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A general perspective of Canadian constitutional interpretation as illustrated by the criminal law power Knight, William Harwood 1967

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A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW POWER by WILLIAM HARWOOD KNIGHT LL.B.(Honours), U n i v e r s i t y of Sydney, 1966  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS i n the Department of LAW  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1967  In presenting  t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements  for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that che L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available f o r reference and study,,  I further agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s  thesis f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives.  I t i s understood that copying  or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thesis f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of  Lcui.  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8,'. Canada Date  i ABSTRACT 'A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW POWER' The t h e s i s i s d i v i d e d intofour s e c t i o n s .  The f i r s t  s e c t i o n lays down a method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S.91 and S.92 of the B.N.A. A c t . The suggested method i s comprised of making three e n q u i r i e s : w i t h i n S.92  I s the s t a t u t e i n question  i s the s t a t u t e w i t h i n a S.91 enumerated  power and i s the statute w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y  general  power? The v a l i d i t y of t h i s method r e s t s on four viz:-  propositions  S.91 comprises the residue of powers a f t e r the pro-  vinces have been given c e r t a i n basic heads of powers; the enumerated powers i n S.91 are supreme over those  contained  i n S.92; where the subject matter of the s t a t u t e i n question goes beyond l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern or i n t e r e s t i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the general f e d e r a l power under S.91 even though i t might otherwise appear to come w i t h i n S.92; where n e i t h e r S.92 nor S.91 enumerated powers apply the s t a t u t e i n question f a l l s under the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power i n S.91. Each one of these p r o p o s i t i o n s i s examined and supported.  The second s e c t i o n deals w i t h the general r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the powers i n S.91 and S.92.  The matter  i s approached from the idea of a dichotomy between f a c t o r s and formulae i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . are  The f a c t o r s  those matters that guide the court i n answering the  questions posed i n the f i r s t s e c t i o n and the formulae are the  r a t i o n a l e s given f o r the d e c i s i o n s .  This approach i s  inseverably connected w i t h the concept of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l decisions being e v a l u a t i v e judgments.  The e v a l u a t i v e  judgment made i n answering the o r i g i n a l questions i s r e f e r r e d to as the 'nexus' judgment.  The p l a c e of precedent, evidence  and e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l i n r e l a t i o n to the f a c t o r s i s then examined and the general ideas prevalent i n Canadian cons t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n such as the double aspect, a n c i l l a r y , trenching, paramountcy and s e v e r a b i l i t y doctrines are  looked at i n the l i g h t of t h i s 'nexus'  judgment.  The strength and i d e n t i t y of the f a c t o r s w i l l vary from i n d i v i d u a l power to power and the c r i m i n a l law power i s adopted as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the use of the f a c t o r i a l approach.  This i l l u s t r a t i v e use comprises the t h i r d  s e c t i o n of the t h e s i s .  The lack of l o g i c a l l i m i t s to the  power i s f i r s t shown and then the general f a c t o r s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , purpose and e f f e c t are used to provide a  basis for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n .  The  evaluation  f a c t o r s i s viewed both from the standpoint of l e g i s l a t i o n and that of the provinces.  federal  No attempt i s made  to give an exhaustive survey of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c r i m i n a l law power.  of  the  I t i s merely given as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the use of the f a c t o r i a l approach. The  f i n a l s e c t i o n i s the conclusion and  the major p r i n c i p l e s contained i n the e a r l i e r  recapitulates sections.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Introduction  page 1  Section I . Method of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  page 1  Section I I . General P r i n c i p l e s of Construction  ;  page 25  Section I I I . Factors i n I n t e r p r e t i n g the C r i m i n a l Law Power Section IV.  Conclusion  page 72 page 100  Bibliography  page 103  Table of Cases C i t e d  page 105  1. In any f e d e r a t i o n based on a w r i t t e n d i v i s i o n of powers the method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s going to assume a prominent p o s i t i o n i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  This  p o s i t i o n w i l l be more q u i c k l y reached where a system of stare d e c i s i s p r e v a i l s .  A c c o r d i n g l y i t i s intended to look  at a method by which meaning can be given to the d i v i s i o n of powers i n Canada.  Subsequently  the general p r i n c i p l e s  i n s i d e t h i s method w i l l be examined and f i n a l l y  the c r i m i n a l  law power w i l l be used an an example of the p a r t i c u l a r canons of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n here advanced.  I t i s important  to r e a l i z e a t the outset that the treatment of the c r i m i n a l law power i s not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative. I.  METHOD OF  INTERPRETATION  Viewed a n a l y t i c a l l y there are three parts of S.91 of the B r i t i s h North America A c t 1867 as amended, that serve as i n d i c a t o r s to a c o n s i s t e n t methodology.  The f i r s t  of these i n d i c a t o r s i s the opening words of S.91: " I t s h a l l be l a w f u l f o r the Queen, by and w i t h the Advice and Consent of the Senate and the House of Commons to make laws f o r the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada i n r e l a t i o n to a l l matters not coming w i t h i n the Classes of Subjects by t h i s A c t assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the L e g i s l a t u r e s of the  2. Provinces  11  .  Ex f a c i e t h i s p r o v i s i o n implies that  the  method of i n t e r p r e t i n g the f e d e r a l parliament's powers s h a l l be to i n t e r p r e t f u l l y the e x c l u s i v e powers of the Provinces and allow the residue of powers to f a l l to the  federal  parliament. However the f i r s t i n d i c a t o r i s succeeded immediately by the words: "and  f o r greater C e r t a i n t y , but not so as to  r e s t r i c t the g e n e r a l i t y of the foregoing terms of t h i s Section, i t i s hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything i n t h i s Act)  the e x c l u s i v e L e g i s l a t i v e A u t h o r i t y  of the Parliament of Canada extends to a l l matters coming w i t h i n the Classes of Subjects next h e r e i n a f t e r enumerated; that i s to say  11  .  Now  t h i s p o r t i o n of S.91  is  p o i n t i n g to a method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n whereby one  first  f u l l y i n t e r p r e t s the enumerated powers and then looks elsewhere f o r the p r o v i n c i a l powers. then i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed to the The "And  The  second i n d i c a t o r  first.  t h i r d i n d i c a t o r i s the c l o s i n g words of  S.91:  any Matter coming w i t h i n any of the Classes of Subjects  enumerated i n t h i s Section s h a l l not be deemed to come w i t h i n the Class of Matters of a l o c a l or p r i v a t e Nature comprised i n the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by t h i s Act assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the L e g i s l a t u r e s the P r o v i n c e s . "  Regardless of whether one holds as  of the  3. J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l held i n A-G f o r Ontario v. A-G f o r Canada-*- that the paragraph a p p l i e s to a l l S.92 powers and not only to S.92(16) i t a l s o supports a method of f u l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f e d e r a l powers before considering those of the provinces. Thus the A c t i t s e l f suggests a method of c o n s t r u c t i o n whereby one would f u l l y i n t e r p r e t the enumerated powers i n S.91 before considering any p r o v i n c i a l powers.  This  f o l l o w s from the second and t h i r d i n d i c a t o r s . The general f e d e r a l power contained i n S.91 i s not included as i t i s postponed to S.92 because n e i t h e r the second nor the t h i r d i n d i c a t o r a p p l i e s to i t . 2 The next step suggested by the i n d i c a t o r s would be to i n t e r p r e t the powers i n S.92 given to the provinces, having regard only to the enumerated f e d e r a l powers i n S.91.  This stems from the word ' e x c l u s i v e l y '  i n S.92 and the f i r s t i n d i c a t o r which would make the S.92 powers f i r s t i n p r i o r i t y but f o r the second and t h i r d indicators.  The f i n a l step would be to f u l l y i n t e r p r e t  1 Q.89C] A.C. 348 (Local P r o h i b i t i o n s Case) . 2 This i s not to suggest that the 31 enumerated powers i n S.91 are to be regarded as sources of f e d e r a l power a d d i t i o n a l to the opening words of the s e c t i o n but r a t h e r that the p o r t i o n of the f e d e r a l power comprised i n the enumerations i s d i f f e r e n t i n i t s r e l a t i o n to S.92 powers than the residue of the f e d e r a l power which f o r convenience i s termed hereafter the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power.  4. the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power contained i n the opening words of S.91 having regard to the enumerated powers i n both S.91  and S.92. Such a method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i l s t i m p l i e d from  the terms of the A c t i s fraught w i t h p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . These d i f f i c u l t i e s were a l l u d e d to i n C i t i z e n s Insurance Co. v. Parsons-^ where the P r i v y Council s t a t e d ^ "Notwithstanding t h i s endeavour ( i . e . : the non obstante clause i n S.91) to give pre-eminence to the Dominion Parliament i n cases of a c o n f l i c t of powers i t i s obvious that i n some cases where t h i s apparent c o n f l i c t e x i s t s the (Imperial) l e g i s l a t u r e could not have intended that the powers e x c l u s i v e l y assigned to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s should be absorbed i n those given to the Dominion Parliament.  Take as one instance the  subject 'marriage and divorce' contained i n the enumeration of subjects i n S.91; i t i s evident that solemnization of marriage would come w i t h i n t h i s general d e s c r i p t i o n ; y e t 'solemnization of marriage i n the province' i s enumerated among the classes of subjects i n S.92 and no one can doubt notwithstanding the general language of S.91, that t h i s subject i s s t i l l w i t h i n the e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y of the 3 (1881) 7 App. Cas. 96. 4 i b i d p. 108.  5. l e g i s l a t u r e s of the provinces.  So 'the r a i s i n g of money  by any mode or system of t a x a t i o n ' i s enumerated amongst the c l a s s e s of subjects i n S.91; but, though the d e s c r i p t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y large and general to include ' d i r e c t t a x a t i o n w i t h i n the province i n order to the r a i s i n g of a revenue for p r o v i n c i a l purposes' assigned to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s by S.92, i t obviously could not have been intended that i n t h i s instance a l s o , the general power should override the p a r t i c u l a r one." Thus i t i s not p o s s i b l e to f u l l y i n t e r p r e t the enumerated powers i n S.91 without paying regard to S.92 powers and s t i l l give some e f f e c t to each of the powers i n the l a t t e r section.  The P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Parsons Case^ having perceived  the d i f f i c u l t y and asserted that the two sections should be read together went f u r t h e r and l a i d down a method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the two groups of powers.  "The f i r s t  question to be decided," i t s a i d , " i s whether the A c t impeached i n the present appeal f a l l s w i t h i n any of the c l a s s e s of subjects enumerated i n S.92, and assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the provinces, f o r i f i t does not, i t can be of no v a l i d i t y , and no other question would then a r i s e . 5 ibid.  I t i s only when an A c t of the p r o v i n c i a l  6. l e g i s l a t u r e prima f a c i e f a l l s w i t h i n one of these classes of subjects that the f u r t h e r questions a r i s e , v i z : whether, notwithstanding t h i s i s so, the subject of the Act, does not a l s o f a l l w i t h i n one of the enumerated classes i n  S.91  and whether the power of the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e i s or i s not thereby o v e r b o r n e . T h i s concept of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was  expressly adopted and a p p l i e d i n R u s s e l l v. The Queen7  and Toronto E l e c t r i c Commissioners v.  Snider.^  The p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y and the a u t h o r i t y of the three P r i v y Council decisions force the scheme or method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n drawn from the i n d i c a t o r s i n the Act i t s e l f to be amended.  The modified method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would be to f i r s t l y f u l l y i n t e r p r e t the S.92  powers and  secondly to i n t e r p r e t the enumerated powers i n S.91 regard to the S.92  powers.  F i n a l l y the r e s i d u a r y  having federal  power would need to be i n t e r p r e t e d having regard to both S.92  and S.91  enumerated powers.  This method which a p p l i e s  to both f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and involves three questions was 6 i b i d p.  l a i d down by Viscount Haldane i n  109.  7 (1882) 7 App. 8 Q.9253 A.C.  Cas. 396.  829.  asking  7. Snider's Case.9  The mode of a p p l i c a t i o n i s : - Is the s t a t u t e  i n question w i t h i n one of the powers i n S.92?  I f i t i s not  then i t can only be passed by the f e d e r a l parliament e i t h e r under one of the enumerated heads of power i n S.91 the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power.  or under  This r e s u l t f o l l o w s from the  o v e r a l l r e s i d u a r y character of S.91. s t a t u t e that i s being considered  i t w i l l be necessary to  decide under which branch of S.91 achieved by construing the S.91  I f i t i s a federal  i t was  passed.  enumerated powers.  This i s I f the  s t a t u t e i s not under one of them i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power. Where the s t a t u t e i n question i s prima f a c i e w i t h i n a S.92  power i t i s presumed that i t can only be passed by a  provincial legislature. i n S.92.  This flows from the word ' e x c l u s i v e l y '  The presumption can be rebutted by e i t h e r the  enumerated heads of power i n S.91 the r e s i d u a r y power i n S.91.  or by the a p p l i c a t i o n of  In order to a s c e r t a i n whether  the presumption i s rebutted by one of the enumerated heads of power i n S.91 viz:-  i t i s necessary to ask the second question  Is the statute w i t h i n one of the enumerated heads of  power i n S.91?  I f i t i s then because of the second and  t h i r d i n d i c a t o r s the presumption i s rebutted and the s t a t u t e 9 i b i d p.406.  8. can only be passed by the f e d e r a l parliament.  I n determining  the answer to t h i s question however the existence of a narrower S.92 power must give r i s e to the i m p l i c a t i o n that the Imperial parliament d i d not intend i t to be absorbed by a wider S.91 power and hence the S.91 power should be i n t e r p r e t e d so as not to include the narrower S.92 power. I f the S.91 enumerated powers do not apply the t h i r d question must be asked v i z : - I s the s t a t u t e i n question w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power under S.91?  The answer to t h i s  question w i l l depend on whether the subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n goes beyond matters of mere l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern.  I f the s t a t u t e i s w i t h i n the f e d e r a l r e s i d u a r y  power i t must be passed by the f e d e r a l parliament as the presumption i n favour of the p r o v i n c i a l power i s again overruled. This method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s s t r u c t u r e d upon the accuracy of four p r o p o s i t i o n s ^ " f i r s t l y , that S.91 comprises the residue of powers a f t e r the provinces have been given c e r t a i n b a s i c heads of powers. This p r o p o s i t i o n i s necessary as the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r looking to S.92 before S.91 and for  the concept that i f the s t a t u t e does not f a l l w i t h i n a  S.92 power i t must ex hypothesi be passed by the f e d e r a l parliament to be i n t r a v i r e s .  I t i s c l e a r from the phrasing  of the Act that S.91 i s a r e s i d u a r y clause as i t gives the  9. power to make laws i n r e l a t i o n to a l l matters not coming w i t h i n the classes of subjects assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the provinces.  The P r i v y Council recognized  t h i s i n C i t i z e n s Insurance Co. v. Parsons^- where i t stated^-*0  "the scheme of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n expressed i n the branch of S.91  first  i s to give the Dominion Parliament a u t h o r i t y  to make laws f o r the good government of Canada i n a l l matters not coming w i t h i n the classes of subjects assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . " The  second p r o p o s i t i o n i s that the enumerated powers  under S.91  are supreme over those contained i n S.92.  p r o p o s i t i o n substantiates  This  the a f f i r m a t i v e answer to the  f i r s t question as r e b u t t i n g the presumption i n favour of p r o v i n c i a l competence.  I f i t was not c o r r e c t then the f a c t  that the s t a t u t e i n question came under a S.91  enumerated  power would not give the a u t h o r i t y to enact i t to the f e d e r a l parliament i f i t a l s o came w i t h i n a S.92 The cases c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h the supremacy of S.91 powers.  power. enumerated  Thus i n Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada^ the  p l a i n t i f f was  suing for damages f o r the conversion of some  10 op. c i t . 11 i b i d p.  107.  12 0-894] A.C.  31.  10. timber that was under c e r t a i n warehouse r e c e i p t s .  These  r e c e i p t s were made out by a f i r m to i t s e l f and endorsed to the defendant as s e c u r i t y f o r advances.  The f i r m became  i n s o l v e n t and the assignee of i t s estate sued the defendants who had taken possession of the timber.  Recovery depended  on the e f f e c t of the Bank A c t and whether that A c t was i n t r a v i r e s the Dominion parliament.  The P r i v y C o u n c i l advised  that the Bank Act was a good defence and then considered i t s constitutional validity.  The a p p e l l a n t argued that S.92(13)  gave the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to make laws i n r e l a t i o n to property and c i v i l r i g h t s i n the province to each p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e and therefore despite S.91(15) which declared that the L e g i s l a t i v e A u t h o r i t y of the Parliament of Canada extended to Banking, I n c o r p o r a t i o n of Banks and the issue of paper money, the parliament of the Dominion could not v a l i d l y enact the Bank Act as i t a f f e c t e d property and c i v i l r i g h t s i n the Province.  The P r i v y C o u n c i l dismissed t h i s contention  and upheld the v a l i d i t y of the Act. the t r i b u n a l ' s advice s t a t e d ^  Lord Watson i n d e l i v e r i n g  "The o b j e c t i o n taken by the  a p p e l l a n t would be unanswerable i f i t could be shown that by the A c t of 1867 the Parliament of Canada i s a b s o l u t e l y debarred from trenching to any extent upon the matters 13 i b i d p. 45.  11. assigned to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s by S.92. But S.91 expressly  declares that 'notwithstanding anything i n t h i s  Act' the e x c l u s i v e l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y of the Parliament of Canada s h a l l extend to a l l matters coming w i t h i n the enumerated c l a s s e s ; which p l a i n l y i n d i c a t e s that the l e g i s l a t i o n of that Parliament so long as i t s t r i c t l y r e l a t e s to those matters i s to be of paramount a u t h o r i t y . To refuse e f f e c t to the d e c l a r a t i o n would render negatory some of the l e g i s l a t i v e powers s p e c i a l l y assigned to the Canadian parliament. For example among the enumerated c l a s s e s of subjects i n S.91 are 'Patents of Invention and Discovery' and 'Copyrights'. I t would be p r a c t i c a l l y impossible f o r the Dominion Parliament to l e g i s l a t e upon e i t h e r of these subjects without a f f e c t i n g the property and c i v i l r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s i n the provinces." Subsequently t h i s case and Cushing v. Dupuy^-^ which had e s t a b l i s h e d the same p r i n c i p l e were adopted i n the F i s h Canneries Case^  where Lord Tomlin l a i d down four p r o p o s i t i o n s  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the B.N.A. Act.  