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Leadership exit: the departure of provincial party leaders Maisey, Murray D. 1993

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LEADERSHIP EXITTHE DEPARTURE OF PROVINCIAL PARTY LEADERSbyMURRAY DEAN MAISEYB. A., The University of Lethbridge, 1986A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREEMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAMarch 1993© Murray Dean Maisey, 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department of fcarlie-dgThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate ^441- ( 4, ill 3.DE-6 (2/88)iiABSTRACTCanadian party leadership studies have tended to focus on the ways leaders areselected without considering how leadership careers end. Data was assembled on the careersof 138 provincial party leaders during the past forty years to answer two related questions: Howlong did leadership careers last, and under what conditions did leaders leave (or "exit") theirpositions?Most party leadership careers were brief. More than half of all leaders led their partiesthrough no more than one general election. Longevity differed by political party, with theaverage length of leadership being Teeter among C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders than among those ofLiberal and Conservative parties. More than two-fifths of all leaders exited their positions forelectoral reasons, and more than one-quarter of all leaders were personally defeated inelections or by-elections. Electoral exits were slightly more common among Liberal andConservative leaders than among C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders.Leaders who were successful in leading governments tended to have much longerleadership careers than other leaders. Premier leaders were more likely to make voluntaryexits, and were less susceptible to election-related departures than less successful leaders.Little evidence was found to support the hypothesis that C.C.F. / N.D.P. provincial parties whichenjoyed some success in forming governments were any more competitive (from theperspective of leadership exit) than were C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties which had been unsuccessful informing governments.Most party leaders had pre-leadership elected experience at either the provincial orfederal level. Experience prior to leadership careers seemed to serve as a "hedge" againstiiileadership exits caused by personal defeat at the polls. "Experienced" leaders, however, wereno more likely than others to have long careers. More than one-quarter of former leadersbecame M.L.A.s or M.P.s after exit. Most of those with post-leadership elected careers hadrelatively long leadership careers, and most had left their leadership positions involuntarily.About one-fifth of all party leaders had elected service both before and after their leadershipcareers.TABLE OF CONTENTS EntABSTRACT^ iiLIST OF TABLES viABBREVIATIONS^ viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ixCHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION^ 1The Data Set 2Exploring Leadership Exit and Longevity: The Agenda^4CHAPTER 2 LONGEVITY AND EXIT OF PARTY LEADERS:AN OVERVIEW^ 6Leadership Longevity 6Leadership Exit^ 13Longevity and Exit 19Conclusion 23CHAPTER 3 THE "SUCCESS" FACTOR:PREMIERS AND NON-PREMIERS^ 24Longevity and the "Success" Factor 25Exit and the "Success" Factor^ 30The C.C.F. / N.D.P.—A Special Case? 37Longevity and Exit Among "Successful"and "Unsuccessful" Leaders^ 44Conclusion^ 47ivTABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)CHAPTER 4 POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER LEADERSHIP^49Pre-Leadership Political Experience^ 50Politics After Leadership?^ 58Conclusion^ 65CHAPTER 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS^ 67BIBLIOGRAPHY^ 72APPENDICES A^List of Party Leaders by Province^ 79B^List of Variables^ 90C^Data Set 101TableLIST OF TABLESPage2-1 Length of Leadership Terms in Years 82-2 Number of General Elections During Leadership Terms 92-3 Mean Length of Leadership Terms for All Leaders,and by Province and Party 102-4 Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)by Party 142-5 Exit Patterns for All Leaders, and by Province and Party 172-6 Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)for Different Types of Exit 212-7 Exit Patterns for Leadership Terms of Different Length(by Number of General Elections) 223-1 Mean Leadership Length for Premiers and Non-Premiers 263-2 Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)for Premiers and Non-Premiers 283-3 Mean Length of Leadership for Premiers and Non-Premiersby Province and Party 293-4 Exit Patterns for Premiers and Non-Premiers 323-5 Exit Patterns for Premiers and Non-Premiers by Province 343-6 Exit Patterns for Premiers and Non-Premiers by Party 363-7 "Pressured Exits" in C.C.F. / N.D.P. Conquest and CoronationParties (and Comparisons with Cacke Parties) 413-8 Mean Leadership Length of Non-Premier C.C.F. • N.D.P.Leaders (and Comparisons with Cadre Parties) 43viviiLIST OF TABLES (Continued)Table^ Page 3-9^Exit Patterns Among Premiers and Non-PremiersWho Had Different Leadership Longevity^ 453-10^Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)for Premiers and Non-Premiers Who Different Types of Exit^464-1^Number of Years of Pre-Leadership Elected ExperienceAmong Those Having Such Experience^ 514-2^Pre-Leadership Experience in a LegislatLre, the House ofCommons, or in Either the Commons or a Legislature^534-3^Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)Among Those With (and Without) Pre-Leadership Experience^554-4^Exit Patterns Among Those With (and Without)Re-Leadership Elected Experience^ 574-5^Number of Years of Post-Leadership Elected ServiceAmong Those with Post-Leadership Careers^594-6^Post-Leadership Elected Careers in a Legislature, the House ofCommons, or in Either the Commons or a Legislature^614-7^Proportion of Former Leaders with Different Types of ExitsAmong Those with Post-Leadership Elected Careers^634-8^Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections)Among Those With (and Without) Post-LeadershipElected Careers^64ABBREVIATIONSAfta.^AlbertaB.C. British ColumbiaC.C.F./N.D.P.^Cooperative Commonwealth Federation / New Democratic PartyExp.^ExperienceLib. LiberalMan.^ManitobaM.L.A.^Member of the Legislative AssemblyM.P. Member of ParliamentN.B.^New BrunswickNfld. NewfoundlandN.S.^Nova ScotiaOnt. OntarioP.C.^Progressive Conservative (and Conservative)P.E.I.^Prince Edward IslandP.Q. Parti QuebecoisQue.^QuebecSask.^SaskatchewanS.C. Social Credit (and Crecitiste)U.N.^Union NationaleixACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am thankful to a number of people who have supported and assisted me in thepreparation of this thesis. My advisor, Ken Carty, generously offered advice and feedback fromthe beginning to the end of the project. Special thanks are ckie to Alberta Legislature referencelibrarian Lorne Buhr for his help in unearthing seemingly obsure details about the careers offormer party leaders in Alberta. I am indebted to Ken Schmidt for his willingness to spend timetutoring me in the mysteries of the SPSS Data Entry Program, and to Lawrence Hanson whoread and commented on a &aft of this document. I have also appreciated the friendship of othergraduate student colleagues, including that of Stephen Phillips. For the prayers and words ofencouragement from other friends and family members, I am also very thankful.The thesis is dedicated to Sherry, my wife, who patiently supported me throughout theproject and maintained her infectious good humour on both good and bad writing days.1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTIONThe dynamic of leadership change in a political party involves the departure (cc "exit")and selection of party leaders. Canadian party leadership studies have traditionallyconcentrated on how leaders are chosen. This research has scrutinized important elements ofleadership selection such as the voting impact of various identifiable goups in party leadershipconventions. 1 National party leadership selection has received the most attention, but scholarshave also recently looked at the way provincial leaders are chosen, inducing assessments ofthe emergent more "democratized" selection processes which have been implementedprincipally in provincial parties.2 This thesis constitutes an initial exploration of the other majorelement of party leadership change: the conclusion of leadership careers.The thesis will look at the careers of people who held, and exited, provincial partyleadership positions over the past forty years. Two main questions will be addressed. First,what was the longevity of leaders? In other words, cid leaders tend to have long or short terms?Second, under what ckumstances cid leaders exit their positions? Did a leader resignbecause of electoral failure, or due to party pressure, or for some other reason? Questions oflongevity and exit are dearly related. The length of leadership terms is partly a product of theact of exiting since it ends the life-cycle" of a particular leadership term. It seems likely that1A wealth of research on convention-style national party leadership selection may befound in George Perlin, ed., Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Party Conventions  (Scarborouli: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988).2A number of artides on provincial party leadership selection may be found in R.Kenneth Carty, Lynda Erickson, and Donald E. Blake, ed., Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics: Experiences of the Provinces (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1992).2leadership terms of different length would be associated with different kinds of exit. Forinstance, a disproportionate number of those who exited after being personally defeated in anelection or by-election might be new leaders since leaders with longer terms have mcre time toestablish safe seats. Therefore, exits which occurred under conditions of personal electoraldefeat would be associated with relatively short leadership terms.The Data SetThe study is based on information collected on the careers of 138 provincial partyleaders which was assembled in a machine-readable data set.3 For each party leader indudedin the data set, 19 pieces of data were collected. Appendix B provides a detailed explanation ofeach variable in the data set and Appendix C displays all of the data in the data set. AppendixC should be read in conjunction with Appendix B.Another data set, prepared by John Courtney and entitled "Provincial Party-LeadershipConventions and Votes: 1961-1991", was an important starting place in constructing the dataset for this thesis.4 The Courtney material provided much of the data for four of the variablesincluded in the thesis data set.5 Peter E. James' M. A. thesis on the careers of Canadianpremiers was also the source of some pieces of data for this study, and was helpful in providing3A copy of the machine-readable data set has been deposited in the University of BritishColumbia Data Library. The data set was organized using the SPSS-PC software program.4John C. Courtney, "Provincial Party-Leadership Conventions and Votes: 1961-1991,"in Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics, 227-35.5The thesis variables which draw heavily on Courtney's data set are as follows: V2 (theleader's party), V3 (status of the leader's party at the start of his or her leadership), V7 (the yearthe leader assumed the leadership), and V19 (the name of the leader).3ideas on how to organize the data setts The rest of the data was collected from a variety ofsources, including various editions of the Canadian Parliamental Guide, Canadian Annual Review Canadian News Facts, and The Canadian Who's Who. Newspaper artides, andbiocjaphies, and historical accounts also were rich sources of information on the careers ofparty leaders (see Bibliocjaphy).The data set indudes all those who were party leaders on January 1, 1955 or later andwho exited their leadership positions not later than December 31, 1991. The starting date of thedata set marks the earliest date for which data for most variables was readily available.Complete information on the careers of those who were party leaders prior to 1955 was difficultto obtain. The decision to limit the data set to party leaders who exited by the end of 1991 was,to some extent, arbitrary. The intention, however, was to allow leaders who exited most recentlysome time to establish post-leadership careers which could be identified in the data set.Appendix A lists, by province, all leaders included in the data set.Not all leaders of political parties are induded in this study. Only leaders of provincialparties which demonstrated an ability to elect M.L.A.s on an at least semi-regular basis wereincluded. Thus, for example, C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders in Quebec are excluded in this study sincethat party has been singularly unsuccessful in electing individuals to the Quebec NationalAssembly. There are also cases of provincial parties which have "counted" for our purposes atone period and "not counted" at a later date. One example of this is the Alberta Social Creditparty, the leaders of which were not induded following the exit of Rod Sykes, in 1982, since theparty has been all but moribund since that time. Similarly, leaders of the B.C. Progressive6Peter E. James, "Canadian Provincial Premiers: A Statistical Analysis of 185 Careers"(M. A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1987).4Conservative party were not counted following the exit of Vic Stephens in 1980. MichaelMacDonald is the first C.C.F. / N.D.P. leader to be counted in Nova Scotia because prior to hisleadership term the party was not a serious electoral competitor in that province. There areinstances in the data set in which the first leader listed for a given party had a leadership startingdate later than 1955. Alberta Conservative leader Cam Kirby is an example. In this case theresimply was no identifiable party leadership position prior to Kirby's after the benchmark year of1955. The Alberta Conservative party had been "mothballed" for a number of years prior toKirby's selection as leader in 1958. Ontario Liberal leader John Wintermeyer who waspreceded by an interim leader, Oliver Farquhar, is another example. Interim party leaders arenot included in this study, so Wintermeyer is shown in the data set as the first Ontario Liberalleader. There are also some chronological "gaps" in the prociession of leaders identified in thedata set. Such gaps occur for one of two reasons. Either there was an interim party leader orthere was no party leader of any sort during the period in question.Exploring Leadership Exit and Longevity: The Agenda Questions of leadership longevity and exit will be explored in the thesis in three stages.First, in Chapter 2 an overview will be provided of the longevity and exit patterns of all leadersincluded in the study. The chapter will explore whether the length of leadership terms and theways in which leaders left their positions differed by province or by party, and how leadershipexit and longevity were related.Chapter 3 will assess whether leaders who succeeded in becoming premiers lastedlonger and exited differently than leaders who never led governments. Ultimate "success" inpolitical life is generally understood to mean success in forming a government. It seems likely,5therefore, that leaders who never enjoyed such success would not have endued in leadershipfor as long as those who became premier. It also seems likely that "unsuccessful" leaders mighthave been more susceptible to party and electoral pressures than were more successfulleaders. The chapter will explore both of these questions, and will also ask whether C.C.F. /N.D.P. provincial parties which had formed governments were more likely to be similar toLiberal and Conservative parties, in terms of the competitiveness surrounding leadership exit,than C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties which never enjoyed electoral success.The extent to which party leaders were involved in elected political life before and aftertheir leadership terms will be the subject of Chapter 4. Did pre-leadership elective experiencemake a difference to leadership longevity or exit? Were "experienced" leaders more likely tohave longer terms and be less susceptible to exits due to personal defeat at the ballot box? Thechapter will also examine the extent to which it was typical for former party leaders to be electedto public office after exit and what were the predominant leadership exit and longevitycharacteristics of those with post-leadership political careers. Chapter 5 will summarize theprincipal findings and advance the condusions of the thesis.6CHAPTER 2Longevity and Exit of Party Leaders: An OverviewWhen actress Sophie Tucker was asked on her 80th birthday what she believed was thesecret of longevity, she tartly replied: "Keep breathing."7 It might be imagined that Ms. Tucker'sprescription for the longevity of political party leaders would be "keep leading". Leadershipcareers, like lives, inevitably end, but most leaders