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The problems of micro-states in international law Chen, Charng-ven 1969

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THE PROBLEMS OF MICRO-STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW by CHARNG-VEN CHEN B.A. i n law, National Taiwan University, 1967 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of laws i n the Faculty of Law We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1969 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d S t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d b y t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r b y h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f Law The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a D a t e 30 A p r i l 1969 - i -ABSTRACT The problems a r i s i n g from the emergence of micro-States have recently received a great deal of attention i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. These problems can be seen to have two major aspects. One i s the question of the future statehood of micro-States i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, the other i s the poten t i a l problems r e s u l t i n g from t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . The object of t h i s paper i s to point out the v i s i -ble problems involved i n the process of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of micro-States i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s i n order that possible solutions: can be proposed. In i n v e s t i g a t i n g the h i s t o r i c a l background of these problems, we are aware that the continuing e f f o r t s of the United Nations on decolonization are the main st i m u l i to the b i r t h of micro-States. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the League of Nations has faced the same problem as the United Nations over the question of the admission of small States. Although no d e f i n i t e c r i t e r i a had been set out by the League of Nations f o r determining the admission of small States, i t did prevent i n due course the admissions of certa i n small States. The increasing number of micro-States poses serious - i i -problems to the United N a t i o n s . On the one hand, the question i s whether the micro-States, most o f which are h a r d l y able to meet the admission requirements of the Charter, should be e l i g i b l e f o r membership i n the United Nations* In t h i s r e s -pect, i t has been suggested t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between "the r i g h t to Independence and the question of f u l l membership i n the U n i t e d Nations." On the other hand, the imbalance o f the v o t i n g power and r e a l power r e s u l t i n g from the r u l e o f "one-State one-vote" w i l l become more profound un-l e s s some s o l u t i o n s to the q u e s t i o n o f admission o f micro-States i n the United Nations can be worked out. F i n a l l y , we reach the c o n c l u sions t h a t , f i r s t o f a l l , the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and the General Assembly should set out c r i t e r i a g u i d i n g the admission o f new Members; secondly, c e r -t a i n s p e c i a l arrangements f o r the micro-States are needed so t h a t micro-States can f u l l y b e n e f i t from these arrangements without s t r a i n i n g t h e i r resources and p o t e n t i a l through assum-i n g the f u l l burdens of U n i t e d Nations membership which they are not i n a p o s i t i o n to assume. As to the f u t u r e statehood of the s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s , t here i s a g e n e r a l awareness t h a t t o t a l "independence" may not be d e s i r a b l e f o r a l l o f them. On t h i s p o i n t , s e v e r a l s o l u t i o n s s h a l l be recommended i n the l a s t Chapter o f t h i s paper. - i i i -TABLE 03? CONTENTS Chapter I Introduction to the Problems and Their H i s t o r i c a l Background A Introduction to the Problems of Micro-States B The H i s t o r i c a l Background of the Problems I I The P o s i t i o n of Small States i n the League of Nations A The Admission of Small States to the League of Nations and the P r i n c i p l e of U n i v e r s a l i t y i n the League of Nations B The Special Arrangements f o r Small States i n the League of Nations III The Problems of Micro-States i n the United Nations A The Reasons of Micro-States i n Seeking Membership B The Impact of Membership of Micro-States on the United Nations (1) The Admission of Micro-States to the United Nations and the P r i n c i p l e of Un i v e r s a l i t y (2) The Rule of One-State One-Yote and the P r i n c i p l e of Sovereign Equality i n the United Nations C Proposed Special Arrangements f o r Micro-States i n the United Nations - i v -Chapter Page 17 'The Problem of Statehood f o r Micro-States 48 V Conclusion 60 Footnotes 62 Bibliography 81 Appendix 8 7 - 1 -I INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS AND THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND A Introduction to the Problems of Micro-States Secretary General U Thant, i n the Introduction to h i s annual report to the General Assembly f o r 1964-65? wrote that "a new problem was being r a i s e d by the recent phenomenon 1 of the emergence of exceptionally small States." Also i n h i s annual report to the General Assembly f o r 1966-67» he r e -defined the micro-States as " e n t i t i e s which ;are exceptionally small i n area, population and human and economic resources, 2 and which are now emerging as independent States." Such was the case of the former Trust T e r r i t o r y of Nauru, which attained i t s independence on 31 January 1968 and has an area of only 8.25 square miles and an indigenous population of about 5,000. Besides, the p o t e n t i a l smallest State i s P i t -c a i r a Island which'N i s only 1.75 square miles i n extent and .3 has a population of around 90. The most c r u c i a l problem, as U Thant indicated, was that " t h e i r l i m i t e d s i z e and resources can pose a d i f f i c u l t problem as to the r o l e they should t r y to play i n interna-4 t i o n a l l i f e . " Under A r t i c l e 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, new Members of the United Nations not only must subscribe to the purposes and i d e a l s of the Organization and be peace-loving States which accept the" obligations under the Charter; they must also be " w i l l i n g and able" to carry out - 2 -t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as Members. In t h i s respect, i t seems obvious that most of the e x i s t i n g or p o t e n t i a l micro-States would hardly be able to f u l f i l such a requirement. The f a c t i a that the United Nations has been admitting any State as long as i t claims to be an independent State and applies f o r admission. As i t has been pointed out, "the step from inde-pendence to United Nations membership has been v i r t u a l l y 5 automatic." Such phenomenon i s p a r t l y due to the c o n f l i c t s between the big powers i n seeking supporters i n the Cold f a r . These emerging numerous micro-States are the best candidates fo r a l l i e s . i.The practice, of admitting them indiscriminately i s usually referr e d to as the approaching way to the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y which seems more i d e a l i s t i c than r e a l i s t i c . Furthermore, as indicated by U Thant i n discussing the membership of these micro-States i n the United Nations, "such membership may, on the one hand, impose obligations which are too onerous f o r the micro-States and, on the other.. '6 hand, may lead to a weakening of the United Nations i t s e l f . " In fact, one or two present Members have not been able to main-t a i n a permanent mission at the United Nations Headquarters. Micro-States not only cause problems f o r the United Nations.; they have serious problems: of t h e i r own. Most of them lack the capacity f o r economic and p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y , and should concentrate on developing t h e i r own economies be-fore t r y i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the world a f f a i r s . Before the - 3 -l i t t l e landlocked African State of Swaziland was approved as the 125th Member^of the United Nations on 24 September 1968, Lord Caradon of B r i t a i n , i n presenting t h i s country to the Security Council, described i t as industrious and economical-8 l y v i a b l e . But he had to admit that i t was small and poor. Although " v i a b i l i t y " may be a s u f f i c i e n t t e s t of independent statehood, i t i s not necessarily competent enough to be a Mem-ber.:in a p o l i t i c a l organization l i k e the United Nations, the Members of which must be "able" and w i l l i n g to carry out the obligations under the Charter. U Thant has indicated that " i t i s , of course, per-f e c t l y legitimate that even the smallest t e r r i t o r i e s , through the exercise of t h e i r r i g h t to self-determination, s h a l l a t t a i n independence as a r e s u l t of the e f f e c t i v e application of the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." But he further stated that " i t appears desirable that a d i s t i n c t i o n be made between the r i g h t to independence and the question of f u l l membership i n the United Nations." He therefore suggested a study of the c r i t e r i a f o r membership i n the United Nations with a view to l a y i n g down the necessary l i m i t a t i o n s on f u l l membership while also defining other forms of association which q would benefit both the micro-States and the United Nations. I t has been suggested that f o r the time being micro-States might have membership only i n sp e c i a l i z e d agencies of - 4 -the Organization, which would aid them i n economic and s o c i a l development even though they did not have f u l l membership i n the United Nations. One or two micro-States did follow t h i s suggestion. Western Samoa, 1097 square.miles i n area with a population of'114,627, became independent on 1 January 1962; however, i t s leaders chose not to j o i n the United Nations 10 because the country could not a f f o r d i t . Nevertheless, Western Samoa i s a Member of the World Health Organization and of the Economic Commission f o r Asia and the Far East. (ECAFE) i n the United Nations family of organizations. (These give i t p r a c t i c a l advantages more important to i t s people than the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t i n the General Assembly about which U Thant has expressed doubts. Besides, the present e x i s t i n g smallest independent State, that i s Nauru, has also decided not to seek membership In the United Nations because of i t s 11 small s i z e . Another problem clo s e l y r e l a t e d to the membership of the micro-States i n the United Nations i s the voting problem under the rule of "one-State one-vote." This r u l e i s primarily based on the so-called p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equality. But i n fa c t , t h i s voting p r i n c i p l e i s not consistent with r e a l i t y . The chief problem under t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s whether the United Nations can afford to run the r i s k of the system of "one-State one-vote" degenerating into a system of power with-out r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t i s believed that ri g h t s must be pro-portionate to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s involved. The f i n a n c i a l - 5 -G o n t r i b i i t i p n ^ to the U n i t e d Nations a u t h o r i z e d by the General Assembly has always been unequal. I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , u n f a i r to g i v e s m a l l S t a t e s , which are incapable of making s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , a g r e a t e r say i n the running of the United Nations a f f a i r s than that o f those who bear a g r e a t e r p a r t o f the f i n a n c i a l burden. And i t has been s a i d t h a t the t h i n k i n g of diplomats who f a v o r some r e s t r i c t i o n on the powers of u n u s u a l l y s m a l l c o u n t r i e s i s t h a t i f a l a r g e number of them came i n t o the p o s i t i o n of c o n t r o l l i n g a m a j o r i t y i n the General Assembly, i t would encourage power p o l i t i c s . The great powers w i l l be' d r i v e n to i g n o r i n g the Assembly and s e t t l i n g world problems among themselves. ..This i s the s u r v i v a l o f the so c a l l e d " h o t e l diplomacy." In response, a proposal f o r the reform o f the present v o t i n g procedure has been suggested, such as a weighted v o t i n g system. To conclude, the problems of micro-States i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l law can be put i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s : one i s the pro-blem i n s i d e the micro-States themselves, i n c l u d i n g the choice of t h e i r statehood and t h e i r domestic developments, while the other i s the impact of these micro-States on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, i n c l u d i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i o n s of these micro-States i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. A l l o f these problems w i l l be discussed s e p a r a t e l y i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters. B The H i s t o r i c a l Background of the Problems In recent years the number of t e r r i t o r i e s under e i -- 6 -ther the United Nations trusteeship or c o l o n i a l rule have 12 ra p i d l y decreased. With few exceptions most of them, upon gaining t h e i r independence, have applied f o r membership i n the United Nations and were admitted. The t e r r i t o r i e s that are s t i l l dependent are the numerous small sparsely populated, economically i s o l a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s i n the A t l a n t i c , P a c i f i c and Indian Ocean and i n the Caribbean. These t e r r i t o r i e s have been approaching the threshold of self-government and independence, and have became the focus of attention only i n recent years. These small t e r r i t o r i e s are to give b i r t h to the "micro-States" defined by the Secretary General i n h i s annual report to the General-Assembly f o r 1966-67. The United Nations has done a great deal i n stimulat-ing the b i r t h of these micro-States. Since i t s beginning i t has encouraged and assisted the r i s i n g national consciousness of the peoples of dependent t e r r i t o r i e s and t h e i r determination to achieve t h e i r independence. The United Nations Charter contains three chapters s p e c i f i c a l l y devoted to the'dependent peoples. Under Chapters XI, XII,and XIII, especially the l a t t e r two, the United Nations established a system of trustee-ship f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision of the administration of t e r r i t o r i e s placed under the system through i n d i v i d u a l - 7 -agreements. The b a s i c o b j e c t i v e of the t r u s t e e s h i p system i s to promote the p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l advancement of the Trust T e r r i t o r i e s and t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of each t e r r i t o r y and t h e i r people's f r e e l y expressed wishes. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the operation o f the system I s entrusted, under the Charter, to the Trusteeship C o u n c i l — o n e o f the p r i n c i p a l organs of the United N a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n to the establishment o f a t r u s t e e -s h i p system, the Charter l a y s down the p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r -n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the w e l f a r e and advancement of dependent peoples who have not yet a t t a i n e d a f u l l measure of self-government. Under Chapter XI o f the Charter, States Members of the U n i t e d Nations which have assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s recognize the p r i n c i p l e that the i n t e r e s t s of the i n h a b i t a n t of these t e r r i t o r i e s are paramount and accept as a sacred t r u s t the o b l i g a t i o n to promote the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n h a b i t a n t s . To t h i s end, they undertake to develop self-government, to take due account of the p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n of the peoples, and to a s s i s t them i n the development of t h e i r f r e e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i -t u t i o n s . I n summing up t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r of t h i s Chapter, i t i s noted the c o l o n i a l powers f o r the f i r s t time i n h i s t o r y had v o l u n t a r i l y accepted, as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a d m i n i s t e r i n g the t e r r i t o r i e s i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of the United Nations. - 8 -Although a large number of t r u s t and other non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s did at t a i n t h e i r independence, there was growing concern among Members of the United Nations that the progress towards complete emancipation of the many countries and peoples s t i l l remaining under c o l o n i a l status was too slow and should be accelerated. At i t s I960 session, following a h i s t o r i c a l debate i n plenary session, the General Assembly, on 14 December, expressed i t s deep concern and desire f o r the speedy a t t a i n -ment of independence by the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s i n i t s Resolution 1514 (XV) e n t i t l e d : Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In t h i s Declaration, the General Assembly expressed the conviction that the continued existence of colonialism prevented the develop-ment of in t e r n a t i o n a l economic cooperation, impeded the s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l and economic development of dependent peoples? and m i l i t a t e d against the United Nations i d e a l of universal peace. The Declaration emphasized that " a l l peoples of these t e r r i -t o r i e s has the inalienable r i g h t to complete freedom, the exercise of t h e i r sovereignty and the i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r national t e r r i t o r y ; a l l peoples Have the r i g h t to self-determination and by v i r t u e of that r i g h t they f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l status and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l development." And the Declaration went on to. proclaim that "inadequacy of p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l or educational pre-- 9 -paxedness should never serve as a pretext f o r delaying inde-pendence; i n Trust and Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s or a l l other t e r r i t o r i e s which had not yet attained independence, immediate steps should be taken to transfer a l l powers to the peoples without any d i s t i n c t i o n as to race, creed or color." 