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Millar v. Taylor (1769) and the new property of the eighteenth century Carver, Peter John 1990

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MILLAR V. TAYLOR (1769) AND THE NEW OF THE EIGHTEENTH  PROPERTY  CENTURY  By PETER JOHN CARVER B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1975 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o , 1976 LL.B., M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1981  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE (Faculty  We a c c e p t to  this  STUDIES  o f Law)  t h e s i s as  the required  conforming  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October © Peter  1990  J o h n C a r v e r , 1990  In  presenting  degree freely  at  the  available  copying  of  department publication  this  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  University  of  British  Columbia,  for  this or of  reference  thesis by  this  for  his  and  scholarly  or  thesis  her  for  of  LRuJ  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  •ate  DE-6  (2/88)  Qc-rnftER  il  J  MO  I  I further  purposes  gain  the  shall  requirements  agree  that  agree  may  representatives.  financial  permission.  Department  study.  of  be  It not  that  the  advanced  Library shall  by  understood be  an  permission for  granted  is  for  allowed  the  make  extensive  head  that  without  it  of  copying my  my or  written  ABSTRACT  The  r e c e p t i o n of copyright  the  eighteenth  the  jurisprudential  change. W h i l e "right the it  century  concept  of property  had been  was  not u n t i l  later  Court  of King's  in  Millar  rights  Bench  property  press  debate",  term, t h e  England  8 Anne, 2303,  arose  i n 1476, the  genesis  paper  proceeds  and p u r p o s e o f i n the course of  a commercial  and t h e o r e t i c a l  address  two  questions:  through background  struggle  a "new p r o p e r t y "  contribute  to a conceptual  evolution emerged  The Murray,  of M i l l a r sense  i n t h e common  trade. of the  v. T a y l o r t o d i d copyright  l a w , and how d i d i t  change i n p r o p e r t y  conceive  study  between  rights;  of " a u t h o r s h i p "  (2) how  during  the  o f c o p y r i g h t , and how, i n t u r n , d i d c o p y r i g h t a s  from  the a u t h o r  courts  detailed  ( 1 ) i n what  constitute  English  a  first  c . 19. S i x t y  b o o k s e l l e r s f o r p r e d o m i n a n c e i n t h e e m e r g i n g book This  since  98 E r 202, t h e  the nature  The c a s e  t o study  a t a moment o f  enacted  4 Burr  considered time.  into  o f Anne  law i n  o f development  Parliament  v. T a y l o r  f o r the f i r s t  "literary  rival  1709 t h a t  s t a t u t e , the Statute  copyright  opportunity  i n the process  i n t r o d u c t i o n of the p r i n t i n g  years  did  a unique  c o p y r i g h t , o r t o use t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y  of copy",  copyright  the  provides  i n t h e E n g l i s h common  the l i t e r a r y  property  debate  alter  i t  the role of  ? judgments  Lord  of Justice  Joseph  Yates  Mansfield, offered particular  and o f W i l l i a m  insights  into  each  iii  of  these  questions.  copyright  posed  especially subject  to  copyright  law  be  his  interests  the  justification The  of  for  the  Mansfield  i t largely  labour  explores  to the precedent  tracing  back  intellectual Justice  through  Yates  and  subsequent developments In  particular, and  is  shown as  to  property  Further,  in Millar cited  Mansfield in legal  in  the  imposed  copyright  on  property the a  right  natural  personal, served. the  him,  a  by  giving  v. T a y l o r  therein to Second,  are  theory  Yates'  the  and  as The  product  principal  taken and  now  the  the  of  insights  of  through  followed M i l l a r  by  predominate of  and  copyright.  of  copyright  political  utilitarian,  Lord Mansfield's understanding  close  roots  forward  position,  limited  a  (1769),  leading t h e o r e t i c a l  including  approaches—which  and  adopted  r e c o g n i t i o n , which  designed  rights--  ideas  i t was  ideas, f i r s t ,  cited  characterising  its  right.  these  vindicated Justice  statutory property  critical  the  as  for  i n E n g l i s h law.  Lord  be  in controlling  formed,  precedent  property  which  and  to  As  p u b l i c d o m a i n . The  Lord  f o r the p r o p e r t y  paper  limits  that  theory,  law.  literary  value,  in privacy  property  natural  from  located  reading  a  need  value.  intellectual  in  i n t a n g i b l e of  derived  but  traditional  to p r o p r i e t a r y , i n t e r e s t s  author's  Taylor  to  in dissent, perceived  grounded  interests  created  approach,  opposed  of  not  which  the  argued  i n the  could  itself  was  he  Yates,  challenge  arguments  matter  expression,  right  a  Justice  in  the  v. as  choice  approaches  Realist  and  jurisprudence. dual purpose  of  iv copyright  is  justification copyright  as  information, endeavours for  of  property,  a property and  in  relation  and  regime  fictional  early  interests  of  in  for  works  to h i g h l i g h t both the  personal  i n the  examined  of  protecting of  a the  evolution  factual  for  works The  of of  paper  p u b l i c domain and  which had such  copyright.  personhood  imagination.  concern  authors  development o f  terms  to  significance  V  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.  INTRODUCTION A.  B.  1  SOURCES OF THE INQUIRY  1  1.  Law: The F o r g o t t e n  2.  The C h a l l e n g e  Source  Of The P r i n t i n g  1 Press  . . .  "PROPERTY"  5  1.  Property  in Political  T h e o r y and Law  2.  A D e f i n i t i o n of "Property" (a) " P r o p e r t y " and " P r o p e r t y R i g h t " (b) T h r e e A t t r i b u t e s o f P r o p e r t y  . . .  5  . . .  8 10 11  (1) E x c l u s i v i t y (2) A l i e n a b i l i t y (3) E x t e r n a l i t y C.  II.  2  11 13 13  "COPIES"  14  1.  A New  Property  ?  14  2.  D e f i n i n g "The Copy"  16  D.  "AUTHORS"  17  E.  APPROACH AND OUTLINE OF INQUIRY  22  1.  Millar  2.  Method and O u t l i n e  23  THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE  26  A.  THE BOOKSELLERS* WAR  26  B.  THE OVERTURNING  C.  v. T a y l o r  (1769) as a F o c u s  . . . .  . .  OF MILLAR V. TAYLOR  22  . . . . .  33  1. The R e s u l t i n D o n a l d s o n v. B e c k e t t . . . . 2. L o r d Camden and L o r d M a n s f i e l d AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS 1. Interests i n Conflict ? 2. E c o n o m i c I n t e r e s t s and t h e V a l u e o f S i n g l e Case A n a l y s i s  33 36 38 38 41  vi  III.  PROPERTY AND P O L I T I C S :  CROWN PREROGATIVE AND  THE RIGHT OF COPY A.  CROWN CONTROL OF PRINTING AND CENSORSHIP  B.  ANALYSIS OF THE PREROGATIVE CASES 1. 2. 3.  4.  . . .  43 45  The P r e - R e v o l u t i o n C a s e s C i t e d i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r The P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n C a s e s The S u b s i d i a r y P r e r o g a t i v e C a s e s : P r o p e r t y i n Patent Grants (a) Patents For O f f i c e Holders (b) D o c t r i n e s o f Patent C o n s t r u c t i o n . . (c) Nature o f Property Rights . . . . . . . The Scope a n d N a t u r e o f Crown C o p y r i g h t  46 51 53 53 55 55  .  57  . . .  59  C.  DARCY V. ALLEN AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS  D.  MILLAR v . TAYLOR AND THE C I T I Z E N KING  65  1.  The I s s u e  65  2.  The P r e r o g a t i v e C a s e s i n M i l l a r  E.  IV.  43  SUBSEQUENT  of Inventions  DEVELOPMENTS  v. Taylor  IN CROWN COPYRIGHT  . .  68 74  1. Crown P r e r o g a t i v e C o p y r i g h t 2. P u b l i c Domain a n d Government P u b l i c a t i o n s P R O P R I E T A R Y AND P E R S O N A L I N T E R E S T S IN EARLY COPYRIGHT: THE EQUITY INJUNCTION CASES  74 75  A.  INTRODUCTION  80  B.  REVIEW OF THE CASES: V I C I S S I T U D E S AND PRINTERS 1. 2.  C.  OF AUTHORS  I n j u n c t i o n s f o r P u b l i s h e d Works The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n C a s e s  PROPRIETARY  INTERESTS:  Scope o f t h e R i g h t  81 82 86  THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT  OF COPY 1.  80  87 i n the I n j u n c t i o n Cases  (a) Type o f Work (b) Uses by T h i r d P a r t i e s  87 88 90  vii  D.  PERSONAL I N T E R E S T S OF T H E A U T H O R : L O R D MANSFIELD AND THE LITERARY PROPERTY QUESTION . 1. 2. 3. 4.  E.  V.  A CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPART: MISAPPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS  THEORIES OF PROPERTY IN MILLAR V. TAYLOR LIMITS OF PRECEDENT AND THE RESORT TO REASON  B.  NATURAL LAW COPYRIGHT  3. 4. C.  2. 3. 4.  2. E.  RIGHTS  CRITIQUE  114  118  OF  THE  NATURAL  120 121 124 129  LAW 132  THE  BREAKDOWN  Intangible Property of L e g a l T h e o r y The P o l i t i c i s a t i o n Legal Theory  THE CONTINUING DEBATE COPYRIGHT . . . . . THE  l l  AND  P u b l i c Domain: N a t u r a l R i g h t s of the Public The Argument Over I n c o r p o r e a l P r o p e r t y . . V a l u e as P r o p e r t y o r C r e a t i o n o f Law . . . Statutory Property  COPYRIGHT AND PERSONHOOD A.  PROPERTY  .  The P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y o f N a t u r a l R i g h t s . . L o c k e a n d t h e N a t u r a l Law T h e o r y o f Property Blackstone On P r o p e r t y Rights and Copyright . The M a j o r i t y O p i n i o n s i n M i l l a r v. T a y l o r  C O P Y R I G H T AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 1.  OF  106 107  119  J U S T I C E YATES' POSITION 1.  D.  THEORY  103  118  A.  1. 2.  VI.  The F i r s t P u b l i c a t i o n C a s e s P e r s o n a l I n t e r e s t s A f t e r D o n a l d s o n V. B e c k e t t (1774) . P e r s o n a l I n t e r e s t s and C o p y r i g h t Law . . . Lord M a n s f i e l d : Authors and P r o p e r t y Rights I  103  OF  132 134 138 141  ABSOLUTE 145  and The  Transformation . . . . . o f P r o p e r t y i n Modern  145 149  OVER  JUSTIFICATION  THE  NATURE  OF 153  OF  PROPERTY  LORD MANSFIELD AND THE LABOUR THEORY  FROM 158 158  viii  B.  PROPERTY AND 1. 2. 3. 4.  C.  3. D.  3. E.  THEORIES  . . . .  PERSONHOOD  CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT  BIBLIOGRAPHY  162 163 167 169  '.  170 171 175 177  O r i g i n a l i t y i n Modern C o p y r i g h t Law . . . The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d 'Informational' Works The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d ' C r e a t i v e ' Works .  RETRIEVING A PERSONAL INTERESTS PERSPECTIVE  ENDNOTES  160  170  The J u s t i f i c a t i o n From P e r s o n h o o d . . . . Problems with a Personhood Justification of Property . A P r e f e r r e d Use o f t h e T h e o r y  LABOUR AND 1. 2.  TWO  P r o p e r t y and P o s s e s s i v e I n d i v i d u a l i s m . . H e g e l ' s T h e o r y o f P r o p e r t y and P e r s o n a l Will C o n t e m p o r a r y S c h o l a r s h i p on t h e P e r s o n h o o d Basis of Property The A p p e a l o f a T h e o r y o f P e r s o n h o o d . . .  COPYRIGHT AND 1. 2.  PERSONALITY:  . .  177 180 184 189 193 246  1  I.  A.  SOURCES OF THE INQUIRY Prior  found the  to  outlining  i n the  body  questions  questions indeed  the  of  which  have  1.  Law:  discussion  the  stuff the  legal  of  the  Western  which  ensues  f o r the  the  argument  Introduction highlights inquiry. they  suggests  reader to  Whether deserve,  useful  these whether  answers  to  determine.  law,  inter of  while  of  the  in  law,  intimate h i s t o r i c  relationship  concern of t h e o r i s t s political  rights,  between  tradition  systems.  rules  and and  social  Many  of  political most  workings  the  theory  demonstrated of  thought  obligations  sovereign authority se.  whose work  ancient  and  is  which  citizens,  great  writers  in  were  themselves  a  sophisticated  and  contemporary  1  Scholars  degree,  interdependency of  Western  citizens  i n the  theories  of  law:  understanding  lesser  r e s e a r c h and  discussion  t h e o r y . The  relations  between  legal  the  this the  t h e o r y s h a r e s an  corpus  and  trained  paper,  of  The F o r g o t t e n Source  w i t h law and  shape  course  excited  received  Political  forms  the  the  the q u e s t i o n s , remains  the  INTRODUCTION  have of  as long  well  as  shown  lawyers an  and  judges  understanding  law  and  legal  t h e o r y on  politics  and  epistemology  on  the the  one  of  hand,  other.  to  a  the and This  2 interest recent  in political  years  systems—  of  dynamics  recognition  and  studies  the  with  social  theory  the  lacuna  of  in  ideas  on  of  commentary,  of  ground ideas  courts  of  in  comprehending  everyday to  studies the  is  a  judicial  represents practice.  connect  devising  and  legal  however,  much  in  Somewhat  statutes,  very  seek  do  legal  jurisprudence.  comprised  the  on  understanding  law,  the  partly  i t s place within  the  h i s t o r y of  law  incorporated  property history  law.  of  this  The This  ideas,  the  a Few  works  in  solutions  to  balancing  of  paper  recognition  that  takes  and  conflicting  the  theory  paper, which of  very of  legal  be  common  C h a l l e n g e Of  in  the  opportunity  and  political  traditions  Further,  an  of  inspired this  inquiry will i n the  study  ideas,  provides  practice  2.  in  arrival  interests.  history  for  emphasis  theory,  work of  critical  political  on  the  perspectives  of  history  problems  This  seeks  the  and  change  doctrinal  of  in  placed  study  that  increased with  feminist  have  the  working, o u t  discrete  the  has  theory-based  historical  in  decisions  as  which  of  neglected  theory  critical,  such  movements—  theory  legal  way  ideas roots  admittedly  i n which  reflect  on  the  as  issues  copyright  and  common  objects  specifically. of  the  scholarship  themselves,  to  and  in  The theory  of the  field and  law.  The  Printing  advantage  i t was  dealing  Press  of  the  with  English a  new  legal  kind  of  system's property  3 right  t o examine  conceptions  a  historical  of property  judicial  decision-making.  decision  o f the Court  Burr  2303,  98  penultimate  ER  moment  moment  were  drawn  The moment  of King's  201.  into  decision  i n the l i t i g i o u s  o f whether  alienable  and p e r p e t u a l  composition  right  was a common  Encouragement  of Learning  printed  i n the Authors  during of "is  Books  t h e Times  Anne).  that question  property" this  paper  literary  that  of the existed  i n 1709 o f An A c t f o r t h e  4  of the Copies o f such  (hereafter the  courts  ? By e x a m i n i n g intends  raised the  of copies  or Purchasers  the E n g l i s h  4  literary  of a  of property  the Vesting  t h e r e i n mentioned  In s h o r t ,  copyright  by  Taylor  i s , an e x c l u s i v e ,  t h e making  t o , and s u r v i v e d t h e enactment  v.  of the  i n the author  law r i g h t  i s t h e 1769  The d e b a t e  that  of  constituted the  centre  of copy,  t o make o r a u t h o r i s e  composition, prior  a right  the process  in Millar  p r o p e r t y debate o f the mid-18th c e n t u r y . question  t h e o r i e s and  i n question  Bench  That  3  when  faced  this  answers  t o address  Copies Statute  question:  they  gave t o  two i s s u e s :  (1)  I n what ways d i d t h e ' r i g h t o f c o p y ' c o n s t i t u t e a new t y p e o f p r o p e r t y , and how d i d i t s a p p r e c i a t i o n a s s u c h a f f e c t l e g a l theory ?  (2)  How w e r e t h e r o l e a n d i n t e r e s t s o f 'the author' understood i n the l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y d e b a t e , and how i n t u r n d i d t h e ' r i g h t o f copy' re-make those i n t e r e s t s ?  of  4 These and  issues  bar  two  mechanical We the  came f o r  consideration before  centuries  i n v e n t i o n : the  live  i n times  information  age.  The  devices,  claimed  to  changing  making  "information"  be  international repeatedly  the  exhorted  i s not  speculated invention  very  of  way  the  and  fashionably of  the  in  by  play  a  most  and and  valuable and  overcome  described  age—  humans t h i n k  Law  to  about of  are  a  the  as  computers,  so  on—  are  interact,  resource  legal  and  in  the  institutions  are  traditions  nature  subsequent This  and  drawn  first  that  the  transformative  communications  from  an  years  brought  ago  twentieth events  in  about  by  Marshall  McLuhan  r e v o l u t i o n i n human a f f a i r s wrought press  elaborated media o f  than  a  late  theory  fifteenth of  communications. H i s  instruments  life,  i n the  into  characteristics  social  has  of  the  shape c o m m u n i c a t i o n taken  up  by  the  century  formative  argument  communication,  been  by  that  that their  itself  and  numerous  scholars.^ paper  question  technology  suggests  the  thirty  printing  he  more  to  human  Almost  insight  therefore  the  the  bench  press.  technologies  scholarship  powers o f d i f f e r e n t media  put  telecommunications,  witness  history  an  were  English  c u l t u r e t o keep p a c e .  technology.  ^,  printing  economy.^  Considerable century  they  frequently  reprographic  earlier  after  the  of  does  not  whether  seek, and  to  however, what  d r i v e s o c i a l c h a n g e . The  to  extent  answer  involve  itself  in  developments  in  t h a t must  suffice  5 here,  is  that  the  process  precipitates  change  relations,  existing  in  which  technology  affairs. of  and  The  is  created  resulted  in  perhaps  'ownership' of  did  i n the  seem  not  itself  a  creature  of  by  existing  terminology  public by  Europe  surprising.  presented  inherently  new  and  press  of  a priestly  of  the  Certainly  incrementalism,  time for  the  manner  into  the  could  domain  social  the  incorporated  the p r i n t i n g  the p r e s s e s  and  determine  f o r mass d i s t r i b u t i o n  England  a c c i d e n t a l or  relations  full-scale  technology  production  r e c e i v e d and  by  a  dialectical:  economic  social  possibiity  authorship  have  in  is  human  products  conceivably  in  texts,  or  cast; that i t should  the  hardly  common  initial  law,  challenge  phenomena i s a l w a y s t o comprehend them w i t h i n and  conservative  categories  practice,  of  talk  analysis.  of  In  this  revolutions is  a  risky enterprise.  B.  "PROPERTY"  1.  Property On  T h e o r y and  a philosophical level,  discussions Indeed,  in Political  the  of  "problem"  justification constitutive political allocating  property  and  comprise property  critique,  issues  theory,  of  the  i n modern  "property"  resources  in  may  Law  level an  of p o l i t i c a l honoured  rights, be  secular  delineation,  as  one  political  g e n e r a l l y connotes  nature,  tradition.  their  seen  whether  land  theory,  of  theory.  the or  means  the In of  physical  6 objects,  including  production, nature  use  of  general  and  rights  exchange o f  philosophy  and  possible.  to  abstract  It  to  i s of  way  the  to  interests  be  i s , in  unique  such  disputes  to  imposed  statute,  the  and  recently  in  ruled  names  tangible  object.**  specific  has  and  in  comes  case  of  interpretation.  a  theories  of  property  actually  accorded  meet  of  form  term  interests  ground  the  instance  in  a  by  a  court  contract demands  for  or i t s  instance,  alleged  theft  of  photocopied  lists  of  the  must  i n the an  in  be  a  which  r i g h t - h o l d e r to  receive  point  resembling  law,  or  circumstance  to  in  resolve,  "property"  may  "what  particular  addressed  entitling  simply the  classic  of  or  to  adversarial  of  Canada,  that  ?"  recognise  the  a  discourse  answers  the  in  to  in  the  however,  dispute  different  is  terms  arise  In  used  involving  the  i s of  ?"  course  be  is  Court  i n the  remedy, This  to  the  addresses, In  the  A  become a c a t e g o r y  civil  context.  "property"  information  employee  a  a  law,  important  disputes.  Supreme  define  common  The  ?"  It  philosophic  parties.  resolution The  "property"  those  word  interpretation.  confidential  the  cultivation,  "what i s p r o p e r t y  i t is  particular  to  proprietary  arise  i s property  when  as  by  questions  resolve,  "what  occurs  courts,  between  attempt which  the  demands  system,  justified  of  the  resources.  make  nature  When the q u e s t i o n  that  those  universalise,  particularise. can  control  out legal  ideal  a  different  that  while  protections of  property,  7 lawyers  and  that  philosophers.  of  judges  Defining utility  in  property" and  are  "property"  the  in  two  has.  the  use  world  not  result  law  of  system of  land  outright  by  subject of  any  property In  private  that  to  carve  primogeniture.  The  of  Incorporeal recognised, The genesis.  law  land, rights  doctrine  as  arose in  out  personal  Blackstone,  moveables gave  rise  the  incidents  and  which  and  title  from  the  course of  property  material  unity.  to  the  not  of  The  feudal  be  the  owned Crown,  incidents  strict  over  actual that and  use  a to  rules  separated  of  incomes  of  legal and  struggle.  offices  were  land.^ had  i n 1763,  to property  both  a l i e n a t i o n and  uses,  form  writing  That  struggled  r i g h t s of  r i g h t s running with of  land  of  have  could held  "law  property  in  of  in  the  the  limited  1709,  procedural  was  from  to  regimes.  'things'  but  in  feudal  b e n e f i c i a l ownership  benefit  "personal"  or  prior  s t r i c t u r e s i m p o s e d by  centuries  to a v o i d  exist  legal  of  English  and  party,  estates  i n order  An  system, l a n d  of  devise  exercise  not  of  distinct  owed i t s c h a r a c t e r  Holders  of  an  did  conceptual  o b l i g a t i o n s and  period  from  sense  control in  activity  tradition.  separate  and  tenure.  to the  tenure.  real  i n an  seems  "Real"  quite  concerned  English  law  generic  never  represented  often  common  the  perhaps  did  engaged  a more felt  straightforward  able  r i g h t s sooner  to  than  state land  . . . p r i n c i p a l l y b e c a u s e few o f them c o u l d be f i t for use, t i l l improved and  that  8 a m e l i o r a t e d by t h e b o d i l y l a b o r o f t h e o c c u p a n t , which b o d i l y l a b o r , bestowed upon any s u b j e c t which b e f o r e l a y i n common t o a l l men, i s u n i v e r s a l l y a l l o w e d t o g i v e t h e f a i r e s t a n d most reasonable t i t l e t o an e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y t h e r e i n . 1 0  The  law of ownership  developments without in  English  quality: the  tradition  law d i d not i n v o l v e  the p a r t y  with  i t s concomitant  and c o n v e r s i o n ,  t o f e u d a l i n c i d e n t s . The c o n c e p t  rather, t i t l e  owner.  things,  i n t h e law o f t h e f t  reference  ownership;  of  concept  of property  of  outright  t o l a n d o r t o goods h a d a c o m p a r a t i v e  with  Another  a  evolved  the best  feature  was t h e i m p o r t a n c e  claim  to t i t l e  of property  was v i e w e d a s  i n t h e common  of possession  law  a s an i n d i c i u m o f  title.  2.  A D e f i n i t i o n of With these  of  caveats  g i v i n g meaning  offer  "Property"  a definition  t o t h e term a t an e a r l y  purposes  i s to explore  occurred  as a r e s u l t  to  the ownership  reproducing paper of  defined  rights  I t may  moment i n a p a p e r  changes i n t h e c o n c e p t  seem odd t o  of property  of i n t a n g i b l e s i n the form  only  t o be a h i s t o r i c a l  i n reference  task  one o f whose  o f t h e common law's e n c o u n t e r  "property"  time and p l a c e . sets  "property".  with  construct,  that  claims  of ideas  t h e m a t e r i a l e x p r e s s i o n o f i d e a s . The t i t l e  implies  being  i n m i n d , we t u r n t o t h e h a z a r d o u s  and  of the capable  to the understandings  of  I t i s u s e f u l , however, t o have an i d e a o f what  of property  apart  from  other  interests  known t o  9 law,  and  further  the  paper  when  proffered have  been  private  The  here  to  have  a  the  word  "property"  names  first  property  i n the  exclusivity alienability  (3)  externality  rights  certain  has  the  in  still,  and i n many ways r e p r e s e n t s paper.  it  was  generally  objects  in  notion.  the  exclusive  rights  This than  central the  outset  physical  that  literary  in  which  development  of  of  The a t t r i b u t e  of  seeming  periods,  the  is  but as  story  becoming  property  pertained  "property"  took  be  through  told  debate, only  challenged  interests  of  problematic  that w i l l  Copyright  to  vestiges  more  literary  personal  specific  arrangements  property  world.  feature  to  that  judicial  c o u l d ground  property.  definition.  roles  rights  constant  relations  the  that  became  d e f i n i t i o n of a  of  'internal', of  most  "externality"  thought  Copyright  recognition  post  of  At the  throughout  The d e f i n i t i o n  the  and m a r k e t  The  this  of  societies.  property  over.  in  meant  of p r o p e r t y  historical  disappeared,  attribute  is  used.  problematic,  and  dominant  traditions  is  course  remained  more  societies  increasingly  the  i n modern W e s t e r n is  what  common law t r a d i t i o n :  (1) (2)  "alienability"  feudal  through  attribute  of  three a t t r i b u t e s  important  property  sense  the  "property" These  concept  property  of  debate  is,  three  then,  attributes  private fell  more  property in  of  a  have  signplayed  into  seventeenth  which and  10 eighteenth reflect like  century  in part  of  attribution intended. the  saying,  'right  however,  understanding legal  history  because of  (a)  and  phrase  property.  Waldron make  a  indicates interest is  "right  of  intended  references  t h i s paper  the  The  theories opposed  to " r i g h t  legal this  can  Right  to  to  meanings  are  when  1 1  they  property'  ?  that  In  this  developments  i s addressed,  in  partly  Wesley H o h f e l d  to  with to  of  .  x  "property"  denote  a moral  Property  purely The  "right  ~*  claim Jeremy  whether  they  utilitarian) latter to  property,  phrase,  property", that  i s ,  remedy. I t i s t h a t m e a n i n g d i s c u s s i o n , and  to  in philosophical  identify  rights".  entitlement  throughout  like  of  relationship  synonymously  e n f o r c e a b l e by  and  Right"  "property  legal  writer's context  conscious  because  theorists  of  attention. First,  book  (as  'right  to property"  several  mo r a 1  used a  his  minimum  remain  partly  about  deserve  In  justification frequently  must  a  a  and  rights  what t h e E n g l i s h c o u r t s  at  copy'  "Property  explores  out  one  i n f l u e n c e of  "right"  the  the  changed,  ambiguities  word  terms to  the  with  the  paper;  uses  through  property  as  this  other  meant  t o w h i c h much o f  "Property" Two  the  has  when  accords  of  serve  throughout  century  have gone  intellectual  They  indicate  This d e f i n i t i o n  changes t h e y  of  law.  "property"  will  i s the  The  arrival  in  eighteenth  asked: so  the  copyright  understanding  of  Britain.  for  that  t o p r o p e r t y " have g e n e r a l l y been  an  which reason  avoided.  11 Second, "property" right.  refers  The  Macpherson The  idea  "property  that  i s a colloquial out-' ,  property  and c o n t i n u e s  statutes  using  paper  uses  unless otherwise  was  -4  tenacious  This  contains  n o t t o an o b j e c t  former points  rights"  never  refers t o cause  t h e term  but t o a meaning  redundancy: type  to objects  as  legal C.B.  f o r theory.  i s nevertheless  difficulties, require  and " p r o p e r t y  of  which,  satisfactory  "property"  "property"  a  not l e a s t  when  interpretation.  rights"  synonymously  indicated.  (b) T h r e e A t t r i b u t e s o f P r o p e r t y What  c o n s t i t u t e s "property"  rights  ? I n t h e common  Taylor  i n 1769, a n d i n major  have  been  for brief  (1) the  central  person others  law t r a d i t i o n  i n making  part  to other  a t the time  since  something  then,  kinds of  of Millar  three  "property";  v.  elements  each  calls  explanation.  Exclusivity  exclusion  covered  as opposed  of  —  a property  right  non-rights-holders  by t h e r i g h t .  That  from  the  activities  i s , the r i g h t - h o l d e r i s the only  who may engage i n t h e a c t i v i t y engaging  necessarily involves  i n i t . Felix  Cohen  p r o t e c t e d , or consent provides  to  the following  definition: P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p among human b e i n g s such t h a t t h e s o - c a l l e d owner can e x c l u d e o t h e r s f r o m c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s or p e r m i t others t o engage i n those  12 activities assistance decision.  and i n e i t h e r c a s e s e c u r e t h e o f the law i n c a r r y i n g o u t h i s  1 5  Property points in  is,  in this  out that  this  1  given  state-owned  respect  corporations. ^  as  private  property  i s property  He goes  t o o narrow  extended  sense,  to include a right  i s equally  owned  on t o a r g u e  a meaning  property.  that  by  Macpherson as  individuals  "property"  by l i b e r a l i s m ,  'private'  that  or  has b e e n  i t should  be  n o t t o be e x c l u d e d :  Exclusiveness i s not l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d i n t h e c o n c e p t o f p r o p e r t y a s an i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t n e e d e d t o e n a b l e men t o r e a l i z e t h e i r human e s s e n c e a s m o r a l o r r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . . . . A n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t n o t t o be e x c l u d e d f r o m s o m e t h i n g h e l d i n common i s a s much i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y a s t h e r i g h t to exclude. ' 1  While a d e f i n i t i o n o f p r o p e r t y a  right  lacks  n o t t o be e x c l u d e d  some  theory,  precision;  f o r instance,  inalienable. to  retain  infusing Despite the  term  however, as  i t with  a  his critique  c a n be i n t e r n a l l y  i t seems t o f o l l o w that  His definition  "property"  as a new  a  norm  i t seems more u s e f u l  source o f i n d i v i d u a l  rights  i t  Macpherson's  political  purpose:  society,  f o r human  property,  while  relations.  he w i s h e s  to retain  For explanatory  purposes,  to d i s t i n g u i s h  and a p u b l i c  consistent,  n o t t o be e x c l u d e d i s  o f the good  value.  t o e x c l u d e and  from  h a s an o v e r t l y  of private  t o exclude,  right  possibility  f o r i t s hortatory  a right  as b o t h a r i g h t  domain  between  property  o r commons  as the  n o t t o be e x c l u d e d . E x c l u s i v i t y i n  13 the  Western  and  not groups.  literary  that  been  kin-group  (2) issue  debate,  could  be  the case  dominated  the  rule-bound  can  think  of  preserves  sell.  --  persons',  copyright  never  i n the  contemplated  by a c o l l e c t i v i t y ,  this  criterion  The E n g l i s h by  as may  around  a  well  tribal  clearly  law o f r e a l  innumerable  of feudal  or  was f o r  1  Further,  Restricted, involve  but  limits  rarely  by  limits  eliminated;  for a period  one  from a g r i c u l t u r a l  to the r e g u l a t i o n of i n s i d e r t r a d i n g — are restricted  the  to get around  land. ®  circumstances—  raises  property  the e f f o r t s o f lawyers  inalienability  of property  instances  given  the courts  'owned'  to legal  structures.  of h i s t o r i c i t y .  rights  'exclusive  i n s o c i e t i e s organised  Alienability  centuries  land  has meant  In t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  property  property have  tradition  on  i n which  t h e power t o  almost  a l l such  o f t i m e , on t h e c l a s s o f  p e r s o n s w i t h whom e x c h a n g e c a n be made, o r on t h e u s e s a b u y e r may  make  of the property  alienation. 'power', various  In  not a  sold,  Hohfeldian right,  b u t n o t an a b s o l u t e  terms,  a n d a power  alienability which  ways, b u t i f s o i t has become  c a n be  bar to  may  be  a  limited in  t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e power 1Q  of a p r o p e r t y  (3)  r i g h t i n the commercial age. ^ x  Externality  —a  to p e r t a i n to resources right-holder.  property  right  i n the m a t e r i a l  I n h i s 1917 a r t i c l e  i s generally  world, e x t e r n a l  Hohfeld  listed  five  thought t o the things  14 to  which  rights  objects, person, 'moral issue of  the and  what  whether  property. by  copyright  be In  0  only  time  in  nature  and  endeavour  property  tangible  called the  the  the  and  a  property  wrote,  of  right.  This  encompassed a c t i v i t i e s  p e r f o r m e d on  world,  was  and  distinction  property  C.  "COPIES"  1.  A New  be  a  key  subject  intangible  objects  raises  property"  had  term  a  property. of  aspects  been  resources  But  moral became  questions  about  which t h i s  paper  distinction  a l i e n a b l e . With  became much l e s s  better debate,  could  those  fundamental  rights  a  another  characteristics  debate,  "new  of  become  the  answer. The  personal  the  had  a l s o had  purposes of the to  of  intangible  person,  property  category  one  Hohfeld  course  lack  literary  was  objects,  physical for  first  i n i t s o r i g i n s had  subsumed w i t h i n  will  can  Copyright  the  interests;  the  pertain:  r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s own  interests.'"^ was  which,  may  between  that  property  i n the  objective  copyright,  clear.  Property ? The chief attribute of intellectual property i s that apart from i t s r e c o g n i t i o n i n law i t has no e x i s t e n c e o f i t s own. I t i s i n f a c t as w e l l as i n d e f i n i t i o n t h e s t u f f o f an intellectual, r a t h e r than a f e e l i n g accord. Lacking tangible substance altogether, i t s boundaries c a n n o t be r e c o g n i z e d through t h e medium o f the human s e n s e s .  that  15 In  what  principal nature  senses  problem  copyright  f o r t h e judges  o f an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t  its  intangibility,  the  physical  evidenced little to  was  a claim  first  t o copy  t o which  to property  significance  ceded  who  new  property grappled  written  i t pertained. for realty  ? The  with the  texts  the s e p a r a t i o n of the r i g h t  object  copy was t h a t  a  concerned  claimed  If possession  or c h a t t e l s ,  i t  f o r c o p y r i g h t ; the very purpose of a  i t pertained after  possession  of  each  an a u t h o r  physical  copy  from  had  right  or a s s i g n e e had of a  published  composition. The  printing  property  with  Blackstone's printing factor. as  a number view  press  2 2  ,  presented of related  was  largely  The p r e s s  the market  books  press  could  reproduce  imposed  an a r t i f i c i a l  by law r a t h e r t h a n  without  i t s author's thing;  nature.  permission  concepts  a  text  unaffected,  make. T h e p r o b l e m  save  matter.  That  an  of texts  Similarly,  d i d not d e p r i v e  as a number  i n copying a  scarcity a book  him o f any  d i d not a p t l y  he m i g h t  or r e p r o d u c t i o n  otherwise  might  processes  objects a relatively property  The  t h e p u t a t i v e owner o f  f o r the p r o f i t s  'industrial  a  copying  o f t r e s p a s s and t h e f t  of copying  of physical  scarcity.  scarcity,  more g e n e r a l l y a s a p r o b l e m o f i n d u s t r i a l replication  by  i n as great  d e s c r i b e an i n v a s i o n o r t a k i n g t h a t l e f t  of  Property, i n  scarcity  books  concepts  r e c o g n i t i o n of property  produced  physical  paradoxes.  necessary  eliminated  demanded. A  actually  made  traditional  be  seen  w h i c h made  straightforward  debate'  d i d not  take  16  place  in  English  literary  law,  property  at  least  debate,  not  raises  in  the  same  interesting  way  as  the  questions  of  23 comparison.  2.  J  D e f i n i n g "The Copy" Just  parlance "copy"  as but  in  meaning.  the One  In  law,  of  copy"  of  the  or  property"  "owned" the  a  century  copy,  their  for  Company,  own  exclusive this  both  usage  ongoing  theory,  as  a  as  the  with  the  did  object. right  members  guild,  registering The  4  legal  "the  printers'  2  word  and  mean  started  for  common  physical  to  publication.  meaning,  in  colloquial  London  system  owned"  legal  understood  the  internal  in  copies,  was  This  "objects  had  or  "copy"  "copy-right."  'copies'  Statute  eighteenth  who  of  century  J  Copying When  had  done  from  the  This  latter  a  one's  own.  over  time,  someone  of  term  What  particular  by  'owner'  referred  the  should  to  be  constitutes  with  the  of  another's  steadily  declining  press. ^  Piracy  is  since the  it  not was  to  another's  work  plagiarism of  have  has  called  from and  particular  'piracy.'  claiming  attribution  concern  that  'plagiarism',  varied  introduction  by  authorisation  "legitimate"  without the  connotation  often  distinguished  scope work  commercial  alleged  copy,  copying  borrowing  2  of  eighteenth  recognised  courts.^  which  "rights  Stationers'  claimed  time.  connotes  however,  developed  Anne  "property"  it  considerably copying generally  of of  as  the  or and  printing  publishers,  17 plagiarism  the concern  d e b a t e , p i r a c y was and  the c l a r i o n  i n the l i t e r a r y  property  o f the p l a i n t i f f  printers  c r e a t o r of l i t e r a r y  works i s  call  booksellers.  D.  "AUTHORS"  The a u t h o r a  of authors;  relatively  has Oral  varied  written  than  greatly  before  performers  is a  society  storytelling  exist  become a v a i l a b l e . than  authors,  stage  pre-literate  source  o f power  status  of the  t o s o c i e t y , and  m e c h a n i c a l means  centre  within  The  2  rather  texts, hold  stories  conception. ^ from  of  language  language  with  modern  traditions  predominate  how  a s an i n d i v i d u a l  over  for multiple Richard theatre  societies.  recording of  Wincor  of  Knowledge  I n a n c i e n t s o c i e t y i t was t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o v i n c e o f a p r i v i l e g e d few t o r e c i t e special words and p e r f o r m certain c e r e m o n i e s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e was a t h i n g o f v a l u e . . . . T h e s e r i t u a l p l a y s were n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n implements o f s o v e r e i g n t y , t h e i r c o r p o r a t e owners u s e d them as s t o c k i n trade to preserve s t a t u s . . .  Foucault  8  writes:  In our well--  culture—undoubtedly d i s c o u r s e was n o t  rather symbolic of the  i s bound  the s t a t u s o f the p r i e s t :  Michel  describes  and r i t u a l  i n f l u e n c e , and  2  time.  i n a l l c u l t u r e s , and  i n the transmission  and  'author'  i n o t h e r s as originally a  up  18 t h i n g , a p r o d u c t , or a p o s s e s s i o n , b u t an action situated in a bipolar f i e l d of s a c r e d and p r o f a n e , l a w f u l and u n l a w f u l , r e l i g i o u s and b l a s p h e m o u s . 9  To F o u c a u l t , the  the  modern c o n c e p t  "author-function"3°,  "objects  of  traces the  in  Europe  represented  by  the  far  the  guise  master  in  of  the  of  p h i l o s o p h y or  man's  activities  possible  that  on  they  Among the  printing  press  b o t h as  an e c o n o m i c  of  the  and c o p y i s t s heavily  the  intensive,  of  she view,  the  social  possible  life of  was  the  copying  of  her  has  tilted  whether  in  classes,  as  those  and  they  relationships,  and  that  made  intellectual suggests  of  the  authorship,  endeavour. following. texts  craftsmen.-^ and most  states  before;  which E i s e n s t e i n  altered  not  itself;  human  of  does  p r i n t i n g press  communication  include  respected  i n her  were not  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l points  was  breakthrough  Eisenstein  view,  institutions  press,  were  labour  on  became  concept  human a g e n c y ,  structure  irrevocably  Eisenstein's advent  the  the  Rather,  that,  intellectual  are  exchange.  '  dynamics  i n her  affected as  the  in  technological  seeing  fate.^  bore  profoundly  of  words  codification  changes  determinism.  direction  in his  when books  legal  press.  r i g h t i n g a balance  some a c t i v i t i e s  dependent  printing  technological as  too  to  or  1  Eisenstein  authorship  intention  ago."^  author,  roughly  a p p r o p r i a t i o n . . . whose  Elizabeth  a  the  commenced  a c c o m p l i s h e d some y e a r s  propose  of  4  books  was  Prior done  by  to  hand,  Book p r o d u c t i o n copied  were  the  was  classic  19 texts.  Original  composition  Indeed c o p y i n g , activity small was  the p h y s i c a l text  was  With  The  from and  press  came  by t h e v i r t u a l  became  the task  the exegesis ideas.  feasible  The  valued  as  of s c h o l a r l y  of s i n g l e printing  and w o r t h w h i l e ,  texts  press  which  readership.  Eventually,  be  as a p r o f e s s i o n  conceived  for a  relatively  law d i d n o t r e c o g n i s e  the presses with m a t e r i a l to p r i n t .  availability,  the e s s e n t i a l  work and t h e p a p e r  the p r i n t i n g  writer  texts  value.  and t h e o l o g i a n s . So paramount  medieval  characterised f i r s t  copyists. provide  that  between a l i t e r a r y  written.  labour,  readers  had l i t t l e  represented  of producing  of s c h o l a r l y  distinction  in  and n o t c o m p o s i t i o n ,  i n the world  class  consequently  a  on w h i c h i t division  of  disappearance  of  someone  who  could  As books i n c r e a s e d  writing itself  t o a combining made  changed  of  wide-scale  sources  literacy  l e d t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f a mass  i t became p o s s i b l e f o r a u t h o r s h i p - 3 3  a  , at least  to  for writers achieving  a measure o f s u c c e s s . With an  t h e c r e a t i o n o f an a u d i e n c e  entirely  new  concept  of  originator,  of compositions.  of  which  factors  individualism to  a  have  i n writing:  counterbalancing  expression not  may  had  print before,  attribution  f o r b o o k s , however,  the author  as  a  creator,  an  E i s e n s t e i n s p e c u l a t e s on a number contributed  to a  new  emphasis  on  the s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of typefaces l e d  search  f o r more  idiosyncratic  personal  g a v e w r i t i n g a p h y s i c a l permanency  permitting  of authorship  came  ^7.  much p i t r  n  greater permitted  i t had  certainty f o r the  in  first  20 time  a  "silent",  readership  and  confessional drawings  in-depth a  living.author,  mode  could  of  be  writing  for  readers  authors  ^9.  Eisenstein  movement  artist-genius, praised  the  that of  role,  the  and  career, responses  censorship.  responded  to  animators  threatened  the  or  harm t o  In  of  defining  however,  the  exclusive her  for  to  their  i n the  or  becoming t h e link  subject  as  and  appeared  the  copyright  by s e v e r a l  scholars.  of  the as  naturally  disparaging  printing  areas of  to  of  rights  libel  and  the  the  ?  largely  technology  harm  and  spawned  these  state's  the  reproduction  and  4 2  author,  a form of of  the  constituted  4 1  its  powerful.  of  individuals,  the for  his  or  state's reason books  4 4  and the 4 5  that author  a connection:  authors  between  of  with c o p y r i g h t :  sees  property.  portraits  printing  reputation  named  more  it  the  related  new it  over  a  making  while  concern,  the  status  restrain  of  i n the  be  wide  figurative  who q u i t e  that  legal  Foucault  4  of  a  4 0  author  do,  author  the  new phenomena  private  response  and  suggest  readers,  not.  the  to  authors  which  the  recognition  been n o t e d  image  of  to  the  work. ^  punish  their  The  law's  right  literary  desire  its  occurred  harm  security, terms  with  the  As a r e a s  with  as  of  in  books,  far  of  of  printed  so  work  encounter  resulting  familiar  p h i l i s t i n e s who d i d  Two i m p o r t a n t and  goes  between  engravings  in  become  itself,  was  How d i d law the  to  sensibility  the  ^8.  reproduced  possible  Romantic  communication  Romantic  As w i l l  be  movement  shown i n  has  greater  21  detail,  copyright  proscribed  the unauthorised  the p r i n t i n g been  press,  imitation, property  production.  concept  through  i s plausibly  as a  should  be  romantic  noted,  continued  however,  to thrive  movements  figure,  i n literary  the  o f t e x t s , even  author.  second  through  made  v. T a y l o r  and  both serves  author  into  exalted  as a  form of  t h e most  the role  of the  system  It has  influential  of the author  d e c l a r i n g the death  paper,  then,  of copyright  legal  i n guiding  and in  of the  to which thinking,  images a n d how  i t s subsequent  expression;  this  t o meet  i n sending  material  of  in  "authorship"  copyright  the author  has  as  'owner'  relationship  t o the  notion  and p e r s o n a l  ( p u b l i s h i n g ) h i s work  examine  configuration. It will  property  c e l e b r a t e s an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  i s to  and i t s a p o t h e o s i s  t h a t c o p y r i g h t has c o n s t r u c t e d  his original  work  of t h i s  the degree  way  a part  be a r g u e d of  purpose  the development  their  played  when  ;  4 7  A  Millar  then,  4 6  had  c r i t i c i s m - - s t r u c t u r a 1ism  have d i s p a r a g e d  and l i f e  which  o f Shakespeare  the copyright  a time  to  have  the s e l f - e x p r e s s i v e hero.  deconstructionism— birth  texts  i n the c o n s t i t u t i n g  that  during  studies  endeavour  Copyright,  prior  i t s i n v e n t i o n , had  earlier  t h e time  implicated  which  Several  from  of a r t i s t i c  not o r i g i n a l i t y .  author  of texts  'borrowing'  authorship  classical  copying  o f book  the extensive  characterised  f o r h i s o r i g i n a l i t y , and  a n d f o r some t i m e a f t e r  the backbone  examined  the  rewarded the author  of  creativity,  expectations  into  the world.  of the  22  E.  APPROACH AND  1.  M i l l a r v. T a y l o r (1769) as a Focus Taking  certain case  a  risks.  stand  OUTLINE OF INQUIRY  single  case  For  thing, there  one  f o r more  the c o n t e x t  than  of a case  make a r g u m e n t s not  v.  property  question  with  the  bear the  provides the  noted  the  Justice failed  for  book  focus  to achieve  important  Millar  positions  study  as  be  i t . There  when  f o r our  represented by  the  bear of  the  over  4 9  ;  26-year  four and  the  as  judges  the  responses  to  s e v e r a l of  retain  single  case  for  one  of  tenure  to  believing case  has  only  two  as  Chief  i n King's  Bench  a p i v o t a l moment i n t h e  d o c t r i n e of  purposes,  London  to  a t t e n t i o n . The as  debate  interesting  reasons  reasons:  The  literary  major  Further,  are  parties  interests;  effort  such  the  above,  Their  commercial  sufficiently  the  t o win.  i n an  Mansfield's  debate  approach  several  debate  must  unanimity  developed  of  4  can  Lord  one  poses  noted  d i s p u t e i n which  not  trade. **  number  (1756-1782)  jurisprudential Most  a  during  reality;  struggle of  the  attention given  instances  in  the  decision in Millar  been  a  i s a d a n g e r o f making  in  did  was  pressed  in  for  p h i l o s o p h i c detachment.  Millar  who  predominance which  Taylor  long-standing  plaintiff  booksellers  i t did  focus  f o r t h e sake o f a e s t h e t i c s , but  in Millar  a  the  i s a particular  parties  represented  as  the  stare  opinions extensive more  of  decisis. the  5 0  judges  theoretical  impressive  legal  figures  of  the  age.  They s t a n d  up w e l l  y e a r s o f e v o l u t i o n i n a complex a r e a o f The  Millar  literary Lords  and  property  in  ruling  was  debate  Donaldson v.  in  Millar,  and  more  on  extended  the  in  opinions of In  the  deciding  work  Mansfield, many o f That  in  a  course  statutory  decision  literary  most  the  important  for  which property  property  explaining  copyright  appears  later  in  the  the  This  issues  twelve  the  the  raised  judges  as  do  the  in  those  of  Court  authors  opinion  personal  implicated  in  neglected  of  Lord of  copyright.  right,  but  property  of and  nature  betrayed  a p u r e l y commercial  intellectual  paper  3  issue,  the  the  contains  developments  various  and o f  it  the p l a c e  of  interests  as  of  5  the  reversed  regime.  reported. '  in  t h e House o f  same g r o u n d ,  Particularly  200  of Anglo-Canadian  because  o p i n i o n s of  cover  appreciation  relevance of  effectively  p r o v i d e d a sense of  literary  by has  important as  a whole.  Method and O u t l i n e This  legal  part  the  conceiving  2.  earlier  appreciation,  features  2  law as  society.  an  the  Beckett^  the  after  chapter  f i v e years l a t e r  Lords which are  K i n g ' s Bench a l s o their  penultimate  because  The a d v i s o r y large  theory  law.  and t h o u g h t f u l e l a b o r a t i o n  debate.  Donaldson  the  the  settled  American copyright  concentrates  in  case  as  paper  sources  precedent  approaches  Millar  v.  from which i t  arose.  Specifically,  cited  by t h e  King's  Bench  Taylor  judges  by e x a m i n i n g it  traces  in Millar,  and  the the the  24  sources cases  of that  precedent,  and l i m i t s  o f law F r e n c h  doctrine  which i n f l u e n c e d  printing  press  When  analysed,  into  three  Parts  a s f a r back  as t h e r e p o r t i n g o f  allow.  the reception  In that  broad  cited  categories,  which  legal  of the products of the  i n t o t h e common law c a n be r e a d i l y the precedent  way,  i n Millar give  identified.  divided  itself  the structure f o r  I I , I I I and IV o f t h e p a p e r :  Part I I . - - Cases which comprised the l i t e r a r y property d e b a t e l e a d i n g up t o Millar; i n these cases the p a r t i e s d e v e l o p e d t h e s t r a t e g i e s and arguments t h e y used i n i n t e r p r e t i n g c o p y r i g h t t o t h e courts; this Part also considers the outcome o f the debate i n Donaldson v. Beckett a n d it's i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e subsequent development o f c o p y r i g h t law. P a r t I I I — C a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h Crown r i g h t s and powers i n and o v e r t h e book t r a d e , and prerogative powers i n general; the interpretation of the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of publishing represented o n e o f t h e two major grounds o f d i s p u t e i n the debate; Part I I I also reviews i n brief the comparable development o f t h e law o f p a t e n t s as a Crown-granted r i g h t . P a r t IV - - C a s e s i n v o l v i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s for injunctions t o prevent unauthorised uses or takings o f l i t e r a r y compositions, and t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f a u t h o r s and/or p u b l i s h e r s ; L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s use o f the r e c o g n i t i o n o f a p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t i n the protection given unpublished manuscripts receives p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n , and l e a d s t o a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n o f m o r a l r i g h t s and p u b l i c i t y r i g h t s i n contemporary law.  Notable precedent  by  i t s absence  drawn  from  from  the f i e l d s  the precedent of real  in Millar  or personal  was  property,  25 with  a  single  awareness  that  the  problems,  not  principles  of  however,  That  attempts  to  property  This  4  i s s u e s posed  easily common  deal  rights.  of  exception.-*  at  copyright  assimilated  law  property.  some  length  discussion  forms  explore  the  of  earlier  the  by  reflected  by  the  judges  to  theoretical  for  unique  existing  in Millar  principles basis  Court's  presented  analogy  The  with  the  of  Part  property V,  implications for  findings, particularly  did,  which  the  law  those  in  how  the  Part I I I .  Part V -- A s t u d y of the competing theories of p r o p e r t y raised by the majority and dissenting opinions in M i l l a r , w i t h e m p h a s i s on the c h a l l e n g e t o a n a t u r a l law e x p l a n a t i o n and j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y by J u s t i c e Y a t e s for i n t a n g i b l e s ; the e f f e c t of this i n s i g h t on t h e p o s i t i v i s t r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s and t h e p o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i n modern l e g a l t h e o r y .  The dual  paper  interests  interests related law,  concludes  of  Part  copyright  commercial  to a u t h o r s h i p —  drawing  opinion  of  in  with  reflected  exploitation, continue  in particular  examined i n P a r t  VI  on  an  a n a l y s i s of  in M i l l a r — and  proprietary  personal  interests  to p l a y themselves out aspects  of  Lord  in  the  Mansfield's  IV.  Part VI-A reexamination of Lord Mansfield's p o s i t i o n as a t h i r d justification of property in lightof H e g e l ' s t h e o r y of p r o p e r t y as c o n s t i t u t i n g p e r s o n h o o d , and an a n a l y s i s o f the subsequent e v o l u t i o n of c o p y r i g h t ' s use of o r i g i n a l i t y as a b a s i s f o r a property r i g h t .  26  II.  A.  THE LITERARY PROPERTY  T H E B O O K S E L L E R S ' WAR  Cases  are  not  responses  to  does  dispute  the  varying  philosophical  particular  social  drives  of  that  terms  judges  make;  it  that,  for  find  is  dispute  Bench  decide  incorporated  an  compositions. nature  of  before  commercial of  noting  Legal the  late  paper  aspects  resolution  rights,  of  the  of  a  an  answer  might they to  means  to  of  judicial  provide  simply  only  facts  of  decisions  far  Not  untidy  realists  argue  wish  to  recognise the  end  of  itself.  