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The argument for the application of the royal proclamation of 1763 to British Columbia, its force and… Hutchings, Patricia Margaret 1987

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THE ARGUMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 TO BRITISH COLUMBIA: ITS FORCE AND EFFECT By PATRICIA MARGARET HUTCHINGS LL.B. U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , 1983 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER IN LAWS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1987 (c) P a t r i c i a Margaret Hutchings, 1987 A 6 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of I V H I A J  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6G/81) PAGE i i ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s work i s to construct the argument f o r the continuing a p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to B r i t i s h Columbia and to examine i t s l e g a l f o r c e and e f f e c t i n r e l a t i o n to pre-Confederation c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . This has important i m p l i c a t i o n s as to the continued e x i s t e n c e of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In Canada the existence of a s u i g e n e r i s , a b o r i g i n a l l e g a l i n t e r e s t ( " a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e " ) i s no longer i n doubt.(1) Scattered j u d i c i a l statements have not f u l l y addressed the s u i generis nature of the i n t e r e s t but have focused s o l e l y on i t s 'common law' source(2) and have held i t , l i k e other common law r i g h t s , to be subject to l e g i s l a t i v e abrogation.(3) That i s not to say extinguishment w i l l be l i g h t l y implied.(4) A b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s are now recognized and confirmed i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act.(5) To the extent that the a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t i s declared and confirmed i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763(6) a d i f f e r e n t argument can be (1) Guerin v. R^, [1984] 6 W.W.R. 481 (S.C.C.). (2) Hamlet of Baker Lake v. M i n i s t e r of Indian A f f a i r s and  Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (F.C.T.D. 1979) at p. 568. (3) A.G. of Ontario v. Bear I s l a n d Foundation (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. H.C.). (4) Simon v. The Queen (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 238 (S.C.C.). (5) C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1867 30 & 31 V i c t . , c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982, Sched. B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). (6) R. v. White and Bob (1965), 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.). PAGE i i i made.(7) The Royal Proclamation i s a Prer o g a t i v e instrument. The "Indian p r o v i s i o n s " come towards the end of the Proclamation and address a s e r i e s of diverse i s s u e s . Confusion e x i s t s as to the geographic scope of the p r o v i s i o n s concerning Indian lands and p a r t i c u l a r l y regarding t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to B r i t i s h Columbia. I t i s here argued that i t i s misleading to focus s o l e l y on the geographic scope as explained i n the document i t s e l f . The Royal Proclamation of 1763, as a law of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and man i f e s t l y u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , i t i s argued, a p p l i e d to B r i t i s h Columbia, i f not as of i t s enactment i n 1763, then e i t h e r upon the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty over that area or by v i r t u e of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865. Further i t i s argued that the Proclamation enjoyed the f o r c e and e f f e c t of an Imperial s t a t u t e i n the c o l o n i e s to which i t ap p l i e d . The Indian r i g h t s t h e r e i n declared or confirmed thus became s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s . This has important i m p l i c a t i o n s regarding the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of the a r t i c u l a t e d r i g h t s to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e derogation. In order to understand f u l l y the import of the Royal Proclamation i n the c o l o n i e s i t i s necessary to understand B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s governing the nature and e x e r c i s e of the Sovereign's prerogative l e g i s l a t i v e and executive powers i n newly acquired t e r r i t o r i e s and the r u l e s governing the Imperi a l laws to which the co l o n i e s are subject. Whether or not the Royal (7) v. White and Bob (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481 (S.C.C.). PAGE i v Proclamation extends to a f t e r acquired c o l o n i e s depends i n part upon the category of Prerogative to which the Proclamation belongs. B a s i c a l l y "minor" prerogatives operate i n those t e r r i t o r i e s i n which the B r i t i s h common law operates and are f r e e l y a l t e r a b l e by the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e bodies. "Major" Pr e r o g a t i v e s , however, e x i s t i n a l l B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s whether or not the B r i t i s h common law i s i n force and operate to bind and l i m i t c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . The argument i s made that the Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 should be be c l a s s i f i e d as major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n on the grounds t h a t : (1) they are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n nature having to do p r i n c i p a l l y with l i m i t a t i o n s on the powers of Governors to acquire unsurrendered t r i b a l lands, or (2) as l e g i s l a t i o n governing the procedure to be adopted f o r Crown a l i e n a t i o n of Indian lands they f a l l w i t h i n the King's p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y . Further that as major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n the Indian Land p r o v i s i o n s enjoyed the force and e f f e c t of an Imperial s t a t u t e with the necessary intendment f o r the c o l o n i e s w i t h i n the meaning of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. Further that by v i r t u e of such Act the p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of  1763 (at l e a s t up u n t i l the passing of the Statute of  Westminster, 1931) operated to vo i d c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n (or f o r that matter Dominion or P r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n ) repugnant to any of i t s p r o v i s i o n s to the extent of any such repugnancy. PAGE v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i TABLE OF CONTENTS v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v i i i INTRODUCTION 1 PART I: THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 10 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 10 2. C o n s t r u c t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 19 3. Geographic Scope of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 23 (i) I n t r o d u c t i o n 23 ( i i ) Indian P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation - P a r t IV 26 ( i i i ) The Indian B e n e f i c i a r i e s of Part IV 30 (iv) Geographic Reach of Pa r t IV of the Proclamation 33 4. P r o s p e c t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1764 48 (i) I n t r o d u c t i o n 48 ( i i ) C o n s t r u c t i o n of the T e r r i t o r i a l E f f e c t of the Royal Proclamation's Indian P r o v i s i o n s i n L i g h t of T h e i r L e g i s l a t i v e Purpose 49 ( i i i ) B a s i c Rules of S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n re Temporal A p p l i c a t i o n 56 (iv) P r o s p e c t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Documents 6 2 (v) E x t e n s i o n of T e r r i t o r i a l L i m i t s of B r i t i s h J u r i s d i c t i o n 66 (vi) C r e a t i o n of New C o l o n i e s and P l a n t a t i o n s 72 5. S t a t u t o r y E f f e c t of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 82 (i) I n t r o d u c t i o n 82 ( i i ) S t a t u t o r y E f f e c t of the Indian P r o v i s i o n s of The Royal Proclamation of 1763 89 PAGE v i PART I I : THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE AS IT RELATES TO COLONIES 100 1. The Royal P r e r o g a t i v e 100 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 100 ( i i ) H i s t o r i c a l Roots of the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e 102 2. T e r r i t o r i a l A c q u i s i t i o n 107 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 107 ( i i ) The P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i v e Power as I t R e l a t e s to Settlements 108 ( i i i ) The P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i v e Powers as I t R e l a t e s to Conquered and Ceded C o l o n i e s 113 ( i v ) The King's C o n s t i t u e n t L e g i s l a t i v e Power i n R e l a t i o n to B r i t i s h Dominions 119 3. The Laws to Which C o l o n i e s Are Subject 122 4. The Imperial Law i n Force P r o p r i o V i g o r e i n B r i t i s h T e r r i t o r i e s 127 5. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e 138 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 138 ( i i ) Major P r e r o g a t i v e Powers 142 PART I I I : THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 AS MAJOR PREROGATIVE LEGISATION 144 1. The Indian Land P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 7th October 1763 as Major P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n R e f e r a b l e to the B r i t i s h Crown's C o n s t i t u e n t Power i n Dependent B r i t i s h T e r r i t o r i e s 144 2. The Indian Land P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 7th October 1763 as Major P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n R e f e r a b l e to the B r i t i s h Crown's Power i n R e l a t i o n to Land i n Dependent B r i t i s h T e r r i t o r i e s 164 ( i ) General 164 ( i i ) Crown Rights i n R e l a t i o n to Land as a Major P r e r o g a t i v e 171 3. Amendment of P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n by L o c a l Laws 187 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 187 PAGE v i i PART IV: THE COLONIAL LAWS VALIDITY ACT, 1865 205 1. The H i s t o r i c S e t t i n g 205 (i) I n t r o d u c t i o n 205 ( i i ) Background to the Enactment of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act 206 ( i i i ) C o l o n i a l L e g i s l a t i v e Powers P r i o r to 1865 -The D o c t r i n e of Repugnancy 210 2. Substantive P r o v i s i o n s of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t , 1865 222 (i) I n t r o d u c t i o n 222 ( i i ) S e c t i o n 2 231 ( i i i ) S e c t i o n 4 249 (iv) S e c t i o n 5 258 (v) Concluding Remarks 26 9 CONCLUSION 273 BIBLIOGRAPHY 27 8 APPENDIX I: THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 7 OCTOBER 1763 284 APPENDIX I I : THE COLONIAL LAWS VALIDITY ACT, 1865 289 Page v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my a p p r e c i a t i o n to my t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r . P r o f e s s o r M. Jackson f o r h i s encouragement and a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s undertaking. I wish to thank P r o f e s s o r Murray Greenwood f o r v a l u a b l e d i s c u s s i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y with r e f e r e n c e to the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t . 1865. I would l i k e to thank the Department of J u s t i c e who pr o v i d e d funding through a D u f f - R i n f r e t S c h o l a r s h i p . In p a r t i c u l a r I would l i k e to thank S h e i l a T a l b o t f o r her pa t i e n c e i n t y p i n g and e d i t i n g t h i s manuscript. PAGE 1 INTRODUCTION In the past western conceptions of the Native people's i n f e r i o r l e g a l s t a t u s have denied the e x i s t e n c e of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . Such t r e a t i e s as were concluded with the Indians were expl a i n e d on grounds of moral duty or p o l i t i c a l expedience r a t h e r than upon the r e c o g n i t i o n of a s u b s i s t i n g l e g a l i n t e r e s t . A change was evidenced i n 1973 when the f e d e r a l government, which had p r e v i o u s l y denied the e x i s t e n c e of the a b o r i g i n a l c l a i m , i n d i c a t e d a w i l l i n g n e s s to n e g o t i a t e c l a i m s based on a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , a response due i n p a r t to the Ca l d e r ( 8 ) d e c i s i o n . Such n e g o t i a t i o n s were to be premised upon extinguishment of the a b o r i g i n a l c l a i m i n r e t u r n f o r bare compensation. The most recent f e d e r a l p o l i c y statement (December, 1986) i s s u e d i n response to the " C o l l i c a n " Report, i n d i c a t e s a w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t of the f e d e r a l government to r e j e c t the n o t i o n of the n e c e s s i t y of extinguishment as a p r e - c o n d i t i o n to n e g o t i a t i o n . Recent changes i n p o l i c y have allowed f o r s e l f government powers to be i n c l u d e d i n the settlement p r o c e s s . These p o l i c y developments are r e f l e c t e d i n the content of four modern t r e a t i e s — the 1975 James Bay Agreement, the 1984 Cree-Naskapi Act, the 1984 Western A r c t i c ( I n n u i a l u i t ) Claims Settlement and the 1986 S e c h e l t Indian Band S e l f Government A c t . (8) Calder v. Attorney-General of B r i t i s h Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.); (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64 (B.C.C.A.); (1969) 8 D.L.R. (3d) 59 ( B . C . S . C ) . PAGE 2 A l e g a l basis for the r e s o l u t i o n of outstanding claims i s now found i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act 1982.(9) The a b o r i g i n a l people are secured a commitment to a j u s t r e s o l u t i o n of t h e i r claims i n the r e c o g n i t i o n given to t h e i r e x i s t i n g t r e a t y and a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 35. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference e s t a b l i s h e d under s e c t i o n 37 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982 and the a d d i t i o n a l conferences added by the 1983 amendments were intended to provide a forum f o r reaching some agreement on the content of such claims. The c l e a r l y expressed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of a b o r i g i n a l people to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s process r e f l e c t s t h e i r v i t a l input i n t o the s o l u t i o n . These conferences have f a i l e d to make any s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s . I t seems c l e a r that u l t i m a t e l y the terms of accommodation w i l l be set through n e g o t i a t i o n between the governments of Canada and i t s a b o r i g i n a l peoples. However, although such i s a r i s i n g f a c t o r on the p o l i t i c a l agenda, the f e d e r a l government and most p r o v i n c i a l and t e r r i t o r i a l governments (notably B r i t i s h Columbia) continue to deny the existence of a v a l i d l y s u b s i s t i n g a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . In B r i t i s h Columbia i t i s f u r t h e r argued that land l e g i s l a t i o n of the Colony of B r i t i s h Columbia, p r i o r to Confederation, served to e x t i n g u i s h such t i t l e . Thus i n B r i t i s h Columbia the Courts p r e s e n t l y seem to o f f e r the only means of ensuring the n e g o t i a t i o n envisioned by ss. 35 and 37 take p l a c e . (9) C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act  1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. PAGE 3 Indian r i g h t s were f i r s t addressed i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763,(10) promulgated by George I I I of Great B r i t a i n i n regard to B r i t i s h North America, which arguably reserved to the Indians a l l land i n t h e i r possession which 'not having been ceded to or purchased by [the B r i t i s h Crown] are reserved to them as t h e i r hunting grounds'. As pointed out by Lysak, a f i n d i n g that the Royal Proclamation a p p l i e s to the province of B r i t i s h Columbia, coupled with the f a c t that the greater part of B r i t i s h Columbia has never been f o r m a l l y surrendered through t r e a t i e s made with the Indians, would suggest a broader ambit of f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y i n r e l a t i o n to 'lands reserved f o r the Indians' than i s g e n e r a l l y conceded.(11) Legal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or a b o r i g i n a l peoples i s assigned to the f e d e r a l government under s e c t i o n 91(24) of the C o n s t i t u t i o n  Act, 1867.(12) This s e c t i o n gives the f e d e r a l Parliament j u r i s d i c t i o n over two d i f f e r e n t subject matters: Indians and Lands reserved for Indians. I t can be argued that i n g r a n t i n g the Parliament of Canada the power to l e g i s l a t e with respect to Indians the United Kingdom Parliament intended and assumed i t would respect Indian t i t l e . That a c c o r d i n g l y i t would honour e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s with the Indians and continue the B r i t i s h (10) Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, t e x t given i n Brigham, ed., B r i t i s h Royal Proclamations R e l a t i n g to America, 212-8. Text a l s o given i n R.S.C. 1970, Appendix I I , No. 1. See Appendix I. (11) Lysyk, Kenneth, "The Indian T i t l e Question i n Canada: An A p p r a i s a l i n L i g h t of Calder" (1973), LI Canadian Bar Review 450. (12) C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 V i c t . , c. 3. PAGE 4 p o l i c y , expressed i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763, of pr o t e c t i n g Indian lands from p r i v a t e encroachment and of t h e i r purchase only i n the name of the Crown and according to the formal procedure f o r such purchases t h e r e i n enunciated. Although i t i s c l e a r that s. 91(24) alone creates no l e g a l l y enforceable duty i n the f e d e r a l government as regards Indians, by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (and the various Indian Acts) a f i d u c i a r y duty i s placed upon the f e d e r a l government i n regard to the a b o r i g i n a l peoples and t h e i r lands.(13) Recently the Supreme Court of Canada a p p l i e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e of l e g i s l a t i o n by reference i n a way that permits the Parliament of Canada to abandon i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the a b o r i g i n a l peoples to the provinces.(14) The court ignored completely the important h i s t o r i c a l evidence that f e d e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Indians i s touched by a s p e c i a l charge to p r o t e c t the a b o r i g i n a l peoples and t h e i r c u l t u r e , a charge that traces from the beginning of B r i t i s h r u l e i n North America. The Courts have yet to r u l e on whether f e d e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 'lands reserved for Indians' ( s . 91(24)) can be l i k e w i s e abandoned to the provinces. In the St.  Catherines(15) case Lord Watson ( P r i v y Council) pointed out that the l a t t e r words were not synonymous with 'Indian reserves' but were to be more broadly construed. He held that "the words used (13) Guerin, supra, footnote 1, c f . MacDonald J.A. d i s s e n t i n g i n R^ v. Morley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 193 at 218. (14) Dick v. The Queen (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 33 (S.C.C.). (15) St. Catherine's M i l l i n g and Lumber Co. v. R^ (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.); 10 O.R. 196 (Ont. Ch. D i v . ) . PAGE 5 are according to t h e i r n a t u r a l meaning s u f f i c i e n t to i n c l u d e a l l lands reserved, upon any terms or c o n d i t i o n s , f o r Indian occupation..." The Royal Proclamation of 1763 may have an even greater s i g n i f i c a n c e i f i t i s held a p p l i c a b l e to B r i t i s h Columbia. An argument can can be made that as a P r e r o g a t i v e instrument under the Great S e a l , to the extent that i t i s i n t r a v i r e s and a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of the Crown's p r e r o g a t i v e power, i t enjoyed the f o r c e and e f f e c t of an Imperial Statute applying p r o p r i o v i g o r e to a l l B r i t i s h Colonies throughout North America. That as such i t operated to v o i d i n c o n s i s t e n t c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , a r u l e contained i n part i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865,(16) and therefore served to i n v a l i d a t e the land l e g i s l a t i o n r e l i e d on by the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia as e x t i n g u i s h i n g a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e p r i o r to Confederation. I t thus becomes important to explore the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to B r i t i s h Columbia and the s t a t u s and scope of the Indian r i g h t s a r t i c u l a t e d t h e r e i n . The Royal Proclamation of 1763 announced a s e r i e s of p o l i c i e s i n respect of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s i n North America. In part i t provided for the o r g a n i z a t i o n and government of B r i t a i n ' s newly acquired t e r r i t o r i e s a r i s i n g out of French cessions under the Treaty of P a r i s (signed on 19th February 1763). More importantly the Proclamation f o r m a l l y enunciated I m p e r i a l p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n to those lands i n B r i t i s h North America i n a b o r i g i n a l (16) C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, 28 & 29 V i c t . , c. 63. See Appendix I I . PAGE 6 possession. In r e l a t i o n to i t s 'Indian p o l i c y ' , the Proclamation i s d e c l a r a t i v e of p r i n c i p l e s already w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n the common law. I t merely gave s t a t u t o r y expression to the common law concept of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , which d e r i v e s from the f a c t that the Indians were i n occupation and use of the lands p r i o r to the settlement or conquest of North America by European S t a t e s . The Indians were recognized from e a r l i e s t times as possessing a degree of sovereignty which n e c e s s i t a t e d t h e i r consent as a pre - c o n d i t i o n to the v a l i d a c q u i s i t i o n of land i n t h e i r possession. Such r e f l e c t e d contemporary p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which found i n a l l peoples with a s u f f i c i e n t l y developed p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a degree of sovereignty such that c o n s t i t u t e d a bar to the fre e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y by more h i g h l y c i v i l i z e d people. Indian r i g h t s to land i n t h e i r possession were always recognized by the B r i t i s h Crown. The i n v a r i a b l e procedure adopted by the B r i t i s h Crown i n i t s e a r l y r e l a t i o n s with the Indian Nations had, p r i o r to 1763, already hardened i n t o substantive r u l e s of common law which a r t i c u l a t e d a s u i generis Indian i n t e r e s t . Such has now been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada i n the Guerin d e c i s i o n . Because of the p r i n c i p a l of discovery, which gave to the European di s c o v e r e r the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to purchase v i s a v i s other European n a t i o n s , such Indian t i t l e was subject to the sol e r e s t r i c t i o n as to i t s a l i e n a b i l i t y to a l l save the Crown. Such r e s t r i c t i o n d i d not extend to a d e n i a l of the r i g h t of the a b o r i g i n a l possessor to s e l l : r a t h e r , purchase was premised upon Indian consent. This notion of PAGE 7 " t i t l e " i s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n the c o n t r a c t s between the Crown and the Indian Nations i n the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth c e n t u r i e s . Such then must inform the debate on the nature and scope of the Indian r i g h t s a r t i c u l a t e d i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763. In the opening r e c i t a l to the Indian p r o v i s i o n s , the Proclamation s t a t e s that the Indians should not be molested or disturbed i n the possession of such p a r t s of the King's t e r r i t o r i e s "as, not having been ceded t o , or purchased by us, are reserved" to the Indians as t h e i r hunting grounds. The Proclamation then recognizes as 'Indian Country' land o u t s i d e c o l o n i a l borders and i n t h i s area Indian t i t l e i s u n e q u i v o c a l l y affirmed and white settlement, at l e a s t f o r the present (presumably u n t i l f u r t h e r consensual arrangements) p r o h i b i t e d . Further the Proclamation recognizes Indian t i t l e to a l l unceded lands i n a b o r i g i n a l possession w i t h i n the bounds of the c o l o n i e s and lays down d e t a i l e d procedures f o r i t s purchase. The t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of 'Indian' lands was p r o t e c t e d by r e s t r i c t i o n s on grants, settlements and purchases. I t i s to be noted that the 'Indian Country' i s not brought w i t h i n any c o l o n i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognizes then, Indian t i t l e i n a l l those areas of B r i t i s h North America i n which the Indians r e t a i n possession of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l lands. Where settlement i s to be allowed i t provides for the consensual a c q u i s i t i o n of those lands by the Crown. Arguably the Proclamation, i n l e a v i n g the 'Indian Country' out of the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s e t t l e d PAGE 8 c o l o n i e s , a l s o recognizes a degree of Indian t r i b a l sovereignty. In so doing the Proclamation i s d e c l a r a t i v e of a p r e - e x i s t i n g l e g a l r i g h t i n the a b o r i g i n a l people. Confusion e x i s t s as to the geographic scope to be a t t r i b u t e d to the Proclamation and more s p e c i f i c a l l y i t s Indian p r o v i s i o n s . The major problem of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the meaning to be a t t r i b u t e d to the phrasing of the opening r e c i t a l to the Indian p r o v i s i o n s , to the e f f e c t that Indians l i v i n g under B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n should not be d i s t u r b e d " i n the Possession of Such Parts of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded t o , or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds,...". I t might be suggested that B r i t i s h Columbia i s excluded from the Proclamations p r o v i s i o n s because that area was t e r r a i n c o g n i t a , or not otherwise f i r m l y under B r i t i s h sovereignty, as of 7 October 1763 when the Proclamation was issued. This argument cannot be resolved through an examination of the text alone. C l e a r l y on i t s terms the Proclamation i s uncertain and ambiguous as to i t s geographic reach. I t i s open to argue that the 'Indian Country' s t r e t c h e d i n d e f i n i t e l y westwards, an argument supported by the absence of express terms i n the Proclamation suggesting otherwise, d e s p i t e the f a c t that a western boundary had been proposed i n the documentation l e a d i n g to the issuance of the Royal Proclamation. Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y that parts of B r i t i s h Columbia were brought w i t h i n the Hudson Bay's t e r r i t o r y , as t h i s was described i n the mid 18th century, or w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y covered by the New England Charter of 1620. PAGE 9 A much more compelling argument, however, can be mounted. Whether or not the Royal Proclamation of 1763 o r i g i n a l l y a p p l i e d to B r i t i s h Columbia, i t nonetheless subsequently a p p l i e d with the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h sovereignty over that area. This r e s t s on the f a c t that the Proclamation of 1763 was a law of m a n i f e s t l y u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n broad enough to p r o t e c t the j u s t r i g h t s and claims of those Indians who came under B r i t i s h sovereignty at any time during the Proclamation's l i f e . Such i s supported by the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 which gives s t a t u t o r y extension to those Imperial Acts i n which a necessary intendment can be i n f e r r e d . By v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 2 of the Act, t h i s i m p l i e d intendment a p p l i e s a l s o to those Imperial Orders having the fo r c e and e f f e c t of Imperial Statutes i n the c o l o n i e s . C e r t a i n l y since 1763 the p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation governing Indian land purchases have been widely a p p l i e d , as r e f l e c t e d i n the t r e a t y making process. Between 1680 and 1923, over 480 t r e a t i e s , grants and surrenders were made upon terms and con d i t i o n s compatible with the Proclamations p r o v i s i o n s . The Royal Proclamation of 1763 continues today as part of Canada's c o n s t i t u t i o n . As an instrument having the f o r c e of an Imperial Statute and recognized i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n A c t, 1982 as a document of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l importance, i t should be a p p l i e d l i b e r a l l y i n favour of those Indians throughout Canada who r e t a i n possession of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l lands. PAGE 10 PART I; THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The Royal Proclamation of 1763(17) was promulgated by George I I I of Great B r i t a i n i n r e l a t i o n to B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s i n North America i n gener a l , and i n p a r t i c u l a r to those r e c e n t l y acquired from France under the Treaty of P a r i s of 10 February 1763. By A r t i c l e IV of t h i s t r e a t y , the King of France ceded to B r i t a i n , Canada, with a l l i t s dependencies, as w e l l as .... i s l a n d , and a l l other i s l a n d s i n the St. Lawrence G u l f , and i n general everything that depended on the s a i d c o u n t r i e s , lands, i s l a n d s , by t r e a t y or otherwise, which the King of France had u n t i l then over the s a i d i s l a n d s , c o u n t r i e s , e t c . , and t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s so that the King of France thus ceded and made over to the B r i t i s h King, and to the Crown of Great B r i t a i n , and that i n the most ample manner and form, without r e s t r i c t i o n , and without any l i b e r t y to depart from the cession and guaranty under any pretence, or to d i s t u r b Great B r i t a i n i n the possessions above mentioned. Under A r t i c l e X, the Spanish King made a s i m i l a r c e s s i o n of Spanish F l o r i d a , with Fort St. Augustin, and the Bay of Pentagonal, as w e l l as a l l that Spain possessed on the Continent of North America, to the east or to the southeast of the M i s s i s s i p p i , and, i n ge n e r a l , everything that depends on the s a i d c o u n t r i e s and lands, with the Sovereignty, property and possession, and a l l r i g h t s acquired by t r e a t y or otherwise, which the C a t h o l i c King and Crown of Spain had t i l l then. Although by (17) Supra, footnote 10. PAGE 11 the t r e a t y the King of France r e t a i n e d L o u i s i a n a to the West of the M i s s i s s i p p i , i t had been ceded i n secret to the Spanish King i n 1762 and 1763. I t then f e l l to the B r i t i s h Crown to formulate a coherent p o l i c y f or the o r g a n i z a t i o n and government of i t s new possessions. This was e f f e c t e d i n the Royal Proclamations of  1763 (the Proclamation). The Proclamation was not l i m i t e d to the establishment of such governments but addressed a s e r i e s of diverse and unconnected i s s u e s ; each with i t s own preamble. One of the main goals of the Proclamation was the establishment of a uniform, c o n s o l i d a t e d p o l i c y with regard to Indian occupied lands i n i t s American possessions. While the Proclamation i s a bas i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l document e s t a b l i s h i n g the government f o r the t e r r i t o r i e s acquired from France f o l l o w i n g the Treaty of P a r i s , a most important part of the document i s the announcement of new r e g u l a t i o n s i n respect to Indians and t h e i r lands. One scholar thus noted; "The f i r s t thought of the framers was to a l l a y the alarms of the Indians, and the a r t i c l e s , concerned with Indian r e l a t i o n s , form the core of the document and of i t s p o l i c y 1 1 . ( 1 8 ) The "Indian p r o v i s i o n s " which came towards the end of the Proclamation give s t a t u t o r y force to Imperial p o l i c i e s , developed over a long p e r i o d of time, of respect f o r the Indian c l a i m to land i n t h e i r possession and thus of the n e c e s s i t y f o r Indian consent to i t s a l i e n a t i o n . Improved (18) A l v o r d , The Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763 (Michigan Pioneer and H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y : 1908), p. 22, c i t e d i n Cumming, P.A. and Mickenberg, N.H., Native Rights i n  Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto: The Indian-Eskimo A s s o c i a t i o n of Canada, 1972 ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as Native Rights i n Canada). PAGE 12 r e l a t i o n s with the Indians, e s s e n t i a l to the peace and s e c u r i t y of B r i t i s h North America, had been the subject of ongoing concern to the B r i t i s h government and the Proclamation was s e i z e d as a means to express f o r m a l l y Imperial i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s regard, hastened perhaps by news of the Pontiac r e b e l l i o n on the mid-western f r o n t i e r . Indian complaints of fraudulent land grants, made by the various c o l o n i a l governors without concern for the r i g h t s of the Indian o c c u p i e r s , had been long voiced and the Imperial government had made various ad hoc attempts at i t s s o l u t i o n . S l a t t e r y and Lester have d e a l t e x t e n s i v e l y with the h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n g of the Proclamation and the documentation preparatory to i t s enactment.(19) I t i s intended here to underline the f a c t that the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation, though perhaps made more urgent by the news of Indian h o s t i l i t y on the mid-western f r o n t i e r , were not conceived i n haste. They declared what was indeed the law. The Imperial Government had long debated the establishment of an Indian p o l i c y which was uniform throughout the c o l o n i e s and had as i t s major component respect f o r Indian lands. (19) S l a t t e r y , B r i a n , The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian  Peoples, as A f f e c t e d by the Crown's A c q u i s i t i o n of Their  T e r r i t o r i e s (PhD Thes i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford 1979) (h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as S l a t t e r y ) . L e s t e r , Geoffrey, The T e r r i t o r i a l Rights of the I n u i t of the Canadian  Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s : A Legal Argument (J.D. t h e s i s , Osgoode H a l l Law School, York U n i v e r s i t y , 1981) ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as L e s t e r ) . PAGE 13 The f i r s t step i n the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of these p o l i c i e s was the c a l l i n g of the Albany Congress i n June, 1754, to e s t a b l i s h the j o i n t Management of Indian A f f a i r s . ( 2 0 ) Unlawful land grants and purchases were major problems on the agenda of the Albany Conference of 1754 which although a f a i l u r e i n many respects(21) nevertheless formulated a procedure to govern f u t u r e Indian land purchases. A l l f u t u r e purchases from the Indians would be vo i d unless executed i n the name of the government w i t h i n which the lands were s i t u a t e , and unless i n p u b l i c c o u n c i l . This p o l i c y was put i n t o e f f e c t through the issue of new i n s t r u c t i o n s to the Governors. Throughout the eighteenth century a s e r i e s of t r e a t i e s had been concluded with the Indians, f o l l o w i n g such procedure, by which t h e i r land was ceded to the Crown.(22) Although these t r e a t i e s went some way to a l l a y Indian fears about encroachments upon t h e i r lands, the problem was not f u l l y resolved and news of Indian h o s t i l i t y continued to reach the Imperial Government. In 1761, as an immediate r e a c t i o n to proposed land grants i n the Colony of New York, the Board of Trade wrote a comprehensive report to the King, s e t t i n g f o r t h the b a s i c p o l i c i e s which ought (20) Supra, footnote 18, Native Rights i n Canada, p. 23 c i t i n g A l v o r d p. 24. (21) K e i t h , A. B e r r i e d a l e , The F i r s t B r i t i s h Empire, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, p. 334 et seq. (22) See f o r example the Treaty of Easton, Oct. 1758, at which Pennsylvania agreed to r e l i n q u i s h claims to part of the land i t had purchased ( f r a u d u l e n t l y ) at-an e a r l i e r congress at Albany. Text i n Indian T r e a t i e s , p r i n t e d by Benjamin Franklyn, 1736-1762, with an i n t r o d u c t i o n by C a r l Van Doren ( P h i l a d e l p h i a H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y of Pennsylvania). PAGE 14 to be pursued i n a l l the American c o l o n i e s as regards Indian lands. Noting that the main reason prompting the Indians to make war on the E n g l i s h was the "C r u e l t y and i n j u s t i c e with which they have been t r e a t e d with respect to t h e i r hunting grounds, i n v i o l a t i o n of those solemn compacts by which they have y i e l d e d to us the Dominion, but not the Property of those Lands" the Board commented t h a t : ... the gran t i n g of Lands h i t h e r t o u n s e t t l e d and e s t a b l i s h i n g Colonies upon the F r o n t i e r s before the claims of the Indians are as c e r t a i n e d appears to be a measure of the most dangerous tendency, and i s more p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n the present case, as these Settlements now proposed to be made, e s p e c i a l l y those upon the Mohawk River are i n that part of the Country of the Possession of which the Indians are most jealous having at d i f f e r e n t times expressed i n the most strongest terms t h e i r R e s o l u t i o n to oppose a l l settlements thereon as a manifest v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r Rights.(23) Their Lordships went on to recommend that the King immediately issue orders " f o r p u t t i n g a stop to a l l Settlements" upon land s t i l l i n Indian possession. This report was adopted by Order i n Cou n c i l on 3 December(24) and l e d to the i s s u i n g of Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s which r e f e r to the King's determination to support and pr o t e c t the Indians " i n t h e i r j u s t r i g h t s and possessions", f o r b i d d i n g the Governors of the various c o l o n i e s from passing any grants of lands possessed by the Indians. Added to t h i s i n j u n c t i o n was an order that the Governors promulgate a proclamation i n the King's (23) Supra, footnote 19, L e s t e r . (24) I b i d . PAGE 15 name s t r i c t l y e n j o i n i n g and r e q u i r i n g a l l persons whatever, who may " i n a d v e r t e n t l y have seated themselves upon any lands so reserved or claimed by the Indians, without any l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y f o r t h w i t h to remove therefrom". And f u r t h e r required a l l a p p l i c a t i o n s to purchase Indian lands to be f i r s t t r a n s m i t t e d to the Crown f o r s c r u t i n y and p e r u s a l . These i n s t r u c t i o n s were to be made p u b l i c throughout the colony and made known to the Indians, that the l a t t e r "may be apprized of Our determined R e s o l u t i o n to support them i n t h e i r j u s t R i g h t s , and i n v i o l a b l y to observe our Engagements with them."(25) The l a t t e r i s c l e a r l y a forerunner of the Proclamation's s t r i c t u r e s ; any a p p l i c a t i o n to purchase lands from the Indians had to receive p r i o r approval from the Crown, through the Lords of Trade, and be communicated to the Governor before such l i c e n c e could i s s u e . And more i m p o r t a n t l y , the Governors were not to make grants of any lands "possessed or occupied" by the Indians or "reserved to or claimed by them".(26) Several of the Governors issued proclamations i n the terms ordered by the December i n s t r u c t i o n s . ( 2 7 ) The same concern i s evidenced i n the various documents preparatory to the Proclamation. A l e t t e r from Lord Egremont, Secretary of State f o r the Southern Department, to the Board of Trade, 5 May 1763, asking f o r a report on various (25) I b i d . (26) I b i d . (27) e.g. see Gov. Belcher's proclamation r e l a t i n g to Nova S c o t i a i n Native Rights i n Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto: The Indian-Eskimo A s s o c i a t i o n of Canada, 1972, pp. 287-288. PAGE 16 questions r e l a t i n g to the p o l i c i e s to be adopted f o r the r e c e n t l y ceded t e r r i t o r y i n North America contained the f o l l o w i n g passage: His Majesty's J u s t i c e & Moderation i n c l i n e s Him to adopt the more e l i g i b l e Method of c o n c i l i a t i n g the Minds of the Indians by the Mildness of His Government, by p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r Persons & Property & securing to them a l l the Possessions, Rights and P r i v i l e d g e s [ s i c ] they have h i t h e r t o enjoyed, and are e n t i t l e d t o , most c a u t i o u s l y guarding against any Invasion or Occupation of t h e i r Hunting Lands, the Possession of which i s to be acquired by f a i r Purchase only; and i t has been thought so h i g h l y expedient to give them the e a r l i e s t and most convincing Proofs of His Majesty's Gracious and F r i e n d l y I n t e n t i o n s on t h i s Head, that I have already received and t r a n s m i t t e d the King's Commands to t h i s Purpose to the Governors of V i r g i n i a , the Two C a r o l i n a s and Georgia, and to the Agent of Indian A f f a i r s i n the Southern Department, as your Lordships w i l l see f u l l y i n the i n c l o s e d Copy of my C i r c u l a r L e t t e r to them on t h i s Subject. This shows Imperial r e c o g n i t i o n of the Indian c l a i m and evidences the King's power to command the observance of such p o l i c y . Thus although news i n B r i t a i n of the Pontiac r e b e l l i o n on the mid-western f r o n t i e r ( 2 8 ) may have prompted the B r i t i s h Crown to take immediate a c t i o n i n t h i s regard, a c t i n g under the P r e r o g a t i v e , i t i s c l e a r that the r e s u l t i n g Royal Proclamation of 1763, i n the Indian p r o v i s i o n s , r e f l e c t e d a longer h i s t o r y of Imperial c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the problem. The reasons adopted by the Board of Trade f o r i t s d e c i s i o n to issue a Proclamation rather than some other P r e r o g a t i v e (28) K e i t h , The F i r s t B r i t i s h Empire, supra, footnote 21 at p. 334 et seq; and see S l a t t e r y , p. 201 where he s t a t e s that news of the r e b e l l i o n reached i n England i n the l a t t e r part of J u l y . (May 1763) PAGE 17 instrument are not made cl e a r . ( 2 9 ) The Board wanted to make an a u t h o r i t a t i v e p u b l i c statement that would serve to bind a l l c o l o n i a l governors to a uniform procedure when d e a l i n g with land burdened by Indian t i t l e . S l a t t e r y suggests a Proclamation was an obvious and appropriate choice, i t being an o f f i c i a l expression of the Sovereign w i l l i n matters f a l l i n g w i t h i n the Crown's p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y . ( 3 0 ) As an instrument under the Great Seal i t c a r r i e d the l e g a l a u t h o r i t y of a Commission — that i s , i t had i n the c o l o n i e s to which i t r e l a t e d the f o r c e and e f f e c t of an Imperial S t a t u t e , a f a c t subsequently j u d i c i a l l y confirmed.(31) To be v a l i d , a Proclamation must pass the Great Seal and f u l f i l requirements regarding i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . I t seems c l e a r that the Royal proclamation of 1763 s a t i s f i e s the formal requirements attending i t s issue and p u b l i c a t i o n . ( 3 2 ) The f i n a l amended d r a f t of the Proclamation was. read and approved by the King i n C o u n c i l on 5 October, and H a l i f a x was ordered to prepare a d r a f t f o r the King's signature.(33) I t was immediately approved and signed on 7 October 1763. Copies were p r i n t e d and ordered to be sent to the Governors of the Kings' s e v e r a l c o l o n i e s and p l a n t a t i o n s i n America and to the agents of Indian A f f a i r s . As to the l e g a l i t y of i t s contents, (29) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 200 et seq. (30) I b i d , p. 200. (31) R^ v. Lady McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68 (Can. Ex.). (32) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 287. (33) Proceedings i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l , 5 Oct. 1763, Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Documents, p. 158. PAGE 18 Attorney-General Yorke when asked to review i t by the Board of Trade commented that the Proclamation "contains nothing contrary to law."(34) (34) Yorke to the Board of Trade, 3 Oct. 1763. P.R.O. Co. 0. 323/16, p. 337. PAGE 19 2. C o n s t r u c t i o n of the Royal P r o c l a m a t i o n of 1763 The question to be asked i s : to what peoples and to what t e r r i t o r i e s does the Royal Proclamation of 1763 apply? The answer may be found i n part by focusing on the words used i n l i g h t of events l e a d i n g up to i t s enactment and f r e e z i n g i t s geographic scope and Indian b e n e f i c i a r i e s as of t h i s date. However, i t i s misleading to focus s o l e l y on the geographic scope as explained i n the document i t s e l f . The Proclamation, as w i l l be seen, i s broadly enough worded to a l l o w f o r a l t e r e d circumstances whether as to peoples or t e r r i t o r i e s covered. And as a document which i s of c o n t i n u i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and which r e l a t e s to Indians i t should be i n t e r p r e t e d so as to give the most b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t i t s words w i l l permit. The f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s of the scope of the Indian p r o v i s i o n s as expressed i n the document i t s e l f , i s undertaken merely to show that even on i t s face the geographic extent i s not c l e a r l y expressed so as to exclude i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to lands i n the west and northwest of modern day Canada. To the extent that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 i s i n t r a  v i r e s and a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of the p r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e power, i t s e f f e c t and o p e r a t i o n are to be determined according to the w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a p p l i c a b l e to l e g a l instruments. In a l l cases the object i s to determine the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n as expressed by the words used i n the document. However i t seldom happens that the framers have i n PAGE 20 t h e i r contemplation a l l the cases that are l i k e l y to a r i s e . Moreover, from the im p e r f e c t i o n of language i t i s impossible to know f o r c e r t a i n the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n without some i n q u i r y as to the circumstances of the enactment and the mischief i t was aimed to corr e c t . ( 3 5 ) The Royal Proclamation of 1763 i s a composite document f a l l i n g i n t o s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t p a r t s with d i s t i n c t purposes, each prefaced with i t s own preamble or r e c i t a l i n t r o d u c i n g p r o v i s i o n s , of v a r y i n g scope. I t i s c l e a r that the various p a r t s , covering d i v e r s e and unconnected i s s u e s , are not a l l to be r e s t r i c t e d to the t e r r i t o r i e s ceded to B r i t a i n from France i n 1763. In i t s Indian p r o v i s i o n s , the Proclamation gives s t a t u t o r y expression to Imperial r e c o g n i t i o n of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e to lands i n B r i t i s h North America i n Indian possession, and f u r t h e r p r e s c r i b e s the procedure whereby such lands might be acquired by the Crown.(36) The problem that a r i s e s i s whether such p r o v i s i o n s are to be read narrowly and confined to the peoples and t e r r i t o r i e s contemplated i n 1763 or are to be construed more broadly so as to allow f o r a l t e r e d circumstances as B r i t i s h c o l o n i z a t i o n of North America spread west. To answer t h i s question i n i t i a l l y , one must look to the document and to the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t there expressed, bearing i n mind that words of a wide and general meaning i n a remedial s t a t u t e should be given a broad c o n s t r u c t i o n so as to be n e f i t the gr e a t e s t numbers of peoples. Such i s mandatory where (35) River Wear Commrs. v. Adamson (1877), 2 App. Cas. 743, at 763 per Lord Blackburn. (36) See Appendix I . PAGE 21 the s t a t u t e to be construed r e l a t e s to Indians. As most r e c e n t l y expressed by the S.C.C.: I t i s l e g a l l o r e t h a t , to be v a l i d , exemptions to tax laws should be c l e a r l y expressed. I t seems to me, however, that t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g to Indians should be l i b e r a l l y construed and doub t f u l expressions resolved i n favour of the Indian. I f the s t a t u t e contains language which can reasonably be construed to confer tax exemption, that c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n my view, i s to be favoured over a more t e c h n i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n which might be a v a i l a b l e to deny exemption. In Jones v. Meeham, (1891), 175 U.S. 1, i t was held that Indian t r e a t i e s 'must ... be construed, not according to the t e c h n i c a l meaning of t h e i r words ... but i n the sense i n which they would n a t u r a l l y be understood by the Indians?(37) I t i s to be noted that the narrow t e c h n i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n was open to the Court on the words of the s t a t u t e to be there construed. I t i s suggested that the words of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 admit of a wide geographic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and evidence seeking to narrow such a c o n s t r u c t i o n i s only to be found i n the documentation leading up to i t s enactment. The Proclamation continues as a s i g n i f i c a n t document i n our Co n s t i t u t i o n . ( 3 8 ) I t s words, as s t a t e d above, are to be l i b e r a l l y construed with d o u b t f u l expressions resolved i n favour of the Indians.