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Testamentary freedom against provisions for families : the evolution of dependents' relief legislation,… Amighetti, Leopold 1988

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TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM AGAINST PROVISIONS FOR FAMILIES; THE EVOLUTION OF DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, AS A FLEXIBLE RESTRAINT ON TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM By LEOPOLD AMIGHETTI B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1957 LL.B., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1960 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAW i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (The F a c u l t y of Law) We accept t h i s .thesis as confirming to the required standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1988 © Leopold Amighetti, 1988. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of L a w  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date 1 2 t h O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 8 . ABSTRACT The concept of testamentary freedom has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been a s s o c i a t e d with the law of s u c c e s s i o n i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s with l e g a l regimes based on the common-law system. T h i s con-cept became s u b j e c t to abuse and dependents of deceased t e s t a -t o r s were sometimes l e f t to the mercy of the community f o r t h e i r support. New Zealand was the f i r s t j u r i s d i c t i o n to c o u n t e r a c t t h i s abuse by i n t r o d u c i n g i n i t s law, dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n which, e s s e n t i a l l y , a c t ed as a f l e x i b l e r e s t r a i n t on testamentary freedom. T h i s concept r e t a i n e d the t r a d i -t i o n a l testamentary freedom, y e t , the c o u r t s were gi v e n the a u t h o r i t y to remedy any abuses of such freedom. The Canadian common-law p r o v i n c e s through a p e r i o d of s i x t y - f o u r years have adopted l e g i s l a t i o n s i m i l a r to that enacted i n New Zealand. In Canada, the concept has worked, on the whole, w e l l . Many Canadian j u r i s d i c a t i o n s have, through the y e a r s , a d j u s t e d t h e i r o r i g i n a l l e g i s l a t i o n to meet what appears to be contemporary norms. - i i i -The p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o has undertaken e x t e n s i v e reform, and to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , has attempted to r e c o n c i l e the p r o v i s i o n s of s u c c e s s i o n law with that of matrimonial p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . The p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o appears to have achieved some degree of harmony between the two l e g a l con-cepts . The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia on the other hand, although the i s s u e has been the s u b j e c t of a study and a Report of the Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia, has r e t a i n e d the l e g i s l a t i o n as o r i g i n a l l y enacted i n 1920. The j u r i s p r u d e n c e has, however, i n t e r p r e t e d the s t a t u t e with such i n c o n s i s t e n c y that the s t a t u t e has gone beyond i t s remedial purpose and has been i n t e r p r e t e d as a form of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be supported by the wording of the s t a t u t e , nor by i t s h i s t o r i c a l i n t e n t . T h i s t h e s i s surveys the v a r i o u s enactments commencing with the one i n New Zealand, the p r o g e n i t o r s t a t u t e , and con-t i n u i n g with those of the Canadian p r o v i n c e s and f i n a l l y , the U.K. s t a t u t e . There i s a l s o a g e n e r a l comparison of contem-porary l e g i s l a t i o n s . The j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s analysed from the enactment of the l e g i s l a t i o n and the s h i f t s that the c o u r t s have undertaken over the past s i x t y - e i g h t years are c o n s i d e r e d . In a d d i t i o n to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e f e c t of the B.C. l e g i s l a t i o n , c e r t a i n t e c h n i c a l d e f i c i e n c i e s are a l s o c o n s i d e r e d . - i v -The present law of O n t a r i o , which has been the sub-j e c t of e x t e n s i v e reform, i s a n a l y s e d and compared with that P r o v i n c e ' s p r e v i o u s l e g i s l a t i o n as w e l l as that of the p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia. The e f f e c t of the present s t a t e of law i n t e r p r e t i n g the B r i t i s h Columbia l e g i s l a t i o n i s such that i t can be s a i d that as i t stands, i t has o u t l i v e d i t s s o c i a l u t i l i t y and r e q u i r e s review to meet contemporary s o c i a l norms. The g e n e r a l recommendation i s that dependency be a c o n d i t i o n p r e -cedent to an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e l i e f , and that the spouse be e n t i t l e d as of r i g h t , i n any event, to h a l f of the f a m i l y a s s e t s . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r t h i s t h e s i s c o n s i s t e d , prim-a r i l y , o f : a n a l y s i s of the l e g i s l a t i v e debates, a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t u t e s and the a p p l i c a b l e j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t e r p r e t i n g such s t a t u t e s . Supervisor Date - v -TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF CASES i x PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION IN NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND ENGLAND 1 CHAPTER 1. H i s t o r i c a l Background of Testamentary Freedom 2 2. New Zealand 10 3. B r i t i s h Columbia 22 4. The Other Canadian P r o v i n c e s and T e r r i t o r i e s 31 5. England 38 6. Contemporary Dependents' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n , an Overview 44 APPENDICES "A" Comparison of Contemporary Dependents' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada 49 S t a t u t e or Ordinance Persons E n t i t l e d to Apply "B" Comparison of Contemporary Dependents' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada 54 Status of the Deceased Th r e s h o l d Question and P r e s c r i b e d R e l i e f - v i -PAGE "C" Comparison of Contemporary Dependents' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada 58 L i m i t a t i o n P e r i o d P r o p e r t y Subject to Act PART I I : THE NATURE OF RELIEF UNDER THE BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT 62 CHAPTER 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 63 2. The P e r t i n e n t Clause of the Act and the E a r l y Cases 65 3. Walker v. McDermott 74 4. The Aftermath of Walker v. McDermott 82 A. Need as C o n d i t i o n Precedent 84 B. E q u i t a b l e D i s t r i b u t i o n Theory 87 C. P r i c e v. Lypchuk E s t a t e ..102 5. S u r v i v a l of Right of A c t i o n 109 6. G u i d e l i n e s f o r E q u i t a b l e D i s t r i b u t i o n 118 7. Ass e t s Subject to the Act and the Avoidance of I t s A p p l i c a t i o n 125 8. C o n c l u s i o n 137 - v i i -PAGE PART I I I : PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY UNDER THE BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT 145 CHAPTER 1. Wife and Husband 147 2. C h i l d r e n 153 3. P u b l i c T r u s t e e on Behalf of C h i l d r e n 159 4. Recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia 165 5. Persons Under D i s a b i l i t y and R e c e i v i n g Support from the State 169 A. New Zealand Cases 171 B. A u s t r a l i a n Cases 174 C. E n g l i s h Cases 177 D. Canadian Cases 180 E. Summary of B r i t i s h Columbia D e c i s i o n s 190 F. Nature of St a t e Support 191 G. Law Reform Commissions 198 (a) O n t a r i o 198 (b) The A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform 199 (c) B r i t i s h Columbia 200 - v i i i -PAGE PART IV: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSION LAW REFORM ACT OF ONTARIO; A CONTRAST OF IT WITH THE NOW REPEALED DEPENDANTS' RELIEF ACT OF ONTARIO AND THE PRESENT BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT 202 CHAPTER 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 203 2. A n a l y s i s of the Succession Law Reform Act of O n t a r i o and a Co n t r a s t with the Dependants' R e l i e f Act of O n t a r i o 205 3. C o n t r a s t Between the Succession Law Reform Act of O n t a r i o and the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act of B r i t i s h Columbia 218 4. The Family Law Act of O n t a r i o and C o n c l u s i o n 223 PART V: CONCLUSION 2 27 A. T e c h n i c a l D e f i c i e n c i e s 228 B. P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n c o n s i s t e n c y 231 C. Recommended R e s t r u c t u r e 237 BIBLIOGRAPHY 240 - i x -TABLE OF CASES PAGE Adams v. I r v i n e and Adams 148 A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e 66, 67, 68, 69, 81, 82 B a i l e y v. P u b l i c Trustee and Others 148 Banks v. Goodfellow 5, 6, 7, 8 Ba r c l a y E s t a t e , In re 195 Barker v. Westminster T r u s t Co 65, 74, 87, 88, 89 110, 111, 112, 113 114, 115, 116, 119, 120 Bates v. Bates and Froom 118, 121, 123 Bates v. Bates et a l 118 Berezowsky v. Berezowsky 135 Boughton and Marston v. Knight and Others 4 Bowe, Re 117, 228, 229 Brauer v. H i l t o n 94, 95, 116 Br i g h t e n v. Smith 70, 72 Brousseau E s t a t e , Re (1952) 182, 183, 184, 189, 190 , 191, 197, 198 Brosseau E s t a t e , Re (1975) 153, 154 Buchanan E s t a t e , Re 157 C a l l a d i n e E s t a t e , Re 115, 229 Co-op. T r u s t Co. of Can. v. A d m i n i s t r a t o r of E s t a t e s f o r Sask 208 C o l l i e r v. Yonkers et a l 133, 134 - x -PAGE Compton-Lundie E s t a t e , Re 157 C o r l e t v. I s l e of Man Bank L t d 127, 132 Cousins E s t a t e , In re 181, 183, 188, 189, 193 C u r t i s v. Adams 172, 173, 175, 181, 182 Dalton & MacDonald, Re 135 D a l z i e l v. Br a d f o r d 96 Dawson, Re 84, 85, 100 Deis, Re; Deis v. Deis 187, 188, 189 Deis, Re; S p i c e r v. Deis 187 Denton E s t a t e , In re 159, 160, 161 D i l l o n v. P u b l i c T r u s t e e of New Zealand 117 Dower v. P u b l i c Trustee et a l 125, 126, 127 130, 131, 132, 135 Downton v. Royal T r u s t Co. et a l 149, 150, 151 W.S. Duff, Re 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 191 Dun v. Dun 117 Dupaul, Re 121 Emele E s t a t e , Re 133 E s p l i n E s t a t e , In re 157, 158 Gaynor, deceased, In the W i l l of 212 G i l b e r t E s t a t e , Re 135 G r a n f i e l d v. W i l l i a m s 95, 96 Greenwood v. Greenwood 99 H a l l , Deceased, In re 69 Harding, Re 86 Hartman, Re; Mer n i c k l e v. Westaway 155, 208 Hawker et a l . v. Hawker E s t a t e 186, 187, 188, 189 - x i -PAGE H i r s c h , Re 230 H o l t , Re 90 Hornett, Re 85, 116 H u l l , Re 228 Janke, Re 92 Jones E s t a t e , Re (1959) (B.C.S.C.) 121 Jones, Re (1974) (O.H.C.) 151 Jones, Re (1934) (B.C.S.C.) 229 Jones, Re; Jones v. Fox et a l . (1961) (B.C.C.A.)..85, 86, 89 K a e t l e r v. K a e t l e r 232, 233, 235 Kensington (deceased), In re; Kensington and another v. Kensington and others 127 Kent et a l . v. McKay et a l 212 Kerby E s t a t e , Re ....110 Kerslake E s t a t e , In re; Kerslake v. Gray 126, 135 K i n l o c h E s t a t e , Re 192, 195, 196 Kuseta v. Kuseta 164 Lakha Singh E s t a t e , Re 154 Larsen E s t a t e , Re 230 Laur, Re 148 Lawther E s t a t e , In re 210 Lewis, Re 119, 137, 138, 212 L i v i n g s t o n , Deceased, In re 68, 69 Lukie , Re 91, 92, 93, 94, 97 Malat, In the Matter of Cynthia Jane and D i n n i s e Ann, In f a n t s 161, 162, 163 Marusyn v. P r i l l 99, 100 - X I i -PAGE Maxwell E s t a t e , Re 128, 129 McAdam, (Mrs.) Mary Ann, Re 156, 157 McCarthy, In re; P u b l i c Trustee v. P u b l i c T r u s t e e . . 171, 172 173 McCoy v. Paterson et a l 98 McDermott v. Walker 75, 76, 77, 78 McMaster, Re 110 McNamara, Re 212 Mernickle v. Westaway 155 Michalson, Re 90 M i l l a r , Re 194, 195 M i l l w a r d v. Shenton 178, 179 Mo r r i s v. M o r r i s 95, 97, 233 Naples v. M a r t i n E s t a t e and M a r t i n 156 N o v i k o f f , Re 229 Osland, Re 90, 117 O'Connell, Re 147 Page E s t a t e , Re 192, 193, 194 Parks E s t a t e , Re 74, 93, 94 Pa t t e r s o n v. L a u r i t s e n , Crowther, McKay and Lauritsen....100 P a t t i s o n ' s T r u s t e e s v. U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh 231 P a u l i n , In re 127, 134 Pennington v. Boucher 83, 84 Penty v. Mott et a l 188, 189, 190, 191, 197 Pfrimmer E s t a t e , Re 184, 188, 189 Plummer, Re; Minckle r v. Pinder 98, 99 P r i c e v. Lypchuk E s t a t e 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 - x i i i -PAGE P u b l i c T r u s t e e v. Buchholz 160, 162, 163 Quon, Re 148 R a d c l i f f e , Re 92 Richards v. Person et a l 122, 123 Richardson, deceased, In re 129, 130 Robins v. N a t i o n a l T r u s t Company, L i m i t e d 231 Sleno, Re 93, 94 S t i g i n g s , In re 70 St. C a t h a r i n e s General H o s p i t a l v. S v i e r g u l a 164 Swain v. Dennison 101 T a y l o r E s t a t e , Re 180, 190, 191, 197, 198 Thomson (deceased), Re; Thomson and another v. Thomson 129, 130, 133 Tornroos E s t a t e , Re 82 Tweney v. Tweney 148 Urquhart, Re 228, 229 Walker v. McDermott 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89 97, 102, 104, 117 Watkins (deceased), Re; Hayward v. C h a t t e r t o n and Others 177, 178, 180, 185, 186 192, 195 Wetzel v. N a t i o n a l T r u s t Company L t d 110 Whiting, In re 174, 175 W i l l a n , Re .121 W i l l i a m s , In re 174, 175 Young E s t a t e , Re 127, 135 Zajac v. Zwaryz 195 - 1 -PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION IN NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND ENGLAND - 2 -CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF  TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM Few l e g a l agencies are , i n f a c t , the f r u i t of more complex h i s t o r i c a l agencies than that by which a man's w r i t t e n i n t e n -t i o n s c o n t r o l the posthumous d i s p o s i t i o n of h i s goods.1 It i s f a r beyond the scope of t h i s paper to t r a c e the evo-l u t i o n of testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n s . S u f f i c i e n t f o r the p r e -sent purposes to s t a t e that the concept of posthumous d i s p o s i -t i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o two broad p o s i t i o n s . The f i r s t one p e r -mits the t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y on death at the a b s o l u t e d i s -c r e t i o n of the t e s t a t o r ; the other imposes o v e r r i d i n g p r o v i -s i o n s f o r c e r t a i n r e l a t i v e s . G e n e r a l l y , testamentary freedom i s a t t r i b u t e d to the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n and f o r c e d h e i r s h i p to other systems of j u r i s p r u d e n c e , more notably those systems based on Roman law. We are t o l d 2 however, that l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n was recog-nized i n a n c i e n t Roman law, but e l i m i n a t e d l a t e r as the Roman 1 S i r Henry Maine, Ancient Law, ( e d i t e d by E r n e s t Rhys 1917), at p. 103. 2 A. Nussbaum, " L i b e r t y of T e s t a t i o n " , (1937), 23 A.B.A.J. 183. - 3 -Empire developed a b a s i c d o c t r i n e of c i v i l law as to i n h e r i -tance. As a r e s u l t , c e r t a i n c l o s e r e l a t i v e s became "compul-sory" h e i r s and g e n e r a l l y a b s o l u t e l y e n t i t l e d to a p o r t i o n of the deceased's e s t a t e . T h i s a b s o l u t e i n t e r e s t i s c a l l e d " l e g i t i m e " . The r u l e as to " l e g i t i m e " has been adopted, with v a r i o u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , by n e a r l y a l l c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s . Arthur Nussbaum, i n h i s a r t i c l e " L i b e r t y of T e s t a t i o n " , observed t h a t : The p e c u l i a r i t y of the e a r l y Roman and the Anglo-Saxon law has aroused the i n t e r e s t of s o c i o l o g i s t s . Says Max Weber, (1864-1920) the most important German s o c i o l o g i s t , i n h i s posthumous 'Sozialoeconomik' [ S o c i a l Economy] p u b l i s h e d i n 1921: 'Complete, or n e a r l y complete, l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n i s only r e -corded twice: as to Republican Rome and as to E n g l i s h Law; i n both cases f o r expanding n a t i o n s r u l e d by a landed gentry. Today the most important t e r r i t o r y r e c o g n i z i n g l i b e r t y of. t e s t a t i o n , i s the t e r r i t o r y of g r e a t e s t economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s : the United S t a t e s . In Rome, l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n grew up under a b e l -l i c o s e expansion p o l i c y which promised a l i v i n g on conquered land f o r the d i s i n h e r i t e d ; i t vanished through the l e g i t i m e r u l e borrowed from Greek law when Rome's c o l o n i a l p e r i o d was coming to an end. In E n g l i s h law l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n aimed at maintenance of f o r t u n e s w i t h i n the great f a m i l i e s , a goal which can be reached a l s o by measures of a l e g a l l y oppo-s i t e , e.g., f e u d a l , nature.'4 3 I b i d . 4 I b i d . , at pp. 183 and 184. I t c o u l d be argued that the r e f e r e n c e to such l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n i n E n g l i s h law i s not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s i s t e n t with the concept of m a i n t a i n i n g f o r t u n e s w i t h i n the great f a m i l i e s . L i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n could have p e r m i t t e d the deceased to d e s t r o y the i n t e g r i t y of the f a m i l y f o r t u n e by d i v i d i n g i t amongst many. However, what the author probably meant was that without f o r c e d h e i r s h i p , which would out of n e c e s s i t y cause a d i v i s i o n of the f o r t u n e , the t e s t a t o r c o u l d pass the e n t i r e f o r t u n e to an i n d i v i d u a l without having to sever i t . - 4 -Complete freedom of testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n i s a char-a c t e r i s t i c a t t r i b u t a b l e to the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n . T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c has been recognized by standard books of r e f e r -ence^ and by the averments of the j u d i c i a r y . I t i s not necessary to go beyond the a s s e r t i o n s of recog-n i z e d l e g a l h i s t o r i a n s , and other w r i t e r s , to demonstrate that the s o - c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l freedom of t e s t a t i o n i n England was a r e l a t i v e l y recent phenomenon and of e q u a l l y r e l a t i v e s h o r t d u r a t i o n . So f a r as p e r s o n a l t y i s concerned complete t e s t a -mentary freedom e x i s t e d from 1724 u n t i l the p a s s i n g of the I n h e r i t a n c e (Family P r o v i s i o n ) Act 1938. As to r e a l t y there was complete testamentary freedom from the date of the p a s s i n g of the Act f o r the A b o l i t i o n of M i l i t a r y Tenures 1660, again u n t i l the I n h e r i t a n c e (Family P r o v i s i o n ) Act 1938. 6 At the prime of testamentary freedom, v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i e s i n i t s support were advanced. S i r Henry J . Hannen^ made the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n : 5 Theobald, W i l l s , (13th ed. 1971) at pp. 6 and 114. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth ed. V. 17. at p. 673. 6 A. R. Mellows, The Law of Succession (3rd ed. Butterworth, London, 1977) at p. 237. (A b r i e f and understandable h i s t o r i c a l background i s found i n Mellows at page 237.) I t should be noted that testamentary freedom d i d c o - e x i s t with the r i g h t s of dower and c u r t e s y which i n England were a b o l i s h e d only by the enactment of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of  E s t a t e s A c t , 1925 15 Geo. V. c.23. 7 Boughton and Marston v. Knight and Others, (1873), L.R. 3 P. & D. 64. - 5 -A c c o r d i n g l y , by the law of England every one i s l e f t f r e e to choose the person upon whom he w i l l bestow h i s p r o p e r t y a f t e r death e n t i r e l y u n f e t t e r e d i n the s e l e c t i o n he may think proper to make. He may d i s -i n h e r i t , e i t h e r wholly or p a r t i a l l y , h i s c h i l d r e n , and leave h i s p r o p e r t y to s t r a n g e r s to g r a t i f y h i s s p i t e , or to c h a r i t i e s to g r a t i f y h i s p r i d e , and we must g i v e e f f e c t to h i s w i l l , however much we may condemn the course he has pursued. In t h i s r e s p e c t the law of England d i f f e r s from that of other coun-t r i e s . I t i s thought b e t t e r to r i s k the chance of an abuse of the power a r i s i n g from such l i b e r t y than to d e p r i v e men of the r i g h t to make such a s e l e c t i o n as t h e i r knowledge of the c h a r a c t e r s , of the past h i s -t o r y , and f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s of t h e i r c h i l d r e n or other r e l a t i v e s may demand.8 The reason f o r the p h i l o s o p h y of testamentary freedom may very w e l l have been that advanced by S i r Henry J . Hannen,^ that the t e s t a t o r was b e t t e r able to judge h i s testamentary o b l i g a t i o n s than the State through some r i g i d predetermined scheme of s u c c e s s i o n . The concept of testamentary freedom may a l s o be j u s t i f i e d by the t h e s i s advanced by Cockburn C.J. i n Banks v. G o o d f e l l o w 1 0 i n favour of such freedom: F r i e n d s h i p and t r i e d attachment, or f a i t h f u l s e r v i c e , may have claims that ought not to be d i s r e g a r d e d . In the power of rewarding d u t i f u l and m e r i t o r i o u s con-duct, p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y f i n d s a u s e f u l a u x i l i a r y ; age secures the r e s p e c t and a t t e n t i o n s which are one of i t s c h i e f c o n s o l a t i o n s . As was t r u l y s a i d by C h a n c e l l o r Kent, i n Van A l s t v. Hunter(1), [5 Johnson N.Y. Ch. Rep. at p.159.] 'It i s one of the p a i n f u l consequences of extreme o l d age that i t ceases to 8 9 10 I b i d . , at p. 66. I b i d . , at p. 66. (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549. - 6 -e x c i t e i n t e r e s t , and i s apt to be l e f t s o l i t a r y and n e g l e c t e d . The c o n t r o l which the law s t i l l g i v e s to a man over the d i s p o s a l of h i s p r o p e r t y i s one of the most e f f i c i e n t means which he has i n p r o t r a c t e d l i f e to command the a t t e n t i o n s due to h i s i n f i r m i t i e s . ' For these reasons the power of d i s p o s i n g of p r o p e r t y i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of death has ever been regarded as one of the most v a l u a b l e of the r i g h t s i n c i d e n t a l to p r o p e r t y . . . 11 Regardless of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory s u p p o r t i n g t e s t a -mentary freedom, the b e l i e f that the concept was an i n h e r e n t p a r t of the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n i s not c o r r e c t . To quote Anthony R. Mellows: In much the same s p i r i t as people r e f e r , q u i t e i n -a c c u r a t e l y , to an Englishman's home being h i s c a s t l e , people a l s o seem convinced that a person has an i n -a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to l e a v e h i s p r o p e r t y to whomsoever he wishes. Both n o t i o n s were d e r i v e d from the n i n e -teenth century, but are commonly thought to represent immutable p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h law. In n e i t h e r case i s t h i s so.12 The concept of testamentary freedom d i d e x i s t i n England f o r a p e r i o d of approximately two hundred y e a r s . The e x i s -tence of such freedom however, c o u l d be supported o n l y a g a i n s t a background i d e n t i f i e d by Cockburn C.J. i n Banks v. G o o d f e l l o w . 1 3 Although Banks v. Goodfellow was e s s e n t i a l l y the f i r s t case d e a l i n g with testamentary c a p a c i t y , i n h i s quest to 11 I b i d . , at p. 564. 12 Op. c i t . , f ootnote 6 at p. 235. 13 Supra, f o o t n o t e 10. - 7 -r a t i o n a l i z e the requirements f o r c a p a c i t y , Cockburn C.J. e x p l a i n e d the nature of the r i g h t to d i s p o s e , i n whole or i n p a r t , of a person's a s s e t s by W i l l . A f t e r examining, b r i e f l y , the E n g l i s h concept a g a i n s t the c o n t i n e n t a l one, he concluded t h a t : The law of every country has t h e r e f o r e conceded to the owner of p r o p e r t y the r i g h t of d i s p o s i n g by w i l l e i t h e r of the whole, o r , at a l l events, of a p o r t i o n , of t h a t which he possesses. The Roman law, and that of the C o n t i n e n t a l n a t i o n s which have f o l l o w e d i t , have secured to the r e l a t i o n s of a deceased person i n the ascending and descending l i n e a f i x e d p o r t i o n of the i n h e r i t a n c e . The E n g l i s h law lea v e s e v e r y t h i n g to the u n f e t t e r e d d i s c r e t i o n of the t e s t a t o r , on the assumption t h a t , though i n some i n s t a n c e s , c a p r i c e , or p a s s i o n , or the power of new t i e s , or a r t f u l con-t r i v a n c e , or s i n i s t e r i n f l u e n c e , may l e a d to the ne-g l e c t of claims that ought to be attended t o , y e t , the i n s t i n c t s , a f f e c t i o n s , and common sentiments of mankind may be s a f e l y t r u s t e d to secure, on the whole, a b e t t e r d i s p o s i t i o n of the p r o p e r t y of the dead, and one more a c c u r a t e l y a d j u s t e d to the r e -quirements of each p a r t i c u l a r case, than c o u l d be obtained through a d i s t r i b u t i o n p r e s c r i b e d by the ste r e o t y p e d and i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s of a g e n e r a l law.14 A c l e a r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of testamentary freedom i s found i n Cockburn C.J.'s continued a n a l y s i s of the n o t i o n of the power of t e s t a t i o n : [ I ] t i s c l e a r t h a t , though the law lea v e s to the owner of p r o p e r t y a b s o l u t e freedom i n t h i s u l t i m a t e d i s p o s a l of that of which he i s thus enabled to d i s -pose, a moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of no o r d i n a r y impor-tance a t t a c h e s to the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t thus g i v e n . The i n s t i n c t s and a f f e c t i o n s of mankind, i n the vast m a j o r i t y of i n s t a n c e s , w i l l l e a d men to make p r o v i s i o n f o r those who are the nearest to them i n kindre d and who i n l i f e have been the o b j e c t s of 14 I b i d . , at p. 564. - 8 -t h e i r a f f e c t i o n . Independently of any law, a man on the p o i n t of l e a v i n g the world would n a t u r a l l y d i s -t r i b u t e among h i s c h i l d r e n or nearest r e l a t i v e s the p r o p e r t y which he possessed.... Hence a r i s e s a reasonable and w e l l warranted e x p e c t a t i o n on the p a r t of a man's kindr e d s u r v i v i n g him, that on h i s death h i s e f f e c t s s h a l l become t h e i r s , i n s t e a d of being g i v e n to s t r a n g e r s . To d i s a p p o i n t the e x p e c t a t i o n thus c r e a t e d and to d i s r e g a r d the c l a i m s of k i n d r e d to the i n h e r i t a n c e i s to shock the common sentiments of mankind, and to v i o l a t e what a l l men concur i n deeming an o b l i g a t i o n of the moral law. I t cannot be supposed t h a t , i n g i v i n g the power of testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n , the law has been framed i n d i s r e g a r d of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . On the c o n t r a r y , had they stood alone, i t i s probable that the power of t e s t a -mentary d i s p o s i t i o n would have been w i t h h e l d , and that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y a f t e r the owner's death would have been u n i f o r m l y r e g u l a t e d by the law i t s e l f . 1 5 Testamentary freedom c o u l d o n l y be supported i f t e s t a t o r s c o u l d a c t r e s p o n s i b l y towards those persons to whom they owe e i t h e r a l e g a l or moral o b l i g a t i o n . I t has been s a i d that " l i b e r t y of t e s t a t i o n . . . f a v o r s the maintenance of a r i s t o c r a c y . . . " 1 6 I t has a l s o been observed that i n England the e f f e c t of the d o c t r i n e was c o n s i d e r a b l y r e s t r i c t e d by customary marriage s e t t l e m e n t s . 1 ^ The obser-v a t i o n s of Cockburn C.J. i n Banks v. G o o d f e l l o w 1 ^ produce the c o n c l u s i o n that testamentary freedom can e x i s t o n l y a g a i n s t a background of a w e l l - d e f i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a person's "kindred". I t i s u n l i k e l y that any one of the reasons were by 15 I b i d . , at p. 563. 16 Op. c i t . , f o o t n o t e 2 at p. 184. 17 I b i d . , at p. 184. 18 Supra, footnote 10. - 9 -themselves s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n testamentary freedom i n E n g l i s h law. Testamentary freedom i n England e x i s t e d at a time when there were some w e l l - d e f i n e d norms of conduct i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the " k i n d r e d " of a p r o p e r t y owner. These norms i n c l u d e d such concepts as the making of marriage and other s e t t l e m e n t s which would assure maintenance of those to whom the t e s t a t o r owed a duty. In a d d i t i o n , i t a l l e x i s t e d at a time when most of the wealth was represented by r e a l t y which had been passed from f a m i l y to f a m i l y through the g e n e r a t i o n s and t e s t a t o r s probably d i d not c o n s i d e r such r e a l t y as anything e l s e other than f a m i l y p r o p e r t y . However, the dynamics which s u s t a i n e d the system i n England were absent i n other p a r t s of the world where the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n had been adopted. - 10 -CHAPTER 2.  NEW ZEALAND Testamentary freedom became a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n and i t s s u r v i v a l depended, i n a l a r g e measure, on a w e l l - d e f i n e d s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e with recog-n i z e d o b l i g a t i o n s and b u i l t - i n p r o t e c t i o n s a g a i n s t the pos-s i b i l i t y of a deceased's "kindred" being l e f t at the mercy of the S t a t e f o r t h e i r support. The inadequacy of the concept was f i r s t documented i n New Zealand. During the second reading debates of the T e s t a t o r ' s Family  Maintenance B i l l , a f t e r approving the b i l l "because i t d e a l s a blow - and I hope a f i n i s h i n g blow - at the mischievous power of the dead hand", the Honourable Mr. S c o t l a n d made the f o l -lowing o b s e r v a t i o n : There i s no doubt, i n a new country e s p e c i a l l y , men who become suddenly r i c h - nothing to-day and every-t h i n g to-morrow - are too apt to become unduly i n -f l a t e d with t h e i r own importance. They say to them-s e l v e s , 'We have made the money, and we have a r i g h t to do what we p l e a s e with i t , and no one has a r i g h t to say nay.'.19 His o b s e r v a t i o n c a s t s a l i g h t upon the s o c i a l background i n which the b i l l was being debated. 19 113 N. Z. P a r l i a m e n t a r y Debates, (1900), at p. 617. - 11 -A w e l l - d e f i n e d , or re c o g n i z e d , s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e l i k e l y d i d not e x i s t i n new j u r i s d i c t i o n s s u b j e c t to the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n . The reason f o r t h i s l a c k of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e can only be s u b j e c t to s p e c u l a t i o n , but was l i k e l y due to the pioneer nature of such j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and the f a c t that they d i d not have the time to evolve a t r a d i t i o n such as e x i s t e d i n E n g l a n d . 2 0 New Zealand was the f i r s t common-law j u r i s d i c t i o n i n modern times which brought i n t o q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of the concept of testamentary freedom. The New Zealand P a r l i a -mentary Debates of 1895 d i s c l o s e the genesis of the process which c h a l l e n g e d such freedom. The i s s u e was r a i s e d by way of a q u e s t i o n from a Mr. J . W. K e l l y to the then M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e . The f o l l o w i n g i s the e n t i r e e x t r a c t of the debate at that p o i n t : Mr. J . W. KELLY asked the M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e , I f [ s i c ] he w i l l d u r i n g the present s e s s i o n i n t r o d u c e a B i l l to a l t e r the law r e l a t i n g to the s u c c e s s i o n of pr o p e r t y , so as to pr o v i d e that no widow s h a l l be l e f t e n t i r e l y d e s t i t u t e , but s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to some p o r t i o n , say o n e - t h i r d , of the p r o p e r t y of her deceased husband. I f not, w i l l the M i n i s t e r a f f o r d every f a c i l i t y f o r a p r i v a t e member to do so? He had been induced to put t h i s q u e s t i o n on the Order Paper through a case which had been brought under h i s 20 O. K. McMurray, " L i b e r t y of T e s t a t i o n and Some Modern T e s t a t i o n s Thereon", (1919), 14 111. L. Rev. 96. Pr o f e s s o r McMurray s t a t e s at pages 116 and 117 " S o c i a l o p i n i o n has u s u a l l y prevented t e s t a t o r s from employing a too a r b i t r a r y e x e r c i s e of t h e i r power." - 12 -n o t i c e l a t e l y . I t was a case that arose i n I n v e r c a r g i l l , and i n i t very great h a r d s h i p had been done to the widow and other members of the f a m i l y , as the widow had been l e f t d e s t i t u t e under the w i l l of the deceased husband. Mr. REEVES s a i d i t had, he b e l i e v e d , always been a p r i n c i p l e of the E n g l i s h law that a man should have almost u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t to d e v i s e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y by w i l l , and, f o r a long time pas t , r e a l p r o p e r t y too. In f a c t , i t had been the boast of modern l e g i s -l a t i o n t h a t i t had given more complete freedom i n t h i s r e s p e c t than had been possessed p r e v i o u s l y . I t was q u i t e true that i n c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , l i k e France, where the law was based upon the o l d Roman law, a f a t h e r had not the r i g h t to d e p r i v e h i s widow and orphans of a l l the p r o p e r t y ; and, speaking f o r h i m s e l f p e r s o n a l l y , he thought that was a very j u s t and proper p r o v i s i o n . At the same time, i t would be a change i n our law of such vast importance that i t would have to be very c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d before i t was even suggested i n Cabinet. He was s o r r y that on the s h o r t n o t i c e he had r e c e i v e d on the matter he c o u l d not promise the honourable gentleman that i t should be c o n s i d e r e d as he desired.21 In the f o l l o w i n g year, 1896, S i r Robert Stout i n t r o d u c e d i n the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s the L i m i t a t i o n of D i s p o s i t i o n  by W i l l B i l l . 2 2 The proposed b i l l , g e n e r a l l y , adopted the c i v i l law concept of l i m i t i n g the d i s p o s a b l e p o r t i o n i n a suc-c e s s i o n . The recommendation was to permit a man to d i s p o s e , by h i s w i l l , of o n l y one t h i r d of h i s e s t a t e i f he was s u r -v i v e d by a wife and c h i l d r e n , and one h a l f when he was s u r -v i v e d by o n l y a wife or c h i l d . The concept of p r o t e c t i n g the widow and the c h i l d r e n r e -c e i v e d e n t h u s i a s t i c support, yet the idea of i n t e r f e r i n g with 21 87 N.Z. P a r l i a m e n t a r y Debates, (1895), at p. 587. 22 92 I b i d . , (1896), at pp. 386 and 585. a man's a b s o l u t e r i g h t of ownership, (which some co n s i d e r e d to be an immutable p r i n c i p l e of the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n ) , was repugnant to the House and the b i l l was discharged. 2-^ The u n a r t i c u l a t e d r a t i o n a l e f o r opposing the b i l l was that the t e s t a t o r would always know best how to leave h i s e s t a t e , and to impose some i n f l e x i b l e r u l e might do i n j u s t i c e . The f o l l o w i n g comments 2 4 are i l l u s t r a t i v e of the a t t i t u d e of those members who opposed the b i l l : Suppose a man had a l i b e r t i n e of a son, that son would on l y have to l i e about and l o a f u n t i l h i s f a t h e r d i e d , knowing that he was sure to get a t h i r d of h i s f a t h e r ' s p r o p e r t y . In the near f u t u r e they would f i n d t h a t men who had any p r o p e r t y at a l l would be ex c e e d i n g l y d i f f i -dent about marrying. The chances are t h a t , i f she [the wife] got the bulk, some money-hunting scoundrel would marry her and spend the c o i n , l e a v i n g her p e n n i l e s s . S i r Robert Stout was not discouraged by the defeat of h i s b i l l and i n 1897 in t r o d u c e d the L i m i t a t i o n of The Powers of  D i s p o s i t i o n by W i l l B i l l . 2 5 The b i l l i n c r e a s e d the f r a c t i o n the t e s t a t o r c o u l d dispose by W i l l to one h a l f . The widow was to r e c e i v e a f o u r t h , and the c h i l d r e n a l i k e amount. T h i s attempt was e q u a l l y as u n s u c c e s s f u l as the f i r s t . 23 96 I b i d . , (1896), at p. 32. 24 92 I b i d . , (1896), at pp. 586 and 587. 25 98 I b i d . , (1897), at p. 546. A m o d i f i e d measure was i n t r o d u c e d to the House i n the f o l -lowing year, 1898, under the name T e s t a t o r ' s Family P r o v i s i o n  out of E s t a t e B i l l . 2 6 T h i s b i l l c o n t a i n e d no f i x e d p o r t i o n of any k i n d , thereby r e t a i n i n g the concept of testamentary f r e e -dom and yet gave the cou r t the power, at i t s d i s c r e t i o n , to make p r o v i s i o n s out of the e s t a t e f o r the t e s t a t o r ' s f a m i l y . In essence, i t gave the cou r t the a b i l i t y to superimpose on the t e s t a t o r ' s W i l l a l l the s o c i a l norms which had h e r e t o f o r e moderated testamentary freedom i n England. The b i l l was i n t r o d u c e d by Mr. McNab who reviewed gener-a l l y the House's o b j e c t i o n s to The L i m i t a t i o n of the Powers of  D i s p o s i t i o n by W i l l B i l l which had been i n t r o d u c e d i n the p r e -v i o u s s e s s i o n . The o b j e c t i o n was e s s e n t i a l l y , that a f i x e d type of d i s t r i b u t i o n might work a very great h a r d s h i p i n c i r -cumstances when a wife had l e f t her husband or when the c h i l -dren were w e a l t h i e r than the t e s t a t o r h i m s e l f , and the t e s -t a t o r was compelled to leave a f i x e d p o r t i o n to them. Mr. McNab a l s o emphasized the f a c t that a l l members were aware of men who had d i e d l e a v i n g l a r g e wealth to o t h e r s l e a v -ing t h e i r f a m i l i e s i n p o s i t i o n s of comparative d e s t i t u t i o n , and although he had no o b j e c t i o n to any person l e a v i n g l a r g e amounts to some o u t s i d e i n s t i t u t i o n , they should be generous i n t h e i r W i l l to o t h e r s , but onl y a f t e r they had been j u s t to those near themselves. 26 101 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 563, 102 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 418. - 15 -Mr. McNab concluded that the b i l l he was i n t r o d u c i n g had met a l l of the o b j e c t i o n s of the House to the p r e v i o u s b i l l s , by not p l a c i n g any l i m i t on the power of d i s p o s i t i o n by W i l l , but p r o v i d i n g that e i t h e r a wife or husband or any c h i l d who claimed to have been l e f t i n a p o s i t i o n of comparative d e s t i -t u t i o n having regard to t h e i r s t a t i o n i n l i f e , c o u l d ask f o r r e l i e f by making an a p p l i c a t i o n to a judge of the Supreme Court. He c h a r a c t e r i z e d the e f f e c t of the b i l l as one where the c o u r t , having s a t i s f i e d i t s e l f of the m e r i t s of the a p p l i -c a t i o n , would make an order to secure a c e r t a i n p o r t i o n of the p r o p e r t y to p r o v i d e f o r the a p p l i c a n t . The members of the House g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d that t h e r e were many cases where great wrongs had been done through W i l l s which d i d not p r o v i d e f o r wives or c h i l d r e n , l e a v i n g them to the mercy of the s t a t e or c h a r i t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r e -f o r e a measure of t h i s nature was e s s e n t i a l . Members f u r t h e r recognized that there e x i s t e d : [A] most f l a g r a n t anomaly that a man, the head of a f a m i l y , should be compelled to p r o v i d e f o r h i s w i f e and f a m i l y while he was a l i v e , but dying and l e a v i n g p l e n t y of p r o p e r t y behind him i t was l e f t to h i m s e l f to determine whether that p r o v i s i o n should be con-tinued? D i r e c t l y he d i e d h i s wife and f a m i l y were c a s t upon c h a r i t y , and thus became a burden upon s o c i e t y . There was no doubt i t was an abuse that should no longer be t o l e r a t e d . 2 7 27 102 I b i d . , (1898), at pp. 422 and 423. - 16 -They a l s o r e c o g n i z e d that " [ t ] h e f a m i l y had a r i g h t to be pro-t e c t e d " . 2 8 Some members, although endorsing the b i l l , f e l t t h a t i t d i d not go f a r enough as they would have p r e f e r r e d to see a f i x e d p o r t i o n a l l o c a t e d to f a m i l y members. Others f e l t that the b i l l was q u i t e wrong as, i n t h e i r view, " [ n j o t h i n g c o u l d be a g r e a t e r wrong than to s p o i l our young people by l e a v i n g them money to squander." 2^ By way of response i t was brought to t h e i r a t t e n t i o n that the " B i l l d i d not in t e n d to go any f u r t h e r than to compel that the widow and c h i l d r e n should be m a i n t a i n e d . " 3 0 One member, Mr. R. McKenzie, was extreme i n h i s c r i t i -cism. He c h a r a c t e r i z e d the b i l l as "a lawyer's B i l l , i n t r o -duced by a l a w y e r . " 3 1 I t simply made food f o r lawyers, and a f f o r d e d oppor-t u n i t i e s f o r lawyers to go and c o n t e s t w i l l s . T h i s B i l l ought to be c a l l e d a Lawyers' Employment B i l l . I t was not a. B i l l i n the i n t e r e s t s of the community at a l l . I t was a B i l l to rob the community - to rob widows and orphans - and he hoped the House would never permit a v i c i o u s B i l l l i k e t h i s to pass to the statute-book.32 28 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 423. 29 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 424. 30 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 425. 31 I b i d . , (1898), at pp. 424 and 425 32 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 425. - 17 -He concluded with the hope t h a t : [ T j h i s House would never go and d i s g r a c e the s t a t u t e -book with a measure of the kind now before them.33 The b i l l d i d r e c e i v e second reading and was sent to com-m i t t e e . I t d i d not, however, go to t h i r d reading and i t was d i s c h a r g e d on October 12th, 1 8 9 9 . 3 4 The b i l l was r e i n t r o d u c e d i n 1900 as the T e s t a t o r ' s Family 3 S Maintenance B i l l . 3 The u n d e r l y i n g theme of the House debate was that the b i l l was a "humanising and C h r i s t i a n i s i n g mea-s u r e " . 3 6 The House recognized that " [ t ] h e present law was o b v i o u s l y u n j u s t , and undoubtedly c a l l e d f o r an a l t e r a t i o n . " 3 ^ [ I ] t was an improper t h i n g that any law should a l l o w a man, i n l e a v i n g an e s t a t e , to n e g l e c t to p r o v i d e f o r h i s wife and c h i l d r e n a f t e r h i s death.38 One of the members, Mr. A. L. D. F r a s e r , expressed a s t o n -ishment that such a b i l l had not been p r e v i o u s l y brought down by the government and viewed the b i l l not only as humanitarian but 33 I b i d . , (1898), at p. 425. 34 110 I b i d . , (1899), at p. 503. 35 111 I b i d . , (1900), at pp. 128 and 503. 36 111 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 504. 37 111 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 505. 38 111 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 504. - 18 -[ R ] e a l l y a loud c r y f o r j u s t i c e from wives and c h i l -dren of deceased persons who had been very wrongly treated.39 Mr. McNab, i n moving the b i l l f o r second r e a d i n g , made i t c l e a r that i t was not the i n t e n t of the b i l l to take away from any person any r i g h t to d i s p o s e of any p a r t of h i s p r o p e r t y by W i l l . Rather i t was intended to " s u p e r v i s e " such d i s p o s i t i o n by posing the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n : [ B ] e f o r e you dispose of your p r o p e r t y , f i r s t c a r r y out your o b l i g a t i o n s ; f i r s t see that you do not leave any person d e s t i t u t e ; f i r s t see that any person who i s at present dependent on you f o r h i s or her support and maintenance i s not l e f t on the St a t e f o r support.40 Mr. McNab i d e n t i f i e d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n to be de-c i d e d as f o l l o w s "[w]as the State to be l i a b l e f o r the support of the wife and c h i l d r e n or was the e s t a t e to be l i a b l e ? " . 4 1 His unequivocal answer was that the e s t a t e of the person should be l i a b l e f o r such support. Thus, i n an ou t c r y of j u s t i c e and f a i r n e s s the b i l l r e -c e i v e d second reading. 39 40 41 111 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 506. I l l I b i d . , (1900), at p. 504. I l l I b i d . , (1900), at p. 504. - 19 -The b i l l was debated i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l 4 2 and i n i t s debates C o u n c i l enunciated the p r i n c i p l e behind the b i l l as f o l l o w s : [T]he p r i n c i p l e of the B i l l i s twofold: F i r s t of a l l , t h a t the t e s t a t o r s h a l l do j u s t i c e to those dependent upon him - h i s nearest r e l a t i v e s , wife and c h i l d r e n -and a l s o that those persons s h a l l not, through the t e s t a t o r l e a v i n g h i s p r o p e r t y away from them, be l e f t perhaps a burden upon the State.43 One member, The Honourable S i r G. S. Whitmore, o b j e c t e d to the b i l l because i t went "too f a r a l t o g e t h e r i n i n t e r f e r i n g with the r i g h t s of p r o p e r t y , and i n the f a c t that i t i s a p r e -mium upon the d i s o b e d i e n t c h i l d . " 4 4 Other members, although endorsing the b i l l , expressed con-cern to the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n : [Tjhere should be some d i s t i n c t guidance g i v e n to the Court as to what percentage of the e s t a t e should be a l l o c a t e d to the wife or c h i l d r e n . As the case stands now, one Court w i l l take one view and another Court probably another view, and there w i l l be no sys t e m a t i c d e a l i n g with the matter.45 New Zealand thus enacted on the 9th day of October, 1900 The T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance A c t, 1900. 4 6 The ch a r g i n g 42 113 I b i d . , (1900), at pp. 613 to 619. 43 113 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 614. 44 113 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 615. 45 113 I b i d . , (1900), at p. 617. 46 N.Z. S t a t . , 1900, No. 20. - 20 -c l a u s e of the Act read as f o l l o w s : 2. Should any person d i e , l e a v i n g a w i l l , and w i t h -out making t h e r e i n adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s or her w i f e , husband, or c h i l d r e n , the Court may at i t s d i s c r e t i o n , on a p p l i c a t i o n by or on behalf of the s a i d w i f e , hus-band, or c h i l d r e n , order that such p r o v i s i o n as to the s a i d Court s h a l l seem f i t s h a l l be made out of the e s t a t e of the s a i d deceased person f o r such w i f e , husband, or c h i l d r e n : Provided that the Court may a t t a c h such c o n d i t i o n s to the order made as i t s h a l l t hink f i t , or may refuse to make an order i n favour of any person whose c h a r a c t e r or conduct i s such as i n the o p i n i o n of the Court to d i s e n t i t l e him or her to the b e n e f i t of an order under t h i s s e c t i o n . 'Court' means the Supreme Court or any Judge t h e r e o f , and, i n the case of deceased Maoris, the Native Land Court.47 By such enactment New Zealand moderated the t r a d i t i o n a l E n g l i s h testamentary freedom by making t e s t a t i o n s , when there are spouses or c h i l d r e n , s u b j e c t to court d i s c r e t i o n . The p r o v i s i o n s have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " f l e x i b l e r e s t r a i n t s on A Q testamentary freedom"^ 0 and considered as "an independent c r e -a t i o n of New Zealand's l e g i s l a t i v e g e n i u s " . 4 ^ 47 I b i d . , s. 2. 48 J . L a u f e r , " F l e x i b l e R e s t r a i n t s on Testamentary Freedom -a Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance L e g i s l a t i o n " , (1955), 69 Harv. L. Rev. 277 at p. 282. 49 I b i d . , at p. 282. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that New Zealand a l r e a d y had a s i m i l a r s t a t u t e , l i m i t e d however to deceased Maoris. Refer to the comments of the Honourable C o l o n e l P i t t i n 113 N.Z.  P a r l i a m e n t a r y Debates, (1900), at p. 614, where he s t a t e s : "I am q u i t e c e r t a i n there can be no g r e a t o b j e c t i o n to the B i l l , because the p r i n c i p l e of the measure has a l r e a d y been recognised by law and r e c o g n i s e d by the New Zealand Parliament, and e s t a b l i s h e d as law i n r e f e r e n c e to the Native race. Under 'The N a t i v e Land Court Act, 1894' s e c t i o n 46, i t i s p r o v i d e d , -By the c r e a t i o n of the Act New Zealand appeared to have found a system s u f f i c i e n t l y e l a s t i c to enable a t e s t a t o r to d i s i n h e r i t h i s undeserving f a m i l y , while yet p r e v e n t i n g an unjust f a t h e r or an u n f a i t h f u l husband from l e a v i n g h i s depen-dents p e n n i l e s s . 'On every a p p l i c a t i o n f o r the appointment of a successor where the deceased has l e f t a w i l l , and on every a p p l i c a t i o n f o r probate or l e t t e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n with w i l l annexed, the Court s h a l l i n q u i r e i f the t e s t a t o r has devised land to a person other than h i s successor; and, i f the t e s t a t o r has so d e v i s e d land, the Court, i f i t s h a l l f u r t h e r appear on i n q u i r y that such successor has not, without the lan d so d e v i s e d , s u f f i c i e n t land f o r h i s support, s h a l l award to such successor a p a r t , o r , i f necessary f o r h i s support, but not otherwise, the whole of the land so devised; and the probate or l e t t e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h a l l be e x p r e s s l y l i m i t e d to the e s t a t e and e f f e c t s of the deceased other than the land so awarded to the s u c c e s s o r . ' " - 22 -CHAPTER 3.  BRITISH COLUMBIA The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia (the second p r o v i n c e i n Canada to adopt such l e g i s l a t i o n ) found i t s e l f i n s i m i l a r s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s as New Zealand and chose to adopt the New Zealand s o l u t i o n to the abuses of testamentary freedom found i n the P r o v i n c e . The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia enacted the T e s t a t o r ' s  Family Maintenance Act on A p r i l 17th, 1920.^0 The ch a r g i n g s e c t i o n i s S e c t i o n 3 which reads as f o l l o w s : Notwithstanding the p r o v i s i o n s of any law or S t a t u t e to the c o n t r a r y , i f any person ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d the " t e s t a t o r " ) d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l and without mak-ing t h e r e i n , i n the o p i n i o n of the Judge before whom the a p p l i c a t i o n i s made, adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of the t e s t a t o r ' s w i f e , husband, or c h i l d r e n , the Court may, at i t s d i s c r e t i o n , on the a p p l i c a t i o n by or on beh a l f of the s a i d w ife, or of the s a i d husband, or of a c h i l d or c h i l d r e n , order that such p r o v i s i o n as the Court t h i n k s adequate, j u s t , and e q u i t a b l e i n the circum-stances s h a l l be made out of the e s t a t e of the t e s t a -t o r f o r such w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n . 