required  the  common to  make  the  the  the  English  law  Court  to  of  that  of  King's  property of  literary  consider  authors. of  a  It  narrow  system's  the came  lengthy  booksellers.  more  legal  of  of  context  groups  outline  Court  copies  rights  in  rival  parties.  terms  to  immediate  This  dispute, ultimate  it.  protections  fifteenth  to  the  in  forced and  between seeks  so  the  however,  dispute  go  right  question  Court,  the  (1769)  whether  property  the  end  exclusive  The  the  represents  an  Taylor  the  Legal  justify  but  its  need  inquiry.  to  two  with  determine  to  not  between  court's  theory  resolution,  to  its  debates,  court,  necessary  judges,  v.  the  theory  not  Millar  a  generality, but  the  disputes  before  decision-making,  Part  DEBATE  for  century  printers'  interests  introduction  of  5 5  the  evolved printing  from press  27 and  have been d e s c r i b e d  Willes  J.  in  Licensing book  Millar.  Acts,  elsewhere, not 5  In  6  which  1694  combined  r e g i s t r a t i o n , came t o an  means  for  the  l e a s t i n the  the  censorship  end,  and  with  London p r i n t e r s ' g u i l d , t h e  to  regulate  of  ' p i r a t e d ' e d i t i o n s o f works t h e y had  primarily  the  they  exclusive  provided  London—  Parliament  an  still  further Statute  14  be  provided  years,  meant  including  the  copyright argument  did  For  an  w i t h no  This  1730,  located the  that works  Parliament  for of  expire  assignment  a  system  of  only  formal  Company,  increasing  printed,  the  problem  booksellers—  for  Statute  legislation  the  of  published r i g h t of  the  making o f years,  copy  In  to  copy t o the  The  author  copies should  extended  prior  1709  o f Anne .  r i g h t to  a f t e r 14  right  the  the  extending  late the  of  Milton  and  the  and  until  most  for  1709,  of the a the  "owner" f o r  1730  of  the  (subject,  period  prior  of  to  expiry  to of  of  for  put  old  course,  1709).  empires, in  protection.  legislation and  to  These  copyrights  further  copyright  books,  statutory  several publishing  agitated  1730s  valuable  Shakespeare,  ownership  basis  i n London. With  in  with  p r i n t i n g of books.  years;  many  London b o o k s e l l e r s  campaign  of  i t the  an  authorise  books  series  Stationers  assignable  the  a  extension.  p r e - 1 7 0 9 works f o r m e d most  14  exclusive  not  over  of  of  in  pressed  enacted  exclusive,  living,  years.  with  r i g h t s i n the  book, f o r a p e r i o d  author  A  in  Faced  a p r i n t e d book t o make or  the  21  trade.  located  s u c c e e d e d , as  Statute of  book  those  recognising  last  opinion  through  increasing  28 protection  from  often  William  with  the  London  the  courts. *'  imported  copies  Murray  booksellers  burgeoning Scottish  (later  started  book  point  publishing  booksellers  existing  Lord  to  trade  did  and  for  the  Mansfield)  pursue  the  their  mid-1740s, as  counsel,  objectives  not  refused  to  their  books  expiry  of  copyright London  the  periods.  booksellers  Scottish  Court  publishers  i n an  et  and  al.  In  5  9  of  1746  in  accorded  by  that  an  copies  action  in  This  action  basis  issue  of  and  that  the  v.  t i m e the  claimed  of  Anne; for  the  In  Millar  House  of  of  that  from  of  their  the  upstart Kincaid  Booksellers  specifically,  Lords  of  other in  e t a l . v.  argument  6 0  .  The  they  had  any  rights  they  argued  property  in  penalties.  Taylor,  Justice  decisions on  a  restricted  interpretation. the  several damages  distinct  v.  the  statutory  number  from s t a t u t o r y  p a r t i e s had  given  for  trespass  of  conventions  and  Scots  t o d i s t i n g u i s h the  statutory  surprisingly  they  failed.  of  al.  first  apart  went t o some l e n g t h s Sessions  et  damages  existed quite  Millar  a  the  Glasgow.  part  28-year  action  was  r e p r i n t i n g popular  known b o t h as M i l l a r  Statute  for  Andrew  or  against  Midwinter  the  21  Sessions  copies  the  s u c c e s s on  an  action  the  respect  the  and  themselves  launched  L o n d o n e r s r a i s e d f o r the property  i n Edinburgh  consider  much o f  after  London b o o k s e l l e r s  industry  London; t h e y b u i l t  the  In  5  5  A p r i n c i p a l sore  of  failed. ^  writ  argument 6  1  of of  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  the  Court  error  to a  Indeed,  Willes  on  narrow  and  not  involved,  the  29 'monopolists' the  course  in Hinton to  met w i t h  of their  1 against  only  intensified  Lord  grounds.  6 3  Tonson v . C o l l i n s  had  (1750), legal  the  London  an e d i t e d v e r s i o n  a temporary  W  on t h e  law j u d g e s  to  injunction  on  the l i t e r a r y  a ruling  Court  he would  Blackstone  make i n M i l l a r  as an a d v i s o r y  property  had m e r e l y  been  five  theory  a t law i n  of King's  f o r the defendant  f o r Tonson.  The  i n Tonson v . Walker and  i n Donaldson v. B e c k e t t  law r i g h t  campaign.  f o r t h e common  as counsel  he s u p p o r t e d  o f Anne  published  Taylor  LC d e c l i n e d t o r u l e  Mansfield's  as counsel  House o f L o r d s  be  Lord  and which  Statute  10  v.  321, 96 ER 180. The  o f t h e argument  brief,  voted  (1762) 1 B l a c k  Joseph Yates  common  Millar  over  i n 1773  sought  featured  In  again  The b o o k s e l l e r s  before  1769,  Hardwicke  the p l a i n t i f f  brought  essence  of  their  re-emerged  i t was a m a t t e r  but granted  Blackstone  courts  of Sessions  i n Midwinter  theory'  Lost.  saying  other  the Court  w r i e n  (1752) 3 Swan. 672, 36 ER 1017 o v e r  Paradise  decide,  strategy, losing  the principle  defeat  property  Merchant  i n the S c o t t i s h  i n Scots law.  booksellers 'literary  ^2  finding  Following  point  litigation  v. Donaldson  applicable  of  no s u c c e s s  case,  Bench,  and W i l l i a m  presented  the  v. T a y l o r i n  judge  before the  years t h e r e a f t e r .  maintained  that the  d e c l a r a t o r y o f an  existing  of property  i n the m u l t i p l y i n g of copies of  b o o k s . As p r o p e r t y ,  common l a w c o p y r i g h t was s a i d t o  perpetual. confirmed  The S t a t u t e , this  right  rather  than  and p r o v i d e d  extinguishing remedies  rights,  and p e n a l t i e s  30 in  a d d i t i o n to those  applying  only  protection. two  claiming right  of the debate,  copyright case  than  more  or  d i d copyright  28 y e a r s  statutory  sought  exist  i t gave  no  the  the statutory periods f o r the courts  the p l a i n t i f f  assignee  remedies  from  was  a  the author  over t h e  bookseller  with  i n the  o n l y by v i r t u e o f t h e S t a t u t e  o f Anne  arose.  which  1709  within  law, a l b e i t  c a s e t h a t came b e f o r e  as u l t i m a t e  Did (in  t o books s t i l l  In every  decades  a v a i l a b l e a t common  exist  way t o a p u b l i c domain from  registration  discussion  limitations  o f l a w on w h i c h i n Parts  Tonson  before  never  took p l a c e ,  litigation defendant returned  applying  Mansfield, Yates) found  plaintiff  c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n , and  i t depended,  occupy  much o f t h e  p a p e r . H e r e we  only  King's  Bench  t o put the  that the  to bring  law j u d g e s .  decided  however, b e c a u s e t h e j u d g e s l e a r n e d the p l a i n t i f f the case  had s p o n s o r e d t h e  to c o u r t .  v . Donaldson and Osborne  skirmish  the Court  This  i f the  argument  collusive:  in Millar  ?  only  law (with t h e  The f u r t h e r  i n order  preliminary latter,  a l l t h e common  was  Hall)  o f the l i t i g a t i o n .  v. C o l l i n s ,  issue  i n Stationers'  I I I , IV and V o f t h i s  need t o o u t l i n e t h e course In  after  by v i r t u e o f t h e common  i t s a d d i t i o n a l remedies)  issues  i n books  to Millar  v. Taylor  (1765),  Aston,  Justice  Willes)  The i s s u e becoming a  i n 1769. In the  o f K i n g ' s Bench by a m a j o r i t y  Justice  6 4  of three  (Lord  t o one ( J u s t i c e  f o r t h e London b o o k s e l l e r s , r u l i n g  that  copyright  31  existed in  prior  rough Oldham cases  collusion  way  in  this  the  property  after,  London  The  same  as  a  the  against  D o n a l d s o n who Donaldson,  Statute's  names  crop  in  monopoly.  passage  and  commercial  Donaldson's  who  precisely  intercepted outlined  a  Scotland  and  Millar's  son:  i n Hinton.  property  in  from  1759  to  Ireland.  of to  was  prevent In  one  copies  the  letter,  a  legal  of  initiated  copies. was  The  Alexander operations,  works, the  and  to  The  London  Boswell, who  to  an  of  three  importing  J  literary  James  publishers  test  owned two  challenge  published,  debate  London  the  his  older  D o n a l d s o n appended  literary  strategy  their  moved  champions  D o n a l d s o n e n c o u r a g e d and  the  concerted  frequently  of  James  matters.  Andrew M i l l a r  reprints  One  game.  the  i n which  throughout  bookseller  i n 1759  his counsel  age,  exhibited a up  typified  this  f r e q u e n t l y as a d e f e n d a n t  inexpensive  of  in  'pirates'  London  whose p o e t r y  w r o t e on  alleged  by  played  h o u s e s i n London, and  Edinburgh  characterised  6 6  (1762)  litigious  booksellers  appeared  an  Collins  brought  debate. Jacob T o n s o n  action  v.  booksellers  were  larger printing  Strand  the  period  frequently  strategy.  i n Tonson  which  notes  Certainly  as  continued  1709. The  the  t o , and  acted  article  he  letters  in  which  they  of  books  from  bookseller  We h a v e a s c h e m e now entered into, for t o t a l l y p r e v e n t i n g the s a l e of Scotch and I r i s h b o o k s , w h i c h were f i r s t p r i n t e d i n E n g l a n d ; and n e a r two t h o u s a n d pounds i s  wrote  to  32 already subscribed f o r carrying i t into i m m e d i a t e e x e c u t i o n . And e v e r y p e r s o n i n England, s e l l i n g s u c h b o o k s , w i l l be proceeded a g a i n s t i n Chancery, with the utmost s e v e r i t y . '  Part  o f t h e London  Chancery alleged  injunctions to  injunctions one by  booksellers' to stop  infringe by C h a n c e r y  strategy  the p r i n t i n g  their  property.  i n a number  o f the b o o k s e l l e r s ' p r i n c i p a l the Lord  injunction  Chancellor should  of a  or sale The  legal  of  copies  then  of  became  arguments: r e c o g n i t i o n  sufficient  good  seeking  granting  of instances  right  constitute  involved  authority  to support  an  f o r t h e common  law. By King's  the time Bench,  protection place  Millar no  frequently,  century  cases  continued  of  going  came  common  property.  exclusively  granted  had  court  to literary  almost  v. T a y l o r  The l e g a l  i n v o l v i n g Crown  granted rights.  were  nor any i n d i c a t i o n only  Injunctions of  or Crown-granted  i n the eighteenth  intended  contest  t o a number  century  p r i v a t e p a r t i e s . The L o r d s C h a n c e l l o r were r e p o r t e d ,  law had y e t  i n equity. back  t o be a r g u e d  rarely  whether  to enforce  before granted  had t a k e n had been  seventeenth rights.  i n cases  This  between  gave r e a s o n s  that  the i n j u n c t i o n s  they  post-1709  statutory  33 B.  THE OVERTURNING  1.  The R e s u l t i n D o n a l d s o n v . B e c k e t t Andrew  edition  v.  Millar  had bought meaning  Taylor  that  turned  King's  Bench  Millar  himself  interest  Beckett  law  Lords  latter's  o f James Thompson's poems,  Seasons.  was  f o r t h e London  before  sold  an i n j u n c t i o n  Thompson i n  b o o k s e l l e r s , as  common  the r u l i n g  at auction  Donaldson  decided  law c o p y r i g h t . was made; h i s  to another  once  again  edition  of  London  t o throw Seasons.  on t h e s t r e n g t h o f M i l l a r ,  t o t h e House o f L o r d s . that  from  e x p i r e d i n 1757. M i l l a r  and p u t o u t h i s own  ordered  over  t h e poems  a perpetual  shortly  Beckett.  Donaldson appealed The  the  out well  died  obtained  Taylor  the s t a t u t o r y term  recognised  the g a u n t l e t ,  John  and p u b l i s h e d  i n Seasons  bookseller, down  had sued  of a c o l l e c t i o n  Millar 1729,  OF MILLAR V. TAYLOR  the twelve  and  6 8  judges  o f t h e common  c o u r t s ^ p r o v i d e o p i n i o n s on t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s : 6  1.  Whether a t common l a w , an a u t h o r o f any book o r l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n had the s o l e r i g h t o f f i r s t p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g t h e same f o r s a l e ; a n d m i g h t b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a n y p e r s o n who p r i n t e d p u b l i s h e d and s o l d t h e same w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t ?  2.  If the author had such right o r i g i n a l l y , d i d t h e l a w t a k e i t away, upon h i s p r i n t i n g a n d p u b l i s h i n g s u c h book o r l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n : a n d might any p e r s o n a f t e r w a r d reprint and s e l l , f o r h i s own b e n e f i t , s u c h book o r l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n , a g a i n s t the w i l l o f the author ?  34  3.  I f such a c t i o n would have l a i n a t common l a w , i s i t t a k e n away by t h e S t a t u t e o f 8 t h A n n . ? And i s an a u t h o r , by t h e s a i d s t a t u t e p r e c l u d e d from every r e m e d y , e x c e p t on t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e s a i d s t a t u t e and on t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d thereby ?  4.  Whether t h e a u t h o r o f any l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n a n d h i s a s s i g n s , had t h e s o l e r i g h t o f p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g t h e same i n p e r p e t u i t y , by t h e common law ?  5.  Whether this right i s a n y way impeached r e s t r a i n e d o r t a k e n away by t h e S t a t u t e 8 t h Ann. ? " 7  0  Q u e s t i o n s 4 and 5 a p p e a r t o be r e s t a t e m e n t s o f q u e s t i o n s 3,  and t h e judges Determining  difficult; Abrams  7  a  responded  the precise  recent  suggests  2  in like  outcome  reassessment that  i t may  The  together  of the judges  to  them.  believing  Lord  on  comprised  eleven  different subsequent  Mansfield  i t inappropriate  judgment  question  first  appeal  i s , a s Abrams sources. ^ 7  judgments  of Donaldson  given  chose  interpreting  an  'vote'  epic  opinion, h i s own therefore  o f answers  out, reported  The a c c o u n t  t o an  to support  The  The b r e a k d o w n  by Howard  questions put  not to give Peer  remains  lay i n putting  on t h e f i v e  for a  points  rise  difficulty  to the Lords.  opinions.  7 1  o f the d e c i s i o n  have  misinterpretation. the 'votes'  fashion.  2 and  t o each  differently in  generally  accepted  in  D o n a l d s o n , was a s f o l l o w s —  35 the  results  given  t h e same q u e s t i o n s  The held  i n brackets  No - 3  (Yes  2.  Yes  - 4  No - 7  (No  3-1)  3.  Yes  - 6  No - 5  (No  3-1)  4.  Yes  - 7  No - 4  (Yes  5.  Yes  - 6  No " 5  (No  of this  Court  respect  with  of the United  doubts.  The c a s e  involved  i n England  common acquire  was w h o l l y  Donaldson, common Statute  under  law; s e v e r a l  agreed,  stated judges  After that  added  in  right  then  only  t h e Supreme  consecrated  o f whether  composer  a statutory  o f Anne was r u l e d  Indeed,  i n appeal  published  copyright.  a majority  the Statute  this  could  statute  outside  Donaldson  7  7  for  England. I f  reviewing  even  ,  claim  and n o t p r o p e r t y  copyright  6  the publisher  foreign artists  that  7  expressed  Bellini,  t h e 1842 c o p y r i g h t  first  law, t h e judges English  the issue  law c o p y r i g h t  J e f f e r y s v. Boosey  sitting  the opera  compositions  copyright  books.  were  by t h e S t a t u t e o f  since  subsequently  judges  opinions  a common  books—  I n t h e 1854 c a s e  7 5  a foreign artist,  musical  i f the judges'  printed  States  the English  copyright  3-1)  be t h a t  to published  to deal  however,  would  :  3-1)  t o 1709 b u t was e x t i n g u i s h e d  interpretation.  for  outcome,  answers  4-0) 74  - 8  prior  purported  court—  Yes  effect  Anne w i t h  by t h e M i l l a r  1.  t o be d i s p o s i t i v e ,  existed  i n d i c a t e the h y p o t h e t i c a l  never  did  Millar  at not and  existed at  i f i t had, the  t o have  extinguished  36 it. **  From t h a t  7  was deemed longer law  point  t o be e n t i r e l y  applied,  right  save  to f i r s t  to withhold  argues  convincingly wrongly  judges d e c i d e d decide not  follow  copyright  that  however,  should that  works—  never  that  had a  no  common  and t h e r e f o r e  the ambiguity  have s u r v i v e d  assumed  that  l a y with  Court  the advisory  i n Donaldson.  the advice  He  i n Wheaton  v.  opinions  t h e House o f L o r d s . of the judges,  about  Donaldson.  In f a c t ,  of the  t h e power t o The L o r d s d i d  8 1  voting  22-11  that  n e v e r e x i s t e d a t common law, b u t o r i g i n a t e d w i t h a n d  was e m b o d i e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y by t h e S t a t u t e  2.  in Millar  authors  t h e U.S. Supreme  the issues  t h e case  The h o l d i n g  7 9  establishes,  law c o p y r i g h t  0  statutory.  publication of their  common  8  i n A n g l o - C a n a d i a n law c o p y r i g h t  f o r the p o i n t  publication.  Abrams  Peters  forward  o f Anne.  L o r d Camden and L o r d M a n s f i e l d Lord  Camden  Donaldson.  l e d the charge  The l i t e r a r y  disagreement  between  appropriate  sources  heightened  by t h e i r  respectively. suitable evident  8 2  Lord  Lord  Lord  of Lords i n  debate  revealed  profound  Camden and L o r d  Mansfield  over t h e  political  i n the r e l i s h with  property  f o r t h e common  arena  with  law, a  differences  Camden's s p e e c h  f o r the p o l i t i c a l  identified  i n t h e House  Mansfield,  a s Whig  and T o r y ,  had a h o r t a t o r y  o f t h e House  which  disagreement  quality  of Lords,  most  he a t t a c k e d  the p o s i t i o n  that  could  judges  common l a w r i g h t s i n t h e ' f i t n e s s o f t h i n g s ' .  divine  To t h e c o n t r a r y ,  37 Lord  Camden a r g u e d ,  would be In  the  f r e e t o say instance  called  on  right  was  and  j u d g e s must hew  to  of  the  law  was  the  alleged  determine, without  assignable  circulating  and  anything  they  a i d of  else  judges  precedent,  i t extended  w e l l as  or  they  chose i t to  copyright,  whether  o f books, a s  to precedent  to t h e i r  would  whether  to  the  be. be the  lending  copying:  What a Code o f Law y e t r e m a i n s f o r t h e i r I n g e n u i t y t o f u r n i s h , and c o u l d t h e y a l l a g r e e on i t , i t would not be Law a t l a s t , but L e g i s l a t i o n . 8 3  Lord private  Camden  only  Beckett's  period  "Scribblers the  Milton  and  unworthy perpetual locked Age."  up 8 4  forcefully the That  the  freely  litigation.  reward  of  fourteen  for  the  years  was  too  true  creators  others such  did  men  copyright i n the  to  found  not  would  The  position  had  been s t a t e d  opinion  publish  traffic  Hands o f  their  with  result the  for  in  Tonsons which  a  gain  labour.  The  long  in dissent  the  Bacon,  " i t would  Bookseller";  the  Camden  in Millar  be a  [being]  L i n t o t s of  i n the more c i r c u m s p e c t  J u s t i c e Yates  for  " a l l Learning  Lord  not was  and  dirty  and  was  in glory.  receives detailed consideration  paper.  He  the  the w r i t i n g , c r a f t ,  reward  for  about  copyright  author's  f o r b r e a d " t h a t made up much o f  c o u r t r o o m by  V of t h i s  behind  himself  argument t h a t a p e r p e t u a l  appropriate  statutory  while  expressed  i n t e r e s t s standing  i m p r e s s e d by the  also  spoke language v.  in Parts  the so of  Taylor. III  and  38 As  a postscript  t o Donaldson,  shocked a t the i n s t a n t by  the decision  House for  a  passed  further  ,  rearrangement o f t h e i r  immediately  extending  fourteen  by a v o t e  again  1.  Interests i n C o n f l i c t ? Patterson  Historical  argued  Perspective  resulted  in a  bedeviled  and a u t h o r s  compositions  that  publisher's  interest  the  composition  through  to material  controlling  i.e.,  a  exclusive  is sale  reward  rights  defeated  identical to 8 6  Copyright  property theory  in  debate  that  has  H i s t h e s i s was  that  different interests legal  the commercial of copies,  expired  related to recognition.  e x p l o i t a t i o n of  while  the author i n  has a l e g i t i m a t e  interest in  o f t h e c o m p o s i t i o n . The f o r m e r , he  forlegislation  statutory  since.  deserve separate  the ' i n t e g r i t y '  argued, c a l l s  the l i t e r a r y  law e v e r have  The  addition  Camden,  earlier.  d i s t o r t i o n of copyright  Anglo-American  publishers  l e d by L o r d  i n h i s 1968 s t u d y  that  8 7  before the  The House o f Commons  body a few months  AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS  effected  and h i s E d i n b u r g h  o f 21 t o 11, a r e s u l t a l m o s t  C.  Lyman  affairs  otherwise  Donaldson the B i l l .  booksellers,  placed  a l lcopyrights  p e t i t i o n e d t o defeat  v o t e as a j u d i c i a l  literary  had a B i l l  years.  i t , but the L o r d s ,  Bill  their  5  o f Commons  colleagues  the  8  t h e London  regulating  "copyright", t o copy,  while  that  the p u b l i s h i n g includes  the latter  trade,  limits  should  on  most  39 appropriately  be  jurisprudence. the  London  approach that  The  by in  the  hope  courts.  wholly  i n terms of  mention  of  plaintiff.  In  to  the  could  use  t h e s i s presents theory,  and  rights  to  sympathetic  discussed  be  with  wholly  scarcely who  avarice, forced  with  the  to  their  author's  predictable  expand  was  subject  publishers, with  face  copyright  D o n a l d s o n was  associated  to  rights  perpetual  booksellers'  in  that  to  right,  an  interests;  bookseller  legislators'  at  desire  unconscionably  Patterson on  copyright,  a IV  the  V  of  used  and  to the  to mainstream  this law  question  the  insight that of  to  erodes  the  dual  general  neglect  and  i n t e r e s t s of  authors  in  part  this  case  The  8 8  personal  significant and  has  American  in copyright, of  Parts  a r r e s t i n g challenge  in information.  play  forms  an  attacks  misapprehension  in  the  the  Lords  was  a more  the  such  commercial  rights  author's of  for  by  rights in copyright.  p u b l i c domain  ensues  House o f  artists  persuasive  interests  an  permanently  impoverished  develop the  the  their  law  initiated  authors'  in Millar  overcome  corollary  interests,  copyright  court  author's  now  This  to  and  presenting  interests  order  The  commercial  of  common  possibility  authors'  i t s being  the  interests  help  as  by  litigation  the  dressed  I n d e e d , the  argued,  declare  statute.  damaged  statute)  time  property  booksellers  to the  Patterson  over  conflating publishers'  i s , the  ownership,  a  literary  booksellers  by  (granted  developed  of  the  paper.  At  discussion this  which  point,  two  40 weaknesses  of  P a t t e r s o n ' s argument  he e x a g g e r a t e d distinct  the d e g r e e  commercial  broader  the  of  assignment. of  To  suggest  c o p y r i g h t as  the i s s u e  a  an  indifference right  the a u t h o r  ( t o use  photocopying )  a  recent  Statute  termed  author. That the  legal  behind  debate  see  entail.  at f i r s t harm 9  booksellers materials  any  of  a  in  to  strategy  by  Burke  1774  of  example,  that  right  booksellers  achieved  t h e economic c l o u t  publishers.  9 2  the for  9 1  reflect  a  ownership  debate the  the  wrote  research  of  the  of  to  the of  hide  fact  Bill was  about into  Samuel  but  sought  not  came t o might by  indicate  authors  had  terms f o r s a l e  the  the  However,  booksellers  that  the  that  lost.  do  own  property  copyright  London  to set t h e i r  cynicism  Further  the  Donaldson  from  support  or  literary  Boswell  supported  authors.  rights,  the  t h e London b o o k s e l l e r s ,  after  T h i s may  in  determine.  perpetual  reprinted  groundswell  their  i t conferred a  authors  supported  Edmund  0  as  role  is difficult  the  scope  author.  actual  Johnson  to  as much o r more t o do w i t h t h e s t r u c t u r i n g  arguments  the  The  had  right  the  i s somewhat m i s g u i d e d , i f  8 9  the  The  prior  by a u t h o r s t o t h e  Second, P a t t e r s o n d i s c o u n t s t h e f a c t  Anne  have  i n c o p y r i g h t e d works,  not p a t r o n i s i n g . of  First,  respect to c o p y r i g h t .  i s i n t h e hands o f  commercial  of l i b r a r y  with  publishers  more v a l u a b l e t h e work  attention.  t o w h i c h a u t h o r s and p u b l i s h e r s  interests  rights  deserve  goals  of  involvement  a by not of  the of  41  writers  o f t h e day i n t h e d e b a t e  assess  2.  this  to properly  issue.  literary  property  Certain  well-established publishing  genesis. tried  to ignore  i n the very  last  Licensing  publishers the  be needed  E c o n o m i c I n t e r e s t s and t h e V a l u e o f S i n g l e C a s e The  out  would  premised  had a s p e c i f i c  t h e time l i m i t a t i o n s legislation  their  i n 1694.^  bluff  lobbied  a f t e r the Scottish  i n the mid-eighteenth  century,  with  When  3  a litigation  extra-statutory  o f those  t o copy s e t  rival  i n t e r e s t s responded  on a n a l l e g e d  they  commercial  i n t e r e s t s had  on t h e r i g h t  f o r which  Act expired  called  London  debate  Analysis  strategy  copyright.  In t h a t  i n t e r e s t s i n Donaldson  seemed  light,  the defeat  merely  a v i n d i c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e  Taylor  an a b e r r a n t  footnote  intent,  i n the l e g a l  and M i l l a r  history  v.  o f book  publishing. The  intellectual  however, context great behind  be  s i g n i f i c a n c e of M i l l a r  so e a s i l y  i n which  d e a l about judicial  dismissed.  private l i t i g a t i o n i t s motivation  interests  o f t h e two p a r t i e s  judicial  reasoning  particular  d e c i s i o n . The r e a s o n i n g  autonomy  derived  jurisprudence  in a  from  itself.  and economic  takes  may e x p l a i n a  specific  the forces  wholly case  process  style  In t h e i r  place  but merely  cannot  the  cannot,  The s o c i a l  and about  decision-making:  v. T a y l o r  the  for  leads  retains a  and  effort  exposing  account that  operating  the  to a  relative  traditions  to consolidate  of a  42  commercial English right  judiciary  Millar Bench  legal  and  judges  give  ongoing  debates  discussion control examine  of a r t i s t s  of the author's  over  the p r o d u c t s  the contentious  in  property  9 5  about  i n material less  than  echo  Lord  the f o u n d a t i o n  9 6  v.  We  and the  rewards i n the  Mansfield's  i n e x e r t i n g a degree  in Millar  of copyright.  arguments  remarks  of h i s a c t i v i t y . issue  King's  of copyright  Camden's  and t h i n k e r s  of the  of their  the nature  interest  which p r o v i d e d  i n t o the nature  consideration occurred  significantly  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  prerogative, insights  Lord  for instance,  development  of  i n the cogency  9 4  property  i n t h e scheme  of the response  concerning  property.  disinterestedness had,  reflected  o f t h e new  i t a place  c a t e g o r i e s . That  was  booksellers required the  the nature  v . T a y l o r . The v i t a l i t y  intellectual  has  t h e London  to consider  i n "the copy",  accepted  to  pre-eminence,  turn  Taylor  of  for Justice  now  of to  Crown Yates'  43  III.  PROPERTY AND POLITICS:  CROWN PREROGATIVE AND THE RIGHT OF COPY  A.  CROWN CONTROL OF PRINTING AND CENSORSHIP  T i l l t h e y e a r 1640, t h e Crown e x e r c i s e d a n u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y over t h e press; which was e n f o r c e d b y t h e summary p o w e r s o f search, c o n f i s c a t i o n and imprisonment, g i v e n t o t h e S t a t i o n e r s Company, a l l o v e r the realm a n d the dominions thereunto belonging, a n d by t h e t h e n supreme j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the Star-Chamber, w i t h o u t the l e a s t o b s t r u c t i o n from WestminsterH a l l , o r t h e P a r l i a m e n t , i n any i n s t a n c e . ( M i l l a r v . T a y l o r , a t 206) Mr. J u s t i c e W i l l e s ' regulation press the  first  decree  King's  remained  i n t o England  Stationer small  the  trade  until  the  approval  that,  1694. The d e c r e e  of the Privy  I n 1556 Queen  Mary  decades.  o f working  By a S t a r  o f Henry V I I I  required  Council  that  prior  conferred  a  a  governed  printers  obtain  t o p u b l i s h i n g any Charter  Company, t h e p r i n t i n g g u i l d t o w h i c h  booksellers  belonged;  on t h e  p r i n t e r s and  t h e Company became an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t  t h e l i c e n s i n g s y s t e m t h r o u g h a d e c r e e o f 1558 t h a t  Master  Chamber  introduced  i n d i f f e r e n t forms,  Stationers'  in  The p r i n t i n g  i n 1 4 8 5 . T h e number  for several  l i c e n s i n g books  i n England.  i n 1476, and H e n r y V I I named  o f 1538, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  system.of  book.  an a p t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e a r l y  o f the p r i n t i n g industry  was i n t r o d u c e d  presses  provided  and Wardens t h e a u t h o r i t y  t o search  gave i t s  f o r and c o n f i s c a t e  44 unlicensed entered  publications.  i n the r e g i s t e r  commercial  interest  suppressing The A  heretical  passed embodied renewed  the  an  attempt  new  for of  censorship,  Car. I I , c.33, which  expired  printing  began  in licensing  a few y e a r s  during place  later  apparently  in  b u t none  practice,  saying  9 9  of this  within  the t i t l e s  were  custom.  most  Printers  Blackstone  this  refused to draft  patents  they  on a n y f o r m  Company.  'pirates'  John Locke,  o f t h e Company  t h e Crown  role  i n 1694; t h e House o f  being  a t the behest  The A c t ,  p r o t e c t i n g c o p y r i g h t s , not based  o u t , took  Millar,  Parliament  Petitioning  Company's r e g i s t e r  on  14  and r e s u l t e d  o f t h e S t a t u t e o f Anne i n 1 7 0 9 .  Stationers'  and  &  system.  books.  'Copyright' pointed  A c t 13  confirming  legislation  with  t h e demise o f t h a t  the Restoration  o f i t s argument  a n d t h e Company's  adoption  later  finally  by t h e L o r d s  legislation  held  t o government's c o n c e r n s  o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e 1637 d e c r e e .  the author  be  fashion,  and e x p a n d e d t h e c e n s o r s h i p  years  several times,  Commons,  could  In t h i s  i n 1637 e x p i r e d w i t h  Licensing  most  books  and s e d i t i o u s p u b l i c a t i o n s .  Stuarts continued  i n 1640. Two  licensed  o f t h e Company.  was m a r r i e d  S t a r Chamber d e c r e e  Court  Only  9 7  argued  the fact  period,  as W i l l e s J .  the self-governance  f o r which they to  from  o f the judges Justice  9 8  and b o o k s e l l e r s e n t e r e d  subject  claimed  the guild's the records based  Willes  of the i n the  t h e copy,  sanctions.  o f t h e Company  common  alone  i t operated  i n the  law c o p y r i g h t  referred  entirely  to the  outside the  45 concern  of  t h e Crown,  Parliament  or  the  courts  of  law,  confirmed [ i ] t c o u l d be done o n l y on p r i n c i p l e s o f p r i v a t e j u s t i c e , m o r a l f i t n e s s , and p u b l i c convenience; w h i c h , when a p p l i e d t o a new subject, make common l a w w i t h o u t a precedent; much m o r e , when r e c e i v e d a n d a p p r o v e d by u s a g e , ( a t 206)  The  history  of  the e a r l y  entangling  i n t e r e s t s and s t a t e c e n s o r s h i p the  monopoly  Yates  aspects  J . and  preserve  history of  licensing presented  Lord  for censorship  i n the copy.  exist  i n common  1709  required  to deal  a p l a u s i b l e basis  court  v.  by  Beckett  grants and  of  with  from  t h e Crown,  guild  monopoly,  demonstrating  this  to  of the Statute  of  history,  t h a t found  property  the r i g h t  for a private copyright.  i n the King  i t t o be t h e  to the advocates of a  recognition of prerogative  of property  expressed  i n Donaldson  to the enacting  a d o p t e d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  judicial right  purposes  task  law p r i o r  them  right  of  CASES  patent  challenge The  the d i s t r u s t  t o 1694, s h o w i n g  royal prerogative,  a difficult  law  copyright  Camden.  of p u b l i s h i n g  right  it  o f t h e common  ANALYSIS OF THE PREROGATIVE  The  explains  s e v e r a l of the speakers  (1774), p a r t i c u l a r l y  B.  partly  of p r i v a t e  and t o f i n d In M i l l a r ,  in the  i n t h e e x e r c i s e and  rights  over  and h i s p a t e n t e e s  printing analogous  a to  46 the the  right  claimed  royal  sovereign  by t h e p l a i n t i f f .  rights  and  patents  a u t h o r i t y over  endeavour  by. a c k n o w l e d g i n g  a t t h e command  arising  from the a c t i v i t y  The P r e - R e v o l u t i o n The  Court  prerogative  ran  high"  members  or  identifies in  some  cases,  cases  none  o f them  Carter  t h e scope  prerogative  against  the Patentees  89,  124  ER  842,  seven  J . noted,  dealt  f o r the p r i n t i n g  common l a w " , f i r s t Abridgment.  the  p o s i t i o n of c h a l l e n g i n g  grant,  the  In t h i s  irony  of  guild  This  section  and  property  of the asserted  rights to  case a u t h o r i t y .  case  cited  in Millar,  f o r R o l l ' s Abridgment with  instance,  which  between  others  authors.  a  i n 1558, o v e r  the  from  "prerogative  patentees,  dispute  o f " a l l law b o o k s  granted  dated  disputes  members o f t h e S t a t i o n e r ' s Company and A t k i n s , patent  a t law  Taylor  themes o f p r e r o g a t i v e  earliest  Stationers  had  i n v o l v i n g Crown  involved  o f them  c o p y , and r e l a t e d themes f r o m c i t e d The  right  v.  cases  of these,  when", W i l l e s  the respective  the pre-1688  t o t h e copy  not as a  nine  printing;  importers,  of  of private subjects.  ( a t 209). A l l nine  i n the trade,  the r i g h t  d e a l t with  "times  parties  manifestation  Cases C i t e d i n M i l l a r  r i g h t s over  Restoration,  that  t o see i n  t r a d e , would s u b v e r t t h e  of authority,  in Millar  the  t h e mere  the p r i n t i n g  existed  1.  To do o t h e r w i s e ,  (1666)  between  the holder  that  concern  the r i g h t  The  two of a the  to publish  t h e Company members were i n  a printing  patent  d i d not escape  as a monopoly counsel  for  47 Atkins. by  The House o f L o r d s  1 0 0  the Lord  Chancellor  does  not i n d i c a t e  basis  of a strong  had  confirmed  i n favour  the reasons,  an i n j u n c t i o n  of Atkins; while the patentee  p r e r o g a t i v e . The K i n g ,  a p r e r o g a t i v e over  the p r i n t i n g  granted  the report  argued  counsel  on t h e  maintained,  trade  ...necessary as t o r e l i g i o n , c o n s e r v a t i o n of t h e p u b l i q u e p e a c e , and n e c e s s a r y t o p r e s e r v e good u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n K i n g and p e o p l e , ( a t 843)  The  prerogative  printing  press  "communicating the  patent  counsel (at were  which  replied  t h e King's first  his  particular  similar  Stationers  (1670) v.  the a s s i g n e e King's  decided  upholding  Bench  (1685)  of Justice against  means o f  only  f o rthe prerogative trade  derived  the c o n t i n e n t  1 0 1  from , and  due t o  his  and f o r m e r l y t h e r e p o r t e r s . the case Atkins'  on t h e l a t t e r ,  patent  time  233,  Crook's executors  i s unclear. A  later  as d e s c r i b e d  Skinner  the holder  as a t r a d e ,  not a p r e r o g a t i v e "  o f England  them a s h o r t  (available  Parker  from  o f t h e laws  of the judges,  for  hath  of the printing  i tt o England  t h e Lords  recent  printing  as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  i s s u e came b e f o r e  Streater  over  cited  ownership  pre-dating the  ( a t 843). To t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t  a monopoly  ownership  grounds  t h e most  where t h e K i n g  bringing  Whether  only  "True,  the s a l a r i e s  narrower  wass  represented  his  o u t o f memory,  our thoughts"  844). Also  paying  was t i m e  i n Roper v .  i n Company  90 ER 1 0 7 . ) , obtained  of a royal  of  where  judgment i n  patent  for  law  48 books  for  overturned  the  i n the context  the a u t h o r ' s statement  of  with  influential  law  the  books  challenged  Roper  printing. 1  3  of  before  favour  of  little  doubt  the assignee  a strong  cases  almanacs.  In  followed the  King's  the  The  two  was  in printing  of  (1677)  defendant of  reports of  f o r the d e c i s i o n i n  t h e Company.)  Bench  most  f o r the p r i n t i n g  on t h e r e a s o n s (i.e.,  of  1 0 2  3 Keb 792, 84 ER 1015,  the p a t e n t e e s  Lords  patentee.  Company o f S t a t i o n e r s v . Seymour  importantly  prerogative  of a  three  t h e Book o f Common P r a y e r .  that  The  represented  t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a Crown p a t e n t  differ  subject  i n favour  decided ** ,  publishing  of these,  Reports.  o f a c o n t e s t between  257, 86 ER 865 a n d  Seymour  ruling  e s t a t e and a p a t e n t e e ,  fate  dealing  almanacs  Crook's  f o r a p r e r o g a t i v e over  The  broad  of  t h e judgment, a g a i n  Occurring  1 Mod  printing  prepared  Keble  leaves  t o acknowledge  a l l books,  regardless  a of  matter: T h a t a l b e i t p r i n t i n g i n E n g l a n d be b u t o f l a t e , y e t p u b l i c a t i o n o f books was b e f o r e , and b o t h b e f o r e and s i n c e t h a t h a t h been under t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e Government.... i t i s i m p l i e d l y g r a n t e d [by t h e L i c e n s i n g A c t 1662] t h a t t h e p r i n t i n g o f a l l books i s r e s t r a i n a b l e , o r g r a n t a b l e by t h e K i n g s p a t e n t , ( a t 1015)  The M o d e r n argument over  report  ambiguous.  f o r the p a t e n t e e s ,  whether  "property  i s more  a  Crown  patent  i n the copy,  It provides  i n w h i c h he could  paramount  referred  stand to the  against King's  Pemberton's to a debate a  claim  grant"  of (at  49 865).  The  Court  came  under  "a  governance,  and  Further,  the  prerogative, where  a  "then, the  is  public for  has  the  rule  copy"  (at  866).  ("the  -866), fact  to the  no  of  that  Court the  first  a  law,  Expressly resort  also  the  of  law  and  always  prerogative.  basis  with  has  the  for  an  the  had  the  care  realty:  property  j u s t i c e being on  the  almanac,  House o f  i t s decision  had  to  Church  vis-a-vis  as  King  following  based  Government  author,  almanacs  under  'residual'  Crown's p o s i t i o n  our  that  and  were s u b j e c t  particular  ultimate  the  finding  reason  accepted  similar  work  as  constitution",  that  Court  by  Roper  reported  of  Lords to  in in  them"-  historical the  printing  trade. In 258,  The  89  Company  ER  927,  related  case  Lee  2  at  and  K.B.  granted  psalm-books  the  and  Crown  Stationers 2  Company o f  Show  originally  of  Chan.  the  James  imported  prerogative  be  consequence  their  own  to  interest  66, v.  (1681) 2 22  enjoin  the  the in  on  sale  and  the  a  of  in  patent almanacs both  licensing  i t otherwise  protection  to  argued  and  Government" the  K.B.  referred  Plaintiffs  were  Show  849,  relied  restraining and  ER  Wright,  Holland.  a l l sorts;  commercial  Lee  Company to  "in  of  dangerous  I  from  prognostications of  Cas.  Stationers  258,  by  v.  (at of  industry: . . . i t w o u l d be o f d a n g e r o u s c o n s e q u e n c e , t h a t t h e H o l l a n d e r s and o t h e r foreigners should print our primers, psalters, a l m a n a c k s , and s i n g i n g psalms, f o r they  i t would 928),  and  domestic  50 may and a c t u a l l y do abuse them, f o r b e i n g a t no c h a r g e f o r c o r r e c t i n g , and p r i n t i n g i n a worse c h a r a c t e r and p a p e r , t h e y w i l l u n d e r s e l l t h e E n g l i s h , and d e s t r o y o u r m a n u f a c t u r e , ( a t 927) Company King's  Bench  competing under  of  omnimodos  patent  from  Charter  under  1 0 5  perplexing  libros  University (1677)  the  grants  their  printed  S t a t i o n e r s v.  the  from  (1685)  i s s u e of  parties  Crown.  James  Psalmorum", a  patent  counsel  to Oxford  for  the  allowed  I f o r the took  not  The  1 0 4  by  before  claiming  under  stationers,  claiming  printing  "omnes &  Charles  of  Parker,  who  I  to  Oxford  prohibited." Relying  on  Seymour  s t a t i o n e r s argued  the  brought  action against  granted  f o r " a l l books  ,  Parker  that  the  later  university  . . . t o p r i n t b o o k s f o r t h e i r use t h e r e , and n o t t o come t o L o n d o n f o r t h e m ; . . . f o r i n making t h e s e c h a r t e r s the K i n g d i d not i n t e n d t h e u n i v e r s i t y t o be b o o k s e l l e r s , but gave them t h e power t o p r i n t f o r t h e i r own c o n v e n i e n c e . ( P a r k e r , a t 108) In  other  words,  university  up  granted  the  that and  to  government  power  personal  could  not  commercial  Company  have  the  conformed  between a  the  a l w a y s was  King" the  (at  with  the  King,  could  under  107).  King's  prerogative  of  not  intended  competitor.  i s a t h i n g o f p u b l i c k use  of  and to  a  King  ought and  distinguished of  as  "printing religion  the  the  Holt  interest;  set  'sole  matters  the  right'  long-standing  [and]  granting  bind  The  to  view  of  law  immediate c a r e  and  for  the  under  a  the  subsequent  defendant prerogative  former, monarchs.  more The  51 Court  said  Seymour  would  evident case  i t "enclined  is significant  The  of  the  after  approach  to  Partridge  right  (1685),  the  Crown's  almanacs the  the  of  Court's  narrowing  discussed  the  of  the  state.  Company  of  t o the  ( 1 6 6 6 ) and  Seymour  different  Stationers  final the  in  The  rejecting t o argue  of  the  issue  as  an  Court,  as  in  ruling, Crown  v.  reprise  Company  put  subject's liberty.  implicitly  Millar  represented a  again  a  in  distinctly  647  was  i n almanacs,  but  had  a  the  for a  put  the  "special  stationers' patent  over  t r a d e as a whole. v. U n i v e r s i t y  the  a  d i s p u t e between  'not  printing  statutes  the the  of Cambridge  University  University's of  a  grant  whether  and  at  ER  on  a l l books  arrived  88  f o r argument  involved  statutes,  105,  make  Baskett  for  implied  show  to  Roll' s  1222,  both  refused  the p r i n t i n g  ER  from  because  t o t h e c a t e g o r y o f works o f  and  print  restraint  over  of  an  p r e r o g a t i v e cases  Mod  (1677); to  interest" use  Aside  prerogative issue.  (1711) 10  unlawful  case  nine 1688,  the  Seymour  Parker  f o r showing  over p r i n t i n g  occurred  sole  argument.  but  P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n Cases  Two  of  more  defendant"  d i s c o m f o r t w i t h t h e Company's near-monopoly c l a i m ,  prerogative  2.  hear  f o r the  otherwise and  realm. issue  under  of  selling The the  a  (1758) 2 Keny 395,  the  King's  patent,  printer  like  prohibited' , i n London an  circuitous nature  of  for  Oxford's, over  edition  arguments  96  of  of  the the  counsel  prerogative in  this  52 fashion: to  i f t h e Crown, by v i r t u e o f p r e r o g a t i v e , had t h e r i g h t  grant  letters  this, 'general' grant  patent  grant  for statutes  f o r a n y and a l l p r i n t e d b o o k s ,  t o Cambridge to Baskett;  p r e r o g a t i v e extended o n l y the  s t a t u t e s , then  Solicitor-General  patent,  attacked  over  fall  i f , on  t o the s p e c i f i c  the contrary,  t o c e r t a i n works o f s t a t e ,  the patent  latter.  must  Yorke,  the i d e a  that  t o Cambridge arguing there  then  the  including  must  cover  the  f o r the U n i v e r s i t y ' s  was  ever  a prerogative  printing:  The p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t o f in monopolizing the a r t it claims a copyright S t a t e , as Acts of proclamations, Orders of having the e x e c u t i v e p a r t  t h e Crown i s n o t o f p r i n t i n g ; but of a l l Acts of P a r l i a m e n t , C o u n c i l , e t c . as o f Government.  B e s i d e s w h i c h g e n e r a l g r o u n d , t h e Crown has a r i g h t t o some c o p i e s from e x p e n s e . T h u s G r a f t o n ' s g r e a t B i b l e was t h e f i r s t t h a t was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , a n d was done a t t h e K i n g ' s e x p e n s e . So o f t h e Year B o o k s , w h i c h were c o m p i l e d a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e Crown, a s a p p e a r s by t h e p r e f a c e t o Plowden's Com. I n t h e s e t h e Crown c l a i m s a c o p y r i g h t , t h e same a s a u t h o r s h a v e t o t h e i r works, ( a t 1226)  Yorke  thereby  printing  s e t out an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  that  was  Taylor  eleven  upheld  both  Cambridge doing  years  later.  the patent  "within  s o , he  t o be a d o p t e d  said:  1  0  6  o f t h e Crown's  by t h e m a j o r i t y Lord  Mansfield  of the King's  the u n i v e r s i t y "  role i n  in Millar  v.  f o r the Court  printer  as c o n c u r r e n t  and  that  of  grants.  In  53 What power t h e Crown had assumed, i n f a c t , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e g r a n t by H. 8 t o t h e university, i s v e r y m a t e r i a l as t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h o s e p a t e n t s ; whether t o operate as t o the g e n e r a l right of printing, or only with r e s p e c t to the K i n g ' s c o p y r i g h t s , because we must presume t h e C r o w n i n t e n d e d t o g r a n t what t h e y h a d , o r , i n f a c t , assumed a r i g h t o v e r ( a t 1230) .  3.  The  Subsidiary Prerogative  Cases:  Property  in  Patent  Grants The  reported  cases  referred  t o by  counsel  the n i n e p r e r o g a t i v e c a s e s , and t h o s e w h i c h t h e y as  precedent,  the  Crown:  dealt  their  almost  construction,  validity  in light  remedies  i n instances  The  concept  Several or  church  526,  78  cases  774,  wholly  King's  appointed  bishop,  argued  patent  inconsistent  independent absent  from  to  as  i n part:  1 0 8  and  grants.  1 1 0  o f p r e r o g a t i v e and these  cases.  Holders disputes over  Bench  name  from  in prerogative,  In Wentworth v. W r i g h t  right  General  right  concerned  prerogative a  basis  1 0 7  of successive  For O f f i c e  office. ER  letters  cited  1 0  of property  Patents  with  i n turn  of c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e , ^  Crown g r a n t was a l m o s t  (a)  entirely  and c o u r t s i n  decided  patents  for public  (1596) C r o . t h e Queen  the  replacement  against  the patron.  had  for a The  Eliz. the  priest  Attorney-  54 And a l t h o u g h it is said that this p r e r o g a t i v e c a n n o t be p r o v e d by r e a s o n , t h i s i s not m a t e r i a l ; n o r ought t h e r e any r e a s o n t o be g i v e n o r e n q u i r e d about the Queen's p r e r o g a t i v e ; f o r i n regard she i s the head o f t h e weal p u b l i c k , and d e f e n d s her s u b j e c t s and t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n s , the law a t t r i b u t e s u n t o h e r many p r e r o g a t i v e s , f o r w h i c h no r e a s o n c a n be y i e l d e d , (at 775) . The c a s e o f ER  involved successive  773  the  L o r d Brook v. Lord G o r i n g  council  Holt  et  brought royal  "of  al i n the  Chief  for  the  the  claims  of  claim.  office,  to  What public realty. the  the  the  is  of  office  grants  Opposing  office-holders (Wentworth, prerogative  Chief  1  1 ER  over  and  to  the  the  sufficient  to  of  post  by  the  prove  the  defendant's  a  Court  basis  rejected  was  these  repeatedly  claimed to  i n the  cases  terms  challenged  the  of  is  the Crown  counsel,  treated be s e i s e d  that like of  Crown's  right  Bridgman), itself.  but  did  not  directly  title  to  tenure  in  the  gifting estates  by showing l o n g - s t a n d i n g custom t o  power  was  under  historical  Court  of  a l v.  action  76,  named t o  the  to  clerk  by c l a i m a n t s  Clerk  usurper  ,  as  about  holders  made  1  of  79  Justice.  interest  parties  Ill,  according  by p a t e n t  were  1  patent  Chief  The p a t e n t  of  office  In B r i d g m a n e t  Disseisin  an a l l e g e d  presentation  "belonged"  Novel  the  Wales".  Argument e n s u e d  respective  The  for  P.C.  office  against  Justice.  of  Shower  A s s i z e of to  Bench,  the  marches  (1693)  patent  King's  the  patents  (1630) C r o . Car 197,  office; in  land.  to  appoint  the  contrary  question  the  55  (b)  Doctrines  Cases c i t e d the  strongest  Counsel Le  o f Patent  Construction  f o r p r i n c i p l e s of patent  i n f l u e n c e of concepts  i n Parker  drawn  (1685) and B a s k e t t  i n arguing  Crown the  can grant  grant  that  by w o r d i n g  less  than  to the C i t y  r i g h t s t o the s u b s o i l  more  of the prerogative  likened  the grant  i n a patent  o f London 1  1  2  t o Cambridge  i n The Duke o f Chandos' Case  336.  The s c i r e 76 ER  deceived  prerogative  reported  late Co. 542,  decisions  1 1 3  .  None  Elizabethan  did  not  p a s s e d no  stated.  Yorke  interest  intended  by t h e  (1606) 6 Co. Rep 55, 77 ER  with  remedies  where  cases  made  of estates  passing  involving printing cases  i n property,  period.  the King  had been  i n land.  Rights  with  S i r Henrie  Rep. 1 0 5 b , 77 E r 218 c i t e d concerned  as  and Re A l t o n Woods (1594) 1 Co Rep  of the c i t e d  of r i g h t s  Thames  just  cases  Nature o f Property  The  origins  l e s s e r than  ( i . e . mistaken) i n h i s grants  (c)  Taylor  t o p a s s a s an e s t a t e  64 d e a l t  55, 80 ER  to the reversionary  King  26b,  referred to  patent  i t expressly  was s a i d  facias  property.  or c h a r t e r the  of the River  that  reflect  b u t n o t more;  , so a p r i n t i n g  than  real  (1611) D a v i s  i t intended,  pass  from  (1758) b o t h  C a s e D e l R o y a l l P i s c a r i e de l a Banne  540  construction  r i g h t s i n flotsam,  references  not c i t e d  discussed  i n Millar  the nature  two e x c e p t i o n s Constable's  i n Royall jetsam  t o two  Case  Piscarie  v. and  from the (1600) 5 (1611) a t  and w r e c k s w a s h i n g up  56 on  land.  describes  The r e p o r t ,  with  how  can acquire  prescription  subjects  or grant,  Coke's  observations property  which otherwise  appended,  i n t h e g o o d s by  belong  to the King  by  prerogative:  the common law gave a s w e l l wreck, j e t s a m , flotsam, and lagan upon t h e s e a , as estray... and the l i k e to the King, b e c a u s e by r u l e o f t h e common l a w , when no man c a n c l a i m p r o p e r t y i n any g o o d s , t h e K i n g s h a l l h a v e them by h i s p r e r o g a t i v e , ( a t 223)  'Estrays' Swans  sort  are dealt  with  i n The C a s e o f  (1591) 7 Co. Rep. 15b, 77 ER 435, a l s o  Piscarie wild  of a d i f f e r e n t  a t 542. W h i l e  swans  subject  found  could  the King  within  also  land  acquire  cited  has a p r e r o g a t i v e  o r water  property  held  i n Royall  property i n  by t h e Crown, t h e  i n swans and o t h e r  ferae  n a t u r a e by l a b o u r : P r o p e r t y q u a l i f i e d and p o s s e s s o r y a man may have i n t h o s e w h i c h a r e f e r a e n a t u r a e ; and t o s u c h p r o p e r t y a man may a t t a i n by two w a y s , ... by i n d u s t r y a s by t a k i n g them, o r by making them mansueta , (438) Property might  i n swans  s t r a y . Wild  could swans  never  on o n e ' s  domesticated  swans  Justice  Aston  was t o compare  naturae  in  Millar,  be a b s o l u t e  could  a point  land  be w i l l e d copyright discussed  so l o n g  passed  with  as p e r s o n a l with i n Part  property V.  1 1 4  as  they  the land; property. i n ferae  57 The Scope a n d N a t u r e o f Crown C o p y r i g h t  4.  The  prerogative  cases  e s t a b l i s h e d an e x c l u s i v e  right i n  t h e Crown t o c o n t r o l t h e p r i n t i n g  o f c e r t a i n works, whether by  prerogative  printing  originating the  over  i n expenditure,  executive  this  government.  'copyright'?  deserve a b r i e f First, of  complete  opposed  the entire  or i n t h e King's What  The c a s e s  the cases works  deal  only  with  right  a s head o f  and e x t e n t  hints,  the p r i n t i n g  ( B i b l e s , law r e p o r t s ,  to portions  or abridgments  no c o n s i d e r a t i o n  taking  that  would  but  of  these  t o such  There, the defendant  exception  almanacs  issues  constitute a trespass  The o n l y  or  copying  etc.),  as  o f w o r k s . As a r e s u l t , t h e  nor o f t h e t a k i n g o f the i d e a  expression.  the nature  provide  only  gave  its  was  role  a  exploration.  courts  right,  trade,  as the degree o f  on t h e C r o w n - d e r i v e d  f o r a work, a s o p p o s e d t o  i s found  had p r i n t e d an almanac  i n Seymour  (1677).  