(39 ) (37) Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] S.C.C. 29, 144 D.L.R. (3d)193, [1983] C.T.C. 20, 83 D.T.C. 5041, 46 N.R. 41, [1983] 2 N.L. ( S . C . C ) , at p. 198 D.L.R. per Dickson J . (38) See R.S.C. 1970, App. I I and C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982, supra, footnote 9. (39) Supra, footnote 37. PAGE 2 2 For the foregoing reasons, the t e r r i t o r i a l extent of the Indian p r o v i s i o n s (Part IV) of the Proclamation (Part IV) should be given a broad c o n s t r u c t i o n so as to b e n e f i t those peoples whose r i g h t i t was designed to p r o t e c t . PAGE 23 3. Geographic Scope of the Royal Pro c l a m a t i o n of 1763 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n I t i s not intended here to analyze a l l the substantive p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation, but s e v e r a l p r o v i s i o n s are relevant when seeking to i n t e r p r e t Part IV, the s o - c a l l e d Indian p r o v i s i o n s . Part I of the Proclamation r e l a t e s to the t e r r i t o r i e s acquired by B r i t a i n from France under the then r e c e n t l y signed Treaty of P a r i s . I t s opening r e c i t a l s t a t e s : Whereas We have taken i n t o Our Royal Cons i d e r a t i o n the extensive and valuable A c q u i s i t i o n s i n America, secured to Our Crown by the l a t e D e f i n i t i v e Treaty of Peace, concluded at P a r i s the Tenth Day of February l a s t ; and being d e s i r o u s , that a l l Our l o v i n g Subjects, as w e l l of Our Kingdoms as of Our Colonies i n America ... . I t then provides f o r the establishment of the governments of these areas: To erect w i t h i n the Countries and Islands ceded and confirmed to Us by the s a i d Treaty, Four d i s t i n c t and separate Governments, s t i l e d and c a l l e d by the Names of Quebec, East F l o r i d a , West F l o r i d a , and Grenada, ... Por t i o n s of the newly ceded t e r r i t o r i e s are thus brought w i t h i n four new c o l o n i e s whose boundaries are then described. Other areas are to be annexed to e x i s t i n g c o l o n i e s and the remaining areas, by f a r the l a r g e s t p a r t , are l e f t i n an unorganized state.(40) (40) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 205 et seq. PAGE 24 Part I I of the Proclamation begins with the r e c i t a l And whereas i t w i l l c o n t r i b u t e to the speedy s e t t i n g Our s a i d new Governments... and proceeds to e s t a b l i s h the c o n s t i t u t i o n s of the " s a i d c o l o n i e s " , c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g s o l e l y to the new c o l o n i e s e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the r e c e n t l y acquired t e r r i t o r i e s (Treaty of P a r i s ) . Power i s given to the Governors of the s a i d c o l o n i e s to c a l l general assemblies i n "such Manner and Form as i s used and d i r e c t e d i n those Colonies and Provinces i n America, which are under Our Immediate Government." The governors were then given law-making powers with the r e s t r i c t i o n that such should be "as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England". Further that such powers, i n a d d i t i o n , were to be exer c i s e d "under such Regulations and R e s t r i c t i o n s as are used i n other Co l o n i e s " . These p r o v i s i o n s are i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to the need for conformity between the governor's powers i n the newly created c o l o n i e s with those of the governor's of the e s t a b l i s h e d c o l o n i e s . I t evidences an i n t e n t i o n on the part of the B r i t i s h Crown that a l l B r i t i s h dominions i n North America were to be administered i n a c o n s i s t e n t manner. Power was then given to the Governors of the " s a i d new Colonies" to s e t t l e lands upon the i n h a b i t a n t s thereof l i m i t i n g such grants to "such Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments, as are now, or h e r e a f t e r s h a l l be i n Our Power to dispose of. . . " PAGE 25 I t i s unclear as to what f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n the underlined words were r e f e r a b l e . They could apply e q u a l l y to lands coming w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the " s a i d " t e r r i t o r i e s described through future boundary a l t e r a t i o n s or to lands which, although already w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s of the new governments were not p r e s e n t l y i n the B r i t i s h power to grant as being unceded and unpurchased from the Indians. What i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note i s the expressed i n t e n t of f u t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n . The Proclamation goes on to s t a t e that such grants be upon "such Terms, and under such moderate Quit Rents, S e r v i c e s , and Acknowledgments as have been appointed and s e t t l e d i n Our other  Colonies ... This again evidences the framers i n t e n t i o n that c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was to be c o n s i s t e n t throughout B r i t i s h North America. And t h i s was to be the case not only as of 1763 but a l s o as to "such lands" as are "hereafter" w i t h i n B r i t i s h power to dispose o f . Even though these statements were c l e a r l y r e f e r a b l e to lands w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g or future t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s of the new c o l o n i e s , they show an i n t e n t i o n that fu t u r e lands were to be granted i n the same way. Part I I I of the proclamation d i f f e r s from the preceding parts i n subject matter and scope. I t begins And whereas We are desirous upon a l l Occasions to t e s t i f y Our Royal Sense and Approbation of the Conduct and Bravery of the O f f i c e r s and S o l d i e r s of Our Armies, and to reward the same, We do hereby command and impower Our Governors of Our Said Three New Colonies, and a l l other  Our Governors of Our Several Provinces on the Continent of North America.... PAGE 26 Part I I I c l e a r l y r e f e r s both to the Governors of the " s a i d " new co l o n i e s and to the Governors of other B r i t i s h provinces on the continent of North America. The words are c l e a r and unambiguous and cannot be construed so as to l i m i t the operation of Part I I I to the t e r r i t o r i e s ceded by France. The wording i s comprehensive and prima f a c i e would include a l l B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s i n North America i n c l u d i n g Rupert's Land. This part goes on to provide f o r fre e land grants to m i l i t a r y men who served i n the war i n America, s p e c i f i c a l l y to those "as have been or s h a l l be disbanded i n America, and are a c t u a l l y r e s i d i n g there...". C l e a r l y t h i s part covers those q u a l i f y i n g o f f i c e r s who at any time hereafter might be disbanded i n America. The same q u a n t i t i e s of land, upon the same co n d i t i o n s are then given to Navy O f f i c e r s of l i k e rank having served i n the l a t e war. Part I I I i s important to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Part IV i n that i t c l e a r l y a p p l i e s to a wider geographic area than the preceding p a r t s , suggesting that each Part must be read i n l i g h t of the r e c i t a l of that Part and not to the r e c i t a l at the opening of the Proclamation. The f o u r t h and f i n a l part of the Proclamation deals with a v a r i e t y of matters r e l a t i n g to Indians. ( i i ) I n d i a n P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation - P a r t IV The Indian p r o v i s i o n s came towards the end of the Proclamation (Part IV) and contain a s e r i e s of d i s t i n c t clauses with varying geographic reach. PAGE 27 The general scheme of the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation r e f l e c t both Imperial p o l i c y to regulate Western c o l o n i a l expansion and to recognize a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s over lands i n Indian possession which had not been ceded to or purchased by the Crown. To t h i s end i t creates an i n t e r i o r Indian reserve with u n c e r t a i n western boundaries i n t o which no settlement was to be allowed f o r an u n s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d . A rough boundary was drawn i n d i c a t i n g that the f r o n t i e r of expansion f o r the o l d c o l o n i e s along the A t l a n t i c seaboard was to be, temporarily at l e a s t , the Allegheny mountains. The s e v e r a l clauses r e l a t i n g to these r a i s e two d i s t i n c t problems of c o n s t r u c t i o n . The f i r s t l i e s i n j u s t what lands are included i n the created reserve and the second to what extent lands i n Indian possession i n North America e i t h e r w i t h i n c o l o n i a l boundaries or outside thereof are reserved. The Proclamation makes i t c l e a r that neither land i n the i n t e r i o r reserve nor land s t i l l i n Indian possession was to be acquired from the Indians except through the Crown and with Indian consent. To determine the character and extent of the r e g u l a t i o n of Indian t i t l e , the r e s t r i c t i o n s upon white encroachment on these lands and the procedures to be adopted for i t s purchase by the Crown, i t i s necessary to focus on the i n d i v i d u a l enacting p r o v i s i o n s of Part IV and t h e i r scope as t h e r e i n expressed. In so doing i t should be noted that no greater l i m i t a t i o n s on Indian t i t l e should be imposed than i s rendered necessary by the nature of the p r o v i s i o n , i t s subject matter and the words used.(41) PAGE 28 Part IV begins with the r e c i t a l : And whereas i t i s j u s t and reasonable, and e s s e n t i a l to Our I n t e r e s t and the S e c u r i t y of Our C o l o n i e s , that the s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who l i v e under Our P r o t e c t i o n , should not be molested or d i s t u r b e d i n the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded t o , or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them as t h e i r Hunting Grounds; This part then goes on to give a s e r i e s of clauses r e l a t i n g to Indians. The question to be i n i t i a l l y asked i s to what t e r r i t o r y and to what peoples d i d the framers intend the various p r o v i s i o n s of Part IV to apply. Arguably such a question cannot be answered i n a comprehensive fashion unless the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the B r i t i s h and the Indians of North America and the h i s t o r i c a l context i n which the Proclamation developed are c l e a r l y understood. C e r t a i n l y i n the Indian p r o v i s i o n s the Proclamation l a y s down very l i t t l e that i s new i n p r i n c i p l e or implementation. The main elements of Part IV can be found i n e a r l i e r precedents and i n long s e t t l e d Imperial Indian p o l i c y . The Proclamation merely entrenched the r e c o g n i t i o n of Indian t i t l e and the requirement of Indian consent to i t s abridgement, such being " j u s t and reasonable" and " e s s e n t i a l to the ( B r i t i s h ) i n t e r e s t and s e c u r i t y of ( B r i t i s h ) C o l o n i e s " . That even h o s t i l e t r i b e s were to be e n t i t l e d to the Crown's p r o t e c t i o n i s c l e a r from the enacting clauses of the Proclamation, the purposes of which, as sta t e d i n the preamble, (41) S u l l i v a n v. M i t c a l f e (1880), 5 C.P.D. 455 C.A. at p. 459. Such p r o v i s i o n s must be i n t e r p r e t e d i n favour of the Indian b e n e f i c i a r i e s (Nowejegick, supra, footnote 37). PAGE 29 i s that the Indians not be "molested or d i s t u r b e d i n the Possession of such Part s of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds. Preambles, or opening r e c i t a l s , e s p e c i a l l y i n the e a r l i e r A c t s , have been regarded as of great importance as guides to c o n s t r u c t i o n . They were used to set out the f a c t s or s t a t e of the law f o r which i t was proposed to l e g i s l a t e by the statute.(42) According to normal r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n where the words of the enacting s e c t i o n s are unclear the words of the preamble r e c i t a l prima f a c i e give the scope of the s e c t i o n s that follow.(43) The words of the preamble i n Part IV are wide and g e n e r a l l y recognize prima f a c i e that lands i n Indian possession throughout B r i t i s h North America, which have not been ceded to or purchased by the Crown, are reserved for Indian use. And i t i s to be noted here that there i s nothing i n the opening preamble nor i n the enacting p r o v i s i o n s of Part IV that suggest such " r e s e r v a t i o n " i s r e f e r a b l e s o l e l y to lands reserved by reason of antecedent t r a n s a c t i o n such as by t r e a t y or other course of d e a l i n g . The words of the r e c i t a l are however not e n t i r e l y f r e e of u n c e r t a i n t y . The major problem l i e s i n what meaning i s to be a s c r i b e d to the phrasing of the opening r e c i t a l . The people to (42) S a l k e l d v. Johnson (1848), 2 Ex. 256, at 283 per P o l l o c k C.B. (43) Crowder v. Stewart (1880), 16 Ch. D. 368, 50 L.J. Ch. 136; 29 W.R. 331. PAGE 30 whom part IV i s a p p l i c a b l e are stated to be "the s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who l i v e under our P r o t e c t i o n " . The geographic extent i s given i n the words: "Such Parts of Our Dominions or T e r r i t o r i e s . . . " The o r d i n a r y and l i t e r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of such expressions would have Part IV, apply to a l l Indians i n possession of lands anywhere i n B r i t i s h North America. Any r e s t r i c t i o n s or l i m i t a t i o n s must then be found i n the enacting p r o v i s i o n s or i n the circumstances j u d i c i a l l y cognisable under which the various p r o v i s i o n s were i n s e r t e d . In looking to the p r o v i s i o n s of Part IV no greater r e s t r i c t i o n should be imposed than i s rendered necessary by the nature and subject matter of the pr o v i s i o n . ( 4 4 ) The presumption i s that i n the absence of express words, the extent of a s t a t u t e and the l i m i t s of the a p p l i c a t i o n are prima  f a c i e the same. ( i i i ) The Indian B e n e f i c i a r i e s of p a r t IV We turn f i r s t to the persons to whom Part IV a p p l i e s . Such i s to be gathered from the language and purview of Part IV, which r e c i t e s that the p r o v i s i o n s are d i r e c t e d at "the s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who l i v e under our P r o t e c t i o n " . Where, an Act uses, as here words r e f e r r i n g to general c a t e g o r i e s or sets of t h i n g s , rather than to p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s , the categories designated w i l l normally encompass things not s p e c i f i c a l l y contemplated by the maker who (44) S u l l i v a n v. M i t c a l f e (1880), 5 C.P.D. 455, C.A. at p. 459; Warburton v. Loveland (1828), 1 Hud. & B. 623, (Ex. Ch.), at 648 5 E.R. 499. PAGE 31 cannot imagine a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s or a n t i c i p a t e every e v e n t u a l i t y — no l e g i s l a t u r e has a mind except that which i s expressed. Here the enacting p r o v i s i o n s which f o l l o w the r e c i t a l to Part IV shed no l i g h t on the category of Indians to whom i t a p p l i e s , r e f e r r i n g merely to the " s a i d " Indians. We need t h e r e f o r e to ask what i s meant by the term "Indians" and by the phrase "with whom we are connected and who l i v e under Our Protection".(45) As to the term Indians, the Supreme Court of Canada i n Reference re Term "Indians",(46) held that "Indians" as used i n s. 91(24) of the B r i t i s h North America Act 1867, encompassed Eskimos. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the p r i n c i p a l opinion considered and re j e c t e d the contention that the phrase, "the s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, ..." as used i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763, d i d not cover Eskimos.(47) As to the phrase r e s t r i c t i n g the category of Indians to those "with whom we are connected and who l i v e under Our P r o t e c t i o n " , an i n i t i a l i n t e r p r e t i v e problem to be addressed i s whether, i f the l i n k e d phrases are not synonymous, e i t h e r or both c r i t e r i a are req u i r e d , i . e . d i d the framers of Part IV intend to reach both those Indians with whom the B r i t i s h Crown was f a c t u a l l y connected and those Indians i n h a b i t i n g t e r r i t o r y over which the B r i t i s h Crown asserted sovereignty and who thus f e l l (45) See g e n e r a l l y S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 19, ch. 14, p. 231 et  seq. (46) [1939] S.C.R. 104, sub nom "Re Eskimos" (47) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 232 and footnote 7 at that page. PAGE 32 w i t h i n B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n ; or d i d the framers intend the Proclamation's p r o v i s i o n s to reach only those Indians s a t i s f y i n g both c r i t e r i a ? Grammatically e i t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o r r e c t . The manner of expression, nevertheless, suggests an i n t e n t i o n to prote c t a l l Indians who i n f a c t possess parts of B r i t i s h dominions i n North America i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r f a c t u a l t i e s with B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . ( 4 8 ) S l a t t e r y addresses the p e c u l i a r consequences of extending Part IV to only those Indians meeting both c r i t e r i a . ( 4 9 ) S l a t t e r y a s s e r t s moreover that the travaux p r e p a r a t o i r e s to the Royal Proclamation do not support the view that the problems r e l a t i n g to North American Indians were perceived by the Crown as confined to one or more p a r t i c u l a r area or group of indigenous peoples. Rather they suggest that the "mischief" was considered to be g e n e r a l i z e d , and common to a l l Indians l i v i n g under B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . B a s i c a l l y , the c o n f i d e n t i a l m i n i s t e r i a l correspondence i n d i c a t e s that the Indian p r o v i s i o n s were designed to c o n c i l i a t e and p r o t e c t the Indians and t h e i r property.(50) S l a t t e r y notes that as e a r l y as 1765 and 1766 the term "connection" was dropped and the Proclamations Indian p r o v i s i o n s i n t e r p r e t e d as relevant to a l l Indians l i v i n g under His Majesty's protection.(51) S l a t t e r y concludes that the category of Indians (48) I b i d . , p. 234. (49) I b i d . , p. 234-5. (50) I b i d . , p. 240. (51) I b i d . , p. 243. PAGE 33 r e c i t e d i n the preamble encompasses a l l indigenous groups occupying t e r r i t o r i e s claimed by the B r i t i s h Crown as of October 1763.(52) Such i s c o n s i s t e n t with the extent of the 'mischief' p e r c e i v e d by the Crown i n North America and i s supported by contemporaneous e x p o s i t i o n . ( i v ) Geographic Reach of Part IV of the Procla m a t i o n The r e c i t a l to Part IV g i v e s the geographic reach i n wide general terms; "Such P a r t s of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded t o, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds;..." Prima f a c i e such words recognize Indian t i t l e to land i n Indian p o s s e s s i o n throughout B r i t i s h North America. The wide, general words of the r e c i t a l are, however, l i m i t e d to v a r y i n g extent i n the enacting c l a u s e s , although not always i n words e n t i r e l y f r e e of u n c e r t a i n t y . The c o n f u s i o n over the geographic reach of the v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s i s r e a d i l y apparent i n the divergence of j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n on the matters. N o r r i s J.A. of the B r i t i s h Columbia Court of Appeal i n R^ v. White and Bob hel d that the terms of the Proclamation extended to Vancouver Island.(53) His judgment was accepted without reasons i n the Supreme Court of Canada. H a l l J . i n Calder v. Attorney-General f o r B r i t i s h Columbia(54) was w i l l i n g to extend (52) I b i d . , p. 243. (53) (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 at 638; 52 W.R.R. 493. (54) (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, at 203. PAGE 34 i t s p r o t e c t i o n to the Naas V a l l e y . Judson J . i n the same case was, however, u n w i l l i n g to extend i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to B.C. In v. Discon and Baker,(55) discussed by H a l l J . i n Calder,(56) Schulz Co. Ct. J . r e j e c t e d the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation to B r i t i s h Columbia. Johnson J.A. i n Rj_ v. Sikyea(57) and H a l l J . i n R^ v. Sigeareak,(58) r e j e c t e d the contention accepted by the lower courts that the Proclamation a p p l i e d to the lands of the Hudson's Bay Company alhough he seems l a t e r to have changed h i s mind, see Narvey).(59) H a l l ' s judgment should probably be read as r e f e r r i n g only to the extent of the Indian T e r r i t o r y , from which Rupert's Land was c l e a r l y excluded rather than as r e f e r r i n g to the p r o v i s i o n s as a whole. The Proclamation's land purchases were not at i s s u e . In R^ v. Syliboy(60) the court r e j e c t e d the argument that the Proclamation e s t a b l i s h e d a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s i n Nova S c o t i a , though P a t t e r s o n , A c t i n g Co. Ct. J . recognized that i t might so apply i n (55) (1968), 63 W.W.R. 488, at 495; 67 D.L.R. (2d) 619. (56) I b i d . , at pp. 206-208. (57) (1964), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 150, at 152; [1964] 2 C.C.C. 325; 46 W.W.R. 65. (58) [1966] S.C.R. 645, 49 CR. 271; 56 W.W.R. 478, at 483. (59) Narvey, Kenneth M. 'The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763: The Common Law, and Native Rights to Land w i t h i n the T e r r i t o r y Granted to the Hudson's Bay Company' 38 Sask. Law  Review 1973-4, 123, at p. 230. (60) 50 C.C.C 389, at 393; [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307. (61) (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 at 478 (N.S.S.C. App.) however i t was held to be a p p l i c a b l e to Nova S c o t i a . And see R_^  v. PAGE 35 Quebec. (61) In R^ v. Isaac and i n War man v. F r a n c i s (62) the court held that the terms of the Proclamation d i d apply to New Brunswick. There has yet to be an a u t h o r i t a t i v e j u d i c i a l statement by the Supreme Court of Canada on the geographic scope of the Proclamation's Indian p r o v i s i o n s . I t seems c l e a r that the various clauses of Part IV do not have the same geographic i n t e n t i o n . The i n q u i r y here as to geographic a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l be l i m i t e d to the clause which gives the widest r e c o g n i t i o n to Indian t i t l e (clause 2). This clause expresses the general p r o h i b i t i o n against g r a n t i n g lands i n Indian possession which have not been made the subject of c e s s i o n or purchase. The clause i s d i r e c t e d at a l l c o l o n i a l governors or commanders-in-chief i n B r i t i s h North America. The clause s t a t e s ; We do t h e r e f o r e , with the Advice of Our P r i v y C o u n c i l , declare i t to be Our Royal W i l l and Pleasure, that ( i ) no Governor or Commander i n Chief i n any of Our Colonies of Quebec, East F l o r i d a , or West F l o r i d a , do presume, upon any Pretence whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents f o r Lands beyond the Bounds of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Governments, as described i n t h e i r Commissions; as a l s o , ( i i ) that no Governor or Commander i n Chief i n any of Our other Colonies or P l a n t a t i o n s i n America, do presume, for the present, and u n t i l Our f u r t h e r Pleasure be known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or ( i i i ) pass Patents f o r any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which f a l l i n t o the A t l a n t i c k Ocean from the West and North-West, or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded t o , or purchased by Us as a f o r e s a i d , are reserved to the s a i d Indians, or any of them.(63) Smith (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 522 at 528, 548-50 (F.C.A.). (62) (1958), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 627 (N.B.S.C.) at 634. (63) See Appendix I. PAGE 36 Before proceeding with the i n q u i r y as to geographic reach, a point of minor relevance i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to be put on the phrase " f o r the present and u n t i l our f u r t h e r pleasure be known". It seems to cast a "temporary" l i g h t on the e f f e c t of clause 2. Such i s r e a d i l y e x p l a i n a b l e . The Imperial government recognized that the move to westward expansion could not be stopped f o r a l l times — that at some future time land w i t h i n the r e s t r i c t e d areas might be needed f o r settlement. However i t seems c l e a r , given the mischief aimed a t , where such land was needed i t would have to be premised upon cession and purchase with Indian consent. The phrase i t s e l f i s co n s i s t e n t with such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and should be so i n t e r p r e t e d . To suggest that i t im p l i e d , r a t h e r , a temporary r e c o g n i t i o n of Indian t i t l e would be to construe the document to the detriment of the Indians a course no longer open to the courts unless such i s c l e a r l y expressed to be the int e n t i o n . ( 6 4 ) Moreover, to i n t e r p r e t t h i s ambiguous expression i n favour of the Indians i s to give i t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n most c o n s i s t e n t with the i n t e n t expressed i n the r e c i t a l , i t being j u s t and reasonable and c o n s i s t e n t with the Imperial p o l i c y of recognizing land i n Indian possession.(65) This clause i s r i f e with t e x t u a l ambiguity. C l e a r l y the governors of Quebec, East F l o r i d a and West F l o r i d a are p r o h i b i t e d from granting lands beyond the boundaries of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e (64) Nowejigick, supra, footnote 37. (65) c f . St. Catherine's M i l l i n g and Lumber Co. v. (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.); (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can. S . C ) ; (1886), 13 O.A.R. 148 (Ont. C A . ) ; (1885), 10 O.R. 196 (Ont. Ch. D i v . ) . PAGE 37 commissions. This s t i p u l a t i o n i s followed by a semicolon. The clause then proceeds to p r o h i b i t " f o r the present..." "the Governor or Commander-in-Chief i n any of Our other Colonies or P l a n t a t i o n s i n America" from granting lands west of a described watershed (Allegheny Mountains) or "Upon any Lands Whatever,  which not having been ceded to or purchased by Us as a f o r e s a i d  are reserved to the Said Indians,, or any of them." The underlined p o r t i o n of the clause r e f e r s to lands p r e v i o u s l y mentioned ("as a f o r e s a i d " ) and can only r e f e r to the words i n the r e c i t a l - that i s - "such Parts of our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s as, not having been ceded t o , or purchased by Us, are reserved to them....". Thus "fo r the present" the governors of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s throughout North America are p r o h i b i t e d from granting lands i n Indian possession. However a problem l i e s i n determining whether t h i s general p r o h i b i t i o n , given i n the underlined phrase of clause 2, ( i i i ) i s r e f e r a b l e s o l e l y to the immediately preceding phrase ( i i ) or i s a l s o r e f e r a b l e to phase ( i ) (supra, p. 40) so as to apply r e s t r i c t i o n s west of the Appalachian d i v i d e to both the New and Old Colonies. Grammatically both i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are open but the l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has much to commend i t — i t i s c o n s i s t e n t with the mischief as explained i n the preamble to p r o t e c t Indian t i t l e i n a l l of B r i t i s h North America and i t i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , open on the words, that most b e n e f i t the Indian b e n e f i c i a r i e s of Part IV. I t i s a l s o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which makes the most sense. The Royal Proclamation c l e a r l y l a i d down the boundaries PAGE 38 of the new provinces - why then e n j o i n the governors merely from granting land outside such boundaries, an act u l t r a v i r e s the governor's powers on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s ? S l a t t e r y presents evidence showing that contemporary o f f i c i a l s i n Quebec believed that clause 2 prevented them from g r a n t i n g lands, w i t h i n t h e i r boundaries, s t i l l i n Indian possession.(66) An argument can be made that i t i s only the Governors of the ol d c o l o n i e s and p l a n t a t i o n s that are enjoined from g r a n t i n g lands w i t h i n t h e i r boundaries i n Indian possession or indeed upon any lands "whatever" i n Indian possession where such have not been ceded to or purchased by the Crown. On t h i s narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the clause then p r o t e c t s lands i n Indian possession, outside of the boundaries of the newly e s t a b l i s h e d c o l o n i e s , which i s subject to an Indian t i t l e . Of major importance then i s the meaning to be given to the expression i n clause 2 ( i i ) "Our Colonies or P l a n t a t i o n s i n America" since i n such areas Indian t i t l e i s recognized to the extent of p r o h i b i t i n g land grants. Blackstone t r e a t s the words " p l a n t a t i o n s " and " c o l o n i e s " as synonymous.(67) Holt defines "colony" or " p l a n t a t i o n " to mean "any land, t e r r i t o r y , i s l a n d or possession beyond the sea, belonging t o , or under the dominion of Great B r i t a i n " . ( 6 8 ) On such a d e f i n i t i o n Rupert's Land, Nova S c o t i a , Newfoundland and the Coast of Labrador would a l l be (66) See S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 19, p. 246. (67) I b i d . , p. 245 c i t i n g Blackstone, Commentaries, 1st ed., I , 104, 1765. (68) I b i d . , c i t i n g H o l t , Navigation Laws, (1820), I , at p. 80. PAGE 39 included, as w e l l of course as the American c o l o n i e s . Again the c o n s t r u c t i o n adopted should be that which o f f e r s the g reatest p r o t e c t i o n to Indian held lands (Nowejigick). A c c o r d i n g l y , the better i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that any unceded and unpurchased lands whatever are immune from being granted away by the governing a u t h o r i t y of B r i t i s h possessions (other than Quebec, East F l o r i d a and West F l o r i d a where by v i r t u e of ( i ) above the r e s t r i c t i o n i s l i m i t e d to land grants beyond t h e i r boundaries i f a narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of clause 2 i s adopted). I do not propose to f u l l y explore B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l Claims i n North America i n 1763 but a b r i e f review of such shows that the geographic extent of B r i t i s h dominions was u n c e r t a i n as of 1763. Such supports a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Proclamation's a p p l i c a t i o n as of 1763 to meet the expressed aim of the Royal Proclamation, that being to recognize and p r o t e c t 'Indian t i t l e ' throughout North America. Further, such unc e r t a i n t y as to intended geographic scope i s o f f e r e d as support for a prospective a p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation, whereby the i n q u i r y as to a c t u a l geographic scope i n 1763 becomes an exercise i n f u t i l i t y . Even the boundaries of New France or Canada, at i t s cession to Great B r i t a i n i n 1763, were undefined on the north and west, and the boundaries given by the Quebec  Act, 1774 were not n e c e s s a r i l y those of Canada i n 1763. In 1763 B r i t a i n could point to wide claims i n North America based on the wide wording of the e a r l y c h a r t e r s and p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the V i r g i n i a Charter of 1609 which describes the t e r r i t o r i e s to be co l o n i z e d as e i t h e r p e r t a i n i n g to the Crown or PAGE 40 not a c t u a l l y possessed by any C h r i s t i a n p r i n c e or people.(69) This charter and subsequent c h a r t e r s were d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r predecessors i n designating s p e c i f i c boundaries f o r the t e r r i t o r i e s to which they r e f e r r e d , and a s s u r i n g e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s for the E n g l i s h Crown w i t h i n such boundaries.(70) They thus represent a Royal a s s e r t i o n v i s - a - v i s other C h r i s t i a n s t a t e s , of e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s of c o l o n i z a t i o n , trade and t e r r i t o r i a l expansion w i t h i n a designated area, r i g h t s which i n turn are conferred upon the company.(71) The V i r g i n i a Charter of 1609 would seem to confer r i g h t s to a l l lands s i t u a t e d upon a sector of the East Coast s t r e t c h i n g 200 miles north and south of Cape Comfort "up i n t o the Land throughout from Sea to Sea, West and North West".(72) On one common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , while the southern boundary ran due west to the P a c i f i c , the northern boundary extended i n a north-westerly d i r e c t i o n taking up a l a r g e part of Western Canada.(73) The New England Charter of 1620 i s expressed to cover t e r r i t o r y between the 40th and 48th p a r a l l e l s "and i n length by a l l the Breadth a f o r e s a i d throughout the Mainland, from Sea to Sea",(74) thus suggesting that B r i t a i n viewed i t s American (69) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 102 et seq. (70) I b i d . , p. 103. (71) I b i d . (72) I b i d . , c i t i n g Thorpe, Charters, V I I , 3795. (73) I b i d . PAGE 41 dominions as s t r e t c h i n g i n d e f i n i t e l y westward to the P a c i f i c Ocean.(75) The p r i n c i p a l E n g l i s h Charter of the 17th Century was that granted to the Hudson Bay Company i n 1670, f o r Rupert's Land. This Charter gives i t s geographic scope i n vague terms: The s o l e Trade and Commerce of a l l those Seas St r e i g h t e s Bayes R i v e r s Lakes Creekes and Soundes i n whatsoever L a t i t u d e they s h a l l bee that l y e w i t h i n the entrance of the S t r e i g h t e s commonly c a l l e d Hudsons S t r e i g h t e s together with a l l the Landes and T e r r i t o r y e s upon the  Countryes Coastes and confynes of the Seas  Bayes Lakes Rivers Creekes and Soundes  a f o r e s a i d that are not already a c t u a l l y  possessed by or granted to any of our Subjectes or possessed by the'Subjectes of any other C h r i s t i a n Prince or State....(76) (My emphasis). The text envisages not merely lands bordering d i r e c t l y upon the Sea, but a l l t e r r i t o r i e s whose waters d r a i n i n t o the seas l y i n g w i t h i n the Hudson S t r a i t except those lands already possessed or granted to B r i t i s h s ubjects; and 2) those possessed by the subject of other C h r i s t i a n Sovereigns.(77) The only other C h r i s t i a n s t a t e e n t e r t a i n i n g s e r i o u s claims w i t h i n the designated region was France and i n 1763 a l l t e r r i t o r i e s claimed by France i n t h i s area had been ceded to B r i t a i n . In reference to these "lands and t e r r i t o r i e s " (mentioned i n the Charter, above) Mr. J u s t i c e Monk, of Lower Canada s a i d i n Connolly v. Woolrich,(78) (74) I b i d . , c i t i n g Thorpe Charters, I I I , 1829. (75) I b i d . (76) The'Royal Charter i s given i n R i c h , H.B.C. Minutes 1671-74, 131-53, c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y at p. 149. (77) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 185. PAGE 4 2 "The western boundaries have never been c l e a r l y s e t t l e d or defined by j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n or otherwise". In the B r i t i s h Columbia case of Sheppard v. Sheppard(79) M a r t i n J . , i n holding that the l i m i t s of Rupert's land d i d not extend to what became B r i t i s h Columbia nevertheless included w i t h i n such boundaries "the present Provinces of Manitoba, A l b e r t a and Saskatchewan (and much more) granted to them by .their Charter of 2nd May, 1670." Arguably such lands were not w i t h i n B r i t i s h Sovereignty as of 1763. The Hudson's Bay t e r r i t o r y c l e a r l y can be brought w i t h i n clause 2 ( i i ) of the Royal Proclamation as a matter of l e g a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . The t e r r i t o r y granted to the Hudson's Bay Company i s included i n the expression "any of Our other Colonies or P l a n t a t i o n s i n America" by v i r t u e of the words i n the Company's Charter of 1670 "that the s a i d lands be henceforth reckoned and reputed as one of Our P l a n t a t i o n s or Colonies i n America c a l l e d 'Rupert's Land'".(80) Indian held lands w i t h i n the boundaries of company land could not be granted away u n t i l some f u r t h e r Imperial e d i c t i n t h i s regard (clause 2 ( i i ) ) . What areas, then d i d the Hudson's Bay Company t e x t of 1670 encompass? This i s a d i f f i c u l t question to answer with any degree of c e r t a i n t y . S l a t t e r y has reviewed various options and concludes that "considering the c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n between the (78) Connolly v. Wool r i c h (1867), 11 L.C. J u r . 197 (Que. S . C ) . (79) (1908), 13 B.C.R. 486 at 496. (80) Narvey supra, footnote 59, p. 129, c i t i n g company c h a r t e r , i n Beckles Wilson - The Great Company, v o l . 2 (London, 1900), pp. 318-336 at p. 326. PAGE 43 Charter of 1670 and the e a r l i e r attempts at d i s c o v e r i n g a Northwest Passage, there would seem to be some b a s i s , prima f a c i e for adopting an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that extends i t s geographic reach to the A r c t i c drainage b a s i n , thus i n c l u d i n g lands f u r t h e r west."(81) In 1719 B r i t a i n o f f i c i a l l y presented to France a c l a i m to a l l t e r r i t o r i e s north of the 49th p a r a l l e l west of Lake M i s t a s s i n i . At t h i s time B r i t a i n thus a s s e r t e d e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to the whole of Western Canada north of the 49th p a r a l l e l . B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were d i r e c t e d to c l a i m a l l lands north of a l i n e drawn from the coast of Labrador at 58 1/2 degrees north l a t i t u d e running i n a south westerly d i r e c t i o n so as to b i s e c t Lake M i t a s s i n i , and then i n d e f i n i t e l y west along the 49 degree p a r a l l e l . ( 8 2 ) At t h i s time then the Company ass e r t e d r i g h t s to the whole of western Canada north of 49 degrees l a t i t u d e . One scholar has noted that i n 1763 there were two common ve r s i o n s of the southern l i m i t of Rupert's Land west of Lake Superior.(83) One he says "had the boundary proceed i n d e f i n i t e l y west along the  49 degree north l a t i t u d e " and p o i n t s to the contemporary maps of Bowan, Kitchen and others as evidencing t h i s . On another contemporary map ( M i t c h e l l ) the southern l i m i t i s drawn f o l l o w i n g the height of the land — from the western end of Superior the undulating l i n e on M i t c h e l l ' s map drops from almost 51 degrees (81) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 186. (82) I b i d . (83) Greenwood, Murray, Summary of an Opinion, Oct. 31st, 1986, unpublished manuscript on the Geographic Scope of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, at p. 41. PAGE 44 north to about 49 degrees north when i t leaves the map j u s t north of the Lake of the Woods. On e i t h e r account the western boundary was u n s p e c i f i e d . There were no competing claims i n 1763 from other European nations that suggest one should be i m p l i e d . Arguably then clause 2 of the Proclamation's Indian p r o v i s i o n s operates to p r o t e c t lands i n Indian possession above 49 degrees north l a t i t u d e i n d e f i n i t e l y west.(84) Various arguments have been r a i s e d to suggest that the Hudson's Bay t e r r i t o r y d i d not f a l l w i t h i n the scope of clause 2 ( i i ) or ( i i i ) (see p. 40 above). F i r s t l y the clause p r o h i b i t s land grants and as one scholar has pointed out, settlement had been p r o h i b i t e d by the Hudson's Bay sin c e 1680.(85) However there was nothing to prevent the Hudson's Bay Company from a l t e r i n g t h i s p r o v i s i o n . By t h e i r Charter of 1670 the Hudson's Bay Company were allowed "to erect and b u i l d such c a s t l e s , f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , f o r t s , g a r r i s o n s , c o l o n i e s or p l a n t a t i o n s , towns or v i l l a g e s " as they should think f i t w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y granted to them.(86) In 1763, the t e r r i t o r y granted to the (84) For j u d i c i a l statements c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s view, see v. White & Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 B.C.C.A. at 639 per No r r i s J.A.; Calder v. A.G.B.C. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), per H a l l J . at 204 Re Pa u l e t t e and R e g i s t r a r of  T i t l e s (No. 2)P 1973 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8 (N.W.T.S.C.) at 24-5. c f . Rex v. Wesley, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774 at 786; Regina v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150; Sigeareak El-53 v. The  Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 645 at 650 per H a l l . (85) Supra, footnote 83 at p. 22. (86) Narvey supra, footnote 59 p. 138 c i t i n g Company Charter i n Beckles Wilson - The Great Company, v o l . 2 (London, 1900), p. 334. PAGE 4 H u d s o n ' s Bay Company was u n i q u e among t h e v a r i o u s j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n B r i t i s h N o r t h A m e r i c a i n t h a t i t s o n l y n o n - n a t i v e i n h a b i t a n t s were Company s e r v a n t s whose c o n t r a c t s o f s e r v i c e d e b a r r e d them f r o m p r i v a t e t r a d e . T h e c o m p a n y ' s r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n r e s t e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g w o r d s i n t h e i r C h a r t e r f r o m C h a r l e s I I : A n d f u r t h e r , o f o u r more e s p e c i a l g r a c e , we h a v e c o n d e s c e n d e d a n d g r a n t e d , a n d by t h e s e p r e s e n t s , f o r m s , o u r h e i r s a n d s u c c e s s o r s , do g r a n t u n t o t h e s a i d g o v e r n o r a n d c o m p a n y , a n d t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s , t h a t we o u r h e i r s a n d s u c c e s s o r s w i l l n o t g r a n t l i b e r t y , l i c e n c e o r power t o any p e r s o n , o r p e r s o n s w h a t s o e v e r , c o n t r a r y t o t h e t e n o r o f t h e s e o u r l e t t e r s p a t e n t , t o t r a d e , t r a f f i c o r o r i n h a b i t ! , u n t o o r u p o n any o f t h e t e r r i t o r i e s , l i m i t s , o r p l a c e s a f o r e s p e c i f i e d , c o n t r a r y t o t h e t r u e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e p r e s e n t , w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t  o f t h e s a i d G o v e r n o r a n d Company o r t h e most  p a r t o f t h e m . . . I t w o u l d t h u s seem t o be c o m p l e t e l y a t t h e c o m p a n y ' s d i s c r e t i o n w h e t h e r s e t t l e m e n t was t o be a l l o w e d o r p r o h i b i t e d . C l a u s e 2 ( i i ) a n d ( i i i ) o f P a r t I V o f t h e P r o c l a m a t i o n a r e t h u s n e c e s s a r y a n d a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e H u d s o n ' s B a y C o . t e r r i t o r y t o p r o h i b i t t h e Company f r o m g i v i n g l a n d g r a n t s on l a n d s i n  I n d i a n p o s s e s s i o n w h i c h were u n c e d e d a n d u n p u r c h a s e d by t h e C r o w n . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t h e n l e s s o f a n a n o m a l y t h a t c l a u s e 2 ( i ) w h i c h w o u l d p r i m a f a c i e h a v e t h e s o l e p u r p o s e o f p r e v e n t i n g t h e new c o l o n i e s , w i t h d e f i n e d b o u n d a r i e s , f r o m i s s u i n g e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l l a n d g r a n t s , a power d e n i e d them a t l a w , was i n c l u d e d . I n t h e " P l a n f o r t h e f u t u r e management o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s " PAGE 46 issued by the Lords of Trade i n 1764,(87) none of the t r i b e s i n h a b i t i n g the Hudson's Bay t e r r i t o r y were l i s t e d i n the Appendices. This omission i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g when i t i s r e a l i z e d that two of the t r i b e s i n v o l v e d — the Assinboines and the Cree — were w e l l known and t h e i r hunting grounds were i n v a r i a b l y i n d i c a t e d on contemporary maps ( i n c l u d i n g Bowens) as being i n Rupert's Land.(88) Professor Greenwood has argued that since the appendix l i s t e d a l l the Indian t r i b e s save those i n Rupert's Land, thought to be w i t h i n B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s i n North America, t h e i r omission may be taken as an e x c l u s i o n of the Hudson's Bay T e r r i t o r y . In answer A r t i c l e 2 of the Plan provided f o r the d i v i s i o n of "the B r i t i s h Dominion i n North America" i n t o two d i s t r i c t s "to comprehend and i n c l u d e " the s e v e r a l t r i b e s of Indians mentioned i n the Appendix. I t was thus not seen to be exhaustive of the t r i b e s of Indians then i n B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s — i t was not on i t s words l i m i t e d to the mentioned t r i b e s . And not only was the 1764 l i s t i t s e l f not exhaustive, i t already included t r i b e s which had l i t t l e , i f any, contact with the B r i t i s h at the time of the Proclamation a year e a r l i e r . ( 8 9 ) (87) See Narvey supra, footnote 59, p. 139. footnote 51. (88) Supra, footnote 83, at p. 25. (89) Morrison, Jim, Research Report, The Prospective A p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, unpublished manuscript, p. 8. PAGE 47 For the foregoing reason i t seems that the b e t t e r view i s that the Hudson's Bay t e r r i t o r y was comprehended by the general terms "col o n i e s and p l a n t a t i o n s " even i f excluded from the d e s c r i p t i o n of 'Indian Country'. Again the Indians of the Hudson's Bay t e r r i t o r i e s should not, i f at a l l p o s s i b l e the words of the proclamation, be denied i t s b e n e f i t s s o l e l y on grounds of a narrow c o n s t r u c t i o n . Narvey holds that as a matter of i n t e n t i o n the Proclamation i n the underlined phrase of clause 2 above recognized, confirmed and declared Indian t i t l e over a l l unceded and unpurchased land. "Whatever". That i s : . .. a l l lands i n the possession of the Indians as t h e i r hunting grounds were intended to be ipso f a c t o reserved to them .... u n t i l ceded to or purchased by competent a u t h o r i t y . PAGE 48 4. Prospect i v e A p p l i c a t i o n of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n The argument i s here made that even i f the Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 d i d not apply on t h e i r terms to Western Canada, such areas were nevertheless brought w i t h i n t h e i r scope upon the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty over t h i s area. As a law of m a n i f e s t l y u n i v e r s a l p o l i c y r e f e r a b l e to a major Crown Prerogative(90) i t was "a law which followed the f l a g as England assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over newly discovered or acquired lands or t e r r i t o r i e s " , ( 9 1 ) applying p r o p r i o vigore to bind such t e r r i t o r i e s regardless of t h e i r date of a c q u i s i t i o n , a r u l e contained i n part i n the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. Such a conclusion i s not f o r e c l o s e d by the wording of the tex t and i s c l e a r l y c o n s i s t e n t with i t s s p i r i t as determined from an examination of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s which l e d to the passage of the s t a t u t e and the e v i l i t was designed to remedy.(92) From t h i s point of view the s p e c i f i c problems of l e g a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as to i t s geographic scope as of 1763, assume a secondary p l a c e . (90) See d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a p. 144 et seq. (91) Supra, footnote 8, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at p. 203 per Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l . (92) See g e n e r a l l y S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 19, c h 1 s . 11, 14. PAGE 49 I t w i l l elsewhere be argued that c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were powerless to i n t e r f e r e with any of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation both because of the p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d such major Prerogative instruments by the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act,  1865,(93) and upon the f u r t h e r ground that i n t e r f e r e n c e with a major Pre r o g a t i v e would be repugnant "not merely to the law of England but to the a u t h o r i t y of the Crown as an e s s e n t i a l part of the c o u n t r i e s c o n s t i t u t i o n . " ( 9 4 ) L e g i s l a t i o n under the pr e r o g a t i v e powers of the Crown i s , l i k e s t a t u t e s , o r i g i n a l i n character(95) and i s to be construed i n l i k e manner. The Proclamation i s on i t s face ambiguous as to i t s geographic reach and temporal a p p l i c a t i o n , many of i t s p r o v i s i o n s being framed i n general terms. Although i t d i d not expressly address i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to f u t u r e cases such does not preclude i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t h e r e t o . The Proclamation must be construed i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t with i t s s p i r i t and the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t as to cases not e x p l i c i t l y provided f o r , discovered, or presumed i n l i g h t of i t s purpose or object according to the well-known r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . ( i i ) C o n s t r u c t i o n of the T e r r i t o r i a l E f f e c t of the Royal  Proclamation's Indian P r o v i s i o n s i n L i g h t of T h e i r L e g i s l a t i v e  Purpose (93) See d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a p. 211 et seq. (94) Roberts-Wray, S i r Kenneth, Commonwealth and C o l o n i a l Law London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, at p. 381. (95) C r a i e s , Statute Law, 7th ed. e d i t e d by S.G.G. Edgar, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, at p. 52 c i t i n g Hawkins, preface to s t a t u t e s (1735). PAGE 50 When seeking to construe l e g i s l a t i o n , a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n to be made i s that between i n t e n t i o n as meaning and i n t e n t i o n as goa l . The l a t t e r may n e c e s s a r i l y d e f i n e the meaning of the words used, e s p e c i a l l y where general expressions, without reference to p a r t i c u l a r cases, are used. The c o n s t r u c t i o n placed upon such general words should then be that best designed to reach a l l cases w i t h i n the mischief to be remedied. Recognition of the importance of l e g i s l a t i v e purpose was f i r s t expressed i n Heydons case, an Exchequer Court d e c i s i o n of 1584, where i t was s t a t e d i n Lord Coke's report t h a t : And i t was resolved by them [the Barons of the Exchequer], that f o r the sure and true i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u t e s i n general (be they penal or b e n e f i c i a l , r e s t r i c t i v e or enl a r g i n g of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect f o r which the common law d i d not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the o f f i c e of a l l the Judges i s always to make such c o n s t r u c t i o n as s h a l l suppress the m i s c h i e f , and advance the remedy, and to suppress s u b t l e inventions and evasions f o r continuance of the m i s c h i e f , and pro p r i v a t o commodo, and to add force and l i f e to the cure and remedy, according to the true i n t e n t of the makers of the Act, pro bono  publico.