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The Rotterdam convention on hazardous chemicals and pesticides : a meaningful step towards environmental… Barrios, Paula 2003

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THE ROTTERDAM CONVENTION ON HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AND PESTICIDES: A MEANINGFUL STEP T O W A R D S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION? by PAULA BARRIOS LL.B, University of Los Andes, 2000 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES FACULTY OF LAW We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard Professor Karin Mickelson, Faculty of Law Professor o T a v Slaymaker, department of Geography \ THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 2003 © Paula Barrios 2003 In present ing th is thes is in part ial fu l f i lment of the requ i rements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of Br i t ish C o l u m b i a , I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f reely ava i lab le for reference and s tudy . I fur ther agree that pe rm iss ion for ex tens ive copy ing of th is thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be gran ted by the head of my depa r tmen t or by his or her representa t ives . It is unders tood that copy ing or publ icat ion of th is thes is for f inancia l ga in shal l not be a l lowed w i thou t my wr i t ten pe rm iss ion . Mar ia Paula Barr ios Facul ty of Law The Un ivers i ty of Br i t ish Co lumb ia V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a Augus t 2 9 , 2003 Abstract The expor t of chemica l s that are banned or seve re l y restr ic ted for d o m e s t i c use in the expor t ing count ry for reasons of the env i ronmen t or heal th is sti l l a c o m m o n prac t ice . T h e s e doub le s tandards have a l lowed pest ic ide manufac tu re rs to expor t haza rdous pest ic ides to deve lop ing count r ies , wh ich have l imi ted capac i ty to m a n a g e t h e m in a safe manner . The consequences are not su rp r i s ing . It is es t ima ted , for ins tance , that a l though the grea t major i ty of pest ic ides are app l ied in indust r ia l ized count r ies , the ma jor i t y of po ison ings and dea ths ar is ing f rom pest ic ide use occur in the deve lop ing wo r l d . In 1 9 9 8 , the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion was adopted to deal wi th th is and o ther re lated p rob lems . The t rea ty , not yet in force, essent ia l ly conver ted a vo lun ta ry s y s t e m of in format ion exchange and pr ior in formed consent (PIC) into a legal ly b ind ing p rocedure . Th is thes is under takes a cr i t ical eva luat ion of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . It a rgues that the t rea ty is f undamenta l l y f l awed , as it does not add ress s o m e of the essen t ia l e l emen ts upon wh ich a success fu l PIC s y s t e m depends . Fu r the rmore , because it is l imi ted to in fo rmat ion exchange and PIC, the convent ion may wel l be insuff ic ient to dea l wi th the p rob lems per ta in ing to hazardous chemica ls in an ef fect ive manner . In o rder to subs tan t ia te that asse r t i on , the thes is cons iders the con tex t in wh ich the t rans fe r of haza rdous chemica ls occurs , and the cha l lenges fac ing the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . It desc r ibes the nature of the subs tances being t r aded , and exp lo res the pest ic ides marke t . It a lso cons iders the contex t in wh ich the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s deve lops , and a rgues that it is pr imar i ly an eth ica l ques t i on . A s a resu l t , it s tud ies the mora l and legal pr inc ip les that app ly to tha t t rans fe r , and the imp l ica t ions of ful ly imp lement ing t hem in the Rot te rdam Conven t i on . T h e n , it under takes a cr i t ical eva lua t ion of the convent ion 's ma in prov is ions , cons ider ing the vo lun ta ry i ns t ruments that se rved as its base . Last ly , it sugges ts s o m e m e a s u r e s that cou ld be incorpora ted into the convent ion for a more success fu l PIC p rocedure . Howeve r , it wa rns that a s y s t e m of PIC may not the most appropr ia te way of dea l ing wi th the p rob lems per ta in ing to haza rdous chemica ls and pest ic ides. Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents Ni Acronyms v Dedication vi Acknowledgments vii Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides: Understanding the Problem 2.1. Introduction 10 2.2. Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides: Why regulate them? 11 2.2.1. Industrial chemicals 12 2.2.2. Pesticides and Pesticide Formulations: 14 2.2.2.1. Impact of hazardous pesticides on human health 15 2.2.2.2. Impact of hazardous pesticides on the environment 19 2.2.2.3. The circle of poison: a concern of the North 21 2.3. Northern legislation regulating the export of hazardous chemicals 23 2.3.1. The European Union 24 2.3.2. Switzerland 25 2.3.3. The United States 26 2.3.4. Justifications to maintain pesticide export double standards 27 2.4. The Global Pesticides Market 29 2.4.1. Production of hazardous pesticides 31 2.4.1.1. China 32 2.4.1.2. India 33 2.4.1.3. Brazil 34 2.4.2. Northern Agrochemical Giants: Looking toward the South 35 2.4.2.1. Bayer (Germany) 35 2.4.2.2. Syngenta (Switzerland) 36 2.4.2.3. BASF (Germany) 37 2.4.2.4. Dow Agrosciences (U.S.) 38 2.4.2.5. Monsanto (U.S.) 38 2.4.2.6. DuPont (U.S.) 39 2.5. Conclusion 39 Chapter Three: The North, the South, and Trade in Hazardous Chemicals: Ethical Dilemmas 3.1. Introduction 40 3.2. North-South disparities: hazardous substances trade in a divided world 42 3.2.1. The World Trade Organisation 44 3.2.2. Financial Institutions: the World Bank and the IMF 46 3.3. International trade, environmental protection and hazardous substances 49 3.3.1. Hazardous Chemicals and the World Trade Organisation 51 3.3.1.1. The Multilateral Trading System and Environmental Protection 52 3.3.1.2. How the WTO Promotes Trade in Hazardous Pesticides 55 3.3.2. Financial Institutions and Trade in Hazardous Chemicals 57 3.4. The North-South Transfer of Hazardous Substances: Ethical Dilemmas 59 3.4.1. The principle of State responsibility for transboundary harm 60 3.4.2. The principle of international environmental equity 63 3.4.2.1. Promoting human rights 64 3.4.2.2. Treating others as ends: Kant's Categorical Imperative 66 3.4.2.3. Maximizing human happiness 67 3.4.2.4. Common but differentiated responsibilities 68 3.4.3. Implications of the principles of state responsibility and environmental equity for the treaties dealing with hazardous chemicals and wastes 74 Chapter Four: The Rotterdam Convention: A Modest Starting Point 4.1. Introduction 78 4.2. The voluntary PIC system: Code of Conduct and London Guidelines 79 4.2.1. UNEP London Guidelines (as Amended in 1989) 84 4.2.2. The FAO Code of Conduct (as amended in 1989) 85 4.3. The Rotterdam Negotiations 86 4.3.1. Antecedents 86 4.3.2. The Negotiations: the opinion of the Group of Experts on PIC 89 4.4. The Rotterdam Convention 95 4.4.1. Information exchange, export notification and PIC procedure 95 4.4.2. Chemicals covered by PIC and export notification under Rotterdam 98 4.4.2.1. Severely hazardous pesticide formulations 98 4.4.2.2. Banned and Severely Restricted Chemicals 99 4.4.2.3. Never registered chemicals 101 4.4.3. Labelling requirements 101 4.4.4. International cooperation and assistance 103 4.4.5. Compliance 104 4.5. Will a binding PIC make a difference? 104 Chapter Five: Protecting Health and the Environment from Hazardous Substances: How and to What Extent Could Rotterdam Contribute? 5.1. Introduction 111 5.2. Towards a successful PIC system 112 5.2.1. Training and technical support to developing countries 112 5.2.1.1. Specific obligations for capacity building activities in the South 113 5.2.1.2. Regional centres for training and assistance 115 5.2.1.2.1. Regional Centres of the Basel Convention 115 5.2.1.2.2. Regional Centres under the Rotterdam Convention 117 5.2.3. Creation of a financial mechanism for capacity building activities 118 5.2.2. Trade with non-Parties: promoting participation of all exporting countries 120 5.3. Trade in hazardous chemicals and the environment: mutually supportive? 122 5.3.1. Trade and environment in the Stockholm and Basel conventions 125 5.3.2. Conclusion 130 Bibliography 133 Acronyms COP Confe rence of the Part ies DNA Des igna ted Nat iona l Au thor i t y (for PIC) ENB Earth Negot ia t ions Bul let in EC European C o m m u n i t y EPA Env i ronmen ta l Protect ion A g e n c y (U .S . ) EU European Un ion FAO Food and Agr icu l tu re Organ iza t ion of the Uni ted Nat ions FDA Food and Drug Admin is t ra t ion (U .S . ) FIFRA Federa l Insect ic ide , Fung ic ide and Rodent ic ide Ac t (U .S . ) GATT Genera l A g r e e m e n t on Tari f fs and T rade GC Govern ing Counc i l (e .g . of UNEP) GEF Globa l Env i ronmen t Faci l i ty GIFAP G r o u p e m e n t In ternat iona l des Assoc ia t i ons de Fabr icants de Produ i ts Ag roch im iques (now Cropl i fe In ternat ional ) GNP Gross Nat iona l Product G-77 Group of 77 (deve lop ing count r ies) IFCS I n te rgovernmenta l Fo rum on Chem ica l Sa fe ty INC I n te rgovernmenta l Negot ia t ing C o m m i t t e e IRPTC In ternat iona l Reg is ter of Potent ia l ly Tox ic C h e m i c a l s (now U N E P Chemica l s ) NGO nongove rnmen ta l o rgan isa t ion ODA Official Deve lopmen t Ass i s tance OECD Organ iza t ion for Econom ic Co-opera t i on and D e v e l o p m e n t PAN Pest ic ide Act ion Network PANNA Pest ic ide Act ion Network North A m e r i c a PAN UK Pest ic ide Act ion Network Uni ted K ingdom PIC Prior In fo rmed Consen t POPs Pers is tent Organ ic Pol lu tants TSCA Tox ic Subs tances Cont ro l Ac t (U .S . ) UNDP Uni ted Nat ions Deve lopmen t P r o g r a m m e UNEP Uni ted Nat ions Env i ronmen t P r o g r a m m e UNGA Uni ted Nat ions Genera l A s s e m b l y WHO Wor ld Heal th Organ iza t ion WTO Wor ld Trade Organ iza t ion To my mother Acknowledgments First and fo remos t , I wou ld l ike to thank Pro fessor Kar in Micke lson for her d i rec t ion , inspi rat ion and cons tan t suppor t . Her va luab le c o m m e n t s and ideas are very m u c h ref lected on th is thes is . I wou ld a lso l ike to thank Pro fessor O lav S l a y m a k e r , f rom the Depa r tmen t of G e o g r a p h y , for his observa t ions , ideas and e n c o u r a g e m e n t . His v is ion and exper ience in the f ie lds of sc ience and env i ronmen ta l e th ics enr iched wha t I in tended to be a mul t i faceted ana lys i s . Last ly , I wou ld l ike to thank Pro fessor Peter D a u v e r g n e , f rom the Depa r tmen t of Pol i t ical Sc ience , for his inc is ive remarks on one of m y chap te rs , and Miki Fabry for his helpful c o m m e n t s and cont inuous suppor t . The Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals: A Meaningful Step Towards Environmental Protection? Chapter One Dur ing the last three d e ca d e s , the product ion of chemica l s increased spec tacu la r l y . 1 Real is ing that s o m e of these subs tances pose ser ious th reats to the env i r onmen t and to h u m a n hea l th , g o v e r n m e n t s in most indust r ia l ised count r ies dec ided to p romu lga te str ict regu la t ions dea l ing with the i r reg is t ra t ion, t es t i ng , p roduc t ion , d is t r ibut ion and s a l e . 2 In add i t i on , severa l hazardous chemica ls were banned or seve re l y restr ic ted for domes t i c use . Howeve r , these subs tances could be expor ted to o ther coun t r ies , as regu la t ions were s i lent or lenient wi th regard to e x p o r t s . 3 Deve lop ing count r ies were and cont inue to be a favoured des t ina t ion of hazardous chem ica l s , s ince they are less aware of the r isks invo lved and they of ten depend on t h e m to earn fore ign cur renc ies (e .g . the use of low-pr iced pest ic ides to sus ta in expor t agr icu l ture) or to cont ro l vec to r -bo rne d i seases (e .g . ma lar ia and ye l low fever ) . Howeve r , these count r ies usua l ly lack appropr ia te env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions to dea l wi th hazardous chemica l s , and w h e n these regula t ions ex is t , there is ve ry l imi ted capac i ty to enforce t h e m . Deve lop ing count r ies a lso genera l l y lack the abi l i ty and the in f rast ructure to hand le these mater ia ls in an env i ronmenta l l y sound m a n n e r ( i .e. , in a way that protects the env i r onmen t and h u m a n heal th f rom thei r negat ive ef fects) . A s a resul t , the expor t of In 1982 there were around 60,000 chemicals on the market, and production of synthetic materials had increased some 350 times since 1940. In the 1990s the number was 100,000, with some 1,000 substances becoming available every year. Mostafa Tolba & Osama A. El-Kholy, eds., The World Environment 1972-1992. Two Decades of Challenge, 1 s t ed. (London, New York: Chapman & Hall on behalf of UNEP, 1992) at 249. See also UNEP Chemicals, Introduction to the Rotterdam Convention, UN doc. UNEP/Chemicals/98/17 (January 1999). 2 This raised the costs of producing and registering chemicals. The costs of developing and marketing a new insecticide are, for instance, around US $75 million, due partly to strict registration requirements. See Helmut F. Van Emden & David B. Peakall, Beyond Silent Spring: Integrated Pest Management and Chemical Safety, 1 s t ed. (London; New York: Chapman & Hall, 1996) at 62. 3 In the United States, the export of banned or never registered pesticides to other countries is permitted as long as the foreign purchaser signs a statement acknowledging that he understands that the pesticide is not registered for use in the U.S. The US Environmental Protection Agency strengthened the notification and labelling requirements in its Export Policy 1993, but U.S. companies can still produce and export unregistered pesticides to any country, as long as they are labelled "unregistered" and the importer is notified of this classification. [See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1996), at § 136o.]. In the European Union, Council Regulation EEC No. 2455/92 allowed the export of pesticides that were banned or severely restricted within the EC to other states, as long as the exporter complied with certain requirements such as prior notification and consent by the importer and acceptable standards of packaging and labelling. (EC, Council Regulation 2455/92 of 23 July 1992 concerning the export and import of certain dangerous chemicals [1992] O.J. L. 251/13. The regulation was recently replaced by Regulation 304/2003 (EC, Regulation 304/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals, [2003] O.J. L. 063/1), which implements the Rotterdam Convention within the EU. For further details see section 2.3. in Chapter 2. hazardous chemica l s to these count r ies poses a ser ious threat to h u m a n heal th and to the env i ronmen t . The mos t a la rm ing f igures involve the use of haza rdous pest ic ides by fa rmers in the S o u t h . 4 Rev iews of hospi ta l da ta f rom the W H O , wh ich record on ly the g raves t c a s e s , ind icate that there are about 1 mi l l ion acc identa l po ison ings and 2 0 , 0 0 0 dea ths due to pest ic ides every yea r , pr imar i ly in deve lop ing count r ies . Agr icu l tu ra l s u r v e y s , for the i r part , sugges t that there could be as m a n y as 25 mi l l ion agr icu l tura l wo rke rs in the deve lop ing wor ld suf fer ing f rom an ep isode of pest ic ide po ison ing each year . In add i t i on , there is ev idence that pest ic ides banned in deve loped count r ies may return to t h e m in the fo rm of res idues in food impor ted f rom the deve lop ing wor ld . Th is p h e n o m e n o n is known as the 'c i rc le of p o i s o n . ' 5 These and other prob lems prompted a global response to deal wi th t rade in hazardous chemica ls between deve loped and develop ing countr ies in the late 1980s . The initial react ion of s tates was to adopt two vo luntary ins t ruments that created a sys tem of in format ion exchange on hazardous chemica ls and pest ic ides. They are the In ternat iona l C o d e of Conduc t on the Dis t r ibut ion and Use of Pes t ic ides , adopted by the Food and Agr icu l ture Organisat ion of the United Nat ions (FAO) in 1985 , and the London Gu ide l ines for the Exchange of In format ion on Chemica l s in In ternat iona l T rade , adopted by the Uni ted Nat ions Env i ronment P rog ramme (UNEP) in 1987. In 1989 , the prior in formed consent (PIC) procedure was int roduced into both ins t ruments , due to the pressure exer ted by deve lop ing countr ies and by env i ronmenta l nongovernmenta l organisat ions. The PIC procedure was intended to give import ing countr ies the oppor tun i ty to refuse future impor ts of a number of hazardous chemica ls that had been banned or severe ly restr icted in o ther countr ies . In 1998 , the vo luntary PIC sys tem was t rans fo rmed into a legal ly binding ins t rument , wi th the adopt ion of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on on the Pr ior In fo rmed Consen t Procedure for Cer ta in Hazardous Chem ica l s and Pest ic ides in In ternat iona l T rade . The t reaty is not yet in f o r ce , 6 and it was agreed that the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m wou ld cont inue to opera te on an in ter im bas is , af ter undergo ing s o m e ad jus tmen ts tha t put it in l ine wi th the conven t ion 's p rov i s i ons . 7 While the word 'South' refers to the developing and less developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the word 'North' encompasses the industrialized nations of Europe, Japan, North America and Australasia. For further details see section 3.2. in Chapter 3. 5 For further details on the health and environmental effects of hazardous chemicals see Chapter 2. 6 As of August 2003, the Rotterdam Convention had 73 signatories and 46 parties. 50 ratifications are needed for the treaty to enter into force, online: <http://www.pic.int> (last visited 24 August 2003). 7 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Convention of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Rotterdam 10-11 September 1998, Resolution on Interim Arrangements, Annex I, doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/CONF/5 (1998) [Hereinafter Resolution on Interim Arrangements] at 9. The purpose of th is thes is is to under take a cr i t ical eva lua t ion of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . Its cent ra l a rgumen t is that the t reaty is f undamenta l l y f l awed, and that it wil l not adequa te ly respond to the p rob lems and cha l lenges it is in tended to add ress . Th is is not on ly because it v i r tua l ly reproduced the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m wi thout in t roducing m u c h needed prov is ions on tes t ing , m a n a g e m e n t and product ion of chem ica l s , but a lso because it does not feature s o m e of the essent ia l e lemen ts upon wh ich a success fu l PIC s y s t e m depends . Its most notable def ic iency is that it fai ls to t ru ly acknow ledge the d i f ferences be tween deve loped and deve lop ing count r ies . T h u s , a l though it s e e m s to recogn ise the lack of capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to m a n a g e hazardous chemica l s and to imp lemen t its p rov is ions , it ref lects in pract ice the m is taken assump t i on that in format ion wil l by i tself improve that capac i ty . Ye t , the exper ience ga ined wi th the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m revea ls that enhanc ing the abi l i ty of deve lop ing s ta tes to ana lyse da ta on chem ica l s , to test chemica ls under the i r own cond i t ions , to d o c u m e n t and report po ison ing inc idents , and genera l l y to safe ly m a n a g e hazardous chem ica l s , is essent ia l for the success fu l imp lemen ta t i on of the PIC p rocedure . A l though the cent ra l sub jec t of th is ana lys is is the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , two mul t i la tera l t reat ies that are connec ted to it are a lso cons ide red , to the ex ten t that they ass is t in the eva lua t ion of the conven t i on . These t reat ies are e x a m i n e d , in par t icu lar , in the s tudy of the under ly ing causes of the p rob lem, and of the poss ib le so lu t ions that could cont r ibute to ach ieve s o m e progress in the area of haza rdous chemica l s m a n a g e m e n t . They are the Base l Conven t i on on the Cont ro l of T ransbounda ry M o v e m e n t s of Haza rdous Was tes and the i r D isposa l (adopted in March 1989 and in force s ince May 1 9 9 2 ) , 8 and the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on Pers is tent Organ ic Pol lu tants (adopted in May 2 0 0 1 , not yet in f o r ce ) . 9 Whi le the Base l Conven t i on seeks to contro l the in ternat ional t rade of haza rdous wastes,10 the S t o c k h o l m Conven t ion dea ls wi th persistent organic pollutants (here inaf ter In the late 1980s, and encouraged by several scandals involving the dumping of hazardous wastes in the South by industrialised countries, a coalition of developing countries (led by African states) and non-governmental organisations lobbied UNEP's Governing Council to negotiate an international legally binding instrument dealing with the international trade of hazardous wastes, which resulted in the adoption of the 'Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal' in 1989. For a review of the Basel negotiations see Jennifer Clapp, Toxic Exports. The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001) at 38-44 [Clapp, "Toxic Exports"], and Pamela S. Chasek, Earth Negotiations. Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2000) at 110-116. As of June 2003, the Basel Convention had 158 parties. The only signatories that are not parties to the treaty yet are the U.S.A, Afghanistan, and Haiti, online <http://www.basel.int> (last visited 24 August 2003). 9 As of 22 August 2003, the Stockholm Convention had 151 signatories and 35 parties. 50 ratifications are needed for the treaty to enter into force, online <http://www.pops.int> (last visited 24 August 2003). 1 0 Although there is no legal definition of 'hazardous wastes,' they can be defined as those substances that require special technologically advanced methods of disposal to render them harmless or less dangerous because of the threat they pose to human health and the environment. They are generated in manufacturing processes, the chemical industry, the petroleum industry and other industrial sectors. Some examples include P O P s ) , a g roup of chemica ls that pers ist in the env i ronmen t , b ioaccumu la te exponent ia l l y up the food c h a i n , 1 1 and t ravel long d is tances . A s pointed out by U N E P , these two t reat ies and the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion " toge the r prov ide an in ternat ional f ramework govern ing the env i ronmen ta l l y sound m a n a g e m e n t of hazardous chemica l s th roughout the i r l i fe-c y c l e s . " 1 2 A s a resul t , the ef fect ive imp lementa t ion of each one of these t reat ies depends in part on the success fu l imp lementa t ion of the other two . The reduct ion of POPs , for ins tance , part ia l ly depends on the sound m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous w a s t e s , 1 3 wh ich in turn part ia l ly depends on cer ta in pest ic ides not being expor ted to a count ry wi th very l imi ted or no capac i ty to d ispose of t h e m once they e x p i r e . 1 4 The Base l Conven t i on on hazardous was tes is the on ly one of these t reat ies that is cur rent ly in force (s ince June 1992) a n d , l ike Ro t t e rdam, it is based on the PIC p rocedure . It a lso dea ls wi th a p rob lem that par t icu lar ly af fects the S o u t h , wh ich due to its lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards has been an appea l ing dest ina t ion for the haza rdous was te genera ted in the N o r t h . 1 5 Because it takes p lace under s im i la r c i r cums tances , the Nor th -acids, alkalis, solvents, medical waste, sludge, resins and heavy metals. See David R. Boyd, Canada vs. the OECD: An Environmental Comparison (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria, Eco-Research Chair of Environmental Law & Policy, 2001) at 20. 1 1 POPs resist breakdown in water but they are soluble in fatty tissue. Thus, they bioaccumulate exponentially up the food chain, reaching their greatest magnitudes in birds, mammals and humans. In addition, POPs bioconcentrate under typical environmental conditions. Bioconcentration is the process by which animals absorb high concentrations of POPs directly from the environment. See Resource Futures International, "POPs and the Stockholm Convention: A Resource Guide" (Draft), presented at the Forum "Implementing the Stockholm Convention," March 11-12, 2002 Vancouver, BC, Canada (September 2001) [unpublished] at 2. 1 2 UNEP, Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Interim Secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention and Interim Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention, "The Hazardous Chemicals and Wastes Conventions" (July 2002), online <http:// www.pops.int/documents/background/hcwc.pdf> 1 3 The recycling and incineration of some hazardous wastes are important sources of PCDD, PCDF, HCH and PCBs, which are all persistent organic pollutants. See Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May 2001, Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/2, 40 I.L.M. 532 (not in force as of 24 August 2003) [hereinafter Stockholm Convention] Annex C, Part II, online: <http://www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf>. 1 4 Obsolete pesticides are wastes, and they are thus excluded from the scope of the Rotterdam Convention (Art. 2). FAO estimates that there are more than 100,000 tonnes of obsolete pesticides in developing countries, most of which are leftover from donations provided by foreign aid programmes. Among these substances are DDT, dieldrin and HCH (hexachlorocyclohexane). Due to a lack of environmentally sound disposal facilities stocks are constantly increasing, FAO has called for an urgent concerted global effort to dispose of this hazardous waste and to avoid further accumulations. FAO, Press Release, "Stocks of Obsolete Pesticides Threaten the Environment" (5 June 1996). 1 5 About 95 per cent of the total annual output of hazardous waste comes from a few developed countries. Due to strict regulations on waste disposal in those countries, the export of such wastes to the developing world became an attractive option. During the 1970s and 1980s, the world learned about several toxic wastes dumps in Africa and the Caribbean, and it was found that an estimated U$3 billion worth of hazardous wastes was being exported from the industrialised world to developing countries, most of which lacked the technology or the administrative capacity to dispose of them in a safe manner. In response to this problem, the legal department of UNEP began working towards an international agreement to control the international trade of hazardous wastes in 1981. A group of experts elaborated the "Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes," which was adopted by UNEP in 1987. Subsequently, encouraged by the scandals involving the dumping of hazardous wastes in the South by industrialised countries, a coalition of developing countries (led by African states) and non-governmental organisations lobbied UNEP's Governing Council to negotiate an international legally binding instrument dealing with the international trade of hazardous wastes. Negotiations started in 1988, and culminated with the adoption of the 'Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal' in 1989. See Christoph Hilz, The S o u t h t rans fer of haza rdous was tes sheds l ight on the causes under ly ing the t ransfer of haza rdous chemica l s . In add i t ion , the exper ience ga ined wi th the imp lemen ta t i on of the Base l Conven t i on (and the fact that it has proven largely insuff ic ient to add ress the p rob lems posed by haza rdous was tes desp i te its comprehens i veness ) m a y prov ide ins ight into how to add ress the p rob lem of the t rans fer of chemica ls more ef fect ive ly . A s for the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on POPs , its most d i rect re lat ion wi th Ro t te rdam is that they have seven subs tances in c o m m o n . 1 6 However , POPs are perce ived as a more press ing p rob lem for the N o r t h , 1 7 because they t rave l long d is tances and tend to accumu la te in cold regions and at h igh a l t i tudes, e .g . the Canad ian A r c t i c . 1 8 One could a rgue that part ly because of t h i s , 1 9 the app roach of the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on to dea l wi th POPs is di f ferent than that of the Ro t te rdam and Basel conven t ions , wh ich seek to contro l t rade th rough pr ior in formed consen t ra ther than th rough contro ls on the product ion or genera t ion of the subs tances they r e g u l a t e . 2 0 Bes ides inc luding prov is ions on t rade , product ion and use of P O P s , a im ing at the i r u l t imate e l im ina t ion , the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on has va luab le prov is ions dea l ing wi th Nor th -Sou th d ispar i t ies that are not featured in e i ther Base l or R o t t e r d a m . 2 1 Notab ly , it exp ress l y recogn izes the di f ferent responsib i l i t ies of the S o u t h International Toxic Waste Trade (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992) at 12-37; Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 33-34; and Chasek P., supra note 8 at 110-116. 1 6 See Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 10 September 1998, UN Doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/CONF/2, 38 I.L.M. 1 (1999), (not in force as of 31 August 2003) [hereinafter Rotterdam Convention], Annex III, online: <http://www.pic.int/en/ViewPage.asp?id = 104>, and Stockholm Convention, supra note 13 Annexes A and B. 1 7 Although POPs are also problematic for developing countries, especially in relation to the environment, human poisonings in the South are mostly due to organophosphates and carbamate pesticides, which do not persist in the environment but are acutely toxic for humans and wildlife (See Chapter 2 for details). In addition, the fact that most POPs are inexpensive because patents no longer protect them, and that they serve important health or agricultural purposes suggests that developing countries had no wish to halt the use of these substances, unless affordable and effective alternatives were available. 1 8 Mechanisms such as the "cold condenser effect" exist for intra-hemispheric distribution of POPs, such as HCB. These POPs are sourced in temperate and tropical regions, and volatilised and transferred by atmospheric movement to cold arctic regions. The major source for environmental contamination with POPs is still the Northern Hemisphere, with tropical Asia being a recent and major source. See D.W. Connell etal., "POPs in the Southern Hemisphere: Executive Summary," prepared as a Consultancy Service for the Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Environment Protection Agency, Environment Standards Branch of Australia (June 1996), online: <http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/manexpl4.html> 1 9 Other factors that serve to explain the stronger measures of the POPs treaty include: the particular properties of POPs, which triggered serious concern and public attention; the limited number of POPs being initially controlled (12), which may have contributed to broad consensus on some of the most ambitious elements of the convention; many of the initial 12 POPs had already been heavily regulated in many countries and, in some cases, were no longer protected by patents. This suggests that industry did not exert such a great influence to prevent the development of strong commitments to protect the environment and human health from the risks posed by POPs. See Peter L. Lallas, "The Role of Process and Participation in the Development of Effective International Environmental Agreements: A Study of the Global Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)" (2000) 19 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 83. 2 0 Although initially the Basel Convention only regulated the export of hazardous waste from North to South, the pressure exerted by developing countries and environmental nongovernmental organisations culminated in 1995 with the adoption of Decision III/l, which proscribes the export of hazardous wastes from the countries of Annex VII (EU members, OECD members and Liechtenstein), to Non-Annex VII countries. It is an amendment to the Convention and, as of August 2003, it had not entered into force. See note 380 and section 3.4.3. in Chapter 3. 2 1 See Chapter 3 for further details. and of the Nor th in dea l ing wi th POPs , and prov ides the m e a n s to ensure that deve lop ing count r ies wil l rece ive the funds and the techno logy they requi re in o rder to imp lemen t the i r ob l igat ions under the t reaty . In th is w a y , the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on fi l ls s o m e of the gaps of the Ro t te rdam t reaty in relat ion to the subs tances they have in c o m m o n . It a lso prov ides s o m e gu idance on how to bet ter dea l wi th o ther haza rdous chemica ls that are espec ia l l y p rob lemat ic for the Sou th but are on ly regu la ted by Ro t te rdam because they do not exh ib i t the character is t ics of POPs . Th is thes is is d iv ided as fo l lows. Chap te r 2 looks at the p rob lems that made a conven t ion on haza rdous chemica ls necessary . First , it shows the ef fects that s o m e pest ic ides and industr ia l chemica ls have on the env i ronmen t and h u m a n hea l th , wi th spec ia l a t tent ion to the chemica l s present ly inc luded in the PIC p rocedure . T h e n , the chap te r looks at the domes t i c laws that have a l lowed ma jo r ag rochemica l c o m p a n i e s to expor t haza rdous chemica l s ( i .e. chemica l s banned or severe ly restr ic ted for domes t i c use) to deve lop ing count r ies . T h e jus t i f i ca t ions regulators have g iven to sus ta in these doub le s tandards are a lso br ief ly cons ide red . Last ly , the chapte r looks at the g loba l pest ic ide marke t . G iven that it is cont ro l led by s ix mul t inat iona l corpora t ions based in the N o r t h , 2 2 a brief prof i le of these c o m p a n i e s is p resen ted . In add i t ion , the chap te r looks at the product ion of haza rdous pest ic ides in the Sou th by mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions and by s o m e local manu fac tu re rs in C h i n a , India and Braz i l , wh ich are the mos t impor tan t Sou the rn marke ts . Chap te r 3 se ts the con tex t in wh ich the expor t of haza rdous chem ica l s f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies takes p lace , tak ing into account the t rans fe r of haza rdous w a s t e , wh ich occurs under s im i la r c i r cums tances . It a rgues that there are essent ia l l y two forces faci l i tat ing - i f not p r o m o t i n g - , these t rans fers . The f irst one is the No r th -Sou th d iv ide ( i .e . , the e c o n o m i c and techno log ica l gap that ex is ts be tween deve loped and deve lop ing coun t r ies ) . The second one is e m b e d d e d in the pa rad igm that is uphe ld wi th in the contex t of a f ree marke t g loba l ised e c o n o m y . The chap te r looks at these two forces wi th in the con tex t of mul t i la tera l economic inst i tu t ions, i.e. the Bre t ton W o o d s inst i tut ions and the Wor ld T rade Organ i za t i on , as they have p romoted t rade l ibera l isat ion at a g lobal sca le and have cons ide rab ly in f luenced, if not s h a p e d , No r th -Sou th re la t ions s ince the i r incept ion . 2 2 The chapter focuses on agrochemical companies because, unlike most industrial chemicals included in the PIC procedure, pesticides are still largely traded and used in agriculture and public health programmes in the South, and they pose the biggest problems due to conditions of use in those countries. Af ter cons ider ing the condi t ions under ly ing the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and w a s t e s , Chap te r 3 looks at the mora l and legal pr inc ip les that app ly to the t reat ies dea l ing wi th that t ransfer , and the re levance that s ta tes have g iven to these rules in the in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l a rena . These pr inc ip les are impor tan t for at least th ree reasons . First , because of the l imi ted cho ice deve lop ing count r ies have , and because of the nature of the subs tances being expo r ted , the dec is ion of a Nor thern c o m p a n y to expor t haza rdous chemica l s and was tes to the Sou th (and of a Nor thern s tate to a l low such expor ts ) is u l t imate ly of e th ica l nature. T h u s , even if a c o m p a n y over looks mora l cons idera t ions w h e n dec id ing to expor t a domest i ca l l y banned chemica l to a count ry wi th ve ry l imi ted or no capac i ty to m a n a g e it, that is, in itself, an eth ical cho ice . S e c o n d , these pr inc ip les are inc luded , e i ther impl ic i t ly or exp l ic i t ly , in the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t i ons , wh ich ind icates that they are d i rect ly app l icab le to the t rans fe r of haza rdous chem ica l s and was tes . Moreover , they have been recogn ised by the major i ty of s ta tes in the in ternat ional env i ronmenta l a r e n a , s o m e of t h e m to the ex ten t of hav ing ga ined the s ta tus of cus tomary in ternat ional law. Th i r d , if ful ly imp lemen ted these pr inc ip les wou ld great ly cont r ibute to the ef fect ive protect ion of the env i ronmen t and h u m a n heal th f rom hazardous chemica l s and was tes . A long these l ines, two pr inc ip les and the i r impl ica t ions for the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes are cons ide red . The f irst is the pr incip le of s tate responsib i l i ty for t r ansboundary h a r m , e m b e d d e d in pr inc ip les 21 of the S t o c k h o l m Dec lara t ion (1972) and 2 of the Rio Dec lara t ion (1992 ) . The second is the pr incip le of in ternat ional env i ronmenta l equ i ty and the ru les that der ive f rom it, in par t icu lar the pr inc ip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent ia ted responsib i l i t ies (as fo rmu la ted in pr incip le 7 of the Rio Dec la ra t ion) . Tak ing into accoun t the con tex t in wh ich the t rans fe r of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides occu rs , Chap te r 4 prov ides a cr i t ical eva lua t ion of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . First , it e x a m i n e s the or ig ins of the in ternat ional reg ime of haza rdous chemica ls and p e s t i c i d e s , 2 3 and descr ibes the vo lun ta ry ins t ruments that p receded the conven t i on , i .e., the FAO C o d e of Conduc t and UNEP 's London G u i d e l i n e s . 2 4 T h e s e two ins t ruments International regimes are, according to Keohane (1989) "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations," while institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constraint activity, and shape expectations." This means that the Rotterdam Convention, the voluntary PIC system and the principles of international environmental law analysed in Chapter 3 are part of the regime of hazardous chemicals and pesticides. See Robert O. Keohane "The Analysis of International Regimes. Towards a European-American Research Programme," in Rittberger Volker, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Claredon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 28-29. 2 4 For the full name of these instruments see page 2, in this chapter. l aunched a s y s t e m of in format ion exchange on hazardous chem ica l s , and were a m e n d e d in 1989 to in t roduce the pr ior in formed consen t (PIC) p rocedure , wh ich is descr ibed in deta i l in the chapter . T h e n , the chap te r p resents a su rvey of the negot ia t ions that led to the adopt ion of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , cons ider ing the ma jo r po ints of d i ve rgence be tween state represen ta t i ves . A brief descr ip t ion of the t rea ty 's ma in prov is ions fo l lows, tak ing into accoun t the co r respond ing prov is ions of the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m . Last ly , in v iew of the exper ience ga ined wi th the vo lun ta ry p rocedure -pa r t i cu la r l y the op in ions exp ressed by the F A O / U N E P Joint Group of Exper ts on P I C - the chap te r ref lects on whe the r the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion enhanced the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m in any mean ing fu l way . The conc lus ion of the ana lys is is that no s igni f icant i m p r o v e m e n t s were in t roduced into the conven t i on , and that even by its own s tandards ( i .e . , cons ider ing that it seeks to improve the env i ronmen t and h u m a n heal th th rough in format ion exchange and not th rough the safe m a n a g e m e n t of chemica ls ) the t reaty is f undamen ta l l y f l awed . Th is is because it does not adequa te ly address the ve ry l imi ted capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to ef fect ive ly imp lemen t its prov is ions. T h u s , it m a k e s a p rocedure manda to ry w i thout prov id ing the m e a n s for most vu lne rab le count r ies (for wh ich the s y s t e m was created) to imp lemen t it. In add i t ion , it does not p romote par t ic ipat ion of all impor tan t p layers , as r e c o m m e n d e d by the Joint G roup of exper ts on PIC. Hav ing exp lo red the cha l lenges fac ing the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on and the sho r t com ings of the t reaty , C h a p t e r 5 cons iders the ways in wh ich the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on cou ld mean ing fu l l y cont r ibute to the protect ion of the env i ronmen t and h u m a n heal th f rom haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides. Tak ing into accoun t the exper ience ga ined wi th the imp lemen ta t i on of the vo lun ta ry PIC p rocedure , and the re levant p rov is ions of the Base l Conven t i on on haza rdous was tes and the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on POPs , the chap te r sugges ts a n u m b e r of measu res that could be in t roduced in the text of the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion for a success fu l PIC p rocedure . The chap te r a r g u e s , howeve r , that a s y s t e m of pr ior in formed consen t might not be the mos t appropr ia te me thod to add ress the p rob lems per ta in ing to hazardous chemica l s and pest ic ides. The pr ior in formed consen t app roach ref lects the idea that t rade in hazardous chemica l s and expor t doub le s tandards are not a p rob lem in t h e m s e l v e s , and thus t rade shou ld not be proscr ibed but mere ly regu la ted . For that reason , Chap te r 5 ref lects on whe the r t rade in hazardous chemica l s and env i ronmen ta l protect ion are inherent ly compa t ib le , as c la imed by the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on and ref lected in the PIC procedure a p p r o a c h . The ana lys i s shows that to m a k e that assump t i on is in many ways p rob lemat ic , and it has det rac ted s ta tes f rom ef fect ive ly address ing the p rob lem of t rade in hazardous chemica l s . A l though a more ef fect ive way of dea l ing wi th th is p rob lem is wi th in reach , the chap te r notes the lack of pol i t ical will to imp lemen t it. Th is is because excep t for those that are pers is tent o rgan ic po l lu tants , the chemica l s and pest ic ides regu la ted by the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on are pr imar i ly a concern of the S o u t h . Meanwh i le , the so lu t ions largely depend on the w i l l ingness of the North to take ac t ion . Chapter Two Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides: Understanding the Problem 2.1. Introduction The purpose of th is chapte r is to in t roduce the p rob lem that led s ta tes to negot ia te a conven t ion on t rade in hazardous chemica ls . First , the chap te r looks at the ef fects s o m e industr ia l chemica ls and pest ic ides have on the env i ronmen t and h u m a n h e a l t h . 2 5 T h e n , it p resents a brief synops i s of the laws that have a l lowed Nor thern ag rochemica l compan ies to expor t chemica l s banned or severe ly restr ic ted for domes t i c use to the deve lop ing w o r l d . 2 6 Because these doub le s tandards are sti l l in p lace, the jus t i f ica t ions that regu la tors have of fered to sus ta in t h e m are a lso br ief ly cons ide red . Last ly , the chap te r looks at the g lobal pest ic ide m a r k e t , 2 7 prov id ing a brief profi le of the s ix mul t inat iona l co rpora t ions that contro l it, and an overv iew of a n u m b e r of local c o m p a n i e s produc ing haza rdous pest ic ides in C h i n a , India and Braz i l , wh ich are the b iggest Sou the rn marke ts . The s tudy of the pest ic ides marke t revea ls not on ly the magn i tude of the cha l lenges fac ing the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on , but a lso the p rob lems that cou ld ar ise if doub le s tandards were s imp ly e l im ina ted . Because the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on dea ls on ly wi th t rade in haza rdous chemica l s , Nor thern compan ies could t ransfer the i r p roduct ion faci l i t ies to deve lop ing count r ies , where they have severa l subs id ia r ies and s o m e of t h e m are a l ready produc ing hazardous p e s t i c i d e s . 2 8 In add i t i on , Sou the rn compan ies cou ld e m b a r k on - o r e x p a n d - , the product ion of haza rdous chemica l s . If no regula t ions on product ion are es tab l i shed , a ban on the expor t of haza rdous chemica l s could thus intensi fy haza rdous product ion in deve lop ing count r ies by both nat ional and fore ign p layers (or by jo in t ven tu res be tween t h e m ) . 2 9 Th is wou ld mere ly t rans fo rm the p rob lem Substances that are not included in the PIC procedure but are also problematic for the South (e.g. the herbicide paraquat) are also mentioned in the chapter. 2 6 The world's agrochemical market is controlled by six agrochemical corporations based in the U.S., Switzerland and Germany. For that reason, only EU, Swiss and U.S. legislation is considered. 2 7 The main focus of this chapter is on pesticides, since they pose the biggest problems in due to their use in agriculture and public health programmes, and they are still largely traded and used in the South. 2 8 Syngenta, for instance, opened a US$85 million factory China to manufacture paraquat, a herbicide responsible for many poisonings in developing countries. Paraquat is banned in Switzerland, home of Syngenta, and other countries. (For details on paraquat please see notes 142 and 194). 2 9 Lower standards of production in developing countries could potentially lead to more disasters such as the one occurred in 1984 in Bhopal, India, when about 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate and other lethal gases leaked from Union Carbide Corporation's pesticide factory. On the night of the disaster, six safety measures designed to prevent a gas leak were not functioning properly, they were shut down or inadequate. The safety siren, intended to alert the community in case of an accident, was turned off. See "Bhopal: The Ongoing Disaster 1984-2001," Greenpeace International, 2001, online: <http://zope.greenpeace.Org/z/gpindia/bhopal-factsheet>. of t rans fer of haza rdous chemica ls into one of t rans fer of p roduc t ion , ra ther than address ing the issue at its root. 2.2. Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides: Why regulate them? Haza rdous chemica l s can be def ined as industr ia l chemica l s and chemica l pest ic ides that in sma l l doses can cause s igni f icant ha rm to the env i ronmen t or h u m a n h e a l t h . 3 0 They may pol lute water , a i r and so i l , and dest roy fauna and f lo ra ; s o m e of t h e m pers is t in the env i ronmen t for a long per iod of t ime , and accumu la te in the food c h a i n . 3 1 Impac ts on heal th can be both acute and chron ic . Acu te ef fects inc lude sk in bu rns , para lys is , b lurred v i s i on , b l indness and d e a t h , whi le s o m e chron ic ef fects are neuro log ica l d a m a g e , endocr ine d is rup t ion , reproduct ive d a m a g e , birth defec ts , cance r , i m m u n e s y s t e m s u p p r e s s i o n , lung and heart d i sease , and k idney d a m a g e . 3 2 Under the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on , 17 pest ic ides, 5 industr ia l chemica l s and 5 severe ly haza rdous pest ic ide f o r m u l a t i o n s 3 3 shou ld not be expor ted un less ag reed by the impor t ing c o u n t r y . 3 4 In add i t ion , f ive new pest ic ides have been added in the in ter im p e r i o d , 3 5 and par t ies wil l cons ider inc luding these chemica l s in the or ig ina l ly agreed list of 27 subs tances once the convent ion enters into f o r c e . 3 6 Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Brent R. Hendricks, International Environmental Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1997) at 190. 3 1 Organochlorines, for instance, persist in the environment and accumulate in fatty tissue of animals, reaching the greatest magnitudes in predatory birds and mammals. Bioaccumulation means an increase in the concentration of a chemical in a biological organism over time compared to the chemical's concentration in the environment (e.g., some POPs present in water may bioconcentrate in the fatty tissue of fish by factors up to 70,000 times their concentration in the water column). Resource Futures International, supra note 11 at 2. 3 2 For pesticides see World Resources Institute, UNEP, UNDP, World Bank, World Resources 1998-1999 (New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) [hereinafter World Resources 1998-1999] at 42-45. For industrial chemicals, see next two pages. 3 3 While the active ingredient is the one that has the pesticidal effect, a formulation is a mixture of active ingredient(s) with carriers, spreaders or other inert materials, to improve the storage, mixing and/or application properties of a product. See Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Land, Water and Air Protection, Integrated Pest Management Manual for Home and Garden Pests in BC: Glossary, online: <http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/epd/ipm/docs/envirowe/gloss.htm>. [Hereinafter BC Glossary]. 3 4 Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention lists the substances subject to the PIC procedure. Although Annex III chemicals should not be exported unless expressly agreed by the importing country, three exceptions apply to this rule. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 11(2), and Chapter 4. 3 5 Binapacryl, toxaphene, ethylene oxide, ethylene dichloride, and monocrotophos. The first two were added to the list in July 1999, the following two in November 2000, and the latter in October 2002. Certain formulations of monocrotophos were already included in Annex III. 3 6 Art. 8 of the Rotterdam Convention states that any chemical other than those listed in Annex III that has been included in the voluntary PIC procedure before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) may be added to Annex III by the COP if it finds all the relevant requirements have been fulfilled. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 8. 2.2.1. Industrial Chemicals Indust r ia l chemica ls are chemica l c o m p o u n d s used or p roduced by indust ry . Those present ly sub jec t to the PIC procedure a r e : po lych lor ina ted b ipheny ls ( P C B s ) ; po lych lor ina ted te rpheny ls (PCTs ) ; po lybromina ted b ipheny ls ( P B B s ) ; croc idol i te (a type of a s b e s t o s ) ; and tr is (2 ,3 -d ib romopropy l ) phospha te (TBPP) . Both P C B s and PCTs are ch lor ina ted c o m p o u n d s . PCBs are non - f l ammab le oi ly l iquids or w a x e s used as hydrau l ic f lu ids or add i t i ves to oi ls in sea lan ts , e lectr ica l app l ica t ions and pa in ts . They are suspec ted of p romot ing cancer , damag ing the i m m u n e and reproduct ive s y s t e m s and inter fer ing wi th ho rmone s y s t e m s th rough endocr ine d is rup t ion . There is a lso ev idence that ch i ldren born to mothers con tamina ted wi th high levels of P C B s suf fer impa i red nervous s y s t e m d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 7 PCBs pers is t in the env i r onmen t , b ioaccumu la te in the food c h a i n , concent ra te in h u m a n fat ty t issue and mi lk and t rave l long d is tances . For tha t reason , they are a lso inc luded in the S t o c k h o l m C o n v e n t i o n . PCTs are ye l low res ins wi th proper t ies s im i la r to PCBs and used for s im i la r purposes . The i r p roduct ion was te rm ina ted in mos t count r ies in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , wh ich ind icates that there is no s igni f icant t rade of PCTs . A l t hough they are tox ic , pers is tent , and b ioaccumula t i ve l ike P C B s , fu r ther s tud ies are needed to eva lua te the heal th impact of PCTs and the i r potent ia l l ink to long- range t ransboundary ai r po l l u t i on , 3 8 wh ich is poss ib ly why they were not inc luded in the init ial list of 12 POPs of the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on . PBBs and T B P P are two b romina ted f l ame- re ta rdan ts . PBBs are added to p last ics used in products such as c o m p u t e r mon i to rs , te lev is ions , tex t i les , and p last ic f o a m s , to m a k e t h e m diff icult to burn . Tes ts on laboratory an ima ls show that PBBs can cause body we igh t loss , sk in d iso rders , nervous and i m m u n e s y s t e m d a m a g e , and injure the l iver, k idneys , and thyro id g lands . The In ternat ional A g e n c y for Research on C a n c e r ( IARC) has de te rm ined that they are poss ib le h u m a n s carc inogens . They are s tored ma in ly in body fat, tend to concent ra te in breast mi lk fat, and can en ter the bod ies of infants th rough breast f eed ing , and the bodies of unborn babies th rough the p l a c e n t a . 3 9 T B P P is a v i scous l iquid that was used pr imar i ly as a f lame re tardant add i t ive for syn the t ic tex t i les , See Paul Harrison & Fred Pearce, American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Atlas of Population and the Environment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000) at 111. 3 8 Environment Canada, "Polychlorinated Terphenyls (PCTs)" by Greg Filyk (Quebec: 2002) at 24, online: <http://www.unece.orq/env/popsxq/pct.pdf>. 3 9 PBBs were banned in the U.S. in 1976, but they can be released in small amounts into the environment from poorly maintained hazardous waste sites and improper incineration of plastics that contain them. U.S., Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public Health Statement for Polybrominated Biphenyls and Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (Draft for Public Comment) (September 2002), online: <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp68.html>. par t icu lar ly in ch i ld ren 's s leepwear . It can be abso rbed th rough the s k i n , and carc inogen ic ef fects have been found in rats and m ice . In 1 9 7 7 , the U S C o n s u m e r Product Sa fe ty C o m m i s s i o n banned ch i ld ren 's c lo th ing t reated wi th T B P P , on the g rounds that it m a y be a h u m a n ca rc inogen . The use of th is subs tance as a f l ame re tardant in c o n s u m e r products has been seve re l y restr ic ted in m a n y count r ies and prohib i ted in t e x t i l e s . 4 1 Last ly , asbes tos is the name g iven to a g roup of s ix d i f ferent f ibrous m inera ls made of t h in , separab le f ibres that do not d isso lve in water or evapora te and are res is tant to heat , f i re, and chemica l and biological d e g r a d a t i o n . 4 2 These proper t ies m a k e it ideal for a w ide range of p roduc ts , such as bui ld ing mater ia ls , f r ict ion produc ts , and heat - res is tan t fabr ics . The downs ide of asbes tos is that its f ibres get eas i ly t rapped in the lungs, where they bui ld up over t ime and may not be d e g r a d e d . Th is can cause asbes tos i s , a lung d isease that m a y lead to d isabi l i ty or dea th , and increased chances of get t ing lung cancer and cancer in the s t o m a c h , in tes t ines, o e s o p h a g u s , panc reas , and k i d n e y s . 