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Morals and the enforcement of values : an analysis of the Hart - Devlin debate Wade, John Harington 1971

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'MORALS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF VALUES An A n a l y s i s o f the Hart - D e v l i n Debate by JOHN HARINGTON WADE LL.B., U n i v e r s i t y o f Sydney,  1969  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS  i n the Department of LAW  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1971  In  presenting this  thesis  an advanced degree at the L i b r a r y s h a l l I  f u r t h e r agree  in p a r t i a l  fulfilment of  the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  make i t  freely available  that permission  for  the requirements f o r  Columbia,  I agree  r e f e r e n c e and  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f  this  that  study. thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head of my Department o r by h i s of  this  written  representatives. thesis  it  for financial  i s understood that copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n gain shall  permission.  Department of  LAW  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Columbia  not  be allowed without my  ABSTRACT Morals and the Enforcement of Values - An o f the H a r t - D e v l i n Debate  Analysis  T h i s t h e s i s attempts to d i s c o v e r out o f the  debate  between L o r d D e v l i n and H.L.A. Hart the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s of decision-making i n cases where there i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom and  is a conflict  social control.  between  It i s structured  i n the form o f an a n a l y s i s of the debate between D e v l i n Hart  concerning  of morality. short  the p r i n c i p l e s f o r and  a g a i n s t the  There are f i v e main chapters  and  enforcement  o f the t h e s i s and  a  conclusion. The  introduces  first and  chapter,  headed "The  Hart-Devlin  summarises D e v l i n ' s answers and  to the f i r s t two  h y p o t h e t i c a l questions  to h i m s e l f , namely, (1) Has  Debate",  Hart's  criticism  which D e v l i n addresses  s o c i e t y the r i g h t to pass judge-  ment at a l l on matters of morals?, (2) I f s o c i e t y has the to pass judgement, has the law  to enforce  a l l y convert  right  i t a l s o the r i g h t to use the weapon of  it?  I t analyses  D e v l i n ' s attempt to r a t i o n -  the d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the m a j o r i t y  have  power to enforce m o r a l i t y to the normative p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s o c i e t y ought to enforce m o r a l i t y .  There i s an  observation  t h a t the c o - e x i s t i n g " r i g h t " o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s not debated by r a t i o n a l argument. The and  second chapter  under the heading "The  Common M o r a l i t y  the F e e l i n g s T e s t " sets out the f e e l i n g s t e s t as expounded  by D e v l i n as a means to determine which r u l e s o f m o r a l i t y ought to be enforced.  There i s a s p e c i f i e d l i s t  t i o n s to the f e e l i n g s t e s t which Hart  of the  overlooks  qualifica-  f o r the most  part.  However I reach the c o n c l u s i o n that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to  authoritatively  interpret  any  D i s c u s s i o n then c e n t r e s around Hart's o b j e c t i o n s  substance.  t h a t the f e e l i n g s of p o t e n t i a l  injustice.  These o b j e c t i o n s are not s u f f i c i e n t  the f e e l i n g s  t h i r d chapter, c a l l e d  to i s o l a t e the d i f f e r e n c e analysis  o r t o g i v e them  t e s t i s an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason and a source  basis f o r r e j e c t i n g The  these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  test. "Moral P a t e r n a l i s m " , attempts  i n the views o f Hart and D e v l i n by  o f Hart's phrase " m o r a l i t y as such."  Hart c r e a t e s an  a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between " p a t e r n a l i s m " and"enforcement o f p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y , " thereby attempting to e x p l a i n which moral rules  ought t o be enforced by a s s i g n i n g these two l a b e l s .  c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the o n l y r a t i o n a l  distinction lies  a v a i l a b i l i t y o f e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove p h y s i c a l non-availability  My  i n the harm and  o f e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove moral harm.  Hart has a s t r i c t e r onus o f proof than D e v l i n when i t comes to p r o v i n g harm t o the i n d i v i d u a l . However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n physical  and n o n - p h y s i c a l harm as the b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n s which  we../'want" t o make. practice  i n the a c t i o n  and thereby j u s t i f y i n g enforcement o f morals  using M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y .  public  Concepts o f p r i v a t e  and  harm are e a s i l y used to cloak the r e a l b a s i s o f the  decision. the  The d i s t i n c t i o n i s rendered impotent i n  by f i n d i n g elements o f harm to s o c i e t y  of the i n d i v i d u a l by  the d i s t i n c t i o n o f  My c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the r e a l d i f f e r e n c e  between  views o f Hart and D e v l i n , behind a l l the " p r i n c i p l e s , " i s  a difference  of value-preference.  The  f o u r t h chapter, under the heading  "Value D i f f e r e n c e  between Hart and D e v l i n " d i s c u s s e s t h e p o s s i b l e reasons f o r the d i f f e r i n g v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e s .  I t q u e s t i o n s whether v a l u e  p r e f e r e n c e s can u l t i m a t e l y be t r a c e d to p r e v a l e n t s o c i a l tions.  condi-  There has always been h i s t o r i c a l debate concerning the  mysterious control.  balance  between i n d i v i d u a l  I n o r d e r to a s s i s t  freedom and s o c i a l  i n identifying  the p e r s o n a l values  of Hart and D e v l i n , t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t h e o r i e s a r e viewed i n terms o f three t r a d i t i o n a l antinomies  i n t e l l e c t u a l antinomies.  These  i n v o l v e the problem o f choosing between  (a)  Public authority or a Platonic e l i t e  (b)  Individualism or collectivism  (c)  Reason o r f a i t h ; i n t e l l e c t o r i n t u i t i o n  Both Hart and D e v l i n stand i n d e f i n i t e  historical intellectual  p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r t h e o r i e s can be compared to the w r i t i n g s of numerous l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s .  I agree w i t h  those w r i t e r s who argue t h a t a c o n f l i c t between two u l t i m a t e v a l u e s cannot be s e t t l e d  by reason.  value preference f o r i n d i v i d u a l  Can we argue t h a t Hart's  freedom i n moral matters i s  s u b j e c t to q u e s t i o n due to modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s ? The  f i f t h chapter i s g i v e n the name "The I r r e v e r s i b l e  D i s a s t e r Argument."  T h i s s e c t i o n analyses D e v l i n ' s o r i g i n a l  argument t h a t s o c i e t y has the r i g h t to preserve i t s common morality.  J u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s argument i s attempted i n  terms o f the r i g h t o f s o c i e t y to prevent ter."  ''irreversible disas-  T h i s i s an attempt to d e r i v e a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e  an extreme f a c t s i t u a t i o n deadlocked  values.  from  i n order to a s s i s t to decide the  I n times o f emergency o r threatened  d i s a s t e r , the v a l u e of i n d i v i d u a l freedom ought to he subo r d i n a t e d to other v a l u e s .  An analogy i s drawn between  D e v l i n ' s arguments f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y c u r r e n t arguments f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the  and  environment.  However D e v l i n ' s arguments f o r the enforcement of m o r a l i t y , even i n terms o f the p r i n c i p l e o f i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r , can be met  by s e v e r a l unanswerable o b j e c t i o n s .  A short attack i s  made on D e v l i n ' s theory by a s i m i l a r device o f a p p l y i n g  the  theory to a p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of modern s o c i a l  condi-  tions.  subordinate  However t h i s c r i t i c i s m does not enable us to  Devlin's value-preference and  either.  The  conclusion i s that  D e v l i n have d i f f e r e n t v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e s  and  nounced t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s only dress these w i t h the garb of r a t i o n a l i t y .  their  pro-  preferences  U l t i m a t e l y they are only  to s t a t e the t h e o r i e s which they develop to support p e r s o n a l values and  cannot e x p l a i n  why.  Hart  able  their  Page Chapter I. II.  III. IV. V.  VI.  The H a r t - D e v i i n Debate  1  The Common M o r a l i t y and the F e e l i n g s Test  11  Moral P a t e r n a l i s m  18  Value D i f f e r e n c e between Hart and D e v l i n The I r r e v e r s i b l e  30 Disaster  Argument  56  Conclusion  70  Bibliography  73  THE  HART-DEVLIN DEBATE  In our s o c i e t y , we are c o n s t a n t l y s e a r c h i n g f o r p r i n c i p l e s to a s s i s t the decision-maker  answer the q u e s t i o n , "what should  I do?" One a r e a o f our search i n v o l v e s an attempt  to r e c o n c i l e  the r i g h t o f the i n d i v i d u a l to freedom w i t h the r i g h t o f s o c i e t y to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l . legislative or judicial,  A decision-maker,  can w e l l ask,  "Upon what p r i n c i p l e s  should I decide whether t o i n t e r f e r e with i n d i v i d u a l In a democracy he w i l l  whether  freedom?"  u s u a l l y be c a l l e d upon t o e x p l a i n the  reasons f o r h i s d e c i s i o n . L o r d D e v l i n addressed  h i m s e l f t o t h i s problem i n the  Maccabaean L e c t u r e on J u r i s p r u d e n c e which was d e l i v e r e d i n 1959 under the t i t l e  "The Enforcement o f M o r a l s . " p  the E n g l i s h j u r i s t Herbert Hart r e p l i e d .  1  This  To t h i s l e c t u r e jurisprudential  debate d i s c u s s e s the problem o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom w i t h s o c i a l c o n t r o l and emphasises the s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n whether morals  should be l e g a l l y e n f o r c e d .  J u s t how f a r has  t h i s debate p r o v i d e d a s s i s t a n c e t o the decision-maker?  Have any  d e c i s i v e p r i n c i p l e s emerged i n o r d e r to answer the q u e s t i o n , "what should I do?" Before d i s c u s s i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i t i s worthwhile  t o note t h a t there i s general agreement t h a t two  Now i n c l u d e d i n a book c a l l e d The Enforcement o f Morals, by P a t r i c k D e v l i n , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965. ^"Law, L i b e r t y and M o r a l i t y , " (1963) and "The M o r a l i t y o f the C r i m i n a l Law," (1965) by H.L.A. Hart.  p r a c t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  d e c i s i v e . the  Where  f r e e d o m  o f  are  s o c i e t y  a c t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n t ,  t h o u g h  i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  some  an  i n d i v i d u a l ,  we  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n t e r f e r e n c e  s h o u l d  ask,  w i t h  i n t e r  a l i a :  (a) law  w i t h  W i l l a  W i l l  c a u s e  more  a t t a i n e d  by  T h e r e  a  i s  e r a t i o n s o f  the  o f  w i l l  l a w s  t h e s e our  t h a n  t o  o f  the  t e n d e n c y be  e n f o r c e  the  " i n t e r f e r i n g "  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ?  e n f o r c e m e n t b e n e f i t s  to  p r i n c i p l e s .  the  o f  the  w h i c h  the  a  " i n t e r f e r i n g "  c o u l d  We  When  i t  b a s e d  are  o r  to  o b l i g e d  t h e s e  b e c a u s e  o f  i s  p o s s i b l y  the o f  o t h e r s , a t  the  o r  f o r  l e a s t  example, s h o u l d  p r a c t i c a l p r i v a c y , a  c o n s i d -  be  r e a s o n s o r  a  t h e o r y  c o m b i n a t i o n  a t t e m p t  t o  D e v l i n  o r d e r  s e t s 1.  out  Has on  2.  3.  t o  d i s c u s s  t h r e e  s o c i e t y m a t t e r s  words,  to  a l w a y s  a  I f  a d d r e s s e d  the  t o  o f be  a  a l s o  law  t o  e n f o r c e  so,  on  what  o n l y  p.  the  7-8.  p a s s  t o  to  h i m s e l f s  t h e r e ,  m o r a l i t y ,  r i g h t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  judgement  Ought  p r i v a t e  r i g h t  o r  i n  a t  i t i n  t o  use  some;  a r e  m o r a l s  judgement?  t o  p a s s  use  t h a t and  s h o u l d  a l l  o t h e r  the  judgement, weapon  o f  i t ?  p r i n c i p l e s  -'Devlin,  f o r  the  ought o r  p u b l i c  has  i t  I f  r i g h t  m o r a l s ?  m a t t e r  s o c i e t y  t h e o r e t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  has  c a s e s  the  weapon i f  i t  o n l y  i n i n  a l l some,  d i s t i n g u i s h ? 3  o f  e x p l a i n  d e c i s i o n s . I n  be  i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s  m a r i h u a n a  v a l u e  t o  p r a c t i c a l  a r g u e d ,  o f  upon  p r e d o m i n a n t  i n d i v i d u a l  r e a s o n s ?  t h a t  p o s s e s s i o n  argument  o r  say  d e c i s i v e  r e s t r i c t i n g  i s  to  d e g r e e  a t t e m p t e d  o f t e n  m e n t i o n e d ,  harm  p o s s i b l e  e n f o r c e m e n t ? modern  a b o l i s h e d , j u s t  the harm  t h e o r e t i c a l  t h a t  be  r e a s o n a b l e  (b) law  i t  t h e  In answer to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , people do i n f a c t speak as though there  D e v l i n notes t h a t i s a public  morality.  4 Even the Wolfenden Report i n existence  "takes i t f o r granted t h a t there i s  a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y which condemns homosexuality and  prostitution."5  However i t i s always d i f f i c u l t to convert  d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n such as t h i s i n t o a normative tion.  The f a c t t h a t there  proposi-  i s a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y cannot neces-  s a r i l y mean t h a t there ought to be a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y . Devlin turn a f a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n into a right? t h a t the r e a s o n i n g  a  How can  We w i l l see  he chooses meets with c o n v i n c i n g  criticism  from Hart. While answering the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , encompass the second q u e s t i o n a l s o .  He s t a t e s t h a t  i s not something t h a t i s kept t o g e t h e r together  arguments "society  p h y s i c a l l y ; i t i s held  by the i n v i s i b l e bonds o f common thought"^ and i f the  common thought i s not enforced society w i l l disintegrate. f a c i e r i g h t to enforce survival.  Devlin's  then there  i s a danger t h a t  S o c i e t y a c c o r d i n g l y has a prima  the common m o r a l i t y  i n order to ensure  Devlin,' endeavouring t o l o c a t e a " r i g h t , " appeals  to the most b a s i c r i g h t o f a l l — t h e Hobbesian r i g h t o f s u r v i v a l and  self-defense.  S o c i e t y , threatened  w i t h d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , has  a r i g h t to defend i t s e l f by e n f o r c i n g i t s common m o r a l i t y which i s the essence o f s o c i e t y .  Why i s i t t h a t D e v l i n does not r e s t  n  Report o f the Committee on Homosexual Offences and P r o s t i t u t i o n (Cmnd. 247, 1 9 5 7 ) . ^ D e v l i n , p. 9« 6  I b i d . , p. 1 0 .  his  argument on the s u p e r i o r power o f the m a j o r i t y  minority?  The  over the  reasons t h a t D e v l i n t r i e s to avoid a r g u i n g  terms of power are t h a t to base the  in  j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the  enforcement of morals upon the brute  f o r c e of the m a j o r i t y  is  not a s a t i s f a c t o r y moral argument and would c l e a r l y pave the way  f o r b l a t a n t abuse o f m a j o r i t y  power.  In Rousseau's words  "To  y i e l d to the s t r o n g i s an act o f n e c e s s i t y , not o f  At most i t i s the r e s u l t o f a d i c t a t e o f prudence. can  will.  How,  then,  i t become a duty?""' ' 1  I t appears t h a t D e v l i n a l s o wishes to argue f o r a r i g h t o f enforcement above and  beyond the democratic r i g h t o f a  government e l e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y . has  In a democracy, a  minority  c e r t a i n acknowledged r i g h t s q u a l i f y i n g the r i g h t of  majority Therefore  r u l e (e.g. at l e a s t equal p r o t e c t i o n and  due  to base the r i g h t o f enforcement upon the  t i o n o f democratic m a j o r i t y  and m i n o r i t y  process).  reconcilia-  r i g h t s i s to r e s t a t e  the problem o f the whole debate f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p of  individ-  ual  broader  freedom and  s o c i a l c o n t r o l i s a category w i t h i n the  relationship&of minority  and m a j o r i t y  rights.  The  r i g h t of  s u r v i v a l i s u n q u a l i f i e d ; the r i g h t of a democratic m a j o r i t y r u l e i s q u a l i f i e d ; D e v l i n t r i e s to strengthen  the case f o r the  enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y by f i t t i n g i t i n t o the  former  right. Hart p o i n t s out two  major flaws  i n Devlin's  S o c i a l Contract by J . J . Rousseau (New U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ) , p. 172.  to  arguments*  Yorkj Oxford  (1) enforce  I f s o c i e t y , on the p r i n c i p l e o f s u r v i v a l , can  i t s common m o r a l i t y , then s o c i e t y w i l l "be able to  oppose any moral change, whether good o r bad, preserve  and merely  the s t a t u s quo.  (2)  There i s no necessary causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between  a change i n the common m o r a l i t y and a p h y s i c a l c o l l a p s e o f society.  On the o t h e r hand, i f D e v l i n i s d e f i n i n g s o c i e t y i n  terms o f ideas and m o r a l i t y , t h e n h e i s merely s t a t i n g a t r u i s m , 1  namely t h a t s o c i e t y has a r i g h t to prevent change o f i t s common m o r a l i t y because otherwise i t s common m o r a l i t y w i l l In Hart's words "...even i f the c o n v e n t i o n a l  m o r a l i t y d i d so  change, the s o c i e t y i n q u e s t i o n would not have been or subverted.  We should  change.  destroyed  compare such a development not t o  the v i o l e n t overthrow o f government but to a p e a c e f u l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n i t s form, c o n s i s t e n t not o n l y w i t h the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a s o c i e t y but with  i t s advance."