The f i r s t of these was:-I  "the l e g i s l a t i o n of the Parliament of the Dominion so long as 14 5 App. Cas. 409. 15 A-G Can, v. A-G B.C. 0-93(7] A.C. 111. 16 i b i d p. 118.  6  12. i t s t r i c t l y r e l a t e s to subjects of l e g i s l a t i o n expressly enumerated i n S.91 i s of paramount a u t h o r i t y even though i t trenches upon matters assigned to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s by S.92."  This p r i n c i p l e was expressly adopted as good law  i n I n Re Aeronautics R e f e r e n c e ^ ; I n Re S i l v e r B r o t h e r s ^ 1  and i n C.P.R. v. A-G B.C.  19  W h i l s t the a u t h o r i t y of these decisions e s t a b l i s h e s the p r i n c i p l e that the enumerated powers i n S.91 override those i n S.92 t h i s does not imply that i n determining whether a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e f a l l s w i t h i n a S.91 power no regard  should  be p a i d to the f a c t that i t a l s o f a l l s w i t h i n a S.92 power. As was pointed out i n Parsons Case^O the sections must be read together and i n c e r t a i n cases, notably marriage and d i v o r c e , the S.91 power must be taken not to include the narrower power bestowed on the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . The t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n i s that where the subject matter of the s t a t u t e i n question goes beyond l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern or i n t e r e s t i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power under S.91 even though i t might otherwise 17 Q 9 3 3 A.C. 54. 18 D.9323 A.C. 514 19 0-95(0 A.C. 122. 20 op. c i t . and see i n f r a .  13. appear to come w i t h i n S.92. This p r o p o s i t i o n i s the basis of the t h i r d question. In A-G f o r Ontario v. Canada Temperance F e d e r a t i o n Viscount Simon d e c l a r e d 2 1  2 2  "the  true t e s t must be found i n the r e a l subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n ; i f i t i s such that i t goes beyond l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern or i n t e r e s t s and must from i t s inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole .... then i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter a f f e c t i n g the peace order and good government of Canada, though i t may i n another aspect touch upon matters s p e c i a l l y reserved to the P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t u r e s . " I t has been assumed -^ that t h i s d e c i s i o n i s a departure from 2  the e a r l i e r views of the P r i v y C o u n c i l .  However when the  previous cases are examined i t i s apparent that t h i s d e c i s i o n i s merely a restatement of a p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r than a new departure.  I n R u s s e l l v. The Queen ^ the P r i v y C o u n c i l 2  l a i d down that where a f e d e r a l A c t f e l l w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y power of the Dominion i t was not rendered u l t r a v i r e s by 21 [1946] A.C. 193. 22  i b i d p. 205.  23 e.g. - B. L a s k i n - Book - "Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law" 3rd E d i t i o n , pages 269 and 270. 24  op. c i t .  14. reason of i t s i n c i d e n t a l l y a f f e c t i n g a S.92 power.  Later  i n the L o c a l P r o h i b i t i o n s " C a s e ^ i t was stated that there would be matters under S.91 that were not w i t h i n the enumerated classes i n that s e c t i o n and that Acts passed under t h i s r e s i d u a r y power could not encroach upon the S.92 powers of the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s .  However  Lord Watson who d e l i v e r e d the judgment went on to say that the P r i v y Council recognized that some matters i n o r i g i n l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l might a t t a i n such dimensions as to j u s t i f y f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n under r e s i d u a r y power.  The  r e s u l t then of the cases p r i o r to 1916 was that as a general r u l e the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power could not encroach on the S.92 powers but as an exception to t h i s general r u l e where the matter a t t a i n e d c e r t a i n n a t i o n a l dimensions i t could be the subject of f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n even though i t was o r i g i n a l l y w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l power under S.92. In 1916 i n the Insurance R e f e r e n c e ^ the P r i v y Council recognized t h i s general r u l e as follows--27 "the i n i t i a l p a r t of S.91 of the B r i t i s h North America A c t .... does not 25 op. c i t . 26 A-G Can, v. A-G A l t a . \j-9lQ 1 A.C. 588. 27 i b i d p. 595.  15. unless the subject matter of l e g i s l a t i o n f a l l s w i t h i n one of the enumerated heads which f o l l o w enable the Dominion parliament to trench on the subject matters entrusted to the provinces by the enumeration i n S.92."  However the  Court went on to say that the only exception to the r u l e that the f e d e r a l parliament cannot e f f e c t i v e l y l e g i s l a t e for  the provinces under the r e s i d u a r y power was where the  subject matter was not w i t h i n one of the S.92 R u s s e l l v. The Queen^  w a s  powers.  explained on t h i s b a s i s .  a f t e r the Insurance R e f e r e n c e ^  Hence  there was no doubt as to  the general r u l e but considerable question as to the existence of the exception. The succeeding cases of F o r t F r a n c i s Pulp & Power Co. L t d . v. Manitoba Free Pressed and Toronto E l e c t r i c Commissioners v. Snider-^ saw the r e s u s c i t a t i o n of the exception to the 1  general r u l e under a d i f f e r e n t f o r m u l a t i o n . l a i d down i n these d e c i s i o n s was  The  principle  that i n cases of emergency  the Dominion parliament could l e g i s l a t e under i t s r e s i d u a r y power even though i t encroached on the S.92 28 op. c i t . 29 op. c i t . 30 Q.9233 A.C. 31 op. c i t .  695.  powers of the  16. provinces.  Under t h i s formulation of the exception  intem-  perance i n 1881 was held to have been regarded as a n a t i o n a l emergency and R u s s e l l ' s Case^ was explained on t h i s ground. 2  Despite c r i t i c i s m ^ the emergency d o c t r i n e as the basis f o r the exception to the general r u l e remained extant u n t i l 1946.  The general r u l e and the exception were stated by  Lord Tomlin i n the F i s h Canneries Case-^ as the second of h i s four p r o p o s i t i o n s thus:- "the general power of l e g i s l a t i o n conferred upon the Parliament of the Dominion by S.91  of  the Act i n supplement of the power to l e g i s l a t e upon the subjects expressly enumerated must be s t r i c t l y confined to such matters as are unquestionably  of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t  and importance and must not trench on any of the subjects enumerated i n S.92  as w i t h i n the scope of p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n , unless these matters have a t t a i n e d such d i mensions as to a f f e c t the body p o l i t i c of the Dominion."35 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Lord Tomlin p r e f e r r e d Lord Watson's d e s c r i p t i o n of the exception to that of 32 op. c i t . 33 vide f o r example A n g l i n C.J. i n The King v. Eastern Terminal E l e v a t o r Co. Q.9253 S.C.R. 434 at 438. 34 op. c i t . 35  i b i d . p.  118.  17. Viscount Haldane i n the 'emergency' cases.  This  statement  of Lord Tomlin's was approved i n the Aeronautics i n I n Re S i l v e r B r o s .  3 7  Reference ^* 3  and i n C.P.R. v. A-G B.C. ** 3  The emergency d o c t r i n e was repudiated i n A-G Ontario v. Canada Temperance F e d e r a t i o n ^ and the dimensions 3  of the exception r e v i v e d i n a modified form.  rationale  I n t h i s case a  s i m i l a r s t a t u t e to that upheld i n R u s s e l l ' s Case^Q was under attack and Viscount Simon i n d e l i v e r i n g the P r i v y Council's advice, a f t e r denying that the existence of an emergency gave "power to the Dominion parliament to l e g i s l a t e i n matters which are p r o p e r l y to be regarded as e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h i n the competence of the P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t u r e s , " ^ went on to hold that "the true t e s t must be found i n the r e a l subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n : i f i t i s such that i t goes beyond l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern or i n t e r e s t s and must from i t s inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole (as f o r example i n the Aeronautics Case and the Radio Case) then i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the competence 36 op. c i t . 37 op. c i t . 38 op. c i t . 39 op. c i t . 40 op. c i t . 41 i b i d p. 205.  18. of the Dominion Parliament as a matter a f f e c t i n g  the peace,  order and good government of Canada, though i t may i n another aspect touch upon matters s p e c i a l l y reserved to the P r o v i n c i a l Legislatures."42 The emergency d o c t r i n e however was not yet dead as i n Japanese-Canadians v. A-G Canada43 Lord Wright  said44  "the Parliament of the Dominion i n a s u f f i c i e n t l y great emergency such as that a r i s i n g out of war, has power to deal adequately w i t h that emergency f o r the s a f e t y of the Dominion as a whole."  Nevertheless the statement of  Viscount Simon i n the Canada Temperance C a s e ^ has r e c e i v e d l a t e r j u d i c i a l approval46 good law.  a n  d must now be taken to represent  On one p o i n t the statement i s misleading and t h i s  has caused d i f f i c u l t i e s . Viscount Simon c i t e d as examples of s t a t u t e s where the subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n was beyond mere l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l  concern and therefore w i t h i n  f e d e r a l parliament's r e s i d u a r y power the Aeronautics Case47 42 i b i d p. 205.  43 [19473 A.C. 87. 44 i b i d p. 101. 45 op. c i t . 46 Johanneson v. West S t . P a u l [19523 1 S.C.R. 292; and Munro v. N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Commission (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 753 a t 759. 47 op. c i t .  19. and the Radio Case.48  Now the major ground f o r the former  d e c i s i o n was that stated by Lord A t k i n i n the Labour Conventions Case^  9 v  i z : - whether S.132 e n t i t l e d the f e d e r a l government  to implement t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s even though they impinged on p r o v i n c i a l powers.  In the Radio Case^O the basis f o r  the d e c i s i o n was that stated by Lord Dunedin^l v i z : - l e g i s l a t i o n not f a l l i n g under e i t h e r S.92 or the enumerated heads of S.91 must come w i t h i n the f e d e r a l r e s i d u a r y power. The p o s i t i o n then would appear to be that as a general r u l e the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power under S.91 cannot encroach on matters f a l l i n g w i t h i n S.92 powers.  An example of the  e x e r c i s e of t h i s power i s where the subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n i s under n e i t h e r the S.91 enumerations nor under S.92.  To t h i s general r u l e there i s an exception that i f  the subject matter of any s t a t u t e goes beyond mere l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern i t w i l l f a l l w i t h i n the residuary f e d e r a l power even i f i t does f a l l w i t h i n a S.92 power. The l a t e F.P. Varcoe i n h i s book 'The C o n s t i t u t i o n of Canada'"^ asserts "The powers of Parliament are not to be  48 [1932] A.C. 304. 49 0.937] A.C. 326. 50 op. c i t . 51 i b i d p. 312. 52 2nd E d i t . 1965.  20. considered as f a l l i n g i n t o two c l a s s e s , f i r s t c l a s s and second c l a s s .  The e f f e c t of the e x e r c i s e of such powers  must be regarded as uniform as regards paramountcy and exclusiveness."53  ^he learned author bases these comments  on the f a c t that the S.91  enumerated powers are only examples  of the matters i n r e l a t i o n to which the f e d e r a l parliament can l e g i s l a t e under S.91.  However such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w h i l s t v a l i d up to a p o i n t f a i l s to give e f f e c t to the 'non obstante c l a u s e . 1  This clause purports to make a  d i s t i n c t i o n between the r e s i d u a r y and the enumerated f e d e r a l powers as i t gives to the l a t t e r a precedence over  S.92  powers which the l a t t e r , except to the extent that the s t a t u t e passed thereunder has a subject matter of n a t i o n a l importance, does not enjoy.  This d i f f e r e n c e has been  e x p l i c i t l y recognized since the L o c a l P r o h i b i t i o n s Case,54 and i s fundamental to the d i v i s i o n of the second and questions i n the suggested method of a n a l y s i s .  third  I t should not  be assumed however that Varcoe i s e n t i r e l y inaccurate and that the f e d e r a l r e s i d u a r y power and the enumeration i n  S.91  are each c o n f e r r i n g l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y on the f e d e r a l parliament.  There i s only one source of f e d e r a l power and  53 i b i d p. 54 op. c i t .  18.  21. that i s the opening words of S.91; the enumerations that f o l l o w are merely examples of matters included i n that one source of f e d e r a l power.  However the examples have a d i f f e r e n t  r e l a t i o n to the S.92 powers than does the remaining p o r t i o n of  the f e d e r a l power.  I t i s to keep the d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r  between a doctrine of two sources of f e d e r a l power (which i s p a t e n t l y inaccurate) and a doctrine of one source but w i t h d i f f e r e n t a p p l i c a t i o n s that the phrase  'residuary  f e d e r a l power' rather than 'general f e d e r a l power' has been used here.  A l l f e d e r a l power i s 'general f e d e r a l power'  but some of that f e d e r a l power i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the examples ( i . e . the S.91 enumerations) and the r e s t of i t i s r e s i d u a r y . Under t h i s a n a l y s i s cases f a l l i n g under the general r u l e r e l a t i n g to non encroachment would come w i t h i n the negative answer to the f i r s t question i n the general scheme w h i l s t those cases f a l l i n g w i t h i n the exception would come w i t h i n the a f f i r m a t i v e answer to the t h i r d question.  In  other words the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power would have a twofold operation.  F i r s t l y those statutes d e a l i n g w i t h matters not  w i t h i n e i t h e r S.92 or the enumerations i n S.91 and secondly those statutes on matters which prima f a c i e are w i t h i n S.92 but which because of t h e i r non l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern cease to be caught under that s e c t i o n .  Before t u r n i n g to  the f o u r t h p r o p o s i t i o n i t i s opportune to note how the court  22. s l u r r e d around between the general r u l e of non encroachment and the exception i n Munro v. N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Commission^ In that case the question was whether the N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l A c t , 1958 was i n t r a v i r e s the f e d e r a l parliament.  The  Supreme Court of Canada c i t e d w i t h approval the statements of Viscount Maugham and Viscount Dunedin i n Reference Re the Debt Adjustment A c t 1937-^ and Re Regulation and C o n t r o l of Radio Communication.57  i n these statements the p o i n t was  made that where the subject matter of any l e g i s l a t i o n i s not w i t h i n the S.91 enumerated powers or S.92 i t f a l l s w i t h i n the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power.  The court a l s o approved  the dictum of Viscount Simon i n the Canada Temperance Federation Case58 then proceeded to f i n d that the subject matter of the A c t was not i n e i t h e r S.92 or the S.91 enumerations and that i t went beyond l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l concern.  It is  apparent that e i t h e r approach would have given the same r e s u l t v i z : - that the s t a t u t e was i n t r a v i r e s , and the court f a i l e d to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between them or even admit that there were two grounds f o r i t s d e c i s i o n . 55 op. c i t . 56 0-9433 A.C. 356. 57  op. c i t .  58 op. c i t .  23. The f o u r t h p r o p o s i t i o n i s that where n e i t h e r S.92 the S.91  nor  enumerated powers apply the s t a t u t e i n question  f a l l s under the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power i n S.91.  This  p r o p o s i t i o n i s connected w i t h both the f i r s t and the propositions e a r l i e r advanced. of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n where S.92  third  Under the suggested scheme does not apply and the statute  which i s having i t s v a l i d i t y determined i s a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e , i t w i l l be necessary to determine whether i t was under one of the enumerated powers i n S.91 r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power. S.91  passed  or under the  Once i t has been decided that  enumerated powers do not apply i t follows l o g i c a l l y  that the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power does so apply. assuming S.92  That i s ,  does not apply and therefore the s t a t u t e i n  question can only be passed by the f e d e r a l parliament, i t must f a l l e i t h e r w i t h i n one of the S.91 residue of S.91  examples or the  and i f the former p o s s i b i l i t y i s excluded  then the a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s enactment can only be the residue.  S.91  This p r o p o s i t i o n i s supported by the d i c t a already  mentioned of Viscount Maugham i n Reference Re the Debt Adjustment Act 1937^9  a n  d  of Viscount Dunedin i n Re  and Control of Radio Communication. 59 op. c i t . 60 op. c i t .  60  Regulation  In the f i r s t of these  24. the learned law l o r d s a i d " I t must not be forgotten that where the subject matter of any l e g i s l a t i o n i s not w i t h i n any of the enumerated heads of e i t h e r S.91  or S.92,  the  sole power r e s t s w i t h the Dominion under the p r e l i m i n a r y words of S.91  r e l a t i v e to ''Laws f o r the Peace, Order and  Good Government of Canada"^ w h i l s t i n the second instance 1  the dictum was: i n e i t h e r S.91  "Being therefore not e x p l i c i t l y mentioned or S.92  such l e g i s l a t i o n f a l l s w i t h i n the  general words at the opening of S.91,  which assign to the  Government of the Dominion the power to make laws ''for the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada  i n r e l a t i o n to  a l l matters not coming w i t h i n the Classes of Subjects  by  t h i s Act assigned e x c l u s i v e l y to the L e g i s l a t u r e s of the Provinces."62  Both these j u d i c i a l pronouncements were  approved and adopted i n Munro v. N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Commission and can therefore be regarded as good law. Having e s t a b l i s h e d a method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of and S.92  of the B.N.A. Act i t i s now  S.91  opportune to look at  the general p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n that supply the means of answering the b a s i c questions 61 op. c i t p.  371.  62 op. c i t p.  312.  63 op. c i t p.  757.  that comprise such method.  25. II.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION  The courts have often stated that i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the S.91 and S.92 powers i t i s e s s e n t i a l to look a t the r e a l nature of the s t a t u t e i n question.  The expressions of t h i s  idea have been as v a r i e d as they have been numerous.  Thus  i n R u s s e l l v. The Queen and A-G Saskatchewan v. A-G Canada^ 1  the P r i v y C o u n c i l t a l k e d of 'true nature and character o f the l e g i s l a t i o n ' i n Union C o l l i e r y L t d . v. Bryden^ i t was 'the whole p i t h and substance of the enactments' and i n Gold Seal L i m i t e d v. Dominion Express Co. and A-G A l t a * Duff J . r e f e r r e d to a d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g i s l a t i o n ' a f f e c t i n g ' and l e g i s l a t i o n ' i n r e l a t i o n t o ' matters i n the c l a s s e s of powers.  This d i s t i n c t i o n was subsequently  a p p l i e d i n Munro v. N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Commission^  These  examples are capable of vast m u l t i p l i c a t i o n . 6 1 op. c i t . 2 Q 9 4 3 A.C. 110,  3 Q899D A.C. 580. 4 (1921) 62 S.C.R. 424. 5 op. c i t . 6 v i d e e.g:- Lord. A t k i n i n Ladore v. Bennett 1939 A.C. 468 a t 482; Madden v. Nelson Q8993 A.C. 626 a t 627.  26. However a l l these d i c t a are mere v e r b a l formulae. By r e l y i n g on.them a lawyer i s not able to p r e d i c t the outcome of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l case except one on a l l fours w i t h a previous d e c i s i o n . _ The vagueness of the language w h i l s t p e r m i t t i n g a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of d e c i s i o n s a s s i s t s not one whit i n t r y i n g to determine why a court came to a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n and, more importantly, what d e c i s i o n a future court w i l l be l i k e l y to come to on another s t a t u t e . These formulae are masking an e v a l u a t i v e judgment.  This  judgment i s a d e c i s i o n as to whether a s t a t u t e has or has  not  a s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e nexus w i t h the power under which i t i s being  justified. This idea of nexu& i s s t r u c t u r e d on the b a s i c tenet  that i t i s wrong to say that there are c e r t a i n features of every s t a t u t e that as a matter of l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y force one to t r e a t i t as f a l l i n g w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r head of power, i . e : - there i s no necessary connection between the s t a t u t e and the power but of s e l e c t i o n .  