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The problems of micro-states in international law Chen, Charng-ven 1969

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THE  PROBLEMS OF MICRO-STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  by CHARNG-VEN CHEN B.A. i n law, N a t i o n a l  Taiwan U n i v e r s i t y , 1967  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master o f laws i n the Faculty of Law  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the required  THE  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1969  In  presenting  an  advanced  the  Library  I further for  this degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  thesis  in partial  fulfilment  of  at  University  of  Columbia,  the  make that  i t freely  permission  purposes  may  representatives.  written  thesis  for  financial  of  for  April  1969  by  the  is understood gain  Columbia  for  extensive  granted  Law  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  30  It  available  permission.  Department  Date  be  British  shall  Head  be  requirements  reference copying  that  not  the  of  and  of my  I agree  for that  Study.  this  thesis  Department  copying  or  allowed  without  or  publication my  - i -  ABSTRACT  The  problems a r i s i n g from t h e emergence o f m i c r o -  S t a t e s have r e c e n t l y r e c e i v e d a g r e a t d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. have two major a s p e c t s . statehood  These problems can be seen t o  One i s the q u e s t i o n o f the f u t u r e  o f micro-States  i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community,  the o t h e r i s the p o t e n t i a l problems r e s u l t i n g from t h e i r participation i n international affairs. The  o b j e c t o f t h i s paper i s to p o i n t out the v i s i -  b l e problems i n v o l v e d i n the process micro-States  o f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s i n order t h a t p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s : can be proposed. In i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l background o f these problems, we are aware t h a t the c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t s o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s on d e c o l o n i z a t i o n are the main s t i m u l i to the b i r t h o f micro-States. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the League o f N a t i o n s has f a c e d the same problem as the U n i t e d N a t i o n s over the q u e s t i o n o f the admission o f s m a l l S t a t e s . had  Although no d e f i n i t e  criteria  been s e t out by the League o f Nations f o r determining  the admission o f s m a l l S t a t e s , i t d i d prevent i n due course the admissions o f c e r t a i n s m a l l The  States.  i n c r e a s i n g number o f m i c r o - S t a t e s  poses s e r i o u s  - i i -  problems t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  On t h e one hand,  the question  i s whether t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s , most o f which a r e h a r d l y a b l e t o meet t h e a d m i s s i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f the C h a r t e r , s h o u l d  e l i g i b l e f o r membership i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s * p e c t , i t has been s u g g e s t e d  In t h i s res-  t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n s h o u l d be made  between " t h e r i g h t t o Independence and t h e q u e s t i o n o f membership i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . " imbalance  be  full  On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e  o f t h e v o t i n g power and r e a l power r e s u l t i n g from  the r u l e o f "one-State  one-vote"  w i l l become more p r o f o u n d  un-  l e s s some s o l u t i o n s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f a d m i s s i o n o f m i c r o S t a t e s i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s can be worked o u t . F i n a l l y , we r e a c h the c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t , f i r s t o f a l l , t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and t h e G e n e r a l Assembly s h o u l d s e t out c r i t e r i a g u i d i n g the a d m i s s i o n o f new  Members; s e c o n d l y , c e r -  t a i n s p e c i a l arrangements f o r t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s are needed so t h a t m i c r o - S t a t e s can f u l l y b e n e f i t from t h e s e arrangements w i t h o u t s t r a i n i n g t h e i r r e s o u r c e s and p o t e n t i a l t h r o u g h ing  assum-  t h e f u l l burdens o f U n i t e d N a t i o n s membership w h i c h t h e y  a r e n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o assume. As t o t h e f u t u r e s t a t e h o o d o f t h e s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s , t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l awareness t h a t t o t a l "independence" n o t be d e s i r a b l e f o r a l l o f them.  may  On t h i s p o i n t , s e v e r a l  s o l u t i o n s s h a l l be recommended i n the l a s t Chapter o f t h i s paper.  - iii  -  TABLE 03? CONTENTS Chapter I  II  III  I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Problems and T h e i r H i s t o r i c a l Background A  I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Problems o f Micro-States  B  The H i s t o r i c a l Background o f the Problems  The P o s i t i o n o f Small S t a t e s i n the League o f N a t i o n s A  The Admission o f Small S t a t e s t o the League o f Nations and the P r i n c i p l e o f U n i v e r s a l i t y i n the League o f N a t i o n s  B  The S p e c i a l Arrangements f o r Small S t a t e s i n the League o f Nations  The Problems o f M i c r o - S t a t e s i n the United Nations A  The Reasons o f M i c r o - S t a t e s i n Seeking Membership  B  The Impact o f Membership o f M i c r o - S t a t e s on the U n i t e d Nations (1) The Admission o f M i c r o - S t a t e s to t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and the Principle of Universality (2) The Rule o f One-State One-Yote and the P r i n c i p l e o f Sovereign E q u a l i t y i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  C  Proposed S p e c i a l Arrangements f o r M i c r o - S t a t e s i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  - iv -  Chapter 17 V  'The Problem o f Statehood f o r M i c r o - S t a t e s  Page 48  Conclusion  60  Footnotes  62  Bibliography  81  Appendix  8  7  - 1 -  I  INTRODUCTION TO THE  PROBLEMS AND  A  I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Problems o f  THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  Micro-States  S e c r e t a r y General U Thant, i n the I n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s annual r e p o r t to the General t h a t "a new  problem was  Assembly f o r 1964-65? wrote  being r a i s e d by the r e c e n t phenomenon 1  o f the emergence o f e x c e p t i o n a l l y s m a l l S t a t e s . " h i s annual r e p o r t to the General d e f i n e d the m i c r o - S t a t e s  Also i n  Assembly f o r 1966-67» he r e -  as " e n t i t i e s which ;are e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s m a l l i n area, p o p u l a t i o n and human and economic r e s o u r c e s , 2 and which are now was  emerging as independent S t a t e s . "  the case o f the former T r u s t T e r r i t o r y o f Nauru, which  a t t a i n e d i t s independence on 31 January 1968 o f o n l y 8.25 about 5,000.  square m i l e s and an indigenous Besides,  and  has  an  population  area  of  the p o t e n t i a l s m a l l e s t State i s P i t -  c a i r a I s l a n d which'N i s o n l y 1.75 has  Such  square m i l e s i n extent  and  .3  a p o p u l a t i o n o f around 90. The most c r u c i a l problem, as U Thant i n d i c a t e d ,  t h a t " t h e i r l i m i t e d s i z e and r e s o u r c e s  was  can pose a d i f f i c u l t  problem as to the r o l e they should t r y to p l a y i n i n t e r n a 4 tional l i f e . " N a t i o n s , new  Under A r t i c l e 4 o f the C h a r t e r of the  United  Members o f the U n i t e d Nations not o n l y must  s u b s c r i b e to the purposes and i d e a l s o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n be p e a c e - l o v i n g Charter;  S t a t e s which accept  and  the" o b l i g a t i o n s under the  they must a l s o be " w i l l i n g and a b l e " to c a r r y out  - 2 -  t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as Members.  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , i t seems  obvious t h a t most o f the e x i s t i n g o r p o t e n t i a l  micro-States  would h a r d l y be a b l e to f u l f i l such a requirement.  The  fact  i a t h a t the U n i t e d Nations has been a d m i t t i n g any S t a t e as l o n g as i t c l a i m s to be an independent State and a p p l i e s f o r admission.  As i t has been p o i n t e d out, "the step from i n d e -  pendence to U n i t e d N a t i o n s membership has been v i r t u a l l y 5 automatic."  Such phenomenon i s p a r t l y due to the  conflicts  between the b i g powers i n seeking supporters i n the C o l d f a r . These emerging numerous m i c r o - S t a t e s for a l l i e s .  are the best  candidates  i.The p r a c t i c e , o f a d m i t t i n g them i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as the approaching  way  to the p r i n c i p l e  o f u n i v e r s a l i t y which seems more i d e a l i s t i c than  realistic.  Furthermore, as i n d i c a t e d by U Thant i n d i s c u s s i n g the membership o f these m i c r o - S t a t e s i n the U n i t e d Nations, "such membership may,  on the one hand, impose o b l i g a t i o n s  which are too onerous f o r the m i c r o - S t a t e s and, on the other.. '6 hand, may  l e a d to a weakening o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  I n f a c t , one o r two  itself."  present Members have not been able to main-  t a i n a permanent m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d Nations  Headquarters.  M i c r o - S t a t e s not o n l y cause problems f o r the U n i t e d Nations.; they have s e r i o u s problems: o f t h e i r own. them l a c k the c a p a c i t y f o r economic and p o l i t i c a l and should concentrate on d e v e l o p i n g t h e i r own  Most o f viability,  economies be-  f o r e t r y i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the world a f f a i r s .  Before  the  - 3 -  l i t t l e l a n d l o c k e d A f r i c a n S t a t e o f Swaziland was approved as the 125th Member^of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s on 24 September 1968, L o r d Caradon o f B r i t a i n , i n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s country to t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , d e s c r i b e d i t as ly viable.  i n d u s t r i o u s and economical8  But he had t o admit t h a t i t was s m a l l and poor.  Although " v i a b i l i t y " may be a s u f f i c i e n t t e s t o f independent statehood, i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y competent enough to be a Member.:in a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n l i k e the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the Members o f which must be " a b l e " and w i l l i n g to c a r r y out the o b l i g a t i o n s under the C h a r t e r . U Thant has i n d i c a t e d t h a t " i t i s , o f course, perf e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e t h a t even the s m a l l e s t t e r r i t o r i e s ,  through  the e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , s h a l l a t t a i n independence as a r e s u l t o f t h e e f f e c t i v e  application  of  the G e n e r a l Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 1514 (XV) on t h e G r a n t i n g  of  Independence t o C o l o n i a l C o u n t r i e s and Peoples."  f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t " i t appears  But he  d e s i r a b l e that a d i s t i n c t i o n  be made between t h e r i g h t t o independence and t h e q u e s t i o n o f f u l l membership i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . "  He t h e r e f o r e suggested  a study o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s with a view to l a y i n g down t h e n e c e s s a r y l i m i t a t i o n s on f u l l membership while a l s o d e f i n i n g o t h e r forms o f a s s o c i a t i o n which would b e n e f i t both t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  q  I t has been suggested t h a t f o r t h e time being microS t a t e s might have membership o n l y i n s p e c i a l i z e d agencies o f  - 4 -  the O r g a n i z a t i o n , which would a i d them i n economic and  social  development even though they d i d not have f u l l membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . suggestion.  One  or two m i c r o - S t a t e s d i d f o l l o w t h i s  Western Samoa, 1097  square.miles i n a r e a w i t h a  p o p u l a t i o n of'114,627, became independent  on 1 January  1962;  however, i t s l e a d e r s chose not to j o i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s 10 because the country c o u l d not a f f o r d i t .  Nevertheless,  Western Samoa i s a Member o f the World H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n and o f the Economic Commission f o r A s i a and the F a r E a s t . (ECAFE) i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s f a m i l y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  (These  g i v e i t p r a c t i c a l advantages more important to i t s people than the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t i n the General Assembly about which U Thant has expressed doubts.  B e s i d e s , the p r e s e n t e x i s t i n g  s m a l l e s t independent S t a t e , that i s Nauru, has a l s o decided not to seek membership In the U n i t e d Nations because o f i t s 11 small s i z e . Another problem  c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the membership o f  the m i c r o - S t a t e s i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i s the v o t i n g problem under the r u l e o f "one-State one-vote."  This r u l e i s primarily  based on the s o - c a l l e d p r i n c i p l e o f s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y .  But i n  f a c t , t h i s v o t i n g p r i n c i p l e i s not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e a l i t y . The c h i e f problem  under t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s whether the  U n i t e d N a t i o n s can a f f o r d to run the r i s k o f the system  of  "one-State one-vote"  degenerating i n t o a system o f power w i t h -  out r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t r i g h t s must be p r o -  p o r t i o n a t e to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n v o l v e d .  The  financial  -  5  -  G o n t r i b i i t i p n ^ t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a u t h o r i z e d by t h e G e n e r a l Assembly has always been u n e q u a l .  I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e ,  u n f a i r t o g i v e s m a l l S t a t e s , which are i n c a p a b l e o f making s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , a g r e a t e r say i n t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a f f a i r s t h a n t h a t o f t h o s e who p a r t o f t h e f i n a n c i a l burden. t h i n k i n g o f d i p l o m a t s who  bear a g r e a t e r  And i t has been s a i d t h a t t h e  f a v o r some r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e powers  of u n u s u a l l y s m a l l c o u n t r i e s i s t h a t i f a l a r g e number o f them came i n t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f c o n t r o l l i n g a m a j o r i t y i n t h e Assembly, i t would encourage power p o l i t i c s .  General  The g r e a t powers  w i l l be' d r i v e n t o i g n o r i n g t h e Assembly and s e t t l i n g w o r l d problems among t h e m s e l v e s . c a l l e d " h o t e l diplomacy."  ..This i s t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e so I n response, a p r o p o s a l f o r the  r e f o r m o f t h e p r e s e n t v o t i n g procedure has been suggested,  such  as a w e i g h t e d v o t i n g system. To c o n c l u d e , t h e problems o f m i c r o - S t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can be put i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s : one i s t h e p r o blem i n s i d e t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s t h e m s e l v e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e c h o i c e of  t h e i r s t a t e h o o d and t h e i r domestic developments, w h i l e t h e  o t h e r i s t h e impact o f t h e s e m i c r o - S t a t e s on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, i n c l u d i n g t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n s o f t h e s e m i c r o - S t a t e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.  A l l o f t h e s e problems w i l l  be  discussed separately i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters. B  The H i s t o r i c a l Background o f t h e Problems In  r e c e n t y e a r s t h e number o f t e r r i t o r i e s under e i -  - 6 -  t h e r the U n i t e d N a t i o n s t r u s t e e s h i p o r c o l o n i a l r u l e have 12 r a p i d l y decreased.  With few  exceptions  most o f them, upon  g a i n i n g t h e i r independence, have a p p l i e d f o r membership i n the U n i t e d Nations and were The t e r r i t o r i e s  admitted. t h a t are s t i l l dependent are the  numerous s m a l l s p a r s e l y populated,  economically  isolated  t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e A t l a n t i c , P a c i f i c and I n d i a n Ocean and i n the Caribbean.  These t e r r i t o r i e s have been approaching  t h r e s h o l d o f self-government  and independence, and have became  the f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n o n l y i n r e c e n t y e a r s . territories  the  These s m a l l  are to g i v e b i r t h to the " m i c r o - S t a t e s " d e f i n e d by  the S e c r e t a r y General i n h i s annual r e p o r t to the GeneralAssembly f o r 1966-67. The U n i t e d N a t i o n s has done a g r e a t d e a l i n s t i m u l a t ing  the b i r t h o f these m i c r o - S t a t e s .  Since i t s beginning i t  has encouraged and a s s i s t e d the r i s i n g n a t i o n a l consciousness o f the peoples o f dependent t e r r i t o r i e s  and t h e i r  determination  to achieve t h e i r independence. The U n i t e d Nations C h a r t e r c o n t a i n s t h r e e specifically  devoted  Under l a t t e r two,  to the'dependent  Chapters  chapters  peoples.  XI, XII,and X I I I , e s p e c i a l l y  the U n i t e d Nations  the  e s t a b l i s h e d a system o f t r u s t e e -  s h i p f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p e r v i s i o n o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s  p l a c e d under the system through  individual  - 7  agreements.  -  The b a s i c o b j e c t i v e o f t h e t r u s t e e s h i p  system  i s t o promote t h e p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l advancement o f t h e T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s and t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e development toward s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t o r independence as may  be a p p r o p r i a t e  to the p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f each t e r r i t o r y and people's f r e e l y expressed wishes.  their  The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e  o p e r a t i o n o f t h e system I s e n t r u s t e d , under t h e C h a r t e r , t o t h e T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l — o n e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l organs o f t h e United Nations.  I n a d d i t i o n t o the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a t r u s t e e -  s h i p system, t h e C h a r t e r l a y s down t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e w e l f a r e and advancement o f dependent p e o p l e s who have n o t y e t a t t a i n e d a f u l l measure o f self-government.  Under Chapter X I o f the C h a r t e r , S t a t e s  Members o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s which have assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s r e c o g n i z e t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t o f t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s are paramount and accept as a s a c r e d t r u s t the o b l i g a t i o n  t o promote t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s .  To t h i s end, t h e y undertake t o d e v e l o p s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , t o t a k e due account o f t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n  o f the p e o p l e s , and t o  a s s i s t them i n t h e development o f t h e i r f r e e p o l i t i c a l tutions.  insti-  I n summing up t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r o f t h i s  Chapter,  i t i s n o t e d t h e c o l o n i a l powers f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n h i s t o r y had v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d , as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  obligation,  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e t e r r i t o r i e s i n accordance w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  -  8  -  Although a l a r g e number o f t r u s t and other  non-self-  governing t e r r i t o r i e s d i d a t t a i n t h e i r independence, there  was  growing concern among Members o f the U n i t e d Nations t h a t the progress towards complete emancipation o f the many c o u n t r i e s and peoples s t i l l remaining under c o l o n i a l s t a t u s was too slow and  should  be a c c e l e r a t e d . At i t s I960 s e s s i o n , f o l l o w i n g a h i s t o r i c a l debate  i n plenary  s e s s i o n , the General Assembly, on 14 December,  expressed i t s deep concern and d e s i r e f o r the speedy  attain-  ment o f independence by the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s i n i t s Resolution  1514 (XV) e n t i t l e d : D e c l a r a t i o n on the Granting o f  Independence to C o l o n i a l C o u n t r i e s  and P e o p l e s .  In t h i s  D e c l a r a t i o n , the General Assembly expressed the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the continued  existence  ment o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o f c o l o n i a l i s m prevented the develop-  economic  cooperation,  impeded t h e s o c i a l ,  c u l t u r a l and economic development o f dependent peoples? and militated The  a g a i n s t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i d e a l o f u n i v e r s a l peace.  