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Winning consent: the protracted campaign for an anti-corporatist "common sense" Fuller, S. 1995

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WINNING CONSENT: THE PROTRACTED CAMPAIGN FOR AN ANTI-CORPORATIST “COMMON SENSE” by S. FULLER B.A., University of Cape Town, 1977 Post Baccalaureate Diploma, Simon Fraser University, 1988 M.A., Simon Fraser University, 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 14, 1995 © S. Fuller, 1995  _________________  presenting this thesis In fulfillment in partial of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be the head granted department by of my or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of  fV4Zti1(L4/uW4k”/  7’vo,e  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  YCL’-I  2\ “(5  AB STRACT The metaphor used to read the world significantly influences how it is interpreted. Similarly, the assumptions which underpin a study influence the form the arguments take. This thesis embodies the assumption that in complex systems such as that of contemporary society, which do not merely reproduce themselves but entail continual change, this change is best understood in terms of how it has been actively contested. The metaphor is struggle. The project has social movements theory as its theoretical interest, in particular themes derived from the thought of Antonio Gramsci and Main Touraine. Specifically, the study pursues its understanding of social transformation using a framework formulated by social movements theorists Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison to search out and identifj longer-term processes related to the subjectivities of intellectual and social action as the key to understanding how the dominant way in which a society sees itself can change and in turn can change the society. The thesis argues for a new understanding of the dramatic changes which took place in industrialised western countries during the 1 980s associated with a decline of the corporatist perspectives of what is known as the Keynesian “consensus” and an erosion of the power of meta-narratives. Adapting to a new purpose an investigative approach in the social movements tradition, it identifies and traces a movement campaigning against large-scale state intervention and for a more market-based social order and pushes its origins back to the 193 Os. It takes issue with and puts forward a reformulation of what the dominant accounts have called the “New Right,” generally seen as a response to the “crisis” of the late 1 96Os and  II  1970s and interpreted through the metaphor of base/superstructure, where historical developments are rooted in economy. Selecting the period from 1931 to 1981, this study traces the development over 50 years of a movement whose growth began with the arrival in Britain of Friedrich Hayek in 1931 and which since that time has fought a concerted international campaign for limited government and more market-based approaches, creating and developing the research and policy institute, or think-tank, as an important organisational form along the way and consistently foreshadowing political/policy change in the thrust of its movement activities. Methods associated with field work are used, such as observation of the activities and practices of the intellectuals in their various fora; focused, semi-structured interviewing, used as a method within the methodology of both survey and case study; as well as what is referred to as unobtrusive measures, such as the examination of documents and other archival material. An account of material not in the bibliography is included in a set of appendices. The originality of this thesis lies in two things: Firstly, in showing that the more robust market policies of many Western governments in the 1980s were the result not just of currents of ideas but of 50 years of struggle by a social movement with intellectuals and organisation; secondly, in using a social movements approach to study a grouping generally conflated with the Right. The study examines in detail the process in which the movement intellectuals were engaged and makes links between their protracted, organised intellectual campaign and the changes which have undermined the postwar Keynesian welfare state. Direct contact was  ifi  made with the intellectuals in their organisational settings, notably the think-tank, and relevant documents stretching back close to the turn of the century were consulted. The study also identifies Hayek not only as a central figure in the revival and reformulation of classical liberalism and resolute organiser of the movement campaigning against centralised, large-scale state intervention, but also as an important player in contemporary epistemological themes. His critique of positivism in particular has been a contribution to an intellectual strand eroding the dominance of positivist notions in the post-World War II social sciences. Overall, his work has contributed to keeping the movement vital while raising his own profile in the last quarter of the 20th century in what is being called the knowledge or information society.  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Table of Contents List of Tables Acknowledgements Preface  ii v viii ix xii  PART ONE Mapping the methodological. theoretical, historical and spatial terrain CHAPTER 1 1. Introduction 2. Why the Period 1931 to 1981? 3. Whythis Site? 4. The “New Right,” and a Reformulation i) The Term Contested ii) Taking Issue with the Dominant Accounts of the “New Right” iii) The Reformulation 5. Divisions within this Work  20 27 36 45  CHAPTER 2 Making Links to Existing Literature on Intellectuals and Social Movements 1. The Revival of Interest in the Intellectual and Social Movements as Social Agents 2. (3ramsci as Invigorator, and some Similarities to Hayek 3. Touraine’s Influence on Social Movements Theory 4. The Project Framework: Mapping the Eyerman & Janiison Approach 5. Cycles and Social Movements  48 58 63 71 86  CHAPTER 3 The Research 1. Research Problem 2. Research Strategy: Why This Approach? 3. Research Questions 4. Procedures i) Interviewing ii) Observation iii) Documentary Research: Historical, Biographical and Organisational Statements 5. General Significance of Research Approach  5 10 14  90 91 98 100 105 106 107  v  PART TWO Considering the Contexts: The Political. Economic, Cultural and Intellectual CHAPTER 4 The Period 1931 to 1948: From National Crisis to the Official Inauguration of the British Welfare State  113  CHAPTER 5 Keynes and Hayek and the Intellectual Milieu from which they Emerge Cambridge and the LSE: Opposing Camps in Contested Terrain a) Hayek: His Position Hayek’s Austrian Beginnings Hayek at the LSE, 1931-1950, and his Academic Evolution Keynes: His Position c) Keynes at Cambridge, 1919-1946 b) The Keynes/Hayek Struggle: Differences and Some Similarities  126 137 149 152 155  CHAPTER 6 1. The Keynesian Climate, and the Early Resistance 2. The Contexts and the Movement  163 176  124  PART THREE Reading the movement: The protracted struggle against large-scale state intervention and campaign for a more market-based order. 1931-1981 CHAPTER 7 The Period of Gestation, 1931 to 1944: Contesting the Interventionist Argument  180  CHAPTER 8 The Period of Formation, 1944 to 1957: Organising the Base  202  CHAPTER 9 The Period of Consolidation, 1957 to 1974: The lEA, the Changing Climate and the Campaign for Market Approaches to Policy  228  CHAPTER 10 Winning Consent for Market-Based Thinking, 1974 to 1981: Creating Spaces, Expanding the Network and Translating the Model  276  vi  PART FOUR The influence on the intellectual and social field of the movement’s protracted campaign for a more market-based social order CHAPTER 11 By Way of Conclusion: Intellectuals, Think-tanks and the Intellectual and Social Field  304  POSTSCRIPT: BETWEEN THE LINES  316  BIBLIOGRAPHY  335  APPENDICES I The Research Procedure II People attending Mont Pèlerin Society inaugural meeting, April 1-10, 1947 ifi Statement of Aims of the Mont Pêlerin Society IV First elected office-bearers of the Mont Pèlerin Society V Chronology of the lEA to 1981 VI Topics discussed at Mont Pèlerin meetings, 1947 to 1989 VII Institute of Economic Affairs publications from inauguration to 1981 VIII U.K. parliamentary election results 1931-1987 IX U.S. presidential election results 1932-1988 X The British Privatisation Campaign  359 368 369 370 371 374 375 384 385 386  INDEX  390  vii  LIST OF TABLES Table 1: U.K. parliamentary voting trends 1945-1987  3  Table 2: U.S. presidential voting trends 1932-1984  4  Table 3: lEA Income and Expenditure for 1990/91  248  Table 4:  International growth of research and policy institutes resisting large-scale state intervention and promoting market-based approaches  277  vifi  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Most work is a collaboration before it is an individual effort and, as I note in a postscript, Between the Lines, which augments the brief acknowledgements format, this thesis is no exception. To rank those who contributed is always difficult, but the tireless support at every level of my foremost partner, John Fuller, from unflagging encouragement to committed editing, was crucial to the completion and quality of this project, a contribution so considerable as to make any attempt at thanks seem insufficient and the customary rendition of thanks too clichéd to describe either the contribution or my appreciation. While my thanks fall short of the contribution, I offer them with sincere gratitude. The significant contribution of my other foremost partner, Marc Fuller, stretches back some way through time. An academic career would have been impossible to even conceive of without his enthusiasm, grace, humour and wisdom  —  attributes he always exhibited irrespective of his youth. As son  and friend, I couldn’t have had a more exemplary model to grow up alongside. Again, any expression of appreciation and thanks for his vital contribution appears severely lacking in terms of what he gave. While I wrote of Brian Elliott’s contribution to this work in the postscript, the invaluable role he played as chair of my thesis committee needs reiteration. I repeat, too, my thanks to the other committee members, Patricia Marchak, Martin Silverman and Philip Resnick. An important contribution came also from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), which gave me funding, as did the University of British Columbia. To repeat my thanks given elsewhere, Dean John Grace of Graduate Studies and Associate Dean Laurie Ricou, responsible for Interdisciplinary Studies, showed an interest which was especially gratil,’ing in light of the large body of students for which they  ix  are responsible. My topic required significant travel in the U.S and Britain to conduct interviews, carry out observation and collect archival material. I was lucky to have gracious friends with whom I could stay, an essential factor in being able to take on the topic, and I am especially grateful for this help and accommodation in London, New York, Washington and San Francisco. I owe gratitude to David Lewis and his family, who let me live in their house  on two research trips to London. John Cavil and Sarah Davey were two other friends who graciously opened their home to me on three visits to London and extended many other generosities. Matthew Franzidis I thank for his continual offers of hospitality. Clive Helfet and Susie Adams were my kind hosts and friends in New York City, while Adrian Croft extended hospitality to me in San Francisco, as did Ros Davidson, who gave me her apartment while I was doing archival work at Stanford. These acts of generosity are greatly appreciated. I also thank the following friends who helped out in many different ways, often with accommodation as well  —  John Blake and Karen Brown, John and Judy Smithson, Edward Russell-Walling,  Michael Richman, Chris Ball, Cecilia Colombi, John and Anne Buckman, Mike and Nicky Hughes and Michael Gavshon, an intimate friend going back to our first year as undergraduates. I thank Chantal Mouffe for the hospitality she and Ernesto Laclau extended to me in London, and also for the introductions they made possible to scholars in the cultural studies field such as Stuart Hall, who has greatly influenced my thinking. The friendship I received at UBC and from others in Vancouver was also greatly appreciated. I shared collegiality with many, but would like specifically to thank the following. Jill Fitzell lent an ear and read my thesis, making useful comments, but more especially, as one of the x  first to read the draft, her positive feedback was most encouraging, spurring me on to further refinements. Ian Angus was another who generously read my thesis. Sut Jhally gave me material of interest on Hall, having earlier fuelled my enthusiasm for his work. Doug Aoki, with whom I wrestled ideas, was a supportive friend and intellectual buddy. Mohammad Soleiman-Panah was there to read, which he did readily. Bruce Arai, as the student representative in sociology  —  my “home department” most of the way  —  acted with  consideration whenever encountered. My colleague and friend at Spartacus Books, Jill Spicer, kept an eye out for books and kept me on my toes in terms of social and cultural theory. Kevin Haggerty was generous, passing material of interest to me. Bob Ratner, with whom I share an interest as the other professor with Brian Elliott in the department of sociology engaged in social movements theory, would also remember me when he came upon pertinent material. The students in my Sociology 300 class in 1994 heightened the excitement of working in the field. The archival staff of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University gave freely of their time, as did the staff at the London School of Economics and the Rockefeller Archive Center in upstate New York. This help was much appreciated, as was that of the staff at the lEA library. UBC library staff were always accommodating and insightful when called upon for help. The  office staff in Political Science and in Anthropology and Sociology helped wherever they could, as did the staff at Graduate Studies and Green College. This made life a lot easier. My other informants from within the movement I studied and who were thus crucial to this project, I thank in detail in the postscript.  x  PREFACE  We know that earlier transitions (feudalism to capitalism, household production to modem industry) all tumed out, on inspection, to be more protracted and incomplete than the  theory suggested. —  Stuart Hall, Brave New World (1988)  XII  PART ONE  Mapping the Historical. Spatial. Theoretical and Methodological Terrain  1  the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerfil than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil. —  John Maynard Keynes’  The character of the process by which the views of the intellectuals influence the politics of tomorrow is therefore of much more than academic interest. Whether we merely wish to foresee or attempt to influence the course of events, it is a factor of much greater importance than is generally understood. What to the contemporary observer appears as the battle of conflicting interests has indeed often been decided long before in a clash of ideas confined to narrow circles. —  2  Friedrich A. Hayek 2  John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment . Interest and Money (London: Mac millan, 1960) 383-384. (First published in 1936.) F.A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review 16.3 (1949) 6. Reprinted with permission in 1990 by the Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University. The intellectual battle between Keynes (1883-1946) and Hayek (1899-1992), two figures in 20th century economics well known for their respective roles in proposing and opposing the welfire state, is a major theme of this work. 2  TABLE 1: U.K. VOTING TRENDS: Percentage of vote obtained  D  Labour  •  Conservative  50  40  30  20  10  1945  1950  1951  1955  1959  1964  1966  1970  1974  1974  1979  1983  1987  This table indicates the domination of British politics by the Conservative Party in recent years. The election victories of 1979, 1983 and 1987 represent the most substantial, most sustained support any party platform has received in the postwar era. Source: Parliamentaiy Elections in Britain, published by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1992.  3  ______  TABLE 2: U.S. VOTING TRENDS: Percentage of presidential vote obtained  D  •  Democrats  Republicans  -  ...........  60  50  .....  40  .  30 20 10  1932  -  -  .  .  ..  .  ...  .  ..  .  .  .  ..  ..  -.  .  ..  .  ..  ..  ..  .  ...  .  -  ..  1936 1940  1944  1948  1952 1956  .  1960  1964  1968  ....  ..  ..  ..  .  ..  .  ..  1972  :..  1976  1980  1984  This table shows strong support at one end for Roosevelt’s interventionist New Deal, and at the other for Reagan, a rhetorical advocate of the market. Source: StatisticalAbstract of the Us., 112th edition, 1992  4  CHAPTER 1 1. Introduction Accounts of the rise of a “New Right” 3 began to proliferate in the 1 980s, with critics and scholars of differing persuasions often sharing the conclusion that what they conceived of as a new movement had materialised about a decade earlier. It was generally held that this movement had gained quick political success with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 198O, two leaders distinguished by a commitment to arguments associated with the movement position on limited government and a more market-based social order, at least rhetorically. 5  For the most part, these accounts draw on the base-superstructure tradition, which comes out of the historical materialist variant often associated with orthodox Marxism. In this rendering, which generally says relatively little about culture, historical development is rooted in the economy and the emergence of classes with conflicting interests. Following this tradition, a diverse set of elements is grouped together and collectively labelled the New Right, a term around which the theorists construct a critique of forces challenging the Keynesian welfare state and eroding the “consensus”  —  the body of economic and social ideas that dominated political  thought and practice in most industrialised democracies for about three decades after World The term “New Right” has been introduced in quotation marks to indicate a recognition that it is a problematic construction, as will be discussed later; where it is used, it is used as a shorthand or to represent the formulation of the body of literature that uses it. See Tables I-1V. While the term “market” is sometimes spoken with uncritical praise, other times as a reproach, it generally is used to convey the notion that some buyers and sellers have been able to meet, bargain, agree and set a price where, in the language of economics, their supply and demand curves meet. Rupert Pennant-Rea and Bill Emmott in The Pocket Economist (Oxford and London: Martin Robertson and The Economist, 1983) 113 point out that “market forces” does not mean that open, still less perfect, competition prevails, or that all market participants are well infonned. 5  War II. Most of these theorists, whose work in this regard is discussed later in the chapter, view with alarm what they identif’ as the New Right, which they see as arising out of an economic, accumulation and/or legitimation crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For them, the rejuvenation of ideas associated with liberalism and the dwindling of support for large-scale state intervention and rationalist planning are largely attributable to conditions of breakdown and crisis in these decades  —  thus following rather than coming before or  contributing to the crisis they describe. In departing from this type of account, this study identifies and traces the development of an important movement which was not only a source of coherence for the other elements which were to later come under the banner, but which as the generative force for what was to follow contributed to creating the crises which are said to have given rise to what has been characterised as the New Right. The economic circumstances and technological environment of the 1970s indeed offered new opportunities for the movement campaigning against large-scale state intervention and for limited government and a more market-based social 6 This thesis will argue, however, that the roots of the movement do not lie in the global order. economic and technological restructuring that began in the 1970s. The genesis of the movement lies deeper.  In proposing an alternative view, this study adopts an approach informed by social movements theory and uses a theoretical framework formulated mainly from the work of three key figures 6  This study concentrates on a movement whose actors have in common their advocacy of a society based on market principles and the pursuit in principle of reduced government involvement in economic relations between citizens. This is what is denoted by the term “the movement” in the text from here forward, a notion not necessarily always synonymous with what scholars signify when they use the term “New Right,” as will be more fully explained later in this chapter. 6  in the field  —  Antonio Gramsci, Main Touraine and Mberto Melucci  —  insofar as it posits a  protracted period of intellectual contestation during which the dominant view or “common sense” is disputed and transformed in advance of political and policy change. The approach draws on insights of the tradition which, deriving much from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, sees a new common sense or hegemony as having to be developed from a critical position by intellectuals; having to be worked for; and then being partially achieved and incomplete. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is an approach which conceives a Gramscian theoretical framework whereby a significant role is given to intellectuals, using the term in a non-elitist way to mean those who function, in Gramsci’s language, as permanent persuaders. In addition, this study takes the position that the act of calling into question a dominant interpretation, an undertaking frequently performed by social movements, can bring to light social situations previously without significant expression, creating counter-arguments which to some degree contribute to constructing what is then seen as the changed social reality. 