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Te Mana Motuhake Me Te Iwi Maori : indigineous self determination Williams, Joseph Victor 1988

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TE MANA MOTUHAKE ME TE IWI MAORI: INDIGENOUS S E L F DETERMINATION By JOSEPH VICTOR WILLIAMS L L . B . V i c t o r i a U n i v e r s i t y o f W e l l i n g t o n , 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED I N P A R T I A L FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Law) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA F e b r u a r y 1988 (c) J o s e p h V i c t o r W i l l i a m s In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) i i ABSTRACT Maria Maori Motuhake or Maori s e l f determination i s developing i n t o one of the most p r e s s i n g p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l i s s u e s i n modern New Zealand. The Maori s t r u g g l e f o r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h a t r i g h t i s a long one. I t began w i t h contact w i t h B r i t i s h c o l o n i s e r s , and has continued i n d i f f e r e n t forms throughout New Zealand's h i s t o r y . The f o l l o w i n g t h e s i s suggests t h a t t h a t s t r u g g l e i s one which the Maori share w i t h Indigenous peoples throughout the world. The r e c o g n i t i o n i n law of Mana Maori Motuhake i n New Zealand w i l l come from an understanding, by both Maori and Pakeha, of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nature of t h a t s t r u g g l e . A c c o r d i n g l y the e s s e n t i a l purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o put the i s s u e of Maori r i g h t s i n t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l and c o l o n i a l p e r s p e c t i v e . In P a r t I , the question of Indigenous s e l f determination i s discussed i n the context of h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary developments i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I t i s concluded f i r s t l y t h a t there i s room f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a r i g h t of Indigenous s e l f determination can be drawn from the c u r r e n t s t a t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Secondly, i t i s argued t h a t recent developments i n the United Nations suggest p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h a t r i g h t w i l l occur i n the near f u t u r e . In P a r t I I , the development of c o l o n i a l law i n the United S t a t e s , Canada and New Zealand add a f u r t h e r dimension t o t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . In t h i s p a r t p a r a l l e l developments i n the three c o u n t r i e s are h i g h l i g h t e d t o prove the ' i n d i v i s i b i l i t y ' of c o l o n i a l i s m , and the inex o r a b l e development i n modern law toward r e c o g n i t i o n of the ' c o l o n i a l paradigm'- Nati v e t i t l e and Native sovereignty. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS HEI TIMATANGA; A BEGINNING 1 PART I; INDIGENOUS SELF DETERMINATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 3 2. C o l o n i a l Roots 5 2.1 Guardianship and E a r l y Concepts o f Indigenous R i g h t s 5 2.2 E a r l y I n t e r n a t i o n a l Standard S e t t i n g 12 3. S e l f Determination and D e c o l o n i s a t i o n 14 3.1 S e l f Determination o f Peoples and the League E ra 14 3.2 Indigenous Peoples and A r t i c l e 23(b) o f the League Covenant 18 3.3 Indigenous Peoples and the League E r a Cases 19 3.4 The League E r a : A S y n t h e s i s 23 3.5 D e c o l o n i s a t i o n and the UN Concept o f S e l f D e t ermination 24 4. S e l f Determination as a M i n o r i t y R i g h t 38 4.1 M i n o r i t y R i g h t s Under the League 39 4.2 The UN Human R i g h t s Approach 45 4.3 Indigenous Peoples as M i n o r i t i e s 51 5. I n t e r n a l S e l f Determination and Indigenous Peoples 55 5.1 Indigenous Claims t o S e l f Determination 56 5.2 Overcoming T e r r i t o r i a l I n t e g r i t y 59 5.2.1 The E n c l a v e s and R e l a t e d Examples 60 5.2.2 E f f i c a c y and C o n s i s t e n c y 68 5.3 S e l f Determination as a Continuum: I n t e r n a l S e l f D e t ermination 70 5.4 The A p p l i c a t i o n o f T h i s Concept t o Indigenous Peoples 74 6. C o n c l u s i o n 87 PART I I : NATIVE TITLE AND NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 90 2. Contact: E s t a b l i s h i n g the ' C o l o n i a l Paradigm 7 93 2.1 North America: C o l o n i a l Law, C o l o n i a l P r a c t i c e 93 2.2 C o n c l u s i o n 119 2.3 New Zealand and the T r e a t y of Waitangi: Maori S o v e r e i g n t y and Pakeha S o v e r e i g n t y 120 2.4 C o n c l u s i o n 135 3. The Mythology o f Conquest: C o l o n i a l Paradigm Becomes  C o l o n i a l Parody 3.1 The U n i t e d S t a t e s 139 3.1.1 Removal, A l l o t m e n t and F e d e r a l P l e n a r y Power 139 3.1.2 The I n d i a n New Deal 151 3.1.3 T e r m i n a t i o n 153 3.2 Canada 157 3.2.1 T r e a t y Making and T r e a t y Breaking 157 3.2.2 A b o r i g i n a l T i t l e and S t C a t h e r i n e s M i l l i n g 169 3.2.3 N a t i v e S o v e r e i g n t y and the I n d i a n A c t 177 V I 3.2.4 The White Paper: A s s i m i l a t i n g the C o l o n i a l Paradigm 180 3.3 New Zealand 182 3.3.1 R e j e c t i o n o f Rangatiratanga 183 3.3.2 J u d i c i a l R e j e c t i o n o f the T r e a t y o f Waitangi and the C o l o n i a l Paradigm 189 3.3.3 L e g i s l a t i v e R e j e c t i o n o f the T r e a t y o f Waitangi and the C o l o n i a l Paradigm 201 3.4 C o n c l u s i o n 213 4. Indigenous R i g h t s . Indigenous S e l f D e t e r m i n a t i o n ; The  C o l o n i a l Paradigm i n the Modern Age 4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 215 4.2 The U n i t e d S t a t e s : I n d i a n S o v e r e i g n t y 217 4.3 Canada and New Zealand: P r e - E x i s t i n g R i g h t s 225 4.3.1 The Beginnings of Change 228 4.3.2 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l , L e g i s l a t i v e and P o l i c y Change 237 4.3.3 J u d i c i a l Return t o the C o l o n i a l Paradigm 248 5. Drawing C o n c l u s i o n s 268 HEI TIMATANGA HOU: A NEW BEGINNING 269 BIBLIOGRAPHY 217 1 HEI TIMATANGA: A BEGINNING The uneasy r e l a t i o n s h i p between Maori and Pakeha (white New Z e a l a n d e r s ) , and the r u l e s which govern t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p are undergoing fundamental r e d e f i n i t i o n i n modern New Zealand. T h i s r e f l e c t s mounting Maori n a t i o n a l i s m . I t a l s o r e f l e c t s a n a t i o n a l Pakeha i d e n t i t y c r i s i s . I t i s important t h a t we g e t t h i s r e d e f i n i t i o n p r o c e s s r i g h t . A f a i l u r e t o do so w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l disharmony a t a l e v e l unprecedented s i n c e the Pakeha-Maori wars of the 1860s. Recent developments i n New Zealand and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y suggest t h a t we are now i n a unique p o s i t i o n t o a v o i d t h a t s c e n a r i o . Governmental and j u d i c i a l responses t o Maori g r i e v a n c e s and Maori r i g h t s have, i n the 2 0th century, been piecemeal and u n p r i n c i p l e d . Each i s s u e has been d e a l t w i t h as an i s o l a t e d problem u n r e l a t e d t o New Zealand's c o l o n i a l p a s t or t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law concepts of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The r e s u l t has been a g r a d u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the c o n t e x t w i t h i n which Maori g r i e v a n c e s and i s s u e s are p e r c e i v e d by government and the Courts. The c o n t e x t has s h i f t e d from c o l o n i a l i s m and x i n t e r n a t i o n a l ' c o n f l i c t t o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and s o c i o economic i n e q u i t y . The Maori were transformed from a people s u f f e r i n g under B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m t o a m i n o r i t y s u f f e r i n g from s o c i a l and economic i n j u s t i c e . The t r e n d has been c a r e f u l and i n s i d i o u s . The r e v e r s e t r e n d which has a l r e a d y begun, i s by c o n t r a s t , o c c u r r i n g a t g i d d y i n g speed. The c r e a t i o n of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l ; i t s immense p o p u l a r i t y as a forum f o r t r i b a l g r i e v a n c e s ; the f a c t t h a t t r i b a l i s m i t s e l f i s r e g a i n i n g l o s t s t r e n g t h ; the c u r r e n t 2 beginnnings o f a Maori r i g h t s l i t i g a t i o n boom; the p r o p o s a l t o entrench the T r e a t y o f Waitangi i n a B i l l o f R i g h t s ; the r e b i r t h o f the K o t a h i t a n a a ; the maturation o f the o b j e c t i v e o f Maori n a t i o n a l i s m beyond * b i c u l t u r a l i s m ' and toward s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n a r e but a few of the s i g n s t h a t the c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n o f Maori i s s u e s i s s h i f t i n g back t o i t s r o o t s . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s an attempt t o put the i s s u e o f Maori s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . To show t h a t the Maori s t r u g g l e i s by no means unique. To express i t as an Indigenous s t r u g g l e , shared by Indigenous peoples throughout the world. In t h a t c o n t e x t i t i s argued t h a t the only p o s s i b l e l e g a l framework w i t h i n which the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d can be worked out i s a c o l o n i a l one. Though the p o i n t may appear obvious, i t had u n t i l r e c e n t l y been f o r g o t t e n by the Pakeha m a j o r i t y i n New Zealand. That p r o v i d e d the b a s i s f o r the x m i n o r i t i s a t i o n ' o f Indigenous i s s u e s , not j u s t i n New Zealand, but around the world. T h i r d World d e c o l o n i s a t i o n i n t h e 1960s and 70s was premised upon an acceptance t h a t the s i t u a t i o n T h i r d World peoples l i v e d under was c o l o n i a l . Indigenous s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n - d e c o l o n i s a t i o n - w i l l never be achieved u n t i l t he same c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n i s a p p l i e d t o Indigenous peoples l i v i n g as m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n n a t i o n - s t a t e s imposed upon them by the c o l o n i s e r . Throughout t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i t w i l l be argued t h a t modern developments, both i n domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, are f a s t approaching t h i s p o i n t . My approach t o the i s s u e i s a t two l e v e l s . In P a r t I, h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary developments i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law are d i s c u s s e d . In t h a t p a r t , the development of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l concept o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n both f o r ^ m i n o r i t i e s ' and f o r 3 x p e o p l e s x i s d i s c u s s e d and a p p l i e d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n o f Ind igenous p e o p l e s . In P a r t I I , a compara t i ve a n a l y s i s i s p r o v i d e d o f the e v o l u t i o n o f c o l o n i a l law i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Canada and New Z e a l a n d . Here i t w i l l be argued t h a t t h i s law was p r e m i s e d upon a r e c o g n i t i o n o f N a t i v e t i t l e and N a t i v e s o v e r e i g n t y . F u r t h e r , t h e c u r r e n t r e t u r n t o prominence o f N a t i v e r i g h t s i s s u e s i n the t h r e e j u r i s d i c t i o n s s u g g e s t t h a t the law i s d e v e l o p i n g toward a r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h a t pa rad igm. T h i s two l e v e l l e d approach shows c l e a r l y how h i s t o r i c a l p a t t e r n s have c o n v e r g e d , d i v i d e d and r e c o n v e r g e d . In t h e e a r l y e r a o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n i n t o the new w o r l d , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and Ind igenous r i g h t s were a s i n g l e body o f law. By t h e m i d - t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t h e two had become c o m p l e t e l y d i v i d e d . I n t e r n a t i o n a l law r e g u l a t e d the r e l a t i o n s o f S t a t e s . Ind igenous r i g h t s were c o n s i d e r e d t o be p u r e l y d o m e s t i c i s s u e s . Today , i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f the 20th c e n t u r y , t h e two a r e r e c o n v e r g i n g i n a way which p r o m i s e s a r e t u r n t o the o r i g i n a l framework w i t h i n which r e l a t i o n s between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d a r e t o be worked o u t . PART I; INDIGENOUS SELF DETERMINATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. INTRODUCTION The t r e a t m e n t o f i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s d u r i n g the age o f European c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n r e f l e c t s a b r o a d spect rum o f e x p e r i e n c e . A t one end o f the spect rum e x i s t i n g p r o p e r t y r i g h t s were r e c o g n i s e d and p r o t e c t e d , as e v e n t u a l l y was t h e r i g h t t o r e g a i n independence . A t the o t h e r end o f t h e spect rum no r i g h t s a t a l l were r e c o g n i s e d by the c o l o n i s i n g power, s y s t e m a t i c 4 s e t t l e m e n t p o l i c i e s reduced the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n t o a m i n o r i t y and, upon a c h i e v i n g independence, the new s t a t e e x e r c i s e d f u l l i n t e r n a l s o v e r e i g n t y over them. D e s p i t e t h i s apparent d i v e r s i t y o f experience e a r l y attempts t o r e g u l a t e the a c t i v i t i e s o f c o l o n i a l powers imposed, w i t h i n the parameters of a crude i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, a s i n g l e standard o f treatment i n r e s p e c t o f c o l o n i s e d peoples a t a l l p o i n t s a l o n g the spectrum. T h i s , i t i s submitted, showed i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n on the p a r t of the c o l o n i a l powers, o f the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o l o n i a l p r o c e s s . I t a f f i r m e d the n o t i o n t h a t the two p o l e s d e s c r i b e d above, i n f a c t belonged t o a s i n g l e spectrum and c o u l d not be d i v i d e d i n t o s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r i e s . With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the UN and the new age o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n which has dominated i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and p o l i t i c s f o r the l a s t t h i r t y y e a r s , the s i n g l e s t a n d a r d was r e p l a c e d by a double standa r d both l i t e r a l l y and f i g u r a t i v e l y . The new r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples espoused by the UN as the b a s i s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and the l i b e r a t i o n o f peoples s u f f e r i n g under c o l o n i a l regimes, was t o be a r i g h t o n l y i f the indigenous peoples r e t a i n e d t h e i r s t a t u s as a m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n . M i n o r i t i s e d indigenous peoples were not, i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scheme of t h i n g s , t o be c o n s i d e r e d peoples a t a l l . I n s t e a d , as Sanders (1) p o i n t s out, they were accorded r i g h t s as i n d i v i d u a l s and m i n o r i t i e s whose problems were understood not i n terms o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n and s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , but i n terms o f economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l human r i g h t s . That p e r s p e c t i v e i s changing — r a p i d l y . With the d e c o l o n i s a t i o n p r o c e s s a l l but complete i n the 1 Sanders, The Re-emergence o f Indigenous Questions i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1983) 1 Can. Human R i g h t s Y.B.3 5 t h i r d world, commentators i n c r e a s i n g l y a re c o n f r o n t i n g the argument t h a t s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s a r i g h t a t t a c h i n g a l s o t o s u b - s t a t e groupings such as indigenous e n c l a v e s . As w e l l , indigenous advocacy o f t h e i r own cause has become more urgent and a r t i c u l a t e i n r e c e n t y e a r s and has i d e n t i f i e d more c l o s e l y w i t h the t h i r d world g o a l s of d e c o l o n i s a t i o n and s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . A g a i n s t t h a t background the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r w i l l t r a c e the development o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and p r a c t i c e i n r e l a t i o n t o indigenous peoples up t o the pr e s e n t day. T h i s w i l l i n c l u d e the development of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p r i n c i p l e , the development of the concept o f c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y groups r i g h t s and r e c e n t development i n terms o f melding these i n t o a d i s t i n c t and comprehensive law i n r e s p e c t o f m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples drawing on both t r a d i t i o n s . As a secondary o b j e c t i v e t h i s c h apter i s a l s o designed t o p r o v i d e an e s s e n t i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law content a g a i n s t which the remainder o f t h i s t h e s i s s hould be viewed. 2 COLONIAL ROOTS 2.1 Guar d i a n s h i p and E a r l y Concepts o f Indigenous R i g h t s . V i c t o r i a (2) i n the 16th ce n t u r y was the f i r s t t o apply a t h e o r e t i c a l framework t o the f a c t o f c o l o n i a l i s m . He argued t h a t the I n d i a n s of the Americas were human beings whose t i t l e t o lan d and whose c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were e n t i t l e d t o be r e s p e c t e d and p r o t e c t e d . C o l o n i a l government he argued c o u l d be imposed by " n a t i o n s of more mature i n t e l l i g e n c e " o n l y i n 2 F r a n c i s c o de V i c t o r i a , De I n d i s e t de l u r e B e l l i Reflectum 6 c i r c u m s t a n c e s where such i m p o s i t i o n was f o r "the w e l f a r e and i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of the I n d i a n s , and not merely f o r the S p a n i a r d s . . . " (3) T h i s was the f i r s t a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e o f g u a r d i a n s h i p o r t r u s t e e s h i p which a f f e c t e d the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n r e l a t i o n t o indigenous peoples up t o and i n c l u d i n g the UN C h a r t e r . V i c t o r i a ' s f o r m u l a t i o n however became s e l f - s e r v i n g . The " o f f i c i a l " motives of c o l o n i a l conquest s h i f t e d from p o l i t i c a l and economic g a i n t o c h r i s t i a n i s i n g and c i v i l i s i n g the savages. W i t h i n t h a t framework c o l o n i s a t i o n became s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g . C h r i s t i a n i t y and c i v i l i s a t i o n were c l e a r l y o f b e n e f i t t o the "savages" and would be imparted w i t h o r without t h e i r consent. In exchange they would l o s e t h e i r homelands. Thus the doctrime o f g u a r d i a n s h i p developed as a paradox. I t was promoted as the o n l y hope of r e d u c i n g t h e worst excesses of c o l o n i s a t i o n w h i l e a t t h e same time p r o v i d i n g a b a s i s f o r the l e g i t i m a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l i s m i t s e l f . (4) The concept r e s u r f a c e d d u r i n g the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l e r a i n the Royal P r o c l a m a t i o n o f 1763 which accorded s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n t o the l a n d t i t l e and h u n t i n g and f i s h i n g r i g h t s o f t h e " s e v e r a l N a t i o ns o r T r i b e s o f Indians w i t h whom We are connected, and who l i v e under Our P r o t e c t i o n . . . " i n North /America. In t h r e e s i g n i f i c a n t cases of the e a r l y 19th c e n t u r y (5) C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l o f the US Supreme Court attempted t o 3 I b i d , Quoted i n Bennett A b o r i g i n a l R i g h t s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law (1978) 4 Op. c i t . Sanders p.5 5 Johnson v Mcintosh (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 Cherokee  N a t i o n v Georgia (1831) 30 US (5 Pet) 1, Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515 7 u t i l i s e t h i s concept o f g u a r d i a n s h i p as a means o f r e c o n c i l i n g the c o n f l i c t between the s t r u g g l e o f the I n d i a n Nations f o r s u r v i v a l and the f a c t o f US c o l o n i a l expansion. These cases p r o v i d e d the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d a n a l y s i s o f indigenous peoples r i g h t s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d as w e l l as h i g h l i g h t i n g the severe l i m i t a t i o n s which c o l o n i a l i s m p l a c e d on the e a r l y concept o f g u a r d i a n s h i p . The f i r s t o f these, Johnson v Mcintosh, made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g a l i t y o f c o l o n i a l a c q u i s i t i o n and a s s e r t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y over I n d i a n lands c o u l d not be c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n under the p r i n c i p l e o f g u a r d i a n s h i p or any o t h e r p r i n c i p l e : (6) However extravangant the p r e t e n s i o n of c o n v e r t i n g the d i s c o v e r y o f an i n h a b i t e d country i n t o conquest may appear i f the p r i n c i p l e has been a s s e r t e d i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , and afterwards s u s t a i n e d , i f a country has been a c q u i r e d and h e l d under i t ; i f the p r o p e r t y o f the g r e a t mass of the community o r i g i n a t e s i n i t , i t becomes the law of the l a n d and cannot be q u e s t i o n e d . Thus g u a r d i a n s h i p was t o be a p r i n c i p l e m i t i g a t i n g the worst a f f e c t s o f c o l o n i a l i s m without a c t u a l l y a t t a c k i n g the c u l p r i t i t s e l f . Cherokee N a t i o n v Georgia concerned the l e g a l s t a t u s of indigenous groupings, i n t h i s case the Cherokee N a t i o n . A t i s s u e was whether the Cherokee c o u l d , i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t the s t a t e of Georgia, invoke the o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the US Supreme Court as a f o r e i g n s t a t e pursuant of A r t i c l e I I I o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n . The m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n d e l i v e r e d by C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l denied the Cherokee a p p l i c a t i o n . The c o u r t accepted the view t h a t the 6 I b i d , Johnson a t 591 8 Cherokee were a s t a t e which was not p a r t o f the union, but r e j e c t e d the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s s t a t e was " f o r e i g n " as r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e I I I . The Cherokee were, he h e l d "a domestic dependent n a t i o n " (7) who were " . . . i n a s t a t e o f p u p i l a g e . " (8) F i n a l l y , i n terms echoing V i c t o r i a ' s d o c t r i n e he concluded; (9) They l o o k t o our government f o r p r o t e c t i o n ; r e l y upon i t s kindness and i t s power; appeal t o i t f o r r e l i e f o f t h e i r wants; and address the P r e s i d e n t as t h e i r g r e a t f a t h e r . . . T h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the US resembles t h a t o f a ward t o i t s g u a r d i a n . As a whole, the case produced a c u r i o u s b l e n d . In terms a n t i c i p a t i n g the UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n p e r i o d 130 y e a r s l a t e r , C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l accepted t h a t the Cherokee N a t i o n had a separate and l e g i t i m a t e e x i s t e n c e as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y : (10) They have been u n i f o r m l y t r e a t e d as a s t a t e from the s e t t l e m e n t of our country. The numerous t r e a t i e s made with them by the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e c o g n i s e s them as a people capable o f m a i n t a i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s o f peace and war, of b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r f o r any v i o l a t i o n o f t h e i r engagements, o r f o r any a g g r e s s i o n committed on the C i t i z e n s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s by any i n d i v i d u a l o f t h e i r community. Laws have been enacted i n the s p i r i t o f these t r e a t i e s . The a c t s of our government p l a i n l y r e c o g n i s e the Cherokee N a t i o n as a s t a t e , and the Courts are bound by these a c t s . Yet almost i n the same b r e a t h he used the g u a r d i a n s h i p p r i n c i p l e t o s t r i p t h i s new found s t a t u s of any apparent b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t i n law. L i k e a c h i l d ward, the Cherokee n a t i o n would be s u b j e c t t o the a b s o l u t e a u t h o r i t y o f i t s g u a r d i a n — i n 7 Op. c i t . Cherokee N a t i o n a t 17 8 I b i d . 9 I b i d . 10 I b i d , a t 16 9 t h i s case the f e d e r a l government. Nor d i d i t appear t h a t the c o u r t contemplated an e v e n t u a l t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p a l l o w i n g the Cherokee t o r e g a i n i n law the f u l l independence they a s s e r t e d i n p r a c t i c e . I t was f o r s e e n t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n s of g u a r d i a n s h i p would cease o n l y when the l a s t o f the Cherokee lands had been ceded, v o l u n t a r i l y or otherwise, t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s . (11) Worcester v Georgia, the most f a r - r e a c h i n g o f the t h r e e cases, concerned e s s e n t i a l l y a c o n f l i c t of j u r i s d i c t i o n between the US and the s t a t e of Georgia. In the course o f h i s t h i r d such d e c i s i o n , C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l e l a b o r a t e d on both the guardian/ward and the "domestic dependent n a t i o n " limbs r e f e r r e d t o i n Cherokee N a t i o n . As t o the former, he c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the f e d e r a l government and the Cherokee was an e x c l u s i v e one. In p a r t i c u l a r i t p r e c l u d e d t h e s t a t e of Georgia from l e g i s l a t i n g f o r the Cherokee t e r r i t o r i e s t o the detriment of the Cherokee. The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s e x c l u s i v i t y was c l e a r l y t o p r o t e c t the Cherokee from t h e emnity e x h i b i t t e d by n e i g h b o u r i n g s t a t e s . (12) As t o the s t a t u s o f the Cherokee Nation, C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l concluded the f o l l o w i n g : (13) [T]he s e t t l e d d o c t r i n e of the law of n a t i o n s i s t h a t a weaker power does not s u r r e n d e r i t s independence - i t s r i g h t 11 I b i d , a t 17 12 See US v Kagama (1886) 118 US 375 a t 384 "They owe no a l l e g i a n c e t o the s t a t e s and r e c i e v e from them no p r o t e c t i o n . Because of the l o c a l i l l f e e l i n g , the people o f the s t a t e s where they are found are o f t e n t h e i r d eadly enemies." See g e n e r a l l y a l s o Andress and Falkowski: S e l f Determination Indians  and the U n i t e d N a t i o n s : The Anomalous S t a t u s o f America's  Domestic Dependent Nations (1980) 8 Am.Ind. L.R. 97 a t 101 13 Op. c i t . Worcester v Georgia a t 561-2 10 t o s e l f government, by a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a stronger and t a k i n g i t s p r o t e c t i o n . A weak s t a t e i n order t o provide f o r i t s s a f e t y , may pla c e i t s e l f under the p r o t e c t i o n of one more powerful without s t r i p p i n g i t s e l f of the r i g h t of government, and ceasing t o be a s t a t e . Examples of t h i s are not wanting i n Europe. The d e s c r i p t i o n of the Cherokee as a "domestic dependent n a t i o n " i n Cherokee Nation was so c o n t r a d i c t o r y as t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y apt. They were not f o r e i g n and so were domestic. For t h e i r own p r o t e c t i n they were subject t o plenary US j u r i s d i c t i o n , a g a i n s t whom they had the c o l l e c t i v e s t a t u s of wards. They were t h e r e f o r e dependent. F i n a l l y they were c o l l e c t i v e l y a n a t i o n , s i m i l a r i n s t a t u r e t o the weaker European nations who were " a s s o c i a t e d " w i t h stronger powers. The Indian Nations, according t o M a r s h a l l , "had always been considered as d i s t i n c t , independent p o l i t i c a l communities, r e t a i n i n g t h e i r o r i g i n a l n a t u r a l r i g h t s , " (14) foremost among these being the r i g h t t o s e l f government. Thus the Cherokee were independent and s e l f - g o v e r n i n g — but only t o the extent allowed by the f e d e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n upon whom they were dependent. In the context of t h i s t r i l o g y of cases M a r s h a l l posed a paradigm w i t h i n which t o co n t a i n the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of 18th and 19th century c o l o n i a l i s m . Encompassing i t a l l was the simple r e a l i t y of c o l o n i a l conquest. T h i s , Johnson v Mcintosh makes p l a i n , was not open t o question by the Supreme Court. To do so would be t o question the l e g i t i m a c y of the Court i t s e l f . W i t h i n t h a t l i m i t e d framework both Cherokee Nation and Worcester v Georgia show M a r s h a l l g r a p p l i n g w i t h the t e n s i o n between f e d e r a l guardianship on the one hand and Cherokee nationhood on the other. The guardian/ward r e l a t i o n s h i p as understood by him 14 I b i d , a t 559 r e q u i r e d the submission of the ward t o the u n i l a t e r a l a u t h o r i t y of the g u a r d i a n . The guardian i n r e t u r n owed a duty t o a c t i n the i n t e r e s t o f the ward. P i t t e d a g a i n s t t h i s was the h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y t h a t the Cherokee were indeed a n a t i o n which had not, i n the c o l o n i a l p r o c e s s , s u r r e n d e r e d e i t h e r i t s independance o r i t s r i g h t t o s e l f government. T h i s too M a r s h a l l accepted. Rather than r e s o l v e the i s s u e of power d i s t r i b u t i o n between the "guardian" and the " n a t i o n " , he simply i n c o r p o r a t e d the c o n f l i c t i n t o the paradigm and r e s t a t e d i t i n t h r e e words. The Cherokee were a Domestic Dependent N a t i o n . 'Domestic' because the Court r e f u s e d t o q u e s t i o n the l e g i t i m a c y o f c o l o n i a l a c q u i s i t i o n . 'Dependent' because o f US g u a r d i a n s h i p . Yet i n the same b r e a t h a 'Nation' because they r e f u s e d t o surrender, indeed c o n t i n u e d t o a s s e r t independance and s e l f government. D e s p i t e i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , w i t h i n t h i s paradigm can be found the seeds which p r o v i d e d the t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n i n the 1960's and 1970's. As we s h a l l see, t h i s was made p o s s i b l e i n two s t e p s . The f i r s t was t o r e j e c t t h a t which the Supreme Court r e f u s e d t o q u e s t i o n - the l e g i t i m a c y of c o l o n i a l i s m i t s e l f . Freed of t h a t framework, the t e n s i o n between s e l f government and g u a r d i a n s h i p c o u l d be r e s o l v e d by f u s i n g them i n t o a s i n g l e model. Under M a r s h a l l , the o b j e c t i v e o f g u a r d i a n s h i p was f e d e r a l p r o t e c t i o n from s t a t e greed. The p r i c e was submission t o p l e n a r y f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y . Chapters XI and XII o f the U n i t e d Nationd C h a r t e r combined w i t h the subsequent d e c l a r a t i o n s on d e c o l o n i s a t i o n t u r n e d g u a r d i a n s h i p o r " t r u s t e e s h i p " as i t had come t o be known, on i t s head. Rather than competing w i t h s e l f government, the o b j e c t i v e o f t r u s t e e s h i p 12 became i t s e l f t he r e a l i s a t i o n o f s e l f government f o r c o l o n i s e d p e o p l e s . (15) 2.2 E a r l y I n t e r n a t i o n a l Standard S e t t i n g . The next stage i n the development o f the concept o f indigenous peoples r i g h t s a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law came w i t h the B e r l i n A f r i c a Conference o f 1884-5. I t accompanied the l a s t g r e a t surge o f European c o l o n i a l expansion. That i s t h e grab f o r b l a c k A f r i c a . The conference, attended by 14 n a t i o n s i n a l l , was concerned s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h European commercial and c o l o n i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n m i d - A f r i c a , i n p a r t i c u l a r the Congo. (16) I t was aimed p r i m a r i l y a t e s t a b l i s h i n g a t r a d e and t e r r i t o r i a l p e c k i n g o r d e r among the c o l o n i a l powers a c t i v e i n the r e g i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t r e p r e s e n t e d the f i r s t r e a l attempt a t consensus as between themselves on the i s s u e o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s toward indigenous p e o p l e s . The F i n a l A c t (Art.6) o f the confer e n c e p r o v i d e d t h a t ; (17) A l l powers e x e r c i s i n g s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s o r i n f l u e n c e i n the a f o r e s a i d t e r r i t o r i e s b i n d themselves t o watch over the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the n a t i v e t r i b e s , and t o c a r e f o r the improvement of the c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r moral and m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g , and t o h e l p i n a b o l i s h i n g s l a v e r y and e s p e c i a l l y the s l a v e t r a d e . A c c o r d i n g t o Snow, t h i s A r t i c l e (18) 15 Support f o r t h i s a n a l y s i s can be found i n the I C J o p i n i o n i n the South West A f r i c a (Namibia) case [1971] I C J Rep a t p.31: In t he domain t o which the above proceedings r e l a t e , the l a s t f i f t y years...have brought important developments. These developments l e a v e l i t t l e doubt t h a t the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e o f the s a c r e d t r u s t was the s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n and independance o f the p eoples concerned." 16 Op. c i t . Sanders Re-emergence...; a t p.17 17 Quoted i n Snow The Question o f A b o r i g i n e s i n the Law and  P r a c t i c e o f Na t i o n s . (1919) p.149 18 I b i d , a t 21-22 13 ...marked the d e f i n i t e acceptance by the c i v i l i s e d s t a t e s o f a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p towards a b o r i g i n a l t r i b e s o f a p e r s o n a l and f i d u c i a r y c h a r a c t e r — a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which was a t once i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e . The d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e conference r e g a r d i n g a b o r i g i n e s l e f t no doubt on t h i s p o i n t . The p r i n c i p l e o f the law o f n a t i o n s t h a t such t r i b e s are the wards of the s o c i e t y o f n a t i o n s and t h a t the s o v e r e i g n t y of c i v i l i s e d s t a t e s over them f o l l o w s the d i s p o s i t i o n o f t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y made by the c i v i l i s e d s t a t e s among themselves was upheld. (emphasis added) The 1888 d e c l a r a t i o n o f the I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (19) and B r u s s e l s A f r i c a Conference o f 1889-90 (20) took s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n s each b u i l d i n g on t h i s concept o f g u a r d i a n s h i p and the o b l i g a t i o n o f s t a t e s t o p r o t e c t and " c i v i l i s e " the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n s s u b j e c t e d t o c o l o n i s a t i o n . These d u t i e s o f " c i v i l i s e d " s t a t e s were r e f e r r e d t o , i n a p a t r o n i s i n g way, as the "white man's burden". Snow again, summarises the p r a c t i c e o f c o l o n i s i n g s t a t e s a t t h a t time i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: (21) [D]omination o f d i s t a n t communities by a R e p u b l i c was p e r m i s s i b l e when n e e d f u l and t o t h e ex t e n t n e e d f u l . but only p r o v i d e d the s t a t e r e c o g n i s e d and f u l f i l l e d t he p o s i t i v e and im p e r a t i v e duty o f h e l p i n g those dominated communities t o h e l p themselves by t e a c h i n g and t r a i n i n g them f o r c i v i l i s a t i o n , as the wards and p u p i l s o f the n a t i o n and of the s o c i e t y o f n a t i o n s (emphasis added) Empire b u i l d i n g was c l e a r l y an a c c e p t a b l e phenomenon o f the time. The phrase "when n e e d f u l and t o the ex t e n t n e e d f u l " was code f o r "when i t i s t o the commercial o r p o l i t i c a l advantage of the c o l o n i s i n g power". The "white man's burden" o f c i v i l i s i n g (and c h r i s t i a n i s i n g ) the n a t i v e s p r o v i d e d a c r u s a d e - l i k e , q u a s i 19 I b i d , a t 174 e s p e c i a l l y A r t i c l e s (IV) and (V) quoted t h e r e i n . 20 I b i d , a t 178 21 I b i d , 175 14 r e l i g i o u s and expost f a c t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r conquest. Seen i n t h i s l i g h t , c o l o n i a l expansion was the duty o f every good c h r i s t i a n s t a t e . Thus, as w i t h V i c t o r i a ' s and M a r s h a l l ' s concept o f g u a r d i a n s h i p , t h i s new and now f u l l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r u s t o b l i g a t i o n c o u l d be imposed o n l y w i t h i n the g e n e r a l parameters of c o l o n i a l i s m . The nature o f the standard n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s t h a t c o l o n i a l expansion was i t s e l f l e g i t i m a t e . A c c o r d i n g l y , consensus among the c o l o n i a l powers as t o the s t a n d a r d o f treatment of indigenous peoples a t the time should be understood p r i m a r i l y as a means o f entrenchng the a t a t u s quo r a t h e r than a l t e r i n g i t . In a d d i t i o n the conference f a i l e d t o agree on a mechanism f o r the c o l l e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the Congo — i t s major o b j e c t i v e . The Congo, a f t e r r e v e r t i n g t o i t s o r i g i n a l c o l o n i a l master, became the B e l g i a n Congo. Nonetheless, a s t a n d a r d had, f o r the f i r s t time been s e t , and w h i l e i t s c o n n o t a t i o n s were a t the time l a r g e l y n e g a t i v e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l standard s e t t i n g would over the next 80 y e a r s come t o the f o r e as one o f the most e f f e c t i v e mechanisms f o r a d d r e s s i n g the concerns o f c o l o n i s e d p e o p l e s . The B e r l i n - A f r i c a conference r e p r e s e n t e d the f i r s t s t e p i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 3 SELF DETERMINATION AND DECOLONISATION 3.1 S e l f Determination of Peoples and the League E r a The c o n c l u s i o n o f World War I saw the f i r s t t e n t a t i v e i n c u r s i o n o f the concept of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t o the c o l o n i a l world. S e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n had been dubbed by the a l l i e d powers 15 as "the honourable aim o f the war," (22) l a r g e l y t o l u r e the US i n t o t h e f r a y . US P r e s i d e n t Wilson was the g r e a t e s t champion of t h i s newly p r o c l a i m e d r i g h t . In h i s view i t s r e c o g n i t i o n was the b a s i s upon which a new e r a o f peace and o r d e r might be b u i l t . In a speech t o Congress he d e c l a r e d ; (23) No peace can l a s t o r ought t o l a s t , which does not r e c o g n i s e and a c c e p t t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t governments d e r i v e a l l t h e i r j u s t powers from the consent of the governed and t h a t no r i g h t e x i s t s t o hand peoples from s o v e r e i g n t y t o s o v e r e i g n t y as i f they were p r o p e r t y . T h i s new concept i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s p r o v i d e d the c o r n e r s t o n e o f two p o s t war developments. The f i r s t was the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Europe. The second was the c r e a t i o n o f the mandates system under A r t i c l e 22 of the Covenant o f the League of N a t i o n s . The l a t t e r r e p r e s e n t e d a l i m i t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f the c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s of the European powers. By the terms o f A r t i c l e 22, c o l o n i a l powers a d m i n i s t e r i n g league mandates were charged w i t h the " s a c r e d t r u s t o f c i v i l i s a t i o n " f o r "peoples not y e t a b l e t o stand by themselves under the strenuous c o n d i t i o n s of the modern world." Under the s u p e r v i s i o n o f a d m i n i s t e r i n g powers, the mandates were t o be prepared i n o r d e r t o (24) . . . b u i l d up i n as s h o r t a time as p o s s i b l e a p o l i t i c a l u n i t which can take charge of i t s own p o l i c i e s . 22 Umozurike, S e l f Determination i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1972) p.14 23 (1917) 54 Cong. Rec. 1742, Quoted i n C l i n e b e l l and Thomson; S o v e r e i g n t y and S e l f Determination; The R i g h t s of N a t i v e American  In d i a n s under Contemporary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1977-8) 27 B u f f a l o L. Rev. 669 a t 702 24 Op. c i t . Umozurike a t p.31 16 For the f i r s t time the " s a c r e d t r u s t " w i t h a l i n e a g e running back f o u r hundred years t o V i c t o r i a , was t o have a p o s i t i v e o b j e c t i v e . I t would te r m i n a t e not upon a s s i m i l a t i o n o r e x t e r m i n a t i o n , but upon the attainment o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The mandated t e r r i t o r i e s were d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g a descending s c a l e o f " c i v i l i s a t i o n " . The "A" mandates were a l l middle e a s t e r n and r e c o g n i s e d as s u f f i c i e n t l y " c i v i l i s e d " t o a t t a i n s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n q u i c k l y . For "B" and "C" mandates (the former mostly A f r i c a n and the l a t t e r mostly P a c i f i c t e r r i t o r i e s ) s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n was seen as a more remote o b j e c t i v e , o f t e n s u b o r d i n a t e d t o the p o l i t i c a l ambitions o f the mandatory s t a t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o Duncan H a l l (25) [ i ] n p r a c t i c e the [League o f Nations Permanent] Mandates Commission c o n s i s t e n t l y a c t e d on the assumption t h a t the words i n A r t i c l e 22 of the Covenant about the peoples of "B" and "C" mandates b e i n g "not y e t a b l e t o stand by themselves" i m p l i e d the g o a l of s o v e r e i g n independance. I t was by no means however a u n i v e r s a l l y o r o b j e c t i v e l y a p p l i e d p r i n c i p l e . The domination o f the league by the A l l i e d Powers meant t h a t the mandates were l i m i t e d t o former c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s o f Germany, Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire. C o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s of the A l l i e s were exempt. Even w i t h i n t h i s v e r y r e s t r i c t e d a p p l i c a t i o n no mechanism was p r o v i d e d i n A r t i c l e 22 f o r r e p o r t i n g o r enforcement, and the requirement of unanimity i n League v o t i n g ensured t h a t c o l o n i a l powers were not s u b j e c t e d t o d i r e c t s c r u t i n y or c r i t i c i s m . The o t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n was as the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e i n the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p o s t war Europe. In t h a t c o n t e x t i t became c l e a r t h a t d e s p i t e i t s 25 H a l l , Mandates. Dependencies and T r u s t e e s h i p (1948) a t p.81 17 s e l e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n and i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s the r i g h t d i d have one important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . I t was c l e a r l y intended t o be a r i g h t o f peoples — not o f s t a t e s o r t e r r i t o r i e s . As noted, the p r e v a i l i n g t h e o r y o f the time, espoused not o n l y by P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n but a l s o by the Russian B o l s h e v i k s (26) was t h a t the war c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o the hegemony o f the European m i l i t a r y powers (no t a b l y Germany and Austria-Hungary s i n c e they were on the l o s i n g s i d e ) . A s i m i l a r war c o u l d o n l y be avoided i n f u t u r e by r e j e c t i n g the p r a c t i c e of t r e a t i n g weaker n a t i o n s and n a t i o n a l i t i e s as c h a t t e l s t o be bought, s o l d and fought over. Thus peace c o u l d be maintained i n Europe by r e c o g n i s i n g a r i g h t o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n v e s t i n g i n European n a t i o n s s i n c e they were a product o f the hegemony o f the m i l i t a r y powers. In accordance w i t h t h i s view the Balkans were d i v i d e d i n t o L i t h u a n i a , L a t v i a and E s t o n i a ; Poland and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a were c r e a t e d ; and a c a r e f u l regime of c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y r i g h t s was c r e a t e d p r o t e c t i n g those n a t i o n a l i t i e s who were not accorded independence. (27) The p o i n t i s an important one from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples. I t shows c l e a r l y t h a t a t i t s i n c e p t i o n , the concept of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples was d e l i b e r a t e l y a p p l i e d t o s u b - s t a t e groupings. That i s t o m i n o r i t y 26 For example the D e c l a r a t i o n of the R i g h t s o f the Peoples of R u s s i a of 15 Nov. 1917 i n c l u d e d the f o l l o w i n g as r i g h t s a c c r u i n g t o R u s s i a ' s m i n o r i t y n a t i o n a l i t i e s (1) the e q u a l i t y and s o v e r e i g n t y o f Russians n a t i o n a l i t i e s (2) the r i g h t t o Russian n a t i o n a l i t i e s t o f r e e s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n up t o seceding and the o r g a n i s a t i o n of an independent s t a t e . The R u s s i a n p o s i t i o n was l a t e r t o become c r u c i a l i n the d r a f t i n g o f the UN C h a r t e r i n s o f a r as i t i n c l u d e d a r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 27 See I n f r a f o o t n o t e s 69 t o 79 and accompanying t e x t 18 peoples w i t h i n a p r e - e x i s t i n g s t a t e . As w i l l become c l e a r i n the d i s c u s s i o n below, the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o m i n o r i t y peoples has been a t o p i c o f c o n s i d e r a b l e debate under the UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n instruments, and has been the major o b s t a c l e t o a r e c o g n i t i o n a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l of a r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r a l l indigenous p e o p l e s . The emphasis i n Europe on n a t i o n a l i t i e s r a t h e r than s t a t e s as the a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i d e s some h i s t o r i c a l support f o r t h e argument t h a t m i n o r i t y peoples are intended t o be t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f such a r i g h t . 3.2 Indigenous Peoples and A r t i c l e 23(b) o f the League Covenant. Though c l e a r l y p e r c i e v e d as r e l e v a n t t o the c o l o n i s e d world beyond Europe, t h e primary and immediate importance of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n a t the time was as a t o o l f o r the maintenance of peace i n the " c i v i l i s e d world". The mandate mechanism was necessary because of the power vacuum c r e a t e d by the d e f e a t of t h r e e c o l o n i a l powers. As noted, the mechanism was a p p l i e d o n l y i n t h a t narrow c o n t e x t . The o n l y standard o f u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o indigenous peoples was t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n A r t i c l e 23(b) o f the League Covenant. I t p r o v i d e d (23) S u b j e c t t o and i n accordance w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conventions e x i s t i n g o r h e r e a f t e r t o be agreed upon, the members o f the League • • • (b) undertake t o secure the j u s t treatment of t h e n a t i v e i n h a b i t a n t s o f the t e r r i t o r i e s under t h e i r c o n t r o l . Though the standard s e t c o u l d h a r d l y be d e s c r i b e d as r i g o r o u s or p a r t i c u l a r i l y e n l i g h t e n e d , i t a t l e a s t a p p l i e d a s i n g l e s t a n d a r d t o a l l League members. H a l l d e s c r i b e d i t as one o f the m y s t e r i e s of the Covenant because " i t remained dead 19 wood".(28) Each of the s i x o t h e r c l a u s e s of A r t i c l e 23 "budded and grew" i n t o one o r more o f the League's t e c h n i c a l organs while (b) d i d not. I t was u t i l i s e d o n l y once by B r i t a i n i n t h e case of t h e L i b e r i a n s t a t e and i t s treatment o f indigenous t r i b e s . B r i t a i n t h r e a t e n e d i n 1934 t o have L i b e r i a e x p e l l e d from the League f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o observe the terms o f 23(b). (29) A p p a r e n t l y n o t h i n g came o f the t h r e a t . D e s p i t e i t s i n e f f e c t u a l i t y , A r t i c l e 23(b) i s important f o r a t l e a s t two reasons. F i r s t l y i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o the L i b e r i a case makes i t c l e a r t h a t m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples w i t h i n independent s t a t e s were p r o t e c t e d by i t s terms. Secondly, i t i s not completely t r u e t h a t the p r o v i s i o n remained "dead wood" as H a l l put i t . I t i s w i d e l y regarded as the predecessor t o Chapter XI o f the UN C h a r t e r r e g a r d i n g the r i g h t s o f n o n - s e l f governing t e r r i t o r i e s . (30) As w i l l be argued below, the scope of A r t i c l e 23(b) p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r h i s t o r i c a l evidence i n support o f the view t h a t Chapter XI and the r i g h t t o s e l f government c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n , (31) was o r i g i n a l l y i ntended t o apply t o m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples w i t h i n independant s t a t e s as w e l l as " o f f shore" c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s . 3.3 Indigenous Peoples and the League E r a Cases Three important cases d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d d e a l t e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r by way of o b i t e r w i t h the s t a t u s o r indigenous 28 Op. c i t . H a l l p.273 29 See Kingsbury, M.Ph. T h e s i s (Oxon) (1984) a t p.16 30 See I n f r a f o o t n o t e s 50 t o 54 and accompanying t e x t 31 See A r t i c l e 73(b) U n i t e d Nations C h a r t e r . Note however t h a t s e l f government d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y i n p l y a r i g h t t o s e c e s s i o n , ( c f . Chapter X I I ; A r t 76(b) UN Charter) 20 peoples a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. They p r o v i d e an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r a s t t o the developments i n the o l d world. fa) The Cayuga Indians Case (32) T h i s i n v o l v e d a c l a i m f o r a n n u i t i e s a l l e g e d l y owed by the s t a t e o f New York t o the Cayuga Nations most o f whom had migrated t o Canada as p a r t of the I r o q u o i s Confederacy a f t e r t h e American r e v o l u t i o n . On b e h a l f o f t h e Canadian Cayuga, B r i t a i n argued t h a t because most Cayuga were i n Canada, the Cayuga N a t i o n was i n Canada and the a n n u i t i e s should be p a i d n o r t h of the border. The Anglo-American Claims T r i b u n a l took a r a t h e r c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e i n r e f u s i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n . The d e c i s i o n was based on the t r i b u n a l ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t r i b e s were not l e g a l u n i t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law; (33) The American Indians have never been so regarded...from the time o f the d i s c o v e r y o f America, the I n d i a n t r i b e s have been t r e a t e d as under the e x c l u s i v e p r o t e c t i o n o f the power which by d i s c o v e r y o r conquest o r c e s s i o n h e l d t h e l a n d which they occupied...So f a r as an I n d i a n t r i b e e x i s t e d as a l e g a l u n i t , i t i s by v i r t u e of the domestic law o f the s o v e r e i g n w i t h i n whose t e r r i t o r y the t r i b e o c c u p i e s the l a n d , and so f a r o n l y as t h a t law r e c o g n i s e d i t . From t h i s v e r y grand statement as t o the l e g a l s t a t u s of indigenous peoples came the innocuous c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the money owing had t o be p a i d p e r - c a p i t a t o a l l Cayuga. (b) I s l a n d o f Palmas A r b i t r a t i o n (34) Though p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the l e g a l e f e c t o f t i t l e by d i s c o v e r y , t h i s d e c i s i o n d e a l t a l s o w i t h the s t a t u s o f t r e a t i e s made w i t h indigenous governments. 32 [1926] 6 R. I n t ' l Arb. Awards 831 33 I b i d a t 176 34 [1928] 2 R. I n t ' l Arb. Awards 831 21 On the f a c t s the US as successor t o Spain contested Dutch cl a i m s t o the I s l a n d of Palmas, near the P h i l i p i n e s . Since Spain's d i s c o v e r y of the i s l a n d was unsupported by occupation the Panel concluded t h a t the US c o u l d not take a good t i t l e . By reaching t h i s c o n c l u s i o n however, the Panel f e l t c o n s t r a i n e d t o d i s r e g a r d s e v e r a l t r e a t i e s between the East I n d i a Co. and the indigenous peoples of the i s l a n d . These t r e a t i e s were according t o the Panel, (35) ...not i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law sense t r e a t i e s or conventions capable of c r e a t i n g r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s such as may i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a r i s e our of t r e a t i e s . (c) Status of Eastern Greenland (36) This case i n v o l v e d a d i s p u t e between Norway and Denmark as t o sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. In the context of t h i s a n a l y s i s , the case i s important f o r i t s view t h a t although e a r l y Norwegian settlements were exterminated by the indigenous I n u i t , t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l r e s i s t a n c e could not e x t i n g u i s h Norway's c l a i m : (37) Conquest only operates as a cause of l o s s of sovereignty when there i s war between two s t a t e s and by reason of the defeat of one of them, sovereignty over the t e r r i t o r y passes from the l o s e r t o the v i c t o r i o u s s t a t e . The p r i n c i p l e does not apply i n a case where a settlement has been e s t a b l i s h e d i n a d i s t a n t country and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s are massacred by the a b o r i g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n . 