^  However, the i n t e l l e c t u a l weaknesses i n D e v l i n ' s  argu-  ment t h a t the enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y i s a s t r o n g are s u b j e c t to two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  F i r s t l y , Hart  right  f e e l s that  D e v l i n ' s argument escapes complete d e m o l i t i o n by some h e l p f u l confusion.  "There i s no evidence t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a  s o c i e t y r e q u i r e s the enforcement o f i t s m o r a l i t y "as such." His (Devlin's) p o s i t i o n only appears to escape t h i s by a confused d e f i n i t i o n o f what a s o c i e t y i s . "  8  Hart  (1963),  p. 5 2 .  9  Hart  (1963).  p. 82.  9  criticism  Secondly, j u s t as D e v l i n has d i f f i c u l t y  proving  ration-  a l l y t h a t enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y by s o c i e t y i s a " r i g h t " , both Hart and D e v l i n would have equal d i f f i c u l t y the  o p p o s i t e and y e t c o - e x i s t e n t v a l u e i n the debate, i n d i v i d -  ual freedom, i s a " r i g h t . "  I t i s t r u e that both Hart and  D e v l i n place h i g h value upon i n d i v i d u a l feel ant  p r o v i n g that  freedom, t h a t they  i t ought to be a fundamental r i g h t , t h a t i t i s predominamong the n a t u r a l r i g h t s o f man.  r a t i o n a l l y why i n d i v i d u a l ally  d i f f i c u l t task.  However, t o argue  freedom i s a r i g h t  i s a tradition-  We end up d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t t h i s  i s based upon f e e l i n g s ,  "right"  v a l u e s , precedent o r n a t u r a l law.  D e v l i n ' s attempt to show t h a t enforcement o f the common m o r a l i t y i s a paramount r i g h t  i s weak.  However, we should  r e a l i z e t h a t Hart does not argue the paramount value o f the right of individual  freedom on e m p i r i c a l o r c o g n i t i v e  grounds—  he simply assumes i t o r perhaps bases i t upon i n t u i t i o n . In answer to the second r h e t o r i c a l question, *^ D e v l i n 1  s t a t e s that the law has a prima f a c i e r i g h t t o enter the 11  field  o f enforcement o f m o r a l i t y ,  though having entered the  f i e l d , a c t u a l enforcement o f morals should o n l y take p l a c e i n limited  circumstances.^  Hart on the o t h e r hand says t h a t the  law prima f a c i e has no r i g h t to e n t e r the f i e l d o f enforcement 1 0  n  D e v l i n , p. 8 .  lbid.,  1 2  Ibid.,  p. 1 1 . pp. 1 6 - 2 0 .  of m o r a l i t y except where harm to others  is proved.  1 3  D e v l i n concludes, "I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e to set t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t s to the power of the  State  to l e g i s l a t e a g a i n s t  immorality." ^  clear  what D e v l i n means by  "power" because she does i n f a c t  1  t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t s to the against  immorality. ^  However i t i s not  " r i g h t " of the State to l e g i s l a t e  Dean Rostow's d e s c r i p t i o n of  1  p o s i t i o n i n terms o f H o h f e l d i a n between power and  Hohfeldian  of p u t t i n g S i r P a t r i c k ' s t h e s i s , I  right.  t h i n k , would be to say t h a t the s t a t e has  "The  the  p r o t e c t i t s p u b l i c m o r a l i t y through the law; has no  "immunity" a g a i n s t  i s under the respect  Devlin's  a n a l y s i s i s h e l p f u l to  t h i s confusion way  set  avoid  correct should  "power" to t h a t the  citizen  such a c t i o n ; t h a t the s t a t e , however  "duty" i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s power to enforce  certain equally real  " r i g h t s " and  and  " p r i v i l e g e s " of i t s  c i t i z e n s , i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s governing B r i t i s h lawmaking to whicn he addressed so c o n s i d e r a b l e l e c t u r e ; and  t h a t i n some i n s t a n c e s  " d i s a b i l i t y " ; o r perhaps may q u a l i f y these r i g h t s and the name o f  1 3  Hart  (1963),  the s t a t e may  not have the  have a  " p r i v i l e g e " to  p r i v i l e g e s of the c i t i z e n even i n  self-defence."  This Hohfeldian  a part of his  1 6  a n a l y s i s o f D e v l i n ' s arguments i s  p.  5.  14 D e v l i n , p. • ^ D e v l i n , pp.  12. 16-20.  16 L . J . 174  Rostow—The Enforcement o f Morals, i 9 6 0 , at 1 9 5 .  Cambridge  h e l p f u l because i t answers the f i r s t of  power and  ing to  two  In terms o f power, i t i s analogous  a s i t u a t i o n where D e v l i n would say,  "Yes,  "The  the s t a t e has  j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a l l these m o r a l i t y cases and  must c o n s i d e r each case on i t s m e r i t s . " say,  i n terms  throws the crux o f the whole debate upon answer-  the t h i r d q u e s t i o n .  territorial  questions  s t a t e has no t e r r i t o r i a l  cases though t h i s w i l l  now  Whereas Hart would  j u r i s d i c t i o n i n morality  require a p r e - t r i a l  h e a r i n g to determine  whether each p a r t i c u l a r case c o n t a i n s a m o r a l i t y i s s u e . "  An  answer i n terms o f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l power i s r a t i o n a l but i s an answer which i n i t i a l l y  avoids the moral c o r r e c t n e s s of the  e x e r c i s e o f t h a t power i n s p e c i f i c cases.  Devlin obviously  •fries to i n c l u d e the moral i s s u e i n h i s answers to the  first  two  has  questions.  But  i n f a c t i t i s not c l e a r whether he  answered i n terms o f power o r r i g h t .  As shown b e f o r e ,  he  t r i e s u n s u c c e s s f u l l y to r a t i o n a l i s e the e x i s t e n c e of a r i g h t based on more than mere f o r c e . ' ' 1  F a c i n g the moral dilemma and the e x i s t e n c e o f r i g h t s cannot be s t a l l e d any 1  the t h i r d q u e s t i o n ,  f u r t h e r when D e v l i n attempts to answer  ft  " I f s o c i e t y has the r i g h t to use law  to  enforce p u b l i c m o r a l i t y , ought i t to use enforcement i n a l l cases or o n l y i n some; and should i t d i s t i n g u i s h ?  i f o n l y i n some, on what p r i n c i p l e s  Hart's answer at f i r s t  —  See  previous d i s c u s s i o n pp.  3-4.  seems c l e a r  "...on the narrower i s s u e r e l e v a n t to the enforcement of morality M i l l  seems to me  to be r i g h t . "  i s found i n h i s famous essay "On  1 9  Mill's principle  Liberty."  "The o b j e c t of t h i s Essay i s to a s s e r t one very simple p r i n c i p l e , as e n t i t l e d to govern a b s o l u t e l y the d e a l i n g s of s o c i e t y w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l i n the way of compulsion and c o n t r o l , whether the means used be p h y s i c a l f o r c e i n the form o f l e g a l p e n a l t i e s , or the moral c o e r c i o n o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . That p r i n c i p l e i s , t h a t the s o l e end f o r which mankind are warranted, i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y , i n i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the l i b e r t y o f a c t i o n o f any o f t h e i r number, i s s e l f p r o t e c t i o n . That the o n l y purpose f o r which power can be r i g h t f u l l y e x e r c i s e d over any member o f a c i v i l i s e d community, a g a i n s t h i s w i l l , i s to prevent harm to o t h e r s . His own good e i t h e r p h y s i c a l or moral, i s not s u f f i c i e n t warrant."2 0 I t was  the use  of t h i s p r i n c i p l e as adopted by the Wolfenden  21  Committee  t h a t o r i g i n a l l y prompted D e v l i n i n t o t a k i n g h i s  p o s i t i o n as s t a t e d i n the Maccabaean L e c t u r e . t h a t M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e i s only one "The  e r r o r of j u r i s p r u d e n c e  by the search  D e v l i n argues  g u i d e l i n e among o t h e r s .  i n the Wolfenden Report i s caused  f o r some s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e to e x p l a i n the  division  between crime and s i n . " The Wolfenden Committee put forward "Our own f o r m u l a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n o f the c r i m i n a l law so f a r as i t concerns the s u b j e c t s o f t h i s enquiry. In t h i s f i e l d i t s f u n c t i o n as we see i t , i s to preserve p u b l i c order and decency, to p r o t e c t the 2 2  Hart, 1 9 6 3 , p. 5 . 2 0 John S t u a r t M i l l , U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , L i b e r t y and Representative Government (Everyman's), p. 72. 21 Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences Prostituion, 1957.  and  c i t i z e n from what i s o f f e n s i v e o r i n j u r i o u s , and to provide s u f f i c i e n t safeguards a g a i n s t e x p l o i t a t i o n and c o r r u p t i o n o f o t h e r s p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r able because they are young, weak i n body o r mind, i n e x p e r i e n c e d , o r i n a s t a t e o f s p e c i a l p h y s i c a l , o f f i c i a l o r economic independence. I t i s not, i n our view, the f u n c t i o n o f the law to i n t e r v e n e i n the p r i v a t e l i v e s o f c i t i z e n s , o r to seek to enforce any p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n o f behaviour f u r t h e r than i s necessary to c a r r y out the purposes we have outlined."23 Although  D e v l i n r e j e c t s M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e as adopted by  Hart as an absolute guide, he s t i l l  c o n s i d e r s i t to be one  r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e among o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . sphere  "Morality i s a  i n which t h e r e i s a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and a p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t , o f t e n i n c o n f l i c t , and the problem i s to r e c o n c i l e the two.  T h i s does not mean t h a t i t i s impossible to put f o r -  ward any general statements ought t o be s t r u c k .  about how i n our s o c i e t y the balance  Such statements  cannot o f t h e i r nature be  r i g i d o r p r e c i s e ; they would not be designed to c i r c u m s c r i b e the o p e r a t i o n o f the law-making power but to guide those who have t o apply i t .  23 Para.  13.  What D e v l i n  THE  COMMON  a r e  the  l a y s  q u e s t i o n , c e r t a i n  down  "What  MORALITY  g e n e r a l  to  I  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  our  who  " i s  not  may  be  and  whose  judgement  ^  T h e r e  i s  has by  w i l l  t a k e n  p a i n s  f o l l o w i n g  t i o n s  upon  r e a s o n a b l e (1)  be  a  the  t r e a t e d to  w a r n  s i n g l e  us  e n f o r c e m e n t  t h a t  man  are  as  o f  l e g i s l a t o r t o  l a r g e l y d a n g e r  m o r a l  answer  h e l d to a  by  d e c i s i o n s  a b o u t  g e n e r a l  and  D e v l i n  c a n n o t the  hypo-  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  common  the  r e a s o n  t h a t  the  w i t h  m a t t e r  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the  w h i c h  e n f o r c e ,  e x p e c t e d  a b s o l u t e  p r i n c i p l e .  the  T h e r e  an  TEST  g u i d e l i n e s  judgements  immediate as  and  ought  m o r a l  a n y t h i n g  c r i t e r i a  He  the  r e a s o n a b l e  2  FEELINGS  p u z z l e d  do?"  t h e t i c a l  f e e l i n g . "  man  THE  s t a t e m e n t s  a s s i s t  s h o u l d  AND  be  made  q u a l i f i c a -  m o r a l i t y  o f  the  f o l l o w s s  must  be  t o l e r a t i o n  o f  the  maximum  i n d i v i d u a l 26  f r e e d o m  t h a t  (2) w i t h i n  not  i s  As  the  c h a n g i n g  any  new  l i m i t s  f a s h i o n ,  m o r a l  (3)  As  (4)  The  w i t h  c o n s i s t e n t  the  the  m o r a l law  i n t e g r i t y  t o l e r a n c e  o u g h t  to  be  o f  s o c i e t y .  sometimes s l o w  to  s h i f t  i n t e r v e n e  2  f a r law  as  p o s s i b l e ,  s h o u l d  maximum  P.  o f  15.  5  D e v l i n »  2  6  I b i d . ,  P«  16.  2  7  I b i d . ,  P-  18.  I b i d . ,  P.  18.  . I b i d . ,  P.  19.  7  o f  the  matter. "?  2  29  w i t h  be  p r i v a c y  c o n c e r n e d  m o r a l i t y .  2  9  s h o u l d w i t h  be  the  r e s p e c t e d . minimum  and  28  (5)  Before s o c i e t y can put a p r a c t i c e beyond t h e l i m i t s  o f t o l e r a n c e , the common m o r a l i t y o r f e e l i n g s must make a d e l i b e r a t e judgement t h a t the p r a c t i c e i s i n j u r i o u s t o s o c i e t y . 3 0 (6)  The common m o r a l i t y which ought to be enforced must  o n l y be those moral r u l e s the breach o f which causes ance, i n d i g n a t i o n and d i s g u s t . breach o f which would s t i l l  Or, those moral  intoler-  r u l e s , the  cause us i n t e n s e f e e l i n g s o f abom-  i n a t i o n even a f t e r calm and d i s p a s s i o n a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n — " m e r e d i s a p p r o v a l i s not enough to j u s t i f y (7)  interference." " " 3  1  Any law on matters o f m o r a l i t y ought to be "deeply  imbued w i t h a sense o f s i n . "  3 2  I t i s t o t h i s " f e e l i n g s t e s t " o f Devlirfs t h a t Hart r e a c t s most s t r o n g l y and i t i s here t h a t we should l o o k to f i n d the core o f disagreement  between Hart artd D e v l i n .  Hart's  o b j e c t i o n s a r e as f o l l o w s : (1)  The f e e l i n g s t e s t amounts to an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason  to the mere f e e l i n g s o f the reasonable man.  We should not  s u r r e n d e r the process o f decision-making to f e e l i n g s and p a s s i o n e s p e c i a l l y when such a v i t a l value as i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s i n v o l v e d . (2)  D e v l i n ' s hope i s t h a t the reasonable man w i l l  i n c l u d e the q u a l i t y o f j u s t i c e i n h i s f e e l i n g s i n most cases. Hart i s not as w i l l i n g t o take t h i s r i s k .  30  ; I b i d . , p. 1 7 .  3 1  3 2  I b i d . , p. 1 7 . I b i d . , p. 24.  The f e e l i n g s t e s t  can be used as a method o f p r e s e r v i n g p r e j u d i c e s , b i g o t r y and the s t a t u s quo i n moral b e l i e f s .  " I t seems f a t a l l y  easy t o  b e l i e v e t h a t l o y a l t y to democratic p r i n c i p l e s e n t a i l s ance o f what may be termed moral populism:  accept-  the view t h a t the  m a j o r i t y have a moral r i g h t to d i c t a t e how a l l should l i v e . "33 —"To  use c o - e r c i o n to m a i n t a i n  the moral s t a t u s quo a t any  p o i n t i n a s o c i e t y ' s h i s t o r y would be a r t i f i c i a l l y to a r r e s t the process which gives s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e i r v a l u e . " 3 4 (3)  The f e e l i n g s t e s t w i l l  m o r a l i t y o r " m o r a l i t y as s u c h " ^ 3  i n v o l v e enforcement o f mere That i s , enforcement o f a  moral r u l e f o r i t s own sake w i t h l i t t l e breach o f the r u l e w i l l The apparently torial  spirit  cause harm to the a c t o r o r to o t h e r s .  o f Hart's o b j e c t i o n s i s e n t i c i n g as he  champions i n d i v i d u a l freedom and p r e d i c t s the d i c t a -  abuses by the m a j o r i t y which are made p o s s i b l e i f we  agree w i t h D e v l i n ' s f e e l i n g s t e s t . his  o r no evidence t h a t  But as Hart enlarges  upon  o b j e c t i o n s we f i n d the apparent d i f f e r e n c e s d i m i n i s h i n g . L e t us now c o n s i d e r Hart's o b j e c t i o n s more (l)  fully.  I t can be argued that D e v l i n ' s f e e l i n g s t e s t does  not amount to an unnecessary a b d i c a t i o n o f reason. p r e c o n d i t i o n o f calm and d i s p a s s i o n a t e i s s u e before  3 6  c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the Rostow defends D e v l i n a t  Hart,  (1963),  p. 79.  \iart,  (1963),  p. 7 5 .  Hart,  (1963),  pp. 18, 2 3 , 2 5 , 32, 41, 82.  3 3  3  a c t i n g upon f e e l i n g s .  3 5  36  .  ,  x  •  D e v l i n ( i x ) o f Preface  I t has a  l e n g t h c o n c e r n i n g t h i s c r i t i c i s m and Patrick's  l e c t u r e would weaken the  detached and  concludes "Nothing i n S i r  primary importance  of  d i s p a s s i o n a t e s c h o l a r s h i p , conducted at  h i g h e s t l e v e l of reasonableness we s o c i a l reform, and  the  can  a t t a i n i n the  law ."37  reform of  courses of a c t i o n ,  work of  When e m p i r i c a l  evidence i s u n a v a i l a b l e or i n c o n c l u s i v e , and l e a v e s us a l t e r n a t e  the  our  reason  where do we  still  turn?  D e v l i n ' s answer i s t h a t we  ought to apply the  feelings  test  with i t s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s •  D e v l i n would argue that the  fact  t h a t the  feelings  3 8  t e s t plus q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a t r o c i t y o n l y shows t h a t the that i t i s a false t e s t . application  t e s t can  The  problem i s t h a t n e i t h e r  o f how  Thus both Hart and  each wants the  test respectively interpreted label  used.  I f the  37  p r i n c i p l e and  that  principle  the  feelings  t e s t are  not  concepts then each w i l l  exception.  d i f f i c u l t y which a r i s e s can  practice  D e v l i n have p e r s o n a l concepts  a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own  qualifications  the  i s being  p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y and  i t as a misuse or f i n d an One  when e i t h e r  not  of  i s b e i n g wrongly used, not  s u f f i c i e n t content to i n d i c a t e  wrongly used.  area  However such abuse i n  principle  i s wrong i n i t s e l f .  in  be wrongly used and  of M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y i n the  o n l y shows t h a t the  has  result  L i k e w i s e Hart would argue t h a t  morals i s s u b j e c t to abuse.  it  can  i s t h a t these enumerated  be looked upon as a mere sop  Refer to f o o t n o t e 16 at p.  197.  f o r those  who c r i t i c i s e the f e e l i n g s t e s t and f e a r d e s t r u c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom.  Devlin himself  i n s e r t s the q u a l i f i -  c a t i o n s because o f h i s own uneasiness about a p r i n c i p l e which s t i p u l a t e s the absolute question  enforcement o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  i s , "Do the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s have any substance?"  I t i s t r u e t h a t they do r e q u i r e a procedural passion  The  pause between  and a c t i o n i n the hope t h a t r e f l e c t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l modify u n j u s t i f i e d i n t o l e r a n c e .  A man can a c t immediately  on s i g h t to i m p r i s o n a homosexual because he f e e l s i n t o l e r a n c e , i n d i g n a t i o n and d i s g u s t .  But the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e a  r e f l e c t i v e pause between the i n t o l e r a n c e and the e n f o r c i n g action.  I f the f e e l i n g o f i n t o l e r a n c e  i s not f i r s t l y  subjected  to the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s then the decision-maker i s a c t i n g i n procedural  breach o f the p r i n c i p l e .  