Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The impact of industrialization on the quality of life in Korea: case studies of Ulsan and Kyungju Shin, Dong-Ho 1994

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-ubc_1994-893532.pdf [ 5.05MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0076951.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0076951-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0076951-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0076951-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0076951-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0076951-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0076951-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZA11ON ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN KOREA: CASE STUDIES OF ULSAN AND KYUNG1U  By DONG-HO SHIN B.A., HAN NAM UNIVERSITY, 1980 M.P.A., PUSAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, 1985 M.A. (PLANNING), UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1990  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Urban Studies Programme Interdisciplinary Graduate Programs We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  February, 1994 (c) Dong-Ho Shin, 1994  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of  -Icii  4—cU  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2188)  cf q1  ABSTRACT South Korea experienced extraordinary economic growth in the period from 1960 to 1990. From a backward economy in the 1950’s, South Korea has been transformed into an urban industrial society with high levels of managerial and technical competence within governments, corporations and local communities. This dissertation examines Korea’s remarkable economic growth from the theoretical level and the local level. It presents an integrative framework, based on a review of the conventional theories and perspectives of modernization, dependency, world-system, and the New International Division of Labor (NIDL). The research documents the central government’s industrial policies and its collaboration with the corporate sector in the policy practice. It then analyzes economic, social, and environmental impacts of the two partners on local communities. The impacts in the industrial city of Ulsan are compared to the conditions in the traditional city of Kyungju. This case study includes survey research, which was designed to obtain public opinion on a wide variety of issues, from three different groups: government officials, corporate managers, and citizens. The research leads to the following conclusions. In contrast to Neo-Marxist arguments, well coordinated actions between the government and the private sector have a positive effect on industrial development, notwithstanding some  II  constraining forces from the external world. Industrial growth in Korea did create a better Quality of Life for the general public. It supports some elements of the world-systems urban theory, such as emphasis on internal and external forces, internal dynamics within a developing country, and the relationships among world core, national centers, and smaller cities. Writings by Peter Dickens, Armstrong and McGee and Hagen Koo are shown to be useful for this kind of research. The thesis does not support the thread of the traditional dependency theory and the NIDL thesis. Industrialization in Korea did not marginalize the general public. Rather it improved the Quality of Life for the public, which is supported by the opinion survey indicating that more than three quarters of the sample respondents see that their Quality of Life has improved. Rapid industrialization in Korea caused social and environmental problems especially in the industrial cities. The survey result indicates that ninety four percent of the respondents from Ulsan regard environmental pollution a ‘very’ serious problem for the city, while the equivalent number for Kyungju was twelve percent. The survey result also shows that the public is now concerned more with social issues, such as a clean environment and a more equal distribution of wealth, than economic growth. As people’s awareness has expanded substantially to include elements of a better Quality of Life, both the local  III  government and citizens agree there are problems with the conventional approach to industrial promotion. Although the strong views are held, neither the national nor local government have developed coherent policies to deal with this new phenomenon. The national government has expanded the roles of provincial and municipal governments in policy development, and this will include the election of local mayors and governors in 1995. It will provide a forum for better definition of the problem and more opportunities for their resolution.  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS ii v vi x xi xii  ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES ABBREVIATIONS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CHAPTER ONE THESIS THEMES 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5  1 4 6 8 8  Problem Statement Research Purpose The Scope Sources of Data Introduction to the Study Areas 1.5.1 Ulsan 1.5.2 Kyungju 1.5.3 Conceptualizing the Difference Between the Two Cities  8 9 11 12  1.6 Thesis Organization CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Economic Growth and Developmental Effects 2.3 The Conventional Views on Third World Development 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 2.3.5  Modernization Perspective Dependency Theory New International Division of Labor The World-Systems Approach Theorizing about the Asian NlCs  2.4 Assessment of the Conventional Development Theories 2.5 Synthesizing Forces of Industrial Growth: An Integrative Framework 2.6 Applying the Integrative Framework in this Dissertation  V  14 14 17 17 18 21 24 25 28 31 38  CHAPTER THREE KEY PLAYERS IN THE KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS  3.1 Overview 3.2 Commanding Capacity of the Central Government 3.2.1 The Characteristics of the Central Government 3.2.2 The Establishment of Planning Capacity 3.3 Expanding Corporate Sector  40 41 41 43 47  3.3.1 The Characteristics of the Corporate Sector 3.3.2 Solid Corporate Linkages with the Government 3.3.3 Business Growth under Powerful Economic Planning, 1960-1970 3.3.4 Becoming Multinationals, 1970-1 990  47 49 51 53  3.4 Managing External Forces, The Central Government and Large Corporations 3.4.1 The Central Government 3.4.2 Corporate Actions 3.4.3 The Government and Corporations within Korea  56 56 59 62  3.5 Local Communities under the Central Forces....  66  3.5.1 Local Governing Structure 3.5.2 Changing Community Lifestyles Changing Economic and Social Conditions Changing Characteristics of Community Needs  66 70 70 72  CHAPTER FOUR CHANGES IN URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA, 1960-1990  4.1 Overview 4.2 Government Intervention in Population and Industrial Concentration 4.2.1 Central Government Initiatives in the 1960s 4.2.2 Central Government Response to the Initial Change 4.2.3 Expanding New Industrial Spaces 4.3 Partners of the Central Government  74 75 75 79 82 86  4.3.1 Local Governments 4.3.2 Roles of the Business The Story of Poongsan, An Example of Public/Private Relationships The Overall Trends  86 89  4.3.3 Local Communities  93  vi  89 92  4.4 Regional Variations in Economic and Social Development  96  4.4.1 Regional Distribution of Economic Activities Employment in the Manufacturing Sector Individual Income  96 96 98  4.4.2 Spatial Patterns of Social Development Infrastructure Education Public Health Care Car Ownership  100 100 105 108 110  4.4.3. Regional Variations in the Perceived QOL: Survey Results  111  4.5 Chapter Summary  114  CHAPTER FIVE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT IN ULSAN AND KYUNGJU 5.1 Overview 5.2 Locational Characteristics of Ulsan and Kyungju 5.3 Forces of Change in Ulsan and Kyungju  117 119 120  5.3.1 Industrializing Ulsan Leading Central Government Overseas Assistance Growing Industrial Linkages Role of Local Governments  120 121 124 126 132  5.3.2 The Development of Kyungju  135  5.4 Transforming Ulsan and Kyungju: Quantitative Assessments  138  5.4.1 The Pattern of Industrializing Ulsan Population Growth Changing Employment Structure Spatial Distribution of Growth  138 138 141 144  5.4.2 The Pattern of Evolving Kyungju  146  5.5. Transforming Ulsan and Kyungju: A Qualitative Comparison 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.5.4  147 147 150 153 155  The Economic Structure The Physical Environment The Community Urban Infrastructure  156  5.6 Chapter Summary  vii  CHAPTER SIX FORCES OF TRANSFORMING ULSAN AND KYUNGJU THE RESULTS OF AN OPINION SURVEY 6.1 Overview  158  6.2 Methods of the Survey  159 160 162  6.2.1 The Questionnaire Survey 6.2.2 Methods of Statistical Analysis 6.3 The General View on Changing Quality of Life  167  6.4 Detailed Analysis on Public Concerns on Municipal Issues  168  6.4.1 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.4.4 6.4.5 6.4.6  Environmental Pollution Recreational and Leisure Facilities Urban Infrastructure Low Income Distribution of Wealth Political Autonomy of the Local Government  6.5 Changing Forces of Municipal Affairs. 6.5,1. The Public Sector 6.5.2. The Corporate Sector 6.5.3 The Changing Community Sector Changing Development Priorities Public Perceptions of Community Spirits 6.6 Chapter Summary  170 171 172 173 173 174 176 .176 178 181 181 183 188  CHAPTER SEVEN POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 192  7.1 Policy Implications of the Research 7.1.1 Korean Industrialization in Bello and Rosenfeld’s Thesis 7.1.2 Korean Strategy in the Future 7.1.3 The Future of Ulsan and Kyungju 7.2 Theoretical Implications of the Research Results 7.2.1 The NIDL Thesis in Industrializing Korea 7.2.2 The Korean Economy and the Dependency Theory 7.2.3 Korea and its Intermediate Cities within the World-System  192 196 197 202 202 207 210  BIBLIOGRAPHY  215  APPENDICES  238  ‘1 (  LIST OF TABLES  Table 3.1: Korean Trade Dependance on the U.S. and Japan, 1965-1 991 Table 3.2: Decreasing Reliance on Foreign Technology in POSCO Table 3.3: Economic and Social Transformations in Korea, 1960-1 990  58 61 71  Table 4.1: Population Growth in National and Provincial Capitals, 1959-89 Table 4.2: Rapidly Growing Industrial Cities, 1959-89 Table 4.3: Designated Industrial Estates in Korea, 1987 Table 4.4: Contribution of Industrial Growth to Community: Questionnaire Survey Table 4.5: Principal Beneficiaries of Industrial Growth: Questionnaire Survey Table 4.6: Gross Regional Products (GRP) by Province, 1962-86 99 Table 4.7: Road Capacity, 1960-90 Table 4.8: Number of Household Using Telephones, 1970-90 Table 4.9: Percentage of Households with Telephones, 1970-90 (%) Table 4.10: Number of Highschool and University Students Table 4.11: Number of Students per One Thousand Populations, 1960-90 Table 4.12: Number of Passenger Cars, 1960-90 Table 4.13: General Evaluation of Regional Population on the Advancement  77 84 85  102 102 103 107 107 111 112  Table 5.1: Comparison of ducational Levels of Officials (1969) Table 5.2: The Level of SO Contamination in the Air of Ulsan  134 151  Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table  94 95  163 6.1: Summary Table for Sampling and Survey Result 166 6.2: Summary of the Results from the Confidence Interval Test 6.3: Observation on the Overall Change in the Community Well-being...168 169 6,4: Public Concerns on Issues Related to Municipal QOL 171 Problem as a Pollution Environmental 6.5: 177 Public Sector Concerns on the Public 6.6: 178 6.7: Local Officials’ Commitment to Solving Civic Problems 180 Corporate Sector on the Public Opinion 6.8: 182 Future in the Development Priorities for 6.9: 185 in Ulsan (or Kyungju) Come Live Having to Feeling about 6.10: 187 Community Change of Public Perceptions 6.11:  ix  LIST OF FIGURES 10 Figure 1.1: Study Areas and their Adjacent Cities of the Southeastern Korea Figure 2.1: Key Players in the Industrialization Process of Developing Countries 33 Figure 44 Figure Figure 61 Figure  3.1: Summary of Institutional Development in Planning Practice in Korea  Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure 109  4.1: 4.2: 4.3: 4.4: 4.5:  Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure  5.1: Map of Ulsan: Roads and Industrial Zones 5.2: Global/Local Linkages of Hyundai Motor Co. and POSCO 5.3: Population in Ulsan and Kyungju 5,4: Employment Structures of Ulsan and Kyungju 5.5: Employment Structure within Ulsan’s Industrial Sector 5.6: Location of Major Employers in Ulsan  55 3.2: Patterns of Interactions Among Key Players of Industrialization 3.3: Decreasing Reliance on Foreign Technology in Hanyang Chemical Co 3.4: Local Administrative System in Korea  67  78 Inter-provincial Migration, 1962-75 81 Spatial Distribution of Industrial Employment, 1960-1 990 Local and International Linkages of Poongsan’s Industrial Activities.... 90 104 Proportion of Populations Accessible to Piped Water, 1960-90 Number of Medical Doctors per One Thousand Population, 1960-90  x  122 129 140 142 143 145  ABBREVIATIONS  CNLUP  Comprehensive National Land Use Plan  EDC  Economic Development Council  EPB  Economic Planning Board  FYEDP  Five-Year Economic Development Plan  FYESDP  Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan  GNP  Gross National Product  GRP  Gross Regional Product  IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  KDI  Korea Development Institute  KERI  Korea Economic Research Institute  KIlT  Korea Institute for Industrial Technology  KIPP  Korea Institute of Pollution Problems  KLARI  Korea Local Administration Research Institute  KOTRA  Korea Trade Promotion Authority  KRIHS  Korean Research Institute for Human Settlement  POSCO  Pohang Steel and Iron Company  QOL  The Quality of Life  UCCI  Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry  UNDP  United Nations Development Program  UNKRA  United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  This research has been completed through an intellectual journey organized by an interdisciplinary advisory committee. Professors David Edgington, Walter Hardwick, Seong-Soo Lee, Terry McGee and Brahm Wiesman kindly joined the advisory committee.  I am greatly indebted for their challenges,  constructive criticisms, persistent encouragements and effective guidelines. Professor Hardwick deserves special acknowledgment for his role in supervising the entire process of the research. Without him the completion of the research may have been impossible. I would also like to thank Dr. Devereux Jennings, who made funds available from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada during the period of writing the dissertation. The work experience with him provided me many lessons that are important for a professional person. Assistance was received from individuals and agencies in Korea. Professor Sung-Chul Kang at the Pusan National University and Professor Seyeul Kim at Han Nam University should be mentioned for their warm encouragement and advice. Dr. Jeong-Han Lee, Director of the Kyungnam Provincial Planning Institute also assisted the process by making available time and travel funds, which were essential for the oral examination and the finalization of the document. This research contains a major questionnaire survey of the cities of Ulsan and Kyungju. My appreciation is extended  XII  to government officials, corporate managers, and citizens who took part in the survey. I would like to mention those who contributed their special efforts to the success of the field research: Jong-Kyu Ha (The City of Ulsan); Sang-Yun Choi (Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry); Sang-Chul Lee (Ulsan MBC); and Yong-Rak Lee (The City Of Kyungju). It is unusually challenging for a student who starts a graduate programme without having sufficient knowledge on local language and culture. I owe a debt of gratitude to the friendship and assistance from a large group of my friends and colleagues around the University. Dr. Rex Casinader, Mr. Brian Geohring, Rene Ragetli, Yaolin Wang, Ralph Perkins, Kwang-il Tak, and Andrew Marton, who shared the ingredients of the academic community: pressure, anxiety, and achievement. The initiation of my overseas study has been possible by continuous supports from the extended family: my parents, my wife, my daughter. Finally, I wish to express special thanks to my wife, who was forced to sacrifice her own career during the period of residing in Canada, and my daughter, who had to miss the love. Nonetheless, I believe that clearly it is a valuable, worthwhile journey to go through. Now I feel that I am obliged to compensate the efforts and compassions attributed to the process.  XIII  CHAPTER ONE: THESIS THEMES  1.1 Problem Statement  The rapidly changing world economy in the post-war era has resulted in the increasing  integration of regional and  national economies of developing countries into the world economy. This process, in turn, stimulates various interactions not only between developed and developing countries but also among governments, corporations, and communities within developing countries. The South Korean economy has undergone extraordinary growth in the past three decades. From a backward economy of the 1950s, Korea has been transformed into an industrial 1 society and established managerial competence within each of the government, corporate, and community sectors. Impacts of such changes on the economic and social conditions are farreaching. Korean development did not occur as a result of market forces alone. The development process has been systematically directed by outward-looking, export-oriented industrial policies (Hughes 1988; vogel 1991; Wade 1990). The central government played a critical role by guiding corporate activities and managing opportunities and constraints of the 1. ‘Korea’ means the ‘Republic of Korea’, or ‘South Korea’, in this dissertation, unless otherwise stated.  1  world economy (e.g., Koo, Hagen 1987). Korean industrial policies that were initially directed from Seoul have over the years now became more decentralized (Yoo, Jong-Hae 1993). The conventional theories of development are incomplete in understanding the dynamic process of Korean industrialization (Koo, Hagen 1984;  1987;  1990) and its  impacts on local communities. The dependency school (Amin 1976; ECLA 1961,  1970; Skocpol 1979), for example, fails to  explain how Korea avoided falling into permanent dependency upon foreign economic assistance (e.g., from the United States). Nor has the New International Division of Labor (NIDL) provided relevant explanations on the apparent economic and social progress during the period of rapid industrialization. Furthermore, the world-system urban theorists (Armstrong and McGee 1985; Chase—Dunn 1984; Timberlake 1985; Timberlake and Kentor 1983; Wallerstein 1974) have to look for more flexible explanations than the top-down approach to account for dynamic interactions between and within the sectoral forces. Since the late 1960s, economic policies of the less developed countries have focused primarily on ‘economic’ measures (see e.g., Streeten 1977). Goals of development policies since then have not been solidly defined, but have varied widely. This dissertation uses the concept of ‘development effects’ to examine the variety of development goals. The ‘development effects,’ as discussed in Chapter II, are a combination of: i) improvement in the Quality of Life  2  (QOL); ii) income and employment growth; iii) equal assess to economic opportunities; iv) economic sustainablity; and v) establishment of technical and managerial skills. Growing economies followed by other development goals is ‘genuine development’  (Henderson 1989).2  Industrialization growth helped the Korean economy to create developmental effects at the national and local levels. The process of Korean industrialization is an exemplar of how a less developed country can generate development effects. To unveil this process, this dissertation focuses on the interactions between the public and private sectors and their impacts on local economic and social conditions. A rapidly growing industrial city, Ulsan, is selected as a case study area, while a traditional city, Kyungju, is an opposite example. This study establishes a framework for analyzing development processes in developing countries in general. Through a review of the development literature, the study: i) identifies goals of development policies in developing countries; ii) identifies key players in the industrialization process: governments, corporations, and local communities; iii) analyzes the roles of these players at three different levels of territorial units: international, national, and municipal political economy; and iv) builds upon a framework of analysis that conceptualizes internal dynamics within a developing society, and its relationships with the world economy. 2. The meaning of ‘development effects’ will be elaborated in Chapter two.  3  This dissertation uses the model to examine the Korean case in particular by: i) examining the interactions of the Korean central government and large conglomerates with the world economy, i.e., ‘global/local’ networks (Dicken 1992); ii) analyzing the interactions between the national players and local players within Korea. i.e., ‘national/local’ networks (Dicken 1992); iii) examining sectoral interactions within Korea, e.g., public/private relationships; and iv) demonstrating features of industrial growth and social change in Ulsan, and a comparison with Kyungju, which was bypassed by economic development policies, i.e., ‘locality—specific’ features.  The dissertation concludes with policy recommendations that can reduce problems of the two cities. It concludes that specific factors of the Korean local industrialization and urban transformation are more diverse than the existing theories indicate. The government, corporations, and communities interact in a complex fashion to increase economic and industrial activities, and improve social and environmental conditions. Implications of these conclusions for the conventional development theories are addressed.  1.2 Research Purpose The main aim of this thesis is to analyze the features of the Korean industrialization experience in order to establish how this process supports or reputes some of the major development theories. To do this the thesis first reviews the development theories. Secondary,  4  it identifies how the forces  of industrial change are formulated in Korea. It demonstrates the unique characteristics of public and corporate actors in managing external and internal conditions of Korea. Thirdly, the dissertation demonstrates how public and corporate sectors interact between the national center (Seoul) and local cities (Ulsan and Kyungju) to improve local social and economic circumstances. It argues that a locality is not only affected by national controlling forces but also maintains region-specific features that moderate this national control. These locality—specific features within Korea as a whole have helped the Korean economy emerge from ‘dependent’ status, thereby creating developmental effects. The dissertation uses data from a survey questionnaire in Ulsan and Kyungju in which public opinion on local economic and municipal affairs is examined. It analyzes improvements in the overall QOL, and social and environmental circumstances in the two cities. It explores shifting development priorities as economic conditions improve. At the nation-wide level, the dissertation: i) reviews the social, economic, and political context of the Korean development experience over the past three decades; ii) documents economic and regional policies; iii) describes processes of economic growth and social change; and iv) analyzes impacts of economic growth on spatial patterns of provincial economic and social conditions. At the local (city) level, the research:  5  i) documents the process and patterns of industrialization in Ulsan, as compared to urban transformation in Kyungju; ii) examines social, economic, and environmental impacts of industrial policies on Ulsan, compared to Kyungju; iii) identifies the characteristics of the government, business, and community, and sectoral relationships among these in each city; iv) surveys public opinion on changing social and environmental circumstances and development priorities; and v) recommends policies to guide each city to be better developed in the future.  1.3 The Scope  The timeframe of this dissertation is the three decades since the early 1960s. Although this study focuses on two case cities, it is the assumption that social and economic conditions at a smaller scale of territorial unit are a mirror of the conditions of the wider geographical unit, the Korean nation. Therefore, the changes at the regional level cannot be fully understood without understanding those at the higher level. It is also true that social transformation within a territorial unit cannot be fully explained by separating them from those at a larger unit. As well, the research looks at Korean central government and corporate interactions with the international community. This is necessary because not only has Korea pursued an outward-looking economic strategy for three decades, but the Korean economy has also become increasingly integrated into the world-systems (Lim, Hyun-Chin 1985). The complex corporate  6  linkages, both among the cities of the research area and with other countries, have supported this duality (e.g., Figure 5.2, page 129). The research places a higher priority on the industrial city of Ulsan, since the research is interested in the impacts of industrialization, while Kyungju is examined only for comparative purposes. The reasons for choosing Ulsan are as follows. First,  it was the earliest ‘industrial’ city to be  designated outside of the Capital Region (for the details of 3 this process, see Chapter  v).  Second, the growth patterns of  the city have been documented better than for any other industrial city in Korea. Third, the author has direct living experience of this city and Kyungju. Kyungju, on the other hand, is chosen because it is one of the least industrialized cities and presents the opposite features of industrial cities (Kim, An-Jae 1974; Kim, Byung-Kuk et al.  1988). Comparisons of  these two cities, therefore, illustrate well the contrast between an industrial city and a non-industrial one. The dissertation emphasizes both the forces that govern all regions of Korea and locality-specific forces. The major reason for emphasizing ‘locality’  is that cities and regions  outside of Seoul have been undergoing a rapid change under the policies of ‘decentralization’,  implemented from the late  1980s onward.  3. The Capital Region in this thesis is defined as Metropolitan Seoul and its surrounding province, Kyungki.  7  1.4 Sources of Data  The data for national economic policies are drawn from existing sources, such as government publications, academic work; and magazine articles. To acquire in-depth information on the local communities, an opinion survey was conducted. This survey included approximately 700 respondents, from three sample groups: government officials, corporate managers, and community members of Ulsan and Kyungju. The survey data are 4 used in comparing responses between the two cities and illustrating public opinion on changing economic, social, and environmental conditions of the cities. Additional sources of local community data include: 1) the author’s interviews with community members, government officials, media reporters, university professors, and corporate managers; 2) previous survey results (e.g., Institute of Social Sciences (ISS) of the Seoul National University (1984) and Jungum Research Institute (1990); and 3) various Korean statistical yearbooks.  1.5 Introduction to the Study Areas  1.5.1 Ulsan  Historically, Ulsan was a small trading and fishing center, located in Southeastern Korea (see Figure 1.1). In 1962, the Chung-Hee Park government (1961-1979) policies to construct an ‘industrial complex’ 4. A full description of this survey appears in Chapter six.  8  initiated  in Ulsan, as  part of the coup government’s aggressive development package. The city was to be a showcase as a symbol of industrial development, and as Park’s project. Since then, the demographic and economic features of the city have drastically changed. The city grew from 85,082 people in 1962 to 682,978 (a 703% increase in 28 years) by 1990. There was also a rapid change in the employment structure, thereby increasing the number of manufacturing employees from 742 in 1962 to 111,885 in 1990 (a 20.3% annual growth rate). Ulsan now plays a key role in automobile, shipbuilding, precision tool manufacturing, and petrochemical industries. It is an important center of the Southeastern Industrial Belt (Jin, Young-Whan 1989; Mills and Song 1978), which is the largest industrial region outside of the Capital Region. Fully 77 percent of the city’s total employment is in the manufacturing sector. Ulsan’s industrial growth has created considerable economic benefits. But the economic success is mixed with negative impacts, especially environmental pollution. This has been pointed out in a number of studies  (ucci  1980,  1990; Lee, Ki—Suk 1984; Kang, Sung—Chul 1989).  1.5.2 Kyungju  More than a thousand years ago, Kyungju was the capital of the kingdom of Silla, rich with historic sites and monuments. For many centuries Kyungju functioned as a center of agricultural trade. However, more recently the city has developed its tourism industry. Unlike Ulsan, Kyungju was not  9  C,)  .  C  0-  . C  0  CI)  CDCD ()  CC  CD  0DD 0  CD  Q  CD  included in the national economic development policies and priorities. Consequently, industrial activities are little developed in the city. In 1991 only one large-scale manufacturer employing more than 200 people existed in the city. The population of Kyungju grew slowly, at a rate lower than the Korean urban average. The total population of Kyungju was about 70,000 in 1960, and increased to 141,895 by 1990. The city’s employment structure is mainly service oriented. Among such activities, education and commerce are well developed. In spite of this economic structure, residents of the city are more satisfied with the city’s urban 5 circumstances than their counterparts in Ulsan.  1.5.3 Conceptualizing the Difference Between the Two Cities  The overall well-being and economic circumstances of Ulsan and Kyungju have improved through the years of development in Korea. The difference is that Ulsan’s economic growth has been more rapid than Kyungju; but improvement in urban well-being in Ulsan has been slower than in Kyungju. The overall economic and social well-being in Ulsan is rated lower than the Korean urban average, while the well-being in Kyungju is considered higher (Kim 1984; Korea Public Administration Research Institute 1988).6 5. Chapter six will discuss this in detail. 6. These studies used statistical data on the economy, physical environment, cultural and leisure facilities, and the provision of urban infrastructure in more than twenty cities.  11  1.6 Thesis Organization Chapter two reviews the conventional theories of economic development. The review identifies: i) main threads of each theoretical perspective;  ii) the driving forces of  industrialization in developing countries in general; and iii) their implications for developmental effects. The final section suggests a conceptual model that illustrates how forces of industrialization in a developing country are organized. In Chapter three, the model put forward in Chapter two is used to examine the characteristics of Korean government, corporations, and local communities. It reviews the central government’s roles in advancing industrial technology and expanding industrial outputs. It shows how corporations supported the government and how the interplay between these forces changed the national and regional economies. It also demonstrates how the players of industrialization interact with each other and how their relationships have been transformed during the past three decades. Chapter four examines how the interplay between the central government and large corporations has affected economic and social conditions at the provincial and regional scale. It reviews, first, regional policies that coordinated corporate activities over the Korean territories. It also illustrates how large corporations assisted the policies.  12  Second,  it analyzes impacts of the policies on spatial  patterns of economic and social development. Chapters five and six analyze the case cities to show how the central government policies affect industrial growth in Ulsan and urban transformation in Kyungju. Using aggregated data, Chapter five compares the economic and social characteristics of the two cities. Chapter six analyzes the data from the opinion survey and compares public opinion in the two cities on municipal issues, roles of the public and corporate sectors, and the degree of QOL improvement in each city. Chapter seven draws out theoretical and policy implications of the Korean experience relevant to the development literature. The first section suggests policy recommendations in relation to Korean industrialization and municipal management. In the second section, the data presented in the previous four chapters will be interpreted in relation to the existing theories, such as the NIOL thesis, dependency theory, and world-system urban theory.  13  CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW  2.1 Introduction  The major strategy of achieving developmental goals in Korea was rapid industrialization. Therefore, this chapter identifies key forces of growing industrial growth in Korea and their impacts on social and economic conditions by reviewing the development theories involved. First, the chapter defines the term,  ‘developmental effects’ and  discusses the links between growth in industrial activities and developmental effects. Second,  it outlines the core  concepts of the conventional development theories and then reviews their strengths and weaknesses. The final section of this chapter suggests a conceptual framework that illustrates operational mechanisms of major players of industrialization and their interactions. The framework will be used in examining how the process of Korean industrialization is organized between the central and local levels.  2.2 Economic Growth and Developmental Effects Until the 1960s, the prime goal of economic policies in most less developed countries was ‘economic growth.’ Economic performance in such countries was measured in aggregate terms, such as the Gross National Product (GNP)  (Morris 1979; Hicks  and Streeten 1977). GNP growth was assumed to be creating  14  economic benefits and a better QOL for the general public (Adelman 1975; Newman and Thomson 1989: 462; Srinivasan 1977: 461). Around 1970, however, this assumption was challenged. Academics noted that aggregate economic growth at the national level did not create equal access to income and employment opportunities between social strata (Baster 1972; Seers 1969,  1977; Streeten 1977). Subsequently, GNP was  considered less relevant for measuring internal disparities between socioeconomic classes (Morris 1979: 8-14). It was not comprehensive enough to indicate the level of development, rather than simply economic growth per se. 7 These critics suggest that not only economic growth but also equal opportunities for access to income and employment activities should be included in the concept of development. The dissatisfaction with the GNP as a performance measure increased the popularity of a more comprehensive concept, the QOL. This dissertation employs the concept of QOL as one of the major components of development effects. The quality of life in urban communities is defined as the social, economic, political, and environmental conditions that constitute the well-being of urban residents which can be directly affected by activities of municipal governments and local businesses. In the Korean context, these include socioeconomic conditions of municipalities, such as the economic, environmental and 7. In the development literature, economic growth is often interchangeably used with economic development (see Morris 1979, for example). Some authors, however, distinguish ‘economic development’ from ‘economic growth’, the former being more comprehensive by including both increases in output of goods and services and changes in institutions and values, while the latter, includes only growth in output.  15  traffic conditions, and local government, but exclude policing, taxation, and public education. Since the latter services are functions of the central government in Korea, municipal governments and local businesses have little control. In relation to Korean industrialization and improvement in QOL, there are two streams of thought: one is a longitudinal approach to change at the national scale (Shin, Doh C.  1979,  1981; Shin and Snyder 1983; Song 1990). With  qualitative and quantitative studies, they have shown that the pace of improvement in the QOL has been slower than that of economic growth,  8 indicating gaps between the two.  The second line of research involves regional variations in the QOL (Kim An-Jae 1974,  1983; Kim, Byung-Kuk et al.  1988). This latter group of studies has shown that most industrial cities remain at lower levels of human well-being than non-industrial. As these results suggest a contradictory relationship between the levels of industrial growth and the QOL, it is necessary to examine the gaps between industrialization and changes in the QOL. This study uses the concept of development effects to examine a wide range of development goals, such as economic growth, social equity, and institutional development that are often assumed to occur with industrial growth. Similar terms 8. These studies are different from the UNDP study in two aspects. They used a broader scope of indicators such as the data from statistical sources and questionnaire surveys, while the UNDP report is based entirely on statistics. In addition, they are longitudinal studies, while the UNDP adopted an approach to cross-national comparison. Therefore, a direct comparison between the results of the studies is not possible.  16  are used by other authors. When Henderson (1989: 65) refers to ‘genuine development,’ he means two concepts: industrial growth on a sustainable basis and the emergence of selfmanaging capacity. Armstrong and McGee (1985: 53) also mention this using the ‘development of the productive forces’. The productive forces are often considered to exist in manufacturing activities, rather than within the primary sector. In the following section, the conventional theories will be reviewed to identify the factors that affect the improvement of QOL and the generation of other development effects in developing countries.  2.3 The Conventional Views on Third World Development  2.3.1 Modernization Perspective  The most widely known author of the ‘modernization perspective’  is W. W. Rostow (1960). Through an analysis of  world economic history, Rostow found that every country has gone, or will go through five stages of development: traditional society, preconditions for take—off, take—off, drive to maturity, and age of mass-consumption. Bernstein (1970:  147) states that, in the development path, there were  no different routes, but one destiny.  ‘Development’  is seen as  linear process that every society goes through. A stable political order, modern economic institutions, and transportation and communications system are regarded to be  17  essential conditions for economic growth (Moore and Smelser 1965; Hoselitz 1953,  1972). The traditional view of  development is that underdevelopment is caused by the lack of modern science and technology (Rostow 1960: 4). Until the end of the 1950s, modernization was seen as a springboard of economic growth and development. The modernization perspective considers the city to be a center for introduction of new social patterns, and for breaking down the ingrained traditional patterns. As in the contemporary advanced economies of the 18th and 19th centuries, industrial cities were believed to be a form of social organization which furthered efficiency in economic activity (Lampard 1964: 332; Breese 1969,  1970: 40—44). Since the 1960s, this modernization  perspective has been challenged because industrial growth and its impacts on urbanization in many developing countries were strikingly different from those of Western countries.  2. 3. 2 Dependency Theory  A group of economists and sociologists working in Latin America (Amin 1974; ECLA 1970; Dos Santos 1970; Cardoso 1975) questioned the modernization assumption that all developing countries can reach a level of economic development equal to the contemporary developed economies. They argued that underdevelopment is caused by dependence on foreign markets, technology, and capital (Dos Santos 1970: (1970:  143),  144). Dos Santos  in particular, stated that ‘dependency’  is ‘a  situation in which the economy of a certain country is  18  conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected’. Economists of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America stated that the problem of industrialization in Latin America is the difficulty in transition to higher levels of industrial technology (ECLA 1961: 4). They found problems due to the historical and cultural circumstances in which the problems arise (ECLA 1961:  1). ECLA economists suggest that  industrialization has not occurred uniformly, but according to the given circumstances in a specific area (or country). They also identified economic relationships between metropolitan core and backward peripheries within a less developed country. Samir Amin (1974) identifies the relationships by suggesting that development in core countries necessitates exploitation of primary resources and labor in the peripheral countries through ‘unequal exchange’  (Amin 1974:  16 and 28).  For Amin, the economic exchange between economies of core countries and underdeveloped peripheral countries remains unequal since the core economies retain the most progressive sectors, leaving less productive sectors for underdeveloped countries. He suggests that economies of less developed countries appear as ‘extensions of the core economies’  (ibid.:  16—17; and Emmanuel 1972). Amin argued that urbanization in the global periphery necessitates the increase in imports of food products, which weakens the economic structure of the periphery. In addition, transformation of the ways of life and consumption patterns of  19  the privileged social strata in a developing country encourages people to initiate the lifestyles common in developed countries (‘demonstration effect’, Amin 1974:  15).  The combined effects of all these forces necessitates the developing countries’ continued dependency upon imported materials, thereby increasing foreign indebtedness. Dos Santos (1970:  144-145) concludes that economic  development in developed countries occurs at the expense of developing countries. He argues that technology in a developing country is adapted not to the needs of the country, but to the demands of the hegemonic (developed) centers. In the 1980s another stream of dependency theory has developed which lays much greater emphasis upon the interrelationship between Third World states, their political elites, and international capital. In this approach, dependency is perceived as a much less one-sided process dominated by the developed countries and much more of a interactive process (Evans 1979). This newer interpretation of the dependency process has much relevance to the case of Korea. The successful experience of the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), such as Korea and Taiwan challenges the classical dependency theory. The weakness of the theory is its virtual disregard of the unique internal conditions in different countries. The emphasis is on external constraint in economic development with little or no room for  20  the operation of specific historical, cultural, and political forces within individual countries (Dicken 1992: 444).  2. 3. 3 New  mt ernat I  onal Di vlsi  Ofl  of Labor  The New International Division of Labor (NIDL) thesis has been put forward by Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye (1980). These authors equate the increasing unemployment in developed countries with out-migration of multinational corporations from developed countries to developing ones (see Cohen 1981,  1989). They argue that employment in the  traditional industrial sectors is most victimized by international relocation of such industries to some successful developing countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and some of the Eastern European countries. Morales and Quandt (1992: 474) observe that a greater economic integration of a developing economy to the international economy leads the developing country to be ‘trapped by the self—defeating strategy of exploiting low wages and by the inability to develop the necessary capabilities to compete with the industrial leaders. This has suggested that cheap labor is the only comparative advantage for less developed countries. Frobel et al.  (1980:  13-15)  indeed observe that some industrial production has relocated to peripheral countries primarily because cheap labor is available there. The NIDL theorists exclude possibilities for developing countries to learn technological abilities from  21  multinational corporations and then enter industries with higher technological involvement. Frobel et al.  (1980: 404) continue to state that ‘world  industrialization marginalizes a large part of the people in developing countries’. Michael T. Donaghu and Richard Barff (1991) have supported the thesis with evidence from the subcontracting network of an American footwear company’s (NIKE) production factories. They documented an example of an American company that, in search of a lower labor price, continuously shifted its production sites through several Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Thailand. Erica Schoenberger (1988a,  1988b) has provided  constructive criticism of the NIDL thesis. After examining the distribution of American manufacturing investment abroad, she argues that changes in production processes, markets, and competitive strategies have influenced multinational corporations’  locational choice. An implication of NIKE’s  success in rapidly changing production sites from one country another is that the employment in the countries concerned is transient and temporary. Richard Child Hill (1987), however, has opposed the NIDL thesis by demonstrating some contradictory evidence from a study of the Toyota manufacturing system. In contrast to the NIDL relocation strategy, he argued, direct foreign investment in poor countries was still a small percentage of total outlays by all major auto corporations (ibid: 34). According  22  to him, the NIDL thesis does not fully explain the complexities of transnational collaboration and rivalry in a ‘world of competing sovereign states with national, often conflicting goals’  (Hill 1987: 36).  