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Revisiting Dionysus : Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault DiPasquale, Steven Dean 2002

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REVISITING DIONYSUS: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT by Steven D e a n D i P a s q u a l e B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1996  A thesis submitted i n partial fulfillment o f the requirements f o r the D e g r e e M A S T E R OF  ARTS  in T h e F a c u l t y o f G r a d u a t e Studies  I n d i v i d u a l Interdisciplinary Studies G r a d u a t e P r o g r a m Germanic Studies/Music/English  W e accept this thesis as c o n f o r m i n g to the required standard  The University o f British Columbia April 2002 © Steven D e a n D i P a s q u a l e , 2 0 0 2  In  presenting  degree freely  at  this  the  available  copying  of  department publication  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  University  of  British  Columbia,  I  agree  for  this or of  reference  thesis by  for  his  this  thesis  and  study.  scholarly  or for  her  I further  purposes  gain  that  agree  may  be  It  is  representatives.  financial  requirements  shall  not  of  l^TfeRfc l,rci P U M ^ E . /  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  APRIL / f u  /  2**2-  Library  be  STVDl gS  an  advanced  shall  permission for  granted  by  understood  permission.  Department  that  the  for  allowed  the  make  extensive  head  that  without  it  of  copying my  my or  written  ABSTRACT  This  thesis  performance  challenges  through  a  the  traditional,  phenomenological  Cartesian  investigation  of  understanding aural  of  experience.  musical Whereas  conventional approaches to m u s i c a l performance prescribe separating ' w o r k ' from 'event' i n order to ascertain m u s i c a l meaning, w e seek to reveal this dualistic  framework  as a limited  k n o w l e d g e p a r a d i g m and argue f o r a m o r e situated account o f p e r f o r m a n c e that includes the m y r i a d contingencies o f its 'presentation.' T o achieve this end, the w r i t i n g s o f F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e , M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , and M i c h e l F o u c a u l t are examined i n o r d e r t o construct a 'hermeneutic'  framework  for  an interdisciplinary exchange  between  relevant w o r k s  in  philosophy, m u s i c o l o g y , and acoustic science. A variety o f c o n t e m p o r a r y r o c k , punk, postpunk, and electroacoustic performances are analyzed w i t h i n this tri-partite m o d e l . B e g i n n i n g w i t h N i e t z s c h e ' s concept o f the D i o n y s i a n , w e f o c u s o u r attention o n the m u s i c a l event as a space o f volatile, c o l l e c t i v e energies that can potentially be channeled into acts o f m o b violence,  or  into  interdisciplinary  more  dialogue,  positive  forms  Heidegger  of  and  community.  Foucault  As  critique  we and  continue refine  with  the  Nietzsche's  understanding o f the D i o n y s i a n t h r o u g h their v a r i o u s analyses o f h u m a n listening, m o o d , shared attunement, t e c h n o l o g y , p o w e r , and the body. B y charting N i e t z s c h e ' s c o n c e p t o f the Dionysian  as  it  is  reinterpreted b y  Heidegger  and F o u c a u l t ,  differentiated understanding o f m u s i c a l experience is achieved.  ii  a much  broader,  more  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Abstract  ii  Reference K e y  iv  Acknowledgements  v  Introduction  1  CHAPTER  CHAPTER  I  II  V i s i o n and M e t a p h y s i c s : T h e E m e r g e n c e o f P e r f o r m a t i v e A g e n c y  12  Seeing Things: Acoustic Objects, Metaphysical Distances The Birth of the Musical Work and its Audience Aural Modes: Sound in and Out of Context  12 19 25  Rhythm and R i s k : The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power Harnessing Dionysus Transmissions from the Dead: The Will to Power as 'Text'  28 32  28  The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power: The Dionysian as Communication 3 3  CHAPTER  CHAPTER  III  IV  Affirming Transgression: The Volatility of the Crowd Affirming Culture: The Articulation of Community Stress Fractures: Nietzsche's Conflicts  39 42 44  Heidegger's Aurality  47  Heidegger as Musical Thinker Primordial Being-in-the-World The Place of Sound and Mood in Being and Time Resonance: An Attunement to Context Listening as Openness, Communication as Shared Attunement From the Everyday to the Musical Sound and Source: Being-in the Music The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon From Sound to Ereignis: Gathering and Sheltering Moments of Resonance: The Audience in and Out of Attunement Heidegger on Nietzsche: Dionysus as Horizon Genre and Community Musical Performance in the Age of Technicity Technologies of Disruption Soundtracks: The Ubiquity of Amplified Sound The Transformation of Musical Space Capturing the Live: Exclusions, Deferrals, Future Pleasures Vision and Voice: Debating Authenticity and Agency in 'Live' Performance Performativity as Physicality Studio Separations Resilience: The Liveness of the Live  47 50 52 55 59 64 66 67 79 83 87 94 96 97 99 102 105 108 110 114 116  S o u n d and P o w e r : E x p l o r i n g F o u c a u l t ' s P e r f o r m a t i v i t y  122  Re-interpreting Nietzsche and Heidegger: Foucault on the Disciplined Mass Foucault on Music, Plurality, Community Music as Means of Political Training, Music as Means of Political Resistance Dionysus Revisited: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault  122 123 125 135  Works Cited  138  iii  REFERENCE  K E Y  AWP  " T h e A g e o f the W o r l d P i c t u r e "  BiW  Being-in-the- World  BoT  The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit ofMusic  BT  Being and Time  DP  " D i s c i p l i n e and P u n i s h "  HFSAP  " H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t o n the Subject, A g e n c y , P r a c t i c e s "  LV  Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound  MS  Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, and Reception  N  Noise: The Political Economy ofMusic  OWA  " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t "  PPC  Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture  PR  Performing Rites  WP  The Will to Power  WPA  The Will to Power as Art  WPKM  The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics  WTL  "The W a y to Language"  Being and Time because o f its scholarship. A l l q u o t e d passages have been left unrevised, except f o r the  I have relied o n M a c q u a r r i e and R o b i n s o n ' s translation o f M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s  t e r m 'state-of-mind' w h i c h I have rendered as ' m o o d ' o r 'attunement,' f o l l o w i n g  Joan  Stambaugh's 1996 translation. S t a m b a u g h ' s translation m o r e faithfully preserves the m u s i c a l overtones i n the G e r m a n , and avoids any misunderstandings o f m o o d as a C a r t e s i a n mental state. A l l other translations have been left unaltered.  iv  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I a m greatly indebted t o a number o f people w h o w e r e w i l l i n g t o lend their support and their ideas t o this project. I w o u l d like first t o thank the members o f m y a d v i s o r y committee: Steve Taubeneck, R i c h a r d K u r t h , and J o h n C o o p e r ; and the D e a n o f the I n d i v i d u a l Interdisciplinary Studies G r a d u a t e P r o g r a m , R h o d r i W i n d s o r - L i s c o m b e ,  who  has w o r k e d t o ensure the  feasibility o f interdisciplinary research here at U B C . I w o u l d also l i k e t o thank all those professors w h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n helped shape v a r i o u s aspects o f this thesis: K e v i n M c N e i l l y , B a r r y T r u a x , A n d r e a Sauder, S o n i a S i k k a , A l a n Thrasher, N o r m a n Stanfield, and Catherine Talmage. F i n a l l y , I w o u l d l i k e to express m y appreciation f o r the conversations o n m u s i c I have had w i t h B a r b a r a A n d e r s e n , C h r i s t a M i n , C h r i s R u d d e n , Jeffrey O r r , M a t t h e w C o r l e t t , M a t t h e w Soules, C o l l i n K n i g h t , A l e x H a r m s e n , J o e l D e S t e f a n o , R o b W r i g h t , M i r e k W a n e k , B r i a n Chippendale, E i l e e n K a g e , E l a i n e Stef, L e s l i e K o m o r i , and Irina K e v o r k o v a .  v  INTRODUCTION  The Fragmentation of Music: Vitality in Diversity M u s i c , once tied strongly t o religious c e r e m o n y and/or the l e g i t i m a t i o n o f established social o r p o l i t i c a l hierarchies, has become, at least i n the W e s t , t o o diffuse a n d t o o fragmented t o b e strictly aligned w i t h any specific institution o r i d e o l o g y . W h i l e the heritage o f many traditional f o r m s o f music is certainly being maintained, n e w f o r m s o f m u s i c are continually being developed, at a seemingly exponential rate, o u t o f an entropic series o f collisions a n d divisions a m o n g the o l d . T h e sheer increase i n the technologies o f musical p r o d u c t i o n , and the experimental ventures w h i c h exploit these n e w technologies, continues t o multiply a n d fracture music into ever m o r e  sub-categories  a n d sub-cultural n e t w o r k s .  W i t h o u t question, the g r o w i n g use o f computers, samplers, sequencers, turntables, and other electronic equipment contributes t o the extension o f existing m u s i c a l vocabularies and the creation o f n e w m u s i c a l dialects. A n d yet, despite the prerecorded nature o f some o f this n e w music, part o f its energy is still channeled into social events featuring its live performance. O u t o f these a n d other n e w musical dialects emerge n e w performative spaces, n e w social codes, and thus, n e w musical communities. B u t the space o f live m u s i c involves even m o r e than this: M u s i c a l events t r a n s p i r e — even erupt—wholly  unplanned, i n any number o f places and o n any n u m b e r o f occasions: i n  the home, i n restaurants, i n parks, o n street corners, even i n the streets. I n all these different places, a n d different t i m e s — c o n v e n t i o n a l performances i n c l u d e d — s o u n d the diverse musics o f entertainment, celebration, and protest. A n d yet, h o w e v e r different a l l these musics m a y be i n their history, purpose, o r technical qualities, i n the act o f their p u b l i c envoicement, they do  share a c o m m o n kinship as spaces o f l i v i n g music. Indeed, i n its most  1  definitive  expression, live m u s i c can catalyze a different set o f social relations  from  those o f the  everyday, and can initiate a space o f n e w social possibilities, a n e w social mood. T o be sure, the scope o f these m o o d s is as b r o a d and variable as the m u s i c a l spaces themselves, and this plurality w i l l be the thrust o f the argument to be e x p l o r e d here: the space o f p e r f o r m a n c e is a site o f social c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and as such is best u n d e r s t o o d not as the presentation o f some m u s i c a l w o r k to an audience, but as a t h o r o u g h l y situated, ephemeral event that includes all those i n v o l v e d as p a r t i c i p a n t s — i n m i n d , in body, i n m o o d . T h e c o l l e c t i v e nature o f m u s i c a l performance and its ability t o b i n d together an otherwise generally individuated g r o u p  o f people has l o n g been asserted. Nevertheless,  testimony o f its social p o w e r bears reiterating: m u s i c a l events can be extraordinarily intense situations, but the c o m p l e x i t y o f their operations has never been f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d . W e have yet to theorize sufficiently those m o m e n t s w h e n one gets the s e n s e — i t m a y o c c u r i n an intimate setting a r o u n d a table i n a restaurant, o r at a w e d d i n g , o r i n a club, o r i n an arena f u l l o f p e o p l e — t h a t most everyone present, albeit f o r a b r i e f moment, is captivated, caught up i n something different  from  the everyday, a different m o o d , a different w a y o f relating to  themselves and to others. H o w e v e r , examining the anatomy and exercise o f this p o w e r — even phrasing it i n these t e r m s — r i s k s an immediate dismissal; this sense o f b e l o n g i n g and togetherness is simply an illusion, says the v o i c e o f the skeptic i n all o f us. B u t such is the w a y that m o o d s determine the manner i n w h i c h things w i l l s h o w u p f o r us at any g i v e n moment: i n m u s i c a l events these social m o o d s can and d o fluctuate, but as they peak, their h o l d can be next to total. I n fact, the 'clarity o f perspective' w e presently enjoy as w e recall these and other m o m e n t s o f i n t e n s i t y — j o y , anger, lust, d e s p a i r — s u r e l y  serves to  emphasize their t h o r o u g h l y situated character, but one thing it most certainly does not  2  re-  d o is  negate the reality o f their occurrence. T h e s e contextual contingencies o u g h t t o b e the l o c u s o f o u r investigation. An  interdisciplinary  approach  which  integrates  relevant  knowledges  f r o m the  disciplines o f philosophy, m u s i c o l o g y , and acoustics can contribute t o a m o r e comprehensive understanding o f m u s i c a l performance  as a space o f contingency, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d  c o m m u n i t y . A l l these disciplines contain valuable and variant analyses o f the most relevant components o f performance that, cursorily, w e have either m e n t i o n e d o r i m p l i c a t e d above: m u s i c a l affect, m o o d , c o l l e c t i v e ecstasy, corporeality, the o n t o l o g y o f sound/music, and the role o f technology. O r c h e s t r a t i n g these v a r i o u s disciplinary a n d i d e o l o g i c a l  encounters—  some dialogues, some c o n f r o n t a t i o n s — w i t h i n a hermeneutic f r a m e w o r k w i l l ensure the necessary thematic and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l g r o u n d i n g f o r a cohesive d i s c u s s i o n o f the issues.  Musical Triads: Dionysus, Apollo, and Hermes; Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault No  o n e has u n d e r s t o o d this t h o r o u g h l y captivating p o w e r  o f the affects—their  trajectories, their rhythms, their p e a k s — b e t t e r than F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e , a n d n o o n e has offered a m o r e satisfying account o f their kinesis i n a specifically m u s i c a l context. N i e t z s c h e is the p h i l o s o p h e r w h o re-introduced the w o r l d t o D i o n y s u s as the g o d o f music, and w h o thus u r g e d us t o again understand the space o f the m u s i c a l as one o f i n t o x i c a t i o n , collectivity, and transformation. Flis D i o n y s u s  first  re-emerged as t h e divine  figure  most suited t o  represent s y m b o l i c a l l y the m u s i c o f R i c h a r d W a g n e r , and i n terms o f scholarship o n t h e issue, there the c o m p o s e r has generally remained. B u t as c o n t e m p o r a r y m u s i c continues t o divide  itself anarchically  into  n e w , experimental  networks  o f sound  a n d space, a n  understanding o f the D i o n y s i a n / A p o l l i n i a n duality amidst these n e w contexts only becomes m o r e and m o r e important t o pursue.  3  A s w e elect t o re-visit D i o n y s u s i n order t o understand m u s i c a l events as situated spaces o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o m m u n i t y , w e are reminded that there is also another g o d — equally important t o the understanding o f social c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n c o n t e x t — t o w h o m w e are re-introduced t h r o u g h the c o n t e m p o r a r y  hermeneutics o f N i e t z s c h e ' s  successor  Martin  H e i d e g g e r . H e r m e n e u t i c s , the science o f interpretation, finds its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r o o t s i n a radically h i s t o r i c i z e d B i b l i c a l exegesis, and its e t y m o l o g i c a l r o o t s i n t h e G r e e k w o r d f o r the messenger g o d H e r m e s . D a v i d E . L i n g e explains i n the e d i t o r ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o H a n s - G e o r g Gadamer's  Philosophical Hermeneutics that the "earliest situations i n w h i c h principles o f  interpretation w e r e w o r k e d o u t w e r e encounters w i t h religious texts w h o s e meanings w e r e obscure o r w h o s e i m p o r t w a s n o longer acceptable unless they c o u l d b e h a r m o n i z e d w i t h the tenets o f the f a i t h " (xii). A n d as G a d a m e r reminds the reader i n his essay " A e s t h e t i c s a n d H e r m e n e u t i c s " i n the b o o k , " A s the art o f c o n v e y i n g what is said i n a f o r e i g n language t o the understanding o f another person, hermeneutics is not w i t h o u t reason named after H e r m e s , the interpreter o f the divine message t o m a n k i n d " (98). F o l l o w i n g the tenets o f the tradition, c o n t e m p o r a r y hermeneutics suggests that the rift o f meaning b e t w e e n message a n d receiver is a c h a s m that c a n never b e completely spanned. U n d e r s t a n d i n g always takes place as an event o f interpretation, o n e that is necessarily mediated b y the interpreter's v a r i o u s culturalhistorical contingencies o f language, tradition, o r prejudice ( i n G a d a m e r ' s non-pejorative sense). B o t h the generative g r o u n d  a n d constraining peak o f interpretation itself, the  inherently fore-guided nature o f interpretation means that the interpreter brings b o t h the openness a n d the resistance o f this tradition i n order t o decipher some ' c o d e , ' b u t as the interpreter is constituted o u t o f a particular tradition, s/he " c a n n o t b e d i s s o l v e d into critical self-knowledge i n such fashion that the prejudice-structure o f finite understanding might  4  disappear" ( L i n g e x v ) . T h e space o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n never i n v o l v e s c o m p l e t e d e c r y p t i o n o f some t o t a l text, b u t i s rather the site o f  co-created and therefore unstable meanings;  c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to the hermeneutic tradition, is always a radically situated  event.  Thus, o u r re-visitation o f D i o n y s u s , l i k e N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n o r i g i n a l c o u p l i n g o f the G r e e k art deities, again b e c o m e s the staging o f a c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n the gods, n o w a tension amongst a triad: D i o n y s u s , A p o l l o , and H e r m e s . Just as i n his e l u c i d a t i o n o f tragedy N i e t z s c h e i m p l o r e s us to hear each figure speak i n the tongue o f the other, so it w i l l be w i t h o u r investigation o f m u s i c a l performance: it must be a p p r o a c h e d w i t h i n a n e w relation that includes n o t o n l y elements o f intensity and c o m m u n i t y , b u t also e x p l i c i t l y incorporates themes o f context, event, and contingency. Friedrich Nietzsche, M a r t i n Heidegger,  and M i c h e l Foucault,  each i n a unique  manner, f o l l o w this hermeneutic circularity i n their analyses o f music, listening, being-in-thew o r l d , art, p o w e r , and the b o d y — a l l stressing a c o m p l e x relation o f co-dependent, r e c i p r o c a l forces rather than charting a strictly linear chain o f causes and effects. T o be clear, N i e t z s c h e and F o u c a u l t  would  both  strongly resist the hermeneutic m o n i k e r , b u t their  common  understanding o f a publicly-constructed subject w h o also constructs the w o r l d into w h i c h s/he is already ' t h r o w n , ' aligns t h e m w i t h at least one o f the core tenets o f the hermeneutic tradition. In  The Gay Science, N i e t z s c h e s h o w s clearly his kinship w i t h the m o s t fundamental  strictures o f hermeneutics as he explores the question o f  whether... all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation—that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and selfexamination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner.... (336) A n d , as H u b e r t L . D r e y f u s and P a u l R a b i n o w contend i n their b o o k o n F o u c a u l t ' s posthermeneutic philosophy,  Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.  5  Like Heidegger and Adorao he [(Foucault)] emphasizes that the historical background of practices, those practices which make objective science possible, cannot be studied by context-free, value-free, objective theory; rather, those practices produce the investigator and require an interpretation of him and his world. (166) N i e t z s c h e , H e i d e g g e r , and F o u c a u l t examine the t h o r o u g h situatedness a n d contingency o f the subject i n differing but related capacities. H o w e v e r , i n terms o f o u r f o c u s here o n performance, the most important c o n g r u e n c y i n their 'hermeneutics' is that a l l three explore the e q u i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y o f g r o u p relations, o f h o w individuals and collectives constitute o n e another: N i e t z s c h e  discusses this i n explicitly m u s i c a l terms w i t h  his account  D i o n y s i a n t h r o n g ; H e i d e g g e r explores the ambiguous unity o f D a s e i n as  o f the  Mitsein across the  shared attunement o f authentic discourse a n d the inauthentic m o d e o f das Man  alike; and  F o u c a u l t investigates these g r o u p relations i n terms o f the v a r i o u s circulations o f p o w e r i n the disciplined mass. H e r e w e shall i n effect confront these thinkers w i t h o u r o w n questions about m u s i c a l performance: w e confront N i e t z s c h e o v e r his m o d e l o f perpetual conflict, and challenge the s o m e w h a t n a r r o w scope o f performance relations this permits; w e confront H e i d e g g e r w i t h the question o f ecstasy and music, and his hesitant relation t o the D i o n y s i a n ; and w e confront F o u c a u l t w i t h the question o f sound and p o w e r , and p o s e the possibility o f examining m u s i c as a discipline. W i t h i n the w o r k s o f these three thinkers are the elements o f a richer understanding o f m u s i c a l performance n o t subject t o t h e v a r i o u s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l pitfalls o f C a r t e s i a n k n o w l e d g e systems that seek t o r e m o v e s o u n d a n d m u s i c from the important contexts o f their presentation. W h i l e n o thinker c a n offer a c o m p l e t e l y satisfying account o f the m u s i c a l event, the trajectory o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l influence amongst this t r i a d — H e i d e g g e r w i t h his indebtedness t o N i e t z s c h e , and F o u c a u l t w i t h his indebtedness t o b o t h Nietzsche  and Heidegger—suggests  heterogeneous  but  still  consonant  that  a confrontation  model  6  of  musical  among  them  performance.  will  The  yield  a  particular  'hermeneutic' perspective shared b y these philosophers offers a certain consistency o f theme and method, so as the subjugated motifs o f one thinker are d e v e l o p e d b y another, these seemingly  disparate  accounts  of  dissimilar p h e n o m e n a  are gathered into  a tessellated  coherence, i n w h i c h related parts i n t e r l o c k to create a r e c o g n i z a b l e w h o l e , but never disappear into c o m p l e t e synthesis. Overview of Thesis T h e relation o f the sources examined in this interdisciplinary investigation, t h o u g h rather  complex,  can  be  divided  according  to  their  primary,  secondary,  and  tertiary  importance. T o b e g i n w i t h those texts w h i c h play a primary role, the N i e t z s c h e a n p o r t i o n o f the o v e r a l l f r a m e w o r k f o r this discussion is derived f r o m charting the continuity o f the D i o n y s i a n i n N i e t z s c h e ' s career, beginning w i t h posthumously compiled informed  from  a  The Birth of Tragedy, and finishing i n the  The Will to Power. T h e H e i d e g g e r i a n c o m p o n e n t o f the m o d e l is  reading  of—most  importantly  but  not  exclusively—his  critique  of  metaphysics and his examination o f primordiality, m o o d , and listening i n Being and Time, f r o m his related critique o f aesthetics and his hermeneutic understanding o f the art event i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k D i o n y s u s i n his  o f A r t , " and f r o m his explicit c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h N i e t z s c h e ' s  Nietzsche: Volume One: The Will to Power as Art. F i n a l l y , the p o r t i o n  i n c l u d i n g important insights f r o m F o u c a u l t gathered f r o m his  o n performativity and m u s i c a l pluralism is  Discipline and Punish, and f r o m his i n t e r v i e w w i t h P i e r r e B o u l e z o n  " C o n t e m p o r a r y M u s i c and Its P u b l i c . " In terms o f those texts w h i c h play a secondary role i n the discussion, H e i d e g g e r ' s " T h e A g e o f the W o r l d P i c t u r e , " " L o g o s , " " T h e W a y to L a n g u a g e , " and " T h e  Question  C o n c e r n i n g T e c h n o l o g y " augment present themes o n metaphysics and listening, as w e l l as  7  introduce n e w ones (most notably i n terms o f the question o f t e c h n o l o g y ) . A l s o important t o the H e i d e g g e r i a n d i a l o g u e are the comments o n m o o d from H u b e r t L. D r e y f u s ' c o m p a n i o n t o  Being and Time, Being-in-the-world, his c o m p a r i s o n o f the later H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t i n his " H e i d e g g e r a n d F o u c a u l t o n the Subject, A g e n c y , P r a c t i c e s , " as w e l l as the account o f aurality offered b y D o n Ihde i n his Listening Reiner Schurmann's  and Voice: A Phenomenology of Listening.  On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy is important f o r its  keen reading o f H e i d e g g e r ' s treatment o f aurality, c o m m u n i t y , a n d event, a n d W a l t e r J . O n g ' s d i s c u s s i o n i n Orality  and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word also contributes t o  the  o f Heidegger's  acoustic  dimensions  understanding  o f communication.  T h e most  important texts i n the field o f m u s i c o l o g y include L y d i a G o e h r ' s historical analysis o f musical performance  in  The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the  Philosophy of Music, as w e l l as the discussions o f m u s i c ' s sociality b y M i c h a e l C h a n a n i n Musica Practica, and S i m o n F r i t h i n Performing Rites. I n the category o f the t e c h n o l o g i c a l and scientific i m p l i c a t i o n s o f sound, B a r r y T r u a x ' s u n w i t t i n g l y H e i d e g g e r i a n analysis o f listening i n his  Acoustic Communication, and Jacques A t t a l i ' s e x p l o r a t i o n o f m u s i c i n light o f  the advent o f r e c o r d i n g t e c h n o l o g y i n his  Noise: The Political Economy of Music are k e y  texts i n the interdisciplinary dialogue w i t h H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t respectively. A n d finally, Elias Canetti's  Crowds and Power contributes t o the sense o f v o l a t i l i t y i n N i e t z s c h e ' s  concept o f the D i o n y s i a n as w e l l as the history o f the audience's training examined i n the chapter o n F o u c a u l t . S o u r c e s o f tertiary i m p o r t a n c e include interviews w i t h musicians Steve A l b i n i , K e i t h Jarrett, o n e personal i n t e r v i e w o n a performance b y T h e N e e d c o n d u c t e d w i t h B a r b a r a A n d e r s e n ( f o r m e r editor o f V a n c o u v e r ' s  Discorder magazine), reports o n performances f r o m  8  Woodstock  '99, a n d G G A l l i n , as w e l l as a host o f personal anecdotes f r o m v a r i o u s  (remarkable) live m u s i c a l events. These sources (and others) are examined i n f o u r chapters. I n chapter one, w e first introduce H e i d e g g e r ' s critique o f W e s t e r n metaphysics i n Being the W o r l d  Picture"  to  frame  and Time and " T h e A g e o f  the interdisciplinary dialogue w h i c h  will  suggest that a  hegemonic visualist e p i s t e m o l o g y essentially 'silences' sound and m u s i c as it turns t h e m into a m a r k i n order that they b e measured, and consequently, k n o w n . B y integrating T r u a x ' s history o f the s o u n d object w i t h C h a n a n and G o e h r ' s historiography o f the m u s i c a l w o r k , w e chart, first, the social p r o d u c t i o n o f these objects as contributing factors i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y understanding o f performance as d i v i d e d into ' w o r k ' and 'event,' a n d second, e x p l o r e the implications that such a d i v i s i o n has f o r the social relations o f the audience. I n chapter t w o , w e p r i m a r i l y examine  The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power i n  order t o understand the unpredictable volatility o f the p e r f o r m a n c e space, its range o f incredibly disparate m o o d s and possibilities. B y e x p l o r i n g the continuity o f the D i o n y s i a n across N i e t z s c h e ' s career, w e assemble all the most relevant c o m p o n e n t s o f his m o d e l — i t s intensity,  its placement  o f listeners w i t h i n  a musical  event,  its p r o v i s i o n a l  sense o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n those l i s t e n e r s — b e f o r e c r i t i q u i n g the s h o r t c o m i n g s i n his m o d e l o f perpetual strife. C h a p t e r three traces the course o f H e i d e g g e r ' s aurality across his career. W i t h the exception o f " L o g o s " (and those m o m e n t s i n w h i c h texts f r o m different t i m e periods are brought into dialogue), o u r general thematic trajectory begins w i t h everyday listening and m o v e s t o w a r d s the m u s i c a l event, t o parallel the c h r o n o l o g y o f H e i d e g g e r ' s m a i n texts outlined above. H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l investigation o f D a s e i n i n Being and Time,  9  the 'being-there' o f h u m a n existence, offers, i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h N i e t z s c h e , a notably less robust  account  listening—but  o f m u s i c — t h e theme nevertheless  makes  o f aurality instead centered o n everyday an  important  suggestion  about  the  human relevant  interrelationship o f sound, m o o d , and the 'shared attunement' o f b e i n g - w i t h o t h e r s — i t is, in fact, a re-interpretation o f the D i o n y s i a n . It is here, amidst these related elements o f everyday aurality, that H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutics o f listening initiates an interdisciplinary dialogue with  research i n the  domain  o f acoustics,  an e x a m i n a t i o n o f  s o u n d that  suggests  a  h o m o l o g i c a l relation between everyday listening and the space o f m u s i c a l performance. H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y continues into " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " i n w h i c h the hermeneutic o f the m u s i c a l event, co-created b y artist and audience alike, replaces the n o t i o n o f the m u s i c a l object w i t h the event as a gathering o f c o m m u n i t y . In  The Will to Power as Art,  Heidegger  w o r k s tenaciously to  Nietzsche, Volume One: e x p l o r e the  metaphysical  undercurrent he is c o n v i n c e d N i e t z s c h e w a s unable to escape, but in d o i n g so, H e i d e g g e r manages to capture b o t h the w i l d intensity o f  Rausch he p u r p o r t s t o deplore, as w e l l as  concede the role o f the b o d y i n the attuning p o w e r o f m o o d . A n d understanding o f m u s i c  as a hub  o f community, w e  finally,  i n light o f this  engage the question o f m u s i c a l  t e c h n o l o g y and its effects o n the social relations o f performance. W e i n t r o d u c e as the m a i n sources o f this latter section H e i d e g g e r ' s " T h e Jacques A t t a l i ' s p i v o t a l w o r k ,  Question Concerning Technology"  and  Noise: The Political Economy of Music, i n o r d e r to examine  the manner i n w h i c h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y — s o u n d r e c o r d i n g and p l a y b a c k e q u i p m e n t — d i s r u p t s an o n t o l o g y o f music as live, as  life, and h o w this rupture  initiates a new, restless o n t o l o g y o f m u s i c that continually vacillates amidst its o w n dialectic uncertainty.  10  I n chapter four, F o u c a u l t ' s analysis o f p o w e r a n d c o r p o r e a l i t y is examined f r o m a performative perspective. I n some o f his personal interviews a n d i n  Discipline and Punish,  F o u c a u l t ' s c o m m e n t s o n the social, pluralistic, a n d affirmative nature o f m u s i c as a n event, combined  with  his understanding  o f the p e r f o r m i n g  body  i n lateral p o w e r  systems,  respectively, extend themes o f p o w e r and agency already present i n the texts o f N i e t z s c h e and H e i d e g g e r . D r e y f u s also helps us see that the later F o u c a u l t ' s generally N i e t z c h e a n understanding  of  a  Heraclitean  flux  d i d begin  to  resemble  t h e later  Heidegger's  understanding o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f l o c a l i z e d gatherings as a resistance t o technicity. Indeed, these three thinkers c a n b e approached as c o m p r i s i n g a genealogy o f a hermeneutics o f listening. A l t h o u g h there are numerous continuities a n d discontinuities w i t h i n this genealogy, a full hermeneutic theory o f sonic experience remains t o b e achieved. W h e r e a s N i e t z s c h e has set us o n perhaps the most definitive path t o w a r d s an understanding o f m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e as an event o f collective intensity, the textual margins o f H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t critique a n d refine, augment a n d extend this understanding t o include a fuller sense o f listening, m o o d , the p e r f o r m i n g body, and m u s i c a l pluralism. F r o m the p r o v i s i o n a l and v a r i e d accounts o f voice, sound a n d m u s i c — i n d e e d , the w o r l d o f h u m a n h e a r i n g — a confrontation  among  these  three  thinkers  can yield  valuable  corporeality, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and c o m m u n i t y i n m u s i c a l experience.  11  insights  o n issues  of  CHAPTER I  VISION AND METAPHYSICS: T H E E M E R G E N C E OF PERFORMATIVE A G E N C Y Seeing Things: Acoustic Objects, Metaphysical Distances T h e hermeneutic t r a d i t i o n holds that acts o f interpretation at o n c e reveal and c o n c e a l the w o r l d o f the interpreter, maintaining, i n corollary, that an interpreter m a y o n l y encounter the w o r l d  a c c o r d i n g t o t h e necessarily l i m i t e d possibilities permitted b y their  socialization. H o w e v e r , i n h i s development o f c o n t e m p o r a r y hermeneutics i n  Time,  specific  Being and  H e i d e g g e r at once challenges and endorses the t o t a l i z i n g nature o f historicity. W h i l e he  does c o n c u r that the realization o f a totally objective g r o u n d f o r h u m a n k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be impossible, he also contends that b y questioning from w i t h i n t h e i m m e d i a c y o f one's o w n tradition, one can achieve a certain clarity about the revealing and c o n c e a l i n g prejudices o f such u n d e r s t a n d i n g — i n e x p l o r i n g the most basic assumptions o f one's interpretations, o n e can attain some sense o f one's history, o f h o w oneself and o n e ' s w o r l d came t o ' s h o w u p ' i n the manner they presently d o . L i k e w i s e ,  as w e inquire into t h e o n t o l o g y  o f musical  performance, as w e challenge our most basic assumptions about live music, and thus o u r understandings o f its c o m p o n e n t p a r t s — m u s i c a l sounds, m u s i c a l w o r k s , performers, a n d a u d i e n c e s — w e are p u l l e d into a genealogical examination o f h o w these entities came t o 'be' the things they presently are. F o l l o w i n g H e i d e g g e r , o u r investigation suggests that the W e s t e r n interpretation o f being as constant p r e s e n c e - a t - h a n d — f r o m P l a t o ' s f o r m s t h r o u g h t o Descartes'  cogito—and  its c o r o l l a r y  v i s u a l i s m o f pure  beholding  erects  a theory o f  k n o w l e d g e that is ill-suited t o thematize sound i n its essential evanescence. R e p r e s e n t i n g sound s u c h that it fit this visualist p a r a d i g m has accelerated the drift t o w a r d s precisely the  12  antinomy which marks our contemporary understanding of musical performance: the duality of work and event. Without question, the sense of sight has dominated Western epistemology. The eye, it has generally been assumed, is the conduit of reality. Beginning to think about the sonic, and undertaking an engagement with the world of sound in its various manifestations immediately unfolds as a remarkably unusual and difficult task, the arduousness and novelty of which suggests a history of its gradual, systematic neglect. As Walter J. Ong reminds the reader in his book, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, in some periods aurality still enjoyed a strong, though marginal, role despite the influence exerted by the written word: [H]earing rather than sight had dominated the older noetic world in significant ways, even long after writing was deeply interiorized. Manuscript culture in the west remained always marginally oral. Ambrose of Milan caught the earlier mood in his Commentary on Luke (iv. 5): 'Sight is often deceived, hearing serves as guarantee.' In the west through the Renaissance, oration was the most taught of all verbal productions and remained implicitly the basic paradigm for all discourse, written as well as oral. Written material was subsidiary to hearing in ways which strike us today as bizarre.... At least as late as the twelfth century in England, checking even written financial accounts was still done aurally, by having them read aloud. (119)  Yet, despite this somewhat astonishing resilience of aurality, the roots of our contemporary visualism have long been firmly secured in the grammar of epistemology. Probing the etymologies of these words shows that epistemic experience—coming to know or understand something—is always troped by the sense of sight. Quoting St. Augustine, in Being and Time Heidegger spells out the obvious visual privileging in everyday speech as we persistently replace the phraseology of the other senses with that of sight: '"See how that sounds,' 'See how that is scented,' 'See how that tastes,' 'See how hard that is'" (215). And pertinent to a discussion of musical performance, even in the everyday rhetoric of live musical events, one talks of going to 'see a concert,' of going to 'see a show.' Speaking of this visualist history,  13  R e i n e r S c h u r m a n n notes i n his b o o k ,  Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to  Anarchy, that "since the classical G r e e k s , to think is to see. T o k n o w is t o have seen, and to attain evidence i s . . . 'to have seen w e l l ' " (65). A  casual glance into the history o f W e s t e r n thought bears out this b o n d between  v i s i o n and k n o w l e d g e , a substantial amount o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y h a v i n g been l i m i t e d t o what D o n Ihde calls in  Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound "the r e a l m o f mute  objects" (50). A s t h e i m m e d i a c y o f sense-experience disappears i n a metaphysical drift t o w a r d s the abstract, Ihde notes that i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f A r i s t o t l e , P l a t o , and Descartes, visuality remains the g r o u n d and peak o f their concepts o f k n o w l e d g e , their epistemologies: P l a t o ' s theory o f k n o w l e d g e rotates around a discussion o f i m m u t a b l e forms; A r i s t o t l e ' s a c c l a m a t i o n o f sight as the sense most keenly suited t o discern difference (and therefore t o access k n o w l e d g e ) i s pivotal; and D e s c a r t e s ' geometric spatiality o f w o r l d as res  extensa  c o u l d b e n o t h i n g other than silent. K n o w l e d g e is insofar as there is stasis. This,  says  H e i d e g g e r , is the essence o f metaphysics: Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are.... That which enduringly remains, really is.... Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp. (BT 128-9). In fact, i n her b o o k ,  The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy  of Music, L y d i a G o e h r appropriately discloses that " D e s c a r t e s p r o d u c e d a rationalistic and mathematically based c o n c e p t i o n o f m u s i c a l principles o f acoustics a n d h a r m o n y i n h i s  Musicae Compendium..."—for  Descartes, and those w h o w o u l d f o l l o w his interpretation o f  the w o r l d as res extensa, sound w o u l d l i k e w i s e continue t o be interpreted as stillness (139).  