do not quickly, willingy, give up that whichthey have in most cases fought hard to obtain. Like all of us, they want to depart on their ownterms. But the task of holding a party leadership position, once attained, is fraught withobstacles. Some of the g-eatest challenges to leadership are faced at the ballot box. A leadermay be forced to resign because of an inability to win or hold a legislative seat or because theparty's electoral fortunes dwindle during the leader's term. Leaders may also be forced to exitbecause of internal dissension and division within the party, culminating in a lack of confidencein the leader. This chapter constitutes an introduction to these twin, central subjects of longevityand exit among provincial party leaders. A survey of the broad longevity and exit patterns ofleaders will be provided, including consideration of whether these patterns differed betweenprovinces or parties.Leadership Longevity In this study, longevity will be measured in both yews and in terms of the number ofgeneral elections into which leaders led their parties. Table 2-1 outlines the percentage ofleaders who stayed in their positions for different numbers of years. More than one-quarter of all7Concise Dictionary of Quotations (London: William Collins and Sons, 1985), 324.7leaders resigned within two years of assuming leadership positions and more than half haddeparted within five years. As would be expected, the proportion of leaders with very long terms(sixteen years or more) was quite small (9.4%). It is somewhat surprising, however, that only22.5% of all leaders served what might be considered medium-length terms of six to ten years.Table 2-1 HereThe data in Table 2-2 show the proportions of all leaders who lasted through differentnumbers of elections. Measuring leadership length this way ties longevity to the greatestpractical test facing parties and their leaders—elections. Most party leaders did not last longenough to face many electoral tests. More than half of all leaders exited prior to leading theirparties into a second general election and more than two-thirds quit before fighting a thirdelection.Table 2-2 HereThe mean leadership longevities for each province are shown in Table 2-3. Both thehighest mean duration, in Nova Scotia, and the lowest, in Newfoundand, are found among theAtlantic provinces. The difference between the highest and lowest average leadership lengthsis substantial, with leadership terms on average lasting 71% longer in Nova Scotia than inNewfoundand. Among the Western provinces, B.C. leaders as a Toup had a very low meanlongevity, while Saskatchewan leaders exhibited a very high one (with the other two Westernprovinces falling somewhere in between). In short, while there were differences in leadershiplongevity from province to province, these differences did not seem to highlight any regionalpatterns.Table 2-3 HereTable 2-1 Length of Leadership Terms in Years(Vertical %)All Leaders Cumulative Percent2 or Less 26.8 26.83 to 5 27.5 54.36 to 10 22.5 76.811 to 15 13.8 90.616 or More 9.4 100.0(138) (138)8Table 2-2Number of General Elections During Leadership Terms(Vertical %)All Leaders Cumulative PercentNone 6.5 6.5One 44.9 51.4Two 17.4 68.8Three 13.8 82.6Four 10.1 92.8Five or More 7.2 100.0(138) (138)9Table 2-3Mean Length of Leadership Terms fcr All Leaders. and by Province and Party (Years)Mean N=All Leaders 6.8 138ProvincesNewfoundand 5.6 13Nova Scotia 9.6 10P.E.I. 6.4 10New Brunswick 6.6 9Quebec 5.8 16Ontario 7.5 13Manitoba 6.7 14Saskatchewan 8.8 12Alberta 6.9 19British Columbia 5.7 22PartiesLiberal 5.9 52Conservative 6.6 44C.C.F./N.D.P. 9.2 22Social Credt 8.1 10Pall Quebecois 9.5 2Union Nationale 5.1 81011Maurice Duverger distinguished two main types of party: "cadre" and "mass". AmongCanadian political parties, the Liberal and Conservative parties generally have been classifiedas cacke parties and the C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties as mass parties.8 According to Duverger, massparties appeal to, and are in many ways creatures of, their membership, while cute parties relyon the selection of important key individuals to manage and secure votes.8 Duverger sluesthat mass parties are partly characterized by a "fundamental conservatism of the masses andtheir fondness for the faces they know", and a preference for older leaders who havemethodically worked their way to the top.10Duverger's definition might be extended slightly to claim that leaders of mass partiesmight have relatively greater longevity than those of cacte parties. Table 2-3 shows that themean leadership longevities of the Liberal and Conservative parties (5.9 years and 6.6 years,respectively) were substantially lower than those of the C.C.F./N.D.P (9.2 years). Put differently,the average leadership length of the C.C.F. / N.D.P. was 56% weater than that of the Liberalparty and 39% greater than that among Conservative leaders. Each provincial party isautonomous and so caution should be exercised in di-awing condusions about "the C.C.F. /N.D.P. party", for instance, when assessing the data. Leaders of parties in each province areresponsible to the executive, caucus and membership of their respective parties rather than to anational body. That said, the data on leadership longevity for C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders seem to8Leaders from six different parties are represented in the study. Most of the leaders werein the Liberal, Conservative, and C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties. Because the leaders from these partiescomprise the bulk of the data set, they will receive the greatest attention.8Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1967), 63-4.iothid., 160.12conform to characteristics which would be expected of mass parties, and the mean longevity ofLiberal and Conservative leaders (taken as a whole) to what would be expected of cutepa-ties.An argument could be made that the Pali Quebecois has mass party characteristicsand, although only two leaders of the party are represented in the data, the very high meanleadership duration for the P.Q. seems to lend support to such a claim. The Union Nationale inQuebec operated like a traditional cute party and its mean leadership longevity approximatesthat of the two largest cute parties.The data in Table 2-3 make it dear that leaders of C.C.F. / N.D.P. provincial parties onaverage remained in leadership positions a great deal longer than cid Liberal and Conservativeparty leaders. Table 2-4 provides an election-based measure of leadership longevity. Whileover half of Liberal and Conservative leaders exited after leading their pa-ties through no morethan one election, this was true of only 27.2% of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders. On the other hand,while only about 13% of Liberal and Conservative leaders lasted through four or more generalelections, nearly one-third of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders did so.Table 2-4 is helpful in darifying the typical election longevity of Social Credit and UnionNationale leaders. While the mean duration of Social Credit leaders was 8.1 yews, Table 2-4demonstrates that fully 60% of Social Credit leaders lasted for no more than one generalelection. Similarly, while the mean duration of leaders of the Union Nationale was 5.1 years,three-quarters of those leaders exited prior to fighting a second general election. Clearly, themean for the Social Credit party was distorted by the extraordinarily long leadership careers of13Ernest Manning and W. A.C. Bennett, and that of the Union Nationale party by the very longcareer of Maurice Duplessis.Table 2-4 HereLeadership Exit In looking at "leadership exit", this study will identify the dominant factors leading to thedeparture of party leaders. The focus will be on the circumstances surrounding the resignationsof leaders rather than the varied, conflicting, and (in most cases) quite personal motives whichwork together to cause a leader to bow out. The conditions under which Canadian provincialpErty leaders left their positions may be grouped into five major categories (see Appendix B,"Variable 5").The most involuntary and final exit route is the dolt of a party leader while still in office.There were only five such cases, three of which were Union Nationale leaders in Quebec.The personal electoral defeat of a leader in a general election or by-election was acommon factor leading to exit. Leaders who exited under circumstances of "personal defeat"induded both those who had never won a seat (such as Saskatchewan Conservative leader,Alvin G. Hamilton), and leaders who had lost seats (like P.E.I. Conservative leader and formerpremier, Jim Lee). A related type of exit occurred when a leader left because of an inabilityeither to attain or retain government. British Columbia N.D.P. leader, Dave Barrett, exited underconditions of party electoral failure.  Barrett resigned shortly after the third successive electoraldefeat for the former premier's party. Such exits were by no means made only by formerpremiers, however. For example, New Brunswick Liberal leader Doug Young exited as a resultof "party failure", although he never formed a government and only led his party through oneTable 2-4Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) by Party(Horizontal %)None One Two Three Four Five orMoreN.Liberal 7.7 48.1 19.2 11.5 11.5 1.9 52Conservative 4.5 47.7 18.2 15.9 4.5 9.1 44C.C.F. / N.D.P. 4.5 22.7 18.2 22.7 22.7 9.1 22Social Credit 10.0 50.0 10.0 10.0 - 20.0 10Parti Ouebilicois 50.0 - 50.0 2Union Nationale 12.5 62.5 12.5 - - 12.5 8All Leaders 6.5 44.9 17.4 13.8 10.1 7.2 1381415general election. Young had indicated before the election that if he did not lead the party tovictory he would resign.iiParty pressure, whether from within the party caucus, executive, or from the generalmembership may also cause a leader to resign. "Party pressure", as broady defined here, maybe relatively subtle or as blatant as the defeat of an incumbent in a leadership review. Partypressure exits were sometimes sparked by personal or political scandals. NewfoundandLiberal leader William Rowe was forced to exit just prior to a general election because it wasrevealed that he had leaked secret police reports to the meda.12 More typically, leaders wholeft under conditions of party pressure had become the focus of internal party strain, divisions,and dissatisfaction with the substance or style of their leadership. For example, Quebec Liberalleader, Claude Ryan felt pressed to resign because he doubted that he had the support heneeded for a vote of confidence at an upcoming party policy convention:13Finally, there are cases in which a leader chose to depart voluntarily for his or her ownpersonal reasons. In such cases, there was no evidence of major external party or electoralpressure. The leader simply made a personal decision to leave the leadership, often to pursueother career interests or retire. Manitoba Liberal leader Douglas Campbell made such an exit,as did Alberta Conservative leader Peter Lougheed.In most cases it was possible to identify one of these factors as the dominant impetus forexit. However, there were some instances in which "electoral failure" and "personal defeat"liCanacian Annual Review, 1983, 261.121bid., 1979, 389.131an L. MacDonald, From Bourassa to Bourassa (Montreal: Harvest House, 1984), 270.16seemed to be of roughly equal significance in causing a leader's exit. For example, OntarioLiberal leader David Peterson resigned after both he and his government were defeated in the1990 general election. For cases in which it was impossible (at least with the documentaryresources available) to claim that one of the two factors was predominant, both factors wererecorded as contributing to exit and will be referred to as "defeat / failure" exits. Exits whichoccurred under conditions of "personal defeat", "party electoral failure", or "defeat / failure" willbe collectively referred to as "electoral exits".Table 2-5 shows overall exit patterns among provincial party leaders. 17.5% of allleaders left under "pure" conditions of personal electoral defeat, and 9.5% left under conditionsin which both personal defeat and party electoral failure were involved. Therefore, personalelectoral defeat was at least one factor in 27% of all leadership exits. More than two-fifths(43.8%) of all exits were electoral exits of one sort or another. Party pressure accounted for thedepartures of another 27% of leaders, while about one-quarter chose to leave leadershippositions of their own accord.Table 2-5 HereTable 2-5 outlines the exit routes of leaders from each province. As with provinciallongevity patterns (Table 2-3), few condusions may be drawn from provincial comparisons ofleadership exit patterns. Among Maritime provincial leaders, for example, personal decisionsaccounted for nearly 56% of all exits in Prince Edward Island, but only 11% of exits in NewBrunswick. Among leaders in the Prairie provinces, only 21% of Manitoba leaders were forcedout by their parties, while nearly one-third of Alberta party leaders (31.6%) left undercircumstances of party pressure.Table 2-5Exit Patterns for All Leaders, and by Province and Party(Horizontal %)Electoral ExitsPalyPressurePersonalDecision Death N=Personal^Defeat /Defeat^FailurePartyFailureAll Leaders 17.5 9.5 16.8 27.0 25.5 3.6 137ProvincesNewfoundand 15.4 7.7 23.1 30.8 23.1 - 13Nova Scotia 10.0 20.0 - 20.0 50.0 - 10P.E.I. 33.3 11.1 55.6 - 9New Brunswick 11.1 11.1 33.3 33.3 11.1 - 9Quebec 12.5 12.5 12.5 37.5 6.3 18.8 16Ontario 7.7 15.4 30.8 15.4 30.8 - 13Manitoba 21.4 - 14.3 21.4 42.9 - 14Saskatchewan 25.0 8.3 8.3 25.0 25.0 8.3 12Alberta 26.3 - 10.5 31.6 26.3 5.3 19British Columbia 13.6 18.2 22.7 36.4 9.1 - 22PartiesLiberal 17.3 13.5 17.3 28.8 21.2 1.9 52Conservative 20.9 11.6 9.3 25.6 32.6 - 43C.C.F./ N.D.P. 13.6 - 27.3 27.3 27.3 4.5 22Social Credit 20.0 - 30.0 20.0 30.0 - 10Pali Quebecois - 100.0 - 2Union Nationale 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 37.5 81718Table 2-5 illustrates strikingly the very small proportions of voluntary ("personaldecision") exits among Quebec and B.C. leaders (6.3% and 9.1%, respectively). Most B.C.leaders left under conditions of personal defeat or party electoral failure or were pressured toleave by their respective parties. The Quebec case is a bit different. Although Quebec leadershad the highest proportion of pressure-related exits (37.5%), the percentage of exits underelection-related conditions was not particularly high relative to the figures for other provinces.The low percentage of voluntary exits for Quebec is accentuated by the high number of deathsamong Quebec leaders. It has been shown that the C.C.F. / N.D.P. was marked by relativelylengthy leadership terms (Table 2-3). That finding suggests that the C.C.F. / N.D.P. may havebeen less inclined than the two cacke parties to pressure its leaders to leave if they did notquickly achieve some measure of electoral success. Table 2-5 summarizes leadership exitpatterns according to party. The expectation that C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders were less likely to exitunder circumstances of party pressure is not supported by the data in the table. On the contrary,there is a remarkable similarity in the proportions of "pressured" leadership exits in each of thethree main parties.Among the three main parties, cases of "pure" personal defeat were most commonamong Conservative and Liberal leaders and less common among leaders of the C.C.F. / N.D.P.The differences among the parties in this regard are even more striking when"defeat / failurecases are induded. The proportion of leaders who exited under conditions in which personaldefeat was at least one important factor was 30.8% in the Liberal party and 32.5% in theConservative party, but only 13.6% in the C.C.F. / N.D.P. It cannot be conduded from this datathat leaders of the C.C.F. / N.D.P. were less prone to personal defeat than leaders of the twocadre parties. The data only indicates if and when a leader's personal defeat seemed to be an19important factor contributing to his or her departure from leadership. In addition, it should beborne in mind that the figures for the C.C.F. / N.D.P. are not representative of the leaders of thatparty in all provinces. This study only includes leaders from provinces in which their respectiveparties enjoyed some minimal electoral success. It seems probable that the personal defeatrecord among C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders in provinces such as Quebec and P.E.I. (neither of whichare induded in this study) would substantially increase the percentage of C.C.F. / N.D.P.personal defeat exits. Given the above provisos, it appears that C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders wereless likely than leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties to consider personal defeatsufficient cause for leadership exit. This finding would seem to be consistent with thecharacterization of the C.C.F. / N.D.P. as a mass party. The "fondness for the faces they know",which Duverger claims is a characteristic of mass parties, suggests that the ability or inability ofa