UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Millar v. Taylor (1769) and the new property of the eighteenth century 1990

You don't seem to have a PDF reader installed, try download the pdf

Item Metadata

Download

Media
UBC_1990_A6_4 C37.pdf
UBC_1990_A6_4 C37.pdf [ 11.99MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 1.0077720.json
JSON-LD: 1.0077720+ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 1.0077720.xml
RDF/JSON: 1.0077720+rdf.json
Turtle: 1.0077720+rdf-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 1.0077720+rdf-ntriples.txt
Citation
1.0077720.ris

Full Text

MILLAR V. TAYLOR (1769) AND THE NEW PROPERTY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY By PETER JOHN CARVER B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto, 1976 LL.B., M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1981 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( F a c u l t y of Law) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1990 © Peter John Carver, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of LRuJ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada •a te Qc-rnftER il J MO DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The r e c e p t i o n of c o p y r i g h t i n the E n g l i s h common law i n the e i g h t e e n t h century p r o v i d e s a unique o p p o r t u n i t y to study the j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l concept of property r i g h t s at a moment of change. While c o p y r i g h t , or t o use the contemporary term, the " r i g h t of copy", had been i n the process of development s i n c e the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the p r i n t i n g press i n t o England i n 1476, i t was not u n t i l 1709 t h a t P a r l i a m e n t e n a c t e d the f i r s t c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e , the S t a t u t e of Anne 8 Anne, c. 19. S i x t y years l a t e r i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r 4 Burr 2303, 98 Er 202, the Court of K i n g ' s Bench c o n s i d e r e d the nat u r e and purpose of copyright f o r the f i r s t time. The case arose i n the course of the " l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate", a commercial s t r u g g l e between r i v a l b o o k s e l l e r s f o r predominance i n the emerging book t r a d e . T h i s p a p e r p r o c e e d s t h r o u g h a d e t a i l e d s t u d y of the g e n e s i s and t h e o r e t i c a l background o f M i l l a r v. T a y l o r t o a d d r e s s two q u e s t i o n s : (1) i n what s e n s e d i d c o p y r i g h t c o n s t i t u t e a "new pro p e r t y " i n the common law, and how d i d i t c o n t r i b u t e to a conceptual change i n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ; (2) how d i d E n g l i s h c o u r t s c o n c e i v e of " a u t h o r s h i p " d u r i n g the e v o l u t i o n of c o p y r i g h t , and how, i n t u r n , d i d c o p y r i g h t as i t emerged from the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate a l t e r the r o l e of the author ? The judgments of J u s t i c e Joseph Y a t e s and of W i l l i a m Murray, Lord M a n s f i e l d , o f f e r e d p a r t i c u l a r i n s i g h t s i n t o each i i i of these q u e s t i o n s . J u s t i c e Yates, i n d i s s e n t , p e r c e i v e d that c o p y r i g h t posed a c h a l l e n g e t o t r a d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y t h e o r y , e s p e c i a l l y t o arguments g r o u n d e d i n n a t u r a l law. As i t s s u b j e c t m a t t e r was the i n t a n g i b l e of l i t e r a r y i d e a s and e x p r e s s i o n , he argued the need f o r l i m i t s t o be imposed on c o p y r i g h t i n the i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c domain. The p r o p e r t y r i g h t c o u l d not be d e r i v e d from v a l u e , as i t was the r i g h t i t s e l f which c r e a t e d value. Lord M a n s f i e l d adopted a n a t u r a l law a p p r o a c h , but l o c a t e d i t l a r g e l y i n the p e r s o n a l , as opposed to p r o p r i e t a r y , i n t e r e s t s which c o p y r i g h t served. The author's i n t e r e s t s i n p r i v a c y and i n c o n t r o l l i n g the product of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r formed, f o r him, a p r i n c i p a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the property r i g h t . The paper explores these i d e a s , f i r s t , by g i v i n g a c l o s e reading to the precedent c i t e d i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r (1769), and t r a c i n g back through precedent c i t e d t h e r e i n to the r o o t s of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y i n E n g l i s h law. Second, the i n s i g h t s of J u s t i c e Y a t e s and Lord M a n s f i e l d are taken forward through subsequent developments i n l e g a l theory and c o p y r i g h t . In p a r t i c u l a r , the r e c o g n i t i o n , which f o l l o w e d M i l l a r v. T a y l o r and v i n d i c a t e d J u s t i c e Yates' p o s i t i o n , of c o p y r i g h t as a s t a t u t o r y p r o p e r t y designed and l i m i t e d by p o l i t i c a l c h o i c e i s shown as c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the l e a d i n g t h e o r e t i c a l approaches to p r o p e r t y r i g h t s - - i n c l u d i n g u t i l i t a r i a n , R e a l i s t and c r i t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s — w h i c h now predominate i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . F u r t h e r , Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s understanding of the d u a l purpose of i v c o p y r i g h t i s e x a m i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a p e r s o n h o o d j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y , and i n terms o f the e v o l u t i o n of c o p y r i g h t as a p r o p e r t y regime f o r p r o t e c t i n g f a c t u a l works of i n f o r m a t i o n , and f i c t i o n a l works of i m a g i n a t i o n . The p a p e r endeavours to h i g h l i g h t b o t h the concern f o r p u b l i c domain and f o r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s of authors which had such s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the e a r l y development o f c o p y r i g h t . V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. SOURCES OF THE INQUIRY 1 1. Law: The Forgotten Source 1 2. The Challenge Of The P r i n t i n g Press . . . 2 B. "PROPERTY" 5 1. Property i n P o l i t i c a l Theory and Law . . . 5 2. A D e f i n i t i o n of "Property" 8 (a) "Property" and "Property Right" . . . 10 (b) Three A t t r i b u t e s of Property 11 (1) E x c l u s i v i t y 11 (2) A l i e n a b i l i t y 13 (3) E x t e r n a l i t y 13 C. "COPIES" 14 1. A New Property ? 14 2. D e f i n i n g "The Copy" 16 D. "AUTHORS" 17 E. APPROACH AND OUTLINE OF INQUIRY 2 2 1. M i l l a r v. Ta y l o r (1769) as a Focus . . . . 22 2. Method and O u t l i n e 23 I I . THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE 26 A. THE BOOKSELLERS* WAR . . 26 B. THE OVERTURNING OF MILLAR V. TAYLOR . . . . . 33 1. The R e s u l t i n Donaldson v. Beckett . . . . 33 2. Lord Camden and Lord M a n s f i e l d 36 C. AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS 38 1. I n t e r e s t s i n C o n f l i c t ? 38 2. Economic I n t e r e s t s and the Value of S i n g l e Case A n a l y s i s 41 v i I I I . PROPERTY AND POLITICS: CROWN PREROGATIVE AND THE RIGHT OF COPY 43 A. CROWN CONTROL OF PRINTING AND CENSORSHIP . . . 43 B. ANALYSIS OF THE PREROGATIVE CASES 45 1. The P r e - R e v o l u t i o n Cases C i t e d i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r 46 2. The Po s t - R e v o l u t i o n Cases 51 3. The S u b s i d i a r y P r e r o g a t i v e Cases: Property i n Patent Grants 53 (a) Patents For O f f i c e Holders 53 (b) D o c t r i n e s of Patent C o n s t r u c t i o n . . 55 (c) Nature of Property Rights . . . . . . . 55 4. The Scope and Nature of Crown Copyr i g h t . 57 C. DARCY V. ALLEN AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS . . . 59 D. MILLAR v. TAYLOR AND THE CITIZEN KING 65 1. The Issue of Inventions 65 2. The P r e r o g a t i v e Cases i n M i l l a r v. Ta y l o r 68 E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CROWN COPYRIGHT . . 7 4 1. Crown P r e r o g a t i v e Copyright 74 2. P u b l i c Domain and Government P u b l i c a t i o n s 75 IV. PROPRIETARY AND PERSONAL INTERESTS IN EARLY COPYRIGHT: THE EQUITY INJUNCTION CASES 80 A. INTRODUCTION 80 B. REVIEW OF THE CASES: VICISSITUDES OF AUTHORS AND PRINTERS 81 1. I n j u n c t i o n s f o r Pub l i s h e d Works 82 2. The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n Cases 86 C. PROPRIETARY INTERESTS: THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF COPY 87 1. Scope of the Right i n the I n j u n c t i o n Cases 87 (a) Type of Work 88 (b) Uses by T h i r d P a r t i e s 90 v i i D. PERSONAL I N T E R E S T S OF THE AUTHOR: LORD MANSFIELD AND THE LITERARY PROPERTY QUESTION . 103 1. The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n Cases 103 2. P e r s o n a l I n t e r e s t s A f t e r D o n a l d s o n V. Beckett (1774) . 106 3. Personal I n t e r e s t s and Copyright Law . . . 107 4. L o r d M a n s f i e l d : A u t h o r s and P r o p e r t y Rights I l l E. A CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPART: MISAPPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS 114 V. THEORIES OF PROPERTY IN MILLAR V. TAYLOR 118 A. LIMITS OF PRECEDENT AND THE RESORT TO REASON . 118 B. NATURAL LAW THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT 119 1. The P o l i t i c a l Theory of N a t u r a l Rights . . 120 2. L o c k e and t h e N a t u r a l Law T h e o r y o f Property 121 3. B l a c k s t o n e On P r o p e r t y R i g h t s a n d Copyright . 124 4. The M a j o r i t y Opinions i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r 129 C. JUSTICE YATES' CRITIQUE OF THE NATURAL LAW POSITION 132 1. P u b l i c Domain: N a t u r a l R i g h t s o f t h e P u b l i c 132 2. The Argument Over I n c o r p o r e a l Property . . 134 3. Value as Property or C r e a t i o n of Law . . . 138 4. S t a t u t o r y Property 141 D. COPYRIGHT AND THE BREAKDOWN OF ABSOLUTE PROPERTY RIGHTS 145 1. I n t a n g i b l e Property and The Transformation of Legal Theory . . . . . 145 2. The P o l i t i c i s a t i o n of P r o p e r t y i n Modern Legal Theory 149 E. THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT . . . . . 153 VI. COPYRIGHT AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTY FROM PERSONHOOD 158 A. LORD MANSFIELD AND THE LABOUR THEORY 158 v i i i B. PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: TWO THEORIES . . . . 160 1. Property and Possessive I n d i v i d u a l i s m . . 162 2. H e g e l ' s Theory of P r o p e r t y and P e r s o n a l W i l l 163 3. Contemporary S c h o l a r s h i p on the Personhood B a s i s of Property 167 4. The Appeal of a Theory of Personhood . . . 169 C. COPYRIGHT AND PERSONHOOD 170 1. The J u s t i f i c a t i o n From Personhood . . . . 170 2. Problems with a Personhood J u s t i f i c a t i o n of Property . 171 3. A P r e f e r r e d Use of the Theory 175 D. LABOUR AND CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT 177 1. O r i g i n a l i t y i n Modern Copyright Law . . . 177 2. The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d ' I n f o r m a t i o n a l ' Works 180 3. The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d ' C r e a t i v e ' Works . 184 E. RETRIEVING A PERSONAL INTERESTS PERSPECTIVE . . 189 ENDNOTES '. 193 BIBLIOGRAPHY 246 1 I. INTRODUCTION A. SOURCES OF THE INQUIRY P r i o r t o o u t l i n i n g the c o u r s e of r e s e a r c h and argument found i n the body of the paper, t h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n h i g h l i g h t s t h e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h e x c i t e d t h e i n q u i r y . Whether t h e s e q u e s t i o n s have r e c e i v e d the d i s c u s s i o n they deserve, whether indeed the d i s c u s s i o n which ensues suggests u s e f u l answers to the q u e s t i o n s , remains f o r the reader to determine. 1. Law: The Forgotten Source P o l i t i c a l theory shares an i n t i m a t e h i s t o r i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with law and l e g a l theory. The concern of t h e o r i s t s whose work forms the corpus of Western p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l thought i s the s t u f f of law: the r i g h t s , r u l e s and o b l i g a t i o n s which shape the r e l a t i o n s between s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y and c i t i z e n s , and between c i t i z e n s i n t e r se. Many of the g r e a t w r i t e r s i n the Western t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y were thems e l v e s t r a i n e d i n the law, w h i l e most demonstrated a s o p h i s t i c a t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the workings of a n c i e n t and contemporary l e g a l systems. 1 S c h o l a r s i n law, as w e l l as l a w y e r s and judges to a l e s s e r d e g r e e , have l o n g shown an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e interdependency of law and l e g a l theory on the one hand, and t h e o r i e s o f p o l i t i c s and e p i s t e m o l o g y on the o t h e r . T h i s 2 i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l t heory has i n c r e a s e d with the a r r i v a l i n recent y e a r s of c r i t i c a l , theory-based p e r s p e c t i v e s on l e g a l s y s t e m s — such as the f e m i n i s t and c r i t i c a l l e g a l s t u d i e s movements— which have p l a c e d emphasis on u n d e r s t a n d i n g the dynamics of h i s t o r i c a l change i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Somewhat n e g l e c t e d i n the s t u d y o f p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , however, i s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the law, comprised of s t a t u t e s , j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s and d o c t r i n a l commentary, very much r e p r e s e n t s a working, out of theory on the ground of everyday p r a c t i c e . Few s t u d i e s i n the h i s t o r y o f i d e a s seek t o c o n n e c t works i n t h e o r y w i t h the work c o u r t s do i n d e v i s i n g s o l u t i o n s t o d i s c r e t e problems of comprehending and b a l a n c i n g c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s . T h i s l a c u n a i n the s t u d y of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y and the h i s t o r y of ideas p a r t l y i n s p i r e d t h i s paper, which a d m i t t e d l y seeks i t s place w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n s of l e g a l s c h o l a r s h i p and the h i s t o r y of law. F u r t h e r , the very way i n which the common law i n c o r p o r a t e d i d e a s , i n and of themselves, as o b j e c t s of p r o p e r t y provides an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e f l e c t on i s s u e s i n the h i s t o r y of ideas, and of l e g a l ideas s p e c i f i c a l l y . The f i e l d f o r t h i s i n q u i r y w i l l be the r o o t s of c o p y r i g h t t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e i n the common law. 2. The C h a l l e n g e Of The P r i n t i n g P r e s s T h i s paper takes advantage of the E n g l i s h l e g a l system's r e c o g n i t i o n t hat i t was d e a l i n g with a new kind of p r o p e r t y 3 r i g h t t o examine a h i s t o r i c a l moment when t h e o r i e s and c o n c e p t i o n s o f p r o p e r t y were drawn i n t o the p r o c e s s o f j u d i c i a l decision-making. The moment i n q u e s t i o n i s the 1769 d e c i s i o n o f the Court of King's Bench i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r 4 B u r r 2 3 0 3 , 98 ER 2 0 1 . 3 T h a t d e c i s i o n c o n s t i t u t e d t h e p e n u l t i m a t e moment i n the l i t i g i o u s c e n t r e of the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate of the mid-18th ce n t u r y . The debate r a i s e d the q u e s t i o n of whether a r i g h t of copy, that i s , an e x c l u s i v e , a l i e n a b l e and p e r p e t u a l r i g h t i n the aut h o r of a l i t e r a r y composition to make or a u t h o r i s e the making of c o p i e s of the composition, was a common law r i g h t of pro p e r t y t h a t e x i s t e d p r i o r t o , and s u r v i v e d the enactment i n 1709 of An Act f o r the Encouragement of L e a r n i n g by the V e s t i n g o f the Copies o f p r i n t e d Books i n the A u t h o r s or P u r c h a s e r s o f such Copies d u r i n g the Times t h e r e i n mentioned 4 ( h e r e a f t e r the S t a t u t e of Anne). In s h o r t , the E n g l i s h c o u r t s f a c e d t h i s q u e s t i o n : " i s c o p y r i g h t p r o p e r t y " ? By examining answers they gave t o that q u e s t i o n t h i s paper intends to address two i s s u e s : (1) In what ways d i d the ' r i g h t of copy' c o n s t i t u t e a new t y p e of p r o p e r t y , and how d i d i t s a p p r e c i a t i o n as such a f f e c t l e g a l theory ? (2) How were the r o l e and i n t e r e s t s o f ' t h e a u t h o r ' u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate, and how i n tu r n d i d the ' r i g h t of copy' re-make those i n t e r e s t s ? 4 These i s s u e s came f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n before the E n g l i s h bench and bar two c e n t u r i e s a f t e r t h e y were p u t i n p l a y by a mechanical i n v e n t i o n : the p r i n t i n g p ress. We l i v e i n times f r e q u e n t l y and f a s h i o n a b l y d e s c r i b e d as the i n f o r m a t i o n age. The t e c h n o l o g i e s of the a g e — computers, r e p r o g r a p h i c d e v i c e s , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and so o n — a r e claimed to be changing the way humans think and i n t e r a c t , and making " i n f o r m a t i o n " t h e most v a l u a b l e r e s o u r c e i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy.^ Law and l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e r e p e a t e d l y e x h o r t e d t o overcome t r a d i t i o n s drawn from an e a r l i e r c u l t u r e to keep pace. C o n s i d e r a b l e s c h o l a r s h i p s u g g e s t s t h a t the t w e n t i e t h century i s not witness to the f i r s t t r a n s f o r m a t i v e events i n t h e h i s t o r y o f human c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b r o u g h t a b o u t by t e c h n o l o g y . A l m o s t t h i r t y y e a r s ago M a r s h a l l McLuhan speculated about a r e v o l u t i o n i n human a f f a i r s wrought by the i n v e n t i o n of the p r i n t i n g press i n the l a t e f i f t e e n t h century ^, an i n s i g h t he e l a b o r a t e d i n t o a theory o f the f o r m a t i v e powers of d i f f e r e n t media of communications. H i s argument that media are more than instruments of communication, that t h e i r very nature and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shape communication i t s e l f and t h e r e f o r e s o c i a l l i f e , has been t a k e n up by numerous subsequent s c h o l a r s . ^ T h i s paper does not seek, however, to i n v o l v e i t s e l f i n the q u e s t i o n of whether and to what ext e n t developments i n technology d r i v e s o c i a l change. The answer t h a t must s u f f i c e 5 h e r e , i s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i s d i a l e c t i c a l : t e c h n o l o g y p r e c i p i t a t e s c h a n g e i n e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , and e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s determine the manner i n which technology i s r e c e i v e d and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o human a f f a i r s . The p o s s i b i i t y f o r mass d i s t r i b u t i o n of the products of a u t h o r s h i p c r e a t e d by the p r i n t i n g press could c o n c e i v a b l y have r e s u l t e d i n a f u l l - s c a l e p u b l i c domain i n t e x t s , or perhaps 'ownership' of the presses by a p r i e s t l y c a s t ; that i t d i d not i n the England and Europe of the time should h a r d l y seem a c c i d e n t a l or s u r p r i s i n g . C e r t a i n l y f o r the common law, i t s e l f a c r e a t u r e of i n c r e m e n t a l i s m , the i n i t i a l c h a l l e n g e presented by new phenomena i s always to comprehend them w i t h i n e x i s t i n g t e r m i n o l o g y and c a t e g o r i e s of a n a l y s i s . In t h i s i n h e r e n t l y c o n s e r v a t i v e p r a c t i c e , t a l k of r e v o l u t i o n s i s a r i s k y e n t e r p r i s e . B. "PROPERTY" 1. Property i n P o l i t i c a l Theory and Law On a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e v e l , the l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l theory, d i s c u s s i o n s o f p r o p e r t y c o m p r i s e an honoured t r a d i t i o n . Indeed, the "problem" of property r i g h t s , t h e i r d e l i n e a t i o n , j u s t i f i c a t i o n and c r i t i q u e , may be s e e n as one o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e i s s u e s i n modern s e c u l a r p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . In p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , "property" g e n e r a l l y connotes the means of a l l o c a t i n g r e s o u r c e s i n n a t u r e , whether l a n d or p h y s i c a l 6 o b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g r i g h t s t o c o n t r o l t h e c u l t i v a t i o n , p r o d u c t i o n , use and exchange of those resources. I t i s of the n a t u r e of p h i l o s o p h y to u n i v e r s a l i s e , to d e f i n e terms i n a g e n e r a l and a b s t r a c t way t o make p h i l o s o p h i c d i s c o u r s e p o s s i b l e . I t i s of the n a t u r e o f common law, however, t o p a r t i c u l a r i s e . When the q u e s t i o n "what i s p r o p e r t y ?" or "what i n t e r e s t s can be j u s t i f i e d as p r o p r i e t a r y ?" a r i s e i n law, t h a t i s , i n the c o u r t s , i t i s i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i s e the unique demands imposed by the c o n t e x t . In the a d v e r s a r i a l s y s t e m , s u c h q u e s t i o n s a r i s e i n the c o u r s e of p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e s between p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s . The answers r e s o l v e , or attempt t o r e s o l v e , those d i s p u t e s . A c l a s s i c i n s t a n c e i n which "what i s p r o p e r t y ?" comes to be addressed by a c o u r t o c c u r s when the word " p r o p e r t y " i s used i n a c o n t r a c t or s t a t u t e , a n d r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e d i s p u t e demands i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The Supreme Court of Canada, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e c e n t l y r u l e d i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g the a l l e g e d t h e f t o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n the form of photocopied l i s t s of employee names and a d d r e s s e s , t h a t " p r o p e r t y " must be a t a n g i b l e o b j e c t . * * In a d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e i n w hich "property" has become a category e n t i t l i n g the r i g h t - h o l d e r to a s p e c i f i c c i v i l remedy, the term may r e c e i v e a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h i s i s s i m p l y t o p o i n t out t h a t w h i l e t h e o r i e s of p r o p e r t y meet the ground i n the l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n s a c t u a l l y a c c o r d e d i n t e r e s t s resembling an i d e a l of p r o p e r t y , 7 lawyers and judges are engaged i n an a c t i v i t y d i s t i n c t from that of p h i l o s o p h e r s . D e f i n i n g " p r o p e r t y " o f t e n seems an e x e r c i s e of l i m i t e d u t i l i t y i n t h e common law t r a d i t i o n . An E n g l i s h "law o f p r o p e r t y " i n the g e n e r i c sense d i d not e x i s t p r i o r to 1709, and perhaps never has. " R e a l " and " p e r s o n a l " p r o p e r t y have r e p r e s e n t e d two q u i t e s e p a r a t e l e g a l r e g i m e s . That b o t h concerned th e use and c o n t r o l of ' t h i n g s ' i n the m a t e r i a l world d i d not r e s u l t i n c o n c e p t u a l or p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y . The E n g l i s h law of r e a l p r o p e r t y owed i t s c h a r a c t e r to the f e u d a l system of l a n d tenure. In t h a t system, land c o u l d not be owned o u t r i g h t by any p r i v a t e p a r t y , but was h e l d of the Crown, subject to the o b l i g a t i o n s and s t r i c t u r e s imposed by i n c i d e n t s of t e n u r e . H o l d e r s of e s t a t e s i n the l a n d s t r u g g l e d over a p e r i o d of c e n t u r i e s to carve out r i g h t s of a l i e n a t i o n and to devise i n order to a v o i d f e u d a l i n c i d e n t s and s t r i c t r u l e s of p r i m o g e n i t u r e . The d o c t r i n e of uses, which s e p a r a t e d l e g a l from b e n e f i c i a l o w n e r s h i p and t i t l e f rom a c t u a l use and b e n e f i t o f l a n d , a r o s e i n the c o u r s e o f t h a t s t r u g g l e . I n c o r p o r e a l r i g h t s i n the form of incomes and o f f i c e s were recognised, as r i g h t s running with l a n d . ^ The law of p e r s o n a l property had a more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d genesis. Blackstone, w r i t i n g i n 1763, f e l t a b l e to s t a t e that moveables gave r i s e to p r o p e r t y r i g h t s sooner than land . . . p r i n c i p a l l y because few of them co u l d be f i t f o r u s e , t i l l i m p r o v e d a n d 8 a m e l i o r a t e d by the b o d i l y l a b o r o f the o c c u p a n t , which b o d i l y l a b o r , bestowed upon any s u b j e c t w h i c h b e f o r e l a y i n common to a l l men, i s u n i v e r s a l l y allowed to g i v e the f a i r e s t and most re a s o n a b l e t i t l e t o an e x c l u s i v e property t h e r e i n . 1 0 The law o f o w n e r s h i p o f t h i n g s , w i t h i t s c o n c o m i t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s i n the law of t h e f t and c o n v e r s i o n , e v o l v e d without r e f e r e n c e to f e u d a l i n c i d e n t s . The concept of p r o p e r t y i n E n g l i s h l aw d i d n o t i n v o l v e a c o n c e p t o f o u t r i g h t ownership; r a t h e r , t i t l e to land or to goods had a comparative q u a l i t y : the p a r t y with the best c l a i m to t i t l e was viewed as the owner. A n o t h e r f e a t u r e o f p r o p e r t y i n the common law t r a d i t i o n was the importance of possession as an i n d i c i u m of t i t l e . 2. A D e f i n i t i o n of " P r o p e r t y " With these caveats i n mind, we turn to the hazardous task of g i v i n g meaning to the term "property". I t may seem odd to o f f e r a d e f i n i t i o n at an e a r l y moment i n a paper one of whose purposes i s to explore changes i n the concept of p r o p e r t y that o c c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of the common law's encounter with claims to t h e o w n e r s h i p of i n t a n g i b l e s i n the form o f i d e a s and reproducing the m a t e r i a l e x p r e s s i o n of ideas. The t i t l e of the paper i m p l i e s "property" to be a h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t r u c t , capable of b e i n g d e f i n e d only i n r e f e r e n c e to the understandings of time and p l a c e . I t i s u s e f u l , however, to have an idea of what s e t s r i g h t s of p r o p e r t y a p a r t from other i n t e r e s t s known to 9 law, and f u r t h e r to have a sense of what i s meant throughout the p a p e r when the word " p r o p e r t y " i s u s e d . The d e f i n i t i o n p r o f f e r e d here names three a t t r i b u t e s of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s which have been impor tant through the course of the development o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i n the common law t r a d i t i o n : (1) e x c l u s i v i t y (2) a l i e n a b i l i t y (3) e x t e r n a l i t y The f i r s t a t t r i b u t e has remained the most c o n s t a n t f e a t u r e o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n modern Western s o c i e t i e s . The a t t r i b u t e o f " a l i e n a b i l i t y " i s more p r o b l e m a t i c , s e e m i n g s p e c i f i c t o c e r t a i n s o c i e t i e s a n d h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s , b u t b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y d o m i n a n t i n p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s as v e s t i g e s o f f e u d a l t r a d i t i o n s d i s a p p e a r e d , and market a r rangements t o o k o v e r . The a t t r i b u t e o f " e x t e r n a l i t y " i s more p r o b l e m a t i c s t i l l , and i n many ways r e p r e s e n t s the s t o r y that w i l l be t o l d i n t h i s p a p e r . At the o u t s e t of the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e , i t was g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t t h a t p r o p e r t y p e r t a i n e d o n l y t o o b j e c t s i n t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d . C o p y r i g h t c h a l l e n g e d t h a t n o t i o n . C o p y r i g h t b e c a m e " p r o p e r t y " t h r o u g h j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t ' i n t e r n a l ' , p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s c o u l d ground e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s of p r o p e r t y . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n of " p r o p e r t y " i s , t h e n , more of a s i g n - p o s t t h a n a d e f i n i t i o n . These t h r e e a t t r i b u t e s have p l a y e d c e n t r a l r o l e s i n the c o n c e p t of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i n t o which t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e f e l l i n s e v e n t e e n t h a n d 10 e i g h t e e n t h century B r i t a i n . The changes they have gone through r e f l e c t i n p a r t the a r r i v a l of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s l i k e c o p y r i g h t i n l a w . T h e y s e r v e as t h e w r i t e r ' s understanding of "property" throughout t h i s paper; context and a t t r i b u t i o n w i l l i n d i c a t e when other uses and meanings are intended. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n accords with what the E n g l i s h c o u r t s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y meant at a minimum 1 1 when they asked: i s the ' r i g h t of the copy' a ' r i g h t of p r o p e r t y ' ? In so s a y i n g , however, one must remain c o n s c i o u s t h a t t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g has changed, p a r t l y because of developments i n l e g a l h i s t o r y to which much of t h i s paper i s addressed, p a r t l y because of the i n f l u e n c e of t h e o r i s t s l i k e Wesley H o h f e l d x . (a) " P r o p e r t y " and " P r o p e r t y R i g h t " Two a m b i g u i t i e s about the r e l a t i o n s h i p of " p r o p e r t y " to the word " r i g h t " deserve a t t e n t i o n . F i r s t , i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms the phrase " r i g h t to p r o p e r t y " can denote a moral c l a i m to p r o p e r t y . In h i s book The R i g h t t o P r o p e r t y ~* Jeremy Waldron e x p l o r e s s e v e r a l t h e o r i e s to i d e n t i f y whether they make o u t a mo r a1 ( a s o p p o s e d t o p u r e l y u t i l i t a r i a n ) j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f " p r o p e r t y r i g h t s " . The l a t t e r p h r a s e , f r e q u e n t l y u s e d s y n o n y m o u s l y w i t h " r i g h t t o p r o p e r t y " , i n d i c a t e s a l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t t o p r o p e r t y , t h a t i s , an i n t e r e s t e n f o r c e a b l e by l e g a l remedy. I t i s that meaning which i s i n t e n d e d throughout t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , and f o r t h a t reason r e f e r e n c e s to " r i g h t t o p r o p e r t y " have g e n e r a l l y been avo i d e d . 11 S e c o n d , " p r o p e r t y r i g h t s " c o n t a i n s a r e d u n d a n c y : " p r o p e r t y " r e f e r s not to an o b j e c t but to a type of l e g a l r i g h t . The f o r m e r i s a c o l l o q u i a l meaning which, as C.B. Macpherson p o i n t s out-' - 4, was never s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r theory. The i d e a t h a t p r o p e r t y r e f e r s t o o b j e c t s i s n e v e r t h e l e s s tenacious and conti n u e s to cause d i f f i c u l t i e s , not l e a s t when s t a t u t e s u s i n g the term " p r o p e r t y " r e q u i r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This paper uses "property" and "property r i g h t s " synonymously unless otherwise i n d i c a t e d . (b) Three A t t r i b u t e s of Property What c o n s t i t u t e s "property" as opposed to other kinds of r i g h t s ? In the common law t r a d i t i o n at the time of M i l l a r v. Taylor i n 1769, and i n major p a r t s i n c e then, t h r e e elements have been c e n t r a l i n making something "property"; each c a l l s f o r b r i e f e x p l a n a t i o n . (1) E x c l u s i v i t y — a pr o p e r t y r i g h t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s the e x c l u s i o n o f n o n - r i g h t s - h o l d e r s from the a c t i v i t i e s covered by the r i g h t . That i s , the r i g h t - h o l d e r i s the only person who may engage i n the a c t i v i t y p r o t e c t e d , or consent to o t h e r s engaging i n i t . F e l i x Cohen p r o v i d e s the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n : P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p among human beings such that the s o - c a l l e d owner can exclude others from c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s or p e r m i t o t h e r s t o engage i n t h o s e 12 a c t i v i t i e s and i n e i t h e r case secure the a s s i s t a n c e of the law i n c a r r y i n g out h i s d e c i s i o n . 1 5 P r o p e r t y i s , i n t h i s s e n s e , p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . Macpherson p o i n t s out t h a t state-owned p r o p e r t y i s e q u a l l y as ' p r i v a t e ' i n t h i s r e s p e c t as i s p r o p e r t y owned by i n d i v i d u a l s or c o r p o r a t i o n s . 1 ^ He goes on to argue that "property" has been g i v e n too narrow a meaning by l i b e r a l i s m , that i t should be extended t o in c l u d e a r i g h t not to be excluded: E x c l u s i v e n e s s i s not l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d i n the concept of p r o p e r t y as an i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t needed t o e n a b l e men t o r e a l i z e t h e i r human essence as moral or r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . . . . A n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t not to be excluded from something h e l d i n common i s as much i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y as the r i g h t to e x c l u d e . 1 ' While a d e f i n i t i o n of p r o p e r t y as both a r i g h t to exclude and a r i g h t not to be excluded can be i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t , i t l a c k s some p r e c i s i o n ; i t seems to f o l l o w from Macpherson's t h e o r y , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t a r i g h t not t o be e x c l u d e d i s i n a l i e n a b l e . His d e f i n i t i o n has an o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l purpose: to r e t a i n " p r o p e r t y " as a norm of the good s o c i e t y , w h i l e i n f u s i n g i t w i t h a new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r human r e l a t i o n s . Despite h i s c r i t i q u e of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , he wishes to r e t a i n the term f o r i t s h o r t a t o r y v a l u e . For expl a n a t o r y purposes, however, i t seems more u s e f u l to d i s t i n g u i s h between p r o p e r t y as a r i g h t t o exclude, and a p u b l i c domain or commons as the source of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s not to be excluded. E x c l u s i v i t y i n 13 the Western t r a d i t i o n has meant ' e x c l u s i v e to l e g a l persons', and not groups. In the c o n s i d e r a t i o n g i v e n c o p y r i g h t i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e , the c o u r t s never c o n t e m p l a t e d a prop e r t y that c o u l d be 'owned' by a c o l l e c t i v i t y , as may w e l l have been the case i n s o c i e t i e s o r g a n i s e d around t r i b a l or kin-group s t r u c t u r e s . (2) A l i e n a b i l i t y - - t h i s c r i t e r i o n c l e a r l y r a i s e s the iss u e of h i s t o r i c i t y . The E n g l i s h law of r e a l p r o p e r t y was f o r c e n t u r i e s dominated by the e f f o r t s o f lawyers to get around the rule-bound i n a l i e n a b i l i t y of f e u d a l land. 1® F u r t h e r , one can t h i n k of in n u m e r a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s — from a g r i c u l t u r a l land preserves to the r e g u l a t i o n of i n s i d e r t r a d i n g — i n which r i g h t s of p r o p e r t y a r e r e s t r i c t e d by l i m i t s on the power to s e l l . R e s t r i c t e d , b u t r a r e l y e l i m i n a t e d ; almost a l l such i n s t a n c e s i n v o l v e l i m i t s for a p e r i o d of time, on the c l a s s of persons with whom exchange can be made, or on the uses a buyer may make of the p r o p e r t y s o l d , but not an a b s o l u t e bar to a l i e n a t i o n . In H o h f e l d i a n t e r m s , a l i e n a b i l i t y may be a 'power', not a r i g h t , and a power which can be l i m i t e d i n v a r i o u s ways, but i f so i t has become the c o n s t i t u t i v e power 1 Q of a pro p e r t y r i g h t i n the commercial age. x ^ (3) Externality — a property r i g h t i s g e n e r a l l y thought to p e r t a i n to resources i n the m a t e r i a l world, e x t e r n a l t o the r i g h t - h o l d e r . In h i s 1917 a r t i c l e Hohfeld l i s t e d f i v e t h i n g s 14 to which r i g h t s may p e r t a i n : t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s , i n t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s , t h e r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s own p h y s i c a l p e r s o n , a n o t h e r p e r s o n , and what can be c a l l e d f o r l a c k of a b e t t e r term 'moral i n t e r e s t s . ' " ^ 0 In the l i t e r a r y p roperty debate, a key issue was whether only the f i r s t category c o u l d be a s u b j e c t of p r o p e r t y . C o p y r i g h t was one of the i n t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s which, by the time Hohfeld wrote, had become p r o p e r t y . But c o p y r i g h t i n i t s o r i g i n s had a l s o had c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of moral i n t e r e s t s ; i n the course of the debate, those aspects became subsumed w i t h i n a property r i g h t . T h i s r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about the nature and purposes of the "new property" which t h i s paper w i l l endeavour to answer. The fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between p r o p e r t y and p e r s o n a l r i g h t s had b e e n t h a t p r o p e r t y encompassed a c t i v i t i e s performed on resources i n the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , and p r o p e r t y was a l i e n a b l e . With c o p y r i g h t , t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n became much l e s s c l e a r . C. "COPIES" 1. A New Property ? The c h i e f a t t r i b u t e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y i s t h a t a p a r t f r o m i t s r e c o g n i t i o n i n law i t has no e x i s t e n c e of i t s own. I t i s i n f a c t as w e l l as i n d e f i n i t i o n the s t u f f of an i n t e l l e c t u a l , r a t h e r t h a n a f e e l i n g a c c o r d . L a c k i n g t a n g i b l e s u b s t a n c e a l t o g e t h e r , i t s b o u n d a r i e s cannot be r e c o g n i z e d through the medium of the human senses. 15 In what s e n s e s was c o p y r i g h t a new p r o p e r t y ? The p r i n c i p a l problem f o r the judges who f i r s t g r a p p l e d with the nature of an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to copy w r i t t e n t e x t s concerned i t s i n t a n g i b i l i t y , the s e p a r a t i o n of the r i g h t claimed from the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t t o which i t p e r t a i n e d . I f p o s s e s s i o n evidenced a c l a i m to p r o p e r t y f o r r e a l t y or c h a t t e l s , i t had l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r c o p y r i g h t ; the very purpose of a r i g h t to copy was that i t p e r t a i n e d a f t e r an author or assignee had c e d e d p o s s e s s i o n o f e a c h p h y s i c a l copy o f a p u b l i s h e d composition. The p r i n t i n g p r e s s p r e s e n t e d t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o f p r o p e r t y w i t h a number of r e l a t e d p a r a d o x e s . P r o p e r t y , i n B l a c k s t o n e ' s v i e w 2 2 , was made n e c e s s a r y by s c a r c i t y . The p r i n t i n g p r e s s l a r g e l y e l i m i n a t e d s c a r c i t y of t e x t s as a f a c t o r . The press c o u l d reproduce books i n as great a number as the market demanded. A r e c o g n i t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n copying books a c t u a l l y imposed an a r t i f i c i a l s c a r c i t y , a s c a r c i t y produced by law rather than nature. S i m i l a r l y , copying a book without i t s author's p e r m i s s i o n d i d not d e p r i v e him of any p h y s i c a l t h i n g ; concepts of tre s p a s s and t h e f t d i d not a p t l y d e s c r i b e an i n v a s i o n or t a k i n g that l e f t the p u t a t i v e owner of a t e x t u n a f f e c t e d , save f o r the p r o f i t s he might o t h e r w i s e make. The problem of c o p y i n g or r e p r o d u c t i o n might be seen more g e n e r a l l y as a problem of i n d u s t r i a l p rocesses which made r e p l i c a t i o n of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s a r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d matter. That an ' i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t y d e b a t e ' d i d not take 16 p l a c e i n E n g l i s h l a w , a t l e a s t n o t i n t h e same way a s t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e , r a i s e s i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s o f 23 c o m p a r i s o n . J 2. D e f i n i n g "The Copy" J u s t a s " p r o p e r t y " c o n n o t e s " o b j e c t s o w n e d " i n common p a r l a n c e b u t " r i g h t s o f p r o p e r t y " i n l e g a l t h e o r y , t h e word " c o p y " i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y had b o t h c o l l o q u i a l a n d l e g a l m e a n i n g . One "owned" a c o p y , o r c o p i e s , a s a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . In l a w , h o w e v e r , t h e " c o p y " was u n d e r s t o o d t o mean " t h e r i g h t o f c o p y " o r " c o p y - r i g h t . " T h i s u s a g e s t a r t e d w i t h t h e members o f t h e S t a t i o n e r s ' C o m p a n y , t h e L o n d o n p r i n t e r s ' g u i l d , who d e v e l o p e d t h e i r own i n t e r n a l s y s t e m f o r r e g i s t e r i n g ' c o p i e s ' c l a i m e d f o r e x c l u s i v e o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n . 2 4 T h e S t a t u t e o f A n n e r e c o g n i s e d t h i s m e a n i n g , a s d i d e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y c o u r t s . ^ J C o p y i n g h a d a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m e r c i a l c o n n o t a t i o n by t h a t t i m e . When d o n e by someone a l l e g e d n o t t o h a v e a u t h o r i s a t i o n f r o m t h e ' o w n e r ' o f t h e c o p y , i t was o f t e n c a l l e d ' p i r a c y . ' T h i s l a t t e r t e r m s h o u l d be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m ' p l a g i a r i s m ' , w h i c h r e f e r r e d t o c o p y i n g a n o t h e r ' s w o r k a n d c l a i m i n g i t a s o n e ' s own . What c o n s t i t u t e s p l a g i a r i s m h a s v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y o v e r t i m e , w i t h t h e s c o p e o f " l e g i t i m a t e " c o p y i n g o r b o r r o w i n g o f a n o t h e r ' s work w i t h o u t a t t r i b u t i o n g e n e r a l l y a n d s t e a d i l y d e c l i n i n g s i n c e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s . 2 ^ P i r a c y i s t h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n o f p u b l i s h e r s , 17 p l a g i a r i s m the concern of a u t h o r s ; i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate, p i r a c y was the c l a r i o n c a l l of the p l a i n t i f f p r i n t e r s and b o o k s e l l e r s . D . "AUTHORS" The author as an i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t o r of l i t e r a r y works i s a r e l a t i v e l y modern c o n c e p t i o n . 2 ^ The s t a t u s of the 'author' has v a r i e d g r e a t l y from s o c i e t y t o s o c i e t y , and over time. O r a l t r a d i t i o n s o f s t o r y t e l l i n g e x i s t i n a l l c u l t u r e s , and predominate before mechanical means f o r m u l t i p l e r e c o r d i n g of w r i t t e n language become a v a i l a b l e . R i c h a r d Wincor d e s c r i b e s how performers r a t h e r than authors, theatre and r i t u a l r a t her than t e x t s , h o l d c e n t r e stage i n the t r a n s m i s s i o n of symbolic l a n g u a g e w i t h i n p r e - l i t e r a t e s o c i e t i e s . Knowledge of the s t o r i e s i s a sou r c e of power and i n f l u e n c e , and i s bound up wit h the s t a t u s of the p r i e s t : In a n c i e n t s o c i e t y i t was the e x c l u s i v e p r o v i n c e of a p r i v i l e g e d few to r e c i t e s p e c i a l w o r d s a n d p e r f o r m c e r t a i n c e r e m o n i e s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the s u b j e c t matter of t h e i r performance was a t h i n g of v a l u e . . . . These r i t u a l p l a y s were n o t h i n g l e s s than implements of s o v e r e i g n t y , t h e i r c o r p o r a t e owners used them as s t o c k i n trade to preserve s t a t u s . . . 2 8 M i c h e l Foucault w r i t e s : In our c u l t u r e — u n d o u b t e d l y i n o t h e r s as w e l l - - d i s c o u r s e was not o r i g i n a l l y a 18 t h i n g , a p r o d u c t , or a p o s s e s s i o n , but an a c t i o n s i t u a t e d i n a b i p o l a r f i e l d o f s a c r e d and p r o f a n e , l a w f u l and u n l a w f u l , r e l i g i o u s and blasphemous. 9 To F o u c a u l t , the modern concept of the a u t h o r , or i n h i s words the " a u t h o r - f u n c t i o n " 3 ° , commenced roughly when books became " o b j e c t s o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n . . . whose l e g a l c o d i f i c a t i o n was a c c o m p l i s h e d some years a g o . " ^ 1 E l i z a b e t h E i s e n s t e i n t r a c e s changes i n t h e c o n c e p t o f a u t h o r s h i p i n E u r o p e t o t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l b r e a k t h r o u g h r e p r e s e n t e d by the p r i n t i n g p r e s s . ' E i s e n s t e i n does not propose a t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m . R a t h e r , she s t a t e s her i n t e n t i o n as r i g h t i n g a b a l a n c e t h a t , i n her v i e w , has t i l t e d too f a r i n the d i r e c t i o n o f s e e i n g human a g e n c y , whether i n the g u i s e of p h i l o s o p h y or the dynamics of s o c i a l c l a s s e s , as master of man's f a t e . ^ i n her v i e w , the p r i n t i n g p r e s s made some a c t i v i t i e s p o s s i b l e t h a t were not p o s s i b l e b e f o r e ; those a c t i v i t i e s b o r e on i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e i t s e l f ; a n d t h e y p r o f o u n d l y a f f e c t e d t h e s t r u c t u r e of human r e l a t i o n s h i p s , d e p e n d e n t as t h e y a r e on c o m m u n i c a t i o n and i n t e l l e c t u a l exchange. Among the i n s t i t u t i o n s which E i s e n s t e i n sugges ts the p r i n t i n g p r e s s i r r e v o c a b l y a l t e r e d was t h a t o f a u t h o r s h i p , both as an economic and p s y c h o l o g i c a l endeavour . E i s e n s t e i n ' s p o i n t s i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g . P r i o r to the advent o f the p r e s s , the c o p y i n g of t e x t s was done by h a n d , and c o p y i s t s were r e s p e c t e d c r a f t s m e n . - ^ 4 Book p r o d u c t i o n was h e a v i l y l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e , and most books c o p i e d were c l a s s i c 19 t e x t s . O r i g i n a l c o m p o s i t i o n c o n s e q u e n t l y had l i t t l e v a l u e . Indeed copying, and not composition, represented the e s s e n t i a l a c t i v i t y i n the w o r l d o f p r o d u c i n g t e x t s f o r a r e l a t i v e l y small c l a s s of s c h o l a r l y readers and t h e o l o g i a n s . So paramount was the p h y s i c a l t e x t t h a t medieval law d i d not recognise a d i s t i n c t i o n between a l i t e r a r y work and the paper on which i t was w r i t t e n . With t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s came a d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , c h a r a c t e r i s e d f i r s t by the v i r t u a l d i s a p p e a r a n c e of c o p y i s t s . The w r i t e r became v a l u e d as someone who c o u l d provide the presses with m a t e r i a l to p r i n t . As books i n c r e a s e d i n a v a i l a b i l i t y , the task of s c h o l a r l y w r i t i n g i t s e l f changed from the e x e g e s i s of s i n g l e t e x t s to a combining of sources and i d e a s . The p r i n t i n g p r e s s made w i d e - s c a l e l i t e r a c y f e a s i b l e and worthwhile, which l e d to the c r e a t i o n of a mass r e a d e r s h i p . E v e n t u a l l y , i t became p o s s i b l e f o r a u t h o r s h i p to be conceived as a p r o f e s s i o n - 3 3 , at l e a s t f o r w r i t e r s a c h i e v i n g a measure of success. With the c r e a t i o n of an audience f o r books, however, came an e n t i r e l y new c o n c e p t o f the a u t h o r as a c r e a t o r , an o r i g i n a t o r , of compositions. E i s e n s t e i n s p e c u l a t e s on a number of f a c t o r s which may have c o n t r i b u t e d to a new emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n w r i t i n g : the s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of typefaces l e d to a c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g search f o r more i d i o s y n c r a t i c p e r s o n a l e x p r e s s i o n p r i n t gave w r i t i n g a p h y s i c a l permanency i t had n o t had b e f o r e , p e r m i t t i n g much g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y i n a t t r i b u t i o n of a u t h o r s h i p ^7. p r i n t p e r m i t t e d f o r the f i r s t 20 t i m e a " s i l e n t " , i n - d e p t h c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n a w i d e r e a d e r s h i p a n d a l i v i n g . a u t h o r , r e s u l t i n g i n a m o r e c o n f e s s i o n a l mode o f w r i t i n g ^8. e n g r a v i n g s and f i g u r a t i v e d r a w i n g s c o u l d be r e p r o d u c e d i n p r i n t e d b o o k s , m a k i n g i t p o s s i b l e f o r readers to become f a m i l i a r w i t h the p o r t r a i t s o f a u t h o r s ^ 9 . E i s e n s t e i n goes so f a r as t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e R o m a n t i c movement i t s e l f , w i t h i t s image o f the a u t h o r as a r t i s t - g e n i u s , was the work of a u t h o r s who q u i t e n a t u r a l l y p r a i s e d t h e s e n s i b i l i t y o f t h e i r r e a d e r s , w h i l e d i s p a r a g i n g that of the p h i l i s t i n e s who d i d n o t . 4 0 How d i d law encounter the new phenomena of p r i n t i n g and the r o l e , and c a r e e r , o f the a u t h o r t h a t p r i n t i n g spawned ? Two i m p o r t a n t responses o c c u r r e d i n the r e l a t e d areas of l i b e l and c e n s o r s h i p . As a r e a s o f l e g a l c o n c e r n , t h e s e l a r g e l y 4 1 r e s p o n d e d t o t h e harm w h i c h t h e new t e c h n o l o g y a n d i t s a n i m a t o r s t h r e a t e n e d t o d o , be i t h a r m t o t h e s t a t e ' s s e c u r i t y , or harm to the p r i v a t e r e p u t a t i o n o f the p o w e r f u l . 4 2 In terms o f d e f i n i n g t h e s t a t u s and r i g h t s of the a u t h o r , however, the l a w ' s response appeared w i t h c o p y r i g h t : a form o f e x c l u s i v e r i g h t i n the author over the r e p r o d u c t i o n of h i s or her l i t e r a r y w o r k . 4 ^ F o u c a u l t sees a c o n n e c t i o n : the s t a t e ' s d e s i r e to p u n i s h or r e s t r a i n a u t h o r s c o n s t i t u t e d the reason f o r t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n as named i n d i v i d u a l s , and f o r b o o k s becoming the s u b j e c t of p r o p e r t y . 4 4 The l i n k between c o p y r i g h t and the Romantic movement has been n o t e d by s e v e r a l s c h o l a r s . 