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Reflections of a language educator : (dissonant discourses, creative language, mindful expressiveness.. 2003

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REFLECTIONS OF A LANGUAGE EDUCATOR (DISSONANT DISCOURSES, CREATIVE LANGUAGE, MINDFUL EXPRESSIVENESS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LANGUAGE EDUCATION) by S AYYED MOHSEN F ATEMI BA., College of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services (IRAN) M.Sc., California Coast University Doctor of Psychology California Coast University A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Language and Literacy Education) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March 2003 ©SAYYED MOHSEN FATEMI2003 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) Abstract of the Dissertation This dissertation examines the creativity of language in producing discourses beyond the ordinary modes of expressiveness. While conducting a critical analysis of discourse and language, the dissertation explores the creativity of language and examines the psychological, linguistic, and philosophical implications of language creativity and its relation to modes of thinking. While drawing on Ricoeur's theory of language creativity, Hairi Yazdi's theory of knowledge by presence and Langer's theory of mindfulness, the research looks into the functions and implications of the theories for language education. The dissertation discusses the role of mindfulness, immediate consciousness and knowledge by presence in generating creativity within language and discusses how changes in modes of expressiveness may give rise to changes in styles of thinking. The research scrutinizes the role of creativity in developing discourses that empower intelligibility and enrich the language thus arguing that language education consists in offering new ways of being. While conducting a critique on pervasive methods of language education and their mere emphasis on techniques, the dissertation offers a new hypothesis for language education and language learning and examines new ways of teaching English to language learners with English as their first, second or foreign language. The dissertation has a special concentration on writing and language and explores their relationship within ordinary and non-ordinary discourses. In line with this emphasis, the author presents numerous examples of language creativity in his own writing to substantiate the promotion of the plurality of meanings, thereby going beyond the reduction of language. The dissertation demonstrates the practical implications of understanding the creativity of language for language education and argues that language educators can not enrich the discourses of education and language education as long as they do not creatively question the existing discourses. I l l TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table of Contents iii List of figures vi Attunement vii Acknowledgements xi Language as Language 1 Ubiquity of Language 1 Language as Discourse 17 The Linguistic Layer 30 The Psychological Layer 31 The Philosophical Layer 32 The Social Layer 33 Ordinary Language 38 The Recount of a Dream 46 A Tour to the Flea Market of Signification 48 A Lyrical Negotiation on the Meta Cognition...., 49 A Jaywalker Just Yelled 51 An Inordinate Feeling 53 Emerging Era of Absence 54 Who Would Cry for Them? 55 The Play of Existence • -56 Savior 59 Days of My Life 60 Explosion of A Thought 61 Non Ordinary Language 65 Gourmet Restaurant • 76 Language of Narratives and Stories 80 Intralinguistic and Extralinguistic Components of Stories 82 The Dialectic of Intralinguistic and Extralinguistic Components 86 The Narrative of'We' and 'F (We and I took a shower of hermeneutics last night.) 94 The Pragmatics of You 97 Philosophical Catch-Cold 99 Recall of A Moment 101 In Search of Narratives 102 Hope 104 They Call It "Education" 106 Back Yard 107 Educational Implications 108 Immediate Consciousness 109 Representations and Obligations .....115 Overview and Conclusion of the Previous Sections 121 Language and Consciousness 127 Mindfulness and Language 134 Popular Culture and Mindlessness 136 V Passionate Winking 155 Language Education and Mindfulness 164 Avenues of Mysticism 171 Towards a New Model for Language Education 174 Immediate Consciousness and Knowledge by Presence 221 Knowledge by Presence and Language Education 226 Application and Implementation 237 Human Science Research Mall 244 Answers to My Question 247 Voices 249 Bibliography 252 V I List of Figures Figure 1. Sentence Configuration 18 Figure 2. Sentence Configuration 18 Figure 3. Sentence Configuration 18 Figure 4. Sentence & Discourse 22 Figure 5. Linguistic Analysis 31 Figure 6.1ntralinguistic Components of Stories 82 Figure 7. Extralinguistic Components of Stories 84 Figure 8. Knowledge by Presence & Knowledge by Conceptualization 225 Attunement Whether we comply with the Greek mythology where Hermes goes to the realm of the wordless and brings the word thus creating the word or we see eye to eye with the religious doctrines where word made flesh explicates the coming into birth of word from word, we are attesting to our inextricably instituted ties to language. If it were not due to language in its broadest meaning, there would be neither an "I" as the locutor of these words nor a "You" as the other locutor whose locution begins right after the emergence of this locutionary, illocutionary and perhaps perlocutionary relationship. This dissertation is about language. It moves within, by and through language. It starts from language and it goes back to language. The journey is embedded in language. It explores language, its capacity, its finitude, its infinity, its potential in giving and taking and its power in creating, generating and developing. The exploration examines language in its broadest sense, above the utilitarian goals that appear in the lowest forms of communication. The journey is associated with serendipitous moments where birth of meanings and plurality of language argue for attention towards the length, breadth and width of language. The dissertation begins with the excavation of meanings and implications, with exemplification and instantiation, and continues with substantiation and corroboration. The dissertation evokes to taxonomy and classification but does not confine itself to their determinants. The dissertation commences with a review of definitions and descriptions but does challenge the definitiveness that impedes the flexibility to look into other horizons. The journey lingers in the abodes of theories and scholarship but does not stop there. It celebrates their discoveries but it questions their fixation. The journey is coupled with flight and gliding. It brings a flight from the established ways of thinking and a gliding over the creative ways of looking at things. The dissertation is mainly in pursuit of examining the creativity of language and its implications for language education. The significant point in respect to language education here is to understand the creational capability of language. To create, to generate, and to bring into being would turn out to be of great vitality here since creation of language would be tantamount to the creation of new modes of being, new ways of living and new manners of thinking. The dissertation challenges the instrumentalist view of language where language is nothing but a means, a tool or a device for conducting communication. The dissertation argues that discourse unfolds forms of being and a sentence, even its primordial examples, indicate an ontological engagement where a mode of existence is either affirmed or negated. Part of the dissertation discusses the educational implications of Ricoeur's philosophy of language and creativity in language education. It explores the implications of his theory in connection with language education both for students with English as their first language and students with English as their second or their foreign language. In line with thinkers such as Heidegger, Ricoeur considers language not as a tool or a means for communication but as a way of being, or as a form of life. Language consists in disclosing and unfolding certain manifestations of being. It is a demonstration of one's character in that it presents certain ways of existence, and especially ways of being in the world. Ricoeur considers the instrumentalization of language and the reduction of language to communication at the lowest level as the most dangerous trend of our culture because this, according to Ricoeur, prevents and foils the breadth and width of language. He warns against the mere use of ordinary language and modeling of the language of science and technology as the only model of language. He argues that promotion of one prominent discourse and emphasis on one model of language would block the varieties of the uses of language and the polarities between different kinds of language. Both Ricoeur and Gadamer claim that through language we discover and create ourselves in relation to a world. Therefore as Wittgenstein pinpoints, 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world'. To Ricoeur, language can help to see the things not only as they are but also as they can be. Ricoeur claims that language, itself, is in the process of becoming and that language in the making celebrates reality in the making. Russian formalists, the Prague school, and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and Genette attempted to offer an exact scientific description of the codes and paradigms of language. The work of Roman Jackobson (one of the founders of the Prague circle) was highly influential within linguistic and literary studies. His structuralist theory of linguistic functions proposed that any text can have one of six distinct but related functions which relate to six factors present in any communication act: addresser, addressee, context, code, contact and message. Ricoeur draws upon structuralist theory but moves significantly away from it. He does not believe that the codes and paradigms of language exclude the creative expression of consciousness. Although he does not deny the codes, he argues that creativity precisely relies on the existence of such fixed codes. Unlike Bakhtin, who seems to think that any normality is inherently oppressive, Ricoeur sees language as creative in ways which are over and against the order and restrictions imposed by structuration. To him, the creation of meaning in language springs from the specifically human production of new ways of expressing the objective paradigms and codes made available by language. Therefore, with the same grammar, for example, we can utter many different and novel ways. Ricoeur's philosophical project is to show how human language is inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it. Contrary to subjectivist accounts such as Croce, Ricoeur sees creativity as social and cultural rather than simply an individual activity. In his overall program of philosophical hermeneutics, Ricoeur demonstrates that there is not just an epistemological and political imagination, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a linguistic imagination which generates and regenerates meaning through the living power of metaphoricity. He investigates the resources of rhetoric to show how language undergoes creative mutations and transformations. Building some parts of his inquiry based on the works of Husserl and Heidegger, Ricoeur proposes that the poet is the one who saves the words and even expands the meaning of words. It is the corollary of his argument in this regard that the philosopher relies on this capacity of poetry to enlarge, to increase, and to augment the capacity of meaning of language. He proposes that the function of poetry is not imitation but a redescription. He emphasizes that if it is true that poetry gives no information in terms of empirical knowledge, it may change our way of looking at things, a change that he claims "is no less real than empirical knowledge." Through presenting metaphor in a new perspective, Ricoeur shows how language could extend itself to its very limits. He argues that metaphor shatters not only the previous structures of our language, but also the previous structures of reality since it redescribes reality. Following Wittgenstein's argument, Ricoeur stresses that there can be no pure or perfectly transparent model of language. He proposes that reworking language is tantamount to rediscovering what we are. What is lost in experience is often salvaged in language. Ricoeur argues that in order to discover meaning we must return to the multilayered sedimentation of language, to the complex plurality of its instances, which can preserve what is said from the destruction of oblivion. Ricoeur's emphasis on promoting the plurality of meanings and going beyond the reduction of language and one narrow model constitutes one of the significant centerpieces of his theory of language and language creativity. The dissertation also looks into Langer's theory of mindfulness where the claim indicates that most of our learning takes place mindlessly. The research here focuses on the implications of mindfulness and mindlessness in language education and reveals their differences in the realm of education and learning. In line with mindfulness, the dissertation discusses Hairi Yazdi's theory of knowledge by presence as another pivotal constituent of the study and argues that creativity of language can occur in light of and on the strength of apprehending the knowledge by presence and its opulent creational gift. It is through living and being in the present, the argument persists, that creativity unfolds itself. Obsession with the learned ways of looking at things, preoccupation with established ways of being and engagements with prescriptive modes of expressiveness would foil and ward off the openness of understanding oneself in the presence. It is through washing away the flux of engagements and preoccupation and reposing in the bailiwick of being in the present that the fountain of creativity can flow with the ebullience of thinking and the zest of expressiveness. This move propounds a breach of belonging to any steady fixture and any established empowerment through which one should say and should avoid saying by virtue of the firmly incorporated prescriptive, descriptive and proscriptive paradigms. Nonetheless, creative thinking exceeds borders, equilibrium, stability, balance, steadiness and equipoise. Thus, creativity of language is away from any affiliation to any recognized source of validation. In other words, in creative language, sensibility is not borrowed necessarily from the conventionally instituted discourses since creativity of language offers discourses where the birth of new paradigms open up new ways of looking at things. It is this gift of experiencing the genius of the present, the dissertation argues, that inspires the creativity. The dissertation incorporates numerous examples of these moments where the marriage of creative thinking and living in the present brings the offspring of discourses which are not subsumed ordinary, and yet they may combine ordinary parlance with non- ordinary modes of expressiveness. Creative discourses do not essentially look for similarity. They may go for dissonance and cacophony and may be parched with thirst for otherwise. For it is in an otherwise look at things that development and becoming happens: remaining in the constancy of rigidity would perish the creativity. If education is somehow synonymous with ascension, it needs to investigate the unfamiliar beside the familiar since it is in the unfamiliar manifestation of things, that we experience the elevation from the ordinary and the mundane. And if language education is the harbinger of introducing new ways of being and new ways of living, it needs to promote the plurality of meaning where exquisite, innovational and ingenious creative discourses and modes of expressiveness create novel ways of looking at language, learner, educator and education. XI Acknowledgements I need to express my deep heartfelt gratitude to my wonderful supervisor professor Dr. Carl Leggo whose advice, support and erudition have always been inspiring and illuminating in the entire years of my Ph.D. program. I should express my thankfulness to my great Ph.D.committee members professor Dr. Stephen Carey and professor Dr. Karen Meyer whose support, time and scholarship have been powerfully encouraging. I should also thank my kind wife, Saqieh Saqian, whose graciousness and care have helped me so much in my research and studies. I owe thanks to my Daughter Sana and my Son Alisina whose playfulness have ornamented my privacy. Finally, I should be well thankful to my benevolent and wonderful parents, my Father, Mohammad and my Mother, Mahvash whose love, munificence and teachings have been dearly invaluable. I am especially indebted to my Mother who has taught me the art of thinking and expressiveness. I thank all of these people and I dedicate my dissertation to all of them. 1 In the infinite world of possibilities, the creative touch of even two words begets the world of meaning where being and becoming reveal themselves. The cascading flow of utterance and words flourishing in the river of thought and crystallized in discourse may glide, lark, sail, and soar, or float and fly, roll and run in the most unanticipated and the most unorchestrated ways, thus creating leaps quite uncommon to the audience who are habitually waiting to see the lagoon like panache of ordinary language entwined with perfunctory meanings. Language As Language Ubiquity of Language It is safe to say that every human being is ineluctably familiar with language in that he/she experiences language as he/she experiences living and he/she languages his/her experiences. This also presupposes that he/she experiences his/her language. Whether we take language as a system of signs and codes (Saussure's term of "langue" and Hjelmslev's term of "schema") or we take language as it is used (Saussure's term of "parole" and Hjelmslev's term of "use"), language is inextricably and inseparably linked to human life. Imagine the world of human beings without language, a world where there 2 is no articulation, no pronouncement, no enunciation, no reverberation, no declaration and no announcement, what would that world be like? A world where there is no speech, no talk, no saying, no newspaper, no book, no conversation, no interlocution, no cursing, no euphemism, no four letter—words, no profanity, no consecration, no oath, no diction, nothing indicative of any form of language, no trace of language. This imagination may sound possible on the surface where we can imagine such a thing, but if we sharpen the tool of our contemplation, we may doubt the possibility of such an imagination. Why? This imagination first undermines and destroys the delivery of such an imagination since these words which invite you to summon such an imagination should first and foremost be destroyed as a part of this imagination. In other words, the imagination, itself, presupposes adherence to some system of signs through which the identified and the familiar come to identify the unidentified and the unfamiliar. Besides, imagining a world presupposes 'a world,' that is some thing by which we understand some thing else. This already implies that while we reside in the language, while we linger in the language, and while we live in the language, we make an attempt to imagine a world without the language. No sooner do we launch our boat of imagination to abandon the ocean of language than we find out that the boat is oaring in the same realm. (One might take language as the superficial signs crystallized in talks and writing. This reading of language, however, excludes the deep activity and involvement of language in the process of our thinking where the concepts and judgements are inexorably linked to language.) More over, imagining an imagination is a destination the path of which passes along the bridge of language. In other words, language is a vehicle without which we can never explore the unfrequented and untrodden domain of the desert of language where 3 there is no language. Oddly enough, we arrive in the desert by the very vehicle and we experience the desert beside the vehicle, i.e. language. (One might argue that some people think not verbally but visually [as some cognitive styles suggest, see Sternberg (1997), for example], yet, thinking in terms of pictures or visual thinking also presupposes the establishment of meaning thanks to one form of language). In other words language, in its broadest sense, which comprises of any system of sign and signification is omnipresent in thinking. Although the vehicle is incessantly with us and beside us in the entire course of our above mentioned imagination, the form, shape, nature, ingredients, constituents, formalities, and substance of the vehicle can be changed. Just as a galloping horse may lead us through a route, we may as well travel through the meanders of a roadway on the strength of another medium. In either case, the medium or the vehicle is inseparably with us and beside us, even if, it is nothing save our own feet. The medium or the vehicle that is actually used in taking us to the destination constitutes the discourse of language in light of its actual usage, exhibition, presentation, demonstration, and representation. Here we look at the flowing flux in the bedrock of actuality. We are still in the bailiwick of the imagination example that opened up our discussion. The imagination vacillates in the entire operation of our analysis. Its fluctuation can give rise to other imaginative prompts that invite other instigation within the all-encompassing principality of language. The relation between imagination and language is like the relationship between water and river. How is it practically possible to deny water while swimming in it? The concept of water is ineluctably linked to the action of swimming in a river in that the action cannot be eliminated from the concept no matter 4 how dramatic a change may occur in the action. The action is inextricably tied to the concept. As long as the action of swimming is in effect as an action, it inseparably carries along the concept of water. Our example is about to instantiate its being intriguing when we find out that the example and the corollaries from the example are transpiring within the domain of one mode of language tied with thinking, viz. metaphor: Understanding something in terms of something else. The metaphoric mode of understanding is both helpful and harmful. It is helpful since it allows us to understand something thanks to something else, i.e. in terms of something else. So, it offers closeness to understanding some other thing. It is harmful since we indulge ourselves so much in the metaphor so we may forget our preliminary and main subject for which the metaphor was used as an auxiliary. Thus we may focus on the metaphor and its multifaceted faces instead of proceeding with what motivated us to go for the metaphor. The mere presence or indication of metaphor for any thing propounds that although there are similarities or even sharp points of similitude between two things, they are not the same: they are different in that they constitute two unanalogous entities which possess their own idiosyncrasies in light of their own exclusive status. Otherwise they were the same and if they were the same they would not be separate so one can serve as an auxiliary to introduce the other one. Not being the same and not having the sameness consists in that although the metaphor reveals what can help us understand the one for whom we use the metaphor better, it also tells us or warns us that the metaphor has differences from what we use the metaphor for. She may have the freshness or beauty of a flower but she does not have other things of a flower such as the specific physicality of a flower. Otherwise there would be no difference 5 between a flower and her. Thus she would have been = flower and a /the flower would have been = she. In other words, if she were entirely identical to a flower, there would be no difference between her as one entity and the/a flower as another entity. But if there is complete sameness between her and the flower, then using a/the flower for a better introduction of her does not make any sense. Our reflection submits that we need to understand the restrictions, containment, and constriction of our above-mentioned analogy. This indicates that anytime we use a metaphor, we understand one thing in terms of the other/another thing. The latter needs to bepan independent entity to help us identify the former. How can a thing that, itself, is unknown help us identify another unknown thing? Our analysis tends to also suggest that our thinking is translated into language so what ever we hear, or see in the context of oral or written discourse, indicates one form of thought such as concept or judgement. Therefore, in a certain language, such as English, the enunciation or imprint of something like 'sky,' as a lexicon, displays the occurrence of thought as a concept in its logical form, whereas the expression, 'The sky is beautiful,' purports the pronouncement of a judgement from a logical point of view. The former lacks any copulation in that we neither have an affirmative nor a negative relation and there is no copula to correlate the predicate to the subject. Thus we have merely a concept. The latter, however, entails copula, viz. 'is,' which generates a relationship between the predicate and the subject. Interestingly enough, the predicate may be encapsulated in the subject, such as 'Black houses are houses' where the predicate 'house' is already contained in the subject that is 'black houses.' These kinds of propositions where the predicate is contained in the subject constitute Kantian Analytic 6 Propositions versus Kantian Synthetic Propositions where the predicate is not held in the subject, such as "Houses are black". In any case, whether we have the concept or the judgment, they are crystallized within words, namely language. When the emphasis is laid on the phonological or lexical sign as the basic unit of language, we have language as a system of signs without a time, without self-reference, without any reference to a /the world (only a reference to other signs), whereas laying emphasis on the sentence as the basic unit of discourse gives rise to a language event where there is a time, there is self- reference, there is a reference to a /the world (Ricoeur, 1991). This juxtaposition of language systems or linguistic codes and language events or discourse made by Ricoeur is also conducted within the realm of language in that the distinction between linguistic usage as discourse and linguistic codes is done on the strength of language. We can not get out of the domain of language to look at the distinction, and then get in to experience our preceding and proceeding states as we get off the plane. It is not an abode that we can really leave unless it is taken superficially. We need to constantly recall that this exegesis of language goes beyond the perfunctory and ostensive understanding of language as it appears in the quotidian interpretation of language where language consists in verbal communication. Quine (1953) attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and questions the issue of analyticity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, logical positivist theory of meaning, and Carnap's distinction between external and internal questions. As Alexander Miller (1998) acknowledges, "Quine's attack extends further than logical positivism and threatens our intuitive notion of meaning itself (p.l 14). The question remains the same: in what realm does he offer his arguments or counter arguments? Within the realm of language. The distinction between metalanguage 7 and object language in modern linguistic philosophy is ineluctably conducted in the framework of language. "If for instance, I were to write a book in English on the grammar of the German language, English would be a Metalanguage and German the object language, talked about in English. In that case, English functioning as the Metalanguage, would take German as the object ( Ha'iri Yazdi, 1992). Again, what we see in both of these distinctions is the omnipresence of language whether we think of a language 'about' or a language 'of something. The distinction is also made within language. As a challenge, it may be argued that "aphasic patients with severely impaired speech do not have comparably impaired intelligence and many great thinkers have agreed with Einstein's claim that he did not use words when he was doing his best thinking" (Miller, 1981). In response to this challenge and similar arguments, we can not forbear adding to these observations that these assertions have been made on the strength of language and within language to the effect that we have discussed the implications, formalities and even the essence of language while lingering within the scope of language. Language, here, has been not only a constantly proactive and powerful medium but also an unavoidably continuous path from which we inevitably go back and forth. Again, we need to recall the profound understanding of language away and beyond the pedestrian interpretation. Thinking and language, in the meticulous understanding of language, are inextricably and inexorably linked to one another. (The point, here, is not to establish a priority or antecedence for one or the other.) 8 Views on language have displayed a development from an "ontology" of language as 'action' (in Heraclitus) to one of 'expression' (in Aristotle) with Plato in the middle (Swearingen, 1933; Heidegger, 1975). Some (Formalism, Monologism including logical positivism, logical atomism, Cartesian epistemology and Chomskyan linguistics) looked at language as a system of signs, a "stock of linguistic resources, i.e. expressions with associated semantic representations" (Linell, 1998). To others who espouse Dialogism', individual words are not considered as analytic units on their own. They are parts of relational wholes. Words are both the speaker and listener's words (Volosinov/Bakhtin, 1973). "If one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee" (Volosinov/ Bakhtin, 1973,60). Language, in this perspective, is constantly renewed through individuals' speech. Wilhelm Von Humboldt (1971) considers language as a living body, an energeia. Others such as Wittgenstein (1963) discuss the limit of language revealing areas that may go beyond language. Freud (1937) and Lacan (1968) propose a language to understand the language of the unconscious. And the story incessantly goes on to say the ever presence of language. All these hues 1 The concept of dialogism originally dates back to the German philosopher, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1170-1831). In Hegelian epistemology, self-consciousness takes place in a mutual way in that the person attains a concept about him/herself while understanding the concept of the other person. Therefore, there is always simultaneity. Self-concept, therefore, is acquired by the individual simultaneously with his/her concept of the other and through what Markova (1997) calls "the process of mutual acknowledgement (or recognition) of one individual by the other." Rozenweig (1921) and Markova (1994) claim that the religiously oriented Neo-Kantian philosophers coined the term dialogism. According to Markova (1997), the Neo-Kantians were concerned with the 'dialogical principle' involved in the relationship between the "I" and "Thou" that is established and maintained through speech and communication. Bakhtin (1979/1986), who according to Markova (1997) also adopted the term 'dialogism', believes that all understanding is dialogical in nature (Volosinov/Bakhtin 1973:102). He also claims that in the process of knowledge, human subjects reflexively cognize other human subjects and their products (Bakhtin 1979/1986:161). 9 and cries, arguments, counterarguments, premises, reasoning, fallacies, evidence, theories, explorations, challenges, condemnations, endorsements, confirmations, nullification, remonstration, appreciation, depreciation, transpire within language so there would have been none of these if there had been no language. It is like every one seizes a part of a/the land and then declares his/her kingdom moving away, against, or for other parts taken by others. The point is: irrespective of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the kingdom, all the movements are within the broader kingdom covering the marginal and peripheral domains (see below). Let's follow up a conversation between a cab driver and a passenger, a scholar and his/her counterpart, two kids, let's listen to what a reporter, an ethnographer, a preacher, a tour leader, a man/ woman of learning and wisdom, etc. say, enunciate, and articulate regardless of the type, nature, ingredients, kind, and idiosyncrasies, diachronic, or synchronic dimensions. What is the denominator of all the above? They are poured into language, expressed in language, interpreted in or by language, make sense or make no sense by, in or beside a /the language. This argument is now transferred to you as the addressee on the strength of a language. It may not be written in this language but in that language. The initial discussion of deixis by ancient 2 Deixis comes from a Greek word that means pointing or indicating. The earliest extant treatise on Greek grammar was written by Dionysus Thrax around 100 B.C. In it he dealt with the eight parts of speech recognized by his teacher, Aristarchus, which today we call noun, verb, pronoun, adverb, participle, article, conjunction, and preposition. One kind of article he discussed was 'deiktikos,' which Roman grammarians translated as 'demonstrativus" and English grammarians translated as 'demonstratives.' In English, we classify demonstratives (this, that, these, those) as pronouns, not articles (the, a, an), but in early Greek there was no basis for distinguishing them. The Greek word was revived in 1934 by the German psychologist Karl Buhler, who wanted a general term to refer to all the lexical and grammatical devices used to relate utterances to the spatio- temporal situations in which they are used. For example, in T am here,' T indicates the speaker's location. The tense of a verb is also deictic: it indicates a time relative to (before, during or after) the time of the speaker's utterance. Greeks, its subsequent presentation in psychology by Karl Buhler, the atomic analysis of the sentence and its disembodiment into elements such as noun, verb, demonstratives, or the investigation of speech and its introduction as an act in the context of the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary by John Austin (1955) etc., all indicate that the caravan has always been and will be going through the path, the medium and the bedrock of language. The above analysis of language, as such, and the emphasis on the all- encompassing presence of language can offer some epiphany. We take for granted language as language, we have this assumption or presupposition of using language so much so that we rarely sit back and look at this wide plain in which we constantly reside. On the contrary, we use it to defend our positioning in the language, our applications, our explanations, our interpretations, our side taking, our engagement, our preoccupation, our own exegesis of every thing including the language. We, however, become oblivious of what we are entrusted with, that is by which we travel, experience, and explore horizons, and spaces attached to or separate from us. The one who is walking every day from places to places, and tastes the experience of finding a new scenery, a new field, a new outlook, a new road, may hardly think about what by whom he/she rambles, traverses, poaches, excursionizes, peregrinates, and roams, namely, his/her feet. Our assumption of language is so rigid, strong, unrelenting, unflinching, and unyielding that we strongly label that among the most indubitable, inarguable, and unquestionable paraphernalia of The reference of nondeictic words like 'cow' or 'table' is generally considered to be part of their meaning. In contrast, deictic words have no fixed reference. They can be used even when the speaker doesn't know what he or she is referring to: people who are lost can always truthfully say T am here,' even though they do not know what place "here" refers to. The meaning of a deictic term must be stated as a rule for determining what the speaker is demonstrating by its use. 11 our own. If we can look at ourselves while walking or if we meticulously look into it after somebody shoots a scene from our walking, we may face up to multitudes of mysteries, questions, secrets, points, and above all the corollaries, which influence us as we are (us as us), and shape us the way we are. We have learned to classify things, to categorize them into adjectives, nouns, clauses, verbs; in one linguistic level, we have mastered to ascertain things and discuss them if they are particular or if they are universal, that is if they go back to individuals and their individualization or if they can be universally applied, in another level that is philosophical layer, we have been delighted to assort things into conscious and unconscious in another layer viz. psychology. We have even come to shatter our taxonomy and build a new taxonomy, calling one superannuated and the other liberating. Language has been incessantly, continuously and ceaselessly with us, beside us and around us. It has been chasing us down from the zephyr of our insurgence to the sunset of our antagonism, from the apex of our triumph to the slopes of our fallacies, from the dungeon of our semantic narrowness to the ocean of our conceptual munificence, from the passions of our philosophical demonstrations to the fervor of our poetry, from the debris of our skepticism to the oasis of our certainty, from the moisture and dampness of our allusions to the volcanoes of our illusions, from the cage of our proofs to the meadows of our imagination, from the waterfall of our syllogisms to the desert of our analyses, from the swamps of our generalizations to the valleys of our rectification, from the apogee of our deduction to the villages of our induction, from the breeze of our conversational implicature to the coasts of our perlocutionary acts, from the troops of our hermeneutics to the brigades of our reductionism, from the premises of our 12 rationalization to the bus stop of our speculation, from our colorful diction to our pale parody, from the bitterness of our irony to the celebration of our humor, from the nutrition of our insolence to the eruption of our impudence, from the typhoon of our allegations to the deluge of our misapprehension, from the castles of our hubris to the abodes of our modesty, from the discursion of our discourses to the fixation of our representations, from the description of our nothingness to the establishment of our blissfulness, from the vampire of our condemnations to the angels of our consecration, from the dead end of our explanations to the meanders of our questions, from the rocks of our acknowledgement to the icebergs of our discombobulation, from the boats of our metaphors to the shores of our metonymy, from the harbors of our contemplation to the lakes of our conclusiveness, from the mirages of our scientism to the horror of our estrangement, from the distortion of our objectivity to the inebriation of our subjectivity, from the elation of our hypotheses to the paralysis of our formulations, from the darkness of our generalizations to the illumination of our perspicacity, from the cachinnation of our models to the prostration of our certainty, from the laxity of our premises to the solipsism of our propositions, from the frivolousness of our reasoning to the emptiness of our expositions, from the distillation of our dictums to the evasiveness of our reasoning, from the glory of our modernism to the crisis of our postmodernism, from the strangulation of our praxis to the enlightenment of our doubts, from your latest sedimentation of language in the pool of your senses to the very moment of reading these words. We have been overwhelmed, through, by, with, in, a/the language(s) that we have often ignored, overlooked, neglected, negated, upbraided, denounced and remonstrated, 13 the incessantly flowing flux of life simmering in other manifestations with, by, in, on, a/the language(s) other than our own particular, idiosyncratic language (s). We have been empowering ourselves with the arrays, ornamentation, grandiloquence, magniloquence, bombast, flamboyance, ostentatiousnes, pretentiousness, of our own language (s) to cripple, and mutilate whoever, whatever, and which ever, not recognizable by our own language(s). We have easily and mercilessly turned a deaf ear to the valid, purposeful and pointed utterances of the human beings whose contents of language(s) have been construed and deciphered as 'invalid' or 'what may not make sense.' We have endowed ourselves with the licensure to enact the criteria of sense making in accordance with the velocity, acceleration, and magnetism of our own language(s). We have made a carriage of our own gauges, benchmarks and precedents to whip and lash any passenger in the way of our trespassing, poaching and transgressing. We have made a tycoon of ourselves to fight any appearance, anomalous to our own language(s). We have embellished the relatives of our language(s) with the attire of credibility, meaningfulness, scientificity, and objectivity. And all have come, emerged, solidified, reinforced, and established in, by, and through our language (s). Language is ubiquitously present in all our undertakings. Many voices we have silenced, many domains we have disdained, and many languages we have suppressed thanks to our own language(s). From our accustomed paradigms established by our own crafted touchstones, we have excavated the strata of meaning, and offered panaceas of education, elixir of edification, and methodology of scholarship. We have forcibly fertilized the offshoots of our enunciation, our declaration and our amelioration. Many horizons we have extinguished, eradicated, and abolished in 14 our immersion in the fierce inundation of our postulations and assumptions. Many a path we have dissipated, annihilated and expunged in our parochial persistence in blocking the avenues of seeing, perceiving and knowing, monopolizing our own as the first and the foremost reflection of reality as submitted in our own language(s). Much greenness we have blemished as dismal, dull and gruesome in the irascible parade of our imposition of our own diction. No wonder our language education, our ethnography, our sociology, our psychology, our philosophy, our epistemology, and our ontology are crying in the inflammatory asymmetrical one-sidedness of our definitions, soaked in our torpid obsession with our own language(s). Entrapped by the ferocious hurricane of our nuisance, uneasiness and vexation with spirit, liveliness and heartfulness, we have been swamped with the indoctrination of our emerging systems coated by flickering allegations in the nights of our alienation. We have presumptuously called for preposterous quantitative observation as instructed by our own language(s) in the hyperbole of our measurement. It may be, at this stage, apposite to conclude that language is unavoidably shaping our translation of thoughts, conceptions, judgements and reasoning. Even an attack on language needs to pour itself through language. Freud's Unconscious, Berne's Transactional Analysis, and Setting Theory, for example, have all appeared through language. No matter how solid or feeble a hypothesis is, it needs to appear through language to be introduced to others who may advocate or suffocate, through language, the veracity or falsification of the hypothesis. What about a seemingly grammatically incomplete conversation of a little boy/girl who spits out his/her experiences through language? There, too, language lies. Strong, powerful and impressive! Just as language 15 starts parading in the bombastically huge lies of politicians who also use language but, this time, to manipulate other language users. When we discuss language education, what is it that we educate? Do we educate the language or do we educate the people on how to see the language? Does this purport that we have already obtained or achieved the Utopian language and then we call on others to get what we already have got? If this is the case that we have got the benefit of this possession, language needs to have a stable and fixed entity. Is language out there waiting to be owned? Does this mean that we ask others to pay attention to how to say according to our prescriptions and what to say based on our formulations? If we comply with Vygotsky's distinction between words as they appear in, for instance, a dictionary and sense as they are used, for example, in a sentence, what do we do in language education? Do we provide educators with words or with senses? If we provide them with words, where do they come from? What is the basis of our selection? (To meet the needs, to pass TOEFL, CBAT, GRE, etc?) If we supply them with senses, what is our source of sense making? And if we give them our own version of sense making, do we leave the path open so other sense makings also can make sense to them or do we already determine what makes sense and what does not make sense? (Therefore, if you wish to be successful, you need to abide by the rules, regulations and directives coming from the source(s) which already tell you what makes sense and what not.) How do we deal with words, sentences, clauses, and expressions that may introduce a new way of looking at things different from what already exists? If we go to any library and flip through the pages of any book on the history of science in its broadest sense, we immediately find out that in any new exploration, 16 invention, theory, construct, and perspective or outlook, new words and new senses have been born which did not exist at all before or did not make any sense to those relying on the pre-established senses. How does language education address this problem? How do we know that there are not words and senses that may make complete sense in 200 years but do not make any sense to us now? How do we educate educators so they can discern the large prism of sense making from the constricted chasm? Do we promote our prescriptions and our proscriptions or do we open up ways to look at 'how language can be' in addition to 'how it is'? (Aristotle speaks of entelecheia, the potentiality to see things in terms of potentialities and not in terms of actualities.) What do language educators do? Do they repeat the previously actualized modes of sense making or do they introduce new ways of looking at senses and words? The question can be boiled down to a more fundamental question of how we understand language. Is language understood as an instrument, a means of delivery or, in Heidegger's words, a way of being? If it is an instrument, its promotion will do nothing but give rise to a utilitarian instrumentalisation where language is to be reduced to, according to Ricoeur (1991), "communication at the lowest level" or is used to manipulate things and people. If, on the other hand, language is a way of being, it is a demonstration of one's character in that it presents certain ways of existence, and especially ways of being in the world. The unveiling of that with which we live is permitted by language (Heidegger, 213-214). Language education, in this case, dramatically differs from the consideration of language as a tool since, in this sense, language education introduces new ways of being in the world. Changes in language education, therefore, can bring about changes in ways of being and modes of living. . 17 Language cannot be separated from the person in whom language is crystallized. Language turn outs to be a way that human beings encounter the world. Our being is experienced in language. Language allows us to reveal what we live with. Thus language education, in this sense, can offer new ways of encountering the world, and new ways of being in the world. Language as Discourse A sentence is the embodiment of a finite form of language with a particular tilt towards a particular perspective. In other words, a sentence is the demonstration of language where it contains, circumscribes, and yet liberates. If we look at a simple sentence, such as 'The sky is blue,' we see that the arrangement of the words, i.e. the, sky, is, and blue in a particular order contains the elements of the very sentence and circumscribes their functions in a way so they cannot be as free as they were, namely when they were not molded in the framework of a sentence and were floating free in a dictionary or someone's mind. Before the framework of the sentence gives specific containment and circumscription to the freely floating words of the above mentioned sentence, those words could have the possibility of appearing in infinite forms, thus developing infinite sentences. They (those words) could also have had infinite meanings in infinite coatings, but the moment they constitute a configuration as a sentence, they lose the infinite direction that each could have gone for. They, therefore, become subjected to certain positions with certain roles and certain functions. Following is the picture of the sentence with the analysis of its fragments and pieces along with examples of other possibilities where the same words could have other functions, thus producing other sentences: (Figure 1, 2, 3, Sentence Configuration) The sky is blue. Article Noun Verb (derivative of to bejrAdjective Figure 1. I see the sky erf your eyes. Personal pronoun verb article noun preposition possessive adjective plurafnouns Figure 2 . The child like blue sky of children playing in the garden of their imagination is filled with smiling stars. 