7 Thus, a campaign can change people’s perceptions of the social world, thereby contributing to bringing about a crisis by unsettling and eroding the legitimacy of a reigning consensus. This examination, then, is underpinned by the following assumptions: I Social transformations are generally protracted processes, and often incomplete;  • Social transformations are the result of a combination of factors, rather than being determined by any one, such as the economic or, for that matter, the cultural;  ‘  See Emesto Laclau’s discussion in “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,” Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 63-82, and Chantal Mouffe’s “Radical Democracy” in the same collection, 31-45. 7  • Intellectual campaigns within social movements play an important role in social change, but people are not cultural dupes who quickly and unthinkingly embrace any set of ideas that is proclaimed, no matter how powerful or well financed the source. In other words, the notion that the mass of people  —  with the exception of the scholars making the claim, of course  —  could be victims of false ideology is rejected, while at the same time the significant influence of texts and narratives on the social world is recognised, as is the constituted but not determined character of the subject; • Complex social systems such as that of contemporary society do not confine themselves to the reproduction of social structures or an order but are characterised also by social action and resistance, change and indeterminacy. In the context of a belief that a new hegemony or common sense has to be worked for over a prolonged period by intellectuals with a critical sense of the reigning common sense or prevailing dominant view, this study takes issue with those arguing that it is through the historical context of the 1960s and 1970s that the rise of a movement campaigning for market-based approaches and against large-scale state intervention should be read. In contrast, this study traces its analysis back to an earlier decade of crisis, the 1930s, finding there the antecedents of the social movement. By proposing the 193 Os, 1940s and the years of postwar economic reconstruction as the context of the genesis, this study brings into focus the importance of the movement’s sustained intellectual campaign in the later decline of the Keynesian consensus, characterised by such programmes as the deregulation of foreign exchange markets and the privatisation of state assets. It is a role practically ignored in those  8  accounts which stress economic or technological aspects as having determined this change and given rise to the New Right, a movement portrayed as an almost spontaneous and “successftil” response to the needs of sections of capital. The welfare state was indeed cenged in the 1970s by a proliferation of organisations rallying against what they argued was an ever greater government encroachment on the private sphere and civil society, but this cenge had as its leading edge a philosophy of limited government and market principles already rendered coherent by years of activity on the part of neo-liberal and libertarian intellectual activists. 8 A critique of the welfare state came from groups on the left as well, who saw bureaucratic domination and the exercise of power by functionaries of the welfare, educational, health and housing agencies as stifling. The opposition of certain intellectuals and activists to the Keynesian, the collectivist and the corporatist views of the relationship between the individual and the state can be seen as having opened up to question and problematised that around which there had seemingly been a “consensus” or dominant interpretation of the nature of this relationship. In other words, their intellectual activity precedes the “crisis” which dominates the earlier accounts, rather than following it, as usually portrayed.  Critiques of the welfare state did not come only from this quarter. For example, Alan O’Connor in Raymond Williams: Writing. Culture, Politics (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 14 cites a 1958 analysis of the welfare state in which Brian Abel-Smith concludes that it benefits mainly the middle classes, contained in Nonnan MacKenzie, ed., Conviction (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1958). Abel-Smith was one of a number of such critics, many of whom developed their positions from his work. 9  2. Why The Period 1931 to 1981? The years from 1931 to 1981 are selected as the period of investigation for a number of reasons. It was during this time that the relative rise and decline of Keynesian thinking took place and the social sciences were at their most confident in the ability to predict and know society, often in the belief it could be controlled. It was also a period which began with the arrival from Vienna of a key movement figure, Friedrich Hayek, at an important site, the London School of Economics (LSE), from which the battle against the Keynesian position would begin. Finally, the 50 years which conclude with the election of Thatcher and Reagan cover the development of the social movement of which Hayek became the symbolic and organisational leader, growing out of a small cadre and reshaping itself to different contexts along the way. Choosing the 1930s over the 1970s as a starting point does not imply that the earlier decade is considered the absolute beginning of the movement. There can be no such point for the analysis of any social movement, transformation or phenomenon, as is argued, among others, by Stuart Hall in his discussion of the origins of the new “discipline” of cultural studies, the body of thought associated with him, others such as Raymond Williams and the centre for cultural studies at Birmingham University. For Hall, there are no “absolute beginnings” and “few unbroken continuities” 9 in intellectual endeavours. However, it was in the 1930s  —  a decade of upheaval and transition which brought striking  economic and political turning points, polarisation, the Depression and World War II  —  that  anti-state-interventionists grouped to fight it out with rival intellectuals and activists Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” Media. Culture and Society 2 (1980) 57-72. 10  championing various forms of collectivism and seeking to establish firmly what was to become known as the Keynesian welfare state. Each of these groupings comprised far more than an intellectual leader and a band of followers; nevertheless the contrary formations did, to a great degree, organise around the work of two key figures  —  Hayek and John Maynard Keynes,  discussed in detail in Part Two. ° Keynes, whose name became synonymous with large-scale 1 government intervention and planned economies, had argued for an end to laissez faire economic thinking since at least  1924.11  Just as the economic and legitimation crisis of the  1 970s was later to offer the anti-state-interventionists new opportunities for persuasion, the Depression and World War II, both economically and politically, made Keynesian analysis compelling to many important groupings. Certain policy aspects offered not only political advantages but perhaps the promise of survival in those troubled times. Against the position argued by Hayek and his Austrian School’ 2 associates, it was the Keynesian intellectual position that was to win out in the postwar period, and from which grew a “consensus,” however fragile and unstable, around the need for an interventionist  ‘°  “  12  In Robert Skidelsky’s view Hayek was, of all Keynes’s critics, “the most intransigent defender of the non-interventionist order.” Skideisky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1992) 454. According to Skidelsky, “Keynes’s 1924 Sidney Ball lecture, ‘The End of Laissez-Faire,’ delivered at Oxford on November 6, 1924 and published in 1926, provides the framework within which Keynes’s arguments developed over the next five years.” Skidelsky 225. Vienna in the early 20th century was the fount of a number of then modem schools of study, such as psychoanalysis, represented by Freud, Austrian School economics, represented by Ludwig von Mises and Hayek, and a variation of philosophy, represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others. During the time Hayek was in Vienna it was one of the three most prestigious places to study economics. A new work characterises fin de siècle Vienna as follows: Vienna, the birthplace of psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud), of atonal music (Arnold Schoenberg) and modem functional architecture (Adolf Loos); but also Zionism (Theodor Herzl) and National Socialism (Adolf Hitler). “In short, the research laboratory for world destruction (Karl Kraus, Viennese satirist).” John Heaton and Judy Groves, Wittgenstein for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon, 1994) 6. 11  Keynesian welfare state. This Keynesian “consensus” 3 was of course incomplete, since an  absolute consensus across a society is improbable, and it, like the current but fiercely contested “consensus” around the preferability of anti-statist, market-based approaches, did not appear out of nowhere in the 1 940s. Rather, it evolved from at least the beginning of the century in a piecemeal fashion, gaining reinforcement from arguments such as those disseminated by the Fabians for some 50 years’ 4 and ironically, too, from Britain’s imperialist aspirations, as discussed later. The favour the Keynesian argument found in Britain in the 1940s, a period discussed in detail in Part Two, facilitated the subsequent formal establishment of the postwar Keynesian welfare state in the United Kingdom in 1948. It was followed elsewhere in the world in either the social democratic or liberal form, and remained largely intact until the 1970s. Although it came under increasing strain in certain respects from the 1950s and a general erosion was under way by the late 1970s, it has, however, in a number of respects continued in a more or less diminished form into the 1980s and 1990s. During the tenure of the “consensus” there was general agreement that large-scale government intervention was necessary, much of this inspired by Keynes’s The General  ‘  14  The term consensus has elicited a number of responses, more recently by thinkers categorised and identified with the post-structural paradigm such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, who characterises a consensus such as that called for by JUrgen Habermas as the end of thinking. In Postmodemism: A Reader (New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1993) 25-26, Thomas Docherty, in his introduction to the debate, discusses this position thus: “In short, this means that it is only in the refusal of consensus and in the search for ‘dissensus’ that we will be able to extend thinking, to allow it to be shocked into the new, the (chronological) post-modern. Consensus is a means of arresting the flow of events, a mode whereby eventuality can be reduced to punctuality; it is a way of reducing the philosophy of Becoming to a philosophy of Being.” This was so not only at the level of ideas, but had its effect on policy as well. In the Liberal governments of the period 1906 to 1916, legislation such as the National Insurance Act of 1911 was enacted which heralded what was later to become known as the welfare state. Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government implemented new unemployment benefits under the 1927 Unemployment Insurance Act, and the scheme was changed again by the 1934 Unemployment Act. 12  Theory of Unemployment. Interest and Money (1936), which argued that where demand fell short of supply, it should be the government’s responsibility to make up the shortfall and, accordingly, employ resources such as labour which otherwise might remain underutilised. Liberal, Labour and Conservative governments in Britain all went along with this thinking until Margaret Thatcher’s government broke with it in the 1980s. Scholars writing on the New Right, Patricia Marchak being one example,’ 5 refer to the postwar ethos of agreement as a consensus. Arthur Marwick, noting that all generalisations are open to criticism in detail, writes of a spirit of consensus that prevailed from 1945 until Thatcher came to power.’ 6 Norman Barry dates the consensus period, which he argues was one of remarkable intellectual stability, from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s. He sees this era of consensus, defining it as a body of social and economic ideas that “ruled” political thought and practice, as prevailing in the western democracies, with the exception of West Germany. 17 The work of the Fabian Society, established in the 1 880s with the intention of reconstructing society on a non-competitive basis,’ 8 also contributed to this orthodoxy. Peter Jenkins prefers to refer to it not so much as a consensus but as a postwar settlement which had grown out of the brief wartime suspension of party politics: Like the 1688 Act of Settlement which finally resolved the constitutional issues of the Civil War, the Attlee government’s social legislation, much of it inspired by the forethought of the Coalition, was designed to call at least a truce in the class war which had disfigured the politics of the 1920s and 1930s. Full employment and the maintenance of the Welfare State became ‘  16 17 18  M. Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of Global Markets (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991) 3. Arthur Marwick, Culture in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 15, 16. Norman Barry, The New Right (London, New York and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987) 1. Edward Pease, The History of the Fabian Society (London: Frank Cass, 1963) 37. 13  the accepted goals of both parties, if for no other reason than to depart from them would be to court electoral defeat.’ 9 In the United States Keynes’s ideas also had an impact, with Harvard University acting as the centre for this development. This Keynesian thinking was evident in the further extension and development of what was termed the “New Deal,” which had been inaugurated in 1933 following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election as president.  3. Why this Site? The geographical focus of this project is the milieu of the British intellectuals in the movement that started with Hayek, since it is there that the international revival and reformulation of classical liberal thought in the 20th century has its early organisational origins. Indeed, the attitude is fairly common that Britain should be seen as the home of liberalism, based on the national origin of many of the thinkers that are constitutive of this corpus, of whom John  Stuart Mill is an often-used example. Through the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, as large-scale state intervention became the practice of Conservative and Labour governments alike, liberal intellectuals waged a battle against the Keynesian consensus through their organisations and key locations. Britain’s welfare state was among the most fully consummated in democratic industrial states, and it was in that country that the wartime interventionist measures were most comprehensively extended after 1945 as the economy was reconstructed. Britain at that time was also a nation of considerable international influence often looked to for intellectual guidance and is still, despite its fall from the role of a major power, a major centre in international financial markets and a country that gets attention when the fierce battles over  19  Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era (London, Sydney and Auckland: Pan, 1989) 5. 14  economic and social issues take place  —  of which the privatisation campaign of the 1980s is  the leading recent example. Peter Saunders and Cohn Harris, in a discussion of British privatisation, cite David Heald and D. Thomas as remarking that there is no other example in the 20th century of a British policy initiative achieving such a degree of influence in the international arena. ° 2 As is more fully set out in Part Three, it was in this environment that one of the most effective and durable institutions of opposition to large-scale state intervention was to develop. The London-based and Hayek-inspired Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA), set up in 1955, was in good part responsible for the fact that Britain was the country in which ideas associated with 20th century liberal thought took firmest hold. For the movement campaigning for limited government and a more market-based society, the TEA is an important organising and articulating site in the sense that, inspired by Hayek, it brought together in material form his views on how consent for a different social order should be won. At the same time it offers an illustration of the practices and activities of intellectuals within an organisation which has been successful in terms of its policy achievements, as evidenced by the influence that a political leader such as Thatcher claims it exerted on her (although there were neo-liberals, market liberals or libertarians who failed to see the liberalism for which they had argued at work in her administration), and which has also been emulated internationally. The lEA’s approach can also be seen as an example of how a more specialised knowledge, in this case, economic thinking and approaches to social problems and  20  Peter Saunders and Cohn Harris, Privatization and Popular Capitalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994) 6. 15  policy formulations, can be disseminated and converted through others (in Gramscian language, permanent persuaders) into a less abstract knowledge, or common sense, which then facilitates a shift through political and policy changes. The lEA spawned many organisations, both nationally and internationally, attempting to emulate the success of its Hayekian formula of indirect persuasion aimed at influencing those in a position to influence others on a larger scale and, through them, politics and policies. It also inspired variants during the 1970s such as the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute, which took a more direct approach. The lEA helped to create the climate which paved the way for the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and the privatisation programme of the 1 980s, which by 1992 had resulted in the disposal of £41.5 billion of state assets, most of which was sold through stock market flotation, ’ bringing with it a weakening 2 of not only trade union power but also the privileges of professionals such as lawyers and professors. Indeed, it is Britain since Thatcher that is seen as a testing ground for the radical implementation of market-based ideas, just as Britain under Clement Attlee from 1945 was seen by other nations as the experimental project for the implementation of radical Fabian/Keynesian corporatist ideas. It was in Britain in the 1930s that a debate began whose impact on the world is still felt. Its  principal protagonists, Hayek and Keynes, were both at British academic institutions; Keynes at Cambridge and Hayek at the more publicly integrated LSE. Both believed strongly that knowledge creation, ideas and their proponents play a significant role in political outcomes, as  21  Ibid 5, citing written reply, Hansard, January 24 1992, Vol. 202, Col. 388-9w. 16  the two quotations at the beginning of this chapter ffiustrate. The two vigorously and publicly contested one another’s ideas in the 1930s and engaged in a conmiitted personal correspondence from the late 1920s until Keynes’s death in 1946. They were rivals as keen as the two institutions within which they worked, and this battle of ideas in the context of the 1930s forms the core of Part Two.  Foreshadowing a theme that now pervades much contemporary thinking, Hayek and others advanced a sceptical view of the social blueprint and the expert constructing it, a view based on an assumption of the uncertainties of knowledge and importance of dispersed and local knowledges. Different variants of this position, critical of absolute knowledge and truth, are now associated with arguments usually designated post-structural and/or post-colonial. Hayek and fellow members of the Austrian School banded together in portraying the market and entrepreneur as playing a positive, progressive and creative role of discovery in society. Hayek waged a battle of ideas from the LSE which, being situated in a capital which is the national centre of almost all activity, had a very public location in British intellectual life and also the advantage of attracting a high percentage of international scholars. This was of great import for a project such as the Hayek-inspired crusade for limited government and a market-based social order.  22  23  As intellectuals, some would argue, both Keynes and Hayek had an interest in putting forward this position in which the role of ideas and intellectuals is seen as being as powerful as they contend it is. While the researcher should be aware of the possible significance of location to argument, this thesis, by considering the role of intellectuals in the manner it does, focuses the question outside of a narrow realm which tends towards the view that action is linked functionally to self-interest. The Austrian School is characterised by a view of markets as a discovery procedure in a world where tastes and techniques are changing, and information scarce and expensive. See Brittan 214. 17  The intellectual culture of a particular geographical community is a significant consideration; theorists using the work of Pierre Bourdieu have revealed, for example, that France, North America and Britain are substantially different in regard to their academic institutions and environments. A number of the active movement intellectuals interviewed for this project also remarked on the need for a sensitivity to different intellectual cultures (these were usually intellectuals engaged in adapting research and policy institutes of the Hayek-inspired model to local milieus in locations outside of the London base; an important focus in this study). Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, whose theoretical framework is used for this study and whose work on social movements informs it, recognise this too. On the empirical level, the success or failure of a particular movement usually depends on its ability to mobilize resources and to exploit the “opportunity structures” of the surrounding particular culture to achieve its strategic aims. 24 Arguably, this difference may also influence which element and aspects of the wider movement, for example the more neo-liberal, libertarian, or neo-conservative, gains prominence in a particular location at a specific time, as discussed later, as well as the particular ways in which these groupings and elements are constituted. The impact which Keynes’s ideas had on public policy in Britain and indeed in the world needs no great elaboration, but Hayek, 16 years his junior, survived him by nearly five decades and went much further as an active mobiliser. The interdisciplinary scholar (not therefore only) of limited government and the more market-based approach who had, he said, been convinced of the merits of his outlook by his experiences of wartime planning, especially in his native  24  Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach (Cambridge: Polity, 1991) 64. 18  Austria during World War I, believed it was important to bring scattered liberal and libertarian scholars together in solidarity and from this base to contest the “common sense” of large-scale state intervention. A major mobiising influence at the time was Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, published in Britain in 1944 and directed at a British audience, according to Hayek, a book in which he warned of the dangers he saw in central social planning. From his British location at the LSE he set about the creation of an organisation which was to be a guiding force for an international movement, and these efforts by Hayek, the symbolic head and chief mobiliser, led to the creation of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 25 which held its first meeting in Switzerland in  1947.26  By the 1990s membership had grown to close to 500 members from  around the world, and the organisation seems equipped to continue into the next century. The Mont Pèlerin facilitated the construction of a sense of solidarity; a collective identity and subjectivity, albeit one that stressed the individual; an entrepreneurial subjectivity; a forum for the interpretation and reinterpretation of classical liberal economics in contemporary terms; a conduit for the sharing of resources, including intellectuals; and a strategic location for organising the international development and dissemination of anti-statist market ideas. One of the most important aspects of this latter goal was the facilitating of the growth of an international network of research and policy institutes promoting limited government and market-based approaches, and a number of institutes later established were first conceived at  26  The Mont Pèlerin Society is an important organisation in the campaign for limited government and a more market-based social order, and it is thus examined in detail in this study. The relevant papers of the organisation are held along with Hayek’s at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Palo Alto. The Hoover Institution’s archival library was visited on two occasions during the research process. Those who attended the first Mont Plerin meeting in April 1947 are listed in Appendix II. 19  an annual Mont Pèlerin meeting. This growth was aided in good measure by the example of  the groundbreaking lEA, which Antony Fisher had set up on the advice of Hayek after reading and being inspired by The Road to Serfdom. Fisher went on to set up what were referred to as “factories for ideas” based on the IRA model, which he reproduced in North American locations from the 1970s. Four Fisher/Hayek research and policy institutes are the focus of the substantive portion of this thesis because of their key role in the winning of consent for a set of ideas internationally, and they are examined in detail in Part Three. They are the TEA; the Manhattan Institute, founded by Fisher in New York City in 1977; the Pacific Research Institute, established by Fisher in San Francisco in 1979; and the Atlas Economic Research Institute, set up in 1981 by Fisher, and located in Virginia near Washington, D.C. Atlas was to fulfil a more comprehensive role than the earlier institutes: It was to nurture an international network of think-tanks campaigning for limited government and advocating and promoting market-based approaches. Indeed, it can be seen as the international meta-institute of the Fisher network.  4. The “New Right.” and a Reformulation (i) The Term Contested The expression “New Right” appears to be the choice of those who construct and oppose it. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 27 it entered the language in the mid-1960s in the United States when Time used it to counter the expression “New Left,” presumably inspired by the work of Daniel Bell on the American right three years earlier in 1963. The term moved  27  Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. Vol. 17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 374. This citation indicates that the first reference to the term occurred in Time on Nov. 11, 1966. 20  across the Atlantic and into the academic domain in Britain with the appearance in 1968 of David Collard’s The New Right: A Critique. Apparently the first to use the term in his field, Collard later referred to this work as “a little Fabian tract” 28 in an TEA publication.  “New Right” is an umbrella term which has been used to cover such disparate constituents as the American religious right; liberals, many actively anti-religious, arguing for limited government and greater freedoms from state control within a more market-based society; and libertarian and anarchist groups calling with others, for example, for the decriminalisation of 29 marijuana.  Generally, at least three larger groupings can be seen as coming together to constitute the movement  —  the neo-liberal, deriving its ideals from classical liberalism and reformulating  these into what has been characterised as a modem classical or economic liberalism; the ° which is inconsistent in its dedication to limited government and a more 3 neo-conservative,  28  29  30  David Collard, “Market Failure and Government Failure,” The Emerging Consensus ...? (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1981)123. On the strength of electronic searches of various library data bases, Collard’s The New Right: A Critique (London: Fabian Society, 1968) is tentatively identified as the first published work to use the term. Daniel Bell had earlier published The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Uydated (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963). A recently published dictionary of words that have entered the English language since 1960 lists “New Right” as having entered mainstream usage in about 1980, and defines it thus: “A coalition of conservative groups, originating in the U.S. but growing in the U.K. during the Thatcher era, whose political and social platform is essentially aimed to reverse the advances made in the 1960s as regarded capital punishment, abortion, gay and lesbian rights, censorship and similar issues.” Jonathan Green, Tuttle Dictionary of New Words Since 1960 (Boston; Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1991) 180. Samuel Brittan in A Restatement of Economic Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1988) 213 notes that neo-conservatism is an American term. He sees it as useful in describing those who flirt with free-market ideas, but are mainly interested in restoring traditional values, Victorian or otherwise, strengthening patriarchal and fuinily feelings, pursuing a strong nationalist or anti-Communist foreign policy and reinforcing respect for authority. 21  market-based society, usually linking such calls to an appeal for greater authority within it; 31  and the libertarian element, which argues for a minimal state and extensive individual freedom. Indeed, many groupings of conservatives and neo-conservatives are antagonistic towards economic and other forms of liberalism. In a discussion of the debate in British media during the Thatcher period, Maurice Cowling describes the major contributors associated with the New Right, noting their diversity: five overlapping movements, conducted by about fifty people (mainly graduates and mostly men) who have come from no one type of social, sexual or intellectual background and who include among their number a smattering of atheists and agnostics, a few converted, a few practising and a few lapsed Catholics, a handfhl of Jews, observing or otherwise, some Dissenters and Evangelicals, a fair number of observing and a number of converted Anglicans, and a contingent for whom religion is of little significance. In opinion there has been a lack of stereotype. Many of those who have supported market economics have been authoritarian about moral and social questions, many who supported Mr Powell economically did not support him about Europe, Ireland, Immigration or the Soviet Union. Cold Warriors and anti-Cold Warriors, Europeans and anti-Europeans, Americans and anti-Americans, and both the friends and the enemies of Israel, have been distributed fairly 32 randomly. 31  32  The difference between the neo-liberal and neo-conservative outlooks, discussed in more detail later, is perhaps demonstrated in the difference between an interview with Madsen Pirie of the Adam Smith Institute, written by Edward Pearce in The Guardian of April 19, 1993, and a Feb. 5, 1994 article by Miro Cernetig in The Globe and Mail entitled the Neo-Cons: Young Bucks of the New Right. Despite the fact that The Guardian is generally considered a paper of the left, and is certainly some distance left of The Globe and Mail, it pens a favourable picture of market advocate Pine, pointing out he should not be dismissed with the careless label “right wing.” It quotes Pine as pointing out that the Adam Smith Institute “has never expressed a view on inmiigration, punishment, race or anything to do with authority.” The article, “The Prophet of Private Profit,” describes Pirie as a follower of public choice theory, a concept, it says, which is “profoundly anti-authoritarian.” The description of the neo-conservative grouping in The Globe and Mail is in sharp contrast. “Today’s neo-cons see themselves as foot soldiers fighting a liberal establishment. They believe the sixties, that much ballyhooed decade, with its free love and free money, caused many of today’s woes,” writes Cemetig. Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 22  In Cowling’s view the divergent elements converge on the belief that: there should in some sense be less government rather than more, even if at times on the way this involves more government rather than less. 33 The meaning of the term New Right changes depending on the national or historical context in which it is being used, yet has gained such acceptance that even those rejecting it in reference to themselves feel bound to use it in their counter-narratives because of its prevalence. 34 Hayek, too, might have expressed distaste for the label New Right. In one of his earlier writings which seems to indicate he has no affinity with the “right,” he says: The forces of the right are usually neither inteffigent enough to value the support of intellectual activities, nor have they the sort of prizes to offer which are likely to influence honest 35 people. Some calling themselves liberals refhse the designation “New Right” because they consider its authoritarian and anti-liberal connotations derogatory, and because it makes them unwilling consorts of others. A number of liberals interviewed for this project believed the label to be inappropriate in reference to themselves, but claimed they had learned to live with it since their objections had been ignored. They felt, however, that the term obscured rather than enlightened, some giving as another example of this the distinction commonly made between left and right. Radicals reside in many places, as do conservatives, they argue.  xowxovfi. Ibidxli. Arthur Seldon, ed., The New Right Enlightenment: The Spectre that Haunts the Left (Sevenoaks, Kent: E & L Books, 1985) xi-xii. F.A. Hayek, “On Being An Economist,” The Trend of Economic Thinking (The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, Vol. III), eds. W.W. Bartley ifi and Stephen Kresge (London: Routledge, 1991) 45. 23  To Max Hartwell, the current president of the Mont Pèlerin Society, it seemed obvious he was not part of the New Right. Asked about the term, he replied, apparently unselfconsciously, “The New Right? I don’t know much about it, really.” Hartwell, who calls himself a classical liberal, said he tended to associate the term with authoritarianism, saying, “I do not like authoritarians of any type or nature.” 36 Arthur Seldon, another important figure in the movement, sees the term as the “derogatory description used by critics who dismiss the new liberalism as reactionary because it rejects the postwar all-Party consensus based on Fabianism, Beveridgism and Keynesianism.” He insists contemporary classical liberalism is not right-wing. 37 However, there are some associated with the wider movement who do not always draw these distinctions. Walter Block, while senior economist in 1980 at one of the research and policy institutes associated with the movement, wrote a letter addressed “Friend of Liberty” appealing for help in compiling a bibliography on “what has come to be called ‘the modern revival of neo-conservatism’.” In his letter from the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute, he said: “For my purposes, synonyms for ‘neo conservative’ include ‘the free market,’ ‘libertarianism,’ ‘the classical liberal tradition,’ ‘right-wing economics’ or pieces on the major spokesmen for this tradition, such as Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman.” 38  36  Interview with Max Hartwell in Oxford in April 1993. Seldon xii. The document “Dear Friend of Liberty,” signed by Walter Block, appears to have been a form letter intended for circulation as a general appeal and is dated April 10, 1980. Located at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. Collection title F.A. Hayek, Box number 20, Folder 1D 11 Fraser Institute. 24  According to some commentators, the misconception of the movement is a fate which also befalls Hayek, the man arguably most responsible for the movement. Along with Keynes, his intellectual opponent on the issue of large-scale state intervention, and many other influential thinkers, Hayek has suffered the fate of being claimed by, or associated with, some with whom he may have little in common. For instance, despite having written an essay, “Why I Am Not a 39 Hayek has often been labelled as a conservative or neo-conservative. Conservative,”  Hayek’s work appears to be as misunderstood by friends as by foes, and he is often forced into the very positions he denounces. John Gray, describing the ways in which Hayek is “vulgarly represented,” argues that in the area of economic theory and policy: Hayek’ s ideas have been consistently conflated with those of the Chicago School, despite the fact that the whole burden of Hayek’s own development of the Austrian tradition is in the claim that contemporary macroeconomics, whether “Keynesian” or “monetarist”, embodies a wholly spurious claim to quantitative exactitude in respect of economic relationships, including especially relative price structures, whose characteristics and properties can only be the object of abstract modelling and not of engineering expertise. ° 4 According to Gray in the same document in the Hayek archive, the misrepresentations abound. Hayek is represented as a proponent of laissez faire approaches despite having argued that liberalism’s defeat was directly related to its dogmatic adherence to such notions. He is seen as an archetypal conservative despite his impassioned arguments to the contrary.  °  Included as a postscript in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) 397-411. From an anonymous, undated three-page photocopy in the Hayek collection at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which has been confirmed as the work of Oxford University’s John Gray with Gray himself. In a telephone conversation on Feb. 23, 1994, Gray confirmed he was the author of the document in the Hayek file, of which a facsimile had been sent to him at Yale University the day before. 25  Samuel Brittan concurs: Friedrich Hayek has been cursed by sneerers, who dismiss everything he has to say without giving it a hearing, and even more by admirers, who agree with it before they have studied it Most complex thinkers have elements in their work which may appear contradictory or to smack of conservatism. Indeed, many people have contradictory elements, incorporating both radical or progressive and conservative aspects. As well, complex thinkers who have a long intellectual career usually move through stages and in some cases become more conservative. Seldon, in a tribute to Hayek following his death in March 1992, noted that: “In his later years Hayek echoed a conservatism that conflicted with his earlier radicalism.” 42 As theorists talk for example of an early Marx, or Marx the humanist as compared with the scientific or later Marx, Hayek, too, is designated differently depending on the part of his canon being referred to. Peter G. Klein notes that some observers charge that his later work, particularly after he began to turn away from technical economics to theories of knowledge, shows more influence of Karl Popper (who also taught at the LSE, in his case philosophy) than of Carl Menger or Ludwig von Mises, Hayek’s mentors at the time of his earlier economic writings associated with market liberalism and what is known as the Austrian School. 43  41  42  Brittan, “Hayek, the New Right, & the Crisis of Social Democracy,” Encounter (January 1981)  31. Seldon, on September 23, 1992, in a tribute to Hayek at the London School of Economics after his death. Peter 0. Klein, Introduction to The Fortunes of Liberalism (The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, Vol. IV), ed. Peter 0. Klein (London: Routledge, 1992), 8. Klein notes that T.W. Hutchison, in “Austrians on Philosophy and Method (since Menger)” in his The Politics and Philosophy of Economics: Marxians. Keynesians and Austrians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) speaks of “Hayek I” and “Hayek II.” Klein also refers to Bruce J. Caldwell’s “Hayek’s Transformation,” History of Political Economy 20:4 (1988). 26  Gray argues that an historical explanation needs to be sought for this widespread misunderstanding of Hayek’s work. Hayek was expounding his ideas to an “invincibly ignorant” as well as hostile intellectual world, he says, offering this interpretation: His fate has been that of the indefatigable critic of the spirit of the age. This view of Hayek as contesting “the spirit of the age” is consistent with a role as a key figure in a social movement. The focus of this study is the form taken by the criticism of the dominant Keynesian consensus which Hayek’s work exemplified, the critical sense around which he organised, and the movement that developed out of it. (ii) Taking Issue with the Dominant Accounts of the “New Right” Among British scholars examining what has been labelled the “New Right,” Andrew Gamble finds the genesis of the movement in the “new politics of the 1970s” which, he argues, spawned many new forces, one of which was the New Right. 45 Gamble’s account of the “new politics” concentrates on breakdown, and he sees the various crises of the 1 970s as responsible. For him, the movement’s programme is determined by economics. The radical right programmes of both Thatcher and Reagan were responses to the breakdown of authority and stability in the world system and in national politics They planned to restore the vigour of British and American capitalism through a new accumulation strategy ...  . .  Bob Jessop and his collaborators also distinguish the 1960s and 1970s as decisive, seeing Thatcherism and the post-1975 years as the environment in which the social movement  46  Gray. Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (London: Macmillan, 1988) 2. Ibid. 27  47 as do others, of whom Marchak, whose work is discussed later in this section, is develops, an example in the North American context. Pointing to the same decade of “origin,” Simon Gunn gives reasons similar to Gamble’s, focusing on questions of economics: It was out of the breakdown of social democracy in the 1 970s, the failure of its prescriptions to deal with the mounting crisis, that the New Conservatism was forged. Questions of economic management were clearly central to this crisis The breakdown of social democracy was also fundamentally the breakdown of a social and moral order. 49 ...  Hall, whose general sympathy for what can be described as Gramscian approaches (which, in part, is also responsible for his being criticised by some for being idealist) is in good part the initial stimulus for the attitude brought to this thesis, observes that the New Right does not “appear out of thin air” and is aware the economic recession of the 1970s succeeds the appearance of the “radical right.” Nevertheless, he does not push his investigation into its beginnings back any further. He identifies the movement as a product of the political polarisations of the 1960s, with 1968 marking the key moment for him. ° Claiming it is 5 incorrect to identil,’ the rise of the radical right too closely with Thatcher’s political success, Hall argues it has a much longer trajectory, yet dates its inception to the late 1960s, seeing the first phase of the movement as a backlash against the revolutionary moment of 1968. It has developed through a number of different phases. First, the ‘backlash’ against the revolutionary ferment of ‘1968’ and all that. Then, the bold, populist bid by Mr Powell speaking —  °  Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling, Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity and Basil Blackwell, 1988) 60-61. Marchak9-10. Simon Gunn, Revolution of the Right (London and Amsterdam: Pluto Press with the Transnational Institute, 1989) 18. Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal (London and New York: Verso, 1988) 44. 