4 5 As w i l l be shown i n g r e a t e r 21 d e t a i l , c o p y r i g h t rewarded the author f o r h i s o r i g i n a l i t y , and p r o s c r i b e d the u n a u t h o r i s e d copying o f t e x t s which p r i o r to the p r i n t i n g p r e s s , and f o r some time a f t e r i t s i n v e n t i o n , had been the backbone of book p r o d u c t i o n . S e v e r a l s t u d i e s have examined the e x t e n s i v e 'borrowing' from e a r l i e r t e x t s which c h a r a c t e r i s e d a u t h o r s h i p through the time of Shakespeare 4 6 ; the c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t o f a r t i s t i c endeavour had e x a l t e d i m i t a t i o n , not o r i g i n a l i t y . C o p y r i g h t , then, as a form of p r o p e r t y i s p l a u s i b l y i m p l i c a t e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i n g of the auth o r as a r o m a n t i c f i g u r e , the s e l f - e x p r e s s i v e h e r o . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , however, t h a t t h e c o p y r i g h t s y s t e m has co n t i n u e d to t h r i v e d u r i n g a time when the most i n f l u e n t i a l m o v e m e n t s i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m - - s t r u c t u r a 1 i s m a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m — have disparaged the r o l e of the author i n the b i r t h and l i f e of t e x t s , even d e c l a r i n g the death of the a u t h o r . 4 7 A second p u r p o s e of t h i s p a p e r , t h e n , i s t o examine through the development of c o p y r i g h t and i t s a p o t h e o s i s i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r the degree to which images of "a u t h o r s h i p " made t h e i r way i n t o l e g a l t h i n k i n g , and how c o p y r i g h t has played a p a r t i n g u i d i n g i t s subsequent c o n f i g u r a t i o n . I t w i l l be argued that c o p y r i g h t has c o n s t r u c t e d the author as 'owner' of h i s o r i g i n a l e x p r e s s i o n ; t h i s p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s h i p to the work both c e l e b r a t e s an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c n o t i o n of c r e a t i v i t y , and serves to meet m a t e r i a l and p e r s o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s of the author i n sending ( p u b l i s h i n g ) h i s work i n t o the world. 22 E. APPROACH AND OUTLINE OF INQUIRY 1. M i l l a r v. Taylor (1769) as a Focus T a k i n g a s i n g l e c a s e as the f o c u s f o r a s t u d y poses c e r t a i n r i s k s . For one t h i n g , there i s a danger of making the case stand f o r more than i t d i d i n r e a l i t y ; as noted above, the context of a case i s a p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e i n which p a r t i e s make arguments not f o r the sake of a e s t h e t i c s , but to win. The p a r t i e s i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r d i d not approach the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y q u e s t i o n w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c detachment. T h e i r debate represented a l o n g - s t a n d i n g s t r u g g l e of commercial i n t e r e s t s ; t h e p l a i n t i f f M i l l a r was one o f s e v e r a l m a j o r L o n d o n b o o k s e l l e r s who p r e s s e d the debate i n an e f f o r t to r e t a i n predominance i n the book trade. 4** F u r t h e r , the s i n g l e case which p r o v i d e s the focus must be s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r e s t i n g to bear the a t t e n t i o n g i v e n i t . There are reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g the d e c i s i o n i n M i l l a r can bear such a t t e n t i o n . The case has been n o t e d f o r a number of r e a s o n s : as one o f o n l y two i n s t a n c e s d u r i n g L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s 26-year t e n u r e as C h i e f J u s t i c e (1756-1782) when the f o u r judges i n K i n g ' s Bench f a i l e d to achieve unanimity 4 9 ; and as a p i v o t a l moment i n the j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l debate over the d o c t r i n e of s t a r e d e c i s i s . 5 0 Most important f o r our purposes, the o p i n i o n s of the judges i n M i l l a r r e p r e s e n t e d r e s p o n s e s t o e x t e n s i v e t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n s developed by s e v e r a l of the more i m p r e s s i v e l e g a l f i g u r e s of the age . They s t a n d up w e l l as t h e o r y a f t e r 200 years of e v o l u t i o n i n a complex a r e a of law. The M i l l a r c a s e was t h e p e n u l t i m a t e c h a p t e r i n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate because f i v e years l a t e r the House of L o r d s i n D o n a l d s o n v . B e c k e t t ^ 2 e f f e c t i v e l y r e v e r s e d the r u l i n g i n M i l l a r , and s e t t l e d the c o u r s e o f A n g l o - C a n a d i a n and American c o p y r i g h t law as a s t a t u t o r y r e g i m e . T h i s paper c o n c e n t r a t e s on the e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n because i t c o n t a i n s the more extended and t h o u g h t f u l e l a b o r a t i o n of the i s s u e s r a i s e d i n the d e b a t e . The a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s of the twelve judges i n D o n a l d s o n i n l a r g e p a r t c o v e r t h e same g r o u n d , as do t h o s e o p i n i o n s of the Lords which are r e p o r t e d . 5 ' 3 In d e c i d i n g the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y i s s u e , the C o u r t o f K i n g ' s Bench a l s o p r o v i d e d a sense of the p l a c e o f a u t h o r s and t h e i r work i n s o c i e t y . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the o p i n i o n of L o r d M a n s f i e l d , an a p p r e c i a t i o n appears of the p e r s o n a l na ture of many of the most important i n t e r e s t s i m p l i c a t e d i n c o p y r i g h t . T h a t a p p r e c i a t i o n , w h i c h l a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t s b e t r a y e d by c o n c e i v i n g l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y as a p u r e l y commercial r i g h t , has r e l e v a n c e f o r e x p l a i n i n g v a r i o u s n e g l e c t e d b u t i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s of c o p y r i g h t and of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y as a w h o l e . 2. Method and Outline T h i s paper approaches M i l l a r v . T a y l o r by examining the l e g a l s o u r c e s from which i t a r o s e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t t r a c e s the precedent c i t e d by the K i n g ' s Bench judges i n M i l l a r , and the 24 s o u r c e s of t h a t precedent, as f a r back as the r e p o r t i n g o f c a s e s and l i m i t s o f law F r e n c h a l l o w . In t h a t way, l e g a l d o c t r i n e which i n f l u e n c e d the r e c e p t i o n of the products of the p r i n t i n g p r e s s i n t o the common law can be r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d . When a n a l y s e d , the precedent c i t e d i n M i l l a r d i v i d e d i t s e l f i n t o t h r e e broad c a t e g o r i e s , which g i v e the s t r u c t u r e f o r Parts I I , I I I and IV of the paper: P a r t I I . - - C a s e s w h i c h c o m p r i s e d t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate l e a d i n g up t o M i l l a r ; i n t h e s e c a s e s t h e p a r t i e s d e v e l o p e d the s t r a t e g i e s and arguments they used i n i n t e r p r e t i n g c o p y r i g h t to the c o u r t s ; t h i s P a r t a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h e outcome o f the d e b a t e i n D o n a l d s o n v. B e c k e t t and it's i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e subsequent development of c o p y r i g h t law. Part I I I — Cases d e a l i n g with Crown r i g h t s and powers i n and over the book t r a d e , and p r e r o g a t i v e p o w e r s i n g e n e r a l ; t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of p u b l i s h i n g r e p r e s e n t e d one of t h e two major grounds of d i s p u t e i n the debate; P a r t I I I a l s o r e v i e w s i n b r i e f t h e c o m p a r a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e law o f patents as a Crown-granted r i g h t . P a r t IV -- Cases i n v o l v i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r i n j u n c t i o n s t o p r e v e n t u n a u t h o r i s e d uses or takings of l i t e r a r y compositions, and to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of au t h o r s and/or p u b l i s h e r s ; Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s use of the r e c o g n i t i o n of a p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n g i v e n u n p u b l i s h e d manuscripts r e c e i v e s p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n , and leads to a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n of moral r i g h t s a n d p u b l i c i t y r i g h t s i n contemporary law. N o t a b l e by i t s a bsence f r o m the p r e c e d e n t i n M i l l a r was precedent drawn from the f i e l d s of r e a l or p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , 25 w i t h a s i n g l e e x c e p t i o n . - * 4 T h i s r e f l e c t e d the C o u r t ' s awareness that the i s s u e s posed by c o p y r i g h t presented unique p r o b l e m s , not e a s i l y a s s i m i l a t e d by a n a l o g y to e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of common law property. The judges i n M i l l a r d i d , however, d e a l at some l e n g t h w i t h p r i n c i p l e s of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . T h a t d i s c u s s i o n forms the b a s i s f o r P a r t V, which attempts to explore the t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the law of p r o p e r t y of the e a r l i e r f i n d i n g s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n Part I I I . P a r t V -- A s t u d y o f t h e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s o f p r o p e r t y r a i s e d by t h e m a j o r i t y a n d d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n s i n M i l l a r , with emphasis on the c h a l l e n g e to a n a t u r a l l a w e x p l a n a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n of property by J u s t i c e Yates f o r i n t a n g i b l e s ; t h e e f f e c t o f t h i s i n s i g h t on the p o s i t i v i s t r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of property r i g h t s and the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of property i n modern l e g a l theory. The paper concludes i n P a r t VI with an a n a l y s i s of how the dual i n t e r e s t s of c o p y r i g h t r e f l e c t e d i n M i l l a r — p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s of commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n , and p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s r e l a t e d to a u t h o r s h i p — continue to play themselves out i n the law, drawing i n p a r t i c u l a r on a s p e c t s of L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s o p i n i o n examined i n Part IV. P a r t V I - - A r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s p o s i t i o n a s a t h i r d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i n l i g h t o f H e g e l ' s t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y a s c o n s t i t u t i n g p e r s o n h o o d , and an a n a l y s i s of the subsequent e v o l u t i o n of c o p y r i g h t ' s u s e o f o r i g i n a l i t y as a b a s i s f o r a property r i g h t . 26 I I . T H E L I T E R A R Y P R O P E R T Y DEBATE A . THE B O O K S E L L E R S ' WAR C a s e s a r e n o t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e b a t e s , b u t i m m e d i a t e r e s p o n s e s t o p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n two p a r t i e s . N o t o n l y d o e s t h e d i s p u t e b e f o r e a c o u r t , w i t h i t s u n t i d y f a c t s o f v a r y i n g s o c i a l g e n e r a l i t y , d e t e r m i n e t h e t e r m s o f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , b u t t h e c o u r t ' s n e e d t o p r o v i d e a n a n s w e r d r i v e s t h e t e r m s o f i t s i n q u i r y . L e g a l r e a l i s t s m i g h t a r g u e t h a t j u d g e s f i n d t h e o r y t o j u s t i f y t h e d e c i s i o n s t h e y w i s h t o m a k e ; i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o go s o f a r s i m p l y t o r e c o g n i s e t h a t , f o r j u d g e s , t h e o r y r e p r e s e n t s a means t o t h e e n d o f d i s p u t e r e s o l u t i o n , n o t an end i n i t s e l f . M i l l a r v . T a y l o r ( 1 7 6 9 ) r e q u i r e d t h e C o u r t o f K i n g ' s B e n c h t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e c o m m o n l a w o f p r o p e r t y i n c o r p o r a t e d a n e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o make c o p i e s o f l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n s . T h e q u e s t i o n f o r c e d t h e C o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , and t h e r i g h t s o f a u t h o r s . I t came b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , h o w e v e r , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a l e n g t h y c o m m e r c i a l d i s p u t e b e t w e e n r i v a l g r o u p s o f b o o k s e l l e r s . T h i s P a r t o f t h e p a p e r s e e k s t o o u t l i n e t h a t more n a r r o w d i s p u t e , n o t i n g a s p e c t s o f t h e E n g l i s h l e g a l s y s t e m ' s u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i t . L e g a l p r o t e c t i o n s f o r p r i n t e r s ' i n t e r e s t s 5 5 e v o l v e d f r o m t h e l a t e f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s 27 and have been d e s c r i b e d elsewhere, not l e a s t i n the o p i n i o n of W i l l e s J . i n M i l l a r . 5 6 In 1694 t h e l a s t i n a s e r i e s of L i c e n s i n g A c t s , which combined c e n s o r s h i p with a system of book r e g i s t r a t i o n , came to an end, and with i t the o n l y formal means f o r the London p r i n t e r s ' g u i l d , the S t a t i o n e r s Company, to r e g u l a t e the book trade. Faced with an i n c r e a s i n g problem of ' p i r a t e d ' e d i t i o n s of works they had p r i n t e d , b o o k s e l l e r s — p r i m a r i l y those l o c a t e d i n L o n d o n — p r e s s e d f o r l e g i s l a t i o n r e c o g n i s i n g e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i n the p r i n t i n g of books. In 1709 they succeeded, as Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne. The S t a t u t e provided an e x c l u s i v e , a s s i g n a b l e r i g h t to the author of a p r i n t e d book to make or a u t h o r i s e the making of c o p i e s of the book, f o r a p e r i o d of 14 years; a f t e r 14 years, should the a u t h o r s t i l l be l i v i n g , the r i g h t of copy ex t e n d e d f o r a f u r t h e r 14 y e a r s . For books p u b l i s h e d p r i o r t o 1709, the S t a t u t e provided an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of copy to the "owner" f o r 21 y e a r s , with no e x t e n s i o n . T h i s meant t h a t f o r many of the most v a l u a b l e books, i n c l u d i n g the works of M i l t o n and Shakespeare, s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t d i d not e x p i r e u n t i l 1730 ( s u b j e c t , of course, to argument over assignment and ownership p r i o r to 1709). These pre-1709 works formed the b a s i s of s e v e r a l p u b l i s h i n g empires, most l o c a t e d i n London. With the e x p i r y of o l d c o p y r i g h t s i n 1730, the London b o o k s e l l e r s a g i t a t e d f o r f u r t h e r p r o t e c t i o n . A campaign i n the l a t e 1730s t o put l e g i s l a t i o n t h r o u g h P a r l i a m e n t e x t e n d i n g the p e r i o d of c o p y r i g h t and i n c r e a s i n g 28 p r o t e c t i o n from imported c o p i e s f a i l e d . 5 ^ In the mid-1740s, o f t e n w i t h W i l l i a m Murray ( l a t e r Lord M a n s f i e l d ) as c o u n s e l , the London b o o k s e l l e r s s t a r t e d to pursue t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s i n the c o u r t s . 5 * ' A p r i n c i p a l sore p o i n t f o r the London b o o k s e l l e r s was the burgeoning book p u b l i s h i n g i n d u s t r y i n Edinburgh and Glasgow. S c o t t i s h b o o k s e l l e r s d i d not consider themselves p a r t of the e x i s t i n g t r a d e and r e f u s e d t o r e s p e c t the c o n v e n t i o n s o f London; they b u i l t much of t h e i r success on r e p r i n t i n g popular books a f t e r t h e e x p i r y o f t h e 21 or 2 8 - y e a r s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t p e r i o d s . In 1746 Andrew M i l l a r and s e v e r a l o t h e r London b o o k s e l l e r s l a u n c h e d an a c t i o n f o r damages i n the S c o t t i s h C o u r t o f S e s s i o n s a g a i n s t a number of u p s t a r t p u b l i s h e r s i n an a c t i o n known both as M i l l a r e t a l . v. K i n c a i d e t a l . 5 9 and Midwinter e t a l . v. S c o t s B o o k s e l l e r s 6 0 . The Londoners r a i s e d f o r the f i r s t time the argument that they had p r o p e r t y i n the copies they claimed d i s t i n c t from any r i g h t s a c c o r d e d by the S t a t u t e of Anne; s p e c i f i c a l l y , they argued that an a c t i o n f o r damages f o r trespass of t h e i r p r o p e r t y i n copies e x i s t e d q u i t e apart from s t a t u t o r y p e n a l t i e s . T h i s a c t i o n f a i l e d . In M i l l a r v. T a y l o r , J u s t i c e W i l l e s went to some len g t h s to d i s t i n g u i s h the d e c i s i o n s of the Court of S e s s i o n s and of the House of Lords on a w r i t of e r r o r on the b a s i s that the p a r t i e s had r e s t r i c t e d argument to a narrow i s s u e o f s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 6 1 I n d e e d , and n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y g i v e n t h e n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , t h e 29 'monopolists' met with no success i n the S c o t t i s h c o u r t s over the course of t h e i r l i t i g a t i o n s t r a t e g y , l o s i n g again i n 1773 i n Hinton v. Donaldson ^2 w r i e n the Court of Sessions voted 10 to 1 a g a i n s t f i n d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f M i l l a r v. T a y l o r a p p l i c a b l e i n Scots law. F o l l o w i n g d e f e a t i n M i d w i n t e r ( 1 7 5 0 ) , t h e L o n d o n b o o k s e l l e r s o n l y i n t e n s i f i e d t h e i r l e g a l c a m p a i g n . The ' l i t e r a r y property theory' re-emerged i n Tonson v. Walker and Merchant (1752) 3 Swan. 672, 36 ER 1017 over an e d i t e d v e r s i o n of P a r a d i s e L o s t . L o r d Hardwicke LC d e c l i n e d to r u l e on the p o i n t s a y i n g i t was a matter f o r the common law judges to de c i d e , but granted the p l a i n t i f f a temporary i n j u n c t i o n on other g r o u n d s . 6 3 The b o o k s e l l e r s sought a r u l i n g at law i n Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762) 1 Black W 321, 96 ER 180. The case, b r o u g h t b e f o r e L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s C o u r t o f K i n g ' s Bench, f e a t u r e d Joseph Yates as counsel f o r the defendant and W i l l i a m B l a c k s t o n e as c o u n s e l f o r Tonson. B l a c k s t o n e p r e s e n t e d the essence of the argument he would make i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r i n 1769, and which he supported as an a d v i s o r y judge b e f o r e the House of Lords i n Donaldson v. Beckett f i v e years t h e r e a f t e r . In b r i e f , the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y t h e o r y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the S t a t u t e of Anne had merely been d e c l a r a t o r y of an e x i s t i n g common law r i g h t of p r o p e r t y i n the m u l t i p l y i n g of c o p i e s of p u b l i s h e d books. As p r o p e r t y , common law c o p y r i g h t was s a i d to be p e r p e t u a l . The S t a t u t e , r a t h e r than e x t i n g u i s h i n g r i g h t s , had c o n f i r m e d t h i s r i g h t and pr o v i d e d remedies and p e n a l t i e s 30 i n a d d i t i o n to those a v a i l a b l e at common law, a l b e i t remedies a p p l y i n g only to books s t i l l w i t h i n the s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d s f o r p r o t e c t i o n . In every case that came before the c o u r t s over the two decades of the debate, the p l a i n t i f f was a b o o k s e l l e r c l a i m i n g as u l t i m a t e a s s i g n e e from the author w i t h i n the r i g h t arose. Did c o p y r i g h t e x i s t o n l y by v i r t u e of the S t a t u t e of Anne ( i n which case i t gave way to a p u b l i c domain i n books a f t e r no more than 28 years from r e g i s t r a t i o n i n S t a t i o n e r s ' H a l l ) or d i d c o p y r i g h t e x i s t by v i r t u e of the common law (with the 1709 s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l y i n g o n l y i f the p l a i n t i f f sought i t s a d d i t i o n a l remedies) ? T h i s c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n , and the i s s u e s of law on which i t depended, occupy much of the d i s c u s s i o n i n P a r t s I I I , IV and V of t h i s paper. Here we onl y need to o u t l i n e the course of the l i t i g a t i o n . In Tonson v. C o l l i n s , King's Bench d e c i d e d t o put the i s s u e before a l l the common law judges. The f u r t h e r argument never took p l a c e , however, because the judges l e a r n e d that the l i t i g a t i o n was c o l l u s i v e : the p l a i n t i f f had s p o n s o r e d the defendant i n order to b r i n g the case to c o u r t . 6 4 The i s s u e returned i n M i l l a r v . Donaldson and Osborne (1765) , becoming a p r e l i m i n a r y s k i r m i s h t o M i l l a r v. T a y l o r i n 1769. In the l a t t e r , the Court o f King's Bench by a m a j o r i t y of thr e e (Lord M a n s f i e l d , J u s t i c e A s t o n , J u s t i c e W i l l e s ) to one ( J u s t i c e Yates) found f o r the London b o o k s e l l e r s , r u l i n g t h a t c o p y r i g h t 31 e x i s t e d p r i o r t o , and continued a f t e r , the S t a t u t e ' s passage i n 1709. The c o l l u s i o n i n Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762) t y p i f i e d the rough way i n which the b o o k s e l l e r s p l a y e d t h i s game. James Oldham notes t h i s p e r i o d as a l i t i g i o u s age, i n which t e s t c a s e s f r e q u e n t l y were b r o u g h t i n c o m m e r c i a l m a t t e r s . J C e r t a i n l y the London b o o k s e l l e r s e x h i b i t e d a c o n c e r t e d l e g a l s t r a t e g y . The same names c r o p up t h r o ughout the l i t e r a r y property debate. Jacob T o n s o n 6 6 and Andrew M i l l a r owned two of the l a r g e r p r i n t i n g houses i n London, and f r e q u e n t l y i n i t i a t e d a c t i o n a g a i n s t a l l e g e d ' p i r a t e s ' o f t h e i r c o p i e s . The Donaldson who appeared f r e q u e n t l y as a defendant was Alexander Donaldson, an Edinburgh b o o k s e l l e r who moved h i s o p e r a t i o n s , c h a r a c t e r i s e d by inexpensive r e p r i n t s of o l d e r works, to The S t r a n d i n London i n 1759 p r e c i s e l y to c h a l l e n g e the London monopoly. One of Donaldson's champions was James B o s w e l l , whose poetry Donaldson encouraged and p u b l i s h e d , and who a c t e d as h i s counsel i n Hinton. Donaldson appended to an a r t i c l e he wrote on the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate copies of three l e t t e r s i n t e r c e p t e d i n 1759 from London p u b l i s h e r s i n which they o u t l i n e d a s t r a t e g y to p r e v e n t the i m p o r t i n g of books from S c o t l a n d and I r e l a n d . In one l e t t e r , a b o o k s e l l e r wrote to M i l l a r ' s son: We have a scheme now e n t e r e d i n t o , f o r t o t a l l y p r e v e n t i n g the s a l e of Scotch and I r i s h books, which were f i r s t p r i n t e d i n England; and near two thousand pounds i s 32 a l r e a d y s u b s c r i b e d f o r c a r r y i n g i t i n t o immediate e x e c u t i o n . And every person i n E n g l a n d , s e l l i n g s u c h b o o k s , w i l l be pr o c e e d e d a g a i n s t i n Chancery, w i t h the utmost s e v e r i t y . ' Pa r t o f the London b o o k s e l l e r s ' s t r a t e g y i n v o l v e d s e e k i n g Chancery i n j u n c t i o n s to stop the p r i n t i n g or s a l e of c o p i e s a l l e g e d t o i n f r i n g e t h e i r p r o p e r t y . T he g r a n t i n g o f i n j u n c t i o n s by Chancery i n a number of i n s t a n c e s then became one of the b o o k s e l l e r s ' p r i n c i p a l l e g a l arguments: r e c o g n i t i o n by the Lord C h a n c e l l o r of a r i g h t s u f f i c i e n t to support an i n j u n c t i o n s h o u l d c o n s t i t u t e good a u t h o r i t y f o r the common law. By the time M i l l a r v. T a y l o r came to be argued b e f o r e K i n g ' s B e n c h , no c o u r t o f common law h a d y e t g r a n t e d p r o t e c t i o n t o l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y . The l e g a l c o n t e s t had taken p l a c e a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y i n e q u i t y . I n j u n c t i o n s had been g r a n t e d f r e q u e n t l y , going back t o a number of s e v e n t e e n t h century cases i n v o l v i n g Crown or Crown-granted r i g h t s . T h i s had c o n t i n u e d i n the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n cases between p r i v a t e p a r t i e s . The Lords C h a n c e l l o r r a r e l y gave reasons that were r e p o r t e d , nor any i n d i c a t i o n whether the i n j u n c t i o n s they g r a n t e d were i n t e n d e d o n l y t o e n f o r c e post-1709 s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s . 33 B. THE OVERTURNING OF MILLAR V. TAYLOR 1. The R e s u l t i n Donaldson v. Beckett Andrew M i l l a r had sued John T a y l o r over the l a t t e r ' s e d i t i o n of a c o l l e c t i o n of James Thompson's poems, Seasons. M i l l a r had bought and p u b l i s h e d the poems from Thompson i n 1729, meaning that the s t a t u t o r y term e x p i r e d i n 1757. M i l l a r v. T a y l o r t u r n e d out w e l l f o r the London b o o k s e l l e r s , as K i n g ' s Bench r e c o g n i s e d a p e r p e t u a l common law c o p y r i g h t . M i l l a r h i m s e l f d i e d s h o r t l y b e f o r e the r u l i n g was made; h i s i n t e r e s t i n Seasons was s o l d a t a u c t i o n t o a n o t h e r London b o o k s e l l e r , B e c k e t t . Donaldson d e c i d e d once a g a i n to throw down the g a u n t l e t , and put out h i s own e d i t i o n of Seasons. Beckett obtained an i n j u n c t i o n on the st r e n g t h of M i l l a r , and Donaldson appealed to the House of L o r d s . 6 8 The Lords o r d e r e d t h a t the twelve judges o f the common law c o u r t s 6 ^ p r o v i d e o p i n i o n s on the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s : 1. Whether a t common law, an author of any book or l i t e r a r y composition had the s o l e r i g h t of f i r s t p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g the same f o r s a l e ; and might b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t any person who p r i n t e d p u b l i s h e d and s o l d the same without h i s consent ? 2. I f t h e a u t h o r h a d s u c h r i g h t o r i g i n a l l y , d i d the law take i t away, upon h i s p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g such book or l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n : and might any p e r s o n a f t e r w a r d r e p r i n t and s e l l , f o r h i s own b e n e f i t , such book or l i t e r a r y composition, a g a i n s t the w i l l of the author ? 34 3. I f suc h a c t i o n would have l a i n a t common law, i s i t t a k e n away by the S t a t u t e o f 8 t h Ann. ? And i s an author, by the s a i d s t a t u t e precluded f r o m e v e r y remedy, e x c e p t on t h e foundation of the s a i d s t a t u t e and on the terms and c o n d i t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d thereby ? 4. Whether the aut h o r o f any l i t e r a r y composition and h i s a s s i g n s , had the s o l e r i g h t of p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g the same i n p e r p e t u i t y , by the common law ? 5. W h e t h e r t h i s r i g h t i s any way impeached r e s t r a i n e d or taken away by the Statute 8th Ann. ? " 7 0 Questions 4 and 5 appear to be restatements of qu e s t i o n s 2 and 3, and the judges responded i n l i k e f a s h i o n . 7 1 D e t e r m i n i n g t h e p r e c i s e outcome of Donaldson remains d i f f i c u l t ; a r e c e n t reassessment o f the d e c i s i o n by Howard Abrams 7 2 s u g g e s t s t h a t i t may have g i v e n r i s e t o an e p i c m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y l a y i n p u t t i n g together the 'votes' of the judges on the f i v e q u e s t i o n s put t o them. L o r d M a n s f i e l d c h o s e n o t t o g i v e an o p i n i o n , b e l i e v i n g i t i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a Peer to su p p o r t h i s own ju d g m e n t on a p p e a l t o t h e L o r d s . The ' v o t e ' t h e r e f o r e comprised e l e v e n o p i n i o n s . The breakdown of answers to each q u e s t i o n i s , as Abrams p o i n t s o u t, r e p o r t e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s . 7 ^ The a c c o u n t g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d i n subsequent judgments i n t e r p r e t i n g Donaldson, was as f o l l o w s — 35 the r e s u l t s i n b r a c k e t s i n d i c a t e the h y p o t h e t i c a l answers given the same questions by the M i l l a r c o u r t — : 1. Yes - 8 No - 3 (Yes 4-0) 2. Yes - 4 No - 7 (No 3-1) 3. Yes - 6 No - 5 (No 3-1) 4. Yes - 7 No - 4 (Yes 3-1) 5. Yes - 6 No " 5 (No 3-1) 74 The e f f e c t of t h i s outcome, i f the judges' o p i n i o n s were h e l d to be d i s p o s i t i v e , would be that a common law c o p y r i g h t e x i s t e d p r i o r to 1709 but was ex t i n g u i s h e d by the St a t u t e of Anne with respect to p u b l i s h e d b o o k s — s i n c e the St a t u t e only p u r p o r t e d t o d e a l w i t h p r i n t e d books. Indeed, the Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n s e c r a t e d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 7 5 In the 1854 case J e f f e r y s v. Boosey 7 6 , however, t h e E n g l i s h j u d g e s s i t t i n g i n a p p e a l e x p r e s s e d doubts. The case i n v o l v e d the i s s u e of whether the p u b l i s h e r f o r a f o r e i g n a r t i s t , the opera composer B e l l i n i , c ould c l a i m c o p y r i g h t i n England under the 1842 c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e 7 7 f o r m u s i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n s f i r s t p u b l i s h e d o u t s i d e E n g l a n d . I f c o p y r i g h t was wholly a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t and not p r o p e r t y at common law, the judges agreed, then f o r e i g n a r t i s t s d i d not a c q u i r e E n g l i s h c o p y r i g h t . A f t e r r e v i e w i n g M i l l a r and Donaldson, a m a j o r i t y s t a t e d that c o p y r i g h t never e x i s t e d at common law; s e v e r a l judges added t h a t even i f i t had, the Statute of Anne was r u l e d i n Donaldson to have e x t i n g u i s h e d 36 i t . 7 * * From that p o i n t forward i n Anglo-Canadian law c o p y r i g h t was deemed to be e n t i r e l y s t a t u t o r y . The h o l d i n g i n M i l l a r no longer a p p l i e d , save f o r the p o i n t that authors had a common law r i g h t to f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e i r w o r k s — and t h e r e f o r e to w i t h h o l d p u b l i c a t i o n . 7 9 Abrams e s t a b l i s h e s , however, t h a t the ambiguity about common law cop y r i g h t should never have s u r v i v e d Donaldson. He argues c o n v i n c i n g l y that the U.S. Supreme Court i n Wheaton v. Pet e r s 8 0 wrongly assumed t h a t the a d v i s o r y opinions of the judges decided the i s s u e s i n Donaldson. In f a c t , the power to decide the case l a y with the House of L o r d s . 8 1 The Lords d i d not f o l l o w the a d v i c e o f t h e j u d g e s , v o t i n g 22-11 t h a t c o p y r i g h t never e x i s t e d a t common law, but o r i g i n a t e d with and was embodied i n i t s e n t i r e t y by the S t a t u t e of Anne. 2 . L o r d Camden and L o r d M a n s f i e l d L o r d Camden l e d t h e c h a r g e i n the House of L o r d s i n Donaldson. The l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate r e v e a l e d p r o f o u n d disagreement between Lord Camden and Lord M a n s f i e l d over the a p p r o p r i a t e s o u r c e s f o r t h e common law, a d i s a g r e e m e n t heightened by t h e i r p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s as Whig and Tory, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 8 2 Lord Camden's speech had a h o r t a t o r y q u a l i t y s u i t a b l e f o r the p o l i t i c a l arena of the House of Lords, most e v i d e n t i n the r e l i s h w i t h which he a t t a c k e d the p o s i t i o n i d e n t i f i e d w i t h L o r d M a n s f i e l d , t h a t judges c o u l d d i v i n e common law r i g h t s i n the ' f i t n e s s of t h i n g s ' . To the c o n t r a r y , 37 Lord Camden argued, judges must hew to precedent or e l s e they would be f r e e to say the law was anything they chose i t to be. In the i n s t a n c e of the a l l e g e d c o p y r i g h t , judges would be c a l l e d on to determine, without a i d of precedent, whether the r i g h t was a s s i g n a b l e and whether i t extended to the l e n d i n g and c i r c u l a t i n g of books, as w e l l as to t h e i r copying: What a Code of Law yet remains f o r t h e i r I n g e n u i t y to f u r n i s h , and c o u l d they a l l agree on i t , i t would not be Law a t l a s t , but L e g i s l a t i o n . 8 3 L o r d Camden a l s o e x p r e s s e d h i m s e l f f r e e l y about t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s standing behind the l i t i g a t i o n . He was not impressed by Beckett's argument that a p e r p e t u a l c o p y r i g h t was the o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e reward f o r the a u t h o r ' s l a b o u r . The s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d o f f o u r t e e n y e a r s was t o o l o n g f o r t h e " S c r i b b l e r s f o r bread" that made up much of the w r i t i n g , c r a f t , w h i l e the t r u e c r e a t o r s found t h e i r reward i n g l o r y . Bacon, M i l t o n and o t h e r s d i d not p u b l i s h f o r g a i n and " i t would be unworthy s u c h men to t r a f f i c w i t h a d i r t y B o o k s e l l e r " ; a p e r p e t u a l c o p y r i g h t would r e s u l t i n " a l l L e a r n i n g [ b e i n g ] locked up i n the Hands of the Tonsons and the L i n t o t s of the A g e . " 8 4 The p o s i t i o n f o r w h i c h L o r d Camden s p o k e s o f o r c e f u l l y had been s t a t e d i n the more circumspect language of the courtroom by J u s t i c e Yates i n d i s s e n t i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . That o p i n i o n r e c e i v e s d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n P a r t s I I I and V of t h i s paper. 38 As a p o s t s c r i p t t o Donaldson, the London b o o k s e l l e r s , shocked at the i n s t a n t rearrangement of t h e i r a f f a i r s e f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n 8 5 , immediately had a B i l l p laced b e f o r e the House of Commons extendin g a l l c o p y r i g h t s o t h e r w i s e e x p i r e d f o r a f u r t h e r f o u r t e e n y e a r s . Donaldson and h i s E d i n b u r g h c o l l e a g u e s p e t i t i o n e d to defeat the B i l l . The House of Commons passed i t , but the Lords, again l e d by Lord Camden, defe a t e d the B i l l by a vote of 21 to 11, a r e s u l t almost i d e n t i c a l to t h e i r vote as a j u d i c i a l body a few months e a r l i e r . 8 6 C. AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS 1. Interests i n C o n f l i c t ? Lyman P a t t e r s o n argued i n h i s 1968 study C o p y r i g h t i n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e 8 7 t h a t the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate r e s u l t e d i n a d i s t o r t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t t h e o r y t h a t has b e d e v i l e d Anglo-American law ever s i n c e . His t h e s i s was that p u b l i s h e r s and a u t h o r s have d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s r e l a t e d to l i t e r a r y compositions that deserve separate l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n . The p u b l i s h e r ' s i n t e r e s t i s the commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n of the c o m p o s i t i o n through s a l e of c o p i e s , while the author i n a d d i t i o n t o m a t e r i a l reward has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n c o n t r o l l i n g the ' i n t e g r i t y ' of the composition. The former, he argued, c a l l s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n r e g u l a t i n g the p u b l i s h i n g t r a d e , i . e . , a s t a t u t o r y " c o p y r i g h t " , t h a t i n c l u d e s l i m i t s on e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s t o c o p y , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r s h o u l d most 39 a p p r o p r i a t e l y be d e v e l o p e d o v e r t i m e by common l a w j u r i s p r u d e n c e . The l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y l i t i g a t i o n i n i t i a t e d by the London b o o k s e l l e r s damaged the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r such an approach by c o n f l a t i n g p u b l i s h e r s ' and a u t h o r s ' i n t e r e s t s ; t h a t i s , t h e b o o k s e l l e r s d r e s s e d t h e i r commercial r i g h t s ( g r a n t e d by s t a t u t e ) as a u t h o r s ' r i g h t s t o p e r p e t u a l ownership, i n the hope of p r e s e n t i n g a more sympathetic face to the c o u r t s . Indeed, the c o u r t i n M i l l a r d i s c u s s e d c o p y r i g h t wholly i n terms of i t s being an author's r i g h t , with s c a r c e l y a m e n t i o n o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e b o o k s e l l e r who was p l a i n t i f f . In o r d e r t o overcome the b o o k s e l l e r s ' a v a r i c e , P a t t e r s o n argued, the House of Lords i n Donaldson was f o r c e d t o d e c l a r e t h e a u t h o r ' s r i g h t s t o be w h o l l y s u b j e c t t o s t a t u t e . The c o r o l l a r y was t h a t p u b l i s h e r s , w i t h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s now p e r m a n e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e a u t h o r ' s i n t e r e s t s , c o u l d use the l e g i s l a t o r s ' p r e d i c t a b l e d e s i r e to h e l p i m p o v e r i s h e d a r t i s t s t o expand u n c o n s c i o n a b l y the commercial r i g h t s i n c o p y r i g h t . T h i s t h e s i s presents an a r r e s t i n g c h a l l e n g e to mainstream c o p y r i g h t t h e o r y , and P a t t e r s o n has used t h i s i n s i g h t t o develop p e r s u a s i v e a t t a c k s on American case law that erodes the p u b l i c domain i n i n f o r m a t i o n . 8 8 The q u e s t i o n of the dual i n t e r e s t s a t p l a y i n c o p y r i g h t , and the g e n e r a l n e g l e c t and m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s o f a u t h o r s i n c o p y r i g h t , forms a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of the d i s c u s s i o n which ensues i n P a r t s IV and V of t h i s paper. At t h i s p o i n t , two 40 weaknesses of P a t t e r s o n ' s argument deserve a t t e n t i o n . F i r s t , he exaggerated the degree to which authors and p u b l i s h e r s have d i s t i n c t commercial i n t e r e s t s with respect to c o p y r i g h t . The broader the r i g h t s of p u b l i s h e r s i n c o p y r i g h t e d works, the more v a l u a b l e the work i s i n the hands of the author p r i o r to assignment. To suggest an i n d i f f e r e n c e by authors to the scope of c o p y r i g h t as a commercial r i g h t (to use a recent example, the i s s u e of l i b r a r y p h o t o c o p y i n g 8 9 ) i s somewhat misguided, i f not p a t r o n i s i n g . Second, Pa t t e r s o n d i s c o u n t s the f a c t t h at the St a t u t e of Anne termed the r i g h t i t c o n f e r r e d a r i g h t of the author. That had as much or more to do with the s t r u c t u r i n g of the l e g a l arguments as any s t r a t e g y by b o o k s e l l e r s to h i d e behind the author. The a c t u a l r o l e o f a u t h o r s i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine. B o s w e l l wrote that Samuel Johnson a t f i r s t supported the London b o o k s e l l e r s , but came to see t h e harm a p e r p e t u a l o w n e r s h i p o f c o p y r i g h t m i g h t e n t a i l . 9 0 Edmund Burke s u p p o r t e d the B i l l sought by t h e b o o k s e l l e r s i n 1774 a f t e r D o n a l d s o n was l o s t . However, m a t e r i a l s r e p r i n t e d f r o m t h e d e b a t e do not i n d i c a t e a g r o u n d s w e l l o f s u p p o r t f o r t h e L o n d o n b o o k s e l l e r s by a u t h o r s . 9 1 T h i s may r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t authors had not achieved the economic c l o u t to set t h e i r own terms f o r s a l e of t h e i r r i g h t s , o r a c y n i c i s m a b o u t t h e g o a l s o f t h e p u b l i s h e r s . 9 2 F u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i n t o the i n v o l v e m e n t o f 41 w r i t e r s of the day i n the debate would be needed to p r o p e r l y assess t h i s i s s u e . 2. Economic I n t e r e s t s and the V a l u e o f S i n g l e Case A n a l y s i s The l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate had a s p e c i f i c commercial g e n e s i s . C e r t a i n w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d p u b l i s h i n g i n t e r e s t s had t r i e d to ignore the time l i m i t a t i o n s on the r i g h t to copy s e t out i n the very l e g i s l a t i o n f o r which they l o b b i e d a f t e r the l a s t L i c e n s i n g Act e x p i r e d i n 1694.^ 3 When r i v a l S c o t t i s h p u b l i s h e r s c a l l e d t h e i r b l u f f i n the mid-eighteenth century, the London i n t e r e s t s responded w i t h a l i t i g a t i o n s t r a t e g y premised on an a l l e g e d e x t r a - s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t . In t h a t l i g h t , the d e f e a t of those i n t e r e s t s i n Donaldson seemed merely a v i n d i c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , and M i l l a r v. T a y l o r an a b e r r a n t f o o t n o t e i n the l e g a l h i s t o r y o f book p u b l i s h i n g . The i n t e l l e c t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of M i l l a r v. T a y l o r cannot, however, be so e a s i l y d i s m i s s e d . The s o c i a l and economic context i n which p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i o n takes p l a c e may e x p l a i n a great d e a l about i t s m o t i v a t i o n and about the f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g b e h i n d j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g : but m e r e l y e x p o s i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the two p a r t i e s cannot w h o l l y account f o r the j u d i c i a l r e a s o n i n g i n a s p e c i f i c c a s e t h a t l e a d s t o a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n . The reasoning process r e t a i n s a r e l a t i v e a u t o n o m y d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s t y l e a n d t r a d i t i o n s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i t s e l f . In t h e i r e f f o r t t o c o n s o l i d a t e a 42 commercial pre-eminence, the London b o o k s e l l e r s r e q u i r e d the E n g l i s h j u d i c i a r y to c o n s i d e r the nature of the new p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n "the copy", and g i v e i t a p l a c e i n the scheme o f a c c e p t e d l e g a l c a t e g o r i e s . That c o n s i d e r a t i o n o c c u r r e d i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . The v i t a l i t y of the response of the King's Bench judges was r e f l e c t e d i n the cogency of t h e i r arguments to o n g o i n g debates c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e of c o p y r i g h t and i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y . 9 4 L o r d Camden's remarks about t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s of a r t i s t s and t h i n k e r s i n m a t e r i a l rewards has h a d , f o r i n s t a n c e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s echo i n t h e development of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y 9 5 than Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the au t h o r ' s i n t e r e s t i n e x e r t i n g a degree of c o n t r o l over the products of h i s a c t i v i t y . 9 6 We t u r n now t o examine t h e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r of Crown p r e r o g a t i v e , which pr o v i d e d the foundation f o r J u s t i c e Yates' i n s i g h t s i n t o the nature of c o p y r i g h t . 43 I I I . PROPERTY AND POLITICS: CROWN PREROGATIVE AND THE RIGHT OF COPY A. CROWN CONTROL OF PRINTING AND CENSORSHIP T i l l the year 1640, the Crown e x e r c i s e d an u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y over the press; which was e n f o r c e d by the summary powers o f s e a r c h , c o n f i s c a t i o n and imprisonment, given to the S t a t i o n e r s Company, a l l over th e r e a l m and the d o m i n i o n s t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g , a n d by t h e t h e n s u p r e m e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Star-Chamber, without the l e a s t o b s t r u c t i o n from Westminster- H a l l , or the Parliament, i n any i n s t a n c e . ( M i l l a r v. T a y l o r , at 206) Mr. J u s t i c e W i l l e s ' p r o v i d e d an apt d e s c r i p t i o n of the e a r l y r e g u l a t i o n of the p r i n t i n g i n d u s t r y i n England. The p r i n t i n g press was introduced i n t o England i n 1476, and Henry VII named the f i r s t K i n g's S t a t i o n e r i n 1485. The number of working presses remained sma l l f o r s e v e r a l decades. By a Star Chamber decree of 1538, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Henry V I I I i n t r o d u c e d a system.of l i c e n s i n g books t h a t , i n d i f f e r e n t forms, governed the trade u n t i l 1694. The decree r e q u i r e d that p r i n t e r s o b t a i n the a p p r o v a l of the P r i v y C o u n c i l p r i o r to p u b l i s h i n g any book. In 1556 Queen Mary c o n f e r r e d a C h a r t e r on t h e S t a t i o n e r s ' Company, the p r i n t i n g g u i l d to which p r i n t e r s and b o o k s e l l e r s belonged; the Company became an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the l i c e n s i n g system through a decree of 1558 that gave i t s Master and Wardens the a u t h o r i t y to search f o r and c o n f i s c a t e 44 u n l i c e n s e d p u b l i c a t i o n s . 9 7 O n l y l i c e n s e d books c o u l d be e n t e r e d i n the r e g i s t e r of the Company. In t h i s f a s h i o n , commercial i n t e r e s t was married to government's concerns with suppressing h e r e t i c a l and s e d i t i o u s p u b l i c a t i o n s . The S t u a r t s continued and expanded the c e n s o r s h i p system. A Star Chamber decree i n 1637 e x p i r e d with the demise of that C o u r t i n 1640. Two y e a r s l a t e r the R e s t o r a t i o n P a r l i a m e n t p a s s e d t h e L i c e n s i n g A c t 13 & 14 C a r . I I , c.33, which embodied most of the p r o v i s i o n s of the 1637 decree. The Act, renewed s e v e r a l times, f i n a l l y e x p i r e d i n 1694; the House of Commons, the author of i t s argument being John Locke, r e f u s e d an attempt by the Lords at the behest of the Company to d r a f t new l e g i s l a t i o n c o n f i r m i n g the Crown p r i n t i n g p a t e n t s they h e l d and the Company's r o l e i n l i c e n s i n g books. P e t i t i o n i n g f o r l e g i s l a t i o n p r o t e c t i n g c o p y r i g h t s , not based on any form of c e n s o r s h i p , began a few years l a t e r and r e s u l t e d i n the adoption of the S t a t u t e of Anne i n 1709. 9 8 ' C o p y r i g h t ' d u r i n g most of t h i s p e r i o d , as W i l l e s J . p o i n t e d o u t, took p l a c e w i t h i n the s e l f - g o v e r n a n c e of the S t a t i o n e r s ' Company. P r i n t e r s and b o o k s e l l e r s entered i n the Company's r e g i s t e r the t i t l e s f o r which they claimed the copy, and ' p i r a t e s ' were s u b j e c t t o t h e g u i l d ' s s a n c t i o n s . B l a c k s t o n e a p p a r e n t l y argued from the records of the Company i n M i l l a r , but none of the judges based common law c o p y r i g h t on t h i s c u s t o m . 9 9 J u s t i c e W i l l e s a l o n e r e f e r r e d t o the p r a c t i c e , s a y i n g the f a c t i t o p e r a t e d e n t i r e l y o u t s i d e the 45 c o n c e r n o f t h e Crown, P a r l i a m e n t or the c o u r t s of law, confirmed [ i ] t c o u l d be done o n l y on p r i n c i p l e s of p r i v a t e j u s t i c e , moral f i t n e s s , and p u b l i c convenience; which, when a p p l i e d to a new s u b j e c t , make common law w i t h o u t a p r e c e d e n t ; much more, when r e c e i v e d and approved by usage, (at 206) The h i s t o r y o f the e a r l y e n t a n g l i n g of p r i v a t e c o p y r i g h t i n t e r e s t s and s t a t e censorship p a r t l y e x p l a i n s the d i s t r u s t of the monopoly a s p e c t s of the common law r i g h t e x p r e s s e d by Yates J . and s e v e r a l of the speakers i n Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), p a r t i c u l a r l y Lord Camden. B. ANALYSIS OF THE PREROGATIVE CASES The h i s t o r y of p u b l i s h i n g to 1694, showing i t to be the pre s e r v e of r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e , patent grants from the Crown, l i c e n s i n g f o r c e n s o r s h i p p u r p o s e s and g u i l d m o nopoly, presented a d i f f i c u l t c h a l l e n g e to the advocates of a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n the copy. The ta s k of d e m o n s t r a t i n g the r i g h t to e x i s t i n common law p r i o r to the enacting of the S t a t u t e of 1709 r e q u i r e d them to deal with t h i s h i s t o r y , and to f i n d i n i t a p l a u s i b l e b a s i s f o r a p r i v a t e c o p y r i g h t . In M i l l a r , the court adopted an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that found i n the e x e r c i s e and j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s over p r i n t i n g a r i g h t of p r o p e r t y i n the King and h i s patentees analogous to 46 the r i g h t claimed by the p l a i n t i f f . To do otherwise, to see i n th e r o y a l r i g h t s and p a t e n t s t h e mere m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f sovereign a u t h o r i t y over the p r i n t i n g t r a d e , would subvert the endeavour by. acknowledging t h a t the r i g h t t o the copy had e x i s t e d a t the command of a u t h o r i t y , not as a r i g h t a t law a r i s i n g from the a c t i v i t y of p r i v a t e s u b j e c t s . 1 . The Pre - R e v o l u t i o n Cases C i t e d i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r The Court i n M i l l a r d e a l t with nine cases i n v o l v i n g Crown p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s over p r i n t i n g ; of these, seven dated from the R e s t o r a t i o n , "times when", W i l l e s J . noted, " p r e r o g a t i v e ran h i g h " (at 209). A l l nine cases i n v o l v e d d i s p u t e s between p a r t i e s i n the t r a d e , some of them p a t e n t e e s , o t h e r s g u i l d members or i m p o r t e r s , none of them a u t h o r s . T h i s s e c t i o n i d e n t i f i e s the r e s p e c t i v e themes of p r e r o g a t i v e and p r o p e r t y i n the pre-1688 ca s e s , the scope of the a s s e r t e d r i g h t s t o copy, and r e l a t e d themes from c i t e d case a u t h o r i t y . The e a r l i e s t p r e r o g a t i v e c a s e c i t e d i n M i l l a r , The S t a t i o n e r s a g a i n s t the Patentees f o r R o l l ' s Abridgment (1666) C a r t e r 8 9 , 124 ER 842 , d e a l t w i t h a d i s p u t e between two members of the S t a t i o n e r ' s Company and A t k i n s , the holder of a pa t e n t f o r the p r i n t i n g o f " a l l law books that concern the common law", f i r s t granted i n 1558, over the r i g h t to p u b l i s h the Abridgment. In t h i s i n s t a n c e , the Company members were i n the p o s i t i o n of c h a l l e n g i n g a p r i n t i n g patent as a monopoly g r a n t , t h e i r o n y o f w h i c h d i d n o t e s c a p e c o u n s e l f o r 47 A t k i n s . 