13 64 small dependent t e r r i t o r i e s , including the only remaining 14 Trust T e r r i t o r y of the P a c i f i c Islands, come within the purview of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . In 1961, one year a f t e r the adoption of the Declara-t i o n , the Assembly reconsidered the extent to which i t had been implemented. In a resolution adopted on 27 November, i t noted "with regret" that, with few exceptions, the provisions, of the Declaration had not been car r i e d out and that armed action and repressive measures continued to be taken i n certain areas with increasing ruthlessness "against dependent peoples, depriving them of t h e i r prerogative to exercise peace-f u l l y and f r e e l y t h e i r r i g h t to complete independence," and the Assembly c a l l e d on a l l States administering Truat or Non-Self-Governing t e r r i t o r i e s to "take action without further delay with a view to the f a i t h f u l a pplication and implemen-15 t a t i o n of the Declaration." In a major provision of t h i s r esolution, the Assembly decided to esta b l i s h a Seventeen-Member Special Conmiittee to examine the application of the I960 Declaration and to make recommendations on the progress 15a and extent of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . Again, i n 1962 the General - 10 -Assembly adopted a r e s o l u t i o n which decided to increase the membership of the Special Committee from seventeen to twenty-16 four—known as the Committee of 2 4 . The i n i t i a l study of the Committee of 24 dealt with the larger dependent t e r r i -t o r i e s , such as Kenya and Guyana, and u n t i l recently the s p e c i a l concern about micro-States received only passing atten-t i o n . In 1965 the General Assembly asked the Committee of 24 17 "to pay p a r t i c u l a r attention to the small t e r r i t o r i e s . " Under the high t i d e of national consciousness and under the repeated affirmations of the."inalienable r i g h t of these people to complete freedom and self-determination" by the United Nations, a number of t e r r i t o r i e s have gainded t h e i r independence, although the small t e r r i t o r i e s gained the atten-t i o n of the Special Committee of 24 only recently. The Committee i s convinced that Resolution 1514 ( X Y ), which states that "inadequacy of p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l or educational • 1 preparedness should never serve as a pretext for" delaying inde-18 pendence," i s f u l l y applicable to the small t e r r i t o r i e s . Besides, the Committee i s also aware that the formation of appropriate concrete measures fo r such f u l l application i s sometimes hampered by the lack of adequate information on the p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n these t e r r i t o r i e s , or on the opinions, wishes and aspirations of the people. In Resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, the General Assembly approved the Committee's desire to send v i s i t i n g missions to - l i -the small i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s . I t also asked the Committee to devise s p e c i f i c recommendations, on appropriate decolonization measures and to suggest time tables f o r independence. • Under the encouragements and e f f o r t s of the United Nations, some of t&e small t e r r i t o r i e s have gained t h e i r inde-pendence, and the res t of these t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l , beyond doubt, a t t a i n the status of self-government or f u l l independence i n the near future. The problems involved i n the future of these small t e r r i t o r i e s pose several questions i n the int e r n a t i o n a l law. W i l l f u l l independence be the best form f o r a l l the small t e r r i t o r i e s ? Should a f u l l membership i n the United Nations be granted to them, i f they do apply so? Or should some spe c i a l arrangements be the alternatives? Or should an equal vote be given to the small States even i f they are not able to contribute as much as the powerful States? A l l these questions w i l l be f u l l y discussed i n the following chapters. I I THE POSITION OP SMALL STATES IN THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS A The Admission o f Small States to the League of Nations and  the P r i n c i p l e o f U n i v e r s a l i t y i n the League o f Nations (1) The Admission of Small States to the League o f Nations During the e a r l y h i s t o r y o f the League of Nations, there were s e v e r a l States t h a t were a l s o ^ v e r y s m a l l i n popu-l a t i o n , t e r r i t o r y and resources, such ; as the P r i n c i p a l i t y o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n , the Republic of San Marino -and the P r i n c i p a l i t y 1 of Monaco and Andorra. Although some o f them d i d apply f o r membership to the League, they were not admitted f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons. Before the f i r s t Assembly of the League, the States mentioned above, except Andorra, had asked f o r admission to the League o f Nations. On 15 J u l y 1920, the Swiss M i n i s t e r i n London asked f o r the admission o f the P r i n c i p a l i t y of L i e c h t e n s t e i n to the League of Nations. And on 20 September 1921, the Committee No. V, a f t e r c a r e f u l study of the L i e c h t e n s t e i n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n , made a unfavorable recommendation«/to the General Assembly. I t read as f o l l o w s : " ( t ) h e Committee i s of the o p i n i o n that the a p p l i c a t i o n o f L i e c h t e n s t e i n can not be granted, as t h i s State does not appear i n a p o s i t i o n to c a r r y out a l l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the Covenant," and the - 13 -Committee went on tb; recommend that a special arrangement be worked out i n order to "attach to the League of Nations Sovereign States which, by reason of t h e i r small s i z e , could not be admitted as ordinary ...Members." On 20 December 1920 the Secretariat informed the"government of the P r i n c i p a l i t y of Liechtenstein that the Assembly, afte r having considered i t s request f o r admission, was of the opinion that the a p p l i -cation could not be granted and at the same time brought t h i s 4 recommendation to i t s notice. As to the applications f o r admission by the Republic of San Marino and the P r i n c i p a l i t y of Monaco, they were some-what d i f f e r e n t from the case of Liechtenstein. On 25 A p r i l 1919 the Charge d» A f f a i r e s of the Republic of San Marino sub-mitted a request with t h i s purpose to the President of the 5 Peace Conference. The Secretary General on 24 August 1920 asked the government of the Republic of San Marino f o r certain information, but no reply to t h i s request was received by the Secretariat during the session of the F i r s t Assembly, and the League therefore did not deal with the question. As f a r as ihe P r i n c i p a l i t y of Monaco i s concerned, on 6 A p r i l 1920 the Secretary of State of the P r i n c i p a l i t y of Monaco submitted a request to the same effect to the President 6 of the Council of the League of Nations, but t h i s japplica- ; t i o n f o r admission was withdrawn by a l e t t e r dated 22 October 7 1920. - H -Under A r t i c l e 1 (2) of the Covenant of the League of Nations concerning t h e application of membership, i t was provided that "any f u l l y self-governing State, Dominion or colony not named i n the Annex... may become a Member of the League i f i t s admission i s agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly provided that i t s h a l l give e f f e c t i v e guarantees of i t s sincere intention to observe i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a -tions, and s h a l l accept such regulations as may be prescrib-ed 1 by the League i n regard to i t s m i l i t a r y , naval and a i r forces and armaments." In in t e r p r e t i n g t h i s A r t i c l e , i t i s desirable to take the view that the admission of new Members to the League of Nations, a world p o l i t i c a l organization, and t h e i r assumption of the r i g h t s and duties thereby i n -curred are necessarily based on "the w i l l and capacity" of these applicants, and s h a l l not be blinded under the p r i n c i -8 pie of u n i v e r s a l i t y . By saying t h i s , i t i s , of course, by no means to exclude States which are small i n population, t e r r i t o r y and resources and are not able to f u l f i l t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l obligations effectively,; from the in t e r n a t i o n a l community. The Sub-Committee i n considering the question whether i t would"be possible to attach States of t h i s kind to the League of Nations, held the opinion that with a view to i t s development, the League of Nations should be able, as soon as possible, to embrace a l l States which, while f u l f i l l - ^ ing the conditions required by A r t i c l e 1 of the Covenant, desire to associate themselves with i t . And i t further i n -- 15 -dicated that although of narrow application, t h i s p r i n c i p l e applied equally to States of very small s i z e , each State constituting a l e g a l e n t i t y whose s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s are de-serving of consideration. However, i n the opinion of the * Suh-Committee the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y of membership was only an i d e a l and could not be applied at random. I t de-cided that the only problem that existed and needed to be solved was that of the form which should be given to these small States' p a r t i c i p a t i o n . SThus, although the recommenda-ti o n of 17 December 1920 excluded, a p r i o r i , the p o s s i b i l i t y of regarding these small States as ordinary Members, the Sub-Committee did propose several methods fo r a t t a i n i n g the aim of f u l l cooperation between the States i r r e s p e c t i v e of being a Member or not. Besides, i t was suggested by the Committee No. V that although these small States could not be admitted at that time, these decisions should not prevent the Assembly i n the future from taking once again these requests into con-si d e r a t i o n . That i s to say, the nations concerned could renew the i r application f o r admission when the reasons against admitting them had disappeared. f'The problems of the small States, as indicated by the Committee No. 7, could only be « solved by time and, as soon as t h e i r problems were solved, they were most l i k e l y to be admitted. At the same time, they could also a v a i l themselves of the technical organizations of - 16 -the League of Nations. In conclusion, under the practice of the League of Nations, although no rule had been s t r i c t l y l a i d down that States, which were too small i n t e r r i t o r y or had too few i n -habitants, should be excluded from the League of Nations, i t did take the view that before granting admission to the small States, f u l l consideration should be paid to the a b i l i t y of the applicant small States to carry out the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 9 obligations imposed by the Covenant. (2) The P r i n c i p l e of U n i v e r s a l i t y under the League of Nations To apply the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y as a basis f o r membership was de l i b e r a t e l y rejected by the League of Na-10 tions i n 1920. A draft proposal incorporating the idea of universa-l i t y of membership into the Covenant had been f i r s t o f f i c i a l l y 11 r a i s e d by the Delegate of Argentina. I t stated that " a l l Sovereign States recognized by the Community of Nations be &* admitted to j o i n the League of Nations i n such a manner that, i f they do not become a Member of the League of Nations t h i s can only be the r e s u l t of a voluntary decision on t h e i r part." In other words, by t h i s proposal a sovereign State, regardless of i t s willingness or capacity to carry cut the in t e r n a t i o n a l obligations imposed by the Covenant, would automatically be-come a Member of the League of Nations, unless an expressed' - 17 -12 r e j e c t i o n was made by that State. The Argentine proposal was primarily based on the consideration that "the strength of the League of Nations depends on i t s including the great-est possible numbers of States; the fewer the States outside , i t , the greater w i l l be the number of the Members pledged to carry out i t s provisions and to perform the duties which i t imposes." In his point of view, "the non-admission of a number of States might lead to dangerous antagonisms, be the cause of the formation of a League of Nations outside the League, i n r i v a l r y to i t , and be a constant source of danger 13 . to the peace of the world." Since the Argentine proposal was f a r away from the actual p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n those days, i t was rejected by 14 the Assembly of the League. B The Special Arrangements fo r Small States i n the League  of Nations The Problems of the small States i n the League c a l l e d f o r a consideration of the question of some spe c i a l arrangements to be made f o r them.. In d e c l i n i n g to admit Liechtenstein as a Member of the League and i n b e l i e v i n g that the true object of the League would be more e a s i l y attained i f a l l States were not excluded, the F i r s t Assembly of the League expressed the wish that some special-arrangements be made, to a certain l i m i t , to attach to the League of Nations - 18 -cert a i n States, which by reason of t h e i r small si z e , could not be admitted to the League. following the wish of the Assembly, the Committee on Amendments to the Covenant presented three alternative 16 methods of attachment: " (a) to recognize f o r such small States a sr r i g h t of f u l l representation without a vote; or (b) to allow t h e i r representation by another State already a Member of the League; or (c) to have recourse to a system of p a r t i c i -pation l i m i t e d exclusively to cases i n which the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s of such small States were involved. As f a r as the f i r s t method was concerned, i t im-p l i e d the right to take part and to speak i n the Assembly on a l l subjects and to p a r t i c i p a t e , as Members of Committees and Sub-Committees, i n a l l the work, but without the r i g h t to share i n i t s decisions. But, by b e l i e v i n g that "the dura-t i o n of debates might be prolonged by the intervention of Members who, i n r e a l i t y , had no concern with the subject un-17 der discussion," the Sub-Committee therefore recommended 18 the r e j e c t i o n of t h i s method and proposed the other two, namely, (a) admission to membership with f u l l p r i v i -- 19 -leges to be exercised only where t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s are involved; or (b) representation by some other State which */ was already a member of the League. Concerning Method (a), i n the Second Assembly, i t was considered that to adopt t h i s method would put the small States i n a very i n f e r i o r and undignified p o s i t i o n while such small States were, at the same time, apt to be extra-19 o r d i n a r i l y sensitive and suspicious. I t was also held that there would be inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s i n defining what were matters of " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , " while the League ought 20 to concern i t s e l f only with matters of general i n t e r e s t . As to Method (b), i t was also argued that i t would create a new class of Members of the League of Nations. Furthermore, t h i s method would also place the small States i n "a p o s i t i o n of i n f e r i o r i t y , under a sort of more l o r l e s s temporary pro-21 tectorate." Besides, the representing States might have i n the Assembly some i n t e r e s t s that would be i n opposition to those of the States which they represented. To sum up, i n addition to the f a c t that there were disagreements among the Member States i n adopting these me-thods, i t became quite evident that both methods were i n c o n f l i c t with A r t i c l e 1 (2) of the Covenant, and that the adoption of either would make an amendment necessary. Since at that time no small States had submitted such a request to the Assembly, and on the other hand, some States which were not Members of the League had then taken part i n Conference i n the League, the /.Second Assembly therefore f i n a l l y consider-ed and approved the report of the F i r s t Committee which sug-gested that "experience should be awaited before any d e f i n i t e 22 conditioniwere l a i d down." I l l THE PROBLEMS 03? MICRO-STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS A The Reasons of Micro-States i n Seeking Membership In spite of the heavy burdens imposed upon the Mem-ber States by the present Charter, micro-States, with few ex-ceptions?, have been s t i l l eager to obtain the membership i n the United Nations. The reasons f o r t h i s are as follows: (1) The emphasis of the Charter on cooperation i n the solution of economic and s o c i a l problems has attracted the micro-States to the United Nations. I t has been well known that the United Nations and i t s Specialized Agencies are the most e f f e c t i v e and appropriate means by which i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation can be e f f i c i e n t l y c a r r i e d out. Actually the greatest achievement of the United Nations and i t s greatest advancement over previous cooperative e f f o r t s have been i n c a l l i n g attention to the s p e c i a l needs of the underdeveloped areas, i n stimulating programs of assistance, and i n organizing programs such as the Expanding Program of Technical Assistance which have placed at the disposal of the underdeveloped coun-t r i e s various forms of technical aid without the p o l i t i c a l conditions that are sometimes attached by the donor States and.