28  over the heads of the party factions to ‘the people’, helping to construct ‘the people’ in their most patriotic, racist, borrowing the clothes of his constitutional disguise. Then opponent, in the best Tory tradition Mr Heath: a politician instinctively of the soft centre, but not averse, in the anxiety-ridden days of the early 1 970s to going to the country with a programme to restore ‘Seisdon Man’ a close cousin of Neanderthal Man at the centre of British politics. ’ 5 —  —  —  —  Scholars viewing the New Right from the other side of the Atlantic take similar positions, generally following the early themes of Alan Crawford (1980) and arguing that the roots of the New Right lie in the global economic and technological restructuring which began in the late 1960s and 1970s, or the crisis of legitimation which they see as occurring in the same period. By and large, theorists evaluating this shift away from the tenets of the Keynesian “consensus,” as discussed earlier, see it as economically and/or technologically determined or resulting from conditions of breakdown and crisis, and having occurred with some speed. 52 In the Canadian context, Marchak takes up a position against the New Right, noting she does “not pretend to admire the philosophy.” It is an ideology which, she says, emerges “with the deterioration of the Pax Americana.” 53 Countering the explanation which she claims the New Right gives for its success, that of the “successful selling of ideas and politicians,” Marchak, although stressing the power of advertising, marketing techniques, and indeed, of words,  ‘  52  Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” The Politics of Thatcherism, eds. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with Marxism Today, 1983) 19. “Selsdon Man” is a reference to the Selsdon Group of economic liberals that formed within the Conservative Party in the 1 970s to promote their belief that economic freedom is indispensable to political freedom. For a fuller discussion of this group, see Patrick Seyd, “Factionalism in the 1970s,” Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-Henry (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980) 235-238. E.g. Gunn xiii. Marchak xii. 29  offers what she refers to as the alternative explanation:  “  ...  that a historical crisis created  panic and a search for solutions.” TM Marchak argues: Its roots lie in the restructuring of a global economy that began in the mid-1960s and reached fruition towards the end of the 1980s. My argument is that the political movements and the parties of the new right, promoted by corporate leaders who funded the think-tanks and participated in the crafting of their strategies, provided the ideological framework for the restructuring of the global economy. 55 Marchak sees the New Right as having produced a populist, sloganeering attack on all the groups in society which she says have been defended by the left. While it has been argued by some on both sides of the ideological spectrum that the left may not always be too committed to democratic participation, and there are groups opposed to the left on the grounds of wanting more of it, Marchak offers the following as a list of those that the left defends and the right attacks: the poor, the handicapped, the unemployed, women in the work-force, the public sector, the welfare state, democracy, majority choice, labour, unions, the underdeveloped nations, impoverished regions, indebted countries, and especially the intellectuals themselves. 56 In general, the works on what they term the New Right show little curiosity about the actual practices and activities within the phenomenon they describe. The long intellectual genealogy of the movement campaigning against large-scale state intervention and for a more market-based social order, the impact of its campaign on the details of changed circumstances and the internal diversity within the New Right go largely unexamined. The category is seldom opened up to question. Where the writers draw attention to the New Right’s various elements ‘  56  Ibid 112-113. Ibid xii. Ibid 115.  30  and the significant tensions within its alliances, there is generally little purposeful exploration of these contradictions, nor of the internal contestation of ideas that takes place. Marchak recognises some later diversity within the New Right, however, stating that there was a uniformly anti-democratic ideology. As the movement grew it became evident that there were diverse contributors, and though they shared an anti-democratic ideology their objectives and interests were not otherwise congruent. Even so, they were united in the primary objective: to dismantle the welfare state. 57 The New Right is indeed far from monolithic. Like most social movements, the movement campaigning for limited government is a shifting, negotiated and unstable alliance of groupings, often of contradictory orientation, with suppression of differences between and within the groupings. It is articulated through a series of differing nodes, with, as Melucci puts  it in another context, a “plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which crystallize in any given collective action.” 58  This understanding contrasts with that of theorists such as Andrew Belsey, who claims to see little difference between what he poses as the different sides of the New Right, the neo-liberal and the neo-conservative. Reading the New Right through the practice of Thatcherism, Belsey argues that other theorists examining the New Right have underestimated “the authoritarian and conservative aspects of neo-liberalism.” 59 He views the categories neo-liberal and neo-conservative as “ideal types,” throwing his critical weight at the neo-conservative ideal Ibid 94. Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, eds. John Keane and Paul Mier (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 25. Andrew Belsey, “The New Right, Social Order and Civil Liberties,” The Ideology of the New Right, ed. Ruth Levitas (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1986) 173. 31  type and apparently refusing to take at their word those who position themselves as neo-liberals or proponents of market liberalism 60 and articulate views different from many of the neo-conservatives in the wider movement. He argues: Any claim that the neo-liberals are ‘libertarian,’ are the friends of liberty, must be regarded with the deepest suspicion. ’ 6 Belsey takes a jaundiced view of neo-liberals within the wider movement arguing for more market-based approaches, suggesting that he is able to detect their true intentions. The New Right is at its most insidious in the neo-liberals, for the neo-conservatives make no secret of their authoritarian 62 aims. Some of the positions set out above appear to be based on two assumptions; firstly, that we can easily discern the “true” motives of people, something which has been called into question by a number of intellectual groupings, most notably the psychoanalytic school; and secondly, that people are easily deceived at the level of ideology or, as is more commonly stated in a particular literature, are the victims of false ideology (from which the theorist making the claim is always immune), leading them, for example, to vote against their own interests. In certain work, Gamble points to the diversity within the New Right while questioning some of the orthodox characterisations of it, but he also is prepared to accept differences within the New Right, within limits. In contrast to Hayek’s organisational statements about the formation  60  61 62  Market liberalism as elucidated by, for example, 212. Belsey 192. Ibid 193.  Brittan  in A Restatement of Economic Liberalism  32  of the movement, which speak of its constituent groups of libertarians, 63 thus placing them in a somewhat symmetrical relationship with liberals, Gamble claims: There is a libertarian wing of the New Right but it is not dominant. The few genuine libertarians stand out among the rest.M He cites Samuel Brittan as one.  Some of the neo-conservative groupings often included under the umbrella of the New Right, such as the Salisbury Group, are open in their hostility to liberalism, preferring to seek their affinity with the conservatism of the last century. For example, the Labour Party-affiliated monthly publication Labour Research quotes a key member of the Salisbury Group, philosopher and Salisbury Review editor Roger Scruton, as saying he and the group formed in the mid-1970s care little for the monetarists and economic liberals. 65 Scruton’s position has been seen as a “comprehensive rebuttal of Hayekian liberalism,” one in which he himself describes his argument as putting “public before private, society before individual and privilege before right.” 66 Commentators on his book The Meaning of Conservatism (1930) portray it similarly as a rebuttal of the Hayekian position.  63  For example, Hayek, when discussing the formation of the movement’s key organisation the Mont Pèleiin Society speaks of bringing “together the various libertarian groups” in the opening address of the 10th anniversary meeting in September 10, 1957. Opening address located at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. Collection title F.A. Hayek; box number 62, folder ID 3. Gamble, “The Political Economy of Freedom,” The Ideology of the New Right, ed. Ruth LeVitas —  —  47. 65  66  Labour Research 74:2 (1985) 48, referring to an article in IiGuardian of March 1, 1983 in which Scruton is quoted. See discussion in Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1994) 220. 33  For Robert Bocock, “New Right” is the more general term used to include the non-economic aspects of the phenomenon, such as the family and sexual morality. 67 Bocock also notes how disparate elements tend to be conflated in descriptions of the New Right, to the extent that the focus is sometimes narrowed to a particular branch of economic theory associated with market-based approaches, monetarism. Discussing the political economy of Thatcherism, Bocock says: The term “monetarism” has been used sometimes to denote all these specific types of new ideology and political economy.. 69 Such is the currency of this misconception that obituaries following Hayek’s death in March 1992 cast him as the father of monetarism ° (a description better befitting Friedman) despite 7 his long-standing objections to this school of economic thought, discussed earlier in reference to Gray and in greater detail later.  In summary, then, this thesis is uneasy with theorists who see the entire movement in monolithic terms and approaches it instead by opening up and questioning the categorisation that has dominated. It takes a different approach to those explanations of the movement for limited government and market-based approaches which trace its beginnings to the 1960s and 67  69 70  Robert Bocock, Hegemony (Chichester, Sussex and London: Ellis Horwood and Tavistock, 1986) 12. Monetarism is described by Pennant-Rea and Emmott in The Pocket Economist, a dictionary of economic terms published by The Economist, as the school of economic thought that places growth in the money supply at the centre of its thinking. Specifically, monetarists believe in the quantity theory of money, and argue that monetary expansion or contraction has only transitory effects on “real” variables like output and employment because ultimately it feeds through solely into the price level. By no means are those in the movement arguing for a more market-based approach all monetarists; indeed, many are vehemently opposed to the monetarist position. Further, the head of this movement, Hayek, belonged in the Austrian School camp. Bocockll-12. For example, the obituary in The Times of March 25, 1992. 34  1970s, usually with accompanying arguments based on theoretical approaches to collective action in terms of which the movement is explained as being primarily a response to one or more of the following: • The needs of global capital; • Breakdown and crisis  —  often constructed as a loss of authority or  legitimacy by central institutions; • Class condition, nurtured by resentments and discontent; • Crucial earlier events, such as economic and technological changes. Here the response is seen as almost spontaneous. ’ 7  It is not the fact of conditions or crucial events in the 1 970s that is in dispute; rather, the question of how they are to be interpreted in the development of the movement. Events of the 1970s, such as the circumstances of Britain’s being forced to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMP), or the oil crisis, did indeed spur a proliferation of organisations campaigning against large-scale state intervention and add weight to the liberal  71  Theories abound on why people engage in collective action. There are socio-psychological explanations which focus on feelings of relative deprivation or the discontent which flows from alienation brought about by mass society. There are others that emphasise the rational and strategic nature of collective action as being in the actor’s individual interest, such as rational choice and resource mobilisation theories. There are also those which see new social movements as the result of a struggle by a new class of knowledge worker for power and status against an older, established class. The perceived power of these differing theories to explain collective action has varied, with different theories dominating different historical epochs in different geographical locations. This vast literature on “general” theories of social movements cannot be dealt with in all its minutiae in this study, and that which is relevant and situates the project is dealt with in Chapter 2. 35  argument for increasing numbers of people. Yet such events cannot alone account for the larger social movement. (iii) The Reformulation The emergence of any changed social order is the result of a complex process, the product of many forces, and hence gives rise to many explanations. Discussion frequently polarises into determining dualisms  —  such as the idealist/materialist or structure/agency polarities  —  as if the  one aspect in each case had virtually no affect on the other. Such either/or paradigms offer no theoretical advantage and promote a dichotomy which, given an emerging awareness of the complexity of social relations and the unrelenting pace of change in the contemporary world, counters an understanding of complex processes of change. This study conceives of structure and agency as being mutually dependent rather than oppositional. Theorists such as Touraine, Bourdieu 73 and, in the Anglophone world, Anthony Giddens, state their refusal of the structure/agency polarity. Touraine contends that although society is still far from egalitarian, factors such as economic growth and the constant lowering of social barriers render inadequate those concepts which assume a society of reproduction of social structure rather than a society of growth, change and mass consumption. 74 In regard to a theoretical approach which refuses the structure/agency dualism, Touraine argues:  72  “  ‘  Main Touraine, “Is Sociology Still the Study of Society?” Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity, eds. Peter Beilharz, Gillian Robinson and John Rundell (Cambridge, Mass.: MiT Press, 1992) 173-198. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and of Field,” Sociocriticism 2:2 (1985e) 11-24. Touraine 184. 36  in contemporary industrial societies, situations do not determine actions, it is, rather, action that brings to light relations of domination and subordination which lack a visible juridical or political expression. 75 Touraine holds that the concept of class as a central category of sociological analysis must be replaced by that of social movement, an argument discussed later in this chapter.  As Peter Beilharz points out, the work of Touraine and others can be seen as raising objections to Marx’s theory in Capital 76 in a number of ways. Some of the questions which Beilharz says are being raised by the interrogators of Capital are: What happened to the class struggle? Where is the history? What has happened to the other classes? And, most importantly for Touraine’s work, where have the actors gone? Piotr Sztompka describes Touraine’s work since he outlined the image of the “self-producing society” as having a critical edge directed against both developmentalism and structuralism, with the main charge that they subordinated the sense of collective action to immutable laws or requirements, consequently eliminating the actor from the sociological perspective, treating the actors as an epiphenomenon of the system. 77  In this study, the burden of the structure/agency dualism is shed in favour of a mode of thought facilitated by a research approach focusing on process, thus assuming continual change, rather than on end result or presumed categories.  76  “  Ibid. Peter Beilharz, “Karl Marx,” Social Theory, ed. Peter Beilharz (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen&Unwin, 1991) 172. Piotr Sztompka, The Sociology of Social Change (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993) 195. 37  Change is a constant feature in all societies, as it is for the structures within these societies, and the difference between societies and between distinct historical periods lies more in the rate at which this change takes place at a particular juncture or locus. 78 Social structure, as formulated by the discipline of sociology and commonly defined as  recurring patterns of social behaviour, is thus also continually subject to disruption, destabilisation, change and reformulation through negotiation by human agency, however slowly, and often in spite of resistance. The abstract formulation of structure, constructed from the more enduring patterned relationships in a particular type of society, can become reified and static in the hands of theorists where, to use the words of Bourdieu, there is a  tendency to slip from the model of reality to the reality of the model. Human creativity, contestation, negotiation and resistance are then often ignored, along with such insights as those of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality (1966), among others, that social structures are themselves created by human beings whose actions can destabilise existing power regimes and transform them again. In the natural sciences it is commonly understood that what is solid at one level is particles at another, yet frequently within the tradition of a determining economic base in the social sciences the idea is resisted that social structure might be far more fluid, a contested process, the product of myriad elements, each subject to various forces which include human action. Notions of rigid and immutable social structure are sometimes wielded in ways which make those structures more than the recurring patterns which they are 78  —  and at a time when patterns  Indeed, the current debate across disciplines, and from a variety of ideological positions, puts the argument that contemporary social actors may no longer be living in a capitalist era, but rather a post-industrial, post-modern and perhaps, it is argued, even post-capitalist world.  38  in society are generally even less enduring than previously. Hall also sees dangers to reif,iing abstract formulations. In a theoretical debate with Jessop et al over explanations of Thatcherism, Hall distances himself from what he refers to as “the fundamentalist marxist revival” precisely because “they believe that the concepts which Marx advanced at the highest level of abstraction (i.e. mode of production, capitalist epoch) can be transferred directly into the analysis of concrete historical conjunctures.”  A questioning of the solidity and meaning of “economic reality” is taking place within the discipline of economics itself Among the issues being discussed are the recognition of economics as discourse and related insights by which economics and the various interpretations of economic reality are seen as respective systems of metaphor which different schools are putting forward. ° 8  The accounts which argue the case for economic and technological determinants for the New Right are, ironically, contradictory, for they appear to undercut their own position. If one were to accept the argument that a social transformation was in progress based merely on the economic needs of accumulation or the material production base and resulting in the move away from the Keynesian state in the 1970s, why would there even be a need for an intellectual movement such as the New Right? Surely to put the argument that the New Right comes after the economic crisis of the 1970s and is concurrent with the restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s, fostered by groups responding to these material changes and with an interest in them, is in part to indicate that the New Right appears on the scene after the real  °  Hail, The Hard Road to Renewal 153. See Warren J. Samuels, ed., Economics as Discourse: An Analysis ofthe Language of Economists, (Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 1990) 7-14. 39  need for its arguments has passed? In terms of the position that relations of production come before and determine ideas and consciousness, it would have to follow that social transformation, say from internal contradictions, would come about irrespective of intellectual work. The economic determinists then, by their own arguments, are perhaps not determinist enough.  The major reason for the lack of detailed attention in the New Right literature to the activity of intellectual activists is that the movement has largely been viewed as the manifestation of economic conflicts, and, therefore, secondary to these considerations. In the approaches which tend to describe this collective action as a response to economic and technological changes, changes on the way to a global capitalism, the discontent on the part of groups which may flow from this transformation, and a loss of authority and legitimacy by central institutions in these decades, the emphasis is generally on postulating why, ’ in terms of 8 82 the collective action occurred. Interests are often assumed by the theorists and then interests, seen as having motivated those who argued for limited government and a more market-based social order and whose ideas contributed to the changed circumstances of the 1980s. Often these assumptions come at the expense of a more detailed examination of either those who have been engaged in prolonged intellectual activity so as to understand their successes, where achieved, or of the protracted process itself by which the ideas were developed and  81  82  In the language of the social movements literature, “why” is used here in the more restricted instrumental sense, rather than in the expressive sense increasingly associated with the new social movements field. For example, Marchak, referring to the New Right and change in the period 1975-1985, speaks in terms of “interest groups” and of change in terms of those “at whose expense” it would be achieved. Marchak 9. 