35 36 37 I b i d a t 856 (1933) PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 53 I b i d a t 47 22 (d) C o n c l u s i o n E s s e n t i a l l y these cases r e p r e s e n t e d a c o n s e r v a t i v e view of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s o f indigenous peoples d u r i n g the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . They were c o n s i d e r e d t o be e x c l u s i v e l y the s u b j e c t o f domestic law having no i n t e r n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e even when engaged i n such i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t s as t r e a t y making and war w i t h c o l o n i a l powers. Not o n l y do they p r o v i d e a s t a r k c o n t r a s t w i t h the d e v e l o p i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n so f a r as i t a p p l i e d t o European and M i d d l e E a s t e r n peoples, they i n f a c t r e p r e s e n t a r e t r o g r a d e s t e p even when compared t o the p r i n c i p l e s formulated by M a r s h a l l more than a century e a r l i e r . Although he q u a l i f i e s t h e i r " n a t i o n " s t a t u s w i t h both "domestic" and "dependent," (38) M a r s h a l l d i d not r u l e out a unique q u a s i - i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s f o r the Cherokee. Indeed, as a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , he s p e c i f i c a l l y a n a l o g i s e d the circumstance of the I n d i a n n a t i o n s t o t h a t of the weaker European s t a t e s . I r o n i c a l l y the Panel i n the Cayuga case u t i l i s e d the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s as a u t h o r i t y f o r the exact o p p o s i t e p r o p o s i t i o n . In the 1975 Western Sahara (39) r e f e r e n c e the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e r e j e c t e d d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y the d i c t a quoted above from the Palmas case and the E a s t e r n Greenland case. Both cases were premised on the i d e a t h a t s o v e r e i g n t y over lands i n h a b i t e d by indigenous peoples c o u l d be secured by simple " d i s c o v e r y " and o c c u p a t i o n . In essence the o r i g i n a l people d i d not have s u f f i c i e n t e x i s t e n c e i n law t o possess e i t h e r t i t l e t o the s o i l o r s o v e r e i g n t y over i t . T h i s was known as the d o c t r i n e 38 Supra, Note 5 Cherokee N a t i o n v Georgia 39 [1975] ICJ Rep 12 23 of t e r r a n u l l i u s . As a l o g i c l e x t e n s i o n of t h i s i t was p o s s i b l e t o conclude t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n s between the indigenous people and the c o l o n i a l power, by t r e a t y o r by war, had no impact i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e i t h e r . These n o t i o n s were unanimously r e j e c t e d by the Court i n Western Sahara not j u s t as outdated p r i n c i p l e s h a ving no p l a c e i n modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, but as i n c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of h i s t o r i c a l l e g a l p r i n c i p l e as w e l l (40) [ I ] n the case o f [ c o l o n i a l ] t e r r i t o r i e s the a c q u i s i t i o n of s o v e r e i g n t y was not g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d as e f f e c t e d u n i l a t e r a l l y through o c c u p a t i o n o f t e r r a n u l l i u s by o r i g i n a l t i t l e but by agreements concluded w i t h l o c a l r u l e r s . . . [ S ] u c h agreements w i t h l o c a l r u l e r s , whether or not c o n s i d e r e d as an a c t u a l " c e s s i o n " o f the t e r r i t o r y , were regarded as d e r i v a t i v e r o o t s of t i t l e and not o r i g i n a l t i t l e s o b t a i n e d by o c c u p a t i o n of t e r r a n u l l i u s . In more f o r c e f u l language V i c e P r e s i d e n t Ammoun, i n a s e p a r a t e but c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n , d e c l a r e d ; (41) The concept o f t e r r a n u l l i u s employed a t a l l p e r i o d s , t o the b r i n k o f the t w e n t i e t h century, t o j u s t i f y conquest and c o l o n i s a t i o n stands condemned. 3.4 The League E r a : A S y n t h e s i s . T h i s p e r i o d then produced a number of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . In r e s p e c t o f Europe and the Middle E a s t the concept of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n of peoples had gained momentum and was d e v e l o p i n g q u i c k l y . As noted, the p e r c i e v e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o a l l peoples r e g a r d l e s s o f s t a t e boundaries i s an important i n d i c a t o r as t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the same p r i n c i p l e today. 40 I b i d a t 39 41 I b i d a t 78 On t h e o t h e r hand, w h i l e a standard i n r e s p e c t o f the remainder o f the world had, f o r the f i r s t time, been s e t i n A r t i c l e 23(b), i n substance i t c o u l d not have been more ambiguous o r l e s s r i g o r o u s . T h i s , combined w i t h the f a c t t h a t the League, dominated by the c o l o n i a l powers, had no e f f e c t i v e promoters of A r t i c l e 23(b) r i g h t s of c o l o n i s e d peoples, was d e c i s i v e i n i t s u n d e r u t i l i s a t i o n when c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e 23. F i n a l l y the t h r e e Anglo-American a r b i t r a t i o n s r e f l e c t the most c o n s e r v a t i v e 19th century d o c t r i n e although d e c i d e d i n the 1920's and 1930's. Thus the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards i n r e s p e c t of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n was s e l e c t i v e and c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . Nonetheless, some a s p e c t s of i t s emergence as a p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, such as i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o s u b s t a t e groupings, p r o v i d e h i s t o r i c a l support f o r the cause of indigenous peoples today. On the o t h e r hand those a s p e c t s which impact n e g a t i v e l y on t h a t cause, n o t a b l y the Anglo-American a r b i t r a t i o n s , s hould no l o n g e r be c o n s i d e r e d good law. 3.5 D e c o l o n i s a t i o n and the UN Concept of S e l f Determination. S i n c e the c r e a t i o n of the U n i t e d Nations i n 1945, the r i g h t of peoples t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n has developed i n t o one o f the most important p r i n c i p l e s of modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Pomerance d e s c r i b e s i t s s t a t u s i n these terms; (42) F o r many r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the UN, s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n has not o n l y been transformed from a p o l i t i c a l o r moral p r i n c i p l e t o a f u l l l e g a l r i g h t ; i t has become the peremptory norm o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, capable o f o v e r - r i d i n g o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l norms and even such o t h e r p o s s i b l e 42 Pomerance, S e l f Determination i n Law and P r a c t i c e (1982) a t 1 25 peremptory norms as the p r o h i b i t i o n s of the t h r e a t o r use of f o r c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The p r i n c i p l e has been mentioned, e l a b o r a t e d upon, s e t out and r e a f f i r m e d i n a m u l t i t u d e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l instruments both UN and non-UN. The more important ones w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d below. Moreover t h e r e i s support i n the ICJ a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n on Namibia (43) and i n the Western Sahara case (44) f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the r i g h t o f peoples t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s a p r i n c i p l e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies, and n o t a b l y the UN have been f a r l e s s a s s e r t i v e i n d e f i n i n g "peoples," as the u n i t t o which the r i g h t a t t a c h e s . In p a r t i c u l a r the problem has been one of e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i v i d i n g l i n e between peoples and m i n o r i t i e s . T h i s i s s u e i s an important one i n the c o n t e x t of indigenous peoples s i n c e they have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f both c a t e g o r i e s and hence occupy the grey area around the d i v i d i n g l i n e . S p e c i a l Rapporteur C r i s t e s c u suggested the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n i n 1981: (45) 43 [1971] ICJ Rep. 16 44 [1975] ICJ Rep. 12; Judge Ammoun i n a s e p a r a t e but c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n d e s c r i b e d s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n as a " g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e " w i t h i n A r t i c l e 38(1)(b) o f the Courts s t a t u t e . He f u r t h e r commented (at 103-4): ...As f o r the " g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e " o f S t a t e s t o which one t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e f e r s when see k i n g t o a s c e r t a i n the emergence of customary law, i t has i n the case of the r i g h t of peoples t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , become so widespread as t o be not merely " g e n e r a l " but u n i v e r s a l s i n c e i t has been so e n s h r i n e d i n the C h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . . . and confirmed by the t e x t s t h a t have j u s t been mentioned; p a c t s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , and r e s o l u t i o n s , which taken as a whole e p i t o m i z e the unanimity of S t a t e s i n favour o f the i m p e r a t i v e r i g h t of peoples t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . . . 45 C r i s t e s c u The R i g h t t o S e l f Determination: H i s t o r i c a l and  S o c i a l Development on the B a s i s of UN Instruments (1981) p.41 para 279 26 (a) The term "people" denotes a s o c i a l e n t i t y possessing a c l e a r i d e n t i t y and i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; (b) I t i m p l i e s a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a t e r r i t o r y , even i f the people i n question has been w r o n g f u l l y e x p e l l e d from i t and a r t i f i c i a l l y r eplaced by another p o p u l a t i o n ; (c) A people should not be confused w i t h e t h n i c and r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s , whose ex i s t e n c e and r i g h t s are recognised i n A r t i c l e 27 of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s . T h i s attempt does no more than beg the question and simply h i g h l i g h t s the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h e o r i s t s are having i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g peoples from m i n o r i t i e s . A more h e l p f u l and comprehensive attempt a t a d e f i n i t i o n was made by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s . (46) In i t a number of r e l e v a n t o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a are l i s t e d , though as the ICJ are c a r e f u l t o p o i n t out no s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n , i f unmet, would be f a t a l t o a c l a i m t o people-hood. The c r i t e r i a are: (1) A common h i s t o r y (2) R a c i a l and e t h n i c t i e s (3) C u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c t i e s (4) R e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l t i e s (5) A common geographic l o c a t i o n (6) A common economic base (7) A s u f f i c i e n t number of people (8) Consciousness of i t s own i d e n t i t y (9) A s s e r t i o n of the w i l l t o e x i s t Indigenous peoples would c l e a r l y s a t i s f y any t e s t d r a f t e d i n these terms. Although as the I s r a e l i delegate t o the UN i n 1952 put i t such d e f i n i t i o n may i n the end prove u n h e l p f u l : (47) Whenever i n the course of h i s t o r y a people has been aware of being a people, a l l d e f i n i t i o n s have proved superfluous. The r i g h t t o s e l f determination of peoples was f i r s t i n c l u d e d i n A r t i c l e s 1(2) and 55(1) of the UN Charter. These 46 ICJ S e c r e t a r i a t , The Events i n East P a k i s t a n : 1971 (1972) at 70 47 I s r a e l : Statement t o T h i r d Committee of General Assembly (1952) Quoted i n Kingsbury op. c i t . note 29 a t 63 27 p r o v i s i o n s use the phrase "the p r i n c i p l e of equal r i g h t s and s e l f d etermination of peoples" i n s p i r e d by the 1936 Russian C o n s t i t u t i o n and i n c l u d e d i n the Charter at S o v i e t suggestion. (48) At t h a t stage, s e l f determination as a u n i v e r s a l r i g h t was a new i d e a , and the approach of many s t a t e s — p a r i t c u l a r l y from the west — was at best t e n t a t i v e . The p r o v i s i o n s of the Charter f o r example do not i n d i c a t e pre-eminence i n 1945-46. Charter chapters XI and X I I , widely regarded as the primary mechanisms f o r the p e a c e f u l attainment of s e l f determination f o r c o l o n i s e d peoples, do not even mention the term. Chapter X I I , the UN successor t o the League Mandate system, created an " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trusteeship System" i n respect of three c a t e g o r i e s of t e r r i t o r y ; former League mandates; former t e r r i t o r i e s of the a x i s powers defeated d u r i n g World War I I ; and t e r r i t o r i e s v o l u n t a r i l y placed under the system by s t a t e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . (49) P r e d i c t a b l y only the f i r s t two c a t e g o r i e s are represented i n the system. F a i r l y r i g o r o u s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o b l i g a t i o n s are imposed on the a d m i n i s t e r i n g power i n c l u d i n g p e r i o d i c v i s i t s by UN delegates, the submission of annual r e p o r t s as w e l l as s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n s which may be provided f o r i n i n d i v i d u a l t r u s t e e agreements between the a d m i n i s t e r i n g power and the UN. (50) A r t i c l e 76(b) provides t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of t r u s t e e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ...progressive development towards s e l f government or independence as may be appropriate t o each t e r r i t o r y and i t s peoples, and the f r e e l y expressed wishes of the people concerned. 48 Op. cit.Umozurike note 21 a t 44 49 UN Charter A r t . 77 50 UN Charter A r t . 87 28 Chapter XI which, as noted, i s d e r i v e d from A r t i c l e 23(b) of the League Covenant concerns i t s e l f w i t h "non-self governing t e r r i t o r i e s " . There are a number of important d i f f e r e n c e s between the two mechanisms; F i r s t l y t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o b j e c t i v e s d i f f e r i n t h a t independence i s not i n c l u d e d as an o b j e c t i v e of n o n - s e l f governing t e r r i t o r i e s . Instead the aim i s : (51) t o develop s e l f government, t o take due account of the p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s of the peoples, and t o a s s i s t them i n the p r o g r e s s i v e development of t h e i r f r e e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , according t o the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of each t e r r i t o r y and i t s peoples and t h e i r v a r y i n g stages of advancement. A c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s a l s o l e s s r i g i d i n t h a t a d m i n i s t e r i n g powers are r e q u i r e d only t o "...transmit r e g u l a r l y t o the S e c r e t a r y General f o r i n f o r m a t i o n purposes..." r e p o r t s on s o c i a l , economic, and e d u c a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s i n the t e r r i t o r y concerned. (52) The modest o b j e c t i v e and lower a c c o u n t a b i l i t y standards may be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t Chapter XI a p p l i e s a u t o m a t i c a l l y t o a l l s t a t e s a d m i n i s t e r i n g " t e r r i t o r i e s whose peoples have not yet a t t a i n e d a f u l l measure of s e l f government." (53) In a l l cases t o which Chapter XI a p p l i e s "the i n h a b i t a n t s are paramount" and the promotion of those i n t e r e s t s i s a "sacred t r u s t " (54) reminiscent of the League Covenant and beyond t o the w r i t i n g s of V i c t o r i a and C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l . Chapter XI i s a quantum leap forward from the h y p r o c r i s y of the League Mandates and the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of A r t i c l e 23(b) of 51 UN Charter A r t . 73(b) 52 UN Charter A r t . 73(e) 53 UN Charter A r t . 73 54 I b i d . the Covenant. But i t i s s t i l l not p e r f e c t . Those t h i n g s omitted from Chapter XI i n d i c a t e d c l e a r l y t h a t these new concepts of s e l f d etermination and d e c o l o n i s a t i o n were s t i l l i n the e a r l y stages of development a t the time of d r a f t i n g . F i r s t l y no t i m e t a b l e f o r the attainment of s e l f government was provided, so t h a t how and when i t was achieved appeared t o be a matter f o r the d i s c r e t i o n of the a d m i n i s t e r i n g power. Secondly no s a n c t i o n s were provided i n the event of breach of the standard other than the u l t i m a t e s a n c t i o n of e x p u l s i o n from the UN. F i n a l l y and most imp o r t a n t l y Chapter XI contained no d e f i n i t i o n of a "non-self governing t e r r i t o r y " . T h i s c a l c u l a t e d omission made the scope of Chapter XI u n c l e a r . That i n t u r n made the p o t e n t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n and scope of s e l f determination i t s e l f u n c l e a r . Belgium argued s t r o n g l y the Chapter XI should have u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l l t e r r i t o r i a l peoples who were not s e l f governing. Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would have brought w i t h i n the ambit of Chapter XI and the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination the c l a s s i c overseas or e x t e r n a l c o l o n i e s as was c l e a r l y intended, and a l s o the peoples s i t u a t e d w i t h i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n boundaries of independent s t a t e s , who are subjected t o i n t e r n a l c o l o n i a l i s m . The i n c l u s i o n of t h i s l a t t e r category was much more the s u b j e c t of debate. (55) 55 The Belgians found support f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n i n the w r i t i n g s of Duncan H a l l : "The idea t h a t expansion by seaways on the same space of time and f o r the same k i n d of reasons, has been of a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t k i n d would have d e l i g h t e d a medieval schoolman." How wide, he might have asked, must be the space of water before a t e r r i t o r y ceased t o be a detached p a r t of the mainland and became "overseas" and so was presumed t o have become incapable of u n i t i n g p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h , or being a s s i m i l a t e d t o , the mother country? And he c o u l d have made good p l a y w i t h l i t t l e - k n o w n f a c t s of geography. 30 Inc l u d e d w i t h i n i t are indigenous peoples i n the west, i n e a s t e r n b l o c c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y R u s s i a and China and a h o s t o f m i n o r i t y groupings and en c l a v e s i n new t h i r d world c o u n t r i e s . The B e l g i a n d e l e g a t e t o the UN argued i n 1952 t h a t the problems s u f f e r e d by c o l o n i s e d people i n A s i s and A f r i c a were a l s o b e i n g e x p e r i e n c e d by underdeveloped e t h n i c groups i n p l a c e s such as t h e Americas. Though "more than h a l f o f t h e 60 members of t h e UN had backward indigenous peoples i n t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s " (56) o n l y e i g h t s t a t e s had submitted i n f o r m a t i o n under the Chapter XI mandatory r e p o r t i n g prodecure.(57) Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o the B e l g i a n view, drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c o l o n i a l i s m would a r t i f i c i a l l y p r e c l u d e s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r a m a j o r i t y o f peoples l i v i n g under c o l o n i a l regimes. O p p o s i t i o n t o the 'B e l g i a n t h e s i s ' came mainly from L a t i n American s t a t e s , but a l s o from newly independent A f r i c a n and A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . ( 5 8 ) L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s argued t h a t I n d i a n Newfoundland, he c o u l d have p o i n t e d out, had a b e t t e r c l a i m t o be regarded as "Overseas B r i t a i n " than Hawaii as "Overseas America". The l a t t e r was 2,400 s t a t u e m i l e s from th e American mainland and i t s p o p u l a t i o n i s pr e p o n d e r a n t l y A s i a t i c and P o l y n e s i a n . Newfoundland, on the other, was whol l y B r i t i s h i n p o p u l a t i o n — and o n l y 2,300 s t a t u e m i l e s away from the mother country. The q u e s t i o n e r might have gone on t o ask, i f the debate had been r a t h e r l a t e r than 1939, "What d i d l a n d and sea d i s t a n c e s matter anygow i n the a i r age when no p o i n t on the p l a n e t was se p a r a t e d from another by more than s i x t y hours — o r had i t a l r e a d y dropped t o t h i r t y ? " H . H a l l Mandates. Dependencies and  T r u s t e e s h i p 43 (1948) 56 (1952) 7 UN GAOR C.4 a t 22 Doc. No. A/2361 57 I b i d , a t 23 58 See eg. statements o f d e l e g a t i o n s from Peru, P h i l i p i n e s , Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, E l Salvador, B o l i v i a , B r a z i l , E t h i o p i a : a t GAOR 7th s e s s ; 4th C t t e e ; 245th Mtg para 5,-7,-8 31 groups w i t h i n t h e i r borders were f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d p o l i t i c i a l l y and had no s e p a r a t e r i g h t o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . F u r t h e r t o t r e a t indigenous m i n o r i t i e s as having the same r i g h t s as the peoples o f overseas c o l o n i e s would encourage t h e s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n o f s t a t e s under the p r o v i s i o n s o f Chapter XI.(59) A f r i c a and A s i a n o p p o s i t i o n was because o f j u s t i f i a b l e s u s p i c i o n o f Belgium's motives. They saw the B e l g i a n t h e s i s as a means of d i s s i p a t i n g the growing d r i v e toward T h i r d World d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , an attempt by Western c o l o n i a l powers who had taken a l l the f l a k , t o share the blame out a l i t t l e more evenly. In a d d i t i o n almost a l l of these newly independent s t a t e s , having taken on the o l d boundaries, c o n s i s t e d o f amalgams o f d i f f e r e n t peoples brought t o g e t h e r t o form an a r t i f i c i a l s t a t e u n i t . They t h e r e f o r e , viewed t h e i r own boundaries as a t r i s k i f t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t peoples were accorded an u n l i m i t e d r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . To combat the B e l g i a n t h e s i s these c o u n t r i e s f o rmulated what became known as the "Blue Water t h e s i s " whereby they argued t h a t Chapter XI the supposedly u n i v e r s a l r i g h t o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p p l i e d o n l y t o c l a s s i c overseas c o l o n i e s and not t o peoples l i v i n g w i t h i n the borders of a p r e - e x i s t i n g s t a t e . T h i s c l a s h between the s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n of peoples and the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f s t a t e s was r e s o l v e d i n a s e r i e s of r e s o l u t i o n s passed by the General Assembly between 1960 and 1970. These were p a r t of a wider agenda of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n and making i t synonymous w i t h d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . 59 Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1982) 62 Oregon L. Rev. 73 a t 85 In I960 the General Assembly passed the D e c l a r a t i o n on the G r a n t i n g o f Independence t o C o l o n i a l Peoples and C o u n t r i e s ( R e s o l u t i o n 1514). The r e s o l u t i o n adopted p a r t i c u l a r l y a g g r e s s i v e language i n i t s advocacy o f the r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . D e c l a r i n g the pr o c e s s o f l i b e r a t i o n t o be " i r r e s i s t a b l e and i r r e v e r s a b l e " (60) member s t a t e s were encouraged i n a f o r e s h o r t e n i n g o f the d e c o l o n i s a t i o n t i m e t a b l e t o take "immediate s t e p s t o . . . t r a n s f e r a l l powers t o the peoples of those t e r r i t o r i e s , without any c o n d i t i o n s o r r e s e r v a t i o n s , and i n accordance w i t h t h e i r f r e e l y expressed w i l l and d e s i r e . 1 1 (61) The d e c l a r a t i o n was e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l w i t h the t h i r d b e i n g a necessary product o f the f i r s t two. The f i r s t dimension p e r t a i n e d t o d e c o l o n i s a t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f which paragraph (1) p r o v i d e s the f o l l o w i n g : The s u b j e c t i o n o f peoples t o a l i e n s u b j u g a t i o n , domination and e x p l o i t a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a d e n i a l of fundamental human r i g h t s , i s c o n t r a r y t o the C h a r t e r o f the U n i t e d Nations and i s an impediment t o the promotion o f world peace and co-o p e r a t i o n . T h i s p r o v i d e d the con t e x t w i t h i n which the second dimension, s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , would operate. Paragraph (2) i n c o r p o r a t e d t h a t p r i n c i p l e i n terms which would be echoed l a t e r i n Common A r t i c l e One of the 1966 Covenants: A l l p eoples have the r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; by v i r t u e o f t h a t r i g h t they f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l development. Though the two concepts are c l e a r l y s e p a r a t e , the a f f e c t of t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n was t o r e s t r i c t t h e framework of s e l f 60 GA Res. 1514 (1960) 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No 16) a t 66-7 preamble. UN Doc A/L 323 and add 1-6 61 I b i d , para.5 33 d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n s and d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . S i n c e c o l o n i a l i s m was " a l i e n s u b j u g a t i o n " , d e c o l o n i s a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d t h e s e c e s s i o n o f t h e former co l o n y and t h e c r e a t i o n of an independent s t a t e . The product o f t h i s r e a s o n i n g was the t h i r d demension o f t h e 1960 d e c l a r a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n paragraph (6) Any attempt aimed a t the p a r t i a l o r t o t a l d i s r u p t i o n o f the n a t i o n a l u n i t y and the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f a cou n t r y i s incompatable w i t h the purposes and p r i n c i p l e s o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n C h a r t e r . On i t s f a c e , the p r o v i s i o n p r o s c r i b e d any a s s e r t i o n o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n which would l e a d t o the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a p r e -e x i s t i n g s t a t e . T h i s d i d not seem an unreasonable l i m i t a t i o n i n most (though not a l l ) cases. E x t e n s i v e Western use o f the f e d e r a l model as a means o f accomodating e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c d i v e r s i t y , showed t h a t s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s h o r t o f s e c e s s i o n was a v i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the b o r d e r s o f an independent st a t e . ( 6 2 ) In f a c t paragraph (6) was i n t e r p r e t e d as a c o d i f i c a t i o n o f the blue-water t h e s i s , espoused by L a t i n America and T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the B e l g i a n t h e s i s . I t came t o be understood not as denying a r i g h t o f s e c e s s i o n f o r peoples l i v i n g w i t h i n independent s t a t e s , but as denying t o these peoples a r i g h t o f s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n p e r i o d . In s h o r t , the r e a s o n i n g p r o c e s s operated i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n means d e c o l o n i s a t i o n ; d e c o l o n i s a t i o n means s e c e s s i o n and independence; s e c e s s i o n i s o n l y a v a i l a b l e t o " o f f -shore" c o l o n i e s because the s e c e s s i o n o f i n t e r n a l c o l o n i e s was in c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f the s t a t e 62 Op. c i t . note 24 34 concerned; t h e r e f o r e s e l f determination i s only a v a i l a b l e t o " o f f - s h o r e " c o l o n i e s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was confirmed the day a f t e r R e s o l u t i o n 1514 by the passing of R e s o l u t i o n 1541(XV) s e t t i n g out the p r i n c i p l e s which should guide members i n determining whether or not an o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s t o t r a n s m i t the i n f o r m a t i o n c a l l e d f o r under A r t i c l e 73(e) (chapt. XI) of the Charter. P r i n c i p l e VI provides t h a t f u l l s e l f government can be achieved through independence, f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h another s t a t e or i n t e g r a t i o n ; suggesting t h a t secession i s not the only mode a v a i l a b l e . P r i n c i p l e IV however makes i t c l e a r t h a t none of Chapter XI a p p l i e s t o peoples who are not " g e o g r a p h i c a l l y separate a n d . . . d i s t i n c t e t h n i c a l l y and/or c u l t u r a l l y " from the a d m i n i s t e r i n g country. I f there was any doubt a f t e r R e s o l u t i o n 1514 as t o the continued v i a b i l i t y of the B e l g i a n t h e s i s t h i s r e s o l u t i o n b u r i e d i t . Chapter XI does not apply t o indigenous enclaves. A s i m i l a r l i n e was taken i n 1970 i n a f u r t h e r refinement of the scope of s e l f determination and d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . The D e c l a r a t i o n on the P r i n c i p l e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Concerning F r i e n d l y R e l a t i o n s and Co-operation Among States (63) discouraged any a c t i o n which would dismember or impair, t o t a l l y or i n p a r t , the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y or p o l i t i c a l u n i t y of sovereign and independent s t a t e s . . . A l i m i t a t i o n was however placed on the p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and s t a t e s were no longer completely immune i n respect of m e t r o p o l i t a n groupings. They had t o be "possessed of a government r e p r e s e n t i n g the whole people belonging t o [ i t s ] 63 GA Res. 2625 (1970) 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No 28) a t 121, UN Doc A/8082 35 t e r r i t o r y without d i s t i n c t i o n as t o race, creed or c o l o u r , " such t h a t i t could be s a i d t o be a c t i n g i n compliance w i t h "the p r i n c i p l e of equal r i g h t s and the s e l f determination of peoples." In s h o r t , d e n i a l of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by v o t i n g and so f o r t h would be grounds f o r a m i n o r i t y grouping t o secede l e g i t i m a t e l y d e s p i t e a s t a t e ' s c l a i m t o breach of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . For m i n o r i t y peoples of course, the r i g h t t o vote i s l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t anyway, s i n c e most l a c k s u f f i c i e n t numbers t o i n f l u e n c e m a j o r i t a r i a n d e c i s i o n s . The p r o v i s o does not t h e r e f o r e , represent any s i g n i f i c a n t change of d i r e c t i o n by the UN. These three r e s o l u t i o n s and p a r t i c u l a r l y R e s o l u t i o n 1514, (64) the f i r s t , form what may be c a l l e d the "new UN law of s e l f determination".(65) New i n the sense t h a t i t represents a departure from i t s antecedents. The e a r l y d o c t r i n e s of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l , c l e a r l y the b a s i s upon which the modern law of s e l f determination was developed, recognised t h a t the Cherokee Nation, a m i n o r i t y indigenous people s i t u a t e d w i t h i n an independent s t a t e , had a r i g h t ( a l b e i t f r a g i l e ) t o s e l f government.(66) When the concept was r e s u r r e c t e d under the League of Nations the n o t i o n t h a t s e l f determination should a t t a c h t o t e r r i r o r i e s and not peoples was e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d . I t was p e r c i e v e d t h a t the i n s t a b i l i t y of Europe was the f a u l t of s t a t e t e r r i t o r i e s r e f l e c t i n g power games i n s t e a d of e t h n i c 64 Pomerance c a l l e d i t "the foundation stone of what may be c a l l e d the New UN Law of s e l f determination"; from S e l f  Determination i n Law and P r a c t i c e (1982) p.12 65 I b i d , though the term i s used i n a d i f f e r e n t sense here. 66 Op. c i t . note 11 groupings. S e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n had t o be a r i g h t o f peoples t o be e f f e c t i v e . Even the use o f the phrase i n the UN C h a r t e r i t s e l f was taken from a model f o r the s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples w i t h i n a s o v e r e i g n state.(67) The new UN law of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples however compromised i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y f o r e n f o r c e a b i l i t y . I t would f o r the f i r s t time be an e n f o r c e a b l e l e g a l r i g h t backed v o c i f e r o u s l y by the General Assembly, but i t would o n l y be f o r some peoples. By f a l s e l y e q u a t i n g d e c o l o n i s a t i o n through s e c e s s i o n w i t h s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , m i n o r i t y peoples "trapped" w i t h i n t h e boundaries o f independent s t a t e s were excluded completely. M i n o r i t y indigenous peoples, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the West, are the ones most b a d l y a f f e c t e d by t h i s e x c l u s i o n . For most, the o n l y d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r predicament and t h a t o f " b l u e -water" c o l o n i e s i s t h a t i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s t he s e t t l e r s stayed. I r o n i c a l l y , t he r i s e o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n i n the T h i r d World was matched by a co r r e s p o n d i n g and contemporaneous slump i n the f o r t u n e s o f many indigenous peoples. I n d i a n p o l i c y i n the US i n the 1950's and 1960 #s was " t e r m i n a t i o n " . Whole n a t i o n s were te r m i n a t e d i n law as was the f e d e r a l t r u s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n r e s p e c t o f them i n a d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o a s s i m i l a t e by c o e r c i o n . The Canadian White Paper on I n d i a n P o l i c y o f 1969 was e q u a l l y a g g r e s s i v e l y a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t and the 1967 Maori A f f a i r s A c t i n New Zealand was dubbed "the l a s t l a n d grab". In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, the 1957 ILO Convention 107 i n r e s p e c t o f t r i b a l and s e m i - t r i b a l m i n o r i t y peoples was d r a f t e d around the 67 Op. c i t . note 24 idea t h a t indigenous peoples had a p o s i t i v e r i g h t of a s s i m i l a t i o n i n t o the m a j o r i t y people. The absolute c o n t r a s t of the two s i t u a t i o n s can be t r a c e d t o an important change i n the s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e which had p r e v i o u s l y bound them together; the guardianship or t r u s t p r i n c i p l e . From V i c t o r i a t o the League convenant, the s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e of the "sacred t r u s t of c i v i l i s a t i o n " had been t o " c i v i l i s e and c h r i s t i a n i s e " the n a t i v e p opulations t h a t European expansion c o n t i n u a l l y encountered. As noted, t h i s became a q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o l o n i a l i s m i t s e l f . U n t i l such time as these peoples emerged reborn i n the c o l o n i s e r s image they were t o be the wards of the c i v i l i s e d world. Most i m p o r t a n t l y , i n terms of the p o i n t being made here, the o b j e c t i v e a p p l i e d t o a l l indigenous peoples whether m a j o r i t y or m i n o r i t y . A l l t h i s was t o change under Chapters XI and X I I of the Charter, as i n f l u e n c e d by the r e s o l u t i o n s mentioned above r e f l e c t i n g the T h i r d World's newly acquired domination of the General Assembly. The r e v o l u t i o n a r y new o b j e c t i v e of the post World War I I t r u s t became the d e s t r u c t i o n of " c o l o n i a l and a l i e n s u b j u g a t i o n " and i t s replacement w i t h s e l f determination through sovereign independence. For those who f a i l e d the "blue water" t e s t however, s t a t e p r a c t i c e a t the time suggests t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t i v e of the t r u s t i n respect of these as yet unrecognised peoples remained unchanged and was prevented from e v o l v i n g i n the same d i r e c t i o n . In the New World at l e a s t , w i t h c i v i l i s a t i o n and Christianity being the norm now, the terminology employed t o d e s c r i b e the t r u s t o b j e c t i v e changed t o a s s i m i l a t i o n , and s t i l l l a t e r t o i n t e g r a t i o n — but the substance was the same. 4. SELF DETERMINATION A8 A MINORITY RIGHT 38 Although indigenous peoples have c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t e d m i n o r i t y l a b e l l i n g , two f a c t o r s make a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s broad area of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law of human r i g h t s r e l e v a n t . The f i r s t as discussed, i s t h a t t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from the r u b r i c of the UN law of d e c o l o n i s a t i o n makes the r e c o g n i t i o n of a r i g h t of s e l f determination through the processes of Chapter XI of the Charter and R e s o l u t i o n 1514 (XV) r a t h e r u n l i k e l y . Consequently other avenues o u t s i d e t h a t context must be pursued. The m i n o r i t i e s category i s the most l i k e l y s u b s t i t u t e . Secondly, though c l e a r l y "peoples" i n terms of the d e f i n i t i o n s already discussed, indigenous groupings are i n most ins t a n c e s a l s o undeniably m i n o r i t i e s . S p e c i a l Rapporteur C a p o t o r t i i n a study of the r i g h t s of M i n o r i t i e s a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (68) commissioned by the UN def i n e d m i n o r i t i e s as (69) ...groups n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r t o the r e s t of the po p u l a t i o n of a s t a t e , i n a non-dominant p o s i t i o n , whose members being n a t i o n a l s of a s t a t e possess e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s or l i n g u i s t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s d i f f e r i n g from those of the r e s t of the p o p u l a t i o n and show, i f only i m p l i c i t l y , a sense of s o l i d a r i t y d i r e c t e d towards p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r c u l t u r e , t r a d i t i o n s , r e l i g i o n or language. This c l e a r l y i n c l u d e s w i t h i n i t s terms m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples. As such, the development of the law i n respect of m i n o r i t i e s i s c l e a r l y p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . 68 C a p o t o r t i : Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging t o  E t h n i c . R e l i g i o u s and L i n g u i s t i c M i n o r i t i e s (1979) UN Doc. E/CN.4 Sub. 2/ 384/ Rev. 1. 69 I b i d , at 96 39 4.1 M i n o r i t y Rights Under the League In a manner complimentary t o the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of s t a t e boundaries i n Europe e a r l i e r , the development of c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y r i g h t s reached a peak under the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s System e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r the F i r s t World War. As w i t h the c r e a t i o n of new European s t a t e s according t o n a t u r a l e t h n i c boundaries, the establishment of a c a r e f u l system of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s recognised the t h r e a t t o world peace which d i s s a f f e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s presented. P r e s i d e n t Wilson s e t out t h a t o b j e c t i v e i n these terms: (70) We are t r y i n g t o make a peacef u l s e t t l e m e n t . . . t o e l i m i n a t e those elements of disturbance...which may i n t e r f e r e w i t h the peace of the world, and we are t r y i n g t o make an e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s according t o the race, the ethnographical c h a r a c t e r of the people i n h a b i t i n g those t e r r i t o r i e s . . . T a k e the r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s . Nothing I venture t o say, i s more l i k e l y t o d i s t u r b the peace of the world than the treatment which might i n c e r t a i n circumstances be meted out t o m i n o r i t i e s . . . In accordance w i t h t h a t o b j e c t i v e , a p l e t h o r a of c o l l e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n s and r i g h t s were e s t a b l i s h e d mostly i n the context of education and worship, t o safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of r a c i a l (the term then used), r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s . Instead of the modern UN system of d e c l a r a t i o n s and covenants, the standards were s e t out i n a s e r i e s of m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s s e p a r a t e l y undertaken i n respect of each s t a t e s u b m i t t i n g t o the regime. In most cases, t h i s was done outside the o f f i c i a l umbrella of the League. L i k e the mandates, m i n o r i t y r i g h t s has no u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n . They were imposed almost 70 League of Nations "Report of the Committee of Three" (Japan, Spain, and the UK) pursuant t o R e s o l u t i o n of 7 March 1929; League  of Nations O f f i c i a l J o u r n a l S p e c i a l suppl. No. 37 (1929) Quoted i n Sohn and Beuergenthal, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r o t e c t i o n of Human  Rights (1973) pp.216-7 e x c l u s i v e l y i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of the defeated powers, and of course d i d not apply ou t s i d e Europe and the Middle East. S p e c i a l m i n o r i t i e s clauses were incorporated i n t o peace t r e a t i e s signed by f o u r of the defeated powers; A u s t r i a , B u l g a r i a , Turkey and Hungary. (71) F i v e other s t a t e s signed complete m i n o r i t i e s t r e a t i e s w i t h the p r i n c i p l e a l l i e d powers, (72) w h i l e f i v e new s t a t e s were r e q u i r e d t o make d e c l a r a t i o n s before the League as t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s . (73) F i n a l l y s p e c i a l m i n o r i t y regimes were e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t e r r i t o r i e s w i t h i n the boundaries of two f u r t h e r s t a t e s — Germany i n respect of S i l e s i a and F i n l a n d i n respect of the Aaland I s l a n d s . The great number of t r e a t i e s meant t h a t even w i t h i n t h i s very r e s t r i c t e d t e r r i t o r i a l a p p l i c a t i o n , no uniform standard e x i s t e d . There were nevertheless a number of common fe a t u r e s . The P o l i s h t r e a t y provided a model i n respect of s e v e r a l of these. I t contained a s e r i e s of non d i s c r i m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s and then guaranteed t o P o l i s h n a t i o n a l s belonging t o r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s or l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s the r i g h t t o e s t a b l i s h , manage, and c o n t r o l (at t h e i r own expense) c h a r i t a b l e r e l i g i o u s and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as schools. S p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s were a l s o added regarding p u b l i c schools u s i n g the language of the m i n o r i t y i n d i s t r i c t s where the m i n o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e d a 71 D i n s t e i n : C o l l e c t i v e Human Rig h t s of Peoples and M i n o r i t i e s (1976) 25 I n t . Comp. LQ 102 a t 113 72 I b i d , they were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Greece and the Sub-Croat-Slovene State which i s present day Yugoslavia. 73 I b i d . , They were L i t h u a n i a , L a t v i a , E s t o n i a and I r a q . . c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n . (74) M i n o r i t y n a t i o n a l s i n these d i s t r i c t s were a l s o as s u r e d an e q u i t a b l e share i n the enjoyment and a p p l i c a t i o n o f sums p r o v i d e d out of s t a t e f u n d i n g . (75) In a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i s i o n s such as these which p r o v i d e d a s o r t o f bench-mark f o r m i n o r i t y r i g h t s , o t h e r t r e a t i e s c o n t a i n e d guarantees which exceeded these standards c o n s i d e r a b l y . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , i n some cases where m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n s were c o n c e n t r a t e d g e o g r a p h i c a l l y , systems of l i m i t e d l o c a l autonomy were i n s t i t u t e d by t r e a t y f o r the m i n o r i t y peoples concerned. Thus the Aaland I s l a n d s were accorded s e l f government by agreement between F i n l a n d and Sweden. (76) The Saxons (German speaking) and S z e k l e r s (Hungarian) i n Rumania were accorded " l o c a l autonomy" i n r e s p e c t o f e d u c a t i o n and r e l i g i o u s matters, (77) as were the V l a c h s of the Pindus i n Greece. (78) The Ruthene m i n o r i t y i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a were guaranteed i n comprehensive terms a f u l l r i g h t of s e l f government as w e l l as a r i g h t o f e q u i t a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the Czech n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t u r e . A r t i c l e s 10 t o 13 o f the T r e a t y Concerning 74 Op. c i t . note 71 a t p.115. V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y w i t h Poland 1919, 13 Am. J . I n t ' l . 1. (supp) 423 a t 426-8: Quoted i n D i n s t e i n . 75 Op. c i t . note 74 A r t . 9 T r e a t y w i t h Poland. 76 Agreement between Sweden and F i n l a n d r e g a r d i n g t h e Aaland I s l a n d p l a c e d on r e c o r d June 27 (1927) 2 League o f Nations O.J. 701 77 T r e a t y on P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s i n Roumania A r t 11; Dec. 9, 1919 a.d. No. 191 3 T r e a t i e s . Conventions. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A c t .  P r o t o c o l s and Agreements Between the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America and  Other Powers (1923) (Redmond) a t 3728 78 T r e a t y on P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s W i t h i n Greece, Art.12, Aug 10, 1920. 28 L.N.T.S. a t 256 42 P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s W i t h i n Czechoslovakia s e t out t h e i r r i g h t s i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: (79) A r t i c l e 10 Czecho-slovakia undertakes t o c o n s t i t u t e the Ruthene t e r r i t o r y south of the Carpathians w i t h i n f r o n t i e r s d e l i m i t e d by the P r i n c i p l e A l l i e d and A s s o c i a t e d Powers as an autonomous u n i t w i t h i n the Czecho-Slovak S t a t e , and t o accord t o i t the f u l l e s t degree of s e l f government  compatible w i t h the u n i t y of the Czecho-Slovak S t a t e . A r t i c l e 11 The Ruthene t e r r i t o r y south of the Carpathians s h a l l possess a s p e c i a l D i e t . This D i e t s h a l l have powers of l e g i s l a t i o n i n a l l l i n g u i s t i c , s c h o l a s t i c and r e l i g i o u s questions, i n matters of l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and i n other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak S t a t e may a s s i g n t o i t . The Governor of the Ruthene t e r r i t o r y s h a l l be appointed by the P r e s i d e n t of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e t o the Ruthene D i e t . A r t i c l e 12 Czecho-Slovakia agrees t h a t o f f i c i a l s i n the Ruthene t e r r i t o r y w i l l be chosen as f a r as p o s s i b l e from the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h i s t e r r i t o r y . A r t i c l e 13 Czecho-Slovakia guarantees t o the Ruthene t e r r i t o r y e q u i t a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the l e g i s l a t i o n assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, t o which assembly i t w i l l send deputies e l e c t e d according t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Czecho-Slovak D i e t upon l e g i s l a t i v e q uestion of the same k i n d as those assigned t o the Ruthene D i e t . (emphasis added) Of course s e l f government r i g h t s of t h i s breadth were c l e a r l y not the norm under the League system i n respect of m i n o r i t i e s . I t would not be r e a l i s t i c t o argue t h a t a u n i v e r s a l r i g h t t o m i n o r i t y s e l f government could be e x t r a p o l a t e d from these c l a u s e s . Nonetheless, the Ruthene example represents simply one extreme end of a spectrum of guarantees which c l e a r l y r e j e c t e d an a s s i m i l a t i v e approach t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i s s u e s . 79 Treaty on P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s With Czechoslovakia A r t s 10-13, Sept 10, 1919 A.D. No. 185 3 Redmond op c i t note 77 at 3703-04 43 Peoples who f o r p o l i t i c a l , econmic numerical o r o t h e r reasons c o u l d not a t t a i n f u l l s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n through independence, had n e v e r t h e l e s s a r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s o r l i n g u i s t i c i n t e g r i t y w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f the s t a t e having dominion over them. Even t o the extent, as the Czech t r e a t y shows, o f b e i n g accorded a c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o s e l f government where circumstances so warranted. In the words o f the Permanent Court o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l J u s t i c e the o b j e c t i v e o f the system was (80) To secure f o r c e r t a i n elements i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a S t a t e , the p o p u l a t i o n o f which d i f f e r s from them i n ra c e , language o r r e l i g i o n , t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i v i n g peaceably a l o n g s i d e t h a t p o p u l a t i o n and c o - o p e r a t i n g amicably w i t h i t , w h i l e a t the same time p r e s e r v i n g the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which d i s t i n g u i s h them from the m a j o r i t y , and s a t i s f y i n g t h e i r enduring s p e c i a l needs. In o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h i s o b j e c t , two t h i n g s are regarded as p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary... The f i r s t i s t o ensure t h a t n a t i o n a l s b e l o n g i n g t o r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s o r l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s s h a l l be p l a c e d i n every r e s p e c t on a f o o t i n g o f p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y w i t h the o t h e r n a t i o n a l s of t h e S t a t e . The second i s t o ensure f o r the m i n o r i t y elements s u i t a b l e means f o r t he p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e i r r a c i a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s , t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s and t h e i r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These two elements a r e indeed c l o s e l y i n t e r l o c k e d , f o r t h e r e would be no  t r u e e q u a l i t y between a m a j o r i t y and a m i n o r i t y i f the l a t t e r  were d e p r i v e d of i t s own i n s t i t u t i o n s and were consequently 80 M i n o r i t y Schools i n A l b a n i a [1935] PCIJ s e r . A/B No. 64 a t 17 44 compelled t o renounce t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s the very essence of  i t s being a m i n o r i t y . (emphasis added) In s h o r t , the system provided the f i r s t ( a l b e i t l i m i t e d ) r e c o g n i t i o n of an a n t i - a s s i m i l a t i o n r i g h t . That i s the r i g h t t o a separate c o l l e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e as a m i n o r i t y and the r i g h t t o maintain t h a t separateness. This of course, i s a l s o the essence of the concept of s e l f determination although m i n o r i t y r i g h t s were not couched i n those terms. Further, the r e c o g n i t i o n i n respect of c e r t a i n s p e c i a l m i n o r i t i e s of a r i g h t t o l o c a l autonomy t e s t i f i e s t o the extent t o which the idea of m i n o r i t y s e l f determination had developed under the League as a means of p r e s e r v i n g both peac e f u l co-existence and the m i n o r i t y i t s e l f . I t must be r e i t e r a t e d however t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e concerning the s t a t u s and r i g h t s of indigenous m i n o r i t i e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d (as the Anglo-American A r b i t r a t i o n s show) was f a r l e s s p r o g r e s s i v e . That a s i d e , these models of l o c a l s e l f government or autonomy w i t h i n the context of the s t a t e are d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o the circumstances and indeed a s p i r a t i o n s of many indigenous m i n o r i t i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h a t model was never allowed t o f u l l y develop. The manipulation of these m i n o r i t y p r o t e c t i o n s by the T h i r d Reich t o provide a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r German expansion meant t h a t the system f a i l e d and was d i s c r e d i t t e d as a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause f o r World War Two. With i t went the whole concept of m i n o r i t y group r i g h t s . The advent of the United Nations saw i t s replacement w i t h the "melting pot" theory espoused by s t a t e s w i t h high immigrant p o p u l a t i o n s , notably the US and UK (and i t s s a t e l l i t e s ) . Supported by the new hegemony of the US t h i s a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t approach became the new agenda f o r the development of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s under the UN. 4.2 The UN Human Rights Approach This change of d i r e c t i o n brought w i t h i t a sharp d i v i s i o n between i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and group r i g h t s . Group r i g h t s became r e s t r i c t e d t o the new law of s e l f determination and d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of which, as dis c u s s e d , were the "blue water" c o l o n i e s of the European powers. For everyone e l s e the s t r o n g l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t new law of " u n i v e r s a l human r i g h t s " a p p l i e d . This was a regime of a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , e g a l i t a r i a n r i g h t s a p p l y i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y t o a l l humans as opposed t o m i n o r i t y groupings. This r e j e c t i o n of the League approach of p r o t e c t i n g sub-national m i n o r i t i e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the h i s t o r y of the U n i t e d Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n and the P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s . I t was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1947 as a sub-commission of the Human Rights Commission. O r i g i n a l l y two sub-commissions were proposed, one i n respect of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and another f o r m i n o r i t i e s . That the two were e v e n t u a l l y fused i n d i c a t e d a general u n w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t of s t a t e s t o s i n g l e out m i n o r i t i e s as a focus of UN a c t i v i t y . Despite t h i s , the new Sub-Commission i n i t i a l l y expended much e f f o r t on i t s m i n o r i t i e s mandate. The proposals o f f e r e d were so unpopular w i t h s t a t e s t h a t they were being c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f e r r e d back t o the Sub-Commission f o r " f u r t h e r study". (81) As a r e s u l t the Sub-Commission changed i t s emphasis 81 Op. c i t . note 68 at 28 n.59 C a p o r t o r t i Report . Referred t o i n Thornberry op c i t note 76 a t 442; as t o o r i g i n a l terms of reference. As t o the l a c k of acceptance of the Sub-Commissions 7 46 t o the prevention of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n 1954.