However the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f f e r no d e f i n i t e t e s t as to what amounts s u b s t a n t i v e l y t o unjustified intolerance.  Once the procedural  s a t i s f i e d , the content i s u n f e t t e r e d .  aspects a r e  As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned,  the f e e l i n g s t e s t i s not a p r i n c i p l e o f guidance a t a l l i f we must r e f e r every case, o r even the d i f f i c u l t cases only,  to the  author f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Although he i s sometimes ambiguous, D e v l i n expects t h a t there  ought to be some r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n before a d e c i s i o n  to enforce common m o r a l i t y  i s made.  "...the moral judgement o f  s o c i e t y must be something about which any twelve men o r women drawn a t random might a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n be expected to be unanimous."39  D e v l i n enlarges upon t h i s p o i n t  i n the preface  to h i s book which was compiled  s e v e r a l years a f t e r  the o r i g i n a l Maccabaean l e c t u r e . irrational process.  "The e x c l u s i o n o f the  i s u s u a l l y an easy and comparatively F o r the d i f f i c u l t  delivering  unimportant  choice between a number o f r a t i o n a l  c o n c l u s i o n s the o r d i n a r y man has t o r e l y upon a ' f e e l i n g ' f o r the r i g h t answer. (2)  Reasoning w i l l  get him nowhere."  D e v l i n , l i k e Hart, o b v i o u s l y r e a l i z e s the dangers  o f u n r e s t r a i n e d l y e n f o r c i n g the f e e l i n g s o f the reasonable o r the common m o r a l i t y .  History i s f u l l  a t r o c i t y and i n j u s t i c e i n f l i c t e d  o f examples o f  upon a m i n o r i t y because m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n d i c t a t e d t h a t i t was r i g h t . and  man  The Spanish  Nazi Germany are t e r r i f y i n g i n s t a n c e s .  Inquisition  That i s s u r e l y why  D e v l i n attempts to l i m i t the o p e r a t i o n o f the f e e l i n g s t e s t by the q u a l i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s enumerated p r e v i o u s l y . a l r e a d y been noted how d i f f i c u l t  i t i s to f i n d  meaning f o r these q u a l i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s .  I t has  substantive  They tend t o beg the  q u e s t i o n o f what amounts to the maximum t o l e r a b l e l e v e l o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom.  A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s absence o f a d e f i n i t e  s a f e t y v a l v e on the f e e l i n g s t e s t tends to s u b s t a n t i a t e fears.  Hart's  On the other hand Hart argues that because enforcement  o f f e e l i n g s held by the m a j o r i t y i s o f t e n a source  of injustice,  then f e e l i n g s ought not to be a guide f o r enforcement.  But  because m a j o r i t y r u l e has been abused, t h i s does not mean that as a matter o f p r i n c i p l e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n ought not to be ZKJ  Devlin ( v i i i ) o f Preface.  enforced.  Abuse o f a r u l e i n p r a c t i c e does not n e c e s s a r i l y -  mean t h a t t h a t r u l e ought not to e x i s t .  Fear t h a t a d e l i c a t e  g l a s s s t o p p e r w i l l be broken i s not a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n to keep i t hidden w h i l e s a f e l y u s i n g the more s o l i d d e c a n t e r . As the g l a s s stopper i s a necessary and f u n c t i o n a l p a r t o f the decanter i t should be used though w i t h constant reminders o f i t s t r u e f u n c t i o n and d e l i c a c y . Just as enforcement o f m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t to  abuse, so i s i n d i v i d u a l freedom o f a c t i o n which by gradual process can undermine  a value important to human l i f e .  In  o t h e r words, both enforcement o f morals and freedom should be s u b j e c t to q u a l i t y c o n t r o l , not e x c l u s i o n .  "...Hart cannot  prove t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n which D e v l i n o f f e r s f o r the enforcement o f morals i s i l l u s o r y o r outmoded; he can o n l y appeal to our own moral sense t h a t i t i s n o t worth the p r i c e . " Perhaps i t i s p o s s i b l e today t h a t our moral sense t e l l s us t h a t enforcement o f morals i s worth the p r i c e (see l a t e r discussion of " i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r " ) .  A.R. B l a c k s h i e l d , Sydney Law Review 1 9 6 5 - 6 7 , pp. 441 a t 4 5 0 .  under  MORAL PATERNALISM (3) feelings  Hart  p o i n t s out on s e v e r a l occasions  that  Devlin's  t e s t can i n v o l v e the enforcement o f mere m o r a l i t y  " m o r a l i t y as such."  o  ho  I t i s out o f t h i s c r i t i c i s m t h a t I w i l l  attempt to e x p l a i n a l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e i n the views o f and  Devlin.  What does Hart mean by  o t h e r p l a c e s he r e f e r s f o r i t s own  i n o p p o s i t i o n to M i l l ,  But then Hart  w i t h i n M i l l ' s theory and  should  morality.  f i r s t l y note t h a t  as a motive f o r p a s s i n g  c r e a t e s h i s own  says t h a t M i l l was  distinction  c o r r e c t to  t h a t he opposed the use o f the c r i m i n a l law  of enforcing p o s i t i v e morality. y e t unstated  paternalism  Somewhere Hart  d i s t i n c t i o n between p a t e r n a l i s m  positive morality.  "The  and  the  as a means  sees a v i t a l enforcing  n e g l e c t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between  and what I have termed l e g a l moralism i s important  as a form o f a more general  e r r o r . I t  immediately d i s c o v e r a r a t i o n a l  is difficult  paternalism. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , pp.  43 e.g. pp. 23, ^Ibid.,  pp.  20. 31-32.  45 Ibid.,  p.  33.  18,  23,  to  basis f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n f o r  the enforcement o f p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y i s undoubtedly one  Tip ^Hart  In  says t h a t i n modern s o c i e t y we  ought not to exclude p a t e r n a l i s m  extent  " m o r a l i t y as such?"  sake or the enforcement of p o s i t i v e  legislation.^  Hart  to i t as the enforcement of m o r a l i t y 43  To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n , we Hart,  or  25,  32,  41,  82.  form of  Hart i m p l i e s t h a t there are c e r t a i n moral r u l e s which e x i s t f o r t h e i r own own  sake.  But no moral r u l e e x i s t s f o r i t s  sake; moral r u l e s are expounded f o r the "good" o f mankind  even though c e r t a i n moral r u l e s may of what i s good f o r mankind w i l l even from person to person.  be mistaken.  The concept  v a r y from group to group o r  A l s o , each group o r person w i l l  have d i f f e r e n t moral r u l e s i n o r d e r to a s s i s t i n a t t a i n i n g i t s i n d i v i d u a l concept o f goodness.  The f a c t t h a t these  moral r u l e s are d i f f e r e n t o r even i n o p p o s i t i o n , does not immediately concern t h i s argument. the  The v i t a l p o i n t i s that  motive behind each moral r u l e i s the "good" o f mankind.  The p r e s c r i p t i o n o f any moral r u l e i s never motivated by a d e s i r e to cause harm though i n f a c t moral r u l e s may and i n f a c t cause harm. and wherever  be bad  T h e r e f o r e a l l moral rules,whenever  s e r i o u s l y p r e s c r i b e d , are f o r the "good" o f man  i n accordance w i t h each r e s p e c t i v e person's d e f i n i t i o n o f good.  When Hart says t h a t m o r a l i t y "as such" should not be  e n f o r c e d , he cannot be s a y i n g t h a t m o r a l i t y should not be enforced.  Rather he i s s a y i n g t h a t m o r a l i t y which does not  embody a c e r t a i n concept o f goodness which he p e r s o n a l l y supports should not be e n f o r c e d .  M o r a l i t y "as such" should  not  be e n f o r c e d , but m o r a l i t y should be enforced i f i t i s  the  k i n d w i t h which I agree.  "...We do not have any moral  For d i f f e r e n t modern concepts of "good" see "An I n t r o d u c t i o n to P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s " by John Hospers, p. 4 4 9 .  o b l i g a t i o n s , n o t ,  d i r e c t l y  makes was  p r i m a o r  f a c i e  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  somebody's  l i f e  good  made  f o r man,  n o t man  p o s i t i v e  m o r a l i t y  o r  impose  c o n c e p t  upon  a  a n o t h e r  c r e a t i n g  a n  " e n f o r c i n g  and  b a d  o f  a r t i f i c i a l  he  a s  made.  The  w i t h i n  H a r t ' s  I n  l a t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between  i n  b u t  p r a c t i c e  c o n c l u d e s i c a l o f  f i n d s a s  a  " I f i  m o r a l i t y ,  argument. m o r a l i t y  j—  i  The a n d  h a s  o r  ( w h i c h  c o n f u s e d between  o f  w h i c h  i s t h e  o f  good  " M o r a l s  t d i f f i c u l t o r  t i s p o s s i b l e , b e t w e e n  t i s n o t  t o e v e n  w h i c h  m o r a l  one  may t h e  t h a t  t h a t  t h a t  b y  a  a n d  r e a l  p a t e r n a l i s m o r  " e n f o r c i n g  d e c i s i o n  o f  e n f o r c e  f a l s e )  t h e  good  a l r e a d y  d e c i s i o n  l i e s  b a d .  m e a n i n g s  s u s t a i n h e l p f u l  t h e  H a r t ' s  o f a  p o s i t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n  g u i d e l i n e .  d o u b t ,  i s a  S o c i a l  t o  s u c h  t o  draw  a n d  t h e  t o  t h e  i s r e l e v a n t  i s n o t  be  i s s u e  e n f o r c e m e n t  t h e r e  t o  p a t e r n a l l y  C o n t e m p o r a r y  I  what  " p a t e r n a l i s m "  p a t e r n a l i s m  i s w h e t h e r  i m m o r a l i t y  b a s i s  p o s s i b l e a n d  t o  " p a t e r n a l i s m "  a n d  a n d  w i t h  d o e s  w o r s e . . . m o r a l i t y  i s o n l y  i s b e t w e e n  l a b e l s  w h i c h  T h e r e f o r e  I t a p p e a r s  p a t e r n a l i s m  i s s u e  s u c h  make  c o n c l u s i v e  d i s t i n c t i o n  a n y t h i n g  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t t e r  g o o d n e s s  d i s c u s s e s  i  do  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s f o r a  e s s a y ,  D e v l i n  m o r a l i t y  t o  c o n c e p t  R e a l i t y , "  a s  H a r t  The  a r e  own  b a d ,  m o r a l i t y . "  d i s t i n c t i o n  a  o r  i s t r y i n g  s u c h "  some  d i s t i n c t i o n  p a t e r n a l i s m .  m o r a l i t y  o r  m o r a l i t y r i g h t  p o s i t i v e  have  t o  f o r m o r a l i t y . " ^ ?  i n d i v i d u a l .  d i s t i n c t i o n  a c t u a l ,  r e a l m  l a w ' s  He  a  t h e o r e t -  e n f o r c e m e n t p r e s e n t  o f  p r i v a t e  b u s i n e s s .  . E t h i c s ,  p.  3 ? .  W i l l i a m  K.  F r a n k e n a .  48 T h i s ment  o f  e s s a y  M o r a l s  a t  i s a l s o p .  124.  f o u n d  i n D e v l i n ' s  book  The  E n f o r c e -  P a t e r n a l i s m , unless i t i s l i m i t e d i n some way as y e t unstated, must, as I have pointed out, make a l l m o r a l i t y the law's business."^9  A c c o r d i n g l y , the enforcement o f m o r a l i t y as such  i s e q u i v a l e n t to "bad" p a t e r n a l i s m .  And " m o r a l i t y as such"  i n c l u d e s those moral r u l e s where t h e r e i s no necessary and r e s u l t a n t harm when a breach o f t h a t m o r a l i t y takes p l a c e . Now l e t us assume t h a t Hart, as he p u r p o r t s t o do, i s u s i n g M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e as h i s main g u i d e l i n e f o r determinirig whether morals should be enforced.  F o r convenience,  we can  summarise M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y — " S o c i e t y should n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h the freedom o f a c t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a c t i o n i s causing harm to o t h e r s . "  unless  But Hart i s no l o n g e r  w i l l i n g i n our modern s o c i e t y to apply M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e i n any area other than morals and he thereby  immediately  a d i s t i n c t i o n between moral harm and p h y s i c a l harm.  creates :  "In Chapter F i v e o f h i s essay M i l l c a r r i e d h i s p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t p a t e r n a l i s m to l e n g t h s t h a t may now appear t o us f a n t a s t i c . He c i t e s the example o f r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the s a l e o f drugs, and c r i t i c i s e s them as i n t e r f e r e n c e s w i t h the l i b e r t y o f the wouldbe purchaser r a t h e r than t h a t o f the s e l l e r . No doubt i f we no l o n g e r sympathise w i t h t h i s c r i t i c i s m t h i s due i n p a r t t o a general dec l i n e i n the b e l i e f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s know t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s b e s t , and to an i n c r e a s e d awareness o f a great range o f f a c t o r s which d i m i n i s h the s i g n i f i c a n c e to be attached to an a p p a r e n t l y f r e e c h o i c e o r to consent. Choices may be made o r consent given without adequate r e f l e c t i o n o r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the consequences; o r i n p u r s u i t o f merely t r a n s i t o r y d e s i r e s ; o r i n v a r i o u s predicaments when the judgement i s l i k e l y to be clouded;  I b i d . , p. 1 3 7 .  or under i n n e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l compulsion; or under pressure by others o f a k i n d too s u b t l e to be s u s c e p t i b l e o f proof i n a law c o u r t . U n d e r l y i n g M i l l ' s extreme f e a r of p a t e r n a l i s m there perhaps i s a conception o f what a normal human being i s l i k e which now seems not to correspond to the f a c t s . " 5 0 Why prevent  i s Hart w i l l i n g to argue t h a t the law ought to  p h y s i c a l c o r r u p t i o n and y e t not i n t e r f e r e w i t h moral  corruption? disapproves  He approves of p h y s i c a l p a t e r n a l i s m and o f moral p a t e r n a l i s m .  o f motive and  how  do we  Why  yet  i s there a d i f f e r e n c e  d i s t i n g u i s h between the two?  It  appears t h a t the only r a t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t p h y s i c a l harm i s f a r e a s i e r to prove i n a law We  have a c l e a r conception  h e a l t h y person and p h y s i c a l harm.  court than moral harm.  of what amounts to a p h y s i c a l l y  can a l s o produce t a n g i b l e evidence  T h i s i s not so w i t h moral harm.  of  But once you  approve of the s t a t e ' s p a t e r n a l motive then d i s a p p r o v a l moral p a t e r n a l i s m  can o n l y be l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d on  b a s i s o f l a c k o f e m p i r i c a l evidence. upon t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n and  Hart does not  of the  elaborate  i n f a c t o n l y r e f e r s to i t i n p a s s i n g  w i t h an h i s t o r i c a l r e f e r e n c e to " s e c u l a r harm"^  1  One  recent  r e f e r e n c e to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s found i n the Report of the L e D a i n Commission.-'  2  While d i s c u s s i n g matters of p r i n c i p l e  50  the  Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 3 2 . The r i g h t o f modern s o c i e t y to embark upon a course of p h y s i c a l p a t e r n a l i s m i s c e r t a i n l y not undisputed. For example, see American Motorcycle A s s o c i a t i o n v Davids, 158 N.W.R. ( 2 n d ) , p. 7 2 . 5 1  Hart  (1963),  p.  23.  52 I n t e r i m Report o f the Commission o f I n q u i r y i n t o the Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Chairman, Gerald LeDain.  Report makes a r e s e r v a t i o n which i s based upon the a b i l i t y to prove the e x i s t e n c e o f harm.  "We  simply say t h a t i n  p r i n c i p l e , the s t a t e cannot be denied the r i g h t to use the c r i m i n a l law to r e s t r i c t a v a i l a b i l i t y where, i n i t s the  p o t e n t i a l f o r harm appears t o c a l l  I t appears t h a t the mere o p i n i o n a c c e p t a b l e evidence o f harm. the r i g h t o f p a t e r n a l  policy."53  f o r such a  o f the s t a t e w i l l  i t s e l f be  And the Commission p r e s e r v e s  a c t i o n where i n the o p i n i o n  t h e r e i s a p o t e n t i a l f o r harm to the i n d i v i d u a l . law  opinion,  of society, "The c r i m i n a l  should not be used f o r the enforcement o f m o r a l i t y  r e g a r d to p o t e n t i a l f o r harm.  In t h i s sense we s u b s c r i b e t o  what Hart r e f e r s to as the 'moderate t h e s i s ' of L o r d We do not s u b s c r i b e to the 'extreme t h e s i s ' that a p p r o p r i a t e to use the c r i m i n a l law to enforce regardless  without  Devlin.  i t is  morality,  o f the p o t e n t i a l f o r harm to the i n d i v i d u a l o r  society."^^ The  statements o f broad p r i n c i p l e made by the L e D a i n  Commission can be summarized as f o l l o w s t (1) Moral b e l i e f s ought o n l y to be enforced where, i n t e r alia, actual  there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence a v a i l a b l e o f p o t e n t i a l o r harm t o i n d i v i d u a l s o r to s o c i e t y . (2)  The o p i n i o n  of society  i s prima f a c i e evidence o f the  e x i s t e n c e o f a c t u a l o r p o t e n t i a l harm.  _ I b i d . , Para. 442. 5 I b i d . , Para. 444. 4  Hart s t a t e s t h a t a d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n of Stephen's arguments''-' (and a p o s s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n of D e v l i n ' s arguments) i s t h a t "we  may  make punishable by law a c t i o n s which are  con-  demned by s o c i e t y as immoral, even i f they are not harmful."56 Here i s the crux o f l o g i c "harmful"?  He  i n the d e b a t e — w h a t does Hart mean by  can only mean "cannot be proved to be  harmful."  Whereas D e v l i n i s ready to accept the s t r o n g l y h e l d f e e l i n g s of the m a j o r i t y as evidence o f harm, Hart says t h a t he i s not (though he does, at l e a s t at one stage, take the f e e l i n g s of the m a j o r i t y i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ). ^7 In summary of matters of p r i n c i p l e , the d i f f e r e n c e between Hart's and D e v l i n ' s views seems to come down to a d i f f e r e n t onus of proof.  Hart appears to say t h a t m o r a l l y  p a t e r n a l a c t i o n i s prima f a c i e not j u s t i f i e d unless s o c i e t y can show t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n proposed  to be  inter-  f e r e d w i t h i s harmful to the i n d i v i d u a l or to o t h e r s .  How  c o n c l u s i v e l y does s o c i e t y have to prove the harm before the prima f a c i e r u l e a g a i n s t p a t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i s d i s p l a c e d ? A b s o l u t e l y , beyond reasonable doubt, or on the balance of probabilities?  Hart's onus of p r o o f f o r showing harm i s a  s t r i c t e r onus.  