration and business activity. Robert Boyle himself wasappointed in 1660 to the "Royal Council on Foreign Plantations", whosemandate was to regulate the economic activities of the American colonies.While many appointments were undoubtedly political sinecures, it is clear thatBoyle actively involved himself in the affairs of the Council and advocated anexperimental approach to the problems they sought to address. 48 Of course Boylewas not the only important member of the Royal Society to blend science with46 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.22-2647 For a further discussion of the distinctions between Boyle's and Descartes' epistemologies seeRose-Mary Sargeant 1986: "Robert Boyle's Baconian Inheritance: A Response to Laudan'sCartesian Hypothesis" in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science  17(4) 469-486, andalso Chapter 4 of this thesis.48 J.R. Jacob 1977 p.144ff57political and economic administration. Isaac Newton himself was appointedWarden of the Royal Mint in March 1696, later adding the honour of Master ofthe Mint, titles he held until his death in 1727. During his tenure at the MintNewton presided over a comprehensive recoinage designed to alleviate thechronic English currency crises of the late seventeenth century, and arguedpersuasively for what we today refer to as fiscal "monetarism". Newton alsooccupied a seat in the Commons for a short time between 1701-2 though,according to Richard Westfall, he "was not prominent in any respect" of thatcapacity. 492.4 Concluding CommentsThe foregoing represents a preliminary attempt to bring an understandingof the major themes of seventeenth century history, primarily with respect theEngland, together with an inquiry into the intellectual responses these themesand events elicited. Especially I have attempted to show how those figureswhich loom large in the next three chapters of this thesis, Descartes, Hobbes,Boyle and Newton, reacted to the situations in which they found themselves.Part of their reactions involved the development and deployment ofphilosophical systems designed to steer epistemological and socio-politicaldevelopment in specific directions. Of course these historico-geographicalprocesses did not act alone in stimulating the elaboration of a socially andpolitically functional experimental philosophy. The atomistic naturalphilosophy of Boyle and Newton was also a continuation of an intellectual trendwhich included Copernicus, Galileo and Bacon whom they embraced, as well asDescartes and Hobbes whom they did not. From this perspective it seems at leastplausible that part of the reason for the remarkable success enjoyed by the RoyalSociety in defining the new science can be traced to two historico-geographicfacts. First, the programme of the Royal Society seems to have cross-cut theprevailing intellectual debates of the day in a highly inclusive manner. The49 For a detailed discussion of Newton's tenure at the Mint and in Parliament, see RichardWestfall 1980: Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press), chapter 12. On the currency crisis of the late seventeenth century see also D.W. Jones1972: "London Merchants and the Crisis of the 1690s" in Peter Clark and Paul Slack (Eds) Crisisand Order in English Towns 1500-1700  (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 311-355.58programme of the Royal Society seems to have delineated ontological andepistemological partitions which could appeal to the felt needs of a majority ofthen extant interest groups. Theologians as well as scientists and nobility as wellas gentry could profitably accede to the programmatic demands of the Society. Ofcourse the broad appeal of the programme of the Royal Society would necessarilylend it further impetus. Undoubtedly the Rationalist programme, especially aselaborated by Hobbes into its political as well as its epistemological dimensionscould not boast such ecumenical appeal! The second reason for the quickascendance of the Royal Society is that it was quickly absorbed into a variety ofpowerful social interests. The social heterogeneity of the membership (Table 2)maintained over the first forty years of the Society's existence attests to thepowerful actors to which it could lay claim in territory disputes or otherdifficulties.59Chapter 3"Ontology and the Spatiality of Subjectivity:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 1"3.1 Ontologies of Self and Substance3.2 Hobbes' and Descartes' Plenist OntologyTheories of SubstanceTheories of Causality and Motion3.3 The Plenist Construction of SubjectivityVarieties of Seventeenth Century DualismHobbes' 'Limited' Dualism3.4 Human and Physical Ontologies and their Spatiality603.1 Ontologies of Self and SubstancePerhaps the most basic rudimentary distinction embedded withindiscernibly modern human and physical sciences pertains to the distinctionbetween inert physical material and the reflective consciousness which perceivesit. At first blush this may seem a facile statement, in the sense that the verysuggestion invokes a distinction which might appear to verge on tautology.After all the distinction between reflecting and non reflecting substances wouldseem to be logically prior to any discussion of ontological partitioning at all. Butthis is just yet another example of the problems intrinsic to attempts tounderstand components of the 'western intellectual tradition' as contextuallyspecific and unique from a perspective largely within that tradition.Nevertheless, historians and philosophers of science, as well as anthropologistsand other social scientists, are discovering that the ontological partition betweensubstance and self is not at all evident, or even universal. Berman and Yatesremind us that the commonplace, modern , distinction between self-individuating consciousness and the brute material world upon which it is thenature of this consciousness to reflect was in fact an innovation of seventeenthcentury philosophy. 1 The fifteenth and sixteenth century Hermetic tradition, forexample, did not posit an oppositional dichotomy of subject and object. Nor didit array a factual, material reality over and against a reflective, privatelycogitating "I". This tradition, with its epitome in the alchemy of Paracelsus andthe numerology of Fludd, was founded on radically different connexionsbetween microcosm and macrocosm, subject and object, and self and substance.Hermetic culture, to use Berman's phrase, was a "participatory culture"; one inwhich an "ecstatic merger of self with nature" meant that scientific study was atone and the same time part of the process of self creation as well as technicalmanipulation:Thus alchemy was - from our viewpoint - a composite of differentactivities. It was the science of matter, the attempt to unravel nature'ssecrets; a set of procedures which were employed in mining, dying andglass manufacture and the preparation of medicines; andsimultaneously a type of yoga, a science of psychic transformation...thealchemist did not confront matter, he permeated it. 21 Morris Berman 1981: The Reenchantment of the World  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press); FrancisYates 1969: Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition  (New York: Vintage Books)2 Berman 1981 p.9261Likewise, in numerology the Ptolemaic cosmology was united with the ancientJudaic cabalarian philosophy in which certain combinations of numbers andarithmetic operations were believed to put one in touch with the divine essence.Even well into the seventeenth century, the century of Descartes and Newton,Figure 6: The Ptolemaic Universe According to Robert Fludd (1619)the recognisably 'modern' oppositions between subject and object, in terms ofwhat Berman calls "non-participating culture", was not yet articulated with whatit meant to think scientifically.62Robert Fludd's numerological formulations (Figure 6) 3, published early inthe seventeenth century, became one of the first lightning rods for thecoalescence of the new empiricism, represented in the 1620s and 1630s by the twoMinorite friars and intellectuals Marin Mersenne and Pierre Gassendi. 4Mersenne and Gassendi recognised that their critique would necessarily have toproceed on at least two fronts. First, they would have to refute the Hermeticidentification of the practical sciences, the "sciences of the forge", as the sciencesof material transmutation and direct ecstatic merger which, they believedundermined Church authority. Second, they would have to offer an alternativewhose ontological and epistemological structures would preclude a lapsing backinto Hermeticism by coopting what they took to be the doctrine's mostsignificant elements. In so doing however, they would also have to avoid beingidentified with the Aristotelian tradition against which Hermeticism was also areaction, at least if they were going to be able to promote their schema as anintellectual advance The core of their attack, which was joined by otherphilosophers after the initial salvos in the early 1620s, was the Baconian idea thatappearances were all that could be known with certainty and that the physicalmatter one studied was devoid of animating forces. Still the task faced by the twofriars, who earnestly hoped to combine their vast intellectual resources and theirconvictions about religious and spiritual order into a new rapprochementbetween reason and faith, was rife with intellectual complexities and nuances.It was this intellectual context that Rene Descartes entered and it was tothe cause of this "new science" that his work was to greatly contribute. Descartes'work was possibly one of the first positive systematic accounts of the new naturalepistemology and was itself founded upon a novel partitioning between subjectsand objects. Even so, Descartes' work, and also that of Thomas Hobbes, lookedback to Hermeticism at least insofar as they theorised motion and cause to beintrinsic to matter. Unlike most contemporary dualisms, mind was taken to benot a thing, but an activity or motion of the brain. As Hiram Caton has argued,Descartes' "true man" would be one who was able to operationalise an3 Berman 1981 p.1014 Our understanding of the place of Bacon in the pantheon of early modern science is currently undermuch reconsideration. Briggs, among others, has contended that we have taken too much of ourimage of Bacon from the highly selective view of him held by members of the early RoyalSociety, especially Abraham Cowley and Thomas Sprat who wrote much of the "official"history of the Society during the 1660s.63understanding of both the unification of mind and body and also thetranscendence of the latter by the former. 5 In England especially, interest inDescartes' plenist physics waned quickly, as philosophers sought a morecomplete break with philosophies of nature tainted by mystical notions ofintrinsic causality. Boyle, Newton and the Royal Society can be seen as, in asense, "completing" the transition from Hermeticism to Empiricism whichBacon and Mersenne began and which Descartes and Hobbes carried forwardthrough mid century. With the atomist philosophy institutionalised in theRoyal Society the mid century partition between subjects and objects wasenhanced and buttressed through its alignment with the partition betweenphysical and metaphysical approaches to knowledge. Of course none of this ismeant to suggest the achievement of any culminating historical moment beyondwhich these questions became somehow 'static'. Rather, what was achievedthrough this period was much more a strategic concordance of philosophicaland contextual predispositions which has, in fact, displayed a remarkablerobustness.In this chapter I will trace some of the relationships between theories ofsubstance and objectivity and corollary theories of self and subjectivity. In theirlargely modern guises, these distinctions can be shown to have becomeincreasingly tied to other more spatially imbued distinctions, such as thosebetween "microcosm/macrocosm", as Livingstone has recently shown for thelate sixteenth century work of John Dee and Leonard and Thomas Digges6, andalso for the relation of public and private spheres as centrally problematised byHobbes. These revised cognitive and cultural 'distances' between ourselves andnature were also quickly articulated with the spaces of incipient capitalism andreligious Protestantism. Further, the elaboration of the new Cartesian form ofsubjectivity, the "analytic of finitude", as Foucault has consistentlydemonstrated, created new possibilities for the elaboration of new disciplinaryspaces in post-seventeenth century society. 7 Interestingly however, analyses inthis vein have often tacitly assumed the positivistic separation between physical5 Hiram Caton 1973: The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes  (New Haven: Yale Univ.Press) p.416 David Livingstone 1990: "Geography and Modernity: Past and Present" paper presented to theAnnual Meeting of the Assn. of Amer. Geogr. Toronto April 1990.7 Michel Foucault 1970: The Order of Things: An Archeaology of the Human Sciences (New York:Vintage Books)64and human sciences. In the instance of studies of Hobbes, for example, this hasresulted in the tendency to contend that, at best, Hobbes' physical and politicalsciences are only analogously integrated. Such interpretations simply to notstand up to a close reading of the interconnections between the author's texts andhis times. Foucault's analyses are an important exception to this sort ofbifurcated thinking, for example in his examination of classification structures inThe Order of Things where he deploys the concept of the "episteme" in adeliberate move to integrate the cultural-intellectual-political whole. Perhapsmore to the point, Foucault's work evinces a deep and abiding interest notmerely in the themes of subjectivity, space, science and power as analyticallydistinct, but in their dynamic historical confluences in (discursively) ordered"epistemes". 8 After a Foucauldian fashion, I will argue that the philosophies ofDescartes and Hobbes are in fact most comprehensible only if one suspends thecontemporary tendency to concede the radical separation of physical andmetaphysical realms. While these two philosophers certainly did distinguishbetween physical and metaphysical discourses, the practice of dichotomisingthem was a subsequent development more closely allied with the program ofRoyal Society experimentalists such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. Thedecision to orient my analysis with the "plenist" perspective of Descartes andHobbes will allow me to show more clearly both the relation of Newtonianscience to that which preceded it, as well as its divergence.The positioning of Cartesian plenism midway between ontologies of thepre-modern and modern worlds, its location "at the edge of modernity" as Greneputs it9, renders it a very fruitful locus for the development of an analysis ofmodern subjectivity. Here is a second Foucauldian aspect to the analysis laid outin this thesis. Beyond merely recounting a specific seventeenth-centuryontological debate about the distinction between substance and self, I hope toprovide some indications as to how these distinctions were implicated in a broadset of emerging power relations. The specific case I will touch on, in theconcluding sections of the chapter involves the intersection between the postCartesian discourse of subjectivity and issues of gender. In subsequent chapters I8 This is true irrespective of the critiques which have been directed at his historicalperiodisations, which J.G. Merquior to take one example, considers to be unwarranted 'totalising'accounts. See Merquior 1985: Foucault (London: Fontana Press).9 Marjorie Grene 1985: Descartes (Brighton: Harvester Press) p.9265will try to elucidate some of the specifically spatial consequences of thesereconceived relations and divergences in what Foucault refered to as"knowledge/power". In Chapter 4 I will introduce more explicitly theFoucauldian interpenetration of power and political spaces with the moreabstract "spaces"discussed here, which is critical to an understanding of, toparaphrase, how "extension was substituted for localisation" in the intellectualtheory and practice of early modernitylo3.2 Hobbes' and Descartes' Plenist OntologyTheories of SubstanceHobbes and Descartes were both committed to the reality of an objectiveworld constituted of "corporeal substance" upon which the individual subjectiveconsciousness contemplates. The immediate object of the senses, "corporeal", or"extended", substance was conceived to be that 'stuff' which is "extended" intothe three geometric dimensions, length, breadth and depth, and also time.Descartes' well known thought-experiment on the true nature of extendedsubstance had systematically stripped away as "secondary" all qualities, such ascolour and hardness, which were not immediately translatable intomathematical expressions. Ultimately all that remained subsequent to thisreductive process were those "primary" qualities without which extendedsubstance simply could not be conceived." These "primary" qualities, ofgeometrical "extension", were then taken to be constitutive of all perceptiblematter. Both Hobbes and Descartes would have agreed with Galileo who wrotein Il Saggiotore :No sooner do I form a conception of material or corporeal substance thanI feel the need of conceiving that it has boundaries and shape; thatrelative to others it is great or small; that it is in this or that place andin this or that time, that it is moving or still....nor can I, by any effort ofimagination, dissociate it from these properties. 1210 Michel Foucault 1986: "Of Other Spaces" in Diacritics 16, translated by Jay Miskowisc11 Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, Trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (New York: LiberalArts Press, 1960), "Second Meditation".12 quoted in Stuart Hampshire 1956: The Age of Reason, (New York: New American Library) p.33.66Corporeal substance therefore is that which can be perceived to be "extended"into the three dimensions of Euclidean geometry and time. Moreover thisontology of extended substance, which was derived from Descartes' priorcommitment to epistemological sceptical realism, was conceived to be absolutelytrue and universal of all physical substance.It must be noted that the very question raised by seventeenth centuryphilosophy regarding "what is physical substance in and of itself ?" was a novelone. Both the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical traditions, as well as theirscholastic offspring, maintained some measure of intentional suffusion ofnoumenal and phenomenal entities in their physical ontologies. 13 For Platophysical substance was not simply "physical" in the modern sense at all; it existedin the world always through the moulding of primordial matter by non material"ideal forms". While Aristotle disagreed with Plato's appeal to "ideal forms", henevertheless contended that substances did have a nature which is completelydetermined prior to human attempts at classifying their sense perceptions ofsubstance. Perhaps more to the point Aristotle argued that everything in theworld had a predetermined place and functionality. While gravity, afterNewton, was taken to be an impersonal force of blind nature, for Aristotle it wasthe product of an "excitement" internal to a substance as it neared its place in thenatural order. The achievement of seventeenth century philosophers was torestate the problem as one of classifying the world according to a revised notionof physicality which eschewed the appeal to anything beyond our senseperceptions of the things themselves. As a reaction against Scholastic attempts toweave a Christian teleology into cosmological theories, in the works of SebastianMunster (1489-1552) for example, Bacon can be said to have spoken for hiscentury:Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, itsconfiguration and changes in configuration. 14But there is a catch to this attempt to recast the ontological partition as onebetween physical substances, which are empirically verifiable, and metaphysical(meta)substances, which are not empirically verifiable and are hence ephemeral13 On Plato and Aristotle see R.G. Collingwood 1945: The Idea of Nature (Oxford: ClarendonPress); Edward Grant 1981: Much Ado About Nothing (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press) p.5ff14 Francis Bacon 1960 Aphorism #5167and "secondary". Descartes' extreme scepticism, which caused him to doubt theauthority claimed by scholastic texts and also the evidence of his own senses, iswholly escaped by the rules of mathematical reasoning and especially byEuclidean geometry. The theorems of geometry and especially Descartes' owntransformational geometry (by which he was able to transform more complexnatural relations onto Cartesian two dimensional surfaces) were held to besomehow part of that special class of "innate ideas"; a form of privileged non-metaphysical description language. 15 Virtually all other seventeenth centurythinkers had also accepted the physical veracity of geometry and mathematics,even if they happened to disagree with Descartes' own formulations of it. In hispreface to the Principia Mathematica, Newton stated thatGeometry itself is founded in mechanical practice and is nothing butthat part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes anddemonstrates the art of measuring. 16Though mathematics, or at least arithmetic, had long been privileged inHermetic epistemology, its Hermetic heritage of esoteric self creation was, by midcentury, severed. Once mathematics' claim to epistemological privilege wassecured through its firm grounding in empirical study, the partition betweenprimary and secondary qualities, between physics and metaphysics, had a firmanchor. Primary qualities were then taken to be those sensible attributes whichcould be expressed in quantitative mathematical terms, while "secondary"qualities were those which could not be so expressed, at least not readily.Extension into geometrically constituted space, space abstracted from the thingswithin it, become the lowest common denominator of all corporeal substance.Even so, the philosophical status of mathematics and geometry still manages tobe a locus for much debate on the partition between physics and metaphysics. 1715 Rene Descartes Third Meditation16 Jeremy Gray 1989: Ideas of Space: Euclidean, Non Euclidean and Relativistic (Oxford: OxfordUniv. Press) p.17817 Descartes recounted that his discovery of the veracity of geometry was in fact a revelationwhich came to him in one of three dreams which he experienced in the winter of 1619. See JackVrooman 1970: Rene Descartes: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons) p.56ff; and JamesGarrison 1987: "Newton and the Relation of Mathematics to Natural Philosophy" in Journal forthe History of Ideas 48(4) pp.609-627. Hobbes took a rather more pragmatic view, contendingthat as a human construction geometry was aptly matched to human theorising about the worldand that there was no need to postulate the existence of some specially privileged scientificlanguage.68It would be a mistake, however, to consider the relationship betweenphysical extension and Euclidean space to be a straightforward identity relation.For plenists such as Descartes and Hobbes, space and physical extension were notidentical concepts at all. And even their philosophical opponents, includingRobert Boyle and Isaac Newton, did not consider space to be coterminous withextension. Both camps were very careful about the distinction between space,whether conceived as an independent substance in and of itself (Boyle andNewton) or as a property of substances (Hobbes, Leibniz and Descartes), andsubstance, as that material which tangibly exists in the world. As I shall go tosome lengths to show in Chapter 5, space and extension were conceived, byseventeenth century thinkers at least, to be very special and distinct ontologicalcategories. But my historiographic project is complicated by the manysubsequent observers who have proposed that space and extension are, at least inpractice, the same thing. Yves Simon, in his The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space, claims that "...extended substance is ...Archimedean space; it is the nonqualitative space of the Greek geometricians." 18 The philosopher MarjorieGrene, in her primer on Descartes, also conflates space and extension. 19 Frankly Isuspect that much of the confusion arises from the difficulty of dissociatingoneself from the intellectual tradition which is problematised herein. One resultis that these thinkers project into their interpretations as "natural" and beyondrefutation spatial conceptions which submerge important distinctions betweenspace, geometry and substance in seventeenth century thought. Even so, thisconflation is also undoubtedly a result of the fact that Descartes, Hobbes andothers were often lamentably imprecise and even contradictory in theirdefinition and use of these critical distinctions. One perhaps unintended resultof this confusion has been to muddy waters crucial to the intelligible renderingof the vigorous debate between plenists and atomists and also spatial relativistsand absolutists.If the notion of "substance" seems as yet unclear, one might contrast itwith the atomistic ideas of the major camp opposing Cartesianism. It isinteresting to note that figures such as Henry More, Isaac Newton and RobertBoyle, though they entertained youthful attractions to Cartesian philosophy,diverged from it markedly in their variously inspired desires to discover the18 Yves Simon 1970: The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space,  (New York: Magi Books) p.319 Marjorie Grene 1985 p.127ff69ontological minima required to support the reality of corporeal substance.Enacting a different epistemological program, they agreed that all matter, inaddition to being generally classifiable as Cartesian "corporeal substance", wasalso at base constructed of simple "atoms". As the basic ontological units ofcorporeal substance these atoms were thought to be incapable of being furthersubdivided either in practice or in principle. "Atoms" are conceived to be, asNewton himself put it, "solid, massy, hard impenetrable, movable particles". 