Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Wetland retention on the prairies through private landowner stewardship Hursin, Tamara Julie Irene 1991

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1991_A6_7 H87.pdf [ 6.79MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0076955.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0076955-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0076955-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0076955-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0076955-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0076955-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0076955-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0076955-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0076955.ris

Full Text

WETLAND RETENTION ON THE PRAIRIES THROUGH PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP By TAMARA JULIE IRENE HURSIN B.Sc, The Un i v e r s i t y of Alberta, 1982 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES School of Community and Regional Planning We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l 1991 (c) Tamara J u l i e Irene Hursin, 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. -Department- of C o m ^ u ^ V ^ & r A ^ e - \ , w - \ P IKAA.V^ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date j \ f r ; \ \~l , 1^1 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Loss and degradation of wetlands across Canada's p r a i r i e pothole region i n Canada i s severe and a c c e l e r a t i n g as on-going i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and expansion of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base continues to exert pressure on the remaining wetland resource. T r a d i t i o n a l l y wetlands have been regarded as unexploited wastelands to be converted to more productive a g r i c u l t u r a l uses. Although wetlands are now recognized as providing v i t a l functions of a h y d r o l o g i c a l , e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l nature which have economic and s o c i a l value as well as i n t r i n s i c value, d i f f i c u l t i e s i n quantifying these b e n e f i t s , coupled with r e a d i l y c a l c u l a t e d and r e a l i z e d b enefits from a g r i c u l t u r a l production, r e s u l t i n continuing wetland losses. As well, because wetlan^jjenejfjj;s__ac„crue_^ rather than the p r i v a t e landJioJ.de^s_jwho_jiomi^ i n d i v i d u a l owners cannot capture pjiyment^fjor^^ favor a g r i c u l t u r a l pro_duc t ion... ove r__we t l and-, re tenti.Qn. The primary objective of the thesis i s to evaluate nonregulatory approaches to encouraging p r i v a t e landowner stewardship on the p r a i r i e s with respect to wetland retention. From the l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s established that a nonregulatory approach to preserving wetlands on p r i v a t e lands i s preferable to p o l i c e power regulation from both a landowner and general p u b l i c perspective. Several benefits associated with using nonregulatory tools to promote changes i n landowner behavior are i d e n t i f i e d and developed into an a n a l y t i c a l framework. Using t h i s framework, s i x market and moral suasion nonregulatory tools commonly used to encourage landowners to r e t a i n wetlands are assessed for t h e i r apparent advantages and disadvantages i n supporting the primary concerns of landowners faced with a d e c i s i o n whether i i to enter into a stewardship program. From t h i s assessment, conclusions regarding probable owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms are drawn, a c c e p t a b i l i t y being a measure f o r how successful the nonregulatory tools w i l l be i n promoting pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. The expected landowner appeal of the mechanisms i s tested by evaluating t h e i r actual owner appeal as implemented i n three on-going Canadian stewardship programs. Actual appeal i s found to be f a i r l y consistent with r e s u l t s from the l i t e r a t u r e analysis and conclusions from these r e s u l t s indicate that the mechanisms do vary i n t h e i r effectiveness to encourage landowners to r e t a i n wetlands and thus vary i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to secure wetland acreage f o r protection. Data l i m i t a t i o n s are encountered i n the case studies due to the infancy of stewardship programs i n Canada and thus i t i s concluded that i t w i l l take time to demonstrate the effectiveness of nonregulatory mechanisms i n promoting pr i v a t e landowner stewardship of wetlands. The evaluation of nonregulatory tools allows a number of recommendations to be drawn with regard to improving stewardship programs i n order to e f f e c t i v e l y encourage landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the type of data base that needs to be established i n order to e f f e c t i v e l y monitor the success of nonregulatory mechanisms, and opportunities for further i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h i s area of study. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v i i LIST OF FIGURES v i i i I. WETLAND RETENTION ON THE PRAIRIES THROUGH PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Purpose and Overview . 3 1.3 Methodology 4 1.4 D e f i n i t i o n s 7 I I . WETLAND RETENTION: RATIONALE AND PROBLEM CONTEXT 11 2 .1 Introduction 11 2.2 Why Preserve Wetlands? 11 2.2.1 Wetland Functions 11 2.2.2 I r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of Wetland Destruction 15 2.2.3 Economic and S o c i a l Value 16 2.2.4 I n t r i n s i c Value 22 2.2.5 Ensuring Sustainable Development 26 2.3 A g r i c u l t u r a l Impacts on P r a i r i e Potholes 28 2.3.1 Transformation of the Rural Landscape 29 2.3.2 Deteriorating Wetland Quality 30 2.3.3 Waterfowl Decline 31 2.3.4 Disruption of the P r a i r i e ' s E c o l o g i c a l Balance 33 i v 2.4 Causes of Wetland Drainage 34 2.4.1 Socio-Economic Considerations 34 2.4.2 I n s t i t u t i o n a l Considerations 37 2.5 Summary 39 II I . POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR WETLAND RETENTION 41 3.1 Introduction 41 3.2 Landownership and Property Rights 41 3.3 Regulatory Mechanisms 42 3.3.1 Police Power and Compliance 43 3.3.2 Regulation and Wetland Retention 44 3.3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Regulatory Mechanisms 46 3.4 Nonregulatory Mechanisms 49 3.4.1 Wetland Retention Through Nonregulation 50 3.4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Nonregulatory Mechanisms 52 3 . 5 Summary 54 IV. PROMOTING PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP THROUGH NONREGULATORY MECHANISMS 58 4.1 Introduction 58 4.2 A n a l y t i c a l Framework 58 4.3 Analysis 61 4.3.1 Market Approach 62 4.3.2 Moral Suasion 71 4.4 Summary 75 v V. SUCCESS OF NONREGULATORY MECHANISMS IN PROMOTING PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP 79 5.1 Introduction 79 5.2 Evaluation C r i t e r i a 79 5.3 Evaluation 80 5.3.1 Alberta's Landowner Habitat Project (LHP) 82 5.3.1 Saskatchewan's P r a i r i e Pothole Project (PPP) 88 5.3.3 Ontario's Natural Heritage Stewardship Program (NHSP) 99 5 .4 Summary 105 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 110 6 .1 Summary of Conclusions I l l 6.2 General Conclusions and Recommendations 114 6.3 Monitoring the Success of Nonregulatory Mechanisms 119 6.4 Recommendations f o r Future Research 122 BIBLIOGRAPHY 125 APPENDIX I- Federal and Alberta L e g i s l a t i o n With P o t e n t i a l Impacts on Wetlands i n Albe r t a 133 v i LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. A Summary of the Apparent Advantages and Disadvantages of Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms i n Supporting Primary Landowner Concerns 77 2. A Summary of Landowner A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms as Determined by P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Stewardship Programs 106 v i i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. P r a i r i e Pothole Region of Canada 10 2. Probable Landowner A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms 78 3. Success of the Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms i n Promoting Stewardship of Wetlands Among Private Landowners 107 v i i i 1 I. WETLAND RETENTION ON THE PRAIRIES THROUGH PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP 1.1 Introduction The p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada i s undergoing a rapid t r a n s i t i o n from a mixture of pastures, wetlands, woodlands, and native grasslands, to cropland. ^ T r a d i t i o n a l l y , wetlands have been regarded as unexploited• wastelands, t h e i r perceived value dependent p r i m a r i l y on t h e i r p o t e n t i a l conversion to more "productive" uses such as a g r i c u l t u r a l production^ This view has l e d to a severe and acc e l e r a t i n g loss of wetlands through indiscriminate drainage. In addition, farming pr a c t i c e s such as c u l t i v a t i n g , grazing and burning have degraded wetland margins, an e s s e n t i a l component of w i l d l i f e habitat. I t has only been i n the l a s t decade that the value of wetland functions has been more widely recognized. In t h e i r natural state, wetlands provide h y d r o l o g i c a l , e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l functions v i t a l to the well-being of Canadians. In addition to t h e i r importance to human-kind, wetland functions have i n t r i n s i c value, that i s , value i n and of themselves. E f f o r t s to protect Canada's wetland resource have been constrained f o r a number of reasons. The lack of coordination i n wetland j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (spread among fed e r a l , p r o v i n c i a l and municipal agencies), has s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced the a b i l i t y to develop a u n i f i e d or long-term wetland management p o l i c y . As a r e s u l t , conservation measures have l a r g e l y been reactive, providing only ad hoc responses to threats of drainage and degradation for development purposes. Aside from coordination problems within l e g i s l a t i v e regimes, c o n f l i c t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , p o l i c e s and programs have r e s u l t e d i n p r o v i n c i a l and fe d e r a l drainage and 2 a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n subsidy programs which often compete with conservation e f f o r t s . In a d d i t i o n to i n s t i t u t i o n a l constraints, r a t i o n a l decisions regarding wetland use are hampered by socio-economic considerations. I t has been d i f f i c u l t to measure many of the wetland be n e f i t s within our present system of resource a l l o c a t i o n . F a i l u r e to quantify wetland ben e f i t s f o r comparison with a l t e r n a t i v e land uses makes i t d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y wetland retention. Immediate economic b e n e f i t can be more r e a d i l y c a l c u l a t e d and r e a l i z e d from a g r i c u l t u r a l production. As well, wetland b e n e f i t s accrue to the p u b l i c i n general, and not e x c l u s i v e l y to private landowners. As a r e s u l t , p r i v a t e land use decisions based on personal costs and b e n e f i t s favor economic development such as a g r i c u l t u r a l production over wetland conservation. This p r i v a t e economic consideration of wetland drainage versus retention i s compounded i n the p r a i r i e pothole region due to the high degree of pri v a t e landownership (National Wetlands Working Group 1988) . ] T r a d i t i o n a l l y , p r o t e c t i o n of natural areas has been undertaken ^ through/^land a c q u i s i t i o n from pr-ivate landowners or through a land use planning process which t y p i c a l l y includes r e s t r i c t i v e land use regulations) More recently, p r i v a t e organizations and government agencies have moved towards another approach to conservation, that of encouraging p r i v a t e land stewardship ( H i l t s and Moull 1988). Private land sjtewarMs_hip simply means &*=f . taking good care of the land while i t i s used and suggests a concern f o r future generations and an e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or o b l i g a t i o n beyond the human community to include a l l other species and the land on which a l l depend ](Hilts 1990)J Retaining wetlands on the p r a i r i e s through pr i v a t e 3 landowner stewardship involves working i n cooperation with landowners to promote the responsible, wise use of the wetland resource. 1.2 Purpose and Overview This thesis evaluates nonregulatory approaches to encouraging private landowner stewardship on the p r a i r i e s with respect to wetland retention. To meet t h i s end, f i r s t , a broad overview of the advantages and disadvantages of both regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms i s presented i n the context of promoting stewardship of wetland environments on private land holdings. Next, s i x common nonregulatory mechanisms used to promote p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands are analyzed. The purpose of the analysis i s to i n d i c a t e the probable a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the nonregulatory mechanisms to landowners. This analysis i s comparative i n nature- assessing the apparent advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms based on those concerns which are foremost i n the landowner's mind when considering stewardship programs: 1) f i n a n c i a l benefits to the landowner, 2) landowner c o n t r o l of property r i g h t s , and 3) design considerations of the mechanism such as f l e x i b i l i t y and complexity. T h i r d l y , the s i x nonregulatory mechanisms are evaluated f o r t h e i r success i n promoting landowner stewardship of wetland environments. This evaluation i s based on the e x i s t i n g landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms as determined through a review of three stewardship programs from Al b e r t a , Saskatchewan and Ontario. The Landowner Habitat Project (Alberta), P r a i r i e Pothole Project (Saskatchewan), and Natural Heritage Stewardship Program (Ontario) u t i l i z e only nonregulatory mechanisms to encourage pr i v a t e stewardship of natural areas and lead the way i n Canada i n terms of length of time i n operation and data generated. A l l have been 4 established i n regions predominantly under pri v a t e ownership and under increasing pressure from i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base and expanding n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l uses such as urbanization. Although the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program i s not within the p r a i r i e pothole region, i t i s considered an appropriate case study because landowners i n the area i n which t h i s program i s operational face the same socio-economic l i m i t a t i o n s as p r a i r i e farmers with regard to wetland retention and thus have the same concerns when considering stewardship programs. To conclude t h i s study, recommendations are made on how nonregulatory mechanisms and stewardship programs can be improved i n order to e f f e c t i v e l y encourage landowner stewardship. To a s s i s t the reader i n understanding the wider problem context of wetland retention, the thesis begins by presenting a r a t i o n a l e f o r r e t a i n i n g wetlands followed by a discussion of the e f f e c t s and causes of p r a i r i e wetland destruction. 1.3 Methodology The use of nonregulatory mechanisms to encourage pr i v a t e stewardship i s a new method f o r achieving conservation goals and as a r e s u l t , quantitative research on t h i s subject i s l i m i t e d . Only l i m i t e d long-term data has been c o l l e c t e d with regard to landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n stewardship programs. As w e l l , there i s a lack of data on those factors that motivate landholders to p a r t i c i p a t e i n stewardship programs and on owner at t i t u d e s towards conservation before and a f t e r program p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 5 There are two general nonregulatory approaches designed to induce i n d i v i d u a l s to a l t e r t h e i r behavior: 1) the market approach and 2) moral suasion. Not a l l market and moral suasion mechanisms are su i t a b l e f or promoting pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands nor are a l l commonly mentioned i n the l i t e r a t u r e or a c t u a l l y implemented through stewardship programs. Six mechanisms d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to promoting wetland r e t e n t i o n are analyzed and evaluated: market approach - 1) property tax incentives, 2) management agreements, 3) leases, 4) conservation easements; moral suasion - 5) landowner education, and 6) landowner recognition. The s i x r e f l e c t a general set of mechanisms that are mentioned r e g u l a r l y i n the l i t e r a t u r e , and which appear to have some merit for promoting p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. To carry out the comparative analysis of the s i x mechanisms, an a n a l y t i c a l framework i s developed. The framework i s used to assess the apparent advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms i n supporting landowner concerns. Conclusions regarding probable owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of each mechanism are based on the r e s u l t s of t h i s assessment. The framework i s comprised of f i v e general c r i t e r i a judged to represent many of the primary concerns of landowners contemplating p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a stewardship program. The c r i t e r i a are: 1) strong economic incentives, 2) landowner con t r o l , 3) f l e x i b i l i t y , 4) c e r t a i n t y , and 5) lack of complexity. Development of the framework i s p r i m a r i l y based on a review of the l i t e r a t u r e p e r t a i n i n g to socio-economic causes of wetland drainage (Chapter II) and the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms (Chapter I I I ) . The information for the comparative analysis of the s i x mechanisms i s based on l i t e r a t u r e research. In carrying out the analysis, four broad 6 headings are used f o r each mechanism: 1) Description, 2) Advantages, 3) Disadvantages, and 4) Conclusion. To summarize the analysis, a matrix of the f i v e c r i t e r i a f o r each of the s i x mechanisms i s assembled as well as a f i g u r e o u t l i n i n g the mechanism's probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y . A f t e r analyzing the selected nonregulatory mechanisms, case studies of Alberta's Landowner Habitat Project, Saskatchewan's P r a i r i e Pothole Project and Ontario's Natural Heritage Stewardship Program are undertaken i n order to evaluate the success of the mechanisms i n promoting pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. Success i s measured by actual landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms as implemented i n the three case studies. Given the purpose of t h i s thesis and case study data l i m i t a t i o n s , landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s judged to be a good measure of a c c e p t a b i l i t y and evaluation c r i t e r i a are developed on that basis. The effectiveness of the mechanisms i s assessed against the following four c r i t e r i a : 1) actual rate of landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 2) length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as indicated by length of agreement the landowner entered into and number of agreements terminated before end of term, 3) rate of agreement compliance, and 4) p o s i t i v e s h i f t i n a t t i t u d e towards wetland stewardship or conservation e t h i c . Limitations with regard to applying the c r i t e r i a are encountered and w i l l be o u t l i n e d l a t e r . The r e s u l t of the analysis and evaluation i s a set of recommendations fo r improving the nonregulatory mechanisms and e s t a b l i s h i n g a data base to e f f e c t i v e l y monitor t h e i r success i n promoting stewardship. Before proceeding, i t i s necessary to define "wetland" and the " p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada". 7 1.4 D e f i n i t i o n s ^ 1) Wetland - Conceptually, wetlands l i e between well-drained t e r r e s t r i a l areas and permanently flooded deep waters of lakes, r i v e r s and coa s t a l areas. They can form i n d i s t i n c t depressions or basins that are r e a d i l y observed or may occur i n unapparent shallow depressions making the wetland-upland boundary d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y . H i s t o r i c a l l y , wetlands were defined by s c i e n t i s t s working i n s p e c i a l i z e d f i e l d s . As a r e s u l t , various d i s c i p l i n e s and professionals such as waterfowl managers and f l o o d control engineers developed t h e i r own wetland d e f i n i t i o n s to meet t h e i r needs, leading to the absence of a standard d e f i n i t i o n i n the l i t e r a t u r e (Tiner, J r . 1984). The United States F i s h and W i l d l i f e Service (Cowardin 1982) took a m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y approach i n attempting to develop a complete, e c o l o g i c a l l y sound d e f i n i t i o n of wetlands. They define wetlands as follows: Wetlands are lands t r a n s i t i o n a l between t e r r e s t r i a l and aquatic systems where the water table i s u s u a l l y at or near the surface or the land i s covered by shallow water. For purposes of t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n wetlands must have one or more of the following three a t t r i b u t e s : 1) at l e a s t p e r i o d i c a l l y , the land supports predominantly hydrophytes; 2) the substrate i s predominantly undrained hydric s o i l ; and 3) the substrate i s nonsoil and i s saturated with water or covered by shallow water at some time during the growing season each year (Cowardin 1982, p83). The d e f i n i t i o n given i n Tarnocai (1979) for the Canadian Wetland Registry i s s i m i l a r : Wetland i s defined as land having the water table at, near, or above the land surface or which i s saturated f or a long enough period to promote wetland or aquatic processes as indicated by hydric s o i l s , hydrophylic vegetation and various kinds of b i o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y which are adapted to the wet environment (Tarnocai 1979, p l l ) . Both d e f i n i t i o n s emphasizefthree key attributesj>£wetlands- the degree of fl o o d i n g or s o i l s aturation and the presence of wetland vegetation (hydrophytes) and/or hydric s o i l s . A l l areas considered wetland must 8 capture enough water at some time during the growing season to put stress on animals and plants not adapted f o r l i f e i n water or saturated s o i l s . This would exclude sheet wash which occurs on f i e l d s a f t e r snow melt and heavy rains or other temporary bodies of water not promoting aquatic processes. Permanently flooded deepwater areas generally deeper than s i x fe e t are not considered wetlands because water and not a i r i s the p r i n c i p a l medium i n which the dominant organisms must l i v e (Tiner, J r . 1984). 2) P r a i r i e pothole region of Canada - The p r a i r i e provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, covering nearly 2.0 m i l l i o n square kilometers, c o n s i s t of grasslands, aspen parkland, and boreal and alpine f o r e s t s ( W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada 1986). The southern p o r t i o n of the p r a i r i e provinces, comprised of grassland and aspen parkland and occupying approximately 390,000 square kilometers, i s the l a r g e s t s i n g l e expanse of arable land i n Canada renowned for the production of grains and beef. This f e r t i l e area i s also characterized by an abundance of shallow wetlands or potholes and i s known as the p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada as indicated i n Figure 1 (Lynch-Stewart 1983 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988). As a r e s u l t of g l a c i a t i o n thousands of years ago, t h i s region i s pock-marked with m i l l i o n s of pothole depressions with the greatest number and v a r i e t y occurring i n hummocky moraine topography created by g l a c i a l stagnation. Although potholes range i n s i z e from a f r a c t i o n of a hectare to several hundred hectares, most are r e l a t i v e l y small i n s i z e . In Alberta f o r example, 59 percent of potholes are 0.04-0.42 hectares i n s i z e . Despite the small s i z e of p r a i r i e potholes, t h e i r cumulative area covers a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of the land surface. On hummocky moraines, wetland d e n s i t i e s as high as 23-35 per section (259 hectares) have been observed. 9 P r a i r i e potholes are shallow, u s u a l l y less than 2 meters i n deep; however, a v a i l a b l e water i n potholes fluctuates widely both seasonally and annually due to differences i n p r e c i p i t a t i o n , water penetration, seepage inflow from groundwater, runoff, and the surrounding topography. Temporary potholes undergo seasonal changes, s h i f t i n g from predominantly open water ponds i n spring to drying basins covered by patchy or closed stands of vegetation i n summer. Semi-permanent potholes p e r s i s t throughout the year during seasons of average p r e c i p i t a t i o n but dry out during drought conditions. Seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s i n p r e c i p i t a t i o n and prolonged periods of drought, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the p r a i r i e s , can dramatically impact the water regime of semi-permanent wetlands. Semi-permanent and permanent potholes are defined by a predominant open pond bordered by a fr i n g e of p e r s i s t e n t emergents such as bulrush and c a t t a i l (National Wetlands Working Group 1988). LEGEND Figure 1. Prairie Pothole Region of Canada lm.iu^ 11 I I . WETLAND RETENTION: RATIONALE AND PROBLEM CONTEXT 2.1 Introduction A l t h o u g h t h e v a l u e of w e t l a n d s has b e e n more w i d e l y r e c o g n i z e d i n the l a s t d e c a d e , t h e r e s t i l l e x i s t s a l a c k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g about n a t u r a l w e t l a n d f u n c t i o n s and the i m p o r t a n c e and e x t e n t of t h o s e f u n c t i o n s , j^or t h i s r e a s o n , i t i s n o t a p p r o p r i a t e to assume t h a t w e t l a n d s must be c o n s e r v e d . T h u s , a r a t i o n a l f o r p r e s e r v i n g w e t l a n d s i s d e v e l o p e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h r o u g h a r e v i e w of the r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e ^ ) I n a d d i t i o n to p r e s e n t i n g a r a t i o n a l e f o r w e t l a n d r e t e n t i o n , the e f f e c t s and c a u s e s o f p r a i r i e w e t l a n d d e s t r u c t i o n a r e examined t h r o u g h l i t e r a t u r e r e s e a r c h . T h i s w i l l a s s i s t the r e a d e r i n p l a c i n g the s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m b e i n g examined i n the t h e s i s i n t o a b r o a d e r p r o b l e m c o n t e x t . 2.2 Why Preserve Wetlands? $1 u The r a t i o n a l e f o r p r e s e r v i n g p r a i r i e p o t h o l e s b e g i n s w i t h an o u t l i n e o f the many f u n c t i o n s n a t u r a l w e t l a n d s p r o v i d e . Subsequent d i s c u s s i o n s f o c u s on t h e i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of l o s t w e t l a n d f u n c t i o n s due to d r a i n a g e and d e g r a d a t i o n , the e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l and i n t r i n s i c v a l u e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w e t l a n d f u n c t i o n s , and the r o l e those f u n c t i o n s p l a y i n a c h i e v i n g s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t . 0 2.2.1 Wetland Functions P r a i r i e w e t l a n d s i n t h e i r n a t u r a l s t a t e a r e an i n t e g r a l component o f t h e p r a i r i e e c o s y s t e m p r o v i d i n g h y d r o l o g i c a l and e c o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s . As w e l l , t h e y f u l f i l l many s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s . 12 1) Hydrological Functions: (a) Flood reduction - Pothole basins may c o l l e c t and store water during floods and storms thereby reducing f l o o d peaks. (b) Erosion control - Peak flow reduction by wetlands l i m i t s erosion by slowing floodwater v e l o c i t i e s . (c) Water q u a l i t y modification- P r a i r i e wetlands are e f f e c t i v e i n improving water q u a l i t y . The basins act as water p u r i f i e r s , removing nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus, sediments and a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t a n t s through f i l t r a t i o n , sedimentation, anaerobic and aerobic decomposition, b i o l o g i c a l a s s i m i l a t i o n , and absorption by mineral and organic sediments (The Ontario Chapter, S o i l Conservation Society of America 1987 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988). (d) Ground water recharge and discharge - Potholes may in t e r s e c t ground water flows so as to function as eit h e r recharge or discharge points (Odum 1978 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988) . 2) E c o l o g i c a l Functions: (a) P r o d u c t i v i t y and d i v e r s i t y - Although p r a i r i e potholes vary i n si z e , depth, longevity, and vegetative composition, they are often highly productive, supporting complex food webs (Brace and Pepper 1984). According.to Odum (1978), the high p r o d u c t i v i t y of many wetlands i s due to 'the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of water flow. Water currents act as an a u x i l i a r y energy subsidy that c i r c u l a t e s nutrients and waste products within the system allowing organisms to use more of t h e i r productive energy for growth. Seasonal f l u c t u a t i o n s i n p r e c i p i t a t i o n , characterized by prolonged periods of drought, are a common and i n t e g r a l part of the p r a i r i e s . The natu r a l drawdown i n p r a i r i e potholes increases the f e r t i l i t y of the pothole 13 s o i l s with subsequent wet years witnessing an explosive nutr i e n t release through vigorous growth of vegetation, invertebrates and other organisms (Lynch-Stewart 1983 and Cowan 1988). The high p r o d u c t i v i t y of wetlands supports a great d i v e r s i t y of f l o r a and fauna. In addition to sustaining large and diverse communities of invertebrates and plants, p r a i r i e potholes provide food, escape cover and reproductive h a b i t a t f o r an array of t e r r e s t r i a l and aquatic w i l d l i f e species. About 45 species of waterfowl, 115 species of other b i r d s , and 50 species of mammals such as deer, rabbit, muskrat and beaver u t i l i z e p r a i r i e wetlands f o r at l e a s t part of t h e i r l i f e cycle (Brace and Pepper 1984 and Schmitt 1985). The high density and v a r i a b i l i t y of wetlands i n the pothole region provide h a b i t a t f o r the production of approximately 50 percent of the North American waterfowl population (Lynch-Stewart 1983). /^Waterfowl are the most prominent and economically important group of migratory birds i n North America. They are high l y p r i z e d by m i l l i o n s of b i r d watchers and hunters, generating a d i r e c t expenditure i n excess of several b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s annually across North America (Canadian W i l d l i f e Service 1986). The mosaic of wetland sizes and types t y p i c a l of the p r a i r i e pothole region meet waterfowl needs including food, space, and habitat f or nesting, brood-rearing, molting and staging. No one type or size of pothole can provide for a l l of these requirements. Shallow temporary ponds with surrounding native meadows and uplands are u t i l i z e d by breeding pa i r s f o r nesting. These ponds are highly f e r t i l e providing a r i c h food source important to nesting ducks. Semipermanent wetlands subsequently provide food and she l t e r f or broods. Larger permanent wetlands provide cover during the f l i g h t l e s s molt period and act as f a l l staging areas allowing waterfowl to 14 r e s t and b u i l d up energy reserves i n preparation f o r the f a l l migration (Brace and Pepper 1984 and Melinchuk 1988). L_(b) C r i t i c a l habitat - Wetlands provide c r i t i c a l h abitat f o r rare and endangered species. T h i r t y f i v e species of f i s h , b i r d s , animals or plants which depend on wetland habitats have been c l a s s i f i e d as endangered by the Committee on the Status of Endangered W i l d l i f e i n Canada (National Wetlands Working Group 1988). 3) S o c i a l Functions: (a) Education and research - Wetlands provide opportunities for educational nature observation and s c i e n t i f i c research. They provide an exc e l l e n t resource base f o r learning and research regarding ecosystem structure and functions. (b) Aesthetics - The v i s u a l d i v e r s i t y and contrast provided by wetland landscapes enhance the q u a l i t y of l i f e by f u l f i l l i n g human needs for open space and landscape v a r i e t y (The Ontario Chapter, S o i l Conservation Society of America 1987 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988) . (c) Recreation - Wetlands serve as recr e a t i o n s i t e s f o r hunters, n a t u r a l i s t s , birdwatchers, hikers, photographers, and others with outdoor i n t e r e s t s . (d) Renewable resource products - Local and regional economies may d i r e c t l y reap economic and other benefits r e l a t e d to the harvest of renewable natural resources from wetlands. Game bi r d s , w i l d r i c e and furs from muskrat and beaver are examples of the many resources provided by wetlands (National Wetlands Working Group 1988). 15 2.2.2 I r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of Wetland Destruction Wetland r e s t o r a t i o n and creation has been attempted as a means of mi t i g a t i n g f o r the adverse impacts of developing natural wetland environments. Restoration re f e r s to returning a damaged or destroyed wetland to a former, normal, or unimpaired state. Creation r e f e r s to bri n g i n g a wetland into existence where i t d i d not formerly e x i s t through such means as f i l l i n g , dredging, or water l e v e l manipulation (Kusler 1990)_.