The NIDL thesis suggests that industrial relocation to developing countries constrains opportunities of economic growth and higher quality of life in global peripheries. Authors of the NIDL state that: i) industrial growth in newly growing regions in the global periphery takes advantage of the low wage, unskilled, hard working labor force (Amin and Robins 1989: 19; cf. Young, et al 1988); ii) multiplier effects within peripheral countries are weak since only less productive production processes are relocated to such countries (Morgan and Sayer 1984), but, cf. Morris 1992: 412); iii) innovations do not occur from growing industrial activities in peripheries because the production processes assigned there are simple, manual work that often rules out innovation possibilities (McCalman 1992: 429); and iv) economies of the global peripheries persistently depend on the core countries, since technological and managerial decisions about peripheral industries commonly remain in the core. (Dunford 1990; McDermott 1976). The NIDL thesis has contributed to development debates by bringing in the roles of multinational corporations in determining pattern of industrialization in developing countries (Frobel 1980:  10). The thesis also takes into  account the influence of state governments on the activities of multinational corporations within developing countries. Not all empirical studies, however, support the peripheral industrialization thesis. Townroe (1975), for  23  example, has shown that branch plants in peripheral regions do create developmental effects that are similar to those of other plants. Storper (1991) and Scott (1988,  1992) have also  identified positive development occurring from the newly industrializing regions in the United States.  2.3.4 The World—Systems Approach  The theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous sections attempt to find sources of change by looking at either the relationships between developed and developing countries or characteristics of developing countries themselves. They do not focus on interactions between different places within developing countries. The ‘worldsystems’ approach, however, focuses not only on interactions between the metropolises of the developed world, but also those between urban systems within developing countries. The world-system perspective was initiated by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974,  1976,  1979). Authors in this stream attempt  to explain the different industrialization patterns within the group of developing countries by introducing a third category, ‘semi-periphery.’  It maintains that the world system is  divided into three levels: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. They also argue that a country’s position in the world system is determined both by the specific country’s internal structure (e.g., historical and political background), and external forces.  24  Warwick Armstrong and Terry McGee are unique in their approach to Third World urbanization. They have attempted to distinguish the patterns of Third World urbanization from the conventional model and to create a general model of Third World urban phenomena. One of their earlier papers (Armstrong and McGee 1968) discussed the apparent difference between urbanization patterns of developing countries and those of developed countries. They have created their own model of an urban system (Armstrong and McGee 1985: 51). In shaping the model, they acknowledge the existing influence from the developed world as an external force. However, they also emphasize internal factors, such as cultural, demographic, political, and economic. The model differs from dependency theory in that it accepts the existence of semi—peripheral status of a country, which allows flexible interpretation of the status of NICs and other countries between core and periphery. In summary, the world-system urban theory is a useful framework for the analysis of Third World urbanization and development. However, a more precise pattern of urbanization in a specific country needs to be examined through the actual conditions of the country (Armstrong and McGee 1985).  2.3.5 Theorizing about  the Asian NICs  Post-war industrial growth in the Asian NICs has provided new ways of thinking to authors such as Alice Amsden (1989; 1990;  1991), Stephen Haggard (1990), Ezra Vogel (1991), and  25  Robert Wade (1990).  In contrast to the dependency and NIDL  theorists, these authors believe, based on the Asian NICs evidence, that developing countries can escape from ‘dependent’  status. They are interested in unveiling the  driving forces behind the success in the Asian NICs, distinct from the debate on the relationships between developing and advanced economies. The driving forces behind Asian industrialization have been various,  ranging from Confucian culture (e.g., Berger and  Hsiao 1988), education, a disciplined and cheap labor force, good entrepreneurship of local business leaders, and strong government intervention, good summaries). Vogel  (see Briages i91; 1-3asao 1976,  (1991:  101-102),  for  for exawple, suggests  cultural practices as the prime factor, and overseas influence (ibid.: 85—lOB) as a supportive factor He .argnes that the Confucian traditions in those countries have helped them make use of the special situational advantages of the Asian NICs, and new worldwide opportunities. In relation to the situational factors, he suggests that American aid, the demise of the Japanese colonial role, a sense of political and economic urgency within each country, a cheap labor force, and the lessons from the Japanese model have helped the emergence of the Asian NICs. For other authors in this group, however, the role of government is considered to be the most important source of success (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Wade 1990; White and White 1988). This is especially true in the Korean case (Amsden  26  1989; Haggard 1990;  for example). The efforts to single out  the most important factors of success, however, tend to provide only a partial account of the reality. As Vogel (1991) observes, the orthodoxy Confucian society, China, has not fully industrialized as much as a non-Confucian society, Japan. In addition, Western Europe and North America have industrialized without Confucianism. Another group of authors suggests the notion that the success  of the Asian NIC5 is at best mixed, with various  social costs, and that therefore the success is only temporary. Bello and Rosenfeld (1990), for example, state that the Asian NICs’ economy is not sustainable since the situational factors that contributed to the success have already disappeared. They argue that the economies of the Asian NICs have begun suffering from rising wages, increasing environmental pollution, less docile labor force, and weakening state influence on the society (Douglass 1993; Song, Ho—Keun 1991). These authors seek the causes of success by looking at internal characteristics of individual countries. They emphasize the role of national government. However, they have not articulated how the national government manage external and internal forces. They have missed interactions of the state with local communities and local governments that might have a strong influence on industrialization and development effects.  27  2.4 Assessment of the Conventional Development Theories  No single theory of development fully explains the process of Korean industrialization, and its impacts on the quality of life in local communities. The conventional development theories are fragmented in explaining complex circumstances in the particular pattern of Korea industrialization. First, the dependency theory, like the NIDL thesis, fails to recognize heterogeneities of developing countries (Dickens 1992) and localities within a developing country. The economic, social, and political characteristics of individual developing countries and localities within them vary from place to place. The dependency theory is incapable of explaining the emergence of the Asian NICs. In this regard, Stephen Haggard (1986; 368) states that ‘static portrayals of a hierarchic international structure cannot account for the upward movement that the NICs represent; nor can they account for the differing strategies that governments of the NIC5 have adopted to manage interdependence’  (see also Evans 1985).  While modernization theory has regarded the backwardness of developing countries as the problem of the specific country alone, the dependency theory explains the problem of stagnant economy in less developed countries as being the result of economic and political control by developed countries. The NIDL theory considers the role of governments at both the national and international level, but not locally. Like dependency theory, the NIDL thesis takes into account external  28  relationships of developing countries with the developed world. It is observed that, under the overall growth-oriented policy, national governments of the developed world encourage their multinational corporations to adjust to changing world market conditions (Frobel et al.  1980:  164), and therefore to  expand investment abroad, often in developing countries, where cheap labor is available. The NIDL theorists argue that governments of developed countries tend to remain quiet about repressive governments of developing countries in order to maintain cheap production sites (ibid:  163). In this way, developing countries’  governments reduce their political risks and avoid serious disturbances to their own regimes (ibid :  164). Authors of the  NIDL argue that the governments of developing countries are forced to cooperate with multinational corporations since they have to compete among themselves to attract international investments. However, the NIDL thesis, first, underestimates  the  advantageous aspects of internationalizing industrial production for developing countries. Second, the thesis neglects the positive roles of national governments in developing countries that can manage external forces (e.g., foreign direct investment) 1992:  (Henderson 1986: 71-72; Dicken  125). State governments do not always collaborate with  multinational corporations. Nor are the people in local communities entirely controlled by the state. As far as Korea is concerned the general public did not remain passive, but  29  often acted strongly, opposing or supporting government policies and corporate actions (Wilson 1988). Third, the NIDL thesis does not recognize regional-, or country-, specific features that may vary from locality to locality, or country to country. Therefore, the theory is unable toexplain regional variations within developing countries. It also oversimplifies the variety of strategic options available to business organizations. For multinational corporations, cheap labor is not the only reason for entering a developing country (Dicken 1992:  125). The authors  mistakenly place all developing countries in a trap set by the forces of developed countries and their multinational corporations (Henderson 1989). The scholars of the Asian NICs, such as Amsden, Haggard, and Vogel, have provided some insights on sectoral relationships by focusing on the role of firm and committed national governments in developing countries. But they have inadequately dealt with the local process which may alter the national forces and implant them in each locality. They also neglect the control forces from the world economy. The external forces may not completely control the industrialization process in developing countries, but they can be serious challenges against, or important opportunities for developing countries. World-systems urban theorists have shed light on interactions between localities at the sub-national level. They suggest that one must take into account the roles of  30  urban centers at different scales: international, national, and regional. Therefore, the world-system theory is useful in examining the social forces of large urban centers in a spectrum of interactions between localities at different territorial levels. The influence of large metropolitan centers must not be considered to be universal to all smaller cities, as world-system theory suggests. Sub-regional centers within developing countries need to be placed in an equation of interactions between different level of urban centers. World-systems urban theories, however, have also not paid particular attention to sectoral interactions, for example public/private relationships. As the Asian NIC5 theorists (Haggard 1990; Koo, Hagen 1987) correctly argue, the types of state governments and their policies toward the private sector must not be omitted in a thorough analysis of patterns and processes of industrialization in developing countries. This review of some of major theoretical debates has indicated that they do not provide a satisfactory intellectual answer to the factors influencing development. In the next section, an alternative framework is put forward to analyze the development process in Korea.  2.5 Synthesizing Forces of Industrial Growth: An Integrative Framework  Using insights from the conventional theories, this sub section puts forward a framework that illustrates key players of industrialization in a developing country, and their roles  31  in changing economic, social, political and environmental circumstances in urban communities. Traditional development theories, reviewed in the previous section, strongly suggest that external forces are one of the key factors in the process of industrialization in a developing country. However, the factors within a developing country, such as roles of governments and corporations, are also different from country to country, and interact among themselves in a complex fashion (see Figure 2.1). Peter Dicken (1992: 444) correctly argues that the particular combination of external and internal forces is the crucial point in understanding industrialization processes. The internal factors are subdivided into different social institutions, as this dissertation defines governments, corporations, and local communities. These sectorially organized forces are operated at different levels of territorial units, such as national, provincial, and municipal evels. These internal factors in a growing economy dynamically interact among each other,  implanting national  forces in a different fashion in a specific locality. Mollenkopf (1981: 334—335) supports studies of internal forces by stating a satisfactory theory of urban industrialization must examine the interactions among the factors that affect the development process.  9. This dissertation does not place a high priority on the provincial level since, in Korea, provinces have a weaker influence on local industrial and municipal management than the central and municipal governments (see Kang, Pyung-Kun (1968).  32  0 G\oaX Polical Eco  Infomation Technology Materials  Infomation Technology Materials  Commodities  Commodities  )f-fl?JA 3 ‘  pqO1O  Weak Influence Strong Influence < Input! Output LEE] Key Players —  4—  Source: Drawn by the Author  Figure 2.1: Relationships betweenKey Players in Industrail Growth and Urban Transformation in Developing Countries  33  Similarly, Hagen Koo (1984) supports such studies by stating that the process of socioeconomic change has to disclose not only the individual sectors but also their relationships with each other. Using three factors: the world economic system, class relations, and the role of the state, he has developed a conceptual model of the political economic processes for Third World development. Recently, the role of localities and communities has received greater attention as a factor of internal dynamics. Vazquez-Barquero (1990: 486), for example, observes that the introduction of the notion of locality (or community) within development theory allows productive restructuring dynamics to be linked to the global production and exchange system. Storper (1991:  116) also supports this view by arguing that  intrinsic elements of community consciousness help keep a production system in a community functioning smoothly (Storper and Christopherson 1987). In the context of Western societies, active roles of the community are emphasized, especially in relation to the newly emerging ‘flexible specialization’  (Piore and Sabel 1984),  conceptualized from the Italian industrial experience (see Brusco 1982; Brusco and Sabel 1981; Russo 1986; Sabel 1989). There are other groups of authors who also suggest that communities can exert influence upon outside forces, shaping their destiny (Cooke 1989: 3; Mollenkopf 1981; Storper 1991: 116, for example). Social relations within a community can contribute to industrial growth. The relations collectively  34  determine the working and living conditions of community members. The present research recognizes the community, sector as an independent actor which influences industrial policy and the urban QOL. There is, of course, much debate about the meaning of locality and community. In this thesis the term ‘locality’  is  applied to units of political organization which have a territorial responsibility for spatially defined territories below the level of nation state.  ‘  city is  Thus a  defined as a locality in this thesis. The term ‘community’  is  more complex often being defined as a like—minded group of people. In this thesis community is defined as the people living in a locality. Both of these terms have varying definitions because they can be applied at different scales of analysis. The concepts of a locality and community have to be incorporated into the analysis of the industrialization process and changing QOL because the community is more than a recipient but an active partner (see Clark 1986, Mair 1988; Glickman 1987; Hudson 1988,  1989; Cox and  1989; Rodwin and  Sazanami 1990). It is often argued that the Confucian ethic (Kim, Kyong-Dong 1988) encourages the people in Korean communities to comply with the directions of the government. However, these communities have also shown that they can be aggressive under certain circumstances. In recent years more authors have brought about significant changes within the Korean political system. As the economic circumstance of the  35  Korean people improves, the quality of life in local communities is becoming more important. Authors like Rostow (1960), Dore (1971;  1982;  1983), and  Vogel (1991) view external factors as beneficial for developing countries in creating development effects. They suggest that developing countries can take advantage of financial resources, technology, and scientific knowledge from developed countries. In contrast, the dependency and the NIOL lines of thought suggest the external forces are hostile to the creation of developmental effects. Authors like Skocpol (1979), argue that developing countries are chronically dependent upon international loans and foreign technology, therefore, financial and industrial sectors of developing countries are controlled by developed countries. Growing employment opportunities in developing countries are sporadic. Therefore, they argue that development effects can not be sustained there due to control by economic and political forces of developed countries. Some world-systems theorists also recognize external forces. These forces are often viewed as hostile to developing countries. Unlike the dependency theory and the NIDL thesis, however, these authors emphasize internal forces that may intervene in the influence of the external forces. Armstrong and McGee (1985: 40) have observed that ‘the prime motivation in social change arises from internal relationships of classes and actions of social groups and  36  individuals in given historical situations’  (see also Hardoy  and Satterthwaite 1986: 3-4). For these authors the internal/external dichotomy is viewed to be too simplistic (Armstrong and McGee 1985; Chase—Dunn 1975,  1979,  1984;  Timberlake and Kentor 1983). These authors emphasize the internal interactions within a country. They observe that the internal systems are incorporated into the ‘world-system’ (Wallerstein 1974). The dynamics of the internal forces are the sources of the different patterns and processes demonstrated by different countries within the developing world. Armstrong and McGee (1985: 51) have diagrammatically illustrated the types of interactions between urban centers at different positions of the world system. They suggest that cultural, political, and economic influence filter down from the world core to the peripheral countries, and move up in the opposite way. The influence flows from the world metropolitan cities to the national centers, then to the regional centers, and finally to the small communities of the peripheries. They observe that through this channel production and consumption patterns of a developing country are affected by the decisions made at world metropolitan centers, such as New York, London, and Tokyo. In common with other world-systems theorists, Armstrong and McGee’s model assumes a series of influences that move downwards through the levels of the urban hierarchy and others that move upwards. This is ordinarily not considered as an  37  equal relationship since the Armstrong and McGee model is designed to explain particularly the flow of capital and the leveling of a surplus from these investment flows. It is thus much narrower than the broader world-systems theories of Wa lie r ste in. The different scale of urban centers within Armstrong and McGee’s model can be interpreted as central/local relationships in the Korean case. The influence from outside Korea may filter down through the national government to municipalities. Head offices of large corporations based in the national center (Seoul) have located their manufacturing plants in local communities. Therefore, even the forces of the corporate sector can be considered to be operating at two levels: central and local.  2.6 Applying the Integrative Framework in this Dissertation The central government in Korea aggressively seeks to minimize external pressures, trying to maximize overseas opportunities, as mentioned earlier. The corporate sector today is integrated into the world system far deeper than ever before. Major corporations in Korea actively seek overseas information, technology, raw materials, and financial resources. They also supply goods and services to the international markets. The flow of resources for the corporate sector is not only from the world to Korea, but also from  38  Korea to the world. Capital investment both in the world core and periphery is an example. The integrative framework in the previous section is useful in analyzing the links among the key players of industrialization in Korea. The model shows how, in the process of implementing industrial policies, changes in the social and economic conditions of local communities have emerged. It is implied that a change in one sector causes subsequent changes in the ways in which the related forces interact, which in turn influences the overall process of industrialization (Koo, Hagen 1987:  165).  The remaining chapters of this thesis utilize this integrative framework to investigate how the process of industrialization had affected Korea at the national, provincial, and local levels.  39  CHAPTER THREE KEY PLAYERS IN THE KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS  3.1 Overview  This chapter shows how the driving forces of Korean industrialization were developed and how their relationships have been changed in the course of industrialization. Employing the framework suggested in Chapter two, this chapter identifies the following three players of Korean industrialization: i) the central government; ii) the corporate sector; and iii) local governments and communities. An examination of the characteristics of these and their interactions reveals how Koreans manage external constraints and internal dynamics of economic and political activities. This chapter begins with an examination of the role of the central government. The next section examines how the central government built capacities for managing external and internal conditions of industrial growth. The third section documents the process of corporate sector growth. This section shows how the corporate sector works within government policies. The fourth section shows how the interplay between the government and the corporate sector has changed the QOL at the locality level. Ulsan is an industrial city that has experienced the most rigorous government and corporate influence, while Kyungju is a city that has much less influenced by them.  40  3.2 Commanding Capacity of the Central Government  The formation of planning institutions and the evolution of planning traditions in the central government are important in understanding how Korea has been able to create rapid industrial growth.  3.2.1 The Characteristics  of the Central Government  A key component of the Korean central government is the Presidential Office (i.e., the president and his advisors, the ‘Blue House’). The Presidential Office is a source of political leadership. Historically, this is most obvious in the example of President Chung-Hee Park. The strong leadership and personal commitment of President Park promoted a general climate, under which most people in local communities strove to achieve the goal of economic growth. Their massive participation in the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong, a comprehensive rural modernization program, see Shin, Dong-Ho 1990; wang, In Keun 1991) was a positive response to the president’s leadership. The strong work-ethic of industrial workers in the 1960s and 1970s was also influenced by this leadership. The Presidential Office is an influential agency, that can directly intervene in any stage of the planning process. The Office plays an important role in setting strategies and targets and monitoring the implementation process (Chung, Chung—Kil 1989; Cummings 1987). Park’s initiative to establish the Monthly Meeting of the Trade Promotion and his strong  41  support to its institutionalization (Lim, Youngil 1981; Oh, Won—Chul 19921 is an excellent example of the President’s 0 roles in the development process. Planning and administrative agencies of the central government work closely with the Presidential Office. The Office plays a role in vertical and horizontal communications among different ministries. High-ranking bureaucrats in the central government exercise modern managerial skills, take pride in being part of the government sector, and are strongly committed to national prosperity (Kim, Kyong-Dong 1988; Luedde-Neurath 1988; Michtell 1984). Government officials work under official laws and regulations. Although the government system in Korea has authoritarian characteristics (Cotton 1992; Kim, Kyong-Dong 1988: 213), officials maintain considerable flexibility in applying the official rules (Deyo 1987: 228; Luedde-Neurath 1988: 85, 99). The government spells out policies only in general terms, leaving the details of implementation to the discretion of administrators (Alam 1989: 31). In this way, central government’s policies often leave much for flexible interpretation. This flexibility, with the officials’ personal commitment to presidential leadership, allows the implementing 10. This information is obtained from a long series of Won-Chul Oh’s newspaper (Hankuk KuyngJae Sinmun) articles. Won-Chul Oh was a core member of the group that organized Korean industrialization strategies. He worked for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry after the 1961 coup and served as the chief economic secretary to the president (Chung-Hee Park) between 1971 and 1979. He is now an advisor to the Economic Research Institute, established by a major corporation, Kia Industry.  42  officials to achieve developmental goals, rather than simply carrying out bureaucratic means (Kim, Kyong-Dong 1988:  3.2.2 The Establishment  213).  of Planning Capacity  Korea built its planning capacities through a process of ‘trial and error’  after its independence (in 1945). The  Syengman Rhee government established the Office of Planning in 1948 (see Figure 3.1).  Indeed, the Office produced some  sectoral ‘modernization’ programs, but these were not mandated as governmental plans, until it was merged into the Ministry of Reconstruction after the Korean War  (Mason, et al.  1980:  252). The second attempt at planning was the ‘Tasca Plan’, that was directed by American president Eisenhower (Lee, Jae-Won 1967;  1969). The Tasca Mission conducted six weeks of field  work in Korea and submitted a report to president Eisenhower, consisting mainly of factual data. The Tasca plan was used as a basis for United States aid, but did not involve any Korean inputs (Mason et al.  1980).  By the end of the 1950s, there were several incidents of planning activities in relation to the Korean government. These include the ‘Nathan Plan the Economic Development Council’s (EDC’s) Three-Year Economic Development Plan (19601962) and the ‘Five-Year Development Plan’  (Lee, Jae-Won 1969:  33). 11. This was prepared by the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to prepare a post-war reconstruction program.  43  1945  I  I  I  1955  I  1960  Chang  1970  2nd Five-Year Economic Development Plan (By EPB) 1st Five-Year Economic Development Plan  1965  Three-Year Economic Development Plan (By EDC)  Nathan Plan (By Nathan Associ tes)  I  Taska’s Recommendatior  I  Five-Year-Plan (By Office of Planning)  1950  I  Rhee Government  Park Government  Instituted the Economic PlanninQ Board (EPB)  Office of Planning & Ministry of Reconstr ction Wer Merged  Instituted the ‘Nathan Associates (UNCRA)  Instituted Economic Development Council (EDO)  Figure 3,1: Institutional Advancement in Korea’s Development Planning, 1948-72 (Source: Mason et al. 1980; Lee, Jae-.Won 1968; Jones and Sakong 1980)  Activity  Major Planning  Year  Regime US Millitary  Institutional Chnage  Established the Office of Plan  First Comprehensive National Land Use Plan (By KRIHS)  -.  Instituted (KRIHS)  Korea’s central planning before the 1960s did not have any real effect on the economy, primarily because the plans were not implemented. The lack of implementation was due primarily to the lack of political commitment. The planning agencies (i.e., EDC, Office of Planning, etc.) did not have the capacity to require other governmental agencies to implement planned activities; and the foreign inputs were ineffective since they were not accepted by the Korean government. These characteristics of central planning in the 1950s changed however with growing technocratic abilities within government in later periods. The planning activities initiated during the 1950s improved the qualification and number of Korean planning professionals. Governmental officials were also trained through planning experience and returning scholars from overseas joined government departments. An additional source of disciplined technocrats was the expanding military. Newly established military schools offered courses on foreign policy, economic policy, defence mobilization, and long-range strategic planning (for details, see Lee, Hahn-Been 1968: 148). In 1961, the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, the powerhouse of the 1961  coup, made an important step toward  central planning. The Council merged the existing EDC with the Bureau of Budget (of the Ministry of Finance) and the Bureau of Statistics (of the Ministry of Home Affairs) into the Economic Planning Board (EPB). The EPB was granted  45  responsibility for the economy, such as economic planning, filing national statistics and, most importantly, budgeting. The EPB’s grip on these activities provided it with an ability to coordinate activities of other ministries. The EPB since its inception has formulated six Five-Year Economic Development Plans (FYEDPs), all of which were systematically implemented. The experience of earlier stages were incorporated into the planning at later stages. As new internal and external circumstances emerged, the EPB adjusted plans. This capacity for timely response and continuous adjustment to changing forces is an important characteristic of government intervention, that accelerated industrial growth. An example of a prompt response to the changing internal circumstances was the initiation in 1970 of the New Community Movement. As industrial growth continued in urban centers, economic disparities widened between urban and rural areas. In response to this, the government with strong presidential leadership implemented the Movement. Through this program, rural economic and social conditions were noticeably improved. For example, the average annual income for a rural household increased by 95 percent between 1970 and 1976 (Kim, Kyong-Dong 1979:  155; and see also Wang, In Keun 1991). Another example of government response to changing  domestic circumstances is illustrated by the institutionalization of the Comprehensive National Land Use Plans (CNLUP5). In the late 1960s, excessive population growth  46  in Seoul and the relative stagnation in the rest of the country became a public issue. To cope with this regional disparity, the government established the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) in 1969. The KRIHS initiated a series of spatial plans. The first of these was a ten—year land use plan (1972—1981). Since its inception, the KRIHS has created three CNLUPs, and has been active in studying spatial issues related to economic growth. The strength of the Korean planning practice since the 1960s is not limited to institutional growth and timely adjustments. The government has also improved the coordination of related institutions. Over some three decades, the basic strategy of industrial policy: outward-looking, export-led growth, learning from the outside, and strong government intervention, moving from low to medium and high technology sectors, has not been altered. Planners hired foreign advisors; paid attention to criticisms from within the country; and employed lessons learned from the earlier planning periods in subsequent plans. Thus it can be argued that the central government had a positive influence on the location and growth of industrial activities in Korea.  3.3 Expanding Corporate Sector  3.3.1 The Characteristics of the Corporate Sector The Korean corporate sector has been the engine of industrial growth. It is the major source of employment  47  opportunities, wealth, and goods and services that has helped the overall improvement in the QOL for the general public. The Korean corporate sector consists of conglomerates and smaller corporations. Many Korean conglomerates are organized under family groups, such as Hyundai and Samsung Chaebols (Whitley 1990; Kang, Chul-Kyu et al.  1991). Although these are privately  owned, they are heavily dependent upon bank loans. In 1990, for example, none of the five largest Chaebol groupsad more than 25 percent of their own capital, leaving the rest with public and private loans (Kang, Chul-Kyu et al.  1991:  286). Banks in Korea are strictly regulated by the government; therefore, the large corporations have to comply with governmental expectations and regulations. This gives the government considerable leverage to intervene in the corporate sector (Whitley 1990; 58). The decision-making process in the corporate sector is highly centralized around the owners of the corporations (i.e., founding fathers and their family members, see Kang, Chul-Kyu et al.  1991). Corporations are organized in a way  that allows them to easily adapt to changing economic and technological circumstances (Dicken 1992; Amsden 1989). Within a Chaebol group, there are active flows of information,  12. Chaebols are large corporate groups in Korea, operated by a single family group. Chaebols have established approximately five to 35 subsidiary corporations which are operated at the international scale. Under the Samsung Chaebol group, for example, 37 subsidiaries are operated, including heavy industry, electronics, and construction companies (Kang, Chul-Kyu et al. 1991).  48  skills, and technology both between subsidiaries and levels of management (Dicken 1992: 64). Korean conglomerates employ well educated and trained managers. Their technical labor force has proven to be energetic, motivated, hard-working, and pragmatic. Enos and Park (1988:  108) report that Korean engineers have a strong  desire to acquire modern technical knowledge, combined with mechanical aptitude; the courage to undertake unfamiliar activities; little resentment at working intensely and regularly for long hours; a spirit of cooperation; a willingness to subordinate private interests to collective goals; and an urgent pragmatism. These characteristics have been conducive to managing external opportunities and constraints.  3.3.2 Solid Corporate Linkages with the Government In the 1950s the current major entrepreneurial groups (i.e., Chaebols), such as Samsung, Lucky, and Ssangyong were formed. For example, Samsung was established in 1951, as a general trading company (GTC).his firm began with light industries, such as textile manufacturing and sugar refining. Under the Rhee regime, Samsung and other large firms made fortunes by taking advantage of the distribution of American aid funds, especially during the rehabilitation period after 13. A general trading company trades goods and services in a close connection with the corporations within the same owner group. Hyundai International Trading Co. imports and exports goods on behalf of other Hyundai corporations, such as Hyundai Motors, Hyundai Shipbuilding, etc.  49  the Korean War. Entrepreneurs received preferential government loans. Obtaining loans with low interest rates itself was an effective and easy way of accumulating wealth since the interest rate of commercial loans were (two to three times) higher than those of government or aid funds (Kang, Chul-Kyu et al.  1991:  113). They also profited by importing commodities  at lower prices than those of domestic markets. Access to public funds and import licences during the 1950s was based substantially upon political connections and contacts with corrupt bureaucrats (Korzeniewicz and Korzeniewicz 1992: 8788). When the Supreme Council promulgated political reform policies after the military coup in 1961, the business leaders who had previously received preferential treatment from government officials and politicians were accused of gathering ‘illicit’ wealth. Some of them were imprisoned (Oh, Won-Chul 1992:  102). The coup Council had at the same time initiated an  ambitious economic reform policy. However, the Council soon realized that these imprisoned entrepreneurs were themselves an important resource. Korea had few entrepreneurs who could actually build factories and produce commodities at the planned scale. Nor did it have financial resources to implement the planned projects. The accused business leaders asked the Council for an amnesty offering their properties and entrepreneurial skills to support government projects (Kim, Kyong-Dong 1979; Oh, Won-Chul 1992). As this offer was  50  accepted by the Supreme Council, the link between the entrepreneur groups and the Park government was established.  3.3.3 Business Growth under Powerful Economic Planning, 1960—1970  The business leaders who had been condemned for business misconduct, began implementing the government’s wishes. They provided business information,  financial resources, and  managerial skills to implement planned activities. For example,  in 1961 a group of entrepreneurs, representing the  Korean Federation of Entrepreneurs, made a visit to the United States where they learned that a precondition of conducting joint ventures was the construction of industrial estates. When the group reported this, the government agreed to provide industrial estates. Ulsan was chosen as the first location in this endeavor (Oh, Won-Chul 1992:  102).  Individual members of the Federation and other entrepreneurs were assigned projects within the first Five Year Economic Development Plan. Samsung, for example, was urged to construct the Korean Fertilizer Co. of Ulsan, while Ssangyong and Hyundai established two concrete cement factories (Oh, Won—Chul 1992:  102). In the following years,  the government strongly assisted the entrepreneurial process through price setting and guarantees of international loans. The quantity of government support was massive, but selective. The government used a ‘carrot and stick’  strategy.  Corporations that performed more poorly than expected were  51  dropped from the list of government recipients and allowed to go into bankruptcy. An electrical machine company, a subsidiary of Daehan Brewery Group and an artificial fabric company, established by Wha Shin Group, suffered this fate (ibid: 3). These incidents were a powerful lesson for other corporations, remaining as a feature of government/corporate relationships. In each of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Five Year Economic Development Plans, the central government identified certain industries as ‘strategic’. Corporations were encouraged to focus on these priority industries. Those corporations that demonstrated the best capacity and were willing to contribute to strategic change obtained government assistance. The most significant growth in the corporate sector was in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The government aggressively pushed chemical and heavy industries, providing public funds, preferential loans, and import licences. The most impressive progress was by the Daewoo group. Daewoo started business in 1967 and had grown to become the fifth largest exporter by 1972. The expansion, which was mainly the result of venturing into new enterprises, continued through the 1970s and the 1980s. Between 1973 and 1979, Daewoo took over five major corporations, such as Shinjin Motor and Okpo Shipbuilding. Hyundai, the second largest conglomerate, and other major corporations also grew through takeovers in this period (Kang et al.  1990:  145). The number of subsidiaries controlled by  52  the 30 largest conglomerate groups increased from 126 to 429 between 1970 and 1979 (Kang, Chul—Kyu et al.  1991:  114-115).  In 1980, Hyundai as a group was among the top 130 largest industrial corporations in the world with US 5.5 billion dollars of annual sales. 14  3.3.4 Becoming Multinationals,  1970—1990  During the 1970s and the 1980s, Korean conglomerates grew to become multinational corporations. In 1991 thirteen Korean firms were listed among the 500 largest companies in the world (Fortune, July 27,  1992). The role of Korean conglomerates in  domestic markets is also extensive. The total sales of the ten largest Chaebol groups, for example, have grown to be equivalent to 54 percent of the Korean GNP in 1989, from 33 percent in 1979 (Kang, Chul—Kyu et al 1991:  120).  Korean Chaebols came to dominate various industries, including machinery, petrochemical, electronics, semiconductor, auto industry, mass media, and banking. The Hyundai group, for example, had expanded from automobile manufacturing, shipbuilding, chemical manufacturing, electronics, iron and steel production into international trading, banking, and the press by the late 1980s. The group employed approximately 140,000 workers in 1990, operating 28  14. The sales amount is in the current prices. The rank is calculated from both the lists of 500 largest industries within and outside the U.S. (Fortune, May 4, 1981; August 10, 1981).  53  15 half of this employment is located in a single subsidiaries, city, Ulsan. Of prime significance for the present study is the knowledge that corporate activities have had a massive impact on local economies. The location of a large company in a small town transforms local economic, social, and environmental characteristics, as Ulsan’s experience will exhibit (see Chapter five). New cities can also be created on a vacant land by a large firm. The small island village on the southern is an example. Daewoo located a major 6 cost, Jangsyeungpo shipbuilding company there in 1986, currently employing more than 5,000 workers. Dongkwangyang city, located in the southern Jeonnam province, is another example, which hosts the second plant of Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) Jung—Rok 1991,  (Lee,  1992; Auty 1990). Between 1984 and 1990, the  city grew from a village of 2.2 thousand people to a city of 13.0 thousand (Lee, Jung—Rok 1992:  121).  Following the late 1980s, the government attempted to change its relationships with the corporate sector. This reflected the fact that there emerged a broad consensus among student activist groups, the intellectual community, the government, and the public in general, that Chaebol groups had grown too large. The large corporations were criticized for entering unconventional business areas, such as real estate 15. Three corporations of the Hyundai group ranked among the 500 fortune global companies in 1991. In the same year, Hyundai Motor Co. was the 140th largest in the world, with 5.5 billion American dollars of annual sales (Fortune, July 27, 1992, p. 218). 16. See Table 4.2, page 84.  54  International Community  c)  National Government Central  vs.  Large Corpora tions in Seoul  -Revenue Political Funds4 4  Head Quarters  -  Local  -  -  Local Governments  -  c_  .  )  Policy Guidelines Financial Assistance Infrastructure  vs.  Branch Plants  i  c:l,  CI) .  —I  .4—  I  I  Communities & Their Environments  Source: Compiled from Armstrong & McGee (1985); Dougkss (1993); Jung (1987); Clark (1989); Warr (1984); & Kim HS (198?).  Figure 3.2: Internal and External Relationships of Governments, Corporations & Local Communities in Korea  55  and stock speculation3 expanding into businesses that ought 7 occupying an excessively large 8 to be left for smaller firms share of the national economy, and creating corruption in the government (Kang, Chul-Kyu et al.  1991). Intellectuals in  Korea also criticized the conglomerates themselves for becoming rigid and, in turn, less competitive in international market s 9 The public has strongly demanded that the government reduce support for conglomerates. The Roh government and its successor initiated policies to distance themselves from the large corporate sector. The firms are expected to demonstrate their competitiveness in the international market, rather than to monopolize domestic markets.  