20Implied in this particle ontology was, of course, the notion of microcosmic voidspace, to be understood as the empty space between the atoms. This latter notionbecame a central point of contention in the debates between Thomas Hobbes andthe Royal Society in the 1650s and 1660s (discussed in Chapter 4). Still, the idea ofthe world being made up of atoms whizzing around in a cosmic void was notnew; marking in fact a renewal of a central tenet of Epicurean philosophy. 21What was novel to seventeenth century atomism, especially after Newton, wasan elegant theory of force and interaction between atoms which didn't rely onthe clumsy mechanical idea, employed even by Boyle, that the particlesthemselves were comprised of "little beards and hooks... which entangle them"and that this could explain their interaction. 22 As well, this period saw the rapiddevelopment and diffusion of scientific technologies, such as Robert Hooke'smicroscope, which seemed to affirm the reality of an atomic world.But, as 'obvious' as such a position may seem to contemporary eyes,Descartes, Hobbes, and others, did not feel this way at all. For them thepostulation of corporeal substance did not entail atomism, but in fact led tosomething quite contrary to atomism. As "plenists" they contended instead that,by definition , extended substance must be infinitely divisible. Pierre Bayle(1647-1706) argued that if...the parts of a finite extension have a magnitude greater thanzero...fthen]...they must be divisible in principle, since whatever hasmagnitude has parts, and whatever has parts is divisible. 2320 From the 31st Query appended to Newton's Optics, cited in Berman p.115.21 Edward Grant 1981, p.5; see also R.G. Collingwood 1945, Ch.1; and R.H. Kargon 1966: Atomismin England From Hariot to Newton  (Oxford: Clarendon Press)22 Robert Boyle 1675: Experimental Notes of the Mechanical Origin or Production of Fixtness(Printed by E. Flesher for R. Davis, Bookseller in Oxford) p.923 Bayle quoted in Philip Cummins 1990: "Bayle, Leibniz, Hume and Reid on Extension, Compositesand Simples", History of Philosophy Quarterly 7(3), p.30170By logical extension, plenists rejected the concrete and easily apprehensibledualism between atom and void, between particles and the forces that act uponthem externally, conceiving instead of a cosmological "plenum"; an ontologicalfield of continuous substance. Thomas Hobbes, for example, argued that sinceBoyle had not, to his satisfaction at any rate, demonstrated the philosophicalnecessity of his notion of 'void' space, his atomism was philosophicallyunsupportable. 24 Therefore, both the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and Occam'sRazor, were taken to demand that Boyle fall back to the plenist position that allspace was 'full' of something and that our human senses are simply inadequateto the task of fully apprehending all that is physically present. With thisontology, which denies the Newtonian separation of substance from force,physical analysis shifts to the examination of discernable instances of "localmotion" within the plenum.Certainly it is worth noting here that the plenist position as thus farelaborated is quite consistent with the epistemological scepticism which wasadopted by Descartes and Hobbes. Doubts about the veracity of sense date couldlead quite easily to doubts about the epistemological status of claims that givenspaces are 'empty' or 'full'. Cartesian scepticism, however, was not simply arevival of the Socratic scepticism of "open-mindedness", what Descartes himselfrefered to derisively as "doubting for the sake of doubting". 25 Even so, as Catonhas shown, Cartesian scepticism ambivalently rooted itself in a conception ofsingle point (optical) perspective as intrinsic to modern subjectivity. 26 Theirwillingness to doubt even the evidence of their own senses, and with them theempirical axiom that the world of appearances is all that there is, does notprohibit them from concluding that positive knowledge about the world ispossible.Theories of Causality and MotionAnother important strand of thought which is implicated in therelationship between ideas regarding corporeal substance and the problem of24 See my discussion of Thomas Hobbes' dispute with Robert Boyle over the air pump trials inChapter 4.25 Descartes, Discourse on Method p.2226 Caton 1973 p.2871subjectivity involves the analysis of physical causality. So far I have avoided theproblem of how extended substance, as conceived by Hobbes and Descartes, wassupposed to be instilled with causal power. How is it, after all, that plain,unthinking 'lumps' of corporeal substance come to exert influence on eachother? At this juncture the ideas of plenists diverge markedly from the ideas ofmost of their contemporaries. In a nutshell, the dispute was between those, suchas Hobbes, Leibniz and Descartes, who argued that causality was a constitutivepart of a cosmological "plenum" of which extended substance was merely aperceptible manifestation, and those who countered that causality was not aconstitutive, or "primary", quality of corporeal substance but rather related to thecombined extrinsic agency of humanity, nature and the prime mover God. ForPlenists, on the one hand, causality and motion are intrinsic elements of theplenum, while for atomists, on the other, they are wholly separable from theconstitution of atomic substance. The differences expressed here are indeedsubtle, often ambiguous and beg a great many questions, but they are also criticalto a fuller understanding of the spatiality of modernity. Insofar as the discussionis maintained on a strictly physical level, the issue of causality can be plausiblyargued either way. But when one considers the moral, political and culturalfactors brought to bear on the issue, the dispute becomes much more intractableand intellectually rich.Hobbes and Descartes held that causality is invested in substance at theontological level, and added that it is also related to a hierarchical chain ofsuperordinance culminating in the "prime mover", God. 27 Let me elaborate onthe first point of this analysis of causality, which proposes a "plenism" based onthe singularity of "action by contact". Hobbes defended eloquently, most notablyagainst Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton, the proposition that causality could onlybe attributed to the physical contact of bodies of matter. Hobbes' plenist ontology,postulated that the world was composed of corporeal substance which existed ina sort of flux, or "xther", of varying densities. At some points the densitiesand/or motion of this plenum are such that even our senses, crude receptorsthough Hobbes and Descartes conceived them to be, could discern the presence of27 This is the Cartesian expression on the doctrine of the "great chain of being" - see Arthur 0.Lovejoy 1936: The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: CUP)72extended substance. 28 In some parts of their writing, motion in the plenum wastheorised to be comprised of the continual reconstitution of phenomena insuccessive external spaces over a particular contiguous series of points in time. Ifone adheres to plenism, then it logically follows that causality must be inherentto the plenum, since the plenum is all encompassing, and therefore all actionmust necessarily happen by contact. More to the point, this nether would have tobe invested with its own intrinsic motion which served to impart force to bodiesaccording to their own relative moments of inertia. 29 Leibniz, though writingrather later than Hobbes or Descartes, concurred:A body is never moved naturally except by another body which impelsit by touching it, and thereafter it advances until it is stopped byanother body which touches it. Every other operation on bodies iseither miraculous or imaginary."Hobbes' rejection of Boyle's "matters of fact" was thus based upon positive aswell as negative criticisms. As far as Hobbes was concerned, Boyle had notdemonstrated that the separation of cause and effect could move science towardsmore satisfactory explanations than simpler alternatives. Nor had Boyleexplained why the contentions he was raising were logically necessary conditionsfor the structuring of physical theories. Hobbes believed it was possible todevelop a plenist account of observed phenomena which did not require thepostulation of "matters of fact" or of a vacuum. Action at a distance, failed tosatisfy, on the plenist view, because it contradicted the conclusions of a simplerphysical system which was itself bolstered by its integration with a theory ofhuman perception and understanding.Obviously a plenist could never accept the postulation of atoms if thesewere meant to be taken as corporeal "simples". Proposing atoms as elementalminima implies proposing a limit to divisibility which entails the existence ofmicrocosmic empty space, thus contradicting plenism. The plenism adopted byDescartes and Hobbes in fact suggested that matter was infinite in both directions28 Note here how Hobbes' proposition of the plenum relies upon an extreme scepticism regardingsense data. By constantly foregrounding this scepticism about sense data they were largelyinoculated against lapsing into any variant of "naive realism"29 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.8830 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 1956: Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol 2 Translated and editedby Leroy Loemker (Chicago: Univ of Chicago Press), "Fifth Letter to Clarke", p.1143 written in171673of magnitude. Matter was infinitesimally divisible in ever smaller components,as well as being infinitely expandable. Rather than becoming preoccupied withmere external "matters of fact"; "atoms" or "corpuscles" as the experimentalistssuch as Boyle did, plenists believed that scientists ought to seek after theorganising "forms" which shaped the phenomena witnessed by the senses. Onthe plenist view, the efficient causes of changes in form, in this case their inertia, were constitutive of the interacting substances themselves. 31 The naturalmomentum of objects in the world was conceived to be oriented towards theircontinual self creation. In my opinion this integration of cause and effect isprecisely what is captured in Descartes' concept of the "conatus", Leibniz'"monads" and Hobbes' "simple circular motion". 32 From a contemporaryperspective these notions of internal causality seem contradictory and fraughtwith difficulty. Therefore, in what follows I will provide only a brief sketch ofthese concepts which will be sufficient for understand the analyses of subjectivityand mind-body dualism which are built upon them.In most plenist schemes "monads", "conatus" or "simple circularmotion", or whatever else such intrinsic "efficient" causality is called, are linkedinto a hierarchical "chain of being" with God, as the "final cause", at the topmostpinnacle. Just as individuals have an intrinsic and undeniable will to selfpreservation, so too was matter theorised to have an inertial "protoforce"oriented toward the preservation of its own natural configuration. 33 Perhaps itmight be more accurate to say that God exists as the highest order of orderingprinciple or force, since most plenists tried to avoid conceiving of God's power ascomprised merely of the ability to impress force on objects. Such a view, after allran the risk of marginalising God's role in the workings of the world to the31 The distinction between "efficient" and "final" causes is one of great philosophical antiquity,and hearkens back to the notion of a gradation of levels of understanding, each of which is morecertain than the last. "Efficient" causes are generally taken to be those which are observed to berequired to produce a particular empirical event. "Final" causes are much more cosmological innature and often hearken, especially in the thought of the seventeenth century, to the causalitywielded by the divine essence.32 On Descartes' "conatus" there is very little written which is anything but derisive. Leibniz'ideas are best accessed through their original articulation in The Monadology, see alsoHampshire 1956. Hobbes' forays into physics came very early in his career, and then, largely inresponse to Boyle, late in his career. Schaffer and Shapin have included in their book atranslation of Hobbes' Dialogus Physicus of 1661 which is a late statement of his physical views33 Howard Bernstein 1980: "Conatus Hobbes and the Young Leibniz" Studies in the History andPhilosophy of Science 11(1) 25-37; William Sacksteader 1979: 'Speaking about Mind: Endeavorin Hobbes" Philosophical Forum 11(1) 65-79.7 4initial "flick of the fingers" required to set it in motion. 34 In Descartes' first proofof God's existence, he reasons that there must be a universal hierarchy ofperfection:...I reflected upon the fact that I doubted many things, and that inconsequence, my spirit was not wholly perfect, for I saw clearly that itwas a greater perfection to know than to doubt...The only hypothesisleft was that this idea was put in my mind by a nature that was reallymore perfect than I was, which had all the perfections that I couldimagine, and which was, in a word, God. 35Thus God, as the final cause of all things, was given the much more dignifiedtask of having guided and constituted those substantial efficient causes whichwere the objects of scientific method. In fact, final and efficient causes weremuch more closely intertwined indeed, since it is easy to get the impression thatthe final causes attributable to God were, in the thought of the era, thought to bediscernable in the 'traces', or overall pattern of "directionality" and"intentionality", created by the world of efficient causes.Obviously true science, the science which would seek after the formsbehind the phenomena, would have to be largely an inward process, sinceplenism ruled out placing too much emphasis on detailed empirical study alone.Contrarily, experimentalists such as Boyle argued that since there could be noapprehensible connection between causes and effects, science would be restrictedto the much more utilitarian task of charting correlations between observed andproduced "matters of fact". 36 Experimental study was thus the beginning and theend of Newtonian science. Empirical study would play a different role in plenistscience. Rather than providing one with those "matters of fact" so dear to Boyleand other experimental philosophers, empirical work was designed to augmentthe internal intellectual process of seeing behind mere sensory perceptions. Thatintellectual process, which elevated geometrical reasoning, was fused with a34 This in fact was the interpretation of Blaise Pascal who quipped "I cannot forgive Descartes forallowing God only a flick of his fingers to the set the world in motion, after which he has nofurther need of him". Pensêes Translated by A.J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1966), #887 (the Pensees are numbered ordinally)35 Descartes Meditations, p. 25-2636 See M.A. Stewart (Ed.) 1979: The Selected Papers of Robert Boyle (New York: Harper and Row);and also Henry Van Leeuwen 1963: The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690(Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague).75confirmationist and comparative role for experimentation, in sharp contrast toits more thoroughgoing constitutive role in the science of Newton and Boyle. 373.3 The Plenist Construction of SubjectivityVarieties of Seventeenth Century DualismIt is possible to bring the basic ontological issues into rather sharper focusby noting that the Cartesian postulation of extended substance as the object ofthe senses unavoidably begs a very important question. It follows logically fromthe proposition that the senses provide a 'window' onto real corporeal substance,however flawed this window may be, that there must be some centralintelligence which collects and rationalises these sense inputs. In other words,the predication of senses necessarily implies a subject , which Descartes equateswith the individual privately cogitating "r. Both Hobbes and Descartesrecognised that their ontologies of corporeal substance necessarily implied acomplementary analysis of the knowing subject. Unlike the Newtonian atomistswho would, for the most part, sever or submerge the connection between thesubjects and objects of scientific discourse, these seventeenth-century thinkersconfronted this issue directly. The resolution of this issue involved, for bothHobbes and Descartes, some infusion of "dualism" into their outlooks.Descartes, the archetypical, though frequently misunderstood, dualist, arguedthat body, that is to say "corporeal substance", must be in some sensequalitatively different from the "I", the locus of "mind", primarily because of theuniqueness of human thought:I concluded that I was a thing or substance whose whole essence ornature was to think, and which to exist has no need of space nor of anymaterial thing or body . (my italics)3837 On this point see MacPherson, 1968 pp.17-18; and Tom Sore11 1988: The Science of Hobbes'Politics" in Ryan and Rogers (Eds) 1989 pp.67-90. John Aubrey, in his Brief Lives (1670) providesa similar account of Hobbes' method which was probably provided by Hobbes himself.38 Rene Descartes Discourse on Method, p.257 6Thus "mind" was fundamentally different from, and considered more noble,than mere "body" or physical being. This view of the subject as uniquely andprivately constituted over and against the objects of ratiocination, followed quitenaturally from that aspect of epistemological scepticism which interposed a "veilof ideas" between the mind and the physical world. 39 This was quite differentfrom the scholastic position which saw the individual mind as constitutedthrough the appeal to the Aristotelian "nous"; a universal ideal of reason andrationality. It was also quite different from the Lockean physicalist view whichconceived of mind as a "tabula rasa" to be filled with public ideals of rationalityand selfhood.Now it is an open question, despite contemporary inclinations, whetherDescartes actually meant to imply an ontological, "two substance", dualism. Inthe first place the common imputation to Descartes of a rigid dualism runs therisk of rendering his carefully argued plenism quite incomprehensible. IfDescartes is in fact the simple qualitative mind-body dualist painted in manyintroductory philosophy texts, then he cannot also be the ontological monist hisphysical plenism clearly implies. 40 Contemporary inclinations to perceive ofmind-body dualism in terms of mutually exclusivity, and to project this viewback into readings of Descartes, are primarily at fault for muddying thesephilosophical waters. I do not contest that Descartes often stated his dualism inrather bald terms, especially in the concisely written Discourse on Method andMeditations. Further I think it possible to find at least the beginnings of arapprochement between plenism and a form of dualism in some of Descartes'own writings. In a letter addressing certain criticisms raised against him,Descartes stated:It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceivingquite distinctly and at the same time both the distinction between mindand body and their union; because to do so it is necessary to conceivethem to be a single thing, and at the same time to conceive them to betwo things, which is self contradictory. 4139 Richard Rorty 1979: p.50-5140 A point which is also made by Stanley Rosen, though for different reasons, in his 1989: TheAncients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity,  (New Haven:Yale Univ. Press).41 Grene 1985 p.1977Rorty has discussed how Descartes' dualism is strongly interleaved with a kindof "meta-distinction" between unities, wholes, and parts whereby "mind" gives afunctional unity to the assemblage of physical parts of which individual subjectsare composed. 42 In a sense I think that what Descartes recognised here is that theindividual subject creates him or her self as an object for self reflection. ThusDescartes probably could not have claimed ontological primacy for thesimplistic material-nonmaterial dualism for which he is primarily remembered.Indeed he was acutely aware of the problems of relating unity and diversity,mind and body, in his natural philosophy. Even if it is granted that Descartesnever produced a clear account of this crucial interface, his infamous deductionsabout the function of the pineal gland notwithstanding, it should be evident thathe was first and foremost a plenist who sought to integrate into his philosophy aform of subjectively oriented dualism. Once again I note that in the sixth andlast Meditation Descartes claimed:I am not only residing in my body as a pilot in his ship, but furthermore,that I am intimately connected with it and that...a single whole isproduced.43In any event it is important to note that for Newtonian-minded experimentalphilosophers this particular problematic, so very central to the relationshipbetween physics and metaphysics, was submerged through strategies to rendertransparent and universal the cogitations of the individual knowing subject. Inthis the experimentalists accomplished something of a reconciliation betweenscholastic modalities, which relied on established traditions of textual authority,and Cartesian rationalism, in which sources of authority were much moresubjectively oriented.But it is critically important to see also that the Cartesian subject is notsimply a physical construct deriving from an objectivist epistemology. Above Inoted in passing that Cartesian subjectivity was rooted in the priorisation as"natural" of single point visually dominated perspective. The argument thatDescartes makes for the "naturalness" of this subjectivity is deeply connectedwith his moral philosophy. A true "moral science" is, Descartes claimed, one ofthe three "fruits" of the "tree of knowledge", the other two being medicine and42 Rorty 1979 p.6443 Descartes Meditations VI78mechanics. Prior to reaching that science however Descartes proposes an interimmoral code based largely in a self correcting asceticism. In the DiscourseDescartes states that it is mete to "seek to conquer [oneself] rather than fortune, tochange [one's] desires rather than the established order". This follows from hisbelief that error derives primarily from one's passions outstripping one'sreason, rather than from the incorrect exercise of reason per se.44 Suchinternalism easily lent itself to the idea that knowledge must be founded uponthe private workings of a "single architect" working to conquer him or her self,rather than the experimentalist model of a publicly disciplined collectivity. Thismoral individualism therefore was an integral and dialectically related elementof his physical theories of mind and body.In basic outline then I have recovered some of the links within Cartesianphilosophy between epistemological scepticism, subjectivism and the ontologicalstatus of mind-body dualism. Though I have chosen to accomplish this objectivethrough an interrogation of the nexus between ideas of physical and moral'nature', it is worth noting that others have arrived at similar conclusionsthrough via other routes. 45 Subsequent to this, a number of other points shouldbegin to fall into place. Descartes, for example, was able to identify theincorporeal mind with God and therefore neatly assimilate a comparativelyorthodox Christian cosmology into his rational scepticism. This was importantsince Descartes was writing at a time when Galileo's conviction by the RomanInquisition for proclaiming the Copernican doctrine as truth in 1633 was stillfresh in popular memory. Descartes' correspondence with confidants such asMersenne belies his anxiety over the potential unorthodoxy of his owndoctrines.46 He even delayed publication of his own Copernican tract for fear itwould give offence to religious authorities in France. However the Cartesianframework was supple enough to escape being parodied as an extremematerialism on the one hand or as an extreme theological mysticism on theother. The fact of this suppleness itself may help explain its widespread44 Descartes Discourse on Method p.22. Indeed, for Descartes, reason 'incorrectly exercised' issimply not reason at all; it is not a tool which can be misused, but rather a state of intellectualactivity which is either achieved or not.45 Rosen 1989 for example works primarily through the nexus of morality and theory of mind inDescartes' thought. See FN #3946 Margaret C. Jacob 1988: The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, (New York: AlfredA. Knopf)79acceptance in England, even by future opponents, during the mid seventeenthcentury. Humanity was seen by Descartes to occupy a unique position in the"great chain of being"; halfway between brute mechanisms, including allanimals, and the divine essence. 47 In this interstitial position human actors areweighted down by their base constitution, though they may rise above theirbaseness through the diligent application of mind. Thus, as Toulmin has noted,Cartesianism incorporated a strong moral vision into its physical ontology andepistemological outlook. 48 Such universal truths as could be determined by theCartesian method would be the physical-ontological anchors of an abidingChristian moral philosophy. Descartes himself further cemented the centralconnection between physics and metaphysics as he saw it in his attacks onatomism:For if we imagine that beyond the heavens there is nothing butimaginary spaces, and that all the heavens are made only for theservice of the earth and the earth only for man, we will be inclined tothink that this earth is our principle abode and this life our best.Instead of discovering the perfections that are truly within us, we willattribute to other features imperfections which they do not have, so asto raise ourselves above them. We will be so absurdly presumptuous asto wish to belong to God's council and assist Him in the government ofthe world; and this will bring us a dross of vain anxiety and distress. 