that  had a l l the e s s e n t i a l parts of the almanack t h a t i s p r i n t e d b e f o r e "The Book o f Common P r a y e r ; " b u t t h a t i t h a s some other a d d i t i o n s , such as a r e u s u a l i n common a l m a n a c k s , e t c . ( a t 865) The  Court  but  no c e r t a i n a u t h o r .  by  held  supplying  t h e almanac  t o be a work w i t h  An i n d i v i d u a l  a d d i t i o n s consistent with  could  a certain  not a c q u i r e  the form:  Those a d d i t i o n s o f p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s and o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t a r e common i n a l m a n a c k s , do n o t a l t e r t h e c a s e ; no more t h a n i f a man s h o u l d c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n another  form, rights  58 man's copy, by reason of some i n c o n s i d e r a b l e a d d i t i o n s o f h i s own. (at 866)  Most  of  said  the  to  works a t  be  of  Abridgment  reporters  the  law  employer  In  the  patent  that  the  printers inroads  for  complaints  of  that  intimation  "competitive' the  The having  public  over  the  (1670),  rights  the  King  could  In  Rol1's  where  judges  "authors"  patentees  paid  the  be  to  argued  salaries,  of  the  the  scope o f  for  The  booksellers  In P a r k e r Oxford  distinction  dealing  granted  reports  suggest  arose  because  started  right  to  purposes. between  work t h a t and  rights  (1685), the  the  competitive  a protected  fair  issue.  the  u n i v e r s i t i e s had  gave  the  the  fair  to  the make  stationers print  This  books was  'intrinsic'  underlies  use  much  exceptions  an and of to  1 1 5  the In of  as  successful  patentees c o n s i s t e n t l y demonstrated  grounds. control  not  uses of  debate  copyright.  by  patent  use,  uncertain.  Streater  important  London m a r k e t .  the  or  cases  him.  an  i t s own  early  for  since  constituted  appointed  prerogative  alienable  u n i v e r s i t y cases,  i n the  argued  v.  had  counsel  to  the  unknown  copyright:  accrued  in  Roper  arguably  reports,  copyright  by  authors  (1666) and  and  an  issue  prerogative  put  on  addition  the  argument  the  to  Crown r e p r e s e n t e d  convenience  1 1 6  ,  patentees  the  a  their  broadest, that  threat  alleged  a to that  interest in  most  political  press peace, the  beyond  the  order  and  possibility  59 of  distortions  prerogative in  Baskett  if  the  (1758) the  printing  the  on  behalf  to  of of  1 1 8  (1758) was  the  famous  Monopolies  (1603) Moor  case of  11  the  h i s t o r y of p a t e n t s more  from  the  issue  of  an  barely  authors  judges  77  in  referred  ER  to  occur  for  the  right'  cornerstone  Crown c o p y r i g h t  to  the  INVENTIONS  Darcy  1260.  i s that Mr.  j u s t as  for  he  property  i t . The  protection of  Yorke  'moral a  a  editions  Concern  remained  accorded  ER  v.  As  the  Noy  Justice  Yates  but  and  legal  more r e v e a l i n g a s p e c t s o f  Case ER  of  1131;  decision  in  surprising; no  did  r e l a t i o n s h i p between inventors  74  i s not  received  Baskett  The  173,  r a i s e d Darcy  case  and  formative  this  Darcy  had  (1709)  A l l e n , or  830;  for inventions,  literary to  .  m i s t a k e s would  Partridge  72  Millar.  inventions,  i s one  671,  surprising  earlier  legal  84b,  (1685),  and  perhaps  Rep.  1 1 7  University  state's  p u b l i c , has  PATENTS FOR  Parker  Co.  the  1230).  the  treatment  books  produce b e t t e r  that  (at  justified  .  in  of  allowing  state,  statutory  day  a l l  the  DARCY V. ALLEN AND  Cited  in  that  books  importing  p r i n t e r would  open  works  unique  present  C.  argued  King's  was  of  exercised  the  English  s t a t u t e s , w h i l e acknowledging  integrity  of  into  power o v e r p r i n t i n g and  compete w i t h of  creeping  attention raise  when the the  the  counsel majority  evolution  protection Millar.  for  60  Dar c y  stands  generally  f o r the proposition  m o n o p o l i e s a r e b a d a t common law 120 ^ counsel  i n the three  (1709),  the defendant  monopoly, c i t i n g his  attack  trade  cases  stationers  e  u  s  e  m a <  5  e  Q  f p a r c y by  the s t a t i o n e r s ' patent  (at 647), a point  on t h e i d e a  (Baskett  h  named v a r i e d somewhat. I n P a r t r i d g e  challenged  Darcy  r n  that  repeated  of a p r e r o g a t i v e  (1758),at  1255);  r e f e r r e d t o Darcy  t o companies h a d been exempted  over  out that  from the  by Y o r k e i n the p r i n t i n g  i n Parker  to point  as a  (1685) patent  the  grants  Statute of Monopolies  (1624) 1. 1 2  Darcy by  Elizabeth  playing of  v. A l l e n  f o r the sole  monopolies  litigation.  l e d her t o d e c l a r e  over  The c a s e fashion  and i m p o r t i n g  i n 1601 t h a t  of the other  of  Crown  patents  l e d t o the Darcy  d i d not i n v o l v e a patent each  granted  t h e Queen's g r a n t i n g  i n t h e common law c o u r t s , w h i c h  i n some  patent:I  to a patent  manufacture  c a r d s . A growing c o n t r o v e r s y  were t r i a b l e  but  I  involved a challenge  four  f o r invention, categories of  2 2  (1)  f o r inventions;  (2)  dispensing patents, relaxing a s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n i n favour o f the patentee;  (3)  t h o s e b e s t o w i n g on t h e p a t e n t e e power t o s u p e r v i s e a t r a d e ;  (4)  a p a t e n t h a n d i n g o v e r an e s t a b l i s h e d trade to patentee(s) for personal gain.  the  61 Darcy's  s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the i n v e n t o r ' s  approval while the  o f the p r a c t i c e  ruling  illegal  as an e x e r c i s e  a l l others  patent  rested  o f Crown  as t e n d i n g  ini t s  prerogative  t o monopoly  against  public interest:  . . . t h a t w h e r e any man by h i s own c h a r g e and industry, o r b y h i s own w i t or i n v e n t i o n d o t h b r i n g a n y new t r a d e i n t o t h e r e a l m , o r any e n g i n e t e n d i n g to the f u r t h e r a n c e o f a t r a d e t h a t was n e v e r u s e d before: and t h a t f o r t h e good o f t h e r e a l m : t h a t i n such c a s e s the King may grant t o h i m a m o n o p o l y p a t e n t f o r some r e a s o n a b l e time, u n t i l the subjects may l e a r n t h e same, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e g o o d t h a t he d o t h b r i n g by h i s i n v e n t i o n t o t h e commonwealth: o t h e r w i s e n o t . (Noy, 1139) ( e m p h a s i s added) 1  This of  3  c a r r i e d over  to s e c t i o n s  Monopolies which permitted  for of  approval  2  patents  "heretofore  any manner  first and  and  The for  Statute  first  practice  t h e word  from  and E.W.  at  years  makinge  Realme,  t o the  manufactures",  a  right  to  as  the  early  1300's  patents  valid  Hulme has shown  that 1  2  4  .  an the The  d i d not a c q u i r e  the  p o l i c y o f g o v e r n m e n t , however,  of Elizabeth's  "invention"  this  declared  patents for invention  years  21  workinge or  of such  d i d not c r e a t e  of a systematic  Statute  thereafter.  o f t h e Crown.  of granting  the e a r l y  issuing  date  within  inventors  recognized  patents  characteristics  out,  but  practice  such  or  therefore  invention,  existing  until  inventor  f o r those  o f no more t h a n  made o f t h e s o l e  o f newe m a n u f a c t u r e  true  14 y e a r s  a term  V and VI o f t h e  the  reign.  time  of  As the  Hulme  points  Statute  and  62  before  d i d n o t mean  'original  modern  sense;  English  trade  end  the seventeenth  of  importing had  i t meant  and  skills  Parliaments  practice its  The Darcy  existed  since  between  o f whether  Despite  Fuller  i n argument  parties at  patent If reports  monarchs  had viewed  this  the country  from  revolved power  and P a r l i a m e n t around  to grant  the prerogative  in  alleged  expended  abuses  by t h e  monopoly p a t e n t s , was  declaration  Darcy  reflected in  subject  and  t o common  i n h e r 1601 considerable  speech,  effort  to  t h e C o u r t o f K i n g ' s Bench had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o  of this  ( t o Darcy,  any p o i n t  century  that  foreigners  English  means o f r e s c u i n g  and i n v a l i d a t e t h e e x p r e s s  the. p u r p o s e s  them.  persons  Europe  including  to  t o the  to  continental  with  new  through  granted  i n England,  Crown  t h e Queen's  demonstrate t h a t review  patents  from  i n the  of something  were  the fourteenth  and t h e S t a t u t e  law.  . Most  or c r e a t i o n '  backwardness.  quarrel  issue  5  and t e c h n i q u e s  Crown o f i t s p r e r o g a t i v e the  2  century  a s an a p p r o p r i a t e  industrial  1  or manufacture  not p r e v i o u s l y  bringing  the bringing  and i n d u s t r y  a trade  discovery  paper,  terms  of a patent  i t i s worth  noting  1  a  natural  right  6  . For  that  and t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate)  invoke  2  the  did  i n the inventor  not  to a  grant. a natural do  Englishman  right  was a t s t a k e  n o t use t h a t to exercise  term—  in Darcy—  i t was  his skills  although the  the r i g h t  and t o o l s  i n an  of  every  acquired  63 trade.  Fuller  argued  that  t h e impugned monopoly v i o l a t e d  this  fundamental r i g h t :  Where b e f o r e i f any p e r s o n by h i s i n d u s t r y had o b t a i n e d e x c e l l e n t s k i l l i n h i s t r a d e , he m i g h t have r e a p e d t h e f r u i t s thereof, and t h a t hath been thought t h e s u r e s t thing a man c o u l d obtain, s k i l l and k n o w l e d g e , because t h e e v e s [ s i c ] c o u l d n o t steal i t . But a r t s a n d s k i l l o f m a n u a l o c c u p a t i o n s r i s e n o t from t h e K i n g , but from t h e labour a n d i n d u s t r y o f men, a n d by t h e g i f t s o f God t o them, t e n d i n g t o t h e good o f t h e commonwealth, and o f t h e K i n g , t h e head t h e r e o f . . . ( a t 1137, 1138) As  illustration  of  a man's t r a d e  report  makes  objection honest one's  and  tradesmen.  right  the  was  of Parliament right  that  rule,  the patent  power t o  i n t e r e s t . The t a r g e t  i n Darcy  trade  patents  per s e , but the  prerogative.  of Monopolies  monopolies. had  for invention  existed  stated  legitimate  by r o y a l  i n the face  . Coke's  t o employment o f  the ' r i g h t '  the s t a t e ' s  craftsmen  the patent  monopoly  argued  of  7  exercise  nor the S t a t u t e t o grant  2  to  not monopoly  monopolies  1  the tools  principal  l a y i n the threat  i n the p u b l i c  of such  monopolies;  the Court's  Nevertheless,  1 2 8  i n argument  The  that  d i d not supersede  monopolies  granting  t o t h e r u l e a t law t h a t  n o t be d i s t r a i n e d f o r debt  i t clear  the Statute  Fuller  could  t o Darcy's patent  craft  create  he p o i n t e d  been  Neither  denied the  1 2 9  raised  against  was made an e x c e p t i o n  of. that a t common  right.  1  3  0  law as a  to  No one property  64 right  of  the  ingenuity. variety  England.  due  the  to  of  bringing  Second,  being  Darcy  good o f  of  the  quite  instrument  the  recognition  including patents  the  for  encompassed  commercial to  d e l i b e r a t e l y brought  the  of of  the  a  continent  mercantile the  basis  for  reward  purely  from  an  commonweal, as  the  invention  manufacture  Crown had as  i n n a t u r e as  including  a  effected the  monopolies,  the  him  concept  activities,  into  Third, the  First,  of  function  patent  inventor,  policy.  public interest,  f o r the  legitimacy  of  invention:  A desire for i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , not an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethic, had j u s t i f i e d c o p y r i g h t p a t e n t s i n the first place, a nd this remained Coke's criterion. 3 1  The  accepted  statutory public over  contract  whereby the  the  right  v.  an  the  example  example  of  control revealed  1  the  from  history  reproduce right  indisputably  arising  prerogative.  We  turn  a  been o f  time-limited  invention  and  intellectual  a  t i m e has  in  a  and  monopoly  exchange  for  2  (1601)  and  that  i n t e r e s t between i n v e n t o r  receives  of 3  since  public  former  Allen  product to  patent  i n the  i t s design.  Darcy provided  the  exploitation  disclosing  in  view of  as now  the of  the  a  to  surrounding  evolution  labour—  of  i . e . , an  a  by  policy  examine  the  common  mandated the  use  law,  under  made  i t  right  exclusive  'newe m a n u f a c t u r e ' .  permitted public  debate  of  That but Crown this  65 example, Court  a n d o f t h e Crown  i n Millar  prerogative printing  MILLAR v . TAYLOR AND THE C I T I Z E N KING  1.  The I s s u e o f I n v e n t i o n s  in  Justice  h i s dissenting  earlier  by t h e  v. T a y l o r .  D.  Mr.  cases,  Yates  raised  the issue o f inventors'  o p i n i o n . He had done  c o p y r i g h t case  so as c o u n s e l  Tonson v. C o l l i n s  (1762):  P a t e n t s f o r new i n v e n t i o n s a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . They a r e a l l o w e d as temporary p r i v i l e g e s , but the v e r y g r a n t s a r e a p r o o f , t h a t , independant o f them, the grantees could have h a d no monopoly ....Sinee t h e n no p e r m a n e n t p r i v i l e g e i s a l l o w e d t o t h e i n v e n t o r o f an a r t , o r a m e c h a n i c a l e n g i n e , what p r e t e n c e have l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n s t o a g r e a t e r right ? Both a r e the p r o d u c t i o n s of g e n i u s , b o t h r e q u i r e l a b o u r and s t u d y , and both, by p u b l i c a t i o n , become e q u a l l y common t o t h e w o r l d , ( a t 187)  Two  related  analogy judges of and  reasons  between p a t e n t s i n Millar,  a published patents  second, could  l e d Yates  J . to develop  and c o p y r i g h t : f i r s t ,  viewed  literary  an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t composition  had always  he b e l i e v e d t h a t  been  a n d draw he, a l o n e  of the  t o produce  copies  as a f o r m  understood  of monopoly - , 1  t o be  conceptually patents  recognized  justifications. a  right  i n both  He  agreed  inventors  that  JJ  monopolies;  and c o p y r i g h t  n o t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r  theoretical  on a n  genesis or  t h e common  and authors  law  not t o  66 publish  their  work.  the  inventor  protected that  he  required  a  The  common  once  he  patent,  law  had  announced  contractual  never, his  in  however,  discovery;  nature  and  for  time-  limited: B o t h o r i g i n a l i n v e n t i o n s s t a n d upon t h e same f o o t i n g , i n p o i n t o f property; whether the c a s e be m e c h a n i c a l , or l i t e r a r y ; . . . B u t when t h e i n v e n t i o n i s o n c e made known t o the w o r l d , i t i s l a i d open; i t i s become a g i f t t o t h e p u b l i c : e v e r y p u r c h a s e r has. a r i g h t t o make what use o f i t he p l e a s e s . On what g r o u n d t h e n c a n t h e a u t h o r c l a i m t h i s r i g h t ? How comes h i s r i g h t t o be s u p e r i o r t o that of the i n g e n i o u s i n v e n t o r o f a new and u s e f u l m e c h a n i c a l instrument? E s p e c i a l l y , when we c o n s i d e r t h i s island a s t h e s e a t o f c o m m e r c e , a n d n o t much a d d i c t e d to l i t e r a t u r e i n ancient days; and t h e r e f o r e can h a r d l y s u p p o s e t h a t our laws g i v e g i v e a h i g h e r r i g h t or more permanent property to the author of a b o o k , t h a n t o t h e i n v e n t o r o f a new and u s e f u l machine. ( M i l l a r , a t 246)  The  fact  that  Monopolies new  in  the  Statute  to  provision  forbidding  copyright  owner,  perpetual  had  from t h a t  14  did  never  and  old and  tracked  not  escape  dared their  come  its  his to  of  not  to  book  21  prices  attention  the  Statute  courts  have  1  3  .  4  to  the  of  by  a the  Patent claim  Statute  expected  of  years,  incorporation  inventions outside should  the  copyrights  'engrossing'  publishers  recourse.  of  years,  the  ownership of  Monopolies,  Anne had  i t s limitation  copyrights  holders  of  a of  results  67 The this  only  majority  argument  difference  judge  i n Millar  was J u s t i c e A s t o n .  existed  between  r e n d e r e d any a n a l o g y  t o respond  He m a i n t a i n e d  inventions  d i r e c t l y to  a  fundamental  and l i t e r a r y  works  that  unhelpful:  And t h e d i f f e r e n c e c o n s i s t s i n t h i s , t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e maker o f a m e c h a n i c a l engine i s confined to that i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g w h i c h he h a s made; t h a t t h e machine made i n i m i t a t i o n o r r e s e m b l a n c e o f i t , i s a d i f f e r e n t work i n s u b s t a n c e , m a t e r i a l s , l a b o u r and e x p e n c e , i n which t h e maker o f the o r i g i n a l machine can n o t c l a i m any property; f o r i t i s not h i s , but o n l y a r e s e m b l a n c e o f h i s : whereas t h e r e p r i n t e d book i s t h e v e r y same s u b s t a n c e ; b e c a u s e its doctrine and sentiments a r e i t s e s s e n t i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t ; and the p r i n t i n g o f i t i s a mere m e c h a n i c a l a c t , and t h e method o n l y o f p u b l i s h i n g and p r o m u l g i n g [ s i c ] t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e book, ( a t 226) This  approach  manufacturing, identifiable, design.  With  disclosed i n which  Aston be  J . took  more  which  this  distinction  J . or Lord  that  of patent  unity  property  underlying  concept  of  i s unique and o f an  as  original  'material'  and  was u n c o n v i n c i n g and  Mansfield.  In Donaldson,  further,  saying  a common  law p r o p e r t y  had e x i s t e d p r i o r t o the S t a t u t e  evolution  a  copy  of inventions  to conclude"  the l i t e r a r y  grasped  produced  fungible  h i s p o s i t i o n one s t e p  liberal  inventions The  by W i l l e s  object  to a  i t s treatment  went u n r e p e a t e d  pre-industrial  each  as opposed  compositions as ' i d e a l ' ,  a  i t "would  of Monopolies  in -  law d i d c h a l l e n g e  the theory  argument  Justice  these  rested. forms  of  LJ  .  on  Yates  intellectual  68 property, features the  of  property  included  property.  The  look  elsewhere  2.  The The  majority  found  took  issue with  respect from of  property.  in the  to  Lord  the  to  Mansfield  the  Crown  right  works,  involved  prerogative  cases  judicial  While  cases  a  both  matters. and  Aston  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of  The  that  (at 2 0 9 ) ,  1 3 8  reason  in  R o l l ' s Abridgment Crown's  steps:  former  found  paying  "These  were  property  (1666) and  judicial  for  even based  times  W i l l e s J . found  the  in  r e c o g n i t i o n o f a Crown r i g h t  recognising  high"  existing  two  Justices Willes  cases.  the  property with the  m a j o r i t y on  their  over  which  of c o p y r i g h t  connection  in  to  Taylor  evidence  the  chose  of  property.  literary  first,  the  ran  pre-1688  (1670),  persuasive  v.  and  equating the Crown's interest in printing author's c o p y r i g h t .  earliest  holdings:  parallel,  common  sanction  (b)  prerogative the  was  the  legislative  the  Millar  him,  i d e n t i f y i n g t h e Crown's c o n t r o l o f those works as a p r o p e r t y interest, r a t h e r t h a n an e x e r c i s e o f e x e c u t i v e authority;  With  in  for  of  Making t h i s  1 3 7  for  6  (a)  J u s t i c e Yates  the  t o be  types  3  to l i t e r a r y  analogy  certain  1  refused  f o r an a n a l o g y  common l a w .  evolution  necessity  majority  preferred of  differed  ideas;  P r e r o g a t i v e Cases i n  printing  at  the  in  when  i n each  of  the  courts'  v.  Streater  Roper  salaries,  1 3 9  and  in  69 Seymour  (1677),  works. Aston 225).  Crown  in  Crown's p r o p e r t y  J . concurred  Lord  Revolution  the  Mansfield cases.  that  To  in a brief  found him,  period,  and  abuse the  intrigued  patentees  took  him,  less  of  the  the  anonymous  t o Seymour  merit  in  the  prerogative  w i l l i n g n e s s of  however,  a similar  default in  reference  much  c o u n t e n a n c e i t s abuse, r e n d e r e d What  by  the  that  approach i n each  pre-  by  courts  judgments o f l i t t l e  was  (at  counsel  the to  value.  for  the  case:  T h e r e w e r e no q u e s t i o n s i n W e s t m i n s t e r H a l l , b e f o r e t h e R e s t o r a t i o n , as t o Crown c o p i e s . The reason i s very obvious: i t w i l l o c c u r t o e v e r y one t h a t h e a r s me. The f a c t , however, i s so: t h e r e were none, b e f o r e the R e s t o r a t i o n . Upon e v e r y p a t e n t w h i c h has been l i t i g a t e d since, the c o u n s e l f o r the patentee, ( w h a t e v e r e l s e m i g h t be t h r o w n o u t [ i e , a r g u e d ] , or whatever encouragement they m i g h t have b e t w e e n the R e s t o r a t i o n and R e v o l u t i o n , t o t h r o w out n o t i o n s o f power and prerogative,) havetortured their i n v e n t i o n , t o s t a n d upon p r o p e r t y , ( a t 254)  In o t h e r doubted, patent state of  words, t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f p r e r o g a t i v e was and  rights or  the  on  power.  counsel  principles Lord  pleadings  prerogative Baskett  good  basis  they  should  try  of  property,  not  Mansfield  proceeded  through  in  Part ridge  for  (1758) no one  knew  Crown  harboured  illusions  died on  to  mere  ( 1709 ) t o  copyright  increasingly  reasons an  argue after  the  justify of  analysis that 1688;  subject:  the in  70  We [the j u d g e s ] had no idea of any p r e r o g a t i v e i n t h e Crown, o v e r the p r e s s ; or of any power to restrain i t by e x c l u s i v e p r i v i l e g e s , o r o f any power t o c o n t r o l the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r on which a man m i g h t w r i t e , o r t h e manner i n w h i c h he m i g h t t r e a t i t . We r e s t e d upon property from the King's r i g h t of original publication. ( M i l l a r at 255)  The  publishing  King...as the On  the  K i n g had  his  second  that  because the  King  subjects.  statutes,  h e a d and  property  did--then  of  however,  Sovereign."  point  the  (at  majority  in certain works—and proved could  a  similar  have no  Justice Willes  to  the  255) judges the  right  greater  "belonged  agreed:  cases  if  the  indicated  existed  in  he  authors  rights i n property  than  said:  I c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e K i n g , and a n d an a u t h o r . I d i s c l a i m any i d e a t h a t t h e K i n g has t h e l e a s t c o n t r o l o v e r the p r e s s , but what a r i s e s f r o m h i s p r o p e r t y i n h i s copy, ( a t 217) To  s i m i l a r e f f e c t Justice Aston: And i f t h a t a l o n e [ p u b l i c a t i o n ] was to p r e v a i l against a private author, why s h o u l d not p r e r o g a t i v e p r o p e r t y , founded on t h e same g r o u n d o f a r g u m e n t a s the general property of a u t h o r s i n their w o r k s , be l i a b l e t o t h e same f r e e and u n i v e r s a l communion ? For I know no d i f f e r e n c e , i n t h a t r e s p e c t , between the r i g h t s o f t h e Crown and t h e p r o p e r t y of the s u b j e c t , (at 224)  For  Lord  deemed  Mansfield, an  author  a crucial to  i s s u e was  abandon  his  whether rights  the in  a  common  law  literary  71 composition rights  in  the  maintained rights  on  publication; Bible  those  rested  the a u t h o r ' s  and  rights  the  other  cases  state  following  in property,  not  dealing  works  with  proved  publication.  prerogative,  Crown  the  King  Because  this  his  established  post-publication rights:  The K i n g has no power or c o n t r o l o v e r t h e subject-matter [ o f t h e B i b l e ] : h i s power r e s t s i n p r o p e r t y . H i s whole r i g h t r e s t s upon the f o u n d a t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n the c o p y b y t h e common l a w . . . . W h a t e v e r the common law s a y s o f p r o p e r t y i n t h e K i n g ' s c a s e , from a n a l o g y t o the c a s e o f a u t h o r s , must hold c o n c l u s i v e l y , in my apprehension, with regard to authors, (at 256) Justice the  Yates  historical  argued  record.  implication that  form  protection  law  c o u l d take  regulation  of  The  ever  courts  legitimate  Star  property  cognizance, printing  patent-granting patents  of  power.  the  Scathing  Willes' of  with  1 4 0  majority in  his  Chamber  J.  had come  to  Neither  decrees  recognise  since  and trimmed-down p r e r o g a t i v e  on  uses  Justice  which the that  C r o w n ' s abuse nor  rights the over  of  represented  p o i n t e d out  the  had a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e  attack  of  accompanied the  the  decrees  interests Yates  over  the of  1680s,  a  common early of  its  printing  authors. however,  certain  state: The books a r e B i b l e s , Common-Prayer B o o k s , and a l l e x t r a c t s from them, (such as primers, Psalters, P s a l m s , ) and a l m a n a c s . Those have r e l a t i o n to the national r e l i g i o n , or Government, or the p o l i t i c a l  works  1 4 1  a of  72 c o n s t i t u t i o n . O t h e r c o m p o s i t i o n s t o which the King's r i g h t of p u b l i c a t i o n extends, a r e t h e s t a t u t e s , A c t s o f P a r l i a m e n t , and S t a t e - p a p e r s . The K i n g ' s r i g h t to a l l t h e s e i s , as h e a d o f t h e C h u r c h , and o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , ( a t 242) The  King's  from  rights  property  over  and  t h e s e works, s i m p l y p u t , d i d n o t  could  not  be  analogised  to  the  derive  author's  claim: The K i n g does n o t d e r i v e t h i s r i g h t from labour, or c o m p o s i t i o n , or any one circumstance a t t e n d i n g the case of a u t h o r s . . . . i t seems t o me, t h a t t h e K i n g ' s p r o p e r t y i n these p a r t i c u l a r compositions c a l l e d p r e r o g a t i v e c o p i e s s t a n d s upon d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s than t h a t of the a u t h o r ; and t h e r e f o r e w i l l not a p p l y t o t h e c a s e o f an a u t h o r , ( a t 244-245)  He  pointed  almanac,  out  in Partridge  The  the  the  interpretation  judges  issue of  First,  Crown  s t a t u s or  subject;  in  the  Lord  and  posed  the  respects. any  compiler  at  the  of  the  injunction  patentee.  majority to  in  Millar,  m a j o r i t y was privileges  Camden's  they  Yates. J . ,  Crown p r i n t i n g  Beckett  (1774),  than  Bookseller".  "a  (1709)  i . e . , i t s p u t a t i v e author,, l o s t  stage to the  answer  how  wished 1 4 2  cases  prerogative  with  regulating  printing  begun,  i n two  phrasing  J . , no which  the less the  of  in  to  the  their  theoretical  to accord  available  t o make o f  expansive  had  not  pursuit  differed  unwilling  blunt  Yates  in  the  to  the  private  i n Donaldson King  nothing  enamoured Crown's  v.  more  of  the  role  in  nevertheless believed  Crown  73 rights  t o have  control  over  a  unique  the p r i n t i n g  the  a c t of publication,  not  prove  a private  reasons of property.  right 1  4  of  stripped common  (1758)  law r i g h t  could  t h e Crown's  indefeasible of state  be j u s t i f i e d  by  and d i d only  by  3  saw i n t h e h i s t o r y common  and M i l l a r  of mystery  works,  f o r reasons  that  t h e shadow o f a n a s c e n t  Baskett  and p u r p o s e :  of certain  existed  Second, t h e m a j o r i t y rights  source  had acceded  law r i g h t .  (1769),  and the t a i n t  o f Crown  Crown  of press  printing  By t h e time  rights  h a d been  control,  to i t s r i g h t f u l place  and the  at centre  s t a g e . Y a t e s J . , however, saw i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o m m e r c i a l rights  i n printing,  as i n the s i m i l a r  inescapable  evidence  authority.  Those  recognition  only  approbation. property'  of the d i r e c t i v e  rights through  The l o n g  signified  rights  had  originated  decrees,  silence  hand  patents  o f t h e common  to Justice  Yates  common law p r i n c i p l e w i t h a p r o p e r t y  in  inventions,  of  sovereign  and  received  and  statutory  l a w on t h i s  the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n ideas.  'new of  74  E.  SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CROWN COPYRIGHT  1.  Crown P r e r o g a t i v e Lord  view  Camden  that  Crown  proprietary  Copyright  i n Donaldson ownership  basis,  had, as noted,  of copies  whether  in various  from  Like  J . he a c k n o w l e d g e d  right  c e r t a i n key works o f s t a t e , s u c h  statutes.  Neither  legitimacy  of a prerogative  and  as  the m a j o r i t y  existence the  o f a common  survival  received  statutory  restrict  Pleas  left  open  could  not  grant  the  could  grant  copies.  (1709),  Irish  The  voyages  restricted, the  doubt  surrounded  The r i g h t  eventually  The C o u r t  and  but  not  moved  o f Common  (1775)  that  1 4 5  settling  that  the  t h e Crown  outside  the  decided  i n 1794  that  for printing  of discovery  narrowing  the  patents  court  Reflecting a priority  1 4 6  during 1 4 7  Church,  denied  affirmed  v. Carnan  printing  patents  J.  the p r e r o g a t i v e ,  Partridge  An  Crown  and D o n a l d s o n , c o u r t s  Company  exclusive  or  as t h e B i b l e and  Donaldson little  a  1 4 4  following Millar  since  had  a prerogative  Yates  copyright.  approbation.  established  purposes.  in  the  expense  appropriately  law c o p y r i g h t ,  of prerogative.  Crown  produced  opinion  i n Stationers  issue  the  right,  d i d n o t come w i t h i n  confines  nor  the scope o f the p r e r o g a t i v e .  ruled  almanacs  Camden  of a prerogative  In t h e y e a r s to  Lord  works  the King's  otherwise. over  Yates  disparaged  books  f o r u s e by  for Bibles of the age, were  of p r e r o g a t i v e  ruled  for  a l l  narratives t o be  copyright  Crown  coincided  75 with  locating  i t s principal  interest  i n preventing  state.  Such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  Yorke  1 4 8  implied  market  value  (e.g.,  a  that,  and  if  also  1  4  Millar  works the  role  that  e d i t i o n of a s t a t e  work  of  1938  cases  (Aust) L t d . the  i t s accuracy.  the s t a t e  20th  from  Attorney-General  century  1  5  New  —cite  0  decisions  Lord  on  i n nature,  South  property  Given  i n economic  the d o m i n i o n s —  of  Crown's  between Crown  to note:  the l a t t e r  copyright, f o r u s e and  owned  by  exclusive  and  R.  v.  Wales  v.  Mansfield  in  interest  in  this  issue.  U.S.  decided  Publications  copyright applies  reproduction  t h e Crown  that  ^2.  1  and s u b j e c t  r i g h t s of copyright.  I n Wheaton  and p u b l i c d o m a i n i s  t o works  are therefore  A m e r i c a n and A n g l o - C a n a d i a n  domain:  the r e a l i s a t i o n  i t t o be p r o p r i e t a r y  Domain and Government  holds  everyone  ruled  Two  stress  The c o n t r a s t  one  as  1 5 1  Public  important  i t s much o f i t s f o r c e ,  judgment) depends on  have  and Co.  to  copyright.  2.  and  9  Butterworth  of  with  i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t  in origin.  Bellman  (1758),  the growing  prerogative  not  loses  public  i n works  of a p r i v a t e l y published or  i n the  d i s t o r t i o n s ' appearing  Baskett  statute  activity, Crown  in  justification  5  he  1  5  no  available  to  former  applies  to  t o a l l the i n c i d e n t s  of  3  law d i v e r g e d  v. P e t e r s  i t s own  1  t  freely  f o r which  4  ,  judgments  significantly  Supreme fell  Court  into  the  of  on  the  public  76 I t may be p r o p e r t o remark t h a t t h e c o u r t a r e u n a n i m o u s l y o f the o p i n i o n t h a t no r e p o r t e r has o r c a n have any c o p y r i g h t i n the w r i t t e n o p i n i o n s d e l i v e r e d by this c o u r t ; and t h a t t h e judges t h e r e o f c a n n o t confer on any r e p o r t e r any s u c h right. (666/ p e r McLean J . ) The  Wheaton d e c i s i o n , b a s e d  public was  access  to  interpreted  government Copyright  law as  precluded  extending  employees, Act  l a r g e l y on  and  a  of  by  law  ownership law  Central  Inc.  defendant in  to t h i s  defendant's  themselves.  in  the  an  plaintiff's computer  of p r i v a t e  despite  copyright  or  Ltd.  Innes C.J.  granted  system of  data  public  Cases headings  and  the live  issue one  in  Co.  v. Mead  Data  to  prevent  the  base.  pagination The  i n the  domain  by 1909  1 5 5  reporter  rights protection  the  the  and  remained a  research  Commonwealth  status  Attorney-General  proposition  was  produced  statutes.  copyrightable, has  judgments,  in  notes, a d d i t i o n s  that  in  result  reporting judgments  1 5 7  Canadian  (Aust.)  embodied  I n West P u b l i s h i n g  injunction  in  a l l publications  reports  day.  LEXIS  extent  endeavour,  No  ,  be  Court's b e l i e f  rights  copyright  the  to  i n law  from using  shows the  of  reporters  1 5 6  to  subsequent  rights  American  private  principle  f o l l o w i n g Wheaton r e c o g n i z e d provided  the  is  that  of  the  are  has The  resolved Australian  South Wales v.  strongest  statutes  reviewed  judgments.  f o r New  the  case  modern  subject  prerogative  the  decision  Butterworth  authority  &  Co.  for  t o Crown c o p y r i g h t .  cases,  issue  the Long  e s p e c i a l l y Roper  v.  77 Streater (1758)/  ( 1 6 7 0) and  found  Crown c o p y r i g h t in  and  nature,  in property  views  abound.  still  good  pointed  out  to  the  case  prerogative  over  not  Millar.  Crown  prerogative  decisions. copyright  1  6  alternatives litigated,  might  to  Commonwealth restricting By  recognition  the  generating  the  of  law.  as  of  Crown  owner  This  the  one  on  trade,  the  be  of  as the  circumstance  has  further  for  to  the  issue  issue  works  obvious  Crown  that  did  whether judicial  to  of  statutory These  come t o To  be  date,  a head  the  by  statutory  produced  an  works  1 6 2  by  decisions.  and  however,  copyrighted  A  the  prerogative  control,  as  authors.  judicial  of  However,  possibility  operation  to  by  question  the  is  copyright  stand  p u b l i c domain l e a d .  or  the  a r g u m e n t s made  extended  open  brought  of  (1666)  proposition  should  ownership  p u b l i c revenue.  a  1 5 9  to  themselves  court,  the  of  origin  judgments, d i f f e r e n t  assessments  Crown by  U.S.  the  Crown has  of  leaves  judges  right proprietary  judges.  ever  have n e v e r  d i r e c t i o n or  Crown  Canadian  only  still  to  both  identified  R o l l ' s Abridgment  that  access to s t a t u t e s  virtue  government  that  now  cause a  courts  He  point.  opinion  recent  to the  follow  the  Concerning  printing More  , or  1  Cambridge  a p p e a r s more l i k e l y  That  1 6 0  an  1 5 8  was  would  belonging  provision  for  the  of  s a l a r i e s of  that  the  on  University  a prerogative  effect  the  above,  survive  giving  suggests  paying  patentee;  as  concepts.  Fox  law  of  not  v.  binding  in statutes  right  the  them  while  virtue  Baskett  under  extensive  role  i s guaranteed  by  implications  for  i m p l i c a t i o n concerns  the  78 issues  of  To  extent  the  freedom  produces  it  prevent  embarrassing  them.  injunction  an  D  Recently,  J  to  prevent  Freedoms  too  easily  have  'licence  will  to  majority  privacy  might  copyright  the  v.  to  being  block  and in  considered  security  and  did  not  point  out to  The  which the judicial  interest  of  most  a  reasonable not  to  be  information, In  Part  IV we  prompted  the  common  law  a  author  in  evident of  interests  in  inappropriateness  withhold p u b l i c a t i o n .  Rights  would  publication  personal  defence  of  ought  an  a  response  of  for  of  Court  which  find  an  Federal  p u b l i c a t i o n of  interest  the  version  Charter  on payment  to  withhold of  the  interests  an  obtained  1 6 4  embarrassment.  two  per s o n a l  to  of  copyright  Taylor  importance  used  is,  avoid  reputation,  the  help  to  the  decision  Retrieving  the  confidence  report.  creative  point  of  Millar  2(b)  publication  to  in was  author's  it  copyright  an a b r i d g e d  expression),  or  one  and  to  of  national  over  The B r i t i s h  C a n a d i a n government  on s .  governments  that  copyright  breach  with  A more  The  arbitrarily see  control  information  investigation  of  permit  fee.  available either  (freedom  to  1  of  where  the  based  dismissed.  been  of  in materials  resorted  p u b l i c a t i o n of  combines  argument  and  rights  expression.  C O  controversial raised  have  dealing  of  information.  printing  harmful,  provisions •I  avail  or  freedom  lever  of  indeed  the  and  ownership  additional  governments  to  statutory  an  has  and d i s s e m i n a t i o n  Australian efforts  information,  government has  publication  of  Crown  his  in  his an  work.  copyright of  Crown  copyright  79 notionally "personal Justice  originated  interests" Yates'  copyright  like  properly  admonition private  withhold  access  private  copyright  government  that  i n t h e Crown's  authors  to l i t e r a r y deserves  authorities.  that  public  inhere only  i s apposite: that  respect  not i n  to i n d i v i d u a l s .  t h e Crown  compositions less  duty,  does the  not  hold  right  to  i s central  to  when  invoked  by  80  IV.  PROPRIETARY AND PERSONAL INTERESTS IN EARLY COPYRIGHT: THE EQUITY INJUNCTION CASES  A.  INTRODUCTION  Part press  I  this  technology  nature  and  approaches English the  of  paper  both  social the  literary  issues  theories  conception  second  courts  for  posed  issue  understood property  by  of  of  raised  property  r o l e and  cases  up  to  the  way  for  the  This  Part  i n which  r i g h t s of  and  printing  and  authorship.  examining  the  by  an  including  the  author  in  Millar  v.  Taylor. Eisenstein a  division  the  of  heritage, scale and  for  which  most  mass  described  included the  heroic  and  the  crucial  texts the  had  readership notes  four  tradition  that  which  1  6  role  in  of  i n the  previously  making  Biblical o f new  or  texts by  13th  'making  created  u l t i m a t e l y made  Where  5  composition.  that  classical on  the  a  Century,  She  following  the  Muses  in defiance  of  i t s genesis  established to the  new  order  of  speculates  artist/author in  St.  none  the  and  large  literacy  books',  1 6 6  texts  sees  figure,  owe  p r i n t i n g press  l i m i t e d only  ways  lonely  a r t s , may  a  production  wholly o r i g i n a l  modern  originality, and  a  the  possible.  the  interests. Eisenstein  Bonaventura  that  played  and  how  i n book p r o d u c t i o n  p r i n t allowed  and  out  profession  had  available,  pointed  labour  author's  copyists  has  as  bursts in  a of  society  technology.  81 As  part  copyright rewards only the the  of  of  a  new  book t r a d e  those  l a w ' s mechanism  the  way  In  doing  in  which  would o c c u r ,  d e f i n i t i o n s of would  come  producers  predecessors originality  had  author  objects  personhood, interests.  that  not  and  his  at  right  on  The  the  to  aside early  the  to  creator  of an and  creator's  his  i n t o the  in  image  economic  copyright  i n t e r e s t s entered  their  value  the  from  in  rewarding  contributed  integral  protection  looks  t h e s e two  was  confirmed  s i g n i f i c a n c e ; the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  labour  Part  t o and  plagiarise  labourer  not  e x p l o i t a t i o n of  property  or  the  copyright  expression.  economic  deserved  This  however,  The  copy  labour,  for distributing  originality,  created  the  literary  commercial  on  intellectual  of  u n d e r s t a n d how  did  who  of  i t a l s o responded  turn  more t h a n  as  so,  authorship.  to  who  but  understanding the  the  market.  structured  new  reconceptualising  a r r i v e d as  copyright  the  this  cases common  to law  tradition.  B.  REVIEW OF  This leading the  to  THE  CASES: V I C I S S I T U D E S OF  section Millar  respective  v.  concern  d e b a t e was  to  the  Taylor  interests  particular  to  provides  for  a  which of  term  overview  dealt  in  publishers  p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the  d i s t i n g u i s h those  statutory  brief  AUTHORS AND  for  cases  copyright  of  some and  PRINTERS  the  fashion  with  authors.  The  literary  i n v o l v i n g books  and  those  cases  which  property subject did  not;  82 injunctions  granted  booksellers,  implied  copyright.  For  distinction  to  unpublished  1.  Injunctions  of  argued  recognition  this  i s between  for Published  paper,  cases  a  the  of  London  common  more  law  important  involving published  and  several  others  quotations,  Crown, p u b l i s h e d  the  copyright  under  the  whether  abridging  infringement  of  original.  Lord  right  Sir and  Statute the  the  of  Chancellor  saying  the  conferred  nature  of  because  i t s i n t e n t was  monopoly  and  the  Anne. The  or  the  deserved  save  of  Crown  Latin  Pleas  of  issue  toward  "liberal  use  the was  and the  claimed  constituted  innocent  489  against  plaintiff  Statute a  ER  for deletion  principal  work  an  26  Modern  Hale's  which  inclined by  book  translation  original  Statute  the  Matthew  over  141,  injunction  verbatim",  English  from  i n 1657  an  publishing  "borrowed  and  (1740) 2 A t k  sought  for  i t t o be  statutes  The  Works  bookseller  booksellers  alleging  French  of  v . W i l c o x and  plaintiff  defendant Law,  latter,  judicial  purposes draw  the  works.  In G y l e s the  for  of  was an the  plaintiff, not  of  the  construction"  to  secure the p r o p e r t y of books i n the authors t h e m s e l v e s , or the purchasers t h e r e o f , a s some r e c o m p e n c e f o r their p a i n s and l a b o u r i n s u c h works a s may be o f use t o t h e l e a r n e d w o r l d , ( a t 490)  83  Nevertheless, determine  he  r e f e r r e d the  whether  plaintiff's,  or  i t would n o t  Court  dismissed  sued  over  an  v.  by  original  edition  Statute,  the  works common rule  on  common  various of  the  21-year The  copyright.  the law  point, judges  for  for  the  protection.  The  of  edition issue  was  new  work  which  did  not  long  the  infringe  Since  the  before  the  for  by  issue,  pre-1709  arguing  Hardwicke  declined  should  sent  their  1730s and by  plaintiff  property  be  he  did  edition  Newton, w h i c h had  whether  n o t e s t o Newton's commentary  the  incorporated  copyright  dispute  i n the  which  report,  writers.  responded  selling  Dr.  in  the  which  r e s o l u t i o n ; however,  commentary  plaintiff's  as  literary  Chancellor  d e f e n d a n t s from p u b l i s h i n g or included  the  the  "same"  the  appeared  plaintiff  saying  was  (1752),  and  statutory  Lord  to  panel's  Poems  poems had raised  panel'  abridgment,  the  Walker  scholars  the  expired.  law  and  'learned  1 6 7  Milton's  defendants  that  had  of  book  Following  Merchant  edition  commentaries  arguing  infringe.  a  genuine  the a p p l i c a t i o n .  Tonson  to  defendants'  constituted a  event  In  the  case  still  adding  to  to  the  enjoin  the  because i t  been had  his  for  written  statutory  own  original  d e f e n d a n t M e r c h a n t had  made a  plaintiff's  in  copyright  the  commentary. In v.  T o n s o n v.  Chetwood  the  unique  The  case  Walker  (1722) 2 Mer factors  dealt  (1752), 441,  involved  with  both  35  Lord ER  Hardwicke c i t e d 1008,  in unpublished  published  and  as  an  Burnett  instance  manuscript  unpublished  of  cases.  works  of  84 the  same w r i t e r .  Dr.  Burnett,  S a c r a . The  of  defendant  had  Latin  prevented  the  Lord of  injunction second  During  being  of  He  d i d so more b e c a u s e  to  supervise publication  wishes  nor  violated  works  1  (1736) ,  1 7 2  (1768).  A  7  collection ownership Wardens from  which  the  summary  of  by  v.  Falkner Walker  of  injunction statutory  Dr.  printer  Prideaux;  a  that  Curl  the  1 7 1  (1722)  cases  t o whom t h e  Ponder  v.  Eyre  v.  Walker  Walthoe  v.  Walker  Reily  appears  v.  Fowler  a  short  in  case  dealt  defendants  c l a i m e d as  author  "first  had  where  publishing  copyright for Directions the  author's  translation  copy:  and  The  1 7 4  and  1 6 8  the  1 7 3  a  obtained.  ideas  the  (1722),  (1739),  an  book and  defendants'  (1735),  cases.  "vulgar"  responsibility  s i x unreported  claimed  Knaplock  felt  granted  that  neither  to prevent  v.  i t  religious  interests.  printers  he  c o n s i d e r i n g the  had  concern  cited  Knaplock  1 6 9  T o n s o n v.  of  from  had  surreptitiously  the Court  from  Burnett  f o r the  from p r i n t i n g  respected  than  Dr.  Statute,  difficult  property  the  Motte  0  had  injunctions  (1679),  (1735) ,  of  translation  after  the  e s t a t e of  Archaeologia  because  suitable  Burnett  felt  in Millar  sought  for  Bradyl  his style,  judges  printers  he  defendant  plaintiff's  The  under  the  work  English  translated  t o stop the defendant work  of  his lifetime  i d e a s not  translations  the  an  Chancellor Macclesfield,  unpublished  because  executor  theological  produced  original. book's  was  the  controversial  reader. status  plaintiff  author  Burnett's  contained  The  to  with  Church-  assignees  delivered  the  85 Copy  to  be  printed"  distinguishing "right  of  between  copy"  plaintiff,  who  (at  as  had  a  441).  "copy"  legal  as  a  right,  subsequently  Lord  Macclesfield,  material object decided  purchased  and  the  of  the  from  the  i n favour  the  "right"  author:  . . . t h e b a r e D e l i v e r y o f t h e Copy by A u t h o r t o be p r i n t e d , d o t h not d e v e s t R i g h t o f t h e Copy out o f t h e A u t h o r , i s o n l y an A u t h o r i t y t o t h e P r i n t e r p r i n t t h a t E d i t i o n , and the A u t h o r a f t e r w a r d s g r a n t the R i g h t o f t h e Copy another Person. (441)  The Cave  same c h a p t e r on  (1740).  There,  against  a  Against  Being  different under  once  or  you  not" but  Walker  (1740)  be an the  the  and  the  case and  the not  claimed of  original  injunction.  with No  extracts  d i d not  and  his  Muscovy,  just  other  a  1 7 5  few  cases  you  come  v.  a l l at Hodges  to both  i n Gyles  v.  Merchant  (1752).  In  republication  was  an  of  abridgment  Hardwicke  ruled  a  work  of  prior  missing, to  Millar  and  the  i t to  as b e i n g a w o r d - f o r - w o r d c o p y pages  a  material  print  f o r Read  referred  Walker  under  " I t i s not  report exists  infringement. Lord  "evasive abridgment"  Book  that  nor  that  Trapp's and  whether  v.  Dr  injunction  extracts  Book, No  an  in  said  Tonson  an  print  Hardwicke  is briefly  Czar  summarises A u s t i n v .  granted  to  Overmuch argument  441).  defendant  history,  original  the  give  (at  (1740),  of  To  Hardwicke  attempted  Statute, Lord  Title  the  who  Righteous  title.  what  Read,  Lord  defendant  the  injunctions also  the the but to may to  of  granted  the  exploring  the  86  proprietary appear  2.  t o be  works  these  cited  and a u t h o r s  i n Millar  dealt  Pope v C u r l  reported.  volume Pope  I n Pope,  titled sought  Letters  from  and obtained of letters  inter  the o b j e c t i o n  makes  a gift  receiver  publication.  (1758)  Swift,  Edward  Pope,and  that  1 7 7  by s e n d i n g  28 ER 924,  Curl  printed  a  Alexander  to prevent the Defendant  a letter  which  raised,  the writer  permitted the  a n y u s e o f i t he w i s h e d ,  The C o u r t  O n l y two  26 ER 608, a n d  Others.  an i n j u n c t i o n  he h a d w r i t t e n .  piracy of  authors.  2 Eden 3 2 8 ,  of i t to the receiver,  t o make  alleged  2 A t k 342,  the publisher  publication alia,  with  by t h e i r  (1741)  Duke o f Q u e e n s b e r r y v . S h e b b e a r e are  books  Cases  had n o t been p u b l i s h e d  cases,  i npublished  1 7 6  Publication  cases  that  of printers  reported.  The F i r s t Four  of  rights  including  replied:  But I am o f o p i n i o n that i t i s only a s p e c i a l property i n the receiver, possibly t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e p a p e r may b e l o n g t o him; b u t t h i s does n o t g i v e a l i c e n c e t o any p e r s o n w h a t s o e v e r t o p u b l i s h them t o t h e w o r l d , f o r a t most t h e r e c e i v e r h a s only a j o i n t property with thewriter, ( a t 608) In  t h e Duke  administrator had  written,  defendant  of Queensberry of the estate  that  the p l a i n t i f f  o f an h e i r  but not published,  Gwynn c l a i m e d  case,  o f Lord  a history  his late  C l a r e n d o n who  of Charles  father,  was t h e  II.  whose e s t a t e  The he  87 administered, Clarendon,  who  make u s e . o f ruled  received  told  the  that  profit  had  him  same as  those  an  "he he  words,  cases,  use  of  Webb v .  (June  13,  prevent  might  should  book  i t , except  Rose  1741),  (May  also  the p u b l i c a t i o n  PROPRIETARY INTERESTS: THE  1.  Scope o f  the Right  speaking  of  copy  fit." not  and  with  The  the  925)  the  a  Lord  Keeper  father Two  and  right  to  "might  unreported  F o r r e s t e r v.  Waller  injunctions granted  SCOPE OF  i n the  Lord  convey  in print; (at  from  thereof,  of p r e v i o u s l y unpublished  C.  In  did  1732)  dealt  a  think  that."  24,  manuscript  take  i f spoken,  from m u l t i p l y i n g t h e  make e v e r y  original  THE  to  manuscripts.  RIGHT OF  COPY  I n j u n c t i o n Cases  scope  of  the  property  right  in  c o p y r i g h t , a number o f t h i n g s m i g h t be  included: for instance,  the  (the  temporal  Millar  v.  duration  of  Taylor),  application,  or  1 7 8  the  the  the  p a i n t i n g , music  This  the  cases of  up  of  t o and  property  which  reveal  recognised d e b a t e . Two work  in  by  paper  seeks  including  the  breadth  the  c o u r t s and  related  understood  to  etc.) to  Millar  authorship. of  To  of  the do  parties  of  to  so,  to  the of  i t focuses the  the  copyright;  i t s  English concept  on  issues  author's  (a) t h e (b)  1 7 9  a  literary  focus:  of  expression  through  in  of  copyright.  development  property  for  works  explore  issue  l i m i t s  subject  issues provide this qualify  driving  geographic  categories  (literature, Part  right  the  work  property type  of  uses  by  88  third  parties  largely  found  to  corresponds  ideas,  or  current  only  infringe  with  the  whether  particular  parlance,  the  idea/  words, what d i d t h e a u t h o r To  ask  these  its  emanations.  earliest  significance  from  Nevertheless, measured  to The  the  i n part  (a)  Type  The  Statute  describe  the  In  for  of  Anne  type of  of  v.  t h a t an  One  to  own  them— In  must  'gaps' the  to  in  other  impose  copyright not  in  a u t h o r as  the  regime  draw  too  early  on  much  copyright.  creator  can  be  factors.  of  other  learned  work."  question  Court  viewed  from  Paradise  same  printed  In the  the  work  that  qualified  rarely  the  be  "book".  only  of  (at  v.  commentary despite  volume.  In  to  the  1 8 0  The  a  issue  Lord  single letter  of  Newton  i t s being v.  a  the  argued  Chancellor from  "any  avoided  the  had  Merchant as  in  constitute a  parties  and  Baskett  an  d i d not the  books"  for protection.  defendant  Walker Dr.  "printed  distinguish this  608)  whether  as  letters  Statute;  mischievous  Tonson  Lost,  of  words  arose  (1741),  edition  i t would  a  gave  degree  used  Curl  stated  as  seen  dichotomy.  some  to these  "book"  purposes  interesting  in  s t a t u s of  in relation  Pope  unsuccessfully book  he  much expanded  perceived  legal  was  point  o f Work  definition  cases.  later,  second  ? is  of  The  author  expression  own  preoccupations  the  expression  questions a  copyright.  copyright  (1752),  work  incorporated  U n i v e r s i t y of  the  separate into  the  Cambridge  89 (1758),  King's  statutes  were  University's Statute's have  not  of  class  1  i n the to  8  word to  1  deal  adopt  Indeed,  purposes—  such  as  theological  writings.  reality  respect  major  literary  placed  s t r e s s on  work. The to  be  Lord  to  for  law This  the  endeavour;  as w o r t h y as  "other  due  as  some of  approach  i n the  no  more as  an  i n Pope v. learned  the  despite  the  English  defining  right.  medical  that,  religious and  historical fiction  however, the  a  courts  letters  elaborated:  I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t no works have done more s e r v i c e t o mankind, t h a n t h o s e which have a p p e a r e d i n t h i s s h a p e , upon f a m i l i a r s u b j e c t s , a n d w h i c h p e r h a p s were n e v e r i n t e n d e d t o be p u b l i s h e d ; and i t i s t h i s makes them so v a l u a b l e ; f o r I must c o n f e s s for my own p a r t , that l e t t e r s which are v e r y e l a b o r a t e l y w r i t t e n , and originally i n t e n d e d f o r the p r e s s , a r e g e n e r a l l y t h e most i n s i g n i f i c a n t , and v e r y l i t t l e w o r t h any p e r s o n ' s r e a d i n g , ( a t 608)  as  protected  (1741) f o u n d  w o r k s " . He  and cases  treatises,  a t t r i b u t e of Curl  the  or  of prose  the  1 8 2  of  reflects  and  courts  early prerogative  doubt  than  within  commentators  to  professional  reports,  that  printers  legislation,  development  'usefulness'  Chancellor  Therefore,  c l e a r preponderance  written  works  with  appear  argument  fall  influence  flexible  a  the  not  f o r the p r o p e r t y  cases. books  did  "books",  a  fiction  with  so  d r a f t i n g of the  works o f  copyright  rejected  "libros".  