7  i t i s not a process of  deduction  The adoption of the general idea of  nexus does not mean that the v e r b a l formulae are redundant 7 This i s a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n to the American Legal R e a l i s t school of j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l thought. See J . Frank. "Law and the Modern Mind" 6th p r i n t i n g - 1949, and a r t i c l e by W.W. Cook, " S c i e n t i f i c Method and the Law" 13 American Bar Assoc. J o u r n a l 303.  27.  and hence should be abandoned but only that the nexus should be determined and the formulae then s e l e c t e d to support the conclusion.  That t h i s process i s what c o n s t i t u t i o n a l courts  i n a f e d e r a l system already do e i t h e r w i t t i n g l y or u n w i t t i n g l y i s c l e a r l y demonstrated by Lane i n "Some P r i n c i p l e s and Sources of A u s t r a l i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law".** Furthermore the dangers of p l a c i n g a l i t e r a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the formulae are shown by Las k i n * when r e f e r r i n g to the d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between consequential e f f e c t s and l e g i s l a t i v e subject matter he says that " i f the d i s t i n c t i o n i s t r u l y one between purpose and e f f e c t , i t runs counter to other a u t h o r i t y which holds that declared or asserted purpose w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y conclude the question of v a l i d i t y on the b a s i s thereof" and he c i t e s A-G Man, v. A-G C a n .  10  i n support of h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . I n  that case the P r i v y C o u n c i l s a i d , "The matter depends upon the e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n not i t s purpose."H  This k i n d  of b l i n k e r e d approach turns a t t e n t i o n from what the courts 8 1st E d i t i o n , Sydney, 1964. 9 B. L a s k i n - Book - op. c i t . a t p. 91. 10 [19293 A.C. 260. 11 i b i d p. '268. The dictum was l a t e r approved by Cartwright J . i n A-G Can, v. Readers' Digest Assoc. (Canada) L t d . Q.96Q S.C.R. 755 a t 793.  28. are i n f a c t doing and c o n s t i t u t e s too narrow a view of the e f f e c t of both the cases d e a l i n g w i t h purpose and those d e a l i n g w i t h e f f e c t , i . e : i t i s a n a l y t i c a l i n an area where pragmatism i s required.12 Nevertheless  i f one debunks the formulae on the b a s i s  of lack of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t to simply s t a t e that i t masks an e v a l u a t i v e judgment.  One must go  f u r t h e r and provide some b a s i s f o r p r e d i c t i n g the outcome of that e v a l u a t i v e judgment.  Stated i n another manner  w h i l s t i t i s true that the v e r b a l formulae are merely what J u l i u s Stone would c a l l a category of indeterminate  refe-  rence, -^ and only mask the e v a l u a t i v e judgment of nexus 1  i f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i s going to be the aim the grounds which led the court to come to the p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n must be discovered. These grounds or f a c t o r s then are the v i t a l element i n the p r e d i c t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions as i t i s on them that the court w i l l r e l y i n making i t s e v a l u a t i v e judgment as to whether a s t a t u t e has a s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e nexus to the head of power under which i t i s being 12 See  justified.  supra.  13 J . Stone - 'Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings', 1964, Sydney, p. 235 et seq.  .29. These f a c t o r s w i l l be dependent on the i n d i v i d u a l power or powers under c o n s i d e r a t i o n and w i l l be drawn mainly from the range of f a c t s before the court.  I t i s the f u n c t i o n of  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l lawyer to s e l e c t and evaluate the r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s which may include such things as the purpose, content and e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n i n question.  These  f a c t o r s w i l l of n e c e s s i t y be l a r g e l y s u b j e c t i v e to the p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n and i t i s to t h i s s t a t u t e s u b j e c t i v i t y that Lord Maugham was r e f e r r i n g i n A-G A l b e r t a v. A-G Canada ^ when he s a i d , " U l t r a v i r e s 1  must be determined i n each case as i t a r i s e s f o r no general t e s t a p p l i c a b l e to a l l cases can be s a f e l y l a i d down."15 The courts then i n deciding whether p a r t i c u l a r l e g i s l a t i o n i s u l t r a v i r e s i t s enacting l e g i s l a t u r e are making an e v a l u a t i v e judgment.  This judgment i s whether or not the p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t u t e has a s u f f i c i e n t l y close nexus w i t h the head of power under which i t i s being j u s t i f i e d .  I n making t h i s  judgment the courts w i l l r e l y on c e r t a i n f a c t o r s and once the d e c i s i o n has been a r r i v e d a t i t w i l l be cloaked w i t h the v e r b a l formulae i n order to preserve 14 Q.939] A.C. 117. 15 i b i d a t p. 129.  the facade of an  30. a p r i o r i l o g i c a l deduction from previous decisions.16 Overlaying the s e l e c t i o n of f a c t o r s i s the system of stare d e c i s i s .  This i s germaine to the process of s e l e c t i o n  on two l e v e l s ; f i r s t l y the binding force of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l precedent and secondly the range of f a c t s before the courts. As to the former the e a r l i e r decisions  i f on s i m i l a r p o i n t s  and binding w i l l themselves c o n s t i t u t e a f a c t o r of the highest importance and i n so f a r as they contain evidence of the f a c t o r s that guided those e a r l i e r courts they w i l l guide the choice of f a c t o r s i n the i n s t a n t c a s e . l ^ The range of f a c t s before the court i s important because i t i s l a r g e l y from these f a c t s that the choice of f a c t o r s w i l l be made.  18  16 This i s not to imply a c r i t i c i s m of the common law system the advantage of such system i s p r e c i s e l y that i t gives an appearance of immutability and c e r t a i n t y w h i l s t i n r e a l i t y being h i g h l y v o l a t i v e and subject to s o c i a l , e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l pressures. See Stone - book - o p . c i t . pages 237 to'241. 17 Too much should not be made of t h i s second p r o p o s i t i o n because of the statute s u b j e c t i v i t y to which reference has p r e v i o u s l y been made. 18 This i s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 'Brandeis B r i e f .  31.  The main r u l e s r e l a t i n g to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l precedent are clear.  Thus the P r i v y Council d i d not regard i t s e l f as  a b s o l u t e l y bound by i t s own decisions but would  seldom  as a matter of p r a c t i c e depart from them on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters.19  The d e c i s i o n s of the P r i v y C o u n c i l on appeal from  Canada were binding on a l l Canadian courts i n c l u d i n g the Supreme Court of Canada u n t i l 1954.20  The Supreme Court  of Canada regarded i t s e l f as bound by i t s own d e c i s i o n s other than i n exceptional circumstances,21 and i t s d e c i s i o n s were n a t u r a l l y conclusive on a l l other Canadian c o u r t s . The p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the binding force today of pre 1954 d e c i s i o n s of the P r i v y Council on the Supreme Court of Canada and the extent to which that court i s , since 1954 bound by i t s own d e c i s i o n s are both more d o u b t f u l . In Reference r e the Farm Products Marketing Act22 R nd J . a  held that "the powers of t h i s Court i n the e x e r c i s e o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n are no l e s s i n scope than those formerly exercised i n r e l a t i o n to Canada by the J u d i c i a l Committee." 19 A-G Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation, op. c i t . 20 Reference r e Sect. 16 of the S p e c i a l War Revenue A c t Q942J S.C.R. 429. 21 A-G Can, v. Western Higbie [1945J S.C.R. 385 a t 403. 22  095Q S.C.R.  196 a t 212.  This i n d i c a t e s that the Supreme Court w i l l place i t s e l f i n the same p o s i t i o n as the P r i v y Council i n r e l a t i o n to d e c i s i o n s of that body on appeal from Canada before 1954. This approach agrees w i t h that of R i n f r e t C.J. i n I n Re Storgoff.23  At the time that that case was heard only  c r i m i n a l appeals to the P r i v y Council had been abolished and the Chief J u s t i c e was therefore dealing w i t h only such appeals when he held "the Supreme Court of Canada i s now the court of l a s t r e s o r t i n c r i m i n a l matters, and although, of course, former d e c i s i o n s of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , or decisions of the House of Lords i n c r i m i n a l causes or matters, are e n t i t l e d to greatest w e i g h t . i t can no longer be s a i d as was affirmed by Viscount Dunedin d e l i v e r i n g the judgment of t h e i r Lordships i n Robbins v. N a t i o n a l Trust Co. L i m i t e d that the House of Lords, being the supreme t r i b u n a l to s e t t l e E n g l i s h law ..... the C o l o n i a l Court, which i s bound by E n g l i s h law, i s bound to f o l l o w i t . " ^ 2  I f t h i s approach i s adopted the Supreme Court of Canada w i l l not be bound by i t s own decisions or those of the P r i v y C o u n c i l on appeal from Canada given p r i o r to 1954 but i t w i l l seldom depart therefrom. 23 [1945] S.C.R. 526. 24 i b i d p. 538.  The adoption of such  33. a p o s i t i o n w h i l s t i n accord w i t h the general crumbling of the c i t a d e l of s t r i c t s t a r e d e c i s i s 2 5 i  s  s t i l l at variance  i n degree w i t h the view p r e v a i l i n g i n the U.S.A.  There,  the Supreme Court has often asserted that i t w i l l not h e s i t a t e to overrule a p r i o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n which i t considers to be wrongly decided State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards C o r p .  26 T h e  r a t i o n a l e of t h i s approach  i s that s t a r e d e c i s i s i n an absolute form i s i n a p p l i c a b l e because i t i s s t r u c t u r e d on the a b i l i t y of the l e g i s l a t u r e to c o r r e c t f a u l t s i n the law by s t a t u t e which i n a f e d e r a l system i s d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible.27  whilst t h i s  r a t i o n a l e has great persuasive e f f e c t against an absolute system of s t a r e d e c i s i s i t does not g r e a t l y a f f e c t a modified approach such as that of the P r i v y C o u n c i l and i t i s suggested that the more cautious p o l i c y be adopted i f only f o r the reason that people w i l l have acted on the p r i o r d e c i s i o n . This i s the pervading r u l e i n A u s t r a l i a where the High Court has s a i d i t w i l l only reverse i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s 25 Vide the High Court of A u s t r a l i a i n Parker v. The Queen (1962-3) 111 C.L.R. 610 at 632-3 and the House of Lords i n P r a c t i c e Note Q.966T] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 26 (1962) 370 U.S.  451.  27 See per Brandeis J . i n Burnet v. Coronado O i l & Gas Co. (1932) 285 U.S. 393 at 405 c i t e d i n L a s k i n - book - op. c i t . at p. 192.  34. on a showing that the case i n p o i n t i s 'manifestly wrong'.28 Regardless however of whether or not the approach of the United States i s adopted the existence of p r i o r d e c i s i o n s on s i m i l a r matters i s s t i l l of major importance being both a f a c t o r i t s e l f and a guide as to the f a c t o r s which other courts have found r e l e v a n t i n dealing w i t h a s i m i l a r case. In considering the range of f a c t s before the court i t must be borne i n mind that there are two types of such f a c t s i n any l i t i g a t i o n  ordinary f a c t s and l e g i s l a t i v e f a c t s .  Ordinary f a c t s are f a c t s p e c u l i a r to the p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s and a r i s e where one p a r t y a s s e r t s and the other certain things.  denies  L e g i s l a t i v e f a c t s are general f a c t s not  p e c u l i a r to the immediate parties.29  Constitutional facts  are a s p e c i f i c type of l e g i s l a t i v e f a c t .  They are f a c t s  'described as information which the court should have i n 28 per Higgins J . i n Gray v. Dalgety L t d . (1916) 21 C.L.R. 551. W h i l s t t h i s power has been exercised e.g: i n Amalgamated S o c i e t y of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. L t d . (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 and the Tramways Case (No. 1) (1914) 18 C.L.R. 54 there have been repeated warnings about a t t a c k i n g decisions" l i g h t l y e.g: Dixon J . i n Cox v. Journeaux (1934-5) 52 C.L.R. 282; A u s t r a l i a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Co. v. Federated Engine d r i v e r s ' & Firemans' Assoc. of A'asia (1913) 17 C.L.R. 274; Metal Trades Employers' Case (1936) 54 C.L.R. 387. Moreover the High Court has on occasions refused to overrule e a r l i e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s given only one or two years p r e v i o u s l y , e . g . Cain v. Malone (1942) 66 C.L.R. 10. 29 This d i s t i n c t i o n i s that of P.H. Lane i n A r t i c l e "Facts and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law" (1963) 37 A.L.J. 108 to 119.  35. order to p r o p e r l y judge of the v a l i d i t y of the s t a t u t e i n question, or f a c t s the existence of which i s necessary i n law to provide a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n ' .  3 0  A court acquires a l l f a c t s e i t h e r by j u d i c i a l n o t i c e or by evidence tendered.  I t has often been s t a t e d  3 1  that  j u d i c i a l n o t i c e can be taken of f a c t s that are so g e n e r a l l y known as to give r i s e to the presumption that a l l persons are aware of them.  Cross  has j u s t l y pointed out that t h i s  3 2  i s only p a r t of the d o c t r i n e , a l b e i t the major p a r t , as the idea of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e a l s o includes ' f a c t s ' which are capable of immediate accurate demonstration by r e s o r t to r e a d i l y assessable sources of i n d i s p u t a b l e  accuracy.  33  Furthermore i n t h i s second p a r t of the d o c t r i n e i t i s p o s s i b l e to give testimony  that w i l l a s s i s t the court.  Thus i n McQuaker v. Goddard ^ the question was whether 3  camels were mansuetae naturae and the court a t f i r s t  instance  30 A u s t r a l i a n Communist P a r t y v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1 a t 222 e t seq. c i t e d i n Lane - A r t . op. c i t . p.108. 31 e.g: i n Holland v. Jones (1917) 23 C.L.R. 149 a t 153. 32 R. Cross - Book - 'Evidence' 2nd E d i t . London, 1963 pages 136-139. 33 Morgan - 'Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo American System of L i t i g a t i o n ' page 61 c i t e d by Cross o p . c i t . page 133.  34 [194(0 1 K.B. 687.  36.  heard witnesses and consulted textbooks.  The b a s i s f o r  the hearing of the witnesses was stated by Clauson L . J . when the case was taken to the Court of Appeal thus:"Sworn testimony can be heard before j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s taken of a f a c t and i n such cases the witnesses are not s t r i c t u sensu g i v i n g evidence but a s s i s t i n g the judge i n forming h i s view as to what the ordinary course of nature i n t h i s regard i n f a c t i s , a matter of which he i s supposed to have complete knowledge."^5  J u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s the  foundation f o r the 'Brandeis B r i e f  i n the U.S.A. f o r as  was s a i d i n M u l l e r v. 0regon^6 "we, (the U.S. Supreme Court) take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a l l matters of general knowledge." Hence i f the courts i n Canada evince an i n t e n t i o n to r e f u s e admission to evidence d e a l i n g w i t h f a c t s of a s o c i a l , e t h i c a l or p o l i t i c a l v a r i e t y i t may be that j u d i c i a l n o t i c e w i l l be able to be used e i t h e r i n b r i e f s or by the use of sworn testimony.  Nevertheless the general a t t i t u d e of  Canadian courts to j u d i c i a l n o t i c e can be seen from Saumur v. A-G Que.37 where the Supreme Court deprived the s u c c e s s f u l 35 i b i d p.700. 36 (1908) U.S. 412. C i t e d by Laskin, op . c i t . p. 187. 37 Q1953]  2 S.C.R. 299.  37. appellant of costs because h i s attorney had swamped the Court's p r o v e r b i a l boat w i t h f a c t s . The  second method whereby the courts can acquire f a c t s  i s by the adducing of evidence s t r i c t u sensu.  There has not  been much a t t e n t i o n p a i d , i n Canada, to the use of evidence as a method of b r i n g i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s before the courts except i n r e l a t i o n to ' e x t r i n s i c aids'. ** 3  i s submitted that t h i s method i s to be p r e f e r r e d of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e f o r as Professor  Yet i t to the use  Lane has a p t l y observed  " i n t r u t h there i s no reason i n law or l o g i c why the court should not acquire r e l e v a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s from e v i dence as much as from j u d i c i a l n o t i c e ; when such f a c t s are propounded i n court by one party subjected to c r i t i c i s m by the other party then 'found' by the court the d e c i s i o n r e s t s on a surer foundation than what i s b u i l t upon the f l a t - e a r t h i s m 38 ' e x t r i n s i c a i d s ' or ' e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l s ' are used l o o s e l y . The f o l l o w i n g four uses are common:' 1) the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of a p a r t i c u l a r impugned s t a t u t e . 2) a l l the f a c t s that i t i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to b r i n g forward i n connection w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such a s t a t u t e other than i t s own words. 3) the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of the p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n of the B.N.A. A c t being considered. 4) a l l the f a c t s that i t i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to b r i n g forward i n connection w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n of the B.N.A. A c t being considered other than i t s own words. As the basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l judgment i s evaluative of the p a r t i c u l a r statute i t i s here proposed to use the second meaning.  38. of so c a l l e d notorious f a c t s which are i n c o n t e s t a b l e . " - ^ Nevertheless i t may w e l l be that there are c e r t a i n areas where j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s a v a i l a b l e but where i t i s impossible to tender evidence.  Thus i n Cairns Construction L t d . v.  Govt, of Saskatchewan^ C u l l i t o n J.A. of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal s t a t e d "The Courts have only departed from t h i s general r u l e (of e x t r i n s i c evidence not being admiss i b l e ) i n c o n s i d e r i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r cases matters of h i s t o r y , law and p r a c t i c e ; circumstances l e a d i n g to the passage of the Act and f a c t s of which the Court could and should take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e . 41  i a n f i n d no cases since C  the d e f i n i t i o n of a d i r e c t tax was adopted by the P r i v y C o u n c i l , i n which the evidence or opinions of p o l i t i c a l economists were considered by the court."42 Whichever method i s used there are two major hurdles to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s before a Canadian court.  The f i r s t of these i s the general r u l e i n  r e l a t i o n to e x t r i n s i c aids and the second i s the concept of 39 P.H. Lane - A r t . - op.cit.p.110. - note however that the learned author assumes that there can be no sworn testimony and cross examination under j u d i c i a l n o t i c e which i s contrary to McQuaker v. Goddard o p . c i t . 40(1959) 16 D.L.R. (2d)  465.  41 i t a l i c s mine - author. 42 i b i d pp. 491-2.  39. relevancy coupled w i t h the nature of j u d i c i a l review  itself.  In considering the use of e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l s i n Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n care must be taken to d i s t i n guish the p o s i t i o n of the use of such m a t e r i a l s i n r e l a t i o n to l e g i s l a t i o n impugned under the Act.  When t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n  i s kept f i r m l y i n mind i t can be seen that the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l s i n the former case i s not conclusive as to the l a t t e r .  Hence even i f V.C. MacDonald i s r i g h t ^  3  i n concluding that the general r u l e i s against the use of such m a t e r i a l s to a s s i s t i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the B.N.A. Act i t by no means f o l l o w s that such use i s excluded i n r e l a t i o n to an impugned s t a t u t e . As a matter of h i s t o r y the general trend i n E n g l i s h s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been t o exclude the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of Acts of Parliament from the c o u r t s . ^  The  t r a d i t i o n a l explanation f o r t h i s view has always been that parliament i s a corporate e n t i t y and the speeches of 43 V.C. MacDonald - A r t i c l e - " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and E x t r i n s i c Evidence" (1939) 17 Can. Bar. Rev. 77 a t 81. 44 Vide Alderson B. i n I n Re Gorham 5 Ex. 667; Barbat v. A l l e n 7 Ex. 616 per P o l l o c k C.B.; J u l i u s v. Oxford 49 L.J.Q.B. 578; South-Eastern Railway Co. v. Railway Commissioners 50 L.J.Q.B. 203. - a l l c i t e d by Taschereau C.J. i n G o s s e l i n v. R. 33 S.C.R. 255. By ' L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y ' i s meant the a c t u a l h i s t o r y of the measure through the l e g i s l a t u r e , e.g. debates; i t i s not meant to include previous Acts d e a l i n g w i t h the same subject matter which have always been admissible.  