49Consequently, this rapprochement between religion and reason can be seen tohave been integrally related with Descartes' ontological plenism. Interestinglythis reconciliation could not have been open to atomists such as Newton andMore, who would have to develop a radically different theological-scientificinterface.47 Descartes Fourth Meditation, in this Meditation Descartes suggests that reason would bemeaningless unless conjoined with the freedom to use or misuse it. We may after all misapplythe dictums of reason, which in Descartes terms would be a case of mismatching our will to ourunderstanding. The critical point here is that Descartes' epistemology clearly depends upon aprior conception of moral philosophy; it maps into a specific moral landscape.48 Toulmin, 1990 p.7349 Grene 1985 p.40; But see also the section of Descartes' Discourse on Method entitled "Some MoralRules Derived from this Method"80Hobbes' 'Limited' DualismLet me now discuss Hobbes' variation on this reconstructed Cartesiandualism, since it can be objected that Hobbes characteristically rejected dualismsof any sort. In fact much has been made in recent scholarship of the intellectualrelationship between Hobbes and Descartes.50 This is so not least because of themany similarities discernable between the two and their partiallycontemporaneous careers, but also in light of their criticisms of each other foundin the "Objections" and "Replies to Objections" to Descartes' Discourse on Method and in other places. 51 During his self-imposed exile in Paris during the1640s, Hobbes frequented that circle of philosophers centered on the AbbeMersenne which included some of the most well known Cartesian philosophersof the day. Revealed in these textual 'meeting places' is a highly variablerelationship wavering between admiration on many mainly general points andvehement opposition on primarily specific and minor points. Indeed Tuck hasgone so far as to claim that:Hobbes' natural philosophy gives the impression of having beendeveloped as the next move in a game where Descartes had been theprevious player.52It is indeed true that Hobbes took a rather harder materialist line withrespect to the ontological constitution of the knowing subject, which I havesuggested is central to Descartes' own form of mind-body dualism. From hisperspective, talk of "incorporeal substance", which Descartes at least arguablyconceived mind to be, was not only wrong but oxymoronic:If a man should talk to me of...immaterial substances; or of a freesubject, I should not say he were in errour; but that his words werewithout meaning; that is to say, Absurd.53Grene 1985; Richard Tuck 1988: "Hobbes and Descartes" in G.A.J. Rogers and A. Ryan (Eds)Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press).51 In this connection, the Abbe Mersenne, as the solicitor of Hobbes' "Objections" to Descartes'Discourse on Method as well as the intermediary in much personal correspondence betweenHobbes and Descartes, is a central though often neglected figure. Though Hobbes spent a decadein France during the 1640s and moved within circles very much immersed in Descartes' ideas, thetwo apparently met only a few times starting in 1648.52 Richard Tuck 1988 p.2853 Thomas Hobbes 1651: Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968) p.113 my italics.81For Hobbes mind was not at all different from body in the qualitative senseintimated by Descartes, or at least, by other less sophisticated Cartesians. Hismaterialistic monism viewed mind simply as a vastly complicated assemblage ofmaterial parts. Notwithstanding the possibility that the operations of the humanmind might in practice transcend the rote functionings of mere machines, suchtranscendence would never merit a qualitative ontological distinction fromthem in principle . Here Hobbes departed from the line taken by Descartes sincehe did not want to admit the possibility of "innate ideas" of soul, of God, or ofanything else. 54 Instead Hobbes sought to show the workings of God in themarvelously complicated functioning of His mechanisms themselves. ThusHobbes collapsed the distinctions Descartes hoped to maintain between mereorganic mechanisms, human subjects, and the divine essence. In my opinion,however, Hobbes did not go so far as to collapse this Cartesian triumvirate into arigid monism, nor do I think that he even intended to do so. Rather it seems hedeveloped, in ways which actually align him with Descartes, a plenist version ofthe dualism between corporeal substance and the divine essence which simplyobviated the need for unsupportable notions of "innate ideas". This version ofthe dualism is dialectical rather than simply analytical, focussing on thedynamic interpenetrations between categories of mind and body, subject andobject and primary and secondary qualities. In the next few paragraphs I willelaborate upon this version of dualism as it is expressed in Hobbes own writings.It is important to see that Hobbes simply could not avoid a form ofdualism which stemmed from the fact that the exercise of the faculties of mind isfundamentally a private subjective affair. This is in contradistinction to theobjects of ratiocination themselves which were, for Hobbes as much as Descartes,publicly and universally constituted. In an early passage in Leviathan Hobbesargues:Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning [to ourselvesl...of theconsequences of generall names agreed upon for the marking andsignifying of thoughts... (my italics)55As individual thinking subjects we "reckon" to ourselves with "generall names"and terms whose meanings are socially "agreed upon" and constituted. Earlier I54 Remember that Descartes "proved" the existence of God and of the soul through hisclassification of those ideas as necessarily innate and therefore true.55 Leviathan p.11182noted how Hobbes unambiguously rejected the postulation of a "free subject"cogitating completely independently of a separate realm of material substance aswell as other subjects. Implicit in this rejection of course is a concomitantrejection of dualism of the 'orthodox' mind-body sort, and also of the atom-voidsort. This physical analysis raised for Hobbes the political problem which heplaced at the center of his natural and political philosophy. Hobbes' physicalontology dovetails with his political philosophy at the point where the veryexistence of myriad privately cogitating individuals necessarily implies somepublic political accommodations. 56 The brutal existence of each individual inthe human "state of nature", the "war of each against all" would be inevitable aslong as individuals formed their actions solely with reference to isolatedprocesses of private judgment. In his own words, what is clearly called for is a"science of politics" which will operationalise the advances of the natural sciencehe developed in his early career and of which he claimed (rather pompously) tobe the progenitor. As with Descartes, Hobbes tried to render explicit theconnection between his physics and his metaphysics, in the sense that he soughtto render the political world amenable to exactly the same sort of integrativeanalysis he forwarded for the physical world. 57This public/private dualism forms part of what I consider to be the more'limited' physical dualism shared by both Hobbes and Descartes, irrespective oftheir other differences. Corporeal, extended substance, that is to say "body", ispublicly constituted because it is, in principle, available equally for thecontemplation of all reflecting minds.58 By contrast, the realm of the mind,irrespective of its corporeal or incorporeal status, is fundamentally private .Individual thoughts are available only to the individual thinking them, whotherefore occupies a unique and incorrigible position as the sole authority and56 Leviathan p.166ff57 There is actually quite a great deal of speculation regarding just how unified Hobbes reallyconceived politics and metaphysics to be. Most of those who suggest that he was not the strongunifier presented in my account stress the very real slippage between the two aspects of his work.In this camp is Tom Sorrel 1988: 'The Science in Hobbes' Politics" in Rogers and Ryan (Eds) 1988pp.67-80. More compelling however is Gary Herbert 1989: Thomas Hobbes: The Unity ofScientific and Moral Wisdom (Vancouver: UBC Press) who points out that Hobbes realised thatpolitical philosophy and physics could be complementary parts of the processes of self andworld creation.58 Remember that for both Hobbes and Descartes the existence of substance is ontologically prior tothe epistemological act of naming. See Leviathan, p. 107 on mental discourse and naming. Seealso Note #17 above.83communicator of her or his ideas. 59 This is especially the case in the ideal "stateof nature" where there have, by definition, been no attempts to understandexperience intersubjectively. "Body" is therefore understood to be morallyindifferent, while "mind", in the state of nature, is quite simply amoral. As adualism however, this is 'nominal' or 'limited' because it stays closer to themonistic materialism of Hobbes than to, for example, scholastic ideas about anoumenal "plastic nature" which mysteriously impresses form upon allsubstance. What Verdon takes to be a fundamental Hobbesian distinctionbetween physical and social cosmologies, is in fact an icon of their transcendencethrough the continual constitution of "being" in time and space. 60 The theory ofthe private individual as a political "atom" is not formally different from thetheory of mind as a self moving physical mechanism. 61 Hobbes recognised, inways similar to Descartes, that the brain in and of itself is a mechanical apparatus,but that the mind is actually not the brain, but the brain in motion , continuallyworking out is own self actualisation. 62 The problem in both cases hinges on thetranscendence of the particular towards the universal, not just the mediation ofan unbridgeable relationship. What is at stake then for Hobbes, and for much ofseventeenth century philosophy, is the way in which public and private realmswill be conceived and linked.Newtonian atomists did not significantly deviate from this more limiteddualism, though their specific response was to submerge the private incorrigiblecharacter of ratiocination by subjecting it to a specifically structured and agreedupon discipline. Moreover they denied that there was anything at all underlyingtheir corporeal-incorporeal conception of the mind-body dualism. As will be59 Richard Rorty, 1970: "Incorrigibility as a Mark of the Mental", iournal of Philosophy, 67. Notethat this characteristic of "incorrigibility" is central to most western theories of the self.60 Micheal Verdon 1982: "On the Laws of Physical and Human Nature: Hobbes' Physical andSocial Cosmologies" in Inl of the History of Ideas 43(4) Oct.-Dec. 1982 p.65661 In Leviathan, p,93-4 Hobbes distinguishes between human and animal minds thus: "ThatUnderstanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely of his will; but hisconceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things..." Note that thisis a process theory of mind, depending on our capacity to reflect upon our own conceptions andtherefore to continually recreate our own subjectivity.62 Descartes and Hobbes analysis of motion and causality as intrinsic to the plenum is relevanthere, but is complex and confusing. Their concept of "conatus" suggested an inertial motion"towards" self preservation in all matter, which underwrites their distinctions between brainand mind as "brain in motion". For a more detailed discussion of the conatus concept see WilliamSacksteader 1979: "Speaking About Mind: Endeavour in Hobbes" Philosophical Forum 11(1)pp.65-7984discussed in chapter 4, they sought to render mind 'public' by institutionalising aparticular conception of right method and epistemology. Knowledge claimswould be directed and disciplined by being forced to conform to anepistemological format which was connected to a specific set of social interests.Plenists, on the other hand, chose to stress the basic incorrigibility of individualthought, insisting only on the veracity of mathematics, and especially geometry,as the appropriate description language. Either strategy brought with it problemsof political and social order. More to the point for present purposes, they alsoentailed explicit attention to the spatial and temporal ordering of social andpolitical relations. What is clearly sacrificed by both camps is the ontologicalpriority of the dialectical interplay between public and private spheres, which hasbecome so central to contemporary critiques of modernity.3.4 Human and Physical Ontologies and their SpatialityAs I have shown, the postulation of a closely interrelated ontology ofsubstance and subjectivity has been a relatively under-recognised legacy ofDescartes' and Hobbes' thought specifically and plenism generally. Descartes,and Hobbes, created as their central philosophical problematic an ineluctablydialectical relation between ideas about substance and ideas about subjectivity.Each element of the dialectic perforce defines, and gives meaning to, the other,and the distinction itself was shown to rely heavily on the locus of perceptionand representation in the "local motion" of the brain which came to be known asthe "mind". It was only with the more atomistic empiricism of Boyle, Newtonand the Royal Society that the partition between mind and body began to be seennot as a complex and multiply imbued dialectic, but rather as an oppositionaldichotomy. After Locke especially, the mind became a "tabula rasa" which was tobe filled with ideas through education and whose "life" was thought to bedetachable, in an idealised sense, from that of the body.My preference then is to see Descartes, Hobbes and all of those whothought like them, as straddling the divide between hermeticism andexperimentalism. There can be no question that Descartes retained the centralHermetic idea that philosophy, while also a means to a technical end, was alsopart of a process of self creation and purification. Moreover, his wholephilosophy, and that of Hobbes too, can be read as attempts to forestall the85emergence of a more depersonalised physical and social cosmology byreviving,in a decidedly 'modern' and innovative manner, certain ideas aboutconnectivity and cosmological integration. Indeed, even Bacon himself, thatscion of empirical methodology, is currently being recovered as a kind of "proto-scientist" who actually sought to retain much more of thought that precededhim than is usually believed. Bacon was acutely aware of the relations betweentruth, beauty and practical morality, as is evident from his short Essays and lesserknown Aphorisms, some of which could easily be (mis)taken for Hermeticinvocations:God's encryption of the world is an enigma, and its Maker is hidden toall but those who can discover the signs of his Wisdom by suffering thescourging of their vanities in the sweet ordeal of Solomonic inquiry. 63All of this brings the argument of the chapter back to that contemporarytheorist with whose analysis my own seems most convergent; Michel Foucault.Particularly in The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish, Foucaultenunciates a vision of seventeenth century philosophy, especially that ofDescartes, as part of a transitional stage between the modern and premodernphilosophies and worldview. In his own lexicon, what I have been talking aboutin this chapter is all part of the seventeenth century "classical episteme" whichmediated the transition from the antecedent "Renaissance" and "Modern"epistemes. And part of what is so compelling about Foucault's analyses is hissensitivity to the relationships between ambiguity and intention in epistemicdevelopment. As Foucault has noted, the structure of knowledge during thistime period, despite its angry denunciations of much of what went before it, stillworked largely to support the existence of God and the Sovereign as the only true"subjects". 64 Claims to objectivity, according to Foucault, often mask subjectivemotives.With respect to considerations of the intersection of epistemology, powerand questions of subjectivity, the issue of the directed gendering of sciencebecomes quite unavoidable. One reason for this is that the exclusion of a vastassortment of subjective "others", especially women, intrinsic to post Cartesian63 cited in Briggs 1989 p.964 Michel Foucault 1978: Discipline and Punish Translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: PantheonPress)86subjectivity and intellectual discourse has recently attracted a great deal of criticalthought and research. Susan Bordo has recently argued that:The founders of modern science consciously and explicitly proclaimedthe masculinity of science as inaugurating a new age...associated witha cleaner, purer, more objective and more disciplined epistemologicalrelation to the world.65A bold thread then which runs at least from Bacon's "masculine birth of time"through Descartes' own gendering of the realms of mind and body as masculineand feminine respectively through to Cowley's bold assertion with reference tothe Royal Society "Philosophy, I say, and call it, He, For whatso'ere the PaintersFancy be, It a male virtue seems to me."66 With subjectivity, that kernel of ideassurrounding what it means to be a rational, modern, being, so thoroughlymasculinised in the Post Cartesian era, other "ways of knowing" the world wereeffectively silenced. Descartes had defined subjectivity as the ability to reason,and reason was, in part, defined through the exercise of an exoterically derivedmoral code of self governance and self contro1. 67 This model of subjectivitywould provide the medium for intellectual and other discourse in the modernera, a way of establishing a cognitive baseline for strategies of assimilation and/orco-optation of all that was unfamiliar in one's surroundings. Uniquely feminine"ways of knowing", which Bordo refers to as "dynamic", "inclusive","relativistic" and "consensual", were, within the post Cartesian discourse,displaced as epistemologically legitimate. 68Foucault has referred to the ways in which power relations haveintersected with post Cartesian discursive formations in terms of the"micropolitics of the body". In Discipline and Punish and later works Foucaultdeveloped this concept by examining the ways in which power is exercised overthe individual subject, especially through the subject's "internal" constitution asa modern, knowing individual. It is here that we encounter the deepunderstanding Foucault developed of the myriad ways and means by whichepistemic transformations of the kind described in this chapter have been65 Susan R. Bordo 1987: The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (New York:State Univ. of New York) p.105, my italics66 excerpted from Abraham Cowley's "Ode to the Royal Society', Seventeenth Century EnglishVerse edited by E.D. Starkman (New York: Bantam Books)67 Caton 1973, p.3268 Bordo 1987, p.10087implicated in explicitly spatial reconstructions. The definition, control andmanipulation of space is integral to an "technology of power". "Starting withGalileo and the seventeenth century", Foucault argues, "extension wassubstituted for localisation." By this he surely meant that the attempt was made,in this era, to render space inert, inconsequential and transcendable throughstrategies of objectification and generalisation. If so, then this remark ofFoucault's resonates with the observations of both Morris Berman and StevenToulmin that the seventeenth century "scientific revolution" marked a shiftfrom the local, partial, and the specific to the universal, comprehensive and thegenera1.69 In the next two chapters I will look at two very different aspects of thespatial structuring of scientific knowledge which were implicated in theseventeenth-century initiation of the project of modernity.8869 See Morris Berman 1984; and Steven Toulmin 1990.Chapter 4"The Human Geographies of Seventeenth Century Philosophy:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 2"4.1 Self/Substance Ontologies and Political Geography4.2 The Frontispiece to Leviathan: Hobbes' Political Geography4.3 Hobbes, Boyle and the Air Pump TrialsTechnological SpaceSocial SpaceThe Spatiality of Hobbes' Objections to Boyle4.4 Spatiality and the Partition Between Physics and Metaphysics894.1 Self/Substance Ontologies and Political GeographyUp to this point I have tried to present the plenisms of Hobbes andDescartes as far as possible in physicalist terms. Or, to be more precise, I havetended to take a physical scientific point of view in my discussions of thelinkages between seventeenth century physics and metaphysics. What I wouldlike to do now is to reverse the order of the preceding narrative and look at thepenetration of metaphysical concerns into debates over primarily physical issues,of ontology and epistemology. In particular I will dwell on the case of ThomasHobbes, who, as I have shown in the previous chapter, employed a plenistphysical ontology to underwrite a 'limited' Cartesian dualism. On this physicalscientific foundation Hobbes establishes his political philosophy. Hobbes' workseems to me to exemplify the interdependence of physical and metaphysicalconcerns in an especially perspicuous, and more importantly self conscious,manner. No respecter of nascent scientific discursive boundaries, Hobbesfrequently deployed metaphysical arguments in physical disputations, as he didin his disputes with Boyle over the interpretation of the celebrated air pumptrials. From a post-positivist perspective it is both telling and fascinating toobserve how an argument about the physical status of an experiment on theproperties of air should move so easily and readily into a disputation about socialand political order. More to the point, problems of political and physicalstructure, including the structure of social and political space, were considered tobe one and same , rather than merely analogous, complementary or otherwiseindirectly related. Subsequently, Hobbes, as I will show, develops a critique ofBoyle's scientific program which hinges, in large measure, on his social andpolitical geography. Whereas in the last chapter I sought to show the penetrationof physical ontological elements into metaphysical problems, here I will focus onthe converse metaphysical imbrications of seventeenth century thought. Oncethe physics/metaphysics partition is reproblematised, from both directions as itwere, the stage will be set for an analysis of seventeenth century disputes aboutspace and geography in chapter 5.904.2 The Frontispiece to Leviathan: Hobbes' Political GeographyHobbes' political theory is, for the most part well known. In response tothe discord of the Civil War and Interregnum Hobbes argued forcefully that civilpeace could only be secured through the establishment of a sovereign withabsolute dominion over both material and spiritual realms. In Leviathan,published in 1651, Hobbes states that:I ground the civill right of Sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty ofsubjects, upon the known natural inclinations of mankind and upon thearticles of the laws of nature. 1In this single succinct statement Hobbes combines virtually all of the elements ofhis ideal state; comprised not just of an absolutist sovereign, but also of abalancing of the "known natural inclinations of mankind" (the material ofnature) and the "articles of the law of nature" (the artificially derived bodypolitic). Note too that both the duty and the liberty of citizens are given carefulweight in his formulation, for Hobbes did not consider that citizens ought beexpected to follow their sovereign either blindly or slavishly, but throughconscious acts of submission which recognise both their own and the commongood.2 For the time, this marked a novel theorisation of the individual privatesubject and his/her relations to a politically constituted public realm. In turn,this theorisation of the political problematic was intricately intertwined with aplenist physics.Though Hobbes rarely thought in explicitly geographical terms, there isnevertheless a fascinating social and political geography implicit in his analyses. 3This is most apparent figuratively, insofar as Hobbes' preoccupation is with theproblems engendered in contexts where 'spaces' of authority only partly overlap1 Thomas Hobbes (1651) 1968: Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common WealthEcclesiastical and Civil with an introduction by C.B. MacPherson (Markham, Ont: PenguinBooks) p.7252 Under certain circumstances Hobbes would permit subjects to legally break their covenant assubjects to the state; or, more precisely, under certain circumstances such as subjugation by a foreignpower, this covenant could naturally dissolve. See Leviathan, chapter 14.3 Where Hobbes did talk of "geography" he tended to follow the common notion that Geography,together with Astronomy comprised Cosmology, which examined the "consequences of theMotion, and Quantity of the great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stares" and thus placedit between mechanics and geometry in his classification of the sciences. Leviathan p.14991and are to some extent in contest with one another. Various forms of religion(Presbyterian, Catholic and Protestant), each with their own locally based centresof allegiance vied with secular authorities and even the economic interests ofEngland's larger cities for political preeminence. Hobbes is particularly sensitiveto the manipulation of theological and intellectual issues in the furtherance offactional objectives during the period. Still, Hobbes' analysis is geographical in amore material sense as well. After all, what was at stake was more than merelythe locus of social and political control. Hobbes' is well attuned to the fact thateach of the competing forces he identifies mobilises different, thought partiallyoverlapping control structures. Moreover these control structures and resourcesare inscribed in the landscape, through the growth and prosperity of some townsover others, the reach of the various ecclesiastical institutions through theirhierarchical network of parishes and churches, and the grassroots basis whichsupported the various Protestant movements. In fact, the chronological analysisof the Civil War in the latter dialogues of behemoth depends quite markedly onan understanding of the conflict as one between a complex patchwork ofdifferently constituted regions. 