4 3 The Ro t te rdam Conven t ion inc ludes only one k ind of asbes tos (croc ido l i te) , but the o ther f ive fo rms m a y be added to the PIC list in N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 3 , t r iggered by bans in Aus t ra l i a , Ch i le and the E U . 4 4 T h e s e industr ia l chemica ls pose a ser ious r isk to heal th and to the env i ronmen t eve rywhe re . Howeve r , w i th the except ion of asbes tos ( though not the type regu la ted by the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n ) , 4 5 mos t of t h e m are no longer being produced or expo r t ed , o r they are not p roduced in s igni f icant a m o u n t s . 4 6 In cont ras t , m a n y hazardous pest ic ides U.S., Department of Health and Human Services, National Toxicology Program (NTP), "Tris(2,3-Dibromopropyl) phosphate," Ninth Report of Carcinogens (January 2001), online: <http://www.sanitaweb.it/web/Biblioteca/carcinogens.htm>. 4 1 TBPP is banned in several European countries, the U.S. and Japan. International Programme on Chemical Safety, "Tris(2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate and Bis(2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate," Environmental Health Criteria No. 173 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1995), online: <http://www.inchem.org/documents/ehc/ehc/ehcl73.htm>. [hereinafter Int'l Programme of Chemical Safety]. 4 2 These are amosite, chrysotile, crocidolite, and the fibrous varieties of tremolite, actinolite, and anthophyllite. Chrysotile is considered less hazardous than the other forms of asbestos fibres, which belong to the amphibole family. U.S., Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public Health Statement for Asbestos (September 2001), online: <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phs61.html>. 4 3 Both the U.S. EPA and the IARC have determined that asbestos is a human carcinogen. See Ibid. 4 4 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Press Release, "Three Deadly Pesticides and Asbestos Targeted for Trade Controls" (February 2002). 4 5 The only type of asbestos manufactured today is chrysotile, and only products in which the fibre is encapsulated in a matrix of cement or resin, preventing the release of fibres, are sold. Major producers are, in order of importance: Russia; Canada; China; Brazil; Zimbabwe; Kazakhstan; Greece; India; Swaziland; South Africa; Colombia; and the U.S. (The Asbestos Institute, 1999-2000, online: <http://www.asbestos-institute.ca/main.html>). 4 6 Production of PCBs has almost totally ceased worldwide, although there are reports of it continuing in Russia. (Greenpeace International, Toxics Campaign, "Down to Zero. POPs in the OSPAR Priority List" (2002), online: <http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/downtozero/POPS/ospar-list.html>.) Production of PCTs is not known to are sti l l w ide ly produced and u s e d , and deve lop ing count r ies s t rong ly rely on t h e m to sus ta in expor t agr icu l ture . For that reason , the focus of th is chapte r is on the in ternat ional t rade and product ion of haza rdous pest ic ides. 2.2.2. Pesticides and Pesticide Formulations 4 7 Pest ic ides are subs tances in tended to p revent , des t roy or contro l pes ts , such as vec to rs of h u m a n or an ima l d isease and unwanted spec ies of p lants or an ima l s caus ing ha rm or inter fer ing wi th the p roduc t ion , p rocess ing , s to rage or marke t i ng of food , agr icu l tura l c o m m o d i t i e s , and w o o d . 4 8 They are the on ly tox ic chemica ls purposefu l ly in t roduced by h u m a n s into the env i ronmen t to comba t , a m o n g s t o thers , insects ( insec t ic ides) , weeds (herb ic ides) and fungi ( fung ic ides) , and to contro l insec t -borne d i seases such as ma la r i a , dengue fever , and r iver b l i n d n e s s . 4 9 Chemica l pest ic ides have cont r ibu ted to increased g lobal agr icu l tura l product iv i ty , reduced vec to r -bo rne d i sease , and to the protect ion or res torat ion of p lanta t ions and f o r e s t s . 5 0 Howeve r , m a n y of t h e m bear effects that may su rpass the i r benef i ts . Mi l l ions of h u m a n po ison ings per yea r , the pol lut ion of a i r , soi l and water , food con tamina t ion (in the case of use of pest ic ides on food c rops ) , and d isrupt ion of wi ld l i fe, are all s ide effects of the p roduc t ion , d is t r ibut ion and use of p e s t i c i d e s . 5 1 occur anywhere since the early 1980s (Filyk G., supra note 38 at 7). U.S. Monsanto, leading manufacturer of PCBs and PCTs terminated production and export of both chemicals in 1977. (Dr. Heidelore Fiedler, "PCBs: Uses and Environmental Releases," St. Petersburg, Russia (1-4 July 1997), online: <http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/POPs_Inc/proceedings/bamako/eng/FIEDLERl.html>). PBBs are no longer produced in commercial quantities in the U.S. Many countries have banned their use in textiles (e.g. several European countries, the U.S. Japan), while their manufacture, use and importation is prohibited in Austria, Canada, and Switzerland. However, PBBs are still used in many electrical and electronic devices [OECD, Environment Policy Committee, "Report of Incineration of Products Containing Brominated Flame Retardants," doc. EIW/EPOC/WMP(97)4/REV2 (Paris: OECD, 1998)]. Lastly, as far as is known, TPBB is no longer produced or used in the world as a flame retardant in textiles, but it may be added to polymers used for other purposes. (See Int'l Programme on Chemical Safety, supra note 41). 4 7 See "BC Glossary," supra note 33. 4 8 Fora complete definition See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Code of Conduct for the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, 23 FAO/CONF/RES 10/85 (28 November 1985) (amended in 1989 to include prior informed consent) [hereinafter Code of Conduct] Art. 2, online: <http://journals.iranscience.net:800/Default/www.fao.org/waicent/FaoInfo/Agricult/AGP/AGPP/Pesticid/Code/P M_Code.htm>. [Note: A revised version of the Code of Conduct was adopted at the 123 r d session of the FAO Council in November 2002, after the adoption of the Rotterdam Convention]. 4 9 See Andrew M. Crain, "Opportunities to Improve Pesticide Policy in Central America," (2000) 11 Colo.J. Int'l. Envtl.L. & Pol'y 151 at 155-156. 5 0 See Donald J. Ecobichon "Pesticide Use in Developing Countries," (2001) 160:1-3 Toxicology 27 at 27. 5 1 Peter Hough, The Global Politics of Pesticides. Forging Consensus from Conflicting Interests (London: Earthscan, 1998) at 21. [Hough, "The Global Politics of Pesticides"]. 2.2.2.1. Impact of hazardous pesticides on human health Pest ic ides have a c lear impact on h u m a n hea l th . G loba l rev iews of hospi ta l data by the W H O es t ima te that there are 1 mi l l ion acc identa l po ison ings and 2 0 , 0 0 0 dea ths eve ry yea r due to pes t ic ides , pr imar i ly in deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 5 2 Ye t , hospi ta l da ta usual ly record on ly the mos t ser ious po ison ing i nc i den t s , 5 3 wh ich exp la ins why agr icu l tura l wo rke r su rveys present much h igher es t ima tes . Acco rd ing to a 1990 su rvey by the W H O in the As ian reg ion , there m a y be as m a n y as 25 mi l l ion agr icu l tura l worke rs in the deve lop ing wor ld suf fer ing f rom an ep isode of po ison ing eve ry year . Th is is based on 3 % of f a rmers recal l ing an i l lness ep isode ove r a yea r a m o n g a work force of 8 3 0 mi l l ion worke rs . Recal l su r veys f rom o ther count r ies f ind stil l a larger rat io at 4 . 5 % in Cos ta R i c a , 9 % in I ndones ia , and up to 1 0 % in B o l i v i a . 5 4 Accord ing to the F A O , a l though more than 8 0 % of the wor ld 's pest ic ides are app l ied in indust r ia l ised count r ies , 9 9 % of all po ison ings occur in deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 5 5 Seve ra l factors m igh t se rve to exp la in this s i tua t ion . First , many pest ic ides c lass i f ied as ex t reme ly or h igh ly haza rdous by the W H O are sti l l used in the S o u t h , whi le they are banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted in the N o r t h . 5 6 S e c o n d , in deve lop ing count r ies , pest ic ides are usua l ly app l ied by people wi th ve ry l imi ted or no t ra in ing in safe app l ica t ion or s to rage. S tud ies of f a rmers and the i r fami l ies repeated ly show that there is a h igh r isk of exposu re th rough lack of protect ive c lo th ing , leak ing spray equ ipmen t , m ix ing and appl ica t ion of pest ic ides wi th bare hands , and s to rage of pest ic ides wi th f o o d . 5 7 A s a resul t , the r isk of po ison ing is m u c h h igher in the Sou th than in the Nor th . The best heal th da ta sugges t , for e x a m p l e , that Lat in A m e r i c a n fa rm worke rs are 13 t imes more l ikely to suf fer pest ic ide po ison ing If intentional poisonings are included, there are 3 million cases of pesticide poisoning per year, which result in approximately 220,000 deaths. Toxic pesticides are extensively used as an agent for suicide in developing countries because of their ready availability to the general public. The herbicide paraquat is largely used for these purposes. See J. Jeyaratnam "Acute Pesticide Poisoning: A Major Global Health Problem," (1990) 43 World Health Statistics Quarterly 139 at 143. 5 3 See "World Resources 1998-1999," supra note 32 at 44. 5 4 Helen Murphy, "IPM and Farmer's Health" Spider Web Newsletter (5 November 2001) Online: <http://www.communityipm.org/Spiderweb/spider05pl.htm> and Jeyaratnam J . , supra note 52 at 141 and 143. 5 5 In "International Code on Pesticide Use Adopted in Rome," EuropaWorld (8 November 2002), online: <http://www.europaworld.org/weekl04/internationalcode81102.htm>. 5 6 According to the Rotterdam Convention, a banned chemical is one all uses of which within one or more categories have been prohibited by final regulatory action in order to protect human health or the environment. A severely restricted chemical is one virtually all use of which within one or more categories have been prohibited by final regulatory action in order to protect human health or the environment. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 2, and Chapter 4. 5 7 Jeremy Harris, Chemical Pesticide Markets, Health Risks and Residues (Wallingford, Oxon, OX; New York: CABI Pub., 2000) at 15. than fa rm worke rs in the U . S . 5 8 Last ly , a factor that m igh t a lso exp la in the h igher inc idence of acute po ison ings in the Sou th is that whi le the Nor thern pest ic ide marke t is dom ina ted by h e r b i c i d e s , 5 9 most deve lop ing count r ies are g rea te r c o n s u m e r s of i n sec t i c i des , 6 0 wh ich are genera l l y more tox ic . Wi th the excep t ion of the herb ic ide paraquat , respons ib le for m a n y acc identa l and intent ional po ison ings in the S o u t h , 6 1 the great major i ty of acc identa l in tox icat ions can be at t r ibuted to two g roups of insec t ic ides : o rganophospha tes and c a r b a m a t e s . 6 2 These pest ic ides inhibi t the act ion of ace ty l cho l ines te rase , an e n z y m e that is essent ia l to the proper funct ion ing of the nervous s y s t e m . 6 3 There are four ma jo r g roups of insec t ic ides : o rganophospha tes , c a r b a m a t e s , o rganoch lo r ines , and syn the t ic p y r e t h r o i d s . 6 4 O rganophospha tes were d iscovered dur ing Wor ld W a r I I , 6 5 as a s ide effect of war t ime research into tox ic g a s e s . 6 6 A l though they do not pers is t in the env i ronmen t or accumu la te in fatty t i ssues , they are usua l ly ve ry tox ic to m a m m a l s . 6 7 Ear ly po ison ing s y m p t o m s inc lude n a u s e a , d i zz iness , s w e a t i n g , sa l i va t ion , l ac r ima t ion , and rh inor rhea, whi le musc le tw i tch ing , w e a k n e s s , t remor , lack of coord ina t ion , vom i t i ng , abdomina l c r a m p s , and d ia r rhea are al l s igna ls of a worsen ing of the po isoned s ta te . Po ison ing can a lso cause sensory and behav ioura l d i s tu rbances , dep ressed mo to r func t ion , and resp i ra tory dep ress ion . Death f rom o rganophospha te po ison ing is usua l ly l inked to increased pu lmonary secre t ions , coup led wi th resp i ra tory Richard R. Tansey etal., "Eradicating the Pesticide Problem in Latin America" (1995) 92 Business and Society Review 55 at 55. 5 9 These are used primarily to reduce the workload of workers. G.S. Dhaliwal & M.D. Pathak, Pesticides: Their Ecological Impact in Developing Countries, Dhaliwal G.S. and Balwinder Singh eds. (New Delhi, India: Commonwealth Publishers, 1993) at 9. 6 0 Insect populations build up more readily in tropical and subtropical regions, and cause the biggest problems. There are some exceptions, such as Malaysia, where herbicides account for % of pesticides used. See Ibid, at 10, and John Madeley, "Unsustainable for Use -Profile of Paraquat," Pesticide News 56 (June 2002) 3 at 3-5, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn56/pn56p3.htm>. 6 1 Besides being a cause of accidental poisoning, paraquat is extensively used in the South as an agent for suicides. Jeyaratnam J . , supra note 52 at 140. 6 2 Organophosphates may account for as many as 70% of occupational pesticide poisonings. In "Environmental Change and Human Health," supra note 32 at 44. 6 3 For further details see Emden H. and Peakall D., supra note 2 at 17. 6 4 Since they are responsible for the majority of global poisonings, this chapter focuses mainly on insecticides. However, not only insecticides are hazardous. Captafol, hexachlorobenzene (extremely hazardous) and pentachlorophenol (highly hazardous), for example, are three fungicides included in the Rotterdam Convention. In addition, the classifications of carbamates, organochlorines, organophosphates and pyrethroids are also valid for other substances: some fungicides are carbamates, acaricides may be organochlorines, herbicides can be organophosphates, etc. See Alan Wood, "Compendium of Pesticide Common Names," 1995-2003, U.K., online: <http://www.hclrss.demon.co.uk/summ groups.html>. 6 5 Organophosphates are a type of organophosphorous compounds. However, many authors use these two terms interchangeably. 6 6 See Hough, "The Global Politics of Pesticides," supra note 51 at 4. 6 7 See Dhaliwal & Pathak, supra note 59 at 7. fa i lure. Para th ion , monoc ro tophos and phospham idon are e x a m p l e s of organophosphar .es. Cer ta in fo rmu la t ions of these th ree pest ic ides are sub jec t to the PIC procedure under the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , and monoc ro tophos was added a lso as a pest ic ide in the in ter im p r o c e d u r e . 6 9 C a r b a m a t e s , d i scove red in the ear ly 1950s , are a lso nerve po isons . Most of t h e m are tox ic to m a m m a l s but they are usual ly exc re ted rapid ly . If exposu re e n d s , cho l ines te rase inhibi t ion reverses p rompt ly . In non- fa ta l cases , the i l lness genera l l y lasts less than 24 h o u r s . 7 0 C a r b a m a t e s have shor t to m e d i u m pers is tence , they are b iodegradab le and do not accumu la te in fat ty t i ssues . Effects of po ison ing inc lude musc le w e a k n e s s , d i zz iness , sa l i va t ion , n a u s e a , vom i t i ng , abdomina l pa in , d ia r rhoea , b lurred v i s i on , lack of coord ina t ion , musc le tw i tch ing , and s lur red s p e e c h . More ser ious ef fects inc lude c o m a , se i zu res , hypoton ic i ty , hyper tens ion and card io resp i ra tory d e p r e s s i o n . 7 1 C a r b o f u r a n , a ld icarb , and carbory l are e x a m p l e s of c a r b a m a t e s . 7 2 The o ther two ca tegor ies of insect ic ides are o rganoch lo r ines and pyre thro ids . Organoch lo r i nes , l ike o rganophospha tes , were d iscovered dur ing Wor ld W a r II. DDT, the most popu la r of these c o m p o u n d s , w a s d iscovered in 1 9 3 9 , and due to its low cost , broad s p e c t r u m , se lec t ive tox ic i ty , ease of fo rmula t ion and pers is tence (which means less app l ica t ions are needed ) , it became the mos t w ide ly used insect ic ide eve r manu fac tu red . A ld r i n , d ie ld r in , heptach lor , and ch lo rdane are o ther e x a m p l e s of o rganoch lo r ines . Like DDT, they are all regu la ted by both the Ro t te rdam and the S t o c k h o l m conven t ions , whi le end r i n , t oxaphene and mi rex are regulated only by S t o c k h o l m , and HCH on ly by R o t t e r d a m . 7 4 A l though they are not acute ly tox ic , o rganoch lo r ines tend to b ioaccumu la te and pers is t in the env i ronmen t for a long per iod of t ime (2 -15 y e a r s ) . A s a resul t , they m a y even tua l l y have a negat ive effect on the env i ronmen t or h u m a n hea l th . A l though the See U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs, "Recognition and Management of Pesticide Poisonings," 5 t h ed., by Drs. J. Routt Reigart & James R. Roberts, (Washington D.C., 1999) at 34 and 38. 6 9 Monocrotophos was added as a pesticide in October 2002, as only certain formulations of the pesticide are included in Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention. Once the treaty enters into force, Parties will decide whether they want to include the pesticide in Annex III. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 7. 7 0 See "Carbofuran. Pesticide Information Profile," Extension Toxicology Network (Oregon University State Archives, September 1993), online: <http://ace.orst.edu/info/extoxnet/pips/carbofur.htm>. 7 1 See Reigart & Roberts, supra note 68 at 49. 7 2 According to WHO classification, aldicarb is "extremely hazardous' (class la), and carboryl and pimiricarb are 'moderately hazardous' (II). These classifications are related to concentration levels and a weaker formulation moves an active ingredient into a lower hazard classification. Pesticide Action Network U.K., "The List of Lists," Briefing 3 (November 2001) at 3, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/briefing/ListofL.pdf>. 7 3 David Dent, "Integrated Pest Management," 1 s t ed. (London; New York: Chapman & Hall, 1995) at 48. 7 4 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Annex III, and Stockholm Convention, supra note 13 Annexes A and B. most conc lus ive s tud ies refer to an ima ls , ep idemio log ica l s tud ies have found an assoc ia t ion be tween exposu re to o rganoch lo r ines and var ious cancers such as l y m p h o m a , l e u k e m i a , l ung , pancreat ic and breast c a n c e r . 7 5 Whi le tes ts are not conc lus i ve , there is a lso ev idence that o rganoch lo r ines affect the h u m a n i m m u n e s y s t e m . Th is might be espec ia l l y t rue for the rural S o u t h , where i m m u n e responses are a l ready w e a k e n e d by ma lnu t r i t i on , con tamina ted wa te r supp l ies , lack of san i ta t ion and poor hous ing c o n d i t i o n s . 7 6 Syn the t i c pyre thro ids are the last ma jo r g roup of insect ic ides. Most of t h e m have low m a m m a l i a n tox ic i ty and are re lat ive ly safe for the spray opera to rs dur ing mix ing and a p p l i c a t i o n . 7 7 Th is is largely because they are rapid ly degraded by m a m m a l i a n l iver e n z y m e s , and because they are part ly exc re ted by the k i d n e y . 7 8 The p rob lem wi th these subs tances is that the cost of impor t ing t h e m can be exorb i tan t for deve lop ing count r ies , g i ven the i r l imi ted access to fore ign cur rency . The use of pyre thro id es ters for ma la r ia con t ro l , for ins tance , is severa l t imes pr ic ier than that of DDT. S o m e s tud ies indicate that pyre thro ids cost n ine t imes as m u c h as D D T ; 7 9 o thers sugges t that DDT is three to f ive t imes c h e a p e r . 8 0 Both ca lcu la t ions , desp i te the gap be tween t h e m , indicate a subs tan t ia l d i f ference of pr ice. A s noted before , h u m a n pest ic ide- re la ted po ison ings are usua l ly re lated to the use of insect ic ides. Herb ic ides genera l l y have low tox ic i ty to w a r m b looded an ima l s , inc luding h u m a n s . Howeve r , s o m e of t h e m can be ve ry tox ic . Th is is the case of paraquat , one of the mos t w ide ly used herb ic ides in deve lop ing count r ies . H igh acute exposu re to paraqua t can cause lung conges t i on , convu ls ions , incoord ina t ion , k idney fa i lure, lung so res , l iver in jury , and death by respi ra tory fa i lure. Con t inued exposu re may cause noseb leed , sk in b l i s te r ing , u lcerat ion or pee l ing , necros is (cell dea th in sk in t i ssue) , t empora ry nai l loss , b l is ter ing in scrota l a reas ( f rom leak ing sp rayers soak ing t rousers ) , b lephar i t is (eyel id i n f l ammat ion ) , con junct iv i t i s , and u lcerat ions or kera tos is (war t - l ike g rowth) of the 7 5 "World Resources 1998-1999," supra note 32 at 45. A seven-year epidemiological study conducted through the Long Island Breast Cancer Study Project found no evidence between organochlorines and the elevated rates of breast cancer in Long Island. However, the study states that it is possible that breast cancer risk in some individuals be associated with organochlorine exposures because of individual differences in metabolism and ability to repair DNA damage. See Cat Lazaroff, "U.S.A.: Study Finds No Link Between Organochlorines and Breast Cancer," Environment News Service (6 August 2002), online: <http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PND.jsp?articleid=3470> 7 6 This is also valid for some organophosphates, carbamates and metal-based pesticides (e.g. mercury compounds). See "World Resources 1998-1999," supra note 32 at 45. 7 7 See Dent, supra note 73 at 48. 7 8 See Reigart & Roberts, supra note 68 at 87. 79 See Ecobichon, supra note 50 at 28. 8 0 Tom Carter, "DDT: Malaria's Answer in Africa?" The Washington Times (6 June 2002). co rnea . Desp i te the p rob lems it causes in deve lop ing count r ies , paraquat is not sub jec t to the PIC p rocedure , pr imar i ly because mos t ser ious paraqua t - re la ted po ison ings are se l f - i nduced , and because mos t of the paraquat bans do not mee t the cr i ter ia es tab l i shed f irst by the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m , and then by A n n e x II of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n - 8 3 e . g . , g o v e r n m e n t s did not car ry out a comp le te risk e v a l u a t i o n . 8 4 The g o v e r n m e n t of S w i t z e r l a n d , home of paraquat 's pr incipal m a n u f a c t u r e r , 8 5 recent ly announced that it wou ld suppor t efforts to add the pest ic ide to A n n e x III of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on to protect deve lop ing count r ies f rom its harmfu l c o n s e q u e n c e s . 8 6 2.2.2.2. Impact of hazardous pesticides on the environment Each yea r , an es t ima ted 2.5 mi l l ion tonnes of pest ic ides are app l ied to agr icu l tura l c rops wor ldw ide . F rom th is a m o u n t , less than 0 . 3 % is es t ima ted to reach the in tended target , and the rema in ing 9 9 . 7 % goes into the env i ronmen t . The env i ronmen ta l impact of pest ic ides depends on the i r tox ico log ica l proper t ies and on the deg ree of the exposu re . Once app l i ed , they m a y runoff into sur face water , leach into g roundwa te r , vo la t i l ise into the a i r , be taken up by p lants or soi l o rgan i sms , or s tay in the s o i l . 8 7 A s por t rayed by Rache l Ca rson in her renowned book "S i l en t S p r i n g , " res idues of insect ic ides get t ing into bod ies of wa te r can be tox ic to aquat ic o rgan i sms . In add i t i on , 'po l lu t ion of the g roundwa te r is pol lut ion of wa te r e v e r y w h e r e , ' 8 8 s ince excep t for wha t en ters s t r eams d i rect ly as rain or sur face runoff, all the running water on the ear th 's sur face was once g roundwate r . Th is is a ser ious concern if one bears in m ind that g roundwate r is a ma jo r source of d r ink ing water in m a n y c o u n t r i e s 8 9 and that one - tab lespoon of concen t ra ted pest ic ide may be enough to pol lute the water supp ly of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 people for a d a y . 9 0 See Madeley, supra note 60 at 3-5. 8 2 Besides being a cause of accidental poisoning, paraquat is extensively used in the South as an agent for suicides. See Jeyaratnam, supra note 52 at 140. 8 3 For a review of the procedure for adding new hazardous chemicals or pesticides to the PIC list under the voluntary PIC system and under the Rotterdam Convention please see note 466. 8 4 Information kindly provided by Mr. Achim Halpaap, Senior Programme Coordinator, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and Ms. Barbara Dinham, Programme Director, Pesticide Action Network (PAN) U.K. 8 5 Syngenta's Gramoxone (paraquat) sales were an estimated $430 million in 2001. Jon Cox "Swiss want big Syngenta chemical on UN control list" Reuters News Service (5 December 2002). 8 6 See "Statement of the Federal Council," 11 November 2002 (answer to the Motion of MP Joseph Zisyadis), posted by the Berne Declaration (a Swiss environmental organization), online: <http://www.evb.ch/index.cfm?page_id = 1832&archive=none>. 8 7 See Hayo M.G. Van Der Werf, "Assessing the Impact of Pesticides in the Environment," (1996) 60 Agriculture Ecosystems & Environment 81 at 81-84. 8 8 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962) at 42. 8 9 See Van Der Werf, supra note 87 at 82-83. 9 0 The Pesticides Trust Review (December 1998) at 3, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/Reviews/review98.pdf>. [The Pesticides Trust is now the Pesticide Action Network U.K.] Pest ic ides can a lso pol lute the so i l , wh ich they can en ter th rough di rect app l ica t ion when they drift af ter sp ray i ng , by a tmospher i c fa l lout , or f rom crop res idues , leaf fa l l , or root depos i t s . Pers is tent pest ic ides such as o rganoch lo r ines are espec ia l l y p rob lemat ic , as they m a y leach into wa te r and ha rm long- te rm soi l fert i l i ty or po ison or affect the behav iour or reproduct ion of soi l o r g a n i s m s , amongs t o t h e r s . 9 1 Pest ic ides m a y a lso cont r ibute to a i r po l lu t ion, w h e n they en ter the a tmosphe re as a resul t of drift dur ing app l ica t ion or subsequen t vo la t i l izat ion into the ai r f rom so i l , p lants , sur face wa te rs , or by wind e ros ion . Vo la t i l i za t ion can cont inue for severa l days or weeks af ter t rea tmen t , and even mon ths in the case of par t icu lar ly pers is tent pest ic ides (e .g . o r g a n o c h l o r i n e s ) . 9 2 O rganoch lo r ines such as a ld r in , ch lo rdane , DDT, d ie ld r in , heptach lor , mi rex and t oxaphene can t rave l long d is tances th rough cyc les of evapora t ion and a tmospher i c cyc l ing and depos i t i on , and w ind and wa te r can car ry t h e m both reg ional ly and g loba l ly . They are a lso vo lat i le at w a r m tempera tu res and condense at coo ler t empera tu res , reach ing the i r h ighest concen t ra t ions in the coo ler reg ions of the wor ld (Nor thern lat i tudes and high a l t i t u d e s ) . 9 3 Th is is why in C a n a d a the h ighest concent ra t ions of POPs are found in the Arc t i c , Grea t Lakes and S t . Lawrence bas in , and levels of cer ta in POPs in breast mi lk have been found up to nine t imes h igher in s o m e Inuit w o m e n than in w o m e n who l ive in sou thern C a n a d a . 9 4 S ince m a n y o rganoch lo r ines pers is t in the env i ronmen t and accumu la te in the food c h a i n , they m a y a lso even tua l l y d is turb wi ld l i fe. DDT, for ins tance , causes eggshe l l th inn ing , reproduct ive d is rupt ion and mor ta l i ty in predatory b i rds such as bald eag les and peregr ine fa lcons , wh ich may feed on f ish that are at the end of a long cha in in wh ich DDT has accumu la ted ove r t i m e . 9 5 A l s o , exposu re to h igh a m o u n t s of a ldr in and d i e l d r i n 9 6 af fects the nervous s y s t e m of an ima l s , and con t inuous oral exposu re to lower levels of these subs tances cou ld affect the i r l iver and dec rease the i r abi l i ty to f ight i n fec t i ons . 9 7 Organophospha tes and c a r b a m a t e s , in tu rn , affect the nervous s y s t e m of m a m m a l s and birds th rough the inhibi t ion of the acety lch lor ina te e n z y m e . C a s e s of bird mor ta l i ty See Hough, "The Global Politics of Pesticides" supra note 51 at 67-69. 9 2 Volatilization is the physico-chemical process by which a compound is transferred to the gas phase. See Carole Bedos etal., "Mass transfer of pesticides into the atmosphere by volatilization from soils and plants: overview," (2002) 22 Agronomie 21 at 22. 9 3 See Resource Futures International, supra note 11. 9 4 See Environment Canada, "The Green Lane: Taking Action on POPs," February 2002, online: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pops/brochure_e.htm>. 9 5 See Guruswamy & Hendricks, supra note 30 at 196-198. 9 6 Because aldrin readily converts to dieldrin in plants and animals, aldrin residues are usually found in small amounts. See Resource Futures International, supra note 11. 9 7 U.S., Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, "Toxic FAQs about Aldrin and Dieldrin" (September 2002), online: <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsl.html>. invo lve the o rganophospha tes d iaz inon , fen th ion , para th ion and p h o s p h a m i d o n (Nor th A m e r i c a ) , ca rbopheno th ion , and ch lo ro fenv inphos (Europe) , monoc ro tophos and ch lorpyr i fos (Argen t ina) . A m o n g the c a r b a m a t e s , carbo fu ran has caused the mos t p rob lems . The pest ic ide was invo lved in the death of 10 ,000 A m e r i c a n robins on berry f ie lds in F lo r ida , and of 500 grey lag geese in S c o t l a n d , where mor ta l i ty was conf i rmed by d i rect coun ts . Ye t , the p rob lem could be more ser ious . Acco rd ing to a 1989 es t ima te by the U S EPA, be tween 1 and 2 mi l l ion birds die each y e a r in the U .S . due to carbo fu ran a l o n e . 9 8 O rganophospha tes may a lso have an effect on the i m m u n e s y s t e m of m a m m a l s . Pa ra th ion , for ins tance , de lays an t ibody p roduc t ion , whi le con t inuous exposu re to ma la th ion can depress di f ferent i m m u n e r e s p o n s e s . 9 9 Syn the t i c pyre thro ids , the last ma jo r c lass of insect ic ides, have genera l l y low m a m m a l i a n tox ic i ty . Howeve r , they can be ve ry tox ic to benef ic ia l insects (e .g . b e e s ) , f ish and aquat ic a r th ropods (e .g . c rabs and sh r imp ) . They are a lso haza rdous to the breed ing habi tat of wa te r fow l . A s tudy in the Canad ian prair ies showed a subs tan t ia l dec rease in inver tebra te spec ies d ivers i ty due to syn the t ic pyre thro ids , wh ich impede d u c k s to obta in enough food to ra ise norma l b roods. A s for herb ic ides , they have the abi l i ty to a l ter habi ta ts and the reby to d is rupt wi ld l i fe. Di f ferent s tud ies in the U.K. sugges t , for e x a m p l e , that the use of herb ic ides has cont r ibu ted to the dec l ine of di f ferent birds spec ies (e .g . g rey par t r idge, corn bun t ing , s k y l a r k ) . 1 0 0 2.2.2.3. The circle of poison: a concern of the North A s exp la ined ear l ier in th is chap te r , acute pes t ic ide- re la ted po ison ings are a ma jo r p rob lem for deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 1 0 1 A l though indust r ia l ised count r ies have largely cont ro l led acute po ison ings , po ison ings m a y sti l l occur , resul t ing f rom exposu re to low levels of pest ic ides ove r a long per iod of t ime . Tha t exposu re usua l ly ar ises f rom env i ronmen ta l pol lut ion and f rom pes t i c ide -con tamina ted f o o d . 1 0 2 The p h e n o m e n o n See Emden & Peakall, supra note 2 at 18-19. For Argentina see Pfa Iolster & Santiago Krapovickas "Los Plaguicidas en Uso en La Argentina: Riesgos para las Aves Silverstres," (1999) Proyecto Pampas Argentinas, 2 Temas de Naturaleza y Conservacion at 7. The study also blames carbofuran for bird mortality in Argentina. 9 9 See "World Resources 1998-1999," supra note 32 at 45. 1 0 0 For details see Emden & Peakall, supra note 2 at 20-21. 1 0 1 This does not mean that long-term pesticide exposure should not also be a matter of concern for the South. For instance, organochlorine residues have been reported in various foodstuffs and human milk in developing countries, suggesting that nursing infants are often ingesting residues at levels many times greater than the acceptable daily intakes proposed by FAO. See G. Forget, T. Goodman & A. de Villiers eds., Impact of pesticide use on health in developing countries: proceedings of a symposium held in Ottawa, Canada, September 17-20, 1990 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1993) at 8. 1 0 2 See Jeyaratnam, supra note 52 at 139-140. known as the 'c i rc le of po i son ' great ly cont r ibu tes to the second p rob lem. In the circ le of po i son , pest ic ides that deve loped count r ies have banned or seve re l y restr ic ted for domes t i c use return to t h e m as res idues (at unacceptab le levels) in agr icu l tura l products impor ted f rom the deve lop ing w o r l d . 1 0 3 In the last d e c a d e , for ins tance , there were more than 14 ,000 e m b a r g o e s (for a va lue of a round US $ 9 5 mi l l ion) of products being expor ted f rom Lat in A m e r i c a and the Car ibbean to the U . S . , due to excess i ve pest ic ides r e s i d u e s . 1 0 4 Sim i la r l y , in an ana lys is based on compu te r i zed records f rom the Food and Drug Admin is t ra t i on ' s (FDA) pest ic ide moni tor ing p rogram for the yea rs 1992 and 1 9 9 3 , the Env i ronmen ta l Work ing Group (an env i ronmen ta l research inst i tute) ident i f ied i l legal res idues on 5.6 percent of the 14 ,923 s a m p l e s ana l yzed (both nat ional ly g rown and impor ted ) , and 7.4 per cent for impor ted f o o d . 1 0 5 Th is p rob lem m a y espec ia l l y affect ch i l d ren , who can be at g rea ter r isk than adul ts because they of ten c o n s u m e more per body we igh t of cer ta in foods such as f ru i ts , wh ich are l ikely to conta in pest ic ide res idues , and because they are undergo ing rapid t issue g row th , a l lowing grea ter concent ra t ion of these subs tances in their s y s t e m s . 1 0 6 Because it wou ld requi re test ing pract ical ly all impor ted food , cont ro l l ing the circ le of po ison at home is highly p rob lemat ic . Even in the U . S . , the Food and Drug Admin is t ra t i on (FDA) tests on ly about one percent of all of the coun t ry ' s f resh food , whe the r g rown nat iona l ly or impo r ted , f inding excess ive res idues in two to f ive percent of these s a m p l e s . 1 0 7 In add i t i on , accord ing to the Env i ronmenta l Work ing G r o u p , s ince 1980 the Many pesticides that developed countries have banned or severely restricted for use in their territory are accepted as residues in the products they import, provided that they are below certain levels. See e.g. EC, Council Directive 76/895/EEC of 23 November 1976 related to the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on fruit and vegetables [1976] O.J.L. 340/26, EC, Council Directive 86/362/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on cereals [1986] O.J.L. 221/37; and EC, Council Directive 90/642/EEC of 27 November 1990 fixing the maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on certain products of plant origin, including fruit and vegetables [1990] O.J.L. 350/71, in force within the EU, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. Chapter 9 (1996) which limits pesticide residues on food in the United States, online: <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/index/ffdc_act/ffdcatoc.html>. 1 0 4 See Lori Ann Thurp "Cultivos Nuevos, Dilemas Viejos: Oportunidades y Retos en la agroexportaciôn no tradicional en Latinoamérica," based on "New Harvest, Old Problems: Feeding the Global Supermarket," (1994) 28:3 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas online: <http://www.rimisp.cl/documentos/web/99/>. 1 0 5 Illegal pesticides include: pesticides which have no tolerance for the crops on which they are detected (the pesticide was used illegally for that crop); pesticides found at levels exceeding legal limits (they were allowed for use on the crop but were found at levels exceeding the legal maximum level); banned pesticides that persist in the environment found at levels exceeding FDA-established limits (e.g. DDT, heptachlor, dieldrin and endrin); pesticides with no tolerance (not allowed in that crop) that are identified at levels too small to be quantified by FDA methods; and pesticides banned for use on some or all crops in the U.S. See Environmental Working Group, "Forbidden Fruit. Illegal Pesticides in the U.S. Food Supply" (February 1995), online: <http://www.ewg.org/reports/fruit/Contents.html> (in Executive Summary). 1 0 6 See "World Resources 1998-1999," supra note 32 at 46. 1 0 7 Robin L. Cowling, "Pic, Pops and the Mai Apocalypse: our Environmental Future as a Function of Investor's Rights and Chemical Management Initiatives" (1999) 21 Hous. J. Int'l L. 231 at 3. U.S . Gene ra l Accoun t ing Off ice (GAO) has pub l ished 22 repor ts deta i l ing the sho r t com ings of the FDA pest ic ide mon i to r ing p r o g r a m . 1 0 8 The circ le of po ison has mot iva ted deve loped count r ies to regu la te the expor t of tox ic pest ic ides to deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 1 0 9 Howeve r , because the ci rc le of po ison is pr imar i ly re lated to pers is tent pest ic ides such as o rganoch lo r ines , the focus of act ion (e .g . env i ronmen ta l c a m p a i g n s , e m b a r g o e s of impor ted produc ts , the s ign ing of the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on POPs) has been on such pest ic ides. Th is has led fa rmers in the S o u t h to use more o rganophospha tes and c a r b a m a t e s , wh ich are less l ikely to leave a res idue but are more acute ly tox ic than o r g a n o c h l o r i n e s . 1 1 0 A s exp la ined ear l ier in th is chapter , o rganophospha tes and c a r b a m a t e s d e c o m p o s e more qu ick ly and thus retain lower levels of res idue , but they present a m u c h h igher heal th risk to f a rmers than do o rganoch lo r ines . The circle of po i son , the re fo re , does not prov ide enough mot iva t ion for deve loped count r ies to contro l or p revent the expor t of pest ic ides they have banned or severe ly restr ic ted for reasons of the env i r onmen t or heal th to deve lop ing count r ies . What is more , it m a y prov ide an incent ive for deve loped count r ies to p romote the use of more acute ly tox ic pest ic ides in the S o u t h in o rder to p revent impor ted food f rom hav ing pest ic ide res idues at unaccep tab le leve ls . T h u s , whi le the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on has s t rong cont ro ls on product ion and use of pers is tent pest ic ides such as DDT, a ld r in , and ch lo rdane , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on mere ly sets a pr ior consen t s y s t e m that u l t imate ly va l ida tes doub le s tanda rds , i .e., the expor t by count r ies of chem ica l s banned or severe ly restr ic ted for domes t i c use . T h u s , one cou ld af f i rm that the spir i t of the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion is cons is tent wi th the spir i t of the laws that have a l lowed Nor thern ag rochemica l corpora t ions to expor t haza rdous chemica l s to the S o u t h , wh ich are p resented in the next sec t ion . 2.3. Northern legislation regulating the export of hazardous chemicals Deve loped count r ies have banned or severe ly restr ic ted the use of m a n y haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides because of the r isks they pose to h u m a n heal th or the See Environmental Working Group, supra note 105 (in FDA Monitoring and Enforcement). 1 0 9 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, refers to growing public concern about pesticide residues in imported foods as one of causes for revising its Pesticide Export Policy in 1993. See EPA Final Pesticide Export Policy Statement Rule, 58:31 Fed. Reg., 9062 (1993) at 9063. [hereinafter EPA Export Policy 1993]. 1 1 0 See James Colopy "Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregistered and Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States" (1995) 13 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 167 at 183. env i ronmen t . A t the s a m e t ime , they have a l lowed the expor t of those subs tances to o ther count r ies , put t ing o ther people 's heal th and env i r onmen t at r isk. Th is sect ion wil l focus on the expor t leg is lat ion of Wes te rn Europe and the U . S . , where al l the cur ren t ag rochemica l compan ies that contro l the g lobal pest ic ides marke t are b a s e d . 2.3.1. The European Union In the European Un ion , the expor t and impor t of haza rdous chemica l s is regu la ted by Regu la t ion No. 3 0 4 / 2 0 0 3 , 1 1 1 wh ich imp lemen ts the text of the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion and the in ter im PIC procedure as es tab l i shed in the Reso lu t ion on in ter im a r rangemen ts laid down in the Final Ac t of the D ip lomat ic Con fe rence wh ich adop ted the conven t i on . The new regula t ion rep laces Counc i l Regula t ion EEC No. 2 4 5 5 / 9 2 , wh ich had made the vo lun ta ry PIC procedure of the FAO Code of Conduc t and U N E P London Gu ide l ines manda to ry wi th in the c o m m u n i t y . The regu la t ion has three basic func t ions : a) to es tab l ish an expor t not i f icat ion s c h e m e for chem ica l s banned or severe ly restr ic ted wi th in the C o m m u n i t y ; b) to imp lemen t the PIC procedure wi th in the EC for those chemica ls sub jec t to it under the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on or under the in ter im procedure ( l isted in Part 3 of A n n e x I), and those qual i fy ing for PIC not i f icat ion ( l isted in Part 2 of A n n e x I ) ; and c) to gua ran tee that prov is ions on c lass i f i ca t ion , packag ing and label l ing that app ly wi th in the c o m m u n i t y a lso be app l ied to hazardous subs tances expor ted to th i rd count r ies ( regard less of whe the r the impor t ing count ry is a party to the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n ) . 1 1 2 In the case of chemica ls that have been banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted wi th in the EC for heal th or env i ronmen ta l reasons , expor ts to th i rd count r ies are a l lowed as long as the expor te r not i f ies its own gove rnmen t ' s des igna ted nat ional author i ty (DNA) of the f irst expor t at least 30 days before it takes p lace. The expor te r ' s D N A mus t then noti fy the expor t to the appropr ia te author i t ies of the impor t ing coun t ry , at least 15 days pr ior to the expor t . Therea f te r , the expor te r mus t noti fy the f irst expor t of the chemica l each ca lendar y e a r to the D N A no later than 15 days pr ior to the e x p o r t . 1 1 3 In the case of the subs tances inc luded in the PIC procedure (and those that have been banned or seve re l y 1 1 1 EC, Regulation 304/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals [2003] O J . L. 063/1. 1 1 2 See Ibid. Arts. 7, 13 and 16. 1 1 3 Ibid. Art. 7. restr ic ted wi th in the C o m m u n i t y and qual i fy for PIC no t i f i ca t i on ) , 1 1 4 impor t ing count r ies mus t have g iven the i r consent for the expor t to occur . If an impor t ing count ry has not g iven a response to the impor t , the chemica l shou ld not be expor ted un less expl ic i t consen t of the impor t ing count ry was sought and obta ined by the expo r te r or , in the case of PIC chem ica l s , the latest c i rcu lar issued by the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on Secre ta r ia t (wi th in format ion on dec is ions on impor ts) ind icates that the impor t ing count ry has g iven its consen t to impor t that c h e m i c a l . Notab ly , the new di rect ive does not reproduce ano the r excep t ion that was inc luded in Counc i l Regula t ion EEC No. 2 4 5 5 / 9 2 : when the chemica l is reg is tered in the impor t ing count ry or it has been used or impor ted in the past . Th is is a s ign i f icant imp rovemen t because , as Chap te r 4 exp la ins , th is excep t ion guaran tees that t rade in haza rdous chemica ls will cont inue un less impor t ing count r ies ef fect ive ly par t ic ipate in the PIC procedure . 1 1 5 Despi te this imp rovemen t , EU legis lat ion a l lows its m e m b e r s to expor t chemica l s that are banned or seve re l y restr ic ted wi th in the c o m m u n i t y to third count r ies , and a l though s o m e m e m b e r s ( i .e. S w e d e n and D e n m a r k ) have ca l led for a ban on the expor t of chemica l s banned in the count ry of p roduc t ion , the proposa l has not s u c c e e d e d . 1 1 6 2.3.2. Switzerland In S w i t z e r l a n d , there is no speci f ic prov is ion regulat ing the expor t of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides to o ther count r ies . A s a resul t , the expor t of subs tances that have been banned or seve re l y restr ic ted domest i ca l l y to protect the env i r onmen t or h u m a n hea l th , or wh ich have never been reg is te red , is permi t ted . More impor tan t ly , there is no ob l igat ion on the part of the expor te r to noti fy the impor t ing g o v e r n m e n t of such expor ts . Even s o , the product ion of a number of subs tances is prohib i ted under the 1986 " O r d o n n a n c e sur les Subs tances Dangereuses pour I' E n v i r o n n e m e n t " (Ord inance on subs tances dange rous to the env i r onmen t ) , wh ich m e a n s that they cou ld not be expor ted to o ther c o u n t r i e s . 1 1 7 i i H See Ibid. Art. 13 1 1 5 Please see section 4.4.1. in Chapter 4, Council Regulation EEC No. 2455/92, supra note 3 Art. 5.5, and Ibid. Art. 13(6). 1 1 6 See "Conference Focuses on International Trade in Dangerous Chemicals" Pesticide Action Network North America Updates Service (PANUPS) (21 July 1995). 1 1 7 These substances include, amongst others: HCH, aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, chlordane, heptachlor, HCB (except Lindane, which can be manufactured), DDT, DDD, DDE, PCBs and PCTs. (Almost all of these substances are organochlorines, which are not acutely toxic to human health). See Ordonnance Sur les Substances Dangereuses pour l'Environnement, 9 June 1986, Bulletin Officiel (B.O.) 814.013, Art. 11 and Annexes 3 and 4, online: <http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/814_013/index.html>. Recogn iz ing the need to ha rmon ise its legis lat ion wi th that of the EU and to imp lemen t the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion in the fu ture, the S w i s s Par l iament adop ted the "Lo i Fédérale sur la Protect ion cont re les Subs tances et les Préparat ions D a n g e r e u s e s " (Federa l Law on protect ion aga ins t hazardous subs tances and fo rmu la t ions) in D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 . Th is new law wil l rep lace the "Lo i Fédérale sur le C o m m e r c e de T o x i q u e s " (Federa l law on the c o m m e r c e of tox i cs ) , in force s ince 1969 , wh ich does not add ress the in ternat ional t rade in subs tances haza rdous to hea l th . Ar t ic le 19 d) of the new law wil l g ive the Federa l Counc i l the power to regulate the expor t of subs tances haza rdous to heal th by m e a n s of o r d i n a n c e . 1 1 8 2.3.3. The United States In the Uni ted S ta tes , the expor t of industr ia l chemica ls fal ls under the Tox ic S u b s t a n c e s Cont ro l Ac t ( T S C A ) . Sec t ion 12 (b) of the T S C A requi res an expor t not i f icat ion of subs tances or m ix tu res in a n u m b e r of cases . If tes t ing of the subs tance or mix tu re has been requ i red under sec t ions 4 ( the expor t p resents an un reasonab le heal th or env i ronmen ta l r isk wi th in the U . S . , e .g . to wo rke rs ) , or 5(b) (it concerns a new chemica l or a new use ) , the expor te r mus t notify the EPA of its expor t or intent to expor t . The EPA mus t then noti fy the gove rnmen t of the impor t ing count ry of the avai lab i l i ty of the da ta rece ived . In add i t i on , the expor te r mus t notify the EPA of an expor t or intent to expor t in the case of a chemica l sub jec t to regulatory o rder or a c t i o n . 1 1 9 In all cases , the expor te r can noti fy the EPA after the expor t has taken p lace. T h u s , no pr ior consent f rom the impor te r is requ i red . A s for pes t ic ides , the Federa l Insect ic ide , Fungic ide and Rodent ic ide Act (F IFRA) a l lows the expor t of unreg is te red pest ic ides ( i .e. banned or never reg is tered) as long as s o m e in format ion is prov ided to the i m p o r t e r . 1 2 0 The act bas ica l ly has three requ i remen ts : 1) the expor te r mus t label its product in a par t icu lar manne r , inc luding a not ice - i f app l i cab le - that the pest ic ide is not reg is tered for use in the U . S . ; 2) pr ior to sh ipp ing the pes t ic ide , the expor te r mus t notify the U .S . EPA that it has not i f ied the fore ign purchaser See Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse, Loi fédérale du 21 mars 1969 sur le commerce des toxiques, 21 March 1969, B.O. 813.0, online: <http://www.admm.ch/ch/f/rs/c813 Q.html> and Loi fédérale sur la protection contre les substances et les preparations dangereuses, 15 December 2000, B.O. 99.090, online: <http://www.baq.admin.ch/chemikal/chemq/f/index.htm>. 1 1 9 For further details see Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976) at § 2611 (exports). See also Ray M. Druley & Girard L. Ordway, The Toxic Substances Control Act, Rev ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1981) at 396. 1 2 0 See FIFRA, supra note 3 at § 136o. that the products sh ipped are not reg is tered for domes t i c u s e ; 1 2 1 and 3) the U .S . g o v e r n m e n t mus t noti fy the impor t ing count ry when it m a k e s a subs tan t ia l change in its regulat ion of a cer ta in p e s t i c i d e . 1 2 2 To s u m up , E U , Sw iss and U .S . law sanc t ion the expor t of chemica l s banned or never reg is tered domes t i ca l l y for reasons of the env i ronmen t or hea l th . Th is has a l lowed the top s ix ag rochemica l co rpora t ions , based in G e r m a n y , Sw i t ze r l and , and the Uni ted S ta tes , to expor t haza rdous pest ic ides to deve lop ing count r ies , where m a n y users are unt ra ined and poor ly educa ted , protect ive c lo th ing is too expens i ve or uncomfo r tab le , and rural c o m m u n i t i e s have poor access to med ica l ca re , good wash ing faci l i t ies or safe s to rage a r e a s . 1 2 3 It shou ld therefore c o m e as no surpr ise that about 9 9 % of al l po ison ings occur in deve lop ing count r ies even though more than 8 0 % of the wor ld 's pest ic ides are app l ied in indust r ia l ised c o u n t r i e s . 1 2 4 In spi te of th is known fact , doub le s tandards are sti l l in p lace , and the expor t of hazardous chemica l s is sti l l a c o m m o n pract ice . The reasons regula tors have prov ided to sus ta in t h e m fol low. 2.3.4. Justifications to maintain pesticide export double standards In its 1993 Pest ic ide Expor t Pol icy (which clar i f ies the F IFRA) , the U .S . Env i ronmenta l Protect ion A g e n c y (EPA) prov ided four a r g u m e n t s to jus t i fy the expor t of unreg is te red pest ic ides (banned or never reg is tered) to o ther c o u n t r i e s . 1 2 5 First , the U .S . is on ly one expor te r in the marke t and its uni lateral prohib i t ion of cer ta in expor ts wil l not s top the use of such products in o ther count r ies . S e c o n d , it m a y be more ef fect ive to concent ra te on the safe m a n a g e m e n t of all pest ic ides rather than on bann ing cer ta in U .S . pest ic ides f rom in ternat ional t rade. Th i r d , the fact that a pest ic ide is not reg is tered in the U .S . may g ive litt le indicat ion of whe the r it a lso wou ld impose a ser ious heal th or env i ronmen ta l threat when used in o ther count r ies , as the EPA 's regu la tory dec is ions are based upon r i sk /benef i t ana lys is speci f ic to the U .S . Last ly , s o m e pest ic ide producers may not wan t to 1 2 1 The foreign purchaser must sign a statement acknowledging that he understands that the pesticide is not registered for use in the U.S. and cannot be sold in the U.S. under the FIFRA. A copy of that statement has to be transmitted to an appropriate official of the government of the importing country. See FIFRA, Ibid., § 136o. (a)(2). 1 2 2 Michael Holley, "The EPA's Pesticide Export Policy: Why the United States Should Restrict the Export of Unregistered Pesticides to Developing Countries," (2001) 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 340, at 3, and FIFRA, supra note 3. 1 2 3 Pesticide Action Network UK, "Prior Informed Consent," Pest Management Notes No. 5 (November 1998) at 1, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/internat/IPMinDC/pmn5.pdf>. 1 2 4 "International Code on Pesticide Use Adopted in Rome," supra note 55. 1 See EPA Export Policy 1993, supra note 109 at 9063. regis ter the i r product in the U .S . s imp ly because it is mean t to be used in o ther coun t ry and it wou ld not be useful in the domes t i c marke t (e .g . it m a y contro l a pest tha t is not a p rob lem in the U . S . ) . 1 2 6 A s pointed out by Michael Hol ley, these cons idera t ions wou ld be reasonab le if all count r ies had a s imi la r capac i ty to eva lua te the r isks posed by a pest ic ide , and if there were a l te rna t ives ( i .e. a less harmfu l or a non -chemica l so lu t ion) to the subs tance be ing e x p o r t e d . 1 2 7 Howeve r , deve lop ing count r ies genera l l y lack the capac i ty to m a k e the c o m p r e h e n s i v e r i sk /ana lys i s eva lua t ions requi red and to ensure the safe use and d isposa l of the impor ted subs tances , and they often cannot afford sa fer a l te rna t i ves . One shou ld probab ly d is t ingu ish be tween pest ic ides that have been banned to protect h u m a n heal th and the env i r onmen t , and pest ic ides that have never been reg is tered for use in the expor t ing count ry . In the f irst c a s e , expor t shou ld not take p lace , as a mat te r of pr inc ip le . If a subs tance is too haza rdous to be used in the Nor th , it is a lmos t cer ta in that it wil l be at least equa l ly harmfu l when used in the S o u t h . The very fact that the great major i ty of pest ic ide po ison ings occur in deve lop ing count r ies even though the g rea ter users are in the Nor th suppor ts th is asser t i on . Fu r the rmore , subs tances that are not all that haza rdous in the Nor th may pose ser ious p rob lems in the S o u t h . Th is is why on ly deve lop ing count r ies (and count r ies wi th economies in t rans i t ion) can t r igger the process of add ing haza rdous pest ic ide fo rmu la t ions to the PIC list, whi le deve loped count r ies c a n n o t . 1 2 8 In re lat ion to pest ic ides never reg is tered for use in the expor t ing count ry , one cou ld accept that in s o m e cases p roducers m a y not want to reg is ter the i r product s imp ly because it is not useful domes t i ca l l y . However , th is shou ld not e x e m p t the producer f rom the respons ib i l i ty of proper ly tes t ing its product so that it does not pose un reasonab le r isks to h u m a n heal th or the env i ronmen t e l sewhere . A comp le te risk ana lys is shou ld be sti l l carr ied out , tak ing into accoun t the phys ica l and env i ronmen ta l cond i t ions of the count ry where the product wil l be u s e d . Th is v iew is ref lected in the FAO Code of Conduc t , wh ich requires pest ic ide manufacturers to "Ensure that each pesticide and pesticide product is adequately and effectively tested by well recognized procedures and test methods so as to fully evaluate its safety, efficacy and fate with regard to the various anticipated conditions in regions or countries of u s e . " 1 2 9 See Ibid, at 9064. For a further analysis of this issue see Holley, supra note 122 at 4-5. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Art. 6. See Chapter 3 and Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 4.1.1) Cons ider ing that six mul t inat ional corporat ions based in the North control the global pest ic ides marke t , and that all of t hem have severa l subs id iar ies in the S o u t h , the requ i rement that they effect ively test their products under the physica l and env i ronmenta l condi t ions of the regions or countr ies of use does not s e e m too onerous . 