D e c l a r a t i o n emphasized t h a t " a l l peoples o f these t e r r i -  t o r i e s has the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t t o complete freedom, the exercise o f t h e i r sovereignty territory;  and t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l  a l l peoples Have t h e r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and  by v i r t u e o f t h a t r i g h t they f r e e l y determine t h e i r  political  s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l development."  And the D e c l a r a t i o n went on to. p r o c l a i m  "inadequacy o f p o l i t i c a l ,  that  economic, s o c i a l o r e d u c a t i o n a l p r e -  -  9  -  paxedness should never serve as a p r e t e x t f o r d e l a y i n g i n d e pendence; i n T r u s t and Non-Self-Governing  Territories ora l l  other t e r r i t o r i e s which had n o t y e t a t t a i n e d independence, immediate steps should be taken t o t r a n s f e r a l l powers t o the peoples  without  any d i s t i n c t i o n as t o r a c e , creed o r c o l o r . " 13 64 s m a l l dependent t e r r i t o r i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e o n l y remaining 14  T r u s t T e r r i t o r y o f the P a c i f i c I s l a n d s ,  come w i t h i n t h e  purview o f t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . I n 1961, one year a f t e r t h e adoption o f t h e D e c l a r a t i o n , t h e Assembly r e c o n s i d e r e d the extent to which i t had been implemented. noted  I n a r e s o l u t i o n adopted on 27 November, i t  "with r e g r e t " t h a t , w i t h few e x c e p t i o n s , t h e p r o v i s i o n s ,  o f the D e c l a r a t i o n had not been c a r r i e d out and t h a t armed a c t i o n and r e p r e s s i v e measures continued to be taken i n c e r t a i n areas w i t h i n c r e a s i n g r u t h l e s s n e s s " a g a i n s t dependent peoples,  d e p r i v i n g them o f t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e t o e x e r c i s e peace-  f u l l y and f r e e l y t h e i r r i g h t t o complete independence," and the Assembly c a l l e d on a l l S t a t e s a d m i n i s t e r i n g Truat o r NonS e l f - G o v e r n i n g t e r r i t o r i e s t o "take a c t i o n without f u r t h e r delay w i t h a view t o t h e f a i t h f u l a p p l i c a t i o n and implement a t i o n o f the Declaration."  15  I n a major p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n , t h e Assembly decided to e s t a b l i s h a SeventeenMember S p e c i a l Conmiittee to examine the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e I960 D e c l a r a t i o n and t o make recommendations on t h e progress 15a and extent o f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . Again, i n 1962 t h e General  -  10  -  Assembly adopted a r e s o l u t i o n which decided to i n c r e a s e  the  membership o f the S p e c i a l Committee from seventeen to twenty16 f o u r — k n o w n as the Committee o f 2 4 .  The  i n i t i a l study  the Committee o f 24 d e a l t w i t h the l a r g e r dependent tories,  "to  terri-  such as Kenya and Guyana, and u n t i l r e c e n t l y the  s p e c i a l concern about m i c r o - S t a t e s tion.  of  I n 1965  received only passing  atten-  the General  Assembly asked the Committee o f 17 pay p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s . " Under the h i g h t i d e o f n a t i o n a l consciousness  under the repeated  the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,  and  affirmations of the."inalienable r i g h t  these people to complete freedom and  the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s gained  the  t i o n o f the S p e c i a l Committee o f 24 o n l y r e c e n t l y .  The  Committee i s convinced  that R e s o l u t i o n 1514  t h a t "inadequacy o f p o l i t i c a l ,  of  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " by  a number o f t e r r i t o r i e s have gainded  independence, although  24  their atten-  ( X Y ) , which s t a t e s  economic, s o c i a l o r  educational  •1  preparedness should never serve as a p r e t e x t for" d e l a y i n g i n d e 18 pendence," i s f u l l y a p p l i c a b l e to the s m a l l Besides,  territories.  the Committee i s a l s o aware t h a t the formation  of  a p p r o p r i a t e concrete measures f o r such f u l l a p p l i c a t i o n i s sometimes hampered by the l a c k o f adequate i n f o r m a t i o n on political,  economic and  social  o r on the o p i n i o n s , wishes and R e s o l u t i o n 2105  s i t u a t i o n i n these  territories,  a s p i r a t i o n s o f the people.  (XX) o f 20 December 1 9 6 5 ,  the  the General  In  Assembly  approved the Committee's d e s i r e to send v i s i t i n g m i s s i o n s  to  - l i -  the s m a l l i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s .  I t a l s o asked the Committee t o  d e v i s e s p e c i f i c recommendations, on a p p r o p r i a t e d e c o l o n i z a t i o n measures and to suggest  time t a b l e s f o r independence.  • Under the encouragements and e f f o r t s o f t h e U n i t e d Nations,  some o f t&e s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s have gained t h e i r i n d e -  pendence, and the r e s t o f these t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l , beyond doubt, a t t a i n t h e s t a t u s o f self-government  o r f u l l independence i n  the near f u t u r e . The problems i n v o l v e d i n the f u t u r e o f these  small  t e r r i t o r i e s pose s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. W i l l f u l l independence be the best form f o r a l l t h e s m a l l territories?  Should a f u l l membership i n t h e U n i t e d  be granted t o them, i f they do apply so? s p e c i a l arrangements be the a l t e r n a t i v e s ?  Nations  Or should some Or should an equal  v o t e be g i v e n t o the s m a l l S t a t e s even i f they a r e not able to  c o n t r i b u t e as much as  the powerful  States?  A l l these  q u e s t i o n s w i l l be f u l l y d i s c u s s e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s .  II  A  THE POSITION OP SMALL STATES I N THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS  The A d m i s s i o n o f S m a l l S t a t e s t o t h e League o f N a t i o n s and t h e P r i n c i p l e o f U n i v e r s a l i t y i n t h e League o f N a t i o n s  (1)  The A d m i s s i o n o f S m a l l S t a t e s t o t h e League o f N a t i o n s D u r i n g t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f t h e League o f N a t i o n s ,  t h e r e were s e v e r a l S t a t e s t h a t were a l s o ^ v e r y s m a l l i n popul a t i o n , t e r r i t o r y and r e s o u r c e s , such as the P r i n c i p a l i t y o f ;  L i e c h t e n s t e i n , t h e R e p u b l i c o f San Marino -and t h e P r i n c i p a l i t y 1 o f Monaco and A n d o r r a .  A l t h o u g h some o f them d i d a p p l y f o r  membership t o t h e League, they were n o t a d m i t t e d f o r a v a r i e t y of  reasons. B e f o r e t h e f i r s t Assembly o f t h e League, t h e S t a t e s  mentioned above, except Andorra, had asked f o r a d m i s s i o n t o t h e League o f N a t i o n s . On 15 J u l y 1920, t h e Swiss M i n i s t e r i n London asked f o r the admission o f the P r i n c i p a l i t y o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n to the League o f N a t i o n s .  And on 20 September 1921, t h e Committee  No. V, a f t e r c a r e f u l s t u d y o f t h e L i e c h t e n s t e i n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n , made a u n f a v o r a b l e recommendation«/to t h e G e n e r a l Assembly. I t r e a d as f o l l o w s :  " ( t ) h e Committee i s o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t  t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n can n o t be g r a n t e d , as t h i s S t a t e does n o t appear i n a p o s i t i o n t o c a r r y o u t a l l t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by t h e Covenant," and t h e  - 13 -  Committee went on tb; recommend  that a s p e c i a l  arrangement be  worked out i n o r d e r to " a t t a c h to the League o f Nations Sovereign  S t a t e s which, by reason o f t h e i r s m a l l s i z e ,  not be admitted  as o r d i n a r y ...Members."  the S e c r e t a r i a t informed  could  On 20 December 1920  the"government o f the P r i n c i p a l i t y  o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n t h a t t h e Assembly, a f t e r having i t s request f o r admission,  considered  was o f the o p i n i o n t h a t the a p p l i -  c a t i o n c o u l d n o t be granted  and at the same time brought 4 recommendation to i t s n o t i c e . As to the a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r admission  this  by t h e Republic  o f San Marino and the P r i n c i p a l i t y o f Monaco, they were somewhat d i f f e r e n t 1919  from the case o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n .  t h e Charge d» A f f a i r e s  m i t t e d a request  On 25 A p r i l  o f the R e p u b l i c o f San Marino sub-  with t h i s purpose t o the P r e s i d e n t o f the 5  Peace Conference.  The S e c r e t a r y General  on 24 August 1920  asked the government o f the R e p u b l i c o f San Marino f o r c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , but no r e p l y to t h i s request  was r e c e i v e d by the  S e c r e t a r i a t d u r i n g the s e s s i o n o f t h e F i r s t Assembly, and the League t h e r e f o r e d i d not d e a l w i t h the q u e s t i o n . As f a r as ihe P r i n c i p a l i t y o f Monaco i s concerned, on 6 A p r i l 1920 the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e o f the P r i n c i p a l i t y o f Monaco submitted  a request  to the same e f f e c t to the P r e s i d e n t 6 o f t h e C o u n c i l o f t h e League o f N a t i o n s , but t h i s j a p p l i c a - ; t i o n f o r admission 7 1920.  was withdrawn by a l e t t e r dated 22 October  - H  -  Under A r t i c l e 1 (2) o f the Covenant o f the League o f N a t i o n s concerning provided  t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f membership, i t was  t h a t "any f u l l y s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  State, Dominion o r  colony n o t named i n the Annex... may become a Member o f the League i f i t s admission i s agreed t o by t w o - t h i r d s Assembly provided its  o f the  t h a t i t s h a l l give e f f e c t i v e guarantees o f  s i n c e r e i n t e n t i o n t o observe i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a -  t i o n s , and s h a l l accept such r e g u l a t i o n s as may be p r e s c r i b ed 1 by the League i n r e g a r d to i t s m i l i t a r y , n a v a l and a i r f o r c e s and armaments."  In interpreting this Article, i t i s  d e s i r a b l e t o take the view that t h e admission o f new Members to the League o f Nations, a world p o l i t i c a l and  organization,  t h e i r assumption o f the r i g h t s and d u t i e s thereby i n -  c u r r e d are n e c e s s a r i l y based on " t h e w i l l and c a p a c i t y " o f these a p p l i c a n t s , and s h a l l not be b l i n d e d under the p r i n c i 8 pie of u n i v e r s a l i t y .  By s a y i n g t h i s , i t i s , o f course, by  no means to exclude S t a t e s which a r e s m a l l i n p o p u l a t i o n , t e r r i t o r y and r e s o u r c e s  and are not able  to f u l f i l  their  i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y , ; from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.  The Sub-Committee i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n  whether i t would"be p o s s i b l e t o a t t a c h S t a t e s o f t h i s k i n d to the League o f N a t i o n s , h e l d the o p i n i o n t h a t with a view t o i t s development, the League o f N a t i o n s should  be a b l e , as  soon as p o s s i b l e , t o embrace a l l S t a t e s which, while f u l f i l l - ^ i n g the c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e 1 o f the Covenant, d e s i r e to a s s o c i a t e themselves w i t h i t .  And i t f u r t h e r i n -  - 15  -  d i c a t e d t h a t although o f narrow a p p l i c a t i o n , t h i s p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e d e q u a l l y to S t a t e s o f very s m a l l s i z e , each S t a t e c o n s t i t u t i n g a l e g a l e n t i t y whose s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s are serving of consideration.  However, i n the o p i n i o n o f  dethe  * Suh-Committee the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y o f membership was  o n l y an i d e a l and  c o u l d not be a p p l i e d at random.  It  c i d e d t h a t the o n l y problem t h a t e x i s t e d and needed to s o l v e d was  de-  be  t h a t o f the form which should be g i v e n to these  small States' p a r t i c i p a t i o n . t i o n o f 17 December 1920  SThus, although the recommenda-  excluded, a p r i o r i , the  possibility  o f r e g a r d i n g these s m a l l S t a t e s as o r d i n a r y Members, the Committee d i d propose s e v e r a l methods f o r a t t a i n i n g the of f u l l cooperation a Member o r  between the S t a t e s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f  Subaim  being  not.  Besides,  i t was  suggested by the Committee No.  V  t h a t although these s m a l l S t a t e s c o u l d not be admitted at t h a t time, these d e c i s i o n s should not prevent the Assembly i n the f u t u r e from t a k i n g once again these requests sideration.  That i s to say,  the n a t i o n s  i n t o con-  concerned c o u l d  renew t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r admission when the reasons a g a i n s t a d m i t t i n g them had  disappeared.  f'The problems o f the  S t a t e s , as i n d i c a t e d by the Committee No. s o l v e d by time and,  7,  small  c o u l d o n l y be «  as soon as t h e i r problems were s o l v e d ,  they were most l i k e l y to be admitted.  At the same time, they  c o u l d a l s o a v a i l themselves o f the t e c h n i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s  of  - 16 -  the League o f N a t i o n s . I n c o n c l u s i o n , under the p r a c t i c e o f the League o f N a t i o n s , although no r u l e had been s t r i c t l y l a i d  down that  S t a t e s , which were too s m a l l i n t e r r i t o r y o r had too few i n habitants, did  should  be excluded from the League o f Nations, i t  take the view t h a t before g r a n t i n g  States,  full  c o n s i d e r a t i o n should  admission to the s m a l l  be p a i d to the a b i l i t y o f  the a p p l i c a n t s m a l l States to c a r r y out the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 9 o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the Covenant. (2)  The P r i n c i p l e o f U n i v e r s a l i t y under the League o f Nations  To apply the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y as a b a s i s f o r membership was d e l i b e r a t e l y r e j e c t e d by the League o f Na10 t i o n s i n 1920. A draft proposal  i n c o r p o r a t i n g the i d e a o f u n i v e r s a -  l i t y o f membership i n t o the Covenant had been f i r s t 11 r a i s e d by the Delegate o f A r g e n t i n a . Sovereign S t a t e s r e c o g n i z e d  officially  I t stated that " a l l  by the Community o f N a t i o n s be  &*  admitted to j o i n the League o f N a t i o n s i n such a manner t h a t , if  they do not become a Member o f the League o f N a t i o n s t h i s  can o n l y be the r e s u l t o f a v o l u n t a r y In o t h e r words, by t h i s p r o p o s a l  d e c i s i o n on t h e i r p a r t . "  a sovereign  State,  regardless  o f i t s w i l l i n g n e s s o r c a p a c i t y to c a r r y c u t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the Covenant, would a u t o m a t i c a l l y come a Member o f the League o f N a t i o n s , u n l e s s  be-  an expressed'  - 17  r e j e c t i o n was was  made by t h a t S t a t e .  ,it,  12  The  Argentine  p r i m a r i l y based on the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t "the  of the League o f N a t i o n s est  -  proposal strength  depends on i t s i n c l u d i n g the g r e a t -  p o s s i b l e numbers o f S t a t e s ; the fewer the S t a t e s o u t s i d e the g r e a t e r w i l l be the number o f the Members pledged  c a r r y out i t s p r o v i s i o n s and to perform imposes."  to  the d u t i e s which i t  In h i s p o i n t o f view, "the non-admission o f a  number o f S t a t e s might l e a d to dangerous antagonisms, be  the  cause o f the f o r m a t i o n o f a League o f N a t i o n s o u t s i d e the League, i n r i v a l r y  to i t , and be a constant source o f danger 13 . to the peace o f the world." Since the Argentine p r o p o s a l was  f a r away from the  a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n those days, i t was 14 the Assembly o f the League.  B  The of  r e j e c t e d by  S p e c i a l Arrangements f o r Small S t a t e s i n the League Nations The Problems o f the s m a l l S t a t e s i n the League  c a l l e d f o r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n o f some s p e c i a l arrangements to be made f o r them.. I n d e c l i n i n g to admit L i e c h t e n s t e i n as a Member o f the League and i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t the t r u e o b j e c t o f the League would be more e a s i l y a t t a i n e d if  a l l S t a t e s were not excluded,  League expressed  the F i r s t Assembly o f the  the wish t h a t some special-arrangements  made, to a c e r t a i n l i m i t , to a t t a c h to the League o f  be  Nations  - 18  -  c e r t a i n S t a t e s , which by reason o f t h e i r s m a l l s i z e , not be admitted  could  to the League.  f o l l o w i n g the wish o f the Assembly, the Committee on Amendments to the  Covenant presented 16  three a l t e r n a t i v e  methods o f attachment: " (a) to r e c o g n i z e f o r such s m a l l S t a t e s a sr right of f u l l representation a vote;  without  or  (b) to allow t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by another State a l r e a d y a Member o f the League; o r (c) to have recourse  to a system o f p a r t i c i -  p a t i o n l i m i t e d e x c l u s i v e l y to cases i n which the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s o f such s m a l l S t a t e s were i n v o l v e d . As f a r as the f i r s t  method was  concerned, i t im-  p l i e d the r i g h t to take p a r t and to speak i n the Assembly on all  s u b j e c t s and  to p a r t i c i p a t e , as Members o f Committees  and Sub-Committees, i n a l l the work, but without to  share i n i t s d e c i s i o n s .  But,  the r i g h t  by b e l i e v i n g t h a t "the  t i o n o f debates might be prolonged  dura-  by the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f  Members who,  i n r e a l i t y , had no concern with the s u b j e c t un17 der d i s c u s s i o n , " the Sub-Committee t h e r e f o r e recommended 18  the r e j e c t i o n o f t h i s method and proposed the o t h e r  two,  namely, (a) admission  to membership w i t h f u l l  privi-  - 19  -  l e g e s to be e x e r c i s e d o n l y where t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s are i n v o l v e d ; o r (b) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by some other S t a t e which */ was Concerning was  a l r e a d y a member o f the League. Method ( a ) , i n the Second Assembly, i t  c o n s i d e r e d t h a t to adopt t h i s method would put the  small  S t a t e s i n a v e r y i n f e r i o r and u n d i g n i f i e d p o s i t i o n while such s m a l l S t a t e s were, at the same time, apt to be e x t r a 19 o r d i n a r i l y s e n s i t i v e and s u s p i c i o u s .  I t was  also held  that t h e r e would be i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e f i n i n g what were matters o f " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , " while the League ought 20 to concern i t s e l f o n l y with matters o f g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t . As to Method ( b ) , i t was new  a l s o argued t h a t i t would c r e a t e a  c l a s s o f Members o f the League o f N a t i o n s .  Furthermore,  t h i s method would a l s o p l a c e the s m a l l S t a t e s i n "a p o s i t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y , under a s o r t o f more l o r l e s s temporary pro21 tectorate."  Besides, the r e p r e s e n t i n g S t a t e s might have  i n the Assembly some i n t e r e s t s t h a t would be i n o p p o s i t i o n to those o f the S t a t e s which they To sum  up,  represented.  i n a d d i t i o n to the f a c t t h a t there were  disagreements among the Member S t a t e s i n adopting these thods,  me-  i t became q u i t e evident t h a t both methods were i n  c o n f l i c t with A r t i c l e 1 (2) o f the Covenant, and t h a t the adoption o f e i t h e r would make an amendment n e c e s s a r y . at t h a t time no  s m a l l S t a t e s had  submitted  Since  such a request  to  the  Assembly, and on t h e o t h e r hand, some S t a t e s which were  not  Members o f the League had then taken p a r t i n Conference  i n t h e League, t h e /.Second Assembly t h e r e f o r e f i n a l l y ed  and approved t h e r e p o r t o f t h e F i r s t  Committee  consider-  which sug-  gested t h a t "experience s h o u l d be awaited b e f o r e any d e f i n i t e 22 c o n d i t i o n i w e r e l a i d down."  Ill  A  THE PROBLEMS 03? MICRO-STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS  The Reasons o f M i c r o - S t a t e s i n Seeking  Membership  I n s p i t e o f the heavy burdens imposed upon t h e Member S t a t e s by the present Charter, m i c r o - S t a t e s , with few exceptions?, have been s t i l l the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . (1)  eager to o b t a i n the membership i n  The reasons  f o r t h i s are as f o l l o w s :  The emphasis o f the C h a r t e r on c o o p e r a t i o n i n the  s o l u t i o n o f economic and s o c i a l problems has a t t r a c t e d the micro-States  t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  t h a t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  I t has been w e l l known  and i t s S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies are t h e  most e f f e c t i v e and a p p r o p r i a t e means by which i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n can be e f f i c i e n t l y c a r r i e d o u t . g r e a t e s t achievement o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  A c t u a l l y the and i t s g r e a t e s t  advancement over p r e v i o u s c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s have been i n calling  a t t e n t i o n t o the s p e c i a l needs o f the underdeveloped  areas, i n s t i m u l a t i n g programs o f a s s i s t a n c e , and i n o r g a n i z i n g programs such as the Expanding Program o f T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e which have p l a c e d at the d i s p o s a l o f the underdeveloped count r i e s v a r i o u s forms o f t e c h n i c a l a i d without  the  political  c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are sometimes attached by the donor States and.