5 1 50 S.B.C. 1920, c. 94. 51 I b i d . , s. 3. - 23 -The s e c t i o n i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, i d e n t i c a l to the e q u i v a l e n t s e c t i o n i n i t s p r o g e n i t o r , the New Zealand s t a t -u t e . 5 2 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , u n l i k e the process l e a d i n g to the enactment of the New Zealand s t a t u t e , the events l e a d i n g to the i n t r o -d u c t i o n of the b i l l which u l t i m a t e l y became the s t a t u t e , are not well-documented by any o f f i c i a l source. The only o f f i c i a l comment to i t s enactment i s found i n the J o u r n a l s of the  L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly of the P r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia where "His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor was p l e a s e d to d e l i v e r the f o l l o w i n g g r a c i o u s Speech:-" The 'Mothers' Pensions Act' and ' T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act' are S t a t u t e s which I f e e l c o n f i d e n t w i l l tend towards the a m e l i o r a t i o n of s o c i a l c o n d i -t i o n s w i t h i n the Province.53 I t i s f a r beyond the scope of t h i s work to do a minute a n a l y s i s of the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d i n the P r o v i n c e . I t can g e n e r a l l y be s a i d , however, that the Act came i n t o being d u r i n g a time of a c t i v e s o c i a l reform. We are t o l d 5 4 t h a t s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n enacted a f t e r World War I was motivated, i n p a r t , by concerns f o r the s t a b i l i t y of the Province's s o c i e t y . The s o c i a l and economic impact of World 52 Supra, footnote 47. 53 Jan. 29 - A p r i l 17 Session 1920, V o l . XLIX at p. 255. 54 M. J . Davies, " S e r v i c e s Rendered, Rearing C h i l d r e n f o r the S t a t e : Mothers' Pensions i n B r i t i s h Columbia 1919 - 1931", at pp. 256 and 257. - 24 -War I, the l o s s of human l i f e d u r i n g the same war, the subse-quent Spanish f l u epidemic, w o r k i n g - c l a s s m i l i t a n c y , the t r i -umph of the B o l s h e v i k s i n R u s s i a and the f e a r by reformers and p o l i t i c i a n s of a p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n , were f o r c e s that com-bined to i n f l u e n c e s o c i e t y ' s c o n c e p t i o n of s o c i a l j u s t i c e and a need f o r guarantees f o r p r e d i c t a b i l i t y and s t a b i l i t y . S o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n was seen by the reformers as the base f o r a s t a b l e s o c i e t y through the s t a b i l i t y of wor k i n g - c l a s s f a m i l i e s . Although i t was a f e r t i l e era f o r s o c i a l l e g i s -l a t i o n , the enactment of the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act was the d i r e c t r e s u l t of l o b b y i n g by women's o r g a n i z a t i o n s with the f i n a l power gi v e n to them through women's e n f r a n -chisement i n 1916. Vancouver women i n the e a r l y p a r t of the tw e n t i e t h century were concerned with maternal f e m i n i s t goals and d e s i r e d a v a r i e t y of reforms concerning themselves and t h e i r c h i l d r e n . The best way to achieve these reforms was to g a i n the vote. Between 1910 and 1928 f i v e Vancouver women's o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , promoted female c i t i z e n s h i p . ^ An examination of the a v a i l a b l e minutes of two of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the U n i v e r s i t y Women's Club (UWC) and the New 55 G. Weiss, The B r i g h t e s t Women of Our Land: Vancouver - 1928 at p. 200 f f . Clubwomen 1910 - 25 -Era League (NEL), i n d i c a t e s a t h r u s t towards promotion and support of l e g i s l a t i o n f o r the gr e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n of women and c h i l d r e n . T h e i r e f f o r t s , however, do not appear to have met with any great success u n t i l enfranchisement. One of the p u b l i c a t i o n s 5 6 d e a l i n g with the quest of women for l e g i s l a t i v e change r e p o r t s : During the same year [1911] the Vancouver L o c a l C o u n c i l r e p o r t e d that when i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and one from the U n i v e r s i t y Club met with the A t t o r n e y General at V i c t o r i a to request amendments i n the laws of i n h e r i t a n c e and those r e l a t i n g to the custody of c h i l d r e n , they r e c e i v e d an a t t e n t i v e hearing.57 Minutes of the U n i v e r s i t y Women's Club r e p o r t Mrs. M c G i l l , [ s i c ] convenor of the Committee on Laws, rep o r t e d having i n t e r v i e w e d Mr. Bowser, the A t t o r n e y -General at V i c t o r i a , p r e s e n t i n g to him the amendments to e x i s t i n g laws concerning women and c h i l d r e n de-s i r e d by the Club.58 However, l a t e r minutes d i s c l o s e t h a t : Mrs. M c G i l l [ s i c ] a l s o r e p o r t e d f o r the Committee on Laws a f f e c t i n g women and c h i l d r e n that t h i s s e s s i o n of Parliament had not made any improvements i n e x i s t -i n g laws.59 56 M. L. Hastings, & L. K. Ellenwood, Blue Bows & the Golden  Rule P r o v i n c i a l C o u n c i l of Women of B.C. ( P r i v a t e l y p u b l i s h e d , 1984). 57 I b i d . , at p. 26. 58 Jan. 13, 1912, C i t y A r c h i v e s , Vancouver, B.C. 59 U n i v e r s i t y Women's Club Minutes, Nov. 25, 1911, to May 13, 1916, at pp. 42 and 43 - C i t y A r c h i v e s , Vancouver, B.C. - 26 -Lat e r minutes show perseverance and hope. The February 13th, 1915, minutes s t a t e : Mrs. M c G i l l [ s i c ] presented the rep o r t of the laws committee. The amendments had been l a i d b efore Mr. Bowser, Mr. MacGowan and Mr. Watson and were f a v o r -a b l y received.60 Subsequent minutes were even more p o s i t i v e : Mrs M c G i l l [ s i c ] e x p l a i n e d that now woman s u f f r a g e was a p r a c t i c a l c e r t a i n t y i n B.C., i n the near f u t u r e , the s e c t i o n on laws bade f a i r to be very important. A l s o that she hoped to be a b l e to use what i n f l u e n c e the Club might have i n the i n t e r e s t of b e t t e r laws f o r women and c h i l d r e n . Mrs. M c G i l l [ s i c ] moved and Mrs. Mcintosh sec. that the f o l l o w i n g measures be giv e n the approval of the Club....That p r o v i s i o n be made f o r a widow, whether her husband leaves a w i l l or not.61 The p r e d i c t i o n of Mrs. M a c G i l l came true when Mary E l l e n Smith was e l e c t e d to the p r o v i n c i a l house i n 1918 and spear-h e a d e d 6 2 the long overdue s o c i a l reforms i n B r i t i s h Columbia. I t was du r i n g the decade that she served as an MLA that the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act was passed, along with other s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . 60 U n i v e r s i t y Women's Club Minutes, February 13, 1915, at p. 212 - C i t y A r c h i v e s , Vancouver, B.C. 61 U n i v e r s i t y Women's Club Minutes, Sept. 9, 1916, to Jan. 30, 1924, at pp. 13 and 14 - C i t y A r c h i v e s , Vancouver, B.C. 62 E. B. Norcross, 1918-1928: The Decade of S o c i a l  L e g i s l a t i o n B r i t i s h Columbia H i s t o r i c a l News, V o l . 17, No. 1, 1983, at pp. 13 to 16. - 27 -The advent of the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act d i d r e c e i v e some p u b l i c i t y . S o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n was foreshadowed by the announcement of Mary E l l e n Smith t h a t : B r i t i s h Columbia's urgent need of human l e g i s l a t i o n , r a t h e r than a d d i t i o n s to the c o l d m a t e r i a l laws a l -ready i n abundance on the s t a t u t e books of the Pro v i n c e , c o n s t i t u t e d the corner stone of the address d e l i v e r e d i n the L e g i s l a t u r e t h i s a f t e r n o o n by Mrs. Ralph Smith, j u n i o r member f o r Vancouver. In the speaker's o p i n i o n the people as a whole were l e s s concerned about the doings of the farmers' p a r t y , the s o l d i e r s ' p a r t y , the l a b o r p a r t y , or even the womans' [ s i c ] p a r t y than they were about the p a r t y that would range i t s e l f on the s i d e of human c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 6 3 The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Act was noted as f o l l o w s : An Act to secure adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the main-tenance of the wife and c h i l d r e n of a t e s t a t o r was in t r o d u c e d t h i s morning i n t o the L e g i s l a t u r e by the Hon. J . W. de B. F a r r i s , A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l and Min-i s t e r of Labor. P r o v i s i o n i s made whereby the c o u r t s may p r o v i d e f o r maintenance f o r the wife or c h i l d r e n , or both, out of the e s t a t e . T h i s means that even i f a person d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l , but without p r o v i d i n g f o r the care of dependents, ample p r o v i s i o n may be made by law.64 The Attorney General was f u r t h e r r e p o r t e d as having com-mented as f o l l o w s : A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l F a r r i s t h i s a f t e r n o o n o u t l i n e d the p r o v i s i o n s of the a c t to secure adequate prov-i s i o n f o r the maintenance of the wife and c h i l d r e n of a t e s t a t o r . 63 B.C. L e g i s l a t i v e C l i p p i n g s Book, Feb. 7, 1920. 64 I b i d . , A p r i l 15, 1920. - 28 -In a d d i t i o n to e x p l a i n i n g the nature of the b i l l , o u t l i n e [ s i c ] i n these columns today, Mr. F a r r i s s a i d the measure was one of the l i n k s i n the Government's c h a i n of s o c i a l w e l f a r e l e g i s l a t i o n . . . I t d i d p r o v i d e , he continued, very necessary a s s i s t a n c e to dependent wives and c h i l d r e n who were not p r o p e r l y p r o v i d e d for.65 The C o l o n i s t was e q u i v o c a l i n i t s r e p o r t on the i n t r o -d u c t i o n of the b i l l (which was to become the T e s t a t o r ' s Family  Maintenance A c t ) . I t s t a t e d : The b i l l now before the L e g i s l a t u r e to secure ade-quate p r o v i s i o n f o r the maintenance of the wife and c h i l d r e n of a t e s t a t o r , while designed with a k i n d l y purpose and at the same time with a view to reducing the number of mothers' pensions which the Government w i l l be c a l l e d upon to pay through new s o c i a l l e g i s -l a t i o n , opens up a v i s t a of c o u r t proceedings i n which l e g a c i e s may be squandered i n l e g a l f e e s . I t i s true no other power c o u l d decide i n a matter of t h i s k i n d save the c o u r t s , but there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , i n some cases at l e a s t , that such a power w i l l have the e f f e c t of d e s t r o y i n g the very safeguard which the Government intends to i n s t i t u t e . I n c i d e n t a l l y , the new l e g i s l a t i o n i s another blow at i n d i v i d u a l freedom of a c t i o n , although i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e that may not make i t the mark of c r i t i c i s m . The m a j o r i t y of people are aware that the con-c e p t i o n of freedom of d i s p o s i t i o n by w i l l i s f a m i l i a r i n England, although i n some other c o u n t r i e s a l i e n a -t i o n i s o n l y p e r m i t t e d where the deceased l e a v e s no widow or near r e l a t i v e s . L e g a l systems which are based on the Roman law provide r e s t r i c t i o n s such as are now proposed i n B r i t i s h Columbia, but i n France, which f o l l o w s t h i s course, the r e s t r i c t i o n has met with condemnation from eminent l e g a l and economical a u t h o r i t i e s . . . . In most i f not a l l of i t s l e g i s l a t i o n d u r i n g recent years B r i t i s h Columbia i s a c o p y i s t , and there i s nothing new or r a d i c a l i n the b i l l i n -troduced yesterday. In l e g i s l a t i n g i n the matter of w i l l s , however, to the extent contemplated the Government i s proposing to throw the q u e s t i o n i n t o the t h i c k e s t hedge of l e g a l entanglements and i s c l a i m i n g the r i g h t to dispose of p r o p e r t y , s u b j e c t to the d e c i s i o n of the c o u r t s , the t i t l e to which i s not 65 I b i d . , A p r i l 16, 1920. - 29 -vested i n the crown. So f a r as the new l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l safeguard the r i g h t s of the immediate r e l a t i v e s of a deceased person i t i s good. So f a r as i t squan-ders e s t a t e s i n l e g a l fees there are at l e a s t doubts about the complete e f f i c a c y of the b i l l . 6 6 Helen Gregory M a c G i l l D / commented as f o l l o w s : The w i f e ' s share i n the f a m i l y e s t a t e r e c e i v e s recog-n i t i o n i n the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance A c t , pas-sed 1920 [ s i c ] . T h i s Act, brought down by A t t o r n e y -General F a r r i s , belongs to that new f i n e s c h o o l of law-making that i s content to enunciate an e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e , l e a v i n g cases to be decided on t h e i r m e r i t s . I t e s t a b l i s h e s the r i g h t f u l c l a i m of the wife (or husband) and c h i l d r e n to proper maintenance before e f f e c t i s given to other g i f t s or bequests.68 Her comment was, however, more r e f l e c t i v e of the acceptance of the Act than that expressed i n The C o l o n i s t . While there i s l i t t l e c oncrete evidence of the i n t e n t i o n s of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n p a s s i n g the A c t , i t i s c l e a r that i t was the r e s u l t of l o b b y i n g of women's o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the sym-p a t h e t i c views of the then Attorney G e n e r a l . 6 ^ 66 A p r i l 16, 1920 at p. 4. 67 H. G. M a c G i l l , Women and C h i l d r e n under B r i t i s h Columbia  Laws, Vancouver, ( P r i v a t e l y P u b l i s h e d , 1935). 68 I b i d . , at p. 38. 69 H. G. M a c G i l l , i n her p u b l i c a t i o n (see f o o t n o t e 67 supra) s t a t e d at pp. 20 and 21: "The Hon. J . W. deB. F a r r i s , when i n London upon i n v i t a t i o n addressed the House of Lords upon the B r i t i s h Columbia Equal Guardianship and T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Acts he having sponsored the l a t t e r and administered both while A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l . " By l e t t e r dated March 10, 1987, an i n q u i r y was made to the - 30 -I t i s r e g r e t f u l , however, that there i s no l e g i s l a t i v e comment e i t h e r endorsing or r e j e c t i n g the t h e s i s put f o r t h by the New Zealand Parliament that the burden of m a i n t a i n i n g spouse and c h i l d r e n should f a l l upon the e s t a t e of the de-ceased r a t h e r than upon the S t a t e . I t can be assumed that the m o t i v a t i o n s were i d e n t i c a l . However, there i s no c l e a r and unequivocal e n u n c i a t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h y behind the A c t . C l e r k of the Records, Record O f f i c e , House of Lords, r e q u e s t i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n of such an address, and p a r t i c u -l a r s t h e r e o f . By l e t t e r dated March 23, 1987, S. K. E l l i s o n , Esq., A s s i s t a n t C l e r k of the Records a d v i s e d that he c o u l d f i n d no r e c o r d of any such address. He s t a t e d f u r t h e r that the Attorney General "... would not have been able to address a s i t t i n g of the House of Lords but very l i k e l y he would have been i n v i t e d to address a group of Lords i n t e r e s t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the s u b j e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n that he sponsored as Attorney G e n e r a l . . . " . - 31 -CHAPTER 4.-THE OTHER CANADIAN PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES The other Canadian p r o v i n c e s a l s o found the concept of testamentary freedom unacceptable and s e q u e n t i a l l y enacted l e g i s l a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g c o u r t i n t e r f e r e n c e with testamentary freedom. A l b e r t a was the f i r s t p r o v i n c e i n Canada to i n c o r p o r a t e dependents r e l i e f p r o v i s i o n s i n i t s s t a t u t e law, by the enact-ment of The Married Women's R e l i e f A c t . ^ u S e c t i o n 2 t h e r e o f provided as f o l l o w s : The widow of a man who d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l by the terms of which h i s s a i d widow would i n the o p i n i o n of the judge before whom the a p p l i c a t i o n i s made r e c e i v e l e s s than i f he had d i e d i n t e s t a t e may apply to the Supreme Court f o r r e l i e f . 7 1 I t i s worthy of note that u n l i k e the New Zealand l e g i s -l a t i o n , the A l b e r t a p r o v i s i o n s l i m i t e d r e l i e f to the widow of a t e s t a t o r , l i m i t i n g i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to w i l l s of males. In a d d i t i o n , i t imposed a minimum e n t i t l e m e n t f o r the widow to a sum of no l e s s than that to which she would have been e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e had the deceased husband d i e d i n t e s t a t e . 70 R.S.A. 1910, c.18 (Assented to December 16, 1910). 71 I b i d . , s. 2. - 32 -The Edmonton D a i l y B u l l e t i n p u b l i s h e d the f o l l o w i n g r e -p o r t : To P r o t e c t Widows. Hon. Mr. M a r s h a l l , i n moving the second reading of a b i l l r e s p e c t i n g the r i g h t s of married women i n the e s t a t e of t h e i r deceased husbands s t a t e d that the b i l l might perhaps have been b e t t e r handled by a l e g a l member of the House, and he asked the a s s i s -tance of the members i n p e r f e c t i n g the l e g i s l a t i o n . The b i l l was e s p e c i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s f a s t grow-ing country and p r o v i d e d that where a wife had helped her husband i n b u i l d i n g up a business he should not have the o p p o r t u n i t y of d e p r i v i n g her of her share. The o p e r a t i o n of the Act, he thought, would be ex-c e p t i o n a l f o r few husbands would be so ungenerous as the b i l l assumes, but p r o v i s i o n had to be made f o r the e x c e p t i o n s . . . .Mr. M a r s h a l l e x p l a i n e d a number of c l a u s e s of the b i l l , the e n t i r e o b j e c t of which was to prevent widows from being u n j u s t l y d e p r i v e d of an e q u i t a b l e share of t h e i r husband's p r o p e r t y . P r o v i s i o n s of B i l l . The Supreme Court i s the c o u r t of j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r the enforcement of the A c t . Any widow l e f t without an e q u i t a b l e share of the e s t a t e of her deceased hus-band by h i s w i l l may apply f o r r e l i e f to the Supreme Court, which, a f t e r t a k i n g a l l necessary evidence, may make an award of a reasonable amount, equal to her share i f her husband had d i e d i n t e s t a t e . 7 2 In a subsequent p u b l i c a t i o n the same newspaper r e p o r t e d that the Hon. Mr. M a r s h a l l commented on the proposed l e g i s -l a t i o n as f o l l o w s : "In some ways t h i s [ l e g i s l a t i o n ] was b e t t e r than a dower law f o r such c o u l d only apply to r e a l e s t a t e and not to s t o c k s , e t c . " ^ 3 72 Feb. 23 1910. 73 Edmonton D a i l y B u l l e t i n , Nov. 26 1910. - 33 -I t i s obvious from the l e g i s l a t i o n i t s e l f and the r a t i o n -a l e expressed by the sponsor of the b i l l , as r e p o r t e d by the newspapers, t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n intended something beyond "maintenance". I t s i n t e n t was to p r o v i d e the widow with a p o r t i o n of the t e s t a t o r ' s e s t a t e , using as the y a r d s t i c k of f a i r n e s s the amount which the widow would have r e c e i v e d had the deceased d i e d i n t e s t a t e . I t accepted t h e r e f o r e , by i m p l i -c a t i o n , f i r s t , that what the l e g i s l a t u r e had p r e s c r i b e d as the i n t e s t a t e p o r t i o n was the widow's f a i r e n t i t l e m e n t to the de-ceased's e s t a t e ; and second, that there e x i s t e d the p h i l o s o p h y of f o r c e d s u c c e s s i o n f o r the widow to an amount of not l e s s than the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n p o r t i o n . 7 4 A f t e r B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 7 5 the pr o v i n c e of O n t a r i o was next i n the sequence by e n a c t i n g , i n 1929, the Dependants' R e l i e f A c t . 7 6 The O n t a r i o p r o v i s i o n s 7 7 were modelled a f t e r the New Zealand s t a t u t e yet i t ^contained two v a r i a t i o n s . The f i r s t one, perhaps of no major consequence, was a r e f e r e n c e to 74 T h i s b r i e f a n a l y s i s of the A l b e r t a l e g i s l a t i o n of 1910 and the j o u r n a l i s t i c - r e p o r t s , supports c e r t a i n h y p o t h e s i s (elsewhere expressed) that testamentary freedom can onl y operate i n a s o c i e t y with w e l l - d e f i n e d and accepted s o c i a l norms. I t a l s o supports the concept that the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n p o r t i o n i s a f a i r b a s i s to determine the widow's p o r t i o n , a concept which has been r e j e c t e d by the B r i t i s h Columbia Courts. L a s t l y , i t makes a l l u s i o n to the f a c t that s i n c e the proposed law was i n i t i a t e d by persons with no l e g a l t r a i n i n g , they were unable to i d e n t i f y the i m p l i c a t i o n s that any such new law may b r i n g with i t . 75 See c.3, supra. 76 S.O. 1929, c. 47 (assented to 28th March, 1929). 77 I b i d . , s. 3. - 34 -" f u t u r e maintenance". The second one was of g r e a t e r impor-tance as i t l i m i t e d the a p p l i c a n t s to "dependants"^ 8 which was a d e f i n e d term and i n c l u d e d o n l y "wife or husband", " c h i l d of the t e s t a t o r under the age of s i x t e e n " , or a c h i l d over that age "who through i l l n e s s or i n f i r m i t y i s unable to earn a l i v e l i h o o d " . By the i n t r o d u c t i o n of such l i m i t a t i o n s O n t a r i o d i d , from the o f f s e t , p r e c l u d e a p p l i c a t i o n s being made by a d u l t c h i l d r e n . The comments i n The G l o b e ^ although r e f e r r i n g to a p r e -decessor b i l l "Widows and Orphans' Maintenance B i l l " , were i n d i c a t i v e of the m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s behind The Dependants  R e l i e f Act, 1929: Idea of B i l l . The b i l l was drawn with the idea of o f f s e t t i n g , i n e f f e c t , a r b i t r a r y attempts by d i s g r u n t l e d heads of f a m i l i e s to prevent t h e i r immediate h e i r s from r e -c e i v i n g any p o r t i o n of t h e i r e s t a t e s . A few years ago, as the Prime M i n i s t e r [ s i c ] e x p l a i n e d y e s t e r d a y , widows were w e l l p r o t e c t e d under the Dower Ac t , s i n c e most e s t a t e s c o n s i s t e d l a r g e l y of r e a l e s t a t e . Of recent years, he p o i n t e d out, there had been a t r e n d toward s t o c k s , bonds, and s i m i l a r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , which do not come w i t h i n the p r o v i s i o n s of the Dower Ac t . The consequence has been that many widows and orphans have been s t r i p p e d of some of the p r o t e c t i o n which formerly was t h e i r s . 8 0 78 I b i d . , s. 2(b). 79 The Globe, (now The Globe and Mail) March 29, 1928. 80 I b i d . , at p. 15. - 35 -Saskatchewan entered the f i e l d next i n 1940 with i t s The  Dependants' R e l i e f A c t , 1940. 8 1 The Saskatchewan p r o v i s i o n s 8 2 i n common with those i n O n t a r i o , l i m i t e d the a p p l i c a n t s to dependents. However, there was an e x t e n s i o n of the c h i l d r e n ' s age to twenty-one from that of s i x t e e n . i n O n t a r i o . Saskatchewan amended i t s l e g i s l a t i o n i n 1 9 4 9 8 3 to extend the a p p l i c a t i o n of i t s p r o v i s i o n s to both t e s t a t e and i n t e s t a t e d e a t h s . 8 4 M a n i t o b a , 8 5 Nova S c o t i a , 8 6 and New B r u n s w i c k 8 7 entered the f i e l d i n 1946, 1956 and 1959 r e s p e c t i v e l y . The l e g i s l a t i v e 81 R.S.S. 1940, c.36, (assented to March 16, 1940). 82 I b i d . , s. 3 and 8. 83 R.S.S., 1949, (assented to March 31, 1949). 84 Although the Pr o v i n c e of Saskatchewan was a r e l a t i v e latecomer i n the f i e l d (30 years a f t e r A l b e r t a and 20 years a f t e r B r i t i s h Columbia), i n 1911 the p r o v i n c e i n t r o d u c e d , by v i r t u e of an Act to amend The D e v o l u t i o n of  E s t a t e s Act, R.S.S. 1910-11, c.13, s. 11(a) i n The  De v o l u t i o n of E s t a t e s Act the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n : "11a. The widow of a man who d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l by the terms of which h i s s a i d widow would i n the o p i n i o n of the judge before whom the a p p l i c a t i o n i s made r e c e i v e l e s s than i f he had d i e d i n t e s t a t e l e a v i n g a widow and c h i l d r e n may apply to the supreme court f o r r e l i e f . " I t w i l l be noted that t h i s s e c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as that c o n t a i n e d i n The Marr i e d Women's R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1910, c. 18, s. 2. 85 The T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t, R.S.M. 1946, c. 64 (assented to A p r i l 13th, 1946). 86 T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t, R.S.N.S. 1956, c. 8, (assented to A p r i l 11th, 1956). 87 T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t , R.S.N.B. 1959, c. 14 (assented to March 13th, 1959). - 36 -p r o v i s i o n s i n these P r o v i n c e s are i d e n t i c a l , and they are much c l o s e r i n e f f e c t to the B r i t i s h Columbia s t a t u t e s than the Ont a r i o ones. Although the a p p r o p r i a t e s e c t i o n i n each Act made r e f e r e n c e to "dependent", the term was d e f i n e d t o mean spouse or c h i l d r e n of the t e s t a t o r , but with no age l i m i t a t i o n of the c h i l d r e n . Newfoundland, 8 8 the Yukon T e r r i t o r i e s , 8 9 the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s , 9 0 and P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d 9 1 i n t r o d u c e d depen-dents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n i n 1962, 1962, 1971 and 1974 r e -s p e c t i v e l y . The common theme of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i o n i s that i t was a v a i l a b l e f o r both t e s t a t e and i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n . There was no u n i f o r m i t y however as to the persons e n t i t l e d to apply. Newfoundland 9 2 permitted spouses and c h i l d r e n , without age l i m i t a t i o n s , to apply. Yukon 3-' l i m i t e d the a p p l i c a n t s to de-pendents who were d e f i n e d as spouse and c h i l d r e n but the c h i l -dren were l i m i t e d to a maximum age of twenty-one years unless i n f i r m . However, the d e f i n i t i o n of c h i l d r e n i n c l u d e d n a t u r a l 88 The Family R e l i e f Act, R.S.N. 1962, c. 56, (assented to March 20th, 1962) . 89 Dependant's R e l i e f Ordinance, R.O.Y.T., 1962, c. 9 (assented to May 11th, 1962). 90 Dependants R e l i e f Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T., 1971, c. D-44. 91 T e s t a t o r ' s Dependants R e l i e f Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. 47 (assented to June 12th, 1974). 92 Supra, footnote 88, s. 2 ( a ) . 93 Supra, footnote 89, s. 2(1). - 37 -c h i l d r e n , s t e p c h i l d r e n or c h i l d r e n who might have been s u b j e c t to a de f a c t o but not a de j u r i s a doption. The Ordinance f o r the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s ^ 4 d e f i n e d c h i l d r e n b a s i c a l l y i n the same manner as those of the Yukon, yet i t extended "dependents" to i n c l u d e c e r t a i n persons i n circumstances of c o h a b i t a t i o n . P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d ^ 5 i n i t s Act i n c l u d e d i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n as c h i l d r e n and i n i t s de-f i n i t i o n of dependents, i t i n c l u d e d grandparents, dependent d i v o r c e d persons and c e r t a i n persons i n circumstances of coha-b i t a t i o n . Dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Canada over a s i x t y - f o u r year span. As a n t i c i p a t e d , the degree of complexity as to the persons e n t i t l e d to apply i n c r e a s e d as the date of enactment became a more contemporary one. 94 Supra, f o o t n o t e 90, s. 2 ( a ) . 95 Supra, footnote 91, s. 1(a) and (d). - 38 -CHAPTER 5.  ENGLAND ! Although England was p e r c e i v e d to venerate the concept of testamentary freedom the House of Lords debates of May 16th, 1 9 2 8 9 6 show m a n i f e s t a t i o n that the concept was not t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . On that date V i s c o u n t A s t o r gave n o t i c e to the House that he wished to i n t r o d u c e a motion to e s t a b l i s h a S e l e c t Committee to see whether a change was necessary i n the law governing testamentary p r o v i s i o n s f o r wives, husbands and c h i l d r e n . A f t e r c i t i n g a s e r i e s of i n c i d e n t s where spouses and c h i l -dren had been d i s i n h e r i t e d , V i s c o u n t A s t o r a f f i r m e d "I c l a i m that they [the i n c i d e n t s c i t e d ] show that r e a l h a r d s h i p and i n j u s t i c e occur under the law as i t stands... He a l s o suggested to the House that these i n c i d e n t s were of s u f f i c i e n t frequency to j u s t i f y the House t a k i n g a c t i o n to prevent t h e i r occurrence as he was [C]onvinced that they [were] e n t i r e l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with and c o n t r a r y to the broad sense of f a i r n e s s and 96 P a r i . Deb. H.L., [16 May 1928], at pp. 38 to 62. 97 I b i d . , at p. 40. - 39 -f a i r p l a y a s s o c i a t e d with t h i s country, and they [were] a l s o opposed to the tr e n d of modern p u b l i c opinion.98 In h i s speech to the House he s t a t e d that England and Wales were the onl y two c o u n t r i e s i n the E n g l i s h speaking world where t h i s s o r t of ha r d s h i p and i n j u s t i c e c o u l d occur.99 A f t e r reviewing, i n a ge n e r a l f o r m , 1 ^ 0 the p e r t i n e n t New Zealand l e g i s l a t i o n and acknowledging i t s adoption by most of the Dominions; and a f t e r making r e f e r e n c e to the law of Sco t l a n d and that of the v a r i o u s S t a t e s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s of America, he concluded t h a t : [I] n most of the E n g l i s h speaking c o u n t r i e s the law makes i t im p o s s i b l e f o r the type of ha r d s h i p and i n -j u s t i c e to a r i s e which i s p o s s i b l e here under our own law.101 The response to t h i s p l e a was r e v e a l i n g . V i s c o u n t Haldane responded that although he was sympathetic to the concept he was "very much averse from p u t t i n g that duty upon the J u d g e s , " l u 2 as he d i d not think that judges c o u l d i n t e r v e n e i n matters r e l a t i n g to W i l l s w i s e l y . H e s t a t e d " [ t ] h a t i s a procedure which I, f o r my p a r t , very much deprecate being 98 I b i d . , at p. 41. 99 I b i d . 100 I b i d . , at p. 42. 101 I b i d . , at p. 44. 102 I b i d . , at p. 47. 103 I b i d . - 40 -t h r u s t on the Judges, simply because they cannot know and they are very apt to do i n j u s t i c e . " 1 ^ 4 Lord Buckmaster d i d not t h i n k that the d i s c r e t i o n a r y duty c a l l e d f o r by the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n a k i n to that of New Zealand was the "kind of duty that the Courts l i k e to d i s -charge, and [he was] not at a l l sure that i t [was] a duty they d i s c h a r g e at a l l w e l l . " - ^ 5 He would have favoured as much more p r a c t i c a l a method where d e f i n e d p o r t i o n s were p r e -s c r i b e d . The Lord C h a n c e l l o r i n a d d i t i o n to f a v o u r i n g the E n g l i s h concept of testamentary freedom, concluded that i f any s t a t -ute, such as that suggested by V i s c o u n t A s t o r , were implemented which would r e s t r i c t testamentary freedom i t would be of no e f f e c t because: He [the t e s t a t o r ] t h e r e f o r e w i l l undoubtedly take the best means he can to evade any law which i s passed, and I do not think i t would be beyond the i n g e n u i t y of the conveyancers of the day to d e v i s e a number of ways i n which he might achieve t h i s end.106 The Lord C h a n c e l l o r a l s o brought to V i s c o u n t A s t o r ' s a t t e n t i o n the f a c t t h at Parliament was at that time extremely busy and expressed the hope that he would not press the i s s u e . l u 7 104 I b i d . , at pp. 47 and 48. 105 I b i d . , at p. 52. 106 I b i d . , at p. 54. 107 I b i d . , at p. 57. V i s c o u n t Astor agreed not to pre s s i t and commented as f o l l o w s : I f u l l y r e a l i s e t h a t , with the amount of business t h a t has to be d e a l t with and with the f a c t that a year hence there w i l l be a General E l e c t i o n , t h i s would be an u n s u i t a b l e o c c a s i o n f o r what would be perhaps a prolonged Inquiry.108 Eleven years l a t e r England f i n a l l y adopted l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d i n g f o r j u d i c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with testamentary d i s p o s i -t i o n s which d i d not make reasonable p r o v i s i o n s f o r the mainte-nance of a t e s t a t o r ' s dependents. The I n h e r i t a n c e (Family  P r o v i s i o n ) A c t , 1 9 3 8 1 0 9 was enacted on J u l y 13th, 1 9 3 9 . 1 1 0 I t imposed upon the E n g l i s h law of s u c c e s s i o n f l e x i b l e r e s t r a i n t s s i m i l a r i n p r i n c i p l e to those c o n t a i n e d i n the New Zealand s t a t u t e . I t i s worthy of note that i n common with the g e s t a t i o n of the New Zealand s t a t u t e , the e a r l y v e r s i o n of the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n i n England took the form of " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " p r o -v i d i n g f o r s p e c i f i c p o r t i o n s f o r the spouse and c h i l d r e n . 1 1 1 I t i s a l s o worthy of note that the o p p o s i t i o n expressed i n the debates where the concept was mooted, both as to the o r i g -108 I b i d . , at p. 61. 109 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c.45. 110 I b i d . , s. 6(2). 111 248 P a r i . Deb. H.C., 1931, 1642 - 1700. i n a l b i l l and subsequent refinements, were r e m i n i s c e n t of those v o i c e d by the members of Parliament i n New Zealand dur-ing the debate which l e a d to the enactments of the New Zealand Act, i n c l u d i n g t h a t : [T]he people who would g a i n most from t h i s B i l l would be the lawyers, and that l a r g e p o r t i o n s of e s t a t e s would be swallowed up i n s o l i c i t o r s ' c o s t s and coun-s e l ' s fees.112 The E n g l i s h l e g i s l a t i o n , although s i m i l a r i n p r i n c i p l e to the New Zealand s t a t u t e , seems to be a major attempt to r e t a i n testamentary freedom and yet impose d e f i n e d maintenance o b l i -g a t i o n s upon the t e s t a t o r . By d e f i n i n g the o b l i g a t i o n s , the c o u r t s were at l e a s t given some guidance, thus attempting to avo i d the p o t e n t i a l u n d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t , a r t i c u l a t e d by the c r i t i c s of the l e g i s l a t i o n , i n England and elsewhere, t h a t the co u r t s should not be given the t o t a l d i s c r e t i o n a r y power to r e v i s e t e s t a t o r s ' W i l l s . The E n g l i s h Act l i m i t e d the persons e n t i t l e d to apply to spouses, unmarried daughters, i n f a n t sons and c h i l d r e n under d i s a b i l i t y . 1 1 3 No a p p l i c a t i o n c o u l d , i n any event, be made i f the t e s t a t o r had bequeathed no l e s s than t w o - t h i r d s of the income of the net e s t a t e to a s u r v i v i n g spouse and the o n l y other dependents were c h i l d r e n of the s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e . 1 1 4 112 328 P a r i . Deb. H.C., 1937, 1294. 113 Supra, footnote 109, s. 1 ( 1 ) . 114 I b i d . , s. 1(1). - 43 -The c o u r t was l i m i t e d to p r o v i d i n g r e l i e f by way of income o n l y . I f t h e . t e s t a t o r l e f t a spouse and one or more c h i l d r e n , then the maximum award, i n c l u d i n g what was a l r e a d y l e f t i n the W i l l , c o u l d not exceed t w o - t h i r d s of the income of the e s t a t e . I f the t e s t a t o r had no spouse or a spouse and no de-pendents then the r e l i e f was l i m i t e d to one-half of the i n -115 come. The Act a l s o p r o v i d e d that the r e l i e f p r o v i s i o n s t e r m i -nated upon the remarriage of the spouse or when the c h i l d r e n ceased to be dependents, as d e f i n e d i n the A c t . 1 1 6 The E n g l i s h s t a t u t e l e f t no doubt that i t s i n t e n t was to ensure that a t e s t a t o r f u l f i l l e d h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to h i s spouse and dependent c h i l d r e n to a p r e s c r i b e d standard but, sub j e c t to such r e s t r a i n t , the t e s t a t o r was f r e e to do as he chose with h i s e s t a t e . 115 I b i d . , s. 1(3) . 116 I b i d . , s. 1(2). - 44 -CHAPTER 6. CONTEMPORARY DEPENDENTS' RELIEF  LEGISLATION, AN OVERVIEW Dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g c o u r t i n t e r -f e rence with testamentary freedom has not remained s t a t i c . I t has undergone s u b s t a n t i a l changes presumably to a d j u s t and c o r r e c t i t s inadequacies and to adapt to changing circum-stances molded by economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and contemporary s o c i a l norms. The p r o g e n i t o r s t a t u t e of New Zealand has been s u b j e c t to r a d i c a l changes from i t s o r i g i n a l s t a t e . The presen t s t a t u t e 1 1 ^ extends i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to i n t e s t a t e as w e l l as I 1 o t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n . x o Persons e n t i t l e d to apply, i n a d d i t i o n to the o r i g i n a l ones, l a w f u l spouses and l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n , now i n c l u d e : 1 1 3 i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n , g r a n d c h i l d r e n , s t e p -c h i l d r e n and, under c e r t a i n circumstances, p a r e n t s . The p r e -sent Act a l s o deems c e r t a i n a s s e t s which do not devolve through the pe r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the deceased to be p a r t of the e s t a t e . 1 2 0 117 The Family P r o t e c t i o n Act, 1955 N.Z.S. 1955, No. 88. 118 I b i d . , s. 4. 119 I b i d . , s. 3. 120 I b i d . , s. 2(5). - 45 -The E n g l i s h s t a t u t e , which appeared to o f f e r the g r e a t e s t p r e s e r v a t i o n of testamentary freedom s i n c e the remedy was a v a i l a b l e to dependents on l y when they were dependents, and was l i m i t e d to a s p e c i f i e d percentage of the e s t a t e ' s income, has a l s o been s u b j e c t to s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e . 1 2 1 The o r i g i n a l c l a s s of a p p l i c a n t s , spouses and dependent c h i l d r e n i n c l u d i n g unmarried daughters, has been expanded by the a d d i t i o n 1 2 2 o f : former spouses who have not remarried; a person other than a c h i l d of the deceased who was at some time t r e a t e d by the deceased as a c h i l d of the f a m i l y i n r e l a t i o n to a marriage to which the deceased had at some time been a pa r t y ; a person, not f a l l i n g i n the pre v i o u s c a t e g o r i e s , who was maintained by the deceased immediately before h i s death. Whereas the e a r l y s t a t u t e l i m i t e d r e l i e f to income from the e s t a t e , the present s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r r e l i e f when the deceased d y i n g , e i t h e r t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e , does not make "reasonable f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n " f o r the a p p l i c a n t . 1 2 3 Where the a p p l i c a n t . i s a s p o u s e 1 2 4 the e x p r e s s i o n "reason-able f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n " means such f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n as would be reasonable i n a l l circumstances of the case f o r the 121 I n h e r i t a n c e ( P r o v i s i o n f o r Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c. 63, (U.K.). 122 I b i d . , s. 1. 123 I b i d . , s. 1(1) . 124 I b i d . , s. 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) . spouse to r e c e i v e , whether or not that p r o v i s i o n i s r e q u i r e d f o r the maintenance of the a p p l i c a n t . In a l l other cases J the e x p r e s s i o n i s l i m i t e d to such an award as would be reasonable i n the circumstances to pr o v i d e f o r the a p p l i c a n t ' s maintenance. I t seems obvious that i n the l i g h t of the d i s t i n c t i o n made between the p r o v i s i o n s f o r spouses and other a p p l i c a n t s , the i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t i o n goes beyond support f o r the spouse but g e n e r a l l y to pr o v i d e the s u r v i v i n g spouse with a p a r t of the deceased's e s t a t e . To prevent avoidance of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , the s t a t u t e con-t a i n s comprehensive a n t i - a v o i d a n c e p r o v i s i o n s by i n c l u d i n g , under c e r t a i n circumstances, ° the value of a s s e t s which do not devolve through the ; p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and by autho-r i z i n g the cou r t to u p s e t . d i s p o s i t i o n s or c o n t r a c t s made by the deceased with the - i n t e n t of a v o i d i n g the e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n . 1 2 7 A l l the Canadian common law p r o v i n c e s , and t e r r i t o r i e s have dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n , and although the common obj e c t of such l e g i s l a t i o n i s to impose r e s t r a i n t s on t e s t a -125 I b i d . , s. 1 ( 2 ) ( b ) . 126 I b i d . , s. 8 and 9. 127 I b i d . , s. 10. - 47 -mentary freedom, there i s a wide divergence of the remedial p r o v i s i o n s of such l e g i s l a t i o n . As to the persons e n t i t l e d to apply, the spectrum moves from the l i m i t e d c l a s s of l a w f u l spouse and l e g i t i m a t e c h i l -dren under the age of s i x t e e n to a much more extended c l a s s t h at would i n c l u d e a d u l t c h i l d r e n , i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n , b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s , parents and grandparents, as w e l l as persons of the o p p o s i t e sex with whom the deceased was cohab-i t i n g as of date of death. The a p p l i c a t i o n of the Act has been extended i n a l l but two j u r i s d i c t i o n s to apply to i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n as w e l l as those which are governed by W i l l s . The l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s , although a l l s p e c i f y i n g s i x months from date of issuance of the grant of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e f o r an exten-s i o n of the l i m i t a t i o n , at the d i s c r e t i o n of the c o u r t , i n r e l a t i o n to a s s e t s that have not been d i s t r i b u t e d . Some s t a t -utes continue to l i m i t the a p p l i c a t i o n to a s s e t s that devolve through the e s t a t e , o t h e r s extend the a p p l i c a t i o n to other a s s e t s such as j o i n t t e nancies and insurance proceeds which pass o u t s i d e the a s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g c h a r g i n g c e r t a i n g i f t s with the o b l i g a t i o n to pay maintenance i f there are not s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s i n the e s t a t e to do so. Some p r o v i n c e s have s p e c i f i e d t h a t agreements e x c l u d i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t e w i l l be v o i d . Others have im-posed a share e q u i v a l e n t as a minimum e n t i t l e m e n t to f o r - 48 -the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n a widow a p p l i c a n t . p o r t i o n Although most of the c h a r g i n g c l a u s e s p r o v i d e f o r the court to make p r o v i s i o n s "adequate f o r the proper maintenance and support", some d i r e c t the c o u r t to make p r o v i s i o n s that are adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e . The a t t a c h e d Appendices "A" ,"B" and "C" p r o v i d e a Table of Comparison of the p r i n c i p a l p r o v i s i o n s of the v a r i o u s s t a t -utes i n f o r c e i n the Canadian p r o v i n c e s and t e r r i t o r i e s . I t w i l l be r e a d i l y seen from a glance at the Table of Com-p a r i s o n t h a t , although the source of the l e g i s l a t i o n i s the same, and the purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n continues to be the same, p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , some p r o v i n c e s have chosen to l e g i s l a t e a " l e g i t i m a t e " p o r t i o n while others s t i l l leave t o t a l d i s c r e -t i o n to the c o u r t s . In a d d i t i o n , the persons e n t i t l e d to apply have, i n c e r t a i n cases, gone f a r beyond those who were the o r i g i n a l sources of concern to the l e g i s l a t o r s . Again, some p r o v i n c e s have r e t a i n e d the t r a d i t i o n a l personages, other p r o v i n c e s have i n c l u d e d others as p o t e n t i a l c l a i m a n t s , p r e -sumably to comply with contemporary s o c i a l norms. - 49 -APPENDIX "A" COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION IN CANADA PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUTE OR ORDINANCE ALBERTA F a m i l y R e l i e f A c t , R . S . A . 1980, c . F - 2 as amended. PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY ( i ) s p o u s e ; ( i i ) c h i l d under 18; ( i i i ) c h i l d over 18 unab le by mental or p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t y to earn a l i v e l i h o o d ( n . b . c h i l d i n c l u d e s acknowledged i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d o f deceased man or i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d of deceased woman). ( s . l ( d ) . ) BRITISH W i l l s V a r i a t i o n COLUMBIA A c t , R . S . B . C . 1979, c.435. w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n (by v i r t u e of the C h a r t e r o f  R i g h t s Amendment Act S . B . C . 1985, c.68, a s s e n t e d to December 2, 1985 and e f f e c -t i v e r e t r o a c t i v e to A p r i l 17, 1985 the r e f e r e n c e to c h i l d i s to i n c l u d e both c h i l d r e n born w i t h i n or w i thout w e d l o c k ) . ( s . 2 . ) MANITOBA The T e s t a t o r s w i f e , husband or c h i l d , and F a m i l y Maintenance common-law s p o u s e , as A c t , R . S . M . 1970, d e f i n e d by the s t a t u t e . c . T 50 o f the ( s . 2 . ) C o n t i n u i n g C o n s o l i -d a t i o n as amended. NEW BRUNSWICK T e s t a t o r s F a m i l y  Maintenance A c t , R . S . N . B . 1973, c . T - 4 , as amended. w i f e , husband or c h i l d , ( s . l . ) NEWFOUND-LAND The F a m i l y R e l i e f A c t , R . S . N . 1970, c . 1 2 4 , as amended. spouse or c h i l d . ( s . 2 . ) - 50 -PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUTE OR ORDINANCE PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY NORTHWEST TERRI-TORIES The Dependants  R e l i e f A c t , R.S.N.W.T. 1974. c.D-4, as amended, ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( i v ) (v) ( v i ) widow/widower; c h i l d under 19 years of age; c h i l d over 19 years of age but unable to earn a l i v e l i h o o d because of p h y s i c a l or mental d i s a b i l i t y ; a person who coh a b i t e d with the deceased f o r one year p r i o r to date of death, and was dependent on the deceased; persons who coh a b i t e d with the deceased and with whom the deceased had one or more c h i l d r e n ; persons who were a c t i n g as f o s t e r parents to the c h i l d r e n of the deceased and dependent on the deceased f o r maintenance and support; (s.2. ) NOVA T e s t a t o r s ' Family SCOTIA Maintenance Act R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 303, as amended ( i ) widow, widower or c h i l d (which i n c l u d e s a c h i l d of whom the t e s t a t o r i s the n a t u r a l parent; ( s . l . ) ( i i ) Right to apply does not s u r v i v e death of dependent; ( s . l 6 . ) ( i i i ) Court not to rec o g n i z e the c o n t r a c t i n g out of the S t a t u t e . ( s . 1 5 ( 2 ) . ) ONTARIO Succession Law  Reform Act, 1980, c.488, R.S.O. Part V. ( i ) spouse or "common-law spouse", ( i i ) parent, ( i i i ) c h i l d , ( i v ) b r o t h e r s or s i s t e r s , - 51 -PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUTE OR ORDINANCE PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY to whom the deceased was p r o v i d i n g support or was under a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e support; (s.57.) - c h i l d i n c l u d e s a g r a n d c h i l d and a person to whom the deceased demonstrated a s e t t l e d i n t e n t i o n to t r e a t as a c h i l d of h i s f a m i l y ; -"common-law spouse" means a man or woman who has been co-h a b i t i n g immediately before the death of the deceased f o r a p e r i o d of not l e s s than three years, or i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p of some permanence where there i s a c h i l d born of whom they are the n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ; -parents i n c l u d e grandparents; -by v i r t u e of the C h i l d r e n ' s  Law Reform Act, R.S.p. 1980, c.68, as amended, s p e c i f i c a l l y s . l , f o r a l l purposes of the law of On t a r i o , there i s no d i s t i n c t i o n between c h i l d r e n born i n or out of wedlock; -Waiver of the Act not bi n d i n g . (s.63(4).) ( i v ) grandparent, parent or descendent of the deceased who, f o r a p e r i o d of at l e a s t 3 years p r i o r to the date of death was dependent upon the PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND Dependants of  Deceased Person  R e l i e f Act R.S.P.E.I., 1974 c.D-6. ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) Widow or widower; c h i l d under 18; c h i l d over 18 who by reason of mental or p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t y cannot earn a l i v e l i -hood ; PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUTE OR ORDINANCE PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY deceased f o r main-tenance and support; (v) a person d i v o r c e d from the deceased who f o r a p e r i o d of at l e a s t 3 years immediately p r i o r to date of death was dependent upon the deceased f o r main-tenance and support; ( v i ) a person of the op p o s i t e sex to the deceased who, although not married, c o h a b i t e d with the deceased as a spouse f o r a p e r i o d of no l e s s than 3 years p r i o r to the date of death and was dependent upon the deceased f o r maintenance and support; - c h i l d i n c l u d e s i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d ; ( s . l . ) -Agreement to waive the p r o v i s i o n s of the Act i n v a l i d ; (s.16.) SASKAT- The Dependants' CHEWAN R e l i e f A c t , R.S.S. 1978 c. D-25, as amended. ( i ) wife or husband; ( i i ) c h i l d under 18; ( i i i ) c h i l d over 18 who by reason of mental or p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t y i s i n c a p a b l e of earning a l i v e l i h o o d ; - c h i l d i n c l u d e s i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , (s.2.) YUKON Dependants' R e l i e f ( i ) widow or widower; TERRITORY Ordinance, O.Y.T. ( i i ) c h i l d under 16; 1980 (2d), c.6. ( i i i ) c h i l d over 16 who by reason of mental or p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t y i s unable to earn a l i v e l i h o o d ; PROVINCE STATUTE PERSONS OR OR ENTITLED TERRITORY ORDINANCE TO APPLY ( i v ) a grandparent, parent or descendent of the deceased who f o r a p e r i o d of at l e a s t 3 years immediately p r i o r to death was dependent upon the deceased f o r maintenance and support; (v) a person d i v o r c e d from the deceased who f o r a p e r i o d of 3 years p r i o r to death, was dependent upon the deceased f o r main-tenance and support; ( v i ) a person of the oppo s i t e sex who f o r 3 years p r i o r to date of death had l i v e d and cohabi t e d with the deceased as a spouse of the deceased and was dependent upon the deceased f o r main-tenance and support; -a c h i l d i n c l u d e s an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d of the deceased; ( s . l . ) -Agreements to waive the p r o t e c t i o n of the ordinance i n v a l i d . (s.17.) APPENDIX "B" COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION IN CANADA PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUS OF THE DECEASED THRESHOLD QUESTION AND PRESCRIBED RELIEF ALBERTA t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e (s.3.) BRITISH COLUMBIA t e s t a t e ( s . 