Hart p u r p o r t s to demand some p h y s i c a l  manifes-  t a t i o n of the harm; D e v l i n i s w i l l i n g to accept i n some cases  James Fitzjames Stephen, F r a t e r n i t y , " London, I 8 7 3 . 5 6  Hart  ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p.  36.  5 7  Hart  ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p.  41.  author o f ' L i b e r t y , E q u a l i t y ,  the i n t a n g i b l e o p i n i o n o f common m o r a l i t y .  In o t h e r words,  reason, "when g i v e n no more a s s i s t a n c e from e m p i r i c a l ought  to c a l l  process."  upon f e e l i n g s to a s s i s t i n the decision-making  But Hart would say "No—where the e m p i r i c a l  a v a i l a b l e does not l e a d us to a d e c i s i o n , we upon c a p r i c i o u s f e e l i n g s ; i n s t e a d we upon the e x i s t i n g presumption prevail."  evidence,  should not  call  ought to base our d e c i s i o n  t h a t i n d i v i d u a l freedom  Thus the e x i s t i n g presumption  should  predetermines  d e c i s i o n i n a l l d i f f i c u l t or c o n t e n t i o u s cases. a decision,Lstill  evidence  the  T h i s means t h a t  based upon f e e l i n g s and v a l u e s , i s made e a r l -  i e r and l e s s o v e r t l y i n our r e a s o n i n g process i n the form of a value-laden  presumption.  Hart has d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n rationally sustaining his  o b j e c t i o n s to the use o f f e e l i n g s as evidence o f harm to s o c i e t y or to an i n d i v i d u a l .  He notes t h a t a breach of moral-  i t y as such assumes a p u b l i c nature when i t i s harmful to others as i t then becomes a n u i s a n c e . ^  When e m p i r i c a l  evi-  dence o f harm to the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n s u f f i c i e n t , t h e r e may  be  s u f f i c i e n t evidence when the mere immorality a f f e c t s o t h e r s . "...If,  i n the case of bigamy, the law i n t e r v e n e s i n o r d e r to  p r o t e c t r e l i g i o u s s e n s i b i l i t i e s from outrage by a p u b l i c a c t , the b i g a m i s t i s punished n e i t h e r as i r r e l i g i o u s nor as immoral but as a n u i s a n c e . " 5 9  T h i s f u r t h e r supports the argument  —  Hart, ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 5 9  I b i d . , p.  41.  p. 41.  that  j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the l i b e r t y of  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s moral a c t i o n depends upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y empirical  evidence o f harm to the a c t o r or to o t h e r s .  pursuant to M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e ,  6 0  wishes to l i m i t the  f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e to those cases where there evidence o f harm to o t h e r s . a case where there us wonder how  But  of Hart,  ground  i s empirical  the example o f bigamy b e i n g  i s predominantly a nuisance to others makes  easy i t w i l l be to f i n d elements of nuisance or  harm to others i n any f a r enough you  can  a c t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l .  convert every " p r i v a t e " act  I f you  look  into a "public"  act as every p r i v a t e act at l e a s t a f f e c t s a person's a t t i t u d e s 61 as a member o f s o c i e t y .  For example, Graham Hughes,  d i s c u s s i n g the f a c t t h a t consent i s not causing  grievous b o d i l y harm remarks how  harm can e q u a l l y w e l l be p a r t i c u l a r imposition  a defence to  while assault  the concept o f p u b l i c  useddas a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s  upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom.  On  i t s face,  the n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of the defence o f consent would appear to be predominantly p r o t e c t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l from h i m s e l f .  How-  ever " p u b l i c " harm a l s o e x i s t s because (a)  there  i s the general  l o s s to s o c i e t y of the  services  o f the v i c t i m when s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm i s i n f l i c t e d , (b) public  there  i s a consequent p o s s i b l e i m p o s i t i o n  charge, 6-0  —  See 6 l  71  footnote Yale Law  number Journal,  20. 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 , p. 662  at  670.  on  the  (c)  the a c t o r may  become p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y a d d i c t e d to  harming o t h e r s , (d) to  s o c i e t y i s offended because  i t f e e l s that  consent  a s e r i o u s i n j u r y i s wrong. The d i f f e r e n c e between a p r i v a t e and a p u b l i c a c t i s  u l t i m a t e l y o n l y a matter o f degree.  But perhaps we  can d e f i n e  a p r i v a t e a c t as one which predominantly a f f e c t s the a c t o r and a p u b l i c a c t as one which predominantly a f f e c t s people other than the a c t o r . to  F o l l o w i n g these d e f i n i t i o n s i t i s d i f f i c u l t  agree w i t h Hart t h a t bigamy i s a crime because  i t pre-  dominantly harms others by b e i n g a nuisance to t h e i r John S t u a r t M i l l attempted  to f a c e t h i s problem  p r i v a t e a c t c o n t a i n i n g some element  feelings.  of every  of p u b l i c e f f e c t and  con-  cluded t h a t he would p r e f e r open p a t e r n a l i s m r a t h e r than p a t e r n a l i s m hidden behind a f a l s e d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e  effect. "The d i s t i n c t i o n here p o i n t e d out between the p a r t o f a person's l i f e which concerns only h i m s e l f , and t h a t which concerns o t h e r s , many persons w i l l r e f u s e to admit. How ( i t may be asked) can any p a r t of the conduct of a member of s o c i e t y be a matter o f i n d i f f e r e n c e to the o t h e r members? No person i s an e n t i r e l y i s o l a t e d being; i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r a person to do a n y t h i n g s e r i o u s l y or permanently h u r t f u l to h i m s e l f , without m i s c h i e f r e a c h i n g at l e a s t to h i s near c o n n e c t i o n s , and o f t e n f a r beyond them. In l i k e manner, when a person d i s a b l e s h i m s e l f , by conduct p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g , from the performance of some d e f i n i t e duty incumbent on him to the p u b l i c , he i s g u i l t y of a s o c i a l o f f e n c e . No person ought to be punished simply f o r b e i n g drunk; but a s o l d i e r or a policeman should be punished f o r b e i n g drunk on duty. Whenever, i n s h o r t , there i s  a d e f i n i t e damage, o r a d e f i n i t e r i s k of damage, e i t h e r to an i n d i v i d u a l o r to the p u b l i c , the case i s taken out o f the prov i n c e of l i b e r t y and p l a c e d i n t h a t o f m o r a l i t y or law. But w i t h r e g a r d to the merely c o n t i n g e n t , or, as i t may be c a l l e d , c o n s t r u c t i v e i n j u r y which a person causes to s o c i e t y , by conduct which n e i t h e r v i o l a t e s any s p e c i f i c duty to the p u b l i c , nor o c c a s i o n s p e r c e p t i b l e hurt to any a s s i g n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l except h i m s e l f ; the inconvenience i s one which s o c i e t y can a f f o r d to bear f o r the sake o f the g r e a t e r good o f human freedom. I f grown persons are to be punished f o r not t a k i n g proper care o f themselves, I would r a t h e r i t were f o r t h e i r own sake, than under pretense o f p r e v e n t i n g them from i m p a i r i n g t h e i r c a p a c i t y o f renderi n g to s o c i e t y b e n e f i t s which s o c i e t y does not pretend i t has the r i g h t to exact."62 M i l l ' s answer echoes ligence.  i n the realms o f the common law o f neg-  But i t s t i l l  begs the q u e s t i o n f o r o n l y w i t h c e r t a i n  kinds o f moral a c t s does an i n d i v i d u a l owe care to h i s neighbour.  a s p e c i f i c duty o f  N a t u r a l l y , s o c i e t y should o n l y  i n t e r f e r e where the i n d i v i d u a l has a s p e c i f i c duty o f care and breaks i t . owe  To complete  the c i r c l e - - w h e n does an  a moral duty o f care to h i s neighbour?  individual  He owes a duty o f  care to h i s neighbour i n those cases where h i s moral a c t i o n or i n a c t i o n w i l l predominantly a f f e c t o t h e r s , t h a t i s , where h i s moral a c t i o n i s o f a p u b l i c n a t u r e .  Once a g a i n we  see how  the  " s o l u t i o n s " to a c o n f l i c t have the unfortunate h a b i t o f r e s t a t i n g the whole  problem.  John S ^ a r t  M  i  l  1  a t p. 136  and p. 1 3 8 .  See f o o t n o t e  In summary, d e s p i t e Hart's i n i t i a l proposal Mill's principle  to apply  of l i b e r t y to d e c i s i o n s concerning  the enforce-  ment o f m o r a l i t y , we soon f i n d t h a t M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e ed beyond r e c o g n i t i o n . bigamy^  3  i s stretch-  Hart's nuisance t e s t and example o f  b l u r the a l r e a d y  awkward d i s t i n c t i o n so important  f o r h i s argument between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c harm.  Mill  r e a l i z e d t h a t unless the d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c could be r a t i o n a l l y preserved,  h i s whole p r i n c i p l e was  consid-  e r a b l y weakened as a means of a s s i s t i n g the decision-maker. The essence o f M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e would then become a p l e a to us "to t h i n k i t p o s s i b l e t h a t we may be m i s t a k e n . B e h i n d  Hart's  pronounced d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , we f i n d that the r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s between p r i v a t e concepts o f r i g h t and  wrong.  Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , D e v l i n , p.  p. 41. 121.  VALUE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HART AND  DEVLIN  I t i s important to remember t h a t the H a r t - D e v l i n aimed at p r o v i d i n g c l e a r g u i d e l i n e s and making i n matters concerning  principles for decision  the enforcement of morals.  p r i n c i p l e s emerge from the debate to a s s i s t question  "what should  debate  I do?"  What  i n answering the  Unfortunately,  the p r i n c i p l e s  which emerge are so i n c o n c l u s i v e as g u i d e l i n e s t h a t one  main  l e s s o n i s to beware o f r e l y i n g a b s o l u t e l y upon s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e s . The  d i f f e r e n c e between the views of Hart and  a d i f f e r e n c e of value  D e v l i n emerges as  r a t h e r than of p r i n c i p l e .  In t h i s  context  a " p r i n c i p l e " i s used i n the sense of a p r o p o s i t i o n which can objectively  judged as true or f a l s e and  to a s e t of f a c t s and  a conclusion?  which can be  scientific A "value"  i n the e x p l a n a t i o n  applied  be l o g i c a l l y deduced.  essence o f a p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t i t purports  to be l o g i c a l  of i t s existence  be  The and  and a p p l i c a t i o n .  i s a p r o p o s i t i o n , i d e a or a t t i t u d e which i s b e l i e v e d  i n of i t s e l f q u i t e independently of e m p i r i c a l or l o g i c a l  proof.  For the purpose of a n a l y s i s , here i s a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e which i s an attempt to amalgamate both s i d e s of the debate.  (This  by no means " s o l v e s " the debate but merely s t a t e s a common p r i n c i p l e so t h a t we  can recapture  place o f disagreement.)  c l a r i t y and  " S o c i e t y should  not  or to o t h e r s . "  The  Why?  55 See  previous  comment on  he i s  causing  r e a l d i f f e r e n c e i s that  Hart s e t s out a s t r i c t e r onus o f proof to rebut presumption o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . ^  real  i n t e r f e r e with  the freedom o f a c t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l unless harm to h i m s e l f  i d e n t i f y the  p.24.  the  basic  Hart p r o t e c t s  individ-  ual freedom b a s i c a l l y because o f a d i f f e r e n t value and  preference  because o f h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h i s p r e f e r r e d value  predominate u n t i l d i s p l a c e d by s u f f i c i e n t e m p i r i c a l Hart c l e a r l y s t a t e s , "I have a l s o assumed from the t h a t anyone who  regards t h i s q u e s t i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y accepts the  as open to  evidence. beginning  discussion  c r i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , c e n t r a l to a l l  m o r a l i t y , t h a t human misery and are e v i l s ; f o r t h a t i s why  the r e s t r i c t i o n o f freedom  the l e g a l enforcement of m o r a l i t y  c a l l s f o r " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " i n the form o f the wishes of common m o r a l i t y . " when he says t h a t  B l a c k s h i e l d a l s o comes to t h i s  6 6  "He  shall  the  conclusion  (Hart) r e l i e s u l t i m a t e l y on two  deep  interdependent c o n v i c t i o n s which are beyond u t i l i t a r i a n even r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  One  i s an absolute  the other  e t h i c a l value;  o f j u s t i c e t h a t any  The  declared  i s that i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y i s the p r i n c i p l e  p u n i t i v e or other l e g a l  cuts down t h i s absolute  value r e q u i r e s to be  reason f o r Hart's value  t h a t the m a j o r i t y w i l l  enforce  or  e n t e r p r i s e which justified." '''  preference  6  i s the  fact  p r e j u d i c e d moral o p i n i o n s  upon  f,P> the  minority. Does Hart value  Devlin?  Yes--to the extent  value.  But 6 6  i n d i v i d u a l freedom more h i g h l y than i s more p r o t e c t i v e of that  i t i s obvious that a great p a r t o f  'Hart,  67  t h a t he  (1963),  p.  Devlin's  82.  A.R. B l a c k s h i e l d , §. Sydney Law Review, 1 9 6 5 - 6 7 , at 4 5 0 . 68 Hart's value presumption r e c e i v e s s t r o n g support from Ronald Dworkin—See The New York Review Dec. 17, 1970. A special Supplement "Taking Rights S e r i o u s l y . " Dworkin argues t h a t where the b a s i c r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s i n v o l v e d , the government cannot conduct experiments of d e p r i v a t i o n based upon f e a r s and f e e l i n g s ; i t must o n l y a c t to l i m i t t h a t r i g h t upon e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t i s c a u s i n g harm. p. 441  o r i g i n a l essay freedom. from?  emphasises the importance  7  of individual  Then where did the d i f f e r e n t v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e s come  We can l o o k f o r answers i n education, psychology and  sociology.  In f a c t , a t one p o i n t , Hart remarks t h a t there i s  a p e r s i s t e n t philosophy among E n g l i s h judges when d e a l i n g w i t h the c r i m i n a l law but then he says "These a r e s o c i o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s o f great importance of  this lecture I will  but as they are not the s u b j e c t  spare you my amateur s p e c u l a t i o n s on  70 these t o p i c s . " '  But we can s p e c u l a t e i n amateur f a s h i o n t h a t  Hart as an i n t e l l e c t u a l vital of  i s l o a t h to openly admit t h a t such a  v a l u e as i n d i v i d u a l freedom should be l e f t  common m o r a l i t y .  to mere f e e l i n g s .  to the whims  I t i s a p p a r e n t l y an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason  And y e t i n the course o f h i s c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s , he concludes i n a d i s g u i s e d manner t h a t f e e l i n g s are and ought to be one c o n s i d e r a t i o n when making d e c i s i o n s about i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom.?  1  The d i f f e r e n c e i n v a l u e s i s  i n d i c a t e d by the u n d i s g u i s e d and b l a t a n t manner i n which D e v l i n , a judge w e l l acquainted w i t h the h a b i t s o f j u r i e s , a s s e r t s t h a t common m o r a l i t y ought to be an important  guide to the  q u e s t i o n o f whether c e r t a i n moral standards should be enforced. It  i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n s t y l e o f l i f e as much as a d i f f e r e n c e i n  v a l u e s — t h e y p l a y the r o l e s o f the P r o g r e s s i v e I n t e l l e c t u a l versus the S o l i d E s t a b l i s h m e n t .  D e v l i n , p. 16-20. 7  °Hart  (1965), p. 36  Hart  (1963), p. 41.  7 1  D e v l i n ' s theory i s t h a t o f a  p r a c t i s i n g judge and t h e r e f o r e does n o t a s p i r e as high as the more i d e a l i s t i c Hart.  Devlin's  a t t i t u d e seems to be t h a t human  beings, who f e a r e x p l o i t a t i o n and d e s i r e a secure and e f f i c i e n t government, w i l l  t r y t o prevent i n d i v i d u a l freedom predominat-  i n g over the wishes o f the m a j o r i t y .  T h i s Hobbesian a t t i t u d e  shows h i s doubts t h a t i n d i v i d u a l men are c o n s i s t e n t l y capable of r e a c h i n g a l e v e l o f moral i n t e g r i t y .  Devlin  innuendos about the f a i t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r s r i t y of minority  groups.  He says t h a t  not as p a t i e n t as p h i l o s o p h e r s minority  casts  i n the moral i n t e g -  " s o c i a l reformers are  and we have not waited f o r  groups to a t t a i n moral i n t e g r i t y " ' '  who over-emphasise i n d i v i d u a l freedom f a i l  72 a n c  i  that those  to r e a l i z e  that  "the pimps l e a d i n g the weak a s t r a y f a r outnumber s p i r i t u a l explorers  at the head o f the strong."''  3  Devlin's  theory  purports  to be a p r a c t i c a l and workable moral theory f o r  fallible  human beings.  In h i s words, "For b e t t e r o r worse the  law-maker must a c t a c c o r d i n g  to h i s l i g h t s and he cannot  there-  f o r e accept M i l l ' s d o c t r i n e as p r a c t i c a b l e even i f as an i d e a l he thought to to be d e s i r a b l e . " ' ' ^  Devlin's  arguments seem to  be both dangerous to i n d i v i d u a l freedom and to present challenge  to the process o f i n t e l l e c t u a l decision-making.  Hart's c r i t i c i s m s , upon a n a l y s i s , o n l y confirm 72 73  a  D e v l i n , p. 1 0 5 . Ibid  p. 108.  I b i d . , p. 1 2 3 .  But  that there are  c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s upon the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n t i f i c a l i s m and n a t u r a l i s m i n the area o f moral d e c i s i o n . ? 5 left  ( l i k e D e v l i n ) f i n a l l y able to t e l l  He cannot t e l l  us why.  And  ration-  "Hart i s  us o n l y what he b e l i e v e s .  t h i s i s o n l y another way  that when i t comes to " j u s t i c e " , n e i t h e r judges nor  of  saying  philosophers  q u i t e know what to do."76 As I have concluded  t h a t the r e a l  crux of the debate i s  a d i f f e r e n c e of v a l u e s , then I should at l e a s t attempt to i d e n t i f y these v a l u e s .  T h i s i s not an easy t a s k .  