4 Ultimately, it may be argued that Hobbespolitical theory marks an attempt to bring these disparate spaces of power into amore convergent harmony, a harmony which he felt must resemble theabsolutist nation state of Leviathan.There may be no better summary of Hobbes' political theory and hisanalysis of the Civil War than in is encapsulated visually in the frontispiecewhich precedes Leviathan (Figure 7). In this frontispiece one can perceive themajor elements of both his critique of the English polity during the midseventeenth century as well as the way this critique relates to his proposedsolution. It is a finely balanced composition of elements and counter-elementswhich operates on scientific, political and aesthetic levels simultaneously. Acareful reading of this frontispiece even allows us to see, as a sort of 'subtext', theexplicit connections Hobbes made between his theories of physical substance andhis more readily apparent political and ecclesiastical discourse. What Schafferand Shapin have refered to, somewhat obscurely, as Hobbes' "politicalepistemology", the relationship between civil and religious power and a theory4 See especially Behemoth, Dialogue 3, p.126 where Hobbes observes that the interests of thecities must necessarily have been against those of the King, given their growing role in the newcircuit of exchange.92of knowledge and linguistic reference, can be inferred from this singlefrontispiece. 5 This is especially the case given that it is now very clear thatHobbes himself was intimately involved in the construction of the design.6Corbett and Lightbown have suggested that the frontispiece design may beread both from the top downwards as well as across. Read downwards, theyclaim that one interprets the drawing as showing the office of the sovereign asconstitutive of the body politic itself. The panels on either side of the lower halfof the engraving, indicating the two realms of spiritual and material authorityare therefore shown to be integrated in the Leviathan state, which is the visualapex of the design. Read horizontally, the lower panels shown instruments ofcivil power arrayed against corollary instruments of ecclesiastical power. It isfairly certain that Hobbes, ever a polemicist, would have intended these visualjuxtapositions to be controversial and perhaps even "frightening". 7 What mightbe "frightening" to English readers in the immediate post Civil War period is ofcourse the constitution of the two sides in such stark and equally powerful terms.All of this seems straightforward enough, though I would add that the engravingcan also be read from the bottom upwards , as Hobbes' critique of the politicallyfractured society which, in his view, was England in the seventeenth century.Read this way, one follows the lines of convergence upward, through thepolitical analysis of the Civil War to its final salvation, or so Hobbes hoped, inthe Leviathan state. To read the frontispiece as a statement of hisepistemological views is less straightforward, as this exists as a kind of "subtext"which informs the manner in which the image is constructed as much as itsspecific content.5 By using this term Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin, in 1985: Leviathan and the Air Pump(Princteon: Princeton Univ. Press) p.99, evidently mean simply the implications of Hobbes'physics for his political theory. However, as will emerge in my account, Hobbes' works marks amore robust "epistemology of politics" dialectically intertwined with such a "politicalepistemology".6 My analysis of the frontispiece is drawn largely from Keith Brown 1978: 'The Artist of theLeviathan Title Page" British Library Inl 4 24-37; M.M. Goldsmith 1981: "Picturing Hobbes'Politics: The Illustrations to Philosophical Rudiments " fill of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44 232-237; and Margery Corbett and Ronald Lightbown 1979: The ComelyFrontispiece: 1550-1660  (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).7 See Brown's discussion of this point; Brown 1978 p.2793LEI IIATIL ^7"114^ITT ER,FOR'Ill'"') /Ins-ER 01,4 Co.4..10 .`"1" -1/Tif Eeccx.c/ ric-iLL94Figure 7: Frontispiece to Hobbes' Leviathan (1651)Now let me turn to the content of the panels themselves. Starting fromthe top right, one sees the temporal military power of the secular sovereign,represented by the fortress, arrayed against the spiritual power of the Church.The next two panels down on either side show symbols of civil and ecclesiasticalauthority, a regal coronet and a Bishop's mitre, and the requisite mechanisms ofcoercion; physical force for the sovereign, and spiritual damnation for theChurch. As will be evident in the reading of the upper half of the panel, Hobbesbelieved that physical and spiritual force constituted a priori as culturallyseparate entities, could contribute only to an unstable commonwealth. Evenacting in concert physical and spiritual "force" would not necessarily have anintegrated and unified disciplinary effect on the polity. These forces of public andprivate compunction would have to be fully integrated if the ideal state of peacewas to be achieved. The next two panels down show the armaments andconduct of war pitted against the rules and conduct of scholastic debate. Theforks in the panel second from the bottom on the left are the rhetorical "forks" ofsyllogistic logic. Interestingly, Hobbes places the intellectual institutions of hisday squarely in the camp of the Church, not even potentially available to civilauthority as such. That Hobbes generally related scholastic modalities with theinterests of the Church is also clear from his writings. In Behemoth, forexample, Hobbes argues in the first dialogue thatTheological discord in the public domain through the universities wasan excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions....[and]...the causeof all our late mischief [the Civil war] was the imposition of abstrusetheological disputes [and interests] into the public realm.8Strategically this was a very powerful connection for Hobbes to make, sincemuch of the thought of the period, even in theology, evoked a generalisedrejection of the long established structures of education, disputation andphilosophical learning. Read by itself then, the lower half of the Leviathan titlepage shows both the tensions which Hobbes believed to exist in English societyand likewise his analysis of the Civil War they participated in.The upper half of the design is rather more interesting since it is arepresentation of Hobbes' desired Leviathan state. The figure of the sovereignlooms large, paternally and beneficently, over an essentially feudal landscape.8 Thomas Hobbes, 1682: Behemoth (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press) pp.xxxiv, 5795His body is composed of the bodies of his subjects all oriented towards him, inthe act of making their covenant with him, and he holds both the "sword ofjustice" and the "shield of faith" (a Bishop's crosier). In words Hobbes describedthe meaning of this remarkable image:From this consolidation of the Right Politique and Ecclesiastique inChristian Sovereigns, it is evident they have all manner of power overtheir subjects...both in policy and Religion; and they may make suchlaws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the Government of theirsubjects, both as they are the Commonwealth, and as they are theChurch: for both State, and Church are the same men. 9As one might expect there has been much speculation regarding whose face isattached to the body of the sovereign, with possibilities ranging from eitherCharles, to Oliver Cromwell, to even Hobbes himself. 10 Yet it seems patentlyobvious, as Brown has argued, that the face cannot be any other than that ofCharles II (see Figure 8), given the fact that Hobbes was not only an avowedRoyalist, but had been Charles's tutor, and was known to have been anxiousabout obtaining Charles's renewed favour during this period. Given thesepoints, any other attribution would seem to be simply spurious.Let me return to a comment I made above about the landscape over whichthe Leviathan sovereign rules. Intriguingly the landscape of the engravingseems decidedly feudal ; small villages each with their own central church dot anapparently pastoral countryside. There are no roads and no industry in evidence,nor are any of the institutions of seventeenth century capitalism, such as aBourse, present. Instead this landscape is presided over by a much larger walledcity of essentially sixteenth or early seventeenth century design. Thecrownworks, bastions and the machiolation of the city wall are clearlycontemporaneous with Hobbes' own time. Such fortifications, as Parker hasobserved, while useful in repelling foreign invasions were probably much more9 Leviathan, p.575. I note in passing the remarkable similarity between Hobbes' ideal state andthat of Plato's Republic: "The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see thelight of day...until philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings andrulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come intothe same hands" Plato's The Republic translated by Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth:Penguin:1974) p.26310 Lightbown and Corbett 1978 p.229 believe it to be a rendering of Hobbes himself, thoughcomparison of the portrait of Hobbes in Chapter 2 with that of Charles II seems to me, togetherwith everything else, to cement Brown's contention, Brown 1978, p.3596ILL DI VIVO PLICL• . :LYCLVZILO litIJIVLAS rY0AW71.II TVILLIULAII FILLITVI ADDLE. W TIAWL° 11 flGiLAL3LL NUT FR AMTS. rr HILLANLL R EL• ..rareogiripmf ffserwirt. _Aft^orwr4P^Aplynra., asewrigarAt mar 11..^ iltrou 11%.4.1 a. Lici^ eirds■^'W,to.ammji.malot^c.a. am%irma. 1■11.0i.4.aw r rFigure 8: Hollar's engraved portrait of Charles 11 (1650) 1197" Brown 1978 p.34important as centers of economic and political domination. 12 Such garrisonswere of course staffed by soldiers from outside the region, so as to boost theireffectiveness in quelling internal unrest. The overall urban plan and especiallythe design of the cathedral seem to reify the urban center as a focus of spiritualand economic power as well (this latter admittedly not as thoroughly treated inHobbes' work as are civil and spiritual domains). Note also however is the lackof geometrical imposition on this "ideal" plan. The streets, the buildings andeven the cartographic projection itself do not show the imprint of rectilinearthinking which became so common during the century, as evident inChristopher Wren's and Robert Hooke's designs for the rebuilding of Londonafter the Great Fire of London in 1668. 13It is thus easy to see why many commentators regard Hobbes' politicalphilosophy as peculiarly backward looking and feudal. However, thisperspective is complicated by a number of factors, not the least of which isHobbes' express abhorrence of the "traditional" as compared to what he took tobe the "modern". Still, no doubt there are strong surficial resemblances betweenhis Leviathan state and the feudal city states of the middle ages, which Hobbeshimself recognised. However, there can be no doubting either that Hobbes'Leviathan was predicated on a radically different - "modern" - view of the rightsand obligations of the citizenry, and the nature of the covenant which was tobind them into a nation-state. On this level Hobbes' thinking evinces affinities,as MacPherson has noted, with more clearly bourgeois political and moraltheories of Locke and others. This point may be obscured somewhat by the factthat he portrays his citizens only in the act of relinquishing their politicalautonomy to the sovereign. This act itself was, however both an act ofindividual judgement, and also a culminating moment for a new conception ofthe subjective consciousness of the individual subject as citizen which wasintegrally related to his physical plenism.Overall, it may be said that Hobbes' political and metaphysical edifice wasintimately related to his plenist physics. Hobbes argued that epistemologicalunity in physical, as well as political, science should derive from a common12—Geoffrey Parker 1988: The Military Revolution:Military Innovation and the Rise of the West(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p.3213 T.F. Reddaway 1937: "The Rebuilding of London After the Great Fire: Wren's Plan" TownPlanning Review 17(3) 205-211.98geometrical style to reasoning and deduction. 14 Consequently there was nocontradiction at all when Hobbes argued that his political philosophydemonstrated without ambiguity the maladaptiveness of an atomist physics. Tohim the mechanical proposal of action-at-a-distance and the related concept ofmacrocosmic void space entailed a basic constitutive separation of civil(material) and religious (spiritual) domains. Quite obviously the externallyverifiable natural laws governing corporeal substance could not be expected to bedirectly applicable to that which was postulated to have an existence independentof the realm of corporeal substance. In other words, the sphere of "incorporealsubstance", if such was admitted to exist, would require a separate and distinctform of investigation and theorising. Hobbes feared that theological attempts tofill the breach with notions of an all pervasive "plastick nature", or popularattempts to proclaim the possibility of direct communion with God (oftenreferred to during this time period as "enthusiasm") would drive a wedge intoany attempts by civil authorities to manage peacefully the relationship betweenpublic and private spheres. 15 But a third candidate to fill this invidious breach,the experimental programme institutionalised in the Royal Society, whilesecular in orientation, nevertheless had to be opposed.4.3 Hobbes, Boyle and the Air Pump TrialsAs has been demonstrated above, Hobbes' plenist physics, in both itsontological and epistemological aspects both informs, and is reciprocallyinformed by, his political philosophy. For the most part I have so far only shownthat half of the Cartesian-Hobbesian cosmology which traces the influence ofphysical structures on metaphysical ones. But I now want to consider the otherhalf of the equation, and demonstrat that Hobbes' political philosophy wasbrought to bear directly on his celebrated controversy with Robert Boyle and the14 G.A.J.j Rogers 1988: "Hobbes' Hidden Influence" in G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Eds)Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p.19815 On the concepts of "plastick nature" and "enthusiasm" see Glacken 1967 p.393ff; Lydia Gysi 1962:Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth (Berne, Switz:HerbertLang); Henry More 1662: A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings;  and John Ray 1692:The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation.99Royal Society over the proper interpretation of Boyle's air pump experiments. 16What for Boyle was a set of experiments which was to set the model for rightmethod in experimental philosophy, was for Hobbes emblematic of the same sortof divisive structures which he had criticised in the English polity. The stakes inthis instance were higher, however, since Hobbes recognised that the structuresof philosophical knowledge could have a profound effect on the possibility ofinculcating the sort of civil society he felt necessary for the securing of civil peace.Consequently, in the late 1650s, when the results of Boyle's experiments with theair pump were becoming well known, Hobbes began to elaborate a strong critiqueof them based upon his earlier work mapping physics into metaphysics, andspecifically his political theory. One might even claim that Hobbes himselfreversed the trajectory of his earlier work, attacking Boyle on the grounds of themetaphysical spaces - political, social and cultural - his physical pronouncementscould be shown to imply.As has been suggested in the last chapter, experimental scientists, at leastthose of the Royal Society's stamp, very carefully circumscribed the object of theirexperimentation. Whereas plenists were compelled by their ontological monismto seek after causal explanations, experimentalists such as Boyle claimed thatcertainty about causes was not possible. 17 After all, Boyle noted, specificreplicable results could often be obtained from a variety of causes, and so theimputation of a cause, or even a set of causes for any given phenomena wouldunavoidably be less certain than statements merely about the phenomena itself.Consequently Boyle argued that scientific experimentation ought be usedprimarily for the determination of "matters of fact"; that is to say observable, andreplicable, "effects" shorn of all considerations of causality. As Schaffer andShapin have it, Boyle's "...overriding concern was to protect the matter of fact byseparating it from various items of causal knowledge". It was primarily to thisend that Boyle, and others, elaborated an experimental paradigm, during the16 This controversy is the subject of Schaffer and Shapin 1985: Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life see Note #517 In De Corpore Hobbes stated categorically that "All phenomena is local motion, and nothing butlocal motion" a statement emphasised also in his Dialogus Physicus, a translation of which iscontained as an appendix to Schaffer and Shapin 19851001640s and 1650s, which was subsequently institutionalised in the Royal Societyafter 1662. 18In a ground-breaking sociological analysis of Boyle's dispute with Hobbesover the interpretation of the Air Pump trials conducted during the 1660s,Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin operationalise a threefold classification of thenew experimental paradigm. They claim that the analysis of scientific disputescan be fruitfully broken down into three closely circumscribed, thoughinterrelated, discussions of the "material, social and literary technologies"deployed by disputants:- a material technology embedded in the construction and operation of theair pump;- a literary technology by means of which the phenomena produced bythe pump were made known to those who were not direct witnesses;- a social technology that incorporated the conventions experimentalphilosophers should use in dealing with each other and consideringknowledge claims. 19As far as it goes, their analytic framework serves their purpose very wellallowing for the articulation of a sensitive analysis of the physical andmetaphysical bases for the Hobbes-Boyle dispute. Also this framework allowsthem to investigate the more general hypothesis that "solutions to the problemof knowledge are also solutions to the problem of social order". 20 However, itseems clear that the emphasis placed on the common term "technology" maymask a bias towards explicitly and self consciously wrought scientificinstruments and procedures as entirely constitutive of seventeenth centurynatural philosophical research. To be sure the seventeenth centuryconcatenation of the revived interest in immediately practical knowledge with avalorisation of the physical trappings of science render this bias quite defensible.However, such focus also seems to somewhat efface the multiplexity of spatialproblematics in the structuring of scientific knowledge. Much of their work can18 During the 1640s and 1650s the nucleus of the future Royal Society met irregularly at varioussites, especially at royalist Oxford University. Though hardly an objective source, HenryOldenburg referred to these precursors to the Royal Society as "the Oxonian Sparkles". SeeOldenburg's dedication to the first volume of Transactions of the Royal Philosophical Society ofLondon reprinted 1963 by the Johnson Reprint Company, New York.19 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.2520 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.14101be read from the geographical point of view as an analysis of the elaboration of aclass of "spatial technologies" which articulated with and cross cut the otherthree technologies as well as broader questions of social and political geography.After a fashion, they themselves come to this selfsame realisation when theyobserve, in the conclusion of their work, that their use of spatial terminology hasalternated between the figurative and the literal. But insofar as they havediscussed elements of the "space" of scientific experimentation, and the "spaces"opened up or closed down by the experimentalist paradigm, they oddly concludethat such usages are "novel". 21Still, not all spatial ordering is "technological" in the sense that they usethe term. The fact of the matter is, especially during the seventeenth centurywhen science, as we know it now, was as yet embryonic, most of the actual workwas conducted in converted and sometimes temporary spaces, spaces originallydesigned for other purposes entirely. For example, the diarist John Evelynhimself records that much disputation of scientific interest and importanceduring the late seventeenth century happened in London's burgeoning coffeehouses.22 Moreover, scientific figures such as Boyle and Hooke, did much oftheir experimentation at home, the latter converting his parlor to the purpose.The Royal Society itself had to adapt to several different lodgings during the1660s and 1670s, though its members quickly realised that they would enhancetheir prestige and scientific eminence if they had their own specially designedspaces. More subtly, technological space, as constituted though theepistemological priority afforded scientific instruments of vision, such asHooke's microscope, which tended toward the reduction of experience to visualquantitative format. These are also of course connected with the more macrolevel spaces in which they existed and were operated. Subsequent work by bothSchaffer and Shapin has become more explicitly spatial in both of these tworespects.2321 Schaffer and Shapin p.332. They are evidently unaware of those geographical treatments ofphilosophy, science, and geographical science which operate at both the microcosmic andmacrocosmic levels; for example the work of David Livingstone 1980; 1984; 1988 and DerekGregory 1978.22 John Evelyn 1881: Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn, FRS  edited by William Bray(London: George Bell and Sons), especially relevent are entries made in December and January1660/61.23 Simon Schaffer 1989: "Glass Works: Newton's Prism and the Uses of Experiment" in Gooding,Pinch and Schaffer (Eds) The Uses of Experiment  ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 67-1 0 2In what follows I will seek to add to Schaffer and Shapin's analysisthrough the employment of a more overtly spatial analytic framework whichconcentrates on some of the spatial aspects of the social and technologicalorganisation of scientific experimentation. Consequently I will be interested insome of the ways certain practitioners, such as Boyle and Newton, constitutedcertain social and physical spaces as legitimate for knowledge production. Thespaces so used can be seen as fluid, changeable composites of a wide range ofsocial, economic and political spaces (using the term both figuratively andliterally). What is available to legitimise a given knowledge claim variescontextually, especially during a period when the scientific societies themselvesare not yet unassailable objectifying resources, and so the contestation ofknowledge claims will necessarily be a highly charged and fluid affair. In the twobrief discussions which follow, of the technological and social spaces ofknowledge production, I will be interested in the further interleaving of theseexplicitly scientific spaces with aspects of the broader human spatial context. It isat this point specifically that the dispute between Hobbes and Boyle shifts frombeing a sterile academic dispute to being a contestation of fundamentallydifferent social and political geographies in the context of Restoration England.Technological SpaceGaston Bachelard has claimed that all "scientific instruments are reifiedtheorems". 24 By this Bachelard would seem to be implying a number of things.First, and most obviously, all scientific instruments share the characteristic ofbeing mechanisms which direct the experimenter's attention to some sorts ofoccurrences, rather than others. Implicit in their employment is the postulation,itself a sort of theorem, that their construction renders perspicuous someimportant aspect of natural structure or process. Thus "artificial instrumentsand methods" such as Hooke's microscope were widely believed to function aspassive "extensions of the senses", not intervening in natural actions at all, butmerely magnifying them for human witnessing. 25 Thus the incredibly detailed103; Steven Shapin 1988: "The House of Experiment in Seventeenth Century England" ISIS 79373-404 in which he claims "The career of experimental knowledge involves the circulationbetween public and private spheres" p.40024 cited in Schaffer 1989 p.6725 See for example the excerpts from Hooke's Micrographia in Brian Vickers 1987: English Sciencefrom Bacon to Newton pp.99-159; Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.36103engravings of Hooke's microscopic investigations were meant as completelyaccurate renderings of what really existed (See Figure 9). Part of the powerFigure 9: Hooke's Diagram of a Flea 26of such instruments was precisely that they were perceived to be largely passive,their work defined solely in terms of magnifying what was already in existence.It is nevertheless true, however, that such instrumentation almost invariablyattempted to reduce the "truth" of a scientific matter of fact, such as the structureof a Flea, to a geometrical, single point perspective, visual rendering. After26 From Robert Hooke's Micrographia, excerpted in Vickers 1987.104Hooke, the question "What is a flea?" was answered primarily in terms of justthese sorts of renderings, even though it should be clear that vision in and ofitself does not even come close to exhausting the total empirical experience ofphenomena. Even where this fact is recognised, the tendency has neverthelessbeen to attempt to reduce empirical phenomena, such as heat and magnetism, tovisual equivalents.But Bachelard's claim is true in a second, more subtle manner as well.Most scientific instruments cannot easily be classified as mere "passive" mirrorsor magnifiers of nature. 