UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Privacy law and the media Paton, Elizabeth Katrine 1990

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PRIVACY LAW AND THE MEDIA By ELIZABETH KATRINE PATON BCom/LLB, U n i v e r s i t y of Auckland, 1988 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( F a c u l t y of Law) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1990 0 E l i z a b e t h K a t r i n e Paton, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Lau  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s e x p l o r e s the i s s u e of how t o r e c o n c i l e the v a l u e o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y w i t h t h a t o f freedom of speech. I t argues t h a t t h e r e ought t o be l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t i n v a s i o n o f p r i v a c y by the media, and t h a t such p r o t e c t i o n s h o u l d be seen as complementary t o a system of f r e e e x p r e s s i o n r a t h e r than opposed t o such a system. A d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y i s o u t l i n e d which, i t i s contended, meets the c r i t e r i a f o r a coherent, n e u t r a l d e f i n i t i o n . V a r i o u s reasons f o r v a l u i n g p r i v a c y and i n favo u r of p r o t e c t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of p r i v a c y are i d e n t i f i e d . I t i s argued t h a t l a c k o f p r e c i s i o n i n the normative realm, i n d e f i n i n g w i t h c e r t a i n t y when p r i v a c y i s invaded, should not be an excuse f o r l e a v i n g the i n d i v i d u a l without l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n . There f o l l o w s an examination of the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y a g a i n s t media i n c u r s i o n s i n E n g l i s h , New Zealand, A u s t r a l i a n and Canadian law, oth e r than the c o i n c i d e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d by c e r t a i n common law a c t i o n s . There has been s i g n i f i c a n t j u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of the need t o safeguard p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s , and many i n t e r e s t i n g developments i n r e c e n t y ears are d i s c u s s e d . However, none of the c o u n t r i e s c o n s i d e r e d has y e t developed e f f e c t i v e r e c o u r s e f o r v i c t i m s of unwarranted and i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s . I t i s argued t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r i v a c y and f r e e speech has been wrongly c o n c e p t u a l i s e d , and t h a t i n f a c t both i n t e r e s t s serve the same u n d e r l y i n g s e t of v a l u e s . Problems a r i s e when p r i v a c y and f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s are balanced i n the a b s t r a c t r a t h e r than i n co n t e x t , and when a s i m p l i s t i c view of p r e s s freedom i s adopted i n d i s r e g a r d of the r e a l i t i e s o f the modern mass media. I n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y do not s i g n i f i c a n t l y advance f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s u n l e s s they h e l p t o p r o v i d e the i n f o r m a t i o n needed f o r p u b l i c decision-making. Furthermore, t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n can i n many cases be conveyed without detriment by w i t h h o l d i n g d e t a i l s which d i s c l o s e i d e n t i t y . A t h r e e - s t e p t e s t i s proposed t o determine whether p r i v a c y and f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s can be r e c o n c i l e d without compromise t o e i t h e r of them, or whether i t i s necessary t o balance these i n t e r e s t s i n the con t e x t of the case. I t w i l l a l s o be maintained t h a t a c o n t e x t u a l approach i s p r e f e r a b l e t o the adopti o n of c a t e g o r i e s such as " p u b l i c f i g u r e s " and " p u b l i c p l a c e s " . These concepts tend t o be m i s l e a d i n g , and should be eschewed as a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s , s i n c e they confuse important q u e s t i o n s which r e q u i r e s e p a r a t e a n a l y s i s . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. THE CONCEPT AND VALUE OF PRIVACY 8 3. PRIVACY LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH 3 0 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenants 3 0 U n i t e d Kingdom 32 New Zealand 52 A u s t r a l i a 69 Canada 75 Co n c l u s i o n . 9 6 4. THE MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 97 5. PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC PLACES 129 6. CONCLUSION 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 142 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am ve r y g r a t e f u l f o r the guidance and a d v i c e p r o v i d e d by my s u p e r v i s o r , Dean Pe t e r Burns, and by P r o f e s s o r J o e l Bakan. I a l s o wish t o thank my mother, K a t r i n e Paton, and my f i a n c e , Grant Simpson, f o r t h e i r encouragement and i n t e r e s t , and t h e i r h e l p i n f i n d i n g New Zealand s o u r c e s . 1 CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION Two of the most important v a l u e s i n a modern democratic s o c i e t y are freedom of e x p r e s s i o n and p r i v a c y . Freedom of e x p r e s s i o n has been c a l l e d "the matrix, the i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n of n e a r l y every o t h e r form of freedom". 1 L i k e w i s e i t has been s a i d t h a t p r i v a c y i s " c e n t r a l t o the attainment of i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s under every t h e o r y of the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t has ever captured man's i m a g i n a t i o n " . Both v a l u e s are d e c l a r e d i n major i n t e r n a t i o n a l covenants t o be fundamental human r i g h t s . Each of these v a l u e s i s an aspect of the moral autonomy of the i n d i v i d u a l and e s s e n t i a l t o i n d i v i d u a l s e l f -f u l f i l m e n t . Each of them a l s o has a v i t a l r o l e i n the f u n c t i o n i n g of a system of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . 4 However, f r e q u e n t l y these v a l u e s seem t o be i n c o n f l i c t w i t h each ot h e r , e s p e c i a l l y where the media i s i n v o l v e d . Two examples from a r e c e n t e d i t i o n of the New Zealand Herald w i l l s erve t o i l l u s t r a t e the k i n d s of c o n f l i c t s which o f t e n a r i s e and the way i n which s o c i e t y w i l l sometimes s t r e s s one v a l u e and sometimes the o t h e r . One h e a d l i n e read: 1 Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319 a t 327 (1937), per Cardozo J ; quoted i n Irwin Toy Ltd c Quebec (Procureur General) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577 a t 606 (SCC). 2 Ruth Gavison, " P r i v a c y and the L i m i t s of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421. 3 See p 30 below. 4 See c h a p t e r s 2 and 4. 2 "Counsel r o l e to protect c h i l d from media c i r c u s . " 5 The story was about an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y p u b l i c i s e d custody case involving a c h i l d who, her mother claimed, was molested by her father. On the previous page of the same paper, a t e l e v i s i o n programme was described for which hidden cameras and bugging devices were used to capture on f i l m the underhanded a c t i v i t i e s of a team of roof painters. Both of the sit u a t i o n s described could be seen as r a i s i n g questions about the "rights to privacy" of the in d i v i d u a l s concerned. There was a marked difference i n the public response to the two matters as regards the privacy issues involved. The New Zealand public, as evidenced by l e t t e r s to newspaper e d i t o r s , 6 was indignant at the media coverage of the custody case, e s p e c i a l l y at the p u b l i c a t i o n of photographs of the c h i l d being driven to and from sc h o o l . 7 The judge who set up the Family Court system said that "he was 'sickened' by the way the drama had been paraded i n newspapers and on t e l e v i s i o n and r a d i o " . 1 0 On the 5 New Zealand Herald, 27 February 1990, Section 1, p 20, elaborating on the front page leader. 6 See f o r example the New Zealand Herald, 2 March, 5 March and 9 March 1990. 7 . . . . See "Hilary i n Hiding", Vancouver Sun, 3 March 1990, p A 3 . The New Zealand Family Court placed a ban on any further p u b l i c i t y concerning the proceedings, under the New Zealand Guardianship Act 1968. "Custody cover 'disgraceful'" New Zealand Herald 28 February 1990. Q . . . . "Freedom of speech" i s used i n t h i s thesis synonymously with "freedom of expression". Likewise "freedom of the press" w i l l be used to include the freedom of other media such as broadcasting and f i l m . 3 o t h e r hand, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e was l i t t l e i f any r e a c t i o n from the p u b l i c r e g a r d i n g the methods used t o expose the d i s h o n e s t r o o f p a i n t e r s . From a l e g a l s t a n d p o i n t , both i n s t a n c e s i l l u s t r a t e important and complex q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the c o r r e c t balance between freedom of s p e e c h 1 0 and p r i v a c y . However, i t w i l l be argued i n t h i s t h e s i s t h a t the q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d have been wrongly con c e i v e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e and by law r e form bo d i e s , r e s u l t i n g i n c o n f l i c t b e i n g seen even when t h e r e i s none. Because of an exaggerated and u n c l e a r p e r c e p t i o n of the c o n f l i c t between freedom of speech and p r i v a c y , the Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s have been v e r y h e s i t a n t i n d e v e l o p i n g ways t o e f f e c t i v e l y p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y from media i n v a s i o n s . The balance i s h e a v i l y weighted a g a i n s t p r i v a c y i n the Commonwealth, 1 0 n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the i n c l u s i o n of p r i v a c y r i g h t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s agreements t o which the Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s are p a r t i e s . 1 1 T h i s t h e s i s s e t s out t o i s o l a t e from the debate s u r r o u n d i n g p r i v a c y law the i s s u e s which p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l a t e t o the media. An a l t e r n a t i v e way of approaching the v a l u e s of f r e e speech and p r i v a c y w i l l be proposed which, i t i s b e l i e v e d , w i l l c l a r i f y the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n d e c i d i n g c l a i m s of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y by the media. The t h e s i s i s As may become apparent from v a r i o u s r e f e r e n c e s t h a t w i l l be made t o U n i t e d S t a t e s law, e s p e c i a l l y i n c hapter 5, the s i t u a t i o n i s not much b e t t e r i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , due t o u n n e c e s s a r i l y wide ex c e p t i o n s i n favour of the media. See p 30 below. 4 w r i t t e n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e E n g l i s h common l a w s y s t e m , e s p e c i a l l y i n E n g l a n d , New Z e a l a n d , A u s t r a l i a , a n d C a n a d a . 1 2 I t w i l l b e s e e n t h a t f r e e s p e e c h a n d p r i v a c y h a v e b e e n s e t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o e a c h o t h e r when i n f a c t t h e y r e p r e s e n t two w a y s o f s e r v i n g t h e same s e t o f v a l u e s . T h e q u e s t i o n i s n o t s o much w h i c h o f two i n d e p e n d e n t i d e a l s m u s t b e s a c r i f i c e d , a s b y w h i c h means w i l l t h e g o a l s t h a t u n d e r l i e b o t h p r i v a c y a n d f r e e e x p r e s s i o n b e o p t i m i s e d . O f t e n no s i g n i f i c a n t s a c r i f i c e o f e i t h e r f r e e s p e e c h o r i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y i s n e c e s s a r y . C h a p t e r 2 w i l l e x a m i n e t h e c o n c e p t o f p r i v a c y a n d w i l l a r g u e f o r a m o d i f i e d f o r m o f a d e f i n i t i o n e x p o u n d e d b y R u t h G a v i s o n . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f f e r s a c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t o f p r i v a c y f r e e o f n o r m a t i v e l o a d i n g . P r i v a c y w i l l t h e n b e e x a m i n e d a s a v a l u e , a n d i t s c o n n e c t i o n t o f r e e d o m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i t y w i l l b e e m p h a s i s e d . I t w i l l b e c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e r e a r e r e a s o n s o f p r i n c i p l e a s w e l l a s p o l i c y t o p r o t e c t t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f p r i v a c y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n o r m s o f t h e s o c i e t y i n w h i c h h e o r s h e l i v e s . C o n c e d i n g t h a t some u n c e r t a i n t y r e m a i n s i n i d e n t i f y i n g when a l o s s o f p r i v a c y a m o u n t s t o a n i n v a s i o n , i t w i l l n e v e r t h e l e s s be a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g d e g r e e o f u n c e r t a i n t y d o e s n o t j u s t i f y j u d i c i a l i n a c t i o n i n t h i s a r e a . T h e t h i r d c h a p t e r w i l l e x a m i n e t h e c u r r e n t l e g a l s t a t u s o f p r i v a c y a n d r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t 1 2 F o r c o n v e n i e n c e a n d f o r w a n t o f a b e t t e r t e r m , t h e s e c o u n t r i e s w i l l c o l l e c t i v e l y b e r e f e r r e d t o a s " t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n t r i e s " . No s l i g h t i s i n t e n d e d t o t h e many o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h a t make u p t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h . 1 3 G a v i s o n , s u p r a n 2. 5 c o u n t r i e s as they a f f e c t the media. I t w i l l be seen t h a t the l a s t twenty y e a r s or so has been a time of many s i g n i f i c a n t developments i n t h i s area, but t h a t t h e r e i s s t i l l a l o n g way t o go b e f o r e the i n d i v i d u a l i s e f f e c t i v e l y p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t i l l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e by the media w i t h h i s or her p r i v a t e l i f e . In the f o u r t h chapter, by examining the p o s i t i o n and f u n c t i o n s of the media i n modern s o c i e t y , i t w i l l be demonstrated t h a t an e f f e c t i v e p r i v a c y law does not pose the danger t o f r e e speech t h a t i t s c r i t i c s c l a i m . Furthermore, i t w i l l be argued t h a t the enforcement of a g e n e r a l p r i v a c y t o r t , w i t h an e x c e p t i o n f o r p u b l i c a t i o n of matters of genuine p u b l i c concern, may a c t u a l l y advance the g o a l s of freedom of speech. F i r s t the d i s t i n c t i o n between speech and a c t i o n w i l l be examined, and i t w i l l be seen t h a t p r i v a c y - i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s i n one important r e s p e c t resemble a c t i o n r a t h e r than speech, namely t h a t the harm caused i s i r r e v e r s i b l e . I t w i l l be contended t h a t e x p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t y ought t o be p r o t e c t e d o n l y i n as much as i t r e f l e c t s the reasons f o r v a l u i n g freedom of e x p r e s s i o n . I t w i l l be seen t h a t the same type of reasons are g i v e n f o r a system of f r e e e x p r e s s i o n as f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o balance them a g a i n s t each ot h e r i n the a b s t r a c t ; r a t h e r , a c o n t e x t u a l approach i s c a l l e d f o r . T u r n i n g t o c o n s i d e r the freedom of the p r e s s , i t w i l l be shown how changes i n the media over the course of the l a s t one hundred and f i f t y y e a rs or so have rendered the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l t h e o r y of freedom of the p r e s s s e r i o u s l y 6 d e f i c i e n t . The media serve powerful p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s of a d v e r t i s e r s and l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , and freedom of the p r e s s must be d e f i n e d i n a way t h a t r e f l e c t s the v a l u e s of f r e e speech. I t w i l l be argued t h a t t h e r e i s no f r e e speech i n t e r e s t i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of p r i v a t e matters u n l e s s they are of genuine p u b l i c concern, i n t h a t they c o n t r i b u t e t o p u b l i c d e cision-making. Furthermore, o f t e n f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s can be s a t i s f i e d without any s i g n i f i c a n t harm t o p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s simply by p r e s e r v i n g anonymity. A t e s t w i l l be proposed t o determine whether t h e r e i s a need t o b alance f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s i n the c o n t e x t of the case, or whether o n l y one of t h e s e i n t e r e s t s i s t r u l y a t s t a k e . In chapter 5 , i t w i l l be demonstrated t h a t the c o n t e x t u a l method o u t l i n e d i n chapter 4 i s p r e f e r a b l e t o the use of c a t e g o r i e s such as a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " or " p u b l i c p l a c e " . These two concepts, much used i n American p r i v a c y cases and f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d t o i n d i s c u s s i n g the e x c e p t i o n of p u b l i c a t i o n i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , w i l l be shown t o be u n h e l p f u l and indeed m i s l e a d i n g , c o n f u s i n g t h r e e c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n c t i s s u e s . The t h r e e major o b j e c t i o n s which r e c u r i n d i s c u s s i o n s of p r i v a c y and the media w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s . They have been n e a t l y summarised as f o l l o w s : (1) A d e c l a r a t i o n of a g e n e r a l r i g h t [of p r i v a c y ] would i n t r o d u c e u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t o the law; (2) i t would i n t e r f e r e w i t h freedom of speech; and 7 (3) t h e r e [ i s ] no evidence of a s u b s t a n t i a l wrong r e q u i r i n g t o be r i g h t e d . 1 4 The f i r s t o f these w i l l be countered by the d i s c u s s i o n i n c h a p t e r 2 of the d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y , and by the p r o v i s i o n i n chapter 4 of a c l e a r e r method of a n a l y s i s . The second o b j e c t i o n w i l l c o n f r o n t e d d i r e c t l y i n chapter 4. The t h i r d o b j e c t i o n was adequately r e f u t e d by a d i s s e n t i n g v o i c e i n the Committee i n which i t was r a i s e d . One r e p l y was t h a t : The same argument might have been used i n r e l a t i o n t o the l e g a l remedies of t r e s p a s s , nuisance, and even n e g l i g e n c e . R e l a t i v e l y few people use these each year but they are c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a l p a r t s of the law. Furthermore, "[t]hough the s c a l e of the problem may be s m a l l the consequences f o r the person a f f e c t e d may be c a t a s t r o p h i c " . 1 6 M i n o r i t y Report of D M Ross i n Report of the Committee on Privacy (chairman: Kenneth Younger), Cmnd. 5012, 1972 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the Younger Committee Report), 208. I b i d a t 210. M i n o r i t y Report of A W Lyon i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 14, a t 208. 8 CHAPTER 2  THE CONCEPT AND VALUE OF PRIVACY I n t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e c o n c e p t of " p r i v a c y " i s examined more c l o s e l y . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n has two p u r p o s e s . F i r s t l y , i t p r o v i d e s a w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n o f p r i v a c y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e c h a p t e r s t h a t f o l l o w . S e c o n d l y , i t a t t e m p t s t o b r i e f l y c o u n t e r t h e arguments o f c e r t a i n w r i t e r s t h a t p r i v a c y i s n o t a u s e f u l c o n c e p t i n a l e g a l c o n t e x t . The p o s i t i o n w i l l be t a k e n t h a t p r i v a c y does have coherence as a c o n c e p t , and t h a t t h e t a s k o f h o n i n g t h e d e f i n i t i o n s h o u l d n o t be abandoned t o o q u i c k l y . One p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n w i l l be s u p p o r t e d as o f f e r i n g t h e b e s t a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f p r i v a c y so f a r . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t w i l l be contended t h a t even i f p r i v a c y c o u l d not be t i g h t l y d e f i n e d , t h i s would n o t d i s q u a l i f y p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s f rom t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e law. The c h a p t e r a l s o d i s c u s s e s t h e i n t e r e s t s t h a t u n d e r l i e p r i v a c y , and some o f t h e r e a s o n s why p r i v a c y i s v a l u e d . T h e r e has been a g r e a t d e a l o f d i s c u s s i o n by l e g a l s c h o l a r s and law r e f o r m b o d i e s around t h e c o n c e p t o f p r i v a c y and t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f d e f i n i t i o n . One commentator has l i s t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a f o r an adequate d e f i n i t i o n : (1) t h e d e f i n i t i o n s h o u l d match " o u r s h a r e d i n t u i t i o n s o f when p r i v a c y i s o r i s not g a i n e d or l o s t " , n o t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a c o r e o f (near) u n i v e r s a l agreement and a p e r i p h e r y o f 9 d i s p u t e d or d i s p u t a b l e c a s e s ; 1 (2) the d e f i n i t i o n "should not a r b i t r a r i l y f o r e c l o s e i s s u e s of substance", such as whether p r i v a c y i s a good t h i n g ; and (3) i t s h o u l d comprise the " s i m p l e s t p o s s i b l e s e t of necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s " . 2 I t i s submitted t h a t the a n a l y s i s which b e s t f u l f i l s t h ese c r i t e r i a t o date i s t h a t of Ruth Gavison, i n terms of " l i m i t e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y " . Before examining t h i s d e f i n i t i o n though, some o t h e r attempts t o e n c a p s u l a t e the concept of p r i v a c y w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d . The f o l l o w i n g passage i s p e r t i n e n t t o the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n : " P r i v a c y i s an o r d i n a r y language word, an o r d i n a r y language concept, not a f i n e l y honed p h i l o s o p h i c a l or l e g a l concept. T h i s means t h a t we may w e l l f i n d i ncoherences, i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n the o r d i n a r y concept such t h a t , t o be made a c l e a r , coherent, u s e f u l concept, i t needs t o be c l a r i f i e d , m o d i f i e d , and made t o be such. However, i f t h i s i s done i n a v e r y r a d i c a l way, the new concept may l o s e i t s r e l e v a n c e t o the o r d i n a r y language concept. I suggest t h e r e f o r e t h a t the concept be e x p l i c a t e d as c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e t o the o r d i n a r y usage concept, and then, i f p r i v a c y so understood seems i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s not t o m e r i t , or not t o l e n d i t s e l f t o , l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n and a s s i s t a n c e , t h i s be s a i d " {McCloskey, "Notes R e l a t i n g t o Law Reform Commission Seminar on P r i v a c y " , unpublished, 8 J u l y 1977, 4; quoted i n A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 22, Privacy (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1983) 11}. A r t h u r Schafer, " P r i v a c y : A P h i l o s o p h i c a l Overview" i n Aspects of Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, ed Dale Gibson (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 1 at 4-5. Ruth Gavison, " P r i v a c y and the L i m i t s of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421. P r o f e s s o r Gavison's a n a l y s i s has been r e f e r r e d t o as the "best account" i n Raymond Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, Modern L e g a l S t u d i e s S e r i e s (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980), a t 15; and the "most ambitious attempt t o formulate a coherent concept of p r i v a c y " i n John G Fleming, The Law of Torts (Sydney: Law Book Co L t d , 1987) p 572, n 1. In the a r t i c l e t h a t i n s p i r e d the development of p r i v a c y law i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , 4 Warren and B randeis d i d not venture a d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y , 5 but " o b v i o u s l y f e l t t h a t the term ' p r i v a c y ' was i n i t s e l f a completely adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of the i n t e r e s t t h r e a t e n e d by an untrammeled p r e s s " . 6 They d i d , as P r o f e s s o r B l o u s t e i n p o i n t s out, r e j e c t any i d e a t h a t r e p u t a t i o n , mental d i s t r e s s or p r o p e r t y r i g h t s 7 . were the essence of the a c t i o n , and i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y was a " s p i r i t u a l " wrong r a t h e r than a m a t e r i a l Q one. One of the most w i d e l y quoted d e f i n i t i o n s i s the phrase o r i g i n a l l y used by Judge Cooley, "the r i g h t t o be l e t a l o n e " . * T h i s phrase may do as a l o o s e a l t e r n a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n f o r the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y , but w i l l not s u f f i c e as a d e f i n i t i o n . Not o n l y i s i t vague and i t s e l f i n need of d e f i n i t i o n , but a l s o i t f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h p r i v a c y from Warren and Brandeis, "The R i g h t t o P r i v a c y " (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193. Gavison p o i n t s out t h a t Warren and B randeis "never equated the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y w i t h the r i g h t t o be l e t a l o n e ; the a r t i c l e i m p l i e d t h a t the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i s a s p e c i a l case of the l a t t e r " . Gavison, supra n 3, a t 437; w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Warren and Brandeis, i b i d a t 195. Edward J B l o u s t e i n , " P r i v a c y as an Aspect of Human D i g n i t y : An Answer t o Dean P r o s s e r " , i n Individual and Group Privacy (New Brunswick, New J e r s e y : T r a n s a c t i o n Books, 1978), 9. See B l o u s t e i n , i b i d a t 6-9. Warren and B r a n d e i s , supra n 4, a t 197; r e f e r r e d t o i n B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6, a t 10. T Cooley, Law of Torts, 2nd ed (1888), 29. " n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y " , so i t i s " a t once too broad and too n a r r o w " , 1 0 and f a i l s on the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n . Many suggested d e f i n i t i o n s must be r e j e c t e d on the b a s i s of the second c r i t e r i o n s i n c e , as P r o f e s s o r Gavison notes, they pre-empt important q u e s t i o n s about p r i v a c y , e s p e c i a l l y t h e q u e s t i o n of whether and under what circumstances p r i v a c y i s d e s i r a b l e . 1 1 D e f i n i t i o n s i n terms of a c l a i m , a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e , an area which s h o u l d not be invaded, or a form of c o n t r o l are of t h i s t y p e . 1 2 For example, a well-known d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n by A l a n Westin s t a t e s t h a t p r i v a c y i s "the c l a i m of i n d i v i d u a l s , groups, or i n s t i t u t i o n s t o determine f o r themselves when, how, and t o what e x t e n t i n f o r m a t i o n about them i s communicated t o o t h e r s " . J Not o n l y i s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n n o r m a t i v e l y loaded, but i t has been c r i t i c i s e d f o r not d e a l i n g adequately w i t h v o l u n t a r y d i s c l o s u r e and f o r c e d n o n - d i s c l o s u r e . 1 4 The l a t t e r c r i t i c i s m a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o other d e f i n i t i o n s i n terms of Schafer, supra n 2, a t 6-8. See a l s o Wacks, supra n 3, a t 12-13; Report of the Committee on Privacy (chairman: Kenneth Younger), Cmnd. 5012, 1972 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the Younger Committee Report), 19; Gavison, supra n 3, a t 437-38. See Gavison, supra n 3, a t 425-28. I b i d a t 426. A l a n F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 7. For more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of these c r i t i c i s m s see Gavison, supra n 3, a t 426-28; and Schafer, supra n 2, a t 8-12. For some other comments, see P e t e r Burns, "The Law and P r i v a c y : The Canadian E x p e r i e n c e " (1976) 54 Can Bar Rev 1 a t 7; and Lubor C Velecky, "The Concept of P r i v a c y " i n Privacy, ed John B Young ( C h i c h e s t e r : John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 13 a t 21. c o n t r o l , such as " c o n t r o l over when and by whom the v a r i o u s p a r t s o f us can be sensed by o t h e r s " . 1 5 Faced w i t h such d i f f i c u l t i e s , some have concluded t h a t what we c a l l " p r i v a c y " i s r e a l l y a c o l l e c t i o n of o t h e r i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t i n the absence of such o t h e r i n t e r e s t s t h a t p r i v a c y alone i s of l i t t l e v a l u e . 1 6 The bes t known account of t h i s type i s P r o s s e r ' s a n a l y s i s of American " p r i v a c y " law as comp r i s i n g " f o u r d i s t i n c t k i n d s of i n v a s i o n of f o u r d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s o f the p l a i n t i f f , which are t i e d t o g e t h e r by the common name, but otherwise have almost n o t h i n g i n common.. . . 1 1 1 7 The i n t e r e s t s which P r o s s e r i d e n t i f i e s , namely the i n t e r e s t i n r e p u t a t i o n , the i n t e r e s t i n freedom from mental d i s t r e s s , and a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n e x c l u s i v e use of name and l i k e n e s s , are the ones e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d by Warren and Br a n d e i s , as B l o u s t e i n p o i n t s o u t . 1 8 I t has been demonstrated, a t l e a s t i n r e s p e c t of P r o s s e r ' s f i r s t two t o r t s , i n t r u s i o n and p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of embarrassing f a c t s , t h a t the i n t e r e s t s he i d e n t i f i e s do not i n f a c t adequately e x p l a i n the American c a s e s . 1 9 P r i v a c y s h o u l d not be confused w i t h r e p u t a t i o n or freedom from mental d i s t r e s s . U n l i k e defamation, a p r i v a c y a c t i o n seeks "not merely t o 1 R T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was proposed by R i c h a r d B Parker, i n "A D e f i n i t i o n of P r i v a c y " (1974) 27 Rutger's Law Review 275 a t 281; quoted i n Burns, supra n 14, a t 8. i fi See Gavison, supra n 3, a t 422. 1 7 W i l l i a m L P r o s s e r , " P r i v a c y " (1960) 48 C a l i f L Rev 383. 1 R B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6. 1 9 I b i d a t 11-23. prevent i n a c c u r a t e p o r t r a y a l of p r i v a t e l i f e , but t o prevent i t s b e i n g d e p i c t e d a t a l l " . u And a person whose p r i v a c y i s v i o l a t e d " s u f f e r s outrage or a f f r o n t , not n e c e s s a r i l y mental trauma and d i s t r e s s " . 2 1 P r o f e s s o r Gavison attempts " t o v i n d i c a t e the way most of us t h i n k and t a l k about p r i v a c y i s s u e s : u n l i k e the r e d u c t i o n i s t s , most of us c o n s i d e r p r i v a c y t o be a u s e f u l concept". She w r i t e s : To be u s e f u l ... the concept must denote something t h a t i s d i s t i n c t and coherent.... Moreover, p r i v a c y must have a coherence i n t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s . F i r s t , we must have a n e u t r a l concept of p r i v a c y t h a t w i l l enable us t o i d e n t i f y when a l o s s of p r i v a c y has o c c u r r e d so t h a t d i s c u s s i o n s of p r i v a c y and c l a i m s of p r i v a c y can be i n t e l l i g i b l e . Second, p r i v a c y must have coherence as a v a l u e . . . . T h i r d , p r i v a c y must be a concept u s e f u l i n l e g a l c o n t e x t s , a concept t h a t enables us t o i d e n t i f y those o c c a s i o n s c a l l i n g f o r l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n . . . . Our everyday speech suggests t h a t we b e l i e v e the concept of p r i v a c y i s indeed coherent and u s e f u l i n the t h r e e c o n t e x t s , and t h a t l o s s e s of p r i v a c y ( i d e n t i f i e d by the f i r s t ) , i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y ( i d e n t i f i e d by the second), and a c t i o n a b l e v i o l a t i o n s o f p r i v a c y ( i d e n t i f i e d by the t h i r d ) are r e l a t e d i n t h a t each i s a subset of the p r e v i o u s category. Using the same word i n a l l t h r e e c o n t e x t s r e i n f o r c e s the b e l i e f t h a t they are l i n k e d . R e d u c t i o n i s t a n a l y s e s o f p r i v a c y - t h a t i s , an a l y s e s denying the u t i l i t y of p r i v a c y as a sep a r a t e concept - sever these c o n c e p t u a l and l i n g u i s t i c l i n k s . 2 3 P r o f e s s o r Gavison c o n c e i v e s of p r i v a c y as a c o n d i t i o n of " l i m i t e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y " c o m p r i s i n g t h r e e components which are " d i s t i n c t and independent, but i n t e r r e l a t e d " . 2 4 The ^ u Warren and Brandeis, supra n 4, a t 218. 2 1 B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6, a t 12. A 2 2 Gavison, supra n 3, a t 422. 2 3 I b i d a t 422-23. 2 4 I b i d a t 428. t h r e e components a r e : se c r e c y , or the l i m i t a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n known about an i n d i v i d u a l ; anonymity, or the l i m i t a t i o n of a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o an i n d i v i d u a l ; and s o l i t u d e , or the l i m i t a t i o n of p h y s i c a l access t o an i n d i v i d u a l . 2 5 Raymond Wacks, w h i l e r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s d e f i n i t i o n as "the b e s t account", n e v e r t h e l e s s o b j e c t s t h a t i t i s "a d i s t o r t i o n t o d e s c r i b e every i n s t a n c e of the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n about an i n d i v i d u a l as a l o s s of ' p r i v a c y ' . " He argues t h a t i n see k i n g a n e u t r a l d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y , P r o f e s s o r Gavison has d i v e s t e d i t of much of i t s i n t u i t i v e meaning, and he suggests t h a t t h e r e i s no l o s s of p r i v a c y u n l e s s the i n f o r m a t i o n i s " p e r s o n a l " . However, the use of a word such as " p e r s o n a l " or " p r i v a t e " t o d e f i n e p r i v a c y i n v o l v e s "the twin dangers of c o v e r t l y i m p o r t i n g a normative element or c o l l a p s i n g i n t o c i r c u l a r i t y " . ° I t i s submitted t h a t P r o f e s s o r Gavison's approach i s p r e f e r a b l e , and t h a t the i n t u i t i v e meaning of p r i v a c y i s r e t a i n e d . P r o f e s s o r S c h a f e r ' s r e j o i n d e r i n the co n t e x t of a s i m i l a r argument i s apt. In d i s c u s s i n g Westin's d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y which was mentioned above, one 2 5 These t h r e e elements are r e m i n i s c e n t of Westin's i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n o f f o u r b a s i c s t a t e s of p r i v a c y : s o l i t u d e , i n t i m a c y , anonymity, and r e s e r v e (supra n 17, a t 31). Reserve i s s i m i l a r t o Gavison's -notion of "s e c r e c y " , w h i l e i n t i m a c y may be found i n a l l of the o t h e r t h r e e s t a t e s : i n being "alone t o g e t h e r " , i n anonymity, and i n s e c r e c y from o u t s i d e r s . Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1989), 15. 2 7 I b i d a t 17. 2 8 See Schafer, supra n 2, a t 13, i n r e l a t i o n t o the term " p r i v a t e a f f a i r s " . commentator had p o i n t e d out t h a t "taken l i t e r a l l y , i t d e c l a r e s my p r i v a c y t o be invaded, o r a t l e a s t a f f e c t e d somehow, i f my one neighbour t e l l s my second neighbour (without my consent) t h a t I am a v e g e t a r i a n or t h a t I l i k e o y s t e r s " . 2 9 S c h a f e r responds t h a t the commentator: ...presumably expects us t o f i n d t h i s absurd. I do not. I f t he i n f o r m a t i o n c i r c u l a t e d about me ... concerns some h i g h l y i n t i m a t e matter, f o r example the f a c t t h a t my marriage i s on the verge of c o l l a p s e , then i t i s unq u e s t i o n a b l e t h a t my p r i v a c y i s s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d . I f I l i v e i n a Moslem s o c i e t y and the g o s s i p c i r c u l a t e d i s t h a t I d r i n k l i q u o r , then i t i s u n q u e s t i o n a b l e t h a t my p r i v a c y i s s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d . I f the i n f o r m a t i o n c i r c u l a t e d about me a g a i n s t my wishes concerns a l e s s i n t i m a t e or l e s s s e r i o u s f a c t about my p e r s o n a l l i f e , f o r example t h a t I am a v e g e t a r i a n , then my p r i v a c y i s a f f e c t e d i n o n l y a minor way. But i t i s none t h e l e s s a f f e c t e d . 3 0 S c h a f e r ' s r e p l y b r i n g s out an important p o i n t about " p u b l i c " and " p r i v a t e " . In e i t h e r a d e s c r i p t i v e o r a normative sense, these are not d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s but matters of degree, e x i s t i n g on a c o n t i n u u m . 3 1 S c h a f e r uses the terms " h i g h l y i n t i m a t e " and " l e s s i n t i m a t e " , and i n everyday speech we may r e f e r t o a matter as "very p r i v a t e " or, c o l l o q u i a l l y , as " k i n d of p r i v a t e " . L o u i s Lusky, " I n v a s i o n of P r i v a c y : A C l a r i f i c a t i o n of Concepts" (1972) 72 Columbia Law Review 693 a t 695; quoted i n Schafer, supra n 2, a t 11. Schaf e r , supra n 2, a t 11. Another problem w i t h u s i n g " p u b l i c " and " p r i v a t e " as mu t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s i s t h a t " p u b l i c " i s u s u a l l y used i n a d e s c r i p t i v e sense, and " p r i v a t e " i n a normative sense. Thus, f o r example, the f a c t t h a t a person has been a v i c t i m of rape, once d i s c l o s e d i n a p u b l i c t r i a l , can be s a i d t o be " p u b l i c " i n the d e s c r i p t i v e sense and a l s o t o be " p r i v a t e " i n the normative sense. I t begs the q u e s t i o n of whether the f a c t ought t o be made p u b l i c t o merely s t a t e t h a t i t i s p u b l i c and t h e r e f o r e not p r i v a t e . There are, as Wacks p o i n t s out, matters which most people would r e g a r d as p r i v a t e i n any c o n t e x t . 