It i s  d i f f i c u l t to d e f i n e e x a c t l y what v a l u e s D e v l i n i s s u p p o r t i n g as he p u r p o r t e d l y argues f o r procedure r a t h e r than substance. That i s , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , he argues t h a t s t r o n g l y h e l d p u b l i c o p i n i o n , almost r e g a r d l e s s o f content to  be enforced.  o r substance, ought  Presumably p u b l i c o p i n i o n tends to embody  t r a d i t i o n a l moral v a l u e s , c l i n g s to s e c u r i t y and embrace any r a d i c a l change.  i s slow to  When there i s c o n f l i c t ,  and  p u b l i c o p i n i o n are to be p r e f e r r e d over s o c i a l  and  i n d i v i d u a l wishes.  The  tradition  changes  d i f f e r e n c e of v a l u e s between Hart  and D e v l i n i s o n l y a matter o f degree and  discovering that  d i f f e r e n c e i s rendered  d i f f i c u l t by the s i m i l a r statements  made by both o f them.  For example, i n a l a t e r essay,  Devlin  says t h a t "the t r u e mark o f a f r e e s o c i e t y " i s t h a t " a u t h o r i t y 77 should be a grant and l i b e r t y not a p r i v i l e g e . "  This s t a t e -  —  See Ekman—Readings i n the Problems of E t h i c s , p. ? 6  77  B l a c k s h i e l d at p.  453.  78.  ment, t o g e t h e r w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s q u a l i f y i n g the f e e l i n g s t e s t , are v e r y r e m i n i s c e n t of Hart's whole argument.  Hart  p l a c e s a h i g h e r prima f a c i e value upon the freedom and  right  o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l and a l e s s e r value on t r a d i t i o n and p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  An important  difference i n  a t t i t u d e which has been p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d  78  i s the  b e l i e f concerning the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the average r e a c h i n g a l e v e l of moral u p r i g h t n e s s . thought  individual  Some i n s i g h t i n t o the  process o f Hart can be gained from h i s book  Concept o f Law".'' Hart observes 79  different  "The  t h a t s o c i a l acceptance  pre-  dominates i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s as a source of a u t h o r i t y whereas o r g a n i z e d a u t h o r i t y predominates i n more h i g h l y developed s o c i e t i e s .  T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s expressed  i n terms o f  c o n t r a s t between primary r u l e s of o b l i g a t i o n and r u l e s of r e c o g n i t i o n .  Hart argues  secondary  that the r u l e s of s o c i a l  acceptance which predominate i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s have the Rn  d e f e c t s o f u n c e r t a i n t y , u n c h a n g e a b i l i t y and  inefficiency.  By h i s a n a l y s i s , the remedy f o r these d e f e c t s i s to have ary r u l e s empowering i n d i v i d u a l s to make a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e r m i n a t i o n s or to have secondary  r u l e s to determine  the primary r u l e s are a u t h o r i t a t i v e .  Thus both  second-  de-  which of  historically  and l o g i c a l l y , Hart argues t h a t norms of behaviour need somet h i n g more than s o c i a l acceptance  _  before they can be considered  See p r e v i o u s page 33•  79 H.L.A. Hart, "The I b i d . , pp. 9 0 - 9 2 .  Concept of Law",  1961.  to be law.  They must be converted to secondary r u l e s by some  a u t h o r i t a t i v e body which i s i t s e l f governed rules.  by  secondary  T r a n s p o s i n g these ideas i n t o t h i s debate,  i t follows  then that i n Hart's o p i n i o n the b e l i e f s o f the p u b l i c are not c e r t a i n , f l e x i b l e or e f f i c i e n t enough to amount to  secondary  r u l e s and t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n alone i s not an a u t h o r i t a t i v e source of law. I t i s h e l p f u l to l o o k at the debate  i n the l i g h t  of  t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o o l s o f l e g a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought.  The  arguments o f both Hart and D e v l i n r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t themes and  i t i s e a s i e r to i d e n t i f y where each stands  historically  than i t i s to s t a t e e x a c t l y what i n n e r v a l u e s each one  holds.  In the w r i t i n g s of Rousseau^  juris-  prudence and p o l i t i c a l  1  some of the paradoxes of  p h i l o s o p h y become apparent  and  i t is  w i t h i n one o f these paradoxes t h a t the a t t i t u d e s taken by Hart and D e v l i n can be l o c a t e d .  Rousseau's theory i s s u b j e c t  to many i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and he can be quoted to support almost any school o f thought. attempted  T h i s i s p a r t l y because he  to r e c o n c i l e the n a t u r a l r i g h t s and freedom of  w i t h a b s o l u t e government by the people.  T h i s attempt  man  failed  and as a r e s u l t Rousseau concluded w i t h p a r a d o x i c a l statements such as "whoever s h a l l r e f u s e to obey the general w i l l must be c o n s t r a i n e d by the whole body o f h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s to do sos 81 Rousseau, "The P r e s s , Ed. Barker..  S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , Oxford  University  which i s no more than t o say t h a t i t may be necessary to Op  compel a man to be f r e e . '  Firstly,  one v i t a l  i s s u e which  emerges from Rousseau's w r i t i n g i s the t r a d i t i o n a l  problem  of who ought to be s o v e r e i g n i n s o c i e t y , a wise d i c t a t o r o r p u b l i c opinion?  He attempted t o answer t h i s q u e s t i o n by  d e v e l o p i n g a concept  o f the i d e a l  "general w i l l " o f the people.  However he was never able t o f u l l y e x p l a i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the mysterious  general w i l l  p u b l i c o p i n i o n o f the people. problem o f the a c t u a l w i l l will,  and the a c t u a l w i l l o r  When faced w i t h the constant  f a i l i n g to r e f l e c t the i d e a l  general  Rousseau opted to take the r i s k o f a p p o i n t i n g an i n t e r i m  d i c t a t o r as s o v e r e i g n .  T h i s Wise L e g i s l a t o r would p e r s o n a l l y  decide upon and enforce the general w i l l understood  the general w i l l  u n t i l the p u b l i c  and embodied i t i n t h e i r o p i n i o n s .  In Rousseau's words, The general w i l l i s always r i g h t , but the judgement g u i d i n g i t i s not always w e l l informed. I t must be made to see t h i n g s as they are, sometimes as they ought to be. I t must be shown how to a t t a i n the good i t seeks, must be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t the temptations inherent i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . . . I n d i v i d u a l s see the good which they r e j e c t ; the p u b l i c d e s i r e s the good which i t does not see. Both, e q u a l l y are i n need o f guidance... That i s why a l e g i s l a t o r i s a n e c e s s i t y . 8 3 T h i s i s a l s o the o p i n i o n t h a t Hart has chosen though he does not d i s c u s s h i s d i c t a t o r , wise l e g i s l a t o r o r wise judge. £2 I b i d . , p. 184. 8 3  I b i d . , p. 204.  At  one p o i n t Hart acknowledges t h a t "a u t i l i t a r i a n " w i l l have to apply c r i t i c a l m o r a l i t y i n order to determine what r u l e s o f 84 m o r a l i t y ought to be e n f o r c e d . important wise  judges are to h i s theory i n h i s book "The  Concept o f Law." judicial  He g i v e s a h i n t o f how  statement  There, w h i l e r e f e r r i n g to the use o f a as an a u t h o r i t a t i v e guide to the r u l e s ,  Hart makes the statement  t h a t "the r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h i s must  f l u c t u a t e both w i t h the s k i l l c o n s i s t e n c y o f the j u d g e s . " 5 8  o f the i n t e r p r e t e r and the Hart l a y s down the p r i n c i p l e  of l i b e r t y as a g u i d e l i n e f o r moral  government and t h i s  p r i n c i p l e i s i n essence p a r t o f the general w i l l o r a p a r t o f the concept o f j u s t i c e .  Now as l o n g as Hart can p e r s o n a l l y  stay a l i v e to i n t e r p r e t t h i s p r i n c i p l e , a l l w i l l be w e l l . However, i n e v i t a b l y he must face the problem  of finding  i n c o r r u p t i b l e P l a t o n i c judges to i n t e r p r e t and enforce c o r r e c t l y t h i s p a r t o f the general w i l l .  T h i s i s an awesome  task f o r i n Rousseau's words "there i s needed a s u p e r i o r i n t e l l i g e n c e which can survey a l l the passions o f mankind, though i t s e l f exposed to none:  an i n t e l l i g e n c e having no  contact w i t h our nature, y e t knowing i t to the f u l l . "  8 6  If  Hart o f f e r s us a l e s s e r man then he i s immediately s u b j e c t to  the same c r i t i c i s m s which he d i r e c t e d a t D e v l i n ' s theory  of  government by p u b l i c o p i n i o n . —j.  Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,  These c r i t i c i s m s would be  p. 2 3 .  H a r t , "The Concept o f Law"$ p. 95. 86 Rousseau, "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , p. 204. 8 5  such as "Why should the p r e j u d i c e s  and b i g o t r y o f a f a l l i b l e  human being be made s o v e r e i g n i n s o c i e t y ? " and "How do we know t h a t the c o r r u p t i b l e i n d i v i d u a l i n c o n t r o l w i l l Hart could  govern  wisely?"  r e p l y t h a t t h i s wise l e g i s l a t o r w i l l be c o n t r o l l e d  to a c e r t a i n extent by such r u l e s as M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e o f liberty.  However we have a l r e a d y  noted  8 7  how such moral p r i n -  c i p l e s need t o be c o n t i n u a l l y r e f e r r e d to t h e i r author f o r substantive  meaning and i n v o l v e  a very wide and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n based u l t i m a t e l y upon personal v a l u e s .  When d i s -  i l l u s i o n e d w i t h t h e search f o r i n c o r r u p t i b l e l e g a l guardians to i n t e r p r e t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y , Hart, l i k e P l a t o  i n his  oo  l a t e r years,  would be compelled to enumerate d e t a i l e d  to e x p l a i n the meaning o f j u s t i c e as embodied i n t h a t D e v l i n has taken the o t h e r p p o s s i b l e  rules  principle. 9 8  path which branches  o f f from the mysterious r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rousseau's general w i l l and the a c t u a l w i l l o f the people.  T h i s course i s a l s o  a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous one i n i t s pure form and i s a l s o mystifying  i n any m o d i f i e d form.  In the realm o f moral govern-  ment, D e v l i n , w i t h some h e s i t a n c y ,  9 0  i s w i l l i n g t o take the  r i s k t h a t the a c t u a l w i l l o f the people w i l l r e f l e c t t i a l l y the i d e a l general w i l l . concept o f s o v e r e i g n t y 7  8 8  substan-  He s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t s the  v e s t e d i n a P l a t o n i c e l i t e as he b e l i e v e s  S e e p r e v i o u s p. 14.  Plato,  "The Laws"  89 See John Hospers, "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s " , pp. 449-494 f o r . a d i s c u s s i o n o f the problems o f d e f i n i n g e t h i c a l terms i n n o n - e t h i c a l language. 9  ° S e e p r e v i o u s pp. 11-12.  t h a t the r i s k o f i n j u s t i c e i s g r e a t e r i n t h a t case than where s o v e r e i g n t y i s vested i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  "The P l a t o n i c i d e a l i s  t h a t the s t a t e e x i s t s to promote v i r t u e among i t s c i t i z e n s . I f t h a t i s i t s f u n c t i o n , then whatever power i s s o v e r e i g n i n the S t a t e — a n  a u t o c r a t , i f there be one, o r i n a democracy  the m a j o r i t y — m u s t standards  have the r i g h t and duty to d e c l a r e what  o f m o r a l i t y a r e to be observed  a s c e r t a i n them as t h i n k s b e s t . Anglo-American thought.  as v i r t u o u s and must  T h i s i s not a c c e p t a b l e to  I t i n v e s t s the State w i t h power o f  d e t e r m i n a t i o n between good and e v i l ,  d e s t r o y s freedom o f 91  conscience and i s the paved road t o tyranny." ing  It i s interest-  to see t h a t both Hart and D e v l i n a r e f e a r f u l o f the same  danger, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f tyranny  i f either public opinion or  an i n d i v i d u a l are g i v e n a b s o l u t e a u t h o r i t y . p u b l i c o p i n i o n to be a l e s s e r e v i l . of what i s necessary  Devlin considers  " S o c i e t y must be the judge  to i t s own i n t e g r i t y i f only because there  i s no other t r i b u n a l to which the q u e s t i o n can be submitted. T h i s i s the choice t h a t Rousseau would l i k e to have made and i n f a c t some o f h i s w r i t i n g s give us the c o n f u s i n g impression t h a t he d i d make p u b l i c o p i n i o n the supreme a u t h o r i t y i n s o c i e t y . For example i n "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " he To these t h r e e kinds o f law be added and i t i s the most them a l l . I t i s to be found —  _ D e v l i n , p. 89.  9 2  I b i d . , p. 118.  said a f o u r t h should important o f not graven on  p i l l a r s of marble or p l a t e s of bronze but i n the hearts of the c i t i z e n s . It i s the true f o u n d a t i o n on which the State i s b u i l t , and grows d a i l y i n importance. When other laws become o l d and f e e b l e i t b r i n g s them new l i f e or f i l l s the gaps they l e a v e untenanted. I t maintains a People i n the s p i r i t of t h e i r Founder, and a l l unnoticed, s u b s t i t u t e s f o r a u t h o r i t y the f o r c e of h a b i t . I r e f e r to manners, customs and above a l l , o p i n i o n . T h i s i s a f i e l d unknown to our p o l i t i c i a n s yet on these t h i n g s depend the success of a l l the r e s t . 9 3 However Rousseau u l t i m a t e l y sees the n e c e s s i t y f o r an i n t e r i m wise l e g i s l a t o r as he observed how  o f t e n i n j u s t i c e and  went hand-in-hand w i t h the r u l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . the same problem and  s t a t e d p o l i c y of education  Unlike Rousseau, he  or reform other than  to the need f o r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h to provide conviction.  He  problem o f how  states that  "No  them..."  7  moral freedom before  has  the  So the  law  to the l i m i t o f i t s  D e v l i n a l s o exhorts p u b l i c  to r e f l e c t upon the  or  a base f o r moral  to each m o r a l i t y without r e l i g i o n .  to be c a r e f u l and  faces  references  s o c i e t y has y e t solved  must base i t s e l f on C h r i s t i a n morals and a b i l i t y enforce  Devlin  cannot guarantee t h a t the a c t u a l w i l l  p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i l l be uncorrupted. no  ignorance  opinion  importance o f i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i n g to r e s t r i c t t h i s freedom. -* 9  other words, he i s r e l y i n g upon the wisdom of the p u b l i c  i  n  and  the a u t h o r i t y o f t h e i r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h to embody j u s t i c e i n 93 "The  S o c i a l Contract"  94  D e v l i n , p.  25.  p.  220.  public opinion.  And  i n any  case,  i n a democracy, i t i s a  l e s s e r e v i l f o r i n j u s t i c e to be i n f l i c t e d  by p u b l i c o p i n i o n  than i t i s f o r i n j u s t i c e to be i n f l i c t e d by an i n d i v i d u a l elite  or  group. Where D e v l i n ' s theory s u f f e r s from the p o t e n t i a l i n -  j u s t i c e s i n f l i c t e d by the enforcement of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , Hart's  theory  i s s u b j e c t to the p o t e n t i a l i n j u s t i c e s  inflicted  by the  "wise" i n d i v i d u a l or P l a t o n i c e l i t e which i n t e r p r e t s  the meaning o f phrases such as " i n d i v i d u a l freedom" and to  others".  I f we  "harm"  i n t e r p r e t D e v l i n ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to the  f e e l i n g s t e s t as b e i n g s u b s t a n t i v e , i n s t e a d o f merely  procedural,  then D e v l i n a l s o f a c e s the same problem as Hart, t h a t i s f i n d i n g . a wise r u l e r to i n t e r p r e t the substance o f the  qualifications.  I f the p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and wisdom of the wise l e g i s l a t o r s u b j e c t to appeal appeal we  court?  or c o r r e c t i o n , then who  I f the appeal  i s to make up  f i n d o u r s e l v e s d i s c u s s i n g the other broad p h i l o s o p h i c a l  ultimate sovereignty  In t h i s  i s invested i n p u b l i c opinion.  immediately apparent how  e a s i l y one  school, It i s  school of thought r e f e r s  the other a p p a r e n t l y opposing school i n an attempt to c r e a t e  a more j u s t theory o f law for  the  i s based upon p u b l i c o p i n i o n then  school o f which D e v l i n i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  to  are  and  government.  However, the  j u s t i c e means t h a t the t h e o r i e s l o s e coherence.  f i n d s h i m s e l f unavoidably  See  previous  search  Thus Hart  r e f e r r i n g to p u b l i c o p i n i o n as a  d i s c u s s i o n on p.l5»  9 6  source o f a u t h o r i t y tial  9 7  though i n general  he d e c l a r e s the poten-  e v i l s of enforcing public opinion.  Also D e v l i n ,  like  Rousseau, could have c a l l e d upon a wise l e g i s l a t o r to l i b e r a t e p u b l i c o p i n i o n by a p p l y i n g a s t a t e d concept o f m o r a l i t y o r n a t u r a l law. theory  But D e v l i n i s u n e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d to h i s own  t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n ought to govern without any pre-  condition of justice.  I t i s o n l y when he r e a l i z e s the extremes  of i n j u s t i c e l a t e n t i n a s t r i c t t h a t he t r i e s to s l i p a c r o s s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s theory  i n t o the r e a s s u r i n g system o f  a u t h o r i t y under a wise l e g i s l a t o r . problem.  Hart  As Rousseau created a m b i g u i t i e s  s u f f e r s from the same i n h i s theory by  t r y i n g to r e c o n c i l e these two p o s s i b l e s o v e r e i g n s , and  Devlin create s i m i l a r ambiguities  so both Hart  i n t h e i r own t h e o r i e s .  U l t i m a t e l y , a u t h o r i t y must r e s t w i t h a s i n g l e s o v e r e i g n and it  appears t h a t u l t i m a t e l y D e v l i n choses p u b l i c o p i n i o n and  Hart  chooses a wise l e g i s l a t o r .  Hart o n l y r e f e r s i n p a s s i n g to  the problem o f who would be u l t i m a t e s o v e r e i g n  i n his theory  9 8  99  and would probably The  t r y to a v o i d the c o n c l u s i o n reached here.  debate can be placed  7  i n a second broad category o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l thought which f o l l o w s on d i r e c t l y from the parad o x i c a l answers g i v e n t o the q u e s t i o n o f "Who ought to be sovereign  i n society?"  