\ Success i n terms of r e s t o r i n g or creating a wetland depends on the c r i t e r i a f o r success. Development impacts ...may be r e v e r s i b l e , i f r e v e r s i b l e i s interpreted to mean r e s t o r a t i o n of part of the functions and s t r u c t u r a l content s u f f i c i e n t to permit resumption of for example, basic r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s (Turner 1988, pl32). Kusler (1990) points out that i f success i s based upon resumption of a l l functions found within a natural wetland environment, then i t i s probably not possible to s u c c e s s f u l l y restore or create a wetland. Based upon l i m i t e d studies, wetland s c i e n t i s t s i n general are i n agreement that neither a l l natural wetland types nor a l l functions may be able to be duplicated or r e p l i c a t e d exactly through either r e s t o r a t i o n or creation. Zedler (1987), supported by Kusler, contends that from a s c i e n t i f i c perspective, much i s s t i l l unknown regarding the functioning or long term processes of wetlands, and how these environments change and react to i n t e r n a l and external s t i m u l i . Much less i s known about how to restore or create c e r t a i n wetland types and functions. Natural wetland environments are extremely complex, dynamic ecosystems representing thousands of years of geologic and hydrologic processes with resultant accumulations of s o i l p r o f i l e s and niches of plant and animal species. Most natural wetland 16 systems require a more or less continuous water supply, sediment balance, and p e r i o d i c f l o o d i n g or droughts to interrupt successional sequences. [According to Larson (1987) and Kusler (1990) e f f o r t s have been successful i n terms of replacing wetland f l o o d and sediment control functions, and manipulating vegetation, often by water l e v e l management, to produce productive w i l d l i f e habitatp However, evidence of performance for other functions i s rare and Kusler reports that functions dependent upon hydrology and s o i l s approximating the o r i g i n a l wetland system may take thousands of years to be restored, and c r i t i c a l habitat f o r endangered species may never return. Kusler also reports that, i n general, researchers have found that i t i s easier to restore c e r t a i n types of coas t a l and estuarine wetlands than inland freshwater wetlands such as p r a i r i e potholes because the hydrology of coastal and estuarine wetlands i s more e a s i l y determined and r e p l i c a t e d and f a r fewer plant species l i v e i n these areas. 2.2.3 Economic and S o c i a l Value The many diverse functions of wetland environments provide a v a r i e t y of goods and services valued by people. These goods and services are valued because they provide basic l i f e n e c e s s i t i e s and l i f e - e n r i c h i n g or amenity services (Leitch and Shabman 1988). The value of wetland goods and services to i n d i v i d u a l s and society can be economic or s o c i a l . Economic values are generally associated with monetary gains that accrue to i n d i v i d u a l s who u t i l i z e wetland products or services f o r p r o f i t . Commercial furbearer trapping, w i l d r i c e harvesting, and water supply for crops or l i v e s t o c k represent p o t e n t i a l sources of revenue from wetlands and thus have economic value. S o c i a l values deal 17 d i r e c t l y with the functioning of i n d i v i d u a l s or society and are associated with improving knowledge, s u r v i v a l , health, and l i f e s t y l e q u a l i t y (Usher and Scarth 1988). Brown and Manfredo (1987) i d e n t i f i e d four broad categories of s o c i a l values: c u l t u r a l , s o c i e t a l , psychological, and p h y s i o l o g i c a l . C u l t u r a l values focus on the ideas and thoughts that make up a c u l t u r e . S o c i e t a l values are those r e l a t i n g to s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among people such as family togetherness that might be fostered through shared p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n nature photography. Psychological values are r e l a t e d to the personal well being that one perceives from the object of value. For example, wetlands may be valued because studying them leads to learning more about the n a t u r a l world or knowing that wetlands e x i s t might provide s a t i s f a c t i o n regarding one's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to future generations. P h y s i o l o g i c a l values are r e l a t e d to improving health and functioning of the human body. Subsistence communities, f o r example, may value wetland environments for t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the communities' food requirements. As well, a value may be attached to wetlands because i n the pursuit of wetland r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s i t may be perceived that they are enhancing health through exercise and reduction of s t r e s s . Brown and Manfredo's broad categorization of s o c i a l values can be applied to the many functions provided by wetland environments. A r e s u l t \ of t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n i s a number of s p e c i f i c , diverse s o c i a l values associated with wetlands. As reported by Usher and Scarth (1988), i n d i v i d u a l s and society may value wetlands for the following: 1) • consumptive r e c r e a t i o n such as hunting; 2) non-consumptive recreation such as w i l d l i f e observation and camping; 3) aesthetics; 4) knowledge gained through education and research; 5) genetic d i v e r s i t y , and 6) environmental o 18 b e n e f i t s such as ground water recharge, and maintenance of water q u a l i t y . Rolston, III (1981) suggests that natural systems such as wetlands can also be valued for t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to l i f e support. The hydrologic and ecologic functions of wetlands contribute to environmental health and thus to the support of human l i f e . In addition, P h i l l i p s and Adamowicz (1986) indicate that there are s o c i a l values associated with the non-use of natural environments including option, existence and bequest values. Option values a r i s e from a desire to be able to use natural environments i n the future. Regardless of whether or not the option to use a wetland i s exercised, there i s a value to maintaining wetlands so that they w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f or future use. Existence values a r i s e from a desire to have natural environments continue to e x i s t regardless of use or option values. Well being may be enhanced by knowing that wetlands w i l l continue to e x i s t i n a given area apart from any desire to b e n e f i t personally from them now or i n the future. Bequest values a r i s e from the f a c t that people derive pleasure from the knowledge that a diverse and i r r e p l a c e a b l e natural environment w i l l be a v a i l a b l e for the enjoyment of future generations. Within our present system of resource a l l o c a t i o n , measurement of economic and s o c i a l values associated with wetlands i s needed i n order to improve tradeoff decisions between wetland retention versus conversion to other uses. The s c a r c i t y of natural resources and resource services makes i t impossible to s a t i s f y a l l of our needs and desires; thus, s o c i a l choices or tradeoffs must be made on how best to use the natural environment to improve s o c i a l w e ll being. Economic questions of resource use a l t e r n a t i v e s focus on comparing benefits and costs i n a common denominator that may be money or some other numeraire ( P h i l l i p s and Adamowicz 1986). The concept 19 of economic e f f i c i e n c y or Pareto optimality i s at the core of t h i s benefit-cost tradeoff a n a l y s i s . An a l l o c a t i o n of resources i s Pareto optimal i f i t i s impossible to better someone's condition without concurrently worsening another's, v i a r e a l l o c a t i o n . That i s , the resource a l l o c a t i o n renders the greatest net b e n e f i t to society (Davis and Kamien 1977) . To quantify the benefits and costs of wetland retention versus conversion to other uses, i t i s necessary to e x p l i c i t l y measure or quantify the economic and s o c i a l values of wetlands. Many resource goods and services are a l l o c a t e d through the market mechanism. Market p r i c e s represent measures of resource values and thus function as r a t i o n i n g devices f o r resource commodities. Market p r i c e s ensue from buying and s e l l i n g behavior of i n d i v i d u a l s and represent the worth of something to buyers and s e l l e r s at the margin- that i s , what the l a s t u n i t traded was worth to both buyer and s e l l e r . Economic values of wetlands such as commercial furbearing trapping have well-defined markets and thus are measured through d i r e c t l y observed market p r i c e s . However, many of the s o c i a l values of wetlands such as w i l d l i f e observation do not have defined markets and thus cannot be q u a n t i f i e d by the i n t e r a c t i o n of supply and demand forces i n a market (Leitch and Shabman 1988). Quantifying s o c i a l values f o r which no market prices e x i s t i s more commonly estimated by i n f e r r i n g what consumers would be w i l l i n g to pay for the resource goods or services or what consumers are w i l l i n g to accept as compensation to forgo the resource goods or services ( P h i l l i p s 1983). Foster (1978) and Power (1985) point out that measurement of the nonmarket s o c i a l values of wetlands can lead to much improved and supportable tradeoff decisions regarding wetland retention versus drainage. Valuation seeks to give e x p l i c i t expression to s o c i a l values which otherwise might be ignored or 20 misstated i n resource a l l o c a t i o n decisions because they are not commercial i n nature. Although willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) are commonly used economic tools to make resource a l l o c a t i o n decisions, authors have recognized t h e i r differences and l i m i t a t i o n s i n estimating s o c i a l values of wetlands. According to Knetsch (1980), a growing number of studies are consistent i n f i n d i n g that people require greater compensation to forego t h e i r freedom to use or to have access to a resource such as wetlands than they are w i l l i n g to pay to maintain the same r i g h t . P h i l l i p s (1983) suggests WTAC and WTP values can d i f f e r widely i f an a c t i v i t y such as duck hunting i s of s i g n i f i c a n t importance to an i n d i v i d u a l and takes a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of that i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i s c r e t i o n a r y income. Asking someone how much they are w i l l i n g to pay to hunt ducks depends, i n part, on what they can aff o r d . In contrast, when asking that same i n d i v i d u a l how much compensation they would accept to forego that a c t i v i t y , the income constraint i s removed. Regarding the l i m i t a t i o n s of WTP and WTAC, L e i t c h and Shabman (1988) argue that some s o c i a l values of wetlands, such as duck hunting, are amenable to i n d i r e c t v a l u a t i o n while others, such as landscape aesthetics, are much more speculative and d i f f i c u l t to quantify because such values are formed t o t a l l y outside the scope of the marketplace. According to Muller (1985), a conceptual l i m i t a t i o n of willingness to pay estimates i s imposed by the fundamental i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of wetland destruction. The willingness to pay f o r the preservation of wetlands w i l l l i k e l y increase over time due to the d e c l i n i n g supply of wetland environments coupled with the increasing demand for wetland goods and services as the population continues to grow and wetland functions become better understood. Consequently, today's 21 estimated q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of wetland values i s probably an underestimation of t h e i r future worth and thus i r r e v e r s i b l y r e a l l o c a t i n g wetland areas to development uses may eventually impose costs greater than the benefits obtained. Given the d e f i c i e n c i e s associated with quantifying wetland values and the r e s u l t a n t negative impact on wetland management, Turner (1988) suggests the "safe minimum standard of conservation" concept be adopted. This concept takes s o c i a l and natural uncertainty e x p l i c i t l y into account by avoiding i r r e v e r s i b i l i t i e s i n the loss of " c r i t i c a l zone resources" unless the s o c i a l costs of doing so are unacceptably high. For example, a safe minimum population of an endangered wetland species should be maintained unless costs are very large- "very large" being defined through considerations of intergenerational equity and other e t h i c a l concerns, and economic an a l y s i s . Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n measuring s o c i a l wetland values, Jaworski (1981) and Danielson and L e i t c h (1986) report that several attempts have been made to quantify i n monetary terms the s o c i a l value of wetlands i n addit i o n to quantifying t h e i r economic value through market p r i c e s . Measuring wetland values i n monetary terms provides the pu b l i c with a standard basis of comparison ( i . e . , d o l l a r values) f o r improved wetland a l l o c a t i o n decisions. As c i t e d by Jaworski, a study of wetlands i n the Great Lakes region of Canada involved c a l c u l a t i n g the gross annual income per acre of wetland generated from sport f i s h i n g , non-consumptive recreation, waterfowl hunting, furbearer trapping, and commercial f i s h i n g . The researchers estimated that wetlands generated a gross return of 470 d o l l a r s per acre per year. In addition, researchers determining the 30 year cost of repla c i n g various wetland functions estimated that the cost of 22 re p l a c i n g the nutri e n t removal functions of a wetland to be 34,000 d o l l a r s per acre (1980 d o l l a r s ) . As c i t e d by Danielson and Le i t c h , f l o o d control values of wetlands i n Massachusetts have been estimated to be as high as 80 d o l l a r s per acre per year, and t o t a l annual wetland s o c i a l values have been estimated to range from 20 d o l l a r s per acre i n New York to 4,070 d o l l a r s per acre i n Louisiana. In a d d i t i o n to research c i t e d by Jaworski and Danielson and Leitch, Jacquemot et a l . (1986), i n a study to examine the importance of w i l d l i f e to Canadians, estimated the net worth residents of the provinces placed on t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w i l d l i f e - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s during 1981. In Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, the t o t a l net worth of r e c r e a t i o n a l hunting of waterfowl i n wetland environments was estimated at 30.5 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . As well, the B r i t i s h Columbia M i n i s t r y of Environment, W i l d l i f e Branch (Renewable Resources Sub-Committee 1989) estimated that waterfowl hunters spent an average of 29 d o l l a r s per day and indic a t e d that they would be w i l l i n g to pay an a d d i t i o n a l 15.60 d o l l a r s f o r the experience. 2.2.4 I n t r i n s i c Value Economic and s o c i a l values of natural environments dominate the thinking of Western society because of the p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e that natural environments are only useful as a means to an end- whether as a means to s a t i s f y human s p i r i t u a l needs, material needs or basic l i f e n e c e s s i t i e s ( C a l l i c o t t 1987) . Ehrenfeld (1978) argues that those species and communities that are not known to be useful to us, that i s , lack an economic or s o c i a l value or demonstrated p o t e n t i a l value as natural resources, are considered worthless and thus tend to be ignored and eventually eliminated due to inadequate protection. This attit u d e towards 23 the natural world i s anthropocentric or human-centered and Is supported by the b e l i e f that humankind stands apart from nature i n a p o s i t i o n of s u p e r i o r i t y with dominion over a l l other forms of l i f e , and that nature e x i s t s only to provide us with the raw materials necessary f o r l i f e and a continuously expanding m a t e r i a l i s t i c l i f e s t y l e (Chant 1986) . From t h i s human-centered standpoint i t i s to humans and only to humans that a l l duties are ultim a t e l y owed. We may have r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s with regard to the natural ecosystems and b i o t i c communities of our planet, but these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are i n every case based on the contingent fa c t that our treatment of those ecosystems and communities of l i f e can further the r e a l i z a t i o n of human values and/or human r i g h t s . We have no o b l i g a t i o n to promote or protect the good of nonhuman l i v i n g things, independently of th i s contingent f a c t (Taylor 1981, pl98). Although economic and s o c i a l values are important to our society, they are not the only ones. A l l l i f e on earth can be valued i n t r i n s i c a l l y , that i s , as having value i n and of i t s e l f and not merely f o r u l t e r i o r human purposes or ends. I f something i s s a i d to have i n t r i n s i c value or inherent worth, i t i s understood that i t i s worthy of preservation and promotion as an end i n i t s e l f (Hanson 1986). Proponents of deep ecology (Devall and Sessions 1985) argue that l i v i n g e n t i t i e s have value i n themselves independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world f o r human purposes, and that humans have no r i g h t to reduce the richness and d i v e r s i t y of l i f e except to f u l f i l l v i t a l needs. This attitu d e towards the natural world i s based on the b e l i e f of b i o c e n t r i c equality. That i s , a l l organisms and e n t i t i e s on earth are equal i n i n t r i n s i c worth and have an equal r i g h t to l i v e and to reach t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l forms of unfolding and s e l f -r e a l i z a t i o n . Thus, humans are thought of as members of the Earth's community of l i f e and r e t a i n that membership on the same terms as apply to a l l nonhuman members. The concept of b i o c e n t r i c e q uality i s intimately 24 r e l a t e d to the b e l i e f that the t o t a l i t y of the earth's natural ecosystems or the biosphere forms an organic whole of f u n c t i o n a l l y interconnected elements, with the sound working of each part being dependent on the sound working of the others. Thus, the i n t e g r i t y of the biosphere i s e s s e n t i a l to the s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of l i f e on earth, and i f we harm the re s t of the natu r a l world then we are harming ourselves. Taylor (1981), argues f o r the adoption of an ultimate moral attitude of respect toward nature founded on the b e l i e f of b i o c e n t r i c equality. He f e e l s that acknowledging the inherent worth of l i v i n g e n t i t i e s i s a presupposition of our taking the attitude of respect toward them and accordingly understanding ourselves as bearing c e r t a i n moral obligations to protect or promote t h e i r good for t h e i r sake. As a consequence of adopting a moral a t t i t u d e of respect toward nature, Taylor contends that one makes a moral commitment to abide by a set of rules of conduct and to f u l f i l l c e r t a i n standards of good character that are to govern our treatment of the natural world. Leopold's (1949) b e l i e f i n b i o c e n t r i c equality i s expressed i n h i s urging f o r a land e t h i c based on e c o l o g i c a l consciousness. He states: A l l e t h i c s so f a r evolved r e s t upon a single premise: that the i n d i v i d u a l i s a member of a community of interdependent parts. His i n s t i n c t s prompt him to compete f or h i s place i n that community, but h i s ethics prompt him also to co-operate.... The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include s o i l s , water, plants, and animals, or c o l l e c t i v e l y : the land. In short, a land e t h i c changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to p l a i n member and c i t i z e n of i t . I t implies respect for hi s fellow-members, and also respect f o r the community as such (Leopold 1949, p203-204). In summary, the preceding discussion on the types of values that can be associated with wetland environments has shown that i n t r i n s i c value has very d i f f e r e n t underlying assumptions compared to economic and s o c i a l 25 values. Despite the differences, there need not be a c o n f l i c t or imbalance between "people" values (economic and s o c i a l ) and "earth" values ( i n t r i n s i c ) when making resource a l l o c a t i o n and management decisions. In the past, resource a l l o c a t i o n decisions have been predominantly based on economic and s o c i a l values with l i t t l e regard for the importance of the earth's natural ecosystems. We have developed l i t t l e value for the biosphere and as such, i t i s considered to be r e l a t i v e l y unimportant compared to the needs and wants of people. This focus on "people" values i n resource decisions has lead to environmental degradation (Rowe 1990). To address t h i s issue, there must be a conscientious consideration and weighing of "people" and "earth" values. The Ecosphere i s degenerating because of our p e o p l e - f i r s t a t t i t u d e , and a dual problem for environmental ethics i s how to elevate the importance of the Ecosphere while putting a damper on the overweening pride and self-aggrandizement that plague our species. To value the Earth more and to value people differently- not less but as an e s s e n t i a l c o l l a b o r a t i v e part of i t - seems necessary i f over-e x p l o i t a t i o n of the globe i s to be stopped. As long as the needs and wants of the people have f i r s t p r i o r i t y , we w i l l continue to pummel the second p r i o r i t y - the planet (Rowe 1990, pl41). The b i o c e n t r i c perspective i s not emphasized i n t h i s t h e s i s . Rather, conservation of the wetland resource i s discussed i n the context of Pareto op t i m a l i t y and the economic and s o c i a l benefits that accrue to the i n d i v i d u a l landowner and society. However, t h i s thesis does explore the a b i l i t y of nonregulatory mechanisms to s h i f t landowner attitudes towards a stewardship ethic that recognizes the i n t r i n s i c value of ecosystems and communities of l i f e . 26 2.2.5 Ensuring Sustainable Development The success of e f f o r t s to sustain economic and s o c i a l development u l t i m a t e l y depends on a healthy environment. In the 1980s i t has become c l e a r that human economic a c t i v i t y has s e r i o u s l y damaged the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of major ecosystems on every continent. To the extent that human populations are dependent on these ecosystems for e s s e n t i a l renewable resources and e c o l o g i c a l services, t h e i r future s e c u r i t y i s at r i s k (Rees 1988a, p i ) . Our Common Future. the report of the United Nations "World Commission on Environment and Development" (WCED 1987), addresses the growing tensions between environment and the economy, and endorses the concept of "sustainable development" as the only v i a b l e route to e c o l o g i c a l s t a b i l i t y (Rees 1988b). As ou t l i n e d by the WCED (1987), sustainable development i s a broad concept f o r s o c i a l and economic progress and change r e q u i r i n g that economic i n i t i a t i v e s be integrated with environmental constraints i n order to maintain or enhance the e c o l o g i c a l base so that i t may y i e l d the greatest b e n e f i t s to present generations while maintaining i t s p o t e n t i a l to meet the needs and aspirations of the generations that follow. Sustainable development requires that the e x p l o i t a t i o n of resources, the d i r e c t i o n of investments, the o r i e n t a t i o n of technological development, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l change respect e c o l o g i c a l boundaries to ensure the functional i n t e g r i t y of the environment i s not destroyed through o v e r e x p l o i t a t i o n and degradation. Rees (1988b) argues that sustainable development i s set apart from t r a d i t i o n a l development planning because i t e x p l i c i t l y recognizes our obligate dependency on a healthy biosphere. From the l i t e r a t u r e , Gardner (1988) summarizes the main p r i n c i p l e s required f o r achieving sustainable development, one of which i s the maintenance of e c o l o g i c a l i n t e g r i t y . This p r i n c i p l e encompasses the three 27 objectives of the World Conservation Strategy with regard to l i v i n g resource conservation: maintaining e s s e n t i a l e c o l o g i c a l processes and l i f e -support systems; preserving genetic d i v e r s i t y ; and ensuring the sustainable u t i l i z a t i o n of species and ecosystems. P o l l a r d and McKechnie (1976) outline the three objectives of the World Conservation Strategy and the r o l e of wetlands and wetland management i n supporting those objectives. By contributing to the maintenance of e c o l o g i c a l i n t e g r i t y , wetlands play a v i t a l r o l e i n ensuring sustainable development. (1) Maintaining e s s e n t i a l e c o l o g i c a l processes and l i f e support  systems - E s s e n t i a l e c o l o g i c a l processes create and maintain the l i v i n g components of the biosphere i n general, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y , sustain human endeavors to achieve economic and s o c i a l development. They include global processes a f f e c t i n g climate, and carbon, water and nutri e n t c y c l i n g , as well as more regional or l o c a l i z e d phenomena such as provided by wetland environments- f o r example, regulation of water flow, and maintenance of clean water. Because these e c o l o g i c a l processes are v i t a l to preserving l i f e , they are known as l i f e support systems. Hydrological and e c o l o g i c a l functions provided by wetlands are c r i t i c a l f o r maintaining c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l e c o l o g i c a l processes and l i f e -support systems. Hydrologically, wetlands moderate f l o o d peaks, help to co n t r o l erosion, enhance water qu a l i t y , and contribute to ground water recharge and discharge. The high primary production i n wetlands provides fo r a complex, dynamic ecosystem with a great d i v e r s i t y of f l o r a and fauna. (2) Preserving genetic d i v e r s i t y - Preservation of genetic v a r i a t i o n , both among and within species, has v i t a l ends. The health and s t a b i l i t y of 28 e s s e n t i a l e c o l o g i c a l processes and l i f e support systems, the breeding programmes necessary to maintain and improve crops, l i v e s t o c k , timber, and aquatic l i f e , as well as much s c i e n t i f i c and medical advances, te c h n i c a l innovation, and the se c u r i t y of the many industries that r e l y on natural resources are dependent upon the preservation of genetic d i v e r s i t y . Wetlands contribute to genetic d i v e r s i t y by supporting diverse communities of plants, waterfowl, mammals, and invertebrates. As well, they provide c r i t i c a l h abitat for many rare and endangered species. (3) Sustainable u t i l i z a t i o n of species and ecosystems - that i s , managing the use of l i v i n g resources so that they l a s t i n d e f i n i t e l y . I f a species i s overharvested or an ecosystem overly degraded, a point w i l l be reached when the species i s so depleted or the ecosystem so degraded that i t s value to humans w i l l be severely reduced or l o s t . Conservation and prudent management of wetlands w i l l ensure present and future generations w i l l b e n e f i t from the many hy d r o l o g i c a l , e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l functions they provide. 2.3 A g r i c u l t u r a l Impacts on P r a i r i e Potholes The p r a i r i e pothole region has been severely impacted by a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n . Over the l a s t century, the loss and degradation of wetlands i n a l l parts of the pothole region has been progressive and severe, and i s accelerating. Larger, r e a d i l y drainable wetlands were o r i g i n a l l y reclaimed for ag r i c u l t u r e because they were viewed as p o t e n t i a l l y productive farmland. More recently, a g r i c u l t u r a l incentives provided by government, coupled with economic pressures brought on by high i n t e r e s t rates and low commodity p r i c e s , have forced farmers to press every 29 a v a i l a b l e acre into production, including marginal farmlands, thereby e l i m i n a t i n g and degrading wetland basins and margins (Lynch-Stewart 1983). This wide-spread assault on wetlands has e c o l o g i c a l implications and has been c i t e d as a major fa c t o r i n the diminishing annual production of waterfowl. 2.3.1 Transformation of the Rural Landscape H i s t o r i c a l l y , a g r i c u l t u r a l reclamation has been the major force behind wetland decline i n the pothole region. The demand for increased a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion was formerly met by breaking large t r a c t s of new land. As the supply of sui t a b l e new lands decreased, producers endeavored to increase production through i n t e n s i f y i n g operations on e x i s t i n g holdings inc l u d i n g the drainage and c u l t i v a t i o n of wetlands. Prolonged periods of drought- a common and i n t e g r a l part of the p r a i r i e environment- encouraged the conversion of wetlands to a g r i c u l t u r a l uses by exposing p o t e n t i a l l y arable dry basins. Draining, f i l l i n g and c u l t i v a t i n g wetlands has resulted i n widespread and s i g n i f i c a n t cumulative losses of the wetland resource base (Turner et a l . 1987). I t i s estimated that from settlement to 1976, 1.2 m i l l i o n hectares or 40 percent of o r i g i n a l p r a i r i e wetlands were l o s t to a g r i c u l t u r a l uses. Numerous s i t e - s p e c i f i c studies i n Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba in d i c a t e that wetland losses range from 9 to 71 percent of the o r i g i n a l wetland area. In Alberta's parkland region, only 39 percent of the o r i g i n a l p r e - s e t t l e d wetlands remained by 1970. In the Minnedosa region of southwestern Manitoba, t o t a l wetland area declined 57 percent during the period 1929-1974 with a further 33 percent loss from 1974 through to 1982. 30 This suggests losses i n the Minnedosa region are progressively increasing with time (Lynch-Stewart 1983 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988). As reported by Turner et a l . (1987), studies documenting annual drainage rates i n P r a i r i e Canada are uncommon. A f i v e year study showed approximately 1 percent average annual drainage rates at selected s i t e s i n the pothole region. Annual drainage rates of 1 to 5 percent have been observed i n the north-central United States. The authors of the study caution that although observed drainage rates are low, the continuing loss i s a serious problem when viewed i n the context that only 60 percent of o r i g i n a l p r a i r i e wetlands remain, and that destruction of many wetland functions i s i r r e v e r s i b l e . 2.3.2 Deteriorating Wetland Quality In a d d i t i o n to the loss of wetlands through drainage, the q u a l i t y of remaining wetlands i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g due to secondary and t r a n s i t o r y impacts from farming p r a c t i c e s . Schmitt (1985) and the Canadian W i l d l i f e Service (1986) report that the impact of drainage and/or intensive a g r i c u l t u r e i s seldom confined to the immediate area. As a r e s u l t of secondary impacts from extensive c u l t i v a t i o n and drainage, remaining wetlands are being degraded through s i l t a t i o n , increased t u r b i d i t y , flooding, and chemical contamination. A study to monitor t r a n s i t o r y a g r i c u l t u r a l impacts on selected p r a i r i e wetland areas was put i n place i n 1981 by Turner et a l . (1987) . Trans i t o r y impacts include haying, burning, c l e a r i n g , grazing and c u l t i v a t i n g of wetland margins and dry or p a r t i a l l y dry basins. Over a f i v e year period r e s u l t s showed that an average of 54.5 percent of the basins and 79.2 percent of the margins were degraded through t r a n s i t o r y impacts and that t h e i r occurrence increased over time. The authors suggest 31 that the wetland resource would restore n a t u r a l l y from these impacts i f not disturbed on an annual basis; however, i f t r a n s i t o r y impacts are i n f l i c t e d annually they are tantamount to being permanent. Not a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l production c o n f l i c t s with the conservation of wetland environments. There are many a g r i c u l t u r a l management pra c t i c e s that are compatible with maintaining wetland basins, margins and surrounding uplands. I f land within the v a c i n i t y of wetlands i s i n a pasture s i t u a t i o n , l i v e s t o c k grazing systems such as supplemental f a l l -seeding which provides l a t e f a l l and early spring grazing and r o t a t i o n a l grazing i n v o l v i n g cross fencing of pastures into several paddocks better maintains margins and uplands versus a continuous grazing system. I f i n hay cover, delayed haying i s recommended u n t i l J u l y 15 to allow the completion of waterfowl nesting cycles. Perennial cover i n wetland margins and uplands can also be more i n t e n s i v e l y managed for both a g r i c u l t u r a l and w i l d l i f e h a b i t a t purposes. A grass-legume mixture i s planted providing a dense nesting cover for waterfowl and per i o d i c grazing or haying for rejuvenation purposes. Land managed for dense nesting cover may be fenced to discourage predators (Alberta Habitat J o i n t Venture Technical Committee 1989 and P r a i r i e Habitat J o i n t Venture Advisory Board 1990). 