27 Certainly Boyle's air pumps, and also Newton'sprisms do significantly more than just show us what is already present in nature.The power of such "active" instruments lies in their putative ability to tease outof the confusion of empirical experience some subset of phenomena which aresubsequently theorised to be somehow significant. Boyle's air pump wasbelieved to provide a way for viewing the effects of vacuum on other materialthings, such as inflated bladders and even animals. Newton's prisms, especiallythe "two prism experiment" recorded in his Opticks, (though originallyconducted in the 1660s) were likewise thought to provide a privileged locus forthe scientific study of the composition of light. Their significance lies, forsubsequent scientific work, in the socially and politically contested claims thatthese experiments constituted a special class of benchmarks, or as Newton put it,"experimentum crucis".Bachelard's claim recognises the fact that the acceptance of anyinstrumentality as epistemologically privileged renders the underlyingprinciples of its construction self evident, and so reflexively sanctions theirperpetuation. Once Boyle's, or Newton's experiments were accepted by themajority of their peers as successfully reducing some phenomena to itsfundamental elements, then all debate about those fundamental elementsbecomes precluded. It would be very difficult indeed to retain the instrumentswhile markedly differing with their ontological presuppositions. From thisperspective Hooke's microscope can be seen as reifying a particle ontology whichthe instrument itself was expected, in principle, to be able to completely reveal.27 The distinction between "active" and "passive" instruments in science comes from W. D.Hackmann 1989: "Scientific Instruments: Models of Brass and Aids to Discovery" in Gooding,Pinch and Schaffer (Eds) 31-65105The case of Newton's prism trials is more complicated, since his interpretation ofthe results was destined to remain a site for debate and disagreement even up tohis death in 1727. His experiments were accepted only as experiments, and theepistemological closure he sought to impose on studies of light was rejected by avariety of authorities including Hooke. 28 It is in this sense that "instruments arereified theorems".For Boyle, and the other Royal Society experimentalists, the series of trialswhich explored the properties of a chamber evacuated of air withFigure 10: Diagram of Boyle's Air Pump28 Schaffer 1989106a small hand pump (Figure 10) 29 were taken to prove beyond doubt the reality ofvoid space and the ontological superiority of atomism over plenism. The pumpshown above of one of Boyle's own design completed around 1660 and couldaccommodate glass vessels ranging up to thirty quarts in volume. The simplestexperiment involved employing the pump's "sucker" to draw air out of thechamber and observing the progressive difficulty encountered after multiplerepetitions of this process. Weights could be hung on the sucker and so the'force' which the evacuated chamber was exerting on the sucker could bequantified and correlated with the amount of air evacuated. Other trials,described by Boyle in New Experiments Physico-Mechanical  included observingthe effects of pump evacuation on lit candles and inflated bladders placed in thechamber. 30 Of course the experiments could also be reversed , observing theeffects of air compression within the chamber. Out of these experiments cameBoyle's celebrated doctrine of the "Spring of the Air" in which he conceived of...air...to be such a heap of little bodies, lying one upon another, as maybe resembled to a piece of wool. For this consists of many slender andflexible hairs, each of which may indeed, like a little spring, be easilybent or rolled up but will also, like a spring, be still endeavouring tostretch itself out again.31Though Boyle professed himself loath to enter "so difficult a controversy" it isnevertheless clear that he tended to think that his air pumps trials demonstratedthe existence of void space, and therefore the superiority of atomism overplenism. 32It is useful to pause and make a few preliminary conclusions about thespatial attributes of scientific equipment. The analytic path I have been followingthus far suggests that such instrumentalities can have the effect of directing thescientific gaze towards certain ontological conclusions and away from others.Thus, Boyle's air pump, and also Hooke's microscope, suggested to seventeenthcentury experimentalists that the world was made up of atoms in a void. As I29 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.27ff30 my citations from Boyle's New Experiments Physico-Mechanical come from Vickers 1987; but seealso Stewart op cit and Robert Boyle 167531 Vickers 1987 p.5232 Shaffer and Shapin 1985 p.45, concerned primarily with the epistemological structure of Boyle'sexperimentalism, downplay his ontological peregrinations. Yet is clear from Boyle's ownwritings, such as those cited above, that he was not averse to conceptualising beyond observed"matters of fact".107will show in the next chapter, such instruments lent credibility to theorisationsof space itself as an "absolutely" constituted vessel in which natural and humanprocesses are contained, and which is to some extent independent of thoseprocesses. But all of this pertains only to spatiality considered at the abstractlevel. There is a much more immediate spatiality to the seventeenth centuryexplosion of interest in material instruments as a necessary part of scientificpursuits which concerns the spatial relations of their production, distribution,exchange and consumption within an incipient commodity economy. Duringthis period instruments were for the most part made to order from plans drawnup by experimenters such as Boyle by specialists in working whatever materialswere required. Few experimenters actually built their own instruments as DaVinci had done a century and a half before. The desire to procure instrumentsfrom certain recognised craftspeople or locations, became not only a resource forvalidating the results obtained with them, but also lent itself to the developmentof new professional and regional specialisations. Venice for example, wasknown during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the best place toobtain glass for the production of high quality lenses. 33There has as yet been very little work on the circulation of scientificinstruments as commodities. While it is no doubt true that the smallness of themarket during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would have renderedthe direct economic impact negligible, it is still true that this period saw thedevelopment of new professional and regional classifications which haveremained with us to the present. Schaffer and Shapin have observed thatBoyle's air pump was seventeenth century "big science", being relativelyexpensive and difficult to build and maintain. The question then arises as tohow these instruments were financed and to whom belonged the rights to usethem and exploit any useful results produced. In the case of the seventeenthcentury the question of financing is much less complex than it is today, sincemost experimenters were then in the habit of financing their own instruments.Boyle himself was aided in this regard by being the son of the Earl of Cork,Descartes came from a family of minor French nobility, and others such as Wren33 Schaffer 1989 pp.96-99. This fact led to a problem for Newton's claims about his prismexperiments once a Venetian experimenter reported being unable to reproduce Newton's results.The battle lines were drawn in this case in terms of Newton's method and craftsmanship on theone side and the superior Venetian materials on the other. The result was for a long timeinconclusive.108and Hooke paid their way through an amalgam of professional callings. 34 Anyanswer to the latter question, regarding the ownership of experimental results, ismuch less clear even though it was becoming an increasingly important issue asresults were produced which were commercially exploitable. Thomas Sprat, inhis highly polemical History of the Royal Society, tells us that theinstitutionalisation of the Royal Society provided "the most solid honour" to thediscoverer of useful scientific facts, and also "...the strongest assurances of stillretaining the greatest part of the profit" derived from them.35 Thus there is notonly an ontological geography inherent in scientific instruments, there is also amuch more immediate, though rarely researched, geography of scientificinstruments, pertaining to their production and diffusion through space. 36Social SpaceBut these experiments became an icon for more than just an alternativeontological regime. Besides their content and outcomes, as Boyle repeatedlyemphasised, experimetnal trials were meant to provide a shining example of thecorrect method for producing and legitimating scientific knowledge claims.Bound up with Boyle's ontological claims about the "spring of the air" and thereality of the vacuum, was an epistemology which was markedly different fromthat proposed by Descartes and Hobbes. While the stakes of the new enterprisewere, of course, Boyle's "matters of fact", the modus operandum was to'externalise' private ratiocination through imposing strict adherence to a closelyspecified experimental procedure. The experimentation, discovery andjustification of scientific knowledge were to be rendered, as far as possible, public,in marked contrast to the reflective private ratiocination of Hobbes' andDescartes' epistemology. Whereas Descartes and Hobbes utilised empiricalstudies primarily to inform and guide their deductive scientific processes, forBoyle and the Royal Society empirical study was the essence of their method.Absent also from the Royal Society programme was the essentially Hermeticsoteriological aspect of philosophical investigations which was still to some34 Both Wren and Hooke had considerable reputations as architects and planners, both being askedto site on the Commission which oversaw the rebuilding of London after the Great Fire of 1666.See T.F. Reddaway 1937: 'Wren's Plan for Rebuilding London" Town Planning Review35 Sprat excerpted in Vickers 1987 p.16636 Schaffer and Shapin begin to hint at the existence of these geographies in their rudimentarydiffusion map of air pump reports p.228.109degree present in present in Descartes and Hobbes. 37 For the Royal Society selfcreation was completely beside the point of scientific pursuit; fact was severedfrom value and the end of science was conceived to be, very simply, technicalknowledge about the external world.Around the revised goals of natural experimentation, a new communitydeveloped which not only defined the proper procedures for knowledgeproduction, but also would act as arbiter of scientific disputes. After 1662 theproduction of knowledge...was to be established by the aggregate of individualbeliefs...Matters of fact were the outcome of the process of having anempirical experience, warranting it to oneself, and assuring others thatgrounds for their belief were adequate.38The solution to the problem of just who could be accepted as a legitimateproducer of a 'matter of fact' ensured that social conservatism and politicalpower would be unavoidable elements in the scientific process. But control overexperimenters and experimentation was more pervasive than simply this. If thetechnological spaces discernable in seventeenth century scientific instrumentshelped reify a particular ontological structure, so to was this structure assisted bythe necessarily social component of their use. After all, especially in the case ofelaborate instruments such as air pumps and, later, leyden jars, the very smallnumber of machines inevitably meant that access to them had to be negotiated byprospective experimenters, and new versions of existing instrumentsthemselves had to be judged to be commensurate with the old ones if knowledgewas to be produced. But these technologies were also social in the sense that theyusually required the cooperation of several people to operate them "correctly".Finally, communications between experimenters were also disciplined in aspecific way designed to enhance objectivity and, as Schaffer and Shapin put it,open up a "space" for benign controversy. 39 All of these functions were37 See chapter 1 on hermetic tradition, and also chapter 3 on ontology and subjectivity in Descartesand Hobbes.38 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.2539 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.51 "...the language game Boyle was teaching experimentalphilosophers to play was based upon implicit acts of boundary drawing..." On the rhetoriccomponent of seventeenth century science see Vickers 1987; Briggs 1989 and also Lisa Jardine 1974:Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press).110incorporated in the scientific societies which began to be formally instituted inEurope in the late seventeenth century.In the first place, "social technologies" were implemented for adducingjust who could be accepted as a legitimate producer of knowledge and witness toexperimentation. At this time there was not yet a professional scientificoccupation which would remunerate its incumbents, the appointment of RobertHooke as "Curator of Experiments" in 1662 for a very modest, and irregularlypaid stipend notwithstanding. 40 Thus the ranks of the Royal Society (as well asother societies elsewhere) tended to be dominated by those men who couldafford the leisure to follow scientific pursuits. Generally speaking membershipin the Royal Society was extended to hegemonic elites; clerics, nobility andmilitary officers were all curried as potential witnesses whose social positionslent their observations of an experiment extra credibility. 41 As well of course,"gentlemen" experimenters such as Boyle (a son of the Earl of Cork) were alsoadmitted, as were persons with university postings, even they weren'tnecessarily pertaining to "science" as such. The social space represented in themembership of the early Royal Society was consequently an intriguingadmixture of the politically and theologically conservative and thephilosophically innovative. Undoubtedly much of the success of this societyderives from its ability to map its scientific agenda into the hegemonic politicaland economic landscape of Restoration England.Legitimacy too flowed from adherence to rules ensuring that experimentalspace and discourse were structured after a highly specific fashion.Communication of results was to be in a plain style, though "prolix" since "theflorid style was to be avoided as a hindrance...it was like painting the eyeglassesof a telescope".42 Boyle counselled that scientific reports were to be dispassionateand prolix in the extreme so that readers would be able, as far as possible, toconceive of the experiment as it actually occured. 43 If the form of written40 Apparently the provider of the endowment out of which Hooke's wage was to be paid was lessthan whole hearted in honouring this obligation41 Micheal Hunter 1982: The Royal Society and It's Fellows: The Morphology of An Early ScientificInstitution (Chalfont St. Giles: British Society for the History of Science)42 Schaffer and Shapin p.6643 The format for scientific reports taught students today seems to have been elaborated first inBoyle's own reports, written more than three hundred years ago. In fact the similarity isremarkable, and even a little unnerving. See Vickers 1987 and Stewart 1979 for further1111V. PresPresSea.Guest .Experiment TableI^I^I^I^11I^I^I^IUnordered tiers as in acollep lecture hall1^I^I^II^I^I^11^I^I^I^I11 II1^"..11, ^.^•^N,I^II^I^1^1I^ I I^1^I I^I^I^Idiscourse was closely controlled by the "new scientists", it is equally true that thespaces in which demonstrations and exchanges took place were equally carefullycontrolled. Count Lorenzo Magalotti visited the Royal Society in 1668 anddescribed the social architecture of the Society's proceedings:They observe the ceremony of speaking to the president, waiting fromhim for permission to be covered, and explaining their sentiments in fewwords relevant to the subject under discussion, and to avoid confusionand disorder one does not begin before the other has ended his speech.Neither are opposite opinions maintained with obstinacy, but withtemper, the language of civility and moderation always being adoptedamong them, which renders them so much the more praiseworthy. 44This account is, of course, as interesting for the iconography it creates as it is forany accounting of the actual state of affairs. Magalotti's description goes on todescribe the actual physical layout of the demonstration hall in which the RoyalSociety's weekly meetings were held (Figure 11), adding the fascinating note thatFigure 11: Sketch of Royal Society Proceedings Based on Magalotti and Shapin45discussion and examples of Boyle's scientific prose. At several points in Boyle's writing he evenapologises for the prolixity of his reports, but points out that this is absolutely necessary if hisreportage is to be complete and accurate.44 Count Lorenzo Magalotti on the Royal Society 1669 in Andrew Browning (Ed) English Historical Documents, Vol. VIII 1660-1714 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode) p.481. See also Shapin's 1988discussion of Magalotti's observations45 Compare this to the 1781 design for the Royal Society's new hall (not built) included in SophieForgan 1989: "The Architecture of Science and the Idea of a University" Stud Hist Phil Sci 20(4).112a mace (permitted the Society by virtue of its royal charter) was ceremonially laidon the table at which the President sat prior to convening meetings. As Shapinnotes, Thomas Sprat reacted vehemently to any suggestion that the Society inany matter observed rituals of authority, though the clear outlines seem toemerge of a "ritual" of putatively non-ritual equality and free concourse amongexperimental equals.Further, a distinction between contexts of discovery and justificationcreated Goffmanesque frontstage and backstage spaces which were potentresources in adjudicating rival knowledge claims." "Discoveries" made inprivate laboratories, where control was much less strict, had to be capable ofbeing replicated in the public demonstration spaces where a different order hadto be maintained. As Shapin notes (citing Kuhn), experiments were not shownmerely to confirm what was already known, but to produce new knowledge. Yetit is obvious that the experimenter would have to have much foreknowledge ofthe results to be obtained from a given public trial, or he would be unable toknow for sure whether or not it succeeded! There was thus a fine and uneasybalance to be struck between the demonstration of knowledge in public , and thecareful, meticulous rehearsal of that knowledge in private . 47 This translation ofprivate experience into public experience however was not as simple as it mightotherwise seem given both the nature of the spaces in which experimentersworked and also the fragile nature of the results. The case of one of Hooke'sattempts to demonstrate the phenomena of "anomalous suspension" of water inthe air pump in the early 1660s is instructive as an instance of private "success"running afoul of public unwillingness to so interpret the demonstration beforethem. "During the early phases of the career of anomalous suspension inEngland, the experimental leaders of the Royal Society were of the opinion thatno such phenomenon legitimately existed." 48 Hooke's "demonstration" ofexactly that phenomenon was therefore rejected as a result of flawed apparatus oroperation, and he was instructed to return to his private laboratory and46 See Wesley Salmon 1970: "Baye's Theorem and the History of Science" in Roger Steuwer (Ed)Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Science (Minneapolis:Univ. of Minnesota Press fora discussion of the distinction between "contexts of discovery" and "contexts of justification",which questions how sharply this distinction may be drawn.47 Shapin 1988 p.40048 Shapin 1988 p.403113"practice" it further until such time as he could produce more satisfactoryresults!Both the legitimacy of witnesses and experimenters as well as the socio-spatial construction of the experiments themselves became obvious sites for thecontestation of knowledge claims. Such contests, often waged solely in terms ofthe social structure of the experiment (who is said to have witnessed what) wereoften won by those with the greater store of the predefined social resources.Naturally, those who were close to the Royal Society enjoyed an obviousadvantage, as no less a continental experimental philosopher than ChristianHuygens was to discover on announcing air pump results anomalous with thoseobtained by Boyle. 49The Spatiality of Hobbes' Objections to BoyleHobbes rebelled against both the ontological and epistemological aspects ofthis new scientific paradigm. In Chapter 3 I intimated some of the reasons,physical and metaphysical, which he took to be proofs against the vacuistontology. On purely physical grounds Hobbes believed that he had developed aplenist physics which assimilated Boyle's "matters of fact" without thesuperfluous postulation of a vacuum. Consequently, in his view, the onus wason the vacuists to prove why the concept should survive the appeal to Occam'sRazor and the "Law of Sufficient Reason". On metaphysical grounds, Hobbesequated the "Greshamites" vacuum with the notions of "incorporeal substance"and "plastick nature", which he had already dismissed as politically dangerous.By emptying phenomena of their temporal and spatial relations, their motionsand causalities, Boylesian pneumaticists provided ample resources for thosewho would subvert civil authority for their own sectarian ends. A whole meta-level of reality was supported by such a notion as "vacuum" which coulddevelop a ritual, hierarchy and hegemony of its own, divergent from the path tocivil order. Hobbes finds a similar breakdown in Aristotle's Politics:49 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 pp.244-245 on the episode occasioned by Huygen's discovery of thephenomenon of "anomalous suspension". This result was only legitimised after Boyle hadmanaged to produce it himself in London.11 4[this] doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy ofAristotle, from fright [men] from obeying the laws of their country,with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an emptydoublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.5°Vacuism was to be strenuously rejected, not just for physical scientific reasons,but because it was politically dangerous, endowing fertile ground for the growthof dissent. This is why the discussions of epistemology in the early sections ofLeviathan properly belong there as a preface to the presentation of his politicalphilosophy, and therefore form the "subtext" of my reading of the Leviathan titlepage.Hobbes argued that the fellows of the Royal Society were in fact creating aclosely disciplined structure of domination over the production of knowledge. 51He attempted to expose as ideology that Society's claim to represent anunprejudiced, value free concourse of philosophical ideas. Even if the Societycould guarantee a true egalitarianism of ideas, such heterodoxy would still beinvidious to the body politic. Hobbes observed that the Society was, in any event,not open and public, but closed and private. Further, Hobbes particularlyattacked the social and technological spaces within which that programme wascontained, and represented, at every turn trying to show that these spaces were,in and of themselves, divisive and partisan to the interests of a specific grouprather than cohesive and unifying as polemicists such as Thomas Sprat andJoseph Glanvill claimed. If the scientific instruments of Boyle and Hooke wererejected as not providing a microcosm of natural world, then Hobbes believedthat, by the same token, the closed society is inadequate to the task ofrepresenting a true public epistemology.In the Dialogus Physicus, Hobbes starts his attack in the Royal Society byundermining their claim to have effected the egalitarian production ofknowledge in open, accessible public spaces. Not only did Hobbes find evidenceof elitism and oligarchy in the fact that membership was in fact relativelyrestricted, but he also pointed out that the structure of its proceedings was in factdefined a priori of any actual experimentation as such, thereby prejudicing theresults. 