3.4 Managing External Forces, The Central Government and Large Corporations  3.4.1 The Central Government  The central government in Korea protects domestic markets by reducing the influence of the foreign sector. Using negative and positive lists, the government strictly control flows of foreign goods and services. This is especially true 17. These two maintain a low profile in the Korean society. Therefore, responsible business leaders are expected to stay away from such ill-respected industries. 18. In the Korean context, some industries should be left over for smaller firms, such as retail services that need low technology and small capital. 19. This view has been confirmed by studies by Dong-Sung Cho (1990), the Korea Development Institute (KDI), and the KIET (Korean Institute of Industrial Technology). However, researchers of the KERI (Korea Economic Research Institute) have reported an opposite conclusion (see Mail kyungJae sinmun, May 10, 1993)  56  for the industrial fields,  in which domestic industries are at  the infant stage. Once a Korean industry builds up a capacity for survival, however, the government gradually releases the control on imported foreign goods, so as to place Korean industries in a more competitive situation. The government, on the other hand, encourages foreign investment for certain industrial sectors with government incentives, such as guaranteeing product prices and providing tax breaks and industrial estates (e.g., free trade zones). Selection criteria for industries to encourage or discourage are based on rational analysis. The government seeks foreign investments for certain industries that are designated for strategic promotion and need foreign capital and/or technology. In this case the government closely monitors the process of the capital and technology transfer. In contrast to the arguments of dependency theorists (Skocpol 1979, for example), Korean government actions are not always constrained by the core countries (see Matsura 1989). One way that the Korean government reduces external constraints is by supporting local companies. The government helps the corporate sector by expanding new export markets. It has contributed to the expansion of commodity markets by establishing diplomatic relationships with the countries that were not officially recognized. Since 1980, Korea has opened formal diplomatic relationships with China, Russia, Vietnam, and other former socialist countries.  57  The government used foreign technology to industrialize its economy. The first element of the Korean strategy for utilizing foreign opportunities was to obtain overseas expertise through Korean-born scientists returning from overseas training. The second element of the government strategy was its direct intervention in the foreign sector. Supporting evidence includes establishment of quasi— governmental research institutions,  such as the Korea Trade  Promotion Authority (KOTRA). KOTRA was instituted in 1962 and has expanded its overseas offices to 85 locations by June  993.  Table 3.1: Decreasing Korean trade dependence on the U.S. and Japan, 1965—1991  Others Expt Impt  Year  U.S. Expt Impt  Japan Expt Impt  Europe Expt Impt  Other Asia Expt Impt  1965  35.2 39.3  25.5 37.8  12.2  8.8  23.5 11.5  3.5  2.7  1970  47.3 29.5  28.1  40.8  9.1  11.0  9.8 16.1  5.7  2.7  1975  30.2 25.9  25.4 33.5  18.4  8.3  15.0 25.8  10.9  6.6  1980  26.3 21.9  17.4 26.3  17.8  8.5  24.4 33.4  14.1  9.9  1985  35.5 20.8  15.0 24.3  14.2 12.9  18.8 21.3  16.5 20.6  1991  25.8 23.2  17.2 25.9  17.6 15.6  26.6 24.3  12.8 11.1  Note: Numbers in the table indicate percentage share of trade measured by amount of sales. Source: SaKong (1993: 233-1 34)  20. Telephone interview with an employee of the corporation’s branch office in Vancouver, Canada.  58  The government has decreased the influence of the U.S. and Japan, by diversifying its partnerships to include Western and Eastern European countries. Reduced Korean reliance on economic, political, and technological supports from the United States and Japan demonstrates this success (Table 3.1). The sum of exports to the two countries drastically declined from 60.7 percent of the total in 1965 to 43.0 percent in 1991, while the sum of imports from the countries declined from 77.1 percent in 1965 to 43.1 percent in 1991. This contrasts with a significant increase in the importance of trade with other countries in other continents.  3. 4, 2 Corporate Act I ons  Corporate strategies to manage external opportunities and constraints include: obtaining advanced technology; expanding foreign markets and investment overseas. The driving forces behind these are; government pressure and assistance; competent managers and engineers and competition among corporations within Korea. Korean corporations actively imported foreign technology by hiring foreign engineers and sending their own engineers for overseas training. In constructing a shipbuilding yard in the mid-1970s, Hyundai Shipbuilding Co. sent 200 engineers and technicians to Japan to import advanced technology (Amsden 1989: 277). In this process, Hyundai did not completely rely on foreign advisors. By drawing upon technicians from various countries, such as Japan, the U.S., and Scotland, the company  59  dispersed external Dependence. The overall process was controlled by its own managers (Amsden 1989). Corporations in Korea actively seek to obtain advanced technology from developed countries. However, they strive to reduce continuous reliance on the foreign sector. Two examples are: POSCO and Hanyang Chemical Co. Building the first phase of POSCO involved 119,070 foreign engineer person hours from Japan. However, foreign engineers required for expansion steadily, decreased through the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th phases (see Table 3.2). The company became one of the lowest-cost steel makers in the world and started exporting its technology locally and overseas. In 1986, 26 year old POSCO initiated a joint venture with the 120 year old United States Steel 21 (USX)  (POSCO 1988; Amsden 1989: 291). Hanyang Chemical plants in Ulsan and Yeocheon provide  another case. In designing and constructing the first plant in Ulsan, Hanyang in 1970 began with 100 percent foreign engineers. For its second plant in Yeocheon, seven year later, the company started with only 50 percent foreign engineering involvement (see Figure 3.3). Inter-corporate competition and cooperation are the major sources of such efforts. Korean corporations expand overseas interactions by diversifying production and market linkages. They have established production units not only in less developed countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, but also in developed countries in North America 21. This will be further discussed in Chapter five.  60  Table 3.2: Decreasing Reliance on Foreign Technology in POSCO Phase I A: Payments to foreign firms for engineering services (Mill. $s)  Phase II Phase III  Phase IV  6.31  5.98  7.01  .38  B: Foreign engineering hours involved 119,070  64200  491  NA  1.03  1.57  2.9  3.6  $6.13  $3.81  $2.42  $0.11  0.116  0.041  0.0002  C: Production capacity (Mill. tons) A/C:  $/ton  B/C: Hours/ton Source: Amsden  (1989:  309)  Figure 3.3: Decreasing reliance on foreign technology in Hanyang Chemical Co, Ulsan and Yeocheon plants Basic design  Detailed design  Construction Start-up Operason  too  ULSAN plant C 0 ,  SC YFOCHEON plant  C 0 0 0  —.—-.—.—-—  a,  —  1970  1977  1971  1978  1972  1979  1974  1973  1980  Source: Enos and Park  1981  (1988:  1975  1982  106)  61  1976  1983  197  1984  (Scale for ULSAN plantl  (Scale for YSOCHEON plant(  ——  and Europe (see Cho, Dong-Sung 1990; Euh, Yoon-Dae and Mm, Sang H.  1986). Hyundai Motors in Canada, Goldstar of America  in Huntsville, Alabama, Samsung International in New Jersey, and Daewoo’s OCMP in New York illustrates the latter case. 22  3.4.3 The Government and Corporations within Korea The interactions among the main forces of industrialization within Korea can be expressed as: i) government/corporate interactions; ii) government/locality interactions; and iii) corporate/locality interactions. The government’s economic plans and strategies provide a broad direction for corporate activities. The corporate sector in Korea is not only ‘guided’ by government directives but is also ‘promoted’ through public resources and information. The government provides the private sector with market information, financial assistance, legal authorizations (e.g., import licences), and physical infrastructure (e.g., construction of roads and industrial tes). The government/corporate interaction in Korea is not a one-way linkage. The corporate sector provides ‘political’ funds to the government (see Kim, Kyong-Dong 1979). It helps the operation of the government by generating revenue, and provides political legitimacy by contributing to economic growth, a primary goal of the past several governments). For 22. Some of these linkages will be elaborated in Chapter five. 23. Byung-Nak Song (1990: 144-145) has stated that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry used to deny supplying electricity to the firms that do not comply with the government policy.  62  example, the corporate sector fulfills export targets, set by the government. These targets are often used as a symbol of the government’s achievement, thereby legitimizing political regimes. This was most clear during the Park period. In summary, this process nurtures opportunities for mutual understanding between corporate leaders, and government officials and planners. Inter-corporate relationships in Korea are dynamic. Large corporations within Chaebol groups exchange capital, management skills, technology, and market networks. General Trading Companies for example trade products of corporations organized under the same corporate family. Smaller corporations also constitute an important part of the corporate sector. These firms contribute to the activities of conglomerates by fulfilling segments of production processes, that are contracted out from these conglomerates. The locality/community interactions with the central government and the corporate sector are less well documented. Although they are not as strong as the government/business partnership, locality/community interactions are important in understanding the process of industrial growth and changing levels of the QOL. The central government provides the locality with public services, such as public health, social security, municipal services, and infrastructure. These are essential components determining the level of local QOL and the quality of labor.  63  The community sector indirectly contributes to industrial growth by providing strong support for the political regime, thereby maintaining a stable business climate. However, people in local communities can also influence government policy through opposition or support, as mentioned earlier. The corporate sector plays an important role for local populations by providing economic opportunities. Corporations create employment opportunities and wealth for the members of communities where they locate. In terms of employment, the role of smaller corporations is also substantial. For example, in 1986 firms with five to 100 workers had 65 percent of the total workers employed by firms with five and more employees. Conversely, corporate activities can harm QOL at the locality level by producing unfavorable by-products (e.g., pollutants). Changes in employment as a result of business cycles also generate a significant effect at the local level. Increased corporate activities can also affect the community lifestyle by monopolizing space and urban infrastructure, thereby reducing open space and increasing living costs (e.g., 2 In addition, the growth of the industrial sector rent) often the breaks down the sense of community by disintegrating existing social networks within communities. The industrialization impacts on community social structure are particularly serious as Korea has developed massive industrial estates in many locations in a short period. 24. This aspect of the increasing social costs of urban development has been well conceptualized in the American context by John Logan and his colleagues (see Logan and Molotch 1987).  64  Communities provide physical and social space for corporate activities. They also share municipal infrastructure with the corporate sector. The levels of community amenities and infrastructure provision are a factor in local corporate activities. Communities are a depository of cultural artifacts. The strong work ethic, for example, is drawn from a culture that is maintained primarily in individual households. Individual households in Korean communities are responsible for the financial resources required for education, a frequently cited force of Korean economic growth. An observer on American industrial change (Nash 1987: 275) stated that ‘interdependence of community and industry is increasingly distorted by changes: the progressive integration of industry at the national and international levels has brought about distancing of the local community from the seats of corporate decision-making.’ In Korea, however, the change seems to have occurred in the opposite direction. Major Korean corporations are increasingly aware of their public image. As well, the community is becoming more active in politicizing the social costs of corporate activities. As this negative role of the corporate sector on the community’s lifestyle is publicized by the free press (see Youm, Kyu-Ho 1986; Youm and Saiwen 1990), the relationship between the two is better understood by the public. This process has accelerated since the late 1980s.  65  3.5 Local Communities under the Central Forces  Central government policies in Korea are transferred to local communities often through local governments. Many conglomerates based in Seoul also operate their production units in local communities.  3.5.1 Local Governing Structure For most provinces and municipalities, the basic structure of the administrative system was established prior to the 1960s. This system has either three or four layers of administrative units. The central government transmits its policies down through these layers of the administrative system, or directly to project sites. Under the central government are the provincial governments. The five largest metropolitan cities have a status equivalent to that of the provinces. The second and the third layers are more complicated as they differ according to the level of urbanization (see Figure 3.4). For example, the City of Kyungju, a medium sized city included in the present study, acts as an administrator of senior government policies. The City of Ulsan, also studied in this dissertation, is similarly ranked. However, unlike Kyungju, Ulsan has another level of administration. Ulsan transmits senior governments’ policies to three of its wards (Ku,  in Korean), under which 48  municipal sub-wards (Dong, in Korean) operate.  (Smaller  cities, including Kyungju, do not have the ward system.)  66  Government with eeced representatives  Source: Yoo, Jong-Hae (1993)  Figure 3.4: Structure of Local Govermement in Korea (1988)  67  In the past local administration had little political autonomy. Provincial governors were appointed by the president, and city and county mayors, in turn, by provincial governors. The local administrative units did not have elected councils until 1991. They were simply means of executing central government policies. This is especially true for industrial cities that grew as a result of the industrial policies of the central government. A major change in relative responsibility is now underway between the central and local governments. The central government began to decentralize its power in 1991. Local councils, with elected members, have already been established. Elections for provincial governors and mayors of municipal governments will be held in the near future (Yoo, jong-hae 1993:  164). The major driving force behind this change has  25 been the increasing public demand for local autonomy. The demand for local autonomy was fueled by the increase in the diversity and quantity of local public services. The former centralized system was unable to meet this change in demand. Furthermore, the public has become increasingly assertive in expressing its demands. These changes led officials and planners at the central government to the conclusion that a more decentralized administration was essential.  25. Korea had established a decentralized local political system in 1960, but it was abolished by the military coup in 1961 (see Yoo, Jong-Hae 1993).  68  The system of local administration has been effective in implementing central policies. The local system as a whole has developed communication channels both between different levels of government and among operational units within it. These channels have worked systematically, especially for strategic projects of the central government. The results of local implementation quickly flow back to the central system, as a homogeneous administrative culture exists throughout the central and local systems. New cities, including Ulsan, initially did not maintain such an effective system. However, they have gradually developed a relatively strong system over the past two decades. It is common for the central government to intervene directly in cities, not through a provincial government, but by establishing its own local branches.  (Using the experience  of Kyungju and Ulsan, this strategy will be further discussed in a later chapter.) Conventionally local government has been considered inferior. The employees of local governments are generally re often 2 less qualified. Centrally recruited officials unwilling to begin their careers working for a local government, since there are fewer training opportunities (Park, Dong-Suh 1988: 376-381) and relatively fewer positions in the higher ranks of the organizational hierarchy. There is  26. In Korea, government officials are mostly recruited through written tests. Most administrative positions both in the central and local of governments are filled with those who pass these tests. These tests are held regularly, commonly once a year for each of the three entry levels.  69  little mobility for officers between local and central governments. The lack of qualified personnel in local governments was not a serious problem in the past since local governments had only to implement central directives. In the 1990s, however, it is emerging as a problem since municipal issues are becoming increasingly complex. In addition, local governments are being given more responsibilities due to the recent decentralization policies.  3.5.2 Changing Community Lifestyles The three decades of intensive interactions between the government and large corporations in Korea have rapidly transformed the economic, social, and physical conditions of communities. The increase in industrial activities created wealth, which in turn contributed to the overall improvement in economic and social circumstances. The improvement of material well-being has recently stimulated public demands for non-material needs, such as equality of income redistribution, political decentralization, public participation, and a clean environment (see Bello and Rosenfeld 1990; Douglass 1993). Changing Economic and Social Conditions In terms of the economy, GNP per capita grew from US $81 in 1960 to US $1,510 in 1980 at current prices (Table 3.3), while the GNP in real terms grew 6.9 percent per annum. Over these two decades, agriculture’s contribution to GNP decreased  70  Table 3.3: Selected Indicators of Economic and Social Transformations in Korea, 1960-1990  GNP per capita (US $a) Export (US $ in milliona) Import (US $ in milliona)  1960  1970  1980  1990  81 .03 .34  242  1,510  5,569  0.8 2.0  17.5 22.3  69.8 65.0  26.2 44.8 9 43.1 146.4 144.3 31.5  15.8 27.3 28 57.3 402.9 527.7 37.4  10.3 19.5(’89) 28.2  Agriculture in GNP (% in total) 35.9 Farming households (% in total) 58.3 Manufacturing employment(% in total) N.A. Urban population (% in total) 28.3 University students (thousand) 92.9 No. of Motor vehicles (thousand) 31.1 Total population (million) 25.0  74.3  1,040.2 3,339.4 42.8  Note: ‘a’: at the current prices; ‘N.A.’ means ‘Not Available’. Sources: Korea Economic Report (Seoul), Vol. 6, No. 6, 1991; United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1991; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAQ Yearbook: Trade and Commerce, Vol. 44, 1990; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1990; Korean Statistical Yearbook(s), 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991; Bank of Korea, Yearbook of Economic Statistics, 1980.  from 35.9 percent to 15.8 percent. The share of manufacturing employment in total employment, on the other hand,  increased  from seven percent in the 1960 to 28 percent in 1980, while the share of farming employment declined from 66 to 34 percent. The fast growth in the manufacturing sector was accompanied by rapid urbanization. Indeed, those who lived in cities with more than 50,000 population increased from 28.3 percent in 1960 to 57.3 percent in 1980, and subsequently to 74.3 percent in 1990. Under these conditions of rapid economic growth, general standards of living also improved. Life expectancy increased  71  from 54 years in 1960 to 66 in 1980 and the number of people per physician decreased by half (3,540 and 1,690 in respective years above). The adult literacy rate increased from 71 to 94 percent during the same period, while students enrolled in higher educational institutions grew from four to 14 percent of the population aged 20 to 24.27 Changing Characteristics of Community Needs The changes in the level of economic and social well being continued throughout the 1980s. However, the more important changes in that period were the diversification and increase in collective needs in local communities, which is the focus of this study. This is because community members became more active in expressing their demands to the government and corporate sectors. These changes can be illustrated by the following two incidents. At end of the Doo—Whan Chun period (mid-1980s), student protests occurred frequently and often turned violent. The measures of the riot police became increasingly militant. Conflicts between the two parties resulted in many casualties on both sides. The central districts of Seoul became what the New York Times’s Clyde Haberman depicted as a ‘war zone’ York Times, June 16,  (New  1987). Civilian life in the cities where  universities were located was seriously affected. Through 1986  27. This percentage tends to underestimate the proportion of university students since there were a great number of male university students aged over 24 years. This is due to the years which are spent in required military service in the middle of their university education.  72  and 1987, the degree of dissension toward the government grew to a critical level. In response to growing public demands, Tae-Woo Roh, who was already designated as presidential successor to Chun, announced democratization policies that embodied a complete acceptance of demands from the opposition. This mitigative treatment was effective in ending the growing discontent. In the following years, the Roh government continued to remove controls on the press and allowed open criticism of the government. It also lifted political restrictions placed on the labor movement. These reform policies improved the bargaining power of local communities in their relationships with both the government and the corporate sector. As Korea becomes more urbanized, the major problems of cities are lack of economic resources for urban infrastructure and management. The problems emerging currently are the results of ineffective coordination and mis-mangement. These include environmental pollution, traffic congestion, escalating land speculation, more frequent and violent crimes, and disparities and antagonisms between regional and social groups. The material well-being created through Park’s government, coupled with Roh’s democratic policy reform, encouraged the Korean people to seek an improvement in the QOL. These developments are discussed in the following chapters.  73  CHAPTER FOUR CHANGES IN URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA,  1960-1990  4.1 Overview  This chapter is concerned with regional variations of the more general factors considered thus far,  i.e., i) economic  development and the QOL in Korea; and ii) the relationship between the various actors in the post-war development period. Its aim is to examine how the major forces of industrialization in Korea affect the spatial distribution of industrial growth and to analyze the impacts of industrial activities and on changing levels of economic and social development. It will show widening gaps of economic activities between regions, and, more importantly, the difference between economic growth and social development. Industrial growth, assisted by government intervention, has improved the overall QOL of the people in all provinces. However, the economic gaps between industrializing regions and the rest of the nation have increased considerably. There is narrower regional differentiation in social indicators. These different trends between economic and social development suggest that the government has more or less succeeded in its aim of industrial decentralization, but social development in the newly growing southern industrial region in particular has not kept pace. 28  28. Chapters five and six will indicate this phenomenon is also presented at the city scale.  74  This chapter first describes the role of the central government in industrial decentralization, and subsequently moves to actions by the corporate sector and local communities. It examines how these industrial forces acted to decentralize population and industrial activities for the Capital Region during the past three decades. Using quantitative indicators, the second section analyzes the degree of economic and social disparities between regions. Without reviewing the context of the regional industrial distribution, a full understanding of the social and economic transformation in Ulsan and Kyungju is impossib1e  4.2 Government Intervention in Population and Industrial Concentration  4.2.1 Central Government Prior to the 1960s,  Initiatives in the 1960s  the spatial distribution of Korean  population and economic activities was more even than that today. This could be attributed to two major factors, the Korean War and Land Reform. he absence of regional economic 2 disparities provided a pre-condition for creating a balanced  29. Before the Korean War, (South) Korean manufacturing was concentrated in Seoul. Seoul’s share of manufacturing employment accounted for more than two-thirds of the national total (see Appendix 1). This concentration was virtually eliminated by the War. Subsequently Seoul’s share of manufacturing employment after the War declined to become approximately one-fifth of the national total in 1960. In the same year, none of the eleven provinces had more than 20 percent of the total population.  75  economic growth between regions. owever, the regional 3 balance was not maintained in the subsequent decades. The initial growth of economic activities centered around the urban manufacturing sector, leading to a large rural-tourban migration. Major cities, Seoul in particular, began to absorb a considerable portion of these migrants. Between 1959 and 1969, the top six cities in Korea grew annually by 3.0 to 6.6 percent (Table 4.1). Seoul’s population share leaped from 9.8 percent (2.4 million people) of the national total in 1960 to 17.6 percent (5.5 million) in 1970 (Appendix 4.1). The proportion of urban dwellers grew from 28.3 percent in 1960 to 43.1 percent in 1970 (Mills and Song 1979: 8). This rapid urbanization was due mainly to rural exodus, especially from the Southwestern provinces as Figure 4.1  illustrates.  The unforeseen growth of Seoul’s population was considered by the central government officials and planners, first of all, to be an issue of national defence, because the city is located within 60 kilometers from the border of the hostile North Korea. Second, Seoul’s excessive expansion was a growing challenge in providing adequate housing, public transit, and educational facilities for the migrants. The government in this period responded to the problem of Seoul’s growth with two policies. The first was the promulgation of the ‘Policy for Controlling Population Concentration of Large Cities’  (1964). To control the growth of Seoul the policy  30. The balance between sectoral and regional economies has remained as an important development goal (see Friedmann 1979; Friedmann and Weaver 1979; Stohr and Taylor 1981).  76  Table 4.1: Population Growth in National and Provincial Capitals, 1959—89 Population (‘000)  Cities  Seoula Inchuna Pusana Taegua Kwangjua Taejeona Jeonju 1 Cheongjub Kangreongb  Annual Growth Rates  1959  1969  1979  1989  2094 361 1087 647 306 200  3969 536 1463 887 433 330  8114 10577 1044 1754 3035 3857 1573 2288 733 1163 613 1052  163 82 53  224 127 67  361 237 111  (%)  1959—69 1969—79 1979—89  514 453 156  6.6 4.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 5.1  7.4 6.9 7.6 5.9 5.4 6.4  2.7 5.3 2.4 3.8 4.7 5.6  3.2 4.4 2.4  4.9 6.5 5.1  3.6 6.7 35  Note: a: Six largest cities in Korea; b: Smaller provincial capitals. Source: Mills and Song (1979: Table A-4-1); Korean urban statistical yearbooks, various issues.  suggested relocation of some government offices to new towns, and designation of  ‘industrial estates’  outside Seoul  (Kim, In  and Kwon, Won-Yong 1988: 385). The second government response to the excessive growth of Seoul was the ‘Plan for the Seoul-Inchun Special Industrial Region’  (1965). While the 1964 plan was a general policy  statement, this plan was an expression of more concrete strategies to slow Seoul’s expansion.  In 1968 the government  announced a new policy package, called ‘Guidelines for Restricting Over-growth of the Capital Region’. These Guidelines expressed a need for a long-term land use plan at the national scale.  77  Scale 0  60Km  Approximate  Source: Reproduced from Kwon (1981), Figure 3 Note: Numbers in circles represent thousands of people migrated.  Figure 4.2: Inter-provincial Migration, 1962-1975  78  4.2.2 Central Government Response to the Initial Change Corresponding to the 1968 policy, the central government mandated the Comprehensive National Land Use Plan (CNLUP)  in  1971, formulated by the Korea Institute of Human Settlements (KRIHS). The previous plans and policies were piecemeal and fragmented. This plan, however, was an attempt at a ‘comprehensive’ policy. It was ‘comprehensive’ territorially as it covered all regions of Korea and was also ‘comprehensive’ temporally, since it suggested the formulation of successive plans in the same vein. The first CNLUP divided Korea into four large regions, each of which was centered on one of the four largest cities: Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, and Kwangju. These four regions were divided into eight smaller ‘development regions’, which scaled further down to 17 sub-regions, each centered on a small town (Kim, An-Jae 1989). The First CNLUP framework was reformulated into specific policies. The expansion of the existing schools and manufacturing firms within central Seoul was greatly discouraged, while some of them were forced to relocate outside Seoul. People living in Seoul, were encouraged, and low income people, such as those in squatter settlements, were forced to move to satellite citiesThese policies created some impacts on the growth patterns of Seoul’s population and manufacturing industries in the 1970s.  31. The best example of this is the City of Syungnam, which was initially formed mainly by relocated residents of squatter settlements in Seoul.  79  However, Seoul continued to grow in the 1970s, but at a slightly slower pace than before. Seoul’s population increased by 51 percent during the 1970s,  in contrast by 126 percent  growth in the previous decade (Appendix 4.1). However, the actual increase in the 1970s was 2.8 million. In terms of the proportion of the national total, Seoul’s population share also steadily increased from 9.2 percent in 1960 to 17.6 percent in 1970, 22.3 percent in 1980, and eventually 25.1 percent in 1990. The gain by the Capital Region during the ten years since 1980 alone was 4.4 million, while the numbers for the ten-year period in the 1960s was 3.7 million (Appendix 4.1). The First CNLUP was concerned with other regions of Korea as well. The plan applied the Growth Pole approach to redirect the flows of migrants and capital investment to provincial centers. It designated ten growth poles, one in each province and two additional ones in Kangwon province, which has the largest land mass and was least urbanized. The provincial boundaries, which had remained as cultural boundaries for centuries without major alteration, were used to draw planning gions. Upon this broad spatial framework, the plan emphasized ‘balanced growth’,  intending to maintain similar levels of  regional economic and social development. This was an idealistic model that the Korean officials and planners hoped 32. The provincial system were formed in about the 16th century, but there has not been a fundamental change since then (see Kim, An-jae 1987: 54-55).  80  I  \‘  I  to use for the spatial allocation of economic growth, but spatial patterns of growth in the subsequent period did not follow the ‘model’. To cope with the problem of polarized growth, the Second CNLUP was promulgated in 1981. In this Second Plan (19821991), three regional centers: Taejeon, Taegu, and Kwangju were selected as primary growth centers (see Figure 4.1, for locations), while Seoul and Pusan were to be ‘restricted and rearranged’  (Kim, In and Kwon, Won-Yong 1988). None of these  ‘development’ centers was located either in the growing Capital Region or the Southeastern Industrial Belt. Notwithstanding the efforts to balance the spatial distribution of population and industries, the polarization of the two national centers continued in the 1980s. In terms of population, the Capital Region gained an additional 5.2 million between 1980 and 1990, while the Southeastern Industrial Belt gained 1.7 million in the same period. By 1990 the Capital Region had 42.1 percent of the national population and 40.8 percent of manufacturing employees (Figure 4.2). At the same time 26.4% of population and 26.1% of manufacturing employees were located in the Southeastern provinces (i.e., Pusan and Kyungnam).  4.2.3 Expanding New Industrial  Spaces  A prime government strategy of industrial decentralization was to designate ‘industrial estates’  in  rural centers. In 1969 the EPB announced the establishment of  82  a Free Trade Zone in Masan, the first in Korea (for the details, see Warr (1984) and Choi, Bum-Jong CHoi  (1975)).  Since then that city, followed by Ulsan, has grown to become a major industrial city specializing in textile and machine industries. Kumi, a town of 23.1 thousand people (in 1970) located 50 kilometers north from Taegu city, was also designated as a focus of electronics and textile industries (see Amsden 1988; Park, Jong-Soo et al.  1978). Pohang, a small  fishing town on the southeastern coastal area, grew as a major steel town (Chang, Sung-Soo 1978), with the international scale of the Pohang Steel and Iron Corporation (POSCO, see Auty 1990,  1991; Lee, Jung-Rok 1992). Two other small towns on  the southern coast, Changwon and Jangsyeungpo, were developed to accommodate large scale machine and shipbuilding industries. These new industrial cities benefiting from decentralization policies expanded rapidly and steadily. Urban population in cities, such as Kumi, Ulsan, and Pohang, grew by 11.1 and 18.1 percent per annum during the first decade following their designation as industrial centers. The pace of population growth in these cities far exceeded the growth trends in other regional centers, including provincial capitals (see Table 4.1). As a result the new cities have formed a massive industrial district, the Southeastern Industrial Belt. The Belt stretches from the southern end of the coastal Kyongbuk to the northern end of Jeonnam province, linking many communities in between.  83  Table 4.2: Rapidly Growing Industrial Cities, Cities  Population 1959  Kumia d 85 uisanb Pohangb 51 Masan 155 ChangwonL jangsaengpob Dongkwangyangc  Source:  1969 231 e 122.4 68.0 164.7  Annual Growth Rates  (‘000) 1989  1979 103.4 393.4 194.9 398.9 124.5  7 o 3 . 37.39  1959—89  (%)  1959—69 1969—79 1979—89  202.2 648.4 313.0 505.6 303.1 48.6 70.1  3.7’ 2.9 .6  l8.l’ 12.4 11.1 9.2  6.9 5.1  4.9 2.4  9.3 •  see Table 4.1.  Note: a: in Kyongbuk province; b: in Kyungnam province; C: Jeonnam province; d: for 1962, the year when Ulsan was incorporated as a ‘city’; e: for 1970, the year when Kumi was designated as a ‘industrial’ city’; : for 1 962, the year when Jangsyeungpo was incorporated as a ‘city’; g: for 1989, the year when Kumi was incorporated as a ‘city’; h: for 1987, when Jangsyeungpo was incorporated as a ‘city’; : These growth rates reflect the period between the year of their incorporation into cities and the year specified in the column head.  Another strategy of  industrial decentralization that the  Korean government resorted to was establishing ‘industrial estates’  in rural areas and intermediate cities. By 1987 the  total area of designated industrial estates amounted to 267,387 square meters in 66 locations. The 7,960 plants in these industrial estates employed 869,500 workers Administration Research Institute As Table 4.3 shows,  1988:  (Korea Local  2—23).  these industrial activities were  highly concentrated in the Southeastern Region  (i.e.,  the  Provinces of Kyungbuk and Kyungnam). Kyungnam province alone  84  accounted for 42.8 percent of the total designated industrial area. This contrasts to the provinces, such as Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, and Chungbuk, each of which had less than five percent. Although official plans identified all provincial centers as growth centers,  in reality, decentralization  policies did not benefit these slower growth provinces.  Table 4.3: Designated Industrial Estates,  REGION Province  CAPI TAL Seoul Kyungki  Area Locations % % (Sq. Meters)  1987  No. of Plants  %  No. of Employees ( 000)  %  2189 53938  .8 20.2  3 11  4.5 16.7  377 2013  4,7 25,3  76.3 164.5  8.8 18.9  MID-WEST Kangwon Chungbuk Chungnam  5786 5270 2115  2.2 2.0 .8  5 2 3  7.6 3.0 4.5  116 105 147  1.5 1.3 1.8  5.2 28.0 15.5  .6 3.2 1.8  S. WESTERN Jeonbuk Jeonnam  12011 25637  4.5 9.6  6 10  9.1 15.2  281 573  3.5 7.2  32.9 34.7  3.8 4.0  S. EASTERN Kyongbuk 35246 Kyungnam 114571 Pusan 10624  13.2 42.8 4.0  13 11 2  19.7 16.7 3.0  1321 941 2086  16.6 11. 26.2  161.1 220.1 131.2  18.5 25.3 15.1  267387  100  66  100  7960  100  869.5  100  TOTAL  Source: Korea Local Administration Research Institute (1988: 20, 23).  85  In terms of regional distribution of industrial activities, both Kyungnam and Pusan drastically increased their manufacturing employment and establishments. The two provincial jurisdictions together accounted for 16.7 percent of Korea’s total manufacturing employees in 1960 and 18.1 percent of units of manufacturing industry. By 1980, however, the numbers grew to 18.8 percent and 26.3 percent, respectively (Figure 4.2). The growing job opportunities in these mega-urban regions  (3m,  Young-Hwan 1989; and Mills and  Song 1979) absorbed a large number of migrants from various parts of Korea, Today this industrial district and its surrounding areas are undergoing massive economic and social transformations. 33  4.3 Partners of the Central Government 4.3.1 Local Governments  As the political regimes directing Korean industrial growth were authoritarian, the decision-making process of industrial policy was markedly top-down. National plans created important and far-reaching impacts on local communities, and their implementation required cooperation from local governments. However, the process was not open to inputs from local governments at early stages of plan formulation. The processes of formulating the principal plans,  i.e.,  the FYEDPs and CNLUPs, for example, were dominated by the two 33. This point is further discussed in the following chapters.  86  major central ministries: EPB and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Choi, Byung-Sun 1990). Neither the provincial nor municipal governments have had access to planning in industrial estates. This remains true even in the most recent economic plan (i.e., the Seventh Five year Economic and Social Development Plan, for the period 1992-1996), which was drawn up by a post-dictatorial government. The weakness of the local government appears to be a serious problem, hindering social and economic progress in local communities.  (Chapter seven  will further discuss this issue.) The weak presence of local governments is also noticeable from the development process of industrial estates. As mentioned earlier, special laws are mandated to promote local industrial estates. Most of these laws, however, do not specify any consultation or bargaining process with local governments prior to making decisions (for a summary, see Korea Local Administration Research Institute 1988). Instead, the local government is identified as an agent, providing ‘necessary infrastructure’  (such as water and sewerage) to the  centrally created industrial estates. This is true for six out of seven laws, hat are the legal base of developing 3 industrial estates. The weakness of local governments in industrial policy making is not limited to the legislation. In locating industrial complexes in Ulsan and Kumi, there is no evidence 34. This includes the Law of Development and Promotion of Industrial Estates, the Law of Establishment of Export Processing Zones, the Local Industrial Development Law, the Law of Developing Export Industries, and Urban Planning Law (see KLARI 1990)  87  that the central government consulted the provincial or municipal governments, prior to the announcement of the project. In the case of Ulsan, officers of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry personally visited the project site and selected areas for industrial use (Oh, Won-Chul 1992). Later, appropriate assistance was ‘ordered’  from the central  government to Kyungnam Province. The central government also decided to form the City of Ulsan combining parts (or all) of the municipalities within the present jurisdiction of the city. There are several reasons for the limited participation of local government in the industrial process. First of all, the administrative culture inherited from the Japanese rule and the pre-modern Yi dynasty has pervaded the policy practice of the Korean government since the 1960s (Meyer and Mm  1987).  Second, the central government and local governments believed that local government officials are less qualified than central officials. his perception has led to a stereotype 3 that local government officials lack managerial skills. Central bureaucrats were the ones who actually laid out detailed plans. Local governments are simply ‘supposed to assist’ the process with local knowledge. One of the by products of this centralized system is the lack of consideration of the direct benefits of industrial growth for  35. This is supported by the lower educational level of local officials as in Table 5.1, page 134.  88  the local people, not the country as a whole (see Chon, Soohyun 1990).36  4.3.2 Roles  of Business The Story of Poongsan, An Example of Public/Private Relationships 37 Chapter three shows that corporations in Korea can grow large only by cooperating with the central government. Poongsan Industrial Company is a firm that grew by taking advantage of government locational policy. In 1962 the company launched its copper manufacturing business with ten employees. Subsequently it  grew quickly to be one of the top thirty  firms in Korea (in sales). The current president of Poongsan, Chan—U Ryu,  selected  Seoul as the site for his firm in 1957, when the city was beginning its period of rapid industrial growth. In 1968, the second year of the second FIVE—YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (FYEDP), he built his first factory in Bupyung, located in the Inchun area of Kyungki Province. At the time the national government had designated the Seoul/Inchun Special Zone and promoted it as an industrial location. In 1970, the government designated Poongsan as one of the five TstrategicT  industries,  recognizing its potential role as a major defence contractor. 36. All of the presidents who served for substantial periods during the industrializing era are from the Province of Kyungbuk and 80 percent of the key economic ministries between 1970 and 1985 came from the two provinces of the Southwestern region (Choi, Yong-Ho 1986). 37. The data in this subsection is extracted exclusively from Choong Sun Kim’ The culture of Korean industry: an ethnography of Poongsan Corporation. Tucson, AZ: The Univ. of Arizona, 1992.  89  ASIA  EUROPE  Japan & Hong Kong  German Stolberger Metaiwerke  IBranch Officel  NORTH AMERICA  U.S.  I Branch Office (LA) I [Plant (Jowa)  0’  &  E: 0,  4050)  Note: Numbers in ( Source: Kim SC(1992)  ) indicate the year of establishment and number of employees in each unit.  Figure 4.3: Operational Units of Poongsan Co. and their Linkages (1987)  90  In 1973 Poongsan expanded by establishing its second plant in Angang, a town between Kyungju and Pohang (See Figure 4.3). The project was initiated after Ryu personally approached President Park with the suggestion of building a defence industry. The project was approved without any problem. More importantly Ryu, like the president himself, had his background in Kyongbuk province. Before official approval, Park and other government officers made a visit to the project site, at Angang. A loan of 1.7 million U.S. dollars from Girard Trust Bank in the United States was instrumental in bringing the Angang plant to Poongsan. Poongsan’s third project was constructing a plant in 1980 that produces copper and aluminium pipes. This was in line with the government decentralization policy in the period of the third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FYEDP), boosting heavy metal and chemical industries. The plant was built in the Onsan industrial estate, which was constructed by the Ministry of Commerce in 1978. The industrial estate was developed as a part of the Ulsan Industrial Complex. By 1990, the company employed almost ten thousand workers, supplying a substantial proportion of munitions to the Korean Army. The company also established three overseas office: Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong and earned 160 million dollars of foreign exchange by exporting ingots to Japan and Taiwan. It expanded its plants in four local mploying a 3 communities Bupyung, Angang, Onsan, and Dongrae, 38. A suburban area of Pusan city in the Southeastern Region.  