2.3.3 Waterfowl Decline Widespread loss and degradation of p r a i r i e wetlands i s a major factor i n the diminishing annual production of waterfowl. The decline of migratory waterfowl i n the p r a i r i e s has been extensively documented due to t h e i r prominence and economic importance as game b i r d s . Other ra m i f i c a t i o n s of wetland drainage are not r e a d i l y measured or have been overshadowed i n the p r a i r i e wetland l i t e r a t u r e due to an emphasis on loss 32 of waterfowl h a b i t a t (Lynch-Stewart 1983 and National Wetlands Working Group 1988) . P r a i r i e drought i s the c y c l i c a l generator of waterfowl p r o d u c t i v i t y -low water l e v e l s r e s t r i c t nesting e f f o r t and reduce brood s u r v i v a l with subsequent wet years producing large numbers of ducklings. The drought of the e a r l y 1960s saw d r a s t i c reductions i n duck numbers. More than two decades of improved, often wet conditions should have stimulated a resurgence i n duck populations; however, several key species such as the Northern P i n t a i l and the Mallard have shown dis t u r b i n g declines (Cowan 1988). The growth of the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry and i n t e n s i f i e d land use has p a r a l l e l e d d e c l i n i n g duck populations. A g r i c u l t u r a l development of the p r a i r i e s has interrupted the natural r e l a t i o n s h i p s that have evolved between migratory waterfowl and t h e i r environment. Loss and degradation of wetlands and wetland margins have concentrated waterfowl and t h e i r predators i n remaining patches of suitable habitat or forced nesting i n sub-optimal areas where predation i s high. As a r e s u l t , over much of the p r a i r i e pothole region, nesting success i s inadequate to maintain or b u i l d c e r t a i n waterfowl populations even i n years of favorable water conditions (Canadian W i l d l i f e Service 1986 and Brace and Pepper 1984). P r i o r to widespread degradation of wetland margins, 40 percent of Mallards s u c c e s s f u l l y reared broods. Currently, nest success rates across the pothole region are less than 15 percent, the minimum l e v e l necessary for s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g Mallard populations. The continuing loss and degradation of wetland habitat coupled with the drought of the mid to l a t e 1980s has severely impacted duck populations. In 1988, the Mallard breeding population on the p r a i r i e s was only 1.7 m i l l i o n breeding b i r d s - a decrease 33 of 50 percent from the 1955-87 long-term breeding averages. Northern P i n t a i l numbers i n the same year were 365,000, down 85 percent (Hochbaum et a l . 1988). There have been arguments that hunter harvest i s the cause of the duck decline. However, Ducks Unlimited (1989) maintain that evidence from years of banding does not support t h i s contention. Public and private sector b i o l o g i s t s agree that the d e c l i n i n g p r a i r i e - n e s t i n g waterfowl species i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to inadequate production of fledged ducklings. Maintenance of q u a l i t y wetland basins and margins are required to boost recruitments and r e b u i l d duck populations on a broad scale. 2.3 . 4 Disruption of the P r a i r i e ' s E c o l o g i c a l Balance The Manitoba Departments of A g r i c u l t u r e and Natural Resources (1985), Cowan (1988) and National Wetlands Working Group (1988) have noted that the trend towards wide-spread eradication of wetlands i s threatening the health of the p r a i r i e ecosystem. Salt accumulation i n the s o i l may increase as farmers remove wetlands and/or upland margins. With extensive wetland drainage, runoff water with i t s load of s i l t , f e r t i l i z e r s , and a g r i c u l t u r a l chemicals eventually accumulates i n streams. The loss of the wetlands water storage capacity increases the p o t e n t i a l for flooding downstream. Water f i l t r a t i o n plants may be needed along streams to replace the natural f i l t r a t i o n process of drained wetlands. When the climax vegetation native to pothole environments i s disturbed, i t i s frequently replaced by t y p i c a l e a r ly-successional weed species which can become well established during periods when t y p i c a l weed control measures cannot be c a r r i e d out. 34 2.4 Causes of Wetland Drainage Socio-economic constraints at the landowner and s o c i e t a l l e v e l as well as constraints within our current i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements play a major r o l e i n the continuing loss of wetlands i n the p r a i r i e pothole region. 2.4.1 Socio-Economic Considerations 1) I n d i v i d u a l landowner - The economic and s o c i a l values of p r a i r i e wetlands p r i m a r i l y accrue to the general public rather than to i n d i v i d u a l landowners. Most p r a i r i e potholes are found on p r i v a t e land, the majority of which i s operated by farmers and ranchers. Individual landowners attempting to maximize returns to ownership of a g r i c u l t u r a l land cannot capture payment for most of the benefits provided by natural wetlands. They have no way of s e l l i n g f l o o d c o n t r o l , water q u a l i t y enhancement, landscape aesthetics, or most of the non-market s o c i a l values of wetlands. As a r e s u l t , the landowner decision regarding wetland drainage versus re t e n t i o n u s u a l l y gives consideration to only private benefits and costs and excludes the benefits and costs to society (Jaworski 1981 and L e i t c h 1988). This wealth-maximizing decision framework, as argued by P h i l l i p s and Veeman (1987), tends to favor the conversion of wetlands to uses which provide p r i v a t e market returns with the r e s u l t being that the quantity of wetlands drained may not be i n the best i n t e r e s t s of society. Because of the predominant s o c i e t a l benefits of wetland environments, the s e l f -i n t e r e s t d e c i s i o n of the landowner to drain wetlands has implications beyond the boundary of the farm. The costs of contending with or c o r r e c t i n g the loss of economic and s o c i a l values associated with wetlands 35 are borne by soc i e t y rather than the i n d i v i d u a l landowners. Such external costs or e x t e r n a l i t i e s , unless taken into account i n the drainage decision of the landowner, w i l l l i k e l y lead to r e s u l t s inconsistent with the i n t e r e s t s of society. An excessive amount of drainage may occur r e s u l t i n g i n a less than optimal amount of wetland preservation from society's view. As w e l l , landowners may manage t h e i r land, including wetland drainage, such that the i n t e r e s t s of future landowners (future generations) are not taken into account. In such circumstances, s o c i e t a l goals of intergenerational equity are not met. When examining ben e f i t - c o s t tradeoffs of wetland retention from a broad perspective, the optimal amount of wetland retention which renders the greatest net b e n e f i t to society has a negative impact on landowners i n general. P h i l l i p s and Adamowicz (1986) point out that the concept of Pareto optimality i s not concerned with who gains and who loses from changes i n resource use patterns. That i s , i t does not address the equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of costs and benefits among i n d i v i d u a l s and groups of i n d i v i d u a l s i n society. For example, the expansion of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base into forested areas may r e s u l t i n economic and s o c i a l losses to outdoor r e c r e a t i o n i s t s , f o r e s t r y i n t e r e s t s and others. However, the gains elsewhere i n soc i e t y from the a l t e r n a t i v e use may more than o f f s e t the losses to these groups i n society and therefore j u s t i f y the change on e f f i c i e n c y grounds. Although pr i v a t e landowner decisions to convert p r a i r i e potholes to a g r i c u l t u r e uses may not be i n the best i n t e r e s t s of society, i n general, i t has been a r a t i o n a l economic decision by farmers. L e i t c h (1983), Desjardins et a l . (1984), and Baltezore et a l . (1987) have demonstrated that when landowners are not made l i a b l e f or off-farm and m i t i g a t i o n costs, 36 drainage of wetlands i s f i n a n c i a l l y f e a s i b l e . By draining wetlands, landowners can capture some of the benefits of the wetland resource through increased crop production and decreased avoidance costs of having to farm around obstacles. Drainage i s often the l e a s t c o s t l y avenue f or expanding t o t a l arable acreage when the a l t e r n a t i v e i s purchase of new land at high land costs. The e f f i c i e n c y of f i e l d operations i s decreased by the presence of wetlands and i s r e f l e c t e d i n avoidance costs such as overlapping operations and extra time spent i n the f i e l d . Aside from the monetary ben e f i t s of wetland drainage there are also several nonmonetary bene f i t s such as the s a t i s f a c t i o n of clean f i e l d s and uniform moisture conditions throughout the f i e l d (Leitch 1988 and Danielson and Le i t c h 1986) . 2) Society - Early p u b l i c p o l i c y towards wetland environments favored drainage by landowners. Wetlands have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been considered wastelands with l i t t l e economic or s o c i a l value. As a r e s u l t , l i t t l e i n t e r e s t and study of wetland environments l e d to a fundamental lack of understanding about wetland functions and the importance and extent of these functions. This lack of understanding extended to v i r t u a l l y a l l resource sectors, l e g i s l a t o r s , economists, the s c i e n t i f i c community, and the general p u b l i c and resu l t e d i n laws and programs repeatedly enacted to encourage the conversion of wetlands to other uses (Usher and Scarth 1988) . The Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s and Environment Canada (1987) contend that a lack of understanding extends to the present due to the diverse nature of wetland functions not being r e a d i l y understood, the i n a b i l i t y to measure many wetland values within our present system of resource a l l o c a t i o n , and a shortage of education dir e c t e d towards the general p u b l i c , d e c i s i o n makers and landowners regarding the benefits of wetlands 37 and the consequences of continuing wetland l o s s . Wallace and'Lane (1988) suggest that these shortcomings, coupled with the immediate economic benefits r e a d i l y c a l c u l a t e d and r e a l i z e d from a g r i c u l t u r a l production, have r e s u l t e d i n pu b l i c i n d i f f e r e n c e to the loss and degradation of wetlands. There has not been a w e l l - d i r e c t e d e f f o r t by society to become involved i n i n d i v i d u a l resource management decisions p e r t a i n i n g to wetland retention. Therefore, drainage decisions are commonly l e f t almost e x c l u s i v e l y up to the i n d i v i d u a l landowner with l i t t l e government intervention through p o l i c i e s and programs. 2.4.2 I n s t i t u t i o n a l Considerations J u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over wetlands i n Canada i s spread among fed e r a l , p r o v i n c i a l , and municipal governments, and among d i f f e r e n t government departments and agencies. None of the many government departments and agencies at any one l e v e l i s completely responsible for wetlands management and conservation. Although l i m i t e d e f f o r t s have been made, inadequate coordination and communication among those holding j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has been cause f o r a lack of u n i f i e d and long-term wetland management planning and a lack of accepted p r i n c i p l e s regarding wetland uses and values. As a r e s u l t , i n i t i a t i v e s to enhance or protect wetland environments have tended to be sporadic, reactive and uncoordinated (Wallace and Lane 1988). Non-government organizations, i n recommending wetlands conservation p o l i c y i n Canada (Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s and Environment Canada 1987), suggested that the need i s not fo r one bureau to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over wetlands. Rather, the need i s to stress b e t t e r communications and consistent, enforced p o l i c y that i s adopted by a l l government agencies. Scace and Associates Ltd. (1989) point 38 out that i t was only i n the l a t e 1980s that the fed e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments began developing consistent and integrated wetland p o l i c y . For example, the Alb e r t a Water Resources Commission, i n conjunction with four other p r o v i n c i a l departments with d i r e c t involvement i n wetland management, i n i t i a t e d studies i n 1988 towards the development of an Alberta wetlands p o l i c y . Aside from coordination and communication problems within current l e g i s l a t i v e regimes, Wallace and Lane (1988) contend that d i f f e r i n g l e g i s l a t i v e mandates and i n t e r e s t s among the p r o v i n c i a l and fed e r a l agencies pose problems of c o n f l i c t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , p o l i c i e s and programs. Federal and p r o v i n c i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l departments have numerous p o l i c i e s and incentive programs for the development and expansion of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands which may s e r i o u s l y jeopardize wetlands. In contrast, w i l d l i f e i n t e r e s t s may be attempting to conserve, protect or expand j u s t such wetland areas through t h e i r own p o l i c i e s , programs and l e g i s l a t i o n . Major government p o l i c i e s or programs promoting a g r i c u l t u r e expansion and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n through income and property tax incentives, low i n t e r e s t loans, drainage and transportation subsidies, and so on are often strong f i n a n c i a l inducements to landowners to c u l t i v a t e wetland basins and margins. Unfortunately, such p o l i c i e s or programs usually do not consider the "secondary" impacts that a f f e c t wetlands or the p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t with i n i t i a t i v e s to promote wetland retention on pr i v a t e lands. Assessing the true magnitude of l e g i s l a t i v e c o n f l i c t s can be d i f f i c u l t because they can emanate from d i f f u s e and subtle o r i g i n s . For example, a low i n t e r e s t loan subsidy f o r land purchase and development may d i r e c t l y accelerate the conversion of wetland basins and/or margins to a g r i c u l t u r a l land considered marginal for crop production. 39 As an example of current l e g i s l a t i v e c o n f l i c t s which hamper wetland conservation and management e f f o r t s , Appendix I provides an overview of both fe d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n with p o t e n t i a l impacts on wetlands i n A lberta. The majority of the l e g i s l a t i o n has eit h e r a negative or p o s i t i v e impact on wetland environments; some pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n have both p o s i t i v e and negative impacts. 2.5 Summary In t h i s chapter, arguments have been presented that j u s t i f y the conservation of wetlands. Wetlands were i d e n t i f i e d as providing h y d r o l o g i c a l , e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l functions, many of which are i r r e v e r s i b l e once the wetland i s destroyed. These functions have associated economic, s o c i a l and i n t r i n s i c value, and play a r o l e i n achieving sustainable development. This r a t i o n a l e for wetland conservation gives support to the need for t h i s study of wetland r e t e n t i o n i n the p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada. The agriculture-wetland interface on private landholdings i n the p r a i r i e pothole region has been delineated as the context within which the issue of wetland retention w i l l be studied. The causes and e f f e c t s of wetland drainage and degradation have been discussed i n t h i s context. Socio-economic constraints at the landowner and s o c i e t a l l e v e l and constraints within current i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements have been recognized as the cause of wetland drainage and degradation. Private landowners cannot capture the benefits provided by wetlands and there i s public i n d i f f e r e n c e to wetlands losses due to a poor understanding of t h e i r functions, the i n a b i l i t y to account for many wetland values i n our current system of resource a l l o c a t i o n , and e a s i l y r e a l i z e d monetary benefits from 40 a g r i c u l t u r a l production. As well, there are coordination and communication problems wit h i n our current l e g i s l a t i v e regimes responsible f o r wetland management, and c o n f l i c t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , p o l i c i e s and programs among fed e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l agencies have negative consequences f o r wetland conservation and management. The resultant impacts on wetlands of these socio-economic and i n s t i t u t i o n a l problems are: 1) destruction of wetlands across the p r a i r i e pothole region, 2) d e t e r i o r a t i n g wetland q u a l i t y , 3) waterfowl decline, and 4) di s r u p t i o n of the p r a i r i e ' s e c o l o g i c a l balance. In the next chapter, regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms for encouraging the stewardship of wetlands on private lands w i l l be examined. This w i l l e s t a b l i s h the groundwork f or the following section on promoting pri v a t e stewardship through nonregulatory to o l s . 41 I I I . POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR WETLAND RETENTION 3.1 Introduction Central to the p o l i c y goal of encouraging pr i v a t e landowner stewardship of wetlands on the p r a i r i e s i s the expectation that society w i l l be better o f f with implementation of wetland conservation measures than without such implementation. There are a number of p o l i c y instruments that may be used to encourage wetland conservation. This chapter explores the wetlands issue from two d i f f e r e n t general p o l i c y instrument perspectives- regulatory and nonregulatory. A broad overview of the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms for promoting stewardship of wetland environments on private landholdings i s presented. In order to provide t h i s overview, i t i s necessary to f i r s t consider the concepts of landownership and property r i g h t s . 3.2 Landownership and Property Rights Landownership refe r s to the l e g a l i n t e r e s t i n a parcel of land, that i s , the r i g h t s i n the property which the law w i l l recognize and protect (Hamilton and Baxter 1977). Thus, ownership consists of l e g a l l y defined user r i g h t s to an asset such as the r i g h t to use your property i n c e r t a i n ways, the r i g h t to prevent others from using the property, except with your permission and on your terms, and the r i g h t to s e l l your ownership r i g h t s to someone e l s e . The f a c t that c e r t a i n uses are r e s t r i c t e d by the state does not diminish the content of ownership, that i s , the many ri g h t s that define ownership remain i n t a c t (Dales 1977 and Bromley 1982) . A discu s s i o n of p o l i c y instruments with regard to encouraging private landowners to r e t a i n wetlands requires a c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of wetland 42 ownership and associated user r i g h t s . In Alberta, f o r example, the ownership of non-permanent wetlands i s an issue. L e g i s l a t i o n provides that the Crown i s the owner of the beds and shores of a l l "permanent" wetlands. A j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n 1983 has been accepted to mean that only those wetlands that have never been dry i n recorded h i s t o r y are owned by the Crown. Most p r a i r i e wetlands are not permanent by t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and as a r e s u l t , landholders are claiming ownership of the beds and shores of so-c a l l e d non-permanent wetlands. Given a more l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of permanence, widespread claims of Crown ownership would s t i l l be u n l i k e l y . The Crown would become the owner of many small, widely scattered wetlands and thus assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for weed con t r o l , access and l i a b i l i t y , i n e v i t a b l y c r e a t i n g management and funding problems. As well, i t would be perceived that the government was taking land away from the i n d i v i d u a l , l i k e l y c r e a t i n g animosity among landowners (Alberta Water Resources Commission 1989). For purposes of t h i s thesis, i t i s assumed that ownership of the beds and shores of wetlands, regardless of permanency, l i e s with the i n d i v i d u a l landowner. 3.3 Regulatory Mechanisms This s e c t i o n begins by examining the concepts of p o l i c e power and compliance. A discussion on how regulatory tools can be used to promote pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands i s then presented and i s followed by an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of using t h i s approach to encourage stewardship. 4 3 3.3.1 Po l i c e Power and Compliance Pol i c e power i s the power of government to regulate the behavior of in d i v i d u a l s i n society i n order to protect the pub l i c welfare, health, safety and morals (Randall 1981). In developing a d e f i n i t i o n of regulation that sets i t apart from other p o l i c y instruments of government, P r i e s t et a l . (1980) argue that regulations operate through command and con t r o l . They require that c e r t a i n behavior (actions or conduct) takes place, such as meeting established performance standards, or they p r o h i b i t c e r t a i n behavior. A p o l i c y t o o l delivered through pure command r e l i e s on penalties to enforce the government's w i l l . That i s , compliance i s monitored and noncompliance i s punished. Inherent i n the concept of commands backed by penalties i s the narrowing of choice. While other p o l i c y instruments a f f e c t a l t e r n a t i v e s and may reduce the number of a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e to an i n d i v i d u a l , the narrowing of c e r t a i n choices i s a primary purpose of regulation. A command i n the form of a p r o h i b i t i o n w i l l eliminate the pro h i b i t e d a c t i v i t y from the set of choices a v a i l a b l e to an i n d i v i d u a l . Consequently, P r i e s t et a l . define regulation as: ...the imposition of rules by government, backed by the use of pena l t i e s , that are intended s p e c i f i c a l l y to modify the economic behavior of i n d i v i d u a l s and firms i n the private sector ( P r i e s t et a l . 1980, plO). The performance of a regulatory system can be measured by the degree of enforcement. Thus, compliance r e l a t i o n s can be a c e n t r a l element of a regulatory system ( P r i e s t et a l . 1980). Rosenbaum (1978) argues that voluntary compliance based upon public acceptance and support i s a f a r stronger foundation upon which to b u i l d a regulatory system than forced compliance based upon the e f f e c t of stringent enforcement a c t i v i t i e s . E t z i o n i (1961, pxv) defines compliance as "... a r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n s i s t i n g 4 4 of the power employed by superiors to con t r o l subordinates and the o r i e n t a t i o n of the subordinates to t h i s power". E t z i o n i argues that those i n power po s i t i o n s manipulate means which they command i n such a manner that subordinates, or those with less power, f i n d following the command rewarding, while not following i t incurs deprivations. The means employed to make subordinates comply can be ph y s i c a l , material, or symbolic and define three major sources of control or power: 1) coercive power based on the a p p l i c a t i o n or the threat of a p p l i c a t i o n of p h y s i c a l sanctions such as r e s t r i c t i o n of movement, 2) remunerative power based on con t r o l over material resources and rewards, and 3) normative power such as the a l l o c a t i o n and manipulation of symbolic rewards, esteem and prestige symbols. The o r i e n t a t i o n of the subordinate to power can be characterized as p o s i t i v e (commitment) or negative ( a l i e n a t i o n ) . Commitment or a l i e n a t i o n i s determined by the degree to which the power applied i s considered legitimate by the subordinate, and by how the power corresponds to the l i n e of a c t i o n the subordinate desires. A l i e n a t i o n i s produced not only by i l l e g i t i m a t e exercise of power, but also by power which f r u s t r a t e s needs, wishes, desires. Commitment i s generated not merely by d i r e c t i v e s which are considered legitimate but also by those which are i n l i n e with i n t e r n a l i z e d needs of the subordinate ( E t z i o n i 1961, pl5-16). E t z i o n i suggests that normative power i s most l i k e l y to be considered legitimate followed by remunerative power; coercive power i s l e a s t l i k e l y to be recognized as legitimate. 3.3.2 Regulation and Wetland Retention Po l i c e power regulation provides a mechanism whereby society, e x e r c i s i n g influence through a l l l e v e l s of government, may seek to control 45 the uses landowners make of t h e i r property through coercive power (Randall 1981) . Because of the benefits to society of wetland r e t e n t i o n and e x t e r n a l i t i e s associated with wetland drainage, society may wish to assert a "public i n t e r e s t " by pla c i n g p r o h i b i t i o n s or r e s t r i c t i o n s on the landholder's r i g h t to drain. By i n t e r f e r i n g with the r i g h t s of landowners to use and manage t h e i r property, society would then govern the decision to drain or r e t a i n wetlands based on s o c i e t a l demand. This would ensure that those wetlands deemed valuable to society would be preserved (Alberta Water Resources Commission 1989) . P r o h i b i t i o n and the imposition of performance standards i s t y p i c a l of environmental regulation which attempts to r e s t r i c t actions which could p o t e n t i a l l y harm resources of b e n e f i t to society. Environmental re g u l a t i o n includes areas such as the co n t r o l of a i r and water p o l l u t i o n , land use regulation, and the environmental management aspects of resource development (Economic Council of Canada 1979). Regulating wetlands can be accomplished through a v a r i e t y of approaches. With regard to regulating s e n s i t i v e areas such as wetland environments, Kusler (1980) notes that two regulatory approaches could be commonly used- statutes authorizing d i r e c t p r o v i n c i a l regulatory control of land uses, and zoning which i s a l o c a l regulatory technique. Zoning includes r e s t r i c t i n g the types of uses permitted i n p a r t i c u l a r areas such as the p r o h i b i t i o n of f i l l s i n wetlands. I t also includes performance standard provisions which define the maximum permissible impact of s p e c i f i c uses on resources such as removal of vegetation, a l t e r a t i o n of natural drainage, and so f o r t h . Performance standards are commonly applied through s p e c i a l permit requirements. To obtain a permit, the applicant must prove that use impacts w i l l not exceed allowable l e v e l s . 4 6 3.3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Regulatory Mechanisms The advantages and disadvantages associated with using regulatory mechanisms to encourage pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands are, i n part, dependent upon how receptive landowners and the general public are to the use of coercive power to protect wetlands. Recent p u b l i c workshops across Canada and i n A l b e r t a regarding environmental p r o t e c t i o n indicate that Canadians are not receptive to regulatory mechanisms which i n t e r f e r e with the use and management of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s property. Public consultations, for development of the Canadian Government's environmental action plan- The Green Plan- r e s u l t e d i n a set of recommendations for wetland preservation that emphasized the use of private landowner education and incentives rather than the use of regulatory mechanisms (Government of Canada 1990). These same recommendations were common during the A l b e r t a Water Resources Commission's p u b l i c meetings held throughout Alberta i n l a t e 1990 to discuss a d r a f t p o l i c y for the management of wetlands i n the s e t t l e d area of A l b e r t a ( F u l l e n 1991). This poor receptiveness of Canadians towards interference with i n d i v i d u a l property r i g h t s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the recently implemented National S o i l Conservation Program which i s a cost-shared f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l program to promote s o i l conservation. Rather than using regulations to encourage stewardship of the s o i l resource, t h i s program emphasizes the use of landowner awareness and f i n a n c i a l incentives ( F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l A g r i c u l t u r e Committee on Environmental S u s t a i n a b i l i t y 1990) . Given the negative a t t i t u d e towards infringement of p r i v a t e property r i g h t s , the use of regulatory mechanisms to promote pri v a t e stewardship of wetlands i s perceived by landholders and the general p u b l i c as having few advantages, most of which accrue to society, and many disadvantages, most 47 of which accrue to the i n d i v i d u a l property owner. The following discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory mechanisms i n encouraging p r i v a t e stewardship r e f l e c t s the poor s o c i e t a l receptiveness towards t h i s p o l i c y instrument. With regard to the advantages of regulatory mechanisms, Kusler (1980) s p e c i f i c a l l y notes that regulation has s u c c e s s f u l l y protected wetlands through use r e s t r i c t i o n s and performance standards. Kusler also notes that r e g u l a t i o n can promote and meet broader l o c a l , p r o v i n c i a l and national economic, s o c i a l and environmental goals by r e q u i r i n g that land uses be consistent with broader land and water management e f f o r t s . The Economic Council of Canada (1979) argues i n favor of regulation as a p o t e n t i a l l y successful mechanism for increasing e f f i c i e n c y i n the use of scarce resources and t h e i r a l l o c a t i o n i n accordance with market demands. Thus, re g u l a t i o n may be successful i n attempting to achieve the Pareto optimal amount of wetland retention which renders the greatest net b e n e f i t to society. With regard to the disadvantages associated with regulation of land use, the A l b e r t a Water Resources Commission (1989) suggest there i s a p o l i t i c a l cost to i n t e r f e r i n g with an i n d i v i d u a l ' s property r i g h t s . Direct p u b l i c interference i n landowner decisions regarding use and management of t h e i r land base may not be considered a legitimate exercise of power and thus compliance may have to be strongly enforced. Baumol and Oates (1979) contend that a l i e n a t i o n towards a regulation and the resultant forced compliance through stringent enforcement may lead to a regulatory process that i s not c e r t a i n and automatic and thus lacks r e l i a b i l i t y i n achieving objectives. For example, v i o l a t o r s of a regulation must f i r s t be caught i n the act and then must be prosecuted, found g u i l t y , and given a s u b s t a n t i a l 48 penalty. I f any of these steps f a i l , the v i o l a t o r s get o f f v i r t u a l l y free despite t h e i r disregard for the law. In addition, landowner a l i e n a t i o n may r e s u l t i n high monitoring and enforcement costs thereby reducing the cost e f f i c i e n c y of regulatory mechanisms. Regardless of p o t e n t i a l s o c i e t a l health and welfare benefits from environmental p o l i c y , i f the costs of the p o l i c y mechanism are exceedingly high then s o c i e t a l and p o l i t i c a l acceptance i s much more d i f f i c u l t to achieve. Randall (1981) points out that, i f supported, p o l i c e power can provide government with a r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive method of c o n t r o l l i n g the uses made of p r i v a t e l y owned property. Further, interference with property r i g h t s to protect wetlands may have equity consequences which increase the p o l i t i c a l cost of regulatory t o o l s . Randall (1981) argues that p o l i c e power regulation of land use may s i g n i f i c a n t l y influence a property owner's prospects of income and wealth. In Canada, the government i s not required to pay compensation to a landowner whose use of a property and associated economic opportunities i s reduced as a r e s u l t of regulation (Hamilton and Baxter 1977). Therefore, a regulatory mechanism, by i t s nature, may r e d i s t r i b u t e wealth- increasing economic opportunities for some i n d i v i d u a l s while decreasing them for others. The A l b e r t a Water Resources Commission (1989) supports t h i s argument by p o i n t i n g out that i n the case of wetland retention, p r o h i b i t i o n of wetland drainage provides benefits to society at the expense of the landholder. The owners' r i g h t s to use and manage t h e i r property as they wish, i n c l u d i n g conversion of wetlands into a g r i c u l t u r a l production for p o t e n t i a l monetary gain, i s removed without compensation. Thus, regulation that conserves wetlands makes society better o f f but leaves landowners worse o f f because they have l o s t a r i g h t previously enjoyed and have not 49 been compensated for that l o s s . The Economic Council of Canada (1979) points out that p o l i c y a c t i o n that improves economic e f f i c i e n c y i n resource a l l o c a t i o n without regard to equity considerations could have negative impacts on s p e c i f i c groups i n society, f o r Pareto optimality i s not concerned with the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income or wealth. A counter argument to equity concerns, as suggested by the Alberta Water Resources Commission. (1989), i s that landowners are members of society as well and thus receive the same bene f i t s from p r o h i b i t i o n of wetland drainage as do other members of society. This argument may have more acceptance among landowners i f they f e l t r e g u l a t i o n of private land use and management was a legitimate exercise of power and thus were committed to i t s use. Another disadvantage of regulatory mechanisms i s recognized by Deknatel (1979). This author points out the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and associated inherent i n f l e x i b i l i t y of regulations. Regulations covering large areas cannot take into consideration the attitudes and actual behavior of a landowner. As a r e s u l t , public objectives are c a r r i e d out on private land i n a p r e s c r i p t i v e manner with l i t t l e input from a f f e c t e d owners, rather than i n a manner that i s f l e x i b l e and cooperative. 3.4 Nonregulatory Mechanisms This s e c t i o n begins by discussing how nonregulatory mechanisms can be used to promote pri v a t e stewardship of wetlands and concludes with an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of using t h i s approach to encourage stewardship. 