52 Remember that Hobbes' political dualism dwelt upon the public50 Hobbes Behemoth p. 41-251 Behemoth p.112-115, also Dialogus Physicus, in Schaffer and Shapin 1985 pp.350-35152 Hobbes Dialogus Physicus p. 353115transcendence of private realms. In the programme of the Royal Society asimilar distinction is maintained, though it is to be mediated (not transcended)in a different way. Hobbes could in fact argue against this programme in twoways. First, he noted that the space was not in fact public, since there werecontrols on who could attend and, more importantly, on the role and characterexpected of an spectator. Count Magalotti had made the same observation,himself declining to enter the Royal Society's meeting place becauseI understood that one is simply not permitted to go in as a curiouspasserby, and I would not agree to take my place there as a scholar, forone thing because I am not one...Thus, therefore, I got as far as the doorand then went away, and if they do not want to permit me to go and be amere spectator...I shall certainly be without the desire to do so. 53Magalotti's principled refusal to enter the closed space of the experimental hall isall the more interesting, of course, because he was precisely the sort of"gentlemen" witness they were keen to attract.But even if admittance to the proceedings of the Royal Society had beencompletely open and free, Hobbes still had another, possibly insurmountable,objection. For Hobbes a "public" space not conceived as merely the ultimateconcatenation of private spaces, but rather, was constituted through theconventicle between citizens and sovereign. If this was his definition of"public", then the antics of the Royal Society were completely beside the point:Are not those phenomena, which can be seen daily by each of you,suspect, unless all of you see them simultaneously? Those experimentsyou see in the meetings, which experiments indeed are well known to befew, you will believe to be sufficient, but are there not enough, do younot think, shown by the high heavens and the seas and the broadearth?54Hobbes' geometrically oriented deductivism was therefore considered to be theultimate "public" methodology, transcending the particularities of place,rendering a true "science of just and unjust". 55His second and more sustained line of attack was directed against thematerial technology of the air pump itself. Hobbes presented a number of53 Shapin 1988 p.389-9054 Hobbes, Dialogus Physicus p.35155 Behemoth p.39116alternative hypotheses which might explain the observed effects of the trials. Allof them depended a root on denying that the vessel was empty. He contendedthat the constituent parts of the air pump simply could not be assembled so wellas to absolutely exclude the possibility of leakage. In this Hobbes was beatingBoyle at his own game since that was a line of reasoning Boyle himself employedagainst the rival claims of Huygens, and Von Guericke. Alternatively Hobbesargued that, even if the chamber was indeed devoid of air, its place had to betaken some other more elemental matter, some "purer air" or "nether", whichcould be shown to account for the experimental results obtained. 56 In theDialogus Physicus, Hobbes deploys his concept of "conatus", defined as that"simple circular motion" which is constitutive of the plenum to offer simplerexplanations for several of Boyle's air pump demonstrations.To be coherent with the sort of political monism espoused by Hobbes, itwas insufficient to attempt to iron out the procedures whereby private contextsof discovery could be transformed into public contexts of justification. Hobbeswas undoubtedly quite correct when he repeated pointed out how the veracity ofsuch mechanisms often boiled down to the arbitership of some social grouping.The ability of such groupings to appropriate resources of legitimation hadproven deadly during the 1640s and 1650s, and Hobbes clearly saw no differencebetween that and the scientific programmes of the 1660s. Instead, Hobbes soughtto reverse the epistemological directionality. If it was politically dangerous to tryto transform private thought into public affirmation, then perhaps privatethought should be firmly anchored to a publicly constituted epistemology.Geometrical reasoning adhered to strictly by private minds would serve as ametaphor for sovereign political authority. Furthermore, such epistemologicalmonism was given the status of a moral imperative as Hobbes sought to returnto philosophy its soteriological and self creative characteristics. Whereas Boylesought to elaborate a space in which dissent could safely take place, Hobbessought to render dissent impossible through universal affirmation of the monistsocio-political space of Leviathan.57 I shall let Hobbes have the last word on thismatter:56 Behemoth p.12557 Schaffer and Shapin p.1071 17...content with Hobbesian physics, I will observe the nature andvariety of motion. I will also use the same Hobbesian rules of politicsand ethics for living.584.4 Spatiality and the Partition Between Physics and MetaphysicsThe blurring of the distinctions between physical and metaphysicalargumentation which I have demonstrated in Hobbes' work is no doubtimportant in its own right, as part in parcel of recent intellectual movementstowards the (re)contextualisation of the human sciences.59 But I would like tohave it serve a more specific, though undoubtedly related, purpose. Byhighlighting the indissoluble relationship between physical and metaphysicalreasoning I hope to elucidate also the mutual interpenetration of discussionsabout the physical and metaphysical structurings of space . Hobbes' argumentswere never meant as part of some abstract philosophical debate, but wereexplicitly designed as a programmatic entry into the political turmoil of CivilWar England. His anxiety about the ongoing strife of his time impelled if not theactual content, then certainly the timing and format of his publications.60Hobbes clearly meant to have an impact on his society, and if it is true that henever thought in terms of political geography per se , it is nevertheless true thathe was the architect of a new ideal spatial political order. Moreover this idealisedpolitical geography, to some degree mapped well into English economic andpolitical actualities after 1688. 61In terms of the Newtonian paradigm which managed to secure a lastingintellectual hegemony after the late seventeenth century, their progressivelymore dogged denial of metaphysical problems as legitimate scientific concerns58 Hobbes, Dialogus Physicus p.39159 putting the 'humanity back in the human sciences, so to speak.60 His original trilogy Of Body, Of Man Of Society, ended up being written almost completelybackwards, with Of Society coming out first, because the latter work was felt by Hobbes to be ofmore immediate importance.61 One has, I think, to be very careful about suggestions that Hobbes was the "first analyst ofbourgeois power", since he himself very clearly sought not a bourgeois nation state but arecrudescent absolutist one. Still, the appellation does have much merit, as C.B. MacPhersonhas pointed out, from the point of view of Hobbes' moral theory. C.B. MacPherson 1962: ThePolitical Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press).118marks the emergence of a double illusion. The first 'level' of illusion is embarksfrom the suggestion that metaphysics is, or ought be, irrelevant to science.Questions about values are explicitly ruled out of court in science, as are morephenomenological questions about selfhood and worldview. But this illusionfeeds back on itself since the connection between physics and metaphysics is noless intractable for the atomists than it was for the plenists. The mere wave of aphilosophical hand cannot logically be expected to purge scientific knowledge ofthe taint of human contingency. Consequently this denial of metaphysicstransforms itself in fact into a metaphysical submergence of implicit political andsocial geographies. Some of these metaphysical 'hostages to fortune' will bediscussed in this section, while a more fully geographical treatment of them isincluded in chapter 5.In this way, experimental knowledge was construed to be both a social aswell as an epistemological category. What is presented, from the positivistperspective, as a simple empiricism based upon the separation of fact from valueand the drive to attain knowledge of, and control over, nature is, on closerexamination, a socio-spatially located and structured system which exerted apowerful discipline over scientific discourse. A self perpetuating experimentalstructure, with significant linkages into political and social elite groupings, theRoyal Society and its related institutions throughout Europe, rapidly attainedhegemony over both the form and the content of post seventeenth centuryscience. The irony of course, is that what was supposed to be in many respects asupremely democratic intellectual space was in fact fairly constrained andultimately, as Hobbes pointed out, rather elitist. Experiments could not beconducted just anywhere, nor could they be about just anything, nor could theybe conducted by just anyone. "Solutions to the problem of knowledge", asSchaffer and Shapin remind us (echoing Foucault), "are solutions to problems ofsocial order".6262 Schaffer and Shapin 1985 p.332119Chapter 5"Theories of Absolute versus Relational Space:the interpenetration of physical and metaphysical spaces 3"5.1 The Latent Spatiality of Scientific Discourse5.2 The Logic of Relational Space5.3 The Triumph of Absolute Space5.4 Theories of Space and Seventeenth Century Geography1205.1 The Latent Spatiality of Scientific DiscourseIn this chapter I would like to inflect the analytical trajectory of theforgoing discussion. Where previously I have undertaken the task of teasingspatial issues and problems out of discourses often putatively aspatial, a kind of'geographical detective work', in this chapter I will introduce and evaluate thephilosophical discourses of space themselves. During the latter seventeenthcentury there arose debates over the constitution of physical space, which werelargely coincident with the two rival positions advocated by plenists andatomists. Statements, plenist or atomist, about how substance is ontologicallyconstituted necessarily entail queries into where that substance is, or can be,constituted. Similarly, the intellectual step of setting this ontological frameworkinto motion involves the problem of determining through what motion occurs.The problem of causality too raises spatial questions which, subsequent to theseventeenth century have been answered with either the idea of "action bycontact" only (Hobbes and Descartes) or "action at a distance" (Newton). 1Physical atomists, such as Boyle and Newton propounded a theory of space as anontologically distinct and "absolute" container in which physical entities areconstituted. Plenists, such as Hobbes and Descartes argued for a view of space as"relational" to the constitution of objects, denying that space has any ontologicalreality in and of itself.This debate, between absolute and relational conceptions of space would beof little interest were it not for the fact that it was often conducted in terms ofmetaphysical as well as physical argumentation. In his Sixth Meditation,Descartes states:Although there are parts of space in which I find nothing thatexcites and affects my senses , I ought not therefore to conclude thatthey contain no objects.2I Robert D. Sack 1980: Conceptions of Space in Social Thought (Minneapolis: Univ of Minn Press).In this work Sack discusses different conceptions of space in terms of the problem of causality,though he rarely places his discussion in the context of the philosophical debates of theseventeenth century, making his a less useful source for my purposes than it otherwise might havebeen. His major organising theme is the development of a rather teleological framework of thedevelopment of space concepts, and consequently his explicit discussion of absolute and relativespace tends to tacitly accept their commonplace objective and subjective imputations respectively.See esp Sack 1980 pp.55ff2 Descartes, Meditations, p.137121Descartes' plenism had been arrived at as a result of his scepticism about sensedata, which is an epistemological claim, and is hence related to his concept of theknowing subject. This same form of argumentation can be applied to hisrelational theory of space where space is shown to be ontologically relative, inthe final analysis, to the perspective of the knowing subject. The constitution ofspace was thought to be completely contingent upon acts of subjectiveperception, which would, ideally, be 'disciplined' through adherence togeometrical-rational habits of mind. And, as Descartes' points out in theDiscourse on Method,  these rational habits of mind ought form the basis for a'scientific' morality. 3 Consequently, the existence, or perhaps 'quasi-existence', ofrelative space would therefore be partially 'absolutised', that is to say rendered tobe a general category, on the basis of Descartes' appeal to private morality.Hobbes too argued along rather similar lines, a fact which has led Gary Herbert torefer to Hobbes as, interestingly enough, a "phenomenologist of space". 4 Hobbes'spatial ideas were initially worked out in his early tract De Corpore where hispreoccupations are physical and dynamical, and, much later, in Leviathan wherethey are political and theological. Even so, Hobbes' spatial ideas probablyreceived their best expression in his polemics, including the Dialogus Physicus,against Boyle's air pump experiments in the early 1660s.Spatial absolutists, such as Boyle and Newton, are rather more difficult tocomprehend in these terms, since a good deal of their absolutism about questionsof space is predicated precisely on the strategic effacement of metaphysical issues.As I argued in the last chapter, their natural philosophy depended uponrendering transparent to the public "Eye" the private activities of intellectualdiscovery, a fact which helps account for the apparent lack of interest in theseintellectual quarters regarding questions of subjectivity, perception and thetheory of mind. The absolutist project can however be shown to involvesomething of a reinterpretation of Cartesian dualism (as a rigid dichotomy ,rather than as a dialectic) and a reformed, and rather Platonic, theology. Thiswill involve a rather careful interrogation, effectively a deconstruction of theirspatial absolutism, of certain scientific texts of Boyle and especially Newton.3 Demonstrating an interesting manner in which Descartes' rendered epistemologcal claims to bemoral claims. Descartes, Discourse on Method,  p.18-244 Gary Herbert 1987: "Hobbes' Phenomenology of Space" fnl of the History of Ideas XLVIII(4) pp.709-717.122Consequently, while the physical and metaphysical imbrications inherent inspatial absolutism were not as self consciously theorised as they were in therelativist writings of Hobbes and Descartes, it is nevertheless possible to tracethem, albeit somewhat indirectly. Through elucidating some of the ways inwhich space is implicated philosophically in Newtonian science, it may bepossible to perceive more subtle continuities and discontinuities between thisabsolute spatiality and that developed in a rather more sophisticated fashion byKant and century later.Such questions of multiply layered spatiality cannot be avoidedindefinitely if one wishes to truly plumb the depths of the seventeenth centuryscientific revolution, and indeed its (spatial) implications for the 'project ofmodernity' itself. However my task is complicated by that fact that, until calledupon to debate explicitly spatial questions, the thinkers under examination hererarely spared much thought at all for the systematic resolution of conceptualproblems of space. Descartes' most rigorous treatment of spatial issues probablyoccurs in his Principles of Philosophy  where he is concerned largely with thephysical aspect of natural philosophy. 5 And while comments about space arescattered throughout Leviathan and De Corpore as they pertain to otherproblems, Hobbes seems never to have felt a compunction to develop anindependent and internally consistent conception of it outside of his manycontroversies. Even in the context of his debates with Boyle over the status ofthe air pump trials, his interest in space rarely rises above the incidental. Hobbes,after all, is quite preoccupied with the challenges posed by Boyle to his physicaldynamics and political science. Similarly, Leibniz, in his written salvos againstNewton's apologist Samuel Clarke (1715/16), does not present precedent in hisown writings for the "relative space" he promulgates in opposition toNewtonian absolute space. 6 Instead he draws on his analyses of physical5 I have relied primarily on those excerpts included in Milic Capek (Ed) 1976: The Concepts ofSpace and Time: Their Structure and Development  (Boston: D. Reidel Co). Interestingly,Margarita Bowen seems to have completely overlooked Descartes' interest in space though shedoes include citations from the Principles of Philosophy. Presumably this absense derives fromthe fact that her preoccupation is with Descartes' epistemology , coupled with the peculiaraspatiality of her a priori concept of geography. As I have argued, Descartes' system is notentirely perspicuous without attention to his ontological peregrinations, including those aboutspace. See Bowen 1980.6 Julian Barbour 1982: "Relational Concepts of Space and Time" British Inl for the Philosophy ofScience 33, p.255123causality and motion. And Newton's conception of space is itself developedexplicitly only as a "scholium", or propaedeutic, to the universal naturalphilosophy he presents in the Principia Mathematica. 7 For the most partquestions pertaining to space are marginalised or otherwise obscured by virtuallyall seventeenth century thinkers, presumably in their rush to develop theories ofuniversal certain knowledge.One may fairly wonder why there were so few theoretical treatments ofspace in early modern thought. Space, no doubt, had the same practicalimportance to the world of everyday affairs that it retains today. More to thepoint, more consideration was in fact given to questions of time, especially in itsrole as an an independent factor in experimentation. These silences about spaceare, in my view, 'eloquent silences', bespeaking not the marginalisation ofspatial concerns, but in fact their very centrality to all that was at stake inseventeenth century scientific controversy. Heretofore I have taken a ratheroblique approach to developing an understanding of seventeenth century ideasabout space, teasing them out of general ontological and epistemologicaldiscussions. In this chapter it is precisely those often overlooked, thoughcritically central, 'spatial modalities' which I would like to elucidate. I think thatit is possible to identify, in the plenist ontologies of Hobbes, Descartes andLeibniz, a forceful, if not always perfectly coherent, 'theory' of space. 8 Whenconfronted with questions about space, place and spatiality, these thinkersattempted to articulate spatialities which followed most satisfactorily from theirlargely convergent plenist ontologies. This will involve tracing how therespective spatialities are implicated in theories of substance, motion, and alsocausality. Attention will then turn to the relationship of mathematics andgeometry especially to spatial conceptions, since relationists and absolutistsappropriated them differently in the debate about space. As previously intimatedthis is related to the process whereby a universalised subjectivity based on single' This is not meant to deny Newton's recognition of the importance of space to his physics, butrather to emphasise the fact that he clearly thought it to be a matter largely preliminary to hismore central physical science.8 Indeed, given my claim that theories of space are really ancillary to the other preoccupations ofthese writers, it would be a matter of some suspicion if a unitary spatiality could be adduced fromsuch diverse writings! Leibniz, for example disagreed with plenists about such basic points as thedistinction between "primary and secondary" qualities, though he still managed to underwrite aremarkably similar conception of relative space. See Paul Janet's introduction to Leibniz'Discourse on Metaphysics  (La Salle, Ill: Open Court Press) p.xi124point perspective, including the priorisation of vision over all other forms ofexperience, came to be hegemonic in scientific discourse. Finally the two sectionswill close with an attempt to link these primarily physical systems with theirmetaphysical counterparts. Some of the implications of absolute and relationalspatialities for conceptions of the subject, social and political order, and finally for'right' theology will be presented. The reproblematisation of thephysics/metaphysics partition will also ease the way for some comments uponthe relationship between these ephemeral ideas and the material processeswithin which they were embedded. From this foundation it will be possible, inthe final section of this chapter to begin to consider the impact thesephilosophies of space have had on the development and stature of the disciplineof geography itself.5.2 The Logic of Relative SpaceI suggested in chapter 3 that Descartes' rejection of corporeal "simples" or"atoms" carries along with it an ontological dualism rather different from thatpopularly conceived. Viewed through positivistic spectacles Cartesian dualismappears as the familiar and straightforward dichotomy between 'mind-stuff' and'body-stuff'. Furthermore, the categories of 'mind' and 'body' are taken to beboth ontologically oppositional and mutually exclusive of one another. YetDescartes' overriding commitment to a plenist ontology renders it impossible, orat least highly improbable, that such an interpretation can be readily maintained.The entire issue hinges, of course, on how the interface between the categories ofmind and body are claimed to be related. My discussion of this problem aboveprovides a useful starting point for an investigation of the notion of relativespace. In much the same way that Descartes brought mind and body closertogether, rendering them dialectical aspects of one another in fact, so too is theontological reality of space postulated. For relativists to say that space is purelyrelative to the bodies located within it is equivalent to saying that space ispredicated on the reality of the plenum. Spatial manifestation is a necessary andconcomitant aspect of extension itself:...the same extension in length, breadth and depth whichconstitutes body, constitutes spaces; and the difference between125them consists only in the fact that in body we consider extensionsparticular and conceive them to change as body changes... 9This internal constitutive manifestation Descartes, and Hobbes, refer to as"imaginary space" and especially "place". "Place" is that expression of spatialitywhich is intrinsic to the very constitution of substance in the perception of theknowing subject. 1 ° For plenists, extension as well as space is predicated onconstructive acts of subjective perception, even to the degree that objects containtheir own locations, or, to be more precise, their quality of locatednessl I Thatpredication, as Hobbes also realised, is itself "relative" to the constitution of theknowing subject. In turn this process is dialectically bound up with the materialfactors which influence the cognitive distancing of the viewer from the viewed,even to the point of objectifying intersubjective relations. From a relationalperspective it is therefore meaningless to attempt to delineate somecharacterisation of space, substance, or the the world prior to its subjectiveapprehension. Space might well be treated as analytically detachable from thatwhich is enmeshed within it, but one should not deduce from this that thisanalytic space merits ontological status. 12 Consequently spatial relativistsimpugned the classical Greek notion, revived by the Newtonians, that space is anontologically distinct "container" for corporeal substance.But spatiality is not entirely expressed as a phenomenological artefact ofthe continual reconstitution of subjects and objects in the plenum, as might beinferred from the Cartesian theories of substance and motion. Nor is it merelyphenomenological in the sense that it is ineluctably determined relative to the'taken for granted world' of the knowing subject, as is implied in the lastparagraph. There is also an external spatiality which is in some senseconstitutive of the plenum itself. Descartes finishes the above quote with thisthought:9 Descartes cited in Milic Capek 1976 p.7610 Note the similarity of this definition of "place" with that of Heidegger, cited in Chapter 1 ofthis thesis. Also in contrast with contemporary geographical notions of "place", this view seemsnot to include the contemporary attributes of "uniqueness" and especially "emergence" cited byFred Lukermann 1965: "Geography: De facto or De Jure" Jnl Minnesota Academy of Science  32(3)11 Hamsphire 1956 p.14512 Hobbes referred to this error as one of mistaking terms of "honour" for terms of "fact". SeeLeviathan chapter 4126...in space, on the contrary, we attribute to extension a generic unity,so that after having removed from a certain space the body whichoccupied it, we do not suppose we have removed the extension ofthat space.Space is thus "relative" in a second, but distinct, sense to that proposed above.Not only is space defined "internally" through the subjective constitution ofcorporeal substance, but it is also imputed from the relations between multiplesubstantial objects. In his "Fourth Letter to Clarke" Leibniz expresses this point:As for my opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space tobe something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be anorder of coexistences as time is an order of successions. For spacedenotes...an order of things which exist at the same time,considered as existing together , without inquiring into theirparticular manner of existing. 13Obviously then space cannot logically be reducible to simple extension as is oftenimplied in contemporary theoretical treatments of space.'" The concept of"extension" contains, in a sense, both internal and external characteristics ofspace. The (external) unity of the space concept derives from its expressionthrough analytic geometry. Nonetheless this "generic" spatiality remainsartifactual in the sense that it is wholly derivative of the convergence ofcollective perceptions of extended substance. In other words, some commonlanguage for the perception of bodies in space had to be discovered. And, ofcourse, the discursive vehicle for uniting myriad subjective perceptions within acommon collectivity had traditionally been held to be, for both relativists andabsolutists alike, geometry. It is tempting to conclude that on the relationalview, space is strictly an epistemological category, with no ontological standing atall. Special impetus for this view derives from the fact that the very ubiquity andrelevance of spatial concerns renders a generic discursive description of spaceitself all that is really possible. While it would be stretching the evidence tosuggest that plenists maintained a single and completely coherent theory ofspatiality, we can nevertheless consider the basic elements of relationism to beexpressed in Hobbes' distinction between the internal "places" which substances13 Leibniz 1956: Philosophical Papers and Letters Vol. II translated and edited by Leroy Loemker(Chiacgo: Univ of Chicago Press) p.110814 See Chapter 3127carry with them and the external "spaces" which are artifactual of their relativelocation. 