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Revisiting Dionysus : Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault DiPasquale, Steven Dean 2002

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REVISITING DIONYSUS: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT by Steven Dean DiPasqua le B.A., Un ivers i ty o f Br i t i sh Co lumbia , 1996 A thesis submitted in partial fulf i l lment o f the requirements for the Degree M A S T E R O F A R T S in The Facu l ty o f Graduate Studies Indiv idual Interdiscipl inary Studies Graduate P rog ram Germanic Studies/Music/Engl ish W e accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard The Univers i ty o f Br i t i sh Co lumb ia Ap r i l 2002 © Steven Dean DiPasquale, 2002 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of l^ TfeRfc l,rci P U M ^ E . / STVDl gS The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date A P R I L / u f / 2**2-DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T This thesis challenges the tradit ional, Cartesian understanding o f musical performance through a phenomenological investigation o f aural experience. Whereas conventional approaches to musical performance prescribe separating 'wo rk ' from 'event' in order to ascertain musica l meaning, we seek to reveal this dualistic framework as a l imited knowledge paradigm and argue for a more situated account o f performance that includes the myr iad contingencies o f its 'presentation.' T o achieve this end, the wr i t ings o f Fr iedr ich Nietzsche, M a r t i n Heidegger, and M i c he l Foucaul t are examined in order to construct a 'hermeneutic ' framework for an interdiscipl inary exchange between relevant wo rks in phi losophy, musico logy, and acoustic science. A variety o f contemporary rock, punk, post-punk, and electroacoust ic performances are analyzed wi th in this tri-partite model . Beg inn ing w i th N ie tzsche 's concept o f the Dionys ian, we focus our attention on the musical event as a space o f volati le, col lect ive energies that can potential ly be channeled into acts o f mob violence, or into more posit ive forms o f community. A s we continue w i th the interdiscipl inary dialogue, He idegger and Foucau l t cr it ique and refine N ietzsche 's understanding o f the D ionys ian through their var ious analyses o f human listening, mood, shared attunement, technology, power, and the body. B y charting N ie tzsche ' s concept o f the D ionys ian as it is reinterpreted by He idegger and Foucault , a much broader, more differentiated understanding o f musical experience is achieved. ii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract i i Reference K e y iv Acknowledgements v Introduct ion 1 C H A P T E R I V i s i o n and Metaphysics: The Emergence o f Per format ive Agency 12 Seeing Things: Acoustic Objects, Metaphysical Distances 12 The Birth of the Musical Work and its Audience 19 Aural Modes: Sound in and Out of Context 25 C H A P T E R II Rhythm and R isk: The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power 28 Harnessing Dionysus 28 Transmissions from the Dead: The Will to Power as 'Text' 32 The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power: The Dionysian as Communication 3 3 Affirming Transgression: The Volatility of the Crowd 39 Affirming Culture: The Articulation of Community 42 Stress Fractures: Nietzsche's Conflicts 44 C H A P T E R III He idegger 's Aura l i ty 47 Heidegger as Musical Thinker 47 Primordial Being-in-the-World 50 The Place of Sound and Mood in Being and Time 52 Resonance: An Attunement to Context 55 Listening as Openness, Communication as Shared Attunement 59 From the Everyday to the Musical 64 Sound and Source: Being-in the Music 66 The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon 67 From Sound to Ereignis: Gathering and Sheltering 79 Moments of Resonance: The Audience in and Out of Attunement 83 Heidegger on Nietzsche: Dionysus as Horizon 87 Genre and Community 94 Musical Performance in the Age of Technicity 96 Technologies of Disruption 97 Soundtracks: The Ubiquity of Amplified Sound 99 The Transformation of Musical Space 102 Capturing the Live: Exclusions, Deferrals, Future Pleasures 105 Vision and Voice: Debating Authenticity and Agency in 'Live' Performance 108 Performativity as Physicality 110 Studio Separations 114 Resilience: The Liveness of the Live 116 C H A P T E R I V Sound and Power: Exp lo r i ng Foucau l t ' s Per format iv i ty 122 Re-interpreting Nietzsche and Heidegger: Foucault on the Disciplined Mass 122 Foucault on Music, Plurality, Community 123 Music as Means of Political Training, Music as Means of Political Resistance 125 Dionysus Revisited: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault 135 W o r k s C i ted 138 i i i R E F E R E N C E K E Y A W P "The A g e o f the W o r l d P i c ture" B i W Being-in-the- World B o T The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music B T Being and Time D P "Disc ip l ine and Pun i sh " H F S A P "He idegger and Foucaul t on the Subject, Agency, Pract i ces" L V Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound M S Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, and Reception N Noise: The Political Economy of Music O W A "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " P P C Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture P R Performing Rites W P The Will to Power W P A The Will to Power as Art W P K M The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics W T L "The W a y to Language" I have relied on Macquar r ie and Rob inson 's translation o f Ma r t i n He idegger 's Being and Time because o f its scholarship. A l l quoted passages have been left unrevised, except for the term 'state-of-mind' wh i ch I have rendered as 'mood ' or 'attunement,' fo l l ow ing Joan Stambaugh's 1996 translation. Stambaugh's translation more faithful ly preserves the musical overtones in the German, and avoids any misunderstandings o f mood as a Cartesian mental state. A l l other translations have been left unaltered. iv A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S I am greatly indebted to a number o f people who were w i l l ing to lend their support and their ideas to this project. I wou l d l ike first to thank the members o f my advisory committee: Steve Taubeneck, R i chard Ku r th , and John Cooper; and the Dean o f the Indiv idual Interdiscipl inary Studies Graduate Program, Rhod r i Windsor-L i scombe, who has wo r ked to ensure the feasibil ity o f interdiscipl inary research here at U B C . I wou l d also l ike to thank all those professors whose instruct ion helped shape var ious aspects o f this thesis: K e v i n McNe i l l y , Ba r ry Truax, And rea Sauder, Sonia S ikka , A l a n Thrasher, N o r m a n Stanfield, and Catherine Talmage. F inal ly, I wou l d l ike to express my appreciat ion for the conversat ions on music I have had w i th Barbara Andersen, Chr ista M i n , Chr is Rudden, Jeffrey Orr , Ma t t hew Corlett, Ma t thew Soules, Co l l i n Kn ight , A l e x Harmsen, Joel DeStefano, R o b Wr ight , M i r e k Wanek, B r i an Chippendale, E i l een Kage , E la ine Stef, Les l ie K o m o r i , and Ir ina K e v o r k o v a . v I N T R O D U C T I O N The Fragmentation of Music: Vitality in Diversity Mus i c , once t ied strongly to rel igious ceremony and/or the legit imation o f established social or pol i t ica l hierarchies, has become, at least in the West, too diffuse and too fragmented to be strictly aligned w i th any specific institution or ideology. Wh i l e the heritage o f many tradit ional forms o f music is certainly being maintained, new forms o f music are continual ly being developed, at a seemingly exponential rate, out o f an entropic series o f col l is ions and divis ions among the old. The sheer increase in the technologies o f musical product ion, and the experimental ventures wh i ch exploit these new technologies, continues to mult ip ly and fracture music into ever more sub-categories and sub-cultural networks. Wi thout question, the g row ing use o f computers, samplers, sequencers, turntables, and other electronic equipment contributes to the extension o f existing musical vocabular ies and the creation o f new musica l dialects. A n d yet, despite the prerecorded nature o f some o f this new music, part o f its energy is stil l channeled into social events featuring its l ive performance. Out o f these and other new musical dialects emerge new performative spaces, new social codes, and thus, new musical communit ies. B u t the space o f l ive music involves even more than this: Mus i c a l events t ransp i re— even erupt—wholly unplanned, in any number o f places and on any number o f occasions: in the home, in restaurants, in parks, on street corners, even in the streets. In all these different places, and different t imes—convent iona l performances i nc luded—sound the diverse musics o f entertainment, celebration, and protest. A n d yet, however different al l these musics may be in their history, purpose, or technical qualities, in the act o f their publ ic envoicement, they do share a common kinship as spaces o f l iv ing music. Indeed, in its most definitive 1 expression, l ive music can catalyze a different set o f social relations from those o f the everyday, and can initiate a space o f new social possibil it ies, a new social mood. T o be sure, the scope o f these moods is as broad and variable as the musical spaces themselves, and this plural ity w i l l be the thrust o f the argument to be explored here: the space o f performance is a site o f social communicat ion, and as such is best understood not as the presentation o f some musical w o r k to an audience, but as a thoroughly situated, ephemeral event that includes all those invo lved as par t i c ipants—in mind, in body, in mood. The col lect ive nature o f musical performance and its abil ity to b