2.4. The Global Pesticides Market In Ju ly 2 0 0 1 , seven ag rochemica l corpora t ions cont ro l led abou t 7 3 % of the g lobal pest ic ides marke t , va lued at about U S $ 2 9 , 8 8 0 mi l l ion in 2 0 0 0 . In o rder of s ign i f i cance, these compan ies are S y n g e n t a ( S w i s s / U . K . ) ; Monsan to ( U . S . ) ; Aven t i s ( G e r m a n / F r e n c h ) ; Dow ( U . S . ) ; Baye r ( G e r m a n ) ; Basf ( G e r m a n ) ; and DuPont ( U . S . ) . 1 3 0 Wi th the acqu is i t ion of Aven t i s by Baye r in S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 , the n u m b e r has been reduced to s i x . 1 3 1 Desp i te the i r a d v a n t a g e o u s pos i t ion , these c o m p a n i e s are fac ing a n u m b e r of di f f icul t ies tha t cou ld s igni f icant ly d im in ish the i r prof i ts. One of t h e m is that pest ic ide techno logy has rel ied heav i ly on ch lor ine chemis t ry , wh ich is a target of env i ronmen ta l c a m p a i g n s because of its pers is tence and related h a z a r d s . 1 3 2 There is a lso litt le l ike l ihood of a su rge in novel p r o d u c t s , 1 3 3 wh ich has pushed ag rochemica l c o m p a n i e s to shif t towards gene t i c eng ineer ing in search of new a v e n u e s of prof i tabi l i ty , and poss ib ly a lso to ensure the con t inuous use of pest ic ides in a g r i c u l t u r e . 1 3 4 The long- te rm and cost ly research that these two indust r ies requi re exp la ins the var ious mergers and takeove rs in the ag rochemica l m a r k e t . 1 3 5 1 3 0 See Barbara Dinham "Corporate change" Pesticides News 53 (September 2001) 12 at 12-14, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn53/pn53pl2.htm>. 131 The agreement was signed in September 2001. Bayer, Press Release, "Bayer Acquires Aventis CropScience," (2 October 2001). 1 3 2 See Dinham, "Corporate Change," supra note 130 at 12-14. 133 After more than 50 years of research, most modern synthetic insecticides are still derived from three chemical classes, i.e., organophosphates, carbamates and pyrethroids. Pesticide Action Network UK, "Review of the Global Pesticide Market" Pesticides News 22 (December 1993) 11 at 11, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn22/pn22pl 1. htm >. 1 3 4 Of the top seven (now six) agrochemical companies, four are among the top 10 seed corporations, and the other 2 (BASF and Bayer) have recently expanded into the sector. See Dinham, "Corporate Change," supra note 130 at 12-14. Although the issue of genetically engineered seeds exceeds the scope of this thesis, it is important to mention its role in promoting the use of pesticides. In 1999, nearly 20 years after agrochemical giants had entered the field, 78% of all the genetically engineered crops planted in the world were engineered for herbicide tolerance. These crops are designed to resist the broad-spectrum herbicides of the companies that make them. One example is Monsanto's 'Roundup' transgenic soybeans, which are resistant to its herbicide glyphosate and have pushed sales through the roof. By gaining control of the genetically engineered seed market, agrochemical corporations are linking the seed market inextricably to the pesticides market. See Devlin Kuyek, "Lords of Poison: The Pesticide Cartel," Seedling (Quarterly Newsletter of Genetic Resources Action International -GRAIN) (June 2000). 135 To give a few examples, Syngenta resulted from the merge of Zeneca and Novartis, while Novartis is a merge between Ciba Ceigy and Sandoz (both Swiss). Aventis (now Bayer) was formed by the merge of Rhône-Poulenc (France) and AgrEvo, which in turn was a fusion between Hoechst (EU/German) and Schering (EU/German). Also, the crop protection business of Cyanamid (U.S.) was acquired by BASF. Ano the r di f f icul ty these compan ies face is that regu la t ions requi re t h e m to deve lop new data on subs tances that are a l ready in the marke t . Th is has c rea ted an incent ive for t h e m to drop m a n y of the i r old subs tances , instead of f ind ing suf f ic ient ev idence that they are safe to the env i r onmen t and h u m a n hea l th . T h u s , whi le the EU Counc i l D i rect ive No 9 1 / 4 1 4 requi res c o m p a n i e s to submi t new data on subs tances that are a l ready on the m a r k e t , 1 3 6 c o m p a n i e s are dropp ing m a n y of the i r reg is tered products . Baye r , for ins tance , has indicated that it in tends to drop two- th i rds of its 60 act ive ingred ients cur rent ly marke ted in Europe , phas ing out a round 100 produc ts , whi le Aven t i s (now Bayer ) has been remov ing minor low profit p r o d u c t s . 1 3 7 S im i la r l y , in the Uni ted S ta tes , the FIFRA requi res the EPA to rereg is ter all pest ic ides reg is tered for use pr ior to N o v e m b e r 1 s t , 1984 to ensure that pest ic ide reg is t ra t ions are based on current sc ient i f ic and legal s tandards . In 1 9 8 8 , U .S . Cong ress a m e n d e d FIFRA to acce lera te the process and es tab l i shed a ser ies of dead l ines , and the EPA d iv ided the pest ic ides to be rereg is tered in four l ists. The overa l l t rend for all l ists is a substant ia l reduct ion in the n u m b e r of pest ic ides being suppor ted for rereg is t ra t ion by pest ic ide compan ies . The n u m b e r of cases cons idered for rereg is t ra t ion dec l ined f rom about 600 in 1988 to about 4 0 0 in ear ly 1 9 9 1 . 1 3 8 Th is m e a n s that s o m e potent ia l ly hazardous chemica l s are becoming ' un reg i s t e red ' and could end up in the deve lop ing wor ld , where appropr ia te risk ana lys is to protect the env i ronmen t and h u m a n heal th are un l ike ly to be pe r fo rmed . Pest ic ide compan ies are a lso fac ing s tagnat ing marke ts in North A m e r i c a and E u r o p e . 1 3 9 In response to that , they are seek ing to increase the marke t for ag rochemica l s in deve lop ing count r ies , espec ia l l y big marke ts such as B raz i l , Ch ina and I n d i a . 1 4 0 Th is impl ies not on ly an increase in pest ic ide expor ts but a lso a t rans fe r of product ion to the S o u t h . In 1 9 9 6 , whi le Novar t i s (now Syngen ta ) announced p lans to phase out the use of monoc ro tophos in the N o r t h , 1 4 1 it opened a new plant in Ch ina capab le of produc ing 5 ,000 See EC, Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market [1991] O.J.L. 230/1, Art. 8. 137 See Dinham, "Corporate Change," supra note 130 at 12-14. 1 3 8 See U.S., EPA, "Pesticide Registration 6/91," posted by the Pesticide Management Education Program, Cornell University (2001), online: <http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/regulation/pcdregs-lib/pestic.reregistration.6.91.html>. 1 3 9 See Barbara Dinham, "Merger Mania in World Agrochemicals Market" Pesticides News 49 (September 2000) 10 at 10, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn49/pn49pl0.htm>. 1 4 0 See Dinham, "Corporate change," supra note 130 at 12-14. 1 4 1 Monocrotophos (which was on the PIC list only as a formulation) was added to the interim PIC procedure in October 2002, and it is not registered for use in Switzerland (In Office Fédéral de l'Agriculture, "Produits Phytosanitaires 2002,' Berne, Suisse (CH), (last update 20.09.2002), online: <http://www.blw.admin.ch/pflanzenschutzverz/pb home f.html>. It is banned in Lybia, Australia, Laos, Vanuatu, Hungary, Kuwait and the U.S., and severely restricted in Sri Lanka. It is also prohibited in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland and Liechtenstein, in their national t onnes of the pest ic ide eve ry year . Shor t l y af ter, Z e n e c a (a lso now S y n g e n t a ) began const ruc t ion of a p lant to manufac tu re up to 6 ,000 tonnes per y e a r of paraquat (banned for use in S w i t z e r l a n d ) 1 4 2 in C h i n a . 1 4 3 Last ly , the potent ia l of Sou the rn count r ies such as C h i n a , India and Braz i l to become ma jo r cen t res of gener ic product ion is push ing big ag rochemica l s to get s t ronger in the sa le of gener i cs , wh ich account for 5 3 % of the g lobal marke t . Aven t i s (now B a y e r ) , for ins tance , bought 5 1 % of Mitsu Indust r ies of Ind ia , wh ich had become a lead ing gener ic p roducer and expor te r of p y r e t h r o i d s . 1 4 4 B A S F bought MicroFlo ( U . S . ) , wh ich is the second b iggest crop protect ion gener ic c o m p a n y in the wo r l d ; DuPont fo rmed a jo in t ven tu re wi th Gri f f in ( U . S . ) , 1 4 5 and Dow Ag roSc iences wi th C h e m i n o v a ( D e n m a r k ) . 1 4 6 Gene r i c p roducers are a lso acqu i r ing compan ies in the S o u t h . M a k h t e s h i m - A g a n Indust r ies L td . ( Is rae l ) , the wor ld 's leading gener ic manu fac tu re r of c rop protect ion p roduc ts , has added A r g e n t i n e a n , B raz i l i an , and Co lomb ian manufac tu r ing faci l i t ies and fo rmula t ion p lants to its g lobal marke t ing and d is t r ibut ion s y s t e m . A m o n g its p roduc ts are dicofol - a n o rganoch lo r ine acar ic ide ex t reme ly tox ic to aquat ic o r g a n i s m s - , 1 4 7 and azynphos m e t h y l , ca rbo fu ran , and m e t h o m y l , three pest ic ides c lass i f ied as h ighly haza rdous by the Wor ld Heal th Organ iza t ion ( W H O ) . 1 4 8 2.4.1. Production of hazardous pesticides Bes ides being expor ted to the Sou th by Nor thern big ag rochemica l co rpora t ions , haza rdous pest ic ides are produced or fo rmu la ted in deve lop ing count r ies by fore ign or domes t i c c o m p a n i e s , or by a comb ina t ion of the two (e .g . th rough jo in t ven tu res or legislation. See S. Orme and S. Kegley, PAN Pesticides Database, Pesticide Action Network, North America (San Francisco: CA., 2002), <http://www.pesticideinfo.org> (Hereinafter PAN Pesticides Database). 1 4 2 Paraquat is not approved for use in Switzerland for toxicological reasons since 1989, which is equivalent to a ban of paraquat as defined by the Rotterdam Convention. See "Statement of the Federal Council," supra note 86. 1 4 3 See Kuyek, supra note 134. 1 4 4 See Ibid. 1 4 5 Griffin L.L.C. has seven separate manufacturing and production facilities in the U.S, Central and South America (Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil). Among its products are methyl parathion (la) and paraquat. See Griffin L.L.C. overview online: <http://www.oriffinllc.com/about/ab ovr.htm>, 1 4 6 See Dinham, "Merger Mania," supra note 139 at 10. Cheminova is a Danish company with Southern headquarters in Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico and Taiwan. It produces mainly organophosphorous insecticides, including ethyl parathion and methyl parathion (two class la -extremely hazardous- pesticides). 1 4 7 Dicofol is banned in Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Belize, and severely restricted in Germany and Slovenia. It is not registered for use in Denmark, Hungary and Sweden. In Switzerland, its use is permitted for research purposes only, and the U.S. EPA has classified it as a possible human carcinogen. See PAN U.K., "Dicofol" Pesticide News No. 43 (March 1999) at 20-21, and PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 4 8 WHO classifications include 'extremely hazardous' (class la) 'highly hazardous' (class lb), and 'moderately hazardous' (II) pesticides. These classifications are related to concentration levels and a weaker formulation moves an active ingredient into a lower hazard classification. See PAN U.K., "The List of Lists," supra note 72 at 3. l icensing a g r e e m e n t s ) . Th is sect ion wil l focus on Ind ia , Ch ina and Braz i l , wh ich are the b iggest Sou the rn m a r k e t s . 1 5 0 The next sec t ion wil l e x a m i n e product ion of haza rdous pest ic ides by t ransnat iona l corpora t ions . The c lass i f ica t ions used are those of the W H O , accord ing to wh ich c lass l a pest ic ides are ex t reme ly haza rdous , c lass l b are h igh ly haza rdous and c lass II are modera te l y hazardous . These c lass i f ica t ions are re lated to concent ra t ion levels and thus a w e a k e r fo rmula t ion could m o v e an act ive ingred ient into a lower hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 1 5 1 2.4.1.1. China Al though it accoun ts on ly for about 5 % of g lobal pest ic ide sa les , C h i n a has been s ince 1990 the wor ld 's second largest ag rochemica l p roducer , w i th a p redominan t l y nat ional indust ry protected by the s t a t e . 1 5 2 Annua l output of fer t i l izers and pest ic ides has increased at an ave rage rate of 8 percent s ince 1 9 9 4 . 1 5 3 Ch inese pest ic ide product ion j u m p e d f rom an es t ima ted 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 tons of ac t ive ingred ients in 1995 to 4 2 4 , 0 0 0 tons in 1999 and rema ined at ove r 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons in 2 0 0 0 . In 1 9 9 9 , C h i n a expor ted 1 4 7 , 0 0 0 tons of pes t i c ides , an increase of more than 3 5 % over 1 9 9 8 . 1 5 4 The nat ional indust ry is largely into gener i cs , wh ich are less expens i ve to produce because patents no longer protect t h e m . In add i t ion , severa l c o m p a n i e s produce and expor t haza rdous pest ic ides. Hebei Long A g e Pest ic ide C o . , L td . , for ins tance , has a product ion capac i ty of 8 ,000 tons of techn ica l p roducts per y e a r and manu fac tu res te rbu fos , e thop rophos , phorate ( l a ) , and d ich lorvos ( l b ) . 1 5 5 Its p roduc ts are expor ted to While production implies synthesizing the 'active ingredient' [which controls the pest(s)], formulation refers to mixing that ingredient with other (inert) compounds to improve its properties for storage, handling, application, effectiveness, safety, etc. The final product is the 'formulation.' See "Glossary," supra note 33. 1 5 0 Although there are other important markets (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Korea), transnational corporations are responsible for most of the pesticide production in those countries. Both Colombia and Mexico, for instance, have basically one single important national manufacturer, Proficol S.A. and Tekchem, respectively. Proficol was partly acquired by Makhteshim-Agan (Israel) in 1998, and one of its two manufacturing facilities is owned by Basf. Tekchem is formed by a 100% Mexican capital, but it exports a large part of its technical grade ingredients to multinational corporations located both in the South and in the North. This information was kindly provided by Mr. Pablo Ortiz, Deputy Director General of Tekchem, and Mr. Esmir Portela, International Sales Manager of Proficol. More information can be found online: Proficol <http://www.proficol.com.co>, and Techkem < http : //www, tekchem. com. mx>. 1 5 1 See PAN U.K., "The List of Lists," supra note 72 at 3. 1 5 2 See "Insight on Booming Chinese Market" Pesticides News 39 (March 1998) 14 at 14, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn39/pn39pl4a.htm>. 1 5 3 See Gary Liu and Christopher Adams, "Fertile ground," (1998) 25:6 The China Business Review 40 at 4 L 1 5 4 See PANNA "China: Land of Vegetables and Pesticides" Global Pesticide Campaigner 11:3 (December 2001), online: <http://www.panna.Org/resources/gpc/gpc_200112.ll.3.05.dv.html>. 1 5 5 The WHO classifies pesticides as classes la (extremely hazardous), lb (highly hazardous), II (moderately hazardous), and III (slightly hazardous). These classifications are related to concentration levels. See "List of Lists," supra note 72. Europe , Sou th A m e r i c a , and Sou theas t A s i a , a m o n g s t o thers . A g r o - C a r e Ch em ic a l Indust ry Group L td , a leading expor te r of ag rochem ica l s , p roduces m e t h o m y l , ca rbo fu ran , and d ich lo rvos ( l b ) , and the herb ic ide paraquat ( I I ) . 1 5 7 Hebei Huafeng Chem ica l G roup manu fac tu res phorate ( l a ) , m e t h o m y l , ome thoa te , and d ich lo rvos (all c lass l b pes t ic ides) . S h a n d o n g Huayang Techno logy C o . L td . ranks f irst in the capac i ty of produc ing methy l para th ion ( la ) in C h i n a , and is the sole producer of a ld icarb ( la ) in A s i a . It a lso p roduces m e t h o m y l ( lb ) and carbofuran ( l b ) . Zhang j i agang T ianheng Chem ica l C o . , L td . manu fac tu res , fo rmu la tes and expor ts monoc ro tophos ( lb ) and endosu l fan ( I I ) . 1 5 8 E p o c h e m C o , L td , based in S h a n g h a i , manu fac tu res m e t a m i d o p h o s ( l b ) , 1 5 9 and t r iazophos ( lb ) . Last ly , Zhe j i ang Yi fan Chemica l C o . , L td . , wi th an annua l output of 8 0 0 0 tons of ag rochem ica l s , p roduces t r iazophos and f enamiphos , two c lass l b pest ic ides . 2.4.1.2. India Al though its tu rnover const i tu tes hard ly 1 .5 -2% of the wor ld 's marke t , the Ind ian pest ic ide indust ry is the four th largest in the wor ld and the second in the As ia -Pac i f i c region af ter C h i n a . It is ma in ly into gener ics and i n s e c t i c i d e s , 1 6 0 wh ich are expor ted to A f r i ca , Sou theas t A s i a , and Wes t A s i a . 1 6 1 The manufac tu r ing capac i ty of the indust ry keeps e x p a n d i n g . In 1 9 9 1 , on ly 50 per cent of its capac i ty was u s e d , 1 6 2 whi le in 2 0 0 1 , it w a s run at 70 per c e n t . 1 6 3 Accord ing to the Pest ic ides Manufac tu re rs & Formu la to rs Assoc ia t ion of Ind ia , there a re 55 bas ic producers - i n c l ud i ng 10 mul t ina t iona l c o m p a n i e s -and 300 pest ic ide f o r m u l a t o r s . 1 6 4 Ral l is Ind ia , Uni ted Phosphorus Ltd and Excel Indust r ies are s o m e of the ind igenous p roducers , whi le Baye r Ind ia , C y a n a m i d Agro (now B A S F Ind ia ) , Aven t i s C ropSc ience (now B a y e r ) , Monsan to , and S y n g e n t a ( fo rmer Novar t is ) are the ma jo r t ransnat iona l corpora t ions opera t ing in I n d i a . 1 6 5 1 5 6 See company introduction online: <http://www.shiii-pesticide.com/info.htm> 1 5 7 See company's profile online: <http://www.aqrocare.com.cn/profile.htm> Certain formulations of monocrotophos are included in Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention, and it was added as a pesticide in the interim procedure (in October 2002). 1 5 9 Certain formulations of metamidophos are included in Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention and are thus subject to the PIC procedure. (See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Annex III). 1 6 0 See Ramnath Subbu, "Low Capacity Use Dogs Pesticide Units" The Hindu (28 July 2001). 1 6 1 See Angus Wright "From Pesticide Trade to Production: New Reform Strategies" Global Pesticide Campaigner (June 1991). 1 6 2 Ibid. 1 6 3 See Subbu R., supra note 160. 1 6 4 See Ibid. Note: While manufacturers produce the pesticide, formulators simply mix the active ingredient with inert materials to make a final commercial product (formulation). 1 6 5 See Ibid. Ral l is India manu fac tu res captafo l ( l a ) , and monoc ro tophos ( l b ) . 1 6 5 It a lso d is t r ibutes the products of a n u m b e r of mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions in I n d i a , 1 6 7 inc lud ing carbofuran ( l b ) , p roduced by U .S . F M C , and me thomy l and o x a m y l ( l b ) , manu fac tu red by U .S . DuPon t . Uni ted Phosphorus L td . manu fac tu res phora te , p h o s p h a m i d o n , t e r b u f o s , 1 6 8 ( three c lass l a pes t i c ides) , d ich lo rvos and monocro tophos (both c lass l b ) . Excel Indust r ies L imi ted manu fac tu res z inc phosph ide ( l b ) , endosu l fan (II), cype rme th r i n (II), and 2-methoxye thy l mercu ry c h l o r i d e . 1 6 9 H indus tan Insect ic ides L im i ted , a c o m p a n y owned by the Ind ian gove rnmen t , p roduces monoc ro tophos ( l b ) , DDT (II) and endosu l fan ( I I ) . 1 7 0 2.4.1.3. Brazil In 1 9 9 6 , Braz i l accoun ted for about 5 5 % of pest ic ides sa les in Lat in A m e r i c a . 1 7 1 A l t hough the p resence of ma jo r ag rochemica l corpora t ions and other fore ign c o m p a n i e s p r e v a i l s , 1 7 2 the Braz i l ian pest ic ide indust ry shou ld not be neg lec ted . Mi len ia Ag ro C ienc ias S . A . p roduces , a m o n g s t o thers , endosu l fan (II), meth ida th ion ( lb) and m e t h a m i d o p h o s ( l b ) 1 7 3 for the domes t i c and in ternat ional m a r k e t s . 1 7 4 Nor tox S . A . , f o rmed by a 1 0 0 % Braz i l ian cap i ta l , is the on ly Braz i l ian c o m p a n y to produce g l yphosa te in the count ry . It a lso manu fac tu res d ich lo rvos ( lb) and d i c o f o l . 1 7 5 Ag r ipec Qu im ica e Farmaceu t i ca S . A . , one of the b iggest Braz i l ian fo rmula t ing c o m p a n i e s , fo rmu la tes the pest ic ides para th ion methy l ( l a ) , monoc ro thophos , m e t h a m i d o p h o s (both l b ) , 1 7 6 d ico fo l , and endosu l fan ( I I ) . 1 7 7 In s o m e c a s e s , it is not easy to de te rm ine if a product is being manu fac tu red , fo rmu la ted or j us t so ld by a c o m p a n y (and if so , wh ich c o m p a n y manu fac tu res i t). Th is is the case wi th Prent iss Q u i m i c a L tda , wh ich offers para th ion methy l ( l a ) , Agr i cu r De fens ivos Agr i co las , wh ich sel ls carbo furan ( l b ) , m e t h o m y l ( lb ) and endosu l fan ( I I ) , 1 7 8 and Ferson Ind. E C o m . 1 6 6 The Rotterdam Convention regulates both captafol and monocrotophos. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Annex III, and note 141. 1 6 7 These companies are: FMC (U.S.); Monsanto (U.S.); Mitsui Chemicals (Japan); Nihon Nohyaku (Japan); and Du Pont (U.S.) 1 6 8 Certain formulations of phosphamidon are regulated by Rotterdam (See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Annex III). 1 6 9 As a mercury compound, the pesticide is regulated by the Rotterdam Convention. See Ibid. 1 7 0 Online: < h t t p : / / i n d i a p u b l i c s e c t o r . c o m / h i n l s . h t m > . Monocrotophos and DDT are subject to the PIC procedure. DDT is also regulated by the Stockholm Convention on POPs. 1 7 1 See "Crop Protection in Latin America" Agrow Reports (1996), in Harris J . , supra note 57 at 7. 1 7 2 E.g. Stoller, Griffin, FMC (U.S.), Hokko, (Japan), Sumitomo (Japan) and Cheminova (Denmark). 1 7 3 Certain formulations of metamidophos are regulated by the Rotterdam Convention. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Annex III. 1 7 4 Online: < h t t p : / / w w w . m i l e n i a . c o m . b r > . 1 7 5 Online: < h t t p : / / w w w . n o r t o x . c o m . b r > . For reference on dicofol see supra note 147. 1 7 6 See supra notes 158 and 159. 1 7 7 Online: < h t t p : / / w w w . a a r i p e c . c o m . b r > . 1 7 8 See Associaçâo das Empresas Nacionais de Defensivos Agricolas (AENDA). Complete catalogue of products available online: < h t t p : / / w w w . a e n d a . o r q . b r / i n d e x . h t m > (last update 08/06/2001). L tda , wh ich offers m e t h a m i d o p h o s ( l b ) , meth ida th ion ( l b ) , endosu l fan (II) and d i c o f o l . 1 7 9 Accord ing to the Assoc ia t ion of Crop Protect ion Nat iona l C o m p a n i e s (Aenda) , Fersol a lso se l ls carbo fu ran ( l b ) , and carbary l ( I I ) . 1 8 0 2.4.2. Northern Agrochemical Giants: Looking toward the South Agrochem ica l corpora t ions marke t haza rdous pest ic ides in the S o u t h th rough the i r subs id ia r ies , jo in t ven tu res , and l icensing a g r e e m e n t s , a m o n g s t o thers . They a lso have product ion faci l i t ies in deve lop ing count r ies , par t icu lar ly in those where the marke t is s ign i f icant , such as C h i n a , India and Braz i l . T a i w a n , Ma lays ia , Sou th K o r e a , T h a i l a n d , Mex ico , C o l o m b i a and Argen t ina are o ther impor tan t marke ts . It is often diff icult to con f i rm whe the r a plant is used for syn thes is or fo rmu la t i on , and what subs tances are be ing produced in a speci f ic faci l i ty . The cases that are k n o w n , howeve r , are d i scou rag ing . Many invo lve the product ion of o rganophospha tes , respons ib le for mos t h u m a n po ison ings in the S o u t h , or ac t ive ingred ients of p roducts that have been banned or seve re l y restr ic ted in the North (e .g . parath ion m e t h y l , pa raqua t ) , wh ich have shown to cause p rob lems under cond i t ions of use in the Sou th (e .g . monoc ro tophos , p h o s p h a m i d o n , pa raqua t ) , or wh ich are unreg is tered in the c o m p a n y ' s count ry of or ig in (e .g . a n i l o p h o s ) . 1 8 1 The next sect ion prov ides a brief profi le of the s ix ag rochemica l corpora t ions that contro l the pest ic ides marke t , inc luding the haza rdous pest ic ides they offer (and /o r produce) in the S o u t h . 2.4.2.1. Bayer (Germany) Baye r Cropsc ience is one of the four bus iness s e g m e n t s of B a y e r . 1 8 2 Based in G e r m a n y , the c o m p a n y is represented in 122 count r ies and has a work fo rce of 2 2 , 0 0 0 peop le . It has product ion faci l i t ies for agr icu l tura l products in Ind ia , C h i n a , B raz i l , A rgen t i na , the Ph i l ipp ines , I ndones ia , V i e t n a m and K o r e a , a m o n g s t o thers . The As ia -Pac i f i c reg ion is one of Baye r ' s mos t impor tan t ma rke t s , and the c o m p a n y p lans to invest by 2 0 1 0 more than U S $ 6 bi l l ion in new product ion and research faci l i t ies in the reg ion , mos t l y in J a p a n , C h i n a and Sou theas t A s i a . 1 8 3 Online: < http://www.fersol.com.br/historia.html>. 1 8 0 See AENDA, supra note 178. 1 8 1 See Barbara Dinham "Pesticide Production in the South. Linking Production and Trade" Pesticides News 26 (December 1994) 7 at 7-10, online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn26/pn26p7.htm>. [Dinham, "Pesticide Production in the South"]. 1 8 2 These are: healthcare, crop science, chemicals and polymers, online: <http://www.baver.com>. 1 8 3 Online: <http://www.baver.com/en/tk/cropscience.php>. Baye r p roduces a s igni f icant numbe r of haza rdous pes t ic ides , wh ich are expor ted to - a n d in s o m e cases produced in - its Sou the rn subs id ia r ies . T h e s e inc lude paraquat , a ld icarb ( l a ) , 1 8 4 para th ion methy l ( l a ) , 1 8 5 f enamiphos ( l b ) , 1 8 5 m e t h a m i d o p h o s ( l b ) , 1 8 7 me th ioca rb ( l b ) , ed i fenphos ( l b ) , 1 8 8 o x y d e m e t h o n methy l ( l b ) , and t r iazophos ( l b ) . 1 8 9 Al l or s o m e of these products are of fered by Baye r in A r g e n t i n a , B raz i l , C o l o m b i a , Ind ia , Pe ru , K o r e a , Cos ta R i c a , El Sa l vado r , G u a t e m a l a , P a n a m a , the Phi l ipp ines, V i e t n a m , T a i w a n , j us t to ment ion a few. In add i t ion , s o m e cases of product ion of haza rdous pest ic ides in the Sou th are known . In its plant in Thane ( Ind ia) , Baye r manu fac tu res para th ion m e t h y l , an ex t reme ly haza rdous pest ic ide that has been banned or seve re l y restr ic ted in m a n y c o u n t r i e s . 1 9 0 It a lso manufac tu res an i lophos ( I I ) , 1 9 1 an o rganophospha te that is not reg is tered for use in G e r m a n y . Abou t 300 tonnes of th is pest ic ide are produced each y e a r in Ind ia , to supp ly the r ice-growing count r ies of the As ia Paci f ic r e g i o n . 1 9 2 2.4.2.2. Syngenta (Switzerland) S y n g e n t a is a wor ld leading agr ibus iness , and it is based in Sw i t ze r l and . The c o m p a n y ranks f irst in crop p r o t e c t i o n , 1 9 3 and th i rd in the h igh-va lue c o m m e r c i a l seeds marke t . It w a s c rea ted by the merge r of Novar t is Ag r ibus iness and Z e n e c a Ag rochem ica l s in N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 , and has crop protect ion bus iness d iv is ions in the f ive con t inen ts . A l t hough genera l in format ion on product ion faci l i t ies is not readi ly ava i lab le , it has manu fac tu r ing faci l i t ies in C h i n a , where it p roduces paraquat , a tox ic herb ic ide banned for 1 8 4 In Germany, aldicarb is severely restricted for use as a plant protection product. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 8 5 Parathion methyl is not registered for use in Germany, the U.K. and Canada, amongst others. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141 and note 190. 1 8 6 Fenamiphos is not registered for use in Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the U.K. and Canada. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 8 7 Methamidophos is banned in Indonesia, Libya and Kuwait, and severely restricted in Sri Lanka. It is prohibited in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Iceland and Liechtenstein, and it is not registered for use in Finland, the U.K. and the Netherlands. In Switzerland, no products and formulations containing Metamidophos are authorized in the Index of Plant protection Products 1998. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 8 8 Edifenphos is not registered for use in Germany, the U.K., Canada, the U.S., etc. See Ibid. 1 8 9 Triazophos is not registered for use in Canada, the U.K., the U.S. and Denmark, amongst others. PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 9 0 Parathion Methyl is banned in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Iceland and Liechtenstein, and severely hazardous formulations are banned in the U.S. It is not registered for use in the U.K. and Denmark, among other countries. In Switzerland, no products or formulations containing methyl-parathion other than one specific Capsule suspension are authorized. See Ibid.. 1 9 1 Anilophos is not registered for use in Germany (home of Bayer), the U.S., the U.K., Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, amongst other countries. See Ibid. 1 9 2 See Dinham, "Pesticide Production in the South," supra note 181 at 7-10. At that time the plant was operated by AgrEvo (now Bayer). 1 9 3 This has probably changed with the recent acquisiton of Aventis Crop Science by Bayer. use in Sw i t ze r land and other c o u n t r i e s . 1 9 4 S y n g e n t a se l ls the herb ic ide in over 100 count r ies under the t r ademark gramoxone,195 w i th sa les es t ima ted at $ 4 3 0 mi l l ion in 2 0 0 1 . In sp i te of ev idence that paraquat is respons ib le for m a n y po ison ings in the S o u t h , S y n g e n t a a rgues that the product can be hand led sa fe ly , and that s teps have been taken to prevent acc identa l ingest ion or the use of paraquat in s u i c i d e s . 1 9 6 Bes ides paraqua t , S y n g e n t a se l ls meth ida th ion ( lb) and profenofos ( I I ) , 1 9 7 two haza rdous pest ic ides not reg is tered for use in severa l deve loped c o u n t r i e s . 1 9 8 2.4.2.3. BASF (Germany) B A S F is based in G e r m a n y and has product ion faci l i t ies in 38 count r ies , inc luding M a l a y s i a , Mex ico , B raz i l , Ch ina and K o r e a . 1 9 9 It a lso has product ion opera t ions in more than 100 s i tes th roughout the wor ld . Its product l ine is very b road , and its Agr icu l tu ra l Produc ts d i v i s ion , located in the U . S . , is a leading supp l ie r and marke te r of herb ic ides , fung ic ides and insect ic ides, opera t ing in 170 count r ies . A m o n g its opera t ions f igure the acqu is i t ion of A m e r i c a n C y a n a m i d in 2 0 0 0 , and of U .S . Micro F lo , a leading supp l ie r of gener i c c rop protect ion p r o d u c t s . 2 0 0 B A S F has p lants for syn thes iz ing pest ic ide act ive ingred ients in G e r m a n y , the U . S . , S p a i n , Braz i l ( three s i tes ) , India and Puerto Rico. End products are fo rmu la ted at severa l B A S F fac i l i t ies, wh ich are usual ly located c lose to the marke t . A l t hough in format ion on product ion is not readi ly ava i lab le to the publ ic , a m o n g its products are monoc ro tophos ( l b ) , 2 0 1 te rbufos ( l a ) , 2 0 2 and phorate ( la ) (not reg is tered for use in G e r m a n y ) , 2 0 3 wh i ch 1 9 4 See Bio Suisse, Communiqué de Presse, "Agriculture Sans Toxiques Au Sud Comme au Nord" (16 Octobre 2002). Paraquat is also banned in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Kuwait, and severely restricted for use as plant protection product in Germany. It is not registered for use in the U.S. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 9 5 See PAN U.K., Press Release "Time to phase out paraquat -Syngenta's controversial pesticide" (22 April 2002), online: <http://www.pan-uk.org/press/paraquat.htm>. 1 9 6 See Cox, supra note 85. 1 9 7 Methidathion is a highly hazardous pesticide not registered for use in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the U.K. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 1 9 8 Profenofos is not registered for use in Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Canada, among other countries. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. Although the active ingredient still has an authorization in Switzerland, there is no product containing profenofos on the Swiss market. However, a réévaluation programme for organophosphates is expected to start in the near future, which will most probably result in the withdrawal of a number of these substances. Information kindly provided by Dr. Elisabeth Bosshard, Federal Office for Agriculture, Section Crop Protection Products, Switzerland. 1 9 9 Information on which products are being manufactured in these facilities is not publicly available. 2 0 0 Including, amongst others products, plastics, colorants, dispersions, coatings, and crop-protection products, online: <http://www.basf.de/en/corporate/overview/?id=V00-*a3.rMy**bsf700>. 2 0 1 For details on monocrotophos please see supra note 141. 2 0 2 Terbufos is a class la insecticide. It is not registered for use in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the U.K. It was expected to be withdrawn in the EU by July 2003. See Ibid. 2 0 3 Phorate is a class la pesticide. It is not registered for use in Germany (home of Basf), Denmark, Finland, are poss ib ly syn thes ised in B A S F ' s Sou the rn faci l i t ies. 2.4.2.4. Dow Agrosciences (U.S.) Dow A g r o S c i e n c e s LLC , based in the U . S . A . , is a g lobal leader in pest m a n a g e m e n t and b io techno logy products . It has wor ldwide sa les of app rox ima te l y U$3 b i l l ion, and opera t ions in 140 count r ies , inc luding A rgen t i na , Mex ico , B raz i l , Ch ina and Ind ia . It a lso has 20 manufac tu r ing s i tes in 15 c o u n t r i e s . 2 0 4 In June of 2 0 0 1 , the c o m p a n y acqu i red R o h m and Haas 's Agr icu l tu ra l Chem ica l s bus iness . The acqu is i t ion inc luded , a m o n g s t o thers , manufac tu r ing s i tes in Jacare i (Brazi l ) and Bar ranqu i l la (Co lomb ia ) , and the R o h m and Haas 's sha re of a jo in t ven ture in Nantong ( C h i n a ) . 2 0 5 In Ind ia , Dow fo rmed a jo in t ven tu re wi th N O C I L , 2 0 6 an Ind ian c o m p a n y that manu fac tu res phospham idon ( l a ) , d ich lo rvos ( l b ) , 2 0 7 and monocro tophos ( lb ) , an insect ic ide banned in the U .S . and o ther c o u n t r i e s . 2 0 8 O the r Dow products inc lude carbo fu ran (Dow B r a z i l ) , 2 0 9 monoc ro tophos (Dow Ind ia ) , d i c o f o l , 2 1 0 and a t r a z i n e . 2 1 1 2.4.2.5. Monsanto (U.S.) Monsan to C o m p a n y , based in the U . S . , is a leading g lobal prov ider of agr icu l tura l p roduc ts , inc lud ing chem ica l s , s e e d s , and b io techno logy . It has locat ions in the f ive cont inents and product ion faci l i t ies in B raz i l , A rgen t ina and Mex ico , where it manu fac tu res a n d / o r fo rmu la tes its Roundup herb ic ide (g lyphosa te ) . Monsan to ' s herb ic ide products inc lude more than 90 g l yphosa te -based herb ic ides , inc luding Roundup agr icu l tura l herb ic ides and Roundup branded turf and o rnamen ta l p roducts . G l yphosa te is a s l ight ly Portugal and other European countries. See Ibid. 2 0 4 Information on the location of these manufacturing sites is not available. See "Organization" online: < h t t p : / / w w w . d o w a q r o . c o m / s p e c i a l t v e u r o p e / o r Q a n i z a t i o n / i n d e x . h t m > . 2 0 5 Dow News room (1 July 2001), online: <http://www.dowaqro.com/newsroom/news/060101 en.htm> 2 0 6 DE-NOCIL is a joint venture between Dow AgroSciences LLC (formerly Dow Elanco) and NOCIL (National Organic Chemical India, Ltd.), a petrochemical company that participates in global generic product development, and operates an agricultural chemicals plant in India. 2 0 7 See Dinham, "Pesticide Production in the South," supra note 181, at 7-10. •jno For additional information see PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 2 0 9 Carbofuran is banned in Lybia and severely restricted in the U.S. and Belize. It is not registered for use in Finland. See Ibid. 2 1 0 See supra note 147. 2 1 1 Atrazine has been identified as a possible human carcinogen by the U.S. EPA and as a possible endocrine disruptor by the EU and the U.K. Environment Agency. It is banned in Angola, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden. It is not registered for use in Austria, Finland and Uganda, and it is severely restricted in Switzerland, where it can only be used as herbicide in corn, with one application per year. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141, and "Interdiction de I' Atrazine," Réponse du Conseil Fédéral Suisse (Septembre 2002). > hazardous herb ic ide (c lass III), and it is reg is tered in the U .S . and o ther count r ies . It is not reg is tered for use in F in land , or I n d i a . 2 1 2 2.4.2.6. DuPont (U.S.) DuPont Crop Pro tec t ion , based in the U . S . , offers products for the gra in and spec ia l ty crop sec tors as wel l as forest ry and vegeta t ion m a n a g e m e n t . It inc ludes g lobal herb ic ide , fungic ide and insect ic ide products and se rv i ces , wi th off ices and opera t ions in 4 0 count r ies a round the wor ld , inc luding A rgen t i na , B raz i l , C o l o m b i a and Mex ico . It a lso has jo in t ven tu res in A rgen t i na , Mex ico and Cent ra l A m e r i c a . In fo rmat ion about the locat ion of its product ion faci l i t ies is not publ ic ly ava i lab le . A m o n g its products are m e t h o m y l and o x a m y l , two c lass l b (h ighly hazardous) pest ic ides not reg is tered for use in severa l c o u n t r i e s . 2 1 3 2.5. Conclus ion This chap te r has cons idered three e lemen ts that are essent ia l to unders tand the need for a conven t ion regulat ing t rade in hazardous chem ica l s : f i rst , it exp la ined why cer ta in pest ic ides and chemica ls are cons idered hazardous to the env i r onmen t and h u m a n hea l th . T h e n , it p rov ided an ove rv iew of the laws that have a l lowed big ag rochemica l compan ies to expor t haza rdous chemica l s to deve lop ing count r ies . Las t ly , the chap te r e x a m i n e d the global pest ic ides marke t , contro l led by a very sma l l n u m b e r of Nor thern corpora t ions . G i ven the nature of the chemica ls being t raded and the negat ive ef fects they have in deve lop ing count r ies , one could th ink that a so lu t ion m a y be to prevent s ta tes f rom expor t ing chemica ls they have banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted for reasons of the env i ronmen t or heal th to o ther count r ies . The ana lys is of the pest ic ides marke t revea ls , however , that e l iminat ing expor t doub le s tandards could be coun te rp roduc t i ve . S ince the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on dea ls on ly wi th the in ternat ional t rade of haza rdous chemica l s , an expor t ban could increase product ion in the Sou th both by fore ign and nat ional manu fac tu re rs if no regulat ion on product ion of haza rdous chemica l s were in t roduced. The p rob lem wou ld thus be d i sp laced , ra ther than being a d d r e s s e d . T h e s e pract ica l d i f f icul t ies, however , do not jus t i fy the ex is tence of doub le s tanda rds , espec ia l l y because of the contex t in wh ich the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s occurs . See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. 2 1 3 Methomyl is banned in Lybia and Kuwait, and it is not registered for use in Finland, Germany, the U.K. and several African countries. Oxamyl is not registered for use in India, Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. See PAN Pesticides Database, supra note 141. Chapter Three The North, the South, and Trade in Hazardous Chemicals: Ethical Dilemmas 3.1. Introduction Probab ly because of the great publ ic i ty sur round ing and the mora l ou t rage at tox ic was te d u m p s d iscovered in a numbe r of deve lop ing count r ies dur ing the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s , 2 1 4 the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous was tes has been largely regarded as an eth ica l ques t i on . Many cons idered it mora l ly unacceptab le that c o m p a n i e s in indust r ia l ised count r ies wou ld expor t the i r tox ic was te to the count r ies of the Sou th in order to avo id the high costs of d isposa l of the Nor th , tak ing advan tage of the diff icult s i tuat ion of m a n y poor count r ies (e .g . the i r despera te need for hard cu r renc ies ; a lack of awa reness regard ing the nature of the w a s t e s ; the need for cheap raw ma te r i a l s ; gove rnmen ta l cor rup t ion) . Consequen t l y , the adopt ion of the Base l Conven t ion on haza rdous was tes and of a subsequen t a m e n d m e n t bann ing the expor t of haza rdous was te f rom indust r ia l ised count r ies to the deve lop ing wor ld was to a large ex ten t t r iggered by a sense of mora l i n j u s t i c e . 2 1 5 Even though the expor t of domes t i ca l l y banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted pest ic ides is sti l l a c d m m o n pract ice , and desp i te the fact that mi l l ions of f a rmers get po isoned eve ry y e a r as a resul t , the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica ls and pest ic ides has rece ived less a t tent ion than that of was tes , and it was hard ly put forward as a mora l issue dur ing the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on n e g o t i a t i o n s . 2 1 6 Th is chap te r a rgues , however , that the dec is ion of a deve loped count ry to a l low the expor t of banned or seve re l y restr ic ted chemica l s to the Sou th is pr imar i ly an eth ical ques t ion , because of the d i sadvan tageous posi t ion of impor t ing count r ies , and because of the nature of the subs tances be ing expor ted and the During the 1970s and 1980s, several scandals involving the shipment of hazardous wastes from the North being dumped in the South were revealed. Toxic wastes dumps were discovered in Africa and the Caribbean. Two of the most famous cases are the "Khian Sea,' in which a ship with toxic ash from Philadelphia was dumped part of its load into the beach of Haiti (after trying to dump its waste in several countries), and the rest apparently into the Indian ocean, and the "Koko case,' in which an Italian businessmen shipped toxic waste of several Italian industries to Nigeria for storage in the backyard of a Nigerian businessman. See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 31-36; and Hilz, supra note 15, at 12-37. 2 1 5 Largely due to the pressure exerted by environmental NGOs and developing countries, a decision banning all transboundary movements of hazardous wastes from Annex VII countries (OECD members, EU members and Liechtenstein) to non-Annex VII countries was adopted during the Third conference of the parties (COP) to the Basel Convention. The ban (not yet in force) is immediate for wastes bound for final disposal and it was expected to take effect at the beginning of 1998 for wastes destined for recycling or recovery operations. See Jim Puckett & Cathy Fogel "A Victory for Environment and Justice: The Basel Ban and How it Happened," Greenpeace International (1994), online: <http://www.ban.org/about_basel_ban/a_victory.html>, and section 3.4.3. in Chapter 4. 2 1 6 See section 3.4.3. in this chapter. negat ive ef fects they have on heal th and the env i ronmen t in the rec ip ient count r ies . It con tends that the issue of t rans fer of hazardous chemica l s , l ike that of was tes , cannot be cons ide red in isolat ion f rom the contex t in wh ich it t akes p lace , nor can the p rob lem be ser ious ly tack led un less mora l cons idera t ions take an impor tan t part in the deba te . Like the t rans fer of haza rdous w a s t e , the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies does not take p lace in the v a c u u m . There are at least two cond i t ions or a r r angemen ts that faci l i tate and a rguab ly p romote these t rans fe rs , wh ich are cons idered in th is chapter . The f irst one is the economic and techno log ica l gap that ex is ts be tween deve loped and deve lop ing count r ies , wh ich t rans la tes not on ly into di f ferent capac i t ies to m a n a g e hazardous subs tances , but a lso into di f ferent levels of economic and pol i t ical power to m a k e dec is ions that are env i ronmen ta l l y des i rab le . T h u s , the chap te r shows that even if deve lop ing count r ies are genu ine ly concerned about the env i ronmen ta l and heal th impl ica t ions of impor t ing haza rdous chemica l s and was tes that they wil l not be ab le to handle in a safe m a n n e r , they are cons t ra ined by more press ing economic and soc ia l p rob lems. These p rob lems go beyond the sho r t - t e rm e c o n o m i c p ressures borne by every Nor thern g o v e r n m e n t in its pursui t of env i ronmen ta l pro tect ion. The expor t of haza rdous waste i l lustrates th is point . In 1 9 8 9 , G u i n e a - B i s s a u , one of the poorest count r ies in A f r i ca , s igned a f i ve -year cont ract wi th two Br i t ish compan ies to rece ive 15 mi l l ion tons of hazardous was te for a paymen t of $ 6 0 0 mi l l ion , wh ich represented four t imes its Gross Nat iona l P r o d u c t . 2 1 7 To just i fy the a g r e e m e n t , the f o rmer Min is ter of T rade and Tou r i sm s imp ly s ta ted 'we need the m o n e y . ' 2 1 8 The second a r rangemen t that faci l i tates and a rguab ly encou rages the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica ls and was tes is the mul t i la tera l t rad ing s y s t e m , wh ich upho lds and de fends the l iberal economic pa rad igm (e .g . f ree marke t , e c o n o m i c ef f ic iency, t rade l iberal isat ion) at a g lobal leve l . To show the w a y s in wh ich these pr inc ip les have p romoted the t ransfer of haza rdous subs tances f rom North to S o u t h , the chap te r looks at the Bre t ton Woods inst i tut ions ( i .e. the Wor ld Bank and the In ternat ional Moneta ry Fund) and at the Wor ld T rade Organ isa t ion (WTO) , as they are the ma jo r in ternat ional e c o n o m i c inst i tut ions that p romote t rade l ibera l isat ion at a g lobal sca le . The chap te r exp la ins how, accord ing to the l iberal e c o n o m i c p a r a d i g m , it is perfect ly reasonab le that haza rdous subs tances genera ted or p roduced in an indust r ia l ised count ry 2 1 7 See Peter Montague, "Dumping on the Developing World," Rachel Hazardous Waste News 126 (25 April 1989). The wastes would have come from American and European firms, but the contract was cancelled due to unfavourable publicity. 2 1 8 Jim Puckett, "The Basel Ban: A Triumph over Business-as-Usual," Basel Action Network (October 1997), online: <http://www.ban.org/about_basel_ban/jims_article.html>. be expor ted to count r ies wi th less s t r ingent regu la t ions a n d / o r ve ry l imi ted capac i ty to enforce regu la t ions that do ex is t , as it is more eff ic ient than to deal wi th t h e m (or they cannot be so ld) at h o m e . A s s ta ted in the we l l - known 1991 m e m o r a n d u m of the Wor ld Bank Ch ie f Economis t Lawrence S u m m e r s , " [ t ]he economic logic behind dump ing a load of tox ic was te in the lowest wage count ry is impeccab le a n d . . . under -popu la ted count r ies in Af r ica are vas t l y u n d e r - p o l l u t e d . " 2 1 9 This chap te r a rgues that even the ' e c o n o m i c logic ' referred by Mr. S u m m e r s has an eth ica l componen t . Th is is because w h e n one cons iders the c i r cums tances in wh ich the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica ls and was tes takes p lace, even the dec is ion by a s ta te or by a c o m p a n y to d is regard mora l cons idera t ions when expor t ing hazardous chemica l s to the Sou th is an eth ical cho ice. T h u s , when a g o v e r n m e n t dec ides to protect its own c i t i zens f rom a tox ic subs tance but de l ibera te ly sends it to o thers - w h o add i t iona l ly happen to be more v u l n e r a b l e - , it is a rguab ly mak ing an immora l dec is ion . For that reason , the ques t ion of what are the mora l pr inc ip les that app ly to th is i ssue , and to wha t ex tent have s ta tes recogn ised t h e m in the in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l a r e n a , is of f undamen ta l impor tance . Th is is what the last part of C h a p t e r 3 endeavou rs to inves t iga te . The chap te r looks at the pr incip le of s ta te responsib i l i ty for t r ansboundary h a r m , and at the pr inc ip le of in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l equ i ty and the rules that der ive f rom it, in par t icu lar the pr inc ip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated respons ib i l i t ies . F ind ing that they are impl ic i t ly or expl ic i t ly inc luded in the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t i ons , and that they have been recogn ised by the major i ty of s ta tes wi th in the in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l a r e n a , the chap te r looks then at the impl ica t ions of put t ing these pr inc ip les into operat ion in the t reat ies dea l ing wi th the in ternat ional t rade of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes . 3.2. North-South disparities: hazardous substances trade in a divided world This chap te r a rgues that the f irst condi t ion that fac i l i ta tes the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes is what is of ten referred to as the ' N o r t h - S o u t h d i v ide . ' Whi le the word ' N o r t h ' e n c o m p a s s e s the indust r ia l ized nat ions of Eu rope , J a p a n , Nor th A m e r i c a and Aus t r a l as i a , the word ' S o u t h ' 2 2 0 refers to the deve lop ing and less deve loped World Bank, Office memorandum, Lawrence M. Summers, Ext. 33774, Subject: GEP, the World Bank/IFC/MIGA (12 December 1991). Later on, Mr. Summers said that this memo was only intended to generate discussion. 2 2 0 The term was first used by Independent Commission on International Development Issues (known as the Brandt Commission due to its Chair, Willy Brandt, ex-chancellor of the former Federal Republic of Germany). count r ies of A f r i ca , As i a and Lat in A m e r i c a . A l though it is t rue that the count r ies of the S o u t h are ve ry d i ve rse , they are in a s im i la r s i tuat ion in relat ion to the deve loped Nor th . Most of t h e m were co lon ies of European powers s o m e t i m e be tween 1400 and 1 9 4 5 , and those that were never under fo rmal European g o v e r n m e n t were part of the co lon ia l in f luence, or v i c t ims of unequa l t rade t reat ies wi th European count r ies that they were in no posi t ion to c o u n t e r . 2 2 2 The domina t ion of these count r ies by Europe was there fore pr imar i ly econom ic , and it wou ld be later perpetuated by the fo rmer set t ler co lon ies of North A m e r i c a and A u s t r a l a s i a . 2 2 3 By the end of Wor ld W a r II, the Uni ted S ta tes emerged as a dom inan t wes te rn power and wi th Br i ta in took the lead in shap ing new inst i tut ions to prov ide the f ramework for wor ld f inance and t rade. Whi le commi t t ed to in tervent ion in the i r home e c o n o m i e s , indust r ia l ised count r ies were de te rm ined to avo id protect ionis t pol ic ies abroad by c reat ing a s t rong f ree- t rade s y s t e m . A s put by the Brandt C o m m i s s i o n , it was " K e y n e s at h o m e , and A d a m S m i t h a b r o a d . " 2 2 4 In 1944 , they met at Bret ton W o o d s , New Hampsh i re and es tab l i shed two cent ra l ins t ruments for in ternat ional f inancia l and mone ta ry coope ra t i on : the In ternat iona l Bank for Reconst ruc t ion and Deve lopmen t ( known as the Wor ld Bank) to prov ide loans to ass is t the reconst ruc t ion of Europe and Japan and to suppor t the deve lop ing wor ld , and the In ternat iona l Monetary Fund ( IMF) to regulate cu r renc ies , p romote s tab le exchange rates and prov ide l iquidi ty for the f reer f low of t r a d e . 2 2 5 Th ree yea rs later , the Genera l Ag reemen t on Tari f fs and Trade (GATT) - p r e d e c e s s o r of the W T O - was s igned wi th the a i m of p revent ing the d isc r im ina to ry m e a s u r e s and reta l ia tory tari f fs that t rad ing nat ions adopted dur ing the great dep ress ion of the 1 9 3 0 s . 2 2 6 It has been sugges ted that these organ isa t ions cont r ibu ted to deepen ing the d ispar i t ies be tween the Nor th and the S o u t h , because they adop ted ru les that neg lected the ac tua l See Neil Middleton, Phil O'keefe & Sam Moyo, The Tears of the Crocodile. From Rio to Reality in the Developing World (London; Boulder, CO: Pluto Press, 1993) at 13. 2 2 1 See Colin Sage, "The Scope for North-South Cooperation," in Environmental Problems as Conflicts of Interest, Andrew Blowers & Peter Glasbergen eds. (London: Arnold; New York: Halsted Press, 1996) at 167. 2 2 2 Only parts of Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Liberia, China, Thailand and Ethiopia were never formal colonial ruling. For further details see J.P. Dickenson etal., A Geography of the Third World (London; New York: Methuen, 1983) at 22-36. 2 2 3 Unlike the colonies in Latin America, Asia and Africa, in the North American and Australasian colonies there existed only weak and small native populations spread out over vast territories, which were easier to exterminate or displaced, and wholly European settlements were established. See Nassau Adams, Worlds Apart. The North-South divide and the International System (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1993) at 6 and Ibid. at 36-37. 2 2 4 Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Willy Brandt Chairman), North-South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (London: Pan Books, 1980) at 36 [hereinafter Brandt Report]. 2 2 5 See Brandt Report, supra note 224 at 36. 2 2 6 See Middleton etal., supra note 220 at 97. shape of the wor ld , be l iev ing the p rob lem of unde r -deve lopmen t in the S o u t h wou ld be set t led wi th aid f lows and loans that were not a lways w e l l - m a n a g e d by the rec ip ient g o v e r n m e n t s . 2 2 7 Th is downfa l l was impl ic i t ly recogn ised in the Brandt report , wh ich s t ressed that deve lopmen t based on s imp le cons idera t ions of economic g rowth had fai led to secure ' h u m a n d ign i ty , secur i ty , jus t i ce and equ i ty ' for m u c h of the wor ld , whi le advoca t ing for s t ruc tura l changes in the in ternat ional e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . 2 2 8 S im i la r l y , the Char te r of Econom ic Rights and Dut ies of S ta tes adopted by the UN Genera l A s s e m b l y in 1974 expl ic i t ly c la ims for soc ia l jus t i ce in in ternat ional economic re lat ions af fect ing the Th i rd W o r l d , 2 2 9 ca l l ing upon deve loped s ta tes to ex tend and improve an en la rged s y s t e m of genera l i zed nonrec iproca l and non-d isc r im ina to ry tariff p re ferences to the deve lop ing count r ies (art 18) . A s s t ressed by Rober t J a c k s o n , under ly ing this d e m a n d is the idea that str ict adhe rence to un iversa l i ty and rec iproc i ty in economic re lat ions neg lects the w idesp read p rob lem of unde rdeve lopmen t in the S o u t h , and that s ince deve lop ing count r ies are in no posi t ion to barga in wi th the North on a bas is of rec iproc i ty , new no rms of preferent ia l t rea tment shou ld be es tab l i shed to c o m p e n s a t e for the i r mater ia l d i sadvan taged posi t ion in the in ternat ional e c o n o m y . 2 3 0 G i ven the i r e n o r m o u s in f luence in shap ing the g lobal e c o n o m y and thereby No r th -Sou th re lat ions ( inc luding the t ransfer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes ) , the next sec t ion g ives a genera l ove rv iew of the W T O , the Wor ld Bank and the IMF, and the w a y s in wh ich they migh t have cont r ibu ted to deepen ing the d iv ide be tween deve loped and deve lop ing count r ies . 