-w'ithout the r i s k s t h a t weaker c o u n t r i e s have r u n i n a c c e p t ing  a i d from more advanced and s t r o n g e r c o u n t r i e s .  United Nations  Also,  a i d t o underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s has been g i v e n  not o n l y through t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e programs but through  - 22  -  l o a n s by the World Bank and by a s s i s t a n c e from the I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n and, ment A s s o c i a t i o n . is.concerned,  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Develop-  As f a r as the economic and s o c i a l  the U n i t e d Nations  field  and i t s S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies  are engaged i n meeting needs t h a t  have e x i s t e d f o r a l o n g  time, and which e x i s t even to a g r e a t e r degree under the modern t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o c i e t y . the U n i t e d Nations sable.  In o r d e r to meet these needs,  and i t s S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies are i n d i s p e n -  Perhaps even more important  i s the f a c t t h a t the  peoples o f these underdeveloped p l a c e s are no l o n g e r to  accept the c o n d i t i o n o f hunger and p e s t i l e n c e which i n the  past have been t h e i r f a t e . ing  willing  They demand a s s i s t a n c e i n improv-  t h e i r f a t e but not on unequal terms.  micro-States  Since a l l the  are underdeveloped and backward, and  they  are  a l s o j u s t emerging from the s t a t u s o f c o l o n i a l o r t r u s t e e d t e r r i t o r i e s and g a i n i n g independence, t h e r e i s a l l the more reason f o r them to a v a i l themselves o f the f a c i l i t i e s o f the United Nations.  Besides, as most m i c r o - S t a t e s owe  independence to the continued  t h e i r very  emphasis which the U n i t e d  Nations  has p l a c e d on the o b l i g a t i o n o f the a d m i n i s t e r i n g Members to develop  self-government  w i t h i n them, the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  been t r e a t e d by these newly independent m i c r o - S t a t e s "fostermother."  as  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a n a t u r a l adherence a r i s e s  among them to the U n i t e d  (2)  has  Nations.  From a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view, membership i n  the U n i t e d Nations i s coveted.  I t has been r e f e r r e d to as a  - 23  2  "mark o f s o v e r e i g n t y . "  -  To be a Member o f the U n i t e d  i s a l s o a symbol o f t h e i r s t a b l e p r e s t i g e i n world The U n i t e d N a t i o n s has; made i t p o s s i b l e f o r these  Nations 3  politics. micro-States  to have a f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and i t enables them to p l a y a r o l e i n the world p o l i t i c s out o f a l l p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r  popula-  t i o n , economic o r m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h .  failure  T h e r e f o r e , the  o f these m i c r o - S t a t e s , upon t h e i r independence, to g a i n admiss i o n to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s might be thought,  by these  S t a t e s , to g i v e doubts on t h e i r independence and (3)  micro-  sovereignty.  The reasons s t a t e d above are the i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s  that s t i m u l a t e the m i c r o - S t a t e s to seek membership i n the United Nations.  But as we know, the b i g powers have by them-  s e l v e s , due to the c o n f l i c t s out o f the C o l d War, the r o l e and power o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s . War,  1  enhanced  I n waging the Cold  the r i v a l powers, i n order to b i d a g a i n s t each other, are  doing t h e i r best to p l e a s e the newly independent s m a l l S t a t e s . Besides, as under the present p r a c t i c e o f the C h a r t e r , each S t a t e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f i t s p o p u l a t i o n o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s has  the  equal v o t i n g power, these m i c r o - S t a t e s are s u r e l y i n "a s t r o n g bargaining position."  4  Since these m i c r o - S t a t e s form a more  o r l e s s " r e l i a b l e p o o l o f support" f o r the r i v a l powers i n 5 the C o l d War,  the r i v a l powers welcome the m i c r o - S t a t e s to  join their bloc. In c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e we have found out the  reasons  the m i c r o - S t a t e s have been eager to seek membership i n the  - 24  U n i t e d N a t i o n s , we  -  should work out a p l a n which would meet the  needs o f such S t a t e s , hut would not impose upon them the heavy o b l i g a t i o n a t t a c h e d to the f u l l membership i n the U n i t e d Nations.  B (1)  The Impact o f Membership o f M i c r o - S t a t e s on the U n i t e d The Admission o f M i c r o - S t a t e s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  Nations and  the P r i n c i p l e o f U n i v e r s a l i t y 6  As i n d i c a t e d above,  ,  the admission  o f new  Members to  the U n i t e d N a t i o n s has become, i n the r e c e n t y e a r s , almost  auto-  matic.  has  T h i s e x p l o s i o n o f membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  caused the O r g a n i z a t i o n to become u n w i e l d l y and unbalanced. The q u e s t i o n s now  before lis are whether the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i -  v e r s a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to membership has been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the p r e s e n t C h a r t e r , and whether the m i c r o - S t a t e s , which are h a r d l y a b l e to meet the admission  requirement  are q u a l i f i e d to be a Member o f the U n i t e d As f a r as the f i r s t two  under the  Charter,  Nations.  problem i s concerned, there  are  approaches towards the problem o f r e c r u i t i n g members to a  World O r g a n i z a t i o n .  One  s t a r t s from the viewpoint  t h a t the  s t r e n g t h o f any such o r g a n i z a t i o n depends on the degree o f i t s i n c l u d i n g the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e number o f S t a t e s ; the fewer the S t a t e s o u t s i d e i t , the g r e a t e r w i l l be the numbers to  c a r r y out i t s d e c i s i o n s and  imposes.  The  to perform  pledged  the d u t i e s which i t  l e a d s to the d o c t r i n e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y i . e . , the  - 25  -  adherence to the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a l l communities t h a t pass the t e s t s o f independent s t a t e h o o d .  ?There i s another s i d e to t h i s  d o c t r i n e ; i t impliess t h a t membership i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n 7 be automatic and no  application i s required.  The  will  second  approach i s s t a r t e d from a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t o f view.  It indi-  c a t e s t h a t , as a r u l e , the s t r e n g t h o f a p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n depends hot n 0  i t s including  the g r e a t e s t  possi-  b l e number o f S t a t e s , but on i t s i n c l u d i n g the g r e a t e s t number o f like-minded together  S t a t e s , such as can be t r u s t e d to work  harmoniously and  efficiently.  u s u a l l y r e f e r e d as the p r i n c i p l e o f  This p r i n c i p l e i s  selectivity.  I t cannot be g a i n s a i d t h a t each o f these two c i p l e has  i t s own  possible  merits,  and  prin-  the c h o i c e between them must  depend on the f u n c t i o n o f the p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n i n question.  Where the f u n c t i o n o b v i o u s l y makes e f f i c i e n c y dependent  on u n i v e r s a l membership, the p r i n c i p l e o f s e l e c t i v i t y little  chance to be recommended.  be i l l  served  F o r example, the world  by a h e a l t h o r g a n i z a t i o n which does not  t h a t the h i g h e s t  has will  guarantee  p o s s i b l e l e v e l o f h e a l t h reached i t s d e s t i -  n a t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , p o l i t i c a l background and  the economic c o n d i t i o n o f the State i n the w o r l d .  S i m i l a r l y the same c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p l i e s to most of a t e c h n i c a l character.  organizations  T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , however, ceases  to be dominant when an o r g a n i z a t i o n mainly o f a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e .  shoulders  responsibilities  - 26 -  At the b i r t h o f the League o f N a t i o n s , the  question  whether the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y should be adopted  was  c o n s i d e r e d at l e n g t h and with c a r e .  T h i s p r i n c i p l e , as  dis-  cussed i n the f o r e g o i n g chapter, was  r e j e c t e d i n the League  of Nations. I n the p r a c t i c e o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the o f u n i v e r s a l i t y took p l a c e i n two  stages.  principle  In the Dumbarton  Oaks, a p r o p o s a l i n a chapter named "Membership" c o n s i s t e d o f a s i n g l e paragraph " i .  Membership o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n  be open to a l l p e a c e - l o v i n g S t a t e s . "  should  I f we r e a d i t i n i s o l a -  t i o n , i t seemed to walk i n the d i r e c t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l i t y . But, o f course, i t has to be read i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h  another  r u l e which a u t h o r i z e d the General Assembly to admit new  Members  to the O r g a n i z a t i o n upon the recommendation o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . • These two adopting one  a  r u l e s read together were e u q i v a l e n t to  p r i n c i p l e o f s e l e c t i v i t y even more severe than  t h a t the League had p r a c t i c e d .  i t was  the  F o r membership i n the League,  s u f f i c i e n t for, a candidate to pass a f a v o r a b l e r e s o l u t i o n  i n the Assembly; while i n the U n i t e d Nations oil,  the S e c u r i t y Coun8 i n a d d i t i o n , has to c o n f e r i t s a p p r o v a l f i r s t . At the San F r a n c i s c o  Conference p r o p o s a l s aiming  immediate u n i v e r s a l i t y o f membership,,similar to those i n the day o f the.League o f N a t i o n s , were put forward L a t i n American S t a t e s .  at  proposed  by s e v e r a l  The Uruguay d e l e g a t i o n demanded t h a t  " a l l communities should be members o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n and  that  - 27  -  t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n be o b l i g a t o r y , t h a t i s to say t h a t i t would not be l e f t to the choice o f any n a t i o n whether to become a member o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n o r to withdraw from  it."  9  But Costa R i c a , while a c c e p t i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y as a g o a l , r e c o g n i z e d "possible r e a l i t y . "  t h a t i t might not at present be a * F o r the f u t u r e i t d i d approve t h a t  " ( o ) n l y i n t h i s premise would i t be p o s s i b l e to b u i l d community o f a l l n a t i o n s h a v i n g i t s own  the  s t r u c t u r e and means  o f making the t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f i t s members s u b j e c t to 10 r u l e s accepted accept  by a l l . "  the  But most o f the S t a t e s r e f u s e d to  t h i s premise as d e s i r a b l e f o r e i t h e r the present  the f u t u r e .  I t seemed to them t h a t an a c t o f admission  q u i r e d a c e r t a i n degree o f c o o p e r a t i o n on both:.sides. maintained  or reFrance  t h a t c o n d i t i o n s o f membership should be l a i d down  which would "ensure a community o f p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s a n i i d e a l shared and any new t a n t was admission  i n common among those who  Member o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n . "  and  were a l r e a d y members 11 And more impor-  t h a t both France and the N e t h e r l a n d s i n s i s t e d t h a t should be l i m i t e d to those  S t a t e s which by  " i n s t i t u t i o n " and by t h e i r " i n t e r n a t i o n a l behaviour"  their had  a l r e a d y g i v e n p r o o f o f " t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s and a b i l i t y " to 12 c a r r y out t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s . The outcome o f the debate was to r e c o g n i z e t h a t u n i v e r s a l i t y was "an i d e a l toward which i t was proper to 13 aim." A c t u a l l y , the San F r a n c i s c o Conference went even  - 28  -  f a r beyond a mere r e f u s a l to i n c o r p o r a t e immediately  the  p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y o f membership.  I t was s t r o n g l y  emphasized by the r e p o r t o f Committee 1/2  t h a t "the o r g a n i -  z a t i o n would e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n a r y power w i t h r e s p e c t to the admission o f new  Members....  To d e c l a r e o n e s e l f  'peace-loving' does not s u f f i c e to a c q u i r e membership i n the - 14 Organization."  According to i t s r e p o r t , new  Members would  be admitted o n l y i f they are " r e c o g n i z e d " as p e a c e - l o v i n g upon examination  by the O r g a n i z a t i o n are judged " a b l e 15 ready" to c a r r y out those o b l i g a t i o n s .  and  and  A r t i c l e 4 o f the present C h a r t e r i s a r e s u l t o f these debates. obscure.  But the words o f the A r t i c l e are r a t h e r  Under i t ; (a) membership i n the U n i t e d Nations i s open to a l l o t h e r p e a c e - l o v i n g S t a t e s which accept the o b l i g a t i o n s contained i n the present C h a r t e r and,  i n the judgment o f  the O r g a n i z a t i o n , are able and w i l l i n g to c a r r y out these  obligations.  (b) the admission o f any such S t a t e to members h i p i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w i l l be  effected  by a d e c i s i o n o f the General Assembly upon the recommendation o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Thus, f o u r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r membership to the U n i t e d can be decuced from the f i r s t paragraph are:  o f A r t i c l e 4;  Nations these  - 29  (i)  -  statehood;  ( i i ) be p e a c e - l o v i n g ; (iii)  acceptance  o f the o b l i g a t i o n s contained  i n the present (iv)  Charter;  a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to c a r r y out these  obligations.  Under these a n a l y s e s , the f i r s t lifications  and the f o u r t h qua-  are o f immediate concern w i t h regards to the  a p p l i c a t i o n o f m i c r o - S t a t e s f o r admission  to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  I n d i s c u s s i n g the statehood o f m i c r o - S t a t e s , the q u e s t i o n before us w i l l be whether the l i m i t a t i o n s upon s i z e , p o p u l a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s o f a S t a t e w i l l somewhat i m p a i r i t s t r u e independence. G e n e r a l l y speaking, the o n l y l i m i t a t i o n upon s i z e , p o p u l a t i o n l i  and r e s o u r c e s w i l l not a f f e c t the t r u e independence o f a S t a t e , although some p u b l i c i s t s took the view t h a t a S t a t e must 17 a c e r t a i n minimum s i z e o f t e r r i t o r y and p o p u l a t i o n .  possess Evidence  has shown t h a t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e had not merely admitted L i e c h t e n s t e i n , which had been r e j e c t e d by the League of N a t i o n s on ground o f i t s i n a b i l i t y  to c a r r y out i t s o b l i g a -  t i o n by reason o f i t s s m a l l s i z e , to i t s S t a t u t e — a n  admission  which i s only open to S t a t e s and which was made by an over a l l 18 m a j o r i t y i n the General Assembly, but s e v e r a l times r e f e r r e d to i t as a State and t r e a t e d i t as such i n the Nottebohm 19 . case. San Marino, which has l e s s p o p u l a t i o n - t h a n t h a t o f 20 L i e c h t e n s t e i n , i s a l s o a p a r t y to the S t a t u t e o f the Court. ;  1  - 30  To sum  up,  -  the mere l i m i t a t i o n upon s i z e ,  popula-  t i o n and, r e s o u r c e s cannot be a ground f o r denying the hood o f a S t a t e .  state-  But, o f course, i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h i s view  one does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h a t a State o f e x c e p t i o n a l l y s m a l l s i z e o r p o p u l a t i o n has tional organization.  any r i g h t to j o i n an i n t e r n a -  An i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n may  reject  i t s a p p l i c a t i o n not on the ground o f s m a l l s i z e o r p o p u l a t i o n alone, but on the undeniable  f a c t o f i t s p h y s i c a l and  finan-  c i a l i n a b i l i t y to c a r r y out the o b l i g a t i o n s o f membership. As U Thant has p o i n t e d out, "a d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between the r i g h t to independence and the q u e s t i o n o f  full  21 membership." Since most o f the newly independent  micro-States  are v e r y s m a l l i n s i z e , p o p u l a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s , they are 22 h a r d l y a b l e to f u l f i l the o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the C h a r t e r . In terms o f p o l i t i c a l experience, they "were s t i l l not mature 23 enough to d e a l w i t h t h e i r own  matter,"  l e t alone to  the U n i t e d Nations to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l  join  affairs.  Besides, under the present s t r u c t u r e o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , to  g r a n t membership to the m i c r o - S t a t e s might do h a r d s h i p to 24 25 both the m i c r o - S t a t e s and the U n i t e d Nations i t s e l f . As U Thant argued, U n i t e d N a t i o n s membership might "impose o b l i g a t i o n s which are too onerous f o r the m i c r o - S t a t e s and 26 a l s o may l e a d to a weakening o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . " In a s c e r t a i n i n g the f a c t s concerning the  admission  - 31 -  o f m i c r o - S t a t e s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , we  are aware t h a t the  U n i t e d N a t i o n s has n o t h i n g comparable to the league o f N a t i o n s ' " Q u e s t i o n n a i r e " to guide the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s Committee on 27 the Admission undertake  o f New  Members,  n o r does the General Assembly  any i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f the a p p l i -  cant S t a t e s .  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , we would suggest t h a t d e f i n i t e  c r i t e r i a should be a p p l i e d before making d e c i s i o n s on the o f g r a n t i n g memberships. s a y i n g t h a t " i t may undertake  T h i s i s a l s o what U Thant has  urged,  be opportune f o r the competent organs t o  a thorough  and comprehensive study o f the 28 f o r membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . . . . " In c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e we  universality"  case  criteria  are aware t h a t the "road to  i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s would merely open "the T: 29  road to f u t i l i t y ,  and f i n a l l y o b l i v i o n , "  We would  suggest  t h a t b e f o r e m i c r o - S t a t e s seek membership i n the U n i t e d Nations. , 1  they should care more about t h e i r i n t e r n a l developments both p o l i t i c a l and economic, and t h a t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s should t take more care i n a d m i t t i n g new S t a t e s to membership, perhaps 30 a d m i t t i n g them o n l y f o r a " t r i a l p e r i o d . " (2)  The Rule o f One-State One-Vote and the P r i n c i p l e o f Sovereign E q u a l i t y i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Along with the problems a r i s i n g from the i n c r e a s i n g  memberships o f m i c r o - S t a t e s i n the U n i t e d Nations i s the b a s i c problem o f the v o t i n g system i n the General Assembly.  - 32  -  A c c o r d i n g to A r t i c l e 2 o f the present  Charter,  " ( t ) h e O r g a n i z a t i o n i s based on the p r i n c i p l e o f the v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y o f a l l i t s Members." mise the G e n e r a l Assembly, as we  so-  And under t h i s  pre-  were t o l d , i s a r e a l "town  meeting o f the world,", w i t h i n which each Member S t a t e i s equal w i t h any o t h e r S t a t e i n so f a r as each Member has  one  vote, r e g a r d l e s s o f s i z e , p o p u l a t i o n or i t s p o l i t i c a l 31 strength.  No  S t a t e , l a r g e o r s m a l l , enjoys any  l e g e s or advantages i n c a s t i n g i t s v o t e . veto.  No  privi-  State has  T h i s i s the so**called r u l e o f "one-State  a  one-vote,"  Under t h i s r u l e , a m i c r o - S t a t e has the same vote as one the b i g powers.  of  I t s vote i s t h e r e f o r e out o f a l l p r o p o r t i o n  w i t h i t s weight i n the r e a l world o f I n t h i s r e s p e c t , one  politics.  can e a s i l y image the, f a c t  t h a t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i s g e t t i n g more and more unmanageable 32 and the c a p a c i t y o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n has a l s o been  reduced.  