40  disseminated by active intellectuals and consent for them was won, which is also important to understanding social change.  This is not to suggest that interests are instead absent; they are of course present in any social interaction, be it in the university or the research and policy institute or think-tank, 83 as argued in the postscript to this thesis, but a neat and consistent correspondence between a particular class location and a set of interests is not sustainable. What can be referred to in the literature as original class location is no guarantee that the ideological position assumed to be appropriate to it by a theorist will indeed be adopted. While it is not argued that one should dissociate class and interest, it can not be automatically assumed that because a set of actions may benefit a particular faction, the arguments on behalf of such actions must have been sponsored by the grouping which the actions are seen to benefit, nor that the benefits that attend changes are necessarily narrowly bestowed and bound by class. Nor can it always be safely assumed that members of a class, however defined, will be able to agree on how their interests should be formulated and protected.  83  The Oxford English Dictionary gives three meanings for the word think-tank, specifies its origin as American and says it was first used in 1905 to refer to the brain. The second meaning denotes a research institute or organisation providing advice and ideas on national and commercial problems (a sense dating to 1959), or an interdisciplinary group of specialist consultants. The term is used in a third sense in the 1970s to indicate a meeting or conference of experts, scholars or specialists. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. Vol. 17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 949-95. Indeed, some theorists draw into question the orthodox formulations which depict the workers’ movement in one-dimensional terms as a strict class movement. For example, Craig Calhoun in his work The Question of Class Struggle indicates that the workers’ movement may not have been the initially conceptualised class movement. The workers’ movement seems to have been far less unified than the more orthodox formulation of its early conception has it, and such works as E.P. Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class emphasise important other aspects to class action besides mere class location. As Alberto Melucci points out in an interview in Nomads of the Present 197, social action is never a given fact, it is always socially produced. 41  Indeed, a category such as class is far from obvious. As Ernesto Laclau points out, class is instead afready a synthesis of determinations and a particular response to a more primary question of social agency. 85 For Melucci  —  noting that he has gradually abandoned the concept  of class relationships as his thinking in the area has developed  —  more appropriate concepts are  required in systems like contemporary ones “where classes as real social groups are withering 86 However, this must be accomplished, argues Melucci: away.” .without ignoring the theoretical problem that the category of class relationships has left behind as its legacy. That problem can be defined as knowing what relations and what conflicts are involved in the production of the crucial resources of a particular system. The notion of mode of production is too closely associated with economic reductionism. Production cannot be restricted solely to the economic-material sphere; it embraces the entirety of social relationships and cultural orientations. Societies through history have been driven by different resources (matter, energy and information) Melucci points out, with many contemporary societies now relying on 88 information for their survival. The adoption of the approach used in this study, underpinned as it is by the framework formulated by Eyerman and Jamison, is an attempt to work towards a synthesis of “determinations,” to use the words of Laclau referred to earlier in another context. A break with the structure/agency dualism is suggested  —  although not directly stated  —  in the  approach to social movements of Eyerman and Janiison, the two principal theorists whose 85 86  87 88  Laclau, “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” 66. Melucci, “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?” New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994) 103. Ibid 103-104. Ibid 110. 42  work directly informs this study in that it is their modus operandi for the examination of social movements which is adopted to examine the movement for limited government and a more market-based social order. It is this perceived break which contributed to the attractiveness of their research attitude, informed by Gramsci, Touraine and Melucci, for use in this study. This study, then, brings into focus an aspect largely neglected in the New Right accounts of the 1980s by considering the importance to change and transformation of prolonged intellectual activity. It will consider how a number of active intellectuals, in the face of great enthusiasm for the view of their opponents, opposed large-scale state intervention from the 193 Os, calling into question and opening up to contestation the dominant interpretation as they went about winning and sustaining intellectual support for limited government and a more market-based social order. In examining the waning of the Keynesian consensus, this study diverges from social determinist and reductionist notions, whether economic or technological (or indeed cultural), to also bring into focus the importance of considering the largely ignored intellectuals who, convinced of the power of ideas, began a campaign out of which grew a social movement dedicated to the revival of liberalism in a 20th century reincarnation. Attention is directed towards the knowledge and organisational culture they developed, shared practices and ideas through which they have come to define themselves as participants in a movement, and their mobilisation, in part through the establishment of effective organisations. In so doing, this study, cognisant of critiques of easy universalising, also modestly seeks to prompt thrther thought on the role of intellectuals in social transformation, specifically to  43  contribute to that body of the literature that focuses on knowledge, the role of ideas and intellectuals, and on collective identity and subjectivity, underpinned always by the position that social actors are produced in the undertaking of action, as is knowledge, with action always socially produced. The emphasis on “how” the movement intellectuals did what they did, mentioned above, does not suggest an approach restricted to examining that which is only strategic and instrumental organisation and mobilisation  —  —  nor does it regard the actions of the movement as such. While  the emphasis on “how” shares certain aspects of the position held by those in the field grouped together as resource-mobilisation theorists insofar as the conception of social movements as resulting solely from strain or discontent in society is rejected, as it is in this thesis, this is not the approach adopted for this study. Rather, the emphasis is on considering how a movement struggles over time to form a collective identity, always within specific contexts, and create knowledges and locations from which to counter the reigning consensus and develop and disseminate sets of ideas and beliefs, always in interaction with the surrounding culture and in relation to specific institutions. At the same time, the emphasis on a process of knowledge creation and dissemination does not imply a disregard for that which is referred to as social structure, as discussed above, and the constraints or opportunities offered by a particular social configuration at a given time. Indeed, the context is considered often, and throughout the thesis, precisely for this reason, and the importance of context to a social movement is a core notion in the Eyerman and Jamison framework. Nor is it the intention to displace the dominant explanations which  44  generally see the needs of global capital as responsible for the New Right, with another that in its stead privileges action and actors without heed to the constraints these actors face, whatever the geographical, political, economic or historical context. In other words, while subjects are constituted, they are not determined. Following Judith Butler, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. 89  5. Divisions within this Work Part One of this dissertation, comprising three chapters, sets out the. historical, geographical, theoretical and methodological boundaries of the study. It introduces the project, situates the study within the existing literature on social movements and sets up the Eyerman-Jamison theoretical framework, explaining how the contributions of Touraine, Gramsci and Melucci, all key figures in the general area, have been drawn from. It deals with the research problem and lays out the methodology, research attitude and strategy, questions and methods that guide the project.  Part Two, following Eyerman and Jamison, deals with context directly, although context is not, of course, dealt with only in this section. It examines the important historical moment of the 1930s and 1940s in Britain, a period that marked the culminating stages in the evolution of the Keynesian welfare state and the beginning of an intellectual battle over its principles out of which a movement grew. This section considers the arguments on state intervention and knowledge of Keynes and Hayek during this period, as well as their intellectual and social  89  Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’ Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) 12. 45  locations, with a view, in the case of Hayek, to shedding light on the way in which he acted in relation to the movement with which he is associated. Part Three reads the development of the movement in terms of the three-stage format of gestation, formation and consolidation subscribed to by Eyerman and Jamison ° in the tradition 9 of other social movements theorists. This section presents empirical and factual material in considering the growth of the movement through its key organisations, such as the Mont Pèlerin Society, the WA and other institutes closely associated with it, and through the relationship of movement actors to them, Hayek in particular. In theoretical terms, Part Three is guided by Eyerman and Jamison’s notions of subjectivity, activity and context in reading the movement cognitively, as they put it, through the 50-year period. The study extends its inquiry into all three dimensions and organisational  —  —  cosmological, technological  identified by Eyerman and Jamison as the areas within which a  movement’s specifiable types of knowledge interest are developed. Part Four concludes the dissertation, reflecting on the impact on social and intellectual life of the movement which can be traced through Hayek, the WA and the network of Fisher research and policy institutes which grew out of the WA’s establishment. This section also considers think-tanks as relatively new sites of knowledge dissemination and their effect, realised and potential, on intellectual life and other institutions of knowledge in the latter half of the 20th century, an aspect deserving of further consideration. Finally, some observations are made about some common ground which Hayek shared with other intellectuals who have  °  Eyerman and Jamison 56. 46  stressed uncertainty and the impossibility of prediction and blueprint, calling into question the all-knowing voice of the authoritative expert.  47  CHAPTER 2 Making Links to Existing Literature on Intellectuals and Social Movements 1. The Revival of Interest in the Intellectual and Social Movements as Social Agents Paradoxically perhaps, as the death and decentring of the subject moves towards the forefront of debate in social theory, another issue of agency and the actor and intellectual  —  —  that of the position and importance to social change is concentrating the sociological mind. ’ Yet perhaps 9  it is the concern with the one that flows from the other. As argued by theorists such as Butler, the constituted subject and agency are closely linked, and to claim the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined. On the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. Butler puts the position when asking the following questions: For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation that can destabilize existing power regimes?  ‘  Debate on the role of the intellectual has been lively at least since the Dreyfus affair in France in the 1890s, when the term came into active use through a stand taken by a group of committed intellectuals on an issue of justice. Robert 3. Brym, in Intellectuals and Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980) 11, noted that although some people specialised in the production of ideas prior to this time, it is only in the last three or four hundred years that intellectuals have become a large, well-defined and self-conscious group. He sees this development mainly as the result of the growing division of labour which accompanied the rise of capitalism and which occasioned a rapid increase in the absolute and proportional number of highly educated people in society. Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodemism.’” 12-13. 48  Some theorists see a retreat of the intellectual (Jacoby 1987, Miliband and Panitch 1990), others a return (Touraine 1988)  —  but all through their reformulations of the notion  (Aronowitz 1990, Foucault 1980, Gramsci 1971, Hayek 1949, Radhakrishnan 1990, Robbins 1993) recognise the intellectual’s importance, and their attention to the matter contributes to the resurgence of interest in this source of change. 94  Accompanying the rejuvenation of the social actor is a burgeoning interest in social movements as agents of social transformation over the past two decades. The two areas are closely linked, and Alan Scott, in a review of the field of new social movements theory which considers the work of Touraine and its impact, argues that social movements have become an attractive object of analysis for an approach which wishes to bring back the social actor, a point he says Touraine’s work makes clear. 95 Scott sees what he refers to as a crisis in “single-order explanations,” a greater awareness of the complexity of social relations and a move away from grand theory as significant factors contributing to this expanding interest in social action and historical analysis, with social  The genre to which books such as Russell Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals belong has been followed by another, of which The Phantom Public Sphere, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) is an example. This genre problematises the notion of the public sphere, asking whether it may not have been a phantom given that the so-called public often excluded many more than it included. Increasingly, theorists and activists are now voicing suspicion of those who claim to speak in the name of the “public.” For Gramsci, there is no question of intellectuals becoming themselves historical agents, argues Stanley Aronowitz. Rather, their importance in Gramsci’s conception is in their ability to link themselves with the “real” agents, namely classes, “which for Gramsci and all Marxists are the only forces capable of making history.” Stanley Aronowitz, “On Intellectuals,” Intellectuals: Aesthetics. Politics. Academics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 11. In Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, Aronowitz argues, the purveyors of ideas are not independent agents (p. 14). Alan Scott, Ideology and the New Social Movements (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 5. 49  movements a manifestation of this interest. He argues that the move away from meta-narratives is taking place as a shift of emphasis along three axes: 96 • From structure to actor; • From static to historical (synchronic to diachronic) explanation; • From conceptual clarification to theory-informed research. Each increase in disillusionment with the single-order explanations such as functionalism and neo-Marxism gives rise to greater interest in social movements as a suitable object of research, asserts Scott. If this increased interest in social movements is indeed aroused in part by the current crisis in the social sciences, it is certainly fanned by concrete historical events. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and various others such as the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s have brought social movements into society to such an extent that sociologists can no longer avoid studying them, argue Eyerman and Janiison. 97 Indeed, Americans Charles Stewart, Craig Smith and Robert Denton go so far as to argue that the United States is experiencing the age of the social movement. The second half of the 20th century may well be called “the age of the social movement” in America. Blacks, students, women, the aged, gays, hispanic peoples, native Americans, prison inmates, and workers of all varieties from the vineyard to the university campus have demanded rights, equality, identity, and a fair share of the American dream. Others have organized to protest the American way of dying, involvement in unjustified wars, pollution and destruction of the environment, Scott4. Eyerman & Jamison 1. 50  nuclear power, forced busing of public school students, violence and sex on television, legalized abortion, marijuana laws, centralized power in corporate, governmental, and educational bureaucracies, and the changes in the American social structure and values. 98 Indeed, if a link is to be found between these two coincidental developments  —  the move away  from single-order explanations, and the increasing importance of social movements  —  it is that  much that was considered settled previously is now being called into question and contested, both in terms of epistemology (with the move from meta- to micro-studies and narratives) and representation  —  political, intellectual or otherwise.  While the significance of social movements appears to have been solidly established (Touraine, Melucci), with many theorists in the field regarding them as having taken up the emancipatory role that Marx, in the previous century, had reserved for the working class alone, 99 there is little agreement on what should constitute a social movement. Frequently one theorist’s social movement is another’s cultural movement, more limited in scope and, for some of the more  98  Charles Stewart, Craig Smith and Robert E. Denton, Jr., Persuasion and Social Movements (Prospect Heights, illinois: Waveland, 1984) 1. Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow’s Social History: Classes. Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, 1971) 3-26. Touraine argues it is the programmed society in which we live that is responsible for the working class no longer being a privileged historic agent, and not the weakening of the labour movement, its subjection to the strategy of a particular party or bad leaders. It is rather because the exercise of power within a capitalist firm now no longer places the working class at the centre of the economic system and its social conflicts. Touraine uses the term programmed society to refer to the type of society being formed, defined in temis of the nature of production methods and economic organisation. It is labelled also as post-industrial to stress the differences in method and organisation between it and the earlier type of society called industrial. For Touraine, in the programmed society economic decisions and struggles no longer possess either the autonomy or the central importance they had in an earlier society defined by the effort to accumulate directly from productive work. Growth now results from a whole complex of social factors, not just from the accumulation of capital, but depends much more directly than before on knowledge and hence on the capacity of society to call forth creativity. All these terms, says Touraine, define a society according to the way it acts on itself, or, in other words, its praxis or historicity, the central concept of his work on social movements which is discussed in the text. 51  orthodox, not a movement at all, perhaps merely the rallying of a special interest, pressure or protest group around a single issue. Scott suggests the following as a rough guide to the notion of social movement: A social movement is a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interests and for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity. Social movements are distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties and pressure groups, in that they have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power. They are fhrther distinguished from other collectives, such as voluntary associations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned to defend or change society, or the relative position of the group in  society. Theorists sometimes argue, too, about how new a social movement actually is, or vacillate on whether a movement, having been accused of having concerns too particular, should be relegated to the status of a cultural movement. Indeed, Melucci, the theorist associated with the introduction of the tenn “new social movements” into the sociological literature, views aspects of the debate around them with frustration, saying that he has: “... watched with dismay as the category has been progressively reified.” ’ 10  Some, Touraine among them in certain of his works, have argued that for each historic period there can be only one historic actor, one central social movement, on whose shoulders rests squarely the burden of social transformation. Other theorists reject new social movements as  100  ‘°‘  Scott 6. Alberto Melucci, “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?” y Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity 105. 