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Winning consent: the protracted campaign for an anti-corporatist "common sense" Fuller, S. 1995

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WINNING CONSENT:THE PROTRACTED CAMPAIGNFOR AN ANTI-CORPORATIST “COMMON SENSE”byS. FULLERB.A., University of Cape Town, 1977Post Baccalaureate Diploma, Simon Fraser University, 1988M.A., Simon Fraser University, 1990A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESINTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIESWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardFebruary 14, 1995THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA© S. Fuller, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of therequirements for an advanced degree at the University of BritishColumbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely availablefor reference and study. I further agree that permission forextensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may begranted by the head of my department or by his or herrepresentatives. It is understood that copying or publication ofthis thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without mywritten permission.(Signature)_________________Department of fV4Zti1(L4/uW4k”/ 7’vo,eThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate YCL’-I 2\ “(5AB STRACTThe metaphor used to read the world significantly influences how it is interpreted. Similarly,the assumptions which underpin a study influence the form the arguments take. This thesisembodies the assumption that in complex systems such as that of contemporary society, whichdo not merely reproduce themselves but entail continual change, this change is bestunderstood in terms of how it has been actively contested. The metaphor is struggle.The project has social movements theory as its theoretical interest, in particular themesderived from the thought of Antonio Gramsci and Main Touraine. Specifically, the studypursues its understanding of social transformation using a framework formulated by socialmovements theorists Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison to search out and identifjlonger-term processes related to the subjectivities of intellectual and social action as the key tounderstanding how the dominant way in which a society sees itself can change and in turn canchange the society.The thesis argues for a new understanding of the dramatic changes which took place inindustrialised western countries during the 1 980s associated with a decline of the corporatistperspectives of what is known as the Keynesian “consensus” and an erosion of the power ofmeta-narratives. Adapting to a new purpose an investigative approach in the socialmovements tradition, it identifies and traces a movement campaigning against large-scale stateintervention and for a more market-based social order and pushes its origins back to the193 Os. It takes issue with and puts forward a reformulation of what the dominant accountshave called the “New Right,” generally seen as a response to the “crisis” of the late 1 96Os andII1970s and interpreted through the metaphor of base/superstructure, where historicaldevelopments are rooted in economy.Selecting the period from 1931 to 1981, this study traces the development over 50 years of amovement whose growth began with the arrival in Britain of Friedrich Hayek in 1931 andwhich since that time has fought a concerted international campaign for limited governmentand more market-based approaches, creating and developing the research and policy institute,or think-tank, as an important organisational form along the way and consistentlyforeshadowing political/policy change in the thrust of its movement activities.Methods associated with field work are used, such as observation of the activities andpractices of the intellectuals in their various fora; focused, semi-structured interviewing, usedas a method within the methodology of both survey and case study; as well as what is referredto as unobtrusive measures, such as the examination of documents and other archival material.An account of material not in the bibliography is included in a set of appendices.The originality of this thesis lies in two things: Firstly, in showing that the more robust marketpolicies of many Western governments in the 1980s were the result not just of currents ofideas but of 50 years of struggle by a social movement with intellectuals and organisation;secondly, in using a social movements approach to study a grouping generally conflated withthe Right. The study examines in detail the process in which the movement intellectuals wereengaged and makes links between their protracted, organised intellectual campaign and thechanges which have undermined the postwar Keynesian welfare state. Direct contact wasifimade with the intellectuals in their organisational settings, notably the think-tank, and relevantdocuments stretching back close to the turn of the century were consulted.The study also identifies Hayek not only as a central figure in the revival and reformulation ofclassical liberalism and resolute organiser of the movement campaigning against centralised,large-scale state intervention, but also as an important player in contemporary epistemologicalthemes. His critique of positivism in particular has been a contribution to an intellectual stranderoding the dominance of positivist notions in the post-World War II social sciences. Overall,his work has contributed to keeping the movement vital while raising his own profile in thelast quarter of the 20th century in what is being called the knowledge or information society.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract iiTable of Contents vList of Tables viiiAcknowledgements ixPreface xiiPART ONEMapping the methodological.theoretical, historical and spatial terrainCHAPTER 11. Introduction 52. Why the Period 1931 to 1981? 103. Whythis Site? 144. The “New Right,” and a Reformulationi) The Term Contested 20ii) Taking Issue with the Dominant Accounts of the “New Right” 27iii) The Reformulation 365. Divisions within this Work 45CHAPTER 2Making Links to Existing Literature on Intellectuals and Social Movements1. The Revival of Interest in the Intellectualand Social Movements as Social Agents 482. (3ramsci as Invigorator, and some Similarities to Hayek 583. Touraine’s Influence on Social Movements Theory 634. The Project Framework: Mapping the Eyerman & Janiison Approach 715. Cycles and Social Movements 86CHAPTER 3The Research1. Research Problem 902. Research Strategy: Why This Approach? 913. Research Questions 984. Proceduresi) Interviewing 100ii) Observation 105iii) Documentary Research:Historical, Biographical and Organisational Statements 1065. General Significance of Research Approach 107vPART TWOConsidering the Contexts: The Political. Economic, Cultural and IntellectualCHAPTER 4The Period 1931 to 1948: From National Crisisto the Official Inauguration of the British Welfare State 113CHAPTER 5Keynes and Hayek and the Intellectual Milieu from which they EmergeCambridge and the LSE: Opposing Camps in Contested Terrain 124a) Hayek: His PositionHayek’s Austrian Beginnings 126Hayek at the LSE, 1931-1950, and his Academic Evolution 137c) Keynes: His Position 149Keynes at Cambridge, 1919-1946 152b) The Keynes/Hayek Struggle: Differences and Some Similarities 155CHAPTER 61. The Keynesian Climate, and the Early Resistance 1632. The Contexts and the Movement 176PART THREEReading the movement: The protracted struggle against large-scale stateintervention and campaign for a more market-based order. 1931-1981CHAPTER 7The Period of Gestation, 1931 to 1944:Contesting the Interventionist Argument 180CHAPTER 8The Period ofFormation, 1944 to 1957:Organising the Base 202CHAPTER 9The Period of Consolidation, 1957 to 1974:The lEA, the Changing Climateand the Campaign for Market Approaches to Policy 228CHAPTER 10Winning Consent for Market-Based Thinking, 1974 to 1981:Creating Spaces, Expanding the Network and Translating the Model 276viPART FOURThe influence on the intellectual and social field of the movement’sprotracted campaign for a more market-based social orderCHAPTER 11By Way of Conclusion:Intellectuals, Think-tanks and the Intellectual and Social Field 304POSTSCRIPT: BETWEEN THE LINES 316BIBLIOGRAPHY 335APPENDICESI The Research Procedure 359II People attending Mont Pèlerin Society inaugural meeting, April 1-10, 1947 368ifi Statement of Aims of the Mont Pêlerin Society 369IV First elected office-bearers of the Mont Pèlerin Society 370V Chronology of the lEA to 1981 371VI Topics discussed at Mont Pèlerin meetings, 1947 to 1989 374VII Institute ofEconomic Affairs publications from inauguration to 1981 375VIII U.K. parliamentary election results 1931-1987 384IX U.S. presidential election results 1932-1988 385X The British Privatisation Campaign 386INDEX 390viiLIST OF TABLESTable 1: U.K. parliamentary voting trends 1945-1987 3Table 2: U.S. presidential voting trends 1932-1984 4Table 3: lEA Income and Expenditure for 1990/91 248Table 4: International growth of research and policy institutesresisting large-scale state intervention andpromoting market-based approaches 277vifiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSMost work is a collaboration before it is an individual effort and, as I note in a postscript,Between the Lines, which augments the brief acknowledgements format, this thesis is noexception. To rank those who contributed is always difficult, but the tireless support at everylevel of my foremost partner, John Fuller, from unflagging encouragement to committedediting, was crucial to the completion and quality of this project, a contribution soconsiderable as to make any attempt at thanks seem insufficient and the customary renditionof thanks too clichéd to describe either the contribution or my appreciation. While my thanksfall short of the contribution, I offer them with sincere gratitude. The significant contributionof my other foremost partner, Marc Fuller, stretches back some way through time. Anacademic career would have been impossible to even conceive of without his enthusiasm,grace, humour and wisdom— attributes he always exhibited irrespective of his youth. As sonand friend, I couldn’t have had a more exemplary model to grow up alongside. Again, anyexpression of appreciation and thanks for his vital contribution appears severely lacking interms of what he gave. While I wrote of Brian Elliott’s contribution to this work in thepostscript, the invaluable role he played as chair of my thesis committee needs reiteration. Irepeat, too, my thanks to the other committee members, Patricia Marchak, Martin Silvermanand Philip Resnick. An important contribution came also from the Social Sciences andHumanities Research Council (SSHRC), which gave me funding, as did the University ofBritish Columbia. To repeat my thanks given elsewhere, Dean John Grace of GraduateStudies and Associate Dean Laurie Ricou, responsible for Interdisciplinary Studies, showed aninterest which was especially gratil,’ing in light of the large body of students for which theyixare responsible. My topic required significant travel in the U.S and Britain to conductinterviews, carry out observation and collect archival material. I was lucky to have graciousfriends with whom I could stay, an essential factor in being able to take on the topic, and I amespecially grateful for this help and accommodation in London, New York, Washington andSan Francisco. I owe gratitude to David Lewis and his family, who let me live in their houseon two research trips to London. John Cavil and Sarah Davey were two other friends whograciously opened their home to me on three visits to London and extended many othergenerosities. Matthew Franzidis I thank for his continual offers of hospitality. Clive Helfet andSusie Adams were my kind hosts and friends in New York City, while Adrian Croft extendedhospitality to me in San Francisco, as did Ros Davidson, who gave me her apartment while Iwas doing archival work at Stanford. These acts of generosity are greatly appreciated. I alsothank the following friends who helped out in many different ways, often with accommodationas well — John Blake and Karen Brown, John and Judy Smithson, Edward Russell-Walling,Michael Richman, Chris Ball, Cecilia Colombi, John and Anne Buckman, Mike and NickyHughes and Michael Gavshon, an intimate friend going back to our first year asundergraduates.I thank Chantal Mouffe for the hospitality she and Ernesto Laclau extended to me in London,and also for the introductions they made possible to scholars in the cultural studies field suchas Stuart Hall, who has greatly influenced my thinking.The friendship I received at UBC and from others in Vancouver was also greatly appreciated.I shared collegiality with many, but would like specifically to thank the following. Jill Fitzelllent an ear and read my thesis, making useful comments, but more especially, as one of thexfirst to read the draft, her positive feedback was most encouraging, spurring me on to furtherrefinements. Ian Angus was another who generously read my thesis. Sut Jhally gave mematerial of interest on Hall, having earlier fuelled my enthusiasm for his work. Doug Aoki,with whom I wrestled ideas, was a supportive friend and intellectual buddy. MohammadSoleiman-Panah was there to read, which he did readily. Bruce Arai, as the studentrepresentative in sociology— my “home department” most of the way — acted withconsideration whenever encountered. My colleague and friend at Spartacus Books, Jill Spicer,kept an eye out for books and kept me on my toes in terms of social and cultural theory.Kevin Haggerty was generous, passing material of interest to me. Bob Ratner, with whom Ishare an interest as the other professor with Brian Elliott in the department of sociologyengaged in social movements theory, would also remember me when he came upon pertinentmaterial. The students in my Sociology 300 class in 1994 heightened the excitement ofworking in the field.The archival staff of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University gave freely of their time, asdid the staff at the London School of Economics and the Rockefeller Archive Center inupstate New York. This help was much appreciated, as was that of the staff at the lEA library.UBC library staff were always accommodating and insightful when called upon for help. Theoffice staff in Political Science and in Anthropology and Sociology helped wherever theycould, as did the staff at Graduate Studies and Green College. This made life a lot easier.My other informants from within the movement I studied and who were thus crucial to thisproject, I thank in detail in the postscript.xPREFACEWe know that earlier transitions (feudalism to capitalism,household production to modem industry) all tumed out, oninspection, to be more protracted and incomplete than thetheory suggested.— Stuart Hall, Brave New World (1988)XIIPART ONEMapping the Historical. Spatial.Theoretical andMethodological Terrain1the ideas of economists and political philosophers, bothwhen they are right and when they are wrong, are morepowerfil than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world isruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to bequite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually theslaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, whohear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from someacademic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that thepower of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared withthe gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately,but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic andpolitical philosophy there are not many who are influenced bynew theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, sothat the ideas which civil servants and politicians and evenagitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest.But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which aredangerous for good or evil.— John MaynardKeynes’The character of the process by which the views of theintellectuals influence the politics of tomorrow is therefore ofmuch more than academic interest. Whether we merely wish toforesee or attempt to influence the course of events, it is afactor of much greater importance than is generally understood.What to the contemporary observer appears as the battle ofconflicting interests has indeed often been decided long beforein a clash of ideas confined to narrow circles.— Friedrich A. Hayek2John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1960) 383-384. (First published in 1936.)2 F.A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review 16.3(1949) 6. Reprinted with permission in 1990 by the Institute for Humane Studies, George MasonUniversity.The intellectual battle between Keynes (1883-1946) and Hayek (1899-1992), two figures in 20thcentury economics well known for their respective roles in proposing and opposing the welfirestate, is a major theme of this work.2TABLE 1: U.K. VOTING TRENDS: Percentage of vote obtained5040302010D Labour • ConservativeThis table indicates the domination ofBritish politics by the Conservative Party in recent years.The election victories of 1979, 1983 and 1987 represent the most substantial, most sustainedsupport any party platform has received in the postwar era.Source: Parliamentaiy Elections in Britain,published by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1992.1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 19873TABLE 2: U.S. VOTING TRENDS: Percentage of presidential vote obtainedD Democrats • Republicans60--...........50 .....______-40.- . . .... ..30 .. . ... . .. . . . .. ..20 .. .. -. . .. . .. .. . ..10.. . ... . - .. . . .. :..1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984This table shows strong support at one end for Roosevelt’s interventionist New Deal, andat the other for Reagan, a rhetorical advocate of the market.Source: StatisticalAbstract of the Us., 112th edition, 19924CHAPTER 11. IntroductionAccounts of the rise of a “New Right”3 began to proliferate in the 1 980s, with critics andscholars of differing persuasions often sharing the conclusion that what they conceived of as anew movement had materialised about a decade earlier. It was generally held that thismovement had gained quick political success with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979and Ronald Reagan in 198O, two leaders distinguished by a commitment to argumentsassociated with the movement position on limited government and a more market-based socialorder, at least rhetorically.5For the most part, these accounts draw on the base-superstructure tradition, which comes outof the historical materialist variant often associated with orthodox Marxism. In this rendering,which generally says relatively little about culture, historical development is rooted in theeconomy and the emergence of classes with conflicting interests. Following this tradition, adiverse set of elements is grouped together and collectively labelled the New Right, a termaround which the theorists construct a critique of forces challenging the Keynesian welfare stateand eroding the “consensus” — the body of economic and social ideas that dominated politicalthought and practice in most industrialised democracies for about three decades after WorldThe term “New Right” has been introduced in quotation marks to indicate a recognition that it is aproblematic construction, as will be discussed later; where it is used, it is used as a shorthand or torepresent the formulation of the body of literature that uses it.See Tables I-1V.While the term “market” is sometimes spoken with uncritical praise, other times as a reproach, itgenerally is used to convey the notion that some buyers and sellers have been able to meet, bargain,agree and set a price where, in the language of economics, their supply and demand curves meet.Rupert Pennant-Rea and Bill Emmott in The Pocket Economist (Oxford and London: MartinRobertson and The Economist, 1983) 113 point out that “market forces” does not mean that open,still less perfect, competition prevails, or that all market participants are well infonned.5War II. Most of these theorists, whose work in this regard is discussed later in the chapter,view with alarm what they identif’ as the New Right, which they see as arising out of aneconomic, accumulation and/or legitimation crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For them,the rejuvenation of ideas associated with liberalism and the dwindling of support forlarge-scale state intervention and rationalist planning are largely attributable to conditions ofbreakdown and crisis in these decades— thus following rather than coming before orcontributing to the crisis they describe.In departing from this type of account, this study identifies and traces the development of animportant movement which was not only a source of coherence for the other elements whichwere to later come under the banner, but which as the generative force for what was to followcontributed to creating the crises which are said to have given rise to what has beencharacterised as the New Right. The economic circumstances and technological environmentof the 1970s indeed offered new opportunities for the movement campaigning againstlarge-scale state intervention and for limited government and a more market-based socialorder.6 This thesis will argue, however, that the roots of the movement do not lie in the globaleconomic and technological restructuring that began in the 1970s. The genesis of themovement lies deeper.In proposing an alternative view, this study adopts an approach informed by social movementstheory and uses a theoretical framework formulated mainly from the work of three key figures6 This study concentrates on a movement whose actors have in common their advocacy of a societybased on market principles and the pursuit in principle of reduced government involvement ineconomic relations between citizens. This is what is denoted by the term “the movement” in the textfrom here forward, a notion not necessarily always synonymous with what scholars signify whenthey use the term “New Right,” as will be more fully explained later in this chapter.6in the field — Antonio Gramsci, Main Touraine and Mberto Melucci — insofar as it posits aprotracted period of intellectual contestation during which the dominant view or “commonsense” is disputed and transformed in advance of political and policy change. The approachdraws on insights of the tradition which, deriving much from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony,sees a new common sense or hegemony as having to be developed from a critical position byintellectuals; having to be worked for; and then being partially achieved and incomplete. Asdiscussed in Chapter 2, it is an approach which conceives a Gramscian theoretical frameworkwhereby a significant role is given to intellectuals, using the term in a non-elitist way to meanthose who function, in Gramsci’s language, as permanent persuaders. In addition, this studytakes the position that the act of calling into question a dominant interpretation, anundertaking frequently performed by social movements, can bring to light social situationspreviously without significant expression, creating counter-arguments which to some degreecontribute to constructing what is then seen as the changed social reality.7 Thus, a campaigncan change people’s perceptions of the social world, thereby contributing to bringing about acrisis by unsettling and eroding the legitimacy of a reigning consensus.This examination, then, is underpinned by the following assumptions:I Social transformations are generally protracted processes, and often incomplete;• Social transformations are the result of a combination of factors, rather than beingdetermined by any one, such as the economic or, for that matter, the cultural;‘ See Emesto Laclau’s discussion in “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,” Universal Abandon?The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1988) 63-82, and Chantal Mouffe’s “Radical Democracy” in the same collection, 31-45.7• Intellectual campaigns within social movements play an important role in social change, butpeople are not cultural dupes who quickly and unthinkingly embrace any set of ideas that isproclaimed, no matter how powerful or well financed the source. In other words, the notionthat the mass of people — with the exception of the scholars making the claim, of course —could be victims of false ideology is rejected, while at the same time the significant influenceof texts and narratives on the social world is recognised, as is the constituted but notdetermined character of the subject;• Complex social systems such as that of contemporary society do not confine themselves tothe reproduction of social structures or an order but are characterised also by social action andresistance, change and indeterminacy.In the context of a belief that a new hegemony or common sense has to be worked for over aprolonged period by intellectuals with a critical sense of the reigning common sense orprevailing dominant