2 . ) MANITOBA t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e , ( s . 3 ( l ) ( 5 ) . ) "Dies t e s t a t e without making i n h i s W i l l adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s dependents or any of them"; or "Dies i n -t e s t a t e and the share under the I n t e s t a t e S u c c e s s i o n Act of the i n t e s t a t e ' s dependents or any of them i n the e s t a t e i s inadequate f o r t h e i r proper maintenance and support." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : adequate f o r "the proper maintenance and support". (s.3.) "Dies l e a v i n g a W i l l which does not, i n the c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of the t e s t a t o r ' s w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n . " R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e " . ( s . 2 . ) "Dies l e a v i n g a w i l l and without making t h e r e i n adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s dependents or any of them." The general p r o v i s i o n s apply a l s o on an i n t e s t a c y . R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". ( s . 3 ( l ) . ) PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUS OF THE DECEASED - 55 -THRESHOLD QUESTION AND PRESCRIBED RELIEF NEW t e s t a t e ( s . 2 ( l ) . ) BRUNSWICK "Dies l e a v i n g a w i l l , and without making t h e r e i n adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r proper maintenance and support of h i s dependents, or any of them." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". ( s . 2 ( l ) . ) NEWFOUND- t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e LAND (s.3(1).) NORTH-WEST TERRI-TORIES t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e ( s . 3 ( l ) . ) "Dies t e s t a t e without having made i n h i s w i l l adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s dependents or any of them"; or "Dies i n t e s t a t e and the share under the I n t e s t a t e S uccession Act of the i n t e s t a t e ' s dependents or any of them i n the e s t a t e i s inadequate f o r t h e i r or h i s proper maintenance and support." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". ( s . 3 ( l ) . ) "Dies t e s t a t e without making i n h i s w i l l adequate pro-v i s i o n f o r the proper main-tenance and support of h i s dependents or any of them"; or "Dies i n t e s t a t e and the share under I n t e s t a t e  Succession Ordinance of the deceased's dependents or any of them i n the e s t a t e i s i n -adequate f o r the proper maintenance and support." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". (s.3.) PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUS OF THE DECEASED - 56 -THRESHOLD QUESTION AND PRESCRIBED RELIEF "Dies without having made adequate p r o v i s i o n i n h i s w i l l f o r the proper main-tenance and support of a dependent." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". ( s . 2 ( l ) .) "Where a deceased, whether t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e , has not made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper support of h i s dependents or any of them." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper support". (s.58. ) "Deceased has not made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r proper maintenance and support of h i s dependents or any of them." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". (s.2.) SASKAT- t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e . "Dies l e a v i n g a dependent CHEWAN (s.4.) or dependents, an a p p l i c a t i o n may be made to the c o u r t by or on beh a l f of any dependent f o r an order making reasonable p r o v i s i o n f o r h i s or her maintenance." (s.4.) R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : ( i ) " s u f f i c i e n t to p r o v i d e such maintenance as the Court t h i n k s reasonable j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circumstances". ( s . 9 ( l ) . ) NOVA t e s t a t e SCOTIA (s.2(1) . ) ONTARIO t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e . (s.58.) PRINCE t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e . EDWARD (s.1(b).) ISLAND PROVINCE OR TERRITORY STATUS OF THE DECEASED - 57 -THRESHOLD QUESTION AND PRESCRIBED RELIEF ( i i ) "For spouses, a sum equal to the i n t e s t a t e succes-s i o n p o r t i o n w i l l be the minimum award. (s.9(2).) YUKON t e s t a t e / i n t e s t a t e . TERRI- ( s . l ) TORY "Where a deceased has not made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s depen-dents or any of them." R e l i e f p r o v i s i o n : "proper maintenance and support". (s.2.) - 58 -APPENDIX "C" COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY DEPENDENTS' RELIEF LEGISLATION IN CANADA PROVINCE OR TERRITORY LIMITATION PERIOD PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ACT ALBERTA 6 months from Grant of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s p e c t of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . ( s . 1 5 . ) ( i ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) P r o p e rty d e v i s e d pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.12.) BRITISH 6 months from Grant COLUMBIA of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n with no e x t e n s i o n s . (s.10.) E s t a t e (s.2. ) A s s e t s MANITOBA 6 months from Grant of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.15.) ( i ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) P roperty d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.18.) NEW 6 months from Grant ( i ) BRUNSWICK of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( i i ) ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.14.) NEWFOUND- 6 months from Grant ( i ) LAND of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( i i ) ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.14.) E s t a t e A s s e t s . Property d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.16.) E s t a t e A s s e t s . Property d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.16.) PROVINCE OR TERRITORY LIMITATION PERIOD - 59 -PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ACT NORTH-WEST TERRI-TORIES 6 months from Grant of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s p e c t of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.14.) ( i ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) P r o p e r t y d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. ( i i i ) Value of c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s deemed to be p a r t of the e s t a t e such as D.M.C.s, money h e l d i n t r u s t , j o i n t p r o p e r t y , proceeds of insurance p o l i c i e s to the extent they were owned by the deceased. (s.20.) ( i v ) C e r t a i n t r a n s f e r s w i t h i n three years from date of death s u b j e c t to an order to make the t r a n s -f e r e e c o n t r i b u t e to the maintenance i f there are no s u f f i c i e n t e s t a t e a s s e t s . (s.21.) NOVA SCOTIA ONTARIO 6 months from Grant ( i ) of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( i i ) ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.13.) 6 months from Grant ( i ) of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( i i ) ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.61.) E s t a t e A s s e t s . Property d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. ( S . 1 5 ( 1 ) . ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . Property d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.71.) PROVINCE OR TERRITORY LIMITATION PERIOD - 60 -PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ACT ( i i i ) Value of c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s deemed to be p a r t of the e s t a t e , e.g., D.M.C.s, j o i n t tenancy and insurance and such a s s e t s s u b j e c t to being charged f o r pay-ment of any award. (s.72.) PRINCE 6 months from Grant EDWARD of Probate or ISLAND a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s p e c t of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.13.) ( i i i ) Value of c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s deemed to be p a r t of the e s t a t e , e.g., D.M.C.s, j o i n t tenancy and insur a n c e . (s.19.) ( i v ) Donee of g i f t may be r e q u i r e d to pay main-tenance and support to the extent that the e s t a t e a s s e t s are not s u f f i c i e n t . (s.20. ) (1) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) P roperty d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded. (s.14.) SASKAT- 6 months from Grant CHEWAN of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n respect of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.15.) ( i ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) Property d e v i s e d under the W i l l pursuant to a bona f i d e c o n t r a c t excluded (s.10. ) - 61 -PROVINCE PROPERTY OR LIMITATION SUBJECT TERRITORY PERIOD TO ACT YUKON TERRI-TORY 6 months from Grant of Probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ( j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s p e c t of a s s e t s u n d i s t r i b u t e d at date of a p p l i c a t i o n ) . (s.14.) ( i ) E s t a t e A s s e t s . ( i i ) Value of c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s deemed to be p a r t of the e s t a t e , e.g. D.M.C.s, j o i n t tenancy and insu r a n c e . (s.20.) ( i i i ) Donee of g i f t may be r e q u i r e d to pay main-tenance and support i f there are i n s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s i n the e s t a t e . (s.21.) - 62 -PART I I : THE NATURE OF RELIEF UNDER THE BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT - 63 -CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia chose, as p a r t of i t s law of s u c c e s s i o n , to r e t a i n the concept of testamentary f r e e -dom. To prevent abuse of such freedom the l e g i s l a t u r e p r o -vi d e d the c o u r t s with s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r f e r e i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of a deceased's e s t a t e i f he d i d not d i s c h a r g e h i s f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n to h i s f a m i l y . U n l i k e so many of i t s c o u n t e r p a r t s , the B r i t i s h Columbia l e g i s l a t i o n has not, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, changed s i n c e i t s enactment. Yet the remedies dispensed and the p h i l o s o p h y a p p l i e d by the c o u r t s have moved r a d i c a l l y from what appeared to be the o r i g i n a l l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The f i r s t enactment of the l e g i s l a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia o c c u r r e d i n 1920 under the t i t l e , An Act To Secure  Adequate P r o v i s i o n f o r the Maintenance of the Wife and  C h i l d r e n of a T e s t a t o r , 1 (commonly r e f e r r e d to as dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n ) . B r i t i s h Columbia, thus, j o i n e d other j u r i s d i c t i o n s which enacted p r o t e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n to prevent abuses of testamentary freedom. 1 S.B.C. 1920, c. 94. The A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform/ com-ments on dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y as f o l l o w s : The success of t h i s b o l d l e g i s l a t i v e experiment by New Zealand i s due to the s a t i s f a c t o r y r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of two b a s i c s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s of the law of succes-s i o n . One i s testamentary freedom and the other i s that dependents of the deceased should r e c e i v e proper maintenance. Proper maintenance f o r dependents has two a s p e c t s . One rec o g n i z e s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the deceased to h i s dependents which i s of an i n d i v i -d ual nature. The deceased should not be p e r m i t t e d to le a v e , without proper support, persons who stood i n a c e r t a i n f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to him at h i s death. The other i s the s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the deceased to the s t a t e . The deceased should p r o v i d e proper maintenance t o h i s dependents i n order that they w i l l not have to be supported from p u b l i c funds. An a n a l y s i s of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e which has developed i n B r i t i s h Columbia q u e s t i o n s the v a l i d i t y of t h i s statement, at l e a s t as i t a p p l i e s to that P r o v i n c e . The j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n -d i c a t e s that the purpose of the Act has become nebulous. In the words of Anthony R. Mellows i n h i s a n a l y s i s of the j u r i s -prudence i n another branch of the law of s u c c e s s i o n , the i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Act "has r e s u l t e d [ i n ] the u n d i g n i f i e d s p e c t a c l e of the c o u r t ' s i n d u l g i n g i n s c h i z o p h r e n i a , ..." 4 The r e s u l t i s that i t i s d i f f i c u l t today to s t a t e with any degree of c e r t a i n t y whether the Act i s t r u l y remedial "to p r o -v i d e proper maintenance f o r dependents", or whether i t i s a s o r t of d i l u t e d and whimsical form of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p . 2 A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 29, Family R e l i e f , (1978), 7. 3 Op. c i t . , Part I, fo o t n o t e 6. 4 I b i d . , at pp. 70 and 71. - 65 -CHAPTER 2. THE PERTINENT CLAUSE OF THE ACT AND THE EARLY CASES The p e r t i n e n t c l a u s e of the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t 3 (the "Act") i s s u b s e c t i o n 2(1) which s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 2.(1) Notwithstanding any law or s t a t u t e to the c o n t r a r y , i f a t e s t a t o r d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l which does not, i n the c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , make adequate pro-v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of the t e s t a t o r ' s w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n , the c o u r t may, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , i n an a c t i o n by or on be h a l f of the w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n , order that the p r o v i -s i o n t h a t i t t h i n k s adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circumstances be made out of the e s t a t e of the t e s t a t o r f o r the w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n . To analyse the purpose of the Act, i t i s necessary t o d i s -s e c t the s u b s e c t i o n . From i t s wording, i t seems c l e a r that c o n d i t i o n precedent to i t s a p p l i c a t i o n must be that a t e s t a t o r f a i l e d to "make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support". And, i f i n the c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , the t e s t a t o r so f a i l e d then the cou r t i s a u t h o r i z e d to make "the p r o v i s i o n that i t t h i n k s adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circum-s t a n c e s " . The words "maintenance and support" are e s s e n t i a l l y synonymous 6 and t h e i r d i c t i o n a r y meaning i s simple: to bear 5 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 435. 6 See i n f r a , f o o t n o t e 27, D.L.R. at p. 524, W.W.R. at p. 483, B.C.R. at p. 35, see a l s o t e x t , i n f r a , at p. 87. - 66 -the expense of sustenance. The mandate of the c o u r t i s t h e r e -f o r e to ensure that the t e s t a t o r has f u l f i l l e d h i s s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e sustenance. As the words "maintenance and support" are p r e f a c e d by the word "proper", i t must be assumed that sustenance must be c o n s i s t e n t with the s t a t i o n i n l i f e of the person e n t i t l e d to such sustenance. In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , as e a r l y as 1911 the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e , 7 by a f f i r m i n g the d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, recognized that "proper main-tenance and support" w i l l d i f f e r from case to case. In A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e the deceased made no p r o v i s i o n s fo r the P e t i t i o n e r s , who were f i v e a d u l t c h i l d r e n from a p r e -vious marriage of the deceased. These c h i l d r e n c o n s i s t e d of three married daughters and two unmarried sons, a l l between the ages of 30 and 38. The t r i a l judge concluded, essen-t i a l l y , that although the c h i l d r e n were not w e l l o f f , they had long s i n c e been out of the dominion of t h e i r f a t h e r and had no c l a i m upon h i s e s t a t e as they had e i t h e r supported themselves or, i n the case of female c h i l d r e n , had been supported by t h e i r husbands. 7 A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e , [1911] A.C. 730. - 67 -Q The Court of A p p e a l 0 d i s a g r e e d with the t r i a l judge as to the three daughters on the b a s i s that they had no adequate means of support and that t h e i r husbands might not, i n f u t u r e , support them as w e l l as they had been supported to date of death. The Court of Appeal d i d , however, agree with the t r i a l judge as to the sons, on the b a s i s that they both had trades and should be a b l e to continue to f i n d employment. Notwithstanding the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s which the word "pro-per" may impose, when the P r i v y C o u n c i l upheld the Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e , by s u p p o r t i n g the award to the daughters and making no award to the sons and endorsing the r a t i o n a l e behind the award f o r the daughters, i t made a c l e a r statement that the wording of the Act c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d i t s purpose as being one of p r o v i d i n g "maintenance and support". Once the co u r t has determined that there i s a f a i l u r e to "make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and sup-p o r t " then i t can order "the p r o v i s i o n that i t t h i n k s ade-quate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circumstances". From the p l a i n meaning of the Act, i t would seem that the purpose of such an order i s to remedy the f a i l u r e by the t e s t a t o r to p r o -vide f o r the "proper maintenance and support", or s t a t e d d i f -f e r e n t l y , had f a i l e d to pr o v i d e f o r the expenses of proper sustenance. 8 (1910), 29 N.Z.L.R. 959. - 68 -The e a r l y cases i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n t e r p r e t i n g the pro-v i s i o n s of the Act l e f t no doubt of i t s i n t e n t and that i t s enactment was to permit the co u r t to pr o v i d e maintenance when the t e s t a t o r f a i l e d to do so. T h i s i n t e n t i s supported by the scanty l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y on the development and enactment of the A c t . 9 In re L i v i n g s t o n , D e c e a s e d 1 0 i s the f i r s t r e p o r t e d case under the A c t . In t h i s case the t e s t a t o r d i v i d e d h i s e s t a t e e q u a l l y between h i s widow and seven c h i l d r e n from a former marriage. The widow a p p l i e d under the then newly enacted T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance A c t . The co u r t recognized that i n making h i s W i l l , the t e s t a t o r d i d not adequately p r o v i d e f o r h i s w i f e , and proceeded to i n t e r p r e t the Act by r e f e r e n c e to the New Zealand s t a t u t e and adopted the reasoning i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e 1 1 that the i n t e n t i o n of such remedial l e g i s l a t i o n was not to i n t e r f e r e with the W i l l of the t e s t a -t o r . Thus, there had to be an i n q u i r y as to the need f o r maintenance and support and as to the pro p e r t y a v a i l a b l e . The judgment concluded that b e a r i n g i n mind the f a c t s and the purpose sought to be obtained by the l e g i s l a t u r e , proper maintenance and support could be achieved by i n v e s t i n g s u f -9 See t e x t , supra, P a r t I, c. 3. 10 [1923] 1 D.L.R. 1167, [1923] 1 W.W.R. 628, (1922), 31 B.C.R. 468 (S.C.). 11 Supra, f o o t n o t e 7. - 69 -f i c i e n t funds to p r o v i d e a s p e c i f i e d income to the widow f o r l i f e . The c o u r t , although adopting the r a t i o n a l e of A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e - 1 - ^ as the purpose of the Act, d i d not, u n f o r t u -n a t e l y , a r t i c u l a t e a c l e a r p r i n c i p l e as to i t s purpose i n B r i t i s h Columbia. I t d i d , however, r e f e r to the Act as "reme-d i a l l e g i s l a t i o n " and the r e l i e f awarded was c l e a r l y l i m i t e d to p r o v i d e an annuity c o n s i s t e n t with what the court con-s i d e r e d to be the widow's needs. In the next r e p o r t e d case i n B r i t i s h Columbia, In re  H a l l , Deceased, J i n which a widow was excluded from her hus-band's W i l l , the court made an award s e t t i n g a s i d e a p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e s u f f i c i e n t to p r o v i d e a determined amount of income f o r the widow. In doing so, the court s t a t e d that such an order would " e f f e c t u a t e the purpose of the s t a t u t e " . 1 4 U n f o r t u n a t e l y the court d i d not a m p l i f y on the purpose of the s t a t u t e other than to say that i t was a p p l y i n g the p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e 1 5 and In re L i v i n g s t o n , D e c e a s e d . 1 6 12 Supra, f o o t n o t e 7. 13 (1923), 33 B.C.R. 241 (S.C.). 14 I b i d . , at p. 243. 15 Supra, footnote 7. 16 Supra, f o o t n o t e 10. - 70 -In re S t i g i n g s , D e c e a s e d 1 7 on an a p p l i c a t i o n by a widower, the c o u r t , without making r e f e r e n c e to the purpose of the A c t , d i r e c t e d that an amount of income, not to exceed a predetermined amount, be p a i d to the widower d u r i n g h i s l i f e -time and upon h i s death the e s t a t e was to be d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to the terms of the W i l l . In B r i g h t e n v. S m i t h , 1 8 at t r i a l , upon the a p p l i c a t i o n of the widow f o r r e l i e f under the then W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act i t was h e l d that she was e n t i t l e d to the whole e s t a t e as i t was nec-essary f o r her to have the e n t i r e e s t a t e to pr o v i d e adequate maintenance f o r her. The e s t a t e amounted to $8,000. The Court of Appeal upheld the d e c i s i o n , with MacDonald C.J.A. and Macdonald J.A. d i s s e n t i n g . However, the court d i v i d e d on the a p p l i c a t i o n of the law to the f a c t s of the case, and not on the b a s i c approach to the A c t . The d i s s e n t i n g judgments are of i n t e r e s t as they r e f l e c t the e a r l y understanding of the purpose of the A c t . MacDonald C.J.A. i n h i s judgment o b v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d that the t r a n s f e r of the e n t i r e e s t a t e , notwithstanding i t s s i z e , was beyond the scope of the s t a t u t e . He commented: With r e s p e c t , I think the order was made under a misapprehension of the o b j e c t and scope of the l e g i s -l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n : i t was made upon a wrong 17 (1924), 34 B.C.R. 347 (S.C.). 18 (1926), 37 B.C.R. 518 (C.A.). - 71 -p r i n c i p l e . The o b j e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n i s mainte- nance, not g i f t . 1 9 Macdonald J.A., commenting on the order made by the t r i a l judge, s t a t e d : [ I t ] i s not an order making adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r maintenance; i t i s r e a l l y an order t r a n s f e r r i n g the whole e s t a t e from the b e n e f i c i a r i e s named i n the w i l l , to the wif e ; something which i n my view was not contemplated by the L e g i s l a t u r e . 2 0 The m a j o r i t y of the cou r t d i f f e r e d only as to whether or not the c o u r t c o u l d t r a n s f e r the e n t i r e e s t a t e to the p e t i -t i o n e r . There does not seem to be any d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n as to the purpose of the A c t . The d i f f i c u l t y encountered by the c o u r t s i n d e a l i n g with these matters was made obvious by M a r t i n J.A. He observed: [W]e are d e a l i n g with a matter which i s something wholly unknown to our former law, and the whole ob-j e c t of the new s t a t u t e i s to defeat the wishes of the t e s t a t o r . T h i s novel circumstance must be con-s i d e r e d by t h i s Court, i n r e l a t i o n to the o b j e c t which i s sought to be maintained.21 The o b j e c t of the Act, at l e a s t as i t r e l a t e d to spouses, was analysed by M c P h i l l i p s J.A. as f o l l o w s : 19 20 21 I b i d . , at p. 520, (emphasis added). I b i d . , at p. 524. I b i d . , at p. 520. - 72 -Now the L e g i s l a t u r e has undertaken to say, and we cannot q u e s t i o n i t s wisdom - and i n t h i s r e s p e c t I am at one with the L e g i s l a t u r e - that a husband or wife should make proper p r o v i s i o n f o r the s u r v i v i n g con-s o r t . The L e g i s l a t u r e has enacted that there i s c r e a t e d by marriage a r e l a t i o n s h i p which c a l l s f o r a p r o v i s i o n being made out of the estate.22 [M]y view [ i s ] that the L e g i s l a t u r e has enacted that the r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t s between husband and wife i s such that that r e l a t i o n s h i p has to be recog-n i z e d , and regarded when there i s a testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n of the e s t a t e . I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , the husband or the wife should be i n need, that the r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t s c a l l s upon the husband or the wife to remember i t and make p r o v i s i o n , otherwise we should have the husband or the wi f e , as the case may be, becoming a p u b l i c charge upon the country. And why should the husband or the wife be a p u b l i c charge upon the country i f there i s an e s t a t e which p r i m a r i l y ought to pay f o r the maintenance of that husband or wife?23 I t w i l l be noted that the emphasis i s on need and the pr e v e n t i o n of the spouse becoming a p u b l i c charge upon the country. M c P h i l l i p s J.A. concluded that the lower c o u r t pro-v i d e d an award that "would enure to her permanent maintenance, thereby p r e v e n t i n g her becoming a charge upon the c o u n t r y . " 2 4 A review of the e a r l y cases, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the cora-ments of the judges i n B r i g h t e n v. Smith 3 whether m a j o r i t y or d i s s e n t i n g , l e a v e no doubt that i n the mind of the judges the Act was remedial to p r o v i d e maintenance and to prevent a spouse, and presumably a c h i l d , from being a burden upon the 22 I b i d . , 23 I b i d . , 24 I b i d . , 25 I b i d . at p. 522. at p. 523. at p. 524. - 73 -country. There i s no sugg e s t i o n that the t e s t a t o r had o b l i g a -t i o n s beyond those of maintenance and support. The d e c i s i o n s are indeed c o n s i s t e n t with the p l a i n meaning of the words of the A c t . The c l a r i t y of purposes which can be e x t r a c t e d from the e a r l y cases d i d not s u r v i v e the d e c i s i o n of Walker v. McDermott. 2 6 26 [1931] S.C.R. 94, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 662 r e v e r s i n g [1930] 1 D.L.R. 945, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 332, 42 B.C.R. 184. - 74 -CHAPTER 3 WALKER V. McDERMOTT I t has been s t a t e d / ' that the l e a d i n g case on dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s Walker v. McDermott. 2 8 Wilson C.J.S.C. s t a t e d i n Re Parks E s t a t e : 2 9 P r a c t i c a l l y a l l judgments under t h i s Act commence with q u o t a t i o n s from Walker v. McDermott [1931] SCR 94, r e v e r s i n g [1930] I WWR 330, 845, 42 BCR 184, 354, and I s h a l l conform by quoting t h i s o f t - c i t e d passage from the judgment of Duff, J . (as he then was) at p. 96: What c o n s t i t u t e s 'proper maintenance and support' i s a q u e s t i o n to be determined with r e f e r e n c e to a v a r i e t y of circumstances. I t cannot be l i m i t e d to the bare n e c e s s i t i e s of e x i s t e n c e . For the purpose of a r r i v i n g at a c o n c l u s i o n , the cou r t on whom de-vol v e s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of g i v i n g e f f e c t t o the s t a t u t e , would n a t u r a l l y proceed from the p o i n t of view of the j u d i c i o u s f a t h e r of a f a m i l y seeking to dis c h a r g e both h i s m a r i t a l and h i s p a r e n t a l duty; and would of course ( l o o k i n g at the matter from that p o i n t of view), c o n s i d e r the s i t u a t i o n of the c h i l d , w ife or husband, and the standard of l i v i n g to which, having regard to t h i s and the other circumstances, r e f e r e n c e ought to be had. The f a c t s of the case are simple. The deceased was su r -v i v e d by h i s second wife, aged f i f t y - f o u r , to whom he had been 27 Barker v. Westminster T r u s t Co. [1941] 4 D.L.R. 514 at p. 525, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 473 at p. 485, (1941), 57 B.C.R. 21 at p. 36 (C.A.), per O'Halloran J.A. 28 Supra, footnote 26. 29 (1968), 64 W.W.R. (N.S.) 586 at p. 590 (B . C . S . C ) . - 75 -married f o r f o u r t e e n y e a r s , and an a d u l t daughter, from a p r e v i o u s marriage, aged twenty-three. The main a s s e t of the e s t a t e was a h o t e l i n T r a i l , B r i t i s h Columbia, and the e v i -dence i n d i c a t e d t hat the wife had a s s i s t e d with the down pay-ment and t h e r e a f t e r had assumed a l a r g e p o r t i o n of the burden of running the b u s i n e s s . At the time of her f a t h e r ' s death, the daughter was married, her husband had steady employment and the daughter was not and had not been dependent upon the t e s t a t o r . The daughter was not i n n e c e s s i t o u s circumstances and the income from the e s t a t e would o n l y be s u f f i c i e n t to maintain the widow. By h i s W i l l , the t e s t a t o r l e f t the e n t i r e e s t a t e to h i s widow. The daughter brought an a p p l i c a t i o n under the Act and at t r i a l , i n an unreported d e c i s i o n , she was awarded the sum of $6,000 from a net e s t a t e of approximately $25,000. The Court of Appeal, with M c P h i l l i p s J.A. d i s s e n t -i n g , set a s i d e the order of the lower c o u r t . The reasoning of the judges, both m a j o r i t y and d i s s e n t i n g i s of a s s i s t a n c e i n understanding the subsequent development of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t e r p r e t i n g the A c t . M c P h i l l i p s J.A., the d i s s e n t i n g Judge, who would have allowed the award to the daughter, observed t h a t : The l e g i s l a t i o n which has to be construed and a p p l i e d i s l e g i s l a t i o n f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d i n the Dominion of New Zealand, a s i s t e r n a t i o n i n the B r i t i s h Common-wealth. I t i s l e g i s l a t i o n of somewhat r e v o l u t i o n a r y nature as a g a i n s t the long maintained law of England, that the t e s t a t o r was at f u l l l i b e r t y to dispose of h i s e s t a t e as he thought f i t , to even - 76 -d i s i n h e r i t h i s c h i l d r e n and others having claims upon him and g i v e h i s e s t a t e to strangers.30 He concluded with the f o l l o w i n g comment: The a p p e l l a n t contends i n the t e e t h of the s t a t u t e and makes bo l d to say that the respondent the s o l e c h i l d of the t e s t a t o r should r e c e i v e nothing out of her f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e . C e r t a i n l y , there i s no la c k of hardihood i n the a p p e l l a n t , but the law i s p o s i t i v e and the Court i s not at l i b e r t y to l e g i s l a t e by way of the r e p e a l of a remedial s t a t u t e , i n t r u t h , of course, i t i s not w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e of the Court to l e g i s l a t e - although we see at times as i n t h i s case, submissions made to the Court i f acceded to would mean t h a t . A p r o v i s i o n must be made f o r the respon-dent the s o l e c h i l d of the t e s t a t o r . 3 1 M c P h i l l i p s J.A. by h i s o b s e r v a t i o n that " p r o v i s i o n must be  made f o r the respondent the s o l e c h i l d of the t e s t a t o r " 3 2 i n t e r p r e t e d the Act as r e q u i r i n g something more than main-tenance and support, and as imposing upon the t e s t a t o r the o b l i g a t i o n to make p r o v i s i o n f o r a c h i l d even though such c h i l d was not i n need of maintenance. The m a j o r i t y of the Court of Appeal f o l l o w e d a l i n e more i n keeping with the p r i n c i p l e s enunciated i n the e a r l y cases. M a r t i n J.A., f o r example, observed t h a t : 30 McDermott v. Walker, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 945 at p. 954, 42 B.C.R. 184 at p. 194. 31 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 955, B.C.R. at p. 195, (emphasis added). 32 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 955, B.C.R. at p. 195, (emphasis added) . - 77 -[ I ] t c l e a r l y appears that he [the t r i a l judge] has, with every r e s p e c t , proceeded upon a wrong p r i n c i p l e i n c o n s t r u i n g the Act as, i n e f f e c t , one which g i v e s a c h i l d a share of the e s t a t e as a g a i n s t the widow where the c h i l d has not di s c h a r g e d the onus upon i t of p r o v i n g that i t i s , i n the tr u e and proper sense, i n need of 'maintenance and support' having regard to her walk i n l i f e and a l l the other circumstances of the case.33 Macdonald J.A. was even more a r t i c u l a t e i n e x p r e s s i n g h i s views of the phi l o s o p h y of the Act, when he s t a t e d : Under the order appealed from the sum of $5,000 i s t r a n s f e r r e d from a p p e l l a n t to respondent (not f o r 'maintenance' because respondent i s not i n s t r a i t e n e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . . . . I do not thin k the Act was intended to apply to such a case. I f i t does few t e s t a t o r s can regard t h e i r testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n s as f i n a l . 3 4 T h i s l e g i s l a t i o n was enacted, as we may gather from i t s p r o v i s i o n s , because i n many i n s t a n c e s hard-s h i p and i n j u s t i c e arose. A husband might d i s i n h e r i t a wife who shared with him the labour of accumulating p r o p e r t y , and leave i t , e.g. to a woman with whom he maintained immoral r e l a t i o n s . 3 5 I t i s a 'Family Maintenance Ac t ; ' not an Act to des t r o y the f r e e d i s p o s i t i o n of pro p e r t y by w i l l . I t i s always a q u e s t i o n of f a c t i n each case whether or not i t was contemplated that an order should be made, su b j e c t to t h i s g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n that the Court must be s a t i s f i e d that the t e s t a t o r has been g u i l t y of a breach of that moral duty which parents owe to the s u r v i v i n g parent and to c h i l d r e n and i t onl y r e f e r s to those f o r whose maintenance at the time of the t e s t a t o r ' s death no adequate means of support are a v a i l a b l e . D i s c r e t i o n i s g i v e n to apply i t where the Court t h i n k s i t i s j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circum-stances to e x e r c i s e the powers c o n f e r r e d . That 33 I b i d . , D.L.R. at pp. 952 and 953, B.C.R. at pp. 192 and 193. 34 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 958, B.C.R. at pp. 198 and 199. 35 I b i d . , D.L.R. at pp. 958 and 959, B.C.R. at p. 199. - 78 -d i s c r e t i o n i s not j u d i c i a l l y e x e r c i s e d u n l e s s the o b j e c t , i n t e n t and s p i r i t of the Act i s observed. Although s.3 of the Act may not be h a p p i l y worded i t would not be suggested that an order must be made i n a l l cases where members of a f a m i l y , a d u l t s or minors, are not l e f t a nything by a parent's w i l l . 3 6 The Supreme Court of Canada, ' R i n f r e t J . d i s s e n t i n g , r e versed the d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal of B r i t i s h Columbia. R i n f r e t J . , i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment, h e l d t h a t : I cannot construe the Act to mean that i n every case where no p r o v i s i o n i s made, the s e c t i o n [the present s u b s e c t i o n 2(1) of the Act] above quoted i s mandatory and the Court must make an order.38 In h i s view: The f i r s t i n q u i r y t h e r e f o r e must be whether, at the death of the t e s t a t o r , the p e t i t i o n e r l a c k e d those means of maintenance and support which would be pro-per, having regard to her o r d i n a r y circumstances i n l i f e . For that purpose, the Court should c o n s i d e r how she has been maintained i n the past and what were, when the t e s t a t o r d i e d , the means of support a v a i l a b l e to her.39 36 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 959, B.C.R. at pp. 199 and 200. 37 Supra, f o o t n o t e 26. 38 I b i d . , S.C.R. at p. 99, D.L.R. at p. 666. 39 I b i d . , S.C.R. at pp. 99 and 100, D.L.R. at pp. 666 and 667. He concluded that the p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d to make out a case f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c t . She f a i l e d to come w i t h i n the purview or i n t e n t of the A c t . Presumably t h i s was because she d i d not demonstrate need having due regard to her circum-stances, and the circumstances of the e s t a t e . The m a j o r i t y judgment was d e l i v e r e d by Duff J . who opened h i s reasons by s t a t i n g that the a u t h o r i t y of the c o u r t came i n t o b eing, i f i n the o p i n i o n of the judge, adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the "proper maintenance and support" had not been made. He then proceeded to i d e n t i f y the meaning of "proper mainte-nance and support" i n the o f t e n quoted passage of h i s judg-m e nt 4 0 and concluded t h a t : I f the Court comes to the d e c i s i o n that adequate  p r o v i s i o n has not been made, then the Court must co n s i d e r what p r o v i s i o n would be not onl y adequate, but j u s t and e q u i t a b l e a l s o ; and i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s judgment upon t h i s , the pecuniary magnitude of the e s t a t e , and the s i t u a t i o n of ot h e r s having c l a i m s upon the t e s t a t o r , must be taken i n t o account.41 Duff J.'s statement i s no more than a restatement of the oper-a t i v e words of the r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n of the Act, namely: 2(1) ... i f a t e s t a t o r d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l which does not, i n the c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of the t e s t a -t o r ' s w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n , the cou r t may, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , ... order that the p r o v i s i o n that i t 40 See footnote 29. 41 Supra, footnote 26, S.C.R. at p. 96, D.L.R. at p. 663, (emphasis added). - 80 -t h i n k s adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circum-stances be made out of the e s t a t e ....42 Duff J . concluded h i s judgment with the f o l l o w i n g s t a t e -ment : I can see nothing i n a l l t h i s to l e a d to the con-c l u s i o n that the t e s t a t o r , i f p r o p e r l y a l i v e to h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , as f a t h e r no l e s s than as husband, ought to have f e l t h i m s e l f under an o b l i g a t i o n to hand over a l l h i s e s t a t e to h i s wife and leave h i s only c h i l d without p r o v i s i o n . 4 3 With t h i s statement, i n t e n t i o n a l l y or otherwise, Duff J . , vested upon the Act an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n under which a support-able argument c o u l d be made that a parent has an o b l i g a t i o n to leave a p o r t i o n of h i s e s t a t e to a c h i l d r e g a r d l e s s of the age or the need of that c h i l d . In any event, the award to the daughter represented approximately t w e n t y - f i v e percent of the net e s t a t e . Con-s i d e r i n g her circumstances, that she was not i n need, had not been supported by her f a t h e r , had reasonable a s s e t s and her husband had a good p o s i t i o n , the lump sum award cannot be j u s t i f i e d under the "support" theory r e g a r d l e s s of how generous support might be construed. 42 Supra, footnote 5, (emphasis added). 43 Supra, footnote 26, S.C.R. at p. 98, D.L.R. at p. 665. - 81 -The c o u r t might have made a comparison with the r a t i o n a l e i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e where the daughters were awarded an annuity on the b a s i s that they had no p e r s o n a l means of sup-po r t and t h e i r husbands may, i n f u t u r e , not be a b l e to support them. The c o u r t i n Walker v. McDermott chose not to c o n s i d e r the r a t i o n a l e of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e s t a t i n g that the case was of no h e l p because, amongst other reasons, the f a c t s were so v a s t l y d i f -f e r e n t . From a l l a s p e c t s , the award i n Walker v. McDermott can only be supported on the b a s i s that the c o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d the purpose of the Act as a v e h i c l e f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the c a p i t a l of the e s t a t e and thus the Supreme Court of Canada a t t r i b u t e d to the Act a meaning and a f u n c t i o n beyond that contemplated by the l e g i s l a t i o n and c l e a r l y beyond that as d e f i n e d by the e a r l y B r i t i s h Columbia cases and, c l e a r l y , beyond the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the A c t . - 82 -CHAPTER 4.  THE AFTERMATH OF WALKER V. MCDERMOTT In the aftermath of Walker v. McDermott two d i s t i n c t l i n e s of cases developed: those which would make "need" a c o n d i t i o n precedent to an award and those which would i n t e r p r e t the Act more i n the terms of e t h i c s than e c o n o m i c s . 4 4 There i s no doubt that "need" has been g i v e n an extended meaning by the c o u r t s . Stout C.J. i n A l l a r d i c e v. A l l a r d i c e r e f e r r e d to the e q u i v a l e n t s t a t u t e i n New Zealand as "some-t h i n g more than a s t a t u t e to extend the p r o v i s i o n s i n the D e s t i t u t e Persons A c t . . . . " 4 5 He f u r t h e r s t a t e d that the con-templated support d i d "not mean merely having a supply of food and c l o t h i n g " 4 6 and that the matter "should be c o n s i d e r e d , both as to widow and c h i l d r e n , i s how she or they have been maintained i n the p a s t . " 4 7 The Supreme Court of Canada took the same p o s i t i o n i n Walker v. McDermott when Duff J . s a i d : 44 Re: Tornroos E s t a t e , 3 Sept. 1976, Vancouver, X6695/74 at p. 5, unreported (B.C.S.C.). 45 Supra, footnote 8 at p. 969. 46 I b i d . , at p. 969. 47 I b i d . , at p. 969. - 83 -What c o n s t i t u t e s 'proper maintenance and support' i s a q u e s t i o n to be determined with r e f e r e n c e to a v a r i e t y of circumstances. I t cannot be l i m i t e d to the bare n e c e s s i t i e s of existence.48 Any r e f e r e n c e to need i n the cases can not, t h e r e f o r e , be l i m i t e d to "the bare n e c e s s i t i e s of e x i s t e n c e " 4 9 but w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g to a m u l t i t u d e of circumstances and w i l l f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e more than mere maintenance. The other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n goes even beyond the extended meaning of need to such an extent so as to p r o h i b i t d i s i n h e r i t a n c e . The two d i f f e r e n t approaches to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the meaning of "adequate p r o v i s i o n " were summarized by Wood J . i n Pennington v. B o u c h e r . 5 0 He s a i d : P l a i n t i f f s ' c o u nsel, i n h i s ab l e submissions, urges me t o conclude, on the b a s i s of a number of a u t h o r i t i e s t hat have been decided both before and s i n c e Walker v. McDermott, that the concept of ade-quate p r o v i s i o n f o r proper maintenance and support i n c l u d e s a moral or an e t h i c a l component, as w e l l as the economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Indeed, Mr. J u s t i c e Dickson, as he then was, i n Barr v. Barr, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 346, a f t e r reviewing a number of such a u t h o r i -t i e s , concluded at page 350 of the re p o r t as f o l l o w s : "The dominant theme running through the cases, and they are myriad, i s one of e t h i c s , even more than economics. Although The T e s t a t o r s Family Maintenance Act i s couched i n terms which at f i r s t impression appear to be pragmatic and economic, 'adequate p r o v i -s i o n f o r . . . proper maintenance and support', i t soon becomes apparent on a review of the a u t h o r i t i e s that heavy emphasis i s p l a c e d upon the moral aspects 48 49 50 Supra, footnote 26, S.C.R. at p. 96, D.L.R. at p. 663. See footnote 48. 18 A p r i l , 1984, Vancouver A82339, unreported ( B . C . S . C ) . - 84 -of the problem. The c o u r t was never intended to r e w r i t e the w i l l of a t e s t a t o r and i n d i s c h a r g i n g i t s d i f f i c u l t task of c o r r e c t i n g a breach of m o r a l i t y on a t e s t a t o r ' s p a r t the c o u r t must not, except i n p l a i n and d e f i n i t e cases, r e t r a i n [ s i c ] a man's r i g h t to d i s p o s e of h i s e s t a t e as he p l e a s e s . But, e q u a l l y , i t i s f a i r to stay [ s i c ] that the l e g i s l a t i o n has by and l a r g e r e c e i v e d a very l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The a t t i t u d e of the c o u r t s has been one of g r e a t f l e x i b i l i t y . Every case must, of course, be decided upon i t s own f a c t s and circumstances." I have concluded, a f t e r reading a l l of the author-i t i e s p r o v i d e d to me by c o u n s e l , that there are two competing l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y i n t h i s country. One, e x e m p l i f i e d by Mr. J u s t i c e Dickson's comment i n Barr  v. B a r r , takes a l i b e r a l approach to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the d i s c r e t i o n to be found i n S e c t i o n 2 of the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act and g e n e r a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e s the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the c o u r t i n t o the t e s t a t o r ' s ex-pressed d e s i r e on the b a s i s of what i s s a i d to be the moral or e t h i c a l duty of a parent to p r o v i d e f a i r l y and generously f o r a l l c h i l d r e n i n the absence of any d i r e c t evidence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r d i s i n h e r i t a n c e . The other l i n e of a u t h o r i t y , more a n a l y l i t i c a l [ s i c ] i n i t s approach, tends to r e l y on the p l a i n meaning of the language to be found i n S e c t i o n 2 and bases any such i n t e r v e n t i o n on the answer to the t h r e s h o l d q u e s t i o n whether or not t h e r e has been adequate p r o v i s i o n i n the economic sense alone, r e c o g n i z i n g that adequate p r o v i s i o n i n such sense w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g to a v a r i e t y of circum-stances and w i l l o f t e n i n v o l v e more than mere mainte-nance . 51 A. NEED AS CONDITION PRECEDENT Coady J . i n Re Dawson3"* c o n s i d e r e d the p r o v i s i o n s of the Act i n the l i g h t of an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e l i e f by two a d u l t c h i l d r e n . He observed that "the Act was [not] intended to operate,... [ f o r ] an order [to be] made i n a l l cases where 51 I b i d . , at pp. 5 and 6. 52 [1945] 3 D.L.R. 532 at p. 534, 61 B.C.R. 481 at pp. 484 and 485 (S.C.). - 85 -members of a f a m i l y , a d u l t s or minors, are not l e f t anything by a parent's W i l l . That i s not the t e s t . The s t a t u t e r e f e r s to f a i l u r e to make 'adequate p r o v i s i o n s f o r the proper main-tenance and s u p p o r t . ' " . 5 3 In r e f u s i n g to make an award f o r the b e n e f i t of the a d u l t a p p l i c a n t s on the b a s i s that they had no need, Coady J . had no h e s i t a t i o n i n con c l u d i n g that the p r i n c i p l e enunciated by Walker v. McDermott supported the view that " [ i ] f there i s no need on the p a r t of the claimant f o r proper maintenance and support, the Act does not a p p l y . " 5 4 In Re H o r n e t t 5 5 the a p p l i c a n t , an a d u l t daughter of the deceased, with reasonable means of her own, submitted that r e g a r d l e s s of her needs she had an "undeniable and ab s o l u t e r i g h t to 'adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r her proper maintenance and support' , . . " 5 6 For t h i s p o s i t i o n she r e l i e d upon the judg-ment of DesBrisay C.J.B.C. i n Re Jones; Jones v. Fox et a l . 5 7 where he s t a t e d : 53 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 534, B.C.R. at pp. 484 and 485. 54 I b i d . , D.L.R. at pp. 534 and 535, B.C.R. at p. 485. 55 (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 289, 38 W.W.R. (N.S.) 385 (B«C«S»C«)• 56 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 292, W.W.R. at p. 388. 57 (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 316 at p. 319, 36 W.W.R. (N.S.) 337 at p. 341 (B.C.C.A.); a f f i r m e d [1962] S.C.R. 273, 32 D.L.R. (2d) 433, 37 W.W.R. (N.S.) 597. The quote from the judgment of DesBrisay C.J.B.C. i s not a f f e c t e d by the a f f i r m i n g judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. - 86 -It i s a l s o to be observed that i n Walker v. McDermott, supra, need was not shown by the p e t i t i o n e r and the view that i t was necessary that i t be shown was r e j e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y of the Supreme Court of Canada. The l e a r n e d judge i n my view f a i l e d to gi v e due c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the qu e s t i o n of awarding to the ap p e l l a n t an e q u i t a b l e share of the e s t a t e which i n my o p i n i o n the cases c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d him to do. L e t t C.J.S.C. i n response to t h i s submission simply s t a t e d t h a t : I cannot i n t e r p r e t these words of the l e a r n e d C h i e f J u s t i c e as counsel f o r the p e t i t i o n e r asks me to construe them, - namely that a p e t i t i o n e r i s not re q u i r e d i n any event to show need ....58 More r e c e n t l y , the same p o s i t i o n was taken by Aikens J . i n Re H a r d i n g 5 ^ where, i n r e f u s i n g to make an award on be h a l f of the p e t i t i o n e r , he s t a t e d : I do, however, re f u s e to make an order i n her favour f o r the reasons e x p l a i n e d e a r l i e r , which, put s h o r t l y , are these: the p e t i t i o n e r has not shown need, so she has not shown that there was any duty owing by her f a t h e r to her, so he was f r e e to gi v e such b e n e f i t s as he saw f i t to h i s other c h i l d r e n . The Court should not i n t e r f e r e with the way he has disposed of h i s e s t a t e . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of these cases decided over a p e r i o d of almost t h i r t y y e a r s , leaves no doubt t h a t , at l e a s t , i n the 58 Supra, f o o t n o t e 55, D.L.R. at pp. 292 and 293, W.W.R. at p. 389. 59 [1973] 6 W.W.R. 229 at p. 242 (B.C.S.C.). minds of the to the c o u r t p r e s i d i n g e x e r c i s i n g judges, need i s a c o n d i t i o n precedent i t s d i s c r e t i o n under the s t a t u t e . B. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION THEORY Almost contemporaneously, the second l i n e of cases d e v e l -oped commencing with Barker v. Westminster T r u s t Company. 