ind together an otherwise generally individuated group o f people has long been asserted. Nevertheless, testimony o f its social power bears reiterating: musical events can be extraordinari ly intense situations, but the complexi ty o f their operations has never been ful ly understood. W e have yet to theorize sufficiently those moments when one gets the sense—it may occur in an intimate setting around a table in a restaurant, or at a wedding, or in a club, or in an arena ful l o f peop le—that most everyone present, albeit for a br ief moment, is captivated, caught up in something different from the everyday, a different mood, a different way o f relating to themselves and to others. However , examining the anatomy and exercise o f this p o w e r — even phrasing it in these te rms—r i sks an immediate dismissal; this sense o f belonging and togetherness is simply an i l lusion, says the vo ice o f the skeptic in all o f us. B u t such is the way that moods determine the manner in wh i ch things w i l l show up for us at any given moment: in musical events these social moods can and do fluctuate, but as they peak, their ho ld can be next to total. In fact, the 'clarity o f perspective' we presently enjoy as we recall these and other moments o f intens i ty—joy, anger, lust, despa i r—sure ly serves to re-emphasize their thoroughly situated character, but one thing it most certainly does not do is 2 negate the reality o f their occurrence. These contextual contingencies ought to be the locus o f our investigation. A n interdiscipl inary approach wh i ch integrates relevant knowledges f rom the disciplines o f phi losophy, musicology, and acoustics can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding o f musical performance as a space o f contingency, communicat ion, and community. A l l these discipl ines contain valuable and variant analyses o f the most relevant components o f performance that, cursori ly, we have either mentioned or impl icated above: musical affect, mood , col lect ive ecstasy, corporeal ity, the onto logy o f sound/music, and the role o f technology. Orchestrat ing these var ious discipl inary and ideologica l encounte rs— some dialogues, some conf rontat ions—with in a hermeneutic f ramework w i l l ensure the necessary thematic and methodologica l grounding for a cohesive discussion o f the issues. Musical Triads: Dionysus, Apollo, and Hermes; Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault N o one has understood this thoroughly captivating power o f the af fects—their trajectories, their rhythms, their peaks—better than Fr iedr ich Nietzsche, and no one has offered a more satisfying account o f their kinesis in a specif ical ly musica l context. N ietzsche is the phi losopher who re-introduced the wor l d to D ionysus as the god o f music, and who thus urged us to again understand the space o f the musical as one o f intoxicat ion, col lect ivity, and transformation. Fl is D ionysus first re-emerged as the divine figure most suited to represent symbol ical ly the music o f R i chard Wagner, and in terms o f scholarship on the issue, there the composer has generally remained. B u t as contemporary music continues to divide itself anarchical ly into new, experimental networks o f sound and space, an understanding o f the Dionys ian/Apol l in ian duality amidst these new contexts only becomes more and more important to pursue. 3 A s we elect to re-visit D ionysus in order to understand musica l events as situated spaces o f communicat ion and community, we are reminded that there is also another g o d — equally important to the understanding o f social communicat ion in con tex t—to w h o m we are re-introduced through the contemporary hermeneutics o f N ie tzsche 's successor Ma r t i n Heidegger. Hermeneut ics, the science o f interpretation, finds its methodolog ica l roots in a radical ly histor ic ized B ib l i ca l exegesis, and its etymologica l roots in the Greek wo rd for the messenger god Hermes. D a v i d E. L i nge explains in the editor 's introduct ion to Hans-Georg Gadamer 's Philosophical Hermeneutics that the "earliest situations in wh i ch principles o f interpretation were wo rked out were encounters w i th rel igious texts whose meanings were obscure or whose import was no longer acceptable unless they cou ld be harmonized w i th the tenets o f the fa i th" (xi i). A n d as Gadamer reminds the reader in his essay "Aesthet ics and Hermeneut ics" in the book, " A s the art o f conveying what is said in a fore ign language to the understanding o f another person, hermeneutics is not without reason named after Hermes, the interpreter o f the divine message to mank ind" (98). Fo l l ow ing the tenets o f the tradit ion, contemporary hermeneutics suggests that the rift o f meaning between message and receiver is a chasm that can never be completely spanned. Understanding always takes place as an event o f interpretation, one that is