14  As  Heidegger  explains  i n h i s essay, " T h e A g e o f the W o r l d  Picture,"  t h e epochal  understanding o f b e i n g invests itself into every facet o f h u m a n interpretation and guides the manner i n w h i c h the w o r l d w i l l s h o w up f o r those w h o live w i t h i n any particular age: Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish that age.... The whole of modern metaphysics taken together, Nietzsche included, maintains itself within the interpretation of what is to be and of truth that was prepared by Descartes. (115,127) S o u n d , i n and o f itself being invisible and transient, is especially p r o b l e m a t i c f o r a Cartesian theory o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h depends u p o n , as H e i d e g g e r states, being as constant presence-athand, a subject set apart f r o m w o r l d as  res externa. I n order t o be suitably u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n  this subject-object f r a m e w o r k , sound must be ever m o r e r e m o v e d f r o m its ephemeral essence and into its representation as a visual phenomenon, that is, to be apprehended, measured, and k n o w n , it must be placed into, in Ihde's w o r d s , the ' r e a l m o f mute objects.' A l b e i t i n m o t i o n before t h e advent o f Cartesian metaphysics, this has been precisely t h e history o f its transformation i n m u s i c a l as w e l l as non-musical domains: a steady drift f r o m that w h i c h i s heard t o that w h i c h is v i s u a l i z e d o n the m u s i c a l staff, the o s c i l l o s c o p e , and the spectrum analyzer. It w a s the positivistic energy transfer m o d e l that c o n c e i v e d listening as simply a chain o f physical vibrations terminating i n a nerve impulse, and t h e stimulus-response m o d e l pioneered b y the f o u n d e r o f m o d e r n psychophysics, G u s t a v Fechner, w h i c h , as B a r r y T r u a x maintains i n his b o o k ,  Acoustic Communication, led t o "the m o d e r n scientific distinction  between the ' o b j e c t i v e ' acoustic parameters, such as intensity, frequency and w a v e f o r m , and their  psychoacoustic,  'subjective'  counterparts,  namely  loudness,  pitch  a n d timbre,  r e s p e c t i v e l y . . . " (5). T o sound is attributed inherent, objective properties o f its o w n , n o w  15  capable o f b e i n g rendered i n v i s u a l terms and w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o subjective categories o f experience. I n the w o r l d o f music, positivists l i k e D e r y c k C o o k e i n his  Language of Music  w o u l d later appropriate the same f r a m e w o r k i n an attempt t o f o r g e equally t i d y relationships between m u s i c a l structures a n d semantic meaning, a project o n l y made feasible under the d o m i n i o n o f the score as w r i t t e n n o t a t i o n  (34). I n his b o o k , Musica Practica,  Michael  C h a n a n observes this u n i o n o f v i s i o n and p o w e r w h e n he claims that  the authority acquired by the score evidently has a good deal to do with the role which it affords in musical intelligence to the process of vision. The basic vocabulary is largely derived from the sphere of optical phenomena: notes are high or low, they move up and down, they are separated by an interval, etc. (71) Silent, enduring, k n o w a b l e — a s a v i s u a l mark, sound and m u s i c c o m e t o rest i n the same presence as the C a r t e s i a n object, and i n this settlement, l i k e w i s e sit i n concealment from their phenomenal v o i c i n g i n time. A n d just as O n g charts a shift i n h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n and h u m a n interpretation w h i c h parallels the rise o f literacy, so c a n a parallel t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f m u s i c a l listening b e o b s e r v e d t o a c c o m p a n y the rise o f a m u s i c a l literacy, t h e rise o f the score. T o e x p l a i n the scope o f this shift, C h a n a n shares a n anecdote i n w h i c h h e describes the difficulty B e l a B a r t o k and Z o l t a n K o d a l y had i n transcribing their o w n 1906  field-recording  o f some H u n g a r i a n f o l k music:  When it came to transcribing what they'd recorded, they discovered that conventional notation wasn't equal to the job. It required modification to capture the quarter-tones, for example, which the phonograph revealed directly to the ear as characteristic of this music but 'cultured' Western hearing all too easily failed to register. The drift of this argument is inescapable. Notation erected a block in the Western ear against the inner complexities of non-Western musics. A strange kind of deafness appeared in the most sophisticated ears.... Under the hegemony of notation, the Western psyche came to fear the embrace of what it repressed, and responded to any music which manifested this repressed material as if it were a threat to civilization. (77) T o b e clear, ' c u l t u r e d ' W e s t e r n h e a r i n g — o f w h i c h B a r t o k a n d K o d a l y w o u l d certainly b e e x e m p l a r y — d i d n o t so m u c h 'fail t o register' the quarter-tones, f o r example, o f n o n - W e s t e r n musics, b u t rather f o u n d  itself unable t o assimilate these  16  'interstitial' sounds  into its  theoretical system. Chanan, however, is m u c h clearer i n the latter h a l f o f the passage as he charts the 'inescapable drift o f this argument': as aurality is increasingly counter-balanced w i t h visuality, s o u n d begins to announce itself accordingly. Indeed, as this anecdote suggests, the h e g e m o n y o f n o t a t i o n — w h i c h  stands germane t o t h e h e g e m o n y o f v i s i o n under a  Cartesian m e t a p h y s i c s — e x e r t s an almost t o t a l i z i n g p u l l o v e r a general m u s i c a l o n t o l o g y , not so problematically f o r those musics w h o s e practices include its sovereignty, b u t rather problematically f o r those musics w h i c h operate w i t h o u t constant recourse t o its authority. C h a r t i n g one o f the k e y extensions o f the score's h e g e m o n i c influence, i n  Rites: On the Value of Popular Music, S i m o n  Performing  F r i t h lauds the p o i g n a n c y o f G o e h r ' s metaphor  o f the m u s e u m o f imaginary w o r k s as it applies to p o p u l a r music: And the power of this metaphor is reflected in the musicological approach to popular music: the first task is transcription, the translation of sound into score, whether the score of an imaginary event (most contemporary recorded music is not performed but constructed) or an improvised one (Ornette Coleman is said to have looked aghast at a transcription of one of his solos, knowing that he would be quite unable to play it). (259) T o be clear, transcription and f o r m a l analysis o f the m u s i c a l structures o f even those musics w h i c h , as F r i t h intimates, c o u l d b e considered inappropriate targets, constitutes n o serious transgression i n itself; it is rather, as C h a n a n argues, the e x c l u s i o n o f all other approaches t o music, t o other musics, that contributes t o an i m p o v e r i s h e d understanding o f their meaning t h r o u g h t h e m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n o f what may b e called, under a positivist paradigm, 'extram u s i c a l ' aspects o f presentation: The discipline of musicology derives both its efficacy and its closure from analysing the formal qualities of music inscribed in its notation, which elicits a highly technical language to match the music's complicated internal properties. This language seems to foreclose and dissolve away the discussion of music in almost any other terms (except perhaps emotional).... (38) O r , as Susan M c C l a r y and R i c h a r d L e p p e r t put it i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the b o o k they edit,  Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception:  17  The only one of the arts that has remained largely untouched by [the new critical] redefinitions of method and subject matter in its academic discipline is music. For the most part, the discourse of musical scholarship clings stubbornly to a reliance on positivism in historical research and formalism in theory and criticism, with primary attention still focused almost exclusively on the canon, (xii) It is first w i t h i n the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f ephemeral sound into enduring m a r k that the severance is anticipated, b u t it is, as H e i d e g g e r w i l l again reiterate, the greater course o f W e s t e r n metaphysics w h i c h is ultimately responsible f o r the separation o f w o r k and event. A s this visualist metaphysics culminates i n the age o f the w o r l d - p i c t u r e , as framed, as distinct, as a w o r l d represented b y humanity " i n t h e sense o f that w h i c h has t h e character o f object," humanity itself is first separated  from  its w o r l d ( A W P  132). I n enumerating t h e most  important extensions o f this severance, H e i d e g g e r then appropriately notes that art t o o undergoes a c o n c o m i t a n t transformation i n its o n t o l o g i c a l status as it m o v e s into " t h e p u r v i e w o f aesthetics. That means that the art w o r k b e c o m e s the object o f mere subjective e x p e r i e n c e . . . " (116). E c h o i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s assertion, G o e h r describes that, i n the w o r l d o f music, this n e w understanding in, o r perhaps as, aesthetics, p r o d u c e s the m u s i c a l art object, the m u s i c a l ' w o r k ' :  At the end of the eighteenth century, changes in aesthetic theory, society, and politics prompted musicians to think about music in new terms and to produce music in new ways. Musicians began to think about music as involving the creation, performance, and reception of not just music per se, but of works as such. The concept of a work first began to serve musical practice in its regulative capacity at thistime.Musicologists and other historians of music have dated this development much earlier, usually as far back as the sixteenth century, (iii) A s she traces the extensions o f this turn, G o e h r appropriately g r o u n d s the d i s c u s s i o n i n terms o f a w i l l t o secure the legitimacy o f m u s i c a l art, a w i l l that p r o d u c e d a pure, independent, enduring m u s i c a l object d i v o r c e d f r o m the superfluous contexts o f its reception:  Of all the changes in meaning the concept of serious music has undergone throughout its history, none has been more far-reaching in its effect than that which moved musical understanding away from 'extra-musical' towards 'musical' concerns. Before 1800 the pivotal question in philosophical thought about music, 'what is music?' asked for specification of music's extra-musical function and significance....  18  The transformation gave rise to a new view of music as an independent practice whose serious concerns were now claimed to be purely musical. The emerging practice became specifically geared towards, and evaluated in terms of, the production of enduring musical products. It was only with the rise of this independent conception of music, in other words, that musicians began to think predominantly of music in terms of works. (122-3) P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the concept  o f the 'purely m u s i c a l ' w a s generated out o f the desire t o  transcend the tyranny o f the visual, that is, t o prioritize a m o r e serious  listening, but the  c o r o l l a r y o n t o l o g y o f the m u s i c a l object w o u l d thereafter strengthen the visuality o f m u s i c ' s o w n theoretical apparatus. A s there existed n o concept o f the 'purely m u s i c a l ' neither c o u l d there be an o p p o s i n g category o f the ' e x t r a - m u s i c a l ' — t h e s e t w o classes c a n o n l y be b o r n e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y w i t h the idea o f an independent m u s i c a l w o r k ; but this d i v i s i o n is also itself a beginning, and w i l l gradually bear the m y r i a d dualities that m a r k o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y understanding o f m u s i c a l performance. A s G o e h r contends, as late as the 1700s, the m o d e r n social d y n a m i c s o f m u s i c a l activity g o v e r n i n g the creation, performance, and reception o f m u s i c a l w o r k s had yet t o reach their  most  robust  audience/performer,  form,  and thus  a multitude  rehearsal/performance,  o f dichotomies  listening  were  time/socializing  yet t o  time,  and  emerge: concert  space/social space are some o f the most c o n s p i c u o u s dualities w h i c h d i d not exist p r i o r t o this aesthetic shift.  The Birth of the Musical Work and its Audience T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y picture o f silent, attentive audiences w h o sit i n sharp distinction t o performers, and listen t o rehearsed and perfected m u s i c a l w o r k s that stand apart from the sociality o f everyday life, and thus require a specific amount o f time and a dedicated space f o r their p r o p e r presentation, is a result o f the idea that m u s i c ought t o be c o n c e i v e d o f i n terms o f independent w o r k s . W i t h o u t the w o r k - c o n c e p t , m u s i c does not o c c u p y the exalted status o f an art w h i c h exists simply f o r its o w n sake, but rather accompanies, and thus  19  remains  spatially, temporally,  aesthetically,  a n d acoustically  subordinate  t o , t h e social  occasions it i s meant t o enhance. P r e v i o u s t o this n e w aesthetics, explains G o e h r , music is altered and adapted a c c o r d i n g t o the circumstances o f each particular event, and those i n attendance  a r e free t o socialize,  sing a l o n g w i t h ,  applaud, b e c o m e  bored with, and,  ultimately, initiate the m u s i c ' s arrest w i t h o u t any conscience f o r its apparent sovereignty:  Compositions were interrupted partly because they were not performed in concert halls devoted to their performance. Usually musical performances were background affairs within a church or court. As accompaniment either to serious or frivolous activities, they were rarely the immediate focus of attention. That fact was obvious given the behaviour of their audiences. Even the term 'audience' is misleading here, for music was not so much listened or attended to, as it was worshipped, danced, and conversed to. It was quite to be expected that audiences would applaud, chatter during, and sing along with a performance. Thus at one of Handel's performances there were 'shouts and acclamations at every pause.' At anothertimethere were several 'disorders interrupting' the performance. (192) G o e h r i s clear t o c o n v e y the relationship b e t w e e n m u s i c ' s o n t o l o g i c a l status and the social behaviour d u r i n g its 'presentation.' A n d w h i l e there is u n d o u b t e d l y a w i d e r scope o f social tendencies i n w h i c h t o contextualize the change t o w a r d s a m o r e reserved audience c o n d u c t (i.e., the rise o f the B o u r g e o i s i e d u r i n g the Enlightenment), these m o r e general social trends cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d independently o f c o r o l l a r y epistemic changes o f the p e r i o d . T h e deification o f reason played a n integral role i n shaping m o d e r n aesthetics, and thus also i n first creating the n o t i o n o f the m u s i c a l w o r k , and second, i n prescribing the means o f its legitimation: m o r e elaborate notational systems strengthened the concept o f the w o r k as a ' r e a l ' entity. Indeed, t h e m o r e fervently the enduring permanence o f the w o r k i s secured t h r o u g h ever m o r e r i g o r o u s notation, the m o r e regimented b e c o m e t h e set o f behaviours necessary f o r its p r o p e r appreciation, and the m o r e f i r m l y secured b e c o m e those dualities w h i c h have c o m e t o i n f o r m o u r common-sense understanding o f m u s i c a l performance today. T h e most significant o f these dualities is the separation o f audience and performer.  20  This separation—now most obviously expressed in the conventional spatial arrangement dividing audience from performer—has its origins in the new status of the musical work and is, thus, at base, not so much a division of physical space as it is one of perceived performative agency. As the level of specialized knowledge and skill required of the performers steadily increases, so too does the perceived importance of their role in the unfolding of the musical event; and, as the audience becomes increasingly alienatedfromthe performer in their musical illiteracy, the perception of their role in the performance is likewise diminished. Describing this illiteracy in performative terms, in the "Music and Class Structure in the United States" chapter of his Studies in Musicology 1935-1975, Charles  Seeger recounts the abysmal state of musical competence in the general population: [I]n America today, the vast majority of the population is virtually incapable of using either a normal oral music tradition on the one hand or an effective music literacy on the other. Few persons, whatever their economic, educational, or social status, can perform any music beyond the level of the simplest item of near-folk or folk-popular repertory, that is, of a sixyear-old competence, in any but a mongrel mixture of styles. (232)  Ideological issues over aesthetic simplicity notwithstanding, Seeger's comments point to the inarguable fact that most Westerners who choose to engage with music do so primarily as listeners and not as performers. However, an important detail must not be passed by in the lamentation over this apparent morass of musical skill: not only do most people lack competence in performance, but they also have an equally feeble grasp of musical rudiments and the associated vocabulary with which to conceptualize this music they enjoy so much. And yet, the force of their enthusiasm for and during this listening is just as likely to match that of the musically educated whose formal knowledge would outweigh theirs tenfold. As quoted by Frith, Nicholas Cook discloses his bewilderment upon observing that the degree of enthusiasm one may lend music seems to bear no correlation to the obviously lopsided split between the musically educated and the non-educated:  21  What I find perplexing, and stimulating, about music is the way in which people—most people—can gain intense enjoyment from it even though they know little or nothing about it in technical terms. (PR 253). That the type o f affiliation that, as Seeger suggests, most enthusiasts have w i t h m u s i c has c o m e t o b e p e r p l e x i n g and stimulating again illuminates the h e g e m o n i c influence notation has exerted o v e r  a general m u s i c a l o n t o l o g y — t h i s  confusion  c a n o n l y arise w i t h the  specialized k n o w l e d g e o f a m u s i c a l g r a m m a r that is inextricably l i n k e d w i t h a w r i t t e n score. B u t g i v e n the g r o s s l y u n e v e n distribution o f technical k n o w l e d g e , o u r sympathies w i t h this c o n f u s i o n s h o u l d be equally p u z z l i n g . A s F r i t h quotes the w o r d s o f F r a n k Sibley, the burden lies i n the hands o f the opposite camp: it is not the i m p r e c i s i o n and indeterminacy o f the n o n technical that bears any tenuous relation t o m u s i c a l pleasure, b u t rather t h e f o r m a l i z e d , technical a p p r o a c h that struggles to offer a sufficiently r i c h sense o f o u r appreciation: Sibley's point is that "purely musical" descriptions (more or less technical accounts of what is "actually" heard) "fail to articulate what, following others, I have been calling the 'character' and qualities of music, and do little to explain why music may engage us as appreciative listeners—which is why non-musicians and musicians alike employ figurative characterizations." (PR 263) T h e purely m u s i c a l and the extra-musical c o m p o s e the t w o sides o f w h a t is, i n effect, a dialectic o f p o w e r : the space o f m u s i c b e c o m e s t h e site o f a silent struggle performative agency, o v e r exactly  over  what and who matters, that is, o v e r w h o controls the event.  T o be m o r e specific, the issue at stake is not so m u c h the u n e q u i v o c a l d i v i s i o n between those w h o are m a k i n g the m u s i c and those others w h o are there t o w a t c h and listen, but it is rather the perceived ineffectuality o f the audience as co-creators o f the meanings o f the musical events they are a part o f that contributes t o a n i m p o v e r i s h e d understanding o f musical performance. A s m u s i c a l w o r k s take o n a k i n d o f static air, they b e c o m e detachable f r o m the events they n o w sustain, and thus, so t o o does the audience, feeling that it plays but a marginal role  22  in the way the music will unfold, a component capable of being inserted and removed without consequence to the character of the 'works' the musicians perform. Notice that, according to comments from independent interviews with jazz musician Keith Jarrett and Steve Albini, guitarist of minimalist rock trio Shellac, in performances which operate without the ontological conception of the fixed musical work, the audience plays a significant role in shaping the character of the event: The audience is much more part of the music than they think.... When we say no photography and they decide to take photos anyway, they think they're detached from the performance. They never allow themselves to realize that they have something to do with what happens on stage, especially with improvisation. Audiences play a large role and it can be positive or it can be not positive. (Jarrett) Very few of our songs even have a definite arrangement that stays the same from day to day.... Some of this experimentation takes place on stage, which forces us to make decisions on the spot, without too much deliberation.... The best thing about playing live is feeling that you're part of a big communal experiment that involves the band and the audience as participants. I'm always curious what's going to happen, and when I am surprised, I am delighted. (Shellac)  Jarrett's opening remark pinpoints the key issue: audiences have come to largely underestimate their own participatory role in these types of musical events—this is the distance modern aesthetics has prescribed for the proper reception of works—and, as they both go on to say (and Albini to later show through the anatomy of Shellac's performances), this disconnected understanding can express itself in a host of negative ways. Indeed, although their musical styles and respective degrees of improvisation may differ somewhat, Jarrett and Albini have remarkably similar analyses of these audience/performer relations, both strongly asserting that, from the perspective of the performers, the success of the event is absolutely bound up with the nature of this interaction. For Jarrett explicitly, and for Albini more implicitly, these relations exert some sway over 'what happens on stage' (which is to say, presumably, the playing of, and communication between, the musicians) and thus, albeit in some generally unascertainable manner, contribute to the character of the music being  23  performed. H o w e v e r , w h i l e the b e h a v i o u r o f the audience u n d o u b t e d l y has some influence u p o n the s o u n d o f the music, and is important, i n part, f o r this role, expressing this participation solely i n these terms ultimately negates the v e r y impetus o f its i n c l u s i o n i n the discussion, namely, t o challenge the n o t i o n that musical performance is n o t h i n g m o r e than the presentation o f s o u n d t o an audience. E v e n positing a r e c i p r o c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the musicians a n d the audience ( a n d between the musicians themselves), t o maintain that some particular aspect o f m u s i c a l performance is important o n l y insofar as it affects the sound o f the m u s i c itself is t o p r e s e r v e — i n fact, t o f o r t i f y — t h e legitimacy o f the 'purely m u s i c a l ' as the k e y b e n c h m a r k o f a successful m u s i c a l event. W h a t e v e r the nearly infinite number  o f mitigating factors,  whether  audience  behaviour,  performer  psychology, or  temperature o f the concert s p a c e — o n e c o u l d attempt t o account f o r such possibilities ad absurdum—expressing  their influence solely i n terms o f m u s i c a l output misrepresents the  real c o m p l e x i t y o f the contingencies o f musical performance. W h i l e  such a n a p p r o a c h  purports t o i n c o r p o r a t e the radicality o f context and contingency, it actually eradicates those entire categories as currently expressed, that is, it erases the d o m a i n o f the extra-musical, and continues t o set m u s i c a l sound as the sole arbiter o f meaning, a n d the listener as o n l y a receiver o f acoustic messages. Indeed,  while  it  is  certainly  conceded  that  there  exist  better  and  worse  interpretations/performances o f a g i v e n musical w o r k , that is, that the a u t o n o m y o f the w o r k is necessarily mediated i n its being-executed b y a musician, audience presence is n o t generally a c k n o w l e d g e d t o b e a n important part o f performative contingency. H o w e v e r , a c o m m o n example f r o m the concert w o r l d shows that the k i n d o f audience presence during a performance plays an integral role f o r the manner i n w h i c h this m u s i c w i l l b e interpreted t o  24  manifest itself, the manner i n w h i c h it w i l l c o m e t o affect those w h o are there as participants: contrast the p o w e r one feels d u r i n g a sparsely-attended afternoon s o u n d c h e c k w i t h the m u c h greater i m p a c t o f the later evening performance at w h i c h there m a y be hundreds o r thousands in a t t e n d a n c e — d e s p i t e  the  congruity  o f the  m u s i c a l w o r k ( s ) , the  consistency  of  the  musician(s) and the constancy o f the performance space, these t w o ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ' emerge as incontestably different  events, and thus, a sense o f audience presence, o f being-there w i t h  other listeners, l i k e w i s e emerges as an unquestionably crucial c o m p o n e n t . A n d yet, this simple anecdote w h i c h suggests, quite plainly, that some understanding o f context, event, and sociality is necessary f o r a t h o r o u g h account o f m u s i c a l performance, is l i k e l y to seem a radical pronouncement. W h a t is this b e i n g - w i t h others at a m u s i c a l performance? D o e s m o o d play an integral role in these relations? W h a t about bodies, their spatial arrangements, and their movements? T h e sights and sounds o f others? Is this sociality m a r k e d b y relations o f p o w e r o r their t e m p o r a r y suspension? Is it important t o understand the w a y i n w h i c h the affair w a s framed from w e l l before the event o f f i c i a l l y began? In fact, pursuing this line o f thought means challenging the precise m e t h o d o l o g y that those in the domains o f acoustic science and aesthetics alike have e m p l o y e d i n their quest f o r the truth about sound: i n all these cases, the observer seeks to put a distance b e t w e e n her/himself and the phenomenon, b y b r a c k e t i n g off, as m u c h as possible, the context o f its occurrence.  Aural Modes: Sound In and Out of Context To  re-iterate the same in H e i d e g g e r i a n terms, c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  sound and m u s i c  w i t h i n a subject-object relation presupposes, just as D e s c a r t e s ' endorsement o f mathematics, first, the idea o f being as constant presence-at-hand, and thus, the m o d e o f pure, distanced beholding w i t h w h i c h it must be apprehended. T h i s a p p r o a c h to the a c o u s t i c w o r l d , w h i c h  25  has c o m e t o seem quite natural, proceeds under the guidance o f a m e t h o d o l o g y  which  actually c o v e r s o v e r the everyday i m m e d i a c y o f experience: i n o r d e r t o understand w h a t sound ' i s , ' and h o w it c o m e s t o affect us, it and its effects must be studied i n isolation, apart f r o m their w o r l d l y , environmental contexts and instead i n terms o f their theoretical, abstract properties. A s T r u a x contends o v e r the course o f his b o o k , this has been as true o f noise as it has been o f music: " T h e scientific m e t h o d has achieved its results t h r o u g h a n experimental m e t h o d o l o g y that a l l o w s observable phenomena t o be studied i n i s o l a t i o n from the variables that n o r m a l l y c o m p l i c a t e most situations" (3). H o w e v e r , as T r u a x explains t h e essential impetus f o r his ' c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l ' m o d e l , t o r e m o v e sound from the c o n d i t i o n s o f its w o r l d l y operation is t o r e m o v e the critical dimension o f its meaning, stressing that a " s o u n d means something  partly because o f w h a t p r o d u c e s it, but mainly because o f the circumstances under  w h i c h it is h e a r d " (xii; my  gloss). E x p l o r i n g the scope o f context and c o n t i n g e n c y thus m a r k s  the essence o f a m o r e comprehensive, richer understanding o f acoustic experience: What distinguishes a model as communicational, in contrast to those arising within the study of a particular system (e.g., linguistic, musical) is the inclusion of the pragmatic level, that is, the notion of context. For instance, music is traditionally analyzed for how it is structured, not how it functions socially. Communicational meaning can only be assessed when a message is understood within its context. The meaning of a message can differ when it occurs within a different context, and conversely, two different messages may have the same meaning within a single context. (What does a piece by Debussy mean when heard in a supermarket?). (Truax 158) A n d , as F r i t h quotes L u c y G r e e n ' s situational understanding o f m u s i c as occurrence: Both experience of the music and the music's meanings themselves change complexly in relation to the style-competence of the [listener], and to the social situations in which they occur.... [M]usic can never be played or heard outside a situation, and every situation will affect the music's meaning. (PR 250) G r e e n ' s c o m m e n t s elicit precisely t h e k e y point that m a n y o f m u s i c ' s interpreters miss altogether: w e are always in some situation, musically o r otherwise, and t o the extent that one attempts t o i g n o r e these contingencies, w i l l thus offer an associatively l i m i t e d portrait o f its  26  meaning. H o w e v e r , a c c o u n t i n g f o r the anatomy o f these contexts is a b o u n d l e s s t a s k — t h e r e is simply no limit to the possibility o f inclusion. H o w e v e r , if, i n p r a g m a t i c terms, w e pursue an understanding o f sound, music, and performance i n w h i c h w e include those most relevant m i c r o - a n d - m a c r o locations o f culture, history, corporeality, space, m o o d , and p o w e r w e w i l l gain a better understanding o f the m u s i c a l event as a space o f contingency, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and c o m m u n i t y .  27  CHAPTER II R H Y T H M AND R I S K : THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE WILL TO POWER  Harnessing Dionysus We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality—just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations. (Nietzsche, BoT 33) First published in 1872, it is in The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, that Nietzsche shares some of his most valuable insights on musical experience, attempting to articulate its essential difference from, as well as its relation to, an experience of the plastic arts. In order to demonstrate this relation, Nietzsche opts to place the reader amidst a variety of contrasting situations—as he will do later in The Will to Power—so that he may show, by analogy, the separate but intermingling worlds of Apollo and Dionysus—Nietzsche goes, so to speak, to the phenomenon, to music as a collective event. Before moving on to include the more communicative frenzy he explores in his physiological aesthetics of the later text, The Will to Power, it is first necessary to have some sense of his overall project in The Birth of Tragedy, where he first introduces the essential elements of the dialogue. Written prior to his break with Wagner, The Birth of Tragedy is appropriately dedicated to him: it is often as bombastic as the music of his mentor, its prose what Walter Kaufmann dubs in the translator's introduction as "occasionally hyperromantic and turgid" (BoT 4). But like Wagner's music—or perhaps all music in general—it is a book of and for certain moments—a point about the text Kaufmann also makes. Indeed, while the number of themes and avenues Nietzsche explores in this text is beyond discussion here, another quote from Kaufmann sets concisely the task at hand:  28  Indeed, it is one of Nietzsche's central points in the book that we cannot do justice to the achievements of the Greeks and the triumph of those powers of restraint he calls the Apollinian unless we first behold the unrestrained Dionysian energies that the Greeks managed to harness. (BoT 4)  As Kaufinann so aptly puts it, the question is precisely how to channel this energy, how to understand and harness the volatility and vitality of Dionysus. Nietzsche first urges us to look back into the history of Greek art in order to gain a better understanding of art's function and meaning in our own (post)modern era. He argues that, unlike ourselves, the Greeks did not understand art in terms of concepts but rather, "in the intensely clear figures of their gods," Apollo and Dionysus (BoT 33). For Nietzsche, the corresponding terms 'Apollinian' and 'Dionysian' can be understood not only as separate artworlds but also as art-impulses originating in nature, as psychological perspectives, and as psychological effects. By first understanding their exclusive domains and then their brilliant union in Attic tragedy, Nietzsche wants to re-initiate a tragic world-view that affirms life in its inevitable suffering. He begins his project with an explanation of the Apollinian domain. For Nietzsche, the purely Apollinian art-impulse is best represented by an analogy to dreams and manifests itself most accurately in thefirmly-articulatedplastic art of sculpture. As spectators of this art we are significantly engaged with and delighted by its appearance yet still remain within the boundaries of a will-oriented, subject-object dichotomy; thus "we still have... the sensation that it is mere appearance" (BoT 34). Apollo then is the tranquil and tranquil/z/«g "soothsaying god," the harbinger of the most spectacular "beautiful illusion[s]... which make life possible and worth living" (BoT 35). As Nietzsche stresses in this work, "existence and the world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BoT 141). Indeed, for Nietzsche, the Apollinian/Dionysian duality extends beyond a model for the understanding of art, but is  29  really a n e q u i v o c a l tension r o o t e d i n nature itself ( B o T 38). F o r N i e t z s c h e , a necessary part of  o u r relationship  individuationis...  t o the world  o f culture  a n d w e might call A p o l l o  i s a faith,  a trust  i n t h e "principium  h i m s e l f the g l o r i o u s divine image o f [this  p r i n c i p l e ] " ( B o T 36). W i t h i n the A p o l l i n i a n perspective w e are able t o augment o u r everyday existence b y engaging i n beautiful illusions w h i l e still retaining o u r necessary subjective w i l l , a w i l l that a l l o w s u s t o continue o u r rational activity a n d c o m p o r t m e n t w i t h i n c i v i l i z e d society. T h r o u g h o u t N i e t z s c h e ' s description o f the A p o l l i n i a n there exists a sense o f the K a n t i a n beautiful, o f permanence, o f an almost p a t h o l o g i c a l c o m f o r t i n stillness. Indeed, i n order t o grasp the nature o f the A p o l l i n i a n impulse " w e must keep i n m i n d that measured restraint, that f r e e d o m f r o m the w i l d e r emotions, that c a l m o f the s c u l p t o r g o d " ( B o T 35). T h e D i o n y s i a n art-impulse reveals itself i n all that i s the antithesis o f the A p o l l i n i a n : the excess a n d ecstasy o f i n t o x i c a t i o n , orgiastic frenzy, a n d the intangibility o f m u s i c a l art ( B o T 33,36). D i o n y s u s introduces u s t o "the emotional p o w e r o f the tone, the u n i f o r m f l o w o f the melody, and the utterly incomparable w o r l d o f h a r m o n y " that "seeks t o get behind a l l p h e n o m e n o n " ( B o T 4 0 , 104). T h r o u g h these devices, D i o n y s i a n m u s i c exerts a p r o f o u n d l y i n t o x i c a t i n g effect and w i t h i n this " n a r c o t i c " spell w e experience the collapse o f the subjectobject antinomy. W h e r e the A p o l l i n i a n experience o f the plastic arts ( o r language) preserves this  subject-object  distinction,  t h e experience  o f Dionysian  music  is marked  by  its  (temporary) rupture:  [A]t this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian, which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of intoxication.... Under the influence of the narcotic draught, of which the songs of all primitive men and peoples speak,... these Dionysian emotions awake, and as they grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness. 03oT 36) T h e effect o f this collapse i s such that the listener feels n o t o n l y unified w i t h other h u m a n beings b u t also r e c o n c i l e d w i t h nature a n d as " p r i m o r d i a l being i t s e l f ( B o T 3 6 , 104). A s  30  Nietzsche writes, "under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son" (BoT 37). When the Apollinian "veil of maya" is torn aside in a musical frenzy, Dionysus is revealed as the primordial ground of existence in all its "terror" and "absurdity" (BoT 40, 60). Nietzsche first praises Dionysian ecstasy, but then points to the moment of its own annihilation as something that confronts us in a very disturbing manner (BoT 19). As the Dionysian rapture dissipates and the everyday, empirical world that was momentarily transcended now reappears, it is seen with a new and "nauseated" understanding of our own powerlessness—our will to action is paralyzed. Where we were once happily deluded by Apollo's illusion we are now tragically aware of the contingency and "absurdity of existence" (BoT 60). Thus, as Nietzsche reminds us from the beginning of the text, the question remains for Dionysus and Apollo to be seen in their complex interrelation, that is, in an antagonistic strife within a parallel structure (BoT 33). Important to retain in our model of performance, Nietzsche's understanding of musical intoxication provides more than just a pleasurable experience: both destructive and revealing, it is a productive rupture in which listeners affirm their sense of belonging to one another: [N]ow all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or impudent convention have fixed between man and man are broken. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community. Q3oT 37) Nietzsche quite clearly suggests that there is at least a temporary suspension of hierarchical relationships between the participants of such a rapture. He is right in asserting the musical event as quite an extraordinary space in just this manner—there do seem to be moments, if  31  only f o r a b r i e f p e r i o d , o r perhaps a multitude o f b r i e f periods, i n w h i c h t h e event reaches an almost supra-political plane. I n listening together a n d perhaps d a n c i n g together, a shared sense o f c o m m u n i t y is felt between people w h o w o u l d otherwise r e m a i n quite alienated one  another—'necessity'  a n d 'impudent  convention'  i n the everyday w o r l d  from  o f (what  N i e t z s c h e refers t o as) culture m a k e this encounter between strangers o r l o o s e acquaintances exceedingly difficult. T h i s unique state is a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h the tensions b e t w e e n the A p o l l i n i a n a n d D i o n y s i a n . W h e r e everyday linguistic discourse preserves t h e p r i n c i p a l o f individuation, a n d thus an unequal p o w e r d y n a m i c b e t w e e n people, N i e t z s c h e ' s description o f m u s i c is appropriately permeated w i t h a language o f access. Thus, i n terms o f tragedy, language " c a n express n o t h i n g that d i d n o t already l i e hidden i n t h e vast universality a n d absoluteness i n the m u s i c . . . " ( B o T 55).  Transmissions from the Dead: The Will to Power as a 'Text' Satisfying t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e ' s c o u r a g e o u s l y j u v e n i l e a c c o u n t o f Rausch may be, this, however, is n o t N i e t z s c h e ' s final w o r d o n the subject o f m u s i c a l i n t o x i c a t i o n — b u t then, neither are his aphorisms i n  The Will to Power. I n the editor's i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the b o o k ,  W a l t e r K a u f m a n n is k e e n t o remind the reader that, despite its c o n t e m p o r a r y appearance as a unified text,  The Will to Power i n its current f o r m is n o t the b o o k N i e t z s c h e h i m s e l f ever  intended t o publish and is actually c o m p r i s e d o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f r a n d o m notes w r i t t e n between 1883 a n d 1888, w h i c h w e r e then p o s t h u m o u s l y o r g a n i z e d a n d published b y his sister, E l i s a b e t h F o r s t e r - N i e t z s c h e . Y e t , w i t h i n his invective c o n d e m n i n g t h e c h r o n i c a n d w i l l f u l misrepresentations o f N i e t z s c h e i n relation t o this w o r k , K a u f m a n n also asserts the value o f its study. A s he writes, "there is n o need t o d o w n g r a d e N i e t z s c h e ' s notes because they are mere notes... [but] these notes o b v i o u s l y d o n o t represent his final v i e w s " ( W P x v i ) . Indeed,  32  K a u f r n a n n ' s most vehement c r i t i c i s m i s levied at those w h o have m i s t a k e n l y dubbed The  Will to Power N i e t z s c h e ' s " c r o w n i n g achievement," his magnum opus, a n d thus suggest reading the text o n terms w h o l l y unwarranted b y the w o r k i t s e l f — K a u f r n a n n ' s ambivalence w a r n s the reader t o a p p r o a c h the text accordingly.  The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power: The Dionysian as Communication D e s p i t e the v e r y disjunctive nature o f the text, e x a m i n i n g N i e t z s c h e ' s c o m m e n t s o n aesthetic experience i n  The Will to Power contributes t o a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e picture o f his  v i e w s o n musical ecstasis first a n d rather ambitiously presented i n The Birth of Tragedy. B e t w e e n these texts arcs a n illuminating continuity o f the D i o n y s i a n . Indeed, N i e t z s c h e ' s discussion o f the aesthetic state i n  The Will to Power seems r e m a r k a b l y u n f o c u s e d on, even  decidedly avoidant of, expected a n d t y p i c a l analyses o f w o r k s o f art, b u t this is only the progression o f his aesthetics p r o c l a i m e d i n the Birth  of Tragedy: "[I]t is o n l y as an aesthetic  phenomenon that existence a n d the w o r l d are eternally justified!''—he is, after all, someone w h o extends the n o t i o n o f ' a r t w o r k ' t o include the P r u s s i a n officer c o r p s as w e l l as the Jesuit order ( B o T 52; W P 4 1 9 ) . P e r h a p s attempting t o c o n v e y the depth, breadth a n d importance o f an artistic rapture, N i e t z s c h e operates largely b y analogy, first p r o b i n g seemingly unrelated realms  before  announcing  their  respective  affinities  with  artistic  experience.  