40. i n d i v i d u a l s should therefore have l i t t l e weight i n deciding what was i t s c o l l e c t i v e aim.  Thus Lord Maugham L.C. i n  A-G f o r A l b e r t a v. A-G f o r Canada45 s a i d " I t must be r e membered that the object or purpose of the A c t , i n so f a r as i t does not p l a i n l y appear from i t s terms and i t s probable e f f e c t , i s that of an i n c o r p o r e a l e n t i t y namely, the L e g i s l a t u r e , and, g e n e r a l l y speaking, the speeches of i n d i v i d u a l s would have l i t t l e e v i d e n t i a r y weight."46 This r u l e has been f i r m l y a p p l i e d i n Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law i n respect of speeches by members of p a r l i a ment.  Thus i n Utah Co. of the Americas and Texada Mines  L i m i t e d v. A-G B.C.47 the t r i a l judge took j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of press and r a d i o statements by M i n i s t e r s of the Crown. On appeal the Supreme Court of Canada held that the t r i a l judge had not based h i s d e c i s i o n on the unproven statements and that evidence to prove them would have been i n a d m i s s i b l e . This p r i n c i p l e was adopted i n A-G v. Readers' Digest Assoc i a t i o n ( C a n a d a ) ^ where the Supreme Court held that a speech of the Finance M i n i s t e r was not admissible to show 45 o p . c i t .  46 D-939] A.C. 117 a t 131. 47 (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 705. 48 o p . c i t .  41. that l e g i s l a t i o n was c o l o u r a b l e . f l i c t i n g views expressed  There have been con-  as to the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of Royal  Commission and Committee r e p o r t s . t r i b u t o r s L t d . v. A-G B.C.  49  Thus i n Home O i l Dis-  Davis J . s t a t e d "Generally  speaking the Court has no r i g h t to i n t e r p r e t l e g i s l a t i o n by reference to such extraneous m a t e r i a l as the evidence taken before and the r e p o r t of a p u b l i c i n q u i r y under a Royal Commission."50  The learned judge went on to c i t e w i t h  approval the judgment of Lord Wright i n Assam Railways and Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue51 where he held that a Royal Commission report was not admissible i n evidence f o r the purpose of showing the i n t e n t i o n i . e : the purpose or object of an Act.  Again i n the Readers'  Digest Assoc. Case-* Cartwright J . i n d e l i v e r i n g the judgment 2  of himself and Locke J . s a i d "there i s no d e c i s i o n which r e q u i r e s us to hold that a r e p o r t of a Royal Commission made p r i o r to the passing of a s t a t u t e and r e l a t i n g to the subject matter w i t h which the s t a t u t e deals, but not r e f e r r e d to i n the s t a t u t e i s admissible i n evidence i n an a c t i o n 49 0.940] S.C.R. 444. 50 i b i d p.452. 51 0  9 3 5  3  A  52 o p . c i t .  « '« c  4 4 5  •  42. seeking to impugn the s t a t u t e .  In my opinion the general  r u l e i s that i f objected to i t should be excluded."53 On the other hand Lord Denning M.R.  used a r e p o r t of  a committee i n Letang v. Cooper54 to see what was "the m i s c h i e f at which the Act was d i r e c t e d " i . e : "to get the f a c t s and surrounding circumstances from the r e p o r t , so as to see the background against which the l e g i s l a t i o n was enacted."55 The learned Master of the R o l l s f u r t h e r stated-56 that "This i s always a great help i n i n t e r p r e t i n g (the Act) ." Lord Halsbury made a s i m i l a r approach i n Eastern Photographic M a t e r i a l s Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents.57  i  n  the  most recent case on the matter58 the question before the A p p e l l a t e D i v i s i o n of the Supreme Court of A l b e r t a was whether c e r t a i n committee reports were admissible to give the court background information as to the Communal Property Act 1955  (Alta.) the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of which was  being impugned.  During a review of the a u t h o r i t i e s  53 i b i d p.791. 54 Q9643  2  A11E.R. 929.  55 i b i d p.933. 56 i b i d , p.933. 57 Ql898] A.C.  517  at  575.  58 Walter v. A-G A l t a . (1967) 58 W.W.R. 385.  43. McDermid J.A. (with whom Smith C.J.A. and P o r t e r J .A. agreed) said^9 "The question of the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the r e p o r t of a commission was l e f t open by the Supreme Court of Canada i n A-G Can, v. Readers' Digest Assoc. (Canada) Ltd."60  H i s Lordship then proceeded t o r e f e r to the r e p o r t s  not as d i r e c t evidence of i n t e n t i o n but " f o r the purpose of a s c e r t a i n i n g the mischief a t which the Act was directed."61 The a u t h o r i t i e s r e l i e d on i n reaching t h i s d e c i s i o n were the judgment of R i t c h i e J.62 i  n  the Readers' Digest Case63  and Letang v. Cooper.64 xn the f i r s t case the f o l l o w i n g statement was made: "As the r e p o r t s were introduced without o b j e c t i o n by counsel f o r background i n f o r m a t i o n , we are e n t i t l e d to use them .... as a source of information as to what was the e v i l or defect which the A c t of Parliament now under c o n s t r u c t i o n was intended to remedy."65 59 i b i d p.403. 60 o p . c i t . 61 o p . c i t . p.405. 62 w i t h whom M a i t l a n d J . agreed. 63 o p . c i t . 64 o p . c i t . 65 o p . c i t . p.796.  The other  44. judges i n the Walter Gase^6 Johnson and Kane J.J.A. h e l d that " i n determining the v a l i d i t y of an Act .... the r e p o r t s of committees which recommended changes which were made i n the l e g i s l a t i o n are proper matters to be  considered."67  I t would seem therefore that on the balance of a u t h o r i t y a Royal Commission or committee r e p o r t w i l l be admissible not as d i r e c t evidence of i n t e n t i o n but as background i n f o r mation.  In a u n i t a r y s t a t e where there are few curbs on  parliamentary power there i s no n e c e s s i t y to look at the purpose of an Act f o r i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n although such purpose may be of a s s i s t a n c e .  The h i s t o r i c a l choice then  of E n g l i s h law to preclude c e r t a i n forms of evidence of such purpose w h i l s t a r b i t r a r y was nevertheless c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s idea of parliamentary sovereignty.  In a* f e d e r a l s t a t e  on the other hand the f i r s t question regarding an Act i s whether i t i s w i t h i n power.  No doubt i t would be p o s s i b l e  to construct a d i v i s i o n of powers based e n t i r e l y on c r i t e r i a extraneous  to purpose but t h i s was not done i n Canada.  The  r e s u l t i s then that i t i s e s s e n t i a l that evidence of purpose be admitted to a i d i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i n Canada 66 o p . c i t . 67 i b i d p.393.  45. and one would wish f o r l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y to be a v a i l a b l e to the court.68 A-G  Davis J . i n Home O i l D i s t r i b u t o r s L t d . v.  B.C.69 recognized  t h i s p o l i c y d i s t i n c t i o n i n the a p p l i -  c a t i o n of the general r u l e of i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y to f e d e r a l as contrasted w i t h u n i t a r y states when he said^O "A r u l e somewhat wider than the general r u l e may be necessary i n considering the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of l e g i s l a t i o n under a f e d e r a l system where l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y i s d i v i d e d between the c e n t r a l and l o c a l l e g i s l a t i v e bodies."  The  necessity  f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n can be seen most a c u t e l y i n the case of colourable l e g i s l a t i o n .  The r e s u l t s of a complete bar  to admission would be that l e g i s l a t i o n f o r an u l t r a v i r e s purpose could be sustained i f as a matter of form i t complied w i t h the r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n of the B.N.A. A c t .  This r e s u l t  68 For a j u d i c i a l p l e a f o r more evidence to be l e d ' of f a c t s that w i l l a s s i s t the court i n examining the purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n see P o r t e r J.A. i n Walter v. A-G A l t a . o p . c i t . at p.387 where dealing w i t h a question of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e that s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y struck a t the H u t t e r i t e community he s a i d : "We should know something of the consequences of the development of these c o l o n i e s on municipal government, on telephone communication, on transp o r t a t i o n f o r school purposes, on snow clearance, and a l l those other elements which go f o r b e t t e r r u r a l l i v i n g , " . His Lordship gave f u r t h e r examples and continued, "These I c i t e as examples of the f a c t s that should be before us i f we are to examine the true purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n . " 69 o p . c i t . 70 i b i d p.453.  46. the Canadian courts have vehemently and s t e a d f a s t l y denied.71 Thus Lord Maugham L.C. i n A-G A l t a . v. A-G Can.72 asserted " I t i s not competent e i t h e r f o r the Dominion or a province under the guise, or the pretence, or i n the form of an e x e r c i s e of i t s powers to c a r r y out an object which i s beyond i t s powers and a trespass on the e x c l u s i v e powers of the other: A-G Ont. v. R e c i p r o c a l Insurers73; i n Re The Insurance Act of Canada74 Here again, matters of which the Court would take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e must be borne i n mind, and other evidence i n a case that c a l l s f o r i t . " 7 5  Another example  of the same j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e i s the j o i n t judgment of Taschereau, R i n f r e t and Crockett J . J . i n Lower Mainland D a i r y Products Board v. Turner's D a i r y Limited76 h e r e i n w  i t was s a i d " I n c e r t a i n cases i n order to avoid confusion extraneous evidence i s r e q u i r e d to f a c i l i t a t e the a n a l y s i s of l e g i s l a t i v e enactments and thus d i s c l o s e t h e i r aims which 71 Vide Lord A t k i n i n Ladore v. Bennett 0-939] « at 482 and the d e c i s i o n of the P.C. i n P.A.T.A. v. A-G Can. Cl93l3 A.C. 310. A  72 o p . c i t . 73 [19243 A.C. 328. 74 [1932] A.C. 41. 75 i t a l i c s mine - author, o p . c i t . pp.130-131. 76 [1941] S.C.R. 573.  c  4 6 8  47.  otherwise would remain obscure or even completely  concealed.  The true purposes and e f f e c t of l e g i s l a t i o n , when revealed to the courts are indeed very precious elements which must be considered i n order to discover i t s r e a l substance.  If  i t were h e l d that such evidence may not be allowed and that only the form o f an Act may be considered, then colourable devices could be used by l e g i s l a t i v e bodies to deal w i t h matters beyond t h e i r powers."77 On p o l i c y the r u l e i s a t variance w i t h purposive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n Canada. convenient  I t would be  to suggest that i t should be abandoned i n the  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l arena but the weight of recent a u t h o r i t y e s p e c i a l l y the Readers' Digest Case^S precludes  this.  I t i s therefore incumbent on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  lawyer  to i n v e s t i g a t e e x a c t l y what i s the ambit of the general rule.  The types of evidence that have so f a r been excluded  77 i b i d p.583 - This r u l e was a p p l i e d i n Anthony v. A-G A l t a . U-9431 S.C.R. 320 and see a l s o the judgment of R i n f r e t C.J. i n Reference r e V a l i d i t y of Wartime Leasehold Regulations Q.950J S.C.R. 124 i n which he h e l d "no doubt anybody a t t a c k i n g Parliament's l e g i s l a t i o n as colourable would have to introduce evidence of c e r t a i n f a c t s to support the contention, f o r i t can hardly be expected that the Order of Reference would contain m a t e r i a l of a nature to * induce the Court to conclude as to the c o l o u r a b i l i t y of the l e g i s l a t i o n . " (page 127) 78 o p . c i t .  48. are press statements by members of p a r l i a m e n t ^ i n parliament by M i n i s t e r s of the Crown.  80  and speeches  Against  this  there have been numerous references to associated s t a t u t e s e s p e c i a l l y where a l e g i s l a t i v e scheme i s involved. re A l b e r t a S t a t u t e s ^ l i s an example of t h i s .  8 2  In Reference  As a matter  of p r i n c i p l e , i t i s therefore submitted that the e x c l u s i o n of e x t r i n s i c evidence should, i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions, be l i m i t e d to those spheres where i t has already been a p p l i e d and that every e f f o r t should be pursued to w h i t t l e away and u l t i m a t e l y a b o l i s h  those.  83  Even i f the hurdle of the non use of e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l i s overcome there i s an e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t b a r r i e r to the wholesale admission of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , v i z : - the concept of relevancy coupled w i t h the nature of j u d i c i a l review.  When a court i s dealing w i t h a question of con-  s t i t u t i o n a l power i t i n q u i r e s whether the s t a t u t e i n issue 79 Texada Mines Case o p . c i t . 80 Readers' Digest Assoc. Case o p . c i t . 81 o p . c i t . 82 See a l s o Laskin - Book - o p . c i t . p. 160 and the cases therein cited. 83 The U.S. Supreme Court has admitted both speeches and r e p o r t s of committees on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues vide Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke (1937) 300 U.S. 1^40 per Brandeis J . and g e n e r a l l y Laskin- o p . c i t . page 171.  49. a t t a i n s an end ' i n r e l a t i o n to' a s p e c i f i e d power^4 contrasted w i t h merely ' a f f e c t i n g ' that power.  a s  Hence f a c t s  w i l l be r e l e v a n t i f they a s s i s t i n r e s o l v i n g that enquiry, i . e : - evidence could be introduced to show that a s t a t u t e although outwardly w i t h i n the power was i n f a c t outside it.85  Lest i t be thought that such an expansive approach  i s tantamount to heresy i n Canada, i t should be pointed out86 that the A u s t r a l i a n High Court which i s probably more ' l e g a l i s t i c ' than i t s Canadian counterpart^? has admitted evidence to show both that a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e w h i l s t purporting to deal w i t h a subject outside the f e d e r a l powers was i n t r a v i r e s and that a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e w h i l s t p u r p o r t i n g to be w i t h i n f e d e r a l powers was u l t r a v i r e s those powers.88 Hence the concept of relevancy by i t s e l f i s f a r from 84 Gold Seal L t d . v. Dominion Express Co. o p . c i t . and Munro v. N a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Commission o p . c i t . 85 This i s 'colourable l e g i s l a t i o n ' - see cases c i t e d p r e v i o u s l y and Lord Greene i n A-G B.C. v. Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway 0-950] A.C. 87 a t 114. 86 As P.H. Lane has done i n A r t . o p . c i t . p. 113. 87 Vide S i r Owen Dixon's address on being sworn i n as Chief J u s t i c e (1952) 85 C.L.R. X I a t XIV and S.A. De Smith Book Review (1957) 20 M.L.R. 681 a t 682. 88 P.H. Lane o p . c i t p.115 and R. v. Burgess Exp. Henry (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608 a t 629 and 0 ' S u l l i v a n v. Noarlunga Meat L t d . (1954) 92 C.L.R. 565 a t 596.  50. being a r e s t r i c t i o n .  The r e s t r i c t i v e element i s introduced  when i t i s coupled to the scope of j u d i c i a l review.  Lane  8 9  has i n d i c a t e d that there i s no w r i t t e n b a s i s i n the B.N.A. Act f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l review by the j u d i c i a r y . may  Whilst t h i s  be so the f a c t remains that the courts have asserted  such a d o c t r i n e which a s s e r t i o n has been s a n c t i f i e d by practice.  The scope of j u d i c i a l review i s l i m i t e d .  I t has  no a p p l i c a t i o n to whether the l e g i s l a t u r e has chosen the best method of achieving i t s aims.  I t i s only concerned  w i t h whether the a c t u a l method chosen i s w i t h i n the l e g i s l a ture's power.  Hence i n theory c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s are  r e l e v a n t i f they go to the l a t t e r p r o p o s i t i o n but i r r e l e v a n t i f they go to the former.  are  These two r u l e s  are however not as c l e a r cut as would at f i r s t s i g h t appear. Thus i f i t i s claimed that a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e i s w i t h i n a power of i t s enacting l e g i s l a t u r e , f a c t s which show that the e f f e c t of the s t a t u t e i s to carry out something w i t h i n that power or to a t t a i n an end  ' i n r e l a t i o n to' the power  are r e l e v a n t whereas the i d e n t i c a l f a c t s are i r r e l e v a n t i f they are only sought to be admitted to show that the l e g i s l a t u r e could otherwise have achieved i t s object  and  89 P.H. Lane - A r t i c l e - ' J u d i c i a l Review or Judgment by the High Court' 5 Syd. L.R. 203 at 203.  51. therefore that the l e g i s l a t i o n i s colourable.90  j  n  Aus-  t r a l i a these two sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g p r i n c i p l e s have been c r y s t a l i s e d i n t o a r u l e that where the question of purpose or e f f e c t of l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n issue as tending to show that the s t a t u t e was w i t h i n power evidence w i l l be admitted to show that some expert opinion was prepared to say that the means chosen by the f e d e r a l parliament would have a w i t h i n power e f f e c t . 9 1  That i s , i f a s i t u a t i o n arose where on the  balance of expert opinion the e f f e c t of a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e would be X, and X was beyond f e d e r a l power, the s t a t u t e would s t i l l be upheld i f there was  some expert opinion that  the means chosen by the l e g i s l a t u r e would have Y e f f e c t and Y was w i t h i n i t s power.  I t seems l i k e l y that Canadian  courts would adopt a s i m i l a r s o l u t i o n at l e a s t i n so f a r as the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s based on a weak presumption of the v a l i d i t y of f e d e r a l statutes.92  Accordingly i t i s submitted  that the scope f o r tendering evidence of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s i n Canada i s wider than has p r e v i o u s l y been acknowledged . 90 This a n a l y s i s i s based on P.H. and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' o p . c i t .  Lane - A r t i c l e - 'Facts  91 Lane i b i d p.119. 92 For such weak presumption i n Canada see V a l i n v. L a n g l o i s 5 App.Cas. 115 at 118.  52. When i t i s r e a l i z e d that the determination v a l i d i t y of l e g i s l a t i o n under S.91  and S.92  of the  i s an e v a l u a t i v e  judgment the scope of the double aspect doctrine can be b e t t e r appreciated.  Under t h i s doctrine l e g i s l a t i o n can be  i n t r a v i r e s the f e d e r a l parliament even though s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n could be enacted from another aspect or f o r another purpose by the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s and. v i c e versa.  The doctrine was  f i r s t stated i n Hodge v. The Queen  where the P r i v y C o u n c i l said94 "subjects which i n one aspect and f o r one purpose f a l l w i t h i n S.92  may  i n another aspect  and f o r another purpose f a l l w i t h i n S.91." observes that t h i s d o c t r i n e was  9  derived from Chief J u s t i c e  Marshall's dictum i n Gibbons v. Ogden judge said97  Laskin 5  96  where that learned  " A l l experience shows that the same measure  or measures s c a r c e l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from each other  may  flow from d i s t i n c t powers; but t h i s does not prove that the powers themselves are i d e n t i c a l . "  Now  a l l t h i s double  aspect doctrine i s r e a l l y s t a t i n g i s that when examining a 93 (1883) 9 App.Cas. 117. 94 i b i d p.130. 95 o p . c i t .  p.90.  96 (1824) 22 U.S. 97 i b i d  p.90.  1.  93  53. p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e the courts may hold that i t has a s u f f i c i e n t nexus w i t h a S.91 power to be v a l i d and that a t another time a s t a t u t e d e a l i n g w i t h s i m i l a r matters may be held to have a s u f f i c i e n t nexus w i t h a S.92 power to be v a l i d .  This i s  a r e s u l t of f a c t o r s such as e f f e c t j "nature of the whole Act and purpose.  I t flows from the f a c t that no d i v i s i o n  of powers can ever be completely w a t e r t i g h t .  Furthermore  t h i s concept of dual aspect i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the general method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e v i o u s l y l a i d down. Thus a court i n answering the f i r s t question as to whether the s t a t u t e i s prima f a c i e w i t h i n a S.92 power may decide that i t has a nexus w i t h that power s u f f i c i e n t l y close to be so c l a s s i f i e d and then go to hold i n answering the second question that i t has a c l o s e nexus w i t h a S.91 enumerated power and thus can only be enacted on a f e d e r a l l e v e l .  Yet when  another s t a t u t e on much the same matter i s impugned the court may hold that i t s nexus i s c l o s e r w i t h S.92 than w i t h the S.91  enumerated power and hence that i t can only be v a l i d  i f enacted by a p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . Associated w i t h the idea of an e v a l u a t i v e judgment i s the question of s e v e r a b i l i t y .  Where c e r t a i n sections of a  s t a t u t e are u l t r a v i r e s there are two s i t u a t i o n s that may occur.  