necessarily mediated by the interpreter's var ious cultural-historical contingencies o f language, tradit ion, or prejudice ( in Gadamer ' s non-pejorative sense). B o t h the generative ground and constraining peak o f interpretation itself, the inherently fore-guided nature o f interpretation means that the interpreter brings both the openness and the resistance o f this tradit ion in order to decipher some 'code, ' but as the interpreter is constituted out o f a particular tradit ion, s/he "cannot be dissolved into crit ical self-knowledge in such fashion that the prejudice-structure o f finite understanding might 4 disappear" (L inge xv) . The space o f communicat ion never involves complete decrypt ion o f some total text, but is rather the site o f co-created and therefore unstable meanings; communicat ion, accord ing to the hermeneutic tradit ion, is always a radical ly situated event. Thus, our re-visitat ion o f Dionysus, l ike N ietzsche 's o w n or ig inal coupl ing o f the Greek art deities, again becomes the staging o f a confrontat ion between the gods, now a tension amongst a triad: D ionysus, Apo l l o , and Hermes. Just as in his e lucidat ion o f tragedy Nietzsche implores us to hear each f igure speak in the tongue o f the other, so it w i l l be w i th our investigation o f musical performance: it must be approached wi th in a new relation that includes not only elements o f intensity and community, but also expl ic i t ly incorporates themes o f context, event, and contingency. Fr iedr ich Nietzsche, Ma r t i n Heidegger, and M i che l Foucault , each in a unique manner, f o l l ow this hermeneutic circularity in their analyses o f music, l istening, being-in-the-wor ld , art, power, and the b o d y — a l l stressing a complex relat ion o f co-dependent, rec iprocal forces rather than charting a strictly l inear chain o f causes and effects. T o be clear, N ietzsche and Foucau l t wou l d both strongly resist the hermeneutic moniker, but their common understanding o f a publ ic ly-constructed subject who also constructs the wo r l d into wh ich s/he is already ' thrown, ' aligns them wi th at least one o f the core tenets o f the hermeneutic tradit ion. In The Gay Science, N ietzsche shows clearly his kinship w i th the most fundamental strictures o f hermeneutics as he explores the question o f whether... all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation—that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner.... (336) And , as Huber t L. Dreyfus and Pau l Rab inow contend in their book on Foucau l t ' s post-hermeneutic phi losophy, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 5 Like Heidegger and Adorao he [(Foucault)] emphasizes that the historical background of practices, those practices which make objective science possible, cannot be studied by context-free, value-free, objective theory; rather, those practices produce the investigator and require an interpretation of him and his world. (166) Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucaul t examine the thorough situatedness and contingency o f the subject in dif fer ing but related capacities. However , in terms o f our focus here on performance, the most important congruency in their 'hermeneutics' is that al l three explore the equivocal rec iprocity o f group relations, o f how individuals and col lect ives constitute one another: N ietzsche discusses this in expl ic it ly musical terms w i th his account o f the Dionys ian throng; He idegger explores the ambiguous unity o f Dase in as Mitsein across the shared attunement o f authentic discourse and the inauthentic mode o f das Man alike; and Foucaul t investigates these group relations in terms o f the var ious c irculat ions o f power in the discipl ined mass. Here we shall in effect confront these thinkers w i th our own questions about musical performance: we confront N ietzsche over his model o f perpetual confl ict, and challenge the somewhat narrow scope o f performance relations this permits; we confront Heidegger w i th the question o f ecstasy and music, and his hesitant relat ion to the Dionys ian; and we confront Foucau l t w i th the question o f sound and power, and pose the possibi l i ty o f examining music as a discipline. W i th in the works o f these three thinkers are the elements o f a richer understanding o f musical performance not subject to the var ious methodologica l pitfalls o f Cartesian knowledge systems that seek to remove sound and music from the important contexts o f their presentation. Wh i l e no thinker can offer a completely satisfying account o f the musical event, the trajectory o f phi losophical influence amongst this t r i a d — Heidegger w i th his indebtedness to Nietzsche, and Foucau l t w i th his indebtedness to both N ietzsche and He idegger—suggests that a confrontat ion among them w i l l y ie ld a heterogeneous but still consonant model o f musical performance. The