(96) The courts have since made f o r c e f u l d e c l a r a t i o n s advocating the primacy of l e g i s l a t i v e purpose as an i n t e r p r e t i v e t o o l . This was c l e a r l y expressed i n Willi a m s v. Box(97) by Idington J : (96) (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 E.R. 637 at 638. (97) (1910), 44 S.C.R. 1, 10 and see H i r s c h v. P r o t e s t a n t Board PAGE 51 I f we would i n t e r p r e t c o r r e c t l y the meaning of any s t a t u t e or other w r i t i n g we must understand what those forming i t were about, and the purpose i t was intended to execute. The r u l e s i n Heydon's Case have been a p p l i e d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . ( 9 8 ) The 'mischief r u l e ' has si n c e been c o d i f i e d i n various Canadian I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Acts. Section 11 of the f e d e r a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act reads: Every enactment s h a l l be deemed remedial, and s h a l l be given such f a i r , l a r g e and l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as best ensures the attainment of i t s objects.(99) This i s derived from the o r i g i n a l Canadian I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act of 1849:(100) ...and every such Act and every p r o v i s i o n or enactment thereof, s h a l l be deemed remedial, whether i t s immediate purport be to d i r e c t the of School Commissioner of Montreal, [1926] S.C.R. 246 at 266 where Mr. J u s t i c e A n g l i n c i t e d with approval the words of Lord Blackburn i n Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 A.C. 354 at 372: A l l s t a t u t e s are to be construed by the Courts so as to give e f f e c t to the i n t e n t i o n which i s expressed by the words used i n the s t a t u t e . But that i s not to be discovered by c o n s i d e r i n g these words i n the a b s t r a c t , but by i n q u i r i n g what i s the i n t e n t i o n expressed by those words used i n a s t a t u t e with reference to the subject matter and f o r the object with which that s t a t u t e was made; i t being a question to be determined by the Court, and a very important one, what was the object f o r which i t appears that the s t a t u t e was made. See a l s o A.G. f o r Canada v. H a l l e t t & Carey, [1952] A.C. 427, at 449 per Lord R u d c l i f f e . and Toronto T r a n s i t Commission v. C i t y of Toronto, [1971] S.C.R. 746 at 752 per Spence J . PAGE 5 2 doing of anything which the l e g i s l a t u r e may deem to be f o r the p u b l i c good or to prevent or punish the doing of anything which i t may deem contrary to the p u b l i c good, and s h a l l a c c o r d i n g l y r e c e i v e such f a i r , l a r g e and l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as w i l l best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and of such p r o v i s i o n or enactment, according to t h e i r true i n t e n t , meaning and s p i r i t . . . Thus the e v i l or abuse that was to be remedied must be i d e n t i f i e d , so that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or c o n s t r u c t i o n may f o l l o w the " i n t e n t , meaning and s p i r i t " of the enactment. I t would appear that Parliament, by c o d i f y i n g the M i s c h i e f Rule, sought to remedy an o v e r l y s t r i c t and l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s t a t u t e s . Of course c o d i f i c a t i o n of the mischief r u l e does not absolve the i n t e r p r e t e r of the o b l i g a t i o n to comply with the w r i t t e n expression of the tex t whose words may circumscribe the f u l l a p p l i c a t i o n of the rule.(101) However where the instrument to be construed i s one of p u b l i c concern the words used should be l i b e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d to best a t t a i n the l e g i s l a t i v e purpose.(102) Where,, as here the instrument r e l a t e s to Indians and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r land r i g h t s , the n e c e s s i t y f o r such a (98) Federated Saw M i l l Employes v. James Moore and Son (1908), 8 C.L.R. 465, at 486. (99) Federal I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act, s. 11. (100) 12 V i c t . , c. 10, s. 5. (101) See Wellesley H o s p i t a l v. Lawson, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 893 at 904 where the Court s t a t e s : "There i s nothing i n t h i s p r o v i s i o n that would tend to d i s p l a c e the r u l e that the i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e i s to be gathered from the words used." (102) See Mackenzie v. Mackenzie (1951), 5 De G. & Sm. 338; 21, L.J. Ch. 385; 64 E.R. 1143 concerning various Annuity Acts and Shipping Acts. PAGE 53 l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n favour of the Indians, i s even stronger.(103) Before mounting an argument f o r a p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of the Indian p r o v i s i o n of the Proclamation then i t i s necessary to address the mischief sought to be remedied thereby. The preamble to Part IV of the Proclamation s t a t e s : And whereas i t i s j u s t and reasonable, and e s s e n t i a l to Our I n t e r e s t and S e c u r i t y of Our C o l o n i e s , that the s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who l i v e under Our P r o t e c t i o n , should not be molested or d i s t u r b e d i n the Possession of such Part s of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s , as not having been ceded t o , or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds; As noted, preambles, e s p e c i a l l y i n e a r l i e r A c t s , have been g e n e r a l l y regarded as of great importance as guides to c o n s t r u c t i o n , being a r e c i t a l of the f a c t s o p e r a t i v e on the mind of the framers at the time of enactment and t h e r e f o r e of the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t of the enacting provisions.(104) Where the i n t e n t i s expressed i n very general terms, such as these, they are p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e to t h e i r l e g a l environment and may be l i m i t e d by the p a r t i c u l a r enacting p r o v i s i o n s . The a c t u a l language of the Indian p r o v i s i o n s w i l l be d e a l t with i n more d e t a i l l a t e r : s u f f i c e i t to say here that they l a y out a general scheme fo r the p r o t e c t i o n of Indian i n t e r e s t s compatible with the (103) Nowegijick v. The Queen (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, [1983] C.T.C. 20, 83 D.T.C. 5041, 46 N.R. 41 [1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 89 (S.C.C.). (104) L.C.C. v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co., [1911] 1 K.B. 445 at p. 451 per Lord Alverstone C.J. PAGE 54 broad purpose r e c i t e d i n the preamble. The l a t t e r describes the Indian b e n e f i c i a r i e s of Part IV as "The s e v e r a l Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who l i v e under Our P r o t e c t i o n " , and the lands a f f e c t e d as "Such Parts of Our Dominions and T e r r i t o r i e s , as not having been ceded t o , or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as t h e i r Hunting Grounds." I t thus recognized 'Indian t i t l e 1 to land i n Indian possession throughout B r i t i s h North America and i n the ensuing p r o v i s i o n s aimed at a uniform procedure f o r Crown purchase of such lands with Indian consent. As one scholar notes: I t may be remembered that the measures i n Part IV are f o r the most part hardly novel. They represent a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s and p r a c t i c e s already p r e v a i l i n g i n many o l d c o l o n i e s . The i n t e n t i o n was to b r i n g the various B r i t i s h holdings i n North America, both new and o l d , under a uniform regime regarding Indian lands, and to in f u s e the whole with p o l i c i e s conceived i n a g l o b a l manner, rather than piecemeal and haphazardly. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n that Indian lands acquired a f t e r October 1763 were meant to be tre a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from those acquired previously.(105) Given then that one of the c h i e f purposes of the Proclamation was to e s t a b l i s h a uniform Indian p o l i c y , i s i t reasonable that the i n t e n t i o n of the Crown i n t h i s regard should be considered as f i x e d as of 1763 and to have no relevance or a p p l i c a t i o n to s i t u a t i o n s a r i s i n g subsequent to t h i s date? There i s no express language i n the Proclamation that suggests such a (105) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 338-9. PAGE 55 l i m i t e d temporal a p p l i c a t i o n . Moreover, to impute such l i m i t e d i n t e n t i o n to the Crown i s to deny both the h i s t o r y of the l e g i s l a t i o n and the dynamics of change i n the l a t e 18th century i n B r i t i s h North America. In f a c t , c o l o n i a l p o l i c y and events subsequent to 1763 evidence a r e l i a n c e on the p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down i n the Proclamation. The Plan of 1764 and the numerous t r e a t i e s , grants and surrenders were made with the Indians on terms and c o n d i t i o n s compatible with the Proclamations p r o v i s i o n s . The 1847 Commission on Indian A f f a i r s i n Canada concluded i n r e l a t i o n to the Crown's p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s lands possessed by the Indians t h a t : Although the Crown claims the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t e and eminent dominion i n Canada, as i n other of the older c o l o n i e s , i t has ever since i t s possession of the province, conceded to the Indians the r i g h t to occupancy upon t h e i r o l d hunting grounds, and t h e i r c l a i m to compensation f o r i t s surrender, r e s e r v i n g to i t s e l f the e x c l u s i v e p r i v i l e g e of t r e a t i n g with them f o r the surrender or purchase of any p o r t i o n of the land. This i s d i s t i n c t l y l a i d down i n the Proclamation of 1763, and the p r i n c i p l e has sin c e been g e n e r a l l y acknowledged and r a r e l y i n f r i n g e d upon by the government.(106) I t i s c l e a r that the Proclamations s t r i c t u r e s as to a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i n general were thought to apply to Indian land p o l i c y i n the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia. The f e d e r a l government e x e r c i s e d i t s power of disallowment of p r o v i n c i a l laws i n r e l a t i o n to the B.C. Land act of 1874 on the basi s that i t d i d not adequately recognize the a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s of the na t i v e (106) Jackson, M., unpublished memo, 1982. PAGE 56 peoples of B r i t i s h Columbia as expressed i n the Proclamation. The M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e s t a t e d i n h i s o p i n i o n t h a t : There i s no shadow of a doubt, that from the e a r l i e s t times England has always f e l t i t imperative to meet the Indians i n C o u n c i l , and to o b t a i n surrenders of t r a c t s of Canada as from time to time were required f o r the purposes of settlement. The M i n i s t e r went on to r e c i t e the p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation and concluded: The undersigneed f e e l s that he cannot do otherwise than advise that Act i n question i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e , as tending to deal with lands which are assured to be the absolute property of the Province, an assumption which completely ignores, as a p p l i c a b l e to the Indians of B r i t i s h Columbia, the honour and good f a i t h which the Crown has, i n a l l other cases since i t s sovereignty i n North America, d e a l t with t h e i r v a rious Indian t r i b e s . C l e a r l y , as of 1874, i n s o f a r as the f e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e was concerned, a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e had not been extinguished i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The ongoing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Proclamation i s evidenced by i t s i n c l u s i o n i n the 1982 C o n s t i t u t i o n Act. The purpose, then, of the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation was c l e a r l y to p r o t e c t Indian land from unlawful white encroachment and to govern s t r i c t l y the procedure to be adopted when such was a l i e n a t e d to the Crown. Such purpose must inform the i n q u i r y i n t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Proclamation and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s p rospective a p p l i c a t i o n . ( i i i ) B a s i c Rules of S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n re Temporal  A p p l i c a t i o n PAGE 57 The r u l e u n i v e r s a l l y adopted as the c o n s t r u c t i o n of w i l l s , s t a t u t e s and indeed a l l w r i t t e n instruments, i s that the grammatical and ordi n a r y sense of the word, at the time of t h e i r enactment,(107) i s to be adhered to unless such leads to some ab s u r d i t y , repugnance or i n c o n s i s t e n c y with the re s t of the instrument.(108) But merely because the meaning of l e g i s l a t i o n at the time of i t s enactment must be respected, i n no way suggests that the s t a t u t e ' s e f f e c t i s confined to m a t e r i a l or s o c i a l f a c t s or events then e x i s t i n g . I t i s necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h the meaning of a term from the things that may be included i n i t s ambit. I t i s a r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n that a s t a t u t e i s to be considered as always speaking and a p p l i c a b l e to circumstances as they a r i s e ( t h i s r u l e i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t with the r u l e that an Act must be construed the day a f t e r i t was passed). This r u l e i s s t a t u t o r i l y recognized i n various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n A c t s : "the law i s ever commanding", and "whatever be the tense of the verb or verbs contained i n a p r o v i s i o n , such p r o v i s i o n s h a l l be deemed to be i n for c e at a l l times and under a l l circumstances to which i t may apply."(109) The use of the present tense i n l e g i s l a t i v e (107) Sharpe v. Wakefield (1889), 22 Q.B.D. 239, at 242, c i t e d with approval by Martland i n Bogoeh Seed Co. v. Canadian  P a c i f i c Railway Co., [1963] S.C.R. 247. (108) [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61, 106 E.R. 1216 at 1234. (109) I n t e r p r e t a t i o n A ct, R.S.Q., c. T-16, s. 49 and see s. 10 f e d e r a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act to the same e f f e c t , R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, s. 10. See a l s o Watson v. United States of  America, [1981] 2 F.C. 431 (CA.) c i t e d i n Cote, J.E. Reception of E n g l i s h Law, 1977, XV A l b e r t a Law Rev. 29 at  p. 54. PAGE 58 d r a f t i n g i s explained p r i m a r i l y by t e c h n i c a l reasons — i t provides no basi s f o r conclusions about the temporal operation of the law. The f a c t that a law i s w r i t t e n i n the present does not imply that i t should receive a r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t or be considered declaratory.(110) And i t should not be presumed that the e f f e c t of the l e g i s l a t i o n i s exhausted a f t e r i t s i n i t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n , normally a s t a t u t e a p p l i e s as f r e q u e n t l y as circumstances r e q u i r e . There i s no presumption that a s t a t u t e a p p l i e s only to persons or property e x i s t i n g at the time of i t s enactment. I t may govern new s i t u a t i o n s i f i t s s p i r i t so requires and i t s wording does not e x p l i c i t l y i n d i c a t e the c o n t r a r y . ( I l l ) Not only can a s t a t u t e apply to s i t u a t i o n s which do not e x i s t when i t was enacted, i t can a l s o govern phenomena which were v i r t u a l l y unimaginable at the time. Thus, i f j u s t i f i e d by i t s aim and compatible with i t s purpose, a s t a t u t e w i l l apply to any f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n s that f a l l w i t h i n the ambit of i t s words.(112) In a d d i t i o n , there i s a presumption that where a s t a t u t e i s b e n e f i c i a l and remedial i t should be l i b e r a l l y construed, and doubtful expressions i n t e r p r e t e d i n the l a r g e s t sense which the words w i l l p r o p e r l y bear. Thus a p u b l i c enactment employing (110) J o i n t Committee v. A. Cohen & Co., [1951] 3 D.L.R. 133 (Que. S . C ) ; Gravel v. C i t y of St. Leonard, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 660. (111) Re Ontario Medical Act, (1907), 13 O.L.R. 501 (Ont. C.A.). (112) Chappell & Co. L t d . v. Associated Radio Co. of A u s t r a l i a  L t d . , [1925] V.L.R. 350; 47 A.L.T. 12; 31 Argus L.R. 297 (Aust.). PAGE 59 general words i s u s u a l l y understood to apply to a l l e n t i t i e s f a l l i n g w i t h i n i t s scope at any time during i t s l i f e , even to things which d i d not e x i s t and could not have been a n t i c i p a t e d at the time of enactment, unless a narrower temporal compass i s expressly s t a t e d or n e c e s s a r i l y implied.(113) The subject of extending s t a t u t e s by inference to include cases not o r i g i n a l l y contemplated i s one which has given r i s e to se v e r a l d e c i s i o n s , the leading c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of which i s , that the e a r l i e r s t a t u t e deals with a genus w i t h i n which a new species i s brought by a subsequent act or circumstance. The Telegraph Act 1869 was passed before telephones were invented, but i n A.G. v. Edison Telephone Co.(114) i t was held that the p r i v i l e g e s the Act conferred on the Postmaster-General extended to messages sent by phone. Thus Steven J . , s a i d : Of course no one suspects that the l e g i s l a t u r e intended to r e f e r s p e c i f i c a l l y to telephones many years before they were invented, but i t i s h i g h l y probable that they would, and i t seems to us that they a c t u a l l y d i d , use language embracing f u t u r e d i s c o v e r i e s as to the use of e l e c t r i c i t y f o r the purpose of conveying i n t e l l i g e n c e . The same has been held to apply to s o c i a l changes. Thus a Quebec bylaw, r e f e r r i n g to the " f a m i l y " was extended to cover " f o s t e r f a m i l i e s " . ( 1 1 5 ) I t has been held that expressions such as (113) Maxwell Statutes 12th ed., 102, c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 9, p. 336 and see Dawes v. Pa i n t e r (1674), 89 E.R. 126. (114) (1860), 6 Q.B.D. 244. (115) V i l l e de St-Hubert v. Riberdy, [1977] Que. S.C. 409, c i t e d i n Cote supra, footnote 109, at p. 205. PAGE 60 " p r a c t i c e of medicine"(116) and farming(117) should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t with s o c i a l development and not by reference to the s i t u a t i o n at the time of enactment.(118) This same reasoning was a p p l i e d i n Associated Newspapers  Lt d . v. C i t y of London Corporation(119) i n r e l a t i o n to taxes, a matter u s u a l l y subject to a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The issue i n question was whether the Act of 7 Geo. I l l , c. 37, s. 51, which provided that land reclaimed from part of the bed of the Thames should vest i n the owners of a d j o i n i n g grounds "free from a l l taxes and assessments whatsoever", r e f e r r e d only to taxes e x i s t i n g at the time of the Act or to taxes subsequently imposed. The E n g l i s h Court of Appeal had held the exemption d i d not extend to f u t u r e rates and taxes, l i m i t i n g i t s operation to taxes e x i s t i n g when the Act was passed, based l a r g e l y on the s e t t l e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of such words. The House of Lords reversed t h i s judgment, f i n d i n g "the n a t u r a l meaning" of " a l l taxes and assessments whatsoever" extended to i n c l u d e f u t u r e as w e l l as e x i s t i n g r a t e s . In so doing the Court noted that the words appear i n a p u b l i c s t a t u t e , that the phrase contains 'words of widest p o s s i b l e meaning' and (116) Re Ontario Medical Act (1907), 13 O.L.R. 501, at 506-7 (Ont. C.A.) per Moss J . (See Cote p. 205). (117) H i l l v. Lethbridge M u n i c i p a l D i s t r i c t No. 25 (1955), 14 W.W.R. 577 ( A l t a . S.C.) (see Cote p. 205). (118) See a l s o Synder v. Montreal Gazette L t d . , [1978] Que. S.C. 32. (119) A s s o c i a t e d Newspapers L t d . v. C i t y of London Corporation, [1916] 2 A.C. 429 (H.L.). PAGE 61 importantly that the s t a t u t e , l i k e any other s t a t u t e , could be repealed by subsequent Act. Lord Sumner, d i s s e n t i n g , gave the words a more l i m i t e d c o n s t r u c t i o n holding that " i t i s more n a t u r a l to read the words as only p u r p o r t i n g to do that which the L e g i s l a t u r e , when i t uses them, i s competent to do..."(120) and held that i t i s not competent to bind f u t u r e l e g i s l a t i o n . He does, however, note that t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n may be set aside where the exemption appears i n an Act of fundamental, general p u b l i c concern c i t i n g among other examples the exemption given i n the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 731.(121) There are many other examples of Acts being extended to cover f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n s f a l l i n g n a t u r a l l y w i t h i n i t s terms. In W i l l i a m s v. Paine(122) an Act of Congress to q u i e t t i t l e s i n favour of persons i n a c t u a l possession of lands i n the d i s t r i c t was a p p l i e d p r o s p e c t i v e l y to b e n e f i t persons coming i n t o possession of lands subsequent to the passing of the Act. So a l s o , the operation of a law f o r r e g u l a t i n g " a l l e x i s t i n g r a i l r o a d c o r p o r a t i o n s " i n respect to r e q u i r i n g them to e x e r c i s e c e r t a i n care and to take c e r t a i n precautions f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the p u b l i c , was held to extend and c o n t r o l r a i l r o a d s incorporated a f t e r as w e l l as before i t s passage (unless exception had been made i n t h e i r charters).(123) And a s t a t u t o r y (120) I b i d , at 452, per Lord Sumner. (121) I b i d . (122) W i l l i a m s v. Paine, 169 U.S. 66, 18 Sup. Ct. 279, 42 L. Ed. 658. (123) I n d i a n a p o l i s and St. L.R. Co. v. Blackram, 63 111, 117. PAGE 62 p r o v i s i o n t h a t an a l i e n "who s h a l l have r e s i d e d w i t h i n the s t a t e two y e a r s " s h a l l be capable of h o l d i n g and t r a n s m i t t i n g r e a l e s t a t e the same as a c i t i z e n , was h e l d to apply to f u t u r e as w e l l as to past residence.(124) In so h o l d i n g , the court focused on the obvious i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e even though a s t r i c t grammatical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would have favoured a narrowed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Further i n New J e r s e y i t was h e l d that a s t a t u t e a u t h o r i z i n g c i t i e s " a l r e a d y d i v i d e d i n t o wards" to s u b d i v i d e the wards when they reached a c e r t a i n s i z e , was not c o n f i n e d to c i t i e s which had been d i v i d e d i n t o wards before the passage of the s t a t u t e . ( 1 2 5 ) ( i v ) P r o s p e c t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Documents The argument f a v o u r i n g p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t where the document to be construed i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n nature. No one would suggest that a w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n should be construed f o r a l l time as i f the court were s i t t i n g the day a f t e r i t was enacted. Lord Jowett s t a t e d t h i s c l e a r l y i n r e f e r e n c e to the q u e s t i o n of whether the B r i t i s h North America Act 1867(126) empowered the Canadian l e g i s l a t u r e to a b o l i s h the r i g h t of appeal from Canadian c o u r t s to the P r i v y C o u n c i l ; (124) Beard v. Rowan, (1835), 1 McLean, 135 Fed. Cas. No. 1, 181; 9 Pet. 301, 9 L. Ed. 135 ( U . S . S . C ) . (125) Wood v. A t l a n t i c C i t y 56 N.J. Law. (126) 30 & 31 V i c t . c. 3 (Imp.). PAGE 63 I t i s , as t h e i r Lordships t h i n k , i r r e l e v a n t that the question i s one which might have seemed unreal at the date of the B r i t i s h North America Act. To such an organic s t a t u t e the f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be given that changing circumstances require.(127) Lord Sankey commented to s i m i l a r e f f e c t that "the B.N.A. Act planted i n Canada a l i v i n g tree capable of growth and expansion w i t h i n i t s n a t u r a l l i m i t s . " ( 1 2 8 ) Professor Hogg, speaking of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers under the B.N.A. Act 1867, s t a t e s : " i t goes without saying that the framers of the B.N.A. Act could not foresee every kind of law which has subsequently been enacted; nor could they foresee s o c i a l , economic and t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments which have required novel forms of r e g u l a t i o n , but ... i t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that the general language used to describe the c l a s s e s of subjects (or heads of power) i s not to be frozen i n the sense i n which i t would have been understood i n 1867."(129) He c i t e s as examples the court's readiness to incl u d e i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l telephone systems under 92(10)(a) of the B.N.A. Act, although the telephone system was unknown i n 1867;(130) the phrase " c r i m i n a l law" (s. 91(27) " i s not confined to what was (127) A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada, [1947] A.C. 127, [1947] 1 W.W.R. 305, [1947] 1 A l l E.R. 137, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 801 (P.C. ) . (128) Edwards v. A.G. Can., [1930] A.C. 124 at 136, approved i n B r i t i s h Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 at 518 and A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada ( P r i v y C o u n c i l Appeals) [1947] A.C. 127, 154. (129) Hogg, P., C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law of Canada Toronto: Ca r s w e l l Co. L t d . , 1977, p. 96. (130) Toronto v. B e l l Telephone Co., [1905] A.C. 52. PAGE 64 c r i m i n a l by the law of England or of any province i n 1867;(131) and "banking" (s. 91(15)) i s not confined to "the extent and kind of business a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d on by banks i n Canada i n 1867."(132) The Courts, moreover, were ready to apply a progressive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n even where to do so meant extending, or rather c o n f e r r i n g a new, j u r i s d i c t i o n . Duff C.J., held i n the Adoption  Reference case (1983)(133) that j u r i s d i c t i o n was "not to be frozen at the l i m i t s i n existence i n 1867" where such increased j u r i s d i c t i o n could come normally w i t h i n the terms of the Act.(134) The court's readiness to adopt the s t a t u t e to changing circumstances i s even more c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l s , c l e a r l y not i n existence as of 1867, and arguably offending the s. 96 court's j u r i s d i c t i o n . The P r i v y Council i n Labour Rel a t i o n s Board of  Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works framed the question broadly and a p p l i e d a very l i b e r a l t e s t : "were the functions of the board analogous to the f u n c t i o n s of a s u p e r i o r , d i s t r i c t or county c o u r t " , implying that new kinds of j u r i s d i c t i o n , since 1867, need not be exercised by higher courts. They went on to f i n d the board was v a l i d l y c o n s t i t u t e d making p o s s i b l e the growth of p r o v i n c i a l l y - a p p o i n t e d t r i b u n a l s to exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n i n (131) Supra, footnote 129, p. 98 c i t i n g P.A.T.A. v. A.G. Canada, [1913] A.C. 310 at 324. (132) I b i d . , p. 98 c i t i n g A.G. A l b e r t a v. A.G. Canada ( A l b e r t a B i l l of Rights) [1947] A.C. 503, 553. (133) Reference re Adoption Act, [1938] S.C.R. 398. (134) And see Reference re Quebec Magistrates Court, [1965] S.C.R. 772; (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 701. PAGE 6 5 areas of enlarged p r o v i n c i a l government r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The court examined not merely the j u r i s d i c t i o n alone but i t s context and s e t t i n g and conformity to broad l e g i s l a t i v e purpose. I t i s included here to show that the c o u r t s , i n the case of instruments of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , are w i l l i n g to construe them p r o g r e s s i v e l y . Their a p p l i c a t i o n to a new s i t u a t i o n depends to a large extent upon whether such comes w i t h i n a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the terms used and whether such i s c o n s i s t e n t with the aims and purposes of the l e g i s l a t i o n . The words of the B.N.A. Act have thus been given a progressive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the courts so as to c o n t i n u a l l y adapt to new c o n d i t i o n s and ideas. In so doing, the Courts, Professor Hogg notes, have g e n e r a l l y r e j e c t e d the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of the B.N.A. Act as an a i d to i t s construction(135) and although he sees l i t t l e reason for i t s e x c l u s i o n , concludes that as time goes by t h i s i s of l i t t l e relevance as "the p r i n c i p l e s of progressive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n undermine the relevance of the m a t e r i a l . " The point i s that the B.N.A. Act i s a " c o n s t i t u e n t " or "organic" s t a t u t e which has to provide the basis f o r the e n t i r e government of a nation over a long period of time and an i n f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rooted i n the past would only serve to withhold necessary powers from the Parliament or l e g i s l a t u r e and defeat i t s purpose.(136) (135) Hogg, supra, footnote 129, p. 98 c i t i n g L a s k i n , Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law (4th ed. rev., 1975) at pp. 59-65 (at footnote 114) . (136) v. Big M Brug Mart L t d . , 1985 1 S.C.R. 295, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481, 37 A l t a . L.R. (2d) 97; Southam Inc. v. D i r . of PAGE 66 I t i s elsewhere argued that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 f u l f i l l e d a s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the Indian peoples of Canada, as i s evidenced by i t s mention i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982. I t was a " c o n s t i t u e n t " instrument expressed i n general terms, w e l l able to incl u d e and make p r o v i s i o n f o r new (and even unforeseen) circumstances. Like the B.N.A. Act, 1867 i t should not be f o r e c l o s e d i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n by the l i m i t s of B r i t i s h sovereignty i n existence i n 1763. As already s t a t e d , the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a s t a t u t e to a new s i t u a t i o n depends i n la r g e part upon whether i t f i t s w i t h i n the aims or purposes of the l e g i s l a t i o n and the terms used to express such. C l e a r l y , l e g i s l a t i o n can be expressed so as to exclude a prospective a p p l i c a t i o n . There appears to be nothing i n the a c t u a l language of the enacting clauses of the Proclamation to defeat a pro s p e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r g i v i n g an extended meaning to i t s words of p u b l i c p o l i c y i s that the law d i f f e r e n t l y i n t e r p r e t e d would f a i l to encompass a large p r o p o r t i o n of Indians i n possession of lands, and allow wholesale a l i e n a t i o n to p r i v a t e s u b j e c t s . C l e a r l y the purpose of the Act was to prevent such and pave the way for a " j u s t and e q u i t a b l e " determination of t h i s r i g h t . (v) Extension of T e r r i t o r i a l L i m i t s of B r i t i s h J u r i s d i c t i o n I n v e s t i g a t i o n and Research of the Combines I n v e s t i g a t i o n Branch, [1984] 6 W.W.R. 577. PAGE 67 A l e g i s l a t u r e i s presumed to enact f o r persons, property and events w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Prima f a c i e an E n g l i s h s t a t u t e a f f e c t s only E n g l i s h subjects or fo r e i g n e r s w i t h i n the a l l e g i a n c e of the E n g l i s h Crown(137) and i n the absence of words to the contrary express or i m p l i e d , i t i s to be construed as applying only to the United Kingdom. A s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e to Her Majesty's dominions i s , i f the context permits, to be construed to apply to a l l B r i t i s h Subjects(138) throughout such t e r r i t o r y ( 1 3 9 ) unless such an a p p l i c a t i o n i s circumscribed i n the enacting p r o v i s i o n s . There are, however, great d i f f i c u l t i e s i n p r a c t i c e a s s o c i a t e d with determining a s t a t u t e ' s a c t u a l t e r r i t o r i a l e f f e c t . This i s obvious when d i s c u s s i n g the Proclamation's intended geographic reach as of 1763 - the boundaries to B r i t i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n being even at that time uncertain (see d i s c u s s i o n above on geographic scope). I t i s c l e a r that i t l i e s w i t h i n the Crown's p r e r o g a t i v e to make d e c l a r a t i o n s of sovereignty from time to time over new areas. Such w i l l normally conform to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law current at the time but i n any event, municipal courts are bound (137) Sawers, Ex. p. B l a i n (1879), 12 Ch. D. 522; 41 L.T. 46; 28 W.R. 334 (C.A.). (138) R^ v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425; 65 L.J.M.C. 218; 75 L.T. 77; 60 J.P. 662; 12 T.L.R. 551; 18 Cox. (139) This i s set out i n the form of a presumption i n the f e d e r a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act, s. 9(1): "Every enactment a p p l i e s to the whole of Canada, unless i t i s otherwise expressed t h e r e i n " . PAGE 68 to enforce such declarations.(140) The question then becomes whether Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n expressed to apply, i n general terms to B r i t i s h dominions, a p p l i e s only so as to bind those t e r r i t o r i e s f a l l i n g w i t h i n such d e f i n i t i o n at the time of the enactment or whether i t a p p l i e s to bind those t e r r i t o r i e s f a l l i n g w i t h i n such d e f i n i t i o n at any subsequent p e r i o d . In v. Kent Justices(141) the courts had to determine the meaning of " t e r r i t o r i a l waters" i n the Wireless Telegraphy Act,  1949 the expression not having been defined i n the Act. The Court concluded, Salmon L . J . , d i s s e n t i n g , that the words must mean t e r r i t o r i a l waters over which from time to time the Crown may declare sovereignty. Lord Parker reached t h i s c o n c l u s i o n f i r s t l y on the basis that i f i t was intended that the expression " t e r r i t o r i a l waters" was to be confined to a p r e c i s e l i m i t , then known, i t would have been p e r f e c t l y easy to so provide and no such s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n was given i n the Act. Secondly that the boundaries of t e r r i t o r i a l waters "must i n e v i t a b l y have been expected to change from time to time and may do so i n the future",(142) thus implying i t could not have been the i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e to f i x a l i m i t the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Act, even though Parliament i n 1949 d i d not have i n mind the p a r t i c u l a r f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n that d i d a r i s e . T h i r d l y , the Court noted that the matter of the extension of sovereignty over the (140) [1967] 1 A l l E.R. 560. (141) I b i d . (142) I b i d . , per Lord Parker at p. 564. PAGE 69 open seas i s a matter for the Crown from time to time to determine under the prerogative and that such could s u r e l y be done without the need f o r s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n . I t would be anomalous to recognize t h i s and yet leave such new areas unregulated. The better p o s i t i o n i s c l e a r l y that the Wireless  Telegraphy Act, 1949 along with a l l Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n expressed i n general terms would flow i n t o such areas ipso f a c t o upon the d e c l a r a t i o n of sovereignty. The Courts h e l d , i n s p i t e of the f o r c e f u l argument to the contrary, that because of the penal nature of the p r o v i s i o n i n question that i t should be construed s t r i c t l y because of the need f o r c e r t a i n t y on the law where c r i m i n a l sanctions were to be imposed. This h o l d i n g was l a t e r approved i n Post O f f i c e v. Estuary  Radio, Ltd.;(143) the court there holding that where an Act of Parliament r e f e r s to the United Kingdom or the t e r r i t o r i a l waters adjacent t h e r e t o , those expressions are to be construed prima  f a c i e as i n c l u d i n g such areas of land or sea as from time to time  are f o r m a l l y declared by the Crown to be subject to i t s Sovereignty and j u r i s d i c t i o n as part of the United Kingdom or i t s t e r r i t o r i a l waters, rather than the p r e c i s e area of these at the moment when the Act received Royal assent. Lord Diplock, noted that i t l a y w i t h i n the prerogative power of the Crown to extend i t s sovereignty and j u r i s d i c t i o n to areas of land or sea over which i t had not p r e v i o u s l y claimed or exercised sovereignty or j u r i s d i c t i o n , ( 1 4 4 ) and the area to which'an Act of Parliament (143) [1967] 3 A l l E.R. 663. PAGE 70 a p p l i e s prima f a c i e v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g l y . There i s nothing to d i s t i n g u i s h these cases from the case where the Crown, under the p r e r o g a t i v e , annexes new t e r r i t o r y to t e r r i t o r y over which i t p r e s e n t l y a s s e r t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Thus where t e r r i t o r y i s annexed to e x i s t i n g B r i t i s h dominions prima  f a c i e Imperial laws expressed i n general terms, to apply to Her Majesty's dominions w i l l extent p r o p r i o vigore to the new t e r r i t o r i e s . Such i s c o n s i s t e n t with the opinions of various law o f f i c e r s i n t h i s regard c i t e d by Slattery.(145) Senegal was annexed to B r i t i s h possessions i n A f r i c a subsequent to the Imperial Act of 1750 for Extending the A f r i c a n Trade.(146) Section 1 of the Act provided that a l l B r i t i s h subjects might l a w f u l l y trade "to and from any Port or Place i n A f r i c a , between the Port of S a l l e e i n South Barbary, and the Cape of Good Hope ... without any r e s t r a i n t whatsoever, save as h e r e i n expressed". Senegal was w i t h i n the expressed l i m i t s though annexed subsequent to t h i s enactment. I t was i m p l i c i t i n the opinion of the law o f f i c e r s as to the Crown's powers i n Senegal that the Act a p p l i e d there to govern trade r e l a t i o n s . ( 1 4 7 ) Of s i m i l a r e f f e c t i s an opinion given i n 1839 on the e f f e c t of the proposed annexation of New Zealand to A u s t r a l i a . ( 1 4 8 ) The (144) I b i d , at p. 680, per Lord Diplock. (145) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y at p. 342 et seq. (146) 23 Geo. I I , c. 31, s. 1 (Imperial) 1750. (147) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 342-3 c i t i n g (footnote 51) J.B.T. 1759-63, 324 and notes that the opinion was r e v i v e d and r e a p p l i e d by Yorke, as Attorney General i n 1763. (148) I b i d . p. 343-44. PAGE 71 1828 Imperial Act(149) e s t a b l i s h i n g the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of A u s t r a l i a i n s e c t i o n 20 r e f e r s to the n e c e s s i t y of f u r n i s h i n g laws f o r the " s a i d Colonies of New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land, and the Dependencies thereof", and provides f o r the establishment of a Council i n "New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land r e s p e c t i v e l y " . The Attorney and S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l Campbell and R o l f e s t a t e d i n t h e i r opinion that the word "Dependencies", "must receive an extended c o n s t r u c t i o n so as to include f u t u r e as w e l l as then e x i s t i n g dependencies" so that the l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y i n question would extend to New Zealand i f annexed to New South Wales. I t seems the same holds true where a p r o t e c t o r a t e i s annexed to B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y . Where an Imperial Act was expressed to apply to the whole or part of Her Majesty's dominions but d i d not extend to any p r o t e c t o r a t e unless a p p l i e d s p e c i f i c a l l y by Order i n C ouncil under a s t a t u t o r y power, an Order i n Council making such an extension i s unnecessary i f the p r o t e c t o r a t e i s annexed -the Act then applying to the t e r r i t o r y of i t s own f o r c e . An example of t h i s i s to be found i n "the omission of references to c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r i e s (Cyprus, Kenya Colony, G i l b e r t and E l l i c e Islands) from the r e v i s e d schedule s u b s t i t u t e d by S.R. & O. 1922 No. 1418 for that contained i n the Order i n Council dated 18th October 1909, S.R. & O. 1909, No. 1230, extending the Evidence  ( C o l o n i a l Statutes) Act, 1907(150) to those t e r r i t o r i e s , which (149) 9 Geo. IV, c. 83. (150) 7 Edw. 7, c. 16. PAGE 7 2 were p r o t e c t o r a t e s at the date of the O r i g i n a l Order.(151) ( v i ) C r e a t i o n of New Colonies and P l a n t a t i o n s I t would seem that the same reasoning should apply to govern the s i t u a t i o n where Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n i s expressed to apply, i n general terms, to "Colonies and P l a n t a t i o n s " , i . e . that such l e g i s l a t i o n binds p r o p r i o vigore those c o l o n i e s and p l a n t a t i o n s coming to existence subsequent to the passage of the l e g i s l a t i o n to the extent that the l e g i s l a t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e to the new s i t u a t i o n and not s p e c i f i c a l l y excluded on i t s terms. At l e a s t one w r i t e r o f f e r s a d e f i n i t i o n of 'colony' or ' p l a n t a t i o n ' which includes i n the d e f i n i t i o n of such any land, t e r r i t o r y i s l a n d or possession beyond the sea "now belonging t o , or under the dominion of the Crown of Great B r i t a i n or which may h e r e a f t e r  become permanently so".(152) Whether a s t a t u t e expressed i n general terms i s deemed to extend of i t s own force to l a t e r acquired t e r r i t o r i e s coming w i t h i n the d e s c r i p t i o n must be informed, i n l a r g e p a r t , by the general purpose and p o l i c y of the l e g i s l a t i o n i n question — whether i t was passed to curb a s p e c i f i c e v i l of purely l o c a l character or whether i t was aimed at a general e v i l of major Imperial concern for which uniform treatment was required under Imperial s u p e r v i s i o n . C l a r k e , w r i t i n g i n 1834 confirms t h i s (151) See Hals. (3d) V o l . 5 - Commonwealth and Dependencies at p. 703. (152) H o l t , Navigation Laws, I, 80; c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y , supra, footnote 19, p. 346. PAGE 73 view: A l l s t a t u t e s which are m a n i f e s t l y of u n i v e r s a l p o l i c y , and intended to a f f e c t a l l our transmarine possessions, at whatever p e r i o d they s h a l l be acquired, such f o r example, as nav i g a t i o n a c t s , or the acts f o r a b o l i s h i n g the slave trade and s l a v e r y ... w i l l upon the conquest or c e s s i o n , ipso f a c t o , and independently of p o s t e r i o r l e g i s l a t i o n , be binding upon a conquered or ceded colony.(153) Statutes of u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n would apply ipso f a c t o i n s e t t l e d colonies.(154) Lord Mansfield i n Campbell v. H a l l c i t e d as an example of such ' u n i v e r s a l ' s t a t u t e s the Acts of Trade but the same reasoning would apply to extend a l l Imperial laws expressed i n the same general terms and embodying uniform Parliamentary p o l i c y i n regard to the treatment of b a s i c problems common throughout the 'colonies and p l a n t a t i o n s ' . The main ingr e d i e n t being that the problem must be such as to demand Imperial s u p e r v i s i o n . In Regina v. Middleton(155) the Imperial Chinese Passenger  Act(156) was held to be i n force i n the colony of V i c t o r i a even though no p a r t i c u l a r colony, but that of Hong Kong, was ex p r e s s l y r e f e r r e d to i n the Act. Section 1 of the Act defined the word 'colony' as i n c l u d i n g a l l Her Majesty's possessions abroad which are not w i t h i n the government of the East India Company. There was no reference i n express terms to any p a r t i c u l a r colony or (153) C l a r k , Charles, A Summary of C o l o n i a l Law, London: Sweet, Maxwell, and Stevens and Sons, 1834. (154) See d i s c u s s i o n , i n f r a , p. 133 et seq. (155) Regina v. Middleton (1868), 8 Comwlth. 771. (156) 18 & 18 V i c , cap. c i v . PAGE 7 4 port outside the colony of Hong Kong. Section 13 enacted that offences and misdemeanours were to be t r i e d as provided by "The Merchant Shipping Act", 1854, Pat 10, s. 518 (17 & 18 V i c , cap. c i v ) and Part 10 thereof i s extended by s. 517 of the same Act to " a l l B r i t i s h dominions not s p e c i f i c a l l y excepted". In f i n d i n g that the Chinese Passenger Act was i n f o r c e i n V i c t o r i a S t a w e l l C.J. held that "The Imperial Parliament passed the Act, as r e l a t i n g to matters which required the e x e r c i s e of the supreme l e g i s l a t i v e power over the whole B r i t i s h dominions."(157) And that "no doubt, l e g i s l a t i o n of the B r i t i s h Parliament i s not to apply to t h i s colony, unless by express words, or by necessary intendment i n t h i s case, i t a p p l i e s by necessary intemdment."(158) There i s scant j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y upon the question of the a p p l i c a t i o n of Imperial A c t s , expressed i n general terms to apply to the North American c o l o n i e s , to c o l o n i e s erected subsequent to the enactment. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1786, was held to be a p p l i c a b l e to Ontario.(159) The Imperial Act 5 Geo. 2, c. 7 (1732) (an Act f o r the more e a r l y recovery of debts i n His  Majesty's P l a n t a t i o n s and Colonies i n America) was held to be i n force i n Nova Scotia.(160) I t i s debatable whether the whole of Nova S c o t i a was i n 1732 a colony of B r i t a i n ( 1 6 1 ) and most i f not (157) Supra, footnote 155 at p. 185. (158) I b i d . , at p. 186. (159) Torrance v. Smith (1854), 3 C P . 411. (160) Kearney v. Creelman (1886), 14 S.C.R. 33. PAGE 75 a l l of Upper Canada was a French colony u n t i l the ces s i o n to B r i t a i n i n 1763. Since the Act i s expressed i n general terms to apply to the P l a n t a t i o n s and Colonies i n America i t seems l i k e l y i t was given a prospective a p p l i c a t i o n , binding a l l c o l o n i e s coming at any time w i t h i n i t s ambit though such i s not made c l e a r i n the d e c i s i o n s . The question of the extension to Quebec of Imperial Acts to colon i e s erected l a t e r was the subject of various law o f f i c e r s ' o p inions, p a r t i c u l a r l y with reference to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the various Imperial Acts r e l a t i n g to trade and n a v i g a t i o n . The issue was r a i s e d i n r e l a t i o n to the conquered i s l a n d of Dominica. Goods (sugars) were seized for an a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n of the Act for Preventing Frauds (7 & 8 W i l l i a m I I I , c. 22) and 6 the Molasses Act, Geo. I I , c. 13, i n that c e r t a i n sugars were landed i n Dominica without a warrant signed by a c o l l e c t o r to the e f f e c t that the required duty had been pa i d . The case came on appeal before the King i n Council i n 1766.(162) Charles Yorke, who appeared f o r the respondent, asserted that from the moment of conquest the i s l a n d was "subject to these and other laws from the Navigation Act which have words of f u t u r i t y . " ( 1 6 3 ) This p o s i t i o n was accepted by Lord President Worthington who s t a t e d i n a r e l a t i o n to the extension of the Acts of Trade that because the l e g i s l a t u r e by a "proper d e s c r i p t i o n " and " t a l k of a f u t u r e (161) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 247 et seq. (162) Smith, Joseph H., Appeals to the P r i v y C o u n c i l from the  American P l a n t a t i o n s New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950, p. 496 et seq." (163) I b i d . PAGE 76 possession" expressed an i n t e n t i o n to bind f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n s the s a i d laws "take place as soon as the Crown has an a c t u a l i n d i s p u t a b l e T i t l e . " ( 1 6 4 ) The emphasis upon possession was necessary to bring the cases w i t h i n the words of the Navigation  Act(165) which defined the colo n i e s as "Lands, I s l a n d s , P l a n t a t i o n s or T e r r i t o r i e s " to His Majesty belonging or i n h i s possession" (and s i m i l a r phraseology i n the Act for Preventing  Frauds, (7 & 8 W i l l i a m I I I , c. 22). The same reasoning was used to extend various Imperial acts of trade without express words of extension to futu r e possessions presumably on the ba s i s that such Acts of m a n i f e s t l y u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y had an i m p l i c i t extension. Thus a law o f f i c e r ' s opinion s t a t e d that the Acts of Tonnage & Poundage of 1660, and subsequent acts r e l a t i n g to the various scales of du t i e s for imports from B r i t a i n , and f o r e i g n p l a n t a t i o n s , should apply to Guadeloupe, conquered from the French i n 1759: I am of o p i n i o n , that Guadaloupe i s to be considered as a p l a n t a t i o n , or t e r r i t o r y belonging to the King, by conquest; and I am a l s o of opinion t h a t , provided the r e q u i s i t e s of the act of n a v i g a t i o n , and the subsequent laws r e l a t i v e to the same subject matter are complied w i t h , the produce ought to be charged with the same d u t i e s , as i f imported from p l a n t a t i o n s o r i g i n a l l y B r i t i s h . The act of navigation r e l i e s not only to the p l a n t a t i o n s and t e r r i t o r i e s belonging t o , or i n the possession of, the Crown, at that time, but, to futur e a c q u i s i t i o n ; and the l a t e r a c t s , which r e l a x , or vary, i n some respects, the (164) I b i d . , at p. 498. (165) 12 Chas. 11, c. 4 (1660). PAGE 77 p r o v i s i o n s of i t , are e q u a l l y extensive....(166) S l a t t e r y notes that the p a r t i c u l a r act i n question contained nothing which e x p l i c i t l y extended i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to a f t e r - a c q u i r e d c o l o n i e s , i t simply employed general phrases such as "the E n g l i s h p l a n t a t i o n s " i n i t s book of rates.(167) A f u r t h e r opinion on the extension of Acts of parliament to the c o l o n i e s , when they are mentioned, g e n e r a l l y , as dominions of the Crown i s given by the Attorney and S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l s , De Grey, and W i l l e s , i n 1767 i n r e l a t i o n to the extension of the Act of 12 Anne s t a t . 2, c. 18 f o r Preserving Ships Stranded upon Coasts of This Kingdom or Any Other of Her Majesty's Dominions.(168) They opined that "as the t i t l e of the act of 12th of Ann. S t a t . 2, ch. 18 expressly imports to be an act f o r preserving ships and goods forced on shore, or stranded upon the coasts of t h i s Kingdom, or any other of Her Majesty's dominions, and the enacting part has words extending to Her Majesty's dominions i n general, the s a i d Act extends t o , and i s i n f o r c e i n , Her Majesty's c o l o n i e s and p l a n t a t i o n s i n America, notwithstanding the s p e c i a l promulgation of the law; and some other p r o v i s i o n s i n i t are a p p l i c a b l e only to t h i s Kingdom. (My emphasis).