(82) I t was another 23 years before the completion of the f i r s t UN study of the r i g h t s of m i n o r i t i e s . (83) The study concerned the p r i n c i p l e s s e t out i n A r t i c l e 27 of the UN Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s , (84) the s i n g l e reference t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i n the major UN Human Rights instruments. The f a c t t h a t A r t i c l e 27 was i n s e r t e d i n the Covenant at a l l i s testimony t o i t s i n s i p i d terms when c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the f a r more a s s e r t i v e statements of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s contained i n i t s other p r o v i s i o n s . A r t i c l e 27 prov i d e s : (85) In those s t a t e s i n which e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s or l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s e x i s t , persons belonging t o such m i n o r i t i e s s h a l l not be denied the r i g h t , i n community w i t h other members of t h e i r groups t o enjoy t h e i r own c u l t u r e , t o pr o f e s s and p r a c t i c e t h e i r own r e l i g i o n , or t o use t h e i r own language. L i k e the i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , i t i s d r a f t e d i n negative terms, apparently imposing upon s t a t e s a m i n i m i a l standard of t o l e r a t i n g e t h n i c , l i n g u i s t i c or r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s . The l i m i t a t i o n of i t s scope t o non-i n t e r f e r e n c e o n l y , i s r e i n f o r c e d by the Sub-Commission's r e j e c t i o n of proposals put forward by Eastern b l o c c o u n t r i e s at the time of d r a f t i n g which proposal see Hoare The UN Commission on Human R i g h t s ; i n The  I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r o t e c t i o n of Human R i g h t s : (E. Luard ed.) (1967) a t 76, i n which he notes t h a t t h i s r e f l e c t e d n o t only the d i f f i c u l t y and d e l i c a c y of the p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s which may a r i s e i n m i n o r i t y questions, but the l a c k of agreement even on p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g t o t h i s s u b j e c t i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, and i t s apprehensions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x p l o i t a t i o n , f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes, of any UN work on m i n o r i t y questions, even i f d i r e c t e d t o recommendations of a general c h a r a c t e r . 82 Thornberry; I s there a Pheonix i n the Ashes? I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law and M i n o r i t y Rights (1980) 15 Texas I n t ' l L.J.421 83 Op. c i t . n.68 the C a p o t o r t i Report 84 UN.GA Res 2200A (1966) 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No.16) 52 85 I b i d , Art.27 47 i n c l u d e d more p o s i t i v e d u t i e s t o promote m i n o r i t y c u l t u r e and -language. Yugoslavia f o r example suggested a cla u s e more c l o s e l y a k i n t o the o l d League system: (86) Every person s h a l l have the r i g h t t o show f r e e l y h i s membership of an e t h n i c or l i n g u i s t i c group [note " r e l i g i o u s " i s excluded] t o use without hindrance the name of h i s group, t o l e a r n the language of t h i s group and t o use i t i n p u b l i c or p r i v a t e l i f e , t o be taught i n t h i s language, as w e l l as the r i g h t t o c u l t u r a l developments together w i t h other members of t h i s group without being subjected on any count t o any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n whatsoever. This was r e j e c t e d on the grounds t h a t i t placed undue emphasis on the r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s i n s t e a d of s t r e s s i n g the importance of t o l e r a n c e and non- i n t e r f e r e n c e , the only duty which could p r o p e r l y be the subject of a u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e standard. (87) Further, although supposedly concerned w i t h m i n o r i t i e s as groups, the substance of A r t i c l e 27 i s a c t u a l l y couched i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s terms. The r i g h t s contained t h e r e i n a t t a c h t o i n d i v i d u a l "persons belonging t o m i n o r i t i e s " and not t o the group c o l l e c t i v e l y . T h i s general approach has p r e v a i l e d even i n secondary UN instruments d e a l i n g s o l e l y w i t h the r i g h t s of m i n o r i t i e s . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covention on the E l i m i n a t i o n of A l l Forms of R a c i a l 86 9 UN ESCOR, Commission on Human R i g h t s , UN Doc E/CN.4/L.225 (1953) The S o v i e t s had a s i m i l a r though s i m p l e r d r a f t : The St a t e s h a l l ensure t o n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s the r i g h t t o use t h e i r n a t i v e tongue and t o possess t h e i r n a t i o n a l schools, l i b r a r i e s , museums and other c u l t u r a l and ed u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 9 UN ESCOR, Commission on Human R i g h t s , UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.222 (1955) Quoted i n Thornberry, op c i t note 82 a t 449 n.115. 87 Op. c i t . Thornberry, note 82 48 D i s c r i m i n a t i o n (88) f o r example i s c l e a r l y a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t i n i t s o b j e c t i v e . A r t i c l e 1 d e f i n e s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as a d i s t i n c t i o n or p r e f e r e n c e based on r a c e which imp a i r s equal enjoyment o f human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms. S p e c i a l measures f o r m i n o r i t i e s are a l l o w e d o n l y i n cases o f , and t o the e x t e n t o f , any i n e q u a l i t y . Upon a c h i e v i n g e q u a l i t y , s p e c i a l measures f o r the m i n o r i t y group concerned must stop. Thus m i n o r i t y r i g h t s t o the e x t e n t t h a t they are a c c e p t a b l e , are viewed o n l y as temporary a b e r r a t i o n s . D e s p i t e t h i s a p p a r e n t l y vehement r e f u s a l t o r e c o g n i s e m i n o r i t i e s as l e g i t i m a t e s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law o u t s i d e the c o n t e x t o f human r i g h t s , i t i s becoming c l e a r t h a t changes ar e i n t h e wind i n the UN approach t o m i n o r i t y i s s u e s . Thornberry, c o r r e c t l y i t i s submitted, a t t r i b u t e s t h i s change t o t h r e e f a c t o r s . (89) The d e c l i n e o f the hegemony o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the UN; the US' own d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h i t s m e l t i n g p o t t h e o r y , as evidenced by the a c t i v i s m of m i n o r i t y groups i n t h a t c o u n t r y ; And f i n a l l y the v i r t u a l completion o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n on A s i a , A f r i c a , the P a c i f i c and the Caribbean which has dominated UN forums f o r t h i r t y y e a r s . The l a s t p o i n t i n p a r t i c u l a r has r e t u r n e d m i n o r i t y i s s u e s t o the foreground as the UN seeks new d i r e c t i o n s f o r the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h i s i s h i n t e d a t i n the 1970 D e c l a r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and c o - o p e r a t i o n among s t a t e s (90) i n which s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n and s e c e s s i o n are seen as l e g i t i m a t e 88 GA Res 2106A, 20 UN GAOR Supp (No.14) 47-51, UN DOC. A/6014 (1965) 89 Op. c i t . note 64 a t 455 90 GA Res 2624 (XXV) (1970) op c i t note 63 49 o b j e c t i v e s of m i n o r i t y peoples though only i n the l i m i t e d circumstances of e x c l u s i o n from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the government of the s t a t e . (91) The commissioning of the C a p o t o r t i Report a l s o suggests t h i s a t t i t u d i n a l change, and the substance of the r e p o r t i s c l e a r evidence of i t . In p a r t i c u l a r C a p o t o r t i suggests t h a t the p r e v a i l i n g view of A r t i c l e 27 as embodying a negative and l i m i t e d standard i s up f o r r e v i s i o n . I n r e l a t i o n t o c u l t u r a l r i g h t s f o r example he comments: (92) i t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t because of the enormous human f i n a n c i a l resources which would be needed f o r f u l l c u l t u r a l development, the r i g h t granted t o members of m i n o r i t y groups t o enjoy t h e i r own c u l t u r e would l o s e much of i t s meaning i f no a s s i s t a n c e from the governments was forthcoming. Neither the n o n - p r o h i b i t i o n of the e x e r c i s e of such a r i g h t by persons belonging t o m i n o r i t y groups nor c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees of freedom of expression and a s s o c i a t i o n are s u f f i c i e n t f o r the e f f e c t i v e implimentation of the r i g h t of members of m i n o r i t y groups t o preserve and develop t h e i r own c u l t u r e . Here, C a p o t o r t i i s c l e a r l y saying t h a t a negative r i g h t i n the context of m i n o r i t i e s i s i n many cases meaningless unless i t i m p l i e s a f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n on the p a r t of the s t a t e t o support the p r e s e r v a t i o n of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which gave the m i n o r i t y i t s s t a t u s . F u r t h e r , i t i s impossible, at l e a s t i n most indigenous c u l t u r e s , t o separate c u l t u r a l r i g h t s o f f from indigenous p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or from land and resource r i g h t s . C u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s are always an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the p o l i t i c a l mechanisms of the community. C u l t u r a l b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s always r e f l e c t the community's pe r c e p t i o n and use of the 91 I b i d , and accompanying t e x t . 92 Op. c i t . note 68 at p.36 50 resources around i t . As such i t may be argued t h a t A r t i c l e 27 r e q u i r e s a f a r more h o l i s t i c approach from s t a t e governments. An o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t m i n o r i t y c u l t u r e i m p l i e s a f u r t h e r and wider o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t the t o t a l environment w i t h i n which t h a t c u l t u r e i s able t o t h r i v e . This a t t i t u d i n a l change has a l s o manifested i t s e l f i n d e c i s i o n s of the j u d i c i a l wing of the UN. The Human Rig h t s Committee i n respect of the Lovelace Communication (93) f o r example considered t h a t A r t i c l e 27 r i g h t s were capable of e x e r c i s e only as p a r t of a c o l l e c t i v i t y even though on a s t r i c t c o n s t r u c t i o n of the p r o v i s i o n such r i g h t s are accorded t o i n d i v i d u a l s only. (94) Beyond A r t i c l e 27, a number of proposals f o r an instrument d e a l i n g w i t h m i n o r i t y r i g h t s have been made t o the UN. Yugoslavia c i r c u l a t e d one i n 1978, t h i s time i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n the scope of the d r a f t (95) and expanding upon the substance of A r t i c l e 27 so as t o re i n t r o d u c e the concept of m i n o r i t i e s as c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . A r t i c l e 3 of the d r a f t , f o r example, provides: For the purpose of r e a l i s i n g the c o n d i t i o n s of f u l l e q u a l i t y and complete development of m i n o r i t i e s as c o l l e c t i v i t i e s and of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l members, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o take  measures which w i l l enable them f r e e l y t o express t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , t o develop t h e i r c u l t u r e , education, language, t r a d i t i o n and customs and t o p a r t i c i p a t e on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s i n the c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , economic and 93 Communication made pursuant t o A r t i c l e 5(4) of the Optional P r o t o c o l t o the UN Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g hts 1966 Reported i n [1982] 1 CNLR 11 94 I b i d , a t 12-13 95 Yug o s l a v i a , D r a f t D e c l a r a t i o n on the Rights of Persons Belonging t o E t h n i c , R e l i g i o u s and L i n g u i s t i c M i n o r i t i e s UN Doc CN. 4/L1367/Rev 1 Quoted i n Thornberry op. c i t . note 82 at 445 51 p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country i n which they l i v e . (emphasis added) In a d d i t i o n a t l e a s t two other d e c l a r a t i o n s have been made by non-UN bodies d e a l i n g w i t h m i n o r i t y r i g h t s ; The Copenhagen D e c l a r a t i o n of 1978 (96) and the Charter of R i g h t s f o r M i n o r i t y E t h n i c Communities and f o r L i n g u i s t i c M i n o r i t i e s . (97) I t i s probably s t i l l too e a r l y i n the apparent renaissance of m i n o r i t y i s s u e s t o forsee a c l e a r course f o r the f u t u r e . As noted the si g n s i n d i c a t e at l e a s t t h e i r r e t u r n t o prominence and a r e v i v a l of c o l l e c t i v e concepts of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s , perhaps up t o and i n c l u d i n g a r i g h t t o s e l f determination i n some circumstances. 4.3 Indigenous Peoples as M i n o r i t i e s Recognition t h a t m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples made up a s p e c i a l category w i t h i n the general r u b r i c of m i n o r i t y i s s u e s came q u i t e e a r l y i n the h i s t o r y of the UN. Along w i t h the c r e a t i o n i n 1947 of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n and the P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s , the General Assembly passed R e s o l u t i o n 273 ( I I I ) c a l l i n g f o r a study t o be undertaken of the " l a r g e a b o r i g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n and other underdeveloped s o c i a l groups which face p e c u l i a r s o c i a l problems" on the American con t i n e n t . An ad hoc committee was e s t a b l i s h e d but was used mainly as a forum f o r Eastern b l o c a t t a c k s on Western s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the US. The US response was t o charge t h a t ECOSOC (the s u p e r i o r body) had no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o act 96 Adopted Sept. 21, 1978 a t the conference on Regional Autonomy, Copenhagen Sept 17-22 (1978) 97 I n t ' l A. f o r the Defence of Menaced Languages and Cul t u r e s (1976) 52 u n t i l requested t o do so by the governments concerned. (98) According t o Kingsbury "the s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e d i e d i n a t o r r e n t of East/West i n v e c t i v e . " (99) Outside the UN context, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O r g a n i s a t i o n became concerned as e a r l y as the 1930's w i t h the s i t u a t i o n of indigenous peoples. The ILO's a c t i v i t i e s were l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d however t o South America, and then only w i t h i n the narrow parameters of indigenous peoples as e x p l o i t e d labour p o o l s . (100) In 1957 the ILO produced Covention 107 on the " P r o t e c t i o n and I n t e g r a t i o n of Indigenous and Other T r i b a l and Semi T r i b a l M i n o r i t i e s i n Independent C o u n t r i e s , " the f i r s t and s t i l l the only r e c o g n i t i o n of the s p e c i a l s t a t u s of indigenous peoples i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l instrument of i t s k i n d . In a manner r e f l e c t i n g the b a s i c tenor of the Covention, i t s i n t r o d u c t o r y a r t i c l e provides that:(101) Governments s h a l l have the primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing co-ordinated and systemic a c t i o n f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the populations concerned and t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the l i f e of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s . (emphasis added) Though d r a f t e d w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of encouraging b e t t e r l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r indigenous peoples, Covention 107 i s g e n e r a l l y viewed n e g a t i v e l y now by indigenous peoples as being a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t and i n d i v i d u a l i s t . 98 Bennett, A b o r i g i n a l Rights i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1978) a t p.13 99 Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Community M.Ph Thesis (Oxon) 1978 a t p.17 100 From Sanders, The Re-emergence of Indigenous Questions i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1983) 1 Can Human Ri g h t s YB.3 a t 19 101 Op. c i t . , t e x t reproduced i n Bennett note 98 As noted a t the beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n on m i n o r i t i e s , the view t h a t indigenous r i g h t s i s s u e s can be p r o d u c t i v e l y analysed from a " m i n o r i t i e s " p e r s p e c t i v e i s not a popular one, l e a s t of a l l among indigenous peoples themselves. Indigenous leaders argue stenuously t h a t they are peoples not m i n o r i t i e s and t h a t m i n o r i t y l a b e l l i n g both denigrates and domesticates t h e i r s t r u g g l e . That view i s e n t i r e l y understandable given the " i n d i v i d u a l human r i g h t s " framework c u r r e n t l y i m p r i s o n i n g m i n o r i t y i s s u e s ; the f a i l u r e of measures such as ILO Convention 107 t o address the r e a l grievances of indigenous peoples; and by c o n t r a s t the r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes made p o s s i b l e i n p a r t by the UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n instruments. Two important p o i n t s are worth making here. The f i r s t i s i t should be remembered t h a t the cu r r e n t r e s t r i c t i v e approach t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i s a very recent post World War Two development. P r i o r t o t h a t , and p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the League p e r i o d , m i n o r i t y r i g h t s were seen i n much broader c o l l e c t i v e terms. The d i v i d i n g l i n e between s t a t e s and m i n o r i t i e s could at times be an extremely f i n e one w i t h both c a t e g o r i e s being bona f i d e s u b j e c t s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. The contemporary d e v a l u a t i o n of m i n o r i t y i s s u e s i s a product of "melting pot" t h e o r i e s of n a t i o n b u i l d i n g once popular i n North America but now l o s i n g ground. In other words there i s a danger i n accepting without question the p r e v a i l i n g framework and m a r s h a l l i n g arguments around the q u i t e a r t i f i c i a l boundaries and c a t e g o r i e s which comprise t h a t framework. The m i n o r i t i e s / p e o p l e s d i s t i n c t i o n i s a p e r f e c t example of t h i s a r t i f i c i a l boundary c r e a t i o n . Seen i n t h i s l i g h t i t becomes c l e a r t h a t a m i n o r i t i e s p e r s p e c t i v e , w h i l e i t does not and should not provide a comprehensive answer t o i s s u e s of 54 indigenous peoples r i g h t s , must not be r e j e c t e d as completely i r r e l e v a n t . The second p o i n t i s t h a t even among the s o - c a l l e d " t e r r i t o r i a l " m i n o r i t y peoples ( i e . peoples who r e t a i n an u n i n t e g r a t e d t e r r i t o r y ) indigenous groupings are q u i t e unique. I f the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i s c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l , as i t was under the League, then indigenous peoples have the g r e a t e s t c l a i m t o such r i g h t s . In almost a l l instances the degree of c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e between indigenous m i n o r i t i e s and the mainstream c u l t u r e or c u l t u r e s i s dramatic. Put simply, indigenous m i n o r i t i e s are more d i f f e r e n t than other m i n o r i t i e s and t h e r e f o r e more deserving of s p e c i a l and r a d i c a l p r o t e c t i o n measures. Both ILO Convention 107 and e a r l y UN concern w i t h the p l i g h t of indigenous peoples i n the Americas show t h a t even i n the heyday of a s s i m i l a t i o n i s m t h i s f a c t was recognised though i t produced few s u b s t a n t i v e b e n e f i t s . That r e c o g n i t i o n has continued and i s growing i n s t r e n g t h . The ILO accepting t h a t Convention 107 i s based upon outmoded concepts, has begun the t a s k of d r a f t i n g a new convention. (102) And as discussed below the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n and the P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s i s a l s o t a k i n g important i n i t i a t i v e s i n the area through i t s Working Group on Indigenous Populations. From a l l of t h i s a sense emerges t h a t indigenous peoples w i t h t h e i r unique h i s t o r y as " c o l o n i s e d m i n o r i t i e s " w i l l provide the l i n k between the UN Law i n respect of m i n o r i t i e s on the one hand and the UN Law of d e c o l o n i s a a t i o n on the other. This l i n k i t i s submitted w i l l provide the means by which the p r i n c i p l e of 102 "Kahtou" March/April 1987 pp.10 and 13 55 s e l f determination w i l l f i n a l l y succeed i n c r o s s i n g the d i v i d e between these mutually e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s . G e n e r a l l y s t a t e s appear more w i l l i n g a t t h i s p o i n t t o accept s e l f determination f o r indigenous peoples r a t h e r than as a general p r i n c i p l e a p p l y i n g t o a l l t e r r i t o r i a l m i n o r i t i e s . This i s f i r s t l y because, as noted, indigenous peoples share w i t h the T h i r d World, a common c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y . Thus the leap of l o g i c or f a i t h between the d e c o l o n i s a t i o n of the T h i r d World and the s e l f determination of the Fourth World i s one t h a t can be made by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community without d i f f i c u l t y . At l e a s t a t an i n t e l l e c t u a l l e v e l . Secondly and more p r a c t i c a l l y , w h i l e n e a r l y a l l s t a t e s have m i n o r i t i e s , not a l l have indigenous m i n o r i t i e s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y the l a b e l "indigenous" has been a p p l i e d only t o a b o r i g i n a l s of the Americas and A u s t r a l a s i a . W i t h i n t h a t l i m i t e d context, as one would expect, Eastern Bloc and T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s are more than w i l l i n g t o e n t e r t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of indigenous r i g h t s . Thus f o r reasons which are h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l , indigenous peoples i s s u e s are now a t the very c u t t i n g edge of developments i n r e l a t i o n t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s and i n r e l a t i o n t o the r e d i r e c t i o n of the concept of s e l f determination. 5. INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter s e t out the c o l o n i a l or h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination as the " a c t i v e agent" i n UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . Most im p o r t a n t l y i t pointed out t h a t t h i s e a r l y law a p p l i e s i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e t o indigenous peoples i n the New World — those peoples who have been reduced t o m i n o r i t i e s i n t h e i r homelands today. The next two p a r t s d e t a i l e d the c r e a t i o n of a d i v i s i o n between overseas c o l o n i e s having indigenous m a j o r i t i e s and m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples, mostly of the new world, l i v i n g w i t h i n the borders of independant s t a t e s . The former were accorded a r i g h t t o s e l f d etermination through d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , the l a t t e r were r e l e g a t e d t o the l e s s e r s t a t u s of " m i n o r i t y " and thereby excluded from the spectrum of c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s accorded only t o "peoples". This f i n a l s e c t i o n a n t i c i p a t e s what i s i n essence a r e t u r n of s e l f determination t o i t s r o o t s . I t i s argued t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s developing r a p i d l y toward b r i d g i n g the " r i g h t s " gap between indigenous m a j o r i t y and indigenous m i n o r i t y . This i s being allowed t o happen f i r s t l y because r e s t r i c t i o n s on s e l f determination such as t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y are decreasing i n r e l a t i v e importance, and secondly because of the r e d i s c o v e r y of the concept of " i n t e r n a l s e l f determination,": The r i g h t of sub-state groupings t o autonomy w i t h i n the l a r g e r n a t i o n s t a t e . T h i s represents an attempt a t coming t o terms w i t h indigenous peoples as m i n o r i t i e s as w e l l as peoples. I t w i l l be remembered t h a t t h i s model was used e x t e n s i v e l y i n respect of European m i n o r i t i e s a f t e r World War One, but was subsequently r e j e c t e d . Today, m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples advocate s t r o n g l y t h i s very same model as a v i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r , as yet unrecognised, peoplehood. 5.1 Indigenous Claims t o S e l f Determination The h i s t o r y of indigenous claims t o s e l f determination i n one or other form before i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r a i s a long one. Indigenous peoples have c o n s i s t e n t l y refused t o accept t h a t t h e i r grievances i n respect of land and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s are p u r e l y 57 domestic i s s u e s . In 1882, 1884, and 1914 f o r example, Maori d e l e g a t i o n s t r a v e l l e d t o England t o p r o t e s t t o the Queen the New Zealand governments' f a i l u r e t o honour the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1906 and 1909 de l e g a t i o n s of B r i t i s h Columbia Indians made the same journey. Deskaheh of the S i x Nations Confederacy spent two years attempting t o get the case of the Ir o q u o i s heard before the League of Nations i n 1923 and 1924. He was s u c c e s s f u l , w i t h the help of sympathetic member s t a t e s , i n having a p e t i t i o n forwarded t o the Secr e t a r y General of the League, but was c o n s i s t e n t l y blocked t h e r e a f t e r — notably by B r i t a i n . The great Maori prophet T a h u p o t i k i Wiremu Ratana a l s o p e t i t i o n e d the League i n 1924 — but t o no a v a i l . Yet again the Ir o q u o i s sought t o be heard d u r i n g the d r a f t i n g of the UN Charter i n San F r a n s i s c o i n 1945 — but were ignored. (103) The dramatic upsurge i n the l a t e 1960's of indigenous i d e n t i t y and n a t i o n a l i s m saw, w i t h the a c t i v e support of non-indigenous groups such as S u r v i v a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l , an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of indigenous a c t i v i t y a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Since the l a t e 1960's i n t e r n a t i o n a l indigenous o r g a n i s a t i o n s have been formed and have obtained c o n s u l t a t i v e s t a t u s t o the UN i t s e l f as non-governmental o r g a n i s a t i o n s . The most r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of these i s the World C o u n c i l of Indigenous Peoples e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1975. The World C o n c i l has been one of the g r e a t e s t advocates of indigenous s e l f determination and i n 1981 produced a d r a f t convention on Indigenous Peoples Rights which gave p r i o r i t y t o t h a t p r i n c i p l e . (104) 103 Supra, see g e n e r a l l y Sanders note 1 at pp.13-14 104 I n f r a note 110 and accompanying t e x t . 58 Most r e c e n t l y two Indigenous groups, both from Canada, have f i l e d c o n t r a v e r s i a l "communications" w i t h the Human Rig h t s Committe of the UN under the O p t i o n a l P r o t o c o l t o the 1966 Convention on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s . Both argue t h a t as peoples, they have been denied the u n q u a l i f i e d r i g h t t o s e l f d etermination guaranteed by A r t i c l e 1 of the Convention. (105) A r t i c l e 1(1) and (2) provides: (1) A l l peoples have the r i g h t of s e l f determination. By v i r t u e of t h a t r i g h t they f r e e l y determinate t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l development. (2) The peoples may, f o r t h e i r own ends, f r e e l y dispose of t h e i r n a t u r a l wealth and resources without p r e j u d i c e t o any o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g out of i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic co-o p e r a t i o n , based upon the p r i n c i p l e of mutual b e n e f i t , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. In no case may a people be deprived of i t s own means of subsistence. The Mic Maq Nation from A t l a n t i c Canada, c l a i m t h a t by v i r t u e of a 1752 Treaty w i t h the B r i t i s h Crown, the Mic Maq Nation i s a B r i t i s h dependency u n l a w f u l l y annexed by Canada and e n t i t l e d now under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t o e x e r c i s e i t s inherent r i g h t of s e l f determination. The response of Canada has been ( i n t e r a l i a ) t o a s s e r t t h a t Indian s e l f government under the I n d i a n Act i s s u f f i c i e n t r e c o g n i t i o n of a r i g h t t o s e l f d etermination, t h a t the c l a i m contravenes Canada's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y i n any case, and t h a t s e l f determination claims cannot be the s u b j e c t of " i n d i v i d u a l " communications anyway. (106) The Lubicon Lake Band of A l b e r t a have a l s o based t h e i r c l a i m on A r t i c l e 1. The substance of the c l a i m i s i n two p a r t s ; 105 I n f r a see t e x t . 106 For the d e t a i l of the Communication and the response of the Canadian Government see Barsh Indigenous North America and  Contemporary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1983) Oregon L.R. 73 a t 95 59 f i r s t l y t h a t t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o s e l f determination under A r t i c l e 1(1) has been denied; and secondly t h a t e x p l o i t a t i o n of the resources on t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l lands has destroyed game and f i s h s t ocks t o such a degree t h a t the band has been deprived of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l means of subsistence c o n t r a r y t o the terms of A r t i c l e 1(2). The Canadian government has r e p l i e d i n terms apparently of general a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l l N a t i v e Indians i n Canada; (107) In the present s t a t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a t h i n l y s c a t t e r e d m i n o r i t y group l i v i n g w i t h i n the midst of a more numerous p o p u l a t i o n grouping and occupying t e r r i t o r y co-extensive w i t h t h a t grouping cannot c l a i m t o be a people w i t h i n the meaning of A r t i c l e 1 of the Covenant. Though no f i n a l d e c i s i o n has been reached by the Committee i n respect of e i t h e r communication, the responses of the Canadian government are i n t e r e s t i n g i n and of themselves. In both cases a standard defence has been adopted i n the face of indigenous c l a i m s t o s e l f determination. In the case of the Lubicon Lake Band, i t i s t o s t r e s s t h e i r m i n o r i t y s t a t u s as a means of denying t h e i r peoplehood. In respect of the Mic Maq the age o l d t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y argument i s dragged out yet again. 5.2 Overcoming T e r r i r o r i a l I n t e g r i t y As has a l r e a s y been discussed, the r i g h t of peoples t o s e l f determination has been l i m i t e d i n p r a c t i c e by i t s c o r o l l o r y , the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of s t a t e s . The orthodox p o s i t i o n has been t h a t s e l f determination attaches only t o peoples under c o l o n i a l and a l i e n domination, not a l l peoples, and t h a t c o l o n i a l means non-continguous " s a l t water" c o l o n i e s . Those peoples l i v i n g 107 Response of the Government of Canada t o Communication No. 167/1984 (Lubicon Lake Band): Geneva May 31, 1985 w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of a l a r g e r s t a t e have a c c o r d i n g l y been t r e a t e d as m i n o r i t i e s both at i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic law. As a r e s u l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers have long considered s e l f d etermination i n p r a c t i c e t o be a r i g h t of t e r r i t o r i e s r a t h e r than peoples. The major j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y a t the expense of s e l f determination i s t h a t t o do otherwise would encourage a m u l t i t u d e of s e c e s s i o n i s t movements and m i n i - s t a t e s and comprise world peace. There are however a number of grounds f o r q u e s t i o n i n g the c r e d i b i l i t y of the p r i n c i p l e , i t s e f f i c a c y i n the post d e c o l o n i s a t i o n age as w e l l as i t s l o g i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y as a l i m i t a t i o n on the r i g h t t o s e l f determination of peoples. 5.2.1 The Enclaves and Related Examples: C r e d i b i l i t y . The enclaves (108) are examples of c o n f l i c t between the i n t e r e s t s of a s t a t e on the one hand and a s m a l l , i n most cases d i s t i n c t p o p u l a t i o n on the other. These enclaves are i n v a r i a b l e contiguous t o , or contained w i t h i n t h a t s t a t e . I n some cases, as w i t h the Ibos i n N i g e r i a or the I r i t r e a n s i n Ethopia, the m i n o r i t y enclaves seek t o secede from the s t a t e e x e r c i s i n g formal sovereignty over them. In others, f o r example the Sahrawi's of the Western Sahara or the Timorese of East Timor a neighbouring s t a t e seeks or sought r e t r o c e s s i o n of the t e r r i t o r y i n h a b i t e d by 108 The term enclave as used here denotes simply a d i s t i n c t m i n o r i t y people w i t h xome s o r t of cohesive land base or bases s u f f i c i e n t t h a t i t has the p o t e n t i a l t o form a separate p o l i t i c a l u n i t . Thus i n t h i s context i t does not i n c l u d e the unique examples of Hong Kong; Goa; I f n i ; or Macao; where the populations concerned are not d i s t i n c t . 61 the enclave on the claimed ground t h a t i t i s h i s t o r i c a l l y a p a r t of the s t a t e ' s own t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . In a l l cases, the e s s e n t i a l c o n f l i c t i s between the r i g h t of an enclave people t o s e l f determination and the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g c l a i m of the s t a t e concerned t o p r o t e c t i o n of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Thus, w i t h e t h n i c a l l y d i s t i n c t p o pulations having a t e r r i t o r i a l base and a s s e r t i n g a r i g h t t o s e l f determination independently of the claimant s t a t e , these examples i n d i c a t e the v a l i d i t y of such claims i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o those of m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples. In the case of the Sahrawi's, the Western Sahara, t h e i r homeland, was claimed both by Morocco and M a u r i t a n i a . In a landmark d e c i s i o n on the question of sovereignty over the t e r r i t o r y , the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e , without d i r e c t l y addressing the question of c o n f l i c t between the two p r i n c i p l e s , i n d i c a t e d the r e l a t i v e importance of s e l f determination. Judge Ammoun i n a separate but c o n c u r r i n g judgment commented f o r example: (109) As f o r the general p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s t o which one r e f e r s when seeking t o a s c e r t a i n the emergence of customary law, i t has i n the case of the r i g h t of peoples t o s e l f d etermination become so widespread as t o be not merely  "general" but u n i v e r s a l s i n c e i t has been so enshrined i n the Charter of the United Nations...and confirmed by the t e x t s t h a t have been mentioned: pac t s , d e c l a r a t i o n s and r e s o l u t i o n s which taken as a whole, epitomise the unanimity  of s t a t e s i n favour of the imperative r i g h t of peoples t o  s e l f determination. (emphasis added) In accord w i t h the terms of R e s o l u t i o n 1541 (110) the e x e r c i s e of t h i s now u n i v e r s a l r i g h t c o u l d r e s u l t i n something 109 Advisory Opinion i n Western Sahara [1975] ICJ Rep. 12 at 103-4 110 R e s o l u t i o n 1541(XV) p r i n c i p l e VI supra a t pp.24-5 62 other than independence — f o r example f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n or i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h another s t a t e . But the choice had t o be one f o r the people concerned t o make. I t could not be a r b i t r a r i l y imposed under a c l a i m t o t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Almost i n passing, the Court went on t o conclude i n response t o the s p e c i f i c q uestion before i t , t h a t the evidence i n d i c a t e d no t i e s of t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty between the Western Sahara and e i t h e r Morocco or M a u r i t a n i a which could a f f e c t i n any way the r i g h t of the Sahrawi people t o s e l f determination. ( I l l ) Morocco, faced w i t h d e c i s i o n and a s i m i l a r i l y adverse r e p o r t by a UN V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n t o the area (112) announced the famous "Green March" i n which 350,000 unarmed c i v i l i a n s entered the Sahara "to g a i n r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s r i g h t t o n a t i o n a l u n i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . " (113) As a r e s u l t of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s f a i l u r e t o respond d e c i s i v e l y and the General Assembly's passing of two c o n f l i c t i n g r e s o l u t i o n s on the matter, the Western Sahara was carved up by Morocco and M a u r i t a n i a i n the face of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Courts finding.(114) Sahrawi r e s i s t a n c e continues. 111 Op. c i t . note 109 at p.68 112 The V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n reported t h a t "there was an overwhelming consensus among Sahrawis w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y i n favour of independence and opposing i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h any neighbouring country." Report of the UN V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n t o the  Spanish Sahara i n Report of the S p e c i a l Committee of 24 on the Spanish Sahara. Quoted i n Frank and Hoffman S e l f Determination  i n Very Small Places (1975) 8 NYU J . I n t ' l . and P o l . 333 at 340 113 L e t t e r from Permanent Representative of Morocco t o the UN and the P r e s i d e n t of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Quoted i n Frank and Hoffman i b i d . 114 Spain acceded t o the d i v i s i o n of i t s former colony by t r i p a r t i t e agreement between i t s e l f and the two claimant s t a t e s . On November 14, 1975 The UN response was t o pass R e s o l u t i o n 3458A (XXX) r e a f f i r m i n g ...the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t t o the People of the Spanish Sahara t o s e l f determination... as w e l l as a second t a k i n g n o t i c e of the t r i p a r t i t e agreement. 63 Nonetheless, the p r i n c i p l e espoused by the Court was p l a i n enough, as was the f a c t t h a t Morocco and Mauitania's a c t i o n s were i n breach of i t . Breach of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination of peoples, t o the extent t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers recognised i t as such, simply served t o r e a f f i r m the p r i n c i p l e . East Timor was the s u b j e c t of a s i m i l a r c l a i m by neighbouring Indonesia at about the same time. Though Indonesia i n i t i a l l y i n d i c a t e d support f o r East Timorese s e l f determination, Indonesian f o r c e s subsequently invaded East Timor s t r e s s i n g t h a t the East Timorese and neighbouring Indonesian West Timorese were c u l t u r a l l y and e t h n i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l , and t h a t the i s l a n d of Timor being s i t u a t e d i n the centre of the Indonesian a r c h i p e l e g o was n a t u r a l l y w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of Indonesia. Thus i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e the East Timorese were not s t r i c t l y t o be considered a people. Secondly t h e i r t e r r i t o r y was so completely surrounded by Indonesia t h a t East Timorese independance was i m p r a c t i c a l . There i s some substance i n the former p o i n t . I f s e l f determination i s a r i g h t of peoples f i r s t and foremost, there i s some argument t h a t the East Timorese alone c o n s t i t u t e only h a l f of a people and t h a t i f s e l f determination does apply t o the Timorese a t a l l , i t a p p l i e s t o the whole p o p u l a t i o n of Timor. Nonetheless, the presumption on favour of s e l f determination over t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y i s apparently a s t r o n g one s i n c e d e s p i t e the question mark above, the UN response was t o support the East Timorese. On December 12, 1975 the General Assembly passed a r e s o l u t i o n s t r o n g l y d e p l o r i n g "the m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n of the armed fo r c e s of Indonesia i n Portuguese Timor" and c a l l i n g upon Indonesia t o "withdraw without d e l a y . . . i n order t o enable the people of the T e r r i t o r y f r e e l y t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t t o 64 s e l f determination and independance. 1 1 (115) The General Assembly f u r t h e r recommended t h a t the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l "take urgent a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Portuguese Timor and the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t of i t s peoples t o s e l f d etermination." (116) The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l condemned the Indonesian a c t i o n (117) but imposed no s a n c t i o n s . At each c o u n c i l s e s s i o n s i n c e 1975 the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l has adopted s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n s , although a recent f a l l o f f i n support f o r such r e s o l u t i o n s appears t o r e f l e c t a growing acceptance of f a i t accompli i n East Timor. (118) The case of East Timor provides an important precedent f o r the f o l l o w i n g reasons: Indonesia's argument i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t the East Timorese have no independent r i g h t t o s e l f determination but t h a t they are r e a l l y a m i n o r i t y group w i t h i n the o v e r a l l "Indonesian people". The UN response was t o d e c l a r e the d e p r i v a t i o n of the East Timorese r i g h t t o s e l f determination t o be i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. The p r i n c i p l e which may be drawn from a l l t h i s i s t h a t the s e l f determination of peoples o v e r r i d e s the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of s t a t e s — even i n s i t u a t i o n s where the "peoplehood" of the u n i t seeking s e l f d etermination i s i n doubt. 115 The c o n t r a v e s i a l nature of the whole question of East Timorese s e l f determination was however r e f l e c t e d i n the v o t i n g f i g u r e s i n respect of the r e s o l u t i o n : 72 f o r , 10 a g a i n s t , and 43 a b s t e n t i o n s . See Frank and Hoffman, note 112 a t p.348 116 GA R e s o l u t i o n 3485 para 6. (1975) UN Doc GA 5438at 262 117 SC Res 384 (1975) 30 UN SCOR 10; UN Doc S/PV 1869 118 See g e n e r a l l y Blay S e l f Determination vs T e r r i t o r i a l  I n t e g r i t y i n D e c o l o n i s a t i o n (1986) 18 NYU J . I n t ' l L and P o l . 441 a t 456 65 B e l i z e provides a f u r t h e r example of the apparent paramountcy of s e l f determination i n the face of a Guatemalan c l a i m t o h i s t o r i c a l t i t l e t o the t e r r i t o r y . I n t h a t case the UN refused t o accept any settlement between the d i s p u t a n t s (Guatemala and the UK i n respect of B e l i z e ) which was not i n accord w i t h the wishes of the p o p u l a t i o n of B e l i z e , i n t h i s case a group e t h n i c a l l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from the Guatemala p o p u l a t i o n . As f o r Guatemala's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , the UN adopted a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g on the UK t o dec o l o n i s e B e l i z e before 1981 without even mentioning the h i s t o r i c a l c l a i m of Guatemala. (119) In a second category of cases m i n o r i t y groupings have sought t o subdivide c o l o n i a l boundaries before the colony gains independance w i t h the aim of e s t a b l i s h i n g a separate p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y or i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h a neighbouring s t a t e w i t h which the m i n o r i t y group has c l o s e r t i e s . Again, such claims are analogous t o those of indigenous peoples today, the d i f f e r e n c e being only one of s t a t u s of the whole t e r r i t o r y when the c l a i m i s made. In general such claims have been r e j e c t e d as c o n t r a r y t o the p r i n c i p l e of u t i p o s s i d e t i s r e q u i r i n g post c o l o n i a l s t a t e s t o conform t o former c o l o n i a l boundaries.(120) Thus the c o n f l i c t i s once again between the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the p u t a t i v e s t a t e and the r i g h t of the sub group c l a i m i n g secession t o s e l f d etermination. 119 (1981) 35 UN GAOR Supp. (No 48) at 214-5; UN Doc A/35/48; note though t h a t Guatemala's h i s t o r i c a l c l a i m i s not g e n e r a l l y considered t o be a strong one. There e x i s t s a Treaty of 1859 between Guatemala and the UK r e c o g n i s i n g B r i t i s h sovereignty: See Frank and Hoffman note 112 a t 359-61 120 See generaly Blay note 118 a t 449-50 66 Though orthodox d o c t r i n e apparently accords pre-eminence to the p u t a t i v e s t a t e and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , the number of c o l o n i e s i n which the d o c t r i n e has not a p p l i e d could l e a d one t o question the e x i s t e n c e of the p r i n c i p l e a t a l l . Ruanda-Urundi was d i v i d e d along e t h n i c l i n e s between Rwanda dominated by the Hutus and Burundi dominated by the T u t s i s . With UN support the B r i t i s h Cameroons were d i v i d e d i n two w i t h each s e c t i o n o p t i n g f o r a d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s ; the North j o i n e d N i g e r i a and the South the State of Cameroon. The former G i l b e r t and E l l i c e I s l a n d s p r e v i o u s l y administered as a s i n g l e colony were separated by d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . The former populated by Micronesians e v e n t u a l l y became K i r i b a t i w h i l e the l a t t e r populated by Polynesians became Tuvalu.(121) In the same way I n d i a became d i v i d e d between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . In a l l the cases c i t e d , s e l f d etermination was e x e r c i s e d by peoples. who l i k e indigenous m i n o r i t y peoples, d i d not comprise a m a j o r i t y of t h e i r former t e r r i t o r i e s . As was the o b j e c t i v e of the League e r a , the s e l f d etermination of peoples overrode the i n t e g r i t y of the t e r r i t o r y concerned. The t h i r d and f i n a l category of enclave cases c o n s i s t s of the more s t r a i g h t forward claims by m i n o r i t y groupings w i t h i n the s t a t e t o secession. This s i t u a t i o n has been d e a l t w i t h s p e c i f i c a l l y by UN R e s o l u t i o n 2625 (1970) discussed e a r l i e r . (122) In essence the r e s o l u t i o n provides t h a t the r i g h t t o s e l f d etermination does not provide a p r e t e x t f o r dismemberment of the s t a t e where such s t a t e s are: 121 Pomerance: S e l f Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an I d e a l (1924) 19 I s . L. Rev. 310 at 322 122 Op. c i t . note 63 and accompanying t e x t 67 conducting themselves i n compliance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of equal r i g h t s and s e l f determination of peoples... and thus possessed of a government r e p r e s e n t i n g the whole people belonging t o the t e r r i t o r y without d i s t i n c t i o n as t o race, creed or c o l o u r . The c o r r o l l a r y of t h i s p r o v i s o i s of course t h a t i f the enclave i s not accorded equal r i g h t s and p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n then s e c e s s i o n becomes a l e g a l remedy a v a i l a b l e t o i t . The two most notable examples here are the B i a f r a n s e c e s s i o n from N i g e r i a and the Bangladesh secession from P a k i s t a n . Though the B i a f r a n s e c e s s i o n u l t i m a t e l y c o l l a p s e d i n what i s g e n e r a l l y accepted by i n t e r n a t i n a l s c h o l a r s t o be a v i n d i c t i o n of N i g e r i a ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , the secession was recognised by a number of mainly A f r i c a n and Eastern Bloc c o u n t r i e s . Even the Bangladeshi s e c e s s i o n , (123) whose success i s a t t r i b u t e d t o the a c t i v e support of the Indian army r a t h e r than any sense of r i g h t , moral or l e g a l , being on t h e i r s i d e — i s at l e a s t an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the "monolith" of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y i s not insurmountable. At the very l e a s t the 1970 R e s o l u t i o n provides a door through which a l i m i t e d number may pass. To sum up, i n a l l the examples from the three c a t e g o r i e s r e f e r r e d t o , peoples (whose r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e e x e r c i s i n g sovereignty over them i s i n essence the same as t h a t of m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples) have had t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s recognised i n s p i t e of s t a t e claims t o t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . T h i s f a c t alone i s s i g n i f i c a n t once i t i s accepted t h a t the only l e g i t i m a t e o b s t a c l e standing between indigenous peoples and s e l f determination i s the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 123 The secession of Bangladesh from P a k i s t a n i s a l s o unique i n t h a t the two t e r r i t o r i e s were not contiguous. Commentators have never t h e l e s s been r e l u c t a n t t o e x p l a i n the success of the sece s s i o n on t h a t b a s i s alone. 68 "sacred cow". Commentators have argued t h a t s t a t e and UN p r a c t i c e make a d i s t i n c t i o n between secession from an independent s t a t e on one hand and r e t r o c e s s i o n or s u b d i v i s i o n of pre-independance c o l o n i e s on the other. (124) To admit t h a t such d i s t i n c t i o n s are made apparently f o r no r a t i o n a l reason except f o r p o l i t i c a l convenience, i s t o admit t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y i s not a p r i n c i p l e a t a l l but as Pomerance suggests, simply a t o o l t o be manipulated. (125) Be t h a t as i t may, i t remains t h a t d e s p i t e UN and academic dogma i n r e l a t i o n t o t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , examples e x i s t showing i t s s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o the s e l f determination of peoples i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r i n p r i n c i p l e t o t h a t of m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples. 5.2.2 E f f i c a c y and Consistency There are at l e a s t three other bases f o r q u e s t i o n i n g the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o b s t a c l e t o indigenous s e l f determination. Two w i l l be discussed here, w h i l e a t h i r d and major reason w i l l be the s u b j e c t of a separate s e c t i o n . The f i r s t r e l a t e s simply t o i t s continued relevance i n the post d e c o l o n i s a t i o n age. I t was designed as a means of r e s t r i c t i n g d e c o l o n i s a t i o n t o the g e n e r a l l y recognised c o l o n i e s , and t o avo i d having t o grapple w i t h i s s u e s of i n t e r n a l c o l o n i a l i s m . Now t h a t t h i s process i s a l l but complete, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , i n s t e a d of being a s a f e t y v a l v e , w i l l serve only t o s u f f o c a t e the continued dynamism of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination. Thus, the r e s t r i c t e d a p p l i c a t i o n of s e l f d etermination t o e x t e r n a l c o l o n i e s only, i n a world where 124 See g e n e r a l l y Blay note 118 at 449 125 Pomerance, note 121 at 328 69 e x t e r n a l c o l o n i e s no longer e x i s t , w i l l i n e v i t a b l y condemn s e l f d etermination t o the h i s t o r y books. Current UN a c t i v i t y i n the area of m i n o r i t i e s and e s p e c i a l l y indigenous m i n o r i t i e s suggests t h a t the UN i s anxious t o maintain and enhance the continued relevance of s e l f determination i n the post c o l o n i a l era. The second p o i n t r e l a t e s t o the d e c l a r e d o b j e c t i v e of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . This was, as noted, p r i m a r i l y t o ensure world peace by d i s c o u r a g i n g the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of s t a t e s through s e c e s s i o n i s t wars. In f a c t some of the most b r u t a l wars of modern times have r e s u l t e d from s t a t e claims t o t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . The Indonesian war w i t h FRETILIN of East Timor f o r example caused the deaths of 10% of the East Timorese p o p u l a t i o n — 60,000 people. In a d d i t i o n 50,000 were fo r c e d t o leave the t e r r i t o r y as refugees. (126) The Moroccan "Green March" i n t o the Western Sahara caused 60,000 Sahrawis — three q u a r t e r s of the p o p u l a t i o n — t o seek refuge p r i m a r i l y i n A l g e r i a . (127) The P r e s i d e n t - e l e c t of the T h i r t y F i r s t General Assembly warned the T h i r d World not t o condone the use of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y as a means "to r e p l a c e the o l d i m p e r i a l i s m by another form of f o r e i g n c o n t r o l founded on t e r r i t o r i a l claims."