view, this study takes issue with those arguing that it is through thehistorical context of the 1960s and 1970s that the rise of a movement campaigning formarket-based approaches and against large-scale state intervention should be read.In contrast, this study traces its analysis back to an earlier decade of crisis, the 1930s, findingthere the antecedents of the social movement. By proposing the 193 Os, 1940s and the years ofpostwar economic reconstruction as the context of the genesis, this study brings into focus theimportance of the movement’s sustained intellectual campaign in the later decline of theKeynesian consensus, characterised by such programmes as the deregulation of foreignexchange markets and the privatisation of state assets. It is a role practically ignored in those8accounts which stress economic or technological aspects as having determined this change andgiven rise to the New Right, a movement portrayed as an almost spontaneous and“successftil” response to the needs of sections of capital.The welfare state was indeed cenged in the 1970s by a proliferation of organisations rallyingagainst what they argued was an ever greater government encroachment on the private sphereand civil society, but this cenge had as its leading edge a philosophy of limited governmentand market principles already rendered coherent by years of activity on the part of neo-liberaland libertarian intellectual activists.8A critique of the welfare state came from groups on theleft as well, who saw bureaucratic domination and the exercise of power by functionaries ofthe welfare, educational, health and housing agencies as stifling. The opposition of certainintellectuals and activists to the Keynesian, the collectivist and the corporatist views of therelationship between the individual and the state can be seen as having opened up to questionand problematised that around which there had seemingly been a “consensus” or dominantinterpretation of the nature of this relationship. In other words, their intellectual activityprecedes the “crisis” which dominates the earlier accounts, rather than following it, as usuallyportrayed.Critiques of the welfare state did not come only from this quarter. For example, Alan O’Connor inRaymond Williams: Writing. Culture, Politics (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 14cites a 1958 analysis of the welfare state in which Brian Abel-Smith concludes that it benefitsmainly the middle classes, contained in Nonnan MacKenzie, ed., Conviction (London: MacGibbonand Kee, 1958). Abel-Smith was one of a number of such critics, many of whom developed theirpositions from his work.92. Why The Period 1931 to 1981?The years from 1931 to 1981 are selected as the period of investigation for a number ofreasons. It was during this time that the relative rise and decline of Keynesian thinking tookplace and the social sciences were at their most confident in the ability to predict and knowsociety, often in the belief it could be controlled. It was also a period which began with thearrival from Vienna of a key movement figure, Friedrich Hayek, at an important site, theLondon School of Economics (LSE), from which the battle against the Keynesian positionwould begin. Finally, the 50 years which conclude with the election of Thatcher and Reagancover the development of the social movement of which Hayek became the symbolic andorganisational leader, growing out of a small cadre and reshaping itself to different contextsalong the way.Choosing the 1930s over the 1970s as a starting point does not imply that the earlier decade isconsidered the absolute beginning of the movement. There can be no such point for theanalysis of any social movement, transformation or phenomenon, as is argued, among others,by Stuart Hall in his discussion of the origins of the new “discipline” of cultural studies, thebody of thought associated with him, others such as Raymond Williams and the centre forcultural studies at Birmingham University. For Hall, there are no “absolute beginnings” and“few unbroken continuities”9in intellectual endeavours.However, it was in the 1930s — a decade of upheaval and transition which brought strikingeconomic and political turning points, polarisation, the Depression and World War II — thatanti-state-interventionists grouped to fight it out with rival intellectuals and activistsHall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” Media. Culture and Society 2 (1980) 57-72.10championing various forms of collectivism and seeking to establish firmly what was to becomeknown as the Keynesian welfare state. Each of these groupings comprised far more than anintellectual leader and a band of followers; nevertheless the contrary formations did, to a greatdegree, organise around the work of two key figures — Hayek and John Maynard Keynes,discussed in detail in Part Two.1°Keynes, whose name became synonymous with large-scalegovernment intervention and planned economies, had argued for an end to laissez faireeconomic thinking since at least 1924.11 Just as the economic and legitimation crisis of the1 970s was later to offer the anti-state-interventionists new opportunities for persuasion, theDepression and World War II, both economically and politically, made Keynesian analysiscompelling to many important groupings. Certain policy aspects offered not only politicaladvantages but perhaps the promise of survival in those troubled times.Against the position argued by Hayek and his Austrian School’2 associates, it was theKeynesian intellectual position that was to win out in the postwar period, and from whichgrew a “consensus,” however fragile and unstable, around the need for an interventionist‘° In Robert Skidelsky’s view Hayek was, of all Keynes’s critics, “the most intransigent defender ofthe non-interventionist order.” Skideisky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour1920-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1992) 454.“ According to Skidelsky, “Keynes’s 1924 Sidney Ball lecture, ‘The End of Laissez-Faire,’ deliveredat Oxford on November 6, 1924 and published in 1926, provides the framework within whichKeynes’s arguments developed over the next five years.” Skidelsky 225.12 Vienna in the early 20th century was the fount of a number of then modem schools of study, suchas psychoanalysis, represented by Freud, Austrian School economics, represented by Ludwig vonMises and Hayek, and a variation of philosophy, represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein, amongothers. During the time Hayek was in Vienna it was one of the three most prestigious places tostudy economics. A new work characterises fin de siècle Vienna as follows: Vienna, the birthplaceof psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud), of atonal music (Arnold Schoenberg) and modem functionalarchitecture (Adolf Loos); but also Zionism (Theodor Herzl) and National Socialism (AdolfHitler). “In short, the research laboratory for world destruction (Karl Kraus, Viennese satirist).”John Heaton and Judy Groves, Wittgenstein for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon, 1994) 6.11Keynesian welfare state. This Keynesian “consensus”3was of course incomplete, since anabsolute consensus across a society is improbable, and it, like the current but fiercelycontested “consensus” around the preferability of anti-statist, market-based approaches, didnot appear out of nowhere in the 1 940s. Rather, it evolved from at least the beginning of thecentury in a piecemeal fashion, gaining reinforcement from arguments such as thosedisseminated by the Fabians for some 50 years’4 and ironically, too, from Britain’s imperialistaspirations, as discussed later. The favour the Keynesian argument found in Britain in the1940s, a period discussed in detail in Part Two, facilitated the subsequent formalestablishment of the postwar Keynesian welfare state in the United Kingdom in 1948. It wasfollowed elsewhere in the world in either the social democratic or liberal form, and remainedlargely intact until the 1970s. Although it came under increasing strain in certain respects fromthe 1950s and a general erosion was under way by the late 1970s, it has, however, in a numberof respects continued in a more or less diminished form into the 1980s and 1990s.During the tenure of the “consensus” there was general agreement that large-scalegovernment intervention was necessary, much of this inspired by Keynes’s The General‘ The term consensus has elicited a number of responses, more recently by thinkers categorised andidentified with the post-structural paradigm such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, who characterises aconsensus such as that called for by JUrgen Habermas as the end of thinking. In Postmodemism: AReader (New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1993) 25-26, Thomas Docherty, in hisintroduction to the debate, discusses this position thus: “In short, this means that it is only in therefusal of consensus and in the search for ‘dissensus’ that we will be able to extend thinking, toallow it to be shocked into the new, the (chronological) post-modern. Consensus is a means ofarresting the flow of events, a mode whereby eventuality can be reduced to punctuality; it is a wayof reducing the philosophy of Becoming to a philosophy of Being.”14 This was so not only at the level of ideas, but had its effect on policy as well. In the Liberalgovernments of the period 1906 to 1916, legislation such as the National Insurance Act of 1911was enacted which heralded what was later to become known as the welfare state. StanleyBaldwin’s Conservative government implemented new unemployment benefits under the 1927Unemployment Insurance Act, and the scheme was changed again by the 1934 Unemployment Act.12Theory of Unemployment. Interest and Money (1936), which argued that where demand fellshort of supply, it should be the government’s responsibility to make up the shortfall and,accordingly, employ resources such as labour which otherwise might remain underutilised.Liberal, Labour and Conservative governments in Britain all went along with this thinkinguntil Margaret Thatcher’s government broke with it in the 1980s.Scholars writing on the New Right, Patricia Marchak being one example,’5 refer to thepostwar ethos of agreement as a consensus. Arthur Marwick, noting that all generalisationsare open to criticism in detail, writes of a spirit of consensus that prevailed from 1945 untilThatcher came to power.’6Norman Barry dates the consensus period, which he argues wasone of remarkable intellectual stability, from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s. He sees this eraof consensus, defining it as a body of social and economic ideas that “ruled” political thoughtand practice, as prevailing in the western democracies, with the exception of West Germany.17The work of the Fabian Society, established in the 1 880s with the intention of reconstructingsociety on a non-competitive basis,’8 also contributed to this orthodoxy. Peter Jenkins prefersto refer to it not so much as a consensus but as a postwar settlement which had grown out ofthe briefwartime suspension of party politics:Like the 1688 Act of Settlement which finally resolved theconstitutional issues of the Civil War, the Attlee government’ssocial legislation, much of it inspired by the forethought of theCoalition, was designed to call at least a truce in the class warwhich had disfigured the politics of the 1920s and 1930s. Fullemployment and the maintenance of the Welfare State became‘ M. Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of GlobalMarkets (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991) 3.16 Arthur Marwick, Culture in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 15, 16.17 Norman Barry, The New Right (London, New York and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987) 1.18 Edward Pease, The History of the Fabian Society (London: Frank Cass, 1963) 37.13the accepted goals of both parties, if for no other reason than todepart from them would be to court electoral defeat.’9In the United States Keynes’s ideas also had an impact, with Harvard University acting as thecentre for this development. This Keynesian thinking was evident in the further extension anddevelopment of what was termed the “New Deal,” which had been inaugurated in 1933following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election as president.3. Why this Site?The geographical focus of this project is the milieu of the British intellectuals in the movementthat started with Hayek, since it is there that the international revival and reformulation ofclassical liberal thought in the 20th century has its early organisational origins. Indeed, theattitude is fairly common that Britain should be seen as the home of liberalism, based on thenational origin of many of the thinkers that are constitutive of this corpus, of whom JohnStuart Mill is an often-used example. Through the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, as large-scalestate intervention became the practice of Conservative and Labour governments alike, liberalintellectuals waged a battle against the Keynesian consensus through their organisations andkey locations. Britain’s welfare state was among the most fully consummated in democraticindustrial states, and it was in that country that the wartime interventionist measures weremost comprehensively extended after 1945 as the economy was reconstructed. Britain at thattime was also a nation of considerable international influence often looked to for intellectualguidance and is still, despite its fall from the role of a major power, a major centre ininternational financial markets and a country that gets attention when the fierce battles over19 Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era (London, Sydney andAuckland: Pan, 1989) 5.14economic and social issues take place — of which the privatisation campaign of the 1980s isthe leading recent example. Peter Saunders and Cohn Harris, in a discussion of Britishprivatisation, cite David Heald and D. Thomas as remarking that there is no other example inthe 20th century of a British policy initiative achieving such a degree of influence in theinternational arena.2°As is more fully set out in Part Three, it was in this environment that one of the most effectiveand durable institutions of opposition to large-scale state intervention was to develop. TheLondon-based and Hayek-inspired Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA), set up in 1955, was ingood part responsible for the fact that Britain was the country in which ideas associated with20th century liberal thought took firmest hold.For the movement campaigning for limited government and a more market-based society, theTEA is an important organising and articulating site in the sense that, inspired by Hayek, itbrought together in material form his views on how consent for a different social order shouldbe won. At the same time it offers an illustration of the practices and activities of intellectualswithin an organisation which has been successful in terms of its policy achievements, asevidenced by the influence that a political leader such as Thatcher claims it exerted on her(although there were neo-liberals, market liberals or libertarians who failed to see theliberalism for which they had argued at work in her administration), and which has also beenemulated internationally. The lEA’s approach can also be seen as an example of how a morespecialised knowledge, in this case, economic thinking and approaches to social problems and20 Peter Saunders and Cohn Harris, Privatization and Popular Capitalism (Buckingham: OpenUniversity Press, 1994) 6.15policy formulations, can be disseminated and converted through others (in Gramscianlanguage, permanent persuaders) into a less abstract knowledge, or common sense, whichthen facilitates a shift through political and policy changes.The lEA spawned many organisations, both nationally and internationally, attempting toemulate the success of its Hayekian formula of indirect persuasion aimed at influencing thosein a position to influence others on a larger scale and, through them, politics and policies. Italso inspired variants during the 1970s such as the Centre for Policy Studies and the AdamSmith Institute, which took a more direct approach. The lEA helped to create the climatewhich paved the way for the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and the privatisationprogramme of the 1 980s, which by 1992 had resulted in the disposal of £41.5 billion of stateassets, most of which was sold through stock market flotation,2’bringing with it a weakeningof not only trade union power but also the privileges of professionals such as lawyers andprofessors. Indeed, it is Britain since Thatcher that is seen as a testing ground for the radicalimplementation of market-based ideas, just as Britain under Clement Attlee from 1945 wasseen by other nations as the experimental project for the implementation of radicalFabian/Keynesian corporatist ideas.It was in Britain in the 1930s that a debate began whose impact on the world is still felt. Itsprincipal protagonists, Hayek and Keynes, were both at British academic institutions; Keynesat Cambridge and Hayek at the more publicly integrated LSE. Both believed strongly thatknowledge creation, ideas and their proponents play a significant role in political outcomes, as21 Ibid 5, citing written reply, Hansard, January 24 1992, Vol. 202, Col. 388-9w.16the two quotations at the beginning of this chapter ffiustrate. The two vigorously andpublicly contested one another’s ideas in the 1930s and engaged in a conmiitted personalcorrespondence from the late 1920s until Keynes’s death in 1946. They were rivals as keen asthe two institutions within which they worked, and this battle of ideas in the context of the1930s forms the core ofPart Two.Foreshadowing a theme that now pervades much contemporary thinking, Hayek and othersadvanced a sceptical view of the social blueprint and the expert constructing it, a view basedon an assumption of the uncertainties of knowledge and importance of dispersed and localknowledges. Different variants of this position, critical of absolute knowledge and truth, arenow associated with arguments usually designated post-structural and/or post-colonial. Hayekand fellow members of the Austrian School banded together in portraying the market andentrepreneur as playing a positive, progressive and creative role of discovery in society.Hayek waged a battle of ideas from the LSE which, being situated in a capital which is thenational centre of almost all activity, had a very public location in British intellectual life andalso the advantage of attracting a high percentage of international scholars. This was of greatimport for a project such as the Hayek-inspired crusade for limited government and amarket-based social order.22 As intellectuals, some would argue, both Keynes and Hayek had an interest in putting forward thisposition in which the role of ideas and intellectuals is seen as being as powerful as they contend itis. While the researcher should be aware of the possible significance of location to argument, thisthesis, by considering the role of intellectuals in the manner it does, focuses the question outside ofa narrow realm which tends towards the view that action is linked functionally to self-interest.23 The Austrian School is characterised by a view of markets as a discovery procedure in a worldwhere tastes and techniques are changing, and information scarce and expensive. See Brittan 214.17The intellectual culture of a particular geographical community is a significant consideration;theorists using the work of Pierre Bourdieu have revealed, for example, that France, NorthAmerica and Britain are substantially different in regard to their academic institutions andenvironments. A number of the active movement intellectuals interviewed for this project alsoremarked on the need for a sensitivity to different intellectual cultures (these were usuallyintellectuals engaged in adapting research and policy institutes of the Hayek-inspired model tolocal milieus in locations outside of the London base; an important focus in this study). RonEyerman and Andrew Jamison, whose theoretical framework is used for this study and whosework on social movements informs it, recognise this too.On the empirical level, the success or failure of a particularmovement usually depends on its ability to mobilize resourcesand to exploit the “opportunity structures” of the surroundingparticular culture to achieve its strategic aims.24Arguably, this difference may also influence which element and aspects of the widermovement, for example the more neo-liberal, libertarian, or neo-conservative, gainsprominence in a particular location at a specific time, as discussed later, as well as theparticular ways in which these groupings and elements are constituted.The impact which Keynes’s ideas had on public policy in Britain and indeed in the world needsno great elaboration, but Hayek, 16 years his junior, survived him by nearly five decades andwent much further as an active mobiliser. The interdisciplinary scholar (not therefore only) oflimited government and the more market-based approach who had, he said, been convinced ofthe merits of his outlook by his experiences of wartime planning, especially in his native24 Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach (Cambridge:Polity, 1991) 64.18Austria during World War I, believed it was important to bring scattered liberal and libertarianscholars together in solidarity and from this base to contest the “common sense” of large-scalestate intervention. A major mobiising influence at the time was Hayek’s The Road toSerfdom, published in Britain in 1944 and directed at a British audience, according to Hayek,a book in which he warned of the dangers he saw in central social planning. From his Britishlocation at the LSE he set about the creation of an organisation which was to be a guidingforce for an international movement, and these efforts by Hayek, the symbolic head and chiefmobiliser, led to the creation of the Mont Pèlerin Society,25 which held its first meeting inSwitzerland in 1947.26 By the 1990s membership had grown to close to 500 members fromaround the world, and the organisation seems equipped to continue into the next century.The Mont Pèlerin facilitated the construction of a sense of solidarity; a collective identity andsubjectivity, albeit one that stressed the individual; an entrepreneurial subjectivity; a forum forthe interpretation and reinterpretation of classical liberal economics in contemporary terms; aconduit for the sharing of resources, including intellectuals; and a strategic location fororganising the international development and dissemination of anti-statist market ideas.One of the most important aspects of this latter goal was the facilitating of the growth of aninternational network of research and policy institutes promoting limited government andmarket-based approaches, and a number of institutes later established were first conceived atThe Mont Pèlerin Society is an important organisation in the campaign for limited government anda more market-based social order, and it is thus examined in detail in this study. The relevantpapers of the organisation are held along with Hayek’s at the Hoover Institution at StanfordUniversity, Palo Alto. The Hoover Institution’s archival library was visited on two occasionsduring the research process.26 Those who attended the first Mont Plerin meeting in April 1947 are listed in Appendix II.19an annual Mont Pèlerin meeting. This growth was aided in good measure by the example ofthe groundbreaking lEA, which Antony Fisher had set up on the advice of Hayek after readingand being inspired by The Road to Serfdom. Fisher went on to set up what were referred to as“factories for ideas” based on the IRA model, which he reproduced in North Americanlocations from the 1970s.Four Fisher/Hayek research and policy institutes are the focus of the substantive portion ofthis thesis because of their key role in the winning of consent for a set of ideas internationally,and they are examined in detail in Part Three. They are the TEA; the Manhattan Institute,founded by Fisher in New York City in 1977; the Pacific Research Institute, established byFisher in San Francisco in 1979; and the Atlas Economic Research Institute, set up in 1981 byFisher, and located in Virginia near Washington, D.C. Atlas was to fulfil a morecomprehensive role than the earlier institutes: It was to nurture an international network ofthink-tanks campaigning for limited government and advocating and promoting market-basedapproaches. Indeed, it can be seen as the international meta-institute of the Fisher network.4. The “New Right.” and a Reformulation(i) The Term ContestedThe expression “New Right” appears to be the choice of those who construct and oppose it.According to the Oxford English Dictionary,27it entered the language in the mid-1960s in theUnited States when Time used it to counter the expression “New Left,” presumably inspiredby the work of Daniel Bell on the American right three years earlier in 1963. The term moved27 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. Vol. 17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 374. Thiscitation indicates that the first reference to the term occurred in Time on Nov. 11, 1966.20across the Atlantic and into the academic domain in Britain with the appearance in 1968 ofDavid Collard’s The New Right: A Critique. Apparently the first to use the term in his field,Collard later referred to this work as “a little Fabian tract”28 in an TEA publication.