-w'ithout the r i s k s that weaker countries have run i n accept-ing aid from more advanced and stronger countries. Also, United Nations aid to underdeveloped countries has been given not only through technical assistance programs but through - 22 -loans by the World Bank and by assistance from the Interna-t i o n a l Finance Corporation and, the International Develop-ment Association. As f a r as the economic and s o c i a l f i e l d is.concerned, the United Nations and i t s Specialized Agencies are engaged i n meeting needs that have existed f o r a long time, and which exist even to a greater degree under the modern technological society. In order to meet these needs, the United Nations and i t s Specialized Agencies are indispen-sable. Perhaps even more important i s the fact that the peoples of these underdeveloped places are no longer w i l l i n g to accept the condition of hunger and pestilence which i n the past have been t h e i r f a t e . They demand assistance i n improv-ing t h e i r fate but not on unequal terms. Since a l l the micro-States are underdeveloped and backward, and they are also just emerging from the status of c o l o n i a l or trusteed t e r r i t o r i e s and gaining independence, there i s a l l the more reason f o r them to a v a i l themselves of the f a c i l i t i e s of the United Nations. Besides, as most micro-States owe t h e i r very independence to the continued emphasis which the United Nations has placed on the o b l i g a t i o n of the administering Members to develop self-government within them, the United Nations has been treated by these newly independent micro-States as "fostermother." In t h i s respect, a natural adherence arises among them to the United Nations. (2) From a psychological point of view, membership i n the United Nations i s coveted. I t has been referred to as a - 23 -2 "mark of sovereignty." To be a Member of the United Nations 3 i s also a symbol of t h e i r stable prestige i n world p o l i t i c s . The United Nations has; made i t possible f o r these micro-States to have a foreign p o l i c y , and i t enables them to play a role i n the world p o l i t i c s out of a l l proportion to t h e i r popula-t i o n , economic or m i l i t a r y strength. Therefore, the f a i l u r e of these micro-States, upon t h e i r independence, to gain admis-sion to the United Nations might be thought, by these micro-States, to give doubts on t h e i r independence and sovereignty. (3) The reasons stated above are the i n t e r n a l factors that stimulate the micro-States to seek membership i n the 1 United Nations. But as we know, the big powers have by them-selves, due to the c o n f l i c t s out of the Cold War, enhanced the r o l e and power of the micro-States. In waging the Cold War, the r i v a l powers, i n order to bid against each other, are doing t h e i r best to please the newly independent small States. Besides, as under the present practice of the Charter, each State i r r e s p e c t i v e of i t s population or contributions has the equal voting power, these micro-States are surely i n "a strong 4 bargaining position." Since these micro-States form a more or le s s " r e l i a b l e pool of support" f o r the r i v a l powers i n 5 the Cold War, the r i v a l powers welcome the micro-States to join t h e i r bloc. In conclusion, since we have found out the reasons the micro-States have been eager to seek membership i n the - 24 -United Nations, we should work out a plan which would meet the needs of such States, hut would not impose upon them the heavy obliga t i o n attached to the f u l l membership i n the United Nations. B The Impact of Membership of Micro-States on the United Nations (1) The Admission of Micro-States to the United Nations and  the P r i n c i p l e of U n i v e r s a l i t y 6 , As indicated above, the admission of new Members to the United Nations has become, i n the recent years, almost auto-matic. This explosion of membership i n the United Nations has caused the Organization to become unwieldly and unbalanced. The questions now before lis are whether the p r i n c i p l e of u n i -v e r s a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to membership has been incorporated into the present Charter, and whether the micro-States, which are hardly able to meet the admission requirement under the Charter, are q u a l i f i e d to be a Member of the United Nations. As f a r as the f i r s t problem i s concerned, there are two approaches towards the problem of r e c r u i t i n g members to a World Organization. One s t a r t s from the viewpoint that the strength of any such organization depends on the degree of i t s including the greatest possible number of States; the fewer the States outside i t , the greater w i l l be the numbers pledged to carry out i t s decisions and to perform the duties which i t imposes. The leads to the doctrine of u n i v e r s a l i t y i . e . , the - 25 -adherence to the organization of a l l communities that pass the t e s t s of independent statehood. ?There i s another side to t h i s doctrine; i t impliess that membership i n the organization w i l l 7 be automatic and no application i s required. The second approach i s started from a d i f f e r e n t point of view. I t i n d i -cates that, as a rule, the strength of a public i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization depends hot 0 n i t s including the greatest possi-ble number of States, but on i t s including the greatest possible number of like-minded States, such as can be trusted to work together harmoniously and e f f i c i e n t l y . This p r i n c i p l e i s usually refered as the p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i v i t y . I t cannot be gainsaid that each of these two p r i n -c i p l e has i t s own merits, and the choice between them must depend on the function of the p a r t i c u l a r organization i n ques-t i o n . Where the function obviously makes e f f i c i e n c y dependent on universal membership, the p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i v i t y has l i t t l e chance to be recommended. For example, the world w i l l be i l l served by a health organization which does not guarantee that the highest possible l e v e l of health reached i t s d e s t i -nation regardless of the h i s t o r i c a l record, p o l i t i c a l back-ground and the economic condition of the State i n the world. S i m i l a r l y the same consideration applies to most organizations of a t e c h n i c a l character. This consideration, however, ceases to be dominant when an organization shoulders r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s mainly of a p o l i t i c a l nature. - 26 -At the b i r t h of the League of Nations, the question whether the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y should be adopted was considered at length and with care. This p r i n c i p l e , as d i s -cussed i n the foregoing chapter, was rejected i n the League of Nations. In the practice of the United Nations, the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y took place i n two stages. In the Dumbarton Oaks, a proposal i n a chapter named "Membership" consisted of a single paragraph " i . Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l peace-loving States." I f we read i t i n i s o l a -t i o n , i t seemed to walk i n the d i r e c t i o n of u n i v e r s a l i t y . But, of course, i t has to be read i n conjunction with another rule which authorized the General Assembly to admit new Members to the Organization upon the recommendation of the Security Council. • These two rules read together were euqivalent to adopting a p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i v i t y even more severe than the one that the League had practiced. For membership i n the League, i t was s u f f i c i e n t for, a candidate to pass a favorable resolution i n the Assembly; while i n the United Nations the Security Coun-8 o i l , i n addition, has to confer i t s approval f i r s t . At the San Francisco Conference proposals aiming at immediate u n i v e r s a l i t y of membership,,similar to those proposed i n the day of the.League of Nations, were put forward by several Latin American States. The Uruguay delegation demanded that " a l l communities should be members of the Organization and that - 27 -t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n be obligatory, that i s to say that i t would not be l e f t to the choice of any nation whether to 9 become a member of the Organization or to withdraw from i t . " But Costa Rica, while accepting the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y as a goal, recognized that i t might not at present be a * "possible r e a l i t y . " For the future i t did approve that "(o)nly i n t h i s premise would i t be possible to b u i l d the community of a l l nations having i t s own structure and means of making the transgressions of i t s members subject to the 10 rule s accepted by a l l . " But most of the States refused to accept t h i s premise as desirable f o r either the present or the future. I t seemed to them that an act of admission r e -quired a c e r t a i n degree of cooperation on both:.sides. France maintained that conditions of membership should be l a i d down which would "ensure a community of p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and a n i i d e a l shared i n common among those who were already members 11 and any new Member of the Organization." And more impor-tant was that both France and the Netherlands i n s i s t e d that admission should be l i m i t e d to those States which by t h e i r " i n s t i t u t i o n " and by t h e i r " i n t e r n a t i o n a l behaviour" had already given proof of " t h e i r willingness and a b i l i t y " to 12 carry out t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l obligations. The outcome of the debate was to recognize that u n i v e r s a l i t y was "an i d e a l toward which i t was proper to 13 aim." Actually, the San Francisco Conference went even - 28 -f a r beyond a mere r e f u s a l to incorporate immediately the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y of membership. I t was strongly emphasized by the report of Committee 1/2 that "the organi-zation would exercise i t s discretionary power with respect to the admission of new Members.... To declare oneself 'peace-loving' does not s u f f i c e to acquire membership i n the - 14 Organization." According to i t s report, new Members would be admitted only i f they are "recognized" as peace-loving and upon examination by the Organization are judged "able and 15 ready" to carry out those obligations. A r t i c l e 4 of the present Charter i s a r e s u l t of these debates. But the words of the A r t i c l e are rather obscure. Under i t ; (a) membership i n the United Nations i s open to a l l other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained i n the present Charter and, i n the judgment of the Organization, are able and w i l l i n g to carry out these o b l i g a t i o n s . (b) the admission of any such State to member-ship i n the United Nations w i l l be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Thus, four q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for membership to the United Nations can be decuced from the f i r s t paragraph of A r t i c l e 4; these are: - 29 -(i) statehood; ( i i ) be peace-loving; ( i i i ) acceptance of the obligations contained i n the present Charter; (iv) a b i l i t y and willingness to carry out these obligations. Under these analyses, the f i r s t and the fourth qua-l i f i c a t i o n s are of immediate concern with regards to the application of micro-States f o r admission to the United Nations. In discussing the statehood of micro-States, the question before us w i l l be whether the l i m i t a t i o n s upon s i z e , population and resources of a State w i l l somewhat impair i t s true independence. Generally speaking, the only l i m i t a t i o n upon size , population l i and resources w i l l not a f f e c t the true independence of a State, although some p u b l i c i s t s took the view that a State must possess 17 a cer t a i n minimum size of t e r r i t o r y and population. Evidence has shown that the International Court of J u s t i c e had not merely admitted Liechtenstein, which had been rejected by the League of Nations on ground of i t s i n a b i l i t y to carry out i t s o b l i g a -t i o n by reason of i t s small size, to i t s S t a t u t e — a n admission which i s only open to States and which was made by an over a l l 18 majority i n the General Assembly, but several times referr e d to i t as a State and treated i t as such i n the Nottebohm 19 .;  case. San Marino, which has less population-than that of - 20 Liechtenstein, i s also a party to the Statute of the Court. 1 - 30 -To sum up, the mere l i m i t a t i o n upon s i z e , popula-t i o n and, resources cannot be a ground f o r denying the state-hood of a State. But, of course, i n maintaining t h i s view one does not necessarily imply that a State of exceptionally small s i z e or population has any r i g h t to j o i n an interna-t i o n a l organization. An i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization may r e j e c t i t s a p p l i c a t i o n not on the ground of small size or population alone, but on the undeniable f a c t of i t s physical and f i n a n -c i a l i n a b i l i t y to carry out the obligations of membership. As U Thant has pointed out, "a d i s t i n c t i o n should be made be-tween the r i g h t to independence and the question of f u l l 21 membership." Since most of the newly independent micro-States are very small i n s i z e , population and resources, they are 22 hardly able to f u l f i l the obligations imposed by the Charter. In terms of p o l i t i c a l experience, they "were s t i l l not mature 23 enough to deal with t h e i r own matter," l e t alone to j o i n the United Nations to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Besides, under the present structure of the United Nations, to grant membership to the micro-States might do hardship to 24 25 both the micro-States and the United Nations i t s e l f . As U Thant argued, United Nations membership might "impose obligations which are too onerous f o r the micro-States and 26 also may lead to a weakening of the United Nations." In ascertaining the facts concerning the admission - 31 -of micro-States to the United Nations, we are aware that the United Nations has nothing comparable to the league of Nations' "Questionnaire" to guide the Security Council's Committee on 27 the Admission of New Members, nor does the General Assembly undertake any i n v e s t i g a t i o n of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of the a p p l i -cant States. In t h i s respect, we would suggest that d e f i n i t e c r i t e r i a should be applied before making decisions on the case of granting memberships. This i s also what U Thant has urged, saying that " i t may be opportune for the competent organs to undertake a thorough and comprehensive study of the c r i t e r i a 28 f o r membership i n the United Nations...." In conclusion, since we are aware that the "road to u n i v e r s a l i t y " i n the United Nations would merely open "the T: 29 road to f u t i l i t y , and f i n a l l y o b l i v i o n , " We would suggest that before micro-States seek membership i n the United Nations.1, they should care more about t h e i r i n t e r n a l developments both p o l i t i c a l and economic, and that the United Nations should t take more care i n admitting new States to membership, perhaps 30 admitting them only f o r a " t r i a l period." (2) The Rule of One-State One-Vote and the P r i n c i p l e of  Sovereign Equality i n the United Nations Along with the problems a r i s i n g from the increasing memberships of micro-States i n the United Nations i s the basic problem of the voting system i n the General Assembly. - 32 -According to A r t i c l e 2 of the present Charter, "(t)he Organization i s based on the p r i n c i p l e of the so-vereign equality of a l l i t s Members." And under t h i s pre-mise the General Assembly, as we were t o l d , i s a r e a l "town meeting of the world,", within which each Member State i s equal with any other State i n so f a r as each Member has one vote, regardless of s i z e , population or i t s p o l i t i c a l 31 strength. No State, large or small, enjoys any p r i v i -leges or advantages i n casting i t s vote. No State has a veto. This i s the so**called r u l e of "one-State one-vote," Under t h i s r u l e , a micro-State has the same vote as one of the big powers. I t s vote i s therefore out of a l l proportion with i t s weight i n the r e a l world of p o l i t i c s . In t h i s respect, one can e a s i l y image the, fact that the United Nations i s getting more and more unmanageable 32 and the capacity of the organization has also been reduced. Furthermore, t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i l l deteriorate i f no reform i s established, since a great number of pot e n t i a l micro-States are