15The plenist' positive theory of relational spatiality implies an obviouscriticism to be levelled against any postulation of absolute space. Taken at themost general level spatial absolutists contend that space is "a distinct, physicaland eminently real or empirical entity in itself". 16 Leibniz vociferouslymaintained that if space was held to be absolute then it must somehow have areal existence independent of subjective perception. Further, Newtonianabsolute space would have to be either corporeal or incorporeal substance. But, ifeither of these possibilities is granted then determining the order of any naturalarray becomes impossible and science, in Leibniz' view, breaks down:If space is a substantial property, prior to substance itself, then howcan one determine the difference of one configuration [of extendedsubstance] from another? 17Leibniz is quite cunning in this line of critique, constructing for Newton'shapless apologist Clarke a logical as well as scientific dilemma. He contends thatthe postulation of absolute space makes it "impossible [that] there should be anyreason why God, preserving the same situations of bodies among themselves,should have placed them in space after one certain particular manner and nototherwise." Theological issues aside for a moment, it would be impossible todistinguish any spatial configuration of objects from any other in absolute space,without first developing an ontological understanding of space itself:' 8 ThusLeibniz infers that the postulation of an absolute ontological space cannot admitof any empirical verification. Now Leibniz himself was quite content to acceptphysical space as a manifestation of a transcendental God. But the dilemma forNewton is that, in terms of his own empiricism he must either come up with acompletely physical explanation for absolute space or he must engage inmetaphysical speculations which threatens the central distinction between15 Herbert 1987 p. 71016 J. M. Blaut 1972: "Space and Process" in W.K.Davies (Ed) The Conceptual Revolution inGeography  (London: Univ of London Press) p.42 Blaut's definition is virtually identical to theone given by Newton in the "Scholia on Space" which prefaces the Principia Mathematica.17 Leibniz, 1956 p. 114518 Barbour 1982; Huygens also held to this view; see Max Jammer 1969: Concepts of Space, SecondEdition (Cambridge:Harvard Univ. Press) p.126128physics and metaphysics which the Newtonians sought long and hard to buildup in the first place! 19But it is not just the ontological status of being in space which is relativefor the plenists. The relative view of space becomes even more apparent when itis viewed in terms of plenist analyses of motion and causality. It will beremembered that, from the plenist perspective, all motion is necessarily "localmotion". In other words, motion was thought to be a temporal sequence ofreconstitutions of extended substance in successive contiguous "external spaces".While bodies necessarily take their places , that is to say their "internal spaces",with them as they move they do not similarly take their (external) spaces withthem. Hobbes is his usual perspicuous self on this point:For no man calls it space for being already filled, but because it maybe filled; nor does any man think that bodies may carry their[spaces] away with them, but that the same space containssometimes one, sometimes another body; which could not be if spaceshould always accompany the body which is once in it. 2°The appearance of motion is in some measure therefore an artefact of thepeculiarities of human perception. For example, in the standard high schoolphysics demonstration of kinematic principles using a bouncing ball, what isperceived as continuous unbroken movement of the same ball, is in fact just thesuccessive reconstitution of the ball in adjacent external spaces. It follows fromthis point that the appearance of rest, taken as lack of movement, is also thecontinual transformation in situ of an object and therefore also constitutes"local motion", a point which Descartes repeatedly emphasised 21 Motion andrest are in fact only conceivable because we possess a generic description of"external space" in terms of the diachronic relations between successivemanifestations of corporeal substance.It follows from this analysis of motion that all causes must be impresseddirectly and cannot be said to act through any putative medium of void space.19 See next section20 Herbert 1987 pp. 711, 713-4. Huygens also commented, in correspondence with Leibniz, 'To thosewho ask what motion is, only this answer suggests itself: that bodies can be said to move whentheir place and their distances change, either with respect to each other, or with respect toanother body." cited in Earman 1989 p.4121 Grene 1985 p.101129After all "action at a distance" implies either void space, or space as anindependent ontological entity endowed with its own causal force. The latteroption is clearly nonsensical since it would then be necessary to developscientific accounts for the agency of space acting independently of substance. Theplenist view, it will be remembered, allows of two sorts of causes: "final" and"efficient". 22 Because of the scepticism about the senses (which is part of anunavoidable metaphysics of subjectivity), it would seem to be impossible toknow if any discernment of natural, or "final", cause has been accuratelydetermined, or indeed how to go about such determinations. Moreover causalitymust be intrinsic somehow to substance itself, since plenism allows no otherlocus of causes. The "final" cause which Descartes and Hobbes eventually feltcompelled to introduce was the highly problematic notion of the "conatus". Thisseems to be defined as the intrinsic volition of constituted substance to preserveits own inertia. 23 In Leibniz' philosophy the corollary is of course the concept ofthe "monad". Once these ideas were on the philosophical table it was but a shortstep to relate them to an absolute final cause which emanates from the Judeo-Christian God. Both Hobbes and Descartes developed "deistic" conceptions ofGod which understood "Him" to be spatial in the sense that "He" pervades theplenum. 24For Hobbes and Descartes, geometry is at once an epistemologicalframework, allowing philosophy to chart out the order of the universe, and alsoan affirmation of the moral landscape. Hobbes argued repeatedly that the valueof geometry in natural and moral philosophy was that it was a discursivemodality wholly within the human compass. Eschewing the renaissance notionof geometry as the "music of the spheres", Hobbes contended that the only wayin which humanity could impose lasting order on its natural significations wasthrough their transformation into a signifying "lexicon" which was rational,internally self contained and also self consistent. geometry understood this wayis the imposition of a unified 'public' order on the activities of 'private' minds.Geometrical reasoning was therefore taken to be the discursive equivalent of thepolitical sovereign as constitutive of the polity itself. By extension, space too was22 See Chapter 323 See Chapter 324 In ways this is similar to the Cambridge Platonist Henry More who argued that God wasequated with space through the "immensity and omnipresence of [His] essence". J.E. Power 1970:"Henry More and Isaac Newton on Absolute Space" in Jnl of the History of Ideas 31 p.290130taken to be geometric in an epistemological sense; a view which forged yetanother connection between the subject of geometry, the singular visuallyoriented perspective, and the plenum itself.5.3 The Triumph of Absolute SpaceExperimental philosophers inclined to an atomist ontology and theprogramme of the Royal Society, as might be expected, adhered to a very differentconception of space. In the elucidation of this space concept there is probably nobetter source than Isaac Newton himself. While Newton was prepared to admitthat, in practice , people tend to treat space as though it was relative only to thosebodies located within it, he nevertheless upheld the view that space existedsomehow in the physical world as an ontological entity in and of itself. His ownmost comprehensive discussion of the constitution of space appears in anintroductory scholium to his epoch marking Principia Mathematica (1687):Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anythingexternal, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space issome movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces. 25At a stroke Newton proposed to settle the dispute between absolutists andrelativists by subsuming relative space into a more general, universal andabsolute space. Absolute space however was not merely conceived, as it was byother of Newton's contemporaries (such as Boyle), to be a universal immediatelyapprehensible "container space" of physical objects and events. Newtonintroduced a new aspect of the notion of absolute space which depended upon adifferent way of partitioning the "spatial" from the "material" and which, whilenovel, was also largely compatible with prevailing absolutist conceptions.One of Newton's major achievements in the history of physics was to shiftthe discursive ground away from mechanistic simplicity and towards a new basisin the concepts of "force " and "mass". Newton proposed to subsume thekinematically based spatial relativism of Hobbes and Descartes within a new25 Newton's "Scholia on Space" cited in Capek 1976 p.97. Compare this definition wth the onegiven by J.M. Blaut 1972, Note #16131dynamically oriented physics. In other words, relativistic arguments based uponthe study of motion as it shows itself to the senses, Newton's "Five Powers",were to be recontextualised through an epistemological privileging of the studyof force in nature. 26 A key goal for all of Newton's dynamical demonstrationswas not simply to show that there is some physical container space in anystraightforward visual-geometric sense. Rather Newton endeavoured to provevia his experiments with moving globes, sailing ships and rotating waterbuckets, that there must be an absolutely constituted "inertial frame ofreference", which is the natural Archimedean point for the scientificinvestigation of all natural phenomena. 27 Newton thus shifted thephilosophical debate from kinematics to dynamics; ground he believed morefavourable to the demonstration of absolute space. Strategically it was also agood choice since plenists had been coming under increasing criticism, from bothnatural philosophers and theologians, in the late seventeenth century forintroducing mystical concepts such as the "conatus" into their explanations ofmotion and causality. 28One of Descartes' demonstrations of the relativity of space, contained inhis Principles of Philosophy, involved the consideration of a captain on a sailingship.29 In this thought experiment Descartes reasoned that while the captainmay be conceived to be at rest with respect to the ship, or some part of it, 'he'must always be in motion with respect to some other points of reference, such asthe shore, the planet itself, and ultimately the universe. Descartes observed thatone could never determine the captain's motion absolutely , since this wouldrequire taking into account all possible relative motions. Further, since onecould never know if all relevant motions were accounted for then the verynotion of absolute motion was not only indeterminate, but actually meaningless.It was an elegant proof, insofar as it forced his opponents to demonstrate thatthey could in fact account for all possible motions, while Descartes himself was26 James Garrison 1987: "Newton and the Relation of Mathematics to Natural Philosophy" in Jaifor the History of Ideas 48(4) p.61827 Max Jammer 1969 provides a good discussion of Newtonian dynamics in the context of theories ofspace, pp. 96-10Off28 "Conatus" was generally conceived as an inclination to preserve being, and hence is not unlike thedynamic concept of "momentum", except that conatus was held to be intrinsic to matter. SeeHoward R. Bernstein 1980: "Conatus, Hobbes and the Young Leibniz" in Studies in the Hist. and Phil. of Science 11(1) pp.25-3729 See the excerpts in Capek 1976 pp.76-84132left the much more congenial task of finding only a single counter example toany putative refutation!Newton challenged this example head on, transforming Descartes'discussion of motion into a discussion of force . Remember that one ofNewton's most significant propositions in the Principia was that naturalphilosophy could be fruitfully conceived as the investigation of interacting"mass points". 30 That is to say he redefined the subject matter of natural sciencein terms of the mass produced in corporeal substance by the existence of forcesacting on substance, rather than physical extension considered in and of itself.The ontological claim was that force, whether through gravity, elasticity, inertiaor anything else, was also a "primary" quality. From this perspective the fact thatthe captain on the ship is in motion relative to the shore, or to anywhere else,becomes irrelevant. He is said to be at rest, inertially, in the absence of anychanges in the forces acting upon him. The absolute space in which the captainon the ship31 is said to be at rest is dynamical space, not kinematic space, and hisabsolute location could, in principle anyway, always be determined as long as oneaccepts the postulation of an inertial centre of the universe. This appeal todynamic, rather than kinematic, inertia obviated the need for for problematicnotions of "conatus" and "simple circular motion", since kinematic motion wasno longer taken to be the underlying basal element of the natural world.Newton also proposed in his Scholium another, more famous,demonstration that space was structured absolutely. The "rotating water bucket"experiment has attracted a great deal of attention in the subsequent debatebetween relativists and absolutists. The eighteenth century geometricianLeonard Euler evaluated this experiment and upheld the conclusions that spaceis structured absolutely while Leibniz, George Berkeley and, much later, ErnstMach rejected its conclusions, and even its premises, as erroneous. 32 Theexperiment itself was quite simple. Newton suspended a bucket of water from arope and gradually began to increase the angular force on the bucket by twistingthe rope. The bucket of course began to spin, and the spin accelerated as long asthe angular force was increased. At some point the water in the bucket, which is30 Capek 1976 p. 9631 Actually Newton talked about a "sphere" rather than a "captain", though this makes nodifference to the argument32 John Earman 1989133moving in a circular motion with respect to the rope, will begin to, as Newtonput it, "climb the sides of the bucket". At some subsequent point the surface ofthe water will become concave indicating the recession of the water from the axisof rotation, while at the same time the angular motion of the water will beexactly equal to that of the spinning bucket itself. Newton then inquired about towhat the recessive motion of the water was relative. The spatial relativist wassupposed to be stymied, since the water clearly was not moving relative to thebucket apparatus itself. Instead it was moving "relative" to a non-physical pointin space which coincided with the axis of angular momentum:The effects which distinguish absolute from relative motion arethe forces receding from the axis of circular motion. For there are nosuch forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true andabsolute circular motion, they are greater or less according to thequantity of the motion. 33The ontological status of "absolute circular motion" had been debated for someyears before Newton, though he was the first to accord it ontological significanceas a dynamic phenomena. The result was to establish a view of absolute space asa real "container space", though not one which was kinematically apprehensible.While plenists and atomists alike argued that the principles of Euclideangeometry and mathematics lent veracity to their respective positions, Newtondeployed geometry in a new and more inclusive manner. Prior to Newton'sPrincipia, the space which was taken to be representable geometrically, relativismand absolutism notwithstanding, was a tangible, visible space, one which wasimmediately apparent to the senses. Similarly the geometry that was conceivedprior to the end of the seventeenth century was specifically suited to themeasurement of that visual space. Succinctly put, Newton's achievement was toexpand the compass of geometry to include also the indirectly apprehensibledynamics of phenomena. In the Principia he states:Geometry itself is founded in mechanical practice and is nothing butthat part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes anddemonstrates the art of measuring.(my italics)3433 Newton quoted in Jammer 1969 p.10534 Jeremy Gray 1989: Ideas of Space: Euclidean, Non-Euclidean and Relativistic (Oxford Univ.Press) p.178134Newton's concept of "mechanics" was concerned with the manipulation ofnature to an end, rather than merely the passive mirroring of what was taken tobe already present. Thus geometry was accorded an added level ofverisimilitude, not present in Descartes, for it not only accurately describes thepractical world of kinematic experience, but also represents the underlyingsubstratum of dynamical phenomena. In Newtonian physics the forces acting onobjects, as well as their motions, are resolved into linear geometric components.After Newton's Principia, debate between absolute space theorists andspatial relativists proceeded essentially along two fronts. In the first place, thedisputants continued to "talk past on another", absolutists proposing dynamicalarguments about force, mass and inertia, while relativists continued to utilise akinematic vocabulary. Newton's epoch-marking reformulation of theproblematic of natural philosophy in terms of mass and force had the effect ofremoving the need for dubious plenist concepts of internal causality and motion.It did however create the not insignificant problem of making everything hingeon the maintenance of the postulation of a universal state of inertia. And sincespatial relations were taken to be absolute insofar as they could objectively bedetermined solely by reference to that state of universal inertia, then any attackon Newtonian inertia was simultaneously an attack on the absolute conceptionof space. It was however at precisely this point that many philosophers, even inNewton's own lifetime, criticised the Newtonian edifice. The attack came frombasically two directions. Theologians such as George Berkeley argued that bycreating a universal physical entity as a pinion of his natural philosophy Newtonhad demeaned the power and glory of God. On the other hand, Huygens andalso Leibniz, contended that the postulation of an inertial "centre" of thecosmos" was, in strictly empiricist terms, unverifiable. 35 Newton's water bucketexperiment, as his detractors repeatedly pointed out, did not establish theexistence of a single "absolute distinguished inertial space", but only that waterin a spinning bucket recedes from the axis of rotation. 36 The horns of thedilemma sketched in the last section were thus posed: Newton had either toequate space with the efflorescence of God, and so give up his pure form ofempiricism; or he must give up the idea of an inertial centre as empiricallyunprovable and with it the concept of absolute space. In various places Newton35 Jammer 1%9 p.10136 Earman 1989 pp.62ff135attempted to deal with each horn of this dilemma, though in his later career hebecame increasingly prone to the theological arguments he had earliereschewed. 375.4 Theories of Space and Geography in the Seventeenth CenturyThe intellectual history of the seventeenth century can be charted in termsof the gradual separation of the constitution of certain knowledge about objectsin the world from the constitution of subjects oriented towards the world.Neither Hermeticism nor Scholasticism, for the most part, had recognised thisdistinction; in those systems claims to knowledge about the 'natural world' weremuch more closely intertwined with moral and spiritual beliefs. By the end ofthe seventeenth century, however, natural and moral philosophy had beenradically bifurcated at both epistemological and ontological levels. Theexperimental programme of Boyle, Newton and the Royal Society radicallydichotomised the relations between subjects and objects, facts and values, and infact most if not all of the conceptual repertoire which had previously integratedthe realms of the physical and metaphysical. The key to the new regime was thenotion that only completely objective knowledge claims about a dehumanisedworld of 'fact', could attain the highest level of epistemological certainty. Bycontrast, the plenisms of Descartes and Hobbes may appear as something of atransitional stage between Hermetic/Scholastic and experimental modalitieswhich while problematising the modern dichotomies, still attempted to forge aradical reconciliation between them.Concomitant with this transition in ideas about epistemological certaintywas a shift in views about the constitution of space and also about its metrics.Throughout the century the concepts of "space", "matter" and "self" wereprogressively estranged from one another in a process which received its37 In his later career he also attempted to assuage ecclesiastical concerns about the putativeatheism of his theories, as is apparent in later editions of the Principia Mathematica. Notealso that the relationship between God and space was central to the debate between Clarke(Newton's mouthpiece since it has been proven that Newton wrote the responses to Leibniz'sletters) and Leibniz. See the discussion of Newton's use of the notion of space as the "sensorium"of God in the first few salvos of the Leibniz-Clarke exchange.136culmination in Newton's view of "absolute space" as that immutable andunchanging "container" for all relative spatial experiences. 38 As Smith haspointed out, a commitment to technical mastery over natural events was anecessary corollary to capitalist political economic development as was thereconceptualisation of space as denatured and 'objective'. Spatial relationismwas coopted, in part, by reinterpreting its relational component as implyingmerely the subjectively interpreted relation between substantial entities in theworld, themselves existing within an absolute spatial field. The constitution ofthe subject, which had so complicated Descartes' thought, was inexorably drawninto a new formative matrix through burgeoning commoditisation. And thisnew matrix itself is subsumed, together with the development of the subject asthe locus of (self) discipline, within what Foucault has referred to as the"analytics of finitude". 39 Correspondingly, mathematics, in Newton's hands,came to be explicitly and solely about empirical objects in empirical spaces, farremoved from the "philosophia prima" of Descartes and Hobbes. 40 TheNewtonian conception of absolute space meant absolute relative to an absolutestate of inertial 'rest'. Despite the fact that this cosmological state of rest wasitself unverifiable by empirical means, and therefore abrogated Newton's owndictum of "hypothesis non fingo", it effectively submerged questions of space-substance-subjectivity relativity which were not to be revisited until Kant at theend of the eighteenth century.'"For geography, as a discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,the ascendance of absolute conceptions of space established both a clear paradigmand an undeniable problematic. Throughout this period geography was for themost part seen merely as the geometrical description of static physical spaces. ForD'Alembert and Busching no less than Locke and Rousseau, geography was38 In his treatment of these themes, Neil Smith seems not to explicitly connect the progressiveseparation of space and matter during the seventeenth century with the progressive separationof the physical and the social during the same period. I tend to consider the radical separationof space, substance and self as a multidimensional whole, a schema which seems to me to allowfor intellectual continuities as well as the discontinuities to be understood which are notnecessarily bound to material practices. Neil Smith 1984: Uneven Development (London: BasilBlackwell)39 Foucault 1970 p. 31240 James Garrison 1987 p.61241 Interestingly, Kant would uphold the Newtonian version of absolute space, though from thepoint of view of a transcendentally 're-natured' world. See Capek 1976.137taken to be only a propaedeutic to the more serious and thoroughgoing sciences.It was, as Bowen notes citing a late seventeenth century source, nothing more orless than "the eyes and feet of history".42 This is a striking metaphor, expressingthe common seventeenth and eighteenth sense that geography is an oculariseddescription of static landscapes. Since the conceptual problem of space seemed tohave been solved, then any putative discipline of geography appeared to strikeintellectuals as at best ancillary to the disciplines of geology, physics, astronomyand other 'hard' sciences. In the human sciences geography suffered from anadded indemnity, for not only was the space in which human action took placedenatured, pushing human geography towards a sort of social cartography, butemerging disciplines such as sociology and anthropology seemed to render thenotion of an autonomous human geography rather redundant. This is seenquite clearly in the spate of environmentally deterministic accounts which werepopular throughout the period. In Shakelton's A Blayzing Starre (1580) no lessthat Hakewill's Apologie (1647), Ray's The Wisdom of God Manifested in theWorks of Creation (1691) and Jean Bodin's Six Bookes of the Commonweal thethe constitution of "geographical facts" was taken to be in large measure selfevident. The realm of the geographical facts was generally considered to be aneasily accessible independent variable by theorists with other substantiveinterests; Shakelton's interest in discerning the signs of senescence and OriginalSin in the landscape, Hakewill's and Ray's refutations of the senescence doctrine,and Bodin's interest in discovering the causal relations between theenvironment and "national character". 