“New Right” is an umbrella term which has been used to cover such disparate constituents asthe American religious right; liberals, many actively anti-religious, arguing for limitedgovernment and greater freedoms from state control within a more market-based society; andlibertarian and anarchist groups calling with others, for example, for the decriminalisation ofmarijuana.29Generally, at least three larger groupings can be seen as coming together to constitute themovement— the neo-liberal, deriving its ideals from classical liberalism and reformulatingthese into what has been characterised as a modem classical or economic liberalism; theneo-conservative,3°which is inconsistent in its dedication to limited government and a more28 David Collard, “Market Failure and Government Failure,” The Emerging Consensus ...? (London:The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1981)123. On the strength of electronic searches of variouslibrary data bases, Collard’s The New Right: A Critique (London: Fabian Society, 1968) istentatively identified as the first published work to use the term. Daniel Bell had earlier publishedThe Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Uydated (Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday, 1963).29 A recently published dictionary of words that have entered the English language since 1960 lists“New Right” as having entered mainstream usage in about 1980, and defines it thus: “A coalitionof conservative groups, originating in the U.S. but growing in the U.K. during the Thatcher era,whose political and social platform is essentially aimed to reverse the advances made in the 1960sas regarded capital punishment, abortion, gay and lesbian rights, censorship and similar issues.”Jonathan Green, Tuttle Dictionary of New Words Since 1960 (Boston; Rutland, Vermont andTokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1991) 180.30 Samuel Brittan in A Restatement of Economic Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1988) 213 notesthat neo-conservatism is an American term. He sees it as useful in describing those who flirt withfree-market ideas, but are mainly interested in restoring traditional values, Victorian or otherwise,strengthening patriarchal and fuinily feelings, pursuing a strong nationalist or anti-Communistforeign policy and reinforcing respect for authority.21market-based society, usually linking such calls to an appeal for greater authority within it;31and the libertarian element, which argues for a minimal state and extensive individual freedom.Indeed, many groupings of conservatives and neo-conservatives are antagonistic towardseconomic and other forms of liberalism.In a discussion of the debate in British media during the Thatcher period, Maurice Cowlingdescribes the major contributors associated with the New Right, noting their diversity:five overlapping movements, conducted by about fiftypeople (mainly graduates and mostly men) who have come fromno one type of social, sexual or intellectual background andwho include among their number a smattering of atheists andagnostics, a few converted, a few practising and a few lapsedCatholics, a handfhl of Jews, observing or otherwise, someDissenters and Evangelicals, a fair number of observing and anumber of converted Anglicans, and a contingent for whomreligion is of little significance.In opinion there has been a lack of stereotype. Many ofthose who have supported market economics have beenauthoritarian about moral and social questions, many whosupported Mr Powell economically did not support him aboutEurope, Ireland, Immigration or the Soviet Union. ColdWarriors and anti-Cold Warriors, Europeans andanti-Europeans, Americans and anti-Americans, and both thefriends and the enemies of Israel, have been distributed fairlyrandomly.3231 The difference between the neo-liberal and neo-conservative outlooks, discussed in more detaillater, is perhaps demonstrated in the difference between an interview with Madsen Pirie of theAdam Smith Institute, written by Edward Pearce in The Guardian of April 19, 1993, and a Feb. 5,1994 article by Miro Cernetig in The Globe and Mail entitled the Neo-Cons: Young Bucks of theNew Right. Despite the fact that The Guardian is generally considered a paper of the left, and iscertainly some distance left of The Globe and Mail, it pens a favourable picture of market advocatePine, pointing out he should not be dismissed with the careless label “right wing.” It quotes Pine aspointing out that the Adam Smith Institute “has never expressed a view on inmiigration,punishment, race or anything to do with authority.” The article, “The Prophet of Private Profit,”describes Pirie as a follower of public choice theory, a concept, it says, which is “profoundlyanti-authoritarian.” The description of the neo-conservative grouping in The Globe and Mail is insharp contrast. “Today’s neo-cons see themselves as foot soldiers fighting a liberal establishment.They believe the sixties, that much ballyhooed decade, with its free love and free money, causedmany of today’s woes,” writes Cemetig.32 Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)22In Cowling’s view the divergent elements converge on the belief that:there should in some sense be less government ratherthan more, even if at times on the way this involves moregovernment rather than less.33The meaning of the term New Right changes depending on the national or historical context inwhich it is being used, yet has gained such acceptance that even those rejecting it in referenceto themselves feel bound to use it in their counter-narratives because of its prevalence.34Hayek, too, might have expressed distaste for the label New Right. In one of his earlierwritings which seems to indicate he has no affinity with the “right,” he says:The forces of the right are usually neither inteffigent enoughto value the support of intellectual activities, nor have they thesort of prizes to offer which are likely to influence honestpeople.35Some calling themselves liberals refhse the designation “New Right” because they consider itsauthoritarian and anti-liberal connotations derogatory, and because it makes them unwillingconsorts of others. A number of liberals interviewed for this project believed the label to beinappropriate in reference to themselves, but claimed they had learned to live with it sincetheir objections had been ignored. They felt, however, that the term obscured rather thanenlightened, some giving as another example of this the distinction commonly made betweenleft and right. Radicals reside in many places, as do conservatives, they argue.xowxovfi.Ibidxli.Arthur Seldon, ed., The New Right Enlightenment: The Spectre that Haunts the Left (Sevenoaks,Kent: E & L Books, 1985) xi-xii.F.A. Hayek, “On Being An Economist,” The Trend of Economic Thinking (The Collected Worksof F.A. Hayek, Vol. III), eds. W.W. Bartley ifi and Stephen Kresge (London: Routledge, 1991) 45.23To Max Hartwell, the current president of the Mont Pèlerin Society, it seemed obvious he wasnot part of the New Right. Asked about the term, he replied, apparently unselfconsciously,“The New Right? I don’t know much about it, really.” Hartwell, who calls himself a classicalliberal, said he tended to associate the term with authoritarianism, saying, “I do not likeauthoritarians of any type or nature.”36Arthur Seldon, another important figure in the movement, sees the term as the “derogatorydescription used by critics who dismiss the new liberalism as reactionary because it rejects thepostwar all-Party consensus based on Fabianism, Beveridgism and Keynesianism.” He insistscontemporary classical liberalism is not right-wing.37However, there are some associated with the wider movement who do not always draw thesedistinctions. Walter Block, while senior economist in 1980 at one of the research and policyinstitutes associated with the movement, wrote a letter addressed “Friend of Liberty”appealing for help in compiling a bibliography on “what has come to be called ‘the modernrevival of neo-conservatism’.” In his letter from the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute, he said:“For my purposes, synonyms for ‘neo conservative’ include ‘the free market,’ ‘libertarianism,’‘the classical liberal tradition,’ ‘right-wing economics’ or pieces on the major spokesmen forthis tradition, such as Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman.”3836 Interview with Max Hartwell in Oxford in April 1993.Seldon xii.The document “Dear Friend of Liberty,” signed by Walter Block, appears to have been a formletter intended for circulation as a general appeal and is dated April 10, 1980. Located at theHoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. Collection title F.A. Hayek, Boxnumber 20, Folder 1D 11 Fraser Institute.24According to some commentators, the misconception of the movement is a fate which alsobefalls Hayek, the man arguably most responsible for the movement. Along with Keynes, hisintellectual opponent on the issue of large-scale state intervention, and many other influentialthinkers, Hayek has suffered the fate of being claimed by, or associated with, some with whomhe may have little in common. For instance, despite having written an essay, “Why I Am Not aConservative,”39Hayek has often been labelled as a conservative or neo-conservative.Hayek’s work appears to be as misunderstood by friends as by foes, and he is often forcedinto the very positions he denounces. John Gray, describing the ways in which Hayek is“vulgarly represented,” argues that in the area of economic theory and policy:Hayek’ s ideas have been consistently conflated with thoseof the Chicago School, despite the fact that the whole burden ofHayek’s own development of the Austrian tradition is in theclaim that contemporary macroeconomics, whether “Keynesian”or “monetarist”, embodies a wholly spurious claim toquantitative exactitude in respect of economic relationships,including especially relative price structures, whosecharacteristics and properties can only be the object of abstractmodelling and not of engineering expertise.4°According to Gray in the same document in the Hayek archive, the misrepresentationsabound. Hayek is represented as a proponent of laissez faire approaches despite havingargued that liberalism’s defeat was directly related to its dogmatic adherence to such notions.He is seen as an archetypal conservative despite his impassioned arguments to the contrary.Included as a postscript in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1960) 397-411.° From an anonymous, undated three-page photocopy in the Hayek collection at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University, which has been confirmed as the work of Oxford University’sJohn Gray with Gray himself. In a telephone conversation on Feb. 23, 1994, Gray confirmed hewas the author of the document in the Hayek file, of which a facsimile had been sent to him at YaleUniversity the day before.25Samuel Brittan concurs:Friedrich Hayek has been cursed by sneerers, who dismisseverything he has to say without giving it a hearing, and even moreby admirers, who agree with it before they have studied itMost complex thinkers have elements in their work which may appear contradictory or tosmack of conservatism. Indeed, many people have contradictory elements, incorporating bothradical or progressive and conservative aspects. As well, complex thinkers who have a longintellectual career usually move through stages and in some cases become more conservative.Seldon, in a tribute to Hayek following his death in March 1992, noted that: “In his later yearsHayek echoed a conservatism that conflicted with his earlier radicalism.”42As theorists talk forexample of an early Marx, or Marx the humanist as compared with the scientific or later Marx,Hayek, too, is designated differently depending on the part of his canon being referred to.Peter G. Klein notes that some observers charge that his later work, particularly after he beganto turn away from technical economics to theories of knowledge, shows more influence ofKarl Popper (who also taught at the LSE, in his case philosophy) than of Carl Menger orLudwig von Mises, Hayek’s mentors at the time of his earlier economic writings associatedwith market liberalism and what is known as the Austrian School.4341 Brittan, “Hayek, the New Right, & the Crisis of Social Democracy,” Encounter (January 1981)31.42 Seldon, on September 23, 1992, in a tribute to Hayek at the London School of Economics after hisdeath.Peter 0. Klein, Introduction to The Fortunes of Liberalism (The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek,Vol. IV), ed. Peter 0. Klein (London: Routledge, 1992), 8. Klein notes that T.W. Hutchison, in“Austrians on Philosophy and Method (since Menger)” in his The Politics and Philosophy ofEconomics: Marxians. Keynesians and Austrians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) speaks of“Hayek I” and “Hayek II.” Klein also refers to Bruce J. Caldwell’s “Hayek’s Transformation,”History of Political Economy 20:4 (1988).26Gray argues that an historical explanation needs to be sought for this widespreadmisunderstanding of Hayek’s work. Hayek was expounding his ideas to an “invinciblyignorant” as well as hostile intellectual world, he says, offering this interpretation:His fate has been that of the indefatigable critic of thespirit of the age.This view of Hayek as contesting “the spirit of the age” is consistent with a role as a keyfigure in a social movement. The focus of this study is the form taken by the criticism of thedominant Keynesian consensus which Hayek’s work exemplified, the critical sense aroundwhich he organised, and the movement that developed out of it.(ii) Taking Issue with the Dominant Accounts of the “New Right”Among British scholars examining what has been labelled the “New Right,” Andrew Gamblefinds the genesis of the movement in the “new politics of the 1970s” which, he argues,spawned many new forces, one of which was the New Right.45 Gamble’s account of the “newpolitics” concentrates on breakdown, and he sees the various crises of the 1 970s asresponsible. For him, the movement’s programme is determined by economics.The radical right programmes of both Thatcher and Reaganwere responses to the breakdown of authority and stability inthe world system and in national politics ... They planned torestore the vigour of British and American capitalism through anew accumulation strategy . .Bob Jessop and his collaborators also distinguish the 1960s and 1970s as decisive, seeingThatcherism and the post-1975 years as the environment in which the social movementGray.Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (London: Macmillan, 1988) 2.46 Ibid.27develops,47 as do others, of whom Marchak, whose work is discussed later in this section, isan example in the North American context.Pointing to the same decade of “origin,” Simon Gunn gives reasons similar to Gamble’s,focusing on questions of economics:It was out of the breakdown of social democracy in the1 970s, the failure of its prescriptions to deal with the mountingcrisis, that the New Conservatism was forged. Questions ofeconomic management were clearly central to this crisis ... Thebreakdown of social democracy was also fundamentally thebreakdown of a social and moral order.49Hall, whose general sympathy for what can be described as Gramscian approaches (which, inpart, is also responsible for his being criticised by some for being idealist) is in good part theinitial stimulus for the attitude brought to this thesis, observes that the New Right does not“appear out of thin air” and is aware the economic recession of the 1970s succeeds theappearance of the “radical right.” Nevertheless, he does not push his investigation into itsbeginnings back any further. He identifies the movement as a product of the politicalpolarisations of the 1960s, with 1968 marking the key moment for him.5° Claiming it isincorrect to identil,’ the rise of the radical right too closely with Thatcher’s political success,Hall argues it has a much longer trajectory, yet dates its inception to the late 1960s, seeing thefirst phase of the movement as a backlash against the revolutionary moment of 1968.It has developed through a number of different phases. First,the ‘backlash’ against the revolutionary ferment of ‘1968’ andall that. Then, the bold, populist bid by Mr Powell— speakingBob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling, Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations(Cambridge and Oxford: Polity and Basil Blackwell, 1988) 60-61.Marchak9-10.Simon Gunn, Revolution of the Right (London and Amsterdam: Pluto Press with the TransnationalInstitute, 1989) 18.° Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal (London and New York: Verso, 1988) 44.28over the heads of the party factions to ‘the people’, helping toconstruct ‘the people’ in their most patriotic, racist,constitutional disguise. Then — borrowing the clothes of hisopponent, in the best Tory tradition — Mr Heath: a politicianinstinctively of the soft centre, but not averse, in theanxiety-ridden days of the early 1 970s to going to the countrywith a programme to restore ‘Seisdon Man’— a close cousin ofNeanderthal Man— at the centre of British politics.5Scholars viewing the New Right from the other side of the Atlantic take similar positions,generally following the early themes of Alan Crawford (1980) and arguing that the roots ofthe New Right lie in the global economic and technological restructuring which began in thelate 1960s and 1970s, or the crisis of legitimation which they see as occurring in the sameperiod. By and large, theorists evaluating this shift away from the tenets of the Keynesian“consensus,” as discussed earlier, see it as economically and/or technologically determined orresulting from conditions ofbreakdown and crisis, and having occurred with some speed.52In the Canadian context, Marchak takes up a position against the New Right, noting she does“not pretend to admire the philosophy.” It is an ideology which, she says, emerges “with thedeterioration of the Pax Americana.”53Countering the explanation which she claims the NewRight gives for its success, that of the “successful selling of ideas and politicians,” Marchak,although stressing the power of advertising, marketing techniques, and indeed, of words,‘ Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” The Politics of Thatcherism, eds. Stuart Hall and MartinJacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with Marxism Today, 1983) 19. “SelsdonMan” is a reference to the Selsdon Group of economic liberals that formed within the ConservativeParty in the 1 970s to promote their belief that economic freedom is indispensable to politicalfreedom. For a fuller discussion of this group, see Patrick Seyd, “Factionalism in the 1970s,”Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-Henry (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980)235-238.52 E.g. Gunn xiii.Marchak xii.29offers what she refers to as the alternative explanation: “... that a historical crisis createdpanic and a search for solutions.”TMMarchak argues:Its roots lie in the restructuring of a global economy thatbegan in the mid-1960s and reached fruition towards the end ofthe 1980s. My argument is that the political movements and theparties of the new right, promoted by corporate leaders whofunded the think-tanks and participated in the crafting of theirstrategies, provided the ideological framework for therestructuring of the global economy.55Marchak sees the New Right as having produced a populist, sloganeering attack on all thegroups in society which she says have been defended by the left. While it has been argued bysome on both sides of the ideological spectrum that the left may not always be too committedto democratic participation, and there are groups opposed to the left on the grounds ofwanting more of it, Marchak offers the following as a list of those that the left defends and theright attacks:the poor, the handicapped, the unemployed, women inthe work-force, the public sector, the welfare state, democracy,majority choice, labour, unions, the underdeveloped nations,impoverished regions, indebted countries, and especially theintellectuals themselves.56In general, the works on what they term the New Right show little curiosity about the actualpractices and activities within the phenomenon they describe. The long intellectual genealogyof the movement campaigning against large-scale state intervention and for a moremarket-based social order, the impact of its campaign on the details of changed circumstancesand the internal diversity within the New Right go largely unexamined. The category is seldomopened up to question. Where the writers draw attention to the New Right’s various elements‘ Ibid 112-113.Ibid xii.56 Ibid 115.30and the significant tensions within its alliances, there is generally little purposeful explorationof these contradictions, nor of the internal contestation of ideas that takes place. Marchakrecognises some later diversity within the New Right, however, stating that there was auniformly anti-democratic ideology.As the movement grew it became evident that there werediverse contributors, and though they shared an anti-democraticideology their objectives and interests were not otherwisecongruent. Even so, they were united in the primary objective:to dismantle the welfare state.57The New Right is indeed far from monolithic. Like most social movements, the movementcampaigning for limited government is a shifting, negotiated and unstable alliance ofgroupings, often of contradictory orientation, with suppression of differences between andwithin the groupings. It is articulated through a series of differing nodes, with, as Melucci putsit in another context, a “plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which crystallizein any given collective action.”58This understanding contrasts with that of theorists such as Andrew Belsey, who claims to seelittle difference between what he poses as the different sides of the New Right, the neo-liberaland the neo-conservative. Reading the New Right through the practice of Thatcherism, Belseyargues that other theorists examining the New Right have underestimated “the authoritarianand conservative aspects of neo-liberalism.”59 He views the categories neo-liberal andneo-conservative as “ideal types,” throwing his critical weight at the neo-conservative idealIbid 94.Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs inContemporary Society, eds. John Keane and Paul Mier (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,1989) 25.Andrew Belsey, “The New Right, Social Order and Civil Liberties,” The Ideology of the NewRight, ed. Ruth Levitas (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1986)173.31type and apparently refusing to take at their word those who position themselves asneo-liberals or proponents of market liberalism60 and articulate views different from many ofthe neo-conservatives in the wider movement. He argues:Any claim that the neo-liberals are ‘libertarian,’ are thefriends of liberty, must be regarded with the deepest suspicion.6Belsey takes a jaundiced view of neo-liberals within the wider movement arguing for moremarket-based approaches, suggesting that he is able to detect their true intentions.The New Right is at its most insidious in the neo-liberals,for the neo-conservatives make no secret of their authoritarianaims.62Some of the positions set out above appear to be based on two assumptions; firstly, that wecan easily discern the “true” motives of people, something which has been called into questionby a number of intellectual groupings, most notably the psychoanalytic school; and secondly,that people are easily deceived at the level of ideology or, as is more commonly stated in aparticular literature, are the victims of false ideology (from which the theorist making theclaim is always immune), leading them, for example, to vote against their own interests.In certain work, Gamble points to the diversity within the New Right while questioning someof the orthodox characterisations of it, but he also is prepared to accept differences within theNew Right, within limits. In contrast to Hayek’s organisational statements about the formation60 Market liberalism as elucidated by, for example, Brittan in A Restatement of Economic Liberalism212.61 Belsey 192.62 Ibid 193.32of the movement, which speak of its constituent groups of libertarians,63thus placing them in asomewhat symmetrical relationship with liberals, Gamble claims:There is a libertarian wing of the New Right but it is notdominant. The few genuine libertarians stand out among the rest.MHe cites Samuel Brittan as one.Some of the neo-conservative groupings often included under the umbrella of the New Right,such as the Salisbury Group, are open in their hostility to liberalism, preferring to seek theiraffinity with the conservatism of the last century. For example, the Labour Party-affiliatedmonthly publication Labour Research quotes a key member of the Salisbury Group,philosopher and Salisbury Review editor Roger Scruton, as saying he and the group formed inthe mid-1970s care little for the monetarists and economic liberals.65 Scruton’s position hasbeen seen as a “comprehensive rebuttal of Hayekian liberalism,” one in which he himselfdescribes his argument as putting “public before private, society before individual andprivilege before right.”66 Commentators on his book The Meaning of Conservatism (1930)portray it similarly as a rebuttal of the Hayekian position.63 For example, Hayek, when discussing the formation of the movement’s key organisation— theMont Pèleiin Society — speaks of bringing “together the various libertarian groups” in the openingaddress of the 10th anniversary meeting in September 10, 1957. Opening address located at theHoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. Collection title F.A. Hayek; boxnumber 62, folder ID 3.Gamble, “The Political Economy of Freedom,” The Ideology of the New Right, ed. Ruth LeVitas47.65 Labour Research 74:2 (1985) 48, referring to an article in IiGuardian of March 1, 1983 inwhich Scruton is quoted.66 See discussion in Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable (London: HarperCollinsPublishers,1994) 220.33For Robert Bocock, “New Right” is the more general term used to include the non-economicaspects of the phenomenon, such as the family and sexual morality.67Bocock also notes howdisparate elements tend to be conflated in descriptions of the New Right, to the extent that thefocus is sometimes narrowed to a particular branch of economic theory associated withmarket-based approaches, monetarism.Discussing the political economy of Thatcherism, Bocock says:The term “monetarism” has been used sometimes to denoteall these specific types of new ideology and politicaleconomy.. 69Such is the currency of this misconception that obituaries following Hayek’s death in March1992 cast him as the father of monetarism7°(a description better befitting Friedman) despitehis long-standing objections to this school of economic thought, discussed earlier in referenceto Gray and in greater detail later.In summary, then, this thesis is uneasy with theorists who see the entire movement inmonolithic terms and approaches it instead by opening up and questioning the categorisationthat has dominated. It takes a different approach to those explanations of the movement forlimited government and market-based approaches which trace its beginnings to the 1960s and67 Robert Bocock, Hegemony (Chichester, Sussex and London: Ellis Horwood and Tavistock, 1986)12.Monetarism is described by Pennant-Rea and Emmott in The Pocket Economist, a dictionary ofeconomic terms published by The Economist, as the school of economic thought that places growthin the money supply at the centre of its thinking. Specifically, monetarists believe in the quantitytheory of money, and argue that monetary expansion or contraction has only transitory effects on“real” variables like output and employment because ultimately it feeds through solely into theprice level. By no means are those in the movement arguing for a more market-based approach allmonetarists; indeed, many are vehemently opposed to the monetarist position. Further, the head ofthis movement, Hayek, belonged in the Austrian School camp.69 Bocockll-12.70 For example, the obituary in The Times of March 25, 1992.341970s, usually with accompanying arguments based on theoretical approaches to collectiveaction in terms of which the movement is explained as being primarily a response to one ormore of the following:• The needs of global capital;• Breakdown and crisis — often constructed as a loss of authority orlegitimacy by central institutions;• Class condition, nurtured by resentments and discontent;• Crucial earlier events, such as economic and technological changes. Herethe response is seen as almost spontaneous.7’It is not the fact of conditions or crucial events in the 1 970s that is in dispute; rather, thequestion of how they are to be interpreted in the development of the movement. Events of the1970s, such as the circumstances of Britain’s being forced to seek a loan from theInternational Monetary Fund (IMP), or the oil crisis, did indeed spur a proliferation oforganisations campaigning against large-scale state intervention and add weight to the liberal71 Theories abound on why people engage in collective action. There are socio-psychologicalexplanations which focus on feelings of relative deprivation or the discontent which flows fromalienation brought about by mass society. There are others that emphasise the rational and strategicnature of collective action as being in the actor’s individual interest, such as rational choice andresource mobilisation theories. There are also those which see new social movements as the resultof a struggle by a new class of knowledge worker for power and status against an older,established class. The perceived power of these differing theories to explain collective action hasvaried, with different theories dominating different historical epochs in different geographicallocations. This vast literature on “general” theories of social movements cannot be dealt with in allits minutiae in this study, and that which is relevant and situates the project is dealt with in Chapter2.35argument for increasing numbers of people. Yet such events cannot alone account for thelarger social movement.(iii) The ReformulationThe emergence of any changed social order is the result of a complex process, the product ofmany forces, and hence gives rise to many explanations. Discussion frequently polarises intodetermining dualisms — such as the idealist/materialist or structure/agency polarities— as if theone aspect in each case had virtually no affect on the other. Such either/or paradigms offer notheoretical advantage and promote a dichotomy which, given an emerging awareness of thecomplexity of social relations and the unrelenting pace of change in the contemporary world,counters an understanding of complex processes of change. This study conceives of structureand agency as being mutually dependent rather than oppositional.Theorists such as Touraine, Bourdieu73 and, in the Anglophone world, Anthony Giddens,state their refusal of the structure/agency polarity. Touraine contends that although society isstill far from egalitarian, factors such as economic growth and the constant lowering of socialbarriers render inadequate those concepts which assume a society of reproduction of socialstructure rather than a society of growth, change and mass consumption.74In regard to a theoretical approach which refuses the structure/agency dualism, Touraineargues:72 Main Touraine, “Is Sociology Still the Study of Society?” Between Totalitarianism andPostmodernity, eds. Peter Beilharz, Gillian Robinson and John Rundell (Cambridge, Mass.: MiTPress, 1992) 173-198.“ Pierre Bourdieu, “The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and of Field,” Sociocriticism 2:2(1985e) 11-24.‘ Touraine 184.36in contemporary industrial societies, situations do notdetermine actions, it is, rather, action that brings to lightrelations of domination and subordination which lack a visiblejuridical or political expression.75Touraine holds that the concept of class as a central category of sociological analysis must bereplaced by that of social movement, an argument discussed later in this chapter.As Peter Beilharz points out, the work of Touraine and others can be seen as raisingobjections to Marx’s theory in Capital76 in a number of ways. Some of the questions whichBeilharz says are being raised by the interrogators of Capital are: What happened to the classstruggle? Where is the history? What has happened to the other classes? And, mostimportantly for Touraine’s work, where have the actors gone? Piotr Sztompka describesTouraine’s work since he outlined the image of the “self-producing society” as having acritical edge directed against both developmentalism and structuralism, with the main chargethat they subordinated the sense of collective action to immutable laws or requirements,consequently eliminating the actor from the sociological perspective, treating the actors as anepiphenomenon of the system.77In this study, the burden of the structure/agency dualism is shed in favour of a mode ofthought facilitated by a research approach focusing on process, thus assuming continualchange, rather than on end result or presumed categories.Ibid.76 Peter Beilharz, “Karl Marx,” Social Theory, ed. Peter Beilharz (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia:Allen&Unwin, 1991) 172.“ Piotr Sztompka, The Sociology of Social Change (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,1993) 195.37Change is a constant feature in all societies, as it is for the structures within these societies,and the difference between societies and between distinct historical periods lies more in therate at which this change takes place at a particular juncture or locus.78Social structure, as formulated by the discipline of sociology and commonly defined asrecurring patterns of social behaviour, is thus also continually subject to disruption,destabilisation, change and reformulation through negotiation by human agency, howeverslowly, and often in spite of resistance. The abstract formulation of structure, constructedfrom the more enduring patterned relationships in a particular type of society, can becomereified and static in the hands of theorists where, to use the words of Bourdieu, there is atendency to slip from the model of reality to the reality of the model. Human creativity,contestation, negotiation and resistance are then often ignored, along with such insights asthose of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality (1966),among others, that social structures are themselves created by human beings whose actionscan destabilise existing power regimes and transform them again.In the natural sciences it is commonly understood that what is solid at one level is particles atanother, yet frequently within the tradition of a determining economic base in the socialsciences the idea is resisted that social structure might be far more fluid, a contested process,the product of myriad elements, each subject to various forces which include human action.Notions of rigid and immutable social structure are sometimes wielded in ways which makethose structures more than the recurring patterns which they are — and at a time when patterns78 Indeed, the current debate across disciplines, and from a variety of ideological positions, puts theargument that contemporary social actors may no longer be living in a capitalist era, but rather apost-industrial, post-modern and perhaps, it is argued, even post-capitalist world.38in society are generally even less enduring than previously. Hall also sees dangers to reif,iingabstract formulations. In a theoretical debate with Jessop et al over explanations ofThatcherism, Hall distances himself from what he refers to as “the fundamentalist marxistrevival” precisely because “they believe that the concepts which Marx advanced at the highestlevel of abstraction (i.e. mode of production, capitalist epoch) can be transferred directly intothe analysis of concrete historical conjunctures.”A questioning of the solidity and meaning of “economic reality” is taking place within thediscipline of economics itself Among the issues being discussed are the recognition ofeconomics as discourse and related insights by which economics and the variousinterpretations of economic reality are seen as respective systems of metaphor which differentschools are putting forward.8°The accounts which argue the case for economic and technological determinants for the NewRight are, ironically, contradictory, for they appear to undercut their own position. If onewere to accept the argument that a social transformation was in progress based merely on theeconomic needs of accumulation or the material production base and resulting in the moveaway from the Keynesian state in the 1970s, why would there even be a need for anintellectual movement such as the New Right? Surely to put the argument that the New Rightcomes after the economic crisis of the 1970s and is concurrent with the restructuring of the1970s and 1980s, fostered by groups responding to these material changes and with aninterest in them, is in part to indicate that the New Right appears on the scene after the realHail, The Hard Road to Renewal 153.° See Warren J. Samuels, ed., Economics as Discourse: An Analysis ofthe Language of Economists,(Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 1990) 7-14.39need for its arguments has passed? In terms of the position that relations of production comebefore and determine ideas and consciousness, it would have to follow that socialtransformation, say from internal contradictions, would come about irrespective of intellectualwork. The economic determinists then, by their own arguments, are perhaps not deterministenough.The major reason for the lack of detailed attention in the New Right literature to the activityof intellectual activists is that the movement has largely been viewed as the manifestation ofeconomic conflicts, and, therefore, secondary to these considerations. In the approacheswhich tend to describe this collective action as a response to economic and technologicalchanges, changes on the way to a global capitalism, the discontent on the part of groups whichmay flow from this transformation, and a loss of authority and legitimacy by centralinstitutions in these decades, the emphasis is generally on postulating why,8’ in terms ofinterests,82the collective action occurred. Interests are often assumed by the theorists and thenseen as having motivated those who argued for limited government and a more market-basedsocial order and whose ideas contributed to the changed circumstances of the 1980s. Oftenthese assumptions come at the expense of a more detailed examination of either those whohave been engaged in prolonged intellectual activity so as to understand their successes, whereachieved, or of the protracted process itself by which the ideas were developed and81 In the language of the social movements literature, “why” is used here in the more restrictedinstrumental sense, rather than in the expressive sense increasingly associated with the new socialmovements field.82 For example, Marchak, referring to the New Right and change in the period 1975-1985, speaks interms of “interest groups” and of change in terms of those “at whose expense” it would beachieved. Marchak 9.40disseminated by active intellectuals and consent for them was won, which is also important tounderstanding social change.This is not to suggest that interests are instead absent; they are of course present in any socialinteraction, be it in the university or the research and policy institute or think-tank,83as arguedin the postscript to this thesis, but a neat and consistent correspondence between a particularclass location and a set of interests is not sustainable. What can be referred to in the literatureas original class location is no guarantee that the ideological position assumed to beappropriate to it by a theorist will indeed be adopted. While it is not argued that one shoulddissociate class and interest, it can not be automatically assumed that because a set of actionsmay benefit a particular faction, the arguments on behalf of such actions must have beensponsored by the grouping which the actions are seen to benefit, nor that the benefits thatattend changes are necessarily narrowly bestowed and bound by class. Nor can it always besafely assumed that members of a class, however defined, will be able to agree on how theirinterests should be formulated and protected.83 The Oxford English Dictionary gives three meanings for the word think-tank, specifies its origin asAmerican and says it was first used in 1905 to refer to the brain. The second meaning denotes aresearch institute or organisation providing advice and ideas on national and commercial problems(a sense dating to 1959), or an interdisciplinary group of specialist consultants. The term is used ina third sense in the 1970s to indicate a meeting or conference of experts, scholars or specialists.The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. Vol. 17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)949-95.Indeed, some theorists draw into question the orthodox formulations which depict the workers’movement in one-dimensional terms as a strict class movement. For example, Craig Calhoun in hiswork The Question of Class Struggle indicates that the workers’ movement may not have been theinitially conceptualised class movement. The workers’ movement seems to have been far lessunified than the more orthodox formulation of its early conception has it, and such works as E.P.Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class emphasise important other aspects to classaction besides mere class location. As Alberto Melucci points out in an interview in Nomads of thePresent 197, social action is never a given fact, it is always socially produced.41Indeed, a category such as class is far from obvious. As Ernesto Laclau points out, class isinstead afready a synthesis of determinations and a particular response to a more primaryquestion of social agency.85 For Melucci— noting that he has gradually abandoned the conceptof class relationships as his thinking in the area has developed— more appropriate concepts arerequired in systems like contemporary ones “where classes as real social groups are witheringaway.”86However, this must be accomplished, argues Melucci:.without ignoring the theoretical problem that the categoryof class relationships has left behind as its legacy. That problemcan be defined as knowing what relations and what conflicts areinvolved in the production of the crucial resources of aparticular system.The notion of mode of production is too closelyassociated with economic reductionism. Production cannot berestricted solely to the economic-material sphere; it embracesthe entirety of social relationships and cultural orientations.Societies through history have been driven by different resources (matter, energy andinformation) Melucci points out, with many contemporary societies now relying oninformation for their survival.88The adoption of the approach used in this study, underpinned as it is by the frameworkformulated by Eyerman and Jamison, is an attempt to work towards a synthesis of“determinations,” to use the words of Laclau referred to earlier in another context.A break with the structure/agency dualism is suggested— although not directly stated — in theapproach to social movements of Eyerman and Janiison, the two principal theorists whose85 Laclau, “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” 66.86 Melucci, “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?” New SocialMovements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994) 103.87 Ibid 103-104.88 Ibid 110.42work directly informs this study in that it is their modus operandi for the examination of socialmovements which is adopted to examine the movement for limited government and a moremarket-based social order. It is this perceived break which contributed to the attractiveness oftheir research attitude, informed by Gramsci, Touraine and Melucci, for use in this study.This study, then, brings into focus an aspect largely neglected in the New Right accounts ofthe 1980s by considering the importance to change and transformation of prolongedintellectual activity. It will consider how a number of active intellectuals, in the face of greatenthusiasm for the view of their opponents, opposed large-scale state intervention from the193 Os, calling into question and opening up to contestation the dominant interpretation asthey went about winning and sustaining intellectual support for limited government and amore market-based social order.In examining the waning of the Keynesian consensus, this study diverges from socialdeterminist and reductionist notions, whether economic or technological (or indeed cultural),to also bring into focus the importance of considering the largely ignored intellectuals who,convinced of the power of ideas, began a campaign out of which grew a social movementdedicated to the revival of liberalism in a 20th century reincarnation. Attention is directedtowards the knowledge and organisational culture they developed, shared practices and ideasthrough which they have come to define themselves as participants in a movement, and theirmobilisation, in part through the establishment of effective organisations.In so doing, this study, cognisant of critiques of easy universalising, also modestly seeks toprompt thrther thought on the role of intellectuals in social transformation, specifically to43contribute to that body of the literature that focuses on knowledge, the role of ideas andintellectuals, and on collective identity and subjectivity, underpinned always by the positionthat social actors are produced in the undertaking of action, as is knowledge, with actionalways socially produced.The emphasis on “how” the movement intellectuals did what they did, mentioned above, doesnot suggest an approach restricted to examining that which is only strategic and instrumental —organisation and mobilisation — nor does it regard the actions of the movement as such. Whilethe emphasis on “how” shares certain aspects of the position held by those in the field groupedtogether as resource-mobilisation theorists insofar as the conception of social movements asresulting solely from strain or discontent in society is rejected, as it is in this thesis, this is notthe approach adopted for this study. Rather, the emphasis is on considering how a movementstruggles over time to form a collective identity, always within specific contexts, and createknowledges and locations from which to counter the reigning consensus and develop anddisseminate sets of ideas and beliefs, always in interaction with the surrounding culture and inrelation to specific institutions.At the same time, the emphasis on a process of knowledge creation and dissemination doesnot imply a disregard for that which is referred to as social structure, as discussed above, andthe constraints or opportunities offered by a particular social configuration at a given time.Indeed, the context is considered often, and throughout the thesis, precisely for this reason,and the importance of context to a social movement is a core notion in the Eyerman andJamison framework. Nor is it the intention to displace the dominant explanations which44generally see the needs of global capital as responsible for the New Right, with another that inits stead privileges action and actors without heed to the constraints these actors face,whatever the geographical, political, economic or historical context. In other words, whilesubjects are constituted, they are not determined. Following Judith Butler, the constitutedcharacter of the subject is the very precondition of its agency.895. Divisions within this WorkPart One of this dissertation, comprising three chapters, sets out the. historical, geographical,theoretical and methodological boundaries of the study.It introduces the project, situates the study within the existing literature on social movementsand sets up the Eyerman-Jamison theoretical framework, explaining how the contributions ofTouraine, Gramsci and Melucci, all key figures in the general area, have been drawn from. Itdeals with the research problem and lays out the methodology, research attitude and strategy,questions and methods that guide the project.Part Two, following Eyerman and Jamison, deals with context directly, although context isnot, of course, dealt with only in this section. It examines the important historical moment ofthe 1930s and 1940s in Britain, a period that marked the culminating stages in the evolution ofthe Keynesian welfare state and the beginning of an intellectual battle over its principles out ofwhich a movement grew. This section considers the arguments on state intervention andknowledge of Keynes and Hayek during this period, as well as their intellectual and social89 Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York and London:Routledge, 1992) 12.45locations, with a view, in the case of Hayek, to shedding light on the way in which he acted inrelation to the movement with which he is associated.Part Three reads the development of the movement in terms of the three-stage format ofgestation, formation and consolidation subscribed to by Eyerman and Jamison9°in the traditionof other social movements theorists. This section presents empirical and factual material inconsidering the growth of the movement through its key organisations, such as the MontPèlerin Society, the WA and other institutes closely associated with it, and through therelationship of movement actors to them, Hayek in particular.In theoretical terms, Part Three is guided by Eyerman and Jamison’s notions of subjectivity,activity and context in reading the movement cognitively, as they put it, through the 50-yearperiod. The study extends its inquiry into all three dimensions— cosmological, technologicaland organisational— identified by Eyerman and Jamison as the areas within which amovement’s specifiable types of knowledge interest are developed.Part Four concludes the dissertation, reflecting on the impact on social and intellectual life ofthe movement which can be traced through Hayek, the WA and the network of Fisherresearch and policy institutes which grew out of the WA’s establishment. This section alsoconsiders think-tanks as relatively new sites of knowledge dissemination and their effect,realised and potential, on intellectual life and other institutions of knowledge in the latter halfof the 20th century, an aspect deserving of further consideration. Finally, some observationsare made about some common ground which Hayek shared with other intellectuals who have° Eyerman and Jamison 56.46stressed uncertainty and the impossibility of prediction and blueprint, calling into question theall-knowing voice of the authoritative expert.47CHAPTER 2Making Links to Existing Literature on Intellectuals and Social Movements1. The Revival of Interest in the Intellectual and Social Movements as Social AgentsParadoxically perhaps, as the death and decentring of the subject moves towards the forefrontof debate in social theory, another issue — that of the position and importance to social changeof agency and the actor and intellectual— is concentrating the sociological mind.9’Yet perhapsit is the concern with the one that flows from the other. As argued by theorists such as Butler,the constituted subject and agency are closely linked, and to claim the subject is constituted isnot to claim that it is determined. On the contrary, the constituted character of the subject isthe very precondition of its agency. Butler puts the position when asking the followingquestions:For what is it that enables a purposive and significantreconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not arelation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted?Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix ofpower by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacyof that constitution, and of working against each other thoseprocesses of regulation that can destabilize existing powerregimes?‘ Debate on the role of the intellectual has been lively at least since the Dreyfus affair in France inthe 1890s, when the term came into active use through a stand taken by a group of committedintellectuals on an issue of justice. Robert 3. Brym, in Intellectuals and Politics (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin, 1980) 11, noted that although some people specialised in the production of ideasprior to this time, it is only in the last three or four hundred years that intellectuals have become alarge, well-defined and self-conscious group. He sees this development mainly as the result of thegrowing division of labour which accompanied the rise of capitalism and which occasioned a rapidincrease in the absolute and proportional number of highly educated people in society.Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodemism.’” 12-13.48Some theorists see a retreat of the intellectual (Jacoby 1987, Miliband and Panitch 1990),others a return (Touraine 1988) — but all through their reformulations of the notion(Aronowitz 1990, Foucault 1980, Gramsci 1971, Hayek 1949, Radhakrishnan 1990, Robbins1993) recognise the intellectual’s importance, and their attention to the matter contributes tothe resurgence of interest in this source of change.94Accompanying the rejuvenation of the social actor is a burgeoning interest in socialmovements as agents of social transformation over the past two decades. The two areas areclosely linked, and Alan Scott, in a review of the field of new social movements theory whichconsiders the work of Touraine and its impact, argues that social movements have become anattractive object of analysis for an approach which wishes to bring back the social actor, apoint he says Touraine’s work makes clear.95Scott sees what he refers to as a crisis in “single-order explanations,” a greater awareness ofthe complexity of social relations and a move away from grand theory as significant factorscontributing to this expanding interest in social action and historical analysis, with socialThe genre to which books such as Russell Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals belong has beenfollowed by another, of which The Phantom Public Sphere, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1993) is an example. This genre problematises the notion of thepublic sphere, asking whether it may not have been a phantom given that the so-called public oftenexcluded many more than it included. Increasingly, theorists and activists are now voicingsuspicion of those who claim to speak in the name of the “public.”For Gramsci, there is no question of intellectuals becoming themselves historical agents, arguesStanley Aronowitz. Rather, their importance in Gramsci’s conception is in their ability to linkthemselves with the “real” agents, namely classes, “which for Gramsci and all Marxists are theonly forces capable of making history.” Stanley Aronowitz, “On Intellectuals,” Intellectuals:Aesthetics. Politics. Academics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 11. InGramsci’s theory of hegemony, Aronowitz argues, the purveyors of ideas are not independentagents (p. 14).Alan Scott, Ideology and the New Social Movements (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 5.49movements a manifestation of this interest. He argues that the move away frommeta-narratives is taking place as a shift of emphasis along three axes:96• From structure to actor;• From static to historical (synchronic to diachronic) explanation;• From conceptual clarification to theory-informed research.Each increase in disillusionment with the single-order explanations such as functionalism andneo-Marxism gives rise to greater interest in social movements as a suitable object of research,asserts Scott.If this increased interest in social movements is indeed aroused in part by the current crisis inthe social sciences, it is certainly fanned by concrete historical events. The civil rightsmovement of the 1950s and 1960s, the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, andvarious others such as the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s have broughtsocial movements into society to such an extent that sociologists can no longer avoid studyingthem, argue Eyerman and Janiison.97 Indeed, Americans Charles Stewart, Craig Smith andRobert Denton go so far as to argue that the United States is experiencing the age of thesocial movement.The second half of the 20th century may well be called “theage of the social movement” in America. Blacks, students,women, the aged, gays, hispanic peoples, native Americans,prison inmates, and workers of all varieties from the vineyard tothe university campus have demanded rights, equality, identity,and a fair share of the American dream. Others have organizedto protest the American way of dying, involvement inunjustified wars, pollution and destruction of the environment,Scott4.Eyerman & Jamison 1.50nuclear power, forced busing of public school students, violenceand sex on television, legalized abortion, marijuana laws,centralized power in corporate, governmental, and educationalbureaucracies, and the changes in the American social structureand values.98Indeed, if a link is to be found between these two coincidental developments— the move awayfrom single-order explanations, and the increasing importance of social movements — it is thatmuch that was considered settled previously is now being called into question and contested,both in terms of epistemology (with the move from meta- to micro-studies and narratives) andrepresentation— political, intellectual or otherwise.While the significance of social movements appears to have been solidly established (Touraine,Melucci), with many theorists in the field regarding them as having taken up the emancipatoryrole that Marx, in the previous century, had reserved for the working class alone,99 there islittle agreement on what should constitute a social movement. Frequently one theorist’s socialmovement is another’s cultural movement, more limited in scope and, for some of the more98 Charles Stewart, Craig Smith and Robert E. Denton, Jr., Persuasion and Social Movements(Prospect Heights, illinois: Waveland, 1984) 1.Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow’s Social History: Classes. Conflicts andCulture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, 1971) 3-26. Touraine argues it isthe programmed society in which we live that is responsible for the working class no longer being aprivileged historic agent, and not the weakening of the labour movement, its subjection to thestrategy of a particular party or bad leaders. It is rather because the exercise of power within acapitalist firm now no longer places the working class at the centre of the economic system and itssocial conflicts. Touraine uses the term programmed society to refer to the type of society beingformed, defined in temis of the nature of production methods and economic organisation. It islabelled also as post-industrial to stress the differences in method and organisation between it andthe earlier type of society called industrial. For Touraine, in the programmed society economicdecisions and struggles no longer possess either the autonomy or the central importance they had inan earlier society defined by the effort to accumulate directly from productive work. Growth nowresults from a whole complex of social factors, not just from the accumulation of capital, butdepends much more directly than before on knowledge and hence on the capacity of society to callforth creativity. All these terms, says Touraine, define a society according to the way it acts onitself, or, in other words, its praxis or historicity, the central concept of his work on socialmovements which is discussed in the text.51orthodox, not a movement at all, perhaps merely the rallying of a special interest, pressure orprotest group around a single issue. Scott suggests the following as a rough guide to thenotion of social movement:A social movement is a collective actor constituted byindividuals who understand themselves to have commoninterests and for at least some significant part of their socialexistence, a common identity. Social movements aredistinguished from other collective actors, such as politicalparties and pressure groups, in that they have massmobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime sourceof social sanction, and hence of power. They are fhrtherdistinguished from other collectives, such as voluntaryassociations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned to defend orchange society, or the relative position of the group insociety.Theorists sometimes argue, too, about how new a social movement actually is, or vacillate onwhether a movement, having been accused of having concerns too particular, should berelegated to the status of a cultural movement. Indeed, Melucci, the theorist associated withthe introduction of the tenn “new social movements” into the sociological literature, viewsaspects of the debate around them with frustration, saying that he has:“... watched with dismay as the category has beenprogressively reified.”10’Some, Touraine among them in certain of his works, have argued that for each historic periodthere can be only one historic actor, one central social movement, on whose shoulders restssquarely the burden of social transformation. Other theorists reject new social movements as100 Scott 6.‘°‘ Alberto Melucci, “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?” ySocial Movements: From Ideology to Identity 105.52reformist— in contrast to what they see as the tmly transformative class movements’02— or asspecial interests simply seeking sectional advantage.Disputes about whether a social movement is “progressive” or “reactionary” are also scatteredthrough the literature, along with a tendency to designate a social movement “progressive” ifthe writer identifies with it and to refuse the designation to others. This debate need not beengaged in, argue Eyerman and Jamison, as “progressiveness” is not a defining attribute forthe notion social movement.there is nothing automatically progressive about socialmovements; as history itself is open and often regresses, socialmovements can re-act, as well as act, mobilizing interests thatrepresent regressive as well as progressive values. Theirideological orientation need not affect their creativity; all socialmovements are producers of knowledge.’°3The aspect of the formation of new collective identities within society is an important one inthe literature on social movements. Doug McAdam, for example, argues that historically,social movements have served as the source for new collective identities within societies,citing as examples the Christian, Muslim and “working class” identities which he points to ashaving emerged in the context of social movements.’04Terry Eagleton is another who pointsto the importance of this aspect when he argues that:no dominant political order is likely to survive very longif it does not intensively colonize the space of subjectivityitself’05102 Scott 7 contains an outhne of this argument.103 Eyennan and Jamison 58.104 Doug McAdam, “Culture and Social Movements,” New Social Movements: From Ideology toIdentity, eds. Enrique Larafta, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1994) 49-50.105 Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990) 36.53In limiting the use of the term social movement to oppositional groupings working for atransformation of the social order, Touraine distinguishes them from others that can be seen asalternative groupings seeking freedom for practices outside of the mainstream, or groupingsthat coalesce temporarily around a particular issue.This distinction, however, can prove problematic. Alternative groupings which set out merelyto seek freedom for divergent practices often have the effect of contributing to atransformation of the social order as well. As McAdam observes in another context:Movement cultures are not static over time. Having openedup the question of the restructuring of social arrangements,there is no guarantee that insurgents will confine their attentionto the specific issues or institutions originally targeted. Whenthis happens, movements can take on the character ofhothousesof cultural innovation. Anything and everything is open tocritical scrutiny. Change becomes the order of the day)°6Acknowledging the difficulty of mapping a sharp boundary around the notion of socialmovement, this study — drawing as it does on Touraine, through the framework of Eyermanand Jamison— will nevertheless also exclude from the concept actors who define their projectsnarrowly, in other words, those actors who could be seen rather as specific or localintellectuals, in Foucauldian terminology. However, this differentiation proves as problematicas the distinction often insisted upon with regard to what constitutes a social movement. Thiswas something that Michel Foucault himself recognised. He was aware that in the definition ofthe one were the seeds of the other.In an interview, “Truth and Power,” published in 1977, Foucault, while recognising thedangers of the specific intellectuals “... remaining at the level of conjunctural struggles,106 MeAdam 46.54pressing demands restricted to particular sectors,” states that the point had been reached atwhich the function of the specific intellectual needed to be reconsidered. Contending that therole of the specific intellectual in local and specific struggles has been productive, he argues:One may even say that the role of the specific intellectualmust become more and more important in proportion to thepolitical responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nifly to accept,as a nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, etc. Itwould be a dangerous error to discount him politically in hisspecific relation to a local form of power, either on the groundsthat this is a specialist matter which doesn’t concern the masses(which is doubly wrong: they are already aware of it, and in anycase implicated in it), or that the specific intellectual serves theinterests of State or Capital (which is true, but at the same timeshows the strategic position he occupies), or, again, on thegrounds that he propagates a scientific ideology (which isn’talways true, and is anyway certainly a secondary mattercompared with the fundamental point: the effects proper to truediscourses).’°7Reviewing the differing attributes and roles given to intellectuals in social theory,Radhakrishnan— examining the intersections between Foucault’s and Gramsci’s theories —makes this distinction between specific and universal intellectuals:there is the Foucauldian “specific intellectual” (inopposition to the universal intellectual), who works “withinspecific sectors at the precise points where [the specificintellectual’s] own conditions of life or work situate” him orher. The specific intellectual is intended in demystification of theuniversal intellectual just as the Gramscian organic intellectualexposes the ideological underpinnings of the traditionalintellectual. But there the similarity ends, for the agencies of thetwo intellectuals have very different orientations.’08Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977. ed. CohnGordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 130-131.‘° R. Raclhakrishnan, “Towards an Effective Intellectual: Foucault or Gramsci?” Intellectuals:Aesthetics. Politics. Academics, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1990) 80.Stuart Hall also discusses these distinctions in “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,”Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Gary Nelson and Paula Treichler (New York andLondon: Routledge, 1992) 288-289.55According to Didier Eribon’s reading, the specific intellectual’09 wages battles on precisepoints and in well-defined places.11°This would seem to contrast sharply with the notion of theuniversal intellectual, where the battleground tends to be the wider social field.Foucault himself, who could be called an active intellectual, intervened in and contributed to anumber of specific causes, such as campaigns for the release of prisoners” or, in concert withfellow intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre, to save boat people.”2An interview Foucault had with a Portuguese worker at a Renault factory suggests that — incontrast to Gramsci, and indeed to Hayek and Keynes— Foucault did not publicly claim thesame crucial role for the intellectual.Jose: What an intellectual who works for the people can dois to reflect the light coming from those who are exploited andmake it brighter. He acts as a mirror.Foucault: I wonder if you are not somewhat exaggeratingthe role of intellectuals. We are in agreement that workers haveno need of intellectuals to know what it is they do. They knowthis perfectly well themselves. An intellectual, for me, is a guyhooked into the system of information rather than into thesystem of production. He is able to make himself heard. He canwrite in papers, give his point of view, He is also hooked into aformer system of information. He has the knowledge, obtainedfrom reading a certain amount of books, that other people donot have directly available to them. His role, consequently, isnot to form the workers’ consciousness, since that afreadyexists, but to allow this consciousness, this workers’knowledge, to enter the information system and be circulated.This will help other workers, and people who are not workers,to become aware of what is happening. I agree with you whenyou speak of a mirror, if one takes the mirror to be a means oftransmission . . . [sic] We can say this: the intellectual’sknowledge is always partial in relation to the worker’s109 As opposed to the Sartre-style total or engaged intellectual.“° Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1991) 259.“ Ibid 267.112 Ibid 278-280.56knowledge. What we know about the history of French societyis entirely partial in relation to all the vast experience that theworking class has.”3Recognising that the notion of an intellectual is contested, this thesis follows the emphasis ofGramsci and Hayek on the potentials of intellectual action and employs the term to denote abroad range of intellectual activity, as discussed in the next section.While Foucault may not have shared Hayek’s position on the role of the intellectual, he was,in terms of arguments he made, sympathetic, perhaps surprisingly so for some, to aspects ofthe modern liberal position, as discussed more fully in Chapter 11, the conclusion.The term social movement is considered appropriate for this study since theintellectuals/activists being examined see themselves as engaged in a social transformation of asocietal type, the argument occurring most frequently in the social movements literature andthat used by figures who dominate the field, such as Touraine. Indeed, in this respect, such anapproach might be better suited to an analysis of the movement considered in this work thanto many others dealt with in the social movements literature. Hayek and his fellow actorsarticulated a vision of, and commitment to, a notion of progress more commonly associatedwith analyses of the historic actor; a progress afforded by the market as adiscovery/epistemological mechanism and representing a project of social transformation of atype not always readily apparent in the other movements with more limited, particular andshort-term goals. A social movements approach is considered well suited to this project byvirtue of its ability to capture that which has been overlooked in the “New Right” literature,“ Thid 253.57and this more comprehensive account thus expects to contribute in part to an understanding ofthe role the actor/agent/intellectual plays in social transformation.Notwithstanding the disagreement over social movements, it seems likely the attention theyare receiving seems set to intensifj in the fi.iture. Giddens concurs. In the eighth of his ninetheses on the future of sociology, he states that:social movements will continue to be of primesignificance in stimulating the sociological imagination.”42. Gramsci as Invigorator, and some Similarities to HayekStanley Aronowitz sees the work of Gramsci as an important reason for the current jointrevival of interest in intellectuals and social movements:In 1968, students and other intellectuals presentedthemselves as new agents not only in Paris, Berlin, and otherWestern capitals but also in Mexico City, Buenos Aires andPrague. In the struggle to comprehend the nature of theiremergence, Antonio Gramsci, until the 1960s a shadowy figureoutside his native Italy, quickly surfaced as a crucial guide. HisSelections from the Prison Notebooks, published in English in1971, provided an argument, if not an elaborated theory, thatplaced intellectuals on the cusp of social transformation insocieties where rule by consent replaces rule by force as theprimary mode.”5Indeed, Gramsci’s reformulation and extension of the notion of the intellectual came, to asignificant extent, out of his interest in the process of the winning of consent for the politics ofa social movement of the 1930s — Italian fascism. He reflected on the response ofcounter-movements, the role of intellectual leadership in organising, negotiating andarticulating groups in alliances which create a new common sense, and the need for a114 Anthony Giddens, “Nine Theses on the Future of Sociology,” Social Theory and Modern Sociology(Cambridge: Polity, 1987a) 48.115 Aronowitz 10.58normative framework ahead of economic and political transformation— ideas which placeGramsci very firmly as a theorist interested in social movements, even though his contributionpredated the work on social movements that was to define the field as it is now known.”6It is to the corpus of Gramsci that many of the theorists working on contemporary socialmovements go, either to borrow and build, or to take issue.Gramsci’s notion of the intellectual is a comprehensive one, extended to all whose socialfunction is to direct ideas, rather than the more limiting notion which restricts the title to thoseseen as engaged in formal or developed thought. As such, it is a conceptualisation well suitedto the analysis of social movements. In Gramsci’s vision the new intellectuals— a group hesees expanding significantly in the 20th century— are active participants, constructors,organisers and permanent persuaders in social