Indeed,  pervasive t h r o u g h o u t N i e t z s c h e ' s discussion i n P a r t I V o f B o o k I I I are descriptions o f w h a t c o u l d be described as a dilated sensory pellucidity, germane, b u t b y n o means exclusive t o , the realm o f artistic creation and aesthetic experience. I n fact, a l t h o u g h P a r t I V o f The  Will to  Power bears the title ' T h e W i l l t o P o w e r as A r t , ' i n a p h o r i s m #801 N i e t z s c h e seems k e e n o n first  p o s i t i n g a certain kinship between what m a y b e considered disparate h u m a n drives,  m o o d s , a n d heightened states: "sexuality; intoxication; feasting; spring; v i c t o r y o v e r a n  33  enemy, mockery; bravado; cruelty; the ecstasy of religious feeling" (421). Before moving on to assert the express animality of such an upwelling in this aphorism and the next, he reiterates as fundamental the ingredients of the "witches' brew" first mentioned in The Birth of Tragedy, declaring that in all the heightened states there are "three elements principally: sexuality, intoxication, cruelty—all belonging to the oldest festal joys of mankind" (BoT 40; WP 421). From the elements in the aforementioned list, Nietzsche asserts, the aesthetic state is thus comprised. A plethora of musical forms and styles elicit interpretations which point to an explicit sexuality, a narcotic adulteration and/or the kind of hubris associated with violent domination—certainly not all, but many forms of music feature the overall rise-climax-fall trajectory easily mapped onto these domains. However, unlike many commentators on music, Nietzsche is not only interested in outlining musical representations of such drives, that is, in the interpretation of a musical 'text,' but also in engaging with the question of how, within the participation of an actual musical event, these drives are thus arranged, experienced, and expunged in a listening audience, indeed, how they are performed. Richard Schacht declares the key importance of this point in his Nietzsche: Nietzsche does not take the notions of transfiguration and illusion to apply only to works of Apollinian and Dionysian art conceived as object [sic] of aesthetic experience, but rather also to the subjects of such experience insofar as they become absorbed in them.... The entire significance of art is missed, for him, if one does not recognize that the consciousness of those experiencing these art-forms undergoes a transformation analogous to that occurring in their creation; and that the experiencing subject's very psychological identity thereby is in a sense transfigured, even if only temporarily.... (492)  Schacht is keen to stress that Nietzsche's analysis of art in The Birth of Tragedy does not begin and end with the metaphorical description of some isolated art-object, but neither does it start and finish with only a psychological transformation. Nietzsche's seemingly tangential accounts of various ecstases above serve as a provisional contextualization of musical  34  performance, and thus suggest not o n l y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , but also a p h y s i o l o g i c a l  and  c o r p o r e a l placement w i t h i n the m u s i c a l e v e n t — i n m u s i c a l performance, the D i o n y s i a n is most intensely experienced amidst the drives and bodies o f others. N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis is perhaps most applicable t o those m u s i c a l events i n w h i c h there exists the structural and historical possibility o f an intense, c o l l e c t i v e experience, those i n w h i c h the anarchic is not merely represented musically, but also  enacted physically. T h e  N o r t h A m e r i c a n and E u r o p e a n r o c k festival scenes w h i c h first emerged i n the ' 6 0 s and have continued t o the present are certainly exemplary o f N i e t z s c h e ' s c l a i m — w r i t h i n g bodies o f those i n t o x i c a t e d b y s o u n d and/or substance seem to tread an a m b i g u o u s distinction between an erotic b o n d i n g and masochistic self-cruelty. N i e t z s c h e ' s same t r i a d o f drives (sexuality, intoxication,  feasting) c o u l d  easily be  applied to  v a r i o u s industrial, metal,  punk,  and  skinhead/Oi! performances in w h i c h audience members (primarily male) w h o participate i n the s c r u m k n o w n as 'the p i t ' justifiably expect and revel i n the ( m o s t l y playful) administering and r e c e i v i n g o f physical pain. A n d yet, as N i e t z s c h e also states (and as it is apparent to the observer o f such a display), f r o m out o f this strange melee c o m e s pleasure. Clearly, N i e t z s c h e wishes to relay a sense o f an animalistic possession, an altered state i n w h i c h certain physical and mental faculties enjoy a simultaneous sharpening and heightened awareness w i t h i n a loss o f cultural inhibition, a k i n d o f blissful forgetting. Indeed, there is a remarkable  conflation  o f the i n h u m a n  and the s u p e r h u m a n i n  Nietzsche's  description, an almost mechanistic brand o f the chaotic that, paradoxically, suggests a k i n d o f organic, feral volatility. In addressing the nature o f rapture in this manner, N i e t z s c h e answers his o w n question p o s e d i n his  Attempt at a Self-Criticism f r o m The Birth of Tragedy: " W h e r e  does that synthesis o f g o d and billy goat i n the satyr point? W h a t experience o f himself, what  35  urge compelled the Greek to conceive the Dionysian enthusiast and primeval man as a satyr?... Visions and hallucinations shared by entire communities or assemblies at a cult?" (21). Capturing the sexuality in the escalating momentum of such a seizure, Nietzsche writes that intoxication is: the feeling of enhanced power; the inner need to make of things a reflex of one's own fullness and perfection; the extreme sharpness of certain senses, so they understand a quite different sign language—and create one— ... extreme mobility that turns into an extreme urge to communicate; the desire to speak on the part of everything that makes signs—; a need to get rid of oneself, as it were, through signs and gestures; ability to speak of oneself through a hundred speech media—an explosive condition.... [A] compulsion and urge to get rid of the exuberance of inner tension through muscular activity and movements of all kinds; then as an involuntary co-ordination between this movement and the processes within (images, thoughts, desires)—as a strong stimuli from within—; inability to prevent reaction; the system of inhibitions suspended, as it were. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, affect) is accompanied by vascular changes and consequentiy by changes in color, temperature and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its "suggestion mentale ".... (WP 428-9) Here, in the Will to Power, and earlier in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche offers a decidedly Freudian model of human drives annexed with his own intensified emphasis on the physiological signs of their kinesis: Inwardness grows as powerful drives that have been denied outward release by the establishment of peace and society seek compensation by turning inward in concert with the imagination. The thirst for enmity, cruelty, revenge, violence turns back, is repressed;... the drives are transformed into demons whom one fights, etc. (WP 202-3) Musical experience, for Nietzsche, disrupts this circularity and re-channels these drives into an outward expression. Nietzsche's picture of the listener is thus one of psycho-physiological dynamism, of circulating, combustible energies stored/repressed in cultural necessity and released explosively in a performed return to the primordial home. Indeed, the exemplary musical experience, for Nietzsche, is this return, one that, in its greatest intensity, would transport the listener out of a constrained and artificial everyday world of culture, and back into the liberating anarchy of nature. Such descriptions of musical transcendence in The Birth of Tragedy reflect this well-documented, rather ubiquitous concept that sound exists as the  36  mediating f o r c e b e t w e e n this, the w o r l d o f culture, and the ' o t h e r ' w o r l d , that o f nature and spirit: And now let us imagine how into this world, built on mere appearance and moderation and artificially dammed up, there penetrated, in tones ever more bewitching and alluring, the ecstatic sound of the Dionysian festival; how in these strains all of nature's excess in pleasure, grief and knowledge became audible, even in piercing shrieks; and let us ask ourselves what the psalmodizing artist of Apollo, with his phantom harp-sound, could mean in the face of this demonic folk-song! (46) Nietzsche  shows  a clear  reverence  f o r these m o m e n t s  when  the w o r l d  o f 'culture'  (understood i n terms o f an adherence t o reason a n d c o n f o r m i t y t o social n o r m s ) i s ruptured, penetrated b y the c o m p a r a t i v e l y untamed a n d m o r e intense expression o f e m o t i o n associated w i t h the ' n a t u r a l , ' the animal. N i e t z s c h e foregrounds the n o t i o n that it i s i n the fear o f this i n t e n s i t y — o f its uncertain e x p r e s s i o n s — t h a t humanity has b e c o m e  domesticated i n t h e  soothing security o f a herd morality. N i e t z s c h e instead calls f o r us t o c o m p o s e ourselves o u t o f this m o r e erratic u n c e r t a i n t y — h e calls f o r us t o embrace a m o r e d y n a m i c  rhythm.  From a superior viewpoint one desires the contrary: the ever-increasing dominion of evil, the growing emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest natural powers—the affects—into service. (WP 208) A d m i t t e d l y , t h e potentially f o m e n t i n g quality o f such passages m a y m a k e f o r a rather apprehensive endorsement o f N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding ( i f f o r any at all): such a m o d e l evokes a n unquestionably dangerous determinism rife w i t h the possibility o f violence and abuse, b u t is disturbingly u n c o n c e r n e d w i t h any associated m o r a l culpability. N o t t o dismiss these concerns, and perhaps o n l y t o increase any present queasiness, w e ought t o examine i n greater  detail N i e t z s c h e ' s  c l a i m that  a n enviable  enhancement  o f the communicative  functions is enjoyed t h r o u g h m u s i c a l intoxication, that a m o r e refined, i m p r o v e d sensory epistemology emerges w i t h i n this state.  37  Although it is often assumed that Nietzsche's aesthetics ultimately funnels into a narrow, perhaps even solipsistic, physiological reductionism, there also exists an opposite, radiating trajectory which situates this physiology in its thoroughly communicative role: The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures—it is the source of languages. This is where languages originate: the languages of tone as well as the languages of gestures and glances. The more complete phenomenon is always the beginning.... Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding.... One never communicates thoughts: one communicates movements, mimic [sic] signs, which we then trace back to thoughts. (WP 427-8) Although here he is addressing art experience in general, it is difficult not to interpret these comments as but a slightly more magnified account of the Dionysian scene presented in his early work. Catalyzing an extraordinary system of relations not carried out through linguistic means, musical performance unfolds in this interplay of bodily communication amongst the audience—as  audience members rendered largely reticent by the volume and social  significance of the performance, our bodies become sites of physical communication for and with other listeners, simultaneously transmitters and receivers of a multitude of'signals.' The momentum of our intoxication is one that, in part, gathers its intensity from an involvement within these audience relations, the manner in which we are, in some way, 'possessed' by these other listeners—the Dionysian scene, after all, is one of collective force, not individual aesthetic delight. Expressing this momentum in typically hyperbolic fashion, Nietzsche first tries to convey the sense of a certain cowardice, of a lame and feeble paralysis in those who resist indulging in the totality of such an intoxication: "But of course such poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called 'healthy-mindedness' looks when the glowing life of the Dionysian revelers roars past them" (BoT 37). In short, Nietzsche claims that life is indeed enhanced, that we can actually improve through such a possession.  38  Affirming Transgression: The Volatility of the Crowd F o r N i e t z s c h e , m u s i c a l performance opens a space i n w h i c h n e w a n d extraordinary possibilities o f h u m a n relations, that is, different possibilities from t h e t e m p e r e d rhythms o f everyday life, have an o p p o r t u n i t y t o emerge. T h e value o f such a p o s s e s s i o n is measured precisely i n terms o f its divergence from c o m m o n , potentially banal m o d e s o f discourse. O u r o w n i m p r o v e m e n t is then congruent w i t h the degree o f this c o l l e c t i v e divergence, w i t h the radicality o f the social experiment, and thus, at b o t t o m , w i t h its risk. F r o m o u t o f this risk emerge a l l the most p o w e r f u l and affirming m o m e n t s o f m u s i c a l elation that have l o n g been described t o b o n d c o m m u n i t i e s o f listeners. B u t , as risk, this v o l a t i l i t y also harbours the potential f o r danger. It is f o r e s h a d o w e d i n the acerbic arrogance o f N i e t z s c h e ' s comments about the ' g l o w i n g life' o f the D i o n y s i a n revelers: it is the m o m e n t u m o f their possession that carries t h e m r o a r i n g past the others, b u t it is o n l y b l i n d l u c k that keeps t h e m  from  carrying straight o n t h r o u g h and t r a m p l i n g those n o t caught u p i n their drive. A s E l i a s Canetti contends i n his b o o k ,  Crowds and Power, there is inhering i n any gathered mass the seeds o f  its possible eruption: " T h e destructiveness o f the c r o w d is often m e n t i o n e d as its most c o n s p i c u o u s quality, a n d there is n o denying the fact that it c a n b e o b s e r v e d everywhere, i n the most diverse countries a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n s " (19). T o lend endorsement t o t h e liberating nature o f this N i e t z s c h e a n anarchism, t o let it stand as t h e articulation o f an intense a n d transcendent  musical  ecstasis, is t o endorse  the undeniable  likelihood  that  some  performances w i l l either erupt into, o r specifically declare themselves t o be, sites o f violence, abuse, and d o m i n a t i o n . It m a y sound extreme, but a f e w c o n t e m p o r a r y examples s h o w that this is n o t merely a hypothetical concern, o r the d r a m a t i z i n g o f an alarmist. C i t i n g the p a r a d i g m a t i c example  39  which outlines the dangers of sanctioning a boisterous, ecstatic feeling of community in music, David Schwartz reminds the reader in his book, Listening Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture, that racist German skinheads draw the energy for their prescribed violence from the collective frenzy of their performances: [0]ne of Oi's long-term effects in its listeners is the production of a sense of community for skins in Germany. Its most common short-term effect is that it is sometimes used to incite acts of terror against foreigners.... (101)  An intimate feeling of community and an absolutely explicit mandate for terror, however, are by no means requisite in inflaming the violent impulse of the crowd: musical performance can also ignite the same will amongst total strangers. An Associated Press articlefromJuly 1999 describes that, in the wake of its finish in flames and rioting, the drug and alcohol fueled "Woodstock 1999" held in Rome, NY, had state police confirming reports of four alleged rapes (one apparently occurring in the mosh pit of the main stage during Limp Bizkit's performance) in addition to a number of other sexual assaults (Police). The article goes on to quote volunteer David Schneider's testimony on the number and the collective nature of these assaults: [These women] were pushed [into the mosh pit] against their will and really raped. From my vantage point, it looked initially like there was a struggle, and after that there were other people holding them down. It seemed like most of the crowd around was cheering them on. (Police)  We may here recall Nietzsche's comments made in his genealogy of the Dionysian, his description of its pre-Greek, barbarian past in festivals which "centered in extravagant sexual licentiousness, whose waves overwhelmed all family life and its venerable traditions; the most savage natural instincts were unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always seemed to me to be the real witches' brew" (BoT 39).  40  H o w e v e r , this same internally-focused brutality, i n w h i c h the v i o l e n c e o f the c r o w d is turned i n w a r d o n itself, exists n o t only amongst the a n o n y m i t y o f the mass event, b u t is present even i n decidedly smaller brands o f performance. I n his article/interview " G G A l l i n , T h e F i r s t A m e n d m e n t , a n d the L a w , " J o e C o u g h l i n relays a s u m m a r y d e s c r i p t i o n o f the n o t o r i o u s l y v i o l e n t performances o f since-deceased p u n k nihilist G G A l l i n t o  include nudity, bloodshed, onstage defecation (which Allin frequently eats and/or flings at the crowd), and the very real threat of personal injury; people do tend to panic, after all, and scramble for doors, among other things. Most of the blood, however, is Allin's own, drawn usually by his own hand. He pummels his face with microphones or shoves them up his ass, cracks bottles over his head and carves himself up with the remnants, dives into furniture, you name it. Often, the uninitiated will attack him as well, but Allin's immunity to pain invariably sends them scurrying. (Allin) D e s c r i b i n g t h e nature a n d value o f his performances d u r i n g a n i n t e r v i e w o n t h e Jerry  Springer Show o n M a y 5, 1993, A l l i n casually declares w i t h N i e t z s c h e a n c o n v i c t i o n his beneficent role i n h a r m i n g others: " I f y o u get raped at m y show, y o u ' r e p r o b a b l y better o f f f o r i t " (Jerry). A l l i n revels i n his self-confessedly mercenary and unrelenting v i e w o f human relations, steadfastly objecting t o any sense o f c o m m u n i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l o r audience i n either private o r p e r f o r m a n c e domains ( A l l i n ) . I n terms o f c o n t e m p o r a r y m u s i c a l performance, there does n o t exist, f o r audience and performer alike, a m o r e definitive and consistently recurring incarnation o f danger than a G G A l l i n show. E a c h performance explicitly, a n d rather paradoxically, centers o n constructing a space o f unrestrained freedom, a n d thus, i n N i e t z s c h e a n fashion, embraces t h e malice erupting w i t h i n it: negative liberty finds n o g r o u n d amidst the D i o n y s i a n scene. Indeed, the D i o n y s i a n is just the opposite: it is the space w h i c h affirms a l l possibilities associated w i t h intensity, i n c l u d i n g acts o f cruelty. H o w e v e r , w i t h i n this absence o f constraint, its positive c o r o l l a r y enjoys a r u n o f the f u l l gamut o f possibilities, f o r e v e r expressing i t s e l f i n entirely  41  unpredictable ways: here, it erupts in the terror of violence and sexual assault, but elsewhere fosters a more nurturing sense of community. Affirming Culture: The Articulation of Community  In order to understand the manner in which musical performance can bind an otherwise fragmented crowd of people, a rather detailed account of the event and those attending—including a description of the time prior to and following the actual performance—is necessary. Without a sense of these details, we risk a rather uninformative reiteration of the long-asserted maxim that music has the power to bind people together, and possibly forego what may be a rare opportunity to gain a more thorough grasp of this enigmatic process. Providing a clear example of exactly this power, Barbara Andersen, former editor of Vancouver's Discorder magazine, recollects a specific performance of The Need which closed the first night of a three-day conference for young feminist activists in Seattle, Washington in the summer of 1996: DiPasquale: Describe to me the circumstances of The Need show in Seattle. Andersen: The show was actually on the first night of a three-day conference at an activist community centre.... There were not a lot of older women or minority women.... There were a few tables set up and people selling, or rather, disseminating things.... I think it was uncomfortable for everybody because nobody knew what was supposed to be going on.... There were various discussions and bands that were mostiy pretty bad.... There were maybe 20 or 30 people at the place at the peak.... [The Need] had some fans who had come just to see them, who hadn't been there earlier, who were older, and kind of more flamboyant, and more dressed up, and more multi-ethnic than the crowd was at that point, and were very loud and aggressively supportive. So they set up in the middle of the room instead of at the back of one of the walls like the other bands had done.... So they played, and people got really excited about it.... They had the audience in a circle around them.... People just got really super amped and were jumping around.... It was all women at that point... The music was good but they made mistakes all the time, and whenever they would make mistakes they would stop the song and start back at the beginning or stop it altogether.... So it was very chaotic and ruptured music that didn't have any long ecstatic periods, but I think that made it more exciting. It was also very different from a lot of the bands we were hearing that weekend.... You could tell they were trying to do something experimental. D: So did their performance change the mood of the conference in any way? A: It made it worth sitting around and being incredibly bored for hours and I was in a much better mood than when I started.... It was fun and it also broke the ice with a lot of people  42  who were there, and I got to talking to them and having a friendly-ish rapport with them and it made it possible to sort of develop relationships. D: How do you think that happened? A: I think it just lightened the mood. Watching bands that aren't very good or entertaining is kind of like work, and in the context of this conference where it was kind of like supporting each other, it was like you were doing your job by standing there and clapping or being excited or just standing there and watching the band.... A lot of those bands are hard to evaluate outside of that context, that community context, or that community social work perspective [laughs]. D: What was it about The Need's performance that sparked this conference into a place where people became a little more comfortable with one another? How do you suspect that their performance broke the ice? A: I think the fans that they brought or that showed up just for them were important because they were kind of goofy and outspoken and they maybe provided models for behaviour that people didn't have, like that you didn't have to be deadly serious, and you could heckle the band and you weren't going to hurt their feelings and make them cry, you could actually joke around and act silly and that everyone had to loosen up a bit. And so they loosened people up... There's also an understandable amazement that even women who are involved in feminist art have when they see women who are either very technically skilled or very creatively driven, who have a very forceful vision. A lot of the music that was being made in that community was very same-ey... and muddy, and maybe kind of wishy-washy, like it didn't really know where it was going—it didn't really have to go anywhere because it was just the act of making music that was the statement in the first place. It was more important that it was women making it than the actual content of the music. That was what things were being evaluated on the basis of. [The Need] weren't incredibly technically skilled, but they were original, which was amazing. According to Andersen, The Need's performance—with its comparative originality, presence, and strength of vision—changed the mood of the conference from an uneasy boredom to at least a space of relative social ease. Aesthetically, it articulated, in a way that perhaps language was unable to, a commonality they shared and a purpose for their conference. However, as she contends, the band's refusal to play through their mistakes meant that their performance offered no extended periods of musical ecstasis and that its success was as much due to the participation of a few boisterous audience members as it was their ventures into experimentalism. Andersen describes a scene of visible excitement, and even its physical expression from the audience, but nowhere in her comments is the suggestion that this performance initiated, in Nietzschean terms, anything as radical as a  43  return t o nature, a return t o the p r i m o r d i a l home. It seems, rather, that it w a s actually a n intensification o f presence i n the w o r l d o f culture, indeed, a n articulation o f exactly their place as a  specific c o m m u n i t y w i t h i n a culture that t o o k place d u r i n g this performance.  A n d e r s e n ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f this particular m u s i c a l space thus sits rather restlessly w i t h i n a N i e t z s c h e a n f r a m e w o r k o f m u s i c a l performance, demanding greater breadth t o account f o r the m y r i a d contingencies suggested i n her analysis.  Stress Fractures: Nietzsche's Conflicts A s a result o f the A p o l l i n i a n / D i o n y s i a n strife, there is still, i n terms o f h u m a n agency, an undeniable t e n s i o n b e t w e e n a n i n d i v i d u a l and a collective i n t o x i c a t i o n i n N i e t z s c h e ' s w o r k . N i e t z s c h e ' s account points t o a n exertion and increase o f i n d i v i d u a l strength w h i l e simultaneously p a r t a k i n g i n a c o l l e c t i v e transformation gesturing t o w a r d s h o m o g e n i z a t i o n . A s N i e t z s c h e observes i n  The Will to Power:  The condition of pleasure called intoxication is precisely an exalted feeling of power— The sensations of space and time are altered: tremendous distances are surveyed and, as it were, for the first time apprehended; the extension of vision over greater masses...; strength as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as suppleness and pleasure in movement, as dance, as levity and presto.... (WP 420-1) A n d yet, another sketch o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thoughts o n m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e sends a message o f subordination: The will to unity (because unity tyrannizes—namely, over the listener, spectator); but inability to tyrannize over oneself concerning the main thing—namely in regard to the work itself (omitting, shortening, clarifying, simplifying). Overwhelming through masses (Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine). (WP 448) A l t h o u g h t h e N i e t z s c h e a n m o d e l articulates t h e volatility a n d intensity o f a collective, c o m m u n a l experience, the c o m p l e x i t y and diversity o f such e x p r e s s i o n s — b e i n g c o m p o s e d f r o m out o f a host o f personal, cultural, and historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s — e x p a n d s b e y o n d the scope  o f this  model's  binary  oppositions.  Nietzsche's  vacillating  descriptions  o f the  A p o l l i n i a n and D i o n y s i a n forces, and his still uneasy settlement o n the dissonance o f their  44  coupling in  The Birth of Tragedy, betray a cognizance o f this tension, b u t even i n his  r e c o g n i t i o n that the m u s i c a l rapture o f D i o n y s u s remains f r a m e d  within and by the cultural  m i l i e u o f A p o l l o , N i e t z s c h e ' s account gives o n l y the p r o v i s i o n a l suggestion o f culture as a mediating f o r c e i n the m u s i c a l possession itself, o v e r l o o k i n g the finer details o f its operation and f o c u s i n g o n l y o n the m o m e n t s o f its apparent exodus. A l t h o u g h he h i m s e l f revels i n this transcendence as a partial destabilization o f the d i c h o t o m y itself, the n o t i o n that the listener oscillates e x c l u s i v e l y b e t w e e n nature and culture, w h o l l y leaving the one t o b e i n the other, is a somewhat crude m o d e l . W i t h o u t question, there is a strong, transformative quality i n the musical event, o u t o f w h i c h n e w possibilities o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e realized; b u t rather than m a r k i n g o r preserving these k i n d s o f dualities, it ought t o b e c o n c e i v e d as illuminating a simultaneous experience o f both, o r perhaps o f suggesting a t e m p o r a r y fusion. It is the destructuring o f these sorts o f dichotomies that H e i d e g g e r is able t o achieve i n  Being and  Time. P r o b i n g his m o r e d e v e l o p e d hermeneutics w i t h a n attention t o the shortcomings o f N i e t z s c h e ' s m o d e l can contribute t o a richer understanding o f m u s i c a l experience n o t as an escape f r o m , but rather, an i l l u m i n a t i o n of this ' w o r l d o f culture.' N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f D i o n y s i a n rapture as a n ecstatic bliss i n w h i c h o n e stands t e m p o r a r i l y outside o f oneself, as a c l i m a c t i c p u n c t u r i n g o f c i v i l i z a t i o n ' s v e i l i n w h i c h one regains an affiliation w i t h a m o r e p r i m o r d i a l , collective nature, t h o u g h i n its o w n manner a reveling i n the destructuring o f Cartesian dichotomies is f o r H e i d e g g e r still exemplary o f the strongest metaphysical prejudice, an inverted P l a t o n i s m w h i c h merely extols the sensuous i n displacement o f the supersensuous ideal. I n many w a y s , H e i d e g g e r is quite justified i n describing N i e t z s c h e as " t h e last  metaphysician o f the W e s t " ( W P K M 8). Indeed, f o r  H e i d e g g e r , u p h o l d i n g the n o t i o n that one c o u l d enjoy the k i n d o f possession a n d collapse  45  described b y N i e t z s c h e w o u l d necessarily presuppose the p o s i t i n g o f its opposite: a state o f unmediated and unadulterated being, a static, P l a t o n i c purity. Still, even w i t h this perpetual tension at every turn, N i e t z s c h e has managed to place us inside the m u s i c a l event, has suggested that the site o f p e r f o r m a n c e is one o f collective audience c o m m u n i c a t i o n as m u c h as it is one o f i n d i v i d u a l aesthetic delight. A n d although it is generally phrased i n terms o f internal drives, N i e t z s c h e does address a certain c o r p o r e a l element i n this sense o f c o m m u n i o n w i t h other listeners. P e r h a p s the greatest element i n his analysis o f m u s i c is the sense that its value is c o n s u m m a t e w i t h the degree o f departure f r o m the e v e r y d a y — m u s i c is capable o f catalyzing a space o f unpredictable and unique social relations f o r some p e r i o d o f time. E v e n w h i l e retaining the v i t a l c o m p o n e n t s i n N i e t z s c h e ' s m o d e l o f performance, an examination o f H e i d e g g e r ' s  hermeneutics  destabilize the N i e t z s c h e a n conflict  o f listening, m o o d ,  attunement, and art  p a r a d i g m that, as A n d e r s e n ' s  e x a m p l e has  can  shown,  obstructs a m o r e differentiated understanding o f the m u s i c a l event. T h e r e is i n musical e x p e r i e n c e — a n d perhaps in the D i o n y s i a n i t s e l f — a broader range o f possibilities, a w i d e r h o r i z o n o f the p r i m o r d i a l , that H e i d e g g e r w i l l articulate i n his d i s c u s s i o n o f listening.  46  CHAPTER III HEIDEGGER'S AURALITY Heidegger as Musical Thinker V a s t l y different as they are stylistically, H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o c u s shows a clear respect f o r N i e t z s c h e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach. E v i d e n t n o t o n l y from his systematic f o u r - v o l u m e w o r k o n N i e t z s c h e b u t also visible m o r e generally i n his re-visitation o f certain themes, H e i d e g g e r  is (especially i n  Being and Time), l i k e N i e t z s c h e , c o n c e r n e d w i t h  problems o f interpretation i n terms o f everyday experience. E v e r y d a y aural experience is o n e of  the themes  Heidegger  re-visits t h r o u g h o u t  his p h i l o s o p h i c a l  career,  urging  a re-  acquaintance w i t h the o f t e n - o v e r l o o k e d w o r l d o f sound. H o w e v e r , germane t o o u r culturalhistorical blind spot i n relation t o the sonic is the l a c k o f attention p a i d t o H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p r o v i s i o n a l hermeneutics o f listening appearing i n his texts. D e s p i t e his comments o n acoustic experience i n  Being and Time, " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , " " T h e W a y t o  L a n g u a g e , " as w e l l as " L o g o s " — a theme spanning a significant p o r t i o n o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l c a r e e r — a m o r e d e v e l o p e d theory o f H e i d e g g e r ' s aurality i n relation t o the m u s i c a l event has yet t o be constructed. W h i l e Ihde's e x p l o r a t i o n into the p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f listening certainly furthers o u r understanding o f H e i d e g g e r ' s acoustic sensibilities, he stops short o f c o m b i n i n g it w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s descriptions o f being-with i n Being  and Time, and c o m m u n i t y i n " T h e  O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t . " A s w i l l b e c o m e clear as o u r analysis m o v e s on, some critics l i k e J o h n R. C o v a c h , R i c h a r d C o c h r a n e , and M i c h a e l E l d r e d see h o w H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutics can be applied specifically t o a m o r e contextual m o d e l o f music, b u t none observe h o w his w o r k m a y coalesce into an important, detailed theory o f audience relations i n m u s i c a l  47  performance. Indeed, it is not immediately obvious that this could ever be a successful enterprise: Heidegger never really engages with music in any rigorous fashion. Heidegger takes a much different approach to sonic experience than Nietzsche, not investigating music with quite the same explicitness  or intensity, but certainly gesturing  towards a kind of quiescent musicality in everyday listening. It is clear that Heidegger does not 'know' music in the manner Nietzsche does: from the inside out, as a composer of at least passable merit. Nevertheless, in clear contra-distinction to the visual, geometric epistemology of Descartes, Heidegger urges a re-acquaintance with the often-neglected world of sound as part of our 'knowledge.' This is not to suggest that Heidegger derides our sense of sight as inherently  inauthentic,  or  somehow  responsible  for  our  contemporary  (Cartesian)  interpretation of Being, but there is a noticeable sonic motif running through his work that evinces an increasing sensitivity and thoughtfulness towards human listening, an engagement with sound not often found in the works of other philosophers. Outlining this general trajectory of Heidegger's aurality in his book,  Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger,  David Halliburton declares his ambition to examine "the meaning of Heidegger's growing concern with music, with dance, with the language of gesture, with Eastern modes of thinking and presentation"  (200).  Indeed, entwined within Heidegger's discussions of some of his most major themes— communication, mood, belonging,  and truth—are strands of this aurality. Tracing the  development of his acoustic sensibility not only reveals its explicit presence at some of the most pivotal moments of his thought, but as the fundamental metaphor for his project of destructuring the antinomies of metaphysics. Despite his infamous  Kehre, his turn away from  a single, unified understanding of Being and towards a more pluralistic, differentiated idea of  48  more localized human practices, he never stopped pursuing new, imaginative formulations to challenge the disjunctive picture of human experience erected by Western metaphysics (Dreyfus, HFSAP). And although it is generally assumed that Heidegger's thought can be divided according to this turn, with the theme of human listening he remains remarkably consistent, at times giving near-verbatim repetitions of his earlier formulations. The change in his acoustic sensibility can only be expressed as an intensified interest, not as a departure. If, cursorily, we consider that sound is transient and immersive, that music catalyzes an ecstatic unity amongst its listeners, and that listening is receptivity, Heidegger's affinity for the sonic, as becoming, as unifying, as unbidden, seems rather appropriate: hearing is the sense that overcomes distance. It is this de-severance that is, as Halliburton contends, the essence of Heidegger's 'poetic thinking': The strain, and hence the pathos of Heidegger's poetic thinking, arises partly from the desire to evoke a sense of the unity of things that has been turned, by metaphysics, into a disunity and opposition; hence, by the measure of metaphysics, the resulting discourse must itself appear contradictory. (19) Listing more specifically the various facets of this project, Schurmann counts Heidegger's attentiveness to the aural among his integral aims: The same methodic retreat makes it necessary to dismiss the dualism of subject and object; to construe phenomenology as interpretation rather than reflection; to follow the arrival and withdrawal of things in the horizon of world instead of remainingrivetedto entities constantly present; to sap the prestige of seeing over hearing; finally, to deconstruct the theories of the constitution of universals for consciousness. (69-70) In first tracing Heidegger's aurality and then extending his understanding of human listening into his own description of the art event, the hegemonies of metaphysics which have been named as the underpinning of an impoverished model of musical performance from the outset can be destructured and replaced with a more comprehensive, contextual, and differentiated account of the musical event. In every component of this analysis—in listening, communication, being-with others, and art as event—mood and attunement emerge  49  as the central themes o f inquiry and must therefore be c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y u n d e r s t o o d from the outset, i f a coherent synthesis o f his earlier and later thought is t o be achieved i n a final m o d e l o f performance.  Primordial Being-in-the-World F r o m the outset o f  Being and Time,  H e i d e g g e r p r o v i d e s r e c u r r i n g reminders as to the  importance o f t a k i n g the p r i m o r d i a l , the elemental, the primary, as the h o r i z o n o f his examination. T h e s e ' m o d e s o f b e i n g , ' f o r m e r l y associated b y N i e t z s c h e w i t h D i o n y s i a n rapture n o w b e c o m e quite radically displaced amidst H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutics: access to the p r i m o r d i a l is no  longer  o n l y possible t h r o u g h cataclysmic i n t o x i c a t i o n , but  is  instead  permeated t h r o u g h o u t D a s e i n ' s everyday being-in-the-world. T h e r e is a sense i n w h i c h this theme o f p r i m o r d i a l i t y rests w i t h i n his greater o n t o l o g i c a l project i n s o m e w h a t c o r o l l a r y fashion. L i k e N i e t z s c h e ' s D i o n y s i a n ' g r o u n d o f existence,' the f u n c t i o n o f the p r i m o r d i a l i n H e i d e g g e r can l i k e w i s e be characterized i n terms o f its transparency, not i n the sense o f clarity and explicit presence, but just the opposite: l i k e a pane o f glass w h i c h makes visible the landscape outside, but must itself recede f r o m v i e w ; it is crucial, perpetually operative, but invisible, and thus concealed f r o m ready apprehension. H e i d e g g e r is, h o w e v e r , m o r e f o r t h c o m i n g in addressing the enigmatic nature o f his o n t o l o g i c a l project as it relates to his understanding o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d . H e i d e g g e r takes the brute possibility o f even p o s i n g the question o f B e i n g to suggest that w e are already operating w i t h at least a p r o v i s i o n a l sense about the p r o p e r h o r i z o n o f inquiry, a v a g u e g l i m p s e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e that w i l l maneuver from w i t h i n , and thus illuminate, D a s e i n "as it is  and for the most part—in investigation, H e i d e g g e r  its average  everydayness"  (BT  37-8). T h r o u g h  proximally  a phenomenological  seeks to " a r r i v e at those p r i m o r d i a l experiences i n w h i c h  50  we  achieved o u r first w a y s o f determining the nature o f B e i n g — t h e w a y s w h i c h have g u i d e d u s ever since" ( B T 4 4 ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s project then, i n terms o f primordiality, is thus t o examine this primary and perpetual m o d e o f interpretation t o u n c o v e r its structure i n its functioning 'transparency.' C o n v e y i n g this k i n d o f elemental, accessible understanding, H e i d e g g e r ' s comments o n D a s e i n and t e m p o r a l i t y i n D i v i s i o n T w o o f Being  and Time  are perhaps illustrative o f  such a p r i m o r d i a l focus. A s H e i d e g g e r wishes t o re-institute D a s e i n ' s c i r c a d i a n reference t o time, "the ' t h e n ' w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n concerns itself gets dated i n terms o f something w h i c h is connected w i t h getting bright, a n d w h i c h is connected w i t h it i n t h e closest k i n d o f environmental i n v o l v e m e n t — n a m e l y , the rising o f the s u n " ( B T 4 1 4 ) . A s J o h n Sallis puts it in his b o o k ,  Echoes: After Heidegger: [S]uch a dating is distinctively public: it introduces a publicly available measure, the sun, a "natural clock," which then motivates the production of clocks in the usual sense. It is thus that Dasein's reckoning withtimeis, first of all, neither environmental nor mathematical but rather astronomical, solar, taking its measure from the sky. (68)  True, any precise sense o f the p r i m o r d i a l still remains (and w i l l perhaps always remain) rather a p o c r y p h a l , b u t f r o m this example w e c a n see that H e i d e g g e r ' s f o c u s does indeed illuminate those n o r m a l l y 'transparent' foundations o f o u r everyday interpretations such that they at least take o n a k i n d o f translucent presence: quietly and constantly, the k i n d o f light that shines at each m o m e n t situates us w i t h i n a certain space i n the trajectory o f o u r day. T h e task f o r a p r i m o r d i a l understanding o f sound is then t o e m p l o y H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d , w i t h its v a g u e yet expansive h o r i z o n o f primordiality, i n order t o regain o u r m o r e elemental affiliation w i t h the sonic, one since concealed b y the pervasive scientism o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y ' w o r l d - p i c t u r e . ' A s N i e t z s c h e expresses t h e D i o n y s i a n i n terms o f music, this p r i m o r d i a l i t y indeed b e c o m e s available t h r o u g h H e i d e g g e r ' s aurality:  51  It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening [Horchen] becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perceptions of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. (BT 207) H e i d e g g e r ' s acoustic primordiality, l i k e N i e t z s c h e ' s D i o n y s i a n , is permeated w i t h a language o f access and immediacy, but it is also something that is at o n c e m y s t e r i o u s l y concealed t h r o u g h its c o n c o m i t a n t m i s t r u s t — i t has been, i n a sense, repressed. H o w e v e r , the sheer scope o f H e i d e g g e r ' s p r i m o r d i a l i t y flattens a n d extends that o f N i e t z s c h e . It is i n this foundation  o f Dasein's  primordial  N i e t z s c h e ' s peaks o f m u s i c a l frame  hearing  that  Heidegger's  acoustic  horizon  caps  ecstasis. R a r e l y i n an appropriately 'artificial and c o m p l i c a t e d  o f m i n d t o hear a pure noise,' D a s e i n ' s sonic possession, its attunement w i t h a  meaningful w o r l d o f sound, is all but perpetual, and thus, i n its o w n ecstatic libration, bisects the baseline p u r i t y o f N i e t z s c h e ' s non-ecstatic w o r l d o f culture and the escalating rapture o f his ecstatic w o r l d o f n a t u r e — p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l listening b e c o m e s o u r point o f access t o a m u c h b r o a d e r understanding o f the p r i m o r d i a l (BT 207). D e s p i t e D e r r i d a ' s critique o f H e i d e g g e r ' s p h o n o c e n t r i s m i n his  Of Grammatology, a t e m p o r a r y r e - o r d e r i n g o f the senses  in w h i c h a phenomenologically-based hearing plays a p r i m a r y role w i l l a l l o w u s t o re-visit and re-interpret the D i o n y s i a n i n a c o n t e m p o r a r y context.  