3.2.1. The World Trade Organisation Under the G A T T / W T O s y s t e m lies the idea that all count r ies wil l benef i t f rom a s y s t e m of f ree t rade that encou rages its par t ic ipants to concent ra te on those manufac tu r ing p rocesses and serv ices in wh ich they are most eff ic ient or where they have compara t i ve advan tages (pr inc ip le of spec ia l i sa t ion) , and this wil l r emove the need for protect ion of cost ly or ineff ic ient indust r ies by means of subs idy or tarif f barr iers . In a d iv ided wor ld , howeve r , th is theory is un l ike ly to work . To have compara t i ve advan tages in agr icu l tura l com m od i t i e s and raw mater ia ls has been prec ise ly one of the ma jo r p rob lems of deve lop ing count r ies , s ince the pr ices of the i r expor t p roduc ts f luctuate eno rmous l y whi le 2 2 7 See, for instance, Middleton etal., supra note 220 at 92-107, and Adams N., supra note 223 at 19-45. 2 2 8 See Peter Calvert & Susan Calvert, The South, the North and the Environment (London; New York, N.Y.: Pinter, 1999) at 184-185. 2 2 9 See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 118. 2 3 0 See Ibid, at 118-119. they depend on impor ts that are eve r more expens i ve to p u r c h a s e . 2 3 1 A s s t ressed by Midd le ton er al, " t he pr incip le [of spec ia l iza t ion] takes no accoun t of ma jo r inequal i t ies be tween nat ions and by this fai lure immed ia te l y puts poorer count r ies at a d i s a d v a n t a g e . " 2 3 2 Fu r the rmore , it has been a rgued that whi le p roc la im ing free t rade as its ma jo r t h e m e , the in ternat ional t rad ing sys tem is not f ree , as tari f fs and non-tar i f f barr iers imposed by the North have impeded the Sou th to expor t , e . g . , p rocessed agr icu l tura l and text i le manu fac tu red p r o d u c t s . 2 3 3 There has been s o m e recogni t ion of th is s i tuat ion wi th in the W T O - G A T T s y s t e m . It has been c o n c e d e d , for ins tance , that the or ig inal G A T T had ser ious loopho les in relat ion to agr icu l tu re , s ince it a l lowed count r ies to use subs id ies and non-tar i f f m e a s u r e s such as impor t quo tas , mak ing the sec tor become h ighly d i s t o r t e d . 2 3 4 A s a resul t , in 1995 W T O m e m b e r s s igned the Agreement on Agriculture, by wh ich al l of t h e m , wi th the excep t ion of l eas t -deve loped count r ies , commi t t ed to l imit agr icu l tura l subs id ies , tarif fs and o ther protect ion is t measu res to make the agr icu l tura l sector Mess d i s t o r t e d . ' 2 3 5 S im i la r l y , the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing es tab l i shed the reduct ion of rest ra in ts and the phase out of the Mul t i -F ibre A r r a n g e m e n t ove r a per iod of ten y e a r s , to improve the s i tuat ion of expor te rs (most ly f rom the Sou th ) that had been sub jec t to b i lateral ly ' a g r e e d ' quant i ta t ive rest ra in ts or uni la tera l ly imposed restr ic t ions on impor ts , wh ich were app l ied both to products and a g g r e g a t e s . 2 3 6 The Sou th also succeeded in get t ing preferent ia l tarif f a g r e e m e n t s bui l t into the GATT. Howeve r , they are seen as mere excep t ions and they are 2 3 1 In the late 1940s, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) was created to elaborate an analysis of the causes of economic stagnation in Latin America and the ways of overcoming it. The analysis demonstrated deterioration on the terms of trade for Latin America's raw materials exports against the import of manufactured goods from the North. These results flew in the face of theories of comparative advantage. For further details see Sage, supra note 221 at 172. 2 3 2 See Middleton etal., supra note 220 at 97. 2 3 3 See Brandt Report, supra note 224 at 8, 19 and 42, and Middleton etal., supra note 220 at 98-100. 2 3 4 Essentially, trade is distorted if prices, quantities produced, bought, and sold are higher or lower than normal. Import barriers and domestic subsidies can raise crop prices in a country's internal market, and higher prices can encourage over-production. If the surplus is to be exported, where prices are lower, then export subsidies have to be paid. Governments give three reasons for applying measures that distort agricultural trade: a) To make sure that enough food is produced to meet the country's needs; b) To shield farmers from the effects of the weather and swings in world prices; and c) To preserve rural society. This has arguably put developing countries at a disadvantage, as they have less economic capacity to apply subsidies. 2 3 5 The Agreement on Agriculture established reductions on tariffs, subsidies and other measures implemented over a six-year period (10 years for developing countries, except least developed countries) that began in 1995. Further negotiations are now underway to continue the reforms. See WTO, "Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO. The Agreements. Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers." Online: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm>. 2 3 6 The M FA (1973) groups eight "importers," (mainly developed countries) among which six apply restrictions to "exporters" (mainly developing countries.) See WTO, Committee on Trade and Development, 77 t h session, November 21-25, 1994, "Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round: An Overview," note by the Secretariat, online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ldc2_512.htm>. usua l ly t empora ry and n o n - c o n t r a c t u a l . 2 3 7 More recent ly , the Chie fs of the Wor ld Bank , the IMF and the W T O issued a jo in t c o m m u n i q u é warn ing the O E C D Counc i l that " i nc reased pro tec t ion ism in the wor ld 's leading economies wou ld unde rm ine deve lop ing coun t r ies ' ef forts to re form th rough more open e c o n o m i e s , " d raw ing par t icu lar a t tent ion to the need of modi fy ing agr icu l tura l suppor t pol ic ies and text i les reg imes , and cal l ing for in tervent ions that are less d a m a g i n g to the e c o n o m i c oppor tun i t ies of the p o o r . 2 3 8 T h e s e ad jus tmen ts represent s o m e progress , but they reinforce the idea that free t rade is the so lu t ion to the p rob lems of the S o u t h , and a necessar i l y cons t ruc t i ve goa l . T h u s , accord ing to th is v iew, the expor t of haza rdous was tes cou ld be jus t i f ied under the a r g u m e n t that deve lop ing count r ies may have a compara t i ve advan tage in recyc l ing such m a t e r i a l s , 2 3 9 regard less of the s igni f icant r isks for the env i r onmen t and h u m a n heal th in those coun t r ies , or of the fact that the recyc l ing of haza rdous subs tances may not be env i ronmen ta l l y d e s i r a b l e . 2 4 0 3.2.2. Financial Institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund The d ispar i t ies that ex is t in the contex t of the In ternat iona l Moneta ry Fund and the Wor ld Bank are in s o m e way s im i la r to those of the G A T T , and are even more p rob lemat ic g iven the v i r tua l ly abso lu te contro l of these o rgan isa t ions by the Nor th (notab ly the U . S . ) 2 4 1 The Bank was set up to mobi l ize and lend funds at marke t rates of in terest to enab le count r ies to pay for capi ta l goods impor ts . However , wha t deve lop ing count r ies needed w a s capi ta l The agreement on Generalised Scheme of Preferences, for instance, seeks to give developing countries a chance to compete on an equal footing with producers in developed importing markets. Yet, preference schemes frequently place a priori restrictions and criteria on the granting of preferences, and in many instances tariff preferences are temporary and non-contractual, and thus not legally binding. See Ibid. See WTO, News Release, "WTO, World Bank, and IMF chiefs warn against rich-country protectionism" (16 May 2002). (The statement refers to the Doha and Monterrey negotiations, before a new WTO Round). This view is supported, for example, by William Schneider "The Basel Convention Ban on Hazardous Waste Exports: Paradigm of Efficacity or Exercise in Futility?" (1996) 20 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 247 at 261 and 268; Jason Gudofsky "Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and Recovery Operations," (1998) 34 Stan. J Int'l L. 219 at 283-285; and D. Kofi Asante-Duah & Imre V. Nagy, International Trade in Hazardous Waste (London; New York: E & FN Spon, 1998) at 5-6 and 110. 2 4 0 For details on the recycling of hazardous wastes in the South see Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 61. See also Basel Action Network, "Comments on Decision IV/8: Regarding Annex VII" (12 April 1999), online: <http://www.ban.org/subsidiary/comments.html>. The report argues that the recycling of hazardous wastes poses in many cases greater risks to the environment and to human health than final disposal. (See Hazardous Waste Recycling — A Closer Look). In addition, the recycling of some hazardous wastes is a source of several POPs (PCDD, PCDF, HCH and PCBs). See Stockholm Convention, supra note 13, Annex C Part II. 2 4 1 In the World Bank, each member has 250 votes, and one additional vote for each share of stock held. The main shareholders are the U.S., Japan, the U.K., Germany, and France. In the IMF, decisions are taken according to the number of quotas. The largest shareholders are the U.S., Japan Germany, France, and the U.K. The WTO is in theory democratically governed, but in practice it is dominated by developed countries, as its negotiations are formed by private discussions between the Group of Seven G-7 (now G-8, which includes: Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, Canada and Italy). See Middleton etal., supra note 220 at 95-96. to bui ld the h u m a n , phys i ca l , and admin is t ra t i ve in f rast ructure for deve lopmen t , and the benef i ts of such inves tmen ts were far in the future and they were not se l f - l iqu ida t ing . T h u s , they could not earn the fore ign exchange requi red to repay convent iona l loans in conver t ib le c u r r e n c i e s . 2 4 2 The F u n d , for its part , was a imed at prov id ing t empo ra ry l iquidi ty to ass is t count r ies in ad jus t ing d isequ i l ib r ium in the i r ba lance of p a y m e n t s . Th is goal was supposed to be a t ta ined wi th as little economic d is rupt ion as p o s s i b l e , 2 4 3 keep ing in m ind its m iss ion of cont r ibut ing to the promot ion and ma in tenance of h igh levels of e m p l o y m e n t and real i ncome of all m e m b e r s . 2 4 4 Yet d ras t ic pol icy measu res - i n the fo rm of s t ruc tura l ad jus tmen t p r o g r a m m e s ( S A P s ) - 2 4 5 were imposed on deve lop ing count r ies fac ing a f inancia l cr is is in the ear ly 1 9 8 0 s . 2 4 6 Whi le these measu res se rved the purpose of conf ront ing Thi rd Wor ld 's debt cr is is and to the ma in tenance of the wor ld e c o n o m i c s y s t e m , 2 4 7 they resul ted in sharp cu tbacks in i ncomes and impor ts , m a s s i v e u n e m p l o y m e n t , soc ia l depr iva t ion and w idespread deter io ra t ion in capi ta l s tocks and in product ive capac i ty in the S o u t h . 2 4 8 S im i l a r p rog rams are now opera ted by the Wor ld Bank , wh ich expanded its role of f inanc ing ind iv idual projects to S t ruc tu ra l Ad jus tmen t Loans ( S A L s ) . 2 4 9 In re lat ion to ind iv idual pro jects , the bank was cr i t ic ized for f inanc ing on ly the fore ign exchange costs of the app roved pro jects , wh ich resul ted in the d is tor t ion of i nves tmen t p lann ing and d e v e l o p m e n t pr ior i t ies and favoured growing impor t dependence . The nar row focus of Bank lending on phys ica l in f rast ructure was a lso c r i t i c i zed , s ince soc ia l i nves tmen ts in 24? See Chandra Hardy "Debt negotiations and the North-South dialogue. 1974-1980," in William I. Zartman, ed., Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987) at 260. 243 According to art I [v] of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, one of the purposes of the IMF is to provide members "with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity." (Emphasis added). See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 22 July 1944 60 Stat. 140, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force 27 December 1945), online: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/>. 2 4 4 See Ibid. Art. I [ii] (Purposes). 2 4 5 Without getting into details, SAPs generally include: exchange rate devaluation, restraints on government spending, controls on wages, liberalisation of trade and the encouragement of export-oriented activity. See Sage, supra note 221 at 177. 2 4 6 Efforts focused on major debtors such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These countries owed U$31 billion to nine banks whose capital totalled U$29 billion. See Adams, supra note 223 at 153-154. 2 4 7 In 1979, a rise in oil prices (after a four-fold rise in the mid 1970s) and the increase of interest rates in the U.K. and the U.S. plugged the world economy into a deep recession, and demand for raw materials fell and by 1982 they were at their lowest price since 1945. All of these factors (economic recession, oil prices increase and high rates on heavy borrowings) resulted in the ballooning of the Third World debt: in 1980 it amounted around $500 billion, and by the end of the decade it was almost $1.3 trillion. For details see Adams N., supra note 223 at 158, Sage, supra note 221 at 177, and Robert Weismann, "Corporate Plundering of Third World Resources," in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles. The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993) at 187. 2 4 8 See Adams, supra note 223 at 158. 249 Over the last two decades, the Bank's lending for structural adjustment has doubled, reaching in 1999 over 50% of its lending portfolio earmarked for structural adjustment loans (SALs). See Christine Lee, "All Pain, No Gain: How Structural Adjustment Hurts Farmers and the Environment" Global Pesticide Campaigner 11:1 (April 2001) at 1, and Adams, supra note 223 at 35-36. areas such as educa t i on , heal th se rv i ces , wa te r and san i ta t ion fac i l i t ies, were not e l ig ib le for bank f i n a n c i n g . 2 5 0 It was a lso c la imed that deve lop ing count r ies needed gran ts and soft loans and not the hard commerc i a l loans prov ided by the bank. Th is p rompted the creat ion of the In ternat iona l Deve lopmen t A g e n c y ( I D A ) , 2 5 1 but its resources we re restr ic ted to l ow- income count r ies and even so they me t on ly a sma l l part of the i r n e e d s . 2 5 2 S o m e re forms were a lso under taken in the Bank itself, and in 1970 new gu ide l ines were p romu lga ted w iden ing its scope for p r o g r a m m e lend ing , in con junct ion wi th a more d ive rse d is t r ibut ion of the loans by sec tor , w i th i nves tmen ts in educa t ion and agr icu l tu re . Howeve r , as put by Nassau A d a m s , " the bas ic charac te r and ph i losophy of the Bank has rema ined unchanged over the yea rs , and it is sti l l m u c h more a bank than a deve lopmen t a g e n c y . " 2 5 3 Because the fo l lowing paragraph captures the very heart of N o r t h - S o u t h d ispar i t ies and s u m m a r i z e s wha t has been sa id up to now, it is wor th c i t ing at l eng th : "The essence of the conflict between North and South is that the two parts are at different stages of development, so that the South only produces the ingredients for the industry of the North and it sells them at uncertain and fluctuating rates to buy the more expensive finished products. There is an interdependence that locks the two parties into their unequal roles and when the South seeks to share in the industrial role of the North it enters an arena where both the conditions of technology and the rules of competition put it at disadvantage. Thus, there is neither equality of present status nor equality of opportunity for the future and the inequality of condition is mirrored and magnified by the inequality of capability to change it. Not only have the norms and practices of postcolonial international relations trained the new nations to expect something different from their status of economic political subjugation, but the problems of economic inferiority within the international economic order keep coming back to the doorstep of the rich, who must keep their debtors alive enough to continue to service their debt, stable enough to continue to export their raw materials and even prosperous enough to continue to buy the exports of the rich. But kept alive to that degree, the South calls for more, demanding the equality that humanitarian norms promise to human beings and that the norms of the United Nations - as part of the current international political order- promise to states. Hence, it is a conflict not only of relations but also of perspectives, for it is primarily seen by both sides in zero-sum te rms" 2 5 4 See Adams, supra note 223 at 33-34. 2 5 1 The International Development Agency is the World Bank's concessional lending window, online: <http://www.worldbank.org/> 2 5 2 See Hardy, in Zartman W., supra note 242 at 261. 253 Adams, supra note 223 at 35. 2 5 4 See William Zartman I. "Introduction: explaining North-South Negotiations" in Zartman, supra note 242 at 3.3. International trade, environmental protection and hazardous substances This chap te r a rgues that , bes ides the gap that ex is ts be tween deve loped and deve lop ing coun t r ies , there is ano the r powerfu l force faci l i tat ing and a rguab ly encourag ing the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes f rom the Nor th to the S o u t h : the mul t i la tera l t rad ing sys tem and the l iberal economic pa rad igm that it upho lds . The re la t ionsh ip be tween free t rade and env i ronmen ta l protect ion has been sub jec t to m u c h deba te , par t icu lar ly s ince the last d e c a d e . 2 5 5 Thus , one wou ld expec t the t rade and env i ronmen t l i terature to s tudy ex tens ive ly the issue of No r th -Sou th t ransfer of haza rdous subs tances ( i .e. haza rdous chem ica l s and was tes ) , and the w a y s in wh ich t rade l ibera l isat ion could be p romot ing th is t ransfer . It is, however , surpr is ing ly dif f icult to f ind such a n a l y s i s . 2 5 6 In a j ud ic ious s tudy of the g lobal t ransfer of haza rdous was te , Jenn i fe r C lapp notes that there are th ree speci f ic inquir ies in the t rade and env i ronmen t deba te that have di rect re levance to the p rob lem of hazard t ransfer . The f irst one is the deba te a round the impac t of env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions on coun t r ies ' t rade compe t i t i veness , that is, whe the r lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards have an impac t in the expor t of haza rdous subs tances to deve lop ing count r ies . A second aspec t is the role env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions might play in industr ia l loca t ion , i .e., whe the r lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards in deve lop ing count r ies par t ly de te rm ine the t rans fe r of industr ia l act iv i ty f rom the Nor th to the S o u t h . Last ly , there is the issue of compat ib i l i t y be tween t rade ru les and the t rade measu res incorpora ted in mul t i la tera l env i ronmen ta l ag reemen ts , wh ich inqui res whe the r t rade can be leg i t imate ly rest r ic ted in the name of env i ronmen ta l p r o t e c t i o n . 2 5 7 In the con tex t of the f irst ana l ys i s , C lapp notes that the l i terature has focused a lmos t exc lus ive ly on the impact of domes t i c env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions on coun t r ies ' expor ts , and not on the impac t of weak domes t i c regu la t ions on the impor t of haza rds such as tox ic was tes and pest ic ides. In o ther t e rms , the ana lys is has cons idered pr imar i ly whe the r For a review of the emergence of the debate and the main issues discussed see Marc Williams "International Trade and the Environment: Issues, Perspectives and Challenges," in Caroline Thomas, éd., Rio. Unravelling the Consequences (London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994) at 80-97, and Annie Taylor "The Trade and Environment Debate," in Annie Taylor and Caroline Thomas eds., Global Trade and Global Social Issues (London; New York: Routledge, 1999) at 72-90. 2 5 6 For a fairly extensive economic literature review see Ravishankar Jayadevappa & Sumedha Chhatre "International trade and environmental quality: a survey," (2000) 32:2 Ecological Economics 175 at 175-194. A notable exception is Marc Williams, supra note 255 at 87-96, who recognises that free trade of hazardous substances causes environmental degradation and that the liberal economic perspective conflicts with the environmental perspective. See also Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT. Trade, Environment and the Future (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994) at 186-187. Although the author does not challenge the liberal economic perspective, he addresses the issue of North-South transfer of domestically banned or dangerous products (e.g. pesticides, waste), and mentions export bans as a possible solution to this problem. 257 See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 6-12. s t r ingent env i ronmen ta l s tandards in indust r ia l ised count r ies have af fected the i r compe t i t i veness in the in ternat ional marke t , rather than what is the impac t of lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards in deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 2 5 8 T h e expor t of haza rdous was tes to the Sou th in o rder to avo id the cos ts of d ispos ing of such mater ia ls in the Nor th , howeve r , is a c lear e x a m p l e of the direct in f luence that lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards have had in the t rans fer of was te . These t ransfers have af fected the env i r onmen t and heal th in the impor t ing count r ies , s ince they have ve ry l imi ted capac i ty to m a n a g e t h e m s a f e l y . 2 5 9 Sim i la r l y , domes t i c Nor thern regula t ions banning the use of a pest ic ide or chemica l but a l lowing its expor ta t ion are c lear ly an inv i tat ion to t rans fe r haza rdous chemica l s to deve lop ing count r ies because of the i r lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards . A s in the case of w a s t e s , haza rdous chemica ls have negat ive ly af fected the env i r onmen t and h u m a n heal th in the rec ip ient count r ies , and in s o m e cases a lso the g lobal env i r onmen t (e .g . pers is tent pest ic ides m a y t rave l long d is tances or return to the North as res idues in agr icu l tura l p roducts and foods impor ted f rom the deve lop ing w o r l d ) . 2 6 0 The second ques t ion wi th in the t rade and env i ronmen t debate that is re levant to the t rans fer of chemica l s and was tes inqui res whe the r f ree t rade and inves tmen t are creat ing 'po l lu t ion h a v e n s , ' i .e., whe the r Nor thern f i rms are re locat ing to deve lop ing count r ies to take advan tage of the i r re lat ive ly lower env i ronmen ta l s tandards . Regard ing th is i ssue , C lapp notes that whi le mos t of the t rade and env i ronmen t l i terature recogn ises that a t rans fer of the mos t haza rdous indust r ies f rom rich to poor count r ies has occur red as a response to s t r ingent env i ronmen ta l regulat ions in deve loped coun t r ies , th is p h e n o m e n o n is regarded as an excep t ion to the ru le, wh ich asser ts that f i rms genera l l y do not re locate for env i ronmen ta l r e a s o n s . 2 6 1 There is, however , ev idence of industr ia l re locat ion in the case of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes . One of t h e m is U . S . - b a s e d Was te M a n a g e m e n t Inc. , wh ich set up faci l i t ies in Hong K o n g , Indones ia and Tha i land in the 1 9 9 0 s , 2 6 2 or S w i s s - b a s e d S y n g e n t a , wh ich opened a plant to manu fac tu re paraquat (banned for use in See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 9. A notable exception is Marc Williams, who claims that the liberal economic perspective does not provide an adequate model for dealing with environmental degradation, because it abstracts from power relations in the global political economy. Thus, it allows for hazardous waste to be dumped in a poor country because it is economically 'efficient.' See Williams M., supra note 255 at 96. 259 See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 26-38. 2 6 0 Legislation on hazardous chemicals and the effects of these substances on health and the environment are considered in Chapter 1. 2 6 1 See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 9. In a subsequent article, Clapp argues that the pollution havens debate has been dominated by economic analysis that use very narrow definitions of'dirty industry' and 'environmental cost,' making pollution havens merely impossible to identify. For instance, the hazardous waste recycling industry, which can be highly polluting, is excluded from the definition of'dirty industry.' See Jennifer Clapp "What the Pollution Haven Debate Overlooks," (2002) 2:2 Global Environmental Politics 9 at 12-16. [Hereinafter Clapp, "Pollution Havens"]. 2 6 2 See Clapp, "Pollution Havens," Ibid, at 12-13. Swi tze r land s ince 1989 ) , and ano the r one to produce monoc ro tophos (not reg is tered for use in Sw i tze r land) in C h i n a . 2 6 3 A s exp la ined in Chap te r 2 , the capac i ty of big ag rochemica l corpora t ions to t ransfer the i r product ion opera t ions to the S o u t h , whe re they have numerous subs id ia r ies and s o m e of t h e m are a l ready produc ing haza rdous pes t ic ides , s t resses the dangers of an out r ight ban on the expor t of haza rdous pest ic ides to deve lop ing count r ies if no regula t ions on product ion are in t roduced. The last issue of the t rade and env i ronmen t l i terature that shou ld be cons idered is the s tudy of the compat ib i l i t y be tween t rade a g r e e m e n t s and env i ronmen ta l ag reemen ts . In th is rega rd , as noted by C l a p p , the l i terature has focused ma in ly on legal aspec ts , ra ther than on the role that the g lobal l iberal t rade order m igh t p lay in the hazard t rans fer p r o b l e m . 2 6 4 The next sec t ion a t tempts to under take that ana lys i s . Bes ides cons ider ing s o m e genera l legal aspec ts (in par t icu lar wi th in the contex t of the WTO) that app ly to the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes , it looks at s o m e of the w a y s in wh ich the ma jo r g loba l economic organ isa t ions ( i .e. the Wor ld Bank , the In ternat iona l Monetary Fund - IMF and the Wor ld T rade O r g a n i s a t i o n - W T O ) have p romoted the expor t of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies . 3.3.1. Hazardous Chemicals and the World Trade Organisation The W T O p romotes t rade in hazardous chemica l s in at least two w a y s . The f irst one is th rough the p romot ion of f ree t rade as its cent ra l ob jec t ive , l imi t ing the legal abi l i ty of m e m b e r s ta tes to protect the env i ronmen t th rough t rade- res t r i c t i ve m e a s u r e s . Because th is is a very genera l i ssue , th is sect ion cons iders s o m e genera l aspec ts of in ternat ional t rade and env i ronmen ta l law, inc luding not on ly the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on on haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides , but a lso the Base l Conven t ion on haza rdous was tes , and the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on Pers is tent Organ ic Po l lu tants . The second ques t ion cons idered is more spec i f i c , and it refers to the w a y s in wh ich the WTO has p romoted the t rans fer of haza rdous pest ic ides to the Sou th by foster ing industr ia l agr icu l tu re , wh ich rel ies heav i ly on chemica l p e s t i c i d e s . 2 6 5 A s ma jo r expor te rs of agr icu l tura l commod i t i es , deve lop ing count r ies have been urged to impor t chemica l pes t ic ides , whi le they are not necessar i l y capab le of manag ing t hem safe ly . Fu r the rmore , because of the i r l imi ted access to fore ign cu r rency , the count r ies of the Sou th have tended to use o lder (and more tox ic) See notes 141 (monocrotophos) and 142 (paraquat). See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 10. See Skip Spitzer, "the WTO and Pesticide Reform" Global Pesticide Campaigner 10:1 (April 2000) at 3. pest ic ides , as they are less expens i ve to purchase because patents no longer protect t h e m . 3.3.1.1. The Multilateral Trading System and Environmental Protection At the heart of the mul t i la tera l t rad ing s y s t e m , cent ra l ised and enforced by the Wor ld T rade Organ isa t i on , l ies the pr incip le of non-d isc r im ina t ion . Acco rd ing to th is n o r m , W T O m e m b e r s ta tes cannot t reat a product of ano the r m e m b e r more favourab ly than l ike p r o d u c t s 2 6 5 of o ther m e m b e r s (mos t - favou red -na t i on p r i n c i p l e ) , 2 6 7 and they mus t t reat goods that have en tered the i r marke t no less favourab ly than equ iva len t domes t i ca l l y p roduced goods (pr incip le of nat ional t r e a t m e n t ) . 2 6 8 Th is l imi ts the abi l i ty of count r ies to restr ict in ternat ional t rade for env i ronmenta l reasons , espec ia l l y if da ta on the impor t , expor t or domes t i c product ion of a par t icu lar subs tance are not ava i lab le or are unc lear . Ar t ic le 10 (9) of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , for ins tance , is cons is ten t wi th the pr inc ip le on non -d i sc r im ina t i on . It p rov ides that in o rder to be ab le to prohib i t the impor ta t ion of a haza rdous c h e m i c a l , a s ta te mus t ensure that the subs tance is not be ing impor ted f rom other sou rce (s ) , or p roduced domest i ca l l y . Th is might be p rob lemat ic because such da ta m a y not be eas i ly access ib le and thus a s tate could not ban the impor t of a subs tance unti l such in format ion is ava i lab le . Desp i te the rest r ic t ions imposed by the pr incip le of non -d i sc r im ina t i on , severa l key W T O a g r e e m e n t s inc lude the possib i l i ty for m e m b e r s ta tes to adopt t rade- res t r i c t i ve measu res for the protect ion of the env i ronmen t . Ar t ic le X X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) , 2 6 9 co rners tone of t rade re lat ions in the a rea of goods and basis of rules on t a r i f f s , 2 7 0 a l lows W T O m e m b e r s to adopt t rade- res t r i c t i ve m e a s u r e s necessary to protect h u m a n , an ima l or p lant life or heal th (par. b) , or to conse rve exhaus t ib le natura l resources if there are equa l restr ic t ions on domes t i c p roduct ion or consump t i on (par. g ) . These m e a s u r e s are on ly a l l owed , however , if they are not app l ied in a m a n n e r tha t const i tu tes a m e a n s of arb i t rary or unjust i f iab le d isc r im ina t ion be tween count r ies where Term used to describe the same or equivalent products, which should be treated equally under the principles of "national treatment" and "most-favoured-nation" treatment. 2 5 7 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [Hereinafter GATT 1947] Art. I, online: <http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/GATT.html>. 2 6 8 See Ibid., Art. III. 2 6 9 As of April 2003, the WTO had 146 member states. The WTO is an institutional framework that includes the GATT and all the agreements and legal instruments negotiated in the Uruguay Round (1986-94), which are binding upon all members, online: <http://www.wto.org>. 2 7 0 Tariffs are national taxes on imported goods that obstruct international commerce. Art I of GATT refers to 'customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation'. the s a m e cond i t ions p reva i l , or a ve i led restr ic t ion on in ternat ional t r a d e . 2 7 1 S im i la r l y , the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM ag reemen t ) a l lows WTO m e m b e r s to take th is type of measu res w h e n it is necessary for the protect ion of h u m a n , an ima l or plant life or hea l th , g iven cer ta in c o n d i t i o n s . 2 7 2 Las t ly , accord ing to art 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, m e m b e r s can adopt techn ica l regu la t ions necessary to protect " h u m a n heal th or sa fe ty , an ima l or p lant life or hea l th , or the e n v i r o n m e n t . " 2 7 3 Howeve r , these regula t ions cannot c reate unnecessa ry obs tac les to in ternat ional t rade , and they cannot be more t rade- res t r i c t i ve than necessary to fulf i l l the i r ob jec t ive . Whi le these ru les s e e m to a l low env i ronmenta l protect ion wi th in the con tex t of t rade , they have been in terpreted in a restr ic t ive m a n n e r by in ternat ional t rade t r ibuna ls . In the Beef-Hormone case, the WTO Appe l la te Body re jected the propos i t ion that a ban on sa le of beef f rom cat t le that had been fed growth ho rmones (appl ied even ly to domes t i c and fore ign l ivestock) w a s just i f ied under the S P M a g r e e m e n t , or was a necessa ry p recaut ionary m e a s u r e . 2 7 4 S im i la r l y , in the Tuna-Dolphin I and II275 and Shrimp-Turtle d e c i s i o n s , 2 7 6 t rade t r ibuna ls conc luded that the measu res taken by the U .S . to protect do lph ins and sea tur t les , respec t ive ly , were incons is tent wi th the G A T T and did not qual i fy for Ar t ic le X X ' s genera l e x c e p t i o n s . 2 7 7 In the case invo lv ing sea tur t les , however , a recent dec is ion (2001) by an arb i t ra t ion panel of the WTO Dispute Se t t l emen t Mechan i sm ruled 2 7 1 See GATT 1947, supra note 267, Article XX. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 27 (1994), Online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf> [hereinafter SPS Agreement], Arts. 2(1), 2(2), 2(3) and 5(7). 2 7 3 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 27 (1994), Online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf> [hereinafter TBT Agreement], Art. 2(2). 2 7 4 For further details of this case see Dale Arthur Oesterle "The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists: Is It Too Little, Too Late?" (1999) Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y Y.B. 1 at 4. 2 7 5 In Tuna/Dolphin I, Mexico challenged the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which allowed the U.S. to unilaterally impose trade sanctions on imported tuna to protect dolphins threatened by foreign fishing practices. A 1991 GATT dispute resolution panel decision declared the Act to be in violation of GATT, and stated that the measures in the Act were not "necessary" to the protection of animal life within the reservation of Article XX(b) In Tuna/Dolphin II, the act was challenged again by the European Union, and the panel held against the U.S., finding that the import embargoes in the Act did not qualify as "necessary" under Article XX(b) For further details see Ibid, at 3-4. 2 7 6 In the Shrimp/Turtle 1998 decision, a WTO panel invalidated a US ban on imports of shrimp harvested with devices that trapped and suffocated endangered sea turtles. The panel found that the US import restrictions were inconsistent with the GATT (art XI), and were not justified under Art. XX. The Appellate Body partially reversed the panel's decision stating that the rule was a permissible measure under art XX (g), but it concluded that U.S. implementation of the Section was discriminatory, and therefore violated GATT Art. XX's chapeau. See Ibid, at 3-4, and United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appeal by the United States) (1998), WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: <http://www.wto.Org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#list> [Hereinafter"Shrimp-Turtle Decision"]. 2 7 7 See Sanford E. Gaines, "Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?" (2002) 27 Colum. J. of Envt'l L. 383 at 385-6. in favour of the U .S . because it cons idered that the appl ica t ion of the measu re protect ing the tur t les w a s no longer d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . 2 7 8 The rul ing was cons is ten t wi th the 1998 panel dec i s i on , wh ich s ta ted that the U .S . law to protect sea tur t les w a s a permiss ib le measu re under Ar t . X X , but was incons is tent wi th its c h a p e a u . 2 7 9 S im i la r l y , in a 2001 dec is ion , the WTO Appe l la te Body uphe ld a pol icy by France wh ich b locked impor ts f rom C a n a d a that con ta ined a s b e s t o s . 2 8 0 Th is is the first t ime that the WTO app roves the use of a t rade rest r ic t ive measu re in order to protect h u m a n h e a l t h . 2 8 1 Al though these two dec is ions sugges t that there is s o m e room for env i ronmen ta l protect ion wi th in the WTO contex t , it is unc lear whe the r t rade- res t r i c t i ve measu res of env i ronmen ta l a g r e e m e n t s such as the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t ions are permiss ib le wi th in the WTO s y s t e m . A s noted by the WTO 's C o m m i t t e e on Trade and Env i ronmen t , a poss ib le source of conf l ict be tween env i ronmen ta l t reat ies and GATT ru les is that severa l of the t rade aspec ts they conta in v io la te the pr incip le of non -d isc r im ina t ion , s ince they env i sage t rade in a product wi th s o m e count r ies but not wi th o thers (which cont rad ic ts the mos t - favou red -na t i on c lause ) , or they permi t d isc r im ina t ion be tween domes t i c and impor ted products (which cont rad ic ts the nat ional t rea tmen t r u l e ) . 2 8 2 The Base l C o n v e n t i o n , for e x a m p l e , requ i res par t ies to app ly more rest r ic t ive t rade m e a s u r e s to non-par t ies to the t r e a t y , 2 8 3 and an a m e n d m e n t adopted in 1995 bans the expor t of haza rdous was tes f rom cer ta in s ta tes to o t h e r s . 2 8 4 Both rules v io la te the pr inc ip le of non -d i sc r im ina t i on , and WTO m e m b e r s could cha l lenge the i r app l ica t ion by ano the r m e m b e r in t rade p a n e l s . 2 8 5 2 7 8 Elizabeth R. DeSombre & J. Samuel Barkin "Turtles and Trade: The WTO's Acceptance of Environmental Trade Restrictions," (2002) 2:1 Global Environmental Politics 12 at 14-17. 2 7 9 See Ibid, and "Shrimp-Turtle Decision," supra note 276 at 46-76. 280 For details on asbestos see section 2.2.1. in Chapter 2. 2 8 1 See Michael Weinstein & Steve Charnovitz, "The Greening of the WTO" Foreign Affairs 80:6 (November/December 2001) 147, and Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, "WTO Case Review 2001" (2001) 19 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 457 at 505-517. 2 8 2 See WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, Agenda Part I, "CTE on: Trade Rules, Environmental Agreements and Disputes," online: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte01_e.htm>. 2 8 3 According to Art. 11 of the Basel Convention, parties can only trade hazardous substances with non-parties under certain circumstances, and if a particular agreement has been previously celebrated. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, UN Doc. I.G.80/3 (22 March 1989), 28 I.L.M. 649 (entered into force 5 June 1992) [Hereinafter Basel Convention], online: <http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm>. 2 8 4 Decision III/l, known as the Basel Ban, proscribes the export of hazardous wastes from the countries of Annex VII (EU members, OECD members and Liechtenstein), to Non-Annex VII countries. It is an amendment to the Basel Convention and as of August 2003 it had not entered into force. Up-to-date information can be found at: <http://www.basel.int/ratif/ratif.html#ban>. 2 8 5 Since so far there have been no disputes between WTO rules and trade provisions of a multilateral environmental agreement, it is still unclear which one would prevail in case of a conflict. The potent ia l legal conf l ic t be tween t rade a g r e e m e n t s and the R o t t e r d a m , Base l and S t o c k h o l m conven t ions could potent ia l ly be so lved wi th the inc lus ion of a t rade prov is ion expl ic i t ly a l lowing those t rade- res t r ic t i ve measu res that are suppor ted by a mul t i la tera l env i ronmen ta l t reaty . A t the s a m e t ime , it does not s e e m des i rab le that t rade t r ibuna ls in terpret W T O ' s genera l env i ronmenta l rules more loosely . A s a rgued by We ins te in and Cha rnov i t z , the WTO mus t f ind a ba lance be tween a t tack ing too s t rong ly the use of env i ronmen ta l t rade rest r ic t ions, wh ich invi tes env i ronmen ta l d a m a g e , and excess i ve len iency in impos ing sanc t ions , wh ich wou ld invi te pressure on poorer count r ies to adopt s tandards that are i l l -sui ted to the i r s t ra ined e c o n o m i e s . 2 8 6 Di f ferent ly put, to a l low pro tec t ion is t -mot iva ted env i ronmen ta l restr ic t ions wi th in the con tex t of in ternat iona l t rade could potent ia l ly w iden Sou th -No r th d ispar i t ies , mak ing it even harder for the Sou th to deve lop the economic and techno log ica l capac i ty to enforce env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions . 3.3.1.2. How the WTO Promotes Trade in Hazardous Pesticides In add i t ion to restr ic t ing the abi l i ty of m e m b e r s ta tes to ban or restr ict the impor ta t ion of haza rdous chem ica l s , the WTO promotes t rade in haza rdous chemica l s by foster ing the industr ia l agr icu l tura l s y s t e m . Industr ia l fa rm ing tends toward l a rge -sca le , cap i ta l -in tens ive fa rms spec ia l iz ing in s ing le c rops. These monocu l tu res usua l ly have m in ima l or no crop ro ta t ions ; they prec lude benef ic ia l crop in terac t ions ; they lead to the loss of soi l o rgan i sms and benef ic ia l i nsec ts ; and they d is rupt o ther comp l imen ta ry re la t ionsh ips on the f a r m , such as the product ion of manu re by l ivestock. T h e s e factors m a k e c rops espec ia l l y vu lne rab le to insects , weeds and d i sease , c rea t ing the need for h igh levels of pest ic ide use . In add i t ion , industr ia l agr icu l tura l s y s t e m s m a y cause acce le ra ted deve lopmen t of pest ic ide r e s i s t a n c e , 2 8 7 requi r ing the use of more or s t ronger p e s t i c i d e s . 2 8 8 See Weinstein & Charnovitz, supra note 281 at 2. 2 8 7 Pesticide resistance is a genetically based phenomenon. It occurs when a pest population (e.g. an insect, a weed) is exposed to a pesticide, and some individuals are resistant to the pesticide. If the pesticide is continually applied to the population of the pest, only resistant individuals will survive, breed and multiply, increasing the number of individuals resistant to that pesticide. The more a population is exposed to a pesticide, the more quickly resistance will develop. Because many generations of some pests can develop in a single year, resistance can develop very quickly. Recent studies indicate that more than 500 species of insects and mites are resistant to pesticides, and at least 17 species of insect species are resistant to all major classes of insecticides. Over 270 weed species, over 150 plant pathogens and about half a dozen of rats are resistant to pesticides that once controlled them. See Robert G. Bellinger, "Pesticide Resistance to Pesticides," Clemson University, SC, U.S.A. (March 1996), online: <http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache:27rqxbPROMcJ:ipm.ncsu.edu/safety/factsheets/resistan.pdf+pest+resi stance+to+pesticides&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 >. 288 See Spitzer, supra note 265 at 3. WTO a g r e e m e n t s p romote th is type of agr icu l ture by e l im inat ing t rade rest r ic t ions in th is sec to r , wh ich is devas ta t ing to sma l l - sca le p roducers , who are potent ia l ly the least pes t i c ide -dependen t . T h u s , ag reemen ts that reduce or e l im ina te tar i f fs, impor t con t ro ls , pr ice and fami ly fa rm suppor t p rog rams , e tc , resul t in open ing marke t s to cheap expor ts wi th wh ich sma l l f a rmers cannot compe te . They are thus forced to get b igger , and to use increas ing chemica l inputs to contro l pes ts . A t the s a m e t ime , t rade ru les a l low subs id ies of expor ts and fore ign inves tment pract ices wh ich great ly fos ter l a rger -sca le , h ighly pes t i c ide -dependen t a g r i c u l t u r e . 2 8 9 A g a i n , one could th ink that the so lu t ion to this p rob lem is to a l low protect ion is t measu res in the agr icu l tura l sector . There a re , however , two s ides of l ibera l is ing agr icu l tura l t rade. A s it w a s exp la ined in the prev ious sect ion (on Nor th -Sou th d ispar i t ies ) , most deve lop ing count r ies largely depend on expor ts of agr icu l tura l c o m m o d i t i e s , and the i r s i tuat ion has worsened due to protect ion is t measu res by the North that have d is tor ted the agr icu l tura l marke t . There fo re , one of the advances in the WTO is the a t tempt to l iberal ise the sec to r so that p roducers in the th i rd wor ld obta in a fair pr ice for wha t they p roduce. Howeve r , th is means that deve lop ing count r ies wil l a lso be unab le to protect the i r f a rmers , and g iven the i r lack of resources wil l have fur ther incent ives to use chemica l pest ic ides in o rder to be compet i t i ve in the in ternat ional marke t . Th is is agg rava ted by the fact that in ternat ional f inancia l inst i tu t ions, wh ich are e x a m i n e d next , usua l ly condi t ion the i r lend ing to s t ruc tura l re forms that l imit the role of the S ta te to improve the condi t ion of f a rmers , and the possib i l i ty of p romot ing the use of mo r7e env i ronmen ta l l y f r iendly techn iques to contro l pes ts . T h u s , whi le mak ing the agr icu l tura l sec to r less d is tor ted is essent ia l to deve lop ing count r ies , it is equal ly impor tan t to enhance the i r abi l i ty to p romote sa fe r w a y s to contro l pests (e .g . in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t ( IPM) t e c h n i q u e s ) 2 9 0 and to safe ly m a n a g e chemica l pest ic ides in those cases in wh ich they mus t be used . " 3 See Ibid, at 3-4. 2 9 0 The FAO Code of Conduct defines IPM as "a pest management system that, in the context of the associated environment and the population dynamics of the pest species, utilizes all suitable techniques and methods in as compatible a manner as possible and maintains the pest population levels below those causing economically unacceptable damage or loss." From this definition follows that IPM seeks to maintain the targeted pest at a level where damage to the crop is not economically unacceptable, rather than to eliminate it. IPM control methods include: biological control, the use of pest-resistant crops, non-fatal chemical controls, and cultural controls. Biological control entails mobilizing the natural predators of a pest in order to control it, which usually involves introducing a natural enemy (such as insects or microbes) where it does not naturally occur. The use of pest resistant crops entails breeding strains of crops that are inherently resistant to their normal predators. Much of the research in this field has concentrated on isolating the genetic traits responsible for resistance, to breed them into other non-resistant plants (e.g. a strain of tomato inter-bred with a gene from the bacterium bacillus thuringiensis). The non-fatal chemical method entails the use of chemicals that are less toxic and fall short of directly killing the pest (e.g., sex pheromones to disrupt the mating of insects). Lastly, cultural controls, 3.3.2. Financial Institutions and Trade in Hazardous Chemicals In ternat iona l f inancia l inst i tu t ions suppor t t rade in haza rdous chem ica l s ma in ly th rough the p romot ion of pest ic ide use in the i r f inanc ing p rog rams . S t ruc tu ra l ad jus tmen t p lans imposed by inst i tut ions such as the Wor ld Bank and the IMF have boosted pest ic ide sa les and use in deve lop ing count r ies , by emphas i z i ng agr icu l tura l expor ts as the key to e c o n o m i c deve lopmen t in these c o u n t r i e s . 2 9 1 A s pointed out by the F A O , ou tb reak budge ts , d i rect and indirect subs id ies and cer ta in ex tens ion pol ic ies are al l typ ica l pest ic ide pol ic ies that cont r ibute to overuse and abuse of pest ic ides , and they are usua l ly imp lemen ted by nat ional or local g o v e r n m e n t s , often in f luenced by deve lopmen t b a n k s . 2 9 2 Struc tu ra l ad jus tmen t loans by the Wor ld Bank , for e x a m p l e , may inc lude cond i t ions such a s : nat ional c o m m i t m e n t s to genera te fo re ign -exchange ea rn ings th rough product ion of cash crops and non- t rad i t iona l expor t c rops ; l ibera l isat ion of agr icu l tura l t r ade ; prov is ion of incent ives and subs id ies for expor t -o r ien ted agr icu l tu re ; reduct ion in avai lab i l i ty of credi t to local f a rme rs ; and cuts in staff and resources in agr icu l tura l depa r tmen ts and g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s . 2 9 3 Apar t f rom the negat ive impac ts on smal l s ized fa rmers , who suf fer m a s s i v e cuts in soc ia l se rv ices and f inancia l s u p p o r t , 2 9 4 these p rog rams can d a m a g e the env i ronmen t , because non- t rad i t iona l crop product ion and cash crops are of ten more suscep t ib le to d isease and pes ts , requi r ing large v o l u m e s of tox ic c h e m i c a l s . 2 9 5 Perhaps recogn is ing its inf luence on pest ic ide use in deve lop ing count r ies , the Wor ld Bank app roved in 1998 Opera t iona l Pol icy 4 . 0 9 (OP 4 . 0 9 ) , wh ich app l ies to all projects invo lv ing pest m a n a g e m e n t and suppor ts a s t ra tegy that p romotes the use of b io logical or env i ronmen ta l contro l me thods and usually based on techniques employed by farmers, seek to limit pests by affecting their habitats. They include: crop rotation, practically abandoned in favour of the monocultures promoted by the 1960s green revolution; physical traps (e.g. yellow boards covered in glue to trap whiteflies); and the^estruction of crop residues after harvesting (so as to remove any remaining pest habitat and eggs). For further details on IPM see Hough, "The Global Politics of Pesticides" supra note 51 at 127-131, and Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 2. T01 See Crain, supra note 49 at 10. 292 See Global IPM Facility, "Four essential Elements of IPM Programmes," Online: <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/AGRICULT/AGP/AGPP/IPM/gipmf/02_programmes/02b.htm>. 2Q"3 See Lee, supra note 249 at 1-2. 2 9 4 As explained by Christine Lee, most cash crops require substantial initial capital investments far beyond the reach of small farmers, such as: complex irrigation systems, sophisticated marketing systems, and information on topics ranging from cultivation techniques to international market dynamics, which only foreign corporations and local elites can afford. Additionally, small farmers rarely have access to the financial capital or technical expertise to make the shift from local food to export crops. See Ibid, at 2. 295 As explained before, the shift from a variety of crops to monocropping systems exacerbates the need for agricultural inputs, depletes the soil of essential minerals and nutrients, and decreases biological diversity (including beneficial insects that eliminate pests.) See Ibid, at 4. reduces re l iance on syn the t i c chemica l pest ic ides. In agr icu l tura l pro jects , the pol icy p romotes f a r m e r - d r i v e n , eco log ica l ly based in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t ( I P M ) . 2 9 7 Accord ing to OP 4 . 0 9 , the Bank can only f inance the acqu is i t ion of pest ic ides w h e n the i r use is just i f ied under an IPM a p p r o a c h ; 2 9 8 it cannot f inance h ighly hazardous fo rmu la ted pest ic ide products be long ing to Wor ld Heal th Organ iza t ion (WHO) C lasses l a , l b , and I I 2 9 9 if t hey are l ikely to be used by persons w i thout adequa te t ra in ing , equ ipmen t and f a c i l i t i e s ; 3 0 0 and when supp ly ing pest ic ides to fa rmers , bank staff mus t fo l low the s tandards set forth by the F A O . 3 0 1 In real i ty , however , m a n y poor ly des igned pro jects p romote increased use of pest ic ides , bank staff tends to over look the inabi l i ty of fa rmers to fo l low FAO gu ide l ines ( i .e. , they often cannot afford protect ive equ ipmen t or e x t r e m e t rop ica l heat m a k e s its use i m p r a c t i c a l ) , 3 0 2 and the pest ic ides used of ten conta in act ive ingred ients that are l isted as C lasses l a , l b or I I . 3 0 3 In add i t i on , pro jects wi th good pest m a n a g e m e n t des ign f requent ly fail to ach ieve the i r goa ls due to inadequate project mon i to r ing and contro l by Bank s t a f f . 3 0 4 Pest ic ide Ac t ion Network Nor th A m e r i c a (PANNA) rev iewed d o c u m e n t s for all Wor ld Bank projects approved be tween 1997 and 2 0 0 0 and found that few of t h e m even ment ion I P M . 3 0 5 In a di f ferent s tudy , P A N N A found that imp lemen ta t i on of OP 4 .09 is genera l ly weak and real p rogress toward eco log ica l ly based agr icu l tura l s y s t e m s and pest ic ide use reduct ion has been l i m i t e d . 3 0 6 T h u s , desp i te the good in tent ions exp ressed in its Pest M a n a g e m e n t Opera t ion Pol icy , the Wor ld Bank stil l p romotes the use of pest ic ides in deve lop ing count r ies . 2 9 6 World Bank, Operational Policy O.P. 4.09 (December 1998) [Hereinafter O.P. 4.09] Art. 1, online: <http://wbln0018.worldbank.Org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/0/665DA6CA847982168525672C007D07A 3?OpenDocument>. [The policy replaced a previous version dated 1996]. 2 9 7 World Bank OP 4.09 defines IPM as "a mix of farmer-driven, ecologically based pest control practices that seeks to reduce reliance on synthetic chemical pesticides." See Ibid, at footnote 4. 2 9 8 See Ibid. Art. 4. 2 9 9 These are: extremely hazardous (la), highly hazardous (lb), and moderately hazardous (II). Please see supra note 72. 3 0 0 See O.P. 4.09, supra note 296 Arts. 6, 7(a) and 7(b). 3 0 1 See Ibid. Art. 7. 3 0 2 See Marcia Ishii-Eiteman etal., "Monitoring the World Bank's Pest Management Policy: A Guide for Communities," Pesticide Action Network North America (PANNA) (May 2001), online: <http://www.panna.org/resources/documents/monitoringWB.dv.html> and Global IPM Facility, supra note 292. 3 0 3 See Ishii-Eiteman etal., Ibid, at 10. 3 0 4 See Ibid, at 3-4. 3 0 5 See Ned Tozun "New Policy, Old Patterns: A Survey of IPM in World Bank Projects" Global Pesticide Campaigner 11:1 (April 2001) at 1, online: <http://www.panna.Org/resources/gpc/gpc_200104.ll.l.02.dv.html>. 3 0 6 Although projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia were most likely to aggravate pesticide problems, projects in Latin America, Europe, and Central Asia showed some promise for ecological alternatives. See Ibid, at 1. Up to now, Chap te r 3 has sought to invest igate the con tex t in wh ich the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides takes p lace, tak ing into account the Nor th -S o u t h t ransfer of haza rdous was tes , wh ich occurs under s im i la r c i r cums tances . The next sect ion a rgues that when the contex t is cons ide red , it becomes ev iden t that the t rans fe r of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies is pr imar i ly an eth ica l ques t i on . A s a resul t , it s tud ies the legal and mora l pr inc ip les that app ly to th is i ssue , and the re levance that s ta tes have g iven to these ru les in the in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l a r e n a . 