(169) (166) Opinion of Yorke, S o l i c i t o r General, Aug. 1759 i n Chalmers, Opinions I I , at 359, c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y at p. 347. (167) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 347. (168) Opinion of Attorney and S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l De Grey and W i l l e s , June 25, 1767, Chalmers, Opinions I , 200 et seq., c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y at p. 347. PAGE 78 Thus the opinion does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between c o l o n i e s acquired p r i o r to the enactment and those e s t a b l i s h e d subsequent to i t . Nor does the opinion give any i n d i c a t i o n that the extension r e l i e d i n any part upon whether or not E n g l i s h law formed the bas i c law of the colonies.(170) And very importantly the opinion c l e a r l y suggests that because some p r o v i s i o n s of an Imperial Act do not extend on t h e i r terms to a l l the c o l o n i e s , i t does not f o l l o w that other p r o v i s i o n s of the same Act must meet the same f a t e . I f any of the p r o v i s i o n s are expressed i n general terms, s u f f i c i e n t to bri n g a l l the c o l o n i e s w i t h i n t h e i r ambit, these p r o v i s i o n s w i l l extend and be i n force i n a l l c o l o n i z e at whatever time they are acquired. S l a t t e r y notes that F r a n c i s Maseres, the Attorney-General of Quebec, i n t e r p r e t e d the above opi n i o n to mean that the Act of 12th Ann (supra, p. 85). extended to Quebec, even though as he noted, the Act was made before the conquest of Quebec "and [was] not extended by express words to the futu r e dominions of the Crown..."(171) He f u r t h e r notes that Maseres, i n r e l a t i o n to the extension of Imperial Acts passed p r i o r to the conquest of Quebec, to Quebec remarks that they: Extend to your Majesty's fu t u r e American dominions, as w e l l as those which belonged to the Crown of Great B r i t a i n at the times of (169) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 201. (170) See d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a , p. 128 et seq. (171) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 347-8, c i t i n g the d r a f t of an intended report of the Governor and Cou n c i l of Quebec to the King concerning the s t a t e of the laws and the Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e i n that province, Feb. 1769; CD. I, 327 at 336. PAGE 79 passing them, e i t h e r by express words f o r that purpose, or by some general words that have been deemed by your Majesty's m i n i s t e r s and l a w - o f f i c e r s , by j u s t c o n s t r u c t i o n i n law, to comprehend them..."(172) The issue arose i n r e l a t i o n to the extension of various Imperial r e l i g i o u s Acts. A question was asked whether the Statute of 27 Mo. E l i z . C-2 against Romish p r i e s t s , s t a t e d to apply " i n any part of t h i s realm, or any other of her Majesty's dominions" a p p l i e d to dominions l a t e r acquired. Attorney-General Northey was of the opinion i t would so bind them: I am of the opinion t h i s law extends to the p l a n t a t i o n s they being dominions belonging to the realm of England, and extends to a l l p r i e s t s , f o r e i g n e r s , as w e l l as natives.(173) A s i m i l a r o p i n i o n was given i n r e l a t i o n to the Statute of 11 Mo. Wi l l i a m I I I f o r Preventing the Future Growth of Popery.(174) Opinions of t h i s time(175) t r e a t e d the American p l a n t a t i o n s as 'conquests' and therefore E n g l i s h law as such had no a p p l i c a t i o n unless 'received' by Imperial or l o c a l s t a t u t e , however c e r t a i n (172) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 348. (173) 1 Chalmers, Opinions, p. 2-5. (174) I b i d . (175) See f o r example Blackstone, Commentaries, 1st ed., I , at p. 105: Our American p l a n t a t i o n s are p r i n c i p a l l y of t h i s l a t t e r s o r t [conquered or ceded t e r r i t o r i e s ] being obtained i n the l a s t century e i t h e r by r i g h t of conquest and d r i v i n g out the nat i v e s .... or by t r e a t i e s . And therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or a u t h o r i t y there .... PAGE 80 st a t u t e s expressed (or n e c e s s a r i l y implied) to bind the c o l o n i e s would do so p r o p r i o v i g o r e . Since the opinions above make no d i s t i n c t i o n as to the time of a c q u i s i t i o n of the various American p l a n t a t i o n s i t seems i m p l i c i t i n the opi n i o n that such Imperial s t a t u t e s bind p r o p r i o vigore a l l t e r r i t o r i e s coming w i t h i n t h e i r general terms at any time during the l i f e of the enactment. Where the Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n express terms made a p p l i c a b l e to the c o l o n i e s g e n e r a l l y and i t i s d i r e c t e d an an e v i l common throughout such t e r r i t o r i e s , the b e t t e r view i s to impute to the l e g i s l a t o r an i n t e n t i o n that f u t u r e c o l o n i e s (even i f not foreseen at the time of enactment) be l i k e w i s e bound, e s p e c i a l l y since the l e g i s l a t i o n i s at any time subject to repeal by s p e c i f i c enactment. This p r i n c i p l e has been accepted i n a d i f f e r e n t context i n r e l a t i o n to the a p p l i c a t i o n of Dominion S t a t u t e s , passed before the admission of a 'province' i n t o the Dominion, to the provinces. In F i t z g e r a l d v. McKinley(176) i t was held that the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act (31 V i c . ch. 1) a p p l i e d to s t a t u t e s of the Dominion r e l a t i n g to Prin c e Edward I s l a n d , whether such s t a t u t e s were passed before or a f t e r the admission of the I s l a n d i n t o the Dominion. There i s no reason why the same p r i n c i p l e s that apply s t a t u t e s p r o g r e s s i v e l y to cover new s i t u a t i o n s should not hold true when considering instruments under the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e that have the force of such s t a t u t e s i n the c o l o n i e s to which (176) F i t z g e r a l d v. McKinlay (1873), Cass. Dig. 2nd ed. 107 (Can.). PAGE 81 they r e l a t e (a r u l e contained i n part i n the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1865). Thus i t would seem that the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal  Proclamation of 1763 should be construed to operate i n a prospective manner and operate so as to p r o t e c t land i n Indian possession throughout B r i t i s h North America at any time during i t s l i f e . PAGE 82 5. S t a t u t o r y E f f e c t of the Royal Pro c l a m a t i o n of 1763 ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n The controversy that e x i s t s as to the geographic scope of the Proclamation and the cases determinative of t h i s question f o r p a r t i c u l a r areas are not per se relevant to a d i s c u s s i o n on the force and e f f e c t of the Proclamation's p r o v i s i o n s . The l a t t e r i s a separate question. The f i r s t and most famous case to canvass the e f f e c t of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was Campbell v. Hall.(177) The s p e c i f i c question there r a i s e d was the v i r e s of Imperial L e t t e r s Patent of 20 J u l y 1764 imposing an export duty on the i s l a n d of Grenada, subsequent to the promise of an assembly i n the Proclamation of 1763. Although the case d i d not s p e c i f i c a l l y address the s t a t u t o r y force of the 1763 Proclamation, i t was i m p l i c i t i n the judgment that i t had such f o r c e . Thus Lord M a n s f i e l d , a f t e r noting that "The f i r s t and m a t e r i a l instrument i s the proclamation of the 7th October 1763"....,(178) comments that "The next Act i s of the 26th 1764, which, the c o n s t i t u t i o n having been e s t a b l i s h e d by the proclamation [The Royal Proclamation of 1763] i n v i t e s f u r t h e r , such as s h a l l be disposed to come and purchase, to l i v e under the c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . . " ( 1 7 9 ) (177) Campbell v. H a l l (1774), L o f f t 655, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045; 20 St. Tr. 239 (K.B.). (178) I b i d . , L o f f t p. 746. (179) I b i d . , p. 747. PAGE 83 Lord Mansfield's reference to i t as an Act i s c o n s i s t e n t with 18th century understanding of the f o r c e of major P r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . I t was widely b e l i e v e d that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had the e f f e c t of l e g i s l a t i v e l y i n t r o d u c i n g E n g l i s h laws i n the new c o l o n i e s of Quebec, the two F l o r i d a s and Grenada. A f t e r announcing new c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r these c o l o n i e s the King promised, u n t i l assemblies were summoned, that a l l persons i n h a b i t i n g i n or r e s o r t i n g to the new c o l o n i e s could confide i n the King's r o y a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r the. enjoyment of the b e n e f i t of the laws of England, and, a c c o r d i n g l y , the Governors of the four new colonies had been empowered to erect and c o n s t i t u t e courts of j u d i c a t u r e and p u b l i c j u s t i c e f o r the hearing and determining of a l l causes, both c r i m i n a l and c i v i l , according to law and e q u i t y , and as near as may be agreeable to the laws of England, with l i b e r t y to a l l persons aggrieved, i n c i v i l cases, to appeal to the P r i v y Council.(180) This issue was f i r s t r a i s e d i n r e l a t i o n to the conquered colony of Grenada. In Attorney-General v. Stewart et a l . (1817)(181) S i r W i l l i a m Grant, Master of the R o l l s , i n d e a l i n g with the question whether the King had l e g i s l a t e d by means of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 so as to introduce E n g l i s h laws i n t o Grenada, commented f i r s t t h a t : "The case of Campbell v. H a l l (1 (180) Royal Proclamation of 1763, (Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix I I , No. 1. See Appendix I. (181) Attorney General v. Stewart et a l . (1817), 2 Mer. 143 at 157-58. PAGE 84 Cowp. 204) determined nothing as to the e f f e c t of the proclamation i n i n t r o d u c i n g the laws of England i n t o the I s l a n d of Grenada..." However he went on to say: "How the law of England became the law of the I s l a n d of Grenada i s not d i s t i n c t l y s t a t e d . Grenada was a conquered colony, i n which French laws p r e v a i l e d at the time of the Conquest. The King might undoubtedly abrogate these, and s u b s t i t u t e the laws of England i n t h e i r place. And i t seems to be supposed that t h i s was done by the proclamation of 1763....".(182) That E n g l i s h law was introduced i s uncontroverted, he thus concludes: " i n whatsoever way the E n g l i s h law may have been introduced i n t o Grenada, there can be no doubt that i t was received and acknowledged law of the i s l a n d . For though there i s no Act of Assembly, e x p r e s s l y recognized or adopting i t , there are Acts which p l a i n l y imply that i t was considered as having been recognized and adopted. And i n the courts of j u d i c a t u r e , i t was the E n g l i s h and not the French law that was administered i n c i v i l as w e l l as c r i m i n a l cases."(183) One may ask what then, other than the Royal  Proclamation of 1763, introduced E n g l i s h law, given that i n the absence of such i n t r o d u c t i o n , Grenada being a conquered colony, French law would have p r e v a i l e d . The question of whether the Royal Proclamation of 1763 l e g i s l a t i v e l y introduced E n g l i s h law was r a i s e d again i n r e l a t i o n to Quebec. Though Quebec was a ceded t e r r i t o r y , and French law (182) I b i d . , p. 157. (183) I b i d . PAGE 85 would p r e v a i l there i n the absence of l e g i s l a t i o n to the contrary, subsequent to the proclamation of 1763 E n g l i s h laws were administered by the Quebec Courts. In the le a d i n g case of Stuart v. Bowman(184) i t was held by the t r i a l court that the E n g l i s h C i v i l Laws had not been introduced i n t o Canada by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Mr. J u s t i c e Vanfelson, f o r the Court, holding as regards the Proclamation: "I thought, at the time of the argument, that the En g l i s h law had been introduced by that Proclamation, but upon f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n I now b e l i e v e that was an erroneous opinion. The terms of the Proclamation are by no means s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t and formal to be considered as i n t r o d u c i n g the body of the E n g l i s h law".(185) Mr. J u s t i c e Smith, d i s s e n t i n g , noted that i t had been held that the Proclamation was a mere d e c l a r a t i o n of i n t e n t that His Majesty's subjects i n the then Province of Quebec should be maintained i n the enjoyment of the laws of England. In response to t h i s argument he comments that " t h i s has been c o n t r a d i c t e d by the establishment of Courts of J u s t i c e , which are ordered to administer j u s t i c e and e q u i t y , as nearly as may be, i n conformity with the laws of England"(186) and continues: " I f the Crown had the r i g h t to make such a d e c l a r a t i o n as that contained i n the proclamation, and i t s i n t e n t i o n to introduce the E n g l i s h law, was thereby made d i s t i n c t l y (184) Stuart v. Bowman (1852), 2 L.C.R. 369 (Quebec S . C ) . (185) I b i d . , at p. 443-444. (186) I b i d . , at p. 394. PAGE 86 manifest, we have nothing to do but to c a r r y that i n t e n t i o n i n t o e f f e c t . " These matters were considered during the debates of the Quebec Act of 1774. The l a t t e r Act enacted i n se c t i o n 4 that l i k e p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 so f a r as r e l a t e d to the c i v i l government and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , i s revoked, annulled and made v o i d . And importantly notes: Could t h i s Act have f o r m a l l y abrogated that which had never subsisted? Was not the i n t e n t i o n of the Crown, and the acquiescence of the Parliament up to t h i s p e r i o d made manifest by t h i s Act? I t d i d not declare i t to have been n u l l , but annulled i t from and a f t e r a c e r t a i n date. The mere e f f e c t of our becoming subjects of the Sovereign of Great B r i t a i n , renders us Subject a l s o to the proclamation, issued by h i s P r i v y C o u n c i l , up to the time that Parliament saw f i t to i n t e r f e r e , and t h i s Act, by i t s terms, maintained what had been done by v i r t u e of that proclamation, only a n n u l l i n g i t f o r the f u t u r e . By the eighth s e c t i o n the r i g h t to hold property by Canadian subjects under the o l d tenure i s conceded, "as i f the s a i d proclamation, & c , had not been made," & c , f u r t h e r o r d e r i n g , that f o r the d e c i s i o n of matters i n d i s p u t e , r e l a t i v e to property and c i v i l r i g h t s , recourse s h a l l be had to the laws of Canada. The Imperial Parliament p l a i n l y h e l d , then, that i t required a d i s t i n c t enactment on t h e i r part to re-convey to the Canadians t h e i r r i g h t s to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the French system of laws, which they must consequently have held to have been formerly taken away by the c a p i t u l a t i o n and proclamation.(187) The words of the Quebec Act, 1774(188) evidence an i n t e n t i o n to abrogate c e r t a i n of Proclamation's p r o v i s i o n s and the m a j o r i t y judgment does not deal s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with t h i s p o i n t . Moreover i n holding that E n g l i s h laws were not introduced i n t o Quebec by (187) I b i d . , at p. 395-6. (188) Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. I l l , c. 83 (U.K.). PAGE 87 the Proclamation the court r e l i e s to a lar g e extent on the vagueness of the language p u r p o r t i n g to do so, a problem not encountered on the wording i n the Indian p r o v i s i o n s where the ambiguity and u n c e r t a i n t y i s only as to geographic scope. On appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench the t r i a l d e c i s i o n was upheld.(189) Alywin J . , however, holding the Quebec Act, 1774 had the e f f e c t of according the Proclamation l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y : This s e c t i o n i n thus revoking the Proclamation, the governors Commission and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Ordinances r e l a t i v e to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , and a l l commissions to judges, p r o s p e c t i v e l y and from a day to a r r i v e , v i z , 1 May 1775, i m p l i e d l y and n e c e s s a r i l y contains a r e c o g n i t i o n by the Parliament of Great B r i t a i n of the a u t h o r i t y of these Ordinances and Commissions and gives them a L e g i s l a t i v e Sanction.(190) The p o i n t at issue i n the case was the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c i v i l law i n t o Quebec and the case i s not a u t h o r i t y i n s o f a r as the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c r i m i n a l law i s concerned. In f a c t E n g l i s h c r i m i n a l law. was widely b e l i e v e d to have been introduced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Although Stuart v. Bowman was accepted i n Wilcox Wilcox(191) the u n c e r t a i n t y and confusion remained.. In Q^ v. Coote(192) (1873) the court suggested that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was res p o n s i b l e f o r the (189) (1853), 3 L.C.R. 309 (Q.B.) at p. 348 per Roll a n d J . ; and p. 399 per Modelet J . (190) I b i d . , per Aylwin J . , at p. 388. (191) Wilcox v. Wilcox (1858), 8 L.C.R. 34 (Q.B.) per Lafontaine C.J. at p. 42-50. (192) Q^ v. Coote (1873), Cases i n P.C. v o l . 14. PAGE 88 i n t r o d u c t i o n of E n g l i s h law i n t o Lower Canada. The u n c e r t a i n t y re the Royal Proclamation's e f f e c t i n r e l a t i o n to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of E n g l i s h law(193) i n t o Quebec was only c l e a r e d up by passage of the Quebec Act, 1774. Professor Hogg comments: The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (at l e a s t by i m p l i c a t i o n ) and an ordinance of the f i r s t E n g l i s h Governor, imposed E n g l i s h law i n the newly-acquired colony, thereby excluding the p r e - e x i s t i n g French c i v i l law ... i f E n g l i s h law had not been ex p r e s s l y imposed, the general r u l e of the common law with respect to a colony acquired by conquest (as opposed to settlement) was that the p r e - e x i s t i n g law of the conquered people would continue i n f o r c e , except i n matters i n v o l v i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the conquered people and t h e i r new sovereign (Campell v. H a l l (1774) 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045).(194) And as to the e f f e c t of the Quebec Act of 1774 comments: The Quebec Act of 1774 (Quebec Act, 1774 (Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix I I , No. 2) replaced the Proclamation of 1763 as the  C o n s t i t u t i o n of Quebec. The Quebec Act  r e s t o r e d the pre-conquest law as the p r i v a t e law of the colony.(195) (My emphasis) thus r e i t e r a t i n g the d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n of Mr. J u s t i c e Smith i n Stuart v. Bowman.(196) And i t i s an uncontroverted f a c t that E n g l i s h laws were being administered by the Quebec courts of superior j u r i s d i c t i o n subsequent to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The change was e f f e c t e d by an Imperial Act of Parliament (Quebec Act, 1774). (193) See Donegani v. Donegani (1835), 1 Can. Rep. A.C. 50 at 65. (194) Hogg, P.W., C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law of Canada ( C a r s w e l l : 1977) p. 296. (195) I b i d . (196) Supra, footnote 184. PAGE 89 This i s c o n s i s t e n t with the judgment of Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l (Spence and Laskin J J . , concurring) i n Calder v. A.G.B.C.(197) who i n commenting on the s t a t u t o r y f o r c e of the Royal Proclamation says: That i t was regarded as being the law of England i s c l e a r from the f a c t that when i t was deemed ad v i s a b l e to amend i t the amendment was e f f e c t e d by an Act of Parliament, namely the Quebec Act of 1774... ( i i ) S t a t u t o r y E f f e c t of the Indian P r o v i s i o n s of The Royal  Proclamation of 1763 I t i s c l e a r that the Indian P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation were seen i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , even i n Quebec. The Quebec Council d e c l i n e d on s e v e r a l occasions i n the l a t e 1760s to accede to land grants re lands claimed by the Indians.(198) The reason f o r t h i s being t h a t : The lands so prayed to be assigned are, or are claimed to be the property of the Indians, and as such by His Majesty's express command as set  f o r t h i n h i s proclamation of 1763, not w i t h i n t h e i r power to grant.(199) (My emphasis) I t i s i m p l i c i t i n t h i s Report that the Indian P r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation of 1763 are of s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t (at l e a s t i n s o f a r as areas c l e a r l y covered by the Proclamation are concerned). A s i m i l a r opinion was d e l i v e r e d by the Board of Trade i n 1767.(200) (197) Calder v. A.-G. B.C. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, at p. 203. (198) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y , p. 309. (199) I b i d , c i t i n g Minutes of the Quebec C o u n c i l , 27 December 1766; P.A.C. RA 1, E l , V o l . 3, p. 293. (200) I b i d . , p. 310-11 commenting on a Board of Trade report on the a u t h e n t i c i t y of a land c e s s i o n made by the Mohawk PAGE 90 There i s no reason why the Orders t h e r e i n , d i r e c t e d i n c l e a r and d i s t i n c t language at B r i t i s h Subjects (not to purchase land or s e t t l e i n the Indian reserve and to remove themselves from settlement upon any unsurrendered lands) should not be held to be of binding s t a t u t o r y f o r c e on B r i t i s h subjects.(201) Such has been the e f f e c t of j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n on t h i s s u b j e c t . The Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation were r a i s e d d i r e c t l y i n Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823).(202) Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l r e f e r r i n g to the e f f e c t of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 throughout the American c o n t i n e n t , s t a t e d : The a u t h o r i t y of t h i s proclamation, so f a r as i t respected t h i s c o n t i n e n t , has never been denied, and the t i t l e s i t gave to lands have always been sustained i n our courts.(203) Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l held that the Proclamation operated so as to i n v a l i d a t e c e r t a i n land conveyances made to p r i v a t e persons by the Indians, such being i n c o n s i s t e n t with i t s p r o v i s i o n s . In Halloway v. Doe D. Buck the Kentucky Court of Appeal came to a s i m i l a r holding i n respect to a t r a c t of land s o l d by the Cherokee Indians to a p r i v a t e company. Chief J u s t i c e Boyle h o l d i n g : The Indian deed c e r t a i n l y conveyed no i n t e r e s t . . . A l l purchases by i n d i v i d u a l s from the Indians, were expressly forbidden by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which remained i n Indians to S i r W i l l i a m Johnson, Superintendent of Indian A f f a i r s f o r the North. Recited i n Order i n C o u n c i l of 26 August 1767; APC, IV, 750. (201) See d i s c u s s i o n above, p. 88 and sequence. (202) 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C). (203) I b i d . , at p. 597. PAGE 91 force u n t i l the r e v o l u t i o n , by which the then American c o l o n i e s became independent states....(204) In the l a t e r case of United States v. M i t c h e l l (1835) (205) a f t e r commenting that the Indian r i g h t of occupancy was "as sacred as the fee of the whites" M a r s h a l l , C.J., comments that such an understanding was adopted " i n the proclamation of October 1763 .... as the law which should govern the enjoyment and transmission of Indian and vacant lands."(206) In Canada the Proclamation's Indian p r o v i s i o n s were d i r e c t l y r a i s e d i n the St. Catherines M i l l i n g and Lumber case.(207) This case involved a dispute between the Province of Ontario and the Government of Canada as to ownership of c e r t a i n lands ceded by the Salteaux Tribe i n an 1873 t r e a t y with the Dominion. The Indian land i n question was c l e a r l y w i t h i n the geographic purview of the Proclamation. The P r i v y C o u n c i l c l e a r l y a s c r i b e d Indian land t i t l e to the p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation: Whilst there has been no change si n c e the year 1763 i n the character of the i n t e r e s t which i t s i n h a b i t a n t s had i n the lands surrendered by the t r e a t y . Their possession, such as i t was, can  only be a s c r i b e d to the general p r o v i s i o n s made  by the Royal Proclamation i n favour of a l l  Indian t r i b e s then l i v i n g under the Sovereignty (204) (1823), 4 L i t t e l l 293; 14 Kentucky R. 293 at 294 c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y at p. 311. (205) 34 U.S. 711, at pp. 745-6. (206) I b i d , and see Montgomery v. Ives (1849), 13 Smedes & M. 161 (Miss. H.C.) at pp. 174-5. (207) St. Catherine's M i l l i n g and Lumber Co. v. Pw (1899), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.); (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can. S . C ) ; (1886), 13 O.A.R. 148 (Ont. C A . ) ; (1885) 10 O.R. 196 (Ont. Ch. D i v . ) . PAGE 92 and p r o t e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h Crown.(208) (My emphasis) The P r i v y C o u n c i l held the l e g a l i n t e r e s t of the Indians to be "personal and usufru c t u a r y " , and to be "dependent upon the goo d w i l l of the Sovereign". The meaning to be a s c r i b e d to these statements has since been q u a l i f i e d by the Guerin decision.(209) For our purposes i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to note that the P r i v y C o u n c i l held that the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 di d give r i s e to a l e g a l l y enforceable i n t e r e s t . Such i s con s i s t e n t with the views of Mr. J u s t i c e Strong d i s s e n t i n g i n the Supreme Court of Canada, i n the St. Catherine's case.(210) Mr. J u s t i c e Strong reviewed the American case law as r e f l e c t i n g the con s i s t e n t p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h government "as c o n s i s t i n g i n the re c o g n i t i o n by the Crown of an usufructuary t i t l e i n the Indians to a l l unsurrendered lands"(211) and concluded: Therefore, when we consider that with reference to Canada the uniform p r a c t i c e has always been to recognize the Indian t i t l e as one which could only be d e a l t with by surrender to the Crown, I maintain that i f there had been an e n t i r e absence of any w r i t t e n l e g i s l a t i v e act  ord a i n i n g t h i s r u l e as an express p o s i t i v e law [ i . e . , The Royal Proclamation of 1763] we ought, j u s t as the United States courts have done, to hold that i t nevertheless e x i s t e d as a r u l e of unwritten common law, which the courts were bound to enforce as such....(212) (My (208) I b i d . 14 App. Cas. at p. 54. (209) Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. (210) St. Catherine's M i l l i n g & Lumber Co. v. R^ (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can. S . C ) . (211) I b i d . , p. 608. (212) I b i d . , p. 613. PAGE 93 emphasis). Mr. J u s t i c e Strong thus would accord the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation s t a t u t o r y f o r c e . And t h i s was taken to have been decided by t h i s case i n two l a t e r cases. In v. Lady McMaster(213) the Exchequer Court of Canada held that a long term lease, (with r i g h t of renewal) over lands w i t h i n the Indian reserve set up by the Proclamation the 1763, was i n v a l i d because i t was i n contravention of the Proclamation's p r o v i s i o n s . Mr. J u s t i c e Maclean s t a t e d : The proclamation of 1763, as has been h e l d , has  the f o r c e of a s t a t u t e , and so f a r t h e r e i n as the r i g h t s of the Indians are concerned, i t has never been repealed.(214) (My emphasis) presumably r e f e r r i n g to the d e c i s i o n i n St. Catherines case as a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n as t h i s was the only case to which he had r e f e r r e d at t h i s p o i n t . And the Supreme Court of Canada i n the l a t e r case of Easterbrook v. R(215) a l s o held the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation to have for c e of s t a t u t e . I t again concerned a l e a s e , the contents of which need not d e t a i n us. In holding the lease v o i d the Court s t a t e d t h a t : ...the lease was i n e f f e c t i v e and vo i d at law, by reason of the absence of any a u t h o r i t y i n the part of the grantors to make i t , and f o r  non-compliance with the peremptory requirements  of the proclamation [of 1763], which have the  force of statute..(216) (My emphasis) (213) [1926] Ex. CR. 68. (214) I b i d . , at p. 72. (215) [1931] S.C.R. 210, a f f i r m i n g [1929] Ex. CR. 28. (216) I b i d . , at pp. 217-8. PAGE 94 And as Robertson J . s a i d i n Regina v. Kruger and Manuel(217) i t s s t a t u t o r y f o r c e was that of an Imperial s t a t u t e : Assuming (without expressing any opinion) that the Proclamation has the forc e of S t a t u t e , i t cannot be s a i d to be an Act of Parliament of Canada: there was no Parliament of Canada before 1867 and by no s t r e t c h of the imagination can a proclamation made by the Sovereign i n 1763 be s a i d to be an Act of a l e g i s l a t i v e body which was not created u n t i l more than 100 years l a t e r . ( 2 1 8 ) Not only have j u d i c i a l statements accorded the Proclamations Indian p r o v i s i o n the force of s t a t u t e , some have gone f u r t h e r and suggested i t to be an entrenched charter of Indian r i g h t s . Thus Mr. J u s t i c e Sissons, of the T e r r i t o r i a l Court of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s i n Regina v. Koonungnak(219) s t a t e d : This proclamation has been spoken of as the "Charter of Indian R i g h t s " . L i k e so many great c h a r t e r s i n E n g l i s h h i s t o r y i t does not create r i g h t s but rather a f f i r m s o l d rights...(220) And Mr. J u s t i c e N o r r i s i n R^ v. White and Bob(221) s t a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to the extinguishment of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s t h a t ; . . . i t would have required s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n to e x t i n g u i s h the a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s and i t i s dou b t f u l whether c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , even of  a s p e c i f i c k i n d , would e x t i n g u i s h these r i g h t s  i n view of the f a c t that such r i g h t s had been  confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1973.(222) (217) [1975] 5 W.W.R. 167 B.C.C.A. (218) I b i d , at p. 170. (219) (1964), 42 C.R. 143; (1963-64), 45 W.W.R. 282 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct. ) . (220) I b i d . , at p. 160 of C.R. (221) (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.). PAGE 95 C l e a r l y f o r Mr. J u s t i c e N o r r i s the s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t of the proclamation was equal to that of an Imperial Statute since i t i s only the l a t t e r that i s protected from C o l o n i a l overide.(223) The judgment of Mr. J u s t i c e N o r r i s was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada without reasons.(224) In Calder v. A.G.B.C. Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l , f o r himself and two other judges i n commenting on the guarantee of Indian r i g h t s contained i n the Proclamation of 1763 s a i d : This proclamation was an Executive Order having the f o r c e and e f f e c t of an Act of Parliament and was described by Gwynne J . , i n St.  Catherine's M i l l i n g case at p. 652 as the "Indian B i l l of Ri g h t s " : see a l s o Campbell v. H a l l . I t s f o r c e as a s t a t u t e i s analogous to the s t a t u s of Magna Carta which has always been considered to be law throughout the Empire.(22 5) Although Judson J . (Martland and R i t c h i e J J . concurring) i n the same case held that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 could not apply to B r i t i s h Columbia he i m p l i c i t l y accepted i t s s t a t u t o r y f o r c e . A f t e r commenting on the judgment of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n the St. Catherine's case, Judson J . s t a t e d : There can be no doubt that the P r i v y C ouncil found the Proclamation of 1763 was the o r i g i n of the Indian t i t l e — "Their possession, such as i t was, can only be a s c r i b e d to the .... ro y a l proclamation i n favour of a l l Indian (222) I b i d . , at p. 662 of Dominion Law Report's quoted i n R^ v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460, at p. 485 (N.S.S.C. App. D i v . ) . (223) See d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a on the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act,  1865. (224) (1966), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481 (S.C.C.). (225) Calder v. A.G.B.C. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, [1973] S.C.R. 313, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1 at p. 203 of D.L.R.. PAGE 96 t r i b e s then l i v i n g under the Sovereignty and p r o t e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h Crown..."(226) Judson J . commented that the Proclamation was not, however, the sole source of Indian t i t l e and accepted a common law t i t l e based on o r i g i n a l occupation and use. In f i n d i n g the l a t t e r was extinguished by the pre-confederation land l e g i s l a t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia Judson J . cannot be taken as saying such l e g i s l a t i o n would be ope r a t i v e to e x t i n g u i s h Indian r i g h t s expressed i n the Proclamation. The point d i d not a r i s e to be determined given h i s f i n d i n g on the geographic scope of the Proclamation. Lord Denning i n v. Secretary of State f o r Foreign and  Commonwealth A f f a i r s , ( 2 2 7 ) s t a t e d of the Proclamation that i t "was equivalent to an entrenched p r o v i s i o n i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the c o l o n i e s i n North America" and that i t continued to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y binding on the dominion and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s even a f t e r Confederation. Recent d e c i s i o n s have made i t c l e a r that a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s a common law r i g h t , not dependent upon the Royal Proclamation the Indian Act, or any other l e g i s l a t i v e recognition.(228) But such i n no way negates the f a c t that the common law r i g h t i s given s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t by such l e g i s l a t i o n . As Mr. J u s t i c e N o r r i s concluded the proclamation of 1763 was "de c l a r a t o r y and confirmatory of a b o r i g i n a l rights."(229) And where an Act of (226) I b i d . , at p. 152 D.L.R. (227) [1982] 2 A l l E.R. 118 (C.A.), at pp. 124, 125. (228) Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, at p. 378 and Calder v. A.G.B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313. PAGE 97 Parliament, according to i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n , has embraced and confirmed a r i g h t which p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e d at common law or by custom or p r e s c r i p t i o n , such r i g h t becomes thenceforth a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t and the lower r i g h t i s merged i n and extinguished to the extent i t i s declared i n the statute.(230) The Royal Proclamation of 1763 i s noted (together with the Quebec Act 1774) i n the Appendix to the 1970 r e v i s e d s t a t u t e s of Canada.(231) Throughout the years since the Proclamation a l l l e g i s l a t i o n i n the form of the various Indian Acts o p e r a t i v e throughout Canada continued the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of the Proclamation's provisions.(232) The contin u i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Proclamation i s evidenced by i t s i n c l u s i o n i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982.(233) Section 25 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982 s t a t e s : 25. The guarantee i n t h i s Charter of c e r t a i n r i g h t s and freedoms s h a l l not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any a b o r i g i n a l , t r e a t y or other r i g h t s or freedoms that p e r t a i n to the a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada i n c l u d i n g : (a) any r i g h t s or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (229) Supra, footnote 221 at p. 636 of D.L.R. (230) See New Windsor Corpn. v. Ta y l o r , [1899] A.C. 41. (231) Royal Proclamation of 1763, ((Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix I I , No. 1. See Appendix I. (232) R_^  v. Lady McMaster, [1926] Ex. CR. 68 at p. 73. (233) C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). PAGE 98 (b any r i g h t s or freedoms that now e x i s t by way of land c l a i m agreements or may be so acquired. This s e c t i o n , c l e a r l y i n s e r t e d to protec t the s p e c i a l r i g h t s of the a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada from the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Charter, recognizes that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 s t a t u t o r i l y recognized c e r t a i n a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s . These r i g h t s are recognized and confirmed by s. 35 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1982 which s t a t e s : 35. (1) The e x i s t i n g a b o r i g i n a l and t r e a t y r i g h t s of the a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada are thereby recognized and a f f i r m e d . (2) In t h i s A c t , " a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada" in c l u d e s Indian, I n u i t and Metis peoples of Canada. (3) For greater c e r t a i n t y , i n subsection (1) , " t r e a t y r i g h t s " includes r i g h t s that now e x i s t by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired (Const. Act, 1982, as amended March 1983). Lord Denning s a i d of s e c t i o n 35: I t seems to me that the Canada B i l l i t s e l f does a l l that can be done to protec t the r i g h t s and freedoms of the a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada. I t entrenches them as part of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , so that they cannot be diminished or reduced except by the p r e s c r i b e d procedure and by the p r e s c r i b e d m a j o r i t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , i t provides f o r a conference at the highest l e v e l to be held so as to s e t t l e e x a c t l y what t h e i r r i g h t s are.... There i s nothing, so f a r as I can see, to warrant any d i s t r u s t by the Indians of the government of Canada.... They w i l l be able to say that t h e i r r i g h t s and freedoms have been guaranteed to them by the Crown - o r i g i n a l l y by the Crown i n respect of the United Kingdom — now by the Crown i n respect of Canada — but, i n any case, by the Crown. No parliament should do anything to lessen the worth of these guarantees. They should be honoured by the Crown i n respect of Canada "so long as the sun PAGE 99 r i s e s and the r i v e r flows". That promise must never be broken.(234) Presumably Lord Denning i n t a l k i n g of the guarantee f o r Indian r i g h t s o r i g i n a l l y given by the Crown i n respect of the United Kingdom i s t a l k i n g of the guarantee contained i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763. I t seems c l e a r the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has, i n Canada, been t r e a t e d as having the force and e f f e c t of an Imperial s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g to the c o l o n i e s . I t w i l l elsewhere be argued that such major Pre r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e was e x p l i c i t l y recognized as having such f o r c e i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865 and that having such force i t operated so as to v o i d repugnant c o l o n i a l laws to the extent of any such repugnancy.(235) In order to f u l l y understand the import of the Royal  Proclamation of 1763 i t i s necessary to understand the h i s t o r i c a l roots of the Sovereign's P r e r o g a t i v e powers and B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s governing the nature and e x e r c i s e of t h i s power i n newly acquired t e r r i t o r i e s . (234) R^ v. Secretary of State f o r Foreign and Commonwealth A f f a i r s , [1982] 2 A l l E.R. 118 (CA.) at p. 126 et seq. (235) See d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a p. 211 et seq. PAGE 100 PART I I ; THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE AS IT RELATES TO THE COLONIES 1 . The Royal P r e r o g a t i v e ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n P r e r o g a t i v e O r d e r s a r e n o t d e l e g a t e d l e g i s l a t i o n . They a r e t h e e x e r c i s e by t h e S o v e r e i g n ( a l b e i t w i t h a d v i c e ) o f Her r e s i d u a l p o w e r s t o l e g i s l a t e w i t h o u t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f P a r l i a m e n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e y a r e o r i g i n a l l e g i s l a t i o n . ( 2 3 6 ) The s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t o f s u c h P r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n i s r e c o g n i z e d by B e n n i o n ( 2 3 7 ) who, i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f A c t s o f P a r l i a m e n t s t a t e s , " A p a r t f r o m A c t s , and i n s t r u m e n t s made u n d e r  t h e R o y a l P r e r o g a t i v e , no i n s t r u m e n t made by P a r l i a m e n t s e p a r a t e l y , o r by a n y o t h e r o r g a n o f s t a t e , h a s t h e q u a l i t y o f l a w p r o p r i o v i g o r e ( b y i t s own f o r c e ) . I f an i n s t r u m e n t s o made d o e s h a v e l e g i s l a t i v e e f f e c t , i t i s a s d e l e g a t e d l e g i s l a t i o n o p e r a t i n g by v i r t u e o f an A c t " . Thus t h e maxim t h a t o n l y P a r l i a m e n t c a n l e g i s l a t e by S t a t u t e d o e s n o t deny t h e o r i g i n a l c h a r a c t e r a n d a u t h o r i t y o f P r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n where s u c h l i e s w i t h i n Crown c o m p e t e n c e a n d c o m p l i e s t h e n e c e s s a r y f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a t t e n d a n t on s u c h l e g i s l a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e p r e s e n c e o f a n y a n c i e n t document v o u c h e d a s a s t a t u t e on t h e P a r l i a m e n t R o l l , o r i t s a b s e n c e t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t c o n c l u s i v e f o r o r a g a i n s t i t s l e g i s l a t i v e v a l i d i t y . ( 2 3 8 ) Inasmuch a s p r e r o g a t i v e (236) S u p r a , f o o t n o t e 9 5 , C r a i e s p. 289 and s e e H a l s . , S t a t u t e s o f E n g l a n d , ( 3 r d e d . p. 4 7 6 ) . (237) F r a n c i s B e n n i o n , S t a t u t o r y I n t e r p r e t a t i o n (KF 425 B 4 6 5 ) . (238) The P r i n c e ' s C a s e ( 1 6 0 8 ) , 8 Co. Rep. 206. PAGE 101 orders, commands or p r o h i b i t i o n s have been always acquiesced i n as unquestionably authentic and a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of the Crown's d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s u n i v e r s a l r e c e p t i o n e s t a b l i s h e s and confirms t h e i r authority.(239) Such has been e x p l i c i t l y recognized i n r e l a t i o n to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 by the Supreme Court of the United States.(240) In Canada the Proclamation has been held to have the for c e and e f f e c t of a Statute.(241) Notwithstanding t h i s i t has, from time to time, been asserted that the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s 'Indian p r o v i s i o n s ' , does not have the force and e f f e c t of a B r i t i s h Act of Parliament extending to the c o l o n i e s . I t i s thus necessary to understand something of the h i s t o r i c a l roots of the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e and i t s e x e r c i s e and l e g a l e f f e c t where Prerogative Instruments are promulgated and expressed to apply to the B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s . (239) Supra, footnote 95, C r a i e s , p. 52 c i t i n g Hawkins, preface to Statutes (1735). (240) See d i s c u s s i o n , i n f r a p. 88 et seq. (241) Pw v. Lady McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68 (Can. Ex.). PAGE 10 2 ( i i ) H i s t o r i c a l Roots of the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e The sovereign i n B r i t a i n possessed various executive and l e g i s l a t i v e powers derived d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y from the p r e r o g a t i v e , general Acts of Parliament and S p e c i a l Acts of Parliament which conferred upon the Crown e x t r a o r d i n a r y r i g h t s and powers. The Royal p r e r o g a t i v e has been v a r i o u s l y described. I t meant to Blackstone the s p e c i a l preeminence of the King;(242) to Dicey, the residue of the d i s c r e t i o n a r y or a r b i t r a r y power l e g a l l y l e f t at any time i n the hands of the Crown;(243) to Lord Haldane i t meant the common law as d i s t i n c t from the s t a t u t o r y powers of the Crown.(244) Whatever i t s p r e c i s e meaning might be the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e can be defined as a l l those powers and p r i v i l e g e s conferred upon the Crown without express l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . The Royal p r e r o g a t i v e i s of ancient o r i g i n . 'Prerogative' s i g n i f i e s something required or demanded before, or i n preference to a l l others.(245) Though the e a r l i e s t s t a t u t o r y expression of the p r e r o g a t i v e Royal i s found i n the Statute of M Ed. 2 s t . 1 de prero g a t i v e r e g i s , i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted that t h i s s t a t u t e was (242) 1 B i a . Comm. 239. (243) Dussault, Rene, A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law: A T r e a t i s e by Rene  Dussault and Lovis Borgeat; t r a n s l a t e d by M. Rankin 2nd ed. Toronto: C a r s w e l l , 1985, p. 314, c i t i n g J.B.D. M i t c h e l l , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 173. (244) I b i d . (245) C h i t t y , Joseph, A T r e a t i s e on the Laws of the Pre r o g a t i v e s  of the Crown, London: Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1820. PAGE 10 3 merely d e c l a r a t i v e of the common law.(246) H i s t o r i c a l l y the Royal Prerogative was the foundation of the l e g i s l a t i v e power ex e r c i s e d by the B r i t i s h sovereign. In 1539, Henry V I I I under the Statute  of Proclamations(247) received the power to issue proclamations of a l e g i s l a t i v e nature. Such proclamations as might be issued were, however, not to e f f e c t or change property r i g h t s , common law p r i n c i p l e s or p r o v i s i o n s of s t a t u t o r y law. U n t i l the r e v o l u t i o n of 1688 t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e power was shared between the King and Parliament. Following the r e v o l u t i o n , Parliament l a i d c l a i m to the power of making laws, the power of ad m i n i s t e r i n g and executing those laws being l e f t to the King. Such l e g i s l a t i v e powers that remained to the King i n B r i t a i n were not of a d e l i b e r a t i v e kind — he no longer had the power to propound laws but merely the pr e r o g a t i v e r i g h t of r e j e c t i o n of suggested laws.(248) This was the general r u l e , however, the Crown d i d r e t a i n the r i g h t i n c e r t a i n cases to enact r e g u l a t i o n s without p r i o r d e l e g a t i o n being w r i t t e n i n t o a s t a t u t e . And t h i s power where i t e x i s t e d was not a delegated power but an o r i g i n a l l e g i s l a t i v e power being a residue of the l e g i s l a t i v e power formerly held by the King and which he l o s t to Parliament. This independent r e g u l a t i o n making power, h i s t o r i c a l l y enjoyed by the King, f e l l i n t o disuse as Parliament with a v i r t u a l monopoly on l e g i s l a t i v e power began i n c r e a s i n g l y to delegate l e g i s l a t i v e (246) I b i d . , c i t i n g 2 I n s t . 496, 263, 10 Co. 64. Bendl 117. (247) 1539, 31 Hen. V I I I , c. 8, repeated 1547, 1 Edw. IV, c. 12, s. 4. (248) Supra, footnote 245, at p. 3. PAGE 10 4 power to the Crown or various a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies. Of more i n t e r e s t are the more extensive p r e r o g a t i v e powers enjoyed by the Crown a r i s i n g out of i t s r o l e as Supreme Executive Magistrate under the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n . C h i t t y s t a t e s As supreme magistrate, the King possesses, subject to the law of the land, e x c l u s i v e , d e l i b e r a t e , and more decided, more extensive, and more d i s c r e t i o n a r y r i g h t s and powers.(249) And goes on to l i s t among such p r i n c i p a l prerogatives the pr e r o g a t i v e with respect to f o r e i g n states and a f f a i r s ; the prerogatives with respect to j u s t i c e and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of laws and that r e l a t i n g to the superintendency and care of commerce i n c e r t a i n cases. Such prerogatives gave the B r i t i s h Crown extensive d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers, many of which had relevance to the Crown's powers i n B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s . The p r e r o g a t i v e with respect to f o r e i g n s t a t e s and a f f a i r s embraced a general power over e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s (and hence a c q u i s i t i o n of new t e r r i t o r y ) and an e x c l u s i v e power to declare war and peace and make t r e a t i e s (and consequently to acquire t e r r i t o r y by v i r t u e of conquest and c e s s i o n ) . The prerogatives enjoyed by the Crown as the f o u n t a i n of j u s t i c e included the pardoning of offe n d e r s , the issue of the w r i t of habeas corpus, the prerogative of mercy and the i s s u i n g of proclamations.(250) I t i s appropriate here to b r i e f l y e x p l a i n the Crown's prerogative to issue proclamations. Proclamations were made by the Sovereign alone and became law on the a f f i x i n g of the Great (249) Supra, footnote 245, p. 3. (250) I b i d . , p. 6. PAGE 10 5 S e a l , under the a u t h o r i t y of a warrant bearing the King's si g n a t u r e . They were approved i n d r a f t by Order-in-Council.(251) The p r e r o g a t i v e respecting proclamations enabled the King as executive Magistrate to command and enforce the performance by h i s subjects of e x i s t i n g laws and to make or a l t e r r e g u l a t i o n s  over which His Majesty had a s p e c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . ( 2 5 2 ) I t d i d not e n t i t l e him to break through those fundamental p r i n c i p l e s on which the l e g i s l a t i v e power of government i s founded, by commanding the observance of matters not sanctioned by Parliament. I t merely enabled the Crown to proclaim the manner, time and circumstances of p u t t i n g those laws i n t o execution.