(128) Thus, not only i s i t questionable whether the p r i n c i p l e ever achieved i t s o b j e c t i v e of promoting world s t a b i l i t y , t here i s evidence t h a t i t a c t u a l l y caused wars. 126 Frank and Hoffman note 112 a t 348 127 I b i d , a t 341 128 UN Doc. A/C4/SR.2175, Fourth Committee a t 15 Nov 27 1975. Quoted at i b i d p.342 70 5.3 S e l f Determination as a Continuum: I n t e r n a l S e l f  Determination The t h i r d and f i n a l reason i s t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y was never intended t o be used as an o b s t a c l e t o s e l f determination i n the f i r s t p l a c e . I t was designed t o prevent the dismemberment of s t a t e s . As already discussed, the problem was t h a t the UN of the 1960's and 1970's equated s e l f determination w i t h secession and independance, so t h a t any c l a i m t o s e l f determination by a n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y was a u t o m a t i c a l l y seem i n terms of a t h r e a t t o the u n i t y of the s t a t e concerned. Such was not the i n t e n t i o n of the d r a f t e r s of the UN Charter. Nor indeed i s i t apparent i n the t e x t s of the major d e c o l o n i s a t i o n instruments. D i s c u s s i o n s during the d r a f t i n g of the UN Charter i n 1945 i n d i c a t e what was a c t u a l l y intended by the phrase " s e l f determination of peoples" as used i n A r t i c l e s 1(2) and 55(1). The B e l g i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e at the t a l k s , f e a r i n g t h a t "peoples" could i n c l u d e sub-national groupings as w e l l as s t a t e s , sought t o pre-empt t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y by proposing a c l a u s e g i v i n g g r e a t e r weight t o the r i g h t s of s t a t e s and i m p l y i n g t h a t "peoples" meant s t a t e p o p u l a t i o n s . (129) This proposal was r e j e c t e d by a two-t h i r d s m a j o r i t y at the meeting on the b a s i s t h a t the Charter should extend t h i s r i g h t t o s t a t e s , nations and peoples. This broad a p p l i c a t i o n of s e l f determination was considered the only way t o achieve u n i v e r s a l peace and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . ( 1 3 0 ) 129 The proposed amendment t o A r t i c l e 1(2) provided:To strengthen i n t e r n a t i o n a l order on the b a s i s of respect f o r the e s s e n t i a l r i g h t and e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s and of the peoples' r i g h t t o s e l f determination. (1945) 6 UNCIO Docs p.300; From Umozurike S e l f Determination at  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1972) p.45 130 Ibid,(1945) 6 UNCIO Docs at 703-5; Referred t o i n Umozurike 71 In r e l a t i o n t o the i n c l u s i o n of the phrase " s e l f d e termination of peoples" i n the Charter the d r a f t i n g Sub-Committee reported:(131) Concerning the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination, i t was s t r o n g l y emphasised t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e corresponded c l o s e l y t o the w i l l and d e s i r e s of peoples everywhere and should be c l e a r l y enunciated i n the Charter; on the other s i d e , i t was s t a t e d t h a t the p r i n c i p l e conformed t o the purposes of the Charter only so f a r as i t i m p l i e d the r i g h t of s e l f  government of peoples and not the r i g h t of s e c e s s i o n . (emphasis added) Thus the Charter, l i k e the League m i n o r i t i e s system, recognised a grey area short of secession w i t h i n which the r i g h t t o s e l f determination continued t o have meaning. I t was t h i s area which was intended t o v i n d i c a t e the r i g h t of m i n o r i t y peoples t o s e l f determination. In the same way R e s o l u t i o n 1514 confirms a r i g h t of s e l f d etermination f o r a l l peoples. Only s e c e s s i o n i s t movements are outlawed. R e s o l u t i o n 2625 makes the same p o i n t . Though applying o n l y t o e x t e r n a l c o l o n i e s , R e s o l u t i o n 1541 concerning non s e l f governing t e r r i t o r i e s makes i t abundantly c l e a r t h a t s e l f d etermination i s not a synonym f o r secession. I t may a l s o be expressed through f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n or i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h another s t a t e . F i n a l l y there i s Common A r t i c l e One of the 1966 Covenants on c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , and economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l r i g h t s . Without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i t provides: (1) A l l peoples have the r i g h t t o s e l f determination. By v i r t u e of t h a t r i g h t they f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l development. (emphasis added) 131 I b i d . 72 Thus as one w r i t e r puts i t , (132) The c o n c l u s i o n i s inescapable t h a t the d e c o l o n i s a t i o n of n e a r l y a l l overseas c o l o n i e s has not rendered the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination obsolete. N e i t h e r i s the content of the p r i n c i p l e as d i c t a t e d by i t s fundamental i d e a l exhausted by such d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , nor i s there an absence of peoples f o r whose p o l i t i c a l e x i s t e n c e the p r i n c i p l e had s i g n i f i c a n c e even though these peoples are beyond the scope of the p a r t i c u l a r f o r m u l a t i o n used by the UN f o r i d e n t i f y i n g peoples t o whom s e l f determination i s t o be accorded. That comment was made i n 1973. I t can no longer be s a i d as c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t the peoples t o whom the w r i t e r r e f e r s are i n f a c t "beyond the scope" of s e l f determination. The post d e c o l o n i s a t i o n era has seen the growth of a school of thought c h a l l e n g i n g the i n f l e x i b i l i t y of the UN p r i n c i p l e of s e l f d etermination. Buccheit i n 1978 proposed t h a t s e l f determination should now be seen as a continuum, w i t h secession as i t s u l t i m a t e , but not s o l e v i n d i c a t i o n . ( 1 3 3 ) Pomerance suggests t h a t the complexity of cu r r e n t claims t o s e l f determination r e q u i r e s o l u t i o n s of corresponding complexity. He s t a t e s t h i s view i n these terms:(134) Such complexity can only be handled by means of a f l e x i b l e  approach which sees s e l f determination as a continuum of  r i g h t s , as a p l e t h o r a of p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s , r a t h e r than as  a r i g i d absolute r i g h t t o f u l l " e x t e r n a l " s e l f determination  i n the form of complete independence. The "choice of the 132 Sinha, I s S e l f Determination Passe? (1973) Colum. J Tr a n s n a t ' l L. 260 at 273 133 Buccheit Secession: The Legitimacy of S e l f Determination (1978) at 222 134 Pomerance note 121 a t 73 73 c h o i c e s " t o be o f f e r e d t o a " s e l f " e x e r c i s i n g the r i g h t of s e l f determination may need t o be determined by others and not by the " s e l f " which i s being consulted. (Indeed, as has been seen, t h i s c o i n c i d e s w i t h c u r r e n t law and much of past p r a c t i c e . ) Independence, or other o p t i o n s , may need t o be precluded — even i f d e s i r e d by the " s e l f " concerned. Such a l t e r n a t i v e s as f e d e r a l schemes, autonomy, m i n o r i t y r i g h t s  guarantees of n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and the r i g h t of "o p t i o n " may present themselves as forms of s e l f determination best s u i t e d t o the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances. (emphasis added) Of course none of t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y new, i t i s simply being r e d i s c o v e r e d . Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l c a t e r g o r i s e d the Cherokee as "domestic dependent n a t i o n " enjoying a r e s i d u a l r i g h t t o i n t e r n a l s e l f government w i t h i n the o v e r a l l US f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e . F u rther, as noted, l o c a l autonomy f o r m i n o r i t y peoples was used e x t e n s i v e l y under the League of Nations as a way of s t r i k i n g a balance between the m i n o r i t y and the s t a t e so as, i n the i n t e r e s t s of world peace, t o remove m i n o r i t y grievances w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g the u n i t y of the s t a t e . Thus, i t w i l l be remembered, the Ruthenes were granted "the f u l l e s t degree of s e l f government compatible w i t h the u n i t y of the Czecho-Slovak s t a t e . " S i m i l a r i l y the S o v i e t c o n s t i t u t i o n guarantees a r i g h t of s e l f determination t o the Russian peoples, but again t o be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e of S o v i e t f e d e r a l i s m . The idea t h a t s e l f determination can be s a t i s f i e d through the e x e r c i s e of a measure of l o c a l autonomy or s e l f government has come t o be known as " i n t e r n a l s e l f determination". I t has the important advantage of p r o v i d i n g a s o l u t i o n t o m a j o r i t y / m i n o r i t y c o n f l i c t which i s f l e x i b l e , and capable of adapting t o the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the p a r t i e s . Thus, r a t h e r than causing c o n f l i c t as the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y p r o t a g o n i s t s would have i t , the r e c o g n i t i o n of m i n o r i t y " i n t e r n a l 74 s e l f d etermination" i n f a c t provides an avenue f o r the p a r t i e s t o a v o i d c o n f l i c t . According t o Suzuki; (135) When a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l group c o n s t i t u t e s the power apparatus by which a given body p o l i t i c c o n t r o l s i t s t e r r i t o r y or i n h a b i t a n t s , i t s a u t h o r i t y i s d e r i v e d from the community's expectations regarding i t s appropriateness as a d e c i s i o n maker. Demands f o r a separate p u b l i c order system by a sub group which had a t e r r i t o r i a l base w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g t e r r i t o r i a l community r e s u l t from a l o s s of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the broader a s s o c i a t i o n s as a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the sub groups expectations regarding who i s t o govern whom. Ac c o r d i n g l y , r e c o g n i t i o n of a r i g h t t o i n t e r n a l s e l f d etermination may be seen e i t h e r as ameans of p r e v e n t i n g a l o s s of m i n o r i t y a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the broader s t a t e , or as a means of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g sub-group n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e i n order t o avoid c o n f l i c t . The grant of autonomy t o Southern Sudan i n 1972 f o r example terminated f o r a considerable time t h a t area's secessionism. On the other hand the E r i t r e a n c o n f l i c t i n E t h i o p i a was the r e s u l t of E t h i o p i a n ' s v i o l a t i o n , i n 1962, of the 1952 f e d e r a t i o n agreement which e s t a b l i s h e d E r i t r e a as an autonomous u n i t . 5.4 The A p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s Concept t o Indigenous Peoples Adopting f o r the moment Pomerance's model of s e l f d etermination, the next question i s what might i t mean on the ground f o r indigenous peoples. That i s , a t what p o i n t along Pomerance's "continuum of r i g h t s or p l e t h o r a of p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s " do m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples f i t ? The answer, i t i s submitted, may be found i n a new paradigm whose nature i s 135 Suzuki S e l f Determination and World P u b l i c Order:  Community Response t o T e r r i t o r i a l Separation (1976) 16 V i r g i n i a J . I n t ' l 779 75 d i c t a t e d by a combination of the two l e v e l s of s e l f determination d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s chapter. Recognition of indigenous peoples as " s p e c i a l " m i n o r i t i e s y i e l d s t h a t p a r t of the paradigm which may be c o n v e n i e n t l y l a b e l l e d the " c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l p e r s p e c t i v e " . This p e r s p e c t i v e has i t s b a s i s i n the t h r e a t t o indigenous c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l posed by the hegemony of the m a j o r i t y s e t t l e r c u l t u r e s . In a sense i t may be t r a c e d t o the c o l l e c t i v e approach t o m i n o r i t y r i g h t s adopted by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community duri n g the League era i n order t o combat the pressure c o n f r o n t i n g a l l m i n o r i t i e s t o a s s i m i l a t e . I t s substance t h e r e f o r e i s s e l f e vident. This l e v e l of s e l f determination r e q u i r e s a degree of autonomy w i t h i n the s t a t e s u f f i c i e n t t o ensure the s u r v i v a l of indigenous peoples whose c u l t u r e s , languages and world views c o n t r a s t d r a m a t i c a l l y w i t h those of s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n s . The second and most important h a l f of the paradigm g i v e s emphasis t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between indigenous peoples and the T h i r d World. That i s , i t approaches indigenous s e l f d etermination from a p e r s p e c t i v e which h i g h l i g h t s t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary s t a t u s as c o l o n i s e d peoples. At t h i s l e v e l , s e l f determination becomes important not j u s t as a v e c h i c l e f o r c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l but as a n a t u r a l expression of "peoplehood" which has been suppressed s i n c e c o l o n i s a t i o n and continues t o be suppressed. This p a r t of the paradigm evokes the same " l i b e r a t i o n " terminology used i n the 1960's and 1970's by the T h i r d World dur i n g i t s process of d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e indigenous s e l f determination too takes on an added d e c o l o n i s a t i o n dimension which transcends i s s u e s of c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l (though such i s s u e s are c l e a r l y important), and demands 76 the r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h i n the n a t i o n s t a t e of s e l f governing indigenous p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s . Thus, t h i s emergent r i g h t of indigenous s e l f determination, i f viewed i n terms of t h i s paradigm, may be best c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a h y b r i d of i t s " m i n o r i t y peoples" and " d e c o l o n i s a t i o n " r o o t s , having elements of both, though combined i n a manner which r e f l e c t s t o some extent the unique concerns of m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples. Beyond t h i s f a i r l y broad framework the d e t a i l s are r a t h e r more e l u s i v e . This i s so because although the m i n o r i t y / d e c o l o n i s a t i o n paradigm holds t r u e i n a l l cases, the i n d i v i d u a l circumstances of indigenous peoples around the world vary so g r e a t l y t h a t a s i n g l e model f o r a l l would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . There are never t h e l e s s , common threads or issues running through a l l cases which make i t p o s s i b l e t o compile a "shopping l i s t " of r e l e v a n t concerns which must be addressed i n adapting i n t e r n a l s e l f determination t o given circumstances. Asbjorn Eide l i s t s s i x such concerns;(136) F i r s t , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of the indigenous populations t o be separate, w i t h i n d e f i n e d t e r r i t o r i e s , and t h e i r r i g h t on the other hand t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the wider s o c i e t y as i n d i v i d u a l s on a b a s i s of non-d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Second, t h e i r r i g h t w i t h i n t h e i r h a b i t a t t o land and other resources, i n c l u d i n g water resources. T h i r d , t h e i r r i g h t t o determine or i n f l u e n c e development p r o j e c t s a f f e c t i n g those t e r r i t o r i e s . Fourth, t h e i r r i g h t t o decide on or i n f l u e n c e 136 Eide UN A c t i o n on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples i n The  R i g h t s of Indigenous Peoples i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (Ruth Thompson ed.) (1978) 11 a t p.25 the system of education, which i s e s s e n t i a l t o the maintenance of c u l t u r e . F i f t h , t h e i r r i g h t c o l l e c t i v e l y t o organise t h e i r r e l i g i o u s l i f e i n accordance w i t h t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n s . S i x t h , w i t h i n some l i m i t s t o c o n t r o l the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e i r own customary law w i t h regard t o such matters as land use, t r a n s f e r of p roperty and i n h e r i t a n c e . The T h i r d Assembly of the World C o u n c i l of Indigenous Peoples i n 1981 produced a d r a f t convention on Indigenous Peoples R i g h t s . That convention used, as a f i r s t step, the formula contained i n R e s o l u t i o n 1541 and the 1966 Covenants: (137) A l l peoples have the r i g h t t o s e l f d etermination. By v i r t u e of t h a t r i g h t Indigenous Peoples may f r e e l y determine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and f r e e l y pursue t h e i r economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l development. (emphasis added) A l a t e r d r a f t a r t i c l e goes on t o suggest the v a r i o u s forms which the e x e r c i s e of t h a t s e l f determination may take:(138) One manner which the r i g h t of s e l f determination can be r e a l i s e d i s by the f r e e determination of an Indigenous People t o a s s o c i a t e t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h one or more s t a t e s i n a manner i n v o l v i n g f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n , r e g i o n a l autonomy, home r u l e or a s s o c i a t e statehood as s e l f governing u n i t s . Indigenous Peoples may f r e e l y determine those r e l a t i o n s h i p s a f t e r they have been e s t a b l i s h e d . Again what i s s t r e s s e d here i s f l e x i b i l i t y , even where the word formulae adhere c l o s e l y , as i n t h i s case, t o e x i s t i n g UN instruments. The e v o l u t i o n toward a r e c o g n i t i o n a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law of a r i g h t of indigenous peoples t o i n t e r n a l s e l f determination i s not 137 P a r t I , A r t i c l e 1. Quoted i n Eide supra a t 27 138 I b i d , P a r t I , A r t i c l e 3. 78 yet a f a i t accompli. Events over recent years a f f e c t i n g indigenous peoples suggest at l e a s t t h a t t h i s i s the d i r e c t i o n i n which the law i s e v o l v i n g , and t h a t t h i s process of e v o l u t i o n i s g a t h e r i n g speed. The re-emergence of indigenous i s s u e s a f t e r the "dark ages" of UN d e c o l o n i s a t i o n began i n the l a t e 1970 7s. In 1977 UN Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) h e l d a conference i n Geneva on d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t indigenous populations i n the Americas. The conference adopted a "commentary on indigenous r i g h t s " d r a f t e d by indigenous r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and s t y l e d the " D e c l a r a t i o n of P r i n c i p l e s f o r the Defence of Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere".(139) Apart from the d i s c r e d i t t e d ILO Convention 107, t h i s was the f i r s t time the r i g h t s of indigenous peoples had been the s o l e s u bject of such a d e c l a r a t i o n . I t d e a l t e x t e n s i v e l y w i t h the s t a t u s of indigenous peoples, t r e a t i e s and r i g h t s t o s e l f government and s e l f determination. In respect of s e l f determination, the d e c l a r a t i o n provided t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s of s e l f government; i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the determination of membership or c i t i z e n s h i p ; occupation o f t h e i r l a n d ; the a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n over them except i n accordance w i t h the terms of t r e a t i e s are a l l i n t r u s i o n s upon the r i g h t of indigenous s e l f determination.(140) In 1978, as p a r t of the UN sponsored "Decade t o Combat Racism", a World Conference t o Combat Racism and R a c i a l D i s c r i m i n a t i o n was h e l d i n Geneva and attended by 125 c o u n t i e s . 139 I n t e r n a t i o n a l NGO Conference on D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Against Indigenous Populations i n the Americas 1977 (Sept 20-24); Geneva Statement and F i n a l Documents 4,5 (1978) 140 Referred t o i n Barsh Indigenous North America and  Contemporary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1983) 62 Oregon 1 Rev 73 a t 100 79 The d e c l a r a t i o n of the World Conference made general p o i n t s i n respect of m i n o r i t y groupings but a l s o made p r o v i s i o n f o r indigenous peoples as a s p e c i a l category. A r t i c l e 21 recorded the Conference's endordement of (141) the r i g h t of indigenous peoples t o maintain t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of economy and c u l t u r e , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r own language, and a l s o [ i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of] the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of indigenous peoples t o t h e i r land... A r t i c l e 8 of the more s p e c i f i c "Program of A c t i o n " i n c l u d e d i n the D e c l a r a t i o n set out a l i s t of c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s i n s p e c i f i c areas. These in c l u d e d the r i g h t of indigenous peoples t o c a l l themselves by t h e i r own name, t o have an o f f i c i a l s t a t u s , t o form t h e i r own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s as w e l l as ...(c) To c a r r y on w i t h i n t h e i r areas of settlement t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of economy and way of l i f e ; t h i s should i n no way a f f e c t t h e i r r i g h t s t o p a r t i c i p a t e f r e e l y on equal b a s i s i n the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l development of the country. (d) To maintain and use t h e i r own language wherever p o s s i b l e f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and education. (e) To r e c i e v e i n f o r m a t i o n and education i n t h e i r own language, w i t h due regard t o t h e i r needs as expressed by themselves, and t o disseminate i n f o r m a t i o n regarding t h e i r needs and problems. A second NGO Conference on "Indigenous Peoples and The Land" i n 1981 i n i t i a t e d the next phase i n the development of indigenous r i g h t s by s u c c e s s f u l l y c a l l i n g f o r the c r e a t i o n of a UN Working Group on the i s s u e . Meanwhile i n 1971 the Economic and S o c i a l C o u n c i l of the UN, a body which had p r e v i o u s l y s a i d next t o nothing about the i s s u e , a u t h o r i s e d a massive study t o be undertaken of the s p e c i a l problems of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t indigenous peoples.(142) The 141 UN Doc A/CONF. 92/40 a t 14 (1978) Quoted i n Hudson The  Ri g h t s of Indigenous Peoples i n Nation and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law - A  Canadian P e r s p e c t i v e LL.M Thesis (M c G i l l ) (1984) p.97 142 ECOSOC R e s o l u t i o n 1589(L) 21 May 1971 80 r e s u l t was the e p i c Martinez-Cobo Report which took 12 years t o complete.(143) Though s t y l e d as a study of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t indigenous peoples, S p e c i a l Rapporteur Martinez-Cobo soon found t h a t approach inadequate i n addressing the i s s u e s . The p a r t i c u l a r problems of m i n o r i t y indigenous peoples, he found were not rooted i n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but i n a f a i l u r e of domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t o recognise c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s s u b s i s t i n g i n indigenous m i n o r i t i e s as peoples. Hence i n h i s view:(144) s e l f determination i n i t s many forms must be recognised as the b a s i c p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the enjoyment by indigenous peoples of t h e i r fundamental r i g h t s and the determination of t h e i r own f a t e . T h i s simple statement represents an important breakthrough i n t h i n k i n g i n indigenous i s s u e s . I t i n d i c a t e s the p r o g r e s s i v e development away from an i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s framework and toward an i n c r e a s i n g l y acceptable concept of indigenous s e l f d etermination. In a d d i t i o n , i t suggests t h a t s e l f determination w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be seen as a benchmark standard r a t h e r than one of a v a r i e t y of options. Most im p o r t a n t l y , Martinez-Cobo makes i t c l e a r t h a t indigenous s e l f determination must be accepted, not as a separate and i s o l a t e d r i g h t , but as the ap p r o p r i a t e s t r u c t u r a l context w i t h i n which land, c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s should be expressed. Martinez-Cobo a l s o s e t out something of the nature and content of s e l f determination as i t should apply t o indigenous peoples:(145) 143 UN Study of the Problems of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t Indigenous Populations, S p e c i a l Rapporteur Jose Martinez-Cobo UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/476/ add.4 e t c 144 UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1985/21/ Add 8, para 380 145 I b i d , paras 579 and 581 81 Any measures designed t o achieve the proper p a r t i c i p a t i o n of indigenous communities i n a l l matters i n f l u e n c i n g t h e i r l i v e s must respect and support the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s of such p o p u l a t i o n s , s i n c e those s t r u c t u r e s form p a r t of t h e i r c u l t u r a l and l e g a l h e r i t a g e and have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r cohesion and t o the maintenance of t h e i r s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , Governments must abandon t h e i r p o l i c i e s of i n t e r v e n i n g i n  the o r g a n i s a t i o n and development of indigenous peoples and  must grant them autonomy, together w i t h the c a p a c i t y f o r managing the r e l e v a n t economic processes i n the manner which they themselves deem appropriate t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and needs... I t must a l s o be recognised t h a t the r i g h t t o s e l f determination e x i s t s at v a r i o u s l e v e l s and i n c l u d e s economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . In essence, i t c o n s t i t u t e s the e x e r c i s e of f r e e choice by indigenous peoples who must, t o a l a r g e extent, c r e a t e the  s p e c i f i c content of t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i n both i t s i n t e r n a l and  e x t e r n a l expressions, which do not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e the  r i g h t t o secede from the State i n which they l i v e and t o set themselves up as sovereign e n t i t i e s . T h i s r i g h t may i n f a c t be expressed i n v a r i o u s forms of autonomy w i t h i n the S t a t e , i n c l u d i n g the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o be d i f f e r e n t and t o be considered d i f f e r e n t , as recognised i n the statement on Race and R a c i a l P r e j u d i c e adopted by UNESCO i n 1978. (emphasis added) Thus, i t i s b a s i c a l l y percieved as a r i g h t t o l i m i t e d l o c a l autonomy — l i m i t e d i n the sense t h a t i t would not normally i n c l u d e a r i g h t t o secession. The emphasis on s e l f determination as a means of m a i n t a i n i n g the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e of the peoples concerned, and the reference t o the " c o l l e c t i v e " r i g h t t o be d i f f e r e n t , makes i t c l e a r t h a t i t i s grounded i n concepts of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s and p r o t e c t i o n as w e l l as the more p o p u l a r l y a c c r e d i t t e d UN law on d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . Indeed much of the terminology used here and i n other contexts, i s more reminiscent of the League m i n o r i t i e s p r o t e c t i o n system and the A l b a n i a  M i n o r i t y Schools case than i t i s of UN R e s o l u t i o n 1514 and so on. Of course t h i s makes p e r f e c t sense when i t i s remembered t h a t the s u b j e c t matter of t h i s developing law are m i n o r i t i e s as w e l l as peoples. As such they are able t o draw on two d i s t i n c t 82 i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t r a d i t i o n s and are i n the process now of developing a t h i r d which has c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of those t r a d i t i o n s as w e l l as elements unique t o the experiences of m i n o r i t y peoples who are a l s o indigenous. Examples of the l a t t e r i n c l u d e the u n i v e r s a l l y h e l d reverence f o r , and s p i r i t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the land and environment, communal s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , reverence f o r e l d e r s and so f o r t h . The view t h a t the context of s e l f determination should be determined l a r g e l y by the indigenous peoples themselves r e f l e c t s the d i v e r s i t y of the circumstances of these peoples on the ground. These d i f f e r e n c e s i n h i s t o r y and experience under a m u l t i t u d e of i n t e r n a l c o l o n i a l regimes makes the s e t t i n g of uniform standards as t o content extremely d i f f i c u l t , though perhaps not impossible. Thus Martinez-Cobo adopts the s e n s i b l e p o s i t i o n of a l l o w i n g the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination t o f r e e l y adapt t o i n d i v i d u a l circumstances. The Report has had only a l i m i t e d impact on the UN s t r u c t u r e g e n e r a l l y . I t has been c r i t i c i s e d by commentators as o v e r l y long, as outdated i n p a r t s and incomplete i n others.(146) Nonetheless, the feedback t h a t has been forthcoming from UN bodies has been p o s i t i v e . The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n and the P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s (the body which sponsored the Report) subsequently d e s c r i b e d i t as "a work of d e f i n i t i v e usefulness".(147) In a d d i t i o n , the Working Group on Indigenous Populations which had by t h i s time been e s t a b l i s h e d , was d i r e c t e d t o r e l y on the r e p o r t i n i t s t a s k of 146 See eg. Sanders The UN Working Group on Indigenous  Populations Unpublished Report 26 Sept, 1987 a t p.3 147 Sub Comm'n Res 1984/35A Preamble 83 d r a f t i n g a s e t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards i n r e l a t i o n t o indigenous peoples.(148) Thus the Report c l e a r l y represents the f i r s t major step toward r e c o g n i t i o n of s e l f determination f o r indigenous peoples, a t l e a s t s i n c e 1945. Since the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Reports' recommendations i n 1983, matters have proceeded a t a d i z z y i n g pace. So much so i n f a c t t h a t Barsh w r i t i n g i n 1986 f e l t s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n f i d e n t t o s t a t e t h a t the consensus among s t a t e s i s ; (149) ...some form of separate i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e f o r indigenous communities, a l b e i t more or l e s s w i t h i n the framework of the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t e , has become a r e l a t i v e l y r e s p e c t i b l e concept. Though i n t e n t i o n a l l y couched i n cautious and ambiguous language, t h i s s t i l l represents c o n s i d e r a b l e progress on the view h e l d i n the 1960's and 1970's t h a t i f indigenous peoples had a r i g h t t o vote then t h a t was s u f f i c i e n t s e l f d etermination. Arch a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t s t a t e s i n North America and A u s t r a l a s i a are now beginning t o accept the idea t h a t indigenous autonomy w i t h i n the framework of the s t a t e could form the b a s i s of government p o l i c y — and t h a t e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s norms are inadequate t o d e a l w i t h the problems of t h e i r indigenous peoples. The next step i n t h i s p r o g r e s s i o n was the establishment i n 1982 of the UN Working Group i n Indigenous Populations mentioned e a r l i e r . ( 1 5 0 ) The c r e a t i o n of t h i s body removed a l l doubt as t o 148 Sub Comm'n Res 1985/22 para. 4(a) 149 Barsh Indigenous Peoples an Emerging Object of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law (1986) 80 AJIL 369 at 377 150 The Working Group was e s t a b l i s h e d on the recommendations of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n and P r o t e c t i o n of M i n o r i t i e s and subsequently approved by the Human 84 the r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of indigenous peoples and questions as appr o p r i a t e s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Convened as a group of supposedly n o n - p o l i t i c a l "experts" i t s mandate was i n two p a r t s ; (1) t o review developments p e r t a i n i n g t o the promotion and p r o t e c t i o n of the human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms of indigenous p o p u l a t i o n s . . . t o analyse such m a t e r i a l s , and t o submit i t s c o n c l u s i o n t o the subcommission, and (2) t o g i v e s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o the e v o l u t i o n of standards concerning the r i g h t s of indigenous p o p u l a t i o n s , t a k i n g account of both the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s i t u a t i o n s and a s p i r a t i o n s of indigenous p o p u l a t i o n s throughout the world. In 1984 a number of indigenous o r g a n i s a t i o n s along w i t h A u s t r a l i a and Canada expressed concern t h a t the Working Group was simply c o m p i l i n g data u n c r i t i c a l l y . The Sub-Commission i s s u e d a request which s i g n i f i e d the next and most recent step i n the pro g r e s s i o n toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t of indigenous s e l f determination. The Working Group was i n s t r u c t e d thence f o r t h to;(151) ..."focus i t s a t t e n t i o n on the p r e p a r a t i o n of standards on the r i g h t s of indigenous peoples" and a c c o r d i n g l y "to consider i n 1985, the d r a f t i n g of a body of p r i n c i p l e s on Indigenous r i g h t s based on r e l e v a n t n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , i n t e r n a t i o n a l instruments and other j u r i d i c a l c r i t e r i a . " The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e of the Sub-Commission was made even c l e a r e r i n a 1985 r e s o l u t i o n n o t i n g the Working Group's submission t o the Sub-Commission's request. The Sub-Commission endorsed the Working Groups' (152) . . . d e c i s i o n t o emphasis i n i t s forthcoming s e s s i o n s the p a r t of i t s mandate r e l a t e d t o standart s e t t i n g a c t i v i t i e s , w i t h  the aim of producing, i n due course, a d r a f t d e c l a r a t i o n on Rig h t s Commission and ECOSOC [Sub-Comm. Res 2 (XXXIV) (1981); Comm. Res 1982/19; ECOSOC Res 1982/34 151 Sub-Comm Res 1984/35B (Aug 27) 152 Sub-Comm Res 1984/22 (Aug 29) 85 indigenous r i g h t s which may be proclaimed by the General  Assembly. (emphasis added) A concrete f i r s t step t h e r e f o r e w i l l be the padding of a non-binding UN d e c l a r a t i o n i n the r i g h t s of indigenous peoples. The f i r s t ever. Most governments appear now t o accept the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of such a d e c l a r a t i o n . This has been r e f l e c t e d i n an inc r e a s e i n governmental observer d e l e g a t i o n s t o the Working Group se s s i o n s . While only Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark expressed more than " i n t e r e s t " i n the Working Group at i t s f i r s t s e s s i o n , the 1985 s e s s i o n e l l i c i t e d comments of p r a i s e from many governments d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d — i n c l u d i n g A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . In a d d i t i o n , although the Human Ri g h t s Commission vote on the establishment of the Working Group produced seven abstentions from L a t i n America and Eastern Bloc countries,(153) i t s recent mandate t o begin d r a f t i n g was adopted by the Commission without the need f o r a vote.(154) I t i s rumoured t h a t the Working Group i s p l a n n i n g t o produce the d r a f t d e c l a r a t i o n by 1992 so as t o c o i n c i d e w i t h the cinq u e c e n t e n n i a l of the "discovery" of the Americas and a proposed " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Year of Indigenous Peoples." (155) Given the very p o s i t i v e feedback from s t a t e s about the Working Group's a c t i v i t i e s , a f i v e year t i m e t a b l e does not at t h i s stage seem u n r e a l i s t i c . 153 Comm Res 1982/19 154 Comm Res 1985/21 155 See eg Barsh note 147 at p.369 86 There are f a i r l y c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n s already t h a t indigenous s e l f determination w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n the d e c l a r a t i o n i n some form. F i r s t l y the "Plan of A c t i o n " f o r the Group's 5th s e s s i o n t o be h e l d i n 1987 has a t the top of i t s l i s t of d r a f t i n g p r i o r i t i e s a " c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r i g h t t o autonomy, s e l f government and s e l f determination, i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n s . " ( 1 5 6 ) This ensures t h a t the i s s u e w i l l be discussed and, although there i s no guarantee of r e s u l t s , i t s p r i o r i t y s t a t u s on the agenda r e f l e c t s i t s c u r r e n t r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . Secondly, E r i c a Irene Daes the present ch a i r p e r s o n of the Working Group has i n d i c a t e d her own personal support f o r the concept of indigenous s e l f determination.(157) In her view the o v e r a l l p r i n c i p l e of s e l f determination e x i s t s at s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s and d i s t i n c t i o n s should be made between them. The f i r s t i s e x t e r n a l s e l f determination, the r i g h t of an e n t i t y t o determine i t s own i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . The second i s the r i g h t of a s t a t e p o p u l a t i o n (not people) t o determine i t s form of government. T h i r d l y , the r i g h t of a s t a t e t o maintain n a t i o n a l u n i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and t o govern without o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . F o u r t h l y , the r i g h t of developing c o u n t r i e s t o c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and economic development. She d e s c r i b e the f i n a l dimension i n the f o l l o w i n g terms;(158) The r i g h t of a m i n o r i t y or an indigenous group or n a t i o n mainly w i t h i n s t a t e boundaries t o s p e c i a l r i g h t s r e l a t e d not only t o p r o t e c t i o n and n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , but p o s s i b l y t o the r i g h t t o e d u c a t i o n a l , s o c i a l and economic autonomy f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of group i d e n t i t i e s . 156 I b i d , annex I para 3a 157 Daes Native Peoples Rights (1986) 27 Les Cahier de D r o i t 123 158 I b i d , at 126 87 In the context of t h i s l e v e l of s e l f determination she goes on; "the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the term ' s e l f d e termination' s p e c i f i c i a l l y excludes the r i g h t of secession."(159) The idea advocated here conforms c l o s e l y t o the concept of indigenous " i n t e r n a l s e l f determination" discussed i n t h i s paper. Daes makes i t c l e a r t h a t the l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c e t h i c t h a t e q u a l i t y and non-discuimination r i g h t s are s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n i s now l a r g e l y d i s c r e d i t t e d — at l e a s t i n respect of indigenous peoples and perhaps, Daes suggests, i n respect of a l l m i n o r i t i e s . Thus, at the r i s k of appearing o v e r l y o p t i m i s t i c , a l l the si g n s i n d i c a t e a p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of indigenous s e l f determination i n some form w i t h i n the next f i v e years. 6 CONCLUSION I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o draw s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n s i n an area i n which change i s o c c u r r i n g so r a p i d l y , and i n which the f i n a l p i c t u r e can only be guessed at on the b a s i s of the i n d i c a t o r s a v a i l a b l e . On the one hand i t must be r e i t e r a t e d t h a t arguments are a v a i l a b l e and are u t i l i s e d t o a s s e r t an e x i s t i n g and unextinguished indigenous r i g h t t o s e l f determination. Such arguments have a strong h i s t o r i c a l b a s i s i n the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s and the t r e a t y making process. They a l s o g a i n support from modern instruments such as Common A r t i c l e One of the 1966 Covenants which contains an u n q u a l i f i e d r i g h t of a l l peoples t o s e l f determination. Further the t r a d i t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n on s e l f determination of s t a t e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y does not preclude 159 I b i d , a t 127 88 the e x i s t e n c e of a r i g h t t o i n t e r n a l s e l f determination. I t i s on the b a s i s of t h i s and other supporting m a t e r i a l t h a t a number of North American t r i b e s have f i l e d claims w i t h the Human Rights Committee under the o p t i o n a l p r o t o c o l t o the C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s . On the other hand, t h i s paper has been concerned l a r g e l y w i t h the p r o g r e s s i o n toward p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of indigenous s e l f determination. That does not imply t h a t the two areas are mutually e x c l u s i v e . In f a c t claims of e x i s t i n g r i g h t before both domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r a have been in s t r u m e n t a l i n a c c e l e r a t i o n the process of p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . That process has, through f i v e hundred years of contact, developed i n d e f i n a b l e phase. At the beginning of the process De Las Casas, a contemporary of V i c t o r i a c a l l e d upon the Spanish t o c o n s i d e r by what r i g h t one people could impose t h e i r laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s on another. By the time of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l the i m p o s i t i o n was f a i t accompli. H i s approach was i n s t e a d t o attempt t o r e c o n c i l e the r e a l i t y of white c o l o n i a l i s m w i t h the j u s t s t r u g g l e of the Cherokee. This he d i d through "domestication" of Indian sovereignty. The League era o f f e r e d g r e a t e r hope through the d i s c o v e r y of both s e l f determination and c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y r i g h t s , but d e l i v e r e d n e i t h e r t o indigenous peoples. I t seemed t h a t indigenous i s s u e s would i n e v i t a b l y disappear from i n t e r n a t i o n a l consciousness. The great age of U n i t e d Nations d e c o l o n i s a t i o n appeared t o confirm t h i s as the blue water t h e s i s cleaved the c o l o n i s e d world i n two. On one s i d e of the l i n e T h i r d World peoples were granted s e l f determination through independent nationhood. On the other s i d e were indigenous peoples trapped, as m i n o r i t i e s , i n n a t i o n - s t a t e s 89 t h a t they c o u l d never hope t o r u l e , and d e l i b e r a t e l y ignored by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l order which r e j e c t e d c o l l e c t i v e m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i n favour of i n d i v i d u a l human r i g h t s . But then, h i s t o r y has an uncanny h a b i t of r e t u r n i n g t o i t s source. The l a s t f i f t e e n years have provided ample evidence t h a t the long s t r u g g l e of indigenous peoples f o r c o n t r o l of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e f u t u r e s w i l l be no exception. The new found s t r e n g t h of indigenous peoples, indigenous c u l t u r e s , indigenous leaders and above a l l world indigenous s o l i d a r i t y has made the f i v e hundred year o l d challenge of De Las Casas more r e a l today than ever before. \ ******************************************** 90 PART I I : INDIGENOUS SELF DETERMINATION AND COLONIAL LAW:  NATIVE TITLE AND NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY.  1. INTRODUCTION Pa r t I was concerned w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law developments i n the area of Indigenous s e l f determination. The d i s c u s s i o n d i d not centre s p e c i f i c a l l y on the s t a t u s of Maori r i g h t s but n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i e d t o the s i t u a t i o n of Maori people by v i r t u e of t h e i r s t a t u s as an Indigenous people. In p a r t I I Maori r i g h t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the concept of Maori sovereignty, w i l l provide the primary focus. The approach w i l l be t o t r a c e the developments of c o l o n i a l law, and l a t e r domestic law, i n North America and New Zealand from the p o i n t of contact w i t h white s e t t l e r s t o the present day. The e v o l u t i o n of Native Rights i n Canada and the U.S. w i l l provide a p o i n t of comparison a g a i n s t which concurrent developments i n New Zealand may be b e t t e r understood. In some instances the North American experience w i l l p rovide a benchmark. Although i t cannot be s a i d t h a t U.S. or Canadian law and p o l i c y adequately addresses the p l i g h t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e n a t i v e peoples, y e t when compared w i t h New Zealand e q u i v a l e n t s , they are made t o appear p o s i t i v e l y p r o g r e s s i v e . Many such examples w i l l be c i t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n . In other i n s t a n c e s , common elements i n the three j u r i s d i c t i o n s w i l l be h i g h l i g h t e d so as t o show q u i t e s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s , not j u s t i n the 91 general contour of Native law and p o l i c y , but i n much of the d e t a i l as w e l l . Thus, i t i s hoped t h a t such a comparative a n a l y s i s w i l l provide new eyes through which t o understand the l a r g e s t r u g g l e of the Maori f o r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r peoplehood, and add as w e l l , a new dimension t o c u r r e n t understanding of c o l o n i a l i s m and Maori law and p o l i c y i n New Zealand. The f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p a r t s , each corresponding t o a d i s c e r n i b l e p e r i o d i n the c o n t i n u i n g h i s t o r y of c o l o n i s a t i o n i n North America and New Zealand. They are: The Contact p e r i o d ; the era of the Conquest Myth; and the Present Day. These ' c o l o n i a l phases' are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r s e v e r a l reasons. Foremost among those reasons i s t h a t the phases appear i n each country a t around the same time r e f l e c t i n g s i m i l a r changes i n the power dynamics as between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d and s i m i l a r changes i n s e t t l e r a t t i t u d e s toward the s t a t u s of Indigenous people and t h e i r r i g h t s . These s i m i l a r i t i e s underpin a str o n g sense of 'connectedness' between Indian and Maori. Most i m p o r t a n t l y a comparative a n a l y s i s makes i t c l e a r t h a t these changes a f f e c t 'the law' i n fundamental ways. For example, r e l a t i o n s of r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e q u a l i t y evoked the 'Indian' n a t i o n s ' and 'Sovereign Maori' terminology of the Contact p e r i o d . This i n t u r n became encapsulated i n 'the law' - The Royal Proclamation of 1763, the 'Cherokee cases' and the Treaty of Waitangi. By c o n t r a s t , the 'dark ages' of the mid-19th t o the mid-2Oth 92 c e n t u r i e s i n which, i n a l l three j u r i s d i c t i o n s , Indian and Maori were reduced t o powerless and s u f f e r i n g m i n o r i t i e s , evoked r a c i s t images of Native peoples as ' p r i m i t i v e b a r b a r i a n s ' and 'savages'. These too became encapsulated i n 'the law' - both judge-made and l e g i s l a t i v e . The f o l l o w i n g w i l l t r a c e these developments. Though we have been taught t h a t there i s a s i n g l e body of Native Law, there are i n f a c t two q u i t e d i s t i n c t and c o n f l i c t i n g streams - the f i r s t borne of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the contact e r a , the second borne of the mythology of conquest and j u s t i f i e d by l e g a l adoption of the r a c i s t imagery r e f e r r e d t o above. U n t i l r e c e n t l y i t has been t h i s conquest mythology which has dominated as x t h e law'. I t w i l l be argued t h a t , l i k e I n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n t h i s area, the domestic law i n a l l t hree c o u n t r i e s i s s l o w l y r e t u r n i n g t o i t s source - the ' c o l o n i a l paradigm' as I have chosen t o c a l l i t . The c u r r e n t upsurge i n Indigenous n a t i o n a l i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n New Zealand and Canada,has r e s u l t e d i n new p o i n t s of power having been found and e x p l o i t e d by Indigenous peoples through the use of white p o l i t i c a l and j u d i c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , and by e f f e c t i v e manipulation of the media which d e l i v e r s Indigenous images t o white people. 'The law' has been reminded of the o r i g i n a l terms by which Indigenous peoples agreed t o 'contact', and has been asked why those terms have not been adhered t o . The power dynamics have changed again, so has the terminology. In time, 'the law' w i l l be dragged k i c k i n g 93 and screaming t o the p a r t y . The above, i t i s submitted i s accurate as a d e s c r i p t i o n of the e v o l u t i o n of c o l o n i a l i s m and of d e c o l o n i s a t i o n i n North America and i n New Zealand. The p o s i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n i n law of Mana Maori Motuhake or Maori s e l f determination, as an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t and as a modern r e a l i t y , w i l l come only from acceptance of t h a t framework. In short t h a t the i n t e r f a c e between Maori and Pakeha i s s t i l l c o l o n i a l i n nature and t h a t c o n f l i c t s , whether l e g a l or p o l i t i c a l , w i l l only ever be r e s o l v e d w i t h i n a c o l o n i a l paradigm. 2. CONTACT; ESTABLISHING THE 'COLONIAL PARADIGM' 2.1 North America: C o l o n i a l P r a c t i c e . C o l o n i a l Law The h i s t o r y of A n g l o - c o l o n i a l 'law' begins w i t h B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p r a c t i c e on the eastern seaboard of what i s now the United S t a t e s , i n the seventeenth century. An understanding of t h i s p e r i o d i n North American h i s t o r y i s c r u c i a l t o a f u l l conception of the eq u i v a l e n t p e r i o d of f i r s t contact i n New Zealand - of the mythology and 'law' which accompanied i t , and of a l a t e r r e v i s i o n of t h a t same mythology and law. The hallmark of t h i s p e r i o d , t o be repeated l a t e r i n New Zealand, was the B r i t i s h preference f o r undertaking the business of c o l o n i s i n g North America by d i p l o m a t i c means. R e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h and Indian t r i b e s or confederacies were r i g h t l y perceived by both s i d e s as i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n cha r a c t e r and were re g u l a t e d on t h a t b a s i s . 94 Thus the execution and n e g o t i a t i o n of t r e a t i e s w i t h the t r i b e s became the primary instrument of B r i t i s h expansion, as w e l l as the means whereby B r i t i s h hegemony as a g a i n s t other European c o l o n i a l powers could be secured. The choice of diplomacy and t r e a t y over was a conquest as the b a s i s f o r r e l a t i o n s between s e t t l e r and Indian was one grounded not i n humanitarian concerns f o r Indians, but i n the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the time. I t was not a u n i l a t e r a l gesture on the p a r t of the B r i t i s h but a mutually accepted means of r e g u l a t i n g common and competing i n t e r e s t s . Strong J . i n the Supreme Court of Canada d e c i s i o n i n S t . Catherines M i l l i n g & Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1) considered t h a t B r i t i s h diplomacy & t r e a t y making duri n g the contact p e r i o d was founded upon very p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : To a s c r i b e i t t o moral grounds, t o motives of humane c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the a b o r i g i n e s , would be t o a t t r i b u t e t o i t f e e l i n g s which perhaps had l i t t l e weight i n the age i n which i t took i t s r i s e . I t s o r i g i n as, I take i t , experience of the great i m p o l i t y of the opposite mode of d e a l i n g w i t h Indians which had been p r a c t i c e d by some of the p r o v i n c i a l governments of the o l d e r c o l o n i e s and which l e d t o frequent f r o n t i e r wars i n v o l v i n g great s a c r i f i c e of l i f e and property and r e q u i r i n g an expenditure of money which had proved most burdensome t o the c o l o n i e s . " During t h i s time, t r e a t i e s were sought f o r three main purposes: t o secure p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s , t o r e g u l a t e trade 1. (1887) 13 SCR 577 at 609. The d e c i s i o n was subsequently appealed t o the J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l 95 and s t i l l l a t e r , t o acquire land upon which t o s e t t l e . ( 2 ) A number of f a c t o r s combined t o r e q u i r e the p a r t i e s t o d e a l w i t h each other i n t h i s way. From the Indian p e r s p e c t i v e , white contact i n i t i a l l y meant manufactured goods and so i t as not i n the Indian i n t e r e s t t o order r e l a t i o n s i n a way which might th r e a t e n trade and access t o those goods. From the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p e r s p e c t i v e animosity between f l e d g l i n g settlements and the surrounding nations and confederacies would have been d i s s a s t e r o u s . In most p l a c e s , Indians s t i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y out-numbered s e t t l i n g . At a commercial l e v e l , the s e t t l e s r e l i e d on trade as much as the Indians d i d . B r i t a i n , a t t h a t time, lacked both an adequate c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and a l a r g e enough merchant f l e e t . As a r e s u l t Indians provided by way of trade many of the s u p p l i e s and s o - c a l l e d "wilderness s u r v i v a l s k i l l s " which the s e t t l e r s c o uld not procure f o r themselves. Thus trade c l a u s e s i n t r e a t i e s were seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y important f o r both s i d e s . The f i n a l and d e c i s i v e f a c t o r was a combination of Indian m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , and competing claims by the French and Spanish t o c o l o n i a l hegemony i n North America. For both of these reasons the B r i t i s h perceived the s e c u r i n g of a l l i a n c e s w i t h Indian nations as c r u c i a l t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 2. See W i l l i a m s Treaty making i n Canada and New Zealand (1986) Unpublished paper at p. 3. 96 i n the region.(3) Among these a l l i a n c e s none was more important than t h a t of the f i v e n ations of the Ir o q u o i s Confederacy i n the North East.