6 0 O'Halloran J.A. noted that i n Walker v. McDermott an award was made to the daughter n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g : (1) the f a t h e r had not supported h i s daughter f o r f i v e years before h i s death; and (2) that she had been married one year p r i o r to h i s death to a young man i n a r e s p o n s i b l e p o s i t i o n with a l a r g e company, who was i n r e c e i p t of a reasonably good s a l a r y and with good prospects f o r the f u t u r e ; and (3) the s t e p -mother had c o n t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y to the u p b u i l d i n g and p r e s e r v a t i o n of the e s t a t e both i n o r i g i n a l c a p i t a l advanced and i n work and management up to the time of the f a t h e r ' s death.61 He t h e r e f o r e concluded: [S]uch a judgment c o u l d not be founded upon a mere duty to support; i t must be manifest that the term 'maintenance' was read to mean something more than 'support' i n i t s o r d i n a r y and accepted sense, and was given a meaning c o n s i s t e n t only with a wider con-c e p t i o n of the e q u i t a b l e powers c o n f e r r e d by the statute. 6 2 60 Supra, f o o t n o t e 27. 61 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 524, W.W.R. at p. 484, B.C.R. at pp. 35 and 36. 62 I b i d , D.L.R. at pp. 524 and 525, W.W.R. at p. 484, B.C.R. at p. 36. - 88 -O'Halloran J.A. a l s o p o i n t e d out: On the f a c t s s t a t e d the f a t h e r ' s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ' to which the Court p o i n t e d , c o u l d not r e f e r to a duty to 'support', f o r he had not supported h i s daughter f o r f i v e years and she was doing very w e l l . Nor was there any room f o r duty on h i s p a r t to 'maintain' her, s i n c e he had not maintained her f o r f i v e years and she had b e t t e r e d her p o s i t i o n on marriage. The only ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' l e f t was not to d i s i n h e r i t her, but r a t h e r to 'advance' her, v i z . , to gi v e her a s u b s t a n t i a l share of h i s estate....63 A f t e r reviewing both the j u r i s p r u d e n c e and the s t a t u t e O'Halloran J.A. viewed the r e l i e f a f f o r d e d by the Act as f o l -lows : [T]here a r e , g e n e r a l l y speaking, at l e a s t two kinds of r e l i e f intended by the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Mainte- nance Act. F i r s t , there i s a form of 'maintenance and support' which i s a p u r e l y p e r s o n a l allowance to the a p p l i c a n t w ife, husband or c h i l d . R e l i e f of t h i s nature i s analogous to alimony.... Secondly, there i s a form of 'proper maintenance' which i s as e f f e c t -i v e l y a share of the e s t a t e as i f i t were so be-queathed i n the w i l l i t s e l f . . . . R e l i e f of t h i s k i n d a r i s e s most f r e q u e n t l y i n cases of d i s i n h e r i t a n c e such as t h i s case and Walker v. McDermott.64 Sloan J.A., McDonald J.A. and O'Halloran J.A. were the p r e s i d i n g judges i n Barker v. Westminster T r u s t Company. McDonald J.A. d i s s e n t i n g , would not allow the appeal on the b a s i s t h a t the a p p e l l a n t had d i e d . Sloan J.A., without r e a -sons, made the award to the a p p e l l a n t ' s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n -63 I b i d , D.L.R. at p. 525, W.W.R. at p. 484, B.C.R. at p.36. 64 I b i d , D.L.R. at pp. 526 and 527, W.W.R. at p. 486, B.C.R. at p. 38. - 89 -t a t i v e s . T h e r e f o r e , the o p i n i o n s expressed i n t h i s a n a l y s i s are those of O'Halloran J.A. onl y and not those of the other two judges. N e v e r t h e l e s s , when O'Halloran J.A. s t a t e d that the Supreme Court of Canada adopted ( i n Walker v. McDermott) an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "which i n p r i n c i p l e and p r a c t i c e accepts a more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the e s t a t e 6 5 the purpose of st a t u t e was extended i n scope f a r beyond i t s o r i g i n a l i n t e n t . The concept of an " e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n " of the e s t a t e was f u r t h e r developed by DesBrisay C.J.B.C. 6 6 when he s t a t e d : The l e a r n e d judge i n my view f a i l e d to g i v e due con-s i d e r a t i o n to the q u e s t i o n of awarding to the a p p e l -l a n t an e q u i t a b l e share of the e s t a t e which i n my op i n i o n the cases c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d him to do. Subsequent d e c i s i o n s have taken s e r i o u s l y the o b s e r v a t i o n of DesBrisay C.J.B.C. that he p e r c e i v e d that the o b l i g a t i o n of a judge, i n dependents' r e l i e f matters, i s to g i v e due c o n s i d -e r a t i o n to the q u e s t i o n of awarding an e q u i t a b l e share of the e s t a t e r e g a r d l e s s of need. 65 I b i d , D.L.R. at p. 525, W.W.R. at p. 485, B.C.R. at p. 36, (emphasis added). 66 Supra, footnote 57, D.L.R. at p. 319, W.W.R. at p. 341. - 90 -In Re M i c h a l s o n 6 7 the a p p l i c a n t daughter was as a f f l u e n t as her f a t h e r . Moreover, the f a t h e r gave the f o l l o w i n g e x p l a -n a t i o n i n h i s W i l l f o r d i s i n h e r i t i n g her: T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of my daughter i n t h i s my w i l l should not be i n t e r p r e t e d to r e f l e c t a lack of p a r e n t a l regard but r a t h e r , as I have over the years d u r i n g my l i f e t i m e p r o v i d e d f o r her generously, and i n view of her s t a t i o n i n l i f e , I f e e l no o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e f o r her f u r t h e r i n t h i s my w i l l . 6 8 Nonetheless, the c o u r t made an award on the b a s i s that there was "a manifest breach of the moral duty owed by the t e s t a t o r to h i s o n l y daughter and that the "moral duty to the p e t i t i o n e r would have been f u l f i l l e d by l e a v i n g her a reasonable sum." 6 9 S i m i l a r f i n d i n g s were made i n Re O s l a n d 7 0 and i n Re H o l t . 7 1 In the l a t t e r case, the c o u r t r e j e c t e d a s p e c i f i c sub-mi s s i o n by counsel f o r the respondent that the p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d to demonstrate that she was i n n e c e s s i t o u s circum-stances and t h e r e f o r e , f a i l i n g to show e n t i t l e m e n t to r e l i e f under the A c t . 67 [1973] 1 W.W.R. 560 ( B . C . S . C ) . 68 I b i d . , at p. 565. 69 I b i d . , at p. 567. 70 (1977), 1 E.T.R. 128 ( B . C . S . C ) . 71 (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 543 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 91 -The s o l i d i f i c a t i o n of the view that need was not a c o n d i -t i o n precedent f o r r e l i e f under the A c t , was b r i e f l y i n t e r -rupted by what appeared to be a misunderstanding of the e f f e c t of the d e c i s i o n i n Re L u k i e . 7 2 In Re Lukie the three members of the cou r t reached the same c o n c l u s i o n , but each based h i s judgment on a d i f f e r e n t premise. In common with most cases of t h i s nature, the f a c t s were r e l a t i v e l y simple. The deceased d i e d l e a v i n g f i v e a d u l t c h i l d r e n s u r v i v i n g and an e s t a t e of $40,000. By h i s W i l l the t e s t a t o r gave a $1,000 legacy to one daughter, f i f t y p ercent of the r e s i d u e of the e s t a t e to each of two sons and nothing to the other two c h i l d r e n . The two d i s i n h e r i t e d c h i l d r e n commenced an a c t i o n and the t r i a l j u d g e 7 3 d i r e c t e d a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the e s t a t e so that a l l four c h i l d r e n would share e q u a l l y . The le g a t e e daughter d i d not j o i n i n the proceedings. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the t r i a l judge. Robertson J.A. hel d that each a p p l i c a n t was adequately and p r o p e r l y maintained at the date of the t e s t a t o r ' s death and, i n h i s view, there was no room f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of eq u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s . 72 72 D.L.R. (3d) 395, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 395, (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 1, 26 R.F.L. 164, r e v e r s i n g [1975] W.W.D. 44, 20 R.F.L. 73 ( C A . ) -73 (1976), 20 R.F.L. 73 (B.C.S.C.). - 92 -Taggart J.A. although a d m i t t i n g that the a p p l i c a n t d i d not have to e s t a b l i s h n e c e s s i t o u s circumstances, r e l i e d upon the f a c t that the a p p l i c a n t s were t o t a l l y independent of the t e s t a t o r and c o u l d not r e l y upon t h e i r f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i . e . being c h i l d r e n ) to succeed. C a r r o t h e r s J.A. admitted that a t e s t a t o r ought to make p r o v i s i o n f o r the support of c l a i m a n t s i n need of a s s i s t a n c e , or f o r those accustomed and dependent upon i t . However, as the e s t a t e was of l i m i t e d value and the c l a i m a n t s were not i n need of a s s i s t a n c e , nor were they accustomed to i t , they c o u l d not succeed. I t was perhaps the emphasis p l a c e d by a l l three appeal judges on the f a c t that the a p p l i c a n t s were not i n need of a s s i s t a n c e that l e d to the misunderstanding of the d e c i s i o n which f o l l o w e d . In both Re R a d c l i f f e 7 4 and Re J a n k e 7 5 counsel argued that Re Lukie had the e f f e c t to make a f i n d i n g of need, presumably i n i t s extended meaning, 7 6 c o n d i t i o n precedent to r e l i e f under the A c t . 74 (1977), 2 B.C.L.R. 220 (S.C.). 75 (1977), 2 B.C.L.R. 378, 3 C.P.C. 249 (S.C.). 76 See t e x t , supra, at p. 87. - 93 -The B.C. Law Reform Commission 7 7 s t a t e d : "In Lukie v. Helgason, Mr. J u s t i c e Robertson h e l d that the showing of need was an a b s o l u t e p r e r e q u i s i t e to the e x e r c i s e of the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . " P r o f e s s o r Gordon B a l e 7 8 was l e d to comment as f o l l o w s : The case of Re L u k i e , [1975] W.W.D. 44, 20 R.F.L. 73 (B.C.S.C.) may, however, represent a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n the way i n which the B r i t i s h Columbia s t a t u t e i s a p p l i e d i n the f u t u r e . The misunderstanding that might have e x i s t e d was q u i c k l y c l a r i f i e d and P r o f e s s o r Bale's hope was soon s h a t t e r e d . The 7 Q c o u r t i n Re_Sleno /^ made r e f e r e n c e to the same e x t r a c t of Duff J.'s judgment as d i d Wilson C.J.S.C. i n Re Parks E s t a t e 8 " and s t a t e d : That statement has become the cornerstone of most of the judgments given under t h i s s e c t i o n s i n c e 1931, and continues to be the b a s i s upon which the s t a t u t e i s i n t e r p r e t e d . 8 1 77 Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia, Report on  S t a t u t o r y Succession R i g h t s , (1983), at p. 54. 78 G. Bale, " T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance i n B r i t i s h Columbia - F a i r share of the E s t a t e or E q u i t a b l e Maintenance and the Dilemma s t i l l C o n f r o n t i n g the Courts by the Supreme Court of Canada D e c i s i o n of 1930 i n Walker v. McDermott" (1977-78), 1 E.T.R. 129 at p. 132. 79 (1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d) 155 ( B . C . S . C ) . 80 Supra, f o o t n o t e 29. 81 Supra, footnote 79 at p. 160. - 94 -I t u n e q u i v o c a l l y concluded t h a t : In contending that proof of need i s a c o n d i t i o n p r e -cedent to recovery counsel f o r the respondent r e l i e s upon the judgment of Robertson, J.A., i n Re Lukie et  a l . and Helgason et a l . (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 395, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 395, 26 R.F.L. 164. A c a r e f u l reading of that judgment, however, i n d i c a t e s that the le a r n e d J u s t i c e of Appeal d i d not say t h a t , i n p r i n - c i p l e , the f i n d i n g of need was a c o n d i t i o n precedent .... 8 2 Indeed, a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Robertson J.A.'s judg-ment does not d i s c l o s e any b a s i s f o r the theory that need, even with the extended meaning gi v e n to i t by the c o u r t s , was to be a c o n d i t i o n precedent f o r r e l i e f under the A c t . Up to the time of the d e c i s i o n of Re Luki e , there might have been some doubt as to whether or not need was a c o n d i t i o n precedent. The d e c i s i o n s that f o l l o w e d Re Sleno make i t c l e a r that there i s no such requirement. In Brauer v. H i l t o n 0 - * the deceased l e f t nothing i n h i s W i l l to h i s three c h i l d r e n , who were a l l of the age of major-i t y , and although not w e l l o f f , were not dependent on the t e s t a t o r , nor were they i n a c t u a l need. The Court of Appeal co n s i d e r e d that the deceased had " l o s t s i g h t of h i s p a r e n t a l 82 I b i d , at p. 160, (emphasis added). 83 (1980), 15 B.C.L.R. 116 (C.A.). - 95 -d u t y . . . " 8 4 and accepted the concept that need d i d not have to be e s t a b l i s h e d . In G r a n f l e l d v. W i l l i a m s 0 an estranged and d i s i n h e r i t e d w i f e , with s u b s t a n t i a l wealth of her own, was awarded the sum of $100,000 from her husband's e s t a t e . In h i s judgment C a r r o t h e r s J.A. b l u n t l y s t a t e d "that n e c e s s i t o u s circumstances need not be shown." Q c In M o r r i s v. M o r r i s 0 0 the t e s t a t o r l e f t h i s e n t i r e e s t a t e of $270,000, p l u s $170,000 p a s s i n g by o p e r a t i o n of law to h i s widow, and nothing to h i s a d u l t c h i l d r e n aged f o r t y and t h i r t y - n i n e both making t h e i r own way i n l i f e , and indeed one of them a p r a c t i s i n g lawyer. The Court of Appeal i n t e r v e n e d by awarding lump sums of $75,000 to the daughter and $50,000 to the son. Macfarlane J.A., i n h i s judgment, concluded that the t e s t a t o r was i n breach of h i s moral duty i n " h i s f a i l u r e ... to r e v i s e h i s w i l l to recognize the l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n of h i s other two c h i l d r e n to share h i s c a p i t a l a s s e t s to some d e g r e e " 8 7 and that i t was "an a p p r o p r i a t e case f o r the Court to e x e r c i s e i t s 84 I b i d . , at p. 123. 85 (1981), 29 B.C.L.R. 150 at p. 153, 23 R.F.L. (2d) 127 at p. 130 (C.A.). 86 (1982), 41 B.C.L.R. 239, 14 E.T.R. 44 ( C A . ) (leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed March 1, 1983). 87 I b i d . , B.C.L.R. at p. 254, E.T.R. at p. 60. - 96 -d i s c r e t i o n by making the p r o v i s i o n which the t e s t a t o r ought to have made f o r the two c h i l d r e n who have been d i s i n h e r i t e d . 1 , 8 8 In making i t s award, the cou r t seems to have taken the p o s i -t i o n that the t e s t a t o r was under an o b l i g a t i o n to t r e a t h i s c h i l d r e n e q u a l l y , and that e q u a l i t y with the n o n - p e t i t i o n i n g c h i l d r e n should have been reached e i t h e r i n t e r v i v o s or p o s t -humously. Perhaps the most contemporary e x p r e s s i o n of how the c o u r t s are p r e s e n t l y viewing the Act can be found i n the words of McEachern C.J.S.C. i n D a l z i e l v. Bra d f o r d where a f t e r acknowledging that " [ t ] h e law on t h i s q u e s t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t to c h a r t . " 8 9 the C h i e f J u s t i c e s t a t e d t h a t : What I thin k the a u t h o r i t i e s are sa y i n g i s that the f i r s t i n q u i r y i s to determine whether the t e s t a -t o r made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r a q u a l i f i e d claimant i n h i s w i l l . I f he d i d not, then the Court may look at a l l the circumstances and decide i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n what a j u d i c i o u s f a t h e r seeking to d i s c h a r g e h i s p a r e n t a l duty would do. For good cause such a parent c o u l d d i s i n h e r i t a c h i l d , and he might not b e n e f i t a c h i l d who i s a l r e a d y adequately maintained; but a j u d i c i o u s f a t h e r would not look j u s t at the present circumstances of a c h i l d , even an a d u l t c h i l d , and probable f u t u r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the c h i l d and h i s f a m i l y must be recognized, s u b j e c t of course to the s i z e of the e s t a t e and other l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s . The approach, i t seems to me, must not be exces- s i v e l y economic f o r that i s not how p a r e n t a l d u t i e s  are u s u a l l y discharged.90 I b i d . , B.C.L.R. at p. 254, E.T.R. at p. 61. (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 215 at p. 227, 18 E.T.R. 261 at p. 273 (S.C.). I b i d . , B.C.L.R. at p. 230, E.T.R. at pp. 276 and 277, (emphasis added). 88 89 90 The C h i e f J u s t i c e thought that the law, based on Walker v. McDermott, a u t h o r i z e d such an approach. He admitted to some d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e c o n c i l i n g M o r r i s v. Morri^s^l a n c ] Re Lukie but e x p l a i n e d M o r r i s v. M o r r i s as an e x c e p t i o n of Re Lu k i e , based upon the s i z e of the e s t a t e and the f a c t that e q u a l i t y c o u l d be reached without endangering other l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s . He, l i k e w i s e , based h i s reasoning f o r awarding one-t h i r d of the r e s i d u e of the e s t a t e to each c h i l d on the f a c t that e q u a l i t y c o u l d be reached without d i s t u r b i n g s p e c i f i c b e q u e s t s . 9 3 I t would appear that the C h i e f J u s t i c e has taken the view that as long as l e g i t i m a t e claims are not a f f e c t e d , the cou r t should t r y f o r e q u a l i t y amongst the c h i l d r e n . C l e a r l y t h i s i s the adoption of a concept of e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n , without r e f e r e n c e to need. I t should perhaps be taken that the law i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s t h a t , absent s p e c i a l circumstances, a parent must leave h i s e s t a t e e q u a l l y amongst h i s c h i l d r e n , a c l e a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p . The concept that the Act i s being i n t e r p r e t e d by some co u r t s as a " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " s t a t u t e i s f u r t h e r emphasized by two recent cases that s t a t e as a p r i n c i p l e t h a t : "no p r o v i -91 Supra, footnote 86. 92 Supra, f o o t n o t e 89, B.C.L.R. at p. 230, E.T.R. at p. 276. 93 I b i d , B.C.L.R. at p. 230, E.T.R. at p. 276. - 98 -s i o n at a l l must n e c e s s a r i l y be regarded as inadequate p r o v i -s i o n " . The most unequivocal endorsement of such statement i s found i n McCoy v. Paterson et a l . 9 4 The t e s t a t r i x l e f t her modest e s t a t e to c h a r i t y and made no p r o v i s i o n f o r two a d u l t sons e x p r e s s i n g her reasons f o r so doing as f o l l o w s : A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n I have not made any p r o v i s i o n f o r any of my c h i l d r e n because they have not expressed any kindness and c a r i n g . I have made t h i s d e c i s i o n with the knowledge of the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act R.S.B.C. 1979, Chapter 435, and amendments thereto.95 In h i s judgment, Drost L.J.S.C. s t a t e d t h a t : [N]o p r o v i s i o n at a l l must n e c e s s a r i l y be regarded as inadequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the purposes of S.2 of the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act.96 In Re Plummer; M i n c k l e r v. P i n d e r 9 7 the t e s t a t r i x l e f t her e s t a t e to her g r a n d c h i l d r e n to the e x c l u s i o n of her daugh-t e r . In h i s judgment, Tyrwhitt-Drake L.J.S.C. s t a t e d : A n o n - d i s p o s i t i o n , being i n so many words no p r o v i -s i o n at a l l , must n e c e s s a r i l y be regarded as 'inade-quate p r o v i s i o n ' f o r the purposes of a c t i o n s such as th i s . 9 8 94 (1987), E.T.R. 6. 95 I b i d . , at p. 8. 96 I b i d . , at p. 12. 97 (1985), 18 E.T.R. 297 (B . C . S . C ) . 98 I b i d . , at p. 302. - 99 -Drost L.J.S.C. i n rea c h i n g the c o n c l u s i o n that no p r o v i -s i o n at a l l must n e c e s s a r i l y be regarded as inadequate p r o v i -s i o n regarded h i m s e l f bound by Tyrwhitt-Drake, L.J.S.C. i n Re Plummer; M i n c k l e r v. P i n d e r , . . . by the statements of McEachern, C.J. i n Greenwood v. Greenwood (1979), 11 B.C.L.R. 218 (B.C.S.C.) and of Taggart J.A. i n Marusyn v. P r i l l , B.C.C.A., Vancouver No. CA820243, 1983 [unreported].99 Tyrwhitt-Drake a l s o c o n s i d e r e d 1 ^ h i m s e l f bound by the d e c i s i o n s i n Greenwood v. Greenwood and Marusyn v. P r i l l . However, a c l o s e a n a l y s i s of these two cases does not show that e i t h e r McEachern C.J.S.C. or Taggart J.A. s t a t e d as a p r i n c i p l e of law that no p r o v i s i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y inadequate p r o v i s i o n . In Greenwood v. Greenwood 1" 1 the deceased made no p r o v i -s i o n s i n her W i l l f o r her husband. On the a p p l i c a t i o n by the husband, McEachern C.J.S.C. s t a t e d : I t i s apparent that the t e s t a t r i x d i e d l e a v i n g a w i l l and without making adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of her husband.102 99 Supra, f o o t n o t e 94 at p. 12. 100 Supra, f o o t n o t e 97 at p. 302. 101 (1979), 11 B.C.L.R. 218 (B.C.S.C.). 102 I b i d . , at p. 221. - 100 -His c o n c l u s i o n that there was no adequate p r o v i s i o n was based on h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f a c t s of the case and not merely because the deceased had made no p r o v i s i o n s i n the W i l l . i n o In Marusyn v. P r i l l 1 " - ' a widow was l e f t nothing i n the t e s t a t o r ' s W i l l . Taggart J.A. d e l i v e r e d the judgment of the cour t and s t a t e d : I t i s c l e a r enough that the t e s t a t o r d i d not make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of h i s wi f e . Indeed, he made none at a l l . Thus, i n my o p i n i o n , that p a r t of S e c t i o n 2 of the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act i s met.104 When Taggart J.A. s t a t e d "Indeed, he made none at a l l . " he was merely making a statement of f a c t and h i s c o n c l u s i o n that no adequate p r o v i s i o n was made was not based s o l e l y on the f a c t that no p r o v i s i o n was made i n the W i l l . I t can be s a i d t h e r e f o r e that the p r i n c i p l e enunciated by Drost L.J.S.C. and Tyrwhitt-Drake L.J.S.C. i s not supported by the cases upon which they r e l i e d . Nor does i t have any foun-d a t i o n on the j u r i s p r u d e n c e produced by the A c t . 1 0 5 Never-103 24 May 1983, Vancouver CA820243, unreported (B.C.C.A.). 104 I b i d . , at p. 7. 105 See: Coady J . i n Re Dawson, supra, at pp. 22 and 23; more r e c e n t l y the statement of Spencer J . i n P a t t e r s o n v. L a u r i t s e n , Crowther, McKay and L a u r i t s e n (1985), 58 B.C.L.R. 182 (S.C.) at p. 185, " [ C o u n s e l ] , f o r the defendants argued that i n proper cases an adequate p r o v i s i o n may be no p r o v i s i o n at a l l . That seems to f o l l o w from s.2(3)(a) of the Act." - 101 -t h e l e s s i t i s another i n d i c a t i o n as to the p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n the c o u r t s are prepared to p l a c e upon the A c t . The j u r i s d i c t i o n of the cou r t i n a d m i n i s t e r i n g the Act i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n Swain v. D e n n i s o n . 1 0 6 M a i t l a n d J . , speaking f o r the court s a i d : The e n t i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the t r i a l judge under t h i s s t a t u t e i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y i n c h a r a c t e r . The r e l i e f which may be granted under i t i s completely dependent on h i s o p i n i o n : (1) As to whether adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r proper maintenance and support has been p r o v i d e d f o r the spouse and c h i l d r e n under the w i l l ; and (2) If adequate p r o v i s i o n i s not thought to be made, as to what p r o v i s i o n should be made.107 The process f o r the cou r t i s twofold, f i r s t l y to determine i f adequate p r o v i s i o n has been made and i f not, to remedy such omission. I t can be seen, as a statement of gen e r a l a p p l i c a -t i o n , t h at i n the cases r e f e r r e d to under the heading "E q u i -t a b l e D i s t r i b u t i o n Theory" very l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n was g i v e n , i f any, to determining the adequacy of the p r o v i s i o n (or l a c k of p r o v i s i o n ) made. The c o u r t , almost a u t o m a t i c a l l y proceeded to deal with the quantum to be awarded, which i n most cases was a lump sum award from the c a p i t a l of the e s t a t e . 106 [1967] S.C.R. 7, 59 D.L.R. (2d) 357 (S.C.C.), 58 W.W.R. 232. 107 I b i d . , S.C.R. at p. 12, D.L.R. at p. 361, W.W.R. at p. 237. - 102 -The development of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e which b a s i c a l l y r e j e c t s need as c o n d i t i o n precedent and adopts " e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n " as the b a s i s f o r r e l i e f under the A c t , leaves no doubt that freedom of t e s t a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s l i m i t e d f a r beyond the c o u r t ' s a u t h o r i t y to p r o v i d e maintenance and support and that the s u c c e s s i o n regime i n the p r o v i n c e has become a form of m o d i f i e d f o r c e d h e i r s h i p . C. PRICE V. LYPCHUK ESTATE The case of P r i c e v. Lypchuk E s t a t e 1 0 " i s the most recent i l l u s t r a t i o n of the f a c t that the Act needs s e r i o u s and urgent r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . When both m a j o r i t y and d i s s e n t i n g judgments, p u r p o r t i n g to apply the p r i n c i p l e enunciated i n Walker v. M c D e r m o t t 1 0 9 came to o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n s i t i s c l e a r the law i s i n need of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . The f a c t s of the case are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y simple. The deceased, Mr. Lypchuk, who d i e d i n 1983, had married f o r the f i r s t time i n 1939 and two daughters r e s u l t e d from that mar-r i a g e . World War II i n t e r r u p t e d the marriage, which was not a happy one, and the deceased served i n Europe u n t i l the end of the war. Upon h i s r e t u r n to Canada i n 1945, he found that h i s wife would not l i v e with him, h i s two c h i l d r e n were being 108 P r i c e v. Lypchuk E s t a t e , 26 E.T.R. 259 [ a l s o r e p o r t e d at 37 D.L.R. ( 4 t h ) , [1987] 4 W.W.R. 128, 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 371, 6 (sub nom P r i c e v. Knutson) (B.C.C.A.)]. 109 Supra, footnote 26. - 103 -cared f o r by h i s in-laws and he was not allowed to see them. The spouses were d i v o r c e d i n 1950. The deceased married h i s second wife s h o r t l y a f t e r the d i v o r c e and had two c h i l d r e n . The marriage was a happy one and ended on the death of the second wife i n 1980. The deceased had no c o n t a c t with the c h i l d r e n of h i s f i r s t marriage f o r the p e r i o d of t h i r t y - f i v e years before h i s death. The deceased's e s t a t e had a value of about $81,000, a l l of which was l e f t e q u a l l y to the two c h i l d r e n of h i s second marriage. The deceased had i n h e r i t e d the t o t a l i t y of h i s second w i f e ' s e s t a t e when she d i e d . The p l a i n t i f f , one of the daughters of the f i r s t mar-r i a g e , a p p l i e d f o r p r o v i s i o n out of the e s t a t e under the pro-v i s i o n s of the A c t . The t r i a l judge found that the deceased d i d not have good cause f o r d i s i n h e r i t i n g the p l a i n t i f f and f a i l e d to d i s c h a r g e h i s p a t e r n a l duty i n so doing. The t r i a l judge, t h e r e f o r e , found that the deceased had not made ade-quate p r o v i s i o n f o r the p l a i n t i f f and awarded her an equal share i n the e s t a t e . The b e n e f i c i a r i e s named i n the W i l l , the c h i l d r e n of the second marriage, appealed the d e c i s i o n . Lambert J.A., Taggart J.A. c o n c u r r i n g , allowed the appeal because the long s e p a r a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y e r a d i c a t e d any moral - 104 -duty which the deceased might have owed the c h i l d r e n of h i s f i r s t marriage. By c o n t r a s t , Esson J.A. d i s s e n t i n g , s t a t e d that the long s e p a r a t i o n by i t s e l f was not s u f f i c i e n t to permit the deceased to d i s i n h e r i t the c h i l d r e n from the f i r s t marriage. In h i s judgment, Lambert J.A. quoted the o f t e n c i t e d passage from the judgment of Duff J . i n Walker v. McDermott and concluded that the p r i n c i p l e s t h e r e i n enunciated were as v a l i d today as when the d e c i s i o n was handed down i n 1931 and were b i n d i n g on the Court of Appeal. He m o d i f i e d the p r i n -c i p l e s so enunciated by r e f e r r i n g to changing s o c i a l circum-stances : Women now have a valued p o s i t i o n i n the workplace; everyone i s e n t i t l e d to r e l y on a widespread network of s t a t e f i n a n c i a l support; the nuclear f a m i l y i s f a r from u n i v e r s a l ; and f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s l e g i s l a t i o n contemplates and promotes the f i n a n c i a l independence of spouses from each other and c h i l d r e n from t h e i r p a r e n t s . The j u d i c i o u s f a t h e r of Walker v. McDermott, seeking to d i s c h a r g e both h i s m a r i t a l and h i s p a r e n t a l duty, must be c o n s i d e r e d as doing so i n accordance with a contemporary view of m a r i t a l and p a r e n t a l o b l i g a t i o n s and i n accordance with a con-temporary view of testamentary i n d e p e n d e n c e . I l l Lambert J.A. a l s o emphasiz a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t and i n h i s the Act makes i t c l e a r that 110 See t e x t , supra, at p. 74. 111 Supra, footnote 108 at pp. ed the f a c t that m o r a l _ c o n s i d e r -o p i n i o n , "the very s t r u c t u r e of the l e g i s l a t i v e scheme contem-268 and 269 E.T.R. - 105 -p l a t e s t h at the concept of moral duty i s an e s s e n t i a l element i n the working of the A c t . " 1 1 2 However, because of the long s e p a r a t i o n and the f a c t t h a t the e s t a t e was b u i l t up, i n p a r t , by the second wife to whom he had been married f o r t h i r t y y e a r s , i t was not a case where a moral duty c o u l d be found that would prevent the t e s t a t o r from d i s i n h e r i t i n g the c h i l d r e n of the f i r s t marriage. The appeal was t h e r e f o r e d i s m i s s e d . Esson J.A., i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment, best i d e n t i f i e s the s t a t u s of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e . He recognizes that i n i t s primary i n t e n t , to p r o t e c t spouses and dependent c h i l d r e n , the Act has been g e n e r a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n a c h i e v i n g i t s o b j e c t . However, he s t a t e s : The same cannot be s a i d of claims by a d u l t c h i l d r e n . The m a j o r i t y of the decided cases, p a r t i -c u l a r l y those which have been the s u b j e c t of appeals, d e a l with such c l a i m s . The law developed i n those cases i s i n a s t a t e of d i s a r r a y such that i t i s a l l but i m p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t with any c o n f i d e n c e what r e s u l t w i l l flow from any g i v e n s t a t e of f a c t s , and unduly d i f f i c u l t to decide what that r e s u l t should be.113 He i d e n t i f i e s the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n , as p r o v i d e d by S e c t i o n 2(1) of the Act, as coming i n t o being a f t e r i t reaches 112 I b i d . , at p. 270 E.T.R. 113 I b i d . , at p. 273 E.T.R. - 106 -the c o n c l u s i o n that the t e s t a t o r has not made "adequate pro-v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support" f o r h i s s u r v i v -ing spouse or c h i l d r e n , such negative f i n d i n g being a c o n d i -t i o n precedent to the cou r t making an award i n favour of the a p p l i c a n t . Esson J.A. f u r t h e r comments that the language of the sec -t i o n c o u l d have been i n t e r p r e t e d as r e q u i r i n g the cou r t to make p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i v e to the o b l i g a t i o n s which e x i s t e d dur-ing the t e s t a t o r ' s l i f e t i m e . I t c o u l d a l s o have been i n t e r -p r e t e d as r e q u i r i n g the a p p l i c a n t to demonstrate need f o r pro-v i s i o n s i n excess of those contained i n the W i l l . Had i t been so i n t e r p r e t e d , Esson J.A. s t a t e s , "there would be an o b j e c -t i v e b a s i s f o r d e c i d i n g whether an abl e - b o d i e d c h i l d c o u l d II 114 recover. ,,-L-L* However, i t has not been so i n t e r p r e t e d . On the con-t r a r y , a long l i n e of b i n d i n g d e c i s i o n s have enunciated the concept of "moral duty" to c h i l d r e n , and that need i s not a c o n d i t i o n precedent to the c l a i m . Esson J.A. concludes that "need having been excluded as an e s s e n t i a l element, the o p i n i o n whether adequate p r o v i s i o n has been made must be almost e n t i r e l y s u b j e c t i v e ; i t must be based l a r g e l y on the i n d i v i d u a l Judge's sense of the f i t n e s s of t h i n g s . " 1 1 5 114 I b i d . , at p. 274 E.T.R. 115 I b i d . , at p. 274 E.T.R. - 107 -In a comment, re m i n i s c e n t of that of O'Halloran J.A., Esson J.A. concluded: That sense may vary widely from person to person, depending upon such t h i n g s as r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l background, f a m i l y h i s t o r y and a t t i t u d e s , and p e r s o n a l experiences.117 He concludes f u r t h e r that the p r e v a i l i n g view, presumably of the j u d i c i a r y , i s that parents have g e n e r a l l y some o b l i g a -t i o n to p r o v i d e , ( i n t h e i r W i l l , ) f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n r e g a r d -l e s s of age. He recognized that " I t i s open to q u e s t i o n whether most people, i n the B r i t i s h Columbia of 1920 or 1983, would have agreed with that v i e w " . 1 1 8 In d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to h i s p e r c e p t i o n of the popular view; the i n e v i t a b l e c o n c l u s i o n from the cases, as w e l l as Esson J.A.'s own view of those cases as expressed i n h i s judgment i s that a c l a i m by a d i s i n h e r i t e d c h i l d w i l l , with some degree of c e r t a i n t y , succeed. However, the r e s u l t of any case i s uncer-t a i n because the remedies are t o t a l l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y . In Esson J.A.'s own words "there i s no way of knowing what p r o v i s i o n s w i l l be found to be a p p r o p r i a t e i n any given c a s e . " 1 1 9 Esson J.A. concluded h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment by adopting 116 See t e x t , i n f r a at p. 120. 117 I b i d . , at p. 274 E.T.R. 118 I b i d . , at p. 274 E.T.R. 119 I b i d . , at pp. 274 and 275 E.T.R. - 108 -the p r i n c i p l e that g e n e r a l l y the t e s t a t o r i s under a moral duty not to d i s i n h e r i t h i s c h i l d r e n and awarded the P l a i n t i f f o n e - f i f t h of the e s t a t e . Thus the m a j o r i t y on the f a c t s found that there was no moral duty owed, i t having been d i s p l a c e d by the long separa-t i o n . The d i s s e n t i n g judge found that the moral duty had not been d i s p l a c e d and t h e r e f o r e the t e s t a t o r c o u l d not d i s i n h e r i t h i s c h i l d r e n . The d e c i s i o n i s a f u r t h e r m a n i f e s t a t i o n that the Act i s being u t i l i z e d by the j u d i c i a r y as a f o r c e d h e i r s h i p s t a t u t e i n an environment where testamentary freedom i s c o n s i d e r e d to be the p r e v a i l i n g p h i l o s o p h y and without the understanding of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p nor with adequate safeguards which, out of n e c e s s i t y , are inhe r e n t i n any such s t a t u t e . I t i s i n c o n -c e i v a b l e that the c o u r t c o u l d adopt such a stance without some l e g i s l a t i v e d i r e c t i o n s on what p o r t i o n of t h e i r p r o g e n i t o r s ' e s t a t e s d i s i n h e r i t e d c h i l d r e n are e n t i t l e d . - 109 -CHAPTER 5.  SURVIVAL OF RIGHT OF ACTION The t h e s i s that the s t a t u t e i s t r e a t e d as c l o s e r to a f o r c e d h e i r s h i p concept than a remedial one i s r e i n f o r c e d by the treatment i n the B.C. c o u r t s of claim a n t s who have d i e d a f t e r the death of the t e s t a t o r . Although there i s no case i n B r i t i s h Columbia, as yet, that d e a l s with the commencement of an a c t i o n by the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a c l a i m a n t , there are cases that do make awards i n favour of the e s t a t e of claima n t s who have d i e d a f t e r commencement of an a c t i o n . The q u e s t i o n as to whether or not the r i g h t of a c t i o n given by the Act s u r v i v e s the death of a claimant should be d i v i d e d i n t o three d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s : (1) The claimant who s u r v i v e s the t e s t a t o r but d i e s w i t h -out commencing the a c t i o n . (2) The claimant who has d i e d a f t e r he has commenced the a c t i o n but before the h e a r i n g . (3) The claimant who d i e s a f t e r the h e a r i n g but bef o r e a l l appeal procedures are exhausted, i . e . before " f i n a l " judgment i s d e l i v e r e d . - 110 -As to the f i r s t c ategory, there i s no case i n Canada, or any other j u r i s d i c t i o n with dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n d e a l i n g with t h i s p o i n t . 1 2 0 For purposes of t h i s a n a l y s i s , c a t e g o r i e s (2) and (3) may be combined as one. Although the B r i t i s h Columbia Court of Appeal c o n s i d e r e d i n v a r y i n g degrees the q u e s t i o n of s u r v i v a l of a c t i o n s under the Act i n Barker v. Westminster T r u s t "191 Company, the case cannot be co n s i d e r e d as d e c i s i v e author-i t y on the i s s u e f o r two b a s i c reasons. F i r s t l y , no c l e a r r a t i o i s d i s c e r n a b l e from that d e c i s i o n . To quote from the e d i t o r i a l n o t e 1 2 2 of that r e p o r t : In r e s u l t t h i s judgment decides nothing more than that the t r i a l Judge wrongly e x e r c i s e d h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n r e f u s i n g the a p p l i c a n t maintenance out of h i s wif e ' s e s t a t e . On none of the other important ques-t i o n s r a i s e d i s there a m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . 120 I t c o u l d probably be saf e to assume from the dictum i n the v a r i o u s cases that i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s other than B r i t i s h Columbia, the Courts would not e n t e r t a i n an a c t i o n commenced by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a deceased c l a i m a n t . See f o r example Re McMaster (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 436 at p. 442, 21 W.W.R.(N.S.) 603 at p. 609 ( A l t a S.C.) where Egbert J . , s t a t e d : "I a c c o r d i n g l y f i n d that the widow's r i g h t to r e l i e f and to apply f o r r e l i e f terminated upon her death, and the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e l i e f by her executors i s d i s m i s s e d . " ; See a l s o : Wetzel v. N a t i o n a l T r u s t  Company L t d . (1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 171, 18 W.W.R.(N.S.) 556 (Sask. C.A.), Re Kerby E s t a t e , [1949] O.W.N. 187 (Co. Ct. ) . 121 Supra, footnote 27. 122 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 514. - I l l -Secondly, the wording of the s t a t u t e i s no longer the same as i t was when the i s s u e was co n s i d e r e d by the Court. As to the wording of the s t a t u t e , O'Halloran J.A. con-s i d e r e d the then S e c t i o n 13 which read: The a p p l i c a t i o n may be made by an executor on be h a l f of any person e n t i t l e d to apply or by any guardian or next f r i e n d of an i n f a n t . He decided that the phrase "an executor" d i d not r e f e r to "the executor" of the t e s t a t o r but that of the c l a i m a n t . 1 2 3 t McDonald J.A., on the other hand, would have read S e c t i o n 13 as contemplating an executor a p p l y i n g on beh a l f of a l i v i n g person. In h i s view, the s e c t i o n contemplated the executor of the t e s t a t r i x (or) a p p l y i n g on beh a l f of her husband ( h i s wife) or c h i l d r e n , not the executor of the husband (wife) or c h i l d r e n a p p l y i n g . " His r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s e c t i o n was that the executor a n t i c i p a t i n g proceedings under the Act might w e l l wish to o r i g i n a t e them h i m s e l f to br i n g the matter to a head and a c c e l e r a t e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the e s t a t e . 123 I b i d . , D.L.R. at pp. 519 and 520, W.W.R. at pp. 478 and 479, B.C.R. at p. 30. 124 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 535, W.W;R. at pp. 495 and 496, B.C.R. at pp. 47 and 48. - 112 -The d i v e r g i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s p l a c e d on the s e c t i o n are no longer of relev a n c e as S e c t i o n 13 has been r e p e a l e d . 1 2 5 N e v e r t h e l e s s the case i s h i g h l y r e l e v a n t s i n c e the ques-t i o n of s u r v i v a l of an a c t i o n under the Act was e x t e n s i v e l y d i s c u s s e d by two of the judges of the Court of Appeal. The i s s u e was, simply, whether judgment on the appeal should be give n d e s p i t e the death of the claimant before Reasons f o r Judgment were handed down. O'Halloran J.A. decided that the r i g h t of a c t i o n g i v e n by the Act d i d s u r v i v e the death of the a p p l i c a n t , so that the pe r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the a p p l i c a n t were e n t i t l e d to continue the a c t i o n on h i s b e h a l f . Macdonald J.A., on the other hand, d i s a g r e e d with t h i s view and hel d that the Act d i d not contemplate the s u r v i v a l of an a c t i o n a f t e r the death of the a p p l i c a n t . O'Halloran J.A. s t a t e d "In t h i s case... i t must be h e l d the r i g h t vested on the death of the t e s t a t r i x " . 1 2 6 He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t : [T]he s t a t u t e i t s e l f p l a i n l y i n d i c a t e s , and as a p p l i e d i n Walker v. McDermott...the p r o v i s i o n i n a 125 S.B.C. 1971, c. 64, s. 4. 126 Supra, f o o t n o t e 27, D.L.R. at p. 518, W.W.R. at p. 477, B.C.R. at p. 29. - 113 -proper case...may extend to an e q u i t a b l e share i n the e s t a t e . . . . 127 On the b a s i s of such statements i t must be concluded, that at l e a s t i n h i s view, the Act p r o v i d e d a pr o p e r t y r i g h t , a chose i n a c t i o n , and thus e n f o r c e a b l e by the p e r s o n a l r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e of the deceased c l a i m a n t . I t was e n f o r c e a b l e even i f the c l a i m a n t , having s u r v i v e d the t e s t a t o r , d i e d before commencing the a c t i o n . McDonald J.A. d i s a g r e e d fundamentally with O'Halloran J.A.'s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the o b j e c t s of the s t a t u t e . In h i s view the Act d i d not c r e a t e a vest e d r i g h t i n a dependent to a share of the deceased's e s t a t e . In h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment, McDonald J.A. s t a t e d : The Court i s to be governed by the a p p l i c a n t ' s needs and moral claims and not by anything resembling l e g a l r i g h t s . So, c l e a r l y i t s powers under the Act are no or d i n a r y j u d i c i a l powers. The qu e s t i o n s n a t u r a l l y a r i s e : How can the Court be asked to meet the needs of a person who no longer needs anything? How can the Court p r o p e r l y p r o v i d e f o r maintenance of a person who can no longer be maintained?128 Concluding that the r i g h t to invoke the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n belonged s o l e l y to the dependent and s i n c e he was no longer 127 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 520, W.W.R. at p. 479, B.C.R. at p. 31. 128 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 536, W.W.R. at p. 496, B.C.R. at p. 48. - 114 -a l i v e , he s t a t e d that there c o u l d be no b a s i s f o r o b t a i n i n g an award under the A c t . O'Halloran J.A. a l s o found support f o r h i s reasoning i n the language of the s t a t u t e i t s e l f . S e c t i o n 3 of the Act pro-v i d e d that the a p p l i c a t i o n c o u l d be made "by or on b e h a l f o f " wi f e , husband or c h i l d r e n of the t e s t a t o r . S e c t i o n 13 p r o -v i d e d t h a t : The a p p l i c a t i o n may be made by an executor on b e h a l f of any person e n t i t l e d to apply or by any guardian or next f r i e n d of an i n f a n t . In O'Halloran J.A.'s view these s e c t i o n s i n d i c a t e d t h a t the s t a t u t e i t s e l f envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t y that a claimant might d i e before having e s t a b l i s h e d h i s c l a i m and t h a t , i n that event, p r o v i s i o n was made f o r h i s executor to continue the c l a i m on h i s b e h a l f . McDonald J.A. dis a g r e e d with O'Halloran J.A.'s i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n of S e c t i o n s 3 and 13, h o l d i n g that they contemplated a r i g h t of a c t i o n being brought on be h a l f of a l i v i n g p e r s o n . 1 2 9 129 McDonald J.A.'s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S e c t i o n 13: (D.L.R. at p. 535, W.W.R. at p. 496, B.C.R. at pp. 47 and 48.) "I have no doubt that s. 13 contemplates the executor of the t e s t a t r i x a p p l y i n g on beha l f of her husband or c h i l d r e n , not the executor of the husband or c h i l d r e n a p p l y i n g . T h i s i s confirmed by the wording of s. 3, which c l e a r l y contemplates a l i v i n g person's a p p l y i n g (by h i m s e l f or through a n o t h e r ) . " i s p l a u s i b l e . However, i t i s not necessary to form a concluded o p i n i o n on t h i s p o i n t s i n c e O'Halloran J.A., d i d not r e s t h i s d e c i s i o n e x c l u s i v e l y on t h i s p o i n t and the S e c t i o n was repealed i n 1971, (S.B.C. c.64, s. 4 . ) . - 115 -The r e s u l t of Barker, t h e r e f o r e , i s to produce two d i a -m e t r i c a l l y opposed views as to the r i g h t of a c t i o n g i v e n by the s t a t u t e . In the view of O'Halloran J.A. the Act c r e a t e s a vested r i g h t on the p a r t of a dependent from the moment a t e s t a t o r d i e s without having made reasonable p r o v i s i o n f o r the dependents i n h i s W i l l , and such i s the nature of t h i s r i g h t t h a t i t s u r v i v e s the death of the dependent and passes to h i s pe r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . In the view of McDonald J.A., how-ever, the r i g h t to make a c l a i m under the Act does not depend on any ves t e d r i g h t but r e s t s i n s t e a d on a s o r t of e x p e c t a t i o n on the p a r t of the dependent that a court w i l l e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n h i s favour i f he makes a c l a i m . Such an expec-t a t i o n can, of i t s nature, o n l y be a v a i l a b l e to a l i v i n g de-pendent. The next B r i t i s h Columbia case d e a l i n g with the q u e s t i o n of an award f o r a deceased a p p l i c a n t , who di e d a f t e r the death of the t e s t a t o r and a f t e r f i l i n g the p e t i t i o n , but before the hea r i n g , i s Re C a l l a d i n e E s t a t e 1 3 0 where Wilson J . adopted the r u l i n g of O'Halloran J.A. i n Barker v. Westminster T r u s t Co. [1941] 3 W.W.R. 473, at 482: The c o u r t should t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r the m e r i t s of the appeal as they e x i s t e d when the husband was a l i v e . . . . the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s i n t e r se should be cons i d e r e d as they e x i s t e d at the commencement of the l i t i g a t i o n : Vide In re Keystone K n i t t i n g M i l l s Trade 130 (1958), 25 W.W.R. (N.S.) 175 at pp. 176 and 177 (5«C*S«C*)• - 116 -Mark [1929] 1 Ch 92, 97 L J Ch 316. The cour t i n coming to i t s c o n c l u s i o n s should be governed by the circumstances as they e x i s t e d when the s t a t u t e was invoked. Wilson J . concluded by awarding to the executor of the deceased claimant a sum equal to what he would have g i v e n the claimant i f l i v i n g , thus t r a n s f e r r i n g o ne-half of the c a p i t a l of the e s t a t e to the e s t a t e of the deceased a p p l i c a n t . The next, and l a s t , case on the s u b j e c t i s Brauer v. H i l t o n 1 3 1 where one of the claimants d i e d a f t e r the t r i a l , but before the appeal, and an order was made pursuant to the pro-v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 11 of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t , 1 3 2 a p p o i n t i n g h i s widow to a c t as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s e s t a t e f o r the pur-poses of the appeal. Hinkson J.A., without h e s i t a t i o n and without r e f e r e n c e to any j u r i s p r u d e n c e , and with no apparent argument by cou n s e l , as to the q u e s t i o n of the e n t i t l e m e n t of the c l a i m a n t s , made an award to the e s t a t e of the deceased a p p l i c a n t . When statements such as: "should r e c e i v e an e q u i t a b l e share of the e s t a t e . " ; 1 3 3 " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ... not to d i s -i n h e r i t . . . " ; 1 3 4 "would a j u d i c i o u s f a t h e r have d i s i n h e r i t e d 131 Supra, footnote 83. 132 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 3. 133 Supra, footnote 55, D.L.R. at p. 296, W.W.R. at p. 393. 134 Supra, footnote 27, D.L.R. at p. 525, W.W.R. at p. 484, B.C.R. at p. 36. - 117 -• j o e h i s o n l y daughter?"- 1-- 3 3 are combined with the i m p l i c a t i o n of the awards made to deceased c l a i m a n t s and the present view as expressed by Wilson C.J.C.A. i n Re Bowe 1 3 6 "that the circum-stances to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n are those e x i s t i n g and reasonably f o r e s e e a b l e at the date of the t e s t a t r i x ' s death ..." (which would presumably g i v e the a p p l i c a n t a vested r i g h t ) the i n e v i t a b l e c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , r e g a r d l e s s of the a r t i c u l a t e d purpose of the s t a t u t e that i t i s intended to assure dependents of proper m a i n t e n a n c e , 1 3 7 the a c t u a l r e s u l t of the cases i s to assure c l a i m a n t s a f a i r share of the e s t a t e . I t can be s a i d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t : In B r i t i s h Columbia, testamentary freedom has been eroded to a c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r extent than i n other p r o v i n c e s because i t s Courts have too f r e e l y exer-c i s e d a wide d i s c r e t i o n which, i t i s submitted, i s not to be found w i t h i n the s t a t u t e . The B.C. Courts have not simply l i m i t e d testamentary freedom i n order to p r ovide maintenance which i s c l e a r l y mandated by the s t a t u t e but a l s o to prov i d e a f a i r d i s t r i b u t i o n of the e s t a t e which i s not mandated by the statute.138 135 Supra, footnote 70 at p. 140. 136 (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 338 at p. 341, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 234 at p. 237 (B.C.S.C.). 137 See: Dun v. Dun, [1959] A.C. 272 at p. 290; D i l l o n v. P u b l i c Trustee of New Zealand, [1941] A.C. 294 at pp. 303 and 304, [1941] 2 A l l E.R. 284 at p. 289, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 865 at p. 871, r e v e r s i n g (1939), N.Z.L.R. 550 which reversed (1938), N.Z.L.R. 693 (P.C.) per Vi s c o u n t Simon L.C.; Walker v. McDermott, (1930), 42 B.C.R. 184 at pp. 198 and 199, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 945 at p. 958, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 332 at pp. 344 and 345 (B.C.C.A.) per Macdonald J.A. reversed by [1931] S.C.R. 94, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 662. 138 G. Bale, "Duty Owed to Ablebodied Adult C h i l d r e n Under T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance L e g i s l a t i o n and the Need to Adopt an O b j e c t i v e Approach", (1983-84), 14 E.T.R. 35 at p. 42. - 118 -CHAPTER 6.  