(253) Such r e s t r i c t i o n s were c l e a r l y stated i n the Proclamations  Case.(254) However, the r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on the ex e r c i s e of the prer o g a t i v e i n B r i t a i n do not n e c e s s a r i l y apply to l i m i t the Crown's powers i n B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s . Whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r p r e r o g a t i v e extends to a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y depends upon (1) whether the l e g a l systems which forms the bas i c law i n the t e r r i t o r y concerned i s or i s not E n g l i s h law and (2) the category of prer o g a t i v e to which i t belongs. (251) Roberts-Wray, S i r Kenneth. Commonwealth and C o l o n i a l Law, London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, p. 144. (252) 1 B i a . Comm. 270; 5 Bac. A6, 549, t i t l e : P r e r o g a t i v e (253) Supra, footnote 245, pp. 2-5. (254) Proclamations Case (1610), 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 E.R. 1352. PAGE 106 Turning f i r s t to the question of the law i n force i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s , t h i s cannot be f u l l y understood without an understanding of the ways i n which t e r r i t o r i e s f i r s t come under B r i t i s h Sovereignty and the consequential e f f e c t the various modes of a c q u i s i t i o n have on the b a s i c law of the t e r r i t o r i e s concerned. PAGE 107 2. T e r r i t o r i a l A c q u i s i t i o n ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n Where the Crown obtains both the power of government and t e r r i t o r i a l t i t l e over the t e r r i t o r y concerned, i t p r o p e r l y becomes part of Her Majesty's dominions and the Crown i s then sovereign i n the same f u l l sense as i n the United Kingdom.(255) T e r r i t o r i a l t i t l e belongs to the sovereign as head of s t a t e and the Crown's a u t h o r i t y i n r e l a t i o n to such t e r r i t o r y i s a pure matter of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. T e r r i t o r i e s may be acquired by any one of the f o l l o w i n g means or by a combination of them: conquest, c e s s i o n , annexation and settlement. The power to acquire t e r r i t o r i e s i s vested i n the sovereign by v i r t u e of the Royal prerogative over e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and i n p a r t i c u l a r the making of war and t r e a t i e s of peace. Conquest i s e x c l u s i v e l y embraced i n the pr e r o g a t i v e to make war and peace, as a l s o i s cession a r i s i n g out of h o s t i l i t i e s . Cession of other kinds r e s t s on the e x e r c i s e of the prerogative to make t r e a t i e s . Settlements are r e f e r a b l e to the general power over e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s . ( 2 5 6 ) Under the d o c t r i n e of Parliamentary Supremacy newly acquired dominions are subordinate to and dependent upon the Imperial Crown and Parliament of Great B r i t a i n . The l a t t e r has f u l l (255) I b i d . (256) Supra, footnote 251, Roberts-Wray, p. 116. PAGE 108 a u t h o r i t y to make laws to bind the colo n i e s q u i t e independent of t h e i r mode of a c q u i s i t i o n . The mode of a c q u i s i t i o n , however, has important c o n s t i t u t i o n a l consequences i n s o f a r as the nature and ex e r c i s e of the King's pre r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e powers i n the new t e r r i t o r i e s are concerned. In p a r t i c u l a r the l e g i s l a t i v e powers of the Crown i n a s e t t l e d colony are d i f f e r e n t from those i n one gained by cession or conquest. I t would seem that i n conquered and ceded c o l o n i e s the King enjoys a v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d power to make laws, at l e a s t u n t i l the promise of a l e g i s l a t u r e . In s e t t l e d c o l o n i e s the c o l o n i s t s have r i g h t s of t h e i r own at common law which are r e f l e c t e d i n a r e s t r i c t i o n on the l e g i s l a t i v e powers of the Crown.(257) I t i s i n t h i s regard that the d i s t i n c t i o n as to the mode of a c q u i s i t i o n has important consequences. ( i i ) The P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i v e Power as I t R e l a t e s to  Settlements We are here concerned with the a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y by the Crown i n consequence of the f a c t of settlement by B r i t i s h subjects i n a place where there i s not a c i v i l i z e d government and l e g a l system. I f a c o l o n i z i n g p r o j e c t i s undertaken with the p r i o r a u t h o r i t y of the Crown, the s e t t l e r s take possession on behalf of the Crown, and the t e r r i t o r y becomes ipso f a c t o a part of the sovereign's dominions.(258) I f the settlement i s a p r i v a t e venture, without p r i o r Crown a u t h o r i z a t i o n , some formal Crown Act (257) I b i d . , p. 111. (258) I b i d . , p. 99. PAGE 109 i s required before t e r r i t o r i a l t i t l e i n the Crown i s recognized. Some confusion stems from the f a c t that "settlement" was i n i t i a l l y only r e f e r a b l e to uninhabited c o u n t r i e s . Thus Blackstone, w r i t i n g i n 1765, s t a t e d that c o l o n i e s i n d i s t a n t cou n t r i e s are of two s o r t s : those where the lands are claimed by r i g h t of occupancy only "by f i n d i n g them desert and u n c u l t i v a t e d and peopling them from the mother country" and those which, when already c u l t i v a t e d , have e i t h e r been gained by conquest or ceded by treaty.(259) The question i s whether such "desert and u n c u l t i v a t e d " lands are to be taken to include lands peopled by a b o r i g i n a l s with t h e i r own system of law and government. Blankard v. Galdy(260) (1693) was the f i r s t case to a t t r i b u t e l e g a l consequences to the d i s t i n c t i o n between occupation (settlement) and conquest. There Holt d i s t i n g u i s h e d between an "uninhabited country newly found out by E n g l i s h subjects" and a conquered country and held that i n the former " a l l the laws i n force i n England are i n force there", i n the l a t t e r "the laws of England d i d not take place u n t i l d e clared by the conqueror or h i s successors."(261) This accords with a statement of Vattel(262) (259) I b i d . , p. 100. (260) Blankard v. Galdy (1693), Holt 341, 90 E.R. 1089; 2 Salk 411, 91 E.R. 356; 4 Mod. 222, 87 E.R. 359; Comb. 228, 90 E.R. 445 (K.B.). (261) I b i d . (262) Q. 10, sec. B l . PAGE 110 When a nation takes possession of a d i s t a n t country and s e t t l e s a colony there, that country, though separated from the p r i n c i p a l establishment or Mother country, n a t u r a l l y becomes a part of the s t a t e , e q u a l l y with i t s ancient possessions... These r u l e s were re s t a t e d i n a P r i v y C o u n c i l Memorandum i n 1722(263) ...that i f there be a new and uninhabited country found out by E n g l i s h s u b j e c t s , as the law i s the b i r t h r i g h t of every s u b j e c t , so wherever they go they c a r r y t h e i r laws with them; and therefore such new formed country i s to be governed by the laws of England, then i n being when they f i r s t s e t t l e d . . These e a r l y cases draw the d i s t i n c t i o n between uninhabited areas that are s e t t l e d by B r i t i s h subjects and conquered countr i e s and as S l a t t e r y suggests, are s i l e n t as to the s i t u a t i o n where the land s e t t l e d was already inhabited.(264) I f the t e r r i t o r y was occupied by " p r i m i t i v e peoples" with "barbarian laws" the s e t t l e r s were s i m i l a r l y deemed to take E n g l i s h law with them. However, i f the t e r r i t o r y was already i n h a b i t e d by " c i v i l i z e d peoples" the s e t t l e r s were considered immigrants i n a country whose laws app l i e d to them, subject to any agreements to the contrary. This was the case on the Indian subcontinent. As to the d i s t i n c t i o n i n general between c o l o n i e s by settlement and c o l o n i e s by conquest or c e s s i o n , the f o l l o w i n g observations were made i n the case of Freeman v. F a i r l i e ( 2 6 5 ) (263) (1722), 2 Peer Wms. 75 (P.C.). (264) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 27 et seq. (265) (1828), 1 Moo. Ind. App. 305 at 324, 18 E.R. 117 (Ch.). PAGE 111 I apprehend the true general d i s t i n c t i o n to be i n e f f e c t between countries i n which there are not, and c o u n t r i e s i n which there are, at the time of t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n , any e x i s t i n g c i v i l i n s t i t u t i o n s and laws; i t being i n the f i r s t of those cases matter of nec e s s i t y that the B r i t i s h s e t t l e r s should use t h e i r n a t i v e laws, as having no others to res o r t to; whereas i n the other case there i s an e s t a b l i s h e d l e x l o c i which i t might be h i g h l y inconvenient a l l at once to abrogate, and therefore i t remains t i l l changed by the d e l i b e r a t i v e wisdom of the new l e g i s l a t i v e power. In the former case a l s o there are not, but i n the l a t t e r case there are, new subjects to be governed, ignorant of the E n g l i s h laws, and unprepared perhaps i n c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l character to r e c e i v e them. The reason why the ru l e s are l a i d down i n books of a u t h o r i t y with reference to the d i s t i n c t i o n between new-discovered countries on the one hand, and ceded or conquered c o u n t r i e s on the other, may be found, I conceive, i n the f a c t that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n had always, or almost always, p r a c t i c a l l y corresponded with that between the absence and the existence of a l e x  l o c i , by which the B r i t i s h s e t t l e r s might, without inconvenience, f o r a time be granted; for the powers from whom we rested c o l o n i e s by conquest, or had obtained them by t r e a t i e s of c e s s i o n , had o r d i n a r i l y , i f not always, been c i v i l i z e d and C h r i s t i a n s t a t e s , whose i n s t i t u t i o n s therefore were not wholly d i s s i m i l a r to our own. Lord Kingsdown i n Advocate-General of Bengal v. Rannee Surnomoye Dossee(266) pointed out i n r e l a t i o n to E n g l i s h settlements i n I n d i a , that i f "the settlement had been made i n a C h r i s t i a n country of Europe, the s e t t l e r s would have become subject to the laws of the country i n which they s e t t l e d " , the laws of England or the Crown of England having no a u t h o r i t y i n such places(267) However where C h r i s t i a n i t y does not p r e v a i l and the l o c a l laws (266) (1863), 2 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 22. (267) I b i d , at p. 800 of E.R. PAGE 112 and usages are so at variance with such p r i n c i p l e s he notes that through the indulgence and weakness of the Potentates of those c o u n t r i e s , E n g l i s h s e t t l e r s have been allowed "to r e t a i n the use of t h e i r own laws".(268) In d e s c r i b i n g the character of E n g l i s h settlement i n India the Court s t a t e d ; I t was a settlement made by a few f o r e i g n e r s fo r the purpose of trade i n a very populous and h i g h l y c i v i l i z e d country, under the government of a powerful Mahamoden r u l e , with whose  sovereignty the E n g l i s h Crown never attempted  nor pretended to i n t e r f e r e for some c e n t u r i e s  afterwards.(269) And although the s e t t l e r s i n India retained t h e i r own laws w i t h i n the " f a c t o r i e s " they e s t a b l i s h e d i t was only because the l o c a l sovereign allowed i t . And; the permission to use t h e i r own laws by European s e t t l e r s does not extend those laws to Natives w i t h i n the same l i m i t s , who remain to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes subjects of t h e i r own Sovereign, and to whom European laws and usages are as l i t t l e s u i t e d as the laws of the Mohometans and Hindoos are s u i t e d to Europeans. These p r i n c i p l e s are too c l e a r to r e q u i r e any a u t h o r i t y to support them."(270) The " I n d i a " cases are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n that "settlement" there was not, i n i t i a l l y at l e a s t , a v e h i c l e f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y — the E n g l i s h Crown i n i t i a l l y never attempted to gain sovereignty i n I n d i a . And given the number and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of i t s Indian i n h a b i t a n t s , any attempt at B r i t i s h sovereignty would (268) I b i d . (269) I b i d . (270) I b i d . PAGE 113 have had to be by conquest. I t i s not ther e f o r e s u r p r i s i n g that the use of E n g l i s h law, extended to the s e t t l e r s , d i d not extend E n g l i s h law to the Natives. The Court went on to f i n d that the case i s d i f f e r e n t where the E n g l i s h e s t a b l i s h themselves i n an "uninhabited or barbarous country." In such a case "they c a r r y with them not only the laws, but the sovereignty of t h e i r own s t a t e ; and those who l i v e amongst them and become members of  t h e i r community become a l s o partakers of, and subject to the same  laws."(271) In summary the King had no ordinary l e g i s l a t i v e p r e r o g a t i v e i n " s e t t l e d " c o l o n i e s . And i n f a c t Roberts-Wray(272) notes that the purpose and e f f e c t of the various B r i t i s h Settlements Acts was to a l t e r t h i s common law r u l e ( t h a t , i n a colony acquired by settlement, the Crown can set up a c o n s t i t u t i o n but cannot enact l e g i s l a t i o n of other k i n d s ) . ( i i i ) The Prer o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i v e Power as I t Relates to Conquered and Ceded Colonies I t i s e s t a b l i s h e d beyond question t h a t , as these t e r r i t o r i e s are acquired by v i r t u e of the Prerogative to make war, peace and t r e a t i e s , so the sovereign has f u l l power under the p r e r o g a t i v e to make laws e i t h e r i n the c o n s t i t u e n t f i e l d or otherwise. As we have seen broad sovereign l e g i s l a t i v e powers i n r e l a t i o n to conquered/ceded col o n i e s was expounded as e a r l y as 1693 by Lord (271) I b i d . (272) Supra, footnote 251, p. 166. PAGE 114 Holt i n Blankard v. Galdy(273) and i n a P r i v y C o u n c i l memorandum, c i r c a 1722.(274)'The l a t t e r i s presumed to have been issued to adopt the ru l e s l a i d down i n Blankard v. Galdy so as to make these r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e to places beyond the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the ordinary c o u r t s . In the l a t t e r case i t was held that i n a settlement " a l l the laws i n force i n England are i n f o r c e there", s e t t l e r s c a r r y i n g with them the common law of England. Whereas i n a conquered country "the laws of England d i d not take place u n t i l declared by the conqueror or h i s successors." This was affirmed by Lord Man s f i e l d i n Campbell v. Hall,(275) mainly on the a u t h o r i t y of C a l v i n s case,(276) only r e j e c t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n put forward i n C a l v i n s case as to the exception regarding i n f i d e l s . I t i s u s e f u l to pr o p e r l y understand the r u l i n g i n Campbell v. H a l l . The case r e l a t e d to the i s l a n d of Grenada, taken by the B r i t i s h armies i n open war from the French king and surrendered upon c a p i t u l a t i o n . L e t t e r s Patent, dated March 26, 1764, commissioned General M e l v i l l e as Governor of Grenada. He was given power to set up a l e g i s l a t u r e as s p e c i f i e d i n a previous proclamation under the Great S e a l , dated October 7, 1763 (the Royal Proclamation). By that Proclamation of the King had empowered and d i r e c t e d the Government of Grenada by L e t t e r s (273) Supra, footnote 260. (274) Supra, footnote 263. (275) Campbell v. H a l l (1774), L o f f t 655, 98 E.R. 848; 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045; 20 St. Tr. 239 (K.B.). (276) C a l v i n s Case (1608), 7 Co. Rep. l a , 77 E.R. 377. PAGE 115 Patent under the Great Seal to summon general assemblies of the representatives of the people of Grenada so soon as the circumstances of the colony would a l l o w , and with t h e i r consent to make laws for the p u b l i c peace, w e l f a r e , and good government of the colony and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . There had been a second proclamation of March 26, 1764, co n t a i n i n g a r e c i t a l of a survey of the i s l a n d s and t h e i r d i v i s i o n i n t o a l l o t m e n t s , as an i n v i t a t i o n to purchasers to come i n and take up p r o p e r t i e s on terms s p e c i f i e d i n the proclamation. A f t e r these instruments had been published L e t t e r s Patent were issued J u l y 20, 1764 purporting to impose by v i r t u e of the Royal P r e r o g a t i v e a duty of 4 1/2 percent on a l l sugars exported from the I s l a n d . The question was whether the King had precluded himself from the exer c i s e of a l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over Grenada by the promise of an assembly i n the e a r l i e r proclamation. Lord M a n s f i e l d l a i d out s i x p r i n c i p l e s governing conquests: 1st, a country conquered by the B r i t i s h arms becomes a dominion of the King i n r i g h t of h i s Crown, and therefore n e c e s s a r i l y subject to the l e g i s l a t i v e power of the Parliament of Great B r i t a i n . 2nd, the conquered i n h a b i t a n t s once received i n t o the conquerors' p r o t e c t i o n become subjects; and are u n i v e r s a l l y to be considered i n that l i g h t , not as enemies or a l i e n s . 3 r d l y , a r t i c l e s of c a p i t u l a t i o n upon which the conquest i s surrendered, and t r e a t i e s of peace by which i t i s ceded, are sacred and i n v i o l a b l e , according to t h e i r true i n t e n t . 4 t h l y , the law and l e g i s l a t i o n of every dominion e q u a l l y a f f e c t s a l l persons and property w i t h i n the l i m i t s thereof, and i s the true r u l e f o r the d e c i s i o n of a l l questions which a r i s e there: whoever purchases, sues or l i v e s there, puts himself under the laws of the PAGE 116 place, and i n the s i t u a t i o n of i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . An Englishman i n Minorca or the I s l e of Man, or the p l a n t a t i o n s , has no d i s t i n c t r i g h t from the natives while he continues there. 5 t h l y , laws of a conquered country continue u n t i l they are a l t e r e d by the conqueror. The j u s t i c e and a n t i q u i t y of t h i s maxim i s u n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e ; and the absurd exception as to pagans, i n C a l v i n ' s Case, shows the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the maxim. The exception could not e x i s t before the C h r i s t i a n e ra, and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y arose from the mad enthusiasm of the Croisades. In the present case the c a p i t u l a t i o n expressly provides and agrees, that they s h a l l continue to be governed by t h e i r present laws, u n t i l His Majesty's pleasure be f u r t h e r known. 6 t h l y , i f the King has power (and when I say the King, I mean i n t h i s case to be understood "without the concurrence of Parliament") to make new laws f o r a conquered country, t h i s being a power subordinate to h i s own a u t h o r i t y , as a part of the supreme l e g i s l a t u r e i n Parliament, he can make none which are contrary to fundamental p r i n c i p l e s ; none excepting from the laws of trade or a u t h o r i t y of Parliament, or p r i v i l e g e s e x c l u s i v e of h i s other subjects."(277) The King's i n i t i a l e x c l u s i v e l e g i s l a t i v e power over conquered c o l o n i e s enables him to " e n t i r e l y change or new-model the whole, or part of i t s laws and p o l i t i c a l form of government" and allows him to govern i t by r e g u l a t i o n s framed by himself.(278) The King may preclude himself from the f u r t h e r concurrent e x e r c i s e of h i s l e g i s l a t i v e p r e r o g a t i v e by the grant of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s without any r e s e r v a t i o n to himself of t h i s important prerogative.(279) However, by such grant the (277) (1774), L o f f t 655, 98 E.R. 848; 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045 (K.B.) at pp. 741-742 L o f f t . (278) Supra, footnote 245, at p. 29. PAGE 117 au t h o r i t y of the sovereign instrument [ u s u a l l y L e t t e r s Patent or Order-in-Council] wherein such grant i s given i s c l e a r l y not i n question. In Sammut v. Strick l a n d ( 2 8 0 ) the Court, c o n s i d e r i n g Campbell v. H a l l , s t a t e d that the true p r o p o s i t i o n to be taken from t h i s case was that "as a general r u l e , such a grant without the r e s e r v a t i o n of a power of concurrent l e g i s l a t i o n precludes the e x e r c i s e of the prero g a t i v e while the i n s t i t u t i o n s continue to exist."(281) and "Nor i s i t i n doubt that a power of revoking the grant must be reserved or i t w i l l not e x i s t " . The same p r o p o s i t i o n was accepted as " s e t t l e d " law i n Canada i n 1820 on the basis of these a u t h o r i t i e s and that of Campbell v. Hall.(282) Subsequent confi r m a t i o n i s to be found i n other decided cases and works on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law.(283) In p o i n t of f a c t the general broad p r i n c i p l e that the Crown possesses f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y i n ceded/conquered c o u n t r i e s was s u b s t a n t i a l l y q u a l i f i e d by the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Campbell v. H a l l — the l i m i t a t i o n being that i f the Crown grants to a (279) I b i d . , 30 and see Campbell v. H a l l , supra, footnote 275. (280) [1938], A.C. 678 (P.C.). (281) I b i d . , at p. 704. (282) Jennings v. Hunt (1820), 1 Newf. L.R. 220 (Newf. S.C.) p. 225. (283) C i t e d i n Roberts-Wray supra, footnote 251 at p. 157. Lyons v. East India Co. (1836) 1 Mod. P.C. 175 P h i l l i p s v. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d (1938), A.C. 678, at 701 Abeyeskera v. Jayahlake (1932), A.C. 260 C h i t t y , prerogatives of the Crown, p. 29 Hood P h i l l i p s , p. 723. PAGE 118 conquered Colony a re p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e body, without r e s e r v i n g to i t s e l f a power to l e g i s l a t e , that power i s no longer e x e r c i s a b l e . Summary The Crown i s prima f a c i e e n t i t l e d to l e g i s l a t e f o r possessions acquired by conquest or ce s s i o n , but i s not so e n t i t l e d i n the case of settlements the l i n e of d i s t i n c t i o n being based on the circumstance that E n g l i s h s e t t l e r s wherever they went c a r r i e d with them the p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h law, and that E n g l i s h common law n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i e d i n s o f a r as such laws were a p p l i c a b l e to the c o n d i t i o n s of the new colony. The Crown c l e a r l y had no prero g a t i v e r i g h t to l e g i s l a t e i n such a case. Where, however, the t e r r i t o r y was acquired by ces s i o n or conquest, more p a r t i c u l a r l y where there was an e x i s t i n g system of law, i t has always been considered that there was an absolute power i n the Crown so f a r as was co n s i s t e n t with the terms of cessi o n , to a l t e r the e x i s t i n g system of law, though u n t i l such i n t e r f e r e n c e the laws remained as they were before the t e r r i t o r y was acquired by the Crown.(284) Further, where the Crown by an ex e r c i s e of pr e r o g a t i v e has conferred r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s on the i n h a b i t a n t s of a t e r r i t o r y which has been acquired by the Crown (without r e s e r v i n g a power of revoking the grant) t h i s act precludes a concurrent r i g h t i n the Crown to l e g i s l a t e f o r that t e r r i t o r y . (My (284) See B l a . Comm., 21st edn., v o l . i , pp. 107, 108) (Campbell v. H a l l , supra, footnote 275). PAGE 119 emphasis). (iv ) The King's Constituent L e g i s l a t i v e Power i n R e l a t i o n to  B r i t i s h Dominions What we have so f a r been concerned with i s the King's power to make ordinary laws f o r B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s , such, as we have seen, being i n lar g e p a r t . r e f e r a b l e to the various modes of a c q u i s i t i o n of the t e r r i t o r i e s concerned. But i n s o f a r as the Crown's l e g i s l a t i v e powers are e x e r c i s a b l e i n B r i t i s h dominions, a major d i s t i n c t i o n which must be made i s that between the Crown's c o n s t i t u e n t power (the power to e s t a b l i s h , amend or revoke c o n s t i t u t i o n s ) and the Crown's power to make o r d i n a r y laws.(285) In a l l c o l o n i e s , whether acquired by settlement, conquest or the establishment of l o c a l governments and the courts f e l l to the Crown by v i r t u e of the Prerogative and the a c t u a l s e t t i n g up of c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s was l e f t to Royal c o n t r o l . In a l l c o l o n i e s , the r i g h t of appointing governors and d e l e g a t i n g powers to him and other o f f i c e r s f o r the execution of the law, of er e c t i n g courts of j u s t i c e for i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and of summoning re p r e s e n t a t i v e assemblies among i t s i n h a b i t a n t s f o r the purpose of i n t e r i o r l e g i s l a t i o n , belonged by v i r t u e of i t s general prerogative to the Crown.(286) (285) Supra, footnote 251, p. 143 et seq. (286) 1 Chalmers 183, 184; 2 Chalmers 169, 170, 241. PAGE 120 I t appears that when the c o n s t i t u t i o n s had a c t u a l l y been set up, the Prerogative instruments responsible took on the for c e of B r i t i s h s t a t u t e s . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s i n these instruments could not be amended by c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , a r u l e affirmed i n part i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. I t i s c l e a r from what has already been s a i d of the Crown's extensive p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s i n r e l a t i o n to conquered or ceded c o l o n i e s , that the Crown has f u l l power to make laws i n the con s t i t u e n t f i e l d or otherwise for such colonies.(287) In a s e t t l e d colony the s e t t l e r s appear to have some s o r t of inherent r i g h t to expect the Crown to grant them the means to l e g i s l a t e fo r themselves. Thus i n P h i l l i p s v. Eyre(288) i t was s t a t e d : There i s even great reason f o r holding sacred the p r e r o g a t i v e of the Crown to c o n s t i t u t e a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e i n the case of a s e t t l e d colony, where the i n h a b i t a n t s are e n t i t l e d to be governed by E n g l i s h law, than i n that of a conquered colony, where i t i s only by the grace of the Crown that the p r i v i l e g e of self-government i s allowed. Even though the pr e r o g a t i v e embraces no general l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over settlements the existence of a c o n s t i t u e n t power has always been acknowledged.(289) Once a grant of a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e i s made, i t cannot be revoked by the Crown unless a power of revocation i s reserved. Where the Crown grants such a l e g i s l a t u r e , without r e s e r v i n g to i t s e l f a power of l e g i s l a t i o n , the Crown loses i t s o r d i n a r y (287) Supra, footnote 251, p. 157, footnote 65. (288) P h i l l i p s v. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at pp. 18-19. (289) Supra, footnote 251, p. 151. PAGE 121 l e g i s l a t i v e power.(290) But as s t a t e d above there i s a d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n s t i t u e n t power of the Crown and i t s ordinary l e g i s l a t i v e power i n r e l a t i o n to B r i t i s h colonies.(291) As already noted one c l e a r d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the f a c t that the l a t t e r i s e x e r c i s a b l e only i n conquered and ceded c o l o n i e s whereas the former can be invoked i n r e l a t i o n to a l l B r i t i s h c olonies regardless of t h e i r mode of a c q u i s i t i o n . ( 2 9 2 ) Moreover, the King enjoyed c e r t a i n other "major" P r e r o g a t i v e s i n r e l a t i o n to a l l B r i t i s h lands and t e r r i t o r i e s . Such P r e r o g a t i v e s a p p l i e d proprio vigore as an i n c i d e n t of B r i t i s h sovereignty. The Royal  Proclamation of 1763, i t i s argued i s such a major P r e r o g a t i v e instrument, being r e f e r a b l e to the Crown's Constituent Prerogative. The P r e r o g a t i v e instruments by which the sovereign's w i l l was expressed, as to matters w i t h i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r a u t h o r i t y , a p p l i e d of t h e i r own f o r c e i n the t e r r i t o r i e s to which they r e l a t e d , independently of whether or not the basic law of such t e r r i t o r y was E n g l i s h law. A r e s u l t occasioned by the e f f e c t of B r i t i s h sovereignty and recognized i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. (290) Supra, footnote 251, p. 157, (and see Campbell v. H a l l , supra, footnote 275). (291) i b i d . , p. 158. (292) Campbell v. H a l l , supra, footnote 275. (This i s discussed more f u l l y i n f r a ) . PAGE 122 3. The Laws to Which C o l o n i e s Are Subject The d i f f e r e n c e s i n the modes of a c q u i s i t i o n of B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s , as we have seen, gives r i s e to corresponding d i f f e r e n c e s i n the b a s i c law to which a colony becomes subject upon i t s foundation. In the case of a t e r r i t o r y ' s e t t l e d ' by B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s , the law of England, then i n being, i s immediately i n fo r c e i n s o f a r as i t i s a p p l i c a b l e to the i n f a n t colony,(293) the s e t t l e r s being deemed at common law to have brought E n g l i s h law there on the foundation of the colony. As a general r u l e the Eng l i s h law so introduced i s taken to be the law which e x i s t e d i n England at the time the colony was s e t t l e d , save f o r any which i s p l a i n l y u n s u i t a b l e to the c o n d i t i o n s of the colony,(294) and subject to l a t e r amendment passed i n or by the colony. And "what s h a l l be admitted and what r e j e c t e d , at what forces and under what r e s t r i c t i o n s , must, i n case of d i s p u t e , be decided i n the f i r s t instance by t h e i r own p r o v i n c i a l j u d i c a t u r e , subject to the d e c i s i o n and c o n t r o l of the King-in-Council;..."(295) i t may be that "as the p o p u l a t i o n , wealths and commerce of the colony increase, many r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h law, which were unsuitable to i t s i n f a n c y , w i l l g r a d u a l l y be a t t r a c t e d to it."( 2 9 6 ) In most s e t t l e d c o l o n i e s there has intruded a s t a t u t e , (293) 2 P. Wms 75; Blankard v. Galdy 2 Salk 411; 1 B l a . Com. 107. (294) I b i d . and see 1 Chalmers Opinions, 195. (295) 1 B l a . Com. 107. (296) Cooper v. Stuart (1889), 14 A.C. 286 (P.C.). PAGE 123 sometimes l o c a l and sometimes I m p e r i a l , c o n f e r r i n g the r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law, and d e f i n i n g e x a c t l y the date at which E n g l i s h law has been received. Where E n g l i s h law i s the b a s i c law of the colony i t i s the E n g l i s h common law and a l l s t a t u t e s i n affirmance of the common law antecedent to the settlement of the colony, or to the date set f o r the r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law, that i s i n force i n the colony, subject to any l o c a l Act to the contrary. No s t a t u t e s made i n England subsequent to such date are i n force unless the c o l o n i e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y mentioned or such extension can be n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d ( C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865). B a s i c a l l y , i n a conquered or ceded t e r r i t o r y i t s former laws are r e t a i n e d u n t i l changed by the King. M u n i c i p a l courts w i l l assume the l e x l o c i remains i n force u n t i l s p e c i f i c a l l y changed, with the notable exception as to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws (and p a r t i c u l a r l y b a r b a r i c laws). Where the King e x e r c i s e s h i s prerogative r i g h t to l e g i s l a t e , he i s not bound to l e g i s l a t e i n conformity with the law of England.(297) But the King's power being subordinate to the a u t h o r i t y of Parliament he "cannot make any changes contrary to fundamental p r i n c i p l e s , none excepting from the laws of trade or a u t h o r i t y of Parliament, or p r i v i l e g e s e x c l u s i v e of h i s other subjects."(298) Where i n g i v i n g a new C o n s t i t u t i o n to the conquered or ceded colony, the King provides for the c a l l i n g of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e assembly i t has been decided (297) Wytham v. Dutton, 3 Mod. 160; Shaw P.C. 24; 2 P. Wms 75; Campbell v. H a l l Cowp. 204. (298) I b i d . , Campbell v. H a l l (1774), L o f f t 665 at pp. 741-742. PAGE 124 that the Crown cannot afterwards e x e r c i s e with respect to such colony i t s former r i g h t of l e g i s l a t i o n ( 2 9 9 ) unless there i s a r e s e r v a t i o n of such r i g h t . Clark s t a t e s that the l e g i s l a t i v e changes made by the Crown may be e i t h e r p a r t i a l , whereby p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s are engrafted on the forms of government of the p l a c e s , or general whereby an e n t i r e l y new code supersedes the former law.(300) "Where the change i s p a r t i a l only, i t i s s a i d that the former customs of the country w i l l s t i l l be i n force as to a l l matters not otherwise provided for".(301) However when by Royal Commission a new l e g a l c o n s t i t u t i o n i s granted e s t a b l i s h i n g a l e g i s l a t u r e and courts of j u s t i c e and i t i s d i r e c t e d that the law administered s h a l l be i n a l l things as 'nearly agreeable as p o s s i b l e to the law of England', then the law of England i s the r u l e as to a l l cases not s p e c i f i c a l l y provided for.(302) Few conquered/ceded c o l o n i e s have been able to r e s i s t a l l i n f u s i o n s of E n g l i s h law.(303) (299) I b i d . (300) C l a r k , Charles. A Summary of C o l o n i a l Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, and Stevens and Sons, 1834, at p. 7. (301) I b i d , c i t i n g Blankard v. Galdy, 4 Mod. 222. (302) C l a r k , supra, footnote 300, p. 7. (303) For a d i s c u s s i o n of the manner and date by which E n g l i s h law was received i n the various p a r t s of Canada, see Clement, ch. 14; J a c k e t t i n Lang (ed., Contemporary  Problems of P u b l i c Law i n Canada, 3; L a s k i n , The B r i t i s h  T r a d i t i o n i n Canadian Law (1969), 3-10; Cote (1977), 15 A l t a . L.R. 29. PAGE 125 As already noted.the E n g l i s h law that i s received as the basic law of the c o l o n i e s i s subject to i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the con d i t i o n s of that colony. In t h i s respect i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the basis of j u d i c i a l statements determining which E n g l i s h s t a t u t e s are to be admitted and which r e j e c t e d . The c o u r t s , i n considering t h i s q u e s t i o n , have looked to the extent to which the st a t u t e appears to be founded upon p l a i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of policy,(304) and have tended to r e j e c t the a p p l i c a t i o n , of En g l i s h Statutes which were formed f o r reasons s o l e l y a f f e c t i n g the land and s o c i e t y of England and not f o r reasons applying to a new colony.(305) In Sammut v. Str i c k l a n d ( 3 0 6 ) i t was s a i d that the s e t t l e r s c a r r i e d with them the " p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h law". In A.G. v. Stewart(307) the court i n determining whether the Statute of Mortmain be i n fo r c e i n the i s l a n d of Grenada held that such was i n larg e part dependent upon whether i t was "a law of l o c a l p o l i c y adapted s o l e l y to the country i n which i t was made, or a general r e g u l a t i o n of property e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to any country: i n which property was to be governed by the r u l e s of En g l i s h law." In r e j e c t i n g i t s a p p l i c a t i o n the Court found that the Mortmain Act, "grew out of l o c a l circumstances and was meant to have merely a l o c a l o p e r a t i o n " . (304) Cooper v. Stuart supra, footnote 296. (305) Rex v. McKinney, [1889] 14 A.C. 77 (P.C.), where the court r e j e c t e d the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Mortmain Act as introduced by the s e t t l e r s i n t o B r i t i s h Honduras. (306) Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d , [1938] A.C. 678 (P.C.), at p. 70. (307) A.G. v. Stewart (1817), 2 ed. 143, 35 E.R. 895 (Ch.). PAGE 126 This then o u t l i n e s the bas i c p r i n c i p l e s governing the laws i n force i n B r i t i s h dominions. I t i s important to understand that the d i f f e r i n g modes of a c q u i s i t i o n are important s o l e l y i n determining the "ordinary" law of such t e r r i t o r i e s . And the repeal or amendment of such law i s , as i s discussed l a t e r , a matter w i t h i n the power of any l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e , even that of a colony that i s not s e l f - g o v e r n i n g . PAGE 127 4. Imperial Law i n Force P r o p r i o Vigore i n B r i t i s h T e r r i t o r i e s The d i s t i n c t i o n as to mode of a c q u i s i t i o n has considerable bearing on the bas i c law i n forc e i n the c o l o n i e s . E n g l i s h law may be "received" as the ba s i c law of the c o l o n i e s through the v e h i c l e s of settlement or re c e p t i o n s t a t u t e s or Orders (Imperial or l o c a l ) . However, there i s a marked d i f f e r e n c e between the E n g l i s h law so received and that which a p p l i e d to a l l c o l o n i e s , p r o p r i o  v i g o r e , or of i t s own f o r c e , regardless of t h e i r mode of a c q u i s i t i o n . The l a t t e r i s most c l e a r l y evidenced by those Imperial Acts which take e f f e c t i n the c o l o n i e s because they were intended by the B r i t i s h Parliament to be i n force i n the colony at a time when i t was part of the Empire and so subject to the Imperial Parliament. Whatever the mode of a c q u i s i t i o n , i t i s cl e a r that the Imperial Parliament has always had f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e power over B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s (at l e a s t up u n t i l the passing of the Statute of Westminster, 1931).(308) The American  Colonies Act, 1766, d e c l a r i n g the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of the B r i t i s h Parliament over the American c o l o n i e s , was considered, u n t i l i t s repeal by S.L.R. Act i n 1964, to be s t i l l i n f o r c e , i f and so f a r as i t a p p l i e d to Canada and the West Indies.(309) Thus Statutes passed by the Imperial Parliament and intended by that Parliament to be i n forc e i n any colony are thereby i n forc e p r o p r i o v i g o r e i n such c o l o n i e s independent of t h e i r mode of (308) Statute of Westminster 1931, (Imp.) 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. (309) Supra, footnote 95 Crai e s p. 493. PAGE 128 a c q u i s i t i o n . This has important c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , as though a colony may repeal a l l or part of the "ordinary" or "basic" law there i n force i t cannot o v e r r u l e Imperial Acts or Orders i n f o r c e p r o p r i o vigore unless i t i s s e l f governing. And the powers granted by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, concern only Acts i n f o r c e p r o p r i o vigore.(310) The C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1865(311) was passed to p r o t e c t Imperial law i n force p r o p r i o vigore i n the c o l o n i e s and to remove doubts as to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence i n regard to E n g l i s h law received as the basic law of the c o l o n i e s (see d i s c u s s i o n below). By the Statute of Westminster, 1931 the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g c o l o n i e s were given the power to modify, a l t e r or repeal Imperial law i n force p r o p r i o v i g o r e . To r e s t a t e the general r u l e regarding the b a s i c law i n f o r c e i n a colony: In settlements the common law and a l l Acts of Parliament passed before t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n are i n f o r c e so f a r as i s a p p l i c a b l e to l o c a l circumstances. In conquered or ceded t e r r i t o r i e s Acts of Parliament passed before t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n have no general f o r c e , unless adopted or incorporated by Royal or Parliamentary a u t h o r i t y , or by acts of t h e i r own l e g i s l a t u r e s , e i t h e r by way of s p e c i f i c enactment or as part of the general law of the mother country i n t o t h e i r subsequent code.(312) But t h i s (310) J.E. Cote, Reception of E n g l i s h Law, (1977), XV A l b e r t a Law  Rev. 29. (311) C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. See Appendix I I . (312) T a r r i n g , S i r C h a r l e s , Chapters on the Law R e l a t i n g to the  Colonies 4th ed. London: Stevens and Haynes, 1913 ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as T a r r i n g ) . PAGE 129 general r u l e i s open to a very important exception, that of Imperial Law i n f o r c e p r o p r i o v i g o r e . C l e a r l y , such includes those Imperial s t a t u t e s passed with the expressed i n t e n t i o n of binding the c o l o n i e s . T a r r i n g suggests i t f u r t h e r extends to include those s t a t u t e s which are m a n i f e s t l y of u n i v e r s a l p o l i c y and intended to a f f e c t a l l our transmarine possessions, at whatever p e r i o d they s h a l l be acquired, such f o r example, as Navigations A c t s , or the Acts f o r a b o l i s h i n g the s l a v e trade and s l a v e r y . For such s t a t u t e s w i l l , upon conquest or c e s s i o n , ipso  fa c t o and independently of p o s t e r i o r l e g i s l a t i o n , be binding upon not only a settlements but a l s o a conquered or ceded colony.(313) Imperial Acts passed s i n c e the a c q u i s i t i o n of a colony or at l e a s t subsequent to the establishment of i t s l e g a l c o n s t i t u t i o n by Royal Commission or Act of Parliament, do not extend to i t , unless they appear to have been passed with the i n t e n t i o n of being so extended.(314) This i n t e n t i o n may be express, r e l a t i n g to a colony by name or by a general d e s i g n a t i o n (such as 'our p l a n t a t i o n s and c o l o n i e s ) , or by reasonable c o n s t r u c t i o n , as i n the case of the Navigation A c t s , Acts of Revenue and Trade and Acts r e l a t i n g to s h i p p i n g , a l l of which are i n general o b l i g a t o r y on the c o l o n i e s although not i n terms extended to them. (313) See 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, s. 18 as to Canada, c i t e d i n T a r r i n g , supra, footnote 312, p. 15. (314) 1 Chal. op. 197-220, 2 P. Wms. 75; 1 B i a . Comm. 108 and see C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865. Appendix I I . PAGE 130 In a d d i t i o n to Imperial s t a t u t e s being i n forc e p r o p r i o  v i g o r e , an argument can be made that major Imperial Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n r e l a t i n g to the c o l o n i e s would l i k e w i s e be i n force p r o p r i o v i g o r e . Such a p r o p o s i t i o n has i t s b a s i s i n the f a c t that upon the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty the p u b l i c law of England (that governing the r i g h t s of subjects v i s a v i s the Crown) i s n e c e s s a r i l y introduced as the p u b l i c law of the c o l o n i e s . I t i s easy to see that i n s e t t l e d c o l o n i e s the p u b l i c law which governs i s that of England. In a d d i t i o n i t seems that B r i t i s h Sovereignty n e c e s s a r i l y introduces E n g l i s h p u b l i c law (or c e r t a i n aspects of i t ) i n t o conquered or ceded c o l o n i e s . I t has been held that the conqueror cannot r e t a i n unimpaired the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of the previous sovereign, f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law i s the essence of the power of the new sovereign over the t e r r i t o r y and i t s inhabitants.(315) Thus laws contrary to fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n cease at the moment of conquest/cession.(316) This d o c t r i n e was discussed at considerable length by Lord Stowell i n Ruding v. Smith(317) He pointed out that even with respect to the ancient i n h a b i t a n t s no small p o r t i o n of the ancient law i s unavoidably superceded by the r e v o l u t i o n of government that has taken p l a c e . The a l l e g i a n c e of subjects and (315) Cote, supra footnote 310, p. 41, c i t i n g Ridges' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law 480 (8th ed. 1950). C h i t t y , supra, footnote 245, p. 25 (1820). (316) c f . Lord Ellenborough, 30 St. Tr. C o l . 742. (317) Ruding v. Smith, (1821), 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 371. PAGE 131 a l l the law that r e l a t e s to i t — the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the law i n the sovereign, and a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and a l l the laws connected with the e x e r c i s e of the sovereign a u t h o r i t y — must undergo a l t e r a t i o n s adapted to the change;(318) Though the laws are to remain, i t i s s u r e l y a s u f f i c i e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of such terms as 'that they s h a l l remain i n f o r c e ' i f they continue to govern (as f a r as they do continue) the tr a n s a c t i o n s of the ancient s e t t l e r s with each other, and with the new owners. To allow that they s h a l l i n t r u d e i n t o a l l separate t r a n s a c t i o n s of the B r i t i s h conquerors i s to give them a v a l i d i t y which they would otherwise want i n a l l cases whatever."(319) Although the general law of the previous sovereign remains, the Crown's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the courts and government i s a d i f f e r e n t thing.(320) One scholar has noted that the conquest of Canada i n 1763 had the e f f e c t of s u b s t i t u t i n g the p u b l i c laws of England f o r that of France.(321) This general p r i n c i p l e was approved by K e l l o c k J . of the Supreme Court of Canada i n Chaput v. Romain.(322) i n r e l a t i o n to Quebec who st a t e d ; (318) I b i d . , pp. 382-3 and see T a r r i n g supra, footnote 312, p. 17. (319) I b i d . , p. 383. (320) Union Government v. Estate of Whittaker, [1916] A.D. 194 at 203-204 c i t i n g Donegani v. Donegani (1835), 3 Knapp 63, 12 E.R. 571 i n support of t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . See Cote supra, footnote 310, p. 42. (321) Dean Walton, The Scope and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C i v i l Code  of Lower Canada (1907), at 26-51. C i t e d i n Cote supra, footnote 310, p. 42 and see The Legal System of Quebec (1913), 33 Can. L.T. 280. (322) Chaput V. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 241 at 259. PAGE 132 Questions which concern the r e l a t i o n of the subject to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e i n i t s broadest sense are subject to the c o n t r o l of the Courts, and are, th e r e f o r e governed by the law of England and not by that of France. K e l l o c k J . r e l i e d on a statement of Ramsey J . i n Corporation du Compte d'Arthabaska v. Patoine(323) to the e f f e c t that I have quoted E n g l i s h law on t h i s s u b j e c t , f o r i t , I t h i n k , determines the p o i n t . M u n i c i p a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as those we have, are deri v e d from the E n g l i s h law, and our courts have the general p r e r o g a t i v e s of E n g l i s h c o u r t s . These l a s t are derived from the a u t h o r i t y of the Sovereign, and as the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e i s one of the greater  r i g h t s of the Crown i t i s governed by the p u b l i c law of the empire.(324) (My emphasis) Cote notes that though these cases are from the Province of Quebec the same p r i n c i p l e has been expressly recognized i n South A f r i c a , ( 3 2 5 ) and i s r e f l e c t e d i n s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s of the P r i v y Council.(326 ) In Abbott v. Fraser the question arose as to whether a French E d i c t (1743) i n force i n Quebec remained i n force a f t e r the cession of that t e r r i t o r y to Great B r i t a i n i n 1763. The (323) I b i d . c i t i n g Corporation du Compte d'Arthabaska v. Patoine (1886), 4 Dorion Que. Q.B. 364 at 370 f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . (324) I b i d . (325) Supra, footnote 310, p. 42-43 c i t i n g Nathan's Common Law of South A f r i c a and c f . Cameron v. Kyte (1835), 3 Knapp 332, 12 E.R. 678 (P.C.) where Parke B. speaks of the King being the Successor of the States General of the Provinces, i n a captured Dutch colony. (326) Supra, footnote 310, p. 42 c i t i n g Abbott v. Fraser (1874), L.R. 6 P.C. 96 at 106-107, 120 and see Madzimbarurto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 A l l E.R. 572 A-E, (P.C.) (Rodesia); Kodeesaran v. A.G., [1962] 2 W.L.R. 456 at 459-60 (P.C.) (Ceylon). PAGE 133 P r i v y C o u n c i l s t a t e d " i t i s open to considerable doubt, whether the f i r s t nine a r t i c l e s of the e d i c t , which a l l r e l a t e to the foundation of c o r p o r a t i o n s , r e t a i n e d the f o r c e of law a f t e r t h i s c e s s i o n ; f i r s t because the forms and r e g u l a t i o n s they p r e s c r i b e d then became out of place; and secondly, f o r the s u b s t a n t i a l reason that the a r t i c l e s , which had f o r t h e i r object to put f e t t e r s on the King's own power, could not, i t may f a i r l y be contended, be of force to c o n t r o l the sovereign w i l l of the E n g l i s h Crown, whose pr e r o g a t i v e i t would be, a f t e r the c e s s i o n , to e s t a b l i s h corporations...."(327) In e f f e c t the P r i v y C o u n c i l upheld, on t h i s p o i n t , the judgment from the Court of Queen's Bench fo r Lower Canada and i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the words of the Queen's Bench on t h i s question. A f t e r f i n d i n g that the d e c l a r a t i o n of 1743 "manifestly f a l l s w i t h i n the c l a s s of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i v e laws, and not of the c i v i l or municipal law of the c o l o n i e s " and that " i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e character and f u n c t i o n s are m a n i f e s t l y the  enforcement of the p u b l i c p o l i c y of the Kingdom, and the removal  of the a l l e g e d p u b l i c m i s c h i e f , which touched the State only..." (My emphasis - c f . Royal Proclamation of 1763) goes on to s t a t e that "as such p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law i t belonged to the State e x c l u s i v e l y , and n e c e s s a r i l y followed i t s fortunes....".(328) A f t e r c i t i n g examples of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e nature, the court f i n d s "the Act of 1743 to be a p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i v e Act, which (327) I b i d . , Abbott v. Fraser at p. 120. (328) I b i d . , pp. 105-106. PAGE 134 e x i s t e d w i t h i n the dominion only to which i t belonged, and could not contract or govern the pre r o g a t i v e r i g h t s or powers of the new sovereign of the colony, and d i d not req u i r e to be abrogated or repealed by express l e g i s l a t i v e authority".