(4) The famous 'covenant c h a i n ' of a l l i a n c e s between the Ir o q u o i s and conquered or a l l i e d n a tions spread I r o q u o i s i n f l u e n c e over the e n t i r e Northeast by the 1700s - west t o Lake Huron, south t o the Tennessee R i v e r . S i r W i l l i a m Johnson, the B r i t i s h Superintendent of Indian A f f a i r s f o r the Northern Department, estimated t h a t the Confederacy was capable of p u t t i n g 12,000 men on the b a t t l e f i e l d . ( 5 ) T h i s i n i t s e l f helped engender B r i t i s h respect f o r the I r o q u o i s , and made i t p l a i n t h a t B r i t i s h hegemony, as a g a i n s t the French i n p a r t i c u l a r , c o uld not have been achieved without I r o q u o i s support. These s o r t s of p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s became entrenched i n 'the law' of white/Indian r e l a t i o n s during the contact p e r i o d : In the form and content of t r e a t i e s of 'peace', ' f r i e n d s h i p ' and ' a l l i a n c e ' between B r i t a i n (and l a t e r the United States) and Indian n a t i o n s ; i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763; i the d e c i s i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n the Moheqan  Indians case; and l a t e r s t i l l i n the d e c i s i o n s of Chief 3. See Jones License f o r Empire (1982) a t p. 2. 4. I b i d , pp. 21-35. 5. I b i d , a t 65. 97 J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l of the U.S. Supreme Court.(6) Thus, as i s suggested i n Cohen, r e l a t i o n s from f i r s t contact through t o the end of the 18th century were premised upon three assumptions: (1) t h a t both p a r t i e s t o t r e a t i e s were sovereignpowers; (2) t h a t Indian t r i b e s had some form of t r a n s f e r r a b l e t i t l e t o the l a n d ; and(3) t h a t a c q u i s i t i o n of Indian lands was s o l e l y a governmental matter, not t o be l e f t t o i n d i v i d u a l c o l o n i s t s . ( 7 ) The 'Iroquois Deeds' between the Crown and the F i v e Nations recognized t r a d i t i o n a l Indian r i g h t s t o t h e i r land and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and o f f e r e d Crown p r o t e c t i o n of Iro q u o i s geographical and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r i t y . ( 8 ) In r e t u r n , the Iro q u o i s promised l o y a l t y t o the B r i t i s h Crown and o f f e r e d t o surrender c e r t a i n of the lands under t h e i r c o n t r o l i f the B r i t i s h c o uld prevent French i n c u r s i o n i n t o t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . ( 9 ) Thus promise of p r o t e c t i o n i n exchange f o r l o y a l t y t o the promisor was f o r m a l i s e d i n 1701 i n Albany where the Sachems of the F i v e Nations met w i t h the 6. These are r e f e r r e d t o i n Part I supra. 7. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed.) at p. 53: Note t h a t these are a l s o the three e s s e n t i a l elements of the Treaty of Waitangi. 8. Jackson, Memorandum Submitted t o Attorney General of the Unit e d Kingdom on behalf of Union of B.C. Indian C h i e f s (1981) p. 5. 9. I b i d . , a t p. 6. 98 Lieutenant-Governor of New York. In 1726 a new deed was executed g r a n t i n g t o the Crown a l l of the lands around the lower Great l a k e s , "to be pro t e c t e d & defended by H i s s a i d Late Majesty f o r the use of the s a i d Nations.' The deed was c l e a r l y understood t o have l e f t both I r o q u o i s sovereignty and t i t l e i n t a c t . The Secretary of Indian A f f a i r s reported i n 1756: That memorable and important a c t by which the Indians put t h e i r P a t r i m o n i a l and conquered lands under the P r o t e c t i o n of the King of Great B r i t a i n , t h e i r f a t h e r a g a i n s t the encroachments or Invasions of the French i s not understood by them as a c e s s i o n or surrender as i t seems t o have been i g n o r a n t l y and w i l f u l l y supposed by some. They intended t o look upon i t as r e s e r v i n g the Property and Possession of the s o i l t o themselves and t h e i r H e i r s . This Property the S i x Nations are by no means w i l l i n g t o p a r t w i t h and are e q u a l l y adverse and j e a l o u s t h a t any f o r t s or settlements should be made thereon by e i t h e r us or the French, (emphasis added)(10) A f t e r the American r e v o l u t i o n , the C o n t i n e n t a l Congress adopted the same p o l i c y as the E n g l i s h . The t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e w i t h the Delaware of September 17, 1778 was the f i r s t t r e a t y entered i n t o between the United S t a t e s and an Indian nation.(11) By the terms of A r t i c l e 4, breach of the Treaty by members of e i t h e r p a r t y could not be punished u n t i l "a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l can be had by judges or j u r i e s of both p a r t i e s , as near as can be t o the laws, 10. S e c r e t a r y W a r a l l t o S i r Wilheim Johnson, January 9, 1756 O'Callaghan Documents R e l a t i v e t o the C o l o n i a l H i s t o r y  of New York. V o l . 7 at p. 18. 11. Treaty w i t h Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 S t a t . 13. 99 customs and usages of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s and n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . . . . " A r t i c l e 5 d e a l t w i t h the a l l important matter of t r a d e between the p a r t i e s , w h i l e A r t i c l e 6 secured t o the Delaware, i n the f o l l o w i n g terms, ownership of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i e s : ...the United States do engage t o guarantee t o the a f o r e s a i d n a t i o n of Delawares, and t h e i r h e i r s , a l l t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s i n the f u l l e s t and most ample manner, as i t hath been bounded by former t r e a t i e s , as long as they the s a i d Delaware n a t i o n s h a l l abide by, and h o l d f i r s t the chain of f r i e n d s h i p now entered into.(12) I t s terms made i t obvious t h a t t h i s was an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t y . The law governing any breach would not be t h a t of the United S t a t e s , but a code which could be agreed upon by both p a r t i e s . The promotion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e featured as of c e n t r a l importance t o both p a r t i e s . The Delaware are r e f e r r e d t o throughout the instrument not as a t r i b e but as a " n a t i o n ' . Such nomenclature i s t e l l i n g . Indeed the U.S. Supreme Court i n Worcestor v. Georgia(13) (of which much more w i l l be s a i d s h o r t l y ) concluded t h a t the f i r s t t r e a t y w i t h the Delaware n a t i o n . . . i n i t s language, and i n i t s p r o v i s i o n s , i s formed, as near as may be, on the model of t r e a t i e s between the crowned heads of Europe. The s i x t h a r t i c l e shows how congress then t r e a t e d the i n j u r i o u s calumny of 12. Op. c i t . Cohen, at p. 59. 13. (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 100 c h e r i s h i n g designs u n f r i e n d l y t o the p o l i t i c a l and c i v i l r i g h t s of the Indians.(14) To back-track a l i t t l e and approach t h i s m a t e r i a l from a d i f f e r e n t angle, one might w e l l ask - what do these t r e a t y examples t e l l us about 'the law' at the time? How are they r e l e v a n t t o the s t a t u s and r i g h t s of Native American? I t i s submitted t h a t these t r e a t i e s were, i n themselves, 'the law.' The Crown, and l a t e r the United S t a t e s c l e a r l y intended themselves t o be bound by these undertakings. E f f e c t i v e c o l o n i a l expansion depended a t t h i s time on the acquiescence of the more powerful Indian nations as s i g n i f i e d by t r e a t y . Most im p o r t a n t l y , these t r e a t i e s d i d not simply manifest the p o l i t i c a l framework w i t h i n which the p a r t i e s n egotiated, they represented a l s o the l e g a l framework adopted by the p a r t i e s as ag a i n s t each other. Put most simply, the use of the Treaty form i m p l i e d immediately Indian t i t l e t o , and sovereignty over the s o i l of North America. E i t h e r or both of these two fundamental elements might have been consensually modified i n some way by the s p e c i f i c terms of the Treaty, but they were the s t a r t i n g p o i n t . The Indian nations were both owners and sovereigns i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i e s . Thus, i t i s important t o recognize t h a t the T r e a t i e s d i d not, indeed could not cr e a t e e i t h e r Indian sovereignty or t i t l e . These t h i n g s pre-e x i s t e d the t r e a t i e s i n f a c t and i n law. A c c o r d i n g l y t h e 14. I b i d , per M a r s h a l l C.J. at 550. 101 t r e a t i e s simply recognized Indian sovereignty and t i t l e both by t h e i r nature, and by t h e i r express terms. J u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e developments c l e a r l y support t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . The f i r s t B r i t i s h d e c i s i o n on the question of the s t a t u s and r i g h t s of Native Americans w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Empire came i n the case of the Mohegan Indians v.  Connecticut (1703-1743).(15) The case i n v o l v e d an attempt by the colony of Connecticut t o appropriate lands guaranteed t o the Mohegans by v i r t u e of a 17th century t r e a t y which secured B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n of the Mohegan people. In 1703 the Mohegans p e t i t i o n e d the Queen t o enforce t h e i r r i g h t i n the face of s e t t l e r claims t h a t the only law which a p p l i e d was B r i t i s h or Connecticut law from which the Mohegans could c l a i m no such r i g h t s . A Royal Commission was s t r u c k and e v e n t u a l l y i t recommended t h a t the land be returned. This d e c i s i o n was appealed t o the P r i v y C o u n c i l which h e l d the Mohegans t o be a sovereign n a t i o n and r e j e c t e d a con t e n t i o n t h a t an a l l e g e d conquest gave t i t l e t o the colony.(16) Having recommended t h a t a Commission of Review re-examine the q u e s t i o n , a second Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1738. The Commission's d e c i s i o n was s e t aside f o l l o w i n g 15. The Governor and Company of Connecticut and Mogeagan  Indians (London) 1769; 5 Acts of the P r i v y C o u n c i l of  England. C o l o n i a l S e r i e s 218; (London 912). In Smith, Appeals t o the P r i v y C o u n c i l from the American P l a n t a t i o n s 418 (New York 1950). 16. Op. c i t . Jackson pp. 7-9. 102 a l l e g a t i o n s of "gross i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . " ( 1 7 ) The t h i r d and f i n a l Court of Commission convened i n 1743. Commissioner Horsmanden, w r i t i n g f o r a m a j o r i t y of the Court h e l d t h a t : The Indians, though l i v i n g amongst the King's s u b j e c t s i n these c o u n t r i e s , are a separate and d i s t i n c t people from them, they are t r e a t e d as such, they have a p o l i t y of t h e i r own, they make peace and war w i t h any n a t i o n of Indians, when they t h i n k f i t , without c o n t r o l from the E n g l i s h . I t i s apparent the Crown looks upon them not as s u b j e c t s , but as a d i s t i n c t people, f o r they are mentioned as such throughout Queen Anne's and His present Majesty's commissions by which we now s i t . And i t i s p l a i n i n my conception, t h a t the Crown looks upon the Indians as having the property of the s o i l of these c o u n t r i e s ; and t h a t t h e i r lands are not by His Majesty's grant of p a r t i c u l a r l i m i t s of them f o r a colony, thereby impropriated i n h i s s u b j e c t u n t i l they have made f a i r and honest purchase of the n a t i v e . . . . so t h a t from hence I adjure t h i s consequence, t h a t a matter of property i n lands i n d i s p u t e between the Indians as a d i s t i n c t people ( f o r no a c t has been shown whereby they became subjects) and the E n g l i s h s u b j e c t , cannot be determined by the law of our l a n d , but by a  law equal t o both p a r t i e s , which i s the law of nature  and n a t i o n s ; and upon t h i s foundation, as I take these commissions have most p r o p e r l y i s s u e d . " (emphasis added)(18) The terminology and imagery adopted by the Commissions i s important. The Mohegans are c o n t i n u a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as a "people". Though i t may appear an obvious f a c t , the use of the word c a r r i e s w i t h i t important p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . By the l a t t e r h a l f of the 19th century i t had 17. Apparently the Commission was stacked w i t h Connecticut men and decided i n favour of the Colony without hearing from Mohegan r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at a l l . See Henderson A b o r i g i n a l  R i g h t s i n Western Legal T r a d i t i o n i n The Quest f o r J u s t i c e :  A b o r i g i n a l Peoples and A b o r i g i n a l R i g h t s , B o l d t & Long (1985) pp. 198-9. 18. I b i d . , Smith a t 425. 103 a l l but disappeared from the vocabulary of the c o l o n i a l Courts, a t l e a s t i n the context of Native peoples. As we s h a l l see, i t came t o be replaced by new terminology and imagery which served t o j u s t i f y new c o n c l u s i o n s as t o the law. The Mohegans d e c i s i o n was subsequently confirmed by the P r i v y C o u n c i l . By v i r t u e of t h i s simple c o n f i r m a t i o n of Commissioner Horsmanden's o b i t e r , the h i g h e s t c o u r t i n the Empire a f f i r m e d Mohegan t i t l e and sovereignty notwithstanding the 17th Century t r e a t y t h a t , by consent, brought them under the p r o t e c t i o n of the Crown. Such an a f f i r m a t i o n went beyond the immediate and p r e s s i n g i n t e r e s t s of the Mohegan. The d e c i s i o n a f f i r m e d the same l e g a l framework which had been a p p l i e d i n p r a c t i c e i n the t r e a t i e s both preceding and p o s t - d a t i n g i t . The r u l e s were t h a t s i n c e Indian nations and s e t t l e r nations stood t o each other ' as d i s t i n c t peoples, the code governing t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p was I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. Any m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p had f i r s t t o be consensual, and second t o be by means of t r e a t y , as the accepted method of s i g n i f y i n g agreement between two n a t i o n s . The u n d e r l y i n g premises of these r u l e s were the p o l i t i c a l f a c t , and the l e g a l p r i n c i p l e of N a t i v e t i t l e and sovereignty over the s o i l . These premises a p p l i e d not j u s t t o the Mohegan n a t i o n , but t o a l l of the Indigenous peoples who had been, or would be c o l o n i s e d by the B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l machine. 104 The next a f f i r m a t i o n of t h i s l e g a l framework came i n l e g i s l a t i v e form: The Royal Proclamation of 1763 which marked the c o n c l u s i o n of the 7 years war w i t h France. The Proclamation was grounded p o l i t i c a l l y i n the growing r e a l i s a t i o n " t h a t continued white expansion [westward] not only might, but would exasperate the Indians i n t o renewed f i g h t i n g " ( 1 9 ) . Thus the Secretary of State f o r the Southern Department s t a t e d b l u n t l y t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y , up u n t i l now a p p l i e d on a n a t i o n by n a t i o n b a s i s , would henceforth be a p p l i c a b l e on a grand s c a l e t o encourage "...the P r e s e r v a t i o n of the intoned Peace and T r a n q u i l i t y of the Country a g a i n s t any Indian Disturbances."(20) A f u r t h e r f a c t o r was t h a t Indian a l l i a n c e d u r i n g the Seven Years War, which was c r u c i a l t o B r i t i s h v i c t o r y , c ould be assured only i n a w a t e r t i g h t guarantee of the framework of Indian r i g h t s discussed above.(21) Thus S i r W i l l i a m Johnson was convinced t h a t t h i s might be achieved by means of: ...a solemn p u b l i c t r e a t y t o agree upon c l e a r and f i x e d boundaries between our settlements and t h e i r hunting grounds so t h a t each p a r t y may know t h e i r own and be a 19. Op. c i t . , Jones p. 46 (emphasis added). 20. Secretary of State f o r Southern Department t o Lords of Trade, May 5, 1763; i n Cumming and Mickenberg, Native Rights  i n Canada (2nd) (1972) p. 95. 21. Op. c i t . , Jackson at p. 18. 105 mutual p r o t e c t i o n t o each other of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e possession.(22) Indian t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y was thus comprehensively a f f i r m e d and guaranteed i n P a r t IV of the Proclamation which pr o v i d e s : Whereas i t i s j u s t and reasonable and e s s e n t i a l t o our i n t e r e s t and the s e c u r i t y of our Colonies t h a t the s e v e r a l Nations or T r i b e s of Indians, w i t h whom We are connected and who we under Our P r o t e c t i o n should not be molested or d i s t u r b e d i n the Possession of P a r t s of our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded t o or purchased by Us, are reserved t o them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds; The wording was c a r e f u l l y chosen. Once again 'Indian N a t i o n ' terminology i s used, an a f f i r m a t i o n of the l e g a l e q u a l i t y mentioned i n the Mohegan's case. The statement t h a t such a guarantee i s " e s s e n t i a l t o Our i n t e r e s t " underscores the f a c t t h a t the Proclamation, though u n i l a t e r a l i n form, was i n substance a simple a f f i r m a t i o n of the consensual framework which had been b u i l t up i n the past, p a r t i c u l a r l y between the B r i t i s h and the I r o q u o i s . Much of the content of the Proclamation had i n f a c t already been mapped out by t r e a t y w i t h the I r o q u o i s . The Proclamation a f f i r m e d t h a t t o breach t h a t framework would have been both i l l e g a l and t o borrow the words of Strong J . , "would have proved most burdensome t o the colonies."(23) 22. I b i d , a t p. 19, S u l l i v a n ; Papers of Johnson I I 879; quoted i n i b i d . , at p. 19. 23. Op. c i t . , St. Catherine's M i l l i n g . 106 F i n a l l y , the Crown does not a s s e r t t h a t the Indians are B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s . Instead, the Crown claims only t o be "connected" w i t h the "Nations or T r i b e s . " Nor does i t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f l i c t w i t h the c l a i m t h a t Indian t e r r i t o r i e s are " P a r t s of Our Dominion and T e r r i t o r i e s . " T h i s i s s u e , as we s h a l l see, i s f u l l y d e a l t w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n s of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l . The Proclamation a f f i r m e d other p a r t s of the l e g a l framework of white/Indian r e l a t i o n s as w e l l . White settlement west of the proclamation l i n e or o u t s i d e the boundaries of the new c o l o n i e s of Quebec, East F l o r i d a , West F l o r i d a and the Hudsons Bay Company t e r r i t o r y was proh i b i t e d . ( 2 4 ) Secondly, a l l p r i v a t e purchases of Indian lands, whether i n s i d e or out s i d e the boundaries of the c o l o n i e s , was s t r i c t l y p r o h i b i t e d . Instead the accepted p r i n c i p l e of c e s s i o n by t r e a t y t o the Crown was a f f i r m e d as the process whereby land could be acquired f o r settlement. W e . . . s t r i c t l y e n j o i n and r e q u i r e t h a t no p r i v a t e person do presume t o make any p r i v a t e purchase from the s a i d Indians, of any Lands reserved t o the s a i d Indians.... But i f , a t any Time any of the s a i d Indians should be i n c l i n e d t o dispose of the s a i d Lands, the same s h a l l be purchased only f o r Us i n OUr Name, a t some P u b l i c Meeting or Assembly of the s a i d Indians t o be h e l d f o r t h a t Purpose by the Governor or Commander i n Chief of Our Colonies r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( 2 5 ) 24. I b i d , Paragraph 2 of Part IV. 25. Paragraph 4. 107 The f i n a l a f f i r m a t i o n " i n law" of Indian t i t l e and s o v e r e i g n t y came a f t e r U.S. independence i n the form of a s e r i e s of seminal d e c i s i o n s of the U.S. Supreme Court headed by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l . These d e c i s i o n s were handed down between 1810 and 1832 at a time when the power dynamics between s e t t l e r governments and Indian n a t i o n s had already begun t o change. Three of these cases have already been r e f e r r e d t o i n P a r t I , though from the p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r impact as subsequent developments i n modern I n t e r n a t i o n a l law r a t h e r than domestic law.(26) The f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s approaches the cases from a p e r s p e c t i v e which g i v e s g r e a t e r emphasis t o t h e i r p l a c e as the f i n a l statement i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l framework w i t h i n which t o express the r i g h t s of c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d ; a process which began a t the p o i n t of contact and was already two c e n t u r i e s o l d . Since l a t e r d e c i s i o n s and l a t e r j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the M a r s h a l l cases are disregarded a i r r e l e v a n t f o r present purposes, i t i s submitted t h a t conclusions which d i f f e r from those i n P a r t I are j u s t i f i e d . A second p o i n t r e l a t e s t o the relevance of these American d e c i s i o n s t o the remaining B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s 26~. Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823) 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1931) 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1; Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 31 U.S> (6 Pet) 515. See footnotes 5 t o 15 and accompanying t e x t . In a very r e a l sense i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i v o r c e I n t e r n a t i o n a l from domestic law i n the area of Native Rights s i n c e the l a t t e r i s so c l e a r l y grounded i n the former. Indeed t h i s was the p o i n t made by Commissioner Harsmanden i n the Mohegan case (supra). 108 ( p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the purposes of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n ; Canada and New Zealand). Are they evidence of the development of a u n i q u e l y American law of Indian r i g h t s , or d i d they a f f i r m the precepts of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l law? Strong J . i n the Supreme Court of Canada d e c i s i o n i n St. Catherines M i l l i n g ( 2 7 ) makes i t c l e a r t h a t these d e c i s i o n s were good law i n the B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s as w e l l : The value and importance of these a u t h o r i t i e s i s not merely t h a t they show t h a t the same d o c t r i n e as t h a t already propounded regarding the t i t l e of the Indians to unsurrendered lands p r e v a i l s i n the United S t a t e s , but, what i s of v a s t l y g r e a t e r importance, they without exception t r a c e i t s o r i g i n t o a date a n t e r i o r t o the r e v o l u t i o n and recognize i t as a continuance of the p r i n c i p l e s of law or p o l i c y as t o Indian t i t l e s then e s t a b l i s h e d by the B r i t i s h government.... 1 1 (28) The case of F l e t c h e r v. Peck(29) concerned a c o n f l i c t between land patents issued by the s t a t e of Georgia and the unextinguished Indian t i t l e of c e r t a i n t r i b e s i n h a b i t i n g the area. C h ief J u s t i c e marshall f o r the m a j o r i t y avoided the i s s u e completely and would be drawn t o s t a t e o n l y t h a t Indian t i t l e was not n e c e s s a r i l y repugnant t o the s e i s i n i n fee of Georgia.(30) J u s t i c e Johnson i n d i s s e n t however 27. Op. c i t . S t . Catherine's M i l l i n g . 28. I b i d , a t 610. 29. (1810) 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87. 30. I b i d , a t 143. 109 approached the f a c t s u s i n g the framework of Indian t i t l e and sovereignty which had been c o n s i s t e n t l y u t i l i z e d up t o t h a t p o i n t , and which would l a t e r be taken up by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l h i m s e l f . "[T]he uniform p r a c t i c e of acknowledging t h e i r r i g h t of s o i l by purchasing from them, and r e s t r a i n i n g a l l persons from encroaching upon t h e i r t e r r i t o r y makes i t unnecessary t o i n s i s t upon t h e i r r i g h t of s o i l . " As t o Indian sovereignty he concluded "innumerable t r e a t i e s formed w i t h them acknowledge them t o be an independent people."(31) C o l o n i s a t i o n imposed but one l i m i t a t i o n on t h e i r inherent sovereignty and t i t l e , a l i m i t a t i o n which a r t i c u l a t e d as w e l l the i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e s i n t r i b a l t e r r i t o r y : Unaffected by p a r t i c u l a r t r e a t i e s , [ t h a t i n t e r e s t ] i s -n o t i n g more than what was assumed a t the f i r s t settlement of the country, t o w i t , a r i g h t of conquest or of purchase, e x c l u s i v e l y of a l l competitors w i t h i n c e r t a i n d e f i n e d l i m i t s . A l l the r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the r i g h t of s o i l i n the Indians, amount only t o an e x c l u s i o n of a l l competitors from t h e i r markets, and the l i m i t a t i o n upon t h e i r sovereignty amounts t o the r i g h t of governing even persons w i t h i n t h e i r l i m i t s except themselves.(32) Thus, t o the extent t h a t i t was discussed at a l l , the accepted framework of Indian r i g h t s was a f f i r m e d i n unequivocal terms. 31. I b i d , a t 146. 32. I b i d , a t 147. 110 The second case t o d i s c u s s the s t a t u s of Indian t i t l e was Johnson v. Mcintosh(33) Again the f a c t s turned on a c o n f l i c t as t o t i t l e ; t h i s time between s p e c u l a t o r s who had purchased d i r e c t l y from the I l l i n o i s and Piankeshaw n a t i o n s , and others who had subsequently taken t i t l e from the U.S. The U.S. t i t l e had i t s root i n a t r e a t y of c e s s i o n p u r p o r t i n g t o t r a n s f e r the land without r e s e r v a t i o n as t o any previous t r a n s f e r s . The Chief J u s t i c e q u i c k l y dispatched the primary i s s u e . In essence he h e l d t h a t the i n t e r n a l land tenure systems of the p a r t i c u l a r I ndian n a t i o n s i n question were beyond the reach of any U.S. Court; t h a t the s p e c u l a t o r s took only what t i t l e the Indians chose t o g i v e ; and t h a t i f the Indians subsequently a n n u l l e d those grants by a l a t e r absolute c e s s i o n of the same lands t o the U.S., they were at l i b e r t y t o do so.(34) Such a c o n c l u s i o n a f f i r m e d I l l i n o i s and Piankeshaw i n t e r n a l s overeignty a t l e a s t . In attempting t o provide a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of s e t t l e r t i t l e i n the U.S. however, M a r s h a l l went beyond the bounds of the s p e c i f i c f a c t s a t i s s u e . For t h i s purpose he formulated and a p p l i e d the d o c t r i n e of d i s c o v e r y . On the d i s c o v e r y of t h i s immense c o n t i n e n t , the great nations of Europe were eager t o a p p r o p r i a t e t o themselves so much of i t as they c o u l d r e s p e c t i v e l y 33. (1823) 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. 34. I b i d , a t 590. I l l a c q u i r e . . . . But as they were a l l i n p u r s u i t of n e a r l y the same o b j e c t , i t was necessary, i n order t o a v o i d c o n f l i c t i n settlement, and consequent war w i t h each other, t o e s t a b l i s h a p r i n c i p l e which a l l should acknowledge as the law by which the r i g h t of a c q u i s i t i o n , which they a l l a s s e r t e d , should be r e g u l a t e d as between themselves. This p r i n c i p l e was t h a t d i s c o v e r y gave t i t l e t o the government by whose su b j e c t s or by whose a u t h o r i t y i t was made, ag a i n s t a l l other European governments, which t i t l e might be consumated by possession. (35) (emphasis added) Thus t h i s d o c t r i n e was p r i m a r i l y a means of r e g u l a t i n g r e l a t i o n s between the c o l o n i a l powers. The t i t l e which B r i t a i n took was good only a g a i n s t other contenders. I t d i d not purport t o e x t i n g u i s h Indian t i t l e . I t d i d however cr e a t e a c o r r e l a t e d l i m i t on Indian sovereignty i n t h a t the n a t i o n s were precluded from ceding t i t l e t o any but the discoveror.(36) M a r s h a l l s t a t e s t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g 'enigmatic'(37) terms: In the establishment of these r e l a t i o n s , the r i g h t s of the o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t s were i n no i n s t a n c e , e n t i r e l y d isregarded; but were n e c e s s a r i l y t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent, impaired. They were admitted t o be the r i g h t f u l occupants of the s o i l , w i t h a l e g a l as w e l l as j u s t c l a i m t o r e t a i n possession of i t , and t o use i t according t o t h e i r own d i s c r e t i o n ; but t h e i r r i g h t s t o  complete sovereignty, as independent n a t i o n s , were 35. I b i d , at 570. 36. B a l l i n C o n s t i t u t i o n . Court. Indian T r i b e s found i n [1987] Am. Bar Foundation Research J o u r n a l 1 a t 26 argues t h a t even t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n was i n f a c t i l l u s o r y . The t r i b e s were f r e e t o t r a n s f e r lands t o purchasers other than agents of the ' d i s c o v e r i n g s t a t e ' , but could t r a n s f e r only the I n d i a n i n t e r e s t . This c o n c l u s i o n i s confirmed by the d e c i s i o n i n Johnson v. Mcintosh. Thus argues B a l l , the r e s t r i c t i o n i s no more than an ' a b s t r a c t t a u t o l o g y ' . 37. Op. c i t . , Jackson 44. 112 n e c e s s a r i l y diminished, and t h e i r power t o dispose of the s o i l a t t h e i r own w i l l , t o whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the o r i g i n a l fundamental p r i n c i p l e t h a t d i s c o v e r y gave e x c l u s i v e t i t l e t o those who made i t ( 3 8 ) (emphasis added) The r e s t r i c t i o n on sovereignty i s apparently s t a t e d i n broad terms, though without reference t o any s u b j e c t save the r e s t r i c t i o n on a l i e n a t i o n . I t would be f a i r t o conclude t h e r e f o r e t h a t the only aspect of Indian sovereignty which was ' n e c e s s a r i l y diminished,' was t h a t of f r e e a l i e n a t i o n of lands. No other aspect of Indian sovereignty was at i s s u e i n the case and none was mentioned even h y p o t h e t i c a l l y . Aspects of Indian sovereignty would become c e n t r a l i s s u e s i n the next two d e c i s i o n s and so i t must be assumed t h a t these are a u t h o r i t a t i v e on the broader question of what other l i m i t s there were. The Chief J u s t i c e then makes a remarkable c o n f e s s i o n as t o the d i f f i c u l t y of r a t i o n a l i s i n g any r e s t r i c t i o n s a t a l l on Indian sovereignty (even i n the l i m i t e d area of a l i e n a t i o n of t i t l e ) , and as t o the r e a l b a s i s f o r h i s r u l e : Every r u l e which can be suggested w i l l be found t o be attended w i t h great d i f f i c u l t y . . . However extravagant  the p r e t e n s i o n of c o n v e r t i n g the d i s c o v e r y of an  uninhabited country i n t o conquest may appear; i f the p r i n c i p l e has been as s e r t e d i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , and afterwards s u s t a i n e d ; i f a country has been acquired and h e l d under i t ; i f the property of the great mass of the community o r i g i n a t e s i n i t , i t becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned. So too, w i t h respect t o the concomitant p r i n c i p l e , t h a t the Indian i n h a b i t a n t s are t o be considered merely as occupants, t o be p r o t e c t e d , indeed, w h i l e i n peace, i n the possession of t h e i r lands, but t o be deemed incapable 38. I b i d , a t 574. 113 of t r a n s f e r r i n g the absolute t i t l e t o others. However  t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n may be opposed t o n a t u r a l r i g h t , and  t o the usages of c i v i l i z e d n a t i o n s , y e t , i f i t be  i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t h a t system under which the country  has been s e t t l e d , and be adapted t o the a c t u a l  c o n d i t i o n of the two people i t may perhaps, be  supported by reason, and c e r t a i n l y cannot be r e j e c t e d  by c o u r t s of j u s t i c e . ( 3 9 ) (emphasis added) In a manner which foreshadowed the j u d i c i a l approach of the second h a l f of the 19th century and beyond, Chief J u s t i c e M a s r s h a l l admitted t h a t when a l l e l s e f a i l e d , the pretense of the r u l e of law could be dropped and the c o u r t s were w i l l i n g t o g i v e l e g a l e f f e c t t o the 'might' of the c o l o n i s e r . He c l e a r l y f e l t uncomfortable i n h i s admission. As was noted at the beginning of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s , the power dynamics as between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d were beginning t o change. M a r s h a l l ' s admission i s the f i r s t s i g n of t h a t change; the f a c t s surrounding the two subsequent cases of Cherokee Nation and Worcester show t h a t p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y could q u i c k l y become p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y subjugation. Though the above passage begs the opposite c o n c l u s i o n , M a r s h a l l e v e n t u a l l y recants h i s c o n f e s s i o n , as we s h a l l see, and r e f u s e s t o accept t h a t the e v o l v i n g p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y dominance of the s e t t l e r government could a f f e c t the e s s e n t i a l framework of I n d i a n r i g h t s worked out when r e l a t i o n s were f a r more equal. 39. I b i d , 591-2. 114 The next Supreme Court d e c i s i o n i n Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (40) i n v o l v e d a headlong c l a s h between the sove r e i g n t y of the Cherokee Nation and the designs of the s t a t e of Georgia upon Cherokee lands. Georgian had by l e g i s l a t i o n attempted t o annul the Cherokee c o n s t i t u t i o n and apply Georgian laws i n Cherokee t e r r i t o r y . As noted i n P a r t I , the Cherokee sought, i n r e p l y , t o invoke the o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Supreme Court under A r t i c l e I I I of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . They claimed s t a t u s as a f o r e i g n s t a t e , and sought t o e n j o i n these i n c u r s i o n s on t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y . The d e c i s i o n i s c u r i o u s f o r the way i n which the Court d i v i d e d on the i s s u e . Two judges r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t the p o l i t i c a l and property r i g h t s of the Cherokee; Two considered t h a t they were indeed a f o r e i g n s t a t e ; The remaining two ( i n c l u d i n g Chief J u s t i c e Marshall) opted f o r the middle ground and d e c l a r e d the Cherokee t o be a "domestic dependent n a t i o n . " (41) Thus the " f o r e i g n s t a t e " advocates on the Court were a m i n o r i t y by four t o two, but a m a j o r i t y (again by four t o two) a f f i r m e d t h a t the Cherokee were nevertheless a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y e x e r c i s i n g a measure of sovereignty.(42) Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l s t a t e d 40. (1831) 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1. 41. I b i d , a t 17. 42. Op. C i t , Sanders, Indian S e l f Government i n the U.S. 115 the paradigm w i t h i n which Cherokee sovereignty was n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: Though the Indians are acknowledged t o have an unquestionable, and h e r e t o f o r e unquestioned r i g h t t o the lands they occupy, u n t i l t h a t r i g h t s h a l l be e x t i n g u i s h e d by the v o l u n t a r y c e s s i o n t o our government; yet i t may w e l l be doubted whether those t r i b e s which r e s i d e w i t h i n the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, w i t h s t r i c t accuracy, be denominated f o r e i g n n a t i o n s . They may, more c o r r e c t l y , perhaps be denominated domestic dependent n a t i o n s . They occupy a t e r r i t o r y t o which we a s s e r t a t i t l e independent of t h e i r w i l l , which must take e f f e c t i n p o i n t of possession when t h e i r r i g h t of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are i n a s t a t e of p u p i l l a g e . T h e i r r e l a t i o n t o the United States resembles t h a t of a ward t o h i s guardian."(43) The t i t l e which he says i s a s s e r t e d by the U.S. a g a i n s t Cherokee w i l l , i s t h a t which was a t t a i n e d by d i s c o v e r y as d i s c u s s e d i n Johnson v. Mcintosh. The only impact upon Indian r i g h t s s e t out i n t h a t case was the r e s t r i c t i o n upon a l i e n a b i l i t y of land. I s Cherokee sovereignty r e s t r i c t e d i n any other way? M a r s h a l l s t a t e s a l s o t h a t they are i n a s t a t e of p u p i l l a g e and t h a t they are wards of the U.S. The n o t i o n of the U.S. e x e r c i s i n g a p r o t e c t o r a t e f u n c t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y not new. Indeed i t predates the U.S. and was e x e r c i s e d as w e l l by B r i t a i n as a t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n owed t o the I r o q u o i s . For a l l of t h a t , the Mohegan case makes i t c l e a r t h a t B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n was not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Indian sovereignty and i m p l i e d no d i m u n i t i o n of i t (except perhaps the Treaty requirement of l o y a l t y and good f a i t h -but such promises were consensually made i n any event). 43. Supra. Cherokee Nation at 17. 116 D e c i s i o n s of the era beyond the M a r s h a l l cases have s e i z e d upon the language used here as p r o v i d i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r some of the most u n b e l i e v a b l e abuses of n a t i v e people and t h e i r r i g h t s . But, i t i s submitted these l a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what M a r s h a l l intended, they are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l context i n which Cherokee Nation f i t s , and they are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the second and f i n a l of the Cherokee cases: Worcestor v. Georgia (44) The Worcestor d e c i s i o n has, r i g h t l y , been d e s c r i b e d as "the c u l m i n a t i o n of an e v o l v i n g d o c t r i n e on Indian r i g h t s and i s p r o p e r l y t o be regarded as the c e n t r e p i e c e of t h a t law."(45) I t concerned a f u r t h e r attempt by the Georgian l e g i s l a t u r e t o l e g i s l a t e f o r the Cherokee t e r r i t o r i e s . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , Worcestor, a missionary was c o n v i c t e d pursuant t o l e g i s l a t i o n making i t i l l e g a l f o r whites t o enter the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Cherokee without a u t h o r i s a t i o n from the Governor of Georgia. The r e a l agenda f o r t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n was t o keep m i s s i o n a r i e s out of Cherokee country because i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t they were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r formenting Cherokee n a t i o n a l i s m . Thus, although the case i s o f t e n d e s c r i b e d as a c o n f l i c t between s t a t e and f e d e r a l p r e r o g t i v e ; the r e a l c o n f l i c t was Indian/white. 44. (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350. 45. Op. c i t . , Jackson at 48. 117 Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l began by r e a f f i r m i n g the 'do c t r i n e of d i s c o v e r y ' - but made i t c l e a r , i n the f o l l o w i n g terms, t h a t , bar the r e s t r i c t i o n on a l i e n a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o i n Johnson v. Mcintosh, none of the p r e - e x i s t i n g r i g h t s of the Indian nations were a f f e c t e d : This p r i n c i p l e [of discovery]...was an e x c l u s i v e p r i n c i p l e which shut out the r i g h t of competition among those who had agreed t o i t ; not one which could annul the previous r i g h t s of those who had not agreed t o i t . I t r e g u l a t e d the r i g h t given by di s c o v e r y among the European d i s c o v e r e r s but could not a f f e c t the r i g h t s of those already i n possession, e i t h e r as a b o r i g i n a l occupants or as occupants by v i r t u e of a d i s c o v e r y made before the memory of man. I t gave the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o purchase, but d i d not found t h a t r i g h t on a d e n i a l of the r i g h t of the possessor t o s e l l . ( 4 6 ) T h e r e a f t e r the Chief J u s t i c e e x p r e s s l y repudiates any no t i o n of conquest, an idea w i t h which he had been t o y i n g i n Johnson v. Mcintosh: The extravagant and absurd idea t h a t the f e e b l e settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired l e g i t i m a t e power by them t o govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea t o sea, d i d not enter the mind of any man.(47) The h i s t o r i c a l f a c t was t h a t B r i t a i n , and s t i l l l a t e r , the U.S. were too busy f i g h t i n g o f f other c o l o n i a l pretenders t o do other than c o n c i l i a t e w i t h the Indian n a t i o n s whose a l l e g i a n c e they desparately needed. 46. I b i d , at 544. 47. I b i d , at 544-5. 118 In t h i s way the sovereignty of the Cherokee, and indeed of a l l the Indian n a t i o n s , was recognised as h i s t o r i c a l and present f a c t and r e a f f i r m e d as h i s t o r i c a l and present law. The Indian nations had always been considered as d i s t i n c t , independent p o l i t i c a l communities, r e t a i n i n g t h e i r o r i g i n a l n a t u r a l r i g h t s , as the undisputed possessors of the s o i l from time immemorial, w i t h the simple exception of t h a t imposed by i r r e s i s t a b l e power, which excluded them from i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h any other European potentate...The very term 'n a t i o n ' , so g e n e r a l l y a p p l i e d t o them, means "a people d i s t i n c t from o t h e r s . . . . " The words " t r e a t y " and " n a t i o n " are words of our own language, s e l e c t e d i n our d i p l o m a t i c and l e g i s l a t i v e proceedings, by ou r s e l v e s . . . . WE have a p p l i e d them t o Indians, as we have a p p l i e d them t o other nations of the e a r t h . They are a p p l i e d t o a l l i n the same sense.(48) F i n a l l y , i n case i t should appear t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n c o n t r a d i c t e d h i s 'domestic dependent n a t i o n ' f o r m u l a t i o n i n Cherokee n a t i o n , M a r s h a l l s e t out j u s t what should be understood by the term "dependent." He t r a c e d the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e I I I of the Treaty of Hopewell (with the Cherokee) acknowledging the Cherokee t o be under the p r o t e c t i o n of the United States and no other, and noted t h a t t h i s was i n f a c t common c o l o n i a l p r a c t i c e . The s t i p u l a t i o n i s found i n Indian t r e a t i e s g e n e r a l l y . I t was introduced i n t o t h e i r t r e a t i e s w i t h Great B r i t a i n ; . . . i t s o r i g i n may be t r a c e d t o the nature of t h e i r connection w i t h those powers; and i t s t r u e meaning i s discerned i n t h e i r r e l a t i v e s i t u a t i o n . The Indian perceived i n t h i s p r o t e c t i o n only what was b e n e f i c i a l t o themselves - an engagement t o punish agressions upon them. I t i n v o l v e d p r a c t i c a l l y no c l a i m t o t h e i r lands, no dominion over t h e i r persons. I t merely bound the n a t i o n t o the B r i t i s h Crown as a dependent a l l y , c l a i m i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of a powerful f r i e n d and neighbour, without i n v o l v i n g a surrender of 48. I b i d , 559-60. 119 t h e i r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . This i s the t r u e meaning of the s t i p u l a t i o n , and i s undoubtedly the sense i n which i t was made. Nei t h e r the B r i t i s h government nor the Cherokees understood i t otherwise.(49) Thus the Cherokee "dependent" s t a t u s had i t s source i n t r e a t y promises of p r o t e c t i o n which were p r o p e r l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s . As such i t could not be understood t o e f f e c t a d i m u n i t i o n of Cherokee sove r e i g n t y and was i n essence consensual i n c h a r a c t e r . A c c o r d i n g l y the Cherokee s i t u a t i o n was s i m i l a r t o t h a t of s m a l l e r European s t a t e s : The s e t t l e d d o c t r i n e of the law of n a t i o n s i s t h a t a weaker power does not surrender i t s independence - i t s r i g h t t o s e l f government - by a s s o c i a t i n g w i t h a stronger and t a k i n g i t s p r o t e c t i o n . . . . Examples of t h i s are not wanting i n Europe 2.2 Conclusion Worcestor v. Georgia e f f e c t i v e l y s ynthesized a l l t h a t had gone before by encapsulating what might best be termed the ' c o l o n i a l paradigm' u t i l i z e d throughout the p e r i o d of i n i t i a l c o n t act. By t r e a t y , by c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and by the j u r i s p r u d e n c e of the c o l o n i a l c o u r t s , Indian t i t l e and Indian sovereignty was repeatedly a f f i r m e d and r e a f f i r m e d . T i t l e and sovereignty were the two fundamental components of t h a t paradigm. They were the bases upon which white s e t t l e r s were accepted on North American s o i l and they formed the focus of Indian/white r e l a t i o n s u n t i l the 1830s. As such they were, as Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l makes p l a i n , 49. I b i d , a t 551-2. 120 "the Law." Subsequent d e c i s i o n s and l e g i s l a t i o n a ttacked t h i s paradigm, u n i l a t e r a l l y abrogated i t , attempted t o d i s c r e d i t i t or ignore i t - y e t i t s e n f o r c e a b i l i t y as a statement of indigneous r i g h t s i s c l e a r and i r r e f u t a b l e . I t s terms are as p r e c i s e and a r t i c u l a t e a statement of Nat i v e demands i n North America today as they were d u r i n g the times when the paradigm was f i r s t c o n s t r u c t e d . Nor i s t h i s c o l o n i a l paradigm r e s t r i c t e d i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o North America. At the very l e a s t , i t i s a statement of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l law and so a p p l i e d t o a l l of the peoples c o l o n i s e d d u r i n g the B r i t i s h expansion. When the I m p e r i a l machine a r r i v e d o f f i c i a l l y i n New Zealand e i g h t years a f t e r Worcestor v. Georgia. the same r u l e s were a p p l i e d . 2.3 New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi: Maori  Sovereignty and Pakeha Sovereignty. The process whereby the formal c o l o n i s a t i o n of New Zealand began i n 1840 must be seen, i n law, as an extension of the process of B r i t i s h expansion i n t o North America. To view white settlement i n New Zealand as an i s o l a t e d example of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m i n the South P a c i f i c , or even f o r t h a t matter A u s t r a l a s i a , i s t o d i s r e g a r d two c e n t u r i e s of the development of c o l o n i a l law and p r a c t i c e . That law and p r a c t i c e , discussed e x t e n s i v e l y above, governed i n i t i a l B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Maori as i t d i d w i t h the Indian n a t i o n s . Once again t h i s i s made c l e a r i n the events preceding and surrounding the treaty-making process i n New Zealand. I t was put beyond doubt i n the 121 d e c i s i o n of the f u l l c o urt of the New Zealand Supreme Court i n R_s_ v. Symonds. (50) This was one of the few d e c i s i o n s of the New Zealand Courts of the Contact era which touched on is s u e s of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e t o land. I r o n i c a l l y the f a c t s of the case repeat those of Johnson v. Mcintosh,, and, as i n t h a t case, the Maori i n t e r e s t was not represented i n argument. Nevertheless, Chapman J . makes i t abundantly c l e a r t h a t the c o l o n i a l paradigm w i t h i t s framework r e c o g n i t i o n of Native t i t l e and Native sovereignty, a p p l i e d as much t o New Zealand as i t d i d t o the North American c o n t i n e n t wherein i t was f i r s t formulated: "The i n t e r c o u r s e of c i v i l i s e d n a t i o n s , and e s p e c i a l l y of B r i t a i n , w i t h the a b o r i g i n a l Natives of America and other c o u n t r i e s , during the l a s t two c e n t u r i e s , has g r a d u a l l y l e d t o the adoption and a f f i r m a t i o n by the C o l o n i a l Courts of c e r t a i n e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s of  law a p p l i c a b l e t o such i n t e r c o u r s e . Although these p r i n c i p l e s may at times have been l o s t s i g h t o f , y e t animated by the humane s p i r i t of modern times, our C o l o n i a l Courts and the Courts of such of the United t a t e s of America as have adopted the common law of England, have i n v a r i a b l y a f f i r m e d and supported them so t h a t a t t h i s day, a l i n e of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , the cu r r e n t of l e g a l o p i n i o n , and above a l l , the s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e of the c o l o n i a l Governments, have concurred w i t h c e r t a i n t y and p r e c i s i o n what would otherwise have remained vague and u n s e t t l e d . These p r i n c i p l e s flow not from what an American w r i t e r has c a l l e d "the v i c e of j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n " . They are i n f a c t t o be found among the e a r l i e s t s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s of law; and they are i n p a r t deduced from those higher p r i n c i p l e s , from c h a r t e r s made i n conformity w i t h them acquiesced i n even down t o the c h a r t e r of our own Colony; and from the l e t t e r of t r e a t i e s w i t h Native t r i b e s , wherein those p r i n c i p l e s have been as s e r t e d and acted upon." (emphasis added)(51) 50. (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 382. 51. I b i d . , a t 388. 122 Chief J u s t i c e M a r t i n i n the same d e c i s i o n r e f e r s t o these p r i n c i p l e s as the "general law...of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l empire. 1 1 (52) Indeed as evidence t h e r e o f he quotes and adopts none other than Rents' Commentaries on American Law.(53) F i n a l l y , i n terms which might have been l i f t e d d i r e c t l y from the d e c i s i o n of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n Johnson v. Mcintosh, he des c r i b e s the nature of Maori t i t l e : The N a t i v e s are admitted t o be the r i g h t f u l occupants of the s o i l w i t h a l e g a l as w e l l as j u s t c l a i m t o r e t a i n possession of i t and t o use i t according t o t h e i r own d i s c r e t i o n , though not t o dispose of the s o i l a t t h e i r own w i l l , except t o the government c l a i m i n g the r i g h t of pre-emption.(54) Quite apart from jurisprudence which confirmed the " c o l o n i a l paradigm" a f t e r the events, formal B r i t i s h a c q u i s i t i o n of the i s l a n d s of New Zealand was e x p r e s s l y premised upon a r e c o g n i t i o n of both Maori t i t l e and Maori sovereignty. As i n North America, t o do otherwise would have been l u d i c r o u s . The subsistence of both t i t l e and sovereignty i n the t r i b e s was so obvious as t o be unquestionable. In the e a r l y 1830's when u n o f f i c i a l white settlement began i n earnest, t h e r e were only 300 non-Maori 52. I b i d , a t 893. 53. I b i d , V o l . 3 a t p. 379. 54. I b i d . 123 i n New Zealand. Even by the time of formal a c q u i s i t i o n i n 1840, t h i s had r i s e n t o only 2000. By c o n t r a s t the Maori p o p u l a t i o n at the time was estimated at between 150,000-250,000! In the already quoted words of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l "... i t was an extravagant and absurd idea t h a t the f e e b l e settlements on the sea coast..." c o u l d have snatched t i t l e and sovereignty from the Maori.(55) Thus by the Murders Abroad Act of 1817(56) concerning the punishment of crimes committed by B r i t i s h seamen 'abroad', the I s l a n d s of New Zealand were e x p r e s s l y considered t o be 'not w i t h i n H i s Majesty's dominions.' The A u s t r a l i a n Court Act of 1828(57) provided t h a t c o u r t s i n the c o l o n i e s of New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land may t r y of f e n c e s , "committed i n the i s l a n d s of New Zealand...not [being] s u b j e c t t o His Majesty or t o any European s t a t e . " I n a memorandum from Lord John R u s s e l l (of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ) t o Lord Palmerston concerning claims of B r i t i s h s o v ereignty by a company formed f o r the purpose of c o l o n i s i n g New Zealand (58) the former wrote: 55. Supra, Worcester v. Georgia 56. 57 Georgia I I I cap. 53 preamble. 57. 4 Georgia IV, cap. 96, s. 4. 58. The New Zealand Company claimed t h a t B r i t a i n had secured sovereignty over New Zealand by d i s c o v e r y and t h a t c o l o n i s a t i o n should occur immediately. 124 I f these solemn Acts of the Parliament and of the King of Great B r i t a i n are not enough t o show t h a t the p r e t e n s i o n made by t h i s company on behalf of Her Majesty i s unfounded, i t might s t i l l f u r t h e r be r e p e l l e d by a minute n a r r a t i o n of a l l the r e l a t i o n s between New Zealand and the adjacent B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s , and e s p e c i a l l y by the j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s of the Supe r i o r Courts of those c o l o n i e s . I t i s presumed however, t h a t , a f t e r the preceding statement, i t would be superfluous t o accumulate arguments of t h a t nature....(59) In 1835, a c o a l i t i o n of C h i e f s from the northern p o r t i o n of the North I s l a n d issued a D e c l a r a t i o n of the  Independence of New Zealand, d e c l a r i n g New Zealand t o be a sovereign and independent s t a t e . This was done l a r g e l y a t the u r g i n g of Busby, the o f f i c i a l ' B r i t i s h Resident' who feared French designs on New Zealand. The D e c l a r a t i o n had the s i g n a t u r e s of 35 c h i e f s appended t o i t , a l l of whom belonged t o the Nga Puhi confederation of t r i b e s (whose r o l e i n New Zealand d u r i n g c o l o n i s a t i o n was s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the Iroquois) and who b a r e l y represented even a s i g n i f i c a n t m i n o r i t y of the Maori p o p u l a t i o n of New Zealand. As such the D e c l a r a t i o n could not have been e f f e c t i v e beyond the boundaries of the Nga Puhi. Of course there was no need f o r such statements. The NgaPuhi were as w i t h a l l the other t r i b e s and confederations, sovereign i n f a c t ; and were, by Maori custom and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l law, recognized t o be 59. 18 March 1840: Note t h a t though the Treaty of Waitangi was signed a month e a r l i e r on 6 February, news of t h i s d i d not reach England u n t i l October: Passage quoted i n Re  Kauaeranga (1877) 4 Hauraki M.B. 236. 125 sovereign i n law. The D e c l a r a t i o n d i d no more than provide f u r t h e r evidence of the t r u t h of these two p r o p o s i t i o n s . By 1839, increased pressure from a burgeoning s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n , t a l e s of woe and s o c i a l d i s o r d e r from James Busby(60), and the urgings of the New Zealand Company l e d t o the d i s p a t c h i n g of Captain Hobson from London, w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o enter i n t o a t r e a t y of c e s s i o n w i t h the Maori t r i b e s of New Zealand. H i s i n s t r u c t i o n s were provided by Lord Normanby,(61) the terms of which a f f i r m y e t again t h a t the c o l o n i a l paradigm a p p l i e d t o the Maori, "whose t i t l e t o the s o i l , and t o the Sovereignty of New Zealand i s i n d i s p u t a b l e , and has been solemnly recognised by the B r i t i s h Government."