marching through the threshold of the post-war indepen-dence movement and may eventually be the Members of the United Nations. Thus, the questions before us are: Is the r u l e of "one-state one-vote" consistent with the r e a l i t i e s , of the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l community? Can the International community af f o r d to run the r i s k of the r u l e of "one-state one vote" converting the United Nations into a system domina-- 33 -ted by irresponsible Members? n t. To the f i r s t question, t h e o r e t i c a l l y speaking the background of adopting the rule of "one-state one-vote" has rather been based on the p r i n c i p l e of workability than on that of sovereign equality. The adoption of the rule of "one-State one-vote" i n the General Assembly was j u s t i f i e d by the b e l i e f that, apart from recognizing s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s i n the Security Council f o r the Big Five, the General Assembly 33 was primarily a forum of discussion and debate. But i t i s evident that the s i t u a t i o n of the General Assembly of the 1940's hardly resembless that of the 1960's. One c r u c i a l example of the increasing power of the General Assembly was shown by the adoption of the Uniting f o r Peace Resolution of 1950 i n respose to the Korea War. In t h i s Resolution i t was intended that a paralyzed Council could not be allowed to stand i n the way of the General Assembly i f the l a t t e r was able and w i l l i n g to deal with the matters i n issue. This Resolution s i g n i f i e d r e a l l y a remarkable departure from the o r i g i n a l s p i r i t of the Charter which never contemplated the use of armed force by recommendation of the General Assembly. Even the practice of complete equality of vote i n the nineteenth century has also been evaded by some d i f f e r e n t alternatives; otherwise the r o l e of some in t e r n a t i o n a l or-34 ganization could never be c a r r i e d out. In e f f e c t , ;the p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equality as proclaimed i n the present - 34 -Charter w i l l convey only that a l l States are equal before the law or, say deserve the equal protection of law. This i s just as described by Professor Westlake that "the e q u a l i -ty of sovereign States i s merely independence under a d i f -35 ferent nature." Prom the equality before law i t follows that each independent State, no matter how small i n si z e , population and resources, i s guaranteed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law the freedom from foreign control without i t s consent. Another thing which follows i s that, injjthe i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l proceedings between the b i g and small powers, the Organization s h a l l t r e a t them i m p a r t i a l l y i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r weight i n the r e a l world p o l i t i c s . With these concepts i n mind, i t would seem t o t a l l y wrong to i n s i s t on further equality among nations which are actually unequal i n the 36 r e a l world. The i n e q u a l i t y among States shows c l e a r l y i n the General Assembly where there are now seated representatives 37 of 126 Member States. Among these only 12 States have a 38 population of 40 m i l l i o n or more. Not l e s s than 59 States have a population of 5 m i l l i o n or below; 17 of these have even a population of l e s s than 1 m i l l i o n . 1 While on the other hand, Chine, India and the Soviet Union have more than h a l f the t o t a l population of the United Nations. As f a r as the population i s concerned, i t i s obvious that i t would tend to diminish the authority of the General Assembly's - 35 -decisions " i f the t o t a l population of States voting i n favor 39 of them are f a r less than that of minority voting against." According to the s t a t i s t i c a l estimate, i n the General Assembly there are 64 States, which represent only a l i t t l e over 5 per centage of the t o t a l population of a l l the Members 40 while t h e i r combined vote w i l l represent an absolute majority. Of..} these 64 States, 43 are so small that they represent only more than 3 per centage of the United Nations population, yet t h e i r combined votes can prevent an affirmative decision on '41 any of these issues which a two-thirds majority ife required. Besides, 86 of the smaller States with a combined population representing only 10 per centage of the t o t a l can' e a s i l y pass 42 a two-thirds majority of votes on any issue. As f a r as the annual contribution by each Member State to the organization i s concerned, t h i s discrepancy exists too. The United States alone pays more than 31 per centage per annum which i s more than 775 times the minimum dues of 0.04 per centage paid by each of the 45 small States 43 i n the United Nations, From t h i s aspect, i t i s quite possible that the General Assembly's majorities are composed of States whose aggregate contribution i s l e s s than that of the m i n o r i t i e s . This i s just the s i t u a t i o n that "the r i c h .. 44 pay a l l the taxes and the poor pass a l l the laws.'! This inequality also exists when t e r r i t o r y i s con-sidered. For example, the t o t a l area of the U.S.S.R. i s more - 36 -than 751,75 times the size of the Maldive Islands which i s f o r the time being, the smallest Member State i n the United Nations. In theory, micro-States may, i f they wish, muster any decision i n the G-eneral Assembly without assuming the corresponding r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s : . In t h i s circumstance, " i t i s not i n accord with reason and common sense" that great and powerful States w i l l agree to be bound i n decisions of 45 important matters passed by these small States. Actually, the Afro-Asian group i s badly fragmented on nearly everything except c o l o n i a l problems and the r a c i a l questions. On these issues t h e i r close voting strength i s rather astonishing. For example, i n 1961, the foreign.mini-ster of South A f r i c a , E r i c Louw, asserted i n the course of h i s speech r e f e r r i n g to h i s Government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s be-fore the General Assembly that South African blacks enjoyed a much higher l i v i n g standard than.many of the African States who attacked h i s government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . But t h i s statement so i n f u r i a t e d the Africans that they passed an un-precedented motion of censure of the Government of South A f r i c a , or i t s delegate, f o r the statement made i n the General "* 46 Assembly which, i n t h e i r view, was offensive and erroneous. In order to gain a greater recognition of equality among the Members of the United Nations, i n 1963 the power of the small States culminated i n the unprecedented adoption by the General - 37 -Assembly of two amendments to the Charter increasing the number of seats of the Security Council and the Economic and 47 S o c i a l Council. Besides, the disproportionate voting strength of these Afro-Asian States have also shown i n several r e solution concerning decolonization i n the General 48 Assembly. Yet i t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the member-ship of the African group has now reached 42 which i s just one-third of the t o t a l United Nations memberships. Although t h e i r combined per centage scale of assessments to the United Nations only counts 2.67 and t h e i r t o t a l population counts 10.2 per centage of that of the United Nations, they may e a s i l y with the support of any one Member from the other group obstruct the adoption of any decision f o r which a two-thirds majority i s required. More important i s the f a c t that some small States are become aware of the dangers of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . A diplomatic o f f i c i a l from a small State recently pointed out that the "one-State one-vote" system deluded the l i t t l e countries into a " f a l s e sense of importance 49 and undermines the effectiveness of the World Organization." In h i s opinion, as a delegate from a small country, he would much prefer to have a voting system which more accurately represented the population and r e a l influence of h i s country. To sum up, viewed from the anomalous phenomenon re -l a t i n g to the voting,strength of the small States, the r u l e of - 38 -"one-State one-vote" i s open to some doubt. In t h i s res-pect, several weighted voting methods f o r the reform of the present voting system of the General Assembly have been pro-50 51 posed by several government o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c i s t s . Among these proposed weighted voting systems, some proposed t h i s system should exclusively based on the population factor; while others suggested i t should r e l i e d on the assess-ment paid by each Member State. Although i t w i l l be highly./ democratic when a weighted voting system i s based on popu-l a t i o n element, i t cound not r e f l e c t the r e a l power solely by t h i s consideration. For instance, so long as the popu-l a t i o n f a c t o r i s the only c r i t e r i a of a l l o c a t i n g the votes i n the General Assembly, India w i l l have no l e s s influence than the United States, while i n a c t u a l i t y the former i s f a r l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l than the l a t t e r . But an unacceptable r e s u l t w i l l also be revealed from adopting the c r i t e r i a that the assessments paid by each State should be the only basis i n d i s t r i b u t i n g the votes i n the General Assembly. In 1967 the Big Five contributed nearly 65 per centage of the t o t a l . Among them the United States alone contributed 31.91 per centage more than twice the contribution of the Soviet Union, more than three times that of the United Kingdom, and more than f i v e times, that of France, s i x times that of China. Therefore, the United States alone could block any important issue i n the General Assembly; and on the other hand, with support of the United Kingdom, France and China, could command - 39 -a simple majority; and together with a small group of a l l i e s could also command a two-thirds majority. I t i s , therefore, evident that neither the Soviet bloc nor the small States i n the Assembly would be expected to support such a reform the r e s u l t s of which would be unacceptable to them. In conclusion, i t seems f a i r to say that the d i s -t r i b u t i o n of votes i n the General Assembly should be'deter-mined by objective c r i t e r i a composed of the factors of both the population and f i n a n c i a l contribution of each Member State. C Proposed Special Arrangements f o r Micro-States i n the  United Nations As mentioned above, the micro-States are expected to benefit more by r e s t r i c t i n g themselves to certain spe-c i a l i z e d agencies of the United Nations or other s p e c i a l arrangements than by assuming the obligations of f u l l member-ship of the United Nations, which are too onerous f o r them to 52 bear because of the lack of economic and human resources. Experience has shown that, other than f u l l member-ship of the United Nations, several forms of association f o r non-Member States are available within the United Nations system, such as access to the International Court of Justice 5 3 (ICJ) and membership i n the relevant United Nations regional - 40 -54 economic commissions, and the r i g h t to maintain a per-55 manent observer mission at the United Nations Headquarters. Membership i n the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies also provides the opportunity f o r access to jthe benefits provided by the United i Nations Development Programme and f o r i n v i t a t i o n s to United Nations conferences. Besides, under the Charter a non-Member may bring to the Security Oouncial or the General Assembly 56 any dispute to which i t i s a party. In addition to these arrangements which are available, at the present time, to the micro-States, a d i f f e r e n t form of association with the United 57 Nations has been proposed. I t i s associate-membership under which a micro-State might be admitted to the United S Nations formally, but t h e i r r i g h t r e s t r i c t only to address the Assembly without holding a vote. Of course, t h i s would involve the amendment of the Charter. A l l of these s p e c i a l arrangements may mostly serve the present need of the micro-States without imposing heavy obligations on them. Thus, a discussion w i l l be found i n the following statements concerning these arrangements i n order to see whether they are adequate to meet the needs of the micro-States, and whether any other arrangements should be devised. To begin with, we are aware that some of the most constructive e f f o r t s i n the economic and s o c i a l f i e l d are performed by the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies of the United Nations. - 41 -In t h i s respect, the micro-States would be well advised to jo i n the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies which would o f f e r them a great help i n t h e i r economic and s o c i a l development, the most urgent job facing them upon the s t a r t i n g of t h e i r new l i f e . Some of the micro-States have chosen p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the sp e c i a l i z e d agencies of the United Nations rather than f u l l membership, such as Western Samoa, Liechtenstein, San Marino 59 and Monaco. Although they have not joined a l l the spe^L, c i a l i z e d agencies of the United Nations, they f e l t that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f c e r t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e i r present need. And equally important i s the f a c t that, although the provisions of admission to membership i n the spe c i a l i z e d agencies vary from one to another, i t i s more ea s i l y obtainable than membership i n the United Nations. Furthermore, some spe c i a l i z e d agencies admit not only sovereign States but non-sovereign States too. This w i l l be h e l p f u l to those s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s that adopt a statehood short of f u l l independence. And other than f u l l membership provided i n the va-rious s p e c i a l i z e d agencies, a form of associate-membership 61 i s also available to the s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s . Under t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n , an associate member may p a r t i c i p a t e i n the ac-t i v i t i e s of the organizations, but without a r i g h t to vote. As f a r as the advantages of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of micro-States i n the sp e c i a l i z e d agencies are concerned, we - 42 -may conclude as follows. F i r s t l y , because of the fact that the functions of these spec i a l i z e d agencies a l l emphasize the promotion of s o c i a l and economic development among the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y i s -62 generally adopted, expressly or t a c i t l y , i n these organi-zations. Consequently, micro-States or small t e r r i t o r i e s are more l i k e l y to gain membership! i n them than i n the United Nations. Secondly? since the funtions of these organizations are concentrated primarily on the promotion of economic and s o c i a l development, the micro-States or s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s , most of which are economically and humanly non-viable, w i l l surely benefit from them i n advancing t h e i r economic and s o c i a l development and they w i l l do so without assuming the heavy obligations involved i n United Nations membership. Besides.'