1 0 0 The House of Lords confirmed an i n j u n c t i o n granted by the Lord C h a n c e l l o r i n favour of A t k i n s ; while the r e p o r t does not i n d i c a t e the r e a s o n s , the p a t e n t e e argued on the b a s i s of a s t r o n g p r e r o g a t i v e . The King, counsel maintained, had a p r e r o g a t i v e over the p r i n t i n g trade ...necessary as to r e l i g i o n , c o n s e r v a t i o n of t he p u b l i q u e peace, and necessary to p r e s e r v e good u n d e r s t a n d i n g between King and people, (at 843) The p r e r o g a t i v e was time o u t o f memory, p r e - d a t i n g t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s which wass o n l y the most r e c e n t means o f "communicating our thoughts" (at 843). To the o b j e c t i o n t h a t the p a t e n t r e p r e s e n t e d a monopoly over p r i n t i n g as a t r a d e , counsel r e p l i e d "True, where the King hath not a p r e r o g a t i v e " (at 844). A l s o c i t e d as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the p r e r o g a t i v e were the King's ownership of the p r i n t i n g trade d e r i v e d from h i s f i r s t b r i n g i n g i t t o England from the c o n t i n e n t 1 0 1 , and h i s p a r t i c u l a r ownership of the laws of England due to h i s paying the s a l a r i e s of the judges, and formerly the r e p o r t e r s . Whether t h e L o r d s d e c i d e d t he c a s e on t h e l a t t e r , narrower grounds f o r uphold i n g A t k i n s ' patent i s u n c l e a r . A s i m i l a r i s s u e came before them a short time l a t e r i n Roper v . S t r e a t e r (1670) ( a v a i l a b l e o n l y as d e s c r i b e d i n Company o f S t a t i o n e r s v . P a r k e r (1685) S k i n n e r 233, 90 ER 1 0 7 . ) , where the assignee of J u s t i c e Crook's executors obtained judgment i n King's Bench a g a i n s t the h o l d e r of a r o y a l p a t e n t f o r law 48 books f o r t h e p r i n t i n g o f C r o o k ' s R e p o r t s . The L o r d s overturned the judgment, again r u l i n g i n favour of a patentee. O c c u r r i n g i n the context of a contest between the assignee of the author's e s t a t e and a patentee, Roper represented a s t r o n g statement f o r a p r e r o g a t i v e over p r i n t i n g . 1 0 2 The f a t e of law books d e c i d e d 1 * * 3 , t h r e e cases f o l l o w e d d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p u b l i s h i n g o f a l m a n a c s . In t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l of these, Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. Seymour (1677) 1 Mod 257, 86 ER 865 and 3 Keb 792, 84 ER 1015, the defendant c h a l l e n g e d the a u t h o r i t y of a Crown patent f o r the p r i n t i n g o f almanacs before the Book of Common Prayer. The two r e p o r t s of Seymour d i f f e r i m p o r t a n t l y on the reasons f o r the d e c i s i o n i n favour o f the p a t e n t e e s ( i . e . , the Company.) Keble l e a v e s l i t t l e doubt that King's Bench was prepared to acknowledge a broad p r e r o g a t i v e i n p r i n t i n g o f a l l books, r e g a r d l e s s of subject matter: That a l b e i t p r i n t i n g i n England be but of l a t e , yet p u b l i c a t i o n of books was before, and both b e f o r e and s i n c e that hath been under the r e g u l a t i o n of the Government.... i t i s i m p l i e d l y granted [by the L i c e n s i n g Act 1662] t h a t the p r i n t i n g of a l l books i s r e s t r a i n a b l e , or gra n t a b l e by the Kings patent, (at 1015) The Modern r e p o r t i s more ambiguous. I t p r o v i d e s Pemberton's argument f o r the patentees, i n which he r e f e r r e d to a debate over whether a Crown p a t e n t c o u l d stand a g a i n s t a c l a i m of " p r o p e r t y i n the copy, paramount to the K i n g ' s g r a n t " ( a t 49 865). The C o urt i s r e p o r t e d as f i n d i n g f i r s t t h a t almanacs came under "a p u b l i c c o n s t i t u t i o n " , and u n d e r C h u r c h governance, and f o r that reason were s u b j e c t to p r e r o g a t i v e . F u r t h e r , t h e C o u r t a c c e p t e d a ' r e s i d u a l ' b a s i s f o r t h e p r e r o g a t i v e , s i m i l a r to the Crown's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s r e a l t y : where a work has no p a r t i c u l a r author, as w i t h an almanac, "then, by the r u l e of our law, the King has the p r o p e r t y i n the copy" (at 866). E x p r e s s l y f o l l o w i n g the House of Lords i n Roper ("the u l t i m a t e r e s o r t of law and j u s t i c e being to them"- -866), the Court a l s o based i t s d e c i s i o n on the h i s t o r i c a l f a c t that the Government had always had care of the p r i n t i n g t r a d e . In The Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. Lee (1681) 2 Show K.B. 258, 89 ER 927, and 2 Chan. Cas. 66, 22 ER 849, and the r e l a t e d case Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. Wright, r e f e r r e d to i n Lee a t 2 Show K.B. 258, t h e Company r e l i e d on a p a t e n t o r i g i n a l l y granted by James I to e n j o i n the s a l e of almanacs and psalm-books imported from Holland. P l a i n t i f f s argued both t h e Crown p r e r o g a t i v e " i n r e s t r a i n i n g a n d l i c e n s i n g p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s of a l l s o r t s ; and were i t otherwise i t would be of dangerous consequence to the Government" (at 928), and t h e i r own commercial i n t e r e s t i n the p r o t e c t i o n of domestic i n d u s t r y : . . . i t would be of dangerous consequence, t h a t the H o l l a n d e r s and other f o r e i g n e r s s h o u l d p r i n t o u r p r i m e r s , p s a l t e r s , almanacks, and s i n g i n g psalms, f o r they 50 may and a c t u a l l y do abuse them, f o r being at no charge f o r c o r r e c t i n g , and p r i n t i n g i n a worse c h a r a c t e r and paper, they w i l l u n d e r s e l l the E n g l i s h , and d e s t r o y our manufacture, (at 927) Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. Parker (1685) brought b e f o r e King's Bench the p e r p l e x i n g i s s u e of p a r t i e s c l a i m i n g under competing grants from the C r o w n . 1 0 4 The s t a t i o n e r s , c l a i m i n g under t h e i r Charter from James I f o r the p r i n t i n g of "omnes & omnimodos l i b r o s Psalmorum", took a c t i o n a g a i n s t Parker, who p r i n t e d under a p a t e n t g r a n t e d by C h a r l e s I t o O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y f o r " a l l books not p r o h i b i t e d . " R e l y i n g on Seymour (1677) 1 0 5 , counsel f o r the s t a t i o n e r s argued that the l a t e r patent to Oxford allowed the u n i v e r s i t y ...to p r i n t books f o r t h e i r use there, and not to come to London f o r them;...for i n making t h e s e c h a r t e r s the K i n g d i d not i n t e n d the u n i v e r s i t y t o be b o o k s e l l e r s , but gave them the power to p r i n t f o r t h e i r own convenience. (Parker, at 108) In o t h e r words, the King c o u l d not have intended to s e t the u n i v e r s i t y up as a commercial c o m p e t i t o r . The ' s o l e r i g h t ' g r a n t e d t o the Company conformed with the long-standing view that " p r i n t i n g i s a t h i n g of p u b l i c k use [and] matters of law and r e l i g i o n ought and always was under the immediate care and government of the K i n g " (at 107). H o l t f o r the d e f e n d a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e d between the King's g r a n t i n g under a p r e r o g a t i v e of power and a p r e r o g a t i v e of i n t e r e s t ; the former, more perso n a l to the King, c o u l d not bind subsequent monarchs. The 51 C o u r t s a i d i t " e n c l i n e d f o r the d e f e n d a n t " but because of Seymour would hear more argument. A s i d e from t h e C o u r t ' s evident d i s c o m f o r t with the Company's near-monopoly c l a i m , the case i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r showing an i m p l i e d narrowing of the p r e r o g a t i v e over p r i n t i n g to the category of works of s t a t e . 2. The P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n Cases Two o f the n i n e p r e r o g a t i v e cases d i s c u s s e d i n M i l l a r o c c u r r e d a f t e r 1688, and both show a d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t approach to the p r e r o g a t i v e i s s u e . Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. P a r t r i d g e (1711) 10 Mod 105, 88 ER 647 represented a r e p r i s e of Seymour (1677); the Crown's grant to the Company of the s o l e r i g h t t o p r i n t almanacs was a g a i n put i n i s s u e as an u n l a w f u l r e s t r a i n t the s u b j e c t ' s l i b e r t y . The C o u r t , as i n Parker (1685), r e f u s e d to make a f i n a l r u l i n g , but put the c a s e over f o r argument on whether the Crown had a " s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t " i n almanacs, i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t i n g the s t a t i o n e r s ' use of R o l l ' s (1666) and Seymour to argue for a patent over the p r i n t i n g trade as a whole. Baskett v. U n i v e r s i t y of Cambridge (1758) 2 Keny 395, 96 ER 1222, i n v o l v e d a d i s p u t e between the King's p r i n t e r f o r s t a t u t e s , and the U n i v e r s i t y under a p a t e n t , l i k e Oxford's, f o r a l l b o o k s ' n o t o t h e r w i s e p r o h i b i t e d ' , o v e r t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' s p r i n t i n g and s e l l i n g i n London an e d i t i o n of the s t a t u t e s of the realm. The c i r c u i t o u s arguments o f c o u n s e l a r r i v e d a t the i s s u e of the n a t u r e of p r e r o g a t i v e i n t h i s 52 f a s h i o n : i f the Crown, by v i r t u e of p r e r o g a t i v e , had the r i g h t t o grant l e t t e r s patent f o r any and a l l p r i n t e d books, then t h i s , ' g e n e r a l ' grant to Cambridge must f a l l t o the s p e c i f i c g r a n t f o r s t a t u t e s t o B a s k e t t ; i f , on the c o n t r a r y , t h e p r e r o g a t i v e extended o n l y to c e r t a i n works of s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g the s t a t u t e s , then the p a t e n t t o Cambridge must cover the l a t t e r . S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l Yorke, arguing f o r the U n i v e r s i t y ' s p a t e n t , a t t a c k e d the i d e a t h a t there was ever a p r e r o g a t i v e over p r i n t i n g : The p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t of the Crown i s not i n m o n o p o l i z i n g the a r t of p r i n t i n g ; but i t c l a i m s a c o p y r i g h t o f a l l A c t s o f S t a t e , a s A c t s o f P a r l i a m e n t , pro c l a m a t i o n s , Orders of C o u n c i l , e t c . as having the e x e c u t i v e part of Government. B e s i d e s which g e n e r a l ground, the Crown has a r i g h t to some copies from expense. Thus G r a f t o n ' s g r e a t B i b l e was the f i r s t t h a t was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , and was done at the King's expense. So of the Year Books, which were compiled at the expense of the Crown, as appears by the p r e f a c e to Plowden's Com. In these the Crown cl a i m s a c o p y r i g h t , the same as a u t h o r s have t o t h e i r works, (at 1226) Yorke thereby set out an understanding of the Crown's r o l e i n p r i n t i n g t h a t was to be adopted by the m a j o r i t y i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r e l e v e n years l a t e r . 1 0 6 Lord M a n s f i e l d f o r the Court u p h e l d b o t h the p a t e n t o f the King's p r i n t e r and t h a t o f Cambridge " w i t h i n the u n i v e r s i t y " as c o n c u r r e n t g r a n t s . In doing so, he s a i d : 53 What power the Crown had assumed, i n f a c t , at the time of the grant by H. 8 to the u n i v e r s i t y , i s v e r y m a t e r i a l as to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of those patents; whether to o p e r a t e as t o t h e g e n e r a l r i g h t o f p r i n t i n g , or o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e King's c o p y r i g h t s , because we must presume t h e Crown i n t e n d e d t o g r a n t what th e y had,or, i n f a c t , assumed a r i g h t over (at 1230) . 3. The S u b s i d i a r y P r e r o g a t i v e C a s e s : P r o p e r t y i n P a t e n t Grants The r e p o r t e d cases r e f e r r e d to by counsel and c o u r t s i n the nine p r e r o g a t i v e cases, and those which they i n t u r n c i t e d as p r e c e d e n t , d e a l t almost e n t i r e l y w i t h l e t t e r s patent from the Crown: t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n , 1 0 7 b a s i s i n p r e r o g a t i v e , 1 0 8 v a l i d i t y i n l i g h t of c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e , 1 0 ^ and remedies i n i n s t a n c e s of s u c c e s s i v e i n c o n s i s t e n t g r a n t s . 1 1 0 The concept of p r o p e r t y r i g h t independent of p r e r o g a t i v e and Crown grant was almost wholly absent from these cases. (a) Patents For O f f i c e Holders S e v e r a l cases concerned d i s p u t e s over patents f o r p u b l i c or c h u r c h o f f i c e . In Wentworth v. Wright (1596) Cro. E l i z . 526, 78 ER 774, K i n g ' s Bench d e c i d e d the Queen had the p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t t o name th e r e p l a c e m e n t f o r a p r i e s t a p p o i n t e d a b i s h o p , as a g a i n s t the p a t r o n . The A t t o r n e y - General argued i n p a r t : 54 A n d a l t h o u g h i t i s s a i d t h a t t h i s p r e r o g a t i v e c a n n o t be p r o v e d by r e a s o n , t h i s i s not m a t e r i a l ; nor ought there any r e a s o n t o be g i v e n or e n q u i r e d about the Queen's p r e r o g a t i v e ; f o r i n regard she i s the head of the weal p u b l i c k , and d e f e n d s her s u b j e c t s and t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n s , t h e law a t t r i b u t e s unto her many p r e r o g a t i v e s , f o r w h i c h no r e a s o n can be y i e l d e d , (a t 775) . The case of Lord Brook v. Lord G o r i n g (1630) Cro. Car 197, 79 ER 773 i n v o l v e d s u c c e s s i v e p a t e n t s f o r the o f f i c e o f c l e r k of t h e c o u n c i l " o f t h e marches of W a l e s " . In Bridgman et a l v. H o l t e t a l (1693) Shower P.C. I l l , 1 ER 76, a c t i o n was brought i n the A s s i z e of Novel D i s s e i s i n by c l a i m a n t s under a r o y a l p a t e n t t o t h e o f f i c e o f C h i e f C l e r k to t h e C o u r t o f K i n g ' s Bench, a g a i n s t an a l l e g e d u s u r p e r named to the p o s t by t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e . Argument ensued over the h i s t o r i c a l b a s i s f o r the r e s p e c t i v e c l a i m s 1 1 1 , and t h e C o u r t r e j e c t e d the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a t e n t as s u f f i c i e n t to p r o v e the Crown c l a i m . T h e o f f i c e , a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l , " b e l o n g e d " to the C h i e f J u s t i c e . What i s of i n t e r e s t about t h e s e cases i s t h a t t i t l e to p u b l i c o f f i c e by p a t e n t was r e p e a t e d l y t r e a t e d l i k e tenure i n r e a l t y . The p a t e n t h o l d e r s c l a i m e d to be s e i s e d o f the o f f i c e ; the g r a n t s were made i n the terms of g i f t i n g e s t a t e s i n l a n d . O p p o s i n g p a r t i e s c h a l l e n g e d t h e C r o w n ' s r i g h t t o a p p o i n t o f f i c e - h o l d e r s by showing l o n g - s t a n d i n g custom to the c o n t r a r y ( W e n t w o r t h , B r i d g m a n ) , b u t d i d not d i r e c t l y q u e s t i o n t h e p r e r o g a t i v e power i t s e l f . 55 (b) D o c t r i n e s o f Patent C o n s t r u c t i o n Cases c i t e d f o r p r i n c i p l e s of patent c o n s t r u c t i o n r e f l e c t the s t r o n g e s t i n f l u e n c e of concepts drawn from r e a l p r o p e r t y . C ounsel i n Parker (1685) and Baskett (1758) both r e f e r r e d to Le Case Del R o y a l l P i s c a r i e de l a Banne (1611) Davis 55, 80 ER 540 i n a r g u i n g t h a t by wording i n a patent or c h a r t e r the Crown can grant l e s s than i t intended, but not more; j u s t as the grant to the C i t y of London of the River Thames d i d not pass r i g h t s to the s u b s o i l 1 1 2 , so a p r i n t i n g patent passed no more of the p r e r o g a t i v e than i t e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d . Yorke l i k e n e d the grant t o Cambridge to the r e v e r s i o n a r y i n t e r e s t t h a t was s a i d to pass as an es t a t e l e s s e r than intended by the King i n The Duke of Chandos' Case (1606) 6 Co. Rep 55, 77 ER 336. The s c i r e f a c i a s cases and Re A l t o n Woods (1594) 1 Co Rep 26b, 76 ER 64 d e a l t w i t h remedies where the King had been dec e i v e d ( i . e . mistaken) i n h i s grants of e s t a t e s i n l a n d . (c) Nature o f Pro p e r t y Rights The p r e r o g a t i v e c a s e s made p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e s to two r e p o r t e d d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g p r i n t i n g not c i t e d i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r 1 1 3 . None of the c i t e d cases d i s c u s s e d the nature and o r i g i n s of r i g h t s i n p r o p e r t y , w i t h two ex c e p t i o n s from the l a t e E l i z a b e t h a n p e r i o d . S i r Henrie Constable's Case (1600) 5 Co. Rep. 105b, 77 Er 218 c i t e d i n R o y a l l P i s c a r i e (1611) at 542, concerned r i g h t s i n flotsam, jetsam and wrecks washing up 56 on l a n d . The r e p o r t , w i t h Coke's o b s e r v a t i o n s appended, d e s c r i b e s how s u b j e c t s can a c q u i r e p r o p e r t y i n the goods by p r e s c r i p t i o n or grant, which otherwise belong to the King by p r e r o g a t i v e : the common law gave as w e l l wreck, jetsam, f l o t s a m , and l a g a n upon t h e s e a , as e s t r a y . . . a nd t h e l i k e t o t h e K i n g , because by r u l e of the common law, when no man can c l a i m p r o p e r t y i n any goods, the King s h a l l have them by h i s p r e r o g a t i v e , (at 223) ' E s t r a y s ' of a d i f f e r e n t s o r t are d e a l t with i n The Case of Swans (1591) 7 Co. Rep. 15b, 77 ER 435, a l s o c i t e d i n R o y a l l P i s c a r i e at 542. While the King has a p r e r o g a t i v e p r o p e r t y i n w i l d swans found w i t h i n land or water h e l d by the Crown, the s u b j e c t could a l s o a c q u i r e property i n swans and other f e r a e naturae by labour: P r o p e r t y q u a l i f i e d and p o s s e s s o r y a man may have i n those which are f e r a e naturae; and to such p r o p e r t y a man may a t t a i n by two ways, ... by i n d u s t r y as by t a k i n g them, or by making them mansueta , (438) P r o p e r t y i n swans c o u l d never be a b s o l u t e so lo n g as they might s t r a y . Wild swans on one's l a n d passed with the land; d o m e s t i c a t e d swans c o u l d be w i l l e d as p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . J u s t i c e Aston was to compare co p y r i g h t with p r o p e r t y i n f e r a e naturae i n M i l l a r , a p o i n t d i s c u s s e d i n Part V . 1 1 4 57 4. The Scope and Nature o f Crown C o p y r i g h t The p r e r o g a t i v e cases e s t a b l i s h e d an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t i n the Crown to c o n t r o l the p r i n t i n g o f c e r t a i n works, whether by p r e r o g a t i v e o v e r t h e e n t i r e p r i n t i n g t r a d e , a r i g h t o r i g i n a t i n g i n expenditure, or i n the King's r o l e as head of the e x e c u t i v e government. What was the nature and extent of t h i s ' c o p y r i g h t ' ? The cases p r o v i d e o n l y h i n t s , but these deserve a b r i e f e x p l o r a t i o n . F i r s t , the cases deal only with the p r i n t i n g or copying o f complete works ( B i b l e s , law r e p o r t s , almanacs e t c . ) , as opposed to p o r t i o n s or abridgments of works. As a r e s u l t , the cou r t s gave no c o n s i d e r a t i o n to such i s s u e s as the degree of t a k i n g t h a t would c o n s t i t u t e a t r e s p a s s on the Crown-derived r i g h t , nor of the t a k i n g of the i d e a f o r a work, as opposed t o i t s e x p r e s s i o n . The only exception i s found i n Seymour (1677). There, the defendant had p r i n t e d an almanac that h a d a l l t h e e s s e n t i a l p a r t s o f t h e almanack that i s p r i n t e d before "The Book of Common P r a y e r ; " but t h a t i t has some o t h e r a d d i t i o n s , such as a r e u s u a l i n common almanacks, e t c . (at 865) The Court held the almanac to be a work with a c e r t a i n form, but no c e r t a i n author. An i n d i v i d u a l could not a c q u i r e r i g h t s by s u p p l y i n g a d d i t i o n s c o n s i s t e n t with the form: Those a d d i t i o n s of p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s and other t h i n g s that are common i n almanacks, do not a l t e r the case; no more than i f a man s h o u l d c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n an o t h e r 58 m a n ' s c o p y , b y r e a s o n o f s o m e i n c o n s i d e r a b l e a d d i t i o n s of h i s own. (at 866) Most of the works at i s s u e i n the p r e r o g a t i v e cases c o u l d be s a i d t o be o f a u t h o r s unknown o r u n c e r t a i n . In R o l 1 ' s Abridgment (1666) and Roper v. S t r e a t e r (1670), where judges and r e p o r t e r s arguably had a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s as "authors" to the law r e p o r t s , counsel f o r the s u c c e s s f u l patentees argued an employer c o p y r i g h t : s i n c e the King p a i d the s a l a r i e s , c o p y r i g h t accrued to him. In the u n i v e r s i t y cases, the scope of the r i g h t s granted by patent c o n s t i t u t e d an important i s s u e . The r e p o r t s suggest t h a t the c o m p l a i n t s o f t h e b o o k s e l l e r s a r o s e because th e p r i n t e r s a p p o i n t e d by the u n i v e r s i t i e s had s t a r t e d to make inroads i n the London market. In Parker (1685), the s t a t i o n e r s argued t h a t the patent gave Oxford the r i g h t to p r i n t books f o r i t s own use, not f o r c o m p e t i t i v e purposes. T h i s was an e a r l y i n t i m a t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' i n t r i n s i c ' and "competitive' uses of a p r o t e c t e d work that u n d e r l i e s much of the d e b a t e over f a i r d e a l i n g and f a i r use e x c e p t i o n s t o c o p y r i g h t . 1 1 5 The patentees c o n s i s t e n t l y demonstrated t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n h a v i n g the p r e r o g a t i v e put on the b r o a d e s t , most p o l i t i c a l grounds. In a d d i t i o n to the argument that a press beyond the c o n t r o l of the Crown represented a t h r e a t to peace, order and p u b l i c c o n v e n i e n c e 1 1 6 , patentees a l l e g e d t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y 59 of d i s t o r t i o n s c r e e p i n g i n t o E n g l i s h books j u s t i f i e d a p r e r o g a t i v e power over p r i n t i n g and importing books 1 1 7 . Yorke i n B a s k e t t (1758) a r g u e d t h a t a l l o w i n g the U n i v e r s i t y to compete with the King's p r i n t e r would produce b e t t e r e d i t i o n s of the s t a t u t e s , while acknowledging that mistakes would occur i f p r i n t i n g was open t o a l l (at 1230). C o n c e r n f o r the i n t e g r i t y of works o f s t a t e , the s t a t e ' s 'moral r i g h t ' e x e r c i s e d on b e h a l f of the p u b l i c , has remained a cornerstone of the unique s t a t u t o r y treatment accorded Crown c o p y r i g h t to the present day 1 1 8 . C. DARCY V. ALLEN AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS C i t e d i n P a r k e r (1685), P a r t r i d g e (1709) and B a s k e t t (1758) was the famous case of Darcy v. A l l e n , or The Case of Monopolies (1603) Moor 671, 72 ER 830; Noy 173, 74 ER 1131; and 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 ER 1260. As the formative d e c i s i o n i n the h i s t o r y of patents f o r i n v e n t i o n s , t h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g ; perhaps more s u r p r i s i n g i s t h a t Darcy r e c e i v e d no a t t e n t i o n from the judges i n M i l l a r . Mr. J u s t i c e Yates d i d r a i s e the i s s u e of i n v e n t i o n s , j u s t as he had r a i s e d Darcy when counsel i n an e a r l i e r l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y case but the m a j o r i t y b a r e l y r e f e r r e d to i t . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e v o l u t i o n of l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r i n v e n t o r s and l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r authors i s one of the more r e v e a l i n g a s p e c t s of M i l l a r . 60 Dar c y s t a n d s g e n e r a l l y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t monopolies are bad at common law 120 ^ r n h e u s e m a < 5 e Q f parcy by counsel i n the three cases named v a r i e d somewhat. In P a r t r i d g e (1709), the defendant challenged the s t a t i o n e r s ' patent as a monopoly, c i t i n g Darcy (at 647), a p o i n t repeated by Yorke i n h i s a t t a c k on the i d e a of a p r e r o g a t i v e over the p r i n t i n g t r a d e ( B a s k e t t ( 1 7 5 8 ) , a t 1 2 5 5 ) ; i n P a r k e r (1685) t h e s t a t i o n e r s r e f e r r e d to Darcy to p o i n t out that patent grants to companies had been exempted from the Sta t u t e of Monopolies ( 1 6 2 4 ) 1 2 1 . Darcy v. A l l e n i n volved a c h a l l e n g e to a patent granted by E l i z a b e t h I f o r the s o l e m a nufacture and i m p o r t i n g o f p l a y i n g cards. A growing c o n t r o v e r s y over the Queen's g r a n t i n g of monopolies l e d her to d e c l a r e i n 1601 that Crown pa t e n t s were t r i a b l e i n the common law c o u r t s , which l e d to the Darcy l i t i g a t i o n . The case d i d not i n v o l v e a patent f o r i n v e n t i o n , but i n some f a s h i o n each of t h e o t h e r f o u r c a t e g o r i e s o f p a t e n t : I 2 2 (1) f o r in v e n t i o n s ; (2) d i s p e n s i n g p a t e n t s , r e l a x i n g a s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n i n f a v o u r o f the patentee; (3) those bestowing on the patentee the power to supervise a trade; (4) a patent handing over an e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d e t o p a t e n t e e ( s ) f o r p e r s o n a l g a i n . 61 Darcy's s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the i n v e n t o r ' s patent r e s t e d i n i t s a p p r o v a l of the p r a c t i c e as an e x e r c i s e of Crown p r e r o g a t i v e while r u l i n g i l l e g a l a l l others as tending to monopoly a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t : . . . t h a t where any man by h i s own charge an d i n d u s t r y , o r by h i s own w i t o r i n v e n t i o n doth b r i n g any new t r a d e i n t o the r e a l m , or any engine t e n d i n g to the f u r t h e r a n c e of a trade t h a t was never used b e f o r e : and t h a t f o r t h e good o f t h e r e a l m : t h a t i n such c a s e s the K i n g may g r a n t t o him a monopoly p a t e n t f o r some r e a s o n a b l e time, u n t i l the s u b j e c t s may l e a r n the same, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the good t h a t he doth b r i n g by h i s i n v e n t i o n to the commonwealth: otherwise not. (Noy, 1139) 1 2 3 (emphasis added) T h i s approval c a r r i e d over to s e c t i o n s V and VI of the S t a t u t e of Monopolies which permitted a term of no more than 21 years f o r patents " h e r e t o f o r e made of the s o l e workinge or makinge of any manner of newe manufacture w i t h i n t h i s Realme, to the f i r s t and t r u e i n v e n t o r or i n v e n t o r s of such manufactures", and 14 years f o r those i s s u i n g t h e r e a f t e r . The S t a t u t e t h e r e f o r e d i d not c r e a t e a r i g h t to patents f o r i n v e n t i o n , b u t r e c o g n i z e d and d e c l a r e d as v a l i d an e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e of the Crown. E.W. Hulme has shown that the f i r s t s u c h p a t e n t s d a t e from t h e e a r l y 1300's 1 2 4 . The p r a c t i c e of g r a n t i n g patents f o r i n v e n t i o n d i d not a c q u i r e the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a systematic p o l i c y of government, however, u n t i l the e a r l y y e a r s of E l i z a b e t h ' s r e i g n . As Hulme p o i n t s o u t , the word " i n v e n t i o n " at the time of the S t a t u t e and 62 b e f o r e d i d not mean ' o r i g i n a l d i s c o v e r y or c r e a t i o n ' i n the modern s e n s e ; i t meant the b r i n g i n g of s o m e t h i n g new t o E n g l i s h t r a d e and i n d u s t r y 1 2 5 . Most patents through to the end o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y were g r a n t e d t o p e r s o n s importing a tr a d e or manufacture from c o n t i n e n t a l Europe that had not p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e d i n England, i n c l u d i n g f o r e i g n e r s b r i n g i n g s k i l l s and t e c h n i q u e s with them. E n g l i s h monarchs and P a r l i a m e n t s sinc e the f o u r t e e n t h century had viewed t h i s p r a c t i c e as an ap p r o p r i a t e means of rescuing the country from i t s i n d u s t r i a l backwardness. The q u a r r e l between Crown and P a r l i a m e n t r e f l e c t e d i n Darcy and the S t a t u t e r e v o l v e d around a l l e g e d abuses by the Crown of i t s p r e r o g a t i v e power to grant monopoly pate n t s , and the i s s u e o f whether the p r e r o g a t i v e was s u b j e c t to common law. D e s p i t e the Queen's d e c l a r a t i o n i n her 1601 speech, F u l l e r i n argument i n Darcy expended c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t to demonstrate t h a t the Court of King's Bench had j u r i s d i c t i o n to review and i n v a l i d a t e the express terms of a patent 1 2 6 . For the. p u r p o s e s o f t h i s p a p e r , i t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t the p a r t i e s (to Darcy, and to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate) d i d not at any p o i n t invoke a n a t u r a l r i g h t i n the i n v e n t o r t o a patent gran t . I f a n a t u r a l r i g h t was a t stake i n D a r c y — although the r e p o r t s do not use t h a t t e r m — i t was the r i g h t o f e v e r y Englishman t o e x e r c i s e h i s s k i l l s and t o o l s i n an a c q u i r e d 63 t r a d e . F u l l e r argued that the impugned monopoly v i o l a t e d t h i s fundamental r i g h t : Where b e f o r e i f any person by h i s i n d u s t r y had o b t a i n e d e x c e l l e n t s k i l l i n h i s trade, he might have reaped the f r u i t s t h e r e o f , and t h a t h ath been t h o u g h t the s u r e s t t h i n g a man c o u l d o b t a i n , s k i l l and knowledge, because theeves [ s i c ] could not s t e a l i t . But a r t s and s k i l l of manual occupations r i s e n o t from t h e K i n g , but fr o m t h e l a b o u r and i n d u s t r y of men, and by the g i f t s of God to them, tending to the good of the commonwealth, and of the King, the head t h e r e o f . . . (at 1137, 1138) As i l l u s t r a t i o n he poin t e d t o the r u l e at law that the t o o l s of a man's trade c o u l d not be d i s t r a i n e d f o r debt 1 2 7 . Coke's r e p o r t makes i t c l e a r t h a t the C o u r t ' s p r i n c i p a l s t a t e d o b j e c t i o n to Darcy's patent l a y i n the t h r e a t to employment of honest t r a d e s m e n . 1 2 8 N e v e r t h e l e s s , the ' r i g h t ' to e x e r c i s e one's c r a f t d i d not supersede the s t a t e ' s l e g i t i m a t e power to c r e a t e monopolies i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The t a r g e t i n Darcy and t h e S t a t u t e was not monopoly p a t e n t s per se, but the g r a n t i n g of such monopolies by r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e . N e i t h e r F u l l e r i n argument nor the S t a t u t e of Monopolies denied the r i g h t of Parliament to grant trade m o n o p o l i e s . 1 2 9 The r i g h t o f c r a f t s m e n h a d b e e n r a i s e d a g a i n s t monopolies; the patent f o r i n v e n t i o n was made an e x c e p t i o n to the monopoly r u l e , i n the f a c e o f . t h a t r i g h t . 1 3 0 No one argued t h a t the p a t e n t e x i s t e d a t common law as a p r o p e r t y 64 r i g h t of the i n v e n t o r , due to him i n nature as the reward f o r i n g e n u i t y . F i r s t , the c o n c e p t of i n v e n t i o n encompassed a v a r i e t y o f a c t i v i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e p u r e l y c o m m e r c i a l f u n c t i o n of b r i n g i n g a m a n u f a c t u r e from the c o n t i n e n t t o England. Second, the Crown had q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e l y brought the p a t e n t i n t o b e i n g as an i n s t r u m e n t of m e r c a n t i l e p o l i c y . T h i r d , Darcy e f f e c t e d the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , the good of the commonweal, as the b a s i s f o r the l e g i t i m a c y of monopolies, i n c l u d i n g patents f o r i n v e n t i o n : A d e s i r e f o r i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , n o t an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c e t h i c , h a d j u s t i f i e d c o p y r i g h t p a t e n t s i n the f i r s t p l a c e , a n d t h i s r e m a i n e d C o k e ' s c r i t e r i o n . 3 1 The accepted view of the patent s i n c e that time has been of a s t a t u t o r y c o n t r a c t i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t between inventor and p u b l i c whereby the former r e c e i v e s a t i m e - l i m i t e d monopoly o v e r t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e i n v e n t i o n i n exchange f o r d i s c l o s i n g i t s design. 1 3 2 D a r c y v. A l l e n (1601) and the d e b a t e s u r r o u n d i n g i t provided an example from h i s t o r y of the e v o l u t i o n of a r i g h t i n the p r o d u c t of i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r — i . e . , an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o c o n t r o l and reproduce a 'newe manufacture'. That example r e v e a l e d a r i g h t p e r m i t t e d by the common law, but i n d i s p u t a b l y a r i s i n g as p u b l i c p o l i c y mandated under Crown p r e r o g a t i v e . We t u r n now to examine the use made of t h i s 65 example, and of the Crown p r e r o g a t i v e p r i n t i n g cases, by the Court i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . D. MILLAR v. TAYLOR AND THE CITIZEN KING 1. The Issue o f Inventions Mr. J u s t i c e Yates r a i s e d the issue of i n v e n t o r s ' i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n . He had done so as counsel e a r l i e r c o p y r i g h t case Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762): Patents f o r new i n v e n t i o n s are s i m i l a r to th e p r e s e n t c a s e . They a r e a l l o w e d as temporary p r i v i l e g e s , but the very grants a r e a p r o o f , t h a t , independant o f them, t h e g r a n t e e s c o u l d h a v e h a d no m o n o p o l y . . . . S i n e e t h e n no p e r m a n e n t p r i v i l e g e i s allowed to the in v e n t o r of an a r t , or a mechanical engine, what pretence have l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n s t o a g r e a t e r r i g h t ? B o t h a r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n s o f genius, both r e q u i r e labour and study, and b o t h , by p u b l i c a t i o n , become e q u a l l y common to the world, (at 187) Two r e l a t e d reasons l e d Yates J . to de v e l o p and draw on an analogy between patents and c o p y r i g h t : f i r s t , he, alone of the judges i n M i l l a r , viewed an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to produce c o p i e s of a p u b l i s h e d l i t e r a r y composition as a form of monopoly 1- J J, and p a t e n t s had always been u n d e r s t o o d t o be m o n o p o l i e s ; second, he b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n c e p t u a l l y p a t e n t s and c o p y r i g h t c o u l d not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d on the b a s i s of t h e i r genesis or t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . He agreed t h a t the common law r e c o g n i z e d a r i g h t i n b o t h i n v e n t o r s and a u t h o r s not t o 66 p u b l i s h t h e i r work. The common law had n e v e r , however, p r o t e c t e d the i n v e n t o r once he announced h i s d i s c o v e r y ; f o r t h a t he r e q u i r e d a p a t e n t , c o n t r a c t u a l i n nature and time- l i m i t e d : Both o r i g i n a l i n v e n t i o n s stand upon the same f o o t i n g , i n p o i n t o f p r o p e r t y ; w h e t h e r t h e c a s e be m e c h a n i c a l , o r l i t e r a r y ; . . . B u t when the i n v e n t i o n i s once made known to the world, i t i s l a i d open; i t i s become a g i f t to the p u b l i c : every purchaser has. a r i g h t to make what use of i t he p l e a s e s . On what ground then can the author c l a i m t h i s r i g h t ? How comes h i s r i g h t t o be s u p e r i o r to that of the ingenious i n v e n t o r of a new and u s e f u l mechanical instrument? E s p e c i a l l y , when we c o n s i d e r t h i s i s l a n d as t h e s e a t of commerce, and not much a d d i c t e d to l i t e r a t u r e i n a n c i e n t days; and t h e r e f o r e can h a r d l y suppose that our laws g i v e g i v e a h i g h e r r i g h t or more permanent p r o p e r t y t o t h e a u t h o r of a book, than to the i n v e n t o r of a new and u s e f u l machine. ( M i l l a r , a t 246) The f a c t that the S t a t u t e of Anne had tracked the S t a t u t e of Monopolies i n i t s l i m i t a t i o n of o l d c o p y r i g h t s to 21 y e a r s , new c o p y r i g h t s t o 14 y e a r s , and i t s i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f a p r o v i s i o n f o r b i d d i n g the ' e n g r o s s i n g ' of book p r i c e s by the c o p y r i g h t owner, d i d not escape h i s a t t e n t i o n 1 3 4 . P a t e n t h o l d e r s had n e v e r d a r e d come t o t h e c o u r t s t o c l a i m a p e r p e t u a l ownership of t h e i r i n v e n t i o n s o u t s i d e the S t a t u t e of Monopolies, and p u b l i s h e r s s h o u l d not have expected r e s u l t s from that recourse. 67 The o n l y m a j o r i t y judge i n M i l l a r to respond d i r e c t l y to t h i s argument was J u s t i c e Aston. He maintained a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d between i n v e n t i o n s and l i t e r a r y works that rendered any analogy u n h e l p f u l : And the d i f f e r e n c e c o n s i s t s i n t h i s , that the p r o p e r t y of the maker of a mechanical e n g i n e i s c o n f i n e d to t h a t i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g which he has made; that the machine made i n i m i t a t i o n or resemblance of i t , i s a d i f f e r e n t work i n substance, m a t e r i a l s , labour and expence, i n which the maker of the o r i g i n a l machine can not c l a i m any p r o p e r t y ; f o r i t i s not h i s , but o n l y a resemblance of h i s : whereas the r e p r i n t e d book i s the very same substance; because i t s d o c t r i n e and s e n t i m e n t s a r e i t s e s s e n t i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t ; and the p r i n t i n g of i t i s a mere mechanical a c t , and t h e method o n l y of p u b l i s h i n g and promulging [ s i c ] the contents of the book, (at 226) T h i s a p p r o a c h d i s c l o s e d a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e p t o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g , i n which each o b j e c t produced i s unique and i d e n t i f i a b l e , as opposed t o a f u n g i b l e copy of an o r i g i n a l d e s i g n . With i t s treatment o f i n v e n t i o n s as ' m a t e r i a l ' and compositions as ' i d e a l ' , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was unconvincing and went unrepeated by W i l l e s J . or Lord M a n s f i e l d . In Donaldson, Aston J . took h i s p o s i t i o n one step f u r t h e r , saying i t "would be more l i b e r a l to conclude" that a common law p r o p e r t y i n in v e n t i o n s had e x i s t e d p r i o r to the Sta t u t e of Monopolies - L J . The e v o l u t i o n of patent law d i d c h a l l e n g e the theory on which the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y argument r e s t e d . J u s t i c e Yates g r a s p e d a u n i t y u n d e r l y i n g t h e s e forms o f i n t e l l e c t u a l 68 p r o p e r t y , o f p r o p e r t y i n i d e a s ; 1 3 6 f o r him, the common f e a t u r e s i n c l u d e d the n e c e s s i t y f o r l e g i s l a t i v e s a n c t i o n of the p r o p e r t y . The m a j o r i t y r e f u s e d the p a r a l l e l , and chose to look elsewhere f o r an analogy to l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y . 2 . The P r e r o g a t i v e Cases i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r The p r e f e r r e d a n a l o g y was t o t h e Crown r i g h t o v e r p r i n t i n g o f c e r t a i n t y p e s o f l i t e r a r y works, which th e m a j o r i t y found to be p e r s u a s i v e evidence of c o p y r i g h t e x i s t i n g at common l a w . 1 3 7 Making t h i s connection i n v o l v e d two s t e p s : (a) i d e n t i f y i n g the Crown's c o n t r o l of those works as a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t , rather than an e x e r c i s e of e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y ; (b) e q u a t i n g t h e C r o w n ' s p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n p r i n t i n g w i t h t h e author's c o p y r i g h t . J u s t i c e Yates took i s s u e with the m a j o r i t y on both matters. With r e s p e c t to the f i r s t , J u s t i c e s W i l l e s and A s t o n d i f f e r e d from Lord M a n s f i e l d i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the e v o l u t i o n of the p r e r o g a t i v e cases. The former found i n even the e a r l i e s t cases j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of a Crown r i g h t based i n p r o p e r t y . While r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t "These were times when p r e r o g a t i v e ran high" (at 2 0 9 ) , 1 3 8 W i l l e s J . found i n each of the pre-1688 c a s e s a r e a s o n i n p r o p e r t y f o r the c o u r t s ' h o l d i n g s : i n R o l l ' s Abridgment (1666) and Roper v. S t r e a t e r ( 1670), t h e Crown's p a y i n g j u d i c i a l s a l a r i e s , 1 3 9 and i n 69 Seymour (1677), the Crown's property by d e f a u l t i n anonymous works. Aston J . concurred i n a b r i e f r e f e r e n c e to Seymour (at 2 2 5 ) . L o r d M a n s f i e l d f o u n d much l e s s m e r i t i n the p r e - R e v o l u t i o n c a s e s . To him, abuse of the p r e r o g a t i v e by the Crown i n t h a t p e r i o d , and the w i l l i n g n e s s of the c o u r t s to countenance i t s abuse, rendered the judgments of l i t t l e v a l u e . What i n t r i g u e d him, however, was t h a t c o u n s e l f o r t h e patentees took a s i m i l a r approach i n each case: T h e r e were no q u e s t i o n s i n Westminster H a l l , before the R e s t o r a t i o n , as to Crown c o p i e s . The r e a s o n i s v e r y o b v i o u s : i t w i l l occur to every one that hears me. The f a c t , however, i s so: t h e r e were none, before the R e s t o r a t i o n . Upon every patent which has been l i t i g a t e d s i n c e , t h e c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a t e n t e e , (whatever e l s e might be thrown out [ i e , a r g u e d ] , or whatever encouragement they might have between the R e s t o r a t i o n and R e v o l u t i o n , tothrow out n o t i o n s of power and p r e r o g a t i v e , ) h a v e t o r t u r e d t h e i r i n v e n t i o n , t o s t a n d upon p r o p e r t y , ( a t 254) In other words, the l e g i t i m a c y of p r e r o g a t i v e was i n c r e a s i n g l y doubted, and good c o u n s e l knew they s h o u l d t r y t o j u s t i f y p a t e n t r i g h t s on p r i n c i p l e s of property, not mere reasons of s t a t e or power. Lord M a n s f i e l d proceeded through an a n a l y s i s o f t h e p l e a d i n g s i n P a r t r i d g e ( 1709 ) t o argue t h a t t h e p r e r o g a t i v e b a s i s f o r Crown c o p y r i g h t d i e d a f t e r 1688; i n Baskett (1758) no one harboured i l l u s i o n s on the s u b j e c t : 70 We [ t h e j u d g e s ] had no i d e a o f any p r e r o g a t i v e i n the Crown, over the p r e s s ; o r o f any p ower t o r e s t r a i n i t by e x c l u s i v e p r i v i l e g e s , or of any power to c o n t r o l the subject-matter on which a man m i g h t w r i t e , or the manner i n which he might t r e a t i t . We r e s t e d upon p r o p e r t y f r o m t h e K i n g ' s r i g h t o f o r i g i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n . ( M i l l a r at 255) The p u b l i s h i n g o f s t a t u t e s , however, " b e l o n g e d t o t h e King...as the head and Sovereign." (at 255) On the second p o i n t the m a j o r i t y judges agreed: i f the King had p r o p e r t y i n c e r t a i n w orks—and the cases i n d i c a t e d he d i d - - t h e n t h a t p r o v e d a s i m i l a r r i g h t e x i s t e d i n a u t h o r s because the King could have no greater r i g h t s i n property than h i s s u b j e c t s . J u s t i c e W i l l e s s a i d : I cannot d i s t i n g u i s h between the King, and and an a u t h o r . I d i s c l a i m any i d e a t h a t the K i n g has the l e a s t c o n t r o l over the p r e s s , but what a r i s e s from h i s p r o p e r t y i n h i s copy, (at 217) To s i m i l a r e f f e c t J u s t i c e Aston: And i f t h a t a l o n e [ p u b l i c a t i o n ] was to p r e v a i l a g a i n s t a p r i v a t e a u t h o r , why s h o u l d not p r e r o g a t i v e p r o p e r t y , founded on t h e same ground of argument as the g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y o f a u t h o r s i n t h e i r works, be l i a b l e t o the same f r e e and u n i v e r s a l communion ? F o r I know no d i f f e r e n c e , i n t h a t r e s p e c t , between the r i g h t s of the Crown and the p r o p e r t y of the s u b j e c t , (at 224) For Lord M a n s f i e l d , a c r u c i a l i s s u e was whether the common law deemed an a u t h o r t o a b a n d o n h i s r i g h t s i n a l i t e r a r y 71 c o m p o s i t i o n on p u b l i c a t i o n ; t h e c a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h Crown r i g h t s i n t h e B i b l e a n d o t h e r s t a t e works p r o v e d the K i n g m a i n t a i n e d t h o s e r i g h t s f o l l o w i n g p u b l i c a t i o n . Because h i s r i g h t s r e s t e d i n p r o p e r t y , not p r e r o g a t i v e , t h i s e s t a b l i s h e d the a u t h o r ' s p o s t - p u b l i c a t i o n r i g h t s : The K i n g has no power or c o n t r o l over the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r [of the B i b l e ] : h i s power r e s t s i n p r o p e r t y . H i s whole r i g h t r e s t s upon t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i n t h e c o p y by t h e common l a w . . . . Whatever t h e common law says of p r o p e r t y i n the K i n g ' s c a s e , from a n a l o g y to the case o f a u t h o r s , m u s t h o l d c o n c l u s i v e l y , i n my a p p r e h e n s i o n , w i t h regard to a u t h o r s , (at 256) J u s t i c e Yates argued w i t h the m a j o r i t y over the uses of t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . S c a t h i n g i n h i s a t t a c k on J u s t i c e W i l l e s ' i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t S t a r Chamber d e c r e e s r e p r e s e n t e d a form o f p r o t e c t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t s of which the common law c o u l d take c o g n i z a n c e , 1 4 0 Yates J . p o i n t e d out t h a t e a r l y r e g u l a t i o n of p r i n t i n g accompanied the C r o w n ' s abuse of i t s p a t e n t - g r a n t i n g power . N e i t h e r the d e c r e e s nor the p r i n t i n g p a t e n t s ever had a n y t h i n g to do w i t h the r i g h t s of a u t h o r s . 1 4 1 The c o u r t s had come to r e c o g n i s e s i n c e the 1680s, however , a l e g i t i m a t e and trimmed-down p r e r o g a t i v e over c e r t a i n works of s t a t e : The books are B i b l e s , Common-Prayer Books , a n d a l l e x t r a c t s f r o m t h e m , ( s u c h a s p r i m e r s , P s a l t e r s , Psa lms , ) and a lmanacs . T h o s e h a v e r e l a t i o n t o t h e n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n , or Government, or the p o l i t i c a l 72 c o n s t i t u t i o n . Other compositions to which the King's r i g h t of p u b l i c a t i o n extends, are the s t a t u t e s , Acts of Parliament, and S t a t e - p a p e r s . The K i n g ' s r i g h t t o a l l t h e s e i s , as head of the Church, and of the p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , (at 242) The King's r i g h t s over these works, simply put, d i d not d e r i v e from p r o p e r t y and c o u l d not be a n a l o g i s e d to the a u t h o r ' s c l a i m : The King does not d e r i v e t h i s r i g h t from l a b o u r , o r c o m p o s i t i o n , o r a n y one c i r c u m s t a n c e a t t e n d i n g t h e c a s e o f authors.... i t seems to me, that the King's p r o p e r t y i n these p a r t i c u l a r compositions c a l l e d p r e r o g a t i v e c o p i e s s t a n d s upon d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s than t h a t o f the a u t h o r ; and t h e r e f o r e w i l l not a p p l y to the case of an author, (at 244-245) He p o i n t e d out how i n P a r t r i d g e (1709) the compiler of the almanac, i . e . , i t s p u t a t i v e author,, l o s t a t the i n j u n c t i o n stage to the patentee. The m a j o r i t y j u d g e s and Y a t e s . J . , i n p u r s u i t of the answer t o the i s s u e p o s e d i n M i l l a r , d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Crown p r i n t i n g cases i n two t h e o r e t i c a l r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , the m a j o r i t y was u n w i l l i n g to accord to the Crown any s t a t u s or p r i v i l e g e s not a v a i l a b l e to the p r i v a t e s u b j e c t ; i n L o r d Camden's b l u n t p h r a s i n g i n Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), they wished to make of the King nothing more than "a B o o k s e l l e r " . 1 4 2 Yates J . , no l e s s enamoured of the e x p a n s i v e p r e r o g a t i v e w i t h w h i c h t h e Crown's r o l e i n r e g u l a t i n g p r i n t i n g had begun, n e v e r t h e l e s s b e l i e v e d Crown 73 r i g h t s t o have a u n i q u e s o u r c e and p u r p o s e : the Crown's c o n t r o l over the p r i n t i n g of c e r t a i n works, i n d e f e a s i b l e by the a c t of p u b l i c a t i o n , e x i s t e d for reasons of s t a t e and d i d not p r o v e a p r i v a t e r i g h t t h a t c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d o n l y by reasons of property. 1 4 3 Second, the m a j o r i t y saw i n the h i s t o r y of Crown p r i n t i n g r i g h t s the shadow of a nascent common law r i g h t . By the time of B a s k e t t (1758) and M i l l a r (1769), Crown r i g h t s had been s t r i p p e d of mystery and the t a i n t of press c o n t r o l , and the common law r i g h t had acceded to i t s r i g h t f u l p l a c e at ce n t r e stage. Yates J . , however, saw i n the development of commercial r i g h t s i n p r i n t i n g , as i n the s i m i l a r r i g h t s i n i n v e n t i o n s , i n e s c a p a b l e e v i d e n c e o f the d i r e c t i v e hand of s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y . T h o s e r i g h t s h ad o r i g i n a t e d a n d r e c e i v e d r e c o g n i t i o n o n l y t h r o u g h d e c r e e s , p a t e n t s and s t a t u t o r y approbation. The long s i l e n c e of the common law on t h i s 'new p r o p e r t y ' s i g n i f i e d t o J u s t i c e Yates the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of common law p r i n c i p l e w i t h a property i n ideas. 74 E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CROWN COPYRIGHT 1. Crown P r e r o g a t i v e Copyright Lord Camden i n Donaldson had, as noted, d i s p a r a g e d the view t h a t Crown ownership of c o p i e s i n v a r i o u s works had a p r o p r i e t a r y b a s i s , whether f r o m t h e K i n g ' s e x p e n s e or ot h e r w i s e . L i k e Yates J . he acknowledged a p r e r o g a t i v e Crown r i g h t over c e r t a i n key works of s t a t e , such as the B i b l e and s t a t u t e s . N e i t h e r L o r d Camden nor Y a t e s J . d e n i e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of a p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t , a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s t r i c t e d , and as t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i n D o n a l d s o n a f f i r m e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of a common law c o p y r i g h t , l i t t l e doubt surrounded the s u r v i v a l of a p r e r o g a t i v e c o p y r i g h t . The r i g h t e v e n t u a l l y r e c e i v e d s t a t u t o r y a p p r o b a t i o n . 