3 2 For example, s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s are regarded as p r i v a t e t o some degree i n almost a l l s o c i e t i e s , p r i m i t i v e as w e l l as modern. J Other matters, though, may not be thought of as " p r i v a t e " u n t i l one i s c a l l e d upon t o r e v e a l them i n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t , or u n t i l they are g i v e n undue p u b l i c i t y . To take the example of l i k i n g o y s t e r s , i f t h i s f a c t was p u b l i c i s e d i n a n a t i o n a l newspaper, one c o u l d imagine the i n d i v i d u a l concerned s a y i n g , " I t ' s not t h a t i t ' s p a r t i c u l a r l y p r i v a t e ; i t ' s j u s t t h a t i t ' s none of t h e i r b u s i n e s s . They are i n v a d i n g my p r i v a c y . " In f a c t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e i v e of i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o an i n d i v i d u a l the communication of which would never i n any circumstances be p e r c e i v e d as d i m i n i s h i n g p r i v a c y . Furthermore, a focus on how p e r s o n a l the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s p u b l i s h e d i s can be m i s l e a d i n g . To focus on what k i n d s of i n f o r m a t i o n should be c o n c e a l e d can obscure the p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s , which may not i n v o l v e c o n c e a l i n g " p r i v a t e " i n f o r m a t i o n a t a l l . O f t e n the r e a l i s s u e i s not t h a t p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n has been p u b l i c i s e d but t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person has been l i n k e d w i t h i t , or t h a t an address has been g i v e n r e s u l t i n g i n h o s t i l e a c t i o n , 3 4 or t h a t unwanted a t t e n t i o n has been drawn t o an i n d i v i d u a l over Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 26, a t 23. R i c h a r d F Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in C o n f l i c t (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1987) 11. See Younger Committee Report, supra n 10, a t 48. some t r i v i a l matter. In some cases, the i n f o r m a t i o n may be innocuous enough i n i t s e l f , but may c o n t r i b u t e t o a l o s s of p r i v a c y by b e i n g added t o o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n t o form a f u l l e r p i c t u r e . 3 5 I f a newspaper p u b l i s h e s a l l k i n d s of "not e s p e c i a l l y p r i v a t e " d e t a i l s about one's l i f e , such as what one l i k e s t o eat, what o r g a n i s a t i o n s one belongs t o , what k i n d of books one reads, and who one's f r i e n d s are, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e has been a l o s s of p r i v a c y . I f o n l y one minor d e t a i l i s p u b l i s h e d , the l o s s of p r i v a c y i s s m a l l and i n s i g n i f i c a n t , but not n o n - e x i s t e n t . Gavison i s r i g h t t o r e g a r d any i n c r e a s e i n i n f o r m a t i o n known about an i n d i v i d u a l as a l o s s of p r i v a c y , however s l i g h t , and r e g a r d l e s s of whether p r i v a c y has been "invaded". There are other o b j e c t i o n s t h a t c o u l d be made t o Gavison's d e f i n i t i o n , some of which she has a n t i c i p a t e d . She l i s t s s e v e r a l s i t u a t i o n s which are o f t e n seen as i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y but do not c o n s t i t u t e l o s s e s of p r i v a c y by her d e f i n i t i o n . Depending on one's view of these s i t u a t i o n s , t h e s e e x c l u s i o n s may be seen as a weakness or as a s t r e n g t h • T 7 of Gavison's account. I t i s submitted t h a t government r e g u l a t i o n of p r i v a t e conduct i s p r o p e r l y excluded f o r the reasons t h a t P r o f e s s o r Gavison g i v e s , and t h a t i t s i n c l u s i o n i n American law has 3 5 As i n the case of d i s c l o s u r e of i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l a t e d by computer, and the anecdote about the p r i e s t i n Gavison, supra n 3, 430-31. 3 6 Gavison, i b i d , a t 436-40. ~K 7 • . P r o f e s s o r Wacks regards these e x c l u s i o n s as a s t r e n g t h ; see Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 26, a t 16. done much t o o b f u s c a t e d i s c u s s i o n s of p r i v a c y law. a As Gavison suggests, "A b e t t e r way t o d e a l w i t h these i s s u e s may be t o t r e a t them as i n v o l v i n g q u e s t i o n s of l i b e r t y , i n which enforcement may r a i s e d i f f i c u l t p r i v a c y i s s u e s . " 3 9 L i k e w i s e a person who i s exposed t o unpleasant or d i s t r a c t i n g n o i s e s , s m e l l s , or s i g h t s , or t o u n s o l i c i t e d m a i l and unwanted phone c a l l s , 4 0 does not thereby s u f f e r a l o s s of p r i v a c y . Instead we would tend t o say t h a t t h e i r p r i v a c y was " d i s t u r b e d " , i n d i c a t i n g a l o s s of the v a l u e of p r i v a c y r a t h e r than a l o s s of p r i v a c y i t s e l f . 4 1 As f o r p r e s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s i n a " f a l s e l i g h t " and commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n of name or l i k e n e s s , Wacks suggests t h a t i t i s not the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r i v a c y t h a t i s a t s t ake i n t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , but r a t h e r the p r o t e c t i o n of h i s or her i d e n t i t y . 4 2 While s u b t l e , such a d i s t i n c t i o n may be h e l p f u l s i n c e t h e s e cases seem t o i n v o l v e r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s from p r i v a c y cases. " F a l s e l i g h t " i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o defamation, which p r o t e c t s r e p u t a t i o n , an aspect of Gavison, supra n 3, a t 436-38. The examples l i s t e d are p r o h i b i t i o n s of such conduct as a b o r t i o n s , use of c o n t r a c e p t i v e s , and " u n n a t u r a l " s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , and r e g u l a t i o n of the way f a m i l i a l o b l i g a t i o n s s h o u l d be d i s c h a r g e d . See a l s o Hixson, supra n 33, e s p e c i a l l y ch 4; Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, supra n 3, a t 12-13. Gavison, supra n 3, a t 439. I b i d a t 436. The i d e a of the l o s s of the v a l u e of p r i v a c y was d i s c u s s e d i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t by Parker, supra n 15, a t 284-88; see Burns, "Canadian Experience", supra n 14, a t 9-10. Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, supra n 3, a t 166. I d e n t i t y . 4 3 A p p r o p r i a t i o n of i d e n t i t y tends t o e n t a i l n o t i o n s of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , whether or not these are the essence of the a c t i o n . 4 4 Often, however, the p r o t e c t i o n of i d e n t i t y and of p r i v a c y w i l l o v e r l a p , as when undue a t t e n t i o n i s drawn t o an i n d i v i d u a l by the p o r t r a y a l . I t has been s a i d of a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t "the subsumption of t h i s t o p i c under the heading of ' p r i v a c y ' may owe r a t h e r more t o t r a d i t i o n , and t o the h i s t o r y and format of American p r i v a c y t r e a t i s e s , than t o any c o m p e l l i n g l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s " , but t h a t t h e r e i s " a t l e a s t a f a m i l i a l resemblance" between the i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d . 4 5 The same c o u l d e q u a l l y be s a i d of p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a f a l s e l i g h t . As B l o u s t e i n has p o i n t e d out, u n d e r l y i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of both p r i v a c y and i d e n t i t y 4 6 i s the more b a s i c d e s i r e t o enhance i n d i v i d u a l i t y and human d i g n i t y . 4 7 In any case, i t w i l l be convenient t o exclude the t o r t o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y from a d i s c u s s i o n of p r i v a c y law and the media, s i n c e the types of p u b l i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d are d i f f e r e n t . A p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i s more l i k e l y 4 3 See a l s o Diane Zimmerman, " F a l s e L i g h t I n v a s i o n of P r i v a c y : The L i g h t t h a t F a i l e d " (1989) 64 NYULR 364, f o r an a n a l y s i s and c r i t i q u e of the " f a l s e l i g h t " t o r t i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 4 4 For an argument t h a t they are not, see B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6, a t 24-30. 4 5 John I r v i n e ' s commentary on Saccone v O r r (1981) 19 CCLT 37, a t 39. 4 6 B l o u s t e i n d i d not use these d i v i s i o n s h i m s e l f , but contended t h a t a l l of these matters were p r i v a c y matters because of the u n d e r l y i n g i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t . 4 7 B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6. t o occur i n a d v e r t i s i n g and p romotional m a t e r i a l , whereas the focus of t h i s t h e s i s i s on the news and entertainment media. One type of p r i v a c y case which i s not e a s i l y i n c l u d e d w i t h i n Gavison's d e f i n i t i o n , however, i s the type of case where an i n d i v i d u a l i s more l i t e r a l l y "naked b e f o r e the AO , . . . world", such as where nude p i c t u r e s of an i n d i v i d u a l are p u b l i s h e d a g a i n s t h i s or her w i l l . The f a c t t h a t o t h e r i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y can be spoken of m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i n these terms, suggests the c e n t r a l i t y of such a case as b e i n g e x a c t l y the s o r t of t h i n g we mean when we speak of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . Gavison noted t h a t where a s t r a n g e r g a i n s entrance t o a woman's home on f a l s e p r e t e n c e s i n order t o watch her g i v i n g b i r t h , 4 9 or i n the case of a Peeping Tom, "the essence of the complaint i s not t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n about us has been a c q u i r e d , nor t h a t more a t t e n t i o n has been drawn t o us, but t h a t our s p a t i a l aloneness has been d i m i n i s h e d " . 5 0 However, the element of p h y s i c a l access can be taken away and t h e r e i s s t i l l an l o s s of p r i v a c y . For i n s t a n c e , a b i r t h c o u l d be f i l m e d (or tape-recorded) without the woman's knowledge by someone a u t h o r i s e d t o be p r e s e n t and the f i l m e x h i b i t e d (or the r e c o r d i n g played) t o o t h e r s without her I b i d a t 45. R e f e r r i n g t o De May v Roberts 46 Mich 160, 9 NW 146 (1881). Gavison, supra n 3, a t 433. c o n s e n t . 5 1 L i k e w i s e , nude photographs c o u l d be taken w i t h consent and used f o r some u n a u t h o r i s e d purpose, as where a p o l i c e o f f i c e r c i r c u l a t e d nude photographs of an a s s a u l t v i c t i m f o r the t i t i l l a t i o n of ot h e r o f f i c e r s . 5 2 Such cases c o u l d perhaps be d e s c r i b e d i n terms of access t o images of the i n d i v i d u a l . Gavison's t h i r d component, s o l i t u d e , c o u l d be m o d i f i e d t o c o n s i s t o f a c o n d i t i o n i n which the i n d i v i d u a l cannot be sensed by o t h e r s , 5 3 e i t h e r d i r e c t l y through p h y s i c a l access o r i n d i r e c t l y through access t o a sensory image of the i n d i v i d u a l . 5 4 P r i v a c y , i n the n e u t r a l , d e s c r i p t i v e sense, can t h e r e f o r e be d e f i n e d as l i m i t e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y , c o m p r i s i n g s e c r e c y , anonymity and what can be r e f e r r e d t o f o r now as sensory i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n p r o b a b l y needs some f u r t h e r f i n e - t u n i n g , but does seem t o have coherence and t o meet the t h r e e c r i t e r i a mentioned above, and w i l l a c t as a working d e f i n i t i o n f o r the chap t e r s t h a t f o l l o w . The next t a s k i s t o examine p r i v a c y as a v a l u e . Gavison m a i n t a i n s t h a t here too p r i v a c y has coherence, s i n c e : ...the reasons f o r which we c l a i m p r i v a c y i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s are s i m i l a r . They are r e l a t e d t o the f u n c t i o n s p r i v a c y has i n our l i v e s : the promotion of Of course, even i f the woman consented t h e r e would be a l o s s o f p r i v a c y . 5 2 York v Storey 324 F 2d 450 (1963). See a l s o Harder v Brown (1989) 50 CCLT 85 (BC SC), d i s c u s s e d below a t p 78-79. 5 3 Borrowing from the d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n by Parker, supra n 15. 5 4 Of course, the term " s o l i t u d e " would not adequately d e s c r i b e the new c o n d i t i o n . l i b e r t y , autonomy, s e l f h o o d , and human r e l a t i o n s , and f u r t h e r i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a f r e e s o c i e t y . I t has been s a i d t h a t "the i d e a l of p r i v a c y i s c l e a r l y one of the fundamental v a l u e s of our c u l t u r e " . 5 6 In f a c t , Gavison s t a t e s , " I t appears t h a t p r i v a c y i s c e n t r a l t o the attainment of i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s under every t h e o r y of the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t has ever captured man's i m a g i n a t i o n . 1 , 5 7 Westin has l i s t e d f o u r b a s i c f u n c t i o n s of p r i v a c y : p r i v a c y f o s t e r s p e r s o n a l autonomy; i t al l o w s f o r emotional r e l e a s e and r e l a x a t i o n from the p r e s s u r e of s o c i a l r o l e s ; i t p r o v i d e s "time out" f o r s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n ; and i t pe r m i t s l i m i t e d and p r o t e c t e d communication, a l l o w i n g f o r both i n t i m a c y and d i s t a n c e i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 5 8 I t i s worth e n l a r g i n g on the p o i n t of p e r s o n a l autonomy and l i b e r t y , s i n c e some of the arguments f o r p r i v a c y a re a c t u a l l y v e r y s i m i l a r t o the type of arguments advanced i n promoting freedom of s p e e c h . 5 9 On the s u b j e c t of autonomy, Westin s t a t e s : T h i s development of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n democratic s o c i e t i e s , s i n c e q u a l i t i e s of independent thought, d i v e r s i t y of views, and non-c o n f o r m i t y are c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e t r a i t s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s . Such independence r e q u i r e s time f o r s h e l t e r e d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and t e s t i n g of i d e a s , f o r p r e p a r a t i o n and p r a c t i c e i n thought and conduct, without f e a r of r i d i c u l e or p e n a l t y , and f o r the O D Gavison, supra n 3, a t 423. 5 6 S c h a f e r , supra n 2, a t 14. Gavison, supra n 3, a t 445. 5 8 Westin, supra n 13, a t 32-39. 5 9 See ch 4. o p p o r t u n i t y t o a l t e r o p i n i o n s b e f o r e making them p u b l i c . 6 0 B l o u s t e i n p i c t u r e s the r e s u l t f o r autonomy i f an i n d i v i d u a l has no p r i v a c y : The man who i s compelled t o l i v e every minute of h i s l i f e among o t h e r s and whose every need, thought, d e s i r e , fancy or g r a t i f i c a t i o n i s s u b j e c t t o p u b l i c s c r u t i n y , has been d e p r i v e d of h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y and human d i g n i t y . Such an i n d i v i d u a l merges w i t h the mass. H i s o p i n i o n s , b e i n g p u b l i c , tend never t o be d i f f e r e n t ; h i s a s p i r a t i o n s , b e i n g known, tend always t o be c o n v e n t i o n a l l y accepted ones; h i s f e e l i n g s , b e i n g openly e x h i b i t e d , tend t o l o s e t h e i r q u a l i t y of unique p e r s o n a l warmth and t o become the f e e l i n g s of every man. Such a being, although s e n t i e n t , i s f u n g i b l e ; he i s not an i n d i v i d u a l . 1 , 6 1 Gavison notes t h a t p r i v a c y promotes l i b e r t y by p e r m i t t i n g " i n d i v i d u a l s t o do what they would not do without i t f o r f e a r of an unpleasant or h o s t i l e r e a c t i o n from o t h e r s " , such as l e g a l punishment or t h r e a t s t o d i s s o l v e an important r e l a t i o n s h i p . 6 2 I t c o u l d be added t h a t p u b l i c i t y may be a form of punishment or "unpleasant r e a c t i o n " i n i t s e l f r e g a r d l e s s of how o t h e r s respond t o the p u b l i c i t y . 6 3 Gavison adds t h a t "we tend t o a l l o w p r i v a c y t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t s promotion of l i b e r t y i s c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e " . 6 4 I t f o l l o w s from the above d i s c u s s i o n t h a t p r i v a c y i s " e s s e n t i a l t o democratic government because i t f o s t e r s and encourages the moral autonomy of the c i t i z e n , a c e n t r a l Westin, supra n 13, a t 34. See a l s o Gavison, supra n 3, a t 448 and 449-50. 6 1 B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6, a t 42. 6 2 Gavison, supra n 3, a t 451. 6 3 D i s c u s s e d below a t pp 104-6. 6 4 Gavison, supra n 3, a t 451. requirement of a democracy" i n which i n d i v i d u a l s must form judgments and express p r e f e r e n c e s . 6 5 Thus f a r the arguments f o r p r i v a c y have shown t h a t some amount of p r i v a c y i s d e s i r a b l e , but not how much. T h i s problem i s d i m i n i s h e d when i t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the l e v e l o f p r i v a c y i n s o c i e t y as a whole i s l a r g e l y determined by f a c t o r s which can, f o r our purposes, be taken as g i v e n . A m u l t i t u d e of f a c t o r s such as housing standards and c u l t u r a l norms are the major determinants of the o v e r a l l l e v e l of p r i v a c y i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y . However, g i v e n the f u n c t i o n s t h a t p r i v a c y s e r v e s , t h e r e are good reasons f o r p r o t e c t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' s "reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n s of p r i v a c y " based on the standards of the s o c i e t y i n which he or she l i v e s . These are arguments of " p r i n c i p l e " r a t h e r than " p o l i c y " . 6 6 A f u r t h e r passage from Westin's d i s c u s s i o n of autonomy w i l l s e r v e t o i n t r o d u c e two of these reasons: Each person i s aware of the gap between what he wants t o be and what he a c t u a l l y i s , between what the world sees of him and what he knows t o be h i s much more complex r e a l i t y . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are a s p e c t s of h i m s e l f t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l does not f u l l y understand but i s s l o w l y e x p l o r i n g and shaping as he develops. Every i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s behind a mask i n t h i s manner.... I f t h i s mask i s t o r n o f f and the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a l s e l f bared t o a world in which everyone else s t i l l wears his mask and believes in masked performances, the i n d i v i d u a l can be seared by the hot l i g h t of s e l e c t i v e , f o r c e d exposure. 6 5 I b i d a t 455. 6 6 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977), 22. 6 7 Westin, supra n 13, a t 33 (emphasis added). P a r t s of t h i s passage have been h i g h l i g h t e d because they emphasise the a s p e c t s of i n e q u a l i t y and s e l e c t i v i t y i n v o l v e d i n i n v a s i o n s of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r i v a c y . As r e g a r d s i n e q u a l i t y , the i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r s by the exposure of areas of h i s or her l i f e which most members of s o c i e t y have kept hidden. For example, most people have s e x u a l f a n t a s i e s , but most people keep such t h i n g s p r i v a t e . ° I f one i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i a r y were found and d e t a i l s of s e x u a l f a n t a s i e s d e s c r i b e d t h e r e i n were p u b l i s h e d , the i n d i v i d u a l ' s m o r t i f i c a t i o n would be compounded by the undue amount of a t t e n t i o n the matter would r e c e i v e . The same i n d i v i d u a l might be r e l a t i v e l y unembarrassed t o d i s c l o s e the same f a n t a s i e s i n a group of f r i e n d s or s t r a n g e r s i n which o t h e r s were doing l i k e w i s e . R e l a t i o n s h i p s tend t o be marked by r o u g h l y equal amounts of d i s c l o s u r e on each s i d e , or an imbalance of power may r e s u l t . As Gavison notes, "...unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i v a c y may l e a d t o m a n i p u l a t i o n , d e c e p t i o n , and t h r e a t s t o autonomy and d emocracy". 7 0 S e l e c t i v i t y can l i k e w i s e exacerbate the e f f e c t s of d i s c l o s u r e . Where the m a j o r i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e i s p r o t e c t e d from the p u b l i c gaze under c u r r e n t s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s and norms, the exposure of an i s o l a t e d d e t a i l can g i v e a d i s t o r t e d image of the person and have an e f f e c t A s i m i l a r example i s used t o i l l u s t r a t e a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t i n Gavison, supra n 3, a t 430. See Roger Ingham, " P r i v a c y and Psychology", i n J B Young, ed, Privacy ( C h i c h e s t e r : John Wiley & Sons, 1978) 53. Gavison, supra n 3, a t 444. d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o i t s importance. Gavison puts the matter as f o l l o w s : An a d d i t i o n a l problem i s t h a t j o u r n a l i s m i s crude, and may not do j u s t i c e t o the s i t u a t i o n exposed. P a r t i a l t r u t h s are u n s e t t l i n g because they p r e s e n t a one-d i m e n s i o n a l image of the s u b j e c t , o f t e n without compassion or benevolence.This may not be u n l i k e s c a n d a l j o u r n a l i s m ' s o l d s i s t e r , g o s s i p . The most important d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t g o s s i p u s u a l l y concerns people who are a l r e a d y known i n t h e i r o t h e r f a c e t s , and thus p a r t i a l t r u t h s are l e s s m i s l e a d i n g . In c o n t r a s t , t h e r e i s no way t h a t most r e a d e r s of newspapers can c o r r e c t f o r the one-dimensional images they r e c e i v e through p r i n t . 1 A t h i r d f e a t u r e of i s o l a t e d i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y , as opposed t o a lower l e v e l of p r i v a c y i n s o c i e t y as a whole, i s t h e i r u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . People tend t o be averse t o r i s k , as economists w i l l t e l l us. When people know t h a t they are b e i n g observed, or t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s w i l l be p u b l i c i s e d , they can a d j u s t t h e i r behaviour a c c o r d i n g l y . However, i f they t h i n k t h a t they are alone, unobserved, or anonymous, or t h a t c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about them i s unknown, but cannot be sure, t h e i r a b i l i t y t o make informed, r a t i o n a l c h o i c e s i s impaired and t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l s e c u r i t y i s undermined. O n t o l o g i c a l s e c u r i t y has been d e f i n e d as " c o n f i d e n c e or t r u s t t h a t the n a t u r a l and s o c i a l worlds are as they appear t o be, i n c l u d i n g the b a s i c e x i s t e n t i a l parameters of s e l f and s o c i a l i d e n t i t y " . 7 2 In a d d i t i o n t o the reasons f o r promoting p r i v a c y i n s o c i e t y a t l a r g e , then, t h e r e are a d d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s I b i d a t 466. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P ress, 1984). f o r g r a n t i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t i s o l a t e d i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y , due t o the problems of i n e q u a l i t y , s e l e c t i v i t y , and u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . There i s good reason t o p r o t e c t people's "reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n s o f p r i v a c y " . The r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i s not a b s o l u t e , however, and i t must be balanced a g a i n s t c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s such as the i n t e r e s t o f o t h e r s i n knowing. Even having a r r i v e d a t a s a t i s f a c t o r y d e s c r i p t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a c y and ha v i n g i d e n t i f i e d t he reasons f o r p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y , i t i s s t i l l d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e e x a c t l y when p r i v a c y i s invaded and when t h e r e ought t o be a l e g a l remedy, without r e s o r t i n g t o s p e c i f i c examples. For t h i s reason i t has been suggested t h a t " i t may be u s e f u l as a l e g a l concept t o r e g a r d the ' r i g h t t o p r i v a c y ' as a p r i n c i p l e , h a v ing a h i g h order of g e n e r a l i t y , than a r u l e which w i l l govern s p e c i f i c c a s e s " . 7 3 P r o f e s s o r Burns has endorsed t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , and added: In such a way the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y w i l l r e v e a l d i r e c t i o n s and be e l a s t i c . The r u l e s w i l l be a r t i c u l a t e d by s t a t u t e s , case law and c o n s t i t u t i o n , whereas the p r i n c i p l e w i l l be d e r i v e d from moral and p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s . 7 4 There has been some c r i t i c i s m t h a t the development of p r i v a c y law on a case-by-case b a s i s would l e a d t o u n c e r t a i n t y i n the l a w . 7 5 However, t h i s c r i t i c i s m c o u l d 7 T Freund, " P r i v a c y : One Concept or Many" (1971) 13 Nomos 182; as quoted i n Burns, "Canadian Experience", supra n 14, a t 11. 7 4 Burns, "Canadian Experience", supra n 14, a t 11. 7 5 See Younger Committee Report, supra n 10, a t 205-6; A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 11, Unfair e q u a l l y be used a g a i n s t the p r o t e c t i o n of a l l i n t e r e s t s which have a p l a c e i n our law, none of which are p r o t e c t e d a b s o l u t e l y . 7 6 I t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t " t o d e c l i n e t o a l t e r the law because i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e the new law i s a d o c t r i n e of d e s p a i r which c o u l d be a p p l i e d t o almost any proposed l e g a l r e f o r m " . 7 7 I t may be t h a t the c r i t i c s have an u n r e a l i s t i c view of what judges a l r e a d y do. B l o u s t e i n observed t h a t : The words we use t o i d e n t i f y and d e s c r i b e b a s i c human v a l u e s are n e c e s s a r i l y vague and i l l - d e f i n e d . Compounded of profound human hopes and l o n g i n g s on the one s i d e and e l u s i v e a s p e c t s of human psychology and e x p e r i e n c e on the other, our s o c i a l g o a l s are more f i t t o be pronounced by prophets and poets than by p r o f e s s o r s . We are f o r t u n a t e , then, t h a t some of our judges enjoy a touch of the prophet's v i s i o n and the poet's t o n g u e . 7 8 In f a c t , some l e g a l s c h o l a r s b e l i e v e t h a t j u d i c i a l p r a c t i c e i s a t h e a r t a n a r r a t i v e or p o e t i c endeavour r a t h e r than simply a matter of a p p l y i n g r u l e s . For i n s t a n c e , S t a n l e y F i s h s t a t e s sees a judge as f a s h i o n i n g "a s t o r y i n which h i s e x p o s i t i o n of the case e x i s t s i n a seamless c o n t i n u i t y w i t h h i s e x p o s i t i o n (and understanding) of the e n t e r p r i s e as a 7 Q . . whole".'^ Another w r i t e r views a judge as a type of poet, and says t h a t the e x c e l l e n c e of a j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n can be Publication (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1978) a t 122. 7 6 See Gavison, supra n 3, a t 468. 7 7 M i n o r i t y Report of D M Ross i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 10, a t 214. 78 B l o u s t e i n , supra n 6, a t 40. t a n l e y F i s h , " S t i l l Wrong 6 Law and Philosophy 401. 7 9 S A f t e r A l l These Years" (1987) measured by "how f a r i t r e c o g n i s e s what i s v a l i d and v a l u a b l e i n each s i d e and i n c l u d e s t h a t w i t h i n i t s e l f " . u In any case, the problem of u n c e r t a i n t y cannot be evaded by j u d i c i a l i n a c t i o n , s i n c e i n d e f a u l t the b a l a n c i n g t a s k r e v e r t s t o the i n t r u d e r : . . . t r u t h i s not i n v i o l a t e , any more than any oth e r v a l u e i n our s o c i e t y . When i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h the commendable i n t e r e s t of p r i v a c y who must draw the l i n e ? At p r e s e n t i t i s the i n t r u d e r h i m s e l f . I t h i n k t h a t i n those cases where an i n d i v i d u a l can be s e r i o u s l y damaged by a wrong judgment of the i n t r u d e r , he ought t o have the r i g h t t o ask s o c i e t y a t l a r g e t o a d j u d i c a t e . The o n l y a c c e p t a b l e instrument we have d e v i s e d i s the law. J B White, "The J u d i c i a l O p i nion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of L i f e " (1984) 5 Missippi College L Rev 25 a t 34-35. M i n o r i t y Report of A W Lyon i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 10, a t 209. See a l s o Gavison, supra n 3, a t 468; and A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Privacy, supra n 75, a t 10. CHAPTER 3  PRIVACY LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH T h i s chapter p r o v i d e s an overview of how p r i v a c y i s p r o t e c t e d w i t h r e l a t i o n t o the media, i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and i n each o f the c o u n t r i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and of some attempts t o change the law i n t h i s a r e a . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenants The r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i s i n c l u d e d as a fundamental human r i g h t i n s e v e r a l major i n t e r n a t i o n a l covenants t o which Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s are p a r t i e s . The U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n of Human R i g h t s , adopted by the G e n e r a l Assembly of the U n i t e d Nations i n 1948, p r o v i d e s i n A r t i c l e 12: No one s h a l l be s u b j e c t e d t o a r b i t r a r y i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s p r i v a c y , f a m i l y , home, or correspondence, nor t o a t t a c k s upon h i s honour and r e p u t a t i o n . Everyone has the r i g h t t o the p r o t e c t i o n of law against- such i n t e r -f e r e n c e or a t t a c k s . 1 The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s , adopted by the General Assembly i n 1966, uses almost i d e n t i c a l terms i n A r t i c l e 17. 2 As quoted i n A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 22, Privacy (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1983) a t 266. 2 I b i d . A r t i c l e 8 of the European Convention f o r the P r o t e c t i o n of Human R i g h t s and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), t o which the U n i t e d Kingdom i s a p a r t y , p r o v i d e s : 1. Everyone has the r i g h t t o r e s p e c t f o r h i s p r i v a t e and f a m i l y l i f e , h i s home and h i s correspondence. 2. There s h a l l be no i n t e r f e r e n c e by a p u b l i c author-i t y w i t h the e x e r c i s e of t h i s r i g h t except such as i s i n accordance w i t h the law and i s necessary i n a demo-c r a t i c s o c i e t y i n the i n t e r e s t s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , p u b l i c s a f e t y or the economic w e l l - b e i n g of the coun-t r y , f o r the p r e v e n t i o n of d i s o r d e r or crime, f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of h e a l t h or morals, or f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the r i g h t s and freedoms of o t h e r s . 3 S i n c e 1966, when B r i t a i n made a d e c l a r a t i o n , renewable every f i v e y e a r s , t h a t i t would r e c o g n i s e the competence of the European Commission of Human R i g h t s , i n d i v i d u a l r e s i -dents of the U n i t e d Kingdom have been a b l e t o b r i n g com-p l a i n t s a g a i n s t the U n i t e d Kingdom government f o r v i o l a t i o n of the C o n v e n t i o n . 4 A l r e a d y s e v e r a l cases brought by U n i t e d Kingdom r e s i d e n t s under A r t i c l e 8 have reached the European Court of Human R i g h t s . However, the complaint procedure i s not a v a i l a b l e t o a person whose p r i v a c y i s invaded by the media, u n l e s s perhaps the o f f e n d i n g p a r t y i s a government body, such as the B r i t i s h B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n . Furthermore, although p a r t i e s t o the Convention are ob-l i g e d by A r t i c l e 1 t o "secure t o everyone w i t h i n t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n " the r i g h t s s e t out i n the Convention, the European Court has pronounced t h a t the "absence of a law ex-p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t i n g t h i s or t h a t v i o l a t i o n does not s u f f i c e 3 I b i d . 4 David H O t t , Public International Law in the Modern World (Pitman P u b l i s h i n g : London, 1987), 260. t o e s t a b l i s h a breach s i n c e such a p r o h i b i t i o n does not r e p r e s e n t the s o l e method of s e c u r i n g the enjoyment of the r i g h t s " . 5 Hence the U n i t e d Kingdom cannot be taken t o the European Court merely over i t s f a i l u r e t o l e g i s l a t e a r i g h t o f p r i v a c y a g a i n s t the media. Enforcement machinery i s more l i m i t e d under the I n t e r -n a t i o n a l Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s , and i s n o n e x i s t e n t under the U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n . 6 U n i t e d Kingdom P r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s d e r i v e a c e r t a i n amount of i n c i d e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n from many e x i s t i n g common law a c t i o n s , f o r exam-p l e , from t o r t a c t i o n s such as those f o r defamation and p a s s i n g o f f , and from a c t i o n s f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . 7 How-ever, a t l e a s t u n t i l r e c e n t l y i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t t h e r e was "broad g e n e r a l agreement... among judges and academics t h a t i n the Commonwealth t h e r e [was] no g e n e r a l l e g a l r i g h t I b i d , 264, q u o t i n g from Ireland v United Kingdom, E Ct HR, Ser A, Judgment of 18 Jan 1978. A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Privacy, supra n 1, a t 268. For d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of such p r o t e c t i o n , see the Report of the Committee on Privacy (chairman: Kenneth Younger), Cmnd. 5012, 1972 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the Younger Committee Report), 25-27 and Appendix I; A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Privacy, supra n 1, a t 377-99; P e t e r Burns, " P r i v a c y and the Common Law: A Tangled Skein U n r a v e l l i n g ? " i n Aspects of Privacy Law:. Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, ed Dale Gibson (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 21. As t o the a c t i o n f o r breach of c o n f i d e n c e , see Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1989), 50-134; D a n i e l L a s t e r , "Breaches of Confidence and of P r i v a c y by Misuse of P e r s o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n " (1989) 7 Otago L Rev 31. t o p r i v a c y " . As w i l l be d i s c u s s e d below, r e c e n t develop-ments have c a s t some doubt on t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n as r e g a r d s the law of New Zealand and Canada. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the E n g l i s h c o u r t s s t i l l seem u n w i l l i n g t o develop a common law r i g h t of p r i v a c y a t t h i s stage, without some l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r v e n -t i o n . The r e l u c t a n c e of the E n g l i s h c o u r t s t o c o n c e i v e a new t o r t of p r i v a c y was demonstrated i n a r e c e n t Court of Appeal judgment, Kaye v Robertson.9 The p l a i n t i f f , a well-known t e l e v i s i o n a c t o r , had been d r i v i n g h i s c a r d u r i n g a g a l e when he was s t r u c k by a p i e c e of d e b r i s , r e s u l t i n g i n s e r i -ous b r a i n i n j u r i e s . A f t e r t h r e e days on a l i f e support s y s -tem and s e v e r a l days i n i n t e n s i v e care, he was moved t o a p r i v a t e h o s p i t a l room. A j o u r n a l i s t and a photographer from Sunday Sport managed t o g a i n e n t r y t o the room without being seen by h o s p i t a l s t a f f . In so doing, they i g n o r e d n o t i c e s on the ward door and on the door of the p l a i n t i f f ' s room. The p l a i n t i f f a p p a r e n t l y agreed t o an i n t e r v i e w and t o b e i n g photographed. The j o u r n a l i s t and photographer r e f u s e d t o l e a v e when asked t o do so by the n u r s i n g s t a f f , and had t o be e x p e l l e d by s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l . M e d i c a l evidence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had been i n no f i t s t a t e t o be i n t e r v i e w e d or t o g i v e informed Burns, " P r i v a c y and the Common Law", supra n 7, a t 22. The p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of S c o t t i s h law i s t h e r e noted, but the law i n S c o t l a n d has developed somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y from E n g l i s h common law, and w i l l not be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s . The Times, 21 March 1990, p 51 (16 March 1990, CA). consent t o an i n t e r v i e w . F i f t e e n minutes a f t e r the i n c i d e n t the p l a i n t i f f had no r e c o l l e c t i o n of i t . The defendants, the e d i t o r and p u b l i s h e r s of Sunday Sport, made i t c l e a r t h a t they intended t o p u b l i s h an a r t i -c l e and one or more of the photographs i n the newspaper. The wording o f the a r t i c l e c l e a r l y i m p l i e d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had consented t o be i n t e r v i e w e d and photographed. An i n j u n c t i o n was granted a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e r e s t r a i n i n g the defendants from p u b l i s h i n g the photographs taken or any statements made by the p l a i n t i f f d u r i n g the i n c i d e n t , o r any summary or r e c o r d t h e r e o f , u n t i l t r i a l or f u r t h e r o r d e r . The t r i a l judge, Mr J u s t i c e P o t t e r , remarked t h a t the Sunday Sport had a " l u r i d and s e n s a t i o n a l , s t y l e " , and the Court of Appeal r e c e i v e d evidence t h a t many of i t s adver-t i s e m e n t s were f o r pornographic m a t e r i a l . The c o u r t f e l t t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had consented t o g i v e the f i r s t " e x c l u s i v e " i n t e r v i e w t o Sunday Sport would p r o b a b l y be found by a j u r y t o be l i b e l l o u s . However, i t d i f f e r e d from the t r i a l judge i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h i s c o n c l u -s i o n would not be i n e v i t a b l e , and t h e r e f o r e i t would not base an i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n on a r i g h t o f a c t i o n f o r l i b e l . The c o u r t d i d , however, f i n d t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t the p l a i n t i f f gave informed consent t o the i n t e r v i e w un-doubtedly amounted t o a m a l i c i o u s f a l s e h o o d . Damage t o the p l a i n t i f f was seen i n t h a t the v a l u e of the p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o s e l l h i s s t o r y would be s e r i o u s l y l e s s e n e d by the p u b l i c a t i o n of the a r t i c l e . 1 0 The c o u r t t h e r e f o r e allowed 1 0 With a l l r e s p e c t , t h e r e appears t o be a f a u l t i n the r e a -soning of the c o u r t a t t h i s p o i n t , as i t i s r e p o r t e d i n the appeal i n part, s u b s t i t u t i n g an interim injunction r e s t r a i n i n g the defendants from publishing anything which would carry the implication that the p l a i n t i f f had voluntar-i l y permitted the photographs or interview. The Court of Appeal judges, while r e j e c t i n g the e x i s -tence of a l e g a l r i g h t to privacy at common law, made some pointed observations on the need for such a r i g h t . Lord J u s t i c e Bingham said: that the case highlighted, yet again, the f a i l u r e of both the common law of England and of statute to pro-t e c t i n an e f f e c t i v e way the personal privacy of i n d i -v idual c i t i z e n s . The defendants' conduct towards the p l a i n t i f f was "a monstrous invasion of h i s privacy" (to adopt the language of Mr J u s t i c e G r i f f i t h s i n Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd ( [ 1 9 7 8 ] [sic] QB 4 7 9 , 489) . I f ever a person had a r i g h t to be l e t alone by strangers with no public i n t e r e s t to pursue, i t must surely be when he lay i n h o s p i t a l recovering from brain surgery and i n no more than p a r t i a l command of h i s fac-u l t i e s . I t was that invasion of h i s privacy which underlay the p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint. Yet i t alone, however gross, did not e n t i t l e him to r e l i e f i n English law. 1 1 Lord J u s t i c e Leggatt said: that we did not need a F i r s t Amendment to preserve the freedom of the Press, but the abuse of that freedom could only be ensured [sic] by the enforcement of a r i g h t to privacy. That r i g h t had so long been disregarded here that i t could be recognized now only by the l e g i s l a t u r e -e s p e c i a l l y since there was a v a i l a b l e i n the United The Times. The court shows that damage would r e s u l t from pu b l i c a t i o n of the a r t i c l e , but not that damage would r e s u l t from the falsehood i t s e l f . However, t h i s point may be c l a r i f i e d by a f u l l e r report of the case. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that a r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y i s recog-nised, but i t i s protected only i n c i d e n t a l l y and the court does not create a t o r t of appropriation of person-a l i t y . The Times, 21 March 1 9 9 0 , p 5 1 . S t a t e s a wealth of experi e n c e of t h a t r i g h t both a t common law and a l s o under s t a t u t e . I t was t o be hoped t h a t the making good of t h a t s i g n a l shortcoming i n our law would not be l o n g de-l a y e d . 1 2 Thus the c o u r t i s s u e d a c l e a r appeal t o the l e g i s l a t u r e t o t a k e a c t i o n i n the area of p r i v a c y law. The judgments i n d i c a t e t h a t i f t h e r e were a l e g a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y , the p r e s e n t case would c e r t a i n l y be one i n which t h a t r i g h t s h o u l d take precedence over the freedom o f the p r e s s . There have been s e v e r a l attempts t o l e g i s l a t e a r i g h t of p r i v a c y i n the U n i t e d Kingdom i n the l a s t t h i r t y y e a r s , a l l of them u n s u c c e s s f u l t o date. The f i r s t attempt was i n 1961, when L o r d Mancroft p r e s e n t e d a b i l l t o the House of Lords which gr a n t e d a r i g h t of a c t i o n a g a i n s t any person who, without the p l a i n t i f f ' s consent: p u b l i s h e s of or con c e r n i n g him i n any newspaper or by means of any cinematographic e x h i b i t i o n or any t e l e v i -s i o n or sound broadcast any words r e l a t i n g t o h i s p e r s o n a l a f f a i r s or conduct i f such p u b l i c a t i o n i s c a l c u l a t e d t o cause him d i s t r e s s or embarrassment. 1 3 There would be no l i a b i l i t y i f the defendant c o u l d prove: (a) t h a t he d i d not i n t e n d t o r e f e r t o the p l a i n t i f f ; or (b) t h a t the words were p u b l i s h e d on an o c c a s i o n of ab-s o l u t e or q u a l i f i e d p r i v i l e g e ; or (c) t h a t a t the time of the p u b l i c a t i o n the p l a i n t i f f was the s u b j e c t of reasonable p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by reason of some o f f i c e or p o s i t i o n then h e l d by him 12 I b i d . 1 3 L o r d Mancroft's b i l l , c l a u s e 1. The t e x t quoted i s as c o n t a i n e d i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n'7, i n Appendix F. or by reason of some conduct of the p l a i n t i f f , and t h a t the words p u b l i s h e d r e l a t e d s o l e l y t o matters which, having r e g a r d t o such o f f i c e , p o s i t i o n or conduct of the p l a i n t i f f , were the s u b j e c t of r e a -sonable p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r were f a i r comment thereon; or (d) t h a t a t the time of the p u b l i c a t i o n the p l a i n t i f f was the s u b j e c t o f reas o n a b l e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by reason of some contemporary event d i r e c t l y i n v o l v -i n g t he p l a i n t i f f p e r s o n a l l y , and (i ) t h a t i t was rea s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o d i s -c l o s e the i d e n t i t y of the p l a i n t i f f , and ( i i ) t h a t the words p u b l i s h e d r e l a t e d s o l e l y t o matters which having r e g a r d t o the event and the p o s i t i o n o f the p l a i n t i f f were the s u b j e c t of rea s o n a b l e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , or were f a i r comment thereon. However, these defences were not t o be a v a i l a b l e i f the p l a i n t i f f proved " t h a t any m a t e r i a l on which the s a i d words were based was o b t a i n e d by f o r c e or t h r e a t s or by any means c a l c u l a t e d t o cause d i s t r e s s or embarrassment t o the p l a i n -t i f f or any member of the f a m i l y or household of the p l a i n -t i f f " . 1 5 Although L o r d Mancroft's b i l l r e c e i v e d s t r o n g support i n the House of Lords, ° the Lord C h a n c e l l o r was opposed t o i t because of the problems he saw i n r e c o n c i l i n g p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s and freedom of the p r e s s . Lord Mancroft, r e a l i z i n g t h a t the Government would not a l l o w time f o r the b i l l i n the • • > • 1 7 c u r r e n t p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e s s i o n , withdrew i t . Clause 2. Clause 3. . On i t s second r e a d i n g , 74 Lords voted f o r the b i l l and 21 a g a i n s t . See the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 196. I b i d a t 196. In 1967, the House of Commons c o n s i d e r e d a p r i v a c y b i l l i n t r o d u c e d by Mr Alexander Lyon, but the b i l l went no f u r -t h e r than i t s f i r s t r e a d i n g . 1 8 U n l i k e Lord Mancroft's b i l l , Mr Lyon's b i l l was not l i m i t e d t o i n v a s i o n s by the media. I t p r o v i d e d : Any person who has been s u b j e c t t o any s e r i o u s and un-r e a s o n a b l e i n f r i n g e m e n t of h i s r i g h t t o p r i v a c y s h a l l have a cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t the o f f e n d e r . 1 9 The r i g h t of p r i v a c y was d e f i n e d as "the r i g h t of any person t o p r e s e r v e the s e c l u s i o n of h i m s e l f , h i s f a m i l y or h i s p r o p e r t y from any o t h e r p e r s o n " . 2 0 Consent, r a t h e r than q u a l i f y i n g the s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t as i n L o r d Mancroft's b i l l , was l i s t e d among the d e f e n c e s . 2 1 I t was a l s o a defence t o show t h a t "the defendant d i d not knowingly i n f r i n g e the r i g h t of p r i v a c y " . 2 2 A p u b l i c i n t e r e s t defence was t o operate where "the i n f r i n g e m e n t c o n s i s t [ e d ] of any w r i t t e n , spoken or v i s u a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n a speech, newspaper, p e r i o d i c a l , book or t e l e v i s i o n or sound broadcast", and the defendant c o u l d show t h a t : the i n f r i n g e m e n t was r e a s o n a b l y necessary t o comment f a i r l y upon a s u b j e c t of reasonable p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n 1 8 I b i d a t 196-97. 1 9 • Mr Lyon's b i l l , c l a u s e 2. The t e x t quoted i s as c o n t a i n e d i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, i n Appendix F. 2 0 Clause 1. 2 1 Clause 3 ( d ) . These two ways of t r e a t i n g consent are r e -f e r r e d t o i n Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 7, a t 104. 2 2 Clause 3 ( a ) . which the p l a i n t i f f , h i s f a m i l y or h i s p r o p e r t y were d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d . . . . 2 3 The next p r i v a c y b i l l was i n t r o d u c e d t o the House of Commons by Mr B r i a n Walden i n 1969. I t was almost i d e n t i c a l t o a d r a f t b i l l which had been produced by a committee of 11 J u s t i c e " , the B r i t i s h S e c t i o n o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commis-s i o n o f J u r i s t s . Mr Walden's b i l l d e c l a r e d t h a t : Any s u b s t a n t i a l and unreasonable i n f r i n g e m e n t of a r i g h t o f p r i v a c y t a k i n g p l a c e a f t e r the coming i n t o f o r c e o f t h i s A c t s h a l l be a c t i o n a b l e a t the s u i t of any person whose r i g h t of p r i v a c y has been so i n -f r i n g e d . "Right o f p r i v a c y " was d e f i n e d as: the r i g h t of any person t o be p r o t e c t e d from i n t r u s i o n upon h i m s e l f , h i s home, h i s f a m i l y , h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s and communications w i t h o t h e r s , h i s p r o p e r t y and h i s bu s i n e s s a f f a i r s , i n c l u d i n g i n t r u s i o n b y — (a) sp y i n g , p r y i n g , watching or b e s e t t i n g ; (b) the un a u t h o r i s e d o v e r h e a r i n g or r e c o r d i n g of spoken words; (c) the u n a u t h o r i s e d making of v i s u a l images; (d) the un a u t h o r i s e d r e a d i n g or copyi n g of docu-ments ; (e) the u n a u t h o r i s e d use or d i s c l o s u r e of c o n f i d e n -t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , or of f a c t s ( i n c l u d i n g h i s name, i d e n t i t y or l i k e n e s s ) c a l c u l a t e d t o cause him d i s t r e s s , annoyance or embarrassment, or t o p l a c e him i n a f a l s e l i g h t ; (f) t he u n a u t h o r i s e d a p p r o p r i a t i o n of h i s name, i d e n t i t y or l i k e n e s s f o r another's g a i n . 2 5 One p r o v i s i o n of p o t e n t i a l r e l e v a n c e t o the media was t h a t a person who "knowing of the inf r i n g e m e n t , [had] made 2 3 Clause 3 ( b ) . 2 4 Clause 1. The t e x t quoted i s as c o n t a i n e d i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, i n Appendix F. 2 5 Clause 9 ( 1 ) . any use t h e r e o f f o r h i s own b e n e f i t or t o the det r i m e n t of the p l a i n t i f f " c o u l d be j o i n e d as a d e f e n d a n t . 2 6 Mr Lyon's b i l l had i n c l u d e d a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n but i n r a t h e r narrower t e r m s . 2 7 The defences i n c l u d e d c o n s e n t , 2 8 or t h a t "the d e f e n -dant, h a v i n g e x e r c i s e d a l l reasonable c a r e , n e i t h e r knew nor int e n d e d t h a t h i s conduct would c o n s t i t u t e an i n f r i n g e m e n t of t he r i g h t of p r i v a c y o f any p e r s o n " . 2 9 Where "the i n f r i n g e m e n t was c o n s t i t u t e d by the p u b l i c a -t i o n o f any words or v i s u a l images", i t was a defence f o r any defendant show t h a t " t h e r e were rea s o n a b l e grounds f o r the b e l i e f t h a t such p u b l i c a t i o n was i n the p u b l i c i n t e r -e s t " . T h i s was the s o l e d eparture from the wording of the " J u s t i c e " b i l l , which r e q u i r e d t h a t "the p u b l i c a t i o n was i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . x F u r t h e r , t h e r e was a defence where: the i n f r i n g e m e n t took p l a c e i n circumstances such t h a t , had the a c t i o n been one f o r defamation, t h e r e would have been a v a i l a b l e t o the defendant a defence of a b s o l u t e o r q u a l i f i e d p r i v i l e g e , p r o v i d e d t h a t i f the i n f r i n g e m e n t was c o n s t i t u t e d by a p u b l i c a t i o n i n a newspaper, p e r i o d i c a l or book, or i n a sound or t e l e v i -s i o n broadcast, any defence under t h i s paragraph s h a l l be a v a i l a b l e o n l y i f the defendant a l s o shows t h a t the Z D Clause 2(c) . 2 7 "6. Any person who knowingly d e r i v e s f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t from an i n f r i n g e m e n t of the r i g h t of p r i v a c y s h a l l be c o n c u r r e n t l y l i a b l e w i t h the o r i g i n a l o f f e n d e r . " 2 8 Mr Walden's b i l l , c l a u s e 3 ( b ) . 2 9 Clause 3 ( a ) . 3 0 Clause 3 ( c ) . 3 1 Clause 3(c) of the " J u s t i c e " b i l l ; quoted i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t p 200, n 204 (emphasis added). matters p u b l i s h e d were of p u b l i c concern and t h e i r pub-l i c a t i o n was f o r the p u b l i c b e n e f i t . . . . 3 2 Mr Walden withdrew h i s b i l l when the Government p r o -posed t o ap p o i n t a committee t o i n v e s t i g a t e more t h o r o u g h l y the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o hear from the m e d i a . 3 3 The m a j o r i t y of the Committee on P r i v a c y (the "Younger Committee") recommended a g a i n s t a g e n e r a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y , f o r the t h r e e reasons mentioned i n ch a p t e r 1 a b o v e . 3 4 For a time the matter r e s t e d , and i t seemed t h a t "the r e p o r t [had] ended attempts t o l e g i s l a t e a t o r t of p r i v a c y i n Great B r i t a i n . " 3 5 However, g i v e n t h a t "the balance [had] f a l l e n h e a v i l y a g a i n s t those who wish[ed] t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r i v a c y " , 3 6 i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the i s s u e was e v e n t u a l l y brought t o the a t t e n t i o n o f the l e g i s l a t u r e once a g a i n . In 1989, Mr John Browne, "who had had h i s own d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h p r e s s i n t e r e s t i n h i s f a m i l y and f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s " , 3 7 p r e s e n t e d a b i l l t o the House of Commons which sought, i n the words of the e x p l a n a t o r y memorandum, " t o c o n f e r remedies f o r the Mr Walden's b i l l , c l a u s e 3 ( e ) . See the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 199. See above, a t p 7. P h i l i p H Osborne, "The P r i v a c y A c t s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan", i n Gibson, supra n 7, 73 a t 86. Mr Lyon d u r i n g the debate on Mr Walden's b i l l ; quoted i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 198. "Slamming the door on t h e i r f e e t " , The Economist, 31 March 1990, 58. p u b l i c misuse o f p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n r a t h e r than a g e n e r a l r i g h t f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y " . I t p r o v i d e d t h a t : Any p u b l i c use or p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of p r i v a t e informa-t i o n i s a t o r t o f breach of p r i v a c y and ... proceedings may be brought by any person t o whom such i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s o r, w i t h the a u t h o r i t y of t h a t person, by another on h i s b e h a l f i n l i k e manner as any ot h e r p r o -ceedings i n r e s p e c t o f a t o r t . 3 8 " P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n " was s a i d t o c o n s i s t of any matter which concerned an i n d i v i d u a l i n r e s p e c t o f h i s p e r s o n a l communications, home, p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , p e r s o n a l be-hav i o u r , h e a l t h , or p e r s o n a l f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s . 3 9 " P e r s o n a l " meant "by v i r t u e of the p r i v a t e c a p a c i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l and exclude[d] any l e g a l c a p a c i t y c r e a t e d by v i r t u e of a c o n t r a c t of employment or a c o n t r a c t f o r s e r -v i c e s or the h o l d i n g of an o f f i c e , whether appointed by the Crown or otherwise and whether renumerated or n o t . " 4 0 " P u b l i c use" and " P u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e " was d e f i n e d as any use or d i s c l o s u r e which i s made i n the form of p r i n t e d mat-t e r or bro a d c a s t m a t e r i a l , and: which the person making the use or d i s c l o s u r e , o r i n -t e n d i n g t o do so, knows, or ought r e a s o n a b l y t o know, w i l l r e s u l t i n the p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n b e i n g made known t o persons, o t h e r than the i n d i v i d u a l t o whom i t r e l a t e s . . . . 4 1 A r a t h e r c u r i o u s p r o v i s o f o l l o w e d : 3 8 R i g h t o f P r i v a c y B i l l 1989 (UK), c l a u s e 1(1) 3 9 Clause 7. 4 0 Clause 7. 4 1 Clause 7. P r o v i d e d t h a t no use o r d i s c l o s u r e made i n t h e c o u r s e o f p r o c e e d i n g s i n a c o u r t s h a l l amount t o a b r e a c h o f p r i v a c y u n l e s s t h e c o u r t i s s i t t i n g i n camera o r i n c h a m b e r s . . . . The e x p l a n a t o r y memorandum commented r e g a r d i n g t h i s p r o v i s o t h a t : I t m a i n t a i n s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f open j u s t i c e , so t h a t t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s s h a l l n o t be a b r e a c h o f p r i v a c y u n l e s s t h e c o u r t i n q u e s t i o n was s i t t i n g i n chambers o r i n camera. The B i l l w i l l not i n h i b i t a c o u r t ' s g e n e r a l power t o keep p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r s p r i -v a t e . C l e a r l y t h e p r o v i s o was i n t e n d e d t o exempt t h e d i s c l o s u r e of c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s r a t h e r t h a n d i s c l o s u r e in the course of c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s . I t seems t h a t a m i s t a k e was made i n t h e d r a f t i n g o f t h e p r o v i s o . The d e f e n c e s i n c l u d e d : t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , h a v i n g e x e r -c i s e d a l l r e a s o n a b l e c a r e , n e i t h e r knew nor i n t e n d e d t h a t h i s c o n d u c t would c o n s t i t u t e a b r e a c h o f p r i v a c y ; c o n s e n t ; a b s o l u t e o r q u a l i f i e d p r i v i l e g e as f o r a d e f a m a t i o n a c t i o n ; and " p r i o r p u b l i c use o r d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e p r i v a t e i n f o r m a -t i o n i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h d i d not amount t o a b r e a c h o f p r i v a c y w i t h i n any p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o r a b r o a d " . 4 2 A p u b l i c i n t e r e s t d e f e n c e was t o a p p l y where t h e d e f e n -d a n t s a t i s f i e d t h e c o u r t t h a t " t h e r e was o r i s a p u b l i c i n -t e r e s t o r p u b l i c b e n e f i t i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n b e i n g so u s e d or d i s c l o s e d " and t h e p l a i n t i f f was u n a b l e t o s a t i s f y t h e c o u r t t h a t " t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r p u b l i c b e n e f i t [was] outweighed by t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r p u b l i c b e n e f i t i n v o l v e d i n u p h o l d -C l a u s e 3. i n g t he p r i v a c y of the i n f o r m a t i o n " . 4 3 In the b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s , the c o u r t was t o take i n t o account a l l the circum-stances of the case, i n c l u d i n g the "extent and n a t u r e " of the use or d i s c l o s u r e j u s t i f i e d by the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or p u b l i c b e n e f i t ; the manner i n which the i n f o r m a t i o n was ac-q u i r e d by the defendant; and the time which had e l a p s e d s i n c e the events which were the s u b j e c t of the p r i v a t e i n -f o r m a t i o n . 4 4 As i n Mr Walden's b i l l , 4 5 the c o u r t would have had the power t o award damages, g r a n t an i n j u n c t i o n , o r d e r an ac-count of p r o f i t s , or o r d e r the d e l i v e r i n g up of documents and a r t i c l e s i n the defendant's p o s s e s s i o n by reason of the b r e a c h . 4 6 Mr Browne's b i l l "was approved by 98 v o t e s t o one a t i t s second r e a d i n g , but thus f a i l e d t o get the 100 v o t e s necessary t o push i t through t o the committee s t a g e " . 4 7 Another p r i v a t e member's b i l l , which would have p r o v i d e d a Clause 2 ( 1 ) . The c h o i c e of words here i s p u z z l i n g , as i t w i l l g e n e r a l l y be somewhat m i s l e a d i n g t o speak of a " p u b l i c " i n t e r e s t i n u p h o l d i n g the p r i v a c y of any s i n g l e item of i n f o r m a t i o n . Sometimes up h o l d i n g p r i v a c y may b e n e f i t a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t such as the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , but the main i n t e r e s t i n p r i v a c y i n any s i n g l e i n s t a n c e i s of course a p r i v a t e one; g e n e r a l l y i t i s o n l y when i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s i n p r i v a c y are aggregated t h a t i t i s c o r r e c t t o speak of a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r i -vacy. However, the c l a u s e makes sense i f one assumes t h a t i t r e f e r s t o the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n c o n s i s t e n t l y u p h o l d i n g the p r i v a c y of i n f o r m a t i o n of t h a t type i n s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 4 4 Clause 2 ( 2 ) . 4 5 Supra n 24, c l a u s e 4 ( 1 ) . 4 6 R i g h t of P r i v a c y B i l l 1989 (UK), c l a u s e 4 ( 1 ) . "Slamming the door on t h e i r f e e t " , supra n 37. r i g h t of r e p l y where f a c t u a l i n a c c u r a c i e s a f f e c t i n g a person or body of persons were p u b l i s h e d , a l s o f a i l e d . 4 8 However, as a r e s u l t of the s t r o n g support shown f o r both of these b i l l s by Members of P a r l i a m e n t on both s i d e s of the House, and the degree of p u b l i c concern over the behaviour of the t a b l o i d p r e s s , the government announced the f o r m a t i o n of a committee t o review p r e s s conduct, f o c u s i n g on p r i v a c y matters. C h a i r e d by David C a l c u t t , QC, the committee r e -c o n s i d e r e d i s s u e s on which the Younger Committee r e p o r t e d n e a r l y twenty years ago. At the time of w r i t i n g , the C a l c u t t Committee has j u s t p u b l i s h e d i t s recommendations. Before examining these, i t w i l l be h e l p f u l t o p r o v i d e some p e r s p e c t i v e by l o o k i n g b r i e f l y a t the p r e s e n t U n i t e d Kingdom Press C o u n c i l . The m a j o r i t y of the Younger Committee p l a c e d g r e a t r e l i a n c e on the p o t e n t i a l f o r a reformed C o u n c i l t o e f f e c t i v e l y handle complaints of breaches of p r i v a c y by the p r e s s . 5 0 However, D M Ross observed i n h i s M i n o r i t y Report t h a t "the Press C o u n c i l was o n l y s e t up by the p r e s s a f t e r s t r o n g p u b l i c p r e s s u r e , and I am bound t o say t h a t what I have l e a r n t about the P r e s s C o u n c i l has not g i v e n me any c o n f i d e n c e t h a t . . . s i i t handles complaints w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y . " 4 8 R i g h t of Reply B i l l 1989 (UK), p r e s e n t e d t o the House of Commons by Mr Tony Worthington, MP. 4 9 See " P r i v a c y invaded i n b a t t l e of t a b l o i d s " , The Times, 22 June 1990, p 6. 5 0 See the Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 54-55, and 203. 5 1 I b i d a t 214. I t i s submitted t h a t the experi e n c e of the succeeding y e a r s has borne out the view of the Press C o u n c i l as a r e l u c t a n t p r e s s c r e a t i o n designed p r i m a r i l y t o f o r e s t a l l attempts a t r e g u l a t i o n . 5 2 The C o u n c i l has implemented recom-mended reforms o n l y p a r t i a l l y , and w i t h much d e l a y . 5 3 One w r i t e r has commented t h a t : The c o u n c i l ' s d e c i s i o n s ... are f r e q u e n t l y t e r s e , un-reasoned and even d i f f i c u l t t o understand. Nor does i t seem t h a t any attempt i s made t o o f f e r any r e a l g u i d -ance as t o the manner i n which i t s " p o l i c y " i s a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s of p a r t i c u l a r cases. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e have been a number of a d j u d i c a t i o n s which are i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h each o t h e r . 5 4 Moreover, the C o u n c i l has no power t o impose s a n c t i o n s o t h e r than t o d i r e c t the newspaper t o p u b l i s h a c r i t i c a l ad-j u d i c a t i o n , 5 5 a f a c t which i n i t s e l f prompts the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t "the procedure cannot be s e r i o u s l y advanced as an a l -t e r n a t i v e t o l e g a l r e g u l a t i o n " . 5 6 There i s l i t t l e e vidence f o r the p r e s s ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the C o u n c i l i s "r e s p e c t e d , f e a r e d and o b e y e d " . 5 7 Rather, the f o l l o w i n g comment i s more p e r t i n e n t : 5 2 The e a r l y h i s t o r y of the Press C o u n c i l a l s o l e nds support t o t h i s view; see the Younger Committee Report, i b i d a t 39-40. 5 3 See A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 11, Unfair Publication:Defamation and Privacy (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1978), 11; Raymond Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, Modern L e g a l S t u d i e s S e r i e s (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980), 72, n 81; Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 7, a t p 165, n 41 and 42. 5 4 Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 7, a t p 164, n 38. 5 5 Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 45. 5 6 Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 7, a t 166. 5 7 Younger Committee Report, supra n 7, a t 44. B r i t i s h r e l i a n c e on gentlemanly s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n may have worked when newspaper owners were keener on r e -sp e c t than on cash. But when the Press C o u n c i l censured the Sun f o r i t s p r e g n a n t - r o y a l photo, the newspaper p r i n t e d i t a g a i n under the h e a d l i n e " T h i s i s what the row's about, f o l k s " . S i n c e t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l y c l o s e c o r r e l a t i o n between a newspaper's c i r c u l a t i o n and the number of complaints a g a i n s t i t t h a t the Press C o u n c i l upholds, t a b l o i d e d i t o r s r e g a r d i t s censures r a t h e r as a roue views notches on h i s b e d p o s t . 5 8 The C a l c u t t Committee unanimously recommended two major changes: a c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , and "to st r e n g t h e n v o l u n t a r y s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n t o the maximum degree C O p o s s i b l e " . 3 The government has announced i t s endorsement of both recommendations. As r e g a r d s s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n , the Committee proposed t h a t the p r e s s be g i v e n "one f i n a l chance t o ... put i t s own house i n o r d e r " . 6 0 I t recommended t h a t the p r e s s should im-me d i a t e l y s e t up and fund a Press Complaints Commission t o r e p l a c e the Press C o u n c i l . The C a l c u t t Committee's r e p o r t s t a t e d t h a t the Commission "must be seen t o be a u t h o r i t a -t i v e , independent and i m p a r t i a l " , ^ and i t was c o n s i d e r e d " p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o emphasise the break from the p a s t " . The new Commission would have an independent c h a i r 5 8 "Slamming the door on t h e i r f e e t " , supra n 37. The C a l c u t t r e p o r t as quoted i n R i c h a r d Evans, "Support f o r h o t l i n e t o stop p u b l i c a t i o n of i n t r u s i v e r e p o r t s " , The Times, 22 June 1990, p 6. A l l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n as t o the Committee's recommendations and the government's response i s based on r e p o r t s i n The Times, 22 June 1990, pp 1, 6, 12. fi o R i c h a r d Evans, " B r i t i s h p r e s s gets one-year d e a d l i n e " , The Times, 22 June 1990, p 1, q u o t i n g the C a l c u t t r e p o r t . 6 1 I b i d , q u o t i n g the C a l c u t t r e p o r t . I b i d , q u o t i n g the C a l c u t t r e p o r t . and up t o twelve members, t o be appointed by an Appointments Commission which would i t s e l f be independently appointed. U n l i k e the Press C o u n c i l , i t would not a l s o be concerned w i t h promoting freedom of the p r e s s , "and so would not be tugged between two o f t e n i n c o m p a t i b l e i d e a l s " . 6 3 The r e p o r t i n c l u d e d a new e i g h t e e n - p o i n t code of p r a c -t i c e which the Committee s a i d should be p u b l i s h e d , monitored and implemented by the Press Complaints Commission. Appar-e n t l y "the s e c t i o n s on p r i v a c y and i n t r u s i o n i n t o g r i e f and shock are n o t i c e a b l y s t r i c t e r than p r e v i o u s g u i d e l i n e s " . I n t r u s i o n s i n t o an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l l i f e and un-s o l i c i t e d approaches t o the r e c e n t l y bereaved would be unac-c e p t a b l e except f o r the purpose of d e t e c t i n g or exposing crime o r s e r i o u s l y a n t i - s o c i a l conduct, p r o t e c t i n g p u b l i c h e a l t h or s a f e t y , or p r e v e n t i n g the p u b l i c from b e i n g m i s l e d by some p u b l i c statement or a c t i o n of t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . An i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l l i f e would be d e f i n e d t o i n c l u d e mat-t e r s of h e a l t h , home, p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , correspondence and documents, but not t r a d e or busi n e s s matters. The p r o -posed g u i d e l i n e s a l s o s t a t e t h a t the p r e s s should not i n t r u d e i n t o p e r s o n a l g r i e f or shock, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the aft e r m a t h of a c c i d e n t s and t r a g e d i e s . 6 5 The proposed Commission would however have no c o e r c i v e powers a t a l l . The main s a n c t i o n a t i t s d i s p o s a l would s t i l l 6 3 "Waddington backs independent Press Complaints Commission", The Times, 22 June 1990, p 6, a response by Home S e c r e t a r y , David Waddington, t o the r e p o r t . 6 4 "Code g i v e s bereaved g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n " , The Times, 22 June 1990, p 6. 6 5 I b i d . be t o recommend the p u b l i c a t i o n of an adverse a d j u d i c a t i o n , or of a c o r r e c t i o n , r e p l y or apology i n a p p r o p r i a t e cases. I t would be a b l e t o s p e c i f y the form of such a p u b l i c a t i o n and the prominence i t should be g i v e n . I t c o u l d a l s o recom-mend t h a t an apology be g i v e n . p r i v a t e l y . The Committee r e j e c t e d submissions t h a t the Commission s h o u l d have powers t o d i s c i p l i n e e d i t o r s and j o u r n a l i s t s and f i n e or suspend p u b l i c a t i o n of newspapers i n s e r i o u s cases, s i n c e "any system of approved or r e g i s t e r e d p u b l i c a t i o n s and j o u r n a l i s t s i s c l e a r l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h freedom of the p r e s s " . 6 6 Although the Committee had some sympathy f o r the i d e a of compensation f o r those whose p r i v a c y had been i n -vaded, i t f e l t t h a t the award of compensatory damages would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a n o n - s t a t u t o r y commission. However, i t recommended t h a t complainants should not have t o waive t h e i r r i g h t s t o l e g a l a c t i o n as they do a t p r e s e n t under the P r e s s C o u n c i l , so compensation might be a v a i l a b l e from the c o u r t s where some o t h e r cause of a c t i o n such as defamation c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . The r e p o r t d i d recommend t h a t t h e r e be some way of a t -tempting t o r e s t r a i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of i n t r u s i v e r e p o r t s . I t suggested t h a t a twenty-four-hour " h o t l i n e " be funded by the p r e s s . People who suspected t h a t i n t r u s i v e m a t e r i a l was about t o be p u b l i s h e d c o u l d thereby n o t i f y the Commission, which c o u l d c o n t a c t e d i t o r s and r e q u est t h a t they d e s i s t from p u b l i c a t i o n . Of course, i f e d i t o r s chose t o p u b l i s h anyway, t h e r e would be n o t h i n g the Commission c o u l d do ex-6 6 "Support f o r h o t l i n e " , supra n 59, q u o t i n g the C a l c u t t r e p o r t . cept t o recommend the p u b l i c a t i o n of an a d j u d i c a t i o n , r e p l y or apology. There i s some i n c e n t i v e f o r the newspaper i n d u s t r y as a whole t o make the Commission work. The r e p o r t recommended t h a t i f the p r e s s d i d not s e t up the proposed Commission, or i f t h e r e was a s e r i o u s breakdown i n s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n , then a s t a t u t o r y t r i b u n a l should be e s t a b l i s h e d , w i t h power t o gr a n t i n j u n c t i o n s and award damages. The government has i n -t e n s i f i e d t h i s ultimatum by announcing a time l i m i t of one year f o r the p r e s s t o s e t up the new Commission, and another e i g h t e e n months or so f o r the Commission t o "prove i t s e l f " . I f t he government i s not s a t i s f i e d a f t e r t h i s t r i a l p e r i o d , i t " w i l l not f l i n c h from i n t r o d u c i n g s t a t u t o r y r e g u l a -t i o n " . 6 7 However, one member of the C a l c u t t committee i n ex-p l a i n i n g i t s f i n d i n g s noted: Some [newspaper e d i t o r s ] may p r e f e r a s t a t u t o r y t o a v o l u n t a r y system. The i n d u s t r y i s now f i e r c e l y i n t e r -n e c i n e . Corners get cut, and not j u s t by the t a b l o i d p r e s s . P u b l i s h e r s c o u l d p r e f e r the d i s c i p l i n e of the law t o keep t h e i r e d i t o r s , and the e d i t o r s of t h e i r r i v a l s , i n e t h i c a l check. They might welcome C a l c u t t ' s f a l l b a c k of a l e g a l t r i b u n a l funded by the s t a t e . I t would get them o f f the hook of i n t e r n a l d i s c i p l i n e . 6 8 Although t h i s member went on t o e x p l a i n h i s view t h a t a non-s t a t u t o r y system would be b e t t e r , the passage quoted h i n t s a t one problem of the n o n - s t a t u t o r y scheme. The more scrupu-l o u s newspapers end up i n e f f e c t s u b s i d i s i n g the o f f e n d i n g newspapers, s i n c e the c o s t s of running the complaints system 6 7 "Waddington backs independent Commission", supra n 63. 6 8 Simon J e n k i n s , "Framework f o r p r e s s freedom on o f f e r " , The Times, 22 June 1990, p 12. are a l l o c a t e d on some k i n d of n o - f a u l t b a s i s , whereas the reward of " c u t t i n g c o r n e r s " i s a d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i v e advan-tage. The s a n c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e seem q u i t e inadeqate. No doubt the g e n e r a l p u b l i c may f e e l some s a t i s f a c t i o n a t s e e i n g the o c c a s i o n a l apology f o r i n v a s i v e m a t e r i a l , and maybe some a l -l e v i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s of g u i l t f o r h a v i n g savoured the i n f o r m a t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . However, a f u r t h e r pub-l i c a t i o n w i l l u s u a l l y be of l i t t l e comfort t o the i n d i v i d u a l whose p r i v a t e l i f e has been exposed t o the p u b l i c gaze. G e n e r a l l y the l a s t t h i n g such persons w i l l want w i l l be t o draw any f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o themselves or the o f f e n d i n g m a t e r i a l . Even a p r i v a t e apology means ve r y l i t t l e when the i n d i v i d u a l i s o f f e r e d no compensation and knows ve r y w e l l t h a t the newspaper i s p r o b a b l y r e t a i n i n g p r o f i t s from the i n v a s i o n . The C a l c u t t Committee d i d r e c o g n i s e t h a t the s a n c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o the Commission would be inadequate f o r the worst forms of p h y s i c a l i n t r u s i o n . The Committee proposed t h a t t h e r e should be a new c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e of p h y s i c a l en-t r y i n t o p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , the p l a c i n g of bugging d e v i c e s on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , or the photographing of i n d i v i d u a l s or the r e c o r d i n g of t h e i r v o i c e s on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , without con-sent and f o r the purpose of o b t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p u b l i c a t i o n . P u b l i c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l u n l a w f u l l y o b t a i n e d would not i t s e l f be an o f f e n c e , but c o u l d be r e s t r a i n e d by i n j u n c t i o n or compensated i n damages and an account of p r o f -i t s g i v e n . There would be a defence where the a c t was committed under l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y , or f o r the purpose of p r e v e n t i n g , d e t e c t i n g o r exposing the commission of a crime or other se-r i o u s a n t i - s o c i a l conduct or f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of p u b l i c h e a l t h o r s a f e t y . A p p a r e n t l y the Committee was h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by the C O case o f Kaye v Robertson, d i s c u s s e d above, and thought " t h a t new o f f e n c e s ... should be t a i l o r e d t o p a r t i c u l a r mis-c h i e f o f t h i s k i n d " . 7 0 T h i s i n f l u e n c e may account f o r the r a t h e r a r b i t r a r y d e f i n i t i o n of what are regarded as the worst forms of i n v a s i o n . Some a c t i o n s f a l l i n g under the de f -i n i t i o n o f the o f f e n c e would a c t u a l l y be r e l a t i v e l y minor, whereas many more s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n s of p r i v a c y would not be caught by i t s p r o v i s i o n s . In summary then, the C a l c u t t Committee has somewhat a r -b i t r a r i l y s i n g l e d out c e r t a i n forms of p r i v a c y i n v a s i o n as wa r r a n t i n g c r i m i n a l p e n a l t i e s , w h i l e l e a v i n g most i n v a s i o n s without s a t i s f a c t o r y r e d r e s s . The recommendations w i l l o n l y p e r p e t u a t e the k i n d of anomalies t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t by v i r t u e of the i n d i r e c t p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y by oth e r common law remedies. New Zealand • • 71 The r e c e n t case of Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd i s n o t a b l e f o r having e l i c i t e d some of the s t r o n g e s t j u d i -See above, p 33-3 6. "Waddington backs independent Commission", supra n 63. [1986] 2 NZLR 716 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as Tucker). c i a l statements t o date w i t h i n the Commonwealth i n favour of a l e g a l r i g h t o f p r i v a c y , so i t w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d a t some l e n g t h . P r i o r t o t h i s case, the i s s u e had not been d i r e c t l y addressed by the New Zealand c o u r t s . The p l a i n t i f f , Mr Tucker, had been c o n v i c t e d of c e r t a i n c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e s , i n c l u d i n g o f f e n c e s of indecency, s e v e r a l y e a r s b e f o r e the events i n q u e s t i o n . He s u f f e r e d from a s e r i o u s h e a r t c o n d i t i o n , and h i s d o c t o r had d e c i d e d t h a t he needed a h e a r t t r a n s p l a n t o p e r a t i o n . I t was government p o l -i c y t h a t h e a r t t r a n s p l a n t s would not be c a r r i e d out i n New Zealand. Even though the New Zealand government o f f e r e d him tw i c e the normal grant, Mr Tucker s t i l l had i n s u f f i c i e n t funds t o t r a v e l t o A u s t r a l i a where he might o b t a i n a t r a n s -p l a n t o p e r a t i o n . So a p u b l i c fund r a i s i n g d r i v e was undertaken, and Mr Tucker "found h i m s e l f p r o p e l l e d r e l u c t a n t l y i n t o the l i m e -l i g h t " . J He was i n t e r v i e w e d on t e l e v i s i o n and r a d i o , and advertisements were p u b l i s h e d i n newspapers. The campaign y i e l d e d some p r i v a t e donations as w e l l as a pledge of up t o $30,000 from the B e l i n d a T r a i n o r T r u s t , which t o g e t h e r w i t h the government g r a n t more than covered the amount needed. Meanwhile, "a w h i s p e r i n g campaign was g a t h e r i n g momen-tum". 7 4 A r e p o r t e r v i s i t e d Mr Tucker and a d v i s e d him t h a t Truth had i n f o r m a t i o n t o the e f f e c t t h a t he had been con-^ See R G Glov e r , "The Ri g h t t o P r i v a c y " (1983) 2 Cant L Rev 51. For d i s c u s s i o n of the Tucker d e c i s i o n s , see a l s o L a s t e r , supra n 7. 3 Tucker, supra n 71, a t 72 6. 