^ i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the s p e c i a l i z e d agencies, micro-States': or small-^territories might also a v a i l themselves of the opportunity f o r access to the benefits provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and f o r i n v i t a t i o n 63 to United Nations conferences. In the United Nations' present practice the only e x i s t i n g intermediate arrangement between f u l l or no member-ship i s the status of "permanent observer" which has developed 64 purely "on practice.". Generally speaking, permanent observer status i s a device that allow a non-Member govern-ment to have i t s representatives stationed i n the United - 43 -Nations Headquarters where i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s are being discussed and where decisions are being made; and these r e -65 presentatives can do anything, subject to a certain l i m i t , that a Member's representative can do except speak and vote i n o f f i c i a l session. Experience has shown certa i n advantages i n maintain-ing a permanent observer mission at the United Nations Head-66 quarters. Secretary General U Thant has, therefore, sug-gested that micro-States should be permitted to est a b l i s h permanent observer status at the United Nations Headquarters and at the United Nations O f f i c e at Geneva i n order that these 67 micro-States can be c l o s e l y associated with the United Nations. There are three advantages ;;to the micro-States i n maintaining permanent observer missions at the United Nations Of f i c e at Geneva. F i r s t l y , since most of the micro-States are newly independent States, i t i s obvious that they are not f u l l y prepared to handle t h e i r foreign a f f a i r s . By maintaining ' a permanent observer mission at the United Nations Headquarters, the representatives of the micro-States w i l l become more fami-l i a r with the functions of the United Nations and i t w i l l , therefore, be easier f o r them to carry out t h e i r p o l i c y e f f e c -t i v e l y whether they w i l l eventually be Members of the United 68 Nations or not. _ 44 -Secondly, by maintaining a permanent observer mission at the United Nations Headquarters, the micro-States may gain more advantages i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l and economic assistance. Although i t i s true that even without maintain-ing permanent observer missions at the United Nations Head-quarters, micro-States can s t i l l benefit through the United Nations s p e c i a l programme and i t s s p e c i a l i z e d agencies. But i t i s equally true that through the close communication be-' tween the observer and the responsible o f f i c i a l s within the United Nations Headquarters, the micro-States* need of obtain-ing assistance can a t t r a c t the attention of the concerned organization e a r l i e r ; thus, micro-States can get such a s s i s t -ance much more e f f i c i e n t l y and e f f e c t i v e l y than the other non-Member State with no permanet observer ei t h e r . F i n a l l y , l i k e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the other arrange-ments, micro-States i n taking t h i s status may enjoy certain p r i v i l e g e s as mentioned above, without assuming the f u l l 69 burdens of the United Nations membership. Since i t has been proved by experience that the maintenance of permanent observer mission at the United Nations Headquarters does i n fact benefit both the United Nations and the non-Member States, i t would be desirable for the General Assembly to convene a study of the questions involved and to draw up a l e g a l r u l e permitting non-Members, including of course micro-States, to take such step. - 45 -Apart from the ex i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s available to the micro-States, several proposals have been recommended fo r solving the problems of micro-States i n the United Nations. One of these proposals i s the creation of asso-ciate membership i n the United Nations. Although t h i s kind of membership involves problems, i t i s s t i l l p r a c t i c a l i f the weighted voting system i s p o l i t i c a l l y impossible. As; f a r as the term of "associate-membership" i s concerned, i t i s 70 not strange to the practice of i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations. But i t i s worth noting that such membership has, with one 71 exception, existed only i n n o n - p o l i t i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations. Perhaps that i s why the term of associate-membership s i g n i f i e s the absence of an independent statehood. Besides, under the practice of the i n s t i t u t i o n s which pro-vide such status, an associate member has no r i g h t to vote but can only p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s of such i n s t i t u -t i o n s . In view of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s membership, i t seems u n l i k e l y to gain the support among the small States f o r the establishment of such membership i n the United Nations, unless certain p r i v i l e g e s be attached to i t . Futhermore the creation o f suchvan i n s t i t u t i o n involves the amendment of the Charter, ; f o r which a two-thirds vote of the Members of the United Nations, including the concurring votes of the f i v e permanent Members of the Security Council.^ i s required. ' - 46 -Under these circumstances, two ideas w i l l be r e -commended. One i s that since the problems of micro-States are problems of the micro-States themselves rather than that of the United Nations, a voluntary associate membership 72 should be encouraged among the micro-States. In order to induce the micro-States to take such a step, the other r e -commendation i s to o f f e r a ce r t a i n advantage to the micro-States which have take such membership. The guiding p r i n -c i p l e i n defining the advantages of t h i s status i s to manage a balance between the ri g h t s and duties of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of each State. In t h i s respect, a reduction of or even an exemp-ti o n from the assessment of the United Nations may be used. In practice, a number of meetings w i l l be of no immediate in t e r e s t to micro-Member-States and they w i l l not wish to attend them. Nevertheless through t h e i r membership fees they w i l l be paying part of the costs of these meetings. There-fore, another suggestion f o r the inducement of micro-States to take such a status i s to l i m i t such membership to certain organs depending on the needs of each State. In addition, a proposal has been made to es t a b l i s h a spe c i a l service centre i n the United Nations Headquarters i n order to give 73 adequate advice and information to the micro-States. Be-cause i t i s believed that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the various spe c i a l arrangements are s t i l l a heavy burden to some micro-States, and a special service centre may give a l l the neces-sary assistance to the micro-States or small t e r r i t o r i e s - 47 -without imposing any obligations on them. In conclusion, i t seems to us that each of these arrangements has i t s own merits and defects. And i n deciding which arrangement i s suitable f o r one s p e c i f i c micro-State does not necessarily make i t suitable f o r another. As f o r the sp e c i a l i z e d agencies, 'there i s no doubt that they w i l l be of aid both to the micro-States and the United Nations. Also, we would l i k e to conclude that a f u l l study and discussion should be made i n order to l e g a l i z e the status of observer which i s also the best alternative to f u l l membership. Besides, the United Nations should also make a study to see whether agreement i s possible oh the creation of an al t e r n a t i v e form of association short of f u l l membership, that i s , associate membership. - 43 -IV THE PROBLEM 01? STATEHOOD FOR MICRO-STATES Apart from the impact of the micro-States on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, there are some problems a r i s i n g from the decolonization of small t e r r i t o r i e s . These are the problems concerning the future statehood of these small t e r r i t o r i e s . Should f u l l independence be advocated? Or something le s s than independence be the alternative? Before we can reach a conclusion on these problems, a scrutiny of the United Nations' attitude toward decolonization and the present practice of some small t e r r i t o r i e s i n choosing t h e i r statehood i s required. 1 As discussed above, since i t s beginning the United Nations has always been active i n the problem of decolonization. The high t i d e of decolonization was reached i n I960 when the General Assembly adopted the h i s t o r i c a l Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December I960—the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Col o n i a l Countries^and Peoples, which became the "Gospel of decolonization." ©lis resolution affirms that "(a)11 peoples have the r i g h t to self-determination; by v i r t u e of that righttibhey f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l status and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l development," and declares that "(ijmmediate steps s h a l l be taken i n Trust and Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s or other t e r r i t o r i e s which have not yet attained independence... i n order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom." More important was the Declaration's assertion'that "inadequacy of p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l or educational preparedness should never 4 serve as a pretext f o r delaying independence." This decla-r a t i o n manifests the f e e l i n g that It goes beyond the Charter 5 requirement of a " f u l l measure of self-government" i n i t s c a l l f o r "immediate and f u l l independence." Most of the relevant resolutions concerning de-colonization adopted by the General Assembly i n these few years s t i l l reaffirmed "the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t of the people... 6 to self-determination and independence."'! But as i n the l a s t few years most of the large c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s have become independent, there appears to be an increasing awareness within the United Nations that t o t a l independence may not be the best alternative f o r the r e s t of the dependent t e r r i -t o r i e s most of which are exceptionally small and poor and which are now one a f t e r another emerging out of t h e i r c o l o n i a l status. By passing several resolutions, the General Assembly recognizes that i n case of some small t e r r i t o r i e s , " s p e c i a l circumstances of geographic l o c a t i o n and economic conditions" 7 should be taken into consideration. In I960 the General Assembly c l a r i f i e d i t s i n t e r -pretation of "a f u l l measure of self-government" by approving 8 i t s Resolution 1541 (X?). In t h i s Resolution i t elabora-tes twelve p r i n c i p l e s to guide Members i n determining whe-- 50 -ther or not an obligation exists to transmit the informa-t i o n c a l l e d f o r i n A r t i c l e 73e of the Charter of the United 9 Nations. And i n the L i s t of Factors attached to t h i s Reso-l u t i o n , ''emergence as a sovereign independent State,": "free association with an independent State," or "integration with 10 an independent State"'- are viewed as meeting the Charter 11 aim of "a f u l l measure of self-government." These developments express two d e f i n i t e and some-what contradictory streams of thought on the approach of the United Nations' attitude toward the remaining non-self-govern-ing t e r r i t o r i e s , Resolution 1514 (XV) emphasizes the immediate termination of colonialism and granting of f u l l independence, while Resolution 1541 (XV) proposes the free choice according to the population's w i l l . • I t i g ^ a j i i t e true to note that although the free expression of the population's w i l l i s f u l l y recognized i n the General Assembly, from a United Nations point of view the 12 p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing indepdendence i s preeminent. Some Members were even reluctant to see any r e s u l t from s e l f - d e t e r -13 mination that f a l l s short of f u l l independence. This kind of f e e l i n g appears s p e c i a l l y i n case of the dependent t e r r i -t o r i e s choosing associate status with a former administering c o l o n i a l power. In t h e i r view t h i s kind of association v i o l a t e s the very concept of self-determination which, they believe, c a l l s f o r immediate and unequivocal decolonization. - 5 1 -The questions now posed before us are: which of the available alternatives w i l l serve best the needs of the small States i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r future statehood? whether other alternatives are necessary f o r some small t e r r i t o r i e s ? As f a r as the f i r s t question i s concerned, the present available alternatives f o r the small t e r r i t o r i e s are 14 contained i n General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV); these are: (1) t o t a l independence of any power; (2) free association with an independent State; and (3) integration with an independent State. One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g instances of indepen-dence through self-determination i s the case of Western Samoa, which became an independent sovereign State on 1 15 January 1962. But i n considering the l i m i t a t i o n of i t s economic and p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y , i t handed back to New Zealand, i t s former administering power, a certain power to act as i t s agent i n matters of external a f f a i r s . Under the Treaty of.Friendship signed at Apia;; on 1 August 1962, the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Wetern Samoa have agreed that the two Govern-ment s h a l l continue to work together "to promote the welfare - 52 -of the people of Western Samoa,'' and s p e c i a l l y the Government of New Zealand s h a l l take into consideration "sympathetically" the requests from the Government of Western Samoa f o r tech-. 1 6 n i c a l , administrative and other assistance. More i n t e r e s t -ing i s that the Government of New Zealand has agreed to pro-vide assistance to the Government of Western Samoa i n the conduct of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n . The Government of Western Samoa may use the New Zealand! :s :overseas posts f o r handling i t s foreign a f f a i r s . Although Western Samoa c o n t i -nually makes use of New Zealand Embassies and High Commissions abroad to communicate between i t s e l f and other foreign govern-ments, i t i s absolutely independent i n formulating i t s own foreign p o l i c i e s . The Government of New Zealand has also agreed, on the request of the Government of Y/estern Samoa, to undertake the representation on behalf of the Government of Western Samoa at any i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference and to undertake the diplomatic protection of Western Samoa i n foreign countries and to perform consular functions on i t s behalf. There seem no insoluable problems a r i s i n g i n the Western Samoa1 s case,,. On the one hand, i t has sovereign status which may serve as the basis f o r i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , and on the other hand, New Zealand deals separately with the external a f f a i r s of Western Samoa, which alone takes the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A recent case of self-government through free asso-- 53 -e i a t i o n i s the instance of the Cook Islands, which had been dependencies of New Zealand. I t became a self-governing State i n free association with New Zealand on 4 August 1965. Under Section 5 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act of 1964, New Zealand i s responsible f o r the discharge 17 of external a f f a i r s and defense of the Cook Islands. But the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly of the Cook Islands has the power to enact laws " f o r the peace, order and good government of the Cook Islands" and these laws are of e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l 18 . a p p l i c a t i o n . Most important i s that under Section 4 1 of the Constitution Act, the Cook Islands has the power to 19 repeal or to amend the Constitution. This implies that i t may have the r i g h t to move to f u l l independence by u n i l a t e r a l act. In i t s Resolution 2064 (XX) on 16 December 1965 concerning the self-determination of the Cook Islands, the General Assembly noted that the people of the Cook Islands "have had controi;ofltheir i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and of t h e i r future," and considers that the ob l i g a t i o n of New Zealand concerning the transmission of information i n respect of the Cook Islands under A r t i c l e 73e of the Charter " i s no 20 longer necessary." The United Nations did not i n s i s t on independence f o r the Cook Islands, primarily because the United Nations observers supervised the referendum and i t s Constitution provided f o r f u l l self-government with the 55 - 54 -option of eventual independence. The United Nations, however, i n i t s Resolution 2064 (XX), s t i l l reaffirms the r i g h t of the people of the Cook Islands to " f u l l independence" under 21 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). To sum up, the United Nations was not opposed to association "provided that the arrangemenit was f r e e l y chosen by the indigenous people and that t h e i r act of choice was 22 supervised by the United Nations," and provided that the people of the t e r r i t o r i e s r e t a i n l t h e r i g h t to change t h e i r 23 dependent status whenever they wish. Speaking generally, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes at the present time, the free association of the Cook Islands with New Zealand works well. But t h i s e f f e c t was not the same i n the case of the s i x i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguila, Dominica, St. l u c i a , St. Vincent and Grenada. These Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s became, at the beginning of 1967, 24 "States i n Association with B r i t a i n . " The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status of these s i x Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s i n association 25 with B r i t a i n i s set out i n the West Indies Act of 1967. Under t h i s Act, each of the Associated States i s f u l l y s e l f -governing i n i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and leaves the responsi-b i l i t y f o r external a f f a i r s and defense with the necessary l e g i s l a t i v e and executive powers to discharge these functions - 55 -to the United Kingdom. But to a certain degree thejUnited Kingdom/ has a t i g h t e r c o n t r o l over these Associated States than New Zealand 26 : on the Goo_ Islands. Under the Act, though the United Kingdom w i l l not af f e c t the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of these s i x States, i t s t i l l r e t ains the competence i n matters r e l a t i n g to the problems, which " i n the opinion of Her Majesty's Government i n the United Kingdom" i s a matter i n respect to defence, eit h e r of an Associated State or of the United Kingdom or any of i t s t e r r i t o r i e s , or to external a f f a i r s , n a t i o n a l i t y or c i t i z e n s h i p , or r e l a t i n g to the succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and T i t l e s . Besides, the United Kingdom possesses the competence r e l a t i n g to any power conferred on the Crown by the West Indies Act or under l e g i s -l a t i o n of an Associated State. Provisions f o r the termination of association and ensuing independence are also contained i n the West Indies 27 Act. Although i t provides that each of the States may pass a law to end i t s association with the United Kingdom and declare i t s e l f to be f u l l y independent, a certa i n pro-cedure i s required before the termination may come into e f f e c t . In b r i e f , i t requires, af t e r the t h i r d reading of the B i l l providing f o r the termination of the association, the B i l l must gain the support of not l e s s than two-thirds of a l l the elected members of the l e g i s l a t u r e and