1 4 4 In the years f o l l o w i n g M i l l a r and Donaldson, c o u r t s moved to r e s t r i c t the scope of the p r e r o g a t i v e . The Court of Common P l e a s r u l e d i n S t a t i o n e r s Company v. Carnan ( 1 7 7 5 ) 1 4 5 t h a t almanacs d i d not come w i t h i n the p r e r o g a t i v e , s e t t l i n g the i s s u e l e f t open s i n c e P a r t r i d g e (1709), and t h a t the Crown c o u l d not g r a n t e x c l u s i v e p r i n t i n g p a t e n t s o u t s i d e t h e c o n f i n e s of p r e r o g a t i v e . An I r i s h court decided i n 1794 t h a t the Crown c o u l d g r a n t p a t e n t s f o r p r i n t i n g books f o r use by t h e e s t a b l i s h e d C h u r c h , b u t n o t f o r B i b l e s f o r a l l p u r p o s e s . 1 4 6 R e f l e c t i n g a p r i o r i t y of the age, n a r r a t i v e s produced d u r i n g voyages of d i s c o v e r y were r u l e d t o be Crown c o p i e s . 1 4 7 The narrowing of p r e r o g a t i v e c o p y r i g h t c o i n c i d e d 75 w i t h l o c a t i n g i t s p r i n c i p a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r e v e n t i n g d i s t o r t i o n s ' a p p e a r i n g i n works of s t a t e . 1 4 8 Such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n l o s e s i t s much of i t s f o r c e , as Yorke i m p l i e d i n B a s k e t t (1758), w i t h the r e a l i s a t i o n t h at market value of a p r i v a t e l y p u b l i s h e d e d i t i o n of a s t a t e work (e.g., a s t a t u t e or judgment) depends on i t s accuracy. Given t h a t , and a l s o the growing r o l e of the s t a t e i n economic a c t i v i t y , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 20th century d e c i s i o n s on Crown p r e r o g a t i v e have r u l e d i t to be p r o p r i e t a r y i n nature, i f not i n o r i g i n . Two 1938 cases from the d o m i n i o n s — R. v. B e l l m a n 1 4 9 and A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l o f New S o u t h Wales v. Butterworth and Co. (Aust) L t d . 1 5 0 — c i t e Lord M a n s f i e l d i n M i l l a r t o s t r e s s t h e C r o w n ' s p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n c o p y r i g h t . 1 5 1 2. P u b l i c Domain and Government P u b l i c a t i o n s The c o n t r a s t between Crown c o p y r i g h t and p u b l i c domain i s important t o note: the l a t t e r a p p l i e s to works f o r which no one h o l d s c o p y r i g h t , and are t h e r e f o r e f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e to everyone f o r use and r e p r o d u c t i o n 1^2. t h e former a p p l i e s to works owned by the Crown and s u b j e c t to a l l the i n c i d e n t s of the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s of c o p y r i g h t . 1 5 3 American and Anglo-Canadian law di v e r g e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y on t h i s i s s u e . In Wheaton v. P e t e r s 1 5 4 , Supreme Court of the U.S. d e c i d e d t h a t i t s own judgments f e l l i n t o the p u b l i c domain: 76 I t may be proper to remark that the court a r e u n a n i m o u s l y o f the o p i n i o n t h a t no r e p o r t e r has or can have any c o p y r i g h t i n t h e w r i t t e n o p i n i o n s d e l i v e r e d by t h i s c o u r t ; and that the judges thereof cannot c o n f e r on any r e p o r t e r any such r i g h t . (666/ per McLean J.) The Wheaton d e c i s i o n , based l a r g e l y on the Court's b e l i e f t h a t p u b l i c a c c e s s to law p r e c l u d e d p r i v a t e r i g h t s i n judgments, was i n t e r p r e t e d as extending to a l l p u b l i c a t i o n s produced by g overnment e m p l o y e e s , a p r i n c i p l e embodied i n the 1909 C o p y r i g h t A c t and subsequent c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e s . 1 5 5 Cases f o l l o w i n g Wheaton recognized the notes, a d d i t i o n s and headings p r o v i d e d by law r e p o r t e r s to be c o p y r i g h t a b l e , and the i s s u e of ownership r i g h t s i n law r e p o r t s has remained a l i v e one i n American law to t h i s day. In West P u b l i s h i n g Co. v. Mead Data C e n t r a l I n c . 1 5 6 , an i n j u n c t i o n was g r a n t e d to p r e v e n t the defendant from using p l a i n t i f f ' s system of r e p o r t e r p a g i n a t i o n i n defendant's LEXIS computer research data base. The r e s u l t shows the extent of p r i v a t e r i g h t s p r o t e c t i o n i n the r e p o r t i n g e n d e a v o u r , d e s p i t e t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n i n j u d g m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s . 1 5 7 No Canadian or Commonwealth case has r e s o l v e d the i s s u e of the c o p y r i g h t s t a t u s of judgments. The A u s t r a l i a n d e c i s i o n i n A t torney-General for New South Wales v. Butterworth & Co. ( A u s t . ) L t d . i s t h e s t r o n g e s t modern a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that s t a t u t e s are subject to Crown c o p y r i g h t . Long Innes C.J. reviewed the p r e r o g a t i v e cases, e s p e c i a l l y Roper v. 77 S t r e a t e r (167 0) and B a s k e t t v. U n i v e r s i t y of Cambridge (1758)/ and found them b i n d i n g on the p o i n t . He i d e n t i f i e d Crown c o p y r i g h t i n s t a t u t e s as a p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t p r o p r i e t a r y i n n a ture, w h i l e not g i v i n g an o p i n i o n on the o r i g i n of the r i g h t i n p r o p e r t y c o n c e p t s . 1 5 8 Concerning judgments, d i f f e r e n t views abound. Fox suggests that R o l l ' s Abridgment (1666) i s s t i l l good law to the e f f e c t that the Crown has c o p y r i g h t by v i r t u e of p a y i n g the s a l a r i e s of j u d g e s . 1 5 9 However, as pointed out above, that was o n l y one of the arguments made by the patentee; the case appears more l i k e l y to stand f o r Crown p r e r o g a t i v e over the p r i n t i n g t r a d e , a p r o p o s i t i o n that d i d not s u r v i v e M i l l a r . More recent assessments q u e s t i o n whether Crown p r e r o g a t i v e would now ever be e x t e n d e d to j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s . 1 6 0 That s t i l l l e a v e s open the p o s s i b i l i t y of copyright belonging to the Crown by o p e r a t i o n o f the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n 1 6 1 , or t o judges themselves as a u t h o r s . These a l t e r n a t i v e s might cause a c o u r t , should the i s s u e come to be l i t i g a t e d , t o f o l l o w the U.S. p u b l i c domain l e a d . 1 6 2 To date, Commonwealth cou r t s have never brought the i s s u e to a head by r e s t r i c t i n g access to s t a t u t e s or to j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s . By v i r t u e both o f the p r e r o g a t i v e and the s t a t u t o r y r e c o g n i t i o n o f Crown o w n e r s h i p o f works p r o d u c e d under government d i r e c t i o n or c o n t r o l , however, an e x t e n s i v e r o l e for the Crown as owner of c o p y r i g h t e d works i s guaranteed by Canadian law. T h i s circumstance has obvious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r generating p u b l i c revenue. A f u r t h e r i m p l i c a t i o n concerns the 78 i s s u e s o f freedom of i n f o r m a t i o n , and freedom of e x p r e s s i o n . To the e x t e n t government has ownership r i g h t s i n m a t e r i a l s i t p r o d u c e s i t has an a d d i t i o n a l l e v e r o f c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n . The B r i t i s h and A u s t r a l i a n governments i n d e e d have r e s o r t e d to c o p y r i g h t i n e f f o r t s t o p r e v e n t t h e p r i n t i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d e m b a r r a s s i n g o r h a r m f u l , where b r e a c h o f c o n f i d e n c e and s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y d i d not •I C O a v a i l them. D J R e c e n t l y , the Canadian government o b t a i n e d an i n j u n c t i o n to prevent p u b l i c a t i o n of an a b r i d g e d v e r s i o n o f a c o n t r o v e r s i a l combines i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t . 1 6 4 The d e f e n c e r a i s e d an argument based on s . 2(b) of the C h a r t e r of R i g h t s and Freedoms (freedom o f e x p r e s s i o n ) , which the F e d e r a l C o u r t too e a s i l y d i s m i s s e d . A more c r e a t i v e j u d i c i a l response would have b e e n t o p e r m i t p u b l i c a t i o n on payment o f a r e a s o n a b l e ' l i c e n c e 1 f e e . The p o i n t i s , c o p y r i g h t o u g h t not t o be a v a i l a b l e to governments to b l o c k p u b l i c a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n , e i t h e r a r b i t r a r i l y or to a v o i d embarrassment . In P a r t IV we w i l l s e e t h a t one o f t h e two i n t e r e s t s w h i c h prompted the m a j o r i t y i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r t o f i n d f o r a common law c o p y r i g h t was t h e p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t o f an a u t h o r i n h i s p r i v a c y a n d r e p u t a t i o n , an i n t e r e s t most e v i d e n t i n an a u t h o r ' s d e c i s i o n t o w i t h h o l d p u b l i c a t i o n o f h i s w o r k . R e t r i e v i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n c o p y r i g h t m i g h t h e l p t o p o i n t o u t t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f Crown c o p y r i g h t b e i n g used t o w i t h h o l d p u b l i c a t i o n . Crown c o p y r i g h t 79 n o t i o n a l l y o r i g i n a t e d i n the Crown's p u b l i c d u t y , not i n "personal i n t e r e s t s " that p r o p e r l y i n h e r e only to i n d i v i d u a l s . J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' a d m o n i t i o n t h a t t h e Crown does not h o l d c o p y r i g h t l i k e p r i v a t e a u t h o r s i s a p p o s i t e : the r i g h t t o w i t h h o l d a c c e s s to l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n s t h a t i s c e n t r a l to p r i v a t e c o p y r i g h t d e s e r v e s l e s s r e s p e c t when i n v o k e d by government a u t h o r i t i e s . 8 0 IV. PROPRIETARY AND PERSONAL INTERESTS IN EARLY COPYRIGHT: THE EQUITY INJUNCTION CASES A. INTRODUCTION P a r t I o f t h i s paper posed i s s u e s r a i s e d by p r i n t i n g p r e s s t e c h n o l o g y both f o r t h e o r i e s of p r o p e r t y and f o r the n a t u r e and s o c i a l c o n c e p t i o n o f a u t h o r s h i p . T h i s P a r t approaches the second issue by examining the way i n which the E n g l i s h c o u r t s understood the r o l e and r i g h t s of an author i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y c a s e s up to and i n c l u d i n g M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . E i s e n s t e i n has pointed out how the p r i n t i n g press c r e a t e d a d i v i s i o n of labour i n book p r o d u c t i o n which u l t i m a t e l y made th e a u t h o r ' s p r o f e s s i o n p o s s i b l e . 1 6 5 Where p r e v i o u s l y c o p y i s t s h a d p l a y e d t h e c r u c i a l r o l e i n m a king t e x t s a v a i l a b l e , and most t e x t s had a B i b l i c a l or c l a s s i c a l h e r i t a g e , p r i n t allowed the p r o d u c t i o n of new t e x t s on a l a r g e s c a l e and f o r a mass r e a d e r s h i p l i m i t e d only by the l i t e r a c y and i n t e r e s t s . E i s e n s t e i n notes that i n the 13th Century, St. B onaventura d e s c r i b e d f o u r ways of 'making books', none of which i n c l u d e d wholly o r i g i n a l c o m p o s i t i o n . 1 6 6 She s p e c u l a t e s t h a t the modern t r a d i t i o n t h a t sees the a r t i s t / a u t h o r as a h e r o i c and l o n e l y f i g u r e , f o l l o w i n g the Muses i n b u r s t s of o r i g i n a l i t y , and i n d e f i a n c e of e s t a b l i s h e d order i n s o c i e t y and the a r t s , may owe i t s genesis to the new technology. 81 As p a r t of t h i s r e c o n c e p t u a l i s i n g of l i t e r a r y l a b o u r , c o p y r i g h t a r r i v e d as the law's mechanism f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g the rewards of a new market. In doing so, however, c o p y r i g h t not o n l y s t r u c t u r e d the way i n which commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n of the book t r a d e would occur, i t a l s o responded to and confirmed the new d e f i n i t i o n s of a u t h o r s h i p . The p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n c o p y r i g h t would come t o t u r n on o r i g i n a l i t y , on r e w a r d i n g t h o s e p r o d u c e r s who d i d n o t c o p y o r p l a g i a r i s e t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s b u t who c r e a t e d e x p r e s s i o n . The v a l u e i n o r i g i n a l i t y had more than economic s i g n i f i c a n c e ; the image of t h e a u t h o r as i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c r e a t o r and the o b j e c t s of h i s l a b o u r was i n t e g r a l t o the c r e a t o r ' s personhood, and deserved p r o t e c t i o n a s i d e from h i s economic i n t e r e s t s . T h i s P a r t l o o k s at the e a r l y c o p y r i g h t cases to understand how these two i n t e r e s t s entered i n t o the common law t r a d i t i o n . B. REVIEW OF THE CASES: VICISSITUDES OF AUTHORS AND PRINTERS T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s a b r i e f o v e r v i e w of the c a s e s l e a d i n g to M i l l a r v. T a y l o r which d e a l t i n some f a s h i o n with t h e r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s o f p u b l i s h e r s and a u t h o r s . The p a r t i c u l a r concern f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate was to d i s t i n g u i s h those cases i n v o l v i n g books s u b j e c t to the s t a t u t o r y term f o r c o p y r i g h t and those which d i d not; 82 i n j u n c t i o n s g r a n t e d f o r t h e l a t t e r , a r g u e d t h e L o n d o n b o o k s e l l e r s , i m p l i e d j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of common law c o p y r i g h t . For p u r p o s e s of t h i s p a p e r , a more i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n to draw i s between cases i n v o l v i n g p u b l i s h e d and unpublished works. 1. I n j u n c t i o n s f o r P u b l i s h e d Works In Gyles v. Wilcox and others (1740) 2 Atk 141, 26 ER 489 t h e p l a i n t i f f b o o k s e l l e r s o u g h t an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t b o o k s e l l e r s f o r p u b l i s h i n g the book Modern Crown Law, a l l e g i n g i t to be "borrowed verbatim", save f o r d e l e t i o n of s e v e r a l s t a t u t e s and the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n of L a t i n and F r e n c h q u o t a t i o n s , from S i r Matthew H a l e ' s P l e a s of t h e Crown, p u b l i s h e d i n 1657 and over which the p l a i n t i f f c l a i m e d c o p y r i g h t under the S t a t u t e of Anne. The p r i n c i p a l i s s u e was w h e t h e r a b r i d g i n g t h e o r i g i n a l work c o n s t i t u t e d an i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t h e S t a t u t e or an i n n o c e n t use o f t h e o r i g i n a l . The L o r d C h a n c e l l o r i n c l i n e d toward the p l a i n t i f f , s a y i n g t h e r i g h t c o n f e r r e d by the S t a t u t e was not of the n a t u r e o f monopoly and d e s e r v e d a " l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n " because i t s i n t e n t was to s e c u r e t h e p r o p e r t y o f b o o k s i n t h e a u t h o r s t h e m s e l v e s , or the p u r c h a s e r s t h e r e o f , as some recompence f o r t h e i r p a i n s and l a b o u r i n such works as may be of use to the l e a r n e d world, (at 490) 83 N e v e r t h e l e s s , he r e f e r r e d the case to a 'learned p a n e l ' to d e t e r m i n e whether th e d e f e n d a n t s ' book was the "same" as p l a i n t i f f ' s , or c o n s t i t u t e d a genuine abridgment, i n which event i t would not i n f r i n g e . Following the panel's r e p o r t , the Court d i s m i s s e d the a p p l i c a t i o n . 1 6 7 In Tonson v. Merchant and Walker (1752), the p l a i n t i f f sued o v e r an e d i t i o n o f M i l t o n ' s Poems which i n c o r p o r a t e d c o m m e n t a r i e s by v a r i o u s s c h o l a r s and w r i t e r s . S i n c e the o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n of the poems had appeared long b e f o r e the S t a t u t e , the defendants r a i s e d the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y i s s u e , a r g u i n g t h a t the 21-year s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t f o r pre-1709 works had e x p i r e d . The p l a i n t i f f responded by a r g u i n g f o r common law c o p y r i g h t . L o r d C h a n c e l l o r Hardwicke d e c l i n e d to r u l e on the p o i n t , s a y i n g the d i s p u t e should be sent to the common law judges f o r r e s o l u t i o n ; however, he d i d e n j o i n the defendants from p u b l i s h i n g or s e l l i n g t h e i r e d i t i o n because i t i n c l u d e d the commentary of Dr. Newton, which had been w r i t t e n f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s e d i t i o n i n the 1730s and s t i l l had s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n . The i s s u e was whether by adding h i s own o r i g i n a l notes to Newton's commentary the defendant Merchant had made a new work which d i d not i n f r i n g e p l a i n t i f f ' s c o p y r i g h t i n the commentary. In Tonson v. Walker (1752), Lord Hardwicke c i t e d Burnett v. Chetwood (1722) 2 Mer 441, 35 ER 1008, as an i n s t a n c e of the unique f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n unpublished manuscript cases. The case d e a l t with both pub l i s h e d and unpublished works of 84 the same w r i t e r . The p l a i n t i f f was executor of the e s t a t e of Dr. B u r n e t t , author of the t h e o l o g i c a l work A r c h a e o l o g i a Sacra. The defendant had produced an E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n from Burnett's L a t i n o r i g i n a l . During h i s l i f e t i m e Dr. Burnett had p r e v e n t e d t h e book's b e i n g t r a n s l a t e d because he f e l t i t c o n t a i n e d c o n t r o v e r s i a l i d e a s not s u i t a b l e f o r the " v u l g a r " reade r . Lord C h a n c e l l o r M a c c l e s f i e l d , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the s t a t u s o f t r a n s l a t i o n s under t h e S t a t u t e , g r a n t e d an i n j u n c t i o n to stop the defendant from p r i n t i n g that book and a second u n p u b l i s h e d work of Burnett s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y o b t a i n e d . He d i d so more because he f e l t the Court had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o s u p e r v i s e p u b l i c a t i o n of d i f f i c u l t r e l i g i o u s i d e a s and because the d e f e n d a n t had r e s p e c t e d n e i t h e r the a u t h o r ' s wishes nor h i s s t y l e , than from concern that the t r a n s l a t i o n v i o l a t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t s . 1 6 8 The judges i n M i l l a r c i t e d s i x u n r e p o r t e d cases where p r i n t e r s sought i n j u n c t i o n s to prevent defendants' p u b l i s h i n g works f o r which the p r i n t e r s c l a i m e d the copy: Ponder v. B r a d y l ( 1 6 7 9 ) , 1 6 9 Knaplock v. C u r l (1722), Eyre v. Walker (1735) , 1 7 0 Motte v. F a l k n e r ( 1 7 3 5 ) , 1 7 1 Walthoe v. Walker (1736) , 1 7 2 Tonson v. Walker (1739), 1 7 3 and R e i l y v. Fowler (1768). A summary o f K n a p l o c k (1722) a p p e a r s i n a s h o r t c o l l e c t i o n o f i n j u n c t i o n c a s e s . 1 7 4 The c a s e d e a l t w i t h ownership of s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t f o r D i r e c t i o n s to Church- Wardens by Dr. Prideaux; the defendants claimed as a s s i g n e e s from the p r i n t e r to whom the author had " f i r s t d e l i v e r e d the 85 C o p y t o be p r i n t e d " ( a t 4 4 1 ) . L o r d M a c c l e s f i e l d , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between "copy" as a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t and the " r i g h t of copy" as a l e g a l r i g h t , d e c i d e d i n favour of the p l a i n t i f f , who had subsequently purchased the " r i g h t " from the author: ...the bare D e l i v e r y of the Copy by the Author to be p r i n t e d , doth not devest the R i g h t of the Copy out of the Author, but i s o n l y an A u t h o r i t y t o the P r i n t e r t o p r i n t t h a t E d i t i o n , and the Author may afterwards grant the Right of the Copy to another Person. (441) The same chapter on i n j u n c t i o n s a l s o summarises A u s t i n v. Cave (1740). T h e r e , L o r d Hardwicke g r a n t e d an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t a defendant who attempted to p r i n t Dr Trapp's Book A g a i n s t B e i n g R i g h t e o u s Overmuch i n e x t r a c t s and under a d i f f e r e n t t i t l e . To the argument t h a t e x t r a c t s d i d not come under the S t a t u t e , L o r d Hardwicke s a i d " I t i s not m a t e r i a l what T i t l e you g i v e the Book, nor whether you p r i n t a l l a t once or not" (at 441). No report e x i s t s f o r Read v. Hodges (1740), but the case i s b r i e f l y r e f e r r e d to both i n Gyles v. Walker (1740) and Tonson v. Walker and Merchant (1752). In Read, the defendant claimed that h i s r e p u b l i c a t i o n of a work of h i s t o r y , the Czar of Muscovy, was an abridgment of the o r i g i n a l and not an infringement. Lord Hardwicke r u l e d i t to be an "evasive a b r i d g m e n t " 1 7 5 as being a word-for-word copy of the o r i g i n a l with j u s t a few pages m i s s i n g , and granted the i n j u n c t i o n . No o t h e r c a s e s p r i o r t o M i l l a r e x p l o r i n g the 86 p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s of p r i n t e r s and authors i n p u b l i s h e d books appear to be r e p o r t e d . 1 7 6 2. The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n Cases Four cases c i t e d i n M i l l a r d e a l t with a l l e g e d p i r a c y of works that had not been p u b l i s h e d by t h e i r authors. Only two of these cases, Pope v C u r l (1741) 2 Atk 342, 26 ER 608, and Duke of Queensberry v . Shebbeare (1758) 2 Eden 328, 28 ER 924, a r e r e p o r t e d . In Pope, the p u b l i s h e r Edward C u r l p r i n t e d a volume t i t l e d L e t t e r s from S w i f t , Pope,and Others. Alexander Pope s o u g h t and o b t a i n e d an i n j u n c t i o n t o p r e v e n t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of l e t t e r s he had w r i t t e n . 1 7 7 Defendant r a i s e d , i n t e r a l i a , the o b j e c t i o n that by sending a l e t t e r the w r i t e r makes a g i f t o f i t to the r e c e i v e r , which p e r m i t t e d the r e c e i v e r t o make any u s e o f i t he w i s h e d , i n c l u d i n g p u b l i c a t i o n . The Court r e p l i e d : But I am of o p i n i o n t h a t i t i s o n l y a s p e c i a l p roperty i n the r e c e i v e r , p o s s i b l y the p r o p e r t y o f the paper may belong to him; but t h i s does not giv e a l i c e n c e to any p e r s o n whatsoever to p u b l i s h them to the w o r l d , f o r at most the r e c e i v e r has only a j o i n t p r o p e r t y with the w r i t e r , (at 608) I n t h e Duke o f Q u e e n s b e r r y c a s e , the p l a i n t i f f was the ad m i n i s t r a t o r of the es t a t e of an h e i r of Lord Clarendon who had w r i t t e n , but not p u b l i s h e d , a h i s t o r y of C h a r l e s I I . The defendant Gwynn claimed that h i s l a t e f a t h e r , whose e s t a t e he 87 a d m i n i s t e r e d , had r e c e i v e d an o r i g i n a l manuscript from Lord Clarendon, who t o l d him "he might take a copy t h e r e o f , and make use.of the same as he should think f i t . " The Lord Keeper ruled that those words, i f spoken, d i d not convey a r i g h t to p r o f i t from m u l t i p l y i n g the book i n p r i n t ; the f a t h e r "might make every use of i t , except t h a t . " (at 925) Two unreported c a s e s , Webb v. Rose (May 24, 1732) and F o r r e s t e r v. W a l l e r (June 13, 1741), a l s o d e a l t w i t h i n j u n c t i o n s g r a n t e d t o prevent the p u b l i c a t i o n of p r e v i o u s l y unpublished manuscripts. C. PROPRIETARY INTERESTS: THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF COPY 1. Scope of the Right i n the I n j u n c t i o n Cases In s p e a k i n g of t h e s c o p e of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n c o p y r i g h t , a number of t h i n g s might be i n c l u d e d : f o r i n s t a n c e , the t e m p o r a l d u r a t i o n of the r i g h t ( the d r i v i n g i s s u e of M i l l a r v . T a y l o r ) , t h e g e o g r a p h i c l i m i t s o f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , 1 7 8 or the c a t e g o r i e s of works of e x p r e s s i o n ( l i t e r a t u r e , p a i n t i n g , music e t c . ) s u b j e c t to c o p y r i g h t . 1 7 9 T h i s P a r t of the paper seeks to e x p l o r e through the E n g l i s h cases up to and i n c l u d i n g M i l l a r the development of a concept of p r o p e r t y i n a u t h o r s h i p . To do so, i t f o c u s e s on i s s u e s which r e v e a l the b r e a d t h of p r o p e r t y i n the a u t h o r ' s work recognised by the courts and p a r t i e s to the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate. Two r e l a t e d i s s u e s p r o v i d e t h i s f o c u s : (a) the type of work u n d e r s t o o d t o q u a l i f y f o r c o p y r i g h t ; (b) the uses by 88 t h i r d p a r t i e s found to i n f r i n g e c o p y r i g h t . The second p o i n t l a r g e l y c o r r esponds w i t h whether the author was seen to own i d e a s , or o n l y the p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n he gave t h e m — i n c u r r e n t p a r l a n c e , the i d e a / e x p r e s s i o n dichotomy. In o t h e r words, what d i d the author own ? To ask these q u e s t i o n s i s i n some degree to impose the p r e o c c u p a t i o n s of a l a t e r , much expanded c o p y r i g h t regime on i t s e a r l i e s t e m a n a t i o n s . One must n o t draw t o o much s i g n i f i c a n c e from p e r c e i v e d 'gaps' i n e a r l y c o p y r i g h t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the l e g a l s t a t u s of the author as c r e a t o r can be measured i n p a r t i n r e l a t i o n to these f a c t o r s . (a) Type of Work The S t a t u t e of Anne used only the words " p r i n t e d books" to d e s c r i b e the type of work t h a t q u a l i f i e d f o r p r o t e c t i o n . The d e f i n i t i o n of "book" r a r e l y a r o s e as an i s s u e i n the c a s e s . I n Pope v. C u r l ( 1 7 4 1 ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t a r g u e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y that an e d i t i o n of l e t t e r s d i d not c o n s t i t u t e a book f o r p u r p o s e s of the S t a t u t e ; 1 8 0 the L o r d C h a n c e l l o r s t a t e d i t would be mischievous to d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s from "any o t h e r l e a r n e d work." ( a t 608) The p a r t i e s a v o i d e d t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n of whether a s i n g l e l e t t e r had c o p y r i g h t as a "book". In Tonson v. Walker and Merchant (1752), the Court viewed the commentary of Dr. Newton as a work separate from P a r a d i s e L o s t , d e s p i t e i t s b e i n g i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the same p r i n t e d volume. In Baskett v. U n i v e r s i t y of Cambridge 89 (1758), K i n g ' s Bench i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d the argument t h a t s t a t u t e s were no t books and so d i d not f a l l w i t h i n the U n i v e r s i t y ' s Charter to p r i n t " l i b r o s " . Therefore, d e s p i t e the S t a t u t e ' s use of the word "books", due as some commentators h a v e s u g g e s t e d 1 8 1 t o t h e i n f l u e n c e o f p r i n t e r s and b o o k s e l l e r s i n the d r a f t i n g of the l e g i s l a t i o n , E n g l i s h c o u r t s were p r e p a r e d to adopt a f l e x i b l e approach to d e f i n i n g the c l a s s of works q u a l i f y i n g f o r the p r o p e r t y r i g h t . 1 8 2 Few works of f i c t i o n appear i n the e a r l y p r e r o g a t i v e and c o p y r i g h t c a s e s . Indeed, a c l e a r preponderance of the cases d e a l w i t h b o o k s w r i t t e n f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l or r e l i g i o u s p u r p o s e s — works such as law r e p o r t s , medical t r e a t i s e s , and t h e o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s . T h i s no doubt r e f l e c t s h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y with respect to the development of prose f i c t i o n as a major l i t e r a r y endeavour; more than t h a t , however, c o u r t s p l a c e d s t r e s s on 'usefulness' as an a t t r i b u t e of the p r o t e c t e d work. The Lord C h a n c e l l o r i n Pope v. C u r l (1741) found l e t t e r s to be as worthy as "other l e a r n e d works". He e l a b o r a t e d : I t i s c e r t a i n that no works have done more s e r v i c e to mankind, than those which have a p p e a r e d i n t h i s shape, upon f a m i l i a r s u b j e c t s , and which perhaps were never in t e n d e d to be p u b l i s h e d ; and i t i s t h i s makes them so v a l u a b l e ; f o r I must confess f o r my own p a r t , t h a t l e t t e r s which a r e very e l a b o r a t e l y w r i t t e n , and o r i g i n a l l y intended f o r the p r e s s , are g e n e r a l l y the most i n s i g n i f i c a n t , and very l i t t l e worth any person's reading, (at 608) 90 In Tonson v. C o l l i n s ( 1 7 6 2 ) , B l a c k s t o n e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t 'value' was an a t t r i b u t e of p r o p e r t y , but emphasized he d i d not thereby equate value with usefulness.(181) He a n t i c i p a t e d a p o i n t made by Aston J . i n M i l l a r about which more i s s a i d i n Part V. D e s p i t e repeated r e f e r e n c e s to "use" and "value" and " l e a r n e d works", no e a r l y c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n f a i l e d on the b a s i s o f a j u d i c i a l assessment t h a t the work i n q u e s t i o n l a c k e d m e r i t , or p r o v i d e d no b e n e f i t to s o c i e t y . 1 8 3 In the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y o b s c e n i t y came to be seen as a reason to deny c o p y r i g h t , a r u l e that o n l y r e c e n t l y has been set a s i d e i n C a n a d a . 1 8 4 (b) Dses by T h i r d P a r t i e s The second p o i n t , c o n c e r n i n g t h i r d p a r t y u s e s 1 8 5 , c a l l s f o r a b r i e f e x p l a n a t i o n . The "uses" made of p r o t e c t e d works r e f e r s to the a c t i v i t i e s over which the law of c o p y r i g h t g i v e s c o n t r o l to a u t h o r s . On one l e v e l , t h i s means the m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t i e s covered by c o p y r i g h t : the S t a t u t e of Anne gave the author and a s s i g n s the " s o l e r i g h t of p r i n t i n g or r e p r i n t i n g " ( A r t . I ) ; W i l l e s J . d e f i n e d the "copy of a book" as "the s o l e r i g h t of p r i n t i n g , p u b l i s h i n g and s e l l i n g " ( M i l l a r , at 206). Present-day s t a t u t e s have added a number of a c t i v i t i e s to t h i s l i s t . 1 8 6 On a d i f f e r e n t , i f r e l a t e d l e v e l , "uses" means the manner and purpose f o r which the work i s taken or reproduced by a t h i r d p a r t y ; f o r example, the t h i r d p a r t y may reproduce a l l or part of the o r i g i n a l f o r the purposes of competing with 91 i t , making a new work based on or i n s p i r e d by the o r i g i n a l , or m e r e l y e n h a n c i n g o r f a c i l i t a t i n g h i s e n j o y m e n t of t h e o r i g i n a l . These t y p e s o f use can be termed, r e s p e c t i v e l y , c o m p e t i n g , d e r i v a t i v e and i n t r i n s i c u s e s . C o n t e m p o r a r y c o p y r i g h t regimes extend p r o t e c t i o n to many d e r i v a t i v e uses, w h i l e p r o v i d i n g g e n e r a l s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s under " f a i r d e a l i n g " or " f a i r use" 1 8 7 p r o v i s i o n s t h a t a l l o w others to be f r e e l y e n g a g e d i n . I n t r i n s i c u s e s , w h i c h h ave g a i n e d importance t h r o u g h the i n c r e a s e d ease and a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e p r o g r a p h i c t e c h n o l o g y l i k e p h o t o c o p i e r s and v i d e o c a s s e t t e r e c o r d i n g d e v i c e s , remain i n a f i g u r a t i v e no man's l a n d between warring c a m p s . 1 8 8 Although these terms and i s s u e s were not i d e n t i f i e d as such i n the e a r l y s t a g e s o f c o p y r i g h t development, they a s s i s t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings of e a r l y c o p y r i g h t . The most i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e r a i s e d by the cases i n t h i s regard concerned the s t a t u s of abridgments. A d o c t r i n e emerged t h a t " g e n u i n e a b r i d g m e n t s " o f p r o t e c t e d works d i d not c o n s t i t u t e i n f r i n g e m e n t s , but were t h e m s e l v e s o r i g i n a l products of labour deserving of c o p y r i g h t . Lord Hardwicke s a i d i n Gyles v. Wilcox (1740): But t h i s [ f i n d i n g of i n f r i n g e m e n t ] must no t be c a r r i e d so f a r as t o r e s t r a i n p e r s o n s f r o m m aking a r e a l and f a i r abridgment, f o r abridgments may with great p r o p r i e t y be c a l l e d a new book, because not o n l y the paper and p r i n t , but the i n v e n t i o n , l e a r n i n g and judgment of the author i s shewn i n them, and i n many cases 92 a r e e x t r e m e l y u s e f u l , though i n some i n s t a n c e s p r e j u d i c i a l , by m i s t a k i n g and c u r t a i l i n g the sense of an a u t h o r , ( a t 490) C i t i n g G y l e s , the C o u r t i n Tonson v. Walker and Merchant (1752) s t a t e d the i s s u e t o be whether a l t e r a t i o n s i n an e x i s t i n g work e f f e c t i v e l y c r e a t e d a new work. Judges denied the s t a t u s of 'new work' to abridgments which i n v o l v e d o n l y minor (Company of S t a t i o n e r s v. Seymour (1677) ) or 'evasive' (Read v. Hodges ) amendments. B u r n e t t v. Chetwood (1722) r a i s e d the s i m i l a r case of t r a n s l a t i o n s : the Lord C h a n c e l l o r agreed t h a t t r a n s l a t i o n s , i n g e n e r a l , r e p r e s e n t e d o r i g i n a l work r e s u l t i n g from the "care and p a i n s " of the t r a n s l a t o r , of th e k i n d w h i c h t h e S t a t u t e i n t e n d e d t o e n c o u r a g e . He n e v e r t h e l e s s g r a n t e d an i n j u n c t i o n , i n p a r t b e c a u s e t h e t r a n s l a t i o n was somewhat too o r i g i n a l : . . . t h e p l a i n t i f f f i n d s t h a t t h e s a i d t r a n s l a t i o n i s e r r o n e o u s , and the sense and words o f the a u t h o r m i s t a k e n , and r e p r e s e n t e d i n an a b s u r d and r i d i c u l o u s manner, (at 1009) T h u s , d e s p i t e t h e c o u r t s ' t e n d e n c y t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of authors and t h e i r a s s i g n s i n the e a r l y c a s e s , they d i d not u n d e r s t a n d the p r o p e r t y r i g h t t o encompass ' d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s ' , i . e . , r i g h t s i n the author t o c o n t r o l the c r e a t i o n of new works brought about by a s u b s t a n t i a l t a k i n g of h i s work. T r a n s l a t i o n s and abridgments r e p r e s e n t forms of d e r i v a t i v e use most c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to pure copying, c e r t a i n l y 93 when compared to other u s e s — s u c h as d r a m a t i s a t i o n , f i l m i n g , and p e r f o r m i n g i n p u b l i c — which c o n s t i t u t e the l i f e b l o o d of many contemporary c o p y r i g h t i n d u s t r i e s . The author had, i n t h i s r e s p e c t , a n a r r o w l e g a l r i g h t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e p u b l i s h i n g and r e p r i n t i n g of the o r i g i n a l work v i r t u a l l y i n i t s e n t i r e t y . 1 8 9 The absence of p r o t e c t i o n f o r d e r i v a t i v e uses suggests t h a t a u t h o r s were n o t v i e w e d as o w n i n g more t h a n t h e p a r t i c u l a r expression which t h e i r work embodied. Although the d i s t i n c t i o n i n c o p y r i g h t between i d e a s (not p r o t e c t e d ) and e xpression (protected) r e c e i v e d e x p l i c i t j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y l a t e r 1 9 0 , the e a r l y cases i m p l i c i t l y accept the l i m i t . 2. Scope of the Right i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r The e a r l y c o p y r i g h t c a s e s a d d r e s s e d p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s r a i s e d i n f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s between a u t h o r s , p r i n t e r s and a l l e g e d i n f r i n g e r s or p i r a t e s . As such, they r e v e a l glimpses o f t h e way i n w h i c h c o u r t s c o n c e i v e d t h e r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g between these p a r t i e s , u s u a l l y ( a f t e r 1709) under the terms s e t out by the S t a t u t e of Anne. The cases making up the l i t e r a r y property debate which culminated i n M i l l a r and Donaldson, however, d i r e c t e d t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n a t t h e b a s e s i n law and p h i l o s o p h y f o r t h o s e r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 94 The M i l l a r C o u r t was r e q u i r e d by v i r t u e o f the i s s u e b e f o r e i t to conside r the scope of the author's r i g h t s under a common law c o p y r i g h t . The m a j o r i t y judges, i n r e c o g n i s i n g a common law r i g h t which had.as i t s main f e a t u r e p e r p e t u i t y — the p r i n c i p a l l i t i g a t i o n goal of the London b o o k s e l l e r s — a l s o adopted the r e s t r i c t e d concept of the author's r i g h t t h a t had emerged, i f only i n f l e e t i n g r e f e r e n c e s , i n the e a r l y cases. T h i s may w e l l have appeared to the judges, and the p l a i n t i f f , a r e a s o n a b l e and a p p r o p r i a t e t r a d e - o f f f o r a p e r p e t u a l r i g h t t o p revent p i r a c y of p r i n t e d works. In d i s s e n t , Mr. J u s t i c e Yates rooted h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s with the common law r i g h t i n the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c o p y r i g h t had unbounded s c o p e , t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e d an expansive r i g h t over ide a s and knowledge as w e l l as o r i g i n a l e x p r e s s i o n . (a) The M a j o r i t y — J u s t i c e s W i l l e s and Aston 1 9 1 W i l l e s J . commenced h i s o p i n i o n by l i s t i n g a s e r i e s of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s l i m i t i n g the impact of h i s judgment. Included i n the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were these comments: I t i s found too [ i n the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t ] "that the defendant s o l d s e v e r a l copies of the s a i d book." And t h e r e f o r e t h i s case i s n o t e m b a r r a s s e d w i t h a ny q u e s t i o n , "wherein c o n s i s t s the i d e n t i t y of a book." C e r t a i n l y b o n a f i d e i m i t a t i o n s , t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d a b r i d g m e n t s a r e d i f f e r e n t ; a n d , i n r e s p e c t o f t h e proper t y , may be considered as new works: but c o l o u r a b l e and f r a u d u l e n t v a r i a t i o n s w i l l not do. (at 205) 95 In so saying, he accepted the narrow c o p y r i g h t , which excluded an a uthor's having c o n t r o l over 'new works' d e r i v e d from h i s own, f o r the common law r i g h t . He l a t e r s t a t e d the essence of the i d e a / e x p r e s s i o n d i s t i n c t i o n which has formed the b a s i s of subsequent c o p y r i g h t law: . . . t h e l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n i s as the m a t e r i a l ; which always i s p r o p e r t y . The book c o n v e y s knowledge, i n s t r u c t i o n or e n t e r t a i n m e n t : but m u l t i p l y i n g c o p i e s i n p r i n t i s a q u i t e d i s t i n c t t h i n g from a l l the book communicates. And t h e r e i s no i n c o n g r u i t y , to r e s e r v e t h a t r i g h t ; and y e t convey the f r e e use of a l l the book teaches, (at 216) J u s t i c e Aston, approaching the i s s u e s more from p r i n c i p l e than p r e c e d e n t , a d d r e s s e d the argument t h a t the o b j e c t of c o p y r i g h t was " q u i t e i d e a l and imaginary" (at 216) and as such c o u l d not be known t o the common law. The r i g h t , though i n c o r p o r e a l , had a p h y s i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n the p r i n t e d book: The p r e s e n t c l a i m i s f o u n d e d upon the o r i g i n a l r i g h t to t h i s work, as being the mental labour of the author; and that the e f f e c t and produce of the labour i s h i s . I t i s a p e r s o n a l , i n c o r p o r e a l p r o p e r t y , s a l e a b l e and p r o f i t a b l e ; i t has i n d i c i a c e r t a : f o r , though the s e n t i m e n t s and d o c t r i n e may be c a l l e d i d e a l , yet when the same a r e communicated to the s i g h t and understanding of every man, by the medium o f p r i n t i n g , t h e w o r k b e c o m e s a d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e s u b j e c t of p r o p e r t y , and n o t t o t a l l y d e s t i t u t e o f c o r p o r e a l p r o p e r t i e s , (at 221-222) 96 N e v e r t h e l e s s , ownership of the p h y s i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the author's labour, the book, and ownership of c o p y r i g h t were two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . The former permitted every use to be made of the book and i t s contents, save one: He [the purchaser of a book] may improve upon i t , i m i t a t e i t , t r a n s l a t e i t ; oppose i t s s e n t i m e n t s : but he buys no r i g h t t o p u b l i s h the i d e n t i c a l book, (at 226) This represented c o p y r i g h t i n i t s narrowest sense. Aston J.'s w i l l i n g n e s s to a l l o w i m i t a t i o n s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g ; i t suggests he had i n mind the c l a s s i c a l n o t i o n of a r t , which envisaged i m i t a t i o n of the form of previous great w r i t e r s as the h a l l m a r k of l i t e r a r y endeavour. This approach would f i n d i n t r i n s i c uses, e.g., copying the work not to p u b l i s h i t but to f a c i l i t a t e s t udying i t , or le n d i n g i t to f r i e n d s , o u t s i d e the ambit o f c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n . Echoing the h o l d i n g i n Knaplock v. C u r l , Aston J . s t a t e d that o n l y the most e x p l i c i t a c t s by the author would e s t a b l i s h a "manifest i n t e n t " to g i v e up h i s p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t y i n the book, the c o p y r i g h t . 1 9 2 Lord M a n s f i e l d f o l l o w e d the l e a d of W i l l e s and A s t o n J J . i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e narrow s c o p e o f c o p y r i g h t when, i n showing how the K i n g ' s r i g h t s i n t h e E n g l i s h v e r s i o n of the B i b l e tracked those of common au t h o r s , he s a i d t h a t t h e K i n g had no r i g h t t o r e s t r a i n o t h e r s ' v e r s i f y i n g B i b l e passages, or making ot h e r t r a n s l a t i o n s (at 253). 97 S t i l l , as narrowly as the common law r i g h t was d e s c r i b e d , Aston J . i m p l i e d that i t might not be r e s t r i c t e d s o l e l y to the "book". In Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762), Blackstone had d e s c r i b e d the o b j e c t of value i n the author's work i n t h i s f a s h i o n : The next way of p u b l i c a t i o n [ a f t e r o r a l performance] i s by w r i t i n g , or d e s c r i b i n g i n c h a r a c t e r s , t h o s e words i n which an a u t h o r has c l o t h e d h i s i d e a s . Here the v a l u e which i s stamped upon the w r i t i n g a r i s e s merely from the matter i t conveys. Ch a r a c t e r s are but the signs of words, and words are the v e h i c l e of sentiments. The sentiment t h e r e f o r e i s the t h i n g of value, from which the p r o f i t must a r i s e , (at 181) J u s t i c e A s t o n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between an i n v e n t i o n and a book 1 9 3 s i m i l a r l y turned on f i n d i n g the i d e n t i t y of a book i n i t s i d e a s , "because i t s d o c t r i n e and s e n t i m e n t s a r e i t s e s s e n t i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t . " ( M i l l a r v. Taylor at 226) I f t h i s opened the door to the e s s e n t i a l p r o b l e m a t i c of the i d e a / e x p r e s s i o n d i s t i n c t i o n , i n J u s t i c e W i l l e s ' words t h e 'embarrassing q u e s t i o n wherein l i e s the i d e n t i t y of the book', Aston J . was prepared to l e a v e to the j u r y i n each case the i s s u e " o f the s u b s t a n t i a l work or c o m p o s i t i o n , and of i t s o r i g i n a l or d e r i v a t e ownership." (at 224) One o t h e r p o i n t from J u s t i c e Aston's o p i n i o n d e s e r v e s mention. The theory of p r o p e r t y he a p p l i e d to copyright turned on f i n d i n g p r e s e n t i n an ' o b j e c t ' a " d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e e x i s t e n c e " and "an a c t u a l v a l u e " . He a r g u e d t h a t b o t h c o n d i t i o n s were met i n a l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n . However, he 98 took pains to show that 'actual value' d i d not mean the o b j e c t must meet some t e s t of u s e f u l n e s s , o r — a p o i n t he c r e d i t e d to Locke and G r o t i u s — c o n s t i t u t e a 'necessary'. He meant that the m e r i t of a book, be i t measured i n l i t e r a r y worth or i n f o r m a t i o n a l v a l u e , c o u l d n o t be a r g u e d as a f a c t o r determining i t s p r o p e r t y s t a t u s . To summarise the p o s i t i o n of the m a j o r i t y i n M i l l a r , the author's p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n h i s work, while p e r p e t u a l i n d u r a t i o n , was c o n f i n e d narrowly to an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t over the c o p y i n g f o r s a l e (the ' m u l t i p l y i n g of copies f o r p r o f i t ' ) of h i s "book", i . e . , the p r e c i s e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of h i s e x p r e s s i o n . E x c l u d e d from the p r o p e r t y was any r i g h t over 'new works' based on h i s book, i n c l u d i n g abridgments and t r a n s l a t i o n s . Aside from these d e r i v a t i v e uses, the m a j o r i t y a l s o i m p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e d what might be termed an ' i n t r i n s i c u s e ' — t h a t i s , copying the book not f o r purposes of s a l e and p r o f i t , but f o r enhanced p e r s o n a l use. The r u l i n g i n Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare (1758) that the defendant c o u l d do anything w i t h the manuscript i n c l u d i n g copy, i t f o r p e r s o n a l reasons, so long as he d i d not p u b l i s h i t f o r the market, i s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with the m a j o r i t y ' s judgment. S i m i l a r l y , Blackstone i n Tonson v. C o l l i n s e a s i l y conceded that a c i r c u l a t i n g l i b r a r y d i d not i n f r i n g e c o p y r i g h t by l e n d i n g i t s b o o k s . 1 9 4 The m a j o r i t y thereby p r o t e c t e d what i t p e r c e i v e d to be the c r u c i a l , or o n l y , means of commercially e x p l o i t i n g a work o f a u t h o r s h i p : p u b l i s h i n g w h o l e c o p i e s f o r s a l e . The 99 c o r r e s p o n d i n g m i s c h i e f t o w h i c h t h e judgment a d d r e s s e d i t s e l f was ' p i r a c y ' b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g p r i n t e r s . S u c h a p e r c e p t i o n , a s s e n s i b l e a s i t a p p e a r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e s t a t e o f b o o k s e l l i n g a n d t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f p r i n t i n g , f o l l o w e d f r o m t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y c a s e s : n o t a u t h o r s , b u t p r i n t e r s c l a i m i n g a s a s s i g n e e s o f a p e r p e t u a l r i g h t t o p r o d u c e f o r t h e m a r k e t . T h e M i l l a r m a j o r i t y a l s o r e c o g n i s e d a f o r m o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i d e a s a n d e x p r e s s i o n w h i c h l e f t t h e f o r m e r u n p r o t e c t e d a n d f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e t o a l l . J u s t i c e Y a t e s f a i l e d t o make t h i s s u b t l e b u t c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , h e p o i n t e d o u t a s e r i o u s f l a w i n t h e m a j o r i t y ' s t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e common l a w r i g h t . (b) J u s t i c e Yates on the Scope of C o p y r i g h t J u s t i c e Y a t e s v i e w e d t h e p o s i t i o n f o r c o m m o n l a w c o p y r i g h t a s t h e s t a k i n g o f a c l a i m t o n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n i d e a s . T h e a u t h o r ' s m a n u s c r i p t was a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , t h e " o b j e c t o n l y o f h i s own l a b o u r " ( a t 2 3 0 ) , b u t t h e ' c o p y ' was " a l l i d e a l " ( a t 2 3 2 ) , a n i n t a n g i b l e c o m p o s i t e o f i d e a s a n d s e n t i m e n t s . A s s u c h , t h e c o p y c o u l d n o t b e s u b j e c t o f a p r o p e r t y r i g h t b e c a u s e common l a w p r i n c i p l e s h a d n e v e r a n d c o u l d n e v e r c o u n t e n a n c e p r o p e r t y i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t : . . . b u t t h e o b j e c t s o f them a l l [ r i g h t s i n t h e n a t u r e o f p r o p e r t y ] , t h e p r i n c i p a l 100 subject to which they r e l a t e , or i n which they e n j o y , must be c o r p o r e a l . And t h i s [ i s ] a p o s i t i o n which a r i s e s from t h e n e c e s s a r y n a t u r e o f a l l p r o p e r t y . F o r , p r o p e r t y has some c e r t a i n , d i s t i n c t and s e p a r a t e p o s s e s s i o n : the o b j e c t o f i t , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g v i s i b l e . . . . w h i c h has bounds to d e f i n e i t , and some marks t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t . (at 232) Pr o p e r t y arose from occupancy and p o s s e s s i o n , and granted to the owner a r i g h t o f e x c l u s i o n to p r e v e n t t r e s p a s s . These a t t r i b u t e s l o s t t h e i r meaning and purpose i f made m e r e l y n o t i o n a l , not corresponding to o b j e c t s i n the m a t e r i a l world. J u s t i c e Yates d i s t i n g u i s h e d between p r o p e r t y meaning 'property r i g h t ' , which he agreed was i n c o r p o r e a l , and p r o p e r t y meaning 'object of property r i g h t ' , which he b e l i e v e d must n e c e s s a r i l y be c o r p o r e a l . 1 9 5 Without p h y s i c a l demarcation, t h i r d p a r t i e s could not know the boundaries they must r e s p e c t , and i t would not be p o s s i b l e even t o i d e n t i f y the moment when p r o p e r t y commenced. J u s t i c e Yates i n s i s t e d that the o b j e c t of c o p y r i g h t was the i d e a , not i t s p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n . He understood the manuscript only as a s i n g u l a r o b j e c t , to which the usual r u l e s of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a p p l i e d (as w e l l as r u l e s of t r u s t and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y owing to i t s communicative nature) and not as an embodiment of e x p r e s s i o n capable of being d i s t i n g u i s h e d and made e x c l u s i v e a t common law. Yates J . d i d not g r a s p the m e d i a t i n g r o l e of the t e x t , which gave a f i x e d form to the a u t h o r ' s i n v e n t i o n . H i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t t e r d e s c r i b e s 101 present-day c o p y r i g h t , with i t s p r o t e c t i o n of the substance of a f i c t i o n a l work and of v a r i o u s d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s , than the r i g h t t o make c o p i e s o f e n t i r e books, w h i c h t h e M i l l a r m a j o r i t y r ecognised as c o p y r i g h t . Y a t e s J . ' s c o n c e r n was t h a t a p r o p e r t y r i g h t t o an i n c o r p o r e a l had no p r i n c i p l e d l i m i t s , whether of d u r a t i o n or sc o p e . He f o u n d the m a j o r i t y ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t common law copyright extended only to d u p l i c a t i o n s of a t e x t , and not to ab r i d g m e n t s or t r a n s l a t i o n s , l o g i c a l l y u n c o n v i n c i n g . The m a j o r i t y l o c a t e d the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o p y r i g h t i n the dual f a c e t s of t h e l a b o u r t h e o r y : a per s o n i s e n t i t l e d t o the f r u i t s of h i s labour, and no one i s e n t i t l e d to reap where he has not sown. With an i n c o r p o r e a l d e r i v e d from i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r , however, the " f r u i t s " have no natural, d e f i n i t i o n . I f the author's reward f o r h i s labour meant p r o f i t s f l o w i n g from t h i r d p a r t y uses of h i s composition, then almost no a c t i v i t y f e l l o u tside the property r i g h t : I f the buyer of a book may not make what use o f i t he p l e a s e s , what l i n e can be drawn that w i l l not tend to supersede a l l h i s dominion over i t ? he may not lend i t , i f he i s not to p r i n t i t ; because i t w i l l i n t r e n c h upon the a u t h o r ' s p r o f i t s . So t h a t an o b j e c t i o n might be made even to h i s l e n d i n g the book to h i s f r i e n d s ; f o r he may prevent those f r i e n d s from buying the book; and so the p r o f i t s of such s a l e of i t w i l l not accrue to the author, (at 234) 102 In other words, the value of a composition depended p r e c i s e l y on what uses of the book the law made the e x c l u s i v e p r e s e r v e of the a u t h o r — law determined value, so value c o u l d not serve as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r law: From [ p u b l i c a t i o n ] , t h e v a l u e , w i t h r e s p e c t t o the a u t h o r , depends upon h i s r i g h t t o t h e s o l e a n d p e r p e t u a l p u b l i c a t i o n o f them: and the g r e a t p o i n t i n q u e s t i o n i s , 'whether he i s i n t i t l e d to t h a t r i g h t , o r n o t . 