F i r s t l y the bad sections may be so i n e x t r i c a b l y  interwoven w i t h the r e s t of the A c t as to be incapable  54. of being deleted without robbing the Act of e f f e c t i n which case the whole Act w i l l be u l t r a v i r e s . sections may  Secondly the bad'  deal w i t h only p a r t of what i s contemplated by  the Act and therefore the residue w i l l be able to stand on i t s own f e e t i n which ease the bad s e c t i o n w i l l be u l t r a v i r e s but the residue w i l l be upheld as being w i t h i n power. The c r i t e r i o n f o r determining s e v e r a b i l i t y was c l e a r l y down by Viscount Simon i n A-G A l b e r t a v. A-G  laid  Canada ( A l b e r t a  B i l l of Rights Act Case)98 wherein d e l i v e r i n g the P r i v y Council's advice, he s a i d the question was whether99 "what remained i s so i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up w i t h the p a r t declared i n v a l i d that what remains cannot independently  s u r v i v e , or  as i t has sometimes been put, whether on a f a i r review of the whole matter i t can be assumed that the l e g i s l a t u r e would have enacted what survives without the p a r t that survives at a l l . " Besides invoking a f i c t i o n , v i z : - the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h i s t e s t of s e v e r a b i l i t y i s an e v a l u a t i v e judgment i t s e l f .  As i t w i l l only be a p p l i e d where p a r t of  the s t a t u t e has been held to be u l t r a v i r e s which i s i t s e l f a value judgment the t e s t of s e v e r a b i l i t y i s b u i l d i n g e v a l u a t i o n on e v a l u a t i o n .  98 D-9473 A.C. 503. 99 i b i d p.518.  W h i l s t t h i s i n i t s e l f i s not  55. o b j e c t i o n a b l e i t i l l u s t r a t e s the f a c t that to regard the question of whether or not to sever the u l t r a v i r e s p a r t s of a s t a t u t e as being based on an o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n i s as accurate as so regarding the 'reasonable man'  concept i n  negligence.100 A c l a s s i c example of j u d i c i a l f a i l u r e to appreciate the e v a l u a t i v e judgment whereby a s t a t u t e i s aaid to be w i t h i n e i t h e r a S.91 enumeration or a S.92 power can be found i n the a n c i l l a r y or i n c i d e n t a l d o c t r i n e . The best  statement  of t h i s concept i s the t h i r d of Lord Tomlin's p r o p o s i t i o n s i n the F i s h Canneries CaselOl v i z : - " i t i s w i t h i n the competence of the Dominion Parliament to provide f o r matters, which, though otherwise w i t h i n the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e are n e c e s s a r i l y i n c i d e n t a l to e f f e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n by the Parliament of the Dominion upon a subject e x p r e s s l y enumerated i n S.91." which i s based on e a r l i e r pronouncements i n A-G  This  statement  f o r Ontario  100 In so f a r as both c r i t e r i a exclude the use of other c r i t e r i a they may p r o p e r l y be termed 'absolute'. However the opposite of 'absolute' i s not ' s u b j e c t i v e ' but ' r e l a t i v e ' . Both the t e s t of s e v e r a b i l i t y and the 'reasonable man' idea are 'absolute s u b j e c t i v e ' concepts. 101 o p . c i t . a t p.118.  56. v. A-G f o r C a n a d a  102  and A-G Ontario v. A-G C a n a d a ,  r e c e i v e d j u d i c i a l approval i n In Re S i l v e r B r o s . , Re Aeronautics R e f e r e n c e  1 0 5  1 0 4  and C.P.R. v. A-G B . C .  103  In  106  I t i s apparent that e i t h e r a s t a t u t e comes w i t h i n a S.91 enumerated power or i t does not do s o .  1 0 7  The whole  idea of s e t t i n g up a d i v i s i o n of powers i s f o r c e r t a i n powers to be given to body A. and c e r t a i n to body B. Of course c e r t a i n powers may be given to both A and B and i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e f o r both bodies to share c e r t a i n powers owing to f a u l t y d r a f t i n g but n e i t h e r form of concurrency denies that f o r example body A has the power i t merely means that body B may have i t a l s o .  Hence to suggest that  something i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n c i d e n t a l to a power i s i n r e a l i t y only saying that i t i s so c l o s e l y connected w i t h the power as to be regarded as p a r t of i t .  On t h i s b a s i s the doctrine  102 [1894] A.C. 189. (Voluntary Assignments Case) 103 (Local P r o h i b i t i o n s Case) o p . c i t . 104 o p . c i t . 105 o p . c i t . 106 o p . c i t 107 Looked a t i n another way a s t a t u t e although not as a matter of l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y belonging w i t h i n a S.91 power, i s deemed e i t h e r to have a s u f f i c i e n t nexus or not to have a s u f f i c i e n t nexus w i t h that power.  57. of a n c i l l a r y or i n c i d e n t a l powers i s redundant. Moreover i t i s a dangerous doctrine as can be seen from the judgment of Duff J . i n Reference r e Waters and Water PowerslQ8 where he asserted that a d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d between powers w i t h i n the S.91 enumerated a r t i c l e s and those a n c i l l a r y or i n c i d e n t a l to such enumerations. Thus he s t a t e d ^  9  " i t i s only the  e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y of the Dominion under the enumerated heads of S.91 which i s accorded the primacy intended to be declared by those words.  I n themselves they have not the  e f f e c t of g i v i n g pre-eminence to the i n c i d e n t a l or a n c i l l a r y powers which are not s t r i c t l y e x c l u s i v e . "  Now although  t h i s approach has not found favour w i t h subsequent c o u r t s H O i t c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s that d i v i d i n g up the S.91 enumerated powers can lead to d i f f e r e n c e i n r e s u l t . The redundancy of the a n c i l l a r y doctrine was j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d i n A-G Can, v. N y o r a k l H where Judson J . held " l e g i s l a t i o n of t h i s kind comes squarely under head 7 of S.91 notwithstanding the f a c t that i t may i n c i d e n t a l l y  108 C 3 » « » 1929  S  C  R  200  •  109 i b i d p.217. 110 Vide Lord Tomlin i n the F i s h Canneries Case o p . c i t . 111 (1962) 33 D.L.R. (2d) 373.  58. a f f e c t property and c i v i l r i g h t s w i t h i n the Province.  It  i s meaningless to support t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n as was done i n the Grand Trunk C a s e i n  o n  t  he ground that i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y  i n c i d e n t a l to l e g i s l a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to an enumerated c l a s s of subject i n S.91." Again i n Commission Du S a l a i r e -Minimum v. B e l l Telephone Co. of C a n a d a  the Supreme  113  Court was faced w i t h deciding whether minimum wages l e g i s l a t i o n of Quebec a p p l i e d to f e d e r a l works or undertakings i n the absence of f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n .  Martland J . i n d e l i v e r i n g  the Court's judgment d e c l i n e d to hold that the f e d e r a l power to l e g i s l a t e on hours o f work was a n c i l l a r y or i n c i d e n t a l to i t s power i n r e l a t i o n to f e d e r a l undertakings and held that i t was a ' v i t a l p a r t ' of such power. The question then i s not whether a s t a t u t e i s on a matter so c l o s e l y connected w i t h a S.91 power to be s a i d to be i n c i d e n t a l or a n c i l l a r y to i t but simply whether i t can be s a i d to f a l l w i t h i n the ambit of that  power.  114  I f the nexus a n a l y s i s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s adopted questions of paramountry between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l 112 0.907] A.C. 65. 113 (1967) 59 D.L.R. (2d) 145. 114 For another c r i t i c i s m of the a n c i l l a r y d o c t r i n e see L a s k i n - A r t i c l e - "Peace, Order and Good Government Re Examined" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 1054 a t 1061.  59. l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l only occur where the double aspect doctrine i s applied.  This i s because such questions can only a r i s e  where both statutes i n the absence of the other are v a l i d and under the nexus method the only case where both statutes would be v a l i d i s where the double aspect doctrine a p p l i e s . H 5 I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that i n the event of a c l a s h between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n the former s h a l l p r e v a i l . The major problem i n the area i s to determine when two statutes c l a s h so that a p p l i c a t i o n of a paramountry doctrine i s required.  The s o l v i n g of t h i s problem i s not a s s i s t e d  by such loose phrases as "There must be a r e a l c o n f l i c t between the two A c t s ; that i s the two enactments must come into c o l l i s i o n . " H 7 There are two methods f o r determining whether you have clashing l e g i s l a t i o n . f i e l d ' test.  The f i r s t of these i s the 'cover the  This t e s t has been adopted f o r determining  115 Under the double aspect doctrine a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e may have a s u f f i c i e n t l y close nexus w i t h a f e d e r a l power and a p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e on a s i m i l a r matter have an equally close nexus w i t h a p r o v i n c i a l power but not a s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e nexus w i t h a f e d e r a l power f o r i t to be u l t r a v i r e s . 116 Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada o p . c i t ; L o c a l P r o h i b i t i o n s Case o p . c i t ; F i s h Canneries Case o p . c i t ; C.P.R. v. A-G B.C. op.cit. 117 L o c a l P r o h i b i t i o n s Case o p . c i t a t p.366.  60. when there i s 'inconsistency' under S.109 of the A u s t r a l i a n Constitution.  That s e c t i o n provides:- "When a law of a  State i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a law of the Commonwealth the l a t t e r s h a l l p r e v a i l and the former s h a l l to the extent of the inconsistency be i n v a l i d . "  A c l a s s i c a l statement of the  'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t i s that of Isaacs J . i n Clyde Engineering Co. L t d . v. C o w b u r n  118  "jf  a  competent l e g i s l a t u r e  evinces i t s i n t e n t i o n to cover the whole f i e l d that i s a conclusive t e s t of inconsistency where another l e g i s l a t u r e assumes to enter to any extent upon the same f i e l d . " i n Ex.p. M c C l e a n  119  Again  S i r Owen Dixon (as he l a t e r became)  i n applying the t e s t p o i n t s out that "inconsistency does not l i e i n the mere co-existence of simultaneous obedience.  of two laws s u s c e p t i b l e  I t depends upon the i n t e n t i o n  of the paramount l e g i s l a t u r e to express by i t s enactment completely,  exhaustively or e x c l u s i v e l y what s h a l l be the  law governing the p a r t i c u l a r conduct or matter to which i t s attention i s directed.  When a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i s c l o s e s  such an i n t e n t i o n i t i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t f o r a State to govern the same conduct or m a t t e r . " 118 (1926) 37 C.L.R. 466 a t 489. 119  (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472.  120 i b i d p.483.  1 2 0  There are then three c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of the 'cover the f i e l d test'  a subject matter or f i e l d  a comprehensive  coverage of that f i e l d by the f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y and a State or p r o v i n c i a l law on a matter i n s i d e that f i e l d . 1 2 1 Hence i n order to determine by the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t whether the two s t a t u t e s c l a s h there are three value judgments to be made:  F i r s t l y what i s the r e l e v a n t  field,I  2 2  secondly whether the f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s or i s not meant to be comprehensive and f i n a l l y whether the State or p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n the f i e l d so covered. In Canada there has been some j u d i c i a l a t t e n t i o n paid to t h i s t e s t .  Thus i n Forbes v. A-G f o r M a n i t o b a l ^ the 2  P r i v y Council s a i d l 4 "the d o c t r i n e of the occupied f i e l d 2  a p p l i e s only where there i s a c l a s h between Dominion and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h i n an area common to both." As the d o c t r i n e of the 'occupied f i e l d ' i s r e a l l y a t e s t to decide whether or not there i s a c l a s h between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i t i s apparent that the P r i v y Council 121 Lane - Book - o p . c i t . p.231. 122 This w i l l l a r g e l y depend on the l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n a t which the s t a t u t e i s viewed. 123 [j.937] A.C. 260. 124 i b i d p.274.  f a i l e d to f u l l y appreciate the concept. v. S p a r l i n g  1 2 5  Again i n 0'Grady  Cartwright J . i n a d i s s e n t i n g judgment w i t h  which Locke J . concurred s a i d  1 2 6  (of the P r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n )  "Assuming .... that S.55(l) has a p r o v i n c i a l aspect  and so would be v a l i d u n t i l Parliament occupies the f i e l d i n which i t operates i t i s necessary to consider whether Parliament has done so. the f i e l d . "  I n my opinion Parliament has occupie  P r e v i o u s l y i n Reference r e S.92(4) of the  V e h i c l e s A c t 1957 Saskatchewan C . 9 3  127  the same learned  judge held " I am of the opinion that S.92(4)d of the V e h i c l e s A c t of Saskatchewan invades a f i e l d occupied by v a l i d l e g i s l a t i o n of Parliament, i s i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h that l e g i s l a t i o n and cannot s t a n d . "  1 2 8  In Mackay v. R .  129  the Supreme Court i n c l i n e d to the view that f e d e r a l parliament had occupied the f i e l d i n respect of signs f o r f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s but found i t unnecessary to decide the point.  Yet another example of j u d i c i a l approval of the  'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t i n Canada i s the statement of 125 0-960] S.C.R. 804. 126 i b i d p.820. 127 Q-958] S.C.R. 608 128 i b i d p.622. 129 O  9 6 5  ]  S.C.R. 798.  63. Lord Tomlin i n the F i s h Canneries Case. 1-^0  "There can be  a domain i n which p r o v i n c i a l and dominion l e g i s l a t i o n may overlap i n which case n e i t h e r l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l be u l t r a v i r e s i f the f i e l d i s c l e a r , but i f the f i e l d i s not c l e a r and the two l e g i s l a t i o n s meet the Dominion l e g i s l a t i o n must prevail."131  Lord Tomlin r e l i e d on Grand Trunk Railway  of Canada v. A-G Can.1^2 s a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a  which has subsequently been j u d i c i a l l y approved.133 The 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t then has been a p p l i e d i n Canada.  I t i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the double aspect  d o c t r i n e as may a t f i r s t s i g h t appear.  Such a suggestion  stems from the idea that where you have f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n dealing w i t h a s i m i l a r subject matter you cannot adopt as a c r i t e r i o n f o r deciding whether the l e g i s l a t i o n clashes the subject matter or f i e l d of the paramount l e g i s lation.  This idea i s based on a misconception of the  'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t .  I t i s not a t e s t of subject matter  130 o p . c i t . 131 i b i d p.118. 132 o p . c i t . 133 In Re Aeronautics Reference o p . c i t ; In Re S i l v e r Bros. o p . c i t ; C.P.R. v. A-G B.C. o p . c i t .  64. for as Wynes ^ a p t l y o b s e r v e s 13  1 3 5  "The  t e s t of  the f i e l d ' i s of course only another way  'covering  of expressing  the  p r i n c i p l e that i t i s the i n t e n t i o n of the f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n which i s to be ascertained i n every case. may,  The f e d e r a l law  f o r example, contemplate the co-existence of State  provisions."  I t i s p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t to say that where  both f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s v a l i d because of the double aspect d o c t r i n e that whether or not they c l a s h w i l l depend on the i n t e n t i o n of the f e d e r a l parliament  and  t h i s i s a l l the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t purports to do. I t seems that t h i s basis of i n t e n t i o n has not been f u l l y understood. Case  1 3 6  Thus the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n the Grand Trunk .  t a l k e d i n terms of l e g i s l a t i o n  F.P. V a r c o e  1 3 7  overlapping.  c r i t i c i z e d the overlapping idea by a s s e r t i n g  " I t i s not p r o v i n c i a l and Dominion l e g i s l a t i o n that overlap. I f they d i d , the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n would be a u t o m a t i c a l l y nullified.  The overlapping i s between c l a s s e s of subjects  134 W.A. Wynes - book - ' L e g i s l a t i v e , Executive and J u d i c i a l Powers i n A u s t r a l i a ' 2nd E d i t i o n - Sydney - 1956. 135 i b i d p.133. 136 o p . c i t . 137 F.P. Varcoe - book - 'The C o n s t i t u t i o n of Canada', Toronto - 1965.  65. or heads of l e g i s l a t i v e power."!  38  With a l l due respect  to the learned author t h i s statement shows a f a i l u r e to comprehend the b a s i c concept of the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t . W h i l s t i t i s true that i t i s the vagueness i n c l a s s e s of subjects that causes overlapping, i t i s nevertheless the l e g i s l a t i o n that overlaps.  One i s not c o n s i d e r i n g i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions i n t h i s area whether S.92(16) and S.91(27) f o r example, overlap each o t h e r  1 3 9  but whether a  s t a t u t e v a l i d under f e d e r a l power and a s t a t u t e v a l i d under p r o v i n c i a l power are able to stand together.  I n t h i s sphere  there are two d i s t i n c t questions: F i r s t l y whether the p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e comes w i t h i n a S.92 power and assuming that i t does whether i t a l s o comes w i t h i n S.91.  I f i t does  come w i t h i n S.91 no question of paramountey can a r i s e as the f e d e r a l parliament has e x c l u s i v e power to deal w i t h S.91 matters.  I f i t does not so f a l l w i t h i n S.91 and a  f e d e r a l s t a t u t e purports to deal w i t h the same act or thing 138 i b i d  p.43.  139 As a side comment i t should be n o t i c e d that the s t r u c t u r e of the B.N.A. A c t i s to deny concurrency of power and hence ex hypothesi the various heads of SS.92 and 91 cannot overlap. When paramountey questions a r i s e i t i s because the l a c k of complete separation has enabled statutes to f a l l w i t h i n the power of both l e g i s l a t u r e s under the double aspect d o c t r i n e .  66. or person then the second question i s posed v i z : - whether the two s t a t u t e s c l a s h w i t h the consequence that i f they do the f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l p r e v a i l .  Unfortunately  the Canadian courts have shown a tendency to confuse  the  question of v a l i d i t y w i t h the question of whether the l e g i s l a t i o n clashes. Thus i n A-G  f o r Ontario v. B a r f r i e d E n t e r p r i s e s L i m i t e d ^ O  Martland J . s a i d ^ l "In these circumstances  there i s a  d i r e c t c o n f l i c t between the two s t a t u t e s and ....  the l e g i s -  l a t i o n of the Canadian parliament v a l i d l y enacted must p r e v a i l , " however he then continued, "In my opinion therefore the l e g i s l a t i o n i n question i s u l t r a v i r e s the Ontario l e g i s lature." The second major t e s t f o r deciding whether or not the two s t a t u t e s meet, c o n f l i c t or c l a s h i s the 'Double Obedience Test'.  Under t h i s theory two s t a t u t e s do not c o n f l i c t  unless i t i s impossible to comply w i t h both at the same time.  This view was  taken by Judson J . i n d e l i v e r i n g the  m a j o r i t y judgment i n 0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g ^ thus 1  i s no c o n f l i c t  142 o p . c i t . p.811.  "There  Both p r o v i s i o n s can l i v e together  140 0-963] S.C.R. 570. 141 i b i d p.583.  2  and  67. operate c o n c u r r e n t l y . "  Again i n Smith v. The Queenl43  Maitland J . h e l d , " i t may happen that some acts might be punishable under both p r o v i s i o n s and i t i s i n t h i s sense that these p r o v i s i o n s overlap.  However even i n such cases  there i s no c o n f l i c t i n the sense that compliance w i t h one law involves breach of the other.  I t would appear therefore  that they can operate concurrently." This t e s t was adopted i n Fawcett v. A-G  for 0ntariol44  and had p r e v i o u s l y been suggested by Roach J.A. i n R. v. Pee Kay Smallwares L i m i ted.145 Laskin  i s on the cases  undoubtedly c o r r e c t when he t a l k s i n terms of the modern trend being towards the complementary approach and i t i s a l s143 o v aD-96(0 l i d to pS.C.R. o i n t out does!46 that under the 776 asat he 800. 144 i b i d p.583.  145 0-9471 O.R.  1019.  146 B. Laskin - o p . c i t throughout parts 3 & 4 of Chapter I I I and e s p e c i a l l y at page 140 the learned author t r e a t s the terms 'paramountcy' and'complementarity as being opposite to one another and thus t a l k s of a 'recession from paramountcy' to express the idea of double obedience r e p l a c i n g the cover the f i e l d t e s t . This use of the term 'paramountcy' ignores the f a c t that there i s no dispute that where v a l i d f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n c l a s h the former w i l l p r e v a i l . The area of d i f f i c u l t y i s i n determining when the statutes do c l a s h . S t r i c t u sensu there i s no r e t r e a t from 'paramountcy' only a change from one t e s t of whether l e g i s l a t i o n clashes to another. To be f a i r however i t i s true that under the double obedience t e s t there w i l l be fewer cases of c o n f l i c t than where the cover the f i e l d t e s t i s a p p l i e d and to that extent L a s k i n i s c o r r e c t i n regarding the adoption of the t e s t as marking a r e c e s s i o n i n the amount of use of the paramountcy d o c t r i n e . 