91  work force of 724, 4050, 1987,  1630, and 2709, respectively. In  it further demonstrated its prowess by exporting its  technology to a German company, Stolberger Metallwerke, thereby receiving 200,000 U.s. dollars in technology fees followed by 60 dollars per ton in royalties for ten years.  4.3.2. 2 The Overall Trends  Under various governmental interventions, large firms in Korea dispersed their manufacturing plants into many local communities. However, according to Sam-Ok Park (1986: 317319), more than 96 percent of the 32 corporate ‘groups’ (included in his study) had spatially separate head offices and the corporate ‘groups’ had their head offices in Seoul. In these firms, major decisions, on such activities as expansion, plant location, promotion, and salary-related personnel matters are concentrated in their head offices. Day-to-day operational matters (e.g., selection of material inputs and marketing strategy), however, are delegated to the local plant level (ibid.: Table 15.8).  Park  observes that more industrial firms were selecting regional centers to establish branch offices and plants in local areas. Park reports that Seoul recorded a considerable decrease of manufacturing plants (in the study period), while most smaller cities and rural areas acquired additional industries. He suggests that this represented a filtering down of the industrial activities from Seoul.  92  4.3.3 Local Communities  In the 1950s, designation of a growth center was considered to be a special gift to the residents. This had real meaning in the initial stage. However, the degree of local enthusiasm waned throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1960s, people believed that the growth of industrial activities in their communities would bring them direct economic benefits. An ex-officer of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Won-Chul Oh, who worked on the establishment of the Ulsan Industrial Complex, has written about the welcoming mood of local people to industrial growth. When he traveled from Seoul to Ulsan to decide upon a location for a industrial complex in 1961, a few dozen local people, standing in a row along his way, bowed to him and said ‘thank you for coming to help in developing our community.’ The same welcoming spirit was presented in a provincial capital, Kwangju, on the other side of the country. Since the 1950s representatives from local communities, the business sector, and the city government have actively tried to obtain an industrial status for the city from the central government (Jung, Keun-Sik 1989; Jung, Ki-Wha 1989). In 1977 the attempt resulted in construction of the Haman Industrial Estate. This success was only after several attempts, as Keun-Sik Jung (1989) and Ki-Wha Jung (1989), attest. The degree of community support for introducing industrial estates has weakened considerably in recent years.  93  Previously the public valued benefits for the entire community from industrial growth. Today, however, people in many communities tend to measure their own benefits in a more individualistic way. Ki-Wha Jung (1989) reports on the public opinion of community members on the industrial estate of Kwangju (i.e., Hanam Industrial Estate). Residents were asked, ‘To what degree has the Hanam Industrial Estate contributed to development  of your community,  and to your own life?’ Out of  the 152 respondents, 51.7 percent viewed that it ‘greatly’ contributes to their community (Table 4.4). But in relation to the improvement of their own life, only 17.1 percent responded yes. Subsequently, the interviewees were asked,  ‘who are most  benefited by the introduction of the Hanam Industrial Estate?’. Not surprisingly, 41.1 percent of the respondents thought that large corporations were the beneficiaries. Only four percent regarded the residents themselves as the major beneficiaries (Table 4.5). Table 4.4: Contribution of Industrial Growth to Community versus Individuals’ Own Life a Questionnaire Survey Range of the answer  To the To their Community (%) own life (%) (n=151) (n=152)  Greatly contributes More or less contributes Little contributes  51.7 27.8 20.5  17.1 30.9 52.0  Source: Compiled from Jung, Keun-Sik (1989: Table 14).  94  Table 4.5: The Principal Beneficiaries of Industrial Growth, a Questionnaire Survey (n=146) Range of the answer  Frequency  (Non-local) Large corporations The central government Land speculators The municipal government Residents (Non-local) Land owners Local (small) business Others  (%)  41.1 21.2 17.1 8.9 4.1 3.4 0.7 3.4  Source: Jung, Keun-Sik (1989: Table 16).  Since the 1970s, people’s responses to the perceived benefits from industrial growth are, at best, mixed. Although the degree of unfavorable responses varies from place to place,  it is clear that local people are now less enthusiastic  about the introduction of industries into their communities than they were in the past. This has been supported by research in various locations,  including Ulsan (Kim, An-Jae  1976; Lee, Moon—Woong 1984; Lee, Ki-Suk 1984; UCCI  1980,  1990b; Whang, Jae-Ki  1983), Dongkwangyang (Auty 1990; Lee,  Jung-Rok 1990), Kumi  (Ma, Jin-Ho 1977; Park, Chan-Suk et al.  1984; Whang, Hong-Do and Jeong-Han Lee 1979; Yu, Si-Jung 1977), Inchun (Kwon, Yung-Jong 1987; Lim, Suk-Whoi 1987) and Pohang (Chang, Sung-Soo 1977).  95  4.4 Regional Variations in Economic and Social Development  This section analyzes and compares the regional distribution of economic and social development. It shows the difference between the patterns of economic and social development, during the past three decades. Social and economic development is expressed by a number of indices, such as employment, income,  infrastructure, education, and  automobile ownership.  4.4.1 Regional Distribution of Economic Activities Employment in the Manufacturing Sector  Through the process of rapid economic growth, regional economic variations increased noticeably. Due to the higher priority for manufacturing industries in national economic policies, the rapidly industrializing Capital Region and the Southeastern region benefited greatly from national economic growth. This process also resulted in increasing economic disparities between the fast industrializing regions and the rest. In 1960, for example, the two fast growing regions together shared slightly more than half (52.0%) of the total manufacturing establishments. These regions grew to account for more than three quarters (86.3%) of the national total in 1989. A similar pattern developed in the regional distribution of employment. The number of manufacturing employees in the fast growing regions increased from 55.7 percent of the 1960s national total to 86.7 percent of 1989.  96  The rest of Korea (Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Chungbuk and Kangwon), which accounted for more than a quarter (28.6%) of Korean population in 1989, was left with only 13.2 percent of manufacturing employees in the same year. This contrasting phenomenon was most apparent in the slow growth in the Southwestern region. The share of the Southwest manufacturing employment declined rapidly from 15.1 percent in 1960 to 9.1 percent in 1970, and later slowly to 6.0 percent in 1989. With regard to the specific provinces within each region, Kyungki was the fastest growing throughout the past three decades, and Kyungnam was second. The number of Kyungnam’s manufacturing employees increased by almost fourfold (283.1% increase) during the 1970s and by an additional 76 percent between 1980 and 1989 (Figure 4.2). This rapid growth in Kyungnam pushed up its provincial manufacturing employment share from seven percent in 1970 to thirteen percent in 1989. There was a marginal increase in the absolute number of manufacturing employees in the slowest growing province, Jeonbuk, located in the Southwestern region. However, its proportional share declined drastically from 8.5 percent in 1960 to 2.5 percent in 1989. During the 1960s, another slow growth province, Kangwon, actually lost manufacturing employment. As stated in the previous section, the Korean government in the 1970s and 1980s was concerned with the widening economic disparities. Regional planners and economists in the central government, therefore, responded to the problem with  97  regional planning, the two CNLUPs, for example, and redistribution policies. But their actions were only partially successful, maintaining the same level of manufacturing employment share (6.0 %) in the Southwest by 1989, for example. Individual Income In 1963, there were few variation in individual earnings in each province. The largest variation was between the biggest urban centers, i.e., Seoul and Pusan, and the rest of Korea. Recently, this pattern has shifted to disparity between the rapidly industrializing regions and the rest. Initially, the people in the two largest urban centers (i.e., Seoul and Pusan) had the highest production on average (Table 4.6). The above pattern remained until 1970, but a swift change occurred in the rank of per capita Gross Regional Products (GRP) during the 1970s. By 1980, Seoul continued to be the place for the highest per capita GRP. Kyungnam, the major industrial area, moved from lowest in the 1963 hierarchy up to first rank by 1986. This rapid growth in the industrializing regions contrasts to the slow pace of economic growth in the provinces of the Southwest and Mid-West.  98  Table 4.6: Gross Regional Product (GRP) by Province, 1963—86 (Thousand Won in the current prices) REGION  PROVINCE  1963 (Rank)  CAPITAL  Seoul Kyungkia  24.4 (1) 18.5 (3)  123.9 (1) 76.2 (3)  Kangwon MID—WEST Chungbuk Chungnam  16.3 (4) 15.5 (8) 15.8 (7)  S. WEST  16.5 (4) 14.0 (10)  S. EAST  Jeonbuk jeonnamb  KyongbukC 16.0 (6) Kyungnam 11.4 (11) Pusan  23.0  (2)  1970 (Rank)  1978 (Rank) (1) (3)  2191.5 (2) 2176.3 (4)  64.3 (7) 69.5 (5) 64.0 (8)  518.7 (8) 568.5 (5) 505.0(10)  1942.9 (6) 1914.2 (8) 1641.7(11)  61.2 (9) 56.4 (10)  491.8(11) 506.1 (9)  1675.2 (9) 1661.7(10)  61.6 (8) 74.1 (4)  561.5 (6) 817.1 (2)  1938.6 (7) 2589.7 (1)  118.6 (2)  832.3 763.3  1986 (Rank)  744.4 (4)  2073.5(3)  Note: 1) Numbers in each ( ) represent provincial rank; 2) For the later period (1987-1991), relevant data are unavailable. But similar data have been compiled by the Bureau of Statistics, Republic of Korea (1993), which can not be used here since the Bureau did not employ consistent categories of data collection with those in the table. 3) a includes Inchun city; b includes Kwangju city; b includes Taeku city. Source: GRP data for the 1963/70 period is from the Asiatic Research Center, Korea University_(1 978: 95) and the data for the 1978/86 period is from Byung-Sun Choi (1990: 190), while provincial population data are from various issues of Korean statistical yearbooks.  The slow growing province, Jeonbuk, shifted from the fourth place in 1963 to the ninth in 1986, while Jeonnam remained as one of the lowest throughout the entire period from 1963 to 1986 Chungnam’s rank also dropped from seventh in 1963 to the lowest by 1986. In 1986, provinces within the Capital and Southeast regions constituted the top four of the provincial GRP hierarchy, while the lowest four were located  99  within the South West and Mid-West. This GRP trend shows that economic disparities between the two industrializing regions and the rest significantly widened through the period from 1963 to 1986.  (The same data for the later period are  unavailable (see ‘Note’ below Table 4.6).  4.4.2 Spatial Patterns of Social Development Infrastructure The level of infrastructure provision is commonly used in measuring the level of human well-being. Korean statistical yearbooks have consistently documented the data for provincial 9 thereby allowing one to compare provincial , 3 infrastructur€ trends over time. The data relevant for the present purpose include three indicators: public health facilities; length of foads, the number of telephone registrations, and population accessible to piped water. nalyses of these measures 4 indicate that the QOL in Korea has considerably improved since the 1960s. In contrast to income, regional disparities in these broader measures are not seriously unbalanced. In 1960 the total road length in Korea was about 27.2 thousand kilometers (Table 4,7). By 1990 the total length increased to 56.7 thousand Kilometers (100.2% increase). There 39. Physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, is used for both economic and social activities. It is commonly considered to be an indicator of the ‘economy’. In this research, however, it is used as a social development indicator, since this research is interested in municipal well-being and it is a major issues of concern in urban Korea. 40. A thorough account of the quality of life has to incorporate more indicators than those considered here. However, only a limited number of indicators are used for the current purpose because Korean statistical yearbooks do not provide a more comprehensive list of indicators keeping temporal and categorical consistency.  100  was also substantial advancement in road pavement. In 1960 only 3.6 percent of the roads were paved. This number increased to 14.2 percent in 1971, 34.1 percent in 1981, and 65.5 percent in 1990. Although the increase in road length varies among regions, the gaps between the less industrialized regions and industrialized ones have become insignificant. With regard to the regional share, the most populated Capital Region had 33.6 percent of the road length laid between 1960 and 1990 (Korea statistical yearbooks, various issues). It is clear that although there are some gaps in the level of infrastructure provision between industrial regions and others, the gap has narrowed. The trend in the provision of roads is also consistent with the pattern in the installation of public utilities, such as telephones and the supply of piped water. In the case of telephones, domestic use telephones increased more than six fold in each ten—year period between 1970 and 1990 (Table 4.8). In 1970 only four percent of the households had registered telephones (Table 4.9). The number, however, expanded rapidly and consistently to 21.8 percent in 1980, and 95.3 percent in 1990. In regard to the regional difference, on the average, more than 84 percent of the households in every province had a telephone installed by 1990. It is fair to state, therefore, that in Korea basic public services, such as telephones, have became easily accessible to the majority of the households.  101  Table 4.7: Road Capacity,  REGION  F-ROY INCE  9991 TGL.  Sec.ui Kyunclk 1  136) TOTGL OF LENGTH PAVED PAVED 1326 160 12. 1 2336 212 6.4 2437 1485 3085  20 14  1.3 .5  2894 3762  89 55  FyunqbLtI< 3510 EAST Lyunqnam 4410  245 172  ncIw.:.r  MID—EAST I::hLtnclbuq :hunna.m  9.  S.  1960—90  WEST JeonbLLk 2 e on am  4(03 2611 3406  3.3fl 278 373  ‘3,7 10.6 11,0  5356 3273 4433  1207 838 1041  2.5 27,4 23.5  5222 3502 4969  3109 2409 3334  5,3. $ 56.9 67. 1  3.1 J•. 5  3171 4s7  192 3o5  6.1 6. i  3603 6257  1006 1420  -7.9 12.7  4015 616-2  2787 -4.1.25  6’3.4 67.0  7.0  5680 4651 408  776 244  13,7 7.4  7051 5-421  2007 1607  6  200  43.0  1575  807  5).  59261769  90l 1171  72.5 53.4  2207  1405  Pusan  ISLAND  Chm.ju  TOTAL  1971 1381 TDTGL X OF TOTAL X OF TOTAL 915 LENGTH PAVED PAVEI) LENGTH PAVED PAVED LENGTH PAVED F-A’6D 5490 1351 35.5 6684 4622 69.2 7374 6235 94. 6 4324 707 16.4 4726 1886 39.3 80. 7  ;-  874  0  0  1809  270  14,3  .1956  677  34.5  27163  367  3.6  40636  5786  .14,2  50335  17179  3-4.1  56715 405-13  Note: ‘Length’ means the length of public roads by Kilometers and ‘Paved’ is proportion of paved roads. Source: Korean statistical yearbooks. Various years.  Table 4.8: Number of Household Using Telephones, 1970—90 1970  1980  1990  127535 15730  654242 163979  3095700 1885200  411 3404 9782  47082 94049 35832  357200 299200 676700  Jeonbuk Jeonnam  5931 11 120  72412 1 18181  457200 794100  Kyongbuk Kyungnam Pusan  20943 8538 25658  197194 122609 203382  1269200 901600 964800  236923  1733400  10819000  REGION  PROVINCE  CAPITAL  Seoul Kyungki  MID—WEST 5. WEST  S. EAST TOTAL  Kangwon Chungbuk Chungnam  Note: 1) Statistics for 1960 are unavailable; 2) Numbers in the table mean the numbers of  telephone units installed for household use. Source: Korean statistical yearbooks. Various years.  102  I  .  -  71.5  Table 4 . 9: Percentage of Households with Telephones,  1970—90  (%)  REGION  PROVINCE  1970  1980  1990  CAPITAL  Seoul Kyungki  11.6 2.5  35.6 15.1  109.9 89.6  Kangwon Chungbuk Chungnam  1.8 1.3 2.0  12.6 N.A. N.A.  86.4 84.3 91.4  Jeonbuk Jeonnam  1.4 1.6  16.0 15.5  88.4 87.5  Kyongbuk Kyungnam Pusan  2.5 1.5 6.9  18.2 17.2 29.6  91.6 90.9 97.1  4.0  21.8  95.3  MID-WEST S. WEST  S. EAST TOTAL  Note: The 1980 statistics for Chungnam and Chungbuk are not presented because they are inconsistent. Source: see Table 4.8,  Accessibility to piped water has also been generalized for the people in all provinces (Figure 4.4).  In 1960 only  32.5 percent of the Korean people were provided with piped water. This had risen to 78.4 percent by 1990. The province of Chungbuk, which ranked the lowest level  (16.7%)  in 1960, was  able to supply 59.8 percent of its residents with piped water by 1990. Although some provincial variations remained in 1990, it was not a serious gap, especially when levels of provincial urbanization are considered.  103  C  1I  I  I’ Education Education is also an important measure of human well being. The Korean statistics have included two major indicators of education for a relatively long period. Levels of secondary schooling and post-secondary education are selected for examination here. The number of highschool students is used as an indicator of secondary schooling, while the number of university students is taken for post-secondary education. In terms of secondary schooling, the number of highschool students has increased by almost 100 percent in each decade since 1960. Initially, opportunities for highschool education were concentrated in Seoul, but later they were gradually decentralized. The number of high school students per 100 people in Seoul in 1960, for example, was 3.2, while the number was only 0.7 for Kyungki, which was at the lowest level in the same year. By 1990 the number for Seoul had risen to 5.3, while that for the lowest provincial rank (Kyungki) rose from 0.7 to 4.2 students per one hundred provincial residents. This has meant a tremendous narrowing of the gap between provincial levels of secondary public schooling. It is rather surprising to find that the Southwest, which has shown slower performance in the economic growth, presented an even greater advance in the proportion of provincial highschool students than the Southeastern provinces. It is also ironic to observe that the two most industrially advanced provinces, Kyungki and Kyungnam, maintained smaller numbers of  105  highschool students. Kyungki had 4.2 percent and Kyungnam, where Ulsan is located, had only 2.4 percent of its provincial population in highschools in 1990. These are far lower than the Korean average (5.3). This trend is consistent in the trend of higher education, presented in the following paragraph. The overall regional pattern of advancement in higher education is even more pronounced than in secondary schooling. The total number of university students increased more than ten-fold during the period from 1960 to 1990 (Table 4.10). This growth in the absolute number served to raise the proportion of university students from 0.4 percent of Korea’s total population in 1960 to 4.2 percent in 1990 (Table 4.11). There was also a substantial equalization effect in the regional distribution of university students. In 1960, 65.8 percent of Korean registered university students were concentrated in the Capital Region (Korea statistical yearbooks). This degree of concentration, however, has been much lower in recent years. In 1990, for example, the Capital Region accounted for 41.4 percent of the total. As in public schooling,  it is interesting to note that in 1990 the  proportion of university students in the Southwest was not perceptively lower than in the Mid-Eastern and Kyungnam provinces. It is worth noting that Kyungnam has traditionally provided fewer university facilities, while Kyongbuk has continued to be a popular place for higher education from  106  1  ‘-‘‘-.  Cs) Ci  • • 00  •.  ,-.i-.-.  ‘  C’)  )  I—’  0  j  o  ‘0  C 0 DC  C)U)  r  -  ,...  1 •tl  I  . C CT’ ZO ‘i  CO  4  < —  0  .‘  -o  Z  ,,  m  00 10  •  CD CO  Q..O  —  PJ Z  i-’.  0’.  .  ID 1’.’  <  ,  C)  ‘-‘  ‘.1’  C)  0  I  IC  —  CO  r  c  C  .<  iu’  I  ,F  I  /1  I I  I.-,  -  -l 0  ID CO  ‘<  -‘  C.)  CO  4.  4.  c  in  CT’ C.) C..) (00’-’  4’  —  NN 0 CC’)  C)  ‘-‘  C)  C,)  4.4’  r,r,  4.4.0’  ’) ‘ N 1  —  —  —  — 4. C’) ‘-‘ C,)  I-.  C-.) 0  —  C’) 4. C.) 10  02 U)  i.-  C.fl0i) Cs) CT’  COO)  C.)010  c —  Cli  Cs) 4.  4’  C)  C.  C.’) C.)  4. ‘.J  Cr’  0  C)’-’’-’  PN  4.()-4 U’’.J4.  .‘)  (q  U.’.)) ‘-..C.)  •‘.  ‘-“1—  .  C) CTt —  ,-,-.,..  LqcnCT’  -_:E  C.)C.J  •‘4 CO 04.  CO I-  i  CO  4-’  C  ‘.0  r  <  co  —  •  C  ‘-‘  2’.)  Cu)  0  U)  Ct) 1  ,  ‘  CD CO  Cl) -t  1<  ri’  ‘  ‘1  CD  C z  a  0) CO  -  ‘-‘  Ut  Cr’  ‘-  0 4. 0  1-’  CT’  CTi Cs)  CT’  10  CT’  4  —  C..) C.)  CO 0  C) CO  C-)  tO  10  C  4.  C.)  4.  4. Cs) CT’  )  Cli  0  0)  10 k CO Cu  0)  Ill —4  Ui  -..i  C  &‘.  ru  O  o  z  CI) r  ‘  10  0 C.)  4.  C.)  U)  ‘.1  CT’  CT’  4-  •— 4.  4.  CT’  — 4.  — ‘4 0)  ‘4  Cr’  0  C.)  .  CO C..)  kt’)  “  •  •  ‘i)  UjCC 90  ‘0  C  to  m  ‘-  0  N  0  C.)  r..i  •  —  C C’. O,C C’  C ‘0 0 DO’ UC  C ‘‘  0 0  (U C C  (U  L,L,  -1  z  CO  to  1D  -  m D  CI)  ()  F I 2  j’  ‘-‘  -‘  to  C••  to  0  —  i’ F  -  C)  -  I.O) Ob  D.  CO  <  CV,  IC I..  10  10  I.-,  F  ‘-  I.  l  M  D  -,  0  C.ñ  —  ‘-‘  tt’O—  ‘--  CUt’) .t.’-J 4.C’.CCI  ‘-‘  COu),-’  4.C’)Cli  Lfl’-C’)  I’) — C.) C. CO CO to Cs) is)  C)—4. 4. —1”) ‘4Cs)’-’ -1’-”l — CT’ 1.’)  U) U) CT’  ‘-.100  ‘..JCO 1)) C.) CO  (.14.4.  Cs)O)  C.)UiC.)  u)  O— ‘.L’ .t  4—  cr’c. ?.3—CO “I)UC COC)t’) C.) C.) Cs)  (0’.)  “1 Ui  OW -410  ) at CO C.) C’)  AC.)  U,C  ‘  ‘-10’ ‘-Cli C’)-’ C’) —C 0)4.  0).  CT’Cq  0)’-  C) C.) C.) C.)  C)  4.0’ 0 to  LrCC.CC  C’)C.) CT’ 4’  COO) — u:  ,..-44-CriC.) C.) CT’  COC.)  CT’’-  u)  -44. C.) Ui  ‘.0  C’)$’ ‘sl[.) 0—  ‘CU1  1.0 4.  ‘‘  i  LflJ  C.)  ‘  C’)— ti h)10  90  DC  DC’  C’0 ‘0  OJDD  C)O  to  m  C C DD C’  (U C C  to  •  (ID  ci  U)CTtt.)  4.0(0 Cli CO C”  (T’4. s j 5  0)4.4.  C’)—.CCI)  ‘-1104.  COCT’C.i  C .1. C.)  “-C ‘4 ‘0  “  S  ‘.104. -s) C.) C  u)l.)0  C’)—— C) C.’)  CliCO’.) OCT’C.r C’) ‘ C.) ,OCrICO U) LI —  —  ‘.1 1.) C. 000) COL’).  CJC’)C.)  r’  tOCOCO Cfll•)C..) 4. 4.  (.iC)10  .2Q)  CT’ (.1 “C  ‘.r,Crto  C.) — —  C..) C.) C.)  WOO COC.CO  ‘-——  UiCC  DO’Cs  C C DD’O ‘0 Ii c  flC)7  r m  CO 0  ‘-4  ,  .  CO  ñ  z  -  0  1)  o z  171  m  “  -  —  DC)  C.) 4’  COCOC  1)12)-I  4.U)CJ)  CO ‘-C)’ 0  C.) 1(1 I C. ‘-1’ ‘sJ C (I) DCI-C CO—C  10 Li  CO—-C C.)C.IC  C.)—)’ 0 C..) I.) to  —CaD  I.)  4.LnC — ‘) C.)  10’.)’ 4.C.C.fl 4 CT’ —C  10—C COLT’  C..)-.)C.iD C..) 10 -I  ‘ “1  ‘O’  ‘.1 CT’  010-C COC.)C—  C’)10Lfl  CT’CT’C  C.’) C.) —C  c  0’ COC.U)  .C.. to —I — C..) C.) C i Cr,  W.C’ C0(fl  7to < C C’ DC ‘o —  -i i. F  )  ) o  I-’ ‘.0  U)  CD  (1)  Cl)  CD  CO  CO  0  0  0  Cfl  C)’ CD  Z  i—’  W  the early 1960s. Therefore, as far as educational measures are concerned, the Southwest is not the lowest! The generally accepted assumption that ‘social conditions in slow growth regions are poorer than in others’  (Chon, Soohyun 1990, for  example) has to be challenged. Public Health Care For a further examination of regional distribution of public services, data on health care services are presented. Two indicators are available for regional comparisons: the number of medical doctors and of registered nurses. Unfortunately, commonly used indicators, such as numbers of hospital beds, are temporally inconsistent in Korean statistics and, therefore, regional comparisons over time are impossible. Overall the numbers of medical doctors (Figure 4.5) and registered nurses rose dramatically during the period of 1960 to 1990. The total number of medical doctors quadrupled (increased by 386.6%) since 1960 (Korea statistical yearbooks, various issues). The number of doctors per one thousand population also rose from 3.1  in 1960 to 7.0 in 1990.  The growth of registered nurses is even greater, rising from 1.9 nurses to 7.2 nurses per thousand population in the same years above. The early spatial concentration of medical services in the Capital Region noticeably decentralized to the rest of Korea. The individuals’ accessibility to medicare became more or less equalized over the regions of Korea.  108  I  R  it’ r.  The Mid-Eastern Regions (The Provinces of Chungnam, Chungbuk, and Jeonbuk) had half as many health care professionals per thousand population as the Southeastern ones in the early 1960s. By 1990 the numbers were almost equal. Among provincial categories, the poorest are not those in the Southwest, but rather those in the Mid-East. This is also true for the number of nurses per thousand provincial population. Car Ownership Another figure selected for measuring social development is car ownership, which grew tremendously in recent years. The total number of passenger cars grew by approximately eight fold in the sixties, five-fold in the seventies, and more than ten—fold in the eighties (Table 4.12). In 1990,  19.9 percent  of households in Korea owned their own cars, nine times the number in 1970 (Appendix 4.2). Currently the provincial variation in car ownership is not very high, with the exception of the two city provinces (Seoul and Pusan). There is some difference between the Southwestern and Southeastern provinces. There is a general agreement on the notion that higher car ownership represents a better QOL. This may not fit in Korea, however. In the Korean case, the opposite could be true at least as far as traffic conditions are concerned. Indeed, although there was considerable expansion in infrastructure, it has fallen far short of meeting the tremendous increase in the number of cars on the road in Korea.  110  Table 4.12: Number of Passenger Cars,  1960—90  REGION  PROVINCE  1970  1980  1990  CAPITAL  Seoul Kyungki  25366 1427  99544 13510  823731 314004  MID-EAST S. WEST  S. EAST  Kangwon Chungbuk Chungnam  310 160 527  2190 2016 5731  39821 35297 89486  Jeonbuk Jeonnam  312 551  3135 5053  45652 78450  Kyongbuk Kyungnam Pusan  TOTAL PASSENGER CARS TOTAL AUTO VEHICLES  1781 596 2863  16833 7882 21531  193370 118444 147235  33994  178515  1902057  144300  527700  3394800  Source: Korean statistical yearbooks. Various years.  Within ten years between 1980 and 1990,  for example, the  total number of automobiles in Korea grew more than ten-fold (965.5% increase, Table 4.12), but road capacity increased by only 12.7 percent (Table 4.7). Therefore, people in regions with higher car ownership, especially urban dwellers, are seriously dissatisfied with current traffic conditions.  4.4.3,  Regional Variations in the Perceived QOL:  Survey  Results  The previous subsections of this chapter used objective data to examine the pattern and extent of regional differentiation. This subsection, however, uses nationwide  111  survey data, obtained from the Institute of Social Science (1SS) at Seoul National University, and attempts to analyze subjective measures of the quality of life. The data is drawn from a survey which asked interviewees, years ago,  ‘Compared to five  has your quality of life generally become better?  Among the three response categories: i) change’; and iii)  ‘Better off’;  ii)  ‘No  ‘Worse off’, 69.8 percent of the total  respondents said that they were ‘better off’, as Table 4.13 shows.  Table 4.13: The General Evaluation of Regional Population on the Advancement in the General Living Conditions(%) Better-off (Rank)  No Difference  Worse-off  Capital Seoul  70.7 (3)  26.4  2.9  Mid-EAST Kangwon Chungnam  77.7 (1) 77.2 (2)  19.1 20.2  3.1 2.6  S. WEST Jeonnam  69.7 (4)  24.2  6.1  S. EAST Kyongbuk Kyungnam  57.7 (6) 65.8 (5)  34.0 28.2  8.3 6.0  69.8  25.4  4.9  TOTAL Sources: SNU Survey (1984)  Note: 1) Numbers in the table indicate percentage of the interviewees who responded with the answer in specific columns; 2) Numbers in each ( ) are the provincial orders by positive response.  112  Relating to specific subject areas, such as regional economy, environmental pollution, education, and medical care, the survey also asked a separate question, “How serious is each issue in your city?” For each of the 19 subject areas, the respondents were instructed to select one answer from the following three choices: 1) a very serious problem, 2) a somewhat serious problem, 3) not a problem.  and  As expected, the responses from the Southeast and the Capital Region perceived higher levels of economic growth than those from the Southwest. Interviewees from Kyungnam, the prime beneficiary of economic policies, on the one hand, has the most (or next to the most) favorably evaluated in terms of regional poverty, unemployment, and the regional economy. Interviewees from Jeonnam, the least benefiting from industrial policies, on the other hand, most (or next to the most) unfavorably evaluated one is in the Southwest provinces. The trends in the social development are the opposite to the economic issues. When specific issues such as education, leisure facilities, traffic conditions, and environmental pollution are considered, the Southeast is the least favorably evaluated.  Ironically, the Southwest, which had the least  advantage of Korean economic development policies, ranked at the intermediate level. This is also true for other non economic measures, such as housing, water supply, and medical care.  113  The findings from the survey mean that a growing economy does not necessarily assure higher levels of social development. The advancement in social conditions in a region is rather inversely related to the regional economic prosperity, which may have resulted from rapid industrial growth. The above finding is strongly supported by Byung-Kuk Kim’s (1988) study. As Bello and Rosenfeld (1990) argue, industrial growth in a Korean region causes social costs. Therefore, one cannot expect social development to occur as an automatic outcome of economic growth. In turn, this means that the improvement both in economic and social development in an Industrial region requires specific policies.  4.5 Chapter Summary The present chapter has examined the government/corporate interactions and their impact on spatial patterns of social and economic development in Korea. The first half documented the spatial context of industrial promotion policies of the central government during the past three decades, to which the corporate sector corresponded. The second half analyzed socio economic indicators of regional development. To indicate the objective level of economic and social development, statistical data were examined. In addition, data from a questionnaire survey were also used to analyze the subjective QOL. The following arguments are drawn from the data analysis:  114  i) in general, the Korean development process has tremendously improved various economic and social conditions; ii) a general improvement has been achieved in the level of QOL for the people in all regions; iii) there is a large gap in the pace of advancement in the economy between Industrial regions and others. The Capital Region and the Southeast are economically much better off than the rest of Korea; iv) the analyses have suggested that gaps in the level of social development between the two groups of regions (i.e., regions of the Southeast and the Capital and the rest) were narrowed; and v) the contrasting phenomenon between economic and social development, measured by statistics, is consistent with subjective measures based on provincial residents’ perception. The above findings suggest an important challenge to the views put forward by Neo—Marxists, such as NIDL (Frobel et al, 1980; Cohen 1989) and peripheral industrialization (Thrift 1989) that industrialization causes massive inequality. Clearly the industrialization process in Korea has created economic and social development in all regions. However, the data analysis has suggested that industrial policies have to be supported by other measures that can create social development. It has been shown that social conditions, such as educational and medical services in most industrialized provinces, are lower than the average. Some studies on the QOL in Korea have supported the above findings. Doh C. Shin (1979,  1981), for example, has  identified the gap between economic growth and the QOL. Based on the analysis, he recommended that higher development priorities be placed on non-economic matters (see also Song,  115  Ho Keun 1991). The following chapters examine how state-backed industrial policies affect economic and social conditions of the cities of Ulsan and Kyungju. This further investigates the impacts of the interaction between the central government, the corporations and the local communities.  116  CHAPTER FIVE: POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT IN ULSAN AND KYUNGJU  5.1 Overview This chapter builds on the previous chapters by describing the historical development of Ulsan and Kyungju, and analyzes the characteristics of urban life in the two cities. The chapter illustrates how interaction between the government and business has affected social, economic, and environmental conditions of the cities. It documents the problems emerging from the rapid industrialization in Ulsan and compares its social and economic conditions with those of the non-industrial city, Kyungju. Thirty years ago Kyungju was the larger of the two cities and was more widely recognized than Ulsan. However, Ulsan has emerged as the largest industrial city of the southeastern region over the past three decades. This transformation was initiated by the central government in the early 1960s. The city’s growth since then has strongly benefited from national industrial policies. Now Ulsan is the sixth largest city in Korea and plays a critical role in the automobile and shipbuilding industries. Kyungju, an old city, was bypassed by the national industrialization policy, but more recently was designated as ’Fhe city is well-known in Korea primarily 4 a historic center. 41. Social and economic aspects of Kyungju have rarely been dealt with in the literature available to English readers.  117  because it was the capital of the unified Silla Kingdom (7th10th century), the first nation controlling most of the Korean peninsula. It has retained artistic activities and inherited many historic treasures. yungju traditionally has been a 4 tourist destination. This city was considered to be economically depressed until mid-1980s, when contrasted to the nearby industrial centers, such as Ulsan, Pohang, Masan, and Changwon. Prior to the 1970s, Kyungju was a small agricultural service center for its surrounding counties. Since the mid— 1980s, the economic and social structure of the city has become more diversified. It has grown to a regional center of higher education, administrative services, and leisure and recreational activities. Although the average income of Kyungju citizens is only a half of those in Ulsan, the overall QOL of the city ranks the highest (Kim, Byung-Kuk et al. 1988), or next to the highest (Kim, An-Jae 1974) among the localities in Korea classified as ‘cities’. As the perception of the city’s economy has improved, residents of Kyungju are more satisfied with the current social and economic conditions of the city than their counterparts in Ulsan. 43 Ulsan, in contrast, has acquired increasing environmental problems and urban congestion in recent years. Although Ulsan’s economy, measured in terms of personal income,  is one  of the strongest in Korea, the city remains at the lowest rank 42. Historical sites and materials designated as the Korean National Treasures located in Kyungju area amount to 40 percent of Korea’s total. 43. The results of the questionnaire survey in Chapter IV will show this more clearly.  118  in social development. The industrial growth is now seen in negative terms.  5.2 Locational Characteristics of Ulsan and Kyungju Ulsan is located in a strategically safe place, which was untouched even during the Korean War. It is surrounded by the Nakdong River and the East Ocean (Donghae,  in Korean) between  Japan and the Korean Peninsula. It has a deep bay which provides the necessary physical conditions for a port. These attributes are important in the Korean economy, since raw materials and a considerable portion of its products have to be traded by sea. Kyungju is located in the center of a triangular area formed by three regional centers of Taegu, Pohang, and Ulsan (Figure 1.1). All of these regional centers are within 60 kilometers radius from Kyungju. This triangular sub-region is attached to the second largest Korean city, Pusan, and constitutes the northern portion of the Southeastern Industrial Belt. Although Kyungju and Ulsan are separated by provincial boundaries, their residents are closely tied by economic and social interactions. Kyungju is actually in Ulsan’s radio and television broadcasting trade area and there are no broadcasting stations in Kyungju. Approximately 30 kilometers away from Kyungju there is a major industrial city, Pohang, where Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) operates. In 1990, P05CC produced 15.7 million tones of steel, employing 23,304  119  workers in its plant in Pohang. It has also established a spin-off plant in the City of Dongkwangyang on the South Coast of Korea (see Figure 4.1, page 78 of this thesis, for the location, and see also PaineWebber 1991; Auty 1990,  1991).  Materials produced in Pohang are commonly transported to other cities through the transport nexus provided by Kyungju.  5.3 Forces of Change in Ulsan and Kyungju The 1961 Supreme Committee for National Reconstruction chose Ulsan for industrial development for a number of reasons. First, Ulsan’s locational characteristics ranked number one out of 15 potential industrial sites (see Whang, Jae--Ki 1983: 322). Second, perhaps more importantly, Ulsan was the home of Hu—Rak Lee, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and a core member of the 1961  coup, who  was then one of the most influential figures in the inner political circle. Third, the members of the Federation of Korean Entrepreneurs recommended that Ulsan be developed as an industrial center. After Ulsan was chosen as a major center of industrial growth, it experienced a series of dramatic changes.  5.3.1 Industrializing Ulsan The central government policy initiated its industrial growth in Ulsan, while large corporations and foreign technology and financial assistance helped in its implementation. The interplay between these three is important  120  in understanding the process of industrial growth and urban transformation in Ulsan and contrasts with those of Kyungju. Leading Central Government The central government led the process of industrial development in Ulsan but since then the role of the central government has gradually been reduced. The central government directed the development process through various government committees in Seoul. The committees planned and coordinated inter—ministerial activities related to the preparation of industrial sites and the promotion of business activities. The first of the central government actions was the establishment of an ad hoc organization, called the Inspection Committee for the Ulsan Industrial Center, chaired by a top manager of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Kyung-Mo Ahn, see Oh, Won-Chul 1992: 4). The 1961 coup committee under General Park ordered this committee to go to Ulsan and prepare a plan for the industrial center. The ad hoc committee completed its task in early 1962 (ibid.: 4). A more permanent agency, called the ‘Ulsan Development Committee,’ chaired by the Prime Minister, followed in 1962, along with a steering committee, called ‘Ulsan Development Planning Center’. The former was to plan and oversee the process of site preparation and subsequent development activities. The latter actually implemented policy decisions of the former. In December 1963, these were merged into the  121  Highway  Town Center  Major Urban Road  Minor Road  4.’!  0  InduslriaJ Zones Town Center  UIi’03Km Approximate  C of  Source: Drawn by the Author  Figure 5.1 : Map of Ulsan: Roads and Industrial Zones  122  newly established Special Bureau of Ulsan Construction within the Ministry of Construction (UCCI  1980), which survived until  1975. The central government also directly operated public corporations. As the private sector lacked capital in the early 1960s,  the government raised money from overseas and  organized large public companies, such as Daehan Petrochemical Authority and Hankuk Fertilizer Co., both of which played a critical role in the growing chemical sector. Park himself and governmental officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry made a special effort to attract foreign investment, as Won-Chul Oh described (Oh, Won-Chul 1992). The key ministries of the central government cooperated in the process of Ulsan’s industrialization. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry promoted capital investments from entrepreneurs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also helped the process, using its diplomatic relationships. While the Ministry of Construction built infrastructure such as roads, and bridges, the Ministry of Transportation constructed railways to link the industrial sites in Ulsan with other urban centers. The Ministry of Home Affairs ensured an adequate supply of water and electricity to the industrial sites (UCCI  1981).  In 1976, the Special Bureau of Ulsan Construction was dismissed and some of its functions were turned over to local governments, i.e., the City of Ulsan and the Province of Kyungnam. Government assistance for Ulsan has become more  123  indirect since then. From this period onward,  industries in  Ulsan grew within the overall national industrial policies. As the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan (FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (FYEDP),  1967-1971) emphasized heavy  and chemical industries, most industrial estates introduced to Ulsan in this period fall in this category. In 1970 the Ulsan Petrochemical Industrial Complex, which contained 18 establishments with 8900 employees (in 1989), was constructed in Southern Ulsan (UCCI  1990a).  In 1975, another  large industrial estate (Mipo)  for machine industries was  created in Eastern Ulsan (UCCI  1990b: 40) to host large  Hyundai corporations, such as automobile and shipbuilding firms (UCCI  1980). Overseas Assistance Foreign financial and technological resources have been important in the initiation of industrialization. Capital investment from the advanced countries enabled Ulsan to organize industrial activities. During the First Five Year Economic Development Plan period, approximately 70 percent of 44 the 40 billion Korean Won (equivalent to US $ 155.9 million at current rate)  invested in development projects in Ulsan was  raised from overseas sources such as the U.S., West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, and Belgium (UCCI  1980:  67). The  balance was drawn from the government budget, private  44. Based on official exchange rate (1/256.53) as of March 22, 1965.  124  investment, and ‘contributions’ by members of the Korean Federation of Entrepreneurs. Overseas technological assistance was critical in raising the technical level of industrial activity. Technological advancement in automobile and shipbuilding industries, in particular, benefited from the assistance of Japan, some European countries, and the U.S. The assistance came in various forms, but can summarized as follows: i) technology licensing; and iii)  ii) overseas training by sending Korean engineers;  inviting foreign engineers. At the firm level often  these occur as a combination. Hyundai Shipbuilding, for example, began with purchased dockyard designs, ship designs, and operating instructions from the Scottish firms, A & P Appledore and Scotlithgow. In 1972, Hyundai Shipbuilding dispatched seventy engineers to A & P Appledore in Scotland to receive instructions on how to lay out a yard (Amsden 1989: 276). In 1974, Hyundai sent a total of 200 engineers and technicians to a Japanese firm, Kawasaki for training, and Japanese foremen were stationed at I-Iyundai to help (Amsden 1989: 277). Through this process, Hyundai Shipbuilding was able to learn how to read blueprints, coordinate drawings on the job, and install machinery. Hyundai Motor’s example will be followed later. TJlsan’s industrialization was not solely dependent upon external forces. Imported technology was quickly absorbed by local engineers and then transferred internally. Hyundai Motor Company increased the use of locally manufacturing parts from  125  80 percent to 96 percent between 1976 and 1989 (Shin, Sang—Suk 1990). The localized technology,  in turn, was used in  expanding similar industrial activities to other locations within Korea. The expansion of Hanyang Chemical plant from Ulsan to Yeochun, and POSCO’s expansion to Dongkwangyang and the United States, are examples of this. Major industries in the city are owned by Korean entrepreneurs (e.g., Hyundai 5 or by the government. None of the top ten largest employers of Ulsan was controlled by foreign owners (tJCCI  1991). Growing Industrial Linkages Local industries in Ulsan have grown through three major stages. The first of these was the 1960s when the central government most strongly intervened in business. The corporations setting up in Ulsan at this stage were affected by the import substitution strategy of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FYEDP,  1962-1966). They were  capital—intensive and large scale. The 1960s industries of Tilsan were characterized by petrochemicals, such as oil refining and fertilizer production. The central officials considered that such industries were fundamental in moving the Korean economy to take-off  (Oh, Won-Chul 1992). The government strategy was to  use the spin-off effects of these ‘basic’  industries in  45. The Hyundai group is financed primarily by the family of Ju-Young Chung, therefore participation of foreign capital is minor. Hyundai Motors, for example, was established solely with Korean funds, but it had to allow Japanese Mitsubishi to invest in 15 percent of the stock as a condition for parts exchange, not for the financial reason.  