4 I b i d a t 726. v i c t e d o f c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e s . Mr T u c k e r ' s d o c t o r , o b s e r v i n g how d i s t r a u g h t h i s p a t i e n t was a f t e r t h e v i s i t , and c o n -s c i o u s t h a t s t r e s s c o u l d be h a r m f u l and perhaps l e t h a l f o r a p e r s o n i n Mr T u c k e r ' s c o n d i t i o n , approached t h e e d i t o r o f Truth and p l e a d e d f o r e d i t o r i a l r e s t r a i n t . The d o c t o r was l e f t w i t h t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t Truth i n t e n d e d t o p u b l i s h . An i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e p u b l i s h e r o f Truth was g r a n t e d by J e f f r i e s J i n t h e H i g h C o u r t , r e s t r a i n i n g any p u b l i c a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . The C o u r t o f A p p e a l h e a r d and d i s m i s s e d an u r g e n t a p p e a l a g a i n s t t h i s i n j u n c -t i o n . W i t h i n t h e next few d a y s , ex p a r t e i n j u n c t i o n s were g r a n t e d a g a i n s t t h e A u c k l a n d S t a r L t d and t h e B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n o f New Z e a l a n d , who had r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n t o a s i m i l a r e f f e c t . Mr T u c k e r , b e l i e v i n g t h a t he had s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s , t r a v e l l e d t o A u s t r a l i a t o be a s s e s s e d f o r a t r a n s p l a n t . How-e v e r , w h i l e he was t h e r e t h e T r a i n o r T r u s t wi thdrew i t s f u n d i n g w i t h o u t g i v i n g any r e a s o n , l e a v i n g Mr T u c k e r $20,000 s h o r t . Then a p r i v a t e r a d i o s t a t i o n , not a p a r t y t o t h e p r o -c e e d i n g s , b r o a d c a s t what t h e y a l l e g e d t o be d e t a i l s o f Mr T u c k e r ' s c o n v i c t i o n s . Most o f t h e p r i v a t e r a d i o s t a t i o n s i n New Z e a l a n d f o l l o w e d s u i t , and an A u s t r a l i a n newspaper r a n a f r o n t page l e a d e r on t h e m a t t e r . Mr T u c k e r had i s s u e d p r o c e e d i n g s f o r permanent i n j u n c -t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e t h r e e d e f e n d a n t s w i t h i n t h e t i m e s p e c i f i e d i n t h e i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n s . However, t h e d e f e n d a n t s d e c i d e d t o a p p l y f o r d i s c h a r g e o f t h e i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n . Hence t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e McGechan J , w h i c h was t o have been t h e s u b -s t a n t i v e h e a r i n g , was i n s t e a d d e a l i n g once agai n w i t h the i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n . During the h e a r i n g , the c o u r t was informed t h a t the A u s t r a l i a n h o s p i t a l had d e c i d e d a g a i n s t the proposed t r a n s -p l a n t o p e r a t i o n . McGechan J heard evidence of the l i k e l y e f f e c t of the p u b l i c a t i o n s on Mr Tucker's h e a l t h , and noted t h a t "the b r e a k i n g p o i n t f o r a c a r d i a c p a t i e n t can be unpre-d i c t a b l e " . 7 5 He a l s o mentioned t h a t Mr Tucker had a n i n e year o l d daughter, and commented: "There must a l s o be commu-n i t y concern f o r her i f h i s c o n v i c t i o n s are d i s c l o s e d . C h i l -dren can be t e r r i b l y c r u e l t o c h i l d r e n . " 7 6 On the i s s u e of whether t h e r e was a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n t o be t r i e d , McGechan J s t a t e d : T h i s f a c t o r causes a b s o l u t e l y no d i f f i c u l t i e s . J e f f r i e s J accepted the p o s s i b l e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the t o r t of i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of emotional d i s t r e s s or p h y s i -c a l damage. F u r t h e r , the l e a r n e d Judge d i d not withdraw from f i n d i n g f o r the f i r s t time i n New Zealand the ex-i s t e n c e of a t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . He regarded the l a t t e r as a n a t u r a l p r o g r e s s i o n from the f o r m e r . 7 7 I b i d a t 728. McGechan J a l s o noted (at 728 and a g a i n a t 734) the evidence of Mr Tucker's d o c t o r t h a t s e e i n g or h e a r i n g an adverse news item had never i n h i s l o n g expe-r i e n c e caused immediate death. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e r e was r e c e n t l y an item on the f r o n t page of the Sunday Star (Auckland, 20 May 1990) r e p o r t i n g t h a t a woman who had a h e a r t c o n d i t i o n d i e d suddenly a f t e r a t e l e v i s i o n crew a r r i v e d unannounced a t her home. Her husband, a Yugoslav immigrant, had been l i n k e d w i t h Nazi war crimes a f t e r h i s b i r t h d a t e was one of e i g h t r e l e a s e d t o the New Zealand government and the media by the Wiesenthal Centre the week b e f o r e . Tucker, supra n 71, a t 728. I b i d a t 731. In h i s judgment, McGechan J quoted the r e l e v a n t pas-sages from the judgments of J e f f r i e s J and the Court of Ap-p e a l , and s a i d : "Nothing has changed s i n c e those r u l i n g s which would persuade me t h a t I can or should d i f f e r . " 7 8 The f o l l o w i n g , i s an e x t r a c t from the judgment of J e f f r i e s J : I t seemed t o the Court t h a t i t was a b l e i n the circum-s t a n c e s t o take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of the f a c t t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had been p r o p e l l e d i n t o the g l a r e of p u b l i c -i t y by events of a h i g h l y p o l i t i c a l n a ture c o n c e r n i n g the p r o v i s i o n of h e a l t h s e r v i c e s i n t h i s country, and over which he p e r s o n a l l y had no c o n t r o l . I am aware of the development i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c -t i o n s of the t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y and t h e f a c t s of t h i s case seem t o r a i s e such an i s s u e i n a dramatic form. A person who l i v e s an o r d i n a r y p r i v a t e l i f e has a r i g h t t o be l e f t alone and t o l i v e the p r i v a t e a s p e c t s of h i s l i f e without being s u b j e c t e d t o unwarranted, or u n d e s i r e d , p u b l i c i t y or p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . O b v i o u s l y such a r i g h t must be s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n e x c e p t i o n s , but on the s t a t e of the evidence b e f o r e the Court the p l a i n t i f f does not seem t o come w i t h i n one of them.... h i s involvement appears a t t h i s p o i n t t o have been u n i n t e n t i o n a l on h i s p a r t . . . . The g i s t of the a c t i o n , u n l i k e defamation, i s not i n j u r y t o c h a r a c t e r or r e p u t a t i o n , but t o one^s f e e l -i n g s and peace of mind.... The gravamen of the a c t i o n i s unwarranted p u b l i c a t i o n of i n t i m a t e d e t a i l s of the p l a i n t i f f ' s p r i v a t e l i f e which are o u t s i d e the realm of l e g i t i m a t e p u b l i c concern, or c u r i o s i t y . I t f o l l o w s i n such circumstances as a matter of l o g i c , t h a t i f a p e r -son's r i g h t of p r i v a c y has been, or i s t o be v i o l a t e d , i t i s no defence t h a t what was, or i s t o be p u b l i s h e d , i s c o r r e c t or p u b l i s h e d without m a l i c e . In my view the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i n the c i r c u m -s t a n c e s b e f o r e the Court may p r o v i d e the p l a i n t i f f w i t h a v a l i d cause of a c t i o n i n t h i s c ountry. I t seems a n a t u r a l p r o g r e s s i o n of the t o r t o f . i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c -t i o n of emotional d i s t r e s s and i n accordance w i t h the renowned a b i l i t y of the common law t o p r o v i d e a remedy f o r a w r o n g . 7 9 The Court of Appeal judgment u p h o l d i n g the i n t e r i m i n -j u n c t i o n was expressed somewhat more guardedly than e i t h e r ° I b i d a t 733. 9 I b i d a t 731-32. of the High Court judgments as regards the a v a i l a b i l i t y of an a c t i o n f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . However, the c o u r t d i d seem q u i t e open t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y i n New Zealand law. In the l i g h t of the "broad agreement among judges and academics" a t t h a t time t h a t " i n the Commonwealth t h e r e [was] no g e n e r a l l e g a l r i g h t t o p r i -v a c y " , 8 0 even the f i n d i n g of the Court of Appeal t h a t t h e r e was a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n t o be t r i e d i n t h i s area was q u i t e p o r t e n t o u s . The c o u r t s t a t e d : We agree w i t h the Judge t h a t the a l l e g a t i o n s r a i s e s e r i o u s arguable and indeed important and d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s . I t i s enough t o read two passages from Salmond and Heuston on Torts (18th ed, 1981) . A t p 3 3 t h e r e i s the f o l l o w i n g : " . . . t h e r e are cases i n which complaint i s made about the p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of embarrassing p r i v a t e f a c t s about the p l a i n t i f f - f o r example, t h a t he does not pay h i s debts. In the l e a d i n g American case the de-fendant p u b l i s h e d t o the world an account of the p l a i n t i f f ' s e a r l y c a r e e r as a p r o s t i t u t e and the ac-cused i n a s e n s a t i o n a l murder t r i a l . The p l a i n t i f f , who had q u i t e l e f t a s i d e her e a r l i e r l i f e o f shame and now moved i n r e s p e c t a b l e s o c i e t y , r e c o v e r e d dam-ages. U n t i l the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n of O f f e n d e r s A c t 1974 the defendants would have had the defence of j u s t i -f i c a t i o n i f sued f o r l i b e l i n such a case i n Eng-l a n d . " 8 1 The second passage r e l a t e d t o the t o r t of i n t e n t i o n a l i n -f l i c t i o n o f emotional d i s t r e s s . The Court of Appeal c o n t i n -ued as f o l l o w s : The r e l e v a n t law of New Zealand i s f a r from c l e a r l y s e t t l e d i n e i t h e r area. We add o n l y t h a t we agree w i t h Miss Moran t h a t the extent of any defence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n would r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . We have i n mind i n p a r t i c u l a r the argument t h a t a p l a i n t i f f who Burns, " P r i v a c y and the Common Law", supra n 7, a t 22. Tucker, supra n 71, a t 732. The case r e f e r r e d t o i s Melvin v Reid ( a l s o known as the Red Kimono c a s e ) , 297 P 91 (1931). makes an appeal t o the p u b l i c f o r funds may i n some circumstances have t o accept a c e r t a i n amount of i n v e s -t i g a t i o n of h i s h i s t o r y . No view would now be a p p r o p r i -a t e on t h a t or any o t h e r aspect of the u l t i m a t e l e g a l i s s u e s i n the case. Although McGechan J reached the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the i n j u n c t i o n s should be d i s c h a r g e d , t h i s was l a r g e l y because the p u b l i c a t i o n of a l l e g e d o f f e n c e s by news media^ which were not p a r t y t o the i n j u n c t i o n s had c l e a r l y rendered the i n -j u n c t i o n s f u t i l e , and " J u s t i c e , as i n the famous s t a t u e , c e r t a i n l y s h o u l d appear b l i n d , but should not appear s t u p i d . " 8 3 In f a c t , of a l l t h r e e judgments, McGechan J's c o n t a i n e d the s t r o n g e s t statements i n favour of a t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . A f t e r q u o t i n g the passages s e t out above, he d e c l a r e d : Indeed, a l b e i t w i t h c a u t i o n and h e s i t a t i o n i n the ab-sence of c o n s i d e r e d argument on the p o i n t and the warn-in g s as t o d i f f i c u l t y sounded by the Court of Appeal, I go f u r t h e r . I support the i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o the New Zealand common law of a t o r t c o v e r i n g i n v a s i o n of p e r -s o n a l p r i v a c y a t l e a s t by p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of p r i v a t e f a c t s . . . . While the American a u t h o r i t i e s have a degree of f o u n d a t i o n upon c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s not a v a i l -a b l e i n New Zealand, the good sense and s o c i a l d e s i r -a b i l i t y of the p r o t e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d are c o m p e l l i n g . I do not t h i n k i t beyond the common law t o adapt the Wilkinson v Downtori p r i n c i p l e s t o s i g n i f i -c a n t l y develop the same f i e l d and t o meet the same needs. Beyond these e x p r e s s i o n s of support f o r the con-c e p t I w i l l not p r e s e n t l y go, although I observe t h a t the need f o r p r o t e c t i o n whether through the law of t o r t o r by s t a t u t e i n a day of i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a t i o n p r e s -Tucker, supra n 71, a t 732. I t seems t h a t the c o u r t must have been u s i n g " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " i n the wider sense of the word, t o mean not merely t r u t h but some o t h e r element such as p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . T h i s f i t s w i t h the c o n t e x t , and the c o u r t c o u l d s u r e l y not have meant t h a t i t was arguable t h a t t r u t h alone might be a defence i n a p r i v a c y a c t i o n . I f t h a t were so, t h e r e would be n o t h i n g l e f t o f the t o r t save " f a l s e l i g h t " i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . 3 I b i d a t 736. ) sures and computerised i n f o r m a t i o n r e t r i e v a l systems i s becoming more and more p r e s s i n g . I f the t o r t i s ac-cepted as e s t a b l i s h e d , i t s boundaries and e x c e p t i o n s w i l l need much working out on a case by case b a s i s so as t o s u i t the c o n d i t i o n s of t h i s c o u n t r y . I f the l e g -i s l a t u r e i n t e r v e n e s d u r i n g the p r o c e s s , so much the b e t t e r . 8 4 McGechan J ended h i s judgment w i t h a more urgent c a l l f o r l e g i s l a t i v e reform, and an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he viewed the development of p r i v a c y law as not o n l y p o s s i b l e but impera-t i v e . He a f f i r m e d t h a t "something must be done w i t h urgency" w i t h r e g a r d t o : L e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n on some comprehensive b a s i s d e t e r -mining the e x t e n t of the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y and the r e l a -t i o n s h i p of t h a t r i g h t t o freedom of speech. As t h i s case shows, the Courts are being f o r c e d i n t o a p o s i t i o n where they must soon c r e a t e new law as they see appro-p r i a t e . T h i s process which w i l l be p a i n f u l and expen-s i v e t o the l i t i g a n t s i n v o l v e d , might not be thought the i d e a l approach. I t w i l l however be n e c e s s a r y i f n o t h i n g i s done. The judgment a l s o d i s c u s s e d some matters r e l e v a n t t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of a p r i v a c y t o r t t o the media. McGechan J a f f i r m e d t h a t " g r e a t care must be taken t o p r e s e r v e freedom I b i d a t 733. One aspect of New Zealand s o c i e t y t h a t might l e a d t o p r i v a c y law d e v e l o p i n g d i f f e r e n t l y t h e r e from elsewhere i n the Commonwealth i s the s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n . McGechan J remarked, "In New Zealand once the p r o v e r b i a l c a t i s out of the bag her progeny spread l i k e l i g h t n i n g " (736). T h i s f a c t o r was r e c o g n i s e d r e c e n t l y when the Simon Wiesenthal Centre a p o l o g i s e d f o r r e l e a s i n g a l i s t o f suspected war c r i m i n a l s t o the New Zealand news media b e f o r e the government reduced i t . The Centre s a i d they had not understood what a s m a l l community i t was i n New Zealand, or what s m a l l e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s were i n v o l v e d . See Tim Murphy, "Nazi hunters send apology t o Palmer", New Zealand Herald, 22 May 1990, sec 1, p 1. The need t o c o n s i d e r New Zealand c o n d i t i o n s r a t h e r than simply f o l -low overseas developments was emphasised by G e o f f r e y Palmer i n " P r i v a c y and the Law" [1975] NZLJ 747. Tucker, supra n 71, a t 737. of speech and i t s a s s o c i a t e d freedom of i n f o r m a t i o n " . 8 6 How-ever, he went on t o d i s t i n g u i s h a defamation a c t i o n , i n which c o u r t s are r e l u c t a n t t o g r a n t i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n j u n c -t i o n s i f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be pleaded, from a p r i v a c y ac-t i o n , i n which j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a " d o u b t f u l defence a r e a " . 8 7 He concluded, "I r e g a r d freedom of speech as important i n the p r e s e n t case, but by no means the d e c i s i v e element which the news media seeks t o demand." In the c o n t e x t of weighing p r i v a c y as a f a c t o r i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of o v e r a l l j u s t i c e , McGechan J d i s c u s s e d the r e l e v a n c e of the p l a i n t i f f having sought p u b l i c i t y . He seemed t o approach i t as a q u e s t i o n of consent r a t h e r than Q Q of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , s t a t i n g : I t may w e l l be t h a t a person l o s e s a r i g h t t o p r i v a c y by p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f t o the p u b l i c eye f o r e v a l u a t i o n . T h i s concept i s w e l l r e c o g n i s e d i n American p r i v a c y law, and i t i s not unknown t o our own law i n the some-what cognate f i e l d of breach of c o n f i d e n c e . I r e f e r f o r example t o Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760 (CA) . In t h a t case a well-known group of s i n g e r s who had ac-t i v e l y sought p u b l i c i t y encountered the g r a v e s t of d i f -f i c u l t i e s i n o b t a i n i n g an i n j u n c t i o n f a v o u r i n g t h e i r p r i v a c y a g a i n s t a former manager on the b a s i s of a breach of c o n f i d e n c e a c t i o n . No doubt the Court of Ap-p e a l had t h i s i n mind when i t r e f e r r e d t o the p l a i n t i f f who makes an appeal t o the p u b l i c f o r funds. In t h i s case Mr Tucker undoubtedly d i d put h i m s e l f and h i s c h a r a c t e r forward t o the p u b l i c when a p p e a l i n g f o r funds through the media. By doing t h a t he i n v i t e d some degree of examination of h i s p e r s o n a l background and "worth" i n the eyes of persons c o n s i d e r i n g r e q u e s t s f o r a s s i s t a n c e . However, on the f a c t s of t h i s case I do not p l a c e undue weight on t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o p r i v a c y . Mr Tucker was a r e l u c t a n t debutante so f a r as p u b l i c expo-6 I b i d a t 734. 7 I b i d a t 735, r e f e r r i n g t o the Court of Appeal judgment. See above, note 82. 8 T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and i t s importance when d i s c u s s i n g the n o t i o n of a p u b l i c f i g u r e w i l l be addressed i n c hapter 5. sure was concerned. I t gave him no p l e a s u r e , and was f o r c e d upon him by a desperate need f o r funds f o r what then was p e r c e i v e d t o be a l i f e s a v i n g o p e r a t i o n . There i s some element of u n f a i r n e s s i n h o l d i n g t h a t i n -e v i t a b l e s i t u a t i o n a g a i n s t h i m . 8 9 In so f i n d i n g , McGechan J adopted an a t t i t u d e r a t h e r more sympathetic t o the p l a i n t i f f than the a t t i t u d e adopted i n some American c a s e s . 9 0 As t o the way i n which the i n j u n c t i o n s were a b l e t o be "subverted by the a c t s of non p a r t i e s who [were] not t e c h n i -c a l l y bound" by them, McGechan J suggested a s t a t u t o r i l y c r e a t e d nominal defendant f o r media i n j u n c t i o n purposes, judgements a g a i n s t which would b i n d a l l components of the media. T h i s seems a s e n s i b l e and p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n , and c o u l d a l s o h e l p w i t h the problem of needing t o e s t a b l i s h w i t h r e s p e c t t o each and every defendant t h a t p u b l i c a t i o n i s i n t e n d e d . 9 2 In the Tucker case, then, the New Zealand c o u r t s have expressed a degree of w i l l i n g n e s s and even urgency t o develop some form of l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y w i t h or without t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e . 9 3 Notably, a l l 8 9 Tucker, supra n 71, a t 735, 9 0 For example i n Sidis v F-R Publishing Co, 113 F 2d 806 (1940). 9 1 Tucker, supra n 71, a t 737. 9 2 Mr Tucker had t r o u b l e s a t i s f y i n g t h i s requirement; see Tucker, supra n 71, a t 733. 9 3 D a n i e l L a s t e r , supra n 7, a t 59, s t a t e s : "Read t o g e t h e r , the t h r e e Tucker judgments s t r o n g l y support a t o r t o f i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . In f a c t , J e f f r i e s and McGechan J J e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i s e the t o r t . In view of these d e c i s i o n s , c o n t i n u e d adherence i n New Zealand t o the t h r e e h e a r i n g s were h e l d i n camera, 4 as was e s s e n t i a l i f the proceedings were not t o be rendered f u t i l e . The case a l s o demonstrates the a b i l i t y of the j u d i c i a l system t o han-d l e p r i v a c y matters w i t h remarkable e x p e d i t i o n where neces-s a r y . 9 5 However, g i v e n the s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n of the country, i t c o u l d be some time b e f o r e the i s s u e a g a i n reaches the c o u r t s . Meanwhile, t h e r e are many s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s which p r o t e c t p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s , a few of which were mentioned i n the Tucker c a s e . 9 6 Such p r o v i s i o n s not o n l y have d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n but a l s o , t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements t o which New Zealand i s a p a r t y , g i v e some i n d i c a t i o n t o New Zealand c o u r t s of the d i r e c t i o n s i n which the common law should be developed. As Cooke P has s t a t e d : ...[W]e i n New Zealand are i n c r e a s i n g l y g i v i n g weight [to t h e p r i n c i p l e ] t h a t the e v o l u t i o n of Judge-made law may be i n f l u e n c e d by the ideas of the l e g i s l a t u r e as r e f l e c t e d i n contemporary s t a t u t e s and by ot h e r c u r r e n t t r e n d s . 9 7 One w r i t e r has concluded t h a t , i n New Zealand, "Recent l e g i s l a t i v e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments make the case f o r adage t h a t no r i g h t o f p r i v a c y e x i s t s would appear t o be mi s p l a c e d . " The h e a r i n g b e f o r e McGechan J was a m o d i f i e d form of i n camera h e a r i n g ; r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the news media were p e r m i t t e d t o at t e n d , but not t o p u b l i s h d e t a i l s of the pro c e e d i n g s . See Tucker, supra n 71, a t 72 0. See McGechan J's account of the proceedings, i b i d a t 719-21. I b i d a t 73 3. See a l s o L a s t e r , supra n 7, a t 60. Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443 a t 451 (CA); as quoted i n L a s t e r , supra n 7, a t 59. j u d i c i a l e v o l u t i o n o f a common law r i g h t o f p r i v a c y overwhelming." S e c t i o n 67 of the Human R i g h t s Commission A c t 1977 s e t s f o r t h t he f u n c t i o n s of the Human R i g h t s Commission i n r e l a -t i o n t o p r i v a c y . The Commission does not have any c o e r c i v e powers i n t h i s area, but has a ve r y broad i n f o r m a t i o n -g a t h e r i n g and r e p o r t i n g mandate. I t s f u n c t i o n s a r e : t o i n q u i r e g e n e r a l l y i n t o matters a f f e c t i n g p r i v a c y whether governmental o r not; t o r e p o r t t o the Prime M i n i s t e r on the need f o r or d e s i r a b i l i t y of t a k i n g any a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y , o r on any oth e r matter r e l a t i n g t o p r i v a c y ; t o make su g g e s t i o n s t o any person r e g a r d i n g the need f o r or d e s i r -a b i l i t y o f a c t i o n by t h a t person i n the i n t e r e s t s of p r i -vacy; t o gather i n f o r m a t i o n t o a s s i s t i t i n i t s f u n c t i o n s ; t o take r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from members of the p u b l i c ; and t o make p u b l i c statements r e g a r d i n g any matter a f f e c t i n g p r i -vacy. The Commission i s not empowered t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n d i -v i d u a l complaints, but may choose t o i n q u i r e g e n e r a l l y i n t o matters t h a t come t o i t s a t t e n t i o n i n t h i s w a y . 1 0 0 B r o a d c a s t i n g bodies i n New Zealand, both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , have a s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p e c t p e r s o n a l p r i -vacy under the B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t 1 9 8 9 . 1 0 1 The A c t s t a t e s : 9 8 L a s t e r , supra n 7, a t 59. 9 9 S e c t i o n 67(1). 1 0 0 See s e c t i o n 67(3). 1 0 1 I t s p r e decessor, the B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t 1976, which a l s o p r o v i d e d f o r complaints about p r i v a c y i n v a s i o n s , i s d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y i n Glover, supra n 72, a t 60-61. Every b r o a d c a s t e r i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g i n i t s programmes and t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n , standards which are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h -(a) The observance of good t a s t e and decency; and (c) The p r i v a c y of the i n d i v i d u a l . . . . 1 0 2 I t i s e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e s h a l l be no c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i n r e s p e c t of any f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h these • • 103 p r o v i s i o n s . However, formal complaints about programmes which do not comply w i t h the r e q u i s i t e standards may be lodged w i t h the b r o a d c a s t e r . The b r o a d c a s t e r i s o b l i g e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e the c o m p l a i n t 1 0 4 and, i f the complaint i s found t o be j u s t i f i e d , i n whole or i n p a r t , t o "take a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n " . 1 0 5 I f the complainant i s d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the d e c i s i o n or w i t h the a c t i o n taken, or has not been g i v e n n o t i c e of the d e c i s i o n or of the a c t i o n taken w i t h i n s i x t y working days, the complainant may r e f e r the complaint t o the 1 O 6 B r o a d c a s t i n g Standards A u t h o r i t y . P r i v a c y complaints, however, may be r e f e r r e d d i r e c t l y t o the A u t h o r i t y . 1 0 7 The A u t h o r i t y c o n s i s t s of f o u r members appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the M i n i s t e r of S e c t i o n 4 ( 1 ) . A l s o , r e c i p i e n t s of government f u n d i n g f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of programmes must undertake t h a t the programmes w i l l be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h these standards; see s 40. 1 0 3 S e c t i o n 4 ( 3 ) . 1 0 4 S e c t i o n 6 ( 1 ) . 1 0 5 S e c t i o n 7 ( 1 ) . 1 0 6 S e c t i o n 8. 1 0 7 S e c t i o n 8 ( c ) . B r o a d c a s t i n g . u o I t s f u n c t i o n s i n c l u d e , as w e l l as d t e r m i n i n g complaints, i s s u i n g " t o any or a l l b r o a d c a s t e r s , a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s r e l a t i n g t o b r o a d c a s t i n g standards and e t h i c a l conduct i n b r o a d c a s t i n g " . U 3 The A u t h o r i t y may d e c l i n e t o determine a complaint i f i t c o n s i d e r s t h a t the complaint i s " f r i v o l o u s , v e x a t i o u s , or t r i v i a l " o r " t h a t , i n a l l the circumstances of the complaint, i t should not be determined by the A u t h o r i t y " . 1 1 0 I f t he A u t h o r i t y d e c i d e s t h a t a complaint i s j u s t i f i e d , i n whole or i n p a r t , i t may make any one or more of the f o l l o w i n g o r d e r s : (a) an order d i r e c t i n g the b r o a d c a s t e r t o p u b l i s h , i n a s p e c i f i e d manner and w i t h i n a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d , a statement which r e l a t e s t o the complaint and i s approved by the A u t h o r i t y f o r the purpose; (b) an order d i r e c t i n g the b r o a d c a s t e r t o r e f r a i n from b r o a d c a s t i n g , o r from b r o a d c a s t i n g advertisements, f o r up t o twenty-four hours, a t a s p e c i f i e d time, f o r each o f f e n d i n g programme; (c) an o r d e r r e f e r r i n g the complaint back t o the b r o a d c a s t e r f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n and d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n accordance w i t h such d i r e c t i o n s or g u i d e l i n e s as the A u t h o r i t y t h i n k s f i t ; and (d) an o r d e r d i r e c t i n g the b r o a d c a s t e r t o pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 by way of compensation t o an i n d i v i d u a l 111 whose p r i v a c y has been i n f r i n g e d . 1 0 8 S e c t i o n 26(1). 1 0 9 S e c t i o n 2 1 ( 1 ) ( d ) . 1 1 0 S e c t i o n 11. 1 1 1 S e c t i o n 13(1). The b r o a d c a s t e r must comply w i t h any such o r d e r and must n o t i f y the A u t h o r i t y and the complainant of the manner i n which the order has been complied w i t h . 1 1 2 F a i l u r e t o comply w i t h such an order i s an o f f e n c e p u n i s h a b l e by a f i n e not exceeding $100,000. 1 1 3 A d e c i s i o n or o r d e r of the A u t h o r i t y , i n c l u d i n g a d e c i s i o n not t o determine a complaint, may be appealed t o the High C o u r t . 1 1 4 I t i s noteworthy t h a t the B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t s i n g l e s out p r i v a c y complaints from o t h e r types of complaints, i n a l l o w i n g the p r i v a c y complainant t o bypass the b r o a d c a s t e r and go d i r e c t l y t o the independent A u t h o r i t y . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n the l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t one of the p r i n c i p l e s on which the r e l e v a n t P a r t of t h e A c t i s e x p r e s s l y based i s t h a t , although an independent complaints procedure must be a v a i l a b l e , 1 1 5 "most complaints t h a t are capable of being r e s o l v e d by an independent complaints procedure should not. be r e q u i r e d t o be r e s o l v e d by t h a t procedure but should be capable of being r e s o l v e d by proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n and proper response on the p a r t of the b r o a d c a s t e r " . X D The s p e c i a l treatment g i v e n t o p r i v a c y complaints suggests t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e suspected t h a t , u n l i k e o t h e r k i n d s of complaints, they would not 1 1 2 S e c t i o n 13(3). 1 1 3 S e c t i o n 14. 1 1 4 S e c t i o n 18(1). 1 1 5 See s e c t i o n 5(b) 1 1 6 S e c t i o n 5 ( g ) . g e n e r a l l y be capable of s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s o l u t i o n by the b r o a d c a s t e r i t s e l f . 1 1 7 The complaints procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by the A c t avo i d s t h e major shortcomings of the U n i t e d Kingdom Press C o u n c i l . The A u t h o r i t y i s independent, and compliance w i t h i t s o r d e r s i s mandatory. I t has the power t o p e n a l i s e a b r o a d c a s t e r by an order t o r e f r a i n from b r o a d c a s t i n g f o r up t o twenty-four hours, and the power t o gr a n t compensation t o an i n d i v i d u a l whose p r i v a c y i s invaded. The A u t h o r i t y r e c e n t l y o r d e r e d an Auckland r a d i o s t a t i o n t o pay f i v e hundred d o l l a r s by way of . . l i f t . . . compensation t o a complainant. x o As w i t h the U n i t e d Kingdom Press C o u n c i l , anyone may complain and not o n l y the person whose p r i v a c y was i n f r i n g e d . However, the A c t a p p l i e s o n l y t o b r o a d c a s t e r s and not to t he p r i n t media. A l s o , w h i l e the p r e v i o u s A c t p r o v i d e d t h a t p r i v a c y complaints were t o be heard i n p r i v a t e , 1 1 9 the new A c t c o n t a i n s no such p r o v i s i o n , and s t i p u l a t e s t h a t the A u t h o r i t y must g i v e p u b l i c n o t i c e of i t s d e c i s i o n s . 1 2 0 The 1 1 7 In f a c t , under the p r e v i o u s Act, t h e r e was not even the o p t i o n o f l o d g i n g a p r i v a c y complaint w i t h the broad-c a s t e r f i r s t ; see B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t 1976, s 9 5 ( 3 ) ( c ) . 11R • xxo n j 3 i a s t f o r d i s c j o c k e y s " , New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1990. Two d i s c jockeys from the s t a t i o n had encouraged l i s t e n e r s t o telephone the complainant, a Maori a c t i v i s t , f o l l o w i n g p u b l i c statements by the complainant which the d i s c jockeys regarded as being r a c i s t . The complainant had r e c e i v e d abusive and obscene c a l l s a t a l l hours of the n i g h t f o r t h r e e weeks. "The a u t h o r i t y d e c i s i o n s a i d t h a t , even i f Dr Walker's p r i v a c y had not been i n f r i n g e d , the broadcast would s t i l l have breached the a c t . " c f Robbins v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (Que) [1958] CS 152, 12 DLR (2d) 35 (Quebec S u p e r i o r C t ) . 1 1 9 B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t 1976, s 95V(2). 1 2 0 B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t 1989, s 15(1). f u r t h e r p u b l i c i t y i s l i k e l y t o i n h i b i t some p r i v a c y c o m p l a i n t s . The F a i r T r a d i n g A c t 1986 p r o v i d e s i n s e c t i o n 9 t h a t : "No person s h a l l , i n t r a d e , engage i n conduct t h a t i s mis-l e a d i n g or d e c e p t i v e or i s l i k e l y t o m i s l e a d or d e c e i v e . " An a c t i o n f o r breach of t h i s v e r y broad p r o v i s i o n i s analogous t o an a c t i o n i n t o r t , 1 2 1 and the remedies i n c l u d e i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and compensatory damages. The p u b l i c a t i o n of any i n f o r m a t i o n or matter i n a newspaper by the newspaper pub-l i s h e r , and the b r o a d c a s t i n g of any i n f o r m a t i o n or matter by a b r o a d c a s t i n g body are s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted from l i a b i l i t y under the A c t , except as regards a d v e r t i s i n g and promotional m a t e r i a l . 1 2 2 However, p u b l i c a t i o n by other media components such as some magazines c o u l d s t i l l a t t r a c t l i a b i l i t y i f i t • • , i p i i s m i s l e a d i n g or d e c e p t i v e . " Thus the A c t may cover some i n s t a n c e s of " f a l s e l i g h t " i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . F u r t h e r , s i n c e a c t i v i t i e s l e a d i n g t o p u b l i c a t i o n are not exempted, s e c t i o n 9 w i l l apply where " m i s l e a d i n g or d e c e p t i v e " methods have been used by the media t o o b t a i n m a t e r i a l f o r p u b l i c a t i o n , such as where an i n t e r v i e w has been o b t a i n e d by d e c e p t i o n . I t may be d i f f i c u l t f o r a p l a i n -t i f f t o prove t h a t he or she has s u f f e r e d " l o s s or damage" 1 2 1 See Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 63 ALR 600 (HC Aus), i n r e l a t i o n t o the v e r y s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s of the A u s t r a l i a n Trade P r a c t i c e s A c t 1974, on which the New Zealand A c t was based. C i t e d i n E l i z a b e t h K Paton, "A Comparison Between S e c t i o n 9 of the F a i r T r a d i n g A c t 1986 and the Common Law" (1988) 6 AULR 14, a t 22. 1 2 2 F a i r T r a d i n g A c t 1986, s 15. 1 2 3 See Paton, supra n 121, a t 36-37. i n such a case, even though damage t o r e p u t a t i o n i s cov-e r e d , 1 2 4 s i n c e the p u b l i c a t i o n i t s e l f i s exempt from l i a b i l -i t y . A l s o , by the nature of the breach, i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f w i l l seldom be of any use. In summary, the New Zealand p a r l i a m e n t has g i v e n r e c o g n i t i o n t o p r i v a c y as an important v a l u e , by i n c l u d i n g p r i v a c y concerns w i t h i n the v i g i l a n c e of the Human R i g h t s Commission, and making s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n f o r independent a d j u d i c a t i o n and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of pena l and compensatory remedies i n r e s p e c t of p r i v a c y complaints a g a i n s t b r o a d c a s t -e r s . As y e t , t h e r e i s no e q u i v a l e n t p r o t e c t i o n from p r e s s i n v a s i o n s , although the New Zealand c o u r t s have i n the Tucker case expressed r e a d i n e s s t o develop the law i n t h i s a r e a . A u s t r a l i a Any p o t e n t i a l f o r d e v e l o p i n g a r i g h t of p r i v a c y through the common law i n A u s t r a l i a w i l l be i n h i b i t e d by the d e c i -s i o n of the m a j o r i t y of the High Court of A u s t r a l i a i n Vic-toria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor.125 D e t a i l s of r a c e s being h e l d on the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d were be i n g s i m u l a t a n e o u s l y broadcast by the defendant, who was watching the r a c e s through b i n o c u l a r s from a p l a t f o r m e r e c t e d on neig h b o u r i n g l a n d . The m a j o r i t y o f the c o u r t h e l d t h a t the defendant's a c t i o n s d i d not c o n s t i t u t e a p r i v a t e nuisance, and t h a t t h e r e was no remedy f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i -1 2 4 I b i d a t 37. 125 ( 1 9 3 7 ) 5 8 CLR 479. vacy. As s t a t e d by Latham CJ: "However d e s i r a b l e some l i m i -t a t i o n upon i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y might be, no a u t h o r i t y was c i t e d which shows t h a t any g e n e r a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y e x i s t s . " 1 2 6 However, i n Bathurst City Council v S a b a n 1 2 7 t h e Victoria Park case was g i v e n a narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by a lower c o u r t . Young J a s s e r t e d t h a t , although the g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t anyone i s f r e e t o photograph another's p r o p e r t y or person, t h e r e i s an e x c e p t i o n where "the photographs i n I T O q u e s t i o n a re o f f e n s i v e " . He e l a b o r a t e d as f o l l o w s : T h i s l a s t e x c e p t i o n r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n . Although i n t h i s area of the law i t i s dangerous t o r e l y on American a u t h o r i t i e s because the law i n t h a t country has developed i n a d i f f e r e n t way t o our own, i t would seem t o me t h a t i t would be as much open t o t h i s Court as i t would be t o an American Court, t o g i v e r e l i e f t o a p l a i n t i f f who complained t h a t someone had taken a photograph of him i n a s h o c k i n g l y wounded c o n d i t i o n a f t e r a road a c c i d e n t ( c f Leverton v Curtis Pub Co 97 F Supp 181 (1951)), or t h a t she had been s t a n d i n g inno-c e n t l y over the a i r vent i n a fun house and someone had photographed her w i t h her s k i r t s blown up: c f Daily Times Democrat v Graham 162 So (2d) 474 (1964). I t may be, however, t h a t t h i s f i n a l e x c e p t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o photographs o f a person i n an embarrassing pose which are s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y taken and p u b l i s h e d : American Re-statement of the Law of Torts, v o l 4, s 8 6 7 . 1 2 9 The photographs i n the Bathurst case were not o f f e n s i v e i n t h i s way, so i t was h e l d t h a t t h e r e was no reason why they s h o u l d not be tendered i n evidence. 1 0 6 I b i d a t 496; quoted i n Burns, " P r i v a c y and the Common Law", supra n 7, a t 22. 1 2 7 (1985) 2 NSWLR 704 (NSW Sup C t ) . 1 2 8 I b i d a t 708. 