mass party leader to secure a legislative seat would not be of prime importance.14Longevity and Exit It seems reasonable to expect that leaders who exited by means of personal defeatwould have had relatively short terms since such leaders likely would be personally defeatedearly in their leadership careers (when leaders are less likely to have safe seats) rather thanlater. If it is assumed that a leader would only leave voluntarily after achieving his or herleadership career objectives (e.g, forming and leading a government), it seems likely that mostleaders who left voluntarily had relatively lengthy leadership terms.The data in Table 2-6 tend to confirm these two hypotheses. Two-thirds of leaders whoexited under conditions of "pure" personal defeat left after fighting only one general election.14Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, 160.20Among those who left voluntarily, more than half (51.4%) quit after leading their parties throughat least three general elections.Table 2-6 HereAs might be expected, the overwhelming majority of pressure-related exits occurredafter leaders led their parties through at least one general election. However, 16.2% of"pressured" leaders were forced out before they had an opportunity to prove themselves in evenone general election. Looked at another way, among those who exited before leading therparties through any elections, two-thirds were forced out by their parties (Table 2-7).15 Most ofthose who were forced out before fighting any general elections left under one of two types ofcircumstances. Some, such as Newfoundand Liberal leader William Rowe, became embroiledin personal or political scandals and experienced party (and general public) pressure to leave.Others, like Alberta Liberal leader Adrian Berry, had inherited from their predecessors conflict-ridden perty organizations which they proved unable to tame quickly.Table 2-7The one case of a party failure exit occurring without the leader facing a general electionis unique. Alberta Social Credit leader Rod Sykes left the leadership after the party suffered amajor by-election defeat in one of the few remaining ridngs assumed to be "safe" for the SocialCredit party. The by-election was won by the leader of the Western Canada Concept party,Gordon Kessler. The outcome of the by-election triggered Sykes' exit and marked thebeginning of the end for the Alberta Social Credit party as a viable political force.1615None of the leaders who made such exits were ever premiers (see Table 3-9).16Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of TorontoPress, 1989), 199-200.Table 2-6Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) for Different Types of Exit (Vertical %)Electoral ExitsPartyPressurePersonalDecision DeathPersonalDefeatDefeat /FailurePartyFailLreNone — — 4.3 16.2 2.9 20.0One 66.7 53.8 43.5 51.4 28.6Two 25.0 15.4 13.0 13.5 17.1 20.0Three 4.2 23.1 17.4 5.6 25.7Four 4.2 — 8.7 10.8 14.3 40.0Five or More — 7.7 13.0 2.7 11.4 20.0N= 24 13 23 37 35 521Table 2-7Exit Patterns for Leadership Terms of Different Length (by Number of General Elections) (Horizontal %)Electoral ExitsPersonalDefeatDefeat!FailurePartyFailurePartyPresstrePersonalDecision Death N.None — — 11.1 66.7 11.1 11.1 9One 25.8 11.3 16.1 30.6 16.1 62Two 26.1 8.7 13.0 21.7 26.1 4.3 23Three 5.3 15.8 21.1 10.5 47.4 19Four 7.1 — 14.3 28.6 35.7 14.3 14Five or More — 10.0 30.0 10.0 40.0 10.0 102223Cgtight§i2EL.This chapter has presented an overview of the longevity and exit patterns of provincialparty leaders. It was found that the turnover or leaders, taken as a whole, was quite brisk. Thisfact held true across the provinces, to varying decjees, and also differed somewhat among thethree main parties. Leaders of the Liberal and Conservative (cate) parties had quite similaraverage longevity, but C.C.F. / N.D.P. (mass) poly leaders tended on average to last longer.Many provincial party leaders exited under ckcumstances of personal electoral defeat, but thiswas much more common among leaders of the two cadre parties than among C.C.F. / N.D.P.leaders. Leaders of mass and cadre parties were about equally likely to be pressured by theirrespective parties to bow out, however.In the next chapter, special attention will be paid to the ways in which exit and longevitydiffered according to whether or not provincial party leaders became premiers.24CHAPTER 3The "Success" Factor: Premiers and Non-PremiersLeslie Pal has succinctly explained the overriding importance of electoral success forCanadian party leaders:The leader, in service of the led, must be seen to further the party's electoral goal.As long as he remains successful in that quest, the party will follow. But shouldhe falter and stumble, his followers are often quite prepared to trample himunderfoot in their stampede to appoint a new champion. Party memberstherefore have, to use Burke's phrase, a dignified obedience, a proudsubmission to their leader which retains, even in servitude a terrible potential ofretribution should the leader fail.17For political parties and their leaders, the ultimate "electoral goal" is generally assumed to meanone thing: forming a government. A party leader may have many important goals, such asimproving the party's organization, strengthening policy platforms and improving his or her (orthe party's) image. Yet, however successful a leader may be in achieving such objectives, theywill amount to little if the party does not win an election. This chapter builds on the overview ofleadership longevity and exit patterns presented in Chapter 2 by considering how thesefeatures differed between "successful" and "unsuccessful" leaders. "Successful" leaders aredefined as those who served as premier at some point in their leadership careers, while thoseleaders who never led a government are (for the purposes of this discussion) considered"unsuccessful".17Leslie A. Pal, "Prime Ministers and Their Parties: The Cauldron of Leadership," inPrime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in Canada,  ed. Leslie Paland David Tams (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), 91.25Longevity and the 'Success' Factor It seems likely that leaders who never reached the premier's chair had briefer leadershipcareers than those who were successful in forming governments. Table 3-1 compares themean leadership durations of leaders who were premiers at some point and those who neverformed a government. Those who never became premiers tended on average to last about halfas long (4.7 years) as cid those who led provincial governments (10.7 years). The differenceof 6 years between mean leadership longevities of successful and unsuccessful leadersexceeds the party and provincial differences found in Chapter 2. The difference between thelargest and smallest mean leadership lengths was 4 years among provinces and 3 yearsamong the three major parties (Table 2-3). As might be expected, the "success" factor seems tohave been a critical factor affecting the length of party leaders' terms.Table 3-1 HereTable 3-2 compares longevity data between premiers and non-premiers in terms of thenumber of general elections into which leaders took their parties. More than two-thirds (67.4%)of non-premier leaders led their parties into no more than one general election before exiting.In sharp contrast, only 22.4% of leaders who attained premierships had such brief leadershipterms. Of those who became premiers, fully 38.8% had leadership terms spanning far or moreelections, as opposed to 5.6% of non-premier leaders. The pattern of marked differences inlongevity between leaders who formed governments and those who cid not is consistent acrossprovinces (Table 3-3). There are, however, interesting differences in "success gaps" among theprovinces. A "success gap" is simply the difference in mean longevities between premiers andless successful leaders. The largest success gap is found in Alberta (difference in means: 11.1years). This is not too surprising given the history of single-party dominance in that province.Table 3-1 Mean Leadership Length for Premiers and Non-Premiers(Years)Mean N.Premiers 10.7 49Never Premiers 4.7 89All Leaders 6.8 1382627The very low level of electoral competitiveness in Alberta provincial elections (except duringperiods of transition from one governing party to another) might be expected to be accompaniedby a relatively rapid turnover of leaders in non-dominant parties.19Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 HereSurprisingly, the second-largest gap in mean leadership duration is among NewBrunswick leaders. Given that this province, like other Atlantic provinces, has tended to have avery competitive and stable two-party system, the success gap of 10.1 years between the meansof premiers and non-premiers is unexpected.19 This feature may be explained as aconsequence of two related peculiarities of the time period covered in the data set. The meanlongevity of New Brunswick premiers was inflated by the extraordinarily long leadership andpremiership of Conservative leader Richard Hatfield. Hatfield was leader for 18 years, and his17-yeer premiership stands as the longest in the history of New Brunswick. Dieing the period inwhich Hatfield was premier, the Liberal party selected three leaders, each of which lastedthrough only one election. Hatfield's unusual longevity as leader and premier and the relatedfactor of short leadership terms for Liberals during his years in power resulted in a largersuccess gap for New Brunswick than would likely be present if the data encompassed a longerperiod of the province's political history.In the previous chapter, a major difference was noted in the average length of leadershipbetween the leaders of the two cacte parties and the C.C.F. / N.D.P. (Table 2-4). This differenceis also evident in Table 3-3 among non-premier leaders in the three parties. While the meanlaPeter McCormick, "Provincial Political Party Systems, 1945-1986," in Canadian Partiesin Transition, ed. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay (Scarborough: Nelson, 1989), 180-81.1911114., 177.Table 3-2Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) for Premiers and Non-Premiers (Vertical %)Premiers Never Premiers All LeadersNone 2.0 9.0 6.5One 20.4 58.4 44.9Two 16.3 18.0 17.4Three 22.4 9.0 13.8Four 18.4 5.6 10.1Five or More 20.4 — 7.2N= 49 89 13828Table 3-3Mean Length of Leadership for Premiers and Non-Premiersby Province and Party(Years)ProvincesPremiers Never Premiers Success Gaps All LeadersNewfoundand 11.0 3.2 7.8 5.6Nova Scotia 12.8 6.4 6.4 9.6P.E.I. 8.2 3.8 4.4 6.4New Brunswick 13.3 3.2 10.1 6.6Quebec 7.8 3.3 4.5 5.8Ontario 8.8 6.6 2.2 7.5Manitoba 9.3 4.8 4.5 6.7Saskatchewan 14.3 6.0 8.3 8.8Alberta 16.3 5.2 11.1 6.9British Columbia 13.0 4.1 8.9 5.7Total Mean 10.7 4.7 6.0 6.8Esti(Liberal 11.3 4.3 7.0 5.9Conservative 10.1 3.9 6.2 6.6C.C.F. / N.D.P. 12.7 7.9 4.8 9.2Social Credit 13.6 2.6 11.0 8.1P. Q. t 9.5 9.5Union Nationale 6.8 2.3 4.5 5.1Total Mean 10.7 4.7 6.0 6.8tA "success gap" could not be calculated for the Parti Quebecois as there are no nonixemierleaders of that party in the data set.2930leadership longevity among non-premier leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties wasabout 4 years, the average length of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders' terms was about twice as long. Theaverage leadership length for premier leaders in the three main parties was quite consistent,however. There seems to have been an average longevity limit of between ten and thirteenyears for "successful" leaders, regardess of party identification. There is a small differencebetween the success gaps of the caste parties and that of the C.C.F. / N.D.P.20 The Liberal andConservative party success gaps are 7 years and 6 years, respectively, and just under 5 yearsamong leaders of the C.C.F. / N.D.P. Put differently, the success gap of the CCF / NDP is 45.8%smaller than the Liberal party success gap, and 29.2% smaller than that of the Conservativeparty. This finding reflects a slightly smaller variation in leadership duration between C.C.F. /N.D.P. leaders who led governments and those who cid not than was the case among leadersof the two cacte parties. In other words, in terms of leadership longevity, electoral successseems to have been somewhat (but not dramatically) less critical to leaders of the C.C.F. /N.D.P. than it was to leaders of Liberal and Conservative parties.Exit and the 'Success' Factor Leaders who enjoyed the ultimate success of forming a government more commonlyexited of their own accord than did non-premier leaders (Table 3-4).21 Over half of all premiers201n the Social Credit party the success gap is very stark indeed (11 years), no doubt duein large part to a distorting effect from the Alberta party which changed in a very short time froma powerful, dominant, governing party to a third party of little political importance.21From this point on, all analysis of leadership exit patterns will exclude the smallnumber of leaders who died while leaders. The overview of exit patterns presented in Chapter2 includes "death" exits.31(51.1%) exited by "personal decision" as opposed to 13.8% of non-premiers.Table 3-4 HereThe proportion of "party pressure" exits among premiers was small relative to theincidence of this among leaders who were never premiers. This would be expected, since the"terrible potential for retribution" of a party was most likely to be visited upon leaders who wereunsuccessful in thek quest to form a government. Furthermore, most leaders who weresuccessful in leading their parties to power, having achieved the ultimate political prize, wereprobably less likely than their unsuccessful counterparts to outstay ther welcome with the palyand chose to make a gaceful exit.Leaders who were unable to lead their parties to power were correspondin4y moresusceptible to election-related departures. Table 3-4 shows that well over half of non-premierleaders (54%) suffered some form of electoral exit ("personal defeat", "party failure", or acombination of the two factors), but less than one-third of leaders who became premiers (31.2%)exited under such conditions. The difference in the proportion of exits under circumstances of"personal defeat" between non-premier leaders (25.3%) and those who had led governments(6.7%) is striking. These figures only capture part of the picture, however. When cases of"defeat / failure" are added to the "pure" cases of personal defeat exits, the data reveal thatpersonal defeat was at least one factor in 36.8% of exits by non-premier leaders, but only 13.4%of leaders who became premiers left leadership under such circumstances. This finding lendssupport to the conventional political wisdom that leaders of winning parties are less prone topersonal defeat than are leaders of losing parties.The findings pertaining to exit patterns of premier leaders and non-premiers are quiteconsistent across provinces (Table 3-5). In all provinces, the proportion of non-premiers whoTable 3-4Exit Patterns for Premiers and Non-Premiers(Horizontal %)Electoral ExitsPersonal^Defeat /^Party^Party^PersonalDefeat^Failure^Failure^Pressure^Decision^N-Premiers 6.7 6.7 17.8 17.8 51.1 45Never Premiers 25.3 11.5 17.2 32.2 13.8 87All 18.2 9.8 17.4 28.0 26.5 1323233left under conditions which included personal defeat exceeded that of leaders who werepremiers. In most provinces, the percentage of premier leaders who exited by their owndecision exceeded that among non-premiers. This is consistent with the 'big picture" of exitpatterns shown in Table 3-4. The only exceptional province in this respect is New Brunswick,where not one premier exited of his own accord. All New Brunswick premier leaders left theirleadership positions under conditions associated with electoral loss.Table 3-5 HereAs would be expected from the general pattern (Table 3-4), "party pressure" exits in mostprovinces were more typical among leaders who never became premier than among those whodid (Table 3-5). The most malted exception to this pattern is Quebec where two-thirds ofpremier leaders were pushed out of leadership by their parties. Most of the Quebec premierleaders who were "presaged" out of leadership were ex-premiers who had led their parties intodefeat.n While electoral factors might often have been sufficient for premiers outside Quebec to"read the writing on the wall" and leave before they were pushed, apparently this was not typicalin Quebec. Quebec leaders who became premiers seemed to ding to their leadership positionsvery tenaciously. It is helpful to think about this point in conjunction with the very lowpercentage of Quebec premiers who chose to exit by "personal decision." The only premierwho left voluntarily, Union Nationale leader Jean-Jacques Bertrand, was ill, and he died twoyears after leaving the leadership.23 The very high proportion of deaths among leaders in22Parti Quebecois leader René Levesque was the sole exception. He was pressured toleave while still premier.23Canadian News Facts,  1973, 976. Bertrand died February 22, 1973 following heartsurgery. He had cited ill health as a factor contributing to his decision to resign the leadership in1971.Table 3-5Exit Patterns fa