(329) The l a t t e r because on the cession of the colony to Great B r i t a i n i n 1763 i t was no longer subject to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p u b l i c law of France but became "subject to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p u b l i c law of Great B r i t a i n . " ( 3 3 0 ) Cote notes that t h i s p r i n c i p l e was recognized i n Re Adam which held that although the o l d law of the conquered colony sets the r i g h t s and d u t i e s of an a a l i e n , v i s - a - v i s the Crown h i s r i g h t s and d u t i e s must be set by the Law of England,(331) presumably on the grounds that B r i t i s h sovereignty n e c e s s a r i l y imported p u b l i c elements of B r i t i s h law i n t o the new colony. This accords with a statement i n Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d where the Court held that the extent of the pre r o g a t i v e must be determined by the E n g l i s h common law i n Malta even though Malta was a conquered colony and ther e f o r e the E n g l i s h common law d i d not as such hold there.(332) Walton, c i t e d i n Cote,(333) canvasses which (329) I b i d . (330) I b i d . , pp. 106-107. (331) Re Adam (1837), 1 Moo. P.C. 460 at 470; 12 E.R. 889 at 893 (P.C.) c i t e d i n Cote, supra, footnote 310, p. 43. (332) Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d , [1938] A.C. 678, 3 A l l E.R. 693 ( P . C ) , at 699. But Cote notes c f . Advocate-General of  Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863), 2 Moo. P.C (N.S.) 22 at 61, 15 E.R. 811 at 825, where i t was held that i n t r o d u c t i o n of B r i t i s h sovereignty would not introduce E n g l i s h r u l e s of f o r f e i t u r e f o r f e l o de se. PAGE 135 part of the o l d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law must be taken to have been superseded on conquest. He suggests that E n g l i s h law replaces the former law as to the d u t i e s of c i t i z e n s , the powers and dut i e s of p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s , p u b l i c p o l i c y as to cont r a c t s [sed  quaerere], p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s of the Crown, c o n t r o l over corporations [sed quaerere], p u b l i c lands, p u b l i c c o n t r a c t s , s u i t s against the Crown, the prero g a t i v e w r i t s , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , l i a b i l i t y of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law. As to pr e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s , Cote cautions that "one must not think that a l l the r i g h t s of the Crown f a l l under t h i s r u b r i c of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. I t has been suggested, f o r instance, that the Crown's t i t l e to the bed of navigable r i v e r s i s governed by the l o c a l law, and that the B r i t i s h sovereign merely takes over such r i g h t s from the former ruler."(334) C i t i n g the case of Dixson v. Snetsinger(335) (wherein the court held that the Crown of Great B r i t a i n having acquired by cession the r i g h t s and prero g a t i v e s which had p r e v i o u s l y belonged to the French King, and that under the French law the Crown was invested with the t i t l e to the bed of the r i v e r f o r p u b l i c purpose, the court held that Crown of Great B r i t a i n gained a s i m i l a r t i t l e . The d e c i s i o n r e l i e d i n l a r g e part however on the Imperial S t a t u t e , 14 Geo. 3, (333) Supra, foonote 310, p. 43 c i t i n g Walton, The Scope and  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C i v i l Code of Lower Canada (1907), e s p e c i a l l y at 38, 30, 31, 32-33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 47; and 33 Can. L.T. at 287-90. (334) Supra, footnote 310, p. 43 c i t i n g In re P r o v i n c i a l F i s h e r i e s (1896), 26 S.C.R. 444 at 529, per Strong C.J.C.; t h i s p o i n t was not mentioned on appeal, [1898] A.C. 700 (P.C.). (335) 23 U.C.C.P. 235. PAGE 136 83 wherein i t was enacted "that i n a l l matters of controversy r e l a t i v e to property and c i v i l r i g h t s , r e s o r t s h a l l be had to the laws of Canada, as the r u l e for the d e c i s i o n of the same".(336) The court d i d not focus squarely on what aspects of French law would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be abrogated upon the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty. From the above i t i s c l e a r that c e r t a i n p r e r o g a t i v e r i g h t s of the Crown form part of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c / c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law immediately i n f o r c e i n the c o l o n i e s (and e q u a l l y c l e a r that not a l l the P r e r o g a t i v e s of the Crown w i l l be i n f o r c e ) . We r e t u r n then to Imperial Law i n force p r o p r i o v i g o r e . I t seems c l e a r that major Pre r o g a t i v e instruments expressed to apply to a p a r t i c u l a r colony or to c o l o n i e s i n g e n e r a l , (and e s p e c i a l l y where such instruments are passed under the Great Seal such as L e t t e r s Patent and Proclamations) are i n f o r c e p r o p r i o vigore i n the t e r r i t o r i e s to which they apply. They do not depend upon "reception" of E n g l i s h law, i t being only "major" Prerogatives that are i n f o r c e ipso f a c t o i n c o l o n i e s subject to B r i t i s h dominion as part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of these c o l o n i e s . Cote c i t e s as f a m i l i a r examples of Imperial s t a t u t e s i n force p r o p r i o vigore "the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Acts c r e a t i n g the Canadian and A u s t r a l i a n f e d e r a t i o n s " which do not depend on any form of r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law - i n f a c t he argues they have "never formed any part of the law of England", having been passed (336) I b i d . c i t e d In re P r o v i n c i a l F i s h e r i e s , supra footnote 334 at p. 530. PAGE 137 p a r t i c u l a r l y for those dominions. He notes too that "the B r i t i s h North America Acts are i n f o r c e i n the Province of Quebec though i t has not introduced the greater part of E n g l i s h law at a l l . " ( c f . Quebec Act) . I t would be anomalous, to say the l e a s t , i f c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s were to be given i n sovereign instruments instead of Imperial A c t s , that the former should be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . However not a l l P r e r o g a t i v e instruments enjoy such f o r c e . I t i s u s e f u l to address the d i s t i n c t i o n to be made between "minor" and "major" pr e r o g a t i v e s of the Crown. PAGE 138 5. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the Royal Pr e r o g a t i v e s ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n B a s i c a l l y , p r e r o g a t i v e s f a l l to be c l a s s i f i e d upon whether the r i g h t fundamentally s u s t a i n s the existence and a u t h o r i t y of the Crown or i s merely i n c i d e n t a l to i t . " ( 3 3 7 ) C h i t t y makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between minor p r e r o g a t i v e s , which are merely l o c a l to England and "those fundamental r i g h t s and p r i n c i p l e s on which the King's a u t h o r i t y r e s t s and which are necessary to maintain i t . (338) Roberts-Wray adopts the convenient term of major  Prerogative f o r t h i s l a t t e r class.(339) More importantly C h i t t y attached c o l o n i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . The minor pre r o g a t i v e powers enjoyed by the King i n England do not prima f a c i e extend to B r i t i s h dominions unless received there as part of the common law.(340) They would run, t h e r e f o r e , i n " s e t t l e d " c o l o n i e s or i n co l o n i e s where the B r i t i s h common law runs as the r e s u l t of a reception s t a t u t e , whether of Imperial or C o l o n i a l o r i g i n . In such t e r r i t o r i e s , the minor pr e r o g a t i v e s are prima f a c i e as extensive as i n B r i t a i n . ( 3 4 1 ) The minor prerogatives are not prima f a c i e (337) B l a . Comm. (14th ed.) 240, 241. (338) Supra, footnote 245, pp. 25-6; 32-33. (339) Supra, footnote 251, p. 557. (340) I b i d . , p. 558. (341) Lyons (Mayor) v. East India Co. (1836), 1 Moo. P.C. 175, at 274; and see N y a l i Ld. v. Att.-Gen., [1956] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.). PAGE 139 e x t e n s i b l e to B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s which, though dependent on the B r i t i s h Crown, have a d i s t i n c t l o c a l jurisprudence. C h i t t y suggests that where the law of such t e r r i t o r i e s i s s i l e n t as to the operation of the prer o g a t i v e s that the prerogatives as e s t a b l i s h e d by the E n g l i s h law p r e v a i l , subject to exceptions which the d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n s t i t u t i o n of that t e r r i t o r y , and that of the mother country, may n e c e s s a r i l y create.(342) In a d d i t i o n to such minor pre r o g a t i v e s the King enjoys c e r t a i n major Pre r o g a t i v e powers which fundamentally s u s t a i n the existence of the Crown, or form the p i l l a r s on which i t i s supported.(343) These p r e v a i l i n every part of the t e r r i t o r i e s subject to the B r i t i s h Crown, by whatever p e c u l i a r or i n t e r n a l laws they may be governed.(344) The King enjoyed major Prer o g a t i v e powers i n B r i t i s h dependent t e r r i t o r i e s by v i r t u e of the s p e c i a l r o l e of the Crown i n r e l a t i o n to f o r e i g n s t a t e s or a f f a i r s . As st a t e d above, i n Sammut v. Strickland(345) i t was held that a major Pre r o g a t i v e operates as "a pure question of E n g l i s h common law i n a country such as Malta where the common law i s not i n force.(346) Major Prerogatives would extend even to (342) Supra, footnote 245, p. 26 and see L i q u i d a t o r s of Maritime  Bank of Canada v. Rec. Gen, of New Brunswick L.R. (1892), A.C. 437, where i t was held that where not expressly created by l o c a l law or s t a t u t e i t i s as extensive i n the co l o n i e s as i n Great B r i t a i n . (343) I b i d . , C h i t t y , p. 25. (344) I b i d . (345) Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d , [1938] A.C. 678 (P.C.). (346) I b i d . , at p. 697. PAGE 140 other t e r r i t o r i e s i n which the Crown had j u r i s d i c t i o n , such as p r o t e c t o r a t e s , subject to the law i f any of that j u r i s d i c t i o n . Roberts-Wray suggests that i t f o l l o w s that major Prerogatives form part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l foundation of the country and th a t , without express grant, the l e g i s l a t u r e s of a dependent t e r r i t o r y cannot a l t e r or a b o l i s h them.(347) ( i i ) Major P r e r o g a t i v e Powers I t i s d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y a l l the subjects f a l l i n g w i t h i n the Crown's p e c u l i a r j u r i s d i c t i o n that are appropriate f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the expression "major Pr e r o g a t i v e s " . C h i t t y describes these only i n general terms as "those fundamental r i g h t s and p r i n c i p l e s on which the King's a u t h o r i t y r e s t s and which are necessary to maintain i t . " ( 3 4 8 ) He goes on to give as the source of such power: "The King i s head of the church; i s possessed of a share of l e g i s l a t i o n ; and i s generalissimo throughout a l l h i s dominions....".(349) He sta t e s that the King's minor pre r o g a t i v e s are f r e e l y a l t e r a b l e by l o c a l assemblies -i m p l i c i t l y then major Prerogatives are not. What then are the major Pr e r o g a t i v e s which the l e g i s l a t u r e s of dependent t e r r i t o r i e s are incompetent to modify and which are e x e r c i s a b l e throughout the B r i t i s h dominion? Roberts-Wray goes some way i n i d e n t i f y i n g some subject matters f a l l i n g w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n of major P r e r o g a t i v e s but i s c a r e f u l to note that the l i s t i s not (347) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 561. (348) Supra, footnote 245, at p. 25. (349) I b i d . PAGE 141 exhaustive.(350) As already noted(351) i n a l l c o l o n i e s the King enjoyed the power to make laws of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l nature - to b r i n g i n t o being, i n such c o l o n i e s , a general power to make laws. The p r e r o g a t i v e instruments by which t h i s was accomplished c l e a r l y f e l l to be c l a s s i f i e d as major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n . The extent of the c o n s t i t u e n t Prerogative i s addressed more f u l l y below. The p r e r o g a t i v e power to grant leave to appeal to the P r i v y Council may a l s o be a major Prerogative r i g h t . I t was held i n B r i t i s h Coal v. 1*^ ( 352) that i f t h i s Prerogative i s to be l i m i t e d by a Dominion or C o l o n i a l Act, i t must be the Act of a Dominion or C o l o n i a l L e g i s l a t u r e which has been endowed with the r e q u i s i t e powers by an Imperial Act g i v i n g the power e i t h e r by express terms or by necessary intendment. This i s not s u r p r i s i n g as c l e a r l y p r e r o g a t i v e powers were i n a l l cases subordinate to the powers of the Imperial Parliament.(353) Roberts-Wray f u r t h e r i d e n t i f i e s the Prerogative of Mercy as a major P r e r o g a t i v e ; " i t could without d i f f i c u l t y be argued that an attempt to i n t e r f e r e with the e x e r c i s e of Her Majesty ( i n England) of her r i g h t to m i t i g a t e the sentences of her courts would c o n f l i c t with the Sovereign's a u t h o r i t y as the f o u n t a i n of j u s t i c e , and that t h i s i s a major Prerogative".(354) S i m i l a r l y (350) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 379. (351) See d i s c u s s i o n above p. 125 e t . seq. (352) B r i t i s h Coal Corpn. v. R^, [1935] A.C. 500. (353) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 377. PAGE 142 the power of an E n g l i s h Court to issue the w r i t of Habeas Corpus, a "high p r e r o g a t i v e w r i t " i s a mani f e s t a t i o n of a major Prer o g a t i v e and so forms part of the basic law of a t e r r i t o r y w i t h i n B r i t i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n , whether or not received as part of B r i t i s h common law.(355) Roberts-Wray suggests that t h i s i n no way l i m i t s the powers of such dependent l e g i s l a t u r e s from enacting laws regarding the issue of w r i t s by t h e i r own c o u r t s , merely that such l e g i s l a t u r e s were incompetent to a l t e r the Crown's power to issue such writs,(356) The c r i t e r i o n upon which a p a r t i c u l a r p r e r o g a t i v e i s c l a s s i f i e d as "major" i s not r e a d i l y d i s c e r n a b l e from the above examples. C l e a r l y the major Prerogative r i g h t s of the Crown (e.g. to make laws - c o n s t i t u t i o n s , or grant p r i v i l e g e s - s p e c i a l leave, mercy) are so fundamental to the p o l i t i c a l character of the Sovereign such that they are n e c e s s a r i l y extended to a l l newly acquired t e r r i t o r i e s as a r e s u l t of B r i t i s h Sovereignty. They form part of the bas i c law and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of such t e r r i t o r i e s and l i m i t the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of the l o c a l assemblies. I t i s argued that the Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 i s major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n on e i t h e r of two grounds: that they are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n nature having to do p r i n c i p a l l y with l i m i t a t i o n s on the powers of Governors to acquire unsurrendered (354) I b i d . , p. 380. (355) I b i d . , p. 615 and see Ex. p. Anderson (1861), 3 E l . & E l . 487. (356) I b i d . , (Roberts-Wray) and see Habeas Corpus Act, 1862, 25 & 26 V. c. 20. PAGE 143 t r i b a l lands or that as l e g i s l a t i o n governing the procedure to be adopted f o r Crown a l i e n a t i o n of Indian lands they f a l l w i t h i n the King's p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y . PAGE 144 PART I I I THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 AS MAJOR PREROGATIVE  LEGISLATION The Indian Land P r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 7th  October 1763 as Major P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n Referable to the B r i t i s h Crown's Constituent Power i n Dependent B r i t i s h  T e r r i t o r i e s The Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 purport to l i m i t the powers of a l l Governors i n North America to acquire unsurrendered t r i b a l lands, except i n accordance with the procedure t h e r e i n enunciated. In t h i s respect they can been seen as part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n thereby given to the newly ceded t e r r i t o r i e s , d i c t a t i n g the co n d i t i o n s upon which the governors were to e x e r c i s e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y over Indian lands. I t i s argued the e f f e c t of these p r o v i s i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to a l l c o l o n i e s i n B r i t i s h North America was to make such procedure a part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . As argued below, the Crown, by v i r t u e of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p r e r o g a t i v e , could e f f e c t such minor c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i n r e l a t i o n to a l l c o l o n i e s whether or not such an amending power was reserved and whether or not a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e was c o n s t i t u t e d . In f a c t i t was common f o r the Crown to issue i n s t r u c t i o n s to Governors even where a general l e g i s l a t i v e power i n r e l a t i o n to the p a r t i c u l a r colony, was l o s t . The Crown c l e a r l y enjoyed the r i g h t to make such laws for two or more t e r r i t o r i e s ; i t was not, as c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were, l i m i t e d i n t e r r i t o r i a l extent. The means chosen to communicate, to the Governors of B r i t i s h North America, the r o y a l pleasure i n r e l a t i o n to the purchase by the Crown of Indian lands was a Royal proclamation, an o f f i c i a l p u b l i c announcement, under the Great Seal. (Remember that the PAGE 145 r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the use of Proclamations i n B r i t a i n , as l a i d down i n the Proclamation Case, do not n e c e s s a r i l y apply to the c o l o n i e s where the Crown's prerogative powers are more e x t e n s i v e ) . The Indian land p r o v i s i o n s t h e r e i n "enacted" d i d not e f f e c t any major c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to any of the c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s but rather entrenched, i n a w r i t t e n document, e x i s t i n g unwritten c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s . From the beginning, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l governors i n North America had been given c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s to respect native land r i g h t s and to acquire t e r r i t o r y only through cession and purchase.(357) The Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Proclamation confirmed the long held B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e of respect for Indian possession and declared the accepted common law p o s i t i o n re Indian land rights.(358) The Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 merely i n s t r u c t e d (reminded) governors to recognize c e r t a i n procedures f o r Crown purchases of Indian t i t l e . That t h i s was w i t h i n the Crown's power gains support from the f a c t that a d r a f t of the Proclamation prepared by the Lords of Trade and passed to Attorney-General, Charles Yorke, f o r l e g a l comment was passed, with the words, " i t contains nothing c o n t r a r y (357) L e t t e r s of i n s t r u c t i o n to Captain Endecott (1629) c i t e d i n F. Jennings, The Invasion of AmericaA Indians,  C o l o n i a l i s m , and the Cant of Conquest, Chapel H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a Press, 1975, at p. 135; Royal  I n s t r u c t i o n s to B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l Governors 1670-1776, ed i t e d by L.W. Labaree (Washington, D.C.: American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 1973. (358) See Governor and Company of Connecticut and Mohegan Indians case discussed i n Smith, J.H. Appeals to the P r i v y C o u n c i l from the American P l a n t a t i o n s , New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950, at p. 425. PAGE 146 to law".(359) I t has been noted that i t i s the prerogative r i g h t of Her Majesty ( i n the United Kingdom) to make laws of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l nature f o r a dependent t e r r i t o r y . The King could e s t a b l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n s for a l l B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s and where expressly r e t a i n e d had a power to amend or revoke the same.(360) The c o n s t i t u e n t power could be invoked i n r e l a t i o n to a l l c o l o n i e s whether acquired by settlement, conquest or cession.(361) I t therefore must be r e f e r a b l e a major Prerogative as prima f a c i e minor prerogatives could only be exercised i n those parts of the B r i t i s h dominions where the common law ran. The c o n s t i t u t i o n s set up by P r e r o g a t i v e instruments i n B r i t i s h dominions were not f r e e l y a l t e r a b l e by non-representative l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , a r u l e contained i n part i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865.(362) Representative l e g i s l a t u r e s , by the same Act, were given the power to make laws respecting t h e i r C o n s t i t u t i o n , Powers and Procedure.(363) In R_^  v. McCawley i t was held t h a t : There i s nothing sacrosanct or magical i n the word " c o n s t i t u t i o n " ; the expression i t s e l f not i n d i c a t i n g how f a r , or when, or by whom, or i n what manner the r u l e s composing i t may be (359) York to the Board of Trade, 3 October, 1763, Pro. Co.O. 323/16, p. 337. (360) Supra, footnote 245, p. 28 and see d i s c u s s i o n above p. 125 et seq.p. (361) Jephson v R i e r a (1835), I I I Knapp. 130. (362) C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, see Appendix I I , and see Chenard v. A r r i s o l , [1949] A.C. 127. (363) I b i d . , C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, s. 5. PAGE 147 altered".(364) The l e g i s l a t u r e must however be endowed with an amending power and must conform to any "manner and form" requirements. In v. McCawley the l e g i s l a t u r e i n question was expressly given such power.(365) The case i s not a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment w i l l be impled i n the absence of a n t a g o n i s t i c l e g i s l a t i o n with an expressed a f f i r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . Repeal by i m p l i c a t i o n i s not favoured by the courts,(366) the presumption being that i f Parliament intended to e f f e c t a repeal i t would do so i n express language.(367) The Prerogative instruments e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n s had the force of Imperial s t a t u t e s and gave a l e g a l b a s i s to the i n s t i t u t i o n s set up under them. Although the d e c i s i o n i n Campbell v. Hall(368) ( l i m i t i n g the Crown's l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y where a l o c a l assembly has been promised) has been taken to extend to l i m i t both the con s t i t u e n t and ord i n a r y l e g i s l a t i v e power of the Crown, i t seems there i s l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y to support such a conclusion and good reason f o r holding otherwise. In t h i s respect i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to look at the d e c i s i o n of the j u d i c i a l committee i n Sammut v. (364) R^ v. McCawley, [1918] 26 C.C.R. 9, at 52 per Isaacs & Rich J J . (365) v. McCawley, [1920] A.C. 691 (and see lower court d e c i s i o n (1918), 26 C.C.R. 9). (366) Bac. Abr., s t a t u t e (D). (367) Maxwell, On the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Stat u t e s ; 10th edn., p. 170; R_^  v. H a l l i d a y , [1917] A.C. 260, at p. 305 (H.L.). (368) Supra, footnote 275. PAGE 148 Strickl a n d( 3 6 9 ) and i n p a r t i c u l a r at t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Lord Mansfield's d i c t a i n Campbell v. H a l l . I t was suggested by counsel i n Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d that as a general p r o p o s i t i o n , whenever responsible government i s conceded by the Crown to a colony or possession, the Royal Prerogative to l e g i s l a t e by L e t t e r s Patent or Orders i n Council comes to an end and i s i r r e v o c a b l y l o s t or surrendered by the Crown, unless a s p e c i a l r e s e r v a t i o n i s made i n the grant.(370) In response the Court s t a t e d : " I t may be sta t e d at once that there i s no a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s view...."(371) The Court noted that the case r e l i e d on f o r the erroneous view was Campbell v. H a l l . (discussed above) In the l a t t e r case, Lord M a n s f i e l d , i n d e l i v e r i n g judgment, s a i d that upon f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n the Court was of the opi n i o n that before the issue of the L e t t e r s Patent of J u l y 20, 1764 (the taxing proclamation) the King had precluded himself from the exe r c i s e of a l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over the i s l a n d of Grenada by the grant of an assembly. He then proceeded to consider the terms of the two proclamations at i s s u e , and a f t e r t h i s examination s t a t e d We therefore t h i n k , that by the two proclamations and the commission to Governor M e l v i l l e , the King had immediately and i r r e c o v e r a b l y granted to a l l who were or should become i n h a b i t a n t s , or who had, or should acquire property i n the i s l a n d of Grenada, or more g e n e r a l l y to a l l whom i t might concern, that the subordinate l e g i s l a t i o n over the (369) [1938] A.C. 678. (370) I b i d . , p. 702. (371) I b i d . PAGE 149 i s l a n d should be exercised by an assembly with the consent of the governor and c o u n c i l i n l i k e manner as the other i s l a n d s belonging to the King.(372) (My emphasis) Of t h i s statement the court i n Sammut noted: I t i s p l a i n that t h i s a u t h o r i t y i s d e a l i n g with a case where the Crown, a f t e r having granted r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s to the colony, was purporting to ex e r c i s e by Royal P r e r o g a t i v e a concurrent r i g h t of l e g i s l a t i o n , though no such r i g h t had been reserved.(373) (My emphasis) The Court i n Sammut v. S t r i c k l a n d goes on to examine the l e g i s l a t i v e grant at issue i n that case and concludes t h a t : The r i g h t [sovereign] to l e g i s l a t e i n r e l a t i o n to l o c a l matters was doubtless suspended while the L e t t e r s Patent were i n f o r c e , f or the reason i n d i c a t e d by Lord M a n s f i e l d i n the passage already quoted — namely, that so to l e g i s l a t e would be "contrary to and a v i o l a t i o n of" the instrument granting the powers; but there i s nothing i n i t to preclude the e x e r c i s e of the Royal Prerogative as soon as the L e t t e r s Patent i n that respect cease to be i n force.(374) C l e a r l y the court i n Campbell v. H a l l was concerned w i t h the Crown's power to l e g i s l a t e f o r l o c a l matters [tax] while the Le t t e r s Patent c o n s t i t u t i n g a l o c a l assembly were i n e f f e c t . The court was at pains to make c l e a r that what was at issue was a concurrent l e g i s l a t i v e power i n the Crown where such a power had not been reserved, and on t h i s point held that where an assembly has been granted the subordinate l e g i s l a t i o n over the t e r r i t o r y i s l o s t to the Crown. As Roberts-Wray p o i n t s out the reference (372) I b i d , p. 703 c i t i n g 1 Cowp. 213. (373) I b i d . , p. 703. (374) I b i d . , pp. 706-707. PAGE 150 to "subordinate" l e g i s l a t i o n seems c l e a r l y to have been a reference to ordinary laws and not those of a c o n s t i t u e n t nature.(375) The co n s t i t u e n t power of the Crown was not at issue i n the case of Campbell v. H a l l and no d e c i s i o n was made regarding i t . Roberts-Wray examines some a u t h o r i t y that i m p l i e s an opi n i o n to the contrary, i . e . that a Crown grant of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e body precludes both the e x e r c i s e , by the Crown, of a general l e g i s l a t i v e power and the co n s t i t u e n t power.(376) He concludes: I t seems that there i s a strong case f o r maintaining that Campbell v. H a l l and subsequent cases mean only t h a t , unless there i s an express r e s e r v a t i o n (a) the Crown does not possess a concurrent power to make ordin a r y laws so long as l e g i s l a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s continue i n the colony; (b) the grant of l e g i s l a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s cannot be revoked unless the power of revocation i s reserved; and (c) amendment of the C o n s t i t u t i o n not amounting  to a revocation of the grant, remains w i t h i n  the prerogative r i g h t s of the Crown.(377) (My emphasis) And he notes that the l a s t p r o p o s i t i o n has the support of C h i t t y where the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l instrument i s Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s but not where i t i s L e t t e r s Patent or founded on l o c a l law.(378) Roberts-Wray a s s e r t s that there i s no basis f o r making a d i s t i n c t i o n between Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s and L e t t e r s Patent but (375) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 157. (376) I b i d . , pp. 159-162 and the cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . (377) I b i d . , p. 162. (378) I b i d . PAGE 151 notes that i t may be that Crown's power of amendment i s only r e f e r a b l e to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l instruments made by the Crown.(379) That the Crown, upon the grant of a l e g i s l a t u r e , i s not emptied of a l l c o n s t i t u e n t power and s p e c i f i c a l l y of the power to make c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments to the c o n s t i t u t i o n , not amounting to a revocation of the grant, gains f u r t h e r support from Section 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865.(380) The C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act was passed to 'remove doubts' as to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence. Section 5 provided t h a t , "every Representative L e g i s l a t u r e " s h a l l have, and be deemed at a l l times to have had, " f u l l Power to make Laws respecting the C o n s t i t u t i o n , Powers, and Procedure of such L e g i s l a t u r e ; . . . " Roberts-Wray notes that i f the doubt as to the competence of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s i n t h i s regard was w e l l founded and i f we accept that the Crown through a grant of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e loses i t s 'constituent' power then i n whom apart from Parliament was the power to amend such a c o n s t i t u t i o n vested or thought to be vested?(381) I f we accept such a power l i e s w i t h the Crown, s e c t i o n 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 does no more than give a concurrent r i g h t to c o l o n i a l " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " assemblies. In f a c t s e c t i o n 5 has been held to enable representative assemblies to change no more than i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n , powers and procedure(382) and such of n e c e s s i t y (379) I b i d . (380) I b i d . , p. 159. (381) I b i d . PAGE 152 implies a power i n the Crown to amend i n other respects (such as the representative character of the l e g i s l a t u r e ) the c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n whether reserved or not.(383) Moreover, s e c t i o n 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 confers or confirms amending powers i n a "representative l e g i s l a t u r e " and i s s i l e n t as to the powers of a "non-representative" l e g i s l a t u r e . The l a t t e r l e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y might enjoy amending powers where such i s expressly authorized by Imperial Act or Order. However, i n the more common s i t u a t i o n such power would, i t i s argued, r e s i d e i n the Sovereign by v i r t u e of the c o n s t i t u e n t p r e r o g a t i v e . (See d i s c u s s i o n on Section 5, C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, below. Roberts-Wray f u r t h e r notes that " i n f a c t , f o r c o l o n i e s where the general l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y has been l o s t , L e t t e r s Patent are made, amended and revoked d e a l i n g with the o f f i c e of Governor, some of h i s powers, the Executive Council and, i n c e r t a i n respects, the L e g i s l a t u r e . ( 3 8 4 ) Further t h a t , " i t i s most u n l i k e l y that power to make p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s o r t has always been expressly reserved, but i t has never been c a l l e d i n t o question."(385) He c i t e s various L e t t e r s patent for Bermuda and fo r the Bahamas and for Barbados which regulate t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s to a s i g n i f i c a n t extent, and various L e t t e r s Patent i n regard to B r i t i s h Honduras, Antigua and the V i r g i n Islands that deal with the O f f i c e of Governor, h i s powers and the (382) Taylor v. Att.-Gen., Queensland (1917), 23 C.L.R. 457. (383) I b i d . (384) Supra, footnote 251, pp. 145-6. (385) I b i d . PAGE 153 executive council.(386) In some instances Acts of Parliament were used to e f f e c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes. Most of these "were c l e a r l y necessary because they involved the complete abrogation of l e g i s l a t u r e s and the v e s t i n g of wide powers i n the Crown".(387) I t i s not suggested, and c l e a r l y , i s not the case, that the Crown's power to amend c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s extended to a revocation of the grant or to amendments that i n substance e f f e c t e d this.(388) But i t seems c l e a r that minor c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s such as the extent of the a u t h o r i t y of the governor and the c o n d i t i o n s on which he was to e x e r c i s e h i s a u t h o r i t y could be v a r i e d by the Crown.(389) This was true whether or not such a power was reserved to the Crown. I t i s argued that the Indian p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n nature having to do p r i n c i p a l l y with the e x e r c i s e of the Governor's powers. In order to f u l l y understand the Crown's power to issue such i n s t r u c t i o n s i t i s necessary to look at the nature of the o f f i c e of the Governor and the powers he e x e r c i s e s . (386) Supra, footnote 251, at pp. 145-6. (387) Roberts-Wray p. 163 c i t i n g as an example The Jamaica Act, 1866 (29 & 30 v. c. 12) and c f . The Malta ( L e t t e r s  Patent) Acts which gave Crown a power to amend, discussed i n Roberts-Wray p. 163. (388) Campbell v. H a l l (1774), supra, footnote 275. (389) K e i t h , A. B e r r i d a l e , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l H i s t o r y of the F i r s t  B r i t i s h Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930. p. 180. PAGE 154 The a u t h o r i t y of the Queen i n the c o l o n i e s i s represented by a Governor. He i s appointed by Her Majesty's Commission, which confers upon him h i s powers and with h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s d e f i nes g e n e r a l l y h i s duties.(390) I t cannot be assumed that he possesses general sovereign power. The p r e r o g a t i v e was the King's to bestow and he could grant i t with or withhold i t i n such degree as he thought f i t . ( 3 9 1 ) Delegation of the p r e r o g a t i v e does not mean that i t has been assigned, i t i s e x e r c i s a b l e by a Governor i n the name and on behalf of Her Majesty and she i s not by such delegation emptied of her own power.(392) I t has been held that a Governor of a colony has not, by v i r t u e of h i s appointment, the whole sovereignty of the t e r r i t o r y delegated to him. He i s not a v i c e r o y , h i s a u t h o r i t y being l i m i t e d to that conferred upon him by the Crown or by the Acts of Parliament or other laws.(393) His a u t h o r i t y i s derived from h i s Commission, and l i m i t e d to the powers thereby expressly or i m p l i e d l y entrusted to him.(394) The instruments most commonly used to convey the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Orders of the Crown were Commissions and I n s t r u c t i o n s but i n the e a r l y days of the B r i t i s h Empire other instruments such as Orders-in-Council and Proclamations seem to have been used more or l e s s d i s c r i m i n a t e l y along with the former (390) T a r r i n g , supra, footnote 312, p. 33. (391) I b i d . (392) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 341. (393) Commercial Cable Co. v. Governor of Newfoundland, [1916] 2 A.C. , at p. 616. (394) Musgrave v. P u l i d o (1879), 5 App. Cas. 102. PAGE 155 instruments for such purposes.(395) A Commission i s a p u b l i c document, issued as L e t t e r s Patent, by which o f f i c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those of the Governor-General and Governor, are created and by which various powers are delegated to the holders of such o f f i c e s . ( 3 9 6 ) L e t t e r s Patent are made by the Sovereign alone and become law on the a f f i x i n g of the Great Sea l , under the a u t h o r i t y of a warrant bearing the Queen's signature. They are u s u a l l y approved i n d r a f t by Order-in-Council and c o n s t i t u t e a d i r e c t expression of the Sovereign's w i l l . ( 3 9 7 ) At one time the p r e r o g a t i v e C o n stituent power was always exercised by means of L e t t e r s Patent (or some other instruments made by the Sovereign alone) conveying i n s t r u c t i o n s to the Governor to e s t a b l i s h a l e g i s l a t u r e . ( 3 9 8 ) They seem to have the force and e f f e c t of B r i t i s h S t a t ute and i t has been held that a Governor's acts exceeding l i m i t s p r e s c r i b e d i n h i s Commission are v o i d . An opinion of Edward Northey, the Attorney General of England, (1713), s t a t e d that land grants made by Governors of New York beyond the a u t h o r i t y given i n t h e i r Commissions would be void.(399) A s i m i l a r o p i n i o n was given i n (395) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 143 c i t i n g : F o r s y t h , p. 15; Jepson v. R i e r a (1835) 3 Knapp 130, at 151-3. A s i n g l e instrument might c a l l i t s e l f by more than one name, e.g., "Charter"., " L e t t e r s Patent" and "Commission"; Gold Coast, J u l y 14, 1874, State Pp., V o l . 66, p. 942. (396) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 143. (397) I b i d . , p. 144. (398) Supra, footnote 19, p. 305 c i t i n g an Opinion of 5 May 1713; O'Callaghan, ed. Documents R e l a t i v e to the C o l o n i a l  H i s t o r y of the State of New York, p. 362-3. PAGE 156 r e l a t i o n to land grants made by a Governor of New Hampshire, a s e l e c t Committee holding " i f the Governor grants i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of h i s Commission, the grant i s void."(400) And such i s i m p l i c i t i n s e c t i o n 4 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, wherein i t i s suggested that i t i s beyond the competence of c o l o n i a l governors to dis r e g a r d even procedural i n s t r u c t i o n s contained i n the 'major' c o n s t i t u e n t instrument. The l a t t e r i s described as "the L e t t e r s Patent or Instrument a u t h o r i z i n g such Governor to concur i n passing or to assent to Laws fo r the Peace, Order, and good Government of such Colony." (s. 4). Sec t i o n 4 was aimed at saving c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n passed without adherance to the procedural f o r m a l i t i e s expressed i n various Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding such laws, but arguably (see d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a ) d i d nothing to de t r a c t from the force of such i n s t r u c t i o n s where they contained a d i r e c t order. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to look at the various statements that have been made regarding the forc e and e f f e c t of Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s . A Governor has no powers to l e g i s l a t e other than those given i n h i s Commission,(401) and he might be d i r e c t e d to exercise such powers i n accordance with Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s . S i r Arthur B e r r i d a l e Keith,(402) quoting Musgrave v. Pulido(403) (399) I b i d . , p. 306 c i t i n g Smith, Appeals to P r i v y C o u n c i l , 607, note 434, c i t i n g PRO W.O. 1/404/13. (401) 5 Hals., 3rd ed., p. 558, para. 1209; Commercial Cable Co. v. Government of Newfoundland, 29 D.L.R. 7 at p. 11, [1916] 2 A.C. 610; Musgrave v. P u l i d o (1879), 5 App. Cas. 102. (402) S i r A. B e r r i d a l e K e i t h , Responsible Government i n the  Dominions, (2nd ed.) (1927), p. 83. PAGE 157 s a i d ; There can be no doubt of the d o c t r i n e of the P r i v y C o u n c i l ; a Governor has no s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e l i k e that of the Crown; he must show i n any court that he has a u t h o r i t y by law to do an a c t , and what i s more important f o r our purpose, he must show not merely that the Crown might do the a c t , but that he p e r s o n a l l y had a u t h o r i t y to do the a c t . And a Governor was d i r e c t e d to perform h i s powers i n accordance with Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding such. Formal I n s t r u c t i o n s were u s u a l l y issued under the Royal Signet and Sign Manual, addressed to the Governor or Governor General and u s u a l l y were c o n f i d e n t i a l , "Only such p a r t s being d i s c l o s e d p u b l i c l y as were thought u s e f u l or e s s e n t i a l f o r p a r t i c u l a r ends."(404) Their l e g a l e f f e c t was c o n t r o v e r s i a l . The force and l e g a l e f f e c t of such i n s t r u c t i o n s was the subject of various l e g a l opinions. S l a t t e r y ( 4 0 5 ) c i t e s a l e g a l o p i n i o n rendered i n 1765 by John Kempe, Attorney-General of New York, i n r e l a t i o n to the d i s r e g a r d by the Governor of Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to land grants, not contained i n the Commission, to the e f f e c t that the acts may nevertheless be b i n d i n g : The Crown has thought f i t by i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s to i t s governments here to d i r e c t them not to Grant Lands, before they were purchased from the Indians, but t h i s i s not a R e s t r i c t i o n contained i n h i s Commission by which he has Power to Grant, but e x i s t s i n the p r i v a t e I n s t r u c t i o n s , and tho' i f a Governor should act contrary to h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i t would j u s t l y expose him to the King's Displeasure, yet perhaps h i s Acts might be nevertheless b i n d i n g , (403) Supra footnote 394. (404) Supra, footnote 19, p. 305, c i t i n g Labaree, Royal  Government, 6 seq., and Swinfen, "Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s " 22-3, 34-6. (405) I b i d , p. 306. PAGE 158 and a Grant contrary to the I n s t r u c t i o n s good, i f the Governor pursued the Powers i n h i s Commission.... But of t h i s I speak d o u b t f u l l y , rather i n c l i n i n g to think there i s a Clause i n the Commission would make i t void.(406) On t h i s opinion land grants made i n excess of powers conferred i n a Governor's Commission are vo i d but the p o s i t i o n as to i n s t r u c t i o n s i s l e s s c l e a r . Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s to a Governor might be merely a d m i n i s t r a t i v e but they were f r e q u e n t l y l e g i s l a t i v e . C l e a r l y i n s t r u c t i o n s may be held to be d i s c r e t i o n a r y and not mandatory i n t h e i r e f f e c t i n the same way as other l e g i s l a t i o n , but Roberts-Wray suggests that such i s part of and not an exception to the general p r i n c i p l e that that Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s are law.(407) As canvassed above, where such i n s t r u c t i o n s were used to convey the Royal pleasure under the Pre r o g a t i v e f o r the s e t t i n g up of a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e , they c l e a r l y had l e g a l effect.(408) I t was a l s o common for the Sovereign to convey c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s to supplement the major c o n s t i t u e n t instrument ( L e t t e r s Patent, Act of Parliament, Order-in-Council) through Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s . I t was i n f a c t common f o r a Governor to be d i r e c t e d i n the c o n s t i t u e n t instrument to perform s p e c i f i e d functions and g e n e r a l l y powers vested i n him, i n accordance with Her Majesty's I n s t r u c t i o n s . ( 4 0 9 ) Of the forc e of such (406) I b i d . , p. 306, footnote 11. (407) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 147. (408) I b i d . , pp. 146-7. (409) I b i d . PAGE 159 i n s t r u c t i o n , Roberts-Wray says " i t would be absurd to suggest that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s set out i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d not have f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e operation...".(410) Such was recognized i n d i c t a of the j u d i c i a l committee i n Cameron v. Kyte(411) to the e f f e c t that i f a Governor had, by v i r t u e of h i s appointment, the whole sovereignty of the colony delegated to him as V i c e r o y , h i s acts would be v a l i d even though not i n conformity with h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s . T h i s , as Roberts-Wray argues, i m p l i c i t l y suggests that where a Governor i s not by h i s Commission made v i c e r o y i t i s not open to him to d i s r e g a r d Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s , regarding the exercise of h i s power.(412) Section 4 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, i t i s tr u e , provided a s t a t u t o r y exemption to t h i s r u l e i n p r o v i d i n g that c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n contravening Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s was to be u l t r a v i r e s only i f such i n s t r u c t i o n s were contained i n (not merely mentioned by) the p r i n c i p a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l instrument whether L e t t e r Patent, Order i n Co u n c i l or otherwise - such instrument being defined as that a u t h o r i z i n g the L e g i s l a t u r e to enact "Laws f o r Peace, Order, and good Government of such Colony". (This point i s more f u l l y discussed under C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, i n f r a . ) (410) Supra, footnote 251, pp. 147-8. (411) (1835), 3 Knapp 332. (412) Supra, footnote 251, pp. 147-8. PAGE 160 I t i s important here to understand that whatever the e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 4 be, i t would not operate to save c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n contravention of i n s t r u c t i o n s contained i n Acts of Parliament, Orders or Regulations under Acts of Parliament, or Orders having the force and e f f e c t of Acts of Parliament. Any such i n s t r u c t i o n s would be binding on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 2 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865 (see d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a under t h i s heading). In most cases the governor then was bound by Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s , other than those of merely procedural e f f e c t ( t h i s exemption being given i n s. 4 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, s. 4). In a d d i t i o n to standing i n s t r u c t i o n s , s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s could be given, e i t h e r by the K i n g - i n - C o u n c i l , or by a secretary of s t a t e or by the Board of Trade. And the i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d not depend f o r t h e i r weight on the mode of communication; they were a l l v a l i d to bind the Governor as regards h i s duty to the King. In t e r r i t o r i e s where the sovereign continued to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s i n matters of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery and l e g i s l a t i v e procedure, the sovereign's pleasure was expressed through O r d e r s - i n - C o u n c i l , Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s , and l e s s f r e q u e n t l y Proclamations.(413) The Crown, as argued above, r e t a i n e d the power to re g u l a t e such (413) Supra, footnote 19, at p. 304 and footnote (3) where he c i t e s as an example of a Royal proclamation c o n t a i n i n g d i r e c t i o n s as to the manner i n which the governor should e x e r c i s e h i s a u t h o r i t y that issued i n respect to T r i n i d a d on 19 June 1813, p a r t i a l t e x t s of which are given i n C l a r k , C o l o n i a l Law, 307-8, and Howard, C o l o n i a l Laws, I , 531-2. PAGE 161 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s even i n those c o l o n i e s with e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e s where the Crown enjoyed l i t t l e or no p r e r o g a t i v e power to enact o r d i n a r y l e g i s l a t i o n ( 4 1 4 ) and where the Crown reserved no power to revoke the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Further the Crown retained such power i n the B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s at l e a s t up u n t i l the enactment of the Statute of Westminster i n 1931 [a l s o see di s c u s s i o n below on the e f f e c t of s. 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1865]. We are here i n t e r e s t e d i n Proclamations. Royal Proclamations, as p u b l i c acts under the Great S e a l , are prerogative instruments of a high order and S l a t t e r y suggests are equal i n a u t h o r i t y to Governor's Commissions.(415) They are su s c e p t i b l e of operating as c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s a f a c t evidenced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which e s t a b l i s h the C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r Quebec.(416) S l a t t e r y notes the b a s i c C o n s t i t u t i o n of T r i n i d a d was f o r many years a Royal Proclamation.