life, directing the ideas and aspirations of theclass to which they belong organically. These intellectuals, often performing the role ofconstructing a critical sense of the prevailing dominant view ahead of campaigning for a newhegemony or common sense, and whose function is directive and organisational, in otherwords, educational and intellectual, provide the theory, ideology and leadership for a base.In Gramsci’s conception the party has importance as the entity which combines and nurtureswhat he called the organic intellectuals, as well as being the channel for the ideas with whichthese intellectuals are involved. For him all members of the party are intellectuals, and the116 Eyerman and Jamison 2, 10. They see the original formulations which inspired the study of socialmovements as located in the 1930s and 1940s, provoked by the fascist and communist movementsthat had upset the political order in Germany and Italy. Some of the scholars responsible for thisearly work were themselves victims of this turmoil, they say.59party may be made up of different levels or types. In addition, the party has the further task ofuniversalising that which is specific:In the political party the elements of an economic socialgroup get beyond that moment of their historical developmentand become agents of more general activities of a national andinternational character.117This particular aspect of Gramsci’s thinking involving the organic intellectuals within the partycorresponds to the thinking of Touraine, who defines social movements as involving actorswith a historic project going beyond the particular to seek a social transformation from onesocietal type to another.The location best suited to organic intellectuals becomes ever more pertinent with thecredibility of political parties of all ideological aflliations increasingly being called intoquestion, a development which suggests a need for an investigation into locations outside ofthe political party for contemporary “organic intellectuals” and perhaps prompts a furtherreformulation of the notion itselfGramsci is used in this work in the spirit ofHall, not to reproduce his analysis directly or claimthat Gramsci has all the answers but, with Hall, to think in a Gramscian way, which he pointsout is quite different.We mustn’t use Gramsci (as we have for so long abusedMarx) like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correctmoment, will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation.We can’t pluck up this ‘Sardinian’ from his specific and uniquepolitical formation, beam him down at the end of the 20thcentury and ask him to solve our problems for us: especiallysince the whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy117 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and tr. Quintin Hoare and GeoffreyNowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) 16.60transfer of generalizations from one conjuncture, nation orepoch to another.”8This study was inspired in part by an interest piqued by similarities that were found betweenthe ways in which the very differently positioned Hayek and Gramsci conceived of the notionof and activities of, the intellectual as agent of social transformation. Each held to what wasat the time an uncommon comprehensive notion of the intellectual, and it was the nature of thefunction and effect of prolonged intellectual activity in society that had their attention.Gramsci’s notion is in stark contrast to the traditional idea of the intellectual as comprisingonly philosophers and people of letters. For Gramsci, thinking is common to all, andintellectuals are not distinguished on these grounds in his work; rather, intellectuals arecharacterised by the functions they perform, and the term is extended to all those who havethe function of organisers in society, be it in the domain of production, politics, or culture.Gramsci saw the defining attributes and abilities of what he called the “organic” or newintellectuals of the social formation he was studying as:active participation in practical life, as constructor,organiser, “permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator(but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematicalspirit) . .For Hayek the intellectual is the intermediary in the spreading of ideas. The notion he posits isextensive and, like Gramsci’s, while not linked to class in the way in which Gramsci’s notionis, it contrasted with the prevailing view of the time.The term “intellectuals,” however, does not at once conveya true picture of the large class to which we refer, and the factthat we have no better name by which to describe what we havecalled the secondhand dealers in ideas is not the least of thereasons why their power is not better understood. Even persons118 Hall, “Gramsci and Us,” The Hard Road to Renewal 161.119 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 10.61who use the word “intellectual” mainly as a term of abuse arestill inclined to withhold it from many who undoubtedly performthat characteristic fhnction.’2°Hayek, too, includes categories usually absent.Until one begins to list all the professions and activitieswhich belong to this class, it is difficult to realize how numerousit is, how the scope for its activities constantly increases inmodem society, and how dependent on it we all have become.The class does not consist only of journalists, teachers,ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers offiction, cartoonists, and artists — all of whom may be masters ofthe technique of conveying ideas ... The class also includesmany professional men and techniciansHe ascribes to this group significant influence.It is the intellectuals in this sense who decide what viewsand opinions are to reach us, which facts are important enoughto be told to us, in what form and from what angle they are tobe presented. Whether we shall ever learn of the results of thework of the expert and the original thinker depends mainly ontheir decision.’22The growing group providing intellectual services in the 20th century which had attracted theattention of Gramsci and Hayek drew interest some decades later when theorists working inthe field saw its swelling numbers as grounds to advance it as a new class in post-industrialsociety (Alvin Gouldner 1979). However, this line of argument portraying knowledge workersas constituting a new class is problematic, especially for those theorists who hold that thesignificant distinction is that between capitalist and worker. Knowledge workers shareattributes of both workers and capitalists, for example, with the emphasis shifting from theone to the other depending on the theorist. Intellectuals can be conceived of both as workersemployed in production in a knowledge-based society and paid wages for their services, or as120 Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” (Fairfax, Va.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1990) 6.First published in the University of Chicago Law Review 16:3 (1949).121 Ibid 7.122 Ibid.62being like capitalists in that they exercise effective control over the components of productionwhere they operate and receive part of their remuneration as a return on human capital, towhich they add continually by acquiring knowledge in the process of production.The argument is made that the new class argument failed to captivate mainstream socialtheory, in part because that community itself could not be convinced intellectuals could fuffilthe role of a class (perhaps, too, partly because that community would have had to find itsplace within the “new” class and acknowledge the privileges which the argument posited.Some of these critiques coincide with public choice arguments that bureaucrats andintellectuals privileged by the welfare state generally act as self-interested politicalentrepreneurs when they call for expansion of the institutions with which they are associated).Referring to what he sees as “the increasingly obsolete notion of a ‘new’ class” (ef Bell,1979), Nico Stehr takes issue with the argument thus:it is rather doubtfifl that emerging societies will have thekinds of masters past societies had. Experts are far toofragmented intellectually to perform such a historical role. Theyalso have the most diverse allegiances.’233. Touraine’s Influence on Social Movements TheoryTouraine is an important figure in the resurgence of interest in the actor as well as a keytheorist within the social movements field, having written on the replacement of older forms ofclass struggle by the new social movements.124 In common with Gramsci, Touraine, with histheoretical and methodological emphasis on the social actor, acts as a touchstone for those123 Nico Stehr, “Experts, Counsellors and Advisers,” The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiriesinto Contemporary Societies, eds. Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter, 1992.)124 Stuart Hall, in a discussion of “post-industrial writers” in “Brave New World,” Marxism Today(October 1988): 24.63working in the area, including Eyerman and Jamison, as well as having a wider influence onthose working in other areas within sociology. He has worked in his field since the 1960s andremains prolific. Alan Scott, in a work in which he reviews new social movements theory,asserts that for Touraine:sociology is the study of social movements.Touraine, along with other social movements theorists, sees new social movements assymptoms of contemporary, post-industrial, programmed society.’26 Introducing Touraine’swork in a foreword, Aronowitz describes his contribution in the following way:whereas Daniel Bell greets the coming of postindustrialsociety as one more confirmation for his older thesis thatcontemporary democratic countries have found the mechanismsto overcome the need for ideology, Touraine understands thisevent as the coming to power of new social agents, which, likeother historical actors, arm themselves with pathbreakingideologies.’27Touraine posits a general theory of social transformation for social movements. These socialtransformations, for Touraine, are the results of conflict, with the conflict not merely aresponse to a situation by actors, but rather an initiative by them:A social movement is a conflictual action through whichcultural orientations, a field of historicity, are transformed intoforms of social organization defined by general cultural normsand by relations of social domination.’28125 Scott 5.126 For Touraine, social movements are both bearers and symptoms of the transition from industrial topost-industrial society, while for Habermas they are to be understood in the long historical processof rationalisation within Western societies.127 Aronowitz in the foreword to Touraine, Return of the Actor: Social Theory in PostindustrialSociety (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) xiii.‘ Touraine, Return of the Actor 66.64For Touraine— who reserves the term social movement for the struggles around theinstitutional potentials of cultural patterns of a given societal type’29 — the idea of the socialmovement is a recognition of the fact that actors do not merely limit themselves to reacting tosituations; rather, they actually produce situations.’3°Social life is a complex of initiatives andnegotiations, in Touraine’s conception, and social movements arise from normatively orientedinteractions between adversaries who have conflicting interpretations and opposed societalmodels of a shared cultural field. The forms of social organisation which result from conflictsbetween social actors striving to control and implement the increasing capability of society toact on itself; and which involve all the techniques of production, communication, informationand administration, are that which Touraine refers to as the field of historicity.’3’Touraine believes the different ways in which the term social movement is used make thedebates artificial and in a recent work he suggests replacing “this exceedingly vagueexpression by a precise representation of social dynamics.”132 In collective action, groupingswith particular subjectivities organise around a central conflict and struggle to have theircultural orientation privileged as the social form for the entire collectivity.Social life has three central elements for Touraine:the subject, as distanciation of organized practices and asconsciousness; historicity, as the set of cultural modes(cognitive, economic, and ethical) and as the stake of the centralsocial conflict; and social movements, as the groups that129 According to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).‘3° Touraine, Return of the Actor 26.Touraine, “Is Sociology Still the Study of Society?” Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity,eds. Peter Beilharz, (lillian Robinson and John Rundell (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England:MIT Press, 1992) 177.132 Touraine, “Beyond Social Movements?” Theory. Culture & Society 9 (1992) 125.65contend in order to give these cultural orientations a socialform.133Touraine’s central concept of historicity is in contrast to the more traditional meaning whichindicates the historical nature of social phenomena.’34However, he argues:Historicity is not a set of values solidly established at thecenter of society; rather it represents a set of instruments, ofcultural orientations, through which social practices areconstituted, and thus one can say it is a set of investments.’35It is this historicity, or set of cultural orientations, that social movements wish to realise in theprocess of transformation. Thus it is the social action arising from the increased ability ofsociety to act upon itself that brings a given situation to light, rather than the situation merelyleading consequentially to action.Touraine’s work on movements, such as the Polish union movement Solidarity, demonstratesthe centrality of the concept of historicity to the development of his theory of socialmovements, the implications ofwhich Aronowitz explains in the following terms:Touraine has developed a theory of social movements interms of the leading concept of historicity, which may transcendthe prevailing cultural model or at least puts it into question.Social movements therefore are not merely groups of actorswith specific grievances within institutions; they are marked bythe degree to which they act upon the prevailing cultural model.They challenge it by proposing alternatives that almostinvariably appear utopian in relation to hegemonic norms andvalues. That Touraine speaks of the cultural model distinguisheshis point of departure from that of Marxism, for which cultureis derivative of the mode of production of material life. WhatTouraine does is to pose the model of life, including itsnormative features, as the thndamental object of historicalcontestation. This paradigm challenges theories of blind forces—whether of the classical Marxist or structuralist varieties—without, for a moment, denying the critical significance of133 Ibid 42.‘‘ Ibid 40.Ibid4l.66struggles over accumulation, class relations, and political poweras crucial elements of the social system.’36For Eyerman and Jamison, too, it is a crucial consideration that the projects of socialmovements go beyond the particular to seek a transformation of cultural values, and indeed,that if cultural values are not embraced there can be no social movement. In this connection,Touraine cites the 19th-century labour movement as an example.The labor movement formed only when it went beyond therejection of machines and began to defend the idea thatmechanization and progress should be put in the service of theworkers and of all people. 137Eyerman and Jamison’s notion of a social movement accords with Touraine’s in this respectand also in that their categorisation limits the definition to those groups that are significant inredefining history and “which carry the historical projects which have normally been attributedto social classes.”38For Touraine, contestation is a central element of social life, and it is through his constructionof historicity — which he uses to consider that which is at stake in society, that which calls intoquestion the dominant interpretation, that which groups struggle over— that he conceives ofthe role social movements play in society, in the process of which subjectivities andconsciousness are changed.Eyerman and Jamison, drawing on Touraine, view social movements as constituted in theinterplay between what they refer to as deep structure of knowledge interests— citing thethinking of JUrgen Habermas and operationalising his epistemological categories — and the136 Aronowitz xiv.137 Touraine, Return of the Actor 134.138 Eyerman and Jamison 56, borrowing from Touraine, Return of the Actor.67practical world of political strategy.’39 They see the process by which movements come torecognise themselves as collective actors with a historic project as involving an interactionamong three interconnected areas:• Opposition: Points to the way the movement casts the groups, actors or institutionsagainst which it is in conflict, often viewing the different and opposing formation as theOther. The Other can thus be seen as contributing to the constitution of that identity;• Identity: Refers to the way in which actors perceive themselves as part of a particulargroup with a specific subjectivity;• Totality: The process by which movement actors perceive themselves as being actors on anhistoric stage)’1°Elucidating the work of Touraine, they argue that he distinguishes a social movement from aprotest organisation by its realisation of historicity. Thus, for them, the social movement ashistoric actor is involved in a struggle in which the foundations of society are at stake and indispute.14’ The theme of the Other is an important one for Eyerman and Jamison in theconstruction of the movement’s collective identity, since it is that at which protest is directedand against which it will act.’42Andrew Jamison, Ron Eyerman and Jacqueline Cramer with Jeppe Lssøe, The Making of theNew Environmental Consciousness: A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements inSweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) 3.‘° Eyennan and Jamison 158.141 Ibid 27. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the foundations of society can change as a result ofthe actions of a grouping which does not articulate those actions as an intention at the outset. Thus,defining what counts as a social movement is highly problematic.142 Ibid 101, 117-118.68In one sense, Touraine’s influence on Eyerman and Jamison is from two directions, for he wasalso the teacher in the 1970s of Melucci, one of the other theorists on whom they draw. Mostimportant in their framework is the work of Melucci, Eyerman and Jamison say, because hesees the challenge of the new social movements in primarily “symbolic” terms.143Melucci, while obviously influenced by his former teacher, breaks with Touraine on a numberof issues. Melucci’s contribution is to focus on the changed way in which collective actorsthink about themselves, the fluidity of collective action and the move to action at the globallevel. Melucci stresses the degree of diversity within collective actions and cautions againstexaggerating the degree ofunity. Eyerman and Jamison measure his contribution thus:Melucci is particularly good in stressing the formativeprocesses of collective identity. Most other theorists of socialmovements deal with this problem as one of organisation,stressing the need for institutionalized roles and order (e.g.Gamson) rather than the processes of interaction in theproduction and maintenance of collective identity.This centrality of the processes of collective will formationor collective identity is what distinguishes a social movementfrom a pressure group, which is formally organized andrelatively certain of its goals and the interests it represents.’Melucci argues that Touraine’s analysis of contemporary movements is not differentiatedenough; a criticism he levels at Habermas as well.Touraine’s idea of the central movement still clings to theassumption that movements are a personage — unified actorsplaying out a role on the stage ofhistoiy.’45143 Ibid 48.‘ Ibid 172.145 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs inContemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 202.69For Melucci, a social movement refers to a class of collective phenomena which are manifestin three dimensions:’• Solidarity: A social movement is a collective action involving a solidarity among actors,which implies a mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit.• Conflict: There must be an engagement in conflict, and therefore opposition to an adversary laying claim to the same goods or values.• A break with the limits of compatibility of a system: The social movement actions violate the boundaries or tolerance of the system, thereby pushing it beyond the range ofvariations it can tolerate without altering its structure.For Melucci, empirical forms of collective action comprise a combination of these analyticaldimensions, with actors engaged in many different games at the same time. An analysis shouldreveal the existence of this pluralism, Melucci argues.On the basis of its suitability for the analysis of a movement which saw its task in these largerterms,’47 this project will use the notion of social movements rendered in the work ofTouraine. However, while Touraine’s work on social movements is an influence both for thisproject and for theorists Eyerman and Jamison, the idea in certain earlier aspects of Touraine’swork that there is one central movement in any given historical period is not found in Eyermanand Jamison, and is not subscribed to here. In other words, no claim is made that the146 Melucci 29.147 Stanley Aronowitz sees intellectuals of the Right, now located in those universal spaces once theprovince of the left and liberals, using the word liberal in the North American sense to indicatethose arguing for government intervention rather than in the classical sense associated with limitedgovernment, such as that used by Europeans like Hayek. Stanley Aronowitz, “On Intellectuals,”Intellectuals: Aesthetics. Politics. Academics, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1990) 41.70movement for limited government and a more market-based social order is the central socialmovement of the second part of the 20th century. Eyerman and Jamison claim that their workwas informed more by the ideas of Melucci who, although he had been a student ofTouraine’s in the 1970s, took a different position from his former teacher on this issue.’44. The Project Framework: Mapping the Eyerman and Jamison ApproachTo investigate the activities and practices of a grouping that believes in the power of ideas,indeed, in the important role of human agency in social change, this study uses a socialmovements theoretical framework with which to consider the role of intellectuals as actors insocial change, specifically the contribution active intellectuals have made to the shift awayfrom the large-scale interventionist Keynesian paradigm.’49 As is appropriate to a socialmovements approach, the study conducts a simultaneous empirical or substantive investigationto interrogate the earlier theories focusing on the 1970s which cast the changes that attendedthe break with the Keynesian consensus in terms of economic and technological determinants.The key element in the various conceptions of what distinguishes a social movement fromother phenomena in the collective action field— along with a level of planning andorganisation, reliance on cultural guidelines and a prolonged nature — is the goal of socialtransformation claimed by collective actors who create a shared identity, however unsettled,‘ See the interview with Melucci in Nomads of the Present 199-204.149 Taking the view that the New Right, or even elements of it, should be considered a socialmovement is not an idiosyncratic position to hold, and is fairly common in the literature of the NewRight. For example, Marchak refers to the New Right as a social movement in The IntegratedCircus 4. The phenomenon is viewed similarly in Elliott and McCrone, “Class, culture andmorality: a sociological analysis of neo-conservatism,” The Sociological Review 35:3 (1987)485-515. Indeed, Jessop et al see it as appropriate to refer to Thatcherism alone as being a socialmovement in Thatcherism (1988) 61.71negotiated, and multi-layered, and are organised around a central social conflict. It is thisengagement by activists and intellectuals in a project of social transformation that qualifiesthem, it is argued, as constituting a social movement. Mere numbers of participants alone arenot a sufficient criterion, for on this basis a movement could not be seen as such from itsbeginnings but only from the later point at which it achieved a certain number, and then whatnumber would suffice? As Eyerman and Jamison point out, social movements emerge far fromfi.illy formed, take organisational form and are then more or less successflil in affectingpolitical and social processes through their challenges.’50 Also, a movement’s numbers canswell and diminish over time depending on the particular period and issue.As illustrated, Eyerman and Jamison’s approach has at its core notions and insights borrowedfrom Melucci, Touraine and Gramsci, and some links to the work of Habermas. They derivefrom the work of these thinkers their two major and interconnected concepts in theframework upon which this study draws — cognitive praxis and movement intellectual.Following Touraine’s stress on social action, cognitive praxis refers to the process by whichthe core identity of a social movement is created in action. In motivating the approach tosocial movements which they have formulated, Eyerman and Janiison argue that:The cognitive praxis of social movements is not just socialdrama; it is, we might say, the social action from where newknowledge originates. It is from, among other places, thecognitive praxis of social movements that science and ideology— as well as everyday knowledge— develop new perspectives. Inorder to see that formative influence, however, it is necessary toread social movements in a particular cognitive way.