Premiers and Non-Premiers by Province(Horizontal %)NewfoundandElectoral ExitsPartyPressurePersonalDecisionN=PersonalDefeatDefeat /FailurePartyFailurePremiers - - 50.0 - 50.0 4Never Premiers 22.2 11.1 11.1 44.4 11.1 9Nova ScotiaPremiers 20.0 - - 20.0 60.0 5Never Premiers 40.0 - 20.0 40.0 5P.E.I.Premiers 16.7 - 16.7 - 66.7 6Never Premiersthrtaamtick66.7 - - - 33.3 3Premiers - 33.3 66.7 - - 3Never Premiers 16.7 - 16.7 50.0 16.7 6QuebecPremiers - 16.7 - 66.7 16.7 6Never Premiers 28.6 14.3 28.6 28.6 - 7OntarioPremiers - 20.0 - 20.0 60.0 5Never Premiers 12.5 12.5 50.0 12.5 12.5 8ManitobaPremiers - - - 16.7 83.5 6Never Premiersatkaithmtar_37.5 - 25.0 25.0 12.5 8Premiers - - 33.3 33.3 33.3 3Never Premiers 37.5 12.5 - 25.0 25.0 8Alimge_Premiers - - - - 100.0 3Never Premiers 33.3 - 13.3 40.0 13.3 15British ColumbiaPremiers - - 50.0 25.0 25.0 4Never Premiers 16.7 22.2 16.7 38.9 5.6 18All Leaders 18.2 9.8 17.4 28.0 26.5 1323435Quebec (Table 2-5), all of whom were premiers at the time, might also be taken as evidence of apreference among Quebec premier leaders to go down fighting rather than resign leadershippositions of their own accord.It was very common for premier leaders in the Conservative party to resign leadershippositions voluntarily (Table 3-6). Fully 63.2% of Conservative premier leaders exited by"personal decision" as compared with one-half in the C.C.F. N.D.P. party, and 36.4% in theLiberal party. The "rejuvenation" technique of the Ontario Conservative dynasty accounted forone-quarter of the "personal decision" exits among Conservative premiers. Each of threesuccessive Ontario Conservative leaders and premiers (Frost, Roberts, and Davis) exited theirleadership positions voluntarily.24 At the time of exit, each leader claimed it was important forConservative leaders to exit while the party held government so that a new leader (and premier)could rejuvenate the party and 4ve the impression of a changing, responsive government eventhough there was no change in the governing party.Table 3-6 HereThe Ontario Conservative party practiced leadership rejuvenation very successfully overan extended period (until Premier Frank Miller's decidedly "pressured" exit). Interestingly,however, fully three-quarters of gl Conservative premier leaders who exited voluntarily leftwhile still holding the premiership. In short, most Conservative leaders who became premierspracticed the rejuvenation technique. In contrast, only one of the eleven Liberal premier leadersexited while still holdng the premiership.24Leslie Frost was not the first Conservative premier of the Ontario Conservative dynasty(he was preceded by George Drew and Tom Kennedy), but he was the first OntarioConservative leader whose leadership term fell within the scope of this study.Table 3-6Exit Patterns for Premiers and Non-Premiers by Party(Horizontal %)LAwitElectoral ExitsPartyPressurePersonalDecisionN=PersonalDefeatDefeat /FailurePartyFailurePremiers 9.1 18.2 27.3 9.1 36.4 11Never Premiers 20.0 15.0 35.0 17.5 12.5 40ConservativePremiers 5.3 5.3 10.5 15.8 63.2 19Never Premiers 33.3 16.7 8.3 33.3 8.3 24C.C.F./ N.D.P.Premiers - - 33.3 16.7 50.0 6Never Premiers 20.0 - 26.7 33.3 20.0 15Social CreditPremiers - - 20.0 20.0 60.0 5Never Premiers 40.0 - 40.0 20.0 - 5Pall QuebecoisPremiers - - - 100.0 - 2Never Premiers - - - - - -Union NationalePremiers - - - 50.0 50.0 2Never Premiers 33.3 33.3 33.3 - - 3All Leaders 18.2 9.8 17.4 28.0 26.5 1323637The C.C.F. / N.D.P.—A Special Case? Nelson Wiseman has pointed out that electoral success has not always meant the samething to the C.C.F. / N.D.P. as it has to the Liberal and Conservative parties. Wiseman'scomments, which pertain specifically to the C.C.F. / N.D.P. in Manitoba, might fairly be applied tothe party in other provinces in which it has not thrived:For most of the party's history, its minor status fed low expectations of the leader.No one expected that the party could or would win an election (until 1969) so, inmost elections, victory consisted merely of escaping a third-party position orgaining a few seats. The leader was not held at fault for party losses or givenmuch credit (1969 and 1973 are exceptions) for party gains.25This is an important caveat to the common understanding of the "terrible potential for retribution"against leaders who fail to deliver electorally. Electoral "success" may have different meaningsdepending on a party's perceived prospects of ever forming a government.Wiseman's comments may go some way toward explaining the smaller "success gap"among C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders relative to leaders of the older, mute parties which was evidentin Table 3-3. It must be emphasized that the difference in success gaps between the C.C.F. /N.D.P. and the Liberal and Conservative parties was not spectacular, and that the N.D.P. hasformed a number of provincial governments over the past two decades. However, the questionarises: if the importance of forming a government is (and remains) for provincial C.C.F. / N.D.P.leaders a matter of relatively little importance, why was the difference in success gaps betweenthat party and the older parties not much creater? Is it possible that the success of the N.D.P. informing governments in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and British Columbia caused the role of theparty leader to be seen in more strictly competitive terms—in other wads, more like leaders of25Nelson Wiseman, "From Jail Cell to the Crown: Social Democratic Leadership inManitoba," in Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics, 148.38the Liberal and Conservative parties?Terry Maley adctessed this question of competitiveness in provincial N.D.P. parties fromthe perspective of leadership selection:For a number of reasons, the CCF/NDP leader's-role concept has been moreresistant to change at the national level than in the provinces. In the provincialparties, the leader has come to occupy a position more akin to that occupied byleaders of other parties, and, as a result, the leadership process in the provincesis similar to the process in those other parties. More specifically, it is argued herethat the prospect of office acts as a catalyst that transforms the leader's role, andthis, in turn, creates a more competitive selection process that more closelyresembles or imitates the process in rival parties rather than the coronationprocess employed by the national CCF/NDP organization.26Maley argued that in those provinces in which provincial N.D.P. parties have had a real chanceof forming a government, the leadership selection process has been similar to the highlycompetitive "conquest" style found in the cadre parties. On the other hand, he argued,provincial parties which had slim hopes of forming a government have much less competitive,"coronation", leadership selection experiences.If the conquest-coronation distinction has any value beyond a description of leadershipselection  in (Afferent provinces, and also says something about the larger issue of leadershipchange  (which indudes leadership exit), then we would expect Morley's "conquest" provincesto have higher proportions of leaders who were pressured to leave by their parties relative to"coronation" provinces. It seems reasonable to assume that a high proportion of "pressured"leadership exits might be suggestive of a party in which the leadership post is viewed in fairlycompetitive (or "conquest") terms.Table 3-7 compares the percentages of pressured leadership exits for the C.C.F. / N.D.P.26Terry Morley, "Leadership Change in the CCF / NDP," Leaders and Parties inCanadian Politics: Experiences of the Provinces, 122-23.39in each province for which data is available. While Morley cid not specifically label the AlbertaC.C.F. / N.D.P., there seems little doubt that he would consider it a "coronation" party, and,accorcingly, a low percentage of pressured leadership exits would be anticipated.27 The datafor the Alberta C.C.F. / N.D.P. lend some support to the Morley thesis, given that not one of thefour leaders was forced out of office by the party. However, most of the data in Table 3-7 tendsto predude an extension of the Morley thesis to leadership exit. The modified Morley argumentwould predict low percentages of pressured exits for the C.C.F. / N.D.P. in Nova Scotia (like theAlberta C.C.F. / N.D.P., &rely a "coronation" party), and relatively higher figures in provinceslike British Columbia and Ontario (both of which Morley considers to be reasonablyunambiguous cases where the "conquest" model has held sway).28 The C.C.F. / N.D.P inSaskatchewan and Manitoba are identified in Table 3-7 as having both "conquest" and"coronation" characteristics, so the percentage of pressured exits in those provinces would beexpected to fall somewhere between those for the archetypal conquest and coronationparties.28 There is little difference, however, between the proportion of pressured exits inManitoba and Saskatchewan and "coronation" Nova Scotia, or "conquest" Ontario. The data do27The two men who have led the Alberta N.D.P. were both selected with minimalcompetition. The frst leader, Grant Notley, was selected with one ballot and his successor, RayMartin, was the sole leadership candidate.28Terry Maley, "Leadership Change in the CCF / NDP," in Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics, 136, 140.29 Morley explicitly classified Saskatchewan as being a conquest-coronation hybrid, buthe did not classify the Manitoba party. Nelson Wiseman, while not discussing the Manitobaparty in terms of Morley's conquest-coronation dichotomy, has, however, implied that theManitoba party has had a mix of conquest and coronation characteristics. See: Terry Morley,"Leadership Change in the CCF/NDP," in Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics, 138-39;Nelson Wiseman, "From Jail Cell to the Crown," in Leaders and Parties in Canadian Politics,148.40not consistently reveal higher levels of pressured exits for "conquest" parties and low levels for"coronation" parties. The proportions of pressured exits for C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders are quitesimilar in most of the provinces.Table 3-7 HereTable 3-7 illustrates that when C.C.F. / N.D.P. pressured exits are compared with thoseamong leaders of other parties, in many provinces (Alberta being an important exception) alarger proportion of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders were pressured to leave than was true of leaders inthe Liberal party. No Liberal leader in Nova Scotia, Ontario, or Manitoba, and only one inSaskatchewan exited under conditions of "party pressure". The very small numbers included inTable 3-7 (and the fact that data for only six of the ten provinces are presented) Teatly distortthe "big picture" presented in Table 2-6, which showed that there was really very little differencein the proportions of pressured exits in each of the three main parties.Another way to test the Morley argument from an exit perspective is to compare thelongevity of non-premier leaders of conquest and coronation C.C.F. / N.D.P. provinces. It wasshown in Table 3-3 that there was little difference in leadership longevity between parties forpremier leaders. Longevity differences among the three main parties were evident only amongleaders who were never premiers. The mean leadership longevity of cacke parties was abouthalf that of the leaders of C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties. If C.C.F. / N.D.P. conquest parties are more likecadre parties in terms of competitiveness than C.C.F. / N.D.P. coronation parties, the non-premier leaders of conquest parties would be expected to have comparatively shorterleadership terms. The data does not lend much support to this hypothesis (Table 3-8). As with41Table 3-7 "Pressured Exits" in C.C.F. / N.D.P. Conquest and Coronation Parties(and Comparisons with Cade Parties)t(%)CXXIE1g583.2118ita 2112=12211k Coronation & ConquestMa. N.S. B.C.^Ont. Sask.^Man.C.C.F./N.D.P. 33.3 40.0 33.3 33.3 25.0(n:4) (n=3) (n=5) (n=3) (n=3) (n=4)Liberal 57.1 — 50.0 — 20.0 —(n=7) (n=4) (n=8) (n=5) (n-5) (n=6)Conservative 66.7 33.3 16.7 20.0 25.0 50.0(n=3) (n=3) (n=6) (n=5) (n=4) (n=4)tin all provinces for which there is data for C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders.42the "pressured exit" test, the data paint a very similar picture for all provincial C.C.F. / N.D.P.parties. The mean leadership longevity figures for the two coronation provinces were relativelyhigh, as expected. However, only one of the two conquest parties, the B.C. party, had a lowmean leadership longevity. Although the Ontario party was classified by Morley as a conquestparty, the mean leadership longevity of 9.7 years is comparable to the figures for the twocoronation parties and nearly twice as high as the mean for the other conquest party in BritishColumbia.Table 3-8 HereMorley devised the conquest-coronation dichotomy to help explain differences inleadership selection between C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties which were more or less successful informing governments. While the numbers are admittedly very small, the data in Table 3-7 andTable 3-8 seem to indicate that the dichotomy cannot successfully explain leadership exits inthese parties. In most provincial C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties, at least one-third of the leaders werepressured to leave and the average length of leadership terms was quite consistently high,regaless of whether or not parties had been at all successful in forming governments. TheBritish Columbia and Alberta parties were exceptional cases. The "pressured exits" test yieldedevidence confirming dassification of the Alberta party as a "coronation" party, and the "meanlongevity" test found that non-premier leaders of the B.C. party had substantially shorter averageleadership terms than was true of C.C.F. / N.D.P parties elsewhere. In short, while there is someevidence that the B.C. party is of the "conquest" variety, and the Alberta party is a "coronation"party, the levels of competitiveness in C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties, when measured from an exitperspective, were more similar than different.43Table 3-8 Mean Leadership Length of Non-Premier C.C.F. / N.D.P. Leaders(and Comparisons with Cacte Parties)t(Years)Coronation Parties Conquest Parties Coronation & ConquestAlta. N.S.* B.C.^Ont. Sask.*^Man.C.C.F./ N.D.P. 9.25 8.0 5.0 9.70 — 8.0(n=4) (n=3) (n=4) (n=3) (n=2)Liberal 4.7 4.0 4.0 5.5 5.25 3.6(n=7) (n=2) (n=8) (n=4) (n=4) (n=5)Conservative 2.0 — 3.7 2.0 6.75 4.0(n=2) (n=6) (n=1) (n=4) (n=1)tin all provinces for which there is data for C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders.*Blank cells indicate that no mean was calculable since there were no non-premier leaders.44Longevity and Exit Among "Successful" and "Unsuccessful" LeadersLongevity and exit among "successful" and "unsuccessful" leaders are linked inTable 3-9 and Table 3-10. Table 3-9 presents data on the types of exits taken by leaders withvarious leadership longevities, and Table 3-10 shows leadership longevity among those whohad different sorts of exits. Leaders with short longevity were, for the most part, "unsuccessful"leaders, and most of them exited under conditions of electoral defeat or failure (Table 3-9). Mostleaders of greater longevity had been premiers at some point in their careers and most chose toleave of their own accord. Leaders who left under conditions of personal defeat, by and large,were those who had never been premier. Most exited after one general election (Table 3-10).Table 3-9 and Table 3-10 HereAs mit be expected, many more non-premiers than premiers were pressured to exit bytheir pates. It is interesting to note, however, that of those premiers who were forced to leave,most (55.6%) had served through only one general election. All such leaders became premiersat the same time they were chosen as party leaders since the previous leader in each case hadexited while still in office. A number of these cases are examples of the failure of the"rejuvenation" technique. The predecessors of such leaders as Ontario Conservative leaderFrank Miller and Manitoba Conservative leader Walter Weir had been long-serving premierswho exited by "personal decision"; however, the leaders who replaced them were unable tosustain party support and were forced to make relatively speedy exitoo30Bri1jsh Columbia Social Credit leader William Vander Zalm, is another example of"rejuvenation" failure, although he lasted longer as premier (five years) than cid Other Miller(five months) or Weir (two years). There are two other cases of premiers who were pressured toexit after only one general election: Parti Quebecois leader Pierre Marc Johnson, who replacedRené Levesque (who was himself pressured to leave), and Union Nationale leader AntonioBarrette.Table 3-9 Exit Patterns Among Premiers and Non-PremiersWho Had Different Leadership Longevity (Horizontal %)PremiersElectoral ExitsPfftyPressure-PersonalDecision-N..