3.4. The Nor th-South Transfer of Hazardous Substances : Ethical D i lemmas The Nor th -Sou th t rans fer of hazardous chemica l s and was tes enta i ls a d i l e m m a for both par t ies. For a Nor thern c o m p a n y , the opt ion is be tween ga in ing prof i ts or sav ing m o n e y by m e a n s of expor t ing hazardous chemica ls and was tes to count r ies that have lower env i ronmen ta l s tanda rds , and fac ing the possib i l i ty of los ing compet i t i veness or , in the wors t c a s e , go ing bankrupt . For the S o u t h , the choice is more dif f icult . The mos t d rama t i c case is that of least deve loped count r ies , wh ich receive nox ious mater ia ls to obta in resources that are ind ispensab le to ove rcome pover ty and to fulfi l l the i r popu la t ions ' mos t bas ic needs . In this case , the d i l e m m a is be tween env i ronmen ta l protect ion and survival, and there fore it is less of a cho ice . The s i tuat ion of o ther deve lop ing count r ies is a lso p rob lemat i c : whi le part of the i r indust ry has b e c o m e dependen t on haza rdous subs tances ( i .e. was tes used as raw mate r ia l s , pest ic ides to sus ta in expor t agr icu l ture) to be v iab le in the in ternat ional and domes t i c marke ts , g o v e r n m e n t s are fac ing an endur ing soc ia l , e c o n o m i c and of ten pol i t ical cr is is that p revents t h e m f rom mak ing dec is ions that wou ld immed ia te l y deepen that cr is is . The opt ion is be tween long- te rm env i ronmen ta l p ro tec t ion , the benef i ts of wh ich are far in the fu ture , and more press ing economic and socia l p rob lems. A l though the North a lso conf ronts th is k ind of p red icament , it is s ign i f icant ly more onerous for the S o u t h , wi th less economic and techno log ica l resources to o v e r c o m e the negat ive soc ia l and economic impac ts that resul t f rom app ly ing dras t ic env i ronmen ta l m e a s u r e s , and less power to enforce env i ronmen ta l regu la t ions . Th is is one of the reasons why a l though all count r ies are respons ib le to protect the env i ronmen t f rom the negat ive ef fects of hazardous subs tances ( i .e. chem ica l s and was tes ) , the Nor th has a g rea ter responsib i l i ty to do s o , s ince it has more f reedom to choose and bet ter resources to do what is right. A s put by Rober t Jackson " the re is no escape f rom respons ib i l i ty a l though it fal ls more heav i ly on the shou lders of those wi th the grea tes t power and author i ty to shape e v e n t s . " 3 0 7 There a re , there fo re , two ques t ions to cons ider . The f irst one is whe the r the expor t of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes by indust r ia l ised count r ies to the count r ies of the S o u t h is just i f ied under in ternat ional mora l i ty and in ternat ional law, cons ider ing that the North has more power to do what is r ight and that it wan ts to protect its own c i t i zens and env i r onmen t f rom those subs tances because of the r isks they en ta i l . The second issue is whe the r No r th -Sou th d ispar i t ies shou ld be addressed for a k ind of env i ronmen ta l protect ion that does not unde rm ine h u m a n ' s bas ic needs or the Sou th ' s sus ta inab le d e v e l o p m e n t , 3 0 8 or they shou ld s imp ly be formally a c k n o w l e d g e d , as they appea r in the Base l and Ro t te rdam conven t ions . In o rder to answer these ques t i ons , the next sec t ion s tud ies the legal and mora l in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l pr inc ip les that have di rect app l ica t ion to the issue of hazard t ransfer . These pr inc ip les app ly not on ly because they are inc luded e i ther expl ic i t ly or impl ic i t ly in the t reat ies dea l ing wi th hazardous chemica l s and was tes , but a lso because they have been recogn ised by the great major i ty of s ta tes in the in ternat ional env i ronmenta l a rena . 3.4.1. The principle of State responsibility for transboundary harm The pr inc ip le of S ta te responsib i l i ty for t r ansboundary ha rm is rooted in pr incip le 21 of the S t o c k h o l m Dec lara t ion (1972) and pr inciple 2 of the Rio Dec la ra t ion (1992 ) . Both dec la ra t ions af f i rm that s ta tes have the responsib i l i ty to " e n s u r e that act iv i t ies wi th in the i r ju r isd ic t ion or contro l do not cause d a m a g e to the env i ronmen t of o ther S ta tes o r of a reas beyond the l imits of nat ional j u r i sd i c t i on . " As fo rmu la ted in the two ins t ruments , the rule has been wide ly accep ted as a s ta temen t of cus tomary in ternat iona l law. A s expl ic i t ly recogn ised by the In ternat iona l Law C o m m i s s i o n of the Uni ted Nat ions (here inaf ter I L C ) 3 0 9 in its c o m m e n t a r y to the Draft ar t ic les on Prevent ion of J U See Jackson, supra note 229 at 4. 3 0 8 By sustainable development I mean a kind of development that seeks to provide human beings a better standard of living by fulfilling their basic needs while respecting the environment and the rights of present and future generations to enjoy a healthy environment. This implies, of course, a change of the consumption patterns both in the North and by the 'elites' in the South. 3 0 9 The ILC was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947. Its main objective is the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification. Although its statute makes a distinction between progressive development and codification, in practice codification embraces also progressive development. See Shabtai Rosenne, ed., The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Parti, Articles 1-35 (Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff; Norwell, MA, U.S.A.: Kluwer Academic, 1991) at 18. Transbounda ry H a r m f rom Hazardous A c t i v i t i e s , 3 1 0 the pr incip le enta i ls an ob l igat ion to prevent t r ansboundary h a r m : 3 1 1 "The prevention of transboundary harm arising from hazardous activities is an objective well emphasized by principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and recognised by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict as now forming part of the corpus of international l aw" 3 1 2 (Emphasis in original). A l t hough in ternat ional j u r i sp rudence has a lso a m p l y referred to th is p r i n c i p l e , 3 1 3 there are s o m e uncer ta in t ies as to what p revent ive ac t ions it en ta i l s , and what k ind of d a m a g e is to be p r e v e n t e d . 3 1 4 The ILC Draft Ar t ic les def ine the rule as an obl igat ion to " t ake al l appropr ia te measu res to prevent s igni f icant t r ansboundary ha rm or at any even t m in im ize the risk t h e r e o f " 3 1 5 when car ry ing out lawful act iv i t ies. Seve ra l conc lus ions can be d rawn f rom th is p rov is ion : f i rst, the ob l igat ion is one of due d i l igence, wh ich means that s ta tes are not ob l iged to guaran tee that s igni f icant t r ansbounda ry ha rm is p reven ted , but to take al l the necessary measu res of wh ich they are capab le - f inanc ia l ly and techno log ica l l y - to prevent such h a r m . 3 1 6 S e c o n d , the ha rm to be p revented mus t be s ign i f icant , that is , more than detec tab le but not necessar i l y ' se r i ous ' or ' subs tan t i a l , ' and it mus t lead to a real de t r imenta l effect, suscept ib le of be ing measu red by factua l and ob jec t ive s tandards (e .g . real de t r imenta l effect on h u m a n hea l th , the env i r onmen t or agr icu l tu re in o ther S t a t e ) . 3 1 7 Last ly , the risk is def ined in t e rms of a h igh probabi l i ty of See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, UN GAOR, 56 t h sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.V.E.l [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], online: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/prevention_articles(e).pdf> at 366-436. 3 1 1 See Gregg Anthony Cervi, "War wrecks and the Environment: Who's Responsible for the Legacy of War? A Case Study: Solomon Islands and the U.S." (1999) 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 351 at 377 and 380; Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law I: Frameworks, Standards and Implementations (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1995) [Sands, "Principles of I EL"] at 190-191; Patricia Birnie & Alan E. Boyle, International Law and The Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 90-92; André Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: Between Discretion and Constraint (Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff/Graham &Trotman; Norwell, MA: Kluwer, 1993) at 30; and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 601 (1987). 3 1 2 See International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, UN GAOR, 56 t h sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.V.E.2) [Hereinafter ILC Commentaries] at 378, online: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/preventionfra.htm>. 3 1 3 See, for instance, Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada) [1941] 3 U.N.R.I.A.A 1938 (1949), Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. vs. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain vs. France) 12 U.N.R.I.A.A 281 [1957], and Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia) [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7. 3 1 4 See Nollkaemper, supra note 311 at 31. 3 1 5 See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 310 Art. 3. 3 1 6 See Nollkaemper, supra note 311 at 40-41. The ILC Draft Articles refer to taking steps such as: requiring prior authorization for the activity (Art. 6); making an environmental impact assessment (Art. 7); notifying states likely to be affected (Art. 8); and enter into consultations with those states (Art. 9). 3 1 7 See ILC Commentaries, supra note 312 at 388. caus ing s igni f icant t ransboundary h a r m , or a low probabi l i ty of caus ing d isas t rous t ransboundary ha rm (e .g . nuc lear d i s a s t e r ) . 3 1 8 The re levance of the pr inc ip le of s tate responsib i l i ty to the t reat ies dea l ing wi th haza rdous subs tances l ies in the fact that s ta tes could be v io la t ing th is rule w h e n expor t ing haza rdous chemica l s or was tes if s ign i f icant ha rm were l ikely to occur . G iven cond i t ions of use in the S o u t h , one could contend that s ign i f icant ha rm is prec ise ly what shou ld be expec ted w h e n e v e r a subs tance that a deve loped coun t ry has banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted for env i ronmen ta l or heal th reasons is expor ted to a deve lop ing count ry . Th is is because if the subs tance is cons idered too haza rdous to be used in an indust r ia l ised coun t ry , w i th amp le resources and capac i ty to m a n a g e th is type of ma te r ia l s , it wil l in all probabi l i ty present equa l or g rea ter p rob lems in the impor t ing s ta te , wi th less capac i ty to m a n a g e it sa fe ly . The expor t of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes to the Sou th could thus be v io la t ing the obl igat ion upon s ta tes to take all pract icable s teps to prevent s ign i f icant t r ansboundary h a r m . The app l ica t ion of th is rule to the issue of t rade in haza rdous chemica l s and was tes res ides a lso in the fact that the p reamb les of the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t ions inc lude it e i ther impl ic i t ly or expl ic i t ly it in the i r p reamb les . The Base l Conven t i on on haza rdous was tes (adopted prior to the adopt ion of the Rio Dec la ra t ion , wh ich re i terates pr incip le 21 of the S t o c k h o l m Dec lara t ion in pr incip le 2) not on ly recogn ises the app l ica t ion of the S t o c k h o l m Dec lara t ion but a lso af f i rms that " S t a t e s are respons ib le for the fu l f i lment of the i r in ternat ional ob l igat ions concern ing the protect ion of h u m a n heal th and protect ion and preserva t ion of the env i ronmen t , and are l iable in acco rdance wi th in ternat ional l aw . " The S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on on pers is tent o rgan ic po l lu tants quo tes the pr incip le in full l eng th , as fo rmu la ted in the S t o c k h o l m and Rio Dec la ra t ions . Las t ly , the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion recal ls the "per t inen t p rov is ions of the Rio Dec la ra t i on , " whi le the London Gu ide l ines for the Exchange of In fo rmat ion on Chem ica l s in In ternat iona l T rade , on wh ich the t reaty w a s b a s e d , expl ic i t ly inc lude pr incip le 21 of the S t o c k h o l m Dec lara t ion in the list of genera l pr inc ip les to be app l ied (Art . 2 ) : "In their activities with regard to chemicals, States should act, in so far as applicable, in accordance with principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment" [i.e., the 1972 Stockholm Declaration]. 3 1 8 See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 310 Art 2(a) and Ibid, at 381. 3.4.2. The principle of international environmental equity The pr inc ip le of env i ronmen ta l equ i ty d ic ta tes the necess i ty of tak ing s teps to ensure that the rich and powerfu l do not insu la te t hemse l ves f rom env i ronmen ta l ha rm by d isp lac ing p rob lems on to the poor and the w e a k . 3 1 9 It refers to d is t r ibut ive jus t i ce , to the fa i rness or Tightness of d is t r ibut ing benef i ts and burdens within c o m m u n i t i e s . 3 2 0 A s a rgued by the env i ronmen ta l jus t i ce m o v e m e n t in the U .S . and paral le l m o v e m e n t s in other coun t r ies , minor i ty commun i t i es and socia l ly d i sadvan taged persons are of ten burdened d ispropor t ionate ly by env i ronmen ta l hazards such as tox ic was te d u m p s and pest ic ide e x p o s u r e , and a s im i la r pat tern of uneven exposure to env i ronmen ta l hazards is apparen t w o r l d w i d e . 3 2 1 In ternat iona l ly , there fore , the pr inc ip le of env i ronmen ta l equ i ty refers to mat te rs such as the expor t of haza rdous was tes and pest ic ides f rom deve loped to deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 3 2 2 In ternat iona l equ i ty was at the core of the debate at the Ear th S u m m i t , where wor ld leaders d i scussed how to a l locate future responsib i l i t ies for env i ronmen ta l protect ion a m o n g s ta tes at d i f ferent levels of deve lopmen t , wi th di f ferent levels of cont r ibu t ion to par t icu lar p rob lems , and wi th di f ferent env i ronmen ta l and deve lopmen ta l needs and p r i o r i t i e s . 3 2 3 Th is does not m e a n , however , that there is on ly one def in i t ion of the pr inc ip le . Jus t as domes t i c soc ie ty has compe t ing def in i t ions of wha t is fair and equ i tab le , d i ss im i la r and even conf l ic t ing v iews of equ i ty are poss ib le in ternat iona l ly . Howeve r , a charac te r isa t ion that cap tures mos t of the in terpreta t ions used in the in ternat ional con tex t def ines in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l equ i ty as " a fa i r and jus t d is t r ibut ion a m o n g count r ies of benef i ts , bu rdens , and dec i s i on -mak ing author i ty that is assoc ia ted wi th in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l r e l a t i o n s " 3 2 4 . Paul Harr is descr ibes six ve rs ions of in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l equi ty that have been present in env i ronmen ta l negot ia t ions. 3 1 9 See Oran R. Young, "Environmental Ethics in International Society," in Jean-Marc Coicaud & Daniel Warner, eds., Ethics and International Affairs: Extents and Limits (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2001) at 167. 3 2 0 See Paul G. Harris, International Equity and Global Environmental Politics: Powers and Principles in U.S. Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) at 27-28. 3 2 1 See Steven S. Coughlin, "Environmental justice: the role of epidemiology in protecting unempowered communities from environmental hazards" (1996) 184:1-2 The Science of the Total Environment 67 at 67-69, and Marianne Lavelle & Marcia A. Coyle, "Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law," in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles. The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993) at 136-143. 3 2 2 For example, chemicals banned or restricted in the U.S. such as DDT and paraquat are widely used in Central America and other less developed areas of the world. See Coughlin, Ibid, at 70. 3 2 3 See Philippe Sands "International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development. Emerging Legal Principles," in Winfried Lang, ed., Sustainable Development and International Law (London; Boston: Graham fkTrotman/M. Nijhoff, 1995) at 60. 3 2 4 See Harris P., supra note 320 at 25-27. The next sec t ion e labora tes on four of these ve rs ions , as they app ly to the issue of t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes . They are p romot ing h u m a n r igh ts ; t reat ing o thers as ends (Kant ian e th i cs ) ; max im iz ing h u m a n happ iness (ut i l i tar ian ism) and r ight ing past w rongs ( c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated respons ib i l i t ies) . Whi le the f irst two indicate that s ta tes have a duty not to expor t harmfu l chemica ls and was tes to o ther count r ies (espec ia l ly if they are more vu lnerab le and have ve ry l imi ted capac i ty to m a n a g e t h e m sa fe l y ) , the last two sugges t that indust r ia l ised count r ies have an ob l igat ion of at least a mora l nature to f inance part of the safe m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes in the S o u t h . 3.4.2.1. Promoting human rights Accord ing to the h u m a n r ights app roach , ind iv idua ls have inherent r ights s imp ly because they are h u m a n be ings. At the very least , ind iv idua ls need to have the i r secur i ty and subs is tence r ights (however def ined) p ro tec ted , for w i thout those r ights al l o thers canno t be fu l f i l led. T h u s , w h e n human- i nduced pol lut ion den ies c o m m u n i t i e s the capac i ty to ach ieve those r ights , s ta tes - a s the mos t impor tan t du t y -bea re rs by v i r tue of the i r capac i t ies - shou ld act ive ly try to s top pol lut ing act iv i t ies f rom wi th in the i r ju r isd ic t ions or wh ich are under the i r c o n t r o l . 3 2 5 In a tho rough ana lys is of the l ink be tween the expor t of banned pest ic ides and h u m a n r ights law, Beth G a m m i e a rgues that the expor t of b a n n e d , un reg is te red , and restr ic ted use pest ic ides m a y v io la te the r ights to life (the mos t f undamen ta l of h u m a n r ights , s ince it is essent ia l for the en joymen t of al l o ther r igh ts ) , heal th (which per ta ins to the r ight to cond i t ions necessa ry for good heal th to occur , and is essent ia l for en j oymen t of the r ight to l i f e ) , 3 2 6 and fami ly or reproduct ion ( i .e. the r ight to conce ive and bear ch i ld ren , wh ich could be af fected by pest ic ides that s ter i l ise men or w o m e n ) . A long these l ines, the dump ing of hazardous was tes that resul ts in the dea ths or po ison ing of people imp l ica tes , respec t ive ly , the i r r ight to life and to h e a l t h . 3 2 7 S im i la r l y , This is consistent with the principle of state responsibility transboundary harm, and with Principle 14 of the Rio Declaration {supra note 341). See last section of Kantian ethics in this chapter and Harris, Ibid, at 32-33. 3 2 6 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Art. 12, online: <http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm>. 3 2 7 See UN, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, which explicitly recognises that "illicit dumping of toxic and dangerous substances and waste potentially constitutes a serious threat to the human rights to life and health of everyone." (Art. 11), online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument>. In 1995, the UN Economic and Social Council called for appointment of a special rapporteur to study and report on the issue (Decision 1995/288). In her 2001 report, the Rapporteur noted that both the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions "contain lacunae which prevent effective action to combat clandestine transfers... [which] themselves may open the way to the "legal" transfer of products which may prove dangerous for humans and the environment and which must accordingly be considered to constitute unlawful transfers in the context of human-rights and environmental standards." The term 'illegal,' thus, refers to a transfer of toxic or dangerous the expor t of pest ic ides banned in the expor t ing count ry v io la tes the r ight to life of people in the impor t ing count ry if those peop le die f rom acute po ison ing or te rmina l d iseases induced by those subs tances , or if the pest ic ides e l im ina te surv iva l requ i remen ts , such as c lean wa te r and food s u p p l i e s . 3 2 8 In add i t ion to the r ights to l i fe, heal th and fami l y , there is cons iderab le in ternat ional suppor t for the r ight to a hea l thy env i ronment in the contex t of h u m a n r ights law. Th is is ev idenced by the pract ice of s ta tes , and by dec la ra t ions , reso lu t ions and o ther off icial ac ts of o rgans of the Uni ted Nat ions , and research by in ternat ional legal scho la rs . The h u m a n r ight to a hea l thy env i ronmen t is expl ic i t ly recogn ised in art 11 of the Protocol of S a n S a l v a d o r , add i t iona l to the A m e r i c a n Conven t ion on H u m a n Righ ts , and it has been incorpora ted in severa l env i ronmen ta l a g r e e m e n t s and in a var ie ty of draft in ternat ional legal pr inc ip les and i n s t r u m e n t s . 3 2 9 It has a lso been inc luded in the nat ional const i tu t ions of more than 60 count r ies , and in the const i tu t ion of severa l S ta tes wi th in the Uni ted S t a t e s . 3 3 0 A s a rgued by Magg io and Lynch , al l these ins t ruments sugges t the ex is tence of a no rma t i ve , if not l ega l , r ight to the env i ronmen t , wh ich despi te its s ty l is t ic var ia t ions has an ident i f iable co re : each person has a r ight to an env i ronmen t that suppor ts h i s /he r phys ica l and spi r i tual we l l -be ing and deve lopmen t wh ich wou ld proscr ibe , a m o n g s t o thers , " the dump ing of tox ic was tes in a reas inhab i ted and ut i l ized by local p o p u l a t i o n s . " 3 3 1 substances that violate human rights in the recipient country, regardless of whether they are legally "permitted" (e.g. under a treaty). The Commission adopted a resolution (Res. 2002/27), where, inter alia: it affirmed that the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous wastes and products are a serious threat to the rights to life and physical health, particularly in developing countries that do not have the technologies to process them; it urged all governments to ban the export of toxic and dangerous products, substances, chemicals, pesticides and persistent organic pollutants that are banned or severely restricted in their own countries; and it invited the Rapporteur to include in her next report "the ambiguities in international instruments that allow illegal movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes, and any gaps in the effectiveness of the international regulatory mechanisms." See UN ESC, Commission on Human Rights, 58 t h session, Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights, Report by Ms. Fatma-Zohra Ouhachi-Vesely, Special Rapporteur on toxic wastes, UN doc. E/CN.4/2002/61 (21 January 2002). 328 For a detailed analysis of the status and scope of these rights see Beth Gammie, "Human Rights Implications of the Export of Banned Pesticides" (1994) 25 Seton Hall L. Rev. 558. See, for example, the 1989 Hague Declaration, the 1994 Final Report on Human Rights and the Environment of the Commission on Human Rights Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities ("Ksentini Report"), the 1986 draft legal principles of the Experts Group of the World Commission on Environment and Development, UNEP's 1993 Proposal for a Basic Law on Environmental Protection and the Promotion of Sustainable Development, Article 24 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) draft International Covenant on Environment and Development. In Greg Maggio & Owen J. Lynch, "Human Rights, Environment, and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and Global Society," Center for Int'l Envtl. L. (15 November 1997), online: <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olpaper3.html> and Neil A.F. Popovic, "In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment" (1996) 27 Colum. H.R.L. Rev. 487 at 505-506. 3 3 0 See Popovic, Ibid, at 505-509. 3 3 1 See Maggio & Lynch, supra note 329. The di f f icul ty of the h u m a n r ights approach is that it is not a lways easy to ca lcu la te who caused how m u c h pol lut ion and to wha t ex tent it af fected whose essen t ia l r i g h t s . 3 3 2 In the case of t rade in hazardous chemica l s and was tes , howeve r , it m igh t be poss ib le to ident i fy those e lemen ts . Fu r the rmore , the so lu t ion might be as s imp le as to prohib i t the expor t of haza rdous was te or of banned or unreg is te red pest ic ides to count r ies where people are unab le to m a n a g e t h e m safe ly and in consequence wil l l ikely get po isoned wi th t h e m . 3.4.2.2. Treating others as ends: Kant's Categorical Imperative This v iew of equ i ty responds to I m m a n u e l Kant 's Categorical Imperative, a gu ide for act ion that requi res us not to t reat o thers as a means to ou r own e n d s , but as ends in t h e m s e l v e s . 3 3 3 We use o thers as mere m e a n s if we act on m a x i m s that they could not consen t as rat ional and free agents (or moral agen ts ) , or if we act on m a x i m s that we could not wan t at the s a m e t ime to be universal laws - t h a t is, laws that any o ther mora l agent cou ld a d o p t . 3 3 4 Kan t ian m a x i m s are usefu l to test the mora l Tightness of expor t ing haza rdous chem ica l s and was tes . The expor t of haza rdous chem ica l s that are domes t i ca l l y banned to o ther count r ies could a rguab ly ref lect the fo l lowing m a x i m : " P e o p l e shal l expor t chemica ls that are banned domes t i ca l l y for heal th and env i ronmen ta l reasons to o ther coun t r i es . " Th is m a x i m could hot be w ished to be a un iversa l law for two reasons : f i rst, its un iversa l isa t ion wou ld imply that eve ryone seeks to expor t its own haza rdous chem ica l s , ins tead of impor t ing t h e m : there fo re , no one would be ab le to expor t t h e m as d ic ta ted by the ru le, wh ich wou ld become unfeasible. S e c o n d l y , seek ing to protect one 's own heal th f rom cer ta in subs tances by g iv ing t hem to o thers enta i ls us ing t h e m as m e a n s , s ince it wou ld impede that they protect t h e m s e l v e s by ac t ing the w a y we do - t h a t is , by not us ing those subs tances . F rom both pe rspec t i ves , there fore , the expor t of haza rdous subs tances is mora l ly unaccep tab le . A l t hough there has been no expl ic i t in ternat ional recogni t ion of th is ve rs ion of equ i ty , one could a rgue that it is ref lected in s ta temen ts re ject ing doub le s tanda rds , such as the dec la ra t ion by a deve lop ing count ry dur ing the Ro t te rdam negot ia t ions that " a n expor t ing count ry that has banned or severe ly restr ic ted a chemica l shou ld not have the mora l r ight 3 3 2 See Harris P., supra note 320 at 32-33. 3 3 3 Since Kantian principles apply whenever there is interaction between actors, they can be used to assess obligations of people in different countries toward one another. See Ibid, at 33. 3 3 4 For a detailed analysis of Kant's categorical imperative see Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 131-140. to sel l it to o the rs , or the v iew de fended by mos t deve lop ing count r ies at the Base l negot ia t ions that was te expor ts f rom rich to poor count r ies was s imp ly an unjust pract ice and shou ld be b a n n e d . 3 3 6 In add i t ion , Pr incip le 14 of the Rio Dec la ra t ion (s igned by more than 170 s ta tes at the Earth S u m m i t or U N C E D ) , 3 3 7 dec la res that " S t a t e s shou ld ef fect ive ly coopera te to d iscourage or p revent the re locat ion and t rans fer to o ther S ta tes of any act iv i t ies and subs tances that cause severe env i ronmen ta l degrada t ion or a re found to be harmfu l to h u m a n hea l t h . " A l though th is rule does not expl ic i t ly c o n d e m n doub le s tanda rds , it is cons is ten t wi th the duty to t reat o thers as e n d s , and wi th the h u m a n r ights approach (mos t notab ly the h u m a n r ight to hea l th ) . 3.4.2.3. Maximizing human happiness Ut i l i ta r ian ism d ic ta tes that any d is t r ibut ion of resources shou ld be just i f ied based on the total a m o u n t of happ iness (or ut i l i ty) it p roduces , measu red by the aggrega t ion of the happ iness exper ienced by ind iv idua ls (not on ly c i t i zens of a par t icu lar S ta te , but h u m a n k i n d ) . 3 3 8 Two ma in charges have been ra ised aga ins t th is t heo ry : f i rst, it m igh t requi re impos ing great ha rm on a few in o rder to confer a sma l l benef i t to m a n y ; and s e c o n d , it p rov ides no method for compar ing levels of sat is fac t ion be tween di f ferent ind iv idua ls to measu re u t i l i t y . 3 3 9 The f irst a rgumen t might lose its re levance in the con tex t of potent ia l ly severe g lobal env i ronmenta l d a m a g e , where s o m e suf fer ing (e .g . chang ing waste fu l cu l tura l pract ices) imposed on a few cou ld be seen as fair if it is needed to save the p lanet on wh ich we al l depend . S im i la r l y , the fact that uti l i ty cannot be eas i l y measu red does not exc lude the possib i l i ty of see ing sus ta inab le deve lopmen t as ut i l i ty. F rom th is perspec t i ve , wea l thy count r ies shou ld aid poor count r ies to ach ieve sus ta inab le deve lopmen t because that wou ld reduce h u m a n suf fer ing (and thus increase overa l l 'ut i l i ty ' ) and d im in ish env i ronmen ta l des t ruc t ion , wh ich could m in im ize happ iness in the f u t u r e . 3 4 0 Statement made by the delegation of Panama. See "Report of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade" Earth Negotiations Bulletin 15:2 (2 June 1997) [hereinafter ENB Report INC-3 PIC] at 7, online: <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enbl502e.pdf>. 3 3 6 See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 40. 3 3 7 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992. Also known as the "Rio Summit" or the "Earth Summit" [hereinafter UNCED]. 3 3 8 Classical utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham believed that people are simultaneously citizens of their own nations and of the world, with duties to the humankind in general. See Harris P., supra note 320 at 30. See H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994) at 10. 3 4 0 See Harris P., supra note 320 at 30-31. At U N C E D , the Nor th acknow ledged that it wou ld have to m a k e s o m e sacr i f ices to ach ieve env i ronmen ta l susta inab i l i ty . Th is is re f lec ted, for ins tance , in its v o w to " r e d u c e and e l im ina te unsus ta inab le consumpt ion and product ion p a t t e r n s . " 3 4 1 In ternat iona l equ i ty as u t i l i ta r ian ism was a lso invoked when deve loped count r ies m a d e a c o m m i t m e n t to reach the target of 0 . 7 % of the i r G N P to off icial deve lopmen t a id (ODA) for imp lemen t ing A g e n d a 21 in the Sou th because it wou ld " s e r v e the c o m m o n in terests of deve loped and deve lop ing count r ies and of humank ind in gene ra l , inc luding future g e n e r a t i o n s . " 3 4 2 Consequen t l y , each chapte r of A g e n d a 21 (the g lobal plan for act ion ag reed upon at U N C E D ) 3 4 3 spec i f ied the annua l costs of imp lemen ta t i on , and it was agreed that s o m e twenty percent of the total costs of imp lemen t ing the agenda in deve lop ing count r ies wou ld have to c o m e f rom the in ternat ional c o m m u n i t y , name ly the N o r t h . 3 4 4 A s A g e n d a 21 conta ins a chapte r on haza rdous chemica ls and ano ther one on haza rdous w a s t e s , one could reasonab ly a rgue that the North has accepted a du ty to part ly f inance the env i ronmen ta l l y sound m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous chemica l s and was tes in the S o u t h . 3 4 5 3.4.2.4. Common but differentiated responsibilities This rule evo lved f rom the pr incip le of env i ronmen ta l equ i ty and f rom the recogni t ion that the spec ia l needs of deve lop ing count r ies mus t be taken into accoun t in the deve lopmen t , app l ica t ion and in terpretat ion of rules of in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l l a w . 3 4 6 A s fo rmu la ted in the Rio Dec la ra t ion , the norm reads as fo l lows: "States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they c o m m a n d " 3 4 7 (emphasis added) See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, U.N. doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l (Vol. I) Annex I, [Hereinafter Rio Declaration], Principle 8, online: <http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163>. 3 4 2 See Agenda 21, 14 June 1992, U.N. doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l (Vol. I) Annex II [Hereinafter Agenda 21], Chapter 33, para. 3, online: <http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=52>. 3 4 3 See supra note 337. Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the U.N. system, governments, and major groups in several areas in which humans have an impact on the environment. More information online: <http://www.un.orq/esa/sustdev/documents/aqenda21/index.htm>. 3 4 4 See Richard N. Gardner, Negotiating Survival. Four Priorities After Rio (New York; Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992) at 26, and Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 33 para. 18. 345 See Agenda 21, Ibid. Chapter 19 (chemicals) para. 18 and Chapter 20 (wastes) para. 25. 3 4 6 See Sands, "Principles of IEL," supra note 311 at 217-218, and Young O., supra note 319 at 168-169. 347 See Rio Declaration, supra note 341, Principle 7. Two ideas are in tegra ted in this pr inc ip le. The f irst one is tha t all s ta tes are af fected by g lobal env i ronmen ta l p rob lems and therefore have shared ob l iga t ions towards the protect ion and restorat ion of the env i ronmen t . The second is that the s i tuat ion of ind iv idual count r ies di f fers ma rked l y , both in relat ion to the cont r ibut ion to the p rob lem and to the e c o n o m i c and technica l capac i ty to conf ront i t . 3 4 8 Consequen t l y , d i f ferent ob l iga t ions and dut ies may app ly . A s pointed out by Phi l ippe S a n d s , the d i f ferent iated responsib i l i ty of s ta tes for the protect ion of the env i ronmen t is w ide ly accep ted in t reaty and o ther pract ice of s t a t e s , 3 4 9 wh ich sugges ts that there is a genera l sense of ob l igat ion in relat ion to this rule. Examp les of th is are pr incip le 23 of the S t o c k h o l m D e c l a r a t i o n , 3 5 0 pr inc ip les 2 and 6 of the Rio D e c l a r a t i o n , 3 5 1 and numerous g lobal t reat ies that ident i fy the necess i ty of tak ing into account the spec ia l needs of deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 3 5 2 Fur the rmore , the rule was expl ic i t ly inc luded in the Uni ted Nat ions F ramework Conven t i on on C l ima te C h a n g e ( 1 9 9 2 ) , and in the S t o c k h o l m Conven t ion on Pers is tent Organ ic Pol lu tants (2001 ) . Howeve r , as s t ressed by Kar in M icke lson , the pr incip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated respons ib i l i t ies can ref lect tota l ly di f ferent v iews of the respect ive ro les of Sou th and Nor th in address ing env i ronmen ta l deg rada t ion . On one h a n d , it can ref lect a p ragmat i c accep tance of d i f ferent f inancia l and techno log ica l real i t ies a m o n g s t count r ies in di f ferent e c o n o m i c s i tua t ions , and of the fact that the North cur rent ly puts a heav ie r burden on the env i r onmen t (as a resul t of the impact of a h igher per cap i ta consump t i on and pol lut ion 34ft See Young 0., supra note 319 at 68-169. 34Q See Sands, "Principles of IEL," supra note at 219. 350 According to this principle 'the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries... may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for developing countries'. See Rio Declaration, supra note 341 Principle 3. 351 Principle 2 states that "environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply." Principle 6 stresses the need to take into account the special situation of developing countries, particularly the least developed among them. See Rio Declaration, supra note 341 Principles 2 and 6. 3 5 2 See, for example, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 21 1.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994), Arts. 148, 202 and 203, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>; International Tropical Timber Agreement, 26 January 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1014 (entered into force 1 January 1997) Pmbl. para. 7, online: <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/ITTA.1994.txt.html>; Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) Pmbl. para. 17 and Arts. 12, 17, 20 and 21, online: <http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp>; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516 (entered into force 22 September 1988), Pmbl. para. 3 and Art. 4(2), online: <http://www.unep.ch/ozone/vienna.shtml> and its Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force 1 January 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol], Pmbl. para. 7 and Arts. 5, 10 and 10A, online: <http://www.unep.ch/ozone/montreal.shtml>, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC], Pmbl. para. 6, 10, 20, 21 and 22, and Arts. 3(1), (2) and (5), 4(3), (7), (8), (9) and (10), online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>; and Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 17 June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 (entered into force 26 December 1996), Pmbl para. 18 and Arts. 3(d), 4(3) and 6(b), (c) and (e), online: < http ://www. u need. int/con vention/text/pdf/conv-eng. pdf >. gene ra t i on ) ; on the other , it can indicate a recogni t ion of the h is tor ic , mora l and even legal responsib i l i ty of the North to shou lder the burdens of env i ronmen ta l p ro tec t ion , j us t as it en joyed the benef i ts of economic and industr ia l deve lopmen t largely uncons t ra ined by env i ronmen ta l c o n c e r n s . 3 5 3 At U N C E D , that was prec ise ly the d iscuss ion be tween the Nor th and the S o u t h : whi le the latter cons idered the text of pr inc ip le 7 inadequate insofar as it did not d i rect ly b lame deve loped count r ies for the cur ren t env i ronmen ta l p rob lems , the fo rmer ob jec ted to the language that descr ibed its spec ia l role. The most radical in terpreta t ion was ar t icu la ted by the U .S . de lega t ion , wh ich did not even accept a spec ia l responsib i l i ty upon deve loped count r ies g iven the current p ressure they put on the env i ronmen t : " the Uni ted S ta tes unders tands and accep ts that Pr inc ip le 7 h igh l ights the spec ia l leadersh ip role of the deve loped count r ies , based on our industr ia l deve lopmen t , our exper ience wi th env i ronmenta l protect ion pol ic ies and ac t ions , and our wea l t h , techn ica l exper t i se and c a p a c i t i e s . " 3 5 4 The Uni ted S ta tes ' s t rong oppos i t ion to a spec ia l du ty to burden a larger sha re for the protect ion of the env i ronmen t cannot be e x t e n d e d , howeve r , to all indust r ia l ised count r ies . A t U N C E D , m a n y indust r ia l ised s ta tes unders tood the c o m m i t m e n t to prov ide add i t iona l funds for deve lop ing count r ies to car ry out the i r ob l iga t ions under A g e n d a 21 as a consequence of the i r spec ia l responsib i l i ty towards the S o u t h , and not on ly as a necessary s tep to ach ieve overa l l sus ta inab le d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 5 5 The Pres ident of the C o m m i s s i o n of the European C o m m u n i t y , for e x a m p l e , s t ressed the need for " m o s t indust r ia l ized count r ies [to] recognize that they have special responsibilities towards the deve lop ing coun t r i es , " hoping that U N C E D wou ld be the s tar t ing point towards a " m o r e equitable w o r l d . " 3 5 6 Luxembou rg acknow ledged the "spec i f i c responsibility [of indust r ia l ized count r ies ] for damage to the h u m a n and natura l environment;"357 The Holy S e e qual i f ied the gap between the North and the Sou th as "unaccep tab le and unjust," and s ta ted that "it shou ld be cons idered qui te norma l for an advanced count ry to devo te a part of its product ion to mee t the needs of the deve lop ing n a t i o n s . " 3 5 8 Consequen t l y , indust r ia l ised s ta tes "reaffirmed] the i r c o m m i t m e n t s to mee t the accepted Un i ted See Karin Mickelson, "South, North, International Environmental Law and International Environmental Lawyers," (2000) 11 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 52 at 70. 3 5 4 See Ved P. Nanda, International Environmental Law and Policy (Irvington, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1995) at 107-108. 3 5 5 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action for sustainable development, adopted by some 178 Governments at United Nations Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED). 3 5 6 See Statements Made By Heads of State or Government at the Summit Segment of the Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, U.N. doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l (Vol. Ill) at 218. (Emphasis added.) 3 5 7 Ibid, at 246. (Emphasis added). 3 5 8 Ibid, at 197. (Emphasis added.) Nat ions target of 0.7 per cent of G N P for O D A and ... agree[d ] to a u g m e n t the i r aid p rog rams in o rder to reach that target as soon as poss ib le and to ensure p rompt and ef fect ive imp lemen ta t i on of A g e n d a 2 1 . " 3 5 9 Near ly all coun t r ies , inc luding Japan and the m e m b e r s of the European C o m m u n i t y , unders tood th is prov is ion as a duty to prov ide new and addi t iona l O D A , and they all re jected the U .S . in terpretat ion that any increased O D A for sus ta inab le deve lopmen t wou ld have to come f rom a reduct ion of O D A for o ther p u r p o s e s . 3 6 0 Neve r the less , cont r ibut ions by most deve loped s ta tes have been ve ry d i sappo in t i ng , and only a few deve loped s ta tes have a t ta ined or su rpassed the 0 . 7 % target . In 2 0 0 0 , the comb ined effort of indust r ia l ised count r ies was the s a m e of 1 9 8 9 : a mere 0 . 3 2 % . 3 6 1 Th is h ighl ights the magn i tude of the gap be tween the ideal and the real in the f ield of the env i ronmen t but, as noted by Oran Y o u n g , it does not cal l into ques t ion the va l id i ty of the pr incip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated respons ib i l i t i e s . 3 6 2 S o m e con tend , howeve r , that there is abso lu te ly no obl igat ion by the North to prov ide part of the funds and techno logy that are requ i red for sus ta inab le deve lopmen t in the S o u t h . R ichard G a r d n e r , 3 6 3 for ins tance , a rgues that Sou the rn d e m a n d s such as a ' G r e e n F u n d ' for sus ta inab le deve lopmen t reveal a ph i losophy of " o n e - w a y sove re ign ty , accord ing to wh ich the poor count r ies wou ld have the r ight to sha re in the wea l th and techno logy of the r ich , but shou ld not be asked to under take any c o m m i t m e n t s w h a t s o e v e r wi th respect to the m a n a g e m e n t of the i r own a f f a i r s . " 3 6 4 Acco rd ing to th is v i ew , spec ia l p rov is ions for the Sou th wou ld not be a mat te r of equ i ty but of mere conven ience : s ince popu lous Sou the rn such as India or Ch ina could offset the efforts of the Nor th to improve the env i ronmen t , the Nor th wou ld need to secure the i r par t ic ipat ion in va r ious t reat ies by prov id ing t h e m wi th f inancia l and techn ica l resources to imp lemen t the i r c o m m i t m e n t s a n d , at least for an init ial per iod , wi th less s t r ingent o b l i g a t i o n s . 3 6 5 3 5 9 See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 33 para. 13. This commitment is at least of moral nature. 3 6 0 See Gardner, supra note 344 at 24-26. 3 6 1 In 2001, only Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden complied with the 0.7% target, and only Denmark (with 1.03%) attained the goal of 1% proposed by the Brandt Commission in 1980. Meanwhile, the U.K. contributed 0.32% of its GNP, Japan 0.28%, and the U.S 0.11% (less than in 1989, when it contributed 0.15%.) See Middleton et al., supra note 220 at 14 (for 1989 data) and OECD, Wet Official Development Assistance Flows from DAC Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Organisations (from 1985 to 2001), online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/26/1894401.xls>. 3 6 2 See Young 0., supra note 319 at 70. 3 6 3 Richard Gardner, former U.S. Ambassador to Italy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs was as a Special Advisor to the UN at the Earth Summit in 1992, as he was in 1972 at the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment. 3 6 4 See Gardner, supra note 344 at 7. 3 6 5 See Ibid, at 34-35. In ternat iona l env i ronmen ta l re lat ions reveal that th is v iew is at best s imp l is t i c , as mora l i ty has p layed a s igni f icant role in the negot ia t ion and ou tcome of m a n y mul t i la tera l a g r e e m e n t s . A representa t ive e x a m p l e is the ozone reg ime. Under the Mont rea l Pro toco l , deve lop ing count r ies were g iven a t en - yea r grace per iod to comp ly wi th the i r ob l iga t ions , and a mul t i la tera l fund was created to ass is t t h e m in meet ing the inc rementa l costs of imp lemen t ing the contro l measu res of the t r e a t y . 3 6 6 A s Richard Bened ick (chief negot ia tor for the U.S. ) exp la ins , these concess ions responded to i r refutable facts . A t the m o m e n t of the Protoco l 's negot ia t ion , and wi th less than 2 5 % of the wor ld 's popu la t ion , indust r ia l ised nat ions were consum ing an es t imated 8 8 % of Ch lo ro f luo rocarbons (CFCs - m a i n ozone dep le t ing s u b s t a n c e ) . 3 6 7 The use of C F C s had for decades cont r ibu ted to the we l l -be ing of indust r ia l ised count r ies , and the prob lem was largely of the i r m a k i n g . T h u s , they were in no posi t ion to deny the mora l g rounds of the concerns exp ressed by Sou the rn de lega t ions , wh ich sought assu rances that the i r popu la t ions wou ld not be depr ived of the benef i ts of the cont ro l led subs tances , and that they wou ld not have to a s s u m e the add i t iona l costs of a l te rnat ive products and t e c h n o l o g i e s . 3 6 8 Al though par t ic ipat ion of popu lous deve lop ing count r ies was cruc ia l to ach ieve g lobal p rogress and spec ia l p rov is ions were conceded par t ly because of t h a t , 3 6 9 mora l cons idera t ions p layed an impor tan t role in the deba te . Dur ing the second meet ing of the par t ies to the Mont rea l P r o t o c o l , 3 7 0 the Pr ime Min is ter of the Uni ted K i n g d o m s t ressed that deve lop ing count r ies had "unde rs tandab le concerns about adve rse effects on the i r e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , " and that it was " the duty of indust r ia l ized count r ies to help t hem wi th subst i tu te techno log ies and wi th f inancing the addi t iona l cos ts i n v o l v e d . " 3 7 1 L ikewise , the Execu t i ve Di rec tor of the U N E P noted that the ozone reg ime wou ld " s h o w that the nat ions of the indust r ia l ized North were ser ious about tackling the inequity in the g lobal e c o n o m y , wh ich was the under ly ing reason for the dest ruc t ion of the h u m a n e n v i r o n m e n t . " 3 7 2 T h e The treaty was adopted in 1987 within the framework of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (see supra note 352). The term incremental cost is defined as "the additional cost that the GEF funds between the cost of an alternative project that a country would have implemented in the absence of global environmental concerns and a project undertaken with global objectives in mind." Global Environment Facility, Glossary, online <http://www.gefweb.org/gefgloss.doo (last visited 24 August 2003). 3 6 7 In China, for example, the per capita consumption was about one-fortieth (1/40) than that of the European Community and the United States. See Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy. New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 149. 3 6 8 See Ibid, at 148-149 and 153. 3 6 9 Gary C. Bryner "Implementing Global Environmental Agreements in the Developing World," (1997) Colo. J. Int'l. Envtl. L& Pol'y Y.B. 1 at 3. 3 7 0 It was in the second meeting of the parties where the multilateral fund was created, through the London Amendment. 3 7 1 UNEP, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, London (29 June 1990) at 2 para. 6 (Emphasis added). 3 7 2 Ibid., at 6 para. 18 (Emphasis added). Uni ted S ta tes ag reed to the Mul t i la tera l F u n d , but it had a ve ry rest r ic t ive in terpretat ion of the te rm ' a d d i t i o n a l l y , ' a rgu ing that a r eassessmen t of pro jects and pr ior i t ies in the Wor ld Bank lending p rograms cou ld come up wi th the s u m s init ial ly requi red for an ozone fund . Domes t i c react ion was immed ia te and cr i t ical to the U .S . a n n o u n c e m e n t , and doubts were exp ressed about its rel iabi l i ty as a negot ia t ing p a r t n e r . 3 7 3 Th is ev idences the impor tance of mora l i ty -bo th in ternat ional ly and domes t i ca l l y - in in ternat ional env i ronmen ta l pol i t ics. A s exp ressed by the U . S . chief negot ia tor " the admin is t ra t ion had ev ident ly m isgauged the in tensi ty of in ternat ional feel ing ove r th is i ssue : deve lop ing count r ies as wel l as o ther donor g o v e r n m e n t s all regarded aid add i t iona l i ty in the case of the ozone layer as a mat te r of equity."374 Equi ty cons idera t ions were a lso at the core of the c l imate change negot ia t ions . Af ter m u c h con t rove rsy , par t ies agreed to inc lude the pr inc ip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent ia ted respons ib i l i t ies in the F ramework Conven t ion on C l ima te C h a n g e , wh ich dec la res that s ta tes have di f ferent responsib i l i t ies towards the p rob lem of g loba l w a r m i n g , g iven di f ferent historical cont r ibut ions and capabi l i t ies for add ress ing i t . 3 7 5 Deve lop ing count r ies genera l l y ma in ta ined that s ince deve loped count r ies were largely respons ib le for c l imate c h a n g e , it w a s the i r responsib i l i ty to take measu res for a so lu t ion . Ye t , they were prepared to accept c o m m i t m e n t s if such measu res were condi t iona l upon ' new and add i t i ona l ' f inancia l resources to cove r the ful l i nc rementa l cos ts of imp lemen t ing t h e m . Wi th the except ion of the U S , deve loped count r ies genera l l y accep ted the need to prov ide add i t iona l funds to the S o u t h . However , w i th a few excep t ions (e .g . No rway ) , they avo ided speci f ic c o m m i t m e n t s to the net increase of f inancia l f l o w s . 3 7 6 A s a resul t , the conven t ion co l lapsed into p lacing basica l ly no ob l igat ions - e v e n condi t iona l on ex terna l f und ing - upon deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 3 7 7 Never the less , equ i ty prov is ions are sp read th roughou t the t r e a t y . 3 7 8 3 7 3 See Benedick, supra note 367 at 158. 3 7 4 See Ibid, at 161. (Emphasis added). 3 7 5 See Matthew Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics (London; New York: Routledge, 1996) at 74-76, and UNFCCC, supra note 352, Pmbl., paras. 3 and 6. 3 7 6 See Dasgupta Chandrashekhar "The Climate Change Negotiations," in Irving Mintzer & Amber Leonard, eds., Negotiation Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 133-135. 377 See Paterson, supra note 375 at 74-76. 3 7 8 See UNFCCC, supra note 352 Pmbl. paras. 3, 6 and 22, and Arts. 3(2), 4(3), (5), and (7), 5(c), and 6(b)[ii]. 3.4.3. Implications of the principles of state responsibility and environmental equity for the treaties dealing with hazardous chemicals and wastes The ful l imp lemen ta t i on of the pr inc ip les of S ta te responsib i l i ty for t ransboundary ha rm and in ternat ional env i ronmenta l equ i ty wou ld have at least two impl ica t ions for the t reat ies dea l ing wi th hazardous chemica ls and was tes , wh ich refer to the two ques t ions that were asked in the in t roduct ion to this s e c t i o n . 3 7 9 First , it wou ld requi re that deve loped count r ies s top expor t ing hazardous subs tances they do not wan t to use t h e m s e l v e s to the count r ies of the S o u t h , because by do ing so they are v io la t ing the i r ob l igat ion to prevent s ign i f icant t ransboundary h a r m , they are p reven t ing deve lop ing count r ies f rom protect ing the i r popula t ions and env i ronmen t , and they are af fect ing bas ic r ights of the people in those count r ies . S e c o n d , it wou ld requi re deve loped count r ies to prov ide f inanc ia l resources , techn ica l ass is tance and techno logy so that deve lop ing count r ies deve lop the capac i ty to m a n a g e hazardous chemica l s ( inc luding the use of sa fer a l te rnat ives) and to d ispose of the i r own hazardous was te in w a y s that protect h u m a n heal th and the env i ronmen t . The v iew that it is mora l ly reprehens ib le to a l low the t rans fe r of haza rdous subs tances f rom indust r ia l ised count r ies to the Sou th was e x p r e s s e d , to d i f ferent deg rees , in the negot ia t ions of the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t ions . A s noted before, the Base l negot ia t ions were largely t r iggered by the mora l ind ignat ion produced by scanda ls of haza rdous was tes being d u m p e d in the Sou th in the 1970s and 1980s , and the issue of inc lud ing a total ban on expor ts of haza rdous was te f rom rich to poor count r ies was at the cent re of the d iscuss ion f rom the ve ry beg inn ing . A l though the ban was not ini t ial ly inc luded in the Base l C o n v e n t i o n , it was unan imous l y adopted as an a m e n d m e n t to the t reaty dur ing the th i rd Con fe rence of the Par t ies ( C O P ) . 3 8 0 A t C O P 3, it was not on ly admi t ted that deve loped count r ies shou ld not expor t the i r haza rdous was te to the S o u t h , but that those wi th the capac i ty to do so shou ld ef fect ive ly cont r ibute to the sus ta inab le That is, whether the export of hazardous chemicals and wastes by industrialised countries to the countries of the South is justified under international morality and law, and whether North-South disparities should be addressed for a kind of environmental protection that does not undermine human's basic needs or the South's sustainable development. Denmark endorsed it at COP1. Eastern and Central European countries, Nordic states and at a later stage the EU supported it at COP2. It was adopted by the parties at COP 3, as Decision III/l. (Previous decisions 1/10 and 11/12, which also included a ban, were rejected because they did not amend the treaty). Decision III/l stipulates a full ban on all transboundary movements of hazardous wastes from Annex VII countries (OECD members, EU members and Liechtenstein) to non-Annex VII countries. It is immediate for wastes bound for final disposal and it was expected to take effect at the beginning of 1998 for wastes destined for recycling or recovery operations. See Puckett & Fogel supra note 215. m a n a g e m e n t of the haza rdous was te genera ted in the S o u t h . Fol lowing the adopt ion of the a m e n d m e n t , Aus t ra l ia s ta ted that the ban wou ld s t reng then the t reaty and prov ide "g rea te r protect ion to those count r ies vu lne rab le to unwan ted haza rdous w a s t e s , " and recogn ised that the ban is " b y no m e a n s the answer to the p rob lems vu lnerab le count r ies face - i t does not deal wi th domes t i c d isposa l needs , was te m in im iza t ion or capac i ty bu i ld ing. Nor does it address the legitimate deve lopmen ta l needs of deve lop ing count r ies . It is, in e s s e n c e , a half measu re - a n d it cannot work w i thout the c o m m i t m e n t of ef forts and resources ... we wil l not shi rk that responsibility."381 In cont ras t , no big scanda ls preceded the Ro t te rdam negot ia t ions , and the issue of e l im inat ing expor t doub le s tandards w a s pract ica l ly left out of the d iscuss ion w h e n negot ia tors dec ided to l imit the i r manda te to conver t ing a vo lun ta ry s y s t e m of in format ion exchange and pr ior consent into a legal ly b inding t r e a t y . 