50 3.4.1 Wetland Retention Through Nonregulation Nonregulatory mechanisms aim to induce i n d i v i d u a l s to a l t e r t h e i r behavior rather than command behavioral changes through the exercise of p o l i c e power (Baumol and Oates 1979). The Alb e r t a Water Resources Commission (1989) and Goldsmith and Clark II (1990) suggest that two general nonregulatory approaches, economic incentives through market processes, and moral suasion, can be used separately or i n combination to promote p r i v a t e stewardship of wetland environments. They contend that the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a nonregulatory approach i s . t h a t property management decisions u l t i m a t e l y l i e with the landowner. Society does not i n t e r f e r e with t h e i r r i g h t s to use and manage t h e i r property including drainage of wetlands. ' Nonregulatory approaches which involve the a c q u i s i t i o n of lands from i n d i v i d u a l s , e i t h e r by the public sector or a pri v a t e , semi-public organization a c t i n g i n the public i n t e r e s t such as a land t r u s t , are beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . Following i s a general overview of the market and moral suasion approaches. A more d e t a i l e d discussion of the common market and moral suasion mechanisms used to promote private stewardship of wetlands i s presented i n the next chapter. (1) Market approach - Recognizing that landowners have an economic stake i n wetlands, t h i s approach s t r i v e s to e s t a b l i s h economic incentives that encourage and a s s i s t landowners i n protecting wetlands valuable to society while contr i b u t i n g to a reasonable return on t h e i r investment (The Conservation Foundation 1988). According to Goldsmith and Clark II (1990), property tax c r e d i t s and exemptions, and d i r e c t payment v i a management or lease agreements are common market mechanisms which o f f e r p r i v a t e property 51 owners economic incentives to r e t a i n wetlands. In both s i t u a t i o n s , landowners who forego the benefits of drainage are compensated by society. This manipulation of monetary resources and rewards to promote pri v a t e stewardship i s a form of remunerative power as defined by E t z i o n i . The A l b e r t a Water Resources Commission (1989) also notes a l a i s s e z -f a i r e method could p o t e n t i a l l y be used as a means of providing economic incentives "to landholders. Under t h i s system, property owners would bargain with other members of society for c e r t a i n wetland benefits such as the use of w i l d l i f e f o r consumptive and nonconsumptive purposes. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , economic transfer occurs between i n d i v i d u a l s instead of between landowners and society as a whole. A s i m i l a r approach was recommended by Ryder and Boag (1981) for the preservation of w i l d l i f e . They c a l l e d for the establishment of a fee schedule payable to the landowner for s p e c i f i e d uses of h a b i t a t . Currently, Saskatchewan and Alberta s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o h i b i t property owners from charging trespass fees for access to w i l d l i f e ; therefore, the l a i s s e z - f a i r e method i s not dealt with further i n t h i s t h e s i s . With regard to the l e v e l of incentive offered to landholders, Danielson and L e i t c h (1986) argue that the lower bound would have to be at l e a s t equal to the net private benefits an owner expects to obtain through drainage while the upper bound i s defined by the s o c i a l cost of draining wetlands. This argument i s based on the assumption that the net private benefits of wetland drainage i s less than the actual value that society places on the wetland. (2) Moral Suasion - This approach attempts to persuade landowners to v o l u n t a r i l y forego the benefits of wetland drainage without the o f f e r of an 5 2 economic incentive. I t i s based on the use of normative power, as defined by E t z i o n i , and includes the a l l o c a t i o n of symbolic rewards, and esteem and prestige symbols. Inherent i n t h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c approach i s a recognition by landholders that they have a s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r conserving wetlands (Baumol and Oates 1979). The Alberta Water Resources Commission (1989) suggests that acceptance of s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by landowners changes t h e i r demand for drainage. In private b e n e f i t / c o s t analysis decisions, they are convinced to place a higher value on the non-cash ben e f i t s of wetlands such as s t a b i l i t y of water supply, intergenerational equity and so on. According to Goldsmith and Clark II (1990), education campaigns d i r e c t e d towards wetland owners and landowner recognition are common moral suasion mechanisms to promote private wetland conservation. 3.4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Nonregulatory Mechanisms The l i m i t e d extent to which Canadians are receptive towards interference with an i n d i v i d u a l ' s property r i g h t s as well as t h e i r support for the use of economic incentives and moral suasion to achieve conservation goals on private lands, determines, i n part, the advantages and disadvantages associated with nonregulatory mechanisms. Given the p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards nonregulation, the use of nonregulatory tools to promote p r i v a t e stewardship i s perceived by landowners and the general pu b l i c as having many advantages which accrue to both landholders and s o c i e t y i n general, and few disadvantages, most of which accrue to society. The following discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of nonregulatory mechanisms i n encouraging private stewardship r e f l e c t s the high degree of s o c i e t a l receptiveness towards t h i s p o l i c y instrument. 53 With regard to the advantages of nonregulatory mechanisms, Baumol and Oates (1979) contend that nonregulatory tools can be p o l i t i c a l l y more acceptable because of t h e i r minimal s o c i e t a l interference with landowner property r i g h t s thus allowing owners ultimate c o n t r o l over wetland drainage decisions. This p o l i t i c a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y i s enhanced by the p o s i t i v e equity consequences which are associated with owners' c o n t r o l l i n g land use decisions. The A l b e r t a Water Resources Commission (1989) notes that r e t a i n i n g wetlands through e i t h e r moral suasion or the market approach leave neither the property owner nor society worse o f f . Landowners' v o l u n t a r i l y r e t a i n i n g wetlands indicates that they f e e l they are at l e a s t as well o f f conserving wetlands versus draining them f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l production. This i s a r e s u l t of the owners' pla c i n g a high value on the non-cash be n e f i t s of wetlands i n t h e i r p r i v a t e b e n e f i t / c o s t decisions regarding land use. With the market approach, Davis and Kamien (1977) point out that acceptance of compensation indicates that the landowner i s at l e a s t as well o f f as before, while an o f f e r of an economic incentive by soci e t y indicates that i t i s at l e a s t as well o f f as before. Deknatel (1979) and P h i l l i p s and Veeman (1987) have recognized that another advantage to nonregulatory mechanisms i s t h e i r decentralized or "grass roots" approach. They argue that with a decentralized approach, pu b l i c objectives can be c a r r i e d out on private land i n a cooperative and f l e x i b l e manner. The focus can be on cooperating d i r e c t l y with the landowner as d e c i s i o n maker or implementor, taking into account the l o c a l circumstances, the landowner's economic status, s i t e - r e l a t e d knowledge, needs and wishes, and so on. Such cooperation permits an i n t e g r a t i o n of landowner and s o c i e t a l concerns. Morgan (1987) maintains that an approach that i s one-on-one and can be t a i l o r e d to s p e c i f i c areas and s p e c i f i c needs 54 of the landholder allows the wetlands issue to be dealt with comprehensively or h o l i s t i c a l l y . Another advantage of nonregulatory tools, as suggested by The Conservation Foundation (1988), i s that, i f properly implemented, they can support and supplement other government wetlands p r o t e c t i o n e f f o r t s . Economic incentives can support regulatory tools by reducing the f i n a n c i a l costs wetland preservation regulations impose on landowners. Moral suasion can supplement regulations by encouraging voluntary p r i v a t e p r o t e c t i o n of wetlands, thereby lessening the need f o r government regulation. With regard to the disadvantages associated with nonregulatory mechanisms, Baumol and Oates (1979) point out that the o f f e r i n g of a strong economic incentive through tax breaks or subsidies does not produce r e s u l t s at low cost to society. (In contrast, an advantage of moral suasion i s i t s p o t e n t i a l cost e f f i c i e n c y ) . F e i s t (1979) suggests that economic incentives o f f e r no long-term investment f o r public money. There i s no guarantee a landowner w i l l continue to conserve wetlands once incentives are removed or reduced. A c r i t i c i s m of the Alberta Water Resources Commission (1989) regarding economic incentives i s that there i s no way of determining the landowner's true intent to drain other than r e l y i n g on t h e i r honesty. Thus, by using tax breaks or subsidies, society would undoubtedly be paying some owners to r e t a i n wetlands that they had no i n t e n t i o n of draining. 3.5 Summary This chapter explored the issue of promoting stewardship of wetlands on p r i v a t e land holdings from a regulatory and nonregulatory perspective. Both regulatory and nonregulatory p o l i c y mechanisms are v i a b l e approaches fo r encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship. However, evidence favors the use of 55 nonregulatory approaches, including economic incentives and moral suasion, as a means of convincing landowners to r e t a i n wetlands rather than commanding conservation through p o l i c e power regulation. I t was established that landowners and the general public i n Canada are more supportive of nonregulatory mechanisms than of regulation as a means to achieving wetland conservation objectives on pri v a t e landholdings. The s o c i e t a l receptiveness towards these two p o l i c y instruments bias the p o s i t i v e and negative aspects associated with each. The use of remunerative (economic incentives) and normative (moral suasion) power to promote p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands was i d e n t i f i e d as having many p o s i t i v e aspects, e s p e c i a l l y f o r the landowner. Owners r e t a i n ultimate c o n t r o l over land use management thus allowing them to make decisions, in c l u d i n g wetland retention, that are i n t h e i r best i n t e r e s t from a be n e f i t - c o s t view point. As well, the cooperative, f l e x i b l e manner i n which nonregulatory tools can be administered ensures that s p e c i f i c landholder i n t e r e s t s and needs are taken into consideration. This approach to encouraging stewardship, which treats landowners i n a very p o s i t i v e way while emphasizing t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n conservation, w i l l l i k e l y be considered a legitimate exercise of power and, therefore, should receive owner support and commitment. In contrast, the use of coercive power (regulation) to encourage pr i v a t e stewardship was i d e n t i f i e d as negatively impacting landowners. * Commanding wetland retention through regulatory mechanisms requires d i r e c t p u b l i c interference i n pri v a t e management decisions. Owners are forced to support a land use which does not maximize t h e i r returns from investment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land, and they are not compensated f o r the loss i n income. As wel l , regulatory mechanisms are c e n t r a l i z e d and i n f l e x i b l e and cannot deal 56 with the property owner on a one-to-one bas i s . This approach to promoting stewardship, which i s not s e n s i t i v e to the needs and i n t e r e s t s of the i n d i v i d u a l landowner, w i l l l i k e l y be considered an i l l e g i t i m a t e exercise of power and, therefore, owner support and commitment w i l l be weak, req u i r i n g enforced compliance. From a s o c i e t a l perspective, i t was recognized that the use of nonregulatory mechanisms to promote pr i v a t e stewardship has economic disadvantages. Providing strong economic incentives to landholders i s c o s t l y ; i t i s not a sound long-term investment of public money because there are no guarantees that wetlands w i l l be retained once incentives are removed; and incentives w i l l be offered to some owners who had no i n t e n t i o n of draining wetlands. In contrast, regulatory mechanisms can be quite cost- e f f e c t i v e f o r c o n t r o l l i n g land uses except i n s i t u a t i o n s where high l e v e l s of monitoring and enforcement are necessary due to poor compliance. Despite the nonregulatory approach having negative s o c i e t a l impacts from a cost point of view, t h i s approach has the p o t e n t i a l f o r greater p o s i t i v e s o c i e t a l impacts through b u i l d i n g c e r t a i n ethics i n landowners. The cooperative, educational, one-on-one approach of nonregulatory tools "...get at the question of the attitudes and actual behavior of a landowner or operator i n a way that regulatory and c e n t r a l i z e d programs seldom do" (Deknatel 1979, p263). Thus, nonregulation has a greater p o t e n t i a l than r e g u l a t i o n for changing landowner attitudes with regard to care and conservation of natural areas for present generations and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to future generations. With p o l i c e power demands to p r a c t i c e stewardship, property owners may j u s t be complying with regulation and have no feelings of s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and thus stewardship towards wetland environments. 57 Although nonregulatory mechanisms are recognized as the preferred approach to promoting private stewardship, i t must also be recognized that some solutions, such as those of a short-term, stop-gap nature, must be prescribed through regulations. As well, regulatory and nonregulatory tools should not be considered mutually exclusive. There may be s i t u a t i o n s i n which the use of nonregulatory mechanisms can support and supplement regulations. They can compensate landholders for l o s t income associated with prescribed wetland retention and encourage them to v o l u n t a r i l y conserve natural areas. As well, the use of economic incentives and moral suasion techniques i n a s s o c i a t i o n with regulations can help to l e g i t i m i z e the use of coercive power. Education, encouragement and incentives can bring landowners to the point where they understand and support the benefits of the regulations that are being imposed on them (Van Patter et a l . 1988, pl68). In a longer-term, the more e f f e c t i v e nonregulatory tools are i n convincing landowners to p r a c t i c e stewardship, the less need there w i l l be for enforcement of regulations and for the use of coercive power. In the next chapters, attention w i l l be given to evaluating common nonregulatory mechanisms for promoting private stewardship of wetlands. This nonregulatory focus has been j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s chapter which established that, from a landowner and s o c i e t a l perspective, nonregulatory tools are preferable to mandatory controls i n encouraging landowners to r e t a i n wetlands. This research focus on nonregulatory mechanisms i s also j u s t i f i e d by the f a c t that the use of economic incentives and moral suasion techniques i s a r e l a t i v e l y new approach to dealing with the issue of p r i v a t e stewardship and thus there i s a need for research on t h i s topic. 58 IV. PROMOTING PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP THROUGH NONREGULATORY MECHANISMS 4.1 Introduction Landowners are ultim a t e l y the front l i n e of wetland conservation. A nonregulatory approach to conserving wetlands must be di r e c t e d towards convincing them to pr a c t i c e stewardship. To gather support from a broad spectrum of landholders, nonregulatory mechanisms must create a capacity for meeting t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and concerns. Landowner appeal i s a measure for how successful these mechanisms w i l l be i n encouraging private stewardship. I f a mechanism has poor a c c e p t a b i l i t y then i t i s highly u n l i k e l y that i t w i l l be successful i n promoting stewardship of wetlands. The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to i d e n t i f y the probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of common nonregulatory mechanisms used to promote private stewardship of wetlands. To accomplish t h i s , a comparative analysis i s presented which assesses the apparent advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms with regard to supporting s p e c i f i c landowner concerns. Before proceeding with the analysis, i t i s necessary to present the framework that w i l l be used i n analyzing the mechanisms. 4.2 A n a l y t i c a l framework The analysis i s intended to be l a r g e l y d e s c r i p t i v e i n nature. A l i s t of general c r i t e r i a was established that would give an i n d i c a t i o n of the probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of each mechanism. The c r i t e r i a chosen are thought to represent many of the primary concerns a landholder has when considering a stewardship program and are based on a review of the l i t e r a t u r e presented i n Chapters II and III and are supported by Smutko et 59 a l . (1984) and Brusnyk et a l . (1990). Although the reason f o r choosing some of the c r i t e r i a w i l l be obvious, an explanation f o r each i s given. It i s recognized that the framework i s not d e f i n i t i v e with regard to analyzing landholder a c c e p t a b i l i t y of stewardship mechanisms; however, the l i s t was comprehensive and appropriate f o r t h i s study. Further, i t i s recognized that the framework measures a c c e p t a b i l i t y among owners who are receptive towards the use of nonregulatory mechanisms to promote private stewardship and have a p o s i t i v e or open-minded a t t i t u d e toward wetland conservation. Regardless of the high degree of receptiveness landowners i n general have towards nonregulatory mechanisms, and regardless of whether a nonregulatory mechanism meets t h e i r concerns, there w i l l be owners who w i l l continue to drain and degrade wetlands due to t h e i r negative and firmly-held a t t i t u d e s toward wetland conservation. The framework c o n s i s t i n g of f i v e c r i t e r i a i s presented below: 1. Strong economic incentives - Landowners are concerned with maximizing returns from t h e i r investment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land. They cannot capture payment f o r most of the benefits provided by wetlands and so have favored the conversion of wetlands to a g r i c u l t u r a l uses f o r economic return. Economic incentives offered to owners f or wetland retention must be s u f f i c i e n t to contribute a reasonable return on owner investment. Landholders w i l l not consider wetlands to be an economically v i a b l e land use i f compensation i s not comparable to a g r i c u l t u r a l production returns that could be achieved given wetland conversion to a g r i c u l t u r a l uses. 2. Landowner control - This ref e r s to the extent to which landholders r e t a i n t h e i r property r i g h t s and thus r e t a i n c o n t r o l over the use of t h e i r land. Although the nonregulatory approach to promoting p r i v a t e stewardship 60 of wetlands i s based on convincing property owners to r e t a i n wetlands rather than c o n t r o l l i n g t h e i r land management, s p e c i f i c nonregulatory mechanisms can i n t e r f e r e with p r i v a t e property r i g h t s . Owners are concerned that stewardship mechanisms allow them ultimate c o n t r o l over pr i v a t e land use decisions through minimal interference with property r i g h t s . In the proceeding chapter, i t was recognized that mechanisms, such as police.power regulation, which i n t e r f e r e with property r i g h t s and pr i v a t e land management negatively impact landholders. Retaining property r i g h t s allows an owner f l e x i b i l i t y i n implementing land use decisions which maximize h i s or her returns to ownership of a g r i c u l t u r a l land. 3. F l e x i b i l i t y - Landowners are a diverse group with varying farming operations, land uses, economic s i t u a t i o n s , a t t i t u d e s , i n t e r e s t s , etc. They are concerned that stewardship techniques are f l e x i b l e i n considering t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l needs, farming operations and changing land uses. In the preceding chapter, i t was recognized that mechanisms, commonly of a regulatory nature, which are i n f l e x i b l e and p r e s c r i p t i v e and thus treat property owners as a homogeneous group without consideration of i n d i v i d u a l needs, are not acceptable to landowners. Working one-on-one with owners i n a cooperative, adaptable manner, empowers them to ensure land use management str a t e g i e s address t h e i r needs and concerns. 4. Certainty - Given recent trends toward drainage and degradation of wetlands for a g r i c u l t u r a l production, asking landholders to r e t a i n wetlands may require a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n t h e i r land use management strategies. This could have repercussions throughout t h e i r operations including impacts on long-term investments i n land and c a p i t a l . With t h i s "commitment" asked of owners, longevity of a program i s an important consideration to them. 61 I f they are convinced of the c e r t a i n t y of a program, they may be more w i l l i n g to make land use and investment changes. 5. Complexity - I f a mechanism cannot be understood by landholders then i t i s too complex. Because owners may be asked to make changes to f a m i l i a r land use p r a c t i c e s which produce known or predictable economic returns, complexity of the mechanism i s a concern to them. A mechanism that i s not r e a d i l y comprehended due to a high degree of l e g a l formality, a complex compensation structure, etc., does not i n s t i l l confidence i n the owner to make changes. As a r e s u l t , i t i s easier and more reassuring for he or she to maintain the status quo. 4.3 Analysis Six nonregulatory mechanisms are assessed as to t h e i r apparent advantages and disadvantages i n supporting the f i v e primary landowner concerns o u t l i n e d i n the a n a l y t i c a l framework. For each mechanism, a short d e s c r i p t i o n i s provided followed by the advantages and disadvantages and a concluding statement regarding probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y . As stated i n Chapter I I I , there are two general nonregulatory approaches to encouraging private stewardship of wetland environments: 1) market approach, and 2) moral suasion. The market and moral suasion mechanisms chosen for analysis are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to promoting wetland retention on pr i v a t e land holdings. They do not represent an exhaustive l i s t of a l l possible means of encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship, but rather r e f l e c t a general set of mechanisms that are mentioned r e g u l a r l y i n the l i t e r a t u r e and which appear to have some merit for encouraging private stewardship of wetlands. 62 The primary sources of l i t e r a t u r e used i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and de s c r i p t i o n of relevant mechanisms was Haigis and Young (1983), Hoose (1981), Goldsmith and Clark (1990), and Milne (1984). 4.3.1 Market Approach Market mechanisms endeavor to o f f e r landowners strong economic incentives to forego the benefits of drained wetlands. I m p l i c i t i n these mechanisms i s an educational process to make owners aware of the need to r e t a i n wetland environments. 1) Property Tax Incentives Description - This incentive-based tax mechanism encourages private stewardship by reducing the property tax burden on landholders who r e t a i n wetlands. There are two types of property tax incentives: 1) exemption of wetland areas from property taxation, and 2) p r o v i s i o n of property tax c r e d i t s on the owner's t i l l a b l e land. Exemptions and/or c r e d i t s are t y p i c a l l y o f f e r e d on a year-by-year basis e i t h e r through a deduction from the net taxes due or a rebate and are based on the number of q u a l i f y i n g wetland acres the property owner agrees to conserve. Agreements are not l e g a l l y binding and owners can r e a d i l y drain or degrade wetlands i f they choose; however, they may be required to pay a l l deferred taxes plus i n t e r e s t . Advantages - An appealing feature of t h i s mechanism i s that landowners r e t a i n control over the use of t h e i r land. There i s no " i n t e r e s t " l e v i e d against private property r i g h t s through a l e g a l agreement and as such, owners are not obligated to a s p e c i f i c land use. They can make land use changes at any time cognizant of the f a c t that wetland drainage would r e s u l t i n the foregoing of tax incentives and pos s i b l y an 63 o b l i g a t i o n to pay back deferred taxes. Property tax incentives also have the advantage of being e a s i l y understood. The administration system for property taxation i s well established and i s f a m i l i a r to most owners. Disadvantages - A major l i m i t a t i o n of t h i s mechanism i s that i t may not o f f e r a landowner strong economic incentives. Offered alone, a property tax exemption on p r i v a t e wetland areas would not provide a s i g n i f i c a n t economic incentive. Tax exemptions are dependent upon the market value of the land and i n r u r a l areas, wetlands have a very low assessed value r e s u l t i n g i n l i m i t e d compensation. In c e n t r a l Alberta for example, wetland areas are taxed at an average of about one d o l l a r per acre whereas high q u a l i t y cropland may be taxed at f i v e d o l l a r s per acre (Brusnyk et a l . 1990). However, i f property tax c r e d i t s on cropland are o f f e r e d i n a d d i t i o n to tax exemptions, the compensation provided may be s i g n i f i c a n t enough to appeal to owners. The l e v e l of compensation i s dependent upon the tax c r e d i t rate and the acreage of private wetlands retained (usually for every one acre of wetland retained there i s a c r e d i t applied to one acre of t i l l a b l e land). I f the rate i s low and/or the acreage of wetland retained i s small, compensation w i l l be l i m i t e d . Another major disadvantage to t h i s mechanism i s i t s lack of f l e x i b i l i t y . A l l landowners, regardless of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l needs, operations and current land uses are offered the same nonnegotiable terms (fo r example, incentives on a year-by-year basis and wetlands retained i n a natural state with no l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use allowed). The c e r t a i n t y of property tax incentive programs i s questionable as w e l l . Tax incentive programs can be expensive for p r o v i n c i a l governments and thus are vulnerable to f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the economy. This funding uncertainty 64 combined with the one year period agreements offered to owners may r e s u l t i n t h e i r questioning the longevity of the program. Conclusion - Property tax incentives which o f f e r strong economic incentives w i l l l i k e l y have moderate appeal among landowners. The advantages of adequate compensation combined with the owner r e t a i n i n g c o n t r o l over land use decisions are o f f s e t by the i n f l e x i b i l i t y and uncertainty of the mechanism as well as the p o s s i b i l i t y of having to pay back a l l deferred taxes i f wetlands are drained. Property tax incentives which do not o f f e r adequate compensation w i l l l i k e l y have high owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n the short term. A large number of landholders who have opted to r e t a i n wetlands w i l l take advantage of the property tax incentives knowing they can convert the area into an a g r i c u l t u r a l use when needed without heavy penalty. I f deferred taxes must be returned, the amount w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to the n e g l i g i b l e tax exemption and\or c r e d i t received. In the long term, the lack of strong economic incentives and the i n f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to allowing compatible a g r i c u l t u r a l uses w i l l push most landowners to opt out of weak tax incentive programs i n favor of converting wetlands into uses that o f f e r economic returns. As an exception, there may be a s e l e c t group of landholders who place a very high value on the non-cash b e n e f i t s of wetlands. They are not concerned about the l e v e l of compensation o f f e r e d nor the requirement for leaving the area natural without the f l e x i b i l i t y of incorporating compatible a g r i c u l t u r a l uses such as haying and grazing. 2) Management Agreements Descr i p t i o n - This mechanism involves the landowner v o l u n t a r i l y entering into a l e g a l l y binding agreement with the Crown or conservation 65 agency i n return for f i n a n c i a l compensation. By the agreement, the owner i s obligated to manage h i s or her property i n a s p e c i f i c manner f o r a stated period of time to achieve a desired goal such as wetland retention. Economic incentives can be i n the form of d i r e c t cash payment, the p r o v i s i o n of t e c h n i c a l services and materials such as fencing and seed necessary to implement the agreed-upon land use management schemes, or a combination of both. The basic premise of management agreements remains even though d e t a i l s of each agreement may vary with regard to length of term, compensation value and schedule, and management of land i n the program i n c l u d i n g the amount of a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted. The l e g a l agreement or contract gives the Crown an enforceable " i n t e r e s t " i n the landowner's property over the duration of the agreement. This " i n t e r e s t " can be expressed i n a caveat r e g i s t e r e d on the owner's Land T i t l e and i s not binding on future buyers. T y p i c a l l y , the landholder i s free to do whatever he or she wants with the land once the agreement period i s over or the incentive payments are no longer paid. Many agreements have a c a n c e l l a t i o n clause which provides for e i t h e r party backing out v i a a mutually agreed upon term of notice. I f an agreement i s terminated by unauthorized land use such as wetland drainage, future compensation to the owner i s u s u a l l y withheld and he or she may be required to pay back that p o r t i o n of the compensation already received. Advantages - The major advantages of t h i s mechanism are i t s f l e x i b i l i t y and p o t e n t i a l o f f e r i n g of strong economic incentives. Management agreements t y p i c a l l y o f f e r the landowner a choice with regard to the length of the agreement (usually 5-20 years), compensation payment schedule (one lump sum payment, annually, every f i v e years, etc. depending on length of agreement), a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted i n the wetland area 66 (ranging from no l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use to u n r e s t r i c t e d haying or grazing), and l e v e l of wetland development or enhancement. Regardless of agreement terms, economic incentives are usually designed to o f f e r strong compensation to the landholder. For example, owners foregoing a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l uses i n the wetland area would receive greater compensation than those opting f o r modified haying or grazing which b r i n g cash returns. An appealing feature of the compensation package i s that i t does not have to be s t r i c t l y cash. Owners who have agreed to some l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use or wetland enhancement can receive adequate compensation through the p r o v i s i o n of te c h n i c a l services or materials. The l e g a l agreement which gives the Crown an " i n t e r e s t " i n private property r i g h t s would seem to l i m i t owner con t r o l . However, the c a n c e l l a t i o n clause i n management agreements allows landowners to r e a d i l y back out of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to a s p e c i f i c land use. This f l e x i b i l i t y i n c a n c e l l i n g the " i n t e r e s t " i n t h e i r property r i g h t s u l t i m a t e l y gives them co n t r o l over land use decisions. Disadvantages - Management agreements can be l i m i t e d by t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r complexity. The l e g a l terminology of the agreement including the r e g i s t e r e d caveat, the many d i f f e r e n t agreements a landowner can enter into, and the incentive package including compensation c a l c u l a t i o n and payment schedule can r e s u l t i n poor landowner understanding. The longevity of management agreements may be questioned as well. Although agreements can be lengthy, the administrator of the program can take advantage of the c a n c e l l a t i o n clause and terminate the agreement at any time given adequate notice. As well, with i t s o f f e r i n g of strong incentives, t h i s mechanism i s expensive to administer and thus vulnerable to changes i n the economy. 67 Conclusion - Management agreements, with t h e i r p o t e n t i a l for strong economic incentives coupled with a high degree of f l e x i b i l i t y i n c l u d i n g the owner's option to cancel the " i n t e r e s t " i n the land at any time, should appeal to a broad spectrum of landholders with diverse farming operations, land uses, and f i n a n c i a l needs. High a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanism w i l l l i k e l y be tempered by the need to enter into a formal agreement. Regardless of the c a n c e l l a t i o n clause i n management agreements which assures owner con t r o l , there w i l l l i k e l y be many owners who w i l l not approve of the mechanism because i t involves signing a document and p o s s i b l y r e g i s t e r i n g a caveat on the Land T i t l e . According to Van Patter et a l . (1988), there tends to be a psychological b a r r i e r among landowners when i t comes to signing a written agreement. As well, a c c e p t a b i l i t y w i l l probably be a f f e c t e d by the complexity of management agreements. Recently, there have been attempts to make the agreements more "landowner f r i e n d l y " such as through the use of non-legal terminology, i n an e f f o r t to a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n of those owners who do not p a r t i c i p a t e due to a lack of understanding. 