the  o f works q u a l i f y i n g Few  and  to p r i n t  the  suggested  prepared  implicitly  books  Charter  use  booksellers were  Bench  90 In  Tonson  'value' not  v.  was  thereby  Collins  an  a t t r i b u t e of  equate value  a p o i n t made by Part  V.  basis lacked  a  nineteenth deny in  for  or  a  no  obscenity that  Third Parties  The  second  point,  brief  to  activities  authors. covered  by  author  assigns  the  one  of  manner by all  a  8  6  printing,  On  and  third  failed  work  in  be  seen  to  as  r e c e n t l y has  third  "uses"  level,  "sole  right  1  the  "value"  came  copyright:  I ) ; Willes J. defined  l i s t .  and  society.  The  (Art.  Present-day  "use"  to  a  in and  on  the  question In  1 8 3  been  the  reason  to  set  aside  ,  calls  protected  works  of copyright  gives  the  publishing  law  this  the  right  party  made o f  over which the  On  activities and  did  anticipated  benefit  concerning  explanation.  to the  control  He  he  1 8 4  D s e s by  refers  to  that  only  (b)  a  emphasized  for protection  assessment  rule  but  that  a b o u t w h i c h more i s s a i d  references  provided  maintained  usefulness.(181)  early claim  century  copyright,  Canada.  no  judicial  merit,  property,  with  repeated  works",  of  Blackstone  Aston J . i n M i l l a r  Despite  "learned  (1762),  of  printing  "copy o f and  means  Statute  of  uses  the  material  Anne gave  "the  sole  at  206).  (Millar,  s t a t u t e s have a d d e d a number o f a c t i v i t i e s a  different,  purpose party;  or p a r t of  the  for for  i f related level,  which  the  example,  original  work  the  "uses"  i s taken  third  party  f o r the p u r p o s e s o f  the  or r e p r i n t i n g "  a book" as  selling"  1 8 5  or may  to  means  this the  reproduced reproduce  competing  with  91 it,  making a new work b a s e d  merely  enhancing  original.  These  competing, copyright while  freely  regimes  extend  8  7  i n . Intrinsic  devices,  remain  camps. as  like  1 8 8  such  these  i n the e a r l y  underpinnings  of early copyright. interesting  which  raised  abridgments"  products  infringements,  land  theoretical  in this  A d o c t r i n e emerged works  themselves  d i d not original  o f labour d e s e r v i n g of c o p y r i g h t . Lord Hardwicke  i n Gyles v. Wilcox  of  of copyright  the  protected  b u t were  gained  man's  by t h e c a s e s  that  constitute  no  stages  the status of abridgments. of  have  terms and i s s u e s were  regard concerned "genuine  "fair  and v i d e o c a s s e t t e  i n understanding  issue  under  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  figurative  Although  they  most  assist  ease  uses,  a l l o w o t h e r s t o be  photocopiers in a  derivative  exceptions  uses,  the increased  development,  The  t o many  provisions that  1  technology  identified  Contemporary  use"  through  between w a r r i n g  uses.  statutory  engaged  recording  respectively,  intrinsic  protection  of the  termed,  general  or " f a i r  reprographic  and  by t h e o r i g i n a l , o r  h i s enjoyment  o f use c a n be  derivative  importance  not  facilitating  types  providing  dealing"  or  on o r i n s p i r e d  (1740):  B u t t h i s [ f i n d i n g o f i n f r i n g e m e n t ] must n o t be c a r r i e d s o f a r a s t o r e s t r a i n persons from making a r e a l and f a i r a b r i d g m e n t , f o r a b r i d g m e n t s may w i t h g r e a t p r o p r i e t y be c a l l e d a new book, b e c a u s e not o n l y the paper and p r i n t , but t h e i n v e n t i o n , l e a r n i n g a n d judgment o f t h e a u t h o r i s shewn i n them, a n d i n many c a s e s  said  92 are extremely useful, t h o u g h i n some i n s t a n c e s p r e j u d i c i a l , by m i s t a k i n g a n d c u r t a i l i n g t h e s e n s e o f an a u t h o r , ( a t 490)  Citing  Gyles,  the Court  i n Tonson  (1752)  stated  the i s s u e  t o be  existing the  work  status  of  minor  (Company  (Read  v.  the s i m i l a r  agreed  that  kind  case  i n an  to abridgments  which  involved  v . Seymour  (1677) ) o r  Burnett  v.  of t r a n s l a t i o n s : i n general,  represented  only  'evasive'  Chetwood  the L o r d  denied  (1722)  Chancellor original  from t h e " c a r e a n d p a i n s " o f t h e t r a n s l a t o r , o f  which  t r a n s l a t i o n was  alterations Judges  translations,  nevertheless  Merchant  work.  ) amendments.  raised  the  work'  and  a new  of Stationers  Hodges  work r e s u l t i n g  whether  e f f e c t i v e l y created 'new  v. Walker  the  Statute  granted  an  somewhat  intended  injunction,  to  encourage.  in part  because  He the  too o r i g i n a l :  ...the p l a i n t i f f finds that the s a i d t r a n s l a t i o n i s e r r o n e o u s , and t h e s e n s e and words o f the a u t h o r m i s t a k e n , and r e p r e s e n t e d i n an a b s u r d and r i d i c u l o u s manner, ( a t 1009) Thus, interests they  of authors  d i d not  'derivative creation his  despite  work.  derivative  courts'  and  understand  rights',  o f new  the  their  works b r o u g h t and  u s e most c l o s e l y  assigns  the property  i.e., rights  Translations  tendency  to  protect  i n the e a r l y right  i n the author  to  abridgments related  cases,  encompass  to control  a b o u t by a s u b s t a n t i a l represent  t o pure c o p y i n g ,  the  the  taking  of  forms  of  certainly  93 when c o m p a r e d and  to  performing  many  in  respect,  publishing  that  authors  of  were  in  expression  not  constitute  right  of  original  the  the  The  legal  copyright  later  1 9 0  filming,  lifeblood  author  had,  restricted work  derivative  as  their  to  virtually  the  owning  uses  of in the in  more  suggests than  work embodied. A l t h o u g h  between  received  ,  for  viewed  which  (protected)  considerably  dramatisation,  industries.  protection  expression  distinction  as  1 8 9  absence  particular  narrow  reprinting  entirety. The  which  copyright  a  and  uses—such  public—  contemporary  this  its  other  ideas  (not  protected)  explicit judicial  early  cases  the the and  recognition  i m p l i c i t l y accept  the  limit.  2.  Scope o f The  raised  the  early in  Right  copyright  factual  alleged  infringers  of  way  the  in  relationships 1709)  under  up  i n M i l l a r and the  bases  or  in  relationships.  terms  courts between set  literary  Taylor  addressed  between  pirates.  which  the  cases  disputes  existing the  c a s e s making  i n M i l l a r v.  out  As  authors,  such,  they  conceived these by  the  property  and  philosophy  the  rights  of  debate which their those  and  glimpses  usually  Statute  for  issues  printers  reveal  parties,  D o n a l d s o n , however, d i r e c t e d law  particular  and  (after  Anne.  The  culminated  discussion  at  rights  and  94 The  Millar  Court  before  i t to consider  common  law c o p y r i g h t .  common  law r i g h t  the  principal  adopted emerged, This a to  may w e l l  prevent rooted  possibility constituted well  which  i n fleeting  copyright  of the author's  a  perpetuity—  right  also  t h a t had  i n the e a r l y  cases.  trade-off works. with  for a perpetual  In dissent,  right  Mr. J u s t i c e  t h e common l a w r i g h t  had unbounded over  ideas  right  scope,  i n the  that i t  and knowledge a s  expression.  J u s t i c e s W i l l e s and A s t o n  J . commenced  qualifications  i n recognising  feature  references,  of printed  an e x p a n s i v e  i t s main  r i g h t s under a  t o t h e j u d g e s , and t h e p l a i n t i f f ,  hisdifficulties that  judges,  of the issue  o f t h e London b o o k s e l l e r s —  concept  (a) The M a j o r i t y —  in  goal  and a p p r o p r i a t e  as o r i g i n a l  Willes  had.as  have a p p e a r e d  piracy  by v i r t u e  The m a j o r i t y  litigation  i f only  required  t h e scope o f t h e author's  the r e s t r i c t e d  reasonable  Yates  was  limiting  the qualifications  h i s opinion t h e impact  were t h e s e  by l i s t i n g  1  9  1  a series of  o f h i s judgment.  comments:  It i s found too [ i n the jury's v e r d i c t ] "that the defendant s o l d s e v e r a l copies o f the s a i d book." And t h e r e f o r e t h i s c a s e i s not embarrassed with any question, " w h e r e i n c o n s i s t s t h e i d e n t i t y o f a book." C e r t a i n l y bona fide i m i t a t i o n s , translations, and abridgments a r e different; and, i n respect of the p r o p e r t y , may be c o n s i d e r e d a s new w o r k s : but c o l o u r a b l e a n d f r a u d u l e n t v a r i a t i o n s w i l l n o t d o . ( a t 205)  Included  95 In  so  an  author's  own, the  saying,  for  he  accepted  having  the  control  common law  idea/ expression  subsequent  the  copyright  narrow c o p y r i g h t ,  over  'new  r i g h t . He  distinction  works'  later  derived  stated  w h i c h has  which  the  excluded from  his  essence  formed t h e  basis  of of  law:  . . . t h e l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n i s as the m a t e r i a l ; which always i s property. The book c o n v e y s k n o w l e d g e , i n s t r u c t i o n or e n t e r t a i n m e n t : but m u l t i p l y i n g c o p i e s i n p r i n t i s a q u i t e d i s t i n c t t h i n g from a l l t h e b o o k c o m m u n i c a t e s . And t h e r e i s no i n c o n g r u i t y , t o r e s e r v e t h a t r i g h t ; and y e t c o n v e y t h e f r e e use o f a l l the book teaches, (at 216) J u s t i c e Aston, approaching than  precedent,  copyright could  not  was be  incorporeal,  addressed  "quite known had  ideal to  the and  the  the  i s s u e s more f r o m p r i n c i p l e  argument imaginary"  common  law.  a physical manifestation  that  the  ( a t 216) The i n the  object and  as  right, printed  The present c l a i m i s f o u n d e d upon the o r i g i n a l r i g h t t o t h i s work, as b e i n g the m e n t a l l a b o u r o f the a u t h o r ; and t h a t t h e e f f e c t and p r o d u c e o f t h e l a b o u r i s h i s . It i s a personal, incorporeal property, s a l e a b l e a n d p r o f i t a b l e ; i t has indicia c e r t a : f o r , though the s e n t i m e n t s and d o c t r i n e may be c a l l e d i d e a l , y e t when the same a r e c o m m u n i c a t e d t o t h e s i g h t and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e v e r y man, by the medium of p r i n t i n g , the work becomes a d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e subject of property, and not totally d e s t i t u t e of corporeal p r o p e r t i e s , ( a t 221-222)  of such  though book:  96 Nevertheless, author's  labour,  different the  ownership  of the p h y s i c a l manifestation  t h e book, a n d o w n e r s h i p o f c o p y r i g h t  t h i n g s . The f o r m e r  book a n d i t s c o n t e n t s ,  permitted  every  of the  were two  u s e t o be made o f  save one:  He [the purchaser o f a book] may improve upon i t , i m i t a t e i t , t r a n s l a t e i t ; oppose i t s sentiments: b u t he buys no r i g h t t o p u b l i s h t h e i d e n t i c a l book, ( a t 226)  This  represented  willingness suggests  hallmark  facilitate  that only  said  This  t h e work  i t , or lending  i n Knaplock  striking; i t of a r t ,  great  which  w r i t e r s as  approach  would  not t o p u b l i s h i t to friends,  when,  version that  versifying  1 9 2  Mansfield  J J . in describing i n showing  the King  how  find  i t  but  outside  right  o r making  would e s t a b l i s h  followed  i n the  the lead of  t h e narrow  those  J . stated  property  the King's  tracked  h a d no  passages,  Aston  up h i s p a r t i c u l a r  Lord  of the B i b l e  Bible  v. C u r l ,  a c t s by t h e a u t h o r  intent" to give  and Aston  copyright  253).  the h o l d i n g  the c o p y r i g h t .  English  notion  of previous  endeavour.  t h e most e x p l i c i t  "manifest  Willes  he  studying  i s particularly  the c l a s s i c a l  e.g., copying  sense. Aston J . ' s  o f copyright protection.  Echoing  book,  imitations  of l i t e r a r y  uses,  the ambit  a  i n i t s narrowest  i m i t a t i o n o f t h e form  intrinsic to  to allow  he had i n mind  envisaged the  copyright  scope  rights  of  i n the  o f common  authors,  to restrain  others'  other  t r a n s l a t i o n s (at  97 Still,  as n a r r o w l y as t h e common law  Aston J . i m p l i e d "book".  that  In Tonson v.  i t might Collins  not be (1762),  right  was  restricted  described,  solely  to  the  B l a c k s t o n e had d e s c r i b e d  the o b j e c t o f v a l u e i n t h e a u t h o r ' s work i n t h i s  fashion:  T h e n e x t way o f p u b l i c a t i o n [ a f t e r o r a l p e r f o r m a n c e ] i s by w r i t i n g , o r d e s c r i b i n g i n c h a r a c t e r s , t h o s e w o r d s i n w h i c h an a u t h o r has c l o t h e d h i s i d e a s . Here the v a l u e w h i c h i s s t a m p e d upon t h e w r i t i n g a r i s e s merely from the matter i t conveys. C h a r a c t e r s a r e but t h e s i g n s o f words, and w o r d s a r e t h e v e h i c l e o f s e n t i m e n t s . The s e n t i m e n t t h e r e f o r e i s the t h i n g o f v a l u e , f r o m w h i c h the p r o f i t must a r i s e , ( a t 181)  Justice book  1  its  9  Aston's similarly  3  ideas,  essential  distinction t u r n e d on  "because  and  t h i s opened expression  finding  i t s doctrine  substantial  t h e door  part."  in  'embarrassing  q u e s t i o n wherein  Aston  J.  prepared  issue  "of  original One mention. on  the  other The  finding  existence" conditions  to  point  and  (Millar  v.  lies  work  ownership." from  in  and  actual  met  are  Taylor at  or (at  Willes'  the i d e n t i t y  to the  Justice  present  were  and  jury  in a  an  its  226)  i n each  the  book',  case  and  If  idea/  words  of the  composition,  the  of i t s  224) Aston's  'object' value".  literary  a  o f a book i n  sentiments  t h e o r y o f p r o p e r t y he a p p l i e d  "an  invention  the i d e n t i t y  Justice  leave  substantial  or d e r i v a t e  an  t o the e s s e n t i a l p r o b l e m a t i c of the  distinction,  was  between  a He  opinion  deserves  to copyright turned "distinguishable argued  composition.  that  both  However,  he  98 took p a i n s  t o show t h a t  must meet some t e s t Locke the  and  Grotius  merit  of  a  To  constitute a be  could  i t s property the  copying  was  for  sale  in  be  meant  literary  from  the  based  his  book,  on  Aside  from these  excluded copying  what  of  the  majority  a  t o an  the  enhanced  personal  Shebbeare  was  any  d e r i v a t i v e uses,  book n o t  copies  right  termed  an  (1758) t h a t  The  s a l e and  i n Duke  the defendant  c o u l d do  i n c l u d i n g copy, i t f o r p e r s o n a l  he  publish  with  not  the  Collins  infringe The  i t for  majority's easily  conceded by  majority  thereby  crucial,  or  of  authorship:  the  judgment.  copyright  the  only,  and  'intrinsic  manuscript did  over  ruling  market,  that  a  publishing  of  of  works'  implicitly  use'—that profit,  is,  but  for  Queensberry  Blackstone  with  so  v. the  long  as  consistent in  library  Tonson did  not  1 9 4  what  i t perceived  commercially whole  the  translations.  anything  circulating  protected  means o f  'new  is entirely  lending i t s b o o k s .  over  in  expression.  reasons,  Similarly,  the  for p r o f i t ' )  the m a j o r i t y a l s o  f o r purposes of  use.  factor  perpetual  exclusive right  i n c l u d i n g abridgments  be  or  in Millar,  i n h i s work, w h i l e  ' m u l t i p l y i n g of  property  might  that  worth  as  "book", i . e . , t h e p r e c i s e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f h i s  Excluded  v.  c r e d i t e d to  He  argued  object  status.  narrowly  (the  'necessary'.  not  position  confined  a p o i n t he  i t measured  proprietary interest  duration,  his  —  value,  summarise  author's  of usefulness, o r —  book,  informational determining  ' a c t u a l v a l u e ' d i d not mean t h e  copies  exploiting for  to  be  a  work  sale.  The  99 corresponding was  'piracy'  sensible and  between  as  the  mischief  it  not  majority  right also  and  subtle  but  serious the  to  flaw  in  of  of  which  left  the  Justice  distinction;  the  the  form  majority's  Yates  however,  "object  only  Yates the  viewed  staking  author's of  his  232),  sentiments.  As  such,  never  of  a  Millar between  unprotected to  a  and  make  pointed  this out  justification  a of  because  countenance  labour" an the  p o s i t i o n  was (at  common property  to a  in  common  physical but  not  be  principles the  absence  less  of  all the  than  had of  was  ideas  and  never a  [rights in principal  the  'copy'  subject  object:  ...but t h e o b j e c t s o f them the nature of p r o p e r t y ] ,  law  object,  the  composite  could law  for  nothing  230),  intangible copy  Copyright  claim  manuscript  own  (at  right  of  right.  ideal"  property  the  property  The  he  theoretical  the  The  from  assignees  failed  as  bookselling  distinction  former  J u s t i c e  ideas.  as  market.  the  Scope o f  as  of  literary  claiming  a  a l l .  the  itself  perception,  f o l l o w e d  in  for  a  state  p r i n t i n g ,  printers  addressed  Such  the  ( b ) J u s t i c e Y a t e s on t h e  copyright  could  printers.  produce  to  crucial  common l a w  "all  but  expression  available  judgment  plaintiffs  recognised  freely  the  terms  of  the  authors,  perpetual  ideas  in  t e c h n o l o g y of  which  competing  appeared  preoccupation cases:  to  of  a and  physical  100 s u b j e c t t o which they r e l a t e , o r i n which t h e y e n j o y , m u s t be c o r p o r e a l . And t h i s [ i s ] a p o s i t i o n which a r i s e s from t h e necessary nature of a l l p r o p e r t y . For, p r o p e r t y h a s some c e r t a i n , d i s t i n c t a n d separate possession: the object of i t , t h e r e f o r e , must be s o m e t h i n g v i s i b l e . . . . w h i c h has bounds t o d e f i n e i t , and some marks t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t . ( a t 232)  Property the  arose  owner  a  attributes notional,  from  right lost  occupancy  and p o s s e s s i o n ,  of exclusion  their  meaning  not c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to prevent  trespass.  and p u r p o s e  i f made  merely  i n the m a t e r i a l  world.  to objects  Justice  Y a t e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d between p r o p e r t y  right',  which  'object  of property  be  he a g r e e d  corporeal.  could not  was  incorporeal,  physical  n o t know t h e b o u n d a r i e s  be p o s s i b l e  meaning  even  demarcation,  t h e y must  to identify  t h e moment  meaning  necessarily  third  respect,  These  'property  and p r o p e r t y  r i g h t ' , which he b e l i e v e d must Without  1 9 5  and g r a n t e d t o  parties  and i t w o u l d when  property  commenced. Justice the  idea,  Yates  not i t s  manuscript only of  personal  exclusive  the object  as a s i n g u l a r o b j e c t ,  owing  applied  a t common  mediating  role  author's  invention.  (as w e l l  law. Yates which  He  was  understood  as r u l e s  capable of being  of the t e x t ,  of copyright  t o which the u s u a l  t o i t s communicative  embodiment o f e x p r e s s i o n  made  that  p a r t i c u l a r expression.  property  confidentiality an  insisted  rules  o f t r u s t and  nature)  and n o t a s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d and  J . d i d not grasp  gave  a  His understanding  the  fixed better  form  the  to the  describes  101 present-day a  c o p y r i g h t , with i t s p r o t e c t i o n of the substance of  fictional  right  work  t o make  majority  He  copyright  found  has  extended  fell  that  limits,  or t r a n s l a t i o n s ,  located  a property whether  only to duplications  than t h e  the  Millar  right  t o an  theory:  that  however,  author's party  the " f r u i t s "  reward uses  have  law  and n o t t o  unconvincing.  i s entitled  The  to the  t o r e a p where he  d e r i v e d from  intellectual  no n a t u r a l , d e f i n i t i o n . I f  f o r h i s l a b o u r meant p r o f i t s  of h i s composition,  outside the property  common  f o r c o p y r i g h t i n the dual  a person  an i n c o r p o r e a l  o f d u r a t i o n or  of a text,  logically  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  n o t sown. W i t h  third  which  o f h i s l a b o u r , and no one i s e n t i t l e d  labour, the  books,  the m a j o r i t y ' s p o s i t i o n  of the labour  fruits  was  h a d no p r i n c i p l e d  abridgments  facets  of e n t i r e  J . ' s concern  incorporeal  majority  copies  rights,  r e c o g n i s e d as c o p y r i g h t .  Yates  scope.  and o f v a r i o u s d e r i v a t i v e  then  almost  flowing no  right:  I f t h e buyer o f a book may not make what u s e o f i t he p l e a s e s , what l i n e c a n be drawn t h a t w i l l n o t t e n d t o s u p e r s e d e a l l h i s d o m i n i o n o v e r i t ? he may n o t l e n d i t , i f he i s n o t t o p r i n t i t ; because i t w i l l i n t r e n c h u p o n t h e a u t h o r ' s p r o f i t s . So t h a t a n o b j e c t i o n m i g h t be made e v e n t o h i s l e n d i n g t h e book t o h i s f r i e n d s ; f o r he may p r e v e n t t h o s e f r i e n d s from b u y i n g t h e book; and s o t h e p r o f i t s o f s u c h s a l e of i t w i l l not accrue t o the author, ( a t 234)  from  activity  102 In  other  words,  on  what  of  the a u t h o r —  the value  u s e s o f t h e book  of a composition  depended  t h e law made t h e e x c l u s i v e  law d e t e r m i n e d v a l u e , s o v a l u e  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  precisely preserve  could  not s e r v e  f o r law:  From [publication], the value, with r e s p e c t t o t h e a u t h o r , d e p e n d s upon h i s right to the sole and perpetual p u b l i c a t i o n o f them: and t h e g r e a t p o i n t i n q u e s t i o n i s , 'whether he i s i n t i t l e d t o that r i g h t , or n o t . But l a y i n g this o b s e r v a t i o n a s i d e , mere v a l u e , ( a l l may s e e ) , w i l l not d e s c r i b e the property i n t h i s . The a i r , t h e l i g h t , t h e s u n , a r e o f v a l u e i n e s t i m a b l e : b u t who c a n c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n t h e m ? mere v a l u e d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e p r o p e r t y , ( a t 230) 1  The of  latter  the author  phrase  reveals J u s t i c e Yates'  as an i n t e l l e c t u a l  ideas which, l i k e  i n t e r m i x i n g h i s labour  by  o t h e r s . Yates J . d i d not share author  the majority's  as o r i g i n a t o r o f v a l u e ,  o f an e x c l u s i v e  reward o n l y  up  those  e n r i c h i n g t h e common c u l t u r e f o r u s e  right  legislation,  t o copy  impression of  a n d o f works  e x p r e s s i o n . He d i d b e l i e v e t h a t a u t h o r s form  taking  view  t h e a i r a n d s u n l i g h t , a r e a l l a b o u t him, a n d  by  the  labourer,  underlying  deserved for a  of unique  reward  limited  a n d n o t common l a w , c o u l d  i n the  time,  design.  a  103 D.  PERSONAL INTERESTS OF THE AUTHOR: LORD MANSFIELD AND THE LITERARY PROPERTY QUESTION  1.  law  The F i r s t  P u b l i c a t i o n Cases  The  cases  four  right  i n an  cited  in Millar  author  to publish,  p u b l i c a t i o n o f , h i s work p l a y e d property printed  debate. books,  Queensberry Forrester  Since  these  cases—  v. W a l l e r  If  a  right  Pope  (1758),  (1741)—could  b a s i s .they m e r e l y e n f o r c e d  proponents of l i t e r a r y  v. Curl Webb  property  a common  authorise  the  i n the l i t e r a r y  o f Anne  protected (1741),  v . Rose  only  Duke o f  ( 1 7 3 2 ) , and  n o t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d on t h e  the s t a t u t o r y  to publish  or  a central role  the Statute  v. Shebbeare  as recognising  existed  right. a t common  law, the  a r g u e d , t h e n how c o u l d  the a c t  o f p u b l i c a t i o n , unaccompanied by any r e n u n c i a t i o n o f r i g h t s by the  author  Certainly  or h i s assignee,  f o r Lord  Mansfield  effectively  extinguish  t h i s was t h e key p o i n t :  I f t h e c o p y b e l o n g s t o an a u t h o r , after p u b l i c a t i o n ; i t c e r t a i n l y b e l o n g e d t o him b e f o r e . B u t i f i t does n o t b e l o n g t o him a f t e r ; w h e r e i s t h e common l a w t o b e found, which says "there i s such a property before?" a l l the metaphysical s u b t i l t i e s from t h e nature o f the t h i n g may be e q u a l l y o b j e c t e d t o t h e p r o p e r t y before. I t i s incorporeal; i t relates to ideas detached from any p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e . ( M i l l a r v . T a y l o r a t 252)  i t ?  104 In  Duke  view,  of Queensberry  had no t r o u b l e  the d e f e n d a n t  (1758)  Chancery,  distinguishing  i n Lord  between  Mansfield's  the manuscript i n  Gwynn's hands a n d t h e p r o p e r t y  interest:  Mr. Gwynn m i g h t h a v e t h r o w n i t i n t o t h e f i r e , had he p l e a s e d . B u t a t t h e d i s t a n c e of near a hundred y e a r s , t h e c o p y was adjudged the p r o p e r t y o f Lord Clarendon's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; a n d Mr. Gwynn's p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g i t , w i t h o u t t h e i r c o n s e n t , was a d j u d g e d an i n j u r y t o t h a t p r o p e r t y . . . (at 252)  The  Lords  Chancellor i n both  and  Pope v . C u r l  acts  as u s u r p i n g  representatives) But  other  the f i r s t  a profit  important  Yates  publication  used  spoken  t o which  were e n t i t l e d  equally  cases. J u s t i c e  (1741) h a d a l s o  Duke o f Q u e e n s b e r r y  should  interests  decide  were  them a s t h e b a s i s  cases from  of the defendants'  the authors they  (1758)  (and t h e i r to publish.  at play  i n those  for distinguishing  Millar:  . . . i n a l l these cases the p u b l i c a t i o n s were s u r r e p t i t i o u s , a g a i n s t t h e w i l l o f t h e owner [ o f t h e m a n u s c r i p t s ] , b e f o r e he had c o n s e n t e d t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f them; a n d , a s s u c h , t h e y w i l l h a v e no e f f e c t upon t h e p r e s e n t q u e s t i o n . I t i s c e r t a i n e v e r y man h a s a r i g h t t o keep h i s own s e n t i m e n t s , i f he p l e a s e s : he has c e r t a i n l y a r i g h t t o judge whether he w i l l make them p u b l i c , o r commit them o n l y to the sight of h i s f r i e n d s . In that s t a t e , the manuscript i s , i n every sense, h i s p e c u l i a r p r o p e r t y ; and no man c a n t a k e i t f r o m him, o r make any u s e o f i t w h i c h he h a s n o t a u t h o r i z e d , w i t h o u t being g u i l t y of a v i o l a t i o n of h i s property.... But t h i s does not a p p l y t o t h e p r e s e n t q u e s t i o n ( a t 242)  105 In  other  words,  personal not  rather  the author  than  commercial  a  manuscript,  to publish  recognised  as a form  right  guilty  was  had l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s nature  of a breach  i n d e c i d i n g whether o r  interests  of property  of a  right;  t h e common  the v i o l a t o r  of t r u s t  law  of that  or confidence, not  m e r e l y o r n e c e s s a r i l y an a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p r o f i t s . Lord  Mansfield  implicated aspect  i n the f i r s t  of the property  copyright's grant of  capacity  t o the author  publication  said  also  debate  the personal  publication  right  cases  to protect  those  of exclusive control  judicial up  interests  as an  important  o f common law c o p y r i g h t ;  was f u n d a m e n t a l  o f any o t h e r  property  identified  interests over  given  to and i n c l u d i n g  through  t h e whole  to h i s r u l i n g .  opinion  indeed,  This  during  a  course  c a n n o t be  the l i t e r a r y  Donaldson  v.  Beckett  (1774). The derived to was  nature from  and f u n c t i o n o f t h e c o p y r i g h t  n a t u r a l law was a c o p y r i g h t  p r o p r i e t a r y and p e r s o n a l significant  letters']  t h a t Pope h a d "a v e r y  contents:  which  their.publication." commercial  value,  prevent  their  asserted  common  control and  over  artistic  interests.  made  public  letters  important,  Pope  The v e r y  law c o p y r i g h t was t h a t  a control  that  both  Mansfield i t  anxious may  right  essence  [his  to stop  have  had a  i t provided  t h e u s e s made o f t h e p r o d u c t s labour,  responded  To L o r d  him t h e more  disclosure.  Mansfield  i m p e r f e c t memory o f  ( a t 252) The  b u t more  that  Lord  had to  of the  the author  of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l  had economic  v a l u e and  106 preserved and  the  indeed  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  h i s p u b l i c persona.  publication  the  the  Should  author this  and  right  r e l a t i o n s h i p between a u t h o r  and  his  not  work,  survive  work w o u l d  be  ruptured:  He i s no more m a s t e r o f the use o f h i s own n a m e . He has no c o n t r o l over the c o r r e c t n e s s o f h i s own work. He c a n n o t prevent a d d i t i o n s . He c a n n o t retract e r r o r s . He c a n n o t amend; o r c a n c e l a f a u l t y e d i t i o n . Any one may p r i n t , p i r a t e and p e r p e t u a t e t h e i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t o the d i s g r a c e and against the w i l l of the a u t h o r ; may p r o p a g a t e s e n t i m e n t s under h i s name, w h i c h he d i s a p p r o v e s , r e p e n t s and i s ashamed o f . He c a n e x e r c i s e no d i s c r e t i o n as t o t h e manner i n w h i c h , or t h e p e r s o n s by whom h i s work s h a l l be p u b l i s h e d , ( a t 252)  2.  Personal The  Boosey with  common v i e w w h i c h  i n 1854  the  a  purposes  henceforth exception  common  of  a  were  King's  law.  but  Bench  the  the  be  Statute  holding  found  books by  copyright right,  determined  right  to of  Beckett  first  Anne,  i n J e f f e r y s v.  that  this the  whose the  a  right  agreed  common had  law been  S t a t u t e o f Anne  became  by  (1774)  House o f L o r d s  in Millar  further  statutory to  the  i n Donaldson the  consequence,  was by  followed  for a l l published  As  1 9 6  affected  that  existed,  extinguished  and  was  Court  copyright  1709.  I n t e r e s t s A f t e r D o n a l d s o n V.  in  for a l l intents  terms  and  scope  legislature.  The  p u b l i c a t i o n which,  not  retained  i t s roots  in  the  107 Lyman law  Patterson's  development  Donaldson t o the U.S.  commercial a  statutes  concept  personal  included  history.  respect  moral  A  1 9 8  Act  on  British  1 9 7  the  of  by  rights  Europe's  striking 1921,  Imperial  with of  the  copyright appear  exception  modeled c l o s e l y Copyright  a m o r a l r i g h t s p r o v i s i o n i n s.  and  only  r e c e n t l y s t a r t e d to  law.  Copyright  common  effected  themselves or  a  interests peculiar  continental only  statutory  i n C a n a d a . The  by  moral,  has  r e j e c t i o n of  copyright  concerned  droit  e a r l y stage,  i n almost every other 1911,  of  f a m i l i a r to  Anglo-American  occurred  the  author's  recognition  r i g h t s . Le  laws f r o m an in  an  that  i s l a r g e l y borne out  copyright  author,  for  stifled  author  point  Act  of  12(7):  I n d e p e n d e n t l y of the a u t h o r ' s copyright, and even a f t e r the assignment, e i t h e r wholly or p a r t i a l l y , of the said copyright, t h e a u t h o r has t h e r i g h t t o c l a i m a u t h o r s h i p o f t h e work, as w e l l as the r i g h t t o r e s t r a i n any distortion, m u t i l a t i o n or o t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n of the w o r k t h a t w o u l d be p r e j u d i c i a l t o h i s honour or r e p u t a t i o n .  In  the  1988  Amendments  were expanded and  3.  Personal The  ss.  12.2,  reputation:  the  authorship  or  the  elaborated.  I n t e r e s t s and  personal  12.1,  to  Copyright  and  Copyright  18.2  i n t e r e s t s of use  a  the  moral  s.  12(7)  and  rights  ^-^^  i n t e r e s t s which 18.1  Act  Law  former  protect paternity  pseudonym)  2  0  0  concern (the and  the  right of  the  the  new  author's to  claim  work's  108 integrity. from  The r i g h t s enumerated a r e s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t  2 0 1  the property  amendments— copyright,  right,  making  the moral  a n d making  them c l o s e r  although  certain  rights  them w a i v a b l e  2  0  of equal —  2  protected  Copyright  by  itself  arrangements which  the moral permits  to exercise  can and cannot  actions  such  to p r o t e c t  law.  provision  be made  through  of c o n t r o l  to  bring  and p a s s i n g  of f i r s t  remained  the only  The B r i t i s h  publication  into  to decide  2 0 3  the uses  Common l a w  o f f are also  available  2 0 4  what  i s perhaps privacy.  2 0 5  Pope v . C u r l  (1741) been t h e p r e s e r v e  publication.  After  part  of copyright  1921  incorporated  statutory  recognised  copyright.  the r i g h t  ,  this  a t common  protection  the statutes  judicial  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . F o r example: an u n p u b l i s h e d copyright f o r an duration; 2 0 7  of  first  Nevertheless,  2 0 6  whether o r n o t t o p u b l i s h under  Donaldson  A c t o f 1911 a n d t h e C a n a d i a n  special  (i)  Act.  contractual  i n t e r e s t of authors:  Copyright  Act of  of the  over  of h i s w o r k .  12(7) of the A c t d i d not p r o t e c t  i n t e r e s t had s i n c e  Copyright  right  effectively  the author's reputational i n t e r e s t s .  the right  right  rights  a degree  the most f u n d a m e n t a l p e r s o n a l  of  duration  i n a l l circumstances,  the author  as defamation  Section  That  t h e 1988  together.  These i n t e r e s t s a r e not s o l e l y nor, best  of  continued  to obtain  and as a matter  work has indefinite  the  of  109 (ii)  u n a u t h o r i s e d p u b l i c a t i o n of an u n p u b l i s h e d work constitutes unfair dealing; 2  (iii)  0  8  the Act provides compulsory licences only for published works. 2 0 9  The  special  suggests granted with  treatment  i t may in  the  have Act.  recognising  Charter  of x  statutes  The evidenced,  contract  nor  to  other,  v.  did and  not  return  the  of  could  treated  the be  author  be  could  effected  the  of  a  Act  works o f the  of  flirted  the  Canadian  and  seizure"  LeSueur  specify  the  -^.  like  other  express  of  a the  in  The  publication  the  early  author  had  publisher  to  be  to  the  merchandise,  r i g h t not terms.  and  to p u b l i s h , The  a  neither  ruled  Court  his  publisher.  under  author.  is  Canadian sold  to a  reasons i t decided  manuscript  however,  privacy  first  Lyon M a c k e n z i e  the  privacy  expression.  r i g h t of  ZJ  adopted  of  remains,  fashion,  alienate his by  8  rights  has  variety  Canada, F i t z p a t r i c k C . J . ,  only  publication  other  "search  protecting  for p o l i t i c a l  Supreme C o u r t not  for  in mirror  Co.  than  i n s.  protect  biography of W i l l i a m  to p u b l i s h , so  &  of  Supreme C o u r t  privacy"  Copyright  nature  albeit  Morang  manuscript  which  and  unique  the  Freedoms,  instrument  author's w r i t t e n ,  right  p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s have  The  significant  The  " r i g h t of and  the  d i f f e r e n t status Canada,  Several  u  interests.  case  In  Rights  provision. privacy  a  a  accorded  J  duty to  do  In  the  a  book  that that  while  this  could  in  essence  I  110 distinguished  between  commercial c o p y r i g h t to f i r s t In formed in  letters  should  publication. the  the  their  argued  the  United  seminal  that and  what t h e y  the  1890  p u b l i s h , and  for  the  early  the  as  the  article  "The  private writings i t s previous  English  argument o f Right  injunctions granted  other  saw  he  undisputed  r i g h t to  author's  the  right  2 1 4  State,  foundation  publisher's  copyright  Brandeis  to P r i v a c y " .  to prevent  d i d not  narrow  and 2 1 5  cases Warren They  publication  r e s t on  property  of in  sense:  The p r i n c i p l e which p r o t e c t s personal w r i t i n g s and a l l other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against p u b l i c a t i o n i n any f o r m i s i n r e a l i t y n o t the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v a t e property, but t h a t o f an i n v i o l a t e p e r s o n a l i t y . ° 2 r  Judge  Jon  O.  commenting on  Newman the  recently  expanded  E n g l i s h c a s e s he  on  this  insight.  said:  T h e r e i s s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n i n the e a r l y cases that while the right being a r t i c u l a t e d was one of property, the interest being protected was one of p r i v a c y . Why then d i d the c o u r t s not p r o t e c t p r i v a c y as s u c h ? The answer l i e s i n t h e law o f r e m e d i e s . P r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t c o p y i n g r e q u i r e d an i n j u n c t i o n . The equity courts doubted their power t o issue i n j u n c t i o n s to p r o t e c t 'personal' r i g h t s , b u t c o n f i d e n t l y commanded r e s t r a i n t o f p u b l i c a t i o n to p r o t e c t property rights. And s o t h e law o f l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t v was e n l i s t e d i n the s e r v i c e o f p r i v a c y .  In  Ill 4.  Lord M a n s f i e l d : Authors  and  Property  Rights  In r e t u r n i n g t o the a n a l y s i s o f L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s in  Millar  its  Taylor,  head, p r o v i d e s  service to  v.  of  common  Bench  law.  precedent  Aston  did  so  property.  was  Lord  cases  whether  Mansfield for  as  the  aware and  prepared  with  interests  beyond  of h i s  phrase  After  from  Newman,  found  in  but  right.  unlike  issue  property the  author's  the  presented at  Willes  and  Mansfield  was  to acknowledge t h a t those the  on  publication  Justices Lord  in  existed  first  them,  turned  enlisted  a l l , the  literary  property  well,  fully  profits  last  a u s e f u l f o c u s : p r i v a c y was  literary  King's  the  judgment  cases  opportunity  to  dealt  reap  the  labour:  I t i s j u s t , t h a t a n o t h e r s h o u l d not u s e h i s name, w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t . I t i s f i t t h a t he s h o u l d j u d g e when t o p u b l i s h , or whether he w i l l e v e r p u b l i s h . I t i s f i t he s h o u l d n o t o n l y c h o o s e t h e t i m e , but t h e m a n n e r o f p u b l i c a t i o n ; how many; w h a t v o l u m e ; what p r i n t . I t i s f i t , he s h o u l d c h o o s e t o whose c a r e he w i l l t r u s t the accuracy and c o r r e c t n e s s of the impression; i n whose h o n e s t y he will c o n f i d e , not to f o i s t i n a d d i t i o n s . . . (at 252)  In t h i s p a s s a g e he  identified  moral  right  right:  maintain Lord  work's  Mansfield,  would of  the  the  g i v e an  his  right.  the  author  c r e a t i o n was  to  the  claim  integrity  and  control  a  later  authorship, the  which  to preserve itself  interests  right  to  copyright  h i s connection  justification  of  comprised the  right  reputation. at to  common the  the  by to To law  object  property  112 The  other  question  did  physicalist  judges not  who  advert, to  concept the  of  the  Yates  viewed  right  t o the m a n u s c r i p t as  ownership  considered  right  rights  first an  f o r a t a k i n g without  breach  of  after  trust  against  receiving  commercial  solely  the in  Justices  with  benefits  of  to  the  using  justification and  so  how  the  the  express  as  author  or  or  the  implied,  of  non-  of  his  themselves  the  advisory  Yates,  any  object  reaping  the  of  manuscript  concerned  in  and  the  a had  trespass  identify  in  Willes  followed  material  opinions  W i l l e s and  common  Personal  of  the  copyright  rights,  from  could  his  being  had  Lord  of  Aston  JJ.  copyright  as  opinion those  of  and  any  indeed  to and  moral  characteristics  the  deal with of  contrast  non-alienable  Mansfield  right,  preserve  in  those  interests  property  law  individual, law  2 1 9  personal  f o r the  author  his  Justice  8  in  published  interest  amendments.  absence  1  with  i n a d d i t i o n to a c l a i m  author  envisaged  lifetime  the  actions  c h a r a c t e r i z e d as  Canadian 1988  2  property  approaches.  are  the  to  who  and  alienable.  rights,  in  until from  and  accord  which the  otherwise  the  Aston  In  property  over  duty,  not  of  i n Donaldson  perpetual  rights  a  did  Mansfield  property  party  author's  respective  Lord  limited  the  rise  his creative labour,  judges their  He  interest  creation.  a  literary  publication essentially  consent,  i t under  confidentiality.  of  object  gave  trover  issue.  objects  of  that  this  the  did  not,  apart  author them i n  as  a  detail  consideration  interests outside  of the  113 contractual Nor  did  r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s p u b l i s h e r i s not  Lord  the a u t h o r  Mansfield  c o u l d a s s e r t the  the  work, a l t h o u g h  The  significance  the  centrality  author's for  his  reasons  which  he  efforts  right  to  author  a c r e a t o r , as  as  a  fuller  t h e use  majority  exists  jurisdictions. the  their of  value  assignees  of  the  integrity  of  to  be  the  case.  interests  reward  he of  of  in  the  the  author  c o u l d make f r o m his  limited  work by  responded  for  something  well  which  the  sale,  statute, as  in  Lord  to  of the  first a  publication  dichotomy  p r o p r i e t a r y and  one  hand, L o r d  of  something  reward.  the  On  in  copyright  in  Mansfield's about  cases  the  personal  important  the  possessive  other,  remained  in Millar  theoretical  interests the view  which  common  law  represented  property  interests  purposes; concerns  the  majority  i n d i v i d u a l i s m , ^" like  creative individual  private  the  to h i s p e r s o n a l i t y .  On  p u r e l y commercial  particular  t h e maker o f  core  personal  constituting for  or  rights:  i n c o r p o r a t e s a p r o t e c t i o n o f p e r s o n h o o d as w e l l  material  using  which  the  embodied a f o r m o f of  term  at  r e c o g n i t i o n of  the  profit  for a  reveals  r e l a t i o n s h i p accorded  saw  copies  reward  i n some f a s h i o n i n t e g r a l I n sum,  this  personal  i n the  i n p e r p e t u i t y or saw  still  implied  gave  multiply  Mansfield  the  to maintain  e n d e a v o u r . Where o t h e r s  exclusive  by  right  heirs  o f L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s o p i n i o n , however, l i e s  his original  whether  e x p l a i n whether  surprising.  as  privacy possessor  i.e., finding a  reason  for  judgment  i n the to  as  sense  justify  of  property  i n the  author's  establishing  a  114 commercial  right  identified  the  interests development prime  proper ty  of  intellectual of  his  from  to  a  internal  logic  of  Millar  This  e x t e n s i v e U.S.  Early to  be  cases,  free  of p e r s o n a l Warren.  of  has  lives  waiver.  "right  of  the  rights.  A  publicity"  now  MISAPPROPRIATION  of  interests  rights,  majority's  least  one  OF  concern  which  treament  of  a  is  the  of  the  modern c o u n t e r p a r t :  personality  in this  and  itself  area than  r e c o g n i s i n g the  unwanted  with  uses  commercial  the  right  more  with  with the  Because  to p u b l i c And  of  of  right  photographs  endeavours,  or  inspired  the  i n f o r m a t i o n were  2 2 2  related  of  of the  Canadian  experiences.  from  2 2 1  and  property  at  will  development  courts denied protection their  of  i n the  American cases  associations  and  system  section  and Commonwealth  personal  hallmark  protection  f o r m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of  publicity.  with  has  law.  legal  nature  actions  i s the  a  Lange  PUBLICITY RIGHTS  evolution  publication  property  David  concern  as  COUNTERPART:  personal  first  rights  i n American  PERSONALITY AND  duration.  judicial  thesis  CONTEMPORARY  The  of  into  example  A  limitless  conversion  well-established  E.  of  this  by  basis in a  t o i n d i v i d u a l s who  view  of  individuals  of  themselves,  public  work o f right  had  in  terms  of  a  Brandeis  of p r i v a c y ,  opened much o f  ( i e , most c e l e b r i t i e s ) ,  indeed,  disclosure  on  a  theory  privacy  right  115 narrowly issue  conceived  was  rather  commercial  the well-known  emerged  likeness.  products  f o r which  i s founded  which  stars  activities otherwise  of stage,  market  publicity such  copyright  only right  to  ( f o rinstance,  this  through  celebrated  o r t o enhance  to cause  i n any On  industry  and other  sell,  of  sales of publicity  t h e o r e t i c a l and  a debate  has raged  over  r i g h t s a r e i n h e r i t a b l e as p r o p e r t y )  o f name  have a  tried  right  or l i k e n e s s  their  commercial  strongly  law. From M i l l a r  until  was c o n c e i v e d  a f t e r an a u t h o r born  name a n d  commodity  The r o o t s  2 2 3  law continue  development  copyright  own  was t h e  h i s persona.  t o untangle of privacy  i n privacy  prevent a t which a  2 2 5  the e v o l u t i o n  the Imperial  as a commercial  t o withhold  to  u s e , and t h e n c e f o r t h  resembles  had p u b l i s h e d  and  t h e web by  up t o t h e p o i n t  right i n further e x p l o i t a t i o n .  This  1911,  i n one's  sports  commodities.  to i n d i v i d u a l s  authorise  problem  over which  t a l e n t s and t h e r i g h t s  fame d i r e c t l y ,  as C a l i f o r n i a  appropriation  property  right  responsible:  screen,  their  confusion  granting  they  he was  unrelated  practical  states  The d o c t r i n e  t o the l a t t e r  a property  per se , but  had c o n t r o l  t h e enormous m e r c h a n d i s i n g  i n privacy  whether  o f h i s fame.  to h i s professional  right  rights  figure  The c e l e b r i t y now had a f u r t h e r  addition  i n many c a s e s t h e  of privacy  public  i n response  of p u b l i c i t y ,  because  or breach  exploitation  eventually  in  made s e n s e  not d i s c l o s u r e  whether  right  this  Copyright right that  of  Act of arose  h i s work, t h e r e b y w a i v i n g a publication.  116 In  Canada,  received  a  right  recognition,  approximating  of p u b l i c i t y although  the p u b l i c i t y  as such  causes  provinces  statutes  their  prevent  include  unauthorised  Further,  in  amongst  commercial  Krouse v. C h r y s l e r  t h e n was, a c k n o w l e d g e d concept an  pattern  Several  states.  a personal  privacy  extends  addition should  have  roughly  opportunity, personal  follow  the Canadian  but l e s s  than  that  2 2 9  have  suggested  that  the a c t i o n  i n protecting  t h e moment  or  found  the right  one's  a t which  of commercial f o r instance,  identified  but because 2 3 1  *' D e v e l o p m e n t s i n  2 2 8  not simply  integrity.  c l a s s i f i e d as  of  i d e n t i t y and  one engages i n  f a c t s o r i m a g e s , and d e s e r v e s  the r i g h t ,  products,  J.A. a s he  make o f one's p e r s o n a l i t y . The p o i n t  beyond  features  •  n o t two r i g h t s j o i n e d b u t a s i n g l e r i g h t  t o any r i g h t s  associating their  personality".  interest  disclosure of private  the r i g h t to  Canada L t d . , E s t e y ,  of p e r s o n a l i t y ,  to c o n t r o l the use others that  privacy  " t h e common law d o e s c o n t e m p l a t e a  commentators  represents  i n both  u s e o f name o r l i k e n e s s .  jurisdictions  misappropriation  publicity,  is  protections  o f o f f e r i n g some p r o t e c t i o n ,  i n most A m e r i c a n  for  that  of one's  Commonwealth  closely  have e n a c t e d  i n t h e l a w o f t o r t s w h i c h may be b r o a d l y  appropriation  other  of a c t i o n  r i g h t a r e now e s t a b l i s h e d  s t a t u t e a n d common l a w . S e v e r a l which  has not y e t  with  because  respect i n  exploitation. to prevent one's  this  the a s s o c i a t i o n  J  U  One  others  from  personality  with  denies  a  offends  Such a t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h  commercial a sense o f tracks the  117 line  of  argument  copyright  as  developed  property  b o t h p e r s o n a l and The  between  while  strong, should  when  looking  the  available  generally  for  justification  rights  as  other  for a  i n t e r e s t s of  a  of  "right  by  publicity  manufacturing commercial  exploitation  for  may  the  because  is a  become t h e  this  sheer norm.  in  that  i t  i s not  so  "celebrity"  of  rewards.  down  rights  expression  however, the  breaks  copyright  activities  The  theory  'commodification'  for  publicity,  two  by-product  and  of  analogy  for  of p u b l i c i t y "  rights,  celebrity  rights  publicity,  purposes  enrichment. With a c o n t i n u i n g effected  and  original  fortuitous  envisaged  authors.  o v e r d r a w n . The  of  who  f u n c t i o n of p r o t e c t i n g  justification  production to  the  copyright be  Mansfield,  justification  The  follows  undertaken  not  the  theory.  encourages easily  at  Lord  performing  commercial  analogy  economic  by  stronger of  unjust  of p e r s o n a l i t y may  change,  purpose  of  and i t s  118  V.  A.  THEORIES OF  LIMITS OF  This  PRECEDENT AND  paper  considered  has  in (1)  during  course  establish involving the  a  of  the  by  various  personal  Taylor  in  a  of  roughly  into  i n E n g l a n d and  law  Scotland  (2)  books e x e r c i s e d of  in  interests  precedent  to  or  at  actions  vindicate  in publication.  stopped  to  cases  by  injunctive  Chancery  and  three  efforts  copyright;  series  commercial  directed  relation  from  illustrate did  the the  not  e i t h e r or  happen.  in  a  succeeded  the  of  p r i n c i p l e s at  Ireland  which  to  fields  decision,  ferae  (3)  argued  booksellers'  booksellers  chain  have seemed l i k e l y  this  and  and  litigation  copy  drawn  common  Crown;  the  London  REASON  and  Millar  At v.  (1769) began.  In to  the  Millar  TAYLOR  authority  i t  r i g h t s to p u b l i s h  authors  point,  legal  dividing  perpetual  brought  that  of  RESORT TO  the  cases preceding  exclusive  grant  THE  examined  Millar,  categories: the  PROPERTY IN MILLAR V.  v.  over  naturae,  the  fixing  common  of  the  right  authority  personal stake.  of  of  b o t h p a r t i e s would c i t e or  With  Aston  (1587) C r o .  claiming  out  law  place  i t might  defendant's  when  the  property,  Justice  Higgins  plaintiff  at  real a  Eliz  objection  possession  single  cited  ownership  was  property  an  that not  exception, Elizabethan  125, of  to  78  a  ER  383,  greyhound  the  dog,  as  subject  of  119 property.  He  d i d so p r e c i s e l y  common law r e c o g n i s e d basis  of p r i n c i p l e  o f owner) w i t h o u t One did  precedent.  n o t go t o r e a l with  may have  seemed  emerging  rights  the p o i n t  i n novel  or personal  why c o u n s e l  property  and  judges  f o r precedent.  relevance  of personal  t o the i s s u e property,  at  centred  bar.  right  t o copy  and  ownership.  represented:  More  important,  doctrine  of stare d e c i s i s  position  by t h e t i m e  and  personal  value, point  i s helpful  comfortable guidance.  B.  serving  cases  i n any event  the  2 3 4  i t s privileged drawn  have  from  real  had exemplary  as a u t h o r i t y f o r c o p y r i g h t , the  i n suggesting  looking  that  to sources  pre-1800  outside  courts  decided  were  law f o r  2 3 5  issue  common  o f whether  l a w demanded  which p r o p e r t y of  would  While  of possession shows,  had n o t y e t reached  which  NATURAL LAW THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT The  the  than  a s James Evans  of M i l l a r .  property  rather  the separation  2 3 3  as they  were on p o s s e s s i o n , may have o n l y u n d e r l i n e d t h e p r o b l e m the  Real  i n f e u d a l law and d o c t r i n e o f s e i s i n  of l i t t l e  principles  determinacy  2 3 2  on t h e r e a s o n s  i t s basis  that the  o b j e c t s on t h e  (object's distinguishability,  can speculate  property,  The  property  t o make  rights  justification  as w e l l a s l e g a l  copyright  that  judges  i n general  of property theory;  this  should look  be r e c o g n i s e d i n t o t h e grounds  on  c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d .  The i s s u e  i s one t h a t p r e o c c u p i e s  political  Part w i l l  concentrate  on t h e  120 justificatory the  manner  t h e o r i e s of  i n which  they  theory.  The  majority  natural  law  theory,  section  turns.  1.  The  Political  The  late  influence first  of  Revolution, later,  drew  theories,  a  judgment  and  the  the  fact  reflected  i n each country.  preserve  of  world,  authorities positive call  theologians  n a t u r a l law,  but  of  positive  as law  stood  above  Leaders  the  to  legal of  this  of  the  decreed  American  o f men. beyond  was  of  Church.  the  Thomas  Aquinas  law  ordering  sovereign Natural  law  documents  that  ordained by  years  natural  " n a t u r a l law"  the  which  twenty  from  particularly of  greatest  theory  constitutional  divinely  and  in  thought  political  t o 1600,  t o govern the a f f a i r s  law  political  law  informed  i t , placing a  higher  on men's a l l e g i a n c e s . The  first  generally natural place  Prior  other  from  law  i n the  philosophy,  and  school  ideology  Christian  distinguished the  and  view  expression  witnessed  Reformation.  