1 2 9 I b i d a t 708. The case demonstrates t h a t t h e r e may y e t be room f o r the A u s t r a l i a n c o u r t s t o gr a n t some degree of p r o t e c t i o n t o p r i v a c y , but i t w i l l p r o b a b l y be o n l y a narrow, q u a l i f i e d p r o t e c t i o n u n l e s s the High Court r e c o n s i d e r s i t s d e c i s i o n i n Victoria Park, or the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e r v e n e s . 1 3 0 The A u s t r a l i a n l e g i s l a t u r e has not y e t taken any a c t i o n on the recommendations of the 1979 Law Reform Commission Report on Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy. The Report recommended a l i m i t e d r i g h t o f a c t i o n f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y where " s e n s i t i v e p r i v a t e f a c t s " had been p u b l i s h e d c o n c e r n i n g a person. The d r a f t B i l l 1 3 1 p r o v i d e d t h a t : ...a person p u b l i s h e s s e n s i t i v e p r i v a t e f a c t s concern-i n g an i n d i v i d u a l where the person p u b l i s h e s matter r e l a t i n g t o or p u r p o r t i n g t o r e l a t e t o the h e a l t h , p r i -v a t e behaviour, home l i f e or p e r s o n a l or f a m i l y r e l a -t i o n s h i p s of the i n d i v i d u a l i n circumstances i n which the p u b l i c a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o cause d i s t r e s s , annoyance or embarrassment t o an i n d i v i d u a l i n the p o s i t i o n of the f i r s t - m e n t i o n e d i n d i v i d u a l . 1 3 2 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was f u r t h e r q u a l i f i e d by a p r o v i s i o n t h a t "matter r e l a t i n g t o h e a l t h does not i n c l u d e a r e a s o n a b l y contemporaneous r e p o r t o f an a c c i d e n t i n which a person was • • I T T i n v o l v e d o r of the sudden i l l n e s s of a person". Thus the i o n , , , , See a l s o the d i s c u s s i o n o f the case i n A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 53, a t 112-3. i - J I , , , , A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 53, Appendix C. The d r a f t B i l l a l s o gave a remedy f o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n of name, i d e n t i t y , r e p u t a t i o n or l i k e n e s s i n c l a u s e 23. 1 3 2 Clause 19(1). 3 Clause 19(2). d r a f t B i l l might not even cover a case such as Kaye v Robertson, d i s c u s s e d a b o v e . 1 3 4 The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t defence was simply s t a t e d as a p p l y -i n g where "the p u b l i c a t i o n was r e l e v a n t t o a t o p i c of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . 1 3 5 T h i s might be somewhat broader than r e q u i r i n g t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n i t s e l f be of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . I f " r e l e v a n t " were g i v e n a wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then almost any p r i v a t e matter c o u l d be seen as r e l e v a n t t o some t o p i c of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by way of i l l u s t r a t i o n . For example, the de-t a i l s of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r i v a t e r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s would not u s u a l l y be a t o p i c of ( l e g i t i m a t e ) p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but c o u l d be seen as b e i ng " r e l e v a n t " , as a case study, t o the g e n e r a l t o p i c of r e l i g i o n i n modern s o c i e t y . An i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of the d r a f t B i l l was t h a t con-sent t o the p u b l i c a t i o n c o u l d be withdrawn w i t h i n a r e a s o n -a b l e time b e f o r e the p u b l i c a t i o n . With such narrow p r o t e c t i o n f o r p r i v a c y and such a wide p u b l i c i n t e r e s t e x c e p t i o n , the B i l l would not have been much of an advance, but even those l i m i t e d p r o v i s i o n s have not been enacted. As regards the 1983 Report of the Law Reform Commission on Privacy, the o n l y l e g i s l a t i o n t o have a r i s e n out of i t s recommendations so f a r r e l a t e s s o l e l y t o the use and d i s c l o s u r e of c o l l e c t e d d a t a . 1 3 6 However, the i n a c t i o n of the A u s t r a l i a n l e g i s l a t u r e has a l s o meant t h a t a somewhat abe r r a n t f e a t u r e of the defama-134 135 136 See above, p 33-36. Clause 21(h). P r i v a c y A c t 1988 (Cth). t i o n law of New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and the A u s t r a l i a n C a p i t a l T e r r i t o r y , a f f o r d i n g p r o t e c t i o n t o p r i v a c y i n some i n s t a n c e s , has been l e f t i n t a c t . In those S t a t e s , t r u t h alone i s not a f u l l defence t o a c i v i l defama-t i o n a c t i o n ; i t must a l s o be proved t h a t the defamatory p u b l i c a t i o n was " f o r the p u b l i c b e n e f i t " 1 3 7 or " r e l a t e s t o a matter of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . 1 3 8 O r i g i n a l l y , t h i s requirement was suggested by a S e l e c t Committee of the House of Lords i n 1 8 4 3 . 1 3 9 Though the p r o -p o s a l was d e f e a t e d i n the House of Commons as r e g a r d s c i v i l a c t i o n s , i t was f u l l y adopted by the New South Wales Govern-ment i n 1847, perhaps due t o a d e s i r e t o p r o t e c t "the l a r g e numbers of e x - c o n v i c t s w i t h r e p u t a t i o n s t o l i v e down". 1 4 0 L a t e r the o t h e r S t a t e s mentioned above f o l l o w e d s u i t . The added requirement has been i n t e r p r e t e d as f o l l o w s : P u b l i c b e n e f i t r e q u i r e s a weighing of the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t of f r e e d i s c u s s i o n of matters of p u b l i c concern. T h i s weighing i n the s c a l e s can o n l y be done i n the l i g h t o f the p a r t i c u l a r c i rcumstances of the case p a r t i c u l a r l y the circumstance whether the matter was p r i v a t e i n the f i r s t p l a c e . 1 4 1 7 C r i m i n a l Code 1899 (Qld), s 376; Defamation A c t 1957 (Tas), s 15; and Defamation A c t 1901 (ACT), s 6. 8 Defamation A c t 1974 (NSW), s 15. S e l e c t Committee of the House of Lords, Report on the Law of Defamation and Libel, 1843; r e f e r r e d t o i n Aus-t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 53, a t 64. 0 Wacks, Protection of Privacy, supra n 53, a t p 112, n 22. Cohen v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1971] 1 NSWLR 623 a t 628, per Jacobs and Manning JJA (CA). I t i s c l e a r , though, t h a t t h e r e may be l i a b i l i t y f o r the "exhumation" of a f o r g o t t e n defamatory matter even i f i t was p u b l i s h e d a t the time i t was c u r r e n t , 1 4 2 or i s on the p u b l i c r e c o r d , c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s b e i n g a prime example. I t i s not " p u b l i c a t i o n " i n the a b s t r a c t t h a t must be shown t o be i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but the a c t u a l p u b l i c a -t i o n t h a t was made. 1 4 3 Thus where a matter of l o c a l concern o n l y was p u b l i s h e d t o a n a t i o n a l newspaper, the p u b l i c a t i o n was h e l d not t o be f o r the p u b l i c b e n e f i t , s i n c e " t o the v a s t body of r e a d e r s of those newspapers [the i n f o r m a t i o n ] f i t t e d i n t o no background, e x p l a i n e d n o t h i n g and c o u l d have had no o t h e r e f f e c t than t o a c q u a i n t them of something t o the d e t r i m e n t of the p l a i n t i f f " . 1 4 4 Another example i s where p u b l i c a t i o n t o the p o l i c e might be i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but not p u b l i c a t i o n t o the p r e s s . 1 4 5 The motive of the pub-l i s h e r i s not r e l e v a n t t o the q u e s t i o n of p u b l i c b e n e f i t . 1 4 6 The a d d i t i o n of a p u b l i c b e n e f i t requirement t o the defence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n defamation law o f f e r s o n l y p a r -t i a l p r o t e c t i o n t o p r i v a c y , s i n c e not a l l p r i v a c y - i n v a d i n g statements are defamatory. Furthermore, i t confuses defama-1 4 2 I b i d a t 628. 1 4 3 Crowley v Glisson (No 2) (1905) 2 CLR 744 a t 764, per O'Connor J (HC Aus). 1 4 4 Tisdall v Button [1944] Tas SR 1 a t 11 (SC). 1 4 5 Supra n 143 a t 756, per G r i f f i t h CJ. 1 4 6 I b i d a t 763-64, per O'Connor J . t i o n and i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , two c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n c t matters, and has a t t r a c t e d c r i t i c i s m on t h a t b a s i s . 1 4 7 In New South Wales, a P r i v a c y Committee of between twelve and f i f t e e n members was e s t a b l i s h e d by the P r i v a c y Committee A c t 1975. The Committee's f u n c t i o n s are s i m i l a r t o those l i s t e d above f o r New Zealand's Human R i g h t s Commis-s i o n , w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t the New South Wales Committee may r e c e i v e and i n v e s t i g a t e i n d i v i d u a l c o m p l a i n t s . 1 4 8 The number of complaints r e c e i v e d by the Committee which r e l a t e t o the media seem t o have i n c r e a s e d over the y e a r s . How-ever, l i k e the New Zealand Commission, the P r i v a c y Committee has p e r s u a s i v e powers o n l y . 1 5 0 Canada Canadian c o u r t s have, almost without e x c e p t i o n , avoided making any d e c i s i o n on whether t h e r e i s a t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , or even o f f e r i n g any o p i n i o n on the matter. In p a r t t h i s has been due t o the w i l l i n g n e s s of the Canadian j u d i c i a r y , more so than the E n g l i s h j u d i c i a r y , t o extend the purview of e x i s t i n g common law a c t i o n s i n order t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s , i n a piecemeal f a s h i o n . 1 5 1 1 4 7 I b i d a t 81; a l s o A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 53, a t 66. 1 4 8 P r i v a c y Committee Act 1975, s l 5 ( l ) ( d ) . S a l l y Walker, The Law of Journalism in Australia (Sydney: Law Book Co L t d , 1989), 315. 1 5 0 See A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publica-tion, supra n 53, a t 115. 1 5 1 See G H L Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada (Toronto: C a r s w e l l , 1990), v o l 2, a t 192-94; John I r v i n e ' s commen-One area which may arguably come under the head of p r i -vacy law, namely " f a l s e l i g h t " i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , was r e j e c t e d by the Judge i n Parasiuk v Canadian Newspapers Co Ltd, i n the f o l l o w i n g words: There i s no f o u n d a t i o n whatever f o r c l a i m i n g t h a t from the p r i m e v a l mud of the common law i n f o r c e i n Manitoba t h e r e has e v o l v e d the t o r t of " f a l s e l i g h t i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y " : t h a t concept has been f a b r i c a t e d i n the markedly d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and l e g a l framework of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 5 2 The t o r t of a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y which, as d i s -cussed a b o v e , 1 5 3 i s c l o s e l y a l l i e d t o the t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , i s now f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n Canadian l a w . 1 5 4 O n t a r i o c o u r t s have on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s d e c l i n e d t o r e j e c t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l e g a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y . 1 5 5 One case which went a l i t t l e f u r t h e r was Saccone v O r r . 1 5 6 The defendant, who was a good f r i e n d of the p l a i n t i f f , r e c o r d e d a p r i v a t e telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h the p l a i n t i f f without h i s knowledge or consent. The p l a i n t i f f l a t e r found out about the tape, and asked the defendant not t o use i t , but the defendant denied t h a t the tape e x i s t e d . However, the t a r y on Saccone v Orr (1981) 19 CCLT 37 a t 39 (Ont Co Ct) . 152 [ 1 9 8 8 ] 2 WWR 737 a t 738 (Man QB). 1 5 3 See p 18-19. 1 5 4 See Fridman, supra n 151, a t 194-97, and the cases d i s c u s s e d t h e r e i n ; a l s o Joseph v Daniels (1986) 4 BCLR (2d) 239 (SC); Baron Philippe de Rothschild SA v Casa de Habana Inc (1987) 17 CIPR (2d) 185, 19 CPR (3d) 114 (Ont HC) . 1 5 5 Krouse v Chrysler Canada Ltd (1970) 12 DLR (3d) 463 (Ont CA); Burnett v R (1979) 94 DLR (3d) 281 (Ont HC); Capan v Capan (1980) 14 CCLT 191 (Ont HC). 1 5 6 Supra n 151. defendant p l a y e d the tape a t a c o u n c i l meeting i n order t o v i n d i c a t e h i m s e l f of an a c c u s a t i o n made by another c o u n c i l -l o r , and the tape and an e d i t o r i a l about the meeting were p u b l i s h e d by a l o c a l newspaper. The p l a i n t i f f based h i s case s o l e l y on i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , and t h e r e was no s p e c i a l damage proved, j u s t "embarrassment". The Judge, Jacob Co Ct J , awarded damages i n t h e amount of f i v e hundred d o l l a r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h c o s t s i n t he same amount. He began by s a y i n g , " . . . I w i l l t r y t o be as c o h e s i v e as I p o s s i b l y can i n g i v i n g t h i s judgment o r a l l y , because I r e a l i z e t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h i s a c t i o n , we may be t r e s p a s s i n g on some new law". A f t e r a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f the cases and s t a t i n g the f a c t s , he r u l e d as f o l l o w s : . . . i t ' s my o p i n i o n t h a t c e r t a i n l y a person must have the r i g h t t o make such a c l a i m as a r e s u l t of a t a p i n g of a p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n without h i s knowledge, and a l s o as a g a i n s t the p u b l i c a t i o n of the c o n v e r s a t i o n a g a i n s t h i s w i l l or without h i s consent. C e r t a i n l y , f o r want of a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n as t o what happened, t h i s i s an i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , and de-s p i t e the ve r y a b l e argument of defendant's c o u n s e l t h a t no such a c t i o n e x i s t s , I have come t o the c o n c l u -s i o n t h a t the p l a i n t i f f must be g i v e n some r i g h t of r e c o v e r y f o r what the defendant has i n t h i s case The commentary on the case d e c l a r e d t h a t "one Judge has f i n a l l y grasped the n e t t l e and pr o c l a i m e d the new t o r t " . 1 5 9 However, the ( o r a l ) judgment was expressed i n f a i r l y narrow terms, and has not, as y e t , been accorded much s i g n i f i c a n c e 1 5 7 I b i d a t 41. 1 5 8 I b i d a t 46. 1 5 9 I b i d , commentary of I r v i n e a t 41. by academic w r i t e r s . 1 6 0 Saccone v Orr was c o n s i d e r e d i n a l a t e r case d e a l i n g w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n of a photograph of a young o f f e n d e r i n a c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n . 1 6 1 In the l a t e r case, the judge found " l i t t l e , i f any, m e r i t i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m " f o r damages f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , but d e c l i n e d t o s t r i k e out the statement of c l a i m , as t h e r e was " a t l e a s t some f o u n d a t i o n f o r the p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n " . 1 6 2 In c i t i n g Saccone v Orr, the judge s t a t e d , "While the r e p o r t i s not c l e a r , i t appears t h a t H i s Honour Judge Jacob r e s e r v e d h i s d e c i s i o n on the defendant's a p p l i c a t i o n and the t r i a l p r o c e e d e d . " 1 6 3 However, as has been seen, the d e c i s i o n i n Saccone v Orr c l e a r l y went f u r t h e r than t h i s statement suggested, as a c t u a l damages were awarded. In Harder v Brown,164 a mandatory i n j u n c t i o n was c l a i m e d on the b a s i s of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , and was granted without any d i s c u s s i o n of the l e g a l b a s i s f o r the remedy, whether a t common law or under B r i t i s h Columbia's P r i v a c y A c t . The defendant had s e x u a l l y a s s a u l t e d the p l a i n t i f f many times over a number of y ears w h i l e the p l a i n t i f f was a minor, and had taken photographs of her d u r i n g the a s s a u l t s . The p o l i c e had not p r o s e c u t e d these o f f e n c e s . Wood J , as w e l l as awarding s u b s t a n t i a l damages, h e l d t h a t the p l a i n -1 6 0 See f o r example Fridman, supra n 151, a t p 192, n 18. 1 6 1 F (P) v Ontario (1989) 47 CCLT 231 (Ont DC). 1 6 2 I b i d a t 234. 1 6 3 I b i d a t 234. 164 ( 1 9 8 9 ) 50 CCLT 85 (BC SC). 1 6 5 RSBC 1979, c 336, r e p l a c i n g the o r i g i n a l s t a t u t e passed i n 1968. t i f f was " c l e a r l y e n t i t l e d " t o a mandatory i n j u n c t i o n o r d e r i n g the defendant t o r e t u r n a l l n e g a t i v e s and p r i n t s remaining i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n or c o n t r o l of any photographs taken of the p l a i n t i f f d u r i n g the continuance of t h e s e x u a l a s s a u l t s . Harder v Brown i s a s t r i k i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of a r i g h t of p r i v a c y b e i n g c a l l e d upon i n order t o remedy a p o t e n t i a l l y v e r y u n j u s t s i t u a t i o n f o r which t h e r e was otherwise no remedy. I t i s not uncommon f o r photographs t o be taken d u r i n g s e x u a l a s s a u l t s , and no o t h e r common law a c t i o n c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be s t r e t c h e d t o cover t h i s case. There has been, perhaps s u r p r i s i n g l y g i v e n the n o v e l t y of the a c t i o n , o n l y one r e p o r t e d case i n which an a c t i o n f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y has been s a i d not t o e x i s t . 1 6 6 In Turton 1 67 v Buttler,™' even though the word " p r i v a c y " was never used i n the judgment, the statement of c l a i m would c l e a r l y have d i s c l o s e d a cause of a c t i o n f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y had such a cause of a c t i o n been r e c o g n i s e d , and i t i s c l e a r t h a t Mas-t e r Funduk saw the case i n those terms. The p l a i n t i f f was a masseuse by p r o f e s s i o n . The Edmon-to n Sun p u b l i s h e d the f a c t t h a t she had been r e c e i v i n g obscene telephone c a l l s . She c o n t a c t e d the newspaper and asked them not t o p r i n t a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r about her, as she Although see the d i s s e n t i n g judgment of Weatherston JA i n Re Zaduk and The Queen (1979) 46 CCC (2d) 327 a t 337 Ont CA). Fridman, supra n 151, a t 203, s t a t e s t h a t i t was h e l d i n Parasiuk, supra n 152, t h a t t h e r e was no common law t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y . However, the Judge's remarks were d i r e c t e d s o l e l y a t " f a l s e l i g h t " i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y ; see p 76 above. 1 6 7 (1987) 42 CCLT 74 ( A l t a QB). was f r i g h t e n e d by t h e obscene c a l l s and d i d n o t w i s h t h e c a l l e r t o be e n c o u r a g e d . She a l s o f e a r e d t h a t t h e a d v e r s e p u b l i c i t y would a f f e c t h e r b u s i n e s s . However, t h e newspaper p u b l i s h e d a second a r t i c l e on t h e m a t t e r . As a r e s u l t t h e p l a i n t i f f was d i s m i s s e d from h e r employment and c l a i m e d t o have s u f f e r e d from d e p r e s s i o n , l o s s o f s l e e p , n e r v o u s n e s s and embarrassment . The s ta tement o f c l a i m was s t r u c k out as n o t d i s c l o s i n g a cause o f a c t i o n . C o u n s e l f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f r e l i e d on " n e r v o u s s h o c k " , but M a s t e r Funduk p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e r e can be no c l a i m f o r shock u n l e s s i t i s caused by a w r o n g f u l a c t i o n . The M a s t e r t o o k t h e v iew t h a t : I t can e a s i l y be s a i d t h a t t h e p u b l i c d i s s e m i n a -t i o n o f t r u e f a c t s about a p e r s o n may i n p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s m e n t a l l y e x a c e r b a t e t h a t p e r s o n . However, i t can h a r d l y be s a i d t h a t p e r s o n s h o u l d have a cause o f a c t i o n f o r t h a t . F o r example, a newspaper p u b l i s h e s t h e t r u e f a c t t h a t a w e l l - k n o w n p u b l i c f i g u r e was b o r n i l l e g i t i m a t e . The b a s t a r d may be m e n t a l l y a g g r i e v e d by t h e d i s s e m i n a -t i o n o f t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n . However, he has no cause o f a c t i o n . 1 6 8 I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t Turton v Buttler i s p r e c i s e l y t h e t y p e o f c a s e w h i c h demonst ra tes t h e need f o r an a c t i o n f o r i n v a s i o n o f p r i v a c y . The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t h i n g t o f u r t h e r f r e e speech or t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , and n e e d l e s s l y added t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f someone who was a l r e a d y b e i n g v i c t i m i z e d . These i s s u e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r 4. A l t h o u g h none o f t h e C a n a d i a n c a s e s may be v e r y s i g n i f -i c a n t t a k e n a l o n e , t h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e t h a t emerges f rom t h e I b i d a t 77. l a s t twenty y e a r s , Turton v Buttler a s i d e , i s one of g r a d u a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f a r i g h t t o p r i v a c y m e r i t i n g p r o t e c t i o n by the common law. I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g t o observe how t h i s p r o t e c t i o n u n f o l d s i n the p r o v i n c e s where t h e r e i s as y e t no s t a t u t o r y guidance i n the matter, n o t a b l y i n O n t a r i o . In Canada as i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , p r i v a c y p r o t e c t i o n must be d i s c u s s e d not o n l y i n the co n t e x t o f t o r t law but a l s o i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e x t . The Canadian C h a r t e r of R i g h t s and F r e e d o m s 1 6 9 may p o t e n t i a l l y a f f e c t t he development of p r i v a c y law i n t h r e e ways: by gu a r a n t e e i n g c e r t a i n p r i v a c y r i g h t s ; by impeding l e g i s l a t i v e attempts t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y ; and by impeding j u d i c i a l attempts t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y . Each of these p o t e n t i a l impacts w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t u r n . There are two s e c t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r which may guarantee c e r t a i n p r i v a c y r i g h t s . S e c t i o n 8 p r o v i d e s , "Everyone has the r i g h t t o be secure a g a i n s t unreasonable s e a r c h o r s e i z u r e . " A major u n d e r l y i n g purpose of t h i s s e c t i o n i s the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y where t h e r e i s a "reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y " , reasonableness b e i n g determined by b a l a n c i n g p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t o t h e r s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s . 1 7 0 I n t r u s i o n s such as i n t e r c e p t i o n of y P a r t I of the C o n s t i t u t i o n A c t 1982, be i n g Schedule B of the Canada A c t 1982 (UK), c 11 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the C h a r t e r ) . 0 Hunter v Southam Inc (1984) 11 DLR (4th) 641 a t 652-53 (SCC); R v Dyment (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503 a t 512-13 (SCC). • • i 1 7 1 • • 1 7 ? p r i v a t e communications and v i d e o s u r v e i l l a n c e have been h e l d t o be w i t h i n the ambit of the p r o v i s i o n . I t has been s a i d t h a t the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y under s e c t i o n 8: ... l i k e o t h e r C h a r t e r r i g h t s , must be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a broad and l i b e r a l manner so as t o secure the c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t t o a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y a g a i n s t governmental encroachments. I t s s p i r i t must not be c o n s t r a i n e d by narrow l e g a l i s t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s based oh n o t i o n s of p r o p e r t y and the l i k e which s e r v e d t o p r o t e c t t h i s fundamental human v a l u e i n e a r l i e r t i m e s . 1 7 3 However, the C h a r t e r a p p l i e s o n l y t o governmental a c t i o n s 1 7 4 and not d i r e c t l y t o the pr i v a t e l y - o w n e d media. P r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s may a l s o be an asp e c t of the l i b e r t y and s e c u r i t y o f the person, guaranteed by s e c t i o n 7 of the C h a r t e r . 1 7 5 The s e c t i o n d e c l a r e s , "Everyone has the r i g h t t o l i f e , l i b e r t y and s e c u r i t y o f the person and the r i g h t not t o be d e p r i v e d t h e r e o f except i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of fundamental j u s t i c e . " Again, the s e c t i o n a p p l i e s o n l y t o governmental a c t i o n . 1 7 1 See f o r example R v Finlay & Grellette (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 532 (Ont CA), leave t o appeal r e f u s e d [1986] 1 SCR i x . 1 7 2 See f o r example R v Wong (1987) 34 CCC (3d) 51 (Ont CA) ; R v LeBeau (1988) 41 CCC (3d) 163 (Ont CA). 1 7 3 R v Dyment, supra n 170, a t 512, summarising statements i n Hunter v Southam Inc, supra n 170, a t 649-53. 1 7 4 See s e c t i o n 32(1) of the Cha r t e r , supra n 169, and Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1986) 33 DLR (4th) 174 (SCC). 1 7 5 See R v Beare (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 481 a t 500-501 (SCC); Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Att-Gen) (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 577 a t 600 per La F o r e s t J (SCC); R v Smith (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 385 a t 468-71 (Ont HCJ). To the c o n t r a r y see Charboneau v College of Physicians & Surgeons of Ontario (1985) 22 DLR (4th) 303 (Ont HCJ). On t h e oth e r hand, the C h a r t e r may impede some l e g i s l a t i v e attempts t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y by gu a r a n t e e i n g r i g h t s which c o n f l i c t w i t h p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s , n o t a b l y freedom of e x p r e s s i o n . Under s e c t i o n 2(b) of the Ch a r t e r , everyone has, as a fundamental freedom, "freedom of thought, b e l i e f , o p i n i o n and e x p r e s s i o n , i n c l u d i n g freedom of the p r e s s and o t h e r media of communication". One case i n which the Supreme Court o f Canada c o n s i d e r e d a c o n f l i c t between l e g i s l a t i o n p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n 17 6 was Edmonton Journal v AZJberta (Attorney-General) . ' ° S e c t i o n 30(1) of the J u d i c a t u r e A c t of A l b e r t a 1 7 7 r e s t r i c t e d the p u b l i c a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n a r i s i n g out of m a t r i m o n i a l p r o c e e d i n g s t o the names of the p a r t i e s , a c o n c i s e statement of the charges and defences, submissions on p o i n t s of law, the judge's summations, the f i n d i n g of a j u r y and the judgement of the c o u r t . S e c t i o n 3 0(2) r e s t r i c t e d the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c o u l d be p u b l i s h e d p r i o r t o a c i v i l t r i a l t o such i n f o r m a t i o n as the names of the p a r t i e s and a c o n c i s e statement of the nature of the c l a i m or defence. The m a j o r i t y o f the c o u r t d e c i d e d t h a t both s u b s e c t i o n s v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 2(b) of the Cha r t e r , and a d e c l a r a t i o n was gr a n t e d a c c o r d i n g l y . The c o u r t was agreed t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n d i d i n f r i n g e the freedom of e x p r e s s i o n guaranteed i n s e c t i o n 2(b) of the C h a r t e r . In the words of Cory J : 6 Supra n 175. 7 RSA 1980, c J - l . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine a guaranteed r i g h t more im-p o r t a n t t o a democratic s o c i e t y than freedom of expres-s i o n . Indeed a democracy cannot e x i s t w i thout t h a t freedom t o express new i d e a s and t o put forward o p i n -i o n s about the f u n c t i o n i n g of p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . The concept of f r e e and u n i n h i b i t e d speech permeates a l l t r u l y democratic s o c i e t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s . The v i t a l importance o f the concept cannot be overemphasized. 7 8 I t was a l s o noted t h a t freedom of e x p r e s s i o n " p r o t e c t s l i s t e n e r s as w e l l as s p e a k e r s , 1 1 1 7 9 s i n c e "members of the p u b l i c have a r i g h t t o i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o p u b l i c 1 ft n i n s t i t u t i o n s and p a r t i c u l a r l y t he c o u r t s " . o u The next q u e s t i o n was whether the impugned l e g i s l a t i o n was j u s t i f i e d on the b a s i s of s e c t i o n 1, which p r o v i d e s t h a t C h a r t e r r i g h t s are guaranteed " s u b j e c t o n l y t o such r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t s p r e s c r i b e d by law as can be demonstrably j u s t i f i e d i n a f r e e and democratic s o c i e t y " . Two requirements must be met f o r l e g i s l a t i o n t o be saved by • i ft i s e c t i o n 1. F i r s t l y , the o b j e c t i v e of the impugned l e g i s l a t i o n must be of s u f f i c i e n t importance t o warrant o v e r r i d i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t or freedom. I t must be of a p r e s s i n g and s u b s t a n t i a l nature. The c o u r t was agreed t h a t t h i s requirement was s a t i s f i e d , a t l e a s t w i t h r e g a r d t o 1 Edmonton Journal, supra n 175, a t 607. I t sh o u l d be noted t h a t Cory J here seems t o be r e f e r r i n g p r i m a r i l y t o p o l i t i c a l speech and speech r e l a t i n g t o p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the c o u r t s . 1 7 9 I b i d a t 610, q u o t i n g from Ford v Quebec (Att-Gen) (1988) 54 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC). •Loyj Edmonton Journal, i b i d a t 610. 1 8 1 T h i s t e s t was o r i g i n a l l y s e t out i n R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC) and was r e s t a t e d i n Edwards Books and Art Ltd v The Queen (1986) 35 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC). s e c t i o n 30(1). In the words of Cory J , the aim of the l e g i s l a t i o n t o p r o t e c t the p r i v a c y of i n d i v i d u a l s : ... does indeed r e l a t e t o a p r e s s i n g and s u b s t a n t i a l concern i n a f r e e and democratic s o c i e t y . Our s o c i e t y has c h e r i s h e d and g i v e n p r o t e c t i o n t o p r i v a c y . T h i s Court has on a number of o c c a s i o n s u n d e r l i n e d the importance of the p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t i n Canadian law 1 8 2 Secondly, "the means chosen t o a t t a i n those o b j e c t i v e s -1 Q O must be p r o p o r t i o n a l or a p p r o p r i a t e t o the ends". O J There are t h r e e components t o t h i s t e s t : . . . the measures must be c a r e f u l l y designed t o achieve the o b j e c t i v e of the l e g i s l a t i o n , w i t h a r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n t o the o b j e c t i v e . The second component i s t h a t the measure should impair the r i g h t or freedom as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e . F i n a l l y , t h e r e must be p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y between the e f f e c t s of the impugned measures on the p r o t e c t e d r i g h t and the attainment of the o b j e c t i v e . 1 8 4 The m a j o r i t y of the c o u r t f e l t t h a t both s u b s e c t i o n s were more r e s t r i c t i v e than necessary t o p r o t e c t the p r i v a c y of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n the proceedings, even though "the l i m i t a t i o n imposed by the l e g i s l a t i o n under a t t a c k need not be e i t h e r the b e s t p o s s i b l e l i m i t a t i o n nor does i t have t o be the l e a s t i n t r u s i v e l e g i s l a t i o n i m a g i n a b l e " . 1 8 5 Edmonton Journal, supra n 175, a t 614. I b i d a t 612, q u o t i n g from Edwards Books, supra n 181, a t 41. I b i d a t 615, q u o t i n g from R v Whyte (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 481 a t 495 (SCC). I b i d a t 618, per Cory J , Dickson CJC and Lamer J c o n c u r r i n g . La F o r e s t J , w i t h whom L'Heureux-Dube and Sopinka J J concurred, d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t , b e l i e v e d t h a t s e c t i o n 30(1) was a reasonable l i m i t , but gave i t a narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Wilson J agreed w i t h Cory J but advocated a c o n t e x t u a l r a t h e r than an a b s t r a c t approach t o the b a l a n c i n g of the i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d (see chapter 4 below). In c o n t r a s t , i n Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney-General)186 the Supreme Court of Canada h e l d t h a t a p r o v i s i o n t h a t a c o u r t s h a l l , on a p p l i c a t i o n of the • 1 8 7 • complainant• L O i n a se x u a l a s s a u l t case, i s s u e an order p r o h i b i t i n g p u b l i c a t i o n of the name or i d e n t i f y i n g d e t a i l s of t h e complainant, was j u s t i f i e d under s e c t i o n 1 of the Ch a r t e r . While i t was acknowledged t h a t freedom o f the p r e s s was "an important v a l u e ... which should not be hampered l i g h t l y " , t he l i m i t s imposed on the media's r i g h t s were "minimal". 0 0 A d i s c r e t i o n a r y ban would not s u f f i c e , as " s i n c e f e a r o f p u b l i c a t i o n i s one of the f a c t o r s t h a t i n f l u e n c e s the r e p o r t i n g of sex u a l a s s a u l t , c e r t a i n t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o n o n - p u b l i c a t i o n at the time of deciding whether to report p l a y s a v i t a l r o l e i n t h a t d e c i s i o n " . 1 8 9 I t seems t h a t the Ch a r t e r may have a l e s s d i r e c t impact on j u d i c i a l attempts t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y . The Supreme Court of Canada has h e l d , on the b a s i s of s e c t i o n 32(1) of the Ch a r t e r , t h a t "...the C h a r t e r a p p l i e s t o the common law but not between p r i v a t e p a r t i e s " . 1 9 0 In other words, " i t w i l l a P P l y t o the common law ... o n l y i n so f a r as the common law 186 ( 1 9 8 8 ) 52 DLR (4th) 690 (SCC). 1 87 • • The p r o v i s i o n a l s o a p p l i e d where the p r o s e c u t o r alone r e q u e s t e d the order, and the c o u r t , w h i l e not r e q u i r e d t o d e c i d e the matter, expressed doubt t h a t t h i s was a l s o j u s t i f i e d . 1 8 8 Supra n 186, a t 696. I b i d a t 697 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . 1 9 0 Dolphin Delivery Ltd, supra n 174, a t 195. i s t he b a s i s of some governmental a c t i o n " . 1 9 1 The c o u r t reasoned as f o l l o w s : The c o u r t s are, of course, bound by the C h a r t e r as they are bound by a l l law. I t i s t h e i r duty t o apply the law, but i n doing so they a c t as n e u t r a l a r b i t e r s , not as contending p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n a d i s p u t e . To r e g a r d a c o u r t order as an element o f governmental i n t e r v e n -t i o n n ecessary t o invoke the C h a r t e r would, i t seems t o me, widen the scope of C h a r t e r a p p l i c a t i o n t o v i r t u a l l y a l l p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i o n . 1 9 2 However, the c o u r t d i d agree t h a t "the j u d i c i a r y ought t o a p p l y and develop the p r i n c i p l e s of common law i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the fundamental v a l u e s e n s h r i n e d i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n " , 1 9 3 so the C h a r t e r w i l l not be without e f f e c t on p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i o n . T u r n i n g t o the s t a t u t e law, s e v e r a l of the Canadian p r o v i n c e s have enacted l e g i s l a t i o n c r e a t i n g a g e n e r a l t o r t of v i o l a t i o n of p r i v a c y . The d r a f t i n g of the s t a t u t e s r e v e a l s t h e i n f l u e n c e of the E n g l i s h b i l l s . 1 9 4 The f i r s t t o . be enacted was B r i t i s h Columbia's P r i v a c y A c t i n 1 9 6 8 , 1 9 5 f o l l o w i n g a commission of i n q u i r y i n t o the m a t t e r . 1 9 6 Mani-t o b a , 1 9 7 S a s k a t c h e w a n 1 9 8 and N e w f o u n d l a n d 1 9 9 have f o l l o w e d . 1 9 1 I b i d a t 195. 1 9 2 I b i d a t 196. 1 9 3 I b i d a t 198. 1 Q4. • See Osborne, "The P r i v a c y A c t s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan" i n Gibson, supra n 7, 73 a t 74. 1 9 5 SBC 1968, c 39. 1 9 6 See Sargent, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Invasion of Privacy, 1967 (BC). 1 9 7 RSM 1987, c P125, o r i g i n a l l y passed i n 1970. 1 9 8 RSS 1979, c P-24, o r i g i n a l l y passed i n 1974. Three of the p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e s are a n a l y s e d t h o r o u g h l y i n Osborne, "The P r i v a c y A c t s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba and S a s k a t c h e w a n " , 2 0 0 and t h a t a n a l y s i s w i l l not be rep e a t e d here. However, a b r i e f o u t l i n e of the r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s f o l l o w s . The B r i t i s h Columbia Act, as r e v i s e d , p r o v i d e s t h a t " I t i s a t o r t , a c t i o n a b l e without proof of damage, f o r a person, w i l f u l l y and without a c l a i m of r i g h t , t o v i o l a t e the p r i -vacy o f a n o t h e r . " 2 0 1 S u b s t a n t i a l l y the same wording i s used i n S a s k a t c h e w a n 2 0 2 and N e w f o u n d l a n d , 2 0 3 but the Newfoundland A c t c l a r i f i e s t h a t the one whose p r i v a c y i s v i o l a t e d must be a n a t u r a l p e r s o n . 2 0 4 In Manitoba, the v i o l a t i o n must be " s u b s t a n t i a l " and " u n r e a s o n a b l e " 2 0 5 r a t h e r than " w i l f u l " , but i t i s a defence t h a t "the defendant, having a c t e d r e a s o n a b l y i n t h a t r e g a r d , n e i t h e r knew or [ s i c ] should r e a s o n a b l y have known t h a t the a c t , conduct or p u b l i c a t i o n . . . w o u l d have v i o l a t e d the p r i -o n vacy o f any person". A l s o , other p r o v i n c e s import reason-a b l e n e s s i n de t e r m i n i n g the nature and degree of p r i v a c y t o 1 9 9 S N f l d 1981, c 6. 2 0 0 Supra n 194. 2 0 1 RSBC 1979, C 336, s 1(1). 2 0 2 Sask, s 2. 2 0 3 N f l d , s 3 ( 1 ) . 2 0 4 N f l d , s 2. 2 0 5 Man, s 2 ( 1 ) . 2 0 6 Man, s 5 ( b ) . which a person i s e n t i t l e d i n the circumstances, "due r e g a r d b e i n g g i v e n t o the l a w f u l i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s " . 2 0 7 Three of the A c t s l i s t some examples of p r i v a c y v i o l a -t i o n s , without l i m i t i n g the g e n e r a l i t y of the t o r t . 2 0 8 However, the f a c t t h a t " f a l s e l i g h t i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y " was not s p e c i f i c a l l y l i s t e d was seen i n Parasiuk v Canadian Newspapers Co Ltd as a r e j e c t i o n by the l e g i s l a t u r e of such a n o t i o n , s i n c e i t would not come w i t h i n the o r d i n a r y mean-i n g of the words of the g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n . 2 0 9 The t o r t of a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i s i n c l u d e d i n the l i s t of • J i n , , examples i n a l l t h r e e cases, and i s g i v e n s e p a r a t e t r e a t -ment i n the B r i t i s h Columbia s t a t u t e . 2 1 1 A number of f a c t o r s are l i s t e d as b eing r e l e v a n t t o the q u e s t i o n of whether p r i v a c y has been v i o l a t e d or, i n Mani-toba, the award of damages. These i n c l u d e the "nature, • • • • . 