-PersonalDefeat_Defeat /Failure-PartyFailureMM.NoneOne - - 20.0 50.0 30.0 10Two 28.6 - - 14.3 57.1 7Three - 18.2 9.1 9.1 63.6 11Four _ _ 25.0 12.5 62.5 8Five or More - 11.1 33.3 11.1 44.4 9Never PremiersNone - - 12.5 75.0 12.5 8One 30.8 13.5 15.4 26.9 13.5 52Two 26.7 13.3 20.0 26.7 13.3 15Three 12.5 12.5 37.5 12.5 25.0 8Four 25.0 - - 75.0 - 4Five or More - - - - - -45Table 3-10Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) for Premiers and Non-Premiers Who Had Different Types of Exit(Vertical %)PremiersElectoral ExitsPartyPressurePersonalDecisionPersonalDefeatDefeat /FailurePartyFailureNoneOne 25.0 55.6 13.0Two 100.0 11.1 17.4Three 66.7 12.5 11.1 30.4Four 25.0 11.1 21.7Five or More 33.3 37.5 11.1 17.4N= 2 3 8 9 23Never PremiersNone - - 6.7 21.4 8.3One 72.7 70.0 53.3 50.0 58.3Two 18.2 20.0 20.0 14.3 16.7Three 4.5 10.0 20.0 3.6 16.7Four 4.5 - - 10.7 -Five or More - - - - -N= 22 10 15 28 124647Most of those who exited voluntarily were "successful" leaders and generally made suchexits after serving relatively long terms as leaders. Table 3-10 indicates that the reverse wastrue for non-premiers who exited in this way. Two-thirds (66.6%) of all non-premiers who leftleadership positions of their own accord did so after leading ther parties through no more thanone general election. A number of non-premiers who made early voluntary exits were relativelyold (such as P.E.I. Conservative leader Melvin McQuaid) or were in poor health (as wereOntario Liberal leader Anctew Thompson, and Alberta C.C.F. leader Floyd Johnson). Others,like Nova Scotia N.D.P. leader James Aitchison, and Manitoba Liberal leader lzzy Asper, ledparties that were mired in third party status and made decisions to return to their pre-politicalcareers.Conclusion It has been established in this chapter that the "success" factor made a major differencein the longevity of party leaders and the way they exited. "Successful" leaders endured in theirpositions, on average, twice as long as those who never led governments. Differences inlongevity between premiers and non-premiers were evident, to varying degrees, in all provincesand in all parties. While this difference in longevity was present in all three major parties, it wasless pronounced in the C.C.F. / N.D.P. This suggests that the "success" factor was somewhatless critical for C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties (and their leaders) than for cede parties.^Little evidencewas found to support the daim that, among themselves, the more successful provincial C.C.F. /N.D.P. parties were more competitive, in terms of leadership exit, than their less successfulcounterparts.48Electoral exits, particularly "personal defeat" exits were far more common among"unsuccessful" leaders and voluntary exits were more common among the "successful".Predictably, this also was the case in exits under conditions of party pressure. Most "successful"leaders made "voluntary" exits. Most other leaders were too preoccupied with staying in powerand rising to "successful" status to afford the luxury of a voluntary exit.The next chapter will ask to what extent party leaders were elected politicians before andafter they became leaders and how the political careers of leaders related to longevity and exit.49CHAPTER 4Politics Before and After Leadership John Courtney has noted that since Canadian national party leaders have beenselected by conventions, they have (as a goup) had much less pre-leadership politicalexperience than earlier leaders chosen by parliamentary caucuses.31 It is not difficult to think ofrecent examples of national party leaders with little or no pre-leadership parliamentaryexperience. Conservative leader Brian Mulroney, and N.D.P. leader Auctey McLaughlin cometo mind. As Pal has commented, this development is partly due to the greater media attentiongiven leadership conventions over the past thirty years or so and the accompanying attractionfor parties of a "fresh face":The hallmark of a parliamentary career is skill in the parry and thrust of debate,but modern Canadian politics places relatively little emphasis upon it. Questionperiod is often a revue of theatrical accusations and denials, and media imagematters as much as, if not more than, parliamentary substance. Conventiondelegates know this, and so a long career in formal politics is no longer regardedas crucial for leaders."32This first section of this chapter will examine the extent to which provincial party leadershave brought some prior elected experience to leadership positions and whether pre-leadership experience made a difference to the longevity of leaders or the way they exited.Later in the chapter it will be asked whether, upon leaving leadership positions, former partyleaders were elected politicians. Were most former party leaders dsindined to become M.L.A.s31John C. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada (Toronto:Macmillan, 1973), 140-41.32Leslie A. Pal, "Prime Ministers and Their Parties: The Cauldon of Leadership," inPrime Ministers and Premiers, 92.50or M.P.s after exit? Have those who pursued post-leadership political careers lasted a longer(or shorter) time than others, and were they more likely to have left leadership positions undersome circumstances as opposed to others?Pre-Leadership Political Experience The vast majority of leaders had pre-leadership elected experience of some sort beforeembarking on leadership careers. More than 60% of leaders had pricy experience in theirrespective provincial legislatures, and 15% had served in the House of Commons. In total,nearly 73% served in either a lejslatize or the House of Commons before becoming partyleader. 33Fully 72.3% of those with prior legislative experience had been M.L.A.s for at least fiveyears before becoming leaders, and 71.5% of those with pre-leadership experience as M.P.shad served for the same length of time (Table 4-1). Less than 10% of those with pre-leadershipprovincial experience entered a legislature immediately (i.e., less than one year) prior tobecoming leader. But while it was by no means a rare occurrence for political neophytes toascend to provincial party leadership posts (nearly 28% had no pre-leadership experience ineither house), this certainly was not the norm. Furthermore, most of those with experience hadserved through at least one full legislature before being selected as leader.Table 4-1 HereTable 4-2 outlines the proportions of leaders from different provinces who had pre-leadership legislative and parliamentary experience. A consistently high proportion of leaders33Four leaders had pre-leadership experience in both a legislature and the Commons:P.E.I. Conservative leader Melvin McQuaid, Quebec Credtiste leader Yvon Dupuis, ManitobaN.D.P. leader Ed Schreyer, and British Columbia N.D.P. leader Tom Berger.Table 4-1 Number of Years of Pre-Leadership Elected ExperienceAmong Those Having Such Experience (Horizontal %)1 or Less^2- 4^5- 10^11 or More^N=Legislature^9.6^18.1^51.8^20.5^83Commons 4.8 23.8 42.9 28.6 215152in each province had pre-leadership elected experience at the federal or provincial level.Alberta leaders were exceptionally inexperienced. Only 36.8% had sat in the AlbertaLegislature and none had served as M.P.s before becoming leader. While Alberta leaders wereexceptional in the west in not having any federal pre-leadership experience, the low level ofprovincial pre-leadership experience was consistent with that among leaders of the other twowesternmost provinces.34 Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia had the lowestproportions of leaders with prior experience in provincial legislatures. The history of politicalpopulism in these provinces may help account for the small proportion of political veteransamong party leaders.Table 4-2 HereAs noted in Chapter 2, one of the characteristics attributed to mass parties by Duvergeris a preference for leaders who methodically work their way to the top.35 While Duverger seemsto have been referring primarily to prior service in party offices, the importance of rising throughthe ranks might fakly be extended to include "paying dues" as a member of a legislature orparliament before becoming leader. Given this assumption, a comparatively high percentage ofC.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders with pre-leadership experience would be anticipated. This expectationreceives little confirmation from Table 4-2, where it is shown that only a slightly Teaterproportion of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders had pre-leadership experience than the leaders of eithermajor cute party. When those with federal experience are induded, no cacte-mass difference34Alberta was not the only province in which no leaders had prim experience at thefederal level. No Ontario leaders served in the House of Commons prior to becoming partyleaders, however nearly all leaders (92.3%) had pre-leadership experience in the OntarioLegislature.35Mau1ce Duverger, Political Parties, 160.Table 4-2Pre-Leadership Experience in a Legislature. the House of Commons. or in Either the Commons or a Legislature (Horizontal %)ProvincesLegislature Commons Either Body N=Newfoundand 69.2 15.4 84.6 13Nova Scotia 60.0 10.0 70.0 10P.E.I. 60.0 30.0 80.0 10New Brunswick 77.8 11.1 88.9 9Quebec 62.5 25.0 81.3 16Ontario 92.3 - 92.3 13Manitoba 78.6 7.1 78.6 14Saskatchewan 41.7 33.3 75.0 12Alberta 36.8 - 36.8 19British Columbia 45.5 22.7 63.6 221:LtLiberal 57.7 17.3 75.0 52Conservative 54.5 15.9 68.2 44C.C.F./N.D.P. 63.6 13.6 68.2 22Social Credt 70.0 10.0 70.0 10Parti Quebecois 100.0 100.0 2Union Nationale 75.0 12.5 87.5 8All Leaders 60.1 15.2 72.5 1385354is evident. The proportion of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders with pre-leadership experience at eitherfederal or provincial levels is the same as that among Conservative leaders (68.2%), and theproportion among Liberal leaders with such experience is even Teeter (75%). In sum, there islittle evidence to suggest that C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders were more likely than cadre party leadersto have "worked their way to the top".It has been established that most party leaders brought to their leadership careers someprior experience as elected politicians, but rid "experienced" leaders tend to have longerleadership terms than those without such training? The data in Table 4-3 do not support such ahypothesis. 18% of those with either provincial or federal experience, and 15.8% of leaderswithout experience at either level, had "very long" leadership terms (spanning four or moregeneral elections). The data indicate, however, that a smaller proportion of leaders with priorexperience had "very short" leadership stays (one general election, or less) than didinexperienced leaders. Less than half (48%) of experienced leaders had "very short"leadership terms, as compared with 60.6% of leaders who lacked legislative or parliamentaryexperience. In short, a creater proportion of inexperienced leaders than those with experiencemade speedy exits, but roughly the same proportion had long leadership terms. This findingsuggests that pre-leadership elected experience might have been helpful in getting leadersthrough the "high risk" early stage of leadership careers, but made no difference subsequently.Table 4-3 HereTable 4-4 identifies the proportions of those with and without pre-leadership experiencewho exited under different conditions. Did a larger proportion of leaders without pre-leadershipexperience suffer electoral exits than those who had some pia experience? It might beassumed that leaders lacking elected experience had not been tried at the polls, were not55Table 4-3 Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) Among Those With (and Without) Pre-Leadership Experience (Vertical %)Legislature Commons Either BodyExp. No Exp. Exp. No Exp. Exp. No Exp.None 4.8 9.1 - 7.7 4.0 13.2One 43.4 47.3 52.4 43.6 44.0 47.4Two 18.1 16.4 19.0 17.1 19.0 13.2Three 15.7 10.9 14.3 13.7 15.0 10.5Four 10.8 9.1 9.5 10.3 11.0 7.9Five or More 7.2 7.3 4.8 7.7 7.0 7.9N= 83 55 21 117 100 3856known, and so were more prone to personal defeat than successful veterans of at least onegeneral election.Table 4-4 HereThe data in Table 4-4 seem to lend some support to this argument. Less than 14% ofthose with prior provincial experience exited under conditions of "pure" personal defeat, asopposed to nearly one-quarter of leaders lacking such experience. When cases of defeat /failure are factored in, a difference in the proportion exiting at least pally due to personal defeatwas still evident between those who had prior provincial experience and those who did not(24% and 33.9%, respectively). The difference in the proportion of personal defeats amongexperienced and inexperienced leaders is somewhat less pronounced when those with priorexperience in the House of Commons are included. The proportion of "pure" personal defeatsamong leaders with neither federal nor provincial experience is greater than that amongexperienced leaders. However, when defeat / failure cases are included there is little differencebetween the two groups. Among those leaders without federal or provincial experience, 29.7%exited under circumstances in which personal defeat was at least one factor. Only a slightlysmaller proportion of experienced leaders departed under conditions which included personaldefeat (27.4%). There is evidence, therefore, that leaders with experience in provinciallegislatures were less susceptible to exits under conditions of personal electoral defeat thanwere those without such experience. This is not particularly surprising since leaders with earlierexperience in provincial legislatures had at least one election (and, in some cases, more) toestablish relatively "safe" seats for themselves. Pre-leadership experience in provinciallegislatures, then, seemed to provide a "hedge" against personal defeat exits. This was not trueof those with eater experience in the House of Commons.Table 4-4Exit Patterns Among Those With (and Without) Pre-Leadership Elected Experience (Horizontal %)LegislatureElectoral ExitsPartyPressurePersonalDecision N.PersonalDefeatDefeat!FailurePartyFailureExperience 13.9 10.1 21.5 27.8 26.6 79No Experience 24.5 9.4 11.3 28.3 26.4 53CommonsExperience 30.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 35.0 20No Experience 16.1 8.9 18.8 31.3 25.0 112Either BodyExperience 15.8 11.6 20.0 25.3 27.4 95No Experience 24.3 5.4 10.8 35.1 24.3 375758Politics Atter Leadership? It has so far been established that most provincial party leaders had some electedexperience before embarking upon leadership careers. To what extent, though, upon exitingleadership, did former leaders become M.L.A.s and M.P.s?Most leaders were not elected to provincial legislatures or the House of Commons afterleaving leadership positions. 