3 8 2 Consequen t l y , the c la im by a deve lop ing count ry de legat ion that an expor t ing count ry that has banned or seve re l y restr ic ted a chemica l shou ld not have the mora l r ight to sel l it to o t h e r s 3 8 3 did not encourage negot ia tors to proscr ibe those expor ts , or to fur ther d iscuss the i ssue . A s for the S t o c k h o l m negot ia t ions, whi le two de legat ions c la imed that indust r ia l ised count r ies shou ld s top expor t ing POPs to deve lop ing count r ies , it was s t ressed that an excep t ion was needed in the case of DDT, used in the Sou th to f ight m a l a r i a . 3 8 4 A l though the t reaty did not go as far as banning all expor ts , it was de te rm ined that POPs would be expor ted only for env i ronmen ta l l y sound d isposa l or for permi t ted uses by the impor t ing p a r t y . 3 8 5 The genera l recogni t ion of the pr incip le that deve loped count r ies shou ld cont r ibute to the safe m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous subs tances in deve lop ing count r ies is less cont rovers ia l than that of e l im inat ing doub le s tandards . A l though the B a s e l , Ro t te rdam and S t o c k h o l m conven t ions offer di f ferent responses to the needs of deve lop ing count r ies , they al l inc lude the idea of d i f ferent iated responsib i l i t ies and capac i t ies in the i r p r e a m b l e s : bes ides quot ing the pr incip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated responsib i l i t ies as fo rmu la ted Statement made by Australia following the Adoption of the Amendment by Consensus in September 1995. See UNEP, Report of the Third Meeting of the COP to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Geneva (18-22 September 1995) Doc. UNEP/CWH.3/34 (Emphasis added). 3fi2 For a survey of the Rotterdam negotiations see section 4.3. in Chapter 4. 3 8 3 Statement made by the delegation of Panama. See ENB Report INC-3 PIC, supra note 335 at 7. 3 8 4 See "Report of the Third Session of the INC for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on certain POPs" Earth Negotiations Bulletin 15:27 (13 September 1999) at 3-4, online: <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enbl527e.pdf>. 3 8 5 See Stockholm Convention, supra note 13 Articles 3(2)[a] and 3(2)[b]. in the Rio Dec lara t ion (par. 13) the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on recogn ises the spec ia l needs of deve lop ing count r ies (par. 11) . L ikewise , the Base l Conven t ion acknow ledges the l imi ted capabi l i t ies of deve lop ing count r ies to m a n a g e hazardous was tes and the need of t rans fer r ing techno logy to the Sou th (par. 20 and 21 ) , and so does the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , wh ich acknow ledges the spec ia l needs of deve lop ing count r ies and the need to s t reng then the i r capac i ty for the m a n a g e m e n t of chem ica l s , inc luding t ransfer of techno logy and f inancia l and technica l ass is tance (par. 4 ) . For that r eason , it is not real ly a ques t ion of expl ic i t ly inc luding the pr incip le of c o m m o n but d i f ferent iated responsib i l i t ies into the Base l and Ro t te rdam t reat ies as it is fo rmu la ted in S t o c k h o l m , but of put t ing the rule into opera t ion wi th concrete ob l igat ions to prov ide ass is tance to the S o u t h , and adequa te m e c h a n i s m s to f inance such ass is tance . E l im ina t ing doub le s tanda rds , in cont ras t , can be p rob lemat i c in pract ice. A s exp la ined ear l ier in th is chap te r , deve lop ing count r ies are not in a posi t ion to ma in ta in a mora l posture if that wou ld prevent t h e m f rom receiv ing subs tances they requi re to so lve more press ing economic needs . T h u s , whi le ini t ial ly deve lop ing count r ies s t rong ly advoca ted the adopt ion of a ban on the expor t of haza rdous was tes f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies , s o m e of t h e m have found that rat i f icat ion is dif f icult because a ban wou ld m e a n that part of the i r indust ry wou ld not be ab le to impor t haza rdous was tes that are used as raw m a t e r i a l s . 3 8 6 In the case of hazardous chemica l s and pest ic ides , there are two addi t iona l issues to cons ider . First , deve lop ing count r ies genu ine ly depend on chemica l pest ic ides to sus ta in expor t agr icu l ture and to comba t vec to r -bo rne d i sease . T h u s , un less af fordable a l te rna t ives are ava i lab le , the opt ion of a ban on the impor t of cer ta in haza rdous pest ic ides is not real ly an opt ion . Th is is why the p romot ion of sa fe r a l te rna t ives such as in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t techn iques is of pa ramoun t impor tance . S e c o n d , as exp la ined in Chap te r 2, the e l im ina t ion of doub le s tandards could create an incent ive to increase product ion in the Sou th by mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions and by a few ind igenous manu fac tu re rs . Th is e m p h a s i s e s the need to deal not on ly wi th the in ternat ional t rade of haza rdous chemica ls and pes t ic ides , but a lso wi th the product ion of these subs tances . This is the case, for instance, of Colombia. While the Colombian government fully supported the adoption of Decision III/l at COP 3, ratification of the Basel ban amendment has proven more difficult. The Colombian government supported the adoption of Decision III/l. However, ratification of the ban requires a stricter analysis, as it would turn the ban into a legally binding provision. Thus, while in the process of considering ratification the Ministry of Environment continues to support the ban, the Ministry of Commerce has expressed its concerns in relation to the negative impacts of the ban on the national industries that depend on hazardous wastes, within the context of an economic crisis. Consequently, it has suggested that a study on the impacts of the ban be carried on before ratification is considered. Letter dated February 12, 2001 from the former Minister of Commerce, Mrs. Martha Lucia Ramirez, to the former Minister of Environment, Mr. Juan Mayr. This chapte r has endeavou red to put the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on in con tex t , so as to prov ide the necessary background to rev iew the t reaty . Fi rst , it looked at the cond i t ions that have faci l i tated and p romoted the t ransfer of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies . T h e n , it looked at the p rob lem f rom the perspec t ive of in ternat ional e th ics , a rgu ing that because of the cond i t ions in wh ich it t akes p lace and because of the nature of the subs tances invo lved , the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides is u l t imate ly an eth ica l ques t i on . Consequen t l y , the chap te r s tud ied the mora l and legal pr inc ip les that are re levant to the issue of hazard t ransfer . Hav ing cons idered these impor tan t an teceden ts , the purpose of next chap te r is to eva lua te the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on in a cr i t ical manne r . Chapter Four The Rotterdam Convention: A Modest Starting Point 4.1. Introduction The ma in purpose of th is thes is is to under take a cr i t ical eva lua t ion of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on on the Prior In fo rmed Consen t Procedure for Cer ta in Haza rdous C h e m i c a l s and Pest ic ides in In ternat ional T rade . Before emba rk i ng on that ana l ys i s , it was necessary to unders tand the nature of the p rob lem, and to put it in contex t . Th is is wha t the two prev ious chap te rs have a t tempted to do . Whi le Chap te r 2 descr ibed the charac ter is t i cs of the subs tances regu la ted by the convent ion and the reasons why the t reaty was necessa ry , Chap te r 3 set the s tage in wh ich the No r th -Sou th t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s takes p lace, cons ider ing the condi t ions that have fac i l i ta ted and p romoted that t ransfer . Th is chap te r rev iews the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion and the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m that se rved as its base . First , it descr ibes the FAO C o d e of Conduc t and the UNEP London Gu ide l i nes , wh ich were the initial internat ional response to the Nor th -Sou th t ransfer of hazardous chemica ls . These vo luntary ins t ruments launched a s y s t e m of in format ion exchange on hazardous chemica l s . In 1 9 8 9 , they were a m e n d e d to in t roduce the pr ior in formed consen t (PIC) p rocedure , so as to a l low impor t ing count r ies to c o m m u n i c a t e whe the r or not they wou ld want to rece ive cer ta in chemica ls in the fu ture. Because the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on essent ia l l y reproduced the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , the PIC procedure is descr ibed in deta i l . T h e n , a su rvey of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on negot ia t ions is p resen ted . A br ief descr ip t ion of the t reaty 's ma in prov is ions fo l lows, tak ing into accoun t the co r respond ing prov is ions of the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m . Last ly , the chap te r cons iders whe the r the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on improved the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m in any mean ing fu l way . Cons ide r ing the exper ience ga ined wi th the imp lemen ta t i on of the vo lun ta ry p rocedure , the chap te r conc ludes that no s ign i f icant imp rovemen ts were in t roduced and thus no subs tan t ia l imp rovemen ts are l ikely to occur . Fu r the rmore , it a rgues that , even by its own s tandards (cons ider ing its ob ject ive) the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on is f undamenta l l y f l awed . Th is is because it does not adequa te ly add ress the lack of capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to ef fect ive ly imp lemen t its p rov is ions , and because it does not p romote par t ic ipat ion of all re levant p layers , wh ich is one of the reasons why a b inding conven t ion on PIC was a d o p t e d . 4.2. The voluntary PIC system: the Code of Conduct and the London Guidelines The g lobal response to the in ternat ional t rade of hazardous chemica l s s tar ted wi th the adopt ion of two vo lun ta ry ins t ruments wi th in the Uni ted Nat ions s y s t e m : the In ternat iona l C o d e of Conduc t on the Dist r ibut ion and Use of Pest ic ides (here inaf ter the C o d e of Conduc t ) , adop ted in 1985 by F A O , and the London Gu ide l i nes for the Exchange of In format ion on C h e m i c a l s in In ternat ional T rade (here inaf ter the London Gu ide l i nes ) , adop ted in 1987 by U N E P . A l though the London Gu ide l ines cover the broad ca tegory of haza rdous chemica l s ( i .e. industr ia l chemica ls and p e s t i c i d e s ) , 3 8 7 they were adop ted pr imar i l y , l ike the Code of Conduc t , to add ress pest ic ide- re la ted p rob lems. Pest ic ides were a ma in focus of concern s ince the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , pr imar i ly for two reasons . First , there was mora l ou t rage at ev idence that pest ic ides banned in the North and expor ted to the Sou th (most ly v ia mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions) were cont r ibut ing to fata l i t ies and env i ronmen ta l degradat ion in deve lop ing count r ies . S e c o n d , deve loped count r ies had an in terest in p revent ing those subs tances f rom re turn ing to t h e m as res idues in impor ted f o o d . 3 8 8 The adopt ion of the London Gu ide l ines was poss ib ly a lso connec ted to severa l chemica l d isas ters tha t occur red in the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s , 3 8 9 wh ich increased in ternat ional awa reness of the necess i ty of improv ing chemica l safety th roughout the g lobe t h rough , a m o n g s t o ther m e a s u r e s , in format ion e x c h a n g e . 3 9 0 The London Guidelines apply to chemicals in international trade (e.g. pesticides, industrial chemicals), except pharmaceuticals, radioactive materials, food additives and others. See London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.15/9/Add.2/Supp. 3 and Corr. l , Appendix (as amended by UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/30, UN Doc. UNEP/GC. 15/12 (Annex II) (1989) [hereinafter London Guidelines], Art. 3, online: <http://www.pestlaw.com/x/international/UNEP-19890500A.html>. For the Code of Conduct see Peter Hough "Institutions for Controlling the Global Trade in Hazardous Chemicals: The 1998 Rotterdam Convention" (2000) 10:2 Global Environmental Change 161 at 161. [Hough, "Institutions for Controlling Global Trade"]. For both instruments see David G. Victor "Learning by Doing in the Nonbinding International Regime to Manage Trade in Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides," in David G. Victor et al., eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. Theory and Practice (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998) at 234. In 1976, an explosion occurred in Meda (Italy) at a chemical plant owned by a subsidiary of a Swiss company. A thick toxic cloud containing dioxin was released into the atmosphere. The accident was named after Seveso, one of the towns most seriously affected. In 1984, toxic gas escaped from a storage tank at the Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal (India), and leaked into the atmosphere. The disaster caused the direct death of over 1,600 people and injured more than 200,000. Two years later, in Basel (Switzerland), efforts to put out a fire at a chemical storage warehouse of Sandoz resulted in a huge discharge of toxic chemicals into the Rhine. The ecological disaster also affected France, Germany and the Netherlands. For details of these disasters see Gunter Handl & Robert E. Lutz, Transferring Hazardous Technology and Substances. The International Legal Challenge (London: Graham &Trotman, 1989) at 2-19. 3 9 0 The London Guidelines seek to increase chemical safety in all countries through the exchange of scientific, technical, economic and legal information on potentially harmful chemicals in international trade. See Peter H. Sand, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments (Cambridge, Eng.: Grotius, 1992) at 326. The p rob lem of t rade in hazardous subs tances w a s on U N E P ' s a g e n d a s ince the m i d -1 9 7 0 s , wi th env i ronmen ta l g roups and deve lop ing count r ies seek ing to h ighl ight in just ices in the wor ld t rad ing s y s t e m . Much of the ear ly d iscuss ion focused on the expor t of subs tances banned or seve re l y restr ic ted in the North to the less regu la ted marke ts of the S o u t h . In 1 9 7 6 , U N E P es tab l i shed the In ternat iona l Reg is te r for Potent ia l ly Tox ic C h e m i c a l s ( IRPTC) , wi th the task of compi l ing and c i rcu lat ing in format ion on chemica l h a z a r d s . 3 9 1 In 1 9 7 7 , in response to a speech by the K e n y a n g o v e r n m e n t denounc ing the ' d u m p i n g ' of banned hazardous chemica l s in deve lop ing count r ies , the Gove rn ing Counc i l of U N E P adopted a resolut ion af f i rming the pr incip le that such chemica l s shou ld not be "pe rm i t t ed to be expor ted wi thout the knowledge and consen t of appropr ia te author i t ies in the impor t ing c o u n t r y . " 3 9 2 In 1 9 7 8 , the UNEP Gove rn ing Counc i l asked IRPTC (now UNEP Chemica l s ) to focus on g iv ing in format ion on l imi ta t ions, bans and regu la t ions enac ted in expor t ing count r ies . Deve lop ing count r ies pushed the s a m e agenda in the UN Genera l A s s e m b l y . 3 9 3 Eve ry yea r , s tar t ing in 1 9 7 9 , the UN Genera l A s s e m b l y adop ted a s t ronger resolut ion advoca t ing l imi ts on expor ts of p roducts banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted in the North and g rea te r in format ion exchange on hazardous c h e m i c a l s . 3 9 4 These efforts cu lm ina ted in a resolut ion on "Pro tec t ion Aga ins t Products Harmfu l to Heal th and the E n v i r o n m e n t , " adopted in 1982 and based on a proposa l by V e n e z u e l a . 3 9 5 The resolut ion asser ted that products banned f rom domes t i c use a n d / o r sa le because of the r isks they posed to heal th and the env i r onmen t shou ld be so ld on ly when a request for such products w a s rece ived f rom an impor t ing count ry , or when the consumpt ion of such products w a s off ic ial ly permi t ted in the impor t ing count ry . It a lso s ta ted that "a l l count r ies that have seve re l y restr ic ted or have not app roved the domes t i c consumpt ion a n d / o r sa le of spec i f ic p roducts , in par t icu lar pharmaceu t i ca l s and pest ic ides , shou ld m a k e ava i lab le full in format ion on these products wi th a v iew to sa feguard ing the heal th and env i r onmen t of the impor t ing 3 9 1 See Victor, supra note 388 at 231-232. 3 9 2 See UNEP, GC, 5 t h session, Decision 85(V), UN Doc. A/32/25 (15 May 1977). In Mark Pallemaerts, Developments in International Pesticide Regulation" (1988) 18:3 Environmental Policy and Law 62 at 65. 93 394 See Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 65. 3 9 3 See Victor, supra note 388 at 231-232 See Ibid, at 232. 395 c o u n t r y . " 3 Consequen t l y , it prov ided for the creat ion of a conso l ida ted list of products whose consump t i on a n d / o r sa le had been b a n n e d , w i t hd rawn , or seve re l y r e s t r i c t e d . 3 9 7 Faced wi th the pol i t ical dec lara t ions in favour of the pr inc ip le of pr ior consent at the U N , the ma jo r pes t i c ide-expor t ing count r ies took the lead wi th in the f ramework of the O E C D (to wh ich they were al l members ) in e labora t ing the i r own gu ide l ines on in format ion exchange as a s t ra tegy to prevent the deve lopmen t of more s t r ingent r e g u l a t i o n s . 3 9 8 In response to the 1977 UNEP reso lu t ion , and at the ini t iat ive of the U .S . and C a n a d a , the O E C D set up in 1980 a spec ia l g roup to prepare gu ide l ines on in format ion exchange on the expor t of c h e m i c a l s . 3 9 9 Four yea rs later, the Counc i l adop ted a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n 'Conce rn i ng In format ion Exchange related to the Expor t of Banned or Seve re l y Rest r ic ted C h e m i c a l s . ' Re i tera t ing the responsib i l i ty of O E C D m e m b e r count r ies to " sa fegua rd and improve the qual i ty of the env i ronmen t , both nat ional ly and in the g lobal c o n t e x t , " 4 0 0 the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n invi tes m e m b e r count r ies that have taken a contro l act ion to ban or seve re l y restr ict a chemica l to make re levant in format ion ava i lab le to impor t ing count r ies . Howeve r , it e m p h a s i z e s that impor t ing count r ies have " the p r imary responsib i l i ty for protect ion of heal th and the env i ronmen t f rom r isks assoc ia ted wi th impor ts of chemica ls wh ich have been banned or severe ly restr ic ted for use in expor t ing c o u n t r i e s . " 4 0 1 In add i t i on , it is not requi red that the not i f icat ion be pr ior to the expor t (a l though it is the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ' s ' in ten t ion ' ) , and it is speci f ica l ly noted that the procedures of the expor t ing coun t ry " shou ld not be such as to de lay or contro l the e x p o r t . " 4 0 2 A s probab ly expec ted by expor t ing count r ies , the O E C D r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ( ready in draft s ince 1982) had a s t rong inf luence on the subsequen t regu la tory efforts of U N E P and the F A O . In 1 9 8 2 , U N E P dec ided to convene a group of exper ts to e labora te gu ide l ines on 3 9 6 UNGA Res. 37/137 (1982), Protection against products harmful to health and the environment, UN Doc. A/37/51 (1982) at 112-113. The list was regarded with suspicion by many developed countries. The U.S., for example, opposed the very concept of a list, arguing that it was an unscientific "blacklist" detrimental to the legitimate interests of industry. See Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 64. 397 Including chemicals and pesticides (the resolution referred also to pharmaceuticals and other products). For further details see UNGA Res. 37/137 (1982), Ibid. Art. 3. 398 See Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 65. 399 Ibid. The initial work of the OECD was focused on harmonising national legislation on hazardous chemicals (testing, pre-market data requisites, information exchange, etc) to facilitate trade in chemicals and elimionate trade barriers. See Victor, supra note 388 at 224-225 and Robert A. Wynman "Control of Toxic Substances: the Attempt to Harmonise the Notification Requirements of the U.S. TSCA and the EC Sixth Amendment," (1980) 20 Virginia J. of Int'l L. 417 at 417-458. 4 0 0 OECD, Council, Recommendation Concerning Information Exchange related to Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals, 4 April 1984, C(84)37/Final, Pmbl. online: <http://webdominol.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/Display/64F5748FC50D6FFCC1256D8E006F4E017OpenD ocument>. 4 0 1 See Ibid. Art. 1. 4 0 2 See Ibid. Art. 5. exchange of in format ion on potent ia l ly harmfu l chem ica l s . A t f i rst, the g roup fa i led to agree on draft gu ide l ines because whi le deve lop ing count r ies ins is ted on t rade regu la t ion , exper ts f rom pes t ic ide-expor t ing count r ies re jected even the weakes t fo rm of expor t not i f icat ion. In the e n d , a "P rov is iona l Not i f icat ion S c h e m e , " p roposed by Br i ta in and largely mode led on the gu id ing pr inc ip les con ta ined in the O E C D ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , was a d o p t e d . 4 0 3 Under that s c h e m e , the IRPTC wou ld deve lop and m a n a g e a da tabase of contro l ac t ions , i.e. dec is ions by count r ies to ban or seve re l y restr ict a c h e m i c a l , and c i rcu late the da ta of these dec is ions to all UN m e m b e r s . In fo rmat ion exchange wou ld supposed ly increase awa reness of cont ro ls on haza rdous s u b s t a n c e s . 4 0 4 Shor t l y af ter the Prov is iona l S c h e m e was adop ted , UNEP reconvened the work ing group to c reate a more pe rmanen t s y s t e m . Th is was ach ieved in 1987 wi th the adopt ion of the London Gu ide l i nes , wh ich essent ia l l y repl icated the prov is iona l s c h e m e and added s o m e genera l c o m m i t m e n t s to p romote the sound m a n a g e m e n t of c h e m i c a l s . 4 0 5 Since pest ic ides were the ma in focus of a t ten t ion , the issue of in format ion exchange w a s a lso add ressed by the F A O , the ma in UN organ isa t ion car ry ing out act iv i t ies re lated to pest ic ides. G i ven its role in the food product ion s y s t e m , the FAO had ex tens ive exper ience imp lemen t ing agr icu l tura l projects in deve lop ing count r ies a n d , af ter a decade of a t t ract ing cr i t ic ism for p romot ing ove rconsump t i on of pest ic ides in the 1970s , it began imp lemen t ing pest ic ides m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m m e s . 4 0 6 In 1 9 8 5 , the FAO adopted its In ternat iona l Code of Conduc t on the Dist r ibut ion and Use of Pest ic ides . Init ial draf ts of the C o d e inc luded a prov is ion on prior in formed consent . Howeve r , the prov is ion was f inal ly removed f rom the C o d e , due to the pressure of indust ry and O E C D coun t r ies , wh ich did not off ic ial ly request its de le t ion but ins is ted on the need of cons is tency be tween the s tandards adopted by the FAO and those r e c o m m e n d e d by o ther in ternat ional o rgan isa t ions such as UNEP and the O E C D . The efforts of the S o u t h to re insta te the PIC prov is ion mere ly resu l ted in the de le t ion of the c lause s ta t ing that " the p rocedures of the count ry of expor t shou ld not be such as to de lay or contro l the expor t , " wh ich had been cop ied f rom the O E C D r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . 4 0 7 See Pallamaerts supra note 392 at 65-66. 4 0 4 See Provisional Notification Scheme for Banned and Severely Restricted Chemicals, UN Doc. UNEP/WG.96/5, Annex (1984), adopted by UNEP Governing Council Decision 12/14, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.12/19 (1984), Annex I. 4 0 5 See Victor, supra note 388 at 232-233, and London Guidelines, supra note 387 Arts. 13, 14 and 15. 4 0 6 See Victor, Ibid, at 231 and 234. 4 0 7 See Hough, "Institutions for Controlling Global Trade," supra note 388 at 161-164, and Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 65. To s u m m a r i s e , ne i ther the C o d e of Conduc t nor the London Gu ide l ines ini t ial ly p rov ided for a p rocedure g iv ing impor t ing count r ies the oppor tun i ty to prohib i t fu ture impor ts of cer ta in haza rdous chemica ls and pest ic ides , and no pr ior consen t by impor t ing g o v e r n m e n t s w a s required for the expor t to o c c u r . 4 0 8 Howeve r , due to the ins is tence of deve lop ing count r ies and of a group of non -gove rnmen ta l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 4 0 9 the PIC procedure w a s in tegrated into both ins t ruments in 1 9 8 9 . 4 1 0 Chem ica l manu fac tu re rs ( represented by G I F A P ) 4 1 1 had s t rong ly opposed PIC, but they c a m e to accept it for fear of s t ronger a l te rna t ives such as a total ban on the expor t of cer ta in haza rdous c h e m i c a l s . 4 1 2 Accord ing to the PIC procedure , opera ted jo in t ly by the FAO and U N E P , 4 1 3 g o v e r n m e n t s shou ld notify any contro l act ion bann ing or severe ly restr ic t ing a chemica l for reasons of the env i r onmen t or h u m a n heal th to the des igna ted body of FAO or U N E P . 4 1 4 Tha t body wou ld in turn d i ssemina te the in format ion to the des igna ted nat ional author i t ies (DNAs) of o ther par t ic ipat ing s t a t e s , 4 1 5 so that they could assess the r isks assoc ia ted wi th the chemica l and dec ide on its future impor ta t ion . C i rcu la t ing a compi la t ion of not i f ied contro l ac t ions was in tended to create awa reness a m o n g compe ten t author i t ies of the regula tory ac t ions in o ther par t ic ipat ing count r ies and of the reason ing beh ind those ac t ions , and to se rve as the pr imary way to identi fy chemica ls for inc lus ion in the PIC procedure . Regard ing the subs tances covered by P I C , 4 1 6 each par t ic ipat ing count ry wou ld in form the 4 0 8 Interestingly, PIC appeared in seven out of eight drafts of the Code of Conduct, but it was removed from the final draft when the instrument was adopted in 1985, apparently in the face of British and American persuasion. See Hough, Ibid, at 162. 4 0 9 Notably, the group of 77 (the largest coalition of developing countries) and the NGOs Pesticides Action Network and Greenpeace. See Ibid, at 162, and Victor, supra note 388 at 235. 4 1 0 PIC was included in the London Guidelines in May 1989 and in the Code of Conduct in November 1989. See Hough Peter, "Institutions for Controlling Global Trade," supra note 388 at 162. 4 1 1 Groupement International des Associations de Fabricants de Produits Agrochimiques (GIFAP). In 1996, GIFAP became the Global Crop Protection Federation, and in 2000-2001 it evolved into Croplife International, which broadened its scope to include agricultural biotechnology. For more information visit their web site, online: <http://www.qcpf.ora/website/paqes/backqround.aspx>. 4 1 2 The U.S., Germany and Britain were openly against the inclusion of PIC in the London Guidelines. See Hough, "Institutions for Controlling Global Trade," supra note 388 at 162. 4 1 3 UNEP and FAO shared operational responsibility for the implementation of the PIC procedure and other common aspects. The Plant Protection Service of FAO was the lead office for pesticides, and the Chemicals Unit of UNEP was the lead office for industrial and consumer chemicals. See London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 5.2. 4 1 4 The International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) in the case of the London Guidelines (London Guidelines, supra note 387 Arts. 6 and 7) and the FAO in the case of the Code of Conduct (Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 9). 4 1 5 According to the London Guidelines and the Code of Conduct, each state had to designate one or more national authorities to perform the administrative functions related to information exchange and the PIC procedure. See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 9.9 and London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 5.4. 4 1 6 Any substance banned or severely restricted by any single state through a final regulatory action would be subject to PIC, provided that the implementing body issued a decision guidance document ensuring conformity of the control action with the definitions of banned and severely restricted of the Code or the Guidelines. imp lemen t ing body whe the r or not it wou ld accept future impor ts of a c h e m i c a l , and expor te rs wou ld have to respect that dec is ion . For a bet ter unders tand ing of the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , a more deta i led ove rv iew of the C o d e of Conduc t and of the London Gu ide l ines fo l lows. 4.2.1. UNEP London Guidelines (as Amended in 1989) The London Gu ide l ines seek to enhance the sound m a n a g e m e n t of chemica l s th rough the exchange of sc ient i f ic , t echn ica l , economic and legal in fo rmat ion . To prevent ove r laps wi th the C o d e of Conduc t , the p reamb le refers to the Code as " the p r imary gu idance for the m a n a g e m e n t of pest ic ides in ternat iona l ly . " The Gu ide l i nes d is t ingu ish be tween three di f ferent m e a s u r e s : in format ion e x c h a n g e ; expor t not i f icat ion in the case of banned or severe ly restr ic ted c h e m i c a l s ; and the PIC p rocedure , wh ich is o p t i o n a l . 4 1 7 In re lat ion to in format ion e x c h a n g e , s ta tes that have taken a contro l ac t ion to ban or severe ly restr ict a chemica l mus t noti fy the I R P T C , 4 1 8 which then d i ssemina tes the not i f icat ions to o ther par t ic ipat ing count r ies to g ive t h e m the oppor tun i ty to assess the r isks assoc ia ted wi th that chemica l (Art. 6 ) . To the ex ten t p rac t icab le , the D N A issu ing the not i f icat ion shou ld prov ide in format ion concern ing a l ternat ive m e a s u r e s , such as in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t techn iques , non -chemica l a l te rna t ives and mi t igat ion measures (art 6 .d) . If an expor t of a chemica l that is domes t i ca l l y banned or severe ly restr ic ted occurs , the S ta te of expor t shou ld ensure that s teps are taken to prov ide the impor t ing count ry 's D N A wi th re levant in format ion abou t the chemica l to be expor ted or being expor ted (it does not need to be pr ior to the expor t ) (Art . 8 ) . Last ly , the PIC procedure g ives par t ic ipat ing count r ies the chance to record the i r dec is ions regard ing future impor ts of banned or severe ly restr ic ted chemica ls in a fo rmal w a y , and expor t ing count r ies shou ld respect those dec is ions (Art . 7 .1) . Acco rd ing to A n n e x II, those chem ica l s banned or severe ly restr ic ted by 10 or more s ta tes wou ld au tomat ica l l y be sub jec t to the p rocedure , whi le chemica l s banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted by 5 or more s ta tes wou ld be submi t ted to in formal consu l ta t ion to de te rm ine if they met the def in i t ion of banned or severe ly restr ic ted for h u m a n heal th or env i ronmen ta l However, the London Guidelines established that for the initial PIC list, a minimum number of five notifications would be required for a substance to be included in the list. See London Guidelines, supra note 387 Annex II. 4 1 7 Countries may participate in the information exchange procedures without participating in the PIC procedure. However, all exporting countries are expected to participate in the PIC procedure by respecting the decisions of importing countries. See London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 7(1) (a) and (b). 4 1 8 International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC), now UNEP Chemicals. reasons . S ince January 1992 , a contro l act ion by any s ing le s ta te could invoke the PIC s y s t e m . 4 2 0 4.2.2. The FAO Code of Conduct (as amended in 1989) The a i m of the code is to set forth responsib i l i t ies and vo lun ta ry s tandards of conduc t for al l ent i t ies engaged in the d is t r ibut ion and use of pest ic ides (Art . 1.1). It s e e k s , a m o n g s t o the rs , to p romote pract ices that encourage the safe and eff ic ient use of pes t ic ides , inc luding min im is ing adverse ef fects on h u m a n s and the env i ronmen t and prevent ing acc identa l po ison ing f rom improper handl ing (Art. 1.5). L ike the London Gu ide l i nes , the Code refers to in format ion e x c h a n g e , expor t not i f icat ion and the PIC procedure as three separa te mat te rs . Regard ing in format ion e x c h a n g e , the g o v e r n m e n t of any count ry that takes act ion to ban or seve re l y restr ict the use of hand l ing of a pest ic ide to protect heal th or the env i ronmen t shou ld noti fy the FAO of the act ion t a k e n . The FAO then not i f ies the des igna ted nat ional author i t ies (DNAs) in o ther count r ies of that act ion (Art. 9.1) In re lat ion to expor t not i f ica t ion, if the expor t of a pest ic ide banned or severe ly restr ic ted in the count ry of expor t occu rs , the count ry of expor t shou ld ensure that necessary s teps are taken to prov ide the D N A of the count ry of impor t w i th re levant in format ion (Art. 9 .3) . Prov is ion of in format ion regard ing expor ts shou ld take p lace at the t ime of the f irst expor t fo l lowing the contro l ac t ion , and shou ld recur in the case of any s igni f icant deve lopmen t of new in format ion or cond i t ion su r round ing the contro l ac t ion . A s in the London Gu ide l i nes , it is on ly intended that the expor t not i f icat ion be pr ior to the expor ta t ion (Art. 9 .5) . Last ly , pest ic ides that are banned or severe ly restr ic ted for reasons of heal th or the env i ronmen t are sub jec t to the PIC procedure (Art. 9 . 7 ) , 4 2 1 and governments of pest ic ide expor t ing countr ies should take su i tab le measu res to ensure that expor ts do not occur cont rary to the dec is ions of part ic ipat ing import ing countr ies (Art. 9 .11 .2) . The inclusion of a new chemical in the PIC list would require, however, that a group of experts confirm that the action taken responds to the definition of "severely restricted" or "banned." According to the London Guidelines, a banned chemical is "a chemical which has, for health or environmental reasons, been prohibited for all uses by final governmental regulatory actions," and a severely restricted chemical is "a chemical for. which, for health or environmental reasons, virtually all uses have been prohibited by final governmental regulatory actions, but for which certain specific uses remain authorized." See London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 1. 4 2 0 See FAO and UNEP, Report of the Third FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Rome, Italy 3-7 June 1991) at 17. 4 2 1 From article 9.8 of the Code of Conduct follows that the PIC procedure applies to those chemicals for which the FAO has issued a guidance document, having ensured conformity of the control action with the definitions of banned and severely restricted given in article 2. See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 9.8. Unl ike the London Guide l ines, the FAO Code goes beyond in format ion exchange . It p rov ides, for ins tance, that pest ic ides whose handl ing and appl icat ion require the use of uncomfor tab le and expens ive protect ive c lothing and equ ipment should be avo ided , especia l ly in the case of smal l scale users in t ropical c l imates (Art. 3 .5 ) ; that concer ted efforts should be made by gove rnmen ts and pest ic ide industr ies to deve lop and promote integrated pest managemen t sys tems and the use of safe , eff icient, cost-ef fect ive appl icat ion methods (Art. 3 .8) ; that expor t ing gove rnmen ts and internat ional organizat ions must play an act ive role in assist ing develop ing countr ies in t ra in ing personnel in the interpretat ion and evaluat ion of test data (Art. 4 . 4 ) ; and that pest ic ide manufac turers should ensure that each pest ic ide and pest ic ide product is adequate ly and effect ively tested by wel l recognized procedures and test methods so as to ful ly eva luate its safety , eff icacy and fate with regard to the ant ic ipated condi t ions in regions or countr ies of use (Art. 4 .1 .1 ) . It a lso asks indust ry to make eve ry reasonab le effort to reduce hazards by, a m o n g s t o thers , mak ing less tox ic fo rmu la t ions ava i lab le (Art. 5 .2 .2 .1 ) , and to halt sa le and recal l p roducts w h e n safe use does not s e e m poss ib le under any use , d i rec t ions or rest r ic t ions (Art . 5 .2 .3 ) . Desp i te the i r e n o r m o u s potent ia l for the ach ievemen t of real p rogress in the f ield of haza rdous chemica l s and pest ic ides , these and o ther p rov is ions were not even cons idered when the vo lun ta ry PIC s c h e m e was t rans fo rmed into a legal ly b ind ing ins t rument . Th is is ma in ly due to the fact tha t the manda te of the negot ia t ing commi t t ee was ve ry nar rowly in te rp re ted , as the next sect ion exp la ins . 4.3. The Rotterdam Negotiations 4.3.1. Antecedents Not long af ter the PIC procedure w a s in t roduced into the Code of C o n d u c t and the London Gu ide l i nes , deve lop ing count r ies , s o m e European s ta tes (notab ly Be lg ium and the Ne the r lands ) , the EC and publ ic interest g roups s tar ted to c la im that a b ind ing PIC procedure wou ld be more ef fect ive than a vo lun ta ry o n e . 4 2 2 Deve lop ing count r ies had suppor ted PIC s ince the late 1970s , when they s tar ted push ing for reso lu t ions wi th in the Uni ted Nat ions s y s t e m to reject impor ts of banned and seve re l y restr ic ted chemica l s that Support by the EC was mainly due to the leadership of the Dutch and Belgian governments. See Victor, supra note at 257 and 277. were not exp ress l y consen ted to by the impor t ing c o u n t r y . 4 2 3 Th is cu lm ina ted , as exp la ined before , wi th the in t roduct ion of PIC into the London Gu ide l ines and the C o d e of Conduc t in 1989 . T h u s , a l though the te rm ' P I C was not a lways used and there was not m u c h deba te on the legal s ta tus of poss ib le c o m m i t m e n t s before the 1990s - a vo lun ta ry s y s t e m w a s hard enough to a c h i e v e - one cou ld contend that the Sou th suppor ted a b inding PIC s ince the late 1 9 7 0 s . 4 2 4 The interest of the EC in mak ing the PIC procedure b inding was p rominen t s ince June 1986 , w h e n the C o m m i s s i o n of the European C o m m u n i t i e s put before the EC Counc i l of Min is ters a proposa l for an EEC regulat ion on expor ts of cer ta in dange rous c h e m i c a l s . 4 2 5 The proposa l was p rompted by a 1983 resolut ion of the Eu ropean Par l iament that ca l led for pr ior in formed consen t to be in t roduced in C o m m u n i t y leg is la t ion , and by the g o v e r n m e n t of the Ne ther lands , wh ich held the p res idency of the EC in the f irst hal f of 1986 and had nat ional legis lat ion prov id ing for PIC s ince 1 9 8 5 . 4 2 6 A l t hough the C o m m i s s i o n did not go that far, it s ta ted that " d a n g e r o u s chemica l s shou ld be expor ted on ly to s ta tes wh ich have prev ious ly agreed to a l low the i r i m p o r t a t i o n , " 4 2 7 and inc luded a d i luted vers ion of PIC ca l led the prior informed choice. Acco rd ing to th is p rov is ion , expor t permi ts wou ld not be gran ted if the g o v e r n m e n t of the impor t ing count ry in formed the C o m m i s s i o n that it ob jected to the impor t w i th in 60 days of the date of expor t not i f icat ion. In o ther t e r m s , impor t ing count r ies could prevent the expor t if they w ished to do s o , but the i r consen t wou ld be p resumed if they fai led to respond wi th in the s igna l led per iod of t i m e . 4 2 8 Even though th is was a weak vers ion of P IC , it was s t rong ly opposed by G e r m a n y , the U.K. and France , three ma jo r EC chemica l expor te rs that advoca ted a 4 2 3 See, for instance, UNEP, GC, Decision 85(V), supra note 392 and UNGA Res. 34/173 (1979) Exchange of information on banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products, UN Doc. A/RES/34/173 (17 December 1979), Res. 35/186 (1980) Exchange of Information on Banned Hazardous Chemical and Unsafe Pharmaceutical Products, UN Doc. A/RES/35/186 (15 December 1980), and Res. 36/166 (1981) Exchange of information on banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products, UN Doc. A/RES/36/166 (16 December 1981). 4 2 4 See Victor, supra note 388 at 277, and Hough, "Institutions for Controlling Global Trade," supra note 388 at 162. 4 2 5 The European Community (EC) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht (amended by later agreements), which in 1993 created the European Union to replace the former European Economic Community. Among its tasks is to develop a common policy in the sphere of the environment. See Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, O J . (C 224) 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), Title II Art. G), online: <http://www.uni-mannheim.de/users/ddz/edz/doku/vertrag/engl/m_engl.html>. 4 2 6 Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 67 and Victor, supra note 388 at 229. Under the 1985 Dutch "Bill on Voluntary Regulation of Exports under the Chemicals Act," in order to export certain banned or severely restricted chemicals the exporter would have to certify that the importing country did not forbid the chemical from entering its market, and that its DNA approved the import. Although voluntary, it was expected that industry would comply with these and other provisions. For details see Cyrus Mehri "PIC: an Emerging Compromise for Hazardous Exports," (1988) 21 Cornell Int'l L.J. 365 at 379-380. 4 2 7 See Mehri, Ibid, at 382. 4 2 8 The proposal also included restrictions on the export of certain chemicals (including 14 organochlorine and mercury-based pesticides). Pallemaerts, supra note 392 at 67. s c h e m e a long the l ines of the O E C D and UNEP gu ide l ines and succeeded in weaken ing the C o m m i s s i o n ' s p r o p o s a l . 4 2 9 The resul t ing ins t rument , Counc i l Regu la t ion (EEC) No . 1 7 3 4 / 8 8 , inc luded prov is ions on not i f icat ion and in format ion exchange s im i la r to those of the or ig inal London Gu ide l i nes , wi th no reference to PIC. Neve r the less , the p reamb le incorpora ted a s ta temen t that the Counc i l wou ld cons ider , before Ju ly 1 9 9 0 , the possib i l i ty of in t roduc ing the pr incip le of "p r io r in formed c h o i c e " into the r e g u l a t i o n . 4 3 0 In the 1 9 8 0 s , t hen , on ly a few European count r ies favoured the pr incip le of pr ior in formed consen t . Howeve r , once the procedure b e c a m e manda to ry for EC m e m b e r s wi th Counc i l Regu la t ion 2 4 5 5 / 9 2 , it was in the interest of all m e m b e r s , par t icu lar ly the ma jo r chemica l s expor te rs who init ial ly opposed PIC ( i .e. G e r m a n y , F rance , and the U .K . ) , that the p rocedure be t rans fo rmed into a b inding t reaty . In that w a y , n o n - E C chem ica l s expor te rs wou ld a lso have to c o m p l y wi th PIC's onerous prov is ions . The coal i t ion be tween deve lop ing count r ies , the EC and s o m e European count r ies led U N E P ' s Gove rn ing Counc i l to adopt a dec is ion in 1991 to exp lore the poss ib le use of a legal ly b ind ing ins t rument for PIC. Th is was reaf f i rmed at the 1992 Ear th S u m m i t ( U N C E D ) , whe re s ta tes set as an ob jec t ive in the f ield of tox ic chemica ls " to ach ieve by the y e a r 2 0 0 0 , as feas ib le , full par t ic ipat ion in and imp lementa t ion of the PIC p rocedure , inc lud ing poss ib le manda to ry app l ica t ions th rough legal ly b inding ins t ruments con ta ined in the A m e n d e d London Gu ide l i nes and in the FAO In ternat iona l Code of Conduc t , tak ing into account the exper ience ga ined wi th the PIC p r o c e d u r e . " 4 3 1 The fo rma l dec is ion to negot ia te a conven t ion was m a d e by the FAO Counc i l at its 1 0 7 t h mee t ing in 1994 , where it w a s dec ided that the FAO Secre ta r ia t shou ld , together wi th UNEP and as part of the F A O / U N E P P r o g r a m m e on P IC, deve lop a draft PIC Conven t i on . L i kew ise , in 1 9 9 5 , the U N E P Gove rn ing Counc i l at its 1 8 t h sess ion au thor ized the Execu t i ve Di rec tor to prepare and c o n v e n e , 4 3 2 toge ther wi th the F A O , an in te rgovernmenta l negot ia t ing commi t t ee wi th a manda te to p repare an in ternat ional legal ly b inding ins t rument on P IC, to be comp le ted and adop ted before the end of 1 9 9 7 . 4 3 3 In 1 9 9 6 , the Jo in t P r o g r a m m e of FAO and U N E P in i t iated the negot ia t ions , and in March 1 9 9 8 , 95 g o v e r n m e n t s f ina l ized the text of the 4 2 9 See Ibid. 4 3 0 See EC, Council Regulation 1734/88 of 16 June 1988 concerning export from and import into the Community of certain dangerous chemicals [1988] O.J. L 155/2 (no longer in force), Pmbl. PIC was introduced in the EU with Council Regulation 2455/92 (see supra note 3). 4 3 1 See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 para. 38(b). 4 3 2 See Victor, supra note 388 at 257, and UNEP, GC, 18 t h sess., Development of a Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in International Trade, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.18/7 27 (February 1995). 4 3 3 See Katharina Kummer "Prior Informed Consent in International Trade: the 1998 Rotterdam Convention," (1999) 8:3 RECIEL 323 at 324, and UNEP, GC, 10 t h meeting, 18 t h session, Decision 18/12 (26 May 1995), online: <http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm/gcl8-pic.pdf>. " R o t t e r d a m Conven t i on on the Prior In fo rmed Consen t (PIC) Procedure for Cer ta in Haza rdous C h e m i c a l s and Pest ic ides in In ternat ional T r a d e . " The t rea ty w a s adopted at a D ip lomat i c Con fe rence in Ro t t e rdam, the Ne ther lands , in S e p t e m b e r 1998 , and it wil l en te r into force once 50 ins t ruments of rat i f icat ion are d e p o s i t e d . 4 3 4 Par t ies agreed that the FAO and U N E P would cont inue to opera te the vo lun ta ry PIC dur ing the in ter im per iod , af ter s o m e ad jus tmen ts to br ing it in l ine with the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on ' s p rov is ions were m a d e . 4 3 5 4.3.2. The Negotiations: the opinion of the Group of Experts on PIC Al though the f ina l izat ion of the conven t ion in such a shor t per iod of t ime could be seen as a s u c c e s s , not eve rybody thought the m o m e n t was r ight to conver t the vo lun ta ry PIC into a legal ly b inding s y s t e m . Shor t l y before the negot ia t ions b e g a n , f rom 1991 to 1 9 9 5 , the F A O / U N E P Jo in t G roup of Exper ts on PIC had repeated ly urged that the vo lun ta ry p rocedure be imp lemen ted ful ly pr ior to focus ing on conver t ing it into a legal ly b inding t r e a t y . 4 3 6 W h e n in 1994 UNEP 's Ad Hoc Group of Exper ts on the Imp lemen ta t i on of the London Gu ide l i nes r e c o m m e n d e d that PIC be made a b ind ing i n s t r u m e n t 4 3 7 and the F A O / U N E P Joint Group of Exper ts was inv i ted to exp ress its v i ews , it expl ic i t ly ind icated that " the t ime might not be r ipe for the deve lopmen t of a manda to ry ins t rument as more t ime is needed to fur ther deve lop and resolve the p rob lems under the ex is t ing vo lun tary p rocedure . The in t roduct ion of a manda to ry sys tem at th is s tage cou ld prove counter -product ive and expens i ve to ope ra te . " Never the less , cons ider ing that the t rans fo rmat ion of PIC into a legal ly b inding ins t rument could be imminen t , it e m p h a s i z e d "the need to resolve several basic problems (whether in the context of a voluntary or a new mandatory procedure) for the successful implementation of the procedure by: • providing substantial training and technical support programmes for developing countries, not only for the implementation of the PIC procedure but in the context of a broader chemicals management scheme; and Interim Secretariat to the Rotterdam Convention, overview, online: <http://www.pic.int/en/ViewPage.asp7id-101>. (Last visited August 2003) 4 3 5 See Resolution on Interim Arrangements, supra note 7. 4 3 5 See FAO and UNEP, Report of the Second FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on Prior Informed Consent (Geneva, 1-5 October 1990) at 22; FAO and UNEP, Report of the Third FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Rome, 3-7 June 1991) at 18; FAO and UNEP, Report of the Fifth FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Rome, 26-30 October 1992) at 5; FAO and UNEP Report of the Seventh FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Rome, 21-25 March 1994) [hereinafter Report of FAO/UNEP 7 t h meeting] at 8; and Victor, supra note 388 at 258. 4 3 7 See Victor, Ibid, at 258-259. • taking measures to ensure that ail exporting countries participate in, and follow up, the import decisions taken under the procedure. " 4 3 8 (Emphasis in original) A l t hough the negot ia t ing commi t t ee was supposed to take into accoun t the exper ience ga ined wi th the vo lun ta ry p r o c e d u r e , 4 3 9 the two aspec ts that in the concep t of the g roup of exper ts were cr i t ical for a success fu l PIC were not inc luded in the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on . Wi th regards to par t ic ipat ion of all expor t ing count r ies in the PIC p rocedure , ini t ial ly there was a prov is ion on t rade wi th non-Par t i es , wh ich wou ld have inci ted expor t ing count r ies to rati fy the t reaty for fear of not be ing ab le to t rade hazardous chemica l s wi th part ies to the conven t i on . The p rov is ion , however , was de le ted in p lenary at INC 4 , 4 4 0 fo l lowing the v iew that the convent ion no longer inc luded proposa ls for phase -ou ts or t rade b a n s . 4 4 1 The unfor tunate resul t is that par t ies can impor t PIC and o ther haza rdous chemica l s f rom non-Par t ies w i thout receiv ing not i f icat ion f rom the expor te r , and they wil l not have the opt ion of refusing fu ture impor ts of PIC chemica l s f rom those count r ies , so there is no incent ive for non-Par t ies to j o in the t reaty. The potent ia l r isk is s ign i f icant , as ev idenced by the fact that the U .S . has not yet rat i f ied the Base l Conven t i on (in force s ince 1992) desp i te being the largest s ing le genera to r of haza rdous w a s t e s . 4 4 2 The U .S . is a lso one of the ma jo r pest ic ide expor te rs , and it has less s t r ingent regu la t ions than those of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on . 4 4 3 Add i t iona l l y , if as noted by UNEP Execu t i ve Di rector E l izabeth Dowdeswe l l at INC 1, a b inding PIC t reaty w a s needed because " a s long as comp l iance was not manda to r y , it was suscept ib le to produc ing uneven resu l t s , " a prov is ion on t rade wi th non-Par t ies w a s an ind ispensab le e l emen t of the t rea ty . The ob ject ive of ach iev ing full par t ic ipat ion in the PIC procedure H J O See Report of FAO/UNEP 7 t h meeting, supra note 436 at 8. 4 3 9 See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 para. 19.38(b). 4 4 0 Only Argentina expressed its reservation to the proposal, stating that the same provision was included in the Basel Convention. See "Report of the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade," Earth Negotiations Bulletin 15:3 (27 October 1997) at 7 [Hereinafter ENB Report INC-4 PIC], online: <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enbl503e.pdf>, and FAO/UNEP Secretariat, Report of the INC for an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade on the Work at its Fourth Session, UN doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.4/2 (4 November 1997) at 8-9. 4 4 1 At INC 1, provisions concerning prohibitions of use or phase-out were considered, but several delegations expressed that it exceeded the INC's mandate, which was limited to the PIC procedure. See FAO/UNEP Secretariat, Report of the INC for an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade on the Work at its Is' Session, UN doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.1/10 (21 March 1996) [Hereinafter UN Report of PIC INC-1] at 12 and FAO/UNEP Secretariat, Comments on the Possible Elements for an International Legally Binding Instrument of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade Identified by the Ad Hoc Working Group, UN doc. UNEP/FAO/INC/INC.1/3 at 11. See also ENB Report INC-3 PIC, supra note 335 at 8. 4 4 2 The U.S. generates about 85% of the world's hazardous wastes. See Clapp, "Toxic Exports," supra note 8 at 22. The Basel Convention proscribes trade with non-Parties. However, it allows Parties to celebrate agreements with non-Parties to trade these wastes provided that some requirements are met (notably, the environmentally sound management of the wastes in question). See Basel Convention, supra note 283 Art. 11. 4 4 3 For U.S. legislation on the export of hazardous chemicals see section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2. was a lso p resen ted as a just i f icat ion for negot ia t ing a b ind ing PIC in A g e n d a 2 1 , wh ich in the a rea of tox ic chem ica l s sets as an ob ject ive " to ach ieve by the y e a r 2 0 0 0 , as feas ib le , full par t ic ipat ion and imp lementa t ion of the PIC p rocedure , inc lud ing poss ib le manda to ry app l ica t ions th rough legal ly b inding ins t ruments con ta ined in the A m e n d e d London Gu ide l ines and in the FAO Internat ional Code of Conduc t , tak ing into account the exper ience ga ined wi th in the PIC p r o c e d u r e . " 4 4 4 The de le t ion of the ar t ic le on t rade wi th non-Par t ies was largely re lated to the nar row in terpreta t ion that was g iven to the in te rgovernmenta l negot ia t ing commi t t ee ' s ( INC) manda te . S ince the beg inn ing of the negot ia t ions, a g roup led by the U .S . advoca ted that the INC had the manda te to s imp ly conver t the vo lun ta ry PIC into a legal ly b inding ins t rument , whi le a g roup led by s o m e EU m e m b e r s wan ted the t reaty to be a f ramework conven t ion on the m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous c h e m i c a l s . 4 4 5 S ince no a g r e e m e n t was reached be tween these g roups , the debate was reso lved in favour of the nar row a p p r o a c h . 4 4 5 Th is c losed the door not on ly to a prov is ion on t rade wi th non-Par t ies but a lso to d i scuss ions on impor tant issues such as in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t , ob l igat ions re lat ing to the m a n a g e m e n t of chem ica l s , and tes t ing , product ion and d is t r ibut ion of haza rdous c h e m i c a l s . 4 4 7 Yet even a t reaty st r ic t ly l imi ted to PIC cou ld have prov ided for concre te ob l igat ions on capac i ty bui ld ing so that deve lop ing count r ies wou ld be ab le to comp ly wi th the i r ob l iga t ions under the conven t i on , in accordance wi th the f irst r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of the F A O / U N E P Jo in t G roup of Exper ts . The issue of f inanc ia l and techno logy t rans fer to deve lop ing count r ies was ano the r ma jo r sub ject of con t rove rsy , th is t ime between the North and the S o u t h . Whi le deve lop ing count r ies asked for f inancia l and techno log ica l ass is tance to imp lemen t the conven t i on , deve loped count r ies did not want to c o m m i t t hemse l ves to prov ide it and ins is ted that any f inancia l m e c h a n i s m shou ld be based on vo lun ta ry c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 4 4 8 The issue of f inancia l resources and m e c h a n i s m s w a s in t roduced on ly at INC 3, where the d iscuss ion focused on whe the r cont r ibu t ions shou ld See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 para. 38(b). 