9 1 9 i n c i d e n c e and o c c a s i o n " of the conduct m q u e s t i o n ; the r e l a t i o n s h i p , domestic or other, between the p a r t i e s ; 2 1 3 the e f f e c t on the h e a l t h , w e l f a r e , or s o c i a l , b u s i n e s s or f i n a n -c i a l p o s i t i o n of the p l a i n t i f f or f a m i l y members; 2 1 4 the 2 0 7 BC, s 1 ( 2 ) ; Sask, s 6(1); N f l d , s 3 ( 2 ) . 2 0 8 Man, s 3; Sask, s 3; N f l d , s 4. 2 0 9 Supra n 152, a t 739. 2 1 0 Man, s 3 ( c ) ; Sask, s 3 ( c ) ; N f l d , s 4 ( c ) . 2 1 1 BC, s 3 . 2 1 2 BC, s 1 ( 3 ) ; Man, s 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) ; Sask, s 6 ( 2 ) ( a ) ; N f l d , s 3(2) . 2 1 3 BC, s 1 ( 3 ) ; Man, s 4 ( 2 ) ( c ) ; Sask, s 6 ( 2 ) ( c ) ; N f l d , s 3(2) . 2 1 4 Man, s 4 ( 2 ) ( b ) ; Sask, s 6 ( 2 ) ( b ) . conduct of the p a r t i e s b e f o r e and a f t e r the a l l e g e d v i o l a -t i o n , i n c l u d i n g any apology or o f f e r of amends made by the d e f e n d a n t ; 2 1 5 and the " d i s t r e s s , annoyance or embarrassment" s u f f e r e d by the p l a i n t i f f or f a m i l y members. 2 1 6 In B r i t i s h Columbia and Newfoundland, the r i g h t of a c t i o n i s e x t i n g u i s h e d by the death of the person whose p r i -vacy was a l l e g e d l y v i o l a t e d . Notably the two p r o v i n c e s which s p e c i f i e d the e f f e c t of the a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n on the f a m i l y o f the p l a i n t i f f as being r e l e v a n t t o l i a b i l i t y or damages, namely Manitoba and Saskatchewan, d i d hot i n c l u d e such a p r o v i s i o n . Consent, express or i m p l i e d , i s a defence i n a l l f o u r p r o v i n c e s . In Manitoba consent must be o b t a i n e d from the PIP . , person a f f e c t e d , whereas i n the other p r o v i n c e s consent must be o b t a i n e d from "some person e n t i t l e d t o consent". In a l l the P r i v a c y A c t s , i t i s a defence t h a t the a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n was i n c i d e n t a l t o the e x e r c i s e of a l a w f u l r i g h t of defence of person or p r o p e r t y , 2 2 0 and t h e r e i s no 2 1 5 Man, s 4 ( 2 ) ( e ) ; Sask, s 6 ( 2 ) ( d ) . 2 1 6 Man, s 4 ( 2 ) ( d ) . 2 1 7 BC, s 5; N f l d , s 11. 2 1 8 Man, s 5(a) . 2 1 9 BC, s 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) ; Sask, s 4 ( 1 ) ( a ) ; N f l d , s 5 ( 1 ) ( a ) . 2 2 0 BC, s 2 ( 1 ) ( b ) ; Sask, s 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) ; N f l d , s 5 ( 1 ) ( b ) . In Man-i t o b a i t must a l s o be reasonable and necessary f o r the e x e r c i s e of such a r i g h t , and r i g h t s t o p r o t e c t o t h e r i n t e r e s t s a re i n c l u d e d ; s 5 ( c ) . l i a b i l i t y f o r a p u b l i c a t i o n which i s p r i v i l e g e d under the laws of d e f a m a t i o n . 2 2 1 The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t e x c e p t i o n i s simply expressed i n a l l f o u r s t a t u t e s , and i t s d e f i n i t i o n i s l e f t t o the c o u r t s . However, t h e r e are some m a t e r i a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n the wording of t h i s e x c e p t i o n . In B r i t i s h Columbia and Newfoundland t h e r e i s no l i a b i l i t y where "the matter p u b l i s h e d was of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or was f a i r comment on a matter of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . 2 2 2 The defence does not extend t o the means by which the matter p u b l i s h e d was obt a i n e d . In Manitoba, on the ot h e r hand, t h e r e need o n l y be a "reasonable b e l i e f " t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n was in the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , although w i t h r e s p e c t t o f a i r comment, i t must i n f a c t be f a i r comment on a matter of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The Saskatchewan s t a t u t e goes f u r t h e r . Not o n l y w i l l i t s u f f i c e t h a t t h e r e were reasonable grounds f o r b e l i e f t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n was e i t h e r of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or f a i r com-ment on a matter of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but t h e r e i s a f u r t h e r s p e c i a l e x c e p t i o n f o r the news media. A person engaged i n a news g a t h e r i n g [ s i c ] f o r a newspaper or a l i c e n s e d broad-c a s t e r w i l l not be l i a b l e f o r any a c t , conduct or p u b l i c a -t i o n which "was reasonable i n the circumstances and ... 2 2 1 BC, s 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) ; Man, s 5 ( f ) ( 2 ) ; Sask, s 4 ( 2 ) ( b ) ; N f l d , s 5 ( 2 ) ( b ) . 2 2 2 BC, s 2 ( 2 ) ( a ) ; N f l d , s 5 ( 2 ) ( a ) . 2 2 3 Man, s 5 ( f ) . The words " i n " and " o f " have been h i g h -l i g h t e d because the f a c t t h a t two d i f f e r e n t words were used suggests t h a t the Manitoba l e g i s l a t u r e meant or expected them t o be i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . n e c e s s a r y f o r or i n c i d e n t a l t o o r d i n a r y news g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s " . 2 2 4 T h i s defence was added on the second r e a d i n g of the Ac t , t o a l l a y the f e a r s of the media and the o p p o s i t i o n t h a t the p r e s s would not be f u l l y p r o t e c t e d . 2 2 5 I t has been suggested t h a t the requirement t h a t the a c t be "reasonable i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s " , and the r e f e r e n c e t o ordinary news-g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s , "lends some support t o the A t t o r n e y -General's c l a i m t h a t the defence was s u p e r f l u o u s " . 2 2 6 On the o t h e r hand, the c o u r t s are l i k e l y t o i n t e r p r e t the p r o v i s i o n so as t o g i v e i t some independent e f f e c t . Some of the most f r e q u e n t v i o l a t i o n s of p r i v a c y by the media c o u l d be h e l d t o be immune from l i a b i l i t y by reason of t h e i r v e r y frequency and " o r d i n a r i n e s s " . Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would render the Act of very l i t t l e use i n p r o t e c t i n g p r i -vacy from media i n t r u s i o n s , even where the p u b l i c had no l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n the r e s u l t i n g "news" item. I t i s indeed t o be "hoped t h a t t h i s defence w i l l r e c e i v e a narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . 2 2 7 There have not been many cases r e p o r t e d under the p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a c y s t a t u t e s as y e t . I t has been surmised t h a t t h i s may be due t o the requirement i n each of the A c t s t h a t a c t i o n s be brought i n the Supreme Court of the 2 2 4 Sask, s 4(1)(e) 2 2 5 See Osborne, supra n 194, a t 107 2 2 6 I b i d a t 107-8. 2 2 7 I b i d a t 107. p r o v i n c e , thus i n v o l v i n g expense and p u b l i c i t y . z ° In Saccone v O r r , 2 2 9 which was d i s c u s s e d above, the County Court Judge noted t h a t the damages awarded t o the p l a i n t i f f were on the Small Claims Court s c a l e , so he s e t c o s t s some-what lower than the County Court s c a l e . Even i n t h a t case, then, which was de c i d e d a t common law s i n c e O n t a r i o has no p r i v a c y s t a t u t e , and c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be heard by a lower c o u r t , the damages and c o s t s t o g e t h e r would not have covered the c o s t t o the p l a i n t i f f of b r i n g i n g the a c t i o n . One case i n which an a c t i o n was brought a g a i n s t the media, under the B r i t i s h Columbian P r i v a c y Act, was Silber v BC Broadcasting System Ltd230 The p l a i n t i f f owned a r e t a i l s t o r e which was i n v o l v e d i n a b i t t e r l a b o u r d i s p u t e . The defendant t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n d e c i d e d t o run a s t o r y on the d i s p u t e . A j o u r n a l i s t from the s t a t i o n met w i t h the p l a i n t i f f , but the p l a i n t i f f d e c l i n e d t o be i n t e r v i e w e d u n t i l a f t e r t he s t r i k e was over. He a l s o s a i d t h a t he d i d not want the t e l e v i s i o n team on h i s premises, i n c l u d i n g the p a r k i n g - l o t . The j o u r n a l i s t and a photographer s t a r t e d f i l m i n g from a c r o s s the s t r e e t . Then they moved t o the p a r k i n g - l o t and con t i n u e d f i l m i n g . A s c u f f l e f o l l o w e d i n which the p l a i n t i f f , h i s son and a s e c u r i t y guard t r i e d t o wrest the microphone and f i l m from the j o u r n a l i s t and photographer. The photographer f i l m e d p a r t of t h i s s k i r m i s h , P e t e r Burns, "The Law and P r i v a c y : The Canadian E x p e r i -ence" (1976) 54 Can Bar Rev 1 a t 38. See supra n 152. (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 345 (SC). and an e d i t e d v e r s i o n of the f i l m was shown on news br o a d c a s t s t h a t n i g h t and the next day. The f i r s t q u e s t i o n was whether the f i l m i n g was a v i o l a t i o n of p r i v a c y . The judge, Lysyk J , h e l d t h a t t h e r e was no "reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y " even though the l o t was p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , s i n c e the events took p l a c e i n f u l l view of a busy s t r e e t . x The second q u e s t i o n was whether the b r o a d c a s t of the f i l m v i o l a t e d p r i v a c y . The judge h e l d t h a t the f i l m was a matter of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s i n c e " i f n o t h i n g e l s e , i t i l l u s t r a t e d the v o l a t i l i t y and h i g h f e e l i n g s which appeared t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s labour d i s p u t e " . The p l a i n t i f f a l s o a l l e g e d " f a l s e l i g h t i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y " . There was no mention i n the b r o a d c a s t t h a t the t e l e v i s i o n crew had been warned t o keep o f f the p a r k i n g l o t or t h a t they were t r e s p a s s i n g , so the f i l m might g i v e the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t the p l a i n t i f f behaved i n a v i o l e n t and intemperate manner. However, the judge r u l e d t h a t "even i f the Privacy Act l e a v e s room f o r the ' f a l s e l i g h t ' d o c t r i n e , which i s d o u b t f u l , " i t d i d not apply t o the c ircumstances of ^ J J- I b i d a t 352. 2 3 2 I b i d a t 354. the p r e s e n t case. 233 There was n o t h i n g f a l s e i n the b r o a d c a s t ; i t was merely m i s l e a d i n g by i t s incompleteness. The judge awarded nominal damages f o r t r e s p a s s and d i s m i s s e d the c o u n t e r c l a i m f o r a s s a u l t . 2 3 4 Other cases under the p r o v i n c i a l P r i v a c y A c t s have a l s o I b i d a t 354-55. In Fridman, supra n 151, a t 203, the judgment i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a c c e p t i n g t h a t f a l s e l i g h t "was one form of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , not s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t out i n the A c t , but not excluded by the p r o v i s i o n s of the A c t " . For t h i s reason P r o f e s s o r Fridman sees a c o n f l i c t between the judgment i n Silber and t h a t i n Parasiuk, supra n 152, which r e j e c t e d the " f a l s e l i g h t " d o c t r i n e . However, the judge i n Silber o n l y noted t h a t " f a l s e l i g h t " was one form of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y i n American law. As noted above, he s a i d t h a t he doubted the B r i t i s h Columbia P r i v a c y Act l e f t room f o r i t . An approach which might have y i e l d e d a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t would be t o c o n s i d e r the i s s u e s of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and " f a l s e l i g h t " t o g e t h e r . To the e x t e n t t h a t the f i l m " i l l u s t r a t e d ... v o l a t i l i t y and h i g h f e e l i n g s " , i t d i d so i n a q u i t e m i s l e a d i n g way, by the o m i s s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was known t o the j o u r n a l i s t s and was v i t a l t o understanding the whole i n c i d e n t . Arguably, the b r o a d c a s t of the f i l m without t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was not of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , even though (or perhaps f o r the v e r y reason th a t ) i t s p u b l i c a t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h the e x p l a n a t o r y m a t e r i a l would have been of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The argument might be even s t r o n g e r where the s t a t u t o r y defence i s t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n i s " i n " the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . I t should be noted, though, t h a t i t would s t i l l be necessary t o prove t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n had v i o l a t e d p r i v a c y f o r t h e r e t o be l i a b i l i t y . Davis v McArthur (1971) 17 DLR (3d) 760 (BCCA), r e v ' g (1969) 10 DLR (3d) 250 (BCSC); Belzberg v BC Television Broadcasting Ltd (1981) Vancouver C803082 (BCSC), summarised i n Silber, supra n 230, a t 350; Wooding v Little (1982) 24 CCLT 37 (BCSC); Bingo Enterprises Ltd v Plaxton (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 604 (Man CA), a f f ' g (1985) 36 Man R (2d) 249 (QB); Parasiuk, supra n 152. One s p e c u l a t i v e reason f o r t h i s r e c o r d of f a i l u r e i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s may p r e f e r t o s e t t l e out of c o u r t t o a v o i d p u b l i c i t y r e g a r d l e s s of the s t r e n g t h of t h e i r case, whereas defendants have l e s s i n c e n t i v e t o s e t t l e i f they b e l i e v e they may succeed i n c o u r t . One case i n which nominal damages were re c o v e r e d was ICBC v Somosh (1983) 51 DCLR (SC). g e n e r a l l y been u n s u c c e s s f u l . 235 The Canadian c o u r t s , d e s p i t e t h e p r o m i s i n g developments a t common law, seem t o be ado p t i n g a r a t h e r c o n s e r v a t i v e approach i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the p r o v i n c i a l P r i v a c y A c t s . One w r i t e r has commented as f o l l o w s : I t seems c l e a r t h a t , d e s p i t e the views of textbook w r i t e r s and oth e r commentators over the p a s t hundred y e a r s , Canadian judges are not convinced t h a t t h e r e i s any g r e a t overwhelming need f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t remedy f o r ... v i o l a t i o n s of p r i v a c y . 2 3 6 C o n c l u s i o n To summarise the p r e c e d i n g survey of r e c e n t d e v elop-ments i n the l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y from i n c u r s i o n s by the media i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e has been s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s towards such p r o t e c t i o n , but the balance remains, as y e t , f i r m l y a g a i n s t the i n d i v i d u a l . The Canadian c o u r t s , u n l i k e the E n g l i s h and A u s t r a l i a n c o u r t s , seem w i l l i n g t o develop a t o r t of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y a t common law, and t h e r e have a l s o been encouraging statements from the New Zealand c o u r t s i n f a v o u r o f such a development. There have been some i n t e r -e s t i n g s t a t u t o r y i n i t i a t i v e s i n s e v e r a l of the Canadian p r o v i n c e s , but the r e s u l t s have so f a r been r a t h e r d i s a p -p o i n t i n g . V a r i o u s approaches t o the e x c e p t i o n f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t have been noted, i n the E n g l i s h b i l l s and the Canadian s t a t u t e s . The i s s u e s r a i s e d w i l l be d i s -cussed more f u l l y i n the chapt e r s t h a t f o l l o w . Fridman, supra n 151, a t 204, a f t e r d i s c u s s i n g some of the cases l i s t e d above a t n 235. 9 7 i CHAPTER 4  THE MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The issue which occasions the most concern i n discus-sions of privacy law i s undoubtedly the c o n f l i c t between privacy values and the value of freedom of expression. The issue i s a l l the more c r i t i c a l i n a discussion focusing on the media, since the media have a c r u c i a l r o l e i n a system of free expression. Freedom of expression i s indeed an exceedingly impor-tant value i n a democratic society. However, i t w i l l be argued i n t h i s chapter that there i s less r e a l c o n f l i c t between privacy i n t e r e s t s and freedom of speech than i s often supposed. Various reasons for valuing free speech w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d , and i t w i l l be seen that the some of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for safeguarding freedom of speech are very s i m i l a r to those discussed i n chapter 2 for respecting i n d i v i d u a l privacy. I t w i l l be argued that, since i t i s d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h speech from action, expressive a c t i v i t y warrants protection only i n as much as the reasons for valuing freedom of expression apply i n the p a r t i c u l a r context. Freedom of expression cannot be balanced against privacy i n the abstract, but rather both i n t e r e s t s must be assessed i n context. The media should not be the ultimate judge of the public i n t e r e s t , since powerful private i n t e r e s t s are at work i n the media. The p o s i t i o n w i l l be taken t h a t a p r i v a t e matter i s not of genuine p u b l i c concern u n l e s s i t s p u b l i c a t i o n f u n c t i o n s t o i n f o r m the p u b l i c i n the wide range of c h o i c e s t h a t the p u b l i c must make. A t h r e e - p a r t t e s t i s proposed t o determine whether t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t f r e e speech v a l u e t o be weighed a g a i n s t the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t i n p r i v a c y . Many supposed c o n f l i c t s can be r e s o l v e d simply by not i d e n t i f y i n g the person t o whom p r i v a t e m a t e r i a l r e l a t e s , without any s i g n i f i c a n t harm t o e i t h e r , f r e e speech o r p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s . F i r s t i t i s necessary t o d e f i n e what i s meant by e x p r e s s i o n . T h i s i s n e a r l y as complex a t a s k as d e f i n i n g p r i v a c y ; the l i n e between e x p r e s s i o n and a c t i o n i s a d i f f i c u l t one t o draw. The Canadian Supreme Court has s t a t e d simply, " A c t i v i t y i s e x p r e s s i v e i f i t . attempts t o convey meaning." 1 However, many forms of e x p r e s s i o n do not c o n s c i o u s l y attempt t o convey any meaning. For example, a p a i n t i n g or a p i e c e of music may d i r e c t l y express c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s o r impulses o r something q u i t e u n d e f i n a b l e i n i t s c r e a t o r , w ithout b e i n g mediated through p r o p o s i t i o n a l thought. To r e q u i r e a composer t o be a b l e " t o i d e n t i f y the meaning being con-veyed"*" may be q u i t e i n a p p r o p r i a t e . To take another example, a yawn i s arguably " e x p r e s s i o n " whether i t i s simply a n a t u r a l impulse which i s not s t i f l e d or whether i t i s a d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o communicate boredom. A Irwin Toy Ltd c Quebec (Procureur General) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577 a t 606, per Dickson CJC, Lamer and Wilson, J J . 2 I b i d a t 613 and 614. Such problems i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g speech from conduct have c o n f r o n t e d the c o u r t s on many o c c a s i o n s , such as i n cases on p i c k e t i n g or the d i s p l a y or d e s e c r a t i o n o f f l a g s . 3 One w r i t e r , i n commenting on the a r b i t r a r y and i n c o n s i s t e n t way i n which such cases a re o f t e n decided, has concluded: I t i s ... not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the [U n i t e d S t a t e s ] Supreme Court has never a r t i c u l a t e d a b a s i s f o r i t s d i s t i n c t i o n [between speech and c o n d u c t ] ; i t c o u l d not do so, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r course of conduct can be hung almost randomly on the "speech" peg or the "conduct" peg as one sees f i t . 4 T h i s may be an overstatement of the matter, as t h e r e i s a core area o f e x p r e s s i o n on which t h e r e i s g e n e r a l agreement, as w e l l as a c o n s i d e r a b l e grey a r e a . 5 However, the grey area may i n c l u d e n e a r l y every c o n c e i v a b l e form of c o n d u c t . 6 The d i f f i c u l t y of drawing the l i n e between speech and conduct s h o u l d prompt c a u t i o n i n a p p l y i n g f r e e speech p r i n -c i p l e s t o d e f e a t p r i v a c y c l a i m s . P r i v a c y - i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a -t i o n s l a c k one of the most important f e a t u r e s of e x p r e s s i o n , For examples and d i s c u s s i o n see Laurence H T r i b e , American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1988), 825-32. See a l s o Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1986) 33 DLR (4th) 174 a t 186-87. 4 I b i d a t 827. 5 The same terms are d e l i b e r a t e l y used here as were used by the " J u s t i c e " Committee on P r i v a c y i n d e s c r i b i n g the area o f a person's l i f e which i s " p r i v a t e " . See " P r i v a c y and the Law" p 5, para 18, quoted i n Report of the Committee on Privacy (chairman: Kenneth Younger), Cmnd. 5012, 1972 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the Younger Committee Report), a t 17. I t i s intended t o emphasise the s i m i l a r i t y between the problems i n d e f i n i n g what sho u l d be p r o t e c t e d as " p r i v a t e " and what sh o u l d be p r o t e c t e d as " e x p r e s s i o n " . Cf "the g r e a t e s t p a r t of human a c t i v i t y has an e x p r e s s i v e element" Irwin Toy, supra n 1, a t 609-10. namely r e m e d i a b i l i t y . In t h i s way they resemble a c t i o n more than speech. One of the best-known a n a l y s e s of freedom o f e x p r e s s i o n s t a t e s : T h i s judgment [of whether conduct i s t o be c l a s s i f i e d as speech o r a c t i o n ] must be guided by c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether the conduct p a r t a k e s of the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s o f e x p r e s s i o n or a c t i o n . In the main t h i s i s a q u e s t i o n of whether the harm a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the conduct i s immediate and instanta n e o u s , and whether i t i s irr e m e -d i a b l e except by p u n i s h i n g and thereby p r e v e n t i n g the conduct. The harm r e s u l t i n g from an i n v a s i o n o f p r i v a c y i s indeed immediate and i r r e m e d i a b l e , as P r o f e s s o r T r i b e has p o i n t e d out: One h e l p f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a t l e a s t , i s the exte n t t o which the harm done by a statement i s t r u l y o f a s o r t t h a t "more speech" c o u l d not p o s s i b l y c u r e . To be sure, the t r u t h may never q u i t e c a t c h up w i t h a l i e , but a t l e a s t i n cases of i n j u r e d r e p u t a t i o n a chance t o c l e a r one's name a f t e r the f a c t may s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce, i f i t cannot w h o l l y erase, the harm. In cases i n v o l v i n g c l e a r breaches of p r i v a c y , however, the ve r y i d e a t h a t more t a l k c o u l d do any t h i n g but add i n s u l t t o i n j u r y b e t r a y s a misunderstanding of the c h a r a c t e r of the harm. Once the c a t i s out of the bag, i t cannot be put back. To t h i s degree, a r e t u r n t o the concept a t the h e a r t o f Chaplinsky - the e l i m i n a t i o n of those communi-c a t i o n s "which by t h e i r v e r y u t t e r a n c e i n f l i c t i n j u r y " - may p r o v i d e one of the few steady guides i n a p o o r l y c h a r t e d sea. Si n c e "the essence of a system of freedom o f e x p r e s s i o n l i e s i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between e x p r e s s i o n and a c t i o n " , 9 p r i v a c y - i n v a s i v e statements should not a u t o m a t i c a l l y be p r o t e c t e d i n the name of " f r e e speech". At the v e r y l e a s t , the i r r e m e d i a b i l i t y of an i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n suggests t h a t 7 Thomas I Emerson, "Toward a General Theory of the F i r s t Amendment" (1963) 72 Yale LJ 877 a t 917. 8 T r i b e , supra n 3, 890. Emerson, supra n 7, a t 955. i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f ought t o be granted more r e a d i l y i n p r i v a c y cases than i n defamation a c t i o n s . 1 0 A s o l u t i o n t o the problem of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g speech from a c t i o n i s t o i d e n t i f y the reasons f o r the s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n accorded t o " e x p r e s s i o n " , and t o use those reasons t o d e c i d e d o u b t f u l c a s e s . A T h i s i s the approach which the c o u r t s appear t o use i n p r a c t i c e , a l b e i t i n an u n c l e a r f a s h i o n . S i n c e some forms of e x p r e s s i o n bear a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p than o t h e r s t o the r a t i o n a l e s t r o n g e r p r o t e c t i o n i n these r e t u r n e d t o b e l o w . 1 2 f o r p r o t e c t i o n , t h e r e s h o u l d be cases, a p o i n t which w i l l be The well-known a n a l y s i s of P r o f e s s o r Emerson p r o v i d e s a good summary of the commonly r e c o g n i s e d f u n c t i o n s o f f r e e speech: The v a l u e s sought by s o c i e t y i n p r o t e c t i n g the r i g h t t o freedom of e x p r e s s i o n may be grouped i n t o f o u r broad c a t e g o r i e s . Maintenance of a system of f r e e e x p r e s s i o n i s necessary (1) as a s s u r i n g i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t , (2) as a means of a t t a i n i n g the t r u t h , (3) as a method of s e c u r i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the members of s o c i e t y i n s o c i a l , i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c a l , d e cision-making, and (4) as m a i n t a i n i n g the balance between s t a b i l i t y and change i n s o c i e t y . Cf Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 a t 734-35. Of course, i t a l s o suggests the f o l l y o f making f u r t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n the main remedy a v a i l a b l e ; see the . comments i n chapter 3 above on the U n i t e d Kingdom Press C o u n c i l . T h i s seems t o be what P r o f e s s o r T r i b e means when he says "Meaning might be poured i n t o the speech-conduct dichotomy by r e f e r e n c e t o a system of f r e e e x p r e s s i o n t h a t p e r m i t s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a c t s t h a t s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d by the f i r s t amendment." T r i b e , supra n 3, 8^27. See p 107ff. Emerson, supra n 7, a t 878-79. Emerson's f o u r t h c a t e g o r y w i l l not be d i s c u s s e d , s i n c e i t seems t o i d e n t i f y a r e s u l t o f the f u l f i l m e n t o f the other t h r e e f u n c t i o n s E s p e c i a l l y i n r e g a r d t o the f i r s t o f the s e f u n c t i o n s , the a s s u r i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t , t he c l a i m s made f o r freedom o f e x p r e s s i o n are ve r y s i m i l a r t o those made f o r p r i v a c y , d i s c u s s e d i n chapter 2. I t has been s a i d t h a t the purpose o f gua r a n t e e i n g freedom of e x p r e s s i o n i s : . . . t o ensure t h a t everyone can m a n i f e s t t h e i r thoughts, o p i n i o n s , b e l i e f s , indeed a l l e x p r e s s i o n s of the h e a r t and mind, however unpopular, d i s t a s t e f u l o r c o n t r a r y t o the mainstream. Such p r o t e c t i o n i s ... "fundamental" because i n a f r e e , p l u r a l i s t i c and democratic s o c i e t y we p r i z e a d i v e r s i t y o f idea s and o p i n i o n s f o r t h e i r i n h e r e n t v a l u e both t o the community and t o the i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s statement i s r e m i n i s c e n t of P r o f e s s o r Westin's argu-ments c o n n e c t i n g p r i v a c y w i t h the "development of i n d i v i d u -a l i t y " , and w i t h "independent thought, d i v e r s i t y of views, and n o n - c o n f o r m i t y " . 1 5 L i k e w i s e , Emerson's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of e x p r e s s i o n as "an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the development of id e a s , of mental i 6 e x p l o r a t i o n and of the a f f i r m a t i o n of s e l f " , p a r a l l e l s r a t h e r than a sep a r a t e f u n c t i o n . For Emerson's views on the i s s u e o f b a l a n c i n g p r i v a c y and f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s , see "The R i g h t of P r i v a c y and Freedom of the P r e s s " (1979) 14 Harv CR-CLL Rev 329. 14 15 16 Irwin Toy, supra n 1, a t 606. A l a n F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 34, quoted more f u l l y i n chapter 2 above. Emerson, supra n 7, a t 879. Another statement i n a s i m i l a r v e i n i s : " E x p r e s s i o n i s an exp e r i m e n t a l p r e l u d e of a c t i o n : i t i s the e x p l o r a t i v e mid-world between thought and the commitment of deed; i t i s a growth f u n c t i o n f o r a l l mental c r e a t i o n . " W i l l i a m E r n e s t Hocking, Freedom of the Press: A Framework of P r i n c i p l e , A Report from the Commission on Freedom of the Pr e s s (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1947; r e p r . New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 72-73. Westin's d e s c r i p t i o n of the v i t a l r o l e of p r i v a c y i n the pr o c e s s o f forming and t e s t i n g independent o p i n i o n s . 1 7 Again, j u s t as B l o u s t e i n saw i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y as "a blow t o human d i g n i t y , an a s s a u l t on human p e r s o n a l i t y " , 1 8 Emerson a s s e r t s t h a t " s u p p r e s s i o n of b e l i e f , o p i n i o n and e x p r e s s i o n i s an a f f r o n t t o the d i g n i t y of man, a n e g a t i o n of man's e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e " . 1 3 C l e a r l y , then, i n r e s p e c t o f the f i r s t o f Emerson's c a t e g o r i e s , p r i v a c y and freedom of e x p r e s s i o n a re heading i n the same d i r e c t i o n , toward i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t . C o n f l i c t may a r i s e i n a s i t u a t i o n where two i n d i v i d u a l s or groups are s t r i v i n g f o r s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , one through e x p r e s s i o n and the other through p r i v a c y . As r e g a r d s Emerson's t h i r d c a t e g o r y , 2 0 i t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g must i n t u r n be j u s t i f i e d by r e f e r e n c e t o the f i r s t c a t e g o r y of v a l u e s : ...once one asks why self-government and p o l i t i c a l p a r -t i c i p a t i o n are t o be valued, one i s apt t o come t o an answer t h a t immediately suggests a broader ground f o r v a l u i n g freedom of speech.... T h e o r i s t s d e f e n d i n g f r e e speech as c r u c i a l t o the p o l i t y i n a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system are i n c l i n e d t o respond t o the "why" by a r g u i n g 1 7 Westin, supra n 15, 34, quoted i n chapter 2 above, i s Edward J B l o u s t e i n , " P r i v a c y as an Aspect of Human D i g n i t y : An Answer t o Dean P r o s s e r " , i n Individual and Group Privacy (New Brunswick, New J e r s e y : T r a n s a c t i o n Books, 1978), 9 a t 13. 1 9 Emerson, supra n 18, a t 879. 2 0 Some t h e o r i s t s view the promotion of democratic s e l f -government as the main or o n l y reason f o r the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of speech; one of the foremost exponents i s Alexander M e i k l e j o h n , see Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965). t h a t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s v a l u a b l e i n p a r t because i t enhances p e r s o n a l growth and s e l f -r e a l i z a t i o n . 2 1 I t can t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t h a t p r i v a c y , freedom of e x p r e s s i o n , and self-government are a l l heading i n the d i r e c t i o n o f s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . I t c o u l d be added t h a t f r e e speech s e r v e s t h i s u l t i m a t e good both d i r e c t l y f o r the speaker (Emerson's f i r s t category) and i n d i r e c t l y f o r the l i s t e n e r through f a c i l i t a t i n g self-government (Emerson's t h i r d c a t e g o r y ) . In the same way, i t has been argued t h a t p r i v a c y not o n l y f o s t e r s s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n d i r e c t l y , but a l s o i s " e s s e n t i a l t o democratic government because i t f o s t e r s and encourages the moral autonomy of the c i t i z e n " . 2 2 Furthermore, the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y may have a more d i r e c t e f f e c t i n encouraging p u b l i c involvement. Some people would be more w i l l i n g t o speak out and p a r t i c i p a t e i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s i f they knew t h a t t h i s would not g i v e the media c a r t e blanche t o p u b l i s h a l l k i n d s of i r r e l e v a n t and embarrassing d e t a i l s about t h e i r p r i v a t e l i v e s . 2 3 T r i b e , supra n 3, a t 787 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Ruth Gavison, " P r i v a c y and the L i m i t s o f Law" (198 0) 89 Yale LJ 421 a t 455. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know j u s t how much t a l e n t may have been l o s t t o s o c i e t y due t o the d e s i r e t o a v o i d unwanted p u b l i c i t y . P r o f e s s o r Wacks mentions t h a t an e a r l y r e s e a r c h e r i n the f i e l d of ovum f e r t i l i s a t i o n who was " s i c k e n e d " by p r e s s harassment withdrew from h i s r e s e a r c h a l t o g e t h e r ; see Raymond Wacks, Protection of Privacy, Modern L e g a l S t u d i e s S e r i e s (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980), p 116, n 82. L i k e the supposed o p p o s i t i o n between p r i v a c y and f r e e speech, the way i n which some w r i t e r s have s e t p r i v a c y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o "community" may be misguided, i n t h a t the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c i v i l a c t i o n s f o r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y may encourage community involvement by d e c r e a s i n g i t s r i s k s . For an example of a d i s c u s s i o n of p r i v a c y as a g a i n s t community, In the U n i t e d S t a t e s , persons who "have t h r u s t them-s e l v e s t o the f o r e f r o n t of p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c c o n t r o v e r s i e s i n o r d e r t o i n f l u e n c e the r e s o l u t i o n of the i s s u e s i n -v o l v e d " are l a b e l l e d " p u b l i c f i g u r e s " and l o s e much of t h e i r l e g a l r i g h t t o p r i v a c y . P r o f e s s o r Gavison comments: [ I ] t can be argued t h a t r e s p e c t f o r p r i v a c y w i l l h e l p a s o c i e t y a t t r a c t t a l e n t e d i n d i v i d u a l s t o p u b l i c l i f e . Persons i n t e r e s t e d i n government s e r v i c e must c o n s i d e r the l o s s of v i r t u a l l y a l l c l a i m s and e x p e c t a t i o n s of p r i v a c y i n c a l c u l a t i n g the c o s t s of r u nning f o r p u b l i c o f f i c e . Respect f o r p r i v a c y might reduce those c o s t s . 2 6 In the same way, p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y may a c t u a l l y encourage f r e e e x p r e s s i o n and more open debate. There i s reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t i r r e l e v a n t p u b l i c i t y can have a p u n i -t i v e and d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t on those who would speak out on see R i c h a r d F Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in Conflict (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1987); however note t h a t Hixson i s a d d r e s s i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s concept of p r i v a c y which encompasses non-i n t e r f e r e n c e by government i n p r i v a t e c h o i c e s as w e l l as l i m i t e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y . Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323 a t 325 (1974); as quoted i n Wacks, i b i d a t 102. T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l s e t out an a l t e r n a t i v e approach t o the q u e s t i o n of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and i d e n t i t y . Problems i n the concept of a p u b l i c f i g u r e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n c h apter 5. Gavison, supra n 22, a t 456. Of course, p u b l i c involvement n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s some l o s s of p r i v a c y , and p r i v a c y must not be p e r m i t t e d t o be used as a c l o a k f o r matters i n which the p u b l i c has a genuine concern. However, p u b l i c i t y i s o f t e n q u i t e unwarranted, e s p e c i a l l y where i t concerns the f a m i l i e s of those i n the p u b l i c eye. American e x - P r e s i d e n t R i c h a r d Nixon has expressed h i s view t h a t , " H i g h l y q u a l i f i e d people are becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l u c t a n t t o take Government p o s i t i o n s i n Washington because they don't want t o expose t h e i r f a m i l i e s t o t h i s m e r c i l e s s s c r u t i n y " ; quoted i n "I Could See No Reason t o L i v e " , Time (New York), A p r i l 2 1990, 43, from a forthcoming book. 106 p u b l i c i s s u e s or q u e s t i o n mainstream thought and v a l u e s . 2 7 A s o c i o l o g i s t has observed "a widespread assumption t h a t p r i v a c y i s s u r r e n d e r e d by almost any form of deviance from, or d i s r e s p e c t f o r , c o n v e n t i o n a l standards of b e h a v i o u r 1 1 . 2 8 John S t u a r t M i l l i s o f t e n quoted f o r h i s f e r v e n t support of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t governmental i n c u r s i o n s , but he a l s o had t h i s t o say: P r o t e c t i o n . . . a g a i n s t the tyranny of the m a g i s t r a t e i s not enough: t h e r e needs p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t the tyranny -of the p r e v a i l i n g o p i n i o n and f e e l i n g ; a g a i n s t the tendency of s o c i e t y t o i m p o s e . . . i t s own i d e a s and p r a c -t i c e s as r u l e s of conduct on those who d i s s e n t from t h e m . 2 9 While the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y w i l l o f t e n f u r t h e r the g o a l s of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n , some i n s t a n c e s of e x p r e s s i o n may have o n l y the remotest c o n n e c t i o n t o these g o a l s . I t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t fundamental human r i g h t s such as freedom of e x p r e s s i o n : ...can be regarded as u n c o n d i t i o n a l o n l y i f we r e f r a i n from g i v i n g reasons f o r them (as by c a l l i n g them s e l f -e v i d e n t or axiomatic) . I f we g i v e reasons f o r them -and t h e r e are reasons f o r our b e l i e f i n them - those reasons s t a t e the c o n d i t i o n on which the r i g h t i s c l a i m e d . For if the facts proposed in the given reason are not present in any case, the ground for the claim For example, a member of the U n i t e d Kingdom p a r l i a m e n t was h a r a s s e d by j o u r n a l i s t s when her marriage broke up. The P r e s s C o u n c i l h e l d t h a t the p u b l i c i t y was warranted s i n c e she had been outspoken on women's i s s u e s . See G e r a l d Dworkin, "Appendix: The Royal Commission on the P r e s s " , i n Privacy, ed. John B Young ( C h i c h e s t e r : John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 330. Denis McQuail, "The Mass Media and P r i v a c y " , i n Young, i b i d a t 188. John S t u a r t M i l l as quoted by G S t u a r t Adam, "Why Should the Press Be Free? A J o u r n a l i s t ' s R e f l e c t i o n s on the C h a r t e r " i n Robert M a r t i n and G S t u a r t Adam, A Sourcebook of Canadian Media Law (Ottawa: C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1989), 113 a t 117. in that case vanishes. T h i s p o i n t i s so obvious t h a t i t has g e n e r a l l y escaped a t t e n t i o n . C l e a r l y t h e r e i s cause t o g r a n t s t r o n g e r p r o t e c t i o n where e x p r e s s i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y f u r t h e r s the g o a l s of f r e e speech than where t h e r e i s o n l y a v e r y tenuous c o n n e c t i o n between an i n s t a n c e of e x p r e s s i v e conduct and f r e e speech v a l u e s . Such an approach has a l s o been c a l l e d a " c o n t e x t u a l approach", s i n c e " i t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t or freedom may have a d i f f e r e n t v a l u e depending on the con-t e x t " . 