Furthermore, t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i l l d e t e r i o r a t e i f no reform i s e s t a b l i s h e d , s i n c e a great number o f p o t e n t i a l are marching through  micro-States  the t h r e s h o l d o f the post-war  dence movement and may  indepen-  e v e n t u a l l y be the Members o f the  United Nations. Thus, the q u e s t i o n s b e f o r e us are: I s the r u l e o f "one-state one-vote" c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r e a l i t i e s , o f the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l community?  Can the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  community a f f o r d to r u n the r i s k o f the r u l e o f  "one-state  one vote" c o n v e r t i n g the U n i t e d Nations i n t o a system domina-  - 33 -  t e d by i r r e s p o n s i b l e Members? n t.  To the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , t h e o r e t i c a l l y speaking the background o f adopting the r u l e o f "one-state one-vote" r a t h e r been based on the p r i n c i p l e o f w o r k a b i l i t y than that of sovereign e q u a l i t y . "one-State one-vote"  has on  The adoption o f the r u l e o f  i n the General Assembly was  justified  by the b e l i e f t h a t , apart from r e c o g n i z i n g s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l f o r the B i g F i v e , the General Assembly 33 was  p r i m a r i l y a forum o f d i s c u s s i o n and debate.  But i t i s  evident t h a t the s i t u a t i o n o f the General Assembly o f the 1940's h a r d l y resembless t h a t o f the 1960's.  One  crucial  example o f the i n c r e a s i n g power o f the G e n e r a l Assembly  was  shown by the adoption o f the U n i t i n g f o r Peace R e s o l u t i o n o f 1950  i n respose to the Korea War.  I n t h i s R e s o l u t i o n i t was  i n t e n d e d t h a t a p a r a l y z e d C o u n c i l c o u l d not be allowed to stand i n the way  o f the General Assembly i f the l a t t e r  a b l e and w i l l i n g to d e a l with the matters i n i s s u e . R e s o l u t i o n s i g n i f i e d r e a l l y a remarkable  was  This  departure from the  o r i g i n a l s p i r i t o f the C h a r t e r which never contemplated  the  use o f armed f o r c e by recommendation o f the General Assembly. Even the p r a c t i c e o f complete  e q u a l i t y of vote i n  the n i n e t e e n t h century has a l s o been evaded by some d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s ; otherwise the r o l e o f some i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r 34 g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d never be c a r r i e d out.  I n e f f e c t , ;the  p r i n c i p l e o f s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y as proclaimed i n the present  - 34  -  C h a r t e r w i l l convey o n l y t h a t a l l S t a t e s are equal  before  the law or, say deserve the equal p r o t e c t i o n o f law. is  This  j u s t as d e s c r i b e d by P r o f e s s o r Westlake t h a t "the e q u a l i -  t y o f s o v e r e i g n S t a t e s i s merely independence under a d i f 35 f e r e n t nature."  Prom the e q u a l i t y before law i t f o l l o w s  t h a t each independent S t a t e , no matter how  small i n s i z e ,  p o p u l a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s , i s guaranteed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law the freedom from f o r e i g n c o n t r o l without  i t s consent.  Another t h i n g which f o l l o w s i s t h a t , injjthe i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l proceedings Organization  between the b i g and  s m a l l powers, the  s h a l l t r e a t them i m p a r t i a l l y i r r e s p e c t i v e o f  t h e i r weight i n the r e a l world  politics.  With these  concepts  i n mind, i t would seem t o t a l l y wrong to i n s i s t on f u r t h e r e q u a l i t y among n a t i o n s which are a c t u a l l y unequal i n the 36 r e a l world. The  i n e q u a l i t y among S t a t e s shows c l e a r l y i n the  General  Assembly where there are now seated r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 37 o f 126 Member S t a t e s . Among these o n l y 12 S t a t e s have a 38 p o p u l a t i o n o f 40 m i l l i o n or more.  Not  l e s s than 59  S t a t e s have a p o p u l a t i o n o f 5 m i l l i o n o r below; 17 o f have even a p o p u l a t i o n o f l e s s than 1 m i l l i o n .  these  While on  1  the  o t h e r hand, Chine, I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union have more than h a l f the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  As f a r as  the p o p u l a t i o n i s concerned, i t i s obvious t h a t i t would tend to d i m i n i s h the a u t h o r i t y o f the General  Assembly's  - 35 -  decisions " i f the t o t a l population o f States voting i n favor o f them are f a r l e s s than t h a t o f m i n o r i t y v o t i n g a g a i n s t . "  39  A c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a t i s t i c a l estimate, i n t h e General Assembly t h e r e are 64 S t a t e s , which r e p r e s e n t o n l y a l i t t l e over 5 p e r centage o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f a l l the Members 40 while t h e i r combined vote w i l l r e p r e s e n t an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y . Of..} these 64 S t a t e s , 43 are so s m a l l t h a t they r e p r e s e n t  only  more than 3 p e r centage o f t h e U n i t e d Nations p o p u l a t i o n , y e t t h e i r combined v o t e s can prevent  an a f f i r m a t i v e d e c i s i o n on '41  any o f these i s s u e s which a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y ife r e q u i r e d . B e s i d e s , 86 o f the s m a l l e r S t a t e s w i t h a combined p o p u l a t i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g o n l y 10 p e r centage o f the t o t a l can' e a s i l y pass 42 a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y o f v o t e s on any i s s u e . As f a r as the annual c o n t r i b u t i o n by each Member S t a t e t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s concerned, t h i s exists too.  discrepancy  The U n i t e d S t a t e s alone pays more than 31 p e r  centage per annum which i s more than 775 times the minimum dues o f 0.04 p e r centage p a i d by each o f the 45 s m a l l S t a t e s 43 i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,  From t h i s aspect, i t i s q u i t e  p o s s i b l e t h a t the General Assembly's m a j o r i t i e s are composed o f S t a t e s whose aggregate c o n t r i b u t i o n i s l e s s than t h a t o f the m i n o r i t i e s . pay  T h i s i s j u s t the s i t u a t i o n t h a t "the r i c h .. 44 a l l the taxes and t h e poor pass a l l t h e laws.'! T h i s i n e q u a l i t y a l s o e x i s t s when t e r r i t o r y i s con-  sidered.  F o r example, the t o t a l area o f the U.S.S.R. i s more  - 36 -  than 751,75 times the s i z e o f the Maldive I s l a n d s which i s f o r the time b e i n g , the s m a l l e s t Member S t a t e i n the U n i t e d Nations. In t h e o r y , m i c r o - S t a t e s may,  i f they wish, muster  any d e c i s i o n i n the G-eneral Assembly without assuming the corresponding r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s : .  In t h i s circumstance, " i t  i s not i n accord w i t h reason and common sense" t h a t g r e a t and powerful S t a t e s w i l l agree to be bound i n d e c i s i o n s o f 45 important matters passed by these s m a l l S t a t e s . A c t u a l l y , the A f r o - A s i a n group i s badly  fragmented  on n e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g except c o l o n i a l problems and the r a c i a l questions.  On these i s s u e s t h e i r c l o s e v o t i n g s t r e n g t h i s  rather astonishing.  F o r example, i n 1961,  s t e r o f South A f r i c a , his  the f o r e i g n . m i n i -  E r i c Louw, a s s e r t e d i n the course o f  speech r e f e r r i n g t o h i s Government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s  be-  f o r e the General Assembly t h a t South A f r i c a n b l a c k s enjoyed a much h i g h e r l i v i n g standard than.many o f the A f r i c a n S t a t e s who  a t t a c k e d h i s government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s .  statement  so i n f u r i a t e d  But  this  the A f r i c a n s t h a t they passed an un-  precedented motion o f censure o f the Government o f South A f r i c a , o r i t s d e l e g a t e , f o r the statement made i n the General "* 46 Assembly which, i n t h e i r view, was  o f f e n s i v e and  erroneous.  In o r d e r to g a i n a g r e a t e r r e c o g n i t i o n o f e q u a l i t y among the Members o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , i n 1963 the power o f the s m a l l S t a t e s culminated i n the unprecedented  a d o p t i o n by the General  - 37  Assembly o f two  -  amendments to the C h a r t e r i n c r e a s i n g the  number o f s e a t s o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and the Economic and 47 Social Council. Besides, the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e v o t i n g s t r e n g t h o f these A f r o - A s i a n S t a t e s have a l s o shown i n s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n concerning 48 Assembly.  d e c o l o n i z a t i o n i n the  General  Yet i t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the members h i p o f the A f r i c a n group has now  reached 42 which i s j u s t  o n e - t h i r d o f the t o t a l U n i t e d Nations memberships.  Although  t h e i r combined per centage s c a l e o f assessments to the Nations 10.2  o n l y counts 2.67  and  t h e i r t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n counts  per centage o f t h a t o f the U n i t e d Nations,  e a s i l y w i t h the support  United  they  o f any one Member from the  may  other  group o b s t r u c t the adoption o f any d e c i s i o n f o r which a two-thirds majority i s required.  More important  i s the  fact  t h a t some s m a l l S t a t e s are become aware o f the dangers o f this situation.  A d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c i a l from a s m a l l State  r e c e n t l y p o i n t e d out t h a t the "one-State one-vote" system deluded the l i t t l e  c o u n t r i e s i n t o a " f a l s e sense o f importance 49  and undermines the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the World O r g a n i z a t i o n . " In h i s o p i n i o n , as a delegate  from a s m a l l country, he would  much p r e f e r to have a v o t i n g system which more a c c u r a t e l y represented To  the p o p u l a t i o n and r e a l i n f l u e n c e o f h i s sum  country.  up, viewed from the anomalous phenomenon r e -  l a t i n g to the v o t i n g , s t r e n g t h o f the s m a l l S t a t e s , the r u l e o f  - 38 -  "one-State one-vote"  i s open t o some doubt.  In t h i s  res-  pect, s e v e r a l weighted v o t i n g methods f o r the reform o f the present v o t i n g system o f the General Assembly have been p r o 50 51 posed by s e v e r a l government o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c i s t s . Among these proposed weighted v o t i n g systems,  some proposed  t h i s system should e x c l u s i v e l y based on the p o p u l a t i o n f a c t o r ; w h i l e o t h e r s suggested i t should r e l i e d on the a s s e s s ment p a i d by each Member S t a t e .  Although i t w i l l be  highly./  democratic when a weighted v o t i n g system i s based on popul a t i o n element, i t cound not r e f l e c t the r e a l power s o l e l y by t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  F o r i n s t a n c e , so l o n g as the popu-  l a t i o n f a c t o r i s the o n l y c r i t e r i a o f a l l o c a t i n g the votes i n the G e n e r a l Assembly, I n d i a w i l l have no l e s s i n f l u e n c e than the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i l e i n a c t u a l i t y the former i s f a r l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l than the l a t t e r .  But an unacceptable r e s u l t  w i l l a l s o be r e v e a l e d from adopting the c r i t e r i a t h a t the assessments  p a i d by each S t a t e should be the o n l y b a s i s i n  d i s t r i b u t i n g the v o t e s i n the General Assembly.  In 1967  the  B i g F i v e c o n t r i b u t e d n e a r l y 65 per centage of the t o t a l . Among them the U n i t e d S t a t e s alone c o n t r i b u t e d 31.91 centage  per  more than twice the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the S o v i e t  Union, more than t h r e e times t h a t o f the U n i t e d Kingdom, and more than f i v e times, t h a t o f France, s i x times t h a t o f China. T h e r e f o r e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s alone c o u l d b l o c k any  important  i s s u e i n the General Assembly; and on the other hand, with support of the U n i t e d Kingdom, France and China, c o u l d command  -  39  -  a simple m a j o r i t y ; and t o g e t h e r w i t h a s m a l l group o f a l l i e s c o u l d a l s o command a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y .  I t i s , therefore,  e v i d e n t t h a t n e i t h e r the S o v i e t b l o c nor the s m a l l S t a t e s i n the Assembly would be expected t o support such a reform the r e s u l t s o f which would be unacceptable to them. In  c o n c l u s i o n , i t seems f a i r to say t h a t the d i s -  t r i b u t i o n o f votes i n the General Assembly should be'determined by o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a composed o f the f a c t o r s o f both the p o p u l a t i o n and f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n o f each Member State.  C  Proposed  S p e c i a l Arrangements f o r M i c r o - S t a t e s i n the  United Nations As mentioned above, the m i c r o - S t a t e s are expected to  b e n e f i t more by r e s t r i c t i n g themselves  to c e r t a i n  spe-  c i a l i z e d agencies o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s o r o t h e r s p e c i a l arrangements than by assuming the o b l i g a t i o n s o f f u l l members h i p o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , which are too onerous f o r them to 52  bear because o f the l a c k o f economic and human r e s o u r c e s . E x p e r i e n c e has shown t h a t , o t h e r than f u l l members h i p o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , s e v e r a l forms o f a s s o c i a t i o n f o r non-Member  S t a t e s are a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  system,  such as access to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court o f J u s t i c e  (ICJ)  and membership i n the r e l e v a n t U n i t e d N a t i o n s r e g i o n a l  53  - 40  economic commissions,  54  -  and the r i g h t to m a i n t a i n a p e r -  manent o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  Headquarters.  55  Membership i n the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies a l s o p r o v i d e s the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r access to jthe b e n e f i t s p r o v i d e d by the U n i t e d i  N a t i o n s Development Programme and f o r i n v i t a t i o n s to U n i t e d Nations conferences. may  Besides, under the C h a r t e r a non-Member  b r i n g to the S e c u r i t y O o u n c i a l o r the General Assembly  56 any d i s p u t e to which i t i s a p a r t y .  I n a d d i t i o n to these  arrangements which are a v a i l a b l e , at the present time, to the m i c r o - S t a t e s , a d i f f e r e n t form o f a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d  57 N a t i o n s has been proposed.  It i s  associate-membership  under which a m i c r o - S t a t e might be admitted to the U n i t e d S N a t i o n s f o r m a l l y , but t h e i r r i g h t r e s t r i c t o n l y to the Assembly without h o l d i n g a v o t e .  address  Of course, t h i s would  i n v o l v e the amendment o f the C h a r t e r . A l l o f these s p e c i a l arrangements may  mostly serve  the present need o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s without imposing heavy o b l i g a t i o n s on them. f o l l o w i n g statements  Thus, a d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be found i n the concerning these arrangements i n o r d e r  to see whether they are adequate to meet the needs o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s , and whether any o t h e r arrangements should be devised. To begin with, we  are aware t h a t some o f the most  c o n s t r u c t i v e e f f o r t s i n the economic and s o c i a l f i e l d performed  are  by the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  - 41 -  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , the m i c r o - S t a t e s would be w e l l a d v i s e d to j o i n the s p e c i a l i z e d  agencies which would o f f e r them a g r e a t  h e l p i n t h e i r economic and s o c i a l development, the most urgent job f a c i n g  them upon the s t a r t i n g o f t h e i r new  Some o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s have chosen p a r t i c i p a t i o n specialized  life.  i n the  agencies o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s r a t h e r than  membership, such as Western Samoa, L i e c h t e n s t e i n , San 59 and Monaco.  Although they have not j o i n e d  full Marino  a l l the spe^L,  c i a l i z e d agencies o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , they f e l t t h a t the participation  of f certain i n s t i t u t i o n s i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r  t h e i r p r e s e n t need.  And e q u a l l y important i s the f a c t  that,  although the p r o v i s i o n s o f admission to membership i n the specialized  agencies v a r y from one to another, i t i s more  e a s i l y o b t a i n a b l e than membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Furthermore,  some s p e c i a l i z e d  agencies admit not o n l y s o v e r e i g n  S t a t e s but non-sovereign S t a t e s t o o . those s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s  T h i s w i l l be h e l p f u l to  t h a t adopt a statehood s h o r t o f  full  independence. And o t h e r than f u l l membership p r o v i d e d i n the v a rious is  specialized  also  available  agencies, a form o f  associate-membership 61  t o the s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s .  i n s t i t u t i o n , an a s s o c i a t e member may  participate  Under t h i s i n the ac-  t i v i t i e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but without a r i g h t to v o t e . As f a r as the advantages m i c r o - S t a t e s i n the s p e c i a l i z e d  o f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  agencies are concerned,  we  - 42  may  conclude  as f o l l o w s .  -  Firstly,  because o f the f a c t t h a t  the f u n c t i o n s o f these s p e c i a l i z e d agencies a l l emphasize the promotion o f s o c i a l and economic development among the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y i s 62 g e n e r a l l y adopted, e x p r e s s l y o r t a c i t l y , zations.  Consequently,  i n these o r g a n i -  micro-States or small t e r r i t o r i e s  are  more l i k e l y to g a i n membership! i n them than i n the U n i t e d Nations.  Secondly?  s i n c e the f u n t i o n s o f these o r g a n i z a t i o n s  are c o n c e n t r a t e d p r i m a r i l y on the promotion o f economic and s o c i a l development, the m i c r o - S t a t e s o r  small-territories,  most o f which are economically and humanly n o n - v i a b l e , s u r e l y b e n e f i t from them i n advancing  will  t h e i r economic and  s o c i a l development and they w i l l do so without  assuming the  heavy o b l i g a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n U n i t e d N a t i o n s membership. Besides.'^ i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies,  micro-  States': o r s m a l l - ^ t e r r i t o r i e s might a l s o a v a i l themselves o f the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r access to the b e n e f i t s provided by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Development Program (UNDP) and f o r i n v i t a t i o n 63 to U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o n f e r e n c e s . In the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' present p r a c t i c e the o n l y e x i s t i n g i n t e r m e d i a t e arrangement between f u l l or no members h i p i s the s t a t u s o f "permanent observer" which has 64 p u r e l y "on p r a c t i c e . " .  G e n e r a l l y speaking,  developed  permanent  observer s t a t u s i s a device t h a t allow a non-Member  govern-  ment to have i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s t a t i o n e d i n the U n i t e d  - 43 -  N a t i o n s Headquarters where i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s  are b e i n g  d i s c u s s e d and where d e c i s i o n s are b e i n g made; and these r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s can do anything, s u b j e c t to a c e r t a i n  65  limit,  t h a t a Member's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e can do except speak and v o t e i n o f f i c i a l session. Experience has shown c e r t a i n advantages i n m a i n t a i n ing  a permanent observer m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d Nations Head66  quarters.  S e c r e t a r y General U Thant has, t h e r e f o r e , sug-  gested t h a t m i c r o - S t a t e s should be p e r m i t t e d to e s t a b l i s h permanent o b s e r v e r s t a t u s at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Headquarters and at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s O f f i c e at Geneva i n o r d e r t h a t these 67 m i c r o - S t a t e s can be c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . There are t h r e e advantages  ;;to the m i c r o - S t a t e s i n m a i n t a i n i n g  permanent o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n s at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s O f f i c e at Geneva. Firstly,  s i n c e most o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s are newly  independent S t a t e s , i t i s obvious t h a t they are not prepared to handle t h e i r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s .  