particular 6 'hermeneutic ' perspective shared by these phi losophers offers a certain consistency o f theme and method, so as the subjugated motifs o f one thinker are developed by another, these seemingly disparate accounts o f dissimilar phenomena are gathered into a tessellated coherence, in wh i ch related parts inter lock to create a recognizable whole, but never disappear into complete synthesis. O v e r v i e w o f Thes i s The relat ion o f the sources examined in this interdiscipl inary investigation, though rather complex, can be div ided according to their primary, secondary, and tertiary importance. T o begin w i th those texts wh i ch play a pr imary role, the N ietzschean port ion o f the overal l f ramework for this discussion is derived f rom chart ing the continuity o f the D ionys ian in N ie tzsche 's career, beginning w i th The Birth of Tragedy, and f inishing in the posthumously compi led The Will to Power. The Heidegger ian component o f the model is informed f rom a reading o f—mos t importantly but not exc lus ive ly—his crit ique o f metaphysics and his examination o f primordial i ty, mood, and l istening in Being and Time, f rom his related crit ique o f aesthetics and his hermeneutic understanding o f the art event in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " and f rom his explicit confrontat ion w i th N ietzsche 's D ionysus in his Nietzsche: Volume One: The Will to Power as Art. F inal ly, the port ion inc luding important insights f rom Foucaul t on performativity and musical plural ism is gathered f rom his Discipline and Punish, and f rom his interview w i th P ierre Bou l e z on "Contemporary M u s i c and Its Pub l i c . " In terms o f those texts wh i ch play a secondary role in the discussion, He idegger 's "The A g e o f the W o r l d P ic ture," " Logos , " "The W a y to Language," and "The Quest ion Concern ing Techno logy" augment present themes on metaphysics and l istening, as we l l as 7 introduce new ones (most notably in terms o f the question o f technology). A l s o important to the Heidegger ian dialogue are the comments on mood from Huber t L. Drey fus ' companion to Being and Time, Being-in-the-world, his compar ison o f the later He idegger and Foucaul t in his "He idegger and Foucau l t on the Subject, Agency, Pract ices," as we l l as the account o f aurality offered by D o n Ihde in his Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Listening. Reiner Schurmann's On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy is important for its keen reading o f He idegger 's treatment o f aurality, community, and event, and Wal ter J. Ong 's discussion in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word also contributes to the acoustic dimensions o f He idegger 's understanding o f communicat ion. The most important texts in the field o f mus ico logy include L y d i a Goehr ' s histor ical analysis o f musical performance in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music, as we l l as the discussions o f music 's social ity by M i chae l Chanan in Musica Practica, and S imon Fr i th in Performing Rites. In the category o f the technological and scientif ic impl icat ions o f sound, Ba r r y Truax 's unwitt ingly He idegger ian analysis o f l istening in his Acoustic Communication, and Jacques At ta l i ' s explorat ion o f music in light o f the advent o f record ing technology in his Noise: The Political Economy of Music are key texts in the interdiscipl inary dialogue w i th Heidegger and Foucau l t respectively. A n d finally, E l ias Canett i 's Crowds and Power contributes to the sense o f volat i l i ty in N ietzsche 's concept o f the D ionys ian as we l l as the history o f the audience's training examined in the chapter on Foucaul t . Sources o f tertiary importance include interviews w i th musicians Steve A lb in i , K e i t h Jarrett, one personal interview on a performance by The Need conducted w i th Barbara Andersen (former editor o f Vancouver ' s Discorder magazine), reports on performances f rom 8 Woods to ck '99, and G G A l l i n , as we l l as a host o f personal anecdotes f rom various (remarkable) l ive musica l events. These sources (and others) are examined in four chapters. In chapter one, we first introduce He idegger 's crit ique o f Western metaphysics in Being and Time and "The A g e o f the W o r l d P i c tu re" to frame the interdiscipl inary dialogue wh i ch w i l l suggest that a hegemonic visualist epistemology essentially 'si lences' sound and music as it turns them into a mark in order that they be measured, and consequently, known. B y integrating Truax 's history o f the sound object w i th Chanan and Goehr ' s histor iography o f the musica l work, we chart, first, the social product ion o f these objects as contr ibut ing factors in the contemporary understanding o f performance as div ided into 'wo rk ' and 'event,' and second, explore the impl icat ions that