The Place of Sound and Mood in Being and Time In o r d e r t o f o l l o w his aurality properly, t o understand all the v a r i o u s extensions that H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f h u m a n listening can p r o v i d e f o r a m o r e differentiated understanding o f m u s i c a l performance, it is first necessary t o have a sense o f his general a i m i n  Being and  Time, as he seeks t o lay bare the structure o f D a s e i n as ' t h r o w n p r o j e c t i o n , ' as the being that finds itself already i n a w o r l d that demands it continually interpret i t s e l f and its w o r l d 'as' something (BT 185).  52  T h e c r u x o f H e i d e g g e r ' s project i n his m a g n u m opus o f 1926, destabilize  the  various  dichotomies—mind/body,  Being and Time, is t o  subject/object,  theory/practice, e t c . — a s s o c i a t e d w i t h o u r Cartesian w o r l d - v i e w , a  nature/culture,  framework  so deeply  ingrained that it n o w enjoys all the natural i m m e d i a c y o f c o m m o n sense. H e i d e g g e r criticizes the history o f W e s t e r n metaphysics w i t h its inquiry only into, as he puts it, the ' B e i n g o f beings' and urges us t o re-discover, t o again think about, the f o r g o t t e n question o f ' B e i n g ' itself. A t the outset H e i d e g g e r asserts that, i n order t o challenge this metaphysics, he wishes to raise a different question, the question o f a proper o n t o l o g y w h i c h w i l l b e p e r f o r m e d  from  out o f a different m e t h o d o l o g i c a l approach. H e i d e g g e r rejects t h e m e t h o d s o f traditional o n t o l o g y w h i c h have been u s e d t o study o n l y the B e i n g o f b e i n g s — a s b r a c k e t e d o f f from t h e e v e r y d a y — i n o r d e r t o y i e l d some indubitable f o u n d a t i o n f o r h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . Instead, H e i d e g g e r turns t o w a r d a m e t h o d o l o g y that w i l l f o c u s o n o u r b e i n g - i n v o l v e d w i t h , and o u r c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d s , objects and entities i n the everyday w o r l d as they s h o w themselves i n the context o f s u c h e n c o u n t e r i n g — f o r H e i d e g g e r , this is  phenomenology. R a t h e r than f o c u s  o n the objects themselves, p o s i t i n g t h e m (as D e s c a r t e s does) as distinct, separate, space-time locations, H e i d e g g e r w i s h e s t o m a k e the v e r y context, the relationships between, the beingi n v o l v e d w i t h , his subject o f inquiry. H e i d e g g e r believes that, p r i o r t o theory and theorizing, the w o r l d is intelligible u p o n a c o m p l e x b a c k g r o u n d o f shared practices, o u r 'being-in-the-world,' and cannot b e sufficiently u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n these Cartesian dichotomies. H i s examination from w i t h i n these practices s h o w s that, a l t h o u g h it is possible t o engage w i t h objects from a distanced perspective o f pure beholding, that is, t o study the B e i n g o f beings, this is actually a derivative m o d e o f encountering that o n l y seems like the most immediate a n d natural w a y o f apprehending  53  because Being has been so systematically misinterpreted as something static, as constant presence-at-hand. More common during one's day is to be involved in shared practices, to cope, to comport oneself towards objects and other human beings without any strong evidence that supports a constant theorizing about one's activity; in terms of objects, things do not show up with the estranged purity of a 'mere' object-thing, but rather,firstand for the most part as the familiar and ready-to-hand. As Dasein, we are always interpreting the world, always taking "something as something" and thus, in terms of our sonic interpretations, are not generally in the "very artificial and complicatedframeof mind to hear a 'pure noise'" but instead hear the sound of the ready-to-hand: we hear the "motorcycle as a motorcycle" (BT 189, 206,7). Heidegger describes this immediacy in "The Origin of the Work of Art": "Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves" (152). To use Ihde's terms, Heidegger attempts to retract sound from the 'realm of mute objects,' and once again let it speak as a worldly phenomenon. As described from the outset of this discussion, our seemingly innocuous interpretations of sound and music as things present-at-hand has been shown to have profound effect on the social relations of musical performance— understanding this immediacy of sound and music as ready-to-hand will contribute significantly to the overcoming  of the metaphysical distance responsible for the  contemporary picture of performance thus ingrained. For Heidegger, this kind of everyday encountering is as radically historical as - Dasein's own existentiell understanding of itself at any particular moment: transient, as the present arises out of a particular past in terms of some possible future. As a historicized and historicizing entity which interprets, Dasein discloses its world not in a mode of detached, theoretical reflection but from within the scope of its ever-present moods, those states that  54  allow the w o r l d t o s h o w up 'as s o m e t h i n g ' at all. A s H u b e r t L . D r e y f u s puts it i n his b o o k , Being-in-the-World, as this entity w h i c h is attuned m o o d w i s e t o its w o r l d , D a s e i n always encounters things " i n some specific w a y , as attractive, threatening, interesting, b o r i n g , frustrating, etc."  (175). Indeed,  it is t h r o u g h the anarchic uncertainty o f these m o o d s that the  ready-to-hand, and thus the sounds of those familiar entities, w i l l s h o w up as mattering: Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its stateof-mind, had not already submitted itself [sich schon angewiesen] to having entities withinthe-world "matter" to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance.... It is precisely when we see the 'world' unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the readyto-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. (BT 177) H e i d e g g e r i s prepared t o declare this pre-cognitive i m m e d i a c y o f m o o d m o r e primary, m o r e acute, and m o r e t h o r o u g h than the subsequent rational t h e o r i z i n g generally p r i v i l e g e d as the process o f true understanding: " [ T ] h e possibilities o f disclosure w h i c h b e l o n g t o c o g n i t i o n reach far t o o short a w a y c o m p a r e d w i t h the p r i m o r d i a l disclosure b e l o n g i n g t o m o o d s , i n w h i c h D a s e i n is b r o u g h t before its B e i n g as ' t h e r e ' " ( B T 173).  T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the  p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y o f m o o d and the derivative quality o f that k i n d o f b e h o l d i n g w h i c h makes a c o n c e r t e d effort t o diminish its role i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — t o isolate sound and music  from  their c o n t e x t — w i l l p r o v e  k e y i n executing o u r critique  o f acoustics a n d  aesthetics alike. H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutics, moreover, can also help u s articulate, i n a m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d manner, t h e positions o f those critics w h o are clearly o n the trail o f a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l understanding o f aural experience.  Resonance: An Attunement to Context I n asserting D a s e i n and w o r l d as a relationship o f attunement, H e i d e g g e r sets h i m s e l f apart f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n w h i c h , i n its interpretation o f b e i n g as constant presence, c o u l d o n l y portray the uncertainty and capriciousness o f m o o d as an obstacle to be  55  o v e r c o m e , t o be, as m u c h as possible, cast aside so that an objective observer might observe an objective w o r l d . B u t , f o r H e i d e g g e r , this objectivity o f either D a s e i n o r w o r l d is a n illusion: m o o d s ( a n d D a s e i n ' s thrownness into a w o r l d that has been interpreted f o r it already) i n f o r m the nature o f o u r everyday interpretations t o a m u c h greater extent than w e may be w i l l i n g t o accept. C o u n t e r i n g this underestimation o f m o o d , D r e y f u s contends that "far f r o m being fleeting as the tradition has supposed, m o o d s settle i n l i k e the weather a n d tend t o perpetuate themselves. F o r example, w h e n I a m annoyed, n e w events, even those w h i c h w h e n I a m j o y f u l s h o w u p as challenging o r amusing, s h o w u p as g r o u n d s f o r further annoyance" ( B i W 174). T h e pervasiveness and constancy o f these v a r i o u s m o o d s m a k e f o r a fundamental difficulty i n discerning, w i t h absolute precision, their respective natures and the manner i n w h i c h they influence, o r perhaps, constitute, o u r interpretations, but " i n every case D a s e i n always has some m o o d " ( B T 173). L i k e Cartesian accounts o f objects as things present-at-hand, analogous theories o f s o u n d — i n p s y c h o a c o u s t i c s and m u s i c theory a l i k e — seeking t o f o r g e an inextricable link between specific sounds and specific affects ignore this p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l (and thus e q u i v o c a l ) g r o u n d o f interpretation that is almost always at play. In fact, it is this k i n d o f mechanistic theory o f correspondence Heidegger  seeks t o undermine  through  a discussion  [Ubereinstimmung] that  o f t h e interrelationship  o f voice  [Einstimme] a n d m o o d [Stimmung] as a 'felt sense' o r attunement [Bejindlichkeii]. I n his book,  Poetics of Resistance, M i c h a e l R o t h quotes a k e y passage from H e i d e g g e r ' s essay,  " W h a t is P h i l o s o p h y ? " , i n w h i c h he insists, somewhat paradoxically, that the  precision o f  correspondence is f o u n d e d o n attunement:  Philosophia is the expressly accomplished correspondence which speaks insofar as it considers the appeal of the Being of being. The correspondence listens to the voice of the appeal. What appeals to us as the voice [Stimme] of Being evokes our correspondence... Being as such determines speaking in such a way that language is attuned (accorder) to the Being of being. Correspondence is necessary and... always attuned \gestimmtes], and not just  56  accidentally and occasionally. It is an attunement [Gestimmtheif]. And only on the basis of the attunement (disposition) does the language of correspondence obtain its precision, its tuning [Be-stimmtheit].  As something tuned and attuned [ge-stimmtes und be-stimmtes), correspondence really exists in a tuning [Stimmung]. (131) A t once e s c h e w i n g t h e rigidity o f conventional notions o f c o r r e s p o n d e n c e and y e t still retaining an adequate connectedness, it is H e i d e g g e r ' s appeal t o o u r a c o u s t i c sensibilities o f attunement that immediately enriches o u r sense o f correspondence as a relation that w e free a c c o r d i n g t o the contingencies o f interpretation. A s the etymologies o f the w o r d s associated w i t h 'attunement' suggest, it is t h r o u g h m o o d  [Stimmung] that this resonance is felt.  H e i d e g g e r ' s acoustic w o r l d , then, is one that is c o m p o s e d o u t o f m a n y different v o i c e s that c o n v e r g e w i t h and resonate w i t h many different m o o d s — n o t  correspondence  between w o r d and thing, but a contingent and ephemeral event as a c o m i n g - i n t o resonance w i t h a v o i c e d m o o d , as a relation w i t h a context. Indeed, it is because o u r hearing so acutely places u s ' s o m e w h e r e ' — p h y s i c a l l y and e x i s t e n t i a l l y — t h a t H e i d e g g e r exploits a number o f telling e t y m o l o g i e s i n t h e G e r m a n w h i c h elicit this essential l i n k b e t w e e n hearing a n d situatedness. L a t e r i n his career, i n " L o g o s , " H e i d e g g e r offers the reader the strikingly close c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the verb, hbren (to listen) and the verb  gehdren (to belong). In Being and  Time, h o w e v e r , he chooses to exploit the express musicality and aurality i n the 'Stimm- r o o t (referring t o v o i c i n g , tuning) o f Stimmung ( n o w m o o d , but o r i g i n a l l y referring t o the tuning o f a m u s i c a l instrument) together w i t h the  'befind r o o t (referring t o place, situatedness) i n  order t o c o n v e y the essential n o t i o n that it is as m o o d that D a s e i n is attuned t o itself i n its context:  An entity of the character of Dasein is its "there" in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself [sich befindet] in its thrownness. In an attunement [Befindlichkeit] Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense offindingitself in the mood that it has [gestimmtes Sichbefinden]. (174)  57  (Here, a n d hereafter, M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n s o n ' s p e r i o d i c translation o f Stimmung a n d  Befindlichkeit as 'state-of-mind' shall instead be rendered as ' m o o d ' o r 'attunement' i n order t o preserve t h e m u s i c a l overtones i n t h e G e r m a n . ) I n h i s b o o k ,  The Role of Mood in  Heidegger's Ontology, B r u c e W . B a l l a r d is able t o gather precisely the essential aspects o f m o o d as this contextualization: In Heidegger's own use of the 'Stimm-' stem, the musical meaning is undoubtedly primary. The most important point to be gathered from this usage is that attunement is always being tuned to. Attunement is only possible as a relation within a context. As a basic state of Dasein then, it expresses an essential contextualization, Being-tfiere. The musical tuning metaphor also brings out the pre-cognitive, pre-intellectual nature of mood. (28) W i t h m o o d as the nexus o f his n o t i o n o f interpretation, H e i d e g g e r formulates a situated understanding contextual  o f everyday  understanding  acoustic  experience  o f musical  that  performance.  c a n b e extended N o t only  central  into  a n equally  t o interpretation  generally, but a l s o — a s intimated i n the e t y m o l o g i c a l history o f the G e r m a n Stimmung as the t u n i n g o f a m u s i c a l i n s t r u m e n t — o f paramount importance t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f acoustic experience, m o o d plays a m a j o r role i n those c o m p o n e n t s o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t that w i l l p r o v e m o s t useful f o r o u r discussion: listening, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , m u s i c a l listening, and beingw i t h others ( B T 172 f.3). Indeed, m o o d is the language o f o u r attunement as being-in-thew o r l d , o u r m o s t elemental and p r i m o r d i a l means o f disclosure. U n d e r s t a n d i n g its i m p o r t a n c e i n D a s e i n ' s being-in-the w o r l d , aurality is thus the central c o n c e r n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n as shared attunement  (MitBefindlichkeif) i n Being and Time. H i s assertion o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n as this socially available, shared understanding suggests a m o d e l that can b e later applied i n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e operations performance.  58  of a  collective attunement d u r i n g m u s i c a l  Listening as Openness, Communication as Shared Attunement H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n functions m u c h differently than c o n t e m p o r a r y models  espoused b y philosophers camped o n either side o f the internalism/externalism  debate, w h o s e m o d e l s rely o n the subject/object distinction and the n o t i o n that ' w o r d - t h i n g s ' are used t o express intentional states between such subjects. H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y challenges this  common  explanation,  contending  that  "communication  is never  anything  like  a  c o n v e y i n g o f experiences, such as opinions o r wishes, f r o m the interior o f one subject into the interior o f a n o t h e r " ( B T 2 0 5 ) . Instead o f f o c u s i n g o n the beliefs, desires, and intentional states o f individuals  as expressing a strict  correspondence  between  word  a n d thing,  H e i d e g g e r understands the possibility o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n as g r o u n d e d i n its p u b l i c life as discourse:  "The existential foundation of language is discourse or talk" ( B T 203). A n d  although the discursive c o m m u n i c a t i o n H e i d e g g e r describes is certainly t h e m o s t c o m m o n , everyday k i n d o f occurrence, its ontologico-existential structure includes the r i c h c o m p l e x i t y o f any  oral discourse: the musicality o f speech, b e i n g - w i t h others, m o o d , hearing, a n d  silence. W h i l e , as H e i d e g g e r states, " L a n g u a g e can be b r o k e n u p into w o r d - T h i n g s w h i c h are present-at-hand," this does n o t offer, as he w i l l later p u t it i n  The Basic Problems of  Phenomenology, an adequate understanding o f its w o r l d l y operation ( B T 2 0 4 ; my gloss): Language is not identical with the sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary; instead, because language, so far as it is, is as the Dasein is, because it exists, it is historical. (208) H e i d e g g e r continually resists the k i n d o f stability these abstractions w o u l d offer, and instead always stresses the ephemerality a n d contingency o f language's w o r l d l y e x i s t e n c e — i n d e e d , it is the aspects and operations o f these situated v o i c i n g s that H e i d e g g e r attempts t o account f o r i n his analysis o f discourse. O n g , i n his examination o f o r a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is equally as  59  adamant t o resist the rigidity o f linguistic meaning, and his critique offers a p r o v i s i o n a l sense o f h o w this w o r l d l i n e s s is, i n part, constituted:  The oral mind is uninterested in definitions. Words acquire their meanings only from their always insistent actual habitat, which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other words, but includes also gestures, vocal inflections, facial expressions, and the entire human, existential setting in which the real, spoken word also occurs. (47) W h i l e the physicality o f gestures a n d facial expressions w i l l most certainly b e an important c o m p o n e n t i n e x a m i n i n g audience relations later as w e examine F o u c a u l t , O n g ' s intimation o f the musicality o f speech o r ' v o c a l inflections' opens u p the possibility t o first analyze h o w this m u s i c a l c o m p o n e n t w o r k s t o appropriate what is, f o r H e i d e g g e r , the essential aspect o f discourse, namely, m o o d . A s s e r t i n g the explicit musicality o f these ' v o c a l inflections,' T r u a x declares that  [p]eople usually refer to this aspect of spoken language by such terms as "voice quality"; or "tone of voice," or simply "it's not what you say, but how you say it."... Sometimes it is called the "musical" aspect of speech, because it involves inflection (pitch contours), rhythm, phrasing, emphasis (or accent), punctuation, timbre (or sound quality), silence (rests), and even cadences—exactiy those variables which are used to describe a single voice melody. (33) A slightly different f o r m u l a t i o n o f the vernacular mantra T r u a x describes above ('it's n o t what y o u s a y . . . ' ) , H e i d e g g e r is explicit t o declare these aspects o f speech, its m u s i c a l aspects, t o b e the ' i n d i c a t o r ' o f m o o d i n everyday discourse as w e l l as t h e essential d o m a i n of'poetical'communication:  Being-in and its attunement [des befindlichen] are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of the talk, 'the way of speaking.' In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's mood [Befindlichkeit] can become an aim in itself. (BT 205) D e s p i t e the possible Cartesian overtones i n this arc o f ' p o e t i c a l discourse,' that is, i n the suggestion o f intentional content i n his remarks about the ' c o m m u n i c a t i o n . . . o f one's m o o d , ' H e i d e g g e r is generally quite vigilant t o portray m o o d n o t as something first held b y o n e and then c o n v e y e d t o another, b u t rather as something r e c i p r o c a l l y appropriated o u t o f the  60  hermeneutic o f being-in-the-world  as being-with. Indeed, the first g l i m p s e o f the true  radicality i n H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis is his a v o w a l that all these contingencies o f o r a l discourse themselves  take  place  within  and  also  articulate  a pre-existing  'shared  attunement'  (Mitbefindlichkeii) as being-with: Through [discourse] a shared attunement [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared,' and so does the understanding of Being-with... In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. (BT 205) W h e r e a s c o m m o n m o d e l s o f linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n posit understanding as the result o f some assertion, H e i d e g g e r recurrently stresses that understanding is something that is shared and shared  already, declaring that " o n l y i f there is some co-understanding beforehand o f  what is said-in-the-talk... is there a possibility o f estimating whether the w a y i n w h i c h it is said i s appropriate t o what the discourse i s about t h e m a t i c a l l y " ( B T 2 0 7 ) . D r e y f u s rightly names this sense o f shared understanding as the k e y value i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense o f linguistic operation: Heidegger's important insight is that everyday communication cannot be understood on this Cartesian model of messages sent from one isolated mind to another. Heidegger would point out that such an account treats language as a context-free code. It leaves out the essential fact that linguistic communication is possible only on the background of a shared world. Q3IW 221) H o w e v e r , as p r o v i s i o n a l l y indicated i n H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f attunement and his description o f discourse as a foundation, this shared situatedness entails s o m e t h i n g even m o r e radical: linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is g r o u n d e d u p o n an understanding that i s yet m o r e p r i m o r d i a l , as " v o c a l utterance... is n o t essential f o r d i s c o u r s e " ( B T 316). Indeed, H a l l i b u r t o n keenly observes b o t h t h e depth and breadth o f H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis t o i n c l u d e n o t o n l y wowlinguistic f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n but t o stress that it i s i n fact the pre-existing nature o f understanding i n being-with, as that shared attunement w h i c h already is, that a l l o w s f o r linguistic utterance t o exist as one o f the possible f o r m s o f discourse:  61  In discourse the act of utterance is not decisive: if I am dealing with you in a social situation, language as discourse transpires as long as I understand you, whether or not either of us speaks aloud, and I can perfectiy well "hear what you are saying" in the sense of understanding what you "really" mean, even if you remain silent. (10) A n t i c i p a t i n g his later description o f D a s e i n as essentially de-severant, as the entity w h i c h is disposed t o b r i n g things close, H e i d e g g e r appropriately turns his d i s c u s s i o n t o w a r d s " a n existential possibility w h i c h belongs t o t a l k i n g i t s e l f — h e a r i n g " t o e x p l a i n this being-attuned to others ( B T 2 0 6 ) :  Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 03T 206) L a t e r i n his career, H e i d e g g e r goes o n t o say explicitly w h a t is o n l y i m p l i e d i n this passage: this characteristic reversal i n w h i c h ' a c o u s t i c p e r c e p t i o n ' is 'based o n h e a r i n g ' really casts hearing i n relation t o belonging. E c h o i n g his earlier formulations from  Being and Time i n  w h i c h he describes the p r i m o r d i a l i t y o f p r o p e r hearing as hearkening i n " L o g o s , " H e i d e g g e r again  casts  sound  i n this  everyday  familiarity  as he m o v e s  towards  t h e revealing  e t y m o l o g i c a l l i n k b e t w e e n ' h e a r i n g ' and ' b e l o n g i n g ' ( B T 2 0 7 ) :  We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e. our bodies are equipped with ears because we hear. Mortals hear the thunder of the heavens, the rusding of the woods, the gurgling of fountains, the ringing of plucked strings, the rumbling of motors, the noises of the city—only and only so far as they always already in some way belong to them and yet do not belong to them. We are all ears when our gathering devotes itself entirely to hearkening, the ears and the mere invasion of sounds being completely forgotten. So long as we only listen to the sound of a word, as the expression of a speaker, we are not yet even listening at all. Thus, in this way we never succeed in having genuinely heard anything at all. But when does hearing succeed? We have heard [gehort] when we belong to [gehdren] the matter addressed. (65-6) Indeed, sounds speak o f the activity o f others, o f events that are t a k i n g place that, even i n their seeming remoteness, still i n some ambiguous w a y include us, implicate u s as part o f them. D e s c r i b i n g H e n r y D a v i d T h o r e a u ' s account o f sound i n  62  Walden, Sallis suggests i n his  Echoes that this acoustic inclusiveness b e c o m e s most apparent d u r i n g m o m e n t s o f seeming distance f r o m 'the w o r l d ' :  In the chapter of Walden entitied "Sounds" he celebrates the undisturbed solitude and stillness of his summer reverie amidst the sounds of the woods. He tells, too, of the intrusive sound of the railroad... and he tells how even in his retreat this sound kept him linked to society. (4) It is o n l y i n these m o m e n t s o f k e e n perspicuity and reflection, often i n concert  with  somewhat extraneous circumstances, that sound even c o m e s t o be c o n s i d e r e d a k e y v o i c e i n o u r sense o f b e l o n g i n g . A n d perhaps n o w h e r e is this role m o r e strikingly and tragically felt than i n those w h o s e w o r l d s have been so radically altered b y a severe loss o f hearing. D e s c r i b i n g o n e particular study o f the patients i n the D e s h o n A r m y H o s p i t a l , i n his essay, " T h e S o n i c E n v i r o n m e n t o f C i t i e s , " M i c h a e l S o u t h w o r t h relays the o v e r w h e l m i n g sense o f loss and separation w h i c h f o l l o w e d as a result o f their deafness:  Their life was a ceaseless pantomime in which it was difficult to maintain the feeling of being part of the world. Loss of sound had cut important links with life and they felt detached. The world seemed dead and had lost its forward motion; it was much less demanding and nervous. All of them felt a poignant loss of background sounds, especially of nature, which had been almost unnoticed before deafness. They experienced great anxiety in crowds or traffic because important auditory danger cues were absent. The psychological effects of sudden deafness were more severe than those suffered by persons who had suddenly become blind. Deep depression resulted, characterized by undefined feelings of loss, lack of alertness, sadness, loneliness, and paranoid tendencies. (51) A s H e i d e g g e r attempts t o c o n v e y i n those passages from  Being and Time and " L o g o s , " and  as is apparent from the above account, sound is c r u c i a l t o h o w w e c o m e t o sense o u r physical and existential placement w i t h i n the w o r l d . It is only n o w that w e c a n understand what Heidegger  proclaims  equiprimordial with  at  the outset  attunement  of  his discussion:  "Discourse  is  existentially  [Befindlichkeit] a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ( B T 2 0 3 ) . Indeed,  t h r o u g h an e x a m i n a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s everyday aurality, w e have gathered together all the most essential concepts f o r a m o r e comprehensive m o d e l o f m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e as a space o f social c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; w e have, i n fact, laid the g r o u n d w o r k t o m o r e fully understand the  63  c o m p l e x operations o f the D i o n y s i a n first offered b y N i e t z s c h e i n  The Birth of Tragedy.  By  retaining H e i d e g g e r ' s interrelated understanding o f m o o d , listening, a n d shared attunement as w e continue o u r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l critique into the d o m a i n o f aesthetics, w e w i l l b e able to w o r k o u t — i n a m u c h m o r e detailed manner than N i e t z s c h e — t h e process o f audience c o n s o l i d a t i o n he describes i n his account o f the D i o n y s i a n .  From the Everyday to the Musical Much, from morning onward, Since we became a conversation and hear from one another, Have human beings undergone; but soon (we) will be song. (HbTderlin qtd. in Heidegger, WTL424) I n c l u d e d b y H e i d e g g e r i n his later essay, " T h e W a y t o L a n g u a g e , " these lines  from  F r i e d r i c h H o l d e r l i n ' s " C e l e b r a t i o n o f P e a c e " m a k e a n apt c o m m e n t a r y n o t only o n this particular essay, b u t also o n the course o f H e i d e g g e r ' s aurality as it d e v e l o p s o v e r his career, as w e l l as the trajectory o f o u r o w n project as w e t r y t o appropriate this acoustic sensibility f o r a better understanding o f m u s i c a l performance: it begins i n listening a n d conversation, but  sees o n the h o r i z o n the p r o m i s e o f song. F o l l o w i n g  the linguistic f o c u s  o f the  hermeneutic tradition, H e i d e g g e r is c o m m i t t e d t o the idea that it is t h r o u g h the revealing openness and c o n c e a l i n g resistance o f language that the w o r l d is a l l o w e d t o s h o w u p f o r an historical people.  A n d while  he describes  h u m a n i t y ' s linguistic  e s s e n c e — i n c l u d i n g his  discussion o f the paramount importance o f names, w o r d s , talk, saying, a n d s p e e c h — i n many different w a y s , o n e passage f r o m " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " suffices t o capture the space it o c c u p i e s i n his thought: " L a n g u a g e , b y n a m i n g beings f o r the first time, first brings beings t o w o r d and t o appearance. O n l y this n a m i n g nominates b e i n g t o their B e i n g from  out  of their B e i n g . S u c h saying is a projecting o f clearing, i n w h i c h announcement is made o f what it is that beings c o m e into the o p e n as" (198). O r , as he puts it m o r e poetically i n his  64  n o t o r i o u s l y obscure d i c t u m f r o m " L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m , " " L a n g u a g e is the house o f B e i n g . I n its h o m e m a n dwells. T h o s e w h o think and those w h o create w i t h w o r d s are the guardians o f this h o m e " (217). B u t even i n this later essay, the fundamental structures o f a u r a l i t y — o f sound and silence, hearing and l i s t e n i n g — r e - e m e r g e as he sets out o n 'the w a y to language.' A f t e r repeating his earlier mantra o n the c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r o f silence from  Being and  Time, that " [ o ] n e can speak, speak endlessly, and it m a y all say nothing. A s o p p o s e d to that, one can be silent, not speak at all, and i n not speaking say a great d e a l , " H e i d e g g e r proceeds w i t h an understanding o f v o i c e he has been reluctant t o f o l l o w i n the past, one that w o u l d cast m u s i c as the r i n g i n g o f  Ereignis ( W T L 4 0 8 ) :  The saying is the mode in which propriation speaks. Yet mode is meant here not so much in the sense of modus or "kind"; it is meant in the musical sense of the melos, the song that says by singing. For the saying that propriates brings what comes to presence out of its propriety to a kind of radiance; it lauds what comes to presence; that is, allows it in its essential unfolding. (WTL 424) A s v o i c e , w e m o v e from speech t o song, and i n song, encounter an alighting that  shines. H e r e  t o o is w h e r e w e w i l l m a k e the shift t o music, w h e r e w e w i l l extend o u r explorations o f everyday listening into m u s i c a l performance. I n m a n y cases it w i l l b e a  series o f parallel  shifts w e w i l l make, i n w h i c h w e w i l l carry the k n o w l e d g e and concepts from o u r p r e v i o u s investigations into further explorations o f m u s i c a l performance.  S o u n d is a n ephemeral  event, and so t o o i s the m u s i c a l one. S o u n d does not p r i m a r i l y s h o w i t s e l f as an object, and therefore neither does music. S o u n d gathers us i n belongingly, and thus, so t o o does music. S o u n d matters most p r i m o r d i a l l y as m o o d , and thus, so t o o does music. D i s c o u r s e is not most p r i m o r d i a l l y language but shared attunement, and thus, w i l l s h o w i t s e l f t o b e part o f the sociality o f performance. H o w e v e r , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l perspective w h i c h suggests, i n a p r o v i s i o n a l sense, the manner i n w h i c h aspects o f everyday listening m a y contribute t o a n  65  understanding o f m u s i c a l listening also directs o u r ear t o the important w a y s i n w h i c h these t w o types o f hearing can differ and even oscillate i n their extremes.  Sound and Source: Being-in the Music T h e most fundamental difference between the v o i c e o f the everyday and the v o i c e o f music w a s anticipated i n H e i d e g g e r ' s passage o n the 'radiance' o f 'the saying that says b y singing': i n v i s u a l terms, song is an alighting, a shining that illuminates 'things' i n a w a y that everyday sound does not. A s Ihde contends, i n everyday listening, " o r d i n a r i l y , sounds are t a k e n directionally. T h e h a m m e r i n g f r o m next d o o r is heard s p a r r o w ' s song i n the garden presents itself  as from next door. T h e  from the g a r d e n , " but, i n contrast, the most  intense m o m e n t s o f m u s i c a l listening are m a r k e d b y a blissful loss o f this point-source directionality and are replaced w i t h a sense o f envelopment ( L V 76):  In the overwhelming presence of music which fills space and penetrates my awareness, not only am I momentarily taken out of myself in what is often described as a loss of selfawareness which is akin to ecstatic states, but there is a distance from things. The purity of music in its ecstatic surrounding presence overwhelms my ordinary connection with things so that I do not even primarily hear the symphony as the sounds of the instruments.... This ecstasy is also the occasion for an illusory phenomenon, the temptation toward the notion of a pure or disembodied sound. In the penetrating totality of the musical synthesis it is easy to forget the sound as the sound of the orchestra and the music floats through experience. Part of its enchantment is in obliteration of things. A counter-variable illustrates this: a philosopher friend who now knows he is going deaf told me that he first noticed this ailment when he experienced loss of interest in music. He described the music as becoming "distant... objecdike... over there apart from me." It had begun to lose its surrounding, penetrating quality for him. (LV 77) These are the m o s t definitive m o m e n t s o f m u s i c a l listening: w h e n m u s i c takes o n this immersive i m m e d i a c y a n d b e c o m e s fully present, so massive that it ' i s ' seemingly w i t h o u t source. T o be clear, the sounds o f h a m m e r i n g that c o m e ' f r o m next d o o r ' and the sounds o f the s y m p h o n y o n e attends are o b v i o u s l y n o t analogous i n terms o f point-source spatiality o r v o l u m e — t h e c o m p a r i s o n is meant t o illustrate the degree t o w h i c h everyday listening and m u s i c a l listening c a n differ at their extremes. A s Ihde goes o n t o e x p l a i n further, this  66  difference cannot b e attributed exclusively t o the nature o f the sounds themselves, b u t is c o m p l i c a t e d significantly b y the listening attitude w i t h i n w h i c h they are heard: [I]f I put myself in the "musical attitude" and listen to the [everyday] sounds as if it were music, I may suddenly find that its ordinary and strong sense of directionality, while not disappearing, recedes to such a degree that I can concentrate upon its surrounding presence. Contrarily, when listening to the orchestra and in the highest moments of musical ecstasy, I can (perversely, perhaps) by an act of will also raise the question of directionality; and while I continue to be immersed in the sound, there also emerges a strong sense of direction. (LV 76) Indeed, this variable attitude o f the listener plays a k e y role i n determining the type o f directionality a n d spatiality some particular m u s i c m a y have: o n e c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y  find  m o r e m u s i c a l interest i n the rhythms, exhalations, and percolations o f the dishwasher than i n the a n n o y i n g s o n g that, as bothersome, is heard as c o m i n g from t h e radio. B u t , h o w e v e r mercurial the circumstances o f its occurrence, this fact remains: t o hear the m u s i c a l at its most p o w e r f u l is t o hear something quite different, o r perhaps, t o hear something quite differently, f r o m the sounds o f the everyday. Similar examples w o u l d bear o u t a comparable c o n t i n u u m b e t w e e n everyday speech a n d s o n g w h e r e a similarly a m b i g u o u s d i v i s i o n exists i n the centre, but is adequately clear at each extreme. H o w e v e r , t o extrapolate u p o n H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n explicitly musical terms, this attuning p o w e r o f music, w h i c h i s t o say its p o w e r t o attune as m o o d , might here a n d elsewhere b e easily and erroneously attributed t o the m u s i c itself, and not u n d e r s t o o d i n its r e c i p r o c a l resonance w i t h its context. I n fact, as w e continue t o examine the relationship b e t w e e n music, m o o d , a n d event i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , " t h e stubborn resilience o f the art-object is encountered at every step.  