1 Article Adjective Adjective* Noun Preposi X turn Noun Gerund ̂ Propositi n Article Noun Preposition Possessive adjective ^ Noun Verb Past Participle Preposition Gerund Figure 3 Noun 19 There can be other forms of analyses on a sentence depending on our methodology and view- point in identifying the constituent(s) of our analysis. Following is an example: "I think I should remind you, my friend, of a fact you seem to have forgotten. You are yourself one of the most splendid world to look at." The structure 'REMIND+OBJECT + OF has two meanings. It is used to talk about remembering the past and also to say that something is similar to something else. The sentence exemplifies the first meaning. The verb 'seem' can also be followed by either 'to+ simple form of the verb' or 'to + the perfect infinitive.' Also note the perfect infinitive in the following part. The agreement between the antecedent and the reflexive is also shown in the example. The reflexives need an antecedent with which they agree with respect to the features of person, gender, and number. The antecedent must not be too far away from the reflexive. In a sense to be made more precise, the antecedent must be found in some local domain, the binding domain. The reflexive must be locally bound. According to the principle of reflexive interpretation, a reflexive must be bound in the minimal domain containing X, X's governor and an accessible subject/SUBJECT. So we cannot say "I talked to himself. There can be hundreds of other sentences in simple, complex and compound forms where the initial fragments of the first sentence occupy varying positions and fulfill different functions from a noun phrase (NP) to an adjective clause where the NP can be one of its parts, (eg. The girl, who gave me the peaches, came from the land of the sun.) Also the function of each piece or each constituent of the sentence can be extended in further analysis from being a common noun (eg. bottle) or a concrete noun (eg. cow) to a coordinating conjunction (eg. and/ but /nor/ so/) or a descriptive adjective (eg. perfect in perfect marriage) or dynamic adjective (eg. careful). This can be explicated ad infinitum depending on the constituent and its function in the sentence. (We can look at each 20 constituent as what they can be in general according to a linguistic taxonomy and what they are in their actual appearance in a sentence.) The point, here, is that before the constituents of a sentence have established a sentence, they can go any where and they can have potentially the bedrock for infinite sentences, but the moment they appear in a special construction of a sentence, they are circumscribed in that specific framework which gives them a special appearance. It is like wearing an outfit which is always associated with a special manifestation. In Saussurian terminology, the words in their freely floating words are what he calls langue, namely the code—or the set of codes—on the basis of which a particular speaker or writer produces parole as a particular message. Once the constituents of a sentence or a clause (regardless of the old controversy between a clause and a sentence) bring about a configuration, they can no longer be indifferent towards a meaning in that it develops a certain, in Vygotsky's term, "sense" or in Wittgenstein's words, a 'language game.' One might here say that if we look at each constituent, that is each signifier, they have the same characteristic, viz. they cannot be anything except what they are in their particular mode (even before they come to a configuration known as a sentence) in spite of having multiplicity in their possibility of being multifarious. For example a tree without serving as a fragment in a sentence such as 'I like apple trees,' can have the potentiality of bearing numerous meanings as a dictionary may cite. Nonetheless, a tree is not a cup so it already has its own circumscription even prior to being a part of a sentence where the actual circumscription is vividly perceptible. The answer to this argument is that tree (as long as it has not been used in a sentence) would refer to other signs within the semiotic system. In this sense, it (tree) is free in that it can be any thing in its realm of possibilities, 21 it can sit any where like a flying bird flying freely in the space. But the moment it sits somewhere, the condition changes, it takes up a direction. It occupies a certain space quite different from other spaces available for it. Again, some may argue and pose these questions: 'If this is the case, how come we can have multitudes of interpretation for a single sentence? Or how come we talk about ambiguity or equivocalness of sentences?' The answer needs to be sought in light of the production of a sentence which according to Ricoeur is the 'basic unit of discourse' and for the same reason claims to 'describe, express, or represent a world.' People may, indeed, have disagreement or conflict with respect to how the sentence should represent or describe the subject matter of representation or expression. It is on the basis of similar considerations that Schiffrin (1987) talks about the key assumption about language (contextualization) which she takes to be central to discourse analysis. Among those assumptions she refers to the ever appearance of language in a context. (The subtle diagnosis, here, reveals that she talks about what Saussure discusses as parole and not langue). In the beginning of our argument, we mentioned that the sentence is liberating while it is containing. How come a sentence can be both incarcerating and yet liberating? It is incarcerating since it provides a certain direction. The moment we say, 'The sky is blue,' we have issued a judgment, logically speaking, where the predicate 'blue' is attached to the subject 'sky' thanks to a copula, that is 'is'. We cannot get the negative connotation from the same sentence unless we change the affirmative mood to a negative mood thus producing another configuration where the predicate is not predicated to the subject: 'the sky is not blue.' It is liberating since it liberates the signs from an indefinitely infinite suspension and gives them a special abode, albeit improper, weak, 22 not eloquent, etc. In addition, it is the reflection of someone's psychological subjectivity in a certain period of time where perception, memory, association of ideas, cognition and many other complex psychological phenomena work and present their product towards a certain direction. It is for the same reason that discourse always refers to what Ricoeur calls "its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as personal pronouns.' It is, therefore, sound to say that any discourse generates addressee(s) for whom the discourse presents itself. If we have the assumption that a sentence, being the basic unit of discourse (Ricoeur), has a configuration in which the signs of X, Y, Z appear not any more as pure signs but with a reference to a world, we can show this in the following way: (Figure 4.) Langue Sentence ^ • Parole ̂  • Discourse Figure 4. Sentence & Discourse 2 3 The interesting point is that from the infinite signs, the speaker can make infinite instances of sentences where infinite discourses can be created. This is the inventive nature of language where the creation, invention, generation and production of form, content, configuration, appearance and modes can emerge as vast as possible. Although the grammar has its own prescription (prescriptive grammar, eg. don't say ' I've forgotten my umbrella at home,' say ' I've left my umbrella at home,' or don't say 'Everybody are ready' say 'Every body is ready'), infinite utterances can be made thanks to the inventive power of language, thus introducing infinite discourses. Structuralism, i.e. Russian Formalists, the Prague school, and the structuralism of Saussure, Levi- Strauss and Genette made an attempt to describe the codes and paradigms of language in a clear scientific way where every piece can be named and known in a certain system and can be treated in light of its having certain characteristics. This, however, cannot and should not impede the process of creativity in language. Even if we accept that the paradigms are nothing but what structuralism has identified (some thing arguable by some), with the same paradigms, one can present the exquisiteness of language by producing exquisite sentences and offering creative discourses which may be quite unknown or uncommon to the established discourses. Language has the potentiality of being revealed, expressed, represented, described and presented in diversified ways. This is the key to opening up a multiplicity of discourses. Having realized the creative power of language and its potentiality for offering manifold creative ways of expression, we may notice that each discourse has its own way of introduction in that it introduces certain ways of looking at something by presenting 24 certain ways of thinking. Apart from the long discussion of thought and language and priority of one to the other one, one may say that any representation of language in a certain mode displays one way of thinking or possibilities of thinking in various ways. Let's look at concepts such as 'the fourth dimension,' 'postmodernism,' 'freewill,' 'cultural diversity,' etc. Do these concepts, in their own contexts, not offer special discourses? Is it not the case that any new way of describing things from atomic analysis of the world and gravity to metropolitan discussions of industry bring about a new trace of discourses along with their corollaries? It is because of the same specific nature of discourse that language is context dependent, metaphorical and figurative. It does not successfully mirror complex circumstances. It is in this sense that Saljo (1990) says language does not reflect reality but 'perspectivizes' it, that is, presents it in a special light. More than a half century ago, Wittgenstein (1953) pinpointed that we cannot take for granted people's capacity in describing their interior realities or external conditions. Some (see for instance, Van Maanen, 1979; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000) even have questioned whether people actually have definite, unambivalent conceptions or values and attitudes which can be clearly and explicitly expressed at all. Even if we comply with those who cast doubt about the explicitness of what people say or write in different situations and circumstances and therefore endorse the problematic nature of people's assertions about their own experiences, ideas, self-images, etc., because of being dependent on contexts and because of being affected by micro contexts and previously established influences, we still need to acknowledge the 25 emergence of certain discourse (s), albeit unrealistic and problematic, with a special display. The French linguist Emile Benveniste (1966) distinguishes between the linguistics of discourse and the linguistics of language. The phonological and lexical 'sign' constitutes the basic unit of language, while the 'sentence' is the basic unit of discourse. According to Ricoeur (1991) discourse is an "event" in that it consists in something happening. A dialectic of event and meaning is born from the linguistic of the sentence. The system of language is virtual and outside of time. Discourse is realized temporally and in the present. Benveniste mentions this as an "instance of discourse." Language as langue used by Ferdinand de Saussure or as schema used by Louis Hjelmslev, lacks a subject in that it does not refer to any one, it only refers to signs whereas language as discourse refers back to "its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators, such as personal pronouns. We can say, in this sense, that the instance of discourse is self- referential" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 145). Discourse as an event always carries someone along its creation, some one who speaks and expresses himself or herself. He/she who speaks creates the speech and this itself generates an occurrence, an event, a happening. Language as a system of signs only refers to itself in that signs relate to other signs and in this sense there is no subject, nor time, but discourse which according to Ricoeur (1991, p. 145) refers to a "world that it claims to describe, express, or represent." This gives us some thing else and that is in language [if taken as signs] we only have the preparatory medium for conducting communication but all messages are exchanged in discourse. Therefore, in discourse we have not only a world that is described or represented or expressed but also an 'other,' another person who is the addressee of the discourse. 26 Discourse always has an interlocutor. Ricoeur then proposes that "if all discourse is realized as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning"(1991.p.l46). He, contrary to what it might seem, does not revert from the linguistics of discourse to the linguistics of language, he presents the articulation of event and meaning in the linguistics of discourse. Some might question and argue that if discourse, as Ricoeur says, exists only as a temporal and present instance of discourse, what happens to writing? If we fathom his analysis, this question can be properly answered since the instance of discourse acts differently in living speech than in writing. He refers to a "fleeting event" in the living speech in that no sooner has the event appeared than it disappears. The myth in Plato's Phaedrus mentions that writing was given to men to "come to the rescue" of the event. In other words, discourse disappears. But this can be fixed by inscription. So the writing fixes not the event of speaking, but the 'said' of speaking. Writing, therefore, is not the reflection of the event as event but is the 'meaning of the speech event.' "What we write, what we inscribe is the noeam of the speaking" (Ricoeur, 1991). A language as discourse, therefore, always has an appearance because of its being or happening as a particular manifestation of a being, in the context of its own appearance. Language in this sense, i.e. discourse, is always about something. In his analysis of Verstehen in Being and Time, Heidegger says that what we understand first in a discourse is not another person but a project, that is, the outline of a new being-in-the- world. It is in line with this way of thinking about language and discourse that Wilhelm Von Humboldt mentions the great justification of language as the establishment of relation of man to the world. 27 Some (see for instance, Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shutter, 1991) may predominantly focus on the social aspect of discourse in which there is always an 'other' or an addressee to whom the locution of discourse is addressed. Some, such as Goffman (e.g., 1974, 1981), also centered on microanalytic frames of social interaction, including the use of language as a sign-vehicle in discourse. Such foci discuss the production or construction of meaning in its social aspect. The focus on discourse, in this sense, can mean a preoccupation, an engagement or a concern with "talk and texts as parts of social practices" (Potter, 1996). This special emphasis has given rise to discourse analysis as it is prevalent in social psychology and social sciences with its claim on rejection of a use of "realist methods in social science, which aims at mirroring extra-linguistic reality by finding patterns in empirical material" (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). The rejection can be applied to both quantitative and qualitative methods. Halliday (1964) discusses "field of discourse, mode of discourse and style of discourse." Later on he replaces the term "style" by "tenor". To him, these three variables 3 The concept of discourse has been profusely presented in academic discussions across the social sciences, literary theory and philosophy. In the past decade, ideas about discourse have appeared in psychology in the context of discussions on the importance of language in shaping and constructing our understanding of the world we live in. Psychology's models, methods and paradigms were seriously and critically questioned in the 1970s something that is considered as a crisis in psychology. According to Burman (1996), "mainstream psychology investigated its subject matter—people—as isolated individuals, rather than as members of special social and cultural practices. This impoverished view was made possible by psychology's failure to theorize language. The world was treated as a silent place (Parker, 1989). Psychology has failed to address the way discourses mark out positions for us as individuals within liberal democracies." (Burman, 1996, p. 5) Burman argues that psychology has failed to reflect on its own culturally privileged (white, Western) positions. "In these ways psychological theory has severed individuals from social and institutional practices. Socially produced characteristics and relationships are treated as properties of individuals. Thus individuals can be treated as the originators of, or responsible for, the circumstances that they suffer. This accounts for the role of psychology in pathologizing those who fail to fit its norms" (Burman, 1996, p.5). 28 serve as a conceptual framework for representing the social context as the semiotic environment in which people exchange meanings. (Recall Ricoeur's analysis of discourse and one of its characteristics, i.e. all messages are exchanged in discourse. Here, Halliday mainly focuses again on the social side within semiotics). According to Halliday, field of discourse refers to "what is going on: to the area of operation of language." Mode of discourse refers to the "medium or mode of the language activity and the role played by the language activity in the situation." Style renamed as tenor, refers to "the relations among the participants." It is not odd to say that discourse and discourse analysis are among the most controversial concepts in terms of definitions. The ambiguity of the field of discourse and particularly discourse analysis has generated many other discourses as vast as the number of definitions and interpretations. Brown and Yule (1983, p. 1) state that "the analysis of discourse, is necessarily, the analysis of language in use." Based on their definition, we obviously encounter the functions of linguistic forms in direct association and link with their application. To them, a functional perspective is preferable to a structural perspective of language. In line with this perspective, Stubbs (1983, p.l) takes a similar perspective and introduces discourse analysis as something "concerned with language in use in social contexts, and in particular with interaction or dialogue between speakers". The roots of discourse analysis can be found in pragmatics as a field that looks at discourse analysis as "the study of the general conditions of the communicative use of language" (Leech, 1983). The roots can also be traced down to sociolinguistics (see, for instance, Baugh & Sherzer, 1984; Giglioli, 1972). In fact, discourse has been under the constant attention of sociology, anthropology, philosophy, social psychology and 29 linguistics. In sociology, for example, ethnomethodology (which is indebted to Schutz, 1970) concentrates on the procedures of common sense used by individuals to construct social worlds. Here, discourse not only serves as one of the procedures but also includes a part of the social world under construction. Apart from the differences of view points or modes of explanation and justification, one may say that the common denominator of all the above discussions and definitions of discourse is that discourse always has its own mode of appearance or emergence in that its production or creation introduces a special way of looking at or thinking about things (no matter whether right or wrong, complete or incomplete [and other value laden judgements that one may issue regarding specific discourse]). For the sake of argument, we focus on the certain exclusive mode of representation and presentation as the salient characteristics of discourse. The emergence of discourse or its establishment may be similar to arrival or presence of a being, say, a human being who has specific characteristics, idiosyncrasies, and singularities which constitute him/her as being different from others. Discourse also has characteristics and it is exactly because of certain characteristics that we can notice the configuration of a discourse as distinct from other discourse(s). Thus, discourse is associated with the production or generation of a cluster of semantic, conceptual, structural, contextual, psychological, individual and social meanings. Depending on the area of focus and our selectivity, we may concentrate on one or several particular constituents of the configuration of discourse and present an analysis, hence creating another /other discourse(s). 30 At this point, I would like to propose four layers of analysis, namely, linguistic, psychological, philosophical and social analysis, for a discourse. I elaborate them one by one through examples. The Linguistic Layer. We may take the sentence as the basic unit of discourse as Ricoeur takes it or we may consider the discourse as something above the clause or above the sentence as Stubbs does that. In either case, we can look at the constituents of the configuration of discourse in its constitutive aspect whether we look at the structure or we focus on the function. Let's look at the following famous example and show this: "I have miles to go and promises to keep" (Robert Frost, 1923, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening Source: An introduction to poetry by X.J. Kennedy & D.Gioia, 1998). We have here a sentence with different linguistic units: T as the subject which appears in the personal pronoun form; 'have' as the main verb with its simple present form which demonstrates a certain tense. It also serves as a transitive verb in that it needs an object as we see the presence of an object right afterward to meet the need of the verb so to speak; 'miles' as a plural noun which acts here as an object too for the verb 'have' followed by an infinitive 'to go.' We have 'and' in continuation of the sentence as a conjunction which conjuncts different parts of this sentence to one another. (From the perspective of discourse analysts such as Schiffrin (1987) who focus on discourse markers 'and' is considered a discourse marker.) 'Promises' appears as another constitutive part of the sentence but not in the form of a verb (such as, "he promises to go") but in the form of a noun and plural noun at that. Right after this noun, we see the appearance of another verb with its simple form as an infinitive that again serves as a 31 transitive verb and needs the object. Interestingly enough, it may seem that the object, i.e. 'promises' has preceded the verb 'keep' contrary to the first part of the sentence which displays the object after the verb viz, 'have miles'. On the other hand, the object 'promises' refers to the verb 'have', namely, 'I have miles to go and promises to keep'. (Another creativity of the form along with the creativity of the content!) So in one level we have the object 'miles' for the verb 'have', but in another level we notice 'miles to go' as the object for the verb 'have' as we have 'promises to keep' as another object for the verb 'have'. (Independently, of course, 'promises' can serve as an object for the verb 'keep'.) See the following: (Figure 5. Linguistic Analysis) VP NP NP Figure 5. Our linguistic analysis of the sentence can be extended further should we plan to scrutinize the other linguistic relations, whether structurally or functionally, within the same sentence. The 'anaphor' "I" for instance can be looked into from different linguistic points of view. The above analysis is just one instantiation of the analysis within the linguistic framework. The Psychological Layer Our analysis of the psychological layer can focus on variegated psychological aspects. We can address questions, such as " What is the relationship of the 'self concept' 32 in the entire actualization of the articulation? Does the overtone of the sentence, especially with the reference to the verb, not suggest an assertive attitude associated with a positive self-esteem? Can we argue that the poet in saying what he has said has given us a description of who he is or a definition of who he is or maybe both? (Self-concept, Identity) (Baumeister, 1986). What does the future perspective embedded in the poem purport? (The poem talks about the implementation of something in the future, namely 'miles to go and promises to keep.') Does it suggest something deterministic or something optional? Why does the first part, i.e. 'miles to go', precede the second part 'promises to keep'? Is this an indication of a correlation, a prioritizing or a causal relationship? Or it may be a mere production of the unconscious subliminal messages involving certain cognitive plans or structures for organizing the experience and guiding the action. (This may get us into the psychoanalytical perspectives.) We need to seriously pay attention to the element of 'situatedness' in our analyses in that in each of our analyses we need to look at the context in which the saying or locution is enunciated to figure out the implications. This suggests that we need to go beyond the sentence and look at other marginal, affective, associative meanings in addition to the 'core meaning' of the text. Our psychological analysis can also be further elaborated depending on the intensity of our dialectical relationship with the psychological implications of the sentence as well as our selective approaches in offering a psychological and psychoanalytical analysis (eg. behaviorist, cognitive, psychodynamics, etc.). The Philosophical Layer Our philosophical analysis can begin looking at the discourse from different points of view. In a very rudimentary way, we see the acknowledgement of T as the first 33 ontological endorsement of agency in serving the function of a philosophical subject. In other words the existence of an T is already substantiated by virtue of the imputation of things which can not ontologically exist without a reference to an entity which can take the position of a philosophical subject. We also notice the acknowledgement of epistemological aspects by the confirmation of the subject's report of 'miles to go' and 'promises to keep' as the subject matter of the clearly stated appendices and designation of the epistemologically identified categories. In looking into our philosophical analysis, we inevitably encounter our logical analysis too since the locution as exteriorized in its configuration has generated a proposition in which we can identify the imputation of a predicate to a subject. Furthermore, our configuration, as it were, suggests an affirmative relationship versus a negative relationship where the predicate is taken away from the subject. In the ontological level, the question can be further investigated: whether the "I" as the subject behind the action or decision making process exist in a different way prior to decision making or the "I" is some how identified with what it chooses to do in that it converges with the undertaking? Our philosophical analysis can also be expounded and can concentrate on multifarious questions. The Social Layer Our social analysis, in fact, is the extension of our psychological analysis with special emphasis on the social aspect of discourse. The first thing we may find out is that behind any discourse, there is a reference to an 'other'. (Something that we already discussed in the presentation of Ricoeur's theory of discourse.) In other words, the locution is addressed to someone or some people as it describes, represents or expresses 34 something about a world. The 'other' can be the speaker or the author himself/herself even if we exclude everybody else. Therefore, a dialogical relationship is inherently born within any discourse in that the speaker or the author says or writes and in doing that he/she has an addressee to whom the locution returns. This can also indicate something else too and that is the recognition that the speaker or the writer gets by pouring out what he/she can not keep inside in an unexteriorized manner. 4 The listener or the reader who can be the addressee of the locution may find the locution purely referential in a very simple communicative mode or he/she may find the locution as something that in Shotter's words (1993) "moves us in the sense of morally 4 From the early stages of life, when the child starts the first locution thus bringing his /her own discourse, we can see the element of an 'other' in the process of his/her saying. Piaget (1923) suggested that the young child has 'egocentric speech'. We often hear the egocentric speech in young children when they are engaged in playing or they are about to sleep. This is tantamount to a kind of monologue. Piaget suggested that the most primitive forms of thought are 'autotistic', namely the unconscious desires, wants, wishes, or fantasies which cannot be conveyed and communicated by language. Their first appearance occurs in the young child in the form of egocentric speech. Piaget distinguished socialized speech from egocentric speech. The function of socialized speech, according to him, is communication with others whereas the egocentric speech does not serve to communicate with others, but is just a means for fulfillment of the immediate needs of the child. To him, the child cannot understand the viewpoint of the listener, or cannot understand that he/she has even one listener. Therefore, the egocentric speech is centered on the self. According to Piaget, socialized speech replaces the egocentric speech as the child develops. Vygotsky (1962) argued that all speech is 'communicative' and socialized. The socialized aspect of the speech in a child emanates from the child's endeavor to respond to the language of adults around him/her. His experiments indicated that the child was less likely to use egocentric speech in circumstances where there was nobody around him/her. On the contrary the child's use of egocentric speech considerably happens in the presence of somebody in the room. Egocentric speech, Vygotsyky argues, is just one manifestation of communicative speech in which the child tries to conceive for himself/herself his/her environment in the course of his/her exploration of it. He almost agreed with Piaget that egocentric speech disappears, but to Vygotsky it does not die away. It, in fact, turns into 'inner speech', namely the language in the mind, so the egocentric speech becomes internalized, serving and interacting with the thought process. 35 repositioning us in relation to our own situation, so that we come to re-see it in a new perspective." The social analysis of discourse can inform us of the power of discourse, the influence of language on thought. (I will elaborate, later, on the relationship of thought and language and their impact on one another). From a social point of view which can obviously and inseparably be linked to education, the discourse may not necessarily entail something new with respect to the form of exteriorization but it, indeed, offers us something new with respect to its role and function, in Wittgenstein's terms, in reminding us of something about ourselves. Shotter"s words are helpful here to cite. " It breaks the flow of our mundane thoughts and interests, and, in contrasting with them, confronts us afresh with a new realization, a consideration, an occasion, perhaps for a revaluation of our lives" (Shotter, 1993, p. 123). Our analysis of the social layer of discourse can also be explicated in light of a selective look at multifaceted social characteristics of a discourse. The least social dimension is the involvement of the audience (listener or reader) with the reality of a text as something which has already appeared. This involvement is a dialectical process that can enhance and flourish in view of the explorations. The involvement, though initially stimulated by the discourse, can be actively upgraded in a more enriching aspect owing to a productive background of the audience. Our layers of analysis are inexorably tied to one another so they can have a simultaneous operation without necessarily going through a hierarchical synchronization or a prioritizing stage. 36 The question, here, in the realm of language education is: how can language educators introduce various modes of expression and diversified discourses if they are already contained only in some recognized ways of presentation? How can language educators enrich the discourse of education if they are not creatively questioning the existing discourses? How can language educators produce and generate numerous ways of looking at things and thinking about things if their own mode of thinking cannot go beyond the mundane ways of looking embedded in ordinary discourses? If the reservoir of language educators be replete with strictly determined ways of articulation, how can their discourses be brim with exteriorization of creative epitomes outside those deterministic ways? How can discourse of creativity be offered if the examples and reflection of discourse have already been entrapped by the passive tone of obedience to only prescribed ways of saying as formulated in a certain educational system? When you say or write something, whatever you say or write, your saying or writing is presented in a special way. It appears in a special mode, complexion, countenance, facade, and expression. It may cavort, glide, fly, drift, coast, float, slide, slip, lark, stagger, stumble, stutter, splutter, roll, run, sail, soar, glissade, glimmer, twinkle, shimmer, glow, glitter and flicker. It expresses itself in one way or another. This is discourse. Let's look at some examples to see how words are poured into texts, contexts, how language displays its expression in frameworks, settings, and how language shows its being as both an expression and an event. (Some dear souls might already suggest no further exemplification since the contextualised locution, so far, unfolds the instantiation of discourse.) 37 "The following conversation between two four-year-old children was recorded in a playroom situation: Girl: [on toy telephone] David! Boy: [not picking up second phone] I'm not home. Girl: When you'll be back? Boy: I'm not here already. Girl: But when you'll be back? Boy: Don't you know if I'm gone already, I went before so I can't talk to you!"(Miller,1981,p. 115). Now, let's look at another form of discourse where language glides and larks with a special rhythm and nuance. We look at Immanuel Kant's (1998, p. 338-339) Critique of Pure Reason, The Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgement (Analytic of Principles) Third Chapter, On the ground of distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena: We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and determined the place for each thing in it. This land, however, is an island and enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself. It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never bring to an end. But before we venture out on this sea, to search through all its breadth, and become certain of whether there is anything to hope for in it, it will be useful first to cast yet another glance at the map of the land that we would now leave, and to ask, first, whether we could not be satisfied with what it contains, or even must be satisfied with it out of necessity, if there is no other ground on which we could build; and, second, by what title we occupy even this land, and can hold it securely against all hostile claims. Although we have already adequately answered these questions in the course of the analytic, a summary overview of their solutions can still strengthen conviction by unifying their various moments in one point. 38 Now let's watch another form of discourse being considered as nonstandard according to prescriptive grammar. The following sentence belongs to a classic movie (/ am a fugitive from a chain gang). " I ain't do nothing." All the above mentioned examples offer the embodiment, crystallization, actualization and expression of language in specific modes, namely certain discourses which display a particular representation or presentation. Ordinary Language Ordinary language generates certain discourse by which certain modes of thinking are presented, promoted, attested, and acknowledged. The main task of ordinary language is to get the things done in the lowest level of communication. People often take for granted certain ways of saying in ordinary language and get used to certain ways of expressiveness so lastingly that they hardly look at the long lasting ways of sayings or locutions. They may never question or think about 'why they say what they say' because of the so-called obviousness of the patterns of sayings. The well-established patterns of saying become the standard way of judging. The obviousness, the pervasiveness and the repeatability of established patterns may generate negligence and carelessness towards thinking about other modes of saying. (People may usually find this negligence problematic when they recursively grapple with difficulties in communication and interaction. Even at that stage, thinking about what is said and how it is said may not be significantly questionable until they may go to a communication consultant, a family therapist, a counselor, etc., and they find out for instance the difference between 'How about going out for coffee?' and T would like to have a coffee' [formal way of saying] or 39 'I want to have a coffee, or I'm gonna go for a coffee' [informal way of saying] by which they understand the use of "I" language for avoiding the problems of communication such as denial, imposition, conflict, and so on.) The problem with the ordinary discourse is that it does not allow people to be creative or it stops people's creativity in the language. It does not allow people to constantly look at things in a different way. It, on the contrary, promotes constant repetition of certain ways of looking, thinking and expressiveness. Ordinary discourse relies on stability, and not change. It tends to stabilize and fortify the habitual way of looking, thinking, and saying. It is scared of changing the stable ways of expressivity and it rejoices in repetition, recursion, generalization, and prevalence of already fixed modes of expressiveness. The ordinary discourse presents prepackaged ways of sayings which suggest pre-prescribed ways of looking at things and therefore pre-crafted ways of thinking. People do not need to be creative as far as they act in accordance with the 'should' and 'should not' of ordinary language. Consequently, ordinary discourse does not offer unlimited ways for thinking, but it offers prescribed insinuation which meet the needs of speakers in conveying messages in the realm of ordinary understanding. Peoples' ways of looking at things and thinking about things, therefore, may not enhance because of prevalence of ordinary ways of thinking under the influence of ordinary language. People may often find themselves unable to express, describe and represent things that they (those things) are not recognized by ordinary language or they (those things) may not have degree of codability (the way in which a language can express certain ideas). Ordinary ways of saying relies only on familiar and familiarity to the effect that any imputation or expressivity being in contravention or incongruence with the certain familiarity of ordinary language would 4 0 sound outlandish, odd, strange, irregular, preposterous, unconventional and unorthodox. To exemplify, it is prescribed, by ordinary language, to end a letter with the best, best regards, sincerely yours, yours sincerely, truly yours, yours truly, and such fairly explicitly recommended ways of saying (with the variation of use depending on for example, American or British English). But what if one ended a letter with "I wish you cascades of lilacs", "I wish you a deep look into the moonlight", "I wish you a passionate reflection on the inward bridge of being and becoming", "I wish you an ebullient dance in "the wild meadows of imagination"? Well, the ordinary way says, "But that's not what people say", or " That's not what you should say". A question as big as history is posed here: "WHY"? How many times have we witnessed that people coming from shopping begin a voluminous chattering about their shopping experience or any other mundane activity? (There are innumerable books on ESL in language education covering the translation of this kind of expressiveness.) But how many times have we witnessed that people display their expressiveness (after being exposed to a delicately gentle breeze swirling around them) on the experience of experiencing the breeze, or how many times have we witnessed people language their looking at the moon light, or sunset? Yes, we often hear exclamations such as "wow", "amazing", "get a load of that", "cool", and" so forth. But why do people rarely express their experiences or even think about their being expressive as regards to areas, realms, and horizons which are not as routine and regular as shopping for potatoes and tomatoes? Are they too busy thinking about the prescriptions of ordinary discourse? The subtlety of the argument is not the embroidery and embellishment or ornamentation of phrases, words and sentences so that they commend themselves to the audience in a sensory level. The same lexicons and signs 4 1 which feed the production of ordinary discourse can be used otherwise to elucidate a streak of discourse being brim with awakening and rethinking.5 The manifestation of discourse can dramatically and fundamentally change by virtue of a change in the creative side of how else and what else can be said, thus offering a New World within the discourse. (This is contrary to the discourse of the ordinary language that keeps on repeating, replicating and copying the same world whose stability is always the main concern). The point is the element of thoughtfulness and its representation in the discourse in that the discourse of ordinary language serves as the only path for driving while it shows other paths unthinkable to pass. It is blocking the possibility of thinking otherwise and legitimizing one way. In other words, ordinary discourse does not promote examining our lives by examining how we think. To ordinary discourse, certain ways of thinking are to be the first and foremost priority. The cover page of the magazine INSTYLE, August 2001 reads: "How to wear. How to get the fit that flatters you". 5 Let's look at the following from Dostoevsky's novel, The Double where it is shown how human language can be inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it, to display and reveal the potentiality of diversity of language, the diversity and potentiality that every day ordinary discourse unflinchingly and relentlessly extinguishes and erodes. ' The low-ranking clerk Golyadkin, in Dostoevsky's novel, hires a magnificent carriage to take him down the Nevsky Prospeckt. He wishes to impress. But suddenly another carriage pulls up alongside his. Inside it sits not a woman to be seduced, but his superior Andrei Filipovich to be obeyed. No place to hide. Caught where he should not be. The other had come too close. Eventually Golyadkin was to go mad: "Should I bow or shouldn't I? Should I acknowledge him? Admit that it is me? Or should I pretend I'm some one else, someone strikingly resembling me, and look completely different?" Golyadkin asked himself in indescribable anguish. "Yes that's it: I'm not me and that's all there is to it." So he thought, his eye fixed on Andrei Filipovich as he took off his hat to him. "I, I, I... no, nothing, sir," he stammered in a whisper. "The fact is, it's not me .. . . Yes, that's all there is to it." 42 To get outside the border of the ordinary or standard language may open up possibilities for thinking in terms of new avenues which may be totally concealed in oblivion while some one is cooped inside the ordinary language. In ordinary language, the relationship between word and meaning tends to reduce in a one to one relationship where the complexity and polysemy (for one word there is more than one meaning) are about to fade way. Ricoeur (1991, p. 449) maintains that "in scientific language there is an attempt to reduce as much as possible this polysemy, this plurivocity to univocity: one word-one sense." He points out that " it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can. Therefore, not to elude or exclude this plurivocity, but to cultivate it, to make it meaningful, powerful, and therefore to bring back to language all its capacity of meaningfulness." The reductionism of language in ordinary, scientific, and artificial language (such as the computer, etc.) may produce and promote reductionism in thinking where the horizons need to be understood often in virtue of the precrafted touchstones of ordinary language, and the emphasis is usually laid on univocity. This reductionism of language contracts, shrinks, dwindles, shrivels, and narrows horizons of meaning and the range of seeing. It imposes certain limitations and prescribes certain ways of visioning; it describes certain ways of examination and proscribes what ever exceeds the limits and boundaries of prescribed paradigms embedded in the heart of the ordinary, standard, univocal, and privileged. Excavation of meaning is here confined to places where the licensure for their investigation is issued by the univocal propensity epitomized in utilitarian language being inextricably linked to the ordinary language. Ordinary interpretation of ordinary language may favor the seduction 43 of attributing ordinary language to ordinary people [an imputation made by ordinary language itself]. Nonetheless, the extension of ordinary language is not necessarily tantamount to the ordinary people since ordinary people too, as human beings, also bring infinite polysemy through their being . (See and think about this following example from Jack London: "From some bo on the drag I managed to learn", [drag here means street] Chapman, 1986.) Oddly enough, the designation of ordinary to those who may not concur with the orchestration of utilitarian language where meanings should be understood as stipulated is vehemently supported in the rhetoric of culture. In order to be labeled as "fine", "star", "successful", "skillful", and being " non ordinary", one needs to be quite ordinary. Paradoxically enough, the adjective serves as both complimentary and derogatory. So, in order to be festooned with the confirmation, endorsement and approval of the culture of moving in the direction as it is expected, one would find oneself in the perplexity of dispensing with inwardly moving in the direction of infinite possibilities of thinking, looking and languaging, or putting on the apparition of 'competence' as introduced in the language of the established discourse of the ordinary. This also reveals the difficulty, in Shotter's terms (1993) of formulating " intelligible, alternative accounts of ourselves". Shotter explains this well by saying, " In fulfilling our responsibilities as competent and professional academics, we must write systematic texts; we run the risk of being accounted incompetent if we do not. Until recently, we have taken such texts for granted as a neutral means to use how we please. This, I now want to claim, is a mistake, and now we must study their influence" (Shotter, 1993, p. 25). 4 4 No matter how big, luxuriant, sumptuous, deluxe, and ritzy (Does ordinary language like these kinds of adjectives with the ensuing noun?) the castle of ordinary language may or might be, it is circumscribed, girdled, circled and surrounded by predetermined and pre-packed circumferences, peripheries, laps, and cycles, coils and circuits, borders and boundaries, limits and margins, rims and verges, bounds and fringes, edges and outlines which impose and enforce thinking inside the same area, orbit, range, region, circuit and perambulation. Signs and symbols, signifiers and signified, description and interpretation, exposition and analysis, exegesis and hermeneutics all make sense within the margins and limits of the said castle. The moment one tends to get out of the castle, he/she will lose his/her sense making; he/she will be charged with breaching the edges and will be threatened to be ostracized. You make sense as far as you abide by living and breathing inside the castle, and looking out from the castle. You will be proscribed and restrained to leave the castle and look out outside the castle. No matter how sharp your eyes see, your vision is contained and enclosed by the castle since you would be surrounded by and through the castle. Hanging out in the castle and groping for the panes to look into the stream of fluidity outside the castle, the castle dweller may borrow trappings and accouterments to smell the taste of discernment and farsightedness. Notwithstanding the high standing and position, the spectator who looks from the castle into the outside is inescapably checked and curbed by impediments emanating from the castle. Ostensibly, the dwellers of the castle, in their interaction and association, support and uphold the attunements attested by the castle. The castle dwellers, accustomed to the walls and fences of the castle, think, perceive and identify every thing in accordance with their habits shaped inside the castle. Not surprisingly enough, they are shaped by the 45 castle, i.e. the ordinary language they use. If they experience seeing the sunrise from within the chambers of the castle, they see the light as it appears from with in the chambers. No wonder they may not get inebriated by the sun rise as some who have experienced breaking the rims of the castle, who have infringed the fringes of the castle and who have violated the limits of the castle. The castle dwellers may enunciate the experience being totally preposterous, unthinkable, nonsensical, fatuous, ludicrous, risible, unreasonable and outrageous. The walls of the castle, castle dwellers stricken by the castle argue, will evidently and definitely say there is no possibility of going beyond the limits. Surprisingly enough, should there be any sign, conveyed from outside the castle to the inside, it would be immediately understood by the taxonomy from inside in that those trapped by the castle go for identifying the meaning through the frameworks and classifications generated within the castle. Some may argue that there needs to be a known in order to help the unknown be known otherwise the unknown will not become known because of other unknowns; the unknown needs to be known by some other known. Nonetheless, the point here is not to defy this principle, the point is to expose how the ordinary language (recall the analogy of the castle) shapes a compartmentalization with which the things are translated and diagnosed as 'meaningful', or 'meaningless'. Let's get outside the castle and see some examples of non-ordinary language beyond the rims of ordinary locution and away from the margins of ordinary diction: 4 6 The Recount of a Dream The other night I had a dream that may not be a dream according to the analysis of a dream. It was a lucid yet inconspicuous dream where aberration, absurdity and sensibility marshaled their lunacy and delicacy. I dreamed of Jacques Lacan galloping the horse of signifiers, lashing and thrashing the signified. He was incessantly sliding and slithering, wearing the inflammatory shoes, trampling upon the flow of luminosity and serenity, satirizing and upbraiding Freud with a bar of repression. I saw Jacques Lacan scuffle with Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur severely slapped him back and let him fall while Lacan was hastily chasing the omnibus of signifiers in and out insisting on satyriasis. Signifiers were unanimously crying vociferously berating and flagellating Strauss and Saussure for extraditing them into the hands of Lacan exasperating and exacerbating the separation anxiety between signifiers and signified. 47 Schopenhauer and Berkeley were tickling each other giggling and making a mockery of Russell who was stuck in the mud up to his head, counting the particles of sense data to corroborate the denial of anything else. Jakobson was whistling toying with metonymy and metaphor while Freud was shrieking, nailing his head against his topographical model of mind. Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, De Man, and Jameson were groping and grappling either above or below the belt to solidify their own saddle. The mob, the crowd, the people, the public, the lay were looking with insouciance, avoiding the purchase of nomenclature. The dream went on and on. And I saw a boy going to the post office of education to mail his letter of loneliness when he crashed into the envelope of skepticism and doubt. And I saw a girl singing a song in the fog stricken imagination. She was singing a song dating back to the time of cave dwellers. This was just a dream or a dream of a dream, perhaps not a dream. 48 A Tour to the Flea Market of Signification I saw a man sitting in the Isle of mysticism Sipping the chalice of insight and Gnosticism. He just got back from a tour. He got soaked in Romanticism, imbued in Structuralism then indulged in Post Structuralism. He shook hands with Ire, danced with Strauss, and flirted with Fish. He read through "The Yel low Wal l Papers", "Life in the Iron Mi l l s " , and "The Awakenings". He went through the market to purchase a key to unlock the signifiers. The market was down. It was empty and dull, according to Derrida. He got lost on the way. But he came back right away. He bought a pair of shoes. Shoes of lunacy. He said "Good bye" to urgency. And he is dwelling in immediacy. A Lyrical Negotiation on the Meta Cognition If I tell you that I read you like a Book, Would I be allowed to Call you a textbook? If I read you and I agree that you have meanings in your textbook, What would you say to he who says you do not have any meaning? That have neither a diction, nor a conception? If I see you with all your text, Within context, Fully blown, Highly grown, How could you say that this is an act of meaninglessness? If I share my signifiers with yours, and divide your signified into mine, Would you then say that this is a construction or a Deconstruction? If I see your words, Worthy, worthwhile, Do you still deny that Words are words, But there is out there a world by far bigger than words? If I would say that I have keys to your meaning, Would you not say that you buy those keys? If I take you with your meaning, Translate you in to something, May be 'being", Would you not see that you have some extra meaning, More than meaning, literal meaning, Above meaning, beyond meaning, Now "becoming", Not just being but becoming. 51 A Jaywalker Just Yelled. Way down south in the Isle of Solipsism, Feminism is honking the horn. Postmodernism has broadsided the wheels of certainty in the crossroad of reality. The ociffers 6 of globalization are patrolling around to modify the bumper to bumper of localization. They call it fender bender. Structuralism has jammed the brakes. The omnibus of discombobulation has been burning rubber, Eating every ones' dust. New Criticism has just conked out. The cyclists of deconstruction are putting the pedal to the metal, sticking out their tongue, giving bird to Feminism. New colonialism, being tailed by Colonialism is souping up the engine. It has already had a pile up. Ethnography is blinking just in the fast lane of ambiguity, getting a booster from Phenomenology. Empiricism has side swiped Structuralism but is going to gas up soon. 52 Besides, it's got a blow out when it blew the doors off Romanticism. Yeah, it's a traffic jam. Traffic lights are still off. "Hey, watch your steps", a jaywalker just yelled. He is giving a boo to all the traffic signs. Oh, he is shouting again: "Signs should be changed. Let's walk in the open air. Breathe in liveliness. Signs should be changed. Pretense should surely go. Signs need to be changed". 