T h i s category  d e a l s with the t r a d i t i o n a l  antinomy between c o l l e c t i v i s m and i n d i v i d u a l i s m and asks the 97 Hart  (1963),  pp. 41 and 5 1 .  I b i d . , p. 80. 99  See p.39 concerning conclusion.  the d i f f i c u l t y o f r e a c h i n g any o l h e r  question  "Which i s more important, the i n d i v i d u a l or  community?" "Whether the i n d i v i d u a l or the ultimate value  i s a problem which was  formulated  by P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e and  the  community i s the  studied  p r i n c i p a l a s p e c t s by Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s .  the  in a l l its  To the  issues  S t o i c s thousands of  years have added an i n f i n i t e number of i l l u s t r a t i o n s v a r i a t i o n s but l i t t l e  as  that i s e s s e n t i a l l y new."  and Attempts  100  to combine i n d i v i d u a l autonomy w i t h the s u p e r i o r power of the  community to create a coherent l e g a l theory  failed. fail  have always  For example, the t h e o r i e s of both Locke and  to e x p l a i n how  Rousseau  the supreme r i g h t s of the m a j o r i t y  can  be  r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . Ultimately,  i n every theory  of government, e i t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l  o r the community w i l l p r e v a i l . a c o l l e c t i v i s t conclusion essay.  He  Duguit's theory  of law  s i m i l a r to the theme of  says t h a t a " r u l e o f law  admits that a  r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the v i o l a t i o n o f the r u l e can be organized." the  socially  01  Such t h e o r i e s as t h a t of D e v l i n ' s  c r i t i c i s m that they may  philosophy.  Devlin's  e x i s t s whenever the mass of  i n d i v i d u a l s composing the group understands and  1  reaches  f o l l o w the  Certain philosophers  are open to  course of Neo-Hegelian  w r i t i n g a f t e r Hegel's death  g l o r i f i e d the a b s t r a c t i d e a l o f the s t a t e w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t the  i n d i v i d u a l was  rendered u t t e r l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  102  This  100  W. 1 0 1  Friedmann, "Legal  D u g u i t 2 Columbia L.R.  102  Theory", F i f t h E d i t i o n , p. 22 and  Friedmann, p.  232.  88.  stream o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought  has been i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the  extremes o f F a s c i s t I t a l y and Nazi Germany i n the t w e n t i e t h century.  Therefore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t o t a l i t a r i a n abuse  l a t e n t i n D e v l i n ' s theory are an i n e v i t a b l e cause f o r c r i t i c i s m from Hart e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t o f r e c e n t h i s t o r i c a l  events.  "For there are i n the a c t u a l working o f democracy many f o r c e s l i k e l y to encourage the b e l i e f t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f democratic 103 r u l e means t h a t the m a j o r i t y a r e always r i g h t . "  J  Savigny  and E h r l i c h are a l s o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f one s i d e o f t h i s antinomy. Savigny*s  " V o l k s g e i s t " and E h r l i c h * s " L i v i n g Law o f the People"  are i d e a s which are b r o a d l y m i r r o r e d by D e v l i n when he uses such phrases as "a n a t i o n ' s thought" and "accepted  public  standards. On the other hand Hart r e f l e c t s ideas from the h i s t o r i c a l l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t s c h o o l s o f thought.  The S t o i c s f i r s t  developed a  l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y e x p r e s s i n g the i d e a o f the i n d i v i d u a l as a reasonable being detached A f t e r the Reformation,  from the community i n which he l i v e s .  the i n d i v i d u a l emerged as an important  e n t i t y i n h i m s e l f r a t h e r than b e i n g o n l y a p a r t o f the l a r g e r s o c i a l organism.  T h i s i d e a r e a l l y blossomed w i t h the propaga-  t i o n o f the " i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s o f man" by Locke.  Hart  embodies such i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s i n h i s theory when he assumes the b a s i c value o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . H o b b e s was a l s o an 1 0 3  S e e Hart  (1963),  pp. 7 9 - 8 1 .  104 D e v l i n , pp. 96 and 9 8 . 1  °' See Hart, 5  (1963).  p. 82.  i n d i v i d u a l i s t though he coupled t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m w i t h a theory that l e d to p o l i t i c a l a b s o l u t i s m . ical  Kant's categor-  imperative was a l s o based on the r a t i o n a l nature o f an  individual. and  1 0 6  But i t i s w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n s , Jeremy Bentham  John S t u a r t M i l l ,  t h a t Hart f i n d s the s t r o n g e s t  thought c o n c e r n i n g the v a l u e o f the i n d i v i d u a l .  "Bentham's  l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y i s an u t i l i t a r i a n i n d i v i d u a l i s m . individualism  bond o f  His  i n s p i r e d h i s numerous and v i g o r o u s l e g i s l a t i v e  e f f o r t s , a l l d i r e c t e d towards the emancipation o f the i n d i v i dual from the many c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s and i n i q u i t i e s which impeded, i n England a t any r a t e , the f r e e p l a y o f f o r c e s t h a t was to give  full  scope to i n d i v i d u a l development.  Bentham measured the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t i n terms o f p a i n and p l e a s u r e and b e l i e v e d consisted  t h a t the i n t e r e s t o f the community  o f a sum o f the i n t e r e s t s o f a l l the i n d i v i d u a l s i n  t h a t community.  Hart a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t the cumulative r e s u l t  o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom w i l l  be the good o f the community and he  adopts "the c r i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , c e n t r a l to a l l m o r a l i t y ,  that  1 Oft  human misery and the r e s t r i c t i o n o f freedom are e v i l s . " John S t u a r t M i l l ,  b a s i c a l l y an i n d i v i d u a l i s t , t r i e d to r e c o n c i l e  i n d i v i d u a l and community i n t e r e s t by f o r m u l a t i n g of l i b e r t y . 1 0 6  We have seen how i n e v i t a b l e c o n f u s i o n and paradox  1 0 9  Hobbes,  "Leviathan".  1 07 'Friedmann, "Legal Theory", p. 312. 1 0 8  Hart See  hisprinciple  (1963),  p. 8 2 .  p r e v i o u s p. 9»  110 arise  out o f t h i s attempt to r e c o n c i l e such opposing  Hart i n h e r i t s  these problems when he a p p l i e s M i l l ' s  values. principle  to the q u e s t i o n o f enforcement o f morals. A third traditional H a r t - D e v l i n debate.  c o n f l i c t can be i d e n t i f i e d i n the  I t can be b r o a d l y l a b e l l e d  o f F a i t h and Reason o r narrowly l a b e l l e d Intuition  as the c o n f l i c t  as a dichotomy between  and I n t e l l e c t . "Time and a g a i n b e l i e f i n the power o f reason has been f o l l o w e d by d i s t r u s t o f reason and corresponding f a i t h i n i n s t i n c t . I n t e l l e c t i s pitched against i n t u i t i o n , r e f l e c t i o n against l i f e . In p h i l o s o p h y , the r a t i o n a l i s m o f the e i g h t e e n t h and the p o s i t i v i s m o f the n i n e t e e n t h century a n a l y s i n g l i f e and t h i n k i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , a c c o r d i n g to the p r i n c i p l e o f c a u s a l i t y , have been f o l l o w e d by a widespread r e v o l u tion. I t s battle cry i s i n s t i n c t rather than i n t e l l e c t , the i n n e r meaning o f t h i n g s , r a t h e r than t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , the t o t a l i t y o f l i f e i n i t s meaning and v a l u e r a t h e r than the a n a l y s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l phenomena a c c o r d i n g to cause and e f f e c t . " 1 1 2 1 1 1  This t r a d i t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t whether law i s p r i m a r i l y a matter o f  i n t e l l e c t o r i n t u i t i o n i s present i n the H a r t - D e v l i n debate. D e v l i n ' s t h e o r y depends upon a h i s t o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n  between  knowledge and b e l i e f and between t h i n k i n g and p o s t u l a t e s . rejects  the optimism o f n i n e t e e n t h century thought  t h i n g i s capable o f b e i n g known and understood mind.  He  t h a t every-  by the human  Hart, i n comparison, has more confidence i n r a t i o n a l i t y  and the a b i l i t y o f the human mind to make deductive d e c i s i o n s  See previous p. 14. Ill Friedmann, "Legal Theory", pp.  83-85.  about c r i t i c a l m o r a l i t y .  By l o g i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f M i l l ' s  p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y , Hart argues be reached.  t h a t c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s can  He goes i n t o a n a l y t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f terms  such as "harm to o t h e r s " , " p a t e r n a l i s m " and "the enforcement of  m o r a l i t y " to show t h a t the p r i n c i p l e can be l o g i c a l l y  a p p l i e d to a s e t o f f a c t s . one  Hart h i m s e l f has remarked t h a t  J  o f the popular meanings o f " p o s i t i v i s m " i s "the c o n t e n t i o n  that a l e g a l  system i s a 'closed l o g i c a l system' i n which  c o r r e c t l e g a l d e c i s i o n can be deduced by l o g i c a l means from predetermined  l e g a l r u l e s without r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l aims,  p o l i c i e s , moral s t a n d a r d s . " ^ 1 1  is  In c o n t r a s t , D e v l i n ' s theory  e m p i r i c a l to some extent as i t i s based  upon the a v a i l -  a b i l i t y o f evidence o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n and y e t he wants p u b l i c 115  o p i n i o n to be shaped by an u l t i m a t e metaphysical a u t h o r i t y .  J  He could be l a b e l l e d as a n a t u r a l lawyer because o f h i s hope t h a t moral r u l e s w i l l be d e r i v e d from b e l i e f i n God. his  political  However  theory l e a d s him t o r e j e c t the i d e a t h a t moral  v a l u e s a c q u i r e d by r e l i g i o u s f a i t h ought to be e n f o r c e d . to  Due  p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f l o c a t i n g a s o v e r e i g n and the  fallibility  o f i n d i v i d u a l human beings, he argues  that only  those moral b e l i e f s h e l d s t r o n g l y by p u b l i c o p i n i o n ought t o be enforced.  Hart on the o t h e r hand avoids a metaphysical  __  (1963), pp. 38-43. V o l . 71, 593 a t 601.  See f o r example Hart  S.958  1:L  U5  Harvard L.R.  n a t u r a l law b a s i s f o r d e c i d i n g upon moral r u l e s . book "The Concept o f Law"  In h i s  he a s s e r t s t h a t the n a t u r a l law  d o c t r i n e " c o n t a i n s c e r t a i n elementary t r u t h s of importance f o r the understanding o f both m o r a l i t y and law.  These we  shall  endeavour to d i s e n t a n g l e from t h e i r m e t a p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g and 116 r e s t a t e here i n s i m p l e r terms."  I t i s not c l e a r  whether  Hart d e r i v e s h i s moral v a l u e s by n o n - c o g n i t i v e or n a t u r a l i s t ethical methods.  1 1 7  To c l a s s i f y the v a l u e s o f Hart and D e v l i n  i n t o e t h i c a l s c h o o l s o f thought would i n v o l v e a complete study i n i t s e l f and w i l l not be undertaken i n t h i s paper. whatever may  However  be the method by which Hart d e r i v e s moral r u l e s ,  he c e r t a i n l y r e l i e s upon l o g i c and a r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e when t r y i n g to decide which moral r u l e s ought to be e n f o r c e d . a n a l y s i s o f the debate l e a d s me  to conclude that  a choice between moral v a l u e s cannot r e s t  My  ultimately  upon r e a s o n .  In the  words o f O l i v e r Wendell Holmes, " I t i s t r u e that b e l i e f s and wishes have a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l b a s i s i n the sense t h a t foundation i s a r b i t r a r y .  their  You cannot help e n t e r t a i n i n g and  f e e l i n g them, and t h e r e i s an end o f i t . " w h i l e d i s c u s s i n g the t h e o r i e s o f Radbruch, c l u s i o n that " l e g a l r e l a t i v i s m  1  1  8  Also  Friedmann,  comes to the con-  i s t h e r e f o r e concerned w i t h the  u l t i m a t e meaning of l e g a l systems but does not see i t s task i n  Hart, "The Concept o f Law", p. 184. 117 'For d i f f e r e n t e i t h i c a l schools o f thought see Ekman, "Readings i n the Problems o f E t h i c s " , Frankena " E t h i c s " o r Hospers "An I n t r o d u c t i o n to P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s " . 118 Holmes, 32 Harvard L.R., (1918), p. 40.  s u g g e s t i n g a choice between o p p o s i t e v a l u e s .  This c h o i c e i s  a matter f o r personal d e c i s i o n s ; a matter not of s c i e n c e but of  conscience.  R e l a t i v i s m does not evade p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s , 119  but does not wish to g i v e them a s c i e n t i f i c Radbruch h i m s e l f s a i d "I have no f e a r of antinomies,  cloak".  irreconcilable  to decide o n e s e l f i s to l i v e ! " ° 1 2  and philosophy can r e v e a l these antinomies, a c h o i c e between them. of  y  Legal science  but cannot  indicate  T h i s does not amount to an abandonment  the search f o r a h i e r a r c h y of v a l u e s .  I t j u s t means that  the h i e r a r c h y of a b s o l u t e v a l u e s cannot be demonstrated scientifically.  However i t i s v i t a l l y important  t h a t the  c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s are s t r i p p e d to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e cores by scientific  i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n every case before d e c l a r i n g t h a t  the c o n f l i c t i s beyond s c i e n t i f i c  settlement.  The  school o f  Reason has not t r a d i t i o n a l l y argued that l o g i c and s c i e n c e are u s e l e s s i n moral matters,  r a t h e r t h a t they are i n c o n c l u s i v e .  T h e r e f o r e i n the next s e c t i o n , I w i l l endeavour to examine whether an a n a l y s i s o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s can a s s i s t i n choosing between the v a l u e s o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom and To begin with, can we of  throw any l i g h t  social upon the  i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n our modern s o c i e t y ?  understanding  o f our own  importance  I t seems t h a t an  v a l u e s w i l l give us a deeper i n s i g h t  ___  i n t o the process of d e c i s i o n making than w i l l Friedmann, p.  cohesion.  the  192.  120  Radbruch, 3 Annaire de l ' i n s t i t u t p h i l o s o p h i c du d r o i t , p. 1 6 2 .  international  de  e x p o s i t i o n o f general moral p r i n c i p l e s . are w r i t e r s such as Herbert M a r c u s e  1 2 1  On the one  hand  there  s a y i n g that today the  minds of most people have been so manipulated by modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s and  communications t h a t m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n i s no  l o n g e r l i k e l y to r e f l e c t t r u t h or j u s t i c e . o f the c o i n , i t i s p o i n t e d dom  On the other  side  out t h a t the c l i m a t e of moral f r e e -  has l e d to u n w i l l i n g n e s s  to enforce moral r u l e s upon  i n d i v i d u a l s f o r "to c l a i m i n f a l l i b i l i t y f a n a t i c i s m ; to impose our own  values  i s to take the path of  on others makes us  zealots  122 and  tyrants."  In an age  our nerve to impose our  of moral r e l a t i v i s m we  concept o f "the t r u t h " upon  c o n v i c t i o n s are o n l y another l i m p i d personal "How  can we  often lose others—our  p o i n t of view.  r e s o l v e our d i f f e r e n c e s when the assurance of  c o g n i t i v e or moral c e r t i t u d e i s o n l y an i l l u s i o n f a t h e r e d a wish?"  1 2 3  Both s i d e s o f the debate continue to be  by  argued  p o l i t i c a l l y without apparent r e s o l u t i o n . The  broader i s s u e o f the H a r t - D e v l i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom and o f t e n been d i s c u s s e d d o c t r i n e and  social control,  h i s t o r i c a l l y both i n terms o f  s p e c i f i c values.  p r a c t i c a l question,  debate, namely, the  John Stuart M i l l  general  said,  "the  where to place the l i m i t - - h o w to make the  f i t t i n g adjustment between i n d i v i d u a l independence and 121  Herbert Marcuse, "A C r i t i q u e o f Pure (Beacon Book). 122  has  social  Tolerance",  Joseph Tussman, " O b l i g a t i o n of the Body P o l i t i c " , p. I b i d . , p.  115.  114.  c o n t r o l — i s a s u b j e c t on which n e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g remains to 124 be done."  Law  and m o r a l i t y have always endeavoured to  these twin g o a l s — p u b l i c the m a j o r i t y  o f men  and  private interest.  serve  Historically,  have been w i l l i n g to emphasise s o c i a l  c o n t r o l above t h e i r d e s i r e f o r freedom as r e l a t i v e s o c i a l peace and We  s t a b i l i t y are obvious p r e c o n d i t i o n s  to i n d i v i d u a l freedom.  u s u a l l y d e s i r e p u b l i c s e c u r i t y as a means to the  a c q u i s i t i o n o f p r i v a c y and  freedom.  T h i s i s a symptom of  b a s i c Hobbesian f e a r - * f e x p l o i t a t i o n by those who 1 2  0  powerful.  And  here we  f i n d a v a r i a b l e which w i l l  i n f l u e n c e the onus of p r o v i n g harm. n e c e s s a r y to rebut  freedom and prevalent  The  to s o c i a l  with  conditions.  i d e a l balance between the v a l u e s  In  of i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i a l a u t h o r i t y s h i f t s i n emphasis depending upon  social  conditions.  t h a t s o c i a l d i s a s t e r may We  directly  evidence of harm  Thus i n extreme s o c i a l  i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s r e s t r i c t e d where there  freedom.  our  are more  the presumption o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g other words, the  later  conditions,  is a possibility  r e s u l t from the e x e r c i s e o f t h a t  are w i l l i n g to accept l e s s e m p i r i c a l evidence of  harm.  S t r i c t censorship  d u r i n g war  i s an obvious example.  recent  example i s the a c t i o n o f the Canadian government r e s t r i c t -  i n g i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y by l e g i s l a t i o n i n order  to suppress  a c t i v i t i e s o f a s e p a r a t i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n known as the P.L.Q. 124~ M i l l , "On Liberty;• p.  125  pp.  68.  Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan." I83-I88.  