3) Leases Description - Through leasehold, a landowner grants to a tenant, i n t h i s case the Crown or conservation agency, exclusive possession of h i s or her property for a f i x e d period of time i n return f o r rent. This gives the tenant absolute r i g h t to and control over the property during the term of the lease, provided the conditions of the lease are observed. The s p e c i f i c terms and condition of a lease can vary with regard to land use a c t i v i t i e s allowed by the tenant, duration of the lease, rent payable, and so on. Rent i s usually i n the form of cash, payable on an annual ba s i s . 68 The lease i s a l e g a l contract giving the tenant an enforceable " i n t e r e s t " i n the landowner's property over the term of the lease. This " i n t e r e s t " i s commonly r e g i s t e r e d by caveat on the owner's Land T i t l e and i s not binding on future buyers of the property. Lease agreements can provide f o r e i t h e r party withdrawing from the terms of the lease given adequate notice, adequate being defined by both p a r t i e s . Commonly, a penalty clause i s included i n the lease; thus, landholders who terminate a lease are l i a b l e f o r a l l advanced r e n t a l payments and a l l costs associated with lessee upgrading of the land such as fencing (Weatherill 1990). Advantages - A s i g n i f i c a n t advantage of t h i s mechanism i s that r e n t a l rates can be set high enough so as to o f f e r landowners strong compensation. The P r a i r i e Pothole Project i n Saskatchewan, for example, has established competitive r e n t a l rates based on the average annual cropland r e n t a l p r i c e (Scace and Associates Ltd. 1989). Leases also have the advantage of being f l e x i b l e with regard to the length of agreement and payment schedule. As well, they are e a s i l y understood by owners because they tend to e x i s t i n standard form which i s well established and a f a m i l i a r way of doing business i n r u r a l areas. Because lease agreements are common i n r u r a l areas, owner perceptions regarding longevity may be p o s i t i v e . Disadvantages - A major disadvantage of t h i s mechanism i s the p o t e n t i a l i t has for l i m i t i n g landowner co n t r o l . Much l i k e management agreements, owners are given the f l e x i b i l i t y to cancel the " i n t e r e s t " i n t h e i r land thereby assuming exclusive possession and c o n t r o l over land use decisions. However, the penalty clause i n leases may make i t impractical, from a cost perspective, for many landholders to terminate a lease. As a r e s u l t , they must continue to surrender c e r t a i n property r i g h t s f or the 69 length of the lease agreement. The exclusive possession clause i n favor of the lease holder i s also another l i m i t a t i o n because i t reduces land use f l e x i b i l i t y . Owners are not given a choice as to the l e v e l of land use they are i n t e r e s t e d i n r e t a i n i n g . They e i t h e r opt i n favor of the lease and give up a l l use of the land or r e j e c t the lease and use the land as they see f i t . Conclusion - I t i s probable that t h i s mechanism w i l l have moderate appeal among landholders. Strong economic incentives, longevity and ease of understanding offered by lease agreements i s o f f s e t by the disadvantages associated with the penalty and exclusive possession clauses. Many owners may f e e l that the disadvantages are s i g n i f i c a n t enough to outweigh the many advantages. 4) Conservation Easements Description - A conservation easement i s a l e g a l means whereby landowners can v o l u n t a r i l y r e s t r i c t the present and future use of t h e i r land by s e l l i n g p a r t i a l r i g h t s to t h e i r property. Through the granting of a conservation easement to a party concerned with wetland retention, an owner surrenders c e r t a i n property r i g h t s and thus r e s t r i c t s the realm of land use a c t i v i t i e s on h i s or her property. Under Canadian Law, a conservation easement must be held by a government or an agency of the government. By acquiring an easement, the Crown i s able to c o n t r o l only those property r i g h t s that the landholder could use to destroy and degrade wetland environments. The owner retains t i t l e to the property and a l l r i g h t s not s p e c i f i e d i n the easement as well as r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s associated with property ownership. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the r e c i p i e n t of an 70 easement i s to ensure that r e s t r i c t i o n s on land use set f o r t h i n the easement are not disregarded now and i n the future. Conservation easements vary with regard to the type of property r i g h t s surrendered by the landowner and the size of property r e s t r i c t e d i n use. One may place a l l of one's holdings under easement or j u s t the port i o n that has greatest s i g n i f i c a n c e from a wetland conservation perspective. Payment f or the easement i s usually determined by subtracting the assessed value of the property with the land use r e s t r i c t i o n s s p e c i f i e d i n the easement from the assessed value of the property with no land use r e s t r i c t i o n s . Easements are re g i s t e r e d on Land T i t l e and "run with the land", l e g a l l y binding present and future owners. They can be granted f o r a s p e c i f i c term or i n perpetuity thus a f f e c t i n g everyone who w i l l ever own the property regardless of whether i t i s transferred by sale, donation or bequest. Perpetuity, however, i s not ne c e s s a r i l y timeless as most easements have a reverter clause s t a t i n g that i f the purpose behind the easement i s ever abandoned, the easement goes back to the land t i t l e holder. Advantages - A major advantage of t h i s mechanism i s that the value of an easement can be established at a high monetary rate i n order to o f f e r landowners strong economic incentives. Easements are also perceived as having a high l e v e l of c e r t a i n t y due to the l e g a l l y binding agreement which r e s t r i c t s present and future land use. The high l e v e l of c e r t a i n t y associated with easements may be considered advantageous by some landholders and l i m i t i n g by others. Although longevity of a mechanism i s appealing to owners, easements granted i n perpetuity may go beyond the bounds of what many consider to be a reasonable time period. 71 Disadvantages - There are two s i g n i f i c a n t disadvantages to t h i s mechanism: loss of landowner con t r o l and l i t t l e f l e x i b i l i t y . Landholders are required to surrender p a r t i a l property r i g h t s and thus are obligated to a s p e c i f i c land use. Present and future owners are l e g a l l y t i e d to t h i s land use o b l i g a t i o n f or the term of the easement which i s us u a l l y i n perpetuity. The only f l e x i b i l i t y the easement may o f f e r i s i n the type of p r i v a t e property r i g h t s surrendered. An easement may r e s t r i c t a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l use, leaving the wetland area natural or i t may allow p a r t i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l uses. Complexity of easements may be a problem as well given the l e g a l documentation and caveat that "runs with the land". Conclusion - Landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanism w i l l l i k e l y be low. The permanent loss of property r i g h t s and the r e s t r i c t i v e nature and longevity of easements more than o f f s e t s the o f f e r i n g of a strong economic incentive. Easements which allow l i m i t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l uses versus none w i l l probably have greater acceptance because i t leaves the present owner and prospective buyers with a reasonable economic use for the land. This mechanism may appeal to a s e l e c t group of i n d i v i d u a l s who value t h e i r wetlands and want to preserve them into the future. They are not concerned with the disadvantages of easements, but are intere s t e d i n the longevity of the mechanism and the resultant p r o t e c t i o n of wetlands for many years to come. 4.3.2 Moral Suasion Moral suasion mechanisms attempt to convince landowners to v o l u n t a r i l y forego the economic benefits of wetland drainage without f i n a n c i a l compensation. 72 1) Landowner Education De s c r i p t i o n - This mechanism involves providing information to landowners i n a e f f o r t to make them aware of the values that wetlands provide, the r e l a t i v e importance of p a r t i c u l a r types of wetland environments, rate of wetland loss, what they can do to protect t h i s resource, and so on. Such educational i n i t i a t i v e s can promote private stewardship by d i r e c t i n g landholder attention to the need f o r wetland p r o t e c t i o n and guiding private conservation e f f o r t s . The p r o v i s i o n of information f o r educational purposes does not include the owner entering into an agreement, ei t h e r verbal or written, to r e t a i n wetland environments. Two important means of disseminating information include: 1) educational outreach programs which involve contacting i n d i v i d u a l landowners d i r e c t l y to provide wetland information of a general and/or s i t e - s p e c i f i c nature, and 2) extension programs which o f f e r i n d i v i d u a l landowners t e c h n i c a l assistance with regard to s i t e - s p e c i f i c land management techniques for wetland protection. Outreach and extension programs need not be mutually exclusive, but can operate concurrently to encourage p r i v a t e stewardship. Advantages - The advantages of t h i s mechanism are many. Educational programs are e a s i l y comprehended by landowners. A l l property r i g h t s remain with them giving them con t r o l over a l l land use decisions. Rather than providing a l l owners with a generic package of information, educational outreach and extension programs can be responsive to a broad spectrum of property owners through the pr o v i s i o n of s i t e - s p e c i f i c information. Longevity of t h i s mechanism should not r e a d i l y be questioned. Due to lower administration costs than other stewardship mechanisms, 73 education programs are not as vulnerable to f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the economy. As well, a f t e r i n i t i a l landowner contact, many owners may not request further information. Disadvantages - Although i t i s recognized that the intent of educational programs i s to convince landholders to preserve wetlands without b e n e f i t of compensation, t h i s lack of economic incentives i s a s i g n i f i c a n t disadvantage,. Conclusion - Through educational programs, there w i l l l i k e l y be a large number of owners who w i l l continue to protect wetland areas as they have i n the past. The p r o v i s i o n of information does not change t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . They have opted to r e t a i n the wetland knowing that land use can be changed at any time i f need be. However, i t i s probable that most landowners continuing to protect wetlands w i l l only do so i n the short term due to the lack of strong economic incentives. Over a longer time frame, i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t convincing a large number of owners to place a high value on the non-cash benefits of wetland environments and thus forego economic compensation. They can be convinced of the need for wetland p r o t e c t i o n but t h i s stewardship ethic w i l l be weighted against the need to drain wetlands i n order to r e a l i z e returns from t h e i r investment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land. A recent study which determined factors a f f e c t i n g landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a p r a i r i e stewardship program concluded that "while farmers expressed concern about the environment, the adverse e f f e c t s of current agronomic pr a c t i c e s and the destruction of w i l d l i f e habitat, economic r e a l i t i e s often caused them to behave i n a fashion that was opposed to t h e i r own value system" (Van Kooten and Schmitz 1990, p95). An exception may be a s e l e c t few i n d i v i d u a l s who place a very high value on 74 the non-cash be n e f i t s of wetlands and thus favor wetland conservation i n t h e i r land use decisions. 2) Landowner Recognition Description - This mechanism involves formally recognizing i n d i v i d u a l landowner e f f o r t s i n r e t a i n i n g wetlands. Inherent i n a r e c o g n i t i o n program i s an owner education process. To p a r t i c i p a t e , an owner agrees, v e r b a l l y or i n writing, to protect and maintain s p e c i f i c wetlands on h i s or her property and give notice i n case of change i n land use or ownership. In recognizing t h e i r contribution to conserving wetland environments, they are presented with a symbol such as a wall plaque, c e r t i f i c a t e , yard sign, or name p u b l i c a t i o n i n the l o c a l newspaper. No payment i s o f f e r e d for c a p i t a l costs associated with wetland maintenance or improvements. The verbal or written agreement i s moral, not l e g a l . Thus, i t i s not binding and does not a f f e c t the deed, allowing the landowner to back out at any time. Advantages - Landholder control i s a s i g n i f i c a n t advantage of t h i s mechanism. Although an owner enters into e i t h e r a verbal or written agreement, no " i n t e r e s t " i s l e v i e d against t h e i r property r i g h t s o b l i g a t i n g them to a s p e c i f i c use. The agreement has no set time l i m i t and can e a s i l y be broken through a change i n land use. Recognition programs also have the advantage of being easy to comprehend since agreements are informal and s t r a i g h t forward with no l e g a l jargon. As well, owners should perceive the mechanism to have longevity due to low administration costs. Disadvantages - As with education programs, the major l i m i t a t i o n of t h i s mechanism i s i t s lack of landowner compensation. I n f l e x i b i l i t y i s also another disadvantage. Landholders are t y p i c a l l y only 75 recognized f o r maintaining wetlands i n a natural state and thus are l i m i t e d to t h i s one land use with no option to incorporate compatible a g r i c u l t u r a l uses. Conclusion - As i n the case of educational programs, owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanism w i l l l i k e l y be high i n the short term. A large number of landholders who have opted to r e t a i n wetlands w i l l continue to do so under a recognition program knowing that they can convert the area to a g r i c u l t u r a l uses at any time i f needed. Due to the psychological b a r r i e r s associated with written agreements, verbal agreements w i l l probably a t t r a c t more landholders even though both have the same degree of owner c o n t r o l . In the long-term, i t i s probable that most owners w i l l opt out of a recognition program. The i n f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to allowing compatible a g r i c u l t u r a l uses and the lack of strong economic incentives does not leave wetland areas economically v i a b l e . As i n education programs, conservation minded landowners w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y g i v i n g the same weight to a stewardship ethic as to the need to maximize investments i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land. The exception w i l l be those few who place a very high value on the non-cash benefits of wetlands. 4.4 Summary This chapter analyzed s i x market and moral suasion nonregulatory mechanisms commonly used to promote private stewardship of wetlands. An a n a l y t i c a l framework was established to assess the apparent advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms i n supporting f i v e primary landowner concerns with regard to stewardship programs. This assessment was used to draw conclusions on the probable landholder a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms. 76 A p p l i c a t i o n o f the a n a l y t i c a l framework i s summarized i n T a b l e 1. R e s u l t s showed t h a t the s i x mechanisms v a r y i n t h e i r s u p p o r t o f owner c o n c e r n s and thus c o n c l u s i o n s drawn from t h e s e r e s u l t s p r o p o s e t h a t the mechanisms w i l l l i k e l y have v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f l andowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y . C o n c l u s i o n s were a l s o drawn to s u g g e s t t h a t t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l mechanisms , i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y t a x i n c e n t i v e s and landowner e d u c a t i o n and r e c o g n i t i o n mechanisms , w h i c h r e q u i r e a m i n i m a l l a n d use o b l i g a t i o n f r o m the l a n d h o l d e r s and o f f e r o n l y weak economic i n c e n t i v e s w i l l l i k e l y d e c r e a s e i n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o v e r t i m e . I t was a r g u e d t h a t a l a r g e number o f owners who have o p t e d to r e t a i n w e t l a n d s i n the p a s t w i l l i n i t i a l l y s u p p o r t s u c h a n o n r e g u l a t o r y mechanism knowing t h a t t h e y c a n c o n v e r t the w e t l a n d i n t o a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n as demanded by t h e i r economic s i t u a t i o n . A l t h o u g h owners may be c o n v i n c e d o f the need to c o n s e r v e w e t l a n d s , i n a l o n g e r t ime frame t h i s s t e w a r d s h i p e t h i c w i l l be w e i g h t e d a g a i n s t the need to r e a l i z e r e t u r n s f rom i n v e s t m e n t i n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d . F i g u r e 2 summar ize s , on a s c a l e o f d e c r e a s i n g a c c e p t a b i l i t y , the p r o b a b l e l andowner r e c e p t i v e n e s s o f the s i x n o n r e g u l a t o r y mechanisms . Where a p p l i c a b l e , t h o s e mechanisms which a r e l i k e l y to have a change i n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o v e r t i m e a r e i n d i c a t e d . I n the n e x t c h a p t e r , the s i x n o n r e g u l a t o r y mechanisms a r e e v a l u a t e d f o r t h e i r s u c c e s s i n p r o m o t i n g p r i v a t e s t e w a r d s h i p o f w e t l a n d s . T h i s e v a l u a t i o n i s b a s e d on the a c t u a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f the mechanisms as d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h a r e v i e w o f t h r e e c a s e s t u d i e s . TABLE 1 A Summary of the Apparent Advantages and Disadvantages of Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms in Supporting Primary Landowner Concerns CRITERIA (Landowner Concerns) MECHANISHE Strong Economic Incentives Landowner Control Flexibility Certainty Complexity Property Tax Incentives Weak i f tax exemption offered (-) Potentially strong i f both exemption and credit offered (+) Yes (+) Little flexibility (-) Questionable (-) Simple (+) Management Agreements Yes (+) Yes (+) Very flexible (+) Questionable (-) Can be quite complex (-) Leases Yes (+) Potential for limiting land-owner control (-) Terms of the lease are flexible (+) Inflexible exclusive possession clause (-) Perceived longevity (+) Simple (+) Conservation Easements Yes (+) No (") Little flexibility (-) Limited by high level of certainty (-) Can be complex (-) Landowner Education No (") Yes (+) Very flexible (+) Perceived longevity (+) Simple (+) Landowner Recognition No Yes (+) Little flexibility with regard to land use (-) Perceived longevity (+) Simple (+) (+) Advantage (-) Disadvantage Figure 2 Probable Landowner Acceptability of Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms High LANDOWNER EDUCATION • short-term LANDOWNER RECOGNITION • ahort-term WEAK PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES • short-term MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Medium STRONG PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES LEASES WEAK PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES • long-term LANDOWNER RECOGNITION - long-term Low LANDOWNER EDUCATION • long-term CONSERVATION EASEMENTS Decreasing Landowner Acceptability 79 V. SUCCESS OF NONREGULATORY MECHANISMS IN PROMOTING PRIVATE LANDOWNER STEWARDSHIP 5.1 Introduction The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to determine how successful nonregulatory mechanisms are i n promoting private stewardship of wetlands. Landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of nonregulatory tools i s a measure of t h i s success. The analysis c a r r i e d out i n Chapter IV gave an i n d i c a t i o n of the probable landholder appeal of s i x common nonregulatory mechanisms. This chapter tests the analysis by examining the actual owner, appeal of the six mechanisms as implemented i n various stewardship programs across Canada. Based on a review of the e x i s t i n g a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms i n three case studies, t h e i r success i n promoting landowner stewardship of wetlands i s evaluated. The c r i t e r i a that w i l l be used to evaluate the success of the mechanisms are presented f i r s t . 5.2 Evaluation C r i t e r i a To evaluate the effectiveness of the s i x nonregulatory tools i n encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship, t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y to landowners must be determined. Given the purpose of t h i s chapter and l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by case study data, landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s thought to be a good in d i c a t o r of a c c e p t a b i l i t y . Thus, to evaluate the mechanisms' success each was measured against the following c r i t e r i a : 1) Actual rate of landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; 2) Length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n indicated by: 80 - length of agreement the landowners entered into (years), and - number of agreements terminated before end of term; 3) Rate of compliance as indicated by the number of owners v i o l a t i n g agreements by unauthorized changes i n land use such as draining or degrading wetlands. 4) Change of a t t i t u d e - In a longer time frame, a p o s i t i v e change i n at t i t u d e of those owners p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a stewardship program can be an i n d i c a t o r of a c c e p t a b i l i t y and thus can contribute to evaluating the mechanisms' eff e c t i v e n e s s . Where possible, each mechanism was assessed for s h i f t i n g landowner attitudes towards the notion of wetland stewardship or a wetland conservation e t h i c . This evaluative c r i t e r i o n i s d i f f i c u l t to apply to a l l the mechanisms due to data l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the case studies. By examining the rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , conclusions can be drawn with regard to the success of the mechanisms i n promoting stewardship of wetlands among priv a t e landholders. Examining length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , rate of compliance and change i n attitu d e w i l l allow conclusions to be made with regard to the success of the mechanisms i n continuing to promote stewardship among those owners p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a stewardship program. 5.3 Evaluation E x i s t i n g data from three stewardship programs c u r r e n t l y implemented i n Canada i s used to evaluate the effectiveness of the mechanisms. The three programs were chosen as case studies based on t h e i r u t i l i z i n g one or more of the s i x mechanisms to encourage wetland retention on private lands (with the combination of the three representing a l l s i x mechanisms), and 81 t h e i r having been i n place long enough to generate data f o r the evaluation. The three case studies are as follows: 1) Case study one - management agreements are evaluated based on data from Alberta's Landowner Habitat Project; 2) Case study two - management agreements, leases, property tax incentives, and conservation easements are evaluated based on data from Saskatchewan's P r a i r i e Pothole Project; 3) Case study three - landowner education and landowner recognition are evaluated based on data from Ontario's Natural Heritage Program. For each case study, background information i s provided followed by the a p p l i c a t i o n of the evaluation c r i t e r i a and a concluding statement regarding the success of the mechanisms in promoting private stewardship of wetlands. A number of l i m i t a t i o n s e x i s t with regard to carrying out the evaluation. F i r s t l y , property tax incentives and conservation easements are not c u r r e n t l y u t i l i z e d i n the P r a i r i e Pothole Project to promote stewardship; thus, the evaluative c r i t e r i a cannot be applied to these two to o l s . However, the f i r s t phase of the P r a i r i e Pothole Project assessed, by way of a landowner survey, a number of nonregulatory mechanisms, including property tax incentives and conservation easements, as to t h e i r landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y . This assessment w i l l be used to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of these two mechanisms. Secondly, because stewardship programs which u t i l i z e nonregulatory mechanisms to promote stewardship are not a t r a d i t i o n a l method of conserving natural areas, they have only been operational f o r a very short time. The three case studies, for example, have only been i n place for about four years. As a r e s u l t , landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the long term cannot be determined and thus evaluating the long-term success of the mechanisms i n promoting stewardship i s not possible. This i s a s i g n i f i c a n t 82 disadvantage given that the analysis i n Chapter IV showed some mechanisms l i k e l y decreasing i n owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y over time. T h i r d l y , due to the nature of a landowner education t o o l which does not require any kind of verbal or written commitment from landowners, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to apply the evaluation c r i t e r i a . This l i m i t a t i o n w i l l be discussed further under the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program case s tudy. 5.3.1 Alberta's Landowner Habitat Project (LHP) The following d e s c r i p t i o n and r e s u l t s of the Landowner Habitat Project i s drawn p r i n c i p a l l y from Brechtel and Anderson (1987), Brusnyk et a l . (1990), and Murphy (1990). 1) Background - In 1986, the Alberta Government, with funding support from W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada, i n i t i a t e d a three-year p i l o t project aimed at preserving w i l d l i f e habitat on p r i v a t e l y owned lands i n selected areas of Alberta. This Landowner Habitat Project was designed to promote land use p r a c t i c e s that would be n e f i t both the landowner and w i l d l i f e and was modelled a f t e r e a r l i e r habitat retention programs i n Red Deer County which ran from 1978 to 1982. The project was established i n the c e n t r a l A l b e r t a Counties of Minburn and Red Deer and the Bow River and Eastern I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t s i n southern Alberta. In the i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t s , the LHP focuses on conserving pheasant habitat and thus w i l l not be evaluated i n t h i s t h e s i s . Minburn and Red Deer Counties, located i n the p r a i r i e pothole region of Alberta, are rated among the highest i n the province for p o t e n t i a l waterfowl production but also have considerable and continuing losses of habitat including wetland drainage and degradation due to i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e . 83 At the outset of the LHP, e x i s t i n g woodland and wetland habitats i n Minburn and Red Deer Counties were evaluated and p r i o r i z e d . The owners of high q u a l i t y habitats were i n d i v i d u a l l y contacted and encouraged to enter into a management agreement. Management agreements under the LHP o f f e r various monetary incentives to landowners to a l t e r t h e i r land management str a t e g i e s i n ways that b e n e f i t w i l d l i f e . The agreements are f l e x i b l e with regard to length of term (5-50 years) and amount of a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted with incentive payments being made annually or i n five-year increments. Caveats are r e g i s t e r e d against the land t i t l e f o r the term of the agreement and an opting out clause i s a v a i l a b l e . This clause i s not as f l e x i b l e as other management agreements i n d i f f e r e n t programs, and only gives an owner the opportunity to opt out every f i v e years. I f an agreement i s terminated by unauthorized land use, incentive payments already received by the landowner have to be repaid. In determining incentive payments, e f f o r t s were made to have them c l o s e l y r e f l e c t the p o t e n t i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l return a v a i l a b l e to owners from t h e i r h a b i t a t areas. Compensation i s based on the landowner's use of the land and the degree to which he or she i s w i l l i n g to forego a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n favor of maintaining w i l d l i f e habitat. Maximum incentive payments are c a l c u l a t e d at 80 percent of the mean annual land r e n t a l rate for f i v e categories of land use: c u l t i v a t e d lands (cropland, summerfallow, seeded hayland), improved pastures (seeded forage or hayland), native pastures, and woodland and wetlands on which grazing i s the dominant use. The maximum compensation rates for these land categories are then modified by the extent to which the owner foregoes a g r i c u l t u r a l production. For example, i f the owner opts for the "no a g r i c u l t u r a l use option", the land i s used s o l e l y f or w i l d l i f e habitat and he or she w i l l receive the maximum 84 incentive payment. This compares to the "modified a g r i c u l t u r a l use option" which allows a g r i c u l t u r a l uses compatible with r e t a i n i n g w i l d l i f e habitat. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the owner receives 50 percent of the maximum incentive payment. For those landowners having q u a l i t y upland nesting cover around wetlands, maximum incentive payments are modified according to the r a t i o of nesting cover retained i n a natural state to water covered area. For example, an owner conserving a three-to-one r a t i o of nesting cover to water area w i l l receive the maximum incentive. This i s reduced to 60 percent of the maximum i f the r a t i o i s one-to-one. 2) Results -Rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n - Up to January 1989, 82 landowners i n the Counties of Minburn and Red Deer have entered into 97 LHP management agreements covering 16,741 acres. The 82 landowners signing agreements represents approximately 30 percent of those owners personally contacted and encouraged to enter into an agreement. Those owners p a r t i c i p a t i n g c i t e program f l e x i b i l i t y ( i n terms of type, duration of agreement, c a n c e l l a t i o n clause, and l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use), personal i n t e r e s t i n long-term habitat protection, and economic incentives as the main features of the LHP that influenced t h e i r d ecision to p a r t i c i p a t e . In 1989, a survey of LHP p a r t i c i p a n t s and non-participants was c a r r i e d out i n order to assess the effectiveness of the program. Ninety three percent of LHP p a r t i c i p a n t s were surveyed as well as 82 non-p a r t i c i p a n t s . When asked about future p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the program, approximately h a l f of the non-participants indicated they would enter into agreements, one-quarter were undecided and one-quarter s a i d they would not l i k e l y p a r t i c i p a t e . Reasons were not given as to why non-participants do 85 not favor the program; however, when p a r t i c i p a n t s were asked to c i t e the disadvantages of the program, those that d i d indicate there were disadvantages s a i d the agreements r e s t r i c t e d land uses and farming operations and could increase w i l d l i f e - r e l a t e d crop damage and hunting r e l a t e d problems. These disadvantages may be the cause f o r many non-p a r t i c i p a n t s continuing to ignore the program. Length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n - The duration of the management agreements the landowners entered into i s one good i n d i c a t o r of t h e i r commitment to the program. Six management agreement terms are offered, ranging from 5 to 50 years. Ove r a l l , 20-year terms comprise the majority of the agreements signed and r e f l e c t landowner i n t e r e s t s i n longer-term wetland protection. The remaining agreements are predominantly for 5- and 10- year terms with very few agreements exceeding 20 years i n length. The number of agreements terminated before end of term i s a second in d i c a t o r of length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The termination rate of management agreements has not been an issue i n the LHP. Up to August, 1990, the number of landowners opting out of agreements has been minimal and predominantly due to a change i n land ownership. The 1989 survey r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e approximately 90 percent of the landowners are e i t h e r very s a t i s f i e d or s a t i s f i e d with the program including the l e v e l of compensation. This low rate of agreement termination and high l e v e l of owner s a t i s f a c t i o n must be tempered by the f a c t that the LHP has only been operating since 1986. Although termination of agreements may not become a concern i n the immediate future, changing economic status and land ownership over the long term may cause some landowners to opt out of agreements. 86 Rate of Compliance - Since LHP start-up, few landowners have v i o l a t e d management agreements by unauthorized land use changes. Program coordinators have t y p i c a l l y had to deal with one to two landowners per year who have not complied with agreement terms. In some of these cases, noncompliance was the r e s u l t of owner misunderstanding with regard to the terms of the agreement and was e a s i l y corrected. Change i n attitud e - The 1989 LHP p a r t i c i p a n t survey also assessed i f the program had influenced landowner attitudes toward conserving w i l d l i f e habitat. Survey r e s u l t s indicate that approximately two-thirds of the landholders strongly agreed or agreed that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the program has re s u l t e d i n a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e change towards habitat conservation. The remaining one-third of p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners indicated that they already had a conservation ethic before entering into an agreement. 