6 Slang for officer 53 An Inordinate Feeling There is a feeling associated by a highly intellectual stimulation coupled with a superordinate rapture replete with a sublime form of consummation, far beyond the sensuous intercourse. The feeling first swirls around the oceans of mind, travels through every corner of the brain, ripples through the psychosomatic system and erupts in the entire realm of my comprehension, ranging form the primordial senses to the most complicated modes of cerebration, cogitation and rumination. It just gets myself pulled up to the apex of reflection, the apogee of contemplation, climax of reverberation where I feel all my particles ascend to a position where the nucleus of my being is absorbed in the nectar of a flight immeasurable in size, quantity and pace, inexpressible in ordinary talk where the borders and margins are already set. This feeling slides, glides and larks any time I write or read what I love to write or what I love to read. 54 Emerging E r a of Absence In the famine of friendship, in the bruised season of estrangement and alienation, in the imponderable time of separation, in the emerging era of absence, where people are unbelievably addicted to contagious drowsiness, where people look for the blanket of loneliness soaked in the pestiferous torrential rain of fastidious and persnickety obsession of self mortification, the fragrant dews of the avenues of watchfulness sing the following song: We go as far as acacia, along with rabbits of our hearts in a spring day of our soul, we say good morning to the ebullience of blossoms, to the orange flowers of affection and adoration, we bristle with meadows, maturity and preparation, we rise with the waves and dance with the fish. We cultivate in the field of praying, in the pasture of presence, in the lea of intuition. Who Would Cry For Them? Thousands of secrets, Thousands of dreams, Mi l l ions of wishes, Mi l l ions of freaks, Carry the people of the earth, The people of the day, The people of the night. Who would fathom their hearts? Overflowing with pain, grief and bait? Who would try their fate, their calamity? Their raid? Who would come and save 'em? Who would commend their gain? Their honesty and their pains? Who would cry for them? Who would cry with them? Truly and with a range? The Play of Existence I am sitting here on the roof of existence Watching every where with persistence. Oh, I am so overwhelmed, so inundated, So submerged. I see the curtains go away, the foams fade away, Stars scintilate, pseudo selves run away. Sagacity penetrates, perspicacity celebrates, Sapience arrives. I witness profusion, infusion, copiousness, Cornucopia of Light Illumination, Luminosity, Scintillation, Refulgence. I see the sunrise of chandeliers, Progression of beacons, Festivity of light, And Glory of galaxies. I hear the rhyme of existence, The reverberation of commendation, The intonation of glorification, The resonance of beauty, The vibration of love. I touch the prism of light, The rapture of passion, The radius of feeling, The pulse of desire, The lips of composure. I smell the fragrance of sublimity, The redolence of transcendence, The bouquet of perfection, The scent of a golden dream. I taste the vivacity of life, The livelihood of faith, The richness of trust. Oh, I embrace monotheism, I disavow solipsism, And I dance with existence. Savior Are you the one Who sings a song? Late in the night When all but God Are on the run? Are you the one With whom the sun Shares the light? Are you the one Who is the one Close to one? If you are the one Whom I recall, Give me a hand Before I die. Days of My Life Saturday I was just a kid. Sunday I grew a bit. Monday I flew away. Tuesday I was not the one to bear. Wednesday I plunged in to gem. Thursday I started to reap. Friday I was no longer with days. Tomorrow I wi l l reach heaven. 61 Explosion of a Thought The arcane, esoteric, polemical, mystical me obsessed with sesquipedalian manifestations of profound, surreptitious and ful l - laden desire of plumbing away from the non-sequitur, yearning for antimetabole, paradox, animetha, and epistemic layers of quiddity, brim with grandiloquent, bombastic, magniloquent appeals of reality, being at the mercy of pandemonium, hue and cry, chaos, turmoil, unrest, and escapist proclivity of circle of solipsism, fraught with tivium, resurgence of dualism, diathesis of life, with seeds of secretion, emanating from all channels of neuro physiological and psychological modification, ramification, extension, bifurcation bedizened with trinkets, gaudy appearance, gloating and brassy, is sitting here. 62 The above mentioned examples indicate an exit from the route of ordinary language where every thing is ordinarily connected, attached and associated in line with the precrafted formulations and prescriptions. The ordinary language is characterized by univocity, namely the establishment of one signifier for one signified without any attempt for fostering the polysemic facet of language. Ordinary language tends to harbor reductionism and simplicity so the plurivocity is dissipated and eliminated. The same tilt is perceptible for scientific language (Ricoeur, 1991). In ordinary language, the emphasis is on the identified margins and limits where the borders establish the modality of movement. Any endeavor to trespass the borders and go beyond the fences of ordinary benchmarks of meaning is considered a nonsensical, meaningless, paradoxical, absurd, and futile enterprise. The concepts created by ordinary language cultivate and promote movements in line with the implications of ordinary language. Thus, the possibilities created by ordinary language are confounded and bound in the realm of ordinary language in that ordinary language necessarily excludes other possibilities that do not fit its implications. Furthermore, ordinary language imposes special inclusiveness and exclusiveness on meanings and their reference to words and the discovery of semantic relation between signifiers and signified would occur in light of the pre-packed and pre- defined fringes and outlines in accordance with ordinary language. Ordinary language identifies associations and connections in the realm of its enactment and prescribes movements in line with its paradigms and formulations. Therefore, the imputation of adjectives to nouns and predicates to subjects or the establishment of copulation for affirmative or negative propositions would transpire in 63 accordance with the ontology of ordinary language namely what can exist and what can not exist which in turn would give rise to what can be said and what can not be said. The ontology of ordinary language would evidently proscribe sayings or utterances that do not have congruity and conformity with its definitions. So, if one wants to make an utterance for instance that X is Y, the affirmation should be already fine with the ratification of ordinary language. Ordinary language does not like looking at possibilities, its mere focus is on the actualities where every thing is already shaped, made and set, where every thing needs to go from the frequented road of ordinary, where borders, limits and spectrums are clearly defined, where the travelers rarely ask themselves if there would be any other way to describe and define things, where every one borrows words and diction from the vendors and the anticipated check posts in the beginning, in the middle and in the end of any destination. Ordinary language gets one accustomed to its essentialities so one can hardly think about the possibility of getting out of it. It is like entering a one-way highway where every one can scarcely dwell upon any other movement except that the highway makes you take it for granted. Ordinary language brings the descending of language where language is nothing but a mere instrument for the lowest possible form of interaction and communication. Varieties of the uses of language, the boundless realm of language, the breadth, the width, the opulence and the abundance of language are ignored, suppressed and neglected in the directives, prescriptions and practices of ordinary language. Thus, people are manipulated to think in terms of the requirements, necessities and explicitness of the practices arising out of the ordinary language. " This instrumentalization of language is the most dangerous trend of our culture" (Ricoeur, 64 1991). Ordinary language limits and circumscribes the capacity of meaningfulness in language. Ordinary language attempts to establish and stabilize a one-to one relationship between word and meaning. Playing with the range of meanings and cultivating the richness of language are proscribed in ordinary language. There is no further meaning except the set, clarified and indicated meanings in virtue of the ordinary language. The full capacity of language for delineating the relationship between man and the world, man and himself, man and the other, is overlooked in ordinary language. The capacity of meaning of language is narrowed, contained and encapsulated by the fences of ordinary language where further excavation is severely punished. The main goal of ordinary language is to facilitate communication. Thus it serves as an instrument for conducting communication in its lowest possible level. Ordinary language is intertwined with the reiteration of reality as already described. There is no room for thinking about redescribing or reconsidering the pre-established description of reality. Accordingly, reality is examined in the neighborhood of ordinary language, and in the vicinity of ordinary diagnoses which do not question the underlying elements of the surface meanings and predications. Ordinary language nurtures people whose thinking is reflected in their univocal reflection of reality, where borders are marked and described in line with the frontiers and premises of pre structured ways of saying. Hence, people nurtured by ordinary way of looking at things hardly allow themselves to come up with non-ordinary or extraordinary modes of expressiveness and thinking where creativity is saliently shining. Non Ordinary Language How can language extend itself to its very limits, thus discovering new reverberations and resonances within itself? How can the possibility be open in creating and inventing new discourses instead of getting stranded within one actualized way of discourse? How can meaning be generated and regenerated within language? How can language teach us new ways of thinking, and formulate new ways of experiencing? How can the creation of meaning, hence creating new worlds to look at, be possible through the inventive power of language? To Ricoeur "it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 449). Therefore, the capacity of enlarging, increasing, enhancing and augmenting the meanings in language can be done by poetry. Here, we see a new horizon of possibilities where new looks at things, and new ways of thinking, can emerge. These possibilities can open up new worlds where we can, in Heidegger's word, "dwell". It may be in line with the same perspective that Gadamer mentions that we don't just try to conceive and understand what is in the poem but to reach the kind of world to which the poem belongs or which it projects and displays. In and through poetry, one may say, language can be liberated from the constrictions of ordinary discourse, and new layers of reality can be revealed. 7 The taxonomy of ordinary versus non-ordinary is not to propound a dichotomy, a binary or an either-or border. It rather discusses the range of possibilities within discourses in terms of their oscillation, their capacity and their incorporation. In this sense, it reveals the leap, the shift and the capacity of soaring the magnitude of expressiveness and the openness of components of discourse, thus allowing every one to experience this elevation. 66 In "The Meaning of Meaning", LA. Richards (1923) in discussing the language of poetry lays emphasis on the element of being "emotive" versus being "symbolic" as a distinction of the language of poetry. On talking about the distinction of the language of poetry, he does not consider truth or falsehood as the primary determinants of the language of poetry. Rather, he focuses on the evocative function as the main fundamental constituent of such language. Very much poetry consists of statements, symbolic arrangements capable of truth or falsity but for the sake of the attitudes which their acceptance will evoke. For this purpose it fortunately happens, or rather it is part of the poet's business to make it happen, that the truth or falsity matters not at all to the acceptance. Provided that the attitude or feeling is evoked the most important function of such language is fulfilled, and any symbolic function that the words may have is instrumental only and subsidiary to the evocative function. (Richards, 1923, p. 150) Swanger (1994) abides by a similar approach and in "response to poetry" states that poetry may not consist of a right or wrong language. While the above analysis of poetry can present one salient of poetry, the language of poetry, however, can not be limited to only evocative function. The evidence in this regard can be born from a huge series of poetry in different languages which demonstrate other major function in addition to the emotive and evocative function. In Arabic and Persian (Farsi) languages, for example, there are innumerable examples of works of poetry where very deep philosophical or even logical arguments, discussion, viewpoints and perspectives are presented. Numerous books of philosophy, logic and metaphysics have been written in strictly explicit poetic language. Among the salient ones, one can refer to Jalaleldin Roumei, Hafis, Sa 'adi, Attar, Ghaznavee, Qa 'ani, etc. Following are some examples to illustrate the point: (Translations are mine) So the heart would be as a substance and the world as an accident (formalities) 67 How can the shadow of the heart serve as the goal for the heart? Jallaleddin Rummie.8 Although my heart made much haste in this desert, It did not know a single hair, but took to hair splitting. In my heart shone a thousand suns, Yet, it never discovered completely the nature of a single atom. Ibn Sina (Avicenna). Oh, You who bestowed upon wisdom, All forms of gratitude and appreciation are ultimately yours. Hadee Sabzevaree. Eastern ways of thinking have not limited rationality and forms of discourse in some recognized ways of expression but have acknowledged numerous modes of thought associated with numerous forms of discourse for the presentation of rationality. The above mentioned examples indicate that poetry can also be used as a language which presents not only evocative and emotive messages but very deep fundamental philosophical points and perspectives. The assumption that poetry enters the scene when the intellect gets feeble needs to be seriously reconsidered. Therefore the subject matter of poetry can be as vast as possible (to use Leggo's word [1998] "capacious") covering infinite realms while revealing worlds for dwelling. In English Language too, one can see, for instance, Immanuel Kant's complex reaction against the extreme Cartesian rationalism. Kant discusses the problem of the "sublime", exploring numerous issues in poetic aesthetics. Following Kant, a number of thinkers continued exploring the language of poetry in their works, revealing the 8 The terms substance and accident are here used in purely philosophical contexts. Roumei's poems are brim with philosophical discussions. 68 application of this discourse as an effective yet inventive way of examining everything. Johann Gottfired von Herder (1774-1803) enormously inspired by Kant, proposed that the language of poetry is a psychological necessity. His writings and thinking had a great influence on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) "whose clear perception of linguistic relativism is scattered through his writings. He who doesn't know a foreign language, knows nothing of his own") (Freidrich, 1986). These and related ways of thinking had also an influence on leaders of English Romanticism such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1832) who studied in Germany and communicated with Wordsworth, Shelley, and other "shapers of what was a fundamentally new world view" (Freidrich, 1986). Almost simultaneous with the formulation of new ideas in questioning the paradigm of language by Frans Boas (1858-1924), Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) propounded a philosophy in which language was considered the essence of intellectual and emotional values, asserting that language was to a large extent poetry. (We will, later, discuss two dramatically different perspectives on the precedence of literal or figurative meaning in the mind, thus covering a perspective which strongly believes that the language of mind is essentially poetic). Along with the same emphasis, we notice the attack on the foundations of linguistic positivism and positivistic semantics by thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899-1951) who revisited the relation of thought, language and reality. While introducing the perspective on linguistic relativism and poetic indeterminacy, Freidrich (1986) pinpoints the existence of different worlds within the heart of different languages noting that "it is persons with experience of foreign 69 languages and poetry who feel most acutely that a natural language is a different way not only of talking but of thinking and imagining and of emotional life" (Freidrich, 1986, p. 16). Whether at the individual, sociocultural, or some universal level, language is "inherently, pervasively, and powerfully poetic" (Freidrich, 1986, p. 17). Questioning the distinction between literal and figurative meaning, Gibbs (1994) uses ideas and research from psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and literary theory and argues that mind has a poetic structure. His findings overturn the traditional perspective which holds that thought and language are inherently literal. Describing the traditional view of mind as a "mistake", Gibbs (1994) argues that human cognition is fundamentally shaped by various poetic or figurative processes. The traditional view of the mind, he argues, has "imposed limitations on the scholarly study of mental life in cognitive science and the humanities and on every day folk conceptions of human experience" (Gibbs, 1994). Pinpointing the failure of lexical semantics in its traditional accounts and assumptions, he argues that "meanings of many polysemous words can be explained in terms of basic metaphors that motivate, among other things, the transfer of English vocabulary from the domain of physical motion and object manipulation and location (eg. stand in its physical sense) to various social and mental domains (eg. stand in he took a stand on the matter)" (Gibbs, 1994). In his discussion of poetics, Aristotle refers to all kinds of making in terms of language, both in fiction and poetry. Ricoeur (1991) argues that "through this recovery of the capacity of language to create and re-create, we discover reality itself in the process of being created. So we are connected with this dimension of reality which is unfinished". 70 Speaking on the role of metaphor and the process of becoming for language, Ricouer (1991) describes the language of poetry and its significant role: "language in the making celebrates reality in the making". Making a distinction between the language of ordinary speech and the language of poetry in dealing with reality, he remarkably presents a very striking characteristic of ordinary language versus the language of poetry: "And the rest of our language in ordinary speech and so on has to do with reality as it is already done, as it is finished, as it is there in the sense of the closedness of what is, with its meaning which is already asserted by the consensus of wise people" (Ricouer, 1991). The discourse of poetry is an inventive discourse that cannot and does not need to remain within the confirmation and endorsement of ordinary discourse where relation, imputation and assertion need to be made in light of some strictly predefined formulations. The language and discourse of poetry recklessly goes beyond the borders of considerations and prescriptions. It opens new ways of considerations, new ways of looking and new ways of thinking. This is one of the most conspicuous features of the language of poetry: not relying on the existing ways of looking and thinking while introducing new and exquisite ways of reflecting on reality, beings, and things. The discourse of ordinary language needs to have the approval of specific forms of presentation whereas the discourse of poetic language creates and invents new forms based on the production of new configurations. Structuralism from Russian formalists, the Prague school, and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and Genette made considerable contribution in offering an exact scientific description of the codes and paradigms of language. Creative expressivity and inventive expression of consciousness can not be codified in that we cannot limit the 71 expressiveness and variety of thinking to several identified ways. This is mainly because of the complexity of human production of new ways of expressing, new ways of looking at things and new ways of thinking about, or on things. Here we see the element of being unanticipated in the heart of the language of poetry; the discourse of poetry, contrary to the discourse of ordinary speech, is not predictable. This lack of predictability is in direct contact with the idiosyncrasy of movedness and connectedness to the open possibilities of the world, continuously and constantly. In other words, the language of poetry, as one example of the non-ordinary discourse, links the perceiver to the open understanding of happenings in an unrestricted way. Let's use an analogy to get the point across more clearly. You are passing by scenery where towering trees and plush greenness have brought an inexpressibly amazing spectacular panorama and as you lark along the rims of the path way, you also smell the redolence of a breeze gently rippling through everything under the shimmering sunlight and you also get saliently impressed by the imminently looming vista displaying an esoteric, arcane and recondite dispersion of an exclusively unique shade where the sunlight ceases to flaunt its piercing footprint: an ineffably bedazzling combination of the light with the smoothness of the shade under the trees where the genuflection of the trees' appendages have powerfully enriched the ornament colorfulness. There are different ways you can approach the described presence around you. One is to hastily pass and just consciously get the minimum compulsory sensory stimuli because of being vehemently preoccupied with mundane and quotidian occupiers from paying a bill and fixing a flat tire to gathering the thoughts on recapitulation of the agenda in a meeting, etc. Quite differently, one may openly experience the presence of what was described as meticulous, perceptive, perspicacious, and comprehensive as 72 possible. This open encounter with the reality allows the perceiver to examine the surrounding and its appurtenances ubiquitously. Every breath would be taken in with a penetrating cogitation and every feeling would be associated with a sharp concentration on the analysis of the inward and outward flux of happenings. The observer proactively takes it upon himself/herself to inquire into the process of crystallization of the happenings in his/her sphere of understanding, thus getting the experience intertwined with his /her exteriorization in enunciating the experience. The former is similar to the ordinary discourse and the latter to the non-ordinary discourse such as the poetic discourse. As the analogy may suggest, the first way is constricted in its preventive parameters, i.e. the previous preoccupation with things that stop the open experiencing of the experience to the effect that the preoccupation serves as an impediment since it tends to preserve the already engaging prompts, namely the previously crafted needles of stimulation in the arena of mind whereas the second encounter tends to explore the new appearance of reality as it spreads itself out in kaleidoscopic facets. It is good, again, here to remember Aristotle's concept of entelecheia, the potentiality to see things in terms of potentialities and not in terms of actualities. One may say that the poetic discourse is a discourse that does not shut down any door to look at realities and offers the possibilities of opening infinite windows to look at things. Poetry, therefore, gives rise to the fusion of ideas and perspectives in an explosion-like production of meanings satiated and soaked in inventive encounters with the realities. What could prevent, in our analogy, the orchestration of a poetic discourse is the excessive preoccupation that is characterized by virtue of the interference of memory. In other words, memory acts like a blocking bunker in the way of the openly inventive 73 investigation by projecting certain elements of engagement and highlighting their priority, precedence, and identification, hence displaying mappings which sounds of high prominence and attention in comparison with other things. That's why, if the passerby is asked why he/she overlooked and ignored a look into or an attention at the surroundings, he/she may indicate that there were other more important things to attend to! Another factor may be a culture which crops up consciously and unconsciously in inhibiting the promotion of a poetic discourse. People may be so obsessed with special indoctrination and insinuation that they keep themselves away from looking into realities beyond the ordinary discourse since the ordinary discourse may have got them entangled in particular engagements and concerns so stridently that they summarize, synopsize, condense, and encapsulate the whole world into the subject matters of insinuation and intimation. (The role of mass media in instigating, generating and prompting these insinuations needs to be taken into consideration here). To look further into the discourse of poetry as an indication of non-ordinary discourse, let's look at the following piece of poetry as the opening lines of "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" from T.S. Eliot: Let us go then, you and I, When the evening is spread out against the sky Like a patient etherized upon a table. If we look at each separate constituent of this piece, we see lexical signs that have often appeared in ordinary discourse, too. Nonetheless, the integration of all the constitutive parts of this piece in their present configuration has developed, certain aesthetic and conceptual uniqueness that carries along a special impact on the audience 74 producing particular playfulness along with certain thoughtfulness. As the interaction theory of metaphor suggests, a creation of similarity can happen in a metaphor and understanding metaphor does not simply lay emphasis on some preexisting but unnoticed aspects of the meaning or relationship of similarity (Black, 1955, 1962, 1979, 1981). When looked at separately, the relationship between the evening, sky, and an etherized patient may be too far to be tied to. The mapping of ordinary discourse gives the licensure to pass only certain paths. (Examples: Hey, look at the sky, Good Evening, the patient is in the hospital, this needs to be etherized.) The poet, however, creates and and explores new relationship where novel perspective on things i.e. the evening and the sky are presented. This art of establishing and shaping newly wed relationships between or among concepts by depicting and portraying new dimensions of a similarity or illustrating a novel contrast would constitute one of the main characteristics of poetic language and discourse. Language of poetry, therefore, does not borrow its underlying components from the prescribed fixed sources of enactment the way the ordinary discourse does. Language of poetry conducts a reflection on novel and new-sprung modes of thinking while seeking exquisitely artistic and superb relationships among or inside the myriad of realities. Ricoeur (1991) discusses the creativity of language in relation to the objective linguistic codes. He claims that My philosophical project is to show how human language is inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it, to reveal the diversity and potentiality of language which the erosion of the everyday, conditioned by technocratic and political interests, never ceases to obscure. To become aware of the metaphorical and narrative resources of language is to recognize that its flattened or diminished powers can always be rejuvenated for the benefit of all forms of language usage. (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 465) 75 Examining the meaning of creativity in language and its relationship to the codes, structures, or laws imposed by language, Ricoeur argues that: Linguistic creativity constantly strains and stretches the laws and codes of language that regulate it. Roland Barthes described these regulating laws as 'fascist' and urged the writer and critic to work at the limits of language, subverting its constraining laws, in order to make way for the free movement of desire, to make language festive. But if the narrative order of language is replete with codes, it is also capable of creatively violating them. Human creativity is always in some sense a response to a regulating order. The imagination is always working on the basis of already established laws and it is its task to make them function creatively, either by applying them in an original way or by subverting them; or indeed both-what Malraux calls 'regulated deformation'. There is no function of imagination, no imaginary, that is not structuring or structured, that is not said or about -to-be said in language. The task of hermeneutics is to charter the unexplored resources of the to-be-said on the basis of the already said. Imagination never resides on the unsaid (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 470-471) This philosophical presentation of creativity in language can have significant consequences for language learning and language education since it rigorously suggests that the approach towards language can develop a difference in application as well. In other words, one can use the same lexical signs and signifiers of the ordinary language and change them creatively, thus introducing new signifieds on the strength of new signifiers. We are so drastically attuned to our habits of being soaked in the ordinary discourse and our thoughts are so strictly geared to the lava of ordinary ways of expressivity that we rarely think about being expressive in ways other than the seemingly recognized ways. The point is not to enlarge the magnitude of formalities for saying or to extend the latitude for bombast of saying; the point is the demonstration of the crucial impact of various sayings on the thinking and the introduction of new ways of thinking by virtue of new ways of saying. It is in our languages that we construct the reality of 76 ourselves and everything around us. If this language cannot go beyond what it has been customarily insinuated to do, the reality will not be anything except what it ordinarily means to be, or what it is allowed to be. But if the language can question the existing parameters and paradigms, it will develop new ways of looking and thinking, albeit new paradigms again. The reality, therefore, is not going to be what it used to be. The non-ordinary discourse of poetry has this capacity to invent, to create and to initiate new ways of looking at the world, new ways of contacting things, and new ways of thinking about the existence not as displayed in the taxonomy of the ordinary discourse but beyond that. Let's look at the following piece to see how the objectified signs of language can violate the habits of identification as prescribed by the ordinary language: Gourmet Restaurant I am sitting in a restaurant In the city of contemplation Dining philosophy and psychology With just a bit of analysis. I am going to order some poetry For dessert. I look at every one. Some are making a pig of themselves 77 With positivism, Others are scarfing out a whole load of behaviorism. They are gulping down Watson and Skinner. At the corner, some are avidly having phenomenology with Isomorphism. Down across the hall, Some are mixing Zeigarnick effect With Horney's basic anxiety. What a combination! Oh, I see the waitress carrying a tray Full of slip of tongues, Tropism, Positive transference. She freely associates with every one. She is wearing Leibnitz's limen of Consciousness, You can see her monadology From behind her skirt. 78 The way she walks can not change your perceptual constancies. The guy on the other side is salting his Phi phenomenon. I hear the lady on the left side: "Waitress, may I have some Titchener's structuralism? "Of Course. How would you like that Ma'am? "Medium with stimulus error"! "Are you sure? It is not good for your health." "Don't care a pin. I'm gonna have a blast." I overhear them and I am flummoxed. Oh, I see the sign, Today's Special: Determinism with reductionism. A lady is striking a match. She is puffing out I.A. Richards' tenor. She is wearing a lipstick of reference-symbol-referent. Yet you could see Kenneth Burke's abstraction in her countenance 79 When she smiles. She is sitting in the smoking isle Of systematic experimental introspection. On a big table over there, there are ten men and women ordering collective unconscious with archetypes of anima and animus on the sides. They are all wearing suits of personas! They are going to have personal unconscious for the starter. Oh, I am parched with thirst. I need to refill my glass. I've had Wundt, Piaget, Freud, and Erickson. I am chewing on Kant's transcendence. "Waitress. Is there some pure water of cognition?" I'm afraid we're out of it. Oh. I am parched with thirst. I need some fresh air. 80 Language of Narratives and Stories Since the early stages of life, stories constantly and continuously appear and paint the pages of our life, giving colorful, kaleidoscopic, psychedelic, or dismal, doleful, and dejected countenance to our living. They get themselves embossed in the calendars of our recollections and have their impact carved in the cornerstone of our memories so we describe them not only as the events and episodes that have transpired, but as happenings that bring forth a narrative truth. Stories are inescapably interlaced in language since their emanation, their narration and their emergence rely on language both in their primordial proscenium and their consequential interconnectedness. Narratives not only represent what is going on in the rostrum and substructure of life, but they also shape, frame and mold our lives. They constitute our attitude, behavior and course of action, as they organize our experience. Social sciences have recognized the powerful role of stories in constituting, organizing and shaping our lives. "We organize our experience and our memory of human happening mainly in the form of narrative—stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on" (Bruner, 1991, p. 4). The role of stories is also well recognized in psychotherapy so "therapists came to recognize how much stories affected clients' perceptions and their interpretations of those perceptions" (Nichols & Schwartz, 1998, p. 401). This interest has been well intensified among social scientists and psychologists on the strength of Foucault's work on the relation between the discourses of power and their dehumanizing role in oppressing those who do not fit those discourses, i.e. the narratives that shape and justify the distribution of power in all levels (Foucault, 1980, 1984). 81 On the other hand, Postmodernism in its defiance against the positivism and certainty of Modernism eschews any grand narratives and any kind of generalization in an interpretation of narratives and stories while laying emphasis on the vitally significant influence of language in affecting perceptions of reality. This has generated a keen interest in reconsidering even the assessment techniques most commonly used by social scientists, psychologists, counselors, social practitioners, etc. The corollary of this attention towards language and its pervasive influence has led to revisiting the variegated manifestations of language in numerous cultural contexts. According to Whiston, "an insensitive counselor may perceive the client's reticence as resistant rather than due to cultural differences, which could encourage misunderstandings and problems in the relationship. The counseling process is predominately a verbal process and the subtle influences on language need to be considered by a multicultural competent practitioner" (Whiston, 2000, p. 315). Intralinguistic and Extral inguist ic Components of Stories Stories comprise two distinct substances, namely intralinguistic and extralinguistic ones. The intralinguistic constituents of story embody themselves in the semiotic entities or signs by which the story or narrative is told or narrated in a particular linguistic system of a language. These constituents can be discussed and analyzed in light of a specific taxonomy of the particular semiotic entities within a distinctive semiotic system in a particular language, for example, English. Here, we may single out and discuss distinct appearances of language in particular units such as syntax, phonology, morphology, etc. A story unavoidably unravels and discloses itself within some specific 82 linguistic system thus generating and producing special semiotic entities. We may look at the semiotic entities of a story and examine and identify specific constituents in an intralinguistic level. (See Figure 6.1ntralinguistic Components of Stories). Intralinguistic Components of Stories Extralinguistic Intralinguistic Constituents Semiotic Entities Phoneme Lexicon Morphemes Syntax (Figure 6 on intralinguistic components of stories). Let's assume that we hear or read a sentence, such as "I want really to understand it", in a story which is essentially exteriorized in an assortment of sentences and clauses in a particular language, i.e. English. We may look at the intralinguistic constituents of the sentence and examine one or some aspects from a selective point of view within the intralinguistic systems of the language being English in our case here. For example, in the sentence, "I want really to understand it", mentioned above in our hypothetical case, we notice a split infinitive. A split infinitive is a structure in which "to" and the rest of the infinitive is separated by an adverb. Although a lot of people consider a split infinitive 83 'bad style', they are quite common in English, particularly in an informal style. (The famous American writer Raymond Chandler got very angry when his British publisher 'corrected' his split irifinitives. He wrote a letter saying 'when I split an infinitive, god damn it, I split it so it stays split.') The intralinguistic components which were identified in our analysis make sense in a specific semiotic system viz. the linguistic system of English language. They do not make any sense in another language such German, Arabic, French, Farsi, etc. since these constituents lie in the heart of their producing linguistic system in that they are enclosed within the system in which they were born. In other words, the appearance of specific signs with specific characteristics within a specific linguistic system is only encased in the given linguistic system and cannot happen in any other linguistic system. The phoneme "P", for example, (whether aspirated such as in 'pet' or non aspirated such as in 'spat') only occurs in the English phonological system although there may be similar brothers and sisters for the same sign, say, in Persian language. Hence, the "P" in English is entirely different from v in Farsi or Persian language. In this sense, stories can not be transferred from one language into another language since they appear within semiotic signs of a linguistic system which makes sense only in that particular language. The extra linguistic components of a story reveal the story's predilections, relations, representations, and revelations on extralinguistic realities. Here stories display their presentation of things such as relations, passions, actions, state of affairs, events, positions, knowing, existence, absence, etc. The phenomena being disclosed in this stage of stories produce propositions, statements, and enunciations which ontologically and 84 epistemologically describe realities which are constructed in the process of narration of narratives or stories (See Figure 7. Extralinguistic Components of Stories). Intralinguistic Components of Stories <^~~^ Extralinguistic Intralinguistic Constituents Extralinguistic Constituents Ontological Stage Epistemological Stage Figure 7 on extralinguistic components of stories The extralinguistic components of stories and narratives can be transferred from one language into another language through translation. Here we encounter the component which cannot be encapsulated in circumscribed borders thanks to the 85 complexity of the underlying constituents of narratives, i.e. human complexity of action, state of mind, events, etc. For the same reason, we can not formulate the happenings of the stories in a definitive way for each story is tantamount to a new birth of meaning in a semantic level, albeit old in the semiotic level. Although, productive attempts have been made to explore the patterns of transpiration and explain the quiddity of happenings and their form of occurrence in narratives such as the Aristotelian concept of plot or the typical five- act tragedy as described by the German critic Gustav Freytag in 1863, as well as the relevant conceptual offshoots such as climax and denouement, one cannot invent the 'what' and 'how' of a not yet happened story thanks to the unpredictable element of human involvement in the process of action within the narratives. Therefore, one can not certainly say how a story will be made although one may be able to partially explain how a story has occurred. In other words, any story is characterized in a unique way because of the exclusively complex human constituents which construct the semantics of the narrative beyond the familiar and identified ways. So although there are expressed ways which may be common to numerous narratives, each narrative has an unexpressed way compared to previously expressed narratives which is going to be presented through its narration. The extralinguistic substance of narratives also presents and represents the ontological perspective of the story so the extralinguistic component can display the existential and non-existential categories within the story. Stories also introduce knowing and ways of knowing in an epistemological level in that they report ways or sources through which knowing manifests itself. This may happen both explicitly or implicitly within the circulation, buoyancy and construction of narratives. Let's consider the 86 following segment from "The Life of Emile Zola" to see how the extralinguistic plays a role in a story. To save Dreyfus we had to challenge the might of those who dominate the world. It is not the swaggering militarists! They're not but puppets that dance as the strings are pulled. It is those others, those who would ruthlessly plunge us in to the bloody abyss of war to protect their power. Think of it, Alexandrine, thousands of children sleeping tonight under the roots of Paris, Berlin, London. All the world! Doomed to die horribly under some titanic battlefield unless it can be prevented! And it can be prevented! The world must be conquered, but not by force of arms, but by ideas that liberate. Then can we build it anew, build for the humble and the wretched! That's good! I must remember that. (Emile Zola) (From theMovie, the Life of Emile Zola) In addition to the presence of the semiotic units which have physically given rise to the production of the above part, there can be an extralinguistic component in the above section which, for example, acknowledges the ontology of ideas as a significant extension of the ontological taxonomy. One can also see the introduction of a new way of knowing amidst the semantic units of the above. The extralinguistic constituents of the above cited segment of the story incorporate numerous entities such as the relation of the domineering pole in the world and their ploys in manipulating others, the concept of oppression and its happening in various modes, the passion for liberation and the state of oppression, etc. The Dialectic of Intralinguistic and Extralinguistic Components The intralinguistic and extralinguistic components are reciprocally linked together: in order for the extralinguistic component to appear, the intralinguistic component should already be present. In other words, the content needs an expression to be sent out, otherwise the content would remain latent in the unenunciated and unexteriorized stage. Here we see the joint and mutual cooperation of signs and semiotics with semantics. Language as discourse parades in narrative here producing the 87 relationship between the mind and the world. Humboldt's presentation of discourse here well elaborates the point: "discourse is the creative process of giving form to both human mind and the world, of forming man and reality at the same time" (Ricoeur, 1991). Therefore, we see the indispensably solid role of discourse in the configuration and existence of narrative to the effect that any narrative brings forth its own special discourse. According to Ricoeur "discourse is this power of indefinitely extending the battlefront of the expressed at the expense of the unexpressed" (Ricoeur, 1991, p.69). In order to understand a story, we need to go beyond the intralinguistic components and explore the extralinguistic reality of story and its discourse which opens a new world. This understanding belongs to inward factors which should search for the meaning beyond the level of semiotics. In the book 'Philosophical Grammar', Wittgenstein (1974) introduces such a deep understanding. Wittgenstein describes a situation in which you receive a card from a loved one that says, "I arrive in Vienna on the 24th of December!" Wittgenstein describes the phenomena in this way: They aren't mere words! Of course not: when I read them various things happen inside me in addition to the perception of the words: maybe I feel joy, I have images, and so on. But I don't just mean that various more or less inessential concomitant phenomena occur in conjunction with the sentence; I mean that the sentence has a definite sense and I perceive it. But then what is this definite sense? Well, that this particular person, whom I know, arrives at such and such a place, etc. Precisely: when you are giving the sense, you are moving around in the grammatical background of the sentence. You're looking at the various transformations and consequences of the sentence as laid out in advance; and so they are [laid out in advance], in so far as they are embodied in the grammar. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 153) This understanding which is embodied in the "grammatical background" does not consist in the intralinguistic or linguistic understanding. Nor does Wittgenstein suggest that. This understanding (in our case, of narratives and stories) partially depends on the linguistic environment in the intralinguistic level so the hearer or reader must be able to have essential familiarity with the assortment and configuration of semiotic signs in a particular language. More important than that, the understanding should occur in the grammatical background namely the conceptual background which provides the integration of the meaning with our own experience so it would enable to us to get connected to the semantics profoundly. This understanding is not a solipsistic and subjectivist understanding, nor is it a Romanticist one. Strikingly interesting, in both levels of intralinguistic and extralinguistic constituents of narratives and stories, language is ubiquitously present with variegated modes of presentation. Language in narratives, both for the reader and the teller, presents ways of being in the world, ways which are fundamentally tied to weaving and constructing ourselves in the process of our narratives. So we are inseparably interwoven with our narratives through the language or discourses which emplot and construct our identity. Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1984) propound their claim in this connection that we discover and create ourselves in relation to a world. One of the salient constituents of each narrative is its possibility of opening a world for the reader or the hearer of that narrative. Stories, in this sense, present not only multifaceted ways of expressing the courses of action, but also they offer stimuli for further stories to be shaped. This prompting and immanent characteristic of stories is substantially related to the function of memory and its implications in the process of narration. The hearer or reader of a story can find potential stimuli and incentives inside the story which can generate actual manifestation of images, impressions, recollections, inferences, affects, emotions, etc. Therefore, the receiver of a story or the one to whom 89 the narrative is narrated is not merely taking in the reality of a story as it is or as it tends to be, but he/she is lead towards an act of narrating and story-telling for himself or herself too. This should not superficially and deceptively purport that the receiver of the story would be equally placed in the status of the narrator in the intralinguistic and extralinguistic levels. It, however, suggests that the receiver of the story is not only getting but will be making his or her own narrative(s) in light of the stories he/she is subjected to. Thus, narratives bring narratives within themselves and by themselves. They do not solely narrate but they invent or open the possibility of further narration within themselves. This narration making inside the stories reveals the conspicuously powerful role of stories in thinking. The prevalent assumption in the Western way of thinking has been that rationality and thinking rationally do not have congruity with narrative thought. Narrative thought is not promoted as a preferred way of thinking in analytic and logical ways. Challenging this way of thinking, works by Havelock (1976, 1982) and Bruner (1985) are examples of the attempts to demonstrate that rationality can not be circumscribed and circumvented in one form of discourse, and narratives can be as effective as other modes of discourse in revealing the reflective and critical form of discourse. Stories' influence on thinking and their own demonstration of thinking can be discussed in light of the discourse of stories. The first thing stories reveal is their outstanding role in determining what we notice and what we remember. They highlight things that are distinctly defined and emphasized. They magnify and yet minimize things. They euphemistically and euphoniously portray things while they derogatorily and 90 deprecatorily expose other things. They bestow ways to explain things and through this they shape our behavior on the strength of their impact on our experiences. The patterns of happenings (if any can be found), the diachronic and synchronic thematic elements, the fusion of emotional and psychological constituents and their sporadic or harmonious distribution in the varying streaks of the plot, etc. in a story propose modes of thinking which may not have a necessarily compatible agreement with our understanding of thinking, but entail worldviews, perspectives, and affirmations of negations which can even boil down to an analytical way of thinking. Let's look at the following piece from Jane Austen's novel Pride and Prejudice: "She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain temper. When she was discontented she fancied herself nervous. The business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news." Apart from the direct method of revealing characters in a story being quite common in prescribed methods of literary analysis and diagnosis, this piece, in its extralinguistic level, incorporates various representations of reality through language. Let's look at some potentially polemical questions which can be unraveled in our first glance: 1. What is the relationship between getting the state of discontentment and the state of nervousness? Is this an etiological relationship? Or purely accidental? How can a feeling of discontentment be compromised through a subjective occurrence of fancying with nervousness? Is this not a demonstration of how mind can escape from one thing through resorting to something else? 91 2. There are four recursive uses of "was" in the above-cited piece. What does this recursive conjugation or inflection of the verb suggest? Is this conjugation not an indication of the relation between two things in an existential level? 3. How come the descriptive adjectives are all cited in a negative way? (Little information, mean understanding, uncertain temper.) What do these adjectives imply in a thinking process? Do they not at least display that there are contrastive modes or oppositive units beside these adjectives that have been the subject of juxtaposition upon the exteriorized enunciation of their diametrically opposing counterparts? 