(62) L a t e r i n those i n s t r u c t i o n s Lord Normanby q u a l i f i e s h i s understanding of Maori sovereignty, i n a manner o f t e n portrayed as f a t a l t o the t h i n g i t s e l f : ( 6 3 ) I have already s t a t e d t h a t we acknowledge New Zealand as a Sovereign and independent STate, so f a r a t l e a s t 60. Oxford New Zealand H i s t o r y (1984). These were according t o Anne Parsonsonn, g r o s s l y o v e r s t a t e d . 61. 14 August 1859 i n ; Mclntyre and Gardner, Speeches and  Documents on New Zealand H i s t o r y (1970) p. 10. 62. I b i d . , at p. 11. 63. See e.g. Prendegast C.J. i n Wi Parata v. Bishop of  W e l l i n g t o n (1877) 3 N.Z. J u r . (N.S.) S.C. 72 a t 77. 126 as i t i s p o s s i b l e t o make t h a t acknowledgment i n favour of a people composed of numerous, di s p e r s e d , and p e t t y T r i b e s , who possess few p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s t o each other, and are incompetent t o a c t as even d e l i b e r a t e i n concert. But the admission of t h e i r r i g h t s , though i n e v i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d by t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i s b i n d i n g on the f a i t h of the B r i t i s h Crown.(64) Of course, h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of the whole of New Zealand as a u n i t a r y s t a t e , i f t h a t was h i s i n t e n t i o n , represented a fundamental misconception of the nature of Maori s o c i e t y . As was the p a t t e r n of r e c o g n i t i o n i n North America, i t was the t r i b e s (or nations as they are r e f e r r e d t o i n North America) which were sovereign, and which were recognized as such. To consider the whole of New Zealand t o be sub j e c t t o a s i n g l e sovereign e n t i t y or power, was as r i d i c u l o u s as making t h a t same c l a i m i n respect of North America. Nor were the t r i b e s d ispersed and p e t t y . I t took t e n thousand i m p e r i a l troops t o subdue the Waikato confederacy i n the 1860s! The n o t i o n t h a t sovereignty over the whole was d i v i d e d amongst v a r i o u s nations or t r i b e s was t h e r e f o r e not new. I t had, as noted, been the p a t t e r n of r e c o g n i t i o n i n the U.S. and Canada. Thus Lord Normanby's " q u a l i f i c a t i o n " must be understood not as d i m i n i s h i n g the n o t i o n of sovere i g n t y i n anyway - but as r e c o g n i z i n g i t s d i v i s i o n between the t r i b e s , and as r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h a t d i v i d e d sovereignty would represent the sum of a v a i l a b l e sovereign a u t h o r i t y i n New Zealand. 64. Supra, Speeches and Documents a t 12. 127 On the 6th of February 1840, Captain Hobson entered i n t o a t r e a t y w i t h 45 northern c h i e f s . The t r e a t y became known as the Treaty of Waitangi, a f t e r the p l a c e where those c h i e f s signed i t . In the months f o l l o w i n g , n e a r l y 500 more adhesions were secured from many (but not a l l ) of the l e a d i n g c h i e f s of the North I s l a n d , and the northern p o r t i o n of the South I s l a n d . The Treaty of Waitangi was a formal a f f i r m a t i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm - of Maori sovereignty and t i t l e - as the framework W i t h i n which c o l o n i s a t i o n of New Zealand would be allowed t o occur. In form, i t resembled a l l of the B r i t i s h and U.S. T r e a t i e s entered i n t o w i t h Native people i n Eastern North /America. Much of the f a m i l i a r language of B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n was used i n t h i s t r e a t y as w e l l . In substance however, the Treaty of Waitangi contained none of the s p e c i f i c i t y and d e t a i l of the North American t r e a t i e s . There was no p r o v i s i o n as t o r e s o l v i n g a c o n f l i c t of laws, as w i t h f o r example, the Treaty of Hopewell. There was no p r o v i s i o n as t o the maintenance of peace between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d ; as t o the c e s s i o n of s p e c i f i c l a nds; or as t o the d e l i n e a t i o n of Maori t e r r i t o r i e s . Instead the Treaty provided no more than a general framework w i t h i n which these d e t a i l s might be l a t e r worked out. In substance, the Treaty of Waitangi resembled the Royal Proclamation of 1763 -though the former was consensual i n form, and the l a t t e r u n i l a t e r a l . Both were intended t o e s t a b l i s h a comprehensive framework f o r o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s between c o l o n i s e r and 128 c o l o n i s e d . T h i s was t o be based upon an e q u a l l y comprehensive guarantee of what l a t e r came t o be known as ' a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s ' . The terminology has v a r i e d but he substance ha remained constant: A b o r i g i n a l t i t l e and a b o r i g i n a l sovereignty.(65) An understanding of the s p e c i f i c terms of the Treaty of Waitangi i s c r u c i a l t o understanding the extent t o which the ' c o l o n i a l paradigm' was imported w i t h B r i t i s h c o l o n i s a t i o n t o New Zealand. A c c o r d i n g l y i t i s worthwhile spending some time a n a l y s i n g the c o m p l e x i t i e s and amb i g u i t i e s of t h i s seemingly simple document. The Treaty c o n s i s t s of three a r t i c l e s preceded by a preamble. I t s complexity i s a t t r i b u t a b l e s o l e l y t o the f a c t t h a t i t was d r a f t e d i n two v e r s i o n s , one i n E n g l i s h , the other i n Maori. N e i t h e r i s a d i r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of the other. Though u n t i l very r e c e n t l y , the E n g l i s h t e x t has been t r e a t e d as the primary reference p o i n t i t was i n f a c t the Maori t e x t which was signed by Hobson and by 500 of the 539 c h i e f s who acceded t o i t s terms. For t h i s reason, the cu r r e n t understanding as i n d i c a t e d by the Waitangi 65. The f a c t t h a t these instruments so c l o s e l y resemble each other i s testimony t o the f u r t h e r f a c t t h a t they belong t o the same body of law and develop from i d e n t i c a l processes though on opposite s i d e s of the world. The e s s e n t i a l i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of c o l o n i a l i s m and t h e r e f o r e of c o l o n i a l law i s a n o t i o n which i s c e n t r a l t o the arguments being s e t out i n P a r t I I . 129 Tribunal(66) i s t h a t where the t e x t s cannot be r e c o n c i l e d by reference t o each other, the Maori should be " t r e a t e d a the prime r e f e r e n c e " i n view of i t s "predominant" r o l e i n s e c u r i n g signatures(67) Such a c o n c l u s i o n must have been c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Maori understandings i n 1840. By A r t i c l e I of the E n g l i s h t e x t the c h i e f s ceded t o the Crown -. . . a b s o l u t e l y and without r e s e r v a t i o n a l l the r i g h t s and powers of sovereignty [which they] r e s p e c t i v e l y e x e r c i s e or possess.... By c o n t r a s t the Maori v e r s i o n of A r t i c l e I d i d not cede even a Maori e q u i v a l e n t of sovereignty. Instead i t ceded a t h i n g c a l l e d Kawanatanga. This was a word invented by the m i s s i o n a r i e s (who i n f a c t t r a n s l a t e d the Treaty i n t o M a o r i ) , and used e x t e n s i v e l y i n the 1820 Maori t r a n s l a t i o n of the 66. A t r i b u n a l w i t h recommendatory powers only, e s t a b l i s h e d under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. The t r i b u n a l ' s mandate i s t o hear claims by Maori t h a t t h e i r r i g h t s under the Treaty have been breached by v i r t u e of s. 5(2) of the Act, i t has f u r t h e r a u t h o r i t y t o "determine the meaning and e f f e c t of the Treaty as embodied i n the two t e x t s and t o decide i s s u e s r a i s e d by d i f f e r e n c e s between them." Much more w i l l be s a i d l a t e r about the workings and d e c i s i o n s of the t r i b u n a l which has been instru m e n t a l i n the r e v i v a l of the c o l o n i a l paradigm i n modern New Zealand. 67. Report of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l i n re the Motunui Claim (1983) WAI 3 a t para. 10.1. 130 B i b l e . I t s base i s Kawana - a simple t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n of "governor." I t was used i n the B i b l e t o d e s c r i b e the p o s i t i o n and a u t h o r i t y of such notable f i g u r e s as Pontius P i l a t e . For the moment l e t us assume t h a t "governorshp" not s o v e r e i g n t y was ceded i n the Maori t e x t and t h a t the substance of the term i s not as yet c l e a r . In r e t u r n f o r whatever was ceded i n A r t i c l e I , the " C h i e f s and T r i b e s of New Zealand" would be p r o t e c t e d , according t o A r t i c l e I I , i n ...the f u l l , e x c l u s i v e and undisturbed possession of t h e i r lands and e s t a t e s , f o r e s t s , f i s h e r i e s and other p r o p e r t i e s which they may c o l l e c t i v e l y or i n d i v i d u a l l y possess.... T h i s amounts t o a simple enough guarantee of a l l the r i g h t s f i t t i n g under the r u b r i c of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . A r t i c l e I I of the Maori t e x t d i f f e r s i n two r e s p e c t s -one r e l a t i n g t o the l i s t of t h i n g s p r o t e c t e d , the other and more important one i n the context of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , r e l a t i n g t o the extent of t h a t p r o t e c t i o n . As t o the f i r s t , w h i l e the E n g l i s h t e x t i s centred around " r e a l e s t a t e r i g h t s " , the Maori r e f e r s a l s o the p r o t e c t i o n of i n t a n g i b l e t h i n g s . The guarantee of "o  r a t o u taonga katoa", or a l l t h i n g s t r e a s u r e d by the ancestors has been taken t o i n c l u d e language, custom and r e l i g i o n . ( 6 8 ) As t o the extent of p r o t e c t i o n of these t h i n g s , the Maori t e x t d i d not guarantee an e q u i v a l e n t of " f u l l , e x c l u s i v e and undisturbed possession." I t guaranteed "te 68. Report of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l i n re Te Reo Maori  Claim (1986) WAI 6 at 4.3.5-9. 131 t i n o r a n q a t i r a t a n q a . " An understanding of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s c r i t i c a l t o a c l e a r p e r c e p t i o n of the framework being s et up by the Treaty. Ranqatiratanqa was a l s o a term coined by the m i s s i o n a r i e s . I t s base i s r a n q a t i r a meaning c h i e f . The a d d i t i o n of the s u f f i x -tanqa a b s t r a c t s t h i s , denoting thereby, c h i e f l y power, a u t h o r i t y , p r e r o g a t i v e or domain. I t s b i b l i c a l usages confirm t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : The phrase "The kingdom come" i n the Lord's prayer i s rendered " k i a tae mai Tou r a n g a t i r a t a n q a . " In the same way the n o t i o n of Roman i m p e r i a l a u t h o r i t y i s rendered " t e ra n g a t i r a t a n q a o Roma." Thus w h i l e i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e e i t h e r Kawana-tanga or ranga t i r a t a n g a p r e c i s e l y , the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of P i l a t e ' s a u t h o r i t y as Kawanatanga and the s u p e r i o r Roman a u t h o r i t y as Rangatiratanga g i v e s one a sense of the r e l a t i v e importance of t h a t which was ceded by A r t i c l e I , and t h a t which was r e t a i n e d by A r t i c l e I I of the Maori t e x t . What can be s t a t e d w i t h p r e c i s i o n , i f one attempts t o read between the two t e x t s , i s t h a t the "sovereignty" ceded by E n g l i s h A r t i c l e I was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d i n i t s scope by the " r a n g a t i r a t a n g a " r e t a i n e d t o the Maori i n A r t i c l e I I of the Maori t e x t . In a recent r e p o r t , the Waitangi T r i b u n a l grappled w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Pakeha sovereignty and Maori rangatiratanga:(69) 69. Report of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l i n re the Orakei Claim (1987) WAI 9. 132 11.5.2 The meaning of t i n o r a n g a t i r a t a n g a has caused us much t r o u b l e . There i s no p r e c i s e E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t and, i t i s used i n the t r e a t y i n an 'un-Maori' manner. To g i v e i t the meaning both p a r t i e s would have understood, we would render i t as f u l l  a u t h o r i t y . . . . 11.5.6 The Maori word f o r a u t h o r i t y i s mana. Rangatiratanga and mana we have s a i d are " i n e x t r i c a b l y r e l a t e d words" (Te A t i Awa Report (1983) 10.2). In the Manukau Report (1985: 8.3) we r e l a t e d t h a t 'mana' had been used i n the e a r l i e r D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence of New Zealand t o d e s c r i b e " a l l sovereign power and a u t h o r i t y " but W i l l i a m s [the missionary r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t r a n s l a t i n g the Treaty] was c a r e f u l t o avo i d u s i n g 'mana' f o r 'sovereignty' i n the Treaty, f o r due t o i t s s p i r i t u a l and h i g h l y personal connotations no person could cede i t . Thus he used 'Kawanatanga' f o r 'sovereignty' and 'rangatiratanga' f o r the Maori a u t h o r i t y though t o Maori, mana would have des c r i b e d both. K u i n i mana [crown a u t h o r i t y ] f o r one (as was used c o l l o q u i a l l y ) , Mana Maori [Maori a u t h o r i t y ] f o r the other, and Mana Motuhake t o d e s c r i b e the autonomous  ch a r a c t e r of the l a t t e r (emphasis added) The second p a r t of A r t i c l e I I reserved t o the Crown e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y t o purchase lands which the t r i b e s wished t o s e l l . By A r t i c l e I I I , the l e a s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l of the three a r t i c l e s , the Maori were c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y guaranteed a l l the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s . Now i t i s p o s s i b l e t o set out w i t h some p r e c i s i o n the s a l i e n t p o i n t s of the framework of Maori/Pakeha race r e l a t i o n s which was being e s t a b l i s h e d by the Treaty of Waitangi. F i r s t l y , l i k e the Royal Proclamation, the Treaty recognized and guaranteed Maori t i t l e t o the whole of New Zealand. I t a l s o guaranteed t r i b a l t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y i n 133 the A r t i c l e I I phrase " e x c l u s i v e and undisturbed possession." Secondly p r e - e x i s t i n g Maori sovereignty was c l e a r l y recognized i n both the form of the Treaty and i n the s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e I . Moreover, t h a t s o v e r e i g n t y was modified by A r t i c l e I but i t was not ext i n g u i s h e d . In essence a r i g h t t o i n t e r n a l Maori s e l f -government - Mana Motuhake - remained i n t a c t and was pr o t e c t e d by the terms of A r t i c l e I I (Maori t e x t ) . I n r e t u r n f o r t h a t p r o t e c t i o n , what remained of the sovereignty r u b r i c was t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Crown pursuant t o A r t i c l e I . This s o - c a l l e d 'sovereignty' amounted t o the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e governmental powers i n respect of the growing s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n . As was e x p r e s s l y i n c l u d e d i n A r t i c l e I I , i t a l s o reserved t o the B r i t i s h Crown the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o purchase land h e l d by the t r i b e s . Given two c e n t u r i e s of c o l o n i a l law and p r a c t i c e - the a f f i r m a t i o n of Native t i t l e and sovereignty i n c o u n t l e s s t r e a t i e s , i n the Royal Proclamation, and i n j u d i c i a l pronouncements i n North America - i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the Treaty of Waitangi was a simple restatement of t h a t same c o l o n i a l paradigm i n respect of New Zealand. There i s ample evidence t h a t t h i s was how the Treaty was understood a t the time by the ch i e f s . ( 7 0 ) The i n s t r u c t i o n s of Lord 70. Op. c i t . . Orakei Report a t 11.5.19. 134 Normandy make i t e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t t h i s was the i n t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h Crown. There has r e c e n t l y been a great d e a l of argument as t o whether the Treaty of W a i t a i n g i was i n f a c t the instrument whereby the B r i t i s h Crown f o r m a l l y 'acquired' New Zealand.(71) P r i n c i p a l l y , the events which have l e d h i s t o r i a n s and lawyers t o question t h a t e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the t r e a t y are as f o l l o w s . On January 14, 1840 ( n e a r l y a month before the Treaty was signed) Governor Gipps of New South Wales swore i n Captain Hobson both as B r i t i s h Consul t o New Zealand and as Lieutenant Governor of New Zealand. On January 19, the Proclamation of the 14th was p u b l i s h e d d e c l a r i n g i n p a r t t h a t the j u r i s d i c i t o n of the colony of New South Wales extended t o New Zealand(72). These and s i m i l a r proclamations are c i t e d i n order t o show t h a t the Treaty was r e a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o the B r i t i s h a c q u i s i t i o n of sovereignty i n New Zealand. That a c q u i s i t o n was e f f e c t e d by u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n and not consensually. Two f a c t o r s make such analyses both f r u i t l e s s and i r r e l e v a n t . F i r s t l y , upon what b a s i s could a mere u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n from A u s t r a l i a rob the Maori of t h e i r 71. W i l l i a m s , The Annexation of New Zealand t o New South  Wales i n 1840: What of the Treaty of Waitangi? (1985) 2 A u s t r a l i a n J o u r n a l of Law and S o c i e t y 41; and Kelsey, Legal  Imperialism and the C o l o n i s a t i o n of Aotearoa 72. I b i d , W i l l i a m s at 42-5. 135 sovereignty? There had been no conquest. And Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l makes i t p l a i n t h a t B r i t i s h " d i s c o v e r y " d i d no more than pre-empt the designs of other European powers - i t d i d not, and c o u l d not derogate from the p r e - e x i s t i n g r i g h t s of the Indigenous peoples. A c c o r d i n g l y the New South Wales proclamations may be understood as e s t a b l i s h i n g B r i t i s h pre-eminence as a g a i n s t other contenders but they c o u l d not a f f e c t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the B r i t i s h Crown and the Maori people. That had s t i l l t o be worked out i n negotiaton between the p a r t i e s . Such a c o n c l u s i o n accords both w i t h l o g i c and common sense. The second p o i n t r e l a t e s t o an e a r l i e r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the Treaty of Waitangi d i d no more than a f f i r m a pre-e x i s t i n g and l e g a l l y enforceable framework of r i g h t s . I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t even i f i t were conceded t h a t the Treaty was i r r e l e v a n t t o B r i t i s h a c q u i s i t i o n , the r i g h t s expressed i n i t would be un a f f e c t e d s i n c e they have independent e n f o r c e a b i l t y i n any event. Cherokee t i t l e and sovereignty was, according t o M a r s h a l l confirmed by the Treaty of Hopewell, not created by i t . The same reasoning must apply w i t h equal f o r c e i n New Zealand. 2.4 Conclusion The promises made (on both sides) i n the Treaty of Waitangi, l i k e those signed by the I r o q u o i s , Mohegan, Deleware or Cherokee, encapsulated the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the contact p e r i o d . From these came n a t u r a l l y the l e g a l norms which have been described and discussed i n the 136 preceding pages. Without exception, t h a t r e a l i t y was a t  l e a s t p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y t o and independence from the c o l o n i e s . In the cases of the I r o q u o i s or the Maori, the years of i n i t i a l contact were c h a r a c t e r i s e d by marked p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y over f l e d g l i n g s e t t l e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . How could these r e a l i t i e s not be r e f l e c t e d i n 'the law' and the l e g a l processes e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g these times t o govern r e l a t i o n s between the two groups? In the years t h a t f o l l o w e d , the power dynamics between them began t o change so t h a t by the 1830's i n the U.S., and the 1860's i n New Zealand these ' f l e d g l i n g ' s e t t l e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had become dominant i n the equation. The f a t e of the c o l o n i a l paradigm during t h i s time i s the s u b j e c t of the next s e c t i o n . S u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t Maori and North American Native peples continued t o r e l y on t h a t paradigm as the r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s and as the focus f o r the next 100 years of m i l i t a r y and l a t e r p o l i t i c a l s truggle.(73) 73. This was made worse i n New Zealand by a complete l a c k of l e g i s l a t i v e and j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l a f f i r m a t i o n of the paradigm. 137 3. THE MYTHOLOGY OF CONQUEST; COLONIAL PARADIGM BECOMES COLONIAL PARODY By the 1830's i n the U.S. and by the 1860's i n Canada and New Zealand the c o l o n i a l paradigm was under t h r e a t . Though the framework of Native t i t l e and Native Sovereignty had been f i r m l y entrenched i n the law, i t became i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent t h a t the power dynamics were changing and t h a t c o l o n i a l governments and cou r t s were beginning t o e x e r c i s e a new-found hegemony as d e f i n e r s and r e d e f i n e r s of t h i s 'law'. Law, the development of which had once been a b i l a t e r a l and consensual process, became i n c r e a s i n g l y a phenomenon u n i l a t e r a l l y imposed upon Indigenous peoples i n a l l t hree j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y of the time was one of s e t t l e r populations and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s growing i n s i z e , i n power and i n arrogance. In the 100 years which was t o f o l l o w , t h i s arrogance c h a r a c t e r i s e d the e n t i r e development of the Nativ e r i g h t s framework. Meanwhile Maori and Indian peoples a l i k e were b a t t e r e d by disease, war, s o c i a l d i s l o c a t i o n and i n c r e a s i n g m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n . By the end of the 19th century, popular mythology i n the three c o u n t r i e s was t h a t N a t i v e peoples would e v e n t u a l l y disappear completely. By these means, Nat i v e p o l i c y moved from the centre-stage of c o l o n i a l p o l i t i c s a t the beginning of t h i s era, t o the perip h e r y of the n a t i o n a l consciousness by the end. In the words of James Youngblood Henderson: "This i s a journey t o the 138 d a r k s i d e of the law - a f a i l u r e of the r u l e of law i n B r i t i s h s o ciety."(74) The j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e subjugation of N a t i v e peoples and the c o l o n i a l paradigm was achieved and r a t i o n a l i z e d by means of a new "mythology of conquest." Of course t h e r e had been no r e a l conquest. The c o l o n i a l paradigm was premised upon the idea t h a t Native/white r e l a t i o n s were worked out consensually. In e f f e c t t h a t h i s t o r y was s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e w r i t t e n during t h i s p e r i o d i n order t o provide a j u s t i f y i n g context w i t h i n which t o promote c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s . Thus the Courts and the l e g i s l a t o r s , sometimes e x p r e s s l y and sometimes more s u b t l e t y , created a conquest. T i t l e t h a t had been formerly unquestioned now depended on the 'grace and favour of the Crown.' 'Sovereign Indian n a t i o n s ' , became overnight, mere savages whose sovereignty had never been recognized. In some i n s t a n c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the United S t a t e s , the Courts r a t i o n a l i z e d unreviewable f e d e r a l plenary power through a s t r i c t l y l e g a l concept of conquest. In most cases however, conquest was merely i m p l i e d as the unquestioned r e a l i t y which allowed a r b i t r a r y and u n i l a t e r a l governmental abrogation of Native t i t l e and sovereignty. J u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s of the p e r i o d almost without exception read l i k e the pronouncements of a conquering power. The terminology 74. Henderson, A b o r i g i n a l Rights i n Western Legal T r a d i t i o n i n Bold and Long, The Quest f o r J u s t i c e : A b o r i g i n a l Peoples  and A b o r i g i n a l Rights (1985) a t p. 214. 139 used and the d o c t r i n e s advocated r e f l e c t a depth of arrogance and racism which, when compared w i t h e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s , i s b r e a t h t a k i n g . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n t r a c e s the development of t h a t mythology, and i t s e f f e c t on the c o l o n i a l paradigm. 3.1 The United States 3.1.1 Removal. Allotment and Federal Plenary Power The f i r s t major a t t a c k on Indian t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y came under the c o n t r o v e r s i a l Indian Removal Act of 1830. In f a c t the Act provided a s i n i s t e r background t o the Cherokee cases which were being c o n c u r r e n t l y argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. The p o l i c y of removing the Indian n a t i o n s i n the east t o p o i n t s west of the M i s s i s s i p p i was not a new one,(75) but t h i s was the f i r s t time l e g i s l a t i o n had been r e s o r t e d t o i n an e f f o r t t o g i v e e f f e c t t o a broader p o l i c y of p r o v i d i n g lands i n the east f o r settlement. I t was n a i v e l y i n v i s a g e d t h a t the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the r e l o c a t e d n a t i o n s could be guaranteed i n p e r p e t u i t y i n permanently p r o t e c t e d "Indian country" west of the M i s s i s s i p p i . The Act provided f o r "volu n t a r y " removal and r e l o c a t i o n , except t h a t r e f u s a l t o v o l u n t e e r exposed the 75. This p o l i c y was f i r s t accomplished by Treaty on a n a t i o n by n a t i o n b a s i s from 1817 on: see g e n e r a l l y , Sanders, A b o r i g i n a l S e l f Government i n the United S t a t e s (1985) ( I n s t i t u t e of Intergovernmental R e l a t i o n s ) , pp. 1011. 140 p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n t o the t h r e a t of c e s s a t i o n of f e d e r a l p r o t e c t i o n and the i m p o s i t i o n of s t a t e law.(76) As the Cherokee found out i n respect of Georgia, t h a t would have meant immediate l e g i s l a t i v e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Cherokee n a t i o n . In the end, and notwithstanding M a r s h a l l ' s v i n d i c a t i o n of Cherokee sovereignty i n Worcestor v. Georgia. the Cherokee were subjected t o the b r u t a l i t y and inhumanity of the removal p o l i c y . A f t e r s e c u r i n g a sham removal t r e a t y w i t h a small f a c t i o n of the Cherokee i n 1835, the M i l i t a r y c a r r i e d out a forced removal of the whole Cherokee n a t i o n i n 1838. In the ' t r a i l of t e a r s ' which f o l l o w e d over 4000 Cherokee d i e d . The Cherokee p l i g h t has, through h i s t o r y , come t o symbolize the b a r b a r i t y of the Removal p o l i c y . In t r u t h i t provides an apt symbol f o r t h i s whole "conquest 1 1 p e r i o d i n the c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y of the New World. By 1869 the whole process of treaty-making, the consensual v e h i c l e which underpinned the c o l o n i a l paradigm was being questioned. In t h a t year the Commissioner f o r I n d i a n A f f a i r s s t a t e d : A t r e a t y i n v o l v e s the idea of a compact between two or more sovereign powers.... The Indian t r i b e s of the United S t a t e s are not sovereign nations capable of making t r e a t i e s , as none of them have an organized government of such inherent s t r e n g t h as would secure a 76. See g e n e r a l l y Cohen, Hand Book of Federal Indian Law (2 ed.) (1982), pp. 81-2. 141 f a i t h f u l obedience of i t s people i n the observance of compacts of t h i s character.(77) W i t h i n two years treaty-making had been f o r m a l l y a b o l i s h e d by Congress. The p r o v i s i o n doing so was tucked away i n the 1871 Ap p r o p r i a t i o n s Act. I t provided ...that h e r e a f t e r no Indain n a t i o n or t r i b e w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of the U.S. s h a l l be acknowledged or recognized as an independent n a t i o n , t r i b e or power w i t h whom the U.S. may c o n t r a c t by t r e a t y . Though i t conceded t h a t Nothing h e r e i n contained s h a l l be construed t o i n v a l i d a t e or impair the o b l i g a t i o n of any t r e a t y h e r e t o f o r e l a w f u l l y made and r a t i f i e d w i t h any such Indian n a t i o n or t r i b e . ( 7 8 ) The wording used i s somewhat c o n t r a d i c t o r y . The f i r s t p a r t of the s e c t i o n acknowledges t h a t the a b i l i t y t o enter i n t o t r e a t i e s i m p l i e s independence and apparently f o r t h a t reason, p r o h i b i t s f u t u r e t r e a t i e s . The second p a r t however, acknowledges the e a r l i e r t r e a t i e s t o be v a l i d - im p l y i n g of course t h a t the p a r t i e s t o those t r e a t i e s were independent powers. Whatever i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , the e f f e c t of t h i s s e c t i o n on the f u t u r e of Native Rights was p l a i n enough. The r e a f t e r Indian law and p o l i c y would be given e f f e c t t o by u n i l a t e r a l c o n g r e s s i o n a l f i a t - a process i n which Indians would have 77. I b i d , a t p. 106. Comm'r Ind. A f f . Ann. GGP, HR Exec. Doc. No. 1, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 448 (1869) 78. 25 U.S. C. s. 71. 142 no formal r o l e - and i n most cases no i n f o r m a l r o l e e i t h e r . The c o l o n i a l paradigm recognized no such Congressional power. Issues which a f f e c t e d the i n t e r f a c e between Indian and s e t t l e r governments were t o be s e t t l e d by agreement between the p a r t i e s - not by i m p o s i t i o n of one p a r t y ' s s o l u t i o n upon the other. Such paradigms appeared t o be i n c r e a s i n g l y i r r e l e v a n t . I n f a c t , the U.S. had, before 1870, an e x t e n s i v e h i s t o r y of l e g i s l a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n , aspects of t h i s i n t e r f a c e . Foremost among these was the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n of 1787 which gave congress the power ...to r e g u l a t e commerce w i t h f o r e i g n n a t i o n s , and among the s e v e r a l s t a t e s , and w i t h the Indain t r i b e s . The Trade and Intercourse Acts passed between 1790 and 1834 were designed t o c o n t r o l trade between the U.S. and Indian n a t i o n s , and f o r t h a t purpose t o maintain the i n t e g r i t y of "Indian country." Thus as U.S. Indian l e g i s l a t i o n developed dur i n g the c o n t r a c t e r a , i t maintained as i t s s o l e concern, the e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of the t r i b e s w i t h the U.S. and the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . No attempt was made t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n t e r n a l workings of Indian governments.(79) 79. Supra, M a r s h a l l C.J. i n Worcestor v. Georgia " C e r t a i n i t i s , t h a t our h i s t o r y f u r n i s h e s no example, from the f i r s t settlement i n our country, of any attempt on the p a r t of the Crown, t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the Indians" (at 457). 143 This was t o change d r a m a t i c a l l y f o l l o w i n g the d e c i s i o n of the Supreme Court i n Ex parte Crow Dog.(80) The case concerned an attempt t o apply f e d e r a l c r i m i n a l law t o a s i t u a t i o n where an Indian had been charged w i t h the murder of another Indian on a r e s e r v a t i o n . The Supreme Court h e l d t h a t f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n had never been a s s e r t e d i n such circumstances and t h a t the Courts, both f e d e r a l and t e r r i t o r i a l , must t h e r e f o r e d e f e r t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the t r i b a l j u s t i c e system. The d e c i s i o n , though soundly based i n the c o l o n i a l paradigm, d i d not match the mood of the time. Congress r e t a l i a t e d two years l a t e r w i t h the Major Crimes Act 1885, the f i r s t ever a s s e r t i o n of u n i l a t e r a l c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Indian n a t i o n s . The Act s p e c i f i e d seven major crimes ( i n c l u d i n g murder) which, even i f committed by an Indian a g a i n s t another Indian i n Indian country, would become re g u l a t e d by f e d e r a l c r i m i n a l law. The Act was challenged the next year i n U.S. v. Kagama.(81) The Supreme Court r e j e c t e d the n o t i o n t h a t the Major Crimes Act was beyond the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of congress. Both the imagery and the r a t i o n a l e adopted by M i l l e r J . i s t e l l i n g . 80. (1883) 109 U.S. 556. 81. (1886) 118 U.S. 375. 144 These Indian t r i b e s are wards of the n a t i o n . They are communities dependent on the United S t a t e s . Dependent l a r g e l y f o r t h e i r d a i l y food. Dependent f o r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . . . . From t h e i r very weakness and h e l p l e s s n e s s , so l a r g e l y due t o the course d e a l i n g of the f e d e r a l government w i t h them and the t r e a t i e s i n which i t had been promised, there a r i s e s the duty of  p r o t e c t i o n , and w i t h i t the power. This has always been recognised by the Executive and Congress and by t h i s c o u r t whenever the question has arisen.(82) (emphasis added) In a complete f l i p , the imagery used i n Worcestor and the other contact cases i s disgarded and the na t i o n s are r e c o n c e p t u a l i s e d as " l o s t s o c i e t i e s without power, as minions of the f e d e r a l government"(83). The case reads as though a conquest had occurred, though none i s r e f e r r e d t o . The ' t r i b e s ' (no longer 'nations') are weak and h e l p l e s s according t o the Court, and no other j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s needed f o r t h i s newly as s e r t e d congressional power t o u n i l a t e r a l l y abrogate t r e a t i e s and t u r n the c o l o n i a l paradigm on i t s head. Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s a r t i c u l a t i o n of the Cherokee as a "domesic dependent n a t i o n " ( i t s e l f e n i g m a t i c ) , i s r e i n t e r p r e t e d by the Court. In the i n t e r v e n i n g f i f t y years, the nations had been r e l e g a t e d t o " l o c a l dependent communities."(84) The duty of p r o t e c t i o n , d e s c r i b e d by 82. I b i d , a t 383-4. 83. W i l k i n s o n , American Indians. Time, and the Law (1987) p. 24. 84. I b i d , a t 382. 145 Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n which d i d not s t r i p the pr o t e c t e d n a t i o n of the " r i g h t of government,"(85) became i t s e l f the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r omnipotent f e d e r a l power i n Kagama. In a f i n a l a t t a c k on the underpinnings of the c o l o n i a l paradigm the Court dismissed the n o t i o n of Indian sovereignty: Indians are w i t h i n the geographical l i m i t s of the Unit e d S t a t e s . The s o i l and the people w i t h i n these l i m i t s are under the p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the government of the United States or of the St a t e s of the union. There e x i s t w i t h i n the broad domain of  sovereignty but these two.(86) In t h i s s hort d e c i s i o n , the Supreme Court s e t out the b a s i c framework which was t o dominate the conquest e r a . The d e n i a l of Indian sovereignty; the a s s e r t i o n of plenary and u n i l a t e r a l f e d e r a l power; and the r a t i o n a l i z i n g of both of these premises through the use of i n c r e d i b l y r a c i s t and p a t r o n i s i n g images of Indian people and Indian l i f e . T h i s framework was almost the exact a n t i t h e s i s of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. As w i l l be demonstrated s h o r t l y , t h a t same framework was u t i l i z e d w i t h equal e f f e c t i n Canada and i n New Zealand. The next major i n i t i a t i v e i n the U.S. was l e g i s l a t i v e r a t h e r than j u d i c i a l , but i t was c l e a r l y motivated by the 85. Supra. Worcestor v. Georgia. 86. Supra, Kagama a t 379. 146 Kagama framework. In the General Allotment Act of 1887 t i t l e t o r e s e r v a t i o n s was i n d i v i d u a l i z e d i n t o f a m i l y a l l o t m e n t s i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of the p r o v i s i o n s of many t r e a t i e s : " S e c t i o n 5 of the [General Allotment] Act provided t h a t t i t l e t o allotments be h e l d i n t r u s t by the Uni t e d State f o r 25 years or longer i f the Pr e s i d e n t so d e s i r e d . During the t r u s t p e r i o d encumberances or conveyances were v o i d . . . . S e c t i o n 6...subjected the a l l o t t e e s t o the c i v i l and c r i m i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t e or t e r r i t o r y i n which they resided.(87) By 1892 allotments could be leased(88), and i n 1906 they became f u l l y a l i e n a b l e notwithstanding the 25 year moratorium, provided t h a t the a l i e n o r was "competent."(89) Reservation lands deemed t o be " s u r p l u s " a f t e r f a m i l i e s had been a l l o t t e d l a n d , was opened up f o r s e t t l e r homesteading. By t h i s means the i n t e g r i t y and cohesion of t r i b a l lands was almost completely l o s t . W i l k i n s o n a p t l y d e s c r i b e s the e f f e c t of the Allotment Act on the Indian nations i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: Allotment and the other a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t programs t h a t complimented i t devastated the Indian landbase, weakened Indian c u l t u r e , sapped the v i t a l i t y of t r i b a l l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l processes and opened most Indian r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r settlement by non-Indians. 87. Op. c i t . , Cohen at 131. 88. I b i d . f p. 135, 25 U.S.C. s. 336. 89. I b i d . . 136-7; 25 U.S.C. S. 35. 147 U l t i m a t e l y i t compromised the guarantee of measured separatism by dashing any remaining hopes t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l Indian s o c i t i e s might t r u l y remain separate.(90) The major e f f e c t of the allotment p e r i o d was, p r e d i c t a b l y , massive land l o s s . The c o l l e c t i v e I n dian landbase shrank from 138 m i l l i o n acres i n 1887 t o 48 m i l l i o n by 1934.(91) Such f i g u r e s make i t c l e a r t h a t the primary g o a l of allotment was land a c q u i s i t i o n . Further removal westward was now no longer a v i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n . Indian country once at the edge of white settlement, had by the 1880's became a s e r i e s of i s o l a t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l pockets surrounded by white settlement. Allotment was t h e r e f o r e the only way t o get a t the landbase short of simple c o n f i s c a t i o n . Allotment was used f o r the same purpose i n New Zealand from 1865 on, and y i e l d e d the same d e v a s t a t i n g r e s u l t s . ( 9 2 ) In both c o u n t r i e s , the i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n of t i t l e l a i d the foundations f o r s e r i o u s Native poverty i n the 20th century. Land l o s s should not however be seen as the only e f f e c t of a l l o t m e n t , as Wil k i n s o n c o r r c t l y suggests i n the above passage. Allotment was an a t t a c k on Indian government as 90. Op. c i t . , W i l k i n s o n , American Indians, time, and the Law, at p. 19. 91. Supra, Cohen at p. 148. 92. See i n f r a notes on t h i s p o i n t . 148 w e l l . A secondary o b j e c t i v e of the Act was t o promote Indian a s s i m i l a t i o n by t e r m i n a t i n g the t r i b e s as p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s and p r i v a t i s i n g the t r i b a l landbase. The net e f f e c t was t o render t r i b a l governments completely i r r e l e v a n t t o the allotment process.(93) In accordance w i t h the terms of s. 6 of the Act (supra) the vacuum l e f t by t r i b a l governments would be f i l l e d by e i t h e r the f e d e r a l or s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . In p r a c t i c e t h i s would mean a 50 year p e r i o d of d i r e c t r u l e of Indian nations by the Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s . As Theodore Roosevelt put i t ; "The General Allotment Act i s a mighty p u l v e r i s i n g engine t o break up the t r i b a l mass. I t a c t s d i r e c t l y on the f a m i l y and the i n d i v i d u a l . " ( 9 4 ) Kaqama and the General Allotment Act represented a j o i n t c o n g r e s s i o n a l and j u d i c i a l a s s a u l t on Indian t i t l e and Indian sovereignty. Together they dominated the law of I n d i a n / s e t t l e r r e l a t i o n s r i g h t up t o the l a t e 1950's, bar one b r i e f r e s p i t e i n the 1930's. In the Courts throughout t h i s p e r i o d , Kaqama's i n v e r s i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm became entrenched as c u r r e n t l e g a l mythology. Indeed Kaqama a f f e c t e d not j u s t f u t u r e developments of the law, i t a l s o rewrote the past. 93. Op. c i t . , Sanders, A b o r i g i n a l S e l f Government i n the  U.S. a t p. 16. 94. S. T y l e r , A H i s t o r y of Indian P o l i c y (1973) a t 104. 149 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchock(95) the Supreme Court upheld a f e d e r a l s a l e of t r i b a l land even though the t r e a t y requirement of consent by three quarters of a d u l t males had not been met - even on the most l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r e a t y ' s t r a n s f e r p r o v i s i o n s . The Court j u s t i f i e d u n i l a t e r a l abrogation of t h i s t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n on the b a s i s of the f e d e r a l government's o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t the Indians! The Indian t r i b e s are dependent wards of the U.S.; the U.S. knows best what i s good f o r the I n d i a n s ; i f the U.S. says t h a t t a k i n g t h e i r land without t h e i r consent and i n breach of t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s i s good f o r them, then the c o u r t s have no business second guessing government p o l i c y . The simple l o g i c of t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n i s astounding. What i s more the Court a s s e r t s t h a t the U.S. has always had t h i s power, and i t s e x e r c i s e has always been considered unreviewable by the Courts. Plenary a u t h o r i t y over the t r i b a l r e l a t i o n s of the Indians has been e x e r c i s e d by congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a p o l i t i c a l one, not s u b j e c t t o be c o n t r o l l e d by the j u d i c i a l department of the government.(96) Federal plenary power, as i t was o r i g i n a l l y formulated by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l , was i n the context of f e d e r a l / s t a t e competition f o r c o n t r o l over Indian a f f a i r s . I t was c o n s t r u c t e d t o exclude s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , not t o 95. (1903) 187 U.S. 553. 96. I b i d , a t 565. 150 exclude the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the very Indian governments i t was designed t o p r o t e c t . The Court, p r e f e r r i n g perhaps t o end on a p o s i t i v e note, concluded: I f i n j u r y was occasioned, which we do not wish t o be understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of i t s power, r e l i e f must be sought by an appeal t o t h a t  body of redress and not t o the courts.(97) (emphasis added) This a s s e r t i o n of the n o n - j u s t i c i a b i l i t y of N a t i v e r i g h t s questions was a t o o l used f r e q u e n t l y by the c o u r t s i n a l l t hree c o u n t r i e s t o r e j e c t n a t i v e c l a i m s . I t was used t o g r e a t e s t e f f e c t i n New Zealand where i t has s u r v i v e d u n t i l r e c e n t l y as the dominant d o c t r i n e i n respect of Maori r i g h t s . ( 9 8 ) The r e v i s i o n of h i s t o r y continued unabated throughout the conquest p e r i o d i n d e c i s i o n s which used Kaqama both as a framework and a springboard. In Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R l y . Co.(99). I t was h e l d : "The p r o p o s i t o n t h a t the Cherokee Nation i s sovereign i n the sense t h a t the United S t a t e s i s sovereign, or i n the sense t h a t the States are s o v e r e i g n . . . f i n d s no support. 97. I b i d , a t 568. 98. See i n f r a notes on t h i s p o i n t 99. (1890) 135 U.S. 641. 151 In Montoya v. U.S.(100) the court r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t one of the b a s i c premises of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. The North American Indians do not and never have c o n s t i t u t e d 'nations'....In short the word 'n a t i o n ' as a p p l i e d t o the u n c i v i l i s e d Indians i s so much of a misnomer as t o be l i t t l e more than a compliment (emphasis added) Again the c o u r t s seemed t o have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h r a t i o n a l i z i n g such r e v i s i o n i s m p u r e l y by adopting r a c i s t imagery and r a c i s t terminology. 3.1.2 The Indian New Deal: A b r i e f r e p r i e v e came i n the form of a l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e i n 1934 which s i g n a l l e d a l i m i t e d p o l i c y r e v e r s a l . The Indian Reorganisation Act 1934 (IRA) was the c e n t r e p i e c e of the "Indian New Deal", a post-depression attempt t o i n c l u d e the t r i b e s i n the b e n e f i t s of the famous "American New Deal". The c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e of the Indian New Deal was the strengthening of r e s e r v a t i o n communities by expanding land bases, p r o v i d i n g development c a p i t a l and strengthening l o c a l s e l f government. I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, a more l i m i t e d p o l i c y t u r n around occurred i n New Zealand seven or e i g h t years l a t e r which r e v i t a l i z e d t r i b a l communities i n a s i m i l a r way and which was s i m i l a r l y temporary.(10IX 100. (1901) U.S. 261. 101. See i n f r a notes on t h i s p o i n t . 152 The IRA p r o h i b i t t e d f u r t h e r i n d i v i d u a l i z a t i o n of t r i b a l t i t l e , returned t o t r i b a l t i t l e any ' s u r p l u s ' lands which had not yet been s o l d , and a u t h o r i z e d the expenditure of $100 m i l l i o n f o r the expansion of r e s e r v a t i o n land bases. Only $4 m i l l i o n of t h a t sum was i n f a c t a ppropriated by congress f o r the purpose and i n most cases onl y marginal lands were purchased.(102) S e c t i o n 16 provided a l i m i t e d r e c o g n i t i o n of t r i b a l government. The governmental model suggested by the Act was a white one: Any t r i b e or t r i b e s , r e s i d i n g on the same r e s e r v a t i o n , s h a l l have the r i g h t t o organize f o r i t s common we l f a r e , and may adopt an a p propriate c o n s t i t u t i o n and by laws, which s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e when r a t i f i e d by a m a j o r i t y vote of the a d u l t members of the t r i b e . In p r a c t i c e the Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s (BIA) monitored c l o s e l y both the terms and the adoption of t r i b a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s - which had t o be approved by the s e c r e t a r y of the I n t e r i o r . Apart from i t s requirement of a c o n s t i t u t i o n and bylaws, s. 16 was d r a f t e d i n a manner which could p o t e n t i a l y accommodate a m u l t i p l i c i t y of t r i b a l government s t r u c t u r e s . In r e a l i t y the c o n s t i t u t i o n s adopted v a r i e d l i t t l e . In most cases, BIA d r a f t e d " b o i l e r p l a t e " c o n s t i t u t i o n s were adopted without argument. These 102. Op. c i t . , Sanders, A b o r i g i n a l S e l f Government i n the  U.S.. a t p. 21. 153 c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n v a r i a b l y contained extensive BIA su p e r v i s o r y powers over a l l important government functions.(103) Notwithstanding these and other s e r i o u s shortcomings i n the Act and i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the New Deal, they d i d represent an important s h i f t i n the assumptions which had b u i l t up around Indian law and p o l i c y i n the 50 years s i n c e Kaqama and the Allotment Act. They s i g n a l l e d the beginnings of r e v i v a l of t r i b a l i s m and concepts of Indian 'nationhood', though these would not be consummated u n t i l the modern era. In the same way t r i b a l governments and t r i b a l c o u r t s were r e v i t a l i z e d or began operating f o r the f i r s t time as a r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y s h i f t and the very l i m i t e d funding which accompanied i t . F i n a l l y and perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y of a l l , the t r i b a l land base was s t a b i l i z e d - though no attempt was made t o address the problems of fragmentation and l o s s of cohesion i n t h a t land base, which were the legacy of allot m e n t . 3.1.3 Termination The years f o l l o w i n g World War I I produced a complete s h i f t back t o the Kaqama framework w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a new p o l i c y of c o - e r c i v e a s s i m i l a t i o n c a l l e d 'Termination.' S u p e r f i c a l l y the p o l i c y r e f l e c t e d p o l i t i c a l d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h the New Deal.(104) I t had f a i l e d t o produce the 103. I b i d . . p. 29. 104. P h i l p , Termination: A Legacy of the New Deal [1983] Western H i s t o r i c a l Q u a r t e r l y 165 at 180. 154 r e s u l t s a n t i c i p a t e d as q u i c k l y as a n t i c i p a t e d . The r e s u l t expected was the removal of the t r i b e s as a d r a i n on the f e d e r a l budget. The f a c t t h a t the New Deal was s t r u c t u r a l l y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y incapable of producing such a r e s u l t was not understood u n t i l much la t e r . ( 1 0 5 ) The r e a l impetus f o r t h i s r e v e r s a l can be found much deeper i n the c o l o n i a l psyche however. Termination b o l d l y repeated the same racism and arrogance e x h i b i t e d i n Kagama and rehearsed i n every j u d i c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e t h e r e a f t e r , bar the New Deal i t s e l f . The f a c t t h a t i d e n t i c a l laws and p o l i c i e s appear i n Canada and New Zealand (as we s h a l l see), serves to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h i s c ontention. A c c o r d i n g l y the t e r m i n a t i o n p o l i c y should be understood not as a p o l i c y r e v e r s a l but as a r e t u r n t o form. C e n t r a l t o the scheme of t e r m i n a t i o n was the enactment i n 1946 of the Indian Claims Commission Act. The i n t e n t i o n behind the c r e a t i o n of the Indian Claims Commission was according t o P h i l p ; ... t o end f e d e r a l guardianship toward Indians by p e r m i t t i n g them t o submit claims f o r past wrongs committed w i t h government approval. Once cash awards had been granted, the U.S. could wash i t s hands of Indian a f f a i r s . ( 1 0 6 ) 105. Op. c i t . Sanders, pp. 18-33 and sources c i t e d t h e r e i n . 106. op. c i t . a t 172. 155 Thus the Commission was t o s o l v e once and f o r a l l , the 'Indian problem' by paying the t r i b e s o f f and then e x t i n g u i s h i n g them as p o l i t i c a l and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l e n t i t i e s . In 1953, by the terms of Concurrent R e s o l u t i o n 108, congress adopted as o f f i c i a l p o l i c y , a l i s t prepared by the Commissioner of Indian Claims, of t r i b e s ready t o be 'released from f e d e r a l care'. The l i s t e s t a b l i s h e d a c l e a r agenda and u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t e d i n the t e r m i n a t i o n of 109 t r i b e s and bands i n v o l v i n g 1,362,155 acres of land and 11,500 i n d i v i d u a l Indians.(107) In a concurrent i n i t i a t i v e congress enacted P u b l i c Law 83-280 i n the same year.(108) The s t a t u t e delegated t o s i x s t a t e s , j u r i s d i c i t o n over most crimes and many c i v i l matters w i t h i n I ndian country. I t a l s o o f f e r e d any other s t a t e the o p t i o n of t a k i n g the same j u r i s d i c t i o n i f i t wished. In e f f e c t P u b l i c Law 280 overturned the r a t i o of Worcestor v.Georgia which had h e l d t h a t s t a t e law, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , s t a t e c r i m i n a l law had no e f f e c t i n Indian country. The i c i n g on the cake of almost 100 years of c o l o n i a l parody came a year l a t e r w i t h the d e c i s i o n of the Uni t e d Sta t e s Court of Claims i n Tee H i t Ton Indians v. United 107. John, A l t e r n a t i v e Approaches t o Alaska Native Lands &  Governance. Dec. 1984 unpublished paper a t p. 30; quoted i n Sanders, supra. 108. 18 USC S . 1162, 25 USC S S . 1321-1326, 28 USC ss 1360 and 1360 note. 156 States.(109) The Tee H i t Ton sought compensation f o r the e x p l o i t a t i o n of timber resources on t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y i n Alas k a . The court r e j e c t e d the p l a n t i f f s ' c l a i m and i n the process of doing so made i t c l e a r t h a t the mythology of conquest had, i n the time s i n c e Kaqama become f i r m l y entrenched i n the j u d i c i a l consciousness as f a c t . According t o Feed J . : A f t e r conquest [the Indians] were permitted t o occupy p o r t i o n s of t e r r i t o r y over which they p r e v i o u s l y e x e r c i s e d "sovereignty" as we use t h a t term.(110) To s t a t e t h a t the Tee H i t Ton were conquered i s preposterous. The h i s t o r y books make no mention of any war, or any conquest i n Alas k a . These people were not even c o l o n i s e d u n t i l the 20th century. He s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h i s ' f a c t ' of conquest by the use of the f o l l o w i n g e m p i r i c a l evidence: Every American schoolboy knows t h a t the savage t r i b e s of t h i s c o n t i n e n t were deprived of t h e i r a n c e s t r a l ranges by fo r c e and t h a t , even when the Indian ceded m i l l i o n s of acres by t r e a t y i n r e t u r n f o r b l a n k e t s , food and t r i n k e t s , i t was not a s a l e but the conquerers w i l l t h a t deprived them of t h e i r l a n d . ( I l l ) 109. (1954) 348 US 272. 110. I b i d , a t 279. 111. I b i d , a t pp. 289-90. 157 Thus, the e f f e c t i n law of 'conquest' was t o render Indian land r i g h t s unenforceable. Indian t i t l e a ccording t o Reed J . ... i s not a property r i g h t but amounts t o a r i g h t of occupancy which the sovereign grants and p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t encroachment by t h i r d p a r t i e s but which r i g h t of occupancy may be terminated and such lands f u l l y disposed of by the sovereign i t s e l f without any l e g a l l y enforceable o b l i g a t i o n t o compensate the Indians.(112) The c o n t r a s t between the r h e t o r i c , imagery and law of t h i s case as a g a i n s t t h a t of, say, Worcestor v. Georgia i s stunning. Indeed these two cases encapsulate i n microcosm the underpinnings of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e eras. As has already been suggested, there i s no s i n g l e body of 'Native law'. These cases show t h a t there are two laws, d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed and i n constant c o n f l i c t w i t h each other. 