3) Conclusion - The analysis i n Chapter IV indic a t e d that management agreements would l i k e l y have a moderate to high a c c e p t a b i l i t y among landowners as a r e s u l t of adequate compensation, retention of owner con t r o l , and f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to length of term and l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use. The evaluation indicates that LHP management agreements only have a 30 percent landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n rate; a l e v e l of appeal that i s not consistent with r e s u l t s from the analysis. Based on t h i s 30 percent l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t can be concluded that the success of the LHP agreements i n promoting private stewardship of wetlands among landowners i s l i m i t e d . P a r t i c i p a n t s have c i t e d adequate economic incentives and f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to length of term and permitted a g r i c u l t u r a l land uses as 87 p o s i t i v e aspects of the agreements. Given t h i s , i t i s l i k e l y that the requirement of a caveat re g i s t e r e d against t i t l e and a very r e s t r i c t i v e c a n c e l l a t i o n clause creates a LHP management agreement that i s less a t t r a c t i v e than other management agreements off e r e d under d i f f e r e n t programs. The r e s t r i c t i v e c a n c e l l a t i o n clause i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y weak aspect of the agreement. Because i t only allows a landowner the opportunity to cancel out of the agreement every f i v e years, he or she i s obligated to a s p e c i f i c land use f o r a set period of time thus l i m i t i n g t h e i r c o n t r o l over the use of t h e i r land. This loss of owner con t r o l was alluded to i n the 1989 landowner survey when p a r t i c i p a n t s c i t e d r e s t r i c t e d land uses and farming operations as a disadvantage of the management agreements. Although p a r t i c i p a t i o n has been lower than anticipated, the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the LHP among those landowners supporting the program through the signing of agreements i s more consistent with the analysis. The p o s i t i v e change i n landowner, attitudes towards a conservation ethic, the n e g l i g i b l e rate of agreement termination and v i o l a t i o n , and the preference f o r 20-year terms indicates that the LHP has been well accepted by p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners. These r e s u l t s must, however, be viewed with caution given the 5-year age of the program. As the management agreements move c l o s e r to maturity, longer-term information w i l l become ava i l a b l e as to the percentage of p a r t i c i p a n t s opting out of or not complying with agreements and the percentage of landowners renewing t h e i r agreement a f t e r the current one has lapsed. In spite of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , the owner commitment shown so f a r towards the program indicates that the LHP has, since implementation, been successful i n continuing to promote pri v a t e stewardship of wetlands among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. 88 5.3.2 Saskatchewan's P r a i r i e Pothole Project (PPP) The following d e s c r i p t i o n and r e s u l t s of the PPP i s drawn p r i n c i p a l l y from Melinchuk and MacKay (1986), Russell and Howland (1988), Duncan (1990) and Van Kooten and Schmitz (1990). 1) Background - In 1985, the Saskatchewan Government, with funding support from W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada and the Canadian W i l d l i f e Service, i n i t i a t e d the P r a i r i e Pothole Project. The p r i n c i p a l objective of t h i s p i l o t p roject i s to i d e n t i f y , apply and evaluate methods of protecting wetlands on p r i v a t e land i n r u r a l Saskatchewan. The. target area for the PPP i s the Rural M u n i c i p a l i t y of Antler i n Southeast Saskatchewan. This municipality has r i c h , black productive s o i l s and a high density of potholes making i t a h i g h l y productive waterfowl habitat. Ninety-six percent of the area Is p r i v a t e l y owned with 80 percent i n t e n s i v e l y managed for the production of cereal grains. Continuing losses of wetlands and associated uplands to a g r i c u l t u r a l production i s t y p i c a l of the area; however, i t s value to waterfowl has not yet been eliminated. The P r a i r i e Pothole Project has two phases. Through a landowner survey, Phase I assessed owner receptiveness to a v a r i e t y of options which could be used to secure long-term protection of wetlands on p r i v a t e landholdings. Licenses (management agreements), leases, property tax incentives, and conservation easements were some of the many options included i n t h i s assessment phase. Producers indicated that they preferred management agreements and leases as methods for encouraging wetland conservation. Phase II, the implementation and evaluation stage of the project endorsed i n 1986, i s a five-year, 1.7 m i l l i o n d o l l a r stage designed to d e l i v e r and evaluate several of the options assessed i n Phase I. During the implementation stage which ran from 1986 to February, 1988, management 8 9 agreements and leases were the primary mechanisms used by p r o j e c t coordinators to promote pri v a t e stewardship of wetlands. This r e f l e c t s landowner preferences recorded i n Phase I. Management agreements were u t i l i z e d to secure native habitat complexes which were generally defined to include a l l uncultivated uplands (i n c l u d i n g hay and pasture) and wetlands containing emergent native vegetation. Letters announcing and explaining the program were mailed to a l l landowners i n the municipality. Those interes t e d i n entering into a management agreement were i n v i t e d to contact project s t a f f who then evaluated the i n d i v i d u a l owner's property to determine i f s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a were s a t i s f i e d . I f so, the landowner was approached to negotiate the agreement. Management agreements under the PPP offered landowners various monetary incentives to a l t e r t h e i r native land management strategies i n ways that b e n e f i t w i l d l i f e . Owners were given a choice of e i t h e r 5- or 10-year terms, up-front incentives are paid out once a year p r i o r to the season covered by the agreement, and agreement terms were f l e x i b l e with regard to the amount of a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted. Unlike the management agreements off e r e d under the Landowner Habitat Project, a l l PPP agreements, regardless of the length of term, have a 90 day c a n c e l l a t i o n clause to promote landowner acceptance and no caveat was r e g i s t e r e d against the t i t l e . Incentives offered were determined through a scaled lease fee structure based on the terms of the agreement including length of term, degree of a g r i c u l t u r a l use maintained and r a t i o of upland to wetland retained. The fee structure was intended to promote longer term agreements, preserve i d l e d native habitats and encourage a high upland to 90 wetland r a t i o . Maximum incentive rates are $10/acre/year (based on average pasture r e n t a l rates f o r the area) and were offe r e d to landowners entering into a 10 year, no a g r i c u l t u r a l use, 3:1 upland to wetland r a t i o agreement. The fee schedule i s as follows: FEE SCHEDULE FOR MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS ($/acre/year) Idled* U t i l i z e d * * Modified*** l : l * * * * 2:1 3:1 Term: 5 years $2.00 $2.50 $4.00 $6.00 $8.00 10 years $3.00 $3.75 $6.00 $8.00 $10.00 * No a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted; landowner i s required to set aside at l e a s t 15 acres of wetlands plus an equivalent or greater amount of uplands. ** U n r e s t r i c t e d haying or grazing permitted. *** Modified use r e s t r i c t s haying or grazing dates u n t i l J u l y 15 or June 20 re s p e c t i v e l y . **** Upland to wetland r a t i o . The p r o j e c t u t i l i z e d leases to secure 40 acre c u l t i v a t e d parcels for purposes of e s t a b l i s h i n g dense nesting cover. Landowners having f l a t c u l t i v a t e d 40 acre parcel blocks around wetlands were contacted and encouraged to lease the parcels f o r a 10-year term to be renegotiated every three years. There was no f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to length of term of f e r e d to the owners and they are unable to opt out of the lease before the term i s complete. Having the owner lock i n for ten years protects the government's investment i n materials and labor. Landowners entering into a lease agreement receive $30/acre/year based on the average annual cropland r e n t a l p r i c e i n the general area and have a caveat r e g i s t e r e d against t h e i r 91 t i t l e . At renegotiation, the r e n t a l p r i c e i s examined and adjusted to ensure the landowner i s adequately compensated. The PPP r e t a i n exclusive possession of the parcel which allowed project coordinators to enclose the area with an e l e c t r i f i e d fence and seed to nesting cover. 2) Results -Results of the PPP are divided into two separate sections: Phase I and I I . Phase I reports landowner receptiveness to conservation easements and property tax incentives based on the landowner survey. Phase II reports landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as measured by the evaluation c r i t e r i a , for management agreements and leases. Phase I - Eighty-seven landowners i n the Rural M u n i c i p a l i t y of Antle r were surveyed i n order to assess t h e i r receptiveness to a v a r i e t y of nonregulatory mechanisms. These 87 landowners represent 68 percent of the study area's 198 landowners and 77 percent of the study area's land base. Of the landowners canvassed, the majority (77%) indicated they preferred management agreements and leases as methods to secure long-term p r o t e c t i o n of wetlands. As a second choice, only 9 percent favored the use of conservation easements. This mechanism was c r i t i c i z e d as being too binding and r e s t r i c t i v e to farming operations. With regard to property tax incentives, survey data indicate that 31 percent favored the use of a property tax exemption on wetland areas i n return for an agreement to conserve these areas. I t was recognized by many landowners that a property tax exemption on wetlands without i n c l u s i o n of a property tax c r e d i t on t i l l a b l e land r e s u l t s i n poor compensation. Those landowners r e j e c t i n g the use of property tax exemptions to promote stewardship c i t e d the following reasons: poor compensation, too much 92 government bureaucracy, too much extra bookwork, and the Rural Municipality of Antler, as the proposed administering body, may not be f a i r and j u s t . These survey r e s u l t s indicate landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of weak property tax incentives over a longer term. The Ontario Conservation Land Tax Reduction Program, i n i t i a t e d i n l a t e 1988, gives a very general i n d i c a t i o n of the short-term a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanism. This new program o f f e r s landowners of highly s i g n i f i c a n t conservation lands a rebate on the municipal property taxes l e v i e d against those lands. The rebate equals 100 percent of the taxes paid on e l i g i b l e lands up to a maximum of 25,000 per landowner over the course of the program. Owners ceasing to maintain the conservation lands i n t h e i r natural state must repay an amount equal to the t o t a l rebates received by a l l owners during the previous ten years plus i n t e r e s t at the rate of 10 percent per year, c a l c u l a t e d annually. Those landowners e l i g i b l e f o r a tax rebate for 1987 and 1988 must have t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n into the Ontario M i n i s t r y of Municipal A f f a i r s by December 31, 1990. According to the M i n i s t r y of Municipal A f f a i r s (1990), the program i s very popular among landholders. As of e a r l y October, 1990, the number of applicants for the rebate have exceeded expectations by approximately 75 percent. Phase II -Rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n - During the implementation stage of Phase I I , 45 percent of a l l landowners i n the Rural M u n i c i p a l i t y of Antler entered into management agreements. In t o t a l , 13,550 acres of native ha b i t a t were secured v i a agreements which represents approximately 30 percent of the t o t a l e l i g i b l e native habitat i n the study area. Of the landowners entering into agreements, almost two-thirds opted to r e t a i n f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of the area ( u n r e s t r i c t e d haying or grazing permitted), one-93 quarter were w i l l i n g to i d l e t h e i r land (no a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted) and only 12 percent opted to modify present land use pra c t i c e s ( r e s t r i c t e d haying or grazing). An agreement that allows f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of the area was favored because i t allows the landowner maximum f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to land use as well as the highest p o t e n t i a l income. Although the fee schedule pays le s s to those owners opting for f u l l y u t i l i z e d agreements, they can "double-up" t h e i r income by renting the land to ranchers while r e c e i v i n g payments from the PPP. Lease e f f o r t s were dire c t e d toward securing 40 acre c u l t i v a t e d parcels f o r dense nesting cover from 26 landowners i n the study area. By the end of the implementation stage of the project, 31 percent of those 26 landowners had entered into a lease agreement. C u l t i v a t e d parcels leased included better and more marginal a g r i c u l t u r a l lands. Those landowners not signing leases were c r i t i c a l of the lease payments, fragmented quarter sections and the inconvenience and cost of farming the extra corners that r e s u l t e d from l e a s i n g a 40 acre p a r c e l . Although lease payments are based on the average annual cropland r e n t a l p r i c e i n the general area, they do not include costs associated with increased f u e l and labor to make turns around the extra corners and they are too low for those landowners having above-average a g r i c u l t u r a l land (based on assessed tax value). Length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n - Landowners entering into management agreements had a choice of eit h e r 5- or 10-year terms. Approximately 60 percent of the owners opted for the 10-year term. Although t h i s s t a t i s t i c can i n d i c a t e landowner commitment to the project, i t must be recognized that l i m i t a t i o n s e x i s t given the manner i n which the agreements were secured. The 90 day c a n c e l l a t i o n clause, emphasized i n negotiations as a "u s e r - f r i e n d l y " feature of the mechanism, was made a v a i l a b l e to landowners 94 regardless of the length of agreement they entered into . This clause favors the 10-year agreements over the 5 because i t o f f e r s owners more money without a greater l e v e l of commitment. Up to December 1990, termination of agreements has been n e g l i g i b l e . Because most of the owners signing agreements opted to r e t a i n f u l l a g r i c u l t u r a l u t i l i z a t i o n of the wetland area, there i s minimal interference i n t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l operations leaving l i t t l e reason to opt out of the agreement. Some owners who signed agreements which p r o h i b i t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l uses came back to the project coordinators to renegotiate f o r more f l e x i b l e terms which allow some a g r i c u l t u r a l use of the area. This renegotiation was p a r t i c u l a r l y prevalent during drought years. With regard to leases offered by the PPP, length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as indicated by agreement term and agreement termination i s not an issue. Landowners signing leases had to enter into a 10-year agreement without option f o r termination. Rate of Compliance - Up to December, 1990, the number of owners v i o l a t i n g management agreement terms has been v i r t u a l l y nonexistent due to the prevalence of " f u l l a g r i c u l t u r a l use" agreements as well as project coordinators allowing the land use terms of agreements to be renegotiated. Landowners v i o l a t i n g lease agreements by unauthorized changes i n land use i s not an issue because exclusive possession of the leased parcel goes to the PPP who take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r land use. Once the par c e l i s fenced, converted to dense nesting, and managed accordingly, i t would be very d i f f i c u l t f o r the owner to v i o l a t e the lease agreement. Change i n attitu d e - The evaluation phase of the PPP has yet to assess the number of landowners currently with management or lease agreements who have had a s h i f t i n a t t i t u d e towards a stewardship e t h i c . A 95 socioeconomic evaluation of the project focussed on those factors a f f e c t i n g landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Results indicate that a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward the project and waterfowl habitat conservation are not s i g n i f i c a n t factors i n encouraging owner p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management agreements or leases. Given these r e s u l t s , many of the landowners entering into agreements did not have a strong conservation ethic and further assessment i s needed to determine i f they have had a change i n a t t i t u d e . 3) Conclusion -Phase I - The analysis c a r r i e d out i n Chapter IV indicated that the probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of conservation easements would be low as a r e s u l t of l o s t property r i g h t s , i n f l e x i b i l i t y and longevity. The analysis also suggested that strong property tax incentives would l i k e l y have only moderate a c c e p t a b i l i t y among landowners due to i n f l e x i b i l i t y and the r e s u l t a n t treatment of landowners as a homogeneous group. Weak property tax incentives would l i k e l y have high owner appeal i n i t i a l l y , decreasing to low appeal i n the long term due to the l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l support given to landowners. Because these mechanisms are not u t i l i z e d i n the PPP, these hypothesis cannot be tested through a p p l i c a t i o n of the evaluation c r i t e r i a . Results of the PPP assessment of landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y towards conservation easements and property tax incentives i s , however, used as a comparison to the l i t e r a t u r e - b a s e d analysis and allows general conclusions as to the success of these mechanisms i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship. The assessment does not allow conclusions to be drawn with regard to the success of these mechanisms i n continuing to promote stewardship among those supportive landowners cannot be made. 96 Results of the PPP assessment of landowner receptiveness to conservation easements i s consistent with the ana l y s i s . Assessment re s u l t s indicate a low l e v e l (9%) of a c c e p t a b i l i t y among surveyed landowners i n the study areas f o r reasons c i t e d i n the analysis. From these r e s u l t s , i t can be concluded, that the success of t h i s mechanism i n encouraging stewardship of wetlands among pri v a t e landholders i s very l i m i t e d . Because the PPP assessment of property tax incentives focused on the exemption of wetland acres rather than a c r e d i t of t i l l a b l e acres, only conclusions as to the success of weak property tax incentives can be made. The assessment indicates that long-term property tax exemptions f o r wetland areas have a 31 percent acceptance rate among surveyed landowners. This lower l e v e l of owner appeal i s consistent with the analysis and from these r e s u l t s i t can be concluded that, over a long time frame, the success of weak property tax incentives i n promoting private stewardship of wetlands among landowners i s l i m i t e d . Although assessed owner appeal of weak property tax incentives was consistent with the analysis, surveyed owners who d i d not favor t h i s mechanism gave reasons f o r t h e i r r e j e c t i o n which were not completely consistent with the analysis. Rather than c i t i n g i n f l e x i b i l i t y which the analysis flagged as a major disadvantage of th i s mechanism, owners c i t e d government bureaucracy and mistrust of l o c a l government as art administering body as reasons f o r r e j e c t i o n . This attack on government may be the r e s u l t of i t s long-term role i n property taxation or owner perception of the Rural M u n i c i p a l i t y of Antler's present p o l i t i c a l representatives not meeting t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Very preliminary r e s u l t s from the Ontario Conservation Land Tax Reduction Program support the analysis with regard to short-term landowner 97 a c c e p t a b i l i t y of weak property tax incentives. Although t h i s r e s u l t gives a very general i n d i c a t i o n of owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y , i t does suggest t h i s mechanism can be successful i n encouraging private stewardship over a short time period. Phase II - The evaluation of PPP management agreements indicates that 45 percent of a l l landowners i n the study area supported t h i s mechanism. When compared with LHP management agreements, t h i s rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s 15 percent higher and more consistent with the moderate to high probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y r a t i n g from the a n a l y s i s . Based on these r e s u l t s , i t can be concluded that the PPP management agreements are moderately successful i n promoting private stewardship among landowners. Since both PPP and LHP management agreements o f f e r the landowner adequate economic incentives and f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to land use, the higher rate of owner appeal among PPP agreements versus LHP agreements may be due to the f a c t that PPP agreements have a 90 day rather than 5-year c a n c e l l a t i o n clause and no caveat i s registered against t i t l e . This 90 day c a n c e l l a t i o n clause i s p a r t i c u l a r l y appealing to owners because i t r e a d i l y allows them to back out of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to a s p e c i f i c land use and thus, does not l i m i t t h e i r control over land use decisions. The evaluation also indicates that the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the PPP management agreements among those landowners holding agreements i s consistent with the analysis. Although change i n owner a t t i t u d e towards a stewardship e t h i c has yet to be assessed, the n e g l i g i b l e rate of termination and v i o l a t i o n as well as a preference for the 10-year length of term suggests that the management agreements offered by the PPP have been well accepted by p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. These r e s u l t s must however, be viewed with caution because the project has been i n place only a short time 98 and the structure of the agreements favor the 10-year term over the 5. Only as time passes w i l l longer-term information be made a v a i l a b l e as to the percentage of p a r t i c i p a n t s opting out or not complying with agreements as well as the number of landowners renewing t h e i r agreements once the current one has lapsed. In spite of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , the owner commitment shown so f a r to the project indicates that the management agreements have, since implementation, been successful i n continuing to promote private stewardship of wetlands among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. The analysis i n Chapter IV indicated that lease agreements would l i k e l y have only moderate a c c e p t a b i l i t y among landowners because of the disadvantages associated with t h i s mechanism including l i m i t e d owner cont r o l and exclusive possession by the lessee. The evaluation indicates that PPP lease agreements have a 31 percent landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n rate: a l e v e l of owner appeal that i s only s l i g h t l y lower than what was suggested i n the a n a l y s i s . Based on t h i s r e s u l t , i t can be concluded that the success of t h i s mechanism.in encouraging private stewardship of wetlands i s l i m i t e d . Although the actual owner appeal i s consistent with the analysis, the disadvantages of t h i s mechanism, as c i t e d by landowners approached to enter into a lease agreement, were not consistent with the analysis. Owners were more concerned with adequate compensation for leasing q u a l i t y a g r i c u l t u r a l lands and minimizing fragmentation of quarter sections than with l i m i t e d c o n t r o l over t h e i r land base or exclusive lessee possession. The success of PPP lease agreements i n continuing to promote private stewardship among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners i s d i f f i c u l t to determine because of the structure of the leases. Because owners had to lock into a 10-year agreement without the a b i l i t y to cancel the lease, t h e i r commitment 99 to the lease over a long time frame cannot be established. As well, owner v i o l a t i o n s of the agreement are very d i f f i c u l t to carry out given the exclusive possession clause. I f the project offered varying terms to the owners with the f l e x i b i l i t y to cancel the lease, landowner commitment could be more r e a d i l y established. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i f the landowner could opt out of the agreement without having to pay f o r the lessee costs incurred to upgrade the land. I f an owner i s l i a b l e f o r costs upon termination of a lease, he or she may be much more reluctant, from a cost perspective, to opt out of the agreement. 5 . 3 . 3 Ontario's Natural Heritage Stewardship Program (NHSP) The following d e s c r i p t i o n and r e s u l t s of the NHSP i s drawn p r i n c i p a l l y from Moull (1987 and 1990), and Rzadki et a l . (1988). 1) Background - The Natural Heritage Stewardship Program i s a research and outreach project sponsored by the Ontario Natural Heritage League. The League i s a loose c o a l i t i o n of 28 government and non-government groups concerned with the protection of Ontario's natural heritage areas. The NHSP began i n 1984 as s t r i c t l y an educational outreach p i l o t project. Private landowners of important natural areas across southern Ontario were contacted d i r e c t l y and informed of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e i r land. Several of the target s i t e s were wetlands. Due to the t r i a l basis of t h i s educational approach to encouraging private stewardship, the p r o v i s i o n of t e c h n i c a l information through extension services was not employed. In 1985, the NHSP adapted the educational outreach approach to the C a r o l i n i a n Canada project i n i t i a t e d by the Natural Conservancy of Canada 100 and World W i l d l i f e Fund. This i s a s p e c i a l conservation e f f o r t to protect 38 key natural areas i n the southernmost part of Southwestern Ontario, most of which are i n the private ownership of over 1,000 landowners. This " C a r o l i n i a n zone", containing e c o l o g i c a l communities and habitats unique to Canada, i s under increasing pressure from i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base, and r a p i d l y expanding r e c r e a t i o n a l uses and urban and i n d u s t r i a l development. The 38 s i t e s represent a range of habitat types, i n c l u d i n g wetlands, i n a v a r i e t y of surrounding land uses. By 1987, the research aspect of the NHSP lead to the development and implementation of the Natural Heritage Stewardship Award Program i n the C a r o l i n i a n region ( i n conjunction with the educational outreach program). This landowner recognition approach to promoting private stewardship requires owners cooperating i n the program to make a verbal, s t r i c t l y voluntary agreement to protect the natural areas on t h e i r land. They also consent to give notice of land use change, such as wetland drainage, when deciding to terminate the agreement. To recognize t h e i r ongoing c o n t r i b u t i o n to protecting natural areas, owners receive a plaque or c e r t i f i c a t e of recognition. Recipients are recontacted at l e a s t annually to maintain and b u i l d upon the cooperation established when the agreement was f i r s t entered i n t o . 2) Results -As mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s section, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to apply the evaluative c r i t e r i a to the educational outreach component of the NHSP. F i r s t , receptiveness to a landowner education mechanism does not ne c e s s a r i l y mean that the owner w i l l opt to r e t a i n wetlands. P a r t i c i p a t i o n rate as ou t l i n e d i n the evaluation c r i t e r i a r e f e r s to landowners who have 101 agreed to the terms of the mechanism and thus protect wetlands on t h e i r land. Secondly, an educational program does not require a l e g a l or nonlegal agreement from the landholder and as a r e s u l t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to keep track of the number of owners who have opted to r e t a i n wetlands. These l i m i t a t i o n s on evaluation apply to the' educational component of the NHSP. Following the p r o v i s i o n of information i n the NHSP, data i s not av a i l a b l e i n d i c a t i n g the number of landowners choosing to r e t a i n wetlands. Rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n - Between 1985 and 1986 the educational outreach component of the NHSP personally contacted 539 landowners over 38 s i t e s i n the C a r o l i n i a n region. Eighty seven percent of those owners contacted were receptive to the educational program and showed a p o s i t i v e attitude.toward the concept of private stewardship. They were generally pleased to le a r n of the value and s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e i r land and were also i n t e r e s t e d i n ways to enhance or maintain these natural areas. When the Natural Heritage Stewardship Award Program began i n 1987, many of the landowners contacted i n 1985-86 were r e v i s i t e d to see i f they were w i l l i n g to enter into the verbal agreement. As of August 1990, approximately 1200 landowners have been approached and asked to enter into agreements. Of the 1200 contacted, a high percentage (approximately 80) were supportive of private stewardship with 470 or 39 percent entering into the verbal handshake agreement. These agreements account f o r approximately 46 percent of p r i v a t e l y owned land i n the 38 s i t e s i d e n t i f i e d f o r p r o t e c t i o n i n the C a r o l i n i a n region. Data indicates that wetland owners do not as r e a d i l y enter into agreements as non-wetland owners. Program coordinators speculate that t h i s i s due to the larger s i z e of wetland areas versus other natural areas on i n d i v i d u a l properties. The data also indicates that those landowners not receptive to the educational outreach 102 program and to the concept of voluntary stewardship without compensation tend to be young farmers with high l i a b i l i t i e s . Because i t i s d i f f i c u l t to evaluate the educational outreach component, i t i s unknown how many of those contacted owners supporting pr i v a t e stewardship but not entering into agreements are a c t u a l l y conserving t h e i r natural areas. Program coordinators v i s i t i n g owners indica t e that there are many owners who are very conservation oriented and have every i n t e n t i o n of conserving t h e i r natural areas, but do not wish to enter into a stewardship agreement. Length of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and rate of compliance - As of October, 1990, the number of landowners opting out of the terms of t h e i r verbal agreements i n order to pursue other land uses has not been an issue. As well, only a very few owners v i o l a t e d t h e i r agreements by changing land use without g i v i n g notice to the program coordinators. This low termination and v i o l a t i o n rate must be tempered by the f a c t that the landowner recognition aspect of the NHSP has only been i n place since 1987. Since the landowner agreements are s t r i c t l y voluntary without any compensation, changing landowner economic status over a longer time period may cause many owners to opt out or v i o l a t e agreements i n order to r e a l i z e returns from t h e i r investment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land. Change i n at t i t u d e - NHSP coordinators have not formally assessed the number of owners currently with agreements who have had a s h i f t i n a t t i t u d e towards a stewardship e t h i c . However, i n q u i r i e s by a number of landowners regarding other nonregulatory stewardship mechanisms which require greater owner commitment, such as conservation easements, has been int e r p r e t e d as an a t t i t u d i n a l change towards conservation of natural areas. 