The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon B a s e d o n a three-part lecture  from  1936, i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , "  H e i d e g g e r embarks u p o n the general task N i e t z s c h e first set out t o a c c o m p l i s h i n  67  The Birth of  Tragedy: t o re-visit the G r e e k s and their art concepts i n order t o re-vitalize and re-interpret art and its forces f o r a c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d b o u n d t o the precepts o f aesthetics ( n o w a n aesthetics o f ' e x p e r i e n c e ' t o w h i c h N i e t z s c h e had been an enthusiastic c o n t r i b u t o r ) (140). I n fact, i n an editor's note to the essay, K r e l l contends that "[t]o some extent the w h o l e o f the present essay m a y be v i e w e d as a response t o the N i e t z s c h e a n Der Wille zur Macht als  Kunsf  (OWA  193). Indeed, H e i d e g g e r ' s m a i n objective i n this essay i s t o urge a re-  evaluation o f o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y concept o f art as first determined b y the rise o f aesthetics i n the 1 8  t h  century, that is, t o challenge the n o t i o n that art i s something created b y a self-  contained, a u t o n o m o u s artist w h o wishes to express a feeling o r e m o t i o n i n the created w o r k , and that this w o r k , as such, (and this is the point t o w h i c h K r e l l refers) exists i n order t o elicit sensual pleasure i n the spectator. H e i d e g g e r spends a considerable amount o f t i m e discussing the essential m i s d i r e c t i o n o f this starting point, clear i n his assertion that w e shall never unravel the mystery o f art as l o n g as this n o t i o n o f its object-being is preserved. A n t i c i p a t e d i n o u r preparatory r e m a r k s o n the historical p r o d u c t i o n o f the s o u n d object and its place i n aesthetics, H e i d e g g e r  (as expected) contends here that it is a metaphysics o f constant  presence w h i c h initiates and maintains the sovereignty o v e r this t h e o r y o f art: " T h e w a y i n which  aesthetics v i e w s  the artwork  f r o m t h e outset  is dominated  b y t h e traditional  interpretation o f all b e i n g s " ( O W A  164). Indeed, w h i l e departing from his earlier texts i n  some  nonetheless  important w a y s , H e i d e g g e r  makes explicit, t h o u g h  variant,  gestures  t o w a r d s the ' s i g n p o s t s ' o f his earlier thought. T h e general structuring o f the discussion, is, f o r example, one that unfolds in familiar accordance w i t h that o f  Being and Time: a critique  o f metaphysics t h r o u g h an examination o f h o w objects have c o m e t o s h o w u p f o r us at present, and h o w they w e r e understood m u c h differently b y the G r e e k s . F o l l o w i n g his  68  m e t h o d o l o g y i n that text, H e i d e g g e r begins his essay b y interrogating (and thus exposing) the metaphysical foundations  o f o u r v a r i o u s 'thing-concepts'  so that w e m a y first " d e c i d e  whether the w o r k is at b o t t o m something else a n d n o t a thing at a l l . . . . T h a t is w h y it is necessary t o k n o w  about these thing-concepts, i n order thereby t o t a k e heed o f their  provenance a n d their boundless presumption, b u t also o f their semblance and self-evidence" ( O W A 164, 157). I f the general themes o f his analysis remain familiar, so t o o d o the counter-examples he chooses  t o illuminate t h e shortcomings  discontinuities b e t w e e n this text and  o f traditional o n t o l o g y . D e s p i t e the many  Being and Time, the themes o f sonic experience and  m o o d remain a m a r g i n a l b u t c r u c i a l part o f his n o t i o n o f interpretation, and serve as counterexamples i n precisely the same w a y s , and f o r precisely the same ends. I n fact, i n his opening critique o f these thing-concepts, H e i d e g g e r first returns immediately t o t h e pre-cognitive disclosure o f m o o d , a n d then t o t h e de-severance o f hearing. W h i l e alleging the violence done i n t h e m a t i z i n g " t h e thing as a bearer o f its characteristics," H e i d e g g e r contrasts the limits o f (misinterpreted) reason w i t h the p r i m o r d i a l perspicuity o f m o o d , a n d i n so doing, implicates this acuteness as a relevant v o i c e i n the dialogue o n art ( O W A 150):  But in defining the essence of the thing, what is the use of a feeling, however certain, if thought alone has therightto speak here? Perhaps, however, what we call feeling or mood, here and in similar instances, is more reasonable—that is, more intelligendy perceptive— because more open to Being than all that reason which, having meanwhile become ratio, was misinterpreted as being rational. (OWA 151) A s his deprecation o f this metaphysical b e h o l d i n g continues into the a c c o u n t o f the " t h i n g as nothing but the unity o f a m a n i f o l d o f what is g i v e n i n the senses," H e i d e g g e r repeats, almost verbatim, his earlier f o r m u l a t i o n s o n hearing as hearkening i n  Being and Time ( O W A 151):  We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistiing in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the  69  door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly. (OWA 151,2) H e finally closes his preamble o n the inadequacy o f o u r thing-concepts b y c o n c l u d i n g that the " d i s t i n c t i o n o f matter and f o r m i s the  conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest  variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics" ( O W A 153). B u t i n attempting t o thematize the essence o f the artwork, t o grasp, i n this case, that w h i c h i s " s o n o r o u s i n a m u s i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n , " w e d i s c o v e r that the p a r a d i g m o f aesthetics w h i c h prescribes interpreting the art object as this f o r m e d matter actually negates the v e r y quality it seeks to u n c o v e r ( O W A 145): Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectification of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will. (OWA 172) H e i d e g g e r neglects t o p r o v i d e a m u s i c a l analogue t o his v i s u a l e x a m p l e o f the c o l o u r that is represented i n terms o f its wavelengths, but w e might imagine that a n analogy c o u l d be d r a w n b e t w e e n his example and the f o r m a l aspects o f a score, o r the sonic frequencies w i t h i n a piece o f music. I n  Heidegger's Philosophy of Art, Julian Y o u n g rightly observes that " [ f j o r  H e i d e g g e r , then, t h e ultimate g r o u n d o f the t r i u m p h o f the aesthetic v i e w o f art is the imperialism o f reason, the t r i u m p h o f the v i e w that science (in the b r o a d , G e r m a n sense), and science alone, has access t o t r u t h " — t h i s is the thrust o f H e i d e g g e r ' s deviations into the d o m i n i o n o f o u r v a r i o u s thing-concepts: t o s h o w that  aesthetics is a metaphysics is a  scientism (14). T o demonstrate, i f i n the f o l l o w i n g passage f r o m Y o u n g ' s b o o k i n w h i c h he first introduces, quotes, and then comments o n E r w i n P a n o f s k y ' s definition o f the aesthetic state, w e replace the references to aesthetics w i t h the equivalent t e r m d e n o t i n g the w o r l d s o f  70  science o r philosophy, it b e c o m e s apparent that n o disservice is done t o a traditional understanding o f any o f these disciplines. I n all these cases, t r u t h is decontextualization:  What is the 'aesthetic state'? According to the tradition Heidegger holds to be dominant in the modern age, the hallmark of the proper reception of art is, in Kant's word, 'disinterestedness'. Here, for example, is the famous art historian, Erwin Panofsky: It is possible to experience every object, natural or man-made, aesthetically. We do this when we just look at it (or listen to it) without relating it, intellectually or emotionally, to anything outside itself. When a man looks at a tree from the point of view of a carpenter, he will associate it with various uses to which he might put the wood; and when he looks at it from the point of view of an ornithologist, he will associate it with the birds that might nest in it. When a man at a horse race watches the animal on which he has put his money, he will associate its performance with his desire that it may win. Only he who simply abandons himself to the object of his perception will experience it aesthetically. On an aesthetic approach such as this, the essential thing about aesthetic experience is decontextualization. We attend to the object of perception in and for itself, abstract, that is, from every relation it may have to our intellectual and practical interests. (9-10) W h e r e H e i d e g g e r often appears t o execute his p h i l o s o p h y f r o m o u t o f a Z e n - l i k e quiescence, in  contrast  to Panofsky's  prescription  f o r this  H e i d e g g e r ' s understanding o f D a s e i n i n its  pure,  fluctuating  nearly  transcendent  objectivity,  m o o d s l o o k s p o s i t i v e l y turbulent.  W h i l e H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f o u r v a r i o u s thing-concepts seems, at first, a w a y w a r d tangent, the substitutions p e r f o r m e d i n this passage again suggest that here, i n the d o m a i n o f art, ring  the echoes o f his poignant critique i n Being and Time: i f it is not first and foremost out o f disinterest that D a s e i n encounters a meaningful w o r l d b u t rather m o s t p r i m o r d i a l l y a n d acutely o u t o f the ' a s structure' o f m o o d , then the same perspectival distance prescribed b y the philosopher i n thematizing the object, and the scientist i n t h e m a t i z i n g nature, w i l l b e the same distance that leads us a w a y f r o m o u r most immediate affiliation w i t h the meaning o f art. A n d , just as H e i d e g g e r endeavours t o e m p l o y a language i n Being  and Time that w o u l d  proffer the possibility f o r o v e r c o m i n g this distance, so t o o does he re-interpret the decidedly visualist, distanced terms o f art a p p r e c i a t i o n — v i e w i n g , spectating, seeing, l o o k i n g a t — i n t o a unified a n d u n i f y i n g t e r m that closes this g a p t h r o u g h the richness a n d p o l y s e m y o f its  71  connotations, a w o r d that elicits the essence o f the p a r a d o x i c a l l y resolute a l l o w a n c e o f  Gelassenheit. E n c a p s u l a t i n g all o f this is the t e r m ' p r e s e r v i n g , ' a y i e l d i n g that entitles and shelters. Although phenomenological  understanding encountering,  the full  import  o n e important  o f this  aspect  term  goes  o f its negative  well  beyond  definition w a s  f o r e s h a d o w e d i n his earlier comments o n the stubborn w i t h d r a w a l o f art u n d e r the specious d o m i n i o n o f science: " M o s t o f all, k n o w l e d g e i n the manner o f preserving i s far r e m o v e d f r o m that merely aestheticizing connoiseurship o f the w o r k ' s f o r m a l aspects, its qualities and charms"  ( O W A 193).  Following  Heidegger,  John  R. C o v a c h  notes  i n h i s article,  " D e s t r u c t u r i n g C a r t e s i a n D u a l i s m i n M u s i c a l A n a l y s i s , " that t h e sensibility o f this latter m e t h o d o l o g y i s — a s w e have seen at every stage a l o n g the s o u n d - m u s i c  continuum—  determined b y the t h o r o u g h g o i n g guidance o f the isolated acoustic object: [M]usic theorists and analysts tend to assume that the musical work is an object, even if it is a richly faceted one. We have a tendency to "measure" works according to objective standards: on the most fundamental level we speak of intervals, rhythms, or timbres—all aspects of the physical make-up of sounds that can be measured empirically. Other aspects of music that are less physically tangible—aspects such as form, harmony, counterpoint, voice leading, and motive—are sometimes thought of as if they were physical properties that operate according to certain kinds of laws. (Covach) Also  a p p r o p r i a t i n g H e i d e g g e r i n order t o destabilize this understanding, D o n Ihde a n d  T h o m a s F. Slaughter assert the derivative nature o f these interpretations and argue, instead, f o r the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f m u s i c a l experience i n their article, " S t u d i e s i n the Phenomenology o f Sound: Listening": "I hear an octave," or, "that is a chord composed of A# and F," are examples of statements which may mistake a conceptual classification for direct description. "That is a loud noise," or, "That's screechy," are examples of the ordinary response prior to phenomenological reduction. (233) E v e n as the musically educated can, i n precise and r i g o r o u s terms, explain the anatomy o f a 'screechy,' and perhaps therefore 'eerie,' o r ' g r a t i n g ' phrase, this ' w o r l d l y ' interpretation o f  72  its character—-as eerie, as g r a t i n g — r e m a i n s t h e elemental g r o u n d o f meaningful m u s i c a l experience, a n d is, from t h e v e r y outset, t h e m o t i v e behind a technical d i s c u s s i o n o f its constituent aspects. C o n s i d e r e d i n exactly this context o f a m u s i c a l p r i m o r d i a l i t y , a n earlier quote f r o m H e i d e g g e r ' s discussion o n the disclosure o f m o o d i n  Being and Time asserts that  this trajectory o f meaning is impossible t o reverse: " P u r e beholding, even i f it w e r e t o penetrate t o t h e innermost core o f the B e i n g o f something present-at-hand,  could never  discover anything like that which is threatening' ' ( B T 177; my gloss). It is o n l y i n its 1  ' w o r l d l y ' character that m u s i c initiates the most intense m o m e n t s o f its appreciation: great pains must b e undertaken t o c o n c e a l that w h i c h most immediately strikes u s as 'threatening,' 'pensive,' o r ' j o y o u s ' i n its sounding. These interpretations o f m u s i c ' s 'character,' as F r i t h paraphrases the w o r d s o f F r a n k Sibley, are n o t adjectives feebly t a g g e d o n t o ' t r u e ' m u s i c a l understanding ( s h o w n as technical literacy), b u t rather, can b e t h e m a r k o f an appreciation and ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' unshared b y those w h o c o u l d offer a c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e o f its theoretical properties:  As Sibley suggests, someone could describe a piece of music perfectly accurately in technical terms while being quite unable to appreciate it; while someone quite unable to read music can perfectiy well convince us that they've "understood" a work: they make sense of our own experience of it through their figurative description. This is the job of the rock critic, for example. (PR 263) A l t h o u g h F r i t h ' s use o f the terms 'appreciate' a n d ' u n d e r s t a n d ' is s o m e w h a t unclear, the thrust o f his argument must not be misconstrued as a derision o f the m u s i c a l l y educated, a n d a v a l o r i z a t i o n o f the non-educated. T o b e clear, the point o f suggesting the i m p o r t a n c e o f an elemental attunement t o m u s i c is n o t t o extend a naivist p r i v i l e g i n g o f m u s i c a l illiteracy, b u t to suggest, rather, that most everyone, b y virtue o f being socialized into a culture i n w h i c h music plays a n important and variegated role, is capable o f ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' music: w e h u m and h u m a l o n g t o o u r favourite songs, dance t o that w h i c h m o v e s us, feel the tension as the  73  allegro trill o f strings accompanies  some p i v o t a l m o m e n t o f a f i l m , and refuse  some  particular m u s i c w h e n it elicits something inappropriate f o r the situation at hand. T h i s is H e i d e g g e r ' s p r i m o r d i a l i t y as it announces itself w i t h i n a m u s i c a l context: this is m u s i c a l hearkening, the 'hearing w h i c h understands.' A l t h o u g h F r i t h ' s argument is hampered b y cliched concepts, his blunt declaration o f o u r everyday m u s i c a l ' k n o w l e d g e ' demonstrates this hearkening: " [ W ] e m a y not be able t o tell the difference b e t w e e n a m a j o r and a m i n o r chord, but w e d o k n o w w h e n a piece turns s a d " ( P R 109). T o be clear, w e m a y be m o r e faithful to F r i t h ' s intention i f w e change the w o r d ' t e l l ' ( w h i c h c o u l d be confused w i t h 'sense') t o  the w o r d  'name'  (which  captures  unequivocally  the  k n o w l e d g e ) . W e must also be careful to stress that it is not the piece  essence  of  technical  itself that is sad, but  rather the m o o d - r e s p o n s e it m a y e v o k e f o r some particular listener. Indeed, as hearkening, this m u s i c a l listening is also a resonance w i t h i n a specific context. A s H e i d e g g e r w i l l m a k e explicit i n his analysis o f art as event, understanding musical performance requires an understanding, as comprehensive as possible, o f the context o f its presentation. B u t w r e s t i n g free from the p u l l o f this enduring m u s i c a l object, the ' w o r k , ' is a struggle that e v e n those w h o c l a i m to have grasped the contingencies o f its p r o d u c t i o n are often unable t o w i n . E x p l o r i n g these particular pitfalls encountered i n the w o r k o f C h a n a n and C o v a c h w i l l prevent us f r o m m a k i n g the same mistakes as w e m o v e o u r analysis further into H e i d e g g e r ' s discussion o f the art event. A l t h o u g h the seeds o f a m o r e radical understanding o f m u s i c are certainly present i n their w o r k , the periodically misdirected c o n c l u s i o n s d r a w n b y C h a n a n and C o v a c h exemplify the i l l u s o r y nature o f such victories. Chanan, f o r example, is unquestionably tuned i n t o the sociality o f music, and, o n the w h o l e , extends arguments calling f o r its l e g i t i m a c y and p r o p e r  74  understanding, b u t is nonetheless periodically l u r e d b a c k into a f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h the musical w o r k still persists as the sole arbiter o f meaning: In neither case can meaning really be stabilized and foreclosed, because music, like the uttered word—as opposed the word in the dictionary—leads a socially charged life, which always tastes of the concrete circumstances. Every actor knows that the same words can be uttered in an infinite number of ways.... If this is the case with words, which have definite meanings, how much more so with music, where intonation is everything? (42) T h o u g h o n the surface a critique o f the shortcomings o f p o s i t i v i s m , C h a n a n ' s analysis is i n fact only a v e i l e d example o f precisely this line o f thinking: t o argue that m u s i c a l meanings change a c c o r d i n g l y w i t h measurably different intonations is but t o shift the threshold o f its application further  a l o n g t h e spectrum, a w a y  from  t h e abstract value  o f t h e sounds  themselves and onto the infinite w a y s they are able to be s o u n d e d — i n b o t h cases, the totality o f meanings, h o w e v e r boundless, is thought t o be derived from s o m e p o s i t e d m u s i c a l object. A  truly radical stance against p o s i t i v i s m challenges that meanings c a n change n o t only  a c c o r d i n g t o the infinitesimal differences in the sounds themselves, but also ineluctably along w i t h the extra-musical contingencies o f their presentation. A s o m e w h a t h u m o u r o u s anecdote from  an u n c o m m o n  opportunity t o compare  three  consecutive  concerts b y t h e same  musicians w i l l demonstrate the i m p o r t a n c e o f this point. T h r e e separate s h o w s played b y Shellac d u r i n g the final w e e k e n d o f January, 2001 at T h e K n i t t i n g F a c t o r y i n L o s A n g e l e s , C a l i f o r n i a p r o v i d e d a rare and remarkable space o f c o m p a r i s o n f o r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the extra-musical contingencies o f m u s i c a l performance. T h e o v e r a l l m o o d at each o f these s h o w s was, from the v e r y start o f these events, something quite distinct from the t w o others. W h i l e t h e first s h o w o n Saturday evening held a certain a i r o f anticipation, and Sunday evening's performance, b y contrast, w a s e m b r o i l e d i n one o f unmistakable belligerence, it w a s the events o f S u n d a y m o r n i n g  75  w h i c h exemplified the w a y that the social m o o d s o f a m u s i c a l event are intimately b o u n d up w i t h its social possibilities. T h i s unscheduled S u n d a y m o r n i n g s h o w ' b e g a n ' at ten o ' c l o c k i n the m o r n i n g . T h e occurrence that m a r k e d this beginning, however, w a s not the s o u n d i n g o f the b a n d ' s  first  note, but w a s the assembly o f all the attendees into the lounge area o f the v e n u e t o await the delivery o f breakfast: 4 0 - d o z e n K r i s p y K r e m e brand donuts furnished at the b a n d ' s expense. T h e n e w s — a n d the eventual d e l i v e r y — o f the donuts initially elicited amongst the concertgoers a sense o f that same uneasy gratitude one feels t o w a r d s the p e r s o n w h o has just extended one a k i n d favour, but w i t h w h o m one is not v e r y w e l l - a c q u a i n t e d — t h e r e was, at first,  a general hesitancy, even a sense o f disbelief and mistrust, that made people resist  opening the b o x e s to take one o f the donuts. T h e y ate their first l i k e it w a s stolen. W h e n the h u m o u r o f it all o v e r t o o k these sheepish feelings, it turned out to be a w o n d e r f u l l y — a n d apparently n e c e s s a r y — d i s a r m i n g gesture. S o d i d arranging f o r the c o m e d i a n w h o , p o s i n g as an actual priest, d i d some o f f - c o l o u r j o k e s and call-and-response set-ups w i t h the audience before the b a n d came out o n stage. T h e b a n d c o n t i n u e d the c o m e d y w i t h the real-life tales of,  first,  the m i x - u p i n  o r d e r i n g and p i c k i n g u p the donuts, and then i n exchanging w i t h the audience stories o f f o r m e r donut-and-coffee binges. T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n b a n d and audience i n these moments w a s unusually friendly, quite u n l i k e that o f the p r e v i o u s night. In fact, most everything about the event w a s unusual: the time o f day, the free donuts, the comedian, the lack o f intoxicated audience members, the lack o f an abundance o f audience members, the lack o f audience chatter w h e n the band w a s n ' t playing, the l a c k o f canned m u s i c to  fill  periods o f ' w a i t i n g , ' the lack o f an opening band, and most generally, the fact that, at eleven  76  o ' c l o c k o n a S u n d a y m o r n i n g , w e w e r e all about t o subject ourselves t o the m u s i c o f one o f the most decisive and punishing syncopated r o c k bands out t h e r e — a giant, i r o n i c smirk hung o v e r the w h o l e affair. T h e experiment, h o w e v e r , turned o u t t o b e a n absolute success: the buoyant atmosphere sensed at the start o f the s h o w w a s carried t h r o u g h o u t the entire performance. T h e difference b e t w e e n these events c o u l d never b e a c c o u n t e d f o r i n purely m u s i c a l terms. A n d yet, despite o u r reading o f H e i d e g g e r w h i c h has l e d u s t o e x p l o r e the extramusical contingencies m u s i c a l performance, C o v a c h ' s ( p r o v i s i o n a l l y ) H e i d e g g e r i a n pursuit o f a ' w o r l d l y ' understanding o f m u s i c periodically veers b a c k into the d o m a i n o f the purely musical. H e is certainly k e e n t o understand the c r u x o f H e i d e g g e r ' s argument a n d its potential a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a better understanding o f music: C o v a c h r e c o g n i z e s that a Cartesian metaphysics  has, i n its h e g e m o n i c  primacy,  obstructed  a more  elemental,  primordial  understanding t h r o u g h w h i c h w e are first and most authentically i n v o l v e d w i t h o u r w o r l d , and thus, f r o m w h i c h any theoretical understanding o f m u s i c has thus derived. H o w e v e r , although he thus claims t o challenge this perspective a n d argue f o r a m o r e situated, contextual understanding o f m u s i c a l experience, the c o m p o n e n t s i n his n e t w o r k still remain musical w o r k s , w h i c h , albeit n o w interlace m o r e enigmatically as they f o r m the structure o f v a r i o u s " m u s i c a l w o r l d s , " nonetheless, still sit i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m the contingencies o f their presentation. T h e scope o f his critique still encloses o n l y a dualistic a n t i n o m y o f w o r k and event: " T h e m u s i c a l w o r l d o f a piece is a number o f other w o r k s that f o r m a k i n d o f b a c k g r o u n d — a b o d y o f other pieces that create a purely piece" (Covach;  my gloss).  77  musical context f o r some particular  I n h i s article, " T h e Ideal F o u r M i n u t e s a n d T h i r t y - T h r e e  Seconds: R e s p o n s e t o  C o v a c h , " R i c h a r d C o c h r a n e recognizes this s h o r t c o m i n g and, t a k i n g C o v a c h ' s n o t i o n o f a 'musical w o r l d , '  appropriately broadens its scope t o reflect H e i d e g g e r ' s  o w n radically  historical understanding o f art n o t as static, enduring object, but as a specific, contextual event. I n r e f o r m u l a t i n g C o v a c h ' s n o t i o n o f a m u s i c a l w o r l d , C o c h r a n e s h o w s immediately his grasp o f the issue b y t e m p o r a l i z i n g such a w o r l d as a transient space: It is absolutely essential that this space is not considered to be a static space.... [And] we can see that it must be a mobile space, if only because Dasein is necessarily temporal, and so therefore is all musical experience.... [A musical world] is certainly constituted from musical experiences (what else could constitute it?), yet it does not contain works of music. It is, rather, a space created by experiences of music, engagements with music as "equipment," as environment. Thus, it is an aesthetic space.... Thus the musical world, although still subjective, is nevertheless social and political. (Cochrane) Cochrane  sees t h e radical understanding o f m u s i c that a H e i d e g g e r i a n  critique  points  t o w a r d s , t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f the h i s t o r i c i z e d event that H e i d e g g e r w i l l later offer i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k  o f A r t " : t h e definitive elements o f m u s i c a l experience are m u s i c a l  moments, not m u s i c a l w o r k s . Indeed, as " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " m o v e s t o w a r d s its finality,  H e i d e g g e r gradually abandons references t o ' w o r k s ' as the l o c u s o f this truth,  r e c o g n i z i n g that " h o w e v e r zealously w e inquire into the w o r k ' s self-sufficiency, w e shall still fail t o find its actuality as l o n g as w e do not also agree to take the w o r k as something w o r k e d , effected. T o t a k e it thus lies closest t o us, f o r i n the w o r d ' w o r k ' w e hear w h a t is w o r k e d "  (183). Indeed, as intimated t h r o u g h o u t o u r d i s c u s s i o n o n the pervasiveness o f the m u s i c a l object, o u r analysis is being p r o p e l l e d t o w a r d s understanding m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e as a unique social space, b o u n d t o the context o f its occurrence. H a v i n g prepared H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutic understanding o f everyday listening, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , m o o d , and attunement,  78  returning to " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , "  Being and Time, and The Will to Power as Art,  w i l l extend these themes into a portrait o f v a r i o u s audience relations i n the m u s i c a l event.  From Sound to Ereignis: Gathering and Sheltering In "The  O r i g i n o f the W o r k  o f Art," Heidegger  contends that, i n its greatest  incarnation, encountering art (and thereby m u s i c a l performance) is not so m u c h a private experience w i t h some art-object as it i s a cultural-historical event  (Ereignis), a happening o f  truth as t h e ' f o u n d i n g leap' (Ur-sprung) w h i c h articulates a c o m m u n i t y . Ereignis is a c o m m o n w o r d i n G e r m a n , w h e r e it means 'event,' ' o c c u r r e n c e , ' o r ' i n c i d e n t ' but becomes, f o r t h e m i d d l e H e i d e g g e r , t h e t e r m f o r the ' w o r l d l y ' v o i c i n g o f t r u t h as gathering, a disclosure that u n f o l d s — a n d unfolds o n l y — a l o n g w i t h preserving as  Gelassenheit. A s event,  and not object-thing, art has no localizable o r i g i n i n the genius o f s o m e creator, and no pure expression as the w o r k thus p r o d u c e d ; rather, it o c c u r s as entities n o r m a l l y secluded i n everydayness are brought together i n an o p e n allowance: The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creators. But it is the work that makes the creators possible in their essence, the work that by its own essence is in need of preservers. If art is the origin of the work, this means that art lets those who essentially belong together at work, the creator and the preserver, originate, each in his own essence. (OWA 196) P l a c e d i n the context o f m u s i c a l performance, H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the event as a ' b e l o n g i n g together' o f creators and preservers, and as g r o u n d i n g " b e i n g f o r and w i t h one another" suggests a certain degree o f sociality, o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n that t r a n s p i r e s — a n d here the n o t i o n o f discourse as shared attunement first established i n  Being and Time makes itself  h e a r d — p r i o r to, o r s o m e h o w outside of, language ( O W A 193). It is precisely i n terms o f this situated attunement that S c h i i r m a n n explains the relationality o f  Ereignis:  In Heidegger's thinking there exists, for lack of a better term, a pervasive mutuality in which all aspects pertaining to artistic creation—artist, art work, audience, and art itself—occur in concert, each tuned to the other, so that the happening of art, the happening of truth through art, comes from the fourfold totality or it does not come at all. (45)  79  A n d , again e c h o i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f discourse as shared attunement, C h a n a n t o o describes the m u s i c a l event precisely in terms o f an alinguistic ' s o c i a l d i a l o g u e ' : Music is performance art. What does this mean apart from gate-money, deficits, impresarios, agents, copyrights, trades unions, the financial (and emotional) insecurity of rank-and-file musicians? It means the break, the rupture, the abyss between the world of these social agents and the space of music itself, where the form of interaction is embodied differently: through a language of sonic gesture that begins and ends beyond words. Music is a form of social communication; musical performance is a site of social intercourse, and a form of social dialogue. (23) A l t h o u g h C h a n a n ' s c o m m e n t s suggest a c o n g r u e n c y w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s m o d e l o f everyday communication in  Being and Time, he is also clear that the p e r f o r m a t i v e event, as such, is the  space i n w h i c h everydayness is seized u p o n differently, i n w h i c h a different f o r m o f dialogue takes place. A n d w h i l e the sociality C h a n a n describes seems t o p r o p e l the d i s c u s s i o n t o w a r d s a richer understanding o f performance as a space o f social discourse, his insinuation o f the cleanliness o f this rupture points t o w a r d s some unsettling extensions. Indeed, i n C h a n a n ' s description o f w h a t constitutes the rift b e t w e e n these t w o w o r l d s , that the social mechanisms w h i c h set up the event are severed f r o m the event itself i n its u n f o l d i n g , there exists the same conflicted duality o f N i e t z s c h e ' s m o d e l . S u c h accounts fail t o r e c o g n i z e that the manner i n w h i c h t h e event is f r a m e d f r o m t h e outset plays a significant r o l e i n determining the possibilities o f the social relations that m a y o c c u r w i t h i n it. F r o m the variant descriptions o f performance relations o f W o o d s t o c k '99 t o G G A l l i n t o T h e N e e d , it i s apparent that the trajectory o f these events maintains a certain g r o u n d i n g i n the social apparatus they arise f r o m . W h i l e H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f the art event also stresses a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of, even a transportation out of the everyday, i n " L o g o s , " H e i d e g g e r also explains that every gathering always takes place under the guidance o f the 'fore-gathering' [Vor-lese]: [G]athering is more than mere amassing. To gathering belongs a collecting which brings under shelter....  80  It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to coordinate their work to the sheltering, and—gathered together with that end in view—first begin to gather. The gathering [die Lese] requires and demands this assembly. This original coordination governs their collective gathering. (61-2) H e i d e g g e r ' s declaration i n t h e first line o f this passage announces t h e issue: 'gathering is m o r e than mere amassing.' U n d e r C h a n a n ' s v i e w , t h e specific social discourse o f each particular p e r f o r m a n c e w o u l d have t o generate itself out o f such a physical amassing o f listeners. C h a n a n ' s comments, however, b r o a c h once again the k e y issue o f audience presence, specifically,  t h e question  o f the c o l l e c t i v e  relations  that  Nietzsche  addressed  only  p r o v i s i o n a l l y i n terms o f the D i o n y s i a n throng. T o return t o t h e soundcheck/performance case at the o p e n i n g o f the discussion, hinging the contrast o n the p h y s i c a l presence o f others certainly makes intuitive sense: t h e difference b e t w e e n these t w o m u s i c a l 'presentations,' obviously, lies i n the number o f people there t o observe them. Indeed, the physical presence o f these other listeners seems, at first, t o be the variable o n w h i c h this c o n t i n g e n c y rests, but reducing other audience members t o a set o f bodies, a regiment o f space-fillers, offers a crude and c r i p p l e d understanding o f w h a t is a m o r e e q u i v o c a l c o - p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the event. True, a c o m p l e x interplay o f o u r s e n s e s — v i s u a l , acoustic, olfactory, and t o v a r y i n g o r even non-existent degrees, tactile and s a v o r y — w o r k i n largely u n c o n s c i o u s o p e r a t i o n t o ascertain the presence o f other listeners d u r i n g a performance. H o w e v e r , p r i o r t o the increase i n v i s u a l stimuli, the rise i n c r o w d noise, the change i n humidity, temperature, smell, and the expanded o p p o r t u n i t y o f t o u c h ushered i n b y bolstering the size o f the audience, encapsulating a l l o f these are t h e d e m a r c a t i o n o f t h e performance as a performance p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l g r o u n d o f being-with other listeners the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  and the concomitant  at that performance. B y establishing  p r i o r i t y o f being-with others at a m u s i c a l performance, w e c a n  81  illuminate, i n a m o r e precise way, the scope o f this contingency to i n c l u d e the m y r i a d possibilities o f audience relations w h i c h surface f r o m this elemental g r o u n d . I n his d i s c u s s i o n o f D a s e i n and its spatiality i n Being and  Time, H e i d e g g e r w o r k s to  s h o w that, i n their everydayness, other D a s e i n are not p r i m a r i l y interpreted i n their brute physical occurrence, but rather i n terms o f their contextual, existential being-in-the-world. Heidegger  seems  entirely justified  in  often  reiterating  his  own  caveat against  such  interpretations:  Theoretically concocted 'explanations' of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too easily; but over against such explanations we must hold fast to the phenomenal facts of the case... namely, that others are encountered environmentally. (BT 155) A n d yet, u n l i k e objects t h a t — a c c o r d i n g to D a s e i n ' s particular m o d e o f c o n c e r n — o s c i l l a t e between s h o w i n g up as present-at-hand o r ready-to-hand entities, H e i d e g g e r contends that being-with other D a s e i n cannot be p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n either o f these t w o ordinary categories. Indeed, encountering other D a s e i n — t h o u g h as radically c o n t e x t u a l as D a s e i n ' s involvement  with  other  entities—nonetheless  remains  distinct  from  other  types  of  involvement i n its being manifest from out o f a selfsame existential l o c a t i o n :  Thus Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite different from equipment and Things, but which also—in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves—are 'in' the world in which they are at the sametimeencountered within-the-world, and are 'in' it by way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it. (BT  154)  A s H e i d e g g e r contends i n his illustration o f such existential priority, i n meeting a c o - w o r k e r " w e meet t h e m 'at w o r k , ' that is, p r i m a r i l y i n their B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , " and l i k e w i s e i f w e see someone "just standing a r o u n d , " w e interpret this not entirely indifferently, but in terms o f " a n existential m o d e o f B e i n g " — i n short, "the other is encountered i n his D a s e i n - w i t h i n the w o r l d " ( B T 156). Thus, i n H e i d e g g e r i a n terms, those other members i n the audience are  82  encountered as other Dasein in that context, as there along with us, also participating in the preservation of that particular performance in its being set out in such and such a fashion (BT 156). Indeed, it is out of this shared existential ground, and not first and foremost from a common physical location, that various sorts of audience relations are able to emerge.  Moments of Resonance: The Audience In and Out of Attunement Just as discourse transpires as the social being-with that understands a shared situation as mood, so too it is mood that is the attuning force of the audience at a musical performance. Indeed, attending a live musical performance is not only a listening-to, that is, a privative exchange between one's own mood and musical sound, but it is also a listeningwith other participants, and in this manner becomes a nebulous and contingent space of communication with the moods of other listeners as much as an absorption in one's own. Comprised of a number of individual listeners who are—at any given moment during that performance—each a site of their own musical and personal contingencies of the past and present, such relations will play themselves out amidst the moods of these individual audience members: boredom, consternation, contentment, or elation, a circulating energy of vastly different (even competing) moods both constitutes and transforms the possibilities of any particular musical event. As Heidegger declares, "we are never free of moods" and "when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood" (BT 175). As such, over the course of the performance, it is possible that each individual in the audience will undergo various unique mood changes of varying intensities. However, despite what may seem, at times, a precariously solipsistic account of individual mental states which we alone may determine and control, some of Heidegger's comments suggest that it is not so much that we have moods, but more accurately, that moods have us: " A mood assails us. It comes neither  83  from 'outside' nor from 'inside,' but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being" (BT 176). In The Will to Power as Art, Heidegger broadens and clarifies his earlier, provisional sketch of this equivocality to include a more distinctly public and even more corporeal mediation of our moods, suggesting that our environmental context always exerts a kind of magnetic pull on our moods, urging them towards a resonance with this public situation: We do not "have" a body; rather, we "are" bodily... But because feeling, as feeling oneself to be, always just as essentially has a feeling for beings as a whole, every bodily state involves some way in which the things around us and the people with us lay a claim on us or do not do so.... Mood is never merely a way of being determined in our inner being for ourselves. It is above all a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be attuned, in this or that way in mood. Mood is precisely the basic way in which we are outside ourselves. But that is the way we are essentially and constantiy. (99)  This being-with other listeners grounded in its existential priority, our corporeal involvement in the audience now emerges not as the sole fulcrum of audience presence, but as the inextricable interface of this attunement—immersed within a crowd of other listeners, we are, in this dyad of body and mood, situated within a hermeneutic circle of affecting and beingaffected by these other listeners, and as such, co-create the unfolding of the musical event itself. Most often during a musical performance—even as we are inevitably affected by the presence of other listeners—the trajectories of individual moods may not intersect in any significant manner, or may, in this intersection, express only a uniform boredom with the banality of the affair, but sometimes, albeit for brief, fleeting moments, the sense of a more powerful resonance amongst the crowd makes for a kind of audience cohesion. A mood of elation arising in the assembled crowd, we help carry, and are carried by, the momentum of this collective energy. Eliciting this sense of group unity, Dreyfus quotes Heidegger's comments on the thoroughly captivating power of social moods: A—as we say—well-disposed person brings a good mood to a group. In this case does he produce in himself a psychic experience, in order then to transfer it to the others, like the way  84  infectious germs wander from one organism to others?... Or another person is in a group that in its manner of being dampens and depresses everything; no one is outgoing. What do we learn from this? Moods are not accompanying phenomena; rather, they are the sort of thing that determines being-with-one-another in advance. It seems as if, so to speak, a mood is in each case already there, like an atmosphere, in which we are steeped and by which we are thoroughly determined. (BiW 171) D i f f u s e , enveloping, totalizing: o u r o w n m o o d is seized u p o n and t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h this participation i n a g r o u p m o o d . H o w e v e r , H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t s here e v o k e n o t only the manner i n w h i c h one partakes i n a n eruption o f a c o l l e c t i v e ecstasy, but also points, m o r e foundationally, t o o u r earlier supposition as t o the contingency o f the event's enjoinment as that specific event. In being demarcated as a particular type o f concert catering t o a particular segment o f the p o p u l a t i o n , there is, set out ' i n advance,' a certain m o o d t o the performance w h i c h , as H e i d e g g e r states i n the passage above, w o u l d determine and delimit the scope o f these relational possibilities, the sheltering o f the 'fore-gathering.' A s H e i d e g g e r contends o f interpretation, " W h e n e v e r something i s interpreted as something, the interpretation w i l l be f o u n d e d essentially u p o n fore-having, fore-sight, and f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n . A n interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending o f something presented t o u s " ( B T 192). A selfcontaining volatility, m o o d is at once the anarchic and unpredictable f o r c e o f liberation, and the constraining a n d c o e r c i v e b o u n d a r y o f such possibilities. I n its greatest intensity, t h e collective m o o d o f elation d u r i n g a m u s i c a l performance is thus l i k e w i s e b o t h the expression, and the f o u n d i n g articulation of, what is i n m a n y w a y s a pre-existing c o m m u n i t y — i n d e e d , it is the site and manner o f its  gathering.  