3 1 In Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney-General),32 Wilson J of the Canadian Supreme Court advocated the use of a c o n t e x t u a l approach t o r e s o l v e a c o n f l i c t between p r o t e c t -i n g the p r i v a c y of p a r t i e s i n m a t r i m o n i a l d i s p u t e s and a l l o w i n g media reports, of such proceedings. She e l a b o r a t e d as f o l l o w s : The c o n t e x t u a l approach attempts t o b r i n g i n t o sharp r e l i e f the aspect of the r i g h t or freedom which i s t r u l y a t stake i n the case as w e l l as the r e l e v a n t a s p e c t s of any v a l u e s i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i t . I t seems t o me t o be more s e n s i t i v e t o the r e a l i t y of the dilemma posed by the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s and t h e r e f o r e more conducive t o f i n d i n g a f a i r and j u s t compromise between the two competing v a l u e s . . . . I t i s my view t h a t a r i g h t or freedom may have d i f f e r e n t meanings i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s . . . . I t seems e n t i r e l y probable t h a t the v a l u e t o be a t t a c h e d t o i t i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s f o r the purpose of the b a l a n c i n g under s. 1 might a l s o be d i f f e r e n t . 3 3 Hocking, supra n 16, 72-73 (emphasis added). Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney-General) (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 577 a t 583-84, per Wilson J (SCC). I b i d , d i s c u s s e d above a t p 83-85. 3 3 I b i d a t 584. In the case i n q u e s t i o n , the c o n t e x t u a l approach b a l -anced the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n guaranteeing the p r i v a c y o f p a r t i e s i n m a t r i m o n i a l d i s p u t e s a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n knowing the d e t a i l s o f such proceedings. The a l t e r n a t i v e would be t o p i t a r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i n the a b s t r a c t a g a i n s t the whole p r i n c i p l e o f freedom of the p r e s s , a f r u s t r a t i n g and u l t i m a t e l y f u t i l e approach, l e n d i n g i t s e l f t o r h e t o r i c r a t h e r than reason. Perhaps even worse than a p u r e l y a b s t r a c t approach i s t o attempt t o weigh a s p e c i f i c p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t the a b s t r a c t i n t e r e s t i n freedom of speech. As Wilson J put the matter: One t h i n g seems c l e a r and t h a t i s t h a t one sho u l d not balance one v a l u e a t l a r g e and the c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e i n i t s c o n t e x t . To do so c o u l d w e l l be t o pre-judge the i s s u e by p l a c i n g more weight on the v a l u e developed a t l a r g e than i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n the con t e x t of t h e c a s e . 3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s k i n d of t h i n k i n g plagues many d i s c u s s i o n s o f p r i v a c y law d e s p i t e i t s obvious f l a w s . The pr e s s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y prone t o c a s t i t s arguments i n such weighted terms, as the f o l l o w i n g quote from the Younger Committee Report i l l u s t r a t e s : Perhaps the p r e s s evidence t o us can.be b e s t summed up i n the words of one l e a d i n g spokesman, who asked whether the shortcomings of some newspapers and some r e p o r t e r s from time t o time were, i n sum, so outrageous t h a t the ve r y p r i n c i p l e of freedom of speech needed t o be s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a g e n e r a l r i g h t of p r i v a c y . 3 5 The r e t o r t o f f e r e d i n the m i n o r i t y r e p o r t o f D M Ross evidences h i s support f o r a c o n t e x t u a l approach: 3 4 I b i d a t 582. 3 5 Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t 39. I t h i n k t h a t the q u e s t i o n should be put more f a i r l y thus - whether freedom of speech i s so important t h a t i t s h o u l d p r e v a i l over an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o p r i v a c y [ i t s h o u l d be added, i n every c a s e ] , and i n my o p i n i o n , i t s h o u l d o n l y so p r e v a i l where it can be shown to be in the public interest.36 I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o adopt a s e m i - c o n t e x t u a l approach, d i v i d i n g speech i n t o broad c a t e g o r i e s which are accorded v a r y i n g amounts of p r o t e c t i o n . For example, a d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s between commercial and non-commercial speech, w i t h the former b e i n g g r a n t e d more l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n than the l a t t e r . 3 7 The Canadian c o u r t s have r e j e c t e d such c a t e g o r i s a t i o n , i n s t e a d t a k i n g the nature o f the s p e c i f i c e x p r e s s i o n i n q u e s t i o n i n t o account as a f a c t o r i n the b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s under the C h a r t e r . 3 8 I t i s submitted t h a t a f u l l y c o n t e x t u a l approach, a s s e s s i n g the f u n c t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t forms of e x p r e s s i o n on a case-by-case b a s i s , i s p r e f e r a b l e t o the adopti o n of r i g i d c a t e g o r i e s , which merely r a i s e f u r t h e r problems of d e f i n i t i o n . 3 9 To a v o i d u n f a i r l y w e i g h t i n g the s c a l e s , not o n l y must both i n t e r e s t s s hould be weighed i n cont e x t , but a l s o "both I b i d a t 215 (emphasis added). See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc, 425 US 748 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v New York Public Service Commission, 447 US 557 (1980); T r i b e , supra n 3, 890-904. See Ford v Quebec (Att-Gen) (1988) 54 DLR (4th) 577 a t 609-619 (SCC). One example of such a problem i s whether p o l i t i c a l a d v e r t i s i n g i s p r i m a r i l y " p o l i t i c a l " or " a d v e r t i s i n g " ; see M a r t i n and Adam, supra n 29, a t 87. NB: the s e c t i o n headed "A Note on A d v e r t i s i n g and Free E x p r e s s i o n " was w r i t t e n b e f o r e Ford v Quebec, supra n 38, was d e c i d e d . See a l s o T r i b e , supra n 3, 894-99. i n t e r e s t s must be seen as p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s " . 4 0 The p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t t o be weighed i s the i n t e r e s t of the p u b l i c i n p r o t e c t i n g the p r i v a c y of i n d i v i d u a l s i n l i k e cases g e n e r a l l y . Freedom o f the p r e s s can be seen as a p a r t of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n , i n othe r words as the freedom t o express o n e s e l f through the o r g a n i s e d media. However, c l e a r l y not everyone has access t o media f a c i l i t i e s ; i n f a c t , v e r y few people do. I t has been s a i d t h a t "Communication i s power, and e x c l u s i v e access t o i t i s a dangerous, unchecked power." 4 1 In a s i m i l a r v e i n i s the view, "An overpowering, omniscient, m i n o r i t y - c o n t r o l l e d media i s always a danger t o both the i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y . . . . " 4 2 There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t the media, i n the Commonwealth as i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , i s c o n t r o l l e d by a s m a l l m i n o r i t y . In f a c t the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of media ownership i n the hands of a few l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s has been the s u b j e c t of p u b l i c c o n s t e r n a t i o n and o f f i c i a l i n q u i r i e s i n the d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . 4 3 Edmonton Journal, supra n 31, a t 582 per Wilson J . Senator J W F u l l b r i g h t , 4 August 1970, quoted i n He r b e r t Brucker, Communication is Power: Unchanging Values in a Changing Journalism (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1973) . John David V i e r a , "Images as Pr o p e r t y " i n Image Ethics: The Moral Rights of Subjects in Photographs, Film, and Television, ed. L a r r y Gross, John S t u a r t Katz, and Jay Ruby (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1988) 135 a t 138. See f o r example Royal Commission on the Press 1947-9 Report, Cmnd 1811 (1949); Royal Commission on the Press 1961-2 Report, Cmnd 1811 (1962); and Royal Commission on the Press 1974-7 Final Report, Cmnd 6810 (1977). See a l s o A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 11, Unfair Publication:Defamation and Privacy (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1978), 23. The need t o keep a check on the power of the media i s one reason f o r r e j e c t i n g the n o t i o n t h a t the media i t s e l f s h o uld be the f i n a l judge of what matters are of p u b l i c concern. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of what the p u b l i c i s i n t e r e s t e d i n , much l e s s what i s of genuine p u b l i c concern, are by no means the o n l y f a c t o r s d e t e r m i n i n g what the media chooses t o p u b l i s h . The t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l view of the p r e s s as r e p r e s e n t i n g the p u b l i c , and as "a watchdog a g a i n s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of power, whether p o l i t i c a l or economic", i s inadequate: T h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a f r e e p r e s s may have seemed p l a u s i b l e i n m i d - V i c t o r i a n B r i t a i n when i t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e f o r groups of working people t o launch g r e a t n a t i o n a l newspapers, and when the p r e s s as a whole r e f l e c t e d an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y wide spectrum of p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n . But the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l t h e o r y of p r e s s freedom has become s t e a d i l y l e s s c o n v i n c i n g as the gap between r h e t o r i c and r e a l i t y has w i d e n e d . 4 4 The v e r y nature of the media has changed s i n c e the e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h century, and a d i v e r s e , c i r c u l a t i o n - b a s e d media has been r e p l a c e d by a few v e r y l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s whose primary income source i s a d v e r t i s i n g . James Curran and Jean Seaton have ana l y s e d t h i s change and argued c o n t r a r y t o the orthodox i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t : The p e r i o d around the middle of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . . . d i d not inaugurate a new era of p r e s s freedom and l i b e r t y : i t i n t r o d u c e d a new system of p r e s s c e n s o r s h i p more e f f e c t i v e than a n y t h i n g t h a t had gone b e f o r e . James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain, 2nd ed (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), 285. I b i d , chaps 1-7 and 16; see a l s o Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 1-18. Market f o r c e s succeeded where l e g a l r e p r e s s i o n had f a i l e d i n c o n s c r i p t i n g the p r e s s t o the s o c i a l o r d e r . 4 6 Curran and Seaton note the r a p i d growth of a r a d i c a l p r e s s o r g a n i s e d and read by the working c l a s s e s i n the l a t e e i g h t e e n t h and e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h century. Government attempts t o s t i f l e t h i s movement through the laws of s e d i t i o u s l i b e l and through onerous t a x a t i o n were u n s u c c e s s f u l . The r a d i c a l papers had the h i g h e s t c i r c u l a t i o n s of the contemporary p r e s s , and were f i n a n c e d by t h e i r r e a d e r s h i p . During the 1850s, however, a campaign mounted t o have p r e s s taxes r e p e a l e d . I t was argued t h a t a f r e e market would more e f f e c t i v e l y keep the r a d i c a l p r e s s i n check. For example, the p r e s i d e n t of the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r the Promotion of the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge maintained t h a t the r e p e a l would c r e a t e "a cheap p r e s s i n the hands of men of good moral c h a r a c t e r , of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , and of c a p i t a l " . 4 7 The campaign was s u c c e s s f u l , and so was the o b j e c t i v e of c u r b i n g the r a d i c a l p r e s s . The main e f f e c t of t h e r e p e a l s was t o reduce the c o s t s of newspaper a d v e r t i s i n g , l e a d i n g t o a l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n the amount of a d v e r t i s i n g : [A]11 c o m p e t i t i v e l y p r i c e d newspapers - i n c l u d i n g those w i t h v e r y l a r g e c i r c u l a t i o n s - became dependent on a d v e r t i s i n g . A d v e r t i s e r s thus a c q u i r e d a de facto l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y s i n c e , without t h e i r support, news-papers ceased t o be e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e . 4 8 Curran and Seaton, supra n 44, a t 9. I b i d a t 31. I b i d a t 41. A d v e r t i s e r s p r e f e r r e d an "upmarket" audience f o r t h e i r a dvertisements, as the f o l l o w i n g quote from a contemporary a d v e r t i s i n g manual i l l u s t r a t e s : C h a r a c t e r i s of more importance than number. A j o u r n a l t h a t c i r c u l a t e s a thousand among the nipper or middle c l a s s e s i s a b e t t e r medium than would be one c i r c u l a t -i n g a hundred thousand among the lower c l a s s e s . The new dependence on a d v e r t i s i n g was d i s a s t r o u s f o r the r a d i c a l papers, d e s p i t e t h e i r l a r g e c i r c u l a t i o n s . The c r u c i a l importance of a d v e r t i s i n g support has co n t i n u e d i n t o the t w e n t i e t h century. Curran and Seaton p o i n t t o the c l o s u r e o f the Daily Herald i n 1964, a working c l a s s paper which when i t c l o s e d had a c i r c u l a t i o n almost double t h a t o f The Times, the Guardian and Financial Times added t o g e t h e r . As a d v e r t i s i n g revenue d e c l i n e d , however, the paper r a n a t a l o s s . 5 0 One w r i t e r has e x p l a i n e d the importance of a d v e r t i s i n g as f o l l o w s : To make sense of A u s t r a l i a ' s media monopolies, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o get the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the media and a d v e r t i s i n g the r i g h t way round: commercial mass media are not news and f e a t u r e s backed up by a d v e r t i s i n g ; on the c o n t r a r y , the commercial mass media are advertise-ments which carry news, features and entertainment in order to capture audiences for the advertisers.... I t i s a complete mistake t o ana l y s e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between media and a d v e r t i s i n g by supposing t h a t the media's prime f u n c t i o n i s t o s e l l a d v e r t i s e d p r o d u c t s t o audiences. On the c o n t r a r y , the media's j o b i s t o s e l l audiences t o a d v e r t i s e r s . I b i d a t 43. I b i d a t 107-8. McQueen, Humphrey, Australia's Media Monopolies (Camberwell, V i c t o r i a , A u s t r a l i a , 1977); as quoted i n D a l l a s W Smythe, Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada (Norwood, New Sometimes i n f l u e n c e from a d v e r t i s e r s i s o v e r t , but more o f t e n i t simply takes the form of a h i g h e r demand f o r , and thus a h i g h e r revenue from, c e r t a i n types of programmes which w i l l a t t r a c t c e r t a i n types of audiences: A d v e r t i s e r s w i l l want ... t o a v o i d programs wi t h s e r i o u s c o m p l e x i t i e s and d i s t u r b i n g c o n t r o v e r s i e s t h a t i n t e r f e r e w i t h the "buying mood." They seek programs t h a t w i l l l i g h t l y e n t e r t a i n . . . . 5 3 Not o n l y a d v e r t i s i n g but ownership can e x e r t some i n f l u e n c e on what m a t e r i a l i s p u b l i s h e d . 5 4 In B r i t a i n f o r example: J e r s e y : Ablex P u b l i s h i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , 1981), 14 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . See Herman and Chomsky, supra n 45, a t 16-17, f o r examples. Barr y Zwicker, i n "Where commerce, j o u r n a l i s m meet", The Globe and Mail, 15 September 1990, D l , d i s c u s s e d the i s s u e of a d v e r t i s i n g b o y c o t t s , commenting: "[A] b o y c o t t i s one k i n d of event i n a spectrum t h a t i s the norm. The s i z e and v e r y e x i s t e n c e of so many r e v e n u e - r e l a t e d s e c t i o n s such as t r a v e l , automobiles and r e a l e s t a t e i s proof of how the very s t r u c t u r e of newspapers i s skewed by ad revenue c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . " The a r t i c l e a l s o e x p l a i n e d t h a t p u b l i s h e r s do not l i k e t o p u b l i s h the f a c t t h a t they are being boycotted, and gave an example of a boycotted paper p r i n t i n g a statement denying t h a t t h e r e had been a b o y c o t t . One prominent example of both o v e r t and de f a c t o c e n s o r s h i p by a d v e r t i s e r s i s the e f f e c t on coverage of s m o k i n g - r e l a t e d h e a l t h i s s u e s of r e l i a n c e on a d v e r t i s i n g from tobacco companies, as documented by e m p i r i c a l and a n e c d o t a l e v idence; see Kenneth E Warner, Selling Smoke: Cigarette Advertising and Public Health (Washington, DC: American P u b l i c H e a l t h A s s o c i a t i o n , 1986), 74-81. Herman and Chomsky, supra n 45, 17. See Robert M a r t i n , "Does L i b e l Have a ' C h i l l i n g E f f e c t ' i n Canada?" i n M a r t i n and Adam, supra n 29, 757 a t 758-59. A f u r t h e r f a c t o r other than p u b l i c i n t e r e s t which a f f e c t s what i s p u b l i s h e d i s the ease of o b t a i n i n g the m a t e r i a l , and hence r e l i a n c e on i n s t i t u t i o n a l s o u r c e s . See Curran and Seaton, supra n 44, a t 270-72; Herman and Chomsky, supra n 45, a t 18-25. Many of the best-known newspapers are kept a l i v e o n l y by the p r o f i t s o f t h e i r conglomerate p a r e n t s ' other i n t e r e s t s . They are the kept m i s t r e s s e s of major c o r p o r a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g i n a world where p o l i t i c s and bu s i n e s s impinge on one another. The t r a d i t i o n a l c l a i m made f o r the p r e s s t h a t i t i s a f o u r t h e s t a t e , uncompromised and independent, no lon g e r h o l d s g o o d . 5 5 Given the r e a l i t i e s of modern mass media, p r e s s freedom i s b e s t regarded as b e i n g d e r i v e d from freedom of speech and s u b s e r v i e n t t o i t : Freedom of the p r e s s i s a r i g h t b e l o n g i n g , l i k e a l l r i g h t s i n a democracy, t o a l l the people. As a p r a c t i -c a l matter, though, i t can be e x e r c i s e d o n l y by those who have e f f e c t i v e access t o the p r e s s . Where f i n a n -c i a l , economic, and t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s l i m i t such access t o a s m a l l m i n o r i t y , the e x e r c i s e of t h a t r i g h t by t h a t m i n o r i t y takes on f i d u c i a r y or q u a s i - f i d u c i a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The e x c l u s i v e e x e r c i s e of a g e n e r a l r i g h t by a l i m i t e d m i n o r i t y can be j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f the e x e r c i s e i s of such a c h a r a c t e r as t o r e a l i z e the g e n e r a l purpose f o r which the r i g h t was e s t a b l i s h e d . 5 6 In o t h e r words, p u b l i c a t i o n i n the mass media, i n order t o m e r i t p r o t e c t i o n , ought t o be j u s t i f i e d by something more than merely the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t of the j o u r n a l i s t who happens t o have access t o o u t l e t s denied t o the o r d i n a r y person. Such f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n may be found i n the p r o -motion of s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t f o r those of the p u b l i c who f i n d t h e i r own thoughts or o p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d , 5 7 i n c o n t r i b u t i n g Curran and Seaton, supra n 44, a t 292. See a l s o Herman and Chomsky, supra n 45, a t 3-14. From a note by A r c h i b a l d MacLeish i n Hocking, supra n 16, at 99. As p o i n t e d out i n Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1989), a t 74, the n o t i o n of s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t i s more a p p l i c a b l e t o the e x p r e s s i o n of idea s than i n f o r m a t i o n , so i s "of l i m i t e d u t i l i t y " i n d i s c u s s i n g p r i v a c y law. t o p u b l i c debate and the attainment of t r u t h , or i n in f o r m -i n g the p u b l i c i n t h e i r decision-making. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the freedom of the p r e s s as an important democratic y a l u e should not be d e f i n e d as "the freedom o f a p u b l i s h e r t o p u b l i s h what he w i s h e s " . 5 8 A b e t t e r d e f i n i t i o n o f freedom o f the p r e s s i s : . . . t h a t freedom from r e s t r a i n t which i s e s s e n t i a l t o enable p r o p r i e t o r s , e d i t o r s and j o u r n a l i s t s t o advance the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by p u b l i s h i n g t he f a c t s and o p i n i o n s without which a democratic e l e c t o r a t e cannot make r e s p o n s i b l e judgements. 5 9 The p u b l i c a t i o n o f a p r i v a t e matter i n the media g e n e r a l l y does l i t t l e t o f u r t h e r f r e e speech u n l e s s i t informs decision-making. In othe r words, i f a p r i v a t e matter i s not r e l e v a n t t o any of the broad range of c h o i c e s which the p u b l i c must make, then n e i t h e r w i l l attainment o f t r u t h on the matter be a s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i e t a l good. A l s o , i t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t the n o t i o n of s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t i s more* a p p l i c a b l e t o the e x p r e s s i o n of ideas and o p i n i o n s than t o the d i s c l o s u r e of i n f o r m a t i o n , so i s "of l i m i t e d u t i l i t y " i n d i s c u s s i n g p r i v a c y l a w . 6 0 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was adopted i n the B r i t i s h Royal Commission on the Press 1961-2 Report, supra n 43; as quoted i n Curran and Seaton, supra n 44, a t 2 97. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was adopted i n the B r i t i s h Royal Commission on the Press 1974-7 Final Report, supra n 43; as quoted i n Curran and Seaton, supra n 44, a t 296-97. In q u o t i n g t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i t i s not intended t o p l a c e any emphasis on the word " e s s e n t i a l " or t o otherwise suggest a more r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n than the r e s t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n suggests. I t i s t o be assumed t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t w i l l be advanced by p u b l i s h i n g the s a i d f a c t s and o p i n i o n s , r a t h e r than any sepa r a t e i n q u i r y b e i n g made i n t o the p u b l i c b e n e f i t . Wacks, Personal Information, supra n 57, a t 74. E m e r s o n ' s t h i r d c a t e g o r y , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n -m a k i n g , c a n t h e r e f o r e b e u s e d t o g i v e some c o n t e n t t o t h e c o n c e p t o f g e n u i n e p u b l i c c o n c e r n . 6 1 A m a t t e r i s o f g e n u i n e p u b l i c c o n c e r n i f i t w i l l b e u s e f u l t o members o f t h e p u b l i c i n i n f o r m i n g c h o i c e s t h a t t h e y m u s t m a k e . T h i s a r g u m e n t r e s t s p a r t l y o n a r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g o a l o f a t t a i n m e n t o f t r u t h . 6 2 D i s c u s s i o n s o f t h i s g o a l t e n d t o c e n t r e o n w h e t h e r t h e f r e e e x c h a n g e o f i d e a s i s " t h e b e s t p r o c e s s f o r a d v a n c i n g k n o w l e d g e a n d d i s c o v e r i n g t r u t h " . 6 3 A s a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , 6 4 o n e o f t h e m a i n p r i n c i p l e s o f t h i s p r o -c e s s , n a m e l y t h a t t h e r e m e d y f o r f a l s e h o o d i s m o r e s p e e c h , s i m p l y d o e s n o t a p p l y t o p r i v a c y - i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s . F a l s e h o o d i s n o t t h e i s s u e i n a p r i v a c y c a s e , a n d t h e damage t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a n n o t b e r e c t i f i e d b y m o r e s p e e c h . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e v a l u e o f t r u t h i s a s s u m e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e " m a r k e t p l a c e o f i d e a s " , a n d r i g h t l y s o w h e r e t h e t o p i c i s o n e w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e p u b l i c , o n e o n w h i c h a " s o c i a l j u d g m e n t " 6 5 i s c a l l e d f o r . H o w e v e r , i t h a s b e e n r e m a r k e d t h a t a l t h o u g h "more o p e n d i s c u s s i o n o f p u b l i c 61 T h e m o r e common e x p r e s s i o n s , " o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " a n d " i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " , a r e a m b i g u o u s . A l t h o u g h t h e y a r e u s u a l l y i n t e n d e d t o b e s y n o n y m o u s w i t h " o f g e n u i n e p u b l i c c o n c e r n " , t h e y c a n a l s o b e t a k e n t o mean " o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e p u b l i c " a n d " b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e p u b l i c " r e s p e c t i v e l y . S e e P h i l i p H O s b o r n e , " T h e P r i v a c y A c t s o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , M a n i t o b a a n d S a s k a t c h e w a n " , i n Aspects of Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, e d D a l e G i b s o n ( T o r o n t o : B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1 9 8 0 ) , 73 a t 9 5 - 9 6 . S e e a l s o W a c k s , Personal Information, s u p r a n 5 7 , a t 1 7 3 , f o r some b r i e f comments o n t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m t r u t h . 6 T E m e r s o n , s u p r a n 7 , a t 8 8 1 . 6 4 S e e p 9 9 - 1 0 1 a b o v e . 6 5 E m e r s o n , s u p r a n 7 , a t 8 8 2 . i s s u e s based on f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of the f a c t s " i s t o be welcomed: . . . t h a t i s f a r from s a y i n g t h a t the p u b l i c i s e n t i t l e d t o know all the t r u t h about an i n d i v i d u a l o r group. Some area of a man's l i f e i s h i s b u s i n e s s a l o n e . 6 6 C u r i o s i t y , the d e s i r e t o a t t a i n t r u t h f o r i t s own sake, i s commendable and r i g h t l y a i d e d by a system of f r e e expres-s i o n when i t r e l a t e s t o matters i n the p u b l i c domain, such as p h i l o s o p h y , s c i e n c e and p o l i t i c s . However, when c u r i o s i t y i s d i r e c t e d a t the p r i v a t e a f f a i r s o f oth e r i n d i v i d u a l s , unaccompanied by any l e g i t i m a t e need t o know, s o c i e t y l o o k s on i t l e s s k i n d l y , and i t i s not the bu s i n e s s o f the law t o secure i t s indulgence. I t i s important t o note t h a t the n o t i o n of c h o i c e s which the p u b l i c must make should not be c o n c e i v e d t oo nar-rowly. C e r t a i n l y they are not l i m i t e d t o p o l i t i c a l c h o i c e s . The Younger Committee Report commented as f o l l o w s : Knowledge of what ot h e r people are doing i s e s s e n t i a l t o members of a s o c i e t y who are interd e p e n d e n t . . . . [The need] extends t o a g e n e r a l knowledge of events i n the wider s o c i e t y and i n the world as a whole, which i s the raw m a t e r i a l out of which p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s formed, on which n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l p o l i c i e s a re made, and by which standards of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e customs and morals a re ev o l v e d . . . . Marriage customs, the u p b r i n g i n g of c h i l d r e n , conventions and h a b i t s i n e d u c a t i o n , en-t e r t a i n m e n t and s o c i a l l i f e , are a l l examples of s u b j e c t s which should be w i d e l y d i s c u s s e d i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and y e t i n v o l v e examination of the way of l i f e o f i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , which most people r e g a r d as p r i v a t e . 6 7 M i n o r i t y Report of A W Lyon i n the Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t 209 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Supra n 5, a t 46-47. A l l o f the s u b j e c t s l i s t e d are ones on which the p u b l i c has important c h o i c e s t o make. However, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o meet the p u b l i c ' s need f o r open d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e t o p i c s without t r a m p l i n g on i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . In f a c t , some of the most v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on i n t i m a t e t o p i c s i s o b t a i n e d o n l y by g u a r a n t e e i n g p r i v a c y . People are o f t e n prepared t o , d i s c l o s e a l l k i n d s of p e r s o n a l d e t a i l s i f they know t h a t t h e i r anonymity i s assured, as i s s t a n d a r d i n surveys and s t u d i e s of a t t i t u d e s and behaviour. The s o l u t i o n t o a g r e a t number of supposed c o n f l i c t s between f r e e speech and p r i v a c y , perhaps the m a j o r i t y of 6 Q them, ° i s simply t o p r o t e c t the i n d i v i d u a l s concerned from being i d e n t i f i e d . T h i s s o l u t i o n seems obvious, where the i d e n t i t y i s not the essence of the i n f o r m a t i o n , and y e t seems t o be o v e r l o o k e d completely by many commentators on 69 p r i v a c y . 3 The Younger Committee addressed the i s s u e of p u b l i c a t i o n of i d e n t i t i e s b r i e f l y , mainly by r e p o r t i n g the P r e s s C o u n c i l ' s views on the m a t t e r . 7 0 None of the P r e s s C o u n c i l ' s arguments are v e r y p e r s u a s i v e . F i r s t l y , the C o u n c i l argued t h a t " i d e n t i t i e s are e s s e n t i a l t o e s t a b l i s h the a u t h e n t i c i t y of the news". However, whether or not i d e n t i t i e s are g i v e n i s not a v e r y r e l i a b l e guide t o a u t h e n t i c i t y . On the one hand, s t o r i e s such as "Woman Gives B i r t h t o Green P i g l e t s " o f t e n come 6 Q See the Younger Committee Report, i b i d a t p 36, para 121. fiQ . . . . . The s u b j e c t of i d e n t i t i e s i s mentioned b r i e f l y i n Wacks, Protection of Privacy, supra n 23, a t 90 and 104-5. 7 0 Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t 49. complete w i t h names and photographs. On the oth e r hand, i t i s not uncommon f o r the more r e l i a b l e media t o p r o t e c t anonymity by the use of pseudonyms, 7 1 v a r i o u s methods f o r d i s g u i s i n g a f a c e o r v o i c e , or simply the omi s s i o n of names and i d e n t i f y i n g d e t a i l s . 7 2 The q u a l i t y and r e p u t a t i o n of the newspaper or oth e r media component i s a much b e t t e r guide t o c r e d i b i l i t y than whether names are g i v e n . Secondly, i t was contended t h a t i d e n t i t i e s were nece s s a r y t o a v o i d new items b e i n g a t t r i b u t e d t o the wrong person. T h i s i s a v a l i d concern i n some cases, but u s u a l l y t h i s danger can be avoided by o m i t t i n g unnecessary d e t a i l s which unduly narrow the range of people t o which the item may r e f e r . 7 3 T h i r d l y , t he Press C o u n c i l mentioned t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n o f i d e n t i t i e s enabled the persons i d e n t i f i e d t o commence proceedings i f they c o n s i d e r e d they had been defamed. The Younger Committee noted a case d e c i d e d s i n c e the P r e s s C o u n c i l gave evidence which made t h i s argument o b s o l e t e . 7 4 F o u r t h l y , the e f f e c t of i d e n t i t i e s on the r e a l i s m and immediacy of a news item and the p u b l i c ' s "sense of p e r s o n a l involvement" was p o i n t e d out. However, t h i s " h e i g h t e n i n g of 71 For example, "Nancy and Robert (not t h e i r r e a l names)". 7 2 For example, "An onlooker, who d i d not wish t o be i d e n t i f i e d . . . . " 7 "\ See f o r example chapter 3, notes 75 and 84. The problem t h e r e noted might have been avoided i f the media had not d i s c l o s e d the n a t i o n a l i t i e s of the suspected war c r i m i n a l s . 7 4 Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t p 49, n 65. e f f e c t " does not i n i t s e l f c o n t r i b u t e t o p u b l i c debate or the v a l u e s of f r e e speech. I t may be the i c i n g on the cake which makes the cake more en j o y a b l e , but i t i s not the cake i t s e l f . I t s hould not j u s t i f y any but a t r i v i a l i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e o f t e n i t i s the " v i c t i m s " i n media s t o r i e s who are f u r t h e r v i c t i m i s e d by the p u b l i c i t y i n the name of drawing a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r p l i g h t . 7 5 Furthermore, the C o u n c i l ' s argument was tantamount t o s a y i n g t h a t the p r e s s has a r i g h t t o d e c i d e what the p u b l i c ought t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n . The argument i s c o n t r a r y t o the most b a s i c t e n e t s of a system of f r e e speech, founded on the assumption of r a t i o n a l i t y and f r e e c h o i c e . The p u b l i c w i l l t ake an i n t e r e s t i n some matters w i t h or without the p u b l i c a t i o n of s e n s a t i o n a l p i c t u r e s or a c t u a l names. 7 6 I f the p u b l i c i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n the substance of a matter, then the c o n c l u s i o n of the p r e s s t h a t the p u b l i c ought t o take an i n t e r e s t should not j u s t i f y the v i o l a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y t o arouse such i n t e r e s t . An example i s found i n the Younger Committee Report, i b i d a t 48-49. V i v i d newspaper accounts and photographs of the d i s t r e s s of c h i l d r e n taken from t h e i r f o s t e r p a r e n t s and r e t u r n e d t o n a t u r a l p a r e n t s a t t r a c t e d p u b l i c i n d i g n a t i o n and condemnation. The p r e s s c l a i m e d the pub-l i c a t i o n s were j u s t i f i e d because they s t i m u l a t e d p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n an important s o c i a l i s s u e . See a l s o B r i a n Winston, "The T r a d i t i o n of the V i c t i m i n G r i e r s o n i a n Documentary" i n Image Ethics, supra n 42, a t 34, which argues t h a t "the f i f t y - y e a r parade of the h a l t and lame has p a t e n t l y done more good t o the documentarists than i t has t o the v i c t i m s " (p 53) and t h a t film-makers have a duty of c a r e t o o b t a i n f u l l y informed and v o l u n t a r y consent from t h e i r s u b j e c t s . See the Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t 50, f o r an example where "the substance of the news, without the i d e n t i t y of the g i r l b e i n g r e v e a l e d , was enough t o arouse g r e a t p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . B e s i d e s , i n t e r e s t aroused o n l y through d r a m a t i s i n g an event and the " c h a r a c t e r s " i n v o l v e d 7 7 tends t o l a c k depth. C r e a t i n g emotion i n t h i s way may a c t u a l l y , over time, thwart the purpose claimed, of a r o u s i n g genuine s o c i a l concern. The f o l l o w i n g quote supports t h i s view: S e n s a t i o n a l i s m i s the attempt t o r e c o v e r by a c e r t a i n v i o l e n c e the f r e s h n e s s of f e e l i n g which t o a jaded s p i r i t the simple human r e c o r d has l o s t . . . . The moral emotions are the most c o s t l y , the i n d i g n a n t response t o i n j u s t i c e , p i t y toward misery, the expansion of one's being i n presence o f an element of human g r e a t n e s s . Readers are not prepared t o spend l a v i s h l y i n these c o s t l y terms; and the p r e s s , whose emotional s t r a t e g y must veer toward the non-committal, tends t o a v e r t i t s e l f from the e x i s t e n c e o f moral concern. I t must d e a l w i t h entertainment, w i t h the " f u n n i e s , " w i t h a crime, c a t a s t r o p h e , and adventure, because these i n v o l v e the common emotion of s e m i p h y s i c a l " r e a c t i o n " ; they make no heavy d r a f t s on e i t h e r thought or con s c i e n c e or f a i t h . The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t h a t i t i s a p r a c t i c e of emotional u n t r u t h . I t robs the event of i t s genuine depth. F i n a l l y , "besides a l l these s p e c i a l reasons, the Press C o u n c i l maintained t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n of i d e n t i t i e s i s an important p a r t of the newspaper's s e r v i c e i n keeping the p u b l i c informed on a l l r e l e v a n t items o f news". 7 9 T h i s i s t r u e when the i d e n t i t y of the person i s i n f a c t r e l e v a n t , i n ot h e r words when i t s d i s c l o s u r e c o n t r i b u t e s t o i n f o r m i n g the p u b l i c i n c h o i c e s i t must make. " D e c i s i o n s about what events are newsworthy and about how t o p r e s e n t them are h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of dramatic form and content (e.g. c o n f l i c t and r e s o l u -t i o n ) t h a t are drawn from f i c t i o n a l a r c h e t y p e s . . . . " L a r r y Gross, "The E t h i c s of ( M i s ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " , i n Image Ethics, supra n 42, a t 191. See a l s o Smythe, supra n 51, a t 15. Hocking, supra n 16, a t 45. Younger Committee Report, supra n 5, a t 49. I t i s submitted t h a t i n an i d e a l system a t h r e e - p a r t t e s t s hould be used i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether a p a r t i c u l a r i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y by p u b l i c a t i o n i n the media i s j u s t i f i e d on t h e grounds of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n . Before t h i s t e s t i s a p p l i e d , i t must f i r s t have been determined t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a n o n - t r i v i a l i n v a s i o n of r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of p r i v a c y a c c o r d i n g t o community standa r d s . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s whether the matter p u b l i s h e d i s of genuine p u b l i c concern, meaning whether i t i s of use i n i n f o r m i n g c h o i c e s which the p u b l i c must make. Not o n l y p o l i t i c a l c h o i c e s are r e l e v a n t , but a l s o r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l , p e r s o n a l , economic, and p h i l o s o p h i c a l c h o i c e s . 