103 3) Conclusion - The Chapter IV analysis indicated that both landowner education and landowner recognition mechanisms would probably have high owner appeal i n the short term, decreasing to low appeal i n the long term due to the lack of f i n a n c i a l compensation. Given the l i m i t e d time period the NHSP has been operational and the d i f f i c u l t y i n evaluating education mechanisms, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to t e s t the analysis and draw conclusions on the success of these mechanisms i n promoting pr i v a t e stewardship. As the landowner recognition component of the NHSP has only been operational since 1987, only a short-term evaluation of t h i s mechanism i s po s s i b l e . As the program progresses, evaluating i t s long-term success i n encouraging stewardship w i l l be possible. The evaluation of short-term data indicates that only 39 percent of contacted landowners were w i l l i n g to enter into a verbal handshake agreement- a l e v e l of owner appeal that i s much lower that what was suggested i n the analysis. Based on t h i s 39 percent p a r t i c i p a t i o n rate, i t can be concluded that recognition agreements are only moderately successful i n promoting private stewardship among a large number of landowners. It was argued i n the analysis that a large number of landowners who have opted to r e t a i n natural areas i n the past w i l l continue to do so i n the short term under a recognition program because they have nothing to lose. The agreement can be e a s i l y broken when the owner wishes to change land uses. Reasons were not given for why many landowners who expressed an i n t e n t i o n to conserve t h e i r natural areas refused to enter into a verbal agreement. The analysis i d e n t i f i e d i n f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to allowing compatible a g r i c u l t u r a l uses as a short and long-term disadvantage of rec o g n i t i o n agreements. The insistence upon maintaining a wetland area i n a natural state without other land uses may play a bigger r o l e i n the 104 i n i t i a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanisms than was a n t i c i p a t e d . Landowners may f e e l that some l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l use such as grazing or haying i s compatible with conservation of natural areas. Although p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n recognition agreements i s lower than a n t i c i p a t e d over the short term, a c c e p t a b i l i t y among those owners supporting the program i s more consistent with the analysis. The evaluation shows that the recognition component of the NHSP has been well accepted by p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. Since implementation, termination and v i o l a t i o n s of agreements have been n e g l i g i b l e and program coordinators are seeing a s h i f t i n owner attitud e towards a stewardship e t h i c . This owner commitment to the agreements indicates that t h i s mechanism, over a short time period, has been successful i n continuing to promote private stewardship of wetlands among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. However, based on the analysis, t h i s success i s expected to decrease over time as landowners move into land uses that allow a return on investment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l land. With regard to the education component of the NHSP, i t i s impossible to determine the short and long-term effectiveness of t h i s mechanism i n encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. Data from the NHSP shows that a very high percentage (87) of contacted landowners were receptive to the educational component and the conservation goal of the program. Because i t i s not known how many of these landowners a c t u a l l y opted to r e t a i n t h e i r n atural areas, t h i s r e s u l t only gives a very general i n d i c a t i o n of the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of an educational mechanism. I f most of these landowners continued to conserve t h e i r natural areas i n the short term, t h i s l e v e l of a c c e p t a b i l i t y would be consistent with the analysis. As well, i t would indic a t e that t h i s mechanism i s successful i n promoting private stewardship over a.short time frame. 1 0 5 5 .4 Summary In t h i s chapter, the s i x market and moral suasion nonregulatory mechanisms analyzed i n Chapter IV were evaluated f o r t h e i r success i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. Evaluation c r i t e r i a based on landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n were established to determine the landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the selected mechanisms as implemented i n three Canadian stewardship programs: Alberta's Landowner Habitat Project, Saskatchewan's P r a i r i e Pothole Project and Ontario's Natural Heritage Stewardship Program. Results from the a p p l i c a t i o n of the evaluation c r i t e r i a were used to draw conclusions with regard to the success of the mechanisms i n encouraging p r i v a t e landholders to r e t a i n wetlands, and the success of the mechanisms i n continuing to promote stewardship among those owners p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a stewardship program. Data l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the case studies d i d not allow for the evaluative c r i t e r i a to be f u l l y applied to a l l s i x mechanisms. A landowner survey, conducted by the P r a i r i e Pothole Project to determine owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a number of nonregulatory tools helped to supplement data gaps; however, conclusions with regard to the success of the s i x mechanisms in promoting private stewardship of wetlands are l i m i t e d . A p p l i c a t i o n of the evaluative c r i t e r i a i s summarized i n Table 2. Results with regard to the rate of landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n (coupled with supplemental data from the landowner survey) showed that owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y and support vary among the selected mechanisms. Conclusions drawn from these r e s u l t s indicate that the mechanisms have varying degrees of success i n encouraging private landholders to conserve wetlands. Figure 3 summarizes the mechanisms' success. Excluded are strong property tax incentives, landowner education and long-term landowner recognition TABLE 2 A SUMMARY OF LANDOWNER ACCEPTABILITY OF SELECTED NONREGULATORY MECHANISMS AS DETERMINED BY PARTICIPATION IN STEWARDSHIP PROGRAMS EVAHJATION CRITERIA MECHANISMS Participation Rate Length of Particip Predominant Agreement Term Chosen ition Termination Rate Rate of Compliance Positive Change in Attitude Weak Property Tax Incentives** (short-term) High (high) Not Available Not Available Not Available PPP Weak Property Tax Incentives* (long-term) 31% (low) Not Available Not Available Not Available LHP Management Agreements 30% (low) 20 year (high) Negligible (high) High (high) Yes (high) PPP Management Agreements 45% (moderate) 10 year (high) Negligible (high) High (high) Not Available PPP Leases 31% (low) ^^-^^ Not Available PPP Conservation Easements* 9% (low) ^^^^ Not Available Not Available NHSP landowner Education Not Available Not Available Not Available NHSP landowner Recognition (short-term) 39% (moderate) Negligible (high) High (high) Yes (high) Landowner Acceptability: (low) (moderate) (high) Strong Property Tax Incentives, Landowner Education *Based on PPP Landowner Survey and landowner Recognition (long-term) are excluded **Based on the Ontario Conservation Land Tax Reduction Program due to data limitations U ^ l Not Applicable 107 Figure 3 Success of the Selected Nonregulatory Mechanisms In Promoting Stewardship of Wetlands Among Private Landowners Due to data limitations, the success of Strong Property Tax Incentives Landowner Education and Landowner Recognition (long-term) In promoting private stewardship cannot be determined. 108 agreements whose effectiveness could not be determined due to data s h o r t f a l l s . Results with regard to the length of owner p a r t i c i p a t i o n , rate of compliance and change i n owner attitud e indicated that management agreements and landowner recognition agreements have the support and commitment of p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. Conclusions drawn from these r e s u l t s suggest that these two mechanisms are successful i n continuing to promote stewardship of wetlands among p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners. This success however, was q u a l i f i e d by the. f a c t that management agreements and landowner recognition agreements i n the case studies have only been i n place for less than 5 years. This success may diminish over the years, p a r t i c u l a r l y with recognition agreements which do no o f f e r the owner compensation. With regard to leases, property tax incentives, landowner education and conservation easements, data l i m i t a t i o n s were such that the effectiveness of these mechanisms i n promoting on-going stewardship among supportive landowners could not be determined. The evaluation c a r r i e d out i n t h i s Chapter tested the analysis of Chapter IV. Probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the selected nonregulatory mechanisms, as determined by an a n a l y t i c a l framework applied to the l i t e r a t u r e , was shown to be consistent with the actual owner appeal of the mechanisms as implemented i n the case studies or assessed by way of the landowner survey i n the P r a i r i e Pothole Project. Management agreements offe r e d by the Landowner Habitat Project and short-term landowner recognition agreements are an exception. Based on rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , these two tools have lower owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y than was expected. Although landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the mechanisms i s consistent between the analysis and evaluation, data l i m i t a t i o n s make i t d i f f i c u l t to draw 109 conclusions as to the v a l i d i t y of the a n a l y t i c a l framework developed i n Chapter IV. In a l l three case studies, only l i m i t e d information i s a v a i l a b l e as to why landholders e i t h e r accepted or rejected a stewardship mechanism o f f e r e d to them. The information that i s a v a i l a b l e indicates that owners are concerned with adequate compensation, c o n t r o l over land use decisions, and mechanism f l e x i b i l i t y which confirms at l e a s t a p o r t i o n of the a n a l y t i c a l framework. The framework also suggested mechanism complexity and c e r t a i n t y were concerns to owners, but due to l i m i t e d case study information, these concerns could neither be confirmed nor d i s c r e d i t e d i n the evaluation. There were however, concerns c i t e d by owners which the framework di d not cover including mistrust of l o c a l government as an administration body for incentive payments and fragmentation of farmland by leasing agreements and the resultant a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n e f f i c i e n c i e s . These concerns are v a l i d and suggest that the a n a l y t i c a l framework could be expanded on. As current stewardship programs progress and new ones are implemented, more information on landowner concerns w i l l be made ava i l a b l e which w i l l allow stewardship program coordinators to more r e a d i l y meet the needs and wishes of landholders. 110 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Loss and degradation of wetlands across the p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada i s severe and acc e l e r a t i n g as on-going i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of farming and expansion of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base continues to exert pressure on the remaining wetland resource. Through increased p u b l i c awareness of the s o c i e t a l values provided by wetlands, society i s in c r e a s i n g l y i n d i c a t i n g a desire to preserve wetland environments. Although government has reacted to environmental degradation on p r i v a t e l y held lands through the use of mandatory controls which i n t e r f e r e with the use and management of an in d i v i d u a l ' s property, landowners and the general p u b l i c i n Canada are more receptive to the use of nonregulatory tools than of p o l i c e power regulation as a means of achieving p r i v a t e wetland conservation. This preference r e f l e c t s society's desire to minimize infringement on the property r i g h t s of landowners. This desire, i n turn, r e f l e c t s the perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with regulation and nonregulation i n c l u d i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n a l impacts. Interference with private property r i g h t s i s perceived negatively by society: society benefits at the cost of the i n d i v i d u a l landowner. Wetland retention through e i t h e r moral suasion or the payment of economic incentives i s recognized as p o s i t i v e : neither s o c i e t y nor the i n d i v i d u a l landowner i s l e f t worse o f f . General p u b l i c and landowner perceptions regarding the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l impacts associated with regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms and the high degree of s o c i e t a l receptiveness towards the use of nonregulatory t o o l s to achieve wetland conservation objectives provided the framework i n I l l which nonregulatory approaches to encouraging pr i v a t e landowner stewardship of wetlands were evaluated. This chapter begins by summarizing the conclusions of Chapters IV and V with regard to the probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the s i x selected market and moral suasion nonregulatory mechanisms and t h e i r success i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands based on actual owner appeal. General conclusions that follow from these s p e c i f i c r e s u l t s are then o u t l i n e d as w e l l as recommendations on how the nonregulatory mechanisms and stewardship programs can be improved upon i n order to e f f e c t i v e l y encourage landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Further, recommendations are given f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a data base to monitor the success of nonregulatory mechanisms i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship and suggestions are made f o r further research. 6.1 Summary of Conclusions Market approach 1) Property Tax Incentives The l i t e r a t u r e analysis showed that strong property tax incentives would l i k e l y have moderate owner appeal; however, t h i s l e v e l of a c c e p t a b i l i t y could not be tested i n the case studies due to data l i m i t a t i o n s . The analysis also indicated that weak property tax incentives would l i k e l y have high owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n the short term, decreasing to low a c c e p t a b i l i t y over time. The expected short-term appeal of t h i s mechanism i s supported by very case study r e s u l t s and as such, i t was caut i o u s l y concluded that, over a short time period, weak property tax incentives are successful i n encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship. The expected 112 diminishing long-term appeal was substantiated by case study data and i t was concluded that, over time, the success of t h i s mechanism i n promoting stewardship among landowners i s l i m i t e d . 2) Management Agreements From the l i t e r a t u r e analysis i t was concluded that management agreements would probably have a moderate to high appeal among landholders. This r e s u l t was both substantiated and contradicted by case study r e s u l t s . The actual owner appeal of management agreements off e r e d i n the Landowner Habitat Project (LHP) was lower than predicted and a conclusion was drawn that such agreements had l i m i t e d success i n promoting stewardship among landowners. The appeal of management agreements o f f e r e d i n the P r a i r i e Pothole Project (PPP) was more consistent with expectations and i t was concluded that such agreements are moderately successful i n encouraging owners to conserve wetlands. The case studies also i n d i c a t e d that, since implementation, both LHP and PPP agreements have been successful i n continuing to promote stewardship among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners. This i s a preliminary conclusion due to the programs having only been i n place f o r a short time period and as a r e s u l t , i t i s unknown i f t h i s mechanism w i l l continue to receive p a r t i c i p a n t support over time. 3) Leases The l i t e r a t u r e analysis indicated that leases would l i k e l y have moderate appeal among landholders. This l e v e l of a c c e p t a b i l i t y was supported by case study data and i t was concluded that leases have l i m i t e d success i n promoting stewardship among landholders Conclusions regarding the success of t h i s mechanism i n continuing to promote stewardship among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners could not be drawn due to the i n f l e x i b l e structure 113 of the lease agreements which make i t d i f f i c u l t to determine p a r t i c i p a n t support and commitment. 4) Conservation Easements The l i t e r a t u r e analysis showed that conservation easements would l i k e l y have low landowner appeal. Case study data supported t h i s expected l e v e l of a c c e p t a b i l i t y and i t was concluded that the success of t h i s mechanism i n encouraging owners to conserve wetlands i s very l i m i t e d . Conclusions regarding the success of t h i s mechanism i n continuing to promote stewardship among p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners could not be drawn due to data l i m i t a t i o n s . Moral Suasion 5) Landowner Education I t was concluded from the l i t e r a t u r e analysis that landowner education mechanisms would probably have high landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n the short term decreasing to low a c c e p t a b i l i t y over time. This l e v e l of appeal could not be tested i n the case studies due to data l i m i t a t i o n s . 6) Landowner Recognition Conclusions drawn from the l i t e r a t u r e analysis with regarji to the probable owner appeal of landowner recognition mechanisms are the same as those f o r landowner education. The expected high owner appeal of t h i s mechanism over the short term was not supported by case study r e s u l t s . Actual owner appeal was much lower than predicted i n the analysis and i t was concluded that, over a short time period, landowner recogni t i o n i s only moderately successful i n encouraging stewardship among landholders. From t h i s short-term data, i t was also concluded that, since implementation, 114 t h i s mechanism has been successful i n continuing to promote stewardship of wetlands among p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners. This i s a preliminary conclusion based on the f a c t that the case studies have only been operational f o r less than f i v e years and the analysis shows decreasing owner appeal of rec o g n i t i o n mechanisms over time. The expected low l e v e l of a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h i s mechanism over a longer time frame could not be tested i n the case studies due to data l i m i t a t i o n s . 6.2 General Conclusions and Recommendations From the r e s u l t s of t h i s study, two general conclusions can be drawn. F i r s t , due to the infancy of stewardship programs i n Canada and the re s u l t a n t lack of short and long-term data on landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t w i l l take time to demonstrate the effectiveness of nonregulatory mechanisms i n promoting p r i v a t e landowner stewardship of wetlands. Currently, there are a l i m i t e d number of stewardship programs i n place across Canada and the three chosen f o r study i n t h i s thesis lead the way i n terms of length of time i n operation (approximately 4 years) and data generated. As current programs progress and new programs are initiated^", a data base can and should be established whereby a better determination can be made of the short and long-term success of nonregulatory mechanisms i n encouraging stewardship among landowners and i n continuing to encourage stewardship among p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners. Further on i n t h i s chapter, recommendations In 1989-1990, W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada a s s i s t e d i n the promotion of pr i v a t e landowner stewardship programs through the approval of over 1.3 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s to 10 new and ongoing private stewardship i n i t i a t i v e s . This increases t h e i r commitment to over 6.3 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a l l o c a t e d to 18 p r i v a t e stewardship programs underway i n v i r t u a l l y every province of Canada ( W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada 1990). 115 are given concerning the development of a data base to monitor the success of nonregulatory mechanisms. Second, from the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of success the mechanisms have shown i n the case studies with respect to encouraging landowners to s t a r t p r a c t i s i n g stewardship, i t i s apparent that the mechanisms vary, over a broad range, i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to secure wetland acreage for p r o t e c t i o n . (Information gaps exclude strong property tax incentives, landowner education and long-term landowner recognition agreements from t h i s conclusion). Two general categories e x i s t with regard to the adequacy of the mechanisms i n pr o t e c t i n g wetlands. F i r s t , those mechanisms which have only moderate to l i m i t e d success i n encouraging pr i v a t e stewardship are l i m i t e d i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to secure wetland acreage f o r p r o t e c t i o n and thus only inconsistent conservation i s achieved. The majority of the mechanisms, incl u d i n g management agreements, landowner recognition, leases, and conservation easements f a l l within t h i s category. The second category includes those mechanisms which are successful i n promoting stewardship over a short term only and thus are l i m i t e d i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to adequately protect wetlands over a longer time frame. Weak property tax incentives f a l l w ithin t h i s category. Given the two wetland p r o t e c t i o n categories a t t r i b u t e d to the mechanisms, i t would appear that not one of the mechanisms evaluated i n t h i s study ensures a high l e v e l of wetland conservation. The infancy of the stewardship programs may be a cont r i b u t i n g f a c t o r . Although the o I t must also be recognized that the effectiveness of nonregulatory mechanisms i n continuing to protect wetlands over the long term i s c r i t i c a l to the success of any stewardship program. However, s u f f i c i e n t evidence i s not a v a i l a b l e at t h i s time to indicate how successful each mechanism i s with regard to maintaining support and commitment among landowners p r a c t i s i n g stewardship. 116 nonregulatory tools are cu r r e n t l y l i m i t e d i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship, any degree or of receptiveness and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s valuable f o r b u i l d i n g understanding and support for wetland preservation. Mechanisms such as landowner education which i s well received by most landowners i n the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program, and weak property tax incentives which show wide landowner appeal i n the short term, can be very valuable i n t h i s r o l e . Weak property tax incentives, f or example, can be a s t a r t i n g point f or promoting greater owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of other nonregulatory mechanisms which may provide for longer term wetland protection. By promoting the need for wetland conservation, they may increase owner receptiveness to management and lease agreements which ask for a land use commitment through l e g a l agreements. As well, i f they can s h i f t landowner at t i t u d e s towards a stewardship e t h i c , some of the primary concerns of owners may eventually change and they may in c r e a s i n g l y be more receptive towards r e s t r i c t i v e nonregulatory mechanisms, such as conservation easements, which are less f l e x i b l e and demand c e r t a i n property r i g h t s . Increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management and lease agreements should also have the same p o s i t i v e outcome with respect to increasing receptiveness to conservation easements. To e s t a b l i s h that the effectiveness of the nonregulatory mechanisms i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship can increase over time, stewardship programs i n Canada must be given time to mature and b u i l d support among landowners f o r the conservation of wetlands. The p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l backing f o r implementation of long-term stewardship programs and the maintenance of e x i s t i n g programs looks very p o s i t i v e . The co n t r i b u t i o n W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada makes towards pri v a t e stewardship i s a good example as i s the North American Waterfowl Management Plan (NAWMP). The NAWMP i s a 117 comprehensive Canada- United States land use and w i l d l i f e h a b i t a t plan to restore waterfowl populations i n North America. Established i n 1988, programs are expected to cost 1 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s over 15 years of which the majority i s targeted for the p r a i r i e pothole region of Canada to finance a v a r i e t y of p r i v a t e stewardship programs geared towards wetland preservation through nonregulatory, market mechanisms ( P r a i r i e Habitat J o i n t Venture 1990). In a d d i t i o n to allowing stewardship programs to mature so as to p o s s i b l y increase landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y , the mechanisms and programs themselves can be improved upon to make them more appealing to owners. From the evaluation of the case studies, i t was established that adequate f i n a n c i a l incentives, landowner control over land use decisions and f l e x i b i l i t y are important i n order to a t t r a c t owner p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Program coordinators must therefore s t r i v e to ensure that nonregulatory tools meet these three landowner concerns- the exception being landowner recognition mechanisms which do not provide economic incentives and conservation easements which are i n f l e x i b l e and l i m i t owner c o n t r o l . In the case of management agreements under the Landowner Habitat Project, landowner appeal can be strengthened by having a f l e x i b l e c a n c e l l a t i o n clause. Lease agreements under the P r a i r i e Pothole Project can be improved upon by adding f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to length of term and s i z e of pa r c e l to be leased. Currently, l e a s i n g of only 40 acre parcels contributes to farmland fragmentation and production i n e f f i c i e n c i e s . F i n a l l y , landowner rec o g n i t i o n tools under the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program can be strengthened i n terms of landowner appeal by adding more f l e x i b i l i t y i n the types of land uses permitted around a wetland. At present, wetland areas 118 are not allowed to support any a g r i c u l t u r a l production regardless of i t s c o m p a t i b i l i t y with wetlands. Currently, l i t t l e evidence i s a v a i l a b l e i n the case studies to suggest i f other landowner concerns and issues e x i s t which a f f e c t mechanism a c c e p t a b i l i t y . As more information on owner concerns becomes av a i l a b l e , program coordinators need to assess and revise the nonregulatory tools to ensure they more r e a d i l y meet the needs and desires of landholders. With regard to improving the pr i v a t e stewardship programs, the evaluation of the case studies r a i s e a number of questions that may have an impact on owner a c c e p t a b i l i t y : 1) Rather than having the stewardship programs target a v a r i e t y of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands i n areas of wetland environments, would i t not be more appealing i f programs focussed, wherever possible, on land that i s economically marginal for crop and l i v e s t o c k production? Lands with low a g r i c u l t u r a l value w i l l l i k e l y have a higher p r o b a b i l i t y of being committed to stewardship programs, e s p e c i a l l y i f owners are not allowed any kind of a g r i c u l t u r a l land use. Regardless of the l e v e l of incentive o f f e r e d to owners, they are i n the business of growing food and are more apt to r e t a i n b e t t e r q u a l i t y lands f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l production. 2) Rather than having the stewardship programs target s p e c i f i c wetland r e t e n t i o n a c t i v i t i e s which may encompass only a small p o r t i o n of a landowner's farm, would i t not be more appealing i f programs are d i r e c t e d towards landscape stewardship? That i s , maintaining and enhancing a l l aspects of the p r i v a t e land base including the s o i l resource, natural areas such as woodlots and wetlands and water resources such as lakes and streams. 119 I t should be remembered that most landowners don't compartmentalize t h e i r property. They see t h e i r property as a u n i t , recognizing the importance of the parts that make up the whole (Rzadki et a l . 1988 pl79-180) . At present, stewardship programs s p e c i f i c to e i t h e r wetlands or s o i l conservation operate concurrently. A r u r a l landscape approach would demonstrate to landowners that w i l d l i f e and a g r i c u l t u r a l objectives can be integrated, and would make owners more aware of the linkages between nat u r a l area p r o t e c t i o n and p r o d u c t i v i t y of the s o i l resource. Only 6 percent of landowners p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Landowner Habitat Project were aware that p r o t e c t i o n of wetlands has s o i l conservation benefits such as l i m i t i n g s o i l erosion through reduced spring runoff (Brusnyk et a l . 1990). 3) Rather than stewardship programs o f f e r i n g only one or two nonregulatory options to landowners, would i t not be more appealing i f programs o f f e r e d a number of d i f f e r e n t options ranging from landowner rec o g n i t i o n to conservation easements? This would create a capacity f o r maximum f l e x i b i l i t y i n meeting the needs of a broad spectrum of landowners o with diverse p e r s o n a l i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s . Landowners could choose the option that best meets t h e i r needs and desires or opt for a v a r i e t y of options f o r a number of d i f f e r e n t s i t e s on t h e i r property. 6.3 Monitoring the Success of Nonregulatory Mechanisms As current stewardship programs progress and new ones are i n i t i a t e d , i t i s necessary to e s t a b l i s h an appropriate data base i f the success of the mechanisms are to be monitored e f f e c t i v e l y . Determining the success of pr i v a t e stewardship programs w i l l become inc r e a s i n g l y important i n the future as the pu b l i c p r o f i l e of the programs increases and society demands 120 to see the r e s u l t s that are achieved through t h e i r continued f i n a n c i a l support. Given the infancy of stewardship programs i n Canada, data gaps or information l i m i t e d to a short term nature i s expected. However, stewardship program coordinators must focus on c o l l e c t i n g key information i n order to make a good determination of the mechanisms' success i n promoting p r i v a t e stewardship. The evaluation of the case studies i n d i c a t e d that the data bases being developed are, for the most part, adequate to monitor success. D e f i c i e n c i e s that do e x i s t are r e l a t e d to the s o c i a l aspects of stewardship programs such as s h i f t i n landowner attitud e and the b e n e f i t s and disadvantages of a program as perceived by p a r t i c i p a n t s and nonparticipants. Following are recommendations f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a data base that would allow program coordinators to e f f e c t i v e l y monitor the success of the mechanisms: 1) Landowners p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the program as a percentage of the t o t a l e l i g i b l e landowners ( e l i g i b i l i t y defined by q u a l i t y of wetland on landowner parcel) must be determined. 2) Landowner commitment to a stewardship program must be established by determining the length of agreements entered into, number of agreements terminated p r i o r to end of term, and agreement v i o l a t i o n s through land use changes. Because most mechanisms require some sort of agreement, information i s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e on the number of p a r t i c i p a t i n g owners, the length of agreements they entered into and agreement termination. Program coordinators w i l l however, need to monitor over time the u t i l i z a t i o n of 121 c a n c e l l a t i o n clauses, number of owners renewing agreements and stewardship compliance i n order to e s t a b l i s h a long-term commitment by landowners. Compliance can be d i f f i c u l t to determine and may require on-going monitoring of owner land use patterns and resource management pra c t i c e s v i a a p r a c t i c a l land stewardship monitoring system. The a b i l i t y to r e a d i l y monitor land use and management i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important for those mechanisms such as property tax incentives that can cover large areas and have large owner appeal i n the short term. However, monitoring may also become in c r e a s i n g l y important for other nonregulatory tools such as management agreements, leases and landowner recognition. Coordinators of the Landowner Habitat Project, the P r a i r i e Pothole Project and the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program have expressed concern over the need to adequately monitor compliance. I f these programs were to s i g n i f i c a n t l y expand over the next few years, some sort of formal land use and management monitoring program w i l l be required to ensure incentives or recognition are only given to those landowners i n compliance. In a d d i t i o n to determining compliance, a monitoring system i s necessary to e s t a b l i s h landowner p a r t i c i p a t i o n following an education campaign. Since no landowner agreement i s required, only monitoring of land use w i l l determine i f education i s at a l l e f f e c t i v e i n encouraging stewardship. Due to a lack of monitoring i n the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program following an educational campaign, s i g n i f i c a n t data l i m i t a t i o n s were faced i n t h i s study r e s u l t i n g i n an i n a b i l i t y to assess the success of t h i s mechanism i n promoting pr i v a t e stewardship. 