126  expanding to other industrial sectors within the same city. Most products from these businesses were in fact not final products, but intermediate materials marketed as inputs to other industries, such as textiles and chemical fabrics manufacturing (ibid.). ]Jaehan Petrochemical Authority refined oil, which has been used universally in all kinds of industries. One product of the Authority, Methanol, was used by Hankuk Fertilizer Co., whose products (i.e., fertilizers) contributed to the growing productivity in the agricultural sector. These earlier companies were located in residential areas of Southern Ulsan, thereby polluting the environment of these areas. The majority of industries in the second stage (the 1970s) were set up by Korean entrepreneurs, using indigenous capital. The leading growth sector in this period was heavy industry, which was one of the ‘strategic’  industries  designated by the government in the 1970s. The growth in this sector was affected by the government’s big push toward heavy industry and its industrial decentralization policies in that period. However, government intervention became more indirect at this stage. The companies that grew rapidly through this Hyundai 6 period include Hyundai Automobile (38,50O) Shipbuilding (22,276), and Hyundai Precision (4,770), that were characterized as export-oriented and labor-intensive. The Hyundai group as a whole had expanded to employ more than 65,000 people by 1991  (UCCI  1991).  46. The numbers in ( ) indicates the number of employees in each company in 1991 (UCCI 1991)  127  The machine industries in Ulsan grew with extensive local/global production and market linkages. In 1967, Hyundai launched automobile manufacturing with entirely Korean financial sources (Hyun, Young—Suk 1988: 76). Since 1982, it has developed formalized linkages with Mitsubishi of Japan to receive technological assistance (Figure 5.2). ithout such 4 assistance it may have been impossible for Hyundai Motors to improve its technological ability to the level where it could develop its own models, such as Pony, Stellar, and Sonata. The company also established relationships with Ford in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Hyundai’s strategy was to reduce technical dependence on a single partner, by diversifying parts and  technology exchange to other countries  (Hyun, Young—Suk 1988: 75—77). From 1986, Hyundai Motor started to operate a production plant in Bromont, Canada, that employed 900 workers in 1991 (The Province, January 12,  1992). It has also expanded its  overseas networks by instituting its subsidiaries such as Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai America Technical Center, and Hyundai Auto Canada (Cho, Dong-Sung 1990: 239). Global linkages of the Ulsan industrial sector were not limited to large corporations, such as Hyundai. Many of the smaller firms established production and market relationships abroad. Among those operating in Ulsan and its surrounding county,  101  firms have indicated that their products were  47. Since 1985 the capital investment of Mitsubishi increased to 15 percent.  128  ASIA  EUROPE  NORTH AMERICA  U.K  Japan  Ford  IMitsubishi I  Canada U.S. I Pohang Steel Iflytrndai Ameiica Canadal Illyundai Tech. Center I  I  IFord  I  ITr Coal Co.  I .1 -  ‘ ‘  LUSS-POSCO mdi  i  “  I  ‘  —  7 ‘V  1 c-)  Sii  .‘ ‘  V/  ‘VI -I ,  I  ‘  IHY111idal Canadaj  ‘__4i  I I  1 ‘.I uI 4-‘c)I  I  lI , ‘-I dl  ‘  _4  V  \+.  Ulsan  Ikhang  & Iron - —  -  .POSC()  of  IIljinI Kangryeong  Kyungju  Input Output L1 Company —  Note: The Diagram is based on Amsden (1990); Cho, Dong-Sung (1990); Hyun, Young-Suk (1988); Hyun, Young-Suk and Iee, Jinjoo (1989); POSCO (1988).  Figure 5.2: External & Internal Production Linkages of Hyundai Motors  & POSCO  129  traded in international markets, or sold to other firms that manufactured goods sold in such markets (Based on UCCI  1991).  The pace of growth in industrial activities slowed in the 1980s. The industrial sector grew mainly by the expansion of small businesses with local capital from the Ulsan area. This contrasts to the earlier capital sources such as those from developed countries and the national center, Seoul. Out of 82 newly located industrial plants in Ulsan between 1981 and 1991, only ten employed more than 300 workers However, the 8 largest employed only 390. A stark change from huge firms established in the previous decade (e.g., Hyundai). Many of the small firms manufactured auto parts, such as seat covers, brakes, bodies, bumpers, and oil pumps, subcontracted out from large corporations. The auto industry of Ulsan has diversified local linkages with small firms both within the city and those in adjacent localities. For example, POSCO of Pohang is a primary source of Hyundai’s steel and iron inputs. Twelve of the 19 major industries of Kyungju manufacture supplies for Hyundai 9 lijin Industrial Co. of Kyungju is an example that manufactures brake disks and gear shifts as a subcontractor of riyundai  50  Industrial growth in Ulsan in the last decade has provided a rich business environment especially to the 48. In Korea, manufacturing firms with more than 300 full-time workers are legally defined as ‘large companies,’ while those with five to 299 persons are termed ‘small-and-medium size companies’ (Choi, Sang-Yun 1991). 49. Based on an internal document of the Kyungju Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 50. Based on an interview with a manager of the company (July 1991).  130  communities along the transportation corridors of Pohang Kyungju-Ulsan and Masan-Pusan-Ulsan (Figure 1.1). The interfirm linkages centered around Ulsan became highly diversified. POSCO,  for example, began its business by importing raw  materials not only from less developed countries, such as Indonesia (coal) and Saudi Arabia (oil), but also from Canada, the United States, and Australia. In 1987, 25 percent of POSCO’s total output went to North American markets and another 12 percent to Europe (POcsO 1988). To expand product and raw material markets in the advanced economies, POSCO has established three subsidiaries within the world metropolis, located in Japan, Canada, and the U.S. The company has also initiated a joint-venture with the largest steel maker in the U.S., US Steel. The two companies established United Pacific Industries of Pittsburgh, California, which experienced positive profits throughout its initial three years of operation. During this period other American steel makers suffered primarily due to increased price competition. Having invested 50 percent of the total capital, POSCO’s role in the project was that of an equal partner. This venture does not use cheap labor and nor is it located in a developing country. Rather it uses POSCO’s capital and management strategy to compete within North American markets. The process of industrial growth in Ulsan illustrates how global/local interactions are organized in a regional context. It also exemplifies the Korean government strategy of promoting industrial activities and managing the local  131  corporate sector and foreign assistance. The above discussion shows how the corporate sector absorbs and transfers imported technology into the indigenous system. This has various theoretical implications, which will be further discussed in Chapter seven. Industrial growth in Ulsan, on the one hand, has contributed to the creation of wealth and the advancement of technical skills for both the national and regional economies. On the other hand, the aggressive industrial promotion by the central government, with little community participation, has caused problems in the physical environment,  infrastructure,  and transportation. he municipal government, which has 5 began to take more responsibility for the emerging problems of urban congestion and industrialization has few solutions since the government lacks experience with such problems. This is a basic difference from slow growth, non—industrial cities, such as Kyungju. Role of Local Governments Prior to 1962, when the City of Ulsan was constituted as a single administrative unit, two local governments existed within the Ulsan area  (ucci  1980: 5). Lacking financial  sources and managerial skills, these municipalities did not have capacity to plan and manage large development projects, that were initiated by the national government.  51. The details of these will be discussed in a later section of the present chapter.  132  The central government instituted a field office, called a ‘land acquisition committee’. The office collected local data, implemented central policies, and reported back results of policy implementation. Local circumstances were interpreted by the officers of this branch office. At this early stage, there was little input from the municipal or provincial governments before any major decisions were taken (Oh, Won Chul 1992; ARC 1978: 76). Both the Province and the municipal government were repeatedly overridden by the central ministries, that implemented the major development for Ulsan. Central government intervention has gradually declined through the past three decades. By 1975, the two central organizations for Ulsan’s industrial growth, i.e., the land acquisition committee and the Special Bureau of Ulsan Construction, were dissolved. Some authority for ‘managing’ industrial estates was transferred to the municipal government, although the estates were initially ‘designated’ (established) by the central ministries. Prior to the 1970s, the managerial competence of municipal officers was much lower than that of the central officials. There were large gaps between educational levels of local officials and employees of central agencies. As Table 5.1 shows, the Ulsan Development Planning Center, a central agency, had hired far better educated officials than the municipal government. Almost 60 percent of the Center’s employees were those with a college degree and over.  133  Table 5.1: Comparison of educational levels of officials in Ulsan municipality and Ulsan Development Planning Center (1969)  Ulsan Ulsan Development Municipality Planning Center  (%) Schooling lower than garde 12 77 (30.3) 142 (55.9) Highschool graduatesa 19 (7.5) 2—year college graduatesb 4—year university graduates c 16 (6.3) TOTAL  254 (100.0)  (%) 15 38 27 50  (11.5) (29.2) (20.8) (38.5)  130 (100.0)  Note: a: includes highschool graduates and college drop-outs: b: includes college graduates and university drop-outs: c: includes university graduates and post-university degree holders. Source: Compiled based on Statistical yearbook of Ulsan (1970),  However, the municipality employed only 13.8 percent of its officials in that category. Such low educational levels of the local officials have improved during the past two decades, benefiting from the general advancement of formal education, as shown in Table 3.1  (page 58). This has subsequently helped  to advance the managerial skills of municipal officials. The number of officers has also increased from 1.8 per 1000 ield offices of the 5 residents in 1969 to 4.4 in 1990. central ministries, such as those of Labor and the Environment, still operate in Ulsan. However, these offices no longer dominate the processes of industrial and urban growth.  52. Compiled from Statistical yearbook of Ulsan (1968) and Korean urban statistical yearbook (1991).  134  The local councils with elected members newly established in 1991 are expected to help strengthen local decision-making affecting changes in Ulsan. The financial capacity of the local government has also expanded with the help of growing revenue from industrial taxation. In 1990, Ulsan generated 1.5 billion dollars f tax revenue, 88.1 percent of which were 5 transferred to the central government (calculated from UCCI 1991: 22-23). Among the ten largest cities in Korea, Ulsan maintains the most healthy revenue structure with a 96 percent self-financing capacity (Korean urban statistical yearbook 1991). The municipal government’s improved managerial and financial capacities, however, do not necessarily mean that the local government is fully able to manage municipal affairs and local industries. The majority of its revenue flows back to the central government. In addition, the municipal officers are not used to the burden of decision-making in the increasingly complex socio-political atmosphere in Ulsan’s municipal affairs.  5.3.2 The Development  of Kyungju  In contrast to Ulsan, there were no national industrial policies designed for Kyungju. Kyungju has been a regional administration center and historic site. Between 1971 and 1979, the city benefited from a minor intervention by the central government. The Park regime attempted to develop 53. Based on the official exchange rate (1: 740) of 1990.  135  Kyungju as a place symbolic of national identity and Korean people’s spiritual heritage. A special planning committee was organized at the central level in 1971. The committee was composed of 22 central officers, including those of the Presidential Office. However, only two officials representing the municipal government of Kyungju participated in this committee (Kyungju Development Office 1979). The committee formulated a plan for developing the city as a tourist center. To implement this plan, a field office of the Ministry of Construction, called the Kyungju Development Office, was opened. Subsequently, new facilities were created partly with financial assistance from the central government and also foreign assistance, such as from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). However, the amount of money raised from the latter was minor, compared to that invested in the industrial projects in Ulsan. Many buried historical sites were excavated and some of these were restored to their original form. New accommodation and leisure facilities of international standard were built to house overseas and domestic tourists. Large hotels, country clubs, urban gardens, and water-sports facilities resulted. To house some of these, a new recreational center, called the ‘Bomun Tourist Complex,’ was established in a suburb of the city. However, the expansion did not continue through the 1980s, primarily because of the termination of the Park  136  government. The Kyungju Development Office was dismissed in 1980 and some of its functions taken over by the municipal government and these were not implemented as originally planned. There was little local support for the tourism industry because citizens of Kyungju did not like to see their city becoming a tourism center (Park, Byung—Sik 1992:  108).  When the central government’s special grants diminished, local revenue was insufficient to continue the planned activities. Under the Second CNLUP (1982-1991), Kyungju was designated as a ‘reserved,’  in contrast to ‘developing,’ area.  The people living in Kyungju did not appreciate this designation (Park, Byung-Sik op. sit.), considering the city’s economy as depressed. Rather, they preferred that the city gain economic opportunities by developing a strong industrial sector, as had Ulsan and Pohang. According to this expectation, a small industrial estate was opened in an outlying area of the city in the inid—1980s. By 1991, nineteen firms employing more than 50 workers operated within the owever, the scale of the firms was 5 jurisdiction of Kyungju. small, with only a single company employing more than 200 people. Some of these firms manufacture automobile parts and supply them to Hyundai Motor of Ulsan (Figure 5.3). In 1987, 12 of the nineteen medium-scale companies performed this role (Shin, Sang-Suk 1990: 226). Many of these companies are a part of the dynamic production linkage among the regional centers.  54. An internal document from Kyungju Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  137  They receive materials from POSCO to manufacture semi-final products for Hyundai Motor Co. The amenities of the city now provide the labor force of adjacent cities, including Pohang and Ulsan, with recreational and leisure activities. n the late 1980s, as the economic 5 circumstances of the Korean people improved, and traffic conditions and environmental pollution in other cities worsened, residents of many cities sought leisure activities outside of the communities where they work. Therefore, the open space and leisure facilities in Kyungju are becoming increasingly important not only for its own citizens, but also for those of other cities.  5.4 Transforming Ulsan and Kyungju: Quantitative Assessments  5.4.1 The Pattern of Industrializing Ulsan Population Growth When Ulsan was designated as a city,  its population was  about 91 thousand in 1962 (Figure 5.4). Its numbers grew to 393.4 thousand in 1979, and 683.0 thousand in 1990. During this period, Ulsan’s annual average population growth rate was 12.7 percent, which made Ulsan one of the fastest growing cities in Korea. Four stages are distinguishable in Ulsan’s population growth. In the first five years after Ulsan?s designation as a 55. The growth of Kyungju’s revenue from foreign visitors increased steadily by 1989, but declined since then (see Table 11-7, in Bong-Suk Lee (1992).  138  city and during its initial planning phase the population growth was not fast. Its population began to rise rapidly during the second stage commencing in 1967, with a 5.6 percent annual growth rate. Major employers, such as Hyundai Motors began its operation in 1968. From 1977 to 1981, a third phase, Ulsan’s population growth was its most rapid, due to the expansion of the automobile industry and opening of heavy machine industries, such as Hyundai Shipbuilding and Hyundai Precision. Finally, during the 1980s, Ulsan’s population growth has slowed. Ulsan’s population growth in the 1960s and the 1970s is attributable to long-distance migration from various parts of Korea. However, out-of--province movements of people to and from Ulsan have noticeably decreased between the 1970s and the 1980s. The number of people who migrated from outside of Kyungnam province, has decreased. The proportion of migrants from Kyungnam was 57.4 and 59.1 percent in 1971 and 1979 respectively, while in 1991 almost three quarters (74.8 %) of Ulsan’s migrants were from Kyungnam. Among the out-of-province migrants the share from the Capital Region (i.e., Seoul and its surrounding province) has greatly declined. In the 1980s nearly one half of the out-of province migrants were from the Capital Region. By 1991 the share of the Capital Region declined to a quarter of the out of—province migrants (Korean Statistics Association,  139  1992).  Thousand People  800  600  400  200  0 Us  KJ 1963  KJ Us 1969  KJ Us 1979  US  KJ  1990  Female  Male  Sources: Korean Urban Statistical Yearbooks, 1970, 1980, 1990; Kyungju Statistical and UCCI (1981)  Yearbook, 1964;  Figure 5.3: Population Levels in Ulsan (US) and Kyungju (KJ), 1963-1990  140  These changes show:  i) an increasing number of in-province  migrants, leading to a relative homogeneous migrant population in Ulsan; and ii) an weakening influence from Seoul on the character of migrants to Ulsan. The combined effects of these two are expected to influence the future stability of community social ties within Ulsan. Changing Employment Structure There are two noticeable changes in Ulsan’s employment structure. The first is extensive growth in the total employment in the manufacturing sector (Figure 5.4). In 1963 there were only 948 people in the formal manufacturing sector. But by 1979 this number grew dramatically to 74,241, and by 1989 to 111,885. The second is the shift from industrial sectors depending on low skills to those requiring more sophisticated skills. In terms of the employment structure, there was a significant shift even within the manufacturing sector (Figure 5.5). In the early years, employment was concentrated on the sectors with relatively low skills, such as foods processing. The employment share of food processing was more than fifty percent in 1962. But in 1970, the share of food processing declined to less than 10 percent.  141  1963  1970  1980  1986  Ulsan  100%  75%  50%  25%  0% 1970  1980  1986  Kyungju Primary  Sources: UCCI 1997,  p.  Secondary  Tertiary  286; Statistical Yearbook of Kvungju 198B,  p.  58.  Figure 54: Employment Structure of Ulsan and Kyungju by Three Major Industrial Categories, 1963-1986  100%  75%  50%  25%  0% 1963  1970  U Food Ptrochemical  EIITh  1980  Textile  Wood  Metal  Machinery  1986 Paper  Source: UCCI 1991, p. 287.  Figure 5.5: Employment Composition of Ulsan’s Manufacturing Sector, 1963-1986  143  Throughout the 1970s the employment share of the machine dustry grew to 67.8 percent by 1979, while those of chemical and chemical fabric declined to 17.7 and 8.4 percent respectively. The employment growth in technologically more advanced sectors, such as machinery and industrial equipment, continued throughout the 1980s. In 1990 more than three quarters (76.4 percent) of total employment was in the machinery sector, while the share of food processing and chemical fabrics were in the order of 1.2 and 6.5 percent. Ulsan’s economy has transformed into a full stage of industrialization. Spatial Distribution of Growth The built areas of Ulsan developed around the estuary of the Taewha River. The areas can be divided into four sectors: i.e., northcentral, northeast, southcentral, and south (Figure 5.1). The interior areas are less populated, while those close to the Taewha River or the sea have a higher population density. The distribution of industrial lands in Ulsan almost overlap the residential areas. The mix of industrial and residential use illustrates the absence of land use planning. The center of tJlsan is the northeasterly portion, where the old town center is located. The area is also the center of 57 the city’s transportation and commercial activities.  56. This industrial category includes automobile, shipbuilding, and industrial equipments. 57. All buses running between Ulsan and its adjacent cities leave from and arrive in Ulsan through a bus terminal located in this area.  144  •  Note: Numbers shon in represent the number of employees in each firm. Only the firms with more than 1,000 employees are shown in the map. and the firms with more than 5,000 employees show their names. Source: Drawn by the Author  Figure 5.6: Location of Large Employers in Ulsan  145  The northeast is occupied primarily by Hyundai companies (i.e., Hyundai Automobile, Shipbuilding, Wood Processing, and Precisions). Earlier the area was used for farming and fishing. The south central has been developed as an administrative center, by locating city hail and promoting office work, such as banking. Developing this area was intended to reduce the continuous growth of the old town center. It was formerly agricultural, where rice farming was practiced. This area did not expand until the late 1980s when other sites available for commercial uses were exhausted. The failure of the new town to attract growth from the old town center left the congestion problem there unresolved in the early 1990s. This has been described as seriously constraining the transportation and commercial needs of all residents of Ulsan (Kim, Sun-Bum 1990). The southern one-fourth of the city was a low density residential area before the 1960s, where the earliest firms (i.e.,  1960s) started to locate their plants. The main  industrial categories of these plants were a mix of chemical and petrochemical industries. Industrial activities are located along the main traffic route, thereby increasing traffic congestion.  5.4.2 The Pattern of Evolving Kyungju  The population of Kyungju has grown at much slower pace than Ulsan, and at an even slower rate than the average urban  146  population growth in Korea. In the early 1960s Kyungju had a population of similar size to Ulsan, as Figure 5.3 has shown. The development activities in the 1970s did not stimulate Kyungju’s population growth. Kyungju’s secondary sector was not much smaller than that of Ulsan in 1963. But by 1989 the secondary sector, was only five percent of Kyungju’s employment sector (Korean urban statistical yearbook 1991). Overall, the changes in Kyungju’s population, economic, and employment structures have been much slower and smaller in scale than those in Ulsan. The underdevelopment of the secondary sector, and the historical and social character of Kyungju have contributed to the growth of the tertiary sector. Although Kyungju’s economy in term of income is not strong, its diverse economic structure has provided a better standard of living than Ulsan.  5.5. Transforming Ulsan and Kyungju: A Qualitative Comparison  5.5.1 The Economic Structure  Ulsan’s industrialization makes an enormous contribution to the national economy. It has created employment opportunities and advanced the technological levels of Korean industries. The city contributes the second highest amount of tax per household in Korea. In 1989, the total amount of tax collected from Ulsan was 4.6 million Won per household, which is compared to 1.3 million for Kyungju. Ulsan contributed 3.8 percent of the total tax revenue of the national budget  147  (Korean urban statistical yearbook 1990). In the production of manufacturing goods and exports of materials (by price), Ulsan ranked second among Korean cities. Ulsan is an engine of the growth of Korean manufacturing. Kyungju, by contrast, has had little impact on the national economy. The city does not host a single corporation that hires more than three hundred employees. The total number of employees in the secondary sector of the city is fewer than 7,000. The employment share of the industrial sector increased from 9.1 percent in 1969 to approximately a quarter of the total employment by 1990 (Korean urban statistical yearbook 1991), while that of the primary sector remained at thirty percent by the 1990 (Statistical yearbook of Kyungu 1990). Kyungju has not transformed its economy into an industrial one. In Ulsan problems have emerged as development priorities of its citizens shift from simply economic ones to a complex he major firms are large 5 of social and economic concerns. scale operations, which local capital markets were incapable of financing. The economic destiny of that community is subject to those who may be less considerate of local well being than local entrepreneurs might be. Local leaders complain that Ulsan, as a regional economic center, does not receive sufficient financial returns from local manufacturing activities. The transfer of money for the goods traded through Ulsan usually occurs outside of the Ulsan 58. This statement is supported by public opinion (see Table 6.9, page 182)  148  region, often in Seoul. A clear indicator is that in 1986 exported goods which passed through ports in the Ulsan area (including Kyungnam) were valued at 6,564 million dollars. However, only 17.5 percent of the transactions occurred through local banks in Ulsan (uccI 1990a). In addition, the industrialization of Ulsan came at the cost of the traditional economy. The number of people working in the primary sector fell by more than half, from 23,428 in 1962 to approximately 10,000 in 1986 (uCci  1990a: 25). This  has meant that new jobs were created at the expense of the existing jobs of indigenous residents. Kyungju’s economy is diverse, such as higher educational services, administrative and legal services, commercial activities, tourism, and a minor manufacturing sector. The promotion of tourism in Kyungju has also resulted in the improvement of the city’s amenities, which became superior to those of other cities in Korea. Economic resources of the Korean people have increased and their lifestyle has changed toward increasing leisure opportunities. More people from other cities visit Kyungju to enjoy the clean environment and recreational facilities of the city, especially since the late 1980s. Kyungju came to host three four-year universities and a two-year college (Statistical yearbook of Kyungiu 1990). The first two universities were opened in Kyungju in 1981 and in 1990 and another is scheduled for 1992. The scale of higher education in Kyungju is unusually large, compared to its  149  population. The universities in Kyungju have generated a pool of white-collar jobs, brought in money from other parts of the country, and reduced the outflow of financial resources which might have been spent for supporting students from Kyungju who study in educational institutions elsewhere. The universities in Kyungju have infused new blood into an already culturally diversified community. The generation of knowledge of the tourism industry, nd developing and preserving heritage, 5 are some examples of the benefits spun off from the universities. Opening universities in Kyungju is a recent phenomenon. Kyungju was able to attract the (Dong-Kuk) Buddhist university in 1985 since the city is the home of Korean Buddhism. Kyungju University opened in 1990 since it is home of an ex-National Assemblyman, Il-Yun Kim, who was an educationist previously. Furthermore, in 1992, a new university is proposed to be opened in a rural area, within the range of Kyungju’s urban influence. This increase in higher educational institutions in Kyungju contrasts to Ulsan, which did not gain any additional universities since the establishment of the existing one, Ulsan University in 1978.  5.5.2 The Physical Environment  The problems of air and water quality in Ulsan are well reported, while terrestrial pollution is less well known. According to a report by the Kyungnam Institute of Public 59. Kyungju University has focused on disciplines related to the tourism industry.  150  Health, the air above one of the industrial sites contained  97 ppm of SO (KIPP 1986: 58), which is 57.4 times the official tolerance level (0.05 ppm) set by the Korean Ministry of Environment. Table 5.2 also indicates that air quality of the Ulsan Area is the lowest among the cities within the same region. The poor air quality is easily detectable at any time of the day. When there is no wind and the air pressure is low, the pungent air can be tasted, especially in an area close to the Petrochemical Industrial Complex in Bugok Dong. Smog in the air is so visible that light colored clothing hung to dry in the sunlight is often dirty from falling particles.  Table 5.2: The Level of SO 2 Contamination in the Air of Ulsan and its Adjacent Cities, Selected Months of 1990 and 1991 (ppm). 1990 Jun  Jul  Aug  1991 Sep  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  Jun  0.031*  Ulsan Kyungju  0.017 0.012 0.011 0.020  0.020 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.011  Pohang  0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016  0.029 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.014  Note:  *:  1990 annual average  Source: Lee, Dong-Woong (1991: 194)  60. One ppm is 0.0001 percent.  151  Ulsan’s lands were fertile and fish farms along the costal areas were productive before tJlsan’s industrialization. A paddy plain, called ‘Samnam Plain,’ on both sides of the Taewha River was productive for growing rice. Since the air quality of the agricultural land in that area is seriously affected by industrial smog, the area currently cultivatable has decreased to one sixth of the area of the early 1960s. The region was also famous for the special taste of ‘Ulsan pears’ and some seaweeds. As the lands used for fruit production were contaminated by industrial pollution, only one sixth of the old fruit garden areas, 6,000 ha in the early 1960s, was available for growing pear trees in the mid-1980s (KIPP 1986: 67). As a result, the famous ‘Ulsan pear’ disappeared. There are three major reasons why environmental problems in Ulsan are more serious than in any other Korean cities. First, the kind of industries, such as chemical and petrochemical, introduced in Ulsan are more destructive to the environment. Second, when these industries were constructed, emphasis was not placed on the environmental aspects (KIPP 1986). Therefore, most industries in Ulsan are not equipped with effective means to  clean or reduce pollutants. Third,  locational policies failed to separate industries from residential areas and good agricultural land. The central government efforts toward reducing industrial pollution have been piecemeal. The government has not created strong measures to directly control major polluters, such as large petrochemical industries. Rather it has planned  152  relocating the victimized neighborhoods where environmental conditions are detrimental e.g., Bugok Dong). The plan is 6 to simply move the concerned neighborhoods to a suburban area of the city, several kilometers away from the industrial areas. The natural environment of Kyungju is less polluted. The quality of air and drinking water is better than in the three adjacent cities, i.e., Taegu, Pohang, and Ulsan (Lee, Dong Woong 1992:  191-195). Kyungju and its surrounding counties  contain ample and inexpensive space for future expansion. Under strict land use policies,  industrial facilities have not  been allowed in residential and commercial areas and the existing small—scale industrial zones are separated from major residential areas. In addition, unlike Ulsan the environmental quality of Kyungju is openly discussed by the concerned public (see Lee, Dong-Woong (1992), for example).  5.5.3 The Community  The Korean people traditionally have a strong sense of place, which has not been completely replaced by the modernization process. There is tremendous movement of people .g. New Year’s 6 across the country on traditional holic3ays, day or full-moon day, is evidence of this. In Ulsan, migrants make up the majority of the current populace. In one neighborhood (Sinpyong Maeul) within Ulsan, 61. Information obtained from the author’s interviews with the concerned residents (in 1990). 62. The number of those who move out from Seoul to their hometowns in three to four days of a traditional holiday is estimated at over a million people.  153  three quarters of the total number of households (310 in 1983) originated from regions other than the Kyungnam province. In the neighborhood, more than two households, on the average, live in shared houses. This means that migrants and indigenous people are living physically close to each other (Lee, Moon Woong 1984). Unlike other cities in Korea, Ulsan has been described as an uneasy place for migrants to settle down (Ryu, Woo-Ik and Lee, Joung-Whan 1985). The city lacks an integrating force upon which the municipality can build a consensus between the existing populace and migrants. The sense of place maintained by the existing populations, on the one hand, was too weak to mitigate the various regional characteristics, brought by massive migration. The migrants, on the other hand, did not assimilate themselves into Ulsan’s local identity. There is some hostility and tension among regional groups. Those who think of themselves as ‘foreigners’ (Ta Hyang-In,  in Korean) do not cooperate with community actions  toward long-term prosperity. A survey (Lee, Moon-Woong 1985: 128—133) has reported that ‘foreigners’ do not pay attention to indigenous people’s concerns, while neither do the indigenous people concern themselves with the foreigners’ matters. Unlike Ulsan, Kyungju maintains stable neighborhoods. Its population is more homogeneous, with a cohesive community spirit, partly because the people take pride in being descendents of a culturally advanced ancient nation, Silla  154  Kingdom. Furthermore, most public institutions (e.g., public schools)  in the city encourage people to be generous and  friendly to provide a better climate for the tourism industry. Therefore, reaching a consensus on common neighborhood issues has been more difficult in Ulsan than in traditional communities, such as Kyungju.  5.5.4 Urban Infrastructure  The level of tJlsan’s urban services which are not directly affected by local circumstances, such as compulsory public education, and those which are provided at the national scale, such as communication and medical services, have kept pace with Korean urban standards. However, some public services provided at the municipal level compare poorly with those of other cities in its rank. TJlsan has a single fouryear university, hile a much smaller city, Kyungju, has 6 three and other comparable cities, such as Suwon, Chungju, and Junju, have at least three. Another problem in Ulsan is the poor provision of transportation infrastructure. Even though car ownership in Ulsan increased from 1.7 percent of total households in 1963 to 21.8 percent in 1988, there has been insufficient expansion of roads. The result is increasing traffic congestion and car accidents. The ratio of people involved in automobile traffic accidents per one thousand residents (6.62) was the highest in 63. The University of Ulsan has a similar educational capacity to the University of Dongkuk at Kyungju.  155  Ulsan in 1987 among the seven largest cities in Korea  (ucci  1990a). This was also true for death and injury rates caused by traffic accidents, with O.36 nd 6.15 per one thousand, 6 respectively. There was also a similar increase in traffic volume within Kyungju and across the city’s boundaries. While traffic demand in Ulsan is stable throughout the year,  in Kyungju it  is seasonally cyclic since there are a greater number of tourists in the Spring and Fall. If this is considered, traffic conditions in Kyungju are not much better than those in Ulsan. In Kyungju, however, road connections are better organized and major roads in Kyungju are often wider than those in Ulsan, although the number of motor vehicles registered in Kyungju is one-third of those in Ulsan. The following Chapter reveals the difference in the public opinion in each city based on a questionnaire survey.  5.6 Chapter Summary Ulsan has experienced the special features of a rapidly growing new industrial city: increase in its population size, employment structure, and social and environmental conditions. While there were apparent benefits from national economic policies, there have also been problems in the various aspects of the city’s conditions, which have constrained the QOL of local residents. The contaminated physical environment, low  64. This ratio is more than twice of the Korean average (UCCI 1990a: 531).  156  standard of urban services, and dissolving community integrity are evidence of the problems. Kyungju has followed a different path from Ulsan. The city received little attention from the industrial policies. The inferior position of Kyungju in national priorities and its weak economic base is in contrast to Ulsan. The disadvantageous status of Kyungju in the early period ironically has contributed to the improvement in the QOL in Kyungju in the recent years. The general QOL in Kyungju is rather better than that of Ulsan. To examine thoroughly these contrasting phenomena, the following chapter analyzes the results from the opinion survey.  157  CHAPTER SIX FORCES TRANSFORMING ULSAN AND KYUNGJU: THE RESULTS OF AN OPINION SURVEY  6.1 Overview  The previous chapters have argued that; i) the Korean national government initiated aggressive industrial policies, which were implemented by large corporations; ii) the effort has strengthened the Korean economy both in terms of technological involvement in manufacturing products and the volume of goods exported; iii) as a consequence, some industrial cities, including Ulsan, are challenged by growing social and environmental problems. The political response to these problems at the national level has been to decentralize decisions to the local communities, generating dynamic local interactions within governments and among governments and corporations. This chapter moves to examine the outcome of Korea’s economic growth through exploring the different views on social and environmental problems of government officers, corporate managers, and residents of Ulsan and Kyungju. Using he chapter 6 the data obtained from a questionnaire survey, analyses the differences in responses between the two contrasting cities. This chapter is concerned with documenting local responses: i) to the broad social changes accompanying the process of economic growth; and ii) the impacts of 65. The details of this survey are discussed in section 6.2.  158  industrial growth on social development. The questionnaire enables, first, differential responses to problems of the three sample groups within the cities to be identified; second, how the separate sample groups view the process of transformation; and third, to what extent do responses differ between Ulsan and Kyungju. The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. First, people generally feel that they are better off than five years ago. However, this favorable evaluation is tempered by the dissatisfaction expressed over issues of the environment and municipal infrastructure. Second, people now place a higher priority on social development, in contrast to continuing economic growth. The strongest response is in regard to environmental pollution which is seen as a very serious problem by more than ninety-three percent of the respondents from Ulsan, Third, respondents in Kyungju are generally more satisfied with social and environmental conditions than those in Ulsan. Fourth, for some specific issues, such as evaluating the role of city councils, and the lack of urban infrastructure, there is no significant difference in the responses between residents of the two cities.  6.2 Methods of the Survey  159  6.2.1 The Questionnaire Survey 66  The survey was undertaken to acquire in-depth information on the changing perceptions and attitudes towards community matters of government officials, corporate managers, and citizens. Municipal bureaucrats who have some influence in making or implementing policies affect local patterns of industrial growth and urban transformation. Considering these as representatives of the public sector, the survey sampled the bureaucrats using a two-stage cluster sampling to create a manageable set of approximately 100 cases. The classification categories were rank of officials, and agencies and departments with which they were affiliated. A list of corporate managers was drawn from the 1991 Directory of Members of the Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI) From the total of 300 firms listed, only 7 those firms employing more than 50 workers and producing manufactured goods as their ‘major’ products were selected. The survey forms were distributed to heads of departments (Chong-Mu-Kwa-Jang,  in Korean) within each of the 100  corporations fitting the criteria (i.e., one from each company). The individuals chosen were those with the best knowledge of their company and of their business relationships with the government and communities. 66. This section is generally about the survey in Ulsan: but, for Kyungju, some modifications were necessary because the size of the sample population was different: however, the principles applied to Ulsan were kept for Kyungju as well. 67. This contains more than 99 percent of the total manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees (Interview with Sang-Yun Choi, the head of survey division at the UCCI).  160  A total of approximately 600 community members in Ulsan (and another 400 for Kyungju) were selected in equal numbers of three municipal sub-wards (Dongs in Korean) in each of the three municipal wards (Kus in Korean) in Ulsan. Survey instrument. A draft questionnaire was developed to elicit responses based upon the research proposal. It was revised after a pilot survey of ten respondents in Ulsan and Kyungju. The final version of the survey consisted of thirtyeight questions. It was administered to all public individuals sampled. An additional twenty-two questions were administered to government officials and corporate managers. These additional questions are related to the work of those professionals (see Appendix 6.1  for the questionnaire).  The questions were grouped into the following five categories: i) perception of the costs and benefits of industrial growth; ii) opinion on the roles of the public sector and corporations, iii) relationships among the three major sectors sampled in each city; iv) social transformation within each of the three sectors of the city; and v) personal background of the respondents. Survey administration. For government bureaucrats, the author made contact with key municipal officials in each city. These persons distributed questionnaires to individuals within the selected sample groups, asking the individuals to fill out  161  the questions. For the corporate managers, questionnaire sets were mailed to the head of departments in each of the firms selected. Each questionnaire set contained a covering letter, a survey form, and a stamped envelope and the return address. For the community sector, university students were recruited to deliver and collect questionnaires to a sample of households. The students were briefed about the study and methods of survey execution. Twelve students were assigned to Ulsan and five to Kyungju. Survey results. In general, respondents were cooperative and showed a strong interest in the survey, However, government officials working for a branch office of the Ministry of Environment in Ulsan, were not cooperative at all. From a total of approximately 960 survey forms distributed to potential respondents, 691 were returned. Seventeen were incomplete and therefore the 674 were used for the analysis (see Table 6.1).  6.2.2 Methods of Statistical Analysis  Primary concerns of the analysis are three fold: first, to what degree respondents agree, or disagree, with the selected issues; second, if there is any difference between responses in Ulsan and Kyungju (i.e., third, whether  inter-city difference);  the responses from the public sector differ  from those of corporate managers and citizens (i.e., inter— groups difference).  162  Table 6.1: Summary Table for Sampling and Survey Result City  Sample Group  ULSAN (n=425)  Government Sector  327 (100)*  49  -Through Informal Channels -Direct Visits  Corporate Sector  134 (100)*  51  -By Mail  154,009 (600)*  325  144 (50)*  34  -Through Informal Channels  35 (50)*  28  -Through Informal Channels -Direct Visits  33,187 (300)*  187  Community Sector KYONGJU (n=249)  Government Sector Corporate Sector Community Sector  No. of Target Population  No. of Questionnaire Collected  Method of Survey Administration  -By University Students  -By University Students  Note Numbers in bracket indicate the numbers of questionnaires distributed to potential respondents (ie. Target Populations). ‘:  163  The difference between the public sector and others is reported here since the previous chapters have demonstrated that,  in the past, the public sector was the primary actor of  urban industrialization. The sector is believed to continue to be the principal authority for municipal management in Korean urban communities. This sub-section does not report all questions that appeared in the survey questionnaire, but only selected questions that are important for the present research. 