fully  By m a i n t a i n i n g  a permanent observer m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d Nations  '  Headquarters,  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s w i l l become more f a m i l i a r with the f u n c t i o n s o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and i t w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be e a s i e r f o r them to c a r r y out t h e i r p o l i c y tively  effec-  whether they w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be Members o f the U n i t e d 68 Nations or not.  _ 44  -  Secondly, by m a i n t a i n i n g a permanent observer m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Headquarters, may  the m i c r o - S t a t e s  g a i n more advantages i n the f i e l d o f s o c i a l and economic  assistance.  Although i t i s t r u e t h a t even without m a i n t a i n -  i n g permanent observer m i s s i o n s at the U n i t e d Nations Headq u a r t e r s , m i c r o - S t a t e s can s t i l l b e n e f i t through the U n i t e d N a t i o n s s p e c i a l programme and i t s s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s . it  But  i s e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t through the c l o s e communication be-'  tween the o b s e r v e r and the r e s p o n s i b l e o f f i c i a l s w i t h i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Headquarters,  the m i c r o - S t a t e s * need o f o b t a i n -  i n g a s s i s t a n c e can a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n o f the organization earlier;  concerned  thus, m i c r o - S t a t e s can get such  assist-  ance much more e f f i c i e n t l y and e f f e c t i v e l y than the o t h e r non-Member S t a t e with no permanet observer  either.  F i n a l l y , l i k e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o t h e r arrangements, m i c r o - S t a t e s i n t a k i n g t h i s s t a t u s may  enjoy  p r i v i l e g e s as mentioned above, without assuming the 69 burdens o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s membership.  certain full  S i n c e i t has been proved by experience t h a t the maintenance o f permanent observer m i s s i o n at the U n i t e d Nations Headquarters does i n f a c t b e n e f i t both the U n i t e d Nations  and  the non-Member S t a t e s , i t would be d e s i r a b l e f o r the General Assembly to convene a study o f the q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d and to draw up a l e g a l r u l e p e r m i t t i n g non-Members, i n c l u d i n g of course m i c r o - S t a t e s , to take such s t e p .  - 45  Apart  -  from the e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a v a i l a b l e to  the m i c r o - S t a t e s ,  s e v e r a l p r o p o s a l s have been recommended  f o r s o l v i n g the problems o f m i c r o - S t a t e s  i n the U n i t e d  Nations. One  o f these p r o p o s a l s i s the c r e a t i o n o f  c i a t e membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  Although  asso-  this kind  o f membership i n v o l v e s problems, i t i s s t i l l p r a c t i c a l i f the weighted v o t i n g system i s p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e .  As;  f a r as the term o f "associate-membership" i s concerned, i t i s 70 not strange to the p r a c t i c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . But i t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t such membership has, with 71 exception, organizations.  existed only i n n o n - p o l i t i c a l Perhaps t h a t i s why  international  the term o f a s s o c i a t e -  membership s i g n i f i e s the absence o f an independent Besides, under the  one  statehood.  p r a c t i c e o f the i n s t i t u t i o n s which p r o -  v i d e such s t a t u s , an a s s o c i a t e member has no r i g h t to vote but can o n l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s o f such i n s t i t u tions. it  I n view o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h i s membership,  seems u n l i k e l y to g a i n the support  f o r the establishment  among the s m a l l S t a t e s  o f such membership i n the U n i t e d  u n l e s s c e r t a i n p r i v i l e g e s be a t t a c h e d to i t .  Nations,  Futhermore the  c r e a t i o n o f suchvan i n s t i t u t i o n i n v o l v e s the amendment o f the Charter, f o r which a t w o - t h i r d s vote o f the Members o f the ;  U n i t e d N a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the c o n c u r r i n g votes o f the  five  permanent Members o f the S e c u r i t y Council.^ i s r e q u i r e d . '  - 46 -  Under these circumstances, two i d e a s w i l l be r e commended.  One i s that s i n c e the problems o f m i c r o - S t a t e s  are problems o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s themselves  r a t h e r than t h a t  o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t e membership 72 should be encouraged  among t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s .  In order to  induce the m i c r o - S t a t e s t o take such a s t e p , the o t h e r r e commendation i s t o o f f e r a c e r t a i n advantage t o the microS t a t e s which have take such membership.  The g u i d i n g p r i n -  c i p l e i n d e f i n i n g the advantages o f t h i s s t a t u s i s t o manage a balance between the r i g h t s and d u t i e s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f each S t a t e .  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a r e d u c t i o n o f o r even an exemp-  t i o n from t h e assessment o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s may be used. I n p r a c t i c e , a number o f meetings w i l l be o f no immediate i n t e r e s t t o micro-Member-States and they w i l l not wish to attend them.  N e v e r t h e l e s s through t h e i r membership f e e s they  w i l l be paying p a r t o f the c o s t s o f these meetings.  There-  f o r e , another s u g g e s t i o n f o r the inducement o f m i c r o - S t a t e s to take such a s t a t u s i s t o l i m i t such membership to c e r t a i n organs depending  on the needs o f each S t a t e .  In addition,  a p r o p o s a l has been made to e s t a b l i s h a s p e c i a l centre i n the U n i t e d Nations Headquarters  service  i n order to give 73  adequate advice and i n f o r m a t i o n t o the m i c r o - S t a t e s .  Be-  cause i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e v a r i o u s s p e c i a l arrangements are s t i l l a heavy burden t o some microS t a t e s , and a s p e c i a l s e r v i c e c e n t r e may g i v e a l l the necess a r y a s s i s t a n c e to t h e m i c r o - S t a t e s o r s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s  - 47 -  without imposing any o b l i g a t i o n s on them. In conclusion,  i t seems t o us t h a t each o f these  arrangements has i t s own m e r i t s and d e f e c t s .  And i n d e c i d i n g  which arrangement i s s u i t a b l e f o r one s p e c i f i c m i c r o - S t a t e does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y make i t s u i t a b l e f o r another. As f o r t h e s p e c i a l i z e d agencies, 'there i s no doubt t h a t they w i l l be o f a i d both t o the m i c r o - S t a t e s and the United Nations.  A l s o , we would l i k e to conclude t h a t a f u l l  study and d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d be made i n o r d e r t o l e g a l i z e the s t a t u s o f o b s e r v e r which i s a l s o the best membership.  a l t e r n a t i v e to f u l l  B e s i d e s , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s should a l s o make a  study t o see whether agreement i s p o s s i b l e oh the c r e a t i o n o f an a l t e r n a t i v e form o f a s s o c i a t i o n short o f f u l l membership, t h a t i s , a s s o c i a t e membership.  - 43  IV THE  -  PROBLEM 01? STATEHOOD FOR  MICRO-STATES  Apart from the impact o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, t h e r e  are some problems a r i s i n g  from the d e c o l o n i z a t i o n o f s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s . the problems concerning territories.  These are  the f u t u r e statehood o f these  Should f u l l independence be advocated?  small Or  something l e s s than independence be the a l t e r n a t i v e ? we  the  Before  can r e a c h a c o n c l u s i o n on these problems, a s c r u t i n y o f  the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' a t t i t u d e toward d e c o l o n i z a t i o n and present  the  p r a c t i c e o f some s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s i n choosing t h e i r  statehood i s r e q u i r e d . 1 As d i s c u s s e d N a t i o n s has The  above,  s i n c e i t s b e g i n n i n g the  always been a c t i v e i n the problem o f  h i g h t i d e o f d e c o l o n i z a t i o n was  United  decolonization.  reached i n I960 when the  General Assembly adopted the h i s t o r i c a l R e s o l u t i o n 14 December I 9 6 0 — t h e D e c l a r a t i o n on the G r a n t i n g  1514  (XV)  of  o f Independence  to C o l o n i a l Countries^and Peoples, which became the "Gospel o f decolonization."  ©lis r e s o l u t i o n a f f i r m s t h a t "(a)11 peoples  have the r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;  by v i r t u e o f t h a t righttibhey  f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic s o c i a l and  c u l t u r a l development,"  and  declares  t h a t "(ijmmediate steps s h a l l be taken i n T r u s t and Non-SelfGoverning T e r r i t o r i e s o r o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s which have not a t t a i n e d independence... i n order to enable them to enjoy  yet  complete independence and Declaration's  freedom."  More important was  a s s e r t i o n ' t h a t "inadequacy o f  the  political,  economic, s o c i a l or e d u c a t i o n a l preparedness should never 4 serve  as a p r e t e x t f o r d e l a y i n g independence."  r a t i o n m a n i f e s t s the f e e l i n g t h a t It  This  goes beyond the 5  Charter  requirement o f a " f u l l measure o f self-government" c a l l f o r "immediate and  full  decla-  in its  independence."  Most o f the r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s concerning  de-  c o l o n i z a t i o n adopted by the G e n e r a l Assembly i n these few y e a r s s t i l l r e a f f i r m e d "the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t o f the people... 6 to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n few  and independence."'!  But  as i n the  last  y e a r s most o f the l a r g e c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s have become  independent, there appears to be an i n c r e a s i n g awareness w i t h i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s t h a t t o t a l independence may the best  a l t e r n a t i v e f o r the r e s t o f the dependent  not  terri-  t o r i e s most o f which are e x c e p t i o n a l l y s m a l l and poor which are now status.  one  and  a f t e r another emerging out o f t h e i r c o l o n i a l  By p a s s i n g  recognizes  be  s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n s , the General Assembly  t h a t i n case o f some s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s , " s p e c i a l  circumstances o f geographic l o c a t i o n and  economic c o n d i t i o n s "  7 should  be taken i n t o  consideration.  In I960 the G e n e r a l Assembly c l a r i f i e d i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "a f u l l measure o f self-government" by 8 i t s Resolution  1541  (X?).  approving  In t h i s R e s o l u t i o n i t e l a b o r a -  t e s twelve p r i n c i p l e s to guide Members i n determining  whe-  - 50  -  t h e r o r not an o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s to t r a n s m i t the  informa-  t i o n c a l l e d f o r i n A r t i c l e 73e o f the C h a r t e r o f the U n i t e d 9 Nations.  And  i n the L i s t o f F a c t o r s attached to t h i s Reso-  l u t i o n , ''emergence as a s o v e r e i g n independent State,": " f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n with an independent S t a t e , " o r " i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h 10 an independent State"'are viewed as meeting the Charter 11 aim of " a f u l l measure o f self-government." These developments express two  d e f i n i t e and some-  what c o n t r a d i c t o r y streams o f thought on the approach o f the United Nations' ing  a t t i t u d e toward the remaining  t e r r i t o r i e s , R e s o l u t i o n 1514  (XV)  non-self-govern-  emphasizes the immediate  t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l i s m and g r a n t i n g o f f u l l while R e s o l u t i o n 1541 to  (XV) proposes the f r e e c h o i c e  the p o p u l a t i o n ' s w i l l . It  independence, according  •  i g ^ a j i i t e t r u e to note t h a t although the f r e e  e x p r e s s i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n ' s w i l l i s f u l l y r e c o g n i z e d i n the General Assembly, from a U n i t e d N a t i o n s p o i n t o f view the 12 p o s s i b i l i t y o f choosing indepdendence i s preeminent. Some Members were even r e l u c t a n t to see any r e s u l t from s e l f - d e t e r 13 mination of  t h a t f a l l s short o f f u l l independence.  This kind  f e e l i n g appears s p e c i a l l y i n case o f the dependent  terri-  t o r i e s choosing a s s o c i a t e s t a t u s with a former a d m i n i s t e r i n g c o l o n i a l power.  In t h e i r view t h i s k i n d o f a s s o c i a t i o n  v i o l a t e s the v e r y concept  o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n which, they  b e l i e v e , c a l l s f o r immediate and u n e q u i v o c a l d e c o l o n i z a t i o n .  -  The  q u e s t i o n s now  51  -  posed before us are: which o f the  a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l serve best the needs o f the s m a l l S t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r f u t u r e statehood? a l t e r n a t i v e s are necessary  whether o t h e r  f o r some s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s ?  As f a r as the f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s concerned, the present a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s 14 contained i n General Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 1541  (XV);  are  these  are: (1) t o t a l independence o f any power; (2) f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n with an independent State;  and  (3) i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h an independent State. One  o f the most i n t e r e s t i n g i n s t a n c e s o f  indepen-  dence through s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s the case o f Western Samoa, which became an independent s o v e r e i g n S t a t e on 1 15  January 1962.  But i n c o n s i d e r i n g the l i m i t a t i o n o f i t s  economic and p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y , i t handed back to Zealand,  New  i t s former a d m i n i s t e r i n g power, a c e r t a i n power to  act as i t s agent i n matters o f e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s . Under the T r e a t y o f . F r i e n d s h i p signed at Apia;; on 1 August 1962, the Government o f New  Zealand  and  Government o f Wetern Samoa have agreed  t h a t the two  the  ment s h a l l continue to work t o g e t h e r " t o promote the  Governwelfare  - 52 -  o f the people o f Western Samoa,'' and s p e c i a l l y the Government o f New Zealand s h a l l take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n " s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y " the r e q u e s t s from the Government o f Western Samoa f o r t e c h . 1 6 n i c a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e .  More i n t e r e s t -  i n g i s t h a t the Government o f New Zealand has agreed to p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e to the Government o f Western Samoa i n the conduct o f i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n .  The Government o f  Western Samoa may use t h e New Zealand! s overseas p o s t s f o r :  handling i t s foreign a f f a i r s .  :  Although Western Samoa c o n t i -  n u a l l y makes use o f New Zealand Embassies  and High Commissions  abroad t o communicate between i t s e l f and o t h e r f o r e i g n ments, i t i s a b s o l u t e l y independent foreign p o l i c i e s .  govern-  i n f o r m u l a t i n g i t s own  The Government o f New Zealand has a l s o  agreed, on the r e q u e s t o f t h e Government o f Y/estern Samoa, t o undertake  the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on b e h a l f o f the Government o f  Western Samoa at any i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference and t o undertake the d i p l o m a t i c p r o t e c t i o n o f Western Samoa i n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s and t o perform c o n s u l a r f u n c t i o n s on i t s b e h a l f . There seem no i n s o l u a b l e problems a r i s i n g i n the Western Samoa s case,,. 1  On the one hand, i t has s o v e r e i g n s t a t u s  which may serve as the b a s i s f o r i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , and on the o t h e r hand, New Zealand d e a l s s e p a r a t e l y w i t h the e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f Western Samoa, which alone takes t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A r e c e n t case o f self-government through f r e e  asso-  - 53 -  e i a t i o n i s the  instance  o f the Cook I s l a n d s , which had been  dependencies o f New Zealand.  I t became a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  S t a t e i n f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n with New Zealand  on 4 August 1965.  Under S e c t i o n 5 o f the Cook I s l a n d s C o n s t i t u t i o n Act o f 1964, New Zealand  i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d i s c h a r g e 17  o f e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and defense o f the Cook I s l a n d s .  But  the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly o f t h e Cook I s l a n d s has the power to enact laws " f o r t h e peace, o r d e r and good government o f the Cook I s l a n d s " and these laws are o f e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l application.  18 .  Most important  i s t h a t under S e c t i o n 4 1 o f  the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, the Cook I s l a n d s has the power t o 19 r e p e a l o r t o amend t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n .  This implies that i t  may have t h e r i g h t t o move to f u l l independence by u n i l a t e r a l act. In i t s R e s o l u t i o n 2064 (XX) on 16 December 1965 concerning General  the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the Cook I s l a n d s , the  Assembly noted t h a t the people o f the Cook I s l a n d s  "have had c o n t r o i ; o f l t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and o f t h e i r f u t u r e , " and c o n s i d e r s t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n o f New concerning  Zealand  the t r a n s m i s s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f  the Cook I s l a n d s under A r t i c l e 73e o f the C h a r t e r " i s no 20 l o n g e r necessary."  The U n i t e d Nations  d i d not i n s i s t on  independence f o r the Cook I s l a n d s , p r i m a r i l y because the U n i t e d Nations  observers  s u p e r v i s e d the referendum and i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n provided f o r f u l l  self-government with the 55  - 54 -  o p t i o n o f e v e n t u a l independence.  The U n i t e d N a t i o n s , however,  i n i t s R e s o l u t i o n 2064 (XX), s t i l l r e a f f i r m s the r i g h t o f the people o f the Cook I s l a n d s to " f u l l independence" General Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 1514  (XV).  under  21  To sum up, the U n i t e d N a t i o n s was not opposed to a s s o c i a t i o n " p r o v i d e d t h a t the arrangemenit was  freely  chosen  by the indigenous people and t h a t t h e i r a c t o f c h o i c e was 22 s u p e r v i s e d by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , " and p r o v i d e d that the people o f the t e r r i t o r i e s r e t a i n l t h e dependent s t a t u s whenever they  r i g h t t o change t h e i r 23  wish.  Speaking g e n e r a l l y , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes at the p r e s e n t time, the f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n o f the Cook I s l a n d s w i t h New  Zealand works w e l l . But t h i s e f f e c t was not the same i n the case o f the  s i x i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s o f Antigua, S t . K i t t s - N e v i s - A n g u i l a , Dominica,  S t . l u c i a , S t . V i n c e n t and Grenada.  These  Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s became, at the b e g i n n i n g o f 24 "States i n Association with B r i t a i n . "  The  1967,  constitutional  s t a t u s o f these s i x Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s i n a s s o c i a t i o n 25 w i t h B r i t a i n i s s e t out i n the West I n d i e s Act o f  1967.  Under t h i s Act, each o f the A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s i s f u l l y governing i n i t s i n t e r n a l  self-  a f f a i r s and l e a v e s the r e s p o n s i -  b i l i t y f o r e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and defense w i t h the necessary l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e powers to d i s c h a r g e these f u n c t i o n s  -  to  55  -  the U n i t e d Kingdom. But t o a c e r t a i n degree t h e j U n i t e d Kingdom/  t i g h t e r c o n t r o l over these on the Goo_ I s l a n d s .  A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s than New 26 :  Under t h e Act,  has a Zealand  though t h e U n i t e d  Kingdom w i l l not a f f e c t the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f these s i x S t a t e s , i t s t i l l r e t a i n s the competence i n matters r e l a t i n g to  the problems, which " i n the o p i n i o n o f Her Majesty's  Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom" i s a matter i n r e s p e c t t o defence,  e i t h e r o f an A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e o r o f the U n i t e d  Kingdom o r any o f i t s t e r r i t o r i e s , o r t o e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s , n a t i o n a l i t y o r c i t i z e n s h i p , o r r e l a t i n g t o the s u c c e s s i o n to  t h e Throne o r the Royal S t y l e and T i t l e s .  U n i t e d Kingdom possesses  Besides, the  the competence r e l a t i n g to any power  c o n f e r r e d on the Crown by the West I n d i e s Act o r under l e g i s l a t i o n o f an A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e . P r o v i s i o n s f o r the t e r m i n a t i o n o f a s s o c i a t i o n and ensuing independence are a l s o contained i n t h e West I n d i e s 27 Act.  