1 But l a y i n g t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n a s i d e , mere v a l u e , ( a l l may s e e ) , w i l l not d e s c r i b e the p r o p e r t y i n t h i s . The a i r , the l i g h t , the sun, are of v a l u e i n e s t i m a b l e : but who can c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n them ? mere v a l u e does not c o n s t i t u t e p r o p e r t y , (at 230) The l a t t e r phrase r e v e a l s J u s t i c e Yates' u n d e r l y i n g view of the author as an i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r e r , t a k i n g up those ideas which, l i k e the a i r and s u n l i g h t , are a l l about him, and by i n t e r m i x i n g h i s labour e n r i c h i n g the common c u l t u r e f o r use by o t h e r s . Yates J . d i d not share the m a j o r i t y ' s impression of the a u t h o r as o r i g i n a t o r o f v a l u e , and o f works of unique e x p r e s s i o n . He d i d b e l i e v e that authors deserved reward i n the form of an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to copy f o r a l i m i t e d time, a reward o n l y l e g i s l a t i o n , and not common law, could d e s i g n . 103 D. PERSONAL INTERESTS OF THE AUTHOR: LORD MANSFIELD AND THE LITERARY PROPERTY QUESTION 1. The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n Cases The four cases c i t e d i n M i l l a r as r e c o g n i s i n g a common law r i g h t i n an a u t h o r t o p u b l i s h , or a u t h o r i s e t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f , h i s work played a c e n t r a l r o l e i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e . S i n c e the S t a t u t e o f Anne p r o t e c t e d o n l y p r i n t e d books, t h e s e c a s e s — Pope v. C u r l (1741), Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare (1758), Webb v. Rose (1732), and F o r r e s t e r v. Waller (1741)—could not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d on the b a s i s .they merely enforced the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t . I f a r i g h t t o p u b l i s h e x i s t e d a t common law, t h e proponents of l i t e r a r y property argued, then how cou l d the a c t of p u b l i c a t i o n , unaccompanied by any r e n u n c i a t i o n of r i g h t s by the a u t h o r or h i s a s s i g n e e , e f f e c t i v e l y e x t i n g u i s h i t ? C e r t a i n l y f o r Lord M a n s f i e l d t h i s was the key p o i n t : I f the copy belongs to an author, a f t e r p u b l i c a t i o n ; i t c e r t a i n l y belonged to him b e f o r e . But i f i t does not belong to him a f t e r ; where i s t h e common law t o be f o u n d , w h i c h s a y s " t h e r e i s s u c h a p r o p e r t y b e f o r e ? " a l l the m e t a p h y s i c a l s u b t i l t i e s from the nature of the t h i n g may be e q u a l l y o b j e c t e d to the p r o p e r t y b e f o r e . I t i s i n c o r p o r e a l ; i t r e l a t e s to i d e a s d e t a c h e d f r o m a n y p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e . ( M i l l a r v. T a y l o r at 252) 104 In Duke of Queensberry (1758) Chancery, i n Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s view, had no t r o u b l e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the manuscript i n the defendant Gwynn's hands and the property i n t e r e s t : Mr. Gwynn might have thrown i t i n t o the f i r e , had he pleased. But at the d i s t a n c e of near a hundred y e a r s , the copy was adjudged the property o f Lord Clarendon's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; and Mr. Gwynn's p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g i t , without t h e i r consent, was adjudged an i n j u r y to that p r o p e r t y . . . (at 252) The Lords C h a n c e l l o r i n both Duke of Queensberry (1758) and Pope v. C u r l (1741) had a l s o spoken of the defendants' a c t s as u s u r p i n g a p r o f i t t o which the a u t h o r s (and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) were e n t i t l e d should they decide to p u b l i s h . But o t h e r e q u a l l y important i n t e r e s t s were at p l a y i n those cases. J u s t i c e Yates used them as the b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n cases from M i l l a r : . . . i n a l l t h e s e c a s e s the p u b l i c a t i o n s were s u r r e p t i t i o u s , a g a i n s t the w i l l of the owner [of the m a n u s c r i p t s ] , before he had consented to the p u b l i c a t i o n of them; and, as such, they w i l l have no e f f e c t upon the present q u e s t i o n . I t i s c e r t a i n e v e r y man has a r i g h t t o keep h i s own sentiments, i f he p l e a s e s : he has c e r t a i n l y a r i g h t to judge whether he w i l l make them p u b l i c , or commit them o n l y t o t h e s i g h t o f h i s f r i e n d s . In t h a t s t a t e , the manuscript i s , i n every sense, h i s p e c u l i a r property; and no man can take i t from him, or make any use of i t which he h a s n o t a u t h o r i z e d , w i t h o u t b e i n g g u i l t y of a v i o l a t i o n of h i s p r o p e r t y . . . . But t h i s does not a p p l y t o the p r e s e n t q u e s t i o n (at 242) 105 In o t h e r words, the author had l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s o f a per s o n a l r a t h e r than commercial nature i n d e c i d i n g whether or not t o p u b l i s h a m a n u s c r i p t , i n t e r e s t s t h e common law recognised as a form of p r o p e r t y r i g h t ; the v i o l a t o r of that r i g h t was g u i l t y o f a b r e a c h of t r u s t or c o n f i d e n c e , not merely or n e c e s s a r i l y an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p r o f i t s . L o r d M a n s f i e l d a l s o i d e n t i f i e d the p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i m p l i c a t e d i n the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n c a s e s as an i m p o r t a n t aspect of the pr o p e r t y r i g h t of common law c o p y r i g h t ; indeed, c o p y r i g h t ' s c a p a c i t y to p r o t e c t those i n t e r e s t s t h r o u g h a grant to the author of e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over the whole course of p u b l i c a t i o n was fundamental to h i s r u l i n g . T h i s cannot be s a i d of any other j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n given d u r i n g the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e up to and i n c l u d i n g Donaldson v. B e c k e t t (1774). The nature and f u n c t i o n of the c o p y r i g h t Lord M a n s f i e l d d e r i v e d from n a t u r a l law was a cop y r i g h t that responded both to p r o p r i e t a r y and p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s . To Lord M a n s f i e l d i t was s i g n i f i c a n t that Pope had "a very imperfect memory of [ h i s l e t t e r s ' ] c o n t e n t s : which made him the more anxious to stop t h e i r . p u b l i c a t i o n . " ( a t 252) The l e t t e r s may have had commercial v a l u e , but more i m p o r t a n t , Pope had a r i g h t to p r e v e n t t h e i r p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . The v e r y e s s e n c e o f the a s s e r t e d common law co p y r i g h t was that i t pr o v i d e d the author c o n t r o l over the uses made of the products of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c l a b o u r , a c o n t r o l t h at had economic v a l u e and 106 p r e s e r v e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the author and h i s work, and indeed h i s p u b l i c persona. Should t h i s r i g h t not s u r v i v e p u b l i c a t i o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between author and work would be ruptured: He i s no more master of the use of h i s own name. He h a s no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of h i s own work. He can not p r e v e n t a d d i t i o n s . He can not r e t r a c t e r r o r s . He can not amend; or c a n c e l a f a u l t y e d i t i o n . Any one may p r i n t , p i r a t e and p e r p e t u a t e the i m p e r f e c t i o n s , to the d i s g r a c e and a g a i n s t the w i l l of t h e author; may propagate sentiments under h i s name, which he disapproves, repents and i s ashamed o f . He can e x e r c i s e no d i s c r e t i o n as to the manner i n which, or the persons by whom h i s work s h a l l be p u b l i s h e d , (at 252) 2. P e r s o n a l I n t e r e s t s A f t e r Donaldson V. Beckett (1774) The common view which followed the h o l d i n g i n J e f f e r y s v. Boosey i n 1854 was that i n Donaldson the House of Lords agreed with the Court of King's Bench i n M i l l a r that a common law c o p y r i g h t e x i s t e d , but f u r t h e r found t h i s r i g h t had been e x t i n g u i s h e d f o r a l l p u b l i s h e d books by the Statute of Anne i n 1 7 0 9 . 1 9 6 As a consequence, co p y r i g h t became for a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t , whose terms and s c o p e h e n c e f o r t h were t o be d e t e r m i n e d by the l e g i s l a t u r e . The e x c e p t i o n was the r i g h t to f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n w h i c h , n o t a f f e c t e d by the S t a t u t e of Anne, r e t a i n e d i t s r o o t s i n the common law. 107 Lyman P a t t e r s o n ' s p o i n t t h a t the r e j e c t i o n of a common law d e v e l o p m e n t f o r an a u t h o r ' s c o p y r i g h t e f f e c t e d by Donaldson s t i f l e d r e c o g n i t i o n of p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s p e c u l i a r to the author i s l a r g e l y borne out by h i s t o r y . 1 9 7 B r i t i s h and U.S. c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e s c o n c e r n e d t h e m s e l v e s o n l y w i t h commercial r i g h t s . Le d r o i t m o r a l , or moral r i g h t s of the author, a concept f a m i l i a r to c o n t i n e n t a l Europe's c o p y r i g h t laws from an e a r l y stage, has only r e c e n t l y s t a r t e d to appear i n A n g l o - A m e r i c a n s t a t u t o r y l a w . 1 9 8 A s t r i k i n g e x c e p t i o n occurred i n Canada. The Copyright Act of 1921, modeled c l o s e l y i n almost every other respect on the Imperial C o p y r i g h t Act of 1911, i n c l u d e d a moral r i g h t s p r o v i s i o n i n s. 12(7): Independently of the author's c o p y r i g h t , and e ven a f t e r the a s s i g n m e n t , e i t h e r w h o l l y o r p a r t i a l l y , o f t h e s a i d c o p y r i g h t , the a u t h o r has the r i g h t to c l a i m a u t h o r s h i p of the work, as w e l l as t h e r i g h t t o r e s t r a i n any d i s t o r t i o n , m u t i l a t i o n or o t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n of the work t h a t would be p r e j u d i c i a l t o h i s honour or r e p u t a t i o n . In the 1988 Amendments to the Copyright Act the moral r i g h t s were expanded and e l a b o r a t e d . ^-^^ 3. P e r s o n a l I n t e r e s t s and Copyright Law The p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s which former s. 12(7) and the new s s . 12.1, 12.2, 18.1 and 18.2 p r o t e c t concern the a u t h o r ' s r e p u t a t i o n : the i n t e r e s t s of p a t e r n i t y (the r i g h t to c l a i m a u t h o r s h i p o r use a pseudonym) 2 0 0 and o f t h e w o r k ' s 108 i n t e g r i t y . 2 0 1 The r i g h t s enumerated are separate and d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t , a l t h o u g h c e r t a i n o f t h e 1988 amendments— making the mor a l r i g h t s of e q u a l d u r a t i o n t o c o p y r i g h t , and making them waivable 2 0 2 — e f f e c t i v e l y b r i n g them c l o s e r t o g e t h e r . These i n t e r e s t s are not s o l e l y nor, i n a l l circumstances, b e s t p r o t e c t e d by the moral r i g h t s p r o v i s i o n of the A c t . C o p y r i g h t i t s e l f p e r m i t s t h e a u t h o r t h r o u g h c o n t r a c t u a l arrangements t o e x e r c i s e a degree of c o n t r o l over the uses which can and cannot be made of h i s w o r k . 2 0 3 Common law a c t i o n s such as defamation and passing o f f are a l s o a v a i l a b l e to p r o t e c t the author's r e p u t a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 2 0 4 S e c t i o n 12(7) of the Act d i d not p r o t e c t what i s perhaps the most fundamental p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t of authors: p r i v a c y . 2 0 5 That i n t e r e s t had s i n c e Pope v. C u r l (1741) been the pre s e r v e of the r i g h t o f f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n . A f t e r Donaldson , t h i s r i g h t remained the only p a r t of cop y r i g h t recognised at common law. The B r i t i s h C o p y r i g h t Act of 1911 and the C a n a d i a n C o p y r i g h t A c t o f 1921 i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e r i g h t o f f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n i n t o s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t . 2 0 6 N e v e r t h e l e s s , the r i g h t to decide whether or not to p u b l i s h continued to o b t a i n s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n under the s t a t u t e s and as a matter o f j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For example: ( i ) a n u n p u b l i s h e d w o r k h a s c o p y r i g h t f o r an i n d e f i n i t e d u r a t i o n ; 2 0 7 109 ( i i ) u n a u t h o r i s e d p u b l i c a t i o n of an u n p u b l i s h e d work c o n s t i t u t e s u n f a i r d e a l i n g ; 2 0 8 ( i i i ) t h e A c t p r o v i d e s c o m p u l s o r y l i c e n c e s o n l y f o r p u b l i s h e d w o r k s . 2 0 9 The s p e c i a l treatment accorded the r i g h t of p u b l i c a t i o n s u g g e s t s i t may have a d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s than o t h e r r i g h t s granted i n the A c t . In Canada, the Supreme Court has f l i r t e d with r e c o g n i s i n g a " r i g h t of p r i v a c y " i n s. 8 of the Canadian C h a r t e r o f R i g h t s and Freedoms, the " s e a r c h and s e i z u r e " p r o v i s i o n . x u S e v e r a l p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s have adopted p r i v a c y s t a t u t e s w h i c h p r o t e c t a v a r i e t y o f p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s . The C o p y r i g h t A c t r e m a i n s , h o w e v e r , a s i g n i f i c a n t i n s t r u m e n t f o r p r o t e c t i n g the p r i v a c y of the author's w r i t t e n , and other, works of e x p r e s s i o n . The unique nature of the r i g h t of f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n i s e v i d e n c e d , a l b e i t i n m i r r o r f a s h i o n , i n the e a r l y Canadian case Morang & Co. v. LeSueur Z J-^. The author had s o l d h i s manuscript biography of W i l l i a m Lyon Mackenzie to a p u b l i s h e r . The c o n t r a c t d i d not s p e c i f y the p u b l i s h e r to be under a duty to p u b l i s h , and f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons i t decided n e i t h e r to do so nor to r e t u r n the m a n u s c r i p t to the a u t h o r . J In the Supreme Court of Canada, F i t z p a t r i c k C.J., r u l e d that a book c o u l d not be t r e a t e d l i k e o t h e r merchandise, and that while the author c o u l d a l i e n a t e h i s r i g h t not to p u b l i s h , t h i s c o u l d be e f f e c t e d o n l y by e x p r e s s terms. The C o u r t i n e s s e n c e I 110 d i s t i n g u i s h e d between the p u b l i s h e r ' s undisputed r i g h t to the commercial c o p y r i g h t should he p u b l i s h , and the author's r i g h t to f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n . 2 1 4 In the U n i t e d S t a t e , the e a r l y E n g l i s h c o p y r i g h t cases formed the f o u n d a t i o n f o r the argument of Brandeis and Warren i n t h e i r seminal 1890 a r t i c l e "The Right to P r i v a c y " . 2 1 5 They argued that the i n j u n c t i o n s granted to prevent p u b l i c a t i o n of l e t t e r s and other p r i v a t e w r i t i n g s d i d not r e s t on property i n what they saw as i t s previous narrow sense: The p r i n c i p l e w hich p r o t e c t s p e r s o n a l w r i t i n g s a n d a l l o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o d u c t i o n s , n o t a g a i n s t t h e f t a n d p h y s i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n , but a g a i n s t p u b l i c a t i o n i n any form i s i n r e a l i t y not the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , but that of an i n v i o l a t e p e r s o n a l i t y . 2 r ° Judge Jon O. Newman r e c e n t l y expanded on t h i s i n s i g h t . In commenting on the E n g l i s h cases he s a i d : There i s s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n i n the e a r l y c a s e s t h a t w h i l e t h e r i g h t b e i n g a r t i c u l a t e d was one o f p r o p e r t y , t h e i n t e r e s t b e i n g p r o t e c t e d was one o f p r i v a c y . Why t h e n d i d t h e c o u r t s not p r o t e c t p r i v a c y as such ? The answer l i e s i n the law of remedies. P r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t copying r e q u i r e d an i n j u n c t i o n . The e q u i t y c o u r t s d o u b t e d t h e i r power t o i s s u e i n j u n c t i o n s to p r o t e c t 'personal' r i g h t s , but c o n f i d e n t l y commanded r e s t r a i n t o f p u b l i c a t i o n to p r o t e c t p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . And so the law of l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t v was e n l i s t e d i n the s e r v i c e of p r i v a c y . I l l 4 . Lord M a n s f i e l d : Authors and P r o p e r t y Rights In r e t u r n i n g to the a n a l y s i s of Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s judgment i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r , the l a s t phrase from Newman, turned on i t s head, provides a u s e f u l f o c u s : p r i v a c y was e n l i s t e d i n the s e r v i c e of l i t e r a r y property. A f t e r a l l , the i s s u e presented t o K i n g ' s Bench was whether l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y e x i s t e d a t common law. L o r d M a n s f i e l d found i n the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n cases precedent f o r the p r o p e r t y r i g h t . J u s t i c e s W i l l e s and A s t o n d i d so as w e l l , but u n l i k e them, L o r d M a n s f i e l d was f u l l y aware and prepared to acknowledge that those cases d e a l t w i t h i n t e r e s t s beyond the a u t h o r ' s o p p o r t u n i t y to reap the p r o f i t s of h i s l a b o u r : I t i s j u s t , t h a t another s h o u l d not use h i s name, without h i s consent. I t i s f i t that he should judge when to p u b l i s h , or whether he w i l l ever p u b l i s h . I t i s f i t he should not o n l y choose the time, but the manner o f p u b l i c a t i o n ; how many; what volume; what p r i n t . I t i s f i t , he should choose t o whose c a r e he w i l l t r u s t the a c c u r a c y a n d c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e i m p r e s s i o n ; i n whose h o n e s t y he w i l l c o n f i d e , not to f o i s t i n a d d i t i o n s . . . (at 252) In t h i s passage he i d e n t i f i e d the i n t e r e s t s l a t e r comprised by m o r a l r i g h t : t h e r i g h t to c l a i m a u t h o r s h i p , the r i g h t t o m aintain the work's i n t e g r i t y and the r i g h t to r e p u t a t i o n . To L o r d M a n s f i e l d , the c o n t r o l which c o p y r i g h t a t common law would give an author to preserve h i s connection to the o b j e c t of h i s c r e a t i o n was i t s e l f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the p r o p e r t y r i g h t . 112 The o t h e r judges who c o n s i d e r e d the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y q u e s t i o n d i d not advert, t o t h i s i s s u e . In a c c o r d w i t h h i s p h y s i c a l i s t concept of the o b j e c t s of property 2 1 8 J u s t i c e Yates viewed the r i g h t of f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y as a r i g h t to the manuscript as an o b j e c t over which the author had o w n e r s h i p r i g h t s t h a t gave r i s e t o a c t i o n s i n t r e s p a s s or t r o v e r f o r a t a k i n g without consent, i n a d d i t i o n to a c l a i m of b r e a c h of t r u s t a g a i n s t a p a r t y who p u b l i s h e d the manuscript a f t e r r e c e i v i n g i t under a d u t y , e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d , of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . He d i d not o t h e r w i s e i d e n t i f y any non- c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t o f t h e a u t h o r i n the o b j e c t o f h i s c r e a t i o n . J u s t i c e s A s t o n and W i l l e s concerned t h e m s e l v e s s o l e l y w i t h the a u t h o r ' s i n t e r e s t i n r e a p i n g the m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s of h i s c r e a t i v e l a b o u r , and the advisory o p i n i o n s of the judges i n Donaldson f o l l o w e d Yates, W i l l e s and Aston J J . i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e approaches. L o r d M a n s f i e l d e n v i s a g e d common law c o p y r i g h t as p e r p e t u a l and a l i e n a b l e . P e r s o n a l r i g h t s , i n c o n t r a s t t o p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , are c h a r a c t e r i z e d as being n o n - a l i e n a b l e and l i m i t e d to the l i f e t i m e of the i n d i v i d u a l , and indeed moral r i g h t s i n Canadian c o p y r i g h t law had those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s u n t i l the 1988 amendments. 2 1 9 Lord M a n s f i e l d d i d not, apart f r o m u s i n g t h e p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s o f t h e a u t h o r as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the property r i g h t , d e a l with them i n d e t a i l and so the absence from h i s o p i n i o n of any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of how the author c o u l d p r e s e r v e t h o s e i n t e r e s t s o u t s i d e the 113 c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with h i s p u b l i s h e r i s not s u r p r i s i n g . Nor d i d Lord M a n s f i e l d e x p l a i n whether h e i r s or assignees of the author c o u l d a s s e r t the r i g h t to maintain the i n t e g r i t y of the work, a l t h o u g h h i s reasons i m p l i e d t h i s to be the case. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s o p i n i o n , however, l i e s i n the c e n t r a l i t y w h i c h he gave p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e author's endeavour. Where others saw the reward of the author f o r h i s o r i g i n a l e f f o r t s i n the p r o f i t he c o u l d make from the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o m u l t i p l y c o p i e s of h i s work f o r s a l e , whether i n p e r p e t u i t y or f o r a term l i m i t e d by s t a t u t e , Lord M a n s f i e l d saw a f u l l e r reward which responded as w e l l to the author as a c r e a t o r , as the maker of something which remained i n some f a s h i o n i n t e g r a l to h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . In sum, the use of the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n cases i n M i l l a r by t h e m a j o r i t y r e v e a l s a d i c h o t o m y i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p accorded p r o p r i e t a r y and p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s which s t i l l e x i s t s a t the c o r e o f c o p y r i g h t i n t h e common law j u r i s d i c t i o n s . On one hand, Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s view represented the r e c o g n i t i o n of something important about p r o p e r t y r i g h t s : t h e i r value i n c o r p o r a t e s a p r o t e c t i o n of personhood as w e l l as of m a t e r i a l r e w a r d . On the o t h e r , the m a j o r i t y judgment embodied a form of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m , ^" i n the sense o f u s i n g p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s l i k e p r i v a c y t o j u s t i f y c o n s t i t u t i n g the c r e a t i v e i n d i v i d u a l as possessor of p r o p e r t y f o r p u r e l y commercial purposes; i . e . , f i n d i n g i n the author's p a r t i c u l a r p r i v a t e c o n c e r n s a r e a s o n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a 114 c o m m e r c i a l r i g h t of l i m i t l e s s d u r a t i o n . D a v i d Lange has i d e n t i f i e d the c o n v e r s i o n of j u d i c i a l c o n c e r n with p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n t o p r o p e r t y r i g h t s as a h a l l m a r k o f t h e development of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y and r e l a t e d r i g h t s . A prime example of h i s t h e s i s i s the " r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y " now w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d i n American law. E. A CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPART: MISAPPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS The e v o l u t i o n from l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of i n t e r e s t s of a personal nature to a system of property r i g h t s , which i s the i n t e r n a l l o g i c of M i l l a r i n the m a j o r i t y ' s treament of the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n cases, has at l e a s t one modern c o u n t e r p a r t : a c t i o n s f o r m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y and the r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y . T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l c o n c e r n i t s e l f more w i t h the extensive U.S. development i n t h i s area than with the Canadian and Commonwealth experiences. E a r l y American cases r e c o g n i s i n g the r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l s to be f r e e from unwanted uses of photographs of themselves, a s s o c i a t i o n s with commercial endeavours, or p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n were i n s p i r e d by the work of Brandeis and W a r r e n . 2 2 1 Because of t h i s b a s i s i n a r i g h t of p r i v a c y , courts denied p r o t e c t i o n to i n d i v i d u a l s who had opened much of t h e i r l i v e s to p u b l i c view ( i e , most c e l e b r i t i e s ) , on a theory of w a i v e r . 2 2 2 And i n d e e d , i n terms o f a p r i v a c y r i g h t 115 narrowly conceived t h i s made sense because i n many cases the i s s u e was not d i s c l o s u r e or breach of p r i v a c y per se , but r a t h e r whether the well-known p u b l i c f i g u r e had c o n t r o l over c o m m e r c i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n o f h i s fame. The d o c t r i n e w hich e v e n t u a l l y emerged i n response to the l a t t e r problem was the r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y , a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n one's own name and l i k e n e s s . The c e l e b r i t y now had a f u r t h e r commodity to s e l l , i n a d d i t i o n to h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l t a l e n t s and the r i g h t s i n any p r o d u c t s f o r which he was r e s p o n s i b l e : h i s persona. On t h i s r i g h t i s founded the enormous merchandising i n d u s t r y through which s t a r s of s t a g e , s c r e e n , s p o r t s and o t h e r c e l e b r a t e d a c t i v i t i e s market t h e i r fame d i r e c t l y , or to enhance s a l e s of ot h e r w i s e u n r e l a t e d c o m m o d i t i e s . 2 2 3 The r o o t s o f p u b l i c i t y r i g h t s i n p r i v a c y law c o n t i n u e t o cause t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o n f u s i o n ( f o r i n s t a n c e , a debate has raged over whether p u b l i c i t y r i g h t s are i n h e r i t a b l e as property) and s t a t e s such as C a l i f o r n i a have t r i e d to untangle the web by g r a n t i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l s a r i g h t o f p r i v a c y t o p r e v e n t a p p r o p r i a t i o n of name or l i k e n e s s up to the p o i n t at which t h e y a u t h o r i s e t h e i r c o m m e r c i a l u s e , and t h e n c e f o r t h a pr o p e r t y r i g h t i n f u r t h e r e x p l o i t a t i o n . 2 2 5 T h i s development s t r o n g l y resembles the e v o l u t i o n o f co p y r i g h t law. From M i l l a r u n t i l the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, c o p y r i g h t was conceived as a commercial r i g h t that arose only a f t e r an author had pu b l i s h e d h i s work, thereby waiving a r i g h t born i n p r i v a c y t o withhold p u b l i c a t i o n . 116 In Canada, a r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y as such has not y e t r e c e i v e d r e c o g n i t i o n , a l t h o u g h c a u s e s of a c t i o n c l o s e l y approximating the p u b l i c i t y r i g h t are now e s t a b l i s h e d i n both s t a t u t e and common law. Se v e r a l p r o v i n c e s have enacted p r i v a c y s t a t u t e s which i n c l u d e amongst t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n s the r i g h t to prevent u n a u t h o r i s e d commercial use of name or l i k e n e s s . • Furt h e r , i n Krouse v. C h r y s l e r Canada L t d . , E s t e y , J.A. as he then was, acknowledged that "the common law does contemplate a concept i n the law of t o r t s which may be broadly c l a s s i f i e d as an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of one's p e r s o n a l i t y " . *' Developments i n other Commonwealth j u r i s d i c t i o n s roughly f o l l o w the Canadian p a t t e r n of o f f e r i n g some p r o t e c t i o n , but l e s s than that found i n most American s t a t e s . 2 2 8 S e v e r a l c o m m e n t a t o r s 2 2 9 have suggested t h a t the a c t i o n f o r m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p e r s o n a l i t y , o r t h e r i g h t o f p u b l i c i t y , represents not two r i g h t s j o i n e d but a s i n g l e r i g h t to c o n t r o l the use others make of one's p e r s o n a l i t y . The p o i n t i s t h a t a pe r s o n a l i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g one's i d e n t i t y and p r i v a c y extends beyond the moment at which one engages i n d i s c l o s u r e of p r i v a t e f a c t s or images, and deserves r e s p e c t i n a d d i t i o n t o any r i g h t s of commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n . J U One should have the r i g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e , to prevent others from a s s o c i a t i n g f e a t u r e s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h one's p e r s o n a l i t y w i t h t h e i r p r o d u c t s , not simply because t h i s d e nies a commercial o p p o r t u n i t y , but because the a s s o c i a t i o n o f f e n d s a sense of personal i n t e g r i t y . 2 3 1 Such a t h e o r e t i c a l approach t r a c k s the 117 l i n e of argument developed by Lord M a n s f i e l d , who envisaged c o p y r i g h t as p r o p e r t y p e r f o r m i n g the f u n c t i o n of p r o t e c t i n g both p e r s o n a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s of a u t h o r s . The analogy between c o p y r i g h t and r i g h t s of p u b l i c i t y , while s t r o n g , should not be overdrawn. The analogy breaks down when l o o k i n g a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e two r i g h t s i n economic t h e o r y . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o p y r i g h t t h a t i t encourages the p r o d u c t i o n of o r i g i n a l e x p r e s s i o n i s not so e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e t o r i g h t s of p u b l i c i t y , because " c e l e b r i t y " g e n e r a l l y f o l l o w s as a f o r t u i t o u s by-product of a c t i v i t i e s u n d e r t a k e n f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s and r e w a r d s . The s t r o n g e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a " r i g h t of p u b l i c i t y " i s a theory of u n j u s t enrichment. With a c o n t i n u i n g 'commodification' of p e r s o n a l i t y e f f e c t e d by p u b l i c i t y r i g h t s , however, t h i s may change, and m a n u f a c t u r i n g c e l e b r i t y f o r t h e s h e e r p u r p o s e o f i t s commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n may become the norm. 118 V. THEORIES OF PROPERTY IN MILLAR V. TAYLOR A. LIMITS OF PRECEDENT AND THE RESORT TO REASON T h i s paper has examined the l e g a l a u t h o r i t y argued and c o n s i d e r e d i n M i l l a r , d i v i d i n g i t r o u g h l y i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : (1) cases preceding M i l l a r i n England and S c o t l a n d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f the London b o o k s e l l e r s ' e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h a p e r p e t u a l common law c o p y r i g h t ; (2) c a s e s i n v o l v i n g e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to p u b l i s h books e x e r c i s e d by or at the grant of the Crown; (3) a s e r i e s of i n j u n c t i v e a c t i o n s brought by a u t h o r s and b o o k s e l l e r s i n Chancery t o v i n d i c a t e v a r i o u s p e r s o n a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s i n p u b l i c a t i o n . At t h a t p o i n t , t h e c h a i n of p r e c e d e n t stopped and M i l l a r v. T a y l o r (1769) began. In l i t i g a t i o n d i r e c t e d at f i x i n g the p l a c e of the r i g h t to copy i n r e l a t i o n t o the common law of p r o p e r t y , i t might have seemed l i k e l y e i t h e r or both p a r t i e s would c i t e a u t h o r i t y d r awn f r o m t h e f i e l d s o f p e r s o n a l or r e a l p r o p e r t y t o i l l u s t r a t e the p r i n c i p l e s at stake. With a s i n g l e e x c e p t i o n , t h i s d i d not happen. J u s t i c e A s t o n c i t e d an E l i z a b e t h a n d e c i s i o n , I r e l a n d v. H i g g i n s (1587) Cro. E l i z 125, 78 ER 383, i n w h i c h a p l a i n t i f f c l a i m i n g o w n e r s h i p o f a g r e y h o u n d succeeded over the d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n t h a t the dog, as f e r a e n a t u r a e , when out of p o s s e s s i o n was not s u b j e c t of 119 p r o p e r t y . He d i d so p r e c i s e l y t o make the p o i n t t h a t the common law recognised p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n novel o b j e c t s on the b a s i s of p r i n c i p l e ( o b j e c t ' s d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y , determinacy of owner) without p r e c e d e n t . 2 3 2 One can sp e c u l a t e on the reasons why c o u n s e l and judges d i d not go to r e a l or p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y f o r precedent. Real property, with i t s b a s i s i n f e u d a l law and d o c t r i n e of s e i s i n may have seemed of l i t t l e r e l e v a n c e to the i s s u e at b a r . 2 3 3 The emerging p r i n c i p l e s of p e r s o n a l property, c e n t r e d as they were on p o s s e s s i o n , may have o n l y underlined the problem which the r i g h t to copy r e p r e s e n t e d : the s e p a r a t i o n o f p o s s e s s i o n and ownership. More important, as James Evans s h o w s , 2 3 4 the d o c t r i n e of s t a r e d e c i s i s had not yet reached i t s p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n by the time of M i l l a r . While cases drawn from r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y would i n any event have had exemplary v a l u e , r a t h e r than s e r v i n g as a u t h o r i t y f o r c o p y r i g h t , the p o i n t i s h e l p f u l i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t pre-1800 c o u r t s were c o m f o r t a b l e l o o k i n g t o s o u r c e s o u t s i d e d e c i d e d law f o r g u i d a n c e . 2 3 5 B . NATURAL LAW THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT The i s s u e o f whether c o p y r i g h t should be r e c o g n i s e d i n the common law demanded t h a t judges look t o the grounds on which property r i g h t s i n general c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d . The i s s u e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y i s one that p r e o c c u p i e s p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as l e g a l theory; t h i s P a r t w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on the 120 j u s t i f i c a t o r y t h e o r i e s of the M i l l a r judges, with a view to the manner i n which they presaged l a t e r developments i n l e g a l t h e o r y . The m a j o r i t y judgment i n M i l l a r i s an expression of n a t u r a l law theory, and i t i s to that s c h o o l of thought t h i s s e c t i o n t u r n s . 1. The P o l i t i c a l Theory of N a t u r a l R i g h t s The l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y w i t n e s s e d the g r e a t e s t i n f l u e n c e o f the s e c u l a r n a t u r a l law p o l i t i c a l theory which f i r s t emerged during the Reformation. Leaders of the American R e v o l u t i o n , and the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s i n France twenty y e a r s l a t e r , drew i n s p i r a t i o n and i d e o l o g y f r o m n a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s , a f a c t r e f l e c t e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l documents produced i n each country. P r i o r to 1600, " n a t u r a l law" was the preserve of C h r i s t i a n philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of Thomas A q u i n a s a n d o t h e r t h e o l o g i a n s o f t h e C h u r c h . A q u i n a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d n a t u r a l law, as d i v i n e l y o r d a i ned law o r d e r i n g the world, from p o s i t i v e law decreed by s o v e r e i g n p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to govern the a f f a i r s of men. N a t u r a l law informed p o s i t i v e law but stood above and beyond i t , p l a c i n g a higher c a l l on men's a l l e g i a n c e s . The f i r s t s e c u l a r t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law has been g e n e r a l l y a s c r i b e d to Hugo G r o t i u s . F o l l o w i n g G r o t i u s , such n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r i s t s as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau put i n p l a c e of d i v i n e w i l l the nature of man as autonomous moral agent. The s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n n a t u r a l r i g h t s theory was a s t a t e 121 of nature a n t e r i o r to the c r e a t i o n of human s o c i e t y i n which i n d i v i d u a l s acted on t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and d e s i r e s . S o c i e t y a r o s e as a c o n t r a c t between autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s , designed to meet t h e i r needs f o r s e c u r i t y and mutual p r o s p e r i t y , the r o l e p l a y e d by a government of laws. In t h i s f a s h i o n , s t a t e and s o c i e t y e x i s t e d t o serve the i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , i n t e r e s t s which assumed the character of l e g a l r i g h t s i n and, i f n e c e s s a r y , a g a i n s t the p o l i t i c a l o r d e r . Those r i g h t s i n h e r e d to the i n d i v i d u a l by v i r t u e of h i s nature as a human being. The s t a t u s and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y became key i s s u e s i n n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r i e s . Conceiving p r o p e r t y as being brought i n t o s o c i e t y by i n d i v i d u a l s , and i t s p r o t e c t i o n as c o n s t i t u t i n g a p r i n c i p a l reason f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to enter i n t o p o l i t i c a l compact w i t h e a c h o t h e r , t h e o r i s t s were r e q u i r e d to e x p l a i n why and how i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s i n p r o p e r t y c o u l d a r i s e i n the s t a t u t e of n a t u r e . The most i n f l u e n t i a l theory of property i n the n a t u r a l r i g h t s school was developed by John L o c k e . 2 3 6 2 . Locke and the N a t u r a l Law Theory of Property The meaning and i m p l i c a t i o n s o f L o c k e ' s t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y c o n t i n u e t o be the s u b j e c t o f i n t e n s e s c h o l a r l y debate. C.B. Macpherson's a n a l y s i s of Locke's thought as the a r c h e t y p a l moment i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m 2 3 7 i d e n t i f i e d the s o u r c e f o r modern l i b e r a l 122 t h e o r y i n a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m as the n a t u r a l and moral outcome f o r man conceived as an a c q u i s i t o r . T h i s i n t u r n prompted e x t e n s i v e response, some arguing a g a i n s t h i s t h e s i s on the b a s i s of a h i s t o r i c a l reading of Locke as engaged i n the t h e o l o g i c a l wars of h i s time 2 3 8 , o t h e r s that Locke made p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y secondary to s o c i e t y , i n which men r e a l i s e d t h e i r fundamental p u r p o s e s . 2 3 9 Almost i r r e s p e c t i v e of these s u b t l e t i e s , Locke's t h e o r y has had e x t e n s i v e i n f l u e n c e i n l i b e r a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e r e g a r d i n g property r i g h t s . The L o c k e i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y has been termed the labour theory of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . Locke argued that i t was m o r a l l y r i g h t t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l have e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i n p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s which he has produced by mixing h i s labour w i t h n a t u r e ' s r e s o u r c e s . Lawrence Becker p o i n t s out t h a t L o c k e ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y had two c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n c t b a s e s : 2 4 0 (1) the i n d i v i d u a l has a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n h i s own body and i t s l a b o u r ; (2) t h e b e n e f i t o f p r o p e r t y i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e reward f o r the p a i n of labour. The s e cond b a s i s r e p r e s e n t s the c l a i m t h a t labour d e s e r v e d reward, and t h a t p r o p e r t y was t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e reward, not because i t was good i n and of i t s e l f , but because i t was p a i n f u l and c r e a t e d v a l u e . A l a n Ryan, i n d i v i d i n g p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s between those that view labour as a means to m a t e r i a l 123 ends and those t h a t view i t as s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n , and thus an end i n i t s e l f , p l a c e s Locke's t h e o r y i n the f i r s t c a m p . 2 4 1 The v a l u e c r e a t e d by labour s h o u l d a c c r u e to i t s p r o d u c e r . Locke d e s c r i b e d how by mixing one's labou r with nature, the l o t of a l l improved; but only the producer was e n t i t l e d to the f r u i t s of that l a b o u r . To deny reward i n these circumstances was a k i n to p e r m i t t i n g u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t , the r e a p i n g by s t r a n g e r s w h e re t h e y h a v e n o t s o w n . 2 4 2 T h e s e d u a l a g r i c u l t u r a l images of owning the ' f r u i t s of one's l a b o u r 1 and o t h e r s 'reaping where they have not sown' were the hallmarks of L o c k e i a n labour t h e o r y as i t has continued to operate i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Of course, the reward f o r labour d i d not i n l o g i c have to be o w n e r s h i p of the o b j e c t p r o d u c e d . That i t was s o , f o r Locke, d e r i v e d from the second aspect of h i s theory i d e n t i f i e d by B e c k e r : a more m e t a p h y s i c a l e n t i t l e m e n t to the o b j e c t f o l l o w i n g from the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r o p e r t y i n h i s own body and l a b o u r . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the body (but o n l y one's own) was t r e a t e d as an o b j e c t i n nature, capable of being owned i n as e x c l u s i v e a manner as any other o b j e c t : T h o u g h t h e E a r t h , and a l l i n f e r i o r c r e atures be common to a l l Men, yet every Man has a Property i n h i s own Person. T h i s no Body has any r i g h t to but h i m s e l f . The Labour of h i s Body, and of the Work of h i s hands, we may say, are p r o p e r l y h i s . 2 4 3 124 D e n i a l o f p r o p e r t y i n the o b j e c t s o f one's l a b o u r was t h e r e f o r e l i k e an i n v a s i o n of one's own person. So, while an i n d i v i d u a l l a b o u r e d to p r o v i d e h i m s e l f with the n e c e s s i t i e s and comforts of l i f e , h i s ownership of the t h i n g s he produced a l s o bore on h i s p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y . Becker w r i t e s of t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c e t of the labour theory i n t h i s way: I am what I have made. I am what I was. what I want to do, and what I produce. This p a r a l l e l e d the a n a l y s i s found i n Hegel's thought, and i t s l a t e r emendation i n Marx's concept of a l i e n a t i o n . 2 4 5 Locke di d not go so f a r as to o f f e r a c r i t i q u e of making labour and i t s o b j e c t s a l i e n a b l e . He looked upon c r e a t i o n of money as a f a l l from g r a c e , but an i n e v i t a b l e and i r r e v o c a b l e f a l l . Money's great a t t r i b u t e was that i t could not waste, and waste was the o n l y l i m i t Locke b e l i e v e d e x i s t e d w i t h r e s p e c t to accumulation of p r o p e r t y i n i t i a t e d i n one's own labour. The r i g h t t o s e l l one's labour time and produce was assumed by Locke to be p a r t of the n a t u r a l r i g h t of p r o p e r t y , r e q u i r i n g no j u s t i f i c a t i o n apart from that of the r i g h t i t s e l f . 2 4 6 3. Blackstone On Property R i g h t s and Copyright W i l l i a m Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England appeared i n 1765, three years a f t e r he argued f o r a common law copyright i n Tonson v. C o l l i n s , four years before h i s argument for the p l a i n t i f f i n M i l l a r , and nine years b e f o r e he rendered 125 an a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n i n f a v o u r o f l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y i n Donaldson v. Beckett. The argument he made i n Tonson and h i s o u t l i n e o f p r o p e r t y t h e o r y i n t h e Commentar i e s c l o s e l y resembled the a n a l y s i s o f J u s t i c e Aston i n M i l l a r ; i t seems reasonable to s p e c u l a t e that B l a c k s t o n e p l a y e d an important r o l e i n s e t t i n g the terms of the debate on the b o o k s e l l e r s ' s i d e . The Commentaries r e v e a l e d B l a c k s t o n e ' s tempered n a t u r a l law p o s i t i o n . He i d e n t i f i e d the r i g h t s t o l i f e , l i b e r t y and property as the three absolute r i g h t s inherent to E n g l i s h m e n — that i s , r i g h t s grounded i n n a t u r e and p r o t e c t e d from time immemorial by the common law. Pro p e r t y r i g h t s had t h e i r o r i g i n as u s u f r u c t u a r y r i g h t s i n a s t a t e of nature where a l l o b j e c t s were o t h e r w i s e h e l d i n common. At a p o i n t when p o p u l a t i o n growth produced s c a r c i t y of l a n d and f o o d , a more e v o l v e d r i g h t , a permanent p r o p e r t y i n the substance as w e l l as the use of t h i n g s , developed. The b a s i s f o r p r o p e r t y both i n the use ( c o nsumption) and the s u b s t a n c e of t h i n g s was f i r s t occupancy, although Blackstone acknowledged a moral d i f f e r e n c e between mere occupancy and labour: [Movables were a p p r o p r i a t e d b e f o r e l a n d ] p r i n c i p a l l y because few of them c o u l d be f i t f o r use, t i l l improved and a m e l i o r a t e d by t h e b o d i l y l a b o u r o f the o c c u p a n t , which b o d i l y l a b o u r , bestowed upon any sub j e c t which before l a y i n common to a l l men, i s u n i v e r s a l l y a l l o w e d to g i v e the f a i r e s t and most r e a s o n a b l e t i t l e t o an e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y t h e r e i n . 2 4 7 126 B l a c k s t o n e n o t e d a " n i c e t y " d i s t i n g u i s h i n g G r o t i u s and Pufendorf from Locke, i n that the former argued f o r an i m p l i e d a s s e n t by men t h a t f i r s t occupancy should y i e l d ownership, while Locke b e l i e v e d occupancy as labour j u s t i f i e d p r o p e r t y on i t s o w n . 2 4 8 P r o p e r t y s u b s i s t e d i n the f i r s t taker u n t i l he demonstrated an i n t e n t i o n t o abandon the o b j e c t as p u b l i c i j u r i s ; a l i e n a t i o n , which f o l l o w e d p r o p e r t y as a matter of convenience f o r owners, i n v o l v e d an abandonment coupled w i t h an i n t e n t i o n of the purchaser to 'occupy* the o b j e c t . Blackstone d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y i n an a b s o l u t e manner: T h e r e i s n o t h i n g w h i c h so g e n e r a l l y s t r i k e s the i m a g i n a t i o n , and engages the a f f e c t i o n s o f mankind, as the r i g h t of p r o p e r t y ; o r t h a t s o l e and d e s p o t i c d o m i n i o n w h i c h one man c l a i m s a n d e x e r c i s e s over the e x t e r n a l t h i n g s of the world, i n t o t a l e x c l u s i o n of the r i g h t of any other i n d i v i d u a l i n the u n i v e r s e . 2 4 9 This d e s p o t i c dominion over the e x t e r n a l world was God's g i f t to m a n k i n d . 2 5 0 K . J . V a n d e v e l d e (1980) 2 5 1 a r g u e s t h a t B l a c k s t o n e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f p r o p e r t y was ' p h y s i c a l i s . t ' and ' a b s o l u t i s t ' . By the former he means c o n c e i v i n g p r o p e r t y as a r i g h t r e l a t i n g to t h i n g s . While Blackstone recognised that not a l l p r o p e r t y had c o r p o r e a l form, Vandevelde argues t h a t he r e i f i e d the concepts of i n c o r p o r e a l hereditaments and choses i n a c t i o n by c a l l i n g them ' t h i n g s i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n . ' Vandevelde c o n t r a s t s t h i s to the l a t e r H o h f e l d i a n scheme which des c r i b e d p r o p e r t y not as a r i g h t over t h i n g s , but as a j u r a l 127 r e l a t i o n between p e r s o n s . The 'ab s o l u t i s m ' of B l a c k s t o n e ' s t h o u g h t made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r l e g a l t h e o r y to comprehend degrees o f or l i m i t s on ownership: property meant nothing l e s s than d e s p o t i c dominion. Hohfeld's a n a l y s i s i n v o l v e d s e p a r a t i n g r i g h t s , powers, p r i v i l e g e s , and l i b e r t i e s , and showing how they c o u l d e x i s t i n v a r i o u s combinations i n a s i n g l e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ; law co u l d l i m i t v a r i o u s of these f a c t o r s without d e s t r o y i n g the r i g h t of pr o p e r t y . While Vandevelde's p o i n t i s g e n e r a l l y w e l l - t a k e n , and corresponds to our d i s c u s s i o n of the c h a l l e n g e which c o p y r i g h t p r e s e n t e d to n a t u r a l law p r o p e r t y t h e o r i e s , he i s wrong t o say t h a t B l a c k s t o n e m a i n t a i n e d p r o p e r t y c o u l d not be s u b j e c t t o l i m i t a t i o n i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 2 5 2 Indeed, Blackstone wrote that property c o n s i s t s i n the f r e e use, enjoyment, and d i s p o s a l of a l l h i s a c q u i s i t i o n s , without any c o n t r o l or d i m i n u t i o n , save o n l y by the laws of the land. 2 5 3 The a b s o l u t e r i g h t of p r o p e r t y , founded i n n a t u r a l law and p r e s e r v e d by common law, was not f o r B l a c k s t o n e immune to e x p r o p r i a t i o n by t h e s t a t e , o n l y e x p r o p r i a t i o n w i t h o u t c o mpensation. The compact between the i n d i v i d u a l and c i v i l s o c i e t y i n v o l v e d the former making some s a c r i f i c e o f h i s r i g h t s i n exchange f o r peace and s e c u r i t y . In r e t u r n , s o c i e t y must r e s p e c t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e s i d u a l r i g h t s ; as w e l l , i t must endeavour to r e s t s e c u r i t y on p r i v a t e property i t s e l f : 128 And thus the l e g i s l a t u r e of England has u n i v e r s a l l y promoted the grand ends of c i v i l s o c i e t y , the peace and s e c u r i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s , by s t e a d i l y p u r s u i n g t h a t wise and o r d e r l y maxim, of a s s i g n i n g to every t h i n g capable of ownership a l e g a l and determinate owner. 