inspiration  a  Rights  century natural  i s an  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s i n France  produced  Aquinas  that  with  developments  in Millar  i t i s to  secular  judges,  later  Theory o f N a t u r a l  during and  Millar  presaged  eighteenth the  emerged  the  ascribed  rights  of  a g e n t . The  secular  t o Hugo  theorists  divine will starting  theory  the  point  as  of  Grotius.  natural Following  Hobbes, L o c k e and  nature  of  law  man  as  in natural rights  has  been  Grotius,  such  R o u s s e a u put autonomous  theory  was  in  moral  a state  121 of  nature  anterior  individuals arose to  and  their  played  which  t o serve  assumed against  t o the i n d i v i d u a l  by v i r t u e  fashion, of  of legal  the p o l i t i c a l  designed  prosperity,  In this  the i n t e r e s t s  the character  Society  individuals,  and mutual  of laws.  i n which  and d e s i r e s .  autonomous  for security  existed  necessary,  inhered  between  needs  o f human s o c i e t y  own i n t e r e s t s  by a g o v e r n m e n t  society  interests if  on t h e i r  as a c o n t r a c t  meet  role  acted  to the creation  state  individuals,  rights  order.  the  i n and,  Those  of h i s nature  rights  a s a human  being. The key  issues  being as  into  constituting  could theory  Locke.  of private  theories.  reason  with  and i t s  other,  why and how i n d i v i d u a l of nature. rights  became  p r o p e r t y as protection  for individuals  each  i n the natural  property  Conceiving  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i n the s t a t u t e  of property  John  society  compact  to explain  arise  rights  a principal  political  required  2.  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n natural  brought  into  by  status  to enter  theorists  were  rights  i n property  The most  influential  school  was  developed  2 3 6  L o c k e and t h e N a t u r a l Law T h e o r y o f P r o p e r t y The  property debate.  meaning continue  and  implications  t o be  C.B. M a c p h e r s o n ' s  archetypal  moment  individualism  2 3 7  the subject analysis  o f Locke's of intense  o f Locke's  i n the development  identified  theory  the source  scholarly  thought of  of  as the  possessive  f o r modern  liberal  122 theory  in a  justification  o f c a p i t a l i s m as the n a t u r a l and  m o r a l outcome f o r man c o n c e i v e d prompted on  extensive  the b a s i s  the  their  of a h i s t o r i c a l  property  secondary  fundamental  subtleties, liberal The  physical  Locke's  theory  Lockeian theory  right  of property  objects  nature's  an  which  8  ,  others  distinct  bases:  Locke  of property  rights.  of  these  by m i x i n g  had  i t was  rights  in  h i s labour  points two  termed  that  out  that  conceptually  2 4 0  (1)  t h e i n d i v i d u a l has a p r o p e r t y i n h i s own body and i t s l a b o u r ;  (2)  the b e n e f i t of property i s the a p p r o p r i a t e reward f o r t h e p a i n of labour.  second  of  has b e e n  exclusive  Becker  property  realised  influence i n  Locke argued  have  Lawrence  made  rights.  he h a s p r o d u c e d  resources.  that  irrespective  property  individual  justification  basis  reward,  and that  because  i t was  painful  3  has had e x t e n s i v e  justification  that  2  his thesis  o f Locke as engaged i n  Almost  2 3 9  regarding  Locke's  The  reading  against  i n turn  t o s o c i e t y , i n w h i c h men  purposes.  jurisprudence  labour  morally  with  some a r g u i n g  t h e o l o g i c a l wars o f h i s time  private  the  response,  a s an a c q u i s i t o r . T h i s  represents property  good  and c r e a t e d  the c l a i m  was  that  that  t h e o r i e s between t h o s e  Alan  labour  appropriate  i n and of i t s e l f , value.  right  Ryan,  t h a t view l a b o u r  deserved  reward, not  but because i n dividing  i t was  political  a s a means t o m a t e r i a l  123 ends  and  those  end  in  The  value  Locke lot  itself,  created  by  how  of  that  akin  to  labour by  should  only To  where  labour  they  theory  not  have as  was  sown.  entitled  i t has  the  to  the  circumstances  the  reaping These  2 4 2  sown' were  the  continued  to  by  dual  ' f r u i t s o f one's l a b o u r not  2 4 1  producer.  nature,  i n these  an  camp.  its  with  enrichment,  have  thus  first  to  labour  reward  unjust  the  accrue  the producer  deny  they  in  one's  images o f owning t h e  'reaping  Lockeian  s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n , and theory  mixing  permitting  agricultural others  labour.  where  i t as  Locke's  o f a l l improved; b u t  strangers  of  view  places  described  fruits was  that  1  and  hallmarks operate  in  jurisprudence. Of be  course,  ownership  the of  reward  the  object  L o c k e , d e r i v e d from the by  Becker:  following labour. treated  more  from  In as  a  the  this an  for labour  produced.  second a s p e c t  metaphysical individual's  respect,  object  e x c l u s i v e a manner as  the  other  That  in logic  of h i s theory  property (but  capable  to  of  the  one's  being  Though the E a r t h , and a l l inferior c r e a t u r e s be common t o a l l Men, yet every Man has a P r o p e r t y i n h i s own P e r s o n . T h i s no Body has any r i g h t t o b u t h i m s e l f . The Labour o f h i s Body, and o f t h e Work o f h i s hands, we may s a y , a r e p r o p e r l y h i s . 4  3  for  object  body  and  own)  was  owned  object:  2  so,  to  identified  i n h i s own only  have  i t was  entitlement  body  i n nature, any  d i d not  in  as  124  Denial  of  therefore  property like  individual and  bore  of  on  to  life,  his  psychological  the  objects  i n v a s i o n of  laboured  comforts  also  an  in  provide  own  of  himself  with the  integrity.  the labour  theory  later  the a n a l y s i s  emendation  did  not  its  objects alienable.  fall  go  so  i n Marx's  from  f a r as  grace,  to o f f e r  the  only  looked  accumulation right  to  Locke  to  no  3.  sell be  an  inevitable  part  of  copyright  the  apart  B l a c k s t o n e On  appeared  labour  P r o p e r t y R i g h t s and Commentaries  three years a f t e r  i n Tonson v. C o l l i n s ,  the p l a i n t i f f  and  in Millar,  and  he  this  of  and i t s Locke  2 4 5  labour  of  money  irrevocable  produce  t h a t of the  of  way:  of making  i n one's  and  produced  thought,  creation  natural right  from  Blackstone's  i n 1765,  time  necessities  alienation.  believed existed initiated  an  what I was. produce.  t h a t i t c o u l d not  Locke  property  one's  justification  William  for  of  upon  was  while  writes  in this  a critique  He  but  limit  of  So,  t h i n g s he  i n Hegel's  concept  Money's g r e a t a t t r i b u t e was was  found  labour  the  Becker  I am what I have made. I am what I want t o do, and what I This p a r a l l e l e d  one's  person.  h i s ownership of  personal  facet  one's  of  own  labour.  was  a  waste  respect  assumed  property,  right  as  fall.  w a s t e , and with  and  to The by  requiring  itself.  2  4  6  Copyright on  the  argued  Laws o f  England  f o r a common  four years before  law  h i s argument  n i n e y e a r s b e f o r e he  rendered  125 an  advisory  Donaldson outline  v. B e c k e t t . of property  resembled  i n favour  of l i t e r a r y  The argument theory  he made  to speculate  i n setting  that  t h e terms  property  i n Tonson  Blackstone  o f t h e debate  in  and h i s  i n t h e Commentar i e s  the a n a l y s i s o f J u s t i c e Aston  reasonable role  opinion  closely  in Millar;  i t seems  played  important  an  on t h e b o o k s e l l e r s '  side. The law  Commentaries  position.  property that  He  identified  as the t h r e e  i s , rights  revealed  absolute  grounded  Blackstone's  the rights rights  usufructuary  were  rights  otherwise  held  growth  produced  right,  a permanent  use use  of things,  i n nature  i n common.  and f o o d ,  Blackstone  when  time  origin  population  a more as w e l l  f o r property  and the substance  from  where a l l o b j e c t s  i n t h e substance  The b a s i s  to Englishmen—  had t h e i r  At a point  of land  property  developed.  occupancy, although  rights  natural  l i b e r t y and  and p r o t e c t e d  i n a s t a t e of nature  scarcity  (consumption)  to l i f e ,  inherent  immemorial by t h e common l a w . P r o p e r t y as  tempered  both  of things  was  evolved as t h e i n the first  acknowledged a m o r a l d i f f e r e n c e  between mere o c c u p a n c y a n d l a b o u r : [ M o v a b l e s were a p p r o p r i a t e d b e f o r e land] p r i n c i p a l l y b e c a u s e few o f them c o u l d be f i t f o r u s e , t i l l i m p r o v e d and a m e l i o r a t e d by t h e b o d i l y l a b o u r o f t h e o c c u p a n t , w h i c h b o d i l y l a b o u r , bestowed upon a n y s u b j e c t w h i c h b e f o r e l a y i n common t o a l l men, i s u n i v e r s a l l y a l l o w e d t o g i v e t h e f a i r e s t and most r e a s o n a b l e t i t l e t o an exclusive property therein. 2  4  7  126 Blackstone Pufendorf assent while its  noted  "nicety"  from Locke,  b y men  that  distinguishing Grotius  i n t h a t the former argued first  occupancy  should  L o c k e b e l i e v e d o c c u p a n c y as l a b o u r  own.  Property  2 4 8  demonstrated juris;  subsisted  alienation,  which  f o r owners,  followed  involved  i n t e n t i o n of the purchaser Blackstone  yield  property  taker  the o b j e c t  as  on  until  he  publici  as a m a t t e r  an abandonment  t o 'occupy*  described property  ownership,  justified  property  and  f o r an i m p l i e d  i n the f i r s t  an i n t e n t i o n t o abandon  convenience an  a  coupled  of with  the object.  i n an a b s o l u t e  manner:  There i s nothing w h i c h so g e n e r a l l y s t r i k e s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , and engages the a f f e c t i o n s o f mankind, as the r i g h t o f property; o r t h a t s o l e and d e s p o t i c dominion which o n e man claims and e x e r c i s e s over t h e e x t e r n a l t h i n g s o f the world, i n t o t a l e x c l u s i o n o f the r i g h t of any o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e u n i v e r s e . 2 4 9  This to  despotic  mankind.  dominion  over  K.J. Vandevelde  2 5 0  Blackstone's  treatment  'absolutist'.  By t h e f o r m e r  right all  relating  property  reified in  of property  had c o r p o r e a l  was  by  calling  property  2  5  was God's argues  1  he means c o n c e i v i n g  form,  them  property  recognised  Vandevelde  'things  t o the l a t e r  not as a r i g h t  over  gift that  ' physicalis.t'  argues  of i n c o r p o r e a l hereditaments  Vandevelde c o n t r a s t s t h i s described  (1980)  to t h i n g s . While Blackstone  the concepts  action  the e x t e r n a l world  in  and as a  that not that  he  and c h o s e s  contemplation.'  Hohfeldian  scheme w h i c h  t h i n g s , but as a  jural  127 relation  between  thought  made  persons.  i t difficult  degrees o f or l i m i t s than  'absolutism'  for legal  powers,  could  exist  relationship; destroying  privileges, i n various  law c o u l d  the r i g h t  which  theories,  he  i s wrong  property  could  interest.  2 5 2  to comprehend  meant n o t h i n g  and l i b e r t i e s , combinations  i n a single factors  how  legal without  point i s  to our d i s c u s s i o n o f the to natural  t o say that  law p r o p e r t y  Blackstone  to limitation  Indeed, B l a c k s t o n e  separating  While Vandevelde's  presented  n o t be s u b j e c t  less  and showing  various of these  and corresponds  copyright  Blackstone's  analysis involved  of property.  generally well-taken, challenge  limit  of  theory  on o w n e r s h i p : p r o p e r t y  d e s p o t i c dominion. Hohfeld's  rights, they  The  wrote t h a t  maintained  i n the p u b l i c  property  c o n s i s t s i n t h e f r e e u s e , e n j o y m e n t , and disposal of a l l h i s a c q u i s i t i o n s , without a n y c o n t r o l o r d i m i n u t i o n , s a v e o n l y by t h e laws o f t h e l a n d . 2  The  absolute  preserved  compensation.  rights must  of property,  by common  expropriation  society  right  by  i n exchange respect  must e n d e a v o u r  l a w , was  the state,  The c o m p a c t  involved  5  3  founded  not f o r Blackstone only  between  the former  i n natural  making  some  f o r p e a c e and s e c u r i t y .  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s to rest  immune t o  expropriation the i n d i v i d u a l  residual  law and  without  and  sacrifice  civil  of h i s  In r e t u r n , s o c i e t y  rights;  as w e l l , i t  s e c u r i t y on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y  itself:  128 And t h u s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f E n g l a n d has u n i v e r s a l l y promoted t h e grand ends o f c i v i l s o c i e t y , t h e p e a c e and s e c u r i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s , by s t e a d i l y p u r s u i n g t h a t w i s e a n d o r d e r l y maxim, o f a s s i g n i n g t o every t h i n g capable of ownership a l e g a l and d e t e r m i n a t e owner. 5  Blackstone for  a  common  argued  that  factors. labour  brought  law  many o f  copyright.  copyright  First,  was  literary  4  these  In  Tonson  founded  property  themes  in  met  v.  to h i s  Collins  reason,  the  arguments (1762)  citing  requirements  he  three of  the  theory:  The n a t u r a l f o u n d a t i o n and commencement o f p r o p e r t y ; v i z . by i n v e n t i o n and labour. Both e x e r t e d i n a l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n ; the p r e s e n t work i s f o u n d t o be an o r i g i n a l composition. Original (ex v i t e r m i n i ) i m p l i e s i n v e n t i o n ; as c o m p o s i t i o n does i n d u s t r y a n d l a b o u r . P r o p e r t y may with e q u a l r e a s o n be a c q u i r e d by m e n t a l , as by b o d i l y l a b o u r , ( a t 180) An  idea  could  cultivation order  to  property  and  be be  be  occupied  like  improvement on  useful. recognised  Second, i n the  a  field,  but  the p a r t of the "common fruits  both  right-holder in  utility" of  required  demanded  that  i n d u s t r y , i n order  to  encourage f u r t h e r p r o d u c t i o n : S c i e n c e e q u a l l y e n c o u r a g e d by p r o t e c t i n g t h e p r o d u c e o f g e n i u s and application. W i t h o u t some a d v a n t a g e p r o p o s e d , few w o u l d r e a d , s t u d y , compose or p u b l i s h . ( a t 180) Because  only  reward,  the  the  profits  appropriate  of  publication  property  was  "an  could  provide  this  exclusive right  of  129 publication." yet  In  significant  things  of  However,  the  itself,  or  between  literary  and  he  of  the  of  its  The  judges  looked  property to  history  metaphysical judgment  work"  the  (at  natural  it  Lord  and i n b r i e f e r  law  identified  in  discussion  shortly  metaphysics  and drew on n a t u r a l  Aston J . property law,  nor  "certain answer  was  thought  that  "quite  ideal  capable great began  returns.  of  protection"  truths with  defendant's and  a  and  he  the  and  for  of  views  and  a  his  stranger  of  man's  his  two from  which  this  commenced  from  and  arguments  i m a g i n a r y . . . not  Blackstone. that an  demanded an answer  by  eschewed  approach  to  Aston theory  Willes  another  sound p r o p o s i t i o n s . "  statement  of  the  concluded  justice  IV,  rights  right  Justice  d e v e l o p e d the  Justice  composition the  answers  produce  Part  value.  approached  ways.  adopted  reasons  the not  an  "essential  exchange  Millar  natural  Mansfield  over  Taylor  for  pecuniary  right the  was  Nevertheless,  violated  subtle  2 5 5  different  2 5 6  the  dominion over  a  shared  v.  in  precedent  beneficial  218).  colleagues,  and  in  reasoning.  by s a y i n g  "reap  issue  as  here  composition.  majority  as  "sentiment",  in Millar  three  over  property":  described  precisely  copies  property  compositions  subject  "subject"  glided  property  The M a j o r i t y O p i n i o n s  literary  to  Blackstone  labour  every  more  multiplying  4.  by  Third,  requisite  way,  difference  produced  activity.  this  Pufendorf,  (at the  literary  object  of  founded i n 219)  His  "learned  130 author with  of the r e l i g i o n  legal  Pufendorf of  r i g h t . He intended  the labour  another  of nature",  then  of  one  man  Willes  lawyerly  can  itself  J . and  impatience  no  with  copyright  an  His c r i t i c i s m s revealed  modernism, by  state  rejecting of  definitions  nature  propositions  be  tending  subject  He  Aston  to cast  f o r property  the p e r s p e c t i v e  theories. cited  the p r o p e r t y  of  said  showed  'niceties'  l i m i t a t i o n s on p r i v a t e  of property"  from  the products  Justice  certain  works, e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e  law.  coincides  can be.  Blackstone,  appropriate  good  truth that  more  philosophers' as  moral  several  t o prove as a moral  than h i s labour  Like  reviewed  that  that  by l a w y e r s  of  the  d o u b t on  at  o f an  common  empirical  property several  implied "written  i n argument  a r e , i n my o p i n i o n , v e r y i n a d e q u a t e t o t h e o b j e c t s o f p r o p e r t y a t t h i s day. They a r e a d a p t e d , by t h e w r i t e r s , t o t h i n g s i n a p r i m i t i v e (not t o say imaginary) s t a t e ; when a l l t h i n g s were i n common.... T h u s g r e a t men, r u m i n a t i n g b a c k t o t h e origin of things, lose sight of the p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d ; and end t h e i r i n q u i r i e s a t t h a t p o i n t where they s h o u l d b e g i n o u r improvements, ( a t 220-221) The only  great  men,  i n c l u d i n g Locke, l i m i t e d property  as o b j e c t s  "necessaries" rejected principle Grotius.  as of He  wrested required  by o c c u p a n c y  preferred  t h e commons, and as  f o r s u r v i v a l . Aston  irrelevant spoilage,  from  to  the modern  which  he  J.  age  attributed  Pufendorf's  by v i e w i n g i t  view  specifically  the to  that  limiting Locke  and  "distinct  131 properties"  increased  over  time  as c i r c u m s t a n c e s  genius  required.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  longer  demanded  that  objects  theory be  and  useful  and  human  common  law  no  i n order  to  be  objects  of  property:  Things of fancy, p l e a s u r e or convenience a r e a s much o b j e c t s o f p r o p e r t y ; a n d s o c o n s i d e r e d by t h e common l a w ; m o n k e y s , p a r r o t s or the l i k e ; i n s h o r t , a n y t h i n g m e r c h a n d i z a b l e and v a l u a b l e , ( a t 221)  If  such  objections  no  necessary  t o know t h e a t t r i b u t e s  the  subject  capacity thing  t o be  Aston  provided  i t  with  represented then  a  argued. Having two  "value"  attributes  noted  by  of  and  rights.  He  be  two:  i t was  of property,  Blackstone:  "The  that  in printed  form  to  be  t o i t s author Justice  Aston  If publication  in  of the author  inhis  i n the very  act of  to f i n d property,  Aston best  which  right.  established literary  IV t h a t  c o r p o r e a l i t y  and p r o p e r t y  of  ( 1 ) "a i n that  i n Part  of a composition  illogical  renunciation  shown  only  something t o  cited  the composition  the p r o p e r t y  the value  i t would  publication  i t was  which q u a l i f i e d  s u f f i c i e n t  The  the s u b j e c t  work,  J . argued,  (221) I t was  believed fixing  in i t s publication,  itself  of  d i s t i n g u i s h e d " ; (2) "an a c t u a l v a l u e  distinguishable.  made  expansion  , Aston  of property  t o t h e t r u e owner."  Justice  lay  held  the  property  be  longer  to  as  the  defendant  p r o p e r t y as p o s s e s s i n g the J . then rule,  both  cited  the  of  reason  maxim and  132  justice,  seems  t o be, ' t o a s s i g n  ownership, a l e g a l To  Justice  and d e t e r m i n a t e  Aston,  owner.'"  the author's  composition  was n o t o n l y  entitlement,  i t could  or  to every  justified  claim  thing  capable  of  ( a t 221)  ownership of the l i t e r a r y on t h e l a b o u r  superiority  over  theory  property  of  i n land  tangible objects:  And there i s a material d i f f e r e n c e i n favour of t h i s s o r t o f p r o p e r t y , from that . . g a i n e d b y o c c u p a n c y ; w h i c h b e f o r e was common, a n d n o t y o u r s ; b u t was t o b e r e n d e r e d s o by some a c t o f y o u r own. F o r , this i s originally t h e a u t h o r ' s : and, t h e r e f o r e , u n l e s s c l e a r l y r e n d e r e d common by h i s own a c t a n d f u l l c o n s e n t , i t ought s t i l l t o r e m a i n h i s . ( a t 221)  In  other  common forth  words,  literary  resources,  l e t alone  a s an o r i g i n a l  mental  composition  product  natural  d i d n o t emanate resources,  of the author's  but  labour.  J U S T I C E YATES' CRITIQUE OF THE NATURAL LAW POSITION  1.  P u b l i c Domain: N a t u r a l R i g h t s o f t h e P u b l i c Justice  creative  Yates  activity.  occupancy",  appropriating the  sprang  i m a g i n a t i o n and  C.  upon  from  from  impossibility  d i d not share In m a i n t a i n i n g he  implied  this that  authors  view  same way one o c c u p i e d  land:  author's  " [ p j r o p e r t y i s founded also  t h e commons; t h e p r o b l e m , of occupying  of the  were  engaged i n  however,  or a p p r o p r i a t i n g ideas  lay  in  i n the  133 Some a c t o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n must be e x e r t e d , to take t h e t h i n g o u t o f t h e s t a t e o f b e i n g common, t o d e n o t e t h e a c c e s s i o n o f a p r o p r i e t o r : f o r , o t h e r w i s e , how s h o u l d o t h e r p e r s o n s be a p p r i z e d t h e y a r e n o t t o use i t ? t h e s e a r e a c t s t h a t must be e x e r c i s e d upon s o m e t h i n g . The o c c u p a n c y o f a t h o u g h t would be a new k i n d o f p r o p e r t y i n d e e d , ( a t 230) For  Yates  J . , the  interdependency from  with  compositions  the c u l t u r e  a. "commons" o f i d e a s  commons.  In s h o r t , J u s t i c e  in  literary  composition.  of  the author's  labour  of  i n which  and s t y l e , Yates  authors they  arose,  the point  t o that  a public that  an  arising  and r e t u r n i n g  h a d i n mind  I n making  had  domain  the f r u i t s  s h o u l d be c i r c u m s c r i b e d he s a i d :  He [ t h e a u t h o r ] must n o t e x p e c t t h a t t h e s e f r u i t s s h a l l be e t e r n a l ; t h a t he i s t o monopolize them t o i n f i n i t y ; t h a t e v e r y v e g e t a t i o n a n d i n c r e a s e s h a l l be c o n f i n e d t o h i m s e l f a l o n e , and n e v e r r e v e r t t o t h e common m a s s . I n t h a t c a s e , t h e i n j u s t i c e would l i e o n t h e s i d e o f t h e m o n o p o l i s t , who w o u l d t h u s e x c l u d e a l l t h e r e s t o f mankind f r o m e n j o y i n g t h e i r n a t u r a l and s o c i a l r i g h t s , ( a t 231-232) ( e m p h a s i s added) The  'fruits'  might be m a t e r i a l r e w a r d , b u t t h e ' v e g e t a t i o n a n d  increase'  referred  inventions  themselves.  that  common  t o the uses Justice  law o w n e r s h i p  of the author's  Yates  i d e a s and  had a p a r t i c u l a r  of ideas  would  bar  concern  independent  a p p r o p r i a t i o n by s u b s e q u e n t  a u t h o r s — t h a t i s , authors  at  any r e f e r e n c e t o or n o t i c e o f t h e  t h e same p l a c e  'original',  without  and w i t h o u t  copying.  2 5 7  T o t h e argument  arriving  that the  134 custom  of the s t a t i o n e r s  amongst  each o t h e r  J.  said  that  of  the public,  can't  private  create  right  arbitrary  reasons,  represented  generations  of writers,  of the creator  his  assignees,  was u n i q u e  labour this  2 5 9 f  -  right  incorporeal,  gave  rise  something  reward  however,  they  property i t gave  ( a t 249) works so  choose.  2 5 8  of i n t e r e s t s composed o f  and b o o k s e l l e r s ,  J . amongst  the author  i n terms o f d e s e r v i n g  that  audience  o f an o r i g i n a l  that  he d i d o b j e c t ,  they  readers,  to Yates  He d i d n o t d i s p u t e  h i s side  was  a balancing  r i g h t s " of a p u b l i c  the r i g h t s  on  should  right  contracts:  "a r i g h t t o s u p p r e s s "  and  Millar.  t o such  of compositions  copyright  the " n a t u r a l  succeeding  law, Yates  not " a f f e c t the r e a l  a r e no p a r t i e s  and a u t h o r s ,  sense that  between  copyrights  a r i g h t a t common  parties could  i n the p u b l i s h i n g  entirely  This  who  sustain  and s e l l i n g  law." ( a t 237) One d a n g e r o f a p e r p e t u a l  booksellers, for  could  of buying  m a n u s c r i p t and the judges i n  had n a t u r a l  right  forhis intellectual  to the contention  to  common  law property  he  argued  English  that  over  law had  an  never  countenanced.  2.  The Argument O v e r I n c o r p o r e a l The  two s i d e s  property law  debate  could  argued property  only  rights,  v. T a y l o r  d i f f e r e d vehemently  recognise  that  i n Millar  Property  property physical  that  and i n t h e l i t e r a r y  over  whether  i n incorporeals.  t h e common  Justice  Yates  things  could  be t h e o b j e c t  incorporeals  lacked  the f i n i t e ,  of  fixed  135 boundaries.that function that  of  property  preserving  social  property  a  literary  the  composition,  was  no  less  required  an  had  and  2 6 0  in  peace;  that  the  incorporeal  right  than  for  Importantly,  deny  a  common  archaic. law  property  property  unlimited  statutory  property.  To  understand  necessary over  to  two  the  address  types  copyright:  in  of  (1)  to  and  (2)  of  Yates  he a  the  felt  natural  not  point  were  activities  and  wished  a  i t is  law  first  opinion  implicated of  to  limited  i n J u s t i c e Yates' he  of  J.'s  physicalist  however,  this  form  publication  2 6 1  duration--  confusion  incorporeals  ideas;  first  t o be w h o l l y  significance a  to  its  replied  i n the  incorporeals—  scope  perform  opponents  copyright.  glance  reason  his  to  corporeal quality  p o s i t i o n appeared at f i r s t that  order  copying  in or  publishing. As copy  pointed  gave  out  i n Part  p r o t e c t i o n to  expression  embodied  in a  Thompson's  Seasons,  he  violated the  very  any  style  author's]." ideas  property  could  (at  and 230)  not  abandonment—in 'property'  from  be  Yates J . b e l i e v e d the  ideas, fixed  said of  IV,  that  the  main  the  author  another's,  the  defendant his  the  concern  sufficient  to  work. W i t h  or  in  demarcated--  a manner  merely  literary  sentiments His  not  in to  causing  respect  could  were  this  to  particular  not  assignees  work  on  right  score  to  have  "unless  his  [the  was  that  d e r i v a t i o n , extent separate  one  endless  dispute  or  person's and  136 litigation. law  Such  a  result  i n a Hobbesian  frustrated  the  purpose  of  property  world:  T h e p r i n c i p a l end f o r w h i c h t h e first i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y was e s t a b l i s h e d , was to p r e s e r v e the peace of mankind; which c o u l d not e x i s t i n a promiscuous scramble. Therefore a moral o b l i g a t i o n a r o s e upon a l l , " t h a t none s h o u l d i n t r u d e upon t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a n o t h e r . " But t h i s o b l i g a t i o n c o u l d o n l y t a k e p l a c e where t h e p r o p e r t y was d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; and every body knew t h a t i t was not open t o a n o t h e r , ( a t 234)  However  i f , as  copyright  solely  expression argument Justice of  of  using  as  (verbatim  the  may  copying,  have  expression  property.  It  influenced  by  the  was a  maintained,  exclusive  uncertainty  Yates  many o f  J u s t i c e Aston  as  and  also  an  i t were)  to  observable  possible, of  authorship.  As  books w h i c h  had  come b e f o r e  the  In s u c h works,  the  wedded. could  account  expression  Protecting  be  Having  i n nature.  tantamount  a  the to  and  of  expression protecting  n o n - f i c t i o n model  for  ideas  J u s t i c e Yates'  of  of the  an  2  6  2  significance for  literary  that  he  was  i n Part  courts  up  IV,  to  the  were i n f o r m a t i o n a l  compared  the  this  failed.  shown  Millar  precise  author,  the  however,  or  the  an  boundary  (1762) and  conceived  largely  concept  instructive  law  copy  of  appreciate  time o f T o n s o n v. C o l l i n s  fiction,  to  insecurity  failed  as  right  the  author  t o works were  closely  informational ideas  composition  strongly voiced  it  of  work  contained.  i n mind concerns  might for  the  137  \  issues the  of  independent  p u b l i c domain i n Justice  implicated -was  paper, the  but  a  activity  correctly actions  understanding  right of  not to  others,  commons  of  of  property— He  the the  knowledge,  perceived  prevent a he  but  i n t e r f e r e n c e with m a t e r i a l  a l l the  copy said, the  of  second  and  that  proscribed  from  of  a poem  on  engaging  in  All  rights actions  copyingowner  a book o r  object.  involved  of  what t h e  world  the  incorporeal  activity  a physical object,  making  understood, by  as  more c l e a r l y .  owned was  a  ideas.  in copyright  stated  copyright  Yates'  creation,  to  property prevent  related  objects:  In answer t o t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , it was a l l e d g e d f o r the p l a i n t i f f , "that there a r e many o t h e r instances of incorporeal r i g h t s ; s u c h as a l l t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s o f p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t s and p a r t i a l c l a i m s . " But the f a l l a c y l i e s i n t h e e q u i v o c a l use of the word " p r o p e r t y ; " w h i c h sometimes d e n o t e s t h e r i g h t o f the p e r s o n ; (as when we s a y , " s u c h a one has t h i s e s t a t e , o r that piece of goods:") sometimes, the object i t s e l f . Here, the q u e s t i o n i s upon the object i t s e l f , not the p e r s o n . I r e a d i l y admit that the r i g h t s of persons may be incorporeal. But the q u e s t i o n i s now, "whether any t h i n g c a n be t h e o b j e c t o f p r o p r i e t a r y right, which i s not the object of corporeal s u b s t a n c e . " And, f o r my own p a r t , I know n o t o f any one i n s t a n c e of any one r i g h t w h i c h has n o t r e s p e c t to corporeal substance. Every p r e s c r i p t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e , e v e r y t i t l e whatever has r e s p e c t to the l a n d s i n which they are e x e r c i s e d . No r i g h t c a n e x i s t , w i t h o u t a  to  138 s u b s t a n c e t o r e t a i n i t , and t o w h i c h c o n f i n e d : i t would, o t h e r w i s e , be a w i t h o u t any e x i s t e n c e , ( a t 233) Here,  the  without  being  unitary of  substance,  sense  owned  of  claimed of  by  chose  right  exclude  of  analogy this  he  as  exclusive  3.  drew t o p a t e n t s  Value  his  right  by  object property  Aston  and  yielded property  his  labour  this  the  was  the  an  property a  form  printed a  copy  to  copyright  understanding. in certain  author  the  for  more t h a n  and  plaintiff  profit  that  as  As  a  type  assignee.  The  precisely in  a  activities  conferred  for inventions focused which  the  on  actuality  issued  from  an  to manufacture.  as P r o p e r t y  Justice value  The  on  in  245)  references  engaging  the  the  capable  down  Yates,  benefit, copyright  monopoly  way;  them  broke  nothing  (at  from  from  economic  trade  issue.  claimed  logically  any  made  a p a r t y who  consent,  repeated  others  presumed  partial  without  t o sue  replicated  in perpetuity,  Justice  represented  be  in  which  person')  To  a right  Yates'  followed  a  'some  plaintiff  monopoly  with  by  could  with  (including  1  of h i s composition  to  objects  'copying .  in action,  Justice  spatial  owned  like the  of  work,  interfered  absolutely  being  incorporeal  literary  physically  character  being  the  it is right  was  or C r e a t i o n of the  other  rights,  entitled  Law  majority  judges  in  that  he  who  to  the  reward  argued  createds of  that value  exclusive  139 ownership of the object reap  part  of  enrichment. unjust  that  Yates  of value.  value  To p e r m i t  would  J . challenged  be  this  non-producers to  tantamount logic.  to  unjust  Responding  to the  e n r i c h m e n t p o i n t he s a i d :  F o r , t h e i n j u s t i c e i t s u g g e s t s , depends upon t h e e x t e n t and d u r a t i o n of t h e a u t h o r ' s p r o p e r t y ; as i t i s t h e v i o l a t i o n of that property that must alone c o n s t i t u t e t h e i n j u r y , ( a t 231)  As  discussed  briefly  value produced  i n Part  I V , he r e j e c t e d t h e i d e a  that  property:  ...mere v a l u e , ( a l l may s e e ) , w i l l n o t d e s c r i b e t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h i s . The a i r , the l i g h t , the sun, are of value i n e s t i m a b l e ; b u t who c a n c l a i m a p r o p e r t y i n them ? mere v a l u e does n o t c o n s t i t u t e property. Property must be s o m e w h a t e x c l u s i v e of the c l a i m of another. ( a t 230) (emphasis added) Thus,  property  which  created  escape  right  nature, What  as  J . mean  common;  being  such  property  i s capable  wherein  of being  exclusivity could not  the value  in a  the value e x i s t e d  i t protection. 'property'  t h e examples  "must  the  J . implied,  by p r e t e n d i n g  by  t o o , had c i t e d which  Yates  for creating  t h e law g r a n t e d  d i d Yates  things  I t provided  The C o u r t ,  of publication  before  Blackstone, water  value.  value.  i t s responsibility  perpetual in  preceded  still nothing  had."  2 6 3  in this  argument  of a i r , l i g h t  unavoidably b u t an  remain  ?  and in  usufructuary  These t h i n g s c o u l d  only  140  be  subjects  scarce;  a  of property  as t o t h e i r  substantive  property  use because  arose  argument made t h e p o i n t  that scarcity  was  into  essentially  Property value,  brought  i n p u b l i c a t i o n meant t h e  an a l i e n a b l e p r o p e r t y  "merchandizable value." property  Justice in  another,  and  a half  wire  2  6  4  board  defendant wire  because  of their  convincing of  a new  akin  found  case  to property  Press,  York  a  echoes century  the F i r s t  the dispatches newspapers  Its  majority  Press to find  posted  W o r l d War o n  competitor,  a n d p u t them across  a  i n t h e news  f o r the use o f  North  d i d n o t comply  by t h e U.S. C o p y r i g h t  Associated  whether  the p l a i n t i f f ,  offices  public distribution  a Court tort,  property  s u e d . The d i s p a t c h e s  required  confidence.  and v a l u e  interested parties.  I.N.S. c o p i e d  formalities  of  i t s New  and o t h e r  Press  and p u b l i s h i n g  o f t h e U.S. c o n s i d e r e d  Associated  to i t ss u b s c r i b i n g  Associated  to conceive o f  copying  i t s reporters covering  outside  newspapers  J . ' s words,  I n I n t e r n a t i o n a l News S e r v i c e v . A s s o c i a t e d  i t produced. from  nature.  from e x c h a n g i b i l i t y .  intellectual  , t h e Supreme C o u r t  dispatches a  later.  compositions  had, i n Aston  like  distinct  famous  Yates'  by t h e l a w , n o t by  that  s e r v i c e company had a r i g h t  stories  in literary  Y a t e s argument on p r o p e r t y more  scarcity.  Indeed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t  a n y "use v a l u e "  were n o t  c r e a t i o n by law o f e x c h a n g e  i n incorporeal a c t i v i t i e s  as h a v i n g  Press  being  with  they  local the  over t h e America. with the  A c t (1909), and  no a c t i o n  l a y i n breach  succeeded,  however, i n  i n i t s favour  on t h e b a s i s  "unfair competition".  The m a j o r i t y  spoke t h e  141  language  of  plaintiff's labour, be  that  law,  news s t o r i e s  and  the  allowed  Brandeis  natural  to  unjust  finding  on  the  the  of  the  practice.  strongly disagreed, adopting  taken  by Y a t e s  Brandeis  quasi-property  grounds of  enrichment  continue  a  in  the  i t s investment  and  defendant  Justices  should  Holmes  it and  2 6 5  a perspective similar  to  J. in Millar:  J.:  Upon t h e s e i n c o r p o r e a l p r o d u c t i o n s the a t t r i b u t e of property i s continued after such communication o n l y i n c e r t a i n cases where p u b l i c p o l i c y has seemed t o demand i t . ( a t 215) Holmes J . : P r o p e r t y , a c r e a t i o n of law, does not a r i s e from v a l u e , although e x c h a n g e a b l e — a matter of fact....Many exchangeable v a l u e s may be d e s t r o y e d intentionally without c o m p e n s a t i o n . P r o p e r t y depends upon e x c l u s i o n by law f r o m i n t e r f e r e n c e , (at 246) The  point  made  recognition  or  these  a  not  the appropriate bodies  Statutory As  an  question  he  was  exclusive property  i n the  broad  to decide  sense;  the  in  and  clear:  the  activities courts  were  question.  Property  s t a t e d above, J u s t i c e  author's  fact,  dissenting voices  c r e a t i o n of  was  4.  political  by  Yates  'natural' entitlement  adhered  to  the  belief  d i d not  to reward that  entirely  discount  for his labour.  property  at  common  In law  142 derived  from  products,  natural  however,  had  owned h i s m a n u s c r i p t alone it  (and  for  thus,  the  Justice reward implied  that  He  than  i f the  and  sale  author  the  some  author  whether  the  manuscript  right  to  reward,  also  The  therefore  s a l e of the  of  yield  labour.  publish although  owned c o p y r i g h t .  author's  right  to  although  he  the  of  i t d i d not.  that  encouragement represented  on  The  The  of  beyond p r o p e r t y i n t h e m a n u s c r i p t ,  acknowledged  authors  the  might  vague  products  corporeal.  time)  was  extended  t o be  a t common law.  less  Yates  i n the  for Yates,  first  significantly  rights  a  that  society  system  or  of  incentive.  the r e a l  benefited  reward As  from  was  with  c l a i m of the a u t h o r  needed  the  to  work  provide  inventor,  on E n g l i s h  this  laws:  The whole c l a i m t h a t an a u t h o r c a n r e a l l y make, i s on t h e p u b l i c b e n e v o l e n c e , by way o f e n c o u r a g e m e n t ; b u t n o t a s an a b s o l u t e c o e r c i v e r i g h t , ( a t 246) The that  r e a s o n no  the  right  competing and  in  labour value  rights  the  of  also  The held  producers mistake the  c r e a t e d was  limits. had  the book);  The  of  in  to  has  be  resting entitled  value a  (or a t  a l l of  had  as  been  shown,  balanced  with  ( a u t h o r s and b o o k s e l l e r s )  author that  owner  rights but  l a y was,  i n h i s view  i n other  that  h i s labour  presumably  copy  public.  theory  inherent  uses  to  absolute right  those  so  book  least  copyright to  the  rights  had  physical  interests c o u l d be  in  a  entire  understood in  on  no  form  certain  conceived  143 on  a pure l a b o u r  theory  as b e l o n g i n g  he  had c r e a t e d ,  and a l l c o u l d  to the author  then  as  'values'  be t r a n s f e r r e d t o him i n  law:  I f t h e buyer o f a book may n o t make what u s e o f i t he p l e a s e s , what l i n e c a n be drawn t h a t w i l l n o t t e n d t o s u p e r s e d e a l l h i s d o m i n i o n o v e r i t ? he may n o t l e n d i t , i f he i s n o t t o p r i n t i t ; b e c a u s e i t w i l l i n t r e n c h upon t h e a u t h o r ' s p r o f i t s . So . t h a t a n o b j e c t i o n m i g h t be made e v e n t o h i s l e n d i n g t h e book t o h i s f r i e n d s ; f o r he may p r e v e n t those f r i e n d s from b u y i n g t h e book... ( a t 234)  A  perpetual  of a  copyright,  he a r g u e d ,  l o c k i n g up t h e most v a l u a b l e  would  also  literary  have  the e f f e c t  works i n t h e hands o f  few p r i n t e r s a n d b o o k s e l l e r s f o r e v e r , g i v i n g them a huge a n d  unfair (250)  advantage Lord  every  a g e , made  If, involved  then,  of this  concern  trade."  i n h i s polemic  Yates  power  of copyright  of legitimate interests,  in  legislature  can r e s t r a i n  pointed  to the Statute  Statute  gave  of their  who s h o u l d  o f a book.  o f Anne a s j u s t an e x c l u s i v e ,  compositions  less  t h e use of a n y t h i n g "  t o s o r t out the i n t e r e s t s a t p l a y  authors  necessarily  h a d no h e s i t a t i o n : " N o t h i n g  a s t h e u s e made o f a s i n g l e c o p y  copies  "lawful  t h e "Tonsons a n d L i n t o t s " o f  the consideration  the balancing  legislative  the  much  to this  Beckett.  ? Justice  such  a l l newcomers  Camden, who d i s p a r a g e d  Donaldson v.  it  over  such  than 234),  It fell  to  and Yates J .  an e x e r c i s e . The  assignable  f o r sale  (at  do  f o r up  right  t o make  t o 28  years  144 following  r e g i s t r a t i o n i n Stationers  not  t o be  want  uninterested that  considered  i n their  28 y e a r s  c a u s e harm o r f a i l If it  copyright  any l e s s  right"  2 Salk  rights of property  absolute  law p r o p e r t y ; i n terms  duration, legislature Part the  cited  in  early linked  one l i m i t e d i n (1703)  f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n by s t a t u t e s  could  that  be sued  h a d t h e power a n d s t a t u s  i t differed reserved that  examined  with  Millar.  I t showed  from  Crown  those  i n that  i t was n o t  f o r t h e owner should  or i n  b e made  t h e arguments  prerogative that  cases  had r e s i s t e d  expressions  by a  to a property  the analogy.  as p r o p e r t y .  of the nature The Crown  i t sfinancial  grants  had t r i e d  to  a t common l a w .  H i s view  protections  of  those  could  be  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of  had d e v e l o p e d  a n d f o r p r i n t i n g , a s an e x e r c i s e  t o serve  surrounding  and p a t e n t  the majority  of copyright-type  to h i s theory  invention,  2 6 7  property  dealing  Yates  copyright  both  right, albeit  i n the public i n t e r e s t .  draw a n a n a l o g y Justice  d i d n o t make  may make a new  of policy  I I o f the paper  cases  2 6 6  t h e c a s e o f Ewer v . J o n e s  of uses  decisions  i t would  indeed  created  a t common l a w . S t a t u t o r y  that  or  however,  that  encouragement.  by s t a t u t e ,  415, 6 Mod 26, 87 ER 7 9 0 ,  common  not a c c e p t ,  The " L e g i s l a t u r e  J u s t i c e Yates c i t e d  exclusive  of  only  Yates d i d  to writers  protection  material  ( a t 2 4 5 ) , a new p r o p e r t y  duration.  for  existed  property.  he c o u l d  so l i t t l e  to give  Justice  unsympathetic  welfare;  provided  Hall.  interests  patents f o r  of state  power,  i n patronage  and  145 political develop early had  ends  i n censorship,  national  forms  had always  generalised  distributing  of  considerations. common  obscured  this  i t away  recognition  of  industry.  in Justice  literary  property  rethinking commenced  from  as  The taking  itself  i t also  i t s  o f Anne  t h e power  of  but continued to  the  policy  copyright  on t h e f o o t i n g  on n a t u r a l  law p r i n c i p l e s  i n society.  debate  to  in  Statute  responding  to place  thought  legitimately, 'copyright'  t h e Crown,  justified  of the nature shortly  by  Yates'  since;  of  political.  property  i t played  copyright  ever  basis  copyright  law p r o p e r t y  copyright  The  been  The e f f o r t  the r o l e  a n d more  The p o l i t i c i s a t i o n  of  and i n t h e outcome o f t h e has  infused  contributed  and p u r p o s e s  t h e law o f  to a  of legal  complete  rights  that  thereafter.  D.  COPYRIGHT AND  1.  Intangible  THE BREAKDOWN OF ABSOLUTE PROPERTY  Property  and The  credited  in this  Transformation  RIGHTS  of  Legal  Theory The that at  insight  copyright  common  founded  could  property:  to Justice  not be made a n a l o g o u s  law, c o n c e i v e d  i n natural  paper  as a b s o l u t e  l a w . He  envisaged  a common law p r o p e r t y  political  or  statutory  commercial  r i g h t s of exclusive  to property  and p e r p e t u a l instead  applicable  property  two  to  rights rights  types  to tangibles,  applicable  activity.  Yates i s  of  and a  intangible  The dominant  schools  146 in  contemporary  their  20th c e n t u r y  radical  sharing Before  the  critics,  liberal  have  attributes  copyright  as  property  transformation general  of  deserves  Patrick property  the  come  Yates  r e t u r n i n g to consider  legal  J.  to  had  view  the  to  of  well  as as  copyright.  understanding  contemporary  jurisprudence  as  a l l property  ascribed  more c l o s e l y in  theory,  theory,  property  of  this  rights  in  attention.  Atiyah  debate  and  says the  of  the  outcome  r e v e r s a l of  of  Millar  the  by  literary  the  Lords  in  Donaldson; The t r u t h was l a i d b a r e f o r a l l who wanted to see i t , though few probably did: p r o p e r t y r i g h t s were not ' n a t u r a l ' but a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n s o f law, and i t was t h e l a w , b a s e d on v a l u e s and policies, which determined the extent of those r i g h t s . P r o p e r t y had s u f f e r e d i t s f i r s t major d e f e a t . 2 6 8  He  makes  this  observation  transformation "possessions", promissory  secured, new  so  law  course  from  interests,  with  exchange v a l u e .  dissimilar  prevalent  of  in  to  the  created, only property  in  transformation.  Atiyah's  were  by  propelled  the  law  of  by  law.  to  real  property  These  of  interests  property,  which law  and  was  that could  one  of  embodied legal  copyright  the as  including  interests  Copyright  i s that  property  interests,  future  expectations  point  new  the  discussing  viewing  use  not  value,  of  with  indeed  types  common  the  things  expectations, become  in  in  and  or had be the the  theory other  147 commercial vision the  of  rights  natural  political  a  and  position  statutory  commodity  of  the  trace  2 7 1  increasing  exchange.  understanding of law  occurred might  the  over  Daniel  evolution  property  the  treatment  Both  2 6 9  r i g h t s . The  issue  to  of  monopolies  the  the  that  distinctive'  marks  a  (i.e.,  name o r  basis,  and  d i s t i n c t i v e marks on  former  cannot  defendant's  receive defendant  On  user for  involves  no  role  law  K.  J.  trademark  law  to  the  that as  the  which  law  on  i n the  involves  ' nonon  is,  the  a  'passing-off'  plaintiff  mark-owner's  distinctive in  mark  even  when  of  the  based  b a s i s . That  advantage  that  in  misrepresentation  take  be  trademarks  those  to  can  debate,  protects  a  however,  public's  law  j u r i s d i c t i o n s has  misappropriation  seeks  natural  property  common law  theory,  from  to  and  2 7 0  competition  a property  Distinctiveness  trademark  as  i n Anglo-American  to  reduced  way  plaintiff's  confusion  product. in  property  allegedly  the  a  products  protection  existing  the  the  in  real property  of  debate  geographic location)  used  to  d e s c r i p t i v e marks or  a personal  be  this evolution  McClure  extent  duality:  by  of  literary  been  characterised  recognition  of American  i n the  products.  a  t o a breakdown i n the  corresponding  create  the  to  bifurcated  rights.  m a r k e t p l a c e . Trademark law  of  Yates'  property,  a l l property  demonstrate i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n  trademark  beyond  l e g a l h i s t o r i a n s have c o n n e c t e d  beginnings to  Vandevelde  a  nature of  Several the  to  the  which of  over  the  seen  playing in  the  goodwill  impugned  mind  originality  marks  source a  use of  similar  copyright.  148 McClure  and V a n d e v e l d e  the p r o p e r t y  theory  from i t s f i r s t the  early  argue  century,  on u n f a i r  period,  however,  courts  business on  copyright lost  discomfort good  s t a t u t e s was  industry  mark's  states  2  7  owner)  Even  during  with  the sweeping  against  this  limits  analogous  into  of the  and s t a r t e d t o p l a c e t o t h e time  the p r i n c i p l e  fell  the time  i n any  ( o f t e n because  2  i n a period  anyone  that  i t s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s a n d became  entire the  showed  location,  One l i m i t  around  competition.  as p r o p e r t y ,  or geographic  the right.  law o c c u r r e d  culminating  decision  o f trademarks  moment f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e mid-19th c e n t u r y t o  I.N.S.  power  the high-water  i n U.S. trademark  judicial  20th  that  a trademark  a generic  term  of the marketing  the p u b l i c  the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r property  limitation in  domain.  which f o r an  skill  of  Vandevelde  theory:  Designating a t r a d e m a r k o r t r a d e name p r o p e r t y no l o n g e r s t a t e d a p r e m i s e f r o m w h i c h t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d be a u t o m a t i c a l l y deduced. C a s e s w o u l d be d e c i d e d , n o t by d e d u c i n g l e g a l r i g h t s f r o m c o n c e p t s , b u t o n l y by the p o l i c y o f p r o t e c t i n g i n v e s t o r s from injury. ^ 7 3  Interestingly, Lord in  Mansfield  early  these  reasons jury  showed  trademark,  cases  Lord  were  himself  off actions.  presided  a r e extant;  generous  i n a recent  t o be s u p p o r t i v e  or passing  Mansfield  f o r judgment  awards  James Oldham n o t e s  over  2 7 4  study  of p l a i n t i f f s I n most o f  jury t r i a l s ,  however, Oldham  i n the context  that  a n d few  remarks  of the times,  that and  149 argues to at  this  protect  would  be  consistent  reputations  over  and  others  2  7  developments 5  ,  influenced  particularly theories. between  in  This the  above  positions  the  paper  nor  to  that  noted  and  were  rise  of  does  literary  philosophy,  an  the  commercial  been  concern interests  how m a i n s t r e a m  have  much  value.  concerning 2  7  the  Vandevelde  in  legal  utilitarian  and  seek  a  to  show  debate  subject  demonstrating  Millar  reflected  follows  of  Atiyah,  exhaustive  which  adopted  by  property  give  have  not  d i s c u s s i o n  to  Justice  relationship  of for  modest  critical  Yates'  legal  modern  influence legal  philosophical decades.  The  purpose  of  jurisprudence  theoretical  between  realist  subsequent  review  the  philosophy,  direct  scrutiny  has and  and  and  position  property  rights  in and  6  The P o l i t i c i s a t i o n  Late his  Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s  play. The  2.  with  in  the  critique  construction utilitarian  natural English  philosophy.  sources  of  arguing  instead  common  in  its  general  it  had  social  Property  eighteenth  of of  of  law  that and  rights  rights  law  Modern L e g a l  Jeremy  theory  law  from  He d i s p a r a g e d  was  specific  utility,  century  common  2 7 7  in  a  in  rules  reflected  and the  perspective  metaphysics  or  the  launched  Blackstone's  to  only in  Bentham  efforts  social  Theory  locate  of the  morality,  institution,  justified  to  to  the  extent  measure  of  which  utility  as  150 "the  greatest  strong  preference  reflected  refined  with on  theory  legal  l a w over  capable  measure.  heir  treated tested  law p r e c e d e d  leading  production  exponent  now a U.S. f e d e r a l j u d g e ,  and  school".  'end' o f l a w , c o n c e i v e d  i s the e f f i c i e n t Posner,  That  common law  be  of being  of u t i l i t a r i a n  i s t h e "law and e c o n o m i c s  Richard  could  Bentham's  was f u n d a m e n t a l t o Bentham's  contemporary  approach  number."  judge-made  jurisprudence  concepts  the u t i l i t y  measure, o r s o c i a l  and  that  than the reverse  The  f o r the greatest  for statute  his belief  science,  rather  happiness  and  rights  credo.  positivist The  2 7 8  as  utility  by t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l  o f goods  o f economic  and s e r v i c e s .  analysis  o f law  writes:  This example s u g g e s t s that the l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of property r i g h t s h a s an important f u n c t i o n : t o create incentives t o use r e s o u r c e s e f f i c i e n t l y . . . . T h e p r o p e r i n c e n t i v e s a r e c r e a t e d by t h e p a r c e l i n g out among t h e members o f s o c i e t y o f mutually e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to the use of p a r t i c u l a r resources...The creation of e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i s a necessary rather than sufficient condition f o r the e f f i c i e n t use of r e s o u r c e s . The r i g h t s must be t r a n s f e r a b l e . 7  9  i  The  example  who  works  has  no e x c l u s i v e  lawful to  t o which  a piece  harvesting  l e t the land  course,  he r e f e r s  of land  i s a revisiting  b u t h a s no p r o p e r t y  r i g h t i n the produce; a f t e r o f ' h i s ' c r o p by o t h e r s , l i e fallow.  foreign  to  This  natural  o f the farmer i n i t , and so  experiencing  he w i l l  type o f a n a l y s i s rights  soon  the  decide  was n o t , o f  theorists  like  151  Blackstone find  2 8 0  ,  but  i t irrelevant  for property t o use  sole  law  is  misleading or  precisely provide  to  a  for property create  secure  counter  logic  to  a  of  demand  the  economic  limiting  theorists  is  acceptable  as  existing  and  utility position  Wealth  of  with  in  a  may  to By  secure out,  and  sometime  rights,  perceive  as  value  Nevertheless,  have  adopted i t s  conceiving  human  acquisitive  moves  property  runs  copyright. This  naturally theory  of and  absolute  law.  seems  a  the  an  i t d o e s not  property.  