3.2 Canada 3.2.1 Treaty Making and Treaty Breaking Because the f e d e r a l s t a t e of Canada d i d not e x i s t u n t i l c o n f e d e r a t i o n i n 1867, and because most of North America was B r i t i s h u n t i l 1776, much of Canada's e a r l y c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y was shared w i t h or based on t h a t of the United S t a t e s . For t h a t reason, no d i s t i n c t i o n was made between the two c o u n t r i e s i n the e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n of the contact era i n North America. The r e s u l t has been t h a t the only d i s t i n c t i v e l y Canadian ju r i s p r u d e n c e on Native R i g h t s i s s u e s 112. I b i d a t 279. The d e c i s i o n of Reed J . was a f f i r m e d on appeal t o the U.S. Supreme Court: see [Wilkenson]. 158 (at l e a s t u n t i l the 1970's), comes out of the conquest era -the p e r i o d i n which n a t i v e r i g h t s were c o n t i n u a l l y being denigrated. P o l i c y and l e g i s l a t i o n f o r 100 years a f t e r c o n f e d e r a t i o n , w i t h one notable exception, belonged a l s o t o t h a t era - t o i t s a t t i t u d e s and t o i t s o b j e c t i v e s . The notable exception i s t h a t treaty-making continued throughout t h i s p e r i o d as the primary v e h i c l e f o r westward and northward expansion and the ' b r i n g i n g i n ' of n a t i v e t i t l e . As noted, treaty-making was a b o l i s h e d i n the U.S. i n 1871, w h i l e i n New Zealand only one agreement was ever signed i n respect of which the term ' t r e a t y ' was used. Between 1871 and 1877 i n Canada seven t r e a t i e s were executed along the f e r t i l e b e l t of the p r a i r i e s as the new f e d e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sought t o set the stage f o r ' o r d e r l y ' white expansion i n t o the Canadian West. These seven t r e a t i e s covered the lands between Ontario and B r i t i s h Columbia. Much of the remaining areas north of the f e r t i l e b e l t were mopped up between 1899 and 1929 by t r e a t i e s No. 8 t o 11 and by adhesions t o t r e a t i e s No. 5 and No. 9. Although they ceded v a s t expanses of lan d , i n most cases only s p a r s e l y populated, a l l t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s were c a r r i e d out i n accordance w i t h the " p u b l i c meeting" process r e q u i r e d by the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. This was undertaken by a s o r t of t r a v e l l i n g roadshow which v i s i t e d major meeting places i n the area sought ( u s u a l l y t r a d i n g p o s t s ) , and gathered s i g n a t u r e s as i t went. This o f t e n meant t h a t the term ' n e g o t i a t i o n ' was a misnomer. 159 Government o f f i c i a l s were g e n e r a l l y not empowered t o modify t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n s i n any way. The Indian input t h e r e f o r e was g e n e r a l l y reduced t o a f f i r m i n g or r e j e c t i n g the offer.(113) These "numbered t r e a t i e s , " of which 11 were f i n a l l y executed, probably ceded over h a l f of the Canadian land mass t o the Crown. There was very l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n between the t r e a t i e s . A l l provided f o r the s e t t i n g aside of s m a l l reserves t o be determined e i t h e r on the b a s i s of 160 acres(114) or 1 square mile(115) per f a m i l y of f i v e . Cash a n n u n i t i e s v a r i e d , but averaged $5 per head e x c l u d i n g C h i e f s who got $25 and Headmen who got $15. One-off cash payments t o i n d i v i d u a l s , a l s o a common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the numbered t r e a t i e s , v a r i e d depending on the date of the t r e a t y ' s execution. T h e i r common featu r e according t o one commentator was t h a t they were "so s m a l l , " and i n such " f a n t a s t i c d i s p r o p o r t i o n t o the value of the t e r r i t o r y ceded" t h a t they could be considered only as token payments.(116) 113. Harper, Canada's Indian A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : The Treaty  System (1949) 7 America Indigena 129 a t 147. 114. T r e a t i e s 1, 2, 5 and 8. 115. T r e a t i e s 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11. 116. op. c i t . Harper at 136. 160 One of the most important of a l l the Treaty guarantees was the e x p l i c i t r e s e r v a t i o n of hunting and f i s h i n g r i g h t s over land ceded t o the Crown but as yet u n s e t t l e d . This guarantee was c l e a r l y perceived by the Indian s i g n a t o r i e s not j u s t as a p r o t e c t i o n of the food resource but a l s o of t h e i r l i f e s t y l e i n the face of i n e v i t a b l e white invasion.(117) Of equal importance were the clauses which promised farm equipment, stock and seed t o encourage farming, or 117. Tonar, Two Views on the Meaning of T r e a t i e s S i x  and Seven i n P r i c e (ed.), The S p i r i t of the A l b e r t a Indian  T r e a t i e s (1979) at p. 32. The importance of hunting and f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n the t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s i s evidenced by the f o l l o w i n g excerpt the Report t o the Commissioners f o r Treaty 8: "Our c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y was the apprehension t h a t the hunting and f i s h i n g p r i v i l e g e s were t o be c u r t a i l e d . The p r o v i s i o n i n the t r e a t y under which ammunition and twine i s t o be fu r n i s h e d went f a r i n the d i r e c t i o n of q u i e t i n g the f e a r s of the Indians, f o r they admitted t h a t i t would be unreasonable t o f u r n i s h the means of hunting and f i s h i n g i f laws were t o be enacted which would make hunting and f i s h i n g so r e s t r i c t e d a t o render i t impossible t o make a l i v e l i h o o d by such p u r s u i t s . But over and above the p r o v i s o n , we had t o solemnly assure them t h a t only such laws as t o hunting and f i s h i n g as were i n the i n t e r e s t of the Indians and were found necessary i n order t o p r o t e c t the f i s h and f u r - b e a r i n g animals would be made, and t h a t they would be f r e e t o hunt and f i s h a f t e r the t r e a t y as they would be i f they never entered i n t o it."Quoted i n Cummings and Mickenberg, Native Rights i n Canada (2nd) (1972) at p. 16. 161 which promised f e d e r a l p r o v s i o n of schools and medical supplies.(118) The Indian view of these t r e a t i e s was t h a t they were a simple c o n t i n u a t i o n of the t r e a t y t r a d i t i o n which began w i t h the I r o q u o i s d u r i n g the contact e ra. They were s t i l l c e n t r a l l y concerned w i t h t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r i t y " w i t h i n the framework of a p r o t e c t o r a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Crown."(119) I t i s t r u e t h a t circumstances had changed much s i n c e those e a r l y days - none could have been more aware of the extent of change than the Indian s i g n a t o r i e s t o a t r e a t y ; i t was a constant r e a l i t y i n the l i v e s of t h e i r peoples. As Jackson s t a t e s s u c c i n t l y ...the Indians were f a c i n g i n c r e a s i n g white settlement, d e v a s t a t i n g epidemics, the i n f l u x of whiskey t r a d e r s and the disappearance of the b u f f a l o , the s t a p l e of the t r i b e s ' economy. The p r o t e c t o r a t e r o l e embodied i n the t r e a t i e s was a c c o r d i n g l y not confined, i n the Indians' eyes, t o p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c i a l i n t e g r i t y w i t h i n lands they were not prepared t o cede, but a l s o extended t o the p r o t e c t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l I n d ian economy and a s s i s t a n c e i n the development of new forms of Indian economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . " ( 1 2 0 ) Thus i t i s i n t h i s context t h a t the hunting and f i s h i n g p r o v i s i o n s were understood t o be guaranteeing, as f a r as was 118. Supra, T a y l o r , at p. 32. In many cases such clauses were added a t the request of Indian s i g n a t o r i e s ; See d i s c u s s i o n s concerning n e g o t i a t i o n of Treaty 6 and T r e a t i e s 1 t o 3. 119. Jackson, The A r t i c u l a t i o n of Native R i g h t s i n Canadian  Law (1984) 18 UBCLR 255 at 281. 120. I b i d . 162 s t i l l p o s s i b l e , a t r a d i t i o n a l economic base. Further, what i n modern parlance between developed and developing c o u n t r i e s would be c a l l e d 'economic a i d p r o v i s i o n s , ' - the gaurantee of farming equpment, edu c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s and medical s u p p l i e s - allowed p r o g r e s s i v e development toward new forms of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . A l l of t h i s was confirmed, i n the Indian view, by c o n s i s t e n t use of the t r e a t y form t o conclude n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n l i k e manner the c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y of c a r r y i n g on negotations w i t h t r i b a l c h i e f s a f f i r m e d t h a t the white government recognized the l e g i t i m a c y of Indian governments. While the Indian view of the t r e a t i e s remained constant through h i s t o r y , the government p e r s p e c t i v e had changed r a d i c a l l y . T r e a t i e s were now perceived p r i m a r i l y as instruments f o r the a c q u i s i t o n of land f o r settlement. They were considered t o have no i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , and very l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l content. The hunting and f i s h i n g guarantees were seen as necessary f o r the moment, l a r g e l y i n order t o secure agreement, but were temporary and would soon be f o r g o t t e n . The a g r i c u l t u r a l and ed u c a t i o n a l promises were considered c e n t r a l t o t h a t process of f o r g e t t i n g . They were t o promote the speedy a s s i m i l a t i o n of Indians i n t o white l i f e . The cases throughout t h i s p e r i o d make i t c l e a r which view would p r e v a i l as the law. The power base from which the I r o q u o i s , Cherokee, Delaware or Mohegan could enforce t h e i r understanding of the t r e a t i e s i n the 18th century had 163 been overwhelmed by the mid 19th century. In the r e s u l t the t r e a t i e s were, q u i t e l i t e r a l l y , whitewashed. The f i r s t case t o deal w i t h the s t a t u s and nature of t r e a t i e s i n Canada concerned the question of whether the payment of a n n u i t i e s owed under the Robinson t r e a t i e s i n c e n t r a l Ontario was a f e d e r a l or p r o v i n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n . ( 1 2 1 ) One i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t about the case i s t h a t the p a r t i e s seem t o have assumed throughout the d i s p u t e t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n was enforceable. At i s s u e was simply who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r paying. In New Zealand, the Courts simply refused t o acknowledge a t the outset t h a t promises under the Treaty of Waitangi were enforceable. In the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , a r b i t r a t o r s were appointed t o s e t t l e the Robinson a n n u i t i e s d i s p u t e e x t r a - j u d i c i a l l y . In t h e i r view the t r e a t i e s were c l e a r l y i n the nature of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l compacts"(122) which should be l i b e r a l l y construed. On f i n a l appeal t o the P r i v y C o u n c i l the argument was avoided, though not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d . The P r i v y C o u n c i l simply concluded t h a t even i f the t r e a t i e s i n question c o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as such, i t d i d not a i d i n s o l v i n g the i s s u e of the case and so could be l e f t undecided. 121. A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario [1897] AC 199 (The Robinson A n n u i t i e s c a s e ] . 122. I b i d , at 211. 164 I t i s d i f f i c u l t however, t o r e c o n c i l e Lord Watson's view as t o the s t a t u s of the a n n u i t i e s c l a u s e w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . He concluded t h a t the t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n was: ...a promise and agreement, which was nothing more than  a personal o b l i g a t i o n by i t s governor as r e p r e s e n t i n g the o l d province, t h a t the l a t t e r should pay the a n n u i t i e s as and when they become due.(123) The t r e a t y was then, a simple p r i v a t e law c o n t r a c t - a c o n c l u s i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the government p e r s p e c t i v e on t r e a t i e s as instruments f o r the a c q u i s i t o n of l a n d . The low water mark came i n the case of R. v. Syliboy.(124) a 1929 d e c i s i o n of the Nova S c o t i a County Court. The decison was a t t r i a l l e v e l , and t e c h n i c a l l y should have had almost no precedent value. I t was however, q u i c k l y adopted as an accurate statement of 'the law' on the s t a t u s of t r e a t i e s . At i s s u e was a very e a r l y t r e a t y between Governor Hopson of Nova S c o t i a and the Mic Maq nations(125) executed i n 1752 and s t y l e d "The Treaty or A r t i c l e s of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p Renewed." By i t s terms the Mic Maq, who had p r e v i o u s l y a l l i e d themselves w i t h the French, were r e c e i v e d 123. I b i d , a t 213. 124. (1929) 1 DLR 307. 125. Op. c i t . , Cumming and Mickenberg, Appendix 3 f o r Treaty t e x t . 165 back i n t o H is Majesty's "Favor, F r i e n d s h i p and P r o t e c t i o n . " The t r e a t y guaranteed hunting and f i s h i n g r i g h t s ( 1 2 6 ) and made p r o v i s i o n f o r trade and commerce between the part i e s . ( 1 2 7 ) In common w i t h other t r e a t i e s of the contact e r a , i t a l s o designated a forum through which d i s p u t e s between the p a r t i e s c ould be s e t t l e d amicably.(128) In sh o r t , t h i s t r e a t y was probably one of the most i n t e r n a t i o n a l , i n form and content, of a l l the Canadian Indian t r e a t i e s . In a s i n g l e s t r o k e , Judge Patterson of the Nova S c o t i a County Court rewrote both the terms of the t r e a t y and the e n t i r e h i s t o r y of the contact era: T r e a t i e s are unconstrained Acts of independent powers. But the Indians were never regarded as an independent power.... The savage's r i g h t s of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognised.... I n my Judgment the Treaty of 1752 i s not t o be t r e a t e d as such; i t i s a t best a mere agreement made by the Governor i n C o u n c i l w i t h a handful of Indians.(129) S y l i b o y makes i t c l e a r t h a t the racism and arrogance so pre v a l e n t d u r i n g the conquest era i n the U.S., had a l s o taken r o o t i n Canada. Once again the Indians were savages, 126. A r t i c l e 4. 127. I b i d . 128. A r t i c l e 8. 129. I b i d , a t 313-4. 166 and once again, t h a t , i n and of i t s e l f , provided j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r transforming " A r t i c l e s of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p " i n t o 'mere agreements...with a handful of I n d i a n s . ' Treaty promises i t appears, f a r e d e q u a l l y p o o r l y i n the l e g i s l a t i v e f i e l d . Soon a f t e r the execution of Treaty 8 which, s p e c i f i c a l l y guaranteed hunting and f i s h i n g r i g h t s , f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced t o r e s t r i c t hunting and t r a p p i n g . One w r i t e r notes f o r example "In 1917, c l o s e d seasons were e s t a b l i s h e d i n the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s and A l b e r t a on moose, caribo o and other animals e s s e n t i a l t o the economy of the Dene. In 1918, the Migratory B i r d s Convention Act f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t e d t h e i r hunting. The v i o l a t i o n of the t r e a t y promises by t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n has been recognised by Canadian co u r t s which, c o n t r a r y t o the I n d i a n s ' conception of the b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r of the t r e a t i e s , have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t r e a t y promises may, as a matter of law, be abrogated by f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n without p r i o r Indian consent."(130) This p r o p o s i t i o n was confirmed i n the 1960's i n R_s_ v. Sikyea(131) concerning the shooting of a w i l d duck f o r food, out of season and i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the M i g r a t o r y B i r d s Convention Act r e f e r r e d t o above. Judge Sis s o n s , who heard the t r i a l a t f i r s t i n stance had a r e p u t a t i o n f o r being sympathetic t o Indian r i g h t s - b a s e d cases. Sikyea i s j u s t 130. Supra, Jackson at p. 265. 131. (1962) 40 WWR 494 (NWT T e r r i t o r i a l C o u r t ) ; (1964) 46 WWR 65 (NWT C.A.); [1964] SCR 642 (S.C.C.]. 167 one of many such d e c i s i o n s which were overturned on appeal. Sissons wrote i n the course of h i s d e c i s i o n : I t i s not o r i o u s t h a t a few years ago a government o f f i c i a l spoke t o one of the l o c a l I n dian c h i e f s and poi n t e d out t h a t shooting ducks i n the s p r i n g was co n t r a r y t o the Migratory B i r d s Convention. The c h i e f asked what was t h i s convention and was t o l d i t was a t r e a t y between Canada and the United S t a t e s . When queried "Did the Indians s i g n the t r e a t y ? " The r e p l y was "No." "Then" the c h i e f d e c l a r e d , "We shoot the ducks. 1 1 The Indians have t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and t h e i r own t r e a t y p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r ancient hunting r i g h t s . The o l d Chief was on sound ground. There i s or should be as much or more s a n c t i t y t o a t r e a t y between Canada and i t s Indians as t o a t r e a t y between Canada and the United States.(132) The r e v e r s a l on appeal t o the Federal Appeal Court was c u r i o u s l y a p o l o g e t i c . Perhaps Judge Sisson's comment t h a t t o s u b j e c t Treaty 11 t o the Migratory B i r d s Convention Act would render the guarantees contained i n the former ' d e l u s i v e mockeries and d e c e i t f u l i n the highest degree." The Covention was signed 5 years before execution of t r e a t y 11.(133) In any event Johnson J . who d e l i v e r e d the d e c i s i o n of the c o u r t concluded t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e must have made a mistake. How are we t o e x p l a i n t h i s apparent breach of f a i t h on the p a r t of the government, f o r I t h i n k i t cannot be desc r i b e d i n any other terms? This cannot be des c r i b e d as a minor or i n s i g n i f i c a n t c u r t a i l m e n t of these t r e a t y 132. I b i d , at p. 496. 133. I b i d , a t 504. 168 r i g h t s , f o r game b i r d s have always been a most p l e n t i f u l , a most r e l i a b l e and r e a d i l y o b t a i n a b l e food i n l a r g e p a r t s of Canada. I cannot b e l i e v e t h a t the government of Canada r e a l i s e d t h a t i n implementing the convention they were a t the same time breaching the t r e a t i e s they had made w i t h the Indians. I t i s much more l i k e l y t h a t the t r e a t i e s were overlooked - a case of the l e f t hand having f o r g o t t e n what the r i g h t had had done.(134) Of course i f t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s had been overlooked i n the d r a f t i n g of the convention, the Court would have been at l i b e r t y t o read the Act down on the ground t h a t t h e r e was no i n t e n t i o n t o abrogate those r i g h t s . The Court apologised f o r a d e c i s i o n i t could e a s i l y have avoided. S t i l l , the "savages" imagery which had underpinned e a r l i e r pronouncements, had disappeared. Perhaps t h a t could be considered p o s i t i v e , though Michael Sikyea would not have been so e a s i l y impressed. In the Supreme Court, the d e c i s i o n of Johnson J . was upheld, though i n a judgment so devoid of l e g a l reasoning as t o be "embarrassing."(135) H a l l , J . used most of h i s decison t o d i s c u s s the s t a t u s of the duck i n question - i . e . whether i t was w i l d or tame, and i n two sentences simply agreed w i t h Johnson J.'s reasoning. The o v e r a l l e f f e c t of 134. I b i d , a t 74. 135. See Sanders, P r e - e x i s t i n g R i g h t s ; The A b o r i g i n a l  Peoples of Canada, unpublished paper, UBC, January 5, 1988 at p. 5. 169 Sikyea i s s t a t e d s u c c i n c t l y by Sanders i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: The Sikyea d e c i s i o n and i t s progency e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Indian hunting and f i s h i n g r i g h t s c ould be taken away by general f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n . There was no need t o demonstrate an i n t e n t i o n t o end Indian r i g h t s . I t d i d not matter whether the hunting was p r o t e c t e d by t r e a t y , took p l a c e on a reserve or occurred i n one of the three p r a i r i e provinces (and t h e r e f o r e under the p r o v i s i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act 1930). Indian hunting r i g h t s were upheld a g a i n s t p r o v i n c i a l laws but only on reserves or where the r i g h t s were under the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act 1930, as under s. 88 of the Indian Act. Indians had r i g h t s only i f they flowed from the  d i v i s i o n of powers, the C o n s t i t u t i o n or  l e g i s l a t i o n . ( 1 3 6 ) (emphasis aded) 3.2.2 A b o r i g i n a l T i t l e and St. Catherines M i l l i n g I f treaty-based r i g h t s d i d not f a r e w e l l , such a t l e a s t was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the fortunes of concepts of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e and non-treaty r i g h t s . The most s i g n i f i c a n t case t o come out of Canada during the conquest era i n r e l a t i o n t o these i s s u e s was St. Catherines M i l l i n g and Lumber Co. v. The Queen.(137) a decison of the l a t e 19th century, i n the heyday of p o s i t i v i s m and racism i n the colonies.(138) At i s s u e was ownership of lands i n respect of which the f e d e r a l government had issued a timber c u t t i n g l i c e n s e . I t 136. I b i d . , footnotes excluded. 137. (1885) 10 OR 197 (Ont. Ct. of Chancery); (1886) 13 OPR 148 CA (Ont.); (1887) 13 SCR 577; (1889) 13 AC 461 (PC). 138. As t o p o s i t i v i s m see Sanders, supra p. 2. 170 was e s s e n t i a l l y a d i v i s i o n of powers case, but s i n c e the f e d e r a l government claimed t i t l e by v i r t u e of having purchased the Indian t i t l e , the case a t f i r s t turned on the l e g a l s t a t u s of Indian t i t l e . ( 1 3 9 ) The treatment of the case by the Canadian co u r t s before i t reached the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n England makes i t c l e a r t h a t j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s i n Canada resembled c l o s e l y those expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court i n the Kaqama l i n e of a u t h o r i t i e s . C h a n c e l l o r Boyd of the Ontario Court of Chancery heard the case at f i r s t i n s t a n c e . His d e c i s i o n dominated l a t e r appeals w i t h i n the Canadian h i e r a r c h y . I t was w i d e l y p r a i s e d i n respect of i t s treatment of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s s u e s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t h i s reasoning on the p o i n t was r e j e c t e d by the P r i v y C o u n c i l on appeal.(140) Boyd concluded: The c o l o n i a l p o l i c y of Great B r i t a i n as i t regards the c l a i m s and treatment of the a b o r i g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n s i n America, has been from the f i r s t uniform and w e l l d e f i n e d . Indian peoples were found s c a t t e r e d wide c a s t  over the c o n t i n e n t , having as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , no  f i x e d abodes, but moving as the e x i q e n i c e s of l i v i n g demanded. As heathens and barbarians i t was not thought t h a t they had any p r o p r i e t a r y t i t l e t o the s o i l , nor any such c l a i m t h e r e t o as t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the p l a n t a t i o n s , and the general p r o s e c u t i o n of c o l o n i z a t i o n , they were t r e a t e d ' j u s t l y and g r a c i o u s l y ' , as Lord Bacon advised, but no l e g a l 139. In the end, i t proved not t o be a c r u c i a l argument. The P r i v y C o u n c i l decided i n favour of p r o v i n c i a l t i t l e n o twithstanding a h o l d i n g t h a t Indian t i t l e was l e g a l l y e nforceable. 140. See Sanders, supra at p. 1. 171 ownership of the land was ever a t t r i b u t e d t o them.(141) (emphasis added). He adds as a l o g i c a l extension of the above, t h a t a t r e a t y i n respect of the lands i n question signed between the f e d e r a l government and the Ojibway n a t i o n conveyed nothing. While i n a nomadic s t a t e they may or may not choose t o t r e a t w i t h the Crown f o r the e x t i n c t i o n of t h e i r p r i m i t i v e r i g h t of occupancy. I f they r e f u s e the government i s not hampered, but has p e r f e c t l i b e r t y t o proceed w i t h the settlement and development of the country; and so, sooner or l a t e r , t o d i s p l a c e them.(142) (emphasis added) The above statements are packed f u l l of s o c i a l Darwinism, of the s u p e r i o r i t y of a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s over hunters, and above a l l , of the s u p e r i o r i t y of white c o l o n i a l i s t s over Native peoples. The imagery i s the same as t h a t invoked i n Kagama - heathens, barbarians and savages. And the purpose f o r i n v o k i n g them i s the same - t o deny Indian r i g h t s . Chancellor Boyd goes a step f u t h e r . He denies Indian t i t l e i n the face of c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n ! Perhaps he could be excused f o r d i s r e g a r d i n g the Mohegans case - a P r i v y C o u n c i l d e c i s i o n , but the Royal Proclamation 1763 makes i t c l e a r t h a t Indian t i t l e had l e g a l f o r c e . Boyd's r e p l y t o t h i s was the Royal Proclamation was superceded by the Quebec Act 1774, and so "must be regarded 141. (1885) 10 OR 197 at 206. 142. I b i d . , a t p. 229-30. 172 as obsolete."(143) There i s simply no b a s i s f o r such a c o n c l u s i o n . To add i n s u l t t o i n j u r y , t h i s r e j e c t i o n of the r u l e of law and i t s replacement w i t h an amateur a n t h r o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s (which i t s e l f was p a t e n t l y errnoeous), i s p r a i s e d f o r i t s depth of reasoning! In the Ontario Court of Appeal(144), Boyd's d e c i s i o n was p r a i s e d as having been "mapped out w i t h so much care and p e r s p i c a c i t y . " The appeal t o the Supreme Court of Canada was a repeat performance.(145), w i t h the s i n g l e exception of a powerful d i s s e n t from Strong J . R i t c h i e C.J. was f u l l of a d o r a t i o n f o r Boyd: The case has been f u l l y and ably d e a l t w i t h by the Learned C h a n c e l l o r , and I so e n t i r e l y agree w i t h the c o n c l u s i o n a t which he has a r r i v e d , t h a t I f e e l I can add nothing t o what has been s a i d by him.(146) Henry J . invented a conquest of the Ojibway as the context f o r denying t h e i r t i t l e . I t h i n k a f t e r the conquest of t h i s country a l l w i l d lands, i n c l u d i n g those h e l d by nomadic t r i b e s of Indians, were the proporty of the Crown.... 143. I b i d , a t 227. 144. (1886) 13 OPR 148. 145. (1887) 13 SRC 577. 146. I b i d , a t 601. 173 ...the Indians were never regarded as having t i t l e . ( 1 4 7 ) In d i s s e n t Strong J . r e s t a t e d and defended the c o l o n i a l paradigm. He r e f e r r e d t o Johnson v. Mcintosh. Worcestor. and Cherokee Nation(148) as the l e a d i n g US cases on a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s , and concluded: The value and importance of these a u t h o r i t i e s i s not merely t h a t they show t h a t the same d o c t r i n e as t h a t already propounded regarding the t i t l e of the Indians t o unsurrendered lands p r e v a i l s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , but, what i s of v a s t l y g r e a t e r importance, they without exception r e f e r i t s o r i g i n t o a date a n t e r i o r t o the r e v o l u t i o n and recognise i t as a continuance of the p r i n c i p l e s of law or p o l i c y as t o Indian t i t l e s then e s t a b l i s h e d by the B r i t i s h government, and t h e r e f o r e i d e n t i c a l w i t h those which have a l s o continued t o be recognised and a p p l i e d i n B r i t i s h North America."(149) He then went on t o h o l d t h a t there was not even a need f o r s t a t u t o r y r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t t o render i t enforceable. I maintain t h a t i f there had been an e n t i r e absence of any w r i t t e n l e g i s l a t i v e act o r d a i n i n g t h i s r u l e as express p o s i t i v e law, we ought, j u s t as the U n i t e d Sta t e s Courts have done, t o h o l d t h a t i t nevertheless e x i s t e d as a r u l e of the u n w r i t t e n common law, which the Courts were bound t o enforce as such....(150) 147. I b i d , a t 639. 148. See i n f r a notes r e l e v a n t t o t h i s p o i n t . 149. Supra, n. 76, at 610. 150. I b i d , a t 613. 174 A c c o r d i n g l y , the Royal Proclamation could be regarded only as evidence of Indian t i t l e , not the o r i g i n of i t . The d i s t i n c t i o n i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t o the c o l o n i a l paradigm. By Strong J's a n a l y s i s , a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s p r e - e x i s t i n g and does not depend on c o l o n i a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r i t s l e g a l e n f o r c e a b i l t y . I t e x i s t s independently and continues u n t i l s p e c i f i c a l l y e x t i n g u i s h e d . I t i s i r o n i c t h a t i f St. Catherines had have a r i s e n 80 years e a r l i e r , t h i s view would have been i n the m a j o r i t y . I t i s probably t r u e a l s o t h a t i f the f a c t s i t u a t i o n arose today i n Canada, Strong J's o p i n i o n would have been the majority.(151) C h a n c e l l o r Boyd, the Ontario Court of Appeal and a m a j o r i t y of the Supreme Court belong t o what might most a p p r o p r i a t e l y be d e s c r i b e d as the " b l a t a n t l y r a c i s t " school of l e g a l thought. In t h i s view, not only were n a t i v e r i g h t s not pre-e x i s t i n g , they were not enforceable even when recognised as such i n p o s i t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . In the P r i v y C o u n c i l p o s i t i v i s m p r e v a i l e d , a more s u b t l e form of racism i n which Nati v e r i g h t s are considered t o e x i s t only t o the extent s p e c i f i c a l l y granted i n l e g i s l a t i o n . W i t h i n t h a t framework the P r i v y C o u n c i l considered t h a t Indian t i t l e was enforceable i n law though i t s e n f o r c e a b i l i t y depended e n t i r e l y upon the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. T h e i r possession such as i t was, can only be a s c r i b e d t o the general p r o v i s i o n s made by the Royal Proclamation i n favour of a l l Indian t r i b e s then l i v i n g 151. See g e n e r a l l y Rj. v. Guerin discussed i n f r a 175 under the sovereignty and p r o t e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h Crown.(152) The Court f u r t h e r concluded t h a t s i n c e Indian t i t l e depended on the Proclamation; i t s scope was d e f i n e d by the Proclamation's terms. Indian lands were i n t h a t instrument r e f e r r e d t o as "parts of Our dominions and t e r r i t o r i e s " w i t h i n which i t was d e c l a r e d t o be the w i l l and pleasure of the King t h a t " f o r the present" they should be reserved t o the Indians as t h e i r hunting grounds. Such terminology i n the Courts' view was c o n s i s t e n t only w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n : ...that the tenure of the Indians was a personal and u s u f r u c t o r y r i g h t , dependent on the good w i l l of the  sovereign.(153) (emphasis added) In t h i s way, Chancellor Boyd's f i n d i n g as t o the s t a t u s of Indian t i t l e and as t o the obsolesence of the Proclamation was overturned. As Sanders puts i t "the choice f o r the Courts [ i n t h i s p o s i t i v i s t framework] was between no Indian r i g h t s and granted Indian rights".(154) The Court opted f o r the l a t t e r , but i n doing so, i m p l i e d l y r e j e c t e d any notions of inherent r i g h t which had been the hallmark of the contact p e r i o d . By s h i f t i n g the framework, the s t a t u s of Indian t i t l e could be i n s t a n t l y devalued. That t i t l e , 152. (1889) 13 AC 46 at 53. 153. I b i d , a t 54. 154. Sanders, P r e - e x i s t i n g Rights supra, a t p. 2. 176 r e f e r r e d t o by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l as "unquestionable and h e r e t o f o r e unquestioned" became "dependent on the g o o d w i l l of the sovereign." P o s i t i v i s m never r e a l l y took h o l d i n the U.S. where the n o t i o n of inherent Indian r i g h t s was s t r o n g l y entrenched i n l e g a l mythology. Thus conquest law i n America centred around d e f e a s i b i l i t y r a t h e r than rec o g n i t o n of these r i g h t s . In New Zealand however, the same p o s i t i v i s t framework has dominated s i n c e a t l e a s t the 1860's - and continues even today t o be a powerful f o r c e i n the j u d i c i a l treatment of Maori r i g h t s . The St. Catherines M i l l i n g cases provide a graphic study of the treatment, not j u s t of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , but of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s g e n e r a l l y during t h i s p e r i o d . C o l o n i a l c o u r t s were f a r more w i l l i n g than the P r i v y C o u n c i l t o i s s u e d e c i s i o n s which can only be d e s c r i b e d as vehemently r a c i s t and which f o r the most p a r t dispensed w i t h l e g a l a n a l y s i s i n favour of a n t h r o p o l g i c a l or s o c i o l o g i c a l analyses. This was as t r u e of American and New Zealand Courts as i t was of Canadian Courts. The P r i v y C o u n c i l on the other hand was c l e a r l y more a l o o f and was u n w i l l i n g t o adopt such t a c t i c s . Nonetheless, the p o s i t i v i s t framework i t espoused amounted t o an e q u a l l y f i n a l r e j e c t i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. P o s i t i v i s m r e f l e c t e d w e l l the new found hegemony of c o l o n i a l governments. To recognise only those r i g h t s s p e c i f i c a l l y granted by the s t a t e meant i m p l i c i t l y the r e j e c t i o n of those r i g h t s which p r e - e x i s t e d the s t a t e . The c o l o n i a l paradigm i s of course made up e n t i r e l y of p r e - e x i s t i n g r i g h t s . 177 For N a t i v e peoples a l l of t h i s meant t h a t the choice o f f e r e d by the law was between l o s i n g badly and l o s i n g worse. 3.2.3 N a t i v e Sovereignty and the Indian Act The Indian Act(155) was t o the Native sovereignty p a r t of the c o l o n i a l paradigm, what St. Catherines was t o Native t i t l e . In Canada, the r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r n a l t r i b a l a f f a i r s began i n the 1850's.(156) and by 1869 and the "Act f o r the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians and the B e t t e r Management of Indian A f f a i r s . " ( 1 5 7 ) major inroads had been made i n t o t r i b a l p r e r o g a t i v e s . By the terms of t h i s Act the new Superintendent of Indian A f f a i r s was vested w i t h f u l l power t o manage or dispose of reserve l a n d , t o a l l o c a t e l a nd i n t e r n a l l y and t o c o n t r o l reserve income.(158) The Indian 155. O r i g i n a l l y S t a t u t e s of Canada .C. 18 (1876) - now R.S.C. C 1-6 (1970). 156. Two s t a t u t e s were enacted by the province of Canada i n 1850. The f i r s t an "Act f o r the B e t t e r P r o t e c t i o n of the Lands and property of Indians i n Lower Canada" (Prov. Can. S t a t . c. 42 (1850)); The second an "Act f o r the B e t t e r P r o t e c t i o n of Indians i n Upper Canada from I m p o s i t i o n , and the Property Occupied or Enjoined by Them from Trespass or I n j u r y (Prov. Can. STat. C42 (1850)). The f i r s t d e c l a r e d l e g a l t i t l e i n a l l reserves t o be i n the Commissioner of Indian Lands i n t r u s t f o r the r e s p e c t i v e bands. 157. S t a t u t e s of Canada C. 6 (1869). 158. B a r t l e t t , The Indian Act of Canada (1980), pp. 3-4. 178 Act of 1876 d i d no more than entrench t h i s p r e - e x i s t i n g p o l i c y . In a manner s i m i l a r t o the broad powers h e l d by the Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s i n the US, the Indian Act e s t a b l i s h e d sweeping executive c o n t r o l and s u p e r v i s i o n of every aspect of Indian l i f e . The c e n t r a l p o l i c y of the Act was p r o g r e s s i v e and c o e r c i v e Indian a s s i m i l a t i o n i n t o mainstream Canada w i t h i n the r u b r i c of t h a t b u r e a u c r a t i c power. I n i t i a l l y , t h i s p o l i c y was expressed through an attempt t o destroy the power of t r a d i t o i n a l and h e r e d i t a r y l e a d e r s and t o r e p l a c e them w i t h younger l e a d e r s , more amenable t o a s s i m i l a t i o n . To t h i s end an e l e c t i v e system of muni c i p a l s t y l e government was introduced. By an amendment i n 1880(159) the system could be, and was, imposed upon any reserve "whenever the Governor i n C o u n c i l deems i t a d v i s a b l e . " In p r a c t i c e these band c o u n c i l s e x e r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n only i n respect of p e t t y matters such as the c o n t r o l of s t r a y dogs and c a t t l e , or the " r e p r e s s i o n of intemperance and p r o f l i g a c y . ( 1 6 0 ) C o u n c i l s were without a u t h o r i t y t o enforce t h e i r own by-laws u n t i l the amendment 159. S t a t u t e s of Canada C. 28 (1890). 160. M a d i l l , Indian Government Under Indian Act L e g i s l a t i o n (Part 2) DIANA (1980) p. 4. 179 of 1980 and even then f i n e s could only be imposed on c o n v i c t i o n by a white j u s t i c e of the peace.(161) The powers of the Superintendent of Indian A f f a i r s -e x e r c i s e d l o c a l l y by the infamous Indian agents were overwhelmingly g r e a t e r both i n s t r i c t law and i n p o l i t i c a l f a c t . A l l by-laws had t o be consented t o by the Governor i n C o u n c i l . The b u r e a u c r a t i c chain of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y meant, of course, t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e consent was given or w i t h h e l d by the l o c a l Indian agent.(162) An amendment of 1882 gave Indians agents the power of a s t i p e n d i a r y magistrate on the reserve. A meeting of the band c o u n c i l could not be summoned without n o t i c e being given f i r s t t o the Indian agent.(163) Under s. 9 of the Indian Advancement Act of 1884(164) the agent was r e q u i r e d t o p r e s i d e over every meeting of the c o u n c i l on the ground t h a t g i v i n g the c h a i r t o the e l e c t e d c h i e f c o u n c i l l o r would l e a d t o "mischievous r e s u l t s " . ( 1 6 5 ) Thus, although the form of muni c i p a l s e l f -161. Op. c i t . B a r t l e t t at 16. 162. Op. c i t . M a d i l l at p. 5. 163. I b i d . , a t 16. 164. S t a t u t e of Canada C. 44 (1884). 165. Op. c i t . B a r t l e t t a t 17. 180 government was i n p l a c e , the Act was no more than an instrument f o r f e d e r a l i n d i r e c t r u l e and was administered f o r t h a t purpose. By a f u r t h e r amendment i n 1884(166) the P o t l a t c h and the Sundance were banned. The P o t l a t c h i n p a r t i c u l a r was and continues t o be a c e n t r a l component of t r a d i t i o n a l governmental systems amongst west coast Indians. Further p r o h i b i t i o n s of t r a d i t o n a l dance and customs were introduced i n 1895;(167) 1914,(168) and as l a t e as 1933.(169) 3.2.4 The White Paper; A s s i m i l a t i n g the C o l o n i a l Paradigm None of the a t t i t u d e s which underpined such l e g i s l a t i o n , and few of the l e g i s l a t i v e d e t a i l s changed between t h a t time and 1969. That year d i d not s i g n a l a p o l i c y change so much as an attempt t o a c c e l e r a t e the p o l i c y a l r eady i n p l a c e . In t h a t year the new Trudeau government pu b l i s h e d the f e d e r a l 'white paper' on Native Indian p o l i c y . The white paper decreed t h a t s i n c e attempts a t p r o g r e s s i v e a s s i m i l a t i o n had f a i l e d , a new p o l i c y of aggressive and 166. S t a t u t e of Canada C. 27 (1884). 167. S t a t u t e of Canada C. 35 (1895). 168. S t a t u t e of Canada C. 3 (1914). 169. S t a t u t e of Canada C 42 (1933). 181 c o e r c i v e a s s i m i l a t i o n would be s u b s t i t u t e d . In f i v e years the Department of Indian A f f a i r s was t o be dismantled, the Indian Act would be repealed and replaced by a t r a n s i t o r y I n dian Land Act. T r e a t i e s would be terminated and a l l r e f e rences t o Indians i n the (then) B r i t i s h North America Act would be purged. The f i n a l blow was t o be a t r a n s f e r f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Indian A f f a i r s from the f e d e r a l government t o the provinces.(170) A b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s c laims were according t o the white paper, "so general and undefined t h a t i t i s not r e a l i s t i c t o t h i n k of them as s p e c i f i c claims capable of remedy".(171) Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau i n a speech i n t h a t same year s t a t e d : A b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s , t h i s r e a l l y i s saying "We were here before you. You came and took the land from us and perhaps you cheated us by g i v i n g us some worthless t h i n g s i n r e t u r n f o r v a s t expanses of land and we want t o reopen t h i s question. We want you t o preserve our a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s and r e s t o r e them t o us." And our answer — i t may not be the r i g h t one and may not be the one t h a t i s accepted...our answer i s 'No'.(172) The p o l i c y was a d i r e c t copy of the American t e r m i n a t i o n p o l i c y of the 1940's and 50's. The same p o l i c y would be a p p l i e d as w e l l i n New Zealand by the Maori A f f a i r s 170. See g e n e r a l l y Weaver, Recent D i r e c t i o n s i n Canadian  Indian P o l i c y (1978) at p. 4. 171. Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian P o l i c y (1969). 172. Speech r e p r i n t e d i n Cumming and Mickenberg, Nat i v e  R i g h t s i n Canada (1972) (2ed.) at 331. 182 Amendment Act 1967.(173) The f a c t t h a t the 'white paper' p o l i c i e s c o u l d be espoused i n good f a i t h by any government was testimony t o the degree of Indian p o l i t i c a l m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n i n Canada, and t o the b a s i c i r r e l e v a n c e of Indian p o l i c y t o white Canada. The same was t r u e i n New Zealand and i n America. The f a c t t h a t the White Paper never became law i n Canada i s evidence t h a t a t the very n a d i r of Indian powerlessness, the dynamics which had p r e v a i l e d f o r 100 years were about t o change again. 3.3 New Zealand Of the three c o u n t r i e s compared i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , New Zealand was the country i n which the mythology of conquest and concepts of p o s i t i v i s m became most entrenched. In some ways such a c o n c l u s i o n i s s u r p r i s i n g . The Treaty of Waitangi was, and i s , the most comprehensive statement of the c o l o n i a l paradigm e x i s t e n t i n any of the three j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I t s t a t e d i n the most e x p l i c i t terms p o s s i b l e t h a t r e l a t i o n s between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d would be premised upon a c o n t i n u i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of Maori t i t l e and Maori sovereignty. I m p e r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s c o n t i n u a l l y a f f i r m e d B r i t i s h r e c o g n i t i o n of New Zealand as a sovereign s t a t e . Changing power dynamics has already become a f a m i l i a r theme however, and New Zealnad was t o be no d i f f e r e n t . As 173. See i n f r a notes r e l e v a n t t o t h i s p o i n t . 183 those dynamics changed, so d i d 'the law.' Maori sovereignty was b r u t a l l y suppressed when i t was discovered t h a t t h i s was an o b s t a c l e t o c o l o n i s a t i o n . Maori t i t l e was manipulated i n a way t h a t served the purposes of c o l o n i s a t i o n and not of the Maori. When one compares t h i s t o the c l a r i t y and l o g i c of the c o l o n i a l paradigm as i t a p p l i e d t o New Zealand, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not t o conclude t h a t 'the law' had become founded on nothing more than suppression and manipulation. 3.3.1 R e j e c t i o n of Rangatiratanga The c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n New Zealand d i d not l a c k the o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o g i v e p o s i t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o g n i t o n t o the r a n g a t i r a t a n g a guaranteed by A r t i c l e I I of the Treaty of Waitangi, and e x e r c i s e d i n f a c t by the t r i b e s . I n the decade preceding the anglo-Maori Wars of the 1860's three such o p p o r t u n i t i e s presented themselves. S e c t i o n s 71 of the New Zealand C o n s t i t u t i o n Act 1852 (UK) provided: And whereas i t may be expedient t h a t the laws, customs and usages of the a b o r i g i n a l or Native i n h a b i t a n t s of New Zealand...should f o r the present be maintained f o r the government of themselves, i n a l l t h e i r r e l a t i o n s and d e a l i n g s w i t h each other, and t h a t p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i c t s should be set apart w i t h i n which such laws, customs or usages should be so observed: I t s h a l l be l a w f u l f o r Her Majesty... from time t o time t o make p r o v i s i o n f o r the purposes a f o r e s a i d . E s s e n t i a l l y the p r o v i s i o n provided f o r the c r e a t i o n by proclamation of 'Native D i s t r i c t s ' w i t h i n which t r i b a l law and t r i b a l s overeignty would p r e v a i l . In 1860 i n the months immediately p r i o r t o the commencement of h o s t i l i t i e s , former Chief J u s t i c e M a r t i n 184 (who had s a t i n the Svmonds d e c i s i o n ) and Wiremu Tamihana (a prominent Waikato c h i e f ) sought such a proclamation i n respect of the Waikato, and the lands s u b j e c t a t t h a t p o i n t , t o the a u t h o r i t y of the Kingitanga (King Movement). S e t t l e r and missionary groups were vehemently opposed t o such a move. The King i t a n g a had become a powerful c o n f e d e r a t i o n of T a i n u i and Taranaki t r i b e s under the t i t u l a r head of Potatau. the f i r s t Maori King. I t had a l s o become the primary focus f o r Maori n a t i o n a l i s m and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the e f f e c t s of c o l o n i s a t i o n . In t r u t h the s e t t l e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n feared the Kingitanga as ' a l t o g e t h e r too d i s t i n c t i v e and n a t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r t o admit of i t s being blended i n t o any form which would recognize European d i r e c t i o n or ascendency.(174) I t was u l t i m a t e l y f o r t h a t reason t h a t Governor Gore Brown refused t o make a d e c l a r a t i o n under s. 71. In 1865, a f t e r most of the heavy f i g h t i n g i n the Waikato had ended, a Native Provinces B i l l was mooted. Ward notes: . . . l a t e i n the [1865] s e s s i o n F i t z g e r a l d introduced a Native Provinces B i l l which i n v i s a g e d the c r e a t i o n of semi-autonomous Maori provinces.... The B i l l r ecognized t h a t the government could not then impose i t s r u l e i n the King's t e r r i t o r y without r e v i v i n g the war i n the Waikato, but i t sought t o e s t a b l i s h some l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y which the i n t e r i o r t r i b e s might, i n 174. McLean, Native Secretary - Memorandum, 30, A p r i l 1860. Quoted i n Ward A Show of J u s t i c e (1974) a t p. 121. 185 time, accept. Settlement meanwhile would be kept out of the Maori provinces.(175) S t a f f o r d , the f u t u r e Premier, p r o t e s t e d the B i l l s t r o n g l y . Recognising Maori provinces would he argued, perpetuate "th a t Maori communism...that cursed wharepuni ( s l e e p i n g house)...and the communism of the sexes", which were i n h i s view the r u i n and d e s t r u c t i o n of the Maori race.(176) P r e d i c t a b l y , the B i l l never became law. I f enacted i t would have created j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s s i m i l a r t o the American concept of "Indian country," so c e n t r a l t o f e d e r a l Indian law and Indian s o v e r e i g n t y today. The f i n a l o pportunity f o r r e c o g n i t i o n , was enacted as l e g i s l a t i o n but f a i l e d because i t d i d not go f a r enough. By the 1858 Native D i s t r i c t R egulation Act, l o c a l Maori c o u n c i l s or Runanqa were e s t a b l i s h e d under a Pakeha chairman. These runanqa were t o be empowered t o make by-laws on matters of l o c a l concern.(177) As c o l l a t e r a l measure, the Native C i r c u i t Courts Act of the same year cr e a t e d Courts which could enforce both these by-laws and the general law of the colony. The M a g i s t r a t e would be a Pakeha and would be aided i n h i s d e c i s i o n by Maori 175. I b i d , Ward. 176. [1864-6] NZPD 621-4. 177. Supra, Ward at pp. 132-47 and Sorrenson Maori and  Pakeha i n The Oxford New Zealand H i s t o r y (1981) pp. 176-66. 186 'assessors', u s u a l l y a l o c a l c h i e f who could lend a u t h r o i t y t o any d e c i s i o n of h i s s u p e r i o r . In f a c t runanqa or t r i b a l c o u n c i l s were i n s t i t u t i o n s of a n c i e n t o r i g i n whose p r i n c p l e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e was t h a t of r e s o l v i n g i n t e r n a l t r i b a l d i s p u t e s i n accordance w i t h customary law. I t was not s u r p r i s i n g then t h a t most t r i b e s r e j e c t e d the audacity of such a measure which sought t o delegate t o the c h i e f s , a u t h o r i t y they already possessed and unquestionably e x e r c i s e d . In r e a l i t y , the o b j e c t i v e f o r the c r e a t i o n of the s t a t u t o r y runanqa was t o e s t a b l i s h a body from which the government could purchase lan d , and which could be manipulated, i f not completely c o n t r o l l e d , by a Pakeha chairman. The p o l i c y was dropped 3 years l a t e r having f a i l e d i n i t s primary o b j e c t i v e of encouraging land s a l e s and i n g a i n i n g widespread acceptance among the t r i b e s . The runanqa and c i r c u i t c o u r t s were c l e a r l y designed t o e s t a b l i s h a system of i n d i r e c t r u l e r a t h e r than recognize Maori sovereignty or self-government. I t resembled c l o s e l y the model imposed, w i t h g r e a t e r success, i n Canada -government by an Indian agent through a band c o u n c i l . Thus, the s e t t l e r government at the beginning of the Conquest e r a , r e j e c t e d as incompatible w i t h c o l o n i s a t i o n , any formal r e c o g n i t i o n of the t r i b e s as p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s . The dynamics were almost i d e n t i c a l t o those o b t a i n i n g between the s t a t e of Georgia and the Cherokee Nation i n the 1820's. Georgia knew t h a t t o g i v e r e c o g n i t i o n t o the Cherokee as a n a t i o n would a u t o m a t i c a l l y h a l t c o l o n i a l 187 expansion a t the border of the Cherokee t e r r i t o r i e s . So i t was w i t h the Maori i n New Zealnad. I f the t r e a t y promise t o p r o t e c t t r i b a l sovereignty was honoured, white settlement would have been stopped i n i t s t r a c k s . Almost without exception the t r i b e s refused t o s e l l l and. White resentment of t h i s f a c t was summed up i n an e d i t o r i a l i n The New Zealander a s e t t l e r newspaper. The Maori w i l l not be able t o say t o the Pakeha 'Thus f a r s h a l t thou come and no f u r t h e r ; the Maori and the Pakeha w i l l become j o i n t occupiers of the same t e r r i t o r y . But i t i s impossible t h a t the two races should continue t o l i v e i n neighbourly amity whose laws and usages i n no way c o i n c i d e . Both races must be persuaded t o g i v e t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e t o the same laws; the same usages must pervade f o r both.... And s i n c e i t i s a l s o very c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s s t a t e of happiness cannot be obtained by the White race conforming t o the usages of the Maori, i t i s p l a i n t h a t the Maori must be made amenable t o the higher c i v i l i z a t i o n of the white man.(178) Two d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. and New Zealand meant t h a t the f a t e of the Cherokee was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t t o the f a t e of the t r i b e s i n New Zealand which refused t o s e l l or t o accept Pakeha a u t h o r i t y . The f i r s t d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t i n the U.S. Indian A f f a i r s was a f e d e r a l matter - t h a t i s the r a t i o of the Cherokee cases. S t r i c t l y then, Georgia's r e f u s a l t o recognize Cherokee sovereignty had no impact on the s t a t u s of the Cherokee a t a l l . In New Zealand as w e l l , a d i v i s i o n of power had been e s t a b l i s h e d between the s e t t l e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n New Zealand and C o l o n i a l O f f i c e i n London. 178. Supra, Ward a t p 164. 188 As was standard a t the time, Native A f f a i r s was considered t o be an i m p e r i a l concern, and was w i t h i n the p r e r o g a t i v e of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . That c o n t r o l (such as i t was, bearing i n mind the huge d i s t a n c e s involved) was r e l i n q u i s h e d t o the s e t t l e r government i n 1861.(179) The r e s u l t was the New Zealand e q u i v a l e n t of Georgia having c o n t r o l of Cherokee a f f a i r s . The second d i f f e r e n c e r e l a t e d t o the sheer s i z e of North America. This was the s i n g l e f a c t which made the removal p o l i c y of the 1830's p o s s i b l e . There i s no doubt t h a t removal was implemented by c o e r c i o n and t h a t i t had a de v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t on the nations who were removed. Indeed i t was the Cherokee who came t o embody the b r u t a l i t y of t h a t p o l i c y . But removal was perceived by the f e d e r a l government as a compromise between s e t t l e r greed f o r land on one s i d e and Indian sovereignty on the other. In New Zealand, removal was simply not p o s s i b l e . Every p a r t of both i s l a n d s was claimed and j e a l o u s l y guarded by one t r i b e or another. There was no room f o r such a compromise, even i f removal could be a p p r o p r i a t e l y viewed i n those terms. The t r a g i c r e s u l t was t h a t the Kingitanga t e r r i t o r i e s were invaded i n J u l y 1863 by 10,000 Imper i a l troops and m i l i t i a , ( 1 8 0 ) 179. See Report of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l i n the Orakei Calim 91987) WAI 9 a t 4.5. 180. Supra, n.2, Sorrenson at 182. 189 f i g h t i n g f o r the r i g h t of the Pakeha government t o "acquire" land a g a i n s t the w i l l of i t s owners. T r i b e s from throughout the c e n t r a l and southern North I s l a n d sent men t o a i d i n the defence of King Tawhiao (the second king) and of the promises s e t out i n the Treaty of Waitangi. The i n v a s i o n meant however, t h a t a l l hope of honouring the terms by which white contact was agreed t o was l o s t . 