8 1 I f the f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s answered i n the n e g a t i v e , then t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t f r e e speech i n t e r e s t t o be balanced a g a i n s t the i n t e r e s t i n i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . In such a case t h e r e ought normally t o be a remedy i n law. An example might be the p u b l i c a t i o n of items about the marriage break-up of a t e l e v i s i o n j o u r n a l i s t . * P r o f e s s o r T r i b e i s p r o b a b l y Some of the f e a t u r e s of such a system w i l l be mentioned i n c h apter 6. Of course, almost any i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be of use t o those who know them p e r s o n a l l y , i n d e c i d i n g how t o speak or behave towards t h a t person. Such p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t does not i n i t s e l f j u s t i f y widespread p u b l i c a t i o n u n l e s s the i n f o r m a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important, f o r example i f i t warned the p u b l i c t h a t the person had a h i s t o r y of v i o l e n c e . P e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t might be r e l e v a n t i f the matter was o n l y p u b l i s h e d l o c a l l y , i n which case the l o c a l i n t e r e s t would need t o be balanced a g a i n s t the p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t . See A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 43, a t 120. I f t h e r e were more than t o t a l l y s u p e r f i c i a l d i s c u s s i o n about the causes of such a break-up, then the matter should proceed t o the second q u e s t i o n . A famous case where t h e r e was no genuine p u b l i c concern, and y e t a U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u r t h e l d t h a t r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s type of case i n the f o l l o w i n g passage c o n c e r n i n g the accommodation of the v a l u e of " u n i n h i b i t e d p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n " w i t h the v a l u e of p r i v a c y : F i n a l l y , t h e r e comes a p o i n t where o n l y t h i s l a t t e r v a l u e p l a y s a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n a case - a p o i n t a t which such p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n as o c c u r s i s w h o l l y p a r a s i t i c upon a c l e a r i n v a s i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l over p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . Nothing i n the Court's defamation d e c i s i o n s , and noth-i n g i n the t h r e e d e c i s i o n s coming c l o s e s t t o a d d r e s s i n g the c o n f l i c t between speech and p r i v a c y , remotely suggests t h a t , when t h i s p o i n t i s reached, government must e x a l t an a b s t r a c t r i g h t t o know, here reduced t o g o s s i p , above the deeper concerns of personhood. On the c o n t r a r y , once t h i s p o i n t i s reached, i t would d e p r i v e i n d i v i d u a l s of l i b e r t y or p r o p e r t y without due p r o c e s s of law t o p r o v i d e no l e g a l remedy. 3 I f on the o t h e r hand the f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e , then i t i s necessary t o proceed t o the second q u e s t i o n . For example, a news item about a rape i s of genuine p u b l i c concern. I t informs c h o i c e s such as what s i t u a t i o n s t o a v o i d , whether t o take s e l f defence c l a s s e s , and whether t o advocate changes i n the law. The second q u e s t i o n i s whether d i s c l o s i n g the i d e n t i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l adds t o the value of the i n f o r m a t i o n t o the p u b l i c i n i n f o r m i n g decision-making. As a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , i t i s not enough t h a t i d e n t i t y merely adds t o the interest of the i n f o r m a t i o n . G e n e r a l l y t h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be answered by whether the p u b l i c i s c a l l e d t o make c h o i c e s c o n c e r n i n g the i n d i v i d u a l s p e r s o n a l l y , such as whether t o v o t e f o r them, whether have f i n a n c i a l d e a l i n g s w i t h them, whether t o f o l l o w t h e i r s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r s h i p , or maybe i n " f r e e speech" should p r e v a i l , i s Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp, 113 F 2d 806 (1940). T r i b e , supra n 3, a t 889-90. the case o f people who make t h e i r money from a p e r s o n a l f o l l o w i n g such as f i l m s t a r s and pop s i n g e r s , whether t o a d u l a t e them. To c o n s i d e r a g a i n the example of an account of a rape, i t may be i n t e r e s t i n g t o know the i d e n t i t y o f the v i c t i m , but t h i s would not add t o the u s e f u l n e s s of the 84 i n f o r m a t i o n . In such a case, i t i s necessary t o move on t o the t h i r d q u e s t i o n . In c o n t r a s t , i f a man c o n v i c t e d of f r a u d t e n y e a r s ago were now s t a n d i n g f o r p a r l i a m e n t , not o n l y would t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n be of genuine p u b l i c concern, but d i s c l o s u r e of h i s i d e n t i t y would most c e r t a i n l y add t o the v a l u e of the i n f o r m a t i o n . I f he attempted t o prevent d i s c l o s u r e of the matter, the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n f r e e speech would need t o be weighed a g a i n s t h i s i n t e r e s t i n p r i v a c y , both i n t e r e s t s b e i n g seen i n c o n t e x t . 8 5 Where i d e n t i f y i n g the i n d i v i d u a l concerned would not add t o the v a l u e of the i n f o r m a t i o n , a t h i r d q u e s t i o n must be asked. I t must be c o n s i d e r e d whether the matter c o u l d be p u b l i s h e d without mentioning i d e n t i t y o r p r o v i d i n g See a l s o Turton v Buttler (1987) 42 CCLT 74, d i s c u s s e d above a t p 79-80. Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716, d i s c u s s e d a t p 52-62 above, i s an example i n v o l v i n g a matter of genuine p u b l i c concern under the d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n h e r e i n , and where the i d e n t i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l concerned would have been of use i n i n f o r m i n g p u b l i c decision-making (such as whether t o donate f u r t h e r money f o r the t r a n s p l a n t ) . Hence t h e r e was a f r e e speech i n t e r e s t t o be balanced a g a i n s t Mr Tucker's i n t e r e s t i n p r i v a c y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the c o u r t s f e l t t h a t the p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t was of g r e a t e r weight than the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n f r e e speech. S e r i o u s i r r e m e d i a b l e harm would be caused by p u b l i c a t i o n . i d e n t i f y i n g d e t a i l s . I f i t c o u l d , then the i n t e r e s t i n f r e e speech can be s a t i s f i e d i n t h i s way without any breach of p r i v a c y . 8 6 Free speech and p r i v a c y are not t r u l y i n c o n f l i c t . An i n j u n c t i o n can be granted t o p revent the d i s c l o s u r e of i d e n t i t y without i n f r i n g i n g any of the v a l u e s of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n . I f i d e n t i t y has a l r e a d y been d i s c l o s e d , then the breach of p r i v a c y cannot be j u s t i f i e d by r e f e r e n c e t o f r e e speech p r i n c i p l e s , and damages may be a p p r o p r i a t e . For example, the New South Wales P r i v a c y Committee d e a l t w i t h a complaint from a rape v i c t i m t h a t people had been a b l e t o i d e n t i f y her from d e t a i l s g i v e n i n a newspaper. The Committee d e c i d e d t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n , which i n c l u d e d the v i c t i m ' s age and o c c u p a t i o n , and the f a c t t h a t she l i v e d i n a home u n i t , would not have breached p r i v a c y i f i t had not a l s o named the s m a l l town she l i v e d i n . In cases where, although i d e n t i t y i s not i t s e l f of gen-u i n e p u b l i c concern, i t i s not p o s s i b l e 8 7 or d e s i r a b l e 8 8 t o p u b l i s h the i n f o r m a t i o n w h i l e c o n c e a l i n g i d e n t i t y , the need t o balance p r i v a c y and freedom of e x p r e s s i o n i n the r e l e v a n t 8 6 There may be some l e s s e n i n g of p r i v a c y s i n c e t h e r e i s an i n c r e a s e d r i s k t h a t subsequent events, or matters known t o c e r t a i n persons, w i l l connect the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h the f a c t s . See Gavison, supra n 22, a t 43 0-31, f o r an anecdote i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s danger. However, cases where t h i s r i s k would be s e r i o u s enough t o o v e r r i d e the i n t e r e s t i n f r e e speech would probably be e x c e p t i o n a l . O f t e n people such as c o u n s e l l o r s who c i t e r e a l - l i f e case s t u d i e s not o n l y c o n c e a l i d e n t i t i e s but a l s o change some unimportant d e t a i l s t o p r o t e c t t h e i r c l i e n t s . 8 7 For example, d e t a i l s which are important t o the u s e f u l n e s s of the i n f o r m a t i o n may b e t r a y i d e n t i t y . 8 8 For example, where a news item i s l i k e l y t o be a t t r i b u t e d t o the wrong person i f t r u e i d e n t i t y i s c o ncealed. c o n t e x t cannot be avoided. An important c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s would be whether the p u b l i c a t i o n would cause s e r i o u s i r r e m e d i a b l e harm. As d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , 8 9 a p u b l i c a t i o n which causes i r r e m e d i a b l e harm, as p r i v a c y -i n v a s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y do, i n t h i s c r u c i a l r e s p e c t resembles a c t i o n r a t h e r than speech. The l i k e l i h o o d of such harm t o i n d i v i d u a l d i g n i t y should be balanced a g a i n s t the importance of the i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p u b l i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 9 0 The proposed t h r e e - p a r t t e s t can t h e r e f o r e be summarised as f o l l o w s : (1) Does the i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e t o i n f o r m i n g the p u b l i c i n the c h o i c e s i t must make? I f not, then i t i s not of genuine p u b l i c concern, and t h e r e i s no f r e e speech i n t e r e s t t o be weighed a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . (2) Does the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l concerned c o n t r i b u t e t o the v a l u e of the i n f o r m a t i o n ? I f so, then t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t f r e e speech i n t e r e s t t o be weighed a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y i n the r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t . (3) Can the i n f o r m a t i o n be d i s c l o s e d without r e v e a l i n g i d e n t i t y ? I f so, then f r e e speech v a l u e s can be f u r t h e r e d without s i g n i f i c a n t harm t o i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . I f not, then i t i s necessary t o weigh the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n f r e e speech a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y i n the r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t . The above a n a l y s i s demonstrates t h a t i t i s sometimes p o s s i b l e t o d e c i d e cases i n v o l v i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of p r i v a t e f a c t s i n the media without needing t o balance the v a l u e s of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n and p r i v a c y . Where the See p 99-101 above. Other f a c t o r s which may be r e l e v a n t i n the b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s i n c l u d e the conduct of the p a r t i e s , the motives of the p u b l i s h e r , the manner i n which the i n f o r m a t i o n was a c q u i r e d , and the e f f e c t on t h i r d p a r t i e s such as the f a m i l y of the i n d i v i d u a l concerned. i n f o r m a t i o n i s not of genuine p u b l i c concern, the v a l u e s of f r e e speech are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y advanced by i t s p u b l i c a t i o n , and i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y i s the o n l y i n t e r e s t s e r i o u s l y a t stake. Where the i n f o r m a t i o n i s of genuine p u b l i c concern but i d e n t i t y i s not, p u b l i c a t i o n of the p r i v a t e f a c t s without i d e n t i f y i n g d e t a i l s , i f p o s s i b l e , e nables f r e e speech g o a l s t o be f u l f i l l e d w i t hout any s i g n i f i c a n t harm t o p r i v a c y . The need t o balance p r i v a c y a g a i n s t f r e e speech i n the co n t e x t of the case o n l y a r i s e s where both the i n f o r m a t i o n and the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i d e n t i t y are of genuine p u b l i c concern, or where i d e n t i t y i s not important but cannot be obscured. 129 CHAPTER 5  PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC PLACES T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l examine the two r e l a t e d terms " p u b l i c f i g u r e " and " p u b l i c p l a c e " which, although commonly viewed as c a t e g o r i e s which a i d the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r i v a c y c l a i m s , s h o u l d be d i s c a r d e d as a n y t h i n g more than terms of convenience. I f used f o r a n a l y s i s they can suggest d e c e p t i v e l y simple answers t o complex matters which r e q u i r e more c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . An important concept i n p r i v a c y law i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s t h a t of the " p u b l i c f i g u r e " . 1 P u b l i c f i g u r e s f a l l i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s . F i r s t l y , t h e r e are those who "have assumed r o l e s of e s p e c i a l prominence i n the a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y " , who "occupy such p o s i t i o n s of such p e r s u a s i v e power and i n f l u e n c e t h a t they are deemed p u b l i c f i g u r e s f o r a l l purposes". A more common category, which was mentioned i n c h apter 4, comprises those who "have t h r u s t themselves t o the f o r e f r o n t of p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c c o n t r o v e r s i e s i n o r d e r t o i n f l u e n c e the r e s o l u t i o n of the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d " . 3 1 The concept o r i g i n a t e d i n defamation law; see A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 11, Unfair Publication (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1978), App F. 2 Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323 a t 325 (1974); as quoted i n Raymond Wacks, Protection of Privacy, Modern L e g a l S t u d i e s S e r i e s (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980), at 102. 3 I b i d a t 325. Persons i n these two c a t e g o r i e s s a c r i f i c e most of t h e i r r i g h t s t o p r i v a c y i n U n i t e d S t a t e s law: [The law] has r e c o g n i z e d a l e g i t i m a t e p u b l i c c u r i o s i t y about the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of c e l e b r i t i e s , and about a g r e a t d e a l of otherwise p r i v a t e and p e r s o n a l informa-t i o n c o n c e r n i n g them. T h e i r b i o g r a p h i e s can be w r i t t e n , and t h e i r l i f e h i s t o r i e s and t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s s e t f o r t h b e f o r e the world i n u n f l a t t e r i n g d e t a i l . D i s c r e d i t a b l e f a c t s about them can be exposed. And as our newspapers demonstrate d a i l y , the p u b l i c can be t r e a t e d t o an enormous amount of p e t t y g o s s i p as t o what they eat f o r b r e a k f a s t , wear, read, do w i t h t h e i r spare time, or say t o t h e i r f r i e n d s . The t h i r d c a t e g o r y i s t h a t of the " i n v o l u n t a r y p u b l i c f i g u r e " , the o r d i n a r y person who happens t o become i n v o l v e d i n some newsworthy event such as an a c c i d e n t or c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s . Such persons a t t a i n the s t a t u s of p u b l i c f i g u r e s t e m p o r a r i l y , and " u n t i l they have r e v e r t e d t o the l a w f u l and u n e x c i t i n g l i f e l e d by the g r e a t b u l k of the community, they are s u b j e c t t o the p r i v i l e g e which p u b l i s h e r s have t o s a t i s f y the c u r i o s i t y of the p u b l i c as t o t h e i r l e a d e r s , heroes, v i l l a i n s and v i c t i m s " . 5 D i s c u s s i o n s of p r i v a c y law i n the Commonwealth a l s o r e f e r f r e q u e n t l y t o " p u b l i c f i g u r e s " , o f t e n q u o t i n g from the U n i t e d S t a t e s d e c i s i o n s . While the term i s o f t e n c onvenient f o r the purposes of d i s c u s s i o n , i t i s submitted t h a t i t s h o u l d not be used i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r i v a c y c l a i m s . There are s e v e r a l reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g the concept of a p u b l i c f i g u r e as a t o o l of a n a l y s i s i n b a l a n c i n g p r i v a c y and f r e e speech i n t e r e s t s . The f i r s t i s simply t h a t the 4 W i l l i a m L P r o s s e r , " P r i v a c y " (1960) 48 Calif L Rev 383 a t 416. 5 I b i d a t 413. concept i s unnecessary, and merely c o m p l i c a t e s matters. As P r o f e s s o r Wacks p o i n t s out, the c o u r t w i l l i n any case u l t i m a t e l y have t o r e v e r t t o c o n s i d e r i n g whether a d i s c l o s u r e i s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , s i n c e the f a c t t h a t someone i s a p u b l i c f i g u r e does not i n i t s e l f determine what areas of t h e i r p r i v a t e l i f e may be exposed. 6 I t i s b e t t e r t o proceed d i r e c t l y t o the r e a l i s s u e . A second, more important, reason f o r r e j e c t i n g the concept i s t h a t i t confuses s e v e r a l q u i t e d i f f e r e n t matters which i n v o l v e d i f f e r e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 7 P r o s s e r l i s t e d the reasons f o r the d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment of p u b l i c f i g u r e s as f o l l o w s : Three reasons are g i v e n , more or l e s s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , i n t he d e c i s i o n s : t h a t they have sought p u b l i c i t y and consented t o i t , and so cannot complain of i t ; t h a t t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t i e s and t h e i r a f f a i r s a l r e a d y have be-come p u b l i c , and can no lo n g e r be regarded as t h e i r own p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s ; and t h a t the p r e s s has a p r i v i l e g e , guaranteed by the C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o in f o r m the p u b l i c about those who have become l e g i t i m a t e matters of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Wacks, Protection of Privacy, supra n 2, a t 102. For example, the i s s u e of consent i n v o l v e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether consent can be revoked, whether v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been g i v e n , whether the consent was f u l l y informed and v o l u n t a r y , and by whom consent was g i v e n . See P h i l i p H Osborne, "The P r i v a c y A c t s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan", i n Aspects of Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, ed Dale Gibson (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 73 a t 90-94. An example of the last-mentioned c o n s i d e r a t i o n was the d e c i s i o n of a c o u r t t h a t Brooke S h i e l d s c o u l d not r e s t r a i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of nude photographs taken when she was o n l y t e n years o l d , because her mother had s i g n e d an u n l i m i t e d r e l e a s e . See R i c h a r d F Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in Conflict (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1987), 162. P r o s s e r , supra n 4, a t 411. O b v i o u s l y not a l l of these reasons apply t o a l l p u b l i c f i g u r e s ; i n f a c t , i n some cases a person i s l a b e l l e d a p u b l i c f i g u r e even though none of these reasons r i g h t l y a p ply. The avoidance of i n q u i r i n g i n t o each of t h e s e matters s e p a r a t e l y , by a t t a c h i n g a l a b e l d e f i n e d i n dependently of the reasons, l e a d s t o c o n f u s i o n between the d e s c r i p t i v e and normative i m p l i c a t i o n s of p u b l i c f i g u r e s t a t u s 9 and p r e -empts important q u e s t i o n s . The problem i s b e s t demonstrated by an example. The B r i t i s h B r o a d c a s t i n g A s s o c i a t i o n t o l d the Younger Committee t h a t the g i r l f r i e n d of a well-known f o o t b a l l e r would be a p u b l i c f i g u r e . 1 0 We know t h a t such a person does a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n i n the media, and c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as a p u b l i c f i g u r e . However, none of the reasons l i s t e d above j u s t i f y any unwanted and i n v a s i v e p u b l i c i t y about t h i s woman. Her consent t o such p u b l i c i t y cannot be i m p l i e d merely from the f a c t t h a t she i s d a t i n g a well-known f o o t b a l l e r . U n l e s s she s t a r t s t o v o l u n t a r i l y g i v e i n t e r v i e w s and p l a c e h e r s e l f i n the p u b l i c eye, her p e r s o n a l i t y and a f f a i r s are not p u b l i c t i l l t he media makes them so. And as can be seen from the a n a l y s i s i n c hapter 4, her p e r s o n a l b u s i n e s s i s not of The d e s c r i p t i v e and normative d e f i n i t i o n s of a p u b l i c f i g u r e are mentioned i n Wacks, Protection of Privacy, supra n 2, a t 102; however, i t should be noted t h a t the c a t e g o r y of i n v o l u n t a r y f i g u r e s can be d e f i n e d by normative as w e l l as d e s c r i p t i v e c r i t e r i a , by r e f e r e n c e t o genuine p u b l i c concern. Report of the Committee on Privacy (chairman: Kenneth Younger), Cmnd. 5012, 1972, 61. The same argument a p p l i e s t o the o t h e r example gi v e n , of the r e l a t i v e s of an a c c i d e n t v i c t i m . genuine p u b l i c concern, s i n c e i t would not c o n t r i b u t e t o i n f o r m i n g p u b l i c decision-making. Another example i s the case of Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp,11 i n which a man who had been a well-known c h i l d p r o d i g y , but had s i n c e h i s l a t e teens t r i e d t o l i v e a q u i e t l i f e , was h e l d t o be a p u b l i c f i g u r e . He had c e r t a i n l y not consented t o the p u b l i c i t y and had i n f a c t gone t o some l e n g t h s t o m a i n t a i n h i s anonymity. The second reason, t h a t of a l r e a d y b e i n g p u b l i c , i t s e l f needs e x p l a n a t i o n . I f i t means t h a t anonymity has a l r e a d y been l o s t , and so the p u b l i c i t y does no harm, then i t does not apply t o S i d i s s i n c e he had l a r g e l y r e g a i n e d h i s anonymity over the l a s t twenty y e a r s . The second reason may a l s o be a l e s s c l e a r way of s t a t i n g t h e t h i r d reason, t h a t of l e g i t i m a t e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , or as i t was e x p l a i n e d i n chapter 4, genuine p u b l i c concern. A p p l y i n g the t e s t proposed i n chapter 4, the l i f e o f a c h i l d p r o d i g y might p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n r e l e v a n t t o q u e s t i o n s o f ed u c a t i o n , u p b r i n g i n g and the e f f e c t o f p u b l i c i t y on c h i l d r e n , but S i d i s was o n l y a case study. H i s i d e n t i t y was not of genuine p u b l i c concern; the p u b l i c were not c a l l e d t o make c h o i c e s about him p e r s o n a l l y such as whether t o vote f o r him or i n v e s t t h e i r money w i t h him. However, i t might be d i f f i c u l t t o p u b l i s h h i s s t o r y without r e v e a l i n g h i s i d e n t i t y , so the importance of the case study might need t o be balanced a g a i n s t S i d i s ' i n t e r e s t i n g e t t i n g on w i t h h i s l i f e without p u b l i c s c r u t i n y . 113 F 2d 806 (1940). I t i s important t o c o n s i d e r s e p a r a t e l y the q u e s t i o n s of whether t h e r e has been s i g n i f i c a n t harm t o p r i v a c y , whether t h e r e has been express or i m p l i e d consent, whether a matter i s o f genuine p u b l i c concern, and whether i d e n t i t y s h o u l d be d i s c l o s e d . I t i s submitted t h a t the a n a l y s i s s e t out i n c h a p t e r 4 asks t h e s e q u e s t i o n s more c l e a r l y and i n a way l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e t o pre-judgment than the c o n c e p t u a l l y f u z z y n o t i o n of a p u b l i c f i g u r e . The n o t i o n of a " p u b l i c p l a c e " i s v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e same k i n d s of c r i t i c i s m s , and should be used w i t h c a u t i o n . I t i s commonly s a i d t h a t photographs may be taken i n p u b l i c p l a c e s and p u b l i s h e d w i t h i m p u n i t y . 1 2 One apparent e x c e p t i o n i n U n i t e d S t a t e s law i s when the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n a . . . . . I T " d i s t r e s s e d , i l l or i n j u r e d c o n d i t i o n " . The reasons behind the r u l e s f o r p u b l i c p l a c e s are the same t h r e e as f o r the d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment of p u b l i c f i g u r e s : t h a t consent can be i m p l i e d ; t h a t p r i v a c y has a l r e a d y been l o s t and so the harm t o p r i v a c y i s minimal; and t h a t events i n a p u b l i c p l a c e are of p u b l i c concern. Again these t h r e e reasons s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n c o n t e x t r a t h e r than a v o i d i n g important q u e s t i o n s by a d e s c r i p t i v e c a t e g o r i s a t i o n . I t i s o f t e n l e g i t i m a t e t o imply consent t o o b s e r v a t i o n and p u b l i c a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s i n a p u b l i c p l a c e , but not always. On the one hand, people do have d i f f e r e n t See f o r example A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 1, a t 125; A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Report No. 22, Privacy (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1983), para 1186; Wacks, Protection of Privacy, supra n 2, a t 103. See P r o s s e r , supra n 4, a t 392-93. e x p e c t a t i o n s o f p r i v a c y when i n p u b l i c p l a c e s than when i n t h e i r own homes: When we go i n t o a p u b l i c p l a c e we know t h a t we are l i k e l y t o be seen by ot h e r s , s t r a n g e r s and acquain-t a n c e s . We g e n e r a l l y c o n t r o l o u r s e l v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h a t e x p e c t a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the way we dr e s s and a c t . We know we are, t o some extent, o b j e c t s o f p u b l i c s c r u t i n y . In a p r i v a t e p l a c e we may r e a c t q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y , knowing or b e l i e v i n g t h a t we w i l l o n l y be seen by s p e c i f i c people, u s u a l l y f a m i l y o r i n t i m a t e f r i e n d s . . . . P r i v a c y v a l u e s may be v i o l a t e d i f some ot h e r person, without consent or oth e r proper reason, t r a n s f o r m s the second s i t u a t i o n i n t o t he f i r s t , e xposing a person t o a p u b l i c audience when he rea s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d t h a t he was a b l e t o behave i n a manner a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a l i m i t e d a u d i e n c e . 1 4 On the ot h e r hand, most people spend a g r e a t d e a l of t h e i r everyday l i v e s i n p u b l i c p l a c e s without i m a g i n i n g t h a t they are be i n g observed any more than c a s u a l l y and by a l i m i t e d number of people. P r i v a c y i n p u b l i c p l a c e s i s maintained by s t r i c t s o c i a l r u l e s and by a n o n y m i t y . 1 5 What i s more, i n the normal course of t h i n g s people know when these r u l e s are being broken, and can r e a c t a c c o r d i n g l y t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r i v a c y . For example, a person r e a d i n g a p r i v a t e l e t t e r w h i l e s i t t i n g on a park bench w i l l be a b l e t o r e a c t by h i d i n g the l e t t e r i f someone t r i e s t o read i t over her s h o u l d e r . She would probably be h i g h l y i n d i g n a n t t o f i n d t h a t a r e p o r t e r had photographed the l e t t e r u s i n g a t e l e p h o t o l e n s and p u b l i s h e d i t i n the human i n t e r e s t pages. Furthermore, the d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e p l a c e s tends t o be confused by n o t i o n s of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication, supra n 1, a t 125 (emphasis added). A l a n F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 31. which have o n l y a l o o s e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h how much p r i v a c y can r e a s o n a b l y be expected i n a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e or s i t u a t i o n . In r e g a r d t o e x p e c t a t i o n s of p r i v a c y , t h e r e i s not a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e p l a c e s but a d i f f e r e n c e of degrees. People assess j u s t how " p u b l i c " a s i t u a t i o n i s , and a d j u s t t h e i r behaviour a c c o r d i n g l y . Consent might more r e a d i l y be i m p l i e d i f a person "has sought a t t e n t i o n by p l a c i n g h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f i n a p o s i t i o n l i k e l y t o c r e a t e a good d e a l of i n t e r e s t , such as appearing i n p u b l i c i n scanty c l o t h i n g , or appearing i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h famous people", or "attends an event a t which he or she knows t h e r e w i l l be p r e s s or t e l e v i s i o n c o v e r a g e " . 1 6 In c o n t r a s t : A person who walks down a s t r e e t , s i t s i n the park, or v i s i t s a s t o r e or r e s t a u r a n t , cannot be [ f a i r l y ] s a i d t o be i m p l i e d l y c o n s e n t i n g t o e x t e n s i v e p u b l i c a t i o n of any photograph taken of him or h e r . 1 7 G e n e r a l l y the second reason, t h a t t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t p r i v a c y l o s s , w i l l apply t o p r o t e c t p u b l i c a t i o n s of photographs of people i n v o l v e d i n such innocuous a c t i v i t y . However, i n some cases widespread p u b l i c a t i o n of otherwise harmless m a t e r i a l may cause s i g n i f i c a n t harm by d e s t r o y i n g anonymity. Constant harassment or s u r v e i l l a n c e by the media i n p u b l i c can be a very s i g n i f i c a n t p r i v a c y l o s s . Westin observes: Osborne, supra n 7, a t 92; c i t i n g Field v United Amusement Corp [1971] CS 283 (Que Sup Ct) as an example of someone who i m p l i e d l y consented t o p u b l i c i t y when he f r o l i c k e d i n the nude i n p u b l i c a t the Woodstock Music F e s t i v a l . Osborne, i b i d a t 91. Knowledge or f e a r t h a t one i s under s y s t e m a t i c o b s e r v a t i o n i n p u b l i c p l a c e s d e s t r o y s the sense of r e l a x a t i o n and freedom t h a t men seek i n open spaces and p u b l i c a r e n a s . 1 8 One reason not t o be too ready t o d i s m i s s p r i v a c y i n p u b l i c p l a c e s i s t h a t t h i s type of p r i v a c y i s e s p e c i a l l y important t o the l e s s w e l l o f f , who cannot a f f o r d l a r g e p r i v a t e homes 1 9 and gardens, p r i v a t e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and the l i k e . I t i s submitted, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the n o t i o n s of a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " and " p u b l i c p l a c e " should not be used as t o o l s o f a n a l y s i s . The i s s u e s of consent, harm, and genuine p u b l i c i n t e r e s t need separate c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n and pre-judgment of important q u e s t i o n s . Westin, supra n 15, a t 31. Westin, i b i d , notes t h a t people i n crowded l i v i n g q u a r t e r s o f t e n seek p r i v a c y outdoors. 138 CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION The c o n f l i c t between p r i v a c y and freedom of e x p r e s s i o n has g e n e r a l l y been o v e r - s t a t e d and under-analysed. T h i s t h e s i s has attempted t o show t h a t an e f f e c t i v e system of p r i v a c y p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t media i n v a s i o n s does not pose a t h r e a t t o a system of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n , but on the c o n t r a r y i s an important a d j u n c t t o such a system, t o h e l p ensure t h a t the power of communication i s used t o i n f o r m the p u b l i c r a t h e r than t o o v e r r i d e i n d i v i d u a l freedoms. I f a p p l i e d w i t h a c l e a r s i g h t of the v a l u e s t h a t i t s e r v e s , i t w i l l f u n c t i o n t o advance the v a l u e s of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n such as the development of i n d i v i d u a l i t y , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s and u n i n h i b i t e d debate of p u b l i c i s s u e s . P r i v a c y has been d e f i n e d h e r e i n as l i m i t e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y , c o m p r i s i n g s e c r e c y , anonymity, and sensory i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s a s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h a t put forward by P r o f e s s o r G a v i s o n . 1 As a v a l u e , p r i v a c y promotes i n d i v i d u a l i t y and self-government, and can encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the community and i n the f r e e d i s c u s s i o n of p u b l i c i s s u e s where unwanted p u b l i c i t y would d e t e r such involvement. D e s p i t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y , t h e r e i s as y e t very l i t t l e e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t Ruth Gavison, " P r i v a c y and the L i m i t s of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421. i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y by the media i n any of the Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s , although t h e r e have been some encouraging developments i n New Zealand and Canada. What has been l a c k i n g i n d i s c u s s i o n s of p r i v a c y law and the media i s not so much a c l e a r understanding of p r i v a c y as a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of the v a l u e of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o p u b l i c a t i o n s of p r i v a t e matters i n the media. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of freedom of e x p r e s s i o n w i t h whatever the media see f i t t o p u b l i s h has been based on a view of the media which does not a c c o r d w i t h present-day r e a l i t i e s . I t has thus f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i s e the commonality of v a l u e between f r e e speech and p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s . A t e s t has been developed which a s s e s s e s both the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y , and the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the f r e e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n of use i n d e c i s i o n -making, i n the c o n t e x t of the p a r t i c u l a r case. Three q u e s t i o n s are used t o determine whether t h e r e i s a way of r e s o l v i n g the problem without impinging on e i t h e r any s i g n i f i c a n t f r e e speech i n t e r e s t or i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . When necessary, the two i n t e r e s t s should be balanced i n the c o n t e x t of the case, and without r e f e r e n c e t o such h y b r i d concepts as a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " or " p u b l i c p l a c e " . Questions of the s e r i o u s n e s s of the l o s s t o p r i v a c y , whether consent was g i v e n or can be i m p l i e d , and whether and t o what ext e n t the matter i s one of genuine p u b l i c concern, s h o u l d each be g i v e n s e p a r a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t remains t o make some b r i e f o b s e r v a t i o n s on what form the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y a g a i n s t media i n v a s i o n s s h o u l d i d e a l l y take. There are s e v e r a l important c r i t e r i a f o r an e f f e c t i v e system of h e a r i n g p r i v a c y complaints, some of which have been i n d i c a t e d i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s . An important c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h a t p r i v a c y complaints need t o be heard i n p r i v a t e . The A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission on U n f a i r P u b l i c a t i o n , concerned t h a t genuine p l a i n t i f f s might be d e t e r r e d , recommended t h a t p r i v a c y l e g i s l a t i o n : ...should empower the c o u r t t o order t h a t the h e a r i n g , or any p a r t i c u l a r p a r t of the h e a r i n g , be i n c l o s e d c o u r t and t o p r o h i b i t or r e s t r i c t r e p o r t of the p r o c e e d i n g s . P r o v i s i o n s of t h i s type are t o be found i n numerous e x i s t i n g s t a t u t e s . . . . There i s no evidence t h a t such a f a c i l i t y has been abused. Judges are w e l l aware of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of c l o s i n g the c o u r t or r e s t r i c t i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o n l y where the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e so r e q u i r e . T h i s seems an obvious p o i n t , and y e t i t has not been r e f l e c t e d i n any of the Canadian p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e s . In New Zealand, the new B r o a d c a s t i n g A c t does not p r o v i d e f o r a p r i v a t e h e a r i n g as i t s predecessor d i d . 2 On the o t h e r hand, a l l o f the h e a r i n g s i n Tucker were h e l d i n camera. 3 Another c r i t e r i o n i s t h a t the c o s t s of b r i n g i n g p roceedings should not be p r o h i b i t i v e . I t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t "the g r e a t e s t t h r e a t t o p r i v a c y i n t h i s s o c i e t y i s from many s m a l l a s s a u l t s on one's p r i v a c y " . 4 The h i g h c o s t of b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n has been p o i n t e d t o as one s p e c u l a t i v e See p 67-68 above. See p 62 above. P h i l i p H Osborne, "The P r i v a c y A c t s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan", i n Aspects of Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, ed Dale Gibson (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 73 a t 101, r e f e r r i n g t o Ryan i n O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission, Report on Protection of Privacy in Ontario (1968) 68. reason f o r the p a u c i t y of cases under the Canadian p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e s . 5 I t i s a l s o v i t a l t h a t t h e r e be e f f e c t i v e remedies i n c l u d i n g i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and damages. C e r t a i n l y f u r t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s h o u l d not be the main or o n l y remedy a v a i l a b l e . F i n a l l y , the body making the d e c i s i o n s s h o u l d be c o m p letely independent of the media so t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s w i l l r e f l e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c r a t h e r than p r i v a t e media i n t e r e s t s . I t i s submitted t h a t e i t h e r the c o u r t s or a s t a t u t o r y t r i b u n a l would be s u i t a b l e forums f o r p r i v a c y c omplaints i f empowered by s t a t u t e t o meet a l l of the c r i t e r i a l i s t e d . P e t e r Burns, "The Law and P r i v a c y : The Canadian E x p e r i e n c e " (1976) 54 Can Bar Rev 1 a t 38. 142 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books and Reports A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission. D i s c u s s i o n Paper No. 2, Privacy and Publication - Proposals for Protection. Sydney: A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission, 1977. . Report No. 11, Unfair Publication. Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1978. . Report No. 22, Privacy. Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n Government P r i n t i n g S e r v i c e , 1983. B l o u s t e i n , Edward J . Individual and Group Privacy. New Brunswick, New J e r s e y : T r a n s a c t i o n Books, 1978. Brucker, Herbert. 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