68 The selected questions cover four groups, relating to:  i) civic  issues, such as urban infrastructure and environment pollution; ii) roles of the public sector; iii) roles of the corporate sector; and finally iv) changing community lifestyle. Two-way contingency tables are used to show inter-city and inter—group difference, reporting proportions of the or the 6 respondents who fall in a certain response category. questions that have important implications on the previous research or the present study, the details of their results are reported with contingency tables (see Table 6.3, for example). Others appear in the text only in a summary table (see Table 6.4, for example). Descriptive statistical tools are used to present the degrees of inter-city and inter-group difference and 68. The questions that were not reported here are related to organizational changes in the government and large corporations. This issue was a secondary research interest at the time of the author’s field research. 69. See ‘Note’ under Table 6.3.  164  similarities. In deciding ‘statistical’  significance of the  similarities and differences, an in-depth analysis has been conducted using the a post en on  contrast method of  ‘confidence interval’. This confidence interval is a statistical tool that is used in testing homogeneity of sample proportions (see Marascuilo and McSweeney (1977:  141-151, for  example). Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott (1986: 233-255) have demonstrated how to use this tool in calculating estimated sample proportions for two-stage cluster samples. This sampling method was used in selecting sample respondents of the survey of the present research. The test of ‘confidence interval’  is considered to be relevant particularly for the  present research in the view that the total sample was based on different sampling fractions across different clusters that were located by fiat. The survey data were coded into a computer-readable form. Using the UBC Mainframe BMDP, descriptive statistics were calculated. In testing confidence interval,  ‘Qbasic’ was  used 70 The results of confidence interval tests appear in Table 6.2. The column,  ‘inter—city difference’, indicates that there  are no statistically significant gaps, at alpha level of 0.05, between the responses of the two cities for the variables related to the overall QOL, roles of the public and corporate sector. For many variables in the categories of  ‘municipal  affairs’ and ‘community changes,’ however, the inter-city 70. See Appendix 6.2, for a sample program.  165  difference is statistically significant at 0.05 confidence level.  Table 6.2: Summary of the results from the confidence interval test Variables * (Question # )  Genqol  (li-i)  Infrst Income Dispar Envpol Poliau Reclei  (11—2—1) (11-2-2) (11—2—3) (11-2-4) (11-2-5) (11-2—7)  Counci Offici Govpro Goveff Actoff  Inter—city difference us/KJ  Y Y  Inter—group difference Kyungju Ulsan Gvt/Mgr Gvt/Ctz Gvt/Mgr Gvt/Ctz  y  y Y  y Y  y Y  Y y Y  Y y Y  y Y y y y  y Y y y y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y y Y  (11-6) (11—7) (111-2) (111-3) (111-6)  Y  Y y y y  Y y y y  Cormgr Satent Buseff  (11—8) (ill—i) (111—4)  Y  Intact Takcar Cooper Friend Attach  (I—i) (1-2) (1-3) (1-4) (1-5)  Y  Y Y y  Y Y  y  Y  Y  ‘I y  Y Y  Note 1: On the second column, the term, ‘GvtlMgr’ means the difference between government officers and corporate managers, ‘Gvt/Ctz’ means that between government officials and citizens. Note 2: ‘Y’ in the table means statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level, while empty cells mean statistically nonsignificant difference. Note 3:  *  These numbers are identifiable with the question numbers in the Appendix 6.1.  166  The findings suggest that, contrary to the initial expectations, the public opinion of an industrial city is not entirely different from that of a traditional city. There is no clear gaps between public opinions on the improvement in the overall QOL of Ulsan and that of Kyungju, for instance. This is also true for the inter-group comparison within each city (see the row of ‘Question # 11—1’  in Table 6.2). In fact,  none of the inter-group comparisons has shown a statistically significant difference! This suggests that there is a broad consensus on the improvement in the QOL not only between respondents from the two cities but also among those of the government, corporations, and communities within each city. The detailed content of each question and the analysis of the responses to it will follow below.  6.3 The General View on Changing Quality of Life The survey results indicate that, generally, all groups in Kyungju and Ulsan view the overall QOL in their communities as improved relative to the recent past. Although there were some differences across the sectoral and city boundaries, the majority of the respondents feel that they are ‘better-off’. This was most clear in response to a question, five years ago,  ‘Compared to  has the quality of life in your city generally  become improved?  167  Table 6.3: Observation on the Overall Change in the Community Well—being Range of Change City  Sample Group Better—off No Much Slightly Change  Worse—off Slightly Much  14.3 9.8 17.2  57.1 66.7 61.6  8.2 11.8 6.6  12.2 9.8 9.8  8.2 2.0 4.4  Sub—Total 16.0  61.7  7.4  10.5  4.5  22.9 11.1 20.5  60.0 74.1 58.9  17.1 11.1 14.6  3.7 4.3  1.6  Sub—Total 19.8  60.7  14.6  3.6  1.2  Ulsan Gvt Off (n=420) Cor Mgr Ctz  Kyungju Gvt Off (n=247) Cor Mgr Ctz  Note 1: On the second column, the terms, ‘Gvt Off,’ ‘Cor Mgr,’ and ‘Ctz’ mean government officials, corporate managers, and citizens, respectively. Note 2: The numbers in the table represent row percentages of cell frequency. These are consistent in the tables throughout the rest of this chapter, unless otherwise specified. Source: Author’s survey (1991). The data in the subsequent tables are drawn from the same survey, unless otherwise indicated.  More than three quarters (77.7%) of the 420 respondents in Ulsan view that they are much or slightly better-off, while even a larger proportion (80.5%) of the 247 respondents in Kyungju fall in the same category (Table 6.3).  6.4  Detailed Analysis of Public Concerns on Municipal Issues This section examines the degree of public concern on a  number of municipal issues affecting the level of municipal QOL. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of their  168  concerns on selected issues as follows (see the questionnaire in Appendix 6.1): 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)  environmental pollution, recreational and leisure facilities. urban infrastructure, local political autonomy, individual income, and distribution of wealth.  Respondents were asked, “How serious is each issue in your city?” For each category, they were instructed to select one answer from the following three choices:  1) a very serious problem, 2) a somewhat serious problem, 3) not a problem.  and  Table 6.4: Public Concerns on Issues Related to Municipal Affars  Degree of concern* KJ US  Subject area  Environmental pollution Leisure & recreation Infrastructure Political decentralization Economic inequality Local economic growth  VH VH I-I M M L  L M M L M L  Note: *: The degree of concern is measured by the proportion of respondents who indicated the issue was a ‘very serious’ problem. ‘VH’ (Very High) indicates that more than three quarters of the respondents viewed the issue as a ‘very serious’ problem; ‘H’ (High) indicates more than half; ‘M’ (Moderately High) indicates more than a quarter; ‘L’ (Low) indicates less than a quarter.  169  Table 6.4 summarizes the results of the responses. A few interesting points emerge. A striking result is that continuing economic growth is no longer an important issue for respondents in either of the cities. Instead, respondents are concerned more with the issues of social and environmental development, such as environmental pollution, leisure and recreational facilities, and community infrastructure. This is true particularly for Ulsan, where the respondents indicated that issues related to social development are ‘very serious’ problems. Large proportions of the Ulsan respondents, regardless of the sample groups, consider the social issues as being more serious problems than the economy. 6.41 Environmental Pollution  In Chapter two, the process of the growing environmental awareness was discussed and in Chapter five the degraded environmental conditions in Ulsan were discussed. This sub section documents the extent to which local people in Ulsan understand the problem and how the level of their environmental concerns differs from residents of Kyungju, Table 6.5 shows that the environmental issue is perceived as a greater problem in Ulsan than in Kyungju. The table reports the difference between the two cities. There is a broad agreement among sample groups within Ulsan. Out of the 421 respondents from Ulsan, 94.3 percent considered environmental pollution as being a ‘very’  serious problem,  compared to only 12.9 percent of the respondents from Kyungju.  170  Table 6.5: Environmental Pollution as a Problem Degree of Being a Problem City  Ulsan (n=421)  Kyungju (n=248)  Sample Group Very serious  Somewhat serious  Not a problem  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  91.8 94.1 94.7  6.1 3.9 4.7  2.0 2.0 0.6  Sub—Total  94.3  4.8  1.0  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  0.0 15.4 15.0  54.3 53.8 44.9  45.7 30.8 40.1  Sub—Total  12.9  47.2  39.9  In Kyungju, one of the least contaminated cities in Korea, a considerable proportion (60.1%) of people regarded the issue as at least a ‘moderately serious’ problem. This not only confirms the growing environmental awareness in both cities, but also suggests a shift in development priorities at the local community level.  6.4.2 Recreational  and Leisure Facilities  Some earlier studies (Hong, Syeung-Jik and Ro, Kil-Myung 1974; Choi, Eun—Hee 1980) suggested that cities dependent primarily upon manufacturing industries suffered from the insufficient provision of recreational and leisure facilities. Ulsan is no exception. Thus, the survey asked if the lack of recreational and leisure facilities was a problem in Ulsan.  171  This survey confirms that the lack of recreational and leisure facilities is an area of serious concern for Ulsan and, to a lower degree, for Kyungju. In Ulsan, 76.1 percent of the respondents regard the issue as a ‘very’  serious problem,  while 48.2 percent of Kyungju respondents state it is a ‘somewhat’  serious problem (Appendix 6.3). It is worth noting  that 82.2 percent of the respondents from Kyungju, an ’!’iew that the lack 7 attractive tourist destination in Korea, of recreational and leisure facilities is at least a ‘moderately’ serious problem. These results support rising demands for social and environmental development, which should be taken into account in the future development of policy.  6.4.3 Urban Infrastructure  Municipal infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and sewage treatments is an important factor determining urban QOL. The analyses by Kim, Byung-Kuk et al (1988) and Choi, Young-Chul (1991) have shown that rapidly growing industrial cities suffer from insufficient provision of such infrastructure. This survey seeks to clarify to what extent residents of Ulsan are concerned with issue of urban infrastructure compared to their counterparts in Kyungju. Proportionally, more respondents from Ulsan report that the lack of urban infrastructure is a serious problem. Sixty five percent of Ulsan’s respondents identified the issue as 71. In Ulsan, 91.8 percent of the samples regarded the issue as being at least a ‘somewhat’ serious problem.  172  being ‘very’  serious, in contrast to only 28.2 percent for  Kyungju (Appendix 6.4). Clearly provision of urban infrastructure in Ulsan has not kept pace with industrial and demographic changes.  6. 4. 4 Low Income  The word,  ‘low income’ here means the lack of income  opportunities, reflecting slow economic growth. Chapter four has reported a large gap between the economies of Ulsan and Kyungju. It is interesting, therefore, to examine how the apparent difference in the actual economic conditions affect the opinions of local residents in each city. The survey results show that only 10.1 percent of Ulsan’s respondents viewed ‘low income’ as a serious problem. The corresponding number for Kyungju is 19.8 percent (Appendix 6.5). The narrow gap in the opinions of the two cities suggests that the Korean economy has grown to a degree that the economic needs are not perceived as a serious problem in either wealthier cities or less wealthy ones. This finding is consistent with the results of a question on the respondents’ development priorities, that will be discussed later.  6.4.5 Distribution of Wealth  A more equal distribution of wealth among social classes and territorial units has been an important social goal in the process of economic planning in Korea. A widely accepted notion is that as the economy grows income disparity between  173  social classes widens at the initial stage (i.e., the ‘reversed-U’ curve, see Kuznets 1955). Some authors have argued that the Korean experience supported this notion (Koo, Hagen 1984). While Koo’s studies examined the disparities between social strata, Chapter four of this thesis has analyzed the spatial context of inequality in provincial GRP and employment opportunities. The present sub-section deals with the wealth distribution issue at the community level. The questionnaire asked how serious is the unequal distribution of wealth between wealthier and poorer segments of the population. Respondents from each city regard the wealth distribution as a ‘moderately’  serious problem. For Ulsan, 35.7 percent of the  people regarded wealth distribution as being a ‘very’  serious  problem, while 30.4 percent of the Kyungju people fall in the same category (Appendix 6.6). It is interesting to note that although there is a large income gap between the two cities, the respondents did not significantly differ in their opinion on the issue of income distribution.  6.4.6 Political Autonomy of the Local Government Although the top-down approach was common for local administration in Korea, Ulsan has been suffering more severely from the lack of local autonomy. Therefore, one can expect that local people would identify the low level of autonomy as a more serious problem than would citizens of other cities. To examine this proposition, the respondents  174  were questioned on their opinions regarding municipal governmental autonomy. The lack of political autonomy is seen as a moderately serious problem in both cities (Appendix 6.7). However, the issue is perceived to be more serious in Ulsan than it is in Kyungju. Twenty eight percent of the respondents from Ulsan thought the issue was a ‘very serious’ problem. A larger proportion of the Ulsan people view the lack of political autonomy as being ‘very serious,’ as opposed to 21.1 percent for Kyungju, Respondents in the government sector of Ulsan consider the local autonomy issue as being less of a problem than do average citizens. However, there was no statistically significant variations between the respondents in government sector and others in Kyungju. This may suggest that Ulsan’s government officials are more reluctant to accept citizen inputs on local civic matters. For Kyungju, such differences, however, are not observed. 72 These questions make it clear that there are large gaps in the perception of the QOL between respondents in Ulsan and Kyungju. In understanding important issues, such as the environment and infrastructure, there is no strong disagreement among the selected sample groups of Ulsan.  72. While 8.8 percent of officials of Kyungju municipal government stated that the issue was a very serious problem, 23.1 percent of the corporate sector and citizenry group responded with the same answer. However, the variation over three groups is statistically nonsignificant.  175  6.5 Changing Forces of Municipal Affairs  6. 5. 1.  The Public Sect or  The Ohn Research Institute (1990), a research and consulting unit based in Pusan, conducted a major questionnaire survey n Ulsan in 1990. The Institute 7 subsequently reported that Ulsan citizens did not respect their administrative officials. Officials were described as being ‘discredited for corruption and lazy.’ The Institute’s study did not disaggregate opinion among different social groups. Nor did it illustrate how Ulsan’s public sector differs from that of other cities, Therefore, the present research examines the difference both between the two cities and among selected sample groups within each city. There are no large differences between responses of the two cities. The public sector is not well respected in either of the cities. Evaluation of the ‘role of the newly-formed city councils,’  ‘officials’ commitment’, and ‘government  responsiveness to municipal management’ are no higher than ‘moderate’  level (see the ‘note’  in Table 6.6). For example,  people in both cities are highly skeptical about the ability of their City Councils to improve municipal QOL. Respondents were asked, “Concerning the solution of the urban problems in our city, City Council are as 1)  very helpful,  activities of the members of the and four choices were given, such  2) somewhat  helpful,  73. This survey included approximately 2000 interviewees.  176  3) not  helpful,  and  4) rather harmful. More than one—half of the respondents from each city stated that their councils were not helpful in solving civic problems in their city and 7.9 percent of those felt that the council may even be harmful.  Table 6.6: Public Concerns on the Public Sector Degree of credit* KJ US  Subject area  L L M L  Role of city council Official’s commitment Government responsiveness Economic policy  M L M L  *  Note; ‘M’ (Moderate) indicates more than a quarter, but less than half of the respondents within a certain sample category viewed the most positive response (e.g., ‘very helpful’; ‘L’ (Low) indicates less than a quarter chosen the most positive response;  In response to the question, government  “Do you think that  officials in our city are dedicated to making the  city more liveable?”, officials of Kyungju were evaluated slightly more favorably than their counterparts in Ulsan. Among the three given choices such as 1) highly dedicated, somewhat dedicated,  and 3) not  dedicated at all,  2)  12.4 percent  of Kyungju people chose ‘1)’, while the same response for Ulsan was elicited from only 6.7 percent (Appendix 6.8). The differences in views between the public bureaucracy and the citizenry are reported by Table 6.7. As many as 47.0 percent of the citizen—respondents of Ulsan agreed that  177  government officials were ‘not dedicated’ but only 14.6 percent of the officials shared such unfavorable view. In Kyungju, government officials evaluated themselves sightly more favorably, but this difference is not statistical significant  (Sig.  >  0.05).  Table 6.7: Local Officials’ Commitment to Solving Civic Problems Degree of Commitment City  Sample Group  Ulsan (n=418)  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  Not Highly Somewhat dedicated dedicated dedicated  12.5 2.0 6.6  72.9 60.8 46.4  14.6 37.3 47.0  6.7  51.2  42.1  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  20.0 11.1 11.2  62.9 51.9 52.9  17.1 37.0 35.8  Sub—Total  12.4  54.2  33.3  Sub—Total  Kyungju (n=249)  6. 5. 2.  The Corporate Sect or  In Korean development, the corporate sector is appreciated primarily for their beneficial aspects: creating wealth and employment opportunities. This image has gradually eroded in recent years. Now the general public does not respect industries, especially large corporations (see Cho DONG-SUNG 1989; Kang et al.  1990). The corporate sector is  blamed for environmental problems, monopolizing urban infrastructure, engaging in political corruption, and  178  practicing nonproductive economic activities (e.g., real estate speculation), as discussed earlier. There is a mixed view of the advantageous and disadvantageous aspects of the corporate sector. The two cities perceived them differently. The research questionnaire included a statement, corporations provided:  1)  that  it  “It  is  that  our city has the  currently has.” A four—scale measure was  very fortunate,  fortunate nor unfortunate,  2)  somewhat fortunate,  and 4)  unfortunate.  3)  neither  This question  has assumed that if opinion of the corporate sector was favorable, respondents would say that the city was very fortunate to have such corporate sector and vice versa. Respondents in Ulsan vary widely over the four alternative answers. Ulsan’s pattern is again different from those of Kyungju. A higher percentage of people in Kyungju chose positive views, such as ‘very fortunate’ and ‘somewhat fortunate.’ The number of those who chose the ‘unfortunate’ category was much smaller for Kyungju than for Ulsan. Indeed, 20.0 percent of the respondents from Ulsan chose the extreme negative answer,  ‘rather unfortunate,’  in contrast to Kyungju,  where only four percent replied that answer. The responses of Ulsan’s corporate sector are widely spread. It is interesting to note that a large proportion of these respondents take the two extreme sides, such as ‘very fortunate’ or ‘rather unfortunate.’  In fact, 29.4 percent of  the corporate sector also itself expressed the view that it is unfortunate to have the business companies in the city.  179  Table 6.8: Public Opinion on the Corporate Sector  Degree of credit* KJ US  Subject area  Overall evaluation Contribution to community Commitment to community  M L L  H M L  Note: See note 1 under Table 6.3.  To examine views on aspects of corporate activities and compare differences between Kyungju and Ulsan, the survey asked a question, “How often do the business companies of your city directly or indirectly harm the lives of the people in your city?” The choices provided as an answer to this question included: 1) very often,  2) sometimes,  and 3) never.  Ulsan people are much more critical of the corporate sector (Appendix 6.9). Forty-two percent of the respondents from Ulsan say that such cases exist ‘very often’, as opposed to only 8.1 percent of those from Kyungju (Table 6.8). The same view is held by representatives of the three selected sample groups, i.e., the public sector; the corporate sector; and the citizens in two cities. When the respondents were asked to name specific areas where the corporate sector of their community most hindered the progress of the city, he majority (88.2%) of Ulsan 7 74. Seven areas were given to choose, such as environmental pollution, widening income disparity, deepening social segregation, monopolizing infrastructure use, and degrading the image of city, and others.  180  residents pointed out ‘environmental pollution,’ while the rest responded with various concerns, such as ‘monopolistic use of urban infrastructure’ and ‘adverse impacts on income disparity’  (Appendix 6.9).  For Kyungju, however, 53.2 percent pointed to environmental pollution, with other responses scattered over ‘contribution to the increasing income disparity’; ‘monopolistic use of urban infrastructure’; and ‘the increase in social disintegration.’  In both cities, the overall  evaluation of the corporate sector’s dedication to the progress of the city was less charitable than that of the public sector.  6.5.3 The Changing Community Sector This sub—section is devoted to the analysis of the changes occurring in the community lifestyle in tJlsan and Kyungju. The preceding analysis has strongly suggested, people’s priorities have shifted away from economic growth to social development. Changing Development Priorities The survey asked where the respondents for their priorities on future policies for development in their city. One question phrased, “Concerning how we can make Ulsan (or Kyungju) a better place to live, mark “1” beside the factors shown below which you consider the most issues were listed:  181  important.” Seven  1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)  improving urban infrastructure, economic growth, strengthening local political autonomy, environmental clean—up, equal distribution of wealth, enhancing trust among neighborhood populations, improving recreational and leisure facilities.  and  Table 6.9: Policy Priorities for Governmental Actions for the Future City  Order of Popularity  Subject Area  Ulsan  1st 2nd 3rd  The environment (37.2%) Urban Infrastructure (31.6%) Wealth distribution (13.6%)  Kyungju  1st 2nd 3rd  Urban Infrastructure (32.9%) Wealth distribution (21 .4%) The environment (176%)  Note: The numbers in ( ) show the row proportions of respondents who chose that item as their first priority.  The top three priorities are the environment, urban infrastructure, and equal income distribution. The results are common for both cities (Table 6.9). For Ulsan, 37.2 percent of the people chose ‘environmental clean-up,’  followed by the  ‘provision of urban infrastructure’ and ‘even distribution of wealth’. For Kyungju, even if the order of the issues selected is slightly different, the subject areas remain consistent. In this case, the most popularly selected one is the provision of infrastructure, which is followed by environment preservation and even wealth distribution.  182  In Kyungju, environmental quality has been less of a problem than in other Korean cities. It is surprising, however, to find that the corporate respondents consider the environment as important as urban infrastructure and even more ’he environmentally 7 so than the creation of wea1th. conscious corporate sector of Kyungju contrasts with its counterpart in Ulsan, a place suffering greatly from industrial pollution. Public Perceptions of Community Spirit Losing cooperative spirit and social ties in a community is considered to be a negative consequence of industrial growth (Kim, An-Jae 1976). Although most Korean cities have experienced rapid disintegration of social ties within urban communities, the authors tend to make distinctions between issues facing industrial and non—industrial cities. In the former the issues are considered to be problems, while in the latter accepted as a natural process. Deterioration in community cooperative spirit is a problem not unique to Ulsan but a typical phenomenon in many other industrial cities. Recent survey research conducted by Jung-Rok Lee (1992)  indicates that such a problem also exists  in Dongkwangyang in the Province of Jeonnam. Suk-Whoi Lim (1987)  included declining community integrity in his study of  industrialization impacts on the fringe of the Yi-Chun industrial area in Kyungki province. Although the previous 75. This is not reported by any table.  183  studies show varying degrees of problems and importance, it is clear that disintegrating community spirit is an issue in the study of industrial impact on the existing communities. This research assumes that solid community spirit is integral to healthy communities. For the survey, the following variables were selected to measure community spirit: 1) 2) 3) 4)  interactions among neighborhood people, attitude of people towards their neighbors, cooperation with community matters, and sense of belonging to their community.  The research sought to explore, how community spirit of Ulsan has changed, and how such changes compare to those in Kyungju. To quantify the degree and direction of change, a four-point scaling instrument was used, comprising: 1) 2) 3) 4)  very positive progress, moderately positive progress, no change, and adverse change.  The analysis of questionnaire responses reveals that the people in Ulsan perceive themselves less friendly and less cooperative with each other within their neighborhoods now than several years ago. Compared to the recent past, they maintain less frequent interaction with their neighbors and feel that neighborhood relationships are less warm and friendly. This view is surprisingly true for all of the four questions. The people in Kyungju also perceive that they have become less friendly than previously, but the extent of  184  perceived change is less than in Ulsan. In relation to the inter-groups difference in Kyungju, however, none of the questions showed statistically significant differences.  Table 6.10: Feeling about Having Come to Live in Ulsan (or Kyungju) Scale of Response Cities  Ulsan  Very fortunate  Somewhat fortunate  Somewhat unfortunate  Very unfortunate  12.2 3.9 5.6  20.4 11.8 17.8  49.0 56.9 55.5  18.4 27.5 21.1  6.2  17.3  54.9  21.6  31.4 44.4 32.6  20.0 25.9 23.5  2.9  Ctz  45.7 29.6 41.2  Sub-Total  40.6  33.7  23.3  2.4  Gvt Off Cor Mgr  Ctz Sub-Total Kyungju Gvt Off Cor Mgr  --  2.7  The best example of the pattern is shown by the results from a question,  “How do you feel  about  having come to live in  Ulsan (or Kyungju)?” The given choices to this were four: very fortunate; nor unfortunate;  2) somewhat fortunate; and 4)  3)  1)  neither fortunate  unfortunate, The results show a  considerable variance between the two cities. While only 6.2 percent of the respondents in Ulsan take the view that it is ‘very’  fortunate for them to live in Ulsan, 40.6 percent of  the respondents in Kyungju agreed (Table 6.10).  185  Respondents were asked to fill the blank in the statement: “Compared to five years ago, people in your neighborhood have  interactions with .“  The research  questionnaire provided four choices to complete the sentence: 1) 2) 3) 4)  Greatly increased, Somewhat increased, Not changed, and Rather decreased.  The term ‘interaction with people’  in the statement was  expected to be interpreted, in the Korean context, as “people’s interaction with each other in their neighborhood.” This question was designed to investigate the degree of intimacy among people living nearby, rather than attempting to measure the exact frequency of interaction in a certain period. In addition, the term,  ‘five years,’ was interpreted  by a phrase referring simply to ‘the recent past,’  rather than  the specific year 1986, which was five years prior to the time when the survey was actually executed. Similar phrasings are found in other studies  (iss  1984; and Lim, Suk—Whoi 1987).  A more positive response came from Kyungju. A greater proportion of respondents (than in Ulsan) believed that neighborhood contacts have ‘greatly’  increased. This variation  between the two cities is statistically significant (Table 6.10). Respondents were asked to complete a sentence to measure in terms of harmony and community spirit, “Compared to 5 years  186  Table 6.11: Public Perceptions of Community Change  Degree of change* KJ US  Subject area  Community integrity Interactions among neighbors Cooperative spirit Friendliness among neighbors  L M M M  VH H H H  *  Note: ‘VH’ (Very High) indicates that more than three quarters of the respondents perceived positive progress; ‘H’ (High) indicates more than half; ‘M’ (Moderately High) indicates more than a quarter; and ‘L’ (Low) indicates less than a quarter.  ago,  the attitudes of the people in Ulsan (or Kyungju) towards  their neighbors have become  .“  A four—point measuring  instrument was provided. According to responses, proportionally more people in Ulsan than in Kyungju considered that their attitudes had become cooler towards their neighbors. While only 5.7 percent of the populations in Kyungju regarded neighborhood relations as becoming ‘rather cooler’,  14.7 percent of the respondents  from Ulsan agreed on the movement in a negative direction (Table 6.11). The difference between the two cities was statistically highly significant (see Table 6.1). The analysis of the four questions related to community integrity confirms that more people in Ulsan, compared to those in Kyungju, perceive that their neighborhood became less  187  friendly and less cooperative during the past several years. It has also confirmed that more people from Ulsan consider themselves unfortunate for having to come to live in Ulsan, suggesting that they feel weaker ‘belongingness’  in Ulsan than  their counterparts do in Kyungju.  6.6 Chapter Summary The data analysis in the previous sections indicates that the overall QOL of Ulsan and Kyungju has improved in the period of rapid industrialization. However, public opinion on a variety of municipal issues indicates that industrial growth in Ulsan has caused serious social and environmental problems. A summary of these contrasting results is that Ulsan’s industrialization in the past helped improving the overall QOL, but the achievement has also caused some problems that may harm further progress. The implication is that, without solving the problems,  it is impossible to sustain or upgrade  the level of Ulsan’s QOL in the future. The following distinctions differentiate Ulsan from Kyungju. First, the problems of Ulsan’s municipal issues, such as environmental quality, urban infrastructure, and urban economy, are more seriously considered than those of Kyungju. While the one exception is economic growth, the clearest distinction between responses in the two cities concerns issues related to environmental pollution. The survey showed that there is an increasing desire for better condition in certain facets of the two cities on an  188  equal basis. The issues are clean environment, economic equality, and better urban infrastructure. There is no distinction between the two cities in viewing these issues. The survey also confirms that the public and corporate sectors are not highly respected in either city. However, those of Kyungju are slightly better respected by its residents that those of Ulsan. The inter-groups comparison has indicated that each group of Ulsan’s respondents maintains different views on fewer issues that those in Kyungju. It is not surprising to find that there is a broad consensus among the sample groups of Ulsan in responding to issues concerning seriously flawed municipal affairs, as mentioned above. This general consensus is believed to be a minimum basis of action upon the problems with cooperation among the key players of industrialization. The implications of these findings, and those of the previous chapters, will be elaborated upon in the following chapter.  189  CHAPTER SEVEN POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  This dissertation has attempted to examine the process of industrialization in Korea and its social, economic, and environmental impacts on people living at the local level. Chapter two outlined core concepts of the conventional theories of Third World development, which are used in establishing a framework of analyzing industrialization processes in developing countries. Based on this framework, Chapter three identified the key players in Korean industrialization and their impacts on socioeconomic changes during the period from 1960 to 1990. The analysis of regional social and economic conditions in Chapter four has shown that economic activities of Kyungnam province and the Capital Region drastically increased. The growth in provincial Gross Regional Product and manufacturing employment in the two areas has benefited from strong actions between the central government and large conglomerates. It indicated growing economic gaps, measured by Gross Regional Product and industrial employment, between these industrial regions and the rest of Korea. Notwithstanding such economic disparities, the level of social development, measured by education, medical services, accessibility to piped water, and car-ownership, in all regions improved sustainablity. Subsequently, Chapter five described the processes of industrial growth in Ulsan, which was created by the central  190  government and large corporations such as Hyundai. It demonstrated that there are dynamic linkages between the industries of Ulsan and those of other locations both within and outside Korea. It is argued that industrial growth in Ulsan has created economic growth and technological advancement, but this has come at the cost of environmental quality. The opinion survey in Chapter six confirmed that the overall quality of life both in Ulsan and Kyungju has substantially improved. The survey, however, indicated that in Ulsan there are growing public concerns on selected issues of living conditions in the city (e.g., environmental pollution), but to a much lower extent in Kyungju. This dissertation concludes that Korea has emerged as a competitive economy in contrast to its backwardness thirty years ago. Korea’s rapid industrial growth was strongly supported by coordinated actions between the central government and large corporations. Industrial growth helped improve the QOL at the local level and created economic growth in a short period. The Korean case demonstrates that creating development is not impossible for less developed economies, if there is a strong government commitment to economic planning, and strong degree of cooperation with the corporate sector. For Ulsan and Korea,  intensive policy planning, timely  adjustment, and learning from both its past experience and other countries were major factors of economic growth. The generation of initial momentum by the central government and  191  subsequent support by the corporate sector are also important for industrial growth in Ulsan. The process of planning and implementing industrial policies helped create stronger local corporations and government. Practical and theoretical implications of these changes deserve further discussions.  7.1 Policy Implications of the Research  7.1.1 Korean Industrialization in Bello and Rosenfeld’s Thesis  Two broad streams of thought are identifiable from the debate on the process of industrialization in the rapidly growing Asian economies. One is represented by Bello and Rosenfeld (1990), Hagen Koo (1984), and Douglass (1993), who point out increasing social and environmental problems during the process of industrialization. They emphasize negative impacts of industrial growth, and suggest that industrial growth in developing countries does not create development effects. Bello and Rosenfeld (1990), for example, list problems of rapidly industrializing countries such as environmental pollution, rising wages, increased labor militancy, and increasing public demand for political freedom. Their view is that industrial growth in the newly growing economies did not create development effects, and past pace in economic growth will not be sustained in the future. In fact, the data presented in the previous chapters support some of Bello and Rosenfeld’s line of thought, It is  192  true that social and environmental problems in Korea increased as part of the industrialization process. However, those authors have paid insufficient attention to the capacity to solve which include: such problems that can be ameliorated by: 1) accumulated managerial and planning capacities in the public and private organizations;  ii) improved industrial  technology; and iii) political decentralization. There are signs of change in reducing the social and environmental problems that are raised by Bello and Rosenfeld. The growing economy in Korea helped the majority of Korean people to satisfy basic economic and social needs. The analysis of economic and social conditions in Chapter four and the opinion survey in Chapter six have supported this. The satisfaction of these basic economic and social needs, in turn, stimulated Korean people to aspire to better conditions of human satisfaction, such as a decentralized political system and a clean environment. The changing lifestyles in Korean local communities in general (Chapter three) and the analysis of the selected survey questions (e.g., changing development priorities), in particular, support the notion that Korean citizens are anxious to solve the social and environmental problems. In fact, since the early 1980s the central and local governments in Korea and other Asian NICs have already made a commitment to tackle such problems. Leonard (1985) documented increasing government actions to tackle environmental problems in the  193  Asian developing countries. Kim and Murabayashi (1992) demonstrated initial progress in Korea, in particular. Decentralizing local administration and increased political freedom in Korea since the late 1980s have stimulated public awareness of the value of a clean environment. At the local level, the results of the opinion survey indicated that people in both Ulsan and Kyungju consider a clean environment, good urban infrastructure, and social justice are more important than continuing growth. In contrast to the pessimistic view of industrial growth in Asian NICs, another group of scholars (Amsden 1989,  1990;  Wade 1990; Haggard 1990) emphasize the advantageous changes generated by rapid industrial growth. It it true that there has been substantial improvement in the quality of life for the majority of Korean people. The analysis of economic and social indicators in Chapter four and the survey results support this conclusion. The role of industrial growth in such progress is undeniable. Industrial growth in Korea has permitted the Korean economy to become more independent from external aid than before its industrialization. This is exemplified by Hyundai Motors which was established with minimum foreign financial assistance. The expanding process of POSCO’s production capacity within Korea and the United States has shown an example of reducing foreign technology import. Poongsan’s technology export to the  German company is also an excellent  example of the outcome of Korean companies’ efforts to reduce  194  their dependence on foreign technology. Bello and Rosenfeld (1990) have overlooked these positive aspects of change that have been internalized into the Korean corporate sector. This study does not argue that the Korean economy has grown sufficiently to sustain itself. The Korean economy is too small to compete in a wide range of areas with the economies of the core countries of the world. But unlike some other developing countries, Korean achievement has provided invaluable experience and skills for the future. Notwithstanding these improvements, there are some pockets of degradation within Korea, as claimed by Bello and Rosenfeld (1990). The most serious problem is environmental pollution. Bello and Rosenfeld (1990) and Douglass (1992; 1993) are correct in arguing that Korean industrial growth has been made at the expense of environmental quality. Until the late 1980s, the need for reducing environmental pollution had been largely neglected by industrial planners and corporate managers, as they were geared to a policy of ‘rapid’ economic growth. The spatial analysis of quantitative indicators in Chapter four has shown that signs of widening gaps exist both between social strata and among regions, as Koo, Hagen (1984) concludes. The survey results in Chapter six also show that increasing public concern for unequal wealth distribution among social groups, rather than simply economic growth. The continuing generation of development effects and improvement  195  in the quality of life in Korea may not be possible without solving these problems.  7.1.2 Korean Strategy in the Future  Korea’s exemplary performance in the recent past does not guarantee future success. Increasing property values and emerging environmental problems are new costs not previously experienced. The central government has to initiate strong measures to contend with these problems. The corporate sector has to incorporate costs of environmental quality in their strategies. These conditions may constrain economic growth in the future. In such a case, the Korean people may have to make choices between rapid growth with social and environmental problems and slow growth without such problems. Korea’s economic future is dependent upon how the government, corporations, citizens, and labor coordinate in planning new development strategies. The past strategies may not be effective under the changing social and economic circumstances both within and outside Korea. Direct government support to the large business groups is no longer acceptable to the majority of people in Korea, where there are stronger demands for social equity than economic growth, as the survey results have indicated. The corporate strategy has to be developed with a renewed relationship among the different sectors of the society. The future circumstances may be more turbulent and complex, both within and outside Korea.  196  Korea’s economic prospect, however, is not entirely gloomy,  in contrast to the claims by Bello and Rosenfeld  (1990) and Hyun-Chin Lim (1985). As old opportunities disappear, new ones arise. For example, preferential treatment in the American markets for Korean products terminated in the 1980s, as did foreign aid. However, opportunities for exchanging managerial and manufacturing skills, importing raw materials, and marketing products are growing with China, Eastern Europe, and Russia, as Table 3.1, page 58) showed. They can replace old linkages. Korea has accumulated the necessary resources to explore such opportunities and Korean firms have already expanded trading relationships with some of these nations. Hyundai’s timber company is one example that has expanded its linkages to the forestry industry of Russian Far East (see Petrof 1992).  7.1.3 The Future of Ulsan and Kyungju  This dissertation has shown that rapid industrialization in Korea contributes to the growth of the national economy. Ulsan’s industries have now grown to a degree that they can compete in the international markets. Large corporations located in the city create industrial products and employment for the people in various parts of Korea. They have also helped the economies of adjacent localities, such as Kyungju and Pohang, through diverse economic interactions. The costs of rapid industrialization in Ulsan are the losses of a clean environment, stable community, and the  197  relative demise of traditional economic sectors. The overall QOL of Ulsan’s population is less favorable when compared to that of a traditional city, Kyungju. The most serious problem is environmental pollution. Survey results have indicated that the citizens strongly demand policies to improve environment quality, urban infrastructure, and leisure and recreational facilities. The three different social groups: government officers, corporate managers, and citizens equally viewed the needs for improvement in these social facilities and environmental quality as more urgent than economic needs. Initiatives to solve the social and environmental problems in Ulsan may have to come from strengthening municipal government, and an increasingly active citizenry in Ulsan. A promising sign is that, in assessing the problems, there is a broad consensus between government officials, corporate leaders, and citizens, as the survey results showed (e.g., Table 6.5, page 171). These local actors have to be assisted by the central government. This is because public concerns of environmental pollution, insufficient urban infrastructure and recreational facilities are not limited to a specific locality, such as Ulsan, but wide-spread over Korea. The analysis of the opinion survey indicates a substantial portion of the citizens in Kyungju, one of the least polluted cities in Korea, are concerned with such problems. The central government must develop strong and effective measures to improve the QOL, rather than industrial  198  growth alone. Sustaining government actions by local and central government requires public pressure on the elected and appointed officers. The analysis of the process of industrial growth in Ulsan has indicated neither the central government nor the large corporations, the initial powerhouse of Ulsan’s industrialization, were based on the local community. The topdown approach prior to the 1980s had little local input. As mentioned earlier, increasingly complex local socio-political issues in Korean cities in the 1980s stimulated the Roh government to initiate decentralization policies. The central government was ineffective in solving local problems. The establishment of local councils with elected representatives is a major step toward a decentralized political system. The survey results have shown that elected council members do not maintain reputation among local citizens. Local populations both in Ulsan and Kyungju do not believe that their elected representatives would act on the social and environmental problems, at least in the short-term. From the basis of the author’s observation on Ulsan’s council eting, meaningful discussions on, and solutions to, such problems are hardly expected, considering the qualifications of the individual council members. The traditional city, Kyungju, provides its citizens with better standards of living Ulsan. There is no strong support for industrial growth in the city. The economy of Kyungju is 76. The author attended a session of Ulsan’s council meeting in the summer of 1991.  