3.3.2 J u d i c i a l R e j e c t i o n of the Treaty of Waitangi and the  C o l o n i a l Paradigm As i n Canada and the U.S., the i n v e r s i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm, t h a t i s of Native T i t l e and Nativ e Sovereignty, was e f f e c t e d on two f r o n t s . By l e g i s l a t i v e abrogation and by j u d i c i a l pronouncement. The t a s k of the cou r t s i n New Zealand was made e a s i e r by the f a c t no c l e a r l i n e of j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm had developed there. I t i s t r u e t h a t Svmonds had r e s t a t e d the d o c t r i n e i n Johnson v. Mcintosh, but t h a t i n i t s e l f was not enough. The New Zealand Courts had no eq u i v a l e n t of Cherokee Nation or of Worcestor v. Georgia the cases which completed and cemented the c o l o n i a l pardigm. I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t Svmonds made i t c l e a r t h a t the c o l o n i a l law of North America and of New Zealand were the same. But the cou r t s of the conquest era i n New Zealand simply ignored t h a t p r i n c i p l e and a p p l i e d feudal notions of the non-j u s t i c i a b i l i t y of t i t l e not d e r i v e d from the Crown. As noted, the c l e a r e s t and most comprehensive statement of p r e - e x i s t i n g Native t i t l e and Native sovereignty could be 190 found i n the Treaty of Waitangi i t s e l f . P r e d i c t a b l y , t h a t t r e a t y was, by v a r i o u s means, rendered i n e f f e c t i v e and unenforceable i n law. This process of i n v e r s i o n began w i t h the 1877 d e c i s i o n of the f u l l c o u r t of the New Zealand Supreme c o u r t i n Wi.  Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington.(181) In t h a t case the a p p e l l a n t argued ( i n t e r a l i a ) t h a t the making of a Crown grant t o the respondent Bishop without p r i o r extinguishment of the Maori t i t l e contravened the guarantees of A r t i c l e I I of the Treaty of Waitangi. Prendegast C.J., Who d e l i v e r e d the o p i n i o n of the c o u r t , concluded t h a t the Court had no power t o look behind a Crown grant. In reaching t h i s c o n c l u s i o n he attacked every aspect of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. His c o n c l u s i o n s i n respect of the p r e - e x i s t e n c e of Maori sovereignty r e f l e c t a l e v e l of arrogance which was unprecedented - even f o r the conquest era. He begins by r e f e r r i n g t o the p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Government p r i o r t o c o l o n i s a t i o n of r e c o g n i s i n g Maori sovereignty, and concludes t h a t i t was a mistake: On the foundation of t h i s colony, the a b o r i g i n e s were found without any k i n d of c i v i l government or any s e t t l e d system of law. There i s no doubt t h a t d u r i n g a s e r i e s of years the B r i t i s h Government d e s i r e d and endeavoured t o recognise the independent n a t i o n a l i t y of New Zealand. But the t h i n g n e i t h e r e x i s t e d nor a t the time c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . The Maori t r i b e s were 181. [1877] 3 NZ J u r . (NS) 72. 191 incapable of performing the d u t i e s , and t h e r e f o r e of assuming the r i g h t s of a c i v i l i s e d community.(182) Prendegast uses a theme which has now become f a m i l i a r . To have any r i g h t s at a l l , the holder must be c i v i l i s e d ; N a t i v e people are by d e f i n i t i o n u n c i v i l i s e d and so have no r i g h t s . As w e l l , he indulges i n the same amateur anthropology used i n almost a l l the conquest era cases as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h a t d e n i a l . The Maori had no system of law or government. Such a statement i s outrageous i n i t s arrogance and i t s b i g o t r y . He continues: So f a r indeed as [the Treaty of Waitangi] purported t o cede sovereignty, i t must be regarded as a simple  n u l l i t y . No body p o l i t i c e x i s t e d capable of making c e s s i o n of sovereignty, nor could the t h i n g i t s e l f e x i s t . ( 1 8 3 ) In essence the propositon i s t h a t the Maori c o u l d not have been sovereign because they had no c e n t r a l government, no houses of parliament and no B r i t i s h s t y l e Court system. Though preposterous as a b a s i s f o r l e g a l d o c t r i n e , Prendegast's ' n u l l i t y ' a s s e r t i o n served t o bury both the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori sovereignty. New Zealand was i n h i s view, "acquired j u r e gentium, by d i s c o v e r y and 182. 183. I b i d , a t 77. I b i d , at 78. 192 p r i o r i t y of occupation, as a t e r r i t o r y i n h a b i t e d only by savages.(184) His conclusions as t o the e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of Maori t i t l e were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the above. He r e f e r s f i r s t t o the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s as "the most complete e x p o s i t i o n on the subject,"(185) and t o the Symonds d e c i s i o n as c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s own conclusions.(186) Prendegast proceeds t o reach a c o n c l u s i o n d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed t o the very core of the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s , and t o the c o n c l u s i o n i n Symonds t h a t Maori t i t l e "must be respected." He begins . . . i n the case of p r i m i t i v e barbarians, the Supreme executive government must a c q u i t i t s e l f as best i t may, of i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o respect n a t i v e p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s , and of n e c e s s i t y must be the s o l e a r b i t e r of i t s own j u s t i c e . I t s act s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r cannot be examined or c a l l e d i n question by any t r i b u n a l , because there e x i s t no known p r i n c i p l e s whereon a r e g u l a r a d j u d i c a t i o n can be made.(187) Once again the conclusions are f a m i l i a r and the imagery i d e n t i c a l . The p l a i n t i f f c h i e f i s a ' p r i m i t i v e b a r b a r i a n . ' I n the Treaty of Waitangi the imagery was "Ch i e f s of the Confederation of the United T r i b e s of New Zealand and the 184. I b i d , a t 78. 185. I b i d , a t 77. 186. I b i d , a t 78. 187. I b i d . 193 separate and independent C h i e f s . 1 1 (188) But t h a t was dumped i n order t o j u s t i f y an i n v e r s i o n of the law. That i n v e r s i o n , i n the context of t i t l e , was t h a t the executive now had a completely u n f e t t e r e d and unreviewable d i s c r e t i o n t o d i s r e g a r d Maori t i t l e as i t saw f i t . Such a c o n c l u s i o n was "of n e c e s s i t y " according t o the Chief J u s t i c e , because these people are " p r i m i t i v e b a r b a r i a n s . " The l o g i c i s impeccable. In t h i s regard i n f a c t , Wi Parata simply r e s t a t e s the p r i n c i p l e of St. Catherines M i l l i n g - t h a t N a t i v e t i t l e , once l i m i t e d only by Crown pre-emption, was now depended f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e on the grace and favour of the Crown. He concludes: E s p e c i a l l y i t cannot be questioned, but must be assumed t h a t the sovereign power has p r o p e r l y discharged i t s o b l i g a t i o n s t o respect and cause t o be respected, a l l n a t i v e p r o p r i e t o r y rights.(189) This too i s f a m i l i a r . The U.S. Supreme Court i n Lone  Wolf v. Hitchcock(190) reached an i d e n t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n i n order t o avoid reviewing a land s a l e i n c l e a r breach of t r e a t y : [ P ] l e n e r y a u t h o r i t y over the t r i b a l r e l a t i o n s of the Indians has been e x e r c i s e d by congress from the 188. See Treaty of Waitangi, A r t i c l e I . 189. Supra, n.6 a t 79. 190. (1903) 187 US 553 discussed supra. 194 beginning and the power has always been deemed t o be a p o l i t i c a l one not s u b j e c t t o be c o n t r o l l e d by the j u d i c i a l department.(191) L i k e C h a n c e l l o r Boyd i n St. Catherines however, Prendegast C.J. went f u r t h e r i n Wi Parata. He discussed the Native R i g h t s Act 1865 which de c l a r e d t h a t the Courts had j u r i s d i c t i o n i n matters "touching the t i t l e t o land h e l d under Maori custom and usage."(192) Prendegast wrote: The Act speaks f u r t h e r as t o the 'Ancient Custom and Usage of the Maori people', as i f some such body of customary law d i d i n r e a l i t y e x i s t . But a phrase i n a  s t a t u t e cannot c a l l what i s non-existent i n t o being. As we have shown, the proceedings of the B r i t i s h Government and the l e g i s l a t i o n of the colony have a t a l l times been p r a c t i c a l l y based on the c o n t r a r y s u p p o s i t i o n , t h a t no such body of law e x i s t e d ; and h e r e i n have been i n e n t i r e accordance w i t h good sense and i n d u b i t a b l e f a c t s . Ideas and p r a c t i c e s r e s p e c t i n g property i n l a n d , and the power of a l i e n a t i o n t o Europeans, which have been growing up s i n c e the settlement of the country, cannot a f f e c t the question.(193) (emphasis added) In St. Catherines M i l l i n g C h a n c e l l o r Boyd was so convinced of h i s own a n a l y s i s of Indian savagery, t h a t he f e l t able t o d i s r e g a r d the p l a i n terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Prendegast i n Wi Parata. again so e n t i r e l y convinced of the t r u t h of h i s b i g o t t e d a n a l y s i s , 191. I b i d , at 568. 192. Native Rights Act 1865. s. 3. 193. Supra, Wi Parata. a t p. 79. 195 simply disregarded the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n which was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t a n a l y s i s . H i s treatment of the c o l o n i a l paradigm a t contact i s a l s o f a m i l i a r . He says B r i t i s h p o l i c y , p r a c t i c e and l e g i s l a t i o n has always been based on the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the Maori were l a w l e s s . The very e x i s t e n c e of the Treaty of W a i t a i n g i shows t h i s t o be p a t e n t l y f a l s e . The C h i e f J u s t i c e i s i n f a c t attempting the same r e v i s i o n of h i s t o r y undertaken i n Kagama. i n Lone Wolf, i n Montoya f i n S t .  Catherines, i n S y l i b o y and i n a l l the other cases r e f e r r e d t o which c o n t r i b u t e d t o the mythology of conquest. I t was an o l d t r i c k but i t worked as w e l l (perhaps b e t t e r ) i n New Zealand as i t d i d i n North America. Wi Parata s e t out i n c l e a r terms the b a s i c framework of the development of 'the law' of Maori r i g h t s throughout the conquest era. L a t e r d e c i s i o n s would depart from i t s most r a c i s t hyperbole, but none would upset i t s u n d e r l y i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s . Maori Sovereignty and Maori t i t l e could not be enforced except by the grant of a u t h o r i t y from Parliament. Law which i s based so completely upon r a c i a l arrogance, as Wi Parata so c l e a r l y was, must be challeneged as i n v a l i d . Nor i s one's sense of wrongness lessened i n any way by knowledge of the f a c t t h a t North American j u r i s p r u d e n c e a t the time drew i t s underpinnings from the same source. The s i m i l a r i t i e s discussed serve only t o prove the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of the c o l o n i a l process, and the s i n g l e 196 r e a l i t y of Indigeneous peoples i n North America and New Zealand. In Moore v. Meredith(194) the Chief J u s t i c e cemented t h i s i n v e r s i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. A c l a i m t o a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e y i e l d e d i n h i s view, "no e s t a t e i n land known t o the law beyond p o s s i b l y , a tenancy a t w i l l . . . " . In Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker(195) Richmond J . adopted completely, Prendegast's views i n Wi Parata: ...the mere a s s e r t i o n of the c l a i m of the Crown i s i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t t o oust the j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s or any other Court i n the Colony. There can be no known r u l e of law by which the v a l i d i t y of the d e a l i n g s i n the name and under the a u t h o r i t y of the Sovereign w i t h the N a t i v e t r i b e s of t h i s country f o r the e x t i n c t i o n of t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s can be t e s t e d . Such t r a n s a c t i o n s began w i t h the settlement of these i s l a n d s ; so t h a t Native custom i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o them. The Crown i s under a solemn engagement t o observe s t r i c t j u s t i c e i n the matter, but of n e c e s s i t y i t must be l e f t t o the conscience of the Crown t o determine what i s j u s t i c e . The s e c u r i t y of a l l t i t l e s i n the  country depends on the maintenance of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e . ( 1 9 6 ) The f i n a l comment i s a c o n f e s s i o n as t o the r e a l purpose behind the Courts' d e n i a l of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i n New Zealand. A reverse h o l d i n g could l e a d t o inconvenient q u e s t i o n i n g of white t i t l e s i n New Zealand. 194. (1889) 8 NZLR 160 (C.A.). 195. (1894) 11 NZLR 483 (C.A.). 196. I b i d , a t 488. 197 The P r i v y C o u n c i l on appeal considered t h a t Prendegast's r e j e c t i o n of Maori custom and usage i n Wi  Parata "goes too f a r " and t h a t i t was " r a t h e r l a t e i n the day f o r such an argument t o be addressed t o a New Zealand Court."(197) But the Court refused t o question Prendegast's b a s i c a s s e r t i o n t h a t Maori t i t l e e x i s t e d e n t i r e l y a t the whim of the Crown.(198) The f a c t s of W a l l i s v. The S o l i c i t o r General(199) were s i m i l a r t o Wi Parata; land had been given t o the church f o r a school which had never been b u i l t and now the donor t r i b e wanted i t back. The Crown contended among other t h i n g s t h a t the c e s s i o n of the land had been an act of s t a t e and could not be questioned by the Courts. The Crown contended f u r t h e r t h a t any i n t e r f e r e n c e by the Court would be i n breach of the " t r u s t . . . c o n f i d e d i n the Crown."(200) The New Zealand Court of Appeal d e f e r r e d t o the Crown, i n a manner desc r i b e d by the P r i v y C o u n c i l as " c e r t a i n l y not f l a t t e r i n g 197. [1901] AC 561 a t 577, per Lord Davey. 198. I b i d . 199. [1903] AC 173. 200. I b i d , a t 188. 198 t o the d i g n i t y or independence of the highest c o u r t i n New Zealand."(201) This reprimand of the New Zealand Courts by the J u d i c i a l Committee sparked the famous P r o t e s t a t Bench and  Bar i n 1903(202) a t which judges p u b l i c l y f l a i l e d the P r i v y Council,(203) threatened t o end appeals t h e r e , and a s s e r t e d t h a t the c o r r e c t d o c t r i n e i n New Zealand was t h a t the Courts c o u l d take no cognisance of Native t i t l e ( 2 0 4 ) . T h i s d i s p l a y of c o l o n i a l p a t r i o t i s m cemented Wi Parata as the dominant l e g a l d o c t r i n e i n New Zealand f o r the next 100 years. In 1909 Wi Parata was i n f a c t c o d i f i e d as s. 84 of the N a t i v e Land Act of t h a t year. The s e c t i o n provided: Save so f a r as otherwise e x p r e s s l y provided i n any other Act the Native customary t i t l e t o land s h a l l not be a v a i l a b l e or enforceable as a g a i n s t H i s Majesty the King by any proceedings i n any Court or i n any other matter. The ' s e c u r i t y of t i t l e s ' i n the colony turned out t o take p r i o r i t y over the c o l o n i a l paradigm i t s e l f . 201. I b i d . 202. Recorded at [1840-1932] NZPCC, App. p. 730. 203. Mc Hugh, " A b o r i g i n a l T i t l e i n New Zealand Courts" [1984], 2. Cant L. Rev. 235 at 249. 204. Supra, P r o t e s t a t Bench and Bar a t 732. 199 The same p o s i t i v i s t d o c t r i n e was h e l d t o apply as w e l l t o f i s h e r i e s - a matter c e n t r a l t o the Maori economy. In Waipapakura v. Hempton(205) Stout CJ concluded: In t i d a l w a t e r s . . . a l l can f i s h unless a s p e c i a l l y d e f i n e d r i g h t has been given t o some of the King's s u b j e c t s which excludes others. I t may be t o put the case the strongest p o s s i b l e way f o r the Maoris t h a t the Treaty of Waitangi meant t o g i v e such a e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o the Maoris but i f i t meant t o do so no l e g i s l a t i o n has been passed c o n f e r r i n g the r i g h t , and i n the absence of such both Wi Parata v. The Bishop of  W e l l i n g t o n and Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker are a u t h o r i t i e s f o r saying t h a t u n t i l given by s t a t u t e no such r i g h t can be enforced....(206) The f i n i s h i n g touches t o the j u d i c i a l p i c t u r e of the conquest era came i n the d e c i s i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Hoani Te HeuHeu Tukino v. Aotea D i s t r i c t Maori Land  Board.(207) Tukino argued t h a t a p r i v a t e Act of the New Zealand Parliament which i n e f f e c t c o n f i s c a t e d t r i b a l lands was u l t r a v i r e s . He contended t h a t the New Zealand l e g i s l a t u r e was not empowered t o contravene the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e I I of the Treaty of Waitangi. The c o n t e n t i o n was l o g i c a l enough i f i t could f i r s t be accepted t h a t the l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y of the New Zealand Parliament could be t r a c e d t o , and t h e r e f o r e r e s t r i c t e d by, the Treaty. Viscount Simon L.C. i n d e l i v e r i n g the d e c i s i o n of the P r i v y 205. (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (SC). 206. I b i d , a t p. 1071. 207. [1941] AC 241 200 C o u n c i l simply assumed without question or argument t h a t A r t i c l e I of the Treaty was e f f e c t i v e i n ceding sovereignty t o the Crown. Because however, the Treaty had the s t a t u s of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement between two "High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , " any r i g h t s granted by i t s terms could not be d i r e c t l y enforced i n New Zealand's domestic Courts. Instead the e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of these r i g h t s depended on t h e i r being e x p r e s s l y incorporated by l e g i s l a t i o n i n t o m u n i c i p a l law.(208) Indeed even i f such i n c o r p o r a t i o n had occurred (and i t had not) such l e g i s l a t i o n would have been s u s c e p t i b l e t o i m p l i e d r e p e a l by subsequent s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n of the k i n d i n t h i s case anyway. I r o n i c a l l y the Treaty, once worthless as a 'simple n u l l i t y ' and not a t r e a t y at a l l , was now unenforceable p r e c i s e l y because i t was a t r e a t y . The p r o p o s i t i o n i n the case was simply another route t o a Wi Parata c o n c l u s i o n . By a l l these means, the j u d i c i a l i n v e r s i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm was executed and cemented as 'the law.' P r e - e x i s t i n g Maori sovereignty and t i t l e were r e j e c t e d and r e p l a c e d by granted r i g h t s i n a process which used r a c i s t imagery and r a c i s t assumptions as i t s l y n c h p i n . By the time of the Tukino case, the C o l o n i a l paradigm had been b u r i e d , Wi Parata had become "the t r u t h " and Tukino i t s e l f c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as " u n s u r p r i s i n g . " "Every American Schoolboy 208. I b i d , a t pp. 324-5. knows..." t o borrow the words of Reed J . i n Tee H i t  Ton.(209) 3.3.3 L e g i s l a t i v e R e j e c t i o n of the Treaty of Waitangi and  the C o l o n i a l Paradigm I t was noted t h a t the a t t a c k on the c o l o n i a l paradigm i n New Zealand was executed on two f r o n t s - j u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e . I t should be pointed out however t h a t these ' f r o n t s ' formed p a r t of a s i n g l e process and should not be viewed as separate. In many ways, i t was the l e g i s l a t i o n which encouraged j u d i c i a l amnesia as t o the contact era and contact law. That i s , the e a r l y l e g i s l a t i o n as t o Maori land t i t l e c reated a code which the Courts had no i n c l i n a t i o n t o look beyond or behind. I t became very easy t h e r e f o r e (as i t was f o r the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n St. Catherines) t o conclude t h a t the only Maori r i g h t s are granted r i g h t s . As a c o r o l l a r y , j u d i c i a l adoption of p o s i t i v i s m served t o a f f i r m the l e g i t i m a c y of the l e g i s l a t i v e a t t a c k on Maori t i t l e and sovereignty. Kaqama had l e g i t i m a t e d the Major Crimes Act i n a s i m i l a r way. The dynamic was t h e r e f o r e one of the j u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e a t t a c k s feeding o f f , j u s t i f y i n g and strengthening each other. The N a t i v e Land Acts of 1862 and 1865 were t h e r e f o r e c o l l a t e r a l 'accomplices' t o j u d i c i a l developments i n Wi  Parata and beyond. 209. (1954) 348 US at 289-90. 202 The 1862 Act provided f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of lands h e l d by customary t i t l e and t h e i r replacement w i t h Crown d e r i v e d f r e e h o l d t i t l e s . This was t o be achieved through the working of a new t r i b u n a l - The Nativ e Land c o u r t . The Act was not a t t h a t stage a code. I t d i d not preclude Crown purchase of the bare a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e and was t o apply only i n d i s t r i c t s so proclaimed by the Governor. The f i r s t p roclamation was not made u n t i l two yars l a t e r . ( 2 1 0 ) The i n t e r v e n t i o n of war i n the Waikato, Taranaki and Bay of Pl e n t y meant t h a t the Act never become f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l before i t was superceded by the Native Land Act 1865. That Act was f a r more agr e s s i v e i n the p u r s u i t of i t s p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . Those o b j e c t i v e s were best a r t i c u l a t e d by the Honourable Henry Sewell i n the House of Representatives: The o b j e c t of the Native Lands Act was tw o - f o l d : t o b r i n g the great bulk of the lands i n the Northern I s l a n d which belonged t o the Maoris, and which, before the passing of t h a t Act, were e x t r a commercium—except through the means of the o l d purchase system, which had e n t i r e l y broken down, w i t h i n the reach of c o l o n i s a t i o n . The other great object was the d e t r i b a l i s a t i o n of the M a o r i s — t o destroy, i f i t were p o s s i b l e , the p r i n c i p l e of communism which ran through the whole of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s , upon which t h e i r s o c i a l system was based, and which stood as a b a r r i e r i n the way of a l l attempts t o amalgamate the Maori race i n t o our s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l system. I t was hoped by the i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n of t i t l e s t o land, g i v i n g them the same i n d i v i d u a l ownership which we ourselves possessed, they would l o s e t h e i r communistic c h a r a c t e r , and t h a t t h e i r s o c i a l s t a t u s would become a s s i m i l a t e d t o our own.(211) 210. Report of the Waitangi T r i b u n a l on the Cerakei Claim (1987) WAI 9 a t p. 30. 211. (1870) 9 NZPD 361. 203 The c e n t r a l mechanism f o r a c h i e v i n g these t w i n goals was t h i s " i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n " of t i t l e s r e f e r r e d t o by Sewell. In f a c t , although Sewell r e f e r s t o two o b j e c t i v e s , t h e r e was only one. The overwhelmingly important aim was t o get a t the l a n d . Experience of the previous 20 years had shown t h a t the only way t o do so was t o r e f u s e t o recognize t r i b a l t i t l e . The T r i b e s refused t o s e l l (and i t was f o r t h a t reason t h a t the Waikato was invaded). Thus ' d e t r i b a l i s a t i o n ' as Sewell termed i t was not an end i n i t s e l f - i t was simply a means of g e t t i n g at the land. H i s t o r y has shown i t t o have been extremely e f f e c t i v e i n a c h i e v i n g t h a t end. By the terms of the Act, t i t l e t o t r i b a l land had t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d by the Native Land Court which, on the b a s i s of the evidence before i t , would i s s u e a c e r t i f i c a t e of f r e e h o l d t i t l e - the e q u i v a l e n t of a Crown grant. The c e r t i f i c a t e c o uld c o n t a i n no more than ten names, w i t h the named i n d i v i d u a l s t a k i n g as tenants i n common. Though t r i b e s people had assumed these 'owners' would take i n t r u s t f o r the whole t r i b e , the Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Act was t h a t those named were f r e e t o a l i e n a t e without reference or o b l i g a t i o n t o t h e i r kinspeople.(212) This s e v e r e l y t e s t e d an i n t e r n a l t r i b a l cohesion and r e c i p r o c i t y which was 212. Supra, See g e n e r a l l y Orakei at s e c t i o n 4-7; and Ward at 213. 204 already under t h r e a t from disease and war. Thus the Act created and promoted i n t r a - t r i b a l d i v i s i o n s which had never e x i s t e d before. The Act took claimants away from the land they were c l a i m i n g because Court s i t t i n g s were h e l d i n main centres and were i n v a r i a b l y p r o t r a c t e d a f f a i r s . Having abandoned income producing c u l t i v a t i o n s and having been f o r c e d t o run up l a r g e debts f o r food and accommodation i n the towns, t r i b e s were o f t e n forced t o s e l l immediately t o c r e d i t o r s whatever they were awarded. Nor c o u l d the t r i b e s a void the Land Court process. The Court decided only on the b a s i s of the best evidence before i t - a p r i n c i p l e which i n v i t e d t r i b e s w i t h l i t t l e connection t o the land i n question t o make claims i n the hope t h a t the r e a l owners would not get n o t i c e . The r e a l owners were fo r c e d t o counter c l a i m ( i f they were l u c k y enough t o get n o t i c e ) or r i s k l o s i n g t h e i r land completely. In t h i s way, even the many t r i b e s which completely r e j e c t e d the Land Court's a u t h o r i t y were i n e x o r a b l y drawn i n t o the process. By these means i n d i v i d u a l i z a t i o n of t i t l e was as e f f e c t i v e at a t t a c k i n g the Maori land base as the i d e n t i c a l a l l o t m e n t process would be i n the US twenty years l a t e r . ( 2 1 3 ) As w i t h the Allotment Act, New Zealand's Native Land Act would l a y the foundation f o r Maori poverty and massive u r b a n i s a t i o n i n the 20th century. 213. Supra, notes 75 and 76 and accompanying t e x t . 205 I t was not j u s t an a t t a c k on the land-base however. L i k e the Allotment Act, i t was a l s o an a t t a c k on Maori sovereignty. I n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n of t i t l e meant p r i v a t i s a t i o n of t i t l e . T r i b a l a u t h o r i t y and government was rendered completely i r r e l e v a n t t o a process which was transforming the t r i b e s ' s p i r i t u a l and economic base. As i n the United S t a t e s , t h i s blow t o t r i b a l cohesion and a u t h o r i t y was n e a r l y f a t a l . In a move which must be seen as c o l l a t e r a l t o the above, the Native Representation Act was passed i n 1867. I t provided f o r the establishment of four Maori seats i n the New Zealand parliament.(214) This was a simple expedient t o t r i v i a l i z e what might otherwise have been a s u b s t a n t i a l Maori vote. One s i d e e f f e c t of the i n d i v i d u a l i z a t i o n of t i t l e s was t h a t Maori were now beginning t o s a t i s f y the o l d property requirements f o r v o t i n g purposes. The Native Representation Act meant t h a t 35-40% of the p o p u l a t i o n was reduced i n Parliamentary r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o 4 v o i c e s out of 76.(215) This was not the only impact of the Act. The f o u r Maori seats aided i n the process began i n the N a t i v e Land 214. For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s Act see Kelsey, Legal  I m p e r i a l i s m and the C o l o n i s a t i o n of Aotearoa i n Tauiwi:  Racism and E t h n i c i t y i n New Zealand (1984) a t p. 34. 215. D a l z i e l , The P o l i t i c s of Settlement, i n O l i v e r and W i l l i a m s (ed.), Oxford New Zealand H i s t o r y (1981) at p. 102. 206 A c t o f s e v e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p from the people and the l a n d . The f o u r Maori MP's and not the t r i b a l l e a d e r s became the o f f i c i a l (and impotent) v o i c e o f the Maori people. Many o f thes e MP's, though i n some cases e f f e c t i v e e x p l o i t e r s o f the Pakeha governmental s t r u c t u r e , had no c o n s t i t u e n c i e s o f t h e i r own and were not r e c o g n i z e d a t a l l as t r i b a l l e a d e r s . In t h i s way the A c t complemented the N a t i v e Land A c t by c o - o p t i n g , i n t e g r a t i n g , a s s i m i l a t i n g and f i n a l l y s i l e n c i n g Maori p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n t . As t h i s p r o c e s s ground on, the r e a l Maori l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d do no more than sta n d on the s i d e l i n e s and watch. These two A c t s p r o v i d e d the f o u n d a t i o n f o r the l e g i s l a t i v e a t t a c k on the c o l o n i a l paradigm i n New Zealand. L i k e the I n d i a n A c t i n Canada and the A l l o t m e n t A c t i n the U.S. these two measures dominated the whole of the conquest er a i n New Zealand, d u r i n g which t r i b a l l a n d and t r i b a l a u t h o r i t y dwindled t o a bare remnant of what i t once was. The m i l i t a r y d e f e a t by 1867 of the c e n t r a l North I s l a n d c o a l i t i o n o f t r i b e s under the l e a d e r s h i p o f King Tawhiao l e d t o two A c t s which n e a r l y g u t t e d the K i n g i t a n g a and i t s l a n d base. The Suppression o f R e b e l l i o n A c t 1863 and the New Zealand Settlements A c t o f the same year e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y Courts t o d e a l wth charges o f " r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t the Crown," suspended the r i g h t t o habeus corpus and c o n f i s c a t e d 3 1/4 m i l l i o n a c r e s o f ' r e b e l ' land.(216) In 216. For an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f the l a t t e r A c t and the circu m s t a n c e s surrounding i t see L i t c h f i e l d , C o n f i s c a t i o n of  Maori Land (1985) 15 VUWLR 335. 207 f a c t land was c o n f i s c a t e d on the b a s i s of i t s " f e r t i l i t y and s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n , " r a t h e r than because i t s owners were i n r e b e l l i o n . ( 2 1 7 ) The Acts rendered l a n d l e s s and powerless the most formidable Maori n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n New Zealands h i s t o r y and so l e f t the a t t a c k on Maori t i t l e and sover e i g n t y t o continue l a r g e l y unobstructed. Other r e l i g i o - n a t i o n a l i s t movements would become prominent throughout the l a t e 19th and e a r l y 20th c e n t u r i e s , but those t h a t worked i n s i d e the system were doomed t o f a i l , ( 2 1 8 ) and those t h a t worked outside the system were b r u t a l l y put down.(219) L e g i s l a t i o n a f t e r t h i s f i r s t r a f t of measures amounted to more of the same i n ever i n c r e a s i n g doses as the t r i b a l power base (and t h e r e f o r e t r i b a l o pposition) dwindled and f a l t e r e d . The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 attacked c e n t r a l c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the way t h a t the a n t i - p o t l a t c h and anti-sundance laws had i n Canada.(220) The Act rendered 217. Sorrenson, Maori and Pakeha i n O l i v e r and W i l l i a m s (ed.) Oxford New Zealand H i s t o r y . (1984) a t p. 185. 218. In respect of the Kotahitanaa or Maori Parliament Movement see: g e n e r a l l y W i l l i a m s , P o l i t i c s of the New  Zealand Maori pp. 33-67. 219. See S c o t t , Ask That Mountain: The Story of Parihaka (1975). 220. See supra notes 166 t o 169. 208 i l l e g a l the a c t i v i t i e s of Tohunqa. the s p i r i t u a l and educatonal leaders of the communities. By the 1909 Native Land Act, as mentioned, a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e was rendered unenforceable a g a i n s t a Crown a s s e r t i o n of extinguishment. An i n t e r e s t i n g though temporary departure from t h i s p a t t e r n came w i t h the advent of World War I I . The departure was not due t o any p a r t i c u l a r change of heart on the p a r t of government, but because the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r e n g t h of t r i b a l i s m c ould be harnessed f o r the war e f f o r t . The No. 28 Maori B a t t a l i o n was formed a t the behest of Maori MP's w i t h i t s companies and platoons s t r u c t u r e d along t r i b a l l i n e s . Back home the Maori War E f f o r t O r g a n i s a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d comprising Maori MPs and m i l i t a r y personnel.(221) Under the auspices of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n t r i b a l committees were e s t a b l i s h e d i n a l l areas: ... i n order t o f o s t e r and r e s t o r e t o the Maori people t h a t ancient c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t r i b a l l e a d e r s h i p so v i t a l t o the s u c c e s s f u l p r o s e c u t i o n of the Maori War e f f o r t . ( 2 2 2 ) Not only were t r i b e s recognised as p o l i t i c a l u n i t s f o r the f i r s t time s i n c e 1865, but c o - o r d i n a t i o n on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e meant t h a t t r i b a l l eaders were working together i n a s i n g l e o r g a n i s a t i o n . The t r i b a l committees had 221. See g e n e r a l l y , Puao Te A t a t u Report of the M i n i s t e r i a l  A d v isory Committee on S o c i a l Welfare (1986) Appendix 1. 222. I b i d , p. 16. L t . Colonel Hemphill, Chief A d m i n i s t r a t o r - Maori War E f f o r t O r g a n i s a t i o n . 209 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r and c o n t r o l over food p r o d u c t i o n , workers and m o b i l i z a t i o n w i t h i n the t r i b e on a day t o day b a s i s . I n i t i a t i v e and c o n t r o l over t r i b a l resources was returned t o Maori hands, when the War ended the Maori MP's l o b b i e d t o r e t a i n the committees (powers i n t a c t ) on the s t r e n g t h of t h e i r great success. They saw the r e b u i l d i n g of t r i b a l cohesion as fundamental t o the s u r v i v a l of the Maori people. To t h i s end the M.P. f o r the Northern Maori e l e c t o r a t e introduced the Maori S o c i a l and Economic Re c o n s t r u c t i o n B i l l 1945. The B i l l was taken over by the M i n i s t e r f o r Maori A f f a i r s and renamed the Maori S o c i a l and Economic Advancement Act 1945. A l l the t e e t h of self-government had been e x t r a c t e d i n the p o l i t i c a l l aundering process because, according t o the Prime M i n i s t e r of the time, i t would "encourage Maori nationalism."(223) T r i b a l i s m and pan-Maori s o l i d a r i t y was encouraged only t o the extent t h a t i t was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the n a t i o n a l (Pakeha) i n t e r e s t . Having o u t l i v e d t h a t purpose i t c o n s t i t u t e d a t h r e a t t o the same n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and was promptly d i t c h e d i n favour of the o l d a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s which i n v e r t e d the c o l o n i a l paradigm. Thus, t h i s temporary change of d i r e c t i o n resembled the U.S. Indian New Deal i n the 1930s(224) though i t s motive 223. Supra, The Hon. Peter Fraser, from King Maori and Pakeha, p. 259. 224. See supra page 151 t o 153. 210 d i f f e r e d . There was a l s o an important d i f f e r e n c e i n reasons f o r abandoning the p o l i c y . I n the U.S., the New Deal was abandoned because i t was perceived by white p o l i t i c i a n s t o have f a i l e d . I n New Zealand t r i b a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was abandoned a f t e r the war because i t had been too s u c c e s s f u l . The Maori A f f a i r s Act of 1953 cemented the r e t u r n of the conquest ideology. By the time of i t s enactment the bulk of Maori land had been a l i e n a t e d by s a l e or l e a s e or had been "compulsorily acquired" by the Crown. The a l i e n a t i o n rush was over but Maori land-holdings which had s t a b i l i z e d by now faced the legacy of a system designed t o f a c i l i t a t e f a s t turn-over r a t h e r than r e t e n t i o n and u t i l i z a t i o n . The primary concern was over an i n c r e a s i n g "fragmentation" of i n t e r e s t s - a problem which e x i s t e d a l s o i n r e l a t i o n t o the U.S. a l l o t m e n t s . Fragmentation was caused by the imposed Pakeha concept of i n d i v i d u a l s uccession t o f a m i l y i n t e r e s t s and exacerbated by a sharp in c r e a s e i n the Maori p o p u l a t i o n i n the post-war years. The A c t s ' answer t o the problem created by i t s predecessors was t o i n t r oduce a scheme whereby the Maori Trustee (a government o f f i c e ) could c o m p u l s o r i l y acquire "uneconomic i n t e r e s t s of l e s s than $50.(225) The answer t o 225. See g e n e r a l l y Maori A f f a i r s Act 1953. P a r t X V I I I ; e s p e c i a l l y s s . 200 and 201. 211 fragmentation was to slowly confiscate a l l the fragmented t i t l e s . The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 was New Zealand's version of the 1969 'White Paper' or of the Termination policy. It was perceived, as with the White Paper and Termination, as the inevitable end in a long road of policies and laws which had successfully assimilated the Maori. Pursuant to i t s provisions large tracts of Maori land were unilaterally terminated and declared to be European land (that i s land subject to the "normal law").(226) The already weak restrictions on alienation of Maori A land were relaxed even further,(227) and what residual restrictions as to(successions to Maori land existed were dropped completely in favour of the Pakeha rules of succession.(228) In the words of one judge, the Act 226. Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 s. 31(3) declared that a l l lands held by a Maori incorporation would cause to cease to be Maori Land. By subs. (2) the shares of the incorporation shareholders (the tribe or subtribe) were declared to be personalty and not interests in Maori land. By the terms of Part I (ss. 2-14) of the Act, the Registrar of the Maori Land Court could unilaterally declare land owned by less than 4 persons to be European land. 227. Part VI ss. 90-118. 228. Section 76: The effective of this change allowed non Kingroup members - spouses for the most part - to succeed to interests in kin owned land in the event of intestacy. 212 represented "Parliamentary r e c o g n i t i o n of the onward march of the Maori race toward e q u a l i t y w i t h Europeans freedom of a l i e n a t i o n s of Maori land."(229) The Act was more c o r r e c t l y dubbed "the l a s t land grab" by the Maori l e a d e r s h i p ( 2 3 0 ) . By 1965, j u s t before t h i s Act, only an estimated 3,680,500 acres remained i n Maori t i t l e . In 1840 t h a t f i g u r e was c l o s e t o 66 m i l l i o n . ( 2 3 1 ) Of the 1965 t o t a l over 271 thousand acres were c l a s s i f i e d as "probably of no use"; n e a r l y 916 thousand acres were unoccupied or u n s u i t a b l e f o r farming or f o r e s t r y ; and 1.28 m i l l i o n acres were s u b j e c t t o long term leases.(232) Only 695 thousand acres remained i n Maori occupation.(233) The 1967 Act showed c l e a r l y t h a t the systematic a t t a c k on the Maori land-base begun i n 1862 had yet t o abate. 229. Alexander v. Maori A p p e l l a t e Court [1979] 2 NZLR 44 at 56. 230. Supra, Tauiwi p. 90. 231. Figures quoted i n Simpson, Te R i r i Pakeha; The White  Man's Anger (1979) at 241. 232. I b i d . 233. I b i d . 213 3.4 Conclusion The foregoing s e t out t o d e s c r i b e j u s t how "the law" i n the U.S., Canada and New Zealand developed i n a way which c o n t r a d i c t e d and simply r e j e c t e d the c o l o n i a l paradigm of Native t i t l e and Native sovereignty. In the Courts, the imagery, terminology and p r i n c i p l e s invoked t o i n v e r t the c o l o n i a l paradigm, were not j u s t s i m i l a r as between the three j u r i s d i c t i o n s - they were i d e n t i c a l . In the l e g i s l a t u r e s , enactments used t o a t t a c k N a t i v e t i t l e and sovereignty were o f t e n the same or s i m i l a r . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a v oid the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h i s was not simply an i n c r e d i b l e coincidence. As the power dynamics between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d changed so d i d the c o l o n i s e r s ' image of both Indian and Maori. As those images changed so d i d the law. The s i m i l a r i t i e s underscore the f a c t t h a t the same sub-stratum of arrogance and r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y was the c o n t r o l l i n g i n f l u e n c e i n l e g a l developments - the lowest common denominator - i n the three c o u n t r i e s throughout t h i s p e r i o d . I t was t h i s which demanded the j u d i c i a l c r e a t i o n of a mythology of conquest. I t was noted i n the beginning t h a t the Courts only r a r e l y used the term. Most o f t e n i t was used as an unstated backdrop t o d e c i s i o n s which t o r e a t the foundations of the c o l o n i a l paradigm. Conquest mythology underpinned a l l of the l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c i e s aimed a t subsuming Maori and Indian i n t o the ' n a t i o n a l m i l i e u . ' I t l e g i t i m a t e d the 'domestication' of Indigenous r i g h t s i s s u e s , a framework c o n t r a r y t o the very nature of those r i g h t s . I t 214 r e s u l t e d i n the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n of Indian and Maori. A m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n which transformed them from 'independent n a t i o n s ' at the beginning of the 19th Century, t o the ' p r i m i t i v e savages' of the l a t e 19th century - and thence t o the ' d i s a f f e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s ' of the 1960's and 70's. Throughout t h i s whole a n a l y s i s of i n j u s t i c e t h e r e has been one f a c t which can be clung t o , and which provides hope: The mythology of conquest was j u s t t h a t - a myth. The concept which underpinned the r e j e c t i o n of the law as agreed t o between c o l o n i s e r and c o l o n i s e d was a l i e , and can be e m p i r i c a l l y proved t o have been such. Even the f a i t h brought from Europe by the c o l o n i s e r s teaches t h a t houses b u i l t on s o f t foundations w i l l e v e n t u a l l y c o l l a p s e . 215 4. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS. INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION; THE  COLONIAL PARADIGM IN THE MODERN AGET  4.1 Introduction Part II of t h i s thesis began with the suggestion that the h i s t o r i c a l and current r e a l i t y of Indigenous r i g h t s i n North America might be most c l e a r l y understood by d i v i d i n g the past and present into three. The law of contact; the law of conquest and the law of the modern era. The f i r s t two d i v i s i o n s - contact and conquest - are not j u s t d i v i s i o n s i n time. They have been demonstrated to be d i v i s i o n s of ideology, of perspective and of the f l u c t u a t i o n of power between coloniser and colonised. I t was argued that the power balance which obtained at contact evolved n a t u r a l l y into a law of consensus between the nations meeting each other for the f i r s t time. The d e t a i l s of that law, I have c a l l e d the c o l o n i a l paradigm. I t required that r e l a t i o n s between the parties who met within t h i s paradigm would be based upon a benchmark recognition of Native t i t l e and Native sovereignty. The terms of that paradigm were affirmed and enforced i n t r e a t i e s , i n l e g i s l a t i o n and i n j u d i c i a l decisions. The 100 or more years from the mid 19th century on developed into the very a n t i t h e s i s of consensus. This period i n which the j u d i c i a l myth of conquest was established was a period of the imposition of the coloniser's law upon the colonised. This law entrenched and exploited the coloniser's new found hegemony. This new law rejected the c o l o n i a l paradigm, not because i t was unsound 216 i n law or i n j u s t i c e - f o r i t s u r e l y was sound; but because Native peoples were conquered savages. As such they could ot c l a i m the p r o t e c t i o n of the c o l o n i s e r ' s law. In t h i s way law which had been the product of consensus between the p a r t i e s , was appropriated by the c o l o n i s e r f o r h i m s e l f and f o r h i s b e n e f i t . The f a c t t h a t the w r i t e r i n s i s t s upon a t h i r d d i v i s i o n - the modern era - suggests t h a t the s t o r y does not end a t conquest. I t was noted t h a t contact and conquest cannot be synt h e s i z e d i n t o a s i n g l e body of Indigenous law. They are, i t was argued, i r r e c o n c i l a b l y incompatible w i t h one another. That i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y holds the key t o the modern era once i t i s recognized and accepted f o r what i t i s . The judges and p o l i t i c i a n s - white hegemony - are, i n the modern e r a , confronted w i t h a simple choice: Contact or conquest. That choice w i l l govern the e v o l u t i o n of Indigenous r i g h t s i n t o the 21st century. W i t h i n the framework of t h a t choice i t w i l l be argued t h a t the mythology of conquest was not i n i t s time, and i s not now, a v a l i d or d e f e n s i b l e b a s i s f o r the law of Indigenous r i g h t s . I t w i l l be argued f u r t h e r t h a t judges and p o l i t i c i a n s are, inc h by i n c h , moving toward an acceptance of t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n . These changes are o c c u r r i n g , or w i l l occur, because of a huge upsurge of Indigenous n a t i o n a l i s m i n the three c o u n t r i e s d i s c u s s e d . That n a t i o n a l i s m has t r a n s l a t e d i n t o an Indigenous a c t i v i s m both w i t h i n and ou t s i d e 'the system' which i s unprecedented. 217 Unprecedented t h a t i s , s i n c e the contact era. This a c t i v i s m has changed white images of Indigenous peoples, has educated white m a j o r i t i e s i n respect of the cu r r e n t and h i s t o r i c Indigenous r e a l i t y , has forced the c o l o n i s e r t o look a t h i m s e l f . In proudly e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t i e s such as the U.S., Canada and New Zealand, these r e v e l a t i o n s have provided a new powerbase from which t o r e a s s e r t the o r i g i n a l c o l o n i a l paradigm. 4.2 The United States Changes i n j u d i c i a l l y invoked imagery of Indigenous peoples, and i n j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s t o Indigenous r i g h t s has been most marked i n the United S t a t e s . Though Nati v e Americans are the most p o l i t i c a l l y m a r g i n a l i z e d of Indigenous peoples i n the three j u r i s d i c t i o n s , the j u d i c i a l t r a n s i t o n back t o contact imagery and r h e t o r i c has been much e a s i e r i n the U.S. The r e s i l i e n c e of the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s , even during the conquest p e r i o d , has c o n t r i b u t e d much t o t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . Decisions of the l a t e 19th century such as T a l t o n v. Mayes(234) helped t o keep the c o l o n i a l paradigm a l i v e and would provide, i n the modern er a , a b a s i s f o r a new myth of c o n t i n u i t y . In t h a t case i t was h e l d t h a t Cherokee Courts were not subject t o the F i f t h Amendment requirement of a twelve member grand j u r y because t r i b a l powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n predated the c o n s t i t u t i o n and were 234. (1896) 163 U.S. 376. 218 not a f f e c t e d by the passage of the F i f t h Amendment. The case a p p l i e d M a r s h a l l i a n concepts of p r e - e x i s t i n g sovereignty a t a time when such concepts had been u n i f o r m l y r e j ected. As w e l l F e l i x Cohen, the formost American s c h o l a r on " f e d e r a l Indian law," wrote a t r e a t i s e on the s u b j e c t i n 1942.(235) That t r e a t i s e returned the M a r s h a l l d e c i s i o n s t o the centre-stage of Indian r i g h t s law.(236) In f a c t Cohen's handbook so dominated the f i e l d t h a t i t has taken on something a k i n t o the s t a t u s of a Supreme Court decision.(237) Cohen avoided, as f a r as was p o s s i b l e , the conquest cases and expostulated t h a t t r i b a l s o v e r e i g n t y was "perhaps the most b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of a l l Indian law."(238) The few T a l t o n type cases out of the conquest era were r e i n t e r p r e t e d by Cohen. Decisions once considered t o be maverick became an a f f i r m a t i o n of the c o l o n i a l paradigm and provided a l i n e of c o n t i n u i t y between contact law and t h a t 235. Supra, Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 236. I b i d (1942 ed.) at 143. Though h i s t r e a t i s e confirmed Federal plenary power by r i g h t of conquest i n an attempt t o meld contact and conquest law. 237. See W i l k i n s o n , American Indians. Time and the Law (1987) a t pp. 57-59. 238. Supra, Cohen a t 122. 219 of the modern era. The U.S. Supreme Court seems now t o have accepted t h i s r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as the b a s i s f o r a new law, though i t has continued t o a s s e r t t h a t f e d e r a l p lenary power remains i n t a c t . In U.S. v. Wheeler(239) the Supreme Court h e l d t h a t s u c c e s s i v e prosecutions i n t r i b a l and f e d e r a l c o u r t s was not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the f i f t h Amendment because the United States and the Navajo n a t i o n were i n f a c t separate sovereigns. The Court c i t e d both Worcestor and Cohen, t r a c e d unextinguished t r i b a l s overeignty t o the present day and concluded t h a t the Navajo were i n f a c t a t h i r d order of government i n the U.S.(240) This amounted t o an o v e r t u r n i n g of the Kagama d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d but two sources of sovereignty the U.S. In a c u r i o u s attempt t o blend the two c o n f l i c t i n g streams of law, the Court h e l d t h a t t h i s sovereignty was nevertheless f r a g i l e . The sovereignty t h a t the Indian t r i b e s r e t a i n i s of a unique and l i m i t e d c h a r a c t e r . I t e x i s t s only a t the s ufference of Congress and i s subject t o complete defeasance. But u n t i l Congress a c t s , the t r i b e s r e t a i n t h e i r e x i s t i n g sovereign powers.(241) 239. (1978) 435 U.S. 313. 240. I b i d , at 319-32. 241. I b i d , a t 323. 220 In other words the Court i s w i l l i n g t o apply the c o l o n i a l paradigm t o Indian r i g h t s questions unless t o l d t o do otherwise by Congress. This blend has created a c o n t r a d i c t i o n - a sovereign a t sufference. In Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe(242) decided i n the same year the Supreme Court r u l e d t h a t t r i b a l c r i m i n a l law d i d not apply t o non-Indians even on a r e s e r v a t i o n . On the other hand i n N a t i o n a l Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe(243) the Court upheld the pre-emptive c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n of a T r i b a l Court and refused a non-Indian a p p e l l a n t access t o the f e d e r a l Courts f o r e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f a f t e r the t r i b a l Court had given judgment t o the respondent. A framework f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t r i b a l powers over non-Indians had been posed i n 1981 i n Montana v. U.S.(244) The Court suggested a t e s t i n which t r i b a l j u r i s d i c i t o n would apply where non-Indian a c t i o n threatened or had some d i r e c t e f f e c t on the p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r i t y , economic s e c u r i t y or h e a l t h and we l f a r e of the t r i b e . I f N a t i o n a l Farmers Union s a t i s f i e d such a t e s t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o understand why Oliphant i n respect of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y on the r e s e r v a t i o n , d i d not. 242. (1978) 435 U.S. 191. 243. (1985) 105 S.Ct. 2447. 244. (1981) 450 U.S. 544. 221 In Merrion v. J a c a r i l l a Apache Tribe245) the Supreme Court h e l d t h a t the t r i b e s had an inherent power t o impose a severence t a x on non-Indian mining a c t i v i t i e s on the r e s e r v a t i o n . The p l a n t i f f s p l e a of non-user of t h i s t a x i n g power was r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t by the Court. Sovereign power even when unexercised, i s an enduring presence t h a t governs a l l c o n t r a c t s s u b j e c t t o the sovereign's j u r i s d i c t i o n , and w i l l remain i n t a c t unless surrendered i n unmistakeable terms. In Kerr McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe(246) the question of Navajo a b i l i t y t o tax business a c t i v i t y on Navajo land arose. The Court adopted l i b e r a l canons of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n respect of Indian r i g h t s and the U.S. government c u r r e n t o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of Indian s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n h o l d i n g t h a t the Navajo had such a r i g h t . The Court emphasized the c l o s e c o r r e l a t i o n between self-government and s e l f - h e l p i n upholding the t a x i n g power. T r i b a l governments, according t o the Court, could "gain" independence from the f e d e r a l government only by f i n a n c i n g t h e i r own p o l i c e f o r c e , schools and s o c i a l programs.(247) The foregoing cases have coalesced i n t o something of a framework f o r t h i s d e f e a s i b l e Indian sovereignty or 245. (1982) 455 U.S. 130. 246. (1985) 471 U.S. 195. 247. I b i d , a t 201. 222 j u r i s d i c t i o n . On the i s s u e of Indian t i t l e two cases are worth r e f e r r i n g t o . In Mescalero Apache Indian T r i b e v. New Mexico(248) Judge McKay of the 10th C i r c u i t Court of Appeals seemed t o r e j e c t the n o t i o n of conquest - a t l e a s t as a b a s i s f o r denying Indian t i t l e . The s t a t e questions the e x i s t e n c e of any inherent t r i b a l powers i n t h i s case. I t argues the t r i b e c o u l d not have e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i n any t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y because i n e f f e c t there i s no t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y : "the Mescaleros were being swept from t h e i r lands by a t i d e of white s e t t l e r . " I f we were t o accept the s t a t e s argument, we would be e n s h r i n i n g the r a t h e r perverse n o t i o n t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l r i g h t s are not t o be p r o t e c t e d i n p r e c i s e l y those instances when p r o t e c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l , i e . when a dominant group has succeeded i n t e m p o r a r i l y f r u s t r a t i n g the e x e r c i s e of those r i g h t s . We p r e f e r a view more compatible w i t h t h i s n a t i o n ' s founding: r i g h t s do not cease t o e x i s t because a government f a i l s t o secure them. See The D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence (1776). In the County of Oneida v. Onedia Indian Nation(249) the Supreme Court showed g r a p h i c a l l y t h a t contact r u l e s r a t h e r than conquest r u l e s were beginning t o dominate modern law. At i s s u e was a 1795 agreement p u r p o r t i n g t o t r a n s f e r 100,000 acres i n t