5 4 Blackstone brought many of these themes to h i s arguments f o r a common law c o p y r i g h t . In Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762) he argued t h a t c o p y r i g h t was founded i n r e a s o n , c i t i n g t h r e e f a c t o r s . F i r s t , l i t e r a r y property met the requirements of the labour theory: The n a t u r a l foundation and commencement of p r o p e r t y ; v i z . by i n v e n t i o n and l a b o u r . Both ex e r t e d i n a l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n ; the p r e s e n t work i s found to be an o r i g i n a l c o m p o s i t i o n . O r i g i n a l (ex v i t e r m i n i ) i m p l i e s i n v e n t i o n ; as c o m p o s i t i o n does i n d u s t r y and l a b o u r . P r o p e r t y may w i t h equal reason be acquired by mental, as by b o d i l y l a b o u r , (at 180) An i d e a c o u l d be o c c u p i e d l i k e a f i e l d , but both r e q u i r e d c u l t i v a t i o n and improvement on the p a r t of the r i g h t - h o l d e r i n o r d e r t o be u s e f u l . Second, "common u t i l i t y " demanded t h a t p r o p e r t y be recognised i n the f r u i t s of i n d u s t r y , i n order to encourage f u r t h e r p r o d u c t i o n : S c i e n c e e q u a l l y encouraged by p r o t e c t i n g t h e p r o d u c e o f g e n i u s and a p p l i c a t i o n . Without some advantage proposed, few would read, study, compose or p u b l i s h . ( a t 180) Because o n l y the p r o f i t s of p u b l i c a t i o n c o u l d p r o v i d e t h i s reward, the a p p r o p r i a t e p r o p e r t y was "an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of 129 p u b l i c a t i o n . " In t h i s way, B l a c k s t o n e g l i d e d over the s u b t l e yet s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between p r o p e r t y as dominion o v e r t h i n g s p r o d u c e d by l a b o u r and p r o p e r t y as a r i g h t over an a c t i v i t y . T h i r d , l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n s shared the " e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e o f e v e r y s u b j e c t o f p r o p e r t y " : exchange v a l u e . However, the " s u b j e c t " he d e s c r i b e d here was the c o m p o s i t i o n i t s e l f , o r more p r e c i s e l y i t s " s e n t i m e n t " , not the r i g h t of m u l t i p l y i n g c o p i e s of the c o m p o s i t i o n . 2 5 5 4. The M a j o r i t y O p i n i o n s i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r T h e t h r e e m a j o r i t y j u d g e s i n M i l l a r a p p r o a c h e d t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y i s s u e i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s . J u s t i c e W i l l e s l o o k e d t o h i s t o r y a n d p r e c e d e n t f o r answers and eschewed m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a s o n i n g . 2 5 6 N e v e r t h e l e s s , he c o n c l u d e d h i s judgment by s a y i n g i t v i o l a t e d n a t u r a l j u s t i c e f o r a s t r a n g e r t o " r e a p the b e n e f i c i a l p e c u n i a r y p r o d u c e of a n o t h e r m a n ' s work" (a t 218) . L o r d M a n s f i e l d a d o p t e d the views of h i s two c o l l e a g u e s , and i n b r i e f e r reasons d e v e l o p e d the approach f rom n a t u r a l l a w i d e n t i f i e d i n P a r t I V , a n d t o w h i c h t h i s d i s c u s s i o n s h o r t l y r e t u r n s . J u s t i c e A s t o n commenced f r o m m e t a p h y s i c s and drew on n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r y and B l a c k s t o n e . A s t o n J . thought t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s arguments that l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y was " q u i t e i d e a l and i m a g i n a r y . . . not an o b j e c t of law, nor c a p a b l e of p r o t e c t i o n " demanded an answer founded i n " c e r t a i n g r e a t t r u t h s and sound p r o p o s i t i o n s . " (at 219) H i s answer b e g a n w i t h a s t a t e m e n t by P u f e n d o r f , the " l e a r n e d 130 author of the r e l i g i o n of nature", that moral good c o i n c i d e s w i t h l e g a l r i g h t . He then reviewed s e v e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s from Pufendorf intended t o prove as a moral t r u t h that the products o f t h e l a b o u r o f one man can no more be the p r o p e r t y of another than h i s labour i t s e l f can be. L i k e W i l l e s J . and B l a c k s t o n e , J u s t i c e A s t o n showed l a w y e r l y i m p a t i e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n ' n i c e t i e s ' o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' works, e s p e c i a l l y those tending to c a s t doubt on c o p y r i g h t as an a p p r o p r i a t e s u b j e c t f o r p r o p e r t y a t common law. His c r i t i c i s m s r e v e a l e d the p e r s p e c t i v e of an e m p i r i c a l modernism, r e j e c t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i m p l i e d by s t a t e of nature t h e o r i e s . He s a i d that s e v e r a l " w r i t t e n d e f i n i t i o n s of p r o p e r t y " c i t e d by lawyers i n argument are, i n my o p i n i o n , very inadequate to the o b j e c t s of pro p e r t y at t h i s day. They are adapted, by the w r i t e r s , t o t h i n g s i n a p r i m i t i v e (not t o say imaginary) s t a t e ; when a l l t h i n g s were i n common.... Thus g r e a t men, r u m i n a t i n g back to the o r i g i n o f t h i n g s , l o s e s i g h t o f t h e present s t a t e of the world; and end t h e i r i n q u i r i e s at that p o i n t where they should begin our improvements, (at 220-221) The great men, i n c l u d i n g Locke, l i m i t e d property by viewing i t o n l y as o b j e c t s wrested by occupancy from the commons, and as " n e c e s s a r i e s " r e q u i r e d f o r s u r v i v a l . Aston J . s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d as i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e modern age t h e l i m i t i n g p r i n c i p l e o f s p o i l a g e , which he a t t r i b u t e d t o L o c k e and G r o t i u s . He p r e f e r r e d P u f e n d o r f ' s view t h a t " d i s t i n c t 131 p r o p e r t i e s " i n c r e a s e d over time as c i r c u m s t a n c e s and human g e n i u s r e q u i r e d . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e o r y and common law no l o n g e r demanded t h a t o b j e c t s be u s e f u l i n o r d e r t o be pr o p e r t y : Things of fancy, p l e a s u r e or convenience a r e as much o b j e c t s o f p r o p e r t y ; and so c o n s i d e r e d by the common law; monkeys, p a r r o t s or the l i k e ; i n s h o r t , a n y t h i n g merchandizable and v a l u a b l e , (at 221) I f s u c h o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e e x p a n s i o n o f o b j e c t s o f p r o p e r t y no l o n g e r h e l d , A s t o n J . a r g u e d , i t was o n l y necessary to know the a t t r i b u t e s which q u a l i f i e d something to be the s u b j e c t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . He c i t e d two: (1) "a c a p a c i t y to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d " ; (2) "an a c t u a l value i n t h a t t h i n g to the t r u e owner." (221) I t was shown i n Part IV t h a t J u s t i c e Aston b e l i e v e d f i x i n g the composition i n p r i n t e d form p r o v i d e d i t w i t h s u f f i c i e n t c o r p o r e a l i t y t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The "value" of a co m p o s i t i o n t o i t s author l a y i n i t s p u b l i c a t i o n , and i t was that which J u s t i c e Aston made the s u b j e c t of the p r o p e r t y r i g h t . I f p u b l i c a t i o n i n i t s e l f represented the value and pro p e r t y of the author i n h i s work, then i t would be i l l o g i c a l to f i n d i n the very act of p u b l i c a t i o n a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y , as the d e f e n d a n t argued. Having e s t a b l i s h e d l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y as p o s s e s s i n g the two a t t r i b u t e s o f p r o p e r t y , A s t o n J . then c i t e d the maxim no t e d by B l a c k s t o n e : "The b e s t r u l e , b o t h o f r e a s o n and 132 j u s t i c e , seems to be, 'to a s s i g n to every t h i n g c a p a b l e o f ownership, a l e g a l and determinate owner.'" (at 221) To J u s t i c e Aston, the author's ownership of the l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n was not o n l y j u s t i f i e d on the labour t h e o r y o f e n t i t l e m e n t , i t c o u l d c l a i m s u p e r i o r i t y over property i n l a n d or t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s : And t h e r e i s a m a t e r i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n favour of t h i s s o r t of prope r t y , from that ..gained by o c c u p a n c y ; which b e f o r e was common, and n o t y o u r s ; b ut was t o be rendered so by some act of your own. For, t h i s i s o r i g i n a l l y t h e a u t h o r ' s : and, t h e r e f o r e , unless c l e a r l y rendered common by h i s own act and f u l l consent, i t ought s t i l l to remain h i s . (at 221) In o t h e r words, l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n d i d not emanate from common r e s o u r c e s , l e t a l o n e n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , but s p r a n g f o r t h as an o r i g i n a l product of the author's imagination and mental labour. C. JUSTICE YATES' CRITIQUE OF THE NATURAL LAW POSITION 1. P u b l i c Domain: N a t u r a l R i g h t s o f the P u b l i c J u s t i c e Yates d i d not share t h i s view of the a u t h o r ' s c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y . In m a i n t a i n i n g that " [ p j r o p e r t y i s founded upon o c c u p a n c y " , he i m p l i e d a u t h o r s a l s o were engaged i n a p p r o p r i a t i n g from the commons; the problem, however, l a y i n the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of occupying or a p p r o p r i a t i n g ideas i n the same way one occupied l a n d : 133 Some act of a p p r o p r i a t i o n must be exerted, to take t h e t h i n g o ut o f the s t a t e o f being common, to denote the a c c e s s i o n of a p r o p r i e t o r : f o r , o t h e r w i s e , how s h o u l d other persons be a p p r i z e d they are not to use i t ? t h e s e a r e a c t s t h a t must be ex e r c i s e d upon something. The occupancy of a thought would be a new k i n d of property indeed, (at 230) F o r Y a t e s J . , t h e c o m p o s i t i o n s o f a u t h o r s h a d an interdependency with the c u l t u r e i n which they arose, a r i s i n g from a. "commons" of ideas and s t y l e , and r e t u r n i n g t o t h a t commons. In sh o r t , J u s t i c e Yates had i n mind a p u b l i c domain i n l i t e r a r y composition. In making the p o i n t that the f r u i t s of the author's labour should be c i r c u m s c r i b e d he s a i d : He [the author] must not expect that these f r u i t s s h a l l be e t e r n a l ; t h a t he i s t o monopolize them t o i n f i n i t y ; t h a t every v e g e t a t i o n and i n c r e a s e s h a l l be confin e d to h i m s e l f alone, and never r e v e r t to the common mass. In that c a s e , the i n j u s t i c e would l i e on the s i d e of the monopolist, who would thus e x c l u d e a l l the r e s t o f mankind from e n j o y i n g t h e i r n a t u r a l and s o c i a l r i g h t s , (at 231-232) (emphasis added) The ' f r u i t s ' might be m a t e r i a l reward, but the 'vegetation and i n c r e a s e ' r e f e r r e d t o the uses of the a u t h o r ' s i d e a s and i n v e n t i o n s themselves. J u s t i c e Yates had a p a r t i c u l a r concern t h a t common law o w n e r s h i p of i d e a s would bar i n d e p e n d e n t a p p r o p r i a t i o n by subsequent a u t h o r s — t h a t i s , authors a r r i v i n g at the same p l a c e without any r e f e r e n c e to or n o t i c e of the ' o r i g i n a l ' , and without c o p y i n g . 2 5 7 To the argument t h a t the 134 custom of the s t a t i o n e r s o f b u y i n g and s e l l i n g c o p y r i g h t s amongst each other c o u l d s u s t a i n a r i g h t at common law, Yates J . s a i d that p r i v a t e p a r t i e s c o u l d not " a f f e c t the r e a l r i g h t of the p u b l i c , who are no p a r t i e s t o such c o n t r a c t s : they can't c r e a t e law." (at 237) One danger of a perpetual p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n the p u b l i s h i n g of c o m p o s i t i o n s was t h a t i t gave b o o k s e l l e r s , and authors, "a r i g h t to suppress" (at 249) works f o r e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y r e a s o n s , s h o u l d they so c h o o s e . 2 5 8 T h i s sense that c o p y r i g h t represented a balancing of i n t e r e s t s between the " n a t u r a l r i g h t s " of a p u b l i c audience composed of suc c e e d i n g g e n e r a t i o n s of w r i t e r s , readers, and b o o k s e l l e r s , and the r i g h t s of the c r e a t o r of an o r i g i n a l manuscript and h i s a s s i g n e e s , was unique to Yates J . amongst the judges i n M i l l a r . He d i d not di s p u t e that the author had n a t u r a l r i g h t on h i s s i d e i n terms of deser v i n g reward f o r h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r 2 5 9 f - he d i d o b j e c t , however, to the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s r i g h t g a v e r i s e t o common law p r o p e r t y o v e r an i n c o r p o r e a l , s o m e t h i n g he a r g u e d E n g l i s h law had never countenanced. 2 . The Argument Over I n c o r p o r e a l P r o p e r t y The two s i d e s i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r and i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate d i f f e r e d vehemently over whether the common law c o u l d r e c o g n i s e p r o p e r t y i n i n c o r p o r e a l s . J u s t i c e Yates a r g u e d t h a t o n l y p h y s i c a l t h i n g s c o u l d be the o b j e c t o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , t h a t i n c o r p o r e a l s l a c k e d the f i n i t e , f i x e d 135 b o u n d a r i e s . t h a t p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o p e r f o r m i t s f u n c t i o n of p r e s e r v i n g s o c i a l peace; h i s opponents r e p l i e d that l i t e r a r y p roperty had a c o r p o r e a l q u a l i t y i n the form of the c o m p o s i t i o n , 2 6 0 and t h a t the r i g h t to f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n was no l e s s an i n c o r p o r e a l than c o p y r i g h t . 2 6 1 Yates J . ' s p o s i t i o n appeared at f i r s t g l a n c e to be wholly p h y s i c a l i s t and fo r t h a t reason a r c h a i c . I m p o r t a n t l y , however, he wished to deny a common law p r o p e r t y to i n c o r p o r e a l s — a n a t u r a l law p r o p e r t y u n l i m i t e d i n scope and d u r a t i o n - - not a l i m i t e d s t a t u t o r y p r o p e r t y . To understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s p o i n t i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y to address a c o n f u s i o n i n J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' o p i n i o n over two types of i n c o r p o r e a l s he f e l t were i m p l i c a t e d i n c o p y r i g h t : (1) i d e a s ; (2) t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f c o p y i n g or p u b l i s h i n g . As p o i n t e d out i n Part IV, Yates J . b e l i e v e d the r i g h t to copy gave p r o t e c t i o n to i d e a s , not merely to the p a r t i c u l a r expression embodied i n a f i x e d l i t e r a r y work. With res p e c t to Thompson's Seasons, he s a i d t h a t the defendant c o u l d not have v i o l a t e d any property of the author or h i s a s s i g n e e s "unless the v e r y s t y l e and s e n t i m e n t s i n the work were h i s [ t h e a u t h o r ' s ] . " (at 230) His main concern on t h i s score was t h a t i d e a s c o u l d not be d e m a r c a t e d - - i n d e r i v a t i o n , e x t e n t or abandonment—in a manner s u f f i c i e n t to separate one person's ' p r o p e r t y ' f r o m a n o t h e r ' s , c a u s i n g e n d l e s s d i s p u t e and 136 l i t i g a t i o n . Such a r e s u l t f r u s t r a t e d the purpose of p r o p e r t y law i n a Hobbesian world: The p r i n c i p a l end f o r which th e f i r s t i n s t i t u t i o n of p r o p e r t y was e s t a b l i s h e d , was t o p r e s e r v e the peace o f mankind; which c o u l d not e x i s t i n a promiscuous s c r a m b l e . T h e r e f o r e a moral o b l i g a t i o n arose upon a l l , "that none should i n t r u d e upon the p o s s e s s i o n of another." But t h i s o b l i g a t i o n c o u l d only take p l a c e where the p r o p e r t y was d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; and every body knew that i t was not open to another, (at 234) However i f , as J u s t i c e Aston m a i n t a i n e d , the law c o n c e i v e d c o p y r i g h t s o l e l y as the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o copy the p r e c i s e e x p r e s s i o n (verbatim copying, as i t were) of an author, t h i s argument of u n c e r t a i n t y and i n s e c u r i t y l a r g e l y f a i l e d . 2 6 2 J u s t i c e Yates may have f a i l e d to a p p r e c i a t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f u s i n g e x p r e s s i o n as an o b s e r v a b l e boundary f o r l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y . I t was a l s o p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , t h a t he was i n f l u e n c e d by a concept of a u t h o r s h i p . As shown i n Par t IV, many of the books which had come before the c o u r t s up to the time of Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762) and M i l l a r were i n f o r m a t i o n a l or i n s t r u c t i v e i n nature. In such works, compared to works of f i c t i o n , the expression and ideas of the author were c l o s e l y wedded. P r o t e c t i n g the e x p r e s s i o n of an i n f o r m a t i o n a l work c o u l d be tantamount t o p r o t e c t i n g the i d e a s i t c o n t a i n e d . H a v i n g a n o n - f i c t i o n model of c o m p o s i t i o n i n mind might account f o r J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' s t r o n g l y v o i c e d concerns f o r the \ 137 i s s u e s of independent c r e a t i o n , a commons of knowledge, and the p u b l i c domain i n i d e a s . J u s t i c e Yates' u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the second i n c o r p o r e a l i m p l i c a t e d i n c o p y r i g h t as p r o p e r t y — the a c t i v i t y of c o p y i n g - -was s t a t e d more c l e a r l y . He p e r c e i v e d that what the owner of c o p y r i g h t owned was not a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , a book or a poem on paper, but a r i g h t to prevent a l l the world from engaging i n the a c t i v i t y of making a copy of t h e o b j e c t . A l l p r o p e r t y c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d , he s a i d , i n v o l v e d r i g h t s t o p r e v e n t a c t i o n s by o t h e r s , but the p r o s c r i b e d a c t i o n s r e l a t e d to i n t e r f e r e n c e with m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s : In answer t o t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , i t was a l l e d g e d f o r the p l a i n t i f f , " t h a t there are many o t h e r i n s t a n c e s o f i n c o r p o r e a l r i g h t s ; such as a l l the v a r i o u s kinds of p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t s and p a r t i a l claims." But the f a l l a c y l i e s i n the e q u i v o c a l use of the word " p r o p e r t y ; " which sometimes denotes the r i g h t of the person; (as when we say, "such a one has t h i s e s t a t e , or t h a t p i e c e of goods:") sometimes, the object i t s e l f . H e re, th e q u e s t i o n i s upon the o b j e c t i t s e l f , not the p e r s o n . I r e a d i l y admit t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f p e r s o n s may be i n c o r p o r e a l . But the q u e s t i o n i s now, "whether any t h i n g can be the o b j e c t of p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t , w h i c h i s n o t t h e o b j e c t o f c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e . " And, f o r my own p a r t , I know not of any one i n s t a n c e of any one r i g h t which has not r e s p e c t t o c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e . E v e r y p r e s c r i p t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e , e v e r y t i t l e whatever has r e s p e c t t o the l a n d s i n which they a r e e x e r c i s e d . No r i g h t can e x i s t , without a 138 substance to r e t a i n i t , and to which i t i s c o n f i n e d : i t would, otherwise, be a r i g h t without any e x i s t e n c e , (at 233) Here, the substance, the l i t e r a r y work, c o u l d be r e p l i c a t e d w i t h o u t b e i n g p h y s i c a l l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h i n any way; the u n i t a r y c h a r a c t e r of s p a t i a l o b j e c t s which made them capable of b e i n g owned a b s o l u t e l y ( i n c l u d i n g i n p e r p e t u i t y , i n the sense o f b e i n g owned by 'some person') broke down f o r an i n c o r p o r e a l l i k e ' c o p y i n g 1 . To J u s t i c e Yates, the p r o p e r t y claimed by the p l a i n t i f f represented nothing more than a form of chose i n a c t i o n , a r i g h t to sue a p a r t y who p r i n t e d a copy of h i s composition without consent, (at 245) J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' r e p e a t e d r e f e r e n c e s t o c o p y r i g h t as monopoly f o l l o w e d l o g i c a l l y from t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As a r i g h t to exclude o t h e r s from engaging i n c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s with a presumed economic b e n e f i t , c o p y r i g h t c o n f e r r e d a type of p a r t i a l t r a d e monopoly on the author and a s s i g n e e . The analogy he drew to patents f o r i n v e n t i o n s focused p r e c i s e l y on t h i s i s s u e . The o b j e c t which t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a c t u a l i t y c l a i m e d as h i s p r o p e r t y was the p r o f i t t h a t i s s u e d from an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o manufacture. 3. Value as P r o p e r t y or C r e a t i o n of Law J u s t i c e A s t o n and the other m a j o r i t y judges argued that v a l u e y i e l d e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , i n that he who c r e a t e d s value by h i s l a b o u r was e n t i t l e d t o the r e w a r d o f e x c l u s i v e 139 ownership of the object of v a l u e . To permit non-producers to r e a p p a r t o f t h a t v a l u e w o u l d be t a n t a m o u n t t o u n j u s t enrichment. Yates J . c h a l l e n g e d t h i s l o g i c . Responding to the unjust enrichment point he s a i d : F o r , the i n j u s t i c e i t s u g g e s t s , depends upon t h e e x t e n t and d u r a t i o n o f t h e author's property; as i t i s the v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t p r o p e r t y t h a t m u s t a l o n e c o n s t i t u t e the i n j u r y , (at 231) As d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y i n P a r t IV, he r e j e c t e d the i d e a t h a t value produced property: ...mere v a l u e , ( a l l may s e e ) , w i l l not d e s c r i b e the p r o p e r t y i n t h i s . The a i r , t h e l i g h t , t h e s u n , a r e o f v a l u e i n e s t i m a b l e ; but who can c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n them ? mere v a l u e does not c o n s t i t u t e p r o p e r t y . P r o p e r t y must be somewhat e x c l u s i v e of the c l a i m of a n o t h e r . ( a t 230) (emphasis added) Thus, p r o p e r t y preceded v a l u e . I t p r o v i d e d the e x c l u s i v i t y which c r e a t e d v a l u e . The Cour t , Yates J . i m p l i e d , c o u l d not e s c a p e i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c r e a t i n g t h e v a l u e i n a pe r p e t u a l r i g h t of p u b l i c a t i o n by pretending the va l u e e x i s t e d i n nature, b e f o r e the law granted i t p r o t e c t i o n . What d i d Yates J . mean by 'property' i n t h i s argument ? B l a c k s t o n e , t o o , had c i t e d the examples of a i r , l i g h t and water as t h i n g s which "must s t i l l u n a v o i d a b l y remain i n common; b e i n g s u c h w h e r e i n n o t h i n g b ut an u s u f r u c t u a r y p r o p e r t y i s capable of being h a d . " 2 6 3 These t h i n g s could only 140 be s u b j e c t s of property as to t h e i r use because they were not s c a r c e ; a s u b s t a n t i v e p r o p e r t y arose w i t h s c a r c i t y . Y a t e s ' argument made the po i n t t h a t s c a r c i t y i n l i t e r a r y compositions was e s s e n t i a l l y brought i n t o being by the law, not by nature. Property i n p u b l i c a t i o n meant the c r e a t i o n by law of exchange v a l u e , an a l i e n a b l e p r o p e r t y that had, i n Aston J.'s words, "merchandizable value." Indeed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive o f property i n i n c o r p o r e a l a c t i v i t i e s l i k e copying and p u b l i s h i n g as having any "use value" d i s t i n c t from e x c h a n g i b i l i t y . J u s t i c e Yates argument on property and value found echoes i n a nother, more famous i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y case a cen t u r y and a h a l f l a t e r . In I n t e r n a t i o n a l News S e r v i c e v. A s s o c i a t e d Press 2 6 4 , the Supreme Court of the U.S. considered whether a wire s e r v i c e company had a r i g h t a k i n t o pr o p e r t y i n the news s t o r i e s i t produced. A s s o c i a t e d Press, the p l a i n t i f f , p osted d i s p a t c h e s from i t s r e p o r t e r s covering the F i r s t World War on a board o u t s i d e i t s New York o f f i c e s f o r the use of l o c a l newspapers and other i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . I t s competitor, the defendant I.N.S. copied the dispatches and put them over the w i r e t o i t s s u b s c r i b i n g newspapers a c r o s s North A m e r i c a . A s s o c i a t e d Press sued. The disp a t c h e s d i d not comply with the f o r m a l i t i e s r e q u i r e d by the U.S. C o p y r i g h t Act (1909), and because of t h e i r p u b l i c d i s t r i b u t i o n no a c t i o n l a y i n breach of c o n f i d e n c e . A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s s u c c e e d e d , however, i n co n v i n c i n g a Court m a j o r i t y to f i n d i n i t s favour on the b a s i s of a new t o r t , " u n f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n " . The m a j o r i t y spoke the 141 l a n g u a g e of n a t u r a l law, f i n d i n g a q u a s i - p r o p e r t y i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s news s t o r i e s on the grounds of i t s investment and l a b o u r , and the u n j u s t enrichment of the defendant should i t be a l l o w e d to c o n t i n u e the p r a c t i c e . J u s t i c e s H o l m e s 2 6 5 and Brandeis s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e d , adopting a p e r s p e c t i v e s i m i l a r to that taken by Yates J . i n M i l l a r : Brandeis J . : Upon t h e s e i n c o r p o r e a l p r o d u c t i o n s the a t t r i b u t e of p r o p e r t y i s c o n t i n u e d a f t e r such communication o n l y i n c e r t a i n cases where p u b l i c p o l i c y has seemed to demand i t . (at 215) Holmes J . : P r o p e r t y , a c r e a t i o n o f law, does not a r i s e from value, although e x c h a n g e a b l e — a m a t t e r o f f a c t . . . . M a n y e x c h a n g e a b l e v a l u e s may be d e s t r o y e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n . P r o p e r t y depends upon e x c l u s i o n by law from i n t e r f e r e n c e , (at 246) The p o i n t made by t h e s e d i s s e n t i n g v o i c e s was c l e a r : the r e c o g n i t i o n or c r e a t i o n of e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y i n a c t i v i t i e s was a p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n i n the broad sense; and c o u r t s were not the a p p r o p r i a t e bodies to decide the q u e s t i o n . 4 . S t a t u t o r y P r o p e r t y As s t a t e d above, J u s t i c e Yates d i d not e n t i r e l y d i s c o u n t an author's ' n a t u r a l ' e n t i t l e m e n t to reward f o r h i s l a b o u r . In f a c t , he adhered to the b e l i e f t h a t p r o p e r t y at common law 142 d e r i v e d from n a t u r a l r i g h t s i n the p r o d u c t s of l a b o u r . The p r o d u c t s , however, had to be c o r p o r e a l . The author t h e r e f o r e owned h i s manuscript a t common law. The s a l e of the manuscript alone (and thus, f o r Yates, the s a l e of the r i g h t to p u b l i s h i t f o r the f i r s t t i m e ) might y i e l d some reward, a l t h o u g h s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than i f the author a l s o owned c o p y r i g h t . J u s t i c e Y a t e s was vague on whether the a u t h o r ' s r i g h t to reward extended beyond property i n the manuscript, although he i m p l i e d that i t d i d not. He acknowledged that s o c i e t y b e n e f i t e d from the work of a u t h o r s and t h a t a system of reward was needed to p r o v i d e e n c o u r a g e m e n t or i n c e n t i v e . As w i t h t h e i n v e n t o r , t h i s represented the r e a l c l a i m of the author on E n g l i s h laws: The whole c l a i m that an author can r e a l l y make, i s on the p u b l i c benevolence, by way of encouragement; but not as an a b s o l u t e c o e r c i v e r i g h t , (at 246) The reason no a b s o l u t e r i g h t l a y was, as has been shown, t h a t the r i g h t to copy i n h i s view had to be b a l a n c e d w i t h competing r i g h t s i n other producers (authors and b o o k s e l l e r s ) and i n the p u b l i c . The mistake i n r e s t i n g c o p y r i g h t on a l a b o u r t h e o r y t h a t h e l d the author e n t i t l e d t o the e n t i r e value h i s labour c r e a t e d was that value so understood had no i n h e r e n t l i m i t s . The owner of a book i n p h y s i c a l f o r m presumably a l s o had r i g h t s (or at l e a s t i n t e r e s t s i n c e r t a i n uses of the book); but a l l of those r i g h t s c o u l d be conceived 143 on a pure labour theory as belonging to the author as 'values' he had c r e a t e d , and a l l c o u l d then be t r a n s f e r r e d to him i n law: I f the buyer of a book may not make what use o f i t he p l e a s e s , what l i n e can be drawn that w i l l not tend to supersede a l l h i s dominion over i t ? he may not lend i t , i f he i s not to p r i n t i t ; because i t w i l l i n t r e n c h upon the a u t h o r ' s p r o f i t s . So . t h a t an o b j e c t i o n might be made even t o h i s l e n d i n g the book t o h i s f r i e n d s ; f o r he may prevent those f r i e n d s from buying the book... (at 234) A p e r p e t u a l c o p y r i g h t , he argued, would a l s o have the e f f e c t o f l o c k i n g up the most valuable l i t e r a r y works i n the hands of a few p r i n t e r s and b o o k s e l l e r s f o r e v e r , g i v i n g them a huge and u n f a i r advantage over a l l newcomers to t h i s " l a w f u l t r a d e . " (250) Lord Camden, who disparaged the "Tonsons and L i n t o t s " of e v e r y age, made much o f t h i s c o n c e r n i n h i s p o l e m i c i n Donaldson v. Beckett. I f , t h e n , the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d the b a l a n c i n g of l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s , who should do i t ? J u s t i c e Y a t e s had no h e s i t a t i o n : "Nothing l e s s than l e g i s l a t i v e power can r e s t r a i n the use of anything" (at 234), such as the use made of a s i n g l e copy of a book. I t f e l l to the l e g i s l a t u r e to s o r t out the i n t e r e s t s at pl a y and Yates J . poi n t e d to the Statute of Anne as j u s t such an e x e r c i s e . The S t a t u t e gave authors an e x c l u s i v e , a s s i g n a b l e r i g h t to make c o p i e s o f t h e i r c o m p o s i t i o n s f o r s a l e f o r up t o 28 y e a r s 144 f o l l o w i n g r e g i s t r a t i o n i n S t a t i o n e r s H a l l . J u s t i c e Yates d i d not want t o be c o n s i d e r e d u n s y m p a t h e t i c t o w r i t e r s or u n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e i r w e l f a r e ; he c o u l d not accept, however, t h a t 28 y e a r s p r o v i d e d so l i t t l e p r o t e c t i o n t h a t i t would cause harm or f a i l to g i v e m a t e r i a l encouragement. 2 6 6 I f c o p y r i g h t e x i s t e d o n l y by s t a t u t e , that d i d not make i t any l e s s p r o p e r t y . The " L e g i s l a t u r e indeed may make a new r i g h t " (at 245), a new pr o p e r t y r i g h t , a l b e i t one l i m i t e d i n d u r a t i o n . J u s t i c e Yates c i t e d the case o f Ewer v. Jones (1703) 2 Salk 415, 6 Mod 26, 87 ER 7 9 0 , 2 6 7 f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s of p r o p e r t y created by s t a t u t e s c o u l d be sued for a t common law. S t a t u t o r y property had the power and s t a t u s of common law p r o p e r t y ; i t d i f f e r e d i n t h a t i t was not a b s o l u t e i n terms o f u s e s r e s e r v e d f o r the owner o r i n d u r a t i o n , d e c i s i o n s o f p o l i c y t h a t s h o u l d be made by a l e g i s l a t u r e i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . P a r t II of the paper examined the arguments surrounding the c a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h Crown p r e r o g a t i v e and p a t e n t g r a n t s c i t e d i n M i l l a r . I t showed that the m a j o r i t y had t r i e d to draw an analogy from those cases to a prop e r t y at common law. J u s t i c e Yates had r e s i s t e d the a n a l o g y . H i s view of those e a r l y e x p r e s s i o n s o f c o p y r i g h t - t y p e p r o t e c t i o n s c o u l d be l i n k e d t o h i s t h e o r y o f the n a t u r e and j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t as p r o p e r t y . The Crown had developed p a t e n t s f o r i n v e n t i o n , and f o r p r i n t i n g , as an e x e r c i s e of s t a t e power, b o t h t o s e r v e i t s f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n p a t r o n a g e and 145 p o l i t i c a l ends i n c e n s o r s h i p , and more l e g i t i m a t e l y , t o d e v e l o p n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y . The b a s i s of ' c o p y r i g h t ' i n i t s e a r l y forms had always been p o l i t i c a l . The S t a t u t e of Anne had g e n e r a l i s e d t h i s p r o p e r t y by t a k i n g t h e power o f d i s t r i b u t i n g i t away from t h e Crown, but c o n t i n u e d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t a s r e s p o n d i n g t o p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The e f f o r t to p l a c e c o p y r i g h t on the f o o t i n g of common law p r o p e r t y j u s t i f i e d on n a t u r a l law p r i n c i p l e s obscured the r o l e i t played i n s o c i e t y . The p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of copy r i g h t i n J u s t i c e Yates' thought and i n the outcome of the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e i t s e l f has i n f u s e d the law o f c o p y r i g h t e v e r s i n c e ; i t a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o a c o m p l e t e r e t h i n k i n g of the nature and purposes of l e g a l r i g h t s t h a t commenced s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . D. COPYRIGHT AND THE BREAKDOWN OF ABSOLUTE PROPERTY RIGHTS 1. I n t a n g i b l e P r o p e r t y and The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f L e g a l Theory The i n s i g h t c r e d i t e d i n t h i s paper to J u s t i c e Yates i s that c o p y r i g h t c o u l d not be made analogous to prop e r t y r i g h t s a t common law, c o n c e i v e d as a b s o l u t e and p e r p e t u a l r i g h t s founded i n n a t u r a l law. He e n v i s a g e d i n s t e a d two types of pro p e r t y : a common law property a p p l i c a b l e to t a n g i b l e s , and a p o l i t i c a l or s t a t u t o r y p r o p e r t y a p p l i c a b l e t o i n t a n g i b l e commercial r i g h t s of e x c l u s i v e a c t i v i t y . The dominant schools 146 i n contemporary 20th century l i b e r a l l e g a l theory, as w e l l as t h e i r r a d i c a l c r i t i c s , have come to view a l l p r o p e r t y as s h a r i n g the a t t r i b u t e s Yates J . had a s c r i b e d to c o p y r i g h t . Before r e t u r n i n g to consider more c l o s e l y the understanding of c o p y r i g h t a s p r o p e r t y i n c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r y , t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n g e n e r a l deserves a t t e n t i o n . P a t r i c k A t i y a h s a y s o f the outcome o f the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate and the r e v e r s a l of M i l l a r by the Lords i n Donaldson; The t r u t h was l a i d bare f o r a l l who wanted t o s e e i t , t h o u g h few p r o b a b l y d i d : p r o p e r t y r i g h t s were not ' n a t u r a l ' but a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n s of law, and i t was t h e law, based on v a l u e s and p o l i c i e s , w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d t h e e x t e n t o f t h o s e r i g h t s . P r o p e r t y had s u f f e r e d i t s f i r s t major d e f e a t . 2 6 8 He makes t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i n the c o u r s e of d i s c u s s i n g the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n common law f r o m v i e w i n g p r o p e r t y as "possessions", things with use value, to i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g promissory i n t e r e s t s , with exchange value. These i n t e r e s t s or e x p e c t a t i o n s , not d i s s i m i l a r to the f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s that had become so p r e v a l e n t i n the law of r e a l p r o p e r t y , c o u l d be secured, indeed created, only by law. Copyright was one of the new t y p e s o f p r o p e r t y i n e x p e c t a t i o n s which embodied the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . A t i y a h ' s p o i n t i s t h a t law and l e g a l theory were p r o p e l l e d by the new p r o p e r t y of c o p y r i g h t and o t h e r 147 c o m m e r c i a l r i g h t s t o a p o s i t i o n beyond Y a t e s ' b i f u r c a t e d v i s i o n of n a t u r a l and s t a t u t o r y property, to a r e c o g n i t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l nature of a l l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . S e v e r a l l e g a l h i s t o r i a n s have connected t h i s e v o l u t i o n to the beginnings to the i n c r e a s i n g treatment of r e a l p r o p e r t y as a commodity of e x c h a n g e . 2 6 9 Both Daniel M c C l u r e 2 7 0 and K. J . V a n d e v e l d e 2 7 1 t r a c e the e v o l u t i o n of American trademark law to demonstrate i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to a breakdown i n the n a t u r a l law understanding of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . The debate i n Anglo-American trademark law c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate, o c c u r r e d over the i s s u e of the e x t e n t t o which trademarks m i g h t c r e a t e m o n o p o l i e s t h a t r e d u c e d c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e marketplace. Trademark law i n the common law j u r i s d i c t i o n s has been c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a d u a l i t y : the law p r o t e c t s ' non- d i s t i n c t i v e ' marks ( i . e . , d e s c r i p t i v e marks or those based on a p e r s o n a l name or geographic l o c a t i o n ) on a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b a s i s , and d i s t i n c t i v e marks on a property b a s i s . That i s , the former cannot be used i n a way that i n v o l v e s a ' p a s s i n g - o f f ' of the d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o d u c t s as the p l a i n t i f f mark-owner's p r o d u c t s . On the p r o p e r t y theory, however, d i s t i n c t i v e marks r e c e i v e p r o t e c t i o n f r o m m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e defendant user a l l e g e d l y seeks to take advantage of g o o d w i l l e x i s t i n g f o r the p l a i n t i f f ' s mark even when the impugned use i n v o l v e s no c o n f u s i o n i n the p u b l i c ' s mind over the source of the p r o d u c t . D i s t i n c t i v e n e s s can be seen p l a y i n g a s i m i l a r r o l e i n trademark law to that of o r i g i n a l i t y i n c o p y r i g h t . 148 McClure and Vandevelde argue that the high-water moment f o r the p r o p e r t y theory i n U.S. trademark law occurred i n a p e r i o d from i t s f i r s t j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n i n the mid-19th ce n t u r y to the e a r l y 20th c e n t u r y , c u l m i n a t i n g around the time o f the I.N.S. d e c i s i o n on u n f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n . Even d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , however, c o u r t s showed d i s c o m f o r t with the sweeping power of trademarks as p r o p e r t y , good a g a i n s t anyone i n any b u s i n e s s or geographic l o c a t i o n , and s t a r t e d to p l a c e l i m i t s on the r i g h t . One l i m i t analogous t o the time l i m i t a t i o n i n c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e s was the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a trademark which l o s t i t s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s and became a g e n e r i c term f o r an e n t i r e i n d u s t r y 2 7 2 ( o f t e n because of the marketing s k i l l of the mark's owner) f e l l i n t o the p u b l i c domain. V a n d e v e l d e s t a t e s the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r property theory: D e s i g n a t i n g a trademark or t r a d e name p r o p e r t y no longer s t a t e d a premise from which the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s could be a u t o m a t i c a l l y deduced. Cases would be d e c i d e d , not by deducing l e g a l r i g h t s from concepts, but onl y by the p o l i c y o f p r o t e c t i n g i n v e s t o r s from i n j u r y . 7 3 ^ I n t e r e s t i n g l y , James Oldham notes i n a recent study that Lord M a n s f i e l d showed himself to be su p p o r t i v e of p l a i n t i f f s i n e a r l y trademark, or p a s s i n g o f f a c t i o n s . 2 7 4 In most of these cases Lord M a n s f i e l d p r e s i d e d over j u r y t r i a l s , and few reasons f o r judgment a r e extant; however, Oldham remarks that j u r y awards were generous i n the c o n t e x t of the ti m e s , and 149 a r g u e s t h i s w o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s c o n c e r n t o p r o t e c t r e p u t a t i o n s o v e r a n d a b o v e t h e c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t s a t p l a y . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s n o t e d b y A t i y a h , V a n d e v e l d e a n d o t h e r s 2 7 5 , i n f l u e n c e d and were r e f l e c t e d i n l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e r i s e o f u t i l i t a r i a n a n d l e g a l r e a l i s t t h e o r i e s . T h i s p a p e r d o e s n o t s e e k t o show a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e b e t w e e n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y , n o r t o g i v e an e x h a u s t i v e r e v i e w o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t t o s c r u t i n y f o r d e c a d e s . T h e d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w s h a s t h e m o d e s t p u r p o s e o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g how m a i n s t r e a m a n d c r i t i c a l modern j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a v e a d o p t e d much o f J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n M i l l a r c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s a n d v a l u e . 2 7 6 2. T h e P o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f P r o p e r t y i n M o d e r n L e g a l T h e o r y L a t e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y J e r e m y B e n t h a m l a u n c h e d h i s c r i t i q u e o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r y a n d B l a c k s t o n e ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f E n g l i s h common l a w f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f u t i l i t a r i a n p h i l o s o p h y . 2 7 7 He d i s p a r a g e d e f f o r t s t o l o c a t e t h e s o u r c e s o f common l a w r i g h t s i n m e t a p h y s i c s o r m o r a l i t y , a r g u i n g i n s t e a d t h a t law was a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , j u s t i f i e d i n i t s g e n e r a l a n d s p e c i f i c r u l e s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h i t h a d s o c i a l u t i l i t y , r e f l e c t e d i n t h e m e a s u r e o f u t i l i t y a s 150 "the g r e a t e s t happiness f o r the g r e a t e s t number." Bentham's s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t a t u t e law over judge-made common law r e f l e c t e d h i s b e l i e f t h a t j u r i s p r u d e n c e c o u l d be t r e a t e d as s c i e n c e , w i t h l e g a l c o n c e p t s c a p a b l e of b e i n g t e s t e d and r e f i n e d on the u t i l i t y measure. That law p r e c e d e d r i g h t s rather than the reverse was fundamental to Bentham's credo. The c o n t e m p o r a r y h e i r o f u t i l i t a r i a n and p o s i t i v i s t t h e o r y i s the "law and economics s c h o o l " . 2 7 8 The u t i l i t y measure, or s o c i a l 'end' of law, conceived by t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l approach i s the e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c t i o n of goods and s e r v i c e s . R i c h a r d Posner, l e a d i n g exponent of economic a n a l y s i s of law and now a U.S. f e d e r a l judge, w r i t e s : T h i s example s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s has an important f u n c t i o n : t o c r e a t e i n c e n t i v e s to use resources e f f i c i e n t l y . . . . T h e proper i n c e n t i v e s are c r e a t e d by the p a r c e l i n g o u t among t h e members o f s o c i e t y o f m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to the use of p a r t i c u l a r r e s o u r c e s . . . T h e c r e a t i o n o f e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i s a n e c e s s a r y r a t h e r t h a n s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e e f f i c i e n t use of r e s o u r c e s . The r i g h t s must be t r a n s f e r a b l e . 7 9 i The example to which he r e f e r s i s a r e v i s i t i n g of the farmer who works a p i e c e of land but has no pr o p e r t y i n i t , and so has no e x c l u s i v e r i g h t i n the produce; a f t e r e x p e r i e n c i n g the l a w f u l h a r v e s t i n g of 'h i s ' crop by others, he w i l l soon decide to l e t the land l i e f a l l o w . T h i s type of a n a l y s i s was not, of c o u r s e , f o r e i g n t o n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r i s t s l i k e 151 B l a c k s t o n e 2 8 0 , but u n l i k e them economic t h e o r i s t s l i k e Posner f i n d i t i r r e l e v a n t and m i s l e a d i n g to p o s i t a moral grounding f o r p r o p e r t y i n labour or occupancy; the c r e a t i o n of i n c e n t i v e to use resources e f f i c i e n t l y , to maximise economic u t i l i t y , i s the s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . The f u n c t i o n of law i s p r e c i s e l y t o c r e a t e and p r o t e c t t h o s e r i g h t s , and thereby p r o v i d e a secure e x p e c t a t i o n of reward and a secure b a s i s f o r c o n t r a c t u a l promises. As Lawrence Becker p o i n t s out, however, the l o g i c of the u t i l i t a r i a n / economics approach runs c o u n t e r t o a c o n c e p t o f p r o p e r t y as an a b s o l u t e and i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e r i g h t . 2 8 1 Wealth maximisation may sometime demand the l i m i t i n g or c u r t a i l i n g of o w n e r s h i p r i g h t s , as economic t h e o r i s t s b e l i e v e to be the case with c o p y r i g h t . T h i s i s a c c e p t a b l e to the theory because i t does not p e r c e i v e v a l u e as e x i s t i n g p r i o r t o i t s c r e a t i o n i n law. N e v e r t h e l e s s , u t i l i t a r i a n / economic theory o f t e n seems to have adopted i t s own ' n a t u r a l i s t ' d e f e n c e of p r o p e r t y . By c o n c e i v i n g human nature i n terms of economic man, a n a t u r a l l y a c q u i s i t i v e and u t i l i t y m a x i m i s i n g c r e a t u r e , the t h e o r y moves e a s i l y t o a p o s i t i o n a d v o c a t i n g u b i q u i t o u s p r o p e r t y r i g h t s v i r t u a l l y 9 ft 9 u n a s s a i l a b l e by the s t a t e . °* The L e g a l R e a l i s t s c h o o l i n A m e r i c a n j u r i s p r u d e n c e adopted the u t i l i t a r i a n s k e p t i c i s m of n a t u r a l law, but added a TOT c r i t i q u e of the a n a l y t i c a l framework of p o s i t i v i s m . O J I t s a t t a c k i n v o l v e d a c h a l l e n g e to the i d e a t h a t law c o u l d be understood as a process of deducing r u l e s from broadly s t a t e d 152 l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s . Law was not a d i s c r e t e universe of a p p l i e d l o g i c , but a realm of s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e . J u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , l i k e s t a t u t e law, r e p r e s e n t e d the making of s o c i a l p o l i c y c h o i c e s . As S i n g e r p o i n t s o u t 2 8 4 , the R e a l i s t s b e l i e v e d the supposedly n e u t r a l f r e e market p r i n c i p l e s which then h e l d sway i n l e g a l d o c t r i n e obscured the p o l i t i c a l nature of p r i v a t e law and a c o n s e r v a t i v e agenda r e s i s t a n t to s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the economy. Holmes' o p i n i o n i n the I.N.S. v. A s s o c i a t e d Press case was a s i g n i f i c a n t moment i n R e a l i s t j u r i s p r u d e n c e . L i k e Holmes, s c h o l a r s such as F e l i x Cohen 2 8 5 sought to e s t a b l i s h p r o p e r t y as an i n e l u c t a b l y p o l i t i c a l category. Property r i g h t s d i d not m e r e l y depend on the s t a t e f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , however, they c a r r i e d w i t h them s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l power. I n c u r s i o n s on p r o p e r t y r i g h t s had p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y as a t t a c k s on the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power i n American s o c i e t y . The C r i t i c a l Legal S t u d i e s movement, contemporary h e i r to the R e a l i s t s , has f u r t h e r r a d i c a l i s e d these i n s i g h t s . Singer p o i n t s out that many l i b e r a l l e g a l s c h o l a r s o p e r a t i n g i n the p o s t - R e a l i s t era have sought o b j e c t i v i t y i n a p r o c e s s - b a s e d approach to r i g h t s ; l i k e D w o r k i n 2 8 6 , they d i s t i n g u i s h between a p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e which i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y the p r e s e r v e of l e g i s l a t o r s and the j u d i c i a l d i s c o u r s e of the c o u r t s . L e g a l i s s u e s can then be d i v i d e d on the b a s i s of which d i s c o u r s e i s more s u i t e d to t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n . J u d i c i a l d i s c o u r s e i s a form o f p o l i t i c s , but one t h a t i s s u b j e c t t o the demands o f a p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e of argument, r e a s o n i n g and i s s u e - s p e c i f i c 153 r e s o l u t i o n . The C r i t i c a l s c h o o l d e n i e s even t h i s degree of o b j e c t i v i t y i n the l e g a l system, and any meaningful s e p a r a t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e l a w . 