4. The piece suggests, at least implicitly, that the business of one's life should not be limited to only getting the daughters married. Is this not a perspective on life? Is this not one way of thinking about how life should be versus how life is? Is this not a worldview determining the enactment of "should" in a process of life? 5. The piece also suggests that some, at least one person to the knowledge of the storyteller, find visiting and news as the source of peace and solace. Does the emphasis on the anaphor "it" and its relation to life not suggest that there are or there can be other solaces in life? Is this not a way of thinking and differentiating some ways from others in the Aristotelian taxonomy of the particular and general? Any story inescapably uses verbs and accordingly tenses. Aside from what the content of the verb is and what action or what happening it reports of, the inflection of a verb in different levels indicates that something gets actualized in a way or is created at least in light of a certain embodiment. It follows that the narrator or storyteller considers that way of actualization as the way that could be descriptive of a particular objectified or even subjectified entity in different levels of appearance. As the organizers of our life, 92 stories can, in this stage, translate what exists and what does not exist and can present interpretations on what exists and what does not, thus influencing our ways of looking at everything including ourselves. This way of understanding narratives would go beyond the perfunctory analysis of stories in a shortsighted way which is only confined to some specific books of literature and some special abodes of instruction and education. On this way of understanding narratives and stories, Bruner (1986) says: By the mid 1970s the social sciences had moved toward a more interpretive posture; meaning became the central focus—how the world was interpreted, by what codes meaning was regulated, in what sense culture itself could be treated as text that participants read for their own guidance. (Bruner, 1986, p. 8) If we go beyond the description of Hume in introducing image as the residue of an impression, we shall not be sufficing to explore the sensory fields, namely sight, hearing, touch, etc. So imagination will not merely act in a passive way. Rather, we exceed the definition of imagination as the place of fading impressions. Parallel with this understanding, we can notice Kant's theory of schematism where the imagination acts in a productive way so we can see the generation of meanings from this place of imagination. Here, imagination and creativity move together. This also indicates the crucially vital role of stories in expressing not only the familiar ways of discourses and the known ways of analyzing realities but also the unfamiliar and non ordinary discourses which shape our meanings inside our own stories too. In light of a flight beyond the quotidian way of understanding stories, we come to this significant and liberating realization that every one, no matter how poor or rich in the production of the verbal exteriorization of stories might be, is a storyteller. So we constantly and continuously tell ourselves stories. This understanding can be liberating, 93 since it allows us to revisit the stories we tell ourselves or we allow others to tell us. Stories which may not necessarily appear in books, movies and places where we are accustomed to hear stories, can also turn out to be stories, albeit not in conformity with our already established ways of defining story telling. Plato's attack on narrative and certain forms of discourse, in this sense, is itself tantamount to one form of story, one form of organizing our life, one form of expressiveness that constitutes one way of living. Stories, therefore, not only appear in our recognized taxonomy of storytelling, but also marshal their forces deep in our various modes of thinking, even in our philosophical contemplation. In this sense, we are born with and into stories, we grow with stories, we fight and challenge beside and against stories. We let stories shape our lives. 9 4 Let's see the following examples in which the non-ordinary discourse expresses itself within narratives in a non-ordinary way: The Narrative Of 'We' and 'I' (We and I took a shower of hermeneutics last night.) One day in the finale of the melody, on the eve of composing, we drove into the golden lucubrating composition of trepidation, petrifaction and intimidation. We lingered on the portico of explicitness to watch the ambiguity of elucidation. We went through the purgatory of glamour. Deep in the purples of the island of dormancy, we came across the illusive rhinoceros crooning with deer. We heard a crocodile with the tears of a dragonfly, we crossed the bridge of absolutism, and we mingled with trinkets of rebellion, insurgency and objection. We saw the girls of arguments and demonstrations pluck us from leaves of syllogism. We slept in the jaconet of angels as far as the sunset of zephyr. 95 Isolation fell upon us and we were circumvented and surrounded by desolation and seclusion. The superannuated rhapsodies and ravishment began gaping, waters went up their knees, and amidst the dampness of allegory, the ocean of metaphor displayed its parlance. In ourselves, we found the alley of proportion, symmetry and isometry; we witnessed the white cloud of liberty, the bantam, unpretentious, diminutive, mignon bird of happiness, beatitude and bliss. We heard the turbulence of fire, the discipline of the plants. We milked our bamboozlement, consternation, and bafflement. We castled the leopard of detachment in the gypsy like cage of hubris. We abstained from juxtaposing the sun and the candle. We conceptualized spring even when the facade of countenance was brim with tears. We walked through the farm of ebullience when our heart was in dire need of a beacon light of hope. We saw the pulses of the rabbits' heart relying on the palpitation of our walks. We extinguished the sunset to say no to loneliness, we awakened the sunrise to appear in the altar. "We" changed into "I" and "I" changed into "We". We went through monism. I embraced monotheism. We galloped in the galaxy of locution; I 96 launched satellite to the solar system of diction. We examined the Milky Way of subjectivity. I played with the Lesser Bear and the Greater Bear. We had intercourse with Venus. I made love with the moon. We lied down on the tiles of sentiments; I gazed at the tintinnabulation of elation. We habituated the brutality of sentiments to the urbanization of emotion. I imagined an oasis on the brink of estrangement. We yelled in the avenues of denial, abjuration and abnegation. I scuffled with tycoons of submission, obedience and acquiescence. We spread our hearts in the balcony of our expectation. I waited for the cascading curly hair of the lyrics in the veranda of blossoms. We saw God taking a shower in the tears of His beloved. We drove in to a celibate candle which never experienced marrying a butterfly. I crashed into the sheep gazing at the footstep of the wolf. We yearned for chandeliers. I ached for fruits tasting like miniature. We danced with apothegm. I larked with apotheosis. 97 The Pragmatics of You I was somnambulating in the M i l k y Way of fervor and passion out of sensibility and not stupidity when the bees of parlance stung the tender cheeks of my sentiments. So I call on you to plumb how precisely and distinctly the measurement of collyrium has been calculated from the center of our eyelashes. And I urge you to see how close the architecture of altars is linked to the eyebrows of eternity. I would like to measure the density of your eyes so you feel the special weight of my tears. I would like to constitute two atoms of eternity on the strength of one molecule of your smile. I want to travel through the meanders of your complexion, your countenance and your pigmentation to see the celestial gems of collyrium. I would like to set myself parallel with your eyelashes, tangent with the semicircle of your eyebrow. Then I wi l l change the composition and 98 configuration of minute, incapacious miniscule universe of any sorrow, lamentation and hardship. I would like to hear the flowing secretion of your pituitary glands, releasing adreno cortico trophic hormone stimulating your adrenal cortex. I would like to invent a thermometer for the qibla of your eyebrow. Let me illustrate your tears, let me paint your sigh, let me shape my semantics in your physiognomy, let me let your soul sculpture its mould. Let me untie thousands of maritime knots from your eyes. Let me calculate the cryptic, clandestine, surreptitious taverns in any corner of your eyes, to see how many goblets I can take. Let me, under these pulchritudinous ravishing white flowers of intention and meaning, take just one piece of your reaction to solidify my demonstration. 99 Philosophical Catch-Cold Having a philosophical catch cold, my mind took some pills of modernism in the hope of getting recuperation. Before I could say Jack Robinson, my power of analysis got a splitting headache. The hypothalamus of my contemplation soon started a number of malfunctions and the thalamus of my emotions reported severe disruptions in the relay station because of receiving incoming sensory stimuli poisoned by unquestionable certainty soaked in a free base of generalization and prefabrication. Delirium, vertigo, and parochialism started raining in the farm of my insight, intuition and wisdom. M y hippocampus started yelling vociferously against the suffocation of emancipating memories by modernism pills. The limbic system, the basal ganglia and the cortex staged demonstration to challenge what they called the Parkinson's disease of imagination characterized by degenerating the heartful liveliness. I could almost hear the second by second objection of parasympathetic branch profusely crying for the paralysis of poetry due to Korsakoff s Syndrome which brought psychotic behavior for my creative analysis. The sagacity of my mind immediately prescribed a mystical electroencephalography of the mind beyond the 100 magnetic resonance imaging of empiricism. The side effects of the pills of modernism were soon alleviated by the illuminating interaction of exhaustive contemplation away from bioavailability of modernism. I began barfing, throwing up the topography of modernism with its squeezed junky food. Here I am feeling better with a little bit of frustration in the neuro muscular junction as a repercussion of the poisonous medication. M y beta-blockers are working better relieving my hypertension of statistical packaging. M y inferior colliculi and superior colliculi can now access the sound and visual localization of dialectial lyrics which had been cooped in the crack down of modernism. M y reticular activating system of seduction is relentlessly tempting me to take some anti biotic of modernism with the B complex of post modernism to get really ameliorated. I am going for an Intramuscular Injection 101 Recall of a Moment I recall hearing the pulse of existence amidst the suspension of my chronic anxiety fraught with pandemonium and diathesis. I heard the split of a second, which avidly called for consecration of attention, with all its grace on the brink of the border of nihilism. o I listened to it carefully and notice how delectable would be to have just a simple loaf of bread and appreciate the magnitude of magnificence away from the obsession of self-assertive materialism which savagely and brutally spoliate the appreciation of invaluable moments drowned in the swamps of self-immersion in the unmentionably horrendous alienation of the soul. 102 In Search of Narratives This week, I walked through time and places, and bumped into fountain -heads of erudition I had never seen in any class of learning. I came across a watercourse singing like a crooner. I listened to its reverberation, which deciphered: Every drop in a rivulet is like a cause warmly embracing its effect. I learned causality then. I ran into wallflowers incessantly genuflecting, benevolently sharing their fragrance and lavishly diffusing their inebriating redolence. I learned magnanimity then. I drove into sunlight bravely and bounteously beaming on every thing and every one including the bats. I learned compassion then. I crashed in to history rife with narratives burgeoning every where from Babylon to the White House, from abbe to Sir, From Pandora to Spice girls, from Hades to Las Vegas, from Shinar to seventy-nine Park Avenue. I came across people wallowing in their stories, vomiting their narratives, wailing for their anecdotes, exfoliating themselves. I ran into others glorifying their parables, emblazoning their diaries, wassailing for the book of their narratives. 103 I got baffled, flummoxed and discombobulated by the flurry of commotion, agitation, exasperation, irritation, exacerbation and aggravation, cryptically moving in the pulse of narratives. I drove into people whose prisons were way bigger than Alcatraz; they were the prisoners of their own prisons, the dungeon of hubris, and ignorance. The train of politics burning narratives as its fuel to carry on the course shocked me, running over narratives to pass by the goals. I bumped in to the crowd spell bound and transmogrified by the diabolical despotism disguised in enticing cynosures. I was about to disintegrate, to smash into pieces by despondency and despair when I bumped in to prophets, the gold, the silver, the immaculate chandeliers, festooning narratives with virtue, piety, purity, and integrity, excellence and worth, gilding the lines of narratives with their enlightening souls. I came across a lady whose heart was more tender than lilacs, who was born out of fragrance and gave rise to sun light. I paused for a second and I learned how to write my own narrative. 1 0 4 Hope Amidst the dark nights of despondency when the nightmares of failure, fiasco, annihilation, devastation, and delirium ferociously echo in the dismal channels of desperation and frustration, when the fulcrum of being is paralyzed by the antagonizing impediments which havoc the mansion of life, hope appears as a panacea which dissipates the deleterious and noxious inundation of erosion of life. When speculative rationalization incarcerates man's choice of action and declares the nullification of going further, it is hope that emerges and removes all hurdles, and all impossibilities on the strength of what seems to be absurd but is an illuminating perspicacity. Hope is the key to overcome the insurmountable, the insuperable and the insupportable. Hope speaks every where, exists every where, in the scintillation of sunlight, in the refulgence of moonlight, in the innocent complexion of children waiting for maturity, in the flight of birds of passage, in the callous hands of breadwinners, in the tintinnabulation of the limpid water going form the bridge of mysticism, in the irresistible smile of girls 105 who know what motherhood means, in the indefatigable passion of boys who wrestle with the time of obedience, in the eager eyes which yearn to consummate. Hope is the essence of becoming, the substance of moving, and the elixir of revitalization, vivacity and livelihood. Hope is the ineffable perseverance on tapping the iron bound door of impossibilities, unacceptibilities, and having faith in opening. Hope, faith and love are all together. 106 They Call It "Education" Way down south northwest east in the exhibition of solipsism, there is a pavilion called 'subjugating education'. You need to get passes to enter the exhibition, to be called educated. To get the passes, you need to take off your sense of "I ness", you need to wear the high heeled shoes of pretension, ostentation and fabrication. Down across the hall of the exhibition, you see masquerading bogus subservient of subjugation honking the horn of monopolizing regulations to mould you in to packages. They set your clock and wind you tuned to their own calculation of regression-progression. They give you the soporific wake-up call that synchronizes for you what to see and how to see. Inside the pavilion, you see multitudes of transmogrified sycophants of subjugating education calling for the methodology of diaper. There are huge pulpits in the pavilion with effigies making faces cachinnating and deriding the authenticity of hearts, teaching you elaborately how to play Dr. Jackyle and Mr. Hide. This is the bitterness in the chamber of subjugating education. 107 Back Yard I flip through the pages of the past and I bump in to the backyard of childhood where multitudes of recollections and memoirs uncannily reside. I see the unflinching complexion of a little boy who smoothly and surreptitiously slinks along the backyard hunting for the painters of butterflies' wings, the architecture of the moon, the mason of the sun, and the mentor of the flowers. I recall the boy's insatiable curiosity in the pathway of the backyard where you can hear and see the throbbing reverberation of lilacs, the genuflection of carnations and the celebrating dance of elms. 108 Educational Implications In my recent tour to Niagara Falls, I interviewed people on the site as they were passing by the Waterfalls and the mist was running into their faces. I asked them to describe the happening. The people who were asked to describe the scene were coming from all different walks of life, mainly North American with a variance of age, sex and education. Following are some of the answers that were given by people: • The mist is annoying but the scene is beautiful. • It is amazing! • It is so powerful! • Umm, well, it's beautiful. • I cannot. I never thought about that. • Oh, yeah. It is great! • I can't. • It makes me imagine things. • I want to dance. • Wow! Umm, it's amazing. • I don't have words for it. • Cool! • I just know it's so beautiful. • Oh, I don't know. 109 Immediate Consciousness As the answers suggest, all have described the end product of the happening and not the happening itself. In spite of the fact that I clearly explained that I wanted them to describe what was happening and not the effect of what was happening, they gave me the same response, i.e. exposing the effect of what was happening on them and not what was occurring. What does this suggest? The least suggestion is that people, at least in this example, do not have an immediate consciousness of what is happening around them. Obviously, they are affected by what is transpiring beside them that indicates the realization of a response from a living organism. But as far as the immediate consciousness is concerned, people usually overlook that immediacy thanks to their engagement with other things, their preoccupations, their affective associations and their lack of education in this respect. As a result of not having an immediate consciousness or a meticulously immediate consciousness, people may not be able to put into words the subject matter of the immediate consciousness. Above all, once people are not trained or are not educated to focus on the immediacy of consciousness, they are not languaging that immediacy. If this happens in a larger scale, namely if people are deprived of their immediate consciousness, they are not accordingly expressive of the belongings or appendages of their immediate consciousness. Furthermore, if we give credit to this axiom that there is a relationship between people's way of expressiveness or people's expression and their thoughts, we may acknowledge that the more people's thinking be enhanced or enriched, their expressivity can be richened and improved. Accordingly, we may suggest that for people whose repertoire of thinking does not stimulate an opulent imagination and affluent substances 110 of reflectivity, language i.e. expressiveness can not emerge transcendentally. If people were not supposed to think beyond what ordinarily impels them to think, what would their language look like? If people do not focus on their immediate consciousness reflectively, how can they ever express the consciousness and its immediacy? If education does not promote a focus on languaging the immediate consciousness and its ramifications, how do we expect to see creativity in thinking and in language? What happens if education focuses its attempt on languaging the immediate consciousness? How much thinking would change thanks to a shift from being merely receptive to being proactively involved in producing the expressivity that is potential in any immediate consciousness? Since the subject matter of the consciousness in its immediate representation is constantly varied and fresh, would we not most likely witness the freshness, newness and novelty in languaging those unique experiences of immediacy? What would be the implications of a reflectively concentrated attention on the immediate consciousness in respect to multifarious aspects of individual and social life? If people learn to think profoundly and if they get educated to go beyond the predefined borders of languaging and thinking, what implications would this thinking bring in the realm of politics, social life, etc? What are the consequences, impacts and corollaries of meticulously languaging the immediate consciousness in respect to understanding the meaning of "I—ness", "self, "identity", and "self-concept"?9 What would be the role of creativity and its influence on languaging the immediate consciousness? How can creative thinking be reinforced, bolstered and encouraged by virtue of a concentrated attention on languaging the immediate consciousness? 9 Self-concept is one's description of who one is. Identity is one's definition of who one is, namely those things that most fundamentally define who we are (Baumeister, 1986). I l l In order to present a more tangible and a more perceptible account of our questions and their etiological goal, we may single out a number of people and do the following measurement to cast light on the manifest results. We record the conversations or statements and assertion of say, fourteen people, who are asked to describe or express their immediate consciousness in respect to something being common for those fourteen people. In the first stage, we count the number of words spoken by each person. We enter these numbers in column 2 of Table A. We then total the number of words spoken by the group and use this total as the basis for calculating the percentages in column 3. Column 3 should add up to 100 per cent. Table A: (1) (2) (3) People's Name Number of Words Spoken Percentage of Total Words Spoken 112 Continuation of Table A: (1) (2) (3) People's Name Number of Words Spoken Percentage of Total Words Spoken Total Total To get a measure of the creative statements or the statements indicating the immediate consciousness of the person, we go over the recorded tape and identify all such statements. We, then, count the number of times that each person produced such languaging and enter the number in column 2 of table B. Later, we total column 2 and use the total to calculate percentages for column 3. (The percentages in column 3 should add up to 100 per cent.) Table B: (1) (2) (3) People's Name Total Number of Percentage of Total Immediate Consciousness 113 Continuat ion of Table B : (1) (2) (3) People's Name Tota l N u m b e r of Percentage of Tota l Immediate Consciousness Group totals In the third stage, we look at the receptive statements arising from the immediate consciousness. We count the number of such statements and enter the number for each person in column 2 of Table C. We then total column 2 and use the total to calculate the percentages for column 3. (The percentages in column 3 should add up to 100 per cent.) 114 Table C: (1) (2) (3) People's Name Total Number of Percentage of Total Receptive Statements Group totals Now, if we juxtapose these tables, we can look at spread. For example, we may calculate the number spread by subtracting the number of words spoken by the person who spoke least creatively from the person who spoke most creatively. 115 Another measurement can be made if the same group is trained to work on languaging their thoughts profoundly through focusing on their immediate consciousness and harboring creativity of thought. Representations and Obligations While examining the English as a Second language, we are unavoidably bound to address some fundamental and significant questions. Those questions are not merely the questions on methodology where one needs to search for applying the best method so that the learner can learner better and faster. More important than that the questions address the goals in that what are the goals of learning a second language? What is it that that we try to achieve through learning a second or a new language? Depending on our perspective, our epistemological and our ontological systems, these questions will be answered in different ways. In other words, based on our understanding and our answer to questions of what the reality is, how the human experience is organized, what are the ways of knowing, what is important to know, what is the goal of education, what is the nature of language and similar questions, we would design different programs and treat the learners in different ways. Obviously examination of the answers to the cited questions reveal our paradigms and assumptions that play the most pivotal role in shaping our curriculum and policies. On may see the polemical questions and responses in this regard in the burgeoning discussions and studies in the field of ESL which strongly challenge the previously accepted beliefs and approaches about language education. Some of these critique come from the heart of the postmodern, feminist, critical applied linguistics, and political discourses (for example, Benesch, 1993, 2001; Canagarajah, 116 1996; Corson, 1997; Pennycook, 2000, 2001; Vandrick, 1994). There are also other perspectives such the spiritual and aesthetic discourses that challenge the fundamental beliefs and approaches of language education and make a critique on the role, nature and dynamics of language education (Please see, Greene, 1993; Mendelsohn 1999; Vanlier, 2000). Language education whether for ESL or non-ESL mainly lies on pre-established paradigms of language and education which accordingly move in line with the promotion or actualization of those paradigms or their implications. This means that language education can vary if the perspectives on language and education change. The fundamentally significant questions on a language education program ultimately boil down to the following questions: 1. What is language? What is important to learn? 2. What is the goal of language? What is it that we can do through language? 3. What is the relationship between us as language user and the language that we use? Discussing the relationship of imagination, communication and critique with education, for example, Snyder (2002, p. 181) looks into a critical perspective and indicates that "we need to develop pedagogical and curriculum frameworks that seek to endow students with a sense of their place in the new global system, but also with the capacity to view that system critically. At the very least, we can help our students to engage in local forms of cultural critique." Obviously if the underlying paradigms are essentially embedded in certain epistemological and ontological positions, they will support nothing but what concurs with those underlying elements. For example, if thinking is subsumed only in certain predefined analytical and logical prose which excludes narratives, then this perspective cannot appreciate, for instance, narrative as a reflective and critical form of discourse. 117 Since in such an epistemology, narrative is not taken as an ontologically supportive element of thought, language education, therefore, may not foster serious attempts to introduce narrative structures for the goal of language and thought education. On the contrary, a more flexible system of epistemology where the ontological relationships can be sought in a broader perspective, and knowledge and rationality are not doomed to be circumvented in certain prescribed ways, multifarious and diverse specialized uses of language related to distinctive modes of thought are encouraged and supported. In such an epistemology, oral narratives, for example, can be seen as rich and productive in relation to the demonstration of rationality and embodying a distinctive form of language and thought as other conventionally recognized traditions. Therefore, the question of language, literacy, writing, and education ultimately goes back to a question of epistemology and more important than that a question of ontology. What realms do exist for knowing in language education? What exists should be known? (Questions on ontology) What are the ways of knowing? What ways of knowing we should explore? (Questions on epistemology) These questions along with questions such as what is language? What is the goal of language learning? What do we want the language for? need to be examined in any program or project in a language education program. On the basis of these definitions and explanations, practical approaches are framed, promoted and approved.10 The conductors of language education in ESL, for example, write curriculum and educational programs for learners in accordance with their pre-established models and 1 0 University dissertation committees and journal editors more readily accept research supporting the dominant paradigm, and foundations and government agencies are more likely to fund such research (Rappaport, 1977). 118 formulations which prescribe attention towards certain aspects of language. An ESL student who is learning English as a new language needs to abide by not only the regulations, being less disputable in the realm of grammar, vocabulary, etc. but also the discourse(s) through which the regulations are expressed. If we assume that those discourses are predominantly ordinary discourses, what will be the chance of learners' acquaintance with the non-ordinary discourse? What are the consequences of mere emphasis on ordinary discourse in terms of thinking? If the learners are only to focus on strings of 'what they should say' and 'what they should not' in order to pass TOEFL, CBAT, etc. and if they only concentrate on the actualized patterns of expressivity arising from the promoted models, what will happen to their chance of expressing the potentiality of thought in various modes of language and languaging? Once the learners learn a new language such as English, they also face up to the identification of correlation, relationship, connectedness and interconnectedness of not only semiotics (signs) of the language but also the semantics (meanings) within the language. Therefore, when they learn the correlation of adjectives to nouns or adverbs to verbs, they encounter the semantics of what can happen and what cannot happen. Can we say that if language educators open up the semantics formation and allow the learners to explore the possibilities of sense making within the language semantically, learners will understand the richness of language better although their initially made linguistic exteriorization may not comply with the necessary semiotics of English language? In other words, can we say that learners who are allowed to offer manifold ways of thinking in their modes of expressivity, in a second language, may have a better chance to recognize the wildness and vivacity of language than if they are kept within the boxes of 119 "Do's and Don'ts"? How can creativity of thought and richness of expressiveness be experienced by ESL? How can the modes of discourse be enhanced for ESL students so they can think reflectively and not just receptively take a leaf from the book of the pervasive discourses? How can language educators motivate ESL learners to think profoundly? How can language educators make ESL learners language their immediate consciousness? The same questions can be posed to the learners whose first language is English. How can language educators allow learners to find language as a way of being and not just as a means for communication? How can language educators allow learners to reflectively language their immediate consciousness and experience the creativity of their thought? How can language and languaging help the learners explore oneself and shape their lives? The educational speech community, therefore, can be merely the representatives of a series of constructions in the field of language and script obligations based on their authority to weave language and language learning in line with their perspectivized prescriptions and proscriptions, thus imposing obligations against any one who would like to get endorsement in the framework of the community. To put it bluntly, he who writes the program for language education brings his perspectives on language, knowing and existence into the program. Unquestionable replication of the woven regulations would qualify the learners to reach the level of competency based on the diagnosis of the representatives. Interestingly enough, one can trace down the root of the representation and obligations (manifested in "is" and "ought" of the speech community) in the epistemological and ontological viewpoint of the dominant educational speech 120 community. Therefore, if learners move in line with the underlying perspective of the authorities of language program where "what needs to be learned" is defined, they are doing the right thing. A change in language learning and language education of the dominant methodology, programs, and curriculum of the educational speech community requires a radically significant change in the epistemology and ontology of the dominant language education system where the beliefs, views, perspectives, interpretations and definitions towards thinking, language, rationality, and education are shaped, framed and organized. A shift on some applications of one technique and selection of another to get better results in an educational setting without fundamentally questioning the issue of representations and obligations in the dominant pedagogical system of language may develop some superficial alterations in particularized aspects of language education but will not open up the world of possibilities for human learning of language where personal and social growth, creativity, sublimity of thinking, and openly intelligible expressiveness move in line with languaging. So to add computers in classes of language may do not do so much justice to the possibility of looking into the mindful learning as a revisit of questions on what is that we teach, what our areas of emphases, what do we consider learning may do. Above all, expressivity of immediate consciousness and experiencing the creativity of thought would make sense only if the etiological, epistemological and ontological questions of language and thinking are explored and scrutinized in light of questioning the representatives which define the borderline of competency, understanding and rationality within the speech community. The question in the realm of language education both for first language and ESL is this: how can the non-ordinary discourse open new possibilities for a better language education or even a better education? How can the non-ordinary.discourse develop further empowerment and enrichment of both thinking and language for language educators and students of language (no matter first language or ESL)? Overview and Conclusion of the Previous Sections Even in the most pregnant pauses where the silence strikingly reigns, language presents itself and its presence is indispensably linked to the formation of thought, expressiveness of intention and delivery of communication. This understanding of language is not limited to the description of language as a system of signs where the codes or signs identify themselves in a system of signs. Rather, this understanding of language goes beyond the identification and establishment of signs and incorporates meaning making and sense making not only in verbal aspect but in any process of thought formation from concept making and statement production to the most cryptic inner voices where language and languaging are proactively present. Hence, language, here, can be taken in its broadest sense which includes any sort of signification regardless of its exteriorization as an utterance and or its happening in a non verbal form. Language is not only a means for conducting communication and meeting the needs of daily lives, but is a presentation of a being. Language, in this sense, consists in disclosing and unfolding certain manifestations of being. It is a demonstration of one's character in that it presents certain ways of existence, and special ways of being in the world. The unveiling of that with which we live is permitted by language. Language education, in this case, dramatically differs from the consideration of language as a tool. 122 Since, in this sense, language education introduces new ways of being in the world. Along with language education in this sense, the ways of being can change and when ways of being change, ways of one's demonstration and one's character can also change. Language can not be separated from the person in whom language is crystallized. Language consists in a way that human beings encounter the world. Our being is experienced in language. Language allows us to reveal that with which we live. Thus language education, in this sense, can offer new ways of encountering the world, and new ways of being in the world. In this sense, language shapes our life. If the representation of language is circumscribed in narrow and parochial ways, it cannot represent anything but a confined package of presentations defined and prescribed by dominant discourses. Movement, in the limited interpretation of language, is permitted as far as the limiting representatives of language endorse. Consequently, obligations are generated from within the same limiting representations as to what should be done and what should not. If understanding towards language changes, the representations of language as well as the presentation of language would emerge in a new perspective which can accordingly offer new horizons and open up new realms of consideration in both private and public education (see for instance, Herda, 1999). The pervasive influence of language in organizing our experiences, and shaping our being and becoming demonstrates the overarching influence of language in our personhood and selfhood. Language, in this sense, determines what we notice and what we remember. A shift in language in this respect would generate a shift in our definitions, our analyses, our thinking and our behavior. The question of language and language 123 education, therefore, goes back to a question of epistemology and ontology. If our epistemological and our ontological propositions have already blocked our ways and restrained our exegesis of language, our language education is ineluctably bound in the same restrictions. The exteriorization of our thoughts in the context of enunciation and articulation in our languages (the appearance of our thinking in what we say) propounds the dynamics of the mutual relationship between thinking and language in that the expressiveness and presentation of our languages would demonstrate at least our ability to transfer our inner voices. Therefore, what is uttered can be in some from of relationship (not necessarily a cause and effect relationship) with the modes of thinking. Although the question of the indication of thought by language is still a controversial question with polemical responses, our languages open up the ways for exploring our thoughts. Total rupture of language in its fundamentally profound meaning would be tantamount to disconnection and severance of any human activity. If language is so powerfully delineating our lives and if we are shaped through and by the languages we use and we are told to use, how can language education use language to open up the possibilities for a better life, a better living, and a better education? How can language education help us shape our lives through languages we choose to use rather than being shaped by the languages we are subscribed to use? If thinking can be improved through stimulation of our languages to bring new expressivity of what is around us, about us, beside us, for us, etc., what can language education do to improve both language and thinking? As Ricoeur's discussion of language and discourse (1991) indicates, the manifestation of language in a sentence gives rise to discourse. Thus the sentence can be 124 considered as the focus of creativity where meanings can be born and the burgeoning meanings open up new worlds. It is in line with these openings that the understanding and thinking can be transposed through a shift from merely focusing on actualities to looking at and in the possibilities and potentialities. Discourses, thus, are events and report of an open process of mediation between mind and the world. It is in this process and through this process that human mind and the world, man and reality are formed and shaped. Expressiveness is inevitably linked to the emergence of discourse to the effect that any appearance of expressivity generates it own discourse. The dialectic of the expressed and the unexpressed exhibit their conspicuity in discourse. One may create infinite creations through the finite means of language. Ordinary language concentrates on communication, the familiar ways of explanation and description to convey information from one person to the other. The goal of ordinary language, here, is to deliver messages concerning concrete situations being tied up in our daily lives. Ordinary language essentially tends to reduce polysemy which is the potential creativity contained in the word. In polysemy, words have the capacity to mean more than one thing. Ordinary language relies on univocity and cleverly reducing the ambiguities (Examples: I need a cab. How much does this cost? What time is it?). The non-ordinary language cultivates polysemy and manifests itself in narrative and poetry and poetic narrative. Language here constitutes a world of its own. Mimesis is not a copying of reality, but a redescription in light of a heuristic fiction that is to the attempt to redescribe things while searching for many possibilities. Poetry, in this sense, reaches the essence of things. Contrary to Western ways of thinking, poetry is not just a means for evoking feelings and emotions but it can present fundamentally philosophical 125 propositions. There are numerous examples in Eastern philosophy that have been composed in the form of poetry. Also German romantic folklorists were among the first to propose the concept of the universality of poetry and poetic language, a universality in which they included stories (see, Hairi, 1992, for instance). There are solid arguments and demonstrations that indicate rationality is too significant to be identified with a single technology. Poetry and narratives can be taken into account as embodying distinctive forms of language and thought and can demonstrate the reflective forms of discourse. Here language has to be interpreted not only because words are symbols and signs, but also because discourse is fundamentally the interpretation of reality. That means what we utter in one way or the other or what we are subscribed to say defines our realities. According to Ricoeur (1991) poetic language has both a mimetic function inasmuch as it is a heuristic fiction preparing a redescription of reality. That means: poetry is capable of not only creating but also redescribing. It has both creational capabilities in that it creates and yet it can focus on the already described things and changes them dramatically through offering a new describing of the thing. If it is true that poetry gives no information in terms of empirical knowledge, it may change our way of looking at things, a change which is no less real than empirical knowledge. What is changed by poetic language is our way of dwelling in the world. From poetry we receive a new way of being in the world, of orienting ourselves in this world. Even if we say with Northrop Frye that poetic discourse gives articulation only to our moods, it is also true that moods as well as feelings have an ontological bearing. When we feel some thing, or we are positioned in a special mood, the feeling or the mood make up some stages of 126 existence in that they become existent and our existence is partially identifiable ,at least in particular moments and place, through their existence. Through feeling we find ourselves already located in the world. In this way, by articulating a mood, each poem projects a new way of dwelling. It opens up a new way of being for us. If poetic language can awaken the moments of thoughtfulness and can allow the piercing contemplation, how can language education use the poetic and narrative language to foster creativity of thought and fluency of expressiveness among people, especially language learners? If an image is understood as more than a residue of an impression and if imagination is cherished as the place of nascent meanings and categories, and if imagination is understood not only in terms of receptiveness but also in terms of productivity, then language can be well connected to this constantly potential effervescent spring namely imagination. In other words, if imagination is taken into consideration with its creative capacity, then creative language can lie within the heart of creative imagination. Both narrative and poetic language being capable of intermingling in one another drink from the spring of imagination where the vivaciousness is continuously giving rise to new modes of thought, thus novel forms of discourse. How can this understanding help language educators open the possibility of new discourses for learners whose creativity of thought can be poured into their languages? People are often unaware of their immediate consciousness and their capacity to express and language the subject matter of this consciousness. How can language education use the immediacy of consciousness and support the expressivity of that immediacy through empowering learners to use openly the possibilities and potentialities of language in shaping their realities better? The question on consciousness becomes 127 significant here since my awareness of my language, of the potentiality and the resourcefulness of my language, of the dialectics of my language and my consciousness can allow me to see the implications of my language in my life, my being and my choices. So we need to address the issue of consciousness first in order to discuss its implications for language later. Language and Consciousness Regardless of the easy access to the repertoire of the first language in terms of semantics and grammar and the easiness of applying the lexicons to express the needs at least in rudimentary level, language users may sometimes experience their consciousness and mindfulness in spelling out what they tend to say. This may transpire when language users find themselves in a situation where they fail to mindlessly express what they want to say either because they may not have the words to display what they intend to convey or they may not generally know how to say what they want to say. This brings forth the emergence of attention or consciousness towards ways of expressiveness for the language users. It may be proper here to mention the concept of understanding in Heidegger's Hermeneutics where he distinguishes between understanding and knowing. Understanding, to Heidegger occurs when the person finds himself/herself in a state of practical belonging or connectedness with the object of understanding so he/she goes beyond knowing about the object and understands it in the sense that understanding turns out to be a mode of being. Here in our case, the person may feel that he/she knows the language and he/she rarely thinks about what he/she says as it often happens when people do shopping and ask for the price of what they intend to purchase. Nonetheless, they may be entangled, entrapped or stuck in a situation, condition, mood, or circumstances where 128 they consciously seek to use the words and mindfully strive to employ sentences to articulate what it is that they want to say. According to Ussher (1955, p. 80) " The world as world is only revealed to me when things go wrong". It is exactly in such cases when the person becomes so conscious of the language he/she uses or the significance of the type of language that he/she needs to hire to unearth his/her feelings, affects, ideas, opinions, beliefs, etc. For example, if some one plans to write a letter on an important or crucial issue of his/her life, or if one faces up with a situation where he/she engages in a defense, support and championship of what he/she assumes is brutally ignored by others, he/she may find himself/herself in a very sharp state of awareness and mindfulness in respect to the choice of the words, the arrangement of the phrases, etc. This consciousness does not necessarily warrant the production of a finely woven locution which is amazingly riveting in terms of style and opulently rich in view of content. The consciousness or mindfulness, however, cultivates the mindfulness for the user of a language to experience and understand the signification, the impressiveness, and the implication of language, locution, wording and expression. In other words, when caught in situations where acknowledgement of the significance of language becomes necessary, one becomes more conscious of his relationship with the language one uses. The same mindfulness or consciousness can happen in more sublime cases of expressiveness where language unfolds itself in the context of poetic, philosophical and scientific expressions. Here, the poet, the philosopher and the scientist may feel his/her connectedness and relation to language and his/ her mindfulness of the language. For, notwithstanding their command, their expertise and their mastery, poets, philosophers and scientists may undergo and encounter situations where they voraciously seek modes, 129 avenues and forms of expressivity either in terms of form and style or content and substance. This consciousness usually stands out in cases of second language where the language user has not yet gained the necessary dexterousness to express himself/herself. For the same reason, they may witness this mindfulness sooner and better especially if they juxtapose their position, at the time of expressiveness, in their first and their second language. Second language learners can easily connect themselves to their first language's resources where as they may experience some difficulty in regards to their second or their foreign language, at least in the early stages of learning. The very consciousness can boil down to two major questions: 1. What is it that I want to say? 2. How should I say what I want to say? In other words, the questions find their way in both the content and the subject and the form and the style. The person in these states of consciousness can see himself/herself as the perceiver or the knower that perceives and knows his attempt to use language and yet he/she observes his/her need of language. The person can easily experience his/her consciousness regarding the above mentioned questions. We will get back to these questions shortly after we briefly discuss some of the theories and scholarship which in one way or the other deal with the key component of these questions, namely consciousness and expression. According to German Expressivism1the act of expression is not something that can be added or attached to other human characteristics. Every thing that we do and every facet of our human activity, is a form of expression and a form of self-realization and self-unfolding (Markova, 1982, p. 105). Our realization happens in every single act that 130 we do. This brings a distinction between Leibniz's monad and expressivism since in Leibniz's view, monads which are totally isolated, individual/'windowless " substances, move and develop in accordance with a predetermined plan by God. There is no interaction between the monads, yet, the changes and developments inside them happen synchronically based on God's prearranged plan so the changes within each of them synchronize with the changes and developments within other monads. To Leibniz, this holds true for the human soul being a monad too. Expressivists were in agreement with Leibniz so far as he postulated that monads are unrepeatable. Expressivists also maintained that every human being is unrepeatable. Their distinction from Leibniz, however, lies in their agreement with Kant that this is the individual himself/ herself who determines his/her own actions. Again, expressivists departed from Kant since Kant discussed the free action in the context of reason and excluded any other action which may come from irrational motives and desires, etc. Kant proposed that human rationality should determine the human freedom to act: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine, own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only". (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 47). Expressivists' departure point starts from the assertion that each person develops and unfolds according to his/her own code and there is not any universal moral code (Herder, Samtliche Werke, XIII, p. 292). This part may make expressivisim some how similar to postmodernism. Through breaking the grand narratives and negating the universality of Truth, postmodernism, too, focuses on local, provisional and particular truths. lO.The term expressivisim' was coined by Berlin (1965) and has been used by others such as Taylor (1975) and Markova (1982) to illustrate the movement against the prevailing rationalism. According to 131 The emphasis on expression in its general term can also be seen in romanticism where consciousness of one's expression, one's action, one's past, one's history and one's childhood are highly encouraged. Although Sir William Hamilton (1870) attributes the use of consciousness to Descartes and claims that before Descartes, consciousness has been used merely in an ethical sense, the word consciousness has been profusely used in its entirely philosophical senses by a large group of Islamic Philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, etc. (Ha 'iri 1992). Ironically enough, the issue of consciousness has been presented in certain circumscribed ways and has not received enough attention in the Western way of thinking: " Modern Western philosophy has, since its inception, been compelled to exclude certain claims of awareness from the domain of human knowledge, and to brand them as mere expressions of fervor or as leaps of imagination" (Ha 'iri, p.5, 1992). In defense of certain claims of awareness, Ha 'iri (1992) argues:"Yet, the exclusion by philosophical thought of these matters does not, ipso facto, prove the falsehood of these types of knowledge". Ha 'iri ( 1992) brings philosophical arguments to substantiate a wide array of awareness including mystical experiences and particularly knowledge by presence by making a rigorous distinction between a knowledge based on the concept in the mind of something that is itself absent from the mind and a knowledge based on something which is itself present in the mind and whose very existence is inseparable from the knowledge of it. I will elaborate on this further when discussing knowledge by presence. In the realm of psychology, consciousness has often been used to refer to one's knowledge about his/her experience, and the construction of reality. In line with this Markova(1982) expressivisim was mainly characterized in artistic and philosophical modes. 