3) Landowner attitudes towards stewardship of wetlands and the program i n general i s also an important component i n determining the success of the mechanisms i n encouraging wetland retention. A s h i f t i n 122 a t t i t u d e towards a stewardship e t h i c must be determined as well as p a r t i c i p a n t and non-participant perceptions with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of the stewardship program, s p e c i f i c features of the program that influenced or may influence p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s a t i s f a c t i o n , and the l i k e l i h o o d of future involvement by non-participants. To achieve these ends, those landowners involved i n a stewardship program and those non-participants e l i g i b l e to become involved must be personally surveyed. The survey of p a r t i c i p a t i n g landowners should be an extension of the good l i n e of communication maintained between the owner and program coordinator throughout the e n t i r e l i f e of the program. E s t a b l i s h i n g the a b i l i t y of nonregulatory mechanisms to s h i f t landowner att i t u d e s towards a stewardship ethic i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y important component of the data base. I t i s c r i t i c a l that p o l i c i e s and tools f o r achieving those p o l i c e s contribute to the b u i l d i n g of a land e t h i c i n society. Ultimately, i f sustainable development i s to be achieved, i n c l u d i n g a conscientious conservation of wetlands over time, landholders and societ y i n general must have a land e t h i c based on the recognition that ecosystems and communities of l i f e have i n t r i n s i c value. 6.4 Recommendations f o r Future Research At many points throughout t h i s study, l i m i t a t i o n s due to informational gaps have been acknowledged and unanswered questions have been raised. These present opportunities f or further i n v e s t i g a t i o n into a number of areas r e l a t e d to the use of nonregulatory approaches to promote p r i v a t e stewardship of wetlands. F i r s t , the need for and content of a data base to e s t a b l i s h the short and long-term success of nonregulatory mechanisms i n encouraging landowners to conserve wetlands has been outlined 123 i n t h i s chapter and w i l l not be dealt with further. Second, while an a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r assessing the probable landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y of nonregulatory mechanisms was established and tested i n t h i s study, more research i s needed to further r e f i n e i t so that i t could be of use when developing or r e v i s i n g stewardship programs. Limited information from the case studies supported three of the f i v e landowner concerns making up the framework, in c l u d i n g adequate compensation, landowner c o n t r o l and f l e x i b i l i t y . A d d i t i o n a l information regarding the primary concerns of landowners asked to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a stewardship program i s required i n order to b e t t e r support these three concerns, substantiate the remaining two concerns from the framework (complexity and c e r t a i n t y ) , as well as to h i g h l i g h t other s i g n i f i c a n t concerns. The proposed data base can play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n supplying the needed information. F i n a l l y , researchable questions p r i m a r i l y r e l a t i n g to the focus of p r i v a t e stewardship programs were brought up e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter and warrant further i n v e s t i g a t i o n . F i r s t , there i s a need to determine i f stewardship programs have wider appeal among landowners i f they target lands economically marginal for crop and l i v e s t o c k production. Concurrent with such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n would be the need to e s t a b l i s h the q u a l i t y and quantity of wetland environments that would be protected across the p r a i r i e pothole region i f programs were to predominantly focus on marginal a g r i c u l t u r a l lands. Second, there i s a need to determine i f p r i v a t e stewardship programs have wider appeal among landowners i f they deal with a l l conservation,aspects of a land base through a comprehensive landscape approach. To t e s t a landscape approach for landowner a c c e p t a b i l i t y , there must be development and promotion of a g r i c u l t u r a l systems that not only b e n e f i t the a g r i c u l t u r a l land base but also natural ecosystems such as 124 wetlands. This w i l l require a coordinated e f f o r t on the part of w i l d l i f e , environmental and a g r i c u l t u r a l agencies. F i n a l l y , there i s a need to determine i f programs have greater landowner appeal i f they o f f e r a number of nonregulatory options to owners such as the range evaluated i n t h i s study. In conclusion, a nonregulatory approach to promoting p r i v a t e landowner stewardship provides society with an opportunity to meet natural area conservation objectives while encouraging the development of a sustainable land use e t h i c i n the general p u b l i c and i n d i v i d u a l landowners. This promise of the c o n t r i b u t i o n nonregulatory tools can make towards b u i l d i n g a land e t h i c i n society i s t h e i r greatest opportunity. For although both regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms are v i a b l e approaches f o r meeting conservation objectives, nonregulatory tools may better serve the challenge of changing s o c i e t a l values and attitudes to r e f l e c t a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards natural ecosystems and communities of l i f e . 125 BIBLIOGRAPHY Alberta Habitat Joint Venture Technical Committee. 1989. Implementation of the North American Waterfowl Management Plan in Alberta. Edmonton: Alberta Habitat Joint Venture Technical Committee. Alberta Water Resources Commission. 1989. Development of a Wetlands Policy for the Settled Area (White Area) of Alberta. Draft. Edmonton: Alberta Water Resources Commission. Baltezore, J.F., J.A. Leitch and W.C. Nelson. 1987. Economic Analysis of Draining Wetlands in Kidder County, North Dakota. Agricultural Economics Report no. 230. Fargo: Agricultural Experiment Station, North Dakota State University. i^ Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates. 1979. Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life. Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-Hall, Inc. Brace, R.K and G.W. Pepper. 1984. Impact of Agricultural Drainage on Wildlife. In Proceedings of the Third Annual Western Provincial Conference: Rationalization of Water and Soil Research and Management- Agricultural Land Drainage. November 20-22, 1984, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Brechtel, S. and P. Anderson. 1987. The Alberta Landowners Habitat Program. In Wildlife Conservation on Private Lands: Proceedings of the Private Stewardship/ Landowner Contact Workshop. August, 1987, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Winnipeg: Wildlife Habitat Canada. ^Bromley, D.W. 1982. The Rights of Society Versus the Rights of Landowners and Operators. In Soil Conservation Policies, Institutions and Incentives, ed. H.G. Halerow, E.O. Heady and M.L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of America, riuo SuM-M sg@ C8<) Brown, P.J. and M.J. Manfredo. 1987. Social Values Defined. In Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives, ed. D.J. Decker and G.R. Goff. Boulder: Westview Press . ®^ * 1 . < v /3sr(s%) ^ J ^ W * - ^ . Brusnyk, L.M., D.A. Westworth, and W.L. Adamowicz. 1990. An Evaluation of the Landowner Habitat Project. Edmonton: D.A. Westworth and Associates Ltd. for the Alberta Fish and Wildlife Division and Wildlife Habitat Canada. Callicott, J.B. 1987. The Philosophical Value of Wildlife. In Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives, ed. D.J. Decker and G.R. Goff. Boulder: Westview Press. Canadian Wildlife Service. 1986. North American Waterfowl Management Plan: A Strategy for Cooperation. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. Chant, D.A. 1986. Forward to An Environmental Ethic- Its Formulation and Implications. In Environmental Ethics: Philosophical and Policy Perspectives, ed. P.P. Hanson. Burnaby: Simon Fraser University Publications. 126 Cowan, W. 1988. U n t i t l e d . Manitoba: Ducks Unlimited. Cowardin, L.M. 1982. Wetlands and Deepwater Habitats: A New C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 37(2): 83-85. Dales, J.H. 1977. The Property Interface. In Economics of the Environment. 2d ed., ed. R. Dorfman and N.S. Dorfman. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Danielson, L.E. and J.A. L e i t c h . 1986. Private vs Public Economics of P r a i r i e Wetland A l l o c a t i o n . J. Environ,. Economics and Manage. 13:81-92. Davis, O.A. and M.I. Kamien. 1977. E x t e r n a l i t i e s , Information, and A l t e r n a t i v e C o l l e c t i v e Action. In The Economics of the Environment. 2d ed., ed. R. Dorfman and N.S. Dorfman. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Deknatel, C. 1979. W i l d l i f e Habitat Development on Private Lands: A Planning Approach to Rural Land Use. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 34(6): 260-263. Desjardins, R., K MacDonald and D. Wutzke. 1984. The Economics of Drainage i n A l b e r t a . In Proceedings of the Third Annual Western Provincial Conference: Rationalization of Water and Soil Research and Management- Agricultural Land Drainage. November 20-22, 1984, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Devall, B. and G. Sessions. 1985. Deep Ecology. S a l t Lake C i t y : Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. Ducks Unlimited. 1989. The Duck Depression of the 1980's- An Agenda for Recovery. Long Grove IL: Duck Unlimited Inc. Duncan, D. Saskatchewan Wetland Conservation Corporation. Personal communication with author, 3 December 1990. Economic Council of Canada. 1979. Responsible Regulation. Interim Report. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada. Ehrenfeld, D. 1978. The Arrogance of Humanism. Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. E t z i o n i , A. 1961. Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. Federal- P r o v i n c i a l A g r i c u l t u r e Committee on Environmental S u s t a i n a b i l i t y . 1990. Growing Together: Report of the Federal- Provincial Agriculture Committee on Environmental Sustainability. Ottawa: A g r i c u l t u r e Canada. 127 Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s and Environment Canada. 1987. Wetlands Conservation Policy in Canada: Recommendations by Non-Government Organizations. Ontario: Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s and Environment Canada. F e i s t , M. 1979. Management Agreements: A Valuable Tool of Rural Planning. The Planner January:3-5. Foster, J.H. 1987 Measuring the S o c i a l Value of Wetland Benefit. In Wetland Functions and Values: The State of our Understanding. Proceedings of the National Symposium on Wetlands, November 7-10, 1978, Disneyworld V i l l a g e , Lake Buena V i s t a , F l o r i d a . Minneapolis: American Water Resources Association. F u l l e n , L. A l b e r t a A g r i c u l t u r e . Personal communication with author, 28 January 1991. Gardner, J.E. 1988. Decision-Making for Sustainable Development: P o t e n t i a l i n Selected Approaches to Environmental Assessment and Management. In The Role of Environmental Assessment in Promoting Sustainable Development: Three Views. UBC Planning Paper no. 13. Vancouver: School of Community and Regional Planning, The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Goldsmith, A. and E.H. Clark I I . 1990. Nonregulatory Programs Promoting Wetlands Protection. In Issues In Wetlands Protection: Background Papers Prepared for the National Wetlands Policy Forum, ed. G. Bingham, E.H. Clark I I , L.V. Haygood and M. L e s l i e . Washington, D.C: The Conservation Foundation. Government of Canada. 1990. A Report on the Green Plan Consultations. Ottawa: Government of Canada. Haigis, B and W. Young. 1983. Methods of Preserving Wildlife Habitat. Working Paper no. 25. Ottawa: Lands Directorate. Hamilton, S.W. and D.E. Baxter. 1977. Government Ownership and the Price of Land. In Public Property? The Habitat Debate Continued, ed. L.B. Smith and M. Wallace. Vancouver: The Fraser I n s t i t u t e . Hanson, P.P. 1986. Morality, Posterity, and Nature. In Environmental Ethics: Philosophical and Policy Perspectives, ed. P.P. Hanson. Burnaby: Simon Fraser U n i v e r s i t y Publications. H i l t s , S.G. and T. Moull. 1988. Ontario's Innovative Natural Heritage Stewardship Programme: A Novel Approach to Conservation. Highlights 11(1): 11-13. H i l t s , S.G. 1990. Good Stewardship Matters to Our Land. Land Matters 2(1): 1. 128 Hochbaum, G.S., R.K. Brace, andW.F. Cowan. 1988. Buffer Zones Between Ag r i c u l t u r e and W i l d l i f e . In Proceedings of the Symposium on Water Management Affecting the Wet-to-Dry Transition: Planning at the Margins. November 8-9, 1988, Regina, Saskatchewan. Hoose, P.M. 1981. Building an Ark: Tools for the Preservation of Natural Diversity Through Land Protection. Covelo: Island Press. Jacquemot, A., R. Reid and F.L. F i l i o n . 1986. The Importance of Wildlife to Canadians: The Recreational Economic Significance of Wildlife. Ottawa: Canadian W i l d l i f e Service and Environment Canada. Jaworski, E. 1981. The Economics of Wetland Protection. In Proceedings of the Ontario Wetlands Conference, ed. A. Champagne. September 18-19, 1981, Toronto, Ontario. Toronto: Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s . Knetsch, J.L. 1980. Property Rights, Land Use C o n f l i c t s and Compensation. CAES Annual Meeting Proceedings. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 28:20-30. Kusler, J.A. 1980. Regulating Sensitive Lands. Cambridge: B a l l i n g e r ^ Publishing Company. Kusler, J.A. 1990. Views on S c i e n t i f i c Issues Relating to the Restoration and Creation of Wetlands. In Issues in Wetland Protection: Background Papers Prepared for the National Wetlands Policy Forum, ed. G. Bingham, E.H. Clark I I , L.V. Haygood and M. L e s l i e . Washington, D.C: The Conservation Foundation. Larson, J.S. 1987. Wetland Creation and Restoration: An Outline of the S c i e n t i f i c Perspective. In Increasing Our Wetland Resources, ed. J . Zelazny and J . S. Feierabend. National W i l d l i f e Federation- Corporate Conservation Council Conference Proceedings, October 4-7, 1987, Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C: National W i l d l i f e Federation. L e i t c h , J.A. 1983. Economics of P r a i r i e Wetland Drainage. Transactions of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers 26(5): 1465-1470, 1475. L e i t c h , J.A. and L.A; Shabman. 1988. Overview of Economic Assessment Methods Relevant to Wetland Evaluation. In The Ecology and Management of Wetlands, Volume 2: Management, Use and Value of Wetlands. London: Croom Helm. L e i t c h , J.A. 1988. Economics of the P r a i r i e Wetland. In Proceedings of the North Dakota Wetlands Workshop, ed. T.A. Messmer. J u l y 13-15, 1987, Bismarck, North Dakota. Leopold, A. 1949. A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. Lynch-Stewart, P. 1983. Land Use Change on Wetlands in Southern Canada: Review and Bibliography. Canada Land Use Monitoring Program Working Paper no. 26. Ottawa: Lands Directorate. 129 Manitoba Departments of Ag r i c u l t u r e and Natural Resources. 1985. Proposed Guidelines for the Management of Prairie Potholes in Manitoba. Manitoba: Manitoba Departments of Ag r i c u l t u r e and Natural Resources. Melinchuk, R and R. Mackay. 1986. Prairie Pothole Project- Phase I- Final Report. Regina: Saskatchewan Parks and Renewable Resources. Melinchuk, R. 1988 Wetlands and Waterfowl. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Water Management Affecting the Wet-to-Dry Transition: Planning at the Margins. November 8-9, 1988, Regina, Saskatchewan. Milne, J.E. 1984. The Landowner's Options. In Land Saving Action, ed. R.L. Brenneman and S.M. Bates. Covelo: Island Press. M i n i s t r y of Municipal A f f a i r s . Personal communication with author, 12 October 1990. Morgan, J.P. 1987. Private Stewardship/Landowner Contact: Some Thoughts on Its Beginnings, Structure, and Use i n Canada. In Wildlife Conservation on Private Lands: Proceedings of the Private Stewardship/Landowner Contact Workshop. August, 1987, Winnipeg. Moull, T. 1987. Ontario's Natural Heritage Stewardship Program. In Wildlife Conservation on Private Lands: Proceedings of the Private Stewardship/ Landowner Contact Workshop. August, 1987, Winnipeg. Winnipeg: W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada. Moull, T. Coordinator of the Natural Heritage Stewardship Program. Personal Communication with author, 1 October 1990. Muller, R.A. 1985. The Socioeconomic Value of Water in Canada. Research Paper no. 5. Ottawa: Grady Economics and Associates Ltd. f o r Inquiry on Federal Water P o l i c y . Murphy, A. Alber t a Forestry, Lands and W i l d l i f e . Personal communication with author, 22 October 1990. National Wetlands Working Group. 1988. Wetlands of Canada. E c o l o g i c a l Land Canada Committee on E c o l o g i c a l Land C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Series no. 24. Ottawa: Environment Canada. Odum, U.P. 1978. The Value of Wetlands: A H i e r a r c h i c a l Approach. In Wetland Functions and Values: The State of Our Understanding. Proceedings of the National Symposium on Wetlands, November 7-10, 1978, Disneyworld V i l l a g e , Lake Buena V i s t a , F l o r i d a . Minneapolis: American Water Resources Association. Ontario Chapter- S o i l Conservation Society of America. 1987. Wetland Conservation: A Call for Action. Ontario: Ontario Chapter- S o i l Conservation Society of America. 130 P h i l l i p s , W.E. 1983. Economics of Recreational Resources: F i s h and W i l d l i f e Valuation. In Symposium on Fish and Wildlife Resources and Economic Development. Conference proceedings, A p r i l 26-27, 1983, Edmonton, Alberta. Edmonton: The Alb e r t a Society of Professional B i o l o g i s t s and Al b e r t a Energy and Natural Resources. P h i l l i p s , W.E. and W.L. Adamowicz. 1986. Valuing Environmental Resource Commodities and Service. Agriculture and Forestry Bulletin 9(3): 14-18. P h i l l i p s , W.E. and T.S. Veeman. 1987. A l t e r n a t i v e Incentives and I n s t i t u t i o n s f o r Water and S o i l Conservation. Canadian Water Resources Journal 12(3): 27-33. P o l l a r d , D.F.W. and M.R. McKechnie. 1986. World Conservation Strategy-Canada: A Report on Achievements in Conservation. Ottawa: Environment Canada. Power, T.M. 1985. Economic Valuation of the Natural Environment: Profaning the Sacred? In Economy and Ecology: The Economics of Environmental Protection. Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental B i o l o g i s t s . P r a i r i e Habitat J o i n t Venture Advisory Board. 1990. Prairie Habitat: A Prospectus. Edmonton: P r a i r i e Habitat J o i n t Venture Advisory Board. P r i e s t , M., W.T. Stanbury and F. Thompson. 1980. On the D e f i n i t i o n of Economic Regulation. In Government Regulation Scope, Growth, Process, ed. W.T. Stanbury. Montreal: The I n s t i t u t e f o r Research on Public P o l i c y . Randall, A. 1981. Resource Economics: An Environmental Approach to Natural Resources and Environmental Policy. Columbus: Gr i d Publishing Inc. Rees, W.E. 1988a. The Global Context for Sustainable Development. Background paper prepared for the Planning f or Sustainable Development Symposium, November 25-27, 1988, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Vancouver: School of Community and Regional Planning, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Rees, W.E. 1988b. Defining Sustainable Development. Background paper prepared f o r the Planning f or Sustainable Development Symposium, November 25-27, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Vancouver: School of Community and Regional Planning, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Renewable Resources Sub-Committee, Public Advisory Committees to the Environment Council of Alberta. 1989. A Place for Wildlife. Edmonton: Environment Council of Alberta. Rolston I I I , H. 1981. Values i n Nature. Environmental Ethics 3:113-128. 131 Rosenbaum, N. 1978. Enforcing Wetlands Regulations. In Wetland Functions and Values: The State of our Understanding. Proceedings of the National Symposium on Wetlands, November 7-10, 1978, Disneyworld V i l l a g e , Lake Buena V i s t a , F l o r i d a . Minneapolis: American Water Resources Association. Rowe, J.S. 1990. Home Place: Essays on Ecology. Edmonton: Newest. Rus s e l l , R.D. and R.M. Howland. 1988. Prairie Pothole Project 1987 Annual Report. Regina: Saskatchewan Parks, Recreation and Culture and the Canadian W i l d l i f e Service. Ryder, J.P. and D.A. Boag. 1981. A Canadian Paradox- Private Land, Public W i l d l i f e : Can i t be Resolved? The Canadian Field Naturalist 95:35-38. Rzadki, J . , T. Moull, S. H i l t s , and M. Van Patter. 1988. Landowner Contact: Four Years Later. In Wetlands: Inertia or Momentum. Conference proceedings, October 21-22, 1988, Toronto, Ontario. Don M i l l s : Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s . Scace and Associates Ltd. 1989. Aspects of Policy, Programming and Practice: A Contribution to Pilot Planning Project Phase III Sub-Basin Water Management Planning Study (SWMP). Draft no.2. Calgary: Scace and Associates Ltd for Alberta Environment. Schmitt, K. 1985. A g r i c u l t u r a l Landuse and Waterfowl: A C o n f l i c t ? In 22nd Annual Alberta Soil Science Workshop Proceedings. February 19-20, 1985, Lethbridge, Alberta. Smutko, L.S., J.A. L e i t c h , L.E. Danielson, and R.K. Stroh. 1984. Landowner Attitudes Toward Wetland Preservation Policies in the Prairie Pothole Region. Fargo: North Dakota State Un i v e r s i t y . Talbot, L.M. 1984. The World Conservation Strategy. In Sustaining Tomorrow: A Strategy for World Conservation and Development, ed. F.R. Thibodeau and H.H. Herman. London: U n i v e r s i t y Press of New England. Tarnocai, C. 1979. Canadian Wetland Registry. In Proceedings of a Workshop on Canadian Wetlands. E c o l o g i c a l Land C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Series no. 12. Ottawa: Lands Directorate. Taylor, P.W. 1981. The Ethics of Respect f o r Nature. Environmental Ethics 3:197-218. The Conservation Foundation. 1988. Protecting America's Wetlands: An Action Agenda. The F i n a l Report of the National Wetlands P o l i c y Forum. Washington D.C: The Conservation Foundation. Tiner, R.W. J r . 1984. Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent Trends. Newton Corner: U.S. F i s h and W i l d l i f e Service. 132 Turner, B.C., G.S. Hochbaum, F.D. Caswell, and D.J. Nieman. 1987. A g r i c u l t u r a l Impacts on Wetland Habitats on the Canadian P r a i r i e s , 1981-85. Trans. N. Am. Wildl. and Natur. Resour. Conf. 52:206-214. Turner, R.K. 1988. Wetland Conservation: Economics and Et h i c s . In Economics, Growth and Sustainable Environments, ed. D. C o l l a r d , D. Pearce and D. Ulph. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Usher, R. and J . Scarth. 1988. Wetlands Sector Report. Draft. Edmonton: Environment Council of Alberta. Van Kooten, G.C. and A. Schmitz. 1990. Socioeconomic Evaluation of Incentives to Promote Waterfowl Habitat: Prairie Pothole Project Extensive Survey Results. Regina: Saskatchewan Parks, Recreation and Culture. Van Patter, M., S. H i l t s , T. Moull and J . Rzadki. 1988. Stewardship Enhancement Techniques for Wetland Conservation. In Wetlands: Inertia or Momentum. Conference proceedings, October 21-22, 1988, Toronto, Ontario. Don M i l l s : Federation of Ontario N a t u r a l i s t s . Wallace, R.R. and P.A. Lane. 1988. Feasibility Study in CEARC Cumulative Effects Assessment (CEA): Wetlands of the Boreal Agricultural Fringe of the Prairie Provinces. Volume I I . H u l l : The Canadian Environmental Assessment and Research Council. W e a t h e r i l l , R. Al b e r t a Forestry, Lands and W i l d l i f e . Personal communication with author, 13 September 1990. W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada. 1986. The Status of Wildlife Habitat in Canada: Problems, Issues and Opportunities. Ottawa: W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada. W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada. 1990. 1989-1990 Annual Report. Ottawa: W i l d l i f e Habitat Canada. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. Zedler, J.B. 1987. Why i t ' s so D i f f i c u l t to Replace Lost Wetland Functions. In Increasing Our Wetland Resources, ed. J . Zelazny and J . S. Feierabend. National W i l d l i f e Federation- Corporate Conservation Council Conference Proceedings, October 4-7, 1987, Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C: National W i l d l i f e Federation. o 133 APPENDIX I FEDERAL AND ALBERTA LEGISLATION WITH POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON WETLANDS IN ALBERTA FEDERAL L e g i s l a t i o n Migratory Birds Convention Act (Environment Canada) Pot e n t i a l Impacts POSITIVE: Provides the basic foundation f o r the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, an agreement between Canada and the United States with the objective of cooperation between the two countries i n achieving waterfowl population goals. The importance of the plan i n a wetlands habitat context i s i t s emphasis on protection, r e s t o r a t i o n and management of wetland habitat for the maintenance of abundant waterfowl populations. Canada W i l d l i f e Act (Environment Canada) POSITIVE: Empowers Minist e r of the Environment to coordinate j o i n t f e d e r a l / p r o v i n c i a l w i l d l i f e p o l i c i e s and programs and to acquire lands f o r research, conservation and in t e r p r e t a t i o n i n respect of migratory b i r d s or other w i l d l i f e . A l l provisions of the Act respecting w i l d l i f e extend to w i l d l i f e h a bitat. Department of A g r i c u l t u r e Act (Agric u l t u r e Canada) NEGATIVE: Provides f o r development and expansion of the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry through v e h i c l e s such as subsidies, grants, tax incentives, extension programs and research which are generally geared towards a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n through c u l t i v a t i o n of wetlands and other lands not cu r r e n t l y i n production. 134 L e g i s l a t i o n P o t e n t i a l Impacts Canadian Wheat Board Act (Canadian Wheat Board) Income Tax Act (Revenue Canada) P r a i r i e Farm R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Act (Agriculture Canada) NEGATIVE: The Canadian Wheat Board was created to market Canadian-grown grain. The CWB sets grain d e l i v e r y quotas cu r r e n t l y based on t o t a l seeded and summerfallow acreage per producing farmer. This quota determination has been c r i t i c i z e d f o r encouraging landowners to expand t h e i r quota acreage through c u l t i v a t i o n of marginal land thereby promoting destruction of wetland basins and margins. NEGATIVE: Makes p r o v i s i o n f o r fed e r a l income tax deductions for costs incurred i n draining wetlands. A double monetary incentive f or drainage can occur- a landowner can borrow money f o r drainage at subsidized rates such as through the Farm Credit Act and then recover the costs through tax deductions. POSITIVE: Created the P r a i r i e Farm R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Administration which administers s o i l and water conservation programs that could have a s u b s t a n t i a l impact on wetlands. Canada Water Act (Environment Canada) POSITIVE: Provides a framework f o r cooperative, coordinated approaches between fed e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments for e f f i c i e n t conservation, development and u t i l i z a t i o n of any waters where there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Farm Credit Act; A g r i c u l t u r a l and Rural Development Act; A g r i c u l t u r a l S t a b i l i z a t i o n Act; Farm Improvement Loans Act; Excise Tax Act. NEGATIVE: These Acts provide assistance to farmers, through low cost loans or tax c r e d i t s , to expand and improve t h e i r productive land base often at the expense of e x i s t i n g wetlands. 135 PROVINCIAL L e g i s l a t i o n P o t e n t i a l Impacts Water Resources Act (Alberta POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE: Provides for Environment) a l i c e n s i n g system f o r a l l d i v e r s i o n and use of water. There are two types of l i c e n s e s p e r t a i n i n g to drainage: 1) a l i c e n c e to impound water f o r water management, f l o o d c o n t r o l , erosion c o n t r o l , flow regulation, conservation recreation, propagation of f i s h or w i l d l i f e , or l i k e purpose and 2) a l i c e n c e to use water i n i t s natural state for conservation, recreation, propagation of f i s h or w i l d l i f e , or l i k e purpose. The natural state l i c e n c e has been used sparingly f o r wetland protection. The Act provides for enforcement of l i c e n s i n g requirements and has been used s u c c e s s f u l l y i n s i t u a t i o n s where wetlands have been i l l e g a l l y drained. Conversely, the Act provides for construction of works and undertakings, in c l u d i n g drainage, by the province or j o i n t l y with l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , and a "notwithstanding" p r o v i s i o n permits the Mi n i s t e r to approve drainage projects without formal l i c e n s i n g . Drainage D i s t r i c t s Act (Alberta NEGATIVE: Provides f o r the creation Environment) of drainage Boards which regulate drainage within the boundaries of t h e i r respective drainage d i s t r i c t s . Although the l a s t d i s t r i c t was created i n 1956 (there are currently 9 d i s t r i c t s covering approximately 190,000 acres), t h e i r c r e a t i o n would l i k e l y accelerate wetland l o s s . 136 L e g i s l a t i o n P o t e n t i a l Impacts The Department of the Environment POSITIVE: Contains provisions to Act (Alberta Environment) e s t a b l i s h " r e s t r i c t e d development areas" or "water conservation areas" for a number of i d e n t i f i e d purposes, several of which include wetland conservation. However, they appear to have received l i t t l e use i n a wetland context. These provisions within the Act have considerable p o t e n t i a l as powerful land use controls since the Act supersedes a l l other p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . I r r i g a t i o n Act (Alberta Agriculture) POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE: Provides f or the cr e a t i o n of i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t s and t h e i r governing boards which regulate drainage r e l a t i n g d i r e c t l y to the i r r i g a t i o n system. A c t i v i t i e s of the boards may be both p o s i t i v e and negative with respect to wetlands- wetlands management projects have b e n e f i t t e d from water supplied by i r r i g a t i o n systems, conversely, r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of i r r i g a t i o n systems have detrimentally impacted adjoining wetlands. There are c u r r e n t l y 13 I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t s covering over 1.48 m i l l i o n acres of i r r i g a b l e farmland. 137 L e g i s l a t i o n P o t e n t i a l Impacts Wilderness Areas, E c o l o g i c a l Reserves and Natural Areas Act (Recreation and Parks, Forestry, Lands and W i l d l i f e ) POSITIVE: Provides f o r designation of "wilderness areas, e c o l o g i c a l reserves and natural areas". L e g i s l a t i o n i s confined to i n d i v i d u a l areas under protection. The areas i n question are u s u a l l y small and thus, has l i t t l e i m p l i c a t i o n f or pr o t e c t i n g wetlands scattered widely across p r i v a t e land. Public Lands Act (Forestry, Lands and W i l d l i f e ) POSITIVE: The Act states that beds and shores of a l l "permanent" waterbodies are p u b l i c land. J u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "permanent" meaning only those wetland areas remaining constantly wet i n recorded h i s t o r y . The Act has been used to r e s t r i c t a g r i c u l t u r a l development of wetlands. I t permits departmental personnel to reserve and protect p u b l i c land, in c l u d i n g large acreages of p u b l i c wetlands, from harmful developments or uses, and outlines p r o h i b i t i o n s to any act or disturbance that may r e s u l t i n i n j u r y to bed and shores of r i v e r , streams, lakes or other body of water. The W i l d l i f e Act (Forestry, Lands and W i l d l i f e ) POSITIVE: E x p l i c i t l y forbids the sale of access to land f or hunting purposes. Provides authority to e s t a b l i s h w i l d l i f e and game b i r d sanctuaries of which eight c u r r e n t l y e x i s t as well as provides f o r the establishment of Habitat Development Areas. 138 L e g i s l a t i o n Department of Forestry Lands and W i l d l i f e Act The Planning Act (Municipal A f f a i r s ) P o t e n t i a l Impacts POSITIVE: Empowers the M i n i s t e r to place conditions on the use of Crown wetland areas at the time they are s o l d to p r i v a t e landowners. In addition, provides for " E c o l o g i c a l Corridor Agreements" for long term pro t e c t i o n of important water courses on lands s u i t a b l e f o r sale. POSITIVE: Allows a s u b d i v i s i o n approving authority to require the owners of a proposed subd i v i s i o n to provide part of the p a r c e l of land as an "Environmental Reserve" i f the p a r c e l consists of a swamp, gu l l y , ravine, coulee or natural drainage course. T h i s i s r a r e l y applied i n respect of wetland protection. Municipal land use bylaws may be used to a l i m i t e d extent to achieve habitat management objectives. Municipal Taxation Act (Municipal POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE: Wetlands are A f f a i r s ) generally taxed at a very low rate and i f drained, the assessment increases to r e f l e c t the increased p r o d u c t i v i t y . Municipal taxes are often c i t e d as incentive f o r wetland drainage. Because wetlands are not e x p l i c i t l y delineated on the assessment notice, landowners may think t h e i r wetlands are taxed as high as productive land and thus are motivated to put them into crop production for monetary return. Exempts f o r assessment a l l land occupied by Ducks Unlimited by lease or l i c e n s e . 139 L e g i s l a t i o n P o t e n t i a l Impacts S o i l Conservation Act (Alberta A g r i c u l t u r e ) Department of Ag r i c u l t u r e Act (Alberta A g r i c u l t u r e ) A g r i c u l t u r a l Service Board Act (Alberta A g r i c u l t u r e ) POSITIVE: Provides a framework to promote sound s o i l conservation p r a c t i c e s , to preserve Alberta's land base and to ensure a g r i c u l t u r a l s u s t a i n a b i l i t y . NEGATIVE: Provides authority f o r the Minister to make loan guarantees to landowners f o r c l e a r i n g , breaking, l e v e l i n g , preparing, improving or developing land f o r any a g r i c u l t u r a l purpose. Drainage of wetlands could p o t e n t i a l l y f a l l under "improving" or "developing". -POSITIVE: Directs A g r i c u l t u r a l Service Boards to advise on the organizing of s o i l and water conservation programs i n mu n i c i p a l i t i e s . The Board may recommend to a municipality measures to r e c t i f y s i t u a t i o n s of water erosion and land impoverishment. Adapted from: Usher and Scarth (1989) and the Alberta Water Resources Commission (1989). 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0076955/manifest

Comment

Related Items