71% of leaders worked in areas other than federal or provincialelected politics after exit. However, more than 16% of leaders were M.L.A.s and 10.5% wereM.P.s after leadership exit. All told, more than one-quarter of all leaders were elected politiciansat either the federal or provincial levels (or both) after leaving leadership positions.36Of the leaders who pursued provincial political careers after leaving leadershippositions, most continued on as M.L.A.s for relatively long periods (Table 4-5). Fully 63.7% ofthose with provincial post-leadership careers held their seats for five or more years. Only two ofthese leaders were ever premiers, and most (64%) had been pressured to exit leadershippositions. It is not surprising that most leaders who went on to elected work after leadership hadneither "electoral" nor "personal decision" exits. Leaders who exited for electoral reasonswould be unlikely to establish successful post-leadership elected careers, and it would beexpected that most of those who left leadership positions vduntarily decided to leave electedlife as well.Table 4-5 HereLeaders who had post-leadership careers in provincial legislatures tended to retain theirseats somewhat longer than did leaders who became M.P.s atter exit. The majority of those303New Brunswick Liberal leader Doug Young served in both the provincial legislatureand the House of Commons following leadership exit.Table 4-5Number of Years of Post-Leadership Elected ServiceAmong Those With Post-Leadership Careers (Horizontal %)1 or Less^2 - 4^5- 10^11 or More^N=Legislature^13.6^22.7^45.5^18.2^22Commons — 57.1 14.3 28.6 145960who became M.P.s (57.1%) lasted less than five years in the House of Commons.The proportions of leaders involved in elected politics after leadership exit were quitesimilar among provinces (Table 4-6). In most provinces, between 20% and 40% of formerleaders served in either a legislature or the House of Commons. Once again, Alberta standsout, with a very small proportion of leaders who were elected federally or provincially after exit.Less than 6% of Alberta leaders were involved in politics (all in provincial legislatures) afterleaving party leadership positions. The proportions of leaders who were M.L.A.s after exit wererelatively low in each of the three westernmost provinces, just as the proportions of leaders withpre-leadership experience were quite low in those provinces (Table 4-2). In Saskatchewan,Alberta, and British Columbia, most leaders did not spend time in provincial legislatures prior tobecoming leaders, and very few cid so after leaving leadership positions.Table 4-6 HereA greater proportion of Liberal leaders served in provincial legislatures atter exit than cidleaders of either the Conservative or the C.C.F. / N.D.P. parties (Table 4-6). More than one-quarter of Liberal leaders were M.L.A.s after leaving leadership positions, as compered with11.4% of Conservative leaders and 14.3% of C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders. However, when post-leadership Wert service is considered, fully one-third of leaders of both the Liberal party andthe C.C.F. / N.D.P. had post-leadership service as either M.L.A.s or M.P.s. In mated contrast,only one-fifth of Conservative leaders were elected to either body. An explanation for thisdifference may lie in the fact that a somewhat greater proportion of Conservative leaders exitedby means of "personal decision" than in either of the other two major parties (Table 2-8). Itseems safe to assume that most of those who left party leadership positions of their own accordwould be unlikely to pursue elected political careers afterward. This assumption is validated inTable 4-6 Post-Leadership Elected CarfterS in a Legislattre. the House of Commons. or in Either the Commons or a Legislature (Horizontal %)ProvincesLegislature Commons Either Body N=Newfoundland 30.8 - 30.8 13Nova Scotia - 20.0 20.0 10P.E.I. 10.0 10.0 20.0 10New Brunswick 33.3 22.2 44.4 9Quebec 30.8 7.7 38.5 13Ontario 15.4 7.7 23.1 13Manitoba 28.6 - 28.6 14Saskatchewan 9.1 18.2 27.3 11Alberta 5.6 - 5.6 18British Columbia 9.1 22.7 31.8 22Bike.Liberal 25.5 9.8 33.3 51Conservative 11.4 9.1 20.5 44C.C.F./N.D.P. 14.3 19.9 33.3 21Social Credit - - - 10Part 00U:cols - - - 2Union Nationale 20.0 20.0 20.0 5All Leaders 16.5 10.5 25.4 1336162Table 4-7 which shows that the proportion of leaders who exited by "personal decision" andwere later elected politicians was almost as low as that for those who exited by way of personalelectoral defeat. The high percentage of voluntary exits among Conservative leaders may pertlyexplain the very low percentage of Conservative leaders with post-leadership political careers.This explanation may also pertly account for the fact that not one of the ten Social Credit leadershad any post-leadership service. One-half of all Social Credit leaders exited either of their ownaccord or by personal defeat.Table 4-7 HereMost leaders who had "very short" terms (one general election or less) exited underelectoral conditions (Table 2-9). Given that fact, it seems unlikely that most leaders whobecame M.L.A.s or M.P.s after leaving leadership positions were "very short" term leaders. Itseems improbable that many leaders who were forced to resign leadership positions becauseof some sort of electoral failure would become elected politicians after exiting. This hypothesisreceives some support from the data in Table 4-8. A relatively small proportion of leaders withpost-exit political careers had "very short" leadership terms (42.8%). In contrast, 56.1% ofleaders who did not become M.L.A.s or M.P.s after exit made speedy leadership exits. Morethan one-quarter (25.7%) of leaders who went on to post-leadership political careers had had"very long" leadership terms (spanning fotr or more general elections), but only 12.2% ofleaders without post-exit political careers had lasted that long.Table 4-8 HereTable 4-7Proportion of Former Leaders with Different Types of ExitsAmong Those with Post-Leadership Elected Careers(Vertical %)Electoral ExitsPersonal^Defeat /^Party^Party^PersonalDefeat Failure Failure Pressure^DecisionLegislature orCommons 12.5 23.1 47.8 32.4 14.3N. 24 13 23 37 3563Table 4-8 Length of Leadership Terms (by Number of General Elections) Among Those with (and Without) Post-Leadership Elected Ctweers(Vertical %)Legislature Commons Either BodyYes No Yes No Yes NoNone 9.1 5.4 - 6.7 5.7 6.1One 36.4 48.6 42.9 47.1 37.1 50.0Two 22.7 16.2 21.4 16.8 22.9 15.3Three 9.1 15.3 7.1 15.1 8.6 16.3Four 18.2 7.2 14.3 8.4 17.1 6.1Five or More 4.5 7.2 14.3 5.9 8.6 6.1N= 22 111 14 119 35 986465ConclusionMost leaders came to leadership positions with some elected experience in either alegislature or the House of Commons. The proportions were roughly the same throughout theprovinces (except for low proportions in the three westernmost provinces) and parties. Leaderswith prior elected experience cid not have longer leadership longevity than cid those lackingsuch experience. There was some evidence, however, that "experienced" leaders were lesslikely than "inexperienced" leaders to make very speedy exits. Those with experience were lesssusceptible than other leaders to exit under conditions of personal electoral defeat. More thanone-quarter of leaders pursued political careers after leadership exit. Those who went on topost-leadership elected careers tended to have had longer leadership terms than others andmost had left leadership under conditions of party pressure or party electoral failure.One final question links the two sections of this chapter: what proportion of formerleaders had elected careers (either provincially or federally) both before and after their terms asparty leaders? In other words, what percentage of party leaders might be defined as "die hard'career politicians? Of the 133 valid cases, 27 leaders had political service both before and aftertheir terms as party leaders. In other words, about one-fifth (20.3%) of all leaders were "diehard" career politicians.37 Most die-herds had been leaders of one of the three major parties.No former Social Credit or Pall Quebecois leaders, and only one former Union Nationaleleader (Rodrigue Bon) had both pre- and post-leadership elected careers. Just under one-half(48.1%) of all die-hards were Liberals, about one-quarter (25.9%) were Conservatives, and22.2% were C.C.F. / N.D.P leaders. All provinces except Alberta were represented among the370nly 133 of the 138 leaders were "valid" for this test Oven that the five leaders whodied while still leader could not be induded.66die-herds, however a disproportionate number came from British Columbia. More than one-fifthof all die-hard cases were former B.C. ptrty leaders, and half of all C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders whowere die-herds were from that province.It is not surprising that the proportion of die-hard politicians among party leaders is quitelow (20.3%). A low number of "die herds" would be expected given the small percentage ofleaders who were elected politicians after exit (25.4%). What is interesting is that nearly all ofthose leaders who successfully sought election after leaving the leadership also had eitherprovincial or federal elected experiences prior to seeking the leadership. In other words, formerleaders were most likely to be M.L.A.s or M.P.s after leadership if they had been electedpoliticians prior to becoming leaders. Few of the 27.5% of provincial perty leaders without anypre-leadership elected service were among those who made political careers after exit.67CHAPTER 5CONCLUDING REMARKS Duverger stated that leaders but rarely aTee voluntarily to abdicate their power and toretire when retirement is not automatic:38 This statement might be modified slightly, in light ofthe findings of this study, to state that most provincial party leaders did not exit their positionsvoluntarily, and most of those who did were "successful" leaders. Duverger's point stands.Aside from leaders who enjoyed the success of heading governments, few could be said tohave left on their own terms. Most leadership careers were quite brief, and most exits wereconsequences of powerful partisan or electoral forces.Exits due to personal electoral defeat accounted for more than one-quarter of alldepartures, and this route was particularly common among leaders who were unsuccessful inthe quest to lead a government. Most of those who left by "personal defeat" had relatively shortleadership terms, while those who left voluntarily tended to last longer.There is indirect evidence that leadership exit practices may have been different forcute and mass parties. Electoral exits (especially those due to "personal defeat") were morecommon among Liberal and Conservative leaders than among C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders. As well,the differences in longevity between premiers and non-premiers of the C.C.F / N.D.P. weresomewhat smaller than among cadre parties. The evidence suggests that there may not bequite the same dkect relationship between electoral losses and exit in the C.C.F. / N.D.P. asseems to be present among the Liberal and Conservative parties.The popular image of the C.C.F. / N.D.P. is of a less internally competitive party than thenMaurice Duverger, Political Parties, 160.68Liberal and Conservative parties. This image, together with the greater average longevity ofunsuccessful C.C.F. / N.D.P. leaders, and the apparently weater tolerance for the personaldefeat of leaders, might lead one to expect fewer "party pressure" exits among leaders of thatparty. This was not the case. About the same proportion of leaders from each of the three mainparties were "pressured" out of office. Neither was there much evidence to support a daim thatC.C.F / N.D.P. provincial parties which had some success in forming governments were anymore competitive (from an "exit" perspective) than were C.C.F / N.D.P. provincial parties whichhad been permanently mired in opposition party status. The data lent some support todassifying the British Columbia party as a "conquest" party and the Alberta party as a"coronation" party. On the whole, however, Morley's conquest—coronation dichotomy forexplaining differences in the competitiveness of the C.C.F / N.D.P. in selecting  leaders was nottoo helpful in explaining the quite consistently hist' level of competitiveness in the way theparty's leaders exited.Most leaders had some elected experience in either legislatures or the House ofCommons prior to becoming leaders. Pre-leadership provincial experience seemed to providea "hedge" against exits by personal electoral defeat. However, experienced leaders were nomore likely to enjoy long leadership terms than those without pre-leadership experience. Themost that could be said was that those leaders with some elected experience were less likelythan inexperienced leaders to make very hasty exits.More than one-quarter of all party leaders went on to become M.L.A.s or M.P.s afterexiting. Those who had post-leadership elected careers tended to have had relatively longleadership terms. Most of those who established political careers after leadership had notexited voluntarily and, not surprisingly, few had been victims of "personal defeat" exits. About69one-fifth of all party leaders were "de hard" career politicians (with elected service before andafter leadership terms), and nearly all those with post-political careers were "die-herds".Herbert F. Quinn has remarked that leadership exit is common when a Quebec leaderfails to get "quick results" electorally.39 This thesis has confirmed the truth of Quinn's statementnot only in Quebec, but across the country. There were provincial differences in averageleadership length and exit patterns, but there were few regional patterns in the data. The onlyclear case of regional consistency was the very small number of leaders from the threewesternmost provinces who were elected politicians before and after leadership careers.It could be argued that brief party leadership terms are desirable. Such a view miOt bebased on the notion of temporary incumbency which is a major tenet of democratic theory.Robert Michels, for instance, has argued that "[gong tenure of office involves dangers fordemocracy. For this reason those organizations which are anxious to retain their democraticessence make it a rule that all offices at their disposal shall be conferred for brief periodsonly." 40It must be asked, however, whether the very brief periods' of service for many provincialparty leaders were really long enough for leaders to accomplish a Teat deal. Jean l3londelraised such a question in his survey of the careers of world political leaders. That Blonde! was39Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis toLevesque  2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 180.40Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendenciesof Modern Democracy trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958),103.70describing the careers of government leaders does not blunt the applicability of his point topolitical party leaders in general:At the end of the day, the prize of leadership may be given only for a very shorttime—too short even for many to enable them to show effectively their talents forleadership... Jilt poses truly the question whether men and women who stay inpower for such short periods—some months, a year, even two years—cangenuinely be described as leaders'; they seem to be 'stop-gap' occupiers of thehighest office, rather than real leaders able to make a mark on the society whichthey ere called to ("rectoLeaders with brief leadership terms were largely those who had been unsuccessful in attainingpremierships, and no wonder: More than half of all leaders exited after leading their parties intono more than one general election. For many leaders, particularly cadre party leaders, therewas, quite simply, very little time to "make a mark", to succeed in becoming premiers.Gordon Black remarked, in a quite different context, that "R]he average politician canhardly afford to develop elaborate plans concerning his political life."42 This is even more true ofparty leaders. The various types of non-voluntary leadership exits explored in this study speakto some of the major challenges facing party leaders. Not the least of these challenges is thetask of getting themselves elected and re-elected. The fact that 27% of party leaders exited dueto personal defeat at the polls is evidence of just how daunting this challenge can be. Ofcourse, the ultimate electoral challenge for leaders is to lead a government and remain ingovernment. Leaders who never became premiers, for the most part, had brief leadershipcareers. The longevity of party leaders was also potentially limited by more direct pressurescjean Blonde!, World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Postwar Period, PoliticalExecutives in Comparative Perspective: A Cross-National Empirical Study, Vol. 1 (London:Sage Publications, 1980), 163-64.42Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role ofStructural Initiatives," The American Political Science Review (March 1972): 145.71from within the party. Negative perceptions of the electoral standing of the party during theleader's term could force the leader to resign. Party scontent stemming from internal division,or a consensus that the leader's image was potentially damaging to the party could alsoculminate in exit. Leadership selection is only the first step to attaining a working, or, inBlondel's words, a 'real" leadership. Once leader, the challenge is to remain leader longenough to build (or re-build) the party's strength and lead the party into government. Most of theleaders examined in this study had only one election to accomplish that objective, and mostfailed.72BIBLIOGRAPHYGeneral Bellamy, David J., Jon H. Pammett and Donald C. Rowat, ed. The Provincial Political Systems: Comparative Essays. Toronto: Methuen, 1976.Black, Gordon S. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of StructuralIncentives." The American Political Science Review 66, 1 (March 1972): 144-59.13Iondel, Jean. World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Postwar Period. PoliticalExecutives in Comparative Perspective: A Cross-National Empirical Study, Vol. 1.London: Sage Publications, 1980.Canadian Annual Review. 1960-1970.Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs. 1971-1987.Canadian News Facts. 1967-1992.Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1940-1992.The Canadian Who's Who. 1952-1991: 1952-1966, Trans-Canada Press; 1967-1978, Who'sWho Canadian Publications; 1979-1991 University of Toronto.Courtney, John C. 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'The Younging of Australian Politics or Politics as First Career."Politics: Journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association 22, 2 (November1987): 76-83.Wiseman, Nelson. "From Jail Cell to the Crown: Social Democratic Leadership in Manitoba."In Leaders and Pw-ties in Canaan Politics: Experiences of the Provinces, ed. R.Kenneth Carty, Lynda Erickson and Donald Blake, 147-169. Toronto: Harcourt BraceJovanovich Canada, 1992.Newfoundand Browne, William J. And Now...Eigity-Seven Years a Newfoundander. St. John's: By theauthor, 1981.Cuff, Robert H., ed. Dictionary of Newfoundand and Labrador Biography. St. John's: HarryCuff Publications, 1990.Neary, Peter. "Party Politics in Newfoundand, 1949-71: A Survey and Analysis." InNewfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation, ed.James Hiller and Peter Neary, 205-245. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.Nova ScotiaBeck, J. Murray. Politics of Nova Scotia. Vol. 2, Murray—Buchanan (1896-1988). Tantallon,Nova Scotia: Four East Publications, 1988.Earle, Michael and Herbert Gamberg. "The United Mine Workers and the Coming of the CCF toCape Breton." In Workers and the State in Twentieth Century Nova Scotia, ed. MichaelEarle, 85-108. Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989.The Chronicle-Herald on microform.MacEwan, Paul. Miners and Steelworkers: Labour in Cape Breton. Toronto: Samuel StevensHakkert & Company, 1976.75Prince Edward Island Barrett, John I., ed. Who's Who on Prince Edward Island. Charlottetown: Walt WheelerPublications, 1986.MacKinnon, Frank. "Prince Edward Island: Big Engine, Little Body." In Canacian Provincial Politics: The Party System of the Provinces. 2d ed., ed. Martin Robin, 222-47.Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1978.New Brunswick Doyle, Arthur T. The Premiers of New Brunswick. Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1983.Stanley, Della M. M. Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power. Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1984.Starr, Richard. Richard Hatfield: The Seventeen Year Saga. Halifax: Formac Publishing,1987.Quebec MacDonald, L. Ian. From Bourassa to Bourassa. Montreal: Harvest House, 1984.The Montreal Gazette on microform.Quinn, Herbert F. The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Levesque. 2ded. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.Ontario Gagnon, Georgette and Dan Roth. Not Without Cause: David Peterson's Fall From Grace.Toronto: Harper Collins, 1991.Graham, Roger. Old Man Ontario: Leslie M. Frost. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1990.MacDonald, Donald C. The Happy Warrior: Political Memoirs. Markham: Fitzhenry &Whiteside, 1988.McDougall, A. K. John P. Roberts: His Life and Government. Ontario Historical Studes Series.Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.76Manitoba Doem, Russell. Wednesdays are Cabinet Days. Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1981."Interview: Two Former Premiers Look at Manitoba Politics." Canadian Parliamentary Review 13, 4 (Winter 1990-91): 29-31.McAllister, James A. The Government of Edward Schreyer: Democratic Socialism in Manitoba.Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984.Stinson, Lloyd. Political Warriors: Recollections of a Social Democrat. Winnipeg: QueenstonHouse, 1975.Winnipeg Free Press on microform.Wiseman, Nelson. Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP. Winnipeg:University of Manitoba Press, 1983.Saskatchewan Archer, John H. Saskatchewan: A History. Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980.Eisler, Dale. Rumours of Glory: Saskatchewan and the Thatcher Years. Edmonton: Hurtig,1987.Gruending, Dennis. Promises to Keep: A Political Biogaphy of Allan Blakeney. Saskatoon:Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990.Lloyd, Dianne. Woockow: A Biogaphy of W. S. Lloyd. Woodrow Lloyd Memorial Fund,1979.Shackleton, Doris French. Tommy Douglas. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.Smith, David E. Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan 1905-71. Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1975.Wilson, Barry. Politics of Defeat: The Decline of the Liberal Pey in Saskatchewan.Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980.77Alberta_Barr, John J. The Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Social Credit in Alberta. Toronto: McClellandand Stewart, 1974.Calgary Herald on microform.Finkel, Alvin. The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1989.Hunter, Robin. "Social Democracy in Alberta: From the CCF to the NDP." In Essays in Honour of Grant Notley: Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, ed. Lary Pratt, 57-87. Edmonton:NeWest, 1986.Macdonald, R. H. Grant MacEwan: No Ordinary Man. Saskatoon: Western Producer Books,1979.MacEwan, Grant. Poking into Politics. Edmonton: The Institute of Applied Arts, 1966.Mardiros, Anthony. William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical. Toronto: James Lorimer &Company, 1979.Mardon, Ernest G. and Austin A. Mardon. Alberta Judicial Biogaphical Dictionary. Edmonton:RTAJ Fry Press, 1990.Pratt, Larry. "Grant Notley: Politics as a Calling." 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Committee for the New Democratic Party. n. d.The Province on microform.Vancouver Sun on microform.79APPENDIX A This appendx shows (by province) the name, party affiliation, and leadership period ofeach leader induded in the data set. The data set indudes information on the careers of 138former provincial party leaders. Leaders induded in the data set are those who were leadngprovincial parties on January 1, 1955 or later and exited their leadership posts not later thanDecember 31, 1991. The lists which follow are organized accordng to party (first Liberal partyleaders, then Conservative leaders, and so on) and chronologically within each party beginningwith the first party leader through the last leader induded in the time frame for the data set.Lesigiff_NEWFOUNDLAND PARTY LEADERSarty Leadership Period1. Joey Smallwood Liberal 1949 - 19722. Edward Roberts Liberal 1972 - 19773. William Rowe Liberal 1977 - 19794. Donald Jamieson Liberal 1979 - 19805. Len Stirling Liberal 1980 - 19826. Leo Berry Liberal 1984 - 19877. Malcolm Ho!lett Conservative 1953 - 19598. James Greene Conservative 1959 - 19669. Noel Murphy Conservative 1966 - 196710. Gerald Ottenheimer Conservative 1967 - 196911. Frank Moores Conservative 1970 - 197912. Brian Peckford Conservative 1979 - 198913. Tom Rideout Conservative 1989 - 199180NOVA SCOTIA PARTY LEADERSLusk_^Nay Leadership Period1. Henry Hicks Liberal 1954- 19612. Earl Urquhart Liberal 1962 - 19643. Gerald Regan Liberal 1965 - 19804. A. M. ( Sandy ) Cameron Liberal 1980 - 19865. Robert Stanfield Conservative 1948 - 19676. G. I. (Ike) Smith Conservative 1967 - 19717. John Buchanan Conservative 1971 - 19908. Michael MacDonald C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1952 - 19629. James Aitchison C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1966 - 196810. Jeremy Akerman C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1968 - 198081PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND PARTYLeask_^PIMLEADERSLeadership Period1. Alexander Matheson Liberal 1953 - 19652. Alexander Campbell Liberal 1965 - 19783. W. Bennett Campbell Liberal 1978 - 19814. Richard Bell Conservative 1950 - 19575. Walter Shaw Conservative 1957 - 19686. George Key Conservative 1968 - 19717. Melvin McQuaid Conservative 1973 - 19768. J. Angus (Walter) MacLean Conservative 1976 - 19819. Jim Lee Conservative 1981 - 198610. Mel Gass Conservative 1988 - 199082Leader_NEW BRUNSWICK PARTY LEADERSEarly Leadership Period1. Louis Robichaud Liberal 1958 - 19712. Robert Higgins Liberal 1971 - 19783. Joseph Daigle Liberal 1978 - 19814. Douglas Young Liberal 1982 - 19835. Hugh John Flemming Conservative 1951 - 19606. COI Sherwood Conservative 1962 - 19667. Charles Van Home Conservative 1966 - 19688. Richard Hatfield Conservative 1969 - 19879. Barbara Baird-Filliter Conservative 1989 - 199183Leask_QUEBEC PARTY LEADERSPlay Leadership Period 1. Georges Lapalme Liberal 1950 - 19582. Jean Lesage Liberal 1958 - 19693. Robert Bandar Liberal 1970 - 19764. Claude Ryan Liberal 1978 - 19825. Camil Samson Creditistes 1970 - 19736. Yvon Dupuis Creditistes 1973 - 19747. René Levesque Pali Quebecois 1968 - 19858. Pierre-Marc Johnson Pall Quebecois 1985 - 19879. Maurice Duplessis Union Nationale 1936 - 195910. J. M. Paul Sauve Union Nationale 1959 - 196011. Antonio Barrette Union Nationale 196012. Daniel Johnson Union Nationale 1961 - 196813. Jean-Jacques Bertrand Union Nationale 1968 - 197114. Gabriel Loubier Union Nationale 1971 - 197415. Roctigue Biron Union Nationale 1976 - 198016. Roch LaSalle Union Nationale 198184Leader_ONTARIO PARTY LEADERSEarly Leadership Period1. John Wintermeyer Liberal 1958 - 19632. Andrew Thompson Liberal 1964- 19663. Robert Nixon Liberal 1967 - 19764. Stuart Smith Liberal 1976 - 19825. David Peterson Liberal 1982 - 19906. Leslie Frost Conservative 1949 - 19617. John Roberts Conservative 1961 - 19718. William Davis Conservative 1971 - 19859. Frank Miller Conservative 198510. Larry Grossman Conservative 1985 - 198711. Donald C. MacDonald C.C.F./N.D.P. 1953 - 197012. Stephen Lewis C.C.F./N.D.P. 1970 - 197813. Michael Cassidy C.C.F./N.D.P. 1978 - 198285Lock_MANITOBA PARTY LEADERSParty Leadership1. Douglas Campbell Liberal 1948 - 19612. GiIdes Molgat Liberal 1961 - 19693. Robert Bend Liberal 19694. I. H. (Izzy) Asper Liberal 1970 - 19755. Charles Huband Liberal 1975 - 19786. Douglas Lauchlan Liberal 1980 - 19827. Duff Roblin Conservative 1954 - 19678. Walter Weir Conservative 1967 - 19719. Sidney Spivak Conservative 1971 - 197510. Sterling Lyon Conservative 1975 - 198311. Lloyd Stinson C.C.F./N.D.P. 1953 - 196012. A. Russell Paulley C.C.F./N.D.P. 1960 - 196913. Ed Schreyer C.C.F./N.D.P. 1969 - 197814. Howard Pawley C.C.F./N.D.P. 1979 - 198886Leader_SASKATCHEWAN PARTY LEADERSant Leadership Period1. A. H. McDonald Liberal 1954 - 19592. Ross Thatcher Liberal 1959 - 19713. David Steuart Liberal 1971 - 19764. Ted Malone Liberal 1976 - 19805. Ralph Goodale Liberal 1981 - 19886. F. Alvin G. Hamilton Conservative 1949 - 19577. Martin Pederson Conservative 1958 - 19698. Ed Nasserden Conservative 1970 - 19729. Dick Coliver Conservative 1973 - 197910. Tommy Douglas C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1942 - 196111. Woockow Lloyd C.C.F./N.D.P. 1961 - 197012. Allan 13Iakeney C.C.F./N.D.P. 1970 - 198787Leader_ALBERTA PARTY LEADERSNay Leadership Period1. J. Harper Prowse Liberal 1947- 19582. J. W. Grant MacEwan Liberal 1958 - 19603. Dave Hunter Liberal 1962 - 19654. Adlan Berry Liberal 19665. Jack Lowery Liberal 1969 - 19706. Robert Russell Liberal 1971 - 19737. Nick Taylor Liberal 1974- 19888. W. J. C. (Cam) Kirby Conservative 1958 - 19609. Milt Harradence Conservative 1962- 196410. Peter Lougheed Conservative 1965 - 198511. Elmer Roper C.C.F./N.D.P. 1942 - 195512. Floyd A. Johnson C.C.F./N.D.P. 1958 - 196113. Neil Reimer C.C.F./N.D.P. 1963 - 196814. Grant Notley C.C.F./N.D.P. 1968 - 198415. Ernest Manning Social Credit 1943 - 196816. Harry Strom Social Credit 1968 - 197217. Werner Schmidt Social Credit 1973 - 197518. Bob Clark Social Credit 1975 - 198019. Rod Sykes Social Credit 1980 - 198288Leask_BRITISH COLUMBIA PARTY LEADERSEarly Leadership Period1. Arthur Laing Liberal 1953 - 19592. Ray Perrault Liberal 1959 - 19683. Pat McGeer Liberal 1968 - 19724. David Anderson Liberal 1972 - 19755. Gordon Gibson Liberal 1975 - 19786. Jev Tothill Liberal 1979 - 19817. Shirley^McLoughlin Liberal 1981 - 19838. Art Lee Liberal 1984 - 19879. Deane Finlayson Conservative 1952 - 196110. E. Davie Fulton Conservative 1963 - 196511. John de Wolf Conservative 1969 - 197112. Derril Warren Conservative 1971 - 197313. G. Scott Wallace Conservative 1973 - 197714. Vic Stephens Conservative 1977 - 198015. Arnold Webster C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1953- 195616. Robert Strachan C.C.F./N.D.P. 1956 - 196917. Tom Berger C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1969 - 197018. Dave Barrett C.C.F. / N.D.P. 1970 - 198319. Robert Skelly C.C.F./N.D.P. 1984- 198720. W. A. C. Bennett Social Credit 1952 - 197321. Bill Bennett Social Credit 1973 - 198622. Bill Vander Zalm Social Credit 1986 - 19918990APPENDIX BThe thesis includes 19 variables for each of 138 provincial party leaders in Canada. Thedata set appears in Appendix C.Variable 1 This variable has two components. The first digit (or the first two dgits, for leaders fromBritish Columbia) identifies the province of which an individual was party leader and theremaining (tits are a leader's identification number. The provinces are identified as follows:1 represents Newfoundand2 represents Nova Scotia3 represents Prince Edward Island4 represents New Brunswick5 represents Quebec6 represents Ontario7 represents Manitoba8 represents Saskatchewan9 represents Alberta10 represents British ColumbiaThe leader's identification number corresponds to the number assigned to each leader inAppendix A. For example, Variable 1 for Joey Smallwood (Newfoundland) is 101 and forArnold Webster (British Columbia) it is 1015.91Variable 2Variable 2 identifies the partisan stripe of leaders. The parties are identified as follows:1 represents Liberal^(including^Liberal-Progressive)2 represents Conservative and Progressive Conservative3 represents C.C.F. and N.D.P.4 represents Social Credit and Cröditistes5 represents Pall Quebecois6 represents Union NationaleThe data set does not include information on the leaders of every party listed above for everyprovince for the entre period under consideration in the thesis. Party leadership data was onlycollected for parties which had demonstrated a minimal capacity to elect members to theLegislative Assembly of a province. Where there was a consistent pattern of electoral failure fora provincial party the leaders of that party were not examined in this study. The C.C.F. / N.D.P.provincial parties in the maritime provinces (save Nova Scotia) and in Quebec were excludedon these gounds.Some provincial parties have been noteworthy forces in their respective provinces foronly a portion of the period under consideration here. In these cases when the parties ceasedto elect M.L.A.s on a regular basis data was not collected on subsequent leaders. An exampleof such a case is the Social Credit Party of Alberta which, though it still exists today and has aleader, has not had any elected M.L.A.s since shortly after the resignation of Rod Sykes. Thus,Sykes is the "final" Alberta Social Credit leader for the purposes of this study.92Some leaders were members of different parties during their political careers. Variable2 only identifies the party membership of the leader at the time he or she was a party leader.There are no cases in the data set of a party leader leasing more than one party. Yvon Dupuismade an abortive attempt to found the Presidential Party after leaving the leadership of theCreditistes, but the new party never had any electoral success and is not induded in this dataset.Variable 3 This variable indicates the status of the leader's party at the time he or she assumed theleadership.1^represents^the party is in Government2^represents^the party is the Official Opposition3^represents^the party is a Third Party (represented in thelegislature but is not the Official Opposition)The data for this variable in the case of Nova Scotia Conservative leader, Robert Stanfield (V1-205) is exceptional. The Conservative party was not technically the Official Opposition party atthe time Stanfield assumed the leadership (his party held no seats and 34% of the popular vote;the C.C.F., two seats and 14% of the popular vote), however for the purposes of this study wewill consider the Conservative party to have had "Official Opposition" status at the beginning ofStanfield's leadership. To code the Conservative party strictly as a 'Third Party" would seem tomisrepresent the actual status of the party.93Variable 4This shows the status of the leader's party at the time the leader departs the partyleadership. The codes are identical to those outlined for Variable 3 above.Variable 5 The primary motives for a leader's departure from the party leadership ere identified byVariable 5.1^represents^Nat2^represents^Personal defeat of the leader in a general election or by-election3^represents^Party electoral failure  for leader's party during his or herterm as leader. The party either fails to attain or retaingovernment status during the leader's term.4^represents^Nauman for exit (e.g., caucus revolt, pressurestemming from public scandal, or loss of leadership vote)5^represents^egoignig_gigitm (e.g., retirement, career change)6^represents^(2 and 3) Personal defeat and electoral failureIn a number of cases when leaders are personally defeated the leader's party also sufferselectoral failure. In most cases it seems safe to say that personal defeat of the leader "trumps"electoral failure as the prime factor contributing to a leader's exit. However, it is sometimesdifficult to dsentangle which of the two events (personal defeat or electoral failure) was theprimary factor in the leader's decision to resign. In cases where the two factors seem to havebeen of roughly equal weight code "6" was assigned.94Variable 6 V6 represents the year of birth of a leader. The final three digits of the year of birth weindicated (e.g., 1933=933; 1895=895).Variable 7 V7 is the year the leader assumed the party leadership. As with V6, the final three digitsof the year we shown.Variable 8 The year the leader exited the leadership (again, showing the final three digits of theyear) is represented by V8. Many leaders aTee to remain in the leadership post for a few(sometimes several) months after they announce their resignation until a successor is chosen.This sometimes means the announcement of resignation and the actual yielding of the office ofleadership occur in different years. In such cases the later date is taken to be the year ofleadership exit.Variable 9 V9 indicates the number of general elections during the leadership period.Variable 10 V10 indicates whether a