132 approach, John Locke defined consciousness as " the perception of what passes in a man's own mind" or, according to Ornstein (1972) consciousness consists in "subjective life". In the meantime, Freudian psychoanalysis revealed specific domains where awareness is replaced by unawareness or unconsciousness or non-consciousness. Interestingly enough, one of the goals of psychoanalysis and Rogerian therapies is to "expand consciousness of our inner life" (Feshbach, et al., 1996). Back to our questions, one can see that a language user needs to have an awareness of what he/she wants to say whether he/she is aware of this awareness or not. Even in stages of unconscious competence which may happen for a language user, he needs to have an awareness of one sort or the other otherwise he can not say or express what he /she wants to say. Arguably, he may be aware of one layer and not the other ones or some and not all or may be aware of some in the conscious level and unaware of some others in an unconscious level. In spite of a large bulk of unconsciousness that may protuberate, there remains a part, albeit miniscule, which inescapably stands out in the conscious level. Before we go further with this we need to again look at some of the distinctions that have been made in philosophy and cognitive psychology. Some Aristotelian philosophers made a distinction between what they called potentia pura or the fundamental activity to acquire an aptitude , actus primus or the acquisition of this aptitude and actus secendus or the utilization of this aptitude. This was promoted in linguistics by Chomsky with his introduction of competence and performance. Others such as Falvell and Wohlwill (1969) made an attempt to do the same in discussions of cognitive development. This distinction did generate various sorts of controversies both 133 in theoretical and empirical spheres even by people who tried to use the distinction ( see for instance Falvell &Wohlwill, 1969, Sternberg; 1985; Chomsky, 1965; Premack, 1979). Accroding to Chomsky (1979), " linguistic competence (the knowledge of the language) constitutes only one of the factors in performance (Chomsky, 1979, p. 84). He points out that " there is, first of all, the question of how one is to obtain information about the speaker-hearer's competence, about his knowledge of language" (Chomsky, 1979 p. 18). In empirical aspects, the major question was: how do we know about competence if and only if the way to understand competence is nothing other than performance? As long as some one has not talked or written any thing, how can we ever have any access to the repertoire of his/her knowledge of language? In other words competence evaluation mainly relied on performance itself. As a reaction to these controversial discussions, some such as Goodnow (1985) viewed the distinction on the same continuum or put aside the distinction and spoke of moderators of competence. Back to our discussion of the awareness of the language user, we obviously see that whether we agree or disagree with this distinction, or other distinctions such as availability, i.e. what one can do and accessibility, i.e. what one does do, at least of some aspects of what the language user says is at the mercy of his/ her consciousness. In other words, the language user may come to recognize his/her consciousness of the language h/she uses. At this stage, it maybe worth recalling Vygotsky (1962) and his discussion on the direct relationship between consciousness of one's cognitive processes and one's ability to control them. In line with this postulation, he focused on the conditions under which children ultimately gain consciousness and mastery of their own thoughts. So this may suggest that attainment or increase of consciousness can make a contribution to the 134 mastery of thoughts and thinking. So, if this is the case, namely, if increase of consciousness can be of help to the language user, we need to see what this conscious raising or this mindfulness is. Mindfulness and Language According to Langer (2000) "mindfulness is a flexible state of mind in which we are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to the context. When we are in a state of mindlessness, we act like automatons who have been programmed to act according to the sense our behavior made in the past, rather than the present". Focusing on the benefits of mindfulness and the detriments of mindlessness, Langer (2000) evokes to the experimental research conducted over 25 years and mentions "increase in competence; a decrease in accidents; an increase in memory; creativity, and positive affect; a decrease in stress; and an increase in health and longevity" as some of the consequences and implications of mindfulness. Langer (2000) argues that the majority of teaching and learning approaches harbor mindlessness. As our mindlessness increases, she argues, our creativity and the act of drawing novel distinctions decreases. It is only in mindfulness that we can look into alternative ways, and notice new and novel things. It is at the time of mindfulness that we can actively live in the present, situate ourselves in the moment and think creatively about perspectives and possibilities. On the contrary, it is in the mindlessness that we unquestionably rely on our mind-sets and ignore alternative ways. Langer challenges many of our beliefs about learning and argues that these are some of the mind-sets that have been mindlessly learned and work to our detriment. She recommends mindful 135 learning and propounds its consequences: "The result is that we are then able to avert the danger not yet arisen and take advantage of opportunities that may present themselves. Teaching mindfully not only sets students up for these advantages, but has advantages for teachers as well" (Langer, 2000). In the meantime, Langer (2000) indicates that mindfulness "leads us to greater sensitivity to context and perspective, and ultimately to greater control over our lives". Langer (2000) considers mindfulness as some thing that liberates us from our limitations and allows us to learn as creatively and openly as possible. On the other hand, she indicates that mindlessness is not only an impediment for novel ideas and distinctions but is also imposing mind-sets "that have been mindlessly accepted to be true". Our own perusal in the inner layers of our awareness can expose the signification and impressiveness and implication of our consciousness in our activity including our language. Once we let the estrangement of our consciousness be replaced by the sharpness of our awareness and the clouds of oblivion and negligence move away from the realm of our mindfulness, we may experience the burgeoning sunlight of watchfulness, attentiveness and sharpness and their sparkling lights in our enunciation and our articulation. The awareness or consciousness of the language user in expressing the thought may be overshadowed by the user's engagement in things which may not necessarily belong to the moment. In other words, when the language user is not in the present, when he/she is not in the moment, he/she may not discern the sharpness of the awareness and its pouring grace in opening the pores of mindfulness where creativity, novelty, and innovation lie. The cling to the preset ways of listening, understanding, responding, judging and analyzing and its forceful interference in determining the whole process of comprehension and cognition is what exceeds and surmounts the consciousness of the moment. Therefore, those preset ways prescribe certain ways of expressiveness, which have already been endorsed in the context of the "mind-sets". Accordingly what is said can not essentially depart from the already recognized borders of what should be said. Further more, the very expressiveness can also reveal the limiting paradigms and models or styles of thinking which manifest within the preset ways of prescription. On the other hands, the cling is proscribing since it does not allow the stream of any thing except the associated trail of what is already stuffed and suffused. Hence, the reality is looked into in light of the emphasis on preset ways of looking into the reality, albeit part or whole, small or large, particular or general. We need to examine this with thoroughness to avoid any form of misunderstanding. Popular Culture and Mindlessness Popular culture has been studied from different angles including linguistic, Marxist, feminist, structuralist and post structuralist approaches which have examined popular culture based on their selective outlook. (See, for instance, Day et al. 1990). In spite of polemical disputes on the definition, inclusion, exclusion, nature and studies of popular culture, there is almost a unanimous agreement that popular culture incorporates a cosmos of widely shared beliefs and practices. Mukerji and Schudson (1999, p. 3) reiterate this point "We will side step a great many technological disputes with the inclusive claim that popular culture refers to the beliefs and practices, and the objects through which they are organized, that are widely shared among a population". 137 On the other hand, television and entertainment machines would constitute significant parts of popular culture so convincingly that denial of television as the constituent of the culture would be in the words of David Mark (1987) "poor research" or its ignorance would be " suicidal politics". In line with this claim, Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi (1990) and Numbers (1997) report that every week, residents of the United States spend 15 out of their average 39 hours of free time watching television, making it by far the most popular leisure activity. Only work and seeping take most of the time. In a worldwide level, people spend over 3.5 billion hours watching television, (see Haris, 1999). To put all these definitions, debates, and discussions together, we may come either inductively or deductively to at least one conclusion: the constant preoccupation and engagement of people with what the popular culture readily pours in to the minds or has already taken it well upon itself to do so. Whether we exemplify popular culture in horror films or baseball or we take popular culture ranging from television and music to T-Shirts and Mc Donald, we see the ineluctable presence of language in popular culture. Taken in its broadest sense as a system of signs, language entails any system or structure of signification that may manifest itself verbally and in the traditional sense of text or may appear in non -verbal forms and the open sense of text. In either case, pop culture is displayed, transmitted and presented through and by language. Understanding language and its role on popular culture becomes so vital especially if we comply with Heideggar, Habermass and Ricoeur where language ceases to be merely a tool for communication but it becomes a way of being in that one's being is characterized through the language he/she either chooses to use or is 138 subscribed to use. Focus on language as a way of being consists in understanding the language as the dwelling place for being where one can sense his/her being through the language. Language thus displays our being and our becoming. Ricoeur (1982), Heidegger (1971), Gadamer (1988), Habermas (1979) and others consider the centrality of language and its relation with our being as Heidegger describes language "as the house of Being" from which he presents the mutual relationship between the individual and Being. On the other hand, the ontological relationship of language and its creational capabilities disclose the modes of thinking and knowing which lead to the acknowledgement of another ontological relationship that 'knowing is nothing but being'. This focus on language gives birth to a new horizon in language education where the relationship between thinking and expressiveness is constantly examined in views of their interconnectedness with being. So language education becomes proactively involved in revealing stages of being and becoming, and serves as a grand resource and invaluable wealth for promotion of thinking and expressiveness. Language learners not only go through a journey of becoming beside learning a language but also they discover their position of being while exploring the possibilities of becoming through a look into the plurality of possible modes of becoming. Therefore, they do not get enmeshed in any fixed actuality which stops them from mindfully exploring the genius of "and" in the profound modes of thinking. Hence, the openness towards the creativity of language and its flourishing implications for being and thinking epitomize the essence of language education. The quest for looking in to 139 the layers of popular culture and its construction of realities becomes so vitally significant. A revisit on language, education and popular culture on the strength of the above understanding indicates that language shapes the world we live in and constructs the realities we define and describe. We, therefore, shape our lives through the language we choose to use and we are shaped through the language which is used for us. To consider our choices and to reconsider those made for us through many constituents including the popular culture would not be a trivial and miniscule task to undertake since it ultimately boils down to our question of being and our modes of characterization. The question especially in terms of education would be: if learners are to be so engaged in preoccupations of popular culture how can they mindfully reexamine their position? If they are so contained within the sovereignty of pre-defined languages and discourses, how can they acknowledge their freedom and choices in questioning the sovereignty? If they grope for themselves among the placements of simulacra being introduced as the true configuration of identities, how can they ever experience a journey to the knowledge by presence where you feel your presence in spite of the spawned attachments of pop culture? And what does education do if it, in its turn, fosters in the words of Langer (2000) "mindlessness?" Industrialization, political interests and the growth of artificial languages along with the flurry of mass media in various forms tend to keep the use of language within enclosed axes which ultimately diminish or flatten the power of language and its creativity. Political side takings, utilitarian objectives and goals, materialistic aspirations 140 and numerous shapes of parochialism encourage the detention of language and its containment so meanings and language use would be channeled into limited conduits. What would happen if people, if the language user, if the speech community can be exposed to the socialization and cultivation of only specific limited ways of looking at things and into things? It is note worthy at this juncture to refer to cultivation and socialization theories. The cultivation theory, developed by George Gerber, and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania looks at how extensive exposure to media over time gradually shapes our view of the world and of social reality (see Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994). Socialization theories (see Heath & Bryant, 1992, for discussion) emphasize how prolonged exposure to media teaches us about the world and our role in it. To put the argument in another perspective, the limited number of stimuli would develop limited number of responses so the more varied the stimuli be, the more variegated the responses would become. If, for instance, a child is exposed only to certain limited visual stimuli, say a monotonous ambiance in a small apartment, he/she would most likely fail to discern the variety of stimuli that may be available for another child growing up in a place where multicolored stimuli with their manifold compounds appear in the coruscating field of a hand woven carpet. Television may be used as an example of "stuffing," a kind of "mind engaging occupier" where the people are constantly bombarded with stimuli. If your stimuli are composed of X, Y, Z, what is the chance of you thinking of B, F, and L? What would be the chance of people's detachment from the continuously implanting engaging media, if they are ceaselessly subjected to particular modes of expressiveness through the pervasive media? What else can people express if special ways of expressions are often 141 promoted, and recommended? You may explore this further while talking to people in different parts of the United States, for example. You can hear people and say what kind of television program they are watching from their ways of talking and their manners of expressiveness. It is good enough to look at the coverage of the magazines, newspapers, etc. to see the flow of engaging items. How much engaged our mind can be through the flow of all forms of engaging stimuli? It is like people go to the market where there are already certain goods to think about, where there are ways to sell thinking in certain ways, where ways to certain ways of thinking and certain ways of expressiveness are waiting to be picked up for customers. So what would happen to people's potential of experiencing things, expressing them, and thinking about, and over them creatively? I don't argue that people are merely passive recipients of messages without any ability to change what they receive or to analyze what they are given. I argue that if the engagements are so vehemently filling our attention and occupy our focus and time, how else can we think of other things? So what does this customer have of his/her own to think about or to express if the pavilions for thinking and expressiveness are already set up? If the subject matters of thinking (what should be thought of) and the subject matters of languaging are already ready made and well done, what can people think of or can express other than what is already prescribed? Interestingly enough and ironically enough too, hundreds of studies are conducted on television, and mass media where scholarship focuses on studying the happenings inside the media, the interaction between the media and people 1 2 (For example, see Newcomb, 1994). 1 2 I am aware of television studies as an academic enterprise which developed mainly from four major backgrounds i.e. the literary studies that brought the critical analysis towards the study of popular entertainment forms such as novels, radio programs, etc. Cultural studies which initially emerged in great Britain from the works of Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and Stuart Hall. Here in the second facet, 142 The act of 'stuffing', 'engaging' and ' I have something for you to think of is a significant factor why people may not allow themselves to detach themselves from the daily agenda of mind's engagement. It may also be the reason why people do not often experience immediate consciousness since they are so deeply preoccupied with a series of engagements that their involvements are deemed ineluctably necessary. The people's propensity towards meditation these days may be the indication of a challenge against or escape from these 'stuffing' propellants. Ask the people if they did look at the moon light last night, if they saw the sun rise this morning or if they looked at the sun set last evening, if they looked up to see the stars, to see the proportion and symmetry of their position as they looked up, and you may often hear answers in the following ways: "You know what, I am too busy to think about these things!" "I have things to do. I have not got any time for these." " Come on!" If people are so overwhelmed by what they should already think about in view of the pre packaged ways of thinking, can they express except those engagements? If the sources and ways of thinking are already available to stuff particular modes of thinking and special ways of expressiveness, then how could thinking and languaging open up infinite ways of self-realization, and self-growth? What does creativity and critique mean if the borders are predetermined, precontrived and prescribed? there are some differences between American and British scholars such as the former's emphasis on 'polities', and the latter's concentration on 'ideology' in their work on cultural artifacts. Continental Marxism and structural anthropology also had a significant contribution in this respect with the stress on economic determination of social categories by one and focus on mental structures by the other. The mental structures laid emphasis on the deeper structures that constituted human experience from text to modes and forms of social organizations. The third factor was the role of critical sociology coupled with the Frankfurt School of sociological analysis followed by the fourth factor i.e. increasing trend of film studies in the United States and abroad. 143 One of the biggest problems with classes of ESL lies in the promotion of prescribed ways of thinking. It is true that a student needs to learn the fundamental rules of grammar, speaking, writing, etc. in a language and in this stage he/she should merely or simply imitate the stream of the competent language user, but if this is emphasized as the only continual key to learn a language in all levels, it generates solely passive students whose vocabulary does not exceed the boxes of recommendations within the limited world of their teachers and their practices and whose ways of expressivity would contain strict manifestations of articulations. ESL students may often use adverbs such as 'actually' in an increasingly repetitive ways and even in contexts where there is not any need to such modifications. Also the verb 'make' may be used more profusely than any other word when it comes to a discussion or presentation of 'causative sentences' where as they have an enormous prism of options. The corner stone of the ESL students' sentences may often be associated with cliched ways of expressivity, too. The question, here, is: how much learning a new language brings students' familiarity with new ways of thinking, novel ways of reflection, and genuine ways of contemplation? If students' concern is only to remember what they are told to remember, how can they go beyond the paradigms of stuffed instructions? What can an ESL teacher teach in this case except offering instructions whose violations would bring about being labeled 'wrong', 'incompetent', 'weak', etc.? Therefore what is the best way to achieve the emblem of 'competent', 'fluent', and 'excellent' except marshalling all forces to remember and remember the exact ways of the instructions' recommendations in so far as they pertain to speaking, writing, and of course thinking? If the whole attempt is used to recall, and recollect the instructors' ways of saying and writing, then what happens to students' 144 experience of immediate consciousness when it is supposed to bring about student's novelty, creativity and innovation? How can a student be connected to his/her immediate consciousness if his/her fear is not to remember what should be remembered from the repertoire of the teacher's instruction? How can the avenues of creativity and novelty loom if teachers already prescribe travelling through only one or a few avenues? Let's look at some examples from "American Headway" by Soars (2001). The book is also used on teaching English to ESL students by some language centers and colleges. Under the heading of Vocabulary and Pronunciation, the book gives the following exercise: Restate these sentences using not very. (P. 48) 1. Mark's apartment is tiny. 2. Paul and Sue are stingy. 3. This TV show is boring. 4. Their children are rude. 5. John looks miserable. 6. His sister is stupid. On the other section, Listening and Reading, A spy story, (p.22), the book reads: "who is James Bond? Write down any thing you know about him and share ideas with the class". Under the heading Vocabulary in another section on page 72, the book reads "Discuss these questions with a partner. • How long does it take from your school to the nearest train station or bus stop? From your home to your work? • When did you last do some one a favor/make a complaint/take a photo/get angry? 145 • What time did you get home last night! • Do you get along with your parents/your neighbors ? • Is it easy for you to make friends? " Having looked at these examples, it is now time to think of some questions such as: How much does the cited material stimulate learners' thinking? How much does the material invite students to think beyond the routine ways of thinking? How much does the material stimulate learners' critical or creative thinking? What kind of discourse is promoted through these examples, ordinary or non-ordinary? If learners are frequently exposed to these kinds of discourses, what is the possibility of thinking about other sorts of discourses? I do not tend to argue that we need to make our learners philosophers who philosophize every thing. Yet, I argue that along with attention towards everyday dialogue and conversation, we need to encourage students to connect to their power of thinking, to examine the relationship between discourse and self-construction and to look into self-construction, self-deconstruction and self-reconstruction through revisiting their languages. According to Gosn (2002, p. 175): We should be careful not to retain the young EFL learners at the 'utilitarian' level of basic dialogues about mundane activities, or have them endlessly limited to the present tense. Yet, that is still a common approach in many ELT texts, including even the newer ones. Part of the reason for this, of course, can be attributed to the constraints imposed by publishers seeking to reach the wildest possible market for their materials. Gosn (2002) presents four reasons being respectively "motivation, language learning, academic literacy, and literature as a change agent" to use literature in primary school of English teaching. She argues "through the medium of literature, we can provide 146 young EFL learners with language experiences that will not only motivate and foster oral language, but also deepen their awareness of the target language in its written form" (Gosn, 2002, p. 175). It seems her reference to literature as an effective medium for teaching language can be one of the corollaries of our already discussed topic on Ricoeur, Polysemy and the non-ordinary discourse. While referring to the role of language teaching in critical thinking, she argues that teaching a second language based on some provocative thinking materials can help learners even establish more thoughtful relationships with their first language and help them foster the effective cognitive language development (Gosn, 2002, p. 176). Referring to the role of ESL teachers in encouraging students to think beyond the ordinary discourse and frequently habituated modes, Morgan (2002, p. 151) indicates that In terms of critical reflexivity, one of the issues that emerges in this case is how we, as ESL teachers, encourage students to view their role as citizens in a new political culture. For example, to what extent do we consciously or unconsciously (through our theories, methods, and materials) create a learning environment that suggests the meanings of citizenship are already determined for our students, and is their duty to accept them as is? Conversely, to what extent do we suggest these meanings are open to negotiation and (re) definition, drawing from the experiences that newcomers bring to a society? While drawing on scholarship in the field of ESL, Morgan (2002, p. 152) claims the methods favored in many Canadian ESL citizenship classes tend to encourage political passivity. Instruction in these programs has often been preoccupied with the rote learning of "facts" and the stimulation of the question-and answer format used at citizenship hearings. . On the active role of language learners and the teachers' significant method of presenting the materials on awakening the ESL learners' power of thinking, Morgan (2002, p. 156) argues As students start to question "texts in the world", they also begin to question "texts in the mind". They come to recognize that they are not necessarily the sole authors of "commonsense" beliefs but are instead subjects produced through language 147 and discourse. Such forms of understanding, from a poststructural perspective, are necessary to imitate attention and action on social inequalities whose persistence is sustained by their seeming naturalness. To invite the language learners to go beyond the ordinary discourse and its insinuating modes of thinking, to question the questions and to revisit the answers, to help students to reexamine their horizons of thinking, to display the possibilities and their wildness and wideness, to locate and to relocate the position of utterances and understandings, to think creatively and to teach critically would characterize a language educator who teaches language while cherishes thinking. It seems that as the children grow and their developments get completed, the number, the size and the quality and the quantity of restrictive modes of thinking and expressiveness increase. For example, it may be quite acceptable that children in the age of 3-8 talk, tell, or write stories of talking animals where for example a sparrow confides in a grandmother and simultaneously a cow cuddles the deer who may be in the grandmother's house and they all have breakfast together. Such stories reveal the break of ordinary equations, the disintegration of the routine discourse and the decomposition of banal layers of the relationship and interaction where people are supposed to necessarily think within boxes and if they don't, they will not be rewarded or they may be punished. Such stories open up the possibilities of distancing from what ought to be said and what ought to be thought of in the context of ordinary discourses. In support of such medium in language education, Gosn (2002, p. 173) indicates that: Literature can function as a change agent: good literature deals with some aspects of the human condition, and can thus contribute to the emotional development of the child, and foster positive interpersonal and intercultural attitudes. 148 Nonetheless, as the child develops, we impose an increasing number of modes, and styles of thinking and languaging simply for the sake of education! We describe "what exists', and prescribe ' what can exist' and proscribe 'what can not exist'. A good student being well prepared for education is a student who can abide by the above mentioned description, prescription and proscription. So education is already circled and enclosed within specific borders and maps. Its topography and its territory has already been charted and diagramed. 1 3 It is in line with such mapping that certain language and ways of thinking are required to undertake writing a research grant, a proposal and even a paper. Ironically enough, there might be still places in academia where the use of the pronoun, or the anaphor "I" in a scholarly paper is a reprehensible and condemnable infraction and the cause of failure. Interestingly enough the question 'why' in this case has no answer except "you are not supposed to write your own ideas in a scholarly work. Therefore write in forms such as one may think ". The question "who is it that writes 'one may think...?" may reveal the superciliousness and shallowness of such responses. One of Sternberg's (1995) goals in his book 'thinking styles', is to demonstrate how people's ways of thinking are different and entrapment in one way or one style of thinking may prevent some one to look into other ways of looking into the world. On educational implications of thinking styles, his argument is that many teachers deny students and disapprove of their works not because the given students are not able to do the task or they have some sort of inability or disability but because their preferred way l 3 " Such a narrow conceptual framework has a self-perpetuating quality that leads to many unfortunate scientific and political consequences. University dissertation committees and journal editors more readily accept research supporting the dominant paradigm, and foundations and government agencies are more likely to fund such research. The general population finds the result of research favoring the dominant paradigm to be more believable. These societal effects influence students and novice researchers to choose to investigate only phenomena that are declared valid by the dominant perspective. Thus, the dominant 149 of thinking is different from the preferred way of their teachers. Hence, students are accused of being stupid, idiot, etc. just because their ways of thinking or their style of thinking is incongruent with that of their instructors. If we look at the implications of thinking style and its impact on language, we may see huge cases where we do not allow the generation, the production or the birth of any language except the language which has conformity and congruity with our own preferences. Many a thought has been suppressed, repressed, restrained, remonstrated and rebuked and many a language has been silenced, suffocated, and stifled merely because they did not commend themselves to the boxes of the dominant styles and the tycoons of prescriptions. The essence of creativity and critical thinking begins with questioning and challenging the boxes of clinging habits, ordinary and every day discourses, memory's impact, and the interference of association of ideas. It is here when the new horizons of thinking powerfully beam, it is here where the spectrum of looking into things in a novel way glow. Creativity starts with a journey inside and outside the existing values, prevalent practices, pervasive approaches and common modes and exercises. It begins with questioning the flux of order, the arrangement of presentation, the apparition of the happenings, the manner of unfolding, the ways of showering, the moments of satisfaction, the pleasures of certainty, the avenues of solutions, the mansions of conclusiveness, the comfort of sufficiency, the impressiveness of suppositions, the forcefulness of associations, the obviousness of realization and the easiness of acceptance. Creativity challenges the way things are and explores other ways things can paradigm is unfairly supported, and other views are quickly discounted" (Scilppi, Teed, & Torres, 2000, p. 12). be. Creativity fights for otherwise. Creativity targets the unknown, the unfamiliar and the unexplored . It searches for mystery within mastery, the opening within the closure, the possibility within actuality, the passage within the blockage, the revolution within stability, the disintegration within integration, the decomposition within the composition, the indeterminacy within determinacy, the plurivocity within univocity, the imperturbability within perturbability, and the light within the darkness. Creativity rises in the midst of habituation, acclimatization, and familiarization and seeks novelty, exquisiteness, innovation and revivification. Creativity does not succumb to the deluge of ordinariness, commonality, platitudinous and conventionality. Creativity of language and creativity of thought unfold and evolve dialectically and yet syllogistically. Creative thought harbors creative language and creative language nourishes creative thought. Creativity of language defines grammar, grammaticality and syntacticality in line with the creation of new rules, new openings and new perspectives. Creative language can open up the possibilities of seeing things in a new way. It can augur a change in the interpretations, a revision of the unquestionable, and a challenge of the well taken for granted premises. Creative language can offer re-description of things, subjects, categories, issues, people, and existence. In any act of creativity being epitomized in an enunciation or articulation, the act of redescription, and redefinition parade by virtue of a re -exploration of the consistent constituents of any compound or composition. If people are supposed to think inside the boxes, and if they are to abide by the prescribed manners of expressiveness and recommended tables of thinking, and if they are to do their best to recall the rules of what need to be said and what need not to be said, 151 how do they ever give themselves a chance to get out side the boxes, to escape from the mind sets, to connect to their immediate consciousness and to experience thinking away from the pervasiveness of the past engagements, and to express the gliding, unpredictable, and creative reflection within the crystals of language? Think about educational examples as far as language education is concerned. If students are mainly called upon to fit the teachers' style of thinking and manner of expressivity, if they are rewarded for remembering what they ought to remember based on their teachers' taxonomy of instructional devices, and if they are readily subjected to be flooded by the indications of attentiveness, consciousness and studiousness as indications reveal themselves within the dominant paradigms of thinking, what is it that they think of and what is it that they language? There are two major impediments to block the eruption of immediate consciousness where students can connect to their mindfulness and scrutinize things in light of their immersion in living in the moment: 1. The need to get approval and endorsement from the dominant system which pedagogically manifests itself in the countenance of teachers. So the slogan of T have to language in a way that it gives back reward" is the main concern. 2. The fullness of attention towards the reservation and maintenance of things that students are already stuffed and suffused with. In other words, how does an engaged mind think of anything except what it is engaged about? Students whose learning focuses on appropriateness of forms may strive to produce works whose forms are similar or identical to the approved forms. Here I don't mean to question the appropriateness of forms in so far as it refers to the essential linguistic configuration of the production of sentences in a natural language so no one 152 expects to say that the difference between 'the sun rises in the east' and 'the in sun east rises' is not of a great concern and it lacks any significance so learners are freely welcome to use the second form instead of the first one. The point, however, boils down to two things: 1). How much emphasis is laid on the forms 2). How much mindfulness is encouraged so learners undertake the learning activity with mindfulness or they are expected to mindlessly learn and mindless language? There might be an argument that teaching grammar or any subject of language requires teaching forms, codes and rules which requires abeyance from creativity of thought and language or immediacy of consciousness. This argument might be built based on the findings of linguistic structures as claimed by structuralism and exemplified by the Russian Formalists, the Prague school and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and Genette. What can be said vis-a-vis this argument is that language is not a mechanical activity, it is not a machine oriented undertaking where the automatic buttoning of a number of keys would produce certain product. Language is a human production. It is attuned to complexities, multiplicity, and diversities as well as potentialities of human beings. The capacity of human learning, the aptitude of human responses, and the capability of human process of information is not limited, contained or circumscribed in any way and can manifest within language in multitudes of known and unknown ways. What happens is that human beings get used to expressing ways that are recursively transpired and repeatedly occurred. In other words, we are used to hearing what we hear but this does not mean that that the next thing we are going to hear in terms of content, form and discourse can be certainly predicted. The moment you liberate your self from the fetters of the ordinary discourse, you find yourself frolicking in the infinite meadows 153 of expressiveness where your modes of expressiveness and your modes of thinking are not contained inside the boxes. The mere repetition and the sole replication of patterns and paradigms insinuate the exclusiveness of their validity and their indisputable reliability. The Modeling, the Classical Conditioning and the Skinner's Operant Conditioning are attempts to introduce the dynamics of the aforementioned repetition and replication and their impact on learning attitudes and behaviors. But what the codes and the rules or the recursion of the paradigms and styles can not by any means exclude or nullify is the creativity of expression and immediacy of consciousness. For although a sentence may be identifiable to a number of constituents and components whose linguistic translation may develop terms such as 'subject', 'verb', 'object', 'adverb of place', 'adverb of time', this cannot preclude the generation of creative expressions. In other words, the creation of meaning is not bound to those identified paradigms within the linguistic construction but it can unfold itself in infinite ways and manners. If a sentence in English, for instance, is constructed with the 'subject' first, followed by the 'verb', 'object', 'adverb of place', and 'adverb of the time' at the end, this cannot suggest a limited number of semantical constructions. To put it in another way, innumerable novel and diverse sentences with their ensuing meanings can be constructed and created within the same arrangement. Let alone the break of the same ordering that open up new patterns of orchestration as well. For example, the use of an adverb of place or an adverb of time or an adjective right at the beginning of the sentence either for emphasis or any other function breaks up the already cited sequence and gives rise to the placement of the constituent of a sentence in a variety of places. The point, however, in this stage is the availability and the possibility of meaning making through benefiting from the very 154 inventive, the very creative and the very innovative gift of human being namely language. For example, the sentence "In Italy, they celebrate this day in June" is a sentence with the following characteristics: In: Preposition Italy: Adverb of place They: Pronoun (NP) Celebrate: Verb This day: Definite demonstrative adjective In: Preposition ' June: Adverb of time The adverb of place has appeared at the beginning of the sentence perhaps to lay emphasis on the place. The adverb of place could have appeared right before the adverb of tense. In this case we had the sentence: They celebrate this day in Italy in June. Now think of possibilities which may come for each component of this sentence namely in the very sentence what else can come instead of they? (eg. the people, the merchants, the aged, the librarians, etc.). What else can appear instead of celebrate? (eg. commemorate, observe, memorialize, hallow, etc.). You can do the same with the remaining parts of the sentence. The point is that these possibilities are by no means limited. So we can make infinite sentences with the same form while offering new perspective through each form. Our habits of hearing special utterances should not stop us from searching the unexplored modes of expressiveness. Creativity gives credit to these explorations. The rejuvenation of all forms of language use, the revitalization of diversified manifestations of meaning making, and the revival of the otherwise happen in line with 155 the burgeoning transformation of language and its flourishing creativity. It is in line with this process of creativity and meaning making within language and through language and by language that Ricoeur (1990) propounds the emergence of a linguistic imagination beside an epistemological and political imagination which originates meaning through the living power of metaphoricity. Let's look at the following example and see how language can creatively link two seemingly unrelated categories and make meaning within them in a reconciliatory way. Passionate Winking Discombobulated and deluded in the chamber of inductive and deductive imagination 1 4, a moment of illuminative philosophical reflection passionately winked at me bringing an intuition. M y cerebral cortex and my limbic system marshaled their desire and ebullience right in front of the window of intentionality1 5 way beyond Husserl's conception of consciousness. 1 4 Inductive and deductive arguments refer to two different process of reasoning. In induction, the reasoning is done from particular to the general. Although the conclusion is supported by the premises in induction, it does not necessarily follow from the premises and its truth is not guaranteed by them. In deduction, a conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. There are minor and major premises in deductive argument and the conclusion is born out of these two premises. Here these processes are linked to imagination so imagination is broadly used here as a 'noun' (linguistically speaking) for the adjectives inductive and deductive. This also opens up a new discussion on the relationship between reasoning and imagination. 1 5 Husserl made this concept famous. Before him, his teacher, Franz Brentano used the concept and he borrowed the term form some medieval philosophers. In phenomenology, intentionality refers to the thesis that every conscious act has an object. The act is called 'intentional act' and the object 'intentional object'. The term gains its significance because it undercuts the metaphor of mental 'contents' ( as in a theater, an image explicitly used by David Hume, for example). Therefore, conscious acts are not self-contained contents that are unknowingly coordinated with the movements of our bodies. Intentional conscious acts are among various acts. Here, the concept is pinpointed, yet it is distinguished from the one used by Husserl. 156 The excitement phase 1 6 of intriqueness honked the horn of engrossment for the urge to consummation. The lips of my curiosity pressed the thighs of sagacity away from 17 18 Strawson's conceptual analysis and Quine's denial of Kant's synthesis . The kiss of perspicacity smacked so vociferously that it brought the sex flush of my privileged access 1 9 in the plateau of abundance. The heart rate of my sensation became united with the palpitation of my 1 6 This is a term used by William Masters and Virginia Johnson who studied human sexual response and used laboratory setting to learn about physiological changes during sexual arousal ( see Crooks and Baur, 1996 for a discussion). Excitement phase refers to the first phase of the sexual response cycle, in which engorgement of sexual organs and increases in muscle tension, heart rate, and blood pressure occur. This is used here analogically to indicate the commencement of the act. Notice the word 'consummation' right afterward and its implications of fulfillment, completion, and achievement. So the language of sexuality is associated with the language of philosophy. 1 7 Peter Freerick Strawson called his metaphysics 'descriptive'. He insisted on indicating that it was only to be construed as an analysis and description of our conceptual framework and not of reality-in-itself. He introduced systematic metaphysics into current British philosophy through his book Individuals (1959) where he argues that only after the recognition of the primary category of 'persons', we can consider the distinction between mind and body. Persons are not conglomerates of minds and bodies, and we can talk of minds and bodies only because we first have a way of specifying the different attributes of a person. The reference is made here to a form of sagacity whose analysis can not even done by Strawson's conceptual framework. 1 8 The reference is made here to Quine's attack on Kant's distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' sentences. According to Quine, there are no indubitably 'necessary' statements or beliefs, just those that happen, at a particular point in our knowledge and interests, to hold a relatively protected place in the overall system of our beliefs for ostensibly practical reasons (see, Miller, 1998, for a discussion). 1 9 A term used by philosophers to refer to the point that only a person knows directly what is in his mind without having to observe his behavior. This is also indicative of the point that mind has a unique characteristic in that one and only one person can and must experience what is going on. Here this has been preceded by the introduction of sex flush, a term form the psychology of sexuality which refers to a pink or red rash that appears on the chests or breasts during sexual arousal. So the sex flush has been used metaphorically and analogically to to serve as a preamble for the introduction of the concept of privileged access as if privileged access sprung from somewhere. The plateau of abundance pinpoints the opulence and profusion of the privileged access and its happening. The plateau is also a term used by Masters and Johnsons (already explained) for the second phase of the sexual response cycle, in which muscle .tension, heart rate, blood pressure, and vasocongestion increase. 157 understanding. They both exceeded transcendental hermeneutics and warmly embraced the Heideggerian one. The rapture of the intelligibility cuddled the velvet of joy apart from the every day discourse. The yearning for embracing the reality bloomed in the havoc of 21 22 Hume's exegesis and I felt ascended towards the plains of epistemology . Was this intuition, inspiration, reason, senses, or experience? Maybe none, maybe all. Maybe it was ineffable. But it is incorrigible.23 The blooms of my contemplation had their ornate intercourse with the sunlight of enrichment. The refraction period was quick. No resolution phases24 whatsoever. In his book, Being and Time (1928), Heidegger suggested that life is like a text, and the purpose of our lives is to understand that text. He tries to 'uncover' the hidden meanings in our experience in his hermeneutical phenomenology. He rejects the scientific tone of Husserl's phenomenology and prefers to talk about the structures of life itself, including our profound sense of history, which defines human life. Heidegger was a student of Husserl. And therefore a phenomenologist. Phenomenology refers to the study of human consciousness. The use of the word 'transcendental' in Husserl and also Kant means the basic and the only rules with which we 'constitute' our world. Husserl attacked all forms of relativism and tried to develop a transcendental hermeneutics that discovers the basic rules of all experience ( see, Bauman (1978) for a discussion). 2 11 use this here as a critique of David Hume's thesis that there is no knowledge of right and wrong and no rational defense of moral principles. These are based on sentiments or feeling and, as such, can not be defended by argument. 2 2 The study of human knowledge, its nature, its sources, its justification. 2 3 Philosophical term which refers to the point that we can not be mistaken about our mental states. There is a distinction between privileged access and the incorrigibility. The fist means that the person knows what is in his/her mind without having to observe his behavior; the second means that he/she knows for certain and beyond the possibility of error. This is used here as an indication of a thing that can not be mistaken. 