ubiquitous  and  ownership  the case  often  creature,  advocating  of  because  theory  rights,  reward  as  is  function  maximisation  curtailing  e c o n o m i c man,  maximising  grounding  economics approach  property  2 8 1  defence of  Posner  Lawrence B e c k e r p o i n t s  i t s creation  economic  terms  of  The  those  of  utilitarian/  theory to  protect  As  b e l i e v e t o be  to the  'naturalist' in  or  prior  utilitarian/  nature  the  right.  a moral  rights.  expectation  concept  incontrovertible  to p o s i t  like  t o maximise economic u t i l i t y ,  f o r c o n t r a c t u a l promises.  however, t h e  theorists  occupancy; the c r e a t i o n of i n c e n t i v e  efficiently,  justification  thereby basis  and  i n labour  resources  the  own  u n l i k e them economic  easily  rights  and to  a  virtually  9 ft 9  u n a s s a i l a b l e by The  Legal  adopted  the  the  state.  Realist  utilitarian  °* school  in  American  jurisprudence  s k e p t i c i s m o f n a t u r a l law,  but  added  a  TOT  critique attack  of  the  involved  understood  as  analytical a  framework  challenge  a process  of  to  the  deducing  of idea  rules  positivism. that from  law  O  Its  J  could  broadly  be  stated  152  legal  principles.  logic, like  but  realm  statute  choices.  As  supposedly in  a  legal  Law  was  of  law,  not  social  Singer  points  conservative  a  property  as  did  merely  an  the  on  approach a  rights;  discourse  can  and  t h e n be  more s u i t e d  to  politics,  particular  the  which  but  style  one of  and  rights  existence,  political  power.  legitimacy  as  society.  movement, c o n t e m p o r a r y h e i r  is  on  Like  establish  Property  political  these  insights.  scholars  2 8 6  ,  operating  in a  they  discourse  of  the  of  basis  is  argument,  subject  Singer in  the  process-based  the  the  preserve  courts.  of  Legal  which d i s c o u r s e discourse  to  reasoning  to  d i s t i n g u i s h between  appropriately  resolution. Judicial that  to  their  objectivity  judicial  their  had  Dworkin  divided  for  social  legal  sought  like  sought  5  in  Press  jurisprudence.  category.  radicalised  many l i b e r a l have  8  law  intervention  o f power i n A m e r i c a n  Studies  further  2  state  them  rights  Legal  era  legislators  of  the sway  I.N.S. v. A s s o c i a t e d  Cohen  the  concentration  that  to  on  property  the  political  issues  policy  Realists believed  in Realist  Felix  c a r r i e d with  on  post-Realist  as  depend  Critical  out  i n the  moment  such  R e a l i s t s , has  points  social  state  ineluctably political  they  Incursions  The  the  of  r e s i s t a n t to  agenda  significant  scholars  attacks  ,  making  decisions,  nature of p r i v a t e  economy. Holmes' o p i n i o n  however,  2 8 4  Judicial  applied  the p o l i t i c a l  the  not  the  of  n e u t r a l f r e e m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e s which t h e n h e l d  a  Holmes,  discourse.  out  d o c t r i n e obscured  was  d i s c r e t e universe  represented  and  case  a  the and  is a  demands  is  form of  a  issue-specific  153 resolution.  The C r i t i c a l  objectivity  i n the l e g a l  between p u b l i c (and  directs  refuse  school  this  degree of  s y s t e m , and any m e a n i n g f u l  separation  and p r i v a t e its  law.  distribution  to permit  anyone  denies  even  I f t h e law c r e a t e s  2 8 7  i n society)  i n the country  then  value  the C r i t i c s  o f law t o  eschew  •y o p  political  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences.  Justice  Yates  was  not a R e a l i s t ,  adherent  of CLS. H i s p a r t i c u l a r  copyright  required  that,  a political  without  tipping  structuring  which  arose  with  held  the kernel  the technology of  an  idea  an  i n order serve  f o r reproducing swept  that  t o ensure  of competing  that  early  however,  i t would  the balance  0  l e t alone  insight,  a s an i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y ,  purpose  0  a  social  interests  books.  away  This  earlier  u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f p r o p e r t y and p r i v a t e law.  E.  THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT  Part copyright rejected common common  II of after in  reviewed  Donaldson  v. Beckett  save  of Donaldson  o f Anne.  rejected  f o r the f i r s t Such  of J u s t i c e  a  result  Yates'  the concept  the development  the majority p o s i t i o n  by t h e House holds  law was r e c o g n i s e d b u t r u l e d  vindication had  paper  M i l l a r , showing t h a t  interpretation  pre-empted, Statute  this  that  of was  o f L o r d s . The a copyright at  by t h e j u d g e s t o have been publication  constituted  theoretical  o f common  right, only  a partial  position,  law c o p y r i g h t  by t h e  since  he  altogether.  154 It  did  as  he  effectively  had  make c o p y r i g h t  a  deemed n e c e s s a r i l y t o be  Over  the  years  and  wholly  the  through  statutory  case.  the  ongoing  s t a t u t o r y amendment and  international agreement  of  and  authors  extended, subject  of for  to  the  a  provisions. copyright  literary  most p a r t ,  form  debates  over  often  heated,  the  to  established  by  Despite  sense, has  representative  between  t o be  author  legislature,  cited  by  on  the  sides  dominant  Claude  comprehensive  adopted  a  2 9 4  'copyright  as  years. lively, right,  goes  generally  2 9 2  justification  of  a n a l y s i s . In  eighteenth  a  Brunet,  Roberts  most  of  in  of  argued  a  century  remain  roughly  to  copyright  1979  exchange  authors  directed at  overhaul  for  duration  approaches  study of c o p y r i g h t  Roberts.  licensing  and  in Millar  surfaced  made  basis  the  two  been  or  fifty  statutory  of  and  have  remain  courts.  and  of  rights  statutory  debate  Keyes  had  a  property  debate  Brunet  as  intense  the  R.J.  issues  of  Canada  and  plus  definition  nature  two  a  compulsory  subject  the  the  narrowed  the  and  ,  2 9 3  of  consensus  government-sponsored  Act  limits  the  for  the  copyright  of  A.A.  groundwork  of  underlying  ended,  In  of  responsible  literary  never  life  ,  works  occasion by  2 8 9  process  international period  i s frequently  continue  the  today.  the  the  on  p a r t i c u l a r copyright  this  copyright, copyright  is  the  u n q u e s t i o n e d and  expressive  expropriation  nature  a l l  and  standard  2 9 1  While  subject  of  The  2 9 0  works  other  entity,  the  laying  a the  Copyright  that  natural  of  Keyes  and  property  of  155 creators'  stance,  and  owners i n a s e r i e s o f Through  a  debate  he  resolved in  the  brief  consequently  endeavoured  public  narrowly  legislators.  to  the  review  to  be  interest  by  show  a monopoly and  courts  as and  similar  who to  caused  Uneasy  Case  for  theory  that  copyright  a minor  alternatives  works  at  issues.  literary  the  right  law  property  had  granted  i t must  expanded  in  by  be  with  could lower  as  believing  copyright,  expression  and  g r o u n d s , he  still  to  a has  Yates  J.  i n 1970  2 9 6  fact  statute construed  caution  by  restricted  fixed  term,  in  is  from  creators, and  i s also i t  and  that  government of  creative  uneasy;  on  doubts:  One i s not sure that any copyright p r o t e c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y to g e n e r a t e the s o c i a l l y optimal amount of book production, given the advantages that accrue to the f i r s t p u b l i s h e r ( i t takes a w h i l e t o c o p y ) and the f a c t t h a t r o y a l t i e s are u s u a l l y o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of the o v e r a l l c o s t o f p r o d u c i n g and s e l l i n g a book. 2 9 7  "The  economic  presently  justified  a  Stephen  his a r t i c l e  production  as  and  with  Millar.  argued  Posner  law  copyright  licences  encourage  society.  from t h e  with  which  compulsory  to  view  overcompensates  adequately cost  of  sensation  Copyright"  such  of w r i t e r s  generally  that  Breyer  subsidies  controversial the  such,  copyright  2 9 5  school,  suspicion  of  that  R o b e r t s ' p o s i t i o n echoes t h a t economics  favoured  recommendations on  historical  copyright  had  while is  to  efficiency  156 The  'encouragement  copyright yield  law i s  the  more,  theory'  to  Those  the  writing  from  creators  public,  arguing that  benefit  Ladd, by  for  of  to  the  using  many o f  Court  of  King's  reflect  now be more  an  monopoly show,  one  it  vs.  informs  is  ironic  like  ways  a  it  terms  frame  drawing  i t .  often  of  that  reap David  aimed  'optimal and  While  at  amount' impose  2 9 9  continues  i d e n t i f i e d by  heart  3  the  suggested  debate  Taylor. the  o  to  works.  market  the  y  no  consuming  endeavour.  theoretical to  but  take  regime  an  the  that  dilemma at its  to  entitled  policy  and v.  sufficient  the  protected  distort  property'  the  the  debate  of  copyright  vitality,  t h e r e may  0  The  0  discussion  seems  categorical  like  an  lines  that  which J u s t i c e  Yates  reveals. it  forgets  much o f  and p r o p e r t y .  changing  least  encourage  in Millar  interesting  thing,  at  attempts  to  of  perspective  o f worth on c r e a t i v e  much o f  more t h a n  that  that  goal  of monopoly.  and a r e  legal/social  essential  overdramatisation,  or  their  doomed t o  Bench  'monopoly  made  of  same arguments  w h i c h has g i v e n i t  For  a  years, the  cost  competing  uses  argues  standard 200  the  the p u b l i c ,  valuable  works a r e  After  obscures  the  creators  the  of...production",  creators deserve  develop  an a r b i t r a r y  of  amount  minimum n e c e s s a r y  creative  does  against  instance,  Breyer  paying  of  optimal  r e w a r d comes a t  s i d e of  the  holds that  p r o v i d e a reward to  "socially  because  of c o p y r i g h t  modern  As the  conceptions  the  of  point  jurisprudence:  foregoing the  review  appropriate  copyright  is  has  to  tried  d e f i n i t i o n of  157 property  l e d t o a recognition that  less property contingent a  than r i g h t s p r e s e r v e d  than  state-granted  this  to a  "natural and  over and  as  and o p p o s e s i s that  of the p u b l i c  interest  w h i c h t h e new t h e o r y o f  activities  t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  was no  copyright  interest,  of property  i t sextent  sees  the implication  understanding  Any t y p e  exclusivity  correspond  i n the p u b l i c  exists regardless  attacked.  justification,  Roberts  law p r o p e r t y ;  I t i s this  statutory right  a t common l a w , and no more  law r i g h t .  monopoly  property"  property for  a common  common  politics.  this  , p r o v i d i n g as i t does i n owners,  and scope on w h i c h  requires  i n law  should  i t r e s t s a t any one  time. Second, almost  e x c l u s i v e l y on  benefit, the  one s i d e  fullest  concerned maintain tends  possible  a high  Mansfield, author's  serves  historic  rent  or rather  separate,  receive  on p r o t e c t e d  works a n d  activity. a  This  crucial  dichotomy aspect  of  o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l and  i s discussed  i n protecting the  i n t e r e s t s . Whether  third  an e x p l a n a t i o n  development  owners  the other  i n t h e copy  a s w e l l as m a t e r i a l a  reward and  v . T a y l o r : a s u n d e r s t o o d by L o r d  of property  as  place  labour,  i n the examination  the role  personal,  copyright  consideration  of M i l l a r  takes  o f economic  of competitive  from  sources  copyright, its  the economic  revealed  theoretical  on s e e i n g  debate  r e t u r n on t h e a u t h o r ' s  level  t o remove  v s . monopoly'  the terrain  intent  to limit  copyright  factor  the 'property  justification  this for  f o r c e r t a i n features of i n Part VI.  158 VI.  COPYRIGHT  AND T H E J U S T I F I C A T I O N  OF P R O P E R T Y FROM  A.  PERSONHOOD  LORD M A N S F I E L D AND T H E LABOUR  The  labour  theory  of  property,  L o c k e i a n , and t h e u t i l i t a r i a n two  dominant  day.  Both  analyses are  individualism, pecuniary  within  and b o t h  speak  i n property of labour  created  the l a t t e r  maximising of material In had  Part  v.  Taylor  beyond  the r i g h t  the pecuniary  property  literary  himself,  of  his personality,  Mansfield  justified  afforded a  at least  i n part  c o n t r o l over  consequence,  pointed  the granting  over  out, this  of  this  liberal or  to the  just  to value  to ensure the  i n society.  debate, of  Lord  unique one  composition  to having  on t h e b a s i s  Mansfield to M i l l a r  that  dividing  and  such  f o r the personal  a  Lord  copyright  of the composition creative  to  part of  composition.  that  moved  economic  invested  o f an e x c l u s i v e  the author's  concern  means  i n the  the i n t e g r i t y  to  to a m a t e r i a l  i n a fashion  o f the a u t h o r ' s c l a i m  author  the  rights  argued . that  consideration  the  represent  entitlement  to a l e g a l  consideration a  as  t h e former  or the j u s t  o f copy  from  described  tradition  essentially  i t was  and the l i t e r a r y  benefits'derived  the  g o o d s and b e n e f i t s  IV, h o w e v e r ,  discussed  and r e l a t e d  rights:  reward f o r the p a i n by l a b o u r ,  often  or economic theory  of copyright  located  purpose  THEORY  a  to  right  and, as  reputation.  As  implications  in  159 ownership  of  preceding  the  text  Millar  Lord  v.  had  appeared  Taylor.  Mansfield's  in a  number  of  the  3 0 1  approach  could  be  described  as  e l u c i d a t i o n o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l dimension u n d e r l y i n g a theory  of property  entitlement,  t o which e a r l i e r  made.  In  Locke's  theory,  property  extended  through  the  Another an  way  to  e x c l u s i v e property  reward  for  statement  the  of  the  body's  approach  the  labour  the l i m i t i n g  in  to  labour  i n the  producer's  cases  the  theory  object  labour?  own  object  Becker  the  labour  person  when  is  appropriate  attempts  c o n d i t i o n s of the  was  produced.  i s to ask:  produced  labour  reference  one's  an  a  general  theory:  W e l l , i t means t h a t when p e o p l e d e s e r v e a b e n e f i t f o r t h e i r l a b o u r , and when ( i n terms of the p u r p o s e s of t h e i r efforts) nothing but property i n the things p r o d u c e d w i l l do, and when t h e v a l u e o f such r i g h t s meets the t e s t of proportionality, then they deserve p r o p e r t y i n t h o s e t h i n g s . When, on the o t h e r hand, s u b s t i t u t e s w i l l do e v e r y b i t as w e l l , t h e y t h e n d e s e r v e either the t h i n g s p r o d u c e d or an e q u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y s u b s t i t u t e . And f i n a l l y , where p r o p e r t y i n t h e t h i n g s p r o d u c e d i s not what i s s o u g h t at a l l , and cannot be an adequate substitute f o r what i s sought, the l a b o r e r s deserve something e l s e (perhaps recognition, gratitude). 0  Property the  therefore  purposes  produces. commercial deserves  This  of  2  seems a p p r o p r i a t e the  labour  clearly  component.  something a k i n  and  denotes  If  the  where  to  both  purpose  to property,  the a of  and  i t corresponds value  the  labour  psychological the not  labour  to  and  a  expended  a substitute (for  160 instance, assume  a derived  i t relates  produced relate all  to  the  i f  control  one  the  and  to  use  the  object—  purpose  in  producing  or  personal just  as  the the  property  over  addresses,  of  equal  of  labourer.  assume  Therefore,  of  importance  specific  were  psychological part  to  to possession  alienable.  the  income) a l t h o u g h  value,  the  This  specific  i s the  in  i t . "Control"  might  question  appropriate  which  object  that cannot  is  the  be  where  relates  therefore  labour  " p r o p o r t i o n a l reward"  be  to  reward  including i t s exchange—  interest  must  importance  o b j e c t , but right  one  to the  theory  i s the  in  economic  interest. Lord  Mansfield's  particular that  kind  the  of  was  rights,  a  right  and  to  labour  purchaser  B.  labour:  appropriate  intellect  of  to  the  the  reward  indeed  set  concern  the  right  to  Mi l i a r  labour for  of  the  an  a  for  for  very  author.  He  found  exercise  inhered  material  reward  exploitation  copy.  was  author's  c o n t r o l which  extract terms  in  of  to  of  property  for authorial the  work  by  a  3 0 3  PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: TWO THEORIES  Just  as  Justice  Yates  1  opinion  presaged developments  i n nineteenth  Mansfield's  might  philosophy  opinion of  relationship  century  Millar legal  v.  objects  of  of  the  property  significance and  Taylor  theory,  a n t i c i p a t e d developments  i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and between  in  the  Lord  in  the  of  the  individual  161  owner did  to the l a t t e r ' s  Lord Mansfield's  understanding the  self-development.  perspective truly  objects o f h i s labour implications  and  ?  Answering  the nature  Ryan  otherwise  provides  helpful  in political  the  which  first,  converting  more  be  he terms  concerning  tradition  requires  between  property  f o r what  might  Ryan  The  individual  Ryan  and t h a t  and Bentham,  with  Rousseau  i t , imply  role  that  labour  i s a s much o r  o f p e r s o n a l i t y as f o r the  amongst  tradition  p e r s o n a l i t y . The s t a t e m e n t  as a  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  instrumental  others,  and t h e German  for property  :  the second, the  he owns  tradition a  3 0 4  and a s a means  both  identifies  "instrumental"  gives  constitutive  asserts  and t h e o b j e c t s  3 0 5  Locke  self-developmental 3 0 6  consumables;  satisfying  rights  views p r o p e r t y  of labour  f o r the development  purposes. with  into  tradition,  the i n d i v i d u a l  economic  name  first  property  "instrumental",  resources  intrinsically  important  Hegel.  material  i n q u i r y due t o t h e s i l e n c e o f much  theory  "self-developmental"  between  the  level. focus  r e w a r d f o r t h e p a i n and i n c o n v e n i e n c e  should  over  t h e o r i s i n g on t h e i s s u e o f p e r s o n h o o d . He o p p o s e s two  traditions  for  words, d o e s  i t s evident  question  theoretical a  distinctive  i n the author  of the relationship  prove a d i f f i c u l t  property  this  a  i n other  have meaning beyond  p e r s o n h o o d on a g e n e r a l Alan  right  begs a q u e s t i o n :  represent  of the basis f o r p r o p e r t y —  recognition of a property  considering  This  might, that  and t h e  philosopher by t h e v e r y denies  i n the development that  any of  i t does have s u c h a  162 function  appears,  critique  of  possessive  1.  the  surprisingly  tradition:  individualism.  ontological Hobbe,  Locke  philosophers. human  seventeenth  in a  by  Macpherson s  explicated  the p o l i t i c a l  of  nature  what  century  he  relations.  He  propositions  was  of  English back  argued  the i n d i v i d u a l  the  theories  f o r reading  into  was  in a  the  society  characterised  o f t h e m a r k e t as " p o s s e s s i v e  (iii).  of  and c r i t i c i s e d  seventeenth  image o f  seven d e f i n i n g  leading  theory  1  these t h e o r i e s  state  market  in a  Individualism  work  other  century's  individualism whose  and  C.B.  underlying  He a t t a c k e d  nature  dominated  seminal  assumptions  therefore,  3 0 7  P r o p e r t y and P o s s e s s i v e Macpherson's  of  not  individualism",  the one  that:  The i n d i v i d u a l i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e p r o p r i e t o r o f h i s own p e r s o n and c a p a c i t i e s , f o r w h i c h he owes n o t h i n g t o s o c i e t y . 3 0 8  Freedom the  and humanity  were  i n turn  i n d i v i d u a l a s owner o f h i m s e l f  defined  by t h e c o n c e p t  i n a cold  of  world:  The i n d i v i d u a l i n market s o c i e t y _is human as p r o p r i e t o r o f h i s own p e r s o n . However much he may w i s h i t t o be o t h e r w i s e , h i s h u m a n i t y d o e s d e p e n d on h i s f r e e d o m f r o m any but s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d contractual relations with others. 0  The  possessive  society  9  nature o f t h i s concept  t o t h e sum  of a c q u i s i t i v e  of individualism  actors  pursuing  reduced  their  own  163 interests:  " S o c i e t y c o n s i s t s of  proprietors." subjects  of  pointed  his  to  a  personality: the  study,  to  possibilities. own  a  as  of  theory  second  viewing  seem  the  property.  elaboration developed point  of  i t will  i n The a  history  work.  In  provided about  construct  normative  first to  History  represented  affairs,  a  ideal  identify  as  the  of  reason  in  the working out  continual progress  owner  3 1 1  did  (albeit  of  .  To  Hegel's fullest  say  Hegel  misses  the  human  life  'stuff',  not  endeavour  its  to  did,  but  institutions.  or S p i r i t  through  for  institutions  philosophers  Idea  offered  the  existing  of  of  i t s  somewhat  point,  law  of  possessive  i n terms  s o c i e t y and  natural  the  Will  (1828)  Hegel  as  communal  the  p h i l o s o p h i c method  forms.  theory  as  and  products  acme o f  received  property  starting  i t  society.  examined  Hegel's the  principles,  rather  of  of  self-developmental,  of R i g h t  se,  reified  i n the  Personal  theory  Philosophy  speculation a  be  That  justification  his  the  to  the  reduced  bereft  the  of  property  man,  individual  owes n o t h i n g  tradition,  more. Here  of  of  between  that  institution  measure  well  like  between  an  H e g e l ' s T h e o r y o f P r o p e r t y and  something  from  relationship  might  exchange  p s y c h o l o g i c a l per  r e c o g n i t i o n of p r o p e r t y  f o r which he  Ryan's  of  theory,  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d atom  The  individualism,  2.  not  all-encompassing  imagination  capacities  was  dynamic  n a t u r a l and  one's  Macpherson's  private property,  individual  and  While  3 1 0  relations  i n human  contradiction  164 and  conflict)  imbued  h i s thought  determinism him  o f man and s o c i e t y with  and p o l i t i c a l  to discuss society  over  time  a s humans  natural  world,  Rousseau  and o t h e r  a  of  state  purposes  initial Hegel the  chose  basis  rational then,  and  instead  a  Hegel  social  abstract  saw h i s t a s k  this  historical  i t also  permitted changes  relationships  to the  themselves.  Locke,  to  used  their  the f i c t i o n s of to explain  views  and s t a t i c , from  of  apart  nature  the course  the  society from  to  o f human  t o assume t h a t  In a p p r o a c h i n g  of  contract  of the ' f a l l ' t o adopt  ,  While  phenomenon t h a t  law t h e o r i s t s  f o r philosophy,  purpose.  and  institutions;  remained  3 1 2  out t h e i r  other  natural  description  trappings  as a dynamic  worked  for social  consequently  the  conservatism  t o each  nature  t o w a r d s an i d e a l .  the  society.  history  as  i t had meaning and  an i n s t i t u t i o n  like  property,  n o t a s one o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  but of  understanding. To  Hegel,  history  problem,  or Idea,  time  and  stages  form  themselves  As  much  of i n d i v i d u a l  of s o c i a l as f u l l y  his  played  over  of  development  o f humans willing  individual.  role.  externalised  objects  3 1 3  out of the  the struggle  p r o g r e s s i o n , Hegel  every  a crucial  the individual  will  will,  as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e t h i c a l  self-constituting  which  the working  differentiated,  as a h i s t o r i c a l  development  property  represented  (but not other  seeking  process  In  to  individuals.  envisaged  I t represented his will  through  this  this  i n the scheme,  t h e means by  i n nature, persons)  3 1 4  imposed i n the  165 external  world.  property  relations  society  were  The  the  fully-formed  with  ones  o b j e c t s , and  which  private property. Property an  economic  recognised  Hegel  wrote,  To  enough m e r e l y  to w i l l ,  occupancy  requisite."  is  invest  property  was  Hegel  extolling  labour  mistakenly  oneself  " i s i n an  Here,  3 1 5  i n the  form  led  some,  Ryan  to a l l o t h e r s . According  significance. consciousness with  finding That  3 1 6  was a  relationship  object  of  institution  of  purpose  than  was  grounded fuller of  created)  the  i n labour to  to  and  of  his  examination  basis  for  view  and  property  that  Labour  awareness  of  Hegel  activity  have  to o b j e c t produced  one  end  made no  for Hegel,  i n experience.  good  this  intellectual  labour  experience  not  of  The  assume  t o Ryan, H e g e l  because,  labourer  was  then  occupation.  labour, with  a l l  i t was  "to secure  too,  of  embodiment  object  argues,  superior  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  the  ' self-expression'  i n a h i e r a r c h y of  The  stages  ethical  or want, o w n e r s h i p ;  believed  labourer  higher  the  s e r v e d more an  personality"'.  has  the  established  one.  Property,  as  individual  such  e t h i c a l  knowledge  or  provided  the  of  himself.  (or author  self-construction,  not  to  mere  ownership. Hegel Philosophy not  concluded of  Right  insignificant,  moving  i n every  complex,  the  with  a d i s c u s s i o n of  because  Hegel's  phenomenon  primitive  to  of  in  The  copyright. This  was  expository  studied  the  property  from  the  sophisticated,  style simple showing  involved to at  the each  166 point  the  urged  inner  development  copyright Millar; the  was  how  to conceive  and  means  of  the  argued  a  author's  ownership."  J i  reproducible divisibility  of  whereby  capital  asset."  modifications  to  restricted  the  narrow  overall attention and  in  on  property theory  of  about  judges  in  in  property  other.  because  "complete problem  by  nature  between merely  the  sciences  work  of  the  he  has,  had free  finding  the  entailing  the  owner  the  and  a possession  but  and  in  a  making  appropriateness law,  of  which  Copyright  of authors  f r e q u e n t l y "the  the  This  and  predecessors.  the p r o p e r t y  the m a j o r i t y  right  and  t o d i s c u s s the ease of  the  and  " u n i v e r s a l ways the  on  of one  Hegel  negligible."  which e x p l o i t s  intellectual  uses  d i s c u s s i o n of of  that  the  to  work, and  the  extent"  opinions  the  value  on  unique  i s not  author's occur  brief  Hegel  by  3 1 7  the  a  proceeded  the author...becomes  beyond  have  t h e r e f o r e secured  Hegel's  a  to  dialectics,  and  the  required  thing  building  legislation very  t o an  this on  challenge  to  He  3 1 9  of  books"  i t s external "the  faced  a l l i t s use  sidestepped  'thing'  author,  depended  He  the  concerned  dilemma  such  property °  What  ownership  particular  that  allowing  the  and  multiplying  presented  dynamics,  o f the d i f f e r e n c e between o w n e r s h i p  book,  1  and  forward.  precisely  ' t h i n g , the  hand,  a  conflicts  "only  profit  to  promised  3 2 0  copyright in Millar author  not  with  over  however,  its particular  did  much  respect  copying.  received  relevance  go  to His  recent  to copyright  p r o p e r t y . These s t u d i e s h e l p t o show how  Lord  167 Mansfield's objects  of  insight  intellectual  understanding  o f these  Contemporary  3.  into  the purposes labour  of p r o p e r t y  remain  crucial  i n the  to a  full  rights.  Scholarship  on  the  Personhood  Basis  of  a concept  of  self-realisation,  or  Property Margaret Radin develops property  as  serving  "personhood."  a  from Hegel's thought  function  of  She d e f i n e s h e r a p p r o a c h t h i s  3 2 1  way:  The premise u n d e r l y i n g the personhood p e r s p e c t i v e i s that to achieve proper self-development-t o be a p e r s o n - an individual needs some control over r e s o u r c e s i n t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . The necessary assurances o f c o n t r o l take the form o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . 3  This in  represents  addition  a "third  t o the Lockeian  welfare  maximising  general  justification  Radin  seeks  that  dimension  constituting economic  property unspoken property  t o show  of  of  that  legal  like  theory  property  personhood,  a  Like  that as  them  posits  which  by c o u r t s and  from  underlie  them a n d  to  the  i t s purely this  of p r i v a t e r e v e a l the  the p r o t e c t i o n s  legislatures.  a  rights.  not use  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  understand  both  neglected  i s important  she does  3 2 3  utilitarian  has l a r g e l y  distinct  Hegel,  critique  as t o b e t t e r  assumptions granted  and  and  theory"  f o r and d e l i n e a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y  to offer  s o much  property  labour-desert  strands,  consequences.  perspective  strand of l i b e r a l  of  168 Radin property. latter owner  d i s t i n g u i s h e s between The  former  "property of  sense,  an  that  object  cannot  receiving  i s property  an  i s held  of  be  purely  adequately object  personal  property  ring's both  manufacturer.  d e s c r i p t i v e and  personal protection she  than  argues  higher  argues  that  philosophers,  her  and  a  in  recognises for  how  can  unhealthy  327 unconvincing. *'  rights  that  without she  f o r law.  drawn  In  between  She  to  argues of  of the is  that legal  descriptive side, fact  grant  without  this  explicit  rules.  3  2  She  5  posited bifurcated  resemble  her  scheme  in  well-grounded  theory  of  3 2 6  a  turns  risks  she  in  have  by  distinction  other  which  substance.  approach  be  under  this  character  measure  although  The  i t s loss  the  this  the  does  theorists  which  significance line  many  On  .  in  fungible property  higher  system  subsumed  property  personhood,  without  a  3 2 4  the  equivalent.  Normatively,  protection,  implicitly  Radin  legal  often  further  f o r m , and  i n using  purpose  deserves  of  and  of  Her  the  measure  conceptions  but  fungible property.  that  recognition  w h i c h has  i t s wearer,  normative.  property  for  i t s monetary  example o f a wedding r i n g ,  a person",  understood  compensated or  "fungible"  instrumentally"  property,  uses the  to  and  "bound up w i t h  personal  identical  "personal"  being fact,  to  Hegel  wholly her  'healthy'  and  subjective  attempt  to  personal  o b j e c t - f e t i s h i s m appears  other and  explain property  arbitrary  and  169  4.  The  Appeal  The  last  separated  Hegel more and at  Personhood  perhaps  Hegelian  i n d i c a t e s what  theory  from  the  critique  are  his  contemporary  (and than  point  a  personhood  of a Theory of  c e l e b r a t i n g the  of  political  society sense,  and  Property  and  be  p r o p e r t y as out, Hegel and  than had  most  a  served  trader  more  for  in  the  sense,  possessor  no.  Hegel's  private property. something the  new  individual to  be  than  the  own  of  ethical  individual  capacities.  author's  ability  evident  of  property  where  labour  rights. most  was Just  to  i n mind, so H e g e l s u g g e s t e d  phenomenon  expression.  in his  purposes  3 2 9  himself  philosophy, to In  to  liberal a  the  to  Was  anything  of  a panegyric  s o c i e t y was  The  3 2 8  embodying  i n t e r p r e t e r s ) doing as  line  individualism.  deeper  property  express  his  different  e x c h a n g e a b l e good i n t h e m a r k e t . As  maximisation.  a  way  fine  as  r e j e c t e d a c o n t r a c t model f o r l e g a l  creativity the  an  of  provided  recognised  property  wealth  as  possessive  represented  its institution  however, Hegel  debate. will  level,  property  individual  o f w o r l d l y o b j e c t s ? In one the  of  a  than  Ryan p o i n t s  relations;  work  development, conceived as  profit  Lord  as  not more  Mansfield his  own  a f u r t h e r dimension  for  That  closely  from  dimension resembles  may  be  self-  170 C.  COPYRIGHT AND PERSONHOOD  1.  The J u s t i f i c a t i o n The  play  endeavour  i n property  property  copyright. article  to highlight rights,  c a n be  individual,  From P e r s o n h o o d  seen  has v a l u e J  Justin  U  more  the r o l e  personal  specifically  to constitute  t o examine  personhood  Hughes  this  exploits  of Intellectual  potential  Property."  concept  need  to externalise i t s e l f  labour  particularly other  be  Alan  a  which  justification.  for intellectual  that  conditions 'object'  Ryan,  subset  maintains  which  of property  theory  t h e case  of property  He  in  his  Hughes  3 3 1  as f u l f i l l i n g t h e constitutes a  supplements  believes  property  3 3 2  this  the  t o be  compared t o  forms o f p r o p e r t y . Like  to  will  justification  Lockeian  i n the  t h e unique p r o p e r t y o f  argues that the Hegelian  second  how  for interpreting  "The P h i l o s o p h y  f o r personal  interests  Hughes  of  the  the labour  for justifying (read  idea)  the object  views  utilitarian  'instrumental' theory  derived  a property  requires  i s taken  labour  theory.  He  from L o c k e has t h r e e  right:  labour;  justifications  (1) p r o d u c i n g  (2) t h e commons  i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  devalued;  the from (3)  t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r o f t h e o b j e c t does n o t w a s t e i t . I n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y meets t h e s e the  commons  regimes 'sunset'  of ideas  respect  a  conditions, especially i s not f i n i t e public  domain  p r o v i s i o n s . However,  the second  and i n t e l l e c t u a l through  their  intellectual  because property  statutory  property  does  171 encounter  certain  little  labour  ideas,  especially  inspiration, their  problems  may  be  author  justification  the  i n v o l v e d i n the  those  and  from  the  more  violate  of  waste  certain  creativity  intellectual  the  from personhood can  perspective:  a p p r o p r i a t i n g of  associated with  withholding  may  Lockeian  and  products  principle.  overcome t h o s e  by The  difficulties:  Such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n p o s i t s t h a t p r o p e r t y p r o v i d e s a unique or e s p e c i a l l y s u i t a b l e mechanism f o r s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n , for p e r s o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , a n d f o r d i g n i t y and r e c o g n i t i o n a s an i n d i v i d u a l person.... According to t h i s p e r s o n a l i t y theory, the k i n d of c o n t r o l needed i s best fulfilled by t h e s e t o f r i g h t s we c a l l property rights. 3  The  concept  control person, is  to  the  3  of  copyright  creator  represented  c l o s e to  the  by  reputation able  to  through  prevent  e f f e c t , of justified  2.  a  (author)  the  object  approach Lord  too b e l i e v e d t h a t the  as  interest  altering  his  over of  the  his  of  property  the  intellectual  identifies  justification:  the  issue of a l i e n a t i o n  two  difficulty  his  labour,  in Millar.  integrity,  'takings' which  would  the  He  being  have  the  composition,  law.  Problems w i t h a Personhood J u s t i f i c a t i o n Hughes  of  in preserving his  work's  to  giving  extension  the author  relationship  c o p y r i g h t a t common  of  M a n s f i e l d adopted  p r o t e c t i o n of  unauthorised  right  problems  with  in establishing  of p r o p e r t y .  To  t h a t , two  of the  Property personhood  limits, related  and  the  problems  172 could  be a d d e d :  concept, (1) can  inherent  i n the  and the m a t e r i a l consequences o f a l l p r o p e r t y  rights.  Subjectivity—  easily  individual which  founder willing.  provides  relations, employ  rules  the w i l l which  recognised  rise  object-  system  rights  was  where  t o Hegel,  embodied  i n the e x t e r n a l property  and t a l e n t s , t h e  an  objective  by l e g a l  a  personhood  will  property's  the i n d i v i d u a l  incurs risks  has h i s  the e f f o r t  for defining  Limitless—  t h e argument  Mansfield's  compositions  basis  gives  to  l e g i t i ma t e  of directing  human  sanction.  Potentially  issue;  and i t i s through that  an  labour i s  to i n t e l l e c t u a l  h i s labour  could  implicated, but  by o t h e r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  personality  as  gives  institution  of individual  seen  becomes  f o r property,  expressions  Lord  integrity  By e x p r e s s i n g  as a s o c i a l  identify  first  and unhealthy  property  of  of p e r s o n a l i t y  i n v e s t s the o b j e c t with h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . This  personality  (2)  theory  t o i m a g i n e how a l e g a l recognise  theory  of the s u b j e c t i v i t y  a developed  or p e r s o n a l  3 3 4  to the claim  character  t h e personhood  where i t was n o t . A c c o r d i n g  expression.  rise  above,  to healthy  would  The labour  individual  seemingly  the issue  guide  means by which  object.  on  Without  that will  deny p r o p e r t y  is  a  as noted  i tis difficult  individual's  the  the s u b j e c t i v i t y  from  This  personhood,  use o f a u t h o r i a l  to justify variation  a property of  closely  over  a t common theory.  experiences  to the  as suggested  control  right  the labour  justification  relates  by  literary  law, c a n be  Like  i t , the  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  173 comprehending or  literary  invested  l i m i t s on work,  his  property.  should  will  in  have  the  by  others  object,  property  in  and  free  will  was  withdrawn  coterminous that  —  end  stage  alienability. from  with  He  the  However, i f t h e  personhood  i t because  i t becomes and  he  has  problematic  unhindered  Hegel maintained  i t s highest  full  alienation.  in  object,  to  uses of  the  begin.  (3) A l i e n a b i l i t y of  c r e a t o r o f an  property  d e f i n e where h i s c o n t r o l s h o u l d object  I f the  any  o f p r o p e r t y . Hughes p u t s  personal  that  the  i n the  interest then  of  individual process  i n an  of  object  i t does  additional  dilemma t h i s  institution  characteristic  owned  value,  unique or  the  the  theorised  object  i t s exchange  offers  had  that the  not  is  seem  justification  way:  T h i s i s the p a r a d o x of a l i e n a t i o n under the p e r s o n a l i t y model of p r o p e r t y . The p r e s e n t owner m a i n t a i n s o w n e r s h i p b e c a u s e he i d e n t i f i e s the property as an e x p r e s s i o n of s e l f . A l i e n a t i o n i s the d e n i a l o f t h i s p e r s o n a l l i n k t o an o b j e c t . But i f t h e p e r s o n a l l i n k does n o t e x i s t — i f t h e o b j e c t d o e s not e x p r e s s o r m a n i f e s t p a r t of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l i t y - t h e r e i s no f o u n d a t i o n f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o v e r t h e o b j e c t by w h i c h t h e 'owner' may d e t e r m i n e t h e o b j e c t ' s f u t u r e . An owner's p r e s e n t d e s i r e to a l i e n a t e a piece of p r o p e r t y i s c o n n e c t e d to the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y e i t h e r i s n o t or s o o n w i l l not be an e x p r e s s i o n o f h i m s e l f . Thus the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for property is missing. 3 3 5  Ultimately, point  as  Lord  Mansfield's  w e l l . That  is, a  approach  fully  would  founder  alienable copyright  on  this  provides  174 only  a  tenuous  control  interests  i n the  h a n d s . An  author  to  parcel  his  of  ongoing  The  work; once in  control,  or  to  in  fact analogised  to  right  the  for  alienable, Act  as  The  point  or  (4) theory  at  economic  a  to  may  other  be  give  a  higher  able  degree  material  the  the  sale  1988,  that  of  the  present  from  f r o m an  they  to  are  property  right,  3  work. rights  Copyright  their is  purpose. that  necessarily,  i f such  by  moral  the  the  with  his  issue  moral  in  of  Several  6  in  however,  not  3  of  inalienable  make  now  Hegel  aspect  this  interests  discussion, does  s e l f .  addressed  inconsistent  personhood a  personality  abandonment  one's  moves  as  seem  of  "universal"  full  personal  waivable  in  the  creator's  preserving  even  interest  to complete a l i e n a b i l i t y .  a l i e n a t i o n of  reason  or  the even  i s conceived  as  right.  Material as  Consequences—  justification on  individual  personal  passes  which  extract  i f the  subject  the  support  property  perhaps  his  position  those  copyright  for  alienable  onto  p r o p e r t y of  amended  primarily,  hold  over  control  bargaining  Canada,  this  justification  the  including  directed  is  be  slavery,  separating  sold,  whether,  property,  jurisdictions,  an  is  count, i t can  idea,  author  withdrawal.  question  intellectual  an  strong and  is  It  a  rights  reward f o r h i s  for  its  will  might  constitutive and  personality,  i n s t i t u t i o n that  F i n a l l y , however be  role the  determines  concerned in  the  fact  of  much  with  this  basing  development property  d i s t r i b u t i o n of  as  of an  rewards  175 and  areas  of  exclusive  justification  that  making  more  subject  to close  3.  could  absolute,  than  justification property, theory  of  property; are  implied  from  the  of  effect  work  which  as  least  own  or  purpose,  t o see  rights.  readily  available  copyright  as  than  economic  the  mere right  As  to  or  should  be  the  tack  a  general  as  that  he  of p r o p e r t y  then  of  as  person  an  finds  absent  i n any  theory  such  an  i t can  be  above.  should  imperative  with  derived  from  It  be  of  insights  the  who  seeing  i s fraught  may  be  hold  theorists  explanation offer  of  c l a i m can  However,  sense  i t cannot  Hegel's  relations  egalitarian in  a of  justification  property  draws  noted  rights  using  a moral  every  as  his more  nature  which  are  from other p e r s p e c t i v e s .  significance an  expanding,  particular  Hegel maintains,  because  i n the  property  The  theory  for  takes  justificatory  not  not  itself  thereby  difficulty,  of  personhood  power  "instrumentalist" tradition.  theory  appropriate  of  economic  Hegelian  development  Waldron  3 3 7  method  of  for self-development,  Ryan's  Hegel's  the  i s , i f , as  Hegel's  follow  effect  A  Theory  Waldron  personal  to  property.  of the  and  Jeremy  necessary  the  rights  viewing  in  that  have  continues.  scrutiny.  A P r e f e r r e d Use Rather  activity  of  explanatory interests  reproduce  the  theory  tool  is a  are  at  of  personhood  for  r e c o g n i t i o n that  more  stake  c r e a t i v e works. T h i s  in has  'ownership' value  of  simply  176 as  an i n t e r p r e t i v e  this  legal  tool  which a l l o w s  institution.  When  we  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f c o p y r i g h t , i t may that  copyright  respecting created  the personal  the object  interpretive balancing between  i s responding  us t o b e t t e r look  at  particular  be u s e f u l t o keep  t o some  integrity  in question.  deeper  interests  copyright  within  of the person Second,  and other  copyright,  competing  knowing  when  o f p e r s o n a l i t y as opposed  In forward literary  into  as  to fungible  of Part  from  o f copy a s i t was e n v i s a g e d  the r i g h t  VI an attempt  i s made  t o move  during the  p r o p e r t y debate t o i t s contemporary c o n f i g u r a t i o n . In the roles  modern  of ' c r e a t i v i t y '  i n copies  copyright)  on b o t h  copyright  will  (and o t h e r be  in  rights  addressed.  that  i t s function  personal  interests  r e c o g n i t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n t h r o u g h -including  and ' o r i g i n a l i t y '  t h e m a t e r i a l and t h e p e r s o n a l  serves  acknowledgment  insight  such  are implicated.  of property  focuses  this  be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s o l v e d by  the remainder  particular, bases  has  especially  interests  may  in  i n which the  and  of expression,  economic i n t e r e s t s  who  beyond  freedom  interests  i n mind  interests  f u n c t i o n , t h e r e may be c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of  understand  non-alienable  available  moral  serve  expression  and  personal  reception  incorporated  The d i s c u s s i o n interests property.  of authors  means o t h e r  which  than  approach; property  interests of p e r s o n a l  and will  The  receive  copyright-  r i g h t s — s h o u l d not obscure  from a Hegelian  themselves  as  as t h e  the  rights i n  c o n s t i t u t e the i n the  world.  177 Copyright economic  in  particular  entitlements:  personal  is  accomplishments, fixed  (which  qualitatively  i s not  that  Radin  might  with  authorial  with  these  D.  LABOUR AND  1.  Originality  provides  further  form,  and  classes  one  rights vice  artistic  "literary  expressed  other  of in  compositions labour  c r e a t i v e labour  imbued  so,  the  however,  i t deals  nominal g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  Law  work." of  to  For  convert 3 4 0  ,  but  The  of  literary,  Copyright  these  Most  3 3 9  every  class,  example, a no  such  rights  some  rights  statute  work  rights  into for  of  charts,  the  but  the  dramatic  of  Act  classes  work... i n c l u d e s maps,  pertain to class.  original  3 3 8  each  compilations."  versa  grants another  the  other  se. works can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  expressive  informational  range  the  doing  definitions  Act  to  Protected are  a  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from  ' f u n g i b l e ' ) to  and  and  the  inter  in  of  courts a l i k e p r e f e r .  example,  tables  derivative  or  p e r t a i n s i n Canada t o " e v e r y  musical  unique  distribution  labour  literary  i n Modern C o p y r i g h t  dramatic,  are  a  CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT  Copyright  by  of  a  i n ways t h a t d e f y  w h i c h s t a t u t e s and  afforded  from  p e r s o n a l i t y . In  forms  works—for  forms  call  than  i t e s t a b l i s h e s value  reproducible,  plans,  more  or  of  creative imagination  between t h o s e  and  others  i n v o l v e an a r r a n g e m e n t o f f a c t u a l  which  which  are  material, a  178 distinction statute. of  which does  Despite  "literary,  been and  artistic,  recognised  tombstones  3 4 4  officials  4  3  5  with  3 4 2  ,  debt  collection  and  3  ,  the text  works c a n be f o u n d "compilations" grounded  i n express  principles  word  "original"  from  which  t o the S t a t u t e  o f Anne  "authors"  and o f " b o o k s " .  in Millar,  English  originality justification  (as i n ,  'first  for copyright, i n order  work might  their  occupancy')  became  i n P a r t IV  a t t e n t i o n on  a  which  theoretical a  plaintiff  modifications  t o support v . Walker  only  book i n q u e s t i o n ;  but not a t e s t Minor  d i d not  i t spoke  examined  the p a r t i c u l a r  Gyles  statutes  ( 1 7 0 9 ) . The S t a t u t e  t o succeed.  a c t i o n , as i n  i n copyright  centred  that  interpretations of  In t h e cases  be s u f f i c i e n t  i t i s more  v. T a y l o r .  of o r i g i n a l i t y ;  courts  i n the  of copyright  judicial  appeared  by t r a c k  references  and " t a b l e s " — b u t  i n basic  arose  produced  on  a few. The i n t e n t i o n t o p r o t e c t  key p r i n c i p l e  infringement  4  plans  t o name  just  races  3  has  ,  The  existing  insurance  letters  i n the decades f o l l o w i n g M i l l a r  t o meet  ,  copyright  of horse  whether d e f e n d a n t s had c o p i e d  had  3 4 1  copyright  mundane works n o t  In C a n a d a ,  directories  c o n t a i n an e x p r e s s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of  practical,  parlance  and s c h e d u l e s  fundamentally  subsequent  i n common  and d r a m a t i c , "  creativity.  i n business  statute—e.g.,  the  recognition i nthe  ,  some o f t h e s e  developed  musical  range o f w h o l l y  associated  schedules  express  the c r e a t i v e connotations  extends t o a vast readily  not r e c e i v e  a defence  (1740).  t o an t o an  179 The minimal;  test  for "originality"  in a classic  statement  under  current  statutes i s  o f t h e law, P e t e r s o n  J . said:  Copyright A c t s a r e not concerned with the o r i g i n a l i t y of ideas but with the e x p r e s s i o n o f t h o u g h t , and i n t h e c a s e o f ' l i t e r a r y work,' w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f thought i n print or w r i t i n g . The o r i g i n a l i t y which i s r e q u i r e d r e l a t e s t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e t h o u g h t . But t h e A c t does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n must be i n an o r i g i n a l o r n o v e l form, b u t t h a t t h e work must n o t be c o p i e d f r o m a n o t h e r work--that i t s h o u l d o r i g i n a t e from the author. 3 4 6  The  case  i n question  copyright. and  I n such  formulations  originality and  drawn  almost  from  merit  adjectives  the subject  a common  and j u d g m e n t .  always  or q u a l i t y  stock  Hay  & Hay v . S l o a n  3 4 8  i s required  but again  plans  Stewart  knowledge,  i n the s e l e c t i o n  i n v o l v e s t h e modest  which m i g h t  defendant  to architectural "artistic".  of  are facts  The argument on o r i g i n a l i t y  3 4 7  and " a r t i s t i c "  an a e s t h e t i c standard,  attracted  matter  u n a v a i l i n g , defendants  as " l i t e r a r y "  as n o t b e i n g  questions  so l o n g as t h a t  for  copyright  exam  f o r c o p y r i g h t i s found  make u s e o f s t a t u t o r y w o r d i n g creative  that  where  of f a c t s ,  exercise of s k i l l proving  cases,  sufficient  arrangement  ruled  suggest  tried  have  been  little  Such  pointed to success.  the court  f o r a standard  to  a degree o f  for copyright.  with  asked  have  t o deny  suburban  J. replied:  I t i s g r a t i f y i n g t o t h i n k t h a t t h o s e who d r a f t e d t h i s A c t were c o n t e n t t o l e a v e such aesthetic responsibility to the  In  home  180 j u d i c i a r y , but i t i s , I t h i n k , t o assume s u c h i n t e n t i o n . 4  This  rationale,  assessments reliance  of  that  expressive  on  the  thin  "literary"  has  written  printed  in  literature. Exxon  for  convey  In  the  exception Exxon  not  to  Canadian  that to  date  the  mean  the  The  work  word  must  be  quality  of  approach  occurred  in  i n which  the  of  i t have  3 5 0  judicial  the  the  name a  Court  "Exxon"  literary  did  work  not must  instruction...or pleasure". been  argument  with  qualitative  originality.  this  that  in  supported  extended  litigation  the  human  over  that  a  beings  to  other  machine work  3 5 1  cases.  readable  that  does  i s unprotected  not was  3 5 2  accepted every  view  although  nature  o f t h e work. S i n c e  ideas,  not  ideas  expression  of  protected  same,  of  and  The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d  afforded  to  engage  protection, that  communication  The  of  Insurance  in deciding  programs,  rejected.  not  not has  measure  form,  v.  has  recent  involve  works,  information  principle  should  understood  copyright  "either  operating  2.  rare  concluded,  qualify  This  A  been  Corporation  Appeal  courts  dangerous  9  the  ' I n f o r m a t i o n a l ' Works copyright  work  scope  of  in  the  law  i s that  same  the  category  p r o t e c t i o n may  vary  are  the  with  the  c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t s the e x p r e s s i o n  t h e m s e l v e s , a work i n v o l v i n g a l i m i t e d  i s less  rights  protected.  3 5 3  of  degree  181  The argument quality of  here,  consisting  two  types  of  relationship  types  o f work.  In a  draws  a  on  t h e work  expression. expression  More  fuses than  idea  'expression' i t readily  have l i t t l e  body  interests  and  to the  implicated i n  a  form  value  ordering  i n this  a n d be e a s i l y  might  Standen.354  example  There,  the p l a i n t i f f  i t claimed  "Overnight",  a sheet  a  or  idea  word  order,  work  of  fact  distinct.  little  actually  of copyright. Jockey  Club  operated  a  i t s copyright  during  may  by s e c o n d -  t o provide  corporation  daily  and  of the s t o r y ,  avoidable  theory  of  and  sense,  The o r d e r i n g  i n B.C.  infringement published  ideas  C a n a d i a n c o u r t s have  occurred  author  of the m a t e r i a l t o  be e x p e c t e d  circumstance,  the  are usually quite  be a s i m p l e  copyright  recent  In  a c c e s s i b l e t o the reader.  intrinsic  while  of e f f i c i e n t  themes.  i n these  important  t o the elements  and e x p r e s s i o n  may  i n an  and s u b s t a n c e ,  choice  and  differ  of knowledge,  c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o t e c t i o n - - on a l a b o u r  track;  involved,  for instance,  h i s work;  characters  compilation,  protection  novel,  i s intimately linked  events,  A  work  a difference relating  and e x p r e s s i o n  common  however,  comers;  'informational'  the labour  of idea  to construct  make  an  o f m a t e r i a l and p e r s o n a l  language  The  a d i f f e r e n c e i n the  o f work.  certainly  its  and  o f the arrangement of f a c t s ,  to the nature  The  be t h a t  between a ' c r e a t i v e ' work, a work  imagination,  constellation both  will  of protection exists  a r t i s t i c  both  however,  the racing  v. race i n  season  182 and  listing  weights,  order  of  jockeys  reproduced daily  the  3 5 5  and  this  next d a y ' s r a c e s ,  post  positions.  