a two-- 56 -t h i r d s majority of the electors i n a referendum before the termination of association could come into e f f e c t . f Within the United Nations, the, attitude of the Committee of 24 towards t h i s "association" was f a r l e s s 28 favorable than that towards the Cook Islands. The Com-mittee took the view that unless the populations are given an opportunity, under the auspices of a United Nations super-vision,, to choose f r e e l y among the available alternatives, the Organization cannot be assured that the wishes of the people have been f u l f i l l e d . The Committee also decided that Resolution 1514 (XV) continues to apply to these t e r r i t o r i e s . In short, the main difference between the case of the Cook Islands and that of the "Associated States" i s that the Cook Islands enjoys complete power of law-making. Un-l i k e the United Kingdom's power i n the "Associated States," New Zealand has no overiding power to extend i t s law to the Cook Islands, unless i t "has been requested and consented 29 to by the Government of the Cook Islands." Viewed from these two cases, there i s a f e e l i n g that i n case of "association" the geographical, economic and communication r e l a t i o n s between the associating and the associated State should be highly considered. This i s also the reason why the contradictions between New Zealand and the Cook Islands are much fewer than those between the United - 57 -30 Kingdom and the Associated States. However, onethihg ; worth noting i n the case of association i s that the status of the associated State i s changeable and the people of the associated State may, according to the outlook of the United 31 Nations, choose independence whenever they wish. The l a s t available alternative f o r " f u l l measure of self-government" i s "an integration with an independent 32 State." Up u n t i l now, there have been two instances of such "integration." The f i r s t one was the Trust t e r r i t o r y of B r i t i s h Togoland, which had been administered as a part of the Gold Coast. On 15 December 1955, the General Assembly passed the Resolution 944 (IX), c a l l i n g f o r a pl e b i s c i t e . under United Nations supervision to ascertain whether the people of the B r i t i s h (T:ogoland desired union with an independent Gold Coast, or separation from the Gold Coast and continuation under trusteeship during the ultimate deter-mination of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l future. On the basis of t h i s p l e b i s c i t e held c.in May 1956, t h i s t e r r i t o r y was united with the Gold Coast i n the independent State of Ghana and ceased 33 to be a Trust t e r r i t o r y . The other case of integration was the Northern part of the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration with Nigeria. Since each part of the t e r r i t o r y had a d i f f e r e n t 58 -history, development and p o l i t i c a l attitudes and l o y a l t i e s , the General Assembly decided that a "separate p l e b i s c i t e " under United Nations supervision should take place i n the southern and northern parts of the Cameroons under United 34 ' Kingdom administration. As a r e s u l t of the 12 February 1961 p l e b i s c i t e s , which faced the peoples i n both parts of the t e r r i t o r y with the choice of union with an independent Negeria or with an independent Cameroon, the Northern Cameroons became a separate province of the Northern Region of Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of 35 Cameroun as a f e d e r a l State. To sum up, the alternative of "integration with an independent State" as shown i n the above two cases i s r e a l l y a practicable way for inhabitants of the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s 36 to achieve independence. In t h i s respect, a form of 37 federation w i l l also have the same e f f e c t , such as the case of the Southern Cameroons under B r i t i s h administration 38 with Cameroun. But, as we are aware, before an " i n t e -gration" or a "federation" may take place, several factors must be considered, such as the geographical, r a c i a l and e t h i c a l l i n k s between the dependent t e r r i t o r i e s and the inde-pendent State. Besides, the difference of p o l i t i c a l achieve-39 ment between the States concerned should not be too great. Thus, as many • small,-territories are geographically i s o l a t e d and p o l i t i c a l l y l e s s developed, i t may be d i f f i c u l t f o r them - 59 -to form an i n t e g r a l part of an independent State. In conclusion, I would suggest that, as f a r as these three alternatives are concerned, the best solution to the problem of the choice of future statehood of the small t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l be the way that was achieved by Western Samoa, which, as indicated above, upon independence requested Hew Zealand to act as i t s agent i n matters of foreign a f f a i r s . Apart from the above alternative, I would recommend another two possible ways for the s m a l l - t e r r i t o r i e s to choose t h e i r future status. The f i r s t one i s that i t would be possible f o r the small t e r r i t o r i e s within a certain area to l i n k together to form a p o l i t i c a l l y and economically v i a b l e S t a t e — e i t h e r a unitary or federal State. The other one i s that a small t e r r i t o r y might choose association with 40 . the United Nations. Under such an association, the United Nations could o f f e r adequate f a c i l i t i e s to meet i t s needs. In practice, the United Nations has set up a certain machinery 41 to administer a»territory which f a l l s short of independence. V CONCLUSION Prom the foregoing discussions, the conclusion of t h i s problem can therefore be drawn into two aspects. (1) As f a r as the future statehood of the micro-States i s concerned, we would suggest that the micro-States, upon t h e i r independence, should consider t h e i r own i n t e r e s t of maintaining some kinds^of r e l a t i o n s h i p with a p o l i t i c a l l y and economically advanced State f o r a certain period. In t h i s respect, they may concentrate on the development of t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l achievements without leaving them defenseless against the external pressure, such as i n the case of Western Samoa. In case of the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of adopting t h i s suggestion, we would recommend that the United Nations should replace the former administering powers to provide enough f a c i l i t i e s f o r the micro-States to have access to. (2) Since i t has been indicated that mere siz e or population should not be the determinant elements f o r membership i n the United Nations, we would not suggest permanent exclusion of the micro-States from the United if Nations. But we would l i k e to see that at the present moment, f o r the benefit of both the United Nations and the micro-States, the United Nations should work out minimum - 61 -c r i t e r i a to serve as a future guideline f o r determining the admission of the micro-States to the United Nations. On the other hand, i n order to encourage the micro-States to a v a i l themselves of the accessible f a c i l i t i e s through the United Nations system without assuming the full-membership, the United Nations should provide enough technical assistance ;to meet the needs of the micro-States. - 62 -FOOTNOTES - 63,- -CHAPTER I 1 U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6001/Add. 1). 2 U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1). 3 I t i s believed that the smallest p o t e n t i a l State w i l l eventually get i t s independence. For references, see Arthen Hoppe, P i t c a i r n Island: The .Ideal State, 7 War/ Peace Rep. No. 4, at 6 (.April 1967;; Urban Whitaker, Mini-Membership f o r Mini-States, 7 War/Peace Rep. supra, at 3. ! "~. . 4 Note 1, supra. 5 Issues before the 21st General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, 88 (September 1966). I t i s : i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the General Assembly, i n i t s Res. 1626 (XVI), expressed the hope that Western Samoa, on the attainment of independence, would be admitted to membership of the U.N. See Y. B.U.N. 497-98 (1961). Western Samoa, however, has decided not to j o i n the U.N. by reason of i t s l i m i t e d s i z e . 6 Note 2, supra. 7 Gambia sends representatives to the General Assembly every year. The ambassador of Maldive Islands to Washington serves concurrently as permanent represen-t a t i v e to the U.N. See Appendix No. 2 (A l e t t e r dated 19 November 1968, from the Chinese Representative to the Trusteeship Council to the Author). For the advan-tages of the maintenance of permanent missions, at the U.N. Headquarters, see Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the U.N. 13-16 (Rev. ed. 1964). 8 New York Times, 15 September 1968, at 6. 9 Note 2, supra. 10 Western Samoa's decision not to j o i n the U.N. on i t s independence was primarily based on the fact that the costs involved i n e f f e c t i v e representation i n the U.N. Headquarters would be too much fo r i t s small country to carry. See Appendix No. 1 (A l e t t e r dated 19 November 1968 from the Acting Assistant Secretary to Government of Western Samoa to the Author). 11 On 6 December 1967, Head Chief of Nauru Hammer De Roburt i n h i s address at the Fourth Committee of the - 6 4 -General Assembly said that "there i s no reason on earth why we should not govern ourselves; but there i s every reason why we should not ignore our small size i n deciding upon our ro l e i n a f f a i r s of the wider world." And he concluded that he thought i t would not be appropriate f o r Nauru to seek membership i n the U.N. See 20 External A f f a i r s (Canada) No. 7, 124 (March 1968); U.N. Monthly Chronicle, 100 (December 1967). 1 2 Among the newly independent small t e r r i t o r i e s , only Western Samoa and Nauru have decided not to apply f o r membership i n the U.N. 13 A l i s t of t e r r i t o r i e s , with which the Special Committee of 2 4 i s concerned, i s contained i n Issues before the 21st General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, at 86 (September 1966). But New Guinea, Nauru, Barbados, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Mauritius and Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea have gained t h e i r independence; they are no longer under the purview of the Special Committee of 2 4 . 1 4 Although the Trust T e r r i t o r y of the P a c i f i c Islands i s designated as a stra t e g i c area under A r t i c l e 82 o f the Charter, i t i s s t i l l under the study of the Special Committee of 2 4 , and the words "or independence" appear also i n the Trusteeship Agreement on the P a c i f i c Islands. The U.S., the administering authority of these t e r r i t o r i e s , o r i g i n a l l y opposed the idea of independence being inserted i n the Agreement by reason of the unlikelihood that such independence "could possibly be achieved within any fore-seeable future i n t h i s case." See 1 Oppenheim, in t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 231 n. 1 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955). 15 I t i s established under the General Assembly Resolution 1 6 5 4 (XIV), on 27 November 1961. See Y.B.U.N. 56 (1961). 1 5 a P r i o r to the establishment of the Special Committee to consider the implementation of the.1960s' Declaration, a number of committees established by the General Assembly had examined conditions i n Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s and had made recommendations on t h e i r deve-lopment to the General Assembly, such as the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing T e r r i t o r i e s i n 1949; the Special Committee on South West A f r i c a established i n 1961, the Special- Committee on Portuguese T e r r i t o r i e s established i n 19614' These Committees were dissolved upon the decisions of the General Assembly made i n 1962, and t h e i r functions were transferred to the Special Committee of 24. - 65 -16 By General Assembly Resolution 1810 (XVII), on 17 November 1962, seven members were added i n the Special Committee of 17. See Y.B.U.N. 65-66 (1962). 17 G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 December 1965. See Y.B.U.N. 554-55 (1965). . 18 See 18 International Organization, 122, 841 (1964). - 66 -CHAPTER II 1 Except the Valleys of Andorra, these three small States are considered as States i n possession of complete sovereignty and independence, although they had, more or l e s s , deputed some of t h e i r functions to other States. See C. D'Olivier Farran, The P o s i t i o n of Dimunitive  States i n International Law, Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen; F e s t s c h r i f t f u r f a l t e r Schatzel zu seinem 70 Geburtstag, 131-48 (I960) (hereinafter c i t e d as Farran); Oppenheim, supra at 193 nn. 1-5, at 194 n. 1, at 256 nn. 3-6; Manley 0. Hudson, Membership i n the League of Nations, 18 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 446-47 . (.1924). Cf. Charles G. Fenwich, International La?/, 134 n. 27 (4^h ed. 1965) (hereinafter c i t e d as Fenwick). 2 League of Nations, Minutes of the F i r s t Committee, 138 (1921). 3 League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 636 (1921). 4 I b i d . 5 League of Nations, Minutes of the F i r s t Committee, 137 (1921). 6 I b i d . 7 I t i s believed that the withdrawl of Monaco and San Marino 1s application of admission to the League were primarily due to the League's r e f u s a l of admission to Liechtenstein. See Farran, supra at 147. 8 As indicated by the Representative of Czecho-Slovakia concerning the admission of small States, he said; In the moral sphere, within the League of Nations, a l l small States were c e r t a i n l y on a completly equal footing, but i n the p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y ... we s h a l l not only be obliged at every step, at every moment, to take a vote i n order to obtain a majority, but we s h a l l have to take into account, and to measure, not only moral worth, but also i n t e l l e c t u a l , economic, f i -- 67 -nancial, s o c i a l and even t e r r i t o r i a l considerations, and attempt to bring them into harmony.... Under these circumstances, we thought that i n the i n t e r e s t s of the League, and i n order not to discourage 1 any of these States, but to show ourselves as favorable as possible towards them i t was desirable not to admit them into the League which would then have to undertake f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y but to allow them to collaborate with the Members of the League i n some of the Technical Organizations. See League of Nations, Records of the F i r s t Assembly, Plenary. Meetings, 564 (1920). 9 Actually, a procedure for admission of Members to the League was established i n December 1920 during the F i r s t Assembly's session. The Committee No. Y of the Assembly which was ih> charge of the problem of admission of new members into the League appointed three sub-committees composed of seven members each and prepared several questions i n respect of each applicant which the sub-committees were charged to invest i g a t e . One of the f i v e questions set out by the Assembly was concerning the a p p l i c a t i o n of small States into the League of Nations; that was under Questionnaire ( c ) , "(wjhat were i t s size and i t s population?". For d e t a i l s see 2 League of Nations, Records of the F i r s t Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 158-59 (1920). 10 The c o l d reception and decision to postpone discussion on the Argentine amendment to the next session resulted i n the withdrawl of the delegation of Argentina from the F i r s t Assembly i n 1920. 11 For the text of the Draft Proposal, see League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Annex 13 to the 28th Meeting, 683 (1921). 12 The Representative of Switzerland indicated that "no one could deny that i t was a fundamental p r i n c i p l e that States wishing to enter the League ought c l e a r l y to express, t h e i r request f o r admission." 1 League of Nations, Records of the F i r s t Assembly, plenary Meetings, 568 (1920). 13 A few Representatives supported t h i s viewpoint, such as: the Representative of Persia who3o'o_Tt-h^ - 68 -States were refused to the League of Nations, another organization might be found-in America or Russia. See 1 League of Nations, Records of the F i r s t Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 567.. (.1920). To t h i s point, the history has shown the contrary that what did lead to the portentous antagonisms and r i v a l a l l i a n c e s was not the r e f u s a l of any membership to any State, but the withdrawl from the League of Nations of such States as Japan, F a s c i s t I t a l y and Nazi Germany. 14 In the revised report, presented by Committee No. I on 30 September 1921/ regarding.the amendment to A r t i c l e 1 of the Covenant;,7>it reportedtr * The Argentine Republic was undoubtedly activated by the highest motives i n proposing a clause which would un-c o n d i t i o n a l l y throw open the doors of the League to a l l States; ... i f actual moral and p o l i t i c a l condi-tions of the world were of a nature to support the i d e a l , . . . the d i f f i -c u l t i e s of a purely l e g a l value which could be r a i s e d against the new reading of A r t i c l e 1 might be removed. But actual circumstance are, unhappily, s t i l l too f a r r e -moved from that i d e a l , and the League of Nations... must rather be content to act as an e f f i c i e n t instrument i n the progress of humanity towards the goal. See 2 League of Nations, Minutes of the F i r s t Committee, 181-82-(1921). See also C. Howard-Ellis, The Orgin Structure and Working of the League of Nations, 104 (1928). 15 See note 3, supra. 16 See League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 819, 687 (1921). 17 League of Nations, the Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 687 (1921). Cf. Farran, supra at 147. 