43Besides the cosmographies of Bodin, Hakewill and others, regionalgeographies, collections of travellers' descriptions, continued to be collected andbound into volumes during the seventeenth century. These works tended to bequite popular, appealing to the general atmosphere of curiosity which must haveattended a western European culture which must have seemed to be expandingalmost daily with accounts of new people and places. Though he almost nevertravelled himself, the compilation of Samuel Purchas, entitled Purchas, His Pilgrimage, was one of the most popular English language works in this42 Margarita Bowen 1980: Empiricism and Geographic Thought  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press) p.155 The "history this source had in mind, of course, was the Baconian notion ofcomprehensive "natural history", of which "chronology" was itself also a subsidiarycomponent.43 Glacken 1969, pp.138tradition. However, insofar as the development of the discipline of geography isat issue here, works such as Purchas's can only be considered as 'systematic' inthe sense that he sought to compile "a [comprehensive] survey of the world fromthe point of view of the people and their religious practices". 44 Other workswhich appeared about this time include William Pemble's A Brief Introductionto Geography (1630), which Taylor referred to as "that arid little compilation",and Peter Heylyn's Microcosmus (1621).45 Once again however these works areexclusively regional, descriptive 'geographies' which, for the most part, revivedan essentially Straban modality. Insofar as one can talk about their 'theories ofspace', it seems fair to conclude that space existed in these works essentially as anabsolute container space. However, missing from these 'geographies' is anyconception of the discipline as centrally concerned with the critical interrogationof "the difference that space makes".Besides these essentially descriptive 'geographies', geographical thinkingdid begin to be stretched in other directions during the seventeenth century. Inkeeping with philosophical trends towards practical utility and empiricism,several works of this period articulate linkages between political and economicinterests and geographical knowledge. To be sure the potential utility ofgeographical knowledge for political and other purposes had been acommonplace of the discipline throughout its history. However, these newgeographies were different. Instead of operationalising the straightforward claimthat knowledge of other peoples and places can be useful, some during thisperiod sought to elaborate geographies which were to some non-trivial degreeconstituted by these interests. Taylor has pointed to Lewis Roberts' TheMerchants Map of Commerce (1660) as one of the first attempts at framing adecidedly commercial geography. In this work Roberts cites as his objective "acompendius survey of world trade, [and] of world rates of exchange". 46 Thefrontispiece to this work (Figure 12) shows the providential aspect pertaining to ageographical understanding of world commerce, not just in terms ofopportunities for exploitation revealed by the voyages of discovery (though this44 E.G.R Taylor 1934: Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography 1583-1650  (London: Metheun and Co.)p.5445 Bowen 1980 p.6846 Taylor 1934, pp.109139iriRCHANTS XAPPCOMMERCE.../1(enty:trai:us traf.latnter tat:m.0in./Frof ri in orainVaartc.r.orniyendienfrelardat Irmaairoakfiettra.lt ZIP /kat eve•reve taArte fffmars4ra'n ^in aly.Porte• War&Bjletve.r VirtfAirgoit'Prititte47460.4,64C• J61e-Ttrir7,11:1:111103!;.tiara; .deleoff4A6'arit11pts140Figure 12: Frontispiece to Roberts' The Merchant's Map of Commerceis not to be passed up) by, and more importantly, in terms of the notion of a"Mundi Commercium"; a world of geographically expressed commercialrelations.47 Similar works which appeared during this period included Keymer'streatise on comparative tax regimes and Battie's work on geographical aspects ofthe wool trade in England. 48 Though of course none of these worksproblematised the conception of space or spatial relations in abstract, theirpreoccupation with problems of commerce would seem to have predisposedthem to the rigidification of the subject as a unit of labour and consumption.Consequently, all of those metaphysical and other issues which hadunderwritten the position of the spatial relativists, would have been eclipsed inimportance and a view of space as an absolute container for the circulation ofcommodities and capital would have seemed most appropriate. All of this lendscredence to Smith's claim that the development of the concept of absolute spaceand its emplacement as the central geographical problematic, should be relatedhistorically to the rise of capitalism if we are to develop a deeper understandingof the history of the discipline and its future prospects. 49Whatever one might think about the argument adumbrated in the lastparagraph, its should be fairly uncontroversial to state that the high water-markof seventeenth century geography was achieved with the publication ofBernhardus Varenius' Geographia Generalis in 1650. In this work Vareniusattempts a remarkable synthesis of many of the epistemological and spatialoppositions discussed in preceding chapters of this thesis. Perhaps first andforemost, Varenius sought to achieve for geographical knowledge the highestpossible degree of epistemological certainty. In this he adopted an essentiallyCartesian schema of the three levels of certainty possible:For science is taken in three ways. Firstly, for any kind ofknowledge, even if it derives only from what is probable. Secondly,for certain knowledge, whether this certitude depends upondemonstrations, or on the testimony of the senses. Thirdly, forknowledge solely by demonstration: which use is most strict and isappropriate to geometry, arithmetic, and other mathematical47 reproduced from Taylor 1934, p.110. The citation "Mundi Commercium" appears just below thetwo pillars on the right side of the frontispiece.48 Taylor 1934, pp.120,12549 Smith 1984, p. 74141sciences, except chronology, astrology and geography, to which theword science in the second sense is applicable . 50In this last clause Varenius establishes geography as a branch of "mixtmathematics" since its 'proofs' come from both mathematical argumentationand also "the experience and observation of men who have described individualregions". 51 By establishing geography as a branch of mixt mathematics, it appearsthat Varenius sought a epistemological reconciliation of the theretoforeseparated and distinct realms of "general" and "specific" geography. Vareniusvilified the tradition of special geography which "bored [its readers] with the bareenumeration and description of regions without an explanation of the customsof the people"52 He believed instead that scientific explanation of human spatialdifferences was not only possible, but was essential to the fullest development ofboth general and special modalities. In the Geographia Varenius argued thatspecial geography was an integral element of general geographical explanationsespecially in its "comparative part" (which was treated in the last ten chapters ofthat work). Figure 13 shows how Varenius proposed to treat special geography ina future work which his untimely death almost immediately after thecompletion of the Geographia Generalis unfortunately precluded.The Geographia Generalis is an interesting work for reasons other thanthose pertaining to Varenius' own genius in reformulating the discipline ofgeography. As Bowen and Warntz have both pointed out, the Geographiaquickly became the standard for geographical research throughout theexperimental and other sciences. 53 Insofar as the English experience isconcerned, the translation of the text by Isaac Newton for use at Cambridge is ofsignal importance. This is because Newton, and those other associates whorevised his translations between 1672 and 1733, not only translated theGeographia from its original Latin, but also appropriated it to underwrite thedynamical cosmology laid out in Newton's Principia Mathematica and DeGra vita tione. Though Newton made numerous corrections to Varenius'50 Bowen 1980, p.8351 Varenius in Bowen 1980, p.28152 Varenius in Bowen 1980, p.27953 While Bowen 1980, pp. 90,104 merely mentions the importance of Newton's translations of theGeographia, Warntz 1989 has produced a careful examination of the many and significantchanges made by Newton and his associates to Varenius' work.142SPECIAL GEOGRAPHYconsiders three kindsof things in individualregions1. TERRESTRIAL(10)1. Limits and Boundary.2. Longitude of a place and situation.3. Shape.4. Magnitude5. Mountains^the name of them and situation,altitude, properties and contents.6. Mines.7. Forests and deserts.8. Waters^see lakes, marshesRivers, their springs, origin, extent, width, abundance of water, speed, quality of water, cataracts, etc.9. Fertility or Barrenness, and Fruits.10. Animals.2. CELESTIAL(8)1 Distance of a place from the Equator and the Pole.2 Obliquity of motion above the Horizon3 The length of days.4 The Climate and Zone.5. Heat, and also the seasons of the year, winds, rains, and other meteors.6 The rising and duration of Stars above the Horizon.7 Stars passing across the Zenith of the place8. Quantity, or rather the speed of motion according to the Copernican hypothesis3. HUMAN(10)1. The stature of the Inhabitants, the life, food and drink, origin. etc2. Profitably activities and arts, commerce, wages3. Virtues and vices, ingenuity, learning etc.4. Customs concerning births, weddings, funerals.5. Common speech and language.6. Political Government.7. Religion and the status of Ecclesiastical matters8. Cities.9. Memorable Histories.10 Illustrious men or women, crafts, inventionsFigure 13: Varenius' Plan for a Special Geography 5454 reproduced from William Warntz 1989: "Newton, The Newtonians and the GeographiaGeneralis Varenii" Annals of the Amer Assn of Geographers  79(2) p.176143calculations, of higher significance are undoubtedly the many illustrations heappended to Varenius' work, based on the Principia and De Gravitatione. WhileNewton himself did not delete Varenius' inclusion of Descartes' explanation oftides in terms of vortices in the cosmic plenum (an inclusion which smacks ofspatial relativism), subsequent Newtonians, such as James Jurin, included "avery long discussion aimed at destroying the 'Cartesians' vain contrivance ofvortices to explain the tides'". 55 In fact, whether of not Varenius was a spatialrelativist is unclear from either Bowen's or Warntz's treatments, though thisdoes not obviate the fact that his Newtonian translators blatantly sought the"hastening and reinforcement of [the Geographia's] transformation into aNewtonian statement". This objective would have entailed the removal ofreferences to spatial relationalism wherever they cropped up, and theirreplacement with an absolutism more in conformity with Newtoniandynamics. 56The debates between spatial absolutists and relativists had involved amixture of both physical and metaphysical argumentation. Indeed, much of thediscussion hinged upon how these categories were themselves constructed andadduced. Theories about perception, mind and subjectivity, as well aboutsubstance, motion and causality marked out the terrain of this debate. Ifgeography is conceived as the particular problematisation of spatial relations,then the intellectual ascendence of absolutism as elaborated especially by Newtonwould have had great impact on the shape and constitution of the discipline.The version of geography implied in Newton's appropriation of Varenius set theobject and methodology for geographical thinking and research (at least inEnglish). These questions would not be revisited until Kant's monumentalcritique of rationality itself at the end of the eighteenth century.Warntz 1989, p.18656 An interesting project would be to try to assess how far the Newtonian "rehabilitation" of theGeographia undermined Varenius' own conception of space and geography.144Chapter 6"The Historical Geography of Modernity and the Prospects for aPostmodern Human Geography"6.1 On the Historical Geography of Early Modern Thought6.2 On the Spatiality of Early Modern Thought6.3 Modernity, Postmodernity and Critical Human Geography1451466.1 On the Historical Geography of Early Modern ThoughtTheories about human activities have always perforce existed under theconstraint that the process of theorising which is intrinsic to all theorisingunavoidably stifles some of the full richness and complexity - even confusion- ofhuman possibility. To theorise is to highlight some aspects over others, and toorganise them into an internally coherent narrative of change. Yet, if I mayparaphrase Micheal Mann, "human societies are much messier than ourtheories of them". 1 Social life will always, it seems, seep through the theoreticalboundaries we so carefully delineate and defend. If this characterisation of theconstraints of historiography is accurate, and I think few would challenge them,then it follows that theories about theories, which is the plane upon which thisthesis operates, must operate under a double indemnity. Theories about how theshifts from certain sorts of theorising to others, each with their ownpermutations of ontological, epistemological, and other elements, can be made tomake some historico-geographical "sense" are doubly complicated (at least) bythe inherent limitations of abstraction. Even so, it is plainly evident thatattempts at broad syntheses of diverse movements into intellectual trajectories,such as the "project of modernity", are valuable tools for developing a deeperunderstanding of the prospects and pitfalls our own contemporary situation.In this thesis I have tried to root seventeenth century theoreticaltreatments of space in a critical historico-geography in a number of ways, and ona number of levels. First, I sought to show, in Chapter 2, how the developmentof new ideas about political, scientific, and moral order were related to materialcontexts within which their protagonists lived and worked. The peopleprimarily discussed in this thesis, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyleand Isaac Newton, lived during a period of intense social, political, and economicturmoil and transformation. Indeed, I have suggested, in concord withToulmin, Berman and others, that this turmoil was integrally related to thesense of intellectual anxiety all of these men felt and which, in part, impelledtheir novel and innovative theoretical formulations. Still, it is not just thematter of the material conditions of seventeenth-century England and westernEurope, as they appear abstractly to a twentieth century observer, which is1 Micheal Mann 1987: The Sources of Social Power, Vo1.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press)147important here. Of equal or greater importance in developing a sensitivehistorico-geographical understanding of intellectual movements is to develop amore hermeneutic understanding of the contexts as the thinkers themselvescomprehended them. What emerges from the treatment developed in this workis a complex, many-sided process which resulted in the ascendence, by century'send, of a new largely Newtonian view of scientific epistemology and the "right"apportionment of the intellectual disciplines. This 'NewtonianAccommodation', institutionalised in the Royal Society of London, was looselythough deeply connected with the rise of early capitalist political economy,especially after the English Revolution of 1688.This 'Newtonian Accommodation' was neatly encapsulated under therubric "Latitudinarianism". Latitudinarians, such as Boyle and Newton,occupied an epistemological position somewhere between the extremes ofRationalism and Empiricism. Though empirical research was, as I have argued,held to be constitutive of 'right' scientific method after 1662, the physical, socialand spatial structure of a scientific "matter of fact" was carefully controlled apriori to the process of scientific knowledge production (See Chapters 3 and 4). Inother words, the programme of the Royal Society did not embrace unequivocablya straightforward Baconian inductivism in which all knowledge proceeds fromthe "things themselves". Newton Boyle and others rigidified many of the basicdistinctions whose complex interrelations had given Descartes and Hobbes somuch trouble. Distinctions such as those between subject/object, self/other andpublic/private received a strong and relatively lasting imprint as dichotomiesand oppositions, rather than as complex dialectics, in the Newtonian tradition.Within the new modality the fluidity and complexity of world processes wasdisplaced from the ontological constitution of the 'things themselves', to theirepistemological and theoretical recombination in Newtonian dynamicaltheories. As such Latitudinarian science coopted much potential dissent fromboth endpoints of the Rationalism-Empiricism axis, creating for itself the basisfor a strong intellectual movement.But Latitudinarianism was more than simply a philosophical creed. Firstand foremost, the term itself had been coined in the context of the EnglishInterregnum to describe a political position which espoused increased civilliberties and religious toleration within the framework of parliamentary1 4 8democracy or constitutional monarchy. The brotherhood of gentleman scientists(and I use these gender terms advisedly) described in such tracts as Bacon's NewAtlantis, Platte's Macaria and Sprat's History of the Royal Society was alsoexplicitly intended as an analogy for socio-political order. This being the case it ishardly surprising to find Royal Society members such as Newton and Boyleactively engaged in the administration of post Restoration, and especially post1688 English government. Hobbes' Leviathan is emblematic of those alternativeschemas which sought social-political-scientific stability through an essentiallyreactionary political absolutism. As Schaffer and Shapin have observed, echoingFoucault, "solutions to the problem of knowledge are also solutions to theproblem of social order". 26.2 On the Spatiality of Early Modern ThoughtOf course these intellectual and political movements suggest spatialtransformations at a number of levels. Of significance are the spatialconstitution of ontological objects, of epistemological access to those objects asobjects, and, ultimately, of space itself. The debate between spatial absolutists,who conceived of space as an ontologically absolute entity in and of itself, andspatial relativists, who thought space to exist solely through the relationshipsbetween bodies, was pursued on a wide assortment of physical, metaphysical, andeven theological levels. From the perspective of the NewtonianAccommodation, the postulation of absolute ontological space eliminated thepotentially pernicious metaphysical reasoning believed to pervade spatialrelativism, while also permitting for the highlighting of dynamical, rather thankinematical, processes. Subsequently, change observed through time wouldassume a much greater theoretical significance than change over space. On thephysical level at least the ascendence of absolute space, in ontology andepistemology, marked the scientific "annihilation of space by time" charted outby David Harvey with respect to primarily material processes. 3None of this is meant to imply that there could be no science of spatialrelations within the Newtonian absolutist modality. On the contrary, the2 Schaffer and Shapin 1985, p.3323 Harvey 1989149seventeenth century saw the development of a number of new lines ofgeographical research. Varieties of environmental determinism were developedalongside more explicitly descriptive regional geographies and chorologies. 4 Aswell, the steadily increasing impetus for new works oriented towards practicalutility, resulted in commercial and political geographies designed to provideknowledge about "the difference that space makes" applicable in business andstatecraft. Despite this effervescence of geographical thinking, few practitionersbothered themselves too much about the deep ontological or epistemologicalspatialities of their research. These of course were more explicitly treated in non-geographical works in physics, mathematics and metaphysics. One result was theinitiation of a geographical paradigm which even as it focussed on the differencethat space makes in the relations between objects, rarely turned its analytic gazetowards the spatiality of its own basic concepts. This silence about self criticalquestions of space is testimony to the very centrality of a highly specific spatialitywhich concretised during the seventeenth century and culminated in the ideasexpressed Newton's "Scholium on Space". The subtle but far-reachingappropriation and transformation worked upon the highly sophisticatedgeographical ideas of Bernhardus Varenius is further testimony to theascendence of a delimited spatiality to a position of unquestioned "naturalness".Such deeply self critical questions about space, spatiality and geography wouldnot be raised again until Kant's critiques of reason at the end of the next century.6.3 Modernity, Postmodernity and Critical Human GeographyA great deal has been said in these pages about the intersection betweenscience, spatiality, geography and historico-geographical processes. I haveattempted herein to develop a thoroughgoing examination of how certain ideasabout space have developed in certain ties and places and what impact thesehave had on the prospects for a truly geographical discipline. In part myobjectives have been 'methodological' as well as 'substantive' (if I may beallowed to tender such a positivistically oriented distinction for the moment).The examination of spatial ideas in seventeenth-century philosophy andgeography has required the elaboration of new, more sophisticated historico-4 Of course, neither of these terms are to be taken in their contemporary senses.150geographical 'tools'. Underneath, and multiply imbricated with, extant theoriesof space, after all, are all sorts of other notions about the structuring, spatial andotherwise, of scientific method, social order, morality, aesthetics, and evensubjectivity itself. An engaged "historico-geography of modernity", such as thatcalled for by Gregory, can easily be made to speak reciprocally to the 'modernityof geography' as well. 5In many ways it is precisely at the junctures of this complex dialecticalrelationship between the 'western philosophical tradition', Rorty's "Philosophywith a capital "P", and philosophy's former disciplinary 'colonies', such asgeography, that the most interesting regions of debate and analysis regarding the"project of modernity" are located. When considered solely in abstractphilosophical terms, questions about modernity, modernism and post-modernism tend to be at best stifling, and at worst completely irrelevant to theworld of practical affairs. On the other hand, purely 'internal' disciplinarydiscourses about 'local' developments, such as the periodic revisitations of the"agency/structure" debate within sociology and human geography, havegenerally missed the broader implications of these inescapable problems. Whatseems to me to be exciting about the present intellectual milieu is the highdegree of cross fertilisation which is occurring between disciplines. If theprogressive partitioning of intellectual activities into increasingly refined(confined) departments is now thought to have been intrinsic to modernity, or atleast modernism, then the re-establishment of lateral interdisciplinaryconnections must logically be part of any putative post-modernism. Withinacademic geography there can be no doubt that infusions of literary criticism andanthropology; of poetics as well as politics, have enriched geographical debate,irrespective of one's personal evaluation of the results. Ultimately suchdisciplinary cross fertilisation may open up the possibility for reclaiming a quasi-foundational basis to replace the discredited Philosophical one. In my view thiswould likely be a 'foundation', not in the old fixed Philosophical hierarchy oflanguage games, the 'ancient regime' as it were, but in the lateral attempts totranslate local disciplinary experiences into one another's lexicon; a kind of5 Gregory 1989, pp.34-5151Lyotardian "free play of signs and signifiers" characterised by an abiding"incredulity towards metanarratives". 6With respect to geography, any attempts to move beyond the confines ofmodern geography must necessarily ground itself in the inquiry into thesecomplexly interleaved spatial and geographical processes. In this thesis variousontological, epistemological, political and material processes have been shown tohave come together in new ideas about spatiality and, therefore, also what is therightful subject matter for geographical science. Any true "post" or "anti"modern geographies which do not take account of these orders of spatiality runthe risk of reifying significant parts of the intellectual edifices they intend totranscend or reform. Yet geographers would seem also to be uniquely situatedamong the disciplines to make just such an interdisciplinary contribution.6 Jean-Francois Lyotard 1984: The Postmodern Condition, translated by G. 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