2 4 Refractory period happens in male after orgasm in the male during which he can not experience another orgasm. The resolution phase of the sexual response cycle as outlined by Masters and Johnson is the fourth phase in which the sexual systems return to their non excited state. This is used here to metaphorically discuss the continuous process of an intelligible ecstasy versus a temporal enjoyment such as that of a sexual one. 158 I could see the incessantly smothering kisses of mystical insights coil around my consciousness, of course not in a Freudian sense.25 An overview of this example shows how at least two disciplines of psychology and philosophy are merged together conceptually and the discourses of sexuality and philosophy of mind and knowledge are mingled together to produce a new discourse. This can also show how several seemingly unrelated concepts and categories can be united to contribute to the production of a new message. So the message is built on the work on the existing forms (remember structuralism), but the content and the meaning are changed. In other words, the act of inventiveness may be born within the same context of order that tries to suppress the act of inventiveness and creativity. But the very creativity and the very inventiveness can rise against the order through distancing from the essence of conceptualization being embedded within the same regulating order. So within the same structures, restructuring can happen. In other words, creativity mingles and intermingles with the recognized components, yet brings disturbance to their order, their configuration and assortment. Creativity is rebellious since it revolts against the stability and it is liberating because it releases the entanglements within the constancy of the repetition. One might think that the overture of sexuality does not have any thing to do with the proposition of fundamental questions of philosophy. Since there is not an already recognized discourse or language that can link these categories together. Language of poetry with its special subtlety and delicacy, it might be argued, has a special terrain and 2 5 Freudian taxonomy of consciousness, pre consciousness and unconsciousness does not have any room, for the placement of mystical experiences as discussed in there. Superficially, it might be subsumed under one division of his category related to sublimation. However, this is epistemologically unknown to Freud 159 needs to proceed within the same containment. To mix that language with a serious language of philosophy and psychology and to link psychology of sexuality which belongs to the scope of tangible bodily categories to the discourse of abstract, conceptual and transcendental categories is not conventional, common, standard, and usual and therefore can not be considered as standard. People are not used to this language. They are accustomed to the ordinary language. To answer these objections, we need to see what would remain of creativity if the work of creativity is supposed to comply with the prevailing standards? If what already exists displays itself, would this be a repetition, or a creation? Besides, if the act of creativity is to preserve the same existing values, the established consistencies and the well recognized equations in effect, and if creativity is to keep the same existing order and interaction in essence, what is it that is created? If the pre-endorsed perspective is supposed to be encouraged, and stabilized, what would be the chance of opening up a new perspective, a new outlook, a new way of looking? If the confirmation and the approval of the existing constituents of a system are taken for granted and questioning the system would be described as an indubitably wrong, odd, and preposterous act, what would be the meaning of being critical? A quick look at the history of invention, discoveries, theories, etc. indicates that there has always been a disparity between the emergence of novelty, and the existing relations within the pre accepted systems. In other words, any new, creative and critical idea tends to dismantle and disintegrate the existing parameters, paradigms, components and order and offers an unaccustomed look into, at, over, and to the reality. Paradigms, Kuhn (1970) and his classification of the consciousness. ( See Ha'airi, 1990, for a discussion of the arguments of the existence of such consciousness). 160 argues, can narrow one's perspective too much and prevent scientists from observing realities that fall outside of the paradigm. As Kuhn (1970) indicated, the real breakthroughs happen during paradigm shifts, when a new way of thinking replaces an older model. A new paradigm does not comply with the old one not only because the presuppositions have changed in the new paradigm but also because the entire scientific field and its relevant problems have been redefined in light of the new paradigm. Therefore, what may be considered a problem may no longer be a problem in view of the new paradigm and what made sense within the old paradigm may be totally nonsensical in view of the new paradigm. According to Kuhn (1962, p. 101): The physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts [space, time and mass] are by no means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low relative velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then they must not be conceived to be the same). The idea of being creative in language is not just an idea of ornamentation to festoon the expressions through appealing non-vernacular devices. The most significant demonstration of this creativity of language and discourse can pour itself into the structures of thinking. In other words, a new discourse may promise the opening of a new way of thinking, a new way of examining the layers of reality. Any time an act of creativity is displayed, it introduces the implementation of a new perspective: seeing the familiar in the novel and the novel in the familiar. Yet, one may be too much stuck in the familiar so one may wear blinders that prevent one from seeing of the forest through the trees. Seeing every thing from a 180 degree angle may deprive one from examining things in other burgeoning horizons. 161 The horizons of thinking are manifested in language in that what is expressed somehow reveals the scope of thinking. So language is reflexive in this sense to the effect that it can expose the structure, the foundation, the composition, the configuration and the 26 form of thinking. The creativity of language unfolds new discourses that offer new ways of thinking just as the new styles of thinking open themselves in new discourses of language. Now from an educational point of view, these are some significant questions: if students are given the chance to experience new and creative ways of expressiveness, does this allow them to experience new ways of thinking? If students are educated to connect to new ways of thinking, would they simply and passively abide by the pre- packed triggering systems of thinking which manifest themselves in the prevailing, and dominant ways of looking? (Think about the social and political implications of these questions.) What are the implications of looking into new things for language and thinking? What can language educators do in terms of creative thinking and language competence for students? The language educators' excessive emphasis on forms and the correction of forms may overshadow the attention towards the other essential constituents of language and language understanding, including the conceptual, semantic and pragmatic aspects. Let's say that a student writes the following sentence: Horses eat also. 2 61 need to acknowledge here that a group of social science scholars [see, for instance, Alvesson & Skoldber (2000)] insist on the point that if people say something, it does not necessarily mean that they mean what they say. My argument here is not in defense or defiance of such a claim. My point is that in either case, the saying, itself is revelatory regardless of the psychoanalytical questions to discuss its roots or the social approaches of discourse analysis to examine the veracity of its subject matter. 162 The teacher may only focus on teaching the proper placement of 'also' thus correcting the above sentence into 'Horses also eat.' The teacher may keep on teaching the discussion on the alternative use of 'too' in such a sentence therefore teaching the possibility of the conversion of the sentence into 'Horses eat too.' He/she can also discuss the agreement of the verb 'eat' with the subject 'horses' teaching the other versions such as 'A horse eats' or 'The horse eats' hence opening the discussion on the requirement of's' at the end of the main verb 'eat' in the event of the appearance of the third person singular subject i.e. he/she/it or their substitutes such as cat. John, the animal, etc. The teacher may also focus on the use of articles 'a', or 'the' with the singular noun of 'horse' versus lack of any articles for the plural noun of 'horses'. The discussion can carry on and cover issues such as the change of the form 'eat' into 'ate' and 'eaten' for the respective tenses of simple past tense, present perfect tense and past perfect tense with the introduction of 'eat' as an irregular verb in English whose other converted forms of the verbal conjugation do not accept 'ed' or'd' (being idiosyncratical to the so-called regular verbs). If these emphases and similar points of concentration constitute the mere or the major axis of teaching, students are compelled to attend to the issues of formalism in the sense that they become concerned to use the right form where it is prescribed and to avoid the improper form where it is proscribed. As to the ESL students, for example, their mind may be engaged in using the 'ing form followed by a number of verbs and the infinitive (to + main verb) following another group of verbs. In practice, I have seen students who spend a large portion of their time memorizing large groups of verbs to make sure that they provide the proper responses in a test of language proficiency. When it comes to writing or speaking, these students may not necessarily 163 produce a rigorously effective work in terms of content and meaning. The same may hold true for students with English as their first language since they may also be impelled to pay their main attention towards the forms and what ever makes the form appropriately accepted. Interestingly enough, in academia too, the first thing that one needs to remember at the time of writing a research grant or a research proposal is to pay attention towards the forms. It is good enough to recall the instructions for writing that is always attached to the conditions of such writings. In classes on composition, teachers usually start explaining the five theme paragraph approach, hence teaching the students that 'well, if you want to write something, make sure that your writing should have all these parts. That is the form of writing.' In other cases students' concern is to realize if the title should come at the right side or the left side and the address should be placed five or six inches below or above the name. ESL books, too, mainly focus on teaching the appropriate forms, proper modes, and apposite shapes of language thus understanding the differences between the standard and non standard, formal and informal. For example, the question "whom did you talk to?" and 'who did you talk to?" are both correct but in formal English, preference goes to the first sentence, viz. "whom did you talk to", whereas in informal English both of these sentences are permissible. It is also suggested that for cases where the interrogative word (WHY word, such as why, when how) targets the objective form or mode, whom and who are equally used where as in the subjective form, the only appropriate form is "who" such as "who told you that" where the subject i.e. NP (noun phrase) already sits in the place of 'who' and is embedded in it. 164 27 Language Education and Mindfulness As to English language education (whether for ESL or the students with English as their first language), the question, here, is: to what extent do language learners learn with mindfulness or mindlessness? Are students or learners actively engaged in the present or they are expected to be in a state of mindlessness and act based on pre-given instructions? Are teachers of language stuck in a single, rigid perspective or they welcome alternative ways of learning? The consequences and implications of these are dramatically different in terms of language learning and language teaching. In one case i.e. mindlessness, students focus only on their pre-instructed guidelines and attempt to abide by the repeated ways of looking at things, solving the problem, writing the subjects and comprehending the text as the suggested instructions inscribe. In this case, students may be oblivious to alternative ways of expressiveness, languaging, and comprehending the language construction. Therefore, students may not demonstrate their creativity in terms of language and thinking since their mere engagement is to act in accordance with the mind-sets that have been mindlessly accepted to be true. Students, in this case, compulsively move towards gaining the gratification of teachers through practicing the practices that have been insinuated. The mindlessly accepted mind-sets or instructions are necessarily limiting and they don't allow the learners to open up their potential in terms of thinking and expressiveness. Teachers, in this case, also compel students to mindlessly 2 7 My reference to mindfulness and mindlessness is not to pose a binary or a dichotomy but is to point out how increasing effective mindfulness would result in enhancing our control of our cognitive processes. In the meantime, I do not intend to limit the scope of creativity to one realm or another since this is obviously in contraposition with the essence of creativity. 165 focus on the mind-sets that have already been prescribed, thus depriving the students of living in the moment. If students or language learners can not experience living in the moment, they can not express novel or distinguished things that may be embedded in the familiar presentation of reality, therefore, they get stuck in one stable, inflexible, and rigid way of responding or looking at things especially if the main concern suggests the proper implementation of the prescriptive ways. So there are not and there can not be any other way except the prescribed ways, there can not be any alternative way since the ways have already been introduced. Teachers, in this sense, inject a from of certainty into students' minds as if the reality and the writing or the act of speaking or expressiveness or the language in general is subjected to a constant flow. In case of mindfulness, the learners and teachers act quite different from the case of mindlessness. They both experience connecting to the present, and looking into novel things and creative ways of examining their perspective. They are not bound in the box of either/or approach where everything is subsumed under the rigid taxonomy of either/or but they experience the genius of 'and', the alternative ways of touching the reality through multiple perspectives. Teachers, in this case, along with students step towards the horizons of wonders, where the certitude of the known, and the unquestionability of the obviousness pine away and fall apart. Let's use an example to show how this may work in practice. A teacher may teach the difference between an 'adjective' and a 'noun' and offers an example such as 'pain' as a 'noun' and 'painful' as an 'adjective' respectively in the sentences of "He feels some pain here in his arms". And "This was a painful situation". Depending on the wealth of the teacher's knowledge of grammar and vocabulary, the 166 teacher may advise students that adjectives in English usually precede the nouns other than some exceptions where the nouns come before the adjectives. The teacher may add on saying that the verbs such as 'taste', 'be', 'feel', 'touch', etc. can not be directly followed by an adverb unless an adjective modifying those adverbs be present. So one can not say 'It was unbelievably" where the unbelievably serves as an adverb. The sentence may be corrected by brining an adjective after the adverb so for example 'It was unbelievably cold" turns out to be correct since the adverb has been proceeded by an adjective. The teacher may also discuss the distinctions among the synonymous words which act in the similar range of connotation such as 'pang', 'twinge', 'ache', 'throe', 'ache'. He may exemplify each case through introducing the specificity of denotations and possible connotations indicating, for instance, the use of 'pang', for a sharp, and sudden and usually transitory pain of great intensity, especially one that recurs in spasms, thus distinguishing that from the use of 'twinge, which is usually suggestive of a momentary shooting pain especially one with muscular contraction or twitching. So far, the teacher has gone through the particular aspects of language being characteristic of things such as lexicon and syntax which are obviously significant in knowing a language and its constituents in terms of usage, order, diction, etc. Nonetheless, the teacher may keep the students in this stage and repeatedly calls upon them to pay their careful attention towards the instructed materials. On the other hand, the teacher may 'proceed' from this stage, in Kierkegaardian sense of the word, and leads the learners towards, in Leggo's words (1999) "wonders." In other words, he may keep on teaching the learners how to wonder. Parallel with this, the teacher may ask students to identify variety of pains and make a list as they actively think about 167 multifarious forms of pain thus inducing the students' state of mindfulness. As students consciously and mindfully explore the extensions and manifestations of pain in multitudes of ways, they may find out how their perspective towards pain may be different form the person sitting next to them who delineates pain in contexts and perspectives other than them, i.e. in alternative ways. (Remember Sternberg's discussion of thinking styles and its impact on people's ways of explanation, analysis, and interpretation and recall how people who are only incarcerated in their own boxes of thinking may not consider other alternative ways of thinking. Therefore their language may be limited within their own limiting perspective or preferred way of thinking.) The mindful teacher laying emphasis on mindful way of learning may keep on asking students to define what pain is through imagining or visualizing an excruciatingly (adverb) painful (adjective) situation (noun). The huge flux of experience bringing forth as many as tens of definitions may help the teacher to voice his argument that pain is not perceptibly observable. Students may pin point physical appearances of pain and give an account of the chemical actions and reactions in the neurological system. The mindful teacher may keep on stipulating the distinctions between the effects of pain as appears in the somatic manifestations and the pain itself, thus opening up the discussion on the multiplicity and plurality and variety of the demonstration of pains as being distinct from the essence of pain. The same can be argued for 'gladness' and 'joy'. The objective behind this example is to expose how students' range of thinking can be well provoked and instigated and how their mindfulness can be activated through putting them into situations where they need to situate themselves into the present and connect themselves into the flux of now. Once this is fostered as a practical method of teaching, students may learn more 168 effectively how to experience living in the present and detach themselves from mindlessness where in Langer's words "our behavior is rule and routine -governed". The enhancement of mindfulness and consciousness may bring empowerment for language learners so they don't rely on the distinctions drawn in the past in terms of concepts and understanding. More recently, I taught an undergraduate course on English Poetry where the discussions and materials ranged from the studies of the works from the ancient poetry, Middle English, etc. to the Modern American and Canadian poetry. The class consisted of some students with English as their first language and some ESL students. As the course progressed and we discussed figures of speech, and other issues such as sound, imagery, rhythm, the revelation of personal identity in the poetry, and other similar concepts and constructs within the context of the class, I asked my students to mindfully experience writing a poem one day while going out to their favorite places. The result was amazingly interesting. Even the ESL students who had some concerns at the beginning of the term because of the difficulty of understanding the text, came back with fascinating pieces. All students unanimously described the event as a very empowering experience which allowed them to creatively weave their thoughts and craft their novel ideas. The good thing with mindfulness and knowledge with presence (that I will shortly address) is that it opens up the avenues of expressiveness and flourishes the possibilities of thinking, seeing and examining things in alternative ways. It cultivates the green meadows of otherwise where the breeze of signification smoothly and softly but freely 169 and copiously swirls around the infinite saplings of signifiers while exploring the unbounded signified. The birds of polysemy and plurivocity will fly in such greenery and they go beyond the fences and vaults of stickiness, cleavage and rigidity being idiosyncratic to mindlessness. As the flight soars and the birds of meaning lark above the towering trees of elevated contemplation, the cynosure of the petals of imaginative reflection along with the luminosity of the intelligible observation glisten and glitter in the sheen of the wings and the radiance of the feathers. One might argue that how can one easily benefit from the implications of immediate consciousness where one is devoid of a strong repertoire of language devices? In response to this objection, we need to reexamine the concept of strength, competence and proficiency and notice that even with the least amount of words or with the least knowledge of grammar and semantics, language learners may produce innumerable sentences with varieties of depth in terms of conceptualization if they are encouraged to language mindfully. In other words, it is the quality of the making that shapes the creativity and not the quantity. The process of language development may seem to be completed after the passage from the raw stages and may be described as completed as it is often said in the discussions of child cognitive and language development. Nevertheless, the process of language development in its sublime sense never gets completed since its scope and its realm is not and can not be limited. Language is not limited though the language devices are limited. One can make infinite discourses while using the finite devices of language. To teach this is to help the learners to understand the infinite potentiality of his/her world of thinking and expressiveness and its empowering role in creating infinite worlds for him/her and others. There is not such a stage as a stage of consummation in language where one can not go further. Nor would such a stage be imaginable for thinking. That may be the reason that the act of languaging and the act of thinking get ripen as their frequency enhances. In other words, a poet becomes more of a poet and a thinker becomes more of a thinker the more he/she immerses in the infinite world of poetry or thinking. Therefore, there is not such a thing as the finale of thinking or the closing of the language in that there is no further point. So in this sense, language needs to be continuously developed and thinking needs to be incessantly fostered. This process of learning never ceases to expose its marvels. And here lies the argument that teaching and education can turn this process to a mindless and passive trend where learning is conducted under the yoke of passivity and mindlessness or teaching and education can change this process into actively exploring ways of knowing, thinking, examining and languaging things under the auspices of mindfulness. So a child may not have the resources of an adult in terms of language tools and devices, but the education and learning system that is offered for him/her can propel and motivate his/her mindfulness and active scrutiny of reality where he/she can look into novel things beside the familiar and the unknown beside the known. Some (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) indicate that mindlessness is necessary since it frees limited cognitive processes. My argument is that mindlessness detaches the connectedness of the person to the present and prevents his/her creativity of thought and language because of emphasis on the involvement and engagement in the pre-arranged ways of thinking. It may be a good idea to recall the presentation of some of the prevalent 171 social discourses and their ramifications in the ways of expressiveness. How many people may have mindfully questioned the use of the superlative adjective 'the most beautiful' for the noun 'woman of the world' as epitomized in advertisements? Well, in terms of grammar, English grammar approves the use of the superlative adjective followed by the noun. In terms of thinking, however, beauty itself is a relative attribute and it is conceived and evaluated in relation to something or in comparison with a group. So the sentence 'she is the most beautiful person in the class or the family' might have room for explanation since the comparison is conducted in relation to some finite members. It, however, can not make any sense in comparison to the whole world since it presupposes that 'she' has already been approved and validated as the yard stick of evaluation which means every one in the world has already confirmed her position in this respect. In addition, there is always the question of 'in whose eyes'? It could be in some one's eyes but could it be in every one's eyes? Moreover, statistically speaking, the sample must be in good proportion with the population. How many people of the world attested to this acknowledgement that the claim is universally made? Mindfulness may find these statements that translate some perspectives to absolute statements questionable. Below, I present another example of creativity of language and thought in light of mindfulness and immediate consciousness. Avenues of Mysticism I w a l k e d t h r o u g h the a v e n u e s o f m y s t i c i s m a m i d s t the d a r k n i g h t s o f d e s p o n d e n c y w h e n the n i g h t m a r e s o f f a i l u r e , fiasco, a n n i h i l a t i o n , d e v a s t a t i o n , a n d d e l i r i u m f e r o c i o u s l y e c h o e d i n the d i s m a l c h a n n e l s o f 1 7 2 desperation and frustration, when the fulcrum of being was paralyzed by the antagonizing impediments and the havoc of the mansion of life. I walked through the avenues of mysticism and searched for the houses of peace where the erosion of anxiety and the mirages of certainty pine away. I saw a man who was selling pomegranates of joy to the hearts of people at the cost of a sincere smile quite different form the ostentatiously hypocritical ones that can often be found in the metropolitan cities. I saw a woman who was giving away cascades of lilacs and baskets of sweet basil munificently and generously to open up the incarcerated hearts. I saw gazelles of sensibility running free in the realms of tigers. In avenues of mysticism, jasmines teach eloquence and water lilies offer philosophy, the chosen would walk on water and the elite would break the moon and exceed the sun. In avenues of mysticism, people share the nakedness of the heart and never get lost in the alleys of alienation. There is not a dead end, or a shut off. Nor any cul-de-sac or impasse. In avenues of mysticism, people use the express train of bliss and bring the news of awareness without any need to C .N.N, or A . B . C . or C.B.S. In avenues of mysticism, the petals of the flowers act as corespondents and report the latest happenings not in utilitarian ways. In the avenues of mysticism, the subordinate clause sits by the main clause without any shame or doubt. Even the compound sentences turn out to be prepositions afterward. In avenues of mysticism, prayer serves as a panacea far better than any amphetamine, barbiturates, and PCP or thrill pills. 174 Towards a New Model for Language Education Creativity of language is an indication that language education and language learning can not be merely justified through the conditioning theory. According to conditioning theory, the presence of responses is related to the presence of stimuli in that specific stimuli can arouse specific responses. Through repeating a series of stimuli, we can expect to have certain responses. In other words, we can create our favorable responses through conditioning. This, however, suggests that we need to have a previous familiarity with the stimulus or stimuli to give some specific determined responses. To put it in another way, conditioning relies on familiarity. It is impossible to do a conditioning or to achieve conditioning without repeating or exposing some thing for a period of time so that the thing (what ever it may be) should be familiar enough to instigate the conditioned responses. As far as learning is concerned, the learner must have 28 heard something said (stimulus) before he/she can repeat it (response). The fact that we can produce sentences we have never heard before can, by no means, explains through the conditioning and behaviorist theories. Even for understanding the meaning of the sentences, the behaviorist theory can not present a solid explanation. For example, the sentences "Barbara is keen to please" and "Barbara is hard to please", present similar structures and forms but in the first sentence "Barbara' is the subject of the sentence where as in the second sentence 'Barbara' is the object since the sentence means it is hard 2 8 Strict Behaviorists who are the advocates of stimulus, response and reinforcement in explaining all sorts of behavior make no distinction between human behavior and animal behavior. As to language learning, their emphasis is, again, on stimulus, response and reinforcement. According to Pavlov, the founder of classical conditioning, words can become conditioned stimuli that control conditioned responses. First he reasoned that words drive their meaning by association with sensory signals from the environment. For example, seeing an apple is a signal, which, in Pavlov's terminology stimulates the animal's "visual analyzer". Seeing the apple is the first signal of the real apple. The word "apple", Pavlov argues, is a conditioned stimulus that is associated with the perceived apple. 175 to please Barbara. They may be both learned through the superficial similarity but it is only through the deeper knowledge of the language that one can understand the distinction of these two sentences. Language creativity goes beyond the receipt of the reward as cited in theories such as those of Skinner where a child learns the meaning of milk each time his/her mother feeds him/her upon his/her crying. Creativity of language is born out of breaking the fences, getting out of the boxes, violating the rules, and breaching the familiar horizons. There is not any form of familiarity or acquaintance in breeding the creative flux of thoughts and its crystallization in language. One might say that creative language needs to be born out of the familiar streaks, otherwise it will be a totally new and unfamiliar language that may make the communication too private or too unfamiliar to be perceivable. The answer to this challenge is that it is true that creation, in its human form and meaning, needs to be somehow built on the existing repertoire, but the existing repertoire are only the constituents of the forms and serve as the means. They are not the ones that develop creativity and they are not the constituents of creativity. It is in the manner of arrangement or designing, or orchestration and organization that the novelty emerges. (Although we even may talk of creativity in forms such as the creation of the new words or new diction, they reveal their novelty within contexts that are subtly designed and crafted to reveal those novelty.) The act of creativity is not searching for the sameness, is not in pursuit of congruence or compatibility, and is not moving towards convergence. Creativity is not bound to coherence, cohesiveness, conformity, correspondence or consistency. What is Naming the perceived apple is the second signal of the real-world apple. Thus, the word apple is the signal of signals; hence, the second signal system (Barker, p.94. 2001). 176 created may not be in coherence or in correspondence with the existing coherence or correspondence but it can have its own coherence and cohesiveness. Creativity may represent an act of revelation where things are revealed in light of creativity as it can be an act of disclosure where things are cryptically and yet creatively presented. Creatively is not dutifully at the service of the recognized order as it is not respectful of the relationships and their establishment. That is why creativity may bring chaos and disorder but this chaotic situation is only as a result of a comparison between the act of creativity and the previously identified system of order. In other words, the disorder and the unrest of the creativity can have their own order if they are examined within their own setting. Creativity is not obedient, but it is cantankerous. Creativity of language does not look at the constancy and the continuum of things in the sense that they have been established within the constantly recognizable properties and attributes but it looks at the change and changeability within the same constancy. We can always see a change in the complexion of constancy but to see the change requires the departure from the actualized constancy. It is by opening up the sharpness of attention and the acumen of consciousness that things can be understood otherwise, i.e. other way(s) that they already are. If students are encouraged to experience this flight from actuality towards potentiality, if they are educated to see the novelty in the familiarity and the change in the constancy, if they find out the move from the orderliness to disorderliness and the ensuing orderliness out of the very disorderliness, if they experience the rapture of uncertainty within the comfort of certainty, if they understand the possibility of exploring the perspicuity within the ambiguity, if they learn to delve into the subject of expressivity by alternating between part and whole, they can touch upon the very act of creativity and its infinite offsprings ( which in our case here in these sentences, is epitomized for instance in the point a 'conditional sentence' (if you go there, you will see him) can be composed of good many 'if clauses' (as shown in this sentence). Teachers who only focus on the productions of forms, structures, and combinations based on prefigured pedagogical ways, impose sets of arrangements for thinking and language for students who unquestionably buy these teachers' products. Obviously, in these cases, students' primary concern is to produce what teachers want in order to get a pass mark, therefore their span of attention is mainly going around the reservoir of learning as instructed by teachers to the effect that they (students) do their best to remember well, to recall carefully and to recollect immaculately what the teachers want which is do it the way I want. One can guess the intensity of the huge minimization of the students' mindfulness and their immediate consciousness in searching for 'otherwise' in such cases where the concern for calling back the instructed ways does not leave any room for pondering any thing else. It might be argued that how can the subject of 'prepositions', for example, be taught in light of creativeness where the rules in language necessitate the attention towards their proper placement or the use of specific forms before and after them? To answer this question, we consider the following example: A teacher can merely lay emphasis on the structural aspects of prepositions within the sentence and teach students the necessity of the -ing form of verbs after prepositions thus making students aware of saying the correct form, for instance, T look forward to seeing you' instead of saying the wrong form T look forward to see you'. A teacher can go further and explain the distinction between the use of 'to' in the above mentioned sentence and the use of 'to' as the sign of an infinitive in a sentence such as T want to write something'. The teacher may go further in the grammatical picturesque of the function and roles of wide varieties of 'to' by exemplifying the use of 'to' in the sentence 'To some people, money brings happiness' where 'to' displays the meaning of 'from the view point of. Apart from the indulgence in such discussions of the grammaticalify of the preposition 'to', the teacher can encourage students to bring forth examples where prepositions can serve as indications of meaning, as the introduction of modes of thinking, as the carrier of specificity of signification where special meanings are crystallized in the weight of prepositions. This means triggering off the possibility of looking into 'how I can say things by virtue of prepositions when I think of things'. This, of course, necessitates that I need to mindfully examine the flux of my thought. Therefore, I do not just use the power of my memory to pinpoint the watchfulness of having an ING form followed by a preposition. I connect to my immediate consciousness and I mindfully look at thinking of and about things within the construction of the preposition. This live connectedness can not take place only on the strength of getting an immersion in the world of memories or association of ideas. I need to rethink about the relationships, positions, events, etc. in light of this possibility and I need to go beyond the constant countenance of examples and incidents the way they are in order to create a new appearance, a new work. In doing so, I need to go beyond the familiar, and recursive exposures of prepositions (eg. I agree with _you. They agree about most things. She agreed on a date. They agree to your proposals.) and look for the possibility of exploring 179 a novelty within the familiar exposures. Here is an example of such mindfulness and the search for polysemy through the act of languaging above the familiar ways: In, and inside the bushes of imagination, beside the fountain of reflection, off the cliffs of internal skirmishes, by the streaks of conscience and in the light of consciousness, away from the weariness and above the lethargy of lassitude deep in the horizon of intuition and beyond the margins of banality, up in the pulpit of vigilance, down in the nadir of assurance and may be upper in the passion of confidence, within the waves of options, through the power of inspiration and by the gift of intuition, at the center of agility, on the moment of alacrity, right about the infusion of dexterity, in the vicinity of sprightliness, during the dispatch of spryness, upon the eruption of celerity, in the time of liveliness, lies the power of creativity. This understanding of language does not solely lean on the instructed forms and structures within the mainstream prescribed practices. Since the prescribed practices call for nothing except correspondence to what is already prescribed. As long as the products of students and learners make sense within the prescription, they are considered acceptable. Students' focus, therefore, is to produce products within the realm of prescription. They don't need to spread the scope of their thinking beyond the recommended forms. Memorization, association of ideas and retention of the learned models would do a good job in presenting the learners' product in this case. Whereas in what was described above in the case of prepositions, a learner abides by the form but does not mindlessly rely on that. He/she would look into the possibility of sitting multiple 180 ways of expressiveness into the forms so he/she uses the forms as a ground where infinite things can be planted, cultivated, harvested and bloomed. In doing such an undertaking, the learner needs to mindfully think over, and about the options that he/she can have i.e. sitting infinite modes of expressivity in the forms or through the forms. It is like dressing a person. It is true that the clothing needs to be done through careful attention towards the form of the one who is to be dressed, but the subject of dressing, the kind of clothing and the type of outfit and clothes can be as infinite as possible both in terms of textile, modes, color, design, tailoring, etc. The same is the case with bringing varied modes of expressiveness in the place of the forms of language. Forms never appear without contents. In other words, forms are inextricably linked to contents. And contents are inexorably tied to thinking. So the movement of contents within the forms require a movement within thinking. If repetitive forms coupled with recurrent content(s) are the constitutive of the teaching of language, language learners' horizon of thinking are constantly kept within the stream of the frequently repeated forms and contents which obviously do not necessitate a flight beyond the ordinary. If the ordinary parades hand in hand with the repetition, mindfulness will not play a role in the construction of the contents that sit in the forms. Creative language breaches the stream of the recursive contents and breaks the constancy of the frequency of thinking within the repeated modes. It negates the placement of repeated exposures in the abodes of forms and it abnegates the belonging of the established contents to the recognized forms. It calls for a live and a genuine connectedness between contents and forms through inciting the infinitely multiple modes, styles and ways of thinking. Thus, creative language opens up the possibility of looking 181 into the known and the familiar through unfamiliar and unknown ways. The very novel ways may reveal various ways of thoughtfulness which may introduce numerous ways of putting into words what moves in the incessantly flowing activity of mind. Language learners, in this case, get engaged in constantly looking for images of 'otherwise' instead of 'either-or' while benefiting from the genius of 'and'. In other words, learners continuously engage in an act of searching for finding out the novelty within the familiar ways. This engagement demands mindfulness. Since oblivion, inattention and passivity can not produce creativity. Creativity is an act of mindfulness. Language educators whose objective is to promote mindfulness and creativity of thought among the language learners teach not only language but also thinking. They take the hands of learners and let them freely play among the bushes of imagination while watching them carefully so they do not get lost in the confusing meanders and slopes of wonders. This free frolic in the bushes of imagination may lead to experiencing what lies beneath, around, beside and above the bushes. But it surely generates the reality of an encounter with what can be experienced consciously. It is through these novel and yet clandestine experiences that the act of creativity can be molded. Language educators who stimulate the wakefulness of consciousness and mindfulness in students and allow them to detach themselves from the tyranny of the preoccupation with and by memory and association also teach living in the moment, living in the present and experiencing the immediacy of consciousness. The gift of living in the present and indulging oneself in the profusion of the moment blooms the state of connectedness to the flowing reality of the moment where the bubbling brook of the happenings are constantly streaming in the river of being and becoming. Now think about 182 this for a moment and consider two pictures from two types of students which I call here for the sake of arguments students A and students B. Students A are grappling with the past and they are so ignorant and oblivious of the moment. They are so preoccupied with the notion of correctly recalling what they are expected to recollect so their language can be described 'good', 'fine', 'excellent', 'acceptable' and terms in line with these nominations. Their span of attention largely or mainly works to help them deliver the goods given by teachers in the maximum possibility of intactness and wholeness. Remember the preoccupation here dictates the immersion in to the ways as directed by teacher(s), books, and sources of correction. This preoccupation consists in an already established goal namely to behave in accordance with the already recognized borders. Students B, however, are not preoccupied so much with the recollection of the infused models and forms, as they are prone to embrace the flow of the present, and the crystallization of the moment. It is impossible to have both the preoccupation with the past and the live connection to the present. "In general, it is impossible for human beings to hold two different interpretations of the same thing in consciousness at the same time. In many cases we can prove that two representations exist fleetingly in the brain, but only once can be conscious at a time" (Baars, 1997, p. 89). This suggests that students B can easily put themselves at the mercy of what is happening at this very moment where as students A may ignore the moment since they are so enmeshed in the past. If the past layers of interpretations and expressiveness are so trenchantly imposing themselves on the minds of students, how could students look at familiar faces and see any unfamiliarity, how could they discern unknown in the known and mystery in the mastery? How could they break up the conventionalized ways of experiencing and look for novelty 183 amidst the cyclone of conventionalization? They can not since they feel so hemmed in by the previously defined demarcation . Students B, however, think about exploring and scouting what can pour in to the open channels of consciousness in the moment of mindfulness so their concern is not to move within the margins. They openly stand under the shower of consciousness and readily accept what lies in the flow. So they may reconnoiter around, by, beside, within, inside, outside, beneath, above, and beyond the happening. Many a time, they may get hold of the stretches of the past and keep track of the threads of'was' and 'were,' yet, they look into 'being' in the moment. What may sometimes serves as an impediment in the way of immediate consciousness for the learners is the vehement fixation of taxonomy which has already created classifications and categories. When we begin to describe a scenery, for example, we may be lead to, through association, think of and about the identified categories which lie in the system of our mind. Thus, we may be compelled to pick up facets of which we have some classification in our mind. This classification does not only incorporate the universal categories known to us through our learning experiences, but also entails our implanted propensity to view things in accordance to our cultural and psychological preoccupations. In other words, we are subscribed to look at and into the familiar things through our association, learning experiences and our cultural and psychological forces which urge us to identify certain layers of a presentation. As long as we stay inside the very familiar tilt, we won't be able to experience things creatively since we resort to what already exists. The essence of creativity does not comply with the already established modes of creation. On the other hand, preoccupation with the prescriptive categories of thinking obviously prescribe an engagement in what drastically drags one to the flux of 184 the past thus detaching one from the immediacy of experience in the bedrock of the present. Second language learners may have, for example, learned to use the verb 'cause' to describe any causative relation. The sentences they make, therefore, may be filled with the overuse of the verb 'cause' where as they may be given the awareness to employ a wide variety of verbs that indicate the same concept i.e. cause and effect relationship. This will practically allow them to produce more sentences that describe causative relationship while benefiting from verbs such as 'induce', 'incite', 'propel', etc. On the other level, they may be given the awareness that not only the verbs but also other forms of syntax may be recruited to describe the causal relationship. This may open the scope of language learners to search alternative ways of describing the cause and effect relationship beyond and above the verb oriented constituents. This may appear to cover the formal and superficial parts of language in that increase of awareness in these instances may give rise to the production of sentences and clauses which manifest themselves with further decorative devices but do not necessarily generate new and novel ways of thinking. To put the verb 'instigate' for example instead of the verb 'cause' will not necessarily open up a novel way of thinking although it may offer a new semantic implication through the presentation of new way of description. Therefore the sentences 'Anger may cause turmoil' will ultimately concur with the sentence 'Anger may instigate turmoil', although the connotation of the verb 'cause' and 'instigate' are conceptually and semantically distinguishable. The same causative relationship may be described in light of other non verbial linguistic forms, for example, in the clause 'the emergence of turmoil through anger', the preposition 'through' 185 indicates the causative relation while the compound of article 'the' plus the NP (noun phrase 'emergence') followed by the preposition 'of along with the NP ( noun phrase 'turmoil') present the effect. Although, the forms are different in each of the above mentioned examples, they eventually converge in delivering the message in that they all display one horizon. A language educator may concentrate in one or some of these structures while urging the learners to abide by the instructed models in expressing themselves either in speaking or writing. Language learners who are instructed to look at the causative relation solely in view of one or a few recognized forms may not look at other possibilities or alternative ways which may be indicative of the cause and effect relationship. Moreover, they would almost inevitably recall the emphasized forms in expressing what they tend to say. In other words, they become more preoccupied with attending to the pre-underlined ways of expressiveness. At the time of expressiveness, the overall attempt of the mind, in this case, is to reproduce what has already been produced by the instructor and has been prescribed to present. On the other hand, a language educator may encourage learners to view multiple possibilities and manifold alternatives while expressing the causative relationship. This does not mean that he/she does not introduce any forms or structures of his/her own but it means that his/her introduction would not be presented as the exclusively correct way of expressiveness. Language learners would not be instructed, in this case, to understand an 'either or ' way to the effect that what they express either corresponds to what the instructed model says (being correct) or it may fail to conform with the instructed model (being incorrect). The genius of 'and' reveals its exquisite and invaluable implication in that this way of expressiveness 186 (the instructed way) is one way and there may be other ways as well. This statement should not bring the fallacy that any form is permissible in a language which may end up contravening the rules of syntax in a language. Through the introduction of multiplicity of forms, a language educator can provide learners with a sense of understanding the comprehensiveness of language and its open capacity to accept innumerable forms. The words of Wilhelm Humbolt is worth mentioning there that language is the use of finite means for infinite forms. The very power of language i.e. the creation of infinite forms do not consist in the creation of appearances which are only distinguishable in terms of outward linguistic forms but they can offer discernible modes of thinking. In other words, the change of forms in language may some times be tantamount to a change of shape as long as it relates to the extraneous facets like changing the dress of some one whose oneness does not change in spite of a change in his/her attire, (see the above mentioned examples). In other cases, however, the change is not merely a change of forms in the arrangement, apparition and the lay out of what is presented but is the introduction of a new way of looking at one thing which may have been looked at previously in a different way or may not even have been looked at in any way. Thus, this change boils down to an ontological level for it purports the existence of something. Language educator who undertakes the work on this level provides the learners with the possibility of searching, exploring and scouting not only the world of words but also the world of thinking. The world of thinking is shaped and introduced through these minute and colossal changes in forms of words in that with some little or huge changes in the composition, one can offer tiny or immense world in thinking and open small or large horizons of reflection. A sentence, no matter how trivial it might be, opens up a world where the speaker or the 187 articulator in general, offers a view point, a position, a mood, a state of affairs, etc. through the arrangement of what are linguistically called, nouns, verbs, etc. Therefore, a change in the placement of these semiotic signs within the linguistic level will not only change the relationship in the sign level but it will also bring about changes in the semantic level. In other words, a sentence always incorporates some signs through which we associate other signs in light of the principle of similarity so we say flower, for example, it already entails the associative property of reminding us of things such as rose, lilacs, fragrance, redolence, flavor, etc., yet there is the adjacency and proximity along with the contiguity which create another dimension i.e. syntagm. For instance, when we articulate a sentence such as ' a flower is blooming in the desert of desperation by the check post of hopefulness', in addition to the associative relation of the words in terms of similarity, we would see the contiguity and propinquity within the sentence to the effect that the words and their placement indicate a special nearness and proximity. If the very nearness and closeness are exposed to any kind of change, our sentence would convert into something else which reveals a different mode of expressiveness. Whether we go with forms and structures and look for the meanirigfulness within the semiotics of the sentence based on our established devices of formalism and structuralism or we comply with deconstruction and look in to the unfolding of the meaning through the disclosure of words, we confront with modes of expressivity which can open up modes of thinking. Language educator who comes along this way would undertake an invaluable task not only for awakening the power of expressiveness in the learner but also urges the learner to gain empowerment through such expressiveness. To recognize the vital significance of the latter, we need to look at the instances of expressiveness and instances 188 of suffocation even in personal level to acknowledge how crucially important and invigorating the grace of expressiveness can be in all sorts of circumstances. As children, we tend to express ourselves freely to broadcast our agony, our joy, our lamentation and our goals. As we grow up, we learn not to express ourselves thanks to fibers of ceremonies, education, practices, traditions, and discourses of power and politics or we learn to copy the ways we are expected to express ourselves. What is the frequency of people's expressiveness when it comes to things other than what the mainstream discourses of cultures and society impel them to do? Why is the average vocabulary of people limited? What is it that people do not express their immediate experiences and only retain them within the scope of memory either consciously or unconsciously? What would happen if people learn to immediately express their immediate experiences regardless of the value, valence, vitality or validity of those experiences? What happens when a language educator prompt the learners to immediately try to express his/her immediate experiences? Revisiting these questions and questions alike can demonstrate that a connection with immediate experience requires mindfulness and immediate consciousness. In other words, you can not somnambulate and get connected to the immediate experience. Mindfulness and immediate consciousness leads the person to experience the moment and the presence of now thus the force of memory and association in keeping the person's attention within the boxes of the past or future would considerably dwindle. Since the immediate consciousness takes place as an action and not an involuntary behavior, it allows the person to vigilantly explore the possibilities in expressing the experience of the moment. Here we need to recall the significance of sentence as the base 189 for discourse and its idiosyncrasies in terms of paradigmatic relationship which occurs in similarity and the syntagmatic relationship which transpires in contiguity. The way the words are selected and clustered, their associative features and their proximity as well as their assortment and attunement embody the mode of expressiveness. Therefore, expressiveness occupies a place of specificity while belonging to the realm of universality of signs and semiotics inside a linguistic system. To put it in another way, a sentence submits a specific position in terms of feeling, emotion, view points, etc., while the finite means i.e. the signs which are used to express these specific entities are understood through a universal associative relationship within the semiotic system of a particular language where those signs are poured into sentences. It is the language educator who can provide learners to find the specificity of expressiveness through creatively and critically looking into the assortment and arrangement of the signs which no longer posses a virtual existence after they appear in sentences. What is it that I need to say, how do I need to select and what is that I should change are no longer determined based on the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationship of the prescriptive practices which also prescribe modes of thinking. But the emergence of sentence and its primordial operations from the choice of the words, their decoration and their clothing in the sentence and their closeness and remoteness from one another are made through a conscious arrangement that propounds a world albeit small or incomplete. The significance of narratology in today's psychology and its application in therapeutic works pinpoint the vital role of expressiveness in every day activities of our lives. The idea of catharsis which goes back to Aristotle move in line with the emergence of empowerment within the grace of expressiveness. 