18 ,2: League of Nations, Minutes of the F i r s t Committee, 132-33 (1921). 19 Ibid., 17-21 - 69 -20 I b i d . , 18, 20. 21 I b i d . , 18-19-22 League of Nations, Records: of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 687-88, 820 (1921). - 70 ~ CHAPTER II I Norman J . Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich, The U.N. i n the Balance, 402 (1965). Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the U.N. 253 (I960).. . The U.N. former Secretary General Hammarskjold. has re f e r r e d to the important r o l e of the U.N. for'the newly . independent States during the period of the t r a n s i t i o n ; he saids, The U.N. i s now, or w i l l be t h e i r Organization. The U.N. can give them a framework f o r t h e i r young national l i f e which gives a deeper sense and a greater weight to i n -dependence . Press conference, Note to Correspondents, No.2108 (4 February I960). 4 See Amry Yandenbosch, The Small States i n International P o l i t i e s and Organization, 26 J . Pol. No. 2. 295-512 ' (May 1964). 5 See Urban Whitaker, Mini-Membership f o r Mini-States, s u o wmta&  p  snip 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, at 3 (1967;. 6 Issues before the 21st General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 559, 88 (September 1966). 7 See note 11 i n Chapter I I . 8 Compare League of Nations Covenant a r t . 1, para. 2 and the U.N. Charter a r t . 4, para. 2. 9 7 Documents of the United Nations Conference on Inter-national Organization, at 352 (hereinafter cited.as UNCIO) 10 3 UNCIO, at 274. 11 Ibid., 377-78 . 12 Ibid., 383 . 1 3 7 UNCIO, at 326 - 71 -14 I b i d . 15 6 UNCIO, at 232. 16 See Farran, supra. 17 Ibid., 133 n. 12. 18 40 votes to 2, 2 abstentions (4th session, 262nd Meeting 1949). See also Walter S.G. Kohn, The Sovereignty of  Liechtenstein, 61 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 547-57 (1967). 19 4-1. ^ J..^Relr.> 20-24 (1955). 20 Since 9 December 1953 (8th Session, 471st Meeting). 21 U.N. Doc; 1A (A/6701/Add. 1). 22 In supporting the application f o r admission of the Maldive Islands to the U.N., the Representative of the U.S.,rh6*ever^ stated that: Today many of the small emerging e n t i t i e s , however w i l l i n g probably do not have the human or economic resource at t h i s stage to meet t h i s second c r i t e r i a (the a b i l i t y to carry out the Charter o b l i g a t i o n s ) . See U.N. Doc. S/PV/243, 31 (September 1965). 23 Arthur I . Washow, Populism and Peace Keeping at the U.N., 5 War/Peace Rep. No. 5, at 8 (.May 1965). 24 E.g., to the micro-States the minimum dues of 0.04 per centage of the U.N.,total assessment amounts to about U.S. $40,000 per annum. This may be nothing f o r a big power, but i t i s undeniably a heavy burden to a micro-S t a t e d See Appendix No. 1. 25 Apart from the serious problems involved i n the voting procedure which have caused the General Assembly to become a powerless forum, there are also physical pro-blems to the U.N. due to the expansion of membership, such as the need of expansion of seats i n the H a l l f o r the new States. "See New York Times, 24 November 1968, at 26. 26 U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1). - 72 -27 See note 9 i n Chapter I I . 28 Note 26, supra. Subsequent to the statement of the Secretary General, a l e t t e r dated 13 December 1967 was sent from the Representative of the U.S. to the Security Council to consult the Members about the p o s s i b i l i t y of reconvening the Committee on Admission of New Members, to provide assistance and advice to the Council r e l a -t i n g to the question of micro-States. See U.N. Doc. S/8296 and S/8316 (December 1967). Besides,'during the discussion preceding the Security Council';) vote on the admission of the Maldive Islands, which has a popula-t i o n of l e s s than 100,000,. the permanent Representative of Prance supported the application, but suggested that the Security Council might reactivate i t s Committee on Member-ship to examine membership applications and to report i t s conclusions to the Council, and urged that the functions of the Committee "must be put to good use henceforth i f we do not wish to r i s k seeing the effectiveness of the Organization diminished i n the future. See U.N. Doc. S/PV/1243, 12-13 (September 1965). But, these suggestions have not been o f f i c i a l l y discussed within the U.N. This i s perhaps due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of defining c r i t e r i a i n examining the applications of micro-States and to the fa c t that such a discussion might displease the micro-States which are somewhat a " r e l i a b l e pool of support!1;/ to the big powers. 29 See Alan W. de Rusett, Refletions of the Expanding Membership of the U.N., International delations, 401-15 T S p r i l 196877 ; * 30 See Carlos P. Romulo, The U.N. Today, 1 P h i l i p p i n e Intj-1 L.J. 531 (1962). . . . 31 See U.N. Charter a r t . 18, para. 1. 32 The former U.N. Secretary General D. Hammarskjold pointed out i n h i s 1958-59 annual report that: Before a p o l i t i c a l evaluation i s po-s s i b l e of the r e s u l t s of the Assem-bly's votes, further analysis of... the-.composition of majorities and minorities i s required. See U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, U.N.fDoc. A/4132 (1959). . 33 See Wellington Koo, J r . , Voting Procedures i n Interna-t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l Organizations, 6, 257 (1947). - 73 -34 See D. W. Bowett, The law of International I n s t i t u t i o n s , 311 (1963). . . . 35 1 Westlake, Chapters on the P r i n c i p l e s of International Law, 321 (2nd ed.'1910). 36 Prof. J . Lorimer indicated that: A l l States equally e n t i t l e d to be recognized as States, on the simple ground that they are States; but a l l States are not e n t i t l e d to be r e -cognized as equal States.... Any attempt to depart from t h i s p r i n c i -p l e . . . leads not to the v i n d i c a t i o n but to violati o n ' of. equality before the law. See Arnold D. McNair* Equality i n International Law, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 135 (1927). " ~~~ " 37 Equatorial Guinea, a small State i n A f r i c a , became the 126th Member of the U.N. on 12 November 1968. 38 The Byelorussian Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic are treated as part of the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic. 39 See Roderick C. Ogley, Toting and P o l i t i c s i n General  Assembly. International Relations,' 1 5 b - b 7 (.April l y b l ) . 40 U.N. Charter a r t . 18, para. 3« 41 U.N. Charter a r t . 18, para. 2. 42 I b i d . 43 For d e t a i l s regarding the percentage scale of assess-ments f o r the U.N. budget and net contributions payable by each Member States f o r 1967, see I.B.U.N. 956 (1966). 44 J . P..Dulles, f a r or Peace, at 3 (1950). 45 See a proposal made by A. Cranston, G. Clark, and others f o r Weighted Voting in.the General Assembly of the U.N., contained i n Solan, Cases and Materials on World Law, - -339 (1950). -46 O r i g i n a l l y , the representative of L i b e r i a moved that the - 74? -entire statement be deleted from the records of the General Assembly. In h i s viewpoint-,} the speech made by E r i c Louw was an.insult to the African people. But i n response to opposition/ of a number of delegations, the representative of L i b e r i a agreed to withdraw t h i s motion but proposed the motion of censure of South A f r i c a . This proposal was adopted by The General Assembly on 11 October 1961, at meeting 1034, by r o l l - c a l l vote of 67 to 1, with 20 abstentions and 9 did not p a r t i c i -pate i n the voting. For d e t a i l s see Y.B.U.N. 109.-10, 113 (1961). 47 Although the General Assembly adopted the amendments by overwhelming majorities f a r exceeding the twbythirds requirement, . i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that several permanent Members were either against or abstaining. See Y.B.U.N. 87-88 (1963). 48 Such as the General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX), adopted on 20 December 1965, and the Resolution 2113 (XX) adopted on 21 December 1965. See Y.B.U.N. 554-55, 113 (1965). 49 Ahmed Baba Miske, who was formerly permanent represen-t a t i v e of Mauritania to the U.N., wrote an a r t i c l e en-t i t l e d Sovereign States Are Not Equal. See 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, at 5-7 ( A p r i l 1967). . * 50 A U.S. o f f i c i a l said that-'"the one-state one-vote p r i n -c i p l e i s mad." See New York Times, October 3 1968, at 0. 16. Besides, the French delegate also expressed reservations about the continued v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i -ple of State equality. See 18 U.N. GAOR, 67 (1963). 51 For d e t a i l s about the proposals made on weighted voting or weighted representation i n a world assembly, see Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, x i x - x x i i (3rd. ed. enlarged; Cambridge, Mass., Harv. Univ. Press, 1966); John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, 191-94 (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1950); Catherine Senf Manno, Selective Weighted Voting i n the UN General- Assembly. 20-International Organization. 57-62 (1966). 52 I t i s believed that, apart from the o b l i g a t i o n of con-t r i b u t i n g a reasonable share to the Organization, there are some other ones i f U.N. membership i s to be meaning-f u l . Such as the maintenance of a permanent mission- at the U.N. Headquarters. See Elizabeth Brown's comments on The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Ministates i n International  A f f a i r s . Am. Soc'y- I n t ' l L. Proceedings. 179-80 ( A p r i l - 75 -1968); see also note 7 i n Chapter I . 55 Non-U.N* Members who desire a permanent association with the Court, may, under A r t i c l e 93 (2) of the Statute, be-come parties to the Statute on conditions to.be deter-mined i n each case by ihe General Assembly on the r e -commendation of the Security Council. Under t h i s p r o v i -sion, Switzerland became party to the Statute i n 1948, Liechtenstein i n 1950 and San Marino i n 1953. 54 The establishment of the regional economic commissions i s one of the p r i n c i p a l devices employed by the Economic and S o c i a l Council (ECOSOG) to help further economic cooperation. These.commissions comprise the Economic Commissions f o r Europe (ECE), f o r Asia _and the Far East (ECAFE), f o r L a t i n America (ECLA) andlfor A f r i c a (ECA), which are i n each case composed of representatives of States, not necessarily Members of the U.N., situated i n the areas mentioned together with some big powers. Equatoria Guinea and Mauritius, before they were admitted to the U.N. on 12 November 1968 and 24 A p r i l 1968 respec-t i v e l y , were elected as associate Members of ECA f o r 1968, and so were Western Samoa as Member of ECAFE and B r i t i s h Honduras as associate Member of ECLA. See 22 Interna-t i o n a l Organization, No. 3, 694-95 (Summer 1968). 55 The f i r s t permanent observer mission was established by Switzerland i n 1946, and f i v e others presently maintain-ing such mission are: the Republic of Korea (1949), the Federal Republic of Germany (1952), the Republic of Vietnam (1952), Monaco (1956) and.the Holy See (1964). These States are l i s t e d i n the la&t section of the "Blue Book" published by the U.N. Secretariat, named Permanent Missions to the U.N., under the heading of Non-Member States Maintaining: Permanent Observers' O f f i c e at Head- quarters", at 44 11968). '. ! "~" '. '. '. " 56 See U.N. Charter a r t . 35. 57 See Issues before 23rd General Assembly* International C o n c i l i a t i o n , 83-84 (September 1968), IssussL/before 21st General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , note 4, at 88 (September 1966). 58 According to the U.Nj Charter a r t . 63,- ECOSOC i s envi-saged as an organ coordinating the a c t i v i t i e s of the sp e c i a l i z e d agencies. Special agreement concluded with ECOSOC brought the spec i a l i z e d agencies into d i r e c t r e -l a t i o n s h i p with the U.N. Up u n t i l now, agreements with 15 Specialized Agencies have come into force, 6 dealing with economic and f i n a n c i a l problems: Bank, IMF, IFC, - 76 -IDA (the Bretton Woods Organizations), and PAO and GATT; 3 dealing with s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l problems: ILO, UNESCO and WHO; 6 dealing with s c i e n t i f i c and technical problems: ICAO, UPU, ITO, WMO, IMCO and IAEA. Por d e t a i l s see U.N. Press Release.SA/312/Eev. 6 (15 March 1968). 59 Liechtenstein i s a Member of UPU and ITU; Monaco i s a Member of IAEA, UNESCO, WHO, UPU and ITU; San Marino i s a Member of UPU, and Western Samoa i s . a Member of WHO. 60 E.g., A r t i c l e 5 and A r t i c l e 6 of the Convention of the UPU and A r t i c l e 19 of the ITU Convention have accorded the membership to "group of t e r r i t o r i e s . " 61 Pive of the f i f t e e n Specialized Agencies have such i n s t i -t u t i o n ; these are UNESCO, PAO, WHO, ITU and IMCO. Por the time being, except ITU, PAO has 3 associate members: Bahrain, Mauritius, Qatar; UNESCO)has 4 associate members: Bahrain, Mauritius, B r i t i s h Eastern Caribbean Group and Qatar; WHO has 3 associate members: Qatar, Mauritius, and Southern Rhodesia; IMCO has only one associate member, that i s Hong Kong. Por d e t a i l s concerning the member chart of these Specialized Agencies, see U.N. Press Re-lease SA/219 (15 March 1968). 6"2 E.g., A r t i c l e 3 of the WHO Constitution s p e c i f i c a l l y declares that membership i n the WHO " s h a l l be open to a l l States." In 1952, the UNESCO Conference adopted a reso-l u t i o n affirming the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y . See UNESCO, Report to the U.N., 165 (1952-53); Oppenheim, supra, at 988. 63 The UNDP, which i s supported by voluntary contributions, i s an operation involving the U.N. i t s e l f and 14 other organizations. Por d e t a i l s about the program of UNDP, see U.N. Background Note No. 63/Add. 1 (30 August 1968). 64 See U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1). 65 E.g.., the l i m i t a t i o n on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of communication i n the form of documents; the d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining, i n certai n situations, the p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t informa-tion t i o n and some personal and technical r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the observers. However, these handicaps are not so big they they would make the observer 1s.function i n e f f e c t i v e . See h ^ e r P t l § ° } ' l e l i J r . , Observer Countries: Quasi-Members of < the United Nations, 20 i n t e r n a t i o n a l Ui'gaJllz'a'Clon, NO. 1 266-33"Tl965). : - 77 -66::. See note 53, supra* 67 Note 11, supra* 68 Secretary General U Thant, i n h i s annual report f o r 1964-65, said: Non-Member States, were encouraged to maintain observers at the U.N. Head-quarters so.that they may have the opportunity to sense the currents and cross-currents of world opinion. 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1A, at 20 (1965). 69 Among1 the f i v e States which maintain permanent observer missions at the U.N. Headquarters, Holy See and Monaco each was required to contribute only 0.04 f<> of the t o t a l assessment of the U.N. annual budget; the Republic of Korea was required to pay 0.12 # and the Republic of Yiet ham 0.07 The Federal Republic of Germany, which was always among the highest contributors to special U.N. Programmes, was required to contribute 7.01 %. Por the contributions of other non-Member States, which p a r t i c i -pated i n the U.N. a c t i v i t i e s , see U.N. Doc. k/C. 5/l». at 953 (15 November 1968). 70 Note 8, supra. 71 This i n s t i t u t i o n was also provided i n the .Council of Europe which i s , i n some respect, a p o l i t i c a l unity of Europe. See Bowett, supra note 3, at 142. 72 See Urban Whitaker, supra, at 4. 73 See Roger Pisher, The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Microstates i n In- ternational A f f a i r s , Am. Soo'.yg> I n t ' l L. Proceedings. 64-68 ( A p r i l 1 % 8 ) . - 78 -1 See Chapter I above. 2 Jacques G. Rapoport, The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Ministates i n International A f f a i e r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L. Proceedings, 156 ( A p r i l 1968) . 3 For text of Res. 1514 (XV), see Y.B.U.N. 49 (I960). The adoption of t h i s r e solution i s also an. evidence of the uncompromising majority of the African and the Asian groups i n the General Assembly. 4 Ilt.N. Charter a r t . 73. 5 Note 3» supra. 6 E.g., G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 December 1965; 2189 (XXI), IT^December 1966 and 2348 (XXII), 19 December 1967. 7 G.A. Res. 2357 (XXII), 19 December 1967; U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6700/Add. 1)... 8 For text of Res. 1541 (XV), see Y.B.U.N. 509-10 (I960). This Resolution i s based on the G.A. Res. 742 (VIII) adopted on 27 November 1953. 9 For the text of the Twelve P r i n c i p l e s , see the L i s t of Factors annexed to the Res. 1541 (XV). 10 P r i n c i p l e VI. 11 U T N. Charter a r t . 73* 12 See Rapoport, supra, at 157. 13 See U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6000/Add. 6); U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SR. 491, at 5; and U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SR. 492, at 7. 14 Note 10, supra. 15 G.A. Res. 1626 (XVI), see I.B .U.N. 497-98 (1961). 16 453 United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S.), 4-6 (1963). 17 1 New Zealand Statutes, No. 69, at 458 (1964). 18 Section 39 respecting the "power to make laws," i b i d . , at 474. , . " - 7.9 -19 I b i d . , at 474. 20 Por text of Res. 2064 (XX), see Y.B.U.N. 574 (1965). 21 I b i d . 22 U.N. Doc. A/AG. 109/SR. 490, at 12. 23 Note 19, supra. 24 Section 1 of the West Indies Act 1967, see note 25, i n f r a . 25 Por text of the West Indies Act 1967, see 47 Halsbury's Statutes^FEngland, at. 499 (2nd ed. 1967). 26 Ib i d . , section 2, 7. 