Although  i t p r o v i d e s t h a t each o f the S t a t e s may  pass a law to end i t s a s s o c i a t i o n with t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and d e c l a r e i t s e l f t o be f u l l y independent, a c e r t a i n  pro-  cedure i s r e q u i r e d before the t e r m i n a t i o n may come i n t o effect.  I n b r i e f , i t r e q u i r e s , a f t e r the t h i r d r e a d i n g o f  the B i l l p r o v i d i n g f o r the t e r m i n a t i o n o f the a s s o c i a t i o n , the B i l l must g a i n t h e support o f not l e s s than of  two-thirds  a l l the e l e c t e d members o f the l e g i s l a t u r e and a two-  - 56 -  t h i r d s m a j o r i t y o f t h e e l e c t o r s i n a referendum before t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a s s o c i a t i o n c o u l d come i n t o  effect.  f  Within the United Nations,  the, a t t i t u d e o f the  Committee o f 24 towards t h i s " a s s o c i a t i o n " was f a r l e s s 28 f a v o r a b l e than t h a t towards t h e Cook I s l a n d s .  The Com-  m i t t e e took the view t h a t u n l e s s t h e p o p u l a t i o n s are g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y , under the auspices o f a U n i t e d Nations  super-  v i s i o n , , t o choose f r e e l y among the a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s , the O r g a n i z a t i o n cannot be assured t h a t t h e wishes o f the people have been f u l f i l l e d .  The Committee a l s o decided t h a t  R e s o l u t i o n 1514 (XV) continues t o apply t o these  territories.  I n s h o r t , the main d i f f e r e n c e between the case o f the Cook I s l a n d s and t h a t o f the " A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s " i s t h a t the Cook I s l a n d s enjoys complete power o f law-making.  Un-  l i k e t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's power i n t h e " A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s , " New Zealand has no o v e r i d i n g power to extend Cook I s l a n d s , u n l e s s i t "has been requested to by the  Government o f t h e Cook I s l a n d s . "  i t s law to the and consented 29  Viewed from these two cases, t h e r e i s a f e e l i n g t h a t i n case o f " a s s o c i a t i o n " the g e o g r a p h i c a l , economic and communication r e l a t i o n s between the a s s o c i a t i n g and the a s s o c i a t e d State should be h i g h l y c o n s i d e r e d .  This i s also  the reason why the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between New Zealand and the Cook I s l a n d s are much fewer than those between the U n i t e d  - 57 -  Kingdom and the A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s .  30  However, onethihg ;  worth n o t i n g i n the case o f a s s o c i a t i o n i s t h a t the s t a t u s of  the a s s o c i a t e d State i s changeable  and the people o f the  a s s o c i a t e d S t a t e may,  a c c o r d i n g to the outlook o f the U n i t e d 31 N a t i o n s , choose independence whenever they wish. The l a s t a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r " f u l l measure of  self-government" 32 State."  i s "an i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h an  Up u n t i l now,  t h e r e have been two first  instances of  such " i n t e g r a t i o n . "  The  of  B r i t i s h Togoland,  which had been administered as a p a r t  of  the Gold Coast.  On 15  one was  independent  December 1955,  Assembly passed the R e s o l u t i o n 944  the T r u s t t e r r i t o r y  the  General  (IX), c a l l i n g f o r a p l e b i  s c i t e . under U n i t e d N a t i o n s s u p e r v i s i o n t o a s c e r t a i n whether the people o f the B r i t i s h T:ogoland d e s i r e d union with an (  independent  Gold Coast, o r s e p a r a t i o n from the Gold  Coast  and c o n t i n u a t i o n under t r u s t e e s h i p d u r i n g the u l t i m a t e d e t e r mination of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e . p l e b i s c i t e h e l d c.in May  1956,  t h i s t e r r i t o r y was  the Gold Coast i n the independent 33 to be a T r u s t t e r r i t o r y . The o t h e r case o f  On the b a s i s o f t h i s united with  S t a t e o f Ghana and  i n t e g r a t i o n was  ceased  the Northern  p a r t o f the Cameroons under B r i t i s h A d m i n i s t r a t i o n with Nigeria.  Since each p a r t o f the t e r r i t o r y had a d i f f e r e n t  58 -  h i s t o r y , development and p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and the General Assembly decided t h a t a "separate  loyalties,  plebiscite"  under U n i t e d N a t i o n s s u p e r v i s i o n should take p l a c e i n the southern and n o r t h e r n p a r t s o f the Cameroons under U n i t e d 34 ' Kingdom a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1961  As a r e s u l t o f t h e 12  February  p l e b i s c i t e s , which f a c e d the peoples i n both p a r t s o f  the t e r r i t o r y with the choice o f union w i t h an N e g e r i a o r w i t h an independent  independent  Cameroon, the Northern  Cameroons became a separate p r o v i n c e o f the Northern  Region  o f N i g e r i a , the Southern  Cameroons j o i n e d the R e p u b l i c o f 35 Cameroun as a f e d e r a l S t a t e . To sum up, the a l t e r n a t i v e o f " i n t e g r a t i o n with independent  S t a t e " as shown i n the above two  an  cases i s r e a l l y  a p r a c t i c a b l e way  f o r i n h a b i t a n t s o f the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s 36 to achieve independence. In t h i s r e s p e c t , a form o f 37 f e d e r a t i o n w i l l a l s o have the same e f f e c t , such as the case o f the Southern 38 with Cameroun.  Cameroons under B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  But, as we  are aware, before an  g r a t i o n " o r a " f e d e r a t i o n " may  "inte-  take p l a c e , s e v e r a l f a c t o r s  must be c o n s i d e r e d , such as the g e o g r a p h i c a l , r a c i a l  and  e t h i c a l l i n k s between the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s and the i n d e pendent S t a t e .  Besides, the d i f f e r e n c e o f p o l i t i c a l  achieve-  39 ment between the S t a t e s concerned  should not be too g r e a t .  Thus, as many • s m a l l , - t e r r i t o r i e s are g e o g r a p h i c a l l y i s o l a t e d and p o l i t i c a l l y l e s s developed,  i t may  be d i f f i c u l t f o r them  - 59  -  to form an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f an independent S t a t e . I n c o n c l u s i o n , I would suggest t h a t , as f a r as these three a l t e r n a t i v e s are concerned,  the best  solution  to the problem o f the c h o i c e o f f u t u r e statehood o f the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l be the way  t h a t was  achieved  by  Western Samoa, which, as i n d i c a t e d above, upon independence requested Hew  Zealand  foreign a f f a i r s .  to act as i t s agent i n matters  of  Apart from the above a l t e r n a t i v e , I would  recommend another two  p o s s i b l e ways f o r the  to choose t h e i r f u t u r e s t a t u s .  small-territories  The f i r s t one  i s that i t  would be p o s s i b l e f o r the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s w i t h i n a c e r t a i n a r e a to l i n k t o g e t h e r to form a p o l i t i c a l l y and v i a b l e S t a t e — e i t h e r a unitary or f e d e r a l State. one  economically The  other  i s t h a t a s m a l l t e r r i t o r y might choose a s s o c i a t i o n with 40 .  the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Nations  Under such an a s s o c i a t i o n , the U n i t e d  c o u l d o f f e r adequate f a c i l i t i e s to meet i t s needs.  I n p r a c t i c e , the U n i t e d N a t i o n s has s e t up a c e r t a i n machinery 41 to a d m i n i s t e r a»territory which f a l l s s h o r t o f independence.  V  CONCLUSION  Prom the f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n s , the c o n c l u s i o n of  t h i s problem can t h e r e f o r e be drawn i n t o two  (1)  aspects.  As f a r as the f u t u r e statehood o f the  S t a t e s i s concerned,  we would suggest  t h a t the  micromicro-States,  upon t h e i r independence, should c o n s i d e r t h e i r own of m a i n t a i n i n g some kinds^of r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a  interest  politically  and e c o n o m i c a l l y advanced S t a t e f o r a c e r t a i n p e r i o d . t h i s r e s p e c t , they may  In  concentrate on the development o f  t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l achievements without  leaving  them d e f e n s e l e s s a g a i n s t the e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e , such as i n the case o f Western Samoa. of  I n case o f the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  adopting t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , we would recommend t h a t the  U n i t e d Nations should r e p l a c e the former a d m i n i s t e r i n g powers to p r o v i d e enough f a c i l i t i e s f o r the  micro-States  to have access t o . (2)  Since i t has been i n d i c a t e d t h a t mere s i z e or  p o p u l a t i o n s h o u l d not be the determinant membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , we  elements f o r  would not  suggest  permanent e x c l u s i o n o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s from the U n i t e d if Nations.  But we would l i k e to see t h a t at the  present  moment, f o r the b e n e f i t o f both the U n i t e d Nations and m i c r o - S t a t e s , the U n i t e d N a t i o n s should work out  the  minimum  - 61 -  c r i t e r i a t o serve as a f u t u r e g u i d e l i n e f o r determining the admission o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . o t h e r hand, i n o r d e r to encourage the m i c r o - S t a t e s to  On  the  avail  themselves o f the a c c e s s i b l e f a c i l i t i e s through the U n i t e d N a t i o n s system without  assuming the full-membership,  the  U n i t e d N a t i o n s should p r o v i d e enough t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e to ;  meet the needs o f the m i c r o - S t a t e s .  - 62 -  FOOTNOTES  - 63,- -  CHAPTER I 1  U.N.  Doc. 1A (A/6001/Add. 1 ) .  2  U.N.  Doc. 1A  3  I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t the s m a l l e s t p o t e n t i a l S t a t e w i l l e v e n t u a l l y get i t s independence. F o r r e f e r e n c e s , see Arthen Hoppe, P i t c a i r n I s l a n d : The .Ideal S t a t e , 7 War/ Peace Rep. No. 4, a t 6 (.April 1967;; Urban Whitaker, Mini-Membership f o r M i n i - S t a t e s , 7 War/Peace Rep. supra, a t 3. ! "~. .  4  Note 1,  5  I s s u e s b e f o r e the 21st General Assembly, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, 88 (September 1966). I t i s : i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the General Assembly, i n i t s Res. 1626 (XVI), expressed the hope t h a t Western Samoa, on the attainment o f independence, would be admitted t o membership o f the U.N. See Y. B.U.N. 497-98 (1961). Western Samoa, however, has decided not to j o i n the U.N. by r e a s o n o f i t s l i m i t e d s i z e .  6  Note 2,  7  Gambia sends r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to the General Assembly every y e a r . The ambassador o f Maldive I s l a n d s to Washington s e r v e s c o n c u r r e n t l y as permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the U.N. See Appendix No. 2 (A l e t t e r dated 19 November 1968, from the Chinese R e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l to the A u t h o r ) . F o r the advantages o f the maintenance o f permanent m i s s i o n s , a t the U.N. Headquarters, see Sydney D. B a i l e y , The G e n e r a l Assembly o f the U.N. 13-16 (Rev. ed. 1964).  8  New  9  Note 2,  10  Western Samoa's d e c i s i o n not to j o i n the U.N. on i t s independence was p r i m a r i l y based on the f a c t t h a t the c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the U.N. Headquarters would be too much f o r i t s s m a l l country to c a r r y . See Appendix No. 1 (A l e t t e r dated 19 November 1968 from the A c t i n g A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y to Government o f Western Samoa to the A u t h o r ) .  11  On 6 December 1967, Head C h i e f o f Nauru Hammer De Roburt i n h i s address at the F o u r t h Committee o f the  (A/6701/Add. 1 ) .  supra.  supra.  York Times, 15 September 1968,  at  6.  supra.  -  64 -  General Assembly s a i d t h a t " t h e r e i s no reason on e a r t h why we should n o t govern o u r s e l v e s ; but there i s every reason why we should n o t i g n o r e our s m a l l s i z e i n d e c i d i n g upon our r o l e i n a f f a i r s o f the wider world." And he concluded t h a t he thought i t would n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r Nauru t o seek membership i n t h e U.N. See 20 E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s (Canada) No. 7, 124 (March 1968); U.N. Monthly C h r o n i c l e , 100 (December 1967). 12  Among t h e newly independent s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s , o n l y Western Samoa and Nauru have decided n o t to apply f o r membership i n the U.N.  13  A l i s t o f t e r r i t o r i e s , with which the S p e c i a l Committee o f 2 4 i s concerned, i s c o n t a i n e d i n I s s u e s before the 21st General Assembly, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, at 86 (September 1966). But New Guinea, Nauru, Barbados, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, M a u r i t i u s and Swaziland and E q u a t o r i a l Guinea have g a i n e d t h e i r independence; they are no l o n g e r under t h e purview o f t h e S p e c i a l Committee of 2 4 .  14  Although t h e T r u s t T e r r i t o r y o f the P a c i f i c I s l a n d s i s d e s i g n a t e d as a s t r a t e g i c a r e a under A r t i c l e 82 o f the C h a r t e r , i t i s s t i l l under the study o f the S p e c i a l Committee o f 2 4 , and the words " o r independence" appear also i n t h e T r u s t e e s h i p Agreement on t h e P a c i f i c I s l a n d s . The U.S., t h e a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y o f these t e r r i t o r i e s , o r i g i n a l l y opposed t h e i d e a o f independence being i n s e r t e d i n t h e Agreement by reason o f t h e u n l i k e l i h o o d t h a t such independence " c o u l d p o s s i b l y be achieved w i t h i n any f o r e seeable f u t u r e i n t h i s case." See 1 Oppenheim, i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 231 n . 1 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955).  15  I t i s e s t a b l i s h e d under the G e n e r a l Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 1 6 5 4 (XIV), on 27 November 1961. See Y.B.U.N. 56 (1961).  1 5 a P r i o r to t h e establishment o f t h e S p e c i a l Committee to c o n s i d e r t h e implementation o f the.1960s' D e c l a r a t i o n , a number o f committees e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e General Assembly had examined c o n d i t i o n s i n Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s and had made recommendations on t h e i r development t o the G e n e r a l Assembly, such as the Committee on I n f o r m a t i o n from Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s i n 1949; the S p e c i a l Committee on South West A f r i c a e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1961, t h e Special- Committee on Portuguese T e r r i t o r i e s e s t a b l i s h e d i n 19614' These Committees were d i s s o l v e d upon the d e c i s i o n s o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly made i n 1962, and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s were t r a n s f e r r e d to the S p e c i a l Committee o f 24.  - 65 -  16  By G e n e r a l Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 1810 (XVII), on 17 November 1962, seven members were added i n the S p e c i a l Committee o f 17. See Y.B.U.N. 65-66 (1962).  17  G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 December 1965. 554-55 (1965). .  18  See 18 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 122, 841 (1964).  See Y.B.U.N.  - 66 -  CHAPTER I I 1  Except the V a l l e y s of Andorra, these t h r e e s m a l l S t a t e s are c o n s i d e r e d as S t a t e s i n p o s s e s s i o n of complete s o v e r e i g n t y and independence, although they had, more o r l e s s , deputed some o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s to o t h e r S t a t e s . See C. D ' O l i v i e r F a r r a n , The P o s i t i o n o f D i m u n i t i v e S t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c h t l i c h e und S t a a t s r e c h t l i c h e Abhandlungen; F e s t s c h r i f t f u r f a l t e r S c h a t z e l zu seinem 70 Geburtstag, 131-48 (I960) ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as F a r r a n ) ; Oppenheim, s u p r a at 193 nn. 1-5, at 194 n. 1, at 256 nn. 3-6; Manley 0. Hudson, Membership i n the League o f N a t i o n s , 18 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 446-47 . (.1924). C f . C h a r l e s G. Fenwich, I n t e r n a t i o n a l La?/, 134 n. 27 (4^h ed. 1965) ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as Fenwick).  2  League o f N a t i o n s , Minutes o f the F i r s t Committee, (1921).  3  League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the Second Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 636 (1921).  4  Ibid.  5  League o f N a t i o n s , Minutes o f the F i r s t Committee, (1921).  6  Ibid.  7  I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t the withdrawl o f Monaco and San M a r i n o s a p p l i c a t i o n o f admission to the League were p r i m a r i l y due to the League's r e f u s a l o f admission to L i e c h t e n s t e i n . See F a r r a n , supra at 147.  138  137  1  8  As i n d i c a t e d by the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f Czecho-Slovakia c o n c e r n i n g the admission o f s m a l l S t a t e s , he s a i d ; I n the moral sphere, w i t h i n the League o f N a t i o n s , a l l s m a l l S t a t e s were c e r t a i n l y on a completly equal f o o t i n g , but i n the p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y ... we s h a l l not o n l y be o b l i g e d at every step, a t every moment, to take a v o t e i n o r d e r to o b t a i n a m a j o r i t y , but we s h a l l have to take i n t o account, and to measure, not o n l y moral worth, but a l s o i n t e l l e c t u a l , economic, f i -  - 67 -  n a n c i a l , s o c i a l and even t e r r i t o r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and attempt to b r i n g them i n t o harmony.... Under these circumstances, we thought t h a t i n the i n t e r e s t s o f the League, and i n o r d e r not to discourage any o f these S t a t e s , but to show o u r s e l v e s as f a v o r a b l e as p o s s i b l e towards them i t was d e s i r a b l e not to admit them i n t o the League which would then have to undertake f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y but to a l l o w them to c o l l a b o r a t e with the Members o f the League i n some o f the T e c h n i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s . 1  See League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the F i r s t Plenary. Meetings, 564 (1920).  Assembly,  9  A c t u a l l y , a procedure f o r admission o f Members to the League was e s t a b l i s h e d i n December 1920 d u r i n g the F i r s t Assembly's s e s s i o n . The Committee No. Y o f the Assembly which was ih> charge o f the problem o f admission o f new members i n t o the League appointed t h r e e sub-committees composed o f seven members each and prepared s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s i n r e s p e c t o f each a p p l i c a n t which the subcommittees were charged to i n v e s t i g a t e . One o f the f i v e q u e s t i o n s s e t out by the Assembly was concerning the a p p l i c a t i o n o f s m a l l S t a t e s i n t o the League o f N a t i o n s ; t h a t was under Q u e s t i o n n a i r e ( c ) , "(wjhat were i t s s i z e and i t s p o p u l a t i o n ? " . F o r d e t a i l s see 2 League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the F i r s t Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 158-59 (1920).  10  The c o l d r e c e p t i o n and d e c i s i o n to postpone d i s c u s s i o n on the Argentine amendment to the next s e s s i o n r e s u l t e d i n the withdrawl o f the d e l e g a t i o n o f A r g e n t i n a from the F i r s t Assembly i n 1920.  11  F o r the t e x t o f the D r a f t P r o p o s a l , see League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the Second Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, Annex 13 to the 28th Meeting, 683 (1921).  12  The R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f S w i t z e r l a n d i n d i c a t e d t h a t "no one c o u l d deny t h a t i t was a fundamental p r i n c i p l e t h a t S t a t e s wishing to e n t e r the League ought c l e a r l y to express, t h e i r r e q u e s t f o r admission." 1 League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the F i r s t Assembly, p l e n a r y Meetings, 568 (1920).  13  A few R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s supported t h i s viewpoint, such as: the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f P e r s i a who3o'o_Tt-h^  - 68  -  S t a t e s were r e f u s e d to the League o f N a t i o n s , another o r g a n i z a t i o n might be f o u n d - i n America o r R u s s i a . See 1 League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the F i r s t Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 567.. (.1920). To t h i s p o i n t , the h i s t o r y has shown the c o n t r a r y t h a t what d i d l e a d to the portentous antagonisms and r i v a l a l l i a n c e s was not the r e f u s a l o f any membership t o any S t a t e , but the withdrawl from the League o f N a t i o n s o f such S t a t e s as Japan, F a s c i s t I t a l y and N a z i Germany. 