1  (J  68. complementary  theory or double obedience t e s t there w i l l be  cases of double sanction because of the discrepancy between the  p e n a l t i e s of the two A c t s .  However i t may be that i n  such cases use would be made of the idea expressed i n the Fawcett Casein? that there w i l l be considered to be a c o n f l i c t where the r e s u l t s of applying the two statutes would be different.  I f so the 'double obedience' t e s t would be modi-  f i e d i n t o an ' i d e n t i c a l r e s u l t ' t e s t which would, as L a s k i n observes,  1 4 8  Sparling.  1 4 9  be d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e w i t h 0'Grady v.  As both t e s t s then have the weight of j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y behind them the question i s immediately posed as to which one should be adopted. the  I t i s suggested that as a matter of  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the v a l i d i t y of the statutes the  'double obedience t e s t ' should be a p p l i e d . reasons f o r t h i s ;  There are three  f i r s t l y the more recent a u t h o r i t i e s such as  0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g ; Fawcett's Case; B a r f r i e d ' s Case; and Smith v. The Q u e e n  150  are i n favour of the idea of dual  147 o p . c i t . 148 o p . c i t . p.142. 149 o p . c i t . - i t would a l s o be contrary to the B a r f r i e d Case p r i n c i p l e discussed e a r l i e r . 150 a l l o p . c i t .  69.  obedience.  Secondly where a judge f i n d s that a p r o v i n c i a l  s t a t u t e has a c l o s e r nexus w i t h a S.92 power than w i t h an o v e r r i d i n g S.91 power he has made an e v a l u a t i v e judgment i n favour of the v a l i d i t y of the P r o v i n c i a l Act and he i s u n l i k e l y to r e t r e a t from that assessment to say that although the Act i s v a l i d i t has no e f f e c t because of a c o n f l i c t w i t h f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n under the head of power that he has j u s t considered not to override the p r o v i n c i a l power. Indeed most of the cases c i t e d by Varcoe-^l i n respect of the overlapping d o c t r i n e r e a l l y turn on the question of whether the p r o v i n c i a l Act was rendered u l t r a v i r e s by an o v e r r i d i n g S.91 enumerated power.  F i n a l l y as pointed out  p r e v i o u s l y the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t involves three evaluative judgments v i z : - what i s the f i e l d , i s the f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n intended to be exhaustive of that f i e l d and has the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n entered on that f i e l d .  On the other hand  the double obedience t e s t ' involves u s u a l l y none and i n the B a r f r i e d s i t u a t i o n only one such judgment.  As the o r i g i n a l  151 Varcoe o p . c i t . pp. 59 to 66 e.g.- Johanneson v. West St. Paul D-952] 1 S.C.R. 292; C.P.R. v. P a r i s h of Notre Dame de Bonsecours 0-8993 A.C. 367; Madden v. Nelson & F o r t Shepperd Railway Q89$FJ A.C. 625; Toronto v. B e l l Telephone Co. Q.90^3 A.C. 52; A-G f o r Ontario v. Winner Q.954~l A.C. 542; John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton [19133 A j C . 330; Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King Q921J 2 A.C. 91, and A-G for Manitoba v. A-G f o r Canada o p . c i t .  70. aim of the t e s t s i s to provide a s o l u t i o n to the e v a l u a t i o n question ( i . e . do the statutes clash?) i t i s s c a r c e l y l o g i c a l to s u b s t i t u t e three evaluations f o r one.1^2 On the other hand i t would be naive to suggest that the double obedience t e s t does not have problems i n a p p l i c a t i o n . Three major d i f f i c u l t i e s  loom besides that of the  of the double penalty mentioned e a r l i e r .  infliction  Thus there i s the  case of the permissive f e d e r a l law and a p r o h i b i t o r y prov i n c i a l law.  Both statutes can be obeyed but i t seems to do  v i o l e n c e to the idea of a paramount f e d e r a l law f o r as a p r a c t i c a l matter i t w i l l be the p r o v i n c i a l enactment that w i l l be obeyed.  Secondly there i s the case of a f e d e r a l  law p e r m i t t i n g an act to be done subject to c e r t a i n r e q u i s i t e s and a p r o v i n c i a l law p r o h i b i t i n g i t completely.  The  third  s i t u a t i o n i s where the f e d e r a l law permits an act to be done subject to c e r t a i n r e q u i s i t e s and a p r o v i n c i a l law permits 152 The doctrine of 'cover the f i e l d ' i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e f o r A u s t r a l i a w i t h i t s large area of concurrent powers of the Commonwealth and the States but even so the 'double obedience t e s t ' has not been e n t i r e l y abandoned. The t e s t i s u s u a l l y a p p l i e d before the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t i . e : - i f the statutes are incapable of double obedience there i s 'inconsistency' while i f they are so capable they may s t i l l be i n c o n s i s t e n t i f the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t i s not s a t i s f i e d ; v i d e S w i f t A u s t r a l i a n Co. P t y . L t d . v. Boyd Parkinson (1962) 108 C.L.R. 189 at 207, and C o l l i n s v. Charles M a r s h a l l P t y . L t d . (1955) 92 C.L.R. 529 at 547 c i t e d by Lane - book - o p . c i t . p.238.  71. the same a c t subject to some other r e q u i s i t e s . I  5 3  The r e a l i s a t i o n that the e v a l u a t i v e judgment of nexus provides the answers to the questions posed i n the method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , permits the doctrines of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e s p e c i a l l y those of s e v e r a b i l i t y and paramountey to be viewed i n t h e i r true r o l e . i s recognised  When t h i s e v a l u a t i v e judgment  i t only remains to s e l e c t the f a c t o r s that are  l i k e l y to guide the court's actions i n order f o r some degree of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y to be a t t a i n e d i n the quagmire of c o n s t i t u tional interpretation. These f a c t o r s w i l l be l a r g e l y dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r heads of matters i n S.91 and S.92 that are being  considered.  I t i s proposed therefore to use the c r i m i n a l law power as an example and to consider some of the f a c t o r s that guide the courts i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that power. 153 I n A u s t r a l i a a l l three of these examples have been held to be cases of inconsistency vide P.H. Lane - book o p . c i t . and the cases c i t e d t h e r e i n a t pages 229 and 230. The answer to the f i r s t s i t u a t i o n i n Canada would appear to be that there i s no c o n f l i c t vide A-G Ontario v. B a r f r i e d Enterprises Limited op.cit.  III. The  FACTORS IN INTERPRETING THE CRIMINAL LAW POWER so c a l l e d ' c r i m i n a l law power' i s contained i n  S.91(27) of the B.N.A. A c t which provides that "the  exclusive  L e g i s l a t i v e A u t h o r i t y of the Parliament of Canada extends to a l l matters coming w i t h i n the Classes of Subjects next h e r e i n a f t e r enumerated; that i s to say  (27) The  C r i m i n a l Law, except the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Courts of C r i m i n a l J u r i s d i c t i o n , but i n c l u d i n g the Procedure i n C r i m i n a l Matters."  Now the very existence of such a c l a s s of matters  presupposes something d i s t i n c t i v e about the c r i m i n a l law, i . e : there i s some area of a c t i v i t y that by i t s very nature f a l l s w i t h i n the c r i m i n a l law.  However under c l a s s i c a l  common law theory t h i s i s simply not f a c t u a l l y accurate. "Crimes" have been defined as "acts or d e f a u l t s which tended to the p r e j u d i c e of the community and were forbidden by law on pain of punishment i n f l i c t e d a t the s u i t of the Crown."  1  I t has thus been t r u l y s a i d that i t would be p o s s i b l e to end crime immediately merely be enacting that every a c t or d e f a u l t which i s now punishable a t the s u i t of the Crown should no longer be so. I t i s r e a d i l y apparent that on t h i s theory i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r the Dominion parliament to acquire 1 per P.G. Osborn 'A Concise Law D i c t i o n a r y ' 4 t h E d i t i o n 1954 p.108.  73. enormous j u r i s d i c t i o n simply by tacking a penalty a t the s u i t of the Crown onto a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n or d e f a u l t thereby c o n s t i t u t i n g such a c t i o n or d e f a u l t , a crime and the A c t one dealing w i t h c r i m i n a l law. I t was no doubt the r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s lack of i n t r i n s i c l i m i t s to the power that prompted Viscount Haldane to l a y down h i s confined view of the scope of ' c r i m i n a l law' i n the Board of Commerce Case where he r e f e r r e d to S.92(27) 2  as "enabling  the Dominion Parliament to exercise e x c l u s i v e  l e g i s l a t i v e power where the subject matter i s one which by i t s very nature belongs to the domain of c r i m i n a l j u r i s p r u dence."  Such a view derived support from the existence of  S.92(15)^ which provides, " I n each Province  the L e g i s l a t u r e  may e x c l u s i v e l y make Laws i n r e l a t i o n to Matters coming w i t h i n the Classes of Subject next h e r e i n a f t e r enumerated; that i s to say:  (15) The Imposition  of Punishment by  F i n e , Penalty or Imprisonment f o r enforcing any Law of the Province made i n r e l a t i o n to any Matter coming w i t h i n any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated i n t h i s S e c t i o n . " Nevertheless the learned law l o r d was l a y i n g down an idea e s s e n t i a l l y f o r e i g n to E n g l i s h jurisprudence where often  2 [19223 A.C. 191. 3 of the B.N .A. A c t .  74. the same a c t i o n i s both a t o r t and a crime e.g:- the s t e a l i n g of another person's goods or the p h y s i c a l s t r i k i n g of another person.  This was pointed out by Lord A t k i n i n  P.A.T.A. v. A-G f o r Canada thus:- " C r i m i n a l Law connotes 4  only the q u a l i t y of such acts or omissions as are p r o h i b i t e d under appropriate penal p r o v i s i o n s by a u t h o r i t y of the State.  The c r i m i n a l q u a l i t y of an a c t cannot be discerned  by i n t u i t i o n ; nor can i t be discovered by reference to any standard but one: I s the a c t p r o h i b i t e d w i t h penal consequences?  M o r a l i t y and c r i m i n a l i t y are f a r from co-extensive;  nor i s the sphere of c r i m i n a l i t y n e c e s s a r i l y p a r t of a more extensive f i e l d covered by m o r a l i t y  unless the moral  code n e c e s s a r i l y disapproves of a l l acts p r o h i b i t e d by the State, i n which case the argument moves i n a c i r c l e . "  On  the a u t h o r i t y of t h i s case together w i t h A-G f o r Ontario v. Hamilton S t r e e t R a i l w a y ;  5  A-G f o r B r i t i s h Columbia v.  A-G f o r Canada;^ and Lord's Day A l l i a n c e v. A-G f o r B r i t i s h Columbia^ the Haldane confined concept of c r i m i n a l law i s now to be regarded as r e j e c t e d . 4 o p . c i t . a t p.324.  5 0-903] A.C. 324. 6 Reference r e S.498A of the C r i m i n a l Code Case 0-937) A.C. 368. 7 0-959] S.C.R. 497.  75. With the r e j e c t i o n of t h i s concept the only l i m i t on the c r i m i n a l law power was  the n e c e s s i t y f o r a penalty at the  i n s t i g a t i o n of the State f o r disobedience.  However the  courts have expressly denied that the mere i m p o s i t i o n of a penalty f o r f a i l u r e to comply w i t h a s t a t u t o r y enactment renders that enactment c r i m i n a l law e i t h e r from the f e d e r a l p o s i t i o n ^ or from that of the P r o v i n c e s .  9  Hence the courts have been faced w i t h making an e v a l u a t i v e judgment as to whether an impugned s t a t u t e has a s u f f i c i e n t nexus to a head of power which head of power has no l i m i t s or d e f i n i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a .  intrinsic  I t i s t h i s lack of osten-  s i b l e l i m i t s that makes the c r i m i n a l law power so u s e f u l as an example of a f a c t o r i a l approach to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r i t e f f e c t i v e l y denies to the court a c l o s e r e l i a n c e on a p r i o r i deductive reasoning.  This i s  not to say that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c r i m i n a l law power i s i n f a c t more e v a l u a t i v e than the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of other parts of sections 91 and 92 but only that i t i s more r e a d i l y apparent i n the case of c r i m i n a l law that the courts are being e v a l u a t i v e or s e l e c t i v e and not  deductive.  8 Toronto E l e c t r i c Commissioners v. Snider o p . c i t . see a l s o A-G Ont. v. R e c i p r o c a l Insurers L t d . o p . c i t . 9 0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g o p . c i t .  76. The broad general categories which a c t as the f a c t o r s that w i l l lead the court to a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n on a question i n v o l v i n g S.91(27) are the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the impugned Act, i t s o v e r a l l purpose effect.  and i t s d i r e c t and immediate  By c o n s t r u c t i o n of the s t a t u t e i s meant the imposi-  t i o n of p e n a l t i e s , the number of sections without such sanctions and the manner of expression  of the s t a t u t e .  W h i l s t i t i s true that the mere f a c t that an A c t imposes p e n a l t i e s does not make i t f a l l w i t h i n S.91(27) e i t h e r from a f e d e r a l or a p r o v i n c i a l aspect, no f e d e r a l s t a t u t e that d i d not have some form of immediate sanction would f a l l i n s i d e the subsection's  ambit.  Conversely a p r o v i n c i a l  Act containing no p e n a l t i e s w i l l not be held u l t r a v i r e s as being on c r i m i n a l law. As a c o r o l l a r y to t h i s the number of clauses or sections w i t h sanctions attached an inducement to c a t e g o r i s a t i o n .  thereto w i l l be  Thus the more clauses  w i t h sanctions there are, the more l i k e l y the s t a t u t e i s to be held to be c r i m i n a l law. Furthermore the manner of expression  of the s t a t u t e i s a guide.  Where the A c t e x h i b i t s  the idea of p r o h i b i t i n g a c e r t a i n a c t i o n i t i s more l i k e l y to be held to be c r i m i n a l law than  otherwise.  This f a c t o r i s however very weak a t i t s best as there are numerous examples of p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n that ex f a c i e are c r i m i n a l statutes and s e v e r a l instances of  77. ' r e g u l a t i o n ' by means of an absolute p r o h i b i t i o n subject to exceptions that have been upheld as w i t h i n S . 9 1 ( 2 7 ) . ^ The d i s t i n c t i o n between d i r e c t and immediate e f f e c t and o v e r a l l purpose i s one between the r e s u l t s of an a c t i o n and the aims thereof.  Lord Sumner i n the P r o v i n c i a l Sale of  Shares Case^l declared that i n determining the nature and character of l e g i s l a t i o n one examines the e f f e c t thereof and not i t s purpose.  These words were adopted by Estey J . i n  h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment i n Johnson v. A-G f o r Alberta-*-  2  where he h e l d that the A l b e r t a S l o t Machine A c t , 1942 was v a l and by Cartwright J . i n A-G f o r Canada v. Readers' Digest Assoc.(Canada) Ltd.13  Such an a t t i t u d e represents a f a i l u r e  to appreciate the true nature of the d e c i s i o n being given. I t i s not a p r i o r i but i s e v a l u a t i v e . There i s not one s i n g l e true nature and character of the l e g i s l a t i o n as the question of true nature and character i s a value judgment and hence there can be many d i f f e r e n t opinions each one of which could lead to a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t i n terms of whether 10 See e.g:- Re Race Tracks and B e t t i n g (1921)49 O.L.R. 387 and 0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g o p . c i t . 11 A-G f o r Manitoba v. A-G f o r Canada 0-929^ A.C. 260 a t 268. 12 p.954] S.C.R. 127 a t p. 142. 13 o p . c i t . p.793.  78. the l e g i s l a t i o n f a l l s under S.91  or S.92.  14  Once t h i s i s  grasped i t becomes absurd to deny to the court the use  of  any a i d to a r r i v i n g a t an informed opinion as to whether the s t a t u t e has a s u f f i c i e n t nexus to i t s head of power. Accordingly  i f purpose of the s t a t u t e i s a help i n reaching  such an opinion i t should be u t i l i s e d .  Moreover the P r i v y  C o u n c i l and Canadian courts have always looked to s t a t u t o r y purpose and i t has been a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n numerous cases. For example i n A-G Maugham L.C. said  1 6  "The  for A l b e r t a v. A-G  for Canada  next step i n a case of d i f f i c u l t y w i l l be to  s i m i l a r matter may  Lymburn v. M a y l a n d  , A closely  a l s o c a l l f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , namely, the  object or purpose of the Act i n question." 17  Again i n  the P r i v y Council i n upholding the  A l b e r t a S e c u r i t y Frauds Prevention Act (1930) was 1 8  Lord  i n d e l i v e r i n g the advice of the P r i v y Council  examine the e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n .....  opinion:  15  of the  "There i s no reason to doubt that the  14 Restated - the d e c i s i o n i s not as between r i g h t and wrong but between one opinion and another. 15 A l b e r t a Bank Taxation Case o p . c i t . 16 i b i d p.130. 17 [1932]  A.C.  18 i b i d p.324.  318.  79. MAIN OBJECT Act i s  19  sought to be secured i n t h i s p a r t of the "  S i m i l a r l y Lord Macnaghten i n A-G Manitoba  v. Manitoba Licence Holder's A s s o c i a t i o n "In l e g i s l a t i n g f o r the suppression  z u  declar ed21  of the l i q u o r t r a f f i c  the object i n view i s the abatement or. prevention of a l o c a l e v i l r a t h e r than the r e g u l a t i o n of property and c i v i l rights."  Yet another example i s the dictum of Locke J . i n 99  Johnson v. A-G A l b e r t a  - " i n essence the A c t was d i r e c t e d  against gambling ..... In 1935 when the S l o t Machine A c t was re-enacted i t s purpose was made even more abundantly clear  and Cartwright J . i n the same case stated "the  conclusion appears to me to be inescapable object of the A c t i s  " 3 2  that the main  These statements s e l e c t e d  at random show that the courts have been concerned w i t h purpose and have not a p p l i e d Lord Sumner's dictum. Furthermore there are two a d d i t i o n a l reasons why purpose i s a matter that should guide the court's d e c i s i o n . In the f i r s t place one of the c a r d i n a l r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y 19 i t a l i c s mine - author.  20 0-902] A.C. 73. 21 i b i d p.79. 22 o p . c i t . p.153. 23 i b i d p.164.  80. i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the M i s c h i e f Rule.  Indeed as Professor  Friedmann has pointed out24 "The mischief r u l e expresses both the o l d e s t  2 5 a n  interpretation."  d the most modern approach to statutory-  Now the mischief r u l e r e q u i r e s that one  should a s c e r t a i n what was the mischief or e v i l or wrong that parliament was attempting to remedy i n order to i n t e r p r e t the A c t i . e : - i t r e q u i r e s the a s c e r t a i n i n g of the object or aim or purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n .  Thus Lord Sumner's  approach runs contrary to t h i s general method of i n t e r p r e tation . Secondly there i s the case of 'colourable l e g i s l a t i o n ' . I t i s c l e a r that legislation that i s i n form w i t h i n power but which i s i n a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s w i l l not be upheld but w i l l be declared u l t r a v i r e s as being a mere sham, a pretence, a colourable d e v i c e .  2 6  Thus the  l e g i s l a t u r e cannot do i n d i r e c t l y what i t i s precluded from doing d i r e c t l y .  2 7  A l l t h i s concept expresses  i s the idea  24 W. Friedmann - A r t i c l e - 'Statute Law and I t s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277 a t 1279. 25 I t i s derived from Heydon's Case i n 1584. 26 vide Lord A t k i n i n Ladore v. Bennett Cl939] 468 a t 482.  A.C.  27 vide Madden v. Nelson & F o r t Shepperd Railway o p . c i t . p.627-8.  81. that an u l t r a v i r e s purpose cannot be achieved tiously.  surrepti-  Hence i t i s c l e a r that t h i s l i n e of a u t h o r i t y i s  a l s o contrary to Lord Sumner's p r o p o s i t i o n . I f i t i s recognized that purpose or object of the Act i n question i s a f a c t o r guiding the courts i n t h e i r e v a l u a t i v e judgment and that evidence i s able to be introduced i n respect of such object or purpose,28 the next step i s to a s c e r t a i n what i s the type of object or purpose that w i l l tend to make the courts lean towards deciding the e v a l u a t i v e question i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. Case^  9  Rand J . i n the Margarine  t a l k e d - ^ of "some e v i l or i n j u r i o u s or undesirable  e f f e c t upon the p u b l i c against which the law i s d i r e c t e d " and again i n Johnson v. A-G community e v i l " . was  f o r A l b e r t a ^ of a " p u b l i c or 1  In R u s s e l l v. The Queen^2 the reference  to laws "designed f o r the promotion of p u b l i c order,  s a f e t y or morals" while Cartwright J . i n Johnson v.  A-G  for A l b e r t a - ^ spoke of "the i n t e r e s t s of p u b l i c m o r a l i t y " . 28 See supra Section I I & g e n e r a l l y P.H. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' o p . c i t . 29 o p . c i t . 30 i b i d  p.49.  31 o p . c i t . p.137. 32 o p . c i t . p.839 33 o p . c i t . p.164.  Lane 'Facts and  82. There are numerous f u r t h e r examples that could be  given.  