4 4 5 At the first meeting the government of Belgium, host of the meeting, expressed the necessity for a "broad perspective and consider the relationship between PIC and possible additional measures." See UN Report of PIC INC-1, supra note 441 at 2. 44fi See Kummer, supra note 433 at 325. 4 4 7 Since the treaty could only apply to states, the regulation of industrial activity would be the responsibility of parties, which would have the obligation to adopt appropriate national legislation. 4 4 8 See ENB Report INC-3 PIC, supra note 335 at 10-11. be vo lun ta ry or manda to r y , and no a g r e e m e n t was reached . The mat te r w a s not d i scussed at INC 4 , and it was sti l l unreso lved at INC 5, wh ich due to t ime and f inancia l cons t ra in ts was the last meet ing before the D ip lomat ic Con fe rence , where the t rea ty wou ld be adop ted . G i ven these cons t ra in ts , and at the sugges t ion of the C h a i r p e r s o n , al l con ten t ious p roposa ls re lated to f inancia l m e c h a n i s m were r e m o v e d f rom the draft tex t in an effort to concent ra te on the ' subs tan t i ve ' i ssues and thus f inal ize the conven t i on . The unfor tunate resul t is that the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on features abso lu te ly no f inancia l m e c h a n i s m to sponso r capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies or techn ica l ass is tance - n o t even one of vo lun ta ry n a t u r e . 4 5 0 In con junc t ion wi th the absence of a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m , no concre te ob l iga t ions on techn ica l ass is tance and capac i ty bui ld ing were ag reed upon . A t INC 4 , negot ia tors prov is iona l ly endorsed an art ic le accord ing to wh ich part ies wou ld have the ob l igat ion to coopera te in p romot ing techn ica l ass is tance to deve lop the capac i ty to imp lemen t the C o n v e n t i o n , tak ing into account the needs of deve lop ing count r ies and count r ies wi th economies in t rans i t ion . It was a lso es tab l i shed that Par t ies wi th more advanced chemica l m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m m e s - r e g a r d l e s s of whe the r they were deve loped or deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s - ' s h o u l d ' prov ide techn ica l ass is tance to o ther p a r t i e s . 4 5 1 A t INC 5, s o m e de lega t ions f rom the S o u t h sugges ted that the techn ica l and f inancia l needs of deve lop ing count r ies be spec i f i ed , but the Cha i r s t ressed that they were impl ic i t in the text of the c l a u s e . 4 5 2 The ar t ic le was approved wi th no changes . The lack of ser ious cons idera t ion to f inancia l and capac i ty bui ld ing prov is ions migh t have been par t ly due to the lack of uni ty a m o n g deve lop ing count r ies in v i r tua l ly all o ther ma t te rs , inc luding that of the nature of the INC 's m a n d a t e . 4 5 3 T h u s , the s t rong Sou the rn coal i t ion that was dec is ive for the in t roduct ion of PIC into the C o d e of Conduc t and the London Gu ide l i nes was v i r tua l ly lost in Ro t te rdam. A few deve lop ing count r ies f avou red , for i ns tance , a lesser a m o u n t of ob l igat ions for expor te rs . S o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s have While Japan, the U.S. and Canada advocated a voluntary mechanism, China, Jordan, Indonesia and other developing countries supported a mandatory fund. See Ibid, at 10-11. 4 5 0 See Kummer, supra note 433 at 326, and "Report of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade" Earth Negotiations Bulletin 15:4 (16 March 1998) at 2 [Hereinafter ENB Report INC-5 PIC], online: <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enbl504e.pdf>. 4 5 1 See ENB Report INC-4 PIC, supra note 440 at 7. 4 5 2 Ethiopia, Morocco, Iran and Malaysia. See ENB Report INC-5 PIC, supra note 450 at 6. 4 5 3 Some developing countries -notably Colombia and Jordan- supported the U.S. position that the INC's mandate was to transform the voluntary PIC into a legally binding procedure. This was possibly due to the fact that they considered that to expand the scope of the agreement too much could impede concluding negotiations in the near future, and that the administrative and technical obligations in a treaty of a narrower scope would be challenging enough. See ENB Report INC-3 PIC supra note 335 at 3 and 11. exp la ined th is shift by the fact that when the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on was being nego t ia ted , m a n y deve lop ing count r ies had become s ign i f icant pest ic ide expor te rs , so that they feared not being ab le to comp ly wi th the i r ob l iga t ions as e x p o r t e r s . 4 5 4 W h e n one looks at the negot ia t ions , however , the a r g u m e n t is not ent i re ly accura te , as the S o u t h was not c lear ly d iv ided between count r ies who were expor te rs and those w h o were mere impor te rs . A t INC 3 , Braz i l and Argen t ina - t w o pest ic ide e x p o r t e r s - de fended , toge ther wi th C a m e r o o n , G h a n a , N iger ia , Ch i le , U ruguay and Morocco , a prov is ion on expor t not i f icat ion for deve lop ing count r ies , and s t ressed the impor tance that it be m a n d a t o r y . 4 5 5 Th is v iew was a lso suppor ted by the Af r ican G r o u p , who warned that it wou ld not s ign the conven t ion if the art ic le were exc luded . In cont ras t , C o l o m b i a - a n o t h e r e x p o r t e r -advoca ted the de le t ion of the p rov is ion , a rgu ing that those in terested in in format ion concern ing restr ic t ive ac t ions could obta in it f rom the S e c r e t a r i a t . 4 5 6 A lso at INC 3, Ch ina - a ma jo r manu fac tu re r and e x p o r t e r - de fended the in terests of impor t ing count r ies by oppos ing a prov is ion accord ing to wh ich a ' gove rnmen ta l ac t i on ' wou ld suff ice to a l low the expor t of a PIC chemica l in cases where no response had been g iven by the impor t ing count ry . The Ch inese de legat ion made it c lear that it wou ld on ly accept a prov is ion indicat ing that on ly the impor t ing count ry 's D N A could au thor ise the impor t in such c a s e . 4 5 7 A t INC 4 , C o l o m b i a and the U .S . suppor ted New Zea land ' s concern in relat ion to an art ic le benef i t ing impor t ing count r ies in case they fai led to g ive a response on the future impor ta t ion of a PIC chem ica l . Braz i l and P a n a m a suppor ted the v iews of the de lega t ions of I ran and J a m a i c a , wh ich s ta ted that the de le t ion of such prov is ion wou ld create a g rave hea l th haza rd , and that deve lop ing count r ies could not have the capac i ty to respond prompt ly in the first p l a c e . 4 5 8 Last ly , at INC 5, whi le A rgen t ina agreed wi th the Phi l ipp ines, P a n a m a and Indones ia that one not i f icat ion shou ld suff ice to t r igger the PIC procedure regard less of the n u m b e r of reg ions , India (a ma jo r Sou the rn pest ic ide p roducer and expor ter ) agreed wi th the U . S . , C a n a d a and the EC that more than one See, for instance, Ibid, at 11-12. 4 5 5 Like the London Guidelines, the Rotterdam Convention requires exporting country parties to notify importing country parties of exports of chemicals banned or severely restricted for domestic use not subject to the PIC procedure. (See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 12). 4 5 6 See ENB Report INC-3 PIC supra note 335 at 6-7. Brazil reiterated this position at INC 4. 4 5 7 According to Art. 11 of the Rotterdam Convention, if a country has not given a response in relation to a PIC substance, that substance cannot be exported to that country unless: i) the chemical is registered in the importing country; or ii) there is evidence that the substance has been used in the importing country, or that it has been imported previously and no measure has banned its use; or iii) the exporter has obtained express authorization by the designated national authority of the importing country. China's position was in relation to the last provision. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 11 and Ibid, at 6. 4 5 8 See ENB Report INC-4 PIC, supra note 440 at 5. reg ion be requ i red , as it wou ld ref lect b roader concern and ensure that chemica l s put on the PIC list had g lobal s u p p o r t . 4 5 9 These few but representa t ive e x a m p l e s show that Sou the rn expor te rs were t hemse l ves d i v ided . Howeve r , it is impor tant to clar i fy what a ' S o u t h e r n expor te r ' is. Most c o m m e n t a t o r s do not d is t ingu ish a m o n g those ' S o u t h e r n expo r te rs ' w h o have a nat ional indust ry manufac tu r ing and expor t ing pest ic ides, and those who are essent ia l l y home of t ransnat iona l corpora t ions that produce and expor t haza rdous subs tances f rom thei r terr i tory. If the d is t inct ion is not m a d e , however , even Af r ican count r ies can be cons idered pest ic ide expor te rs , wh ich can be m i s l e a d i n g . 4 6 0 A s p resen ted in Chap te r 2 , bes ides the p resence of ma jo r mul t inat iona l corpora t ions , C h i n a , India and Brazi l have an impor tan t nat ional indust ry manufac tu r ing pest ic ides. Count r ies l ike C o l o m b i a and Mex ico a re , in cont ras t , home of ma jo r mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions and have only one impor tan t nat ional m a n u f a c t u r e r . 4 6 1 The ques t ion is, t hen , what mot i va tes the second group of expor te rs to protect the interests of the chemica l indust ry . The case of Co lomb ia is par t icu lar ly in terest ing because its de legat ion was very ac t ive dur ing the negot ia t ions , and it pers is tent ly de fended the in terests of i ndus t r y /expor te rs . Ye t , the a rgumen t tha t C o l o m b i a is an expor te r is not suf f ic ient ly s t rong to exp la in th is at t i tude. In fact , there were di f ferent pos i t ions inside the g o v e r n m e n t , 4 6 2 and even though the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on was an env i ronmen ta l t reaty , the Co lomb ian de legat ion did not inc lude a representa t i ve f rom the Minis t ry of Env i ronmen t but an off icial of the Min is t ry of Fore ign Af fa i rs and a representa t i ve of indust ry it had a c c r e d i t e d . 4 6 3 Beh ind the g o v e r n m e n t ' s dec is ion to adopt a posi t ion more protect ive of the chemica l indust ry than of heal th and the env i ronmen t was perhaps the fear of los ing fore ign i nves tmen t in the chemica l indust ry , wh ich is an impor tan t industr ia l sec tor in the count ry . T h u s , the case of C o l o m b i a could be an e x a m p l e of how shor t and m e d i u m - t e r m e c o n o m i c cons idera t ions 4 5 9 See ENB Report INC-5 PIC, supra note 450 at 4. 4 6 0 See, for instance, Harris J . , supra note 57 at 3-14; Wright, supra note 161; Nancy S. Zahedi, "Implementing the Rotterdam Convention: The Challenges of Transforming Aspirational Goals into Effective Controls on Hazardous Pesticide Exports to Developing Countries" (1999) 11 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 707 at 715. Zahedi cites Zambia, Rwanda and Tanzania as pesticide exporters. 4 6 1 For a distinction between manufacture and formulation see note 149. For production in the South see Dinham, "Pesticide Production in the South," supra note 181 at 7, and Wright, supra note 161. 4 6 2 The Ministry of Environment had opposing views to the ones presented during the negotiations, which were supported by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Agriculture, and by industry. This information was kindly provided by a former official of the Ministry of Environment of Colombia. 4 6 3 Although in theory both ministries could have attended the negotiations, the Ministry of Environment could not attend because it was in no position to finance one of its representatives, as it was decided that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would utilize the financial assistance provided by the Secretariat. The fact that a person from industry was accredited as part of the Colombian delegation was related to the fact that she was more familiar with the technical aspects of the convention than officials from the Ministry of Environment. This information was kindly provided by a former official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a former official of the Ministry of Environment. tend to defeat env i ronmen ta l and heal th concerns in the S o u t h , as descr ibed in Chap te r 3. It m a y a lso be an e x a m p l e of a " regu la to ry f r e e z e , " where a coun t ry fears s t r ic ter ( in ternat ional ) s tandards because they could imply that fore ign inves tmen t dec ides to leave or not to c o m e . 4 6 4 4.4. The Rotterdam Convention A s exp la ined before , the manda te of the negot ia t ing commi t t ee for the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on was ve ry nar rowly in terpre ted. A s a resul t , the text of the t reaty v i r tua l ly reproduced the vo lun ta ry PIC s c h e m e . Moreover , as the next sec t ion exp la ins , the new prov is ions that the t reaty incorpora tes were a l ready ope ra t i ng , in pract ice, w i th in the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m . 4.4.1. Information exchange, export notification and PIC procedure Like the London Gu ide l ines and the Code of conduc t , the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion covers three types of p rocedures : in format ion e x c h a n g e ; expor t not i f icat ion of domes t i ca l l y banned or seve re l y restr ic ted chemica ls not sub jec t to P I C ; and pr ior in formed consen t for the chem ica l s l isted in A n n e x III. In fo rmat ion exchange requi res a party to noti fy the Secre ta r ia t in wr i t ing on each ban or severe restr ic t ion on a chemica l it imp lemen ts n a t i o n a l l y . 4 6 5 The chemica l cou ld potent ia l ly be inc luded in A n n e x III and thus be sub jec t to the PIC p rocedure , prov id ing s o m e requ i rements - m o d e r a t e l y st r ic ter than those of the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m - are m e t . 4 6 6 4 6 4 The 'regulatory freeze' refers to the fear of some countries to raise domestic environmental standards, as it could imply a reduction of foreign investment. International standards could have the same effect, as they could make investment in the South less profitable. Thus, one could argue that developing countries may want to prevent those standards from becoming stricter so as to secure foreign investment. See Clapp, "Pollution Haven," supra note 261 at 17. 4 6 5 The notification must be made as soon as possible and no later than 90 days after the regulatory action banning or restricting the chemical has taken effect. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 5 (1). 4 6 6 In the voluntary system (after the initial phase, which required a minimum of 5 notifications to trigger the process of including a chemical in the PIC list), any single action banning or severely restricting a chemical for health or environmental reasons could trigger the PIC procedure (it would require confirming that it responded to the definition of "severely restricted" or "banned" by a group of experts). No country could veto the decision to include a new chemical in PIC. The Rotterdam Convention requires that detailed information (specified in Annex II) be provided. Once the Secretariat receives at least one notification of two different regions, it shall forward them to the Chemical Review Committee. (At INC 6, six regions were established on an interim basis: Africa, Asia, Europe, Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, and South West Pacific). The expert group might decide to recommend the inclusion of the chemical to the PIC list to the COP), in which case it will elaborate a decision guidance document with all the relevant information. It is the COP who makes the final decision, which means that any party could veto the inclusion of a substance in Annex III (According to Art. 22(5)(b), decisions about the Annexes should be made by consensus). This is problematic because chemical manufacturers could lobby a country so it uses its veto. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Arts. 5, 7 and 22(5)(b). Expor t not i f icat ion, in tu rn , requi res a par ty tha t p lans to expor t a chemica l banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted for use wi th in its ter r i tory , to inform the impor t ing party of such expor t before the f irst sh ipmen t and annua l l y thereaf ter . The ob l igat ion ceases if the chemica l is l isted in A n n e x III, s ince it is then covered by the PIC procedure . A s in the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , 4 6 7 the expor t ing party must prov ide an updated expor t not i f icat ion af ter hav ing adopted a f inal regulatory act ion resul t ing in a ma jo r change concern ing the ban or severe restr ic t ion of that c h e m i c a l . 4 6 8 Last ly , the PIC procedure app l ies to A n n e x III chemica l s . Once a dec is ion has been made to inc lude a chemica l in A n n e x III, a dec is ion gu idance d o c u m e n t ( D G D ) mus t be sen t by the Secre ta r ia t to all p a r t i e s . 4 6 9 T h e n , part ies mus t in form the Secre ta r ia t whe the r they wil l receive future impor ts of the chemica l or not, no later than 9 mon ths af ter the date of d ispa tch of the D G D . A dec is ion could cons is t of consen t , no consen t or consent to impor t under cer ta in cond i t ions , or conta in an in ter im r e s p o n s e . 4 7 0 In all cases , the dec is ion mus t be ' t rade neu t ra l . ' Th is means that if a party dec ides to refuse an impor t or consen ts to an impor t under cer ta in cond i t ions , the s a m e restr ic t ions mus t app ly to impor ts of that chemica l f rom any sou rce , and to domes t i c p r o d u c t i o n . 4 7 1 Expor t ing par t ies mus t take appropr ia te legis lat ive or admin is t ra t i ve measu res to ensure that expor te rs wi th in the i r ju r isd ic t ion c o m p l y wi th the dec is ions of impor t ing part ies in re lat ion to PIC d e c i s i o n s . 4 7 2 Accord ing to Ar t ic le 11 (2) , expor t ing part ies mus t a lso ensure tha t , in the absence of a response by an impor t ing par ty , no expor t takes p lace. The re a re , however , th ree excep t ions to th is rule. The expor t cou ld sti l l take p lace if: (a) the chemica l to be expor ted is reg is tered in the impor t ing par ty ; or (b) there is ev idence that it has been used or impor ted into the impor t ing party and no regulat ion to prohib i t its use has been e n a c t e d ; or (c) the expor te r rece ived expl ic i t consent f rom the des igna ted nat ional author i ty (DNA) of the impor t ing p a r t y . 4 7 3 Because of the way in wh ich it is fo rmu la ted , Ar t ic le 11 (2) g ives the impress ion of inst i tut ing the norm that no expor t shou ld take place un less exp ress l y agreed by the impor t ing count ry as the ru le, and expor t w i thout such consen t but under cer ta in 4 6 7 See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 9(5). 4 6 8 For further details see Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 12. 4 6 9 The DGD must have the relevant information on the chemical so parties will be able to decide on its future importation. See Ibid.Art. 7. 4 7 0 See Ibid.Art. 10(4). 4 7 1 See Ibid.Art. 10(9). 4 7 2 For details on timing, etc., see Ibid. Art. 11. 4 7 3 See Ibid. Art. 11 (2). [Note: each party must designate one or more DNAs to act on its behalf in the performance of the administrative functions required by the convention: See Ibid.Art. 4]. c i r cums tances as the excep t ion . In pract ice , however , the ar t ic le p romises that t rade in haza rdous chemica l s wil l cont inue (which is why it is referred as the " s ta tus q u o " c lause) unless the impor t ing count ry impedes it th rough ef fect ive par t ic ipat ion in the PIC p rocedure . Th is is because the th ree except iona l s i tuat ions con temp la ted by the rule are ve ry b road , and they place the burden of p revent ing an expor t on the impor t ing count ry . To p revent an expor t , the impor t ing count ry mus t g ive a negat ive response on the impor t of the subs tance concerned th rough the PIC s y s t e m . In o rder to g ive that response , the count ry mus t be ab le to ana lyse the data rece ived (which requ i res , e . g . , techn ica l capac i t y , suf f ic ient qual i f ied staff, adequa te laborator ies or fac i l i t ies) , to s tudy the poss ib le ef fects of the subs tance under its own env i ronmen ta l cond i t ions , and to cons ider poss ib le and af fordable a l te rna t ives . Perhaps more impor tan t l y , the count ry mus t m a k e sure that its response (whether prov is iona l or f inal) is cons is ten t wi th the rules of in ternat ional t r a d e . 4 7 4 T h u s , the impor t ing count ry must ident i fy if it is cur rent ly impor t ing the c h e m i c a l , the h istory of impor ts f rom dif ferent sou rces , and wha t is the local product ion of the c h e m i c a l , in o rder to ensure that its dec is ion wil l not be cha l lenged in in ternat ional t rade t r ibuna ls because it con t rad ic ts , for ins tance , the pr incip le of non d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 4 7 5 S ince m a n y count r ies lack the capac i ty to fulfi l these requ i remen ts , they might prefer to g ive an in ter im response a l lowing the impor t of a c h e m i c a l , or to regis ter no dec is ion at a l l , as the cur rent record of count ry responses (or fa i lures to respond) r e v e a l s . 4 7 6 One could a rgue that by ensur ing that t rade of hazardous chem ica l s wil l cont inue un less there is an expl ic i t prohib i t ion by the impor t ing s ta te , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on is incons is tent wi th the pr incip le of s ta te responsib i l i ty for t r ansbounda ry h a r m , s tud ied in Chap te r 3. Acco rd ing to th is ru le, s ta tes have the duty to take al l appropr ia te m e a s u r e s to prevent s ign i f icant t ransboundary ha rm when car ry ing out lawful a c t i v i t i e s . 4 7 7 T h u s , a s ta te that has b a n n e d , restr ic ted or not reg is tered a subs tance because it poses unaccep tab le r isks to the env i ronmen t or h u m a n heal th shou ld not expor t it to o thers as a p reven t i ve m e a s u r e , par t icu lar ly if the impor t ing count ry has re la t ive ly less capac i ty to gua ran tee its safe use . The appl ica t ion of the pr incip le of s ta te respons ib i l i ty wou ld en ta i l , there fo re , a p resumpt ion that subs tances that are harmfu l in the Nor th wil l cause ha rm in See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, Art. 10.9, which requires that the decision be 'trade neutral.' 4 7 5 This principle is studied in Chapter 3. 4 7 6 See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 727-729, and Interim Secretariat for the Rotterdam Convention, Pic Ocular XVII June 2003 (Appendix IV), which lists all importing country responses (and failures to transmit a response) received by from parties as of April 2003, online: <http://www.pic.int/en/Circular/CIRC17EN.pdf>. 4 7 7 Since the Rotterdam Convention explicitly allows the export of chemicals that are banned or severely restricted in the exporting country to other states, the export of those substances would be 'lawful.' the S o u t h , unless there is enough ev idence cont rad ic t ing that a s s u m p t i o n . The rule wou ld be therefore the prohib i t ion to expor t PIC chemica l s un less exp ress l y agreed by the impor t ing s ta te , and excep t ions wou ld app ly only if the expor te r prov ided suf f ic ient ev idence that the subs tance to be expor ted wil l cause no s ign i f icant ha rm in the impor t ing count ry . 4.4.2. Chemicals covered by PIC and export notification under Rotterdam 4.4.2.1. Severely hazardous pesticide formulations Bes ides the ca tegor ies of banned and severe ly restr ic ted chemica l s that qual i fy as cand ida tes of the PIC procedure , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on in t roduces the not ion of ' seve re l y haza rdous pest ic ide f o r m u l a t i o n , ' 4 7 8 and the possib i l i ty for a deve lop ing count ry or a coun t ry wi th an e c o n o m y in t rans i t ion exper ienc ing p rob lems wi th th is type of subs tance under cond i t ions of use in its ter r i tory , to p ropose its inc lus ion in A n n e x I I I . 4 7 9 Al though the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m did not exp ress l y inc lude th is t e r m , an exper t g roup was es tab l i shed under the London Gu ide l ines to s tudy the p rob lem of acute ly haza rdous pest ic ide fo rmu la t ions and to r e c o m m e n d those pos ing p rob lems of par t icu lar concern to deve lop ing count r ies for inc lus ion in the PIC p r o c e d u r e . 4 8 0 T h u s , in pract ice, the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on did noth ing but fo rmal ise what w a s a l ready opera t ing in the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m . Fu r the rmore , whi le the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m gave the responsib i l i ty of propos ing the inc lus ion of a severe ly haza rdous fo rmu la t ion to a g roup of exper t s , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on g ives th is task to deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . 4 8 1 Th is may be prob lemat ic because , as recogn ised by the F A O / U N E P Joint Group of Exper ts on P IC, deve lop ing count r ies genera l l y lack the in f rast ructure for documen t i ng and repor t ing inc idents , ideal ly the p r imary w a y of ident i fy ing pest ic ide fo rmu la t ions caus ing p rob lems under cond i t ions According to the Rotterdam Convention, a severely hazardous pesticide formulation is a chemical "formulated for pesticidal use that produces severe health or environmental effects observable within a short period of time after single or multiple exposure, under conditions of use." See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 2(d). 4 7 9 The proposal must contain the information required by part 1 of Annex IV and be presented to the Secretariat, who will forward it to the Chemicals Review Committee. This expert group might decide to recommend the inclusion of the chemical to the PIC list to the COP, in which case it will elaborate a decision guidance document with all the relevant information. The COP will make the final decision. See Ibid. Arts. 5(1) and 6. 4 8 0 As a result, 5 acutely hazardous pesticide formulations were included in the PIC list in 1997. See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 721-722, and London Guidelines, supra note 387 Annex II para. 2. 4 8 1 See Zahedi, Idid. at 722. of use in those count r ies . 8 2 Wha t is more , the group acknow ledged that ava i lab le sc ient i f ic da ta on potent ia l and actual hazards in deve lop ing count r ies were l im i ted , and that it was un l ike ly that they wou ld be ava i lab le in the fo reseeab le future. A s a resul t , it dec ided to app ly the "pr inc ip le of c a u t i o n " in mak ing its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , cons ider ing the "po ten t ia l hazards of the ind iv idual fo rmu la t ions so that the appropr ia te sa feguards can be ident i f ied and d i ssemina ted th rough the PIC p r o c e d u r e . " 4 8 3 Regre t tab ly , th is pr inc ip le was not inc luded in the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on , wh ich requi res the propos ing par ty to p rov ide , a m o n g o thers , " a c lear descr ip t ion of inc idents re lated to the p rob lem, inc lud ing the adve rse ef fects and the way in wh ich the fo rmu la t ion was u s e d . " 4 8 4 4.4.2.2. Banned and Severely Restricted Chemicals Ano the r d i f ference be tween the b ind ing and the vo lun ta ry PIC are the def in i t ions of " b a n n e d " and " s e v e r e l y res t r i c ted" chemica l s . In the vo lun ta ry PIC, a banned chemica l is a chemica l (or a pest ic ide) that has been prohib i ted for all uses by f inal gove rnmen ta l regu la tory ac t i on , or a pest ic ide for wh ich all requests for reg is t ra t ion or equ iva len t ac t ion for al l uses have not been g r a n t e d . 4 8 5 The Ro t te rdam Conven t i on incorpora tes the not ion of c a t e g o r i e s , 4 8 6 and clar i f ies that the def in i t ion inc ludes a chemica l that has been re fused for approva l or been w i thdrawn by indust ry e i ther f rom domes t i c marke t or f rom fur ther cons idera t ion in the domes t i c approva l p rocess , whe re there is ' c lea r ev i dence ' that such act ion w a s taken to protect h u m a n heal th or the env i ronmen t . T h e s a m e app l ies to the not ion of " s e v e r e l y res t r i c ted , " def ined by the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m as a chemica l for wh i ch "v i r tua l l y all uses have been prohib i ted by f inal gove rnmen t regu la tory ac t ion but for wh ich cer ta in uses rema in a u t h o r i z e d . " 4 8 7 A g a i n , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on refers to See FAO/UNEP Secretariat, Review of Issues Relevant to the Implementation of the Existing, Voluntary PIC Procedure, UN doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.1/5 (19 December 1995) [Hereinafter Review of Implementation of voluntary PIC] at 13. 4 8 3 FAO and UNEP, Report of the Fifth FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Rome, 26-30 October 1992) at 17-19. At that meeting, the Group of Experts recommended the inclusion of certain formulations of monocrotophos, methamidophos, phosphamidon, methyl parathion and parathion into the PIC list. 4 8 4 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Annex IV. Annex IV provides the information and criteria for listing severely hazardous pesticide formulations in the PIC list (Annex III). 4 8 5 In both cases, for health or environmental reasons. See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 2 and London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 1(b). 4 8 6 A banned chemical is a chemical "all uses of which within one or more categories have been prohibited by final regulatory action, in order to protect human health or the environment." [For the full definition see Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 2(b)]. Most of the chemicals in the voluntary PIC were included because they were banned or severely restricted for one use category, e.g. as a pesticide. With a reference to categories in the Rotterdam Convention's definition, the DGD could focus on the health and environmental effects of a particular category, mentioning other use categories (e.g. industrial chemical or consumer chemical). This would allow governments to consider the possible implications of a total ban of the substance. See Review of Implementation of voluntary PIC, supra note 482 at 13. 4 8 7 See London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 1(c). The Code of Conduct has a similar definition (see Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 1). ca tegor ies and m a k e s c lear that the def in i t ion inc ludes a chemica l that has , for "v i r tua l l y all u s e , " been refused for approva l or been w i thd rawn by indust ry e i ther f rom the domes t i c marke t or f rom fur ther cons idera t ion in the domes t i c approva l p rocess , to protect the env i r onmen t or h u m a n h e a l t h . 4 8 9 The def in i t ions in Ro t te rdam incorporate those s i tuat ions in wh ich a chemica l is vo luntar i l y w i thd rawn by indust ry , w i thout requi r ing fo rmal regu la tory a c t i o n . 4 9 0 Th is c lar i f icat ion was necessary to fill a gap under the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , wh ich did not exp ress l y cover those chemica ls sub jec t to vo lun ta ry act ion even w h e n mot iva ted by reasons of the env i ronmen t or hea l th . A n e x a m p l e p resented by Nancy Zahed i se rves to i l lustrate th is point . A n acute ly hazardous pest ic ide (mev inphos ) was taken off the U .S . marke t th rough a vo lun tary a g r e e m e n t be tween the EPA and the pest ic ide manu fac tu re r , wh ich prec luded the need for regulatory act ion even if the EPA had been prepared to take act ion to cance l its reg is t ra t ion. However , because it was a vo lun ta ry ac t ion , expor te rs were not requi red to noti fy impor t ing count r ies about mev inphos under the Code of C o n d u c t . 4 9 1 Al though the c lar i f icat ions in the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion are new, the U N E P Gove rn ing Counc i l and FAO Confe rence had prev ious ly dec ided that " c h e m i c a l s wh ich have been refused approva l for f i rst t ime use or have been w i thd rawn by the indust ry , e i ther f rom the marke t or f rom fur ther cons idera t ion in the approva l p rocess , where there is c lear ev idence that such ac t ions have been taken for heal th and env i ronmen ta l reasons , shou ld be inc luded in the PIC p r o c e d u r e . " 4 9 2 T h u s , the loophole of the or ig ina l vo lun ta ry s y s t e m had been a l ready ident i f ied and cor rected by the FAO and UNEP whi le opera t ing the vo lun ta ry s c h e m e . Regre t tab ly , l ike the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on requi res ' c l ea r e v i d e n c e ' that the refuse for approva l or w i thdrawa l by indust ry has been taken for reasons of hea l th or the env i ronmen t . Th is can be diff icult in the case of a vo lun ta ry ac t i on , even for a deve loped count ry . In the U . S . , for ins tance , if c o m p a n i e s vo luntar i l y The Rotterdam Convention defines a severely restricted chemical as "a chemical virtually all use of which within one or more categories have been prohibited by final regulatory control action in order to protect human health or the environment, but for which certain specific uses remain allowed" (emphasis added). See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 2(c). 4 8 9 For a full definition see Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 2(c). 4 9 0 See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 717-719. 4 9 1 See Ibid. Although the paper expresses the author's personal opinion, it is worth noting that at the time of writing Ms. Zahedi had experience working at the U.S. EPA (Office of Pesticide Programs). 4 9 2 FAO and UNEP, Report of the Third FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting on PIC (Geneva, 3-7 June 1991) at 7. pull the i r product out of the marke t once it is sub jec t to invest iga t ion but before a risk a s s e s s m e n t has been comp le ted and pub l i shed , g o v e r n m e n t off ic ials wil l not invest resources to deve lop a full r i sk /benef i t ana lys is of that subs tance . A s a resul t , the ' c lea r e v i d e n c e ' requi red by the convent ion might not be a v a i l a b l e . 4 9 3 A g a i n , the ob l igat ion upon s ta tes to prevent s igni f icant t ransboundary ha rm wou ld d ic tate that , as a p reven t i ve m e a s u r e , s ta tes shou ld not a l low the expor t of subs tances that were refused for approva l or w i thd rawn by indust ry if there were suf f ic ient reasons to be l ieve that they were w i thd rawn or re fused for reasons of heal th or the env i ronmen t . Th is is because , g iven the prevent ive nature of the obl igat ion to prevent h a r m , ' c lear e v i d e n c e ' s e e m s to be too h igh a s tanda rd . 4.4.2.3. Never registered chemicals A s in the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , chemica ls for wh ich no reg is t ra t ion has been sough t rema in comp le te l y ou ts ide the scope of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on . Th is cou ld be an impor tan t loophole because mos t expor t ing count r ies a l low chemica l s never reg is tered for domes t i c use to be expo r ted , and no speci f ic tes t ing requ i rements app ly to these chemica l s . The lack of in terest on the part of a manu fac tu re r to reg is ter its product in the domes t i c marke t might s imp ly ref lect di f ferent needs (e .g . the pest is not a p rob lem in the expor t ing coun t ry ) , but it might a lso be a consc ious dec is ion to p revent a subs tance f rom being re jected for env i ronmen ta l or heal th reasons in its own c o u n t r y . 4 9 4 Th is under l ines the need to e l im ina te doub le s tandards in re lat ion to test ing requ i remen ts , so that p roducers are ob l iged to use s im i la r tes t ing p rocedures for the i r p roduc ts , regard less of whe the r they wil l be used domes t i ca l l y or a b r o a d . 4 9 5 The Joint G roup of Exper ts expl ic i t ly s t ressed the impor tance of tes t ing unreg is te red pest ic ides in its second s e s s i o n , w h e n it r e c o m m e n d e d that " e m p h a s i s be g iven to ar t ic les of the C o d e re lated to the test ing of such p e s t i c i d e s . " 4 9 6 4.4.3. Labelling requirements In re lat ion to labe l l ing , the convent ion requi res that chemica l s inc luded in the PIC procedure and o ther chemica ls that are banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted domes t i ca l l y , w h e n See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 718-719. 4 9 4 See Ibid, at 719-720, and section 2.3.4. in Chapter 2. 4 9 5 This issue is considered in more detail in the last part of this chapter. 4 9 6 See FAO and UNEP, Report of the Second FAO/UNEP Joint Meeting of PIC (Geneva, Switzerland, 1-5 October 1990) at 13. expo r t ed , be sub jec t to label l ing requ i rements that ensure adequa te ava i lab i l i ty of in format ion wi th regard to r isks a n d / o r haza rds to h u m a n heal th or the env i r onmen t , tak ing into accoun t re levant in ternat ional s t a n d a r d s . 4 9 7 If the chemica l s expor ted are to be used for occupat iona l purposes (e .g . by f a rmers ) , the expor t ing party mus t ensu re that a safety da ta sheet that fo l lows an in ternat ional ly recogn ized fo rmat , set t ing out the mos t up - to -da te in format ion ava i lab le , is sent to the impor ter . Howeve r , the in format ion on the label and on the da ta sheet " s h o u l d , as far as p rac t i cab le " be g iven in one or more of the off icial l anguages of the impor t ing p a r t y . 4 9 8 Logic d ic ta tes that a minimum requ i rement to a l low the impor t ing count ry to ensure the appropr ia te use of a chemica l is that its c i t izens unders tand the labe l . The Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , however , does not require that the label be at least in one of the off icial l anguages of the impor t ing count ry . In add i t i on , it is not requi red that when a chemica l that is sub jec t to hand l ing rest r ic t ions (but wh ich is not covered by PIC or banned or seve re l y rest r ic ted in the expor t ing count ry ) is expo r ted , it be sub jec t to label l ing requ i rements that ensure adequa te ava i lab i l i ty of in format ion wi th regard to r isks a n d / o r haza rds to h u m a n heal th or the env i ronmen t . It is mere ly a choice for the expor t ing coun t ry to d e m a n d such a requ i rement . Ye t g iven the condi t ions of use in deve lop ing count r ies , cons idered in deta i l in Chap te r 2 , these restr ic t ions (e .g . on app l ica t ion me thods , protect ive c lo th ing) are of e x t r e m e impor tance to prevent m isuse and h u m a n po ison ings in those c o u n t r i e s . 4 9 9 Fur the rmore , the F A O / U N E P Joint Group of Exper ts had ident i f ied handl ing rest r ic t ions in indust r ia l ised count r ies as a potent ia l m e c h a n i s m for ' f l agg ing ' chemica l s l ikely to cause p rob lems under cond i t ions of use in deve lop ing count r ies . It had a lso ident i f ied da ta on po ison ing inc idents and adve rse effects in indust r ia l ised count r ies as a supp lemen t to in format ion ava i lab le f rom deve lop ing count r ies . The reason ing behind these p roposa ls was that if desp i te the i r re lat ive ly greater abi l i ty to impose and enforce safe ty p recaut ions indust r ia l ised count r ies cont inued to exper ience p rob lems wi th cer ta in fo rmu la t ions , deve lop ing count r ies wou ld be l ikely to have even g rea te r d i f f i cu l t i es . 5 0 0 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 13(2). Both the Code of Conduct and the London Guidelines included similar and more detailed requirements on labelling and packaging. See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Art. 10, and London Guidelines, supra note 387 Art. 14. 49R See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Arts. 13(4) and 13(5). 499 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 13(3), and Zahedi, supra note 460 at 720. 5 0 0 See Review of Implementation of voluntary PIC, supra note 482 at 5-6. 4.4.4. International cooperation and assistance S ince the PIC procedure largely rel ies on the impor t ing count ry 's abi l i ty to m a k e an in formed dec is ion on whe the r it wil l a l low impor ts of cer ta in chemica ls in the fu ture, it is essent ia l that all par t ies possess or acqu i re that abi l i ty . L ike the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m , 5 0 1 the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on expl ic i t ly acknow ledges that deve lop ing count r ies need to deve lop the capac i ty to m a n a g e chemica l s . Th is inc ludes, of cou rse , the ef fect ive m a n a g e m e n t of i n f o r m a t i o n . 5 0 2 Its P reamb le reads : "Taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and countries with economies in transition, in particular the need to strengthen national capabilities and capacities for the management of chemicals, including transfer of technology, providing financial and technical assistance and promoting cooperation among the Parties." In sp i te of th is concess ion in its p reamb le , the text of the t rea ty does not add ress the needs of deve lop ing count r ies in any mean ing fu l way . No concre te ob l iga t ions on capac i ty bui ld ing are inc luded a n d , perhaps more impor tan t l y , there is no f inancia l m e c h a n i s m to suppor t those act iv i t ies . Ar t ic le 16, on techn ica l ass i s tance , con ta ins a very genera l ob l igat ion to " coope ra te in p romot ing techn ica l ass is tance for the deve lopmen t of the in f rast ructure and the capac i ty necessary to m a n a g e chemica l s to enab le imp lemen ta t i on of th is C o n v e n t i o n , " tak ing into account the needs of deve lop ing count r ies and count r ies w i th economies in t rans i t ion . It a lso asks par t ies wi th " m o r e advanced p r o g r a m m e s for regu la t ing c h e m i c a l s " to prov ide techn ica l ass is tance to o ther par t ies to deve lop the i r in f rast ructure and capac i ty to m a n a g e chemica ls th roughou t the i r l i fecycle. Howeve r , it is not c lear whe the r it is deve loped count ry par t ies that shou ld prov ide such ass i s tance , and the prov is ion s tar ts wi th the word " s h o u l d , " 5 0 3 and thus mus t be met on ly to the ex tent p rac t icab le . A more speci f ic prov is ion asks expor t ing par t ies to adv ise and ass is t impor t ing part ies (a) to obta in fur ther in format ion to make a dec is ion in relat ion to the fu ture impor ta t ion of a PIC chemica l and to d i rect ly respond to the expor te r in case no dec is ion has been m a d e , and (b) to s t reng then the i r capac i t ies to m a n a g e chemica l s safe ly th roughou t the i r l i fecycle. Its fu l f i lment is , however , ' upon request and as a p p r o p r i a t e . ' 5 0 4 See, for instance, Code of Conduct, supra note 48 preface para. 5 and Arts. 1.5.2, 3.3.1, and London Guidelines, supra note 387 paras. 6 and 8 (introduction) and Arts. 15(b) and 15(c). 5 0 2 The fact that this provision is included in the preamble of the Rotterdam Convention indicates that the subject of chemicals management is directly related to PIC. 5 0 3 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 16. 5 0 4 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. l l ( l ) (c ) . The v a g u e n e s s of these prov is ions could have been mi t iga ted by a f inanc ia l m e c h a n i s m to secure the i r fu l f i l lment . Yet , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on prov ides abso lu te ly no f inancia l m e c h a n i s m to ensure capac i ty -bu i ld ing act iv i t ies. Moreover , the mat te r was not referred to the Con fe rence of the Part ies for future cons idera t ions , as it occur red wi th n o n -c o m p l i a n c e . 5 0 5 Th is is , w i thout doubt , the greates t f law of the t reaty . 4.4.5. Compliance Part of wha t d i f ferent ia tes a vo lun ta ry s y s t e m f rom a b ind ing one is that comp l i ance is manda to ry on ly in the latter. T h u s , the procedures and inst i tut ional m e c h a n i s m s for de te rm in ing non -comp l i ance are an essent ia l part of any ef fect ive b ind ing s y s t e m . 5 0 6 The Ro t te rdam Conven t i on does not es tab l ish m e c h a n i s m s to measu re comp l i ance wi th its p rov is ions , or the t rea tmen t of par t ies to be found in non -comp l i ance . Howeve r , ar t ic le 17 prov ides that the Con fe rence of the Part ies wil l have the task of c rea t ing such m e c h a n i s m s once the t reaty enters into force. 4.5. Will a binding PIC make a difference? W h e n the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on was being nego t ia ted , the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m had f inal ly taken off, af ter yea rs of p repara t ions and ad jus tmen ts . Hav ing s tar ted wi th s ix chemica l s in late 1 9 9 1 , 38 chemica ls and pest ic ides were sub jec t to PIC in 1 9 9 7 . 5 0 7 In 1 9 9 6 , 143 count r ies had a l ready n a m e d des igna ted nat ional author i t ies (at least for pest ic ides) and were par t ic ipat ing in the p r o c e d u r e . 5 0 8 No s ing le case of a f i rm expor t ing a PIC subs tance cont ra ry to the PIC procedure had been r e p o r t e d , 5 0 9 and the mos t impor tan t chemica l p layers were comp ly ing wi th PIC. Th is is because key organ isa t ions such as Cropl i fe In ternat ional ( fo rmer GIFAP) made comp l i ance wi th the FAO C o d e of See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 17. 5 0 6 The mechanism could include: a clear reporting system for all parties (providing information not only on PIC chemicals but also on export notifications of substances domestically banned or severely restricted); sanctions for non-compliance (from fines for exporters violating the decision of an importing country to the publication of a report listing every country and major chemicals manufacturers and their compliance with the Rotterdam Convention). See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 732 and 733. 5 0 7 One of the most important initial tasks in the voluntary procedure was the creation of the PIC list. Since more than 1,000 control actions existed when PIC was created and a substance could not enter the procedure until a decision guidance document (DGD) had been prepared -an expensive and time-consuming process- the FAO/UNEP Joint Group had to set priorities for the pesticides and chemicals to be included in PIC. For further details see Victor, supra note 388 at 241-244. 5 0 8 The PIC system allows governments to declare different DNAs for pesticides and for chemicals. In 1996, 61 countries had designated combined DNAs while 59 countries had designated separate DNAs (33 countries had designated a DNA for pesticides). See Ibid, at 251. 5 0 9 See Ibid, at 250. Conduc t by nat ional assoc ia t ions and the i r m e m b e r s a cond i t ion for m e m b e r s h i p . In add i t i on , the European Un ion , a ma jo r chemica l expor te r , had made the PIC procedure manda to ry for its m e m b e r s ta tes th rough Counc i l Regu la t ion EEC No. 2 4 5 5 / 9 2 . For impor t ing count r ies , comp ly ing wi th the bas ic requ i rements of the PIC procedure was re lat ive ly s imp le a n d , ove r t ime , the qua l i ty of in format ion prov ided by DNAs i m p r o v e d . 5 1 1 In the str ic t s e n s e , there fore , the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m was fair ly success fu l . The success of the PIC s y s t e m , however , mus t a lso be ana lysed in re lat ion to its u l t imate goa l , wh ich is to " e n h a n c e the sound m a n a g e m e n t of chemica l s th rough exchange of sc ient i f ic , t echn i ca l , economic and legal i n f o r m a t i o n . " 5 1 2 In th is contex t , the ques t ion is whe the r the vo lun ta ry PIC procedure improved the capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to safe ly m a n a g e chemica l s and pest ic ides hazards . W h e n one looks at the rev iews of imp lemen ta t i on made both by the FAO and U N E P , the ach ievemen ts in regards to capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies are ve ry modes t . In a 1993 su rvey to ga ther in format ion on the s ta tus of imp lementa t ion of the C o d e of C o n d u c t , 5 1 3 the FAO conc luded that a l though there was s ign i f icant p rogress towards comp l i ance wi th va r ious prov is ions of the C o d e , mos t notab ly in the As ia and Paci f ic reg ion , there was ev idence of "con t inu ing severa l se r ious def ic ienc ies in cr i t ical a reas of pest ic ide regu la t ion , m a n a g e m e n t and contro l in m a n y coun t r ies , par t icu lar ly in Af r ican and Lat in A m e r i c a n r e g i o n s . " 5 1 4 In add i t ion , the ex ten t of ass i s tance to deve lop ing count r ies by pest ic ide expor t ing count r ies and by in ternat ional o rgan isa t ions , wi th t ra in ing of personne l in the in terpretat ion and eva lua t ion of test da ta , was ident i f ied as a ser ious p rob lem. The lack of capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to imp lemen t the PIC procedure and to make PIC dec is ions w a s expl ic i t ly recogn ised at INC 1. In a note p repared by the F A O / U N E P Secre ta r ia t on the count r ies ' exper ience in the imp lemen ta t i on of the PIC p rocedure , it was s t ressed that whi le the procedure was des igned to ass is t count r ies wi th l imi ted resources to m a k e dec is ions regard ing the impor t of cer ta in chem ica l s , " the D N A s have Formerly GIFAP (see note 411) and then Global Crop Protection Federation, CropLife International represents the global plant science industry. It leads a network of over 80 regional and national associations. Among its members are BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow AgroSciences, DuPont, FMC, Monsanto, Sumitomo and Syngenta. Online: <http://www.croplife.org>. 5 1 1 See Victor, supra note 388 at 253. 5 1 2 See London Guidelines (as amended in 1989), supra note 387, introduction. The paragraph refers to the purpose of the guidelines, which are centered in PIC and information exchange. From this follows that the ultimate goal of PIC and information exchange is to enhance the sound management of chemicals. 5 1 3 The FAO did another survey in 1986, before the Code was amended to include PIC (1989). 5 1 4 See FAO "Analysis of Government Responses to the 2 n d Questionnaire on the State of Implementation of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides" (1996), online: <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/AGRICULT/agp/agpp/Pesticid/Manage/Quest2/2qfrt.htm>. dif f icul ty in fulf i l l ing the i r responsib i l i t ies as def ined in the PIC p rocedure , as the i r g o v e r n m e n t s of ten do not have the inst i tut ional and f inancia l capac i ty nor the access to the techn ica l sk i l ls and in format ion needed to m a k e P IC- re la ted dec i s i ons . " It was a lso noted that " the work resul t ing f rom the par t ic ipat ion in the PIC procedure is of ten an unaccep tab le add i t iona l work load for D N A s , who are a l ready over loaded by the i r regu lar work p r o g r a m m e . " 5 1 5 S im i la r l y , it was ment ioned that " in many countr ies there is a lack of essent ia l local data necessary to make decis ions which are re levant to nat ional condi t ions of use. Th is can include informat ion on actual health and env i ronmenta l effects in the count ry , chemica l types and quant i t ies in use, exposure potent ia l , e t c . " 5 1 6 These remarks sugges t that most deve lop ing count r ies are sti l l largely incapab le of manag ing hazardous chemica ls a n d , perhaps more impor tan t ly , of ana lys ing the in format ion that they receive th rough the PIC s y s t e m . T h u s , the vo lun ta ry PIC procedure was success fu l on ly on the surface. Wh i le there have been no d o c u m e n t e d cases of v io la t ion of PIC and indust ry is commi t t ed to observ ing its p rov is ions , in format ion exchange and the PIC procedure have not had a great impac t because those count r ies for wh ich the s y s t e m w a s created stil l largely lack the abi l i ty to ana lyse the in format ion they rece ive th rough the s y s t e m , and to act upon it. Th is ra ises the cr i t ical the ques t ion of whe the r mak ing the PIC procedure legal ly b inding w a s a va luab le s tep towards the safe m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous chem ica l s in the S o u t h . Th is thes is a rgues that the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on is not l ikely to br ing any subs tan t ia l p rog ress , for two bas ic reasons . First , negot ia tors dec ided that the conven t ion wou ld be l imi ted to reproduc ing the PIC s y s t e m , instead of es tab l i sh ing a legal f r amework for the m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous chemica ls that wou ld have opened the door for much needed prov is ions on chemica l m a n a g e m e n t , chemica l s tes t ing , in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t , and so on . A PIC s y s t e m that ignores these issues is f undamen ta l l y f lawed because w i thout a l te rnat ives the idea of pr ior in formed consent pract ica l ly loses its s ign i f i cance, its raison d'être. A f ter a l l , if there are no a l te rnat ives so that impor te rs can actua l ly refuse a subs tance , there is no the point in going though a p rocedure of pr ior in formed consen t . S e c o n d , a t reaty l imi ted to PIC shou ld have at least prov ided for a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m to improve the capac i ty of the Sou th to ful ly imp lemen t the p rocedure . In fact , one of the on ly a reas where the b ind ing PIC could have t ru ly di f fered f rom the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m w a s See FAO/UNEP Secretariat, Experience in the Implementation of the PIC Procedure, UN doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.1/6 (19 December 1995) [Hereinafter Experience in Implementation of PIC] at 2. 5 1 6 See Ibid, at 3. in the creat ion for a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m wi th manda to ry cont r ibu t ions . Howeve r , a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m was d iscarded and it was not even env i saged for fu ture negot ia t ions in the text of the Conven t i on (in cont ras t to , for ins tance , non -comp l i ance m e c h a n i s m s ) . 5 1 8 A s in the vo lun ta ry P IC, capac i t y -bu i ld ing act iv i t ies can be car r ied out w i thout a b ind ing prov is ion or f u n d . 5 1 9 Howeve r , as ev idenced by the little p rogress ach ieved wi th the vo lun tary PIC and by the exper ience wi th the vo lun ta ry fund of the Base l C o n v e n t i o n , 5 2 0 a b inding f inancia l m e c h a n i s m is v i r tua l ly the on ly way of ensur ing that capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies wil l be carr ied out ex tens ive ly and that all re levant par t ies wil l cont r ibute to mak ing t h e m poss ib le . A s pointed out by a s tudent wr i ter more than ten yea rs a g o : "The [PIC] system's effectiveness depends on the diligence (and, I would add, on the capacity) of importing state authorities. Government indifference to environmental or consumer protection due to corruption or the ability of a powerful multinational corporation to hold a government "hostage" could make a mockery of that country's prior informed consent policy. Such problems might require modifying prior informed consent in the direction of a traditional b a n . " 5 2 1 Whi le cor rupt ion is a s igni f icant p rob lem and it is upon the impor t ing count ry to p revent it, it is the e n o r m o u s power of Nor thern mul t inat iona l corpora t ions (s tud ied in Chap te r 2) tha t present the b iggest c h a l l e n g e . 