2 8 7 I f the law c r e a t e s value (and d i r e c t s i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n i n s o c i e t y ) then the C r i t i c s r e f u s e t o p e r m i t anyone i n the c o u n t r y o f law t o eschew •y o p p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences. 0 0 J u s t i c e Y a t e s was not a R e a l i s t , l e t a l o n e an e a r l y a d h e r e n t o f CLS. H i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s i g h t , however, t h a t c o p y r i g h t r e q u i r e d a p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r i n g i n order to ensure t h a t , as an i n s t i t u t i o n of property, i t would serve a s o c i a l p u r p o s e without t i p p i n g the balance of competing i n t e r e s t s which arose with the technology f o r re p r o d u c i n g books. T h i s h e l d t h e k e r n e l o f an i d e a t h a t swept away e a r l i e r understandings of pro p e r t y and p r i v a t e law. E. THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT P a r t I I o f t h i s p a p e r r e v i e w e d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o p y r i g h t a f t e r M i l l a r , showing that the m a j o r i t y p o s i t i o n was r e j e c t e d i n Donaldson v. Beckett by the House of Lords. The common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Donaldson holds that a c o p y r i g h t at common law was recognised but r u l e d by the judges to have been pre-empted, save f o r the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n r i g h t , by the S t a t u t e of Anne. Such a r e s u l t c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y a p a r t i a l v i n d i c a t i o n of J u s t i c e Yates' t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n , s i n c e he had r e j e c t e d the concept of common law co p y r i g h t a l t o g e t h e r . 154 I t d i d e f f e c t i v e l y make c o p y r i g h t a wholly s t a t u t o r y e n t i t y , as he had deemed n e c e s s a r i l y to be the case. Over t h e y e a r s and t h r o u g h the o n g o i n g p r o c e s s o f s t a t u t o r y amendment and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t 2 8 9 , the r i g h t s of authors of l i t e r a r y and o t h e r e x p r e s s i v e works have been extended, f o r the most p a r t , and on occasion narrowed or made s u b j e c t t o a form of e x p r o p r i a t i o n by compulsory l i c e n s i n g p r o v i s i o n s . 2 9 0 The s t a n d a r d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r i o d f o r most c o p y r i g h t w o r k s 2 9 1 i s l i f e o f the author p l u s f i f t y y e a r s . While debates over p a r t i c u l a r c o p y r i g h t i s s u e s remain l i v e l y , o f t e n heated, the nature of c o p y r i g h t as a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t , s u b j e c t t o a l l t h e l i m i t s o f d e f i n i t i o n and d u r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by the r e s p o n s i b l e l e g i s l a t u r e , goes g e n e r a l l y unquestioned and i s f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d by c o u r t s . 2 9 2 D e s p i t e t h i s c o n s e n s u s on t h e s t a t u t o r y b a s i s o f c o p y r i g h t , t h e u n d e r l y i n g n a t u r e and j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t continue to be the s u b j e c t of i n t e n s e a n a l y s i s . In a sense, the l i t e r a r y p roperty debate of the e i g h t e e n t h century has never ended, and the two s i d e s i n M i l l a r remain roughly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the two dominant approaches to c o p y r i g h t t o d a y . In Canada the d e b a t e s u r f a c e d i n a 1979 exchange b e t w e e n A.A. K e y e s and C l a u d e B r u n e t , a u t h o r s o f a government-sponsored study of c o p y r i g h t d i r e c t e d a t l a y i n g the groundwork f o r a comprehensive o v e r h a u l of the C o p y r i g h t A c t 2 9 3 , and R.J. R o b e r t s . 2 9 4 Roberts argued t h a t Keyes and B r u n e t had a d o p t e d a ' c o p y r i g h t as n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y of 155 c r e a t o r s ' s t a n c e , and c o n s e q u e n t l y had f a v o u r e d c o p y r i g h t owners i n a s e r i e s of recommendations on c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s . Through a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l review of the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e he e n d e a v o u r e d t o show t h a t t h e law had i n f a c t r e s o l v e d copyright to be a monopoly r i g h t granted by s t a t u t e i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and as such, i t must be c o n s t r u e d n a r r o w l y by t h e c o u r t s and e x p a n d e d w i t h c a u t i o n by l e g i s l a t o r s . 2 9 5 Roberts' p o s i t i o n echoes that of w r i t e r s from the law and e c o n o m i c s s c h o o l , who g e n e r a l l y v i e w c o p y r i g h t w i t h a s u s p i c i o n s i m i l a r to t h a t of Y ates J . i n M i l l a r . Stephen Breyer caused a minor s e n s a t i o n i n 1970 with h i s a r t i c l e "The Uneasy Case f o r C o p y r i g h t " 2 9 6 which argued from economic t h e o r y t h a t c o p y r i g h t o v e r c o m p e n s a t e s c r e a t o r s , and t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e s such as c o m p u l s o r y l i c e n c e s and government s u b s i d i e s c o u l d a d e q u a t e l y encourage p r o d u c t i o n of c r e a t i v e works at lower cost to s o c i e t y . Posner i s a l s o uneasy; while b e l i e v i n g c o p y r i g h t , r e s t r i c t e d as i t p r e s e n t l y i s t o e x p r e s s i o n and to a f i x e d term, i s j u s t i f i e d on e f f i c i e n c y grounds, he s t i l l has doubts: One i s n o t s u r e t h a t any c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y to generate the s o c i a l l y o p t i m a l a m o u n t o f b o o k p r o d u c t i o n , g i v e n t h e a d v a n t a g e s t h a t accrue to the f i r s t p u b l i s h e r ( i t takes a while to copy) and the f a c t t h at r o y a l t i e s are u s u a l l y o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of the o v e r a l l c o s t of p r o d u c i n g and s e l l i n g a b o o k . 2 9 7 156 The 'encouragement t h e o r y ' of c o p y r i g h t h o l d s t h a t the g o a l of c o p y r i g h t law i s to p r o v i d e a reward to c r e a t o r s s u f f i c i e n t to y i e l d the " s o c i a l l y o p t i m a l amount o f . . . p r o d u c t i o n " , but no more, because the reward comes a t the c o s t of monopoly . y o T h o s e w r i t i n g f r o m the c o m p e t i n g p e r s p e c t i v e take the s i d e of c r e a t o r s a g a i n s t the p u b l i c , or at l e a s t the consuming p u b l i c , a r g u i n g t h a t c r e a t o r s d e s e r v e and are e n t i t l e d to reap the b e n e f i t of v a l u a b l e uses of t h e i r p r o t e c t e d works . D a v i d L a d d , f o r i n s t a n c e , argues that a t tempts l i k e t h a t sugges ted by B r e y e r to d e v e l o p a l e g a l / s o c i a l p o l i c y regime aimed a t p a y i n g the minimum necessary to encourage an ' o p t i m a l amount' o f c r e a t i v e works a r e doomed to d i s t o r t the market and impose an a r b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d of worth on c r e a t i v e e n d e a v o u r . 2 9 9 A f t e r 200 y e a r s , i t i s i r o n i c that the debate c o n t i n u e s u s i n g many of the same arguments and terms i d e n t i f i e d by the C o u r t of K i n g ' s Bench i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r . W h i l e the debate does r e f l e c t an e s s e n t i a l dilemma a t the h e a r t of c o p y r i g h t which has g i v e n i t much of i t s t h e o r e t i c a l v i t a l i t y , t h e r e may now be more i n t e r e s t i n g ways to frame i t . 3 0 0 The d i s c u s s i o n o f ' m o n o p o l y v s . p r o p e r t y ' o f t e n s e e m s l i k e a n o v e r d r a m a t i s a t i o n , a d r a w i n g o f c a t e g o r i c a l l i n e s t h a t o b s c u r e s more than i t r e v e a l s . F o r one t h i n g , i t f o r g e t s the p o i n t which J u s t i c e Yates made t h a t i n f o r m s much of modern j u r i s p r u d e n c e : c o p y r i g h t i s monopoly and p r o p e r t y . As the f o r e g o i n g review has t r i e d to show, c h a n g i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of the a p p r o p r i a t e d e f i n i t i o n of 157 property l e d to a r e c o g n i t i o n that t h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t was no l e s s p r o p e r t y than r i g h t s preserved at common law, and no more contingent than a common law r i g h t . Roberts sees c o p y r i g h t as a s t a t e - g r a n t e d monopoly i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , and opposes t h i s t o a common law p r o p e r t y ; t h e i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t " n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y " e x i s t s r e g a r d l e s s of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and p o l i t i c s . I t i s t h i s understanding which the new theory of property a t t a c k e d . Any type of property , p r o v i d i n g as i t does f o r e x c l u s i v i t y o v e r a c t i v i t i e s i n o w n e r s , r e q u i r e s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and i t s e x t e n t and s c o p e i n law s h o u l d correspond t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s on which i t r e s t s at any one time. Second, the 'property v s . monopoly' debate takes p l a c e a l most e x c l u s i v e l y on the t e r r a i n o f economic reward and b e n e f i t , one s i d e i n t e n t on s e e i n g c o p y r i g h t owners r e c e i v e the f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e r e t u r n on the author's labour, the other concerned t o l i m i t the economic re n t on p r o t e c t e d works and maintain a h i g h l e v e l of competitive a c t i v i t y . T h i s dichotomy t e n d s t o remove f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n a c r u c i a l a s p e c t o f c o p y r i g h t r e v e a l e d i n the examination of the h i s t o r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l sources of M i l l a r v. T a y l o r : as understood by Lord M a n s f i e l d , the r o l e of p r o p e r t y i n the copy i n p r o t e c t i n g the author's p e r s o n a l , as w e l l as m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s . Whether t h i s f a c t o r s e r v e s as a s e p a r a t e , t h i r d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o p y r i g h t , or r a t h e r an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of i t s h i s t o r i c development i s d i s c u s s e d i n Part VI. 158 V I . C O P Y R I G H T AND THE J U S T I F I C A T I O N OF P R O P E R T Y FROM PERSONHOOD A . LORD M A N S F I E L D AND T H E LABOUR THEORY The l a b o u r t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y , o f t e n d e s c r i b e d as Lockeian, and the u t i l i t a r i a n or economic theory r e p r e s e n t the two dominant analyses of cop y r i g h t and r e l a t e d r i g h t s to t h i s d a y . B o t h a r e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and both speak e s s e n t i a l l y to a m a t e r i a l or p e c u n i a r y purpose i n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s : the former to the j u s t reward f o r the pain of labour or the j u s t e n t i t l e m e n t to v a l u e c r e a t e d by labour, the l a t t e r to a l e g a l means to ensure the maximising of m a t e r i a l goods and b e n e f i t s i n s o c i e t y . In P a r t IV, however, i t was argued . that Lord M a n s f i e l d had d i s c u s s e d the r i g h t of copy i n a f a s h i o n unique to M i l l a r v. T a y l o r and the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate, one t h a t moved be y o n d t h e p e c u n i a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f d i v i d i n g e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s ' d e r i v e d f r o m a l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n and t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the author's c l a i m to having i n v e s t e d p a r t of h i m s e l f , o f h i s p e r s o n a l i t y , i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n . L o r d M a n s f i e l d j u s t i f i e d the g r a n t i n g of an e x c l u s i v e c o p y r i g h t to the author at l e a s t i n p a r t on the b a s i s that such a r i g h t a f f o r d e d c o n t r o l over the i n t e g r i t y of the composition and, as a c o n s e q u e n c e , over t h e a u t h o r ' s c r e a t i v e r e p u t a t i o n . As p o i n t e d o u t, t h i s c o n c e r n f o r the p e r s o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i n 159 ownership of the t e x t had appeared i n a number of the cases preceding M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . 3 0 1 L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s a p p r o a c h c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as an e l u c i d a t i o n of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l dimension u n d e r l y i n g a labour theory of property e n t i t l e m e n t , to which e a r l i e r r e f e r e n c e was made. In Locke's t h e o r y , the p r o p e r t y i n one's own p e r s o n extended through the body's labour to the o b j e c t produced. Another way to approach the labour theory i s to ask: when i s an e x c l u s i v e property i n the object produced the a p p r o p r i a t e reward f o r the producer's l a b o u r ? Becker attempts a g e n e r a l statement of the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s of the labour theory: Well, i t means that when people deserve a b e n e f i t f o r t h e i r l a b o u r , and when ( i n terms of the p u r p o s e s of t h e i r e f f o r t s ) n o t h i n g b u t p r o p e r t y i n t h e t h i n g s produced w i l l do, and when the v a l u e of s u c h r i g h t s m e e t s t h e t e s t o f p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , t h e n t h e y d e s e r v e p r o p e r t y i n those t h i n g s . When, on the other hand, s u b s t i t u t e s w i l l do every b i t as w e l l , t h e y t h e n d e s e r v e e i t h e r the things produced or an e q u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y s u b s t i t u t e . And f i n a l l y , where p r o p e r t y i n the things produced i s not what i s sought a t a l l , a n d c a n n o t be an a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e f o r what i s s o u g h t , t h e l a b o r e r s deserve something e l s e (perhaps r e c o g n i t i o n , g r a t i t u d e ) . 0 2 P r o p e r t y t h e r e f o r e seems a p p r o p r i a t e where i t corresponds to the p u r p o s e s of t h e l a b o u r and t o the v a l u e the l a b o u r p r o d u c e s . T h i s c l e a r l y d e n o t e s both a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and a commercial component. I f the purpose of the labour expended deserves something a k i n to p r o p e r t y , and not a s u b s t i t u t e ( f o r 160 i n s t a n c e , a d e r i v e d income) although of equal value, one must assume i t r e l a t e s t o the importance of the s p e c i f i c o b j e c t p r o d u c e d t o the s p e c i f i c l a b o u r e r . T h i s importance might r e l a t e to possession and use of the o b j e c t , but that cannot be a l l i f one were t o assume t h e r i g h t i n q u e s t i o n t o be a l i e n a b l e . Therefore, property i s the a p p r o p r i a t e reward where c o n t r o l over the o b j e c t — i n c l u d i n g i t s exchange— r e l a t e s to the p u r p o s e i n p r o d u c i n g i t . " C o n t r o l " i s t h e r e f o r e t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l or p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t which the labour theory i n part addresses, j u s t as " p r o p o r t i o n a l reward" i s the economic i n t e r e s t . L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s c o n c e r n i n Mi l i a r was f o r v e r y p a r t i c u l a r kind of l a b o u r : the labour of an author. He found t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e reward f o r the a u t h o r ' s e x e r c i s e of i n t e l l e c t was indeed the c o n t r o l which i n h e r e d to p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , a r i g h t to e x t r a c t a m a t e r i a l reward f o r a u t h o r i a l l a b o u r and to s e t terms f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n of the work by a purchaser of the r i g h t to c o p y . 3 0 3 B. PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: TWO THEORIES J u s t as J u s t i c e Y a t e s 1 o p i n i o n i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r presaged developments i n nineteenth century l e g a l theory, Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s o p i n i o n might a n t i c i p a t e d developments i n the p h i l o s o p h y of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between o b j e c t s of p r o p e r t y and the i n d i v i d u a l 161 owner to the l a t t e r ' s self-development. T h i s begs a q u e s t i o n : d i d Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s p e r s p e c t i v e t r u l y represent a d i s t i n c t i v e understanding of the b a s i s f o r p r o p e r t y — i n other words, does the r e c o g n i t i o n of a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n the author over the o b j e c t s of h i s labour have meaning beyond i t s evident m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s ? A n s w e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n f i r s t r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r i n g the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p e r t y and personhood on a general t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l . A l a n Ryan p r o v i d e s a h e l p f u l f o c u s f o r what m i g h t otherwise prove a d i f f i c u l t i n q u i r y due to the s i l e n c e of much prope r t y t h e o r i s i n g on the i s s u e of personhood. He opposes two t r a d i t i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l theory concerning p r o p e r t y r i g h t s 3 0 4 : the f i r s t , which he terms " i n s t r u m e n t a l " , views property as a reward f o r the p a i n and inconvenience of labour and as a means f o r c o n v e r t i n g r e s o u r c e s i n t o consumables; the second, the " s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t a l " t r a d i t i o n , a s s e r t s b o t h t h a t l a b o u r s h o u l d be i n t r i n s i c a l l y s a t i s f y i n g and that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the o b j e c t s he owns i s as much or more i m p o r t a n t f o r the development of p e r s o n a l i t y as f o r ec o n o m i c p u r p o s e s . 3 0 5 Ryan i d e n t i f i e s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l t r a d i t i o n w i t h Locke and Bentham, amongst o t h e r s , and the s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t a l with Rousseau and the German p h i l o s o p h e r H e g e l . 3 0 6 The " i n s t r u m e n t a l " t r a d i t i o n might, by the ve r y name Ryan g i v e s i t , i m p l y a t r a d i t i o n t h a t d e n i e s any c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e f o r p r o p e r t y i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y . The statement that i t does have such a 162 f u n c t i o n a p p e a r s , not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h e r e f o r e , i n a l e a d i n g c r i t i q u e o f t h e t r a d i t i o n : C.B. M a c p h e r s o n 1 s t h e o r y o f p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 3 0 7 1. Property and Possessive Individualism Macpherson's seminal work e x p l i c a t e d and c r i t i c i s e d the o n t o l o g i c a l assumptions u n d e r l y i n g the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s of H o b b e , L o c k e a n d o t h e r s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r s . He a t t a c k e d these t h e o r i e s f o r reading back i n t o human n a t u r e i n a s t a t e of n a t u r e what he argued was the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y ' s image of the i n d i v i d u a l i n a s o c i e t y d o m i n a t e d by m a r k e t r e l a t i o n s . He c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s m of the market as "p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m " , one of whose seven d e f i n i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s was t h a t : ( i i i ) . The i n d i v i d u a l i s e s s e n t i a l l y the p r o p r i e t o r of h i s own person and c a p a c i t i e s , f o r which he owes nothing to s o c i e t y . 3 0 8 Freedom and humanity were i n t u r n d e f i n e d by the concept of the i n d i v i d u a l as owner of hi m s e l f i n a c o l d world: The i n d i v i d u a l i n market s o c i e t y _is human as p r o p r i e t o r of h i s own person. However much he may wish i t to be otherwise, h i s humanity does depend on h i s freedom from any b u t s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r s . 0 9 The p o s s e s s i v e nature of t h i s concept of i n d i v i d u a l i s m reduced s o c i e t y to the sum of a c q u i s i t i v e a c t o r s pursuing t h e i r own 163 i n t e r e s t s : "Society c o n s i s t s of r e l a t i o n s of exchange between p r o p r i e t o r s . " 3 1 0 While Macpherson's theory, l i k e t h a t of the s u b j e c t s o f h i s s t u d y , was not p s y c h o l o g i c a l per s e , i t p o i n t e d t o a dynamic r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p e r t y and p e r s o n a l i t y : p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , as an i n s t i t u t i o n r e i f i e d as the n a t u r a l and all-encompassing measure of man, reduced the i n d i v i d u a l t o a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d atom b e r e f t o f communal p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The r e c o g n i t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n the products of one's own imagination might w e l l seem the acme of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m , of v i e w i n g the i n d i v i d u a l as the owner o f c a p a c i t i e s f o r which he owes nothing to s o c i e t y . 2. Hegel's Theory of P r o p e r t y and P e r s o n a l W i l l Ryan's second t r a d i t i o n , the s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t a l , o f f e r e d something more. Here i t w i l l be examined i n terms of Hegel's t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y . T h a t t h e o r y r e c e i v e d i t s f u l l e s t e l a b o r a t i o n i n The Philosophy of Right ( 1 8 2 8 ) 3 1 1 . To say Hegel d e v e l o p e d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y somewhat m i s s e s the p o i n t of h i s work. In Hegel's p h i l o s o p h i c method human l i f e and h i s t o r y p r o v i d e d the s t a r t i n g p o i n t , the ' s t u f f ' , f o r s p e c u l a t i o n about i d e a l forms. Hegel d i d not endeavour to c o n s t r u c t a normative theory of s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s from f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s , as n a t u r a l law p h i l o s o p h e r s d i d , but r a t h e r t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e a s o n i n e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . H i s t o r y represented the working out of Idea or S p i r i t i n human a f f a i r s , a c o n t i n u a l p r o g r e s s ( a l b e i t through c o n t r a d i c t i o n 164 and c o n f l i c t ) of man and s o c i e t y towards an i d e a l . While t h i s i mbued h i s t h o u g h t w i t h t h e t r a p p i n g s o f h i s t o r i c a l d e terminism and p o l i t i c a l c o n s e r v a t i s m 3 1 2 , i t a l s o p e r m i t t e d him to d i s c u s s s o c i e t y as a dynamic phenomenon that changes over time as humans worked out t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the n a t u r a l w o r l d , t o e a c h o t h e r and t o t h e m s e l v e s . L o c k e , Rousseau and other n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s used the f i c t i o n s of a s t a t e o f n a t u r e and a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t o e x p l a i n the p u r p o s e s f o r s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e i r views of s o c i e t y c o n s e q u e n t l y remained a b s t r a c t and s t a t i c , a p a r t from the i n i t i a l d e s c r i p t i o n of the ' f a l l ' from n a t u r e t o s o c i e t y . Hegel chose i n s t e a d to adopt the course of human h i s t o r y as the b a s i s f o r p h i l o s o p h y , to assume that i t had meaning and r a t i o n a l purpose. In approaching an i n s t i t u t i o n l i k e p r o p e r t y , then, Hegel saw h i s task not as one of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , but of understanding. To H e g e l , h i s t o r y r e p r e s e n t e d the working out of the problem, or Idea, of i n d i v i d u a l w i l l , the s t r u g g l e through time and stages of s o c i a l development of humans s e e k i n g to form themselves as f u l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , w i l l i n g i n d i v i d u a l s . As much as a h i s t o r i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n , Hegel e n v i s a g e d t h i s development as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e t h i c a l p r o c e s s i n the s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i n g o f e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l . In t h i s scheme, p r o p e r t y p l a y e d a c r u c i a l r o l e . I t r e p r e s e n t e d the means by which the i n d i v i d u a l e x t e r n a l i s e d h i s w i l l i n nature, imposed h i s w i l l over o b j e c t s 3 1 3 (but not other p e r s o n s ) 3 1 4 i n the 165 e x t e r n a l w o r l d . The f u l l y - f o r m e d i n d i v i d u a l e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s w i t h o b j e c t s , and the h i g h e r s t a g e s of s o c i e t y were the ones which r e c o g n i s e d the i n s t i t u t i o n of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . Property served more an e t h i c a l purpose than an economic one. P r o p e r t y , H e g e l w r o t e , " i s t h e e m b o d i m e n t o f personality"'. To i n v e s t oneself i n an object i t was not good enough merely to w i l l , or want, ownership; "to secure t h i s end occupancy i s r e q u i s i t e . " 3 1 5 Here, t o o , then the b a s i s f o r p r o p e r t y was l a b o u r i n the form of o c c u p a t i o n . The view of Hegel as e x t o l l i n g ' s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n ' i n labour and p r o p e r t y has m i s t a k e n l y l e d some, Ryan argues, to assume t h a t Hegel b e l i e v e d i n a h i e r a r c h y of labour, with i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y s u p e r i o r to a l l o t h e r s . According to Ryan, Hegel made no such d i s t i n c t i o n , f i n d i n g a l l l a b o u r t o h a v e e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 3 1 6 That was because, f o r Hegel, knowledge or consciousness was grounded i n experience. Labour p r o v i d e d the l a b o u r e r with a f u l l e r e x p e r i e n c e and awareness of h i m s e l f . The r e l a t i o n s h i p of labourer to o b j e c t produced (or author to o b j e c t c r e a t e d ) was one of s e l f - c o n s t r u c t i o n , not mere ownership. H e g e l c o n c l u d e d h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n The P h i l o s o p h y of Right with a d i s c u s s i o n of c o p y r i g h t . T h i s was not i n s i g n i f i c a n t , because Hegel's e x p o s i t o r y s t y l e i n v o l v e d moving i n e v e r y phenomenon s t u d i e d from the s i m p l e to the complex, the p r i m i t i v e to the s o p h i s t i c a t e d , showing at each 166 p o i n t the i n n e r c o n f l i c t s and dynamics, the d i a l e c t i c s , t h a t u r g e d d e v e l o p m e n t f o r w a r d . What c o n c e r n e d H e g e l a b o u t c o p y r i g h t was p r e c i s e l y the dilemma f a c e d by the judges i n M i l l a r ; how to conceive of the d i f f e r e n c e between ownership of the ' t h i n g 1 , the book, and a l l i t s use and value on the one hand, and the a u t h o r ' s ownership of the " u n i v e r s a l ways and means of m u l t i p l y i n g such b o o k s " 3 1 7 on the o t h e r . T h i s p r e s e n t e d a p a r t i c u l a r c h a l l e n g e t o Hegel because he had a r g u e d t h a t p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e d " c o m p l e t e a n d f r e e o w n e r s h i p . " J i ° He s i d e s t e p p e d the problem by f i n d i n g the r e p r o d u c i b l e ' t h i n g ' to have a unique nature e n t a i l i n g the d i v i s i b i l i t y of i t s e x t e r n a l uses between the owner and the a u t h o r , whereby "the t h i n g i s not merely a p o s s e s s i o n but a c a p i t a l a s s e t . " 3 1 9 He proceeded to d i s c u s s the ease of making m o d i f i c a t i o n s to an author's work, and the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a l l o w i n g t h i s to o c c u r i n the s c i e n c e s and i n law, which depended on b u i l d i n g on the work of p r e d e c e s s o r s . C o p y r i g h t l e g i s l a t i o n t h e r e f o r e secured the p r o p e r t y of authors "only to a very r e s t r i c t e d extent" and f r e q u e n t l y "the p r o f i t promised to the author...becomes n e g l i g i b l e . " 3 2 0 H e g e l ' s b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of c o p y r i g h t d i d not go much beyond the o p i n i o n s of the m a j o r i t y i n M i l l a r with r e s p e c t to a narrow p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n t h e a u t h o r o v e r c o p y i n g . H i s o v e r a l l t h e o r y of p r o p e r t y h a s , however, r e c e i v e d r e c e n t a t t e n t i o n which e x p l o i t s i t s p a r t i c u l a r relevance to c o p y r i g h t and i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y . These s t u d i e s help to show how Lord 167 M a n s f i e l d ' s i n s i g h t i n t o the purposes of p r o p e r t y i n the o b j e c t s of i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r remain c r u c i a l t o a f u l l understanding of these r i g h t s . 3. C o n t e m p o r a r y S c h o l a r s h i p o n t h e P e r s o n h o o d B a s i s o f P r o p e r t y Margaret Radin develops from Hegel's thought a concept of p r o p e r t y as s e r v i n g a f u n c t i o n o f s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n , or " p e r s o n h o o d . " 3 2 1 She d e f i n e s her approach t h i s way: The p r e m i s e u n d e r l y i n g the p e r s o n h o o d p e r s p e c t i v e i s t h a t t o a c h i e v e p r o p e r s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t - - t o be a p e r s o n - - an i n d i v i d u a l n e e d s some c o n t r o l o v e r resources i n the e x t e r n a l environment. The nec e s s a r y assurances o f c o n t r o l take the form of pro p e r t y r i g h t s . 3 T h i s represents a " t h i r d s t r a n d of l i b e r a l p r o p e r t y t h e o r y " 3 2 3 i n a d d i t i o n t o the L o c k e i a n l a b o u r - d e s e r t and u t i l i t a r i a n w e l f a r e m a x i m i s i n g s t r a n d s , and l i k e them p o s i t s b o t h a general j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r and d e l i n e a t i o n of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . Radin seeks to show t h a t l e g a l theory has l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d t h a t d i m e n s i o n o f p r o p e r t y t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i n g o f p e r s o n h o o d , as d i s t i n c t f rom i t s p u r e l y economic c o n s e q u e n c e s . L i k e H e g e l , she does not use t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t o o f f e r a c r i t i q u e of i n s t i t u t i o n s of p r i v a t e property so much as to b e t t e r understand them and r e v e a l the un s p o k e n a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h u n d e r l i e the p r o t e c t i o n s o f property granted by c o u r t s and l e g i s l a t u r e s . 168 R a d i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " p e r s o n a l " and " f u n g i b l e " p r o p e r t y . The former i s property "bound up with a person", the l a t t e r " p r o p e r t y t h a t i s held p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l l y " 3 2 4 . The owner of an o b j e c t of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , understood i n t h i s s e n s e , c a n n o t be a d e q u a t e l y compensated f o r i t s l o s s by r e c e i v i n g an i d e n t i c a l object or i t s monetary e q u i v a l e n t . She uses the example of a wedding r i n g , which has the c h a r a c t e r of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y to i t s wearer, but f u n g i b l e p r o p e r t y to the r i n g ' s manufacturer. Her purpose i n using t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s both d e s c r i p t i v e and normative. Normatively, she argues that p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y d e s e r v e s a h i g h e r m e a s u r e o f l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n than f u n g i b l e p r o p e r t y . On the d e s c r i p t i v e s i d e , she a r g u e s t h a t the l e g a l s ystem does i n f a c t g r a n t t h i s h i g h e r measure o f p r o t e c t i o n , a l t h o u g h w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n and o f t e n subsumed under o t h e r r u l e s . 3 2 5 She argues f u r t h e r t h a t many t h e o r i s t s have p o s i t e d b i f u r c a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s which resemble her scheme i n form, and i m p l i c i t l y i n s u b s t a n c e . 3 2 6 Radin r e c o g n i s e s that without a well-grounded theory of p e r s o n h o o d , f o r w h i c h she t u r n s t o H e g e l a n d o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s , her approach r i s k s being wholly s u b j e c t i v e and without s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r law. In f a c t , her attempt to e x p l a i n how a l i n e can be drawn between 'healthy' p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a n d u n h e a l t h y o b j e c t - f e t i s h i s m a p p e a r s a r b i t r a r y and 327 unconvincing. *' 169 4. The Appeal of a Theory of Personhood The l a s t p o i n t p e r h a p s i n d i c a t e s what a f i n e l i n e s e p a r a t e d a H e g e l i a n t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y as e m b o d y i n g personhood from the c r i t i q u e of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Was Hegel (and a r e h i s contemporary i n t e r p r e t e r s ) doing anything more than c e l e b r a t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l as possessor of h i m s e l f and of w o r l d l y o b j e c t s ? In one sense, no. Hegel's ph i l o s o p h y , a t the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , r e p r e s e n t e d a p a n e g y r i c to l i b e r a l s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . In a deeper sense, however, Hegel p r o v i d e d something new to the p r o p e r t y debate. P r o p e r t y as a way f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to express h i s w i l l and be r e c o g n i s e d i n s o c i e t y was to be d i f f e r e n t than property as an exchangeable good i n the market. As Ryan p o i n t s out, Hegel r e j e c t e d a c o n t r a c t model f o r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ; work and p r o p e r t y served the purposes of e t h i c a l development, not wealth m a x i m i s a t i o n . 3 2 8 The i n d i v i d u a l was conceived as more than a t r a d e r i n h i s own c a p a c i t i e s . J u st as Lord M a n s f i e l d had more t h a n the a u t h o r ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o f i t from h i s own c r e a t i v i t y i n mind, so Hegel suggested a f u r t h e r dimension f o r the phenomenon of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . 3 2 9 That dimension may be most e v i d e n t where l a b o u r most c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e s s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n . 170 C. COPYRIGHT AND PERSONHOOD 1. The J u s t i f i c a t i o n From Personhood The endeavour to h i g h l i g h t the r o l e p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s p l a y i n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , more s p e c i f i c a l l y to examine how p r o p e r t y c a n be s e e n t o c o n s t i t u t e p e r s o n h o o d i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l , has value f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the unique p r o p e r t y of c o p y r i g h t . J U J u s t i n Hughes e x p l o i t s t h i s p o t e n t i a l i n h i s a r t i c l e "The Philosophy of I n t e l l e c t u a l P r o p e r t y . " 3 3 1 Hughes argues that the Hegelian concept of p r o p e r t y as f u l f i l l i n g the need f o r p e r s o n a l w i l l to e x t e r n a l i s e i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e s a s e c o n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y w h i c h s u p p l e m e n t s the L o c k e i a n labour theory j u s t i f i c a t i o n . He b e l i e v e s t h i s t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y the case f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y 3 3 2 compared to other forms of pro p e r t y . L i k e A l a n Ryan, Hughes views u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o be a s u b s e t o f t h e ' i n s t r u m e n t a l ' l a b o u r t h e o r y . He maintains that the labour theory d e r i v e d from Locke has three c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f y i n g a property r i g h t : (1) producing the ' o b j e c t ' ( r e a d idea) r e q u i r e s l a b o u r ; (2) the commons from which the o b j e c t i s taken i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y devalued; (3) the a p p r o p r i a t o r of the o b j e c t does not waste i t . I n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y meets these c o n d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y the second because the commons of ideas i s not f i n i t e and i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y r e g i m e s r e s p e c t a p u b l i c domain t h r o u g h t h e i r s t a t u t o r y ' s u n s e t ' p r o v i s i o n s . However, i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y does 171 encounter c e r t a i n problems from the L o c k e i a n p e r s p e c t i v e : l i t t l e labour may be i n v o l v e d i n the a p p r o p r i a t i n g of c e r t a i n i d e a s , e s p e c i a l l y those more a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c r e a t i v i t y and i n s p i r a t i o n , and the w i t h h o l d i n g of i n t e l l e c t u a l products by t h e i r a u t h o r may v i o l a t e t h e w a s t e p r i n c i p l e . T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n from personhood can overcome those d i f f i c u l t i e s : Such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n p o s i t s that p r o p e r t y p r o v i d e s a unique or e s p e c i a l l y s u i t a b l e mechanism f o r s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n , f o r p e r s o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , and f o r d i g n i t y and r e c o g n i t i o n as an i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n . . . . According to t h i s p e r s o n a l i t y theory, the k i n d of c o n t r o l needed i s best f u l f i l l e d by t h e s e t of r i g h t s we c a l l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . 3 3 The concept of c o p y r i g h t as a r i g h t of p r o p e r t y g i v i n g c o n t r o l t o the c r e a t o r ( a u t h o r ) over the e x t e n s i o n of h i s person, represented by the o b j e c t of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l a b o u r , i s c l o s e to the approach Lord M a n s f i e l d adopted i n M i l l a r . He too b e l i e v e d that the i n t e r e s t of the author i n p r e s e r v i n g h i s r e p u t a t i o n through p r o t e c t i o n of the work's i n t e g r i t y , being a b l e to prevent u n a u t h o r i s e d ' t a k i n g s ' which would have the e f f e c t , of a l t e r i n g h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the c o m p o s i t i o n , j u s t i f i e d c o p y r i g h t at common law. 2 . Problems wi t h a Personhood J u s t i f i c a t i o n of P r o p e r t y Hughes i d e n t i f i e s two p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e p e r s o n h o o d j u s t i f i c a t i o n : the d i f f i c u l t y i n e s t a b l i s h i n g l i m i t s , and the i s s u e of a l i e n a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . To that, two r e l a t e d problems 172 c o u l d be added: the s u b j e c t i v i t y seemingly i n h e r e n t i n the concept, and the m a t e r i a l consequences of a l l property r i g h t s . (1) S u b j e c t i v i t y — as noted above, the personhood th e o r y can e a s i l y f o u n d e r on t h e i s s u e o f t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l w i l l i n g . Without a developed theory of p e r s o n a l i t y which p r o v i d e s a g u i d e t o h e a l t h y and u n h e a l t h y o b j e c t - r e l a t i o n s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine how a l e g a l system c o u l d employ r u l e s t h a t would r e c o g n i s e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s where an i n d i v i d u a l ' s w i l l or p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y was i m p l i c a t e d , but deny p r o p e r t y where i t was not. According t o Hegel, labour i s the means by which the w i l l becomes embodied i n the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . The labour which gi v e s r i s e to i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y i s e x p r e s s i o n . 3 3 4 By expressing h i s labour and t a l e n t s , the i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t s the o b j e c t with h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . T h i s g i v e s r i s e to the c l a i m f o r pr o p e r t y , and i t i s through p r o p e r t y ' s character as a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l has h i s p e r s o n a l i t y recognised by ot h e r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the e f f o r t t o i d e n t i f y an o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r d e f i n i n g l e g i t i ma t e expressions of i n d i v i d u a l w i l l i n c u r s r i s k s of d i r e c t i n g human p e r s o n a l i t y by l e g a l s a n c t i o n . (2) P o t e n t i a l l y L i m i t l e s s — T h i s r e l a t e s c l o s e l y to the f i r s t i s s u e ; the argument from personhood, as suggested by L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s use o f a u t h o r i a l c o n t r o l over l i t e r a r y compositions to j u s t i f y a property r i g h t at common law, can be se e n as a v a r i a t i o n o f t h e l a b o u r t h e o r y . L i k e i t , t h e p e r s o n h o o d j u s t i f i c a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e s d i f f i c u l t y i n 173 comprehending l i m i t s on p r o p e r t y . I f the c r e a t o r of an o b j e c t , or l i t e r a r y work, should have p r o p e r t y i n i t because he has i n v e s t e d h i s w i l l i n the o b j e c t , i t becomes p r o b l e m a t i c to d e f i n e where h i s c o n t r o l should end and unhindered uses of the o b j e c t by others begin. (3) A l i e n a b i l i t y — Hegel maintained that the i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i n i t s h i g h e s t stage had the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of f u l l and f r e e a l i e n a b i l i t y . He t h e o r i s e d that the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l was withdrawn from the o b j e c t owned i n the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n . However, i f the p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t i n an o b j e c t i s c o t e r m i n o u s w i t h i t s exchange v a l u e , then i t does not seem that personhood o f f e r s any unique or a d d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . Hughes puts the dilemma t h i s way: T h i s i s the paradox of a l i e n a t i o n under the p e r s o n a l i t y model of p r o p e r t y . The p r e s e n t owner maintains ownership because he i d e n t i f i e s t h e p r o p e r t y as an e x p r e s s i o n o f s e l f . A l i e n a t i o n i s t h e d e n i a l of t h i s p e r s o n a l l i n k to an o b j e c t . But i f the p e r s o n a l l i n k does not e x i s t — i f the o b j e c t does not express or manifest p a r t of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l i t y - - there i s no f o u n d a t i o n f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s over the o b j e c t by which the 'owner' may determine the o b j e c t ' s f u t u r e . An owner's p r e s e n t d e s i r e t o a l i e n a t e a p i e c e o f p r o p e r t y i s connected to the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the p r o p e r t y e i t h e r i s not or soon w i l l not be an e x p r e s s i o n of h i m s e l f . Thus t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o p e r t y i s m i s s i n g . 3 3 5 U l t i m a t e l y , Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s approach would founder on t h i s p o i n t as w e l l . That i s , a f u l l y a l i e n a b l e c o p y r i g h t p r o v i d e s 174 o n l y a t e n u o u s c o n t r o l f o r an a u t h o r o v e r h i s p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n the work; once s o l d , the c o n t r o l passes to other hands. An author i n a strong b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n may be able to p a r c e l h i s r i g h t s and h o l d onto those which g i v e a degree o f o n g o i n g c o n t r o l , or perhaps e x t r a c t a h i g h e r m a t e r i a l reward for h i s withdrawal. The q u e s t i o n i s whether, i f the i n t e r e s t of p e r s o n a l i t y i s t o count, i t can be subject to complete a l i e n a b i l i t y . Hegel i n f a c t a n a l o g i s e d the a l i e n a t i o n of the " u n i v e r s a l " aspect of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y , the c r e a t o r ' s f u l l abandonment of h i s i d e a , t o s l a v e r y , t h e s a l e o f o n e ' s s e l f . 3 3 6 S e v e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g Canada, a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e by s e p a r a t i n g the p r o p e r t y of c o p y r i g h t from an i n a l i e n a b l e moral r i g h t d i r e c t e d at p r e s e r v i n g p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n the work. I t i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t moves t o make m o r a l r i g h t s a l i e n a b l e , or even waivable as they now are i n the Copyright Act as amended i n 1988, seem i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r purpose. The p o i n t f o r the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , however, i s t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n from personhood does not n e c e s s a r i l y , or even p r i m a r i l y , support a property r i g h t , i f such i s conceived as an a l i e n a b l e r i g h t . (4) M a t e r i a l C o n s e q u e n c e s — F i n a l l y , however much t h i s t h e o r y as j u s t i f i c a t i o n m i g ht be c o n c e r n e d w i t h b a s i n g p r o p e r t y on i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e i n the d e velopment of i n d i v i d u a l w i l l and p e r s o n a l i t y , the f a c t of p r o p e r t y as an economic i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t determines d i s t r i b u t i o n of rewards 175 and a r e a s of e x c l u s i v e a c t i v i t y c o n t i n u e s . A p e r s o n h o o d j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t c o u l d have the e f f e c t of e x p a n d i n g , or making more a b s o l u t e , r i g h t s of economic power s h o u l d be subject t o c l o s e s c r u t i n y . 3. A P r e f e r r e d Use of the Theory Rather than viewing the Hegelian theory of p r o p e r t y as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n and o f i t s e l f f o r p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s o f p r o p e r t y , Jeremy Waldron ta k e s the tack of u s i n g H e g e l ' s theory of p e r s o n a l development as a general j u s t i f i c a t i o n of property; that i s , i f , as Hegel maintains, p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s are necessary for self-development, then a moral c l a i m can be i m p l i e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t e v e r y p e r s o n s h o u l d h o l d p r o p e r t y . 3 3 7 Waldron thereby draws an e g a l i t a r i a n i m p e r a t i v e from H e g e l ' s work which he f i n d s absent i n t h e o r i s t s who f o l l o w Ryan's " i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t " t r a d i t i o n . However, s e e i n g Hegel's theory as j u s t i f i c a t o r y i n any sense i s fraught w i t h d i f f i c u l t y , not l e a s t because i t cannot be d e r i v e d from h i s own method or p u r p o s e , as n o t e d a b o v e . I t may be more a p p r o p r i a t e to see i n the theory an e x p l a n a t i o n of the nature of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . As such i t can o f f e r i n s i g h t s which are not r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e from other p e r s p e c t i v e s . The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e t h e o r y o f p e r s o n h o o d f o r c o p y r i g h t as an e x p l a n a t o r y t o o l i s a r e c o g n i t i o n that more than mere economic i n t e r e s t s are a t stake i n 'ownership' of the r i g h t to reproduce c r e a t i v e works. T h i s has value simply 176 as an i n t e r p r e t i v e t o o l which al l o w s us to b e t t e r understand t h i s l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n . When we l o o k a t p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of c o p y r i g h t , i t may be u s e f u l to keep i n mind t h a t c o p y r i g h t i s r e s p o n d i n g t o some deeper i n t e r e s t s i n r e s p e c t i n g the p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y o f the p e r s o n who has c r e a t e d t h e o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n . S e c o n d , b e y o n d t h i s i n t e r p r e t i v e f u n c t i o n , there may be circumstances i n which the b a l a n c i n g o f i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n c o p y r i g h t , and e s p e c i a l l y between c o p y r i g h t and o t h e r c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s s u c h as freedom of e x p r e s s i o n , may be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s o l v e d by knowing when i n t e r e s t s of p e r s o n a l i t y as opposed to f u n g i b l e economic i n t e r e s t s are i m p l i c a t e d . In the remainder of Part VI an attempt i s made to move forward from the r i g h t of copy as i t was envisaged d u r i n g the l i t e r a r y p roperty debate to i t s contemporary c o n f i g u r a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , the r o l e s of ' c r e a t i v i t y ' and ' o r i g i n a l i t y ' as the bases of p r o p e r t y i n c o p i e s (and o t h e r r i g h t s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o modern c o p y r i g h t ) w i l l be a d d r e s s e d . The d i s c u s s i o n focuses on both the m a t e r i a l and the pe r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s which c o p y r i g h t s e r v e s i n i t s f u n c t i o n a s p r o p e r t y . T he acknowledgment t h a t p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s o f a u t h o r s r e c e i v e r e c o g n i t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n through means other than c o p y r i g h t - - i n c l u d i n g n o n - a l i e n a b l e moral r i g h t s — s h o u l d not obscure the i n s i g h t a v a i l a b l e from a Hegelian approach; p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n t h e m s e l v e s s e r v e p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s and c o n s t i t u t e the e x p r e s s i o n and r e c e p t i o n of p e r s o n a l w i l l i n t h e w o r l d . 