52  reformist  —  in contrast to what they see as the tmly transformative class movements’ 02  —  or as  special interests simply seeking sectional advantage. Disputes about whether a social movement is “progressive” or “reactionary” are also scattered through the literature, along with a tendency to designate a social movement “progressive” if the writer identifies with it and to refuse the designation to others. This debate need not be engaged in, argue Eyerman and Jamison, as “progressiveness” is not a defining attribute for the notion social movement. there is nothing automatically progressive about social movements; as history itself is open and often regresses, social movements can re-act, as well as act, mobilizing interests that represent regressive as well as progressive values. Their ideological orientation need not affect their creativity; all social movements are producers of knowledge.’° 3  The aspect of the formation of new collective identities within society is an important one in the literature on social movements. Doug McAdam, for example, argues that historically, social movements have served as the source for new collective identities within societies, citing as examples the Christian, Muslim and “working class” identities which he points to as having emerged in the context of social movements.’ 04 Terry Eagleton is another who points to the importance of this aspect when he argues that: no dominant political order is likely to survive very long if it does not intensively colonize the space of subjectivity 05 itself’ 102 103  104  105  Scott 7 contains an outhne of this argument. Eyennan and Jamison 58. Doug McAdam, “Culture and Social Movements,” New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, eds. Enrique Larafta, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) 49-50. Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990) 36. 53  In limiting the use of the term social movement to oppositional groupings working for a transformation of the social order, Touraine distinguishes them from others that can be seen as alternative groupings seeking freedom for practices outside of the mainstream, or groupings that coalesce temporarily around a particular issue. This distinction, however, can prove problematic. Alternative groupings which set out merely to seek freedom for divergent practices often have the effect of contributing to a transformation of the social order as well. As McAdam observes in another context: Movement cultures are not static over time. Having opened up the question of the restructuring of social arrangements, there is no guarantee that insurgents will confine their attention to the specific issues or institutions originally targeted. When this happens, movements can take on the character of hothouses of cultural innovation. Anything and everything is open to critical scrutiny. Change becomes the order of the day)° 6 Acknowledging the difficulty of mapping a sharp boundary around the notion of social movement, this study and Jamison  —  —  drawing as it does on Touraine, through the framework of Eyerman  will nevertheless also exclude from the concept actors who define their projects  narrowly, in other words, those actors who could be seen rather as specific or local intellectuals, in Foucauldian terminology. However, this differentiation proves as problematic as the distinction often insisted upon with regard to what constitutes a social movement. This was something that Michel Foucault himself recognised. He was aware that in the definition of the one were the seeds of the other. In an interview, “Truth and Power,” published in 1977, Foucault, while recognising the dangers of the specific intellectuals 106  “...  remaining at the level of conjunctural struggles,  MeAdam 46. 54  pressing demands restricted to particular sectors,” states that the point had been reached at which the function of the specific intellectual needed to be reconsidered. Contending that the role of the specific intellectual in local and specific struggles has been productive, he argues: One may even say that the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nifly to accept, as a nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, etc. It would be a dangerous error to discount him politically in his specific relation to a local form of power, either on the grounds that this is a specialist matter which doesn’t concern the masses (which is doubly wrong: they are already aware of it, and in any case implicated in it), or that the specific intellectual serves the interests of State or Capital (which is true, but at the same time shows the strategic position he occupies), or, again, on the grounds that he propagates a scientific ideology (which isn’t always true, and is anyway certainly a secondary matter compared with the fundamental point: the effects proper to true 7 discourses).’° Reviewing the differing attributes and roles given to intellectuals in social theory,  Radhakrishnan  —  examining the intersections between Foucault’s and Gramsci’s theories  —  makes this distinction between specific and universal intellectuals: there is the Foucauldian “specific intellectual” (in opposition to the universal intellectual), who works “within specific sectors at the precise points where [the specific intellectual’s] own conditions of life or work situate” him or her. The specific intellectual is intended in demystification of the universal intellectual just as the Gramscian organic intellectual exposes the ideological underpinnings of the traditional intellectual. But there the similarity ends, for the agencies of the two intellectuals have very different orientations.’ 08  ‘°  Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977. ed. Cohn Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 130-131. R. Raclhakrishnan, “Towards an Effective Intellectual: Foucault or Gramsci?” Intellectuals: Aesthetics. Politics. Academics, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 80. Stuart Hall also discusses these distinctions in “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Gary Nelson and Paula Treichler (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) 288-289. 55  According to Didier Eribon’s reading, the specific intellectual’ 09 wages battles on precise points and in well-defined places. ° This would seem to contrast sharply with the notion of the 11 universal intellectual, where the battleground tends to be the wider social field. Foucault himself, who could be called an active intellectual, intervened in and contributed to a number of specific causes, such as campaigns for the release of prisoners” or, in concert with fellow intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre, to save boat people.” 2 An interview Foucault had with a Portuguese worker at a Renault factory suggests that contrast to Gramsci, and indeed to Hayek and Keynes  —  —  in  Foucault did not publicly claim the  same crucial role for the intellectual. Jose: What an intellectual who works for the people can do is to reflect the light coming from those who are exploited and make it brighter. He acts as a mirror. Foucault: I wonder if you are not somewhat exaggerating the role of intellectuals. We are in agreement that workers have no need of intellectuals to know what it is they do. They know this perfectly well themselves. An intellectual, for me, is a guy hooked into the system of information rather than into the system of production. He is able to make himself heard. He can write in papers, give his point of view, He is also hooked into a former system of information. He has the knowledge, obtained from reading a certain amount of books, that other people do not have directly available to them. His role, consequently, is not to form the workers’ consciousness, since that afready exists, but to allow this consciousness, this workers’ knowledge, to enter the information system and be circulated. This will help other workers, and people who are not workers, to become aware of what is happening. I agree with you when you speak of a mirror, if one takes the mirror to be a means of transmission [sic] We can say this: the intellectual’s knowledge is always partial in relation to the worker’s . . .  109 “°  “ 112  As opposed to the Sartre-style total or engaged intellectual. Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) 259. Ibid 267. Ibid 278-280. 56  knowledge. What we know about the history of French society is entirely partial in relation to all the vast experience that the working class has.” 3 Recognising that the notion of an intellectual is contested, this thesis follows the emphasis of Gramsci and Hayek on the potentials of intellectual action and employs the term to denote a broad range of intellectual activity, as discussed in the next section. While Foucault may not have shared Hayek’s position on the role of the intellectual, he was, in terms of arguments he made, sympathetic, perhaps surprisingly so for some, to aspects of the modern liberal position, as discussed more fully in Chapter 11, the conclusion. The term social movement is considered appropriate for this  study since the  intellectuals/activists being examined see themselves as engaged in a social transformation of a societal type, the argument occurring most frequently in the social movements literature and that used by figures who dominate the field, such as Touraine. Indeed, in this respect, such an approach might be better suited to an analysis of the movement considered in this work than to many others dealt with in the social movements literature. Hayek and his fellow actors articulated a vision of, and commitment to, a notion of progress more commonly associated with analyses of the historic actor; a progress afforded by the market as a discovery/epistemological mechanism and representing a project of social transformation of a type not always readily apparent in the other movements with more limited, particular and short-term goals. A social movements approach is considered well suited to this project by virtue of its ability to capture that which has been overlooked in the “New Right” literature,  “  Thid 253. 57  and this more comprehensive account thus expects to contribute in part to an understanding of the role the actor/agent/intellectual plays in social transformation. Notwithstanding the disagreement over social movements, it seems likely the attention they are receiving seems set to intensifj in the fi.iture. Giddens concurs. In the eighth of his nine theses on the future of sociology, he states that: social movements will continue to be of prime significance in stimulating the sociological imagination.” 4 2. Gramsci as Invigorator, and some Similarities to Hayek Stanley Aronowitz sees the work of Gramsci as an important reason for the current joint revival of interest in intellectuals and social movements: In 1968, students and other intellectuals presented themselves as new agents not only in Paris, Berlin, and other Western capitals but also in Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Prague. In the struggle to comprehend the nature of their emergence, Antonio Gramsci, until the 1960s a shadowy figure outside his native Italy, quickly surfaced as a crucial guide. His Selections from the Prison Notebooks, published in English in 1971, provided an argument, if not an elaborated theory, that placed intellectuals on the cusp of social transformation in societies where rule by consent replaces rule by force as the primary mode.” 5 Indeed, Gramsci’s reformulation and extension of the notion of the intellectual came, to a significant extent, out of his interest in the process of the winning of consent for the politics of a social movement of the 1930s  —  Italian fascism. He reflected on the response of  counter-movements, the role of intellectual leadership in organising, negotiating and articulating groups in alliances which create a new common sense, and the need for a 114  115  Anthony Giddens, “Nine Theses on the Future of Sociology,” Social Theory and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 1987a) 48. Aronowitz 10. 58  normative framework ahead of economic and political transformation  —  ideas which place  Gramsci very firmly as a theorist interested in social movements, even though his contribution predated the work on social movements that was to define the field as it is now known.” 6 It is to the corpus of Gramsci that many of the theorists working on contemporary social movements go, either to borrow and build, or to take issue. Gramsci’s notion of the intellectual is a comprehensive one, extended to all whose social function is to direct ideas, rather than the more limiting notion which restricts the title to those seen as engaged in formal or developed thought. As such, it is a conceptualisation well suited to the analysis of social movements. In Gramsci’s vision the new intellectuals sees expanding significantly in the 20th century  —  —  a group he  are active participants, constructors,  organisers and permanent persuaders in social life, directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they belong organically. These intellectuals, often performing the role of constructing a critical sense of the prevailing dominant view ahead of campaigning for a new hegemony or common sense, and whose function is directive and organisational, in other words, educational and intellectual, provide the theory, ideology and leadership for a base. In Gramsci’s conception the party has importance as the entity which combines and nurtures what he called the organic intellectuals, as well as being the channel for the ideas with which these intellectuals are involved. For him all members of the party are intellectuals, and the  116  Eyerman and Jamison 2, 10. They see the original formulations which inspired the study of social movements as located in the 1930s and 1940s, provoked by the fascist and communist movements that had upset the political order in Germany and Italy. Some of the scholars responsible for this early work were themselves victims of this turmoil, they say. 59  party may be made up of different levels or types. In addition, the party has the further task of universalising that which is specific: In the political party the elements of an economic social group get beyond that moment of their historical development and become agents of more general activities of a national and 117 international character. This particular aspect of Gramsci’s thinking involving the organic intellectuals within the party corresponds to the thinking of Touraine, who defines social movements as involving actors with a historic project going beyond the particular to seek a social transformation from one societal type to another.  The location best suited to organic intellectuals becomes ever more pertinent with the credibility of political parties of all ideological aflliations increasingly being called into question, a development which suggests a need for an investigation into locations outside of the political party for contemporary “organic intellectuals” and perhaps prompts a further reformulation of the notion itself  Gramsci is used in this work in the spirit of Hall, not to reproduce his analysis directly or claim that Gramsci has all the answers but, with Hall, to think in a Gramscian way, which he points out is quite different. We mustn’t use Gramsci (as we have for so long abused Marx) like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correct moment, will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation. We can’t pluck up this ‘Sardinian’ from his specific and unique political formation, beam him down at the end of the 20th century and ask him to solve our problems for us: especially since the whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy 117  Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and tr. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) 16. 60  transfer of generalizations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another.” 8 This study was inspired in part by an interest piqued by similarities that were found between the ways in which the very differently positioned Hayek and Gramsci conceived of the notion of and activities of, the intellectual as agent of social transformation. Each held to what was at the time an uncommon comprehensive notion of the intellectual, and it was the nature of the function and effect of prolonged intellectual activity in society that had their attention. Gramsci’s notion is in stark contrast to the traditional idea of the intellectual as comprising only philosophers and people of letters. For Gramsci, thinking is common to all, and intellectuals are not distinguished on these grounds in his work; rather, intellectuals are characterised by the functions they perform, and the term is extended to all those who have the function of organisers in society, be it in the domain of production, politics, or culture. Gramsci saw the defining attributes and abilities of what he called the “organic” or new intellectuals of the social formation he was studying as: active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, “permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit) .  .  For Hayek the intellectual is the intermediary in the spreading of ideas. The notion he posits is extensive and, like Gramsci’s, while not linked to class in the way in which Gramsci’s notion is, it contrasted with the prevailing view of the time. The term “intellectuals,” however, does not at once convey a true picture of the large class to which we refer, and the fact that we have no better name by which to describe what we have called the secondhand dealers in ideas is not the least of the reasons why their power is not better understood. Even persons 118 119  Hall, “Gramsci and Us,” The Hard Road to Renewal 161. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 10. 61  who use the word “intellectual” mainly as a term of abuse are still inclined to withhold it from many who undoubtedly perform that characteristic fhnction.’ ° 2 Hayek, too, includes categories usually absent. Until one begins to list all the professions and activities which belong to this class, it is difficult to realize how numerous it is, how the scope for its activities constantly increases in modem society, and how dependent on it we all have become. The class does not consist only of journalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, and artists all of whom may be masters of the technique of conveying ideas The class also includes many professional men and technicians —  ...  He ascribes to this group significant influence. It is the intellectuals in this sense who decide what views and opinions are to reach us, which facts are important enough to be told to us, in what form and from what angle they are to be presented. Whether we shall ever learn of the results of the work of the expert and the original thinker depends mainly on their decision.’ 22 The growing group providing intellectual services in the 20th century which had attracted the attention of Gramsci and Hayek drew interest some decades later when theorists working in the field saw its swelling numbers as grounds to advance it as a new class in post-industrial society (Alvin Gouldner 1979). However, this line of argument portraying knowledge workers as constituting a new class is problematic, especially for those theorists who hold that the significant distinction is that between capitalist and worker. Knowledge workers share attributes of both workers and capitalists, for example, with the emphasis shifting from the one to the other depending on the theorist. Intellectuals can be conceived of both as workers employed in production in a knowledge-based society and paid wages for their services, or as 120  121 122  Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” (Fairfax, Va.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1990) 6. First published in the University of Chicago Law Review 16:3 (1949). Ibid 7. Ibid. 62  being like capitalists in that they exercise effective control over the components of production where they operate and receive part of their remuneration as a return on human capital, to which they add continually by acquiring knowledge in the process of production. The argument is made that the new class argument failed to captivate mainstream social theory, in part because that community itself could not be convinced intellectuals could fuffil the role of a class (perhaps, too, partly because that community would have had to find its place within the “new” class and acknowledge the privileges which the argument posited. Some of these critiques coincide with public choice arguments that bureaucrats and intellectuals privileged by the welfare state generally act as self-interested political entrepreneurs when they call for expansion of the institutions with which they are associated). Referring to what he sees as “the increasingly obsolete notion of a ‘new’ class” (ef Bell, 1979), Nico Stehr takes issue with the argument thus: it is rather doubtfifl that emerging societies will have the kinds of masters past societies had. Experts are far too fragmented intellectually to perform such a historical role. They also have the most diverse allegiances.’ 23 3. Touraine’s Influence on Social Movements Theory Touraine is an important figure in the resurgence of interest in the actor as well as a key theorist within the social movements field, having written on the replacement of older forms of class struggle by the new social movements. 124 In common with Gramsci, Touraine, with his theoretical and methodological emphasis on the social actor, acts as a touchstone for those 123  124  Nico Stehr, “Experts, Counsellors and Advisers,” The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies, eds. Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992.) Stuart Hall, in a discussion of “post-industrial writers” in “Brave New World,” Marxism Today (October 1988): 24. 63  working in the area, including Eyerman and Jamison, as well as having a wider influence on those working in other areas within sociology. He has worked in his field since the 1960s and remains prolific. Alan Scott, in a work in which he reviews new social movements theory, asserts that for Touraine: sociology is the study of social movements. Touraine, along with other social movements theorists, sees new social movements as symptoms of contemporary, post-industrial, programmed society.’ 26 Introducing Touraine’s work in a foreword, Aronowitz describes his contribution in the following way: whereas Daniel Bell greets the coming of postindustrial society as one more confirmation for his older thesis that contemporary democratic countries have found the mechanisms to overcome the need for ideology, Touraine understands this event as the coming to power of new social agents, which, like other historical actors, arm themselves with pathbreaking 27 ideologies.’ Touraine posits a general theory of social transformation for social movements. These social transformations, for Touraine, are the results of conflict, with the conflict not merely a response to a situation by actors, but rather an initiative by them: A social movement is a conflictual action through which cultural orientations, a field of historicity, are transformed into forms of social organization defined by general cultural norms and by relations of social domination.’ 28  125 126  127  ‘  Scott 5. For Touraine, social movements are both bearers and symptoms of the transition from industrial to post-industrial society, while for Habermas they are to be understood in the long historical process of rationalisation within Western societies. Aronowitz in the foreword to Touraine, Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) xiii. Touraine, Return ofthe Actor 66. 64  For Touraine  —  who reserves the term social movement for the struggles around the  institutional potentials of cultural patterns of a given societal type’ 29  —  the idea of the social  movement is a recognition of the fact that actors do not merely limit themselves to reacting to situations; rather, they actually produce situations.’ ° Social life is a complex of initiatives and 3 negotiations, in Touraine’s conception, and social movements arise from normatively oriented interactions between adversaries who have conflicting interpretations and opposed societal models of a shared cultural field. The forms of social organisation which result from conflicts between social actors striving to control and implement the increasing capability of society to act on itself; and which involve all the techniques of production, communication, information and administration, are that which Touraine refers to as the field of historicity.’ ’ 3 Touraine believes the different ways in which the term social movement is used make the debates artificial and in a recent work he suggests replacing “this exceedingly vague expression by a precise representation of social dynamics.” 132 In collective action, groupings with particular subjectivities organise around a central conflict and struggle to have their cultural orientation privileged as the social form for the entire collectivity.  Social life has three central elements for Touraine: the subject, as distanciation of organized practices and as consciousness; historicity, as the set of cultural modes (cognitive, economic, and ethical) and as the stake of the central social conflict; and social movements, as the groups that 129  ‘3°  132  According to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). Touraine, Return of the Actor 26. Touraine, “Is Sociology Still the Study of Society?” Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity, eds. Peter Beilharz, (lillian Robinson and John Rundell (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press, 1992) 177. Touraine, “Beyond Social Movements?” Theory. Culture & Society 9 (1992) 125. 65  contend in order to give these cultural orientations a social 133 form. Touraine’s central concept of historicity is in contrast to the more traditional meaning which indicates the historical nature of social phenomena.’ 34 However, he argues: Historicity is not a set of values solidly established at the center of society; rather it represents a set of instruments, of cultural orientations, through which social practices are constituted, and thus one can say it is a set of investments.’ 35 It is this historicity, or set of cultural orientations, that social movements wish to realise in the process of transformation. Thus it is the social action arising from the increased ability of society to act upon itself that brings a given situation to light, rather than the situation merely leading consequentially to action. Touraine’s work on movements, such as the Polish union movement Solidarity, demonstrates the centrality of the concept of historicity to the development of his theory of social movements, the implications of which Aronowitz explains in the following terms: Touraine has developed a theory of social movements in terms of the leading concept of historicity, which may transcend the prevailing cultural model or at least puts it into question. Social movements therefore are not merely groups of actors with specific grievances within institutions; they are marked by the degree to which they act upon the prevailing cultural model. They challenge it by proposing alternatives that almost invariably appear utopian in relation to hegemonic norms and values. That Touraine speaks of the cultural model distinguishes his point of departure from that of Marxism, for which culture is derivative of the mode of production of material life. What Touraine does is to pose the model of life, including its normative features, as the thndamental object of historical contestation. This paradigm challenges theories of blind forces whether of the classical Marxist or structuralist varieties without, for a moment, denying the critical significance of —  —  133 ‘‘  Ibid 42. Ibid 40. Ibid4l.  66  struggles over accumulation, class relations, and political power as crucial elements of the social system.’ 36 For Eyerman and Jamison, too, it is a crucial consideration that the projects of social movements go beyond the particular to seek a transformation of cultural values, and indeed, that if cultural values are not embraced there can be no social movement. In this connection, Touraine cites the 19th-century labour movement as an example. The labor movement formed only when it went beyond the rejection of machines and began to defend the idea that mechanization and progress should be put in the service of the workers and of all people. 137 Eyerman and Jamison’s notion of a social movement accords with Touraine’s in this respect and also in that their categorisation limits the definition to those groups that are significant in redefining history and “which carry the historical projects which have normally been attributed to social classes.” 38 For Touraine, contestation is a central element of social life, and it is through his construction of historicity  —  which he uses to consider that which is at stake in society, that which calls into  question the dominant interpretation, that which groups struggle over  —  that he conceives of  the role social movements play in society, in the process of which subjectivities and consciousness are changed. Eyerman and Jamison, drawing on Touraine, view social movements as constituted in the interplay between what they refer to as deep structure of knowledge interests  —  thinking of JUrgen Habermas and operationalising his epistemological categories  136 137 138  citing the —  and the  Aronowitz xiv. Touraine, Return of the Actor 134. Eyerman and Jamison 56, borrowing from Touraine, Return of the Actor. 67  practical world of political strategy.’ 39 They see the process by which movements come to recognise themselves as collective actors with a historic project as involving an interaction among three interconnected areas: • Opposition: Points to the way the movement casts the groups, actors or institutions against which it is in conflict, often viewing the different and opposing formation as the Other. The Other can thus be seen as contributing to the constitution of that identity; • Identity: Refers to the way in which actors perceive themselves as part of a particular group with a specific subjectivity; • Totality: The process by which movement actors perceive themselves as being actors on an historic stage)’ ° 1 Elucidating the work of Touraine, they argue that he distinguishes a social movement from a protest organisation by its realisation of historicity. Thus, for them, the social movement as historic actor is involved in a struggle in which the foundations of society are at stake and in ’ The theme of the Other is an important one for Eyerman and Jamison in the 14 dispute. construction of the movement’s collective identity, since it is that at which protest is directed and against which it will act.’ 42  ‘° 141  142  Andrew Jamison, Ron Eyerman and Jacqueline Cramer with Jeppe Lssøe, The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness: A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) 3. Eyennan and Jamison 158. Ibid 27. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the foundations of society can change as a result of the actions of a grouping which does not articulate those actions as an intention at the outset. Thus, defining what counts as a social movement is highly problematic. Ibid 101, 117-118. 68  In one sense, Touraine’s influence on Eyerman and Jamison is from two directions, for he was also the teacher in the 1970s of Melucci, one of the other theorists on whom they draw. Most important in their framework is the work of Melucci, Eyerman and Jamison say, because he sees the challenge of the new social movements in primarily “symbolic” terms. 143 Melucci, while obviously influenced by his former teacher, breaks with Touraine on a number of issues. Melucci’s contribution is to focus on the changed way in which collective actors  think about themselves, the fluidity of collective action and the move to action at the global level. Melucci stresses the degree of diversity within collective actions and cautions against exaggerating the degree of unity. Eyerman and Jamison measure his contribution thus: Melucci is particularly good in stressing the formative processes of collective identity. Most other theorists of social movements deal with this problem as one of organisation, stressing the need for institutionalized roles and order (e.g. Gamson) rather than the processes of interaction in the production and maintenance of collective identity. This centrality of the processes of collective will formation or collective identity is what distinguishes a social movement from a pressure group, which is formally organized and relatively certain of its goals and the interests it represents.’ Melucci argues that Touraine’s analysis of contemporary movements is not differentiated enough; a criticism he levels at Habermas as well. Touraine’s idea of the central movement still clings to the assumption that movements are a personage unified actors playing out a role on the stage of histoiy.’ 45 —  143 ‘ 145  Ibid 48. Ibid 172. Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 202. 69  For Melucci, a social movement refers to a class of collective phenomena which are manifest in three dimensions:’ • Solidarity: A social movement is a collective action involving a solidarity among actors, which implies a mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit. • Conflict: There must be an engagement in conflict, and therefore opposition to an adver sary laying claim to the same goods or values. • A break with the limits of compatibility of a system: The social movement actions vio late the boundaries or tolerance of the system, thereby pushing it beyond the range of variations it can tolerate without altering its structure.  For Melucci, empirical forms of collective action comprise a combination of these analytical dimensions, with actors engaged in many different games at the same time. An analysis should reveal the existence of this pluralism, Melucci argues. On the basis of its suitability for the analysis of a movement which saw its task in these larger 47 this project will use the notion of social movements rendered in the work of terms,’ Touraine. However, while Touraine’s work on social movements is an influence both for this project and for theorists Eyerman and Jamison, the idea in certain earlier aspects of Touraine’s work that there is one central movement in any given historical period is not found in Eyerman and Jamison, and is not subscribed to here. In other words, no claim is made that the 146 147  Melucci 29. Stanley Aronowitz sees intellectuals of the Right, now located in those universal spaces once the province of the left and liberals, using the word liberal in the North American sense to indicate those arguing for government intervention rather than in the classical sense associated with limited government, such as that used by Europeans like Hayek. Stanley Aronowitz, “On Intellectuals,” Intellectuals: Aesthetics. Politics. Academics, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 41. 70  movement for limited government and a more market-based social order is the central social movement of the second part of the 20th century. Eyerman and Jamison claim that their work was informed more by the ideas of Melucci who, although he had been a student of Touraine’s in the 1970s, took a different position from his former teacher on this issue.’ 4  4. The Project Framework: Mapping the Eyerman and Jamison Approach To investigate the activities and practices of a grouping that believes in the power of ideas, indeed, in the important role of human agency in social change, this study uses a social movements theoretical framework with which to consider the role of intellectuals as actors in social change, specifically the contribution active intellectuals have made to the shift away from the large-scale interventionist Keynesian paradigm.’ 49 As is appropriate to a social movements approach, the study conducts a simultaneous empirical or substantive investigation to interrogate the earlier theories focusing on the 1970s which cast the changes that attended the break with the Keynesian consensus in terms of economic and technological determinants.  The key element in the various conceptions of what distinguishes a social movement from other phenomena in the collective action field  —  along with a level of planning and  organisation, reliance on cultural guidelines and a prolonged nature  —  is the goal of social  transformation claimed by collective actors who create a shared identity, however unsettled,  ‘ 149  See the interview with Melucci in Nomads of the Present 199-204. Taking the view that the New Right, or even elements of it, should be considered a social movement is not an idiosyncratic position to hold, and is fairly common in the literature of the New Right. For example, Marchak refers to the New Right as a social movement in The Integrated Circus 4. The phenomenon is viewed similarly in Elliott and McCrone, “Class, culture and morality: a sociological analysis of neo-conservatism,” The Sociological Review 35:3 (1987) 485-515. Indeed, Jessop et al see it as appropriate to refer to Thatcherism alone as being a social movement in Thatcherism (1988) 61. 71  negotiated, and multi-layered, and are organised around a central social conflict. It is this engagement by activists and intellectuals in a project of social transformation that qualifies them, it is argued, as constituting a social movement. Mere numbers of participants alone are not a sufficient criterion, for on this basis a movement could not be seen as such from its beginnings but only from the later point at which it achieved a certain number, and then what number would suffice? As Eyerman and Jamison point out, social movements emerge far from fi.illy formed, take organisational form and are then more or less successflil in affecting political and social processes through their challenges.’ 50 Also, a movement’s numbers can swell and diminish over time depending on the particular period and issue. As illustrated, Eyerman and Jamison’s approach has at its core notions and insights borrowed from Melucci, Touraine and Gramsci, and some links to the work of Habermas. They derive from the work of these thinkers their two major and interconnected concepts in the framework upon which this study draws  —  cognitive praxis and movement intellectual.  Following Touraine’s stress on social action, cognitive praxis refers to the process by which the core identity of a social movement is created in action. In motivating the approach to social movements which they have formulated, Eyerman and Janiison argue that: The cognitive praxis of social movements is not just social drama; it is, we might say, the social action from where new knowledge originates. It is from, among other places, the cognitive praxis of social movements that science and ideology as well as everyday knowledge develop new perspectives. In order to see that formative influence, however, it is necessary to read social movements in a particular cognitive way.  —  ° 151  —  EyemianandJamison 121. Eyerman and Jamison 48-49. 72  The notion of an accompanying consciousness and process of knowledge creation is informed by Melucci’s thinking on the expressive importance of social movements. Gramsci’s influence in their work is found through the taking up of his comprehensively constructed notion of “organic intellectual,” which is transformed by Eyerman and Jamison into a notion of the “movement intellectual” while retaining, and arguably perhaps even strengthening, its comprehensiveness. Eyerman and Jarnison also follow Gramsci in looking at intellectuals in the context of large social forces in which they appear. They see themselves as transforming Gramsci’s insights from the class formation of partisan intellectuals into a more generalised one about intellectual formation,’ 52 and this study follows their lead. The Eyerman-Jamison framework attempts to weave the insights of these three theorists into a mothis operandi for the examination of social movements, mapping a movement’s boundaries by interpreting its cognitive praxis. This conception is in sympathy with Touraine’s explanation that society now has a greater ability to act upon itself and that it is actors, through their actions, conflicts and negotiations, who seek to make use of this potential, thus giving rise to forms of social and cultural organisation.’ 53  From Touraine they take the notion of the process of collective will formation,’ by which they indicate the ways through which movements come to recognise themselves as collective actors with a historic project.  152 153 154  Ibid 166. Ibid 186. Eyerman and Janüson 26. 73  Taking their project further, Eyerman and Jamison draw on the postulate of Habermas that knowledge constitutes interests and develop operational categories of knowledge interests, turning the interests he imputes to humans into specifiable types of knowledge that particular movements could be seen to have expressed and suggesting they could be usefully viewed in three dimensions  —  cosmological, technological and organisational. This they offer as an  alternative to the notion of ideology. The value of Eyennan and Jamison’s modus operandi, then, is that it reformulates these contributions for contemporary times and brings them together in an approach through which the complex nature of social movements can be examined. In other words, their work offers a medium through which to operate in the field, inspiring, it is argued, a mode of thinking in the researcher which favours the reviewing of process over end result or mere category. This research attitude complements the assumptions with which the study starts out, which are underpinned and reinforced by the thinking of the key theorists selected. Society is seen as subject to change and social action rather than mere reproduction, and thus an analysis is favoured that is dynamic rather than static, where structure and agency can be viewed as mutually dependent and an important role given to agency in the long term. In using an approach to study movements which emphasises process over product, procedure over outcome, and development over culmination, this thesis hopes also to demonstrate some of the benefits of this kind of research attitude.  74  Eyerman and Jamison use the term cognitive praxis  —  “the most basic of our concepts” 55  —  in  response to what they see in the collective action field as inadequate frameworks resulting in an incomplete understanding of the complex processes involved in the phenomenon of the social movement. Cognitive praxis is part of an analytical approach that seeks to study social movements on their own terms, an approach which, they assert, has neither the drawbacks of a “naive objeetivism” nor an “equally misguided 5ubjectivism.Só This strategy is based on the notion that social life can be seen as a combination of action and construction. Using an argument which, as argued earlier, while not directly stating it to be the case, suggests a break with the agency/structure dualism, Eyerman and Jamison say action is neither predetermined nor completely self-willed, and all forms of practical activity are informed by some underlying project  —  a position on the relationship between structure and  agency which is akin to that taken in this study. Cognitive praxis demonstrates the core identity of a social movement, which is made up of social action by which individuals create new kinds of knowledge and social identities, a different consciousness, with their cognitive praxis transforming them from groups of individuals into social movements. It (cognitive praxis) is a kind of deep structure that allows us to draw certain boundaries around a movement as it develops over time, as well as to evaluate the current status and potential of actual movements.’ 57 Thus, cognitive praxis is the process of constructing a movement identity, the making of a consciousness with a creation of knowledge which is itself an historical construction. Important to this process are the movement actors, or what Eyerman and Jamison term 155 156 ‘  Ibid 44. Ibid 2. Ibid 44.  75  movement intellectuals in reference to those who through their activities cultivate and express the movement’s knowledge interests or, in other words, its world-view  —  a process which  emphasises the creative role of consciousness and which is sensitive to the context in which this articulation takes place. Through this process, which also includes organisational and technological dimensions  —  discussed later in this chapter  —  movement intellectuals create their  role within the movement at the same time as they create the movement. The notion of movement intellectual within the framework has a different status from that of cognitive praxis, which they see as a kind of deep structure, in that, being oriented more to actors than to movements as a whole, it operates at a different level. Nevertheless, both are key to the framework and are connected in that: it is movement intellectuals, as historic actors, who make visible the underlying cognitive praxis.’ 