190 The world of sentences which are opened through the assortment and arrangement of words, their specific selection and their placement in a wide variety of forms would usher in the potential creativity within the language. This potentiality, as indicated earlier, is not merely an artificial characteristic that can change language into manifold devices of decoration and ornament but it is tantamount to the creation of worlds and realities through the same potentiality. Fallacies in daily activities, in social, cultural, and scientific discourses, and in political discourses, emergence of miscommunication, talk about effective versus in effective messages, all indicate the presence or birth of worlds through sentences which have been constructively or destructively have helped or hurt human beings in general. So this potentiality can not be easily ignored and neglected through an intelligible investigation of language, its functions and its implications. How many times, have we witnessed that the very potential property of language i.e. its creativity along with its ramifications have indoctrinated representations through which people have perceived reality as it is? How many times, have we been bombarded through discourses of power, and politics which have sought for their legitimacy through the same' creativity of language namely creation of discourses? Even in the realm of our personhood and selfhood, the words we have used and we use to define, describe, prescribe and proscribe things are crystallized within the constantly mobile bedrock of sentences by which we have expressed ourselves, others, things about ourselves and others, etc. So this potential property of language viz. creativity eventually constitutes our world and our positions towards that world. In this sense, language becomes constitutional in that it constitutes our realities and it develops, along with that constitution, psychological positions for us that enmeshes our perception towards the 191 world we live in. How long have the East and the West been presented to one another through the same creativity of language when it has been contained within certain directions? How far do people of the West and the East think of one another and how alien have they become of one another through the same construction of realities through the creation of discourses embodied in sentences? What do we think of a boy or a girl walking down in Harlem, Victoria, Dubai, Tehran, Karachi, etc. based on the worlds created for us or by us through the same potentiality of language? Is it not the case that in all these instances, the creativity of language is continuously perceptible in all the streaks of the discourses? What about the humanitarian and philanthropist movements and thoughts? Is it not the case that all the liberating endeavors, emancipating thoughts, and promising explorations spring from the miraculous property of language that is its creativity? So language education, in this sense, not only can teach the preciousness of this potentiality and its invaluable power for creating the worlds and universes, but also can educate learners to consciously and mindfully think about the worlds that have been created for them or the worlds that they themselves choose to create. You may see the connection between the empowerment of the language and the consciousness that mutually contribute to the actualization of education. Language education may overshadow this novel property of language through keeping the learners in the borders of actualities. So the learners think about nothing except what has already been actualized, finished and completed. Obviously when you have something that is already completed, finished and created, and you focus on its completion, you may neglect the potentiality of the object, what ever it may be, therefore, 192 you may not see its potential part namely what else could this be or could it have been through this potentiality? In other words, you would practically; through this monopoly of actuality; deprive yourself of looking into the otherwise for the object. Once this trait is established that is learners be entrapped within the circle of actualities, they reproduce different versions of the already actualized archetype. Concurrently, the pedagogical attempts, in this case, go back to urging the learners to move within the borders of actuality. Attention towards form may go up the ladder since you need to be cautiously careful of not violating the shape, the configuration, and the physiognomy of the actualized forms. So you may spend hours after hours to design programs and devices which can elaborately teach subtle movements within these forms. Now you may think of the corollaries of such sensitivity in terms of thinking and its implications in social, political, educational and personal realms. On the other hand, concentration on actualities and oblivion towards the potential manifestation of things, would generate a unilateral approach towards the practical approaches of language in that learners do their best to keep their loyalty to the actualities as they (actualities) display their establishment. It is like playing in a play ground where the players get vehemently engaged to remain inside the play ground without seeing the possibility of playing otherwise away, above, beyond, beneath, below, within, outside, inside the rules of playing. One might again underline the rules, regulations and yet the containment of language through special syntactical forms, appearances, and structures. In response to these challenges, we heed to understand that the existence of the restraints and circumscription of these features within a language are not at variance with the property of language that is constant creation of multiple novel worlds. It is like walking which 193 could be made in a determined, defined and certain way with identified borders and corners and definitive paces. Antithetically, walking can be made multilaterally namely in all directions and yet no defined direction. It could turn out to be a lark in some stages, and a frolic in other stages, it may change into somersaulting in an instance while other instances may characterize it as stuttering. It is known and yet unknown since it brings about both identification and surprises. It could reveal whereabouts while it can disclose jeopardy. It could be illuminated and illuminating and yet it could be darkening and distorting. It could lead to meanders as it could augur oasis. This is the walker who can have his/her own choice of walks through understanding the power of walking, its potential and its capacities. Education can greatly help walks in this regard to merely copy cat walking and go ahead with the footsteps in the trails or examine and explore a wide variety of avenues for walking, avenues which can accompany new horizons of looking as well. If language education tends to move in this direction, it needs to disengage the learners from engagements that keep them bound within the actuality. The more those engagements be drastic, the more the tilt towards potentiality would be fragile. To put this in another way, if the learners need to incessantly rely on retrieving what they have been expected to retain in order to be revered, they barely find engagement with the flux of happening in the footing of now and the present. Thus, they may not; due to the severity of the engagement with the past; revisit, re describe and re define things as their retrieved memory instructs not to do so. Practically speaking, if we get the span of attention into consideration and we categorize items based on their significance in the prism of attention, what would remain of now and the present if the majority of focus is 194 considerably placed on the revitalization of what has been previously retained particularly if this retrieving is coupled with positive values within educational encouragement and its neglect or oblivion be taken as the symptom of backwardness and failure? This heavy engagement with retrieving the retained parts and their association and the vociferous immersion in reinstating the elements of learning, in its broadest sense, and its mindsets would nurture a detachment from the immediacy of consciousness where things are understood in light of mindfulness in the corner stone of the now and the present. Once mindfulness is replaced by mindlessness and its ensuing emergence of compartmentalization within the associated classification and categories, we begin our searches within the retained margins and pre-packed taxonomy. This tends to move in a linear way where borders have already been set, defined, and designated. "How much does this cost?" is an example of a sentence frequently heard and used by interlocutors in a language. Now if we repeat the very sentence several times and say it slowly to concentrate on what we say, how we say and how we enunciate, we may find out that frequency of the repetition may have stopped us from looking into what is it that we say. In the mean time, we may not be very vigilant of the creation of a relationship between what our position of saying appoints us as the buyer, and what the same locution creates for our addressee that is the seller. Our way of saying that is the presentation of a question as the illocutionary part of what we articulate and its impact on the person whom we address as the perlocutionary part reveal themselves as the sharpness of our attention increases. Apart from the analysis of inter linguistic constituents such as the presence of anaphor or pronoun 'it' and its reference to an 195 already identified noun, the auxiliary 'does', the main verb 'cost', the WH word 'how much' and their relation together within the systems of syntax, sentence patterns and grammar rules, we may look into other things such as the psychological, social, cultural, economic and even political and historical governing and qualifying factors which may bring further meaning into the very simple question. Now that we are mindfully looking at this sentence, we notice the birth of manifold factors which help us understand the expansion of a locution in terms of usage, address, message, contingencies, etc. Language education may stop here that is concentration on locutions which are inextricably tied to the simple act of communication in its lowest level to the effect that people get things done no matter what that may be from purchasing a pencil in a chain store to conducting political campaigns. In all these instances of communication, people experience language as a device or a tool to merely transfer their needs and demands in the lowest possible way of intelligibility. Language learners will learn language at this level to become quite competent and professional or skillful in expressing these needs, urges and demands as the occasion arises. Language teachers also teach language to help learners express what they want in terms of existing procedures of expressiveness. The focus here is the metaphors borrowed from others either in individual or social level to the effect that people use language, as it is suggested in the metaphoricity of the discourses of learning, to convey what they want. This is again like boating in the frequently boated course where the repetition, replication and unanimity in most cases, do not require any mindful consideration. Therefore, the course is unceasingly sailed without any mindful consideration of the journey itself or its surrounding axes. 196 Language education, however, may go beyond this level and looks into the language more than a device. So, here, language changes its status as purely instrumental and becomes an independent source of existence where one is characterized through and by language. Language here becomes in the words of Heideggar an 'abode for being' and turns in to a way of living. So expressiveness is not merely a device oriented manifestation of some one to communicate something or manipulate things and people through conveying messages, but it becomes a manner of being and living where the specificity of one's life is epitomized through the language he/she uses. Language gains an ontological value here where language itself consists in existence or a layer or a stage of existence. It is through utterance that a new form of existence is born and it is by expressiveness that existence unfolds itself in a certain way. So the exteriorization of words in sentences is tantamount to actualization of existence in certain stages. Therefore, language creates positions of existence in which specific molds of ontology unravel themselves. When we look at the externalization of articulation and its exterior exposition either in oral or written forms, we, indeed, look at creation, existence and disclosure. Regardless of the question of quiddity that is 'what of the existence' ( what is that has been created or what is it that presents itself), the expressiveness brings an ontological news, that is of existence and of creation. So if language can create and can bring about existence, what are its implications for me and others who are connected to me or I connect to them through and by language? Besides, how can my language report of my being and my identity? How can my expressiveness disclose my position in the world? These questions become significantly important for language education here since they are the questions that can change the course of social, political and cultural actions if 197 they are understood in light of such language awareness. When I say some thing in a conversation such as "I like your comment", the least I am saying is that I am positioning myself as a subject who can act as an agent and in the mean time I am putting you in the position of an object where you are addressed in view of that position. Thus, in the first step, I ascertain the meaningfulness of both you and me in that both of us exist. Plus, I acknowledge the validity or sensibility of your comment as a part of you and something with which I identify you. I also, through this saying, report of my liking, or the impact of your comment on me which, in this case, puts me in an objective position and you in a subjective position, since your comment had this positive effect on me. So, I am creating something through my locution by which relations, positions, state of affairs, emotions can change. (Look at the discourses of power and see how the use of "I" creates a position of authority and has changed the fate of many lives). The use of narratives and stories in their broadest sense can also indicate the significance of language in view of this status i.e. as a way of being. It is often through writing narratives that we come to a better understanding of our social, political and cultural identity. Our expressiveness within narratives can depict the choices we have made, the choices that others have made for us and the positions we have found or we have chosen in terms of our psychological state and our cultural, social and political status. It is through the manifestation of our expresivity in narratives that we may find out our being and its sense making within special contexts and framework. How our being translates itself, how our positions define themselves and how they describe our acts and our behaviors may be well understood through the specificity of our expressiveness. Our stories show what exist and what does not exist and what ought to come out of those parts 198 and pieces of existence and this is mediated through the expressiveness. So narratives can well reveal the status of language and its educational implications in light of this understanding of language namely language as a way of life, as a mode of being. George Bush's comment after September 11, 2001 " you are either with us or against us" can illustrate how language can create and can construct things, relationships, states, positions, etc. Through his words, Bush categorizes existence through a reference to the objective pronoun "us" thus indicating an either/or relationship with this pronoun. His expressivity can demonstrate that based on his ontological taxonomy and in accordance with his way of creation, there will not and there can not be a third way. Now he decides the existence of choices not only for himself (through saying what he said) but also for the rest of the people in the world hence displaying how creation through language can purport the emergence of authority too. His use of preposition "with" and "against" can also bespeak the impossibility of any other relationship with the pronoun "us". He chooses to make choices through his either/ or thus establishing a position of authority for himself, on the one hand, and a position of subjugation for the addressee. Interestingly enough, he brings the pronoun "you" at the beginning which in English language does not have a distinguishable form in both the objective and subjective form compared to other anaphors and pronouns (eg. he, him), and then he brings the existential verb "are" to proceed with his command of ontological illustration i.e. knowing what exists and what does not and their degrees, ranks, and capacities. The repetition of the pronoun "us" in two places may attest what is that should exist first or what is the priority of existence in his view of ontology. One may notice how language here defines realities, positions, state of affairs, etc. and this characteristic of language i.e. the extra linguistic component is what can be translated in other languages but the intra linguistic component of his words belong merely to English language. Like wise, you may think of the word 'bad' and its slang usage with the implication of'excellent', 'good', and 'admirable' as opposed to bad in the sense of real bad. The former which originally issues from black English and black slang and is pronounced with a falling tone and a lengthened vowel defines and describes realities in an entirely different way than the latter which stigmatizes things in a thoroughly derogatory manner. An understanding of language with these characterizations, capabilities, potentials, and magnitude can shift the practices, areas of emphasis, methodology and syllabus in language education. Should language be understood as a way of living, then the grammar does not solely bring an intense engagement in detecting linguistic categories of 'noun', 'verb', 'clause', and the like, but it instigates a consciously punctilious engagement on both the intra linguistic and extra linguistic constituents. So language learners not only reflect on the intricacies and relation ship within the existing system of language but also they explore the "what' and 'how' and 'why' of relationships in an extra linguistic way. The goal of language education here is to make the language learners not only competent and skillful in uttering language but also effective and qualified in thinking and examination of patterns of thinking. Just as language learning on the surface makes one quite sensitive on identifying errors and mistakes within the system of signifiers and their assortment in linguistic level, this understanding of language allows one to contemplate on the profound layers of intelligibility within the signified, signifiers and the sign. Language educator here does not suffice the rectification of forms and apparition as the utterances unfold themselves but calls for a 200 participatory excavation of meaning and meaning creation within the social, cultural and political contexts. This excavation of extra linguistic constituents would allow the language excavators find out how they have been positioned through the language that they use or they have been subscribed to use. It also expounds on the question of identity, selftiood, and person-hood and elucidates how one may be shaped through the layers of language in terms of social, political and cultural construction. Above all, it makes the language user and language learner become aware of the potential of language in changing the constructions, constrictions, and restrained which have emerged through the language. This understanding of language lets the language educator and language learners to participate in swimming within the realms of language and thinking simultaneously while observing the ties and links and connections between the two. It also empowers both to seek a range of possibilities within the language to re- define and re- describe things, positions, states, etc. Thus, language education can consider its task to pinpoint the affirmative sentences versus negative sentences by exemplifying "He is here", vs. "He is not here" which demonstrates the use of 'not' after the auxiliary "is" as an indication and a guide to change the affirmative sentence into negative ones. Here, the task is conducted within the existing system of a particular language i.e. English and its specific capabilities namely if you say "he is here not", you have made a statement that does not correspond to the rules of syntax in English Language so the proper placement of the fragments and their viability and variety within the language would constitute significant goals of learning. Nonetheless, language education can expand its focus through reflecting on questions such as "what does it mean when we change an affirmative sentence to a negative one? What kind of relationship are we changing here? 201 What are the implications of this change? How can the power of a change of affirmative into a negative can change our perspective towards the thing which goes through the change? How do we see the thing when its shows itself in an affirmative sentence and how do we change to see the thing while it reveals itself in a negative sentence? How can this change of appearance may change our perspective towards our personal, interpersonal and social decisions? One may here refer to the huge attempts of cognitive psychologists who argue that through cognitive changes, one can overcome a large group of psychological problems including anxiety, depression, and particularly eating disorders and panic disorders, (see, for instance, Wilson & Fariburn, 1993). So understanding the differences between a sentence with "not" and without "not" would be tantamount to discovering two immensely distinguished worlds that can induce two enormously striking spheres of action. How significantly vital can this realization be for reconnoitering one's position in personal, interpersonal, social and political contexts? If people who accepted slavery as a rule of the nature had found out the power of changing the affirmative sentence of "slavery must exist" into "slavery must not exist" and their empowerment to bring verb replacement such as "slavery should not and can not exist", what would their world have looked like? How much could their styles of life have been changed on the strength of this verbial change? If people find out their abilities to change the affirmative sentences into negative ones or vice versa, how significantly huge can this realization contribute to changes in their lives? So language education here not only educates learners on language and thinking but also educates learners to find out the degree of control they can have on their choices. In other words, when I understand how powerfully and consciously I can be involved in creating and changing the language for 202 myself, I will be able to discern how much control I can have on my own creation through my choices in social, political and cultural contexts. Grammar can teach a surface where people may apprehend the use and misuse of fragments of sentences and their proper and improper applications based on what grammar describes, prescribes, and proscribes. Practitioners of grammar and grammaticality may insist on strict obedience to rules of syntax and apposite assortment of divisions and subdivisions of the words in light of prescriptive grammar. Better yet, they may proceed with the promotion of what Wittgenstein calls 'grammar of understanding' where the knower leaps beyond the surface of linguistic grammaticality and searches horizons of apprehension within the intelligible, psychological and philosophical strata of what is uttered. Regardless of how impeccable or imperfect this understanding may turn out to be, it incorporates an invitation on exploring the layers of thinking, its impact on our lives, its crystallization in our languages and its ties with our emotionality. Through pinpointing and focusing on these areas, language education may reveal the mysterious, wonderful, enlightening and illuminating potentiality of language for re-creating worlds, meanings, stories, possibilities, and actions. Language learners who receive instruction and training on the use of words, diction, and vocabulary and get acquainted with modes of appropriate grammaticality and become cautious to avoid inadmissible placement, here, will come to realize how language practically can lead or mislead thinking and how ferociously it can induce action or silence, how cunningly it can manipulate and direct and how artistically it can trigger the initiation of mirages or help construct the mansion of assurance. Understanding the power, the vitality, the significance and the practicality of language for language learner can also demonstrate how important our choices of language can alter 203 our positions in the social, political and cultural construction. The point here, therefore, is not just to teach language and its prescriptive linguistic instructions within multifarious facets of listening comprehension, written composition, vocabulary learning, etc. but it is inciting thinking on the enigmatic and obvious aspects of the utterance ranging from form, content, constituents, structure, to modes and manners of the utterance (for example, linguistic, social, psychological, philosophical, and cognitive dimensions). The search for meaning is not bound here solely to the core meaning but it entails an investigation of associative, expressive, affective, social or stylistic meaning. Lets' look at the following piece from D.H. Lawrence's poem 'Piano 'to elucidate the above mentioned argument: "The glory of childish days is upon me and my manhood is cast down by the flood of remembrance. I weep like a child for the past." A language educator may use the said piece of the poem as an instructional device for a wide variety of goals within the language education system and educate the learners in the following levels: 1. Language educator may present discussion on linguistic analysis of the piece and talks about issues such as the reference of the verb "is" as a derivative of the infinitive "to be" to the subject "the glory of the childish days" while decomposing the NP of the subjective position thus separating the adjective "childish" from its modified noun "days". He may proceed with the extension of analysis and juxtaposes the beautifully made combination of active voice beside the passive voice in the piece namely the glory of childish days is upon me (active voice) versus my manhood is cast down by the flood of remembrance (passive voice) to display the exhibition of the action and happening through the passive voice while demonstrating the vitality of agency or subjectivity of the doer in the active voice. Through this distinction, he may proceed with the discussion on the preference of the use of passive voice when the emphasis is laid on the action (eg. the glass was broken) as opposed to the emphasis on the agent and the does when the doer or the subject needs to be largely underscored (eg. He broke the glass). In addition to similar language instructions in respect to the said piece and coverage of points such as the use of "like" as a noun with the literary implication of simile versus metaphor and elaborating their differences, the educator may iterate the application of the verb "weep" and its specific denotations and connotations from its similar verbial family members such as cry, whimper, bawl, mourn, etc. This level can generate ample information on structure, writing ability, choice of words, syntax, etc. so the learner, for instance, can understand the possessive adjective "my" can not come alone and it always needs to sit beside a noun which in this example is "manhood". Like wise, the educator may focus on the whole parts of the sentence and talk about the semantic configuration in light of the general and overall meaning that discloses itself in the entirety of the utterance. So the focus in this level would be placed on the examination of the linguistic knowledge of English language and its application on various parts of the sentence or distribution and dispersion of meaning in discursive facets from literary inspection to grammatical investigations. Obviously, the mode of the presentation can vary 205 depending on the educational goal for example the sentence may be presented in a written text or my be pronounced through an audio visual tape as an aide for listening comprehension. Methodologically again, the presentation may address a number of steps in view of its addressees which, for example, may need back ground information such as ESL students. In other words, the methodology may vary in light of the audience's previous knowledge, basic skills, etc. (To exemplify, one can not expound on the distinction between "he waved as he walked past" where "past" is used as an adverb and "he walked past the window" with "past" as a preposition and the use of the past in D.H. Lawrence's above poem unless the addressee is quite familiar with these linguistic concepts and functions.) Understanding the level of knowledge, background information and basic skills of language can help the educator to act in commensuration with stages of learning in respect to the extent and quality of the transmission of the educational information. So level one may be divided into series of levels with respect to the issues of methodology and teaching presentation. Language educator can prompt a series of thought provocative engagements for learners. This can include posing questions such as what are the effects of the piece on you in a personal level? What emotions or feelings does the piece summon for you? What kind of images and visualization does it conjure up? How do you connect with the piece in a personal level? What kind of being does the piece report of? What types of worlds does the piece create? How does the language show its creativity here? How does the language used in the 206 piece affect us emotionally and cognitively? How does the specificity of the language employed in the piece create similar specific versions of classification and categorization for us? How do you identify with the text or distanciate from the text? What happens between what the text offers and what you get engaged in? How does this connection with the piece suggest one's innate ability to transpose oneself into the mental life of others? What are the distinctive features of understanding in regards to this piece? If these distinctive features should be searched in the realm of psychology, how does the piece unfold itself? Does that imply that we need to understand D.H. Lawrence to understand the piece? (Dilthy's position). In view of the fact that Lawrence is not living now, how do we go for this? Plus, even if he had been alive, how would have we known that his understanding of the piece after its creation is identical to his understanding at the time of creation of the piece? How do we account for the change of time and experience? More over, how do we empathize with him and intuit or grasp the meaning behind the piece? How do we have access to Lawrence's mind? The question might change through a shift indicating that how the piece show Lawrence's being in the world? (Heidegger's concept of understanding as a mode of being and not as a way of knowing). [ Ricoeur (1982, p. 54) refers to the nature of this difference in the question he asks "instead of asking 'how do we know?', it will be asked 'what is the mode of being of that being who exists only in understanding'?"] How do we move from pre-understandings to new understandings as to the piece? 207 These kinds of questions which ultimately lead towards questions of hermeneutics will give the learners to critically and creatively reflect on the possibilities and experience convergent and divergent modes of thinking while paying attention to the role and function of language in initiating these multiples modes of thinking. This can at least serve as an exercise for harboring thoughtful modes of expression. This level strongly encourages the language educators and language learners to deeply understand the significant role of language in defining, shaping and constructing realities for us. It shows how language can define the boundaries of our political, cultural and social realities. It also clarifies how the metaphors used by language can bring such intense engagements for our mind that we no longer think of the original thing for which the metaphor has been used. This can generate considerable volume of fallacies in thinking. On the negative impact of peoples' indulgence in such metaphors in the realm of politics and policy making, Herda (1999, p. 30) says " their acceptance of a certain metaphoric representation can lead them to forget there is a problem or make them believe that significant change or progress is occurring to either curb the problem or prevent it from getting worse." On the other hand, the metaphors that inhere in language can demonstrate and verify the empowerment of the language user in that he/she can always begin re describing the metaphors that has been pervasively used in personal, social and political communication. To understand the possibility of revisiting the metaphors and re-describing them can be associated with understanding the power to change, the power to control and the power to choose. 208 Look at the following poem from H. L. Hix ( 1960) and see how he uses language to redescribe things. "I love the world, as does any dancer" I love the world, as does any dancer, with the tips of my toes. I love the world more than I love my wife, for it contains more crannies and crevasses, it tenders more textures to my twenty digits' touch. Lush grass underfoot after April rain, a pile of petals fallen from a rose, sun-seared sidewalk in summer, sand, fresh-turned garden dirt, and, yes, her hummaocked ankle rubbed by the ball of my foot as she sleeps." If I understand that the metaphors I have been living on in my personal, social, political and cultural spheres are not unquestionable, and can be changed and if I realize my role in reconsidering and re describing these metaphors, then I can grasp my own role in writing, defining and constructing the realities. More over, I can notice that images that I have been living with due to the evocative power of language may not necessarily be the true images that describe things, then I can become more aware of my task and my role in deconstructing those images, analyzing their nature and exploring their constrictions for containing my vision. Students who become aware of the vitality and significance of language in this respect can deal with events, structures, approaches and messages in a more 209 profound way than people who have put these questions into oblivion. To see how language in this sense controls our lives and leads directions, creates emotions, and induces positions, think about the following frequently seen and heard messages in our world of communication: "the most beautiful woman of the world, the U.S.A. the strongest country in the world". Now think about the use of superlative adjectives before these nouns and see if any one can be the most beautiful person in the world either deductively or inductively? Can any country be the strongest country at all? How does the comparative adjective "more beautiful" or " more stronger" (and yet even in this case, based on certain criteria) transform (through language) into superlative adjectives? Moreover, think about how "body" is perceived through the language of material girls, cinematic cyborgs, muscle men, and aerobicizing women in the contemporary western culture? (see, for instance the American body in context by Jessica Johnson, 2001). Again in this level, the methodology and manner of presentation along with the characteristics of the audience will define the stages of discussion. For instance, teaching Ricoeur's defintion of hermeneutics (1982, p. 112) as " the explication of the being -in the-world displayed by the text. What is to be interpreted in the text is a proposed world which I could inhibit and in which I could project my own possibilities" presupposes the basic awareness of learners towards the main questions of hermeneutics and its ramifications. Hermeneutics that comes from the Greek verb hermeneuein means to interpret. It is traditionally used as a word for the interpretation of religious texts, and is now widely used for any kind of 210 interpretation including the interpretation of the world or any philosophical work. Hermeneutics is evolved and developed in different stages of history as one may see its different signification in Greek culture, Herbraic or biblical tradition and Islamic culture. Interestingly enough, in the era of science, hermeneutics rises with its distinctive characteristics within the Western culture. Hermeneutics becomes the subject matter of numerous issues as one may see its signification within phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Habermas and others. Along with its transformations, hermeneutics has been preceded by adjectives such as ontological hermeneutics, critical hermeneutics, etc. ( For a discussion, see Ihde, 1998). One of the main questions for hermeneutics is: what does sense making mean? What does it mean when we say something makes sense? Parallel with the question, hermeneutics deals with meaning, in its broadest sense, from the conventional understanding of the text to other open medium such as the design of a shirt. 3. Language educator, in this level, acts as a bridge between the text in its broadest sense of the word and learners so he/she promotes inspirational messages from the text and guides the learners to begin expressing themselves through an inspiration from the text. This inspiration can range from a word such as "remembrance" in the aforementioned piece or the whole sentence or the smallest miniscule within the piece such as the preposition "upon" or the article "the". Since our mind is used to moving in the same direction that we have initially learned, the crucial role of language educator comes to the scene here where he/she can explicate and encourage the possibility of moving 211 outside the model and form of the instruction so learners can come up with their novel and exquisite modes of expressiveness, not that they all copy the style and mode of expressiveness as it is embedded in the instructed piece. The inspiration can blossom its fruition especially if the focus is not limited on one thing or another so the multiplicity of the fields of reflection displays its cynosure. So the learner should not get obsessed with reproducing the genre, or the theme nor should she/he be tempted to adhere to specific form or style. Language educator, in fact, in this stage deepens the thoughtful engagement of the learners through proper instigation and stimuli while encouraging the learners to search for multiple possibilities to express their thoughtful engagements. Hence, learner's journey of thinking and expressiveness begin concurrently as he/she looks in to the wide range of possibilities both in terms of intelligibility and expressivity. Here, we go back to the previously reiterated point on the empowerment and its relationship with the ability to look at the possibilities instead of actualities, at "otherwise" instead of "as it is". So the language learners begin expressing themselves while experiencing the path taken by the presenter (in this case Lawrence) and nonetheless moving their own steps so their expressivity, albeit influenced and inspired by the presenter, can turn out to be uniquely exclusive. This uniqueness comes from the attempt of the language learner to freely look at possibilities and not actualities. Language educator plays a crucial role here by warmly inviting the learners to explore the horizon of possibilities instead of clinging to one or two established ones. This invitation consists in swimming 212 in the infinite oceans of meanings and excavating manifold pictures of being. It suggests the practicality of illustrating things in a non ordinary way, in an unfamiliar fashion and in a novel manner. Is it not because of the same thing that at their onset, all explorations, inventions, discoveries, and creations have been in opposition with the existing values and established norms of looking? What would people of four hundred years ago have said on telecommunication from a part of a continent to the other one or walking in the air while sitting in an aircraft? How did the established discourses of the Old English and Middle English deal with the authors who wanted to get themselves free from the influence of Latin and Greek and write their own style? What about those who wanted to get out of the Italian influence of genre and literary subjects, how were they received by those who were dogmatically circumscribed within the actualities and did not have any reason at all except a reference to the already actualized reality which need to be considered so fixed that one can not be allowed to see the other wise modes of the thing in question? This level is coupled with both inspiration and awareness. Awareness towards the flow of language and its constant creation of meanings in various contexts and frameworks. It stimulates the mind to trace down the roots, the developments inside and by the language so dogmatic clinging to one horizon shaped by language may become questionable after looking into other horizons beyond the boxes created by specific language. To bring an example, one may refer to the contemporary meaning of consumption in the contemporary American culture 213 where people immerse themselves in consumption and in the words of Larson (1992) " proudly refer to themselves as consumers without a second thought or a blush of shame". In his paper "purchasing identity: Advertising and the embrace and celebration of self, Larson presents an overview of the changes within the word consumption by evoking to the book, Channels of Desire by Stuart and Elizabeth Ewens(1982). According to this analysis, the word consumption served as a derogatory word in the earlier times with an implication of "wasting", "pillaging". According to Ewenses, the word also had some other connotations in the older usage being associated with the disease of tuberculosis, which wasted away the diseased individual. The word changes and brings positive implications as it is used with the rise of industrialization when using things up is an indication of prosperity. The point is not the promotion of the etymology of words, it is the understanding of the function of language and its constitutive feature which creates realities for people, changes position and impacts their way of being and living. Through this vigilance and realization, language learners can better understand their position in the world, their mode of being and their being influenced by the constructions and structures that affect their choices. They can also revisit that what they are living through in terms of constructions and boxes may be not contain the whole truth as they are told by the constructions and boxes. These sorts of reflective insights and inspiration will allow the learners to consciously look into their positioning in the social, political and cultural frameworks and contexts and become aware of their role in writing and expressing their own position in light of the new awareness. 214 Language educator plays a very crucial role in this level which is helping the learners to experience immediate consciousness and mindfulness. I use the term immediate consciousness here in line with mindfulness where attentiveness, wakefulness, awareness and consciousness are present in regards to the subject of focus. However, I will shortly discuss some subtle distinctions of immediate consciousness as I take it here from Langer's concept of mindfulness. According to Langer (2000), "mindfulness is a flexible state of mind in which we are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to context". While claiming that "most teachings unintentionally foster mindlessness", Langer (2000) cites the reliance on distinctions drawn in the past as one of the characteristics of mindlessness and argues that "many of our beliefs about learning are mind- sets that have been mindlessly accepted to be true". She further claims that "when we engage in mindful learning, we avoid forming mind-sets that unnecessarily limit us". Langer describes "repetition" and "single exposure" as the causes of mindlessness where repeating something over and over may lead to reliance on mind-set which deprive us of being mindful or our initial exposure to information. On the second cause of mindlessness, Langer (2000, p. 220-221) says" if when first given the information we process it without questioning alternative ways, the information could be understood, we take it mindlessly. When information is processed mindlessly, we essentially make a commitment to a single way of understanding it. Even if it later would be to 215 our advantage to view the information differently, if we learned it mindlessly, it will not occur to us to reconsider it". Language educator who teaches mindfully and promotes mindfulness among the language learners exalts and advocates students' active engagement with the present. He/she does not merely urge learners to abide by the mind sets within the pre-prescribed instructions. One might strongly challenge this by sating that how could a language learner not rely on those mindsets when he wants to utter something? The learners need to be bound by the existing rules within the syntax and linguistic rules of a language. They can not come and produce a sentence such as "the is sky blue". The answer to this challenge inheres in the heart of our previous analysis on discourse, expressiveness, creativity of language and a deep understanding of language itself. The learner is not expected or encouraged to break the rules of syntax as they manifest themselves within a natural language but in offering the mode and nature of expressiveness, he can get out of the reiterated examples and boxes which prescribe or dictate modes of expressiveness. The point, therefore, is not to produce "the is sky blue", but it is to consider the diversity, multiplicity and plurality of expressiveness in light of the creativity of language, to see in how many other ways "the", "sky", "blue", and "is" may contribute to generate new other ways of expressiveness which ultimately tie to new other ways of thinking regarding "the", "sky", "blue", and "is". That as many as infinite modes of expressiveness can emerge through the finite means of language and all these modes can be as varied and variegated as opposed to being fixed and 216 established. Succinctly put, modes of expressiveness which beckon modes and styles of thought can be mindfully changed thus creating new modes of thinking and expressiveness. Language learners are like viewers who may be instructed to view one streak of line in one direction which develops the subsequent habit of viewing things in the analogous way. Conversely, they may be excited to see manifold ways of viewing and examine various horizons parallel with their viewing. The former fosters passivity and the latter creates creativity where learners mindfully look into possible things in terms of expressivity and do not contain themselves within the fixation of instructional models (again, in terms of expressivity). Furthermore, the latter brings the active engagement in the flux of the presence and its derivatives while considering the ridges of association, the past and memory. When language learners are expected to strain their brains and merely reproduce modes of expressivity as promoted by the mindless way of teaching, their concern and focus is to keep themselves constantly connected to those previously endorsed models and modes and therefore, they can not make time to look for alternative ways of thinking and expressivity. So they invariably transfix their focus on the pre-delivered package of expressivity to receive ovation and commendation on behalf of the promoters of certain kinds of expressivity. Above all, when the learner finds himself/herself quite bound by the suggested modes of expresivity and consequently ways of thinking, he/she becomes inextricably tied to the taxonomy and compartmentalization of the pre-established mind-sets in expressing himself /herself. Because the first 217 thing that stands out in deciding the mode of expressivity would be the emphasis of a number of established modes of classification that inscribe how one needs to approach an issue. Habitually, this is done mindlessly so the frequency of cliche, stereotyped, trivial and superficial ways of languaging increases. Here is the language educator who can openly invite the language learners to mindfully search for plurality and multiplicity of thinking and expressivity through the mindful teaching of language, thinking and their mutual relationship. We may partially do this in our work with children when they come up with their own modes of expressiveness and bespeak of "talking clouds", "the sun which comes down to the room every night", "the singing shoes", "the message of a flower", etc. Interestingly enough, we find their modes of expressiveness funny since it is not developed enough to grasp the ingredients of ours at least within the Piageian model of development. More interesting than that, we acknowledge the beauty of the same kinds of diversity within the recognized discourses of poetry where "shores put their lips on the sea". To clarify this better, notice the following poem by William Wordsworth (1770-1850) by the name of "I wandered lonely as a cloud" and notice the modes of expressivity. "I wandered lonely as a cloud". I wandered lonely as a cloud That floats on high o'er vales and hills, When all at once I saw a crowd, A host, of golden daffodils, Beside the lake, beneath the trees, Fluttering and dancing in the breeze. Continuous as the stars that shine And twinkle on the milky way, They stretched in never-ending line Along the margin of a bay: Ten thousand saw I at a glance, Tossing their heads in sprightly dance. The waves besdie them danced; but they Out-did the sparkling waves in glee; A poet could not but be gay, In such a jocund company; I gazed—and gazed—but little thought What wealth the show to me had brought? For oft, when on my couch I lie In vacant or in pensive mood, They flash upon that inward eye Which is the bliss of solitude; And then my heart with pleasure fills, And dances with the daffodils. 