177 C o p y r i g h t i n p a r t i c u l a r i s more t h a n a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f economic e n t i t l e m e n t s : i t e s t a b l i s h e s v a l u e i n a range of p e r s o n a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , f r o m a l a b o u r e x p r e s s e d i n r e p r o d u c i b l e , f i x e d forms of l i t e r a r y or o t h e r c o m p o s i t i o n s (which i s not q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the labour that Radin might c a l l ' f u n g i b l e ' ) to c r e a t i v e labour imbued w i t h a u t h o r i a l p e r s o n a l i t y . In doing so, however, i t d e a l s with these forms i n ways that defy the nominal g e n e r a l i s a t i o n which s t a t u t e s and courts a l i k e p r e f e r . D. LABOUR AND CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT 1. O r i g i n a l i t y i n Modern C o p y r i g h t Law Copyright p e r t a i n s i n Canada to "every o r i g i n a l l i t e r a r y , d r a m a t i c , m u s i c a l and a r t i s t i c w o r k . " 3 3 8 The C o p y r i g h t A c t p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n s o f each of t h e s e c l a s s e s of w o r k s — f o r example, " l i t e r a r y work... i n c l u d e s maps, c h a r t s , p l a n s , t a b l e s and c o m p i l a t i o n s . " 3 3 9 Most of t h e r i g h t s a f f o r d e d by the Act p e r t a i n to every c l a s s , but some r i g h t s a r e u n i q u e t o one c l a s s . For example, the s t a t u t e g r a n t s d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s t o c o n v e r t a d r a m a t i c work i n t o another form, and v i c e v e r s a 3 4 0 , but no such r i g h t s f o r the o t h e r c l a s s e s i n t e r se. P r o t e c t e d works can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between those which are e x p r e s s i v e of c r e a t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n and o t h e r s which are i n f o r m a t i o n a l or i n v o l v e an arrangement of f a c t u a l m a t e r i a l , a 178 d i s t i n c t i o n which does not r e c e i v e express r e c o g n i t i o n i n the s t a t u t e . Despite the c r e a t i v e connotations i n common p a r l a n c e of " l i t e r a r y , a r t i s t i c , m u s i c a l and d r a m a t i c , " c o p y r i g h t extends to a vast range of wholly p r a c t i c a l , mundane works not r e a d i l y a s s o c i a t e d with c r e a t i v i t y . In Canada, c o p y r i g h t has been r e c o g n i s e d i n b u s i n e s s d i r e c t o r i e s 3 4 1 , i n s u r a n c e p l a n s and s c h e d u l e s 3 4 2 , debt c o l l e c t i o n l e t t e r s 3 4 3 , the t e x t on t o m b s t o n e s 3 4 4 , and schedules of horse races produced by t r a c k o f f i c i a l s 3 4 5 , to name j u s t a few. The i n t e n t i o n to p r o t e c t some of these works can be found i n express r e f e r e n c e s i n the s t a t u t e — e . g . , " c o m p i l a t i o n s " and " t a b l e s " — b u t i t i s more fund a m e n t a l l y grounded i n b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of co p y r i g h t t h a t developed i n the decades f o l l o w i n g M i l l a r v. T a y l o r . The key p r i n c i p l e arose from j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the word " o r i g i n a l " w h ich a p p e a r e d i n c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e s subsequent t o the S t a t u t e of Anne (1709). The Sta t u t e d i d not co n t a i n an express q u a l i f i c a t i o n of o r i g i n a l i t y ; i t spoke o n l y of "authors" and of "books". In the cases examined i n Part IV and i n M i l l a r , E n g l i s h c o u r t s c e n t r e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on whether defendants had c o p i e d the p a r t i c u l a r book i n q u e s t i o n ; o r i g i n a l i t y (as i n , ' f i r s t occupancy') became a t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for c o p y r i g h t , but not a t e s t which a p l a i n t i f f had t o meet i n order t o succeed. Minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o an e x i s t i n g work might be s u f f i c i e n t to support a defence to an infringement a c t i o n , as i n Gyles v. Walker (1740). 179 The t e s t f o r " o r i g i n a l i t y " under c u r r e n t s t a t u t e s i s minimal; i n a c l a s s i c statement of the law, Peterson J . s a i d : Copyright Acts are not concerned with the o r i g i n a l i t y o f i d e a s b u t w i t h t h e expres s i o n of thought, and i n the case of ' l i t e r a r y work,' w i t h the e x p r e s s i o n of t h o u g h t i n p r i n t o r w r i t i n g . T h e o r i g i n a l i t y which i s r e q u i r e d r e l a t e s to the expression of the thought. But the Act does not r e q u i r e t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n must be i n an o r i g i n a l or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work--that i t s h o u l d o r i g i n a t e from the a u t h o r . 3 4 6 The c a s e i n q u e s t i o n r u l e d t h a t exam q u e s t i o n s a t t r a c t e d c o p y r i g h t . In such cases, where the subj e c t matter are f a c t s and f o r m u l a t i o n s drawn f r o m a common s t o c k of knowledge, o r i g i n a l i t y s u f f i c i e n t f o r c o p y r i g h t i s found i n the s e l e c t i o n and arrangement of f a c t s , so long as that i n v o l v e s the modest e x e r c i s e of s k i l l and j u d g m e n t . 3 4 7 The argument on o r i g i n a l i t y p r o v i n g almost always u n a v a i l i n g , defendants have t r i e d t o make use of s t a t u t o r y wording which might suggest a degree of c r e a t i v e m e r i t or q u a l i t y i s r e q u i r e d f o r c o p y r i g h t . Such a d j e c t i v e s as " l i t e r a r y " and " a r t i s t i c " have been p o i n t e d to fo r an a e s t h e t i c standard, but again with l i t t l e s u c c e s s . In Hay & Hay v. S l o a n 3 4 8 d e f e n d a n t a s k e d t h e c o u r t t o deny cop y r i g h t to a r c h i t e c t u r a l p l a n s f o r a standard suburban home as not being " a r t i s t i c " . Stewart J . r e p l i e d : I t i s g r a t i f y i n g t o think that those who d r a f t e d t h i s A c t were c o n t e n t t o l e a v e s u c h a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e 180 j u d i c i a r y , but i t i s , I t h i n k , dangerous to assume such i n t e n t i o n . 4 9 T h i s r a t i o n a l e , t h at c o u r t s should not engage i n q u a l i t a t i v e assessments of e x p r e s s i v e works, has supported the j u d i c i a l r e l i a n c e on t h e t h i n measure o f o r i g i n a l i t y . The word " l i t e r a r y " has been u n d e r s t o o d t o mean the work must be w r i t t e n i n p r i n t e d form, not t h a t i t have the q u a l i t y of l i t e r a t u r e . A r a r e e x c e p t i o n to t h i s approach o c c u r r e d i n Exxon C o r p o r a t i o n v. Exxon I n s u r a n c e 3 5 0 i n which the Court of Appeal concluded, i n d e c i d i n g that the name "Exxon" d i d not q u a l i f y f o r c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n , t h a t a l i t e r a r y work must convey " e i t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n and i n s t r u c t i o n . . . o r p l e a s u r e " . 3 5 1 T h i s p r i n c i p l e has not to date been extended to other cases. In t h e r e c e n t C a n a d i a n l i t i g a t i o n o v e r machine r e a d a b l e o p e r a t i n g programs, the argument t h a t a work t h a t does not i n v o l v e communication w i t h human bei n g s i s u n p r o t e c t e d was r e j e c t e d . 3 5 2 2. The Protection Afforded 'Informational' Works The a c c e p t e d view of c o p y r i g h t law i s that the r i g h t s a f f o r d e d every p r o t e c t e d work i n the same categor y a r e the same, a l t h o u g h t h e scope of p r o t e c t i o n may v a r y w i t h the nature of the work. Since c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t s the e x p r e s s i o n of i d e a s , not ideas themselves, a work i n v o l v i n g a l i m i t e d degree of e x p r e s s i o n i s l e s s p r o t e c t e d . 3 5 3 181 The argument here, however, w i l l be that a d i f f e r e n c e i n the q u a l i t y of p r o t e c t i o n e x i s t s between a ' c r e a t i v e ' work, a work o f a r t i s t i c i m a g i n a t i o n , and an ' i n f o r m a t i o n a l ' work c o n s i s t i n g of the arrangement of f a c t s , a d i f f e r e n c e r e l a t i n g b o t h t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e l a b o u r i n v o l v e d , and t o t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of m a t e r i a l and personal i n t e r e s t s i m p l i c a t e d i n both types o f work. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of idea and expression d i f f e r i n these two t y p e s o f work. In a n o v e l , f o r i n s t a n c e , the a u t h o r c e r t a i n l y draws on a common body of knowledge, i d e a s and l a n g u a g e t o c o n s t r u c t h i s work; i n an i m p o r t a n t s e n s e , however, t h e work f u s e s form and s u b s t a n c e , or i d e a and e x p r e s s i o n . More t h a n a c h o i c e o f e f f i c i e n t word o r d e r , e x p r e s s i o n i s i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d to the elements of the s t o r y , i t s e v e n t s , c h a r a c t e r s and themes. In a work o f f a c t c o m p i l a t i o n , i d e a and ex p r e s s i o n are u s u a l l y q u i t e d i s t i n c t . The 'expression' may be a simple o r d e r i n g of the m a t e r i a l to make i t r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e t o the reader. The o r d e r i n g may have l i t t l e i n t r i n s i c value and be e a s i l y a v o i d a b l e by second- comers; w h i l e c o p y r i g h t might be expected t o p r o v i d e l i t t l e p r o t e c t i o n i n t h i s circumstance, Canadian c o u r t s have a c t u a l l y c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o t e c t i o n - - on a labour theory o f c o p y r i g h t . A r e c e n t e x a m p l e o c c u r r e d i n B.C. J o c k e y C l u b v. Sta n d e n . 3 5 4 There, the p l a i n t i f f c o r p o r a t i o n operated a race t r a c k ; i t c l a i m e d i n f r i n g e m e n t o f i t s c o p y r i g h t i n "Overnight", a sheet p u b l i s h e d d a i l y during the r a c i n g season 182 and l i s t i n g the order of the next day's races, horses e n t e r e d , w e i g h t s , j o c k e y s a n d p o s t p o s i t i o n s . The d e f e n d a n t r e p r o d u c e d 3 5 5 t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n from "Overnight" i n h i s own d a i l y h a n d i c a p p i n g p u b l i c a t i o n , a d d i n g o t h e r s t a t i s t i c a l m a t e r i a l from h i s own r e s e a r c h , a commentary on each race, and b e t t i n g odds. The B.C. Court of A p p e a l a f f i r m e d the t r i a l judge's r u l i n g i n favour of p l a i n t i f f . He had s a i d : But i n my o p i n i o n the d e f e n d a n t i n the c a s e a t b a r has done more t h a n c o p y i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m " O v e r n i g h t " . He has a p p r o p r i a t e d the r e s u l t s of the labour and the s k i l l s of the Club which has gone i n t o the c o m p i l a t i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n which the Club has developed and p u b l i s h e d . 5 6 Even a l t e r i n g the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the b a s i c r a c i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n "Overnight" would l i k e l y not have helped defendant: The c o p y r i g h t of the Club does not r e s i d e s o l e l y i n t h e order of the i n f o r m a t i o n which i t has compiled. 5 7 I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n S t a n d e n c o p y r i g h t r e s i d e d more i n the i n f o r m a t i o n that labour produced than i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r form of e x p r e s s i o n . 3 5 8 S i m i l a r r u l i n g s have been made by other Canadian c o u r t s throughout the h i s t o r y of c o p y r i g h t i n t h i s c o u n t r y . 3 5 9 The s t r o n g e s t statement of the p r i n c i p l e comes from Cartwright v. Wharton 3 6 ° , a pre-1921 case, which concerned a law l i s t that used a p r e v i o u s l i s t as the b a s i s f o r i t s a d d i t i o n a l research, c o r r e c t i o n and comment. The Court s a i d that by sending out names from p l a i n t i f f ' s l i s t 183 f o r c o r r e c t i o n , defendant had " a p p r o p r i a t e d to h i m s e l f the r e s u l t s of the p l a i n t i f f ' s d i l i g e n c e and l a b o u r " 3 6 1 , and c i t e d w i t h favour E n g l i s h d e c i s i o n s r e s t r i c t i n g the l e g i t i m a t e use o f c o p y r i g h t e d i n f o r m a t i o n a l works t o a f t e r - t h e - f a c t v e r i f i c a t i o n of one's own independent research. In Standen, of course, "Overnight" c o n s t i t u t e d the s o l e and s u f f i c i e n t source o f the b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n which defendant r e q u i r e d f o r h i s b e t t i n g sheet. The p r o t e c t i o n o f t i m e , l a b o u r and r e s o u r c e s w hich Canadian c o u r t s have seen f i t to p r o v i d e under c o p y r i g h t might b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as a fo r m o f l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n f o r r e s e a r c h . 3 6 2 In almost every i n s t a n c e the p r o t e c t i o n has been g r a n t e d i n s i t u a t i o n s where a competitor was seeking to make use of the o r i g i n a l to capture p a r t of the c o p y r i g h t owner's market. In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e s e c a s e s resemble t h e t o r t o f u n f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n r e c o g n i s e d i n the A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s v. I.N.S. c a s e 3 6 3 , and a branch of the breach of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y a c t i o n . 3 6 4 A l e g i t i m a t e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as t o how f a r c o p y r i g h t law should be s t r e t c h e d i n order to achieve the same g o a l . T h a t q u e s t i o n i s e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t i n t h e circumstances of a case l i k e Standen, where the defendant was no t a c t u a l l y c o m p e t i n g w i t h the p l a i n t i f f , but making a d e r i v a t i v e use of p r i n t e d i n f o r m a t i o n produced as a byproduct o f p l a i n t i f f ' s b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y . 3 6 5 In any event, c o p y r i g h t i n these cases serves e x c l u s i v e l y a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t of the c o p y r i g h t owner: the i n t e r e s t of commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n of 184 the work. I t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n l i e s both i n the t h e o r y of u t i l i t y and i n c e n t i v e ( e n s u r i n g the p l a i n t i f f r e c o v e r s the c o s t of h i s investment) and i n the a s p e c t of the l a b o u r theory t h a t seeks to p r e v e n t u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t . 3. The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d ' C r e a t i v e ' Works C r e a t i v e works encounter a d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t . C o p y r i g h t law a f f o r d s them p r o t e c t i o n not s o l e l y on t h e g r o u n d s o f l a b o u r expended, but a l s o on that of the i m a g i n a t i v e a c t . As w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n a l works t h e c o n c e r n i s not w i t h o u t r i g h t c o p y i n g of a work, which has always been found to c o n s t i t u t e i n f r i n g e m e n t , b u t w i t h w h a t K a p l a n t e r m s " h o r i z o n t a l r i g h t s " 3 6 6 , the scope of c o p y r i g h t over uses o f the o r i g i n a l work i n an a l t e r e d form. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r , v i r t u a l l y e v e r y s u c h u s e was c o n s i d e r e d by t h e m a j o r i t y to l i e o u t s i d e the scope of a p e r p e t u a l , common law c o p y r i g h t . I t was i n p a r t h i s fear t h a t t h i s would not be so t h a t l e d J u s t i c e Yates to the c o n c l u s i o n that c o p y r i g h t must be a s t a t u t o r i l y r e g u l a t e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t . T h e m o s t r e v e a l i n g i s s u e h e r e i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s . B r a i t h w a i t e o f f e r s t h i s b r i e f d e f i n i t i o n : A d e r i v a t i v e work . . . i n v o l v e s a second t i e r of c r e a t i v e e f f o r t superimposed upon t h a t of the u n d e r l y i n g a u t h o r . 6 ' He p o i n t s to the s u b s e c t i o n s t o s e c t i o n 3 of the C o p y r i g h t A c t as one of two sources of e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s over d e r i v a t i v e uses 185 i n C a n a d i a n law. T h e r e , the r i g h t i s g i v e n t o t r a n s l a t e ( s s . ( a ) ) , adapt dramatic works ( s s . ( b ) ) , dramatise other works ( s s . ( c ) ) , and to m e c h a n i c a l l y reproduce and f i l m c o p y r i g h t e d works. While t h e s e r i g h t s are o s t e n s i b l y a v a i l a b l e f o r a l l works, i n p r a c t i c e they r e f e r to c r e a t i v e works. C e r t a i n l y , an i n f o r m a t i o n a l work may o f t e n be t r a n s l a t e d ; t r a n s l a t i o n , however, i s of t h e l i s t e d d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s the one most c l e a r l y r e l a t e d to simple c o p y i n g . 3 6 8 The others e i t h e r apply e x p r e s s l y (a d r a m a t i s a t i o n ) or i m p l i e d l y (note the r e f e r e n c e t o "a n o v e l " i n s s . (b) and ( c ) ) to c r e a t i v e works. By s p e c i f y i n g these r i g h t s , the s t a t u t e i m p l i e s they would not o t h e r w i s e have f a l l e n w i t h i n r i g h t s t o " r e p r o d u c e . . . any s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t " of the work (s. 3 ( 1 ) ) . What i s a r i g h t to dramatise a novel ? I t c o n s t i t u t e s the r i g h t to take the elements of the novel and express them i n a q u i t e d i s t i n c t form, w i t h i t s u n i q u e demands of d i a l o g u e , t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y and v i s u a l i s a t i o n , to name but t h r e e . An a n a l y s i s of s i m i l a r d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s i n the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 l e d one commentator to conclude that c o p y r i g h t does p r o t e c t ideas, c r e a t i v e i deas: Thus, c o p y r i g h t i s no longer a p u b l i s h e r ' s r i g h t concerned only with form, but r a t h e r i s an a u t h o r 1 s r i g h t c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o n t e n t . 3 6 9 T h i s f o l l o w s l o g i c a l l y from the aforementioned f u s i o n of idea and e x p r e s s i o n , form and s u b s t a n c e , i n c r e a t i v e works. An 186 e x c l u s i v e r i g h t merely to reproduce i n s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t the expression (understood as word order) of a c r e a t i v e work would be a narrow r i g h t , i n both a m a t e r i a l and p e r s o n a l sense. The express d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s i n the Act are the c l e a r e s t demonstration t h a t c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t s a r t i s t i c i d e a s . The same t h i n g o c c u r s , however, with the j u d i c i a l t e s t s d e v i s e d f o r i d e n t i f y i n g ' s u b s t a n t i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n , ' B r a i t h w a i t e ' s second source of d e r i v a t i v e w o r k s . 3 7 0 Whether a p a r t of a work has been reproduced depends on an o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g of s i m i l a r i t y , and whether the part reproduced i s s u b s t a n t i a l can turn on i t s q u a l i t y as much as i t s q u a n t i t y . 3 7 1 With a c r e a t i v e work, these standards r e q u i r e i d e n t i f y i n g core ideas or p a t t e r n s i n the work. In H a n f s t a e n g l v. Empire P a l a c e 3 7 2 , newspaper sketches of tableaux v i v a n t s taken from p a i n t i n g s were found not to i n f r i n g e c o p y r i g h t i n the p a i n t i n g s , m o s t l y because they were fou n d i n f e r i o r i n q u a l i t y and not t o convey the " i d e a " of the o r i g i n a l s . In G l y n v. Weston Feature F i l m 3 7 3 , the court assessed s i m i l a r i t y between a novel and an a l l e g e d l y i n f r i n g i n g f i l m by comparing p l o t and c h a r a c t e r development, f i n d i n g these elements i n the novel too o r d i n a r y to deserve p r o t e c t i o n . A c l a s s i c American statement of how s i m i l a r i t y between c r e a t i v e works i s d e t e r m i n e d comes from J u s t i c e Learned Hand i n N i c h o l s v. U n i v e r s a l P i c t u r e s Corp.: Upon any work, and e s p e c i a l l y upon a p l a y , a g r e a t number of p a t t e r n s of i n c r e a s i n g g e n e r a l i t y w i l l f i t e q u a l l y w e l l , as more and more of the i n c i d e n t i s l e f t out. The 187 l a s t may perhaps be no more than a general statement of what the p l a y i s about, and a t t i m e s may c o n s i s t o n l y of i t s t i t l e ; but t h e r e i s a p o i n t i n t h i s s e r i e s of a b s t r a c t i o n s where t h e y a r e no l o n g e r p r o t e c t e d , since otherwise the playwright c o u l d p r e v e n t the use of h i s 'ideas', to which, a p a r t from t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n , h i s p r o p e r t y i s never extended. ' J u s t i c e Hand continued f u r t h e r to d e s c r i b e how c h a r a c t e r s i n a c r e a t i v e work can be p r o t e c t e d i f s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t . As might have been expected, the b o r d e r l i n e between i d e a s and e x p r e s s i o n i n c r e a t i v e works i s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n . One c a t e g o r y which f a l l s between i n f o r m a t i o n a l and c r e a t i v e works, and has engendered c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f u s i o n , i s t h a t of h i s t o r y and biography. In one r e s p e c t , a h i s t o r i c a l study can be viewed as a c o m p i l a t i o n of evidence which must r e m a i n i n the p u b l i c domain; i n a n o t h e r , such a work may c o n t a i n as much expre s s i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a f i c t i o n a l work. G o f f J . w r e s t l e d w i t h the the a p p r o p r i a t e t e s t f o r i n f r i n g e m e n t to apply i n Harman P i c t u r e s , N.V. v. Osborne et a l , a contest between the p l a i n t i f f owner of f i l m r i g h t s to a book about the c h a r g e of the L i g h t B r i g a d e , and defendant p r o d u c e r s of a s c r e e n p l a y on the same s u b j e c t . 3 7 5 The case t h e r e f o r e concerned d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s to a work of h i s t o r y . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the screenplay shared many p r i n c i p a l events w i t h the book w h i l e d i f f e r i n g from i t i n many d e t a i l s . 3 7 6 In 188 g r a n t i n g an i n j u n c t i o n , J u s t i c e Goff quoted from Wilson J . i n Macmillan v. Suresh Chunder D e b : 3 7 7 ...the t r u e p r i n c i p l e i n a l l these cases i s , t h a t the defendant i s not at l i b e r t y t o use or a v a i l h i m s e l f o f the l a b o u r which the p l a i n t i f f has been at f o r the purpose of producing h i s work; that i s , i n f a c t , merely to- take away the r e s u l t of another man's la b o u r , or, i n other words, h i s property. ' 8 G o f f J . framed the i s s u e i n terms of whether the defendant used the book as a b a s i s , t a k i n g h i s s e l e c t i o n of i n c i d e n t s and q u o t a t i o n s therefrom, a l b e i t . . . m a k i n g some a l t e r a t i o n s and a d d i t i o n s b y r e f e r e n c e to the common sources and by r e f e r e n c e to other sources 3 7 9 T h i s a p p e a r s a g a i n to be a not so l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n o f r e s e a r c h . In a r e c e n t B.C. c a s e , an academic h i s t o r i a n ' s r e s e a r c h was p r o t e c t e d v i s - a - v i s the w r i t e r of more popular h i s t o r i c a l works intended f o r s c h o o l s . 3 8 0 I n H a r p e r & Row, P u b l i s h e r s I n c . e t a l v. N a t i o n E n t e r p r i s e s 3 8 1 , the Supreme Court of the U.S. considered the c o p y r i g h t s t a t u s of the a u t o b i o g r a p h y of former P r e s i d e n t G e r a l d F o r d . The m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y o p i n i o n s b o t h recognised the c e n t r a l i s s u e as the complex f u s i o n of f a c t and e x p r e s s i o n i n h i s t o r i c a l and b i o g r a p h i c a l works. For the m a j o r i t y , J u s t i c e O'Connor s t a t e d the dilemma: 189 E s p e c i a l l y i n t h e r e a l m o f f a c t u a l n a r r a t i v e , the law i s c u r r e n t l y u n s e t t l e d r e g a r d i n g t h e ways i n w h i c h u n c o p y - r i g h t a b l e e l e m e n t s c o m b i n e w i t h t h e a u t h o r ' s o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to form p r o t e c t e d e x p r e s s i o n . 3 8 2 The C o u r t g r a n t e d the i n j u n c t i o n , but n o t e d t h a t the more c l o s e l y f a c t and e x p r e s s i o n are l i n k e d , the l e s s p r o t e c t i o n e x p r e s s i o n w i l l r e c e i v e . 3 8 3 E. RETRIEVING A PERSONAL INTERESTS PERSPECTIVE In sum, copyright law i n i t s n e a r l y 300 year h i s t o r y i n the common law w o r l d has become the s o u r c e of s u b s t a n t i a l commercial e x p e c t a t i o n s and r i g h t s . Many of those r e s i d e i n spheres of a c t i v i t y which have l i t t l e or nothing to do w i t h a v i s i o n o f t h e l o n e l y a u t h o r or p o e t t o i l i n g away i n a g a r r e t . 3 8 4 C o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t s a v a s t range o f o r i g i n a l e x p r e s s i o n , from the most banal b u s i n e s s form or s c r i b b l e d memorandum to the p r i z e - w i n n i n g n o v e l . That v a r i e t y b e t r a y s t h e u n i t a r y p r i n c i p l e s on w h i c h c o p y r i g h t r e s t s . The i d e a / e x p r e s s i o n dichotomy i n p a r t i c u l a r d i s g u i s e s the complex i n t e r p l a y of f a c t o r s which determine the scope of c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n at the margins: with i n f o r m a t i o n a l works and works o f c o m p i l a t i o n C a n a d i a n and o t h e r c o u r t s have e x t e n d e d p r o t e c t i o n under what i s i n e f f e c t a m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n d o c t r i n e t o f a c t s , e s p e c i a l l y i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s which i n v o l v e market competitors; with c r e a t i v e works, c o p y r i g h t has been found to 190 p r o t e c t l i t e r a r y and a r t i s t i c i deas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n terms of t r a n s f e r r i n g works from t h e i r o r i g i n a l form i n t o other forms. As s t a t e d , these e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s have a m a t e r i a l or c o m m e r c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the f i r s t o r d e r . F i l m r i g h t s p r e s e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e t h e f i n a n c i a l j a c k p o t f o r f i c t i o n w r i t e r s . S t i l l , the p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s which animated L o r d Ma n s f i e l d ' s t h i n k i n g i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r can a l s o be seen at p l a y i n the c o p y r i g h t scheme as i t has d e v e l o p e d on these p o i n t s . The e x e r c i s e of d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s ( i n c l u d i n g when those a r i s e through j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ' s u b s t a n t i a l reproduction') c o n s t i t u t e a form of c o n t r o l i n the author over the progress of h i s work i n the world. They re c o g n i s e through a property concept the r i g h t of a c r e a t o r to have a say over whether and how h i s o r i g i n a l work w i l l be remoulded i n t o the new e x p r e s s i o n of a d i f f e r e n t medium. A r e c a s t i n g of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n terms of the two concepts of p r o p e r t y and p e r s o n a l i t y , e a r l i e r d i s c u s s e d , leads i n the f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t i o n s . As a r e s u l t o f the l i t e r a r y property debate and of i t s c u l m i n a t i o n i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r and Donaldson v. B e c k e t t , Anglo-American law ' p r o p e r t i s e d ' the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the author and h i s work. His r i g h t s i n the work c o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a l i e n a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , a l b e i t s t a t u t e - b a s e d . Those r i g h t s c o m p r i s e d a l l o f the a u t h o r ' s m a t e r i a l and p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n the work. In Canada, through the French i n f l u e n c e and an e a r l y adherence to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n which i t s e l f i n c o r p o r a t e d the 191 European t r a d i t i o n , an i n a l i e n a b l e moral r i g h t was i n c l u d e d i n the C o p y r i g h t Act to p r e s e r v e c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s of the author. The recent amendment to the Act both expanded the moral r i g h t , but a l s o and perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y made i t w a i v a b l e ; the u l t i m a t e e f f e c t o f the l a t t e r i s l i k e l y t o i n c r e a s e authors' r e l i a n c e on p r o p e r t y r i g h t s as the source of p r o t e c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s and, i n d e e d , f o r t h e i r s t a t u s as author. The author i s thereby c o n s t i t u t e d i n our law as an owner . C o p y r i g h t t h u s e x e m p l i f i e s ' p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m ' at work; the i n d i v i d u a l conceived as possessor of h i m s e l f and h i s c a p a c i t i e s , r e c o g n i s e d i n r i g h t s he h o l d s a g a i n s t s o c i e t y . I f f o r the moment t h i s p o s i t i o n i s a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t c r i t i c i s m , and we t u r n to Radin's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o p e r t y law i n terms of Hegel 's theory, i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t s come to l i g h t . Her p o s i t i o n i s b o t h d e s c r i p t i v e , i n s a y i n g t h a t p r o p e r t y law i s i n f a c t o f t e n d r i v e n by e t h i c a l concepts of p e r s o n h o o d , and n o r m a t i v e , i n a r g u i n g t h a t a d u a l i t y i n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s s h o u l d be r e c o g n i s e d on t h e b a s i s o f " f u n g i b l e " and " p e r s o n a l " p r o p e r t y . In c o p y r i g h t law such a d i v i s i o n i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t . I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e d i s c u s s i o n above, a " f u n g i b l e " c o p y r i g h t might i n c l u d e : (a) nature of works — i n f o r m a t i o n a l works, and compilations --works p r o d u c e d i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of commercial a c t i v i t y 192 (b) nature o f 'taking' or 'use' — c o m p e t i t i v e uses i n the owner's market By c o n t r a s t a " p e r s o n a l " c o p y r i g h t might encompass (a) nature o f work — c r e a t i v e works, works of imagination (b) nature o f 'taking' or 'use' — d e r i v a t i v e uses The p o i n t of such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , as Radin p o i n t s out, i s not so much to cr e a t e a f i r s t and second c l a s s p r o p e r t y , as to be c l e a r when p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n a d d i t i o n t o m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s a r e i m p l i c a t e d i n a p o l i c y i s s u e o r a f a c t s i t u a t i o n . Appeals t o p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s would o n l y be made when they are i m p l i c a t e d . I t was suggested e a r l i e r t h a t i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r governments to a s s e r t Crown c o p y r i g h t f o r the purpose of p r e v e n t i n g p u b l i c a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . That r e p r e s e n t s one i n s t a n c e i n which the p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s which m o t i v a t e d the o r i g i n a l c o p y r i g h t d e c i s i o n i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r (1769) would not be pr e s e n t , and ought not to support the f u l l e x e r c i s e of an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of p r o p e r t y . 193 ENDNOTES 1. I n c l u d i n g Jean Bodin, Hugo G r o t i u s , Montesquieu, Burke, and J e f f e r s o n . Other t h e o r i s t s l i k e Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and David Hume had no formal l e g a l t r a i n i n g , but i n the course o f t h e i r c a r e e r s a d v i s e d governments on l e g i s l a t i o n and otherwise demonstrated c o n s i d e r a b l e f a m i l i a r i t y with law and the l e g a l p r o c e s s . 2. See h i s " R e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 18th-century E n g l i a h C o n t r a c t Theory: The View from Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s T r i a l Notes" (1988) 76 Georgetown Law J o u r n a l 1949; " E i g h t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Judges' Notes: How They E x p l a i n , C o r r e c t and Enhance the R e p o r t s " (1987) 31 American J o u r n a l of Legal H i s t o r y 9; and a r t i c l e s c i t e d at notes 65 and 274. 3. A b r i e f note on c i t a t i o n : due to the r e l i a n c e p l a c e d on c a s e s i n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e l e a d i n g t o , and i n c l u d i n g , M i l l a r v. T a y l o r , the f i r s t mention of each such case w i l l be h i g h l i g h t e d i n the t e x t ; t h e r e a f t e r , the date of the case w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n the t e x t . 4. 8 Anne. c. 19. 5. See, f o r example, and f o r general d i s c u s s i o n s of the l e g a l s t a t u s of " i n f o r m a t i o n " , Grant Hammond, " P r o p e r t y r i g h t s to i n f o r m a t i o n " (1981) 27 M c G i l l Law J o u r n a l 47; A. W e i n r i b , "Information and pro p e r t y " (1988) 38 U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Law Jo u r n a l 117; R.J. Roberts, "Is i n f o r m a t i o n p r o p e r t y ?" (1987) 3 I n t e l l e c t u a l Property J o u r n a l 209. 6. McLuhan, M a r s h a l l . The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographical Man (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1962) 7. See f o r one important example E l i z a b e t h E i s e n s t e i n , The P r i n t i n g P r e s s as A g e n t o f Change. ( L o n d o n : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979). E i s e n s t e i n c r e d i t s McLuhan w i t h whetting her a p p e t i t e f o r the study of p r i n t i n g ' s impact on s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e , b u t d e s c r i b e s i n t h e P r e f a c e h e r f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h h i s r e f u s a l t o a p p r o a c h t h e t o p i c i n a l i n e a r , h i s t o r i c a l f a s h i o n . See f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of her work at text accompanying notes 3 2 f f , below. Robert Darnton's work l i n k i n g the h i s t o r y of p u b l i s h i n g and book d i s s e m i n a t i o n with p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y p r e s e n t s a s t r i k i n g example o f what s o p h i s t i c a t e d media s t u d i e s can a c h i e v e . See h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s o f methods and r e s u l t s i n The K i s s of Lamourette: R e f l e c t i o n s i n C u l t u r a l H i s t o r y (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1990), Par t s 3-5. 194 8. R. v. Stewart. [1988] 1 SCR 963. To be p r e c i s e , the Court r e a c h e d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h r o u g h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "takes...anything" (emphasis added) i n the t h e f t p r o v i s i o n of the C r i m i n a l Code. "Anything", i t r u l e d , must be capable of being the s u b j e c t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . N e i t h e r c o p y r i g h t nor c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , as i n t a n g i b l e s , s a t i s f i e d t h i s t e s t . See judgment of Lamer J . , as he then was, a t 972 f f . 9. See g e n e r a l l y James Baker, An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o E n g l i s h Legal H i s t o r y (London: Butterworths, 1979) 2d ed., Ch. 13, pp. 193-262; Holdsworth, W.H. A H i s t o r y of E n g l i s h Law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1948) v o l . I I I . 10. B l a c k s t o n e , W i l l i a m . Commentaries, (Chicago: C a l l a g h a n & Co., 1884, 3rd ed.), Book I I , at 473. 11. The i s s u e f o r the c o u r t s , i n a c e r t a i n sense, was whether " p r o p e r t y " had a f u r t h e r a t t r i b u t e to those mentioned here: i t s r e c o g n i t i o n i n common law as an abs o l u t e r i g h t , as opposed to a 'merely' s t a t u t o r y r e c o g n i t i o n . See d i s c u s s i o n i n Part V. 12. H o h f e l d ' s most i n f l u e n t i a l a r t i c l e s w e r e : "Some F u n d a m e n t a l L e g a l C o n c e p t i o n s as A p p l i e d i n J u d i c i a l Reasoning" (1913) 23 Yal e Law J o u r n a l 16; and "Fundamental L e g a l C o n c e p t i o n s " (1917) 26 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 710. See g e n e r a l l y the d i s c u s s i o n i n Part V, below. 13. (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1988) 14. C.B. Macpherson, P r o p e r t y : M a i n s t r e a m and C r i t i c a l P o s i t i o n s (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 7. 15. " D i a l o g u e on P r i v a t e P r o p e r t y " (1954) 9 R u t g e r s Law Review 357 at 379. 16. Supra note 14, at 6. 17. I b i d , at 202. C h a r l e s Reich i n a s i m i l a r v e i n wrote of w e l f a r e e n t i t l e m e n t s and o t h e r s o c i a l program b e n e f i t s as having become the "new p r o p e r t y " of the modern world. See h i s "The New Prop e r t y " (1964) 73 Yale Law J o u r n a l 733. 18. Baker, supra note 9, ch. 14 " E s t a t e s and S e t t l e m e n t s " , 222-250. 19. B e c k e r , Lawrence C. P r o p e r t y R i g h t s : P h i l o s o p h i c Foundations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 24. 20. H o h f e l d (1917), s u p r a note 12. The 'moral i n t e r e s t s ' i n c l u d e d a c t i o n s f o r l i b e l and p r i v a c y . Indeed, H o h f e l d ' s c a t e g o r i e s 2 ( i n t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s - - e . g . , p a t e n t s ) and 5 195 correspond c l o s e l y t o the d i s t i n c t i o n between "commercial" and " p e r s o n a l " i n t e r e s t s i n c o p y r i g h t developed through the course of t h i s paper. 21. David Lange, "Recognizing the P u b l i c Domain", (1981) 44 Law and Contemporary Problems 147. 22. Blackstone wrote that s c a r c i t y made i t " n e c e s s a r y t o e n t e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r e p e r m a n e n t d o m i n i o n s ; a n d t o a p p r o p r i a t e t o i n d i v i d u a l s n o t t h e immediate use only, but the very substance of the t h i n g to be used." (Book I I , 4-5) Supra note 10, at 473. 23. See d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f p a t e n t s f o r i n v e n t i o n s i n Part I I I . 24. Works which d i s c u s s the h i s t o r y of the S t a t i o n e r s Company and i t s i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g members' c l a i m e d r i g h t s , i n c l u d e : P a t t e r s o n , L. Ray, C o p y r i g h t i n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e ( N a s h v i l l e : V a n d e r b i l t U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968); Fox, H a r o l d , The Canadian Law of C o p y r i g h t and I n d u s t r i a l Designs (Toronto: C a r s w e l l , 1967), pp. 1-40; Thomas, Donald, A Long Time B u r n i n g : The H i s t o r y of L i t e r a r y C e n s o r s h i p (New Y o r k : F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r , 1969); and Gray, W. F o r b e s , "Alexander Donaldson and the F i g h t f o r Cheap Books" (1926) 38 J u r i d i c a l Review 180. 25. See comments o f Lo r d M a c c l e s f i e l d i n Knaplock v. C u r l (1922), c i t e d at note 178, below; J u s t i c e W i l l e s i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r (1769), s a y i n g the name "copy of a book" "which has been used f o r ages, as a term t o s i g n i f y the s o l e r i g h t of p r i n i t n g , p u b l i s h i n g and s e l l i n g , shews t h i s s p e c i e s of p r o p e r t y to have been long known." (at 206) 26. On the h i s t o r y of " p l a g i a r i s m " and the d e c l i n e i n i t s a c c e p t a b i l i t y as a method of l i t e r a r y endeavour see Thomas M a l l o n , S t o l e n Words: Forays i n t o the O r i g i n s and Ravages of P l a g i a r i s m (New Y o r k : T i c k n o r & F i e l d s , 1989), and J o e l Wersheimer, I m i t a t i o n (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1984). Wersheimer draws on the work of Samuel Johnson to show how the c l a s s i c a l concept of a r t as i m i t a t i o n was on the d e f e n s i v e i n the mid-seventeenth century. 27. P a r t r i d g e ' s O r i g i n s g i v e s a d e r i v a t i o n f o r "author" which s u g g e s t s i t may once have had to do w i t h 'augmenting' as opposed to ' c r e a t i n g ' : 196 "Augere has pp auctus, on which arose both a u c t i o , ( l i t ) an i n c r e a s i n g , (but always) a p u b l i c s a l e , with o/s a u c t i o n - , whence E a u c t i o n , and a u c t o r , l i t an i n c r e a s e r , h e n c e a f o u n d e r , an a u c t i o n e e r , an author..." P a r t r i d g e , E r i c . O r i g i n s i A Short E t y m o l o g i c a l D i c t i o n a r y of Modern E n g l i s h . (London: Routledge & Kegan Pa u l , 1958), p.32. 28. R i c h a r d Wincor, From R i t u a l To R o y a l t i e s (Toronto: George J . McLeod, L i m i t e d , 1962), p. 16. 29. From "What i s an Author ?" i n Language, Counter-Memory, P r a c t i c e : S e l e c t e d E s s a y s and I n t e r v i e w s , ed. D o n a l d F. Bouchard, (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977), p.124. 30. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s , of course, c r u c i a l . Foucault b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r i s l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i n g of t e x t s than the ' a u t h o r - f u n c t i o n ' , a s o c i a l l y r e c e i v e d idea t h a t a u t h o r s h i p i s important to u n d e r s t a n d i n g t e x t s . He c o n t r a s t s the modern p e r i o d when "works are t o t a l l y dominated by the s o v e r e i g n t y of the a u t h o r " w i t h e a r l i e r p e r i o d s , and o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , i n w h i c h a t t r i b u t i o n o f a u t h o r s h i p p l a y s almost no r o l e i n the ' a u t h e n t i c a t i n g ' of t e x t s — i . e . , the process of g i v i n g them value as t r u t h . I b i d , at 126. 31. I b i d , at 124. 32. Supra note 7. 33. I b i d . , see her o u t l i n e of purposes i n the P r e f a c e . 34. An example of the d i f f e r e n t , modern view of the c o p y i s t as a "mere j o u r n e y m a n " i s f o u n d i n G.W.F. H e g e l , The P h i l o s o p h y of R i g h t , t r a n s . T.M. Knox. ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 4 2 ) . F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1828, i t shows H e g e l d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the c o p y i s t of a work of a r t (e.g., a p a i n t i n g or s c u l p t u r e ) , i n which the "copy of a work of a r t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p r o d u c t of t h e c o p y i s t ' s own m e n t a l and t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y " , whereas the c o p y i s t of a l i t e r a r y work or an i n v e n t i o n i s p e r f o r m i n g a p u r e l y m e c h a n i c a l a c t . S e c t i o n 68, a t 54. 35. " P a r t l y because c o p y i s t s had, a f t e r a l l , never p a i d those whose works they copied, p a r t l y b e c a u s e new books were a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f t h e e a r l y b o o k - t r a d e , and p a r t l y because d i v i s i o n s of l a b o r remained 197 b l u r r e d , t h e a u t h o r r e t a i n e d a q u a s i - a m a t e u r s t a t u s u n t i l t h e e i g h t e e n t h century." I b i d . , at 153-154. V i c t o r Bonham-Carter notes t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of having a c a r e e r as an author only appeared i n the 18th c e n t u r y . For a long time a f t e r the p r i n t i n g press was invented, the dominant f o r c e i n E n g l i s h l i t e r a t u r e was the r o y a l c o u r t : "The i n f l u e n c e of the Court was paramount- - i n r e f i n i n g a n d s t a b i l i s i n g t h e language, i n f i n d i n g o u t l e t s f o r the new l i t e r a t u r e by the p r e s e n t a t i o n of masques, p l a y s a n d a d d r e s s e s f o r c e r e m o n i a l o c c a s i o n s , and g e n e r a l l y i n s t i m u l a t i n g the w r i t i n g of p o e t r y , drama and b e l l e s l e t t r e s . P u b l i c a t i o n i n t h i s f i e l d was i n c i d e n t a l . " Authors by P r o f e s s i o n , (London: S o c i e t y of Authors, 1978), p. 12. 36. I b i d , at 84. 37. I b i d , at 121-122. 38. I b i d , at 230-231. 39. I b i d , at 234 f f . Bonham-Carter notes that u n t i l the 18th c e n t u r y i t was t h e r u l e r a t h e r t h a n t h e e x c e p t i o n f o r p u b l i s h e d authors to be known by a pseudonym. Even M i l t o n a t f i r s t c o n c e a l e d h i s i d e n t i t y . Of course, one reason f o r not coming forward i n p u b l i c was r o y a l c e n s o r s h i p and the harsh punishments i t c a r r i e d . Supra note 35, at 15-18. 40. I b i d , at 156. 41. Of course, l i b e l law became one of the p r i n c i p a l means f o r d e f e n d i n g l i t e r a r y r e p u t a t i o n s as w e l l as l i m i t i n g the a u t h o r ' s l i t e r a r y l i c e n c e . See f o r an e a r l y example of a w r i t e r ' s use of the l i b e l a c t i o n *** 42. L i b e l law i n the seventeenth and eighteenth c e n t u r i e s was p r i m a r i l y used as a means of c e n s o r s h i p to p r o t e c t governments and p o l i t i c a l r e p u t a t i o n s : see Donald Thomas, supra note 24, ( B r i t a i n ) , and Norman L. Rosenberg, P r o t e c t i n g the Best Men: An I n t e r p r e t i v e H i s t o r y of the Law of L i b e l ( C h a p e l H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1986) (the U.S.). Thomas d e s c r i b e s L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s i m p o r t a n t r o l e as a j u d i c i a l 198 e n f o r c e r of s e d i t i o u s l i b e l law, r e s i s t i n g when p o s s i b l e the wish of obstreperous j u r i e s to a c q u i t the accused i n p o l i t i c a l cases. I b i d , a t 100-110. 43. Henceforward, the male p o s s e s s i v e " h i s " , " h i m s e l f " , e t c . i s u s e d , an a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n of s t y l e not i n t e n d e d t o exclude h a l f of the world's authors from the purview of t h i s study. C o p y r i g h t as an a u t h o r ' s r i g h t , as o p p o s e d t o a p u b l i s h e r ' s r i g h t , i s g e n e r a l l y t r a c e d back to the S t a t u t e of Anne (1709). 44. "Speeches and books were a s s i g n e d r e a l a uthors, other than m y t h i c a l or important r e l i g i o u s f i g u r e s , o n l y whenthe a u t h o r became s u b j e c t to punishment and to the e x t e n t t h a t h i s d i s c o u r s e was c o n s i d e r e d t r a n s g r e s s i v e . " That F o u c a u l t i n t e n d s t h i s to mean a phenomenon of the modern age, connected to the a r r i v a l of c o p y r i g h t laws, seems c l e a r e r when he adds that at the moment w r i t i n g achieved i t s status as p r o p e r t y i t s " t r a n s g r e s s i v e p r o p e r t i e s . . . became the f o r c e f u l i m p e r a t i v e o f l i t e r a t u r e . [The danger o f books returned] "at the moment [the author] was accepted i n t o the s o c i a l order o f p r o p e r t y which governs our c u l t u r e . " Supra, note 29, at 124-125. Foucault does not connect these events, i n p a r t i c u l a r the danger which the s t a t e p e r c e i v e d i n w r i t i n g , with the p r i n t i n g press, but the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d i n England speaks f o r i t s e l f . See Part I I . 45. Richard Posner, f o r example, w r i t e s : " T h e d o m i n a n t t h e o r y o f l i t e r a r y c r e a t i v i t y , as i t had been i n c l a s s i c a l a n d m e d i e v a l t i m e s , was c r e a t i v e i m i t a t i o n : the i m i t a t o r was f r e e to borrow as l o n g as he added to what he borrowed. The modern e q u a t i o n of c r e a t i v i t y t o o r i g i n a l i t y i s a l e g a c y of the Romantic e r a , w i t h i t s c u l t o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p r e s s i o n . " Law and L i t e r a t u r e : A M i s u n d e r s t o o d R e l a t i o n (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1988) a t 346. E i s e n s t e i n notes: 199 "That the c o n c e p t o f 'the a r t i s t as a g e n i u s ' i s r e l a t e d to the new n o t i o n of ' i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ' i s u n d e r l i n e d by A r n o l d H a u s e r , S o c i a l H i s t o r y of A r t , I I , 70." Supra note 7, at 229. 46. Supra note [26]. A c o n s i d e r a b l e l i t e r a t u r e d e a l s w i t h the ' l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y ' s t a t u s o f S h a k e s p e a r e ' s w o r k s , i n c l u d i n g h i s borrowings from e a r l i e r w r i t e r s , the b a t t l e s he waged w i t h p r i n t e r s of h i s p l a y s , and the changes made to h i s work i n the decades f o l l o w i n g h i s death. See, f o r example, L. Rose n t h a l , " L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y and the A d a p t a t i o n of Shakespeare" (1990 d r a f t , not f o r p u b l i c a t i o n , p r e s e n t e d a t a c o l l o q u i u m on "C o n c e p t i o n s of P r o p e r t y i n the E i g h t e e n t h Century" a t the UCLA Center f o r 17th and 18th Century S t u d i e s , 1990), and Leo Kirschbaum, Shakespeare and the S t a t i o n e r s (Columbus: Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1955). 47. B a r t h e s , Roland. "The Death of the Author" i n Images, Music, T e x t : Essays S e l e c t e d and T r a n s l a t e d by Stephen Heath (New York: H i l l and Wong, 1977). Barthes, l i k e F oucault, a s s o c i a t e s the author's ' a r r i v a l ' as a known and i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e f o r c r i t i c i s m w i t h t h e b e g i n n i n g o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n l i t e r a t u r e . He recognises the t e n a c i t y of the view that the author matters: " I t i s thus l o g i c a l t h a t i n l i t e r a t u r e i t sh o u l d be t h i s p o s i t i o n , the epitome and c u l m i n a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t i d e o l o g y , which has a t t a c h e d the g r e a t e s t importance t o the 'person' of the author... The image of l i t e r a t u r e to be found i n o r d i n a r y c u l t u r e i s t y r a n n i c a l l y c e n t r e d on the author, h i s p e r s o n , h i s l i f e , h i s t a s t e s , h i s pa s s i o n s . . . . " (at 143) I n d e e d t h e t e n a c i t y o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , a n d t h e i n d u s t r i e s based on them, may e x p l a i n why the s t r e n g t h of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t and other s c h o o l s i n the academy c r i t i c a l of the " a u t h o r - f u n c t i o n " have had l i t t l e or no i n f l u e n c e on the regime of l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n s . 48. See f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i n Part I I . 49. The o t h e r c a s e i n w h i c h J u s t i c e Y a t e s d i s s e n t e d was P e r r i n v. Blake 4 Burr 2579, 98 ER 355, 1 Wm Black 672, 96 ER 392, i n which a s i m i l a r i s s u e of p r i n c i p l e d i v i d e d him from 200 L o r d M a n s f i e l d . In P e r r i n , K i n g ' s Bench was c a l l e d on to i n t e r p r e t a t r u s t by d e v i s e . The f a c t s f e l l s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e r u l i n g i n S h e l l e y ' s Case, w h i c h r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r ' s c l e a r i n t e n t i o n be f r u s t r a t e d . Lord M a n s f i e l d l e d the Court m a j o r i t y n e v e r t h e l e s s to r e j e c t the c l e a r precedent. J u s t i c e Yates defended the r u l e of pre c e d e n t , and h i s view p r e v a i l e d before the House of Lords. W i l l i a m Odgers c i t e d P e r r i n as the o n l y case i n which Yates J . d i s s e n t e d d u r i n g h i s s i x years on the Court, f a i l i n g to note M i l l a r v. T a y l o r : " S i r W i l l i a m Blackstone" (1919) 28 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 542. Odgers' p i e c e p r o v i d e s i n t r i g u i n g background to the r e l a t i o n s between the King's Bench judges d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . In e a r l y 1770 J u s t i c e Y a t e s r e s i g n e d King's Bench to serve on the Court of Common P l e a s . Before he commenced h i s new d u t i e s , and j u s t a f t e r Blackstone was sworn i n to replace him at King's Bench, J u s