199  dominated by services. Even without vital industrial activities, Kyungju has developed a sound economy. This suggests that industrialization is not the only means of economic growth for a local community. If increasing public awareness on social development, rather than economic growth, is considered, Kyungju’s strategy has an important implication in planning local economies in Korea. However, the above assessment raises several questions. First, it is questionable if Kyungju would be economically better off without industrial growth in adjacent cities, such as Ulsan and Pohang. In addition, would it be possible for Kyungju to have such economic conditions without the phenomenal growth in the national economy of Korea, which, in turn, benefited from rapid industrial growth in many other parts of the country, such as Ulsan. This research has suggested strong linkages among the intermediate cities around Kyungju, from which Kyungju’s economy benefits. As pointed out earlier, some of the small firms in Kyungju operate by developing input and output linkages with those of Pohang and Ulsan. It is also undeniable that increasing leisure activities of Ulsan’s and Pohang’s industrial workers helped Kyungju’s service industry. The transfer of money through educational, legal, and administrative services from the two industrial cities to Kyungju is important. 77 77. Local branches of national taxation and legal agencies are located in Kyungju, whose jurisdictions cover the Pohang area. In addition, Kyungju is one of the four candidates for the new  200  The relatively clean physical environment of Kyungju is also challenged by the threat to environment by pollutants from Pohang and Ulsan and traffic conditions around the city. The air quality of Kyungju is seriously affected by the expanding steel-making industries of Pohang and, to a lesser extent, petrochemical industries of Ulsan. These industrial cities are within only 30 kilometers from Kyungju. Solutions to the inter-city environmental problem become more difficult since Kyungju municipality has political influence over neither the municipalities nor the corporations in the industrial cities. Traffic congestion in Kyungju is exacerbated by travellers from the adjacent cities. The future strategy of managing the cities within the triangular sub-region, therefore, necessities coordinated actions both among municipal governments and among sectors within them. Increasing environmental, industrial, and educational interrelationships among the cities strongly support this idea. The failure to preserve the amenities of Kyungju may subsequently necessitate the loss of an alternative of leisure and recreational activities for the residents of other cities,  including the two industrial  cities, Ulsan and Pohang. The need for coordination will even be heightened with the full implementation of decentralization policies, since each municipality may become more demanding with less intervention from senior governments. Thus the provincial capital. The provincial office needs to move out from the current location, Taegu, since Taegu itself became separated as an independent province according to decentralization policies.  201  balance between local governments and the central government will be one of the major rationalizations as Koreans contrive to improve the quality of life in their cities.  7.2 Theoretical Implications of the Research Results The conventional development theories have generalized processes and patterns of industrialization in developing countries, as outlined in Chapter two. This dissertation analyzed the particular pattern in Korean industrialization and its impacts on social, economic and environmental conditions at the local level. The results enables one to critically review the conventional theories.  7.2.1 The NIDL Thesis in Industrializing Korea  The Korean experience of national and regional economic development in general does not support the main arguments of the NIDL. The authors of the NIDL thesis argue that employment in the traditional industrial sectors is most victimized by international relocation of such industries to successful developing countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and some of the Eastern European countries. They observe that a greater economic integration of a developing economy to the international economy leads the developing country to be ‘trapped by the self-defeating strategy of exploiting low wages and by the inability to develop the necessary capabilities to compete with the industrial leaders’ and Quandt 1992: 474). Frobel et al.  202  (1980:  (Morales  13—15) observe  that some industrial production has relocated to peripheral countries primarily because a labor reservoir is readily available there. Ulsan’s industrialization, however, does not support the NIDL argument,  ‘industrialization based on low wages’, In fact  labor costs in Korea were very low in the 1960s. Therefore some industries, such as textile and footwear manufacturing, benefited from cheap labor. However, the industries introduced in Ulsan in the 1960s were capital—intensive, not labor— intensive! Petrochemical industries and fertilizer manufacturing firms in the initial stages of Ulsan’s development are examples, Korean industrial planners were more concerned with exploiting ‘spin—off effects’, than low—wages  (Oh, Won-Chul 1992). They initiated key businesses in the early period so that newer industries could grow using domestically-produced intermediate goods, that were often cheaper than imported goods. It was the right strategy and it worked for the Korean economy. The argument that Korean industrial growth did not benefit solely from a cheap labor force is supported by a national policy of technological advancement. The central government continuously and actively pursued technological advances within Korean industries. It directly took part in research and development activities (e.g., Korea Institute of Science and Technology); encouraged corporations to improve their technological abilities; and monitored these processes. The corporate sector also followed this government example.  203  Large corporations, such as Hyundai Motor Company, acquired foreign technology by purchasing technological licences, dispatching Korean engineers abroad, inviting foreign advisors, and establishing their own research units. The cultural heritage and the unique personality of Korean government officials and industrial engineers helped this process. Technological advancement at the corporate level was not limited to large corporations. Smaller firms, such as Iljin of Kyungju and Yungjin of Ulsan, also regularly send employees to Japanese firms for training. 78 Frobel et al.  (1980: 404) argue that ‘world  industrialization marginalizes a large part of the people in developing countries’. On the basis of the evidence collected for this research, this conclusion must be challenged. Chapter two has demonstrated that Korean industrialization contributed to indisputable improvement in a variety of sectors, such as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, and car ownership. The statistical data in Chapter four indicate that economic and social conditions have improved in all regions, although there is still some degree of regional variation. The survey results (Chapter six) confirm that the people both in industrial and traditional cities feel that they are better off (see Table 6.3). Therefore, based on the Korean 78. This information was obtained through interviews with Heads of Departments of Yungjin and lijin Industrial Companies during the field survey in 1991. The former manufactures car seats to supply them to Hyundai Motors. It employed approximately 80 people and sends a dozen employees a year for three months of on-site training.  204  experience, it is wrong to suggest that industrialization in a developing country marginalizes a large part of the people. Evidence from this research also suggests that Frobel et al.  (1980: 404) are wrong in stating that industrialization in  developing countries does not create ‘even the most rudimentary preconditions of alternative development’. 79 Through the processes of formulating and implementing industrial policies, the Korean government has accumulated managerial skills within the public sector. The increase in the managerial capacity of state agencies, such as the Economic Planning Board, Korean Research Institute of Human Settlements, Korea Development Institute, the Blue House, and ministries, supports this contention. The already established planning traditions within the public sector must be counted as a condition for further development. The solid planning traditions have been demonstrated through the process of systematic and continuous formulation, implementation, evaluation, and adjustment of the series of Five Year Economic Development Plans and Comprehensive National Land Use Plans. At the municipal level, the growth in administrative capacity within local governments such as Ulsan and Kyungju illustrates the improvement in conditions for alternative development. Industrial technology accumulated in the local corporate sector of the two cities provides further evidence  79. The word, ‘alternative development’ here is interpreted as meaning ‘changing the process and patterns of a developing country’s economic destiny by the country itself.  205  of the existence of preconditions for alternative development, in contrast to the NIDL argument. The NIDL thesis has contributed to development debates by incorporating the role of multinational corporations originating from developed countries in the process of industrialization in developing countries (Frobel 1980:  10).  However, its claim that multinational corporations exploit developing countries may not necessarily be true for all countries. Without assistance from foreign multinationals, the large Korean firms may have been unable to grow as world class corporations in such a short period. In improving managerial and technical skills in Hyundai Motor Company, for example, foreign multinationals, such as Mitsubishi, and Ford were not harmful, but helpful. Additional examples can be found from the growth process of Hyundai Shipbuilding and POSCO, as previously discussed in Chapter five. The NIDL theory fails to acknowledge the fact that a careful use of multinational corporations can bring about valuable assistance to the industrialization process of a developing country. Third, the NIDL theory has inadequately articulated the role of nation states and state’s relationships with other sectors of a society, such as corporations and community, as Henderson (1986: 71—72) indicates. The government systematically coordinated the course of development by controlling and assisting the corporate sector (Mason et al. 1980: Lim, Youngil 1981). The government did not collaborate  206  with foreign multinationals, nor was the community entirely controlled by the state.  7.2.2 The Korean Economy and the Dependency Theory  In the late 1960s, a group of economists and sociologists working in Latin America and Africa argued that underdevelopment is caused by dependence on foreign markets, technology, and capital (Dos Santos 1970: Dos Santos (1970:  144). According to  143), the term ‘dependence’ means ‘a  situation in which the economy of a certain country is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected’. Economists at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA 1961: 4) state that the problem of industrialization in Latin America lies in the difficulty of transition to higher levels of production technology. Unlike the claim of dependency theorists, Korea took advantage of opportunities existing in its relationships with world core countries to advance its economy. Koreans borrowed industrial technology from these countries and traded commodities with them. Korea successfully harnessed American aid as a developmental resource. During three decades of industrialization, the level of Korean economic dependence on her principal partners has not increased, but decreased, as measured in commodity trade (Table 3.1, page 58), technology transfer, and diplomatic relationships.  207  Amin (1974:  16-17) may be correct, considering the Korean  economy of the 1960s, to suggest that economies of core countries comprise the most progressive sectors and those of the underdeveloped economy should be considered to be extensions of them. Such an argument, however, has little validity for Korea in the 1990s. For example, consider Poongsan’s technology export to a German company and POSCO’s financial and managerial assistance to US Steel. Amin (1974:  16, 28) and Emmanuel (1972) state that core  countries exploit primary resources and labor in the peripheries of the world through ‘unequal exchange’. In contrast, Korea has few primary resources to offer core countries. Rather, Korean corporations have been exploiting natural resources within advanced countries. As Chapter IV indicated, POSCO imports coal from the United States, Canada, and Australia. Amin and Emmanuel have overlooked the possibility that the relationship formed between developed countries and Korea can also work in reverse. It may be correct to view that there is an ‘unequal exchange’ between the world’s core and (semi-) peripheral countries. However, through coordinated efforts between the public and private sectors, Korea was capable of reducing such constraints in technical, financial, and managerial dependence, by avoiding reliance on only a few countries. When Hyundai shipbuilding and motor companies required foreign technical assistance, they diversified their dependence on several partners such as Japanese, the United Kingdom and the  208  United States firms. In so doing, Hyundai manipulated firms of the core countries to compete with each other. Although this may not always be possible,  intelligent planning and  coordinated efforts between governments nor the corporations of a developing country will increase the possibility, as the Korean experience demonstrates. Amin argues that urban growth in the world periphery necessitates an increase in the import of food products, which weakens the economic structure of the periphery. In addition, he argued that the ways of life and consumption of the privileged social strata in a poor country encourages people to imitate the life style common in developed countries (demonstration effect, Amin 1974:  15). The combined effects of  all these forces makes the Less Developed Countries dependent on foreign aid. In the Korean case, the consumption patterns have became more Westernized during the past several decades. This is especially true if one considers the rapidly rising preference for imported household goods (e.g., appliances and furniture) and the increasing demands for passenger cars in the late 1980s. The Korean government prior to the 1980s, however, demonstrated how such impacts can be controlled by protecting domestic markets. At any rate, it is far too early to state that the transformation of Korean lifestyles makes the Korean economy dependent on foreign aid. In fact, the contribution of foreign aid to the Korean economy since the 1970s has become of very much less importance.  209  7.2.3 Korea and its Intermediate Cities within the World— Sys t em  Some ideas of the World-System perspective were used in this study to analyze Korean public/private relationship and their linkages with internal and external forces. It has been found that the world-system framework is helpful in; analyzing the Korean central government’s 1) relationships with large conglomerates, municipal governments, and local government and communities in Ulsan and Kyungju; ii) understanding interactions of major industries of Ulsan not only with the economies of the ‘core’ countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan but also those of other countries, such as Canada, Australia, and Indonesia; iii) analyzing the linkages between large corporations in Ulsan and Pohang and small firms within Kyungju and those cities, and governments within Korea; and iv) studying Korea’s technological, financial, and rawmaterial dependence on the external world. Concepts of global metropolis, national centers, regional centers, and intermediate cities and their interactions in the world-system urban theory are useful for analyzing the complex relationships between each of the factors of Korean industrialization in various locations. Armstrong and McGee (1985: 50—52) are right in stating that the critical factor that brings successful economic development is the interaction between urban centers within a developing country. They emphasize that the central government can maneuver external and internal forces. The present research supports this notion  210  by arguing that the rapid economic growth in Korea has benefited from the influential central government that acted to maneuver external and internal forces, including corporations and local communities. The model by Armstrong and McGee (1985: 53) suggests that the local production units may be affected the decisions made not just in Seoul, but also in the world core. The large corporations in Ulsan and Pohang suggest that there seem to be other forces that need to be added to this model. For example, the global influence does not necessarily filter down through a hierarchy of the regional and the national centers. It can move directly from outside Korea to the local factory level. Intermediate—sized cities, such as Ulsan, Pohang, and Kyungju, receive foreign influence not only through Seoul and other regional centers (such as Pusan and Taeku) but also directly from abroad (Chapter four). This direct external (i.e., foreign) influence is not limited to large scale corporations. Some of the smaller firms in Ulsan and Kyungju have also established direct relationships outside of Korea, as the variety of their trading relationships has exhibited. A more complete model has to explain how social and economic relationships among intermediate cities themselves are interwoven at the local level. This research has provided some evidence of such phenomena by identifying corporate linkages among the cities of Ulsan, Kyungju, and Pohang (See Figure 5.2, page 129).  211  Another dimension missing from the conventional WorldSystem perspective is that the local units are not always simply recipients of abroad forces. As Dicken (1992) observes, they also have an influence on the abroad economic order, although this influence is not yet pronounced. Decisions made in the intermediate cities not only affect their local communities, but also influence the regional and, to a lesser extent, the national centers as well as the international community. This phenomenon has been illustrated by the international input and output linkages of POSCO, Hyundai Motors, and Hyundai Shipbuilding. The generally accepted view is that newly developing countries (e.g., Taiwan and Korea) import low levels of skills and sophisticated parts from developed countries (e.g., Japan and the U.S.). Employing cheap labor, they assemble machines and then sell their products to the countries that are economically less advanced (e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines). However, the growth of Korean companies exhibited an alternative pattern. POSCO, for example, began its business by importing raw materials not only from less developed countries, such as Indonesia (coal) and Saudi Arabia (oil), but also from Canada, the United States, and Australia. POSCO’s venture with US Steel uses POSCO’s capital and management strategy. The POSCO example shows that industrial capital, technology, and products do not necessarily flow one way,  i.e., from a world metropolis to cities of world  peripheries. Some Korean corporations have demonstrated two-  212  way flows of industrial capital, technology, and raw materials. Conglomerate business groups, such as Hyundai, Samsung, and Gold-Star provide solid examples of out-flowing capital and technology to the advanced economies by opening their manufacturing plants in North America. Some of them import raw materials from advanced economies and then resell their products to world cores. In the final assessment, the evidence of this research on Korea’s industrialization supports the model of a system of decision-making agencies and groups which are engaged industrialization. While much of the period of Korean industrialization has been characterized by a top-down hierarchy of decision-making from the central government to the locality level, since the 1980s this situation has begun to change with more local control and input into the planning process. This thesis has clearly shown that the development process has led to an improved material well-being for a majority of Korea’s population. But it has also shown that improved material well-being is not without social or environmental costs. A clearer understanding of this process comes about with the understanding of the major agencies and groups actions through time in the development process within the context of a nation in a rapidly changing global economy. There thus may no general theory that explains the Korean experience of development. Rather the examination of the  213  Korean experience leads to the reevaluation and re of macro development theory.  214  c.n  ES  •  IC 0.  c-I-  1(i)  CD  -  -  ‘-3  ES  c-n  0  C)CD  ‘-I c-I‘-‘-‘1  Sm (DO)  ES  •  ‘-<  0) 0 ESES 0) ‘I  C,,-.  I—’ CC ‘-ic-I-  i-nO  o<  CD  1<  ‘1  0  I-”  F-”  -  ES.  •  -  ES’I U)I—’O 0..  oo.  I—ES —‘--“0) N’-IES 0) Pa Pa c-I-  F--’-.  t’D 05W c-I-Ui  CD ES • WCD  ‘-“  c-t•C) (Th ES ‘•CD tI <  •  5 U) c-1 ,-.C)ri ESES0 ES0)ES OESiQ <LO. PJCD c-Ic--WP) OES’l ESQa  CD C) •.‘-“C) c-tO C.’-<CD 0i..(D c • 10) C) —Jc-I-LD CDC • CD CD  c-I-  U)  CD’-” 0< CCD  c CflES  •  50 CD ‘-1 ESCD c-I-0)  CD. c-I-U) ES i-” CWC) CDESG)  0  .•••  0  I—-  -“ES 0 CD 0. ‘1(l) c  0.0)  ..  ZU) (Dc-I-. C  .  00’-” ESESC)  ‘-•‘--  ‘1 5 Ci) (ICO)’l ‘-100 bC)ES 0)CLQ ESS i-•C NF0)0)0) c-I-c-I-rI  CDn  <  CD  Pa  ‘-“CD OES ESc-I0)CD  CD  1ES  OCD ‘lU) (DCD 0)0) ESd C)  0) c-t 0 c-nfl  cn  C.. 5  •  •  ‘-ti  CD 0  Z  U)  c-I- c-I0 •‘-l  -“l))  p’-” I—’C)  ESI  ‘-1 I—’ -‘-05 C)c-t P)CD  SCD CD  ‘ES  c-I-  •  ES C Pa  CD  U)ES ‘-“c-IP5.•  5  c-I- C,  P51-’ U)0  O”c-I• CDO.’ ‘lCD < UiCD  CD0)Hi ESU) I--JO.’-” CD 0 t’JLOES I ‘-1 r.JCDO  ‘—.  -0 Q.iU —— CD ‘-“ r—3i-i-h  CD5.  —  CDESD QO  ‘-“ F-” —  CD -i-ES OES— OQj ESC 0U)I— 5-I-i--dC) fl-CD 0) ‘ii-X CD-• <N  0  (1)  S  c-hi-’  i--0)  F-’F-”  0(l) ‘-hO C)  c-I-— ‘-“LD 0—i ESO U).  CD (DES ‘I OW CD •  E  C) 05(l) ES c-IU)CD -‘C,  ‘-“Pa  (DO) tIES  5  0(DU) II--I-IJ •. T’-i PCCDO) I-’-ES CDES • ES  ES 0. ‘1 CD •  Q  c-I-  I—’ —.5 C, 10 ‘1  —JO)  ..  U)c-V CD I-.) U) ‘.0..  0 ‘1 ESO)  i--  ‘-1 CD l-’P) WcO c-I-CD  0  ‘1  1—’ 0) c-ICD  0.,  0) ES  Q.  0 ‘-1 I—’  I-h  0  OCD  WU) I—’ U) C  ES  0E1 CCD  c-I-  0)..  tTU) -‘-CD  5’-”  Cd  U)CD  •  —I—’CD • ES c-IflCD On  ti0  ESES LQc-I-’tl — ‘1 •.C)0< WESO) .7c-I-c-II1CD  CD bES CC— U)U) ---P’ 1 ESESI— CDCD’U)U)C) U)U)CD I I--3LOX (.i0. < — CD (1)’-IL.D ‘C,ESCD tI5CD  Qa  U)  5  .0)  U)nl  CD 0  ‘i  ‘  <C .çI-  F-”  C ES Cl)  i—’’i  0.  •.  00) ‘-IES Pac-t  ‘-h’-”  0  •.  c(D  tIES  R1U) 0  X” Z U) CD’-” O)  •  N 0) — c-I-SO d-’-CD OLD ES.  ‘-‘•.  C (flI-— c-I-‘-IC) •CD 0) I--t  CD ,--ES ES—  Cl)  5  0)0  CU) U) c-I-tI ‘-lCD ‘-“C)  Oa  I-’  ‘I CD ESO)  .0  0). I—i ‘-“Cl) N 0 WC c-I-c-I-“t) 0 ES  F-”C)  Cl) — ctD dD  0..  ESX  I— Wf— c-I-(DC) CD  CD c.Di••ES (tiES—  Qa  U)  S  F-”  CD  F-’-  CD <  I—’  <  c-I-  0 ES  ..  ‘-1  0  1<  Z  0  0)  C  -  I-h  CD <0  ‘-<  ES ‘I c-1-. ESc-II-’d-”  00  •.  0 I—’ ‘I CD r.•  CD  ZQa  CD  •  50) CD ES c-tO •‘-l I—’  (DO <ES CD I—’O OES  Qa  (DO) ‘Ic-I-  0.)—’  ESC  CS  00 i-n C) C  c-I‘IESCfl CDCD• U) U)c-t— •ES’.D CD—.J 0i ‘1  —  ES  ‘-“  5  CD ES c-I-  S  Q. CD < CD I—’ 0  C 0)  C ES CD  •  ‘1(l) CD. U) U)— •O —.5  ES  5  i-h  tO  Pa  0) ES  CD c-I-  ,-‘.  C) CD  ES 05 I—’  0  I-”  ‘1 CD tO  0I—’’-li  U)C,0  ‘-“  •.XCD  CD I—’ ES UCDC)  ES  ES 5 ESOCD i-’-c-tc’l  W’<CD  W’-l C,CD I-ESI  Qa’l  ES tO CD  WoES  •.0)CD c-IU) 3’---). 10 ES’, • 0 CD F 1’J ESSES <‘<U) --rt. ‘I 0 F-” ESC)LD 50)CD CD-LO • ES c-I-cO CD’-  CDI—’--Qa  U)0(D FC,C)fl’ 0)00. C)cES CD500) CSES  —  ES  ‘-“  5  PCI  CD  C)  CD’-’-  05C) ESO • ES 0 Z5  0)  C.4ES  ‘-“  ESU) Pa  CD )Dc-r  ES  05’l  :0  ‘-“5  0)  F-Qa  CD OES ‘1 c-ICDU) 0) 0) ES  5  ‘lCD On SES  -1<  CDES 0) -•ES’ 0)CDc(DU)Q. LO••. CD ‘-1 I—’ •CDt) U)CD U)LD 0• ES U)G) 0  •.c-I-(/)  0c-I-Id. 0)  5  0)  F-”  C)  C)  (.A)  •.Mt  O (310  I—’  (1)0)  “cO 00  5  00)  ES  C)U) 0 ••  (DO  C) 50 (DES ESO c-I-5  OCD  c--i  CD(D <ES (Dc-I-  US  PC,  LOU 0(D 05< )-‘ CD (fl— 0  h.  CD ES— c-I-LD —3 001  5.  ‘-10) (DES 0)U) U)—’ CDd U)S (1)0)  5  CD I—  0.  -  0-  “  -‘  -.  C  -  CD  .  •  0  .  D  -  .  ‘  0  -  <  —  r  CD  —  3  1  Z 0  *  *  ‘.  ‘  0  0  c-i  r’  W  Auty, Richard M. 1990. The impact of heavy-industry growth poles on South Korean spatial structure. Geoforum 21 (1): 23—33. Auty, Richard M. 1991. Creating comparative advantage: South Korean steel and petrochemicals. Tilischrift voor economishe 82: 15-29 Bank of Korea.  1980. Yearbook of economic statistics. Seoul.  Baster, Nancy, ed. 1972. Measuring development: the role and adequacy of development indicators. London: F. Cass. Baster, Nancy. 1985. “Social indicator research,” in J.G.M. Hilhorst and M. Klatter, eds., Social development in Third World. London: Croom Helm. Bello, Walden and Stephanie Rosenfeld. 1990. Dragons in distress: Asia’s miracle economies in crisis. San Fransisco: A Food First Book. Bello, Walden and Stephanie Rosenfeld. 1991. High-speed industrialization and environmental devastation in Taiwan. The ecologist 20 (4): 125—132. Berger, Peter L. and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, eds. 1988. In search of an East Asian development model. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions. Bernstein, Henry. 1970. Modernization theory and the sociological study of development. Journal of development studies 7: 141—160. Breese, Gerald. 1969. The city in newly developing countries. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Briages, Brain. 1991. South Korea: another Japan after all? World today (London) 47 (7): 145-148. Browett, J. G. 1986. Industrialization in the global periphery: the significance of the newly industrializing countries of East and Southeast Asia. Environment and planning D 4: 401—418. Brusco, Sebastiano. 1982. The Emilian model: productive decentralization and social integration. Cambridge lournal of economics 6: 167—184. Brusco, Sebastiano and C. F. Sabel. 1981. “Artisan production and economic growth,” in F. Wilkinson, ed., The dynamics of labour market segmentation. London: Academic Press. pp. 99—113.  216  Bureau of Statistics (Tongkaechung), Republic of Korea. 1993. 1985—1990 yundo donae chong saengsan chukae kyulkwa [The result of survey on 1985-1991 provincial Gross Regional Product]. Seoul. Cardoso, F. H. 1975. “The city and politics,” in 3. E. Hardoy, ed., Urbanization and Latin America. New York. Anchor books. pp. 157—190.  Chang, Sung—Soo. 1978. Yimhae kongyon tosi baehuji ui kaebal siltae ae kwnhan yunku: Pohangsi injunb baehuji leil jungsimeuiro [Development in hinterlands of a costal industrial city: a case study of Pohang city]. M.A. thesis. School of Environmental Planning, Seoul National Un iv e r si t y. Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1975. The effects of international economic dependance on development and inequality: A cross-national study. American sociological review 40: 720—738. Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1979. Comparative research on world system characteristics. International studies quarterly 23(4): 601—623. Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1984. “Urbanization in the Worldsystem: New directions for research,” in Michael Peter Smith, ed., Cities in transformation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. pp. 111—120. Cho, Dam; Kywang-Suh Park, et al. eds. 1989. Kongdan hyungsung kwa jiyuk sahoi kujo byundong ae kwanhan yunku [A study on establishment of an industrial complex and changes in local social structure]. Kwangju, Korea. Cho, Dong-Sung. 1990. Hankuk chaebol yungku [Korean Chaebol research]. Seoul: Mail Kyungjae Sinmun Press. Choe, Bum-Jong. 1975. “An economic study of the Masan Free Trade Zone,” in Wontak Hong and Anne 0. Krueger, eds., Trade and development. Seoul: Korea Development Institute. pp. 229—253.  Choi, Byung—Sun. 1990. Chiyuk Kyunhyung kaebal kwa mingan bumun eui yukhal [Balanced regional development and the role of the private sector]. Haengjunk yunku [Journal of public administration] (Seoul National University) 28 (2): 187—216. Choi, Eun—Hee. 1980. Ulsan kongyub nodongja eui chikjang yidong yunku: koyung anjung eul jungsimeuro [Labor turnover of Ulsan industrial workers]. M.A. thesis. Seoul: Department of Sociology, Euwha Women’s University.  217  Choi, Sang—Yun. 1991. Ulsan eui jungso kiyeb kaeyulwha kaesun bangan yunku [A Study on improving sub—contracting system in Ulsan’s small firm sector]. M.A. thesis. Ulsan, Korea: Ulsan University.  Choi, Yung—Chul. 1991. Tosi seris kongkeub sujun eui pyungka. [An evaluation on the levels of supplying public services among cities (in Korea)]. Paper presented at the 1991 conference of the Korean Association of Public Administration Research. Choi, Yong—Ho. 1986. Chiyuk kyungjae eui whalsungwha junryak [Strategies of regional economic promotion] in the Institute of Social Science Research, Kaemyung Univ. (Taeku, Korea), ed. Chibangwhah wa jungchak kwajae [Policy issues of decentralization]. Taeku, Korea: Kumimuyuk Press. pp. 187-211. Chon, Soohyun. 1990. Political economy of regional development in Korea. Paper presented at the conference on States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, Santa Barbara, California. March 22—25, 1990. Chung, Chung-Kil. 1989. Presidential decision-making in Korea. Governance 2 (3): 267—292. Clark, Gorden. L. 1986. “The crisis of Midwest auto industry,” in Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, eds., Production, work, and territory: The geographical anatomy of industrial capitalism. Boston: Allen & Unwin. pp. 1271 48. Clark, Gordon. 1989. Unions and communities under siege: American communities and the crisis of organized labor. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Cohen, R. 1981. “The NIDL. Multinational corporation and the urban hierarchy,” in Michael Deer and Allen J. Scott, Urbanization and urban planning in capitalist eds., society. New York: Methuen. pp. 287-317. Cohen, R. 1989. “Policing the frontier: the state and the migrant in the international division of labor,” in J. Henderson and M. Castells, eds., Global restructuring and territorial development. London: Sage Publications. pp. 88—111. Cooke, Philip. 1989. Localities: the changing face of urban Britain. London: Unwin Hyman. Cotton, James. 1992. Understanding the state in Korea: bureaucratic-authoritarian or state autonomy theory? Comparative political studies 24: 512—531.  218  Cox, Kevin R. and Andrew Mair. 1988. Locality and community in the politics of local economic development. Annals of the AAG78: 307—325. Cummings, Bruce. 1987. “The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences,” in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The political economy of the new Asian industrialization. Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press. pp. 44—82. Dalkey, Norman C. 1972. Studies in the quality of life: Delpei and decision-making. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. Dasgupta, Partha. 1990. well-being in poor countries. Economic and political weekly 20: 1713—1720. Dasgupta, Partha and Martin Weale. 1992. On measuring the quality of life, world development 20: 119-131. Deyo, F. C. 1987. “State and labor: modes of political exclusion in East Asian development,” in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The political economy of the new Asian industrialization. Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press. pp. 182— 201. Dicken, Peter. Press.  1992. The global shift. London: Paul Chapman  Donaghu, Michael T. and Richard Barff. 1991. NIKE just did it: international subcontracting and flexibility in athletic footwear production. Regional studies 24: 537—552. Dore, Ronald. 1971. Japanese industrialization and the developing countries: model, warning or source of healthy doubt? Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Dore, Ronald. 1982 “The late development effect”, in HansDieter Evers, ed., Modernization in South-East Asia. Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 65-80. Dore, Ronald. 1983. Goodwill and the spirit of market capitalism. British journal of sociology 34: 459—482. Dorfman, Nancy S. 1983. Route 128: The development of a regional high technology. Research policy 12: 299-316. The structure of dependence. American Dos Santos, T. 1970. economic review 60: 231—236. Douglass, Mike. 1992. The political economy of urban poverty and environmental management in Asia: access, employment and community based alternatives. Environment and urbanization 4 (2): 9—32.  219  CD  LI  Z  0. 0 i-h 0 On-  -  •  CD •  —  0) -  a• 0)0  ‘-  Cl)  Z. I-”  <  U)CD  it  01  CD  ri  0  •  •  I-h  •‘.o 0)  r1  •(()  i-”Z I—’C)  0)’-” N 03  P1-  03 W I—’  i—”CD  (flU) • I—’  U)rt••  ‘I Z (D-’-rt  0 ‘tJWCD  <-‘O  •  om .-“ 03 I—’  0  CD CD 01 CU)  LO  ci i-CD  C0<  ::3  OQ  n-rt  <—‘  •U)  PXj  —.  rt  .U)  I—’  01-  I-”  riO  ti- ‘tS  P30 0  •.  OCD riO.  i-”i-”  I-n  ZO  U) CD  CDI-i  I-i  00.  Z  I-hLO  0’-”  CD  U)O CDni  .p3Pxj  1-3  CD Z’-l  oi CD —•  —.  ir’  CD  •‘-<  .-CD  ‘.DrI’.D iO  --..  U).  •.CD  CDP3  0  CD  0.  0  Z  03 ‘In-CD ‘—‘(D  ri-CD  ..U)  •F-ID Ci • •  ZP3—i  ‘.0  rU)  CD  C  0  -  ri  (CD  I-”  i-P3  0 ZU)  CDI-” 0)0  i-i-  I—h  O  0  riO OZ  ()i-”  U)  ••C  I-i I-h ,i-h  0’-”  “10.’  CD Z  ZP3  O-01 ‘-<  030 •  O CD  •°CD U)  ‘EJ  ••  (‘Ji-h  —0  •  U) U) —‘CD  U1’I  CD H,  ‘1  m  CD  I-” ri-  Z  —-  LQ  ‘-“  ‘I  I-’-  I-h  0  0  F-  (‘JO  •rt C  OC b’  I-•’(  Z  — ‘I  CD <  -rI v’i (—3 C  0i-h  n—-—  Lxi  CD  i-  —  —-ri  ZU)  ?-  CD I-  I—”  ‘I  rt  U)  ni  —-I—  — 03  •  (DCD— OO C F-’I  (1)rt  U) 0.  •C’I  030.0 tI .0)  (DD Z O -ri , •LO J I->W  U)  <riO (D(D l—U)(3 O• I-  U  (DO’-”  0  LI  0 0  O  riP) (DZ  ri W Z’ CCD I-’ I—’ri-  d t3 Cl)  i-”  r’-’-  ‘I  C  Z  (Di-”  G’.O CD 0’-” ‘-hZ 001 ‘IC CU)  •  r:) 0303  sri-  •  P3  CD ••..  i4P3 O ‘I  niri-  O  < CD  n-CD ‘I  Crt  O  ZCD CD 0  -h.  C.. 1 P30)  ri-ri-  I-in-  01 O 0  Mi1  003  U) CDCD  03’-3  0  (ni-”  i-t.ct  .1-’  ‘.0  OCD  o  0—  rim  P3 0.C CDP3  c ri-3  CD LO. i-”  i-h  01  ‘-“ ‘-“  0.  1’.)  —.J  -•U) O  fr-i  P3 ZU U)P3 P3<  ri(DO D —  rtio  P3 ‘1 U) (D CD  OD  •  ‘I  ‘-> P3.  LI  01 i.O  0(D  <  ‘-3 C) (DO  Lor) ‘< CD •. , •  O• F0—  (X) CDCD  -  •  I-  U)-  CD  100  ‘-“c:  U)  LI  i-.rtC5-CDC..4  0  LI  ri-’.O  •.  •  On  OtJ  CD 0  ri •  0(1-. -— 0 —  rt  CDj  •tIW  CDZCD  -CD ‘I o-. riO3’I  Oi-”rt  U)ri-  •  I—’ Z CU) rt CD i-’• 0  0  <0.  CD  —ri  OZ CD i-”  CD CD  CDI0 W  LI LI  C I—’  0)0) Qjct  ‘IN  -3I-  03  -I-  CDC U)Z. riI.3’IE  ‘I  U)LO  -  CD  CD  L0P3  i 0 0Q I-’- 0  3CD  0  ‘— 0) 0 Z CD’0.s 0i-. 0U)  m  •<CD  0 00  hI-i  c I—’ (Dr 0)ç  >-00  I-”  0  Z  CD 0 O  (DO)  I  I—’  001j  z  ‘-0 Pun  Cl).>  •  ‘I  O  U)(D  ct(D  0 U)  LI  (DCi I•  tJ‘IC  U)  < P3  LI  ‘-•l-  ‘tJ‘1  (D’’V  ‘1D0j I-”CD  U)  < P3  LI  <00  P3DZ  dr-h (D’lO  •  C  c-ICD  —P3  01  0 0  U)  P3  LI  ri  P3  LI  ‘1 •  I—’-  Cl Z  ..  ‘-3  —  .  I-” —3  rtcC)  C U) -  :i”.  —  •>  Ofl 1 P3t  I-i— I-’-L’j  >0 P3  0  I-’-  •  WLI itO ‘-“0 OZ ZO  CD. ‘1  0 0 I’.O 0 O —  U)> -.•  -“LI O() Zt  ri—.  CDI-i0 •ZP3 U)  ‘ft’I I— CD I-”  DCD  ‘-“CD t3ri ‘-•  (-•  ‘Q. ct  P3>  t-’  LOP3-Oz  i’--  rt ‘-“ 0) rI0)  i-’-ri-  U)t P3  -“  ‘I  Wi-h  (1Z0  I—JO  03  0  I-”  CE) ‘1  LTI-h  U) ci U)  U) - l—  c-I-  0 O P) i-”  CT)  ‘.00)  0.  0)ri0) Z  ‘-“U)  (flU)  >11  003 ri’-i  I-h Xj  I-.’  Cl)  ri-U)  Z  P3  0.  0)  rI-  CD  i-  i-h  U)  0  I-’-  Z U)  CD  I-”  0.  03 oi—’  I—.  Z P3 P3rI  ‘I  0 CU)  ClQj  •  OZ  ‘—‘-U)  itO  i-,ri’-” (1•  —)OI--  —I-hO  lU)  ,fsP3-  -=r-  ••  i-..)WO ()I—0  ‘-‘•  -‘-ct.  P3r  CJ)U)C...)  >C’.D  ‘I  OP) ‘I(D  0)  U)  CD’-”  (DO  Z  i.Q I—i flOP) Or-nU)  0 C  0  I-”  —<  Or-i0 CD  •  ho.  I  -J•  i-JO ‘-.OZ  I-’-  •.rt  (DC I—s  o’.o  P3(T)  (.Ati i-J Z  CDP3 0)Z  0)  0> WU)  I-”  no c-tni  i-a-i-n  ri  I-i  i-h U)  riO wz  OjO  U) (I)’-’-  t3  P3(l)  CDI--  ‘-‘-  ri- P1  (DO  f--(D  U) O’-3 0  .. CD •  ‘.0  l.0  -  •  •.U)  O’.0  ‘.0  LO—O  WU)IP3.  •  0  I-nW(/) ‘—“ ri- 0  P3QjZ 0 Qj ‘--Z  QjOO P3(Di-”  riCDP3  rI-CD CDl—()  Z  I—Qj  U)-  -“  -  0  i-n I-i  0  z  ct  0  C  CD--0  0 Z  U)I-i • 0  LI  0 0  D-” i--<0  CD U) I-”  LI  0 0 :i 0 co  (DI-t) Z U) ‘I rt U)  P3I—fl OO 0)  ‘-3(T)  0 Od i-h(DF-” <0  0  C)  —  -.  .-“  l—  I-I  c-I-  CD CD  ‘-I  .  I 0  —  ri  0  .1-’  ‘1 0) CD (1) I-’CA a’  WI—’ c-I- 0) CD b’  0)  ‘Vri  • ‘-—  D’ CD  c-I-  0  c-I-  CA  •.  LuriD CD .CA  Cfla’0  <  0)  DC)  a’  flP)c-IU) a’ ‘-“  0  C)CDi-” PDD c-I- c-I-‘--CD  C  Di-’‘-“ D  C  CA  Ci) ‘-“CA DC  ‘--  D a’ 0  •  0  0) CA ? Dc-t0  0CD c < CDD a’  ‘-‘-0  CD firi 0’-”  c’—.  a’  I-’  0)  •.  •  D a’  0’  0 0) I—’ I—’ D n0a’  C)  CD0. ri D -WU)  I—’ c-I- CD a’I-’•O  a’  i-’•CA D.  Ui 0DCP)’.D  •  •  I-<  c-I-  C))  CD ‘1  <  e—-  D  I-<  c-I-  I-’-  I—’  C  W  c:  )  c  CDo—  C) c-IC’-<D’  ‘.0’-”  Df-Hi  W00-.  ‘-<‘c)  DD’  c-I-  —  0)0’  CAD  C)i-”  I-’-  C) C)  Ori I—’ c-’• I-’- CD c-I-CA  0  0 nC) i—-’0 a’ C D ‘-‘F--’ c-I- i-” D’ c-IWi-’-  •  CA  CD..  I-”  c-I-CD .1 ri  D  .-  —N  n-’I— CD’-”  D  I.-’  0 0’cnDD (n-.  rii-I—i CD CD  CD•-  0DDc  CDriQ  •.Dc-II-r-’-oc  riri  < ‘-‘-a-’  CD ‘-<  I-  CD  Z  c-I-CD CD  c-I-n-li  CCA CA  DO) a’  ‘—*  D’  c-I-  CA ‘-<‘-3  ND’ ‘-“CD  •  CA  CDI-’W  ‘EJCD  Z•  l—’O-  CD  •  0— D ‘.0 W  Dc-I-— I-” D ‘.0 <CD’.O  c-I-. ‘—‘-  •  CDWD  C.i’1D --.JZCD  c ‘-‘- U) iict cc-I-CD  c  fi ‘-t Cn O0c-i‘1CD Dc-I-’tj CDDD I—’ CD I—’i-”D Z.  -  .-“c-t•  U)CD0?-  •  c-I-r CA ‘.0 D’ .  c’-<  QjO  -.‘.-i c-i-ri D’tT0’ CDP)D O CA D  •  ja’c  •  •  ?O —.0  ‘1—’  •  CD CACfl?’’-’O o .—‘CD  <Dc  i-’-’--’  ZOri •  CDQ. •.CD-  0’  0’ r-t-,Qj  ‘.0 wc-I-’-I  ‘.0  •  I-”  CA  fi  •  0 U)  ‘-“  rim  CD  0  •D  I-’”  ‘C) ‘-I  C  I—’ C C_ D i-’000) • c-I- CD I—’  CDri  c-I-a’i-”  Pin D C)CDW0) q- CA D c-I-  Wi-”c-IbJI—c-I-CD nD’ri  I-”  CD  •.c-I-c-Icnn-’  Ui 0)  •  c-I-’Ca’  0C)I—’W ‘ii-” D  I-”  C) I-” CD CAD’CD c-I- 0) CA CD ‘<  Zi—i-’-c-I-  WZ’  .c-l  C) ‘-“ CA .—•D  i-”p-  I-CDri’.O I-’CD c-I-C)—.1  0’. ‘-3 tr OD0—  c-I-• —I—’C-i  CAHiD  Zri Da’0P)  CD  0Z -00  C)  IQW<Z .Qi-•o  aCD’-”P)  a0’iQ  C)  ‘-•  riCD 00-  D< CDCD LJriD a’Zc-I-  DCA D (nO)  I-” < -Ii  tCD -. I  WCDD c-ILO  ri  c-I-  0’00  ci  i—i  0’ LO  X  0’ 0  C WCA nc-Ic-I-ri o-’-c-’C) 0)  ‘.OLO i-”0CD  0’ —  i-”CD rii-”P) a’rii-’• c-I-  ‘-3c-I-c-I-  CDHiZ 0) CA  0 0’  c-I-CDc-ID’ CA c-ICD..CD ‘-1  riP)  Dc-I-Cl)  (Da’  c-I-C)i-”  CD D 0) D <  0 ‘1 a’  a’WtXI CDc-I-° <CD CD 0)  I-’-  I—’  i-”  a’  CflCD fi c-I-riO CCA I  •  CDCDDc-ICA c-I-’-”CDC-i < 0 ‘-1 0 •ri CDWCD’.O I—a’CD  ri-”’-<  0  I-i  C-iCD 0  0 riri CD 0 •.b  Cj)Hi  ‘0WQ.a ‘Dri• ‘-<< c-’• i-’. 0DCA CA) Oi-” I c-i- ‘1 0 CDD’I-’D -‘CPa’  -‘.  i-on--’  W’tjP)  i-ND  CDi-”CD0  P)Dc-IXDc-I-’-”  ri 0 0riC)Z tT0P)  C)-  CD o ‘-‘i DCDD c-’••Q., • c-I- D  a’  c-lW c-’..  i. a’—  c-I-Z  riri.  I-CD  -  Hi CD 00CA  ‘-<CD--a  c-I- CD  CD.  a’ ‘-I --CD P)ZW DC)I— (Dc-ICD U) 00’l OCD c-I-C)  WCD-  fl’-”’— WO Zfrhc  ri  W  W 0 0)ri  •  •  0-_i  < CD N CD. C) 0— D’.D  ‘-•  W  ri O’tj  -  0-)  CA  CDCD t 0D  a’c-I-0i  I-’  riCD.  CAa’’.D ICD 0Cfl<i  I-,.  —‘.0)0’. DD  OWn  i— I-  (Dd  CDCA < Q.iO  I  CD  CD  ‘1 CA  o.  D  D tS ‘.0 WCD 0  a’  •  u  cn<’-”  F—’D  0’  ..  0 D a’ 0 D  CD  ‘-3  •  C)  1—’ CD  C ri— W’.o  DC)CD a’c-I-.  •WC’-<  i-’-CDCA CDCAc-I-ri riCD CA  CDCc-IDc-I-ric-Ic-I-ri••0 ‘-I i-’-  C)0 OCOO  C)0’Qj  Da’  —.  CD0J0C) I—’ I—’ D D’ CA Oc-” N 0 ‘-‘(DHi  <i--i--  CDriCAri  a’c-I-.-’D  •  ‘-<  CD  I—’  CD  0) w:i CD a’ ri  ‘-“0 Dri  Dc-I-  P)ri Di-”  F- i-I  CD  0). n--s ‘-3  D’.O  ‘-“‘.0 0-_i  -  i-I CD CA ‘1 • CACD  ‘t0< ri Hi CD  0)  Di-” c-’-O WDCD  ric-I-CD  CADI-”CD  l— ‘-<  0Q  Hi  ‘-“0I-  I—<fl  0) CD  fi  CDD  CD’--QiQ  D  ‘D’--I--D  •  <c-I-’-’-Ori  i-’-C  I-hp)  -‘W  0c-I-  DNc-t-c-I-C.i  i-•0C..i <DO •••D  Di-”  ‘ctP) •.Z C)D C c-I- —  fli-i  CD  .-.  Cr-”ZP)  a”iOc-I-r CDCD LOi-• CDWriri I—’CDD-.  -“  “J 0 -ZF--  b-  DZDCDSa’CD  •D—  0  a’  —  —  0)  —  —CD C D •c-1-  CD < OCD C) _J —10 I ..  CDc-I DO) c-I-D  ‘•-‘-  —  ‘-<  0’  —•  ‘.0 ‘.0  -  -_i  I-’ ‘-<  C_i  -•  -  ‘.0 CD  —  -  CD  —  CA c-I  ‘.0 C  -•  —  ‘.0  -  ‘<  I-’  .  ‘o.  —D ‘.DCD  c-I-  0 ‘1  00  I—”tj  CD0  <ri  CD’.O  a’P)  a’-  I—’Cfl  D CD OCD ri a’  C)  btxJ CDP) i—cn 0 1-”  0’.O •  ri -_i  I-tl’.o  ‘0  i-•D  Wci DO DD  I—s  ‘  0) ZOJ a’Z  CD  ‘-“  Henderson, J. 1989. The globalization of high technology production. London: Routledge. Hicks, Norman and P. Streeten. 1979. Indicators of development: the search for a basic needs yardstick. World development 30: 567-580. Hill, Richard C. 1984. “Economic crisis and political response in motor city,” in Larry Sawers and William K. Tabb, eds., Sunbelt/snowbelt: urban development and regional restructuring. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 313-338. Hill, Richard C. 1987. “Global factory and company town: the changing division of labor in the international automobile industry,” in Jeffery Henderson and Manuel Castels, eds., Global restructuring and territorial development. London: Sage Publications. pp. 18-37. Hong, Sung—Jik and Kil—Myung Ro. 1974. Ulsan kongyob nodongja ui jikjang jukeungkwajung yunku [Social adjustment of Ulsan industrial workers]. Asaea yunku [Asian Research Center] (Seoul: Korea University) 17 (1): 65—164. Hoselitz, Bert. 1953. The role of cities in the economic growth of underdeveloped countries. Journal of political economy 61: 195-208. Hoselitz, Bert. 1972. “Industrialization and economic growth,” in D. J. Dwyer, ed., The city as a center of change in Asia. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press. pp. 3-15. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael. 1988. “An East Asian development model: empirical exploitations,” in Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, ed., In search of an East Asian development model. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions. pp. 12—23. Hudson, Ray. 1988. Uneven development in capitalist societies: Changing spatial divisions of labour, forms of spatial organization of production and service provision, and their impacts on localities. Transactions, institute of British geographers 13: 484—496. Hudson, Ray. 1989. Labour-market changes and new forms of work in old industrial regions: maybe flexibility for some but not flexible accumulation. Environment and planning C 7: 5—30. Hughes, Helen, ed. 1988. Achieving industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.  Hyun, Young—Suk. 1988. Hankuk jadongcha sanyub kisul baijun ae kwanhan siljeong bunsuk: 1962—1986. [Empirical analysis of technological development in the Korean automobile  222  industry: 1962-1986. Ph.D. dissertation. Seoul: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Hyun, Young-Suk and Jinjoo Lee. 1989. Can Hyundai go it alone? Long range planning 22 (2): 63—69. Institute of Social Sciences (isS), Seoul National University. 1984. A computer data set created from an interview survey, focused on political decentralization in Korea. International Financial Statistics. International Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington. 1962, 1972, 1982. Jeongoum Social Research Institute (A private consulting company). 1990. A survey on political opinion, conducted for the Province of Kyungsang Namdo (Kyungnam) and the City of Pusan. Pusan, Korea Jin, Young-I-Iwan. 1989. Emerging urban-regional linkages of the Pusan Region in Korea. Paper prepared for the Seminar on Emerging Urban-Regional Linkages: Challenges for Industrialization, Employment and Regional Development, Bangkok, Thailand, August 16—19, 1989. Jones, Leroy P. and Il Sakong. 1980. Government, business, and entrepreneurship in economic development: The Korean case. Studies in the modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975, published by council on East Asian Studies, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Harvard Univ. Press.  Jung, Ki—Wha. 1989. “Junnam jiyuk eui tochak jungso jabon yunku [A study on indigenous, small capitals in Junnam area],” in Dam Cho, Kywang-Suh Park, et al. eds., Kongdan hyungsung kwa jiyuk sahoi kujo byundong ae kwanhan yunku, [A study on establishment of an industrial complex and changes in local social structure]. Kwangju, Korea. pp. 167—185. Jung, Keun—Sik. 1989. “Hanam kongbub danji eui josung kwa jiyuk jumin eui daeeung [Local responses to the establishment of Hanam industrial complex],” in Dam Cho, Kywang—Suh Park, et al. eds., Kongdan hyungsung kwa jiyuk sahoi kujo byundong ae kwanhan yunku, [A study on establishment of an industrial complex and changes in local social structure]. Kwangju, Korea. pp. 103—162. Kang, Chul-Kyu; Jung-Pyo Chio; and Ji-Sang Han. 1991. Chaebol: sungjang eui juyukyinka, tamyok eui whasinyinka? [Chaebol: the major figure of the growth, or representation of ], Seoul: Bibong.  