information  handicapping  from  f r o m h i s own  betting  odds.  judge's  ruling  research,  B.C.  The  of  Appeal  of p l a i n t i f f .  He  in  his  own  statistical  each  affirmed had  entered,  defendant  other  a commentary on  Court  i n favour  horses  "Overnight"  p u b l i c a t i o n , adding  material  The  the  race, the  and  trial  said:  But i n my o p i n i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e c a s e at bar has done more than copy information from "Overnight". He has a p p r o p r i a t e d t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e l a b o u r and t h e s k i l l s o f t h e C l u b w h i c h has gone i n t o the c o m p i l a t i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n which t h e C l u b has d e v e l o p e d and p u b l i s h e d . 5  Even a l t e r i n g in  "Overnight"  the p r e s e n t a t i o n would l i k e l y  of  not  the  6  basic racing  have h e l p e d  information  defendant:  The c o p y r i g h t o f the C l u b d o e s not r e s i d e s o l e l y i n the order of the information w h i c h i t has c o m p i l e d . 5 7  It  is  difficult  copyright than  avoid  in i t s particular  copyright  in  the p r i n c i p l e case,  the  r e s i d e d more i n the  have b e e n made by of  to  which  information  Canadian c o u r t s  country.  The  3 5 9  comes f r o m C a r t w r i g h t  concerned  a  law  list  that  basis  for i t s a d d i t i o n a l research,  The  Court  said  sending  out  in  Standen  labour  produced  Similar rulings  3 5 8  throughout strongest  v. Wharton  the  t h a t by  that  that  form of e x p r e s s i o n .  other this  conclusion  3  6  the h i s t o r y statement  ° , a  used a p r e v i o u s c o r r e c t i o n and  of  pre-1921 list  as  comment.  names from p l a i n t i f f ' s  list  183 for  c o r r e c t i o n , defendant  r e s u l t s of the p l a i n t i f f ' s with of  favour  verification  of  works  o f o n e ' s own i n d e p e n d e n t  the basic  betting  restricting  informational  "Overnight"  information  which  of time,  described  research. granted  as  In almost  3 6 2  i n situations  of the o r i g i n a l  market.  In t h i s  a c t i o n .  3  copyright  6  3 6 3  ,  A  4  to  defendant  labour  after-the-fact In Standen, o f  required  source for  his  part  these  recognised  might  o f a case  was s e e k i n g  t o make  of the c o p y r i g h t  owner's  cases  resemble  competing  question  with  plaintiff's  business  in  these  serves  owner:  3 6 5  arises  as  t o how f a r  to achieve  t h e same  pertinent  i n the  produced  of commercial  was  b u t making as a  I n any e v e n t ,  exclusively a material  the interest  v.  of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  the p l a i n t i f f ,  activity.  of  Press  S t a n d e n , where t h e d e f e n d a n t  use o f p r i n t e d i n f o r m a t i o n  of  the tort  i n the Associated  i s especially like  protection for  t h e p r o t e c t i o n has been  be s t r e t c h e d i n o r d e r  circumstances  copyright  under c o p y r i g h t  and a branch o f t h e breach  law s h o u l d  cases  which  limited  instance  to capture  legitimate  actually  of  and r e s o u r c e s  where a c o m p e t i t o r  question  derivative  form  every  That  not  a  respect,  competition  I.N.S. c a s e  goal.  and c i t e d  c o n s t i t u t e d t h e s o l e and s u f f i c i e n t  protection  be  unfair  ,  the l e g i t i m a t e use  research.  C a n a d i a n c o u r t s have s e e n f i t t o p r o v i d e  use  3 6 1  sheet.  The  best  to himself the  d i l i g e n c e and l a b o u r "  English decisions  copyrighted  course,  had " a p p r o p r i a t e d  a  byproduct copyright  interest  of the  e x p l o i t a t i o n of  184 the  work.  Its  and  incentive  investment)  (ensuring  the  a n d i n the  to prevent  3.  j u s t i f i c a t i o n l i e s both i n the  unjust  p l a i n t i f f recovers  aspect  law  affords  labour with  them  a  but  also  work,  rights"  scope  the  work i n an a l t e r e d virtually  majority  to  copyright. that  led  It  The derivative  It  Yates  to  regulated  theory  of  that  his  seeks  the  found  uses  fear  was a  to  of  outright constitute  the  that  this  original  in Millar  v.  by  the  common  would  that  As  "horizontal  perpetual,  that  of  act.  considered  conclusion  issue  grounds  with  terms  over  of  the  not  been  use  property  Braithwaite  is  be r e c a l l e d  scope  his  on  Copyright  imaginative  Kaplan  such  revealing  rights.  always  will  the  i n part  Justice  most  cost  treatment.  the  concern  what  every  outside  was  be a s t a t u t o r i l y  utility  Works  solely of  copyright  form.  Taylor,  lie  the  with of  not that  which has  but  ,  on  works  infringement, 3 6 6  labour  a different  protection  informational of  the  'Creative'  works e n c o u n t e r  expended,  copying  of  the  of  enrichment.  The P r o t e c t i o n A f f o r d e d Creative  theory  not  law  be  copyright  so  must  right. here  offers  is  this  the brief  question  of  definition:  A d e r i v a t i v e work . . . i n v o l v e s a s e c o n d t i e r o f c r e a t i v e e f f o r t s u p e r i m p o s e d upon t h a t o f the u n d e r l y i n g a u t h o r . ' 6  He p o i n t s  to  as  two s o u r c e s  one o f  the  subsections  to  section  of e x c l u s i v e  3 of  rights  the  over  Copyright Act  derivative  uses  185 in  Canadian  law.  (ss.(a)),  adapt  (ss.(c)),  and  works.  There,  dramatic  these  works, i n p r a c t i c e informational  clearly  is  to  "a  of  they  to  specifying  in  listed  these  otherwise  have  substantial  ss.  or and  the  right  to take  the  quite  distinct  analysis  derivative  Act  of  1976  rights  l e d one  (note  one  most  either  apply  the  creative  a novel novel  reference works.  they  By  would  not  "reproduce...  any  rights  commentator  to  ? It constitutes and  express  demands  visualisation,  does p r o t e c t i d e a s , c r e a t i v e  the  others  to  i t s unique  and  similar  to  an  (s. 3(1)).  three-dimensionality of  The  3 6 8  (c))  elements o f the with  for a l l  translation,  rights  impliedly  to dramatise  form,  works  copyrighted  available  statute implies  within  p a r t " o f t h e work  What i s a r i g h t  other  film  translated;  copying.  rights, fallen  be  derivative  (b)  translate  t o c r e a t i v e works. C e r t a i n l y ,  (a d r a m a t i s a t i o n )  novel"  and  ostensibly  often  simple  to  dramatise  reproduce  are  refer  may  the  i s given  works ( s s . ( b ) ) ,  rights  work  related  expressly  right  to mechanically  While  however,  the  of  them  the in a  dialogue,  t o name b u t  three.  i n the  U.S.  Copyright  that  copyright  conclude  An  ideas:  Thus, c o p y r i g h t i s no l o n g e r a p u b l i s h e r ' s r i g h t c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h f o r m , but r a t h e r i s an a u t h o r s right concerned with content. 1  3 6 9  This and  follows l o g i c a l l y expression,  form  from and  the  aforementioned  substance,  in  fusion  creative  of  idea  works.  An  186 exclusive  right  expression be  merely  to  in  that  occurs,  identifying source  of  copyright  however,  with  'substantial  depends on  and  part  whether  quality  the  they  the  as  much  standards  work.  sketches not  to  In  of  of  court  finding  these  protection. between  inferior  originals.  film  A  by  in In  classic  Glyn  ideas  a  3 7 2  v.  and  novel  too  determined  to  an  because  Film  the 3 7 3  ,  allegedly  development, to  how  comes  in  found  convey  ordinary  Pictures  were  Feature  of  its  newspaper  character  statement  v. U n i v e r s a l  ,  and  has  work,  patterns  mostly  not  Weston  work  t u r n on  paintings  and  for  similarity,  or  Palace  same  second  creative  paintings,  plot  the  is  of  a  between a n o v e l  American  works  L e a r n e d Hand i n N i c h o l s  the  The  devised  f i n d i n g of  from  quality  comparing in  Empire  clearest  ideas.  tests  With  3 7 1  taken  in  the  i s s u b s t a n t i a l can  v.  similarity  elements  creative  objective  vivants  are  a part  i d e n t i f y i n g core  copyright  assessed  infringing  an  the  sense.  Braithwaite's  Whether  3 7 0  Hanfstaengl  tableaux  the  judicial  its quantity.  require  found  the  reproduced  as  infringe  were  "idea"  personal  artistic  reproduction,'  derivative works.  been r e p r o d u c e d  these  and  protects  part  a c r e a t i v e work w o u l d  express d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t s i n the Act  demonstration thing  substantial  ( u n d e r s t o o d as word o r d e r ) o f  a narrow r i g h t , i n b o t h a m a t e r i a l The  the  reproduce  similarity  from  Corp.:  Upon any work, and e s p e c i a l l y upon a p l a y , a g r e a t number o f p a t t e r n s o f i n c r e a s i n g g e n e r a l i t y w i l l f i t e q u a l l y w e l l , as more and more o f t h e i n c i d e n t i s l e f t o u t . The  deserve  Justice  187 l a s t may p e r h a p s be no more t h a n a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t o f what t h e p l a y i s a b o u t , and a t t i m e s may c o n s i s t o n l y of i t s t i t l e ; but t h e r e i s a p o i n t i n t h i s s e r i e s of a b s t r a c t i o n s w h e r e t h e y a r e no longer p r o t e c t e d , s i n c e o t h e r w i s e the p l a y w r i g h t c o u l d p r e v e n t t h e use o f h i s ' i d e a s ' , t o which, a p a r t from t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n , h i s p r o p e r t y i s never e x t e n d e d . ' J u s t i c e Hand c o n t i n u e d creative might  work  have  can  been  expression  f u r t h e r t o d e s c r i b e how  be  protected  expected,  i f sufficiently  the  i n c r e a t i v e works  characters  borderline  in a  distinct.  between  is extraordinarily  As  ideas  and  difficult  to  discern. One  category  creative that  of  study  works,  be  remain  in  contain  as  work.  the  book  a  apply  a  charge  of  therefore  concerned  with  book  one  domain;  in  and  with  the  of  the on  owner o f  Light the  screenplay  differing  shared  from  work  a  fictional  v.  to  a  work  may  test  for  Osborne rights  and  subject.  must  a  film  Brigade,  same  which  appropriate  i n Harman P i c t u r e s , N.V. plaintiff  as  is  historical  such  interpretation the  a  evidence  another,  and  confusion,  respect, of  derivative rights  the  while  In  informational  considerable  compilation  screenplay  surprisingly, the  a  expression  producers  Not  as  b e t w e e n the  the  between  engendered  wrestled  to  falls  biography.  public  J.  contest about  and  much  Goff  has  viewed  infringement al,  and  history  can  which  3 7 5  of  to  et a  defendant The  case  history.  many p r i n c i p a l  i t i n many d e t a i l s .  events 3 7 6  In  188 granting  an  i n j u n c t i o n , J u s t i c e Goff  M a c m i l l a n v.  S u r e s h Chunder  Deb:  quoted  from Wilson  J.  in  3 7 7  ...the t r u e p r i n c i p l e i n a l l these cases i s , t h a t the d e f e n d a n t i s not a t l i b e r t y t o use or a v a i l h i m s e l f of the labour w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f has b e e n a t f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f p r o d u c i n g h i s work; t h a t i s , i n f a c t , m e r e l y to- t a k e away t h e r e s u l t o f a n o t h e r man's l a b o u r , o r , i n o t h e r words, his property. ' 8  Goff  J.  framed  the  used  the  book as  issue  in  terms  of  whether  the  defendant  a  b a s i s , t a k i n g h i s s e l e c t i o n of i n c i d e n t s and q u o t a t i o n s t h e r e f r o m , albeit...making some a l t e r a t i o n s and a d d i t i o n s b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e common s o u r c e s and by r e f e r e n c e t o other sources 3  This  appears  research. research  In was  historical In  a  protected  copyright  3 8 1  &  status  Ford.  recognised  the  expression  in  The  of  a  B.C.  not  so  case,  vis-a-vis  Row,  , the  9  be  recent  Harper  majority,  to  works i n t e n d e d  Enterprises  Gerald  again  7  for  limited an  of  c e n t r a l i s s u e as and  and  of  Inc. the  et U.S.  of  complex  the  more  al  popular  v.  dilemma:  Nation  considered  works.  the  President  opinions  f u s i o n of  biographical  J u s t i c e O'Connor s t a t e d  historian's  former  minority  the  of  3 8 0  autobiography  majority  historical  writer  schools.  Supreme C o u r t the  academic  the  Publishers  protection  both  fact  and  For  the  189 Especially i n the realm of factual n a r r a t i v e , t h e law i s c u r r e n t l y u n s e t t l e d regarding the ways i n w h i c h uncopyrightable e l e m e n t s combine with the a u t h o r ' s o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to form protected e x p r e s s i o n . 3 8 2  The  Court  closely  granted  fact  expression  E.  will  i n j u n c t i o n , but  expression  receive.  sum,  common  copyright law  world  spheres of  activity  vision garret.  of 3  8  the  the  lonely  expression,  from  memorandum  to  unitary  the  protection  of at  protects  on  less  the  more  protection  margins: Canadian  which  with  scribbled betrays  rests. the of  a misappropriation  circumstances  c r e a t i v e works,  have  which  copyright  has  copyright works  extended doctrine  involve been  The  complex  other  especially  a  or  and  courts  in  original  variety  scope  a  of  disguises the  in  with  away  i n f o r m a t i o n a l works and  to  competitors;  t o do  range  That  reside  with  under what i s i n e f f e c t in  those  form  in  substantial  copyright  determine  history  toiling  vast  novel.  of  nothing  business  protection facts,  or  of  poet a  year  source  in particular  f a c t o r s which  compilation  banal  prize-winning  dichotomy  the  or  300  Many  little  author  most  the  rights.  have  principles  idea/expression interplay  the  i t s nearly  become  and  which  Copyright  4  in  has  expectations  of  linked,  that  3 8 3  law  commercial  the  are  noted  RETRIEVING A PERSONAL INTERESTS PERSPECTIVE  In the  and  the  market  found  to  190 protect  literary  transferring As  commercial  Still,  in  points.  ideas,  established  constitute  Mansfield's  those  these  significance  presently  play  artistic  the  the  the  in  the  copyright  The  exercise through  a  progress  property  whether new  scheme  v. as  and  how  i t has  developed  property  v.  relationship  and  a  control  creator  also  fiction  be  Lord  seen on  of  when  'substantial author  recognise  to  at  these  (including  i n the  They  work w i l l  of  between be  the  international  personality, As  have  a  over  through say  over  be  remoulded  into  the  in  terms  the  two  a  discussed,  result  of  author  and  Those  work.  which  an  itself  literary Taylor  His  rights  property  comprised  interests and  v.  leads  'propertised'  alienable  influence  convention  law  his  rights  personal  French  and as  the  in Millar  Anglo-American  the  of  earlier  i t s culmination  characterised  material  Canada, t h r o u g h  discussion  directions.  statute-based.  author's  an  this  Beckett,  work c o u l d  albeit  rights  rights  animated  can  world.  of  original  of  d e b a t e and  Donaldson  right  for  or  o f a d i f f e r e n t medium.  following  property  the  his  recasting  concepts of the  the  Film  jackpot  of  forms.  material  order.  interpretation  i n the  a  Taylor  derivative  judicial  h i s work  concept  expression A  in  of  have  i n t e r e s t s which  Millar  of  first  financial  personal  thinking  arise  of  form i n t o o t h e r  rights  r e p r o d u c t i o n ' ) c o n s t i t u t e a form of the  p a r t i c u l a r l y i n terms  works f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l  stated,  writers.  and  in  the in  rights,  a l l of the  and  the  work.  In  e a r l y adherence  to  incorporated  the  191 European  tradition,  the  Copyright  the  author.  moral  The  right,  waivable; increase  an  but  for  owner .  against If  effect  work;  Act  the  interests  included in interests  of  expanded  the  importantly  rights and,  is  made i t  likely  as t h e  to  source  indeed,  for  exemplifies  law  'possessive  conceived  recognised  of  their  c o n s t i t u t e d i n our  individual  his capacities,  both  latter  i s thereby  the  was  personal  more  of  thus  right  the  on p r o p e r t y  author  as  possessor  in rights  he  holds  society. for  the and  moment  we  turn  i n terms of Hegel  light.  to  perhaps  Copyright at  and  criticism, law  and  personal The  certain  amendment  reliance  author.  himself  preserve  ultimate  individualism' of  to  also  authors'  s t a t u s as  i n a l i e n a b l e moral  recent  the  protection  as  Act  an  Her  property  position  law  personhood, property "fungible" division  to 's  and  and  is  Radin's  both  should  "personal"  be  is  accepted  interpretation  interesting  driven  in  by  arguing  recognised  property.  apparent.  In  In  without  of  property  insights  descriptive,  often  normative,  readily  position  theory,  i s in fact  rights  is  this  in  come  saying  to  that  ethical  concepts  of  that  duality  in  basis  of  on  a the  copyright connection  law  such  with  a  the  d i s c u s s i o n above, a " f u n g i b l e " c o p y r i g h t m i g h t i n c l u d e : (a)  nature  of  works  — i n f o r m a t i o n a l works, and --works p r o d u c e d i n the commercial a c t i v i t y  compilations ordinary course  of  192  (b)  nature  o f ' t a k i n g ' o r 'use'  —competitive By  contrast a "personal" (a)  nature  c o p y r i g h t might  nature  works, works o f  point  not  s o much t o c r e a t e  be  of such  clear  when are  situation.  Appeals  when t h e y  the  purpose  public  decision ought of  of preventing  to assert  to  issue  I t was s u g g e s t e d  out, i s  or only  earlier  Crown  one  motivated  the f u l l  instance  a  fact  be  made  that  exercise  i t  is  copyright for i n the  i n which the  the o r i g i n a l  (1769) w o u l d  as t o  material  publication of information  v. T a y l o r  not t o support  policy  i n t e r e s t s would  represents  i n t e r e s t s which  property.  in a  f o r governments  in Millar  points  and s e c o n d c l a s s p r o p e r t y ,  to personal  That  as Radin  interests i n addition  implicated  interest.  personal  a first  are implicated.  inappropriate  uses  a classification,  personal  interests  imagination  o f ' t a k i n g ' or 'use'  —derivative The  encompass  o f work  —creative (b)  u s e s i n t h e owner's m a r k e t  copyright  n o t be p r e s e n t ,  o f an e x c l u s i v e  and right  193  ENDNOTES  1. I n c l u d i n g J e a n B o d i n , Hugo G r o t i u s , M o n t e s q u i e u , B u r k e , and J e f f e r s o n . O t h e r t h e o r i s t s l i k e Thomas Hobbes, J o h n L o c k e and D a v i d Hume h a d no f o r m a l l e g a l t r a i n i n g , b u t i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e i r c a r e e r s a d v i s e d governments on l e g i s l a t i o n and o t h e r w i s e d e m o n s t r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h law a n d the l e g a l p r o c e s s . 2. See h i s " R e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 1 8 t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i a h C o n t r a c t T h e o r y : The V i e w f r o m L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s T r i a l N o t e s " (1988) 76 G e o r g e t o w n Law J o u r n a l 1 9 4 9 ; " E i g h t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Judges' N o t e s : How T h e y E x p l a i n , C o r r e c t a n d E n h a n c e t h e R e p o r t s " (1987) 31 A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f L e g a l H i s t o r y 9; and a r t i c l e s c i t e d a t n o t e s 65 a n d 274. 3. A b r i e f n o t e o n c i t a t i o n : due t o t h e r e l i a n c e p l a c e d on cases i n t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y debate l e a d i n g t o , and including, M i l l a r v. T a y l o r , t h e f i r s t mention o f each such c a s e w i l l be h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h e t e x t ; t h e r e a f t e r , t h e d a t e o f t h e c a s e w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n t h e t e x t . 4.  8 Anne. c . 19.  5. See, f o r e x a m p l e , and f o r g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e l e g a l s t a t u s o f " i n f o r m a t i o n " , G r a n t Hammond, " P r o p e r t y r i g h t s t o i n f o r m a t i o n " ( 1 9 8 1 ) 27 M c G i l l Law J o u r n a l 47; A. W e i n r i b , " I n f o r m a t i o n a n d p r o p e r t y " (1988) 38 U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o Law J o u r n a l 117; R . J . R o b e r t s , " I s i n f o r m a t i o n p r o p e r t y ?" (1987) 3 I n t e l l e c t u a l P r o p e r t y J o u r n a l 209. 6. M c L u h a n , M a r s h a l l . T h e G u t e n b e r g G a l a x y : T h e M a k i n g o f T y p o g r a p h i c a l Man ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1962) 7. See f o r o n e i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e E l i z a b e t h E i s e n s t e i n , The Printing Press as Agent o f Change. (London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 9 ) . E i s e n s t e i n c r e d i t s McLuhan w i t h w h e t t i n g h e r a p p e t i t e f o r t h e s t u d y o f p r i n t i n g ' s i m p a c t on s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e , but describes i n the Preface her f r u s t r a t i o n with h i s r e f u s a l to approach the t o p i c i n a l i n e a r , h i s t o r i c a l f a s h i o n . See f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f h e r work a t t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g n o t e s 3 2 f f , below. R o b e r t D a r n t o n ' s work l i n k i n g t h e h i s t o r y o f p u b l i s h i n g and book d i s s e m i n a t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y p r e s e n t s a s t r i k i n g e x a m p l e o f what s o p h i s t i c a t e d m e d i a s t u d i e s c a n a c h i e v e . See h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s o f methods and r e s u l t s i n The K i s s o f Lamourette: R e f l e c t i o n s i n C u l t u r a l H i s t o r y (New Y o r k : W.W. N o r t o n & Co., I n c . , 1 9 9 0 ) , P a r t s 3-5.  194 8. R. v . S t e w a r t . [1988] 1 SCR 963. To be p r e c i s e , t h e C o u r t reached t h i s c o n c l u s i o n through an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f " t a k e s . . . a n y t h i n g " ( e m p h a s i s added) i n t h e t h e f t p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C r i m i n a l C o d e . " A n y t h i n g " , i t r u l e d , must be c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t h e s u b j e c t o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . N e i t h e r c o p y r i g h t nor c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , as i n t a n g i b l e s , s a t i s f i e d t h i s t e s t . See judgment o f Lamer J . , a s he t h e n was, a t 972 f f . 9. S e e g e n e r a l l y J a m e s B a k e r , An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o E n g l i s h L e g a l H i s t o r y (London: B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1979) 2d e d . , Ch. 13, p p . 193-262; H o l d s w o r t h , W.H. A H i s t o r y o f E n g l i s h Law, ( L o n d o n : Sweet & M a x w e l l , 1948) v o l . I I I . 10. Co.,  B l a c k s t o n e , W i l l i a m . Commentaries, 1884, 3 r d e d . ) , Book I I , a t 473.  (Chicago:  Callaghan  &  11. The i s s u e f o r t h e c o u r t s , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , was w h e t h e r " p r o p e r t y " had a f u r t h e r a t t r i b u t e t o those mentioned h e r e : i t s r e c o g n i t i o n i n common law a s an a b s o l u t e r i g h t , a s o p p o s e d t o a ' m e r e l y ' s t a t u t o r y r e c o g n i t i o n . See d i s c u s s i o n i n P a r t V. 12. Hohfeld's most influential articles were: "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as A p p l i e d i n J u d i c i a l R e a s o n i n g " (1913) 23 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 16; and "Fundamental Legal Conceptions" ( 1 9 1 7 ) 26 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 7 1 0 . S e e g e n e r a l l y t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n P a r t V, b e l o w . 13.  (Oxford:  Clarendon  P r e s s , 1988)  14. C.B. M a c p h e r s o n , P r o p e r t y : Mainstream P o s i t i o n s (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 15. " D i a l o g u e on P r i v a t e Review 357 a t 379. 16.  Supra note  Property"  (1954)  and C r i t i c a l 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 7. 9 Rutgers  Law  14, a t 6.  17. I b i d , a t 202. C h a r l e s R e i c h i n a s i m i l a r v e i n w r o t e o f w e l f a r e e n t i t l e m e n t s and other s o c i a l program b e n e f i t s as h a v i n g become t h e "new p r o p e r t y " o f t h e modern w o r l d . See h i s "The New P r o p e r t y " (1964) 73 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 733. 18. Baker, 222-250.  supra  note  9, c h . 14  "Estates  and  Settlements",  19. B e c k e r , L a w r e n c e C. P r o p e r t y R i g h t s : Philosophic Foundations (London: R o u t l e d g e and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 24. 20. Hohfeld ( 1 9 1 7 ) , s u p r a n o t e 12. T h e ' m o r a l interests' i n c l u d e d a c t i o n s f o r l i b e l and p r i v a c y . Indeed, Hohfeld's categories 2 (intangible objects--e.g., patents) and 5  195 c o r r e s p o n d c l o s e l y t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between " c o m m e r c i a l " and " p e r s o n a l " i n t e r e s t s i n copyright developed through the course of t h i s paper. 21. D a v i d Lange, " R e c o g n i z i n g t h e P u b l i c Law and C o n t e m p o r a r y P r o b l e m s 147. 22.  Blackstone wrote  that  scarcity  Domain",  (1981)  44  made i t  "necessary to e n t e r t a i n conceptions of more permanent dominions; and to appropriate to individuals not the immediate u s e o n l y , b u t t h e v e r y s u b s t a n c e o f t h e t h i n g t o be u s e d . " (Book I I , 4-5) S u p r a n o t e 10, a t 473. 23. See d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e a r l y inventions i n Part I I I .  history  of patents f o r  24. Works w h i c h d i s c u s s t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e S t a t i o n e r s Company a n d i t s i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g members' claimed r i g h t s , i n c l u d e : P a t t e r s o n , L. Ray, C o p y r i g h t i n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e ( N a s h v i l l e : V a n d e r b i l t U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968); F o x , H a r o l d , T h e C a n a d i a n Law o f C o p y r i g h t a n d I n d u s t r i a l D e s i g n s ( T o r o n t o : C a r s w e l l , 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 1-40; Thomas, D o n a l d , A L o n g T i m e B u r n i n g : The H i s t o r y o f L i t e r a r y C e n s o r s h i p (New Y o r k : F r e d e r i c k A . P r a e g e r , 1 9 6 9 ) ; a n d G r a y , W. F o r b e s , " A l e x a n d e r D o n a l d s o n and t h e F i g h t f o r Cheap Books" (1926) 38 J u r i d i c a l Review 180. 25. See comments o f L o r d M a c c l e s f i e l d i n K n a p l o c k v . C u r l ( 1 9 2 2 ) , c i t e d a t n o t e 178, below; J u s t i c e W i l l e s i n M i l l a r v . T a y l o r ( 1 7 6 9 ) , s a y i n g t h e name "copy o f a book" " w h i c h h a s been u s e d f o r a g e s , a s a t e r m to s i g n i f y the sole r i g h t of p r i n i t n g , p u b l i s h i n g and s e l l i n g , shews t h i s s p e c i e s o f p r o p e r t y t o have been l o n g known." ( a t 206) 26. On t h e h i s t o r y o f " p l a g i a r i s m " a n d t h e d e c l i n e i n i t s a c c e p t a b i l i t y a s a method o f l i t e r a r y e n d e a v o u r s e e Thomas M a l l o n , S t o l e n Words: F o r a y s i n t o t h e O r i g i n s a n d R a v a g e s o f Plagiarism (New Y o r k : T i c k n o r & F i e l d s , 1 9 8 9 ) , a n d J o e l W e r s h e i m e r , I m i t a t i o n (London: R o u t l e d g e & Kegan P a u l , 1 9 8 4 ) . Wersheimer draws on t h e work o f Samuel J o h n s o n t o show how t h e c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t o f a r t a s i m i t a t i o n was on t h e d e f e n s i v e i n the mid-seventeenth century. 27. P a r t r i d g e ' s O r i g i n s g i v e s a d e r i v a t i o n f o r " a u t h o r " which s u g g e s t s i t may o n c e h a v e h a d t o do w i t h ' a u g m e n t i n g ' a s opposed t o ' c r e a t i n g ' :  196  "Augere has pp a u c t u s , on w h i c h a r o s e b o t h a u c t i o , ( l i t ) an i n c r e a s i n g , ( b u t a l w a y s ) a p u b l i c s a l e , w i t h o/s a u c t i o n - , whence E a u c t i o n , and a u c t o r , l i t an increaser, hence a founder, an auctioneer, an author..." P a r t r i d g e , E r i c . O r i g i n s i A Short E t y m o l o g i c a l D i c t i o n a r y of Modern E n g l i s h . ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e & Kegan P a u l , 1 9 5 8 ) , p.32. 28. R i c h a r d W i n c o r , From R i t u a l To R o y a l t i e s J . McLeod, L i m i t e d , 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 16.  (Toronto:  George  29. F r o m "What i s an A u t h o r ?" i n L a n g u a g e , Counter-Memory, P r a c t i c e : S e l e c t e d E s s a y s and Interviews, ed. D o n a l d F. B o u c h a r d , ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 7 ) , p.124. 30. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s , o f c o u r s e , c r u c i a l . F o u c a u l t believes that the i n d i v i d u a l author i s less s i g n i f i c a n t to the c o n s t r u c t i n g of t e x t s than the ' a u t h o r - f u n c t i o n ' , a socially received idea that authorship i s important to understanding t e x t s . He c o n t r a s t s t h e modern p e r i o d when "works a r e t o t a l l y d o m i n a t e d by t h e s o v e r e i g n t y of the a u t h o r " with e a r l i e r periods, and other s o c i e t i e s , i n which a t t r i b u t i o n of authorship p l a y s a l m o s t no r o l e i n t h e 'authenticating' of t e x t s — i . e . , the p r o c e s s o f g i v i n g them v a l u e as t r u t h . I b i d , at 126. 31.  I b i d , at  124.  32.  Supra note  7.  33.  I b i d . , see  her  o u t l i n e of purposes  i n the  Preface.  34. An example o f t h e d i f f e r e n t , modern v i e w o f t h e c o p y i s t as a "mere j o u r n e y m a n " i s f o u n d i n G.W.F. H e g e l , The P h i l o s o p h y of R i g h t , t r a n s . T.M. Knox. ( O x f o r d : Clarendon Press, 1942). F i r s t published i n 1828, i t shows H e g e l d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between t h e c o p y i s t o f a work o f a r t ( e . g . , a p a i n t i n g or s c u l p t u r e ) , i n which the " c o p y o f a work o f a r t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p r o d u c t o f t h e c o p y i s t ' s own mental and t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y " , whereas t h e c o p y i s t o f a l i t e r a r y work or an i n v e n t i o n i s p e r f o r m i n g a p u r e l y m e c h a n i c a l a c t . S e c t i o n 68, a t 54. 35.  " P a r t l y b e c a u s e c o p y i s t s had, after a l l , never p a i d t h o s e whose works t h e y c o p i e d , p a r t l y b e c a u s e new books were a small p o r t i o n of the e a r l y b o o k - t r a d e , and p a r t l y because d i v i s i o n s of l a b o r remained  197 blurred, amateur century."  the author r e t a i n e d a quasistatus until the eighteenth  Ibid.,  153-154.  at  V i c t o r Bonham-Carter n o t e s t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f h a v i n g a c a r e e r as an a u t h o r o n l y a p p e a r e d i n the 18th c e n t u r y . F o r a l o n g t i m e a f t e r t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s was i n v e n t e d , t h e dominant f o r c e i n E n g l i s h l i t e r a t u r e was t h e r o y a l c o u r t : "The i n f l u e n c e o f the C o u r t was paramount- in refining and s t a b i l i s i n g the l a n g u a g e , i n f i n d i n g o u t l e t s f o r the new l i t e r a t u r e by the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f masques, plays and addresses for ceremonial occasions, and g e n e r a l l y i n s t i m u l a t i n g t h e w r i t i n g o f p o e t r y , drama and b e l l e s l e t t r e s . Publication in this field was incidental." A u t h o r s by 12.  Profession,  36.  I b i d , at  84.  37.  I b i d , at  121-122.  38.  I b i d , at  230-231.  (London:  Society  of Authors,  1978),  p.  39. I b i d , a t 234 f f . Bonham-Carter n o t e s t h a t u n t i l t h e 18th century i t was the rule rather than the e x c e p t i o n for p u b l i s h e d a u t h o r s t o be known by a pseudonym. E v e n M i l t o n a t f i r s t c o n c e a l e d h i s i d e n t i t y . Of c o u r s e , one r e a s o n f o r not c o m i n g f o r w a r d i n p u b l i c was r o y a l c e n s o r s h i p and t h e h a r s h p u n i s h m e n t s i t c a r r i e d . S u p r a n o t e 35, a t 15-18. 40.  I b i d , at  156.  41. Of c o u r s e , l i b e l law became one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l means for d e f e n d i n g l i t e r a r y r e p u t a t i o n s as w e l l as l i m i t i n g the a u t h o r ' s l i t e r a r y l i c e n c e . See f o r an e a r l y e x a m p l e o f a w r i t e r ' s use o f t h e l i b e l a c t i o n *** 42. L i b e l law i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s was p r i m a r i l y u s e d as a means o f c e n s o r s h i p t o p r o t e c t g o v e r n m e n t s a n d p o l i t i c a l r e p u t a t i o n s : see D o n a l d Thomas, s u p r a n o t e 24, ( B r i t a i n ) , and Norman L. R o s e n b e r g , P r o t e c t i n g t h e B e s t Men: An I n t e r p r e t i v e H i s t o r y o f t h e Law of L i b e l ( C h a p e l H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1986) ( t h e U . S . ) . Thomas describes Lord M a n s f i e l d ' s i m p o r t a n t r o l e as a judicial  198  e n f o r c e r o f s e d i t i o u s l i b e l law, r e s i s t i n g when p o s s i b l e t h e wish of o b s t r e p e r o u s j u r i e s t o a c q u i t the a c c u s e d i n p o l i t i c a l c a s e s . I b i d , a t 100-110. 43. H e n c e f o r w a r d , t h e male p o s s e s s i v e " h i s " , " h i m s e l f " , e t c . i s u s e d , an a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n o f s t y l e n o t i n t e n d e d to exclude h a l f o f the world's a u t h o r s from the purview of t h i s study. Copyright as an a u t h o r ' s right, as o p p o s e d to a p u b l i s h e r ' s r i g h t , i s g e n e r a l l y t r a c e d back t o t h e S t a t u t e o f Anne ( 1 7 0 9 ) . 44.  " S p e e c h e s a n d b o o k s were a s s i g n e d real a u t h o r s , other than m y t h i c a l or important r e l i g i o u s f i g u r e s , o n l y whenthe a u t h o r became s u b j e c t t o p u n i s h m e n t and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t h i s d i s c o u r s e was considered transgressive."  T h a t F o u c a u l t i n t e n d s t h i s t o mean a phenomenon o f t h e modern age, c o n n e c t e d t o t h e a r r i v a l o f c o p y r i g h t l a w s , seems c l e a r e r when he adds t h a t a t t h e moment w r i t i n g a c h i e v e d i t s s t a t u s as p r o p e r t y i t s " t r a n s g r e s s i v e p r o p e r t i e s . . . became t h e f o r c e f u l i m p e r a t i v e of l i t e r a t u r e . [The d a n g e r o f b o o k s r e t u r n e d ] " a t t h e moment [ t h e a u t h o r ] was a c c e p t e d i n t o t h e s o c i a l o r d e r o f p r o p e r t y which governs our c u l t u r e . " Supra, note 29, a t 124-125. F o u c a u l t d o e s not c o n n e c t t h e s e e v e n t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e danger w h i c h t h e s t a t e p e r c e i v e d i n w r i t i n g , w i t h t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s , but t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d i n E n g l a n d s p e a k s f o r i t s e l f . See P a r t I I . 45.  Richard Posner,  f o r example, w r i t e s :  "The dominant theory of l i t e r a r y c r e a t i v i t y , a s i t h a d been i n c l a s s i c a l and medieval times, was c r e a t i v e i m i t a t i o n : t h e i m i t a t o r was f r e e t o b o r r o w as l o n g as he added t o what he b o r r o w e d . The modern e q u a t i o n of c r e a t i v i t y to o r i g i n a l i t y i s a l e g a c y of the Romantic era, with i t s cult of individual expression." Law and L i t e r a t u r e : A M i s u n d e r s t o o d H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1988) a t 346. Eisenstein  notes:  Relation  (Cambridge:  199 "That the concept o f 'the a r t i s t as a g e n i u s ' i s r e l a t e d t o t h e new n o t i o n o f 'intellectual property rights' i s u n d e r l i n e d by A r n o l d H a u s e r , Social H i s t o r y o f A r t , I I , 70." Supra note 46.  7, a t 229.  Supra note [ 2 6 ] .  A c o n s i d e r a b l e l i t e r a t u r e deals with the ' l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y ' s t a t u s o f Shakespeare's works, i n c l u d i n g h i s borrowings f r o m e a r l i e r w r i t e r s , t h e b a t t l e s he waged w i t h p r i n t e r s o f h i s p l a y s , and t h e changes made t o h i s work i n t h e d e c a d e s f o l l o w i n g h i s d e a t h . See, f o r e x a m p l e , L. R o s e n t h a l , " L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y a n d t h e A d a p t a t i o n o f S h a k e s p e a r e " (1990 d r a f t , n o t f o r p u b l i c a t i o n , p r e s e n t e d a t a c o l l o q u i u m on "Conceptions of Property i n the Eighteenth Century" a t the UCLA C e n t e r f o r 1 7 t h and 1 8 t h C e n t u r y S t u d i e s , 1 9 9 0 ) , a n d L e o K i r s c h b a u m , S h a k e s p e a r e a n d t h e S t a t i o n e r s (Columbus: O h i o State U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1955). 47. B a r t h e s , R o l a n d . "The D e a t h o f t h e A u t h o r " i n Images, M u s i c , T e x t : E s s a y s S e l e c t e d and T r a n s l a t e d by S t e p h e n H e a t h (New Y o r k : H i l l and Wong, 1 9 7 7 ) . Barthes, l i k e Foucault, a s s o c i a t e s the author's 'arrival' a s a known a n d i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e f o r c r i t i c i s m with the b e g i n n i n g o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n l i t e r a t u r e . He r e c o g n i s e s t h e t e n a c i t y o f t h e view t h a t t h e author m a t t e r s : " I t i s thus l o g i c a l t h a t i n l i t e r a t u r e i t s h o u l d be t h i s p o s i t i o n , t h e e p i t o m e a n d c u l m i n a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s t i d e o l o g y , which has a t t a c h e d t h e g r e a t e s t importance t o t h e ' p e r s o n ' o f t h e a u t h o r . . . The image o f l i t e r a t u r e t o be f o u n d i n o r d i n a r y c u l t u r e i s t y r a n n i c a l l y c e n t r e d on t h e a u t h o r , h i s person, h i s l i f e , h i s tastes, h i s p a s s i o n s . . . . " ( a t 143) Indeed the tenacity of property rights, and the i n d u s t r i e s b a s e d on them, may e x p l a i n why t h e s t r e n g t h o f d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t and o t h e r s c h o o l s i n t h e academy c r i t i c a l o f t h e " a u t h o r - f u n c t i o n " have h a d l i t t l e o r no i n f l u e n c e on t h e regime o f l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i o n s . 48.  See f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n i n Part I I .  49. T h e o t h e r c a s e i n w h i c h J u s t i c e Y a t e s d i s s e n t e d was P e r r i n v . B l a k e 4 B u r r 2579, 98 ER 355, 1 Wm B l a c k 672, 96 ER 392, i n w h i c h a s i m i l a r i s s u e o f p r i n c i p l e d i v i d e d h i m f r o m  200 Lord Mansfield. In P e r r i n , K i n g ' s B e n c h was c a l l e d on t o i n t e r p r e t a t r u s t by d e v i s e . The f a c t s f e l l s q u a r e l y w i t h i n the r u l i n g i n S h e l l e y ' s Case, which r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r ' s c l e a r i n t e n t i o n be f r u s t r a t e d . L o r d M a n s f i e l d l e d the Court m a j o r i t y n e v e r t h e l e s s t o r e j e c t the c l e a r p r e c e d e n t . J u s t i c e Yates defended t h e r u l e o f p r e c e d e n t , and h i s view p r e v a i l e d b e f o r e t h e House o f L o r d s . W i l l i a m Odgers c i t e d P e r r i n as t h e only case i n which Y a t e s J . d i s s e n t e d d u r i n g h i s s i x y e a r s on t h e C o u r t , f a i l i n g to n o t e M i l l a r v . T a y l o r : " S i r W i l l i a m B l a c k s t o n e " (1919) 28 Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 5 4 2 . O d g e r s ' p i e c e p r o v i d e s intriguing b a c k g r o u n d t o t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e K i n g ' s B e n c h judges d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . I n e a r l y 1770 J u s t i c e Y a t e s resigned K i n g ' s Bench t o s e r v e on t h e C o u r t o f Common P l e a s . B e f o r e he commenced h i s new d u t i e s , and j u s t a f t e r B l a c k s t o n e was sworn i n t o r e p l a c e him a t K i n g ' s Bench, J u s t i c e Y a t e s d i e d i n J u n e 1770. B l a c k s t o n e went t o Common P l e a s i n s t e a d . The anonymous j o u r n a l i s t J u n i u s w r o t e L o r d M a n s f i e l d a s c a t h i n g l e t t e r , a t t a c k i n g h i s ego a n d t e n d e n c y t o s t r a y f r o m p r e c e d e n t , i n w h i c h he s a i d : "The name o f M r . J u s t i c e Yates will n a t u r a l l y r e v i v e i n y o u r m i n d some o f those emotions o f fear and d e t e s t a t i o n w i t h which you always b e h e l d him. That g r e a t l a w y e r , t h a t h o n e s t man, saw y o u r whole conduct i n the l i g h t that I do." I b i d , a t 548. Odgers c i t e d o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s t o L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s h a v i n g scorned Yates J . with sarcasm, but dismissed them as e x a g g e r a t i o n s . S t i l l , i t appears t h a t d i s s e n t i n g i n P e r r i n and M i l l a r may have t a k e n a t o l l on J u s t i c e Y a t e s and c a u s e d h i m to want t o l e a v e L o r d M a n s f i e l d ' s C o u r t . 50. See J a m e s E v a n s , "Change i n t h e D o c t r i n e o f P r e c e d e n t During the Nineteenth Century" i n Precedent i n Law ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 8 7 ) , ed . L . G o l d s t e i n . 51. W i l l i a m Murray, Lord M a n s f i e l d , p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e d e b a t e f o r t w e n t y y e a r s a s c o u n s e l and j u d g e . Blackstone s i m i l a r l y a c t e d a s c o u n s e l f o r t h e London b o o k s e l l e r s , a n d a s an a d v i s i n g j u d g e i n D o n a l d s o n v . B e c k e t t . L o r d H a r d w i c k e L J C , h e a r d a number o f t h e i n j u n c t i o n c a s e s i n t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . H i s s o n , C h a r l e s Y o r k e , was S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l i n B a s k e t t v . U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge (1758) ( s e e P a r t I I I , b e l o w ) . James B o s w e l l , a l i t e r a r y i f n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a l e g a l n o t a b l e , a c t e d as c o u n s e l f o r A l e x a n d e r D o n a l d s o n b e f o r e t h e S c o t t i s h Court o f S e s s i o n s i n H i n t o n v. Donaldson (1770).  201 Further figures,  reference below.  is  made  to  the  roles  of  each  of  these  52. A l t h o u g h D o n a l d s o n v. B e c k e t t (1774) i s f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d t o 4 B u r r 2408, 98 ER 257, t h a t i s o n l y a summary r e p o r t . The most c o m p l e t e r e p o r t s o f t h e j u d g e s ' o p i n i o n s and s e v e r a l o f t h e L o r d s ' s p e e c h e s a r e f o u n d a t 17 P a r i . H i s t . Eng. 953, and "A G e n t l e m a n ' s R e p o r t " i n The L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y D e b a t e : S i x T r a c t s 1764-1774 (London: G a r l a n d P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1 9 7 5 ) , P a r t F. I t i s t h e l a t t e r t o w h i c h r e f e r e n c e i s made t h r o u g h o u t t h i s paper. 53. The a m b i g u i t y o f t h e D o n a l d s o n d e c i s i o n , i t s p o s s i b l e m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by s u b s e q u e n t c o u r t s and c o m m e n t a t o r s , and i t s e f f e c t on c o p y r i g h t a r e d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y i n P a r t I I . The r e p o r t i n the L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y D e b a t e : Seven T r a c t s 1 7 4 7 - 1 7 7 3 r e p o r t s t h e s p e e c h e s o f L o r d s Camden, E f f i n g h a m Howard and L y t t l e t o n , and o f L o r d C h a n c e l l o r A p s l e y and the Bishop of C a r l i s l e . 54. I r e l a n d v. H i g g i n s ( 1 5 8 6 ) C r o . E l i z . 125, 78 ER 383, d i s c u s s e d below i n P a r t V. The c a s e c o n c e r n e d t h e o w n e r s h i p o f greyhounds. 55. In t h i s paper the terms ' p r i n t e r ' , 'publisher' and ' b o o k s e l l e r ' are used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y (unless otherwise i n d i c a t e d ) , as they a p p e a r e d l a r g e l y t o have been u s e d t h r o u g h t o the end o f the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r i n t h e book t r a d e d e v e l o p e d v e r y s l o w l y , and most members o f t h e S t a t i o n e r s ' Company p e r f o r m e d a l l t h r e e o f t h e s e f u n c t i o n s . See E i s e n s t e i n , s u p r a n o t e 7 a t 136 f f . , and P a t t e r s o n , supra n o t e 24, a t 44-47. 56. See a l s o P a t t e r s o n , i b i d . , G r a y , s u p r a n o t e 24, and Abrams, Howard, "The H i s t o r i c F o u n d a t i o n o f A m e r i c a n C o p y r i g h t Law: Exploding the Myth o f Common Law Copyright" (1983) 29 Wayne Law Review 1119. 57. P a t t e r s o n discusses the b o o k s e l l e r s ' i n t h e 1730s, i b i d , a t 154-157.  legislative  58. L o r d M a n s f i e l d r e f e r r e d to h i s r o l e i n l i t i g a t i o n i n h i s c l o s i n g remarks i n M i l l a r :  the  efforts  booksellers'  "The s u b j e c t a t l a r g e i s e x h a u s t e d : and t h e r e f o r e I have not gone i n t o i t . I have had f r e q u e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c o n s i d e r o f i t . I have t r a v e l l e d i n i t f o r many y e a r s . I was c o u n s e l i n most o f t h e c a s e s w h i c h have been c i t e d from C h a n c e r y : I have  202 c o p i e s o f a l l , f r o m t h e r e g i s t e r - b o o k . The first case of Milton's Paradise Lost [Tonson v . Walker (1739), i n f r a , P a r t I V ] was u p o n my m o t i o n . I a r g u e d t h e s e c o n d [Tonson v. Walker & Merchant (1752)]: w h i c h was s o l e m n l y a r g u e d , by one on e a c h s i d e . I arguedthe case o f M i l l a r against K i n c a i d , i n t h e House o f L o r d s [ 1 7 5 0 , s e e d i s c u s s i o n b e l o w ] . Many o f t h e p r e c e d e n t s w e r e t r i e d by my a d v i c e . " Millar  v. T a y l o r ,  a t 257.  59. Justice Willes ( M i l l a r v . T a y l o r , a t 210) a n d L o r d M a n s f i e l d ( a t 257) r e f e r r e d t o t h e c a s e under t h i s name, b o t h i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e a p p e a l by t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e House o f L o r d s i n 1750, w h i c h was d i s m i s s e d . The o n l y a v a i l a b l e r e c o r d o f t h i s c a s e a p p e a r s i n The L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y D e b a t e : Seven T r a c t s 1747-1773, P a r t s A and B, t h e p l e a d i n g s o f t h e p a r t i e s . 60. J u s t i c e Y a t e s , M i l l a r v . T a y l o r , a t 257. H i s r e f e r e n c e a p p e a r s t o be t o t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o f S e s s i o n s ; M i l l a r and M i d w i n t e r were two o f twenty E n g l i s h b o o k s e l l e r s who t o o k the a c t i o n . 61. M i l l a r v . T a y l o r , a t 210-212. C o u n s e l f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t in M i l l a r had p r e s e n t e d t o t h e C o u r t n o t e s o f a s o l i c i t o r ' s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e which c i t e d L o r d Hardwicke as s a y i n g i n t h e House o f L o r d s t h a t t h e S t a t u t e o f Anne c o n s t i t u t e d a " p a t e n t f o r a u t h o r s " , a view which c o n f i r m e d t h e respondent's p o s i t i o n ( s e e d i s c u s s i o n o f p a t e n t s and c o p y r i g h t i n P a r t I I I ) . J u s t i c e Y a t e s r e p e a t e d t h i s r e f e r e n c e , but W i l l e s J . d i s m i s s e d i t as being u n r e l i a b l e . 62. The L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y Debate: C (Court of S e s s i o n ) . 63.  See f u r t h e r  discussion  Six Tracts  of the case  1764-1774,  Part  i n P a r t IV.  64. J u s t i c e W i l l e s c i t e d t h e denouement t o Tonson v . C o l l i n s (1762) and added b o t h an a p p e a l t o n a m e l e s s a u t h o r i t y , and a n o t e o f c o u r t e s y t o h i s b r o t h e r on t h e B e n c h : "I have been i n f o r m e d from the best a u t h o r i t y , s o f a r a s t h e C o u r t had formed an o p i n i o n , t h e y a l l i n c l i n e d to the plaintiff. On d i s c o v e r i n g collusion, however, t h e y r e f u s e d t o proceed i n the cause; though i t had been argued bona  203 £ i de, and v e r y a b l y , by t h e c o u n s e l [ J o s e p h Y a t e s ] , who a p p e a r e d f o r the defendant." Millar  v . T a y l o r , a t 214.  65. James Oldham, "Law R e p o r t i n g i n t h e London N e w s p a p e r s : 1756-1786" (1987) 31 A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f L e g a l H i s t o r y 177. 66. Amongst o t h e r s , T o n s o n c l a i m e d t o h o l d c o p y r i g h t f o r t h e works o f M i l t o n , D r y d e n and S h a k e s p e a r e . See B o n h a m - C a r t e r , s u p r a n o t e 35, a t 19. 67. L e t t e r from John W h i s t o n t o J o h n M e r r i l l , d a t e d A p r i l 23, 1759, i n c l u d e d i n A l e x a n d e r D o n a l d s o n , "Some T h o u g h t s on t h e S t a t e o f L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y " ( u n d a t e d ) , i n The L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y D e b a t e : S i x T r a c t s 1764-1774, P a r t E . Donaldson  wrote:  "It i s a notorious fact, that the booksellers o f London have hitherto ingrossed, and, i n a great measure, m o n o p o l i z e d t h e p r i n t i n g and v e n d i n g many b o o k s , b o t h a n c i e n t a n d modern, w h i c h a r e m o s t l y i n r e q u e s t , under t h e s p e c i o u s pretence of t h e i r having purchased from t h e a u t h o r s i m m e d i a t e l y , o r by p r o g r e s s , the s o l e and e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y o f s a i d b o o k s . . . " (3) 68. A l i v e l y d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s e and o t h e r e v e n t s r e l a t e d i n t h i s P a r t i s g i v e n by W. F o r b e s G r a y , s u p r a n o t e 24. 69. F o u r j u d g e s s a t i n e a c h o f K i n g ' s B e n c h , Common and t h e C o u r t o f t h e E x c h e q u e r . They were a s f o l l o w s :  Pleas,  K i n g ' s Bench - - A s h u r s t J . , A s t o n J . , W i l l e s J . , L o r d M a n s f i e l d ( J u s t i c e Y a t e s h a d d i e d i n 1770) Common P l e a s J . , Nares J . Exchequer 70.  —  —  De G r e y  LCJ, Blackstone  Smythe CB, B a r o n s  J.,  Adams, E y r e ,  Gould  Perrott  4 Burrow 2408, 98 ER a t 257-258.  71. T h a t i s , s a v e f o r some p e r h a p s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e c o n f u s i o n . Q u e s t i o n s 2 and 4 a p p e a r t o c a l l f o r o p p o s i t e r e s p o n s e s f r o m e a c h j u d g e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , o n e o r two j u d g e s ( i t i snot e n t i r e l y c l e a r ) who o p p o s e d t h e i d e a o f common law c o p y r i g h t  204  a n s w e r e d 'no' t o b o t h q u e s t i o n s , l i k e l y b e c a u s e t h e y d i d not w i s h t o c o n c u r i n t h e a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h Q u e s t i o n 2 a s k e d them t o make. See o p i n i o n s o f De G r e y C J and Smythe CB. 72.  Abrams, s u p r a n o t e  73.  I b i d . , Appendix A  56. a t pp.1188 f f .  74. J u s t i c e Y a t e s , d i s s e n t i n g f r o m t h e m a j o r i t y on a l l o t h e r i s s u e s i n M i l l a r , was w i l l i n g t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e common law r e c o g n i s e d an a u t h o r ' s r i g h t t o f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n o f h i s l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n , as a f o r m o f r i g h t o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . See d i s c u s s i o n , P a r t IV. 75. case  Wheaton v. P e t e r s (1834) 33 U.S. (8 P e t e r s ) i s d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n P a r t I I I , below.  76.  (1854) IV HLC  815,  77.  Copyright  5 & 6 Vict.,  Act  10  ER  591.  This  681. c.  45  (1842).  78. The confusion i n the r e p o r t i n g of Donaldson seems r e s p o n s i b l e , at l e a s t i n p a r t , f o r the J e f f e r y s ' C o u r t own confused i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A further point should be made: i n s p e a k i n g of " c o p y r i g h t " t h e j u d g e s meant a p o s t - p u b l i c a t i o n r i g h t . They a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t a p r e - p u b l i c a t i o n , or f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n , r i g h t e x i s t e d a t common l a w , but d i d not e n v i s a g e t h a t as " c o p y r i g h t . " I n d e e d , v i e w i n g a r i g h t o f f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n as c o p y r i g h t d a t e s from the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h i s r i g h t i n t o " c o p y r i g h t " i n the I m p e r i a l C o p y r i g h t A c t o f 1911: 1&2 Geo. V, c. 46. 