14  I n the r e v i s e d r e p o r t , presented by Committee No. I on 30 September 1921/ r e g a r d i n g . t h e amendment to A r t i c l e 1 o f the Covenant;,7>it r e p o r t e d t r * The Argentine R e p u b l i c was undoubtedly a c t i v a t e d by the h i g h e s t motives i n proposing a c l a u s e which would unc o n d i t i o n a l l y throw open the doors o f the League to a l l S t a t e s ; ... i f a c t u a l moral and p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f the world were o f a nature to support the i d e a l , . . . the d i f f i c u l t i e s of a purely l e g a l value which c o u l d be r a i s e d a g a i n s t the new r e a d i n g o f A r t i c l e 1 might be removed. But a c t u a l circumstance are, unhappily, s t i l l too f a r r e moved from t h a t i d e a l , and the League o f N a t i o n s . . . must r a t h e r be content to act as an e f f i c i e n t instrument i n the progress o f humanity towards the g o a l . See 2 League o f N a t i o n s , Minutes o f the F i r s t Committee, 181-82-(1921). See a l s o C. H o w a r d - E l l i s , The O r g i n S t r u c t u r e and Working o f the League o f N a t i o n s , 104 (1928).  15  See note 3,  16  See League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the Second Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 819, 687 (1921).  17  League o f N a t i o n s , the Records o f the Second Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 687 (1921). C f . F a r r a n , supra at 147.  18  ,2: League o f N a t i o n s , Minutes o f the F i r s t 132-33 (1921).  19  Ibid.,  17-21  supra.  Committee,  - 69 -  20  I b i d . , 18,  20.  21  I b i d . , 18-19-  22  League o f N a t i o n s , Records: o f the Second Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, 687-88, 820 (1921).  - 70 ~  CHAPTER I I I  Norman J . P a d e l f o r d and L e l a n d M. Goodrich, The U.N. the Balance, 402 (1965).  in  Sydney D. B a i l e y , The G e n e r a l Assembly o f the U.N. (I960).. .  253  The U.N. former S e c r e t a r y General Hammarskjold. has r e f e r r e d to the important r o l e o f the U.N. f o r ' t h e newly . independent S t a t e s d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f the t r a n s i t i o n ; he saids, The U.N. i s now, o r w i l l be t h e i r O r g a n i z a t i o n . The U.N. can g i v e them a framework f o r t h e i r young n a t i o n a l l i f e which g i v e s a deeper sense and a g r e a t e r weight to i n dependence . P r e s s conference, Note to Correspondents, No.2108 (4 February I 9 6 0 ) . 4  See Amry Yandenbosch, The S m a l l S t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i e s and O r g a n i z a t i o n , 26 J . P o l . No. 2. 295-512 ' (May 1964).  5  See Urban Whitaker, Mini-Mem Mini-Membership see uroan wmta&er, per s n i p f o r M i n i - S t a t e s , 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, at 3 (1967;.  6  I s s u e s b e f o r e the 21st General Assembly, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, 88 (September 1966).  7  See note 11 i n Chapter I I .  8  Compare League o f N a t i o n s Covenant a r t . 1, p a r a . 2 and the U.N. C h a r t e r a r t . 4, p a r a . 2.  9  7 Documents o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Conference on I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , a t 352 ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d . a s UNCIO)  10  3 UNCIO, at  11  I b i d . , 377-78 .  12  I b i d . , 383 .  13  7 UNCIO, a t 326  274.  - 71  -  14  Ibid.  15  6 UNCIO, a t  16  See F a r r a n , supra.  17  I b i d . , 133 n.  18  40 votes to 2, 2 a b s t e n t i o n s (4th s e s s i o n , 262nd Meeting 1949). See a l s o Walter S.G. Kohn, The S o v e r e i g n t y o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n , 61 Am. J . I n t ' l L . 547-57 (1967).  19  4-1. ^  20  Since 9 December 1953  21  U.N.  22  I n s u p p o r t i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r admission o f the M a l d i v e I s l a n d s to the U.N., the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the U.S.,rh6*ever^ s t a t e d t h a t :  232.  12.  J..^Relr.> 20-24 (1955).  Doc;  1A  (8th S e s s i o n , 471st  Meeting).  (A/6701/Add. 1 ) .  Today many o f the s m a l l emerging e n t i t i e s , however w i l l i n g probably do not have the human o r economic r e s o u r c e at t h i s stage to meet t h i s second c r i t e r i a (the a b i l i t y to c a r r y out the C h a r t e r o b l i g a t i o n s ) . See U.N.  Doc. S/PV/243, 31 (September 1965).  23  A r t h u r I . Washow, Populism and Peace Keeping at the 5 War/Peace Rep. No. 5, at 8 (.May 1965).  24  E.g., to the m i c r o - S t a t e s the minimum dues o f 0.04 per centage o f the U . N . , t o t a l assessment amounts to about U.S. $40,000 per annum. T h i s may be n o t h i n g f o r a b i g power, but i t i s u n d e n i a b l y a heavy burden to a m i c r o Stated See Appendix No. 1.  25  Apart from the s e r i o u s problems i n v o l v e d i n the v o t i n g procedure which have caused the G e n e r a l Assembly to become a powerless forum, t h e r e are a l s o p h y s i c a l p r o blems to the U.N. due to the expansion o f membership, such as the need o f expansion o f s e a t s i n the H a l l f o r the new S t a t e s . "See New York Times, 24 November 1968, at 26.  26  U.N.  Doc. 1A  (A/6701/Add. 1 ) .  U.N.,  - 72  -  27  See note 9 i n Chapter I I .  28  Note 26, supra. Subsequent to the statement o f the S e c r e t a r y General, a l e t t e r dated 13 December 1967 was sent from the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the U.S. to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l to c o n s u l t the Members about the p o s s i b i l i t y o f reconvening the Committee on Admission o f New Members, to p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e and a d v i c e to the C o u n c i l r e l a t i n g to the q u e s t i o n o f m i c r o - S t a t e s . See U.N. Doc. S/8296 and S/8316 (December 1967). B e s i d e s , ' d u r i n g the d i s c u s s i o n p r e c e d i n g the S e c u r i t y Council';) vote on the admission o f the Maldive I s l a n d s , which has a populat i o n o f l e s s than 100,000,. the permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f Prance supported the a p p l i c a t i o n , but suggested t h a t the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l might r e a c t i v a t e i t s Committee on Members h i p to examine membership a p p l i c a t i o n s and to r e p o r t i t s c o n c l u s i o n s to the C o u n c i l , and urged t h a t the f u n c t i o n s o f the Committee "must be put to good use h e n c e f o r t h i f we do not wish to r i s k s e e i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n d i m i n i s h e d i n the f u t u r e . See U.N. Doc. S/PV/1243, 12-13 (September 1965). But, these suggestions have not been o f f i c i a l l y d i s c u s s e d w i t h i n the U.N. This i s perhaps due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f d e f i n i n g c r i t e r i a i n examining the a p p l i c a t i o n s o f m i c r o - S t a t e s and to the f a c t t h a t such a d i s c u s s i o n might d i s p l e a s e the m i c r o - S t a t e s which are somewhat a " r e l i a b l e p o o l o f support! ;/ t o the b i g powers. 1  29  See A l a n W. de Rusett, R e f l e t i o n s o f the Expanding Membership o f the U.N., I n t e r n a t i o n a l d e l a t i o n s , 401-15 T S p r i l 196877 ; *  30  See C a r l o s P. Romulo, The U.N. L . J . 531 (1962). .. .  31  See U.N.  32  The former U.N. S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l D. Hammarskjold p o i n t e d out i n h i s 1958-59 annual r e p o r t t h a t :  C h a r t e r a r t . 18, p a r a .  Today, 1 P h i l i p p i n e Intj-1 1.  Before a p o l i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i s pos s i b l e o f the r e s u l t s o f the Assembly's votes, further analysis of... the-.composition o f m a j o r i t i e s and minorities i s required. See U.N. 33  GAOR Supp. 1, U.N.fDoc. A/4132 (1959).  .  See W e l l i n g t o n Koo, J r . , V o t i n g Procedures i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , 6, 257 (1947).  - 73 -  34  See D. W. Bowett, The law o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , 311 (1963). . . .  35  1 Westlake, Chapters on the P r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 321 (2nd ed.'1910).  36  P r o f . J . Lorimer i n d i c a t e d t h a t : A l l S t a t e s e q u a l l y e n t i t l e d to be r e c o g n i z e d as S t a t e s , on t h e simple ground t h a t they are S t a t e s ; but a l l S t a t e s are n o t e n t i t l e d t o be r e cognized as equal S t a t e s . . . . Any attempt t o depart from t h i s p r i n c i p l e . . . l e a d s not t o t h e v i n d i c a t i o n but t o v i o l a t i o n ' o f . e q u a l i t y before the law. See A r n o l d D. McNair* E q u a l i t y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 26 M i c h . L. Rev. 135 (1927). " ~~~ "  37  E q u a t o r i a l Guinea, a s m a l l S t a t e i n A f r i c a , became the 126th Member o f t h e U.N. on 12 November 1968.  38  The B y e l o r u s s i a n S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republic and the U k r a i n i a n S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c are t r e a t e d as p a r t o f the Union o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c .  39  See Roderick C. Ogley, T o t i n g and P o l i t i c s i n General Assembly. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , ' 1 5 b - b 7 (.April l y b l ) .  40  U.N. C h a r t e r  a r t . 18, p a r a . 3«  41  U.N. C h a r t e r  a r t . 18, para. 2.  42  Ibid.  43  F o r d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g the percentage s c a l e o f a s s e s s ments f o r the U.N. budget and n e t c o n t r i b u t i o n s payable by each Member S t a t e s f o r 1967, see I.B.U.N. 956 (1966).  44  J . P..Dulles,  45  See a p r o p o s a l made by A. Cranston, G. C l a r k , and o t h e r s f o r Weighted V o t i n g i n . t h e General Assembly o f the U.N., contained i n Solan, Cases and M a t e r i a l s on World Law, - 339 (1950). -  46  O r i g i n a l l y , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f L i b e r i a moved t h a t the  f a r o r Peace, at 3 (1950).  - 74  ?  -  e n t i r e statement be d e l e t e d from the r e c o r d s o f the General Assembly. I n h i s viewpoint-,} the speech made by E r i c Louw was a n . i n s u l t to the A f r i c a n people. But i n response to o p p o s i t i o n / o f a number o f d e l e g a t i o n s , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f L i b e r i a agreed to withdraw t h i s motion but proposed the motion o f censure o f South A f r i c a . T h i s p r o p o s a l was adopted by The General Assembly on 11 October 1961, at meeting 1034, by r o l l - c a l l vote of 67 to 1, w i t h 20 a b s t e n t i o n s and 9 d i d not p a r t i c i pate i n the v o t i n g . F o r d e t a i l s see Y.B.U.N. 109.-10, 113 (1961). 47  Although the G e n e r a l Assembly adopted overwhelming m a j o r i t i e s f a r exceeding requirement, . i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to permanent Members were e i t h e r a g a i n s t See Y.B.U.N. 87-88 (1963).  the amendments by the t w b y t h i r d s note t h a t s e v e r a l or a b s t a i n i n g .  48  Such as the General Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 2105 (XX), adopted on 20 December 1965, and the R e s o l u t i o n 2113 (XX) adopted on 21 December 1965. See Y.B.U.N. 554-55, 113 (1965).  49  Ahmed Baba Miske, who was f o r m e r l y permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f M a u r i t a n i a to the U.N., wrote an a r t i c l e ent i t l e d Sovereign S t a t e s Are Not E q u a l . See 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, at 5-7 ( A p r i l 1967). . *  50  A U.S. o f f i c i a l s a i d that-'"the o n e - s t a t e one-vote p r i n c i p l e i s mad." See New York Times, October 3 1968, at 0. 16. B e s i d e s , the French d e l e g a t e a l s o expressed r e s e r v a t i o n s about the c o n t i n u e d v a l i d i t y o f the p r i n c i ple o f S t a t e e q u a l i t y . See 18 U.N. GAOR, 67 (1963).  51  F o r d e t a i l s about the p r o p o s a l s made on weighted v o t i n g or weighted r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a world assembly, see G r e n v i l l e C l a r k and L o u i s B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, x i x - x x i i ( 3 r d . ed. enlarged; Cambridge, Mass., Harv. U n i v . P r e s s , 1966); John F o s t e r D u l l e s , War or Peace, 191-94 (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1950); C a t h e r i n e Senf Manno, S e l e c t i v e Weighted V o t i n g i n the UN GeneralAssembly. 2 0 - I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n . 57-62 (1966).  52  I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t , apart from the o b l i g a t i o n o f cont r i b u t i n g a r e a s o n a b l e share to the O r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e are some o t h e r ones i f U.N. membership i s to be meaningful. Such as the maintenance o f a permanent mission- at the U.N. Headquarters. See E l i z a b e t h Brown's comments on The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i n i s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . Am. Soc'y- I n t ' l L . P r o c e e d i n g s . 179-80 ( A p r i l  - 75  -  1968); see a l s o note 7 i n Chapter  I.  55  Non-U.N* Members who d e s i r e a permanent a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Court, may, under A r t i c l e 93 (2) o f the S t a t u t e , become p a r t i e s to the S t a t u t e on c o n d i t i o n s to.be d e t e r mined i n each case by ihe G e n e r a l Assembly on the r e commendation o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Under t h i s p r o v i s i o n , S w i t z e r l a n d became p a r t y to the S t a t u t e i n 1948, L i e c h t e n s t e i n i n 1950 and San Marino i n 1953.  54  The establishment o f the r e g i o n a l economic commissions i s one o f the p r i n c i p a l d e v i c e s employed by the Economic and S o c i a l C o u n c i l (ECOSOG) to h e l p f u r t h e r economic c o o p e r a t i o n . These.commissions comprise the Economic Commissions f o r Europe (ECE), f o r A s i a _and the F a r E a s t (ECAFE), f o r L a t i n America (ECLA) andlfor A f r i c a (ECA), which are i n each case composed o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f S t a t e s , not n e c e s s a r i l y Members o f the U.N., situated i n the areas mentioned t o g e t h e r w i t h some b i g powers. E q u a t o r i a Guinea and M a u r i t i u s , b e f o r e they were admitted to the U.N. on 12 November 1968 and 24 A p r i l 1968 r e s p e c t i v e l y , were e l e c t e d as a s s o c i a t e Members o f ECA f o r 1968, and so were Western Samoa as Member o f ECAFE and B r i t i s h Honduras as a s s o c i a t e Member o f ECLA. See 22 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 694-95 (Summer 1968).  55  The f i r s t permanent observer m i s s i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d by S w i t z e r l a n d i n 1946, and f i v e o t h e r s p r e s e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g such m i s s i o n are: the R e p u b l i c o f Korea (1949), the F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany (1952), the Republic o f Vietnam (1952), Monaco (1956) and.the Holy See (1964). These S t a t e s are l i s t e d i n the l a & t s e c t i o n o f the "Blue Book" p u b l i s h e d by the U.N. S e c r e t a r i a t , named Permanent M i s s i o n s t o the U.N., under the heading o f Non-Member S t a t e s Maintaining: Permanent Observers' O f f i c e a t Headquarters", a t 44 11968). '. ! "~" '. '. '. "  56  See U.N.  57  See I s s u e s before 23rd General Assembly* I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , 83-84 (September 1968), I s s u s s L / b e f o r e 21st General Assembly, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , note 4, at 88 (September 1966).  58  A c c o r d i n g to the U.Nj C h a r t e r a r t . 63,- ECOSOC i s e n v i saged as an organ c o o r d i n a t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s o f the s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s . S p e c i a l agreement concluded w i t h ECOSOC brought the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies i n t o d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U.N. Up u n t i l now, agreements w i t h 15 S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies have come i n t o f o r c e , 6 d e a l i n g w i t h economic and f i n a n c i a l problems: Bank, IMF, IFC,  C h a r t e r a r t . 35.  - 76 -  IDA (the B r e t t o n Woods O r g a n i z a t i o n s ) , and PAO and GATT; 3 d e a l i n g w i t h s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l problems: ILO, UNESCO and WHO; 6 d e a l i n g with s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l problems: ICAO, UPU, ITO, WMO, IMCO and IAEA. Por d e t a i l s see U.N. P r e s s Release.SA/312/Eev. 6 (15 March 1968). 59  L i e c h t e n s t e i n i s a Member o f UPU and ITU; Monaco i s a Member o f IAEA, UNESCO, WHO, UPU and ITU; San Marino i s a Member o f UPU, and Western Samoa i s . a Member o f WHO.  60  E.g., A r t i c l e 5 and A r t i c l e 6 o f the Convention o f t h e UPU and A r t i c l e 19 o f t h e ITU Convention have accorded the membership t o "group o f t e r r i t o r i e s . "  61  P i v e o f t h e f i f t e e n S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies have such i n s t i t u t i o n ; these are UNESCO, PAO, WHO, ITU and IMCO. P o r the time being, except ITU, PAO has 3 a s s o c i a t e members: B a h r a i n , M a u r i t i u s , Qatar; UNESCO)has 4 a s s o c i a t e members: Bahrain, M a u r i t i u s , B r i t i s h E a s t e r n Caribbean Group and Qatar; WHO has 3 a s s o c i a t e members: Qatar, M a u r i t i u s , and Southern Rhodesia; IMCO has o n l y one a s s o c i a t e member, that i s Hong Kong. Por d e t a i l s c o n c e r n i n g the member chart o f these S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies, see U.N. P r e s s Rel e a s e SA/219 (15 March 1968).  6"  E.g., A r t i c l e 3 o f t h e WHO C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y d e c l a r e s t h a t membership i n t h e WHO " s h a l l be open to a l l States." I n 1952, t h e UNESCO Conference adopted a r e s o l u t i o n a f f i r m i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y . See UNESCO, Report to t h e U.N., 165 (1952-53); Oppenheim, supra, at 988.  63  The UNDP, which i s supported by v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , i s an o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e U.N. i t s e l f and 14 o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Por d e t a i l s about t h e program o f UNDP, see U.N. Background Note No. 63/Add. 1 (30 August 1968).  64  See U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1 ) .  2  65  E.g.., t h e l i m i t a t i o n on the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f communication i n the form o f documents; t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f o b t a i n i n g , i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , the p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t informa-tion t i o n and some p e r s o n a l and t e c h n i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the o b s e r v e r s . However, these handicaps are n o t so b i g they they would make t h e o b s e r v e r s . f u n c t i o n i n e f f e c t i v e . See h ^ P t §°}'l li J r . , Observer C o u n t r i e s : Quasi-Members o f < the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 20 i n t e r n a t i o n a l Ui'gaJllz'a'Clon, NO. 1 266-33"Tl965). : 1  e  r  l  e  - 77  66::. See note 53,  -  supra*  67  Note 11,  supra*  68  S e c r e t a r y General U Thant, i n h i s annual r e p o r t f o r 65, s a i d :  1964-  Non-Member States, were encouraged to m a i n t a i n o b s e r v e r s at the U.N. Headq u a r t e r s s o . t h a t they may have the o p p o r t u n i t y to sense the c u r r e n t s and c r o s s - c u r r e n t s o f world o p i n i o n . 20 U.N.  GAOR, Supp. 1A,  at 20  (1965).  69  Among the f i v e S t a t e s which m a i n t a i n permanent o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n s at the U.N. Headquarters, Holy See and Monaco each was r e q u i r e d to c o n t r i b u t e o n l y 0.04 f<> o f the t o t a l assessment o f the U.N. annual budget; the R e p u b l i c o f Korea was r e q u i r e d to pay 0.12 # and the R e p u b l i c o f Y i e t ham 0.07 The F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany, which was always among the h i g h e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s to s p e c i a l U.N. Programmes, was r e q u i r e d to c o n t r i b u t e 7.01 %. Por the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f o t h e r non-Member S t a t e s , which p a r t i c i pated i n the U.N. a c t i v i t i e s , see U.N. Doc. k/C. 5/l». at 953 (15 November 1968).  70  Note 8,  71  T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n was a l s o provided i n the .Council o f Europe which i s , i n some r e s p e c t , a p o l i t i c a l u n i t y o f Europe. See Bowett, supra note 3, at 142.  72  See Urban Whitaker, supra, a t  73  See Roger P i s h e r , The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i c r o s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Am. Soo'.yg> I n t ' l L. Proceedings. 6468 ( A p r i l 1 % 8 ) .  1  supra.  4.  - 78 -  1  See Chapter  2  Jacques G. Rapoport, The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i n i s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i e r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L. Proceedings, 156 ( A p r i l 1968) .  3  F o r t e x t o f Res. 1514 (XV), see Y.B.U.N. 49 (I960). The adoption o f t h i s r e s o l u t i o n i s a l s o an. evidence o f the uncompromising m a j o r i t y o f t h e A f r i c a n and t h e Asian groups i n the General Assembly.  4  I above.  Ilt.N. C h a r t e r a r t . 73.  5  Note 3» s u p r a .  6  E.g., G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 December 1965; 2189 (XXI), IT^December 1966 and 2348 (XXII), 19 December 1967.  7  G.A. Res. 2357 (XXII), 19 December 1967; U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6700/Add. 1 ) . . .  8  F o r t e x t o f Res. 1541 (XV), see Y.B.U.N. 509-10 (I960). T h i s R e s o l u t i o n i s based on t h e G.A. Res. 742 (VIII) adopted on 27 November 1953.  9  F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e Twelve P r i n c i p l e s , see t h e L i s t o f F a c t o r s annexed to the Res. 1541 (XV).  10  Principle VI.  11  U T N . C h a r t e r a r t . 73*  12  See Rapoport, supra, a t 157.  13  See U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6000/Add. 6 ) ; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SR. 491, a t 5; and U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SR. 492, a t 7.  14  Note 10, s u p r a .  