(417) The Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 purport to l i m i t the powers of a l l Governors i n North America to acquire unsurrendered t r i b a l lands except i n accordance with the procedure t h e r e i n enunciated. In t h i s respect they can been seen as part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n thereby given to the newly ceded (414) See d i s c u s s i o n above p. 114 et seq. (415) Supra, footnote 19, S l a t t e r y p. 307. (416) I b i d . (417) I b i d . PAGE 162 t e r r i t o r i e s , d i c t a t i n g the c o n d i t i o n s upon which the governors were to e x e r c i s e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y over Indian lands and i t i s argued the e f f e c t of these p r o v i s i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to a l l c o l o n i e s i n B r i t i s h North America was to make such procedure a part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . As argued, the Crown, by v i r t u e of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p r e r o g a t i v e , could e f f e c t such minor c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i n r e l a t i o n to a l l c o l o n i e s whether or not such an amending power was reserved and whether or not a l e g i s l a t u r e was c o n s t i t u t e d . In f a c t i t was common f o r the Crown to issue i n s t r u c t i o n s to Governors even where a general l e g i s l a t i v e power i n r e l a t i o n to the p a r t i c u l a r colony, was l o s t . Although d i r e c t i o n s to Governors d i d not depend f o r t h e i r weight on the mode of communication, the mode nevertheless had important consequences i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r force and to t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e " o v e r r i d e " . The Indian land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation were d i r e c t e d at the Governors of the various B r i t i s h North American possessions. As has already been noted, these i n s t r u c t i o n s , reminding the Governors to recognize B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n respect to Indian held lands, merely entrenched unwritten c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s on the Governor's powers, a course of a c t i o n c l e a r l y open to the Sovereign. The Royal Proclamation has been held to have the forc e and e f f e c t of an Imperial Statute i n the c o l o n i e s . The Indian land p r o v i s i o n s , as argued above, are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n nature having to do p r i n c i p a l l y with l i m i t a t i o n s on the Governor's powers to purchase Indian lands and were thus a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of a major PAGE 16 3 Prerogative l e g i s l a t i v e power. The p r o v i s i o n s served to bind the Governors i n a l l B r i t i s h Colonies and p l a n t a t i o n s i n America at any time during the Proclamation's l i f e . PAGE 164 2. The Indian Land P r o v i s i o n s o f the Royal Proclamation of 7th  October 1763 as Major P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n R e f e r a b l e t o the  B r i t i s h Crown's Power i n R e l a t i o n t o Land i n Dependent B r i t i s h  T e r r i t o r i e s ( i ) General I t i s here argued that the u l t i m a t e t i t l e to unsurrendered t r i b a l lands was vested i n the King by v i r t u e of the Executive p r e r o g a t i v e . This allowed the King to enact various l e g i s l a t i v e measures aimed at a uniform regime f o r the r e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l of purchases from the Indians, commensurate with Imperial p o l i c y i n t h i s regard. The r e s u l t i n g Royal Proclamation of 1763 operated, as major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n , to bind c o l o n i a l governors to the extent i t d i r e c t e d the procedure to be followed fo r Crown a l i e n a t i o n s of such l a n d , and bound subjects to the extent i t ordered them not to purchase or s e t t l e i n the newly created Indian reserve and to remove themselves from i l l e g a l settlements on unsurrendered t r i b a l lands there or indeed throughout B r i t i s h North America. As an i n c i d e n t of B r i t i s h Sovereignty the t i t l e to the t e r r i t o r y passes to the B r i t i s h Crown. However, the a c q u i s i t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty by whatever means, a l s o seems to import Crown r i g h t s i n r e l a t i o n to the land i t s e l f . S l a t t e r y has undertaken an extensive review of the e f f e c t of B r i t i s h Sovereignty on p r e - e x i s t i n g land r i g h t s and the p r i n c i p l e s involved.(418) I intend here to merely present a b r i e f review of the main p r i n c i p l e s governing the Crown's t i t l e to land i n newly acquired B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s . (418) Supra, footnote 19, ch. 2. PAGE 16 5 The circumstances i n which a t e r r i t o r y came under B r i t i s h sovereignty may a f f e c t land r i g h t s , although the d i s t i n c t i o n as to mode of a c q u i s i t i o n i s not always apparent i n court judgments. Of more importance to Crown r i g h t s i n t h i s regard, i s the s t a t e of the t e r r i t o r y acquired; namely whether the land was uninhabited or was i n h a b i t e d and subject to e x i s t i n g p r i v a t e or t r i b a l r i g h t s at the time of a c q u i s i t i o n . B a s i c a l l y , i n an uninhabited country acquired by settlement the Crown obtains f u l l t i t l e to the s o i l and u n r e s t r i c t e d powers of d i s p o s a l . Incoming s e t t l e r s can make good against the Sovereign only such r i g h t s to the land as de r i v e from the Crown i t s e l f . ( 4 1 9 ) The p o s i t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t where the t e r r i t o r y acquired i s already subject to e x i s t i n g r i g h t s of p r i v a t e ownership. In such a case the Crown gains immediate t i t l e to a l l land that has no owner, and an underlying t i t l e to those lands subject to p r i v a t e r i g h t s or t r i b a l rights.(420) In the case of a conquest or cession the Crown possesses the i n i t i a l r i g h t to e x t i n g u i s h or modify p r i v a t e r i g h t s through an Act of State (and such i s not reviewable by municipal courts).(421) This was made c l e a r by Lord M a n s f i e l d i n Campbell (419) I b i d . , p. 45, c i t i n g as an example Falklands I s l a n d Company v. Pw (1864) 2 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 266 (P.C.) at 272. And see; Williams v. Attorney General f o r New South Wales (1913), 16 C.L.R. 404, Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1877), 3 N.Z. J u r i s t 72. (420) I b i d . , S l a t t e r y p. 288 and see Amodu T i j a n i v. Secretary,  Southern N i g e r i a [1921] A.C. 399. (421) I b i d , (see S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 19, p. 47 c i t i n g Lord save's remarks i n Attorney-General v. Nissan, [1970] A.C. 179 (H.L.) at 210-211.) PAGE 166 v. H a l l where he s a i d that no man ever disputed that on conquest, i f the King refused a c a p i t u l a t i o n and exterminated the popu l a t i o n , a l l the land belonged to him; and that i f he received under h i s p r o t e c t i o n and granted them t h e i r property he had power to f i x such c o n d i t i o n s as he thought f i t . ( 4 2 2 ) In the case of a conquest or ces s i o n the Crown, as we have seen, possesses the prerogative r i g h t to l e g i s l a t e f o r the t e r r i t o r y concerned, at l e a s t u n t i l an assembly i s summoned. S l a t t e r y c i t e s a u t h o r i t y for the p r o p o s i t i o n that the pr e r o g a t i v e power of the Crown to l e g i s l a t e f o r a newly conquered or ceded t e r r i t o r y i s however constrained by any a r t i c l e s of c a p i t u l a t i o n or t r e a t y under which the country was obtained.(423) The sta t u s of p r i v a t e r i g h t s and na t i v e r i g h t s i n B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s i s thus, i n larg e p a r t , dependent upon the i n i t i a l a c t i o ns of the Crown i n c i d e n t to a c q u i s i t i o n . However, i t i s a "guiding p r i n c i p l e " under B r i t i s h law that the Crown i s assumed to intend, "that the r i g h t s of property of the i n h a b i t a n t s are to be f u l l y respected".(424) In the absence of adverse acts of s t a t e , performed as an i n c i d e n t of a c q u i s i t i o n or of pr e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t i n g such r i g h t s , p r i v a t e r i g h t s are presumed to continue unimpaired and t r i b a l r i g h t s to continue u n t i l extinguished with n a t i v e consent or i n accordance with (422) (1774), 1 Cowp. 204. (423) Supra, footnote 19, p. 49, footnote 18. (424) Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 A l l E.R. 785 at 789 c i t i n g V a j e s i n g j i J o r a v a r s i n g j i v Secretary of State of India (1924), L.R. 51, I.A. 357; Hoani Te Heuhen Tukino v. Aotea  D i s t r i c t Maori Land Bd. (1941), A.C. 308. PAGE 167 s t a t u t e . ( 4 2 5 ) The r i g h t s i n q u e s t i o n m u s t , h o w e v e r , be s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e s o a s t o be s u s c e p t i b l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t . ( 4 2 6 ) H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y t h a t t h e y be s t a t e d i n t e r m s o r c o n c e p t s known t o E n g l i s h l a n d l a w , o r t h a t t h e y b e , i n t h e i r own t e r m s , f r e e l y t r a n s f e r r a b l e o r s u s c e p t i b l e o f i n d i v i d u a l o w n e r s h i p . P r o p e r t y r i g h t s o f a communal o r n o n - t r a n s f e r r a b l e c h a r a c t e r b e i n g e q u a l l y c a p a b l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n . ( 4 2 7 ) The same d o e s n o t h o l d t r u e o f r i g h t s o f a c o n t r a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r h e l d a s a g a i n s t t h e f o r m e r s o v e r e i g n o r g o v e r n m e n t . T h e s e a r e n o t e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t t h e Crown i n m u n i c i p a l c o u r t s u n l e s s c o n f i r m e d by Crown a c t s o r l e g i s l a t i o n 428) Where c o l o n i e s a r e a c q u i r e d by c e s s i o n i t has be e n h e l d t h a t a t r e a t y o f c e s s i o n i s a n A c t o f S t a t e a n d a s s u c h n o t r e v i e w a b l e by m u n i c i p a l c o u r t s w h i c h w i l l n o t e n f o r c e t r e a t y r i g h t s u n l e s s t h e y a r e g i v e n e f f e c t by s t a t u t e . ( 4 2 9 ) I n V a j e s i n g j i  J o r a v a r s i n g j i v. S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a (1924)(430) t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l h e l d t h a t : (425) See Amodu T i j a n i v. S e c r e t a r y , S o u t h e r n N i g e r i a , [1921] A.C. 399 and R o b e r t s - W r a y 636. (426) S u p r a , f o o t n o t e 19, p. 49 a n d f o o t n o t e 20. (427) I b i d . , p p . 49-50, f o o t n o t e 21. (428) I b i d . , p. 50. (429) S u p r a , f o o t n o t e 251, p. 632 c i t i n g Oye Kan v. A d e l e , [ 1957] 2 A l l E.R. 785; R^ v. Symonds (1847), N.Z. P.C.C. 1840-1932, 387; Wi P a r a t a v. B i s h i n g o f W e l l i n g t o n (1877), 3 N.Z. J u r i s t 72 and s e e S l a t t e r y p. 52 e t s e q . c i t i n g ... (430) S u p r a , f o o t n o t e 424 a t p. 360 c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y p. 52-53. PAGE 168 i f i n a t r e a t y of c e s s i o n i t i s s t i p u l a t e d that c e r t a i n i n h a b i t a n t s should enjoy c e r t a i n r i g h t s , that does not give a t i t l e to those i n h a b i t a n t s to enforce these s t i p u l a t i o n s i n the municipal c o u r t s . The r i g h t to enforce remains only with the high c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s . ( 4 3 1 ) And i n Hoani Te Harhen Tukino v. Aotea D i s t r i c t Maori Land Board (1941), a s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n was reached regarding Maori land r i g h t s under the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) by which the Crown guaranteed the i n h a b i t a n t s of the t e r r i t o r i e s f u l l , e x c l u s i v e and undisturbed possession of t h e i r lands. The P r i v y C o u n c i l held that " i t i s w e l l s e t t l e d that any r i g h t s p u r p o r t i n g to be conferred by such a t r e a t y of cession cannot be enforced i n the c o u r t s , except i n so f a r as they have been incorporated i n municipal law."(432) However, t h i s r u l e does not bar a court from r e c o g n i z i n g p r e - e x i s t i n g land r i g h t s where there has been no Crown conduct that n e c e s s a r i l y negates such r i g h t s . This i s c o n s i s t e n t with the view of land ownership taken i n the St. Catherine's Case(433) Lord Watson expl a i n e d , i n r e l a t i o n to the B.N.A. Act, 1867(434) that whenever p u b l i c lands and i t s i n c i d e n t s i s described as the "property of" or as "belonging t o " the Dominion or a Province, these expressions merely import that the r i g h t to i t s b e n e f i c i a l (431) V a j e s i n g j i J o r a v s i n g j i v. Secretary of State f o r India (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357 (P.C.). (432) Hoani te Hevhew Tukino v. Aotea D i s t r i c t Maori Land Board, [1941] A.C. 308 (P.C.) at 324 - c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y p. 53. (433) St. Catherine's M i l l i n g and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.)). (434) 30 & 31 V i c t . , c. 3 (Imp.). PAGE 169 use, or i t s proceeds, has been appropriated to the Dominion or Province, as the case may be, the land i t s e l f being vested i n the Crown ( i n that case by for c e of the Treaty of Paris).(435) I f the Dominion or Province i l l e g a l l y a l i e n a t e d land subject to p r i v a t e r i g h t s or Indian t i t l e , these r i g h t s being capable of being v i n d i c a t e d i n competition with the b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t claimed by the Crown, a cause of a c t i o n would accrue to the i n j u r e d p a r t y , unless the i n t e n t i o n be such as to make such d i s p o s i t i o n an extinguishment of that right.(436) I t i s argued that given Indian land r i g h t s were confirmed i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763, an instrument held to have the force of an Imperial s t a t u t e , that extinguishment of Indian t i t l e was not competent to the Dominion, P r o v i n c i a l or C o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s p r i o r to 1931 (and the Statute of Westminster, 1931) except i n accordance with the procedure l a i d down i n the Proclamation. There have been various j u d i c i a l statements regarding n a t i v e t i t l e . The New Zealand case of R v. Symonds(437) i s a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , though the Crown was the e x c l u s i v e source of t i t l e , i t d i d not i t s e l f acquire t i t l e and that the t i t l e of the na t i v e s could not be extinguished without t h e i r consent. In Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker(438) the J u d i c i a l Committee (435) I b i d . , at p. 56 ( P . C ) . (436) See g e n e r a l l y Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. (437) R^ v. Symonds (1847), N.Z. P.C.C. 1840-1932, 387. (438) Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker [1901] A.C. 561; see a l s o Hoani Te  Heneu Tukino v. Aotea D i s t r i c t Maori Land Board supra, footnote 196. PAGE 170 emphasized that n a t i v e t i t l e could not be extinguished (at l a s t i n times of peace) otherwise than by the fr e e consent of the nati v e occupiers or i n s t r i c t compliance with the p r o v i s i o n s of a s t a t u t e . i a r s i t u a t i o n i n New Zealand. In other cases minimal recognition, has been accorded n a t i v e t i t l e . ( 4 3 9 ) In Canada a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e has been recognized as a s u i generis l e g a l i n t e r e s t , which i s not dependent upon l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n and which i s maintainable at the s u i t of the Indians against the Crown.(440) I t seems c l e a r B r i t i s h sovereignty imports Crown r i g h t s i n the land. Upon a c q u i s i t i o n the r a d i c a l or u l t i m a t e t i t l e vests immediately i n the Crown and the Crown has the r i g h t to dispose of land not subject to p r i v a t e or t r i b a l r i g h t s and a power to abrogate or modify the l a t t e r as an i n c i d e n t of a c q u i s i t i o n . In the absence of Crown conduct impinging on or e x t i n g u i s h i n g such r i g h t s they are however presumed to continue unimpaired. I t remains to determine on what p r i n c i p l e s the accepted r i g h t s of the Crown i n r e l a t i o n to lan d , the subject of B r i t i s h Sovereignty are premised and what powers of d i s p o s i t i o n thereby a t t a c h to the Crown. (439) Supra, footnote 251, pp. 634-5. (440) See Guerin supra, footnote 1 at p. 378. PAGE 171 ( i i ) Crown Rights i n R e l a t i o n to Land as a Major P r e r o g a t i v e Salmond suggests that the p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h feudal law (by which a l l England was not merely the t e r r i t o r y but a l s o the property of the Crown) were n e c e s s a r i l y imported i n t o c o l o n i a l possessions along with the rece p t i o n of E n g l i s h law(441) presumably e i t h e r because such was brought by s e t t l e r s or introduced by s t a t u t e . The r u l e however governing the importation of E n g l i s h law l i m i t s the E n g l i s h law 'received' to that a p p l i c a b l e to l o c a l circumstances and i t i s doub t f u l whether feudal p r i n c i p l e s would meet t h i s t e s t . This a l s o f a i l s to e x p l a i n the uncontroverted Crown r i g h t s i n lands acquired by cession or conquest (see d i s c u s s i o n above) and where the bas i c law i n force i s not that of England. Salmond f u r t h e r suggests that where E n g l i s h common law i s introduced i n t o a c o l o n i a l p r o t e c t o r a t e , a l l the land t h e r e i n vests i n the Crown, i n accordance with feudal p r i n c i p l e s , even though the p r o t e c t o r a t e does not for that reason become a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y . ( 4 4 2 ) As Roberts-Wray argues, there are major problems with such a view: "Even i f f e u d a l p r i n c i p l e s are imported i n t o c o l o n i e s as part of the common law, ownership of land (dominium) thereunder would s u r e l y flow from the ownership of the t e r r i t o r y (imperium) and since i n the case of a p r o t e c t o r a t e the l a t t e r i s not vested i n the Crown there i s no ba s i s f o r applying the f i c t i o n of Crown ownership".(443) However i t would seem that by l e g i s l a t i o n the (441) Salmond, Jurisprudence 10th ed., App. V, pp. 520-521. (442) I b i d . PAGE 172 Crown may have s i m i l a r r i g h t s i n a Protectorate.(444) Since Crown r i g h t s i n r e l a t i o n to land i n the c o l o n i e s does not seem to depend s o l e l y upon the mode of t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n and i t s consequent e f f e c t on the bas i c law there i n f o r c e , the r i g h t s must apply by v i r t u e of Sovereignty — e i t h e r i f feudalism i s i t s e l f a major P r e r o g a t i v e or i f the common law r i g h t s f lowing from i t are a major P r e r o g a t i v e . J u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s have not c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d between the l a t t e r two. In v. Clarke(445) the court asserted that the King by pre r o g a t i v e i s ultim a t e owner of a l l c o l o n i a l l a n d , and absolute owner of ungranted land.(446) The cumulative e f f e c t of the judgments i n the High Court of A u s t r a l i a i n Willi a m s v. Attorney-General f o r  New South Wales(447) i s that on the a c q u i s i t i o n of a Colony, feudal p r i n c i p l e s became a p p l i c a b l e ; the land belonged to the Crown i n the r i g h t of Sovereignty and s e t t l e r s acquired no t i t l e " u n t i l the Crown chose to 'grant' i t . "(448) Whether New Zealand i s regarded as a settlement or as a cessi o n , the laws of New South Wales, a s e t t l e d colony, were immediately a p p l i c a b l e there, and l a t e r E n g l i s h law was confirmed (443) Supra, footnote 251, pp. 626-7. (444) In re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 ( P . C ) . (445) R^ v. Clarke (1851), 7 Moo. P.C. 77 ( P . C ) . (446) I b i d . at p. 79 c f . Roberts-Wray who on t h i s point comments that " i t i s doub t f u l whether i t s a t i s f i e s the t e s t " . Roberts-Wray, p. 627. (447) W i l l i a m s v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913), 16 C.C.R. 404 (Aust. H .C). (448) Supra, footnote 251, p. 631. PAGE 173 to have been i n f o r c e from the New Zealand Parliament. Thus the cases a s s e r t i n g feudal o r i g i n s f o r Crown lands do not n e c e s s a r i l y suggest t h i s flows from a Major Pre r o g a t i v e — such i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with the r e c e p t i o n of feudal p r i n c i p l e s as part of the common law of England. And the cases that are premised upon New Zealand being considered a settlement must be read i n l i g h t of t h i s . In v. Symonds(449) i t was held that a person a c q u i r i n g land from a n a t i v e obtained a good t i t l e as against the n a t i v e but not as against the Crown as the Crown had an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to grant t i t l e s and e x t i n g u i s h n a t i v e t i t l e s . ( 4 5 0 ) The Court accepted that the Crown was the source of t i t l e but expressed doubt as to whether a f u l l p r o p r i e t a r y t i t l e vested i n the Crown. Mar t i n C.J. explained that though t h i s may have o r i g i n a t e d i n feudal law, i t s o b j e c t s were a uniform land system and the prevention of the formation of new c o l o n i e s by s e t t l e r s . ( 4 5 1 ) In re the Ninety M i l e Beach the court accepted the p r o p o s i t i o n that upon the a s s e r t i o n of B r i t i s h Sovereignty over New Zealand the Queen was immediately vested with a f u l l y p r o p r i e t a r y t i t l e to the whole of New Zealand.(452) In Tamihana Korokai v. S o l i c i t o r  General(453) Mr. J u s t i c e Cooper, applying feudal p r i n c i p l e s s a i d (449) R_;_ v. Symonds (1847), N.Z.P.C.C. [1840-1932], 387 - see a l s o Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1877), 3 N.Z. J u r i s t . 72. (450) Supra, footnote 251, p. 631. (451) Supra footnote 449, at p. 395. (452) Re The Ninety M i l e Beach, [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461 c i t e d Roberts-Wray 631. (453) Tamihana Korokai v. S o l i c i t o r General (1912), 32 N.Z.L.R. PAGE 174 that while t e c h n i c a l l y the l e g a l e s t ate was i n His Majesty, customary land could not be s a i d to vest i n him by v i r t u e of the P r e r o g a t i v e unless ceded to or otherwise acquired by him. But such was premised on a d e f i n i t i o n i n the Land Act d e f i n i n g Crown land as a l l n a t i v e land ceded t o , or otherwise acquired by Her Majesty or vested i n her by r i g h t of her Prerogative.(454) And the New Zealand d e c i s i o n s r e f l e c t the u n c e r t a i n t y as to whether New Zealand i s to be regarded as a cession or a settlement and the e f f e c t of the Treaty of Waitang. I t seems c l e a r that whether by applying feudal p r i n c i p l e s or otherwise, i n any colony the u l t i m a t e t i t l e to the land vests i n the Crown by v i r t u e of the P r e r o g a t i v e and the Crown has the r i g h t to dispose of land that has no owner. I t seems f u r t h e r that the Crown has extensive d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers i n r e l a t i o n to land the subject of n a t i v e t i t l e . The question as to whether Crown r i g h t s of d i s p o s i t i o n extended to extinguishment of n a t i v e t i t l e by e x e r c i s e of the P r e r o g a t i v e was l e f t open i n Nireaha  Tamaka v. Baker.(455) I t remains to say something of the power of the c o l o n i a l governors and l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s i n r e l a t i o n to land. I t i s a recognized p r i n c i p a l that r e a l e s t a t e , or land, i s e x c l u s i v e l y subject to the laws of the government w i t h i n whose t e r r i t o r y the land i s s i t u a t e d — i t i s subject to the l e x situs(456) But t h i s 321 at 352-353. (454) Land Act, (1892), No. 37, c i t e d i n Roberts-Wray supra, footnote 251, p. 634. (455) Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] A.C. 561. PAGE 175 r u l e does not, however, apply as between the United Kingdom and the r e s t of the Queen's dominions, inasmuch as the B r i t i s h Parliament was u n t i l 1931 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y competent to l e g i s l a t e f o r the whole.(457) I t has here been argued that the Crown was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y competent to l e g i s l a t e i n regards to land i n Indian possession throughout B r i t i s h dominions and that such Pr e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n was equal i n forc e to an Imperial s t a t u t e . I t i s a l s o argued that i t was incompetent to C o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s to pass l e g i s l a t i o n at variance with any Crown l e g i s l a t i o n i n that sphere. This does not mean that the Governors or l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were incompetent to enact laws r e l a t i n g to land i n the colony. Such a power was normally given i n the l e g i s l a t i v e grant. But, as has already been noted, the d e l e g a t i o n of a Prer o g a t i v e power does not mean i t has been assigned. I t i s e x e r c i s a b l e by a C o l o n i a l Governor i n the name, and on behalf of Her Majesty and she i s not thereby emptied of her own power.(458) The powers of the Governor are various;(459) he i s granted by l e t t e r s patent c o n s t i t u t i n g h i s o f f i c e the executive a u t h o r i t y of the Crown so fa r as i s necessary f o r the government of the t e r r i t o r y , to be exe r c i s e d according to the laws i n forc e and to the i n s t r u c t i o n s (456) B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Co. v. Companlia de Mocambique, [1893] A.C. 602; Deschamps v. M i l l e r , [1908] 1 Ch. 856. (457) C r a i e s , W.F., Statute law, 7th ed. Ed i t e d by S.G.G. Edgar, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1971, at pp. 449-50. (458) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 341. (459) See d i s u c s s i o n above p. 150 et seq. PAGE 176 of the Crown.(460) In a d d i t i o n to h i s voice i n l e g i s l a t i v e matters the Governor i s normally empowered to make grants of land i n accordance with any law or i n s t r u c t i o n s . ( 4 6 1 ) I t i s c l e a r that the Crown (and, of course, the Imperial Parliament) may i n general p r e s c r i b e l i m i t s to the e x e r c i s e of such a power. Cockburn A.-G. st a t e d i n argument before the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n v. Clarke(462) t h a t ; A Governor of a Colony i s not invested with a l l the p r e r o g a t i v e of the Crown. The power of gra n t i n g land i s part of the pr e r o g a t i v e of the Crown. The Governor's power i s l i m i t e d by h i s Commission, and the Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s . (My emphasis). The " i n s t r u c t i o n s " could be merely p r i v a t e d i r e c t i o n s ( l e g i s l a t i v e or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ) addressed to a p a r t i c u l a r Governor or could be d i r e c t e d to a l l c o l o n i a l governors on matters of important Imperial concern. The ne c e s s i t y and the value of Imperial s u p e r v i s i o n i s obvious i n regard to the fundamental i s s u e of land ownership (and the welfare of N a t i v e s ) . I f the Governors or l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were to be r e l i e v e d of Imperial c o n t r o l , i t would be impossible to expect the adoption of s u f f i c i e n t l y generous measures i n regard to nati v e i n t e r e s t s . ( 4 6 3 ) And i t was a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law that B r i t i s h sovereignty d i d not mean the (460) K e i t h , The F i r s t B r i t i s h Empire, (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 1930, p. 480. (461) I b i d , 481. (462) (1851) 7 Moo. P.C. 77 (P.C.) at p. 83. (463) K e i t h , supra footnote 460 at p. 215. PAGE 177 c o n f i s c a t i o n of nati v e land i n t e r e s t s . From an e a r l y time, c o l o n i a l expansion took account of the various a b o r i g i n a l i n t e r e s t s and there was no doubt as to the o b l i g a t i o n of c o l o n i a l governments to respect those r i g h t s . From the beginning, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l governors i n North America had c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s , o f t e n expressed i n the L e t t e r s Patents themselves, to respect n a t i v e land r i g h t s and to acquire t e r r i t o r y only by purchase i n the name of the Crown.(464) In v. Symonds,(465) Mr. J u s t i c e Chapman recognized that such a p o l i c y had been long accepted i n r e l a t i o n to the American c o l o n i e s : The p r a c t i c e of e x t i n g u i s h i n g Native t i t l e s i s c e r t a i n l y more than two ce n t u r i e s o l d . I t has long been adopted by the Government i n our American c o l o n i e s , and by that of the United States ... . whatever may be the opi n i o n of j u r i s t s as to the strength or weakness of Native t i t l e . . ... i t cannot be too solemnly asserted that i t i s to be respected, and that i t cannot be extinguished (at l e a s t i n times of peace) otherwise, by the fre e consent of Native Occupiers. y This o b l i g a t i o n on*'colonial governments, imposed by the -Crown a c t i n g under i t s p r e r o g a t i v e , was expressed i n various Prerogative instruments-'.' Although i t may be p o s s i b l e to argue that where such i n s t r u c t i o n s were d i r e c t e d i n p r i v a t e (464) L e t t e r of i n s t r u c t i o n to Captain Endecott (1629) c i t e d i n F. Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians,  C o l o n i a l i s m , and the Court of Conquest (Chapel H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a Press 1975) 135; Royal  I n s t r u c t i o n s to B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l Governors 1670-1776 e d i t e d by L.W. Labaree (Washington D.C.: American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n 1973. (465) (1847), N.Z.P.C.C. 387 at 390. PAGE 178 communications to c o l o n i a l Governors they d i d not serve to i n v a l i d a t e i n c o n s i s t e n t c o l o n i a l acts (based on s. 4 C o l o n i a l  Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865) i t i s not the case where the King 'enacted' measures of a l e g i s l a t i v e character i n an instrument under the Great S e a l , as was done i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763, for matters w i t h i n h i s c o n t r o l . The Crown's r i g h t to p r e s c r i b e the p o l i c y to be adopted by a l l Governors i n North America i n r e l a t i o n to the procedure to be adopted i n the co l o n i e s f o r Crown purchase of Indian t i t l e and to r e s t r i c t the power of Governors to grant land subject to such t i t l e was a Major Prerogative of the King. I t i s true the Commission u s u a l l y contemplated that the Governor should a c t , not merely under the prer o g a t i v e powers, executive l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l , conferred by i t , but a l s o according to such reasonable laws and s t a t u t e s as might be enacted by the l e g i s l a t u r e . Although where an assembly i s summoned i n a colony whatever powers the Crown enjoyed to enact ordinary l e g i s l a t i o n f o r the colony ceases, Crown r i g h t s i n regard to land are otherwise unaffected by the c a l l i n g of the assembly.(466) C o l o n i a l assemblies were supreme i n t h e i r sphere of a c t i v i t y and could modify by l o c a l l e g i s l a t i o n the p r e r o g a t i v e i n s o f a r as i t concerned l o c a l a u t h o r i t y . However, they could not enact l e g i s l a t i o n i n c o n s i s t e n t with Imperial s t a t u t e s extending to the colony or with Major Prerogative Orders so extending. Any doubts i n t h i s regard were removed by s. 2 of The C o l o n i a l Laws (466) Supra, footnote 19, p. 288, c i t i n g comments i n O'Connell & Rioden, Opinions 329. PAGE 17 9 V a l i d i t y Act, 1865.(467) The d i s t i n c t i o n between the Crown's l e g i s l a t i v e powers i n a colony, over people, and i t s powers over land was i m p l i c i t l y recognized i n Campbell v. Hall.(468) Although i t was h e l d , by Lord M a n s f i e l d , that by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 the King, by promising an assembly to Grenada, l o s t i t s powers of or d i n a r y l e g i s l a t i o n , he nevertheless t r e a t e d as v a l i d a l a t e r proclamation (March 1764) by the King which set f o r t h terms f o r the d i s p o s a l of land i n the colony.(469) Lord M a n s f i e l d thus i m p l i c i t l y recognized that the Crown's Pre r o g a t i v e regarding land i n the colony was not l i m i t e d by the c a l l i n g of an assembly, although h i s power to enact ordinary l e g i s l a t i o n was so l i m i t e d . This f a c t was a l s o recognized i n Johnson v. M'Intosh,(470) as noted by S l a t t e r y . Of t h i s case S l a t t e r y says: [The] Proclamation of 1763 could not r e s t r a i n p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s from purchasing Indian lands i n V i r g i n i a "because the King had not, w i t h i n the l i m i t s of that c o l o n i a l government, or any other, any power of prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n , which i s confined to c o u n t r i e s newly conquered....", and Campbell v. H a l l was c i t e d i n support. M a r s h a l l C.J. r e j e c t e d t h i s c ontention, s t a t i n g that i n B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law a l l vacant lands were vested i n the Crown,and the e x c l u s i v e power to grant them was admitted to resi d e there as a branch of the r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e . This power, he a f f i r m s , was f u l l y recognized i n the American (467) See d i s c u s s i o n below p. 237 et seq. (468) Campbell v. H a l l L o f f t 655, 98 E.R. 848 and see S l a t t e r y p. 289. (469) I b i d . L o f f t 655 at 661-2 — the f u l l t e x t of the Proclamation i s given i n B.R.P., 218-24. (470) Johnson v. M' Intosh (1823), 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C). PAGE 180 co l o n i e s . " A l l the lands we hold were o r i g i n a l l y granted by the Crown; and the establishment of a re g a l government has never been considered as impairing the r i g h t to grant lands w i t h i n the chartered l i m i t s of such colony". This held true not only of vacant lands, but a l s o of lands occupied by the Indians, the u l t i m a t e t i t l e to which, subject to the Indians' r i g h t of occupancy, was held by the King, along with the power grant that t i t l e . "These grants" e x p l a i n s M a r s h a l l i n an e a r l i e r passage, "have been understood by a l l to convey a t i t l e to the grantees, subject only to the Indian r i g h t of occupancy." So, he concludes, the lands covered by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 were lands which the King had the r i g h t to grant or to reserve f o r the Indians. The Chief J u s t i c e goes on to hold that the Proclamation's v a l i d i t y may be j u s t i f i e d on another b a s i s . In B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, the Crown holds extensive prerogative powers to conduct r e l a t i o n s with f o r e i g n nations. The p e c u l i a r s i t u a t i o n of the Indians, considered i n some respects as dependent groups and i n other respects as d i s t i n c t peoples, occupying a country claimed by B r i t a i n , yet too powerful not to be feared as formidable enemies, required that some means should be adopted f o r the presentation of peace, by q u i e t i n g the Indians' apprehension for t h e i r lands. This was to be e f f e c t e d by r e s t r a i n i n g the encroachments of the Whites; and the power to do t h i s was never, we b e l i e v e , denied by the co l o n i e s to the Crown". The powers of gran t i n g or r e f u s i n g to grant vacant lands, and of r e s t r i c t i n g encroachments on the Indian lands have always been admitted." The a u t h o r i t y of t h i s proclamation [the Royal Proclamation of 1763] so f a r as i t respected t h i s c o n t i n e n t , has never been denied, and the t i t l e s i t gave to lands have always been sustained i n our courts."(471) In Jackson v. Porter commenting on the e f f e c t of the Royal Proclamation i n New York, the court held that "the a u t h o r i t y of the King to regulate and c o n t r o l purchases from the Indians (471) Supra, footnote 19, pp. 289-291. PAGE.181 w i t h i n h i s c o l o n i e s , was not questioned on the arguments and \ cannot be denied."(472) The Kentucky Court of Appeal adopted the same p o s i t i o n i n 1823 as regards lands o r i g i n a l l y claimed by the colony of V i r g i n i a , holding t h a t , " a l l purchases by i n d i v i d u a l s from the Indians, were expressly forbidden by the Royal Proclamation of 1763....".(473) S l a t t e r y f u r t h e r p o i n t s to M i t c h e l l v. U.S.(474) and Montgomery v. Ives(475) as evidencing the binding e f f e c t of the Proclamation's land s t r i c t u r e s i n the ceded t e r r i t o r i e s comprised w i t h i n the two F l o r i d a s . A s i m i l a r view of the Royal Proclamation's v a l i d i t y was accepted i n the judgment of Lord Denning i n The Queen v. Secretary of State f o r Foreign and Commonwealth A f f a i r s . ( 4 7 6 ) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note what Lord Denning s a i d i n t h i s regard, although i t was c l e a r l y o b i t e r i n that case: The c o l o n i e s formed one realm with the United Kingdom, the whole being under the sovereignty of the Crown. The Crown had f u l l powers to e s t a b l i s h such executive, l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l arrangements as i t thought f i t . In e x e r c i s i n g these powers, i t was the o b l i g a t i o n of the Crown (through i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the spot) to take steps to ensure that the o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t s of the country were accorded t h e i r r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s according to the customs coming down the c e n t u r i e s , (472) 13 Fed. Cas. 235 at 241 (N.Y. C i r . Ct.) c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y 291. (473) S l a t t e r y 291. (474) M i t c h e l l v. U.S. (1835), 9 Peters 711 (U.S.S.C.) at 746-9 c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y p. 292. (475) Montgomery v. Ives (1849), 13 Smedes & M. 161 (Miss. H.C.) at 174-5, c i t e d i n S l a t t e r y at p. 292. (476) [1982] 2 A l l E.R. 118 (C.A.). PAGE 182 except i n s o f a r as these c o n f l i c t e d with the peace and good order of the country or the proper settlement of i t . This o b l i g a t i o n i s evidenced most s t r i k i n g l y i n the case of Canada by the Royal Proclamation of 1763". and The Royal Proclamation of 1763 had great importance throughout Canada. I t was regarded as of high c o n s t i t u t i o n a l importance. I t was ranked by the Indian people as t h e i r B i l l of Rights (477) To my mind the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was equivalent to an entrenched p r o v i s i o n i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the c o l o n i e s i n North America.(478) And he goes on to say: I f i n d myself i n agreement with what was s a i d a few years ago i n the Supreme Court of Canada i n Calder v. A.G. of B r i t i s h Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 203, i n a judgment i n which Laskin J . concurred with H a l l J . and s a i d : "This Proclamation was an Executive Order having the force and e f f e c t of an Act of Parliament and was described by Gwynne J . , as the "Indian B i l l of Ri g h t s " . . . i t s f o r c e as a st a t u t e i s analogous to the status of Magna Carta which has always been considered to be the law throughout the Empire. I t was a law that followed ;t.he f l a g as England assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over newly-discovered or acquired lands or t e r r i t o r i e s . . . The proclamation must be regarded as a fundamental document upon which any j u s t determination of o r i g i n a l r i g h t s r e s t " . And The 1763 proclamation governed the p o s i t i o n of the Indian peoples for the next hundred years at l e a s t . I t s t i l l governs t h e i r p o s i t i o n  throughout Canada, except i n those cases when i t has been supplemented or superseded by a (477) I b i d . , at p. 154. (478) I b i d . PAGE 183 t r e a t y with the I n d i a n s . . . . ( 4 7 9 ) (My emphasis). When de a l i n g with the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1867 and n o t i n g , that save f o r the reference i n s. 91(24) as to Indian a f f a i r s , nothing was s a i d about the t i t l e to property i n the "lands reserved f o r the Indians".... Lord Denning continued, "I have no doubt that a l l concerned regarded the Royal Proclamation of 1763 as s t i l l of binding f o r c e . I t was an unwritten p r o v i s i o n which went without saying. I t was binding on the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the Dominion and the provinces j u s t as i f there had been included i n the s t a t u t e a sentence "The a b o r i g i n a l peoples of Canada s h a l l continue to have a l l t h e i r r i g h t s and freedoms as recognized by •the Royal Proclamation of 1763."(480) This Act was not amendable by Dominion or p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . The Royal Proclamation of 1763 has thus been held to be a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of the Crown's Prerogative with respect to land the subject of Indian t i t l e and, as an i n c i d e n t to t h i s Major P r e r o g a t i v e , the r i g h t and duty of the Crown to take such measures as are necessary to secure to the n a t i v e s t h e i r land r i g h t s . I t i s true that there was no Imperial Statute of t h i s time embodying the procedures and p r i n c i p l e s set f o r t h i n the Royal Proclamation of 1763 but Parliament was not a l t o g e t h e r s i l e n t on the i s s u e . From an e a r l y time the preoccupation of Parliament was not whether aborigines had any r i g h t s ; nor was there any doubt as to the Imperial o b l i g a t i o n to respect these (480) I b i d . , p. 155. PAGE 184 r i g h t s . The c o n t r o v e r s i a l point was always the extent of these r i g h t s . One of the e a r l i e s t manifestations of Parliamentary concern for the p l i g h t of a b o r i g i n a l peoples was an address of the House of Commons i n 1834. This document i s c l e a r evidence of the awareness of B r i t a i n ' s moral and l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to the Indians and of the Crown's Prerogative to d i r e c t governors i n t h i s regard. The House of Commons resolved unanimously: That His Majesty's f a i t h f u l Commons i n Parliament assembled, are deeply impressed with the duty of a c t i n g upon the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e and humanity i n the in t e r c o u r s e and r e l a t i o n s of t h i s country with the na t i v e i n h a b i t a n t s of i t s c o l o n i a l settlements, of a f f o r d i n g them p r o t e c t i o n i n the enjoyment of t h e i r c i v i l r i g h t s , and of imparting to them that degree of c i v i l i z a t i o n , and that r e l i g i o n , with which Providence has blessed t h i s n a t i o n , and humbly prays that His Majesty w i l l take  such measures, and give such d i r e c t i o n to the  Governors and o f f i c e r s of His Majesty's  c o l o n i e s , settlements and p l a n t a t i o n s , as s h a l l  secure to the natives the due observance of  j u s t i c e and the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s , promote the spread of c i v i l i z a t i o n among them, and lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n . ( 4 8 1 ) (My emphasis) The Lord Chancellor remarks of t h i s Address t h a t , so f a r from being the expression of any new p o l i c y , i t only embodied and recognized p r i n c i p l e s i n which the B r i t i s h government had f o r a considerable time been disposed to a c t . (481) Annexed to the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Aboringines. ( B r i t i s h Settlements) 1837, H.C.P.P. v o l . 7, at 3 et seq. PAGE 185 I have elsewhere de a l t with j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y which accords the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the force of Imperial S t a t u t e . What I have attempted to show here was that the Indian land p r o v i s i o n s were a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of a Major Crown P r e r o g a t i v e , that of e f f e c t i n g minor c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes to the c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s (Constituent Prerogative) or that i n r e l a t i o n to land and more p a r t i c u l a r l y land the subject of n a t i v e t i t l e . The Prerogative instrument chosen to e f f e c t such ' l e g i s l a t i o n ' was a Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal. By v i r t u e of i t being major Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n (which has been accorded the f o r c e of e f f e c t of Imperial Statute) i t enjoys the ' p r o t e c t i o n ' of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 given such Imperial law. I t i s argued that the r u l e extended to pr o t e c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s expressed i n Prer o g a t i v e Instruments of a high order or Imperial Acts. The Crown had the power to e s t a b l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r a l l B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s and where e x p r e s s l y retained had f u l l power to amend the same. Where o f f i c e s of the Governor or Governor-General were c o n s t i t u t e d , i n sovereign instruments, and given thereby l i m i t e d powers, the Crown r e t a i n e d both the power to " i n s t r u c t " such Governors as to how they were to exercise the power thus delegated to them, and the power to enforce, through such i n s t r u c t i o n s , the p u b l i c p o l i c y of the United Kingdom upon matters of s u b s t a n t i a l Imperial concern. The i n s t r u c t i o n s had 'the force of law', subject to any s t a t u t o r y m o d i f i c a t i o n (such as that e f f e c t e d by s. 4 of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1864), and where expressed i n a Major P r e r o g a t i v e instrument c l e a r l y operated to bind c o l o n i a l governors and l e g i s l a t u r e s ( c f . s. 2 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t , 1865). PAGE 186 On t h i s argument the Indian Land p r o v i s i o n s of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 operated to bind a l l B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s i n North America i n 1763. These p r o v i s i o n s express a u n i v e r s a l p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n to the procedure to govern a l l Crown purchases of Indian land and the power of a l l Governors to grant land i n Indian possession. As such, i t i s suggested they operated to bind the Governors of a l l c o l o n i e s i n B r i t i s h North America at whatever period they be acquired and independently of p o s t e r i o r l e g i s l a t i o n expressly extending them, i n much the same way as the Acts f o r a b o l i s h i n g the slave trade are a p p l i e d : p r o p r i o v i g o r e and independent of the mode of a c q u i s i t i o n of the t e r r i t o r y . In fa c t the a u t h o r i t i e s have held that land grants made by c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s of unceded Indian lands contrary to the Proclamations p r o v i s i o n s are i n v a l i d . (see d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a ) . PAGE 187 3. Amendment of P r e r o g a t i v e L e g i s l a t i o n by L o c a l Laws ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n A c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e i s that a u t h o r i t y , other than the Imperial Parliament of Her Majesty i n C o u n c i l , competent to make laws for any colony.(482) C o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s are non-sovereign bodies subject to Imperial l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l . The l e g i s l a t i o n of a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e d i f f e r s from that of the United Kingdom i n that the Acts of the l a t t e r , as has already been pointed out, cannot be questioned as u l t r a v i r e s or i n v a l i d by any court.(483) The c o n s t i t u t i o n s granted to B r i t i s h possessions, whether by proclamation, c h a r t e r , order i n c o u n c i l , or B r i t i s h s t a t u t e , d i f f e r from that of the United Kingdom i n being w r i t t e n , and i n being not o r i g i n a l but d e r i v a t i v e and thus i n a sense subordinate, and i n being more or l e s s r i g i d and r e s t r i c t i v e of the l e g i s l a t i v e body which they create. In the case of such l e g i s l a t u r e s , the courts of the possession, and i n the l a s t r esort the J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , may have to adjudicate not only on the meaning of a s t a t u t e or ordinance, but a l s o as to i t s v a l i d i t y by reference to the instruments c r e a t i n g the a u t h o r i t y to l e g i s l a t e . As to the l a t t e r q u e s t i o n , they have to discharge a f u n c t i o n analogous to that discharged by an Eng l i s h court i n d e a l i n g with subordinate l e g i s l a t i o n . (482) C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 28 & 29 V i c t . c. 63, s. 1, see Appendix I. (483) Dicey, C o n s t i t u t i o n , 10th ed. pp. 702 et seq, 127 et seq. PAGE 188 Regarding the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , the tendency of the d e c i s i o n s of the J u d i c i a l Committee has been to extend and not to l i m i t t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , which i s recognized as supreme w i t h i n i t s sphere of a c t i v i t y . ( 4 8 4 ) The grant of a l e g i s l a t i v e power to a dependent l e g i s l a t u r e i s i n v a r i a b l y expressed as that of making laws f o r the "peace, order and good government" of that t e r r i t o r y . Although the power rests on an Imperial grant, e i t h e r by the a u t h o r i t y of the Crown expressed by c h a r t e r , proclamation, or Order i n C o u n c i l , or by the a u t h o r i t y of Parliament expressed i n a B r i t i s h s t a t u t e c r e a t i n g or a u t h o r i z i n g the c r e a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , ( 4 8 5 ) i t i s not considered to be a delegated power.(486) The dependent l e g i s l a t u r e has w i t h i n i t s sphere of competence, plenary a u t h o r i t y and f u l l d i s c r e t i o n i n the e x e r c i s e of i t s powers subject only to those r e s t r i c t i o n s e x pressly imposed or n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d by the terms of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n ( 4 8 7 ) and from those imposed by the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y , Act 1865(488) (the only express general p r o v i s i o n s i n the B r i t i s h Statute Book (484) Powell v. A p o l l o Candle Co. (1885), 10 App. Cas. 282 at 290; Musgrove v. Chung Teeong Toy, [1891] A.C. 272; Att.-Gen. f o r Canada v. Cain and G i l h u l a , [1906] A.C. 542. (485) See Campbell v. H a l l (1774), 1 Cowp. 204; Wade and P h i l l i p s , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law, 8th ed., pp. 422 et seq. (486) Pw v. Burah (1878), 3 App. Cas. 889, ( P . C ) ; Hodge v. R. (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117. (487) Chenard v. A r i s s o l , ,1949] A.C. 127 ( P . C ) . (488) Supra, footnote 482. See Appendix I I . PAGE 189 with reference to the v a l i d i t y of C o l o n i a l laws) and the Statute  of Westminster, 1931.(489) A l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e probably enjoyed no power to make laws with e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l e f f e c t . ( 4 9 0 ) Nor could i t a l t e r i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n unless a power was ex p r e s s l y given i n the grant of l e g i s l a t i v e power, a r e s t r i c t i o n removed as to c o l o n i e s with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e s by s. 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865. "Accordingly the act of a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e l a w f u l l y c o n s t i t u t e d , whether i n a s e t t l e d or a conquered colony, has, as to matters w i t h i n i t s competence and the l i m i t s of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , the force and oper a t i o n of sovereign l e g i s l a t i o n , though subject to c o n t r o l by l e g i s l a t i o n  of the United Kingdom Parliament, and ... of the Crown."