° EyemianandJamison 121.151 Eyerman and Jamison 48-49.72The notion of an accompanying consciousness and process of knowledge creation is informedby Melucci’s thinking on the expressive importance of social movements.Gramsci’s influence in their work is found through the taking up of his comprehensivelyconstructed notion of “organic intellectual,” which is transformed by Eyerman and Jamisoninto a notion of the “movement intellectual” while retaining, and arguably perhaps evenstrengthening, its comprehensiveness. Eyerman and Jarnison also follow Gramsci in looking atintellectuals in the context of large social forces in which they appear. They see themselves astransforming Gramsci’s insights from the class formation of partisan intellectuals into a moregeneralised one about intellectual formation,’52and this study follows their lead.The Eyerman-Jamison framework attempts to weave the insights of these three theorists into amothis operandi for the examination of social movements, mapping a movement’s boundariesby interpreting its cognitive praxis. This conception is in sympathy with Touraine’sexplanation that society now has a greater ability to act upon itself and that it is actors,through their actions, conflicts and negotiations, who seek to make use of this potential, thusgiving rise to forms of social and cultural organisation.’53From Touraine they take the notion of the process of collective will formation,’ by whichthey indicate the ways through which movements come to recognise themselves as collectiveactors with a historic project.152 Ibid 166.153 Ibid 186.154 Eyerman and Janüson 26.73Taking their project further, Eyerman and Jamison draw on the postulate of Habermas thatknowledge constitutes interests and develop operational categories of knowledge interests,turning the interests he imputes to humans into specifiable types of knowledge that particularmovements could be seen to have expressed and suggesting they could be usefully viewed inthree dimensions— cosmological, technological and organisational. This they offer as analternative to the notion of ideology.The value of Eyennan and Jamison’s modus operandi, then, is that it reformulates thesecontributions for contemporary times and brings them together in an approach through whichthe complex nature of social movements can be examined. In other words, their work offers amedium through which to operate in the field, inspiring, it is argued, a mode of thinking in theresearcher which favours the reviewing of process over end result or mere category.This research attitude complements the assumptions with which the study starts out, which areunderpinned and reinforced by the thinking of the key theorists selected. Society is seen assubject to change and social action rather than mere reproduction, and thus an analysis isfavoured that is dynamic rather than static, where structure and agency can be viewed asmutually dependent and an important role given to agency in the long term. In using anapproach to study movements which emphasises process over product, procedure overoutcome, and development over culmination, this thesis hopes also to demonstrate some ofthe benefits of this kind of research attitude.74Eyerman and Jamison use the term cognitive praxis — “the most basic of our concepts”55— inresponse to what they see in the collective action field as inadequate frameworks resulting inan incomplete understanding of the complex processes involved in the phenomenon of thesocial movement. Cognitive praxis is part of an analytical approach that seeks to study socialmovements on their own terms, an approach which, they assert, has neither the drawbacks ofa “naive objeetivism” nor an “equally misguided 5ubjectivism.SóThis strategy is based on the notion that social life can be seen as a combination of action andconstruction. Using an argument which, as argued earlier, while not directly stating it to be thecase, suggests a break with the agency/structure dualism, Eyerman and Jamison say action isneither predetermined nor completely self-willed, and all forms of practical activity areinformed by some underlying project— a position on the relationship between structure andagency which is akin to that taken in this study. Cognitive praxis demonstrates the coreidentity of a social movement, which is made up of social action by which individuals createnew kinds of knowledge and social identities, a different consciousness, with their cognitivepraxis transforming them from groups of individuals into social movements.It (cognitive praxis) is a kind of deep structure that allowsus to draw certain boundaries around a movement as itdevelops over time, as well as to evaluate the current status andpotential of actual movements.’57Thus, cognitive praxis is the process of constructing a movement identity, the making of aconsciousness with a creation of knowledge which is itself an historical construction.Important to this process are the movement actors, or what Eyerman and Jamison term155 Ibid 44.156 Ibid 2.‘ Ibid 44.75movement intellectuals in reference to those who through their activities cultivate and expressthe movement’s knowledge interests or, in other words, its world-view— a process whichemphasises the creative role of consciousness and which is sensitive to the context in whichthis articulation takes place. Through this process, which also includes organisational andtechnological dimensions — discussed later in this chapter— movement intellectuals create theirrole within the movement at the same time as they create the movement.The notion of movement intellectual within the framework has a different status from that ofcognitive praxis, which they see as a kind of deep structure, in that, being oriented more toactors than to movements as a whole, it operates at a different level. Nevertheless, both arekey to the framework and are connected in that:it is movement intellectuals, as historic actors, who makevisible the underlying cognitive praxis.’58Indeed, social movements, Eyerman and Jamison argue, create spaces for new types ofintellectual to emerge.A social movement combines aspects of collective identity — the creation of an alteredconsciousness, world view or ways of seeing — with political action towards the achievementof ends in more or less successful ways.’59 In The Making of the New EnvironmentalConsciousness, Jamison et al say the organisations within the movement they are studying donot choose “their strategies solely on the basis of practical considerations but realise themthrough the framework of their guiding knowledge interests,”6°or world view.158 Ibid 44.‘ Jamison, Eyerman and Cramer with Lssee 4.160 Ibid7.76This central concept of the approach of cognitive praxis is a synthetic conceptualisation whichthey develop to spedil,i both the construction of consciousness and core identity as well as therole that social movements and associated movement intellectuals’6’play in this process, bothaspects being shaped by the political culture and historical conjuncture in which they appear.’62As cognitive praxis is that process which transforms groups of individuals into socialmovements, it is the placing of social movements in political historical context which amplifiesthe connection to social change. In this regard, Eyerman and Jamison’s approach isolatesthree elements that are key to the understanding of social movements.• Subjectivity: The process of expressing a movement identity, that is the cognitive praxis;• Activity: The actors taking part in this process of cognitive praxis, those they call movement intellectuals;• Context: The context in which the articulation takes place.’63Cognitive praxis is identified along three dimensions, according to Eyerman and Jamison:• Cosmological: This refers to the basic beliefs and assumptions, the world view, which theactivists in the particular movement take for granted;• Organisational: Pertains to the various forms of knowledge production embarked on, theorganisational forms created or adopted for specific types of knowledge production anddissemination. This project identifies the think-tank as an important organisational form161 Eyerman and Jamison 44.162 Ibid 164.163 Ibid4.77created for the production and dissemination of knowledge by the movement activists engaged in the campaign for a more market-based social order, as discussed in Part Three.• Technological: Refers both to the specific topics which engage the movement and the alternative techniques used by the movement actors.’ Here the emphasis on micro studiesas opposed to macro studies on the part of intellectuals in think-tanks can be seen as anexample.Eyerman and Jamison’s definition, in line with Touraine’s, resists seeing social movements asentities comprising one specific organisation or one particular special interest group. Rather,social movements emerge, far from fully formed, take organisational form and are then moreor less successful in affecting political and social processes through their challenging ofstructured definitions and practices.’65 Eyerman and Jamison argue that all social movementsbring about some kind of identity transformation’66by placing new issues on the historicalagenda, proposing new values and generating new types of intellectuals who convert themovement’s cognitive praxis, that is, its created consciousness and knowledge, anddisseminate it into the larger society. This framework emphasises process over product andembraces not only what it is that a movement does, but how it does it, as well as what itsmembers think, and why.’67Eyerman and Jamison’s approach is used for this project in large part for the emphasis itplaces on both process and the intellectuals associated with a movement; how these movementintellectuals are formed who then, in turn, re-form the cognitive identity of the social‘ Ibid 165.165 Ibid 121.Ibid 166.167 Ibid 4678movement. That which this project argues has been left out of the earlier accounts of the“New Right” and the break with the Keynesian consensus is thus brought forward by thisattention to a prolonged intellectual campaign and emphasis on historical process rather thanstatic conceptualisation.This research attitude views the social movement in comparative terms, considering itslocation in both time and space; in other words, seeing the social movement in political,historical and cultural context. The consciousness constructed by movement intellectuals isnot created in a void; rather, it is constrained and bounded by the historical situation of thesocial actors and their particular concerns, as well as by the construction of, and response theyreceive from, their opponents. Viewed from another perspective, the Eyerman-Jamisonframework could be said to have the advantage of combining analyses of the individual, thegroup and the macrostructural.Eyerman and Jamison see their work as both a synthesis of European and North Americansociology as well as a departure from these influences, and they take issue withrepresentatives of both. They argue that the reason for the exclusion in American sociology ofwhat members of a social movement think, and why they think the way they do, in otherwords, the attitude&68 that go into making up the knowledge and identity of the socialmovement, is that these aspects are seen as non-empirical matters. As such, they arecategorised outside of the empirical universe of competence in which most North American‘ North American researchers engaged in survey research may resist a distinction such as this,perhaps claiming that their “empirical method” aims to capture attitudes through the questions theyput to respondents.79sociologists’69 live, argue Eyerman and Jamison, who believe that knowledge, rather thanbeing marginalised to an ephemeral or superstructural level of reality, belongs and should beplaced with the centrality of movement identity formation.The identity of the movement becomes disinterested,stripped of its driving ideas, its cognitive meaning. Theparticular historical interests that a movement aims to furtherare not analysed in the process of being formed, as centralcomponent of movement praxis.’7°The other camp, the more theoretically inclined Europeans who consider identity, drawheavily on long-standing theoretical traditions,17’Eyerman and Jamison argue, rather thanconsidering that actual process which they, Eyerman and Janrison, have isolated and termedthe cognitive praxis of the movements. In other words, they assert that for these theoristssocial change is guided by spiritual or material forces rather than occurring throughcommunicative interaction among members of movements about norms and actions, arrived atby negotiation and agreement.The implication of this camp’s approach, Eyerman and Jamison argue, may be to impose anevaluation on the particular social movement rather than to deepen understanding of it, as thisproject aims to do in regard to the movement arguing for limited government and a moremarket-based approach.169 Resource-mobilization theory has dominated the collective action field in North America with itsperspective that it is not so much strain in society — of which there is always a sufficient supply —which serves as the motivation for collective action and to which the attention of the researchermust be turned, but rather to the organisational resources required for collective action. See GaryT. Marx and Douglas McAdam, Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process andStructure (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994).170 Eyerman and Janiison 46.“‘ According to Melucci, a basic ingredient of modern thought is philosophies ofhistory based on thebelief that the course ofhistory is guided to fulfilment by spiritual or material forces, to whichhuman action is necessarily submitted. Melucci 21.80Eyerman and Jamison argue in regard to European sociology that:The identities are, however, not derived from studying thecognitive praxis of movements themselves, but rather drawnfrom theories of social change and philosophies of history.Lurking behind the identity theorists are the classical socialtheorists of the nineteenth century, and behind them thepositivists and idealist philosophies of Comte and Hegel. Assuch, identity in the sense used by many European sociologistsis something superimposed on a social movement and used as astandard of evaluation to judge their potential and historicalsignificance, even their status as a social movement. Thus AlainTouraine, after investigating the French anti-nuclear energymovement, concluded that the movement was not a real socialmovement: it was not involved in the struggle for what he terms“historicity” (Touraine 1983).172For Eyerman and Janiison, most of the North Americans are constrained by their narrowerempirical world in which that which is examined must be easily reducible to empirical data,while the Europeans are hindered by theoretical and ideological agendas which prohibit themfrom apprehending social movements in terms of the actual process, the cognitive praxis bywhich they create their collective identities, most often through a process of negotiation.Eyerman and Jamison, who view themselves as actor-oriented social theorists, see their workas providing a framework of translation between resource mobilisation theory and identitytheory, the two main contemporary approaches to collective action and social movements.A further contrast is that Eyerman and Jamison make a link with the sociology of knowledgein that their approach also sees social relations and cultural traditions affecting thedevelopment of knowledge. It is these aspects that make their framework appropriate for thisproject, in light of the research strategy outlined in the next chapter.172 Eyerman & Jamison 46-47.81There is in Eyerman and Jamison also a recognition of the importance of the intellectual. Theirconceptualisation of the movement intellectual, derived as it is from Gramsci’s thinking on theorganic intellectual, is similarly broad. Their comparative framework for social movements iswell suited to the comprehensive conception Hayek had of the notion intellectual, given thathis formulation is underpinned by the contention that the “all-pervasive influence of theintellectuals” grows and is strengthened by the ever-increasing importance of organisation.’73Hayek, in the words of Eyerman and Jamison, is a leading example in the social movement ofa “real individual” who is able to “make it happen.”74As scholar, organiser and mobiliser, heis at the centre of the movement associated with the resurrection and reformulation of liberalthought, and has in common with it a belief that the process of social transformation ispropelled by ideas, the influence of intellectuals and in particular, the manner in which theseideas and intellectuals are organised to advance an intellectual position. Thus Hayek saw histask as an intellectual one, that of freeing “the world from the plague of socialism.”175 Indeed,Ralph H. Turner sees the utopia associated with social movements as becoming:the basis for a general social movement that fostersprofound social change, leading ultimately to a different socialorder and a new ideology to support it.’76Hayek argued that a traditional flaw of liberalism had been that it did not proclaim a Utopianvision in the way that socialism had done so successffilly, among the young in particular.Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” 8.Eyerman and Jamison 56.‘ Written by Hayek on an index card in a collection he was in the habit of carrying around to keephandy his latest thoughts.176 Ralph H. Turner, “Ideology and Utopia after Socialism,” New Social Movements: From Ideologyto Identity, eds. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1994), 81.82Hayek was thus committed to creating a vision which he conceived of as Utopian, albeit avery different Utopia and one which those who strongly oppose the neo-liberal vision may seerather as a Dystopia:We must make the building of a free society once more anintellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is aliberal Utopia,’77 a program which seems neither a mere defenseof things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but a trulyliberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of themighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severelypractical, and which does not confine itself to what appearstoday as politically possible.’Thus, the intellectual and political were brought together. Hayek used intellectual means tocontest and bring forward for discussion the wisdom of centralised, large-scale stateintervention. He problematised social planning and calculation which bypassed the market asan institution of communication. In other words, Hayek engaged in action that brought issuesEdwin R.A. Seligman, ed., Selections from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York:Macmillan, 1938) 200 offered the following definition of utopia: “The word utopia, a coinage fromthe Greek, meaning literally “nowhere,” was first used by Sir Thomas More in 1516 as the name ofa far distant island on which, according to his fiction, there existed an ideal commonwealth. Sincethe publication of More’s Utopia its title has been appropriated to designate more or lessindiscriminately literary works of all ages which seek, whether through the medium of the dialogue,the novel or some similar form, to conjure up a society or state free from human imperfections. Inrecent years, however, the term has come also to be used in a more strictly sociological sense. Theanalysis of a particular type of intellectual outlook and thought pattern which is now designated asthe utopian mind or the utopian spirit has become one of the most fruitful fields of inquiry forcontemporary sociologists. It is coming to be realised that a clear understanding of the structureand characteristics of this psychological type is important not only in itself but also because itthrows light on the social process as a whole no less than on intellectual development in its broaderaspects. As a literary genre the utopian fiction made its appearance many centuries before More. Itwas Plato who furnished, notably in his Republic, the general model to which all later utopianfictions have been heavily indebted.‘ Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” 25. Neo-liberal intellectuals usually see the need to frametheir project in utopian terms, but stress that it is one without a blueprint. They oppose blueprints,engineered systems and planned societies because of the constraints placed on individual freedom,their beliefs that one should not decide what the “good life” entails for another and that nobody isso infallible as to be able to foresee the future.83to light which hitherto had lacked the expression he and the movement around him were togive it.Assessing Hayek’s contribution to the revival of interest in and understanding of areformulated classical liberalism, Eamonn Butler, in his book on Hayek, sees Hayek’scontribution as an example confirming his beliefs on the power of ideas, and the people behindthem— in line, therefore, with his belief that all of the great social movements have been lednot by politicians but by “men of ideas.”79The framework formulated by Eyerman and Jamison places great emphasis on process, andthus is well suited to a study taking issue with an approach in which the “New Right” isexplained as an almost spontaneous response to economic restructuring and crisis. Thecognitive approach brings into focus the protracted campaign involved in constructing aconsciousness, along with the requisite organisational strategy for social transformation, bothlengthy processes conducted in a context which has both facilitating and hindering aspects.Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; insteadthey require long periods of preparation both at the individual,group, and societal level. No social movement emerges untilthere is a political opportunity available, a context of socialproblem as well as a context of communication, opening up thepotential for problem articulation and knowledge dissemination.Not every social problem, however, generates a socialmovement; only those that strike a fundamental chord, thattouch basic tensions in a society have the potential forgenerating a social movement.’80Similarly, with its focus on the role played by movement intellectuals, the Eyerman-Jamisonframework is conducive to a position which argues that by overemphasising socialEamonn Butler, Hayek: His Contribution to the Political and Economic Thought of Our Time(London: Temple Smith, 1983) 1.180 Eyerman and Jamison 56.84transformations as a response to economic and technological changes, and to crisis, one failsto capture the role of actors, their initiatives and negotiations, in the transformational process.The three aspects of subjectivity, activity and context are used to structure the cognitiveapproach by synthesising action and actors with configuration and contextual constraints.For Eyerman and Jamison the cognitive praxis of a movement develops over time, and it is aprocess which is best studied empirically.’8’In Parts Two and Three of the study, empiricalmaterial related to a 50-year campaign is examined, structured and elaborated on.It is not the focus or purpose of this study to evaluate neo-liberal, libertarian or Hayekianarguments, market-based approaches or the policies of Thatcherism and Reaganism’82 — thelatter terms generally denoting what has been called the politics of the free economy and thestrong state’83 and which indeed may not have been fully consistent with a liberal position, assuggested by scholars such as Brittan (1988) in Britain and Robert Higgs (1987) in the UnitedStates — nor is it the intent to examine whether the deregulation undertaken may have been atransformation from one form of regulation to another. Not only do the Thatcher/Reaganyears fall outside of the 1931-1981 time frame of this study, but such an inquiry wouldconstitute a thesis of a very different kind. As discussed in the postscript to this thesis, there isalready an overabundance of accounts which deal with Reagan or Thatcher, many eitherwholeheartedly celebrating them or rejecting their ideas out of hand, an aspect also discussed‘‘ Ibid 61.182 Indeed, many both inside and outside of the academy have argued that Reagan’s policies were, inmany ways, far more in line with the Keynesian position. Bruce Robbins, for example, refers to“Ronald Reagan’s military Keynesianism” in “Introduction: The Public As Phantom,” BruceRobbins ed. The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) xv.183 As, for example, in Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics ofThatcherism (London: Macmillan, 1988).85by Gray and Brittan in regard to Hayek in the introduction to this thesis. It may also benecessary to stress that it is not the purpose here to consider whether there is now“intervention” on the part of large corporations or international capital rather than an openinternational or social field. That, too, would entail a project of a very different kind.The thesis finds its place in the social movements literature and the interest here is on theprocess for the winning of consent for a set of ideas or new common sense, and thus it is notthe direct project to evaluate, or pass judgement on any particular critical sense transformedinto “common sense” formulated and disseminated by a movement. Indeed, a review of pastand present movements engaged in social transformation would seem to indicate that thesuccess of a movement and the particular ideas that it disseminates often have little to do withwhat commentators may refer to as the worth or merit of the ideas.5. Cycles and Social MovementsIn order to understand cognitive praxis as movement in formation, Eyerman and Jamison, in amanner common in the field, divide this development into different phases so as to track theprogression. It is this pattern which is followed for this study, bearing in mind that noprogression could be theoretically formulated which would prove a suitable fit to all socialmovements, given their complex, dynamic, evolving and synergistic character. Stewart,Smith and Denton describe the benefits and drawbacks of using a “life cycle” analysis thus:Any effort to prescribe a life cycle suitable to all socialmovements, then, is fraught with dangers. The effort can beproductive, however, if the life cycle is constructed with the fullrealization that social movements differ, change, and develop tovarying degrees of sophistication and at varying speeds— stalling at‘ Stewart, Smith and Denton 85.86times, rushing forward at others, retrenching to earlier stages, ordying premature deaths before all stages are completed. Aportrayal of each stage in the life cycle of “typical” socialmovements can help us to understand the ever-changing persuasiverequirements, problems, and functions of social movements and theinteraction of social-psychological, political-institutional,philosophical-ideological, and rhetorical forces.’85Eyerman and Jamison see the first phase of the process as that in which the movement islargely defensive in its strategic focus, a period of awakening or gestation. Piotr Sztompkadescribes the first of the major stages as “origins,” and uses it to refer to the pre-existentstructure constituting a pooi of resources and facilities for the movement.Stewart, Smith and Denton see this first stage as the genesis, a period in which few takeseriously the intellectuals who “define” and “visualize” for the movements. For this project theperiod identified as such is 1931 to 1944. They see three types of movement — revivalist,which addresses an idealised past; innovative, which addresses an intolerable present andprescribes a means for the future; and resistance, which addresses a terrible future that iscertain to result if CUrtent trends are not stifled.’87 While there are elements of all three in themovement being studied, the last of these conceptualisations appears to fit this project best.Next, there is a shift from defensive to offensive strategy, during which the movementundergoes formation and begins its organisation, or what Sztompka terms the stage ofmobilisation,’88distinguishing itself as a social movement and not merely an action group orsingle-issue protest organisation. The period of formation, dealt with in Chapter 7, includes185 Ibid 37.186 Piotr Sztompka, The Sociology of Social Change (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,1993) 286.187 Stewart, Smith and Denton 38.188 Sztompka 288.87the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947 and covers the period from 1944 to1957, the year in which the lEA can be seen as becoming frilly operational.In the third phase the movement consolidates, and it is in this phase in terms of the generalliterature that movements are most vulnerable to dissension and polarisation.189 The period ofconsolidation, or what Sztompka describes as structural elaboration,’9°in this study is dealtwith in Chapter 8, and covers the years from 1957 to 1974, the year in which Hayek won theNobel Prize for economics.Chapter 9, covering the period 1974 to 1981, considers the further consolidation of the 1970s,when Hayekian research and policy institutes were established by Fisher in North America. Bythe end of this period Thatcher and Reagan— two leaders distinguished by their commitmentto limited government and the market, at least rhetorically — are in power following a decademarked by economic and political crisis.The life-cycle approach is used and developed to give a coherence to Part Three, in which thevarious data — collected through interviewing, observation and other research activities — aredealt with and the framework is applied to the movement under investigation.Besides taking the broad approach outlined in regard to the contested term “intellectual,” thisstudy follows the belief of Hayek and Keynes in the power of ideas, and thus of the bearers ofthose ideas— as enunciated in the two quotations at the start of this section — in that, in theparticular context chosen, this study considers groups similarly committed to this persuasion.189 Eyenuan and Jamison 56.190 Sztompka 289.88Part Two considers this context, this field of historicity, which shaped the movementintellectuals arguing for market-based approaches, and a context, which is, in turn, shaped bythem.V 89CHAPTE1. 3The Research1. Research ProblemDriven by a curiosity as to the role of the social actors in the movement for reducedgovernment involvement and a more market-based social order and the process oftransformation in which they were engaged, this study considers how their grouping wasformed and maintained, with the objective of contributing to an understanding of the role ofintellectuals as actors in social change in a century in which theorists of very differentpersuasions (Hayek 1949, Gramsci, translated into English in 1971) have argued that the roleof the intellectual and activist has expanded dramatically, especially in Western-styledemocracies.’9’To this end, the study concentrates on the intellectuals, their knowledgecreation, their practices, mobilisation strategies, intellectual activities and the organisationalcultures in which they operated— examined always in relation to the specific contexts andsocial relations within which they have worked.In the 50-year period of this study, during which intellectuals associated with Hayek, Misesand the Austrian School developed their critique of blueprints, central social planning andlarge-scale state intervention and took issue with positivist attitudes of certainty andpredictability, neo-liberals and libertarians in this tradition advanced their status and ideassignificantly. From a scattered, marginal existence in opposition to the dominant postwarKeynesian approach they achieved a position whereby leaders citing their influence and191 Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” 5; Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 10,13.90espousing limited-govermnent, market philosophy came to power in Western democracies andformer east Bloc countries alike.The practical applications and social policies which flowed from the success of market-baseddiscourse in the public and political arenas give the impetus for a study of the grouping ofintellectual activists largely responsible for its rise and the social processes in which thatgrouping’s members were engaged.’2. Research Strategy: Why this Approach?The strategy of this investigation, which examines how the process of constructing collectiveaction can take place, was formulated so as to capture that which it argues has been neglectedin earlier accounts, as discussed. By combining documentary, interviewing and observationalresearch methods, this study assembles additional material of a kind that can escape scholarswho either theorise from certain of the outcomes which flow from social transformations orrely on documentary evidence alone. By embracing these various methods of bringingevidence to an argument, this project studies the important, inaugural grouping of themovement for limited government and a more market-based order from the additionalperspective of how the actual participants see their role, thus using an investigative attitudeoften adopted by scholars inquiring into social movements and the role of movement ororganic intellectuals in any process of social and cultural change.192 However, it is not the position taken in this study that the “success” of a social movement shouldbe evaluated in terms of its “success” at the poiis or in the political sphere alone; or for that matterin the ideological sphere. Indeed, the very notion of success is troublesome, and here success isused in the limited sense to mean the electoral success of political leaders associated withmarketplace discourse over the last 15 years.91This blend of the various research methods facilitates an understanding of the process of socialchange and the role of actors involved with the development and acceptance of the ideas andpolicy programmes associated with them because it combines detailed observation from closeup with consideration and reflection from afar. Such an approach addresses the problemreferred to by Touraine in Return of the Actor, in which he argues that the sociologistinterested in the study of historical action is in a situation “practically devoid of method.”93Asa way out of this predicament he offers the following as part of a strategy:It is by concentrating our attention upon the actorsthemselves as we apprehend them under the conditions of theirconcrete existence that we will come closest to the mechanismsby means of which we can get a glimpse, beyond behaviorrelated to social consumption, of behavior engaged in theconflictory production of the society ... The study of historicalaction requires the apparent paradox of a distance from broadfrescoes and extensive opinion surveys and instead the practiceof intensive studies of restricted groups, researched at lengthand in depth.’’Conditions are not of people’s own making, but people do make history, or to put a similarargument, detailed earlier, subjects may be constituted by a matrix of power but there arepossibilities of reworking it that can destabilise existing regimes of power. It is social actorswho create and maintain the recurring patterns of social behaviour referred to as socialstructures, which they can, and do, transform or recreate. This understanding means lookingas well at specific actors in their context, a context that is intellectual, cultural, economic,historic, spatial and political. In other words, examining what Touraine refers to as:the formation of historical activity; the manner in whichmen fashion their history.’95193 Touraine, Return of the Actor 92.Ibid 93.195 Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society (New York: Random House, 1971) 4.92In other words, an examination of the contribution to “history” that was made by theintellectuals and activists who are the focus of this study. In this instance some of the “history”that was made was the revolution that Saunders and many others have spoken about thattranspired in Britain in and around the 1980s when previously nationalised companies andpublic housing projects were privatised, market-based approaches adopted in health care andeducation, foreign exchange controls lifted, trade union and other professional privilegeseroded, and inflation — which had become a problem during the Keynesian consensus years —reduced significantly, among other things. Change is cultural as well as political and economic,often happening at the micro as well as the macro level. It is difficult to separate these variouselements, and studies which have reflected on the changes that have come about in Britainreveal contradictory attitudes and reactions to it.’ “Revolutions” often tend to look lessrevolutionary upon later examination, both because the viewer has become accustomed tosome of the changes and because new hegemonies are always partial and incomplete. By wayof an example, Saunders and Harris point out in their examination of privatisation and“popular capitalism” that while share ownership has more than quadrupled, Britain “is still along way from being a nation of shareholders” after the privatisation programme of the1980s. 197 Nevertheless, the 1930s finally banished the idea that home ownership was only forthe rich, they argue, just as the 19SOs abolished the idea that ownership of shares was only forthe privileged.In both cases, a form of property ownership previouslythought of as ‘alien’ to ordinary people’s culture became196 For example, the discussion in Saunders and Harris.197 While the privatisation programme falls outside of the period covered in this study, it is dealt withfurther in Chapter 10 and Appendix X.93acceptable, desirable and unexceptional within the culture andlifestyle of middle England.198The issue of the cultural aspects of economic and political change, previously associated moreclosely with arguments emanating from what is referred to as the Right, has recently beenexamined by a Labour Party Member ofParliament and chair of the Commons Social SecuritySelect Committee. In a document, “Making Welfare Work,” Frank Field makes the argumentthat the failure of the welfare state is at the moral as much as the economic level. Accordingto Melanie Phillips of The Observer, Field, in an “analysis more generally associated with theAmerican Right than with a Labour IvIP,” and one which has proved controversial, puts thecentral paradox of welfare as seemingly that the more funds the system receives, the morepeople are linked to poverty, crime, dependency and hopelessness. Self-help is paralysed,self-improvement and tax honesty discouraged. Phillips points out that as director of the ChildPoverty Action Group in the 1970s, Field advocated precisely the poverty agenda he nowholds responsible for many social ills.She sees Field as now “telling the truth,” having learned from his constituents, as“uncomfortable and hard as it is.”99Saunders and Harris note that the privatisation programme shifted the cultural normsregarding investment and shares, but the government’s ambition, as they see it, was bolder198 Saunders and Harris 151. See their discussion on the impact of privatisation on the British, inwhich they conclude (p. 161) that “the evidence reviewed in this chapter does not suggest thatBritish culture is antithetical to capitalism as such, but it does indicate cultural ambivalence andcontradiction.”199 Melanie Phillips, “Time’s up for the welfare state,” The Observer Essay, The Observer May 14,1995, p. 25.94than this, seeking not only to change cultural norms but also to influence cultural values, andin this they may have failed, they argue.Cultural approaches to understanding social movements, as opposed to emphases of collectivebehaviour and structural approaches, are gaining currency, such that Doug McAdam argues:Given the entrenched political and economic oppositionmovements are likely to encounter, it is often true that theirbiggest impact is more cultural than narrowly political andeconomic.200Social and economic changes at the micro and macro levels are linked as well — what happensat the one level affects the other, and vice versa. For example, the lifting of foreign exchangecontrol measures by the Thatcher government in 1979 shortly after she took office had animpact on the individual practices of British citizens, who were able to travel far more easilythan previously, as it did on the country’s foreign exchange holdings, and thus its trade andinternational relations.For Hayek, it is the intellectual context, and changes to it, that are crucial to socialtransformation. With his belief in the power of intellectuals and the ideas which theydisseminate, Hayek, in a manner consistent in this respect with a Gramscian position, sees asignificant role for human agency, but in the long term; in the short term people areconstrained by structures, especially mental structures. It is said that when he advised AntonyFisher in the 1940s prior to the establishment of the lEA in 1955 that the way to changesociety was not to go into politics but to set up an independent institute and work to influence200 Doug MeAdam, “Culture and Social Movements,” New Social Movements: From Ideology toIdentity, eds. Enrique Laraila, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1994) 49.95intellectuals, Hayek told him not to expect any results for 25 years.201 This notion is consistentwith an earlier observation of Hayek’s:If in the long run we are the makers of our own fate, in theshort run we are the captives of the ideas we have created.202It is this long-range contribution which this study attempts to assess, principally by examininga body of direct historical evidence relating to the cognitive praxis of a movement to judge towhat extent the themes of a changed world can be identified in it.During the period 1931 to 1981 at least, the focus falls on the neo-liberals— quite aside fromtheir inaugural role behind the leadership of Hayek, and, as discussed in the previous chapter,frequently referred to by him as groups of libertarians— as perhaps the most important of thethree major groupings which come together in the wider movement for limited govermnentand a more market-based society. The neo-liberal position with which Hayek was associated —deriving its reformulated ideals from classical liberalism but not to be equated with the laissezfaire position203 — was certainly more influential than the neo-conservative204 element, whichoften links its call for a more market-based society to its appeals for greater authority within201 As related by Linda Whetstone, daughter of Fisher, in an interview undertaken for this project.202 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1944) 2.203 The following definition of market liberalism can be extracted from Samuel Brittan. Noting that alllabels are somewhat arbitrary and that people rarely fit into neat categories, he offers marketliberalism’s main plea that government corrective action should take the form of known rules ratherthan discretionary and unprincipled intervention, and that it should make use of price mechanismremedies wherever possible. The ideal of market liberalism derives from classical liberalism, hesays. Brittan2ll-212.Jim Tomlinson describes Hayek as an advocate of liberalism in economic affairs without, however,being an advocate of laissez faire. Hayek and the Market (London and Winchester, Mass.: PlutoPress, 1990) viii.204 A case could be made that while it is the neo-liberals who dominated in the period underdiscussion, the neo-conservatives later took over, especially following the election victories ofThatcher and Reagan. Perhaps the argument could be put, to parallel Hayek’s argument that theplanned economy can give rise to the totalitarian society, that the neo-liberal position facilitated theneo-conservative position.96it,205 or the group generally referred to as libertarian, which argues for only the most minimalof states with extensive freedom and does not appear to have held a dominant position at anytime in the development of the movement.There is an emphasis in this study, mostly in Part Three, on intellectuals in research and policyinstitutes, or think-tanks, since that is where the more influential members of this primarygrouping of neo-liberal intellectuals are usually located. These institutes are a relatively recentaddition to the intellectual landscape, a knowledge site which the neo-liberals themselvesdeveloped and popularised as a result of their commitment to winning consent for limitedgovernment and a market-based social order. David Warsh describes these knowledge sites,which he sees as having become familiar and powerful in contemporary times, as operating onthe boundary between university scholarship and public policy.206 Through a vigorousengagement in public policy debates, often on controversial topics such as thedecriminalisation of marijuana— putting positions on this issue that are becoming moremainstream as more government bodies consider this option — these institutes have becomeinfluential contemporary participants in social, political and cultural change. As discussed, theHayek-Fisher think-tanks, as organisation sites, are given close attention in this study, each205 In the description given by Banu Helvacioglu in “The God-Market Alliance in Defence of Familyand Community: The Case of the New Right in the United States,” Studies in Political Economy 35(1991), the U.S. is stressed, an emphasis pertinent and appropriate if the neo-conservative positionis indeed more apparent in the latter stages of the period covered in this study, boosted perhaps bythe electoral victories of Reagan and Thatcher at the end of the 1 970s, and in North America,where it takes on a religious tone not present in the early stages of development, say at the time ofthe inauguration of the Hayek-inspired Mont Pêlerin Society. Helvacioglu argues that: “The NewRight (NR) in the United States refers to a coalition of religious and pro-family groups,think-tanks, Political Action Committees and lobbying groups which operate at both national andlocal levels.” 103.206 David Warsh, “Think-Tank Approach Helped Fuel America’s Turn to the Right,” The WashingtonfSeptember5 1990.97being seen as an embodiment of the intellectual project associated with Hayek, the MontPèlerin Society and their campaign against large-scale state intervention.3. Research OuestionsThis study’s focus in the substantive section is guided by the central research question:• In the years 1931 to 1981, how did intellectuals associated with the critique ofcentralised, large-scale state intervention and the revival and reformulation of liberalthought who were convinced of the power of ideas organise themselves for the effectivecreation, development and dissemination of limited-government, marketplace ideas, and inthis process construct an anti-statist entrepreneurial subjectivity and create a collectivemovement consciousness?207Put differently, the question entails considering how the intellectual activists, committed to thepower of ideas in action, developed sites at which to come together to create a sense ofsolidarity and entrepreneurial subjectivity not reliant on notions of an all-pervading state,which they rejected, and embracing a flexibility and innovative style suited to the project ofdevelopment and dissemination of their ideas.207 The sense in which “collective consciousness” is used here is informed by the following assertionby Melucci in an interview in which he refers to theproblematic nature of the notion of solidarity:“... I soon realized that solidarity is not a given state of affairs, and that a social movement is amultifaceted reality. I therefore became convinced of the need to clarif how collective actors cometo define themselves as a unity. So when I now use the term solidarity I use it as an ideal-type. Itrefers to a dynamic and unstable reality, to the product of intense interaction, negotiation, conflictand compromise among a variety of different actors.” Melucci, “Rethinking Democracy,” Nomadsof the Present 217.98The detail of the answer to the central question is assembled through the following componentquestions:B Who were the intellectuals,208where were they located and what were their strategies forthe revival and reconception of liberal thought leading to political change?• How did these factors change over time, in light of the generational and geographicalseparation of the various intellectuals of the neo-liberal movement and the changingcontexts?• How was a consciousness and subjectivity fostered within the movement and how, inparticular cases of the intellectuals interviewed, was their identity constructed, and in whatcontext?209• Do they “live” their ideas in their personal and organisational practices; in other words,are their practices similar to their preachings?B In terms of their strategies, what institutions of knowledge have they developed and used,and what has been the effect of their activities on those institutions? Have new spaces forthe creation of knowledge be