A f t e r all, what is c o m m u n i t y i f not a concept o f  affect? B e l o n g i n g - t o is not a matter o f shared physicality, but rather a shared social m o o d . Although Heidegger  still o f f e r i n g o n l y a p r o v i s i o n a l m e n t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y i n  Being and Time,  states clearly, at m a n y different points, that authentic b e i n g - w i t h cannot be  predicated o n physical p r o x i m i t y alone:  85  Pasein's] historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for its destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. (BT 436) A s S c h i i r m a n n notes, however, H e i d e g g e r ' s sense o f c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e events i n w h i c h they b e c o m e articulated b e c o m e s stronger after the Kehre;  In the writings after Being and Time, the concept of being-there (Dasein) signifies less and less the individual and increasingly collectivities and peoples—for example, "the historical being of the Greeks." The term designates the situatedness of a Menschentum or a community. (155) Indeed, although this f o u n d a t i o n o f b o d i l y attunement i n m o o d i s w h o l l y absent f r o m the discussion a n d he again resists using the t e r m ' c o m m u n i t y ' as such, i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " H e i d e g g e r recognizes that art is the gathering f o r c e w h i c h erects a space f o r such a n attunement. I n " H e i d e g g e r a n d F o u c a u l t o n the Subject, A g e n c y a n d P r a c t i c e s , " D r e y f u s d r a w s o u t a l o c a l sense o f c o m m u n i o n H e i d e g g e r wants t o set w i t h i n a m o r e grandiose trajectory o f a p e o p l e ' s destiny and 'historical existence' ( O W A 2 0 2 ) :  For everyday practices to give meaning to people's lives and unite them in a community something must collect the scattered practices of the group, unify them into coherent possibilities for action, and hold them up to the people. The people can then act and relate themselves to each other in terms of this exemplar. And the object that performs this function best Heidegger calls a work of art. (HFSAP) Or, i n H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n w o r d s :  The origin of the work of art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people's historical existence—is art. This is so because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical. (OWA 202) Stochastic a n d momentary, the v o i c i n g o f this c o l l e c t i v e D a s e i n articulates " a b e i n g such as never w a s before a n d w i l l never c o m e t o be a g a i n " ( O W A 187). A s S c h i i r m a n n reminds us, to "retrieve it historically is t o r e c o v e r the event o f presencing o n l y  mediately.... T h a t is w h y  w e w i l l never k n o w w h a t the Incan monuments and j e w e l s t r u l y meant f o r their u s e r s " (158). H o w e v e r , despite the t h o r o u g h g o i n g historicality o f the event, it also initiates a gathering, a  86  space o f shared attunement t h a t — e v e n i n all i t s radical m i c r o - c o n t i n g e n c i e s — n o n e t h e l e s s evanesces a l o n g a n arc that manages t o contain it as an event.  Heidegger on Nietzsche: Dionysus as Horizon H a v i n g outlined b o t h the portrait o f N i e t z s c h e ' s D i o n y s i a n i n  The Birth of Tragedy,  and a H e i d e g g e r i a n interpretation o f audience relations based o n h i s account o f m o o d , listening, a n d being-with, w e are n o w prepared t o understand t h e f u l l scope o f their c o n f r o n t a t i o n o v e r the nature o f the D i o n y s i a n . A s Y o u n g simultaneously declares their relation and their rift, " T r a n s l a t e d into H e i d e g g e r ' s language, w h a t N i e t z s c h e u n d e r s t o o d w a s that m u s i c possesses, i n fact t o a c o n s u m m a t e degree, the p o w e r t o b e an  Ereignis-  e x p e r i e n c e " — t h e sub-text is, o f course, that H e i d e g g e r resisted w h a t N i e t z s c h e embraced so emphatically  (170).  Indeed,  in  The Will to Power as Art H e i d e g g e r ' s criticisms o f  N i e t z s c h e ' s enthusiasm mainly c o n f i r m the suspicion that H e i d e g g e r is a linguistic, at most, a poetic  thinker,  n o t a musical  one. B u t investigating H e i d e g g e r ' s  aurality has, rather  paradoxically, illuminated the depth a n d essence o f N i e t z s c h e ' s endorsement o f m u s i c i n its essential difference f r o m the plastic arts: the m u s i c a l event, l i k e the ephemeral sounds a r o u n d w h i c h it revolves, gathers listeners belongingly into a space o f shared attunement. S o intimately c o m p o s e d  o f and sustained b y evanescent  sound, m u s i c a l performance  thus  unfolds i n time m u c h differently than does a painting, a sculpture, or, H e i d e g g e r ' s most c o n s p i c u o u s example, a G r e e k temple. I n  Musical Elaborations, E d w a r d S a i d reminds u s that  " o n e c a n reread a b o o k , o r revisit an exhibition: it makes n o sense t o ' r e v i s i t ' a concert.... [CJoncert occasions are always located i n a uniquely e n d o w e d site" (xix). H o w e v e r , as S a i d w o u l d n o doubt b e the first t o agree, reading a b o o k and v i s i t i n g a n e x h i b i t i o n are just as m u c h unique, transitory ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ' as attending a concert: each o f these encounters  87  unfolds i n some specific situation, and thus, can never be ' r e v i s i t e d ' i n the same w a y again. B u t his intention here is quite l i k e l y t o illustrate the fact that the m u s i c a l event is c o m p o s e d o f a t e m p o r a l i t y and evanescence that is yet m o r e essential than the art encounter w h i c h centers o n a tangible, physically enduring 'object.' N o n e o f this is t o suggest that other art forms—and,  i n fact,  even other  kinds  o f events—do  n o t also  become  the founding  articulation o f communities, o n l y that music, being o f sound, w h i c h is evanescent, w h i c h does gather belongingly, w h i c h is immersive i n its most exceptional moments, catalyzes a n event that can b e c o m e the extension o f all these attributes: unique, socially c o m m u n i c a t i v e , m o v i n g . I n fact, f a r from arguing that the m u s i c a l event alone enjoys this f u n c t i o n , Y o u n g factitiously challenges t h e plurality o f 'art' that H e i d e g g e r ' s understanding o f  Ereignis  entails: " I s a concept o f art a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a G r e e k temple, a m e d i e v a l altarpiece, a Palestrina M a s s , a f o o t b a l l match, a r o c k concert, and perhaps s o m e t h i n g not t o o unlike a N u r e m b u r g rally, might a l l count as ' a r t w o r k s , ' a n artificial c o b b l i n g together o f disparate things?" (18). F r i t h t o o points t o t h e similarity b e t w e e n t h e space o f m u s i c a n d other c o m m u n a l events before declaring that, c o u p l e d w i t h its direct e m o t i o n a l intensity, it is m u s i c ' s abstract malleability that sets it apart from other events o f its k i n d : The experience of pop music is an experience of placing: in responding to a song, we are drawn, haphazardly, into affective and emotional alliances with the performers and with the performers' other fans. Again, this also happens in other areas of popular culture. Sport, for example, is clearly a setting in which people directiy experience community, feel an immediate bond with other people, articulate a particular kind of collective pride.... But music is especially important to this process of placement because of something specific to musical experience, namely, its direct emotional intensity. Because of its qualities of abstractness (which 'serious' aestheticians have always stressed) music is an individualizing form. We absorb songs into our own lives and rhythms into our own bodies; they have a looseness of reference that makes them immediately accessible. (MS 139) A g a i n , F r i t h ' s last lines about the accessibility o f m u s i c echo N i e t z s c h e ' s point i n  The Birth  of Tragedy, but H e i d e g g e r sees the space o f art and c o m m u n i t y as m o r e diffuse (as Y o u n g satirizes s o m e w h a t i n the passage above). A n d yet, as b r o a d as it m a y be, the u n f o l d i n g o f  88  this space also manages t o sit i n distinction t o t h e everyday. Indeed, despite H e i d e g g e r ' s relentless dismantling o f Cartesian epistemology, o n e duality H e i d e g g e r seems w i l l i n g t o maintain i s that b e t w e e n the w o r l d o f the everyday, and the w o r l d o p e n e d up, i n event, b y the w o r k o f art: even as his hermeneutics o f m o o d and listening s h o w h o w the everyday still grounds the u n f o l d i n g o f the m u s i c a l event, there is preserved a r e c o g n i t i o n o f a certain and extraordinary shift that sets it apart f r o m the c o m p a r a t i v e banality o f D a s e i n ' s everyday c o p i n g . T h o u g h admittedly m o r e strongly demarcated i n N i e t z s c h e ' s A p o l l i n i a n / D i o n y s i a n d i c h o t o m y , it i s i n asserting this difference b e t w e e n t h e everyday a n d t h e art event that N i e t z s c h e and H e i d e g g e r c o m e into a partial c o n g r u e n c y — t h e y share a similar understanding o f o u r typical, everyday relations w i t h others and the role that art plays i n transforming, even i f only temporarily, t h e nature o f those relationships. I n his characteristically dramatic fashion, N i e t z s c h e points t o t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e encapsulating presence o f music catalyzes a feeling o f c o m m u n i t y amongst individuals w h o s e relations i n the social w o r l d are m o r e t y p i c a l l y m a r k e d b y that o f alienation:  Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or 'impudent convention' have fixed between man and man are broken. Now with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. (BoT 37) F o r N i e t z s c h e , t h e c o l l e c t i v e participation i n the energy o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e  forces a  t e m p o r a r y rupture o f structural p o w e r i n w h i c h h u m a n relations take place o n w h a t c o u l d be described as a supra-political p l a n e — p e r h a p s i n being c o l l e c t i v e l y silenced, even somewhat p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y manipulated b y t h e totality o f the event, everyday p o w e r - r e l a t i o n s  lack  means o f exercise and are thus rendered ineffectual. T h e m e t a p h o r o f the freed slave elicits this leveling p o w e r o f the event. L i k e w i s e , f o r H e i d e g g e r , D a s e i n , i n its everydayness, remains ensnared w i t h i n w h a t  is only a facade  89  o f togetherness,  carried a l o n g i n the  a n o n y m o u s idle chatter o f das Man  i n w h i c h " u n d e r the m a s k o f '/or-one-another,' a n  'agawsr-one-another' is i n p l a y " ( B T 2 1 9 ; my gloss). H e i d e g g e r reminds us that w h e n D a s e i n "gets lost i n such w a y s as aloofness, hiding oneself away, o r putting o n a disguise, B e i n g with-one-another must f o l l o w special routes o f its o w n i n order t o c o m e close t o Others, o r even t o 'see t h r o u g h t h e m ' ["hinter s i e " z u k o m m e n ] " ( B T 161). W h i l e H e i d e g g e r is n o t particularly f o r t h c o m i n g i n Being and Time about describing these 'special routes,' his  comments later i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " outline—unequivocally so—a space o f authentic togetherness. F o r e s h a d o w e d i n these comments from his earlier w o r k , it is i n The Will to Power as Art that H e i d e g g e r clearly s h o w s his rather anxious relation t o N i e t z s c h e ' s characteristically sporadic ( t h o u g h n o less potent) p h y s i o l o g i c a l conceptions o f aesthetic feeling, especially w h e n it comes t o the fervency o f a musical rapture. T o be clear, H e i d e g g e r is w i l l i n g t o endorse affect as v i t a l f o r the p o w e r o f art, but not o n N i e t z s c h e ' s terms o f D i o n y s i a n frenzy, a rapture w h i c h , despite N i e t z s c h e ' s fanatic praise o f Rausch as a n ecstatic, c o m m u n a l unification,  still remains,  f o r Heidegger,  ensconced  within  a fundamentally  Cartesian  m e t a p h y s i c s — a r t as aesthetics becomes another o c c a s i o n o f t e c h n o l o g y , t h e slave o f a necessarily dualistic, ' l i v e d experience.' Specifically c r i t i c i z i n g W a g n e r i a n o p e r a i n its overt gesture t o w a r d s w h a t is, f o r H e i d e g g e r , a shallow collectivism, H e i d e g g e r c o n d e m n s this w i l l to dominate as the quintessential expression o f such a metaphysics:  But beyond such sheer quantitative unification, the artwork should be a celebration of the national community, it should be the religion... Music in the form of opera becomes the authentic art.... What is wanted is the domination of art as music, and thereby the domination of the pure state of feeling—the tumult and delirium of the senses, tremendous contraction, the felicitous distress that swoons in enjoyment, absorption in "the bottomless sea of harmonies," the plunge into frenzy and the disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive. The "live experience" as such becomes decisive. The work is merely what arouses such experience.... That the music could assume such preeminence at all has its grounds in the increasingly aesthetic posture taken toward art as a whole—it is the conception and estimation of art in terms of the unalloyed state of feeling and the growing barbarization of the very state  90  to the point where it becomes the sheer bubbling and boiling of feeling abandoned to itself. (WPA 86-8) Similar examples o f disdain a b o u n d i n the text. H e i d e g g e r expresses repeatedly his contempt f o r the dynamic, untamed, even volatile essence o f D i o n y s i a n f r e n z y b y e m p l o y i n g a language o f strain, fervor, a n d m u t a b i l i t y — t h o u g h w i t h different intentions,  Heidegger  manages t o capture quite w e l l the unrelenting tenacity, the almost feral quality i n N i e t z s c h e ' s earliest f o r m u l a t i o n s o f rapture from The Birth of Tragedy. T r u e , H e i d e g g e r does seem t o capitulate briefly, even declaring the possibility o f Rausch t o b e a temporary,  almost  therapeutic sanctuary that actually stands i n opposition t o technicity: " A n d yet such arousal o f frenzied feeling and unchaining o f 'affects' c o u l d be t a k e n as a rescue o f 'life,' especially in v i e w  o f the g r o w i n g  industry,  technology  impoverishment a n d deterioration o f existence o c c a s i o n e d b y  and finance..."  ( W P A 88). However,  his c o m m e n t s  immediately  f o l l o w i n g this rather unexpected fissure s h o w that this is o n l y his ruse t o denigrate as merely pedestrian s u c h a rapture o f escape. I n k e e p i n g w i t h his affinity f o r things linguistic, H e i d e g g e r again gives the final a n d decisive w o r d t o the meditative w i t h an alternative language o f c a l m and tangibility: " R i s i n g o n swells o f feeling w o u l d have t o substitute f o r a solidly g r o u n d e d and articulated p o s i t i o n i n the midst o f beings, t h e k i n d o f t h i n g that o n l y great poetry and thought can create" ( W P A 88). Clearly, H e i d e g g e r is t r y i n g t o formulate an understanding o f feeling, o f affect w h i c h does n o t suffer f r o m the v a r i o u s pitfalls o f a Cartesian m e t a p h y s i c s — a s always, he seeks t o further destabilize the c o m m o n d i c h o t o m i e s o f mind/body associated w i t h the Cartesian ' w o r l d - p i c t u r e . ' H o w e v e r , hegemony  a n d nature/culture  generally  i n attempting t o o v e r c o m e the  o f this understanding a n d yet retain a sense o f art's p r o f o u n d  importance,  H e i d e g g e r tries t o leave behind the usual sites o f art's p o w e r o f a f f e c t — e m o t i o n , feeling,  91  p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h a n g e — a n d , c i t i n g N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n reflections o n the rift, shifts the f o c u s onto the dissonant f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n art and truth. H e r e t o f o r e , H e i d e g g e r has not o n l y been unrestrained i n i m b u i n g his analysis o f N i e t z s c h e w i t h his o w n p h i l o s o p h i c a l language and formulations but has seemingly attempted t o execute, w i t h an almost f e r o c i o u s tenacity, a project o f assimilation. A w a r e that he is ' m a s s a g i n g ' N i e t z s c h e ' s text, H e i d e g g e r attempts a b r i e f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the midst o f a discussion o f 'the grand style': " F o r every great thinker always  thinks one j u m p m o r e originally than he directly speaks. O u r interpretation must  therefore t r y t o say w h a t i s unsaid b y h i m " ( W P A 134). A n d yet, strangely, here H e i d e g g e r resists re-visiting the relationship between art and truth discussed i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , " that is, o f art as a setting-into w o r k o f truth, as an  event. Instead, he rests w i t h his  brief, earlier c o m m e n t s about the primacy, captivation, and historical g r o u n d i n g o f art f o r D a s e i n : " A r t is not just one a m o n g a number o f items, activities one engages i n and enjoys n o w and then; art places the w h o l e o f D a s e i n i n d e c i s i o n and keeps it t h e r e " ( W P A 125). F o l l o w i n g N i e t z s c h e , but here m a n a g i n g t o mute his characteristic exuberance, H e i d e g g e r also contends that a certain dilation o f the c o m m u n i c a t i v e faculties takes place i n t h e aesthetic state:  We do not dwell alongside the event as spectators; we ourselves remain within the [aesthetic] state. Our Dasein receives from it a luminous relation to beings, the sight in which beings are visible to us. The aesthetic state is the envisionment through which we constantly see, so that everything here is discernible to us. Art is the most visionary configuration of will to power. (WPA 139) In a f o o t n o t e t o this passage, K r e l l makes clear that the translation o f  durchsichtig as  ' v i s i o n a r y ' c o u l d be " o t h e r w i s e rendered as ' l u c i d ' o r ' p e r s p i c u o u s ' " and, as such, contains not a c o n n o t a t i o n o f ' t h e v i s u a l ' i n art, o f ' v i s u a l art,' but o f the "envisionment,  das Sichtige,  that art opens up f o r b e i n g s " ( W P A 139). In these passages, H e i d e g g e r ' s tentative relation t o Nietzsche's notion o f  Rausch again b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t — w h e r e N i e t z s c h e is quite prepared to  92  endorse a n ecstasis o f possession, u n d e r s t o o d as a  vertical rise and fall, H e i d e g g e r w o r k s t o  manipulate art's p o w e r f u l ' h o l d ' o v e r the spectator, its captivation, into a horizontal lucidity, an attunement b o r d e r i n g o n the meditative. I n d o i n g so, H e i d e g g e r neutralizes a l l the most satisfying anarchic, e x p l o s i v e heights o f N i e t z s c h e ' s m u s i c a l  ecstasis. H o w e v e r , it is i n this  tempering o f N i e t z s c h e ' s s w i n g b e t w e e n nature a n d culture that H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis also revises the a h i s t o r i c a l , largely a c u l t u r a l shortcomings i n N i e t z s c h e ' s t h e o r y a n d suggests a m o r e t h o r o u g h , and itself satisfying, picture o f h o w something  like a D i o n y s i a n frenzy might  transpire. I n its o w n quiescent w a y , applying H e i d e g g e r ' s notions o f everyday listening, b e i n g w i t h , and m o o d t o a n understanding o f m u s i c a l performance y i e l d s a m o r e differentiated picture o f its possibilities, that is, it manages t o capture the true v o l a t i l i t y o f the event w h i c h , f o r the m o s t part and i n most cases, m a y never erupt into united frenzy, but w i l l rather u n f o l d as a space o f v a c i l l a t i n g m o o d s perhaps brought t o m o m e n t s o f r e s o n a n c e — i n acoustic terms, this space w o u l d b e a series o f oscillating hums and drones rather than a m a e l s t r o m o f explosions  a n d crescendos.  Heidegger  again manages t o c o m p r e s s  a n d thus  broaden  N i e t z s c h e ' s anarchism such that it permeates even the banal, b u t despite this v a p o r i z a t i o n o f N i e t z s c h e ' s intensity, there remains i n the b r i e f m o m e n t s o f c o m m u n i t y c o h e s i o n a strong sense o f the same f r e e d o m N i e t z s c h e extols i n the D i o n y s i a n , o f the t e m p o r a r y and blissful escape enjoyed i n o v e r c o m i n g the social obstacles o f the everyday. T r u e , H e i d e g g e r ' s is a decidedly  less  active  brand  o f physical  abandon—his  is an understanding  that  sits  precariously o n the edge o f a p a r a l y s i s — b u t there emerges i n b o t h thinkers the same extraordinary perspicuity sparked i n the m u s i c a l event, the same feverish openness o f  93  c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n w h i c h life is enhanced a n d c o m m u n i t i e s find a means o f their expression. A s N i e t z s c h e writes:  The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures—it is the source of languages. This is where languages originate: the languages of tone as well as the languages of gestures and glances. The more complete phenomenon is always the beginning: our faculties are subtiized out of more complete faculties. But even today one still hears with one's muscles, one even reads with one's muscles.... Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding. Empathy with the souls of others is originally nothing moral, but a physiological susceptibility to suggestion.... (WP 427-8) A n d , t o c o m p a r e this passage from H e i d e g g e r ' s reading o f N i e t z s c h e :  [E]nhancement of force must be understood as the capacity to extend beyond oneself, as a relation to beings in which beings themselves are experienced as being more fully in being, richer, more perspicuous, more essential.... Enhancement is to be understood in terms of mood: to be caught up in elation—and to be borne along by our buoyancy as such.... It means above all an attunement which is so disposed that nothing is foreign to it, nothing too much for it, which is open to everything and ready to tackle anything—the greatest enthusiasm and the supreme risk hard by one another. With that we come up against a third aspect of the feeling of rapture: the reciprocal penetration of all enhancements of every ability to do and see, apprehend and address, communicate and achieve release. (WPA 100) C o n s i d e r e d relationally, the w o r k s o f N i e t z s c h e and H e i d e g g e r share i n p l a c i n g — i n a m o r e precise a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e manner than w h e n approached i n d i s t i n c t i o n — m u s i c a l listeners w i t h i n a live event, a n d thereby challenge the h e g e m o n i c understanding o f the isolated a r t w o r k as the l o c u s o f meaning: being-there w i t h other listeners b e c o m e s a n integral part o f m u s i c a l meaning. W h a t this m o d e l points t o w a r d s is thus a n e w aesthetics o f m u s i c a l performance not based o n the enduring meaning o f a static w o r k , but rather o n e attempting t o account f o r the m y r i a d contingencies associated w i t h its presentation.  Genre and Community T h e d i s t i n c t i o n between ' w o r k ' a n d 'event' has p r e c l u d e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f these contingencies as contributors t o the m u s i c a l meanings o f live performance: it has generally been  assumed  that  'meaning'  resides  i n the ' w o r k . '  However,  i f this  is indeed a n  o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the case, and it is m o r e accurately one o f the factors i n the meaning o f a  94  performance,  then  the  corollary  notion  of  kinship  by  aesthetic  genre  is l i k e w i s e  an  o v e r s i m p l i f i e d a p p r o a c h t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f m u s i c — i t is w i t h o u t question a convenient w a y o f c a t e g o r i z i n g music, but i n terms o f live performance and its gathering f o r c e f o r a particular c o m m u n i t y , it can all t o o easily offer a distorted picture o f these events. S p e a k i n g o f precisely this risk as it applies to the c o n t e m p o r a r y state o f p o p u l a r music, A l b i n i makes an implicit case f o r a m o r e differentiated understanding o f m u s i c w h i c h includes its context w i t h i n a n e t w o r k o f specific social relations:  There has always been a legitimate underground. The difference now is that some of the mainstream music is stylistically similar to some common antecedents in underground music. You can listen to records on major labels that get played on the radio and think, "Wow, some of this sounds like The Stooges or The Ramones or whatever." That does not mean that in any way those people are operating in the legitimate underground or are common in any way with those people in the mainstream. (Shellac) M u s i c i a n s , i n their activity o f rehearsing, r e c o r d i n g , t o u r i n g , and p e r f o r m i n g , operate w i t h i n certain m u s i c c o m m u n i t i e s w h o  themselves operate w i t h i n certain venues, spaces,  and  n e t w o r k s o f personal contacts, and w h o themselves have certain w a y s o f relating w i t h one another: each m u s i c a l c o m m u n i t y , l i k e any c o m m u n i t y , has its o w n particular set o f codes, values, and rules. H o w e v e r ,  as A l b i n i rightly notes, to those outside o f these  specific  networks, kinship m a y appear closer than it is, because stylistically, e v e n i n terms o f a fairly nuanced sub-genre, an entirely quantifiable distinction m a y be e x c e e d i n g l y difficult, i f not impossible,  to  articulate.  For  example,  local  Vancouver  band  Mercury  the  Winged  M e s s e n g e r is stylistically close to the epic metal o f I r o n M a i d e n , but the p e o p l e w h o c r a m the front  r o w o f M e r c u r y s h o w s are not l i k e l y the same people w h o  frequent  the c i t y ' s metal  bars: the members o f this b a n d are n e t w o r k e d w i t h i n the diverse i n d i e - r o c k scene Vancouver  and the identity o f their enthusiasts f o l l o w s  of  accordingly. A n d t o return to  A n d e r s e n ' s detailed account o f T h e N e e d s h o w i n Seattle, even t h o u g h this b a n d c o u l d be  95  categorized as a somewhat experimental brand o f epic p r o g - m e t a l and might thus share c o m m o n elements w i t h H a w k w i n d and/or K i n g C r i m s o n , i n a l l facets o f their operations, these bands exist i n and cater t o entirely different n e t w o r k s and communities: understanding T h e N e e d ' s music, their performances, their reason f o r b e i n g t h e musicians they are, as anything other than f i r m l y ensconced w i t h i n a c o m m u n i t y o f lesbian p u n k y o u t h and a radical gender politics w o u l d be t o grossly misconstrue their presence as a band. Styles and influences c o l l i d e and t r a n s f i g u r e — t h e t w o members o f the b a n d have m a t c h i n g Judas Priest tattoos and sport the fashion signifiers o f the metal g e n r e — b u t their respective communities barely feel the breeze o f the other i n the crossing o f n e t w o r k routes. W e can o n l y imagine h o w things at their Seattle performance c o u l d have been different w e r e there a different blend o f people there t o preserve it. T o grasp the host o f c o n t i n g e n c i e s — p e r s o n a l , historical, and c u l t u r a l — t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o the community-enhancing success o f T h e N e e d s h o w A n d e r s e n describes near the beginning o f the d i s c u s s i o n i s t o grasp the f u l l i m p o r t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s p u z z l i n g hermeneutic circuitry w h i c h states that art is itself the f o u n d i n g leap:  The origin of the work of art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people's historical existence—is art. This so because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is becomes historical. (OWA 202)  Indeed, as w e have demonstrated, m u s i c a l performance, l i k e other live events, partakes o f this historicity i n a c o n s u m m a t e fashion, but the question o f t e c h n o l o g y , w h a t i n the case o f music is the question o f infinitely repeatable sound, must b e addressed i f w e are t o fully understand the social relations o f performance. F o l l o w i n g A t t a l i , w e w i l l e x p l o r e the scope o f these changes initiated b y the v a r i o u s technologies o f repetition. M u s i c a l P e r f o r m a n c e i n the A g e of Technicity  The communal functions of music did not disappear with the demise of tribal society; on the contrary, until now every type of human society has succoured them. But as the millennium draws to a close, the conditions of musical life are radically different. Music is with us all the 96  time, but is made by relatively few, and most of it is not heard as live performance at all. (Chanan 24)  We no longer live in a world of purely ephemeral sound. Phonographic (and now electroacoustic) technology has transformed what was a single listening into a potentially repeatable event. Seemingly simple, but the sound of everyday life changes accordingly, and with it so does the sound, time, and space of music: in its greatest scope, this is primarily a technology of spatio-temporal displacement. Music, once partaking in this ephemerality of sound, no longer exists solely as live performance, but becomes a near-omnipresent force in the listener's soundscape. The variegated prevalence of technology initiates a continuing process of change in our ontology of music, such that, despite their appearance as discrete realms, live performance, in its ephemerality, and electroacoustic technology, in its capability of repetition, more accurately reveal themselves to be part of a complex, tensile interpenetration. Looking at Attali's Noise: The Political Economy of Music in concert with the writings of Derrida, Heidegger, and Truax to examine the impact of this shift reveals not only how musicians and listeners explicitly interact with this technology of repetition, but how it is, even in its absence, also brought to 'presence' in performance, in the home, and in the recording studio, perpetually transforming musical experience in a host of oscillating tensions of artifact/evanescence, visuality/aurality, sociality/solitude, agency/subjection, and resistance/domination.  Technologies of Disruption It was on December 6, 1877 that Thomas Edison used his phonograph—a needle and a rotating cylinder covered in tin foil—to make the first successful recording and replication of human speech (Thompson 133). Although this technology of repetition has since become so prevalent within the soundscape of our everyday lives that we have now integrated as  97  c o m m o n p l a c e its metaphysical p o w e r o f displacement, its emergence ushered i n w h a t was, and remains, i n a c o u s t i c terms, n o less than a fundamental d i s r u p t i o n o f time and space. It i s an o b v i o u s but perhaps still somewhat neglected t r u i s m t o suggest that, p r i o r t o the advent o f even the crudest s o u n d r e c o r d i n g and replication technology, sound, a n y sound, h a d never been exactly replicated, w a s not replicable, h a d never been dislocated o r d i s e m b o d i e d  from  its original s o u r c e — s o u n d and source w e r e always t e m p o r a l l y and (to the extent that sound w o u l d have at least originated at the source) spatially synchronous. I n his article, " A u d i o A r t in the D e a f C e n t u r y , " D o u g l a s K a r i n relays an e q u i v o c a l blend o f v i o l e n c e , desecration, a n d p o w e r i n this simple act o f sound r e p r o d u c t i o n :  Phonography wrenched the voice from its production in the throat, in a dual act of violation and theft, but then lodged it, like an echo without a landscape, in a mechanical memory. Sound was stolen only to be returned to its owner over and over again. Thus the surprise of Edison upon hearing the first recording: 'I was never so taken aback in my life.' (302) T h i s p o w e r i s indeed o n e o f extirpation: it is a t e c h n o l o g y t o first m a r k and then t o r e m o v e sound f o r transplant elsewhere, and, i n this act o f displacement, t h r o w s into crisis the entire spatio-temporal s c o p e a n d purpose o f m u s i c a l performance. W h a t w a s a n inextricable l i n k between s o u n d a n d source meant that, understanding the t e r m i n t h e broadest sense, music was its performance: it was, as w e say n o w , ' l i v e . ' F r o m the perspective o f the listener, t o hear music, w h e t h e r casual practice, o r explicit performance, w a s t o hear the sounds o f musicians p l a y i n g at  that m o m e n t a n d i n that s p a c e — e v e n m u s i c p o u r i n g from a n o p e n  w i n d o w , o r from the d o o r w a y o f a club spoke o f the living, o f life. H e r e t o f o r e , an o n t o l o g y o f m u s i c i s o n e o f context, not ubiquity; it i s o n e o f process, n o t possession; it is o n e o f occasion, n o t banality, b u t the n e w t e c h n o l o g y o f repetition delivers a n e w o n t o l o g y o f music, and thus, o f live m u s i c a l performance itself.  98  T h e definitive change seems rather simple: sound has b e c o m e a mark, an inscription, and not merely i n physical resemblance as the g r o o v e s o f a r e c o r d , but m o r e significantly i n its n e w status o f permanent reserve, a dutiful attendance able t o b e o r d e r e d into a c t i o n at a whim.  Such  command  i s precisely w h a t  indicates t h e present  constellation  o f Being  H e i d e g g e r describes i n " T h e Q u e s t i o n C o n c e r n i n g T e c h n o l o g y " : " E v e r y w h e r e everything is ordered to stand by, t o be immediately o n hand, indeed t o stand there j u s t so that it may be o n call f o r a further ordering. W h a t e v e r is ordered about i n this w a y has its o w n standing. W e call it a standing-reserve  [Bestand]" (322). H o w e v e r , as D e r r i d a ' s analysis o f o r a l a n d  literary m a r k s i n " S i g n a t u r e , E v e n t , C o n t e x t " elucidates, the shift this t e c h n o l o g y seems t o initiate is never total, but instead operates i n a perpetual interplay o f presence and absence: This structural possibility of being severed from its referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its context) seems to me to make of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as we have seen, the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged "production" or origin. And I will extend this law even to all "experience" in general, if it is granted that there is no experience of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks. (318) T o put this into a d i s c u s s i o n o f m u s i c a l t e c h n o l o g y and its impact o n performance, these n e w marks, these noises, leave m n e m o n i c traces i n o u r understanding o f music. Thus,  this  t e c h n o l o g y ' s mediating role is not simply limited t o its operation i n the enhancement o f a g i v e n performance, o r the manner i n w h i c h it affects and determines h o w a g i v e n piece o f music is r e c o r d e d , but extends b e y o n d these such that its pervasiveness has so significantly altered the o n t o l o g i c a l understanding o f m u s i c and its performance, that it is, even i n its absence, e q u i v o c a l l y present. T h i s t e c h n o l o g y creates a situation w h e r e its traces manifest themselves, b r i n g t h e t e c h n o l o g y t o bear u p o n even t h e m o m e n t s o f its c o n s p i c u o u s invisibility. Soundtracks: The U b i q u i t y of A m p l i f i e d Sound  99  A l t h o u g h E d i s o n ' s i n v e n t i o n initiated this fundamental shift i n o u r a c o u s t i c ontology, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f electrical r e c o r d i n g and amplification w h i c h sought t o i m p r o v e u p o n the quality o f s o u n d r e p r o d u c t i o n and replication is really w h a t n o w reigns as the t e c h n o l o g y o f o u r m u s i c a l lives. T r u a x describes this electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y as that w h i c h is  concerned with the energy transfer from acoustic to electrical forms, a process called transduction, as well as the subsequent processing and/or storage of the resultant audio signal.... It is generally assumed that the electroacoustic process ends with the conversion of the signal back into acoustic, audible form via a loudspeaker. (7) In its m y r i a d applications, this t e c h n o l o g y p r o v i d e s t h e possibility f o r a k i n d o f m u s i c a l omnipresence i n w h i c h a host o f everyday activities and experiences are n o w a c c o m p a n i e d b y what c o u l d be considered a m u s i c a l soundtrack. I n the home, n o t o n l y d o stereos and personal c o m p u t e r s overtly deliver m u s i c from either radio stations o r from a variety o f r e c o r d e d media, b u t the other m a j o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l v o i c e o f the h o u s e h o l d , the television, dispenses m u s i c a l s o u n d somewhat m o r e insidiously: at any r a n d o m m o m e n t t h r o u g h o u t the broadcasting d a y here i n V a n c o u v e r ,  flipping  t h r o u g h 5 0 channels ( w i t h a v i e w i n g o f  approximately t w o seconds each) suggests that sometimes as m a n y as ten, but often only as f e w as five channels, w i l l not feature some f o r m o f music being e m p l o y e d t o construct either the b a c k g r o u n d m o o d o f a p r o g r a m / c o m m e r c i a l , o r existing as the explicit spectacle itself. T h i s quasi-omnipresence continues outside the h o m e w i t h the same e q u i v o c a l blend o f active and passive f o r m s o f listening attention: automobiles p r o v i d e m u s i c t o those o n the inside and the outside throughout  o f t h e vehicle; t h e s h o p p i n g m a l l has b a c k g r o u n d level m u s i c  t h e interior a n d immediate exterior o f t h e c o m p l e x , w i t h some  piped  businesses  dispensing a louder, m o r e f o r e g r o u n d level o f m u s i c presumably h o l d i n g a greater appeal f o r their specific clientele; and restaurants, bars and clubs almost always feature some k i n d o f music w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o the atmosphere and nature o f the establishment, w i l l b e played at  100  accordingly  appropriate  volumes—the  list  could  g o o n t o include  the music  which  accompanies the w o r k p l a c e , elevator rides, convenience store shopping, banking, strolls down  the s i d e w a l k s  in  commercial  districts,  mobile  phone  rings,  sporting  event  lulls/intermissions, a n d h o l d i n g f o r service o n the telephone. M u s i c n o longer requires direct human agency f o r its performance, and thus transcends the f o r m e r constraints o f time and space that delimited the possibilities o f its presentation. H o w e v e r , e l e c t r o a c o u s t i c t e c h n o l o g y does n o t o n l y serve t o pluralize opportunities f o r m u s i c a l listening outside o f conventional performance, but has also b e c o m e an integral c o m p o n e n t i n its f u n c t i o n i n g system. A l t h o u g h o u r familiarity w i t h electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y renders it fairly invisible during the p e r f o r m a n c e itself, this technology, i n its m a n i f o l d uses, is o b v i o u s l y i n constant operation d u r i n g m a n y varieties o f performance, is w h a t makes m a n y f o r m s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y music at a l l p o s s i b l e — n e i t h e r r o c k , n o r rap, n o r electroacoustic m u s i c i t s e l f c o u l d exist o r b e presented independently o f this technology. F r i t h points t o this degree o f integration between music a n d electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y i n his article " T o w a r d s a n A e s t h e t i c o f P o p u l a r M u s i c , " maintaining that any understanding o f m o d e r n m u s i c necessitates a n engagement w i t h this relationship:  The history of twentieth-century popular music is impossible to write without reference to the changing forces of production, electronics, the use of recording, amplification and synthesizers, just as consumer choices cannot be separated from the possession of transistor radios, stereo hi-fis, ghetto blasters and Walkmen. (135) W i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f the d r u m k i t , the t y p i c a l r o c k outfit e m p l o y s instruments that are almost entirely electric, s o u n d - m a k i n g objects that w e r e never intended f o r purely acoustic sound, b u t w e r e designed specifically t o convert these acoustic vibrations into an electric signal f o r a m p l i f i c a t i o n and/or manipulation. L i k e w i s e , c o n t e m p o r a r y D J s a n d turntablists belonging t o a l l genres depend o n this same t e c h n o l o g y t o convert k i n e t i c energy from the  101  turntable stylus into electrical energy for amplification, and electroacoustic composers use this technology to first record, or even engineer sounds electrically/digitally before further manipulating  them for their compositions,  which are, in turn, heard via external  loudspeakers. However, even the plethora of instruments which have been designed for delivering a pleasant, unamplified, and audible sound are now often amplified using either a conventional magnetic pickup (e.g., acoustic guitar, double bass) or microphones (e.g., drums, sitar) in order to meet the volume required in a given performance space. Amplification technology has indeed made it possible to transcend the acoustic limitations of both the instruments and the concert space—performances for 100,000 fans would be impossible without it. However, there is a strange and unsettling corollary to this powerful expansion: the perceived need for amplification in the performance space has grown to now include the most intimate of settings, such that, more often than not, voice and instrument will be amplified even in a small cafe. In addition to being a background voice of everyday life, this technology is now almost invariably present in performance as well. The Transformation of M u s i c a l Space  In his book, Attali conducts a genealogy of Western music (art and popular) in order to understand the implications of this technological shift, charting the transformation from music's origins within a collectively experienced simulacrum of ritual sacrifice, into the birth of the audience/musician dichotomy in representation, and then into the inception of the technological era and the concomitant burgeoning of repetition. This technological turn no less radical, Attali illustrates how representation has not been totally supplanted by repetition, that there still remains a contemporaneous co-existence of the two. In delineating their respective boundaries, Attali points to the inherently singular, ephemeral nature of the  102  former, i n contrast t o the m a s s - p r o d u c e d banality o f the latter: " I n representation, a w o r k is generally heard o n l y o n c e — i t is a unique moment; i n repetition, hearings are s t o c k p i l e d " (41). H i l l e l S c h w a r t z relays the astonishing statistics f r o m this era o f representation i n his book  The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles: Around 1900, there was drama enough just in hearing a long piece of music repeated. "The zealous concert-goer," wrote a commentator in 1908, "living at a metropolitan center, would hear in a decade perhaps ten performances of Beethoven's Third and Fifth Symphonies, four performances of one of Mozart's last three symphonies, as well as of Schubert's Unfinished and Schumann's First and Second." (375)  M u s i c — n o w recast as object i n addition to p r o c e s s — o p e n s a host o f n e w p h y s i c a l and social arrangements, one o f the most important o f w h i c h is the spatial c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f its audience: solitary listening b e c o m e s possible. Thus, A t t a l i p r i m a r i l y conceptualizes this t e c h n o l o g y i n terms o f its p o w e r t o actually transform, and, i n a sense, i m m o b i l i z e , the traditional social relations o f m u s i c appreciation i n erecting w h a t is, i n contrast, a n e w system o f m u s i c a l c o n s u m p t i o n based o n the isolated experience and fetishized prestige o f the i n d i v i d u a l : In this network, each spectator has a solitary relation with a material object; the consumption of music is individualized, a simulacrum of ritual sacrifice, a blind spectacle. The network is no longer a form of sociality, an opportunity for spectators to meet and communicate, but rather a tool making the individualized stockpiling of music possible on a huge scale. Here again, the new network first appears in music as the herald of a new stage in the organization of capitalism, that of the repetitive mass production of all social relations. (N 32) T h r o u g h o u t h i s text, A t t a l i relays a n unquestionable c o n c e r n f o r the loss o f sociality i n music, that its n e w possibilities o f presentation have rendered undesirable o r ineffectual the community-enhancing  function  o f live  performance.  