15  G.A. Res. 1626 (XVI), see I.B.U.N. 497-98  16  453 U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r e a t y S e r i e s (U.N.T.S.), 4-6  17  1 New Zealand S t a t u t e s , No. 69, at 458 (1964).  18  S e c t i o n 39 r e s p e c t i n g the "power to make laws," i b i d . , at 474. , ."  (1961). (1963).  - 7.9 -  19  I b i d . , at  474.  20  Por  21  Ibid.  22  U.N.  23  Note 19,  24  S e c t i o n 1 o f the West I n d i e s  25  Por t e x t o f the West I n d i e s Act 1967, see 47 S t a t u t e s ^ F E n g l a n d , at. 499 (2nd ed. 1967).  26  I b i d . , s e c t i o n 2,  27  I b i d . , s e c t i o n 10,  28  1 U.N.L. Rep.  29  See s e c t i o n 46 o f the Cook i s l a a d s - O o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 New Zealand S t a t u t e s , No. 69, 477-78 (1964); c f . same s e c t i o n o f the Cook I s l a n d s C o n s t i t u t i o n Amendment 1965, 1 New Zealand S t a t u t e s , No. 2, 65 (1965).  30  See Margaret B r o d e r i c k , A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e h o o d — A New Porm o f D e c o l o n i z a t i o n , 17 I n t ' l & Comp. L.Q. P a r t 2, 368-403 (1968) L i t t l e A n g u i l l a , the s m a l l Caribbean i s l a n d w i t h a popul a t i o n o f 6,000 i n h a b i t ant ss and an a r e a o f 45 square m i l e s , r e p r e s e n t e d such a problem. I n May 1 9 6 7 — f o l l o w i n g immediately a f t e r the a s s o c i a t i o n o f the s i x Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s with B r i t a i n — t h i s l i t t l e country r e v o l t e d from the domination o f S t . K i t t s , and subsequently d e c l a r e d i t s e l f a r e p u b l i c . B r i t a i n , has then r e f u s e d to g i v e f o r mal r e c o g n i t i o n to t h i s new government o r to d i s t u r b the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements under which the a s s o c i a t e d S t a t e o f S t . K i t t s - N e v i s - A n g u i l l a was formed. But unable to persuade the A n g & i l l a n s to accept the a u t h o r i t y o f the unpopular S t . K i t t s Government run by Prime M i n i s t e r Robert Bradshaw, B r i t a i n bought time b y s e t t i n g up an i n t e r i m per i o d o f a y e a r beginning l a s t January. A f t e r almost two y e a r s o f t u r m o i l and p r o t e s t , t h i s l i t t l e i s l a n d and B r i t a i n made an agreement on 31 March 1969 concerning the f u t u r e s t a t u s o f A n g u i l l a . In the agreement, the B r i t i s h expresses t h a t " i t i s no p a r t o f our purpose to put them (the A n g u i l l a n s ) under an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n under which they do not want to l i v e . " D e f i n i t e p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d i n g the i s l a n d to f u l l self-government was contained i n the agreements. See New York Times, 17 November 1968, at 13; The Province,; 1 A p r i l 1969, at 3-  t e x t o f Res.  Doc.  A/AG.  2064 (XX),  see Y.B.U.N. 574  109/SR. 490,  at  (1965).  12.  supra.  No.  Act 1967,  see note 25,  infra.  Halsbury's  7. 11,  and  7, at 31  Schedule  2.  (1 March 1967).  31  See note 28, supra*  32  See note 8, supra*  33  Under t h e Ghana Independence Act, from midnight 5/6 March 1957, t h e t e r r i t o r i e s f o r m e r l y comprised i n t h e Gold Coast became t h e independent S t a t e o f Ghana. Under t h e same Act, the u n i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h Togoland w i t h the i n dependent S t a t e o f Ghana took p l a c e , f r o m the same time and d a t e . See G.A..Res. 1044 ( X I ) , Y.B.U.N. 370-71 (1956).  34  The n o r t h e r n p a r t was a d m i n i s t e r e d as an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f N i g e r i a ' s Northern Region, whereas//the southern p a r t was s e t up as a separate r e g i o n a l u n i t w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e powers o f self-government w i t h i n the F e d e r a t i o n o f N i g e r i a . See G.A. Res. 1350 ( X I I I ) , Y.B.U.N. 368 (1959).  35  See G.A. Res. 1608 (XV), Y.B.U.N. 494 (1961).  36  See Y.B.U.N. 370 (1956).  37  See U.N. D o c 1A (A/6700/Add. 14) ( p a r t I I ) , at 131.  38  See note 35, s u p r a .  39  See note 9, s u p r a .  40  P r o f e s s o r Roger F i s h e r , t h e L e g a l A d v i s e r t o the P r o v i s i o n a l Government o f A n g u i l l a , on 24 August 1967 t o l d the Sub-Committee IV o f t h e Committee 24 t h a t A n g u i l l a ' s s e cond c h o i c e , a f t e r statehood w i t h i n t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth, would be independence with t h e U.N.,"which would set a precedent f o r o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s s e e k i n g independence but "too s m a l l , t o support themselves". See 2 U.N. L. Rep. No. 1, a t 1 (1967); see a l s o Issue before the 23rd G e n e r a l Assembly, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , note 13 a t 85 (September 1968).  41  I n view o f t h e f a i l u r e o f South A f r i c a t o f u l f i l i t s o b l i g a t i o n towards the Mandated T e r r i t o r y o f South West A f r i c a , t h e U.N« passed/a r e s o l u t i o n known as R e s o l u t i o n 2145 (XXI) and decided'to keep t h e ( T e r r i t o r y under i t s own a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Under t h i s R e s o l u t i o n , the U.N. e s t a b l i s h e d an Ad Hoc 'Committee t o recommend p r a c t i c a l means by which TEe, T e r r i t o r y s h o u l d be administered'so as to enable the people o f South West A f r i c a t o achieve s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and independence. T h i s machinery was, however, f r u s t r a t e d by the South A f r i c a . See Y.B.U.N. 595-607 (1966).  - 81- -  BIBLIOGRAPHY  BOOKS Alexandrowie_, C. H.,  World Economicy Agencies  (1962).  A l l e n , P. M., S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n i n the Western I n d i a n Ocean, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n (November 1966). B a i l e y , S. D., 1964)._  The General Assembly  o f the U.N.  (Rev. ed.  Bowett, D. W.,  The law o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s (1963).  C l a r k , G. and Sohn, L. B., World Peace through World (3rd ed. e n l a r g e d 1966).  Law  Claude, I . L. J r . , Swords i n t o Plowshares: The Problems and P r o g r e s s o f . I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (3rd ed. Rev. 1964). D u l l e s , J . P.,  War o r Peace (1950).  Penwick, C. G.,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law  (4th ed. 1965).  Goodrich, L . M.,  The U n i t e d N a t i o n s ( I 9 6 0 ) .  Goodspeed, S. S., Organization  The Nature and F u n c t i o n o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l (1959).  H i g g i n s , R., The Development o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law through the P o l i t i c a l Organs o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s * ( 1 9 6 3 ) . Howard-Ellis, C , The O r i g i n S t r u c t u r e and Working o f the League o f N a t i o n s (1928). Jacob, P. E . and Atherton, A. L., t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (1965)•  The Dynamics o f I n t e r n a -  Keohane, R. 0., P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e i n the General I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 557 (1966). Koo,  W. J r . , V o t i n g Procedures i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s (1947).  M a r t i n , A. and Edwards, J . B. S., (1955). 0' B r i e n , W. V., The New Diplomacy (1965).  Assembly,  Political  The Changing C h a r t e r  N a t i o n s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law .' •  and  Oppenheim, I . , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law«(8th ed. 1955). P a d e l f o r d j N . J . and Goodrick, L . M.,. The U.N. i n t h e Balance (1965). . P a d e l f o r d , N. J . and L i n c o l n , G. A., tional Politics.(1962). Sohn, L . B.,  :  Stark, J . G., 1967).  The Dynamics o f I n t e r n a -  Cases and M a t e r i a l s on World Law (1950). An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (6th ed.  PERIODICALS Baker, P. J . , The D o c t r i n e o f L e g a l E q u a l i t y o f S t a t e s , B r i t . Y.B. I n t ' l L . 1-20 (1923-24). B r o d e r i c k , M., A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e h o o d — A New Form o f Decolon i z a t i o n , 13 I n t ' l & Comp. L.Q. P a r t . 2-, 368-403 (1968). Brown, E., comments on The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i n i s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L . Proceedings, 179-80 ( A p r i l 1968). Emerson, R., C o l o n i a l i s m , P o l i t i c a l Development, and the U.N., 19 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 484-503 TI3o"5). F a r r a n , C. D., The P o s i t i o n o f Diminutive S t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c h t l i c h e und S t a a t s r e c h t l i c h e Abhaudlungen; F e s t s c h r i f t f&r Walter S c h a t z e l zu seinem 70 Geburtstag, 131-48 ( i 9 6 0 ) . F i s h e r , R., The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i c r o s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L . Proceedings. 16470 ( A p r i l 1968). . . . " G e y e l i n , P., The U.N.'s Future: Small N a t i o n Power Begins t o Bother U.S. as i t Has R u s s i a , 164 W a l l S t . J . No. 16. at D3 (1964). ' " 1  Hoppe, A., P i t c a i r n I s l a n d : The I d e a l S t a t e , 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, 6.(1967). ~~" ' • ~"~ Hudson, M. 0., Membership i n the League o f Nations, 18 Am. J . I n t ' l L. , 446-47 (1924). "' c  -  -843-  Karefa-Smart, J . , A f r i c a and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 19 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 764-73 (1965). Kohn, W. S. G., The S o v e r e i g n t y o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n , I n t ' l L . 547-57 (1967). ~~  61 Am. J .  Manno, 0. S., S e l e c t i v e Weighted V o t i n g i n the U.N., 20 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 37-62 (1966). ~~ Mazrui, A. A., The U n i t e d N a t i o n s and Some A f r i c a n P o l i t i c a l A r t i t u d e s , 18 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 499-520 (1964). McNair, A. D., E q u a l i t y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 134-52 (1927). ' Miske, A. B., S o v e r e i g n S t a t e Are Not E q u a l , 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, 5-7 ( A p r i l 1 § 6 7 ) . Mower, A. G. J r . , . Obserber C o u n t r i e s : Quasi-Members o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 20 I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 1,. 266-83 ( 1 % 6 ) . Ogley, R. C , V o t i n g and P o l i t i c s i n t h e General Assembly, 2 I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , No. 3, 156-67 ( A p r i l 1 9 6 l ) . Pearson, L . B., The Present P o s i t i o n o f t h e U.N., 1 I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , No. 8, 329-38 (October 1957).' Rapoport, J . G., The P a r t i c i p a t i o n o f M i n i s t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L . Proceedings, 156~" 6 3 ( A p r i l 1968). r  R u d z i n s k i , A. W., Admission o f New Members: The U n i t e d N a t i o n s and the League o f N a t i o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 480, 141-88 (1952). Rumnlo, C. P., The U.N. Today, 1 P h i l i p p i n e I n t ' l L . J . 520-35 (1962).. R u s e t t , A. W., R e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e Expanding Membership o f the U.N., 1 I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , No. 9, 401-15 ( A p r i l 1958). Vahdenboseh, A., The Small S t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and O r g a n i z a t i o n , 26 J . P o l . No. 1. 295-512 (May 1964). Washow, A. I . , Populism and Peace Keeping a t t h e U.N., 5 War/Peace. Rep. No. 5, 8-9 (May 1965). —  Weinschel, H., The D o c t r i n e o f the E q u a l i t y o f S t a t e s , 45 Am.. J . I n t ' l . L . 417-42 (1951). ~" :  Whitaker, U.,' Mini-Membership f o r M i n i - S t a t e s , 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4,. 5-5 (1967). ' *""  U.N.  MATERIAL  G.A. Res. 742 (VIII) (27 November 1953). G.A. Res. 1044 (XI) (13 December 1956). G.A. Res. 1350 (XIII) (13 March 1959). G.A. Res. 1352 (XIV) (16 October 1959). G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (14 December I 9 6 0 ) . G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) (15 December I 9 6 0 ) . G.A. Res.'1654 (XIV) (27 November 1961). G.A. Res. 1810 (XVII) (17 December 1962). G.A. Res. 2064 (XX) (16 December 1965). G.A. Res. 2105 (XX) (20 December 1965). G.A. Res. 2113 (XX) (21 December 1965). G.AA Res. 2189 (XXI) (13 December 1966). G.A. Res. 2348 (XXII) (19 December 1967). U.N. Background Note No. 6 3 / A d d . 1 (30 August 1968). UN0I0 (Documents o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Conference on I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n ) , V o l . I l l , VI & V I I . U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6001/Add. 1 ) . ( 1 9 6 5 ) . U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1) (1967). U.N. Doc. 1A (A/7201/Add. 1) (1968). U.N. Doc. S/PV/1243 (1965).  U.N.  Doc. S/8296 (1968).  U.N.  Doc. S/8316 (1968).  U.N.  Doc. A/0. 5/L. 953  U.N.  P r e s s Conference. Note to Correspondents No. (4 February I 9 6 0 ) .  U.N.  P r e s s Release GA/T/1719 (15 December 1967).  U.N.  Press Release SG/SM/897/TR/1929 (26 January  U.N.  Press Release SA/213/Rev. 6 (15 March 1968).  U.N.  P r e s s Release SA/219 (15 March 1968).  U.N.  Press Release M/l449/Rev. 14  (1968). 2108  (  1968).  (12 November 1968).  REPRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Cook I s l a n d s C o n s t i t u t i o n s , 1 New (1964).  Zealand S t a t u t e s , No.  Cook I s l a n d s C o n s t i t u t i o n s Amendment, 1 New No. 2 (1965). .  69  Zealand;^ S t a t u t e s ,  League o f N a t i o n s , Minutes o f the F i r s t  Committee  (1921).  League o f N a t i o n s , Records o f the F i r s t Meetings (1920).  Assembly,  Plenary  League o f N a t i o n , Records o f the Second Assembly, Meetings (1921).  Plenary  T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p (between the Government o f New Zealand and the Government o f Western Samoa), 453 U.N.T.S. (1963).  West I n d i e s Act 1967,  47 Halsbury's S t a t u t e o f England  MISCELLANY N.Y. Times, 15 September 1968,  at 6.  (1967).  N.Y. Times, 17 November 1968, a t 1 3 . N.Y. Times, 24 November 1968, a t 26. Tne P r o v i n c e , 3 October 1968, at 18.  - 88 -  APPENDIX  Ptemt* addrgss alt cnrrespondinc* f. Ik* Sterttary to tkt Gootrnmtnt  Government of Wettern Samoa  P R I M E MINISTER'S APIA-  _  _  _  _  DEPARTMENT _  WESTERN SAMOA  13 May, 1969. Mr Cheung Ven Chen, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8 , B.C., CANADA.. Dear Sir, Thank you for your letter of 25 February 1969 seeking agreement to the use of correspondence between us as part of your thesis. I am happy to say that there i s no objection to this course. I would however like to make two small amendments to my letter to you of 19 November 1968. The first i s the word "current" in line 8 of para ( l ) . This should be "recurrent . The second is to the first sentenoe of para (2), lines 2 and 3» This sentence should read "under the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1962 the Government of New Zealand ha3 agreed that (now word} on the request of the Government of Western Samoa, i t (new word) will make available......,," 11  If i t i s at a l l possible, I should be pleased i f you could let me have a copy of your thesis for my personal reading. Yours faithfully,  for:  (Karanita L. EnarJuJSECRETARY TO~T%VERNMENT  TELEGRAMS: MUX). APIA  OUR REF.: S.: E 3 l / l / l (Please  quote  in your  YOUR REF.:  Please address .all correspondence to the Secretary to the Government  GOVERNMENT OF WESTERN SAMOA  P R I M E MINISTER'S D E P A R T M E N T APIA  WESTERN SAMOA  19 KovcEber, 1568,, Dear Sir, I have received your letter cf 14 Novedbor 1968 poising several question concerning Western Sanoa's foreign policies,. You w i l l appreciate that we have not yet token a firra decision on ©any of the quoaliens you pose. With that background in mind,rayreplies to your individual questions are as f o i l CITS: (l)  Western Samoa*s decision not to join the United Nations on Ind©pendsr.es was based primarily on the costs involved in effective representation in Now York. The outlay, in financial as well as manpower tere.a, would be too much for cur sEaH country to carry. The second pax»t of your question concerning economic development saca to be rather wide for i t to be ens^ercd in this letter. Suffice i t to say that our annual budget - including both current expenditure and development - totalled only $5.6 million i n 1967 and $5.3 nillion 19 S3 (the Saaoan $ i s the equivalent of 10/- sterling before devaluation)© You trill nota frcn that that ours i s not the kind of econcsy that i s able to support widespread representation abroad at the Ease time as dcaestic development.  reply)  Under the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1962 the Government of New Zealand has agreed, on the request of the Government of Western Samoa, to make avaLleble its facilities, particularly in regard to its overseas posts, for use by the Govortsnent of Western Samoa* Although we ourselves formulate our foreign policies, for lack of Embassies and High Coanrdssions abroad, i t i s not dweys possible to effeot quick communication with other diplomatic cosmiesions and foreign governments.* To this end we continually make use of New Zealand Embassies and High Cojar/dssions to forward communications between ourselves and thass foreign governments* In circumstances whore we find a need for information on any particular problem, we have frequently sought the assistance of th3 NETS? Zealand Department of External Affairs and i t s missions abroad in obtaining this information. As to the third part of your question Western Samoa does frequently send delegations abroad to attend international meetings. Western Samoa is a member of the 7/orld Health Organisation and of the ECAFE oply in the United Nations faaily of organisations. In view of the high cost involved, not only in contributions but as well in representation in membership of the United Nations agencies i t is felt that this membership is sufficient for our purposes at present« No decision has yet been taken on this question although of course you will appreciate that once we are in a happier financial condition the major obstaole for us to United Nations membership i s removed*  oo*c« I trust  0  I trust this is of value to you and take this opportunity to wish you success in your project.  Yours faithfully,  (Karanita  Jj^Ei&rx)  ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO C^TOTaiEIOT  Mr Charng Ven Chen, Faculty of Lawj> University of B C ^ o  Vancouver 7» B C 0  0  o>  P E R A U N E N T MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF C H I N A TO THE UNITED NATIONS  November 19, 1968 Mr. Charng Ven Chen F a c u l t y of Lav/ U n i v e r s i t y of B.C. Vancouver 8, B.C., Canada Dear Mr. Chen: I have your i n t e r e s t i n g l e t t e r of 11 November regarding Micro-States." Nauru became independent e a r l y i n 1968. I t was known even before i t s independence that Nauru would not seek membership i n the United Nations. I t i s a r i c h i s l a n d with only 3,000 c i t i z e n s , plus some 2,000 migrant workers from other islands and Hong Kong. Nauru i s associated with the B r i t i s h Commonwealth i n some form. A u s t r a l i a a s s i s t s Nauru i n the l a t t e r s external relations. 1  I do think that Micro-States do constitute a problem. The U.N. Security C o u n c i l has not o f f i c i a l l y discussed t h i s problem. Eventually, i t may have to e s t a b l i s h some standards i n terms of population, land, resources, e t c . I understand that some s p e c i a l i z e d agencies, such as UNL.SC0, FAO and ILO (I b e l i e v e ) , have arrangements f o r associate membership. I t might be i n t e r e s t i n g to study them. Perhaps the U.N. should have s i m i l a r arrangements. I remember vaguely that i n 1920 the League of Nations d i d not admit the f o l l o w i n g Micro-States as members: The P r i n c i p a l i t y of Liechtenstein,. Andora, Monaco, and San Marina, because these countries were too small.and vere not considered to be able to carry out the obligations of the League. I hope you w i l l make a thorough study of the problem of Micro-States and you may very w e l l make a c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This i s a personal l e t t e r . What I have said does not n e c e s s a r i l y represent the view of our Government. . With best v i s h e s , Yours s i n c e r e l y ,  L i n Mousheng  3/85/1 N E W TO  Z E A L A N D  T H E  U N I T E D  M I S S I O N N A T I O N S  8 November 1968 Dear S i r , Thank you f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 25 October s e e k i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f Western Samoa's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d Nations., I s h o u l d f i r s t o f a l l c l a r i f y an a p p a r e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n y o u r l e t t e r . New Zealand i s n o t " i n charge" o f the f o r e i g n a f f a i r s o f Western Samoa. S i n c e 1962, W e s t e r n Samoa has been an independent s t a t e w i t h f u l l c o n t r o l o f i t s own f o r e i g n p o l i c y . New Z e a l a n d ' s r o l e i n t h i s f i e l d i s l i m i t e d t o a s s i s t i n g Western Samoa, a t i t s r e q u e s t , i n the e x e c u t i o n of i t s foreign r e l a t i o n s . Such a s s i s t a n c e i s f r e q u e n t l y sought and g i v e n , b o t h by the' a g e n c i e s o f t h e New Zealand Government i n W e l l i n g t o n and by New Zealand s ' m i s s i o n s abroad; b u t p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s a r e e x c l u s i v e l y a matter f o r t h e Samoan Government i t s e l f . 1  I t would t h e r e f o r e n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r us t o comment on the. q u e s t i o n s you have posed. The i n f o r m a t i o n you r e q u i r e should r a t h e r be sought d i r e c t from the Western Samoan Government and I s u g g e s t t h a t you should w r i t e t o the S e c r e t a r y t o the Government, A p i a , Western Samoa. Your s f a i t h f u 1 l y ,  (N.V. F ^ r r e l l ) A c t i n g Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Mr Charng Ven Caen, F a c u l t y o f Law, University of B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, B.C., CANADA.  Columbia,  

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