P e l i c a n Ch.  XIII,  A  the  The  words o f the preamble o f the emergency r e g u l a t i o n s  s i m i l a r t o the s p i r i t o f D e v l i n ' s  ° are  a r g u m e n t ? t h a t s o c i e t y has  a r i g h t to preserve ideas and moral Whereas i t continues i n Canada t h a t men and f r e e o n l y when freedom f o r moral and s p i r i t u a l 1aw;...  12  values: to be r e c o g n i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n s remain i s founded upon r e s p e c t values and the r u l e o f  And whereas the Government o f Canada d e s i r e s to ensure t h a t l a w f u l and e f f e c t i v e measures can be taken a g a i n s t those who thus seek to destroy the b a s i s o f our democratic governmental system, on which the enjoyment o f our human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms i s founded, and to ensure the continued p r o t e c t i o n o f those r i g h t s and freedoms i n Canada. Therefore, H i s E x c e l l e n c y the Governor G e n e r a l - i n - C o u n c i l , on the recommendation o f the Prime M i n i s t e r , pursuant to the War Measures Act, i s pleased hereby t o make the annexed r e g u l a t i o n s t o provide emergency powers f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f p u b l i c order i n Canada. I t has been argued t h a t s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s generat i o n profoundly placed  i n f l u e n c e d the emphasis which M i l l  himself  upon i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . The e a r l i e r U t i l i t a r i a n s d i d n o t regard l i b e r t y as the most important means l e a d i n g to s o c i a l happiness. The change i n John S t u a r t M i l l i s i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the l i g h t o f the p o l i t i c a l developments o f the time. The e l d e r U t i l i t a r i a n s had been w a r r i n g a g a i n s t p r i v i l e g e and the s i n i s t e r i n t e r e s t s o f the few. They c o u l d e a s i l y persuade themselves t h a t s o c i a l d i s t r e s s and p o l i t i c a l abuses were the work o f those m i n o r i t i e s whom they were 12~fS War Measures Act, P u b l i c Order Regulations,  October 1 6 . 127 See  d i s c u s s i o n on pp. 3-4.  1970,  attacking. But M i l l wrote a t a time when much o f t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e work was done, when i t was becoming apparent t h a t the t a k i n g away o f unjust p r i v i l e g e s from m i n o r i t i e s d i d not o f i t s e l f give s o c i a l happiness. Power had passed from an o l i g a r c h y to a democracy and now the U t i l i t a r i a n s saw t h a t the democ r a t i c government i n t e r f e r e d w i t h l i b e r t y not l e s s but more than formerly."128 D e v l i n a l s o notes that an emphasis upon one value may be a product o f the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f one p a r t i c u l a r g e n e r a t i o n . About M i l l , D e v l i n says "His admonitions were addressed to a s o c i e t y which was secure and s t r o n g and hidebound. r e p e t i t i o n today i s to a s o c i e t y much l e s s s o l i d .  Their As a t r a c t  f o r the times, what M i l l wrote was superb, but as dogma i t has 1 2 9  l o s t much o f i t s appeal."  I agree w i t h L i n d s a y  y  t h a t t h e o r i e s o f t e n r e f l e c t the p o l i t i c a l of the age i n which they were w r i t t e n . and  Devlin's  and D e v l i n  o r s o c i a l problems  Then which o f Hart's  t h e o r i e s i s most a p p l i c a b l e to modern s o c i e t y ?  Are we i n a g e n e r a t i o n  c o n t i n u a l l y threatened  with  conformity  and massive i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h p r i v a c y and freedom o r a r e we i n an age where c h e r i s h e d being  t r a d i t i o n a l values  and a u t h o r i t y a r e  undermined by an undue emphasis upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom? i o n  There a r e numerous w r i t e r s , analyse s o c i a l  ills  J  both modernxand a n c i e n t ,  who  under one o r the other o r a s u b t l e v a r i a t i o n  o f these two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . The next chapter s e t s out an 128 A.D. L i n d s a y , I n t r o d u c t i o n to John S t u a r t M i l l , " U t i l i t a r i a n s i m , L i b e r t y and Representative Government, (p.xv), See a l s o Hart (1963), p. 32. 129 ^ D e v l i n , p. 122. 130 and  For modern examples, see w r i t i n g s o f Herbert Marcuse Joseph Tussman.  attempt to choose between the v a l u e s o f D e v l i n and Hart i n the l i g h t o f modern s o c i a l phenomena and the present p o p u l a r value response to the problem o f p o l l u t i o n .  I have chosen  examples where i t would seem to be obvious t h a t  individual  freedom ought to be subordinated to p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  Then I  w i l l attempt to e x t r a c t a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e from the examples.  IRREVERSIBLE DISASTER ARGUMENT Is i t p o s s i b l e today to envisage  s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which  would a l t e r Hart's b a s i c value p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom?  Can we  s u c c e s s f u l l y argue t h a t Hart's v a l u e  preference  f o r i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s u n r e a l i s t i c and open to q u e s t i o n i n our modern-day s i t u a t i o n ?  The  Quebec M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e ,  Jerome Choquette, i s an example of a person whose emphasis upon one value a p p a r e n t l y changed due  to p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s .  Taking o f f i c e as a champion of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, Choquette i s r e p o r t e d as now liberal.  s a y i n g , "I remain a l i b e r a l ,  but a r e a l i s t i c  Democracy has to f i n d a p p r o p r i a t e means to  defend  i t s e l f a g a i n s t organized crime and t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y ,  and  i f we're not r e a l i s t i c enough to r e a l i s e that s i t u a t i o n ,  and  i f we want to keep p r e a c h i n g Great P r i n c i p l e s o f Freedom of the I n d i v i d u a l , then we're m i s s i n g the p o i n t . "^O the present a n a l y s i s , Choquette would now evidence  j - terms of n  require less empirical  o f harm than p r e v i o u s l y i n o r d e r to j u s t i f y an  ment upon the c h e r i s h e d value of i n d i v i d u a l L e t us look by way environmental  control.  of analogy  encroach-  freedom.  a t the p h y s i c a l problem o f  In t h i s chapter, I take a stand w i t h  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n a t t i t u d e s p u r e l y f o r the purpose of a n a l y s i s i n an attempt to f i n d a c l e a r p r i n c i p l e i n which moral freedom i s subordinated to other v a l u e s .  _  individual P o l l u t i o n i s an  The P r o v i n c e , Newspaper, Vancouver, 2 3 r d  January,  example of how  an a t t i t u d e  of l a i s s e z - f a i r e has  a popular demand f o r c o n t r o l an  of i n d i v i d u a l s .  i d e n t i f i a b l e swing i n the v a l u e s held by  use  to c o n t r o l  of the  disposal  environment.  the m a j o r i t y .  to the whole of human l i f e .  deterioration  individual  The  consequences of p o l l u t i o n w i l l But  o n l y when the  reaches d i s a s t e r p r o p o r t i o n s are  f i n a l l y prompted to take any  eco-  r e s u l t i s a threatened upheaval  take years of d e d i c a t e d work to r e p a i r . ecological  The  f a i l u r e of  of waste m a t e r i a l s and  The  into  T h i s amounts to  l o g i c a l d i s a s t e r of p o l l u t i o n r e s u l t s from the society  changed  a c t i o n to impose r e s t r a i n t s  we and  to r e p a i r the wreckage to n a t u r e . The for  f a c t of p o l l u t i o n continued before our very eyes  years--but we  w e r e ' e i t h e r unaware of the  to impose r e s t r a i n t s on  individual disposal  these r e s t r a i n t s would be  too  difficult.  expediency, freedom of commerce and v a l u e s , the for  ecological  d e c l i n e was  each i n d i v i d u a l to s o l v e and  f y i n g government i n t e r v e n t i o n . all  to show that  initially  t h i n g e l s e than our  For  the  sake  The  only d i f f i c u l t y  of  impose  decline  feelings.  empirical  justi-  i s that  same beaches and  we  enjoy  the  evidence  causes harm to anyI t i s only l a t e r  e c o l o g i c a l l y speaking, the l a c k of r e s t r a i n t of one affect  because  r e a l l y as a problem  There i s l i t t l e  senses and  practices  refused  c l a s s i f i e d as a problem  not  ecological  or  u n w i l l i n g n e s s to  breathethe same a i r , swim at the  same b e a u t i e s of n a t u r e .  decline  that,  person w i l l  another. It  foresight  i s b e i n g wise a f t e r the  event to say now  that s u f f i c i e n t  coupled w i t h determined r e s t r a i n i n g a c t i o n would have  at l e a s t l e s s e n e d the  disasters  of e c o l o g i c a l  pollution.  Some  would say t h a t p o l l u t i o n i s a necessary by-product progressive i n d u s t r i a l society. by-product  However, when the necessary  t h r e a t e n s our enjoyment of l i f e ,  v e r y e x i s t e n c e of one  important  of our  and t h r e a t e n s the  human v a l u e , then i t i s time  to re-arrange our s c a l e of v a l u e s .  Even a person who  has  i n d i v i d u a l freedom a t the top o f h i s h i e r a r c h y of values would a l s o have a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s somewhere on h i s s c a l e .  Now  if  c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t i e s are threatened, not o n l y w i t h damage, but with e x t i n c t i o n or i r r e v e r s i b l e harm, then the h i e r a r c h y o f v a l u e s ought to be a l t e r e d t e m p o r a r i l y .  Thus the  i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r theory c a l l s f o r some r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s , d e s p i t e p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s and d e s p i t e the l a c k of e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove t h a t the harm w i l l irreversible.  We w i l l d i s c u s s l a t e r the problem of who  the a u t h o r i t y to c l a s s i f y the f a c t s .  be  has  J  The words spoken by the advocates  f o r environmental  c o n t r o l have a s u r p r i s i n g s i m i l a r i t y to words and  phrases  embodied i n D e v l i n ' s essays and repeat h i s argument i n a d i f f e r e n t context.  "An e t h i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , i s a d i f f e r e n -  t i a t i o n o f s o c i a l from a n t i - s o c i a l conduct. cally,  An e t h i c  ecologi-  i s a l i m i t a t i o n on freedom of a c t i o n i n the s t r u g g l e  f o r e x i s t e n c e . . . . A l l e t h i c s so f a r evolved r e s t upon a s i n g l e premise  t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s a member of a community o f  dependent p a r t s .  See  p.64.  inter-  His i n s t i n c t s prompt him to compete f o r h i s  p l a c e i n the community, but h i s e t h i c s prompt him t o co-operate perhaps i n order that The  t h e r e may be a p l a c e t o compete f o r . "  p o s s i b i l i t y o f i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r does e x i s t i n our  s o c i e t y more than i t d i d i n the p a s t . and  1 3 2  intensity of l i f e  "...Given the d e n s i t y  i n the modern c i t y one simply cannot  l e a v e the r o l e o f nature and the o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f green p l a c e s  to chance o r to the p r i v a t e  domain." 33  r e l y i n g absolutely  r i g h t s or p r i n c i p l e s .  on b a s i c  1  We are warned a g a i n s t "...The  r i g h t to p o l l u t e has become a major p h i l o s p h i c a l and l e g a l assumption; we tend to r e q u i r e  detailed  s c i e n t i f i c proof of  d i r e c t , p e r s o n a l damage t o man as a p r e r e q u i s i t e considering  f o r even  r e s t r i c t i o n o f any r i g h t to p o l l u t e . " ^ 1 3  We have  seen how D e v l i n ' s t h e s i s makes s i m i l a r o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the moral realm.  For example, " I f we are n o t e n t i t l e d t o c a l l our  society  ' f r e e ' unless we pursue freedom t o an extremity  would make s o c i e t y  that  i n t o l e r a b l e f o r most o f us, then l e t us  s t o p short o f the extreme and be content w i t h some o t h e r name. The  r e s u l t may not be freedom u n a l l o y e d , but there a r e a l l o y s  which s t r e n g t h e n without c o r r u p t i n g . " of ecological  J  J  O f t e n we hear warnings  " d i s i n t e g r a t i o n " u n l e s s r e s t r a i n t s a r e imposed.  "We w i l l go down i n h i s t o r y as an elegant t e c h n o l o g i c a l s t r u c k down by b i o l o g i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n 132  for lack  society  of ecological  "Challenge f o r S u r v i v a l 1968—Land, A i r and Water f o r Man i n M e g a l o p o l i s , " e d . P i e r r e Dansereau, p. 43. 133 ^ I b i d . , p. 66. 1 3 4  Ibid.,  p. 160.  135 Devlin,  p. 123.  understanding."  J  The popular argument continues t h a t as  environmental  c o n t r o l i s not an exact s c i e n c e , we must e r r on the s i d e o f l i m i t a t i o n o f freedom to p o l l u t e . unnecessary  T h i s e r r o r w i l l mean some  l i m i t a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom u n t i l our under-  s t a n d i n g and knowledge i n c r e a s e s .  Can we  argue i n the same  manner f o r enforcement of moral standards?  That i s to ask  "Is the value p r e f e r e n c e as p o p u l a r l y embodied i n the d r i v e a g a i n s t p o l l u t i o n a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to the moral realm?" would immediately  answer "no".  b l a t a n t and all-encompassing.  Hart  However t h i s answer i s too There are circumstances when  even Hart would want to answer "yes" but he then c l o a k s such cases under the p r i n c i p l e o f harm to o t h e r s .  The  popular  argument continues t h a t because m o r a l i t y i s not an exact s c i e n c e we must a c c o r d i n g l y ( i n times o f threatened d i s a s t e r ) e r r i n f a v o u r of the value o f s o c i a l  cohesion w i t h some  unnecessary  l i m i t a t i o n s upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom u n t i l our moral unders t a n d i n g and knowledge i n c r e a s e s . f a c t o r i s t h a t we  However one d i s c o u r a g i n g  do not seem to be capable o f a c q u i r i n g and  then p a s s i n g on to succeeding generations a l a s t i n g moral unders t a n d i n g to which we pay more than l i p - s e r v i c e .  Each  genera-  t i o n s t r u g g l e s to a c q u i r e i t s own moral c o n v i c t i o n s by a p a i n f u l process o f t r i a l  and  error.  "Challenge f o r S u r v i v a l " , p.  154.  Where a change has the tendency to be d i s a s t r o u s i r r e v e r s i b l e , i t i s obvious t h a t we  ought to take care  t h a t change take p l a c e .  where there  t h a t a change w i l l  Therefore,  Here I am  lest  i s a danger  be the b e g i n n i n g of the r o t — o r the  step i n undermining a value which i s b a s i c to the o f human l i f e , we  or  first  enjoyment  ought to take steps to prevent t h a t change.  attempting to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between harm  i r r e v e r s i b l e harm o r d i s a s t e r .  Harm, i n t h i s context,  and is  the n e c e s s a r y e v i l which r e s u l t s from a p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n o f c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n s from conduct considered t o l e r a t i o n does not threaten  r e q u i r e t h a t you  to be good.  l e a d to the eventual  how  do you  before  "Who  distinguishes  d i s t i n g u i s h between t o l e r a b l e harm and i r r e v e r s d i f f e r e n c e w i l l always be a matter  In a d i s a s t e r s i t u a t i o n , i t i s important to be wise  the e v e n t — e s p e c i a l l y as i n a world which i s an  v i l l a g e i t w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t d i s a s t e r without i n c u r a b l e deformity. obscenity,  reasons i n s i m i l a r terms.  urban  to emerge from a  Dworkin, while d i s c u s s i n g "...At some p o i n t i n the  d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f community standards the m a j o r i t y w i l l  not  o b j e c t to f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n , but  the  corruption's tion.  may  d e s t r u c t i o n of a concept o f goodness.  i b l e harm or d i s a s t e r ? " The of degree.  of what i s  I r r e v e r s i b l e harm i s conduct which  N a t u r a l l y t h i s " d e f i n i t i o n " begs the q u e s t i o n and  But  t o l e r a t e d e v i a t i o n s which  the l i k e l i h o o d of the very e x i s t e n c e  considered  to be good.  success,  that i s a mark of  not proof t h a t there has  been no  corrup-  I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y which makes i t impera-  t i v e t h a t we  enforce  our standards w h i l e we  still  have them.  T h i s i s an e x a m p l e — i t  i s not the o n l y o n e — o f our w i s h i n g the 137  law to p r o t e c t us from o u r s e l v e s . " ' J  Although I agree  with  t h i s general p r i n c i p l e c o n c e r n i n g the p r e v e n t i o n of i r r e v e r s i b l e harm, i t s use i n p r a c t i c e w i l l versy.  cause i n e v i t a b l e c o n t r o -  Each i n d i v i d u a l , group or m a j o r i t y w i l l  decide upon  the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and  beliefs. In  the area o f morals, Hart says t h a t s o c i e t y  will  continue to e x i s t i f c e r t a i n core m o r a l i t y changes; people will  go on l i v i n g .  However, the q u a l i t y of t h e i r  may  be i r r e v e r s i b l y lowered  man  who  by the change.  We  life-style  understand  the  says "I am prepared to take the dangerous s t e p of  making a d e c i s i o n to enforce t h i s moral r u l e thereby p l u g g i n g one  hole i n the l e a k y dam  of m o r a l i t y . "  The  concept of p r e s e r -  v a t i o n by enforcement of t h a t which i s v a l u a b l e i s r e f l e c t e d i n the Interim Report of the LeDain C o m m i s s i o n .  138  "The  s o c i e t y to p r o t e c t i t s e l f from c e r t a i n kinds o f harm.  r i g h t of Without  e n t e r i n g i n t o the d i s t i n c t i o n between law and m o r a l i t y , we  also  s u b s c r i b e to the general p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s o c i e t y has a r i g h t to  use the c r i m i n a l law to p r o t e c t i t s e l f from harm which t r u l y  t h r e a t e n s i t s e x i s t e n c e as a p o l i t i c a l l y ,  s o c i a l l y and econom-  i c a l l y v i a b l e o r d e r f o r s u s t a i n i n g a c r e a t i v e and process of human development and 1 3 7  D w o r k i n , 75 Para.  443.  democratic  self-realization."  Yale L . J . (1966) 986 at p.  1004.  It i s d i f f i c u l t  t o determine when a t o l e r a t e d  immorality  w i l l begin the r o t o r break the back o f a p r e v a l e n t moral value.  