3 4  The a c t u a l community i n t e r e s t s supported i n these cases were:c o n t r o l of gambling by f o r b i d d i n g s l o t m a c h i n e s , of d a i r y p r o d u c t s ,  36  35  adulteration  a d u l t e r a t i o n of meat p r o d u c t s .  37  I t i s c l e a r from these cases that the r e l e v a n t purpose i s the safeguarding of p u b l i c m o r a l i t y , the ensuring of p u b l i c safety or the preventing of a community e v i l . applying the purpose of a s t a t u t e as a f a c t o r i n the  In deter-  mination of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y i t i s important to keep the e n t i t y that passed the Act f i r m l y i n mind as  the  strength of purpose v a r i e s according to whether i t i s a f e d e r a l or p r o v i n c i a l Act that i s being considered. I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that a f e d e r a l Act the purpose of which i s not to safeguard p u b l i c morals, ensure p u b l i c s a f e t y or prevent a community e v i l w i l l be held to be outside S.91(27).  Thus i n the Margarine C a s e  of a b e n e f i t to p u b l i c h e a l t h proved f a t a l .  38  the absence  Again the  34 e.g:- Trueman J.A. i n R. v. P e r f e c t i o n Creameries L t d . Cl93sQ 2 W.W.R. 139 - 'public e v i l ' and. Macdonald J.A. i n Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee [1933] 4 D.L.R. 501 - ' p u b l i c injury'. 35 Johnson's Case o p . c i t . 36 R. v. P e r f e c t i o n Creameries L t d . o p . c i t . 37 Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee o p . c i t . 38 o p . c i t .  83. c o u r t s c o u l d n o t f i n d an a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t i n S n i d e r ' s Case  39  or i n  40 the R e c i p r o c a l I n s u r e r ' s Case  and the l e g i s l a t i o n was s t r u c k down.  Purpose has a l s o been used to uphold  federal legislation.  v . P e r f e c t i o n Creameries L t d . ^ and Standard l e g i s l a t i o n was upheld by p r e v e n t i n g  Thus i n R.  Sausage Co. v . L e e ^ the  as being aimed a t the p r o t e c t i o n o f p u b l i c h e a l t h  the a d u l t e r a t i o n o f f o o d .  The purpose f a c t o r i s thus  s t r o n g when used i n r e l a t i o n t o f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n e i t h e r n e g a t i v e l y or  positively. From a p r o v i n c i a l s t a n d p o i n t purpose i s c o n s i d e r a b l y weaker as a  determining  factor.  There have been d e c i s i o n s s t r i k i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h a ' c r i m i n a l law  1  purpose.  down p r o v i n c i a l  Thus f o r example i n A-G f o r  43 O n t a r i o v . Koynok.  l e g i s l a t i o n f o r preventing  m a t t e r was h e l d t o be u l t r a v i r e s the p r o v i n c e .  the p u b l i c a t i o n o f obscene 44  On the o t h e r hand the c o u r t s  39  op.cit.  40  op.cit.  41  op.cit.  42  op.cit.  43  [1941] 1 D.L.R. 548.  44  I n Johnson v . A-G A l b e r t a , o p . c i t . , t h r e e o f seven Judges o f the  Supreme Court o f Canada (Kerwin, vincial  Taschereau and E s t e y J J . ) h e l d  pro-  l e g i s l a t i o n i n h i b i t i n g gambling by p r o h i b i t i n g s l o t machines  ultra vires.  Rand J . h e l d the l e g i s l a t i o n m e r e l y i n o p e r a t i v e , b u t t h e r e  are i n d i c a t i o n s i n h i s judgment t h a t he might have been prepared i t u l t r a v i r e s the p r o v i n c e .  to f i n d  84. have tended to lean i n favour of p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n that prima f a c i e was passed f o r an inappropriate purpose where i t has been dealing w i t h an a c t i v i t y that i n the absence of the i m p o s i t i o n of p e n a l t i e s would f a l l w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l ambit.  In these cases the courts have c h a r a c t e r i s e d  the l e g i s l a t i o n as being f o r the purpose of governing or r e g u l a t i n g the a c t i v i t y and not as being f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of p u b l i c m o r a l i t y or the ensuring of p u b l i c s a f e t y or the preventing of a community e v i l .  Thus i n P,.E.I, v. E g a n  45  a p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e provided for the suspension of a motor d r i v e r ' s l i c e n c e where the holder drove a v e h i c l e w h i l s t intoxicated.  A f t e r three offences the l i c e n c e e was  h i b i t e d from holding such a l i c e n c e .  pro-  The Supreme Court of  Canada held that the Province had the power to p r e s c r i b e the conditions  and manner of use of the highway and  included a l i c e n s i n g system.  this  I t then upheld the l e g i s l a t i o n  holding that i t s purpose and e f f e c t was  to regulate and govern  the conditions under which l i c e n c e s were granted, suspended or f o r f e i t e d .  Again i n 0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g ^ a Manitoba 6  Act p r o v i d i n g f o r d r i v i n g without due care and a t t e n t i o n to be an offence was upheld as being l e g i s l a t i o n for the purpose 45  0-94fJ S.C.R. 396.  46 o p . c i t .  85. or object of the r e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l of t r a f f i c on the highways.  S i m i l a r l y i n Reference r e S.92(4) of the V e h i c l e s  Act 1957 Saskatchewan^  a  p r o v i n c i a l statute requiring a  person to submit to having a sample of h i s breath taken i f he was suspected of d r i v i n g under the i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l was upheld as being f o r the purpose of administering the highways.  Probably  the locus c l a s s i c u s of t h i s kind of  approach i s M i l l a r v. The Queen^8  i  n  that case a l i c e n c e  was granted to M i l l a r to c a r r y on a dance h a l l .  The l i c e n c e  was subject to a c o n d i t i o n that the holder should not permit gambling on the premises and was issued pursuant to a municipal by law. Gambling was conducted on M i l l a r ' s premises without h i s knowledge and he was prosecuted f o r breaking the by law. On appeal i t was argued that the by law was u l t r a v i r e s as i t was d e a l i n g w i t h c r i m i n a l law. The Manitoba Court of Appeal h e l d that the by law was i n t r a vires.  I n the course of h i s judgment Beaubien J.A. stated:49  "The t e s t (of whether the Act i s i n r e l a t i o n to c r i m i n a l law) to be a p p l i e d i t seems to me i s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d i n R. v. 47 D-9583 S.C.R. 608. 48  C D 1954  1  D.L.R. 148.  49 i b i d a t pages 161 & 162.  86. Watson .^  S t r e e t J . , whose d i s s e n t i n g judgment was upheld  on appeal s a i d :  5 1  "Is i t an Act c o n s t i t u t i n g a new crime f o r  the purpose of punishing that crime i n the i n t e r e s t of p u b l i c morality?  Or i s i t an Act f o r the r e g u l a t i o n of the dealings  and r i g h t s of cheese makers and t h e i r patrons w i t h punishments imposed f o r the b e n e f i t of the former?  I f i t i s found to come  under the former head, I think i t i s bad as d e a l i n g w i t h c r i m i n a l law; i f under the l a t t e r I think i t i s good as an e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t conferred on the Province by the 92nd s e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h North America Act." of Jones v. V a n c o u v e r  52  I n the case  a s e c t i o n of a by law of the c i t y  provided that "no keeper of a b i l l i a r d and pool room s h a l l permit or allow any person to play or have part i n any game i n any b i l l i a r d , pool or b a g a t e l l e table r e s u l t of which there i s any wager or take  upon the was by a  unanimous judgment of the B r i t i s h Columbia Court:of Appeal held i n t r a v i r e s of the powers of the c i t y to enact. Macdonald C.J.A. held that "the p r o h i b i t o n of b e t t i n g (contained i n the section) was c l e a r l y aimed a t r e g u l a t i o n and therefore i n t r a v i r e s of the c o u n c i l " . 50 (1890) 17 O.A.R. 221. 51 17 O.A.R. 58 a t 64. 52 (1920) 51 D.L.R. 320.  G a l l i h e r J.A.  87. expressed the same view and M c P h i l l i p s J.A. held that the by-law was i n the subject matter of " r e g u l a t i n g and governing". M  In my view the sole object of the by-law i s to r e g u l a t e and govern the mode of operation of a l i c e n s e d dance h a l l , namely, a p a r t i c u l a r trade or business c a r r i e d on i n the C i t y of Winnipeg.  I t i s not l e g i s l a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to  c r i m i n a l law and that being so i t i s w i t h i n the competence of the c i t y c o u n c i l i n the sphere of 'Municipal I n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Province', 'Property & C i v i l Rights i n the Province' and 'Generally a l l matters of a merely l o c a l or p r i v a t e Nature i n the Province' S-SS (8),(13) and (16) of S.92 of the B.N.A. A c t . " W h i l s t there are cases which are d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e w i t h t h i s j u d i c i a l tendency as they have s t r u c k down l e g i s l a t i o n that could have been regarded as being f o r a r e g u l a t o r y or governing purpose they have u s u a l l y been decided on the b a s i s that the purpose of the s t a t u t e s was to augment the c r i m i n a l code.53 A l l these cases w h i l s t r e v e a l i n g the inadequacies and indeterminacies of the 'purpose f a c t o r ' do not negate 53 Vide S t . Leonard v. Fournier (1956) 115 Can. C.C. 366 and H u r r e l l v. Montreal fl.963j Que.P.R. 89 where the l e g i s l a t i o n was h e l d u l t r a v i r e s because i t s e f f e c t was to supplement the Code.  88. its use.  5 4  I n f a c t they support i t f o r i t i s apparent that  had the court i n P.E.I, v. E g a n ;  55  O'Grady v. S p a r l i n g ;  5 6  Reference Re S.92(4) of the Vehicles A c t ; ^ M i l l a r v. The 5  Queen;  58  R. v. W a t s o n  59  or Jones v. V a n c o u v e r  60  found that  the purpose of the Act was the p r o t e c t i o n of p u b l i c morals, the ensuring of p u b l i c safety or the preventing of a community e v i l i t would have held the Act before i t to be unconstitutional.  6 1  54 Thus i n A-G Ont. v. Koynok o p . c i t . i t was stated a t p.551 "Although the Provinces have the power to impose punishment by f i n e , penalty or imprisonment f o r enforcing any law of the Province under S.92 that s e c t i o n does not include p u b l i c m o r a l i t y . Parliament alone can define crime and enumerate the acts which are to be p r o h i b i t e d and punished i n the i n t e r e s t s of p u b l i c m o r a l i t y . " See also Re Race Tracks & B e t t i n g (1921) 49 O.L.R. 339 per Middleton J . and R. v. Hayduk [1938] O.R. 653. 55 o p . c i t . 56 o p . c i t . 57 o p . c i t . 58 o p . c i t . 59 o p . c i t . 60 o p . c i t . 61 See a l s o Lieberman v. The Queen Q-963] S.C.R. 643 where a m u n i c i p a l by law c l o s i n g down bowling a l l e y s on Sundays was held not to be c r i m i n a l law as i t was not d i r e c t e d to preventing the profanation of the Sabbath and hence was not aimed a t the p r o t e c t i o n of p u b l i c morals. A l s o R. v. Nat B e l l Liquors L t d . 0-922] 2 A.C. 128. On the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems involved i n 'Sunday' l e g i s l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y see K.M. Lysyk - A r t i c l e " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Aspects of Sunday Observance Law": Lieberman v. The Queen" (1964) U.B.C .L.Rev. 59.  89. The major defect i n applying purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n as a f a c t o r i s i t s indeterminacy.  Is the purpose to be  ascertained s u b j e c t i v e or o b j e c t i v e ? The courts i n applying the M i s c h i e f Rule have always attempted to f i n d some object i v e purpose ( v i z : - the i n t e n t i o n of parliament) and have therefore excluded e x t r i n s i c evidence such as parliamentary speeches as going only to a s u b j e c t i v e purpose.  It is  suggested that i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the purpose being sought should be s u b j e c t i v e , i . e : the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n passing t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Act.  The  adoption of a s u b j e c t i v e approach does not mean the d i s r e garding of e f f e c t as a guide to purpose as i n most cases at l e a s t parliament w i l l have been able to foresee the e f f e c t s of i t s a c t i o n s and a c c o r d i n g l y can be taken to have wished those e f f e c t s to have occurred.  I t has e a r l i e r  been pointed out that i n the context of j u d i c i a l review where a purposive power i s being i n t e r p r e t e d evidence would be admissible to show what the most l i k e l y e f f e c t s of the l e g i s l a t i o n would be as an i n d i c a t i o n of parliamentary purpose or o b j e c t .  To t h i s extent then the separate f a c t o r s of  purpose and e f f e c t are l i n k e d .  When i t i s r e a l i z e d that  the e v i d e n t i a r y v e i l i s not inscrutable and that evidence  can  be adduced that w i l l tend to show a d e f i n i t e object or purpose i n passing the l e g i s l a t i o n ^ purpose w i l l assume a more s t a b l e  90. p o s i t i o n and be l e s s dependent on the values of the p a r t i c u l a r judges involved.  I t i s submitted therefore, f i r s t l y ,  that although purpose or object i s vague and indeterminate i t s existence and nature i s capable of being  ascertained  much more a c c u r a t e l y than a t present and secondly that i t i s u s e f u l today and a f o r t i o r i  i n the future as a f a c t o r ,  though not a conclusive f a c t o r i n guiding the court's d e c i s i o n as to nexus. Turning to the d i r e c t and immediate e f f e c t as a f a c t o r i n determining  the court's d e c i s i o n . Where the A c t i n question  i s d e a l i n g w i t h an a c t i o n that has p r e v i o u s l y been the subject of c r i m i n a l sanctions the courts w i l l be l i k e l y t o f i n d that i t i s d e a l i n g w i t h c r i m i n a l law even where the l e g i s l a t i o n i s l e g a l i s i n g rather than p r o s c r i b i n g .  The converse however  does not so apply so that an a c t p r e v i o u s l y untouched by the c r i m i n a l law may be d e a l t w i t h by i t . 6 2  The scope of the  c r i m i n a l law power can be viewed as r e s t i n g i n three The f i r s t of these could be designated  areas.  as c e n t r a l core  p r o h i b i t i o n s , the second as the c e n t r a l core a b o l i t i o n s and the t h i r d as the dynamic or developing  sphere.  By c e n t r a l  core p r o h i b i t i o n s i s meant those things that have t r a d i t i o n a l l y 62 See P.A.T.A. v. A-G Can, o p . c i t . and Toronto Railway v. The King [19171 A.C. 630.  91. been regarded as c r i m i n a l law i n the common law world (e.g: murder, burglary and robbery) and e s p e c i a l l y the actions proscribed  i n Canada i n the past.  By c e n t r a l core  a b o l i t i o n s i s meant the r e l a x i n g of the p r o h i b i t i o n s  of  actions contained i n the c e n t r a l core p r o h i b i t i o n s and  by  the dynamic or developing sphere i s meant the c r e a t i o n of new  offences.  Such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s i t s e l f dynamic as  matters contained i n the dynamic or developing sphere gradually f a l l i n t o the c e n t r a l core p r o h i b i t i o n s and i f they are then modified or relaxed they come i n s i d e the c e n t r a l core a b o l i t i o n s . The penumbra area of d o u b t ^ ±  s  then, the only area  where the scope of S.91(27) i s i n question i n r e l a t i o n to f e d e r a l statutes though because of the double aspect doctrine a l l three areas are opened up when the v a l i d i t y of p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n issue. In the f e d e r a l sphere i t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the immediate e f f e c t of the Act and i t s 63 For the idea of umbra and penumbra from which t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s drawn see H.L.A. Hart - A r t i c l e ' P o s i t i v i s m and the Separation of Law and Morals' 71 Harv.L.R. 593 and the r e b u t t a l thereof by L. F u l l e r A r t i c l e - ' P o s i t i v i s m and F i d e l i t y to Law' 71 Harv.L.R. 630.  92. purpose cannot be too tenuous.64  Thus i f an A c t has a  s u f f i c i e n t purpose f o r the court to lean towards i t s v a l i d i t y t h i s tendency w i l l be overcome i f the d i r e c t e f f e c t i s something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t w i t h only a tenuous connection w i t h the purpose.  Such a d o c t r i n e f l i e s i n the face of the maxim  of j u d i c i a l review that i t i s f o r the l e g i s l a t u r e to choose the means of c a r r y i n g out a grant of power and the courts should not " i n q u i r e whether more or l e s s d r a s t i c means could have been chosen by the l e g i s l a t u r e or whether the theories i n s p i r i n g the ..... measure ..... are sound or whether the measures taken by parliament are regarded by those  subjected  to them as e f f e c t i v e i n p r a c t i c e or whether some other means or method might have been chosen by the l e g i s l a t u r e i n c a r r y i n g out i t s object."65. However as Professor Lane has pointed out66 the court does i n q u i r e i n a question of power "whether the means 64 e.g:- I n Re Board of Commerce A c t [1922] 1 A.C. 191; O i l Chemical and Atomic Workers I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union L o c a l 16-601 v. Imperial O i l L t d . [L963] S.C.R. 584. Conversely i t i s a l s o c l e a r that had the court not decided i n Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen [1963] S.C.R. 651 that the e f f e c t c o n t r o l l e d the purpose the A c t would have been h e l d to be u l t r a v i r e s . 65 P.H. Lane - A r t i c l e - 'Facts i n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' o p . c i t . p.109. 66 i b i d p. 112.  93. chosen by the l e g i s l a t u r e are appropriate ( i n the sense of having an inherent tendency) to a r e l e v a n t end or subject matter f a i r l y w i t h i n power," and f a c t s are admissible as evidence of t h i s .  Thus i n I n Re Board of Commerce A c t  and the Combines & F a i r P r i c e s Act 191967 i t was attempted to j u s t i f y the Act under both the r e s i d u a r y f e d e r a l power and under the trade and commerce power.  The P r i v y C o u n c i l  held that the method chosen was so gross an i n f r a c t i o n of S.92(13) that the matter was i n ' p i t h and substance' not w i t h i n S.91(2).  I n t h i s area i t i s of l i t t l e importance  what the courts say they are doing and i n r e a l i t y they do look a t method or means i n making t h e i r e v a l u a t i v e judgment. A c l a s s i c a l example of the connection between the l e g a l e f f e c t and the purpose being too s t r a i n e d i s Mackay v. The Queen68 67 o p . c i t .  D- D  965 68 S.C.R. 798. - i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of trade and commerce power S.91(2) the courts have not been prepared to uphold a s t a t u t e the purpose of which was i n t r a v i r e s but the e f f e c t of which had too tenuous a connection w i t h that purpose. Thus Duff J . i n R. v. Eastern Terminal E l e v a t o r Co. D-925] S.C.R. 434 s a i d a t p.446, " I t i s undeniable that the one p r i n c i p a l object of t h i s Act i s to p r o t e c t the e x t e r n a l trade i n g r a i n and e s p e c i a l l y i n wheat.... I do not think i t i s f a i r l y d i s p u t a b l e . . . . , that the Dominion possesses l e g i s l a t i v e powers which would enable i t e f f e c t i v e l y . . . . . t o regulate t h i s branch of e x t e r n a l trade..... I t does not f o l l o w that i t i s w i t h i n the power of parliament to accomplish t h i s object by assuming as t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n does, the r e g u l a t i o n i n the provinces of p a r t i c u l a r occupations."  94. where i t was stated that had the court been unable to hold that the A c t d i d not include f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n signs i t would have held the P r o v i n c i a l A c t to be i n v a l i d even though i t s purpose was to preclude c e r t a i n uses of property, a matter c l e a r l y w i t h i n S.92, on the b a s i s that the e f f e c t would have been to encroach on an area where the Dominion had e x c l u s i v e power v i z : - the c o n t r o l of f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . The converse to the main p r o p o s i t i o n i s e q u a l l y true so that where the l e g a l e f f e c t i>s w i t h i n but the purpose i s outside power the l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n v a l i d as being colourable a t l e a s t from a f e d e r a l p o i n t of view. Case_69 h t  e  c  o  u  r  Thus i n the R e c i p r o c a l I n s u r e r s 1  t found that the l e g a l e f f e c t was to make the  s o l i c i t i n g or accepting of any insurance other than on behalf of a company r e g i s t e r e d under the Insurance Act, 1917 an i n d i c t a b l e offence.  Yet i t held the l e g i s l a t i o n i n v a l i d as  being f o r the purpose of g i v i n g compulsory force to the r e g u l a t i v e measure of the Insurance A c t .  A d i f f e r e n t answer  to a s i m i l a r type of l e g i s l a t i v e scheme was given i n A u s t r a l i a i n the F i r s t Uniform Tax Case? where the High Court h e l d 0  each of four Acts to be i n t r a v i r e s and ignored the general 69 R. v. R e c i p r o c a l Insurer's L t d . o p . c i t . 70 South A u s t r a l i a v. The Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373.  95. purpose and scheme of the l e g i s l a t i o n which was to t r a n s f e r e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of a l l income t a x a t i o n to the Commonwealth. In Canada the courts have taken a l e n i e n t view of p r o v i n c i a l cunning as both 0*Grady v. Sparling?-*- and Re V a l i d i t y of S.92(4) of the V e h i c l e s Act?2 could w i t h l i t t l e e f f o r t be regarded as l e g i s l a t i o n f o r u l t e r i o r  motives.73  In the sphere of d i r e c t e f f e c t both f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n can be p r e v e n t i v e . That i s both l e g i s l a t u r e s can pass s t a t u t e s designed to prevent the occurrence of crime.  