While  it m a y seem that  Attali's  lamentations ( t h o u g h based o n accurate descriptions o f the n e w listening) are perhaps m i s g u i d e d yearnings f o r m u s i c a l relations w h i c h still thrive a r o u n d the w o r l d , namely, those o f live m u s i c a l performance, i n fact, p e o p l e ' s attitudes t o w a r d s p e r f o r m a n c e and their o w n agency as amateur musicians w e r e altered significantly b y the advent o f repetitive listening. In  her article, " M a c h i n e s ,  Music,  a n d t h e Quest  103  f o r Fidelity: M a r k e t i n g  the E d i s o n  P h o n o g r a p h i n A m e r i c a , 1 8 7 7 - 1 9 2 5 , " E m i l y T h o m p s o n contends that available technologies o f sound r e p r o d u c t i o n d i d indeed temper the attendance o f live m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e and the w i l l f o r amateur m u s i c - m a k i n g i n the home:  As phonographic technologies provided a means to mass-produce identical recordings of musical performances, people increasingly experienced music not by attending unique live performances or by producing music themselves in their homes but instead by purchasing recordings, carrying them home, and reproducing the music on machines in their parlors, whenever and as often as they desired. (132) D e s p i t e early fears that it w o u l d b e supplanted b y o u r affinity f o r secure,  automated  repetition, and despite the p l e t h o r a o f present choices f o r listening t o r e c o r d e d music, live m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e still enjoys a n indisputable popularity: o n any night o f the week, i n almost any m a j o r centre, people are h o l d i n g and attending live concerts o f v a r i o u s styles and sizes, and testimonials o f the rare but intense experiences they have i n these performances remain an inadequate expression o f their magnitude. A n d yet, there is o n l y partial solace t o be t a k e n i n the still undeniably strong pulse o f live p e r f o r m a n c e b o t h quantitatively, i n the brute facts o f its occurrence, and qualitatively, i n its always unpredictable but resilient p o w e r o f affect and affirmation. W h i l e even the fierce integration o f electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y into daily practices o f m u s i c listening m a y seem t o stand i n contradistinction t o live performance, a n e w o n t o l o g y o f m u s i c thus erected operates to  pervade  what  often  seems  an autonomous  realm.  Simultaneously  elucidating  this  a u t o n o m y and interrelation, A t t a l i b o l d l y contends that t h e lure o f possessing m u s i c has g r o w n stronger than o u r satisfaction w i t h its evanescence:  The love of music, a desire increasingly trapped in the consumption of music for listening, cannot find in performance what the phonograph record provides: the possibility of saving, of stockpiling at home, and destroying at pleasure. (N 84) T h i s technology, w h i c h cannot be u n d e r s t o o d independently o f a c o r o l l a r y o n t o l o g y , alters significantly the concept o f w h a t a m u s i c a l performance can and ought t o be, a n o t i o n that  104  displays  itself t o b e remarkably  consistent  with  Attali's  comments  o n t h e listener's  c o m p u l s i o n f o r material artifact i f w e examine carefully the practice o f m a k i n g unsanctioned recordings o f live performances, or, 'bootlegs.'  Capturing the Live: Exclusions, Deferrals, Future Pleasures D u r i n g the last o f their three L A performances, Shellac w e r e (as usual) confiscating t e m p o r a r i l y the r e c o r d i n g devices, and permanently the cassette tapes o f those attempting t o m a k e bootlegs o f the performance. T h e resulting dialogue that t o o k place d u r i n g one o f their signature question-and-answer periods illuminates the tension b e t w e e n t h e ephemerality o f the event and w h a t reveals itself t o be a f e r o c i o u s desire t o capture and possess it:  Thwarted bootlegger to bassist Bob Weston: "Will I get my tape back at the end of the show?" Bob Weston to bootlegger: "No. It will be destroyed." Guitarist Steve Albini to bootlegger. "What you've just done is remove yourself from everyone else around you. What you're doing now is working on your own little project for the internet, which you can do at home." Bob Weston to bootlegger: "This is it. This is the show." (Shellac performance) C y n i c s w o u l d suggest that the band w a s merely t r y i n g t o protect their a u t o n o m y o v e r the nature a n d sale o f their ' p r o d u c t , ' b u t g i v e n A l b i n i ' s n o t o r i o u s l y steadfast, quasi-socialist w o r k ethos, t h e fact that t h e members o f the band have other full-time j o b s and d o n o t consider themselves t o b e professional musicians b u t instead, as A l b i n i puts it i n the  interview w i t h Sweeney, "part o f the u n d e r g r o u n d o f hobbyist m u s i c i a n s , " perhaps there are also other m o r e significant m o t i v e s behind the seizures (Shellac). W e s t o n ' s last r e m a r k i n the exchange suggests an o p e n i n g into the tension between the live event and the repeatable one: " T h i s is it. T h i s is the s h o w . " W e s t o n ' s blunt appeal t o t h e o b v i o u s seems t o carry w i t h it a n i m p l i c i t sense o f evanescence, that d o c u m e n t i n g this event f o r a later re-visitation debases the v e r y quality that  105  makes it special, namely, that it disappears. A l t h o u g h the b a n d p e r f o r m e d three times i n the short span o f 2 4 hours, o n e o f the w o u l d - b e bootleggers still felt c o m p e l l e d t o hurl rather v i c i o u s and profane insults at W e s t o n u p o n the return o f his r e c o r d i n g d e v i c e — t h r e e live performances were, i n their ephemerality, inadequate i n c o m p a r i s o n t o the chance f o r material artifact. A s A t t a l i declares i n the above quote, the n e w w i l l f o r permanence and possession, f o r product, n o w exceeds the fulfillment derived from t h e intrinsically fleeting nature o f live sound. A g a i n , even i n its seeming absence, i n the  live event, the t e c h n o l o g y o f  repetition makes itself present. T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , another k i n d o f presence manifest d u r i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e w h i c h , i f A l b i n i is c o r r e c t i n his charges against b o o t l e g g i n g , w o u l d n o t b e c o m m i t t e d t o tape. W i t h i n this suggestion lies an implicit critique o f positivistic interpretations o f music, a questioning o f the n o t i o n that a self-contained entity, the w o r k , operates independently o f its p e r f o r m e d context. T o understand this different f o r m o f 'presence' n o t predicated u p o n the physical occurrentness o f either the w o r k , o r the audience, w e c a n return t o H e i d e g g e r ' s hermeneutics  ofEreignis and preserving i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t " : " P r e s e r v i n g the  w o r k does n o t reduce people t o their private experiences, b u t brings t h e m into the truth happening i n the w o r k . T h u s it g r o u n d s being f o r and w i t h o n e another as the historical standing-out o f h u m a n existence i n relation t o u n c o n c e a l m e n t " ( O W A 193). In light o f H e i d e g g e r ' s relational understanding o f art experience, A l b i n i ' s comments about the self-excluding essence o f b o o t l e g g i n g elucidate a quiet resilience, a resistance t o repetition inhering i n the hermeneutic u n f o l d i n g o f meaning i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e itself, a meaning w h i c h is radically mercurial, shifting, contingent u p o n the presence, n o t u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f p h y s i c a l occurrence, b u t rather the engaged  106  there-ness o f the audience members  themselves: p a r a d o x i c a l l y , one seeks t o capture an event that, i n the v e r y act o f this attempted c a p t i v a t i o n itself, b e c o m e s at least partially negated t h r o u g h a c o n c o m i t a n t selfexclusion. A c c o r d i n g to A l b i n i , the b o o t l e g g e r was, i n H e i d e g g e r i a n terms, attempting to ' r e d u c e ' the c o l l e c t i v e preservation o f the live performance d o w n t o his o w n  'private  experience,' one entirely b o u n d u p w i t h precisely the k i n d o f schema H e i d e g g e r seeks to destabilize, namely, an object-oriented n o t i o n o f art borne acquaintance  o f m o d e r n aesthetics.  One  o f mine, reflecting o n her o w n past instances o f successful b o o t l e g g i n g ,  surmised that there had been a strong correlation b e t w e e n the s h o w s she chose t o b o o t l e g and her l a c k o f enjoyment o f the live s h o w itself. In retrospect, m y o w n attempts at b o o t l e g g i n g have y i e l d e d a similarly anaesthetized experience o f these performances. O r i e n t e d t o w a r d s the future moment w h e n one can resurrect this music, the need to engage w i t h the event no longer s h o w s u p w i t h the same urgency. Presence, and the j o y i n experiencing that ' n o w ' is, it seems, deferred i n order to d w e l l w i t h i n a different k i n d o f pleasure: an e q u i v o c a l blend o f the delight in transgression and c o v e t o u s , object fetishism o f a rare and supposedly fleeting event. F u r t h e r m o r e , this r e c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the b o o t l e g g e r directs his o r her enthusiasm, w i l l , because o f the technical limitations o f s u c h clandestine recording, be o f such p o o r audio quality that one w o u l d d o u b t f u l l y ever g i v e it a second or third l i s t e n — w h a t is important is the reserve quality, the  knowledge that the event c o u l d be  re-visited i f so desired, the security that one holds a secret cache o f experience 'just i n case.' T h e r e exists a k i n d o f perverse, P l a t o n i c asceticism i n all this, in w h i c h a v o r a c i o u s w i l l f o r permanence, f o r that w h i c h is k n o w a b l e ,  attempts to m a k e c o n s o l a t i o n f o r the tragic  disappearance o f the fugitive. W e m a y recall this process o f deferral i n the self-exclusion o f b o o t l e g g i n g w h e n A t t a l i declares that " w i t h records, as w i t h all mass p r o d u c t i o n , security  107  takes precedence o v e r freedom; one k n o w s nothing w i l l happen because the entire future is already laid o u t i n advance. Identity then creates a m i m i c r y o f desire and thus rivalry; a n d once again repetition encounters d e a t h " ( N 121).  Vision and Voice: Debating Authenticity and Agency in 'Live' Performance T h e p r e c e d i n g example s h o w s quite clearly t h e manner i n w h i c h a t e c h n o l o g y o f repetition, even i n its supposed absence, brings itself t o presence: terms l i k e ' l i v e ' a n d ' p e r f o r m a n c e ' are cast into ambiguity, into their o w n oscillation o f presence a n d absence. T h e c o m p l e x i t y w h i c h emerges i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f s o u n d r e c o r d i n g a n d sound r e p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n o l o g y notwithstanding, the boundaries o f w h a t qualifies, and what fails t o qualify, as a m u s i c a l performance are still fundamentally a m b i g u o u s . A plethora o f acoustic  events w h i c h  operate  independently  o f electroacoustic  technology  evoke  this  equivocality; w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f h u m a n agency: t h e sung tones o f a priest t o a congregation, t h e c h u r c h bells w h i c h are r u n g o u t o v e r a bustling market, the w a i l i n g ambulance siren that brings traffic t o a standstill, and the train w h i c h pulls into a station f u l l o f commuters could  a l l arguably b e i n c l u d e d at some p o s i t i o n a l o n g t h e performance  c o n t i n u u m . E x p e r i m e n t a l 'performers,' i n setting u p c o l l e c t i v e listenings t o j u s t these sorts o f r e a l - w o r l d phenomena, have been i m p l i c i t l y questioning c o n v e n t i o n a l categorizations o f music a n d its performance f o r m a n y years. I n its inaugural issue ( c i r c a 1995), the B r i t i s h music fanzine,  Obsessive Eye, lists three such exercises, part o f the " F i e l d T r i p s T h r u F o u n d  S o u n d E n v i r o n m e n t s " w h i c h t o o k place i n N e w Y o r k state d u r i n g the '60s: " A n audience expecting a c o n v e n t i o n a l concert o r lecture is put o n a bus, their palms are stamped w i t h the w o r d 'listen,' a n d they are t a k e n t o a n d thru an existing s o u n d e n v i r o n m e n t " (Obsessive). A l t h o u g h n o further d e s c r i p t i o n o f the field trips is given, the p u b l i c a t i o n does p r o v i d e the  108  year, m o n t h , and l o c a t i o n o f the listening events as: C o n s o l i d a t e d E d i s o n P o w e r Station, N e w Y o r k C i t y , i n F e b r u a r y 1963; H u d s o n T u b e s (subway) b e t w e e n 9  Street S t a t i o n and P a v o n i a  i n M a r c h 1967; and N e w Jersey P o w e r and L i g h t P o w e r Plant, S o u t h A m b o y , N e w Jersey, i n July  1968.  The  performer  becomes  the  person  who  initiates the  collective  listening  experience, w h o transforms an insensate b a c k g r o u n d noise into a f o r e g r o u n d performance of, i f not music, at least s o m e w h a t meaningful, c o m m u n i c a t i v e sound. H o w e v e r , this re-definition o f performer and performance o c c u r r e d w e l l before the '60s, and is best e x e m p l i f i e d i n the radical experimentalism o f A m e r i c a n c o m p o s e r J o h n Cage. I n his article, " H e i d e g g e r ' s H o l d e r l i n and J o h n C a g e , " M i c h a e l E l d r e d contends that C a g e ' s explorations i n the contingencies o f m u s i c a l performance as exhibited i n w o r k s like his " I m a g i n a r y L a n d s c a p e , " a piece i n w h i c h the arbitrary time and place o f its performance determines the sound o f t w e l v e different radios each o f w h i c h constantly m o v e s a m o n g several  random  frequencies  (and  may  or  may  not  correspond  to  any  station),  and  paradigmatically i n his infamous " 4 ' 3 3 " , " i n w h i c h the p e r f o r m e r p e r f o r m s only silence, manifests and articulates the m u s i c a l event as this spatio-temporal demarcation, the naming o f the sonic event as a performance: " M u s i c is thus redrafted as listening to w h a t happens in a timespace f r a m e " ( E l d r e d ) . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the listener t o o b e c o m e s a ' p e r f o r m e r ' as their participatory listening also articulates this m u s i c a l location. E l d r e d quotes c o m p o s e r R o b e r t Ashley's i m p r o m p t u musings as they appeared i n Jill Johnston's 1962 r e v i e w o f C a g e ' s b o o k  Silence: " [ T ] h e ultimate result w o u l d be a m u s i c that wouldn't necessarily i n v o l v e anything but the presence o f people. That is, it seems to m e that the most r a d i c a l redefinition o f music that I c o u l d t h i n k o f w o u l d be one that defines ' m u s i c ' w i t h o u t reference t o s o u n d " ( E l d r e d ) . H o w e v e r , despite the w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d nature o f C a g e ' s experiments, as w e l l as those o f his  109  contemporaries  and his f o l l o w e r s , p o p u l a r consciousness has been largely u n w i l l i n g  to  assimilate this n e w schema o f performance and instead, still operates w i t h i n a f r a m e w o r k determined b y m o s t l y v i s u a l c r i t e r i a — t h e question o f p e r f o r m a t i v i t y is the question  of  physicality. P e r f o r m a t i v i t y as P h y s i c a l i t y T o determine whether a g i v e n acoustic event meets the criteria o f a performance, the first question is inevitably one o f h u m a n agency: "Is a n y b o d y doing a n y t h i n g ? " H o w e v e r , this a m b i g u o u s phrasing m o r e accurately stands f o r a m o r e detailed enquiry: " T o  what  degree are s o m e o n e ' s actions responsible f o r the sounds w e h e a r ? " It b e c o m e s immediately o b v i o u s that the v e r y n o t i o n o f ' p e r f o r m a n c e ' is so inextricably b o u n d w i t h a sense o f active gesture, enactment, m o t i o n , o f something w e discern t h r o u g h a p r i m a r i l y  visual means, that it  is difficult t o separate the sound o f music f r o m the h u m a n m o v e m e n t s responsible f o r its character. T h i s visuality i n m i n d as w e t u r n t o w a r d s the t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e a l m o f performance, its scope and intensity o f application b e c o m e clear i f w e examine attitudes t o w a r d s the use o f p r e r e c o r d e d sounds, or even entirely p r e r e c o r d e d w o r k s , i n c o n t e m p o r a r y m u s i c a l events. T o v a r y i n g degrees, many teen p o p acts, r o c k bands and D J turntablists alike m a k e use o f prerecorded sounds o r samples d u r i n g their live performances. F o r some, the p r e r e c o r d e d c o m p o n e n t is the instrumentation w h i l e the singing remains live; f o r others, it m a y be the converse; it may even be the entire performance itself. In many cases, no effort is made to conceal this d i s e m b o d i e d sound; i n other cases, it is deemed necessary. In these latter cases, rarely any dissention is v o i c e d b y the audience w h e n this p e r f o r m a n c e features  some  semblance that it is happening at that m o m e n t and as a direct result o f their physical  110  g e s t u r e s — m a n y audiences either d o n o t k n o w , o r d o n o t care that M i l l i V a n i l l i ' s singing, o r the D J ' s scratch w i z a r d r y is, i n terms o f its live quality, a well-orchestrated illusion, m o t i o n synched t o m u s i c p r o v i d e d b y a D A T cassette. A s T r u a x declares, the reason f o r this is obvious: " T h e sophistication o f m o d e r n r e c o r d i n g studio techniques cannot, i n fact, be easily r e p r o d u c e d live; hence, the frequent dissatisfaction w h e n the l i v e experience cannot match the p r e r e c o r d e d one w h i c h the listener has c o m e t o p r e f e r . . . " (116). A s M i l l i V a n i l l i p r o v e d during the p i v o t a l m o m e n t w h e n their samplers crashed and their p r e r e c o r d e d v o c a l s began b a r k i n g o u t a glitch-ended l o o p , some audiences w o u l d quite admittedly prefer the k i n d o f standardized security o f the repeated: the audience merely laughed at the spectacle's collapse as the p a n i c k e d d u o fled the stage i n embarrassment. T h e band w a s humiliated, but the c r o w d shrugged it o f f ( B e h i n d ) . A t t a l i is thus absolutely correct t o declare that  little by little, the very nature of music changes: the unforeseen and the risks of representation disappear in repetition. The new aesthetic of performance excludes error, hesitation, noise. It freezes the work out of festival and the spectacle; it reconstructs it formally, manipulates it, makes it abstract perfection. (N 106) A n d w h i l e the semi-illusory nature o f this live performance certainly does n o t negate the affirmative quality o f the event f o r that audience, those performances w h i c h must be prerecorded, namely, those o f electroacoustic music, rarely receive the same charitable treatment w h e n  c a t e g o r i z e d i n terms o f their performativity. T h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y  slight  m o v e m e n t s required o f an electroacoustic c o m p o s e r w h i l e p e r f o r m i n g a piece register b e l o w the performance prerecorded.'  threshold f o r some, l e v y i n g charges against its existence as 'merely  However,  assuming  the p o p u l a r  rumour  that  some  turntablists  use a  p r e r e c o r d e d tape t o ensure a quality performance, audiences seem entirely content t o class a DJ  concert  as performance  largely because  o f the hand  movements  synched t o the  prerecorded tape (unbeknownst t o the listeners), whereas electroacoustic performances, i n  111  their l a c k o f deceit about the p r e r e c o r d e d nature o f the w o r k , seem t o e v o k e a greater skepticism even t h o u g h the c o m p o s e r is m i x i n g and fine-tuning the piece t o mesh w i t h the performance space as the audience hears it, as it is being ' p e r f o r m e d . ' Q u i t e l i k e l y a latent schema still ingrained b y m u s i c ' s pre-technological origins i n live p l a y i n g , the criteria being applied is clearly that o f gesture. C o n v e r s e l y , w h e r e an e x a m i n a t i o n o f  electroacoustic  t e c h n o l o g y usually exhibits it to be a mediating f o r c e f o r live performance, i n this case it is the original o n t o l o g y o f live m u s i c w h i c h disrupts the t e c h n o l o g i c a l . O r , is it indeed the case o f a t e c h n o l o g i c a l understanding mediating that o f the live? A r e listeners n o w so a c c u s t o m e d to the fact that d i s e m b o d i e d sound f r o m a loudspeaker no l o n g e r denotes direct h u m a n agency that, i n the absence o f b o l d physical gestures, the signification o f death overrides that o f life? Is the c y n i c i s m w e feel i n the insincerity o f repeated sound, those v o i c e s y o u hear in the labyrinth o f everyday t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that y o u n o w understand as a semblance o f language, is that so strong that w e have no faith i n the sincerity o f the technological? W h a t emerges f r o m this analysis is a t h o r o u g h interpenetrability, a c o m p l e x intermingling o f the live and t e c h n o l o g i c a l realms, suggesting a de-stabilization o f their respective autonomies, that there are no longer any pure ontologies o f ' l i v e ' and ' t e c h n o l o g i c a l ' to speak of. Cage's location  first  "4'33"," demonstrates that performance is a spatio-temporal listening demarcated b y the performer,  and then enacted  and c o m p l e t e d  only  in  c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h an audience. In H e i d e g g e r i a n terms, the m u s i c a l w o r k u n f o l d s as an event i n its co-creation b y creator and preserver alike. A n d yet, despite this re-instigation o f the sonic, a paradigmatic example o f the hermeneutic c o - c r e a t i o n o f m u s i c a l performance s h o w s that a certain visuality still stands as crucial f o r the success o f live performance. W h e n w a l k i n g t o w a r d s m y class from the p a r k i n g  112  lot at S i m o n F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , I heard the sound o f bagpipes i n the distance, p l a y i n g f o r a f e w m o m e n t s and then disappearing again. A l t h o u g h I had t o w a l k i n that d i r e c t i o n anyway, I noticed that I felt (not at all surprisingly) d r a w n to this music. I c o n t i n u e d w a l k i n g and w a s s o o n able to see t w o pipers facing an area o f grass that sits o n the p r e c i p i c e o f a grassy square k n o w n as the A c a d e m i c Quadrangle. A s I kept w a l k i n g t o w a r d s m y class, these t w o pipers w e r e s o o n f l a n k e d b y a f e w m o r e w h o j o i n e d i n the sporadic and i m p r o m p t u bursts o f music. A l t h o u g h all the pipers w o r e the traditional stockings, kilts and j a c k e t s , their casual pacing m o t i o n s and intermittent p l a y i n g made it o b v i o u s that they w e r e not, at the m o m e n t anyway, p e r f o r m i n g i n any serious manner, that is, there seemed to be g o o d evidence to suggest that it w o u l d not have been demarcated, in advance, as a performance. T h e presence o f what l o o k e d to be a professional p h o t o g r a p h e r w h o began setting u p his equipment some 15 metres away seemed to c o n f i r m this suspicion: this w a s some k i n d o f p h o t o shoot, not a concert. I sat d o w n o n the stairs s u r r o u n d i n g the grassy area t o enjoy the sounds and n o t i c e d that others had done, and w e r e c o n t i n u i n g to do, the s a m e — d e s p i t e its i m p r o m p t u , casual nature, this music w a s calling p e o p l e to witness, s u m m o n i n g t h e m to, as H e i d e g g e r describes, 'preserve' these sounds. T o t a l l y unexpectedly, these sounds catalyzed the c o n c u r r e n t self-fabrication and u n f o l d i n g  of  a m u s i c a l performance  (in the  Cagean  sense).  Strangely, the  very  unperformative quality o f this event, w i t h its constant oscillation o f silence and playing, afforded the possibility f o r a rather unique listening experience rife w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r almost clinical observations, potentials f o r c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n the v o i c e o f the everyday w o r l d , and the v o i c e o f the musical. Perhaps an o b v i o u s fact, o r perhaps an o v e r l y dramatic interpretation to u p h o l d , but w h e n the pipers w o u l d play, 'things' w o u l d change drastically. T h e n o r m a l l y banal b a c k g r o u n d sounds o f the w i n d , birds, traffic, and distant c o n s t r u c t i o n  113  noise w e r e d r o w n e d out b y the v o l u m e and magnitude o f the bagpipes, o n l y t o rush b a c k i n again, n o w s o m e w h a t obtrusively, w h e n the pipers w o u l d stop playing. A n d again, w h e n the pipers w o u l d start up, their m u s i c acted t o contain the space and the p e o p l e i n it. T h a t space, during some o f the m u s i c a l moments, s h o w e d up i n its h o l i s m , as m a k i n g sense, o n l y t o dissolve again into the fragmented nature o f the everyday w h e n the m u s i c w o u l d stop. W o u l d there have been a ' p e r f o r m a n c e ' w i t h o u t those w h o sat d o w n to preserve this? W o u l d anyone have sat d o w n t o preserve this had the sounds been delivered b y t w o l o u d s p e a k e r s rather than a handful o f pipers? D o w e have here one possible interpretation o f m u s i c that involves, as R o b e r t A s h l e y mused, nothing but the presence o f people? D e s p i t e the success o f C a g e ' s experiments w h i c h s h o w that a m o r e c o m p l e x e p i s t e m o l o g y o f p e r f o r m a n c e is at play, the visual c o m p o n e n t w i t h i n this schema again manifests itself as c r u c i a l t o a concept o f live performance. W h i l e it is possible that the sound quality o f live bagpipes exceeds their reproduced, amplified sound, it still seems that the greater appeal f o r the audience is the sense o f gesture, h u m a n agency, o f a reassurance o f life. T h e r e is a sincerity associated w i t h the presence and sound o f those performers that quite justifiably abates w h e n replaced b y disembodied, and thus  potentially  repeated, sound. H o w e v e r ,  g i v e n the  aforementioned  commingling  of  t e c h n o l o g i c a l and live ontologies, it is also not surprising that, even d u r i n g this w o n d e r f u l l y spontaneous, evanescent m u s i c a l event I w a s enjoying so m u c h , m y thoughts also w a n d e r e d into the d o m a i n o f repetition: " I should really try and get a C D o f this pipe b a n d . " B u t again, the situation resists such a simple explanation: at the same time, it is the holistic experience o f this event w h i c h fuels the desire f o r its s i m u l a c r u m in solitary h o m e listening. Studio Separations  114  A s this t e c h n o l o g y transforms t h e social relations o f m u s i c a l c o n s u m p t i o n i n t h e home, and, m o r e equivocally, i n live performance itself, its advance has seen it l i k e w i s e disrupt the 'liveness' o f performative relations i n the studio as w e l l . A n d yet, this project o f capturing the intensity o f the live is a dubious p r o p o s i t i o n f r o m the outset. A n y o n e w h o has attempted t o r e c o r d sound, whether m u s i c a l o r otherwise, i n the hopes o f replicating it 'as it happened' k n o w s the futility o f this exercise: there are o n l y greater and lesser degrees o f authenticity, never a n attainment o f its purity. Still, at one point i n history, r e c o r d i n g was, even i n its inevitably mediating role, a d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f a p e r f o r m a n c e ( w i t h o r w i t h o u t a n audience), w i t h musicians p l a y i n g simultaneously, as they w o u l d f o r a g r o u p o f listeners. H o w e v e r , the rupture o f space and time already i n operation s o o n intensifies, investing itself into the recordable performance i t s e l f B e f o r e a further extension t o include the variable o f time, audio engineering first d i s s o l v e d the performance-oriented, spatial arrangement o f the musicians into separate, m o r e manageable acoustic spheres. I n his article, " T h e ' s o u n d ' o f music: T e c h n o l o g i c a l rationalization and the p r o d u c t i o n o f p o p u l a r m u s i c , " P a u l Theberge quotes F. E v e r e s t ' s remarks o n the somewhat e q u i v o c a l but detrimental effects o f spatially and acoustically separating musicians i n the r e c o r d i n g studio:  As musicians are separated from each other physically and acoustically, something tends to be lost in the music in the effect the musicians have on each other. The intangible 'something' that makes a group successful is undermined to a certain extent.... Physical separation, extremely dead studio acoustics, opaque baffles, and isolation booths achieve channel separation all right, even to the extent that the musicians often cannot hear one another. (102) Similar c o m m e n t s f r o m other musicians expressing this inexpressible ' l o s s ' seem almost u b i q u i t o u s — t h e vitality w h i c h unfolds w h i l e the g r o u p plays together as a w h o l e b e c o m e s muted, dulled, a s i m u l a c r u m o f their original cohesion. T h e r e is here another g l i m p s e that the energy i n performance resists being captured. H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h this r e c o r d i n g t e c h n o l o g y has at this point o n l y restructured the spatial arrangement o f the musicians, a severance o f  115  their t e m p o r a l u n i t y is s o o n t o f o l l o w . A s Theberge is k e e n t o point out, this spatial separation w h i c h offers the possibility o f a clean track, free o f bleed from other instruments, later extends into the d o m a i n o f time to enact a further ' c l i n i c i z a t i o n ' o f the studio and a final dissection o f c o l l e c t i v e performance. A n exponential intensification o f the d i s r u p t i o n i n time and space m a d e possible b y E d i s o n ' s phonograph, multi-track t e c h n o l o g y (first invented by L e s P a u l i n the late ' 4 0 s ) uses the same principle o f m a r k i n g and transplanting t o c o n c o c t an illusion o f a singular, acoustic event w h i c h , i n fact, never t o o k place ( R o b e r t s ) . A n a l o g o u s to erecting a b u i l d i n g  from  the b o t t o m up, this t e c h n o l o g y  a l l o w s m u s i c a l w o r k s to  be  constructed piece b y piece, layer b y layer, to ensure not o n l y channel separation, but m o r e importantly, that the best performance  from  each o f the musicians is captured f o r the  recording. I n its most extreme application, musicians w h o have never met, o r are n o w no longer l i v i n g , can exist i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n o n an album. T h e sociality that w a s o n c e inherent i n m u s i c i n all facets o f its p r o d u c t i o n — r e l a t i o n s between audience members, relations between audience  and musician, and relations b e t w e e n the musicians  themselves—appropriately  disintegrates first w i t h i n the studio, and later i n the end result t o w a r d s w h i c h this entire enterprise points: h o m e  listening. H o w e v e r ,  this disintegration o f the social,  although  complete i n the studio, resists a total dissipation i n the w o r l d outside the studio, i n the w o r l d o f m u s i c enthusiasts. Resilience: T h e Liveness of the L i v e A t t a l i criticizes this dissolution o f c o l l e c t i v e participation s p a w n e d b y the system o f repetition, contrasting it w i t h the n e w spatial arrangement o f m u s i c c o n s u m p t i o n i n w h i c h "the listener i n front o f his r e c o r d player is n o w only the solitary spectator o f a sacrificial vestige" ( N 120). A n d , w h i l e it is indisputable that electroacoustic t e c h n o l o g y exerts this  116  transfigurative p o w e r , an ability to reduce the f o r m e r l y c o l l e c t i v e nature o f m u s i c a l listening d o w n to w h a t c o u l d be considered as the most abstract f o r m , A t t a l i ' s m o d e l systematically excludes the v a l u e in the social interdependence w h i c h surrounds this admittedly isolated act: concerts,  conventions,  and  casual  conversations  with  other  music  enthusiasts  still  accompany, possibly even enhance, this solitary, introverted listening. E v e n as the locus o f m u s i c m o v e s , v i a fetish w i t h material artifact into the l i v i n g r o o m s o f the i n d i v i d u a l and away f r o m the sociality o f the ritual, these consumers still operate w i t h i n v a r i o u s l y - s i z e d communities  bonded  by  a  common  interest  and  participation  in  consumption  and  performance alike. F r a g m e n t e d , shifting, surrogate, and thus themselves evanescent, these communities transcend g e o g r a p h i c p r o x i m i t y and instead r e v o l v e a r o u n d the hub o f m u s i c a l interest, one that is, also admittedly, most often ensconced w i t h i n a system o f e c o n o m i c exchange. W i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f some u n d e r g r o u n d bartering n e t w o r k s  o f music fans  (including N a p s t e r and similar technologies), and rare and/or small performances organized as free events, i n v o l v i n g oneself in m u s i c is to i n v o l v e o n e s e l f i n the exchange o f capital. Initiation into m a n y m u s i c communities requires only the means t o acquire the specific, definitive accoutrements  o f a g i v e n league: seminal recordings  on  sanctioned formats,  associated magazines/literature, appropriate fashion, and concert tickets are available to anyone possessing the desire and the means to obtain them. In short, identity can, and must, be claimed t h r o u g h c h o i c e o f purchase. I n e x p l o r i n g the possibility o f a true alternative, it seems i m p o s s i b l e t o stop short o f espousing either a complete, systemic restructuring o f capital exchange o r its converse, a radically hermetic, isolated existence free o f any social c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h others. I f to be a music appreciator in the W e s t is t o necessarily be a music consumer, i f one's identity as a  117  music enthusiast, o r even as a caricatured type o f m u s i c buff, is p r i m a r i l y f o r g e d  and  solidified w i t h i n a host o f e c o n o m i c relations, then the c h o i c e o f w h a t k i n d o f c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k s one b e c o m e s i n v o l v e d in stands as the fundamental d o m a i n , the o n l y o p p o r t u n i t y o f resistance. A t t a l i , h o w e v e r , sees these relations as p r i m a r i l y inauthentic, arguing that, p r i o r to their soothing effect o f c o m m u n i t y , they are first and foremost an endemic expression o f the k i n d o f fear leveraged against the c o n s u m e r i n the m o m e n t u m o f repetition's o w n social system:  Repetition becomes pleasurable in the same way music becomes repetitive: by hypnotic  effect.... [IJn a society in which power is so abstract that it can no longer be seized, in which the worst threat people feel is solitude and not alienation, conformity to the norm becomes the pleasure of belonging, and the acceptance of powerlessness takes root in the comfort of repetition. (N 125) T h e difficulty, h o w e v e r , is accurately discerning w h a t the nature o f this n o r m is, w h a t constitutes b l i n d c o n f o r m i t y , o r innovative venture; what constitutes the mainstream, and what the m a r g i n a l — b e l o n g i n g to any c o m m u n i t y larger than o n e s e l f b e c k o n s charges  of  simply c o n f o r m i n g t o o n e ' s o w n subcultural n o r m . B u t these associations, necessarily based u p o n shared social practice, are w h a t lend o u r lives meaning. T o rally against t h e m o n the premise that they hinder f r e e d o m is t o participate i n a self-imposed exile, to believe i n the E n l i g h t e n m e n t m y t h o f the u n e n c u m b e r e d self, and thus, t o marginalize the i m p o r t a n c e o f the v e r y sociality A t t a l i seems t o embrace. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , this false c o n c e p t i o n o f self seems to be part o f the f o u n d a t i o n f o r the alternative m u s i c practice A t t a l i espouses. Although  Attali's  denigration  of  object  fetishism and  isolated  consumption  of  r e c o r d e d m u s i c is clearly predicated o n a p r i v i l e g i n g o f the social, collective, and thus c o m m u n i c a t i v e aspect o f live m u s i c a l performance, his v i s i o n o f resistance at first seems based o n a similar auto-aurality:  118  [W]e can envision one last network, beyond exchange, in which music could be lived as composition, in other words, in which it would be performed for the musician's own enjoyment, as self-communication, with no other goal than his own pleasure, as something fundamentally outside all communication, as self-transcendence, a solitary, egotistical, noncommercial act. (N 32) H i s v i s i o n o f the n e w c o m p o s i t i o n is the anti-Dionysian: an A p o l l i n i a n narcissism engaged i n a metaleptic chain. W h i l e he does c o n c e d e that the w o r k o f this n e w c o m p o s e r may be heard by others, its o w n creative glance w o u l d n o w b e f i x e d i n w a r d , rather than t o w a r d s a live audience, o r potential audio consumer. H o w e v e r , as the b o o k funnels into the final chapter dedicated t o sketching out the f r a m e w o r k o f this n e w c o m p o s i t i o n , A t t a l i ' s m o d e l o f selfenclosing creativity opens somewhat t o include the participation and appreciation o f others, i m p l o r i n g us t o create our own relation with the world and try to de other people into the meaning we thus create. That is what composing is. Doing solely for the sake of doing.... Playing for one's own pleasure, which alone can create the condition for new communication. (N 134) To  b e fair,  Attali's  pessimism  a n d precariously-balanced  individualism  seem  entirely  justified a n d reasonable u p o n witnessing, even f o r five minutes, t h e state o f mainstream music today. A n d h i s prophesies f o r this n e w c o m p o s i t i o n have been remarkably true: a b u r g e o n i n g o f independent r e c o r d labels, a resurgence i n amateur m u s i c - m a k i n g , and even the advent o f an entirely n e w m u s i c a l v o c a b u l a r y v i a computer-based c o m p o s i t i o n , f o l l o w e d (at their o w n paces) t h e publication o f his b o o k . H o w e v e r , t h e s c o p e o f this change also depends o n w h e r e one fixes one's glance. ' P l a y i n g f o r one's o w n pleasure' and ' d o i n g solely f o r the sake o f d o i n g ' have never really disappeared, b u t s u r v i v e d w h e r e v e r and whenever someone w h i s t l e d a tune, d r u m m e d out a pattern w i t h their fingers, o r played the fiddle w i t h their family i n t h e kitchen. O f course, even at this suggestion, A t t a l i has o p p o r t u n i t y t o interject: w h i c h tune w e r e they whistling? I n h o w m a n y families d i d t h e fiddle playing  119  subside, o r even stop? A g a i n , the live and the t e c h n o l o g i c a l intermingle i n a perpetual dialectic o f u n r e s t — o f A p o l l i n i a n solipsism and D i o n y s i a n ritual. I n a n a l y z i n g the c o m p l e x interplay b e t w e e n the o n t o l o g i e s  o f the live and the  t e c h n o l o g i c a l there exists an indisputable ambiguity o f their a u t o n o m i e s — i n d e e d ,  their  distinction remains m o r e than dubious. A n d yet, there are interstices o f resistance against repetition w h i c h inevitably occur: certainly there are n e t w o r k s o f ' n e w c o m p o s e r s ' w h o are, i f not operating c o m p l e t e l y outside a capitalist system o f exchange, h o l d it at bay and maintain their p r i m e focus, as A t t a l i suggests, o n the act o f m u s i c - m a k i n g . B u t the resistance against repetition is even m o r e than h u m a n resolve: t o c r u d e l y appropriate  Heidegger's  recurrent f o r m u l a t i o n o f essence, it is the liveness o f the live: the live is a resistance. It is a resistance because it is unnecessary, inefficient, and unpredictable. It is the countervailing f o r c e w h i c h balances the w i l l f o r its converse: necessity, efficiency, p r e d i c t a b i l i t y — d r i v e s w h i c h m a r k this age o f technicity in its o w n essence. E v e n i n some o f the most steadfast attempts at turning live performance into r e p e t i t i o n — i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f c o n s c i o u s  human  s u b v e r s i o n — t h i s energy w a s able to maintain a resilience against m a s s - p r o d u c e d repetition: the example o f the b o o t l e g g e r at the Shellac show; the rare and magnificent b r e a k d o w n i n technological  consistency w h i c h y i e l d e d noise out o f a c o n c e r t e d  arrangement f o r its  absence; E v e r e s t ' s c o m m e n t s about the loss o f that certain, inexpressible something i n spatially separating performers i n the studio; the spontaneous preservation o f the pipe band w h i c h catalyzed the creation o f a performance (one that w o u l d have to be live and not recorded); and those events w h i c h are recorded, but still exist as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n — a l l display this resistance. D e s p i t e the transformation o f the listening p u b l i c ' s attitudes into what seems an almost u b i q u i t o u s preference f o r mass-produced repetition, o u r o w n resilience is required  120  t o preserve and foster the seeds o f resilience inhering i n the m u s i c i t s e l f so that w e may, as A t t a l i puts it, " m a k e the free and revocable c h o i c e to interlink w i t h another's c o d e — t h a t is the right t o c o m p o s e o n e ' s l i f e " ( N 132).  121  CHAPTER I V SOUND AND P O W E R : E X P L O R I N G F O U C A U L T ' S PERFORMATIVITY Re-interpreting Nietzsche and Heidegger: Foucault on the Disciplined Mass D e s p i t e the o v e r w h e l m i n g influence N i e t z s c h e has exerted o n F o u c a u l t ' s philosophy, b o t h thematically, i n terms o f his f o c u s o n the exercise o f p o w e r i n relation t o the body, a n d methodologically, i n executing his p h i l o s o p h y as genealogy, F o u c a u l t never explores what is f o r N i e t z s c h e a n essential extension o f this relation: the operations o f m u s i c i n terms o f p o w e r . I n fact, F o u c a u l t ' s f e w comments o n m u s i c o c c u r r i n g i n o n e o f his later interviews gesture m o r e t o w a r d s the p l u r a l i s m o f the later H e i d e g g e r than the e x p l o s i v e frenzy o f the D i o n y s i a n . A f t e r paraphrasing N i e t z s c h e ' s enthusiasm f o r " t h e p r i m o r d i a l pleasure t o b e f o u n d i n inflicting, a n d suffering, p a i n " ( f r o m  Passion of Michel Foucault),  Beyond Good and Evil),  then contends that  James M i l l e r ( i n his  "Discipline and Punish  recapitulated  N i e t z s c h e ' s argument, b u t it also extended it, s h o w i n g h o w the m o d e r n h u m a n sciences h a d taken o v e r the role o f Christianity i n disciplining the b o d y . . . " (219). I n his 1975 w o r k ,  Discipline and Punish,  F o u c a u l t ' s analysis o f p o w e r i n relation t o the b o d y — a n d , most  notably f o r the present purposes, g r o u p s o f b o d i e s — i s an e x a m i n a t i o n that c o n v e y s a sense o f h u m a n p e r f o r m a t i v i t y that w h o l l y surpasses the v e r y p r o v i s i o n a l a c c o u n t o f corporeality suggested  i n the w o r k s  o f Nietzsche  and Heidegger.  Indeed,  Foucault's  pluralistic  understanding o f these disciplinary strategies suggests an essential transience o f these techniques (that their operations are b y n o means l i m i t e d t o a single c u l t u r a l practice), a n d thus intimates a possible transmutability into the d o m a i n o f m u s i c a l performance. A s F o u c a u l t explores h o w the m o b i l i z e d m a s s — f r o m factory w o r k e r s t o military t r a i n e e s — i s infused w i t h p o w e r , the w a y that these relations o f p o w e r are, paradoxically, as p r o d u c t i v e as  122  they are constraining a n d as a n o n y m o u s as they are seemingly locatable, w e c a n observe some parallel relations i n the p e r f o r m i n g mass o f the m u s i c a l event. A l t h o u g h there are many other texts i n w h i c h F o u c a u l t addresses the question o f the body,  Discipline and Punish is the  k e y text f o r understanding c o r p o r e a l i t y i n m u s i c a l performance. H o w e v e r , t o o p e n this discussion o n F o u c a u l t and music, w e w i l l first t u r n t o h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h B o u l e z , i n w h i c h he makes some c o m m e n t s that indicate his relation t o the later H e i d e g g e r specifically i n terms o f the event.  Foucault on Music, Plurality, Community M o d e r a t e d b y P i e r r e B o u l e z a n d appearing i n L a w r e n c e  D. Kritzman's  Michel  Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, some o f F o u c a u l t ' s c o m m e n t s from the 1983 discussion o n " C o n t e m p o r a r y M u s i c a n d Its P u b l i c " betray a stance o n art a n d c o m m u n i t y characteristic o f the m i d d l e a n d later H e i d e g g e r (Dreyfus, H F S A P ) . A l s o u r g i n g u s t o see music as a n event i n v o l v i n g ( t o phrase things i n H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m i n o l o g y ) ' c r e a t o r s ' a n d 'preservers' alike, F o u c a u l t  first  reminds u s o f m u s i c ' s ritual history b e f o r e turning h i s  discussion t o the affirmative quality o f r o c k :  One must take into consideration the fact that for a very long time music has been tied to social rites and unified by them.... Not only is rock music (much more than jazz used to be) an integral part of the life of many people, but it is a cultural initiator: to like rock, to like a certain kind of rock rather than another, is also a way of life, a manner of reacting; it is a whole set of tastes and attitudes.... Rock offers the possibility of a relation which is intense, strong, alive, "dramatic" (in that rock presents itself as a spectacle, that listening to it is an event and that it produces itself on stage), with a music that is itself impoverished, but through which the listener affirms himself; and with [avant-garde] music, one has a frail, faraway, hothouse, problematical relation with an erudite music from which the cultivated public feels excluded. One cannot speak of a single relation of contemporary culture to music in general, but of a tolerance, more or less benevolent, with respect to a plurality of musics. Each is granted the "right" to existence, and thisrightis perceived as an equality of worth. Each is worth as much as the group which practices or recognizes it. (Foucault, PPC 316) I n this exchange w i t h B o u l e z , F o u c a u l t is quite k e e n t o stress the historic role o f m u s i c as a marker, a signal o f a cultural event rather than as some aggregate o f w o r k s , and i n so doing,  123  begins t o m o v e the discussion a w a y from the initial t o p i c o f the avant-garde and its selfsegregating life and into an e x p l o r a t i o n o f m u s i c as a space o f c o m m u n i t y identity. F o u c a u l t sets r o c k ( o r its specific sub-genres) as a n important hub o f i n d i v i d u a l identity, a cultural space o f affiliations and alliances that radiates b e y o n d the m o m e n t s o f m u s i c a l reception, d e s p i t e — a s he is clear t o m e n t i o n — i t s inherently deficient m u s i c a l properties. F o u c a u l t not only rejects j u d g i n g t h e value  o f a particular m u s i c  o n its f o r m a l m u s i c a l  independent o f its affirmative role i n v a r i o u s communities; i n fact, he  qualities,  equates m u s i c ' s value  w i t h this v e r y r o l e — l i k e H e i d e g g e r (and N i e t z s c h e t o a certain degree), F o u c a u l t shifts the focus a w a y from the isolated w o r k , j u d g e d a c c o r d i n g t o its aesthetic principles, and onto m u s i c ' s role as a cultural event. A s such, F o u c a u l t argues f o r a m u s i c a l pluralism, g r o u n d e d in the c o m m u n i t i e s from w h i c h these musics spring, in w h i c h they are ' p r e s e r v e d ' and w h i c h they serve t o enhance. E c h o i n g F o u c a u l t ' s remarks, F r i t h t o o declares the space o f music as one o f identity, difference, and plurality: Music constructs our sense of identity through the experiences it offers of the body, time, and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives.... Identity is necessarily a matter of ritual: it describes one's place in a dramatized pattern of relationships—one can never really express oneself "autonomously." Self identity is cultural identity; claims to individual difference depend on audience appreciation, on shared performing and narrative rules. Such rules are organized generically: different musical genres offer different narrative solutions to the recurring pop tensions between authenticity and artifice, sentimentality and realism, the spiritual and the sensual, the serious and the fun. Different musical genres articulate differently the central values of the pop aesthetic— spectacle and emotion, presence and absence, belonging and difference. (PR 275-6) In his article c o m p a r i n g the t w o thinkers, D r e y f u s contends that f o r the later F o u c a u l t and the later H e i d e g g e r , it is the plurality and anarchic genesis o f these types o f 'gatherings' that o p e n the possibility f o r t e m p o r a r y ruptures i n m o d e r n technicity. D e s p i t e F o u c a u l t ' s characteristically N i e t z s c h e a n resistance i n endorsing any k i n d o f s t a b i l i t y — o f history, o f the body, o f the s e l f — D r e y f u s declares that "the H e i d e g g e r i a n picture o f the w a y marginal practices coalesce t o f o r m stable unities c o m e s m o r e and m o r e t o dominate F o u c a u l t ' s  124  account o f the history o f the W e s t " ( H F S A P ) . Indeed, F o u c a u l t ' s insistence that different musics  live as  the communities  centripetal i n c l u s i o n o f H e i d e g g e r  which  preserve t h e m  certainly gestures  towards the  Ereignis.  I n H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n t u r n t o w a r d s this marginality, his n o t i o n o f preservation becomes paradoxically more  concentrated,  more  potent  as it spreads  o u t t o subsume  a more  differentiated, m o r e l o c a l n o t i o n of Ereignis—a space o f relations that D r e y f u s appropriately sees e m b o d i e d i n the everyday gatherings o f friendship: " P r a c t i c e s that p r o d u c e such f o c a l things as a celebratory m e a l o r p l a y i n g m u s i c together resist t h e p u s h t o w a r d s dispersion w h i c h is the flip side o f technicity's tendency t o w a r d t o t a l i z a t i o n " ( H F S A P ) . I n his article, "Semiosis o f Listening: T h e Other i n Heidegger's Writings o n Holderlin and Celan's ' T h e M e r i d i a n , ' " K r z y s z t o f Z i a r e k also distinguishes the essence o f the later H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f preserving i n terms o f an aural event  Mitsein, declaring that "the question o f b e i n g as such o r o f  (Ereignis) w o u l d have t o b e approached f r o m t h e point o f v i e w o f listening a n d  " f r i e n d s h i p " w i t h others rather than t h r o u g h t h e c o n j u n c t i o n — t h e S a m e (das  Selbe)—of  being and h u m a n being ( t h i n k i n g ) " (130). I f w e c o n c e d e the appropriateness o f i n c l u d i n g the later F o u c a u l t ' s r e m a r k s o n m u s i c and c o m m u n i t y , f o r h i m and the later H e i d e g g e r , Ereignis becomes t h e a l l o w a n c e o f  zusammen(ge)hdren, 'that w h i c h belongs together,' a n d finally  n o w , as the e t y m o l o g y has always suggested, 'that w h i c h belongs together i n listening.'  Music as Means of Political Training, Music as Means of Political Resistance W h i l e it seems that the politics o f marginal practices i n the later H e i d e g g e r and the later F o u c a u l t might yield, b y w a y o f extrapolation, similar portraits o f the m u s i c a l event, F o u c a u l t ' s N i e t z s c h e a n f o c u s o n the b o d y as a site o f p o w e r suggests p r o b i n g the ' m i c r o physics o f p o w e r ' o f Discipline  and Punish i n order t o better understand t h e c o r p o r e a l  125  component  o f m u s i c a l performance. I n fact, t h o u g h n o t a surprising oversight  where  H e i d e g g e r i s c o n c e r n e d b u t a m o r e c o n s p i c u o u s o m i s s i o n i n t h e case o f N i e t z s c h e , t h e importance o f the b o d y — a b o d y that m o v e s and t o u c h e s — i n m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e has been all b u t suppressed as a theme i n o u r discussion. A n d yet, t h e entrance into a somewhat different relation b o t h w i t h one's o w n body, as w e l l as t h e bodies o f other  audience  members, is, i n some varieties o f performance, a n integral part o f w h a t sets the event as distinct f r o m the everyday. Indeed, it is almost exclusively i n the extraordinary events o f the d a y — t h o s e events that i n some w a y stand apart f r o m everyday n o r m a l c y — t h a t w e see a t e m p o r a r y suspension of  the taboo  against  close  a n d unnecessary  physical  contact  with  strangers:  public  celebrations, demonstrations, and m u s i c a l performances are the most c o n s p i c u o u s examples o f this social anomaly. A s C a n e t t i explains, t h e p r o h i b i t i o n against t o u c h i n g pervades o u r n o r m a l daily activities, a n d it i s o n l y i n certain types o f gatherings a n d under  certain  circumstances that this sanction is made t o recede:  The repugnance to being touched remains with us when we go about among people; the way we move in a busy street, in restaurants, trains or buses, is governed by it. Even when we are standing next to them and are able to watch and examine them closely, we avoid actual contact if we can.... It is only in a crowd that man can become free of this fear of being touched.... The crowd he needs is the dense crowd, in which body is pressed to body; a crowd, too, whose psychical constitution is also dense, or compact, so that he no longer notices who it is that presses against him. As soon as a man has surrendered himself to the crowd, he ceases to fear its touch. Ideally, all are equal there; no distinctions count, not even that of sex. The man pressed against him is the same as himself. He feels him as he feels himself. Suddenly it is as though everything were happening in one and the same body. This is perhaps one of the reasons why a crowd seeks to close in on itself: it wants to rid each individual as completely as possible of the fear of being touched. (15-6) I n those m u s i c a l events i n w h i c h the audience is expected t o stand, often the n o r m a l stricture against this physical contact is ignored: it is not unusual f o r people t o c r o w d i n close together even w h e n plenty o f other space i s available. F o r as l o n g as the m u s i c plays, this physical closeness remains acceptable, but its finish ushers i n a gradual re-initiation o f usual distance-  126  standing practices u n t i l the c r o w d finally disperses c o m p l e t e l y — i n short, the m u s i c sustains the abatement o f this rule. H o w e v e r , as C a n e t t i notes, it is not this p h y s i c a l closeness that is the essential m a r k o f the c r o w d — t h i s spatial arrangement o f bodies exists as m u c h i n the subway c a r as i n t h e cafe c o n c e r t — b u t rather the possible c o r o l l a r y c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f its ' p s y c h i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n ' o r m o o d that is the latent end and true cornerstone o f the gathering: "It is f o r the sake o f this blessed moment, w h e n no-one is greater o r better than another, that people b e c o m e a c r o w d " (18). A n d as the m u s i c stops and the c r o w d dissipates, so does the relative density o f its m o o d — t h e sense o f unity, as Canetti also contends, is at base illusory and ephemeral. Indeed, the history o f live m u s i c a l performance is not only the history o f its sounds, o f its noises and o f w a y s o f listening, but also the history o f its m o t i o n , its gestures, and its b e h a v i o u r s — i n F o u c a u l d i a n terms, it is the history o f a physical training. C o n t r a s t the portrait o f the 1 8  t h  century audience G o e h r p r o v i d e s at the beginning o f o u r d i s c u s s i o n — a  scene o f sociality, o f request and a p p l a u s e — w i t h C a n e t t i ' s picture o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y concert scene f o u n d e d u p o n physical restraint:  Here everything depends on the audience being completely undisturbed; any movement is frowned on, any sound taboo. Though the music performed draws a good part of its life from its rhythm, no rhythmical effect of any sort on the listeners must be perceptible. The continually fluctuating emotions set free by the music are of the most varied and intense kind. Most of those present must feel them and, in addition, must feel them together, at the same time. But all outward reactions are prohibited. People sit there motionless, as though they managed to hear nothing. It is obvious that a long and artificial training in stagnation has been necessary here. We have grown accustomed to its results, but, to an unprejudiced mind, there are few phenomena of our cultural life so astonishing as a concert audience. (37) W h e r e w e w o u l d generally speak o f the w a y that m u s i c determines m o v e m e n t , the w a y that it seems t o ' m a k e us m o v e , ' C a n e t t i ' s example s h o w s clearly that those social codes particular t o each brand o f performance are able t o m a k e the audience channel, o r in this case, repress, these energies accordingly. B y examining the trajectories o f p o w e r F o u c a u l t charts i n the  127  disciplined mass, w e c a n then relate this training t o N i e t z s c h e ' s D i o n y s i a n a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f attunement t o the e v e n t — t o understand it, i n fact, as part o f a social m o o d . In  Discipline and Punish, F o u c a u l t explores the history o f the b o d y i n terms o f its  training, i m p e l l i n g the reader t o r e c o g n i z e its instability, its contingency, i n fact, t o address its  public agency as an instrument i n v a r i o u s systems o f p o w e r . Indeed,  following  N i e t z s c h e ' s tenet o f the w i l l t o p o w e r as a n arrangement o f drives, F o u c a u l t understands the b o d y as a shifting m u l t i p l i c i t y o f forces, constructed a n d c o n f i g u r e d b y the a n o n y m o u s and greater n e t w o r k o f power-relations i n w h i c h it is perpetually i n v o l v e d . A n important part o f his project i n  Discipline and Punish is t o question the a s s u m p t i o n that since c o n t e m p o r a r y  W e s t e r n society has curtailed its u s e o f violent punishment as a disciplinary strategy, w e have thus ' p r o g r e s s e d b e y o n d ' the exercise o f a crude a n d brutal f o r m o f d o m i n a t i o n o v e r others, past a subjection that i s ' m e r e l y ' physical. Rather, f o r F o u c a u l t , t h e present a g e i s m a r k e d b y a m o r e insidious brand o f d o m i n a t i o n a n d subjection actually due i n part t o a n illusory b e l i e f i n s u c h progress. A s F o u c a u l t puts it i n an i n t e r v i e w from 1977, " [ P J o w e r i n the W e s t is w h a t displays itself the most, and thus, w h a t hides i t s e l f the b e s t . . . " ( P P C 118). A s s e r t i n g that even w h e r e overt physical v i o l e n c e is n o t present a n d other f o r m s o f discipline are preferred, nonetheless, " i t is always the b o d y that is at i s s u e — t h e b o d y a n d its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their s u b m i s s i o n " (Foucault, D P 172). T h i s p r o m p t s h i m t o investigate the m o r e subtle operations o f p o w e r , m a k i n g detailed observations about w h a t he calls a " n e w ' m i c r o p h y s i c s ' o f p o w e r " as visible i n t h e p e r f o r m e d gestures o f the disciplined i n d i v i d u a l , as w e l l as the collective, b o d y (Foucault, D P 183). Thus, i n defining the essence o f discipline as this emergent relation o f " d o c i l i t y - u t i l i t y , " Foucault  explains that " [ g j e n e r a l l y speaking, it might b e said that the disciplines are  128  techniques f o r assuring the o r d e r i n g o f h u m a n m u l t i p l i c i t i e s " ( D P 181,207). R e f e r r i n g t o the mechanistic relationship t o t h e b o d y associated w i t h t h e military trainee and t h e factory w o r k e r , F o u c a u l t contends that  in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the disciplines became general formulas of domination.... The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was bora, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, or at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior.... [I]t defined how one may have a hold of others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience.) (DP 181-2). Foucault  is clear t o maintain that these techniques w e r e b y n o means l i m i t e d t o o n e  disciplinary institution, but that he is, i n fact, interested i n attempting t o " m a p , o n a series o f examples, some o f the essential techniques that most easily spread from one t o another" ( D P 183). A s M i c h a e l M a h o n w r i t e s in  Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the  Subject, " O t h e r examples c o u l d have c o m e from techniques o f c o l o n i z a t i o n , slavery and c h i l d rearing. T h u s , F o u c a u l t insists that disciplinary penal practices w e r e consistent w i t h general cultural p r a c t i c e s " (148). T o be sure, F o u c a u l t does not intend t o suggest that these transitive techniques are present w i t h i n musical performance, o r any art event f o r that matter. H o w e v e r , the n o t i o n that the b o d y is trained, held, and made d o c i l e w i t h i n a repetition o f c o d e d gestures is a m o d e l that can be transposed onto an understanding o f the " h o l d o v e r others'  bodies"  that N i e t z s c h e  and Heidegger  have b o t h  conceptualized  through the  D i o n y s i a n and attunement, r e s p e c t i v e l y — s e e n i n relation t o these t w o thinkers, F o u c a u l t ' s attention t o the r e c i p r o c a l relation between physicality and sociality can b r o a d e n o u r m o d e l to include this c o m p o n e n t i n its situatedness.  129  Indeed, there i s an undeniable sense o f performativity that courses t h r o u g h F o u c a u l t ' s w o r k , a n d n o t simply i n h i s descriptions o f bodies i n m o t i o n , b u t most i m p o r t a n t l y a n d essentially i n his insinuation o f a certain surrogacy i n these gestures, o f an agency that is as Heidegger's  Dasein, that is neither w h o l l y internal n o r w h o l l y external, b u t ' i s ' as being-in-  the w o r l d — t h a t sense o f an o n t o l o g i c a l (dis)possession i n w h i c h one o n l y ' i s ' as an  attempt  to be some self as determined b y the other. H o w e v e r , i n his w r i t t e n w o r k s , F o u c a u l t neglects embarking  upon  a n y significant  investigation o f sound  and power—indeed,  explorations o f m o v e m e n t , gesture, and the sway o f the g a z e — i t is visuality—that  it is t h e thoroughly  dominates his analysis o f power-relations. A n d yet, just as the e t y m o l o g i e s o f the G e r m a n words  Stimmung and gehdren have suggested an essential musicality i n m o o d and belonging,  Ihde reminds u s that the L a t i n e t y m o l o g y o f the E n g l i s h ' o b e y ' elicits a n integral link between v o i c e and the exercise o f p o w e r :  The languages which relate hearing to the invading features of sound often consider the auditory presence as a type of "command." Thus hearing and obeying are often united in root terms. The Latin obaudire is literally meant as a listening "from below." It stands as a root source of the English obey. (LV 81) F o u c a u l t ' s c o n c e r n w i t h the b o d y nevertheless remains an appropriate f o c a l point: p o w e r is kinetic, p o w e r  moves, b u t p o w e r also speaks t o catalyze, a c c o m p a n y , a n d announce the  m o t i o n s o f its systems. P o w e r is articulated i n the v o i c e o f G o d , the v o i c e o f the leader, i n the sounds o f natural disasters, and i n the sounds o f violence and w a r . Indeed,  clearly  showing  h i s debt  to Foucault's  rhetoric,  Attali  contends  that  understanding the role o f sound i n the exercise o f p o w e r i s key, that it i s first a n d most elementally the sonic phenomena o f the w o r l d , and n o t the v i s u a l ones, w h i c h announce the operations o f p o w e r i n linguistic, social, and c o r p o r e a l systems:  More than colors and forms, it is sounds and their arrangements that fashion societies.... Everywhere codes analyze, mark, restrain, train, repress, and channel the primitive sounds of language, of the body, of tools, of objects, of the relations to self and others.  130  All music, any organization of sounds is then a tool for the creation or consolidation of a community, of a totality. (N 6) S o u n d and m u s i c then, b y F o u c a u l t ' s o w n account, can be u n d e r s t o o d as disciplines, as 'techniques f o r assuring the o r d e r i n g o f h u m a n multiplicities.' A s A t t a l i later declares, " M u s i c , t h e quintessential mass activity, l i k e t h e c r o w d , is simultaneously a threat and a necessary source o f legitimacy; t r y i n g t o channel it is a risk that every system o f p o w e r must r u n " ( N 14). D i s c u s s i n g the exercise o f such p o w e r i n one o f F o u c a u l t ' s most c o n s p i c u o u s themes, namely, military discipline, i n his b o o k ,  The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their  Music in the Third Reich, M i c h a e l H . K a t e r describes r h y t h m precisely i n terms o f its use i n training soldiers to m o v e , and thus feel, l i k e a single entity: Quite apart from its military purposes in war, the march was a conditioner of totalitarian rule. "The more uniformly and rhythmically all are marching in step, the greater will be the inner unity of the troops," preached Ludwig Kelbetz; "for the musician this physical-rhythmic basic training is of particular significance." (142) R h y t h m is a discipline. A s discipline, it forces the audience into a F o u c a u l d i a n docility, that is, into a c o m p l a c e n t  pliability, i n the same fashion as the other disciplines: as the reference  point o f p e r f o r m e d repetition. A casual glance at history suggests that the power-elites o f m a n y p o l i t i c a l systems have l o n g u n d e r s t o o d m u s i c i n the terms A t t a l i describes above, and thus, apparently also c o n c u r w i t h the c o n c l u s i o n w e w e r e able t o d r a w out o f F o u c a u l t : as a discipline, music can m o b i l i z e a mass, a n d as such, c a n arrange these bodies into p e r f o r m i n g sanctioned o r unsanctioned m o t i o n s . U n w i l l i n g t o risk 'channeling' this volatility, g o v e r n m e n t s l i k e t h e Iranian A y a t o l l a h have simply chosen t o b a n music altogether. C o n v e r s e l y , others have elected t o e m p l o y music, kept o n a short rein, as another arm, o r rather, another mouthpiece, o f the state. W h i l e discussing the ideal state i n the  Republic, Socrates w a r n s that "the  guardians must beware o f changing t o a n e w f o r m o f music, since it threatens the w h o l e  131  system. A s D a m o n says, and I a m c o n v i n c e d , the m u s i c a l m o d e s are never changed w i t h o u t change i n t h e m o s t important o f a c i t y ' s l a w s " (99). A n d i n the C h i n e s e " R e c o r d o f M u s i c " f r o m the Li chi, dated at a p p r o x i m a t e l y the third o r second century B . C . E . , C o n f u c i u s w r i t e s that the " t h e object o f the ancient k i n g s i n their practice o f m u s i c w a s t o b r i n g their government into h a r m o n y w i t h those l a w s ( o f heaven a n d earth). I f it w a s g o o d , then the c o n d u c t ( o f the people) w a s l i k e the virtue ( o f their s u p e r i o r s ) " (106). A t t a l i also notes that, in the m i d d l e ages, " C h a r l e m a g n e w o u l d forge the cultural and p o l i t i c a l unity o f his k i n g d o m by  i m p o s i n g the universal practice  o f Gregorian  a c c o m p l i s h that e n d " ( N 14). H o w e v e r ,  chant,  resorting t o a r m e d  force t o  examining the m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s a n d t h o r o u g h  example o f this c o n j o i n i n g o f m u s i c a n d politics, K a t e r describes i n detail t h e m y r i a d w a y s that the N a z i administration sought t o invest itself into nearly every aspect o f G e r m a n musical life:  From the moment it came to power in 1933, the Nazi regime was bent on receiving and coordinating musical practice in conventional institutions such as schools and even the churches as well as the family, which continued to be regarded as the smallest cell in the racially determined body politic. Music was viewed as a convenient form of cement between the rulers and their people. As Joseph Goebbels had long since found out, music possessed vast propagandistic potential through which the collective mood of the subjects could be controlled; it could also be used to dress up important nationalistic incentives for presentation to the public, and it could serve as a vehicle for various regime messages and slogans. Starting at the lowest echelon of communal living, the primary social unit of the family, the medium to effect this musical bonding was Hausmusik, that is, music performed in one's own house or home. The term Hausmusik was not an invention of the Nazis, nor of course was the actual article, but it had never before been politicized to the extent that they would attempt. (130-1) F r o m ancient C h i n a t o N a z i G e r m a n y , hierarchical p o w e r has seized t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e m p l o y m u s i c as a means o f p o l i t i c a l training. A n d yet, as w e are prepared t o implicate music as the p i p e r ' s s o n g that leads us into these d e s c r i b e d — a n d other m o r e h o r r i f i c — e n d s , as w e remind ourselves that it w a s A d o l f H i t l e r ' s favourite opera,  Die Meistersinger von Numberg,  that sounded the beginning o f the infamous N u r e m b e r g rallies, w h a t w e ought t o b e m a l i g n i n g is n o t m u s i c at all, but rather language: it is only t h r o u g h language, either i n the  132  text o f the w o r k itself, o r i n the specific f r a m i n g o f its presentation, that m u s i c b e c o m e s a call to terror. M u s i c is u n d o u b t e d l y intoxicating, b u t it is most often the  linguistic discourse  surrounding its presentation w h i c h suggests t h e particular w a y s that this energy is t o be channeled. W h e r e w e shudder i n pitied disbelief at the frightening, nearly h y p n o t i c levels o f solidarity initiated b y t h e sounds o f the N u r e m b e r g rallies, w e must also consider the gathering p o w e r that the s o n g " W e Shall O v e r c o m e " held f o r those at the forefront o f the Civil Rights  movement  i n A m e r i c a — a m o v e m e n t that, as R o n E y e r m a n a n d A n d r e w  J a m i s o n declare i n their b o o k ,  Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in the  Twentieth Century, " w a s a singing m o v e m e n t par e x c e l l e n c e "  (171). It is because o f the  manner i n w h i c h this m o v e m e n t w a s framed, i n m u s i c a l text and cultural agenda, that t h e strength o f its m u s i c a l solidarity invigorates not fear, but hope. A s A t t a l i notes, " W i t h music is b o r n p o w e r  and its opposite: s u b v e r s i o n " ( N 6; my gloss). O r , as F o u c a u l t puts it i n m o r e  general terms i n a 1977 i n t e r v i e w w i t h B e r n a r d - H e n r i L e v y , " I a m j u s t saying: as s o o n as there is a p o w e r relation, there is a possibility o f a resistance. W e can never b e ensnared b y power: w e can always m o d i f y its grip i n determinate c o n d i t i o n s and a c c o r d i n g t o a precise strategy" ( P P C 123). T o take another example o f h o w m u s i c might serve as a space o f resistance, d u r i n g the '90s, t h e feminist-inspired p u n k r o c k m o v e m e n t k n o w n as R i o t G r r r l w a s able t o m o b i l i z e strategies that w o u l d successfully t u r n m u s i c a l events across N o r t h A m e r i c a into temporarily affirmative spaces. A s T h e o C a t e f o r i s and E l e n a H u m p h r e y s relay this sense o f liberation i n " C o n s t r u c t i n g C o m m u n i t y Identities: R i o t G r r r l N e w Y o r k C i t y " :  Where women musicians in punk traditionally had found themselves objectified under the gaze of a primarily male audience, Riot Grrrl performances subverted such situations. During Double Zero's performances, band and audience were equal participants in the masquerade. (330)  133  A n d yet, this passage points t o the v e r y same p a r a d o x from  The Birth of Tragedy: there  seems, i n this situation, a simultaneous increase and leveling o f p o w e r : increased i n the N i e t z s c h e a n sense o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s enhanced sense o f p o w e r , b u t also equalized, leveled, i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l agency i n t h e event itself. Indeed, reading F o u c a u l t ' s sense o f the performing body in  Discipline and Punish w i t h the m u s i c a l event i n m i n d suggests a m o r e  c o m p l e x account o f this g r o u p dynamic. A n d w h i l e it i s necessary t o locate the i n d i v i d u a l b o d y as the m e c h a n i s m o f the performance, F o u c a u l t ' s rather c o m p l e x , hermeneutic n o t i o n of  power-relations  as operative  i n t h e disciplined  mass  c a n contribute  t o a more  comprehensive understanding o f the b o d y ' s place w i t h i n the c o l l e c t i v e experience o f music, within, as A t t a l i puts it earlier, the ' c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f a c o m m u n i t y . ' A s a p u b l i c ritual and an expression o f c o m m u n i t y , the m u s i c a l event has its o w n set o f c o d i f i e d b o d i l y gestures. I n precisely those m o m e n t s w h e n o n e feels the ecstatic sense o f f r e e d o m and self-abandon i n m o v i n g t o the music, one's b o d y is n o t o n l y ' h e l d ' b y the p o w e r o f m u s i c b u t b y the c o d e d n o r m s o f gesture peculiar t o that event. A s N i e t z s c h e observes, i n the D i o n y s i a n dithyramb " t h e entire s y m b o l i s m o f the b o d y i s called into play, not the mere s y m b o l i s m o f the lips, face a n d speech but the w h o l e p a n t o m i m e o f dancing, f o r c i n g every member  into  rhythmic  movement"  ( B o T 40). Foucault  discusses  t h e simultaneously  comparative, differentiating, and h o m o g e n i z i n g character o f such n o r m a l i z a t i o n :  [I]t refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward which one must move.... In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences. (DP 195-6)  134  A s the m i c r o - p h y s i c s o f p o w e r is " e x e r c i s e d rather than p o s s e s s e d " it is " s o m e t i m e s extended by the p o s i t i o n o f those w h o are d o m i n a t e d " and similarly, f o r v i s u a l surveillance in "its functioning...  from  laterally..." ( D P  top to b o t t o m , but also to a certain extent from b o t t o m to top and  174,192). F o r example, i n a m u s i c a l event that often lauds its anarchic  nature, hardcore p u n k performances s h o w that they t o o operate a c c o r d i n g t o a set o f c o d e d movements, enacted w i t h i n this hermeneutic o f the collective. A t one o f their V a n c o u v e r shows, the lead singer o f N e w Y o r k ' s H 2 0 decreed that he w a n t e d " t o see a ' c i r c l e p i t ' " at the front o f the c r o w d . W h e n the b a n d started the next song, listeners nearest t o the stage began m o v i n g — h a l f - d a n c i n g , h a l f - r u n n i n g — i n a c o u n t e r - c l o c k w i s e direction, s h o v i n g and being shoved i n the m e l e e — a scene perhaps resembling the D i o n y s i a n . F o r the next t w o songs, this enthusiastic, ritualistic display continued. W e can o n l y assume f r o m the b o d y language o f these listeners that they w e r e experiencing something intense, perhaps even a sense o f frenzy, as they danced t o the music. H o w e v e r , w h a t l o o k s t o be an anarchic sense o f freedom  is experienced w i t h i n a musically-enhanced docility. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the i n d i v i d u a l  feels this exalted sense o f p o w e r i n submitting to the m u s i c and, i n a s t r o n g physical sense, other l i s t e n e r s — t h i s ecstasis is centered u p o n a w i l l f u l submission, a k i n d o f masochistic pleasure in subjecting o n e s e l f to, as F o u c a u l t states, ' a rule t o be f o l l o w e d . ' A g a i n , w e are reminded that even the D i o n y s i a n is, l i k e the musical event itself, framed i n its trajectory and, as such, never w h o l l y severed from its A p o l l i n i a n c o m p a n i o n . Dionysus Revisited: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault T h e hermeneutic perspectives o f N i e t z s c h e , H e i d e g g e r , and F o u c a u l t all, i n v a r i o u s w a y s and t o v a r i o u s degrees, suggest a difference between the v o i c e o f m u s i c and the v o i c e o f the everyday, that a certain shift o c c u r s w h e n something is, f o r example, sung rather than  135  spoken. A n d w h i l e the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y is a consistent theme i n their discussions o f listening and music, the enigma o f this presence amidst a radical historicality, and, i n corollary,  the  equivocal  relations  between  individual  and  collective,  are  approached  somewhat differently b y each thinker. S o m e t i m e s e m p l o y i n g a language all their o w n , and sometime a p p r o p r i a t i n g the language m u s i c a l terms, H e i d e g g e r  o f others, these t h i n k e r s — N i e t z s c h e i n explicitly  across existential, aural,  and aesthetic planes, and  Foucault  a c c o r d i n g t o c o r p o r e a l i t y and p o w e r — a l l attempt t o c o n v e y a hermeneutic understanding o f collective h u m a n relations that, in all these capacities, contributes t o a m o r e  situated  understanding o f the m u s i c a l event. A s w e have seen t h e m i n relation t o each other, and i n relation  to  those  on  their  trail  in  the  disciplines  of  musicology  and  acoustic  science/communication, all three thinkers help us m o v e a w a y from the c o n c e p t o f an isolated m u s i c a l w o r k and point to m u s i c a l performance as an important and extraordinary event that, literally and metaphorically, gathers people together. T h i s tri-partite genealogy, c o m p o s e d o f its  own  consonant  and  dissonant  elements,  offers  a heterogeneous  understanding  of  performance as this gathering, a differentiated m o d e l that finds it s c o p e i n the congruencies and confrontations arising w i t h i n , and out of, this dialogue. The  pivotal  question  of  this  gathering,  however,  must  be  addressed—as  our  H e i d e g g e r i a n critique o f N i e t z s c h e has d e m o n s t r a t e d — a l s o as f u s i o n , not o n l y i n its potential conflict. A n d yet, as w e have revisited the D i o n y s i a n in relation t o H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t , w e have not negated its o v e r a l l intensity, but have instead s h o w n the breadth o f its relevance to a host o f c o n t e m p o r a r y m u s i c a l events: w i t h i n these spaces remains the possibility o f transformation and ecstasy. H o w e v e r , t h r o u g h H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f m o o d — t h r o u g h the thinker w h o appears t o be the least D i o n y s i a n o f t h e m a l l — w e have d e v e l o p e d a m o r e  136  differentiated sense o f the D i o n y s i a n that, in one sense, brings out the essence o f what this g o d o f m u s i c and i n t o x i c a t i o n ought to be: anarchic, unpredictable, contingent. In the m o m e n t o f the shift f r o m the everyday to the musical, ecstasy breaks things into this contingency, h o w e v e r b r i e f this rupture might b e — i t is the m o m e n t w h e n w e ourselves are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h this contingency, o f h o w to channel this potential.  137  WORKS CITED A l l i n , G G . I n t e r v i e w w i t h Joe C o u g h l i n .  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