GUIDELINES FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION The o r i g i n of the Act was c l e a r l y remedial and the e a r l y cases leave no doubt that the c o u r t s so i n t e r p r e t e d the A c t . So long as the remedial concept i s f o l l o w e d , the Act i s q u i t e workable and the e a r l y cases, once having determined that the cour t had j u r i s d i c t i o n , d i d p r o v i d e maintenance f o r the a p p l i -cant without d i s t u r b i n g the concept of testamentary freedom. A contemporary example of a most no v e l , yet t o t a l l y p r a c -t i c a l and r e a l i s t i c , guide post i n making an award based on the remedial p h i l o s o p h y was that used by Lander L.J.S.C. (as he then was) i n Bates v. Bates et a l . 1 3 9 Using a c t u a r i a l evidence, he ordered that a sum be set a s i d e from the e s t a t e to p r o v i d e income to the deceased's widow. In using t h i s approach, the judge t r e a t e d the Act as remedial and p r o v i d e d a remedy f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the widow. I t i s unf o r t u n a t e that the Court of A p p e a l 1 4 0 although upholding Judge Lander's d e c i s i o n d i d not see f i t to comment upon h i s method of reach-ing the award. 139 (1981), 9 E.T.R. 235 (B. C . S . C ) . 140 Bates v. Bates and Froom [1982] 4 W.W.R. 193, 11 E.T.R. 310 (B.C.C.A.). - 119 -As f a r as can be determined, t h i s i s the onl y r e p o r t e d case that has used a c t u a r i a l evidence to q u a n t i f y the award. The concept i s c l e a r l y d e s i r a b l e as i t avoids " i n t u i t i v e a s s e s s m e n t " , 1 4 1 and the dangers of r e l y i n g on the " d i s c r e t i o n of the Judge" as g r a p h i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d by O'Halloran J . A . , 1 4 2 I t would go a long way towards r e s t o r i n g the s t a t u t e to i t s o r i g i n a l p h i l o s o p h y . 1 4 3 D i f f i c u l t i e s are encountered, however, when the c o u r t s use the Act f o r purposes of a l l o c a t i n g an " e q u i t a b l e share" of the e s t a t e , e i t h e r to augment a p r o v i s i o n a l r e a d y made or to prevent d i s i n h e r i t a n c e . At t h i s p o i n t , the Act i s not equipped to serve as a " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p s t a t u t e " and the c o u r t s have s t r u g g l e d to i d e n t i f y a g u i d e l i n e or standard. T h i s problem was i d e n t i f i e d by Macdonald J.A. i n Re  L e w i s 1 4 4 and an attempt was made by O'Halloran J.A. to d e a l with i t . Without a r t i c u l a t i n g the t h e s i s O'Halloran J . A . 1 4 5 must have recognized that i f he were to use the Act as a 141 G. Bale, "Bates v. Bates et a l . " Op. c i t . , f o o t n o t e 139 at p. 237. 142 Supra, f o o t n o t e 27, D.L.R. at p. 533, W.W.R. at p. 493, B.C.R. at p. 45. 143 Although the methodology used by Lander L.J.S.C. i s novel and more s c i e n t i f i c the concept and r e s u l t were no d i f f e r e n t than those used by the e a r l y B.C. cases d e c i d e d immediately a f t e r the enactment of the A c t . (See t e x t , supra, at pp. 3 to 10.) 144 See i n f r a , footnote 195. 145 Supra, f o o t n o t e 27. - 120 -v e h i c l e to prevent d i s i n h e r i t a n c e , i t was e s s e n t i a l f o r him to f i n d g u i d e l i n e s or norms which were not o u t l i n e d i n the Act i t s e l f . In g r a s p i n g f o r standards he s t a t e d t h a t : What i s the standard or the y a r d s t i c k by which the Court s h a l l determine i f a p r o v i s i o n i s adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e ? The words of the s t a t u t e ' i n the o p i n i o n of the Judge before whom the a p p l i c a t i o n i s made' should not be read too l i t e r a l l y , f o r then we would r e v e r t to the time when E q u i t y was i n t e r p r e t e d by the l e n g t h of the 'Ch a n c e l l o r ' s f o o t ' and of which Lord Camden was prompted to w r i t e : 'The d i s c r e t i o n of the Judge i s the law of t y r a n t s ; i t i s always unknown; i t i s d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t men; i t i s c a s u a l and depends upon c o n s t i -t u t i o n temper and p a s s i o n . In the best i t i s o f t e n -times c a p r i c e ; i n the worst i t i s every v i c e f o l l y and p a s s i o n to which human nature i s l i a b l e . ' However, there i s a standard f o r the guidance of the Judge. I t i s the standard s et up by law f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e s t a t e estates.146 He concluded that the " i n t e s t a c y p r o v i s i o n s of the Admini- s t r a t i o n Act ... p r o v i d e a convenient and recognized standard f o r determining whether adequate p r o v i s i o n has been made..." 1 4 7 During the next f o r t y y e a r s , the p r i n c i p l e propounded by O'Halloran J.A. (supra) was t r e a t e d with i n d i f f e r e n c e by the Courts of B r i t i s h Columbia, and was n e i t h e r e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y 146 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 533, W.W.R. at p. 493, B.C.R. at p. 45. 147 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 534, W.W.R. at p. 494, B.C.R. at p. 46. - 121 -adopted nor v i o l e n t l y r e j e c t e d , 1 4 8 although a few cases made re f e r e n c e to i t . 1 4 9 In 1982, however, Seaton J.A. r e j e c t e d the argument that the proper standard to apply was what the claimant would have r e c e i v e d i n an i n t e s t a c y under the Admini- s t r a t i o n Act and concluded "that the t e s t l a i d down i n the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act i s s u f f i c i e n t e x p r e s s i o n of the l e g i s -l a t i v e w i l l , . . . " 1 5 0 In the ongoing search f o r a reasonable standard to be a p p l i e d i n an a p p l i c a t i o n under the Act, T a y l o r J . i n t r o d u c e d 148 Re W i l l a n , [1951] 4 W.W.R. 114 at p. 132 ( A l t a . S.C.), Egbert, J . s t a t e d "[W]ith a l l r e s p e c t , I think there i s nothing i n the s t a t u t e of B r i t i s h Columbia which j u s t i f i e s such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n being p l a c e d upon i t . . . " . 149 In Re Dupaul (1941), [1941] 4 D.L.R. 246 at p. 247, 56 B.C.R. 532 at pp. 534 and 535 ( C A . ) O'Halloran J.A. commented: "The combined sum so n e a r l y approximates the share of the e s t a t e the husband would have r e c e i v e d i f the wife had die d i n t e s t a t e (vide s. 112(2) of the Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n Act, R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 5), i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e , that i n h i s search f o r a standard of p u b l i c p o l i c y to guide h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n the d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n he had to make, the l e a r n e d Judge turned to the i n t e s t a c y p r o v i s i o n as a g e n e r a l l y accepted i n d i c a t i o n of what was 'adequate j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circumstances.'" In Re Jones E s t a t e (1959), 30 W.W.R. (N.S.) 498 (B.C.S.C) Ruttan J . observed at pp. 507 and 508 t h a t : "there i s some a u t h o r i t y i n t h i s p r o v i n c e f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d by the same r u l e which governs the apportionment of es t a t e s to widows and c h i l d r e n upon i n t e s t a c i e s under the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of E s t a t e s Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, ch. 6. " However, i t was not a r u l e that must be r i g i d l y f o l l o w e d although i t merited the most c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 150 Supra, f o o t n o t e 140, W.W.R. at p. 196, E.T.R. at p. 314. - 122 -a reasonable, although s h o r t - l i v e d concept not d i s s i m i l a r to that of O'Halloran J.A. when he [O'Halloran J.A.] adopted the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n as a standard. In Richards v. Person et a l . l j l T a y l o r J . commenced h i s judgment by s t a t i n g : T h i s a c t i o n . . . r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n whether a s u r -v i v i n g spouse can today reasonably be h e l d e n t i t l e d to l e s s under the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t , R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 453, than would have been awarded under the Family  R e l a t i o n s A c t , R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, on a s e p a r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e i r l i v e s . He concluded: [T]hat where ... the court i s vested with broad d i s c r e t i o n and r e q u i r e d to do that which appears j u s t i t ought always to seek guidance by r e f e r e n c e to contemporary custom, and p a r t i c u l a r l y to those r u l e s which the community has adopted as p a r t of the s t a t u t e law. Where the community has d e c l a r e d that spouses should, prima f a c i e , share c e r t a i n a s s e t s e q u a l l y on a d i v o r c e or v o l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n , that i s something which a court can h a r d l y ignore i n d e c i d i n g what a l l o c a t i o n of such a s s e t s would be 'adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e ' upon death.152 Given that c o n c l u s i o n , he a p p l i e d , the standard that would have been a p p l i e d i n a c l a i m under the Family R e l a t i o n s A c t . 1 5 3 151 [1982] 2 W.W.R. 668 at p. 669 ( B . C . S . C ) . 152 I b i d . , at p. 671. 153 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121. - 123 -An appeal was taken from T a y l o r J.'s d e c i s i o n 1 5 4 and although the quantum of the award was not d i s t u r b e d , the p r i n -c i p l e of r e f e r r i n g to the Family R e l a t i o n s Act as a guide was t o t a l l y r e j e c t e d . C a r r o t h e r s J.A. s t a t e d i n h i s judgment: I a p p r e c i a t e the temptation to adopt t h i s ... [the p r o v i s i o n s of the Family R e l a t i o n s A c t] ... as a measure of community standard when determining 'ade-quate p r o v i s i o n ' under the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t . However, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and e q u i t a b l e f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g on a d i v i s i o n of a s s e t s f o l l o w i n g an i n t e r  v i v o s marriage breakdown are v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t from and i r r e l e v a n t to those which come i n t o p l a y upon the death of a spouse, and are, with r e s p e c t , improper c o n s i d e r a t i o n s under the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act.155 Hinkson J.A. agreed with the d i s p o s i t i o n of the appeal as i n d i c a t e d by C a r r o t h e r s J.A.. He a l s o adopted Seaton J.A.'s r e j e c t i o n i n Bates v. B a t e s 1 5 6 of counsel's submission that the theory of the Family R e l a t i o n s Act as a guide, as put f o r t h by Ta y l o r J . , 1 5 7 should be co n s i d e r e d . The combined r e s u l t of these two Court of Appeal d e c i -s i o n s i s that i t i s not proper f o r the co u r t to con s i d e r e i t h e r the p r o v i s i o n s of i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n or the Family  R e l a t i o n s Act i n making an award i n an a p p l i c a t i o n under the 154 146 D.L.R. (3d) 565, [1984] 1 W.W.R. 573, (1984), 49 B.C.L.R. 43, 15 E.T.R. 193 (C.A.). 155 Ibid.,D.L.R. at pp. 567 and 568, W.W.R. at p. 575, B.C.L.R. at p. 45, E.T.R. at pp. 195 and 196. 156 See supra, f o o t n o t e 150. 157 Supra, footnote 154, D.L.R. at p. 568, W.W.R. at pp. 575 and 576, B.C.L.R. at pp. 45 and 46, E.T.R. at p. 196. - 124 -Act, f o r c i n g the c o u r t s to be i n c r e a s i n g l y s u b j e c t i v e i n t h e i r awards. A treatment of the Family R e l a t i o n s Act i s beyond the scope of t h i s paper; however, there i s i n B r i t i s h Columbia a lack of symmetry between the t e s t a t o r ' s o b l i g a t i o n b efore and a f t e r h i s death. I f marriage breakdown d u r i n g the t e s t a t o r ' s l i f e t i m e i s , i n g e n e r a l terms, an event which t r i g g e r s the equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , i t i s l o g i c a l t h a t a marriage breakdown caused by death should be an equal t r i g g e r -ing event. T a y l o r J . attempted to b r i n g some harmony between the Family R e l a t i o n s Act and the A c t . The Court of Appeal d i d not f e e l i t c o u l d endorse such concept and i n f a c t r e j e c t e d i t . In t h i s c o n t e x t , i t i s worthy of note that the p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o by i t s newly enacted Family Law A c t 1 5 8 g e n e r a l l y makes p r o v i s i o n that the value of a l l p r o p e r t y accumulated by spouses d u r i n g t h e i r marriage, i n c l u d i n g the matrimonial home, i s to be shared e q u a l l y when the marriage ends. The concept i s extended to the t e r m i n a t i o n of marriage by the death of a spouse. I f a deceased spouse's net f a m i l y p r o p e r t y exceeds the net f a m i l y p r o p e r t y of the s u r v i v o r , then the s u r v i v i n g spouse would be e n t i t l e d to one-half the d i f f e r e n c e . 158 S.O. 1986, c.4, which r e c e i v e d Royal Assent on January 17th, 1986, and proclaimed i n f o r c e on March 1 s t, 1986. CHAPTER 7. ASSETS SUBJECT TO THE ACT AND THE AVOIDANCE OF ITS APPLICATION The p r o v i s i o n s of the Act can only apply to those a s s e t s which devolve through the deceased's p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e . Those a s s e t s which devolve o u t s i d e the deceased's e s t a t e , and t h e r e f o r e o u t s i d e the c o n t r o l of the p e r s o n a l r e -p r e s e n t a t i v e , are immune from p o s s i b l e charge by the A c t . Th i s p r i n c i p l e was c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d by the A l b e r t a Supreme Court i n Dower v. P u b l i c Trustee et a l . 1 5 9 where R i l e y J . i n h i s judgment s t a t e d : No p a r t of any p r o p e r t y with which he has p a r t e d dur-ing h i s l i f e t i m e can be admi n i s t e r e d by the c o u r t under The Family R e l i e f Act and the s t a t u t e does not r e g u l a t e or r e f e r to d i s p o s i t i o n s made du r i n g the deceased's l i f e - t i m e . The c o u r t , t h e r e f o r e , has no j u r i s d i c t i o n to grant a dependent a share of any pr o -p e r t y which was not owned by the deceased at the date of h i s death and i s not comprised i n h i s e s t a t e . G i f t s made i n t e r v i v o s with an i n t e n t to reduce the s i z e of a man's e s t a t e do not h i n d e r , d e l a y or d e f e a t h i s dependents' c l a i m s under the s t a t u t e as the s t a t u t e does not a u t h o r i z e any i n t e r f e r e n c e with i n t e r v i v o s d i s p o s i t i o n s of h i s property.160 He then concluded with the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n : 159 (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 29, 38 W.W.R. 129 ( A l t a . S.C.). 160 I b i d , D.L.R. at p. 39, W.W.R. at p. 141. - 126 -It may w e l l be s o c i a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e to a l l o w a hus-band to d e l i b e r a t e l y impoverish h i m s e l f by denuding h i m s e l f of w e l l nigh a l l h i s a s s e t s d u r i n g h i s l i f e -time, to the p o i n t that an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e l i e f under The Family R e l i e f Act would be a b o r t i v e , and I q u i t e concede that the s t a t e may w e l l have an i n t e r e s t to seein g that a husband c a r r i e s out h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the support of h i s wife and h i s dependents, both d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e and f o l l o w i n g h i s d e a t h — a n i n t e r e s t i n the avoidance of penury, an i n t e r e s t i n a workable Family R e l i e f A c t . That, of course, i s a matter f o r the L e g i s l a t u r e and not f o r the Courts.161 The p r i n c i p l e goes beyond i n t e r v i v o s g i f t s . K e l l o c k J . , 1 6 2 i n the Supreme Court of Canada when d e a l i n g with s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n , s t a t e d : T h i s s e c t i o n would seem i n the c l e a r e s t terms to i n -d i c a t e that the s o l e source from which any allowance granted under the Act i s to be s a t i s f i e d i s the a s s e t s to which c r e d i t o r s are e n t i t l e d to look. The a s s e t s to which c r e d i t o r s are e n t i t l e d to look are the a s s e t s which the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a t e s t a t o r i s e n t i t l e d to a d m i n i s t e r . Instead of con-t a i n i n g any p r o v i s i o n that a dependant i s e n t i t l e d to a higher r i g h t than c r e d i t o r s , as i s here contended by the a p p e l l a n t , the s t a t u t e i s express i n p l a c i n g the dependant i n a l e s s f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n . 1 6 3 A c l o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the cases, i n t h i s area, leaves no doubt that e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p e r t y concepts have been i n v i -o l a t e . The c o u r t s have considered dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s -l a t i o n as a c o n t r o l over testamentary freedom and t h e r e f o r e "a l i m i t a t i o n on the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l to do what he 161 I b i d , D.L.R. at p. 40, W.W.R. at p. 142. 162 In Re Ker s l a k e E s t a t e ; Kerslake v. Gray, [1957] S.C.R. 516. 163 I b i d . , at pp. 519 and 520. - 127 -l i k e s with h i s own." 1 6 4 The c o u r t s have concluded that i f the c o u r t s were to i n c l u d e o u t s i d e a s s e t s as p a r t of the " e s t a t e " " i t would be l e g i s l a t i n g , and not i n t e r p r e t i n g " , 1 6 5 which "of course i s a matter f o r the L e g i s l a t u r e and not f o r the C o u r t s " . 1 6 6 The c o u r t s have reco g n i z e d that " i t may w e l l be s o c i a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e to allo w a husband to d e l i b e r a t e l y impoverish h i m s e l f by denuding h i m s e l f of ... h i s a s s e t s d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e to the p o i n t that an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e l i e f under the Family R e l i e f Act would be a b o r t i v e . . . 1 , 1 6 7 They have lamented t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to make allowances out of excluded a s s e t s , 1 6 8 yet appear to have concluded that they cannot i n t e r f e r e with e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p e r t y concepts even i f they are being used f o r the s p e c i f i c purpose of a v o i d i n g the a p p l i c a -t i o n of the remedial p r o v i s i o n s of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s -l a t i o n . 1 6 9 164 In re Kensington (deceased), Kensington and another v. Kensington and o t h e r s , [1949] N.Z.L.R. 382 at p. 397. 165 I b i d . , at p. 398. 166 Supra, f o o t n o t e 159, D.L.R. at p. 40, W.W.R. at p. 142. 167 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 40, W.W.R. at p. 142. 168 Re Young E s t a t e , [1955] O.W.N. 789. 169 See In re P a u l i n [1950] V.L.R. 462 at p. 464; Dower v. P u b l i c Trustee supra, f o o t n o t e 159 D.L.R. at p. 40, W.W.R. at p. 142; C o r l e t v. I s l e of Man Bank L t d . , [1937] 3 D.L.R. 163 at p. 166 ( A l t a . S.C. App. D i v . ) . - 128 -The f o l l o w i n g are the most common types of a s s e t tenure that can e f f e c t i v e l y n e u t r a l i z e the p r o v i s i o n s of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n : ( i ) J o i n t Tenancies T h e o r e t i c a l l y a person may av o i d the p r o v i s i o n s of depen-dents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n by t r a n s f e r r i n g p r o p e r t y i n t o h i s and h i s s e l e c t e d b e n e f i c i a r y ' s name i n j o i n t tenancy. By so doing the t e s t a t o r ensures that the p r o p e r t y so t r a n s f e r r e d does not pass on h i s death to the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e r e f o r e i s unable to be charged with an order under depen-dents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . There seems to be only one d e c i s i v e case i n Canada on the s u b j e c t . In Re Maxwell E s t a t e 1 7 0 i n proceedings under The  Dependents' R e l i e f A c t , R.S.S. 1953, ch. 121, i n t e r p r e t i n g p r o v i s i o n s s i m i l a r to those common to most dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n i n the country, the court concluded: [T]he husband's one h a l f share of the j o i n t p r o -p e r t y shown as p a r t of h i s e s t a t e by the executors was not i n law p a r t of h i s e s t a t e as the term i s d e f i n e d i n sec. 2 (1) of the A c t : . . . It seems c l e a r that he no longer had power to dispose of h i s share of the j o i n t p r o p e r t y by w i l l , so i t f o l l o w s that i t i s not p a r t of h i s e s t a t e f o r the purposes of the Act.171 170 Re Maxwell E s t a t e (1962), 38 W.W.R. 23 (Sask. Q.B.). 171 I b i d . , at pp. 24 and 25. - 129 -Although the Maxwell E s t a t e i s the o n l y r e l e v a n t precedent i t may be l i m i t e d i n scope because the co u r t found that the circumstances were not a d e l i b e r a t e attempt to a v o i d the p r o -v i s i o n s of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . ( i i ) G i f t s I n t e r Vivos In the e a r l y developments of dependents' r e l i e f j u r i s p r u -dence, both the c o u r t s of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand a r t i c u -l a t e d the p r i n c i p l e t h at i f a v a l i d g i f t was made i n t e r v i v o s , the c o u r t s had no power to i n t e r f e r e with i t even i f the r e -s u l t of the g i f t was to a v o i d the p r o v i s i o n s of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . In re Richardson, d e c e a s e d 1 7 2 i n c o n s i d e r i n g i n t e r v i v o s a l i e n a t i o n of a s s e t s the court s t a t e d : I f a person disposes of h i s p r o p e r t y otherwise than by w i l l , although the r e s u l t may be that the persons mentioned are l e f t at h i s death without adequate p r o -v i s i o n f o r the purposes set out, t h i s Court cannot i n t e r f e r e with h i s d i s p o s i t i o n made du r i n g h i s l i f e . 1 7 3 The Supreme Court of New Zealand i n Re Thomson (deceased),  Thomson and another v. Thomson, 1 7 4 i n d e a l i n g with s i m i l a r circumstances adopted the views expressed by Poole J . i n the 172 [1920] S.A.L.R. 24. 173 I b i d . , at p. 40. 174 [1933] N.Z.L.R. 59. - 130 -Richardson c a s e 1 7 5 and h e l d t h a t : "The s t a t u t e i n no way attempts to r e g u l a t e d i s p o s i t i o n s i n l i f e . " , 1 7 6 and t h a t : "The Act then makes an ex post f a c t o i n t e r f e r e n c e with the e x e r c i s e of testamentary powers, but does not f u r t h e r i n t e r -f e r e with a l i e n a t i o n . " 1 7 7 I t i s important to note that i n the Thomson case an a l l e g a t i o n was made that the t e s t a t o r had completed the i n t e r  v i v o s g i f t with the express purpose of d e f e a t i n g the dependents' r e l i e f s t a t u t e . The court concluded that there was no evidence before i t to s a t i s f y such a l l e g a t i o n , 1 7 8 l e a v -ing unanswered the p e r t i n e n t q u e s t i o n of what would the c o u r t have done i f i t were proven that the i n t e r v i v o s g i f t was as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of a p l a n to a v o i d the s t a t u t e . The most cogent d e c i s i o n d e a l i n g with the q u e s t i o n of i n t e r v i v o s a l i e n a t i o n i s that of Dower v. P u b l i c T r u s t e e et  a l . 1 7 9 where an a p p l i c a t i o n was made, i n t e r a l i a , to have c e r t a i n i n t e r v i v o s g i f t s d e c l a r e d v o i d or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , impressed with a t r u s t , on the grounds that the g i f t s had been made with the express purpose of a v o i d i n g the p r o v i s i o n s of the A l b e r t a Family R e l i e f A c t . Although the t r a n s f e r s were 175 Supra, footnote 172. 176 Supra, footnote 174 at p. 62. 177 I b i d . , at p. 63. 178 I b i d . , at p. 62. 179 Supra, footnote 159. - 131 -s u b s t a n t i a l they were made g r a t u i t o u s l y and had the e f f e c t of rendering the e s t a t e v i r t u a l l y impecunious. The cou r t r e j e c t e d the c l a i m and i n so doing c o n s i d e r e d , i n d e t a i l , the e f f e c t of i n t e r v i v o s a l i e n a t i o n on the A c t . R i l e y J . , s t a t e d : I am of the o p i n i o n that no a c t i o n l i e s under 13 E l i z . , c. 5 [Fraudulent Conveyances A ct] by a wife or widow to set a s i d e t r a n s f e r s or g i f t s of p r o p e r t y made by her husband d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e with an a l l e g e d i n t e n t to defeat her c l a i m to a " f a i r " or "proper" share of h i s e s t a t e under the Family R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1955, c. 109. While the words ' C r e d i t o r s and o t h e r s ' i n 13 E l i z . , c. 5 should be give n a broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , they i n c l u d e o n l y such persons who have ' l e g a l or e q u i t a b l e ' c l a i m s a g a i n s t the grantor or s e t t l o r . In May on Fraudulent and V o l u n t a r y D i s p o s i t i o n s of Pro- p e r t y , 3rd ed., i t i s s a i d , p. 102: 'The words ' c r e d i t o r s and ot h e r s ' are wide enough to i n c l u d e any person who has a l e g a l or eq u i t a b l e r i g h t or c l a i m a g a i n s t the grantor or s e t t l o r , by v i r t u e of which he i s , or may be-come, e n t i t l e d to rank as a c r e d i t o r of the l a t -t e r . ' 180 His c o n c l u s i o n t h e r e f o r e was t h a t : No p a r t of any pr o p e r t y with which he has p a r t e d dur-ing h i s l i f e t i m e can be admini s t e r e d by the Court under the Family R e l i e f Act and the s t a t u t e does not r e g u l a t e or r e f e r to d i s p o s i t i o n s made d u r i n g the deceased's l i f e t i m e . 1 8 1 180 I b i d . , D.L.R. at pp. 33 and 34, W.W.R. at p. 134. 181 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 39, W.W.R. at p. 141. I t t h a t : - 132 -i s of note that R i l e y J . a r t i c u l a t e d the p r i n c i p l e At common law a wife had no r i g h t to a share of her husband's e s t a t e and there was no l i m i t on a hus-band's power to dispose of h i s own pr o p e r t y by g i f t or by w i l l . 1 8 2 He then adopted p a r t of the reasoning of Ford J.A. i n C o r l e t v. I s l e of Man Bank L t d . 1 8 3 which s t a t e d : Counsel f o r the a p p e l l a n t makes the c o n c e s s i o n , i n the soundness of which I agree, that the s e t t l o r ' s i n t e n t i o n to a v o i d , escape or evade the payment of su c c e s s i o n duty i n A l b e r t a or i n O n t a r i o and to p r e -vent recourse being had by h i s widow to the Widows R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1922, c. 145, i s of no s i g n i f i -cance except as a s s i s t i n g i n f i n d i n g whether or not the t r u s t instrument was or was not of a testamentary character.184 On the b a s i s of h i s a r t i c u l a t e d p r i n c i p l e and the reasoning of Ford J.A., R i l e y J . made the statement of p u b l i c p o l i c y t h a t , although s o c i a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e to permit a spouse to d i v e s t h i m s e l f of h i s a s s e t s d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e so as to n e u t r a l i z e the p r o t e c t i o n of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n , there was nothing i n the l e g i s l a t i o n to prevent such course of action.185 182 I b i d , D.L.R. at p. 34, W.W.R. at p. 135. 183 [1937] 3 D.L.R. 163 ( A l t a . S.C. App. D i v . ) . 184 I b i d . , at p. 166. 185 Supra, footnote 159 D.L.R. at p. 40, W.W.R. at p. 142. - 133 -Such statement answered the q u e s t i o n , of the e f f e c t of d e l i b e r a t e course of conduct, which was l e f t unanswered by the Supreme Court of New Zealand i n the Thomson case, and leads to the c o n c l u s i o n that u n l e s s p r o h i b i t e d by the words of the s t a t u t e , plans f o r the avoidance of the remedies a v a i l a b l e under dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n would not be set a s i d e by the c o u r t . ( i i i ) I n t e r V i v o s T r u s t s In keeping with the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e that the c o u r t has no j u r i s d i c t i o n to grant a share of any p r o p e r t y which was not owned by the deceased at the date of h i s death, i n t e r v i v o s s e t t l e m e n t s have the e f f e c t of removing a s s e t s from the e s t a t e of the t e s t a t o r , p r e v e n t i n g them from being charged under de-pendents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . In Re Emele E s t a t e 1 8 6 the Saskatchewan King's Bench Court h e l d that a s s e t s p a s s i n g by v i r t u e of an i n t e r v i v o s t r u s t were not to be con s i d e r e d p a r t of the e s t a t e f o r purposes of a l l o c a t i o n of a s s e t s under the a p p r o p r i a t e remedial p r o v i s i o n s of the dependent's r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n C o l l i e r v. Yonkers et a l . 1 8 7 a wi f e , p r i o r to her death, s e t t l e d the sum of One Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s 186 [1941] 2 W.W.R. 566. 187 (1967), 61 W.W.R. 761 ( A l t a . S.C. App. D i v . ) . - 134 -upon a c o r p o r a t e t r u s t e e to pay the income to her upon her l i f e and, upon her death, to d i s t r i b u t e corpus amongst her c h i l d r e n and g r a n d c h i l d r e n by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The e s t a t e a s s e t s , other than the t r u s t fund, were of i n s i g n i f i c a n t v a l u e . The husband argued that the t r u s t fund formed p a r t of the e s t a t e and s u b j e c t to the p r o v i s i o n s of the a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . The Court of Appeal upholding the d e c i -s i o n s of the t r i a l judge h e l d t h a t : The t r u s t fund i s not p a r t of the e s t a t e of the wife and the c o u r t has no power under the Act to order that p r o v i s i o n be made thereout f o r the husband.188 IRQ In re P a u l i n x o : 7 the c o u r t r e f u s e d to i n c l u d e two d u l y c r e -ated t r u s t funds which, by v i r t u e of the t r u s t p r o v i s i o n s , passed to the deceased's c h i l d r e n on h i s death as p a r t of the " e s t a t e " f o r purposes of the a p p r o p r i a t e dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . In reaching i t s c o n c l u s i o n , the court l e f t no doubt that i t was e x c l u d i n g the t r u s t funds: Notwithstanding the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which t h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n of the Act i n v o l v e s f o r those who may seek by non-testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n s to d e f e a t the c l a i m s of a p a r t i c u l a r dependant or dependants, i t seems to me no other view i s p o s s i b l e 1 9 0 188 I b i d . , at p. 763. 189 [1950] V.L.R. 462. 190 I b i d . , at p. 464. - 135 -(i v ) Other A s s e t s Excluded From the P r o v i s i o n s of Dependents' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n  The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e enunciated i n Dower v. P u b l i c T r u s t e e 1 9 1 i s e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to other a s s e t s which, i n f a c t , pass to des i g n a t e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s independent of the t e s t a t o r ' s W i l l . I t has been h e l d t h e r e f o r e , t h a t : l i f e i nsurance p o l i c i e s payable to a desig n a t e d b e n e f i c i a r y do not form p a r t of the e s t a t e ; 1 9 2 and s i m i l a r l y that pension funds and a n n u i t i e s c o u l d not be charged under the p r o v i s i o n s of dependent's r e -l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . 1 9 3 Whether or not a proven i n t e n t to a v o i d the p r o v i s i o n s of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n would v o i d any i n t e r v i v o s t r a n s f e r , or impress the s u b j e c t matter of such t r a n s f e r with a t r u s t , or whether such t r a n s f e r , s o c i a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e as i t may be, cannot be atta c h e d by the c o u r t , i s r e a l l y not the i s s u e . The i s s u e r e a l l y i s the p o t e n t i a l to a v o i d the p r o t e c -t i o n of dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n and at the very l e a s t , the exposure of a claimant to extended l i t i g a t i o n to a d j u d i -cate on the e f f e c t of such t r a n s f e r . 191 Supra, footnote 159. 192 Re Dalton & MacDonald, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 798 (B.C.C.A.); Ker s l a k e v. Gray, [1957] S.C.R. 516 ; Re G i l b e r t E s t a t e , (1965), 51 W.W.R. 701 (Sask. Q.B.). 193 Re Young E s t a t e , [1955] O.W.N. 789 (Sur. C t . ) ; Berezowsky v. Berezowsky (1975), 23 R.F.L. 26 (Sask. Q.B. ) . - 136 -T h e r e f o r e , f o r e f f e c t i v e n e s s , i f the s t a t u t e i s to be used as a remedial d e v i c e , should c o n t a i n a n t i - a v o i d a n c e procedures otherwise i t does not achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e . - 137 -CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSION The c o u r t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia have, to a great e x t e n t , approached the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Act s u b j e c t i v e l y . Great emphasis i s p l a c e d on the concept that there i s a moral duty owed by the t e s t a t o r and, o f t e n , the remedy f o r a breach of such duty i s a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the c a p i t a l of the e s t a t e . The Act i s remedial, i t s genesis c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s such i n t e n -t i o n s . The Act should r e c e i v e a f a i r and l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n so as to achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e s . However, any i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n which supports a concept of e q u i t a b l e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the e s t a t e cannot be j u s t i f i e d by the wording of the Act and i n t r o d u c e s dangerous u n c e r t a i n t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n leaves both t e s t a t o r s and claim a n t s without d e f i n i t e c r i t e r i a as to when an award w i l l be made and the s i z e of any award. O'Halloran J.A. recognized the need f o r a d e f i n i t e and i d e n t i f i a b l e c r i t e r i a . 1 9 4 Macdonald J.A. i n Re Lewis E s t a t e 1 9 5 observed t h a t : 194 See t e x t , supra, at p. 120. 195 [1935] 2 D.L.R. 45 at p. 47, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 747 at pp. 748 and 749 (C.A.), (1935), 49 B.C.R. 386 at pp. 390 and 391 (emphasis added). - 138 -In view of the d e c i s i o n of the Supreme Court of Canada i n Walker v. McDermott, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 662, [ s i c ] we are compelled to go to unexpected l e n g t h s i n i n t e r f e r i n g with w i l l s , . . . . The d e c i s i o n suggests the need of an amendment to  d i s c l o s e the i n t e n t i o n of Parliament beyond the p o s s i b i l i t y of misunderstanding because as the s t a t u t e now stands with that c o n s t r u c t i o n put upon i t there i s an i n v i t a t i o n (now f r e q u e n t l y a c ted upon) to a t t a c k w i l l s without j u s t cause thereby promoting domestic d i s c o r d and i n j u s t i c e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y O'Halloran J.A.'s suggested c r i t e r i a has been r e j e c t e d 1 9 6 and the l e g i s l a t i v e amendment "to d i s c l o s e the i n t e n t i o n of Parliament" sought by Macdonald J.A. never m a t e r i a l i z e d . The treatment of the Act by the B r i t i s h Columbia c o u r t s , and the awards made, s h i f t i t s purpose from remedial to one g i v i n g p r o p r i e t o r y r i g h t s to the persons e n t i t l e d to apply under i t . The awards made r e f l e c t a tendency to a " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " p h i losophy but the Act was not intended as such, and u n l i k e t rue " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " s t a t u t e s p r e v a l e n t i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , i t does not c o n t a i n d e f i n e d c r i t e r i a to q u a n t i f y the amount of the award. Unless B r i t i s h Columbia i s prepared to l i v e with t e s t -amentary u n c e r t a i n t y , the l e g i s l a t i o n should c l a r i f y the pur-pose of the Act and enact a p p r o p r i a t e amendments, whether they are to c o n f i r m the remedial nature of the Act or to c o d i f y a true f o r c e d h e i r s h i p concept. 196 See t e x t supra, at pp. 120, 121, 122 and 123. - 139 -The Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia ("Commis-s i o n " ) 1 9 7 r e j e c t e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to recommend reform f o r the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the purpose of the Act. The Commission recognized that "[the] c h i e f c r i t i c i s m of dependant's r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n r e s t s on the f a c t that i t i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y , i n v o l v i n g c o u r t a p p l i c a t i o n " . 1 9 8 However, notw i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n the Commission concluded t h a t : The d i s c r e t i o n a r y nature of the r e l i e f i s a l s o i t s s t r o n g e s t and most a p p e a l i n g f e a t u r e , s i n c e i t per-mits the g r e a t e s t f l e x i b i l i t y i n h a n d l i n g these matters on a case by case basis.199 The Commission f u r t h e r s t a t e d that the A c t , i n a d d i t i o n to g i v i n g the c o u r t s a great d e a l of f l e x i b i l i t y , a l s o permits the court to co n s i d e r the i n t e r e s t of dependents of the de-ceased other than the spouse. In the o p i n i o n of the Commis-s i o n "these are compelling reasons to r e t a i n dependant's r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n and not to t i n k e r with i t s b a s i c s t r u c -t u r e . " 2 0 0 As to the nature of the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n the Commission recognized and acknowledged that the co u r t s 197 Op. c i t . , footnote 77. 198 I b i d , at p. 74. 199 I b i d , at p. 74. 200 I b i d , at p. 74. - 140 -[W]aver between a p p l y i n g t e s t s of need and of moral o b l i g a t i o n , and make awards that appear to vary between p r o t e c t i n g dependants from d e s t i t u t i o n to e q u i t a b l y r e a p p o r t i o n i n g the t e s t a t o r ' s estate.201 In s p i t e of t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , the Commission expressed a view that under c u r r e n t law need i s not a c o n d i t i o n precedent f o r a s u c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n under the Act but one of many f a c t o r s to be co n s i d e r e d by the c o u r t s when e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r broad d i s c r e t i o n and that such broad d i s c r e t i o n to the c o u r t was d e s i r a b l e . 2 0 2 An alarming misunderstanding of the purpose of the Act i s manifested i n the f o l l o w i n g comments made by the Commission: When, t h e r e f o r e , a t e s t a t o r by w i l l p r e f e r s one or more members of h i s f a m i l y over o t h e r s e q u a l l y d e s e r v i n g , the c o u r t should be p e r m i t t e d to i n q u i r e i n t o the circumstances surrounding the making of the w i l l i n order to determine the t e s t a t o r ' s motiva-t i o n s . One f u n c t i o n served by the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n  A c t , t h e r e f o r e , i s to guard the t e s t a t o r from being v i c t i m i z e d by g r a s p i n g r e l a t i v e s and o t h e r s . T h i s i s a f u n c t i o n the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act c o u l d not serve i f an a p p l i c a n t ' s success was based upon need. I t i s important, t h e r e f o r e , f o r the c o u r t s ' d i s c r e t i o n under the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act to remain as broad as poss i b l e . 2 0 3 There i s no l e g a l b a s i s f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that the Act i s to f u n c t i o n as a safeguard a g a i n s t undue i n f l u e n c e or any such l i k e u n l awful p r e s s u r e s upon the t e s t a t o r . 201 I b i d , at p. 75. 202 I b i d , at p. 75. 203 I b i d , at p. 76. - 141 -The Commission does recognize that the Act i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a great d e a l of l i t i g a t i o n . I t a l s o accepts the c r i t i c i s m of p r a c t i t i o n e r s which c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f l e c t the f o l l o w i n g view: F i r s t , they were concerned that the c u r r e n t Act p r o -v i d e s l i t t l e c e r t a i n t y to whether an a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l , and what p o r t i o n an a p p l i c a n t may be e n t i t l e d t o . Second, they were concerned that the c u r r e n t Act i s being abused. Many un m e r i t o r i o u s a p p l i c a t i o n s are being brought. Rather than i n c u r the expense of a t r i a l , s e t t l e m e n t s of these nuisance c l a i m s are o f t e n made.204 Yet, the Commission c o n c l u d e d 2 0 5 that as the language of the Act i s capable of a more narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n than that which i t has r e c e i v e d the broad j u r i s d i c t i o n enjoyed by the co u r t i s l a r g e l y of i t s own making. The Commission observed that the judges must f i n d a broad j u r i s d i c t i o n u s e f u l to a v o i d i n j u s t i c e and t h e r e f o r e the c o u r t s ' j u r i s d i c t i o n under the Act should not be c o n f i n e d . The comments of the Commission, although not a r t i c u l a t e d i n p r e c i s e terms, make i t c l e a r that the Commission i s endors-i n g , without f u l l y understanding i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s , a form of e q u i v o c a l f o r c e d h e i r s h i p p h ilosophy. By a l s o viewing the Act as a safeguard a g a i n s t undue i n f l u e n c e , when the t e s t a t o r favours one or more members of h i s f a m i l y over o t h e r s , (pre-sumably not supportable under a proper undue i n f l u e n c e claim) 204 I b i d , at p. 78. 205 I b i d , at p. 78. - 142 -the Commission would f u r t h e r endorse a concept that there i s an o b l i g a t i o n to t r e a t c l a i m a n t s with some degree of e q u a l i t y . These concepts are, however, i n c o n s i s t e n t with a broad c o u r t d i s c r e t i o n which i s a l s o endorsed by the Commis-s i o n . I t i s suggested that any theory that r e s u l t s i n " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " or e q u a l i t y of treatment of c l a i m a n t s i s not harmon-ious with the concept of broad d i s c r e t i o n , as on any p a r t i -c u l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n , views may vary widely amongst judges, t e s t a t o r s and b e n e f i c i a r i e s and no c o n s i s t e n c y of r e s u l t c o u l d be a n t i c i p a t e d . The Commission has f a i l e d to recognize that i t i s impos-s i b l e to impose a regime of " f o r c e d h e i r s h i p " through depen-dent's r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n which i s e s s e n t i a l l y r e m e d i a l . During the past s i x t y years the c o u r t s have, on the whole, used the Act as an a n t i d i s i n h e r i t a n c e v e h i c l e i n con-t r a d i c t i o n with the o r i g i n a l concept of the l e g i s l a t i o n . The Commission, e s s e n t i a l l y endorses such use of the Act, although the r e s u l t s have not been e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , and chose to recommend that the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court should not be r e s t r i c t e d or changed. The Commission's recommendation i s both alarming and d i s -a p p o i n t i n g . I t had w i t h i n i t s grasp the a b i l i t y to recommend a s o l u t i o n to what i s a most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n d i t i o n . The Commission should have been unequivocal i n recommending e i t h e r : - 143 -1. A t r u l y remedial system where, need i n i t s extended meaning i s the c o n d i t i o n precedent; or 2. a tr u e regime of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p , whereby the t e s t a -t o r i s compelled to leave a c e r t a i n p o r t i o n of h i s e s t a t e to c e r t a i n members of h i s f a m i l y , presumably spouse and c h i l d r e n . Yet i t chose to maintain the s t a t u s quo with a l l i t s uncer-t a i n t i e s and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . The r e s e r v a t i o n s e x p r e s s e d 2 0 6 by Arthur L. C l o s e , the Commission's Vice-Chairman [as he then was] are much more r e f l e c t i v e of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the c o u r t s ought to p l a c e on the A c t . He recognizes that the o r i g i n a l purpose of the Act was remedial, and that i t was intended to s a t i s f y the p u b l i c concern that a t e s t a t o r may leave h i s dependents i n needy circumstances and those persons becoming a charge upon the p u b l i c purse; or i n any event, that i t was inhumane to r e q u i r e the t e s t a t o r ' s dependent to eke out an e x i s t e n c e at a much i n f e r i o r standard to that p r o v i d e d by the t e s t a t o r d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e . In the Vice-Chairman's view, the c o u r t s ' d e c i s i o n s have gone beyond the s o c i a l p o l i c y of the Act and i n so doing have c r e a t e d an environment of u n c e r t a i n t y and f e r t i l e ground f o r 206 I b i d , at pp. 152 to 157. - 144 -l i t i g a t i o n by d i s a p p o i n t e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s , even those who may be a d u l t e n j o y i n g a comfortable l i f e s t y l e and not dependent upon the t e s t a t o r . His recommendation would t h e r e f o r e be that c l a i m s under the Act be r e s t r i c t e d to the t e s t a t o r ' s " d e p e n d e n t s " 2 0 7 which would be a c l a s s , l i m i t e d g e n e r a l l y , to the spouse and c h i l d r e n under a c e r t a i n age or under d i s a b i l i t y . In making t h i s recommendation, there i s a l s o an acknowledgement that so long as dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n e x i s t s there w i l l be u n c e r t a i n t y , but such u n c e r t a i n t y would be l i m i t e d to what i s "maintenance" as opposed to what i s an e q u i t a b l e p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e . The recommendation would go a long way to c l a r i f y the purpose of the A c t , would be c o n s i s t e n t with i t s o r i g i n a l i n t e n t , and would r e s t o r e harmony with the ph i l o s o p h y of testamentary freedom. 207 I b i d , at pp. 157 and 158. - 145 -PART I I I : PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY UNDER THE BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT - 146 -PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPLY  UNDER THE BRITISH COLUMBIA  WILLS VARIATION ACT S e c t i o n 2 of the Act i d e n t i f i e s and l i m i t s "the t e s t a t o r ' s w ife, husband or c h i l d r e n " as the persons who may invoke i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . There i s a reasonable body of j u r i s p r u d e n c e which has i n t e r p r e t e d the meaning of the persons e n t i t l e d to apply and, i n most circumstances, the law i s w e l l s e t t l e d . - 147 -CHAPTER 1.  WIFE AND HUSBAND There i s no q u e s t i o n that a r e f e r e n c e to "wife" and "hus-band" can only mean a r e l a t i o n s h i p r e s u l t i n g from a l a w f u l marriage. The Nova S c o t i a Supreme Court i n Re O ' C o n n e l l , 1 d i s m i s s e d the a p p l i c a t i o n of a common-law spouse of seven years under the e q u i v a l e n t s t a t u t e i n that P r o v i n c e . Grant J . con s i d e r e d the d e f i n i t i o n of "widow" i n Stroud's J u d i c i a l D i c t i o n a r y : A widow i s a woman who has s u r v i v e d a man to whom she was l a w f u l l y married, and who was h i s wife at the time of h i s death.2 He than c o n c l u d e d 3 that i n order to q u a l i f y under the s t a t u -t o r y p r o v i s i o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the a p p l i c a n t and the deceased had to be that of a l a w f u l marriage. The wording of the Act does not admit any other type of union or r e l a t i o n s h i p . However, where the v a l i d i t y of the marriage i s brought i n t o q u e s t i o n the c o u r t s w i l l presume i n 1 (1979), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 584 (N.S.T.D.). 2 I b i d . , at p. 585. 3 I b i d . , at p. 585. - 148 -favour of i t s v a l i d i t y u n t i l evidence i s adduced that i n f a c t the marriage i s a n u l l i t y . 4 The s t a t u s of the spouse i s determined at the date of death of the t e s t a t o r and the f a c t that a decree n i s i of d i v o r c e was i s s u e d to the p a r t i e s p r i o r to the death of one of the spouses does not a l t e r the s t a t u s of the a p p l i c a n t . 5 S i m i l a r l y , a remarriage a f t e r the death of the t e s t a t o r does not a f f e c t the a b i l i t y of the s u r v i v i n g spouse to c l a i m r e l i e f under the A c t . In B a i l e y v. P u b l i c Trustee and O t h e r s 6 i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the meaning of the words "husband" or "wife" where the a p p l i c a n t remarried a f t e r the date of death of the t e s t a t o r but p r i o r to the h e a r i n g , the court made the f o l -lowing statement: [T]he s t a t u s of a wife i s f i x e d by her p o s i t i o n at the moment immediately before the death of the hus-band, and t h a t , being a wife then, she i s a q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t at any time subsequently. I t should be noted that the Act r e f e r s to "wife" and "hus-band". The New Zealand s t a t u t e under i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the B a i l e y case a l s o used l i k e words. A c o n t r a r y view c o u l d 4 Tweney v. Tweney (1946), P. 180, [1946] 1 A l l E.R. 564; Re Quon (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 702 ( A l t a . S . C ) . 5 Adams v. I r v i n e and Adams (1978), 4 R.F.L. (2d) 295 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Laur (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 321, 7 O.R. (2d) 385, 21 R.F.L. 159 (Surr. C t . ) . 6 [1960] N.Z.L.R. 741 at p. 744 ( C A . ) . - 149 -e a s i l y be taken i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s where the a p p l i c a n t i s r e f e r -red to as "widow" or "widower". The p o s i t i o n of a s u r v i v i n g spouse, who has ob t a i n e d , or has submitted t o , a d i v o r c e i n a f o r e i g n j u r i s d i c t i o n and the v a l i d i t y of such d i v o r c e i s not recognized i n Canada, i s not s e t t l e d . Prima f a c i e , such a spouse would i n the eyes of a B r i t i s h Columbia court continue to be a husband or wife w i t h i n the meaning of the Act. However, the f o r e i g n decree can under c e r t a i n circumstances be a bar to r e l i e f under the A c t . In Downton v. Royal T r u s t Co. et a l . , 7 i n which the wif e submitted to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court of Nevada to permit her husband to o b t a i n a d i v o r c e (although i t was subsequently found that the d i v o r c e was not v a l i d i n Canada), L a s k i n J . commented as f o l l o w s : My canvass of t y p i c a l cases which have reached Canadian Courts i n d i c a t e s that the onl y c l a i m to con-s i s t e n c y that they e x h i b i t i s the a p p l i c a t i o n of a p r e c l u s i o n d o c t r i n e a g a i n s t a spouse who, having ob-t a i n e d a decree of d i v o r c e or n u l l i t y from a f o r e i g n Court incompetent to g i v e i t , seeks t h e r e a f t e r to a s s e r t that incompetence i n order to g a i n a pecu n i a r y advantage a g a i n s t h i s or her spouse or the e s t a t e of the spouse. The d o c t r i n e has an e t h i c a l b a s i s : a r e f u s a l to permit a person to i n s i s t , to h i s or her pecuniary advantage, on a r e l a t i o n s h i p which that person has p r e v i o u s l y d e l i b e r a t e l y sought t o t e r m i -nate . 8 7 [1973] S.C.R. 437, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 403, 3 N. & P.E.I.R. 576, r e v e r s i n g I N . & P.E.I.R. 528, which r e v e r s e d I N . & P.E.I.R. 203. 