leader served in the provincial legislature of the province inwhich he or she is a leader prior to becoming party leader.0^represents^Did not serve in provincial legislature prior toleadership95If the leader did have pre-leadership lejslative experience, the extent of the leader'sexperience is shown in terms of the number of yews of legislative service (rounded up).95^represents^Leader had less than 1/2 year of pre-leadershiplegislative experienceVariable 11 V11 indicates whether or not there was a non-elected interim between a leader's pre-leadership provincial elective service and his or her selection as party leader.0^represents^Leader had no pre-leadership provincial electiveexperience, so the question is inapplicable95^represents^No interimIf there was a non-elected interim in the leader's career the duration of the interim is measuredin years (rounded up).The definition of "non-elected interim" in this study is quite narrow. Two criteria must besatisfied: 1) the leader must have been an MLA at some point prior to his or her selection asparty leader, and  2) the leader must not have been an MLA at the time he or she was selectedas leader. Therefore, if a person who ultimately became a party leader had a break in his or herlegislative career (say, through electoral defeat or personal choice) but returned to being anM.L.A. afterwards and was an M.L.A. at time of party leadership selection according to thisdefinition we would not consider the leader to have had a non-elected interim.96Variable 12 V12 indicates whether a leader served in the House of Commons prior to becomingparty leader.0^represents^Did not serve in the House of Commons prior toleadershipIf the leader act have pre-leadership experience as an M.P., the extent of the leader'sexperience is shown in terms of the number of years of parliamentary service (rounded up). Asa rule, the partisan identity of individuals dying pre-leadership service in the House ofCommons was thesame during their terms as provincial leaders. There ere some exceptions to this rule, however.Saskatchewan Liberal leader, Ross Thatcher (V1=802), while an M.P. sat first as a member ofthe C.C.F., then as an Independent, and later as a Liberal. Yvon Dupuis (VI=506), was a LiberalMR prior to becoming provincial leader of the provincial Crecitiste party. Roth LaSalle(V1=516) sat at different times as an Independent and Conservative M.P. before becomingleader of the Union Nationale party in Quebec.95^represents^Leader had less than 1/2 year of pre-leadershipHouse of Commons experienceVariable 13 V13 indicates whether a leader led a provincial government. If the leader dcli_ lead agovernment, V13 shows the duration of the premiership in terms of years (rounded up).0^represents^Did not ever lead a government95^represents^Leader was premier less than 1/2 year97Variable 14 V14 represents the occupation of a leader (exdudng federal or provincial elected office)prior to the leadership.0^represents^no known non-elective occupation1^represents^retired / not working2^represents^legal profession (lawyer or judge)3^represents^other professions (e.g., medicine, education, accountancy)4^represents^business / industry (including realtors, insurance agentsand consultants)5^represents^farmer / labourer6^represents^public servant7^represents^government and party-related appointments (includingsenators, vice-regal appointees, members of appealboards, employees of a party, or cabinet member)8^represents^communicator (indudng writers, journalists, andbroadcasters)55^represents^other occupationsVariable 15 V15 represents the occupation of leaders (exdudng federal or provincial elected officeheld) after leaving elective political life. The codes for V15 are identical to V14 except for thefollowing:987^represents^government and party-related appointments (includingsenators, vice-regal appointees, members of appealboards, employees of a party, or cabinet member, andjudcial appointments within a three-year period ofleadership exit)9^represents^death of the leader while leader (and consequently, nopost-leadership occupation)A distinction was made between post-leadership judicial careers which seem like careerappointments and those which have a slightly greater partisan complexion to them. This lattertype of appointment is a fairly common means for a government (usually federal) to rewardfaithful high-profile partisans. Appointments of former leaders to the bench which were madeafter more than three years passed since leadership exit are identified as career, rather thanstrictly political, appointments. Two illustrations of these different types of judicial appointmentsare the appointments to the bench of former P.E.I. Liberal leader Alexander Campbell andformer Alberta Conservative leader Milt Harradence. Campbell was appointed to the P.E.I.Supreme Court by the federal government the same year he exited the party leadership (thus,we would identify this as a political appointment, wr). In contrast, Milt Harradence wasappointed by thefederal government to the Alberta Court of Appeal fully 15 years after completing his term asparty leader (and we identify this as a judicial career appointment, "2").There are some cases in which the first post-leadership occupation is followed sometime later by another occupation or perhaps a Senate appointment (e.g., Henry Hicks of NovaScotia) . In such cases the frst post-leadership occupation is the one identified by V15.Senatorial appointments are identified separately by V18.99Variable 16 V16 indicates whether a leader served in the provincial legislature after leaving the partyleadership. A number of party leaders maintained a seat in the legislature following leadershipexit but in many instances cannot fairly be considered to have been active participants in thedaily activities of the legislature. V16 only measures the years of post-leadership legislativeservice following the former leader's first successful post-leadership election. Therefore, if aformer leader did not successfully contest an election after leaving a party leadership position,his or her post-leadership legislative experience is considered to be nil.0^represents^did not win any provincial elections after leadership97^represents^death in the leadership post or between leadershipexit and the first general election after leadershipexitIf a leader al successfully seek re-election in the legislature after resigning as a party leaderV16 measures the length of service in years (rounded up).Variable 17 V17 indicates whether a leader served in the federal House of Commons after leavingthe party leadership. This variable measures the years of post-leadership Commons servicefollowing a former leader's first successful post-leadership election.0^represents^did not win any provincial elections after leadership97^represents^death in the leadership post or between leadershipexit and the first general election after leadershipexitIf a leader did successfully seek re-election in the House of Commons after resigning as a party100leader V16 measures the length of service in years (rounded up).Variable 18 V18 shows whether or not a former leader was appointed to the Senate at some pointfollowing his or her resignation as leader.1^represents^yes, appointed to the Senate2^represents^no, not appointed to the SenateVariable 19This variable identifies the leader by name and initial(s).APPENDIX C Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 V10 Y11 V12 Y13 Y14 V15 Y16 Y17 Y18 V19101 1 1 2 3 900 949 972 7 0 0 0 23 8 —) 8 2 0 2 Smdwood, JR102 1 2 2 4 940 972 977 2 6 95 0 0 2 2 6 0 2 Roberts, E103 1 2 2 4 942 977 979 0 6 3 0 0 2 2 3 0 2 Rowe, W104 1 2 2 3 921 979 980 1 0 0 130 8 7 0 0 2 Jernies on, D105 1 2 2 6 937 980 982 1 95 95 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Stirling, L106 1 2 2 4 943 984 987 1 8 950 0 2 2 0 0 2 Barry, L107 2 2 2 2 891 953 959 2 1 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 1 Hollett,M108 2 2 2 5 928 959 966 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Greene, JJ109 2 2 2 2 915 966 967 1 4 95 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Murphy, NF110 2 2 2 4 934 967 969 0 1 95 0 0 2 2 16 0 1 Ott en h elm er, GR111 2 2 1 5 933 970 979 3 0 0 2 7 4 4 0 0 2 Moores, F112 2 1 1 5 942 979 989 3 7 95 0 10 3 4 0 0 2 Peckf ord, B113 2 1 2 3 948 989 991 1 14 95 0 95 3 7 0 0 2 Rideout, T201 1 1 2 2 915 954 961 2 9 950 2 2 3 0 0 1 Hicks, H202 1 2 2 6 921 962 964 1 13 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 1 Urquhart, E203 1 2 2 5 928 965 980 4 0 0 2 8 2 2 0 4 2 Regan,G204 1 2 2 6 938 980 986 2 7 95 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Cerneron, AM205 2 2 1 5 914 948 967 6 0 0 0 112 1 0 122 Stanfield, R206 2 1 2 5 909 967 971 1 18 95 0 3 2 2 0 0 1 Smith, GI207 2 2 1 4 931 971 990 5 4 95 0 12 2 7 0 0 1 Buchanan, J208 3 3 3 4 909 952 962 3 7 95 0 0 5 5 0 0 2 Me.d)oneld, MJ209 3 3 3 5 908 966 968 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Aitchison., JH210 3 3 3 5 942 968 980 3 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 2 Mermen, J301 1 1 2 5 903 953 965 3 9 95 0 6 2 7 0 0 2 Matheson, AW302 1 2 1 5 933 965 978 4 1 95 0 12 2 7 0 0 2 Carnpbell, AB303 1 1 2 3 943 978 981 1 8 95 0 1 3 4 0 3 2 Cernpbell, WB304 2 2 2 9 887 950 957 2 7 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 Bell, RR305 2 2 2 5 931 957 968 3 0 0 0 7 6 1 0 0 2 5haw, WR306 2 2 2 2 911 968 971 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Key, G307 2 2 2 5 914 973 976 1 4 95 8 0 2 2 0 0 2 McQuaid, M308 2 2 1 5 937 976 981 2 0 0 25 2 5 1 0 0 2 Mad_ een, JA309 2 1 2 2 938 981 986 2 6 95 0 5 4 7 0 0 2 Lee, J310 2 2 2 2 925 988 990 1 0 0 9 0 4 7 0 0 2 Gass, MAV1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19401 1 2 2 3 925 958 971 4 6 95 0 10 2 7 0 0 1 Robichaud, L402 1 2 2 5 934 971 978 1 4 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 Higgins, RJ403 1 2 2 4 934 978 981 1 4 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 Daigle, J404 1 2 2 3 940 982 983 1 4 95 0 0 2 0 1 4 2 Young, D405 2 2 2 3 899 951 960 3 7 95 0 8 4 1 0 12 2 Flemming, HJ406 2 2 2 4 915 962 966 1 8 95 0 0 4 1 7 0 1 Shervood, CB407 2 2 2 2 921 966 968 1 0 0 6 0 2 4 6 0 2 Van Home„ C408 2 2 2 6 931 969 987 5 8 95 0 17 4 7 0 0 1 Hatfield, R409 2 2 2 4 952 989 991 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Baird-Filliter, B501 1 2 2 3 907 950 958 2 0 0 5 0 2 1 6 0 2 Lapalme, G502 1 2 2 4 912 958 969 3 0 0 136 2 2 0 0 2 Lenge, J503 1 2 2 6 933 970 976 3 4 95 0 6 2 3 7 0 2 B o team, R504 1 2 2 4 925 978 982 1 0 0 0 0 8 8 7 0 2 Ryan, C505 4 3 3 4 935 970 973 2 0 0 0 0 4 99 0 0 2 Samson,C506 4 3 3 2 926 973 974 1 4 17 7 0 3 4 0 0 2 Dupuis, Y507 5 3 1 4 922 968 985 4 8 95 0 9 8 1 0 0 2 Levesque, R508 5 1 2 4 946 985 987 1 9 95 0 95 3 3 0 0 2 Johnson, PM509 6 2 1 1 890 936 959 6 9 95 0 18 2 9 97 97 0 Duplessis, NI510 6 1 1 1 907 959 960 0 28 95 0 95 2 9 97 97 0 Sauve„,IMP511 6 1 2 4 899 960 960 1 24 95 0 1 4 7 0 0 2 Barrette, A512 6 2 1 1 915 961 968 2 15 95 0 2 2 99 97 97 0 Johnson,D513 6 1 2 5 916 968 971 1 20 95 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 Bertrend,JJ514 6 2 3 6 932 971 974 1 9 950 0 2 2 0 0 2 Loubier,G515 6 3 3 3 934 976 980 1 0 0 0 0 4 994 0 2 Biron, R516 6 3 3 2 929 981 981 1 0 0 130 4 4 0 7 2 LaSalle, R601 1 2 2 2 916 958 963 2 3 95 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 V*It am eyer, J602 1 2 2 5 924 964 966 0 5 95 0 0 6 7 0 0 1 Thompson, AE603 1 2 3 3 928 967 976 3 5 95 0 0 3 7 14 0 2 Nixon, R604 1 2 2 3 938 976 982 2 95 95 0 0 3 7 0 0 2 Smith, SL605 1 2 2 6 943 982 990 3 7 95 0 5 2 2 0 0 2 Peterson, D606 2 1 1 5 895 949 961 3 12 95 0 12 2 2 0 0 2 Frost, L607 2 1 1 5 917 961 971 2 10 95 0 10 2 2 0 0 2 Roberts, J608 2 1 1 5 929 971 985 4 12 95 0 14 2 2 0 0 2 Davis, WY1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 V11 V12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 119609 2 1 2 4 927 985 985 1 14 95 0 95 4 7 0 0 2 Miller, F610 2 2 3 6 943 985 987 1 10 95 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 Grossman, L611 3 3 3 4 913 953 970 4 0 0 0 0 8 7 110 2 MacDonald, DC612 3 2 3 3 937 970 978 3 7 950 0 3 7 0 0 2 L ev43, S613 3 2 3 3 937 978 982 1 7 95 0 0 8 4 0 4 2 Cassidy., M701 1 1 2 5 895 948 961 4 26 95 0 10 5 1 7 0 2 Campbell, DL702 1 2 2 3 927 961 969 2 8 95 0 0 4 7 1 0 1 Molgel,G703 1 3 3 2 914 969 969 1 10 10 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Bend, RW704 1 3 3 5 932 970 975 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 Asper, IH705 1 3 3 2 933 975 978 1 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 Huband, C706 1 3 3 2 931 980 982 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 2 Lauchlan, D707 2 2 1 5 917 954 967 4 5 95 0 9 4 4 0 0 1 Roblin,D708 2 1 2 4 929 967 971 1 8 95 0 2 4 4 0 0 2 Weir, W709 2 2 2 4 928 971 975 1 5 95 0 0 2 4 2 0 2 5pivak, S710 2 2 2 5 927 975 983 2 11 7 0 4 2 7 0 0 2 Lyon, S711 3 3 3 3 924 953 960 3 8 950 0 4 0 0 0 2 Stinson, L712 3 3 3 4 909 960 969 2 7 950 0 5 1 8 0 2 Paulley„ AR713 3 3 2 5 935 969 978 3 7 4 4 8 3 7 0 0 2 Schreyer, E714 3 2 1 5 934 979 988 2 10 95 0 7 2 2 0 0 2 PavAey, H801 1 2 2 4 919 954 959 1 6 95 0 0 3 7 5 0 1 McDonald, AH802 1 2 2 1 917 959 971 4 0 0 12 7 4 9 97 97 0 T hatcher, R803 1 2 2 5 916 971 976 1 9 95 0 0 4 7 0 0 1 Ste uert, DG804 1 2 3 2 937 976 980 1 3 95 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Malone, T805 1 3 3 5 949 981 988 2 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 2 Goodale, R806 2 3 3 2 912 949 957 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 272 Hamilton, FAG807 2 3 3 2 921 958 969 3 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 2 Pederson, MP808 2 3 3 6 919 970 972 1 0 0 10 0 4 4 0 0 2 Nasserd en, E809 2 3 2 4 936 973 979 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Collver,D810 3 2 1 5 904 942 961 5 0 0 7 173 7 0 162 Douglas, T811 3 1 2 4 913 961 970 2 17 95 0 3 3 55 0 0 2 Lloyd, W812 3 2 2 3 925 970 987 5 10 95 0 11 6 3 0 0 2 Blekeney, AE901 1 3 2 5 913 947 958 3 2 95 0 0 8 2 0 0 1 FProwse,JH902 1 2 2 2 902 958 960 1 4 95 0 0 3 7 0 0 2 MacEwert, JWGV1 V2 V3 V4 VS V6 V7 Y8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 Y14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19903 1 3 2 4 914 962 965 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Hunter,D904 1 3 3 4 922 966 966 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Berry, AD905 1 3 3 4 930 969 970 0 0 0 0 0 8 99 0 0 2 Lowery,J906 1 3 3 2 931 971 973 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Rosen, R907 1 3 3 4 927 974 988 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 2 Taylor, N908 2 3 3 4 909 958 960 1 4 95 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 Kirby, WJC909 2 3 3 4 922 962 964 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Huradence,M910 2 3 1 5 928 965 985 5 0 0 0 14 2 2 0 0 2 Lougheed, P911 3 3 3 2 893 942 955 4 95 95 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 Roper, E912 3 3 3 5 908 958 961 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Johnson, FA913 3 3 3 2 921 963 968 2 0 0 0 0 SS SS 0 0 2 R eimer, N914 3 3 2 1 939 968 984 4 0 0 0 0 0 9 97 97 0 Notley, G915 4 1 1 5 908 943 968 7 8 95 0 25 1 4 0 0 1 Manning, E916 4 1 2 5 914 968 972 1 13 95 0 3 5 1 0 0 2 Strom, H917 4 2 2 2 932 973 975 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Schmidt, W918 4 2 2 3 937 975 980 1 15 95 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 awk,R919 4 3 3 3 929 980 982 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 5y1ces, R1001 1 3 3 6 904 953 959 2 0 0 4 0 4 7 0 10 1 Laing, A1002 1 3 3 5 926 959 968 2 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 4 1 Perrault, R1003 1 3 3 4 927 968 972 1 6 95 0 0 3 3 14 0 2 McGeer, P1004 1 3 3 4 937 972 975 1 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 2 Anderson, D1005 1 3 3 4 937 975 978 1 1 95 0 0 4 7 0 0 2 Gilman, G1006 1 3 3 4 930 979 981 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Tothill, J1007 1 3 3 6 930 981 983 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 McLoughlin, S1008 1 3 3 2 947 984 987 1 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 2 Lee, A1009 2 3 3 6 920 952 961 3 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2 Finlayson,D1010 2 3 3 6 916 963 965 1 0 0 18 0 2 2 0 3 2 FWton, ED1011 2 3 3 4 931 969 971 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 de Wolf, J1012 2 3 3 2 939 971 973 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Wwren, D1013 2 3 3 3 929 973 977 1 4 95 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Wallace, GS1014 2 3 3 3 931 977 980 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Stephens, Y1015 3 2 2 4 899 953 956 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 Webster, A1016 3 2 2 4 913 956 969 4 14 95 0 0 5 7 6 0 2 Strethen,R1017 3 2 2 2 933 969 970 1 3 951 0 2 7 0 0 2 Berger, T-2V1 V2 V3 V4 VS V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V191018 3 2 2 3 930 970 983 4 10 95 0 3 6 8 0 4 2 Betrett,D1019 3 2 2 3 943 984 987 1 12 95 0 0 3 0 0 4 2 Skeilly,R1020 4 1 2 3 900 952 973 7 7 95 0 20 4 1 0 0 2 Bemett,WAC1021 4 2 1 5 932 973 986 3 95 95 0 11 4 4 0 0 2 Bennett,W1022 4 1 1 4 934 986 991 1 8 3 0 5 4 4 0 0 2 VanderZeltn,W

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