79. I n P r i n c e A l b e r t v. S t r a n g e (1849) 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 64 ER 293, the R o y a l F a m i l y had handed o v e r s e v e r a l o f t h e P r i n c e Consort's etchings t o a p r i n t e r f o r the p r e p a r a t i o n of a p r i v a t e , F a m i l y e d i t i o n . T h e y came i n t o t h e h a n d s o f a p u b l i s h e r who r e a d i e d a volume f o r mass s a l e and c i r c u l a t i o n . P r i n c e A l b e r t s o u g h t and o b t a i n e d an i n j u n c t i o n . The ViceChancellor, disturbed at the p u b l i s h e r ' s bad manners, confirmed a property r i g h t i n f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n w h i c h i s not l o s t "by p a r t i a l o r l i m i t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s not made w i t h a view t o g e n e r a l p u b l i c a t i o n . " (at 310). A l s o , M i l l a r was l a t e r u s e d as a u t h o r i t y i n c a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h Crown c o p y r i g h t , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t Crown r i g h t s were p r o p r i e t a r y i n o r i g i n , and not w h o l l y the r e s u l t o f t h e e x e r c i s e o f p r e r o g a t i v e powers. See d i s c u s s i o n i n P a r t I I I . 80.  Supra, note  75.  205 81. See b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n i n S t e v e n s , R o b e r t . P o l i t i c s and the Law: The House o f L o r d s as a J u d i c i a l Body, 1800-1976 ( L o n d o n : W e i d e n f e l d and Nicolson, 1 9 7 9 ) , and i n W. Holdsworth, A H i s t o r y o f E n g l i s h Law ( L o n d o n : Sweet and M a x w e l l , 1966, 6th ed.) V o l . 10, p . 610 f f . 82. See on t h i s p o i n t James E v a n s , s u p r a n o t e 50, who cites t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n M i l l a r and D o n a l d s o n a s a p r e f i g u r i n g o f the 1 9 t h C e n t u r y t r i u m p h o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s . 83.  D o n a l d s o n v.  84.  I b i d , at  Beckett,  supra  n o t e 52,  at  52.  54.  A r e j o i n d e r t o L o r d Camden's c a s u a l d i s m i s s a l o f the m a t e r i a l needs of w r i t e r s , o f h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the g r e a t w r i t e r s s o u g h t o n l y honour and g l o r y , was g i v e n by Catherine M a c a u l a y i n "A Modest P l e a f o r C o p y r i g h t " (1775), found i n L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y D e b a t e : E i g h t T r a c t s 1774-1775, P a r t C. M i l t o n ' s f a t e had s y m b o l i c v a l u e i n t h e d e b a t e . He had s o l d " P a r a d i s e L o s t " f o r 5 p o u n d s , and d i e d i n p e n u r y s e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r . The poem h a d , o f c o u r s e , become an e x t r e m e l y v a l u a b l e c o m p o s i t i o n , and t h e s u b j e c t o f r e p e a t e d l i t i g a t i o n by T o n s o n , who m a i n t a i n e d a d u b i o u s c l a i m t o i t s o w n e r s h i p up to the time of Donaldson. 85. There is a suggestion i n the material that the b o o k s e l l e r s had s e e n the D o n a l d s o n l i t i g a t i o n not as a t h r e a t , b u t an o p p o r t u n i t y to extend the r u l i n g i n M i l l a r to other c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t by the c a u t i o u s l a n g u a g e o f J u s t i c e s W i l l e s and A s t o n had been e x c l u d e d f r o m i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . See "The C a s e f o r t h e A p p e l l a n t " i n The L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y Debate:Six T r a c t s 1764-1774 (London: G a r l a n d P u b l i s h i n g I n c . , 1974) Part F. 86.  Gray, s u p r a note  87.  Supra note  24.  24.  88. See h i s a r t i c l e s on c o p y r i g h t i n t e l e v i s i o n news and c a s e r e p o r t s i n , r e s p e c t i v e l y : "Free Speech, C o p y r i g h t and Fair Use", ( 1 9 8 7 ) 40 V a n d e r b i l t Law R e v i e w 1, a n d , with Craig Joyce, "Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright P r o t e c t i o n f o r Law R e p o r t s and S t a t u t o r y C o m p i l a t i o n s " , (1989) 36 U.C.L.A. Law Review 719. 89. F o r d i s c u s s i o n o f i s s u e s i n what has been and continues t o be a h e a t e d d e b a t e i n C a n a d a , s e e : Cameron, D o n a l d , "Copyright and C o p y i n g M a c h i n e s " (1986) 4 C a n a d i a n Computer Law R e v i e w 186; Fontaine, P.L., D. A. S m i t h and P. G r a n t ,  206 Developing a Reprography C o l l e c t i v e i n Canada: F i n a l Report ( T o r o n t o : S t e v e n s o n , K e l l o g g , E r n s t & Whinney, 1986); Nabhan, V i c t o r , " T h e New C o p y i n g M e t h o d s : R e p r o g r a p h y , S o u n d a n d Audio-Visual Recording" (1987) 3 I n t e l l e c t u a l P r o p e r t y J o u r n a l 49. I n s h o r t , t h e p o s i t i o n i n C a n a d a i s t h a t t h e r e i s no exemption f r o m c o p y r i g h t l i a b i l i t y f o r l i b r a r y p h o t o c o p y i n g o f o t h e r t h a n ' i n s u b s t a n t i a l ' p a r t s o f a p r o t e c t e d work; t h e p r o b l e m i s w i t h r e s p e c t t o e n f o r c e m e n t and c o l l e c t i o n o f f e e s . The 1988 amendments i n t r o d u c e d p r o v i s i o n s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c o p y r i g h t c o l l e c t i v e s t o engage i n t h i s process on b e h a l f o f l a r g e g r o u p s o f c o p y r i g h t o w n e r s . Copyright Amendment A c t S.C. 1988, c . 15, s . 14. 90. See p a s s a g e s f r o m B o s w e l l ' s L i f e by W. F o r b e s G r a y , s u p r a n o t e 24.  of Johnson  referred to  91. For reference to Burke's support of the London b o o k s e l l e r s , s e e G r a y , s u p r a n o t e 24. B u r r o w s ' n o t e s a p p e n d e d to the r e p o r t o f M i l l a r v. T a y l o r found i n P a r t F o f Seven T r a c t s : 1747-1774 l i s t s e v e r a l books o p p o s i n g t h e i d e a o f common l a w c o p y r i g h t , a n d a l s o r e f e r t o t h e r o l e o f S w i f t a n d A d d i s o n i n t h e d r a f t i n g o f t h e S t a t u t e o f Anne ( 1 7 0 9 ) . P i e c e s by W i l l i a m K e n r i c k , P a r t B, and C a t h e r i n e M a c a u l a y , s u p r a n o t e 84, i n E i g h t T r a c t s : 1 7 7 4 - 1 7 7 5 , assume t h e a u t h o r s ' p o s i t i o n i n a r g u i n g f o r common law c o p y r i g h t . 92.  Wincor,  supra  note  28, a t 35.  93. See f u r t h e r a c c o u n t o f t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e S t a t i o n e r s ' Company and book c e n s o r s h i p a n d l i c e n s i n g III. 94.  See i n p a r t i c u l a r  the discussion i n Part  of the i n Part  V.  95. I t h a s b e e n e c h o e d i n some q u a r t e r s , h o w e v e r : S t e p h e n Breyer's c o n t r o v e r s i a l 1970 a n a l y s i s o f t h e e c o n o m i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r copyright — "The Uneasy C a s e f o r C o p y r i g h t in Books, Photocopies, a n d C o m p u t e r P r o g r a m s " ( 1 9 7 0 ) 84 H a r v a r d Law Review 2 1 — s u g g e s t e d t h a t h o n o u r s and f i n a n c i a l s u b s i d i e s m i g h t be an a d e q u a t e and l e s s e x p e n s i v e way t h a n an e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y r i g h t t o reward a u t h o r s a n d a r t i s t s . 96. 97.  An i s s u e d i s c u s s e d  in detail  Parts  IV a n d V I .  "On t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s e t t i n g a t h i e f t o c a t c h a t h i e f , t h e S t a t i o n e r s ' Company ( t o w h i c h a l m o s t e v e r y o n e engaged i n t h e book trade was c o m p e l l e d to belong) was i n v e s t e d by t h e Crown w i t h t h e power and the o b l i g a t i o n o f operating a censorship by e x a m i n i n g a n d l i c e n s i n g b o o k s b e f o r e  207 publication." Thomas, s u p r a  note  24,  at  9.  98. The p r e c e d i n g i s a v e r y b r i e f summary o f a l e n g t h y and complex h i s t o r y o f t r a d e r e g u l a t i o n , and i n t e r a c t i o n bewtween government a u t h o r i t i e s and p u b l i s h i n g i n t e r e s t s . An e x c e l l e n t and d e t a i l e d s u r v e y o f t h e s e e v e n t s i s g i v e n i n C h a p t e r s 2-6 o f L. Ray P a t t e r s o n ' s C o p y r i g h t i n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e s u p r a n o t e 24. Amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , P a t t e r s o n e x p l o r e s t h e s t r u g g l e s w i t h i n t h e S t a t i o n e r s ' Company t h a t b r o k e o u t a t v a r i o u s t i m e s b e t w e e n t h e w e a l t h y " m o n o p o l i s t ' p r i n t e r s and t h e p o o r e r members, and t h e ebbs and f l o w s between r e g u l a t i o n d i r e c t e d a t c e n s o r s h i p , and t h a t ( o f E l i z a b e t h I i n 1586, and t h e Long P a r l i a m e n t i n 1647) c o n c e r n e d more w i t h "good o r d e r ' i n the p r i n t i n g t r a d e . 99. P a t t e r s o n d e s c r i b e s t h e " s t a t i o n e r s ' c o p y r i g h t " a t some l e n g t h , a r g u i n g t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t e d the l i m i t e d p u b l i s h e r ' s copyright t h a t was confused with author's rights, and s u b s e q u e n t l y consumed i n s t a t u t o r y c o p y r i g h t a f t e r D o n a l d s o n : "The stationers' copyright can be analogized to a p e r p e t u a l lease of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , a manuscript or copy, as i t was called, f o r one specific purpose, that of p u b l i s h i n g . . . . It i m p l i e s a c o n t i n u i n g inchoate property, a type of p r o p e r t y upon w h i c h t h e common law d i d not look with favour." I b i d . , at  10-11.  100.  " I h a v e a n o t e o f one and f i f t y patents granted f o r the i m p r i n t i n g of d i v e r s b o o k s . S i n c e E d . 6 t i m e t h e p r i n t e r s and s t a t i o n e r s are i n c o r p o r a t e d ; they complain a g a i n s t t h e i r own c h a r t e r s ? they have p a t e n t s t h e m s e l v e s . . . . So f o r c i v i l l a w books, s c h o o l books, almanacks, t h a t i s a p r i v i l e d g e t o t h e m s e l v e s as a c o r p o r a t i o n ; i f t h e one i s a m o n o p o l i e , so c e r t a i n l y i s the o t h e r . "  R o l l ' s Abridgment 101.  (1666) 124  ER  843  at  844.  "In monopolies, the inventions are p r e s e r v e d t o them t h a t i n v e n t e d i t . Now i f I c a n p r o v e t h e K i n g a t h i s own price b r o u g h t i t i n t o E n g l a n d f i r s t , t h e n he was t h e f i r s t owner o f i t . "  208  I b i d . , a t 843. T h i s argument, t h e n , draws on t h e e s t a b l i s h e d e x p e r i e n c e o f p a t e n t s f o r i n v e n t i o n s , and on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i n v e n t i o n s ' as i n c l u d i n g m e c h a n i c a l d e v i c e s i m p o r t e d i n t o E n g l a n d . See d i s c u s s i o n o f p a t e n t s i n s e c t i o n D, below. N  102. Lord M a n s f i e l d noted i n M i l l a r that the p r e r o g a t i v e a r g u m e n t i n R o p e r was p r e m i s e d on t h e K i n g ' s p a y i n g the Judges' s a l a r i e s , adding d r i l y that the Judges d i s a g r e e d , t h i n k i n g the r e p o r t s s h o u l d belong t o the "author' (at 254). The i n t e r e s t s a t p l a y m i g h t e x p l a i n why the King's Bench j u d g e s f o u n d f o r Roper, and why t h e L o r d s r e v e r s e d . The f a c t t h a t c o n t e s t s o v e r p u b l i s h i n g law books a p p e a r as t h e f i r s t copyright cases r e f l e c t s a long-standing p r o p e n s i t y of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n to get to the f r o n t o f the l i t i g a t i o n l i n e . The f i r s t U.S. c o p y r i g h t case, which r e i n t e r p r e t e d M i l l a r and Donaldson i n l i g h t of the U.S. Constitutional provision for copyright, involved a dispute o v e r the o w n e r s h i p o f r e p o r t s o f Supreme C o u r t c a s e s : Wheaton v. P e t e r s , s u p r a note 75. In more r e c e n t C a n a d i a n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e f i r s t e q u a l i t y r i g h t s C h a r t e r c a s e t o come b e f o r e t h e Supreme C o u r t c o n c e r n e d t h e r i g h t o f n o n - c i t i z e n s t o p r a c t i c e l a w — Andrews v . Law S o c i e t y o f B.C. [1989] 1 SCR 124; and t h e f i r s t m o b i l i t y r i g h t s c a s e , t h e r i g h t o f law f i r m s t o o p e r a t e a c r o s s p r o v i n c i a l b o u n d a r i e s — B l a c k v. Law S o c i e t y o f A l b e r t a (1989) 58 DLR 4 t h 317 ( S . C . C . ) . 103. The d e f i n i n g o f 'law b o o k s ' was a p p a r e n t l y s e e n a s a d i f f i c u l t i s s u e i n Roper v. S t r e a t e r ( 1 6 7 0 ) — s e e r e f e r e n c e i n P a r t r i d g e , 88 ER 647 a t 649 . C l e a r l y , h o w e v e r , t h e term e x t e n d e d b e y o n d c o m p i l a t i o n s o f s t a t u t e s t o c a s e r e p o r t s , and i n R o l l ' s Abridgment, to e d i t e d c o l l e c t i o n s of cases o r g a n i z e d on t h e m a t i c l i n e s . For l a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t s i n the o w n e r s h i p see b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n i n s e c t i o n E, below.  of  case  reports  104. P a r k e r had p r e v i o u s l y come b e f o r e C h a n c e r y i n [ H i l l s e t a l v. O x f o r d (1684) 1 V e r n 275, 23 ER 4 6 7 ] . The L o r d K e e p e r refused t o g r a n t an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e university p r i n t e r s , and a l t h o u g h c l e a r l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e s t a t i o n e r s , s e n t the c a s e t o law: " . . . i t was n e v e r meant by t h e p a t e n t t o t h e U n i v e r s i t y t h a t t h e y s h o u l d p r i n t more t h a n f o r t h e i r own u s e . . . b u t as t h e y now manage i t , t h e y w o u l d e n g r o s s t h e w h o l e profit of p r i n t i n g to themselves, and p r e v e n t the K i n g ' s f a r m e r s o f t h e b e n e f i t of t h e i r p a t e n t . " ( a t 468).  209  The  case  concerned  the p r i n t i n g  of bibles.  105. C o u n s e l f o r t h e s t a t i o n e r s s a i d t h a t i n Seymour t h e d e f e n d a n t h e l d a p a t e n t f r o m t h e K i n g , showing how s t r o n g a decision i n f a v o u r o f t h e Company's c h a r t e r t h e c a s e r e p r e s e n t s , ( a t 108) The r e p o r t s o f Seymour do n o t i n d i c a t e t h i s t o be t h e c a s e ; i n d e e d , P e m b e r t o n f o r t h e s t a t i o n e r s e x p l i c i t l y a r g u e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d no i n d e p e n d e n t r i g h t t o p r i n t , b u t s o u g h t o n l y t o c h a l l e n g e t h e Company's r i g h t t o do s o . Seymour 86 ER 8 6 5 , a t 8 6 5 . 106. L o r d M a n s f i e l d s a i d i n M i l l a r ( a t 255) t h a t B a s k e t t h a d l a r g e l y f o l l o w e d Y o r k e ' s argument.  t h e Court i n  107. L e C a s e D e l R o y a l l P i s c a r i e De L a Banne (1611) D a v i s 5 5 , 80 ER 5 4 0 ; Duke o f Chandos' Case (1606) 6 Co. Rep 5 5 , 77 ER 336; Re A l t o n Woods (1594) 1 Co Rep 2 6 b , 76 ER 64. 108. B r i d g m a n e t a l v . H o l t e t a l ( M a s t e r o f the K i n g ' s B e n c h O f f i c e ) (1693) Shower P.C. I l l , 1 ER 76; Wentworth v . W r i g h t (1596) C r o . E l i z . 5 2 6 , 78 ER 774; T h e C a s e o f Swans (1591) 7 Co Rep 1 5 b , 77 ER 4 3 5 ; S i r H e n r i e C o n s t a b l e ' s Case (1600) 5 Co Rep 1 0 5 b , 77 ER 2 1 8 . 109.  Armiger  v . Holland  (1596) C r o E l i z  5 4 3 , 78 ER 7 8 9 .  110. Hunt v . C o f f i n (1519) 2 Dyer 1 9 7 , 73 ER 435; C r o u c h v . H a i n (1624) L a t c h 5 7 , 82 ER 273; D i x e v . Browne P a l m e r 4 2 2 , 81 ER 1 1 5 2 . T h e s e c a s e s a r e a l l c i t e d f o r t h e remedy o f s c i r e f a c i a s a v a i l a b l e t o the holder o f a p r i o r patent a g a i n s t the h o l d e r o f a l a t e r , i n c o n s i s t e n t p a t e n t , i n which event t h e K i n g i s found " d e c e i v e d i n h i s g r a n t " and the l a t e r p a t e n t ruled void. 111. When t h e t h r e e j u d g e s o f K i n g ' s B e n c h ( C h i e f J u s t i c e H o l t s a t by t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s t a b l e , t h e d e f e n d a n t h a p p e n i n g t o be h i s b r o t h e r ) r e c e i v e d t h e j u r y v e r d i c t i n f a v o u r o f t h e defendant, they refused t o seal a B i l l o f Exceptions f o r plaintiffs. The b u l k o f t h e r e p o r t c o n c e r n s t h e i n t r i c a t e p o l i t i c a l a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e House o f Lords c o u l d hear a p e t i t i o n complaining of the judges' c o n d u c t . The p e t i t i o n was d i s m i s s e d . 112.  Royall Piscarie  (1611)  80 E r 540 a t 542.  113. H i l l s v . U n i v e r s i t y o f O x f o r d , s u p r a note 5 (as noted t h i s appears t o be t h e Chancery d e c i s i o n i n t h e Parker litigation). Mayo v . H i l l (1673) i s d e s c r i b e d b r i e f l y i n L e e (1681).  210  114. The f a s c i n a t i o n o f swans f o r t h e common law i s s u g g e s t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g l y r i c a l p a s s a g e , a t t r i b u t a b l e e i t h e r to d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l o r Coke as r e p o r t e r : "And t h e l a w t h e r e o f [ d i v i d i n g o f c y n e t s between t h e owner o f t h e c o c k and owner o f t h e hen] i s f o u n d e d on a r e a s o n o f n a t u r e ; for the cock swan i s an emblem or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an a f f e c t i o n a t e and t r u e husband t o h i s w i f e above a l l o t h e r f o w l s ; f o r t h e c o c k h o l d e t h h i m s e l f t o one female o n l y , and f o r t h i s cause nature hath c o n f e r r e d on him a g i f t beyond a l l o t h e r s ; t h a t i s , t o d i e so j o y f u l l y , t h a t he s i n g s s w e e t l y when h e d i e s . " (The C a s e o f Swans 77.ER 435 a t 437) 115. See n o t e s 187-188, and t e x t a c c o m p a n y i n g f o r and c o m p a r i s o n o f " f a i r d e a l i n g " and " f a i r u s e " .  description  116. C o u n s e l f o r t h e s t a t i o n e r s i n P a r t r i d g e (1709) warned o f t h e d a n g e r s i n h e r e n t i n t h e "mismanagement o f t h e p r e s s " i f u n r e g u l a t e d (at 648); i n R o l l ' s Abridgment (1666), counsel a r g u e d t h a t w r i t i n g o n e ' s t h o u g h t s had n e v e r p o s e d a d a n g e r , but p u b l i s h i n g them c e r t a i n l y d i d : "A man a t common law might b u i l d a c h u r c h without licence, f o r t h a t was but a p a r t i c u l a r e x p e n c e , b u t he c o u l d not e r e c t a s p i r i t u a l body p o l i t i c k w i t h o u t l i c e n c e . He may w r i t e a book and p r i n t i t w i t h o u t the King's l i c e n c e , b u t p u b l i s h i t he c a n n o t . . . . I t c o n c e r n s the peace of the K i n g and kingdom. P r i n t i n g i s of an u n u s u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . . n o man may make sea-works o r beacons w i t h o u t l i c e n c e ; and a book may r a i s e as g r e a t a d u s t and a l a r m as a b e a c o n . " ( a t 843) 117. Company o f S t a t i o n e r s v . Lee t h r e a t of u n r e g u l a t e d importing of Holland:  (1681), d e a l i n g w i t h the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l w o r k s from  " . . . b e s i d e s i t w o u l d be o f dangerous c o n s e q u e n c e , t h a t t h e H o l l a n d e r s and o t h e r foreigners should print our psalms, p s a l t e r s , a l m a n a c k s , and s i n g i n g p s a l m s , f o r t h e y may and a c t u a l l y do abuse them, f o r b e i n g a t no c h a r g e f o r c o r r e c t i n g , and p r i n t i n g i n a w o r s e c h a r a c t e r and paper, they w i l l u n d e r s e l l the E n g l i s h , and  211 destroy 118. 119. 187.  See  our  manufacture."  d i s c u s s i o n i n s e c t i o n E,  (at  927)  below.  Tonson v. C o l l i n s (1762) 1 B l a c k W. 321, 96 See d i s c u s s i o n o f Tonson i n P a r t I I , above.  ER  180,  at  120. F o r e x a m p l e , s e e d i s c u s s i o n i n H a r o l d Fox, Monopolies and P a t e n t s ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1947) a t p. 86 f f . 121.  21  J.l,  c.3.  122. T h i s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i s u t i l i z e d by D.S. Davies in " F u r t h e r L i g h t on t h e C a s e o f M o n o p o l i e s " ( 1 9 3 2 ) 48 Law Q u a r t e r l y Review 394. D a r c y was a groom o f the Queen's P r i v y Chamber, and had no e x p e r i e n c e w h a t s o e v e r i n t h e c a r d - m a k i n g t r a d e , one o f t h e c a r d i n a l a b u s e s c i t e d by the C o u r t a c c o r d i n g to Coke's r e p o r t (at 1264). 123. A n o t e s h o u l d be made a t t h i s p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e t h r e e r e p o r t s o f D a r c y . The r e p o r t i n Moore i s i n law F r e n c h . B o t h t h a t r e p o r t a n d t h e r e p o r t by Noy a p p e a r t o g i v e t h e a r g u m e n t s o f F u l l e r , c o u n s e l f o r A l l e n , and n o t t h e K i n g ' s Bench r u l i n g . As the d e f e n d a n t s u c c e e d e d , t h e r e p o r t o f F u l l e r ' s argument i m p l i e s i t s a c c e p t a n c e i n f u l l by the C o u r t . Coke, who as S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l d e f e n d e d t h e patent before the j u d g e s d e s p i t e h i s c o n t r a r y v i e w s , r e p o r t s the d e c i s i o n of the Court. Coke's r e n d e r i n g contains his p a r t i c u l a r emphases, i n c l u d i n g an e x p r e s s e d i t o r i a l comment a t i t s c o n c l u s i o n ( a t 1 2 6 6 ) , and an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e f i n d i n g with respect to the Crown's d i s p e n s i n g power t h a t Lord E l l e s m e r e f e l t i t n e c e s s a r y t o c o r r e c t ( a t 1265). 124. E . Wyndham H u l m e , "The H i s t o r y of the P a t e n t Under the P r e r o g a t i v e and a t Common Law" (1896) Q u a r t e r l y R e v i e w 141, and "A S e q u e l " at (1900) Q u a r t e r l y Review 44. 125. See i n p a r t i c u l a r Hulme, i n t h e 17th and 1 8 t h C e n t u r i e s " 280. 126.  System 12 Law 16 Law  "On t h e H i s t o r y o f P a t e n t Law (1902) 18 Law Q u a r t e r l y R e v i e w  " I t i s a g r e e d by t h e C o u r t , that the g r a n t s o f t h e K i n g s h a l l not be expounded a c c o r d i n g t o the l e t t e r ; but accordingto t h e a n t i e n t a l l o w a n c e , and t o p r o v e t h e same, I w i l l p u t some p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . The Kings grants i n many c a s e s are c o n t r o l l e d by t h e J u d g e s o f t h e law f o r the b e n e f i t o f the King, c o n t r a r y to the  212 expresse  letters  o f the g r a n t .  "  Noy's R e p o r t , 74 ER 1131, a t 1133. 127. M a r g a r e t J u d s o n d i s c u s s e s t h i s form o f ' p r o p e r t y right in craftsmanship i n her chapter "Englishmen View t h e King's P o s i t i o n " i n T h e C r i s i s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n : An E s s a y i n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and P o l i t i c a l T h o u g h t i n E n g l a n d 1603-1645 ( L o n d o n : R u t g e r s U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984) 2d e d . a t 47 f f . 1  128.  F o r example: " I t [monopoly] t e n d s t o t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of d i v e r s a r t i f i c e r s and others, who b e f o r e , b y t h e l a b o u r o f t h e i r hands i n their a r t or trade, had maintained t h e m s e l v e s a n d t h e i r f a m i l i e s , who now w i l l o f n e c e s s i t y be c o n s t r a i n e d t o l i v e i n i d l e n e s s and b e g g a r y "  77  ER 1260, a t 1263.  129. Statute of Monopolies, a r t . V I I ; F u l l e r 74 ER 1131, a t 1137:  i n Noy's  Report,  " . . . w h e r e b y t h e s e v e r a l t r a d e s t h a t now m a i n t a i n many t h o u s a n d g o o d s u b j e c t s may be c u t o f f by l e t t e r s patents i n an i n s t a n t upon b a r e s u g e s t i o n , w h i c h ought only t o be done i n P a r l i a m e n t ; where a m o n g s t t h e a s s e m b l y o f s u c h w i s e men, some w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e i n c o n v e n i e n c e , some t h e damage, some t h e p r o f i t , some t h e m i s c h i e f " 130. Of c o u r s e , p a t e n t s f o r i n v e n t i o n were n o t o b j e c t i o n a b l e on t h i s s c o r e b e c a u s e t h e y i n v o l v e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f new t r a d e s o r s k i l l s , and d i d n o t t h e r e b y d e s t r o y e x i s t i n g t r a d e s . The S t a t u t e o f M o n o p o l i e s l i m i t e d the patent to Fuller's ' r e a s o n a b l e ' d u r a t i o n , a p e r i o d s u f f i c i e n t , f o r one t h i n g , t o a l l o w t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e new s k i l l s by o t h e r craftsmen. 131. B a r b a r a M a l a m e n t , "The ' E c o n o m i c L i b e r a l i s m ' o f S i r E d w a r d C o k e " ( 1 9 6 7 ) Y a l e Law J o u r n a l 1 3 2 1 , a t 1 3 5 0 . Ms. Malament's a r t i c l e c o n s t i t u t e s a c r i t i q u e o f t h e view, attributed to Christopher H i l l , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t Coke, a supporter o f the outcome i n Darcy d e s p i t e h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n , d r a f t e r o f t h e 1624 S t a t u t e , and a r d e n t o p p o n e n t o f J a m e s I ' s u s e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p r e r o g a t i v e , was a n e a r l y c a p i t a l i s t , i n t e n t on d e s t r o y i n g t h e s t a t e ' s r e g u l a t i o n of t r a d e :  213 "Darcy had d e f e n d e d h i s p r i v i l e g e s as l a w f u l e m a n a t i o n s o f t h e Crown p r e r o g a t i v e t o r e g u l a t e f o r e i g n t r a d e and g e n e r a l l y t o a c t p r o bono p u b l i c o . N e i t h e r Coke n o r t h e K i n g ' s B e n c h was p r e p a r e d t o deny the legitimacy of this prerogative." ( a t 1350) Her s h a r p a t t a c k o n t h e n o t i o n t h a t C o k e ' s v i e w s r e v e a l a l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n on f r e e t r a d e d r a w s h e a v i l y on t h e c l e a r w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e D a r c y c o u r t and t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y p a r t y t o accept extensive trade protectionism i n the i n t e r e s t s of E n g l i s h tradesmen and i n d u s t r y . 132. See d i s c u s s i o n s o f common t h e o r e t i c a l v i e w s o f t h e b a s i s for patents b y S t e v e n N.S. C h e u n g , " P r o p e r t y R i g h t s and I n v e n t i o n " , a n d Edmund W. K i t c h , " P a t e n t s : M o n o p o l i e s o r P a t e n t R i g h t s ?", b o t h i n R e s e a r c h i n Law a n d E c o n o m i c s , V o l 8: The E c o n o m i c s o f P a t e n t s a n d C o p y r i g h t s ( G r e e n w i c h , Conn.: JAI P r e s s , 1 9 8 6 ) , a t 5 and 31, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 133. See f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f J u s t i c e Y a t e s ' view of l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y a s a monopoly , and t o t h e m a j o r i t y judges' r e s p o n s e s , i n P a r t V. 134. See h i s argument a t 187.  i n Tonson  v. C o l l i n s  (1762) 96 E r 180,  135. C h i e f B a r o n Smythe a g r e e d , a n d drew a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e c o p i e d i n v e n t i o n a s a t l e a s t an " o r i g i n a l work" a s opposed t o t h e p a s s i n g o f f i n v o l v e d i n p u b l i s h i n g another's l i t e r a r y c o m p o s i t i o n . D o n a l d s o n v . B e c k e t t , E i g h t T r a c t s 17741775, P t . F, a t 44. 136. Y a t e s J . v i e w e d c o p y r i g h t as a p r o p e r t y i n ideas ( M i l l a r , 230 f f . ) ; t h e i s s u e o f t h e i d e a / e x p r e s s i o n d i c h o t o m y i n c o p y r i g h t a n d how t h e c o u r t a p p r o a c h e d i t i s d i s c u s s e d i n Part IV. 137. J u s t i c e A s t o n l a r g e l y eschewed t h e v a l u e o f p r e c e d e n t f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g common l a w c o p y r i g h t , a n d d i d n o t c i t e t h e Crown c a s e s . He was p r e p a r e d t o a c k n o w l e d g e c o p y r i g h t a s a new r i g h t , j u s t i f i e d because i t f e l l w i t h i n the theory o f p r o p e r t y known t o common l a w . F o r a f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n o f h i s v i e w s , see P a r t I V . 138.  He  continued; "But still these cases prove 'that the c o p y - r i g h t was a t t h a t t i m e a w e l l - k n o w n c l a i m ; 'though t h e o v e r g r o w n r i g h t s o f t h e  214  Crown were, i n some i n s t a n c e s , a l l o w e d a n d a d j u d g e d ( a s i n t h i s c a s e [ Seymour ] ) t o o v e r - r u l e them." ( a t 209) The i n t e r n a l q u o t e may be t a k e n f r o m B l a c k s t o n e ' s M i l l a r , w h i c h W i l l e s J . has j u s t p r a i s e d .  argument i n  139. J u s t i c e W i l l e s p r e f e r r e d the r u l i n g of King's Bench t h a t f a v o u r e d Roper, t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e c o p y from C r o k e ' s e s t a t e . He n o t e d t h a t i n r e v e r s i n g t h i s d e c i s i o n t h e House o f L o r d s d i d n o t ask t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e judges (presumably o f t h e t h r e e common l a w c o u r t s ) , who J u s t i c e W i l l e s b e l i e v e d w o u l d h a v e c o n f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n . ( M i l l a r a t 208) 140.  "...a Court the very name w h e r e o f i s s u f f i c i e n t t o b l a s t a l l precedents brought f r o m i t . " ( a t 239)  141.  "The p a t e n t s were e n o r m o u s s t r e t c h e s o f the p r e r o g a t i v e , t o r a i s e a revenue, and to g r a t i f y p a r t i c u l a r f a v o u r i t e s without the l e a s t regard t o a u t h o r s a n d new c o m p o s i t i o n s . " ( a t 241)  142.  " W i l l you t h e n g i v e t h i s h o n o u r a b l e r i g h t [ t o c o n t r o l p r i n t i n g o f works o f s t a t e ] t o your S o v e r e i g n as such ? or w i l l you d e g r a d e him i n t o a B o o k s e l l e r ?"  Eight  Tracts  1774-1775, P t . F, a t 31.  143. J u s t i c e Y a t e s was v i n d i c a t e d on t h i s p o i n t by j u d g m e n t s in E y r e and S t r a h a n v . C a r n a n (1781) 6 Bac. Ab. ( 7 t h e d ) 509, and J e f f e r y s v . Boosey (1854) 4 HLC 815, w h i c h a f f i r m e d h i s v i e w o f t h e p r e r o g a t i v e b a s i s o f t h e s u r v i v i n g Crown p r i n t i n g rights. 144. Crown p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s have b e e n v i e w e d as p a r t o f t h e common l a w d e v o l v i n g to the colonies a n d a c c e p t e d by i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e i r f o u n d i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n 1924, Canada p r o c l a i m e d i n t o law i t s f i r s t c o p y r i g h t s t a t u t e , t h e Copyright A c t 11-12 Geo V, c . 24 ( 1 9 2 1 ) , now and a s amended t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t RSC 1985, c . C-42, c l o s e l y m o d e l l e d on t h e 1911 U.K. C o p y r i g h t A c t 1 & 2 Geo V, c.46, and c o n t a i n i n g a s. 11 i d e n t i c a l t o t h e U.K. s t a t u t e ' s s . 18: "Without p r e j u d i c e t o any r i g h t s or p r i v i l e g e s o f t h e Crown, where any work i s , o r h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d o r p u b l i s h e d by o r u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n o r c o n t r o l o f Her M a j e s t y o r any government d e p a r t m e n t , t h e  215 c o p y r i g h t i n t h e work s h a l l , s u b j e c t t o any a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e a u t h o r , b e l o n g t o Her Majesty, and i n such case shall c o n t i n u e f o r a p e r i o d o f f i f t y y e a r s from the date o f t h e f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n of the work." (emphasis added) The p h r a s e u n d e r l i n e d a c k n o w l e d g e s a n d p r e s e r v e s Crown p r e r o g a t i v e s i n c o p y r i g h t . H a r o l d Fox, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Crown c o p y r i g h t i n Canada i n The C a n a d i a n Law o f C o p y r i g h t a n d I n d u s t r i a l D e s i g n s , s u p r a n o t e 24, a t p . 264 f f . , s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s p h r a s e was u n n e c e s s a r y and r e d u n d a n t , b u t i t w o u l d seem t h a t a Crown c l a i m f o r p e r p e t u a l c o p y r i g h t i n p r e r o g a t i v e w o r k s w o u l d f a i l i n i t s a b s e n c e . F o x ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f Crown r i g h t s i n C a n a d i a n c o p y r i g h t law remains t h e b e s t e x p o s i t i o n of t h i s i s s u e . 145.  2 Wm  B l 1004, 96 ER 590.  146. G r i e r s o n v . J a c k s o n R i d g L & S 304, 27 ER 512. The B i b l e c o n t i n u e d t o be a r i c h s o u r c e f o r l i t i g a t i o n . I n Manners v . B l a i r (1825) 3 B l i g h N.S., 4 ER 1379, t h e C o u r t o f S e s s i o n s d e c i d e d t h a t t h e Crown's p r e r o g a t i v e o v e r a u t h o r i z e d B i b l e s d e r i v e d from the King's r o l e as g u a r d i a n o f c h u r c h and s t a t e , not from h i s p o s i t i o n a s h e a d o f t h e E n g l i s h C h u r c h , s o t h a t the p r e r o g a t i v e extended t o t h e B i b l e f o r t h e S c o t t i s h Church even though t h e K i n g was n o t i t s Head. More r e c e n t l y , a p o i n t made by L o r d M a n s f i e l d i n M i l l a r was c o n f i r m e d i n O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y and Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y v. E y r e & S p o t t i s w o o d e Ltd. [1963] 3 A l l ER 289: t h e p r e r o g a t i v e d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o t r a n s l a t i o n s of the B i b l e , only to the Authorized V e r s i o n . 147.  Nicol  v. S t o c k d a l e  (1785) 37 ER 1023.  148. I n p a r t i c u l a r s e e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a m b r i d g e v. R i c h a r d s o n , (1802) 6 V e s . J u n . 690, p e r L o r d E l d o n a t 7 1 1 . 149.  [1938] 3 DLR 548 (N.B.S.C.)  150.  [1938] NSWR 195.  151. The f a s c i n a t i n g c a s e o f P r i n c e A l b e r t v . S t r a n g e ( 1 8 4 9 ) , 64 ER 2 9 3 , s u p r a n o t e 79, c o n c e r n i n g an u n a u t h o r i s e d p u b l i c a t i o n o f d r a w i n g s made by P r i n c e A l b e r t , a p p e a r s t o be the o n l y example of a r e l a t e d i s s u e : Crown c o p y r i g h t o r i g i n a t i n g i n a c t u a l a u t h o r s h i p o f a member o f t h e R o y a l F a m i l y . 152. The most f a m i l i a r way i n w h i c h w o r k s e n t e r t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n i n Canada i s t h r o u g h t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t p e r i o d ( l i f e o f t h e a u t h o r p l u s 50 y e a r s i n most cases); the f a i l u r e o f c o p y r i g h t t o a t t a c h i n the f i r s t p l a c e ,  216  f o r i n s t a n c e t h r o u g h t h e work's not b e i n g viewed as a p r o d u c t o f o r i g i n a l e x p r e s s i o n , o r n o t f a l l i n g w i t h i n one o f t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f works e x p r e s s l y p r o t e c t e d by t h e s t a t u t e , a l s o p u t s a work i n t h e p u b l i c domain. S e v e r a l European c o u n t r i e s have adopted the c o n c e p t o f 'domain p u b l i c p a y a n t ' , w h i c h r e q u i r e s u s e r s o f w o r k s whose c o p y r i g h t h a s e x p i r e d t o pay a m o d e s t l i c e n s i n g f e e t o t h e s t a t e a s a means o f g e n e r a t i n g p u b l i c r e v e n u e f o r p u r p o s e s r e l a t e d t o t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . See Mouchet, C a r l o s . " P r o b l e m s o f t h e 'Domain P u b l i c P a y a n t ' " (1983) 8 A r t and t h e Law 137. 153. Whether t h e Crown s h o u l d seek t o e n f o r c e i t s r i g h t s i n a l l c a s e s i s a s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n , which i s a d d r e s s e d b r i e f l y below. 154. S u p r a , n o t e 75. A l i v e l y a c c o u n t o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Wheaton f o r the Supreme C o u r t i n i t s e f f o r t s d u r i n g C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s tenure to achieve n a t i o n a l s t a t u r e , and o f t h e p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , i s g i v e n by C r a i g J o y c e i n "The R i s e of the Supreme C o u r t R e p o r t e r : An I n s t i t u t i o n a l P e r s p e c t i v e on M a r s h a l l C o u r t A s c e n d a n c y " (1985) 83 M i c h i g a n Law R e v i e w 1291. 155. A u s e f u l s u r v e y of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s a n d t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n p r i n c i p l e t h e y embody i s g i v e n b y J o h n 0. T r e s a n s k y i n " C o p y r i g h t i n G o v e r n m e n t E m p l o y e e A u t h o r e d W o r k s " , (1981) 30 C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y Law R e v i e w 605. T r e s a n s k y shows t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e h a s been c o n s t r u e d n a r r o w l y , s u c h t h a t government employees c a n a c q u i r e c o p y r i g h t i n works t h e y a u t h o r o u t s i d e t h e s t r i c t bounds o f t h e i r o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . See, f o r example, P u b l i c Affairs A s s o c i a t e s I n c . v . R i c k o v e r 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C.,1967), p e r m i t t i n g an A d m i r a l t o c l a i m c o p y r i g h t o v e r speeches p r e p a r e d w h i l e i n g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e , b u t on t o p i c s o u t s i d e the scope of h i s o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 156. 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. M i n n . , 1985), a f f ' d ( 8 t h C i r c u i t , 1986), c e r t , d e n i e d 479 U.S. 1070  799 F. 2d (1987).  1219  157. The West l i t i g a t i o n u l t i m a t e l y s e t t l e d on t h e b a s i s o f defendant's paying a s i z e a b l e l i c e n s i n g fee f o r the r i g h t to use s t a r p a g i n a t i o n . For a t r e n c h a n t c r i t i q u e of the c o u r t d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e i r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ' a p p r o a c h , and a r e v i e w o f t h e p o s t - W h e a t o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , see a r t i c l e by L.R. P a t t e r s o n and C. J o y c e , s u p r a n o t e 88. 158. The d i s t i n c t i o n may seem l i k e a f i n e one, b u t b e a r s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e view o f Y a t e s J . i n M i l l a r , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e Crown p r e r o g a t i v e c o p y r i g h t d e r i v e s f r o m t h e Crown's e x e c u t i v e r o l e rather t h a n from p r o p e r t y , has  217 p r e v a i l e d . L o n g I n n e s C . J . had an A u s t r a l i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e i n mind when a n s w e r i n g the q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e Crown r i g h t , not i t s d e r i v a t i o n . P a u l Von N e s s e n n o t e s : " T h i s case, which r e a f f i r m s the r i g h t of t h e Crown i n s t a t u t e s , d o e s not fully c l a r i f y t h e b a s i s of the r i g h t . I t does i n d i c a t e t h a t w h a t e v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e on which i t evolved, i t i s a right p r o p r i e t a r y i n nature. " "Law R e p o r t i n g : Another Case Modern Law Review 416 a t 419. 159.  Fox  (1967),  supra  note  24,  for  at  Deregulation",  (1985)  48  267.  160. Von N e s s e n , s u p r a n o t e 158; C o l i n T a p p e r , "Genus and J a n u s : I n f o r m a t i o n T e c h n o l o g y and t h e Law" (1985) 11 Monash Law R e v i e w 75, ans " C o p y r i g h t i n J u d g m e n t s " (1985) 1 Computer law and P r a c t i c e 76; s e e a l s o M. Snow, "Who Owns C o p y r i g h t i n Law Reports?" ( 1 9 8 2 ) 64 CPR 2d 49, a n d B. T o r n o , C r o w n C o p y r i g h t i n C a n a d a : A L e g a c y o f C o n f u s i o n (Consumer and C o r p o r a t e A f f a i r s , 1981). 161. F o r C a n a d a , s . 11 o f t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t ; t h i s w o u l d i n v o l v e a f i n d i n g t h a t j u d g e s p e r f o r m t h e i r d u t i e s under t h e " d i r e c t i o n or c o n t r o l o f the government", which, g i v e n the d o c t r i n e o f j u d i c i a l i n d e p e n d e n c e , may be a d u b i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n . 162. T a p p e r , s u p r a n o t e 160, a r g u e s f o r a p u b l i c domain f i n d i n g . D e s p i t e t h e p r o m i s e o f h i s t i t l e , Von Nessen's a r t i c l e , s u p r a note 158, shows t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t o f s t a t e o w n e r s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y as i t c o n c e r n s or may c o n c e r n law r e p o r t s , has l e d t o few s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e n a t u r e o r q u a l i t y o f r e p o r t i n g between t h e U.S. and t h e U.K.; the p r o b l e m o f e n s u r i n g a c c u r a c y i n l a w r e p o r t s l e d most U.S. s t a t e s t o a p p o i n t o f f i c i a l r e p o r t e r s f o r t h e i r c o u r t s (whose p u b l i c a t i o n s r e c e i v e d a s u b s i d y i n p l a c e o f the u n o b t a i n a b l e c o p y r i g h t monopoly), while B r i t a i n developed C o u n c i l s of Law Reporting; both jurisdictions have r e c e n t l y developed mechanisms f o r r e s t r i c t i n g t h e number o f r e p o r t e d d e c i s i o n s by r e g u l a t i n g the c i t a t i o n of unreported c a s e s . 163. Commonwealth v. J o h n F a i r f a x & Sons L t d . (1981) 55 ALJR ( A u s t . H.C.) ( A u s t r a l i a n government o b t a i n e d an i n j u n c t i o n t o p r e v e n t the p u b l i s h i n g o f a s e l e c t i o n of d i p l o m a t i c c a b l e s , to w h i c h no c o n f i d e n c e o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y c l a i m s a t t a c h e d ) ; A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l v. G u a r d i a n Newspapers L t d . (No. 2) [1988] 2 WLR 776 ( i n t h e n o t o r i o u s S p y c a t c h e r l i t i g a t i o n , t h e House o f L o r d s r u l e d t h a t t h e a u t h o r P e t e r W r i g h t c o u l d n o t have t h e b e n e f i t o f c o p y r i g h t i n E n g l a n d , as i t b e l o n g e d t o t h e C r o w n ) .  218 164. R. (F.C.A.)  v . James  Lorimer  & C o . L t d ( 1984)  165.  " P a r t l y because c o p y i s t s had, a f t e r a l l , n e v e r p a i d t h o s e whose works t h e y c o p i e d , p a r t l y because new b o o k s w e r e a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f t h e e a r l y b o o k - t r a d e , and p a r t l y because d i v i s i o n s o f l i t e r a r y l a b o r remained b l u r r e d , the author r e t a i n e d a quasi-amateur status u n t i l the eighteenth century."  Supra  note  166.  The f o u r ways, a n d t h e i r (1) (2) (3) (4)  Ibid.,  77  CPR  2d  25  7, a t 153-154. artisans:  w r i t e (copy) works o f o t h e r s — ' s c r i b e ' w r i t e works o f o t h e r s w i t h a d d i t i o n s from o t h e r s o u r c e s — 'compiler' c o m b i n e own w i t h o t h e r s ' w o r k , w i t h latter predominating— 'commentator' c o m b i n e own w i t h o t h e r s ' w o r k , w i t h former predominating— 'author'  a t 121.  167. The r e s u l t i n G y l e s i s not found i n the r e p o r t o f t h e c a s e , b u t i s d i s c l o s e d by t h e L o r d C h a n c e l l o r i n Tonson v . W a l k e r a n d M e r c h a n t ( 1 7 5 2 ) , a t 677. He s a y s t h e p a n e l r e p o r t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t s had t a k e n 35 o f 275 s h e e t s i n t h e o r i g i n a l , w h i c h t h e C o u r t r u l e d made i t a " f a i r a b r i d g m e n t " and t h u s o u t s i d e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s o f t h e S t a t u t e o f Anne. 168. The C o u r t a l s o r e f e r r e d t o B u r n e t t ' s h a v i n g e n s u r e d h i s c o n t r o l o v e r t h e u s e s made o f h i s book by n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h h i s p u b l i s h e r a d e c l a r a t i o n o f t r u s t o v e r " t h e copy" t o h i m s e l f . T h i s o c c u r r e d i n 1694, p r i o r t o t h e S t a t u t e o f A n n e . I t i s s u r p r i s i n g the m a j o r i t y judges i n M i l l a r d i d not c i t e the case as a n e x a m p l e o f a u t h o r s and p u b l i s h e r s making p r o p e r t y - l i k e a r r a n g e m e n t s between e a c h o t h e r . 169. C o n c e r n i n g P i l g r i m ' s P r o g r e s s . The L i c e n s i n g A c t o f 1662 had j u s t e x p i r e d , s o t h e c a s e c o u l d have l e d t o an e a r l y d e c i s i o n on t h e l i t e r a r y p r o p e r t y q u e s t i o n . J u s t i c e W i l l e s n o t e s , however, t h a t a f t e r p l e a d i n g s were f i l e d d e s c r i b i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f p r i n t e r as t h e " t r u e p r o p r i e t o r " o f the copy, t h e matter d i d not proceed. Millar  v . T a y l o r , a t 209.  170. Concerning a p u b l i s h e d i n 1657.  work  titled  The  Whole  Duty  of  Man,  219 171. Concerning a c o l l e c t i o n of p u b l i s h e d between 1701 and 1708. 172. Concerning Nelson's between 1712 and 1714.  writings  Festivals  and  of  Pope  Feasts  and  Swift  published  173. The f i r s t i n j u n c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s d e a l i n g w i t h an e d i t i o n of P a r a d i s e L o s t . T h e l a t e r 1752 c a s e b e t w e e n t h e same p a r t i e s o v e r the work i s not r e f e r r e d t o as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e same p r o c e e d i n g , and a p p e a r s t o c o n c e r n a new e d i t i o n . 174.  "Cap.  LV:  I n j u n c t i o n " a t 2 Eq. Ca. Abr.  175.  Tonson v . W a l k e r and  Merchant  522,  (1752), at  176. The I n j u n c t i o n c h a p t e r i n E q u i t y Cases to s e v e r a l other p r i n t i n g cases not c i t e d supporting cases:  22 ER  440  1020.  Abridgment r e f e r s i n M i l l a r or the  Watson v . J e f f e r i e s (1737) o v e r " C o u r t K a l e n d a r " H i t c h v. L a n g l e y (1739) over "Gibb's A r c h i t e c t u r e " R i v i n g t o n v. C o o p e r (1740) o v e r " G a r d i n e r ' s C a l e n d a r " G i l l i v e r v. Snaggs (1729) o v e r "The D u n c i a d " Andrews, M i l l a r v. L i n c h (1742) o v e r "Pamela" Richardson  by  177. B l a c k s t o n e , i n h i s r e p o r t o f T o n s o n v. C o l l i n s (1762), adds i n a n o t e an e x t e n d e d p a s s a g e f r o m J o h n s o n ' s L i f e o f Pope t h a t s u g g e s t s Pope had c o n s p i r e d t o g e t h i s l e t t e r s i n t o t h e hands o f C u r l , knowing the l a t t e r would p r o c e e d t o p u b l i s h them, t h u s a l l o w i n g Pope t o f o l l o w w i t h h i s own e d i t i o n ( w h i c h he d i d ) w i t h o u t a p p e a r i n g immodest. T o n s o n v. C o l l i n s , a t 190191. 178. The f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t on c o p y r i g h t was the B e r n e C o n v e n t i o n o f 1886. T h e U.S. refused to r a t i f y i t ( i n d e e d , i t d i d s o o n l y i n 1986 ) . The i s s u e o f American ' p i r a c y ' o f B r i t i s h c o p y r i g h t s was a b i t t e r i s s u e between t h e two c o u n t r i e s t h r o u g h most o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s s t r u g g l e , and o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f I m p e r i a l c o p y r i g h t l e g i s l a t i o n , f o r C a n a d a a r e d i s c u s s e d by John B a r n e s i n A u t h o r s , P u b l i s h e r s and P o l i t i c i a n s : The Q u e s t f o r an Anglo-American C o p y r i g h t Agreement 1815-1854 (London: R o u t l e d g e & Kegan P a u l , 1974). 179. Separate s t a t u t e s enacted through the c o u r s e of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t h e U.K. expanded c o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n t o o r i g i n a l works i n t h e f o l l o w i n g f i e l d s : S c u l p t u r e C o p y r i g h t A c t 54 Geo.3, c.107 (1814) D r a m a t i c L i t e r a r y P r o p e r t y A c t 3 & 4 W i l l . 4 c.15  (1833)  220 L e c t u r e s C o p y r i g h t A c t 5 & 6 W i l l . 4 c.65 (1835) P r i n t s and E n g r a v i n g s A c t 6 & 7 W i l l . 4 c.59 (1836) These c a t e g o r i e s were c o n s o l i d a t e d under t h e C o p y r i g h t 6 V i c t , c.45 (1842).  Act 5 &  The C a n a d i a n C o p y r i g h t A c t RSC 1985, c . C-42, a s amended, provides copyright f o r "every o r i g i n a l l i t e r a r y , dramatic, m u s i c a l a n d a r t i s t i c work" ( s . 4 ( 1 ) ) , and t h e n g i v e s i n c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n each o f t h o s e f o u r h e a d i n g s , as w e l l as p a r t i c u l a r ways i n w h i c h t h e works must be e x p r e s s e d i n o r d e r to q u a l i f y f o r c o p y r i g h t . 180. A c o n t r a d i c t i o n seems t o l i e i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n c e r n about whether t h e e d i t i o n i n i s s u e f e l l w i t h i n t h e terms o f the S t a t u t e , g i v e n t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l l e t t e r s were u n p u b l i s h e d and t h e r e f o r e , p r e s u m a b l y , h a d no s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n . C e r t a i n l y , t h e judges i n M i l l a r , Yates J . i n c l u d e d , b e l i e v e d Pope v . C u r l t o be d e c i d e d on a common law r i g h t i n t h e a u t h o r of u n p u b l i s h e d works t o c o n t r o l t h e i r p u b l i c a t i o n . See discussion to follow. 181.  See d i s c u s s i o n i n Abrams' a r t i c l e ,  supra  n o t e 56.  182. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note that the l i t e r a r y property d e b a t e was r e s t r i c t e d e n t i r e l y t o t h e i s s u e o f d u r a t i o n o f t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o p e r t y r i g h t . A l t h o u g h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a common law c o p y r i g h t might have been u s e d t o g e t a r o u n d o t h e r l i m i t s imposed by t h e S t a t u t e ( s u c h a s t h e term " b o o k s " ) t h i s d i d n o t occur. 183. An i n s t a n c e where t h e m e r i t o f a work i n f l u e n c e d property r i g h t s occurred i n Burnett (1722). There, the Lord C h a n c e l l o r c l a i m e d f o r t h e j u d g e s "a s u p e r i n t e n d e n c y over a l l b o o k s , [ w h i c h ] might i n a summary way r e s t r a i n t h e p r i n t i n g o r p u b l i s h i n g any t h a t c o n t a i n e d r e f l e c t i o n s on r e l i g i o n o r morality." (1009) As t h e a u t h o r had w r i t t e n i n L a t i n t o r e s t r a i n d i s t r i b u t i o n o f h i s book, w h i c h c o n t a i n e d d i s t u r b i n g r e l i g i o u s i d e a s , t h e C o u r t was more i n c l i n e d t o g r a n t a n injunction preventing i t s t r a n s l a t i o n into English. 184. The C o p y r i g h t A c t 5 & 6 V i c t . , c . 45 (1842) e x p r e s s l y denied c o p y r i g h t t o immoral and i r r e l i g i o u s works. Both E n g l i s h a n d C a n a d i a n c o u r t s d e n i e d c o p y r i g h t t o o b s c e n e works long a f t e r t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n had been d r o p p e d from later s t a t u t e s . J u s t i c e Davies reviewed t h i s l i n e o f cases i n d e t a i l i n t h e B.C. c a s e A l d r i c h e t a l v . One S t o p V i d e o e t a l . (1987) 17 CPR ( 3 d ) 27 (B.C. S.C. ) , i n w h i c h he r u l e d t h a t o b s c e n e works a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o p y r i g h t , a l t h o u g h p l a i n t i f f s might s t i l l be d e n i e d r e m e d i e s a t l a w and e q u i t y i f t h e works a r e otherwise unlawful.  221 185. The term " t h i r d p a r t y " i t s e l f c a l l s f o r e x p l a n a t i o n . H e r e , i t means "a s t r a n g e r " ; i n most i n s t a n c e s i t c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h the a l l e g e d i n f r i n g e r i n c o p y r i g h t l i t i g a t i o n . In t h a t sense, the m i s s i n g " s e c o n d p a r t y " m i g h t be v i e w e d a s the a s s i g n e e or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e o r i g i n a l owner o f c o p y r i g h t . 186. The C o p y r i g h t A c t RSC 1985 c. C-42 p r o v i d e s , i n t e r a l i a , e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to dramatise n o v e l s , to perform works i n p u b l i c , t o make s o u n d r e c o r d i n g s and t o communicate works by r a d i o ( s . 3 ( 1 ) ) ; t h e 1988 amendments h a v e a d d e d a p u b l i c e x h i b i t i o n r i g h t f o r a r t i s t i c w o r k s — the C o p y r i g h t Amendment A c t SC 1988 c. 15, s.2. 187. Section reads: "(2)  17(2)(a)  of  the  Copyright  Act  RSC  1985,  c.  C-42  The f o l l o w i n g a c t s do n o t c o n s t i t u t e an i n f r i n g e m e n t o f c o p y r i g h t : (a)  any f a i r d e a l i n g w i t h any work f o r t h e purposes of p r i v a t e study, research, c r i t i c i s m , r e v i e w , or newspaper summary"  ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . The c o m p a r a b l e U.S. e x c e p t i o n f o r " f a i r u s e " i s s u b j e c t t o an e x t e n s i v e d e f i n i t i o n i n s . 107 of the C o p y r i g h t A c t o f 1976, T i t l e 17 U.S.C. The s e c t i o n l e a v e s " f a i r u s e " o p e n - e n d e d , but r e q u i r e s a c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r f o u r f a c t o r s when d e c i d i n g what c o n s t i t u t e s f a i r u s e : 1. 2. 3. 4.  p u r p o s e and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e u s e , i n c l u d i n g whether f o r p r o f i t or f o r