27 I b i d . , section 10, 11, and Schedule 2. 28 1 U.N.L. Rep. No. 7, at 31 (1 March 1967). 29 See section 46 of the Cook islaads-Oonstitution, 1 New Zealand Statutes, No. 69, 477-78 (1964); c f . same section of the Cook Islands Constitution Amendment 1965, 1 New Zealand Statutes, No. 2, 65 (1965). 30 See Margaret Broderick, Associated Statehood—A New Porm of Decolonization, 17 I n t ' l & Comp. L.Q. Part 2, 368-403 (1968) L i t t l e Anguilla, the small Caribbean i s l a n d with a popu-l a t i o n of 6,000 inhabit ant ss and an area of 45 square miles, represented such a problem. In May 1967—following immediately a f t e r the association of the s i x Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s with B r i t a i n — t h i s l i t t l e country revolted from the domination of St. K i t t s , and subsequently declared i t s e l f a r e p u b l i c . Britain, has then refused to give f o r -mal recognition to t h i s new government or to disturb the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements under which the associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla was formed. But unable to persuade the Ang&illans to accept the authority of the unpopular St. K i t t s Government run by Prime Minister Robert Bradshaw, B r i t a i n bought time by s e t t i n g up an interim pe-r i o d of a year beginning l a s t January. After almost two years of turmoil and protest, t h i s l i t t l e i s l a n d and B r i t a i n made an agreement on 31 March 1969 concerning the future status of Anguilla. In the agreement, the B r i t i s h expresses that " i t i s no part of our purpose to put them (the Anguillans) under an administration under which they do not want to l i v e . " D e f i n i t e provisions f o r leading the i s l a n d to f u l l self-government was contained i n the agree-ments. See New York Times, 17 November 1968, at 13; The Province,; 1 A p r i l 1969, at 3-31 See note 28, supra* 32 See note 8, supra* 33 Under the Ghana Independence Act, from midnight 5/6 March 1957, the t e r r i t o r i e s formerly comprised i n the Gold Coast became the independent State of Ghana. Under the same Act, the union of the B r i t i s h Togoland with the i n -dependent State of Ghana took place,from the same time and date. See G.A..Res. 1044 (XI), Y.B.U.N. 370-71 (1956). 34 The northern part was administered as an i n t e g r a l part of Nigeria's Northern Region, whereas//the southern part was set up as a separate regional unit with considerable powers of self-government within the Federation of Nigeria. See G.A. Res. 1350 (XIII), Y.B.U.N. 368 (1959). 35 See G.A. Res. 1608 (XV), Y.B.U.N. 494 (1961). 36 See Y.B.U.N. 370 (1956). 37 See U.N. Doc 1A (A/6700/Add. 14) (part I I ) , at 131. 38 See note 35, supra. 39 See note 9, supra. 40 Professor Roger Fisher, the Legal Adviser to the Pr o v i -s i o n a l Government of Anguilla, on 24 August 1967 t o l d the Sub-Committee IV of the Committee 24 that Anguilla's se-cond choice, a f t e r statehood within the B r i t i s h Common-wealth, would be independence with the U.N.,"which would set a precedent f o r other t e r r i t o r i e s seeking indepen-dence but "too small,to support themselves". See 2 U.N. L. Rep. No. 1, at 1 (1967); see also Issue before the 23rd General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , note 13 at 85 (September 1968). 41 In view of the f a i l u r e of South A f r i c a to f u l f i l i t s o b l i g a t i o n towards the Mandated T e r r i t o r y of South West A f r i c a , the U.N« passed/a resolution known as Resolution 2145 (XXI) and decided'to keep the (Territory under i t s own administration. 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Goodrich, L. M., The United Nations (I960). Goodspeed, S. S., The Nature and Function of International Organization (1959). Higgins, R., The Development of International Law through the P o l i t i c a l Organs of the United Nations*(1963). Howard-Ellis, C , The O r i g i n Structure and Working of the League of Nations (1928). Jacob, P. E. and Atherton, A. L., The Dynamics of Interna-t i o n a l Organization (1965)• Keohane, R. 0., P o l i t i c a l Influence i n the General Assembly, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 557 (1966). Koo, W. J r . , Voting Procedures i n International P o l i t i c a l Organizations (1947). Martin, A. and Edwards, J . B. S., The Changing Charter (1955). 0' Brien, W. V., The New Nations i n International Law and Diplomacy (1965). . ' • Oppenheim, I., International Law«(8th ed. 1955). PadelfordjN. J . and Goodrick, L. M.,. The U.N. i n the Balance (1965). . Padelford, N. J . and Lincoln, G. A., The Dynamics of Interna-t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . ( 1 9 6 2 ) . Sohn, L. B.,: Cases and Materials on World Law (1950). Stark, J . G., An Introduction to International Law (6th ed. 1967). PERIODICALS Baker, P. J . , The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States, B r i t . Y.B. I n t ' l L. 1-20 (1923-24). Broderick, M., Associated Statehood—A New Form of Decolo- n i z a t i o n , 13 I n t ' l & Comp. L.Q. Part. 2-, 368-403 (1968). Brown, E., comments on The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Ministates i n International A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L. Proceedings, 179-80 ( A p r i l 1968). Emerson, R., Colonialism, P o l i t i c a l Development, and the  U.N., 19 International Organization, No. 3, 484-503 TI3o"5). Farran, C. D., The Positi o n of Diminutive States i n Interna- t i o n a l Law, Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhaudlungen; F e s t s c h r i f t f&r Walter Schatzel zu seinem 70 Geburtstag, 131-48 (i960). Fisher, R., The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Microstates i n Interna- t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L. Proceedings. 164-70 ( A p r i l 1968). . . ." Geyelin, P., The U.N.'s Future: Small Nation Power Begins to Bother U.S. as i t Has Russia, 164 Wall St. J 1. No. 16. at D3 (1964). ' " Hoppe, A., P i t c a i r n Island: The Ideal State, 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, 6.(1967). ~~" ' • ~"~ Hudson, M. 0., Membership i n the League of Nations, 18 Am. J . I n t ' l L.c, 446-47 (1924). "' - - 8 4 3 -Karefa-Smart, J., A f r i c a and the United Nations, 19 Inter-na t i o n a l Organization, No. 3, 764-73 (1965). Kohn, W. S. G., The Sovereignty of Liechtenstein, 61 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 547-57 (1967). ~~ Manno, 0. S., Selective Weighted Voting i n the U.N., 20 In-tern a t i o n a l Organization, 37-62 (1966). ~~ Mazrui, A. A., The United Nations and Some African P o l i t i - c a l Artitudes, 18 International Organization, No. 3, 499-520 (1964). McNair, A. D., Equality i n International Law, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 134-52 (1927). ' Miske, A. B., Sovereign State Are Not Equal, 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4, 5-7 ( A p r i l 1§67). Mower, A. G. Jr.,. Obserber Countries: Quasi-Members of the  United Nations, 20 International Organization, No. 1,. 266-83 ( 1 % 6 ) . Ogley, R. C , Voting and P o l i t i c s i n the General Assembly, 2 International Relations, No. 3, 156-67 ( A p r i l 196l). Pearson, L. B., The Present P o s i t i o n of the U.N., 1 Inter-n a t i o n a l Relations, No. 8, 329-38 (October 1957).' Rapoport, J . G., The P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Ministates i n Inter- r national A f f a i r s , Am. Soc'y I n t ' l L. Proceedings, 156-~" 63(April 1968). Rudzinski, A. W., Admission of New Members: The United Nations and the League of Nations, International Conci-l i a t i o n , No. 480, 141-88 (1952). Rumnlo, C. P., The U.N. Today, 1 Philippi n e I n t ' l L.J. 520-35 (1962).. Rusett, A. W., Reflections of the Expanding Membership of the U.N., 1 International Relations, No. 9, 401-15 ( A p r i l 1958). Vahdenboseh, A., The Small States i n International P o l i t i c s  and Organization, 26 J . Pol. No. 1. 295-512 (May 1964). Washow, A. I., Populism and Peace Keeping at the U.N., 5 War/Peace. Rep. No. 5, 8-9 (May 1965). — Weinschel, H., The Doctrine of the Equality of States, 45 Am.. J . I n t ' l . L . 417-42 (1951). - : ~" Whitaker, U.,' Mini-Membership f o r Mini-States, 7 War/Peace Rep. No. 4,. 5-5 (1967). ' *"" U.N. MATERIAL G.A. Res. 742 (VIII) (27 November 1953). G.A. Res. 1044 (XI) (13 December 1956). G.A. Res. 1350 (XIII) (13 March 1959). G.A. Res. 1352 (XIV) (16 October 1959). G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (14 December I960). G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) (15 December I960). G.A. Res.'1654 (XIV) (27 November 1961). G.A. Res. 1810 (XVII) (17 December 1962). G.A. Res. 2064 (XX) (16 December 1965). G.A. Res. 2105 (XX) (20 December 1965). G.A. Res. 2113 (XX) (21 December 1965). G.AA Res. 2189 (XXI) (13 December 1966). G.A. Res. 2348 (XXII) (19 December 1967). U.N. Background Note No. 63/Add. 1 (30 August 1968). UN0I0 (Documents of the United Nations Conference on Inter-nat i o n a l Organization), V o l . I l l , VI & VII. U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6001/Add. 1).(1965). U.N. Doc. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1) (1967). U.N. Doc. 1A (A/7201/Add. 1) (1968). U.N. Doc. S/PV/1243 (1965). U.N. Doc. S/8296 (1968). U.N. Doc. S/8316 (1968). U.N. Doc. A/0. 5/L. 953 (1968). U.N. Press Conference. Note to Correspondents No. 2108 ( (4 February I960). U.N. Press Release GA/T/1719 (15 December 1967). U.N. Press Release SG/SM/897/TR/1929 (26 January 1968). U.N. Press Release SA/213/Rev. 6 (15 March 1968). U.N. Press Release SA/219 (15 March 1968). U.N. Press Release M/l449/Rev. 14 (12 November 1968). REPRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Cook Islands Constitutions, 1 New Zealand Statutes, No. 69 (1964). Cook Islands Constitutions Amendment, 1 New Zealand;^ Statutes, No. 2 (1965). . League of Nations, Minutes of the F i r s t Committee (1921). League of Nations, Records of the F i r s t Assembly, Plenary Meetings (1920). League of Nation, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings (1921). Treaty of Friendship (between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Western Samoa), 453 U.N.T.S. (1963). West Indies Act 1967, 47 Halsbury's Statute of England (1967). MISCELLANY N.Y. Times, 15 September 1968, at 6. N.Y. Times, 17 November 1968, at 13 . N.Y. Times, 24 November 1968, at 26. Tne Province, 3 October 1968, at 18. - 88 -APPENDIX Ptemt* addrgss alt cnrrespondinc* f. Ik* Sterttary to tkt Gootrnmtnt Government of Wettern Samoa P R I M E M I N I S T E R ' S D E P A R T M E N T APIA- _ _ _ _ _ WESTERN S A M O A 13 May, 1969. Mr Cheung Ven Chen, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, B.C., CANADA.. Dear Sir, Thank you for your letter of 25 February 1969 seeking agreement to the use of correspondence between us as part of your thesis. I am happy to say that there is no objection to this course. I would however like to make two small amendments to my letter to you of 19 November 1968. The first is the word "current" in line 8 of para (l). This should be "recurrent11. The second is to the first sentenoe of para (2), lines 2 and 3» This sentence should read "under the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1962 the Government of New Zealand ha3 agreed that (now word} on the request of the Government of Western Samoa, i t (new word) will make available......,," If it is at a l l possible, I should be pleased i f you could let me have a copy of your thesis for my personal reading. Yours faithfully, for: (Karanita L. EnarJuJ-SECRETARY TO~T%VERNMENT TELEGRAMS: MUX). APIA OUR REF.: S.: E 3 l / l / l (Please quote in your reply) Please address .all correspondence to the Secretary to the Government YOUR REF.: GOVERNMENT OF WESTERN SAMOA P R I M E M I N I S T E R ' S D E P A R T M E N T APIA WESTERN SAMOA 19 KovcEber, 1568,, Dear Sir, I have received your letter cf 14 Novedbor 1968 poising several question concerning Western Sanoa's foreign policies,. You w i l l appreciate that we have not yet token a firra decision on ©any of the quoaliens you pose. With that background in mind, ray replies to your individual questions are as foil CITS: (l) Western Samoa*s decision not to join the United Nations on Ind©pendsr.es was based primarily on the costs involved in effective representation in Now York. The outlay, in financial as well as manpower tere.a, would be too much for cur sEaH country to carry. The second pax»t of your question concerning economic development saca to be rather wide for i t to be ens^ercd in this letter. Suffice it to say that our annual budget - including both current expenditure and development - totalled only $5.6 million in 1967 and $5.3 nillion 19 S3 (the Saaoan $ is the equivalent of 10/- sterling before devaluation)© You trill nota frcn that that ours is not the kind of econcsy that is able to support widespread representation abroad at the Ease time as dcaestic development. Under the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1962 the Government of New Zealand has agreed, on the request of the Government of Western Samoa, to make avaLleble its facilities, particularly in regard to its overseas posts, for use by the Govortsnent of Western Samoa* Although we ourselves formulate our foreign policies, for lack of Embassies and High Coanrdssions abroad, i t is not dweys possible to effeot quick communication with other diplomatic cosmiesions and foreign governments.* To this end we continually make use of New Zealand Embassies and High Cojar/dssions to forward communications between ourselves and thass foreign governments* In circumstances whore we find a need for information on any particular problem, we have frequently sought the assistance of th3 NETS? Zealand Department of External Affairs and its missions abroad in obtaining this information. As to the third part of your question Western Samoa does frequently send delegations abroad to attend international meetings. Western Samoa is a member of the 7/orld Health Organisation and of the ECAFE oply in the United Nations faaily of organisations. In view of the high cost involved, not only in contributions but as well in representation in membership of the United Nations agencies i t is felt that this membership is sufficient for our purposes at present« No decision has yet been taken on this question although of course you will appreciate that once we are in a happier financial condition the major obstaole for us to United Nations membership is removed* oo*c« I trust0 I trust this is of value to you and take this opportunity to wish you success in your project. Yours faithfully, (Karanita Jj^Ei&rx) ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO C^TOTaiEIOT Mr Charng Ven Chen, Faculty of Lawj> University of BoC0^ Vancouver 7» B 0C o > PERAUNENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS November 19, 1968 Mr. Charng Ven Chen Faculty of Lav/ University of B.C. Vancouver 8, B.C., Canada Dear Mr. Chen: I have your interesting l e t t e r of 11 November regarding Micro-States." Nauru became independent early i n 1968. I t was known even before i t s independence that Nauru would not seek membership in the United Nations. I t i s a r i c h island with only 3,000 citizens, plus some 2,000 migrant workers from other islands and Hong Kong. Nauru i s associated with the B r i t i s h Commonwealth i n some form. Australia assists Nauru i n the l a t t e r 1 s external relations. I do think that Micro-States do constitute a problem. The U.N. Security Council has not o f f i c i a l l y discussed this problem. Eventually, i t may have to establish some standards i n terms of population, land, resources, etc. I understand that some specialized agencies, such as UNL.SC0, FAO and ILO (I believe), have arrangements for associate membership. I t might be interesting to study them. Perhaps the U.N. should have similar arrangements. I remember vaguely that i n 1920 the League of Nations did not admit the following Micro-States as members: The Principality of Liechtenstein,. Andora, Monaco, and San Marina, because these countries were too small.and vere not considered to be able to carry out the obligations of the League. I hope you w i l l make a thorough study of the problem of Micro-States and you may very well make a contribution to international law. This i s a personal l e t t e r . What I have said does not necessarily represent the view of our Government. . With best vishes, Yours sincerely, Lin Mousheng 3/85/1 N E W Z E A L A N D M I S S I O N T O T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 8 November 1968 Dear S i r , Thank you f o r your l e t t e r of 25 October seeking i n f o r m a t i o n about c e r t a i n aspects of Western Samoa's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the United Nations., I should f i r s t of a l l c l a r i f y an apparent misunder-standing i n your l e t t e r . New Zealand i s not " i n charge" of the f o r e i g n a f f a i r s of Western Samoa. Since 1962, Western Samoa has been an independent s t a t e w i t h f u l l c o n t r o l of i t s own f o r e i g n p o l i c y . New Zealand's r o l e i n t h i s f i e l d i s l i m i t e d to a s s i s t i n g Western Samoa, a t i t s request, i n the execution of i t s f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . Such a s s i s t a n c e i s f r e q u e n t l y sought and given, both by the' agencies of the New Zealand Government i n W e l l i n g t o n and by New Zealand 1 s ' m i s s i o n s abroad; but p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s are e x c l u s i v e l y a matter f o r the Samoan Government i t s e l f . I t would t h e r e f o r e not be app r o p r i a t e f o r us to comment on the. questions you have posed. The i n f o r m a t i o n you r e q u i r e should r a t h e r be sought d i r e c t from the Western Samoan Government and I suggest t h a t you should w r i t e to the S e c r e t a r y to the Government, Apia, Western Samoa. Mr Charng Ven Caen, F a c u l t y of Law, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, B.C., CANADA. Your s fa i th f u 1 l y , (N.V. F ^ r r e l l ) A c t i n g Permanent Representative 

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