8 I b i d . , S.C.R. at p. 450, D.L.R. at p. 412 and N. & P.E.I.R. at pp. 587 and 588. - 150 -The c o u r t thus c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d , as a ge n e r a l p r i n c i p l e , the p r e c l u s i o n d o c t r i n e that a spouse who has e i t h e r o b t a i n e d , or has submitted t o , a decree of d i v o r c e from a f o r e i g n c o u r t incompetent to gi v e i t , can not r e l y on the i n v a l i d i t y of the decree to g a i n a b e n e f i t . The c o u r t , however, recog n i z e d that under c e r t a i n circum-stances the d o c t r i n e should be q u a l i f i e d and the cou r t should take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the reasons, c o n d i t i o n s and circum-stances under which the p a r t i e s submitted to the " j u r i s d i c t i o n of an incompetent f o r e i g n c o u r t " . 9 In the Downton case the evidence p e r m i t t e d the cou r t to reach the c o n c l u s i o n that the wife d i d not d e r i v e any b e n e f i t s from the f o r e i g n decree. I t was not a case where she b e n e f i t -ted from i t and on the death of her husband chose to r e l y on i t s i n v a l i d i t y to o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t s . The court t h e r e f o r e concluded that i n the circumstances of the case the p r e c l u s i o n d o c t r i n e should not apply and the wife was allowed to r e l y on the i n v a l i d i t y of the f o r e i g n decree. The c o u r t observed: The present case stands, t h e r e f o r e , as one where the wife's formal submission to the f o r e i g n Court was not foll o w e d by any a c t or conduct i n r e l i a n c e upon i t 9 I b i d . , S.C.R. at p. 450, N. & P.E.I.R. at p. 588, and D.L.R. at pp. 412 and 413. - 151 -nor was there any acceptance by her of b e n e f i t s under i t . 1 0 The reasoning of the Downton v. Royal T r u s t Co. et a l . 1 1 case was adopted i n Re Jones where i n circumstances o f f e r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r f a c t s the court s t a t e d : A c c o r d i n g to that [Downton v. Royal T r u s t Co. e t .  a l • ] judgment 'a broad and f l e x i b l e approach based on e q u i t y i s to be adopted i n weighing the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the p r e c l u s i o n d o c t r i n e ' . D i s q u a l i f y i n g i n e q u i t y may e x i s t , f o r instance,.where ' a c t i o n has been taken i n r e l i a n c e on the ( f o r e i g n ) d i v o r c e or e x p e c t a t i o n s are based on i t or when the a t t a c k on the d i v o r c e i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with the e a r l i e r conduct of the a t t a c k -ing p a r t y ' : r e p o r t at p. 452 S.C.R., p. 413 D.L.R.12 The court concluded: App l y i n g these g u i d e l i n e s to the i n s t a n t case I f i n d that A l i c e [the wife] r e c e i v e d no pecuniary b e n e f i t from the d i v o r c e and i s not preclude d from denying i t on that ground.13 Th e r e f o r e , based on e t h i c a l and e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the court chose not to apply the d o c t r i n e of p r e c l u s i o n . 10 I b i d . , S.C.R. at p. 453, N. & P.E.I.R. at p. 591, and D.L.R. at pp. 414 and 415. 11 Supra, footnote 7. 12 (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 655 at p. 661, 6 O.R. (2d) 11 at p. 17, 19 R.F.L. 289 at p. 295 (H.C.). 13 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 662, O.R. at p. 18, R.F.L. at p. 292. Notwithstanding the f a c t t h at the i s s u e i s not s e t t l e d , the two cases g i v e a s t r o n g d i r e c t i o n to the e f f e c t that i f the a p p l i c a n t has had no b e n e f i t as a r e s u l t of the f o r e i g n d i v o r c e he may a t t a c k i t s v a l i d i t y to e s t a b l i s h that he q u a l i -f i e s as a spouse. On the other hand, i f the a p p l i c a n t has r e l i e d upon the f o r e i g n d i v o r c e to g a i n b e n e f i t s , or has acted i n such manner that i n the circumstances taken as a whole, i t would be i n e q u i t a b l e f o r him to p l e a d the i n v a l i d i t y of the d i v o r c e the c o u r t w i l l not a l l o w him to do so. - 153 -CHAPTER 2.  CHILDREN The recent enactment of the Charter of Righ t s Amendment  Act, 1 9 8 5 1 4 has t o t a l l y a l t e r e d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which the co u r t s had p l a c e d upon the meaning of the word " c h i l d r e n " . U n t i l the advent of the Charter of Righ t s Amendment A c t ,  1985 there was no q u e s t i o n that a r e f e r e n c e i n the Act to " c h i l d r e n " c o u l d o n l y mean l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n u n l e s s the c h i l d r e n were c l a i m i n g through t h e i r mother's e s t a t e when S e c t i o n 2 ( 2 ) 1 5 of the Act a p p l i e d . The S e c t i o n reads as f o l -lows : (2) For the purposes of t h i s A c t , an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d s h a l l be t r e a t e d as i f he were a l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d of h i s mother. The q u e s t i o n was u n e q u i v o c a l l y s e t t l e d by Meredith J . i n Re Brosseau E s t a t e 1 6 where the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t of law was put 14 S.B.C. 1985, c. 68 ( r e c e i v e d Royal Assent on Dec. 2, 1985 and came i n t o f o r c e by B.C. Reg. No. 392/85. The p e r t i n e n t s e c t i o n s f o r the purposes of t h i s review, s. 80 and s. 119, were, by the R e g u l a t i o n brought i n t o f o r c e with r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t as at A p r i l 17, 1985). 15 Added i n 1960 as s. 3(2). T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance  Act, 1960. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 378. [Assented to 18th March, I960.] 16 (1975), 19 R.F.L. 255, [1975] W.W.D. 34 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 154 -to him f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n : Are i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n e n t i t l e d to apply f o r pro-v i s i o n from the e s t a t e of t h e i r f a t h e r pursuant to the p r o v i s i o n s of The T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act? A f t e r reviewing an e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n on the p o i n t 1 ' and the a d d i t i o n of S e c t i o n 2 ( 2 ) 1 8 he concluded t h a t : I can o n l y conclude that the a d d i t i o n of the sub-s e c t i o n was remedial: to b r i n g i n t o the purview of the Act not o n l y l e g i t i m a t e i s s u e but i l l e g i t i m a t e as w e l l . I l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n now have recourse under the Act but i n r e s p e c t of the e s t a t e of a deceased mother not f a t h e r . As the L e g i s l a t u r e , i n extending the category of persons e n t i t l e d to c l a i m , l i m i t e d the e x t e n s i o n i n the way that i t d i d , I must answer the q u e s t i o n passed [ s i c ] on t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n i n the negative.19 The new Charter of R i g h t s Amendment Act, 1985 has removed, i n t e r a l i a , any d i s t i n c t i o n , 2 0 f o r the purposes of the Act between l e g i t i m a t e and i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n . T h e r e f o r e , a c h i l d , r e g a r d l e s s whether born i n or out of wedlock, may apply f o r r e l i e f from e i t h e r parent's e s t a t e . x T h i s development b r i n g s the Act i n harmony with most other s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s i n Canada and e s s e n t i a l l y adopts the recommendation of the Law 17 Re Lakha Singh E s t a t e (1955), 14 W.W.R. (N.S.) 617 (6.C.S.C.). 18 See supra, footnote 15. 19 Supra, f o o t n o t e 16 at p. 256. 20 Supra, f o o t n o t e 14, s. 80. 21 I b i d . , s. 119 ( r e p e a l s s. 2(2) of the A c t ) . - 155 -Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia that no d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between c h i l d r e n of married or unmarried By v i r t u e of the Adoption A c t ^ 3 and s p e c i f i c a l l y S e c t i o n 11(1) which s t a t e s : the r e f e r e n c e to " c h i l d " i n the Act w i l l i n c l u d e an adopted c h i l d so long as the f o r m a l i t i e s of adoption have been ob-served. T h e r e f o r e , a c h i l d who has been adopted by the t e s t a -t o r , i n accordance with the p r o v i s i o n s of the Adoption Act, i s e n t i t l e d to c l a i m under the p r o v i s i o n s of the A c t . 2 4 22 Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia, Report on  S t a t u t o r y Succession R i g h t s , (1983) at p. 88 and 89. 23 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4. 24 Although there are no cases decided under the Act d e a l i n g with a c l a i m by a n a t u r a l c h i l d of the deceased who has been adopted, the d e c i s i o n of Hyde L.J.S.C. i n Re Hartman; M e r n i c k l e v. Westaway (1985) 19 E.T.R. 304, was cause f o r alarm. Hyde L.J.S.C. would have allowed an adopted c h i l d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n of the e s t a t e of h i s n a t u r a l parent, F o r t u n a t e l y , the Court of Appeal of B r i t i s h Columbia, M e r n i c k l e v. Westaway (1986) 1 B.C.L.R. (2d) 267, 22 E.T.R. 213, reversed Hyde L.J.S.C. on the b a s i s that an adopted c h i l d ceases, on adoption, to be the c h i l d of h i s e x i s t i n g p arents. Had the lower c o u r t d e c i s i o n been upheld, adopted c h i l d r e n c o u l d , c o n c e i v a b l y , have claimed, under the Act, a g a i n s t the e s t a t e s of t h e i r n a t u r a l p a r e n t s . p a r e n t s . 22 For a l l purposes an adopted the c h i l d of the adopting parent becomes the parent c h i l d had been born to that c h i l d becomes on adoption parent, and the adopting of the c h i l d , as i f the parent i n l a w f u l wedlock. - 156 -It i s immaterial f o r the purposes of the Act i f a c h i l d i s born i n or out of wedlock or whether the c h i l d i s the n a t u r a l c h i l d or adopted c h i l d of the p a r e n t s . The c h i l d must, how-ever, be the c h i l d of the parent. S t e p c h i l d r e n or c h i l d r e n to whom the parent stood i n l o c o p a r e n t i s can not q u a l i f y as " c h i l d r e n " under the A c t . 2 5 However, as the v a l i d i t y of an adoption i s determined by the law of the p l a c e where that c h i l d was adopted, i f the adoption has taken p l a c e o u t s i d e the pr o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia, the c h i l d ' s s t a t u s must be determined by r e f e r e n c e to the p l a c e of adopt i o n . In Re (Mrs.) Mary Ann McAdam, 2 6 i n an a p p l i c a t i o n by a c h i l d who had been adopted under the laws of the State o f C a l i f o r n i a , the argument was made, i n t e r a l i a , that the Act d i d not a f f o r d r e l i e f to the p e t i t i o n e r , as she was only an adopted c h i l d of the deceased, and an a l i e n r e s i d i n g i n C a l i f o r n i a . The c o u r t ' s response to t h i s argument was: In order to e f f e c t proper l e g a l adoption, there should be, at l e a s t , a s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with a l l the e s s e n t i a l requirements of any s t a t u t e i n fo r c e i n the country where adoption takes p l a c e . The burden of proving such compliance r e s t s upon the par t y a s s e r t i n g i t , even though the tendency of the Courts may be, not to i n s i s t upon a s t r i c t compliance with such f u r t h e r s t a t u t o r y requirements. I f i n d that t h i s burden has been f u l l y s a t i s f i e d . ... I 25 Naples v. M a r t i n E s t a t e and M a r t i n , [1987] 1 W.W.R. 52. 26 [1925] 4 D.L.R. 138, [1925], 2 W.W.R. 593 ( S . C ) , (1924 ), 35 B.C.R. 547. - 157 -think the r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of an adoptio n are based upon the law of the l o c a l i t y i n which i t occu r s . Once l e g a l adoption takes p l a c e , i t cannot be l i g h t l y d e stroyed. I t i s b i n d i n g upon a l l p a r t i e s concerned. So, i f , as I have found, the adopti o n of Mrs. Seybold was l e g a l i n C a l i f o r n i a , i t thereby gave her the same standing and r i g h t s , as i f she were the n a t u r a l born c h i l d of her adop t i v e p a r e n t s , no matter where they might r e s i d e i n the f u t u r e . She d i d not l o s e such r i g h t s through Mrs. McAdam l e a v i n g C a l i f o r n i a and ta k i n g up her resi d e n c e i n B r i t i s h Columbia.27 The adoption must, however, be a l e g a l one. In re E s p l i n  E s t a t e 2 8 the p e t i t i o n e r argued that while there was no de ju r e adoption there was a de f a c t o one, and that such was s u f f i -c i e n t to b r i n g him w i t h i n the p r o v i s i o n s of the then W i l l s  V a r i a t i o n A c t . Coady J . concluded that absent a de j u r e adop-t i o n the p e t i t i o n e r c o u l d not have "acquired any s t a t u s en-t i t l i n g him to apply under the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance  Act, which a p p l i e s o n l y to a s u r v i v i n g w i f e , husband or c h i l d . " 2 9 The wording of the Act c l e a r l y l i m i t s i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to the deceased's c h i l d r e n , and makes no ref e r e n c e to g r a n d c h i l -dren. N e v e r t h e l e s s the is s u e came before the B r i t i s h Columbia -3 n Court of Appeal i n Re Compton-Lundie E s t a t e ^ " where the c o u r t 27 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 139, W.W.R. at pp. 594 and 595, B.C.R. at p. 549, 28 [1946] 2 D.L.R. 404, [1946] 1 W.W.R. 679 (B.C.S.C. ) ; see a l s o Re Buchanan E s t a t e (1975), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 262, 24 R.F.L. 255 (Co. C t . ) . 29 I b i d . , E s p l i n , D.L.R. at p. 406, W.W.R. at p. 682. 30 (1958), 26 W.W.R. 229. - 158 -i n the judgment d e l i v e r e d by B i r d J.A., r e v e r s i n g the t r i a l judge as to h i s award to g r a n d c h i l d r e n who p e t i t i o n e d under the A c t , s t a t e d "the Act does not, i n our view, extend to making p r o v i s i o n out of h i s e s t a t e f o r a t e s t a t o r ' s grand-c h i l d r e n . . . " 3 1 31 I b i d . , at p. 230. The C h i e f J u s t i c e of the Supreme Court of B r i t i s h Columbia seems to have made an Order on January 29th, 1958, i n favour of g r a n d c h i l d r e n . B i r d J.A. made r e f e r e n c e , at page 230, to "reasons f o r judgment of the lea r n e d t r i a l judge". An attempt was made to o b t a i n those reasons to determine the r a t i o n a l e of the c o u r t i n making an award f o r g r a n d c h i l d r e n . R e g r e t t a b l y the records of the t r i a l and the appeal are no longer a v a i l a b l e at the Vancouver R e g i s t r y . - 159 -CHAPTER 3.  PUBLIC TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF CHILDREN The i s s u e of the r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n of the P u b l i c Trustee to commence proceedings on b e h a l f of i n f a n t s has r e -c e i v e d l i t t l e j u d i c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The Supreme Court of A l b e r t a In re Denton E s t a t e 3 2 had to r u l e on an a p p l i c a t i o n by the P u b l i c T r u s t e e on b e h a l f of i n -f a n t s . The f a c t s of the case were simple. The t e s t a t o r was s u r v i v e d by h i s wife and f i v e i n f a n t c h i l d r e n . 3 3 By h i s W i l l , the t e s t a t o r l e f t h i s e n t i r e e s t a t e to the widow. The e v i -dence of the widow was most fa v o u r a b l e as i t showed her to be a c a r i n g , d e d i c a t e d and r e s p o n s i b l e mother. N e v e r t h e l e s s Ford J . concluded t h a t : [ A j f t e r g i v i n g the q u e s t i o n some anxious thought, I have reached the c o n c l u s i o n that a sense of prudence must i n d i c a t e that i t [the W i l l ] does not ensure such adequate p r o v i s i o n . 3 4 He t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e d that a p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e be set a s i d e f o r the maintenance and support of the c h i l d r e n . 32 [1950] 2 W.W.R. 848. 33 A l l of whom q u a l i f i e d as "dependants" w i t h i n the meaning of the A l b e r t a L e g i s l a t i o n . 34 Supra, footnote 32, at p. 851. - 160 -The l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n of Ford J.'s f i n d i n g s i s that r e g a r d l e s s of the s u r v i v i n g guardian's a b i l i t y , or l e g a l o b l i -g a t i o n to mai n t a i n , the court must ensure that p r o v i s i o n s are made i n the W i l l f o r i n f a n t s . T h i s i s s u e was again c o n s i d e r e d i n A l b e r t a i n P u b l i c  T r u s t e e v. B u c h h o l z 3 5 where the t e s t a t o r l e f t h i s e n t i r e e s t a t e to h i s widow and the P u b l i c T r u s t e e brought an a c t i o n on b e h a l f of two i n f a n t c h i l d r e n . The c o u r t , once more, ordered that a p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e be reserved f o r the main-tenance and support of the c h i l d r e n . The Court of A p p e a l 3 6 p e r c e i v e d that the P u b l i c T r u s t e e was a s k i n g the cou r t to make the appeal a " t e s t case" f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that i n a l l e s t a t e s when a t e s t a t o r f a i l s to make p r o v i s i o n s f o r the maintenance and support of i n f a n t c h i l d r e n , the c o u r t should order an award i f the P u b l i c T r u s t e e chooses to make an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r maintenance and support. The c o u r t , i n the circumstances of the case, d i d not con-s i d e r i t a p p r o p r i a t e f o r s e t t i n g any such p o l i c y or p r e c e -dent. As to the P u b l i c Trustee's r e l i a n c e upon In re Denton E s t a t e 3 7 the c o u r t ' s response was that "the d e c i s i o n i n Re  Denton should be r e c o n s i d e r e d i n the a p p r o p r i a t e case 1 , 3 8 35 [1981] 1 W.W.R. 500 ( A l t a . C.A.). 36 I b i d . , at p. 506. 37 Supra, footnote 32. 38 Supra, footnote 35, at p. 509. - 161 -The Court of Appeal, at the very l e a s t , c a s t doubt on the p r i n c i p l e t h at might have been e x t r a c t e d from the d e c i s i o n of Re Denton. The i s s u e has been d e a l t with i n B r i t i s h Columbia o n l y once, and then o n l y by o b i t e r d i c t a . In In The Matter of The  "Equal Guardianship of I n f a n t s A c t " , R.S.B.C. 1960, Chapter  130, As Amended and In The Matter Of C y n t h i a Jane Malat and  D i n n i s e Ann Malat, I n f a n t s 3 9 the P u b l i c T r u s t e e a p p l i e d to be appointed guardian of the daughters, aged twelve and seventeen years r e s p e c t i v e l y , f o r the l i m i t e d purpose of l a u n c h i n g an a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e i r b e h a l f under the p r o v i s i o n s of the then T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t . 4 0 Meredith J . d i s m i s s e d the a p p l i c a t i o n on the t e c h n i c a l p o i n t that the P u b l i c T rustee had f a i l e d to o b t a i n the consent of the two daughters as r e q u i r e d by the then Equal Guardianship of I n f a n t s A c t . 4 1 Although the lac k of consent was s u f f i c i e n t ground f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n to f a i l , Meredith J . i n h i s judgment chose to com-ment as f o l l o w s : In any event I do not think i t has been shown, nor should i t be assumed, t h a t , even i f proceedings under the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act were to r e s u l t i n some s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n f o r the two c h i l d r e n out of 39 18 August 1975, Vancouver, X8945/75, unreported (B«C«S«0«)• 40 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 378. 41 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 130, s. 14(1). - 162 -the e s t a t e , such p r o v i s i o n would i n net advance the w e l f a r e of the c h i l d r e n . Proceedings under the Act would e f f e c t i v e l y p i t the c h i l d r e n a g a i n s t t h e i r mother, t h r u s t upon the e s t a t e unwanted c o s t s , oc-c a s i o n a n x i e t y , p r e - o c c u p a t i o n and other s t r a i n s on a l l s i d e s , to say nothing of the r i s k of f a m i l y d i s -c o r d . The p o s s i b l e d i s r u p t i o n might w e l l be much more harmful to the c h i l d r e n than any b e n e f i t they might p o s s i b l y r e c e i v e from the e s t a t e . I have not the s l i g h t e s t reason to suppose that Mrs. Malat w i l l do other than the best f o r a l l her c h i l d r e n d u r i n g her l i f e t i m e . Nor should I s p e c u l a t e that she w i l l do other than make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r her c h i l d r e n out of what may remain of her a s s e t s , i n c l u d i n g those i n h e r i t e d from her husband, on her death. A c c o r d i n g l y , as I am i n c l i n e d to the view that the order sought would d e t r a c t from r a t h e r than advance the i n t e r e s t of the two c h i l d r e n , the order i s r e -fused. 42 In the same l i g h t Lieberman J.A. recognized i n P u b l i c  T rustee v. B u c h h o l z 4 3 the c o n f l i c t r a i s e d by s o c i e t y ' s concern f o r the w e l f a r e of dependent c h i l d r e n and "our t r a d i t i o n a l concept of the p r i v a c y and s a n c t i t y of the f a m i l y u n i t , and the r i g h t of one parent to depend upon the other to p r o v i d e maintenance and support i n a l l f a c e t s to t h e i r c h i l d r e n . . . " 4 4 Lieberman J.A. f u r t h e r commented as f o l l o w s : I am, however, cognizant of the deep resentment that people i n our s o c i e t y f e e l towards governmental i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t o e s s e n t i a l l y p r i v a t e f a m i l y a r e a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y where a l l the evidence leads to o n l y these c o n c l u s i o n s , namely: that the c h i l d r e n are 42 43 44 Supra, fo o t n o t e 39 at p. 2. Supra, footnote 3 5 . I b i d . , at pp. 506 and 5 0 7 . - 163 -being t r e a t e d with love and understanding; that they are being brought up i n an e x c e l l e n t environment; that t h e i r e d u c a t i o n i s being encouraged; and that there i s ample p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e i r maintenance and support.45 A great d e a l of sympathy can be c h a n n e l l e d i n support of the concept that one parent should have the r i g h t , on death, to r e l y upon the other f o r the continued support of dependent c h i l d r e n . But, what i s the P u b l i c T r u s t e e to do when fa c e d with circumstances a k i n to those of Re Malat, and other cases d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n ? At l e a s t i n the p r o v i n c e of A l b e r t a the p e r t i n e n t s t a t -u t e 4 6 p r o v i d e s that when at the date of death the spouses are l i v i n g together and the c h i l d r e n are l i v i n g with or being sup-ported by the spouses or e i t h e r of them, there i s no o b l i g a -t i o n on the P u b l i c Trustee to make an a p p l i c a t i o n on b e h a l f of the c h i l d r e n i f the P u b l i c Trustee i s s a t i s f i e d that the c h i l d or c h i l d r e n w i l l r e c e i v e adequate maintenance and support. B r i t i s h Columbia does not have s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e i t can not be s a i d that the P u b l i c T r u s t e e can always e x e r c i s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n by examining the s u r v i v i n g guardian to determine whether or not an a c t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d . 45 I b i d . , at p. 506. 46 Family R e l i e f Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 134, s. 15 [am. 1971, c. 1, s. 21(2)}. - 164 -Unless i t can be s a i d that the P u b l i c T r u s t e e should be e n t i t l e d to r e l y on the common l a w 4 7 and the s t a t u t o r y 4 8 o b l i -g a t i o n s of parents to support c h i l d r e n , then the p o s i t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia may le a d to the i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t that not-w i t h s t a n d i n g the circumstances i n each i n d i v i d u a l case, the P u b l i c T r u s t e e , i n order to f u l f i l l h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , has no choice but to b r i n g an a p p l i c a t i o n i n every case where no pro-v i s i o n s have been made f o r i n f a n t s under the W i l l r e g a r d l e s s of the outcome of such a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s c o n d i t i o n i s c l e a r l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . The P u b l i c Trustee should be per m i t t e d to e x e r c i s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n as to whether or not an a c t i o n should be brought. The B r i t i s h Columbia s t a t u t e should be amended to at l e a s t g i v e the P u b l i c Trustee the d i s c r e t i o n given to the P u b l i c T r u s t e e i n the prov i n c e of A l b e r t a . 4 9 47 See Kuseta v. Kuseta (1972), 7 R.F.L. 89 (Ont. C.A.); St.  Ca t h a r i n e s General H o s p i t a l v. S v i e r g u l a (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 455 (Ont. S . C ) . 48 Family R e l a t i o n s Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, s. 56(1). 49 See supra, footnote 46. - 165 -CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA The Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 3 " a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g Reports from other l i k e commissions and a n a l y s i n g f a m i l y r i g h t s under other s t a t u t e s 5 1 made the f o l l o w i n g r e c -ommendation : (10) (1) That the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act be amended to per-mit the f o l l o w i n g persons who s u r v i v e the deceased to apply: (a) spouse; (b) a person whose marriage to the deceased was terminated or d e c l a r e d a n u l l i t y i f r e c e i v i n g or e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e maintenance from the de-ceased; (c) common law spouse who, immediately preceding the death of the deceased, ( i ) was c o h a b i t i n g with the deceased f o r not l e s s than two years, or ( i i ) was r e c e i v i n g or e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e main-tenance, pursuant to the Family R e l a t i o n s Act, from the deceased; (d) the deceased's c h i l d r e n , posthumous c h i l d r e n , and s t e p c h i l d r e n ; (2) That the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act be amended to p e r -mit the f o l l o w i n g persons to apply i f they were de-pendent on the deceased immediately p r i o r to h i s death: 5 0 9S.- c i t •' footnote 22, at pp. 78 to 89 51 Such as the the E s t a t e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Family R e l a t i o n s Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121; Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 114. - 166 -(a) g r a n d c h i l d r e n ; (b) grandparents; (c) parents; (d) b r o t h e r s , s i s t e r s , h a l f - b r o t h e r s and h a l f -s i s t e r s . (3) For the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), when determining r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the deceased, no d i s -t i n c t i o n should be made between c h i l d r e n of married or unmarried parents.52 Although the recommendation extends the c l a s s from what i t p r e s e n t l y i s , i t i s much more l i m i t e d i n scope to recommenda-t i o n s made by other commissions which would extend the r i g h t to apply beyond the f a m i l y members and would i n c l u d e c l o s e f r i e n d s . The r a t i o n a l e behind l i m i t i n g the e x t e n s i o n was b a s i c a l l y a r e c o g n i t i o n , by the Commission, of the concept that a person i s under an o b l i g a t i o n to co n s i d e r the needs of h i s f a m i l y , but not the needs of c l o s e f r i e n d s who s u r v i v e him. Yet the Act, i n i t s i n i t i a l s t ages, was intended to pro-v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r the deceased's spouse and c h i l d r e n . One of the main reasons put f o r t h by the propounders of the l e g i s -l a t i o n , both i n B r i t i s h Columbia and other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , was that such members of the f a m i l y should not become a f i n a n c i a l burden on s o c i e t y and that there was c o n f u s i o n i n a system of law where the deceased owed an o b l i g a t i o n to such members of h i s f a m i l y d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e , yet not a f t e r h i s death. The Commission 5 3 j u s t i f i e s extending the persons e n t i t l e d to apply 52 Op. c i t . , footnote 22, at pp. 88 and 89. 53 I b i d . - 167 -on the b a s i s that a t e s t a t o r has an o b l i g a t i o n to c o n s i d e r the needs of h i s f a m i l y , beyond h i s spouse and c h i l d r e n , even though the importance of the f a m i l y i n contemporary s o c i e t y may have d i m i n i s h e d . The Commission t h e o r i z e s that such e x t e n s i o n may have the r e s u l t of i n c r e a s e d l i t i g a t i o n , yet i t concludes that a c t i o n by such extended c l a s s would seldom occur. The humane motives behind the recommendations are d i f -f i c u l t to a t t a c k . However, the r e s u l t sought to be achieved should be one of l o g i c , and harmony with other s t a t u t e s . There i s at present s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n 5 4 to p r o v i d e mainte-nance by one spouse to the other spouse; by a parent to a c h i l d ; and by a c h i l d to a parent. Why should the o b l i g a t i o n s to maintain be d i f f e r e n t d u r i n g the l i f e t i m e of the t e s t a t o r and a f t e r h i s death? T h i s was one of the complaints v o i c e d by the l e g i s l a t o r s i n t h e i r v a r i o u s j u r i s d i c t i o n s which i n t r o -duced dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of such l e g i s l a t i o n was intended, i n p a r t , to achieve harmony between i n t e r v i v o s and posthumous o b l i g a t i o n s . An e x t e n s i o n such as that recommended by the Commission i s r e g r e s s i v e and would only add to the present m a l f u n c t i o n i n g of the A c t . I f i t i s s o c i a l l y d e s i r a b l e to extend the persons e n t i t l e d to apply, i t should be done only a f t e r a restatement of the 54 Supra., f o o t n o t e 48, s s . 56, 57 and 58. - 168 -p h i l o s o p h y of the Act and other c o l l a t e r a l s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have done so. The e x t e n s i o n s , where ap-p l i c a b l e , have been t a b u l a t e d i n the Schedules to P a r t I ( s u p r a ) . In a d d i t i o n the p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o ' s l e g i s l a t i o n , which r e f l e c t s the most contemporary review of dependents' r e l i e f , i s analysed i n d e t a i l i n Part IV ( i n f r a ) . CHAPTER 5. PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY AND RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM THE STATE G e n e r a l l y , there i s l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n determining those persons e n t i t l e d to apply. The Act i s c l e a r , and the p e r t i -nent p r o v i s i o n s of the Charter of Ri g h t s Amendment A c t , 1985 removing any d i s t i n c t i o n between c h i l d r e n born i n or out of wedlock are a l s o c l e a r . To the extent that there are any qu e s t i o n s , the j u r i s p r u d e n c e p r o v i d e s adequate guidance. There i s , however, a very important e x c e p t i o n to t h i s g e n e r a l statement, s p e c i f i c a l l y : whether or not a cla i m a n t would, or should, be excluded by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t such claimant i s under some d i s a b i l i t y , e i t h e r mental or p h y s i c a l , and i s being maintained by the s t a t e . The i s s u e r e a l l y i s : i s a person who i s otherwise en-t i t l e d to apply under the Act not e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f merely because that person i s maintained by the s t a t e through one of i t s s o c i a l support schemes? The cases, with very few e x c e p t i o n s , d e a l with persons s u f f e r i n g from mental d i s a b i l i t i e s . The emphasis i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i l l t h e r e f o r e be on ment a l l y d i s a b l e d a p p l i c a n t s . Yet the p r i n c i p l e should be of equal a p p l i c a t i o n - 170 -to persons r e c e i v i n g s t a t e support r e g a r d l e s s of the nature of t h e i r d i s a b i l i t y . There are c o n f l i c t i n g l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y as to the extent of the t e s t a t o r ' s duty to make p r o v i s i o n s f o r a me n t a l l y d i s -a b l e d dependent who i s being maintained by the s t a t e , and the law i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s f a r from c l e a r . As the j u r i s p r u -dence i n B r i t i s h Columbia r e f e r s to that of other j u r i s d i c -t i o n s a b r i e f a n a l y s i s of the p e r t i n e n t cases of those j u r i s -d i c t i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l . The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia, l i k e many other j u r i s -d i c t i o n s , s u p p l i e s care, at p u b l i c expense, to the me n t a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d . T e s t a t o r s whose f a m i l i e s i n c l u d e a men t a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d member sometimes choose not to make testamentary p r o v i s i o n s f o r him. The q u e s t i o n i n such cases i s whether or not the P u b l i c T r u s t e e as the "guardian" of such person can o b t a i n an order under the Act r e q u i r i n g the e s t a t e to d e f r a y some or, indeed, pay a l l of the c o s t s of such c a r e . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n i s the i s s u e of the nature of the b e n e f i t programmes administered by the s t a t e . On the one hand i t can be s a i d that a l l taxpayers c o n t r i b u t e to f i n a n c i n g such programmes and that there i s t h e r e f o r e an a b s o l u t e e n t i t l e m e n t without f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n . On the other hand, there e x i s t s the argument that although care i t s e l f i s u n i v e r s a l l y a v a i l -a b l e , once the person f o r whom the care i s being s u p p l i e d has, - 171 -or i s e n t i t l e d t o , funds of h i s own, he or she should con-t r i b u t e to the cost of such c a r e . Courts have not d i r e c t l y d e a l t with the u n d e r l y i n g p o l i c y i s s u e , presumably l e a v i n g such to the l e g i s l a t o r s . However, t h e i r treatment of such q u e s t i o n s i n d i c a t e s extreme p h i l o s o -p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s . Some c o u r t s have s a i d that no t e s t a t o r , however l a r g e h i s means, need c o n t r i b u t e . T h i s view i s found s t r o n g l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n England and New South Wales. Some other c o u r t s s p e c i f i c a l l y those of New Zealand favour the id e a of c o n t r i b u t i o n , s u b j e c t to the s i z e of the e s t a t e and the needs of other c l a i m a n t s . The l a t t e r view i s a l s o predominant i n Canada where e s t a t e s of even moderate s i z e have been made to c o n t r i b u t e . The B r i t i s h Columbia Courts appear to r e q u i r e not o n l y c o n t r i b u t i o n to the co s t of the s t a t e care, but a l s o f o r p r o v i s i o n s of e x t r a amenities f o r the b e n e f i t of the i n -s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d persons. A. New Zealand Cases New Zealand, as the f i r s t Commonwealth j u r i s d i c t i o n to enact dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n , not s u r p r i s i n g l y was the f i r s t to de a l with the i s s u e of testamentary c o n t r i b u t i o n i n the case of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d dependents. In re McCarthy; P u b l i c Trustee v. P u b l i c Trustee the f a c t s were that f o r some time before the t e s t a t o r ' s death, h i s wife had been a p a t i e n t i n a mental h o s p i t a l and there was a nom-- 172 -i n a l charge o n l y to the t e s t a t o r f o r such c a r e . On h i s death, the t e s t a t o r made no p r o v i s i o n f o r her i n h i s W i l l . Edwards J . s t a t e d t h a t : [The t e s t a t o r ] having succeeded i n c a s t i n g the burden of n e a r l y f i v e - s i x t h s of the co s t of h i s w i f e ' s main-tenance upon the community d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e , has endeavoured to impose the whole of that l i a b i l i t y upon the community a f t e r h i s death. O b v i o u s l y i t would be i m p o s s i b l e to imagine a case i n which the s a l u t a r y p r o v i s i o n s of the Family P r o t e c t i o n Act co u l d more p r o p e r l y be invoked than i n t h i s . 5 5 The remarks of Edwards J . have o f t e n been c i t e d as f a v o u r -ing v a r i a n c e of W i l l s to reimburse the s t a t e . The i s s u e came bef o r e the New Zealand Court of Appeal i n the case of C u r t i s v. Adams 5 6 where the t r i a l judge augmented the p r o v i s i o n f o r a c h i l d of the t e s t a t o r , who was a mental p a t i e n t , at the co s t of h i s other c h i l d r e n ' s share. In r e -viewing the e x i s t i n g j u r i s p r u d e n c e the a p p e l l a t e judges con-s i d e r e d the case of In re M c C a r t h y 5 7 and other decided cases "of l i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e " . 5 8 However, the Court s t a t e d unequiv-o c a b l y : 55 [1919] N.Z.L.R. 807 at p. 808, [1919], G.L.R. 461 at p. 461 (S.C.). 56 [1933] N.Z.L.R. 385, [1933] G.L.R. 392. 57 Supra, footnote 55. 58 Supra, footnote 56, N.Z.L.R. at pp. 391 and 392, G.L.R. at p. 395. - 173 -The P u b l i c T r u s t e e was e n t i t l e d to make a p p l i c a t i o n under the s e c t i o n , but we think that i n a small e s t a t e the Court, i n c o n s i d e r i n g the v a r i o u s moral cl a i m s of the c h i l d r e n of a t e s t a t o r , must take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n that an allowance made i n favour of a c h i l d c o n f i n e d i n a mental h o s p i t a l i s not i n p o i n t of f a c t f o r i t s p e r s o n a l b e n e f i t , but i s i n r e l i e f of the g e n e r a l taxpayer. The Court s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t : I f t h i s were a s u b s t a n t i a l e s t a t e i t might have been the case that the moral duty of the t e s t a t o r would have r e q u i r e d him to make p r o v i s i o n f o r the payment of the mental h o s p i t a l fees of h i s a f f l i c t e d son, and that the Court should have made an order r e p a i r i n g any f a i l u r e i n h i s duty i n that r e s p e c t ...59 Obvi o u s l y , the view of the Court was th a t the P u b l i c T r u s t e e , i n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a p a c i t y , had a r i g h t to b r i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n , however, the Court before making an award would co n s i d e r the s i z e of the e s t a t e . The p o s i t i o n taken by the Court of Appeal i n C u r t i s v. Adams i s not q u i t e as i n f l e x i b l e as that expressed by Edwards J . In re McCarthy where c o n t r i b u t i o n s were r e q u i r e d . Never-t h e l e s s the Court of Appeal imposes a duty, s u b j e c t to the s i z e of the e s t a t e , to make p r o v i s i o n s f o r the payment of hos-p i t a l fees r e c o g n i z i n g that such payments are not, g e n e r a l l y , f o r the p e r s o n a l b e n e f i t of the p a t i e n t , but f o r the taxpayer i n g e n e r a l . 59 Op. c i t . , footnote 56, N.Z.L.R. at p. 390, G.L.R. at p. 394. B. A u s t r a l i a n Cases - 174 -The p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r l i n i n g the A u s t r a l i a n cases i s not t o t a l l y f r e e from doubt. In Re W i l l i a m s 6 0 Napier J . ordered that a husband's e s t a t e c o n t r i b u t e to the maintenance of h i s widow, an inmate of a s t a t e mental h o s p i t a l , s t a t i n g that he co u l d not take i n t o account that an order i n her favour would, i n r e a l i t y , b e n e f i t o n l y the s t a t e . Some f i v e years l a t e r , Napier J . m o d i f i e d h i s p o s i t i o n i n In re W h i t i n g . 6 1 He recog n i z e d h i s e a r l i e r apparent c o n t r a -d i c t i n g d e c i s i o n i n re W i l l i a m s and d i s t i n g u i s h e d i t on the b a s i s that the a s s e t s were g r e a t e r and the testamentary bene-f i c i a r y had no moral c l a i m upon the e s t a t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d the i s s u e as f o l l o w s : The q u e s t i o n which has been p r i n c i p a l l y debated i n t h i s case i s whether the Court, i n the di s c h a r g e of t h i s duty, should take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the f a c t that any allowance, which may be made to the a p p l i -cant, w i l l not r e a l l y enure f o r her b e n e f i t but w i l l go i n r e l i e f of the cost of her support i n the S t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n i n which she now i s , or i n other words, i n r e l i e f of the gen e r a l taxpayer.62 In reac h i n g h i s c o n c l u s i o n he s t a t e d : 60 [1933] S.A.S.R. 107 at p. I l l (S.C.). 61 [1938] S.A.S.R. 188 (S.A. Sup. C t . ) . 62 I b i d . , at p. 192. - 175 -I cannot shut my eyes to the f a c t that the a p p l i c a n t has no r e a l i n t e r e s t i n the r e l i e f that i s claimed.63 He t h e r e f o r e decided: In the circumstances of t h i s case, where the r e l i e f , i f granted, would not enure to the b e n e f i t of the a p p l i c a n t h e r s e l f , but to the b e n e f i t of the ge n e r a l taxpayer, I have no h e s i t a t i o n i n r e f u s i n g the a p p l i -c a t i o n . 64 Perhaps the s t r o n g e s t view r e j e c t i n g an a p p l i c a t i o n on beh a l f of an i n c a p a c i t a t e d claimant i s found i n Re W. S.  D u f f . 6 5 On an a p p l i c a t i o n on beha l f of a s u r v i v o r i n a mental i n s t i t u t i o n , Sugerman J . r e j e c t e d the views expressed i n cases such as C u r t i s 6 6 and W h i t i n g 6 7 that the matter may t u r n upon the s i z e of the e s t a t e . H is a n a l y s i s was b a s i c a l l y t h a t : The State undertakes the burden of the maintenance i n h o s p i t a l s of mentally a f f l i c t e d members of the community. The cost of such maintenance i s d i s -charged out of revenue.68 The duty of the e s t a t e of a deceased f a t h e r to r e -imburse to the Sta t e the cost of ma i n t a i n i n g a men-t a l l y a f f l i c t e d c h i l d must, I t h i n k , be sought e l s e -where than i n the T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance A c t , 63 I b i d . , at p. 193. 64 I b i d . , at p. 194. 65 (1948), 48 S.R. (N.S.W.) 510, 65 W.N. 282 (N.S.W. Sup. Ct. ) . 66 Supra, footnote 56. 67 Supra, footnote 61. 68 Supra, footnote 65, S.R. (N.S.W.) at p. 511, W.N. at p. 283. - 176 -and t h a t , as i t seems to me, whether the e s t a t e i s l a r g e or small.69 The proper approach, then, appears to me to be that p r o v i s i o n should not be made which would merely have the e f f e c t of r e l i e v i n g the revenue of a charge without c o n f e r r i n g any b e n e f i t upon the a p p l i c a n t . A p r o v i s i o n may of course be made where the a p p l i c a n t i s b e n e f i t e d , even though i n b r i n g i n g about t h i s r e s u l t there i s or may be some r e l i e f of the revenue.70 An a n a l y s i s of the judgment i n Re W. S. Duff would i n d i -c ate that Sugerman J.'s views can be summarized as f o l l o w s : (1) Under pres e n t s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n the s t a t e has a duty to m a i n t a i n mentally i n f i r m i n d i v i d u a l s . (2) I f such duty i s to be s h i f t e d from the s t a t e to the e s t a t e of a deceased parent, there should be c l e a r s t a t u t o r y language. (3) The duty imposed upon the s t a t e does not negate an equal duty of a parent or a spouse to p r o v i d e f o r an incompetent dependent [ I ] n so f a r as p r o v i s i o n may be made f o r b e n e f i t s to the c h i l d [or spouse] other than or a d d i t i o n a l to mere maintenance d u r i n g the p e r i o d of confinement i n a State mental h o s p i t a l , such p r o v i s i o n ought, sub-j e c t of course to a l l other r e l e v a n t circumstances, to be made, and i n t h i s respect the s i z e of the 69 Supra, f o o t n o t e 65, S.R. (N.S.W.) at p. 512, W.N. at p. 283. 70 I b i d . , S.R. (N.S.W.) at pp. 512 and 513, W.N. at p. 284. - 177 -e s t a t e and the c l a i m upon i t are r e l e v a n t circum-stances . 71 However, i n the absence of a High Court d e c i s i o n i t i s hard to say whether the Duff case r e f l e c t s the A u s t r a l i a n law. C. E n g l i s h Cases There i s o n l y one r e p o r t e d E n g l i s h case i n v o l v i n g c l a i m s by m e n t a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d dependents. In Re Watkins (deceased), Hayward v. C h a t t e r t o n and O t h e r s 7 2 the c o u r t r e f u s e d to vary the W i l l of a t e s t a t o r who d u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t of h i s l i f e had maintained h i s daughter, the p l a i n t i f f , i n a p r i v a t e mental h o s p i t a l . S h o r t l y before the death of the t e s t a t o r the N a t i o n a l Health S e r v i c e Act, 1946 p l a c e d upon the State r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to maintain persons i n the daughter's p o s i t i o n . The evidence was such, and i t was accepted, that the t e s t a t o r expressed h i s i n t e n t i o n to leave her care to the s t a t e as soon as the Act came to e f f e c t . The c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d "whether i t was reasonable f o r the t e s t a t o r to make p r o v i s i o n f o r the p l a i n t i f f on the f o o t i n g that she c o u l d and should be maintained f r e e of charge under 71 Supra, f o o t n o t e 65, S.R. (N.S.W.) at p. 513, W.N. a t p. 284. 72 [1949] 1 A l l E.R. 695, 65 T.L.R. 410, [1949] W.N. 125 (Ch.D.). - 178 -the N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e Act, 1946". 7 3 Roxburgh J . had no h e s i t a t i o n i n g i v i n g an a f f i r m a t i v e r e p l y . Through the judgment he makes no r e f e r e n c e to the t e s t a -t o r ' s moral duty, nor to the f a c t that the order sought by the p l a i n t i f f would r e a l l y not be f o r her b e n e f i t but f o r the b e n e f i t of the s t a t e . The u n d e r l i n e d theme of the judgment r e f l e c t s the p h i l o -sophy that the new h e a l t h scheme was meant to r e l i e v e not j u s t p a t i e n t s but a l s o t h e i r f a m i l i e s of the burden of s u p p l y i n g care and t h e r e f o r e the t e s t a t o r had no such o b l i g a t i o n under h i s W i l l . No Commonwealth cases were r e f e r r e d t o . Although not d e a l i n g with mentally i n c a p a c i t a t e d persons, M i l l w a r d v. S h e n t o n 7 4 p r o v i d e s an i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l as i t r e l a t e s to the g e n e r a l concept as to whether or not a t e s t a t o r i s r e l i e v e d from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to p r o v i d e f o r a dependent merely because t h a t dependent i s r e c e i v i n g support from the s t a t e . In t h i s case, the t e s t a t r i x , a widow, l e f t her e n t i r e e s t a t e to c h a r i t y and nothing to her s i x c h i l d r e n on the r a t i o n a l e that they were, i n t e r a l i a , s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g . The 73 I b i d . , A l l E.R. at p. 699, T.L.R. at p. 412, W.N. at p. 126. 74 [1972] 2 A l l E.R. 1025, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 711 (C.A.). - 179 -f a c t was, however, that one of her sons was p h y s i c a l l y i n -c a p a c i t a t e d and t o t a l l y dependent on s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e . The t r i a l judge took the p o s i t i o n that i t was reasonable f o r the t e s t a t r i x to make no p r o v i s i o n f o r the a p p l i c a n t , p r e -sumably because of the support he was r e c e i v i n g from the s t a t e . Lord Denning M.R. r e j e c t e d the view of the t r i a l judge on the b a s i s that there was no reason f o r d e p r i v i n g the son of anything merely because he was r e c e i v i n g s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e and s t a t e d : So f a r from s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e being a ground f o r g i v -ing him l e s s , i t i s a ground f o r g i v i n g him more by doing something to a l l e v i a t e the d i s t r e s s under which he s u f f e r s . I t may not n e c e s s a r i l y be by i n c r e a s i n g h i s income. I t may be b e t t e r by p r o v i d i n g a lump sum so as to enable him to have a t e l e v i s i o n s e t , or a c a r , or even a b e t t e r house. A lump sum would be best here.75 The M i l l w a r d case does not d e a l with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r making p r o v i s i o n s f o r dependents who are m e n t a l l y i n c a p a -c i t a t e d but i t does d e a l with a case where the s t a t e , through i t s w e l f a r e scheme, i s p r o v i d i n g support to a person who i s i n c a p a b l e of l o o k i n g a f t e r h i m s e l f . What the court seems to have done i s to make p r o v i s i o n s from the e s t a t e f o r something beyond mere substenance "above the b r e a d l i n e " . 7 6 75 I b i d . , A l l E.R. at p. 1028. 76 I b i d . - 180 -In Re Watkins the c o u r t d i d not d i s t u r b the p r o v i s i o n s i n the W i l l on the b a s i s that the t e s t a t o r had made h i s W i l l r e l y i n g on the p r o v i s i o n s of the N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e A c t ,  1946 • Although not a r t i c u l a t e d , i t may be that the c o u r t recognized that i n a d d i t i o n to the s t a t e p r o v i d e d support, the i n c a p a c i t a t e d daughter had been pr o v i d e d with a p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e which would, i n due course of time, p r o v i d e her with a d d i t i o n a l "comforts". Perhaps the E n g l i s h p o s i t i o n i s r e a l l y no d i f f e r e n t than that expressed i n Re W.S. D u f f . 7 7 D. Canadian Cases The Canadian p r o v i n c e s have produced numerous cases on the i s s u e of testamentary p r o v i s i o n s f o r mentally i n c a p a c i t a t e d people who are r e c e i v i n g support from the s t a t e , and although i t c o u l d not be s a i d that Canadian c o u r t s have unequivocably adopted the New Zealand philosophy and r e j e c t e d the A u s t r a l i a n and E n g l i s h ones, i t can be s a i d that there i s c l e a r p r e f e r -ence f o r the former. B r i t i s h Columbia o f f e r s the f i r s t r e p o r t e d case i n Re  T a y l o r E s t a t e 7 8 where the t e s t a t o r l e f t nothing f o r h i s widow who was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . Cody J . v a r i e d the W i l l of the 77 See t e x t supra, at pp. 175, 176 and 177. 78 [1950] 1 W.W.R. 1055 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 181 -t e s t a t o r to pr o v i d e f o r a m e n i t i e s , as and when needed, beyond those s u p p l i e d by the i n s t i t u t i o n . No mention was made of the concept that the burden of maintenance should be t r a n s f e r r e d from the s t a t e to the e s t a t e of the deceased. The next Canadian d e c i s i o n i s In re Cousins E s t a t e , 7 9 which has become a l e a d i n g case and i s g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n most subsequent d e c i s i o n s on the s u b j e c t . In h i s judgment, W i l l i a m s C.J.K.B. s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d 8 0 the p r i n c i p l e enun-c i a t e d i n Re W. S. Duff ( D e c e a s e d ) 8 1 [and i n f e r e n t i a l l y t h a t of i n Re W a t k i n s ] 8 2 and made the pronouncement t h a t : [T]here i s i n Manitoba a moral duty on a t e s t a t o r , who i s a b l e to do so, to make p r o v i s i o n f o r the main-tenance and support of an a f f l i c t e d c h i l d , of what-ever age, who i s con f i n e d i n a mental h o s p i t a l . I hol d that that moral duty i s to the c h i l d and not to the state.83 W i l l i a m s C.J.K.B. chose to minimize the apparent impor-tance g i v e n i n C u r t i s v. Adams 8 4 to the s i z e of the e s t a t e by h i s comment that "but i n my view the s i z e of the e s t a t e i s only a circumstance to be considered i n determining what, i f any, allowance should be made." 8 3 79 (1951), 5 W.W.R. (N.S.) 289 (Man. K.B.), 59 Man. R. 372. 80 I b i d . , W.W.R. at p. 296, Man. R. at p. 381. 81 Supra, f o o t n o t e 65. 82 Supra, footnote 72. 8 3 Supra, footnote 79, W.W.R. at p. 299, Man. R. at p. 383. 84 Supra, footnote 56. 