219 One may see the diversity, plurality and ploysemy of expressivity within the poem and its trail of thought and modes of thinking. Brining the adverb "lonely" to modify the verb "wander" and creating a relationship between the verb and the noun "cloud" beckons the initial creative attempt on the part of the poet to offer his otherwise look at things. The delicate use of "lonely"' to describe a psychological state of loneliness instead of "alone" for the physical state of loneliness would testify to the poet's subtlety in expressing a delicately different category i.e. the emotional and psychological state of loneliness versus its pure physical aspect and the creation of that state with an object known as cloud but not patches of clouds but a cloud to illustrate the depth of the psychological state. Now notice the picture of expressiveness and the scope of thinking when the same loneliness is in touch ( of course from a high altitude: "floating on high") with a series of extensions which at least physically suggest collectivity versus being alone ( "vales and hills"). As you proceed you see the emergence of special style where the verb "saw" precedes the subject "I" ( Ten thousand I saw at a glance) in opposition to the ordinary established way of "I saw", while revealing a special horizon through this precedence and that is the emphasis on the action of the verb, on the movement of seeing, and on the verb as the manifestation of acting and doing. The poem embodies numerous other instances of looking at things in an unfamiliar way that is bringing novelty into the scene. If the poet had wanted to put his foot steps on the frequently trodden path of the ordinary by mindlessly repeating what is pervasively repeated in the mindless discourse of the ordinary thinking, he would not have come up with any mode of those expressiveness. This 220 search for the novelty and looking for the unfamiliar among the familiar is the precious substance that can be flourished through mindfulness. Because if I am supposed to look through the glasses of others with their pre-measured frame and size, the most I can do is the reproduction of what they have already produced. In addition, the specificity of frame and size and the containment of horizon and its limitations along with its selective position constantly commit me in the bedrock of the past and do not allow me to search for the unlimited resources since they already claim that they have recognized my resources and its scopes. Through working on a diversified ground and offering kaleidoscopic globe of thinking and expressivity, language educator can open up the horizons of thinking particularly through an intense engagement with the present. Some, contrary to Langer, may advocate the mindless learning (see, for instance Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) and underscore the importance of mindlessness since it frees limited cognitive resources. I argue that limited cognitive resources that grow out of mindlessness can not well serve the creativity of language and bloom creative off springs since thy need to rely on the predefined scopes of thinking which linger in the heart of mindlessness. Plus, they largely encourage convergent way of thinking i.e. search for one right answer where as divergent and creative way of thinking consist in getting out of the boxes and searching the infinite possibilities. In order to be creative, one need to break the margins and violate the certainties and breach the way(s) we were taught. The language educator can, thereby, help the language learners to situate themselves in the present and help students to see 221 the wide scope of opportunities and chances through being active in exploring modes of thinking and expressiveness. Immediate Consciousness and Knowledge by Presence At the beginning of the level four and the presentation of role of language educator in involving the learner in the present, I implied that there needs to be a distinction between mindfulness and the sense of the immediacy of consciousness which I have used here in line with mindfulness. Here I need to introduce the distinction and elaborate the issue in relation to language education. The sense of immediacy of consciousness as I take it here is in close contact with the concept of knowledge by presence. Although its roots date back to Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi, the Founder of the School of Illumination (ishraq)in Islamic philosophy, the Knowledge by Presence was first introduced to Western academic circles by Ha'iri Yazdi (1992). The founder of the School of Illumination (ishraq) based his epistemology on the distinction between knowledge by concept or conceptualization (al-'ilm al-husuli) and knowledge by presence (al-'ilm al-huduri). Beginning with this distinction, Ha'iri (1992) amplifies the meaning of knowledge by presence and its consequences for epistemology, cosmology, theodicy, and mysticism. Along with the historic overview of the scholarship on knowledge by presence within the Islamic philosophy and his extensive debates with kant, Russel, Wittgenstein and others, Ha'iri distinguishes between a knowledge based on the concept in the mind of something that is itself absent from the mind and a knowledge based on something which is itself present in the mind and whose very existence is inseparable from the knowledge of it. 222 Discussing the characteristics of knowledge by presence, Ha'iri (1992, p.43-44) refers to freedom from the dualism of truth and falsehood and freedom from the distinction between knowledge by "conception" and knowledge by "belief. On the former he indicates that "This is because the essence of this pattern of knowledge is not concerned with the notion of correspondence. When there is no external object, correspondence between an internal and external state, as well as between "external fact" and "statement", is not withstanding." On the latter, he evokes to the well-known Islamic philosopher Avicenna in his Logica where Avicenna first makes the distinction between knowledge by "conception" and knowledge by "belief to 'disentangle the problem of definition from the problem of demonstration and confirmation". I bring H'airi's quote of Avicenna here to clarify the distinction: " Every piece of knowledge and apprehension is either by conception (tasawwur) or confirmation (tasdiq). Knowledge by "conception" is the primary knowledge which can be attained by definition or what ever functions as definition. This is as if by definition we understand the essence of human being. Knowledge by "confirmation" on the other hand is that which can be acquired by way of "inference". This is as if we believe the proposition that "for the whole world there is a beginning". One of the corollaries of what Ha'iri discusses within the issue of knowledge by presence, the knowledge that results from immediate and intuitive awareness and constitutes one of the most important themes in Islamic epistemology is the immediacy of awareness in this kind of knowledge. Without getting involved into the details of other implications of the knowledge by presence and its numerous philosophical consequences, I try to first clarify this and then connect the discussion to language education. 223 When we say statements such as T know something,' the object of our knowing may be divided into two categories. It is either an object which is separate from us and is external to us and our knowledge of that thing or object is because of or owing to an intermediary that is something through which we become aware of the object. This is the knowledge by concept or conceptualization where the knower knows the thing by a concept of the thing so the thing itself is not present in the knower but its concept or conceptualization is present in the knower and the knowledge of the knower to the thing is because of this concept or conceptualization. The reason to bring both concept and conceptualization is because our knowledge of something may entail the concept without establishing any affirmative or negative logical designation or our knowledge of something may incorporate the designation of an affirmative or negative relationship between the subject and predicate. In respect to the first example, if we know of 'the sky,' the object of our knowledge namely 'the sky' is not itself present before use but a concept of 'the sky' is what acts as the bridge between us as the knower and the object 'sky.' In this example, you vividly notice the separation of the object of knowledge from the knower that is the sky is external to the knower. Oh the other hand, the concept 'the sky' does not incorporate any affirmative or negative relationship in that we merely offer a conception but we do not make a proposition such as T know that there is a sky or I know that the sky is beautiful' where the predicate (to use the logical parlance) is ascribed and imputed to the subject. Nonetheless, in both cases namely our concept or our conceptualization the object of knowing is external to us. In knowledge by presence, however, the object of knowing is entirely present to the knower to the effect that there is no separation between the object of knowing and the knower and therefore there is no 2 2 4 third agent to act as an intermediary for the knower. For example, when I say that T know of myself or T have knowledge of myself,' I am reporting of an object which is immediately present to me and there is no detachment between me and that object of my knowing being in this case myself. Similarly my knowledge of my being happy or sad is occurring without the intercession of any thing else since my sadness or my happiness is present in me and my knowledge of that is immediate. Ha'ari (1992, p. 2) describes this consciousness in following way: In the language of illuminative philosophy, this consciousness is referred to as "knowledge by presence". The prime example of this knowledge is that which is apparent to the knower performatively and directly without the intercession of any mental representation or the linguistic symbolism. This knowledge manifests itself through all human expressions in general and self-judgements in particular. Hence such assertions as "I think" or "I speak", become in particular the vehicles for the manifestation of this knowledge. The active subject of these judgements is the performative T as distinct from the metaphysical "I" or the self which has been the fundamental issue in any philosophical inquiry. So one of the examples of knowledge by presence which entails the immediacy of consciousness is the knowledge of "I" as the knower or the perceiver or the subject to my own presence as the known or the perceived or the object. Ha'iri (1992) argues that "The very nature of the performative T leads to the conclusion that, in all of our self- judgments, there is necessarily a pragmatic unity and a self-continuity. This impetus, in itself, acts to unify and objectify all that it encounters within the external world." I use the following pictures to somehow cast light on one the examples or instantiation of knowledge by presence and immediate consciousness within it. (Figure 8. Knowledge by Presence & Knowledge by Conceptualization). 225 Knowledge By Presence Knowledge By Concept or Conceptualization (Figure 8. Knowledge by Presence & Knowledge by Conceptualization). 226 Knowledge by Presence and Language Education Apart from the manifold philosophical discussions of the knowledge by presence and its implications, I now discuss its possibility of offering something in regard to language education. My argument here is that knowledge by presence is the most rigorous manifestation of mindfulness as discussed earlier in that knowledge by presence requires a comprehensive engagement with the present and detaches any type of mindlessness since its understanding is in ineluctable tied to a very high state of mindfulness. To understand the argument better, as you are reading this passage, pause for a moment and think of your knowledge of your self in the sense of you as the knower with the object being yourself. Examine the relationship and see if there is any intercession between you as the knower and you as the known that means you as the bearer of this knowledge is immediately in contact with the object of your knowing being yourself where as your knowledge of a mountain, for instance, transpires because of and thanks to a concept since the mountain itself is not present beside you but it is the representation or the concept of the mountain which lingers you and is present in you and not the object itself. In your case of knowledge of you that you are, you as the known is present in you namely you as the knower. Now consider that while you reflect on such a journey of knowing, you need to be totally mindful of yourself and your engagement with your self to the effect that you consciously become further aware of your presence and your being. This is in line with the concept of mindfulness since you can not think of knowledge by presence or experience knowledge by presence if you are mindless. Having realized the delicate relationship between mindfulness and its cultivation at the apex and eminence of knowledge by presence, we may conclude that any time you 2 2 7 experience knowledge by presence or plan to approach its realm as in the case of Youga or meditation which somehow notify you of your immediacy of consciousness, you need to be in state of mindfulness. In addition, experiencing the knowledge by presence immerses one in the present since understanding your presence only appears in the presence of your presence which intrinsically embodies the presence of the present. You can not be in yesterdays or tomorrows and experience the knowledge by presence. Language education may lead the learners to experience this state of awareness and its immediacy which brings the person into an immediate observation of himself/herself. In the moments of this immediacy, the learner can openly look into the infinite resources within himself/herself and focus on his/her being because of what he/is not because of what he/she has. In other words, some times we think of ourselves as what we are because of what we have (position, power, credentials, wealth, etc). Some times we may think of ourselves as what we are in the sense that no matter what we possess or what we lack, the least is that "we are" namely our being is unquestionable although others may indoctrinate that our being is only sensible if we get what we should have in their eyes to make sense. This experience of "I am" can vividly occur for the learner in view of knowledge by presence where the learner can immediately acknowledge his/her knowledge of his presence and his/her being. This acknowledgement can be done not with standing the emergence of all kinds of detachment in that you detach any thing you have (from your paraphernalia and your clothes to your parents, your cultural construction, your political and your social frameworks, etc.) from your self and you notice that at the end although you are fully naked from all these dependencies, yet you 228 make sense because "you are" and this is the time when you consummate your brilliance of presence to your own presence. Knowledge by presence serves as a very significant stage where people can mindfully examine themselves and reconsider their pre-occupations through detaching themselves from those engagements. Referring to the principles of postmodernism and the role of our created technologies in creating us, Miller and Real (1997) mention that " in the media, people are caught up in the play of images, simulacra, that have less and less relationship to an outside, to an external reality. In fact we live in a world of simulacra where the image or signifier of an event has replaced direct experience and knowledge of its referent signified". Relying on Baudrillard's view point on postmodernism, Miller and Real (1997) indicate that "the function of mass media is to prevent response, to privatize individuals; to place them into a universe of simulacra where it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacle and the real." This outcry indicating the placement of people into the world of copies where there is no originality is tantamount to the confirmation of placement of people into various induced engagements that occupy the position of "I" and keep people away from their mindful experience of themselves and their being apart from the so-called simulacra. Under the severe typhoon of such engagements, people can rarely connect to the experience of knowledge by presence since they mainly search for themselves among those engagements. While focusing on the role of advertisements in fostering such engagements, Larson (1997, p. 167) indicates that " a major function of contemporary advertising is to offer consumers an opportunity to embrace and/or celebrate a preferred self-identity through the purchase of goods and services." 229 Marxist perspective on alienation and personal estrangement of the individual because of consumerism also cries out against these kinds of engagements. Going back to Langer's account for the causes of mindlessness and recounting repetition and first exposure, we may now notice why people who are constantly instigated to be kept engaged can not mindfully connect to so many things including themselves. This may also elucidate why the chance of people's experiencing the knowledge by presence dwindles on the strength of such engagements. Add to all of these Hall's (1977, p.85) point that" one of the functions of culture is to provide a highly selective screen between man and the outside world. In its many forms, culture therefore designates what we pay attention to and what we ignore. This screening provides structure for the world". The role of language educator here becomes so crucially vital since he/she can help the learner realize how language representation is pervasively involved in all these forms of engagements and how language creates the simulacra known to us as realities. While mindfully reconnoitering the constitutive role and function of language in developing these engagements, language educator can invite the learners to mindfully search for their choices through language. This mindful attempt is promoted through looking into things by virtue of their ties to language on the one hand and the role of language in constructing the images and representations and ultimately impregnating people with engagements on the other. Furthermore, it may be high time for language educator to open up the issue on language creativity through displaying the possibilities within language in offering various modes of expresiveness. But what can help this process activate more than an thing else is the sense of awareness of the "I" as the creator of creative discourses and "I" as the recipient of representational discourses. This 2 3 0 awareness necessitates that one can mindfully become aware of one's position through the language and especially the performative language that one uses in one's assertions and judgements. Knowledge by presence can lead to such awareness and can let the knower see himself/herself out side the language oriented placements of representational discourses. In the mean time, focusing on the experience of knowledge by presence may blossom the awareness on how the language community may manipulate adoption of positions and attitudes that may even turn out to be contradictory. On such manipulation, Johnston (2001) notes that " in American culture today, the values drawn upon in making decisions in almost any area of life are conflicting. Buying a car generates a desire for a vehicle that is either luxurious yet economical, or compact yet spacious. In a magazine advertisement, a perfume is sole to "bring out the beast in him", next to an article about date rape. Commercialism and advertisements continually direct consumers to both eat and consume, and to lose weight and be thin. Friends and relatives encourage people to eat, "just this once", then critique them for not being able to stick to a weight loss program. From the larger culture through to intimate family and friends, mixed messages are sent about what is important, what is success, what our accomplishments should be". These engagements of the mind and probably the heart bring packages of mindlessness with them in that the language through which the collage of engagement is offered imposes mindlessness. Considering the jargon of the "anchor persons" in the context of the American mass media as an appropriate metaphor, McKinley (1982) expounds on his reason "For those who anchor the news broadcasts are in effect anchoring the flow of events to a stable set of understandings about when and where events can take place in the popular American cosmos". 231 It may be worth while now to see why people may rarely consider a mindful thinking to issues outside the induced engagements. To put it on a trial, ask people a very simple question again, if they mindfully looked into the moon last night or saw the burgeoning of the sun in the morning? Perhaps, preoccupation with baseball as an example of popular culture could be one of example of many which mindlessly coils around the modes of thinking and expressivity. On the pervasiveness of this engagement, Miller and Real (1998) write " in addition, fans spend millions on endorsed bats, balls, shoes, hats, and other properties. To see baseball as dominated by a capitalistic agenda is not difficult. What this agenda explains is postmodernism's concern with unconstrained capitalism. By focusing extensively on revenue, properties, and salaries, baseball has transformed itself from a game into a monolithic business". If learners are to be so engaged in such preoccupations of popular culture, for example, how can they mindfully reexamine their position? If they are so contained within the sovereignty of pre-defined languages and discourses, how can they acknowledge their freedom and choices in questioning the sovereignty? If they grope for themselves among the placements of simulacra being introduced as the true configuration of identities, how can they ever experience a journey to the knowledge by presence where you feel your presence in spite of the spawned attachments of pop culture? And what does education do if it, in its turn, fosters in the words of Langer (2000) "mindlessness"? Language educator can serve as a great wealth in disengaging the learners from the mindlessness that stops them (learners) to question and contemplate on the certainties of preoccupations and engagements. On some of these certain mindlessly accepted engagements, Johnston (2001) writes: " From Marilyn Monroe to the Spice Girls, from 232 Arnold Schwarzenegger to O.J. Simpson, from William Taft to Bill Clinton, to your won naked form reflected in the mirror each morning, we are taught to read bodies as symbols displaying and revealing hidden "truths" about the individual and his or her behaviors. Any discussion of the body becomes complex and muddled as one tries to analyze how and why certain body types are attributed certain meanings". Modernism's break down of grand narratives of progress, certainty and rationality indicate how much these grand narratives had been previously taken for granted within social, political and cultural contexts. On the refutation of such grand narratives that had been mindlessly accepted, Miller and Real (1998) write "For example, the grand narrative of the "American Dream" is reflected by the early history of baseball. The "American Dream" narrative suggests that hard work, commitment, dedication, and sacrifice allow individuals to enjoy economic and material success. The argument is that social mobility is directly related to effort and work. Such grand narratives serve a useful function for American culture. They allow society to explain our heroes success as based on hard work and dedication. We can explain societal failures based on an individual lacking those values". Miller and Real (1998) further go on this to exemplify cases in base ball in particular which did not fit these grand narratives i.e. people who worked, had dedication and yet did not succeed, players who were best at all yet they were considered as the most valuable player. Not very long time ago, In his brilliant work," fear and trembling", while referring to a proverbial expression, Kierkegaard questioned these narratives but in a more mindful way. He argues that in the external and material world not always he who works, would gain, many of those who don't, earn more. But, he clearly argues, in the world of soul and spirit only he who works would gain and earn. 233 These engagements and preoccupations, and constant involvement with the socially constructed metaphors all transpire within language, in its broadest sense, as a system of signs. A sign reveals the correlation between the signified and signifier ( de Saussure, 1966, p. 66). A Sign is not the signifier. The signifier is the sound-image which transports the signified and the signified is a concept which refers to something. What the sign refers to is the referent. According to Italian semiotician, Umberto Echo (1976) there are often cases and examples where the referent of a sign is not a real object or a subject, but the signified or signifier of another sign. Thus, the signified or the signifier of a sign correlation can, in turn, be either the signifier or the signified of another sign correlation. It is in the juxtaposition of signs that signification occurs. Awareness towards happenings and understanding the function of language in framing and constructing a world with numerous engagements also report of thinking since expression and content disclose modes of thinking, albeit premature, concrete, formal or abstract. Now if the learners' minds are so occupied with mindless engagements and repetitious involvement, with taken for granted metaphors, and unquestionable paradigms, can they mindfully experience things, can they creatively think if their scope of attention is already stuck in the channels of the induced engagements? If the learners' minds are linked to mindlessly induced signification, can they mindlessly reconsider the correlation of the signifier and signified within the induced signification? If they mindlessly keep on feeding from the socially and politically imposed signified, can they search for the analysis of correlation between signifier and signified without bring mindfully active? On the description of some of these engagements, Lasn (1999) writes " advertisements are the most prevalent and toxic of the mental pollutants. From the 234 moment your radio alsrm sounds in the morning to the wee hours of late-night TV, microjolts of commercial pollution flood into your brain at the rate of about three thousand marketing messages per day. Every day, an estimated 12 billion display ads, 3 million radio commercials, and more than 200,000 TV commercials are dumped into North America's collective unconscious." How can the educators and learners think critically, profoundly and creatively if the thinking itself is enmeshed through the imposition of circumscribing signification and signs? How can learners think creatively and critically if they are supposed to merely focus on pre-figured engagements? On the entanglement of education and its barking up the wrong tree, Herda (1999, p. 18) notes that " The critical mentality that is sweeping our educational organizations has bewildered and distorted what kind of thinking we actually need in order for our understanding of social, economical, moral problems to change. The lack of depth of the current usage of the term "thinking" in the critical thinking bandwagon undermines the potential of adult or young leaders to reflect, learn, and act in meaningful ways". On our mindless to see what shapes us and how it shapes us, Herda (1999, p. 24) asserts that " Most typically, we take for granted our social actions, structured or patterned by language, and we fail to see them." Knowledge by presence can facilitate and expedite the process of this mindfulness since it promotes the awareness towards challenging signification through assisting the person to understand his/her being without depending on those socially, politically and culturally established signification. It is in the free moments of knowledge by presence that the person can easily connect to his/her creativity since knowledge by presence bestows upon an open channel for the knower to link himself/herself to his/her infinite 235 capacities and possibilities. Knowledge by presence practically offers the possibility of living in the moment where the fountain of creativity can bloom well. Being active in the moment and mindfully looking into burgeoning horizons inhere in the heart of knowledge by presence. Moreover, the idea of having control over the direction of our own creation through language sprouts up in the ineffable and yet opulent moments of knowledge by presence while we mindfully look into the traces of language and its creative capabilities for shaping, molding and figuring our being, our "I ness", and our identity. When knowing is not just a gerund in the air hanging for the alleviation of those who may not be the possessor of nothing save knowing, when knowing turn out to be in the words of Ha'iri Yazdi (1992) "being" and language becomes an "action" in the words of Habermas (1979), we may better understand the ontological aspect of language in terms of its creation. According to Ha'iri (1992, p. 1) ".. .the inquiry into the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the knower can lead to the very foundation of human intellect where the word knowing does not mean any thing other than being. In this ontological state of human consciousness the constitutive dualism of the subject- object relationship is overcome and submerged into a unitary simplex of the reality of the self that is nothing other than self-object knowledge. Form this unitary simplex, the nature of self-object consciousness can, in turn, be derived". The engagements that have been discussed in the above and the involvement of the heart and mind with the induced engagements keep one away from oneself so one gets estranged from oneself. In other words, one moves towards identifying with the engagements as one immerses in the engagements. The same happens when the metaphors including the scientific ones shape and structure our modes of thinking and 236 mould our modes of expresiveness and we mindlessly identify ourselves with those metaphors without mindfully questioning the signification of the metaphoricity. One of such metaphors which has perniciously hurt human nature and human values can be found in Nadeau's (1991, p. 171) words that" human beings are programmed in a manner analogous to programming computers. The hardware that is our brain allows us to assimilate the software of language and this software becomes the basis for encoding all aspects of the elaborate software package of a transmitted culture." Notice how this position uncritically shapes our world of looking at human being and how it shapes our understanding of man through a mere reference to the technological side of the progress. Such metaphors indulge our minds so mindlessly that after a while we think of the metaphor i.e. computer instead of what the metaphor has been used for namely human beings. Against such harmful metaphors, Herda (1999) argues that " this position dangerously ignores the nature and importance of reason spanning both technical and moral imperatives". Besides having numerous implications and consequences, Knowledge by presence facilitates the process of connecting to the present, examining the performative "I" and looking into the openness of "I" in creatively defining and designing itself. Creative thinking can blossom under the auspices of knowledge by presence where obedience to boxes can be revisited through an investigation of one's empowerment. When you find out that you make sense in spite of all your detachments that have engaged you and your being you can make sense without them too, you come to realize the power of your own to shape and figure yourself. This empowerment and connecting to the present through the knowledge by presence and the immediacy of consciousness 237 which lingers in its essence can lead the experiencer to actively and mindfully employ his/her power of creativity. On those moments of living in the present where yesterdays and tomorrows and trail of association of previously engagements do not impose themselves in the actively mindful process of living in the present, the consummation of creativity can unfold itself. The moment of creativity, openness, and exposure to multiplicity of views and viewing, along with navigating in the infinite realm of possibilities would lead to the appearance and creation of expressiveness amidst the zestfully springing waves of thinking. Application and Implementation While teaching a course on English poetry for students of Athabasca University, I applied my discussed model. Students of this class were composed of some Canadian students with English as their first language and others with English as their second language who were mainly from China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Thailand and Singapore. Students came up with remarkably interesting pieces of writing and expressiveness while they mindfully and actively connected to their living in the presence and their knowledge by presence. Although, the differences and multiplicity of understanding and background were perceptibly observable in their perceptiveness, their know how to express themselves, and their modes of thinking, they could all experience the search for novelty within the familiar and they could present works which ascertain an 'otherwise' look at things. Students, in their discursive and creative work, ranging from politics to personal rumination, displayed their disengagement from the boxes of the right answer in thinking and brought plurality of reflective inquiry through their divergent thinking which 238 indicate the multiplicity of horizons of understanding. In their personal approaches and conversations, they almost unanimously acknowledged their sensitivity and increased awareness towards the role and function of language in building personal and social realities and their sensitivity towards understanding the context. Surprisingly enough, students who had other classes with me such as psychology of mass media and were not doing a convincingly good job in those classes, could come up with amazingly appealing modes of expressiveness especially when we worked on understanding knowledge by presence, connecting to the presence, and mindfully being active in exploring the possibilities versus actualities. In my implementation of the levels discussed, I tried to carefully and cautiously avoid expanding on the conceptual or practical aspects of the discussion where I was not certain if students could grasp the intricacy of the discussions. Therefore, I attempted to implement the model and methodology in accordance with the cognitive level of students, as I had understood. Some might challenge the idea and argue that this methodology and the inclusion of the discussed levels may be suitable for students in higher level of learning the language but it may no be appropriate for beginners. Their challenge might be coupled with this question that how could you teach these levels to beginners who have not yet the so called basic skills of language learning? In response to this challenge and similar objections, I need to say that I believe even in the most preliminary levels of language learning, language educator can apply the discussed components in accordance with the level and situatedness of the learners. Although I do not have any empirical evidence to support my claim in this regard and even if I had, it would be limited to the tested area on behalf of me and some body else might come up with other findings, I believe that language creativity can be implemented extensively, there is not limitation for modes of thinking. For example, if we teach simple sentences such as "Johnson is here, Barbara is not here or John is thirsty and Sue is hungry." We can simply pass and ignore exploring other layers within the same examples or we may proceed with questions such as "let's see, what else we can put instead of Barbara, thirsty, hungry, can we change the places? What other things can we come up with in their places? What about saying 'a horse is thirsty", ...? This very simple example is indicative of the possibility of provocative thinking in any stage. Language education may have been traditionally too much obsessed with techniques of education instead of focusing on language itself. Not surprisingly, many of the programs and courses on language education concentrate on those techniques so overwhelmingly that they almost their subject being the language. Accordingly, language is presented in a very perfunctory and superficial way which mainly boils down to the look at language as a tool for conducting the lowest levels of communication, and a tool representing the world. Therefore, the majority of language education programs do not harbor and foster thinking, they already have packages of thinking for you. This look at language as a tool for communication is entirely different from a looking at language as an event, as an act, as a way of being and a manner of living. Building on Heidegger (1971), Herda (1999, p. 26) indicates that " Traditionally, we have examined language by studying the characteristics of an individual language learner or language user, but as Heidegger argues, this is an inappropriate starting point. Instead, we must use social actions, not individual actions, as a starting point in understanding intelligibility and even the existence". 240 It is in line with understanding language as a way of being that we may come to the realization of language in defining the social world for us, and our awareness towards our control on creating and recreating this world. The implications of such awareness are not insignificant especially in light of their social and political and personal contexts. Promotion of such an understanding towards language allows the educators and learners as well as the policy makers to seriously and mindfully revisit the taken for granted metaphors that have built educational practices for us. To illustrate the role of language in crating these metaphors, recall the metaphor of computer for human beings and its support by Nadeau (1991) as well as its practical implications in changing the pedagogical practices. Against such mindless engagements through such metaphors, Bellah and et al (1991, p.44) refer to a wide gap " between technical reason, the knowledge with which we design computers or analyze the structure of DNA, and practical or moral reason, the ways we understand how we should live... What we need to know is not simply how to build a powerful computer or how to redesign DNA but precisely and above all how to do with that knowledge". Language education severe obsession with techniques of language education has its roots in positivist thinking towards language. In line with this obsession, language education has constantly been borrowing the techniques from empirical psychology to treat language education. Thus, the question of applying the right techniques has been at the center of the discussions. This positivist look at language and other ramifications in human and social sciences is what Habermas (1973, p. 255) discusses while describing the modern society's failure to distinguish between the practical and technical. "The real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis does not arise from this new function of science as technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer to able to distinguish between practical and technical power. Yet, even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from practical questions: therefore a particular danger arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of reflection of rationality confined to the technological horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to attian a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical". Reading the passage from Habermas again may also reveal his reference to various engagements that people mindlessly have accepted. It may be through the same analysis that one may come to realize the disempowerment of people who are language learners in light of what Habermas discusses in respect to technical control and manipulation which lead to dismissal of power from the people who are the main addresses of the problem and need to cultivate their capacities to solve the problem. Habermas discusses this process as " the depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the political realm as a political institution" (Habermas, 1973, p. 255). The growth of the "either or mentality" in language education may be searched within the same positivistic approach and its focus on applying the right technique. In other words, the positivistic approach in language education is in pursuit of gaining and using the right skills and techniques. To use an analogy, it is like focusing unilaterally on techniques of cooking without considering what is it that is eaten. Technical expertise becomes the main emphasis in light of the positivistic approach. The result is the 242 magnification of forms arising out of those techniques and minimization of substance which remains outside the realm of the techniques. To put it in another way, progression of superficiality and shallowness at the cost of profundity. On the other hand, it may be worthwhile here to recall Aristotle's distinction between techne and phronesis. While technique deals with skills and techniques and can be easily forgotten after they were learned, phronesis constitutes the ethical knowledge and moral judgment which ca not be learned nor forgotten. According to Gadamer, authentic knowledge is characterized through phronesis. On the significance of phronesis, Herda (1999) claims that " actions in our communities, organizations, and schools have moral implications. We do not act in situations void of consequences. In all respect of our lives, we are by implication obliged to use moral knowledge and apply it in particular situations". Focus on language as a way of being consists in understanding the language as the dwelling place for being where one can sense his/her being through the language. Language thus displays our being and our becoming. Ricoeur (1982), Heidegger (1971), Gadamer (1988), Habermas (1979) and others consider the centrality of language and its relation with our being as Heidegger describes language "as the house of Being" from which he presents the mutual relationship between the individual and Being. On the other hand, the ontological relationship of language and its creational capabilities disclose the modes of thinking and knowing which lead to the acknowledgement of another ontological relationship as discussed before that 'knowing is nothing but being'. This focus on language gives birth to a new horizon in language education where the relationship between thinking and expressiveness is constantly examined in views of their interconnectedness with being. So language education becomes proactively involved 243 in revealing stages of being and becoming, and serves as a grand resource and invaluable wealth for promotion of thinking and expressiveness. Language learners not only go through a journey of becoming beside learning a language but also they discover their position of being while exploring the possibilities of becoming through a look into the plurality of possible modes of becoming. Therefore, they do not get enmeshed in any fixed actuality which stops them from mindfully exploring the genius of "and" in the profound modes of thinking. Hence, the openness towards the creativity of language and its flourishing implications for being and thinking epitomize the essence of language education. By the virtue of knowledge by presence and its pouring of the immediacy of consciousness, creativity can lark and leap in the steaks of thought and expressiveness. Let's conclude by a look at the following creative pieces of such generative moments: 244 Human Science Research Mall Reporting live from the Human Science Research M a l l , The intuition, the insight and I walk in the middle of packed up lines and bring you this report. Your discretion is advised. Right at the beginning of this corner, we see the store "symbolic intentions" with the display of American pragmatism, German neo- Kantianism and German historicism. Some are asking for a double pack and we hear the customer service rep say: "Folks, mellow out. We've got the best for you. Just make sure you got the right brand. Not ethnomethodology". Next door, you see the hardware stores of hard methods with special coupons on structural functionalism and statistical method. They give the shoppers a free bottle of cybernetics with the deposit of their wisdom. Our camera men is already taking some shots of a number of people who are plastered and are tossing their cookies right on the foot of their deviation standard. As we continue our journey in the mall, we drive into a large group asking for a refund from the store "statistical positivism". Some are describing this "a rip o f f . 245 Within the huge line of refund seekers, you can see some biting a grounded theory sandwich with the special sauce of qualitative research. Our cameraman is zooming on a blow out sale "we let you eat till you drop. Get as much as you want. Objectivity, generalizability, reproducibility, and predictability". Right next to this blow out sale, you see lines after lines waiting for the washrooms. Oh, here is the security. Some seem to have fainted due to overeating deviating behavior mixed with ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis. The para medic says: "you got to go drown your sorrows in a vat of ice cream with the flavor of feminism". Hearing the advice, the fainted ones suddenly get up, scream and run away leaving every body including our crew with a cold turkey. Inductive ethnography and anthropology are trashing one another, in front of the bedazzled eyes, seeking the object reality in the pharmaceutical sites. The interpretive cultural analysis steps in and calls for a thick description as a prescription for all the avid eyes. The pager in the mall resonates all over: 246 "Attention, shoppers, there is no more space on the parking lot of objectivism hermeneutics. Please choose the back door". The kids of humanity are trying to get out of the mall but the flashes of data-oriented methods, certainty and strategies try to push them in giving them the brie a brae of recipe book research squeezed in the fragmented envelopes of unreflective theorizing. They receive a linear process or monolithic logic injection if they raise their objection. You can hear them though " What is it that they sell? What is it that we buy"? We pass the crowd and see a number of people slipping in the hallway of post modernism and social construction due to Sokal Affair. We continue our report in the midst of hue and cries with caution. Stay tune for an update. 247 Answers to My Question T i r e d o f the chores a n d h u m d r u m , I set out to get the a n s w e r f o r the q u e s t i o n o f w h a t c r e a t i v i t y i s . I r e a c h e d m o d e r n i s m that c o u l d h a r d l y m o v e due its h u b r i s . I a s k e d w h a t is c r e a t i v i t y ? C l e a r i n g i ts throat , I w a s o f f e r e d s e v e r a l b o x e s r i f e w i t h p l i e r s a n d n a i l s o f cer t i tude , d e t e r m i n i s m a n d p r e d i c t i o n . O n m y w a y out , the b o x e s tore apart w i t h p l i e r s a n d n a i l s a l l o v e r the f l o o r w a i t i n g f o r m e to go a n d p i c k t h e m u p . I t o o k a r a i n c h e c k . I got to a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , a s k e d the s a m e q u e s t i o n . W e l l , w h a t d o y o u m e a n b y w h a t c r e a t i v i t y i s " let m e put it o n the tab le o f P ~ Q a n d t e l l y o u h o w sense m a k i n g i s . I f x is an x then y o u r x c a n ' t b e a n x b u t the x w i t h sense o f c o n t i n u i t y . I p l a y e d truant. I found psychoanalysis, and repeated my question. I felt my shoes were inspected, then my shirt, it went below the belt, all as an indication of the search for the answer. I got out of the inspection which urged me to find the answer between the groin with a little bit of focus on here and there. I did the inspection. There was no answer though. I kept on asking, others and others. I reached post modernism with the same question. Stuttering along the way, postmodernism trembled and said, "how could you? There is not one answer. There are many answers. I paused but I carried along again with dissatisfaction." Suddenly, I saw a shepherd, asked him the question. He smiled. 249 Voices I hear voices D S M - I V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition) knows nothing of such voices They are not schizophrenic. I climb up the mountain of emotions to hear them better. They resonate like the childhood, like the fountain but you can't see them through electroencephalograph. They make brilliant sense but they have neither construct validity nor content validity as it pleases A .P .A . Phonology has not discovered their rhyme or their rhythm yet they are so vibrant. Morphology knows nothing of their morpheme, their cytology, their histology and their physiognomy. Notwithstanding, they stand in high profile. They run without having percentile scores, standard scores or raw scores. Freud failed to detect them, nor could Lacan grasp them. 250 These voices, they echo yet they are silent. They boom and they move you. I hear them. They go up the ladder. They take you to a highway not analogous to 101 or I 5. They are, boisterous, vociferous, rambunctious, and obstreperous yet they sound like velvet, they taste so plushy and they move like silken. They ripple through you with a fluffy, satiny, fleecy, feathery, flocculent and plumed zest, with an aroma beyond the domain-referenced test interpretation, with a piquancy, which dazzles and baffles criterion- referenced testing. No wonder, there is neither syllabus nor any curriculum for them in education. National Assessment of Educational Progress has not yet recognized them. I hear them though. They carry you to the Disney Land of your childhood, but not with an identical cynosure. Sesame Street has never shown them though they are always in there. These voices, they don't let you sleep, yet they let you repose. They inebriate you when you hear them but you remain sober and sound, cool and collected. They cuddle you like a touch of a palate deep into the ocean of sentiment's outburst. They fondle you like a petal that swirls not only around 251 your subcutaneous hospice but they peddle door to door into your own haven. 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