(491) (my emphasis). Imperial c o n t r o l of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i s e x e r c i s e d d i r e c t l y through Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n (Parliamentary or Prerogative) expressed (or implied) to apply to the c o l o n i e s , and by the issue of i n s t r u c t i o n s to c o l o n i a l governors regarding the g i v i n g of assent to b i l l s . L e g i s l a t i o n of the United Kingdom, i t has been held, must not unn e c e s s a r i l y be held to extend to the col o n i e s and thereby o v e r r u l e , q u a l i f y or add to t h e i r own l e g i s l a t i o n on the same subject.(492) Imperial c o n t r o l i s (489) Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4. (490) MacLeod v. A.G. f o r New South Wales, [1891] A.C. 455, ( P . C ) ; but see Ashbury v. E l l i s , [1893] A.C. 339, P.C; and dictum i n B r i t i s h Coal Corp. v. Pw, [1935] A.C 500 (P.C.). (491) Hals, 3d edn. p. 582. (492) New Zealand Loan and M e r c a n t i l e Agency Co. v. Morrison, PAGE 190 exercised i n d i r e c t l y through the machinery of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y A c t, 1865. By the l a t t e r , a c o l o n i a l law w i l l be i n v a l i d a t e d on grounds of repugnancy to any Act of Parliament, extending by express words or necessary intendment to the t e r r i t o r y to which such law r e l a t e s , or which i s repugnant to any Order or r e g u l a t i o n made under the powers of, or having the force  of, such Act i n the colony, to the extent of such repugnancy.(493) Since the passage of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865, repugnancy to the common law of England i s not of i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r i n v a l i d a t i o n . The repugnancy do c t r i n e and the e f f e c t of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 i s dealt with more f u l l y l a t e r . As s t a t e d above, the Crown furt h e r e x e r c i s e s c o n t r o l over c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n through i n s t r u c t i o n s to Governors, f o r example, i n s t r u c t i o n s as to the g i v i n g of Royal assent, and through the power of Crown disallowance of c o l o n i a l a c t s . The Governor i s u s u a l l y given, i n the l e g i s l a t i v e grant, a general d i s c r e t i o n to assent, refuse assent or to reserve a B i l l for Her Majesty's pleasure. And the Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s commonly require him to reserve any B i l l f a l l i n g under s p e c i f i e d headings.(494) [1898] A.C. 349, P.C. at p. 357. (493) Supra, footnote 1, s. 2 & 3. (494) For example the Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s to the Governor of Jamaica of 27th Oct. 1944 mandate such r e s e r v a t i o n of any B i l l s "the p r o v i s i o n s of which appear to him to be i n c o n s i s t e n t with o b l i g a t i o n s imposed upon us by Treaty" or "of an e x t r a o r d i n a r y nature and importance whereby Our Prerogative or the r i g h t s and property of Our subjects not r e s i d i n g i n [the t e r r i t o r y ] or the trade or tr a n s p o r t or PAGE 191 In a l l cases, whether or not e x p r e s s l y reserved, the Crown has the Prerogative power, at common law, to d i s a l l o w C o l o n i a l laws.(495) I f t h i s power i s e x e r c i s e d , the law ceases to have operation from the date at which n o t i f i c a t i o n of such disallowance, i s published i n the colony. Absent such disallowance the c o l o n i a l law u s u a l l y comes i n t o o p e r a t i o n immediately upon r e c e i v i n g the Governor's assent, unless some other date i s p r e s c r i b e d by the law i t s e l f , or unless i t contains a suspension c l a u s e . In the l a t t e r case the C o l o n i a l law, although assented to by the Governor, does not come i n t o operation or take e f f e c t i n the colony u n t i l Her Majesty's pleasure ( i . e . not to d i s a l l o w them) has been s i g n i f i e d , u s u a l l y through the Secretary of State or when the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a colony so p r e s c r i b e s , by Order-in-Council.(496) This procedure i s a recognized a l t e r n a t i v e to r e s e r v a t i o n and may be contemplated i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l instrument(497) or p r e s c r i b e d by the l o c a l law i t s e l f . ( 4 9 8 ) The force of Royal i n s t r u c t i o n s i s d e a l t with elsewhere.(499) By v i r t u e of s. 4 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865, a c o l o n i a l law passed with the concurrence of the communications of any part of Our dominions or any t e r r i t o r y under Our p r o t e c t i o n may be p r e j u d i c e d " . (495) C l a r k , supra, footnote 300, p. 46; Todd, C o l o n i e s , p. 171; Hood P h i l i p s p. 735 ( c i t e d i n T a r r i n g ? ) . (496) Supra footnote 312, p. 41. (497) E.G. the Malta Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s , 5th September 1947, a r t . 20. (498) As was done i n B.C. Land Act of 1870. (499) See d i s c u s s i o n below at p. 255 et seq. PAGE 19 2 Governor or assented to by him i s not i n v a l i d a t e d by reason only of i n c o n s i s t e n c y with Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s regarding such law unless such i n s t r u c t i o n s are contained i n the primary Constituent instrument f o r that t e r r i t o r y . I t has been suggested that where a c o l o n i a l law i s r a t i f i e d by the express sanction of Her Majesty i t then has the same a u t h o r i t y as that of an Imperial S t a t u t e . Such was the opinion given by Attorney-General Northey i n answer to a question posed by the Board of Trade as to whether the Queen could, by proclamation, a l t e r the rates of f o r e i g n c o i n i n the p l a n t a t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y where the rate was set by a C o l o n i a l Act which had been confirmed by the Queen i n Council.(500) Northey was of the opinion that the co n f i r m a t i o n having been absolute, the rate e s t a b l i s h e d would continue u n t i l repeal by another act of the General Assembly, "the passing of an act there with the absolute  confirmation of Her Majesty having the force of an Act of  Parliament made i n England"(501) (my emphasis). Smith notes a s i m i l a r o pinion of S o l i c i t o r General Raymond, to the e f f e c t that acts of c o l o n i a l assemblies were "of the same e f f e c t there, as an Act of Parliament here".(502) (500) For the Act see 1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 296, confirmed by CSP, C o l . 1702-3, #656, c i t e d i n Smith, Joseph H., Appeals to the P r i v y C o u n c i l from the American  P l a n t a t i o n s , New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950, p. 570. p. 570. (501) CSP C o l . , 1702-3, #765, c i t e d i n Smith, i b i d . p. 570. (502) I b i d . , Smith, p. 570 c i t i n g 1712-1714, #457. PAGE 19 3 The question of the e f f e c t of c o n f i r m a t i o n by the King arose as a secondary question i n a s e r i e s of cases r e l a t i n g to c o l o n i a l laws of i n t e s t a c y . The P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Winthrop v. Lechmere(503) declared i n v a l i d the Connecticut Intestacy Law of  1699 which abolished primogeniture i n i n t e s t a t e succession. No power to d i s a l l o w rested with the Crown under the Charter but the Act was found to v i o l a t e the Charter by i t s departure from the r u l e that l e g i s l a t i o n must be i n accord with E n g l i s h law, i n t e r p r e t e d to i n c l u d e common law. This judgment was enforced by Order i n Council of 15 February 1728. Yet i n the Massachusetts case of P h i l i p s v. Savage(504) i n 1738 the Massachusetts Act of 1692 (which had i n s p i r e d the Connecticut Act of 1699) was upheld. I t was argued as a p o i n t of d i s t i n c t i o n i n the l a t e r case that the c o l o n i a l act there i n question was e x p r e s s l y confirmed by the King i n C o u n c i l . Smith notes that 'from the r e c i t a l i n the report i t appeared that the grounds f o r d i s m i s s a l of the appeal included the 1695 c o n f i r m a t i o n of the questioned Act by the King i n C o u n c i l , recent c o n f i r m a t i o n of a 1731 a d d i t i o n a l act and constant usage i n the colony under the Act." Further "that the circumstance of such Crown c o n f i r m a t i o n has been assumed was the r a t i o decidendi of the a f f i r m i n g c o n s i l a r order",(505) although "there was some contemporary op i n i o n i n the Colony to the e f f e c t (503) Winthrop v. Lechmere A.P.C. i i i 149 7 Pub. Rec. C o l . Conn., 578-79, 6 Winthrop Papers, 507-9, c i t e d i n Smith, supra p. 551. (504) P h i l i p s v. Savage, 3 APC, C o l . , #322, c i t e d i n Smith, p. 569. (505) Supra, footnote 500, p. 569. PAGE 19 4 that the Confirmation was of no ope r a t i v e consequence".(506) The l a t t e r view, that i s , that c o n f i r m a t i o n would not of i t s e l f v a l i d a t e an i n v a l i d Act, Smith comments, accords with j u d i c i a l statements that Crown approval of corporate bylaws d i d not render such bylaws of the same forc e as a s t a t u t e such that t h e i r v a l i d i t y was removed from j u d i c i a l review.(507) As regards the force of such bylaws Holt C.J., s t a t e d : Every by-law i s a law, and as o b l i g a t o r y to a l l persons bound by i t , that i s , w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , as any Act of Parliament, only with t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , that a by-law i s l i a b l e to have i t s v a l i d i t y brought i n question but an Act of Parliament i s not.(508) No E n g l i s h court has ever declared an Act of Parliament n u l l and void on j u d i c i a l review.(509) That a c o l o n i a l confirmed act was subject to j u d i c i a l review i s c l e a r from the o p i n i o n of law o f f i c e r s , s o l i c i t e d by the Board of Trade, on the question of whether, subsequent to such a c o n f i r m a t i o n , i t l a y i n the King's power to repeal them where l a t e r they were found to be repugnant to the Charter.(510) The Law O f f i c e r s advised that the laws i n question were probably not repugnant but added that i f they were to be found repugnant "the only method of b r i n g i n g that matter to (506) I b i d . (507) Supra, footnote 500, p. 569 c i t i n g T a i l o r s of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a and The S t a t i o n e r s i n the C i t y of London v. S a l i s b u r y (Comb. 221). (508) C i t y of London v. Wood 12 Mod. 669, 678. (509) Supra, footnote 500, p. 571 and see exceptions c i t e d there. (510) Law O f f i c e r s o p i n i o n c i t e d i n Smith, p. 571 (CSP, c o l . , 1726-27, #784). PAGE 19 5 a determination would be by some j u d i c i a l proceeding".(511) The Board of Trade f i n a l l y allowed c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l of i n t e s t a c y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . Matthew Lamb, Board of Trade C o u n c i l , commented i n r e l a t i o n to a confirmed Pennsylvania Act on t h i s question: This and some other of the neighbouring provinces have p a r t i c u l a r laws r e l a t i n g to the d i s t r i b u t i o n and d i v i s i o n of i n t e s t a t e ' s e s t a t e s which are d i f f e r e n t to the laws of England but as they have heretofore passed and been confirmed here I can make no o b j e c t i o n t h e r e t o . (My emphasis).(512) These cases and opinions were given i n the e a r l y 18th century when u n c e r t a i n t y as to the l i m i t s of the repugnancy do c t r i n e reigned.(513) A l l the c i t e d cases concerned laws not i n c o n s i s t e n t with Imperial law i n forc e p r o p r i o vigore i n the t e r r i t o r i e s but with the received common and s t a t u t e law of England. Arguably they grasped at Imperial c o n f i r m a t i o n of such laws as a means of upholding the impugned c o l o n i a l laws. Even so, that the opinions d i d not go so f a r as to accord them the force of an Imperial S t a t u t e , i s i m p l i c i t i n the suggestion that t h e i r v a l i d i t y was always open to j u d i c i a l review. Smith notes that there i s no evidence that i t was r a i s e d at f i r s t instance i n P h i l i p s v. Savage,(514) that the impugned confirmed act had the force of an act of the Parliament, and goes on to comment " i t i s furthermore extremely do u b t f u l i f Northey's d o c t r i n e [that i t (511) Add. MS, 36, 142/300-311. (512) Supra, footnote 500, p. 577, c i t i n g CO 5/1273/V62. (513) See d i s c u s s i o n above, p. 212 et seq. (514) Supra, footnote 504. PAGE 19 6 did] could be supported. 1 1 ( 515) By the mid 19th century the d o c t r i n e of i n v a l i d i t y on grounds of repugnancy was narrowed and l i m i t e d to that of repugnancy to Imperial Law i n force p r o p r i o  vigore i n the colonies.(516) No exception i s made for those c o l o n i a l acts r e c e i v i n g express c o n f i r m a t i o n i n B r i t a i n , they remain f o r purposes of review, c o l o n i a l acts and subject to the o v e r r i d i n g a u t h o r i t y of Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n d i r e c t e d at the c o l o n i e s . There i s no good reason f o r suggesting that c o n f i r m a t i o n i n B r i t a i n should operate so as to give v a l i d i t y to a c o l o n i a l enactment which i s v o i d by reason of repugnancy to an Imperial s t a t u t e or order of the same e f f e c t applying to the c o l o n i e s . K e i t h comments that the d o c t r i n e of c o n f i r m a t i o n "would not be accepted by courts at the present time as v a l i d a t i n g a measure per se i l l e g a l " . ( 5 1 7 ) The b e t t e r view i s that t h i s i s probably true f o r a much e a r l i e r date, and c e r t a i n l y true since the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. This accords with a 1737 o p i n i o n of the Crown law o f f i c e r s holding that an act of a c o l o n i a l assembly, even i f confirmed by the Crown, could not create a monopoly on trade with the Indians i n h a b i t i n g the colony, "as an absolute e x c l u s i v e trade with the Indians would be d e s t r u c t i v e of that general r i g h t of t r a d i n g which a l l His Majesty's subjects are e n t i t l e d t o , and therefore repugnant to the laws of Great B r i t a i n . . . . " ( 5 1 8 ) (515) Supra, footnote 500, p. 571. (517) K e i t h , The F i r s t B r i t i s h Empire, p. 248-9. (518) C i t e d i n S l a t t e r y supra, footnote 19, p. 316 - Opinion of PAGE 197 An analogy e x i s t s i n the argument that the assent of the Crown may operate so as to cure a defect i n a c o l o n i a l law due to lack of competence i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . In Webb v. Qutrim(519) the J u d i c i a l Committee s a i d Every Act of the V i c t o r i a n C o u n c i l and Assembly requires the consent of the Crown, and when i t i s assented to become an Act of Parliament as much as any Imperial Act, though the elements by which i t i s a u t h o r i z e d are d i f f e r e n t . I f , indeed, i t was repugnant to the p r o v i s i o n s of any Act of Parliament extending to the colony, i t might be i n o p e r a t i v e to the extent of i t s repugnancy, (see the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865, supra) but with t h i s exception, no a u t h o r i t y e x i s t s by which i t s v a l i d i t y can be questioned or impeached. C r a i e s , i n commenting on t h i s statement says i t must be read subject to the comment that the Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1900, i s an Imperial Act extending to V i c t o r i a . In Naden v. 1*^ ( 520) the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n r e l a t i o n to a s e c t i o n of the C r i m i n a l Code of Canada pur p o r t i n g to annul the Royal Prerogative to grant s p e c i a l leave, held the s e c t i o n i n v a l i d as being i n c o n s i s t e n t with the Imperial J u d i c i a l Committee Acts and therefore i n v a l i d under s e c t i o n 2 of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865. Viscount Cave s t a t e d , " I t i s true that the Code has received t h i s r o y a l assent, but that assent cannot give v a l i d i t y to an enactment which i s v o i d by Imperial statute."(521) In f a c t c o l o n i a l acts having received Royal Assent have on many occasions Ryder A.G. and Strange S.G. dated 28 J u l y 1737; F o r s y t h , Opinion, 431. (519) [1907] A.C. 81, at p. 88. ( 520) Naden v. R^, [1926] A.C. 482 ( P . C ) . (521) I b i d , at p. 493. PAGE 198 been subject to review by the j u d i c i a l committee of the P r i v y Council.(522) Before l e a v i n g t h i s point i t i s to be noted t h a t , i n any event, the c o n f i r m a t i o n given i s to the l e g i s l a t i o n on i t s face. Where such does not c o n t a i n express words i n d i c a t i v e of an i n t e n t i o n to e x t i n g u i s h , wholesale, a b o r i g i n a l property r i g h t s throughout a colony, the King cannot be taken to have confirmed t h i s . I t i s a r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n that a Statute should not be deemed to e x t i n g u i s h or take away a r i g h t of property without compensation unless i t appears by express words or by p l a i n i m p l i c a t i o n that i t was the i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e to do so."(523) Given that that Imperial c o n f i r m a t i o n does not a l t e r the a u t h o r i t y of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , confirmed c o l o n i a l laws are subject to the same l i m i t s as those which were not confirmed. Insofar as Imperial s t a t u t e s are concerned, the Imperial Parliament had f u l l power to pass l e g i s l a t i o n binding on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , although the former i s never presumed to l e g i s l a t e except for the United Kingdom, unless a contrary i n t e n t i o n i s to (522) (L'Union St. Jacques de Montreal v. B e l i s l e (1874), L.R. 6 (P.C. 31; A.G. f o r Ontario v. A.G. for the Dominion of  Canada, [1894] A.C. 189, P.C; A.G. f o r Ontario v. Hamilton  S t e e l R a i l . Co. , [1903] A.C. 524, P.C; and see R^ v. Marais, Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 51, P.C. (523) Western Countries R a i l Co. v. Windsor and Annapolis R a i l  Co. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 178, P.C, at p. 188; P u b l i c Works  Commissioner (Cape Colony) v. Logan, [1903] A.C 355, P.C, at p. 363. The same r u l e a p p l i e s to an Order i n C o u n c i l under the Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890 (53 & 54 V i c t . c. 37) (North Charter Land E x p l o r a t i o n Co. (1910), L t d . v. R^, [1931] 1 Ch. 169). PAGE 199 be found i n the Act. The Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e to a colony f a l l s i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s ; ( i ) those B r i t i s h and United Kingdom Statutes e x p r e s s l y , or by necessary i m p l i c a t i o n extending to the colony, being a p p l i c a b l e to a p a r t i c u l a r mentioned t e r r i t o r y or extending to a l l such t e r r i t o r i e s ; and ( i i ) those E n g l i s h , B r i t i s h or United Kingdom s t a t u t e s i n f o r c e i n a colony by reason of settlement or through s t a t u t o r y (Imperial or l o c a l ) adoption. Those Imperial Statutes f a l l i n g w i t h i n Category ( i ) apply p r o p r i o vigore (see d i s c u s s i o n above) to the t e r r i t o r i e s to which they apply, and serve as an absolute l i m i t a t i o n on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence and operate so as to v o i d every subsequent c o l o n i a l act which i s repugnant to any such p r o v i s i o n s , to the extent of the repugnancy ( C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, s. 2). However, by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, no Act of the United Kingdom passed a f t e r December 11, 1931 extends to Canada ( i n c l u d i n g Newfoundland), A u s t r a l i a or New Zealand unless i t i s expressly declared i n the Act that the p a r t i c u l a r dominion has requested and consented to the enactment thereof (s. 4). Those Imperial s t a t u t e s f a l l i n g w i t h i n category ( i i ) above, being the law i n force i n the colony merely by reason of settlement or adoption do not enjoy the p r o t e c t i o n afforded by the C o l o n i a l  Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, and thus can be f r e e l y modified or repealed by a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e w i t h i n i t s sphere of l e g i s l a t i v e competence. Insofar as Imperial Crown l e g i s l a t i o n i s concerned the p o s i t i o n i s l e s s c l e a r . Two issues are r a i s e d ; ( i ) the a b i l i t y of a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e to a f f e c t , by l e g i s l a t i o n , the PAGE 200 Prero g a t i v e of the Crown and ( i i ) the a b i l i t y of a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e to pass l e g i s l a t i o n at variance with l e g i s l a t i o n under the Pr e r o g a t i v e . To deal b r i e f l y with the f i r s t i s s u e . The issue was r a i s e d i n r e l a t i o n to the Prerogative to grant leave to appeal to the P r i v y C o u n c i l . In 1888 the f e d e r a l Parliament enacted an amendment to the C r i m i n a l Code which purported to a b o l i s h appeals to the P r i v y Council i n c r i m i n a l cases. In Naden v. The Queen,(524) the P r i v y C o u n c i l held the s t a t u t e to be i n v a l i d , p r i m a r i l y because i t c o n f l i c t e d with two Imperial s t a t u t e s . A f t e r the Statute of Westminster had conferred on the dominions the c a p a c i t y to repeal or amend Imperial s t a t u t e s , Canada re-enacted the 1888 s t a t u t e and i t was held i n B r i t i s h Coal Corp. v. R_L( 525) to be v a l i d . There i s d i c t a i n the B r i t i s h Coal  Corpn. case to the e f f e c t that where a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e intends to l i m i t the p r e r o g a t i v e , not only must the c o l o n i a l Act i t s e l f mention the prerogative by express terms or necessary intendment, but the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e must have been endowed with the r e q u i s i t e power, expressed or i m p l i e d i n an Imperial Act (or presumably the Crown c o n s t i t u e n t instrument where the l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y i s by v i r t u e of a Crown g r a n t ) . This d i c t a cannot be taken as a u t h o r i t y f o r c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence i n regard to a l l Crown p r e r o g a t i v e s . The case there concerned the power to a b o l i s h the Prerogative power to grant leave to (524) Naden v. The Queen, [1926] A.C. 482. (525) B r i t i s h Coal Corpn. v. R^, [1935] A.C. 500. PAGE 201 appeal to the King i n Council and the court found that s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act, 1867 endowed the Dominion Parliament with the competence to do so. But i t must be remembered that t h i s d e c i s i o n came a f t e r the enactment of the Statute of Westminster,  1931 which freed c e r t a i n c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g Canada, from the r e s t r i c t i o n s , given i n the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act,  1865, as to repugnancy. In Attorney-General of Canada v. Cain  and Gilhula(526) i t was sta t e d that any power or p r e r o g a t i v e of the Crown may be delegated or t r a n s f e r r e d "to the governor or the government of one of the c o l o n i e s , e i t h e r by a Royal Proclamation which has the force of a s t a t u t e ( c i t i n g Campbell v. H a l l (1774), 1 Cowp. 204), or by a s t a t u t e of the B r i t i s h Parliament, or by the s t a t u t e of a l o c a l Parliament, to which the Crown has assented. I f t h i s d e l e g a t i o n has taken p l a c e , the d e p o s i t o r y , or d e p o s i t a r i e s , of the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e powers and a u t h o r i t y of the Crown, can e x e r c i s e those powers and that a u t h o r i t y to the extent delegated, as e f f e c t i v e l y as the Crown could i t s e l f have exer c i s e d them".(527) But as to each possession i t i s necessary to examine the relevant s t a t u t e s , orders and i n s t r u c t i o n s , to see whether the p a r t i c u l a r p r e r o g a t i v e has been surrendered, delegated, or put w i t h i n the l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l of the l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e . ( 5 2 8 ) The minor pr e r o g a t i v e s of the Crown (526) [1906] A.C. 542, at 546. (527) The f o l l o w i n g cases were c i t e d as e s t a b l i s h i n g these p r o p o s i t i o n s : Re Adam (1837), 1 Moo. P.C. 460, 472-476; Donegani v. Donegani (1835), 3 Knapp 63, 88; Cameron v. Kyte (1835), 3 Knapp 332, 343; Jephson v. R i e r a (1835), 3 Knapp 130; 3 St. Tr. (N.S.) 591. PAGE 202 are prima f a c i e as extensive throughout B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s as i n England(529) and the power of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s to a f f e c t such minor prerogatives i s found i n the words, common i n the l e g i s l a t i v e grants to c o l o n i a l assemblies, to make laws f o r the "peace, order and good government of the t e r r i t o r y . " ( 5 3 0 ) The same does not hold true where the Pre r o g a t i v e i s a major Prerogative operating throughout Her Majesty's dominions, independently of the extension of B r i t i s h common law, and which have the force and e f f e c t of Imperial Statutes.(531) Such major Prerogatives "are part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l foundation of the country" and, without express grant, the l e g i s l a t u r e of a dependent t e r r i t o r y cannot a l t e r or a b o l i s h them."(532) Although from the B r i t i s h Coal case i t must be argued that t h i s was changed by v i r t u e of the Statute of Westminster as of 1931. Turning to the second i s s u e ; the a b i l i t y of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n to modify and re s c i n d p r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . The a b i l i t y of c o l o n i a l laws to derogate from p r e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n depends, i n larg e p a r t , on the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the pr e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n i n question. (See d i s c u s s i o n above). There i s no reason for suggesting that c o l o n i a l laws could not a l t e r or repeal prerogative l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s making o r d i n a r y laws (528) Supra, footnote 95 at pp. 502-3. (529) Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New  Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437, at 44a; Cameron v. Kyte (1835), 3 Knapp 332 at 345. (530) See B r i t i s h Coal Corp. v. R^, supra footnote 2. (531) See d i s c u s s i o n above p. 144 et seq. (532) Supra, footnote 251, p. 379. PAGE 20 3 (minor pre r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n ) they being of equal s t a t u r e . But the better p o s i t i o n appears to be that i t was not competent to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s to i n t e r f e r e with major Pr e r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n , the only exception being s t a t u t o r y (s. 5 C o l o n i a l  Laws V a l i d i t y A c t ) . There i s l i t t l e j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y on t h i s p o i n t . The J u d i c i a l Committee s t a t e d i n Chenard v. A r i s s o l , ( 5 3 3 ) that the power to make laws f o r peace, order and good government does not a u t h o r i z e a l t e r a t i o n by a c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n or powers. The d e c i s i o n of the j u d i c i a l committee i n Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo (1975)(534) that a l o c a l ordinance had not abrogated a p r o v i s i o n made by Prerogative L e t t e r s Patent, seems to imply that i t could have done so. The d e c i s i o n , however, d i d not turn on whether such a repeal had been e f f e c t e d , so t h i s statement was unnecessary to the d e c i s i o n . Moreover L e t t e r s Patent of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l nature (here s e t t i n g up a p a r t i c u l a r court) were g e n e r a l l y held to l i m i t c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence. Section 5 of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 removed t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , to a c e r t a i n extent, i n the case of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e , a p r o v i s i o n hardly necessary i f i t was open by mere ordinance to a l t e r the c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . In summary, l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s had plenary law-making powers subject only to the l i m i t s imposed or n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d i n t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s , and to the l i m i t s expressed i n the (533) [1949] A.C. 127 (534) Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo (1875), L.R. 6 .C. 381. PAGE 20 4 repugnancy d o c t r i n e . I t i s here argued t h a t , i n s o f a r as B r i t i s h Columbia i s concerned, the l o c a l Land l e g i s l a t i o n p u r p o r t i n g to e x t i n g u i s h a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e was u l t r a v i r e s the terms of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Colony of B r i t i s h Columbia which included the The Royal  Proclamation of 1763 (as w e l l as i n c o n s i s t e n t with i n s t r u c t i o n s issued to the Governor.) I t i s elsewhere argued that the Royal  Proclamation of 1763 i s as major Pre r o g a t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n , with the force and e f f e c t of an Imperial s t a t u t e extending to the Colonies,(535) and that i t should be held to apply to B r i t i s h Columbia.(536) Because of the p r o t e c t i o n afforded such Orders by the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were powerless to enact l e g i s l a t i o n repugnant to i t s p r o v i s i o n s . I t i s f u r t h e r argued that the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865 pro t e c t s major Prerogative L e g i s l a t i o n r e l a t i n g to the c o l o n i e s from c o l o n i a l derogation, and operates so as to vo i d any repugnant l o c a l l e g i s l a t i o n to the extent of such repugnancy. (535) See d i s c u s s i o n , above p. 144 et seq. (536) See d i s c u s s i o n , supra, p. 54 et seq. PAGE 20 5 PART IV: THE COLONIAL LAWS VALIDITY ACT, 1865 1. The H i s t o r i c S e t t i n g ( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n The C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A ct, 1865,(537) was passed to remove doubts as to the v a l i d i t y of c o l o n i a l laws and remained at l e a s t up u n t i l the passing of the Statute of Westminster, 1931,(538) as a check on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence. I t was never doubted that the Imperial Parliament possessed the u l t i m a t e and f i n a l law making power throughout the B r i t i s h Empire, and that l o c a l assemblies could not derogate from Imperial laws intended by the Imperial Parliament to have c o l o n i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Doubt arose, r a t h e r , as to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a u t h o r i t y of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n that purported to c o n t r a d i c t the o r d i n a r y law of England. In t h i s respect the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act provided that i t was only those Imperial "laws" expressly or "by necessary intendment" extending to the c o l o n i e s that were to be considered sacrosanct i n the c o l o n i e s to which they applied.(539) The Act operated to render c o l o n i a l a c t s , repugnant to the p r o v i s i o n s of such Imperial laws, void to the extent of repugnancy.(540) (537) 28 & 29 V i c t . c. 63. (538) The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. (539) Supra, footnote 482, ss. 2 & 3. Appendix I I . (540) I b i d . PAGE 206 The C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act gave s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n to those Imperial "laws" which were to operate as r e s t r i c t i o n s on the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . C l e a r l y the Act operated to void c o l o n i a l enactments repugnant to Imperial s t a t u t e s with the necessary c o l o n i a l intendment, and delegated l e g i s l a t i o n enacted under the a u t h o r i t y of such statutes.(541) The argument i s made here that such " p r o t e c t i o n " was extended to C e r t a i n Imperial Orders and Regulations, enacted under the r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e , and intended to have c o l o n i a l reach. More s p e c i f i c a l l y the argument w i l l be made that any c o l o n i a l enactment contrary to the p r o v i s i o n s the Royal Proclamation of  1763 being such an 'Order' must by v i r t u e of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act, be held v o i d to the extent of such repugnancy. [Such an argument l i e s i n a d d i t i o n to an argument that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 a p p l i e d p r o p r i o vigore to impose s t r i c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the power of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s to derogate from i t s p r o v i s i o n s . ] ( i i ) Background to the Enactment the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act The immediate cause of the Act was a s e r i e s of judgments rendered by Mr. J u s t i c e Boothby i n the Supreme Court of South A u s t r a l i a i n the e a r l y 1860s.(542) These judgments impugned the v a l i d i t y of s e v e r a l South A u s t r a l i a n s t a t u t e s on various grounds, such as t h e i r repugnancy to the common law of England, t h e i r (541) I b i d . (542) Supra, footnote 251, at p. 396 (hereafter noted as Roberts-Wray). PAGE 207 having been assented to by the Governor contrary to i n s , t r u c t i o n s or t h e i r having been c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments beyond the power of the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . The immediate c r i s e s provoked by these d e c i s i o n s were handled by s p e c i f i c v a l i d a t i n g Acts of Parliament.(543) The problems which these judgments brought to l i g h t were the subject matter of three opinions of the Law O f f i c e r s of the United Kingdom, who agreed with the views of Mr. J u s t i c e Boothby to a s u b s t a n t i a l extent, and showed no sympathy with an address from the L e g i s l a t u r e of South A u s t r a l i a praying for h i s removal.(544) On the question of repugnancy, the Law O f f i c e r s reported that a c o l o n i a l s t a t u t e contravening a B r i t i s h Act appl y i n g of i t s own force was void to the extent of the c o n f l i c t . Moreover, they were of the opinion that repugnancy a l s o arose i n case of c o n f l i c t with fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of the common law. I t was d i f f i c u l t to define fundamental as opposed to other p r i n c i p l e s but i t was suggested, as examples, that repugnant c o l o n i a l s t a t u t e s would include those a u t h o r i z i n g polygamy, a b o l i s h i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y or p r o v i d i n g punishment without t r i a l . ( 5 4 5 ) The Law O f f i c e r s recommended an Imperial Act a p p l i c a b l e to a l l c o l o n i e s to c l a r i f y the r e s t r i c t i o n s upon c o l o n i a l Imperial l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . (543) 25 & 26 V i c t . (1862), c. 11; 26 & 27 V i c t . (1863), c. 84. (544) Supra, footnote 251, p. 396 Dated March 25 Co. 13/110, 456-66, P u b l i c Record O f f i c e , London U.K. (P.R.O.) and A p r i l 12 1862 & September 28, 1864, CO. 13/116, 56-70, P.R.O. (545) I b i d . PAGE 208 The c o l o n i a l o f f i c e prepared the d r a f t b i l l which Parliamentary Reports suggest went through a l l stages and was enacted as the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, without any debate whatsoever.(546) Section 2 of the Act declared s p e c i f i c Imperial l i m i t a t i o n s to f u l l c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence (subject of course to any r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed i n the grant of l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y ) . I t thus preserved the r i g h t of the Imperial Parliament (and i n c e r t a i n respects the Crown) to l e g i s l a t e f o r a colony to which a l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e was granted, and to make i t impossible f o r the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e to enact anything repugnant to Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n so a f f e c t e d ; but not otherwise to derogate from the general powers of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . ( 5 4 7 ) The C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, d i d not impose any new r e s t r i c t i o n s on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n but, r a t h e r , made p r e c i s e the r u l e s regarding the r e l a t i o n s of Imperial and c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . The expressed purpose of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y A c t , 1865, was to remove doubts as to the a u t h o r i t y and powers of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . The preamble to the Act reads: Whereas doubts have been e n t e r t a i n e d r e s p e c t i n g the v a l i d i t y of d i v e r s laws enacted or purporting to have been enacted by the l e g i s l a t u r e s of c e r t a i n of her Majesty's c o l o n i e s , and resp e c t i n g the powers of such l e g i s l a t u r e s , and i t i s expedient that such doubts should be removed.... (546) Supra, footnote 251, p. 397. (547) Reg, v. Marais; ex p a r l e Marais L.R. (1902), A.C. 51, at 71. PAGE 209 Preambles, e s p e c i a l l y i n the e a r l i e r A c t s , have been used as an important guide to c o n s t r u c t i o n . "The Preamble", according to Po l l o c k C.B.(548) " i s undoubtedly part of the Act". I t i s a r e c i t a l of the f a c t s operative on the mind of the framers i n proceeding to enact the law. The i n t e n t i o n of the C o l o n i a l Laws  V a l i d i t y Act c l e a r l y was to remove doubt, and not to fundamentally change the e x i s t i n g law. This makes l e s s s u r p r i s i n g the t o t a l lack of debate preceding i t s enactment.(549) I t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n s why, given that a l l the p r i n c i p l e s e c t i o n s of the Act were r e t r o s p e c t i v e i n op e r a t i o n , there i s no evidence that the Act i n f a c t caused any chaos i n the colonies.(550) Given that the law, then, s u f f e r e d no fundamental change, the Act should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t of the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of the law upon which Boothy's judgments had cast a shadow. I t i s a sound r u l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n that a s t a t u t e be construed i n conformity with the common law except where the st a t u t e i s p l a i n l y intended to a l t e r the course of the common law.(551) Where an expression used i s i n general terms, the words are to receive such a c o n s t r u c t i o n as may be agreeable to the rul e s of common law i n cases of that nature, as s t a t u t e s are not to a l t e r common law f u r t h e r or otherwise than the Act ex p r e s s l y (548) S a l k e l d v. Johnson (1848), 2 Ex. 256 at 83) and see a l s o Davies v. Kennedy (1848), 2 Ex. 256, 283. (549) Murray p. 47. (550) Supra, footnote 251, p. 397. (551) R. v. Morris (1867), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 90 at p. 95. PAGE 210 declares.(552) I t thus becomes necessary to look at the repugnancy d o c t r i n e at common law p r i o r to the passing of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act. ( i i i ) C o l o n i a l L e g i s l a t i v e Powers P r i o r to 1865 - The Doctrine  of Repugnancy The r u l e , that a c o l o n i a l law might be i n v a l i d by reason of repugnancy to the law of England, appears to have i t s o r i g i n i n the p r a c t i c e of Parliament i n making a grant of l e g i s l a t i v e power to s t i p u l a t e that no laws should be repugnant to the "law of England".(553) The r u l e was incorporated i n varying forms, i n many Royal c h a r t e r s , Commissions and other instruments which conveyed c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e power with the pr o v i s o r e s p e c t i n g agreement or non-repugnancy with the laws and s t a t u t e s of England. These formula, i n t h e i r o r i g i n , were intended as caveats against the undue e x e r c i s e of by-law power, being f i r s t employed i n patents of i n c o r p o r a t i o n as a check upon the manner i n which the by-law powers of domestic cor p o r a t i o n s were to be exerc i s e d . Such domestic corporations were s u b j e c t , i n a l l r espects, to the common law and s t a t u t e s of England.(554) There i s reason to b e l i e v e that when they came to be a p p l i e d to (552) Arthur v. Bokenham (1708), 11 Mod. 148 at 150. (553) For an e a r l y formulation of the d o c t r i n e of repugnancy, see the opinion of Yorke A.-G. and Talbot S.-G. of 1 August, 1730 on the powers of the Connecticut Assembly; Chalmers, Opinions, I , 353-A). (554) Smith, Appeals to the P r i v y C o u n c i l from the American P l a n t a t i o n s , ( r e p r i n t 1965; Octagon Books Inc. N.Y.), p. 465. PAGE 211 p l a n t a t i o n c h a r t e r s , t h e i r intendment was to r e s t r i c t the grant of l e g i s l a t i v e power to l o c a l government and to r e t a i n u t t e r d i s c r e t i o n to the Crown and Parliament of England.(555) At an e a r l y stage u n c e r t a i n t y arose regarding what meaning was to be a t t r i b u t e d to the phrase "Laws of England". C l e a r l y i t covered Imperial Acts of Parliament extending to a colony. One scholar notes that a prima f a c i e presumption of repugnancy would a l s o e x i s t i n the case of acts running counter to any e s t a b l i s h e d common law or equity d o c t r i n e that was l i v i n g law i n England.(556) This p o s i t i o n i s r e f l e c t e d i n e a r l y 18th century opinions emanating from the c o l o n i e s suggesting that c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were incompetent to a l t e r the Statute or common law of England and that they could not enact 'anything against Her Majesty's prerogative".(557) (555) I b i d . , 529. (556) I b i d . , 529. (557) This i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n an opi n i o n (1732) of the Attorney-General [Rawlin] of Barbados, on the Act of Assembly c r e a t i n g paper money. Dealing with the Assembly's l e g i s l a t i v e powers i t was s a i d : " . . . i t cannot be granted there, that they are capable to enact, at t h e i r own w i l l , and pleasure, what they think f i t . For they cannot, by law, a l t e r the common law of England, and the s e t t l e d course of proceedings thereon, .... They cannot enact anything against Her Majesty's prer o g a t i v e . ... and they cannot pretend to have an equal power with the Parliament of England." Other e a r l y opinions are to the same e f f e c t . An Opinion of 1718 by Sol.-Gen. Thorison, t r e a t e d as vo i d a C a r o l i n a law imposing a heavy duty on B r i t i s h goods, on the ground that i t e f f e c t i v e l y p r o h i b i t e d trade to B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s , "which PAGE 212 During the eighteenth century, the d o c t r i n e of repugnancy, so f a r as i t r e l a t e d to Imperial law, not given s t a t u t o r y expression, was l i m i t e d to c e r t a i n fundamental features of En g l i s h law and g e n e r a l l y to matters v i t a l to Imperial i n t e r e s t s . ( 5 5 8 ) Parliament i t s e l f had made s e v e r a l attempts to grapple with the problem of measuring c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n against the standard of laws of England. The f i r s t of such Acts was "An Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses i n the P l a n t a t i o n Trade, made a p p l i c a b l e to Colonies i n A s i a , A f r i c a and America.(559) By s e c t i o n 9 of the Act any p l a n t a t i o n laws "...which are i n any ways repugnant to the before mentioned laws, or any of them, so f a r as they do r e l a t e to the s a i d p l a n t a t i o n s , or any of them, or which are any ways repugnant to t h i s present a c t , or to any other law h e r e a f t e r  to be made i n t h i s Kingdom, so f a r as such law s h a l l r e l a t e to and mention the s a i d p l a n t a t i o n s , are i l l e g a l , n u l l and v o i d , to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes whatsoever". (my emphasis). i s by no means agreeable to the laws of B r i t a i n " 7 [5 A p r i l 1718, Chalmers Opinions 11, 292-3]. In 1737 the Crown law o f f i c e r s held that an act of a c o l o n i a l assembly, even i f confirmed by the Crown, could not create a monopoly on trade with the Indians i n h a b i t i n g the colony, "as an absolute e x c l u s i v e trade with the Indians would be d e s t r u c t i v e of that general r i g h t of tr a d i n g which a l l His Majesty's subjects are e n t i t l e d t o , and therefore repugnant i s the law of Great B r i t a i n . . . 8 [Opinion of Ryder A.-G. and Strange S.-G. dated 28 J u l y 1737; Forsyth Opinions, 431]. (558) Supra, footnote 251, p. 316. (559) 7 & 8 Wm. I l l (1969), c. 22. PAGE 213 Repugnancy thus a p p l i e d i n r e l a t i o n to c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g or f u t u r e Imperial 'laws' as d i s t i n c t from e x i s t i n g or f u t u r e " s t a t u t e s " . I t can be i n f e r r e d that repugnancy was intended to cover c o n f l i c t s with the common law (as l i m i t e d during the course of the 18th century to fundamental features thereof) and to Imperial law as w e l l as to Parliamentary enactments. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n accords with an opinion on c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence.(560) However the context of s. 9 might i n d i c a t e a more r e s t r i c t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i . e . that "laws" i n s. 9 should be i n t e r p r e t e d as "Acts" since the "before mentioned laws" were three s t a t u t e s of Charter I I ' s time r e f e r r e d to i n the previous s e c t i o n . The exact meaning of these words of s. 9 was even at the time d o u b t f u l . In 1752 James Abercromby who had extensive c o l o n i a l experience,(561) submitted a proposal to Lord H a l i f a x i n r e l a t i o n to the proper standard f o r repugnancy. The proposal was i n the form of a d r a f t of a lengthy Act of Parliament designed to strengthen the c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system of Great B r i t a i n . Commenting on the inadequacy of s. 9 of 7 & 8 Wm. I l l , c. 22 (supra) to remove doubts re the v a l i d i t y of c o l o n i a l laws, he proposed a new s e c t i o n to deal with repugnancy.(562) B a s i c a l l y , he proposed that c o l o n i a l law should be voidable on grounds of (560) Supra, footnote 374. (561) James Abercromby, served nearly 13 years as Attorney and Advocate-General of South C a r o l i n a and since 1749 as c o l o n i a l agent f o r North C a r o l i n a , Smith 578. (562) Supra, footnote 500, p. 578. PAGE 214 repugnancy to the common law of England; to the pr e r o g a t i v e r o y a l ; to the r i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s of the Subject, or to Imperial s t a t u t e s i n affirmance or amendment of the common law. The l a t t e r he f e l t shoud bind c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s whether or not such s t a t u t e s were expressed to apply to the colonies.(563) Whilst the s o l u t i o n may have been, even at t h i s time, been s t a t e d too broadly, i t can be seen as evidence of the doubt that s t i l l remained. The focus of the 'doubt', as evidenced from Parliamentary response to e a r l y c o l o n i a l "repugnancy" cases, centered upon the problem of which Imperial s t a t u t e s were to have c o l o n i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , a l l Imperial s t a t u t e s or only those with the necessary c o l o n i a l extension? This then, and not the e f f e c t of Prerogative l e g i s l a t i o n with c o l o n i a l i n t e n t i o n , was the focus of the problem to which Parliament turned i t s a t t e n t i o n . I t i s therefore not s u p r i s i n g the l a t e r Acts were d i r e c t e d at the confusion regarding the e f f e c t of Imperial S t a t u t e s . Section 9 of the 1969 Act(564) was repealed i n 1825(565) and replaced i n the same year.(566) The new Act was st a t e d to apply only to co l o n i e s i n "America" i n c l u d i n g Bermuda and those i n the Caribbean. Section 49 of t h i s Act st a t e d repugnancy i n terms of Acts of Parliament: (563) I b i d . (564) Supra, footnote 559. (565) 6 Geo. IV (1825), c. 105, s. 34. (566) 6 Geo. IV. (1825), c. 114, s. 49. PAGE 215 And be i t f u r t h e r enacted, That a l l Laws, Bye Laws, Usages or Customs at t h i s Time, or which hereafter s h a l l be i n p r a c t i c e , or endeavoured or pretended to be i n forc e or p r a c t i c e , i n any of the B r i t i s h Possessions i n America, which are i n any wise repugnant to t h i s Act, or to any Act of Parliament made or hereafter to be made i n the United Kingdom, so fa r as such Act s h a l l r e l a t e to and mention the Possessions, are and s h a l l be n u l l and vo i d to a l l Intents and Purposes Whatsoever.(567) I t has been suggested that t h i s p r o v i s i o n c l e a r l y contemplated only the " p r o t e c t i o n " of Imperial Statutes.(568) C e r t a i n l y i t deals only with repugnancy to Imperial s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g to and mentioning the s a i d possessions. However, t h i s can be explained i n terms of the controversy i t sought to end, that i s which Imperial Acts were to be considered sacrosanct? I t d i r e c t e d that only those E n g l i s h s t a t u t e s , extending by express wording to the c o l o n i e s , were such as would r e s t r i c t c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e competence. A l l other Imperial s t a t u t e s were not to be accorded binding force i n the co l o n i e s such as to l i m i t c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . Section 49 of 6 Geo. IV (1825), c. 114 was i n turn replaced i n 1833(569) and again i n 1845(570) by i d e n t i c a l l y worded Sections. (567) I b i d . (568) Murray p. 33. (569) 3 & 4 Wm. IV (1833), c. 59, s. 56 Act to Regulate the Trade  of B r i t i s h Possessions. (570) 8 & 9 V i c t . (1845), c. 93, s. 63. PAGE 216 The s e c t i o n i n the 1845 Act was repealed i n a s t a t u t e of 1853 c o n s o l i d a t i n g the law r e l a t i n g to customs.(571) This new Act c a r r i e d forward the repugnancy provision,(572) and was s t i l l i n force at the time of the enactment of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y  Act, 1865. I t i s important to recognize that' none of the above considered Acts was worded i n such a way as to l i m i t the repugnancy d o c t r i n e to Imperial Acts with expressed c o l o n i a l intendment. As we have seen, p r i o r to the enactment of the C o l o n i a l Laws V a l i d i t y Act, 1865, the 'repugnancy' d o c t r i n e a l s o served to protect c e r t a i n fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of E n g l i s h law. Thus the wording of the above considered Acts cannot be regarded as exhaustive of the cate g o r i e s of Imperial law which might v o i d c o l o n i a l laws on grounds of repugnancy. Moreover, t h i s i s c l e a r from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of various Imperial Acts passed f o r the c o l o n i e s . An Imperial Act(573