58 Indeed, social movements, Eyerman and Jamison argue, create spaces for new types of intellectual to emerge. A social movement combines aspects of collective identity consciousness, world view or ways of seeing  —  —  the creation of an altered  with political action towards the achievement  of ends in more or less successful ways.’ 59 In The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness, Jamison et al say the organisations within the movement they are studying do not choose “their strategies solely on the basis of practical considerations but realise them through the framework of their guiding knowledge interests,” ° or world view. 6  158 ‘ 160  Ibid 44. Jamison, Eyerman and Cramer with Lssee 4. Ibid7. 76  This central concept of the approach of cognitive praxis is a synthetic conceptualisation which they develop to spedil,i both the construction of consciousness and core identity as well as the role that social movements and associated movement intellectuals’ ’ play in this process, both 6 aspects being shaped by the political culture and historical conjuncture in which they appear.’ 62 As cognitive praxis is that process which transforms groups of individuals into social movements, it is the placing of social movements in political historical context which amplifies the connection to social change. In this regard, Eyerman and Jamison’s approach isolates three elements that are key to the understanding of social movements. • Subjectivity: The process of expressing a movement identity, that is the cognitive praxis; • Activity: The actors taking part in this process of cognitive praxis, those they call move ment intellectuals; • Context: The context in which the articulation takes place.’ 63 Cognitive praxis is identified along three dimensions, according to Eyerman and Jamison: • Cosmological: This refers to the basic beliefs and assumptions, the world view, which the activists in the particular movement take for granted; • Organisational: Pertains to the various forms of knowledge production embarked on, the organisational forms created or adopted for specific types of knowledge production and  dissemination. This project identifies the think-tank as an important organisational form  161 162 163  Eyerman and Jamison 44. Ibid 164. Ibid4.  77  created for the production and dissemination of knowledge by the movement activists en gaged in the campaign for a more market-based social order, as discussed in Part Three. • Technological: Refers both to the specific topics which engage the movement and the al  ternative techniques used by the movement actors.’ Here the emphasis on micro studies as opposed to macro studies on the part of intellectuals in think-tanks can be seen as an example. Eyerman and Jamison’s definition, in line with Touraine’s, resists seeing social movements as entities comprising one specific organisation or one particular special interest group. Rather, social movements emerge, far from fully formed, take organisational form and are then more or less successful in affecting political and social processes through their challenging of structured definitions and practices.’ 65 Eyerman and Jamison argue that all social movements bring about some kind of identity transformation’ 66 by placing new issues on the historical agenda, proposing new values and generating new types of intellectuals who convert the movement’s cognitive praxis, that is, its created consciousness and knowledge, and disseminate it into the larger society. This framework emphasises process over product and embraces not only what it is that a movement does, but how it does it, as well as what its members think, and why.’ 67 Eyerman and Jamison’s approach is used for this project in large part for the emphasis it places on both process and the intellectuals associated with a movement; how these movement intellectuals are formed who then, in turn, re-form the cognitive identity of the social ‘ 165  167  Ibid 165. Ibid 121. Ibid 166. Ibid 46 78  movement. That which this project argues has been left out of the earlier accounts of the “New Right” and the break with the Keynesian consensus is thus brought forward by this attention to a prolonged intellectual campaign and emphasis on historical process rather than static conceptualisation. This research attitude views the social movement in comparative terms, considering its location in both time and space; in other words, seeing the social movement in political, historical and cultural context. The consciousness constructed by movement intellectuals is not created in a void; rather, it is constrained and bounded by the historical situation of the social actors and their particular concerns, as well as by the construction of, and response they receive from, their opponents. Viewed from another perspective, the Eyerman-Jamison framework could be said to have the advantage of combining analyses of the individual, the group and the macrostructural. Eyerman and Jamison see their work as both a synthesis of European and North American sociology as well as a departure from these influences, and they take issue with representatives of both. They argue that the reason for the exclusion in American sociology of what members of a social movement think, and why they think the way they do, in other words, the attitude& 68 that go into making up the knowledge and identity of the social movement, is that these aspects are seen as non-empirical matters. As such, they are categorised outside of the empirical universe of competence in which most North American  ‘  North American researchers engaged in survey research may resist a distinction such as this, perhaps claiming that their “empirical method” aims to capture attitudes through the questions they put to respondents. 79  69 live, argue Eyerman and Jamison, who believe that knowledge, rather than sociologists’ being marginalised to an ephemeral or superstructural level of reality, belongs and should be placed with the centrality of movement identity formation. The identity of the movement becomes disinterested, stripped of its driving ideas, its cognitive meaning. The particular historical interests that a movement aims to further are not analysed in the process of being formed, as central component of movement praxis.’ ° 7 The other camp, the more theoretically inclined Europeans who consider identity, draw heavily on long-standing theoretical traditions, ’ Eyerman and Jamison argue, rather than 17 considering that actual process which they, Eyerman and Janrison, have isolated and termed the cognitive praxis of the movements. In other words, they assert that for these theorists social change is guided by spiritual or material forces rather than occurring through communicative interaction among members of movements about norms and actions, arrived at by negotiation and agreement. The implication of this camp’s approach, Eyerman and Jamison argue, may be to impose an evaluation on the particular social movement rather than to deepen understanding of it, as this project aims to do in regard to the movement arguing for limited government and a more market-based approach.  169  Resource-mobilization theory has dominated the collective action field in North America with its perspective that it is not so much strain in society of which there is always a sufficient supply which serves as the motivation for collective action and to which the attention of the researcher must be turned, but rather to the organisational resources required for collective action. See Gary T. Marx and Douglas McAdam, Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process and Structure (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994). Eyerman and Janiison 46. According to Melucci, a basic ingredient of modern thought is philosophies of history based on the belief that the course of history is guided to fulfilment by spiritual or material forces, to which human action is necessarily submitted. Melucci 21. —  170 “‘  —  80  Eyerman and Jamison argue in regard to European sociology that: The identities are, however, not derived from studying the cognitive praxis of movements themselves, but rather drawn from theories of social change and philosophies of history. Lurking behind the identity theorists are the classical social theorists of the nineteenth century, and behind them the positivists and idealist philosophies of Comte and Hegel. As such, identity in the sense used by many European sociologists is something superimposed on a social movement and used as a standard of evaluation to judge their potential and historical significance, even their status as a social movement. Thus Alain Touraine, after investigating the French anti-nuclear energy movement, concluded that the movement was not a real social movement: it was not involved in the struggle for what he terms “historicity” (Touraine 1983).172 For Eyerman and Janiison, most of the North Americans are constrained by their narrower empirical world in which that which is examined must be easily reducible to empirical data, while the Europeans are hindered by theoretical and ideological agendas which prohibit them from apprehending social movements in terms of the actual process, the cognitive praxis by which they create their collective identities, most often through a process of negotiation. Eyerman and Jamison, who view themselves as actor-oriented social theorists, see their work as providing a framework of translation between resource mobilisation theory and identity theory, the two main contemporary approaches to collective action and social movements. A further contrast is that Eyerman and Jamison make a link with the sociology of knowledge in that their approach also sees social relations and cultural traditions affecting the development of knowledge. It is these aspects that make their framework appropriate for this project, in light of the research strategy outlined in the next chapter.  172  Eyerman & Jamison 46-47. 81  There is in Eyerman and Jamison also a recognition of the importance of the intellectual. Their conceptualisation of the movement intellectual, derived as it is from Gramsci’s thinking on the organic intellectual, is similarly broad. Their comparative framework for social movements is well suited to the comprehensive conception Hayek had of the notion intellectual, given that his formulation is underpinned by the contention that the “all-pervasive influence of the intellectuals” grows and is strengthened by the ever-increasing importance of organisation.’ 73  Hayek, in the words of Eyerman and Jamison, is a leading example in the social movement of a “real individual” who is able to “make it happen.” 74 As scholar, organiser and mobiliser, he is at the centre of the movement associated with the resurrection and reformulation of liberal thought, and has in common with it a belief that the process of social transformation is propelled by ideas, the influence of intellectuals and in particular, the manner in which these ideas and intellectuals are organised to advance an intellectual position. Thus Hayek saw his task as an intellectual one, that of freeing “the world from the plague of socialism.” 175 Indeed, Ralph H. Turner sees the utopia associated with social movements as becoming: the basis for a general social movement that fosters profound social change, leading ultimately to a different social order and a new ideology to support it.’ 76 Hayek argued that a traditional flaw of liberalism had been that it did not proclaim a Utopian vision in the way that socialism had done so successffilly, among the young in particular.  ‘  176  Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” 8. Eyerman and Jamison 56. Written by Hayek on an index card in a collection he was in the habit of carrying around to keep handy his latest thoughts. Ralph H. Turner, “Ideology and Utopia after Socialism,” New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, eds. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 81. 82  Hayek was thus committed to creating a vision which he conceived of as Utopian, albeit a very different Utopia and one which those who strongly oppose the neo-liberal vision may see rather as a Dystopia: We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia,’ 77 a program which seems neither a mere defense of things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severely practical, and which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible.’ Thus, the intellectual and political were brought together. Hayek used intellectual means to contest and bring forward for discussion the wisdom of centralised, large-scale state intervention. He problematised social planning and calculation which bypassed the market as an institution of communication. In other words, Hayek engaged in action that brought issues  ‘  Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed., Selections from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1938) 200 offered the following definition of utopia: “The word utopia, a coinage from the Greek, meaning literally “nowhere,” was first used by Sir Thomas More in 1516 as the name of a far distant island on which, according to his fiction, there existed an ideal commonwealth. Since the publication of More’s Utopia its title has been appropriated to designate more or less indiscriminately literary works of all ages which seek, whether through the medium of the dialogue, the novel or some similar form, to conjure up a society or state free from human imperfections. In recent years, however, the term has come also to be used in a more strictly sociological sense. The analysis of a particular type of intellectual outlook and thought pattern which is now designated as the utopian mind or the utopian spirit has become one of the most fruitful fields of inquiry for contemporary sociologists. It is coming to be realised that a clear understanding of the structure and characteristics of this psychological type is important not only in itself but also because it throws light on the social process as a whole no less than on intellectual development in its broader aspects. As a literary genre the utopian fiction made its appearance many centuries before More. It was Plato who furnished, notably in his Republic, the general model to which all later utopian fictions have been heavily indebted. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” 25. Neo-liberal intellectuals usually see the need to frame their project in utopian terms, but stress that it is one without a blueprint. They oppose blueprints, engineered systems and planned societies because of the constraints placed on individual freedom, their beliefs that one should not decide what the “good life” entails for another and that nobody is so infallible as to be able to foresee the future. 83  to light which hitherto had lacked the expression he and the movement around him were to  give it. Assessing Hayek’s contribution to the revival of interest in and understanding of a reformulated classical liberalism, Eamonn Butler, in his book on Hayek, sees Hayek’s contribution as an example confirming his beliefs on the power of ideas, and the people behind them  —  in line, therefore, with his belief that all of the great social movements have been led  not by politicians but by “men of ideas.” 79 The framework formulated by Eyerman and Jamison places great emphasis on process, and thus is well suited to a study taking issue with an approach in which the “New Right” is explained as an almost spontaneous response to economic restructuring and crisis. The cognitive approach brings into focus the protracted campaign involved in constructing a consciousness, along with the requisite organisational strategy for social transformation, both lengthy processes conducted in a context which has both facilitating and hindering aspects. Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require long periods of preparation both at the individual, group, and societal level. No social movement emerges until there is a political opportunity available, a context of social problem as well as a context of communication, opening up the potential for problem articulation and knowledge dissemination. Not every social problem, however, generates a social movement; only those that strike a fundamental chord, that touch basic tensions in a society have the potential for generating a social movement.’ 80 Similarly, with its focus on the role played by movement intellectuals, the Eyerman-Jamison framework is conducive to a position which argues that by overemphasising social  180  Eamonn Butler, Hayek: His Contribution to the Political and Economic Thought of Our Time (London: Temple Smith, 1983) 1. Eyerman and Jamison 56.  84  transformations as a response to economic and technological changes, and to crisis, one fails to capture the role of actors, their initiatives and negotiations, in the transformational process. The three aspects of subjectivity, activity and context are used to structure the cognitive approach by synthesising action and actors with configuration and contextual constraints. For Eyerman and Jamison the cognitive praxis of a movement develops over time, and it is a process which is best studied empirically.’ ’ In Parts Two and Three of the study, empirical 8 material related to a 50-year campaign is examined, structured and elaborated on. It is not the focus or purpose of this study to evaluate neo-liberal, libertarian or Hayekian arguments, market-based approaches or the policies of Thatcherism and Reaganism’ 82  —  the  latter terms generally denoting what has been called the politics of the free economy and the strong state’ 83 and which indeed may not have been fully consistent with a liberal position, as suggested by scholars such as Brittan (1988) in Britain and Robert Higgs (1987) in the United States  —  nor is it the intent to examine whether the deregulation undertaken may have been a  transformation from one form of regulation to another. Not only do the Thatcher/Reagan years fall outside of the 1931-1981 time frame of this study, but such an inquiry would constitute a thesis of a very different kind. As discussed in the postscript to this thesis, there is already an overabundance of accounts which deal with Reagan or Thatcher, many either wholeheartedly celebrating them or rejecting their ideas out of hand, an aspect also discussed ‘‘ 182  183  Ibid 61. Indeed, many both inside and outside of the academy have argued that Reagan’s policies were, in many ways, far more in line with the Keynesian position. Bruce Robbins, for example, refers to “Ronald Reagan’s military Keynesianism” in “Introduction: The Public As Phantom,” Bruce Robbins ed. The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) xv. As, for example, in Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Macmillan, 1988). 85  by Gray and Brittan in regard to Hayek in the introduction to this thesis. It may also be necessary to stress that it is not the purpose here to consider whether there is now “intervention” on the part of large corporations or international capital rather than an open international or social field. That, too, would entail a project of a very different kind. The thesis finds its place in the social movements literature and the interest here is on the process for the winning of consent for a set of ideas or new common sense, and thus it is not the direct project to evaluate, or pass judgement on any particular critical sense transformed into “common sense” formulated and disseminated by a movement. Indeed, a review of past and present movements engaged in social transformation would seem to indicate that the success of a movement and the particular ideas that it disseminates often have little to do with what commentators may refer to as the worth or merit of the ideas.  5. Cycles and Social Movements  In order to understand cognitive praxis as movement in formation, Eyerman and Jamison, in a manner common in the field, divide this development into different phases so as to track the progression. It is this pattern which is followed for this study, bearing in mind that no progression could be theoretically formulated which would prove a suitable fit to all social movements, given their complex, dynamic, evolving and synergistic character. Stewart, Smith and Denton describe the benefits and drawbacks of using a “life cycle” analysis thus: Any effort to prescribe a life cycle suitable to all social movements, then, is fraught with dangers. The effort can be productive, however, if the life cycle is constructed with the full realization that social movements differ, change, and develop to varying degrees of sophistication and at varying speeds stalling at —  ‘  Stewart, Smith and Denton 85. 86  times, rushing forward at others, retrenching to earlier stages, or dying premature deaths before all stages are completed. A portrayal of each stage in the life cycle of “typical” social movements can help us to understand the ever-changing persuasive requirements, problems, and functions of social movements and the interaction of social-psychological, political-institutional, philosophical-ideological, and rhetorical forces.’ 85 Eyerman and Jamison see the first phase of the process as that in which the movement is largely defensive in its strategic focus, a period of awakening or gestation. Piotr Sztompka describes the first of the major stages as “origins,” and uses it to refer to the pre-existent structure constituting a pooi of resources and facilities for the movement. Stewart, Smith and Denton see this first stage as the genesis, a period in which few take seriously the intellectuals who “define” and “visualize” for the movements. For this project the period identified as such is 1931 to 1944. They see three types of movement  —  revivalist,  which addresses an idealised past; innovative, which addresses an intolerable present and prescribes a means for the future; and resistance, which addresses a terrible future that is certain to result if CUrt ent trends are not stifled.’ 87 While there are elements of all three in the movement being studied, the last of these conceptualisations appears to fit this project best. Next, there is a shift from defensive to offensive strategy, during which the movement undergoes formation and begins its organisation, or what Sztompka terms the stage of 88 distinguishing itself as a social movement and not merely an action group or mobilisation,’ single-issue protest organisation. The period of formation, dealt with in Chapter 7, includes  185 186  187 188  Ibid 37. Piotr Sztompk