Hence i n R. v. N e i 174 a federal Act providing for  preventive d e t e n t i o n of c r i m i n a l psychopaths was upheld. The p r o v i n c i a l power was asserted by Duff J . i n Bedard v. Dawson?^ i n the f o l l o w i n g manner:76 "The l e g i s l a t i o n 71 o p . c i t . 72 o p . c i t . 73 c / f . Reference Re A l b e r t a Statutes [ l 9 3 8 3 S.C.R. 100 and Reference r e S.16 of the S p e c i a l War Revenue ActCl9423s.C.R. 429.  D- 3  S.C.R. 605.  75 Q 9 2 3 ]  S.C.R. 681.  74  957  76 i b i d p.684 - again Locke J . i n Goodyear T i r e & Rubber Co. of Canada L t d . v. The Queen Q.956] S.C.R. 303 a t p.308 s a i d "The power to l e g i s l a t e i n r e l a t i o n to c r i m i n a l law i s not r e s t r i c t e d i n my o p i n i o n to d e f i n i n g offences and p r o v i d i n g p e n a l t i e s f o r t h e i r commission. The power of Parliament extends to l e g i s l a t i o n designed f o r the prevention of crime as w e l l as to punishing crime."  96.  impugned seems to be aimed a t suppressing c o n d i t i o n s c a l c u l a t e d to favour the development of crime.  This i s an  aspect of the subject i n which the Provinces seem f r e e to legislate.  I t h i n k the l e g i s l a t i o n i s n o t i n v a l i d . " I t  i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Duff J . didn't f a l l i n t o the error perpetrated by Estey J . i n h i s d i s s e n t i n Johnson v. A-G f o r A l b e r t a ? ? where the learned judge assumed tha t by h o l d i n g the l e g i s l a t i o n t o be preventive r a t h e r than punishing he had e f f e c t i v e l y removed i t from the scope of S.91(27).  Thus he s t a t e d  7 8  "The e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n  i s to prevent rather than to punish.  I t i s therefore  q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from that which i s c l a s s i f i e d as c r i m i n a l law under S.91(27)." P r o p e r l y viewed t h i s i s an area where the double aspect d o c t r i n e i s a p p l i c a b l e f o r i t would seem that both l e g i s l a t u r e s can l e g i s l a t e as to the prevention of crime from d i f f e r e n t sources of power. The p r i n c i p l e that the Province cannot r e l a x or supplement punishment provided by a f e d e r a l Act i s o f t quoted.?  9  Despite the firmness w i t h which t h i s r u l e i s enunciated 77 o p . c i t . 78 i b i d p. 143. 79. v i d e f o r example Re Morrison & Kingston Q938] O.R. 21; R. v. Stanley (1952)104 Can.C.C. 31 and Boyce v. The Queen (1959) 22 D.L.R. (2d) 553.  97. the courts have not paid much i n the way of obeisance to i t . Thus the combined e f f e c t of Green v. L i v e r m o r e Kennedy v. T o m l i n s o n  81  80  and  i s that a person charged under e i t h e r  a f e d e r a l or a p r o v i n c i a l Act can be committed to a mental h o s p i t a l under a p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e .  S i m i l a r l y the e f f e c t  of the p r o v i n c i a l A c t i n 0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g  8 2 w a s  to  supplement the c r i m i n a l code as was the ^effect of the statutes under consideration  i n P.E.I, v. E g a n  S.92(4) of the V e h i c l e s A c t . decisions  8 4  83  and Reference r e  i n the l i g h t of these  the v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i p l e can w e l l be doubted.  However i t would be premature to r e t i r e the concept e s p e c i a l l y w i t h regard to r e l a x a t i o n of a f e d e r a l l y imposed penalty as i n t h i s area i t seems c l e a r that a p r o v i n c i a l A c t that purported to d i r e c t l y lessen the burden would be down.  85  struck  Furthermore i t would a l s o appear to be good law that  80 0-940] O.R. 381. 81 (1959) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 273. 82 o p . c i t . 83 o p . c i t . 84 o p . c i t . 85 Even were i t to stand i t would be inoperative under the paramountey r u l e because i t would c o n f l i c t w i t h the fede r a l statute regardless of whether the 'double obedience' or the 'cover the f i e l d ' t e s t was a p p l i e d .  98. i f a province a c t u a l l y tacks on a supplementary penalty to a f e d e r a l offence as d i s t i n c t from c r e a t i n g a s i m i l a r offence and p r e s c r i b i n g a penalty f o r that offence the p r o v i n c i a l enactment would be u l t r a v i r e s .  Subject to these exceptions  the r u l e i s of l i t t l e help as an aspect of the f a c t o r of e f f e c t i n determining the court's d e c i s i o n . F i n a l l y there i s a more l i m i t e d f a c t o r than c o n s t r u c t i o n , purpose and e f f e c t which w i l l a s s i s t a court i n deciding the question as to nexus.  This i s the r u l e that where there are  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a s t a t u t e one of which w i l l lead to i t s being u l t r a v i r e s and the other to i t s being i n t r a v i r e s the l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l be adopted.  In any  case i n v o l v i n g a s t a t u t e the f i r s t question i s always whether the f a c t s f a l l w i t h i n the ambit of that s t a t u t e and i t i s only when t h i s has been decided i n the a f f i r m a t i v e that any question as to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y or otherwise of the s t a t u t e can be r a i s e d .  Whilst this proposition i s  easy to formulate i n the a b s t r a c t there i s i n p r a c t i c e a feedback between the two questions so that where a court f i n d s i t s e l f i n the p o s i t i o n of wanting to h o l d the s t a t u t e to be u l t r a v i r e s by reason of i t s applying to a p a r t i c u l a r set  of f a c t s i t w i l l i f p o s s i b l e support the l e g i s l a t i o n  by holding that the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s are not covered by the  99. statute.  Thus i n Mackay v. The Queen ^  municipal by  8  was passed dealing w i t h s i g n s .  a  law  Under t h i s by law which was  enacted pursuant to a p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e , a prosecution  was  launched against Mackay i n connection w i t h a f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n sign.  The Supreme Court stated that i t would have found the  by law to be u l t r a v i r e s had i t a p p l i e d to f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n signs but i t was unnecessary to determine the  question  because on i t s 'proper' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the by law d i d not so apply.  This f a c t o r i s not confined to p r o v i n c i a l statutes  and a s i m i l a r d e c i s i o n to Mackay's C a s e  87  was given i n  Transport O i l Co. L t d . v. Imperial O i l Co. L i m i t e d the court was  dealing w i t h a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e .  t h i s f a c t o r a l s o i s not d e c i s i v e as was v. R.  89  where, d e a l i n g w i t h New  8 8  when  However  shown i n De Ware  Brunswick l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h  respect to s l o t machines, some of the m a j o r i t y judges held that the Act was u l t r a v i r e s and others that i t s terms d i d not apply to the p a r t i c u l a r machine i n the case. By r e l y i n g on these f a c t o r s the facade of formulae be cast aside.  No doubt the charge may  86 o p . c i t . 87 o p . c i t . 88 Cl935] O.R. 89  C 3 1954  215.  S.C.R. 182.  be l e v e l l e d that  may  101. Precedent a f f e c t s the d e c i s i o n i n two ways.  Firstly i t  c o n s t i t u t e s a f a c t o r i t s e l f and secondly i t provides a guide as to the f a c t o r s that determined the d e c i s i o n s of previous courts on s i m i l a r matters.  I n so f a r as i t c o n s t i t u t e s  a f a c t o r i t s e l f precedent e s t a b l i s h e s c e r t a i n b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s which form the l i m i t s of the f a c t o r i a l approach.  These l i m i t s  are only as strong as the strength of the previous  decisions  and i n the u l t i m a t e a n a l y s i s w i l l be able to be overruled. Examples of such l i m i t s are  the r u l e that i t i s w i t h i n  p r o v i n c i a l power to enact a s t a t u t e that provides f o r the suspension of motor d r i v e r l i c e n c e s f o r drunken d r i v i n g and the r u l e that f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s not c r i m i n a l law merely because i t imposes p e n a l t i e s f o r the commission or omission of c e r t a i n a c t s .  The e v a l u a t i v e nature of the  process of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e q u i r e s a more f l e x i b l e j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e w i t h regard to the admission of evidence of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s e s p e c i a l l y where a purposive power i s i n v o l v e d .  Thus the present r u l e  against the use of some e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l should be l i m i t e d to those sources already excluded by j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y and every opportunity taken to confine i t s operation s t i l l f u r t h e r .  100. one has merely replaced one indeterminacy w i t h another but a r e a l i z a t i o n of the e v a l u a t i v e nature of the judgment being made coupled w i t h the adducing of evidence p e r t i n e n t to these f a c t o r s and perhaps some j u d i c i a l acknowledgment of the nature of the question cannot help but lead to a more p r e d i c t a b l e p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to a power which by i t s h i s t o r i c a l nature should never have been l i s t e d as a proper c l a s s of subject matter i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of powers. IV.  CONCLUSION  The B.N.A. Act then, i s capable of supporting a c o n s i s tent method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n based on making three e n q u i r i e s . These e n q u i r i e s are:- Is the s t a t u t e i n question under one of the enumerations i n S.92? the enumerations i n S.91?  I s the s t a t u t e under one of and Is the s t a t u t e w i t h i n the  r e s i d u a r y general power? The answers to these questions are not a p r i o r i or necessary  1  but are e v a l u a t i v e . A c c o r d i n g l y the formulae  used by the courts w i l l not provide a s o l u t i o n and i t i s e s s e n t i a l to look at the f a c t o r s that underly each d e c i s i o n . 1 In the sense of there being only one 'proper' answer to be found by construing the B.N.A. Act and then seeing whether the s t a t u t e comes w i t h i n i t . On the f u t i l i t y of 'proper' meaning g e n e r a l l y see H.L.A. Hart - A r t i c l e - ' D e f i n i t i o n and Theory i n Jurisprudence' (1954) 70 .L.Q.R. 37.  102. The  c r i m i n a l law power provides a good i l l u s t r a t i o n of  the use of a f a c t o r i a l approach to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as i t has no h i s t o r i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s .  In S.91(27) the prime f a c t o r s  beside precedent i t s e l f are the c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  e f f e c t and  purpose of the impugned statute none of which i s i n d i v i d u a l l y d e c i s i v e , but do provide, when combined together, ( e s p e c i a l l y w i t h a wider admission of evidence as to purpose and effect) a more s o l i d basis for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n than a r i g i d adherence to an empty s h e l l . W h i l s t t h i s whole approach reduces c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to the p o s i t i o n of O l i v e r Wendell Holmes J r . ^ i z : - a p r e d i c t i o n as to what the court w i l l do i n f a c t ) , the time i s surely r i p e for some a t t e n t i o n to s t a b i l i t y of expectations i n a v o l a t i l e area of law.  2  2 O.W. Holmes J r . 'Path of the Law' (1897) 10 H.L.R. 457 a t 461.  103. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books:- R. Cross - 'Evidence' 2nd E d i t i o n , 1963. H.R. Curlewis - 'Introduction to the Law of Evidence' 2nd E d i t i o n - 2nd p r i n t i n g , 1954. J . Frank - 'Law and The Modern Mind' 6th p r i n t i n g , 1949. H.L.A. Hart - 'The Concept of Law' 1st E d i t i o n , 1961. P.H. Lane - 'Some P r i n c i p l e s and Sources of A u s t r a l i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' 1st E d i t i o n , 1964. B. L a s k i n - 'Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' 3rd E d i t i o n , 1966. P.G. Osborn - 'A Concise Law D i c t i o n a r y ' 1954.  4th Edition,  K. Olivecrona - 'Law as Fact' 1st E d i t i o n , 1939. J . Stone - 'Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings' 1st E d i t i o n , 1965. F.P. Varcoe - 'The C o n s t i t u t i o n  of Canada' - 1965.  W.A. Wynes - ' L e g i s l a t i v e Executive and J u d i c i a l Powers i n A u s t r a l i a ' 2nd E d i t i o n , 1956. Periodical Articles:W.W.  Cook - ' S c i e n t i f i c Method and the Law' 13 American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n Journal 303.  J.A. Corry - 'The Use of L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y i n the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t a t u t e s ' (1954) 32 Can. Bar Rev. 624. S.A. De Smith - Book Review (1957) 20 M.L.R. 681.  104. S i r Owen Dixon - Inaugural Address (1952) 85 C.L.R. X I . W. Friedmann - 'Statute Law and I t s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277. L. F u l l e r - ' P o s i t i v i s m and F i d e l i t y to Law' 71 Harv.L.R. 630. H.L.A. Hart - ' D e f i n i t i o n and Theory i n Jurisprudence' (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 37. - ' P o s i t i v i s m and the Separation of Law and Morals' 71 Harv. L.R. 593. O.W.  Holmes, J r . - 'Path of the Law* (1897) 10 Harv. L.R. 457.  P.H. Lane - 'Facts and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law' (1963) 37 A.L.J. 108. - ' J u d i c i a l Review or Judgment by the High Court' 5 Syd.L.R. 203. W.R.  Lederman - 'The Concurrent Operation of Federal and P r o v i n c i a l Laws i n Canada' (1962-63) 9 M c G i l l L . J . 185.  B. L a s k i n - 'Peace, Order and Good Government Re Examined* (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 1054. K.M. Lysyk - ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Aspects of Sunday Observance L e g i s l a t i o n : Lieberman v. The Queen' (1964) U.B.C.L.Rev. 59. V.C. MacDonald - ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and E x t r i n s i c Evidence' (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 77. G.D. Nokes - 'The L i m i t s of J u d i c i a l N o t i c e ' (1958) 74 L.Q.R. 59. Symposium - 'The C r i m i n a l Law Power i n Canada' (1957) 15 U.of Tor.F.L.Rev. 1.  105.  TABLE OF CASES CITED A-G Alberta v . A-G Canada (Alberta Bank Taxation Case)  [1939] A.C. 117  A-G Alberta v . A-G Canada (Alberta B i l l of Rights Act Case)  0 9 4 7 ] A.C. 503  A-G B r i t i s h Columbia v . Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway  0 9 5 6 ] A.C. 87  A-G B r i t i s h Columbia v . A-G Canada (S.498A of the Criminal Code Case)  0 9 3 7 ] A.C. 368  A-G Canada v . Nyorak A-G Canada v . A-G B r i t i s h Columbia (Fish Canneries Case) A-G Canada v . A-G Alberta (Insurance Reference) A-G Canada v . Readers' Digest Assoc. (Canada) L t d . A-G Canada v . Western Higbie & Abion Investments Limited A-G Manitoba v . Manitoba Licence Hoders Assoc.  (1962) 33 D.L.R.(2d)373 0 9 3 0 ] A.C. I l l 01916] 1 A.C. 588 0-961] S.C.R. 755 0 9 4 5 ] S.C.R. 385  1  A-G Manitoba v . A-G Canada (Sale of Shares Case) A-G Ontario v . Barfried Enterprises Limited  O902] A.C. 73 0 9 2 9 ] A.C. 260 0 9 6 3 ] S.C.R. 570  A-G Ontario v . Winner  0 9 5 4 ] A.C. 542  A-G Ontario v . Koynok  0 9 4 1 ] 1 D.L.R. 548  A-G Ontario v . Canada Temperance Federation  0-946] A.C. 193  106, A-G Ontario v. A-G Canada (Voluntary Assignments)  0-894] A.C. 189  A-G Ontario v. R e c i p r o c a l Insurers  0-924] A.C. 328  A-G Ontario v. A-G Canada (Local Prohibitions)  0896] A.C. 348  A-G Ontario v. Hamilton S t r e e t Railway  O903] A.C. 324  A-G Saskatchewan v. A-G Canada (Farm S e c u r i t y Act)  0-949] A.C. 110  Re Regulation & C o n t r o l of Aeronautics  [1932] A.C. 54  A l b e r t a Statutes Reference  0938] S.C.R. 100  Amalgamated S o c i e t y of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Company L i m i t e d (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 Anthony v. A-G A l b e r t a Assam Railways & Trading Co. v. Gommis. of Inland Revenue A u s t r a l i a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Co. v . Federated Enginedrivers and Firemans A s s o c i a t i o n of A ' a s i a 1  0943] S.C.R. 320 0-935] A.C. 445  (1913) 17 C.L.R. 274  Barbat v. A l l e n  7 Ex. 667  Bedard v. Dawson  0-923] S.C.R. 681  Boyce v. The Queen  (1959) 22 D.L.R.(2d) 553  Burnet v. Coronado O i l & Gas Co.  (1932) 285 U.S. 393  C.P.R. v. A-G B r i t i s h Columbia  0-950] A.C. 122  C.P.R. v. P a r i s h of Notre Dame de Bonsecours  0899] A.C. 367  107. Cairns C o n s t r u c t i o n L t d . v. Government of Saskatchewan  (1958) 16 D.L.R.(2d) 465  C i t i z e n s Insurance Coy. v. Parsons  (1881) 7 App.Cas. 96  Clyde Engineering Co. L t d . v. Cowburn  (1926) 33 C.L.R. 466  Commission du S a l a i r e Minimum v. B e l l Telephone Co. of Canada  (1967) 59 D.L.R.(2d) 145  Board of Commerce Case  0-922] A.C. 191  Cushing v. Dupuy  5 App.Cas. 409  Re Debt Adjustment A c t  0.943] A.C. 356  De Ware v. The Queen  0 9 5 4 ] S.C.R. 182  Eastern Photographic M a t e r i a l s Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents Q.898] A.C. 517 Reference r e the Farm Products A c t  0-957] S.C.R. 196  Fawcett v. A-G Ontario  019643 S.C.R. 625  Forbes v. A-G Manitoba  Q9373 A.C. 260  F o r t F r a n c i s Pulp & Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press  Q9233 A.C. 695  Gibbons v. Ogden  (1824) 22 U.S. 1  Gold Seal L t d . v. Dominion Express Co. L t d .  (1921) 62 S.C.R. 424  Goodyear T i r e & Rubber Co. of Canada L t d . v. The Queen  Q19563 S.C.R. 303  G o s s e l i n v. The Queen  33 S.C.R. 255  108. In Re Gorham  5 Ex. 667  Grand Trunk Railway Case  [1907] A.C. 65  Gray v. Dalgety L i m i t e d  (1916) 21 C.L.R. 551  Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King  [1921] 2 A.C. 91  Green v. Livermore  [1940] O.R. 381  Hodge v. The Queen  (1883) 9 App.Cas? 117  Holland v. Jones  (1917) 23 C.L.R. 149  Home O i l D i s t r i b u t o r s L t d . v. A-G B r i t i s h Columbia  Cl940] S.C.R. 444  H u r r e l l v. Montreal  0-963] Que.P.R. 89  In r e the Insurance Reference  0-932] A.C. 41  Japanese Canadians v. A-G Canada  0 9 4 7 ] A.C. 87  Johanneson v. West S t . P a u l  0 9 5 2 ] 1 S.C.R. 292  John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton  [1915] A.C. 330  Johnson v. A-G A l b e r t a  0-954] S.C.R. 127  Jones v. Vancouver  (1920) 51 D.L.R. 320  J u l i u s v. Oxford  49 L.J.Q.B. 578  Kennedy v. Tomlinson  (1959) 20 D.L.R.(2d) 273  The King v. Eastern Terminal E l e v a t o r Co.  0 9 2 5 ] S.C.R. 434  Labour Conventions Case  0-937] A.C. 326  109.. Ladore v. Bennett  0-939] A . C . 468  Letang v. Cooper  0-964] 2 A11E.R. 929  Lieberman v. The Queen  Q963] S.C.R. 643  Lord's Day A l l i a n c e v. A-G B r i t i s h Columbia  0 9 5 9 ] S.C.R. 497  Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board v. Turner's Dairy L i m i t e d  0-941] S.C.R. 573  Lymburn v. Mayland  0-932] A . C . 318  Ex p. McClean  (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472  Mackay v. The Queen  Q965] S.C.R. 798  McQuaker v. Goddard  01940] 1 K.B. 687  Madden v. Nelson & F o r t Shepperd Railway  0-8.99] A . C . 625  The Margarine Case  0-949] S.C.R. 1  Metal Trades Employers Case  (1936) 54 C.L.R. 387  M i l l a r v. The Queen  0 9 5 4 ] 1 D .L.R. 148  Re Morrison & Kingston  Q938] O.R. 21  M u l l e r v. Oregon  (.1908) U.S. 412  0'Grady v. S p a r l i n g  O960] S.C.R. 804  O i l , Chemical and Atomic Workers I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union L o c a l 16-601 v. Imperial O i l L t d . 01963] S.C.R. 584 0 ' S u l l i v a n v. Noarlunga Meat Co. L t d . (1954) 92 C.L.R. 565  110.  P.A.T.A. v. A-G Canada  Q.931] A.C. 310  Parker v. The Queen  (1965) 111 C.L.R. 610  P.E.I, v. Egan  Q 9 4 l ] S.C.R. 396  R. v. Burgess Ex p. Henry  (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608  R. v. Hayduk  £1938] O.R. 653  R. v. Nat B e l l Liquors L t d .  0922] 2 A.C. 128  R. v. N e i l  0957] S.C.R. 685  R. v. Pee Kay Smallwares L i m i t e d  Q947] O.R. 101  R. v. P e r f e c t i o n Creameries L t d .  01939] 2 W.W.R.  R. v. Stanley  (1952) 104 Can C.C. 31  R. v. Watson  (1890) 170 A.R. 221  Re Race Tracks & B e t t i n g  (1921) 49 O.L.R. 387  Re Radio Communication  0932] A.C. 304  Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen  0963] S.C.R.  R u s s e l l v. The Queen  (1882) 7 App.Cas. 829  S a i n t Leonard v. Fournier  (1956) 115 Can C.C. 366  Saumur v. A-G Quebec  0953]  139  651  2 S.C.R. 299  Reference r e Section 16 of the S p e c i a l War Revenue A c t Q942] S.C.R. 429 Reference r e Section 92(4) of the V e h i c l e s A c t (Sask.)  Q-958} S.C.R. 608  In Re S i l v e r Bros.  0-932] A.C. 514  111. South A u s t r a l i a v. Commonwealth South Eastern Railway Co. v. Railway Commissioner  (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 50 L.J.Q.B. 203  Smith v. The Queen  Q.96CQ S.C.R. 776  State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp.  (.1962) 370 U.S. 451  Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee  0-933] 4 D.L.R. 501  In Re S t o r g o f f  0945] S.C.R. 526  Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada  0894] A.C. 31  Toronto v. B e l l Telephone Co.  Q905] A.C. 52  Toronto E l e c t r i c Commissioners v. Snider  [1925] A.C. 396  Toronto Railway v. The King  0-917] A.C. 630  Tramways Case (No.1)  (1914) 18 C.L.R. 54  Transport O i l Co. L t d . v. I m p e r i a l O i l Co.  D-935] O.R. 215  Union C o l l i e r y Co. of B r i t i s h Columbia L t d . v. Bryden  0-899] A.C. 580  Utah Co. of the Americas & Texada Mines L t d . v. A-G B r i t i s h Columbia  (1959) 19 D.L.R.(2d) 705  Reference r e V a l i d i t y of Wartime Leasehold Regulations  O950] S.C.R. 124  V a l i n v. L a n g l o i s  5 App.Cas. 115  112. Walter v. A-G A l b e r t a  (1967) 58 W.W.R. 383  Reference re Waters & Water Powers  p.929] S.C.R. 200  Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke  (1937) 300 U.S. 440  

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