85 Supra, footnote 79, W.W.R. at p. 296, Man. R. at p. 380. - 182 -He d i d rec o g n i z e t h a t : [W]hile the moral duty e x i s t s , and i t i s at l a r g e as i t were, i t w i l l , of course, only be enfor c e d with due regard to the e s t a t e of the t e s t a t o r , the neces-s i t i e s of the o b j e c t s of h i s bounty, and a l l the c i r -cumstances of the case.86 The next case i n the chronology i s the B r i t i s h Columbia d e c i s i o n of Re Brousseau E s t a t e . 8 7 The t e s t a t o r i n h i s W i l l made p r o v i s i o n s f o r the payment of h i s widow's maintenance i n a p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n . An a p p l i c a t i o n was made on be h a l f of the widow f o r a l a r g e r p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e so as to per-mit her being admitted to a p r i v a t e f a c i l i t y . P a r t of the argument made by counsel f o r the b e n e f i c i a r i e s opposing the a p p l i c a t i o n was that the v a r i o u s s t a t u t e s d e a l i n g with mental h o s p i t a l s and me n t a l l y incompetents made p r o v i s i o n s f o r main-tenance f o r such persons by the s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e , the r e s -p o n s i b i l i t y of such maintenance f e l l upon the s t a t e and not the t e s t a t o r . To t h i s argument Clyne J . responded: Without d e c i d i n g whether the r e l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s of these Acts would enable the p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s to recover the cost of Mrs. Brousseau's maintenance from her husband's e s t a t e i f he had not pr o v i d e d f o r pay-ment by h i s w i l l , I am of the o p i n i o n that the argu-ment of lear n e d counsel f o r the b e n e f i c i a r i e s begs 86 I b i d . , W.W.R. at p. 299, Man. R. at p. 384. 87 [1952] 4 D.L.R. 664, 7 W.W.R. (N.S.) 262 ( S . C ) . - 183 -the q u e s t i o n . We are not c o n s i d e r i n g the method of recovery of the c o s t of h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n of a l u n a t i c i n t h i s case but whether a l u n a t i c w i f e i s e n t i t l e d to share i n her husband's bounty.88 He adopted the p o s i t i o n taken i n In re Cousins: [T]here are cases such as In re Cousins (1952) 5 WWR (NS) 289, where W i l l i a m s , C.J.Q.B. i n a le a r n e d and comprehensive judgment reviews a l l the a u t h o r i t i e s on the p o i n t and comes to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t : 'Whatever may be the p o l i c y of the l e g i s l a t u r e with regard to the recovery of maintenance c o s t s , I am of o p i n i o n that the p o l i c y of the l e g i s l a t u r e as shown by that Act i s that i t i s the moral duty of a t e s t a -t o r to make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper main-tenance and support of h i s dependant c h i l d who, by reason of mental i n f i r m i t y , i s unable to m a i n t a i n and support himself.'89 Clyne J . concluded as f o l l o w s : To my mind i t i s c l e a r that a man has a moral duty to support h i s wife i n si c k n e s s and i n h e a l t h and the duty extends d u r i n g t h e i r j o i n t l i v e s and a f t e r h i s death, i n so f a r as h i s means permit. In my view, that moral duty i s not discharged by reason of the f a c t t h at the s t a t e w i l l look a f t e r h i s f a m i l y i f he does not and I have no h e s i t a t i o n i n f o l l o w i n g the judgment i n the Cousins case i n p r e f e r e n c e to other a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d to me by counsel.90 Counsel f o r the r e s i d u a r y b e n e f i c i a r i e s argued that the t e s t a t o r i n f a c t made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r h i s w i f e as the 88 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 667, W.W.R. at p. 265. See explana t o r y note i n f o o t n o t e 120, i n f r a . 89 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 671, W.W.R. at p. 269. 90 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 671, W.W.R. at pp. 269 and 270. - 184 -p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e d as good medical care as any p r i -vate one i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In responding to t h i s argument, Clyne J . , r e l y i n g on the medical evidence t h a t , while con-ceding the p a r i t y of medical care between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e f a c i l i t i e s , a p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n would p r o v i d e more " q u i e t -ness and a degree of p r i v a c y " , 9 1 s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : I am of the o p i n i o n that p r o v i s i o n should a l s o be made to ensure that she should have the best p o s s i b l e treatment while she remains i l l , having regard to the s i z e of the estate.92 Clyne J . d i d not, t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the minimum care which would be pro v i d e d by p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s , but r e l a t e d such r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the s i z e of the e s t a t e and the care i t co u l d buy. Some years l a t e r , Deniset J . of the Manitoba Queen's Bench attempted a d i f f e r e n t approach i n Re Pfrimmer E s t a t e 9 3 where the deceased, a widower, was s u r v i v e d by two a d u l t c h i l d r e n , one of whom was an inmate of a p r o v i n c i a l h o s p i t a l and en-t i t l e d to r e c e i v e f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e from the Department of Welfare of the pr o v i n c e of Manitoba f o r the cost of h i s care and maintenance. In h i s W i l l , the deceased l e f t h i s e n t i r e e s t a t e to h i s other son. 91 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 672, W.W.R. at p. 270. 92 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 672, W.W.R. at pp. 270 and 271. 93 (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 71, 64 W.W.R. (N.S.) 762. - 185 -Deniset J . recogn i z e d that any b e n e f a c t i o n to the i n -capable son would end up i n the p r o v i n c i a l c o f f e r s through the Department of Welfare. He a l s o recognized that the p o l i c y of the l e g i s l a t u r e as to the T e s t a t o r s Family Maintenance Act was that a t e s t a t o r owed a duty of maintenance and support to h i s dependent c h i l d r e n who, by reason of mental i n f i r m i t y , were unable to maintain themselves, and yet there was no evidence of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t as to dependents who were being maintained by the s t a t e . R e l y i n g on the r a t i o n a l e of Re W a t k i n s 9 4 he concluded: In my view i t i s reasonable today f o r a t e s t a t o r , f u l l y aware of h i s moral o b l i g a t i o n s towards h i s wife and c h i l d r e n , to take i n t o account when making h i s w i l l t h a t the State does take care of the needy, and, i n the absence of express l e g i s l a t i o n to the con-t r a r y , he does not f a i l i n h i s moral duty i f he con-s i d e r s that one of the 'relevant circumstances' r e -garding h i s dependants' means i s hel p from the State.95 On a p p e a l , 9 6 however, Deniset J.'s d e c i s i o n was reve r s e d and the Court of Appeal r e i t e r a t e d that a t e s t a t o r ' s moral duty may p e r s i s t , notwithstanding s t a t e support. Dickson J.A. st a t e d , i n d e l i v e r i n g h i s judgment: 94 Supra, footnote 72. 95 Supra, f o o t n o t e 93, D.L.R. at p. 76, W.W.R. at p. 767. 96 (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 525, 66 W.W.R. (N.S.) 574; leav e to appeal refused 2 D.L.R. (3d) 720. - 186 -We share the view i m p l i c i t i n the judgment of Wi l l i a m s , C.J.Q.B. i n the Cousins case, supra, that a t e s t a t o r may owe a moral o b l i g a t i o n to a d i s a b l e d dependant not w i t h s t a n d i n g that such dependant i s being maintained by the s t a t e . A t e s t a t o r e x e r c i s i n g the duty imposed upon him by the Act would have to co n s i d e r , among other t h i n g s , the f o l l o w i n g : (a) The p o s s i b i l i t y of recovery by the d i s a b l e d person; (b) The minimal nature of s t a t e support which i n most cases i s unable to be much above s u b s i s t e n c e l e v e l ; and (c) The p o s i t i o n of those f o r whom the d i s a b l e d person i s h i m s e l f r e s p o n s i b l e , such as wife and c h i l -dren. 97 In 1980 i n Hawker et a l . v. Hawker E s t a t e 3 0 the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench i n v a r y i n g a W i l l where the t e s t a t o r l e f t e v e r y t h i n g to a mentally sound c h i l d , and nothing to h i s three mentally handicapped a d u l t c h i l d r e n , made the f o l l o w i n g statement of the law: I t i s now s e t t l e d law i n t h i s p r o v i n c e that the Dependants' R e l i e f Act recognizes that i t i s the moral duty of the t e s t a t o r to make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of a dependent c h i l d of whatever age who, by reason of mental i n -f i r m i t y , i s unable to maintain and support h i m s e l f , even though h i s needs have to be pro v i d e d by the st a t e or he i s a p a t i e n t i n a p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n maintained by the p r o v i n c e . These p r i n c i p l e s were enunciated by the Manitoba Court of Appeal i n Re Pfrimmer E s t a t e (1969), 66 W.W.R. 574, and by Wi l l i a m s , C.J.K.B., i n Re Cousins E s t a t e , [1952] 5 W.W.R. 289, and were approved by C u l l i t o n C.J.S., i n Spi c e r v. Fawe l l , an o r a l d e c i s i o n of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal d e l i v e r e d on A p r i l 26, 1971.99 97 98 99 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 526, W.W.R. at p. 575. (1980), 8 Sask. R. 433 (Q.B.). I b i d . , at p. 435. - 187 -In l e s s than a year a f t e r the d e c i s i o n i n Hawker, Cameron J . of the same Court (Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench) took a c o n f l i c t i n g p o s i t i o n i n Re Deis; Deis v. D e i s 1 0 0 ; r e -versed (sub nom Re Deis; S p i c e r v. D e i s ) . 1 0 1 The case i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from the p o i n t of view that i t i n v o l v e d an i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n and the a p p l i c a t i o n was brought by the widow with the r e s u l t that the a p p l i c a t i o n was being r e s i s t e d by a m e n t a l l y i n c a p a b l e son as opposed to the mentally i n c a p a b l e son having o r i g i n a t e d the a p p l i c a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s the p r i n c i p l e s c o n s i d e r e d are no d i f f e r e n t than those r e q u i r e d to be c o n s i d e r e d i f the son had commenced the proceedings. Cameron J . c o n s i d e r e d that the son's needs were f u l l y met by c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s contained i n the s t a t u t e law of the p r o v i n c e of Saskatchewan and that t h e r e f o r e a t e s t a t o r should be a b l e to r e l y on such s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s i n s e t t l i n g h i s w i l l . He commented as f o l l o w s : I do not think they should be viewed as c h a r i t a b l e or g r a t u i t o u s . They are p r o v i s i o n s which he and the r e s t of us have c r e a t e d and make p o s s i b l e . We con-t r i b u t e to them. They amount to good sense and good pl a n n i n g by a l l of us f o r which we, i n c l u d i n g t h i s t e s t a t o r , pay a p p r o p r i a t e l y . In that sense he has a l r e a d y made p r o v i s i o n f o r the r e t a r d e d son.102 100 (1981), 9 Sask. R. 257, 11 E.T.R. 68 (Q.B.). 101 (1983), 21 Sask. R. 328, 13 E.T.R. 88 (C.A.). 102 Supra, footnote 100, Sask. R. at p. 262, E.T.R. at p. 73. - 188 -Cameron J . r e j e c t e d the theory that a t e s t a t o r had no o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e reimbursement to the s t a t e f o r the co s t of maintenance i n an i n s t i t u t i o n , p r e f e r r i n g to view the prob-lem from the f o l l o w i n g p e r s p e c t i v e : Ample p r o v i s i o n has been made f o r the r e t a r d e d son of t h i s deceased. In a very r e a l sense, the deceased, as a taxpayer, has p r o v i d e d f o r t h i s a s s i s t a n c e . As a member of s o c i e t y as a whole he too i s e n t i t l e d to the b e n e f i t s of the f i n a n c i a l resources of the pro-v i n c e and has, along with a l l of us, seen to i t that those resources are d i r e c t e d to t h i s and other pur-poses. He has thus met h i s o b l i g a t i o n s . 1 0 3 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reversed Cameron J.'s d e c i s i o n c o n f i r m i n g the l i n e of a u t h o r i t i e s running through the d e c i s i o n s of In re Cousins, Re Pfrimmer E s t a t e and quo t i n g the statement of Maher J . i n Hawker v. H a w k e r 1 0 4 concluded that such statement " c o r r e c t l y and s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d " 1 0 5 the law. In the most recent B r i t i s h Columbia d e c i s i o n , Penty v. Mott et a l . 1 0 6 a t e s t a t r i x l e f t her e n t i r e e s t a t e to c h a r i t i e s and made no p r o v i s i o n s f o r her men t a l l y handicapped twenty-seven year o l d son. The P u b l i c T r u s t e e brought proceedings on be h a l f of the son. The argument was made on b e h a l f of the c h a r i t i e s t h at no p r o v i s i o n should be made f o r the claimant 103 I b i d . , Sask. R. at pp. 262 and 263, E.T.R. at p. 73. 104 Supra, f o o t n o t e 98. 105 Supra, f o o t n o t e 101 Sask. R. at p. 334, E.T.R. at p. 93. 106 (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 444, 16 E.T.R. 175 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 189 -unle s s i t co u l d be shown that such p r o v i s i o n s would a s s i s t to pr o v i d e a " b e t t e r l i f e " . MacKinnon J . r e j e c t e d the argument t a k i n g the f o l l o w i n g p o s i t i o n : Counsel have produced no a u t h o r i t y to support the p r o p o s i t i o n submitted that a 'better l i f e ' i s the proper c r i t e r i o n or t e s t by which the Court should determine i f the t e s t a t r i x made adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the care and maintenance of Donald. I am of the  view the i s s u e here i s whether or not an award should  be made when Donald's needs are now being p r o v i d e d by  the p u b l i c purse. I m p l i c i t i n the submission of the defendants i s the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , i f a l l of Donald's needs are p r o p e r l y met by the p u b l i c purse, then no award should be made. The a u t h o r i t i e s do not  support such a p r o p o s i t i o n . 1 0 7 A f t e r reviewing the d e c i s i o n s of Cousins, Brousseau, Pfrimmer, Hawker and Dei s , he concluded as f o l l o w s : 1 0 8 I adopt the p r i n c i p l e s enunciated i n the cases r e f e r -red to abovel09 and conclude the t e s t a t r i x f a i l e d i n her moral o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e f o r her son. The c o u r t then d i r e c t e d that the e n t i r e e s t a t e be set a s i d e and that some or a l l of the income be used f o r the proper care and maintenance of the clai m a n t . 107 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 448, E.T.R. at p. 179 (emphasis added). 108 I b i d . , D.L.R. at p. 449, E.T.R. at p. 181. 109 Cousins, Brousseau, Pfrimmer, Hawker, and Deis. - 190 -Of note i s the f a c t t h at whereas the two o r i g i n a l B r i t i s h Columbia d e c i s i o n s on the s u b j e c t , namely, i n Re T a y l o r and Re Brousseau E s t a t e , the cou r t was ready to vary the W i l l so as to p r o v i d e f o r amenities not provided by the s t a t e c a r e , or f o r an improved l e v e l of c a r e , the d e c i s i o n of the Penty case would i n d i c a t e that the t e s t a t o r ' s e s t a t e may be c a l l e d upon as the primary source of f i n a n c i n g . E. Summary of B r i t i s h Columbia D e c i s i o n s The law i n B r i t i s h Columbia appears to be as f o l l o w s : (a) A t e s t a t o r ' s moral o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e f o r a men-t a l l y incompetent dependent i s not negated by the p r o v i s i o n s of care under s t a t e schemes. In e f f e c t , a t e s t a t o r has a duty to absorb, or reimburse the s t a t e f o r , such c o s t s . 1 1 0 (b) The t e s t a t o r ' s o b l i g a t i o n to c o n t r i b u t e to the men-t a l l y incompetent dependent's maintenance e x i s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not the dependent would b e n e f i t p e r s o n a l l y from any p a r t of the c o n t r i b u -t i o n . 1 1 1 110 Penty v. Mott et a l , supra., f o o t n o t e 106. 111 Penty v. Mott et a l , supra, footnote 106. - 191 -(c) Even where the t e s t a t o r has v o l u n t a r i l y arranged to reimburse the s t a t e f o r the maintenance, the c o u r t may vary the W i l l to p r o v i d e f o r a d d i t i o n a l amenities not s u p p l i e d by the s t a t e but which the dependent i s able to a p p r e c i a t e . T h i s w i l l depend on the s i z e of the e s t a t e and i f s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e , the c o u r t may even r e q u i r e the p r o v i s i o n of p r i v a t e c a r e . 1 1 2 (d) The c o u r t s are not r e l u c t a n t to delay the e s t a t e ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n pending c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the dependent's f u t u r e needs or development of s t a t e s c h e m e s . 1 1 3 F. Nature of State Support I t i s d i f f i c u l t to e x t r a c t a c l e a r p r i n c i p l e from the cases d e a l i n g with a p p l i c a t i o n s by, or on b e h a l f o f , persons r e c e i v i n g s t a t e support. In Re W.S. D u f f 1 1 4 the c o u r t took the view that the s t a t e had. the l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to main-t a i n mentally a f f l i c t e d members of the community. I f such person had any a s s e t s , they c o u l d , by v i r t u e of the appro-p r i a t e s t a t u t e , be used by the s t a t e to d e f r a y that person's c o s t s beyond the b a s i c s t a t e support. 112 Re Brousseau E s t a t e , supra, footnote 87. 113 Re T a y l o r E s t a t e , supra, footnote 78; Penty v. Mott et  a l . , supra, f o o t n o t e 106. 114 Supra, footnote 65. - 192 -S i m i l a r l y , i n Re W a t k i n s 1 1 5 the cou r t h e l d that a t e s t a t o r was e n t i t l e d to r e l y , i n making h i s W i l l , on the p r o v i s i o n s of the a p p r o p r i a t e l e g i s l a t i o n which p r o v i d e d f o r f r e e medical care. In Re K i n l o c h E s t a t e 1 1 6 the t e s t a t o r l e f t nothing to a daughter s u f f e r i n g from a mental d i s o r d e r and permanently i n a mental h o s p i t a l . On an a p p l i c a t i o n on be h a l f of the d i s a b l e d daughter the c o u r t adopted the reasoning i n Re Watkins on the b a s i s that the p r o v i n c e of A l b e r t a was about to in t r o d u c e a u n i v e r s a l h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n p l a n a p p l i c a b l e to a l l r e s i d e n t s w i t h i n the Province under which those r e q u i r i n g h o s p i t a l care would r e c e i v e i t at no expense to themselves and t h e r e f o r e the deceased was e n t i t l e d to r e l y upon t h i s knowledge and make no p r o v i s i o n f o r a mentally s i c k dependent. The B r i t i s h Columbia case of Re Page E s t a t e , 1 1 7 although the a p p l i c a n t was not mentally i n c a p a b l e , he was r e c e i v i n g s t a t e support. The a p p l i c a n t , the e l d e r son of the t e s t a t o r , was p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l e d as a r e s u l t of war s e r v i c e and was i n re c e i p t of a government pension. The pension would abate i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n to any b e n e f i t he may d e r i v e from the es t a t e . Gould J . dismi s s e d the p e t i t i o n : 115 Supra, footnote 72. 116 (1972), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 465, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 445, ( A l t a . S.C. ) . 117 (1969), 67 W.W.R. 407 ( S . C ) . - 193 -Because he i s e n t i t l e d to a pension, and because that pension would abate v i r t u a l l y pro tanto as any i n -creased p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the e s t a t e I might award ...118 Gould J . a l s o r e j e c t e d the argument that he should not con-s i d e r the p e t i t i o n e r ' s pension and i t s p r o s p e c t i v e abatement, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the two cases g i v e n i n i t s support, Re Brousseau and Re Cousins, on the b a s i s that the two cases were concerned with c o s t s of maintenance f o r a p p l i c a n t s who were p a t i e n t s i n mental i n s t i t u t i o n s . In h i s r e j e c t i o n , he concluded t h a t : In my view, i t would have been an a t t i t u d e nothing shor t of b l i n d s t u p i d i t y had t h i s t e s t a t o r not,... a c t e d testamentar i l y upon the f a c t that the p e t i -t i o n e r was i n r e c e i p t of a pension ... that ... would abate to the extent of i n h e r i t a n c e . 1 1 9 One might q u e s t i o n the d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by Gould J . between the pension i n t h i s case and the c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g p a t i e n t s i n a mental h o s p i t a l . He c h a r a c t e r i z e d the d i s -a b i l i t y pension as one that had been earned i n the same sense as a c o r p o r a t e pension payable to an employee upon h i s r e t i r e -ment. By c o n t r a s t , h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of payment to mental h o s p i t a l p a t i e n t s was that of "the eleemosynary m o t i v a t i o n of 118 I b i d . , at p. 414. 119 I b i d . , at p. 415. - 194 -the s t a t e i n p r o v i d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r i t s d e s t i t u t e l u n a t i c s " . 1 2 0 A b e t t e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and treatment of t h i s i s s u e i s found i n Re M i l l a r . 1 2 1 The t e s t a t r i x l e f t a s m a l l e s t a t e e q u a l l y between her ten a d u l t c h i l d r e n . One of them was i n -capable of l o o k i n g a f t e r h i m s e l f and was i n r e c e i p t of a s s i s t -ance under the a p p r o p r i a t e w e l f a r e a s s i s t a n c e l e g i s l a t i o n . Under the p r o v i s i o n s of such l e g i s l a t i o n , e n t i t l e m e n t to a s s i s t a n c e would terminate or be reduced i f a sum were to be r e c e i v e d from the e s t a t e g r e a t e r than that p o r t i o n p r o v i d e d by the t e s t a t r i x . The c o u r t , although r e c o g n i z i n g that the circumstances were not e n t i r e l y s i m i l a r , adopted the r a t i o n a l e i n Re Watkins which, i n the c o u r t ' s view, e s t a b l i s h e d that i n some circum-stances, the t e s t a t o r has the r i g h t to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e when making p r o v i s i o n s f o r persons e n t i t l e d to apply under dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s -l a t i o n . 120 I b i d . , at p. 415. The r e f e r e n c e i n the judgment to " l u n a t i c s " r e s u l t s from the f a c t t h at persons under mental i n c a p a c i t y came under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Lunacy A c t , R.S.B.C., 1948 c. 194. The Lunacy Act was r e p e a l e d on J u l y 1 s t , 1962, by An Act Respecting the E s t a t e s of  M e n t a l l y Incompetent Persons, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44. The t i t l e An Act Respecting the E s t a t e s of M e n t a l l y Incompetent Persons was repealed on November 7th, 1973 and the s h o r t t i t l e , The P a t i e n t s ' E s t a t e s Act was s u b s t i t u t e d f o r i t . The name change was made by s. 24 of An Act to  Amend the Mental Health Act, 1964, S.B.C. 1973, c. 127, s. 24. The P a t i e n t s ' E s t a t e Act became the P a t i e n t s P r o p e r t y Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 313 at the time that many of the B r i t i s h Columbia s t a t u t e s were changed i n 1979. 121 71 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (P.E.I.S.C.), (1976), 12 N. & P.E.I.R. 440. - 195 -The evidence i n the Re M i l l a r case i n d i c a t e d that any money the p e t i t i o n e r might get would go to reduce h i s we l f a r e allowance. The cou r t adopted the dictum of the O n t a r i o Court 1 9 9 of Appeal i n Zajac v. Zwaryz x that i n order f o r dependent r e l i e f s t a t u t e s to serve t h e i r purpose, any award under them must r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l b e n e f i t a c c r u i n g to the r e c i p -i e n t . On the b a s i s of the evidence, the court d i s m i s s e d the a p p l i c a t i o n as i t was unable to f i n d that an award, i f made, would r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l b e n e f i t to the a p p l i c a n t . An a n a l y s i s of In Re B a r c l a y E s t a t e 1 2 3 and Re K i n l o c h  E s t a t e may p r o v i d e some i n s i g h t i n the i n c o n s i s t e n c y of the cases. The judgment of Ford J . i n In Re B a r c l a y E s t a t e responded to the submission that the law, i n cases d e a l i n g with the o b l i g a t i o n of t e s t a t o r s to provide f o r maintenance f o r persons i n s t a t e maintained h o s p i t a l s , was that expressed i n Re Watkins, as f o l l o w s : I am unable to a p p r e c i a t e how the d e c i s i o n i n In re  Watkins; Hayward v. C h a t t e r t o n , 65 LJ Ch 410, [1949] 1 A l l ER 695, i n which i t was held that the t e s t a t o r was e n t i t l e d to d i s t r i b u t e h i s e s t a t e on the f o o t i n g that h i s mentally i l l daughter i n a p r i v a t e i n s t i t u -t i o n should take advantage of the p r o v i s i o n s of the N a t i o n a l Health S e r v i c e A c t , 1946, of England, about to be put i n t o e f f e c t , can be a p p l i e d to the f a c t s here. We have no s i m i l a r Act i n Alberta.124 122 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 52, 1 O.R. 575; a f f i r m i n g (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 6, 2 O.R. 209, (C.A.). 123 (1952), 5 W.W.R. (N.S.) 308 ( A l t a . S.C.). 124 I b i d . , at p. 313. - 196 -C u l l e n J . i n Re K i n l o c h E s t a t e d i s t i n g u i s h e d Re B a r c l a y on the b a s i s t h a t : There has been a change i n circumstances s i n c e that d e c i s i o n ; the change i n circumstances i s that with e f f e c t 1st J u l y 1969 there i s a u n i v e r s a l h o s p i t a l -i z a t i o n p l a n a p p l i c a b l e to a l l r e s i d e n t s w i t h i n the Province of A l b e r t a and while there i s s t i l l some modicum which must be p a i d by persons i n r e c e i p t of h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n b e n e f i t s , the p r i n c i p l e enunciated i n Re Watkins; Hayward v. C h a t t e r t o n , supra, i s now e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e i n the Province of Alberta.125 The e x i s t e n c e of a u n i v e r s a l h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n law such as the N a t i o n a l Health S e r v i c e A c t , 1946 of England, or the u n i -v e r s a l h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n p l a n f o r r e s i d e n t s of the p r o v i n c e of A l b e r t a , r e f e r r e d to i n Re K i n l o c h E s t a t e 1 2 6 should c l e a r l y be circumstances which should be taken i n t o account. The q u e s t i o n , however, i s should the t e s t a t o r be expected to r e p l a c e the support p r o v i d e d by the s t a t e . In B r i t i s h Columbia the Guaranteed A v a i l a b l e Income f o r  Need A c t 1 2 7 [GAIN] p r o v i d e s : 2.(1) Subject to t h i s Act and the r e g u l a t i o n s , the m i n i s t e r may pay, out of money a u t h o r i z e d by an Act of the L e g i s l a t u r e , money necessary f o r the ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n of income a s s i s t a n c e and s o c i a l s e r v i c e 125 Supra, footnote 116 D.L.R. at p. 473, W.W.R. at p. 453. 126 I b i d . 127 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 158. - 197 -programs and the p r o v i s i o n of income a s s i s t a n c e and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n the amounts as i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n he c o n s i d e r s a d v i s a b l e to a s s i s t i n whole or i n p a r t , i n d i v i d u a l s , whether a d u l t or minor, or f a m i l i e s . 1 2 8 The r e g u l a t i o n s p r o v i d e i n S e c t i o n 22.(1) as f o l l o w s : 22.(1) The D i r e c t o r , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , may a u t h o r i z e an a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y to p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e to pay c o s t s of s e r v i c e s d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s S e c t i o n i f an i n d i v i d u a l i s unable to p r o v i d e ade-q u a t e l y out of h i s or her own resources f o r such s e r -v i c e s . The r e g u l a t i o n s t h e r e f o r e permit the D i r e c t o r to p r o v i d e the per diem charge i n h o s p i t a l s operated by the p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia. However, i f the p a t i e n t ' s p e r s o n a l e s t a t e exceeds a c e r t a i n amount, then the p r o v i s i o n s of GAIN w i l l not apply. The burden would t h e r e f o r e be s h i f t e d from the s t a t e to the i n d i v i d u a l . As an example, i n Penty v. Mott et a l . 1 2 9 the award made by the court would go f i r s t l y to s a t i s f y the per diem charges, which had been p r e v i o u s l y p a i d by the Pro v i n c e ; and secondly to pro v i d e b e t t e r a s s i s t a n c e to the p a t i e n t . Much e a r l i e r Re T a y l o r E s t a t e 1 3 0 provided f o r a m e n i t i e s , as and when needed, beyond those s u p p l i e d by the i n s t i t u -i 31 t i o n . Re Brousseau E s t a t e J a l s o made p r o v i s i o n s so that the 128 I b i d . , s. 2(1). 129 Supra, f o o t n o t e 106. 130 Supra, f o o t n o t e 78. 131 Supra. f o o t n o t e 87. - 198 -p a t i e n t c o u l d o b t a i n the best p o s s i b l e care a v a i l a b l e under the circumstances, i n c l u d i n g moving i n t o p r i v a t e f a c i l i t i e s . Re T a y l o r E s t a t e ignored the q u e s t i o n of s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and Clyne J . i n Re Brousseau E s t a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f u s e d to dea l with i t . I t would be d i f f i c u l t to present a v a l i d and suppo r t a b l e argument that a t e s t a t o r need not make p r o v i s i o n s f o r a p a t i e n t i f such p r o v i s i o n s would improve the p a t i e n t ' s l o t i n l i f e . I t i s a l s o , e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t to argue, e n t h u s i a s t i c -a l l y , i n favour of the concept that any award under the Act would merely r e p l a c e h o s p i t a l c o s t s p r e v i o u s l y p a i d by the s t a t e . T h i s i s another area that r e q u i r e s s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the l e g i s l a t u r e to determine what i s , e x a c t l y , expected from the A c t . G. Law Reform Commissions The q u e s t i o n touching on the o b l i g a t i o n of maintenance of an i n c a p a c i t a t e d person has not r e c e i v e d much c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the v a r i o u s law reform commissions i n Canada, (a) O n t a r i o T O O The O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission-1-°^ d i d not c o n s i d e r the s u b j e c t . Furthermore i t i s to be noted that none of the 132 O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission, Report On Family Law; "Part IV, Family Property Law" (1974). - 199 -cases i n v o l v i n g incompetent dependents was decided i n O n t a r i o . I t i s a l s o u n l i k e l y t h a t any such case w i l l a r i s e i n the f u t u r e as under the Succession Law Reform A c t 1 3 3 i n order to have s t a n d i n g to apply f o r v a r i a t i o n of a W i l l the a p p l i c a n t must s a t i s f y a t e s t of dependency on the t e s t a t o r . (b) The A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform The A l b e r t a r e p o r t 1 3 4 s t a t e s "there i s no c o n s i s t e n c y i n the case law on t h i s s u b j e c t . " and there i s no l o g i c to the a p p a r e n t l y anomalous s i t u a t i o n where d u r i n g the l i f e -time of the p a r e n t s , g e n e r a l l y speaking, there i s no f i n a n c i a l l i a b i l i t y i n regard to c h i l d r e n who s u f f e r from a very severe mental or p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t y , but on death the P u b l i c T r u s t e e regards i t as h i s duty to apply on be-h a l f of d i s a b l e d c h i l d r e n . In response to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the cases the I n s t i -t u t e comments as f o l l o w s : It i s e x c e e d i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to d e f i n e the boundary between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the support of a person who q u a l i f i e s as a dependant 133 R.S.O. 1980, c. 488. 134 A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 29, Family R e l i e f , (1978) at p. 42. - 200 -under the s t a t u t e . Where the e s t a t e i s l a r g e , we see no reason why p r o v i s i o n should not be made out of a parent's e s t a t e f o r the support of a d i s a b l e d c h i l d . I t may be somewhat anomalous that d u r i n g the parent's l i f e t i m e the P r o v i n c e d i d not e n f o r c e the parent's o b l i g a t i o n f o r support but does so at death. However, the deceased no longer has a need f o r h i s a s s e t s and, i f h i s e s t a t e i s l a r g e , the com-p e t i n g c l a i m s f o r a share of h i s e s t a t e may a l l be s a t i s f i e d . Where the e s t a t e i s s m a l l and there are competing c l a i m s which cannot be s a t i s f i e d , we f e e l that a judge may p r o p e r l y d i s m i s s the a p p l i c a t i o n on b e h a l f of a d i s a b l e d person who i s r e c e i v i n g support from the P r o v i n c e . We t h e r e f o r e recommend that the f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y assumed by a government f o r a mentally or p h y s i c a l l y d i s a b l e d dependant should be one of the f a c t o r s which i s taken i n t o account i n determining whether an order should be made.135 The I n s t i t u t e concluded i t s r e p o r t with the f o l l o w i n g spe-c i f i c recommendation: That the proposed Act should p r o v i d e t h a t : Upon the h e a r i n g of an a p p l i c a t i o n under t h i s A c t , the judge s h a l l c o n s i d e r a l l matters that should be taken i n t o account, i n c l u d i n g the f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i -b i l i t y assumed by a government f o r a m e n t a l l y or p h y s i c a l l y d i s a b l e d dependant.136 (c) B r i t i s h Columbia The Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia 1" 5 1 con-s i d e r e d the o b s e r v a t i o n s of the A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e but d i d not c o n s i d e r any recommendation necessary. 135 I b i d . , at p. 44. 136 I b i d . , at p. 44. 137 Op. c i t . , footnote 22, at p. 58. - 201 -The B r i t i s h Columbia Commission, commented A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e ' s recommendation as f o l l o w s : upon the I t i s arguable that t h i s i s a f a c t o r the c o u r t s a l r e a d y take i n t o account. There i s no need f o r a s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n to c o n s i d e r whether there i s p u b l i c funding f o r a dependant. In the u s u a l case, i f the e s t a t e i s l a r g e , or there i s no other c l a i m -ant, p u b l i c f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e should be i r r e l e -vant. The c o u r t s seem to take these f a c t o r s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y i n circumstances where i t i s reasonable to do so.138 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the B r i t i s h Columbia j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s not s u p p o r t i v e of the Commission's c o n c l u s i o n and f o r the sake of u n i f o r m i t y and c l a r i t y the B r i t i s h Columbia Commission should have made a recommendation s i m i l a r to that of the A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e . 138 Op. c i t . , footnote 22, at p. 58. - 202 -PART IV: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSION LAW REFORM ACT OF ONTARIO; A CONTRAST OF IT WITH THE NOW REPEALED DEPENDANTS' RELIEF ACT OF ONTARIO AND THE PRESENT BRITISH COLUMBIA WILLS VARIATION ACT - 203 -CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION The Succession Law Reform A c t , R.S.O. 1980, c. 488, (SLRA) came i n t o f o r c e on March 31st, 1978, having f i r s t been i n t r o -duced i n the O n t a r i o L e g i s l a t u r e on May 11th, 1976 as B i l l 85 e n t i t l e d The Succession Law Reform Act 1976. The o b j e c t i v e a r t i c u l a t e d by the Explanatory Note to the B i l l i s to p r o v i d e a comprehensive reform of the law of t e s t a t e and i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n as p a r t of the g e n e r a l review of f a m i l y law. The SLRA i s e s s e n t i a l l y a combination of The W i l l s A c t , 1  The D e v o l u t i o n of E s t a t e s A c t , 2 The S u r v i v o r s h i p A c t , 3 and The  Dependants' R e l i e f A c t , 4 a l l of which have been re p e a l e d except f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of e s t a t e s p o r t i o n of The  De v o l u t i o n of E s t a t e s A c t . The SLRA matured a f t e r more than ten years of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and re s e a r c h . I t had i t s genesis i n the Family Law P r o j e c t of the O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission 1 R.S.O. 1970, c. 499. 2 R.S.O. 1970, c. 129. 3 R.S.O. 1970, c. 454, am. S.O. 1972, c. 43, s . l . 4 R.S.O. 1970, c. 126. - 204 -and culminated i n Chapter 13 of the Commission's Report on  Family Property Law i n 1976. The SLRA i s the most contemporary Canadian attempt to r e c o n c i l e the treatment of posthumous d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n the o v e r a l l context of f a m i l y law and, i t s a p p l i c a t i o n as i t r e l a t e s to dependents' r e l i e f , r e f l e c t s the most r a d i c a l s t a t u t o r y departure from testamentary freedom by any Canadian p r o v i n c e except f o r P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d . 5 I t i s t h e r e f o r e a p p r o p r i a t e to examine the p r o v i s i o n s of the SLRA, as they apply to dependents' r e l i e f , i n r e l a t i o n to the now repealed Dependants' R e l i e f Act (DRA) and to the B r i t i s h Columbia W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t . 6 5 The Dependents R e l i e f Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. D-6 p r o v i d e s by S e c t i o n 19 that the value of c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s (e.g. DMC, J o i n t Tenancy, Insurance) are deemed p a r t of the e s t a t e ; and by S e c t i o n 20 that the donee of a g i f t may be r e q u i r e d to pay maintenance and support. 6 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 435. - 205 -CHAPTER 2. ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSION  LAW REFORM ACT OF ONTARIO AND A  CONTRAST WITH THE DEPENDANTS'  RELIEF ACT OF ONTARIO 1. T e s t a t e , I n t e s t a t e Under the DRA, before the p r o v i s i o n s of the s t a t u t e c o u l d be invoked the deceased must have d i e d t e s t a t e . Subsection 2(1), the chargi n g s e c t i o n , simply made r e f e r e n c e to "the t e s t a t o r ..." By c o n t r a s t , the corresponding s e c t i o n of the SLRA, s u b s e c t i o n 58(1), extends the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t e to circumstances where a deceased has d i e d t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e . By extending the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t e to i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n , O n t a r i o has j o i n e d the growing number of pr o v i n c e s not l i m i t i n g dependents' r e l i e f to t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n . ' 2. A p p l i c a n t s A f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n precedent f o r in v o k i n g the DRA was that the t e s t a t o r had not made p r o v i s i o n f o r the maintenance of h i s dependents. Subsection 1(a) d e f i n e d "dependent" as the 7 R e l i e f l i m i t e d to testamentary s u c c e s s i o n i s found o n l y i n : B r i t i s h Columbia, W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t , R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 435; New Brunswick, T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t , R.S.N.B. 1973, C.T.-4; Nova S c o t i a , T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 303, as amended. - 206 -spouse, c h i l d r e n under the age of s i x t e e n , or c h i l d r e n over s i x t e e n but through i l l n e s s or i n f i r m i t y unable to earn a l i v e l i h o o d . The c l a s s of persons e n t i t l e d to c l a i m r e l i e f under the s t a t u t e was t h e r e f o r e very l i m i t e d . One of the more notable developments of the SLRA i s the widened range of persons who may q u a l i f y f o r r e l i e f , and the e l a b o r a t e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and t e s t s which the cou r t must apply before members of each category can q u a l i f y . S u bsection 57(d) c o n t a i n s the b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n and s e t s out the groups of persons who may seek r e l i e f . These a r e : spouse or common-law spouse of the deceased; a parent of the deceased; a c h i l d of the deceased; or a s i b l i n g of the de-ceased; to whom the deceased was p r o v i d i n g support or was under a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to do so immediately before h i s death. Although the c l a s s of persons has been extended, the r e l a t i o n s h i p by i t s e l f i s not enough. A dependent, to q u a l i f y under the SLRA, must not only be a member of the s p e c i f i e d c l a s s , but must a l s o be i n r e c e i p t , or be l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e , support at the date of death of the deceased. Subsection 57(d) c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s that o n l y a person "to whom the deceased was p r o v i d i n g support or was under a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e support immediately before h i s death" may be a "dependent". - 207 -As each c l a s s i s s u b j e c t to extended meanings they r e q u i r e i n d i v i d u a l examination: Spouses: Paragraph 5 7 ( d ) ( i ) g i v e s l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n to "common-law spouses" and g i v e s members of that c l a s s s t a t u s as depen-dents and t h e r e f o r e r i g h t to r e l i e f under the s t a t u t e . The term "common-law spouse" i s d e f i n e d i n s u b s e c t i o n 57(b), and to q u a l i f y a person, e i t h e r male or female, must have c o h a b i t e d with the deceased immediately before h i s or her death f o r a continuous p e r i o d of not l e s s than f i v e y e a r s . I f there are c h i l d r e n i n v o l v e d of whom the deceased and the a p p l i c a n t were the n a t u r a l p a r e n t s , then the f i v e year c o n d i t i o n precedent i s r e p l a c e d by a " r e l a t i o n s h i p of some permanence". Subsection 5 7 ( b ) ( i i ) , by i t s wording, contemplates o n l y a l i v i n g c h i l d . No p r o v i s i o n has been made f o r unions where there are no l i v i n g c h i l d r e n but there i s a c h i l d en ven t r e sa mere and such c h i l d i s born a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of the l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d as p r e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 61. A person whose marriage to the deceased was terminated or d e c l a r e d a n u l l i t y i s , by s u b s e c t i o n 57(g), i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n of spouse. - 208 -C h i l d r e n ; Subsection 57(a) of the SLRA extends the meaning of " c h i l d " to i n c l u d e g r a n d c h i l d r e n and persons to whom the deceased had demonstrated a s e t t l e d i n t e n t i o n to t r e a t as a c h i l d of h i s f a m i l y , but does not i n c l u d e a f o s t e r c h i l d p l a c e d i n a home f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . By v i r t u e of the d e f i n i t i o n contained i n s u b s e c t i o n 57(a) and ( d ) , i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e that a c h i l d c o u l d be a depen-dent of both a n a t u r a l parent, l e g a l l y o b l i g a t e d to support him, and a "step-parent" who v o l u n t a r i l y supports him. S u b s e c t i o n 57(a) i n c o r p o r a t e s the p r o v i s i o n s of c l a u s e 1(1)(a) which removes any d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between c h i l d r e n born w i t h i n or without marriages, and i n c l u d e s posthumous b i r t h s . Clause 1(1)(a) a l s o i n c o r p o r a t e s the e f f e c t of s e c t i o n s 86 and 87 of the C h i l d Welfare A c t , 8 which c l a r i f y the l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between adopted c h i l d r e n and t h e i r n a t u r a l and adoptive p a r e n t s , e s s e n t i a l l y making the adopted c h i l d r e n the n a t u r a l c h i l d r e n of the ad o p t i v e q parents but not of the n a t u r a l p a r e n t s . 8 R.S.O. 1980, c. 66. 9 Thus removing any doubt as to the l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between adoptive parents and adopted c h i l d r e n and the former (or n a t u r a l ) p a r e n t s . For some recent cases that have c a s t doubt i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p see: Co-op. T r u s t Co.  of Can, v. A d m i n i s t r a t o r of E s t a t e s f o r Sask., [1984] 1 W.W.R. 47, 27 Sask. R. 65, 16 E.T.R. 142 (sub.nom. Re  Kowbel; Co-op. T r u s t Co. of Can, v. A d m i n i s t r a t o r of  Es t a t e s f o r Sask. ) , 36 R.F.L. (2d) 391 (Q.B.); Re Hartman;  Me r n i c k l e v. Westaway (1986), 19 E.T.R. 304 (B.C.S.C.) (reve r s e d on appeal, see (supra) Part I I I , f o o t n o t e 24). - 209 -P a r e n t s : Subsection 5 7 ( f ) of the SLRA extends the meaning of parent to i n c l u d e a grandparent and a person who has demonstrated a s e t t l e d i n t e n t i o n to t r e a t the deceased as a c h i l d of h i s f a m i l y but excludes a " f o s t e r parent". S i b l i n g s : Paragraph 5 7 ( d ) ( i v ) i n c l u d e s b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s of the deceased as persons e n t i t l e d to seek r e l i e f under the s t a t u t e . Even though the SLRA has g r e a t l y extended the c l a s s of person who may seek r e l i e f over those i n the DRA, the c o n d i t i o n precedent f o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s the p r o v i s i o n of support, e i t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y or as a r e s u l t of a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n , or the l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to p r o v i d e support. The c l a s s of a p p l i c a n t s i s , t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t e d to those who were t r u l y dependent on the deceased, t h e r e f o r e making the r e l i e f a v a i l a b l e under the SLRA s t r i c t l y r emedial. One area of d e f i c i e n c y of the DRA was the l a c k of i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n of the time at which circumstances should be con s i d e r e d f o r determining the adequacy of the p r o v i s i o n s contained i n the deceased's W i l l . The SLRA removes t h i s - 210 -u n c e r t a i n t y by s p e c i f y i n g i n s u b s e c t i o n 58(3) that adequacy s h a l l be determined as of the date of the hea r i n g of the a p p l i c a t i o n . 3. F a c t o r s i n A i d of Determining Quantum of E n t i t l e m e n t Both s t a t u t e s , DRA and SLRA, c o n t a i n a l i s t of matters f o r the c o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n upon the hea r i n g of an a p p l i c a t i o n . The l i s t s are s i m i l a r i n nature but the DRA, i n s e c t i o n s 7 and 8, d i r e c t e d the c o u r t to onl y seven items, while the SLRA, i n paragraphs 62(1) (a) and (c) r e f e r s to s e v e n t e e n . 1 0 Both s t a t u t e s a l s o empower the court to c o n s i d e r any other circumstances i t sees f i t . N e i t h e r l i s t i s exhaustive, but the g r e a t e r l e n g t h and s p e c i f i c i t y of the SLRA l i s t may be an i n d i c a t i o n t h at the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d s that l e s s a t t e n t i o n w i l l be p a i d to non-enumerated f a c t o r s . In a d d i t i o n , the DRA i n a u t h o r i z i n g the c o u r t , i n s u b s e c t i o n 7 (g), to look at f a c t o r s beyond those enumerated i n the s t a t u t e used the words " g e n e r a l l y [to] any matter that the judge t h i n k s should be f a i r l y taken i n t o account". The SLRA, paragraph 62(1)(a) simply r e f e r s to " a l l the circumstances i n the a p p l i c a t i o n " . 10 As e a r l y as 1947 W i l l i a m s C.J.K.B. In re Lawther E s t a t e , [1947] 1 W.W.R. 577 at pp. 586 and 587 (Man. K.B.) enumerated 15 matters which i n h i s view was a summary of what the c o u r t s would normally c o n s i d e r . The 15 items In re Lawther E s t a t e are very s i m i l a r to those enumerated i n the SLRA and are, i n any event, those commonly c o n s i d e r e d by c o u r t s d e a l i n g with matters of dependents' r e l i e f . - 211 -The DRA c o n t a i n e d , i n s e c t i o n 8, an i n t e r e s t i n g p r o v i s i o n whereby a dependent might r e c e i v e , from the e s t a t e , compensa-t i o n f o r a s s i s t a n c e g i v e n i n the form of money or s e r v i c e s , to advance the deceased i n a business or o c c u p a t i o n . T h i s p r o v i s i o n e x i s t e d i n a d d i t i o n t o , and independently o f , the l i s t of circumstances enumerated under s e c t i o n 7. The SLRA does not segregate such a s s i s t a n c e as an independent head of r e l i e f . Subparagraph 6 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( v i i ) of the SLRA merely makes such c o n t r i b u t i o n one of the numerous f a c t o r s which the c o u r t i s d i r e c t e d to c o n s i d e r . By v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 9 of the DRA a wife "who was l i v i n g apart from her husband at the time of h i s death under circum-stances that would d i s e n t i t l e her to alimony" was ba r r e d from seeking r e l i e f under the s t a t u t e . I t should be noted that there was no s i m i l a r bar or e x c l u s i o n , a p p l i c a b l e to a husband. By c o n t r a s t the SLRA i n c l u d e s the conduct of both spouses as a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r , and ra t h e r than imposing an ab s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n , the r e s u l t i n g conduct i s one of the f a c t o r s which the court i s d i r e c t e d to c o n s i d e r . Subparagraph 6 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( x i i ) r e f e r s to a course of conduct amounting to "an obvious and gross r e p u d i a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p " . The DRA i s s i l e n t as to the wishes of the deceased while i t i s i m p l i c i t i n the p r o v i s i o n s of the SLRA that the deceased's reason f o r h i s a c t i o n s are r e l e v a n t . The SLRA g i v e s the c o u r t , i n paragraph 62(1)(c) and s u b s e c t i o n 62(2) - 212 -wide d i s c r e t i o n to e v a l u a t e the deceased's wishes and c o n s i d e r r e l a t e d evidence i n making an award. S e c t i o n 10 of the DRA pro v i d e d that any allowance to an a p p l i c a n t was su b j e c t to a maximum l i m i t so that the allowance p l u s any p r o v i s i o n under the W i l l would not exceed the amount to which the a p p l i c a n t would be e n t i t l e d i f the t e s t a t o r had d i e d i n t e s t a t e . The SLRA does not c o n t a i n such l i m i t a t i o n . One of the most important f e a t u r e s of the SLRA i s the un d e r l y i n g p r o t e c t i o n of the p r o s p e c t i v e c l a i m a n t . The p r o t e c t i o n takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the p r o s p e c t i v e c l a i m a n t ' s own a c t i o n s as w e l l as those of the deceased. The q u e s t i o n whether or not a b e n e f i c i a r y can c o n t r a c t out of the p r o t e c t i o n of the dependents r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n has been the s u b j e c t matter of j u d i c i a l debate, but i t can be taken as s e t t l e d l a w 1 1 that the c o u r t s w i l l not be bound by a co n t r a c t waiving the p r o t e c t i o n of such l e g i s l a t i o n . I t can be taken as e q u a l l y s e t t l e d law 1'' that the c o u r t s w i l l i gnore f o r f e i t u r e c l a u s e s which would d e p r i v e a named b e n e f i c i a r y from the b e n e f i t s otherwise provided i n the W i l l i f the 11 See f o r example: Re Lewis, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 45, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 747, 49 B.C.R. 386, (B.C.C.A.); Re McNamara, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 396 (B.C.C.A.). 