223  Rang, Pyung-Kun. 1968. Administrative structure and management in regional development: the case of Korea. Koreana quarterly 10 (2): 121—131.  Kang, Sung—Chul. 1989. Hwankyong kwanri mohyung kwa whankyongchil manchok ae kwanhan yunku [Analysis of urban environmental quality in Korea]. Ph. D. dissertation. Pusan, Korea: Department of Public Administration, Pusan National Univ. Kerr, Clark; John T. Dunlop; Frederick H. Harrison; and Charles A. Myers. 1960. Industrialism and industrial man: the problems of labour and management in economic growth. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Kim, An-Jae. 1974. Disparities in the quality of life among cities in Korea. Whankyung ronchong [Journal of environmental studies] (Seoul: Seoul National Univ). Kim, Ahn-Jae. 1976. Industrialization and growth pole development in Korea: a case study of Ulsan. Kukto kaewhoik [Journal of Korean planners association (Seoul)] 11(1): 49—87.  Kim, An—Jae. 1987. Hankuk jibang jachi eui kaecheong kwa kuyuk [Hierarchy and jurisdiction of Korean local administration] Minok jisung January. Seoul. pp. 52-59. Kim, An-Jae. 1989. National land development and urban policy in Korea. Whankyung ronchong [Journal of environmental studies (Seoul: Seoul National Univ)] 24: 75-89. Kim, Byong-Kuk; saengwhal measuring 25. Seoul:  Chang-Woo Lee; and Jung-Sup Suh. 1988. Tosi eui jil cheikjung ae kwanhan yunku [A study on the urban quality of life]. Research paper No. Korea Local Administration Research Institute.  Kim, Choong Sun. 1992. The culture of Korean industry: an ethnography of Poongsan corporation. Tucson, AZ: The Univ. of Arizona Press. Kim, Dong Hyun. 1991. “Alternative social development strategies for Korea in the 1990s,” in Gerald E. Caiden and Bun Woong Kim, eds., A dragon’s progress: development administration in Korea. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian. pp. 9—15. Kim,  In and Won-Yong Kwon, eds., 1988. Sudokwon jiyuk yunku: konggan yinsik kwa daeeung jungchaek [A study of Seoul metropolitan region: spatial observation and responding policies]. Seoul: Seoul National Univ. Press.  224  Kim, Karl and Duk Hee Lee Murabayashi. 1992. Recent developments in the use of environmental impact statements in Korea. Environmental impacts assessment review 12: 295—314. Kim, Kyong Dong. 1976. Political factors in the formation of the entrepreneurial elite in Korea. Asian survey 16 (5): 465—477. Kim, Kyong-Dong. 1979. Man and society in Korea’s economic growth: sociological studies. Seoul: Institute of Social Sciences, Seoul National Univ. Press. Kim, Kyong-Dong. 1988. “The distinctive features of South Korea’s development,” in Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, eds., In search of an East Asian development model. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions. pp. 197—238. Kim, Limsu. 1980. Stages of development of industrial technology in a developing country : a model. Research policy 9: 254—277, Kim, Limsu and Alice H. Amsden. development 12: 505—533.  Kim, Sun—Bum. 1990. Sinku kwanhan bikyu yunku: comparative study on in new and old urban Ph.D. thesis. Seoul: Seoul National Univ.  1984. Republic of Korea. World  tosimbu eui kongkan hyungsung ae Ulsansi sinku tosimbu eui sarae [A the formation of spatial structure core areas: the case of Ulsan]. Department of Urban Engineering,  Knox, P. 1975. Social well—being: a spatial perspective. Glasgow: Oxford Univ. Press. Koo, Hagen. 1984. The political economy of income distribution in South Korea: the impact of the state’s industrialization policies. World development 12: 10291037. Koo, Hagen. 1987. “The interplay of state, social class, and world system in East Asian Development: the case of South Korea and Taiwan,” in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The political economy of the new Asian industrialization. Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press. pp. 165—181. Koo, Hagen. 1990. From farm to factory: proletarianization in Korea. American sociological review 55: 669-681. Korea annual. Seoul: Hapdong News Agency. Korea economic report. Seoul. June 1991.  225  1969,  1972.  Korea Local Administration Research Institute (KLARI). 1988. Jibang kongdan eui yuksung ae kwanhan yunku [Research on the promotion of local industrial complexes]. Seoul. Korea news report.  1990. Seoul: Habdong news agency.  Korean Institute of Pollution Problems (KIPP). 1986. Hankuk eui konghae jido. [The map of pollution in Korea]. Seoul: I lwolsuigak. Korean Statistics Association. 1992. Inku yidong tongkae yunbo [Statistical yearbook of migration]. Seoul. Republic of Korea. 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1991. Korean urban statistical yearbook (Tosi yunkam). Seoul. Korzeniewicz, Miguel E. and Robert P. Korzeniewicz. 1992. “The social foundations of institutional action: Argentina and South Korea in the post—war era,” in Richard H. Brown and William T. Liu, Modernization in East Asia: political, economic, and social perspectives. London: Praeger. Kuznets, Simon. 1955. Economic growth. Durham, N,C.: Duke Univ. Press. Kuznets, Simon. 1966. Modern economic growth. New Heaven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. Kwon, Won-yong. 1981. A study of the economic impact of industrial relation: the case of Seoul. Urban studies 18: 73-90.  Kwon, Yung—Jong. 1987. Kongeup danji eui jiyuk baijun hyokwa ae kwanhan yunku: Ansung kongeup danji reul jungsim euiro [Regional development effects of industrial complex: Ansung industrial complex]. MA, thesis. School of Environmental Planning, Seoul National University. Kyungju Development Office, Ministry of Construction, Republic of Korea. 1979. Kyungju kwnkwang jonghab kaebal sayubji [Project on comprehensive tourism development in Kyungju]. Kyungju, Korea. Lampard, Eric E. 1964. “The history of cities in the economically advanced areas,” in John Friedmann and William Alonso, eds., Regional development and planning. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. pp. 321—342. Larson, David A. and Walton T. Wilford. 1979. The Physical Quality of Life Index: a useful social indicator? World development 7: 581—584.  Lee, Bong—Suk. 1992. “Kyungjusi kwankwang suyib ae kwanhan yunku [A study on profits from the tourism industry in  226  Kyungju],” in the Consortium of Developing Kyungju, ed., Kyungju baijun [Kyungju Development]. Kyungju, Korea. pp. 146—157.  Lee, Dong—Woong. 1992. “Whankyung ohyum kwa jiyuk baljun [Environmental pollution and regional development],” in the Consortium of Developing Kyungju, ed., Kyungju baijun [Kyungju Development]. Kyungju, Korea. pp. 184-201. Lee, Hahn-Been. 1968. Korea: time, change and administration. Honolulu: East West Center Press. Lee, Hongkoo; Kyong-Dong Kim; and Doh C. Shin. 1982. Perceptions of Quality of Life in an industrializing country: The case of the Republic of Korea. Social indicators research 10: 297—317. Lee, Joe Won. 1967. “Planning efforts for economic development,” in Joseph S. Chung, ed., Korea: patterns of economic development. Korea Research and Publication. pp. 1—24. Lee, Joe-won. 1969. “Perspective for economic development and planning in South Korea,” in Andrew C. Nahm, Studies in the developmental aspects of Korea; proceedings of the conference on Korea held at Western Michign University, April 6-7, 1967. School of Graduate Studies and the Institute of International and Area Studies of Western Michigan University. pp. 30—56.  Lee, Jung-Rok. 1991. Kwangyangmankwon mit mokpokwon eui kwangyuk kaebal banghwyang [Development directions of expanded regions of Kwanyang Bay and Mokpoi. Jiyuk kaebal yunku [The study of regional development (Kwangju, Korea: Junnam Univ.)] 23 (1): 74—120. Lee, Jung—Rok. 1992. Kongyub danji eui yibjika jiyuk byunwha ae ml chin yungwhang [The impacts of the establishment of industrial complex in regional change]. Kukto kaewhoik Journal of Korean planners association (Seoul) 27 (3): 117—133. Lee, Ki-Suk. 1982. “The impact of national development strategies and industrialization on rapid urbanization of Korea,” in V.S.F. Sit and K. Mern, eds., Urbanization and national development in Asia. Hong Kong: Tai Dao Publishing. pp. 23-35.  Lee, Ki—Suk. 1984. Saneup tosi eui yinku sungjang kwa koyong kujo bunwha eui kwanhan yunku: Ulsansi reul saraero [Population growth and changes in the employment structure of an industrial city: a case study of Ulsan] Jirihak [Journal of geography] 14-27.  227  Lee, Moon—Woong. 1984. “Yichuja eui hyunchi cheokeuing yunku: Ulsan eul saraero [Migrants’ adoption in a newly industrializing city: the case of adoption methods]” in Ahn Chung Si and Kyong-Dong Kim, et al., eds., Hankuk ui jibang jachi wa jiyuk sawhoi baijon [Local autonomy and regional development in Korea]. Seoul: Seoul National Univ. Press. pp. 127—145.  Lee, Yong—Yoo. 1990. Hankuk jadongcha saneub eul chukchuk kujo wa bunwha [Structures and changes in the accumutation of the Korean automobile industry],” the Association of Korean Industrial Society Research (Hankuk saneup sawhoi yunkuwhoi), ed., Hankuk jabonjoeui wa jadongcha saneub [Korean capitalism and automobile industry]. Seoul: Pulbit. pp. 219—282. Leonard, H. Jeffrey. 1985. Confronting industrial pollution in rapidly industrializing countries: myths, pitfalls, and opportunities. Ecology law quarterly 12: 748-816. Lim, Myun-Chin. 1985. Dependent development in Korea, 1979. Seoul: Seoul National Univ. Press.  1963-  Lim, Suk—Whoi. 1987. Kongyob danji jubyun nongchon eui jumin kusung kwa teoksung ae kwanhan sahoi jirihak juk yonku [A social geographical study on the construction and characteristics of residents in a rural community adjacent to the industrial complex]. M.A. thesis. Department of Geography, Seoul National University. Lim, Youngil. 1981. Korean government policy and private enterprise in industrialization. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press. Logan, John R. and Harvey Molotch. 1987. Urban fortunes. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press. Luedde-Neurath, Richard. 1988. “State intervention and exportoriented development in South Korea,” in Golden White, ed., Development state in East Asia. Hong-Kong: MacMillan. pp. 68—102.  Ma, Jin—Ho. 1977. Kumi jiyuk eui kongeupwha ae tareun munjaejum kwa keu daechaek ae kwanhan yunku: Kyungjaejuk cheokmyun [A study of problems arising from the process of industrialization of the Kumi area and their coping measures: an economic perspective,” in Topngyang munwha yunku [Oriental cultural research (Taeku, Korea: Kyungbuk National Univ.)] 4: 217—250 McClaman, J. 1992. Setting in Silicon glen: inward investment and implications for spin-off and supplier linkages. Environment and planning C 10: 423-438.  228  McDermott, Philip J. 1976. Ownership, organization and regional dependence in the Scottish electronic industry. Regional studies 10: 319—335. Maeil Kyung-jae sinmun. P.  51.  footnote.  Marascuilo, Leonard A. and Maryellen McSweeney. 1977. Nonparametric and distribution-free methods for social sciences. Mason, Edward S; Mahn Je Kim; Dwight H. Perkins; Kwang Suk Kim; and David C. Cole, eds. 1980. The economic and social modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-75. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press. Matsura, Nanshi F. 1989. Management conflict and foreign direct investment: the case of Japanese investment in South Korea. Columbia lournal of world business 24(2): 61—67. McGee, Terry G. 1971. ‘Catalyst or cancers? The role of cities in Asian societies,’ in L. Jacobson and V. Prakash, eds., Urbanization and national development. Beverley Hills: Sage. pp. 157-182. McGee, Terry G. 1991. “The emergence of the Desakota regions in Asia: Expanding a hypothesis”, in Norton Ginsburg; Bruce Koppel; and T. G. McGee eds., The extended metropolis: settlement transition in Asia. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. Meyer, David R. and Kyonghee Mm. 1987. City employment change in the Republic of Korea, 1960—1970. Urban affairs quarterly 22 (4): 598—616. Michtell, T. 1984. Administrative traditions and economic decision—making in South Korea. IDS Bulletin 15 (2): 3237. Mills, Edwin and Byung-Nak Song. 1978. Urbanization and urban problems in Korea. Boston: Harvard Univ. Press. Mingione, Enzo. 1983. Informalization, restructuring and the survival strategies of the working class. International Journal of urban and regional research 7: 311—339. Mollenkopf, John H. 1981. “Community and accumulation,” in Michael Deer and Allen J. Scott, eds., Urbanization and urban planning in capitalist society. New York: Methuen. pp. 319—337.  229  Moore, Wilbert E. and Neil J. Smelser, eds. 1965. The impact of industry, modernization of traditional societies series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Morales, Rebecca and Carlos Quandt. 1992. The new regionalism: developing countries and regional collaborative competition. International lournal of urban and regional research 16: 463—495. Morgan, K. and A. Sayer. 1983. “Regional inequality and the state in Britain,” in J. Anderson; S. Duncan; and R. Hudson, eds., Redundant spaces in cities and regions? Studies in industrial decline and social change. London: Academic. pp. 17-49. Morris, David M. 1979. Measuring the condition of the world’s poor: the physical quality of life index. New York: Pergamon. Morris, J. 1992. Flexible internationalization in the electronics industry: implications for regional economies. Environment and planning C 10: 407-421. Nash, June. 1987. “Community and corporations in the restructuring of industry,” in Michael Peter Smith and Joe R. Feagin, eds., The capitalist city: global restructuring and community politics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 275—296. New York Times. June 16,  1987.  Newman, Barbara A. and Randall J. Thomson. 1989. Economic growth and social development: a longitudinal analysis of causal priority. World development 17: 461—471. Oh, Won—Chul. 1992. Sanyop junryak kundansa [History of industrial strategy], an extensive series of new paper articles. Hankuk Kyun!ae Sinmum. [Korea News Daily]. Seoul. Ohn Research Institute (Ohn yeuron josa yunkuso, A private consulting company based in Pusan, Korea). 1990. Sunjin simm euisik hamyang eul woihan ulsan simm yeiron josa: bunsuk kyulkwa bokosu [A survey on public opinion, conducted for the City of Ulsan, the Province of Kyongsang Namdo (Kyungnam). Pusan, Korea. PaineWebber Co. 1991. Still the paradigm among developing world steel makers. World steel dynamics, core report. New York.  Park, Bung—Sik. 1992. “Jiyuk haengjung kikwan kwa jibang euiwhoi ae daehan jumindeul eui yinsikdo josa [Survey research on public opinion on local administration and  230  council,” in the Consortium of Kyungju development (Kyungju, Korea), ed., Kyungju Kaebal [Kyungju development]. pp 97-113. Park, Chan—Suk and Jae-Ha Lee. 1984. Sungjang keojum jubyun nongchon ae dae han pakob hyukwa [Impacts of growth pole on rural hinterlands]. Sahoi kwahak [Journal of social sciences] (Taeku, Korea: Kyungbuk National Univ.) 3: 8598.  Park, Chan—Suk. 1990. “Kukwhoi euwon kwa sunkeo kumin kaneul yunkae kwajung [The linkages between National Assemblymen and local voters],” in Chung-Si Ahn and Kyong-Dong Kim, eds., Hankuk eui jungchi kyungjae [Korean political economy: political process and industrialization strategy]. Seoul: Bumunsa. Park, Dong—Suh. 1988. Hankuk haengjung eui miraesang [The future of Korean public administration]. Seoul: Bummunsa. Park, Jong-Soo; Yong-Tae Kim; and Yongwuk Kim. 1978. Jibang kongeup danji ka jiyuksawhoi baijun ae michin yungwyang: Yin kongeup danji wa Junju kongeup danji eul jungsim euro [ Impacts of local industrial estates in community development: case studies of Yin and Junju industrial complex]. Wonkwang Univ. ronmunjib [Journal of the University of Wonkwang] (Kwangju, Korea) 13: 699-742. Park, Moon Kyu. 1987. Interest representation in South Korea: the limits of corporatist control. Asian survey 27 (8): 903—917. Park, Sam Ock. 1986. “Regional changes in the industrial system of a Newly Industrializing Country: The case study of Korea,” in F. E. I. Hamilton, ed., Industrialization in developing and peripheral regions. London: Croom Helm. pp. 311—334. Perrons, D. C. 1981. The role of Irland in the new international division of labour: A proposed framework of regional analysis. Regional studies 15: 81—100. Petrof, Davish. 1992. Siberian forests under threat. Ecologist 22, 6: 267—270. Piore, M. and C. Sabel. 1984. The second industrial divide. New York: Basic Books. POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation). 1988. Pohang jaechul 20 yunsa [A twenty year history of Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation]. Pohang, Korea. The Province (Vancouver, B.C.). January 12,  231  1992.  Republic of Korea. 1992. Jae 7 cha kyungjae sawhoi kaebal 5 kaeyun kaewhoik: 1992-1996. [The 7th economic and social development plan: 1992-1996]. Seoul. Rodwin, Llord and Hidehiko Sazanami. 1990. Industrial change and regional economic transformation. London: Unwin Hyman. Rostow, Walt W. 1960. The stages of economic growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Univ. Press. Russo, M. 1986. Technical change and the industrial district: the role of inter—firm relations in the growth and transformation of ceramic tile production in Italy. Research policy 14: 329—343. Ryu, Woo-Ik and Joung-Whan Lee. 1985. Jiban tosi chungyeuncheong eui chiyeuk euisik: Ulsansi eui sarae yunku [A study on the locality of youngers in regional cities: the case of Ulsan] Jirihak ronchong [Journal of geography] (Seoul) 12: 21—39. Sabel, C. F. 1989. “Flexible specialization and the re emergence of regional economies,” in P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin, eds., Reversing industrial decline? Industrial structure and policy in Britain and her competitors. Berg, Leamington. pp. 17-70. SaKong, Il. 1993. Korea in the world economy. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. Sayer, Andrew. 1986. New development in manufacturing: the just—in—time system. Capital and class 30: 43—72. Scheaffer, R. L.; William Mendenhall; and Lyman Ott. 1986. Elementary survey sampling. Boston: Duxbury Press. Schoenberger, Erica. 1987. Technological and organizational change in automobile production: Spatial implications. Regional studies 21(3): 199—214. Schoenberger, Erica. 1988a. Thinking about flexibility: a response to Gertler. Transactions, institute of British geographers 14: 98—108. Schoenberger, Erica. 1988b. From Fordism to flexible accumulation: technology, competitive strategies, and international location. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 6: 245-262. Scott, Allen J. 1988. Flexible production systems and regional development: the rise of new industrial areas in North America and western Europe. International lournal of urban and regional research 171-185.  232  Scott, Allen J. 1992. Low-wage workers in a high-technology manufacturing complex: the Southern California electronics assembly industry. Urban studies 29: 1231— 1 246. Seers, Dudley. 1969. The meaning of development. International development review 11 (4): 2—6. Seers, Dudley. 1977. The new meaning of development. International development review 19 (3): 2-7. Shin, Doh C. 1979. The concept of Quality of life and the evaluation of developmental effect: some applications to South Korea. Comparative politics 11: 299-318.  Shin, Doh C. 1981. Hankukineui saleui jil taeyunku [A study of the quality of life] Chungkyung munwha [Politico-economic culture] (A Monthly Magazine). Seoul. Shin, Doh C.; Myung Chey; and Kwang-Woong Kim. 1989. Cultural origins of public support for democracy in Korea: An empirical test of the Douglas-Wildavsky theory of culture. Comparative politics studies 22: 217—238. Shin, Doh C. and Wayne Snyder. 1983. Economic growth, quality of life, and development policy: a case of South Korea. Comparative politics studies 16: 195—213. Shin, Dong-Ho. 1990. Applications of regional planning strategies to Korean rural development. M.A. thesis. Vancouver, Canada: School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia.  Shin, Sang—Suk. 1990. “Hankuk jadongcha saneup eui kujo byunwha wa kukga gaeyib eui yukhal [Structural change and the role of state intervention in the Korean automobile industry],” the Association of Korean Industrial Society Research (Hankuk saneup sawhoi yunkuwhoi), ed., Hankuk jabonjoeui wa jadongcha saneub [Korean capitalism and automobile industry]. Seoul: Pulbit. pp. 158—218. Shindongah (A Korean monthly news magazine). 1989. Hyundae jungkongeup satae eui jinsang wka jeonmal [The crisis of Hundai Heavy Industrial Co.: the reality and details], May 1989. pp. 468—481; and Ulsan: juntu eui chumbyung tosi [Ulsan: the frontier city of union battle” May 1989. pp. 542—545. Skocpol, T. 1979. States and social revolutions. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Song, Byung-Nak. 1990. The rise of the Korean economy. Hong Kong: Oxford Univ. Press.  233  Song, Ho-Keun. 1991. Who benefits from industrial restructuring?: Reflections on the South Korean experience in the 1980s. Korea journal 31: 69-84. Srinivasan, T. N. 1977. Development, poverty, and basic needs: some issues. Food research institute studies 16 (2): 11— 28. Statistical yearbook of Kyungju (Kyungjusi tongkae yunbo). Kyungju, Korea: the City of Kyungju. Various years. Statistical yearbook of Ulsan (Ulsan tongkae yunbo). Ulsan, Korea: the City of Ulsan. Various years. Stohr, Walter B. and D. R. Fraser Taylor, eds. 1981. Development from above or below? Dialectics of regional planning in developing countries. New York: John Willy and Sons. Stone, Clarence N. 1982. Social stratification, decision— making, and the study of community power. American political quarterly 10 (3): 275—302. Storper, Michael. 1989. The transition to flexible specialization in the US film industry: external economies, the division of labour, and the crossing of industrial divides. Cambridge journal of economics 13: 273—305 Storper, Michael. 1991. Industrialization, economic development, and the regional question in the Third World. London: Pion. Storper, Michael and Susan Christopherson. 1987. Flexible specialization and regional industrial agglomerations: the case of the U.S. motion picture industry. Annals of the American geographers 77: 104—117. Streeten, Paul. 1977. The distinctive features of a Basic Needs Approach to development. International development review 19 (3): 8—16. Thompson, Wilbur R. and Philip R. Thompson. 1987. National industries and local occupational strengths: the cross hairs of targeting. Urban studies 24: 547—560. Thorns, David. and urban cities in community  1989. “The new international division of labor change: a New Zealand Case Study,” in Pacific the world economy, Comparative urban and research, volume 2. pp. 68-101.  234  Thrift, Nigel. 1989. ‘Introduction’, in Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, eds., New models in geography: The politicaleconomy perspective. London: Unwin Hyman. pp. 255-266. Timberlake, Michael. 1985. “The World-System perspective and Urbanization” in Michael Timberlake, ed., Urbanization in the world-economy. Orlando, Florida; Academic Press. pp. 3—22. Timberlake, Michael and Jeffrey Kentor. 1983. Economic dependence, overurbanization, and economic growth: a study of Less Developed Countries. Sociological quarterly 24: 489—507. Townroe, P. M. 1975. Branch plants and regional development. Town planning review 46: 45—62. Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI, Ulsan sangkong whoieuiso). 1980. Ulsan eui sungjang kwajeong kwa chiyeukjeok teukseong [Development process and regional characteristics of Ulsan]. Ulsan, Korea. Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI). 1990a. 2000 yundae kongeuptosi Ulsan: yunku yongyuk bokosu[An industrial city, Ulsan in the year 2000: A report of commissioned study for Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry]. tilsan, Korea. Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI). 1990b. 1990 Ulsan sangkong hyunwhang [The current state of Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1990]. Ulsan, Korea. Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI). 1991. ‘91 whoi won myongboo [The 1991 directory of the Ulsan Chamber of Commerce and Industry]. Ulsan, Korea. United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Office. 1991. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1993. Human development report 1993. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Urry, John. 1981. Localities, regions and social class. International -journal of urban and regional research 5 (4): 455—474. Vazquez-Barquero, A. 1990. Conceptualizing regional dynamics in recently industrialized countries. Environment and planning A 22: 477—491. Vogel, Ezra F. 1991. The four little dragons: the spread of industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.  235  Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the market: economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The modern world-system. New York. Academic Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. A world—system perspective on the social sciences. British -journal of sociology 27 (3): 343—352. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. “Modernization: requiescat in pace,” in his The capitalist world-economy. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 132-137. Wang,  In Keun. 1991. The Quality of Life in rural areas with special reference to Korea and Some developing countries Korean observer 22 (1): 75—138.  Warr, Peter G. 1984. Korea’s Masan Free Export Zone: benefits and costs. Developing economies 22: 169—184. Whang, Hong-Do and Jeong-Han Lee. 1979. Kongeyubwha ae daehan nongchon eui konghun [Rural contribution to industrialization]. Nongchon kyungjae yunku [Journal of rural economics (Seoul)] 2 (1): 81—93. Whang, In-joung. 1984. Administration of land reform in Korea, 1949—52. Korea lournal 24(10): 4—20.  Whang, Jae—Ki. 1983. Jungwhahak kongeup tosi Ulsaneui baldal kwajung kwa keu teuksung ae kwanhan yunku [A study on development process and characteristics of an industrial city, Ulsan] Jirihak eui yunku kwajae wa chubkeun bangbub [Issues and approaches to geographical studies] Seoul: Kyohaksa. White, Gordon and Robert White. 1988. “Developmental state and markets in East Asia: an introduction,” in Golden White, ed., Development state in East Asia. Hong-Kong: MacMillan. pp. 1-29. Whitley, Richard D. 1990. Eastern Asian enterprise structures and the comparative analysis of forms of business organization. Organization studies. 11: 47—74. Wilson, Richard W. 1988. Wellsprings of discontent: Sources of discontent in South Korean student value. Asian Survey 28 (10): 1066—1081. World Bank. 1976. Industrial location in Ulsan: an interview survey. A World Bank research paper. Washington D.C.  236  World Bank. 1992. World development report 1992. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Yoo, Jong-Hae. 1993. A study on the local autonomy system in Korea: the politics of decentralization. Korean observer 26 (2): 151—167. Yoon, Bang-Soon. 1992. Reverse brain drain in South Korea: state-led model. Studies in comparative international development 27 (1): 4-26. Youm, Kyo-Ho. 1986. Press freedom under constraints: the case of South Korea. Asian survey 26 (8): 868—882. Youm, Kyu-Ho and Michael B. Saiwen. 1990. A free press in South Korea: Temporary phenomenon or permanent fixture? Asian survey 30 (2): 312—325. Young, S.; N. Hood; and S. Dunlop. 1988. Global strategies, multinational subsidiary roles and economic impact in Scotland. Regional studies 22: 487—497.  Yu, Si—Jung. 1977. Kumi jiyuk eui kongeuphwa ae ttareun jae munjaejum kwa keu daechak ae kwanhan yunku: sawhoijuk chukmyun [A study of problems arising from the process of industrialization of the Kumi area and their coping measures: a sociological perspective,” in Topngyang munwha yunku [Oriental cultural research (Taeku, Korea: Kyungbuk National Univ.)] 4: 217-250.  237  APPENDIX 4.1: Provincial Population, 1960-1990: A: ACTUAL NUMBER OF POPULATIOn (in Thousand) REGION  PROVINCE  1960  1970  1980  1990  CAPITAL  Seoul Gyunggi  2445 2758  5536 3358  8367 4935  10726 7286  Kangwon Chungbug Chungnam  1637 1369 2526  1867 1482 2860  1791 1424 2956  1640 1342 3006  Chunbug Chunnam  2395 3553  2434 4006  2288 3779  2093 3671  Kyungbuk Kyungnam Pusan  3850 3602 577  4560 3119 1881  4962 3323 3160  5059 3659 3822  24994  31469  37449  42793  MIDDLE S. WEST  S. EAST  TOTAL  B: PROVINCIAL POPULATION SHARE (%) REGION  PROVINCE  1960  1970  1980  1990  CAPITAL  Seoul Gyunggi  9.8 11.0  17.6 10.7  22.3 13.2  25.1 17.0  Kangwon Chungbug Chungnam  6.5 5.5 10.1  5.9 4.7 9.1  4.8 3.8 7.9  3.8 3.1 7.0  Chunbug Chunnam  9.6 14.2  7.7 12.7  6.1 10.1  4.9 8.6  Kyungbuk Kyungnam Pusan  15.4 14.4 2.3  14.5 9.9 6.0  13.3 8.9 8.4  11.8 8.6 8.9  100  100  100  100  MIDDLE S. WEST  S. EAST  TOTAL  238  APPENDIX 4.2: Number of Passanger Cars per Household, 1970-1990(%) REGION  PROVINCE  CAPITAL Seoul Gyungki  1970  1980  1990  2.3 .2  5.4 1.2  29.2 14.9  MIDDLE  Kangwon Chungbuk Chungnam  .1 .1 .1  .6 .7 1.0  9.6 9.9 12.1  S. WEST  Jeonbuk Jeonnam  .1 .1  .7 .7  8.8 8.6  S. EAST  Kyungbuk Kyungnam Pusan  .2 .1 .8  1.6 1.1 3.1  14.0 11.9 14.8  .6  2.2  16.7  TOTAL  239  APPENDIX 6.1: Survey Questionnaire*: Note:* This appendix is English-translation of the original questionnaire written in the Korean language.  Section I  The following questions intend to find out about social changes occurring in the Ulsan (or Kyungju) area. Please read the questions and choose your answers from the given choices. Question I-i. Compared to 5 years ago, interaction with people in your neighborhood has became  1) Much more frequent 3) Unchanged  2) Somewhat more frequent 4) Infrequent  Question 1-2. If a neighbor is going through hardships, the people of Ulsan (or Kyungju, for the respondents in Kyungju), compared to the people of other mid-sized cities, are 1) Much warmer 3) No difference  2) Somewhat warmer 4) Colder  Question 1-3. In terms of harmony and community spirit, the people of Ulsan, compared in the past 5 years. to those of other cities, are 1) Much better off 3) Somewhat worse off  2) Somewhat better off 4) Much worse off  Question 1-4. Compared to 5 years ago, the attitudes of the people in Ulsan towards their neighbors have become 1) Much warmer 3) Somewhat colder  2) Somewhat warmer 4) Much colder  Question 1-5. How do you feel about having come to live in Ulsan? 1) (I feel) Very fortunate. 3) Neither fortunate or unfortunate.  2) Somewhat fortunate. 4) Unfortunate.  240  Section II  The following questions ask your opinion on, and the prospect for, regional development in Ulsan (or Kyungju). Please read the questions and choose your answers from the given choices.  Question Il-i. Compared to 5 years ago, the quality of life in Ulsan has generally become  1) Much better 3) Unchanged 5) Much Worse  2) Somewhat better 4) A little worse  Question 11-2. How serious are the following problems in Ulsan? Please mark the appropriate box. Very serious  11-2-a. Lack of urban infrastructure 11-2-b. Low income ( 11-2-c. Unequal distribution of wealth ( ll-2-d. Environmental pollution ( II-2-e. Local political autonomy 11-2-f. Distrust between neighbors ll-2.g. Lack of recreational and leisure facilities 11-2-h. Others (Please specify.)__________________  ) ) ) ) ) ) )  No problem  Somewhat serious  ( ( ( ( ( ( (  ) ) ) ) ) ) )  ( ( ( ( ( ( (  ) )  Question 11-3. Among the examples above in Questions “11-2”, which, if any, do you think has shown improvement in the past 5 years? (Select two most important ones and fill in the appropriate letter.) First  Second  Question 11-4. Among the examples above in Questions “2”, which, if any, do you think has changed for the worse in the past 5 years? (Select two most important ones and fill in the appropriate latter.) First  Second  Question 11-5, Concerning how we can make Ulsan a better place to live mark “1” beside the factors shown below which you consider the most important, and mark “2” beside the factors which you consider next in importance. 11-5-a. Lack of urban infrastructure 11-5-b. Low income 11-5-c. Unequal distribution of wealth ll-5-d. Environmental pollution ll-5-e. Local political autonomy 11-5-f. Distrust between neighbors ll-5-g. Lack of recreational and leisure facilities Il-S-h. Others (Please specify)  241  Question 11-6. Concerning the solving of the problems Ulsan faces, the activities of the members of the City Parliament 1) Help a great deal 3) Do not help  2) help somewhat 3) in fact, hinder progress  Question 11-7. The politicians and administrators of Ulsan are making our city a better place to live in. 1) firmly dedicated 3) not dedicated  2) somewhat dedicated  Question 11-8. The business people of Ulsan are better place to live in. 1) firmly dedicated 3) not dedicated  to  making our city a  2) somewhat dedicated  Question 11-9. If our national economy becomes prosperous, the economy of Ulsan will  1) benefited greatly 3) not be affected  2) benefited somewhat 4) be worse off  Question 11-10. Which do you feel is more important, the economic development of our nation as a whole or the economic development of Ulsan? 1) The economy of Ulsan 3) Both are equally important  2) The economy of our whole nation  Section III  The following questions are to ask your opinion on the roles and functions of local political and administrative institutions, local businesses, and citizens, that are important for developing the Lilsan (or Kyungju) area. Please choose your answers from the given choices.  242  Question Ill-i. It is currently has.  that Ulsan has the corporate sector that it  1) very fortunate 3) neither fortunate or unfortunate  2) somewhat fortunate. 4) unfortunate  Question 111-2. The political and administrative institutions of Ulsan to promote economic activities within Ulsan. 1) try very hard 3) do not try  2) try somewhat hard  Question 111-3. If your answer was either “1)” or “2)” in the previous question, the effects of the attempts at promoting economy are actually 1) very helpful 3) not helpful at all  2) somewhat helpful 4) hindering progress  Question 111-4. The direct and indirect harm done to the lives of the people of Ulsan by the corporations of Ulsan is 1) severe 3) nonexistent  2) exists somewhat  Question 111-5. If harm has been done, in what aspects? (Mark “1” beside the most important one, and mark “2” beside the one next in importance.) 111-5-a. Lack of urban infrastructure 111-5-b. Low income Ill-S-c. Unequal distribution of wealth lll-5-d. Environmental pollution II I-5-e. Local political autonomy 111-5-f. Distrust between neighbors lIl-5-g. Lack of recreational and leisure facilities 111-5-h. Others (Please specify)  Question 111-6. Concerning current urban problems which are arising, the political and administrative institutions of Ulsan are to the problems. 1) actively responding 3) not responding at all  2) passively responding  243  Question 111-7. If we were to compare the positive and negative aspects of the effects of the corporations on the common people of Ulsan 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)  the positive aspects are much greater the positive aspects are a little greater they are both of the same degree the negative aspects are a little greater the negative aspects are a much greater  Question 111-8. Among the following, who do you think is most interested in the economic development of the city? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)  Both the large corporations and small firms Small firms more than the large corporations Only the large corporations Only the small firms The large corporations then the small firms Neither the large corporations nor small firms  Question 111-9. The relationship between the business of Ulsan and Ulsan’s administrative institutions is 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)  the administrative sector tends to control the business sector the business sector tends to control the administrative sector both tend to cooperate each each other neither has any relationship with the other not sure  Question 111-10. How effective do you think it would be if ordinary citizens were to participate in the policy making process of regional administrative institutions? 1) very effective 3) no effects  2) somewhat effective 4) would instead have negative effects  Question Ill-il. If the answer was either “3)” or “4)” in Question 111-10 above, what, in your opinion, is the main reason for it? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)  Ordinary citizens do not understand what the job entails. Ordinary citizens will look after personal interests. The existing system is not suited for citizen participation. It makes the policy making process even more complex. Because of the wrong attitude of the policy makers on pubic inputs. Because, in fact, there are no better alternatives. Others (Please specify)______________________  244  Question 111-12. The attempts by the people of our region to have their thoughts and ideas reflected in the policy decisions of the regional government has (recently) become_________________ 1) much stronger 3) no change 5) not sure  2) somewhat stronger 4) weaker  Question 111-13. It has generally been said that in the past the people have not actively participated in city administration. What was the reason for such a phenomenon? 1) Even if active participation had been attempted, if would probably not have been accepted. 2) There was no chance to participate. 3) No time for such things. 4) Did not know the methods of participation. 5) They had no opinions. 6) No need for participation. The existing system was satisfactory. 7) Others (Please specify)_____________________  Question 111-14. The attempts by the business community of our region to have their requests reflected in the regional administrative institutions has of late become__________________ 1) much stronger 3) no change 5) not sure  2) somewhat stronger 4) weaker  Question 111-15. If the answer was either “3)” or “4)” in Question 111-14. above, what, in your opinion, is the most important reason? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)  Such attempts would not be accepted. No chances to attempt. No time to attempt. No need to do so. Did not know how to. Not necessary to attempt such a thing. The existing system is satisfactory. Others (Please specify)____________________  Question 111-1 6. The government administration offices of our region have recently the thoughts and ideas of the people. 1) placed great importance on 3) no change 5) not sure  2) placed some importance on 4) ignored even more  245  Question Ill-i 7. The government administration offices of our region have recently the thoughts and ideas of the business executives of our region. 1) placed great importance on 3) no change 5) not sure  2) placed some importance on 4) ignored even more  Question Ill-i 8. Which among those listed below help most in the economic development of our region? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)  Both the large corporations and the regional small businesses. The regional small businesses more than the large corporations. Only the big businesses. Only the regional small businesses. Neither the regional small businesses nor the big businesses.  Question Ill-i 9. The business community of our region have recently the thoughts and ideas of the people than before. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)  placed greater importance on. placed somewhat more importance on. no change. ignored. not sure.  Question 111-20. The businesses of our region has ideas of the government administration offices than before. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)  the thoughts and  placed greater importance on. placed somewhat more importance on. no change. ignored. not sure.  Question 111-21. Opportunities for communication between the regional businesses and the people of the community have___________________ 1) greatly increased 3) no change 5) not sure  2) somewhat increased 4) decreased  Question 111-22. The expanding of recreation and leisure facilities, and cultural centres___________________ the growth of the regional economy. 1) greatly helps 3) does not matter  2) somewhat helps 4) hinders  Note: The remaining questions in Sections IV, V, and VI of the original questionnaire are not translated because none of them were used for the present research.  246  APPENDIX 6.2: An Example of Qbasic Program Used for Confidence Interval Test: ‘step3.bas using p DIM Im(6), sm(6), ph(6) DIM xx(6) LN12 = 6 SN12 6 FOR i = 1 TO SN12 READ Im(i) NEXT I DATA 327,134,46556,1 44,35,33187 INPUT “No. of Questions”, nq FOR j = 1 TO nq READ qnm$ FOR I = 1 TO SN12 READ sm(i) NEXT I FOR I = 1 TO SN12 READ xx(i) NEXT i DATA befftl, 49,51,321,43,27,186,20,18,142,5,1,14 DATA qol, 49,51,320,35,27,185,7,5,55,8,3,38 DATA goI2, 49,51,320,35,27,185,35,39,252,29,23,147 DATA infra, 49,51,319,35,27,186,37,34,199,8,9,53 DATA income, 49,51,316,34,27,187,2,1,39,2,6,41 DATA dispa, 49,51,317,33,26,187,17,11,121,8,1,66 DATA poll, 49,51,321,35,26,1 87,45,48,304,4,4,28 DATA pollato, 49,51,315,34,26,186,7,9,102,3,6,52 DATA distru, 49,50,31 7,34,26,1 86,7,4,60,0,3,15 DATA cul, 49,51,318,34,26,187,40,35,243,6,15,98 DATA cscstl, 49,51,319,35,27,186,1,1,9,0,1,4 DATA cscstl2, 49,51,31 9,35,27,1 86,13,30,119,19,11,70 DATA offded, 48,51,319,35,27,187,6,1,21,7,3,21 DATA busded, 49,51,315,33,27,185,3,5,18,2,3,15 DATA naloec, 49,51,320,34,27,187,16,14,70,11,5,52 DATA nalopr, 49,51,320,35,27,187,6,4,35,4,5,16 DATA satent, 49,51,321,35,27,187,10,12,59,7,7,47 DATA gpro, 49,51,319,34,27,184,8,2,17,4,1,13 DATA gefft, 42,40,262,30,20,157,10,3,42,8,2,30 DATA ectoff, 49,50,31 7,35,27,1 87,15,3,16,17,3,22 DATA addivu, 48,49,315,35,27,187,9,9,32,7,5,12 DATA inact, 49,51,320,35,27,185,6,5,27,4,6,21 DATA care, 49,51,320,33,27,1 86,7,9,84,28,23,146 DATA coop, 49,51,321,34,27,186,13,9,88,21,19,119 DATA frnd, 49,50,319,34,27,184,11,13,102,12,11,69 DATA fotn, 49,51,321,35,27,1 87,1 6,8,75,27,20,138 DATA part, 49,51,320,35,27,186,11,15,94,4,4,45 DATA wlpart, 49,51,320,35,27,186,10,1,25,4,0,10 DATA gtcore, 49,50,305,35,26,1 73,22,4,1 6,1 8,1,13 DATA gtbsre, 49,50,31 8,35,27,1 86,5,2,24,4,1,15 DATA bscore, 49,50,318,35,27,187,4,4,11,2,0,9 DATA bsgtre, 49,50,31 7,35,27,1 86,2,4,13,3,1,8  247  DATA corn bsco, 49,51,317,35,27,186,4,5,17,4,2,3 FOR I = 1 TO SN12 ph(i) = xx(i) / srn(i) NEXT I xl = Irn(1) + lm(2) + Im(3) x2 = (Im(4) + Irn(5) + Im(6)) yl (lm(1) * ph(l) + Irn(2) * ph(2) + Irn(3) ph(3)) y2 = (Im(4) * ph(4) + lrn(5) * ph(5) + lm(6) * ph(6)) Al = yl / xl A2 = y2 / x2 ‘A=Al-A2 A = ABS(Al A2) ‘calculate Bi SN=3 LN=3 srnpl 0 FOR I = 1 TO SN srnpl = smpl + Irn(i) * ph(i) NEXT I slrnl = 0 FOR I = 1 TO SN sIrni slml + Im(i) NEXT I rnpl = smpl / sIrni mslO FOR i = 1 TO SN ‘rnsl = msl + lm(i) A 2 * (ph(i) A) A 2 rnsl = msl + lm(i) A 2 * (ph(i) rnpl) A 2 NEXT I sr2l = msl / (SN 1) PRINT “sr2l = “; sr2l sxl = 0 FOR I = 1 TO SN sxl sxl + lm(i) A 2 * ((Im(i) srn(i)) / lm(i)) * ((ph(i) * (1 1)) NEXT I ‘In = 6 ‘Sn = 6 brnl = sIrni / SN vpl = ((LN SN) / LN) / (SN * bml A 2) * sr2l + sxl / (SN PRINT “vpl “; vpl smp2 = 0 FOR I = 4 TO SN + 3 srnp = smp + Im(i) * ph(i) NEXT I sIm2 0 FOR I = 4 TO SN + 3 sIrn2 = sIm2 + Im(i) NEXT I rnp2 = smp2 / sIrn2 rns20 FOR I = 4 TO SN + 3 ‘ms2 = ms2 + Im(i) A 2 * (ph(i) A) A 2 ms2 = ms2 + Im(i) A 2 * (ph(i) rnp2) A 2 -  -  -  -  -  -  248  -  *  ph(i))) / (srn(i)  LN  *  brnl  A  -  2)  NEXT i sr22 ms2 / (SN -1) PRINT “sr22 = “; sr22 sx2 = 0 FOR I = 4 TO SN + 3 sx2 = sx2 + lm(i) A 2 * ((Im(i) sm(i)) / lm(i)) * ((ph(i) * (1 1)) NEXT i ‘In 6 ‘Sn = 6 bm2 = slm2 / SN vp2 = ((LN SN) / LN) / (SN * bm2 A 2) * sr22 + sx2 / (SN PRINT “vp2 = “; vp2 B vpl + vp2 II A 1.96 * SQR(B) ul = A + 1.96 * SQR(B) PRINT “lower limit “; II, “upper limit “; ul LPRINT “Question Name: “; qnm$ LPRINT “Al = “; Al LPRINT “A2 = “; A2 LPRINT “A = “; A LPRINT “B = “; B LPRINT “5R21 = “; sr2l LPRINT “SR22 = “; sr22 LPRINT “lower limit = “; II, “upper limit “; ul LPRINT “diff of CI = “; ul II LPRINT LPRINT NEXT END -  -  -  -  249  -  *  ph(i))) / (sm(i)  LN  *  bm2  A  -  2)  APPENDIX 6.3: Insufficient Recreational and Leisure Facilities as a Problem Degree of Being a Problem City  Ulsan  Kyungju  Sample Group Very serious  Somewhat serious  Not a problem  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  81.6 68.6 76.4  12.2 29.4 18.9  6.1 2.0 4.7  Sub-Total  76.1  19.4  4.5  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  17.6 57.7 52.4  50.0 26.9 31.0  32.4 15.4 16.6  Sub-Total  48.2  33.2  18.6  Note: On the second column, the terms, ‘Gvt Off,’ ‘Cor Mgr,’ and ‘Ctz’ mean government officials, corporate managers, and citizens, respectively. The numbers represent row percentage of cell frequency. These are consistent in the tables throughout the rest of this series of appendices. Source: Author’s Survey (1991). The source of all tables in this chapter is this series of appendices.  APPENDIX 6.4:lnsufficient Urban Infrastructure as a Problem Degree of Being Problematic Cities Very serious  Somewhat serious  No problematic  Ulsan  65.3  32.0  2.7  Kyungju  28.2  62.6  9.3  250  APPENDIX 6.5: Low Income as a Problem Degree of Being a Problem  City  Ulsan  Kyungju  Sample Group Very serious  Somewhat serious  Not a problem  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  4.1 2.0 12.3  46.9 31.4 47.5  49.0 66.7 40.2  Sub-Total  10.1  45.4  44.5  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  5.9 22.2 21.9  61.8 63.0 54.5  32.4 14.8 23.5  Sub-Total  19.8  56.5  23.8  APPENDIX 6.6: Income Disparity as a Problem Degree of Being a Problem Cities  Ulsan  Kyungju  Sample Group Very serious  Somewhat serious  Not a problem  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  34.7 21.6 38.2  46.9 52.9 47.0  18.4 25.5 14.8  Sub-Total  35.7  47.7  16.5  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  23.5 3.8 35.3  41.2 61.5 42.2  35.3 34.6 22.5  Sub-Total  30.4  42.2  25.5  251  APPENDIX 6.7: Low Level of Local Political Autonomy as a Problem Degree of Being a Problem City  Ulsan  Kyungju  Sample Group Very serious  Somewhat serious  Not a problem  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  14.3 17.6 32.4  75.5 58.8 51.4  10.2 23.5 16.2  Sub-Total  28.4  55.2  16.2  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  8.8 23.1 23.1  41.2 46.2 47.3  50.0 30.8 29.6  Sub-Total  21.1  46.3  32.5  APPENDIX 6.8: Local Official’s Commitment to Solving Civic Problems Degree of Commitment City  Ulsan  Sample Group Highly dedicated  Somewhat dedicated  Not dedicated  12.5 2.0 6.6  72.9 60.8 46.4  14.6 37.3 47.0  6.7  51.2  42.1  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz  20.0 11.1 11.2  62.9 51.9 52.9  17.1 37.0 35.8  Sub-Total  12.4  54.2  33.3  Gvt Off Cor Mgr Ctz Sub-Total  Kyungju  252  APPENDIX 6.9: The Corporate Sector’s Harm for the Community How often? City  Ulsan  Very often  Sometimes  Never  42.4  55.1  2.5  8.1  68.8  23.1  Kyungju  253  


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items