5 2 2 The fact that mos t deve lop ing count r ies rel ied on the in format ion prov ided by in ternat ional manu fac tu re rs , s ince they lacked the necessary in f rast ructure to obta in it t h e m s e l v e s , was one of the p r imary reasons why the Code of Conduc t and the London Gu ide l ines were a d o p t e d . 5 2 3 In add i t i on , as exp la ined in Chap te r 3 , pest ic ides p lay a very impor tant role in the e c o n o m y of mos t deve lop ing count r ies , 5 1 7 See Victor, supra note 388 at 254. 518 The Rotterdam Convention gives the task of developing mechanisms of non-compliance to the Conference of the Parties (COP). See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 17. 5 1 9 After PIC was introduced into the Code of Conduct, seminars to inform government officials about PIC were initiated through the FAO in Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, South and Central America. Similarly, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) launched a project to implement the London Guidelines in developing countries, and GIFAP initiated a "Safe Use Project" that improved pesticide management, though only in three countries. For details see Victor, supra note 388 at 254-255. For GIFAP see note 411. 5 2 0 The lack of a financial mechanism of a mandatory nature in the Basel Convention has greatly affected the performance and activities of several regional centres for capacity building under the Basel Convention. Please see section 5.2.1.2.1. in Chapter 5. 5 2 1 See Mehri, supra note 426 at 388 (Parenthesis added). 5 2 2 As explained in Chapter 2, six multinational corporations based in the North control about 73% of the world's pesticide market. The Preface of the Code of Conduct reads as follows: "In the absence of an effective pesticide registration process and of a governmental infrastructure for controlling the availability of pesticides, some countries importing pesticides must heavily rely on the pesticide industry to promote the safe and proper distribution and use of pesticides. In these circumstances foreign manufacturers, exporters and importers, as well as local formulators, distributors, repackers, advisers and users, must accept a share of the responsibility for safety and efficiency in distribution and use." (See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Preface para. 6). which largely depend on expor t c rops ( i .e. monocu l tu res , wh ich are more vu lnerab le to pests and more prone to the use of chemica l pes t ic ides) . For these reasons , the role of the chemica l indust ry and of mul t ina t iona l corpora t ions is of e x t r e m e impor tance to ach ieve s o m e progress in the f ield of haza rdous chemica l s . The Ro t te rdam Conven t ion does not, however , regulate the mos t bas ic act iv i t ies of indust ry , p robab ly owing to the nar row in terpretat ion of the negot ia t ing commi t t ee ' s m a n d a t e . A n ob l igat ion on the part of s ta tes to enac t and enforce leg is la t ion to ensure that the s a m e test ing requ i rements app ly in relat ion to subs tances to be sold domes t i ca l l y than those to be expo r ted , for ins tance , was much needed . Even if one accepted the jus t i f i ca t ions g iven by the U .S . EPA to exp la in the expor t of chem ica l s that have never been reg is tered domes t i ca l l y , there are no jus t i f i ca t ions for expor t ing a subs tance that has not been tes ted wi th the s a m e s tandards as it wou ld have been tes ted if it were to be sold domes t i ca l l y . Appropr ia te test ing is even more cr i t ical if the impor te r is a deve lop ing count ry . Howeve r , it shou ld sti l l be requi red if the impor t ing s tate had the capac i ty to proper ly eva lua te the subs tance and make a sound dec is ion about its impor ta t ion , because it is the responsib i l i ty of the manu fac tu re r to ensure beyond an acceptab le level of r isk that its product is sa fe . Fu r the rmore , the on ly way of sus ta in ing the a rgumen t that doub le s tandards m a y in s o m e cases be jus t i f iab le ( i .e. the product is on ly useful in a t rop ica l count ry wi th a par t icu lar pest) is by guaran tee ing that the product is tes ted in the cond i t ions of the coun t ry where it is go ing to be u s e d , and by ensur ing that all re levant in format ion on the subs tance is ob ta ined and t ransmi t ted to the impor t ing count ry so that it can make a t ru ly in formed dec is ion on its i m p o r t a t i o n . 5 2 4 The c la im that a mul t ina t iona l c o m p a n y is not capab le of reproduc ing the impor t ing coun t ry ' s cond i t ions is hard to be l ieve , espec ia l l y if one cons iders that all of t h e m have severa l ' t rop ica l subs id ia r ies ' where tes ts cou ld be comp le ted . The Code of Conduct u l t imately reflects this v iew. Whi le it main ta ins that the fact that a product is not used or registered in a part icular expor t ing country is not necessar i ly a val id reason for prohibi t ing the expor t of that pest ic ide, thereby just i fy ing double s tandards in the case of expor ts , it rejects double s tandards when it c o m e s to product ion, label l ing, and tes t ing. Ar t . 8 .1 .4 , for instance, requires industry to under take to see that pest ic ides that are manufac tured for expor t be subject to the s a m e qual i ty requ i rements and s tandards as those appl ied by the manufac turer to comparab le domest i c products. S imi la r ly , Art . 8 .1 .5 . This should go, of course, in conjunction with improving that country's capacity to analyse the data received and to consider viable alternatives. requires industry to ensure that pest ic ides manufac tured or fo rmula ted by a subs id iary c o m p a n y meet appropr ia te qual i ty requ i rements and s tandards which should be consis tent wi th the requ i rements of the host country and of the parent company . In relat ion to tes t ing , the Code expl ic i t ly aff i rms that "it is general ly accepted that no c o m p a n y should t rade in pest ic ides wi thout a proper and thorough evaluat ion of the pest ic ide, including any r i s k s . " 5 2 5 The Code states that due to the c l imat ic , eco log ica l , ag ronomic , soc ia l , economic and env i ronmenta l condi t ions of deve lop ing countr ies , most ly s i tuated in tropical and semi t rop ica l reg ions, the government of the expor t ing count ry is in no posit ion to j udge the sui tabi l i ty , ef f icacy, safety or fate of the pest ic ide under the condi t ions in the country where it may u l t imate ly be used , and that " such a j udgmen t must , therefore, be made by the responsib le author i ty in the import ing count ry . " Yet the paragraph refers to gove rnmen ts , not to industry. The fact that an expor t ing country gove rnmen t should not dec ide whether or not an import ing country should use a part icular subs tance by no means exemp ts the manufac turer f rom proper ly test ing and label l ing its product. Whi le it is incumbent upon the import ing party to dec ide whether it will al low the use of a subs tance in its terr i tory, it is incumbent upon the producer to ensure the safety of its product . However , the manufac turer will only fol low the rules to which it is bound, and thus the state where the chemica l manufac turer is based should enact appropr ia te legislat ion to ensure that it wi l l . A l though prov is ions on pest ic ides tes t ing , IPM and the m a n a g e m e n t of chemica l s are of pa ramoun t impor tance , one could a rgue that a fair cr i t ique of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on could on ly take into accoun t the t reaty 's own ob jec t i ve , wh ich is : "...to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentally sound use, by facilitating information exchange about their characteristics, by providing for a national decision-making process on their import and export and by disseminating these decisions to Parties." (Article 2 of the Rotterdam Convention) Even by its own s tanda rds , howeve r , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on fai ls to respond _to its ob jec t ive . Th is is not because the t rea ty is l imited to PIC (which in i tself is un for tunate , as it cou ld have deal t wi th needed prov is ions on chemica l m a n a g e m e n t ) , but because it does not add ress any of the e lemen ts on wh ich a success fu l PIC d e p e n d s , n a m e l y : capac i ty bui ld ing of deve lop ing count r ies to ef fect ively imp lemen t the p rocedure ; prov is ions to See Code of Conduct, supra note 48 Pmbl. para. 7. faci l i tate the p romot ion of a l te rnat ives so that count r ies can ac tua l ly reject an impor t ; and t rade wi th non-Par t ies to ensure par t ic ipat ion of al l re levant count r ies . Capac i t y bui ld ing act iv i t ies are abso lu te ly essent ia l because a l though the expor t ing and impor t ing count r ies have a ' sha red respons ib i l i ty ' to protect h u m a n heal th and the env i r onmen t f rom hazardous chemica l s , the PIC s y s t e m rel ies heav i ly on impor t ing count r ies . Expor t ing count r ies must notify expor ts and ensure that dec is ions of impor te rs in relat ion to PIC subs tances are respec ted , but it is upon impor t ing count r ies to ana l yse the da ta rece ived , to cons ider what o ther a l te rna t ives there a re , and to m a k e a dec is ion on the future impor ta t ion of a c h e m i c a l , wh ich mus t be cons is ten t wi th nat ional legis lat ion and the rules of in ternat ional t rade. In add i t ion , they mus t be ab le to ef fect ive ly contro l impor ts . In prac t ice , the l imi ted resources of deve lop ing count r ies great ly reduce the i r g o v e r n m e n t s ' abi l i ty to test , mon i to r , or regulate pest ic ides impor ted ac ross the i r b o r d e r s . 5 2 6 G o v e r n m e n t depa r tmen ts respons ib le for pest ic ides in deve lop ing count r ies have too few t ra ined ag ronomis t s , chem is t s , b io log is ts , eng inee rs , e tc . , in ex tens ion serv ice ro les at the local level to ga ther and ana lyse s a m p l e s (water , so i l , p roduce) , to adv ise f a rmers , to educa te and work wi th those us ing pest ic ides or to ini t iate and p romote new agr icu l tura l and in tegrated pest m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s . 5 2 7 In is in th is con tex t that the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion wil l opera te , jus t as the vo lun ta ry s y s t e m d id . The group of exper ts on the imp lementa t ion of the vo lun ta ry PIC had spec i f ica l ly s t ressed the need to take measu res to ensure par t ic ipat ion of al l expor t ing count r ies in the PIC s y s t e m , and to prov ide substant ia l t ra in ing and techn ica l suppor t p r o g r a m m e s for deve lop ing count r ies for the imp lemen ta t i on of the PIC procedure and for the m a n a g e m e n t of chemica l s . Yet the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on add resses none of these p rob lems . It does not encourage par t ic ipat ion of all count r ies , s ince it a l lows t rade w i th non-Par t i es , and it does not guaran tee capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies because it inc ludes no concre te ob l iga t ions upon deve loped count r ies to prov ide t h e m , and no f inancia l means to sus ta in t h e m . Al l these factors point to the conc lus ion that the t rans fo rmat ion of the vo lun ta ry PIC s y s t e m into a b inding one wil l be of little consequence . Th is is because a t reaty that m a k e s a procedure b inding but p rov ides no m e a n s for al l par t ies to imp lemen t it; no a l te rna t ives to impor t ing count r ies so that they can ac tua l ly refuse impor t s ; and no m e a s u r e s to p romote par t ic ipat ion of all re levant count r ies , is v i r tua l ly mean ing less . 5 2 6 See Zahedi, supra note 460 at 712. See Ecobichon, supra note 50 at 32. Chapter Five Protecting Health and the Environment from Hazardous Substances: How and to What Extent could Rotterdam Contribute? 5.1. Introduction With the a i m of under tak ing a comprehens i ve and cr i t ical ana lys is of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , th is thes is has taken severa l s teps . The f irst s tep , car r ied out in Chap te r 2 , was to def ine the p rob lem that made a convent ion on t rade in haza rdous chemica l s necessary . T h e n , the next chap te r s tud ied the contex t in wh ich the p rob lem d e v e l o p e d , and its under ly ing causes . Wi th those cons idera t ions in m i n d , Chap te r 4 under took a cr i t ical eva lua t ion of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , conc lud ing that the t reaty is f undamen ta l l y f lawed in re lat ion to its own ob jec t ive . The purpose of th is f inal chap te r is to cons ider w a y s in wh ich the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on could be improved so that it can make a s igni f icant cont r ibut ion to the protect ion of the env i r onmen t and h u m a n heal th f rom hazardous chemica l s . On the one h a n d , the chap te r po ints out the e l emen ts that a success fu l PIC s y s t e m requ i res , and sugges ts w a y s to incorpora te t h e m into the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on . On the o ther , it inqui res whe the r these m e a s u r e s wou ld be suf f ic ient to cont r ibute s ign i f icant ly to the protect ion of the env i r onmen t and h u m a n heal th f rom hazardous chemica l s . In o ther wo rds , the chap te r s teps ou ts ide of the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion f ramework and ref lects on whe the r a s y s t e m of pr ior in fo rmed consen t is the most appropr ia te way of dea l ing wi th the p rob lems that relate to the in ternat ional t rade in hazardous chemica l s . In par t icu lar , it cons iders whe the r t rade in hazardous chemica ls and env i ronmen ta l protect ion are inherent ly compa t i b l e , as c la imed by the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on and ref lected in the pr ior consent a p p r o a c h . The chap te r exp la ins why the assump t i on that t rade and env i ronmen t are inherent ly compa t ib le is h ighly p rob lemat ic , and why it has prevented s ta tes f rom ser ious ly address ing the issue of t rade in hazardous chemica l s . The chap te r con tends that the m e a n s to ach ieve real progress are at hand and have been used in o ther cases (e .g . P O P s ) , but that there s e e m s to be a lack of pol i t ical wil l to imp lemen t t h e m in th is case . Th is is a rguab ly because the chemica ls regu la ted by the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on are not a pr ior i ty for the Nor th , wh ich wou ld need to prov ide mos t of the resources to ach ieve these goa ls . One wou ld hope, however , that the pr inc ip les ana lysed in Chap te r 3 prov ide enough reasons for deve loped count r ies to take th is issue as ser ious ly as they took the one on P O P s , par t icu lar ly because it is Nor thern ag rochemica l corpora t ions wh ich are co l lect ing most of the prof i ts of th is t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s . 5.2. Towards a successful PIC system A s pointed out in Chap te r 4, the F A O / U N E P Joint Group of Exper ts - p e r h a p s the mos t au thor i ta t ive body on the vo lun ta ry PIC p r o c e d u r e - def ined two w a y s of wo rk ing towards a success fu l PIC s y s t e m . The negot ia t ing commi t t ee draf t ing the text of the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , however , d id not cons ider these sugges t ions ser ious ly , even though it was expec ted to take into accoun t the exper ience ga ined wi th the vo lun ta ry PIC p r o c e d u r e . 5 2 8 The g roup of exper ts had c lear ly s t ressed the need to so lve severa l bas ic p rob lems for the success fu l imp lementa t ion of the PIC procedure by: a) prov id ing subs tan t ia l t ra in ing and techn ica l suppor t to deve lop ing count r ies to imp lemen t PIC and m a n a g e hazardous chem ica l s , and b) tak ing measu res to ensure full par t ic ipat ion of expor t ing count r ies in the PIC p r o c e d u r e . 5 2 9 The Ro t te rdam Conven t i on a s s u m e d none of these tasks . It fea tu res no concre te ob l iga t ions for deve loped count ry part ies to prov ide f inancia l or techn ica l ass is tance to deve lop ing coun t r ies ; there is abso lu te ly no m e c h a n i s m or fund to f inance such ass i s t ance ; and there is no prov is ion bann ing t rade wi th non-Par t i es , so there are no incent ives for expor t ing count r ies to ratify the t reaty . T h e s e a re , there fo re , two ma jo r issues that the par t ies to the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on wil l need to add ress at a later s tage . The next sec t ion exp lo res the speci f ic measu res that could be adop ted to deal wi th these def ic ienc ies . 5.2.1. Training and technical support to developing countries In re lat ion to the f irst requ i rement , severa l s teps shou ld be cons ide red . First , concre te ob l iga t ions upon deve loped count ry par t ies to cont r ibute to capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies in the S o u t h shou ld be spec i f ied . S e c o n d , part ies shou ld cons ider the creat ion of regional and subreg iona l cent res for capac i ty bui ld ing to car ry out s o m e of t hese act iv i t ies. Th i r d , a m e c h a n i s m to f inance the act iv i t ies per fo rmed by the cen t res (or any o ther capac i ty bui ld ing m e c h a n i s m ) and the addi t iona l costs of us ing sa fer a l te rna t i ves shou ld be es tab l i shed , wi th manda to ry , new and addi t iona l cont r ibu t ions by deve loped count ry par t ies and vo lun ta ry cont r ibut ions by deve lop ing count ry par t ies and o ther donors . 5 2 8 See Chapter 4, and Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 para. 38 (b). 5 2 9 See Report of FAO/UNEP 7 t h meeting, supra note 436 at 8. 5.2.1.1. Specific obligations for capacity building activities in the South The on ly ob l igat ion in the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion that rests spec i f ica l ly on expor t ing par t ies (which are not necessar i l y deve loped count ry part ies) is the one to adv ise and ass is t impor t ing part ies (not necessar i l y deve lop ing count ry par t ies) " u p o n request and as app rop r ia te " to : (i) obta in fur ther in format ion in o rder to be ab le to make a dec is ion in re lat ion to the fu ture impor t of a PIC chemica l and (ii) to " s t reng then the i r capac i t ies and capabi l i t ies to m a n a g e chemica ls safe ly dur ing the i r l i f e - c y c l e . " 5 3 0 In add i t i on , there is an ob l igat ion upon all par t ies to " coopera te in p romot ing techn ica l ass is tance for the deve lopmen t of the in f rast ructure and the capac i ty necessary to m a n a g e chemica l s to enab le imp lemen ta t i on of [the] C o n v e n t i o n , " " t ak ing into account the par t icu lar needs of deve lop ing count r ies and count r ies wi th economies in t r a n s i t i o n . " 5 3 1 These prov is ions are very dif f icult to en fo rce , as they do not feature spec i f ic measu res or degrees of comp l i ance , and they are not expl ic i t ly due by deve loped count ry par t ies , wh ich are the ones that have the capac i ty to fulfi l t h e m . Moreover , the f irst ob l iga t ion , wh ich is s l ight ly c learer , is due mere ly upon request and ' as appropr ia te . ' In teres t ing ly , in a note that was prepared for cons idera t ion of INC 1, the U N E P / F A O Secre ta r ia t had urged s tate representa t i ves to carefu l ly cons ide r and address the p rob lems deve lop ing count r ies were fac ing to imp lemen t the vo lun ta ry PIC p rocedure , so that the legal ly b inding PIC wou ld ach ieve its ob jec t i ve : "Experience with the implementation of the PIC procedure has provided valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the procedure as described in the London Guidelines and the Code of Conduct. When discussing the form and content of a legally binding instrument, due consideration should be given to the points raised above. Many of the problems raised need to be addressed in order to obtain the intended effect of a future legally binding instrument." 5 3 2 The e lemen ts that the note asked representa t i ves to cons ider re lated to a numbe r of p rob lems and def ic ienc ies that had been f requent ly h igh l ighted by DNAs (Des igna ted Nat iona l Author i t ies) and other g o v e r n m e n t represen ta t i ves in the course of the imp lemen ta t i on of the vo lun ta ry PIC p rocedure . They i nc luded : the lack of local da ta ( re levant to nat ional cond i t ions of use) necessary to m a k e f inal dec is ions (e .g . in format ion on heal th and env i ronmen ta l e f fects ; exposu re po ten t ia l , e t c ) ; the lack of rapid commun i ca t i on dev ices (e .g . fax mach ines , c o m p u t e r s , pho tocop ie rs ) ; the need to 5 3 0 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 11 (c). 5 3 1 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 16. 5 3 2 See Experience in Implementation of PIC, supra note 515 at 7. s t reng then the off ices respons ib le for contro l l ing the impor ta t ion of haza rdous chemica l s (e .g . C u s t o m s , ports of en t r y ) ; the need for techn ica l ass is tance to s t reng then research into the env i ronmen ta l effects of use of chemica l s in t ropical e c o s y s t e m s and h igh -a l t i tude cond i t ions , and to f ind , eva lua te and do research on sa fe r and af fordable a l te rna t ives to haza rdous c h e m i c a l s ; the lack of da ta on the chemica l s being manu fac tu red , impor ted or used domes t i ca l l y ; and the need to t ra in and ass is t DNAs to imp lemen t PIC ef fect ive ly . A s speci f ic p rob lems encoun te red by deve lop ing count r ies in the i r efforts to c o m p l y wi th the PIC procedure have been ident i f ied, it wou ld be usefu l to cons ider inc luding concre te ob l iga t ions address ing those issues . These could inc lude ob l igat ions upon deve loped count ry par t ies to : ass is t and s t reng then DNAs in deve lop ing count r ies so that they are ab le to comp ly wi th the i r ob l igat ions under the PIC procedure (e .g . , by supp ly ing t h e m wi th appropr ia te equ ipmen t and by t ra in ing off ic ials so that they can col lect and assess in format ion on the impact of chemica l s on heal th and the env i ronmen t , on local product ion and impor ta t ion of chem ica l s , and on af fordable and sa fer a l te rna t i ves ) ; s t reng then the s y s t e m s and agenc ies respons ib le for cont ro l l ing impor ts (Cus toms of f ices, ports of ent ry , mon i to r ing s y s t e m s ) ; s t reng then and p romote research into the env i ronmen ta l ef fects of the use of chemica l s in t ropical and h igh al t i tude e c o s y s t e m s ; prov ide in format ion on cost -e f fect ive a l te rnat ives to the chem ica l s to be e x p o r t e d ; and prov ide t ra in ing to DNA and other off ic ials on the PIC procedure and on chemica l s m a n a g e m e n t in g e n e r a l . 5 3 3 These and o ther prov is ions would set up concre te ac t ions to enhance the capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies (and of count r ies wi th economies in t rans i t ion , if necessary ) to imp lemen t the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on ef fect ive ly . To have spec i f ic ob l igat ions wi th regard to capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies could a lso cont r ibute to the ef fect ive imp lemen ta t i on of the conven t i on , s ince it wou ld m a k e it eas ie r to de te rm ine whe the r or not a deve loped count ry par ty is comp ly ing wi th its ob l igat ions under the t reaty . A t the s a m e t ime , the genera l charac te r of the last ob l igat ion s u g g e s t e d , the one upon deve loped coun t ry par t ies to ' p rov ide t ra in ing to DNA and o ther off ic ials on the PIC procedure and on chemica l m a n a g e m e n t in g e n e r a l , ' wou ld a l low for s o m e f lexib i l i ty so that o ther act iv i t ies not spec i f ica l ly l isted would be covered by the p rov is ion . See Ibid. 5.2.1.2. Regional centres for training and assistance The second under tak ing part ies shou ld a s s u m e to prov ide t ra in ing and techn ica l suppor t to deve lop ing count r ies is the creat ion of reg ional and subreg iona l cen t res for capac i ty bu i ld ing , as most of the tasks ment ioned above could be per fo rmed th rough these cen t res . Th is idea was put forward in the note that the F A O / U N E P Secre ta r ia t p resented at I N C - 1 , wh ich r e c o m m e n d s that " reg iona l t ra in ing and ass i s tance cent res shou ld be es tab l i shed to prov ide serv ices on b io-ef f icacy, env i ronmen ta l ef fects in t ropical e c o s y s t e m s / h i g h al t i tude cond i t ions , ident i f icat ion of a l te rna t i ves , e t c . " 5 3 4 The cent res for t ra in ing and t ransfer of techno logy could be s im i la r to those that have been es tab l i shed under the Base l Conven t i on . Howeve r , it is impor tan t to take into accoun t the exper ience ga ined wi th the imp lementa t ion of the Base l Conven t i on so that poss ib le m is takes or def ic ienc ies are not rep l ica ted. Wi th that purpose in m ind , the next sec t ion brief ly rev iews the regional and subreg iona l cent res c rea ted under the Base l t reaty . 5.2.1.2.1. The Regional and Subregional Centres of the Basel Convention Recogn is ing the need to enhance the capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to comp ly wi th its p rov is ions , the Base l Conven t ion on hazardous was tes dev ises a speci f ic m e c h a n i s m to prov ide ass i s tance to these count r ies : reg ional and subreg iona l cent res for t ra in ing and techno logy t ransfer . Ar t ic le 14(1) of the t reaty s t ipu la tes : "The Parties agree that, according to the specific needs of different regions and subregions, regional or subregional centres for training and technology transfers regarding the management of hazardous wastes and other wastes and the minimization of their generation should be established. The Parties shall decide on the establishment of appropriate funding mechanisms of a voluntary nature..." 5 3 5 (emphasis added) The role of the cen t res is to s t reng then the capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to imp lemen t the Base l Conven t i on both in relat ion to techn ica l requ i rements ( i .e. env i ronmen ta l l y sound m a n a g e m e n t of hazardous was tes ) and wi th regard to inst i tut ional and legal aspec ts . T h e y a lso play a key role in bui ld ing the capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to enhance the i r know ledge of was tes and address the i r lack of inventor ies on was te 5 3 4 See Ibid, at 7. See Basel Convention, supra note 283 Art. 14 (1). genera t ion and o ther in f rast ructura l d e f i c i e n c i e s . 5 3 6 Ac t iv i t ies inc lude prov id ing gu idance on techn ica l and techno log ica l i ssues , adv is ing on en fo rcemen t aspec ts of the conven t i on , and encourag ing the in t roduct ion of c leaner product ion techno log ies and the use of env i ronmen ta l l y sound waste m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s . 5 3 7 Desp i te the impor tance of the i r ac t iv i t ies , on ly e leven cent res have been fo rma l l y es tab l i shed , and the i r pe r fo rmance has been uneven pr imar i ly because of uneven avai lab i l i ty of f inancia l r e s o u r c e s . 5 3 8 Accord ing to the d i rectors of the cen t res in C h i n a , A r g e n t i n a , U ruguay , Sou th Afr ica and Egypt , the lack of adequa te resources a n d / o r f inancia l insecur i ty are the most impor tant cons t ra in ts for the opera t ion and deve lopmen t of the c e n t r e s . 5 3 9 Fu r the rmore , whi le the numbe r of act iv i t ies that s o m e of cen t res have car r ied out is not ve ry i m p r e s s i v e , 5 4 0 the regional cent re in Niger ia (wh ich covers the who le A f r i can cont inent ) and the subreg iona l centre in India (which covers the count r ies of the Sou th A s i a n Assoc ia t ion for Reg iona l C o o p e r a t i o n ) 5 4 1 have not been fo rma l l y es tab l i shed , pend ing ident i f icat ion of fund ing s o u r c e s . 5 4 2 The f inancia l instabi l i ty of the cent res re la tes to the fact that the fund ing m e c h a n i s m upon wh ich they depend is of vo lun ta ry na ture : the Base l Conven t i on prov ides that See UNEP, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention (Basel, 6-10 December 1999) UN Doc. UNEP/CHW.5/29 (10 December 1999) at 3 (argument presented by Jorge Illueca, speaking on behalf of Mr. Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of UNEP), online: <http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/cop5reportfinal.pdf>. 5 3 7 Basel Secretariat "About the Regional Centres" Online: <http://www.basel.int/centers/centers.html> (last visited 24 August 2003). Centres have been established in Argentina, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago and Uruguay. See "Status of the Basel Regional Centres", online <http://www.basel.int/centers/regcentrestatus01.html>. Only three of them have web portals. 5 3 8 At the 7 t h session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee of the Stockholm Convention on POPs, held in 14-18 July 2003 in Geneva, Switzerland, the representative of Senegal noted that due to lack of financial resources, the performance of the centres in Sub-Saharan Africa has been inferior to that of Francophone Africa. 539 Information kindly provided by Dr. Li Jinhui, Administrative Director of the Regional Centre in China, Ms. Leila Devia, Director of the Centre in Argentina, Ms. Silvia Aguinaga, Director of the Coordinating Centre in Uruguay, Mr. Adel Osman, from the Regional Centre in Egypt, and Dr. John Mbogoma, Director of the Centre in South Africa. The framework agreement that will clarify the legal status of the Regional Center in Egypt still needs to be finalized. Although a fund has been allocated thanks to a grant by the Finish government, it will cover only the first three years of implementation of the activities scheduled in the work plan of the center. Information kindly provided by Mr. Adel Osman (Regional Centre in Egypt). 5 4 0 In terms of capacity building, for instance, the centre in Egypt, which covers the Arabic speaking countries in Africa and in West Asia, has only carried out one workshop on hazardous wastes management (2000); the centre in Indonesia, which covers Asia and Pacific countries, has done a workshop on hazardous waste management (2000) and a workshop on national reporting and the undertaking of national inventories of hazardous wastes under the Basel Convention (2002). See Secretariat to the Basel Convention, Progress Report on the Activities carried out by the Basel Convention Regional Centres for Training and Technology Transfer, UN Doc. UNEP/CHW.6/5 (10 October 2002), online: <http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop6/english/5e.pdf?meetingId=2>. 5 4 1 These countries are: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 5 4 2 See Secretariat to the Basel Convention, Current Status of Basel Regional Centres, (September 1999), online: <http://www.basel.int/centers/reqcentrestatus99.html> (As of 24 August 2003, no information that the centres in Nigeria and India have been established had been posted by the Secretariat to the Basel Convention). cont r ibu t ions to suppor t the cent res are vo lun ta ry , wh ich m e a n s that even deve loped count ry par t ies are seen mere ly as donors . There is thus not m e c h a n i s m to suppor t the l ong - te rm susta inab i l i t y of the cent res a n d , even dur ing the i r f i rst yea rs of ope ra t i on , ex te rna l f inancia l suppor t was requi red th rough the par t ies and o ther d o n o r s . 5 4 3 A s noted by the consu l ta t i ve meet ing of the Base l Conven t ion regional cen t res , held in Ca i ro , Egypt in Apr i l 2 0 0 2 : "The funding of the centres, regardless of their nature, is one of the major problems confronting the Contracting Parties. The voluntary funding, envisaged by the Convention, does not provide stability needed for a smooth operation of the centres according to a longer-term business plan. Obviously, the financial burden for the operation of the centres has to be shared between the host country and other Parties to the Convention. However, in the absence of f irm, longer-term financial commitments of the Parties, the host governments are usually reluctant to make major "investment" in centres whose financial viability and very existence does not seem secured by binding commitment of the Par t ies . " 5 4 4 5.2.1.2.2. The Creation of Regional Centres under the Rotterdam Convention A s the prev ious sec t ion exp la i ned , the lack of a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m wi th manda to ry cont r ibu t ions under the Base l Conven t ion has s ign i f icant ly cur ta i led the overa l l posi t ive impac t of the t rea ty 's reg ional and subreg iona l cen t res . Because the a m o u n t and ava i lab i l i ty of the resources are uncer ta in , there is no guaran tee that the cent res wil l be ab le to car ry out the i r ac t iv i t ies , or be sus ta inab le in the fu ture. T h u s , whi le under the Base l Conven t i on s o m e cent res have been able to obta in resources f rom g o v e r n m e n t s and o ther donors , o thers have not even been es tab l i shed due to a lack of f inancia l m e a n s . On the o ther h a n d , the fact that a donor may suppor t the act iv i t ies of a cent re for a per iod of t ime does not guaran tee its long- te rm susta inab i l i ty . Two conc lus ions can be d rawn f rom the exper ience ga ined wi th the regional cent res of the Base l Conven t i on if regional cent res were to be c rea ted under the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . Fi rst , cont r ibut ions by par t ies shou ld be manda to r y , so as to ensure that enough resources are ava i lab le for a_l the cen t res to car ry out the i r act iv i t ies. S e c o n d , cont r ibu t ions shou ld be made on a regu lar bas is , so as to guaran tee the long- te rm sus ta inab i l i t y of the cen t res . Several aspects show the instability of the centres: in El Salvador and Trinidad and Tobago, the centres have undertaken regional activities without having formally designated specific staff for the long term; in South Africa, funding of the centre is being negotiated with the Government of Denmark and the staffing situation is pending; in Egypt, the identification of funding sources for the long-term funding of the centre is pending, and India is still pending and staffing situation has not been defined yet. See Ibid. 5 4 4 Consultative Meeting of the Basel Convention Regional Centres, "Option of the Establishment of Basel Convention Regional Centres and the Implications of Various Options" (Cairo, Egypt, 4-5 April 2002) at 7-8, online: <http://www.basel.int/centers/draft.options.rev5.pdf>. (Last visited 24 August 2003) 5.2.1.3. Creation of a financial mechanism for capacity building activities Given the ve ry l imi ted capac i ty of deve lop ing count r ies to m a n a g e haza rdous chemica l s and to imp lemen t the PIC p rocedure , it is essent ia l that a f inancia l m e c h a n i s m suppor t ing capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies - regard less of whe the r they are car r ied out th rough regional cen t res or any o ther m e c h a n i s m ( s ) - be c rea ted . The fund shou ld a lso sponso r the add i t iona l costs of us ing safer but more expens i ve a l te rnat ives in the S o u t h . Th is is not on ly because the use of safer a l te rnat ives is d i rect ly connec ted to the safe m a n a g e m e n t of chem ica l s ( i .e. those that are too haza rdous shou ld s imp ly be avo ided ) , but a lso because the PIC procedure is based on the idea that the impor t ing count ry has the choice to refuse an impor t ; w i thout that op t ion , it wou ld m a k e no sense to go th rough the process of in format ion exchange and pr ior consent . T h u s , if the on ly opt ion to a PIC chemica l is a more expens i ve a l ternat ive that the impor t ing count ry needs but cannot a f ford, that addi t iona l cost shou ld be borne by the f inancia l m e c h a n i s m to the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n . The f inanc ia l m e c h a n i s m to fund capac i ty -bu i ld ing act iv i t ies and sa fer a l te rnat ives shou ld be sponsored by manda to ry , per iod ic , new and addi t iona l cont r ibu t ions by deve loped count ry par t ies , and cont r ibu t ions by o ther donors ( inc lud ing deve lop ing count ry part ies) on a vo lun ta ry bas is and wi th in thei r capabi l i t ies . The S t o c k h o l m Conven t ion on POPs p rov ides for a s im i la r m e c h a n i s m , wh ich could serve as gu idance for the Ro t te rdam fund . Howeve r , the S t o c k h o l m Conven t ion dea ls wi th POPs , wh ich by def in i t ion have a g lobal effect. Acco rd ing l y , it p rov ides that the f inancia l m e c h a n i s m wil l cove r the agreed ful l i nc rementa l cos ts of imp lemen t ing measu res that fulfi l l the ob l iga t ions of deve lop ing count ry par t ies and part ies wi th economies in t r a n s i t i o n . 5 4 5 Th is approach wou ld not be appropr ia te for the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , however , because s o m e of the subs tances to be rep laced m a y not have a d i rect impac t on the g lobal e n v i r o n m e n t , 5 4 6 and thus may not be cons ide red an " i nc remen ta l cos t " as def ined by the G loba l Env i ronmen t F a c i l i t y . 5 4 7 The Stockholm Convention also provides for the creation of regional centres for capacity building and transfer of technology to assist developing country parties and parties with economies in transition to fulfill their obligations under the treaty. However, there is no reference to the financial resources that will support the centres. See Stockholm Convention, supra note 13 Art. 12(4). 5 4 6 If just incremental costs were accepted, only safer alternatives to those pesticides directly linked to the global environment, i.e., POPs, could be considered for funding. 5 4 7 The term "incremental cost' refers to "the additional cost that the GEF funds between the cost of an alternative project that a country would have implemented in the absence of global environmental concerns and a project undertaken with global objectives in mind." See supra note 366. S ince the S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on f inances a l te rna t ives to P O P s , wh ich have a c lear g lobal impac t because of the i r charac ter is t ics and t rave l l ing pat terns , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on cou ld f inance and p romote safer a l te rnat ives to those chemica l s wh ich are not POPs and are espec ia l l y p rob lemat ic for thé S o u t h . Th is idea responds to the fact tha t , as exp la ined in Chap te r 3 , it is the responsib i l i ty of all coun t r ies , wi th deve loped count r ies hav ing a larger sha re on accoun t of the i r spec ia l responsib i l i t ies and capac i t ies , to cont r ibute to the safe m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous chemica ls in the S o u t h . Fu r the rmore , Chap te r 19 of A g e n d a 21 speci f ica l ly refers to the use of sa fer chemica l and non -chemica l a l te rnat ives as one app roach to risk reduct ion (one of the s ix p r o g r a m m e areas for the env i ronmen ta l l y sound m a n a g e m e n t of tox ic chem ica l s ) , and to the adopt ion of pol ic ies and measu res to " ident i fy , and m in im ize exposure to , tox ic chemica l s by rep lac ing t h e m wi th less tox ic subs t i tu tes and u l t imate ly phas ing out the chemica l s that pose un reasonab le and o therwise unmanageab le risk to h u m a n heal th and the e n v i r o n m e n t " as an act iv i ty that g o v e r n m e n t s shou ld u n d e r t a k e . 5 4 8 Despi te its s ign i f icance to the PIC procedure and to chemica ls m a n a g e m e n t , the issue of sa fer a l te rna t ives to haza rdous chemica ls is bare ly men t ioned in the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , wh ich s imp ly asks part ies to prov ide ava i lab le in fo rmat ion : "Each Party shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that the public has appropriate access to information on chemical handling and accident management and on alternatives that are safer for human health or the environment than the chemicals listed in Annex III." 5 4 9 By the s a m e t o k e n , A n n e x I (d)( i i ) of the conven t ion inc ludes a m o n g the re levant in format ion that part ies ' m a y ' prov ide to the Secre ta r ia t w h e n not i fy ing a f inal regu la tory ac t ion to ban or seve re l y restr ict a c h e m i c a l : "(ii) Information on alternatives and their relative risks, where available, such as: - Integrated pest management strategies; - Industrial practices and processes, including cleaner technology." A l t hough the Ro t te rdam Conven t ion is not in tended to dea l d i rect ly wi th chemica ls m a n a g e m e n t but wi th in format ion exchange and pr ior in formed consen t , the ve ry concept of PIC l ies on the idea that impor t ing count r ies have a cho ice . A s exp la ined before, if deve lop ing count r ies had no access to a l te rnat ives to the chemica ls inc luded in the PIC l ist, it wou ld be comp le te l y mean ing less to fo l low a p rocedure of pr ior consen t . Fu r the rmore , if the u l t imate goal of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on is to protect h u m a n heal th 5 4 8 See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 paras. 44 and 49(c). 549 See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Art. 15(2). and the env i ronmen t f rom the potent ia l harmfu l effects of s o m e hazardous chemica ls and pes t ic ides , a l te rnat ives shou ld be p r o m o t e d , m a d e known a n d , if necessa ry , suppo r t ed . Ano the r impor tan t aspec t to cons ider in relat ion to the f inancia l m e c h a n i s m is that dec is ions on resources (e .g . wha t pro jects and a l te rnat ives shou ld be f i nanced , what are the pr ior i t ies of pro ject f i nanc ing , etc.) shou ld be made by a body where deve loped and deve lop ing count ry par t ies are equa l l y rep resen ted . It cou ld be, for ins tance , an execu t i ve commi t t ee such as the one manag ing the mul t i la tera l fund of the Mont rea l Pro toco l , the C O P , or a subs id ia ry body of the C O P . Par t ic ipat ion of al l concerned par t ies in dec i s i on -mak ing is impor tan t because capac i ty bui ld ing act iv i t ies are to benef i t deve lop ing count r ies , wh ich are aware of the i r local p rob lems and shou ld have a say in the so lu t ion . In add i t i on , a t tent ion shou ld be paid to the role of ent i t ies that have t rad i t iona l ly p romoted pest ic ide use in the S o u t h . The Wor ld Bank , for i ns tance , has a h is tory of p romot ing chemica l pest ic ides in deve lop ing count r ies , as it has cons is ten t ly encouraged expor t agr icu l tu re ( i .e. large monocu l tu res wh ich are more vu lne rab le to pests and thus requi re s ign i f icant a m o u n t s of pest ic ides) in those count r ies . A s exp la ined in Chap te r 3 , the bank has a t tempted to add ress th is p rob lem th rough Opera t iona l Pol icy 4 . 0 9 , wh ich app l ies to pro jects invo lv ing pest m a n a g e m e n t and suppor ts the use of b io logical or env i ronmen ta l pest contro l me thods to reduce re l iance on chemica l p e s t i c i d e s . 5 5 0 In prac t ice , howeve r , the pol icy has been poor ly i m p l e m e n t e d , and even pro jects wi th good pest m a n a g e m e n t des ign f requent ly fail to ach ieve the i r goa ls due to inadequate project mon i to r ing and contro l by bank s t a f f . 5 5 1 Under these p rem ises , it is not des i rab le that the Wor ld Bank be invo lved in any dec i s i on -mak ing process concern ing the f inancia l m e c h a n i s m of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on . A s an a l te rna t i ve , the bank cou ld opera te under spec i f ic gu ide l ines d ic tated by the C O P or o ther democ ra t i c dec i s i on -mak ing representa t i ve body , wh ich could per iod ica l ly ove rsee its a c t i v i t i e s . 5 5 2 5.2.2. Trade with non-Parties: promoting participation of all exporting countries The second r e c o m m e n d a t i o n by the Joint G roup of exper ts w a s to take measu res to ensure par t ic ipat ion of all expor t ing count r ies in the PIC p rocedure . A s pointed out in " u See O.P. 4.09, supra note 296 Art. 1. 5 5 1 For details see Chapter 3. 5 5 2 Participation of the bank could be indirect, like in the case of the multilateral fund of the Montreal Procotol, managed by an Executive Committee with assistance from the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP. Given its structure and expertise in project finance, the World Bank has directly managed the operations of the multilateral fund. However, the Executive Committee oversees these operations. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 352 Art. 10(5) and Jason M. Paths, "The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment" (1992) 25 Cornell Int'l L.J. 181 at 202. r Chap te r 4, the eas ies t way to ach ieve th is goal was to proscr ibe t rade of PIC chemica l s w i th non-Par t i es , so that all expor t ing count r ies wou ld feel compe l led to rati fy the conven t i on . The Ro t te rdam Conven t ion or ig inal ly inc luded a rule on t rade wi th non -Par t ies , but the prov is ion was later de le ted . There is therefore no incent ive for expor t ing count r ies to become part ies to the t reaty . Th is j eopa rd i ses the very purpose of t rans fo rm ing the vo lun ta ry PIC into a b inding ins t rument , wh ich is to ach ieve "ful l par t ic ipat ion and imp lementa t ion of the PIC p r o c e d u r e . " 5 5 3 The fact that the Uni ted S ta tes , a ma jo r chemica l expor te r , has not yet rat i f ied re lated t reat ies such as the Basel Conven t ion on hazardous was tes (in force for more than ten years ) revea ls the s ign i f icance of a prov is ion on t rade wi th non-Par t ies . Unl ike the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , however , the Base l t reaty genera l l y proscr ibes t rade wi th non -Par t ies , and a l lows it on ly when an a g r e e m e n t that gua ran tees the env i ronmen ta l l y sound m a n a g e m e n t of haza rdous was tes as requi red by the conven t ion has been c e l e b r a t e d . 5 5 4 T h u s , a l though the U .S . has not rat i f ied the Basel C o n v e n t i o n , it is at least bound by s o m e m i n i m u m requ i rements under the bi lateral a g r e e m e n t s it has ce lebra ted wi th Mex ico , C a n a d a , and Ma lays ia , wh ich are al l par t ies to the t r e a t y . 5 5 5 The S t o c k h o l m Conven t i on prov ides that in tent ional ly p roduced POPs ( l isted in A n n e x e s A and B) for wh ich there are speci f ic product ion or use exemp t i ons m a y be expor ted to a non-Par ty on ly if the lat ter has prov ided an annua l cert i f icat ion to the expor t ing par ty . The cer t i f icat ion mus t speci fy the in tended use of the c h e m i c a l , and inc lude a s ta temen t by the impor te r that it is commi t ted to protect h u m a n heal th and the env i r onmen t by tak ing the necessary measu res to m in im ize or prevent re leases , to comp ly wi th prov is ions on f inal d isposa l a n d , if app l i cab le , to use DDT only for ma la r ia contro l and if a f fordable and safe a l te rna t ives are not a v a i l a b l e . 5 5 6 In s u m m a r y , t rade wi th non-Par t ies is proh ib i ted as a genera l ru le, un less th is speci f ic excep t ion app l ies . Whe the r t rade wi th non-Par t ies is ent i re ly p rosc r ibed , or whe the r it is a l lowed under cer ta in cond i t ions (e .g . if pr ior not i f icat ion has been g iven to the impor t ing count ry and a response has been rece ived) , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on mus t add ress the issue so as to See Agenda 21, supra note 342 Chapter 19 para. 38(b), and Chapter 4. 5 5 4 See Basel Convention, supra note 283 Art. 11 (a) This requirement is somehow problematic, as "environmentally sound management" is an ambiguous term. 5 5 5 For details see James O'Reilly & Barbara Cuzze "Trade or Treasure? Industrial Recycling and International Barriers to the Movement of Hazardous Wastes" (1997) 22 Iowa J. Corp. L. 507 at 521-524. 5 5 6 See Stockholm Convention, supra note 13 Art. (3)(b) para. 3. The production and use of DDT is limited to parties included in the DDT Register. (See Annex B Part II para. 1). ensure that a few expor t ing count r ies do not defeat the purpose of the t reaty , wh ich is to protect h u m a n heal th and the env i ronmen t f rom cer ta in haza rdous chemica ls th rough in format ion exchange and pr ior in formed consen t . G i ven the vu lnerab le s i tuat ion of deve lop ing count r ies , it wou ld be preferable that t rade wi th non-Par t ies be ent i re ly p roh ib i ted . The Ro t te rdam Conven t ion features ve ry bas ic requ i remen ts in relat ion to in format ion exchange and pr ior not i f icat ion, and expor t ing count r ies shou ld s imp ly not be ab le to expor t haza rdous chemica l s to part ies un less they rati fy the t rea ty and obse rve it in its ent i re ty . Th is sect ion has sugges ted s o m e speci f ic measu res that wou ld se rve to improve the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on so that it may ach ieve its ob jec t ive th rough a more ef fect ive PIC s y s t e m . A s y s t e m of pr ior in formed consen t , however , m a y not be the mos t appropr ia te way of dea l ing wi th the in ternat ional t rade in hazardous chemica l s and pest ic ides . Th is is because under ly ing that s ys tem lies the assump t i on that t rade in hazardous chemica ls and env i ronmen ta l protect ion are inherent ly compat ib le or , as put by the Ro t te rdam C o n v e n t i o n , 'mu tua l l y s u p p o r t i v e . ' T h i s , however , can be h ighly p rob lemat ic . The purpose of the next sec t ion is to exp la in why . 5.3. Trade in hazardous chemicals and the environment: mutually supportive? The Ro t te rdam Conven t i on prohib i ts t rade of haza rdous chemica l s on ly in ve ry excep t iona l cases . A s exp la ined in Chap te r 4, a l though it p rov ides that no PIC chemica l s shou ld be expor ted when the impor t ing count ry has g iven no pr ior consen t , un less one of three excep t ions app ly , the excep t ions are so broad that they ensure t rade in haza rdous chemica l s wil l con t inue un less the impor t ing count ry ef fect ive ly par t ic ipates in the PIC procedure by refus ing an i m p o r t . 5 5 7 Fu r the rmore , all those haza rdous chemica l s wh ich are not sub jec t to the PIC procedure but that have been b a n n e d , seve re l y restr ic ted or wh ich are not reg is tered for use in the expor t ing count ry can be legal ly expor ted to o ther s ta tes as long as s o m e m in ima l requ i rements ( i .e. not i f icat ion to the impor t ing count ry ) are met . See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16 Arts. 10(9) and 11(2), and Chapter 4. To make a decision, the importing country requires the technical capacity to analyse the data received and to study the possible effects of the substance under its own environmental conditions; to consider viable and affordable alternatives; and to make sure that its decision is consistent with international trade law. T h e s e prov is ions are cons is ten t wi th the l iberal economic pa rad igm of f ree marke t , as they ref lect the not ion that t rade shou ld be d is rupted as litt le as poss ib le . They der ive f rom the a s s u m p t i o n that t rade in haza rdous chemica ls and pest ic ides and the protect ion of the env i ronmen t are inherent ly compat ib le . Th is idea is ar t icu la ted in the p reamb le of the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on as fo l lows: "[t]rade and environmental policies should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development." The c o n s e q u e n c e of th is assump t i on is that the expor t of haza rdous chemica l s ( i .e. chemica l s and pest ic ides banned or severe ly restr ic ted in the expor t ing count ry for reasons of heal th or the env i ronmen t ) is conf i rmed as the genera l ru le , and not as the excep t i on . Like th is , the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on supposes that the p rob lem is not the t rans fer of haza rdous chemica l s f rom deve loped to deve lop ing count r ies in itself, but the lack of in format ion and the very l imi ted capac i ty of the lat ter to m a n a g e hazardous chemica l s safe ly (yet no means are prov ided to enhance that capac i t y ) . More impor tan t l y , the t reaty a s s u m e s that once deve lop ing count r ies have adequa te in fo rmat ion , they wil l be ab le to dec ide f reely on the impor ta t ion of a c h e m i c a l . However , as exp la ined in C h a p t e r 3 , deve lop ing count r ies are in a diff icult economic posi t ion that great ly l imi ts that cho ice , espec ia l l y w h e n one bears in mind the e m p h a s i s that in ternat ional economic inst i tu t ions have put on expor t agr icu l ture as a way to ove rcome unde rdeve lopmen t in the S o u t h - w i t h the resul t ing increas ing dependence on chemica l p e s t i c i d e s - and the e n o r m o u s power exer ted by mul t inat iona l ag rochemica l corpora t ions in deve lop ing count r ies , wh ich not on ly need pest ic ides but are a lso anx ious to at t ract or ma in ta in fore ign inves tmen t . The l iberal economic mode l cal ls for in format ion e x c h a n g e , perhaps t ra in ing on the safe use of chem ica l s , and as little in tervent ion of the in ternat ional t rade in haza rdous chem ica l s as poss ib le . Us ing the a rgumen t of nat ional sovere ign ty , it ma in ta ins that deve lop ing count r ies shou ld dec ide which subs tances they impor t and wh ich subs tances they reject . T h u s , even though it is accep ted that cer ta in chemica l s are too haza rdous to be used in the Nor th , it is a rgued that deve lop ing count r ies might have di f ferent ' p re fe rences ' and needs , and it is up to t hem to dec ide whe the r hea l th and the env i ronmen t are more impor tant than fast e c o n o m i c g rowth . Th is v iew is ref lected in the preface of the FAO C o d e of Conduc t , wh ich jus t i f ies expor t doub le s tandards as fo l lows: "[T]he fact that a product is not used or registered in a particular exporting country is not necessarily a valid reason for prohibiting the export of that pesticide. Developing countries are mostly situated in tropical and semitropical regions. Their climatic, ecological, agronomic, social, economic and environmental conditions and therefore their pest problems are usually quite different from those prevailing in countries in which pesticides are manufactured and exported. The government of the exporting country, therefore, is in no position to judge the suitability, efficacy, safety or fate of the pesticide under the conditions in the country where it may ultimately be used. Such a judgement must, there fore, be made by the responsible authority in the importing country in consultation with industry and other government authorities in the light of the scientific evaluation that has been made and a detailed knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the country of proposed use..." Th is th ink ing wou ld be less p rob lemat ic if all count r ies had the proper resources and techn ica l capac i ty to do a risk ana lys is on each chemica l that they impor t , and if they had the s a m e abi l i ty to refuse the impor t of a subs tance if they found that the r isks for the env i r onmen t or h u m a n heal th are s imp ly too high to a s s u m e . Yet the Code of Conduc t and the Ro t te rdam Conven t i on were ado