12 See f o r example: In the W i l l of Gaynor, deceased, [1960] V.R. 640; Kent et a l . v. McKay et a l . , [1982] 6 W.W.R. 165 (B.C.S.C.). - 213 -b e n e f i c i a r y commenced proceedings under dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n , i n t e r a l i a , as being a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y . The SLRA has e s s e n t i a l l y c o d i f i e d the common law by i n t r o -ducing a s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n i n s u b s e c t i o n 62(4) whereby an order under the s e c t i o n "may be made notwithstanding any agreement or waiver to the c o n t r a r y " . The wording does not appear t o be an a b s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n but i t seems to adopt the r a t i o n a l e of the cases namely that the court may co n s i d e r such agreements, g i v e them the necessary weight, but not be bound by them. 4. Avoidance Schemes It was recog n i z e d i n the House of Re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of New Zealand, as e a r l y as at the time of i n t r o d u c t i o n of the B i l l , (which was d e s t i n e d to be the p r o g e n i t o r of a l l s t a t u t e s of dependents' r e l i e f ) , that such l e g i s l a t i o n was s u s c e p t i b l e to evasion by t r a n s f e r of pr o p e r t y i n t e r v i v o s and other t r a n s a c -t i o n s . I t was s a i d that the l e g i s l a t i o n c o n tained so many loopholes that i t was r e l a t i v e l y simple f o r a person "to d r i v e a coach and four horses" through the l e g i s l a t i o n . 1 3 E s s e n t i a l l y , a t e s t a t o r by the u t i l i z a t i o n of j o i n t u r e s , i n t e r v i v o s t r u s t s or d e s i g n a t i o n s of b e n e f i c i a r i e s i n 13 New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (1900), V o l . 3, at p. 507, (Per. Mr. J . A l l e n ) . See a l s o a n a l y s i s i n Chapter 7, Part I I , supra. insurance or annuity c o n t r a c t s , c o u l d arrange h i s a f f a i r s i n such a f a s h i o n so as to pass, on h i s death, h i s a s s e t s to desig n a t e d , or predetermined, b e n e f i c i a r i e s o u t s i d e h i s e s t a t e , and thus defeat the p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d by dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n . The SLRA has implemented safeguards to a v o i d such p l a n s , by i n t r o d u c i n g S e c t i o n 72 which i n c l u d e s i n the net e s t a t e of the deceased the c a p i t a l v alue of c e r t a i n i n t e r v i v o s t r a n s a c t i o n s . The s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s that v a r i o u s t r a n s a c t i o n s made by the deceased d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e s h a l l be testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n s and d i r e c t s that t h e i r c a p i t a l value be i n c l u d e d f o r purposes of determining the net value of the e s t a t e of the deceased, and that the a s s e t s be made a v a i l a b l e to be charged f o r payment towards the dependents' support. The t r a n s a c t i o n s are enumerated i n S e c t i o n 72 and are g e n e r a l l y the f o l l o w i n g : ( i ) g i f t s m o r t i s causa, ( i i ) bank accounts h e l d by the deceased i n t r u s t f o r ot h e r s , ( i i i ) j o i n t accounts i n the name of the deceased and ot h e r s , s u b j e c t to the r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p , - 215 -( i v ) p r o p e r t y h e l d i n j o i n t tenancy by the deceased and o t h e r s , (v) d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y whereby the deceased s t i l l r e t a i n s at h i s death, e i t h e r alone or with o t h e r s the power to revoke the d i s p o s i t i o n or to use or d i s p o s e of the p r i n c i p a l of i t , ( v i ) proceeds of l i f e insurance on the deceased, which i s owned by him, and ( v i i ) any amount payable under a d e s i g n a t i o n of b e n e f i c i a r y under Part I I I of the SLRA, g e n e r a l l y proceeds from pensions, r e t i r e m e n t , w e l f a r e and other l i k e p l a n s . The a n t i - a v o i d a n c e measures contained i n S e c t i o n 72 of the SLRA c e r t a i n l y go a long way towards responding to the concern f i r s t expressed i n the New Zealand House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Although at f i r s t glance the measures appear to be severe, i t should be noted that the c a p i t a l value of such t r a n s a c t i o n s that may be i n c l u d e d i s l i m i t e d to g r a t u i t o u s t r a n s f e r s . S ubsection 72(2) p r o t e c t s the l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of other p a r t i e s to bank accounts or other p r o p e r t y h e l d by the deceased e i t h e r i n t r u s t or j o i n t l y . In a d d i t i o n , S e c t i o n 71 c r e a t e s a g e n e r a l e x c e p t i o n to the p r o v i s i o n of s u b s e c t i o n 72(1), where the p r o p e r t y i s being d e v i s e d or bequeathed i n compliance with a bona f i d e i n t e r v i v o s c o n t r a c t f o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . - 216 -The burden of pr o o f , p r o v i d e d by Subsection 72(3) i n impugning a t r a n s a c t i o n p r o t e c t e d by Subsection 72(1) f a l l s upon the dependent. On the other hand, where a dependent i s the b e n e f i c i a r y of a t r a n s a c t i o n contemplated by Subsection 72(1), Subsection 72(4) s h i f t s to such b e n e f i c i a r y the burden of proof of p r o v i n g h i s or her c o n t r i b u t i o n s . An a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n to the b e n e f i c i a r y i s found i n s e c t i o n 73 of the SLRA which renders i n v a l i d any "mortgage, charge, or assignment" g i v e n by a dependent i n e x p e c t a t i o n of an order g r a n t i n g r e l i e f . As a f i n a l measure of p r o t e c t i o n to the dependent a g a i n s t the a c t s of the deceased, Subsection 58(1) of the SLRA extends r e l i e f to i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s o r s . Thus a deceased can no longer a v o i d the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n by dying i n t e s t a t e and r e l y i n g on the r u l e s of i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of h i s p r o p e r t y . 5. L i m i t a t i o n The DRA p r o v i d e d , by Subsection 4(2), f o r a l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d so that an a c t i o n was to be brought at the time of the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r probate when the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r probate was being made by or on beha l f of the wife or husband or a guardian on b e h a l f of an i n f a n t c h i l d . In a l l other cases the a c t i o n was to be brought w i t h i n three months from the date of death of the t e s t a t o r , always with d i s c r e t i o n to the court to - 217 -extend the time, but l i m i t e d to any p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e remaining u n d i s t r i b u t e d at the time of the a p p l i c a t i o n . The SLRA, by S e c t i o n 61, has a l t e r e d the l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i -s i o n s to s i x months from the date of the Grant of L e t t e r s Probate of the W i l l or of L e t t e r s of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , always with d i s c r e t i o n to the cou r t to extend the time as to any p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e remaining u n d i s t r i b u t e d at the date of the a p p l i c a t i o n . - 218 -CHAPTER 3. CONTRAST BETWEEN THE SUCCESSION  LAW REFORM ACT OF ONTARIO AND THE  WILLS VARIATION ACT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA There are a number of d i f f e r e n c e s between the SLRA and the B r i t i s h Columbia W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act (WVA) but the most s i g n i f i c a n t ones can be i d e n t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 1. J u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t u t e ; 2. Persons e n t i t l e d to c l a i m under the s t a t u t e ; 3. Relevant date; 4. F a c t o r s going to e n t i t l e m e n t ; 5. L i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d ; 6. P r o t e c t i o n of dependents. For purposes of a n a l y z i n g some of the d i f f e r e n c e s , i t w i l l be u s e f u l to quote Subsections 2(1) and (2) of the WVA which c o l l e c t i v e l y represent the charging c l a u s e and i d e n t i f y the persons e n t i t l e d to apply. The s u b s e c t i o n s read as f o l l o w s : 2.(1) Notwithstanding any law or s t a t u t e to the c o n t r a r y , i f a t e s t a t o r d i e s l e a v i n g a w i l l which does not, i n the - 219 -c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of the t e s t a t o r ' s w ife, husband or c h i l d r e n , the c o u r t may, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , i n an a c t i o n by or on be h a l f of the w i f e , husband or c h i l d r e n , order that the p r o v i s i o n that i t t h i n k s adequate, j u s t and e q u i t a b l e i n the circumstances be made out of the e s t a t e of the t e s t a t o r f o r the wi f e , husband or c h i l d r e n . (2) For the purposes of t h i s A c t , an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d s h a l l be t r e a t e d as i f he were a l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d of h i s mother. 1. J u r i s d i c t i o n of the S t a t u t e I t w i l l be noted that S ubsection 2(1) b r i n g s the s t a t u t e i n t o e f f e c t o n l y when the deceased i s a t e s t a t o r . T h e r e f o r e the WVA has no a p p l i c a t i o n i n an i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n . By c o n t r a s t , the SLRA a p p l i e s to both t e s t a t e and i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n s . 2. Persons E n t i t l e d to Claim R e l i e f Under the St a t u t e I t w i l l again be noted t h a t , by v i r t u e of Subsection 2(1), the o n l y c l a s s of person e n t i t l e d to make an a p p l i c a t i o n and r e c e i v e an award under the Act i s the t e s t a t o r ' s w i f e , husband and c h i l d r e n . S ubsection 2(2) extends the meaning of c h i l d r e n to i n c l u d e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n as i f they were l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n of the mother. By v i r t u e of the newly enacted Charter of Righ t s Amendment A c t , 1 4 f o r the purposes of the WVA, a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s between l e g i t i m a t e and i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n are removed. Thus the c l a s s of a p p l i c a n t s , as i t 14 S.B.C. 1985, c. 68. - 220 -r e l a t e s to c h i l d r e n , i s extended to remove any such d i f f e r e n c e . The SLRA has g r e a t l y extended the c l a s s of person who may p o t e n t i a l l y apply to i n c l u d e persons other than spouses and c h i l d r e n , but with the c o n d i t i o n that the deceased was p r o v i d -ing support, or was under a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to do so immediately before h i s death. 3. Relevant Date The q u e s t i o n of the time or date to determine e n t i t l e m e n t and f o r v a l u i n g the e s t a t e has been a q u e s t i o n of c o n s i d e r a b l e j u d i c i a l debate i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and the s u b j e c t of a recommendation by the Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h  C o l u m b i a . 1 5 N e v e r t h e l e s s the WVA continues to be s i l e n t on the p o i n t . The SLRA, by Subsection 58(3) has i d e n t i f i e d the date of hearing of the a p p l i c a t i o n as the time to measure the adequacy of the p r o v i s i o n made. 4. F a c t o r s Going to E n t i t l e m e n t The SLRA c o n t a i n s i n paragraph 62(1)(a) a lengthy c a t a -logue of f a c t o r s which the court must take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n 15 Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia, Report on  S t a t u t o r y Succession R i g h t s , (1983), at p. 91. - 221 -i n making an award. In a d d i t i o n , the c o u r t i s g i v e n f u r t h e r d i s c r e t i o n to c o n s i d e r anything e l s e i t may c o n s i d e r r e l e v a n t . The WVA does not c o n t a i n a catalogue with analogous f a c t o r s , although as a matter of r o u t i n e the B r i t i s h Columbia Courts c o n s i d e r circumstances s i m i l a r to those enumerated i n the SLRA. 1 6 However both s t a t u t e s c o n t a i n almost i d e n t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s , Subsection 2(3), WVA and paragraph 62(1)(e) SLRA, making the deceased's reasons f o r h i s arrangements r e l e v a n t . 5. L i m i t a t i o n P e r i o d Although both s t a t u t e s impose a l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d of s i x months from the date of probate of the W i l l or the date of the Grant of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , u n l i k e S e c t i o n 10 of the WVA, S e c t i o n 61 of the SLRA g i v e s the court d i s c r e t i o n to extend the time i n r e s p e c t to an a p p l i c a t i o n i n s o f a r as there i s u n d i s t r i b u t e d p r o p e r t y w i t h i n the e s t a t e . 6. P r o t e c t i o n of Dependents S e c t i o n 2(1) of the WVA p r o v i d e s that the c o u r t may make adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the proper maintenance and support of dependents "out of the e s t a t e of the t e s t a t o r " . The f a c t t h a t only those net a s s e t s i n the hands of the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e are a v a i l a b l e to s a t i s f y an order r e p r e s e n t s a s e r i o u s 16 See footnote 10. - 222 -d e f e c t i n the l e g i s l a t i o n as, with j u d i c i o u s p l a n n i n g a t e s t a t o r may render h i s a s s e t s t o t a l l y untouchable by any order under the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act. The WVA continues with t h i s o r i g i n a l d e f e c t . Yet i t appears that there i s no r e c o g n i t i o n by the l e g i s l a t u r e that avoidance of the Act by proper a s s e t p l a n n i n g i s a problem which i t should address. In t h i s connection the c o n c l u s i o n of the Law Reform  Commission of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 1 7 i s of note. I t concluded t h a t : I f i n t e n t to a v o i d the W i l l s V a r i a t i o n Act i s r e q u i r e d , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y very few t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l be s u s c e p t i b l e to a t t a c k . In the Working Paper we concluded that a n t i -avoidance l e g i s l a t i o n i s not necessary .... We see no reason to depart from that conclusion.18 17 Op. c i t . , footnote 15. 18 I b i d . , at p. 97. CHAPTER 4. THE FAMILY LAW ACT OF ONTARIO AND CONCLUSION The SLRA has recognized the need to prevent the avoidance of i t s p r o v i s i o n s by e n a b l i n g a s s e t s p a s s i n g o u t s i d e of the e s t a t e to be charged f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the c l a i m a n t . I t has a l s o g r e a t l y extended the c l a s s of persons e n t i t l e d to apply but o n l y those who were i n r e c e i p t of support or l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e i t can a c t u a l l y q u a l i f y to c l a i m under the SLRA. Outside of spouses, i n c l u d i n g common-law spouses, and c h i l d r e n under the age of eighteen years of age, ( a l l of whom have a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to maintenance,) a l l other c l a i m a n t s must show a c t u a l maintenance at the time of death of the deceased or a l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t to i t . Notwithstanding the e x t e n s i o n i n scope of p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a n t s , the SLRA has i n t e r f e r e d with the i n t e g r i t y of testamentary freedom only to the extent that i s necessary to f u l f i l l the deceased's o b l i g a t i o n s to those who were de f a c t o or de j u r i s dependent upon him. The remedial and p r o t e c t i v e measure of the Act has been emphasized by the e x t e n s i o n of the c l a s s of a p p l i c a n t s and by adding a n t i - a v o i d a n c e p r o v i s i o n s . Yet the deceased has been l e f t with a degree of c e r t a i n t y that h i s posthumous i n t e n t w i l l not be a r b i t r a r i l y a l t e r e d . Any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the SLRA must be supplemented by r e f e r e n c e to the newly enacted Family Law Act, ( F L A ) . 1 9 I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s to analyse the e f f e c t s of t h i s s t a t u t e . However, i t must be observed that i t s enactment r e f l e c t s the adoption by the l e g i s l a t u r e of the p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o , of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e enunciated by the O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission's Report on Family Law to the e f f e c t t h a t ; although spouses should enjoy a matrimonial regime of separate p r o p e r t y d u r i n g the currency of marriage, they are to "be e n t i t l e d to an a p p r o p r i a t e equal s h a r i n g i n f a m i l y a s s e t s upon the t e r m i n a t i o n of the marriage by death or 9 n d i v o r c e The e x p l a n a t o r y preamble of the FLA s t a t e s , i n p a r t : Whereas i t i s d e s i r a b l e to encourage and s t r e n g t h e n the r o l e of the f a m i l y ; and whereas f o r that purpose i t i s necessary to recognize the equal p o s i t i o n of spouses as i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n marriage and to re c o g n i z e marriage as a form of p a r t n e r s h i p ; In keeping with the p o l i c y d i s c l o s e d i n i t s preamble the FLA g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t , upon the death, e i t h e r t e s t a t e or 19 S.O. 1986, c. 4. 20 O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law, Part IV, (1974) at p. 55. - 225 -i n t e s t a t e , of the f i r s t spouse, the value of the net f a m i l y p r o p e r t y accumulated by the spouses d u r i n g t h e i r marriage i s to be determined and then shared e q u a l l y between the e s t a t e of the deceased spouse and the s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e . 2 1 The term "net f a m i l y p r o p e r t y " i s d e f i n e d as p r o p e r t y owned by the spouses l e s s : debts, l i a b i l i t i e s , p r o p e r t y brought i n t o the marriage (other than the matrimonial home) and c e r t a i n excluded p r o p e r t y such as p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by g i f t or i n h e r i t a n c e a f t e r the marriage. 41 The FLA does p r o v i d e f o r an e l e c t i o n f o r the s u r v i v i n g spouse to take under the W i l l , or under the i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s , as the case may be, or to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the deceased spouse's e s t a t e through the e q u a l i z i n g O -J f o r m u l a . " J By e n a c t i n g the FLA, O n t a r i o has, i n f a c t , r e c o g n i z e d a matrimonial regime of d e f e r r e d community p r o p e r t y which c r y s t a l l i z e s upon the t e r m i n a t i o n of marriage by any means. In so doing, O n t a r i o has a l s o l e g i s l a t e d the minimum en t i t l e m e n t of a s u r v i v i n g spouse. 21 Supra, f o o t n o t e 19, s. 5. 22 Op. c i t . , s. 4. 23 Op. c i t . , s. 6. - 226 -I t i s too e a r l y to examine the e f f e c t of the FLA on dependent r e l i e f c l a i m s . In theory the p r o v i s i o n s f o r dependents' r e l i e f w i l l continue to be a v a i l a b l e but the c o u r t s w i l l have to c o n s i d e r the s u r v i v i n g spouse's e n t i t l e m e n t to the net f a m i l y p r o p e r t y i n making an award. Presumably, t h e r e f o r e , a p p l i c a t i o n s under Part V 2 4 of the SLRA should d i m i n i s h as a s u r v i v i n g spouse w i l l , under the p r o v i s i o n s of the FLA, r e c e i v e a f a i r p r o p o r t i o n of the deceased spouse's e s t a t e . The net e f f e c t of the FLA should be to improve the p o s i t i o n of many s u r v i v i n g spouses by p r o v i d i n g them with a f a i r share of the deceased spouse's e s t a t e without having to r e s o r t to l i t i g a t i o n . 24 Support of Dependants. PART V: CONCLUSION - 228 -CONCLUSION A. T e c h n i c a l D e f i c i e n c i e s The Act i s s u b j e c t to v a r i o u s t e c h n i c a l d e f i c i e n c i e s , the most important of which, from an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o i n t of view, are: 1. S t a t u t o r y D e f i n i t i o n of Date of S u f f i c i e n c y The Act i s s i l e n t on the s u b j e c t as to what date the cou r t i s to co n s i d e r circumstances of the claima n t s and of the deceased's e s t a t e f o r purposes of determining the adequacy of the b e n e f a c t i o n under the W i l l , and t h e r e f o r e the quantum of any proposed award. The j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n B r i t i s h Columbia p r o v i d e s a u t h o r i t y , to a gr e a t e r or l e s s e r extent, f o r t h r e e 1 p o s s i b l e times as the a p p r o p r i a t e time to determine whether adequate p r o v i s i o n , w i t h i n the meaning of the Act has been made. These dates a r e : 1 Re H u l l , [1941] 1 D.L.R. 14, [1943] O.R. 778 ( C A . ) concluded that the date of making the W i l l was the p e r t i n e n t date. The c o u r t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia c o n s i d e r e d t h i s d e c i s i o n but chose not to f o l l o w i t . See Re Bowe, i n f r a , f o o t n o t e 2 and Re Urquhart, i n f r a , f o o t n o t e 4. T h i s date cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be co n s i d e r e d as a p o s s i b i l i t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia. - 229 -(a) the date of the t e s t a t o r ' s death; (b) the date when dependent r e l i e f proceedings commence; (c) the date of the he a r i n g . 2. Opportunity f o r In t e r V i v o s Evasion The Act has no mechanism f o r p r e v e n t i n g i n t e r v i v o s p l a n -ning intended to render i t impotent. Only those a s s e t s which devolve through the deceased's p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e are a v a i l a b l e to the cou r t to make an a p p r o p r i a t e award. 5 The Act should, i f intended as a p r e v e n t a t i v e a g a i n s t abuse, c o n t a i n a n t i - a v o i d a n c e p r o v i s i o n s . 6 3. L i m i t a t i o n P e r i o d S e c t i o n 10 of the Act r e q u i r e s that an a c t i o n be commenced 2 Re Nov i k o f f (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 484, 66 W.W.R. 164 (B.C.S . C ) ; Re Bowe, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 388, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 234 ( B . C . S . C ) . 3 Re C a l l a d i n e (1958), 25 W.W.R. 185 (B . C . S . C ) . 4 Re Jones, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 726, 49 B.C.R. 216 (B . C . S . C ) , Re Urquhart (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 235, 20 W.W.R. 177 (B«C«S«C«)• 5 For a more e x t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s of the s u b j e c t see supra, Part I I , c. 7. 6 For examples of pro v i n c e s adopting a n t i - a v o i d a n c e p r o v i s i o n s see supra, Part I, Appendix "C". - 230 -w i t h i n s i x months from "the date of i s s u e of probate", or the date of r e s e a l i n g i n the p r o v i n c e . Questions have a r i s e n as to the meaning of the term " i s s u e " . I t appears that the q u e s t i o n i s now s e t t l e d and that the term " i s s u e " has been d e f i n e d as the date on which the grant was entered i n the records of the Court R e g i s t r y . 7 The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t from that date onward nothing f u r t h e r i s r e q u i r e d to p e r f e c t the grant. Conversely, u n t i l that date the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e c o u l d not prove h i s p o s i t i o n or a u t h o r i t y . A more s i g n i f i c a n t problem, however, i s that the Act does not s p e c i f y the meaning of "probate". The term "probate" (as i t r e l a t e s to matters of W i l l s ) , means to prove the W i l l . However, there are two kinds of probate, s p e c i f i c a l l y ; probate i n common form, and probate i n solemn form. Probate i n common form, i s granted i n the Supreme Court of B r i t i s h Columbia, without any formal procedure i n c o u r t on an ex p a r t e a p p l i c a t i o n made by the executor. Probate i n solemn form, by c o n t r a s t , i s i n the form of a f i n a l decree, or o r d e r , pro-nounced i n open c o u r t , u s u a l l y a f t e r a t r i a l , when a l l a f f e c t e d persons are p a r t i e s to the proceeding, e i t h e r as p l a i n t i f f s or defendants. 7 Re Larsen E s t a t e , [1974] 5 W.W.R. 670 (B.C.S.C.); Re H i r s c h , [1977] 2 B.C.L.R. 216 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 231 -The p r i n c i p a l d i f f e r e n c e of e f f e c t between the two grants i s that probate i n common form i s rev o c a b l e , while probate i n solemn form i s i r r e v o c a b l e , unless there i s f r a u d , or a sub-sequent v a l i d W i l l i s f o u n d . 8 The Act does not s p e c i f y which probate i s meant and i t may be argued that a r e f e r e n c e to probate must mean i n solemn form and that the l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d should not apply u n t i l an order f o r solemn form has been obtained. There i s no contemporary j u r i s p r u d e n c e on the s u b j e c t . However some support f o r the p o s i t i o n that probate must mean an order i n solemn form can be obtained from the judgment of Lord McLaren i n P a t t i s o n ' s  T r u s t e e s v. U n i v e r s i t y of Edi n b u r g h . 9 I f the Act i s s u b j e c t to t h i s p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , there i s no c e r t a i n t y to a pers o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e that even though he waits f o r the s i x month p e r i o d that he i s t h e r e a f t e r immune from a t t a c k . B. P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n c o n s i s t e n c y A l l of the above d e f i c i e n c i e s are, on the whole, t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t s which can be e a s i l y remedied by simple s t a t u t o r y amendments. 8 Robins v. N a t i o n a l T r u s t Company, L i m i t e d , [19 27] A.C. 515. 9 (1889), 16 Court Sess. Ca. 73 at p. 75. - 232 -Of g r e a t e r importance and concern, however, i s the l a c k of d e f i n i t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the ph i l o s o p h y u n d e r l y i n g the nature of the remedy to be pr o v i d e d by the A c t . The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia, i n common with many other j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n the Commonwealth, adopted the E n g l i s h concept of testamentary freedom. The freedom was abused and the l e g i s l a t u r e , to c o u n t e r a t t a c k such abuses, i n t r o d u c e d dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n as a f l e x i b l e r e s t r a i n t on the freedom, g i v i n g the co u r t the power to remedy such abuses. The i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e was remedial. The sketchy h i s t o r i c a l evidence supports t h i s p o s i t i o n and so do the aver -ments of the judges who decided the e a r l y cases i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . 1 0 However, the c o u r t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia have gone f a r beyond the o r i g i n a l purpose of the s t a t u t e . The recent d e c i -s i o n s at the Court of Appeal l e v e l have l e f t an impression that the Act i s intended as an a n t i - d i s i n h e r i t a n c e d e v i c e . 1 1 The most recent m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the adoption of t h i s p o s i t i o n i s found i n K a e t l e r v. K a e t l e r E s t a t e 1 2 where i n an a p p l i c a t i o n brought by d i s i n h e r i t e d a d u l t c h i l d r e n , Bouck J . , 10 See supra, Part I I . c. 2. 11 See supra, Part I I , c. 4. 12 (1988), 27 E.T.R. 93 ( B . C . S . C ) . - 233 -1 o r e f e r r i n g to M o r r i s v. M o r r i s J s t a t e d : [ I ] n a r e l a t i v e l y recent judgment from our Court of Appeal a w i l l was v a r i e d where the t e s t a t o r f a i l e d to t r e a t h i s four c h i l d r e n e q u a l l y i n respe c t to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the c a p i t a l of the e s t a t e . T h i s was found to be a breach of p a r e n t a l duty....14 The p r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia, again i n common with other Commonwealth j u r i s d i c t i o n s , adopted as p a r t of i t s law of s u c c e s s i o n , testamentary freedom. Such freedom has been c u r t a i l e d by the i m p o s i t i o n of the Act as a remedy a g a i n s t abuses. The Act was never intended to c r e a t e a regime of compulsory s u c c e s s i o n , or f o r c e d h e i r s h i p , such as i s found i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h at develop systems of law based on Roman law. J u r i s d i c t i o n s that have adopted f o r c e d h e i r s h i p have w e l l d e f i n e d r u l e s i d e n t i f y i n g the exact p o r t i o n of the e s t a t e that i s to go to each person b e n e f i t i n g from such regimes. There are no a m b i g u i t i e s and there i s no f l e x i b i l i t y . The r u l e s are c e r t a i n and p r e c i s e . Yet, the recent d e c i s i o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, a d v e r t e n t l y or i n a d v e r t e n t l y , are p u r p o r t i n g to apply a f o r c e d h e i r s h i p system without the b e n e f i t of the r u l e s necessary f o r such a system to f u n c t i o n with c e r t a i n t y and f a i r n e s s . 13 See supra, Part I I , footnote 86. 14 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 105. - 234 -I t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f i c u l t f o r a judge to apply the Act f o r purposes of p r o v i d i n g the maintenance which the t e s t a t o r f a i l e d to p r o v i d e . Yet, no matter how d i f f i c u l t t h a t task may be, a judge f a c e d with the task may r e f e r to a m u l t i t u d e of g u i d e l i n e s 1 5 , i n c l u d i n g the standard of l i v i n g enjoyed by the a p p l i c a n t before the death of the t e s t a t o r . Notwithstanding the a v a i l a b i l i t y of i d e n t i f i a b l e guide-l i n e s , both the l e g i s l a t o r s and the j u d i c i a r y have expressed concern that the task of making d i s c r e t i o n a r y awards i s one that i s not handled w e l l by judges and have lamented the l a c k of l e g i s l a t i v e g u i d e l i n e s . 1 6 Yet, the B r i t i s h Columbia c o u r t s have gone one s t e p f u r t h e r by not l i m i t i n g t h e i r award to support (no matter how extended a meaning one c o u l d a t t r i b u t e the term) but to an e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the e s t a t e a s s e t s . They have taken upon themselves the task of determining an e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i -b u t i o n with even l e s s g u i d e l i n e s than those a v a i l a b l e i n determining maintenance and support. The i n e v i t a b l e c o n c l u -s i o n 1 7 i s t h a t , f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , a t e s t a t o r who i s s u r v i v e d by a c h i l d , whether dependent or not, can a n t i c i p a t e that i f the d i s i n h e r i t e d c h i l d makes a c l a i m , the c h i l d w i l l 15 Some of which, a p p a r e n t l y l o g i c a l and i n keeping with contemporary s o c i a l norms, have been r e j e c t e d . See supra, Part I I , c. 5. 16 See supra, P a r t I, c.5, P a r t I I , c. 7. 17 See supra, P a r t I I , c. 4 A and B. - 235 -l i k e l y succeed. The quantum of the award w i l l be u n p r e d i c t -a b l e as most of the cases make the quantum award without proper r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , other than to s t a t e that there was a breach of the moral duty of the t e s t a t o r . 1 8 In a d d i t i o n , i f the phi l o s o p h y of the Act i s remedial i t co u l d be argued that the persons e n t i t l e d to apply under the Act should be enlarged i n keeping with r e v i s i o n s undertaken by 1 q other p r o v i n c e s . * Such g e n e r a l e x t e n s i o n i s a matter of p o l i c y and there are no p a r t i c u l a r compelling arguments one way or another. Indeed, i n B r i t i s h Columbia, there does not appear to be any other p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s that persons other than spouses and c h i l d r e n should be e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f under the A c t . The l e g i s l a t u r e has, however, made a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o -nouncement by r e c o g n i z i n g r i g h t s of persons, who are unmarried yet have coh a b i t e d as s p o u s e s . 2 0 The E s t a t e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  A c t 2 1 p r o v i d e s that such person, s u b j e c t to s t a t u t o r y q u a l i f i -c a t i o n s , may be e n t i t l e d to a share i n the deceased's e s t a t e 18 See f o r example r a t i o n a l e i n K a e t l e r v. K a e t l e r E s t a t e , supra, f o o t n o t e 12. 19 For examples of extended c l a s s of persons e n t i t l e d to apply see supra, Part I, Appendix "A". 20 The term "common-law spouse" has been d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided as i t i s the w r i t e r ' s view that i t has no l e g a l meaning i n B r i t i s h Columbia (unless s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e d by the p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e ) and has been s u b j e c t to misuse i n common pa r l a n c e as w e l l as i n the j u r i s p r u d e n c e and the s t a t u t e s , a l l l e a d i n g to unnecessary c o n f u s i o n . 21 R.S. c. 114, s. 85 and 86. - 236 -on an i n t e s t a t e death, s u b j e c t to the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . Yet such i n d i v i d u a l s do not have a r i g h t to d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e l i e f when the deceased d i e s t e s t a t e as the Act only admits a p p l i c a -t i o n by l a w f u l s p o u s e s . 2 2 I t seems i n c o n s i s t e n t that such i n d i v i d u a l s be g i v e n r i g h t s and p r o t e c t i o n under an i n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n and not under a t e s t a t e one. The Act should be a d j u s t e d to c r e a t e harmony between the two s t a t u t e s . I t i s suggested that the present s t a t u s of the law, as i t r e l a t e s to dependents' r e l i e f , i s i n t o l e r a b l e . Unless remedial steps are taken, i t would appear that dependent r e l i e f l i t i g a t i o n w i l l e s c a l a t e absorbing what i s a l r e a d y a s c a r c e j u d i c i a l r esource. The p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s 2 3 of the l e g i s l a t o r s who viewed dependents' r e l i e f l e g i s l a t i o n as a source of pension f o r lawyers or an avenue f o r d e p l e t i n g the e s t a t e with l i t i g a t i o n w i l l become a r e a l i t y . But what are l e g a l a d v i s o r s to do? I f the j u r i s p r u d e n c e says that there i s g e n e r a l l y a duty not to d i s i n h e r i t , are they not j u s t i f i e d i n b r i n g i n g a c t i o n s on b e h a l f of t h e i r d i s i n h e r i t e d c l i e n t s ? Indeed, would they not be g u i l t y of m a l p r a c t i c e i f they d i d not a d v i s e t h e i r c l i e n t s that although the i s s u e of quantum could not be p r o g n o s t i c a t e d , there could be a reasonable a n t i c i p a t i o n f o r success i n such an a c t i o n ? Notwithstanding 22 For a more e x t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s of the s u b j e c t see supra, P a r t I I I , c. 1. 23 See supra, Part I. - 237 -the recent Court of Appeal cases, the h i s t o r y of the Act, and the Act i t s e l f , do not j u s t i f y the present p o s i t i o n of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the h i s t o r y of the Act, and i t s present i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , viewed i n the context of the system, as a whole, of s u c c e s s i o n r i g h t s as w e l l as r i g h t s to f a m i l y pro-p e r t y , should l e a d our l e g i s l a t o r s to the s a f e c o n c l u s i o n that the Act, i n i t s present form, has o u t l i v e d i t s s o c i a l u t i l i t y , and should be r e p l a c e d or at l e a s t r e s t r u c t u r e d . C. Recommended R e s t r u c t u r e The replacement or r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the Act should be c o n s i d e r e d from two major premises: 1. Testamentary Freedom or Forced H e i r s h i p I f the p r i n c i p l e of testamentary freedom i s to continue i n B r i t i s h Columbia, then dependency should be c o n d i t i o n p r e c e -dent to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c t . I f the l e g i s l a t o r s con-clude that a regime of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p i s what the c i t i z e n s of B r i t i s h Columbia should have, then w e l l - d e f i n e d g u i d e l i n e s (akin to those i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s where compulsory s u c c e s s i o n i s the u n d e r l y i n g philosophy) should be i n c l u d e d i n the Act so as to p r o v i d e c e r t a i n t y and c o n s i s t e n c y . E i t h e r approach w i l l go a long way to reduce l i t i g a t i o n . - 238 -Whether or not the c l a s s of persons e n t i t l e d to apply should be extended i s a matter of p o l i c y and so long as t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t i s based on dependency, e i t h e r de f a c t o or de  j u r i s , such an e x t e n s i o n does no more than to make the t e s t a t o r r e c o g n i z e posthumously o b l i g a t i o n s which he had by o p e r a t i o n of law or which he had assumed v o l u n t a r i l y , i n t e r  v i v o s . On the other hand i f a regime of f o r c e d h e i r s h i p i s the c h o i c e the persons e n t i t l e d to b e n e f i t should not be extended, but l i m i t e d to spouses and c h i l d r e n . 2. Family P r o p e r t y There i s an unacceptable i n c o n s i s t e n c y between the p r o v i -s i o n s f o r d i v i s i o n of f a m i l y p r o p e r t y between spouses, - as a r e s u l t of marriage breakdown or a t e r m i n a t i o n of a marriage during the spouses l i f e t i m e and - as a r e s u l t of death. An attempt to r e c o n c i l e or i n t e g r a t e the two p r o v i s i o n s was r e j e c t e d by the B r i t i s h Columbia Court of A p p e a l . 2 4 There i s , however, no reason why d i s t r i b u t i o n of f a m i l y property should be d i f f e r e n t on a t e r m i n a t i o n of marriage during l i f e than as a r e s u l t of death. They are both termina-t i o n s and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of such a s s e t s should f o l l o w the same p r i n c i p l e . 24 See supra, Part I I , c. 6. - 239 -The Act should be a d j u s t e d to recognize such a p r i n -c i p l e . The p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o has done that r e c e n t l y 2 5 and B r i t i s h Columbia c o u l d e a s i l y adopt l e g i s l a t i o n a k i n to that of the p r o v i n c e of O n t a r i o and thus r e f l e c t a more r e a l i s t i c r e c o g n i t i o n of present s o c i a l norms. T h i s type of l e g i s l a t i o n would c l e a r l y reduce l i t i g a t i o n as the s u r v i v i n g spouse would r e c e i v e , by o p e r a t i o n of law, a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of the deceased spouse's e s t a t e . And dependent's r e l i e f would s t i l l be a v a i l a b l e on the b a s i s of need. Roscoe Pound s a i d "Law must be s t a b l e , and yet i t cannot stand s t i l l . " 2 6 The e v o l u t i o n of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t e r p r e t i n g the Act has c e r t a i n l y not stood s t i l l . Yet, p a r t i a l l y as a r e s u l t of the c o u r t s misunderstanding of the purpose of the A c t , the law on the s u b j e c t has not been s t a b l e . I t i s time that the l e g i s l a t o r s g i v e the people of t h i s p r o v i n c e the l e g a l s t a b i l i t y they deserve. 25 See supra, Part IV, c. 4. 26 R. Pound, I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Legal H i s t o r y , at p. 1, as quoted i n Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1924) at p.2. - 240 -BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS At k i n s o n , Thomas E. Handbook of the Law of W i l l s . 2nd ed. St. P a u l , Minn.: West P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1953. Conference on S o c i a l Meaning of L e g a l Concepts - I n h e r i t a n c e  of Property and the power of Testamentary D i s p o s i t i o n . New York: New York U n i v e r s i t y School of Law, 1948. Hardingham, I . J . et a l . W i l l s and I n t e s t a c y i n A u s t r a l i a & New  Zealand. Melbourne: The Law Book Company L i m i t e d , 1983. Maine, S i r Henry. Ancie n t Law. Ed. Ernest Rhys, London: J . M. Dent & Sons L t d . , 1917. Macdonald, W.D. Fraud on the Widow's Share. Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Law School, 1960. M a c G i l l , E.G. My Mother the Judge. Toronto:. Peter M a r t i n A s s o c i a t e s L i m i t e d , 1981. M a c G i l l , H.G. Women and C h i l d r e n under B r i t i s h Columbia Laws. Vancouver: P r i v a t e l y p u b l i s h e d , 1935. Mellows, Anthony R. The Law of S u c c e s s i o n . 3rd ed. London: Butterworths, 1977. Rathbone, E.F. The D i s i n h e r i t e d Family. London: Edward A r n o l d & Co., 1924. , et a l . Our Freedom and i t s R e s u l t s . Ed. Ray Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1936. R h e i n s t e i n , M. et a l . The Law of Decedents' E s t a t e s . Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1971. Shepherd, J.C. The Law of F i d u c i a r i e s . Toronto: C a r s w e l l , 1981. Waters, D.W.M. Law of T r u s t s i n Canada. 2nd ed. Toronto: C a r s w e l l , 1984. Wright, R.J.D. T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance i n A u s t r a l i a and  New Zealand. 2nd ed. Sydney: The Law Book Company L i m i t e d , 1966. - 241 -B. ARTICLES AND ANNOTATIONS Ashley, A. "A Note on the Claims of Spouses and C h i l d r e n to a Part of P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y as I l l u s t r a t e d by the T r a d i t i o n a l Systems of the Channel I s l a n d s and I s l e of Man R e s p e c t i v e l y , and t h e i r P o s i t i o n Today There and i n S c o t l a n d " , (1953) 2 I n t . & Comp C. L.Q. 274. . "Property i n R e l a t i o n to Marriage and the Family", (1953) 65 J u r i d . Rev. 37. Bale, G. "Bates v. Bates", (1981) 9 E.T.R. 236. . "Dependants' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n and the Changed Emphasis E f f e c t e d by Part V of The Succession Law Reform Act ( O n t a r i o ) " , (1982) 10 E.T.R. 7. . "Duty Owed to Abie-Bodied A d u l t C h i l d r e n Under T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance L e g i s l a t i o n and the Need to Adopt an O b j e c t i v e Approach", (1983-84) 14 E.T.R. 35. . " L i m i t a t i o n on Testamentary D i s p o s i t i o n i n Canada", (1964) 42 Can. Bar. Rev. 367. . "Palm Tree J u s t i c e and T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance - The C o n t i n u i n g Saga of Confusion and U n c e r t a i n t y i n the B.C. C o u r t s " , (1987) 26 E.T.R. 295. ; . "Power to Vary Orders Under T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance L e g i s l a t i o n and the Relevant Date to Determine Adequacy on an I n i t i a l A p p l i c a t i o n " , (1982-83) 12 E.T.R. 231. . " T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance i n B r i t i s h Columbia - F a i r share of the E s t a t e or E q u i t a b l e Maintenance and The Dilemma s t i l l C o n f r o n t i n g the Courts by the Supreme Court of Canada D e c i s i o n of 1930 i n Walker v. McDermott", (1977-78) 1 E.T.R. 129. Brown, M. "Dependants' R e l i e f A c t s " , (1940) 18 Can. Bar. Rev. 261, 449. Dainow, J . "Forced H e i r s h i p i n French Law", (1940) 2 La. L.  Rev. 669. . " I n h e r i t a n c e by P r e t e r m i t t e d C h i l d r e n " , (1937) 32 111. L. Rev. 1. , " L i m i t a t i o n s on Testamentary Freedom i n England", (1940) 25 C o r n e l l L.Q. 337. . " R e s t r i c t e d T e s t a t i o n i n New Zealand, A u s t r a l i a and Canada", (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1107. . "The E a r l y Sources of Forced H e i r s h i p ; I t ' s H i s t o r y i n Texas and L o u i s i a n a " , (1941) 4 La. L. Rev. 42. - 242 -. " U n r e s t r i c t e d T e s t a t i o n i n Quebec", (1936) 10 T u l . L. Rev. 401. Dewar, John L. "The Development of The Remedial C o n s t r u c t i v e T r u s t " , (1982) 60 Can. Bar. Rev. 265. Gold, J . "Freedom of T e s t a t i o n , the I n h e r i t a n c e (Family P r o v i s i o n ) B i l l " , (1938) 1 M.L.R. 296. Keeton, G.W. & Gower, L.C.B. "Freedom of T e s t a t i o n i n E n g l i s h Law", (1935). 20 Iowa L. Rev. 326. K i r a l f y , A.K.R. "Freedom of T e s t a t i o n Under The E n g l i s h I n h e r i t a n c e Act of 1938", (1949) 61 J u r i d . Rev. 186. Kohn, A.C. " L i m i t a t i o n s on Testamentary Power i n M i s s o u r i : P r o t e c t i o n of the Spouse and C h i l d r e n of the T e s t a t o r " , (1954) 1954 Wash. U.L.Q. 354. L a s k i n , B. "Dependants' R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n " , (1939) 17 Can.  Bar. Rev. 181. L a u f e r , J . " F l e x i b l e R e s t r a i n t s on Testamentary Freedom - a Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance L e g i s l a t i o n " , (1955) 69:1 Harv. L. Rev. 277. Liftma n , M.N. "Relevant Date f o r Determining Adequacy of P r o v i s i o n made by T e s t a t o r f o r Purposes of Defendant's R e l i e f L e g i s l a t i o n " , (1977-78) 1 E.T.R. 41. McMurray, O.K. " L i b e r t y of T e s t a t i o n and Some Modern L i m i t a t i o n s Thereon", (1919) 14 111. L. Rev. 96. M u l l e r - F r e i e n f e l s , W. "Family Law and the Law of Succession i n Germany", (1967) 16 I n t . & Comp. L.Q. 409. Nussbaum, A. " L i b e r t y of T e s t a t i o n " , (1937) 23 A.B.A.J. 183. O o s t e r h o f f , A.H. "Remedial C o n s t r u c t i v e T r u s t s - M a t r i m o n i a l P r o p e r t y Disputes - J u s t i c e and E q u i t y or "Palm-Tree" J u s t i c e ? " , (1979) 57 Can. Bar. Rev. 356. Yiannopoulos, A.N. "Testamentary D i s p o s i t i o n i n Favor of the S u r v i v i n g Spouse and the Legitime of Decedents", (1968) 28 La. L. Rev. 509. - 243 -C. REPORTS OF LAW REFORM COMMISSIONS A l b e r t a I n s t i t u t e of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 29, Family R e l i e f , (1978). Law Commission (England), Report No. 61, Family P r o v i s i o n on  Death, (1974). Law Reform Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia, Report on S t a t u t o r y  S u c c e s s i o n R i g h t s , (1983). Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Report No. 28, T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance and Guar d i a n s h i p of I n f a n t s A c t ,  1916, (1977). O n t a r i o Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law, Part IV, (1974) . D. STATUTES An Act Respecting the E s t a t e s of M e n t a l l y Incompetent Persons, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 3. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of E s t a t e s A c t , 1925, 15 Geo. V. c. 23. Adoption A c t, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4. Charter of Right s Amendment Act, 1985, S.B.C. 1985, c. 68. C h i l d Welfare A c t, R.S.O. 1980, c. 66. Dependants of Deceased Person R e l i e f A c t , R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. D-6. Dependants' R e l i e f A c t , S.O. 1929, c. 47. Dependents' R e l i e f A c t , R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. D-6. The Dependants' R e l i e f A c t , R.S.O. 1970, c. 126. The Dependants' R e l i e f Act, 1940, R.S.S. 1940, c. 36. The Dependants' R e l i e f Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. D-25. The Dependants R e l i e f A c t , R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. D-4. The Dependents' R e l i e f A c t , R.S.S. 1953, c. 121. Dependants R e l i e f Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1971, c. D-44. Dependants' R e l i e f Ordinance, R.O.Y.T. 1962, c. 9. - 244 -Dependants' R e l i e f Ordinance, O.Y.T. 1980, (2d), c. 6. The D e v o l u t i o n of E s t a t e s Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 129. The D e v o l u t i o n of E s t a t e s Act, R.S.S. 1910-11, c. 13. Equal Guardianship of I n f a n t s Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 130. E s t a t e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 114. Family Law A c t , S.O. 1986, c. 4. The Family P r o t e c t i o n A c t , 1955, N.Z.S. 1955, No. 88. Family R e l a t i o n s Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121. Family R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1970, c. 134. Family R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1980, c. F-2. The Family R e l i e f A c t , R.S.N. 1962, c. 56. The Family R e l i e f A c t , R.S.N. 1970, c. 124. Guaranteed A v a i l a b l e Income f o r Need A ct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 158. The I n h e r i t a n c e (Family P r o v i s i o n ) A c t, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 45. In h e r i t a n c e ( P r o v i s i o n f o r Family and Dependants) A c t , 1975, c. 63 (U.K.). Lunacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 194. The M a r r i e d Women's R e l i e f A c t , R.S.A. 1910, c. 18. P a t i e n t s P r operty Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 313. Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 488. The S u r v i v o r s h i p A c t , R.S.O. 1970, c. 454. T e s t a t o r s ' Dependants R e l i e f Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. 47. T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act, S.B.C. 1920, c. 94. T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 378. T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.B. 1959, c. 14. T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.S. 1956, c. 8. T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 303. T e s t a t o r s Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. T-4. - 245 -The T e s t a t o r ' s Family Maintenance Act, 1900 N.Z. S t a t . , 1900, No. 20. The T e s t a t o r s ' Family Maintenance A c t , R.S.M. 1946, c. 64. The T e s t a t o r s Family Maintenance A c t , R.S.M 1970, c. T 50. The W i l l s A ct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 499. W i l l s V a r i a t i o n A c t , R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 435. PUBLICATIONS Gosse, R. and Amighetti, L. Succession - A Source Book on the  Law R e l a t i n g to W i l l s and I n t e s t a c i e s . Vancouver, B.C.: V e r s a t i l e P u b l i s h i n g Co. L t d . , 1975. Amighetti, L. W i l l s , Estates and Government B e n e f i t s . Western Canada: Butterworth & Co., 1978. Amighetti, L. ( C o n t r i b u t i n g Author) "Income Taxation i n Canada." P r e n t i c e H a l l of Canada Ltd. B i c e , W. C. and Amighetti, L. "Canadian Taxation of a Non-Resident Decedent." (1978) 4 The American C o l l e g e of Probate Counsel Probate Notes 9. Amighetti, L. "Income Tax Events Triggered by Death: An Examina-t i o n of S e l e c t e d Problems." Report of Proceedings of the T h i r t y - f i r s t Tax Conference 26, 27, 28 November, 1979 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1979), 652. Amighetti, L. and Carphin, J . G. "The New Canada-U.S. Tax Con-ven t i o n - S p e c i f i c a l l y as i t A f f e c t s Succession." Proc. of a Con- ference of The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Academy of Estate and T r u s t Law 9 May, 1981. Amighetti, L. and C u l l i t y , M. C. "Foreign W i l l S u b s t i t u t e s and Legal Regimes: Canada and B r i t i s h Commonwealth." i n Current Legal  Aspects of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Estate Planning Ed. R. A. Hendrickson and W. K. Stevens. Chicago: American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n , 1981, pp. 328-364. Amighetti, L. "Enduring Powers of Attorney i n Canada and England." (1988) 14 The American College of Probate Counsel Probate Notes 46. 

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