And although t o l e r a n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l d e v i a t i o n i s  i t s e l f a moral v i r t u e , i f t o l e r a n c e i n s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s may l e a d to i r r e v e r s i b l e l o s s o f important moral v a l u e s , then we should not take the r i s k . at  Be i n t o l e r a n t now and thereby  l e a s t one p o s s i b l e means o f d e s t r u c t i o n o f those  prevent  important  v a l u e s which we b e l i e v e t o be e s s e n t i a l t o human f u l f i l l m e n t . D e v l i n d i d not o r i g i n a l l y  ( i n the Maccabaean L e c t u r e )  argue the case f o r enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y i n the express terms o f a v o i d i n g some i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r .  However t h i s i s  the i m p l i c a t i o n o f h i s b a s i c argument t h a t s o c i e t y has the r i g h t to preserve i t s e l f and prevent which are the s t r e n g t h o f s o c i e t y . ^ 1  undermining o f core values T h i s i s an important  l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g which should be argued when c o n s i d e r i n g the q u e s t i o n whether to enforce a c e r t a i n moral r u l e .  However i t  i s one argument amongst others and, as we s h a l l see, does not g i v e d e c i s i v e weight t o e i t h e r s i d e o f the debate. We began by q u e s t i o n i n g the emphasis which Hart  places  upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n the context o f modern s o c i e t y .  Has  D e v l i n ' s o r i g i n a l argument, i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r , c a s t doubts on Hart's v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e ? is  "No"—for  The answer  there a r e s e v e r a l unanswerable o b j e c t i o n s to the  Deviin,  p. 10.  i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the enforcement o f morality. (1) Who  i s to be the P l a t o n i c  judge of which moral  change i s the b e g i n n i n g o f the r o t ? moral change and n e i t h e r the  correctness (2)  do we  We  cannot prevent a l l  want t o — b u t who  i s to  decide  o f the proposed enforcement?  I t can be  argued t h a t  i t i s so important  i n d i v i d u a l freedom remain u n r e s t r i c t e d t h a t we r i s k of i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r .  "Rational  i n s i s t on i n d i v i d u a l moral l i b e r t y and  must run  morality  take the  must  the still  even i f non-enforcement  o f morals i s a t h r e a t to s o c i a l s u r v i v a l , m o r a l i t y c r a c y ) demands that we  that  risk." ^ 1  (or demo-  0  (3) What amounts to a c c e p t a b l e evidence t h a t some i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r w i l l probably occur? problem of whether the  f e e l i n g s of the  This restates common m o r a l i t y  a c c e p t a b l e evidence i n most cases as the d i s a s t e r i s to act q u i c k l y at the But  immediately the  we  f i r s t warning of  the l i k e l i h o o d o f r e a c h i n g that  Hart.  present danger  e v i l threatened to  evil.  should the d i s a s t e r r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n be  i n only our modern s o c i e t y ?  f4~0  deterioration.  t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s upon premature  ought to r e l a t e the g r a v i t y of the  (4) Why  Blackshield See p. 452.  are  essence of p r e v e n t i n g  a c t i o n must be a d d e d — t h e r e must be a c l e a r and and  the  H i s t o r y has  applicable  shown t h a t mankind  i n d i c a t e s a s i m i l a r v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e to  has  s u r v i v e d through c y c l e s of both good and a d i s a s t r o u s moral change has or reformation.  bad moral change,  u s u a l l y been f o l l o w e d by  and  revival  But t h i s i s a k i n d o f moral f a t a l i s m which  p l a c e s us at the whim o f u n p r e d i c t a b l e moral f a s h i o n . seems obvious t h a t we  should  fundamental moral v a l u e s .  at l e a s t attempt to  It  preserve  However someone c o u l d e a s i l y  label  the advocate of the i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r p r i n c i p l e as a prophet of gloom and  doom and p o i n t out the h i s t o r i c f a c t  some sense of d i s a s t e r has  always hovered over s o c i e t y .  P l a t o s a i d "...When I considered I s t u d i e d the p o l i t i c i a n s and  f r i e n d s and  the laws and  an age which had it law  impossibly  customs o f the  i t seemed to me  Nothing could be done without  supporters;  and  Even  a l l t h i s , the more c l o s e l y  and the o l d e r I grew, the most d i f f i c u l t govern r i g h t l y .  that  day, to  trustworthy  these were not easy to come by i n  abandoned i t s t r a d i t i o n a l moral code but  d i f f i c u l t to c r e a t e a new  one.  found  At the same time  and m o r a l i t y were d e t e r i o r a t i n g at an alarming r a t e . . . . (5)  Mill  argues t h a t " i f the claims of  are ever to be a s s e r t e d , the time i s now, wanting to complete the enforced the e a r l i e r stages  t h a t any  stand  uniform  4l  individuality  while much i s s t i l l  assimilation.  It i s only i n  can be s u c c e s s f u l l y made  a g a i n s t the encroachment.... I f r e s i s t a n c e waits reduced n e a r l y to one  n l  till  life  is  type, a l l d e v i a t i o n s from t h a t  type w i l l  come to be considered impious,  monstrous and contary to n a t u r e . "  142  immoral, even • i s using a  Here M i l l  s i m i l a r i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument to j u s t i f y p r e s e r v a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i t y before he has e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t i n d i v i d u a l i t y w i l l probably be destroyed.  Early over-caution  i s more d e s i r a b l e than r e p e n t i n g at l e i s u r e when such important v a l u e as i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s i n v o l v e d . t h a t t h i s attempt  to r a t i o n a l l y  erence can b a c k f i r e .  Thus we  an find  j u s t i f y D e v l i n ' s value p r e f -  The same i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r theory,  i m p l i e d i n D e v l i n ' s essay, i s here used to support the o p p o s i t e s i d e of the the debate.  When a breach of a moral p r i n c i p l e  will  e v e n t u a l l y l e a d to more than harm, such as d i s a s t e r or i r r e v e r s i b l e harm, then j u s t i f i c a t i o n e x i s t s f o r p r e s e r v i n g and e n f o r c i n g one moral value i n p r e f e r e n c e to other v a l u e s .  This  p r i n c i p l e ought to be a p p l i e d , even though there i s l i t t l e e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t the d i s a s t e r or i r r e v e r s i b l e harm w i l l a c t u a l l y eventuate; lowered.  the standard or p r o v i n g harm has been  " B e t t e r to cut out one p o s s i b l y f a u l t y eye than to  r i s k the i r r e v e r s i b l e f i r e s of h e l l " i s a p r i n c i p l e which can be e q u a l l y w e l l a p p l i e d by both Hart and D e v l i n .  Thus although  both Hart and D e v l i n would agree w i t h the i r r e v e r s i b l e  disaster  p r i n c i p l e as I have s e t i t out i n t h i s chapter, each has h i s own  i d e a of when i t ought to be a p p l i e d .  A l l we  can say i s  t h a t D e v l i n , b e i n g l e s s t o l e r a n t toward i n d i v i d u a l d e v i a t i o n ,  John S t u a r t M i l l , p.  105.  would invoke the p r i n c i p l e more o f t e n than Hart. analogous  This i s  to s a y i n g t h a t D e v l i n ' s theory i n v o l v e s e n f o r c i n g  moral r u l e s more o f t e n than Hart's theory.  Thus although I  agree w i t h the p r i n c i p l e , i t does not u l t i m a t e l y help to choose between Hart and D e v l i n .  The  i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument  r a i s e s the debate to another l e v e l but u l t i m a t e l y asks  the  same q u e s t i o n , "When should m o r a l i t y be enforced by means of the law?" At the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s chapter, I asked whether i t i s p o s s i b l e today to envisage s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s which would a l t e r  Hart's b a s i c value p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom? have chosen a category o f extreme s i t u a t i o n s under  I  the'.heading  o f " i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r " and t r i e d to formulate a p r i n c i p l e t h a t would enable a c l e a r non-value choice between v a l u e s . attempt  has proved to be u n s u c c e s s f u l and the p r i n c i p l e  This  can  o n l y be a p p l i e d by u s i n g the same v a l u e s as i t i s meant to distinguish.  A s i m i l a r a s s a u l t can be made upon D e v l i n ' s v a l u e -  p r e f e r e n c e i n the l i g h t o f modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . would take the f o l l o w i n g form.  The  assault  As modern s o c i e t y i s so d i v e r s e  and fragmented i n i t s b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s , a theory which depends upon the e x i s t e n c e of some common b e l i e f s and m o r a l i t y w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y f i n d i n g such b e l i e f s . e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i f D e v l i n ' s statement  This w i l l  be  t h a t no s o c i e t y has y e t  been able to teach morals without r e l i g i o n ^ 1  3  i s correct, for  modern s o c i e t y can c e r t a i n l y be l a b e l l e d as s e c u l a r r a t h e r than r e l i g i o u s .  I t c o u l d then be argued t h a t D e v l i n ' s theory  should not be f o l l o w e d u n t i l t h e r e i s a deep r e l i g i o u s i n our p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y .  revival  I f D e v l i n was once w i l l i n g to  take the r i s k t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n would embody j u s t i c e on a m a j o r i t y o f o c c a s i o n s , he ought not to take t h a t r i s k now p u b l i c o p i n i o n has no u n i t y or d i r e c t i o n .  as  T h i s argument i s  s i m i l a r to the r e a s o n i n g o f Herbert M a r c u s e ^ who 1  says t h a t  the p u b l i c i s no l o n g e r capable of determining i t s own good. Therefore Marcuse, r e m i n i s c e n t o f Rousseau, advocates  t h a t an  i n t e r i m P l a t o n i c e l i t e nought to be empowered to determine and enforce the p u b l i c good u n t i l the p u b l i c i s educated l y to resume a government organized on democratic  sufficient-  principles.  Here the attempt to d i s c r e d i t D e v l i n ' s v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e i n modern s o c i e t y breaks  down f o r a t l e a s t two reasons.  Firstly,  D e v l i n would d i s a g r e e w i t h the a n a l y s i s t h a t a p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y no l o n g e r has some common bonds o f thought o p i n i o n w i l l want to e n f o r c e .  which p u b l i c  T h i s i s the same problem as  e x i s t e d w i t h the i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument, namely t h a t t h e r e i s no a u t h o r i t a t i v e body to c l a s s i f y the f a c t s . Secondly,  D e v l i n c l e a r l y f e e l s t h a t Marcuse's s o l u t i o n o f  empowering a P l a t o n i c e l i t e c o n t a i n s more r i s k s o f i n j u s t i c e  See f o r example Herbert Marcuse "A C r i t i q u e o f Pure Tolerance". See p r e v i o u s p. 64.  than government i n the area of moral enforcement by a d i v e r s e and  wavering p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  Thus the a p p l i c a t i o n of  and  Hart's t h e o r i e s to opposite  and  extreme i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of  modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s does not reduce e i t h e r theory absurdity.  Devlin's  to  CONCLUSION N e i t h e r p a r t y to the debate f i n d s a s i n g l e which w i l l a s s i s t the decision-maker  without  upon u n d e r l y i n g p r i v a t e v a l u e s and a t t i t u d e s .  principle  eventually r e l y i n g The  irreversible  d i s a s t e r theory, although g i v i n g some i n s i g h t i n t o D e v l i n ' s p o s i t i o n , can e q u a l l y w e l l he used to support Hart's arguments. L i k e w i s e , the a n a l y s i s of modern p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y does not e a s i l y produce a p r i n c i p l e which can s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n Devlin's value-preference.  Once a g a i n , the arguments are  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s f o r values a l r e a d y chosen. f i n d a meaningful should p r e v a i l ? "The  The  how  does  p r i n c i p l e to determine which of two  one  values  Friedmann answers i n the f o l l o w i n g manner.  agony o f the d e c i s i o n , the conscious choice between v a l u e s  w h i c h — l i k e the c l a i m to s e c u r i t y from t r e a s o n of the community and the c l a i m to i n d i v i d u a l freedom of and o p i n i o n — h a v e  organized  conscience  equal i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , but have to be a d j u s t e d  i n a concrete s i t u a t i o n — i s the n o b l e s t h e r i t a g e of homo s a p i e n s . L e g a l philosophy can a i d i n the c h o i c e : 146 and  should not e l i m i n a t e i t . "  I b e l i e v e t h a t at a c e r t a i n  stage, a n a l y s i s i s no l o n g e r h e l p f u l .  The  c o n f l i c t i n g values  can o n l y be s t a t e d s e p a r a t e l y and a choice made by Intuition i t s e l f theology.  i s unavoidably  i t cannot  intuition.  a t t a c h e d to psychology  Then i t comes down to a matter o f p o l i t i c a l Friedmann, p.  36k.  and phil-  osophy as to whose i n t u i t i o n ought to be given authority. ^? 1  Hospers, at the  conclusion  abolute  of an a n a l y s i s  modern e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s asks an i d e n t i c a l q u e s t i o n , are we  "How  of then  ever to s e t t l e these disagreements about e t h i c a l f a c t s ,  which may  p e r s i s t even a f t e r there  i s no l o n g e r  any  disagree-  1 48  ment about n o n - e t h i c a l  facts?"  At t h i s p o i n t he r e p l i e s  t h a t u l t i m a t e l y disagreements about s e t t l e d by  i n t u i t i o n though there  -.ethical f a c t s must be  are s e v e r a l important matters  which must be i n v e s t i g a t e d before we  reach that  However, having d e a l t w i t h such f a c t o r s as our  human p r e f e r e n c e s i n our own  conclusion.  "our  personal  behalf, wishful  desires,  thinking,  149  c l e v e r r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s and  the l i k e " ,  we  l e f t w i t h an unsolved c o n f l i c t o f v a l u e s . i n t u i t i o n can we  are  sometimes  Then, o n l y  by  e i t h e r make a d e c i s i o n or s e l e c t an e t h i c a l  o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l school  of thought.  To Hart and  Devlin,  who  p l a c e a s t r o n g emphasis upon e i t h e r the v a l u e of i n d i v i d u a l freedom or s o c i a l c o n t r o l , M i l l ' s words taken from a d i f f e r e n t 150  context seem to be very a p p l i c a b l e . are opposed does one complete f a l s i t y .  J  "Rarely when two  c o n t a i n a l l the t r u t h and  the  views  other  Far more common i s i t to f i n d each view  c o n t a i n i n gSeep a rptrse v io o f u sthed i st cr uu stshi.o.n. ipages n the human 37-43.mind, one-sidedness 148 Hospers, "An p.  Introduction  492. 149 I b i d . , p.  493.  John S t u a r t M i l l , p.  105.  to P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Analysis",  has always been the r u l e and many sidedness the e x c e p t i o n . Hence, even i n r e v o l u t i o n s of o p i n i o n , one p a r t of the t r u t h u s u a l l y s e t s while the other r i s e s . to and  superadd,  f o r the most p a r t o n l y s u b s t i t u t e s , one  incomplete  t r u t h f o r another;  c h i e f l y i n t h i s , t h a t the new more adapted 151 places."  consisting  fragment of t r u t h i s more wanted,  The p a r a d o x i c a l v a l u e s , s o c i a l c o n t r o l and  r e c o n c i l e these two We w i l l ,  individual  e i t h e r e x i s t m e a n i n g f u l l y alone.  Today, the decision-maker  affairs,  improvement  partial  to the needs o f the time than that which i t d i s -  freedom, cannot  to  Even p r o g r e s s , which ought  still  asks "What should I do  values?"  as human beings d e s i r i n g p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i n our  continue to s e a r c h f o r r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s to a s s i s t  the decision-maker.  We  do not want to l e a v e him u n a s s i s t e d or  u n r e s t r i c t e d and yet there i s great d i f f i c u l t y i n p r o v i d i n g him w i t h g u i d e l i n e s o t h e r than our own  personal values.  It i s  not an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason to admit t h i s and then to endeavour to  shape our personal values as they ought to be.  Mill,  "On L i b e r t y " , p.  105.  Commission on Homosexual Offences and P r o s t i t u t i o n , Cmd. No. 247, Wolfenden Report ( A u t h o r i s e d Am. Ed. 1 9 6 3 ) . P a t r i c k D e v l i n - The Enforcement o f Morals U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 5 ) . H.L.A. Hart - Law L i b e r t y and M o r a l i t y H.L.A. Hart - The M o r a l i t y  (London, Oxford  1963,  Vintage Book.  o f the C r i m i n a l Law 1965.  H.L.A. Hart - The Concept o f Law, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  Press.  Dworkin - L o r d D e v l i n and the Enforcement o f Morals,  L . J . 986 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .  75 Yale  Graham Hughes - Morals and C r i m i n a l Law, 71 Y a l e L . J . 662 (1962). Rostow - The Enforcement o f Morals i 9 6 0 Cambridge L . J . 174. H.L.A. Hart - 35 U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago H.L.A. Hart - 71 Harvard Law Review,  1 (1958).  S. Wexler - V o l . 43, Dec. 1968 New York U n i v e r s i t y Law Review A. B l a c k s h i e l d  - 1967 Sydney Law Review V o l . 5, p. 441.  L. F u l l e r - The M o r a l i t y  o f Law.  Thomas Hobbes - L e v i a t h a n , Plato  - The Republic*  Dennis L l o y d J.S. M i l l  Pelican.  Penguin.  - The Idea o f Law, P e l i c a n .  - On L i b e r t y , Everyman's L i b r a r y .  J . Bentham and J.S. M i l l  - The U t i l i t a r i a n s - Dolphin Book.  Wolff, Moore, Marcuse - A C r i t i q u e o f Pure T o l e r a n c e . S o c i a l Contract o f Rousseau, Locke and Hume (ed. Baker). William  K. Frankena - E t h i c s .  Challenge f o r S u r v i v a l 1968 - Land, A i r and Water f o r Man i n M e g a l o p o l i s - ed. P i e r r e Dansereau.  Ronald Dworkin - Taking Rights S e r i o u s l y . Review, December 1 7 , 1970. W. Friedmann - L e g a l Rosalind  The New  York  Theory, F i f t h Ed.  Ekman - Readings i n the Problems o f E t h i c s  John Hospers - An I n t r o d u c t i o n  to P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Analysis.;  

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