such a div is ion has for the social relations o f the audience. In chapter two, we primari ly examine The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power in order to understand the unpredictable volat i l i ty o f the performance space, its range o f incredibly disparate moods and possibil it ies. B y explor ing the continuity o f the D ionys ian across N ie tzsche 's career, we assemble all the most relevant components o f his mode l— i t s intensity, its placement o f listeners wi th in a musical event, its provis ional sense o f communicat ion between those l isteners—before cr i t iquing the shortcomings in his model o f perpetual strife. Chapter three traces the course o f He idegger 's aurality across his career. W i t h the exception o f " L o g o s " (and those moments in wh ich texts f rom different t ime periods are brought into dialogue), our general thematic trajectory begins w i th everyday l istening and moves towards the musical event, to parallel the chrono logy o f He idegger ' s main texts outl ined above. He idegger 's phenomenological investigation o f Dase in in Being and Time, 9 the 'being-there' o f human existence, offers, in compar ison w i th N ietzsche, a notably less robust account o f mus i c—the theme o f aurality instead centered on everyday human l is ten ing—but nevertheless makes an important suggestion about the relevant interrelationship o f sound, mood, and the 'shared attunement' o f being-with o thers—i t is, in fact, a re-interpretation o f the D ionys ian. It is here, amidst these related elements o f everyday aurality, that He idegger ' s hermeneutics o f l istening initiates an interdiscipl inary dialogue w i th research in the domain o f acoustics, an examinat ion o f sound that suggests a homolog ica l relat ion between everyday l istening and the space o f musica l performance. He idegger 's phenomenology continues into "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " in wh ich the hermeneutic o f the musical event, co-created by artist and audience alike, replaces the not ion o f the musical object w i th the event as a gathering o f community. In Nietzsche, Volume One: The Will to Power as Art, He idegger works tenaciously to explore the metaphysical undercurrent he is convinced Nietzsche was unable to escape, but in do ing so, He idegger manages to capture both the w i l d intensity o f Rausch he purports to deplore, as we l l as concede the role o f the body in the attuning power o f mood. A n d finally, in light o f this understanding o f music as a hub o f community, we engage the quest ion o f musical technology and its effects on the social relations o f performance. W e introduce as the main sources o f this latter section He idegger 's "The Quest ion Concern ing Techno logy" and Jacques At ta l i ' s p ivota l work , Noise: The Political Economy of Music, in order to examine the manner in wh i ch the introduct ion o f electroacoustic t e chno logy—sound recording and playback equipment—disrupts an ontology o f music as l ive, as life, and how this rupture initiates a new, restless onto logy o f music that continual ly vacil lates amidst its o w n dialectic uncertainty. 10 In chapter four, Foucau l t ' s analysis o f power and corporeal i ty is examined f rom a performative perspective. In some o f his personal interviews and in Discipline and Punish, Foucau l t ' s comments on the social, pluralistic, and affirmative nature o f music as an event, combined w i th his understanding o f the performing body in lateral power systems, respectively, extend themes o f power and agency already present in the texts o f N ietzsche and Heidegger. Drey fus also helps us see that the later Foucau l t ' s general ly N ietzchean understanding o f a Heracl i tean f lux did begin to resemble the later He idegger 's understanding o f the importance o f local ized gatherings as a resistance to technicity. Indeed, these three thinkers can be approached as compr is ing a genealogy o f a hermeneutics o f l istening. A l though there are numerous continuit ies and discontinuities wi th in this genealogy, a ful l hermeneutic theory o f sonic experience remains to be achieved. Whereas N ie tzsche has set us on perhaps the most definit ive path towards an understanding o f musical performance as an event o f col lect ive intensity, the textual margins o f Heidegger and Foucau l t cr it ique and refine, augment and extend this understanding to include a ful ler sense o f l istening, mood, the performing body, and musical plural ism. F r o m the provis ional and var ied accounts o f voice, sound and mus ic—indeed, the wo r l d o f human hear ing—a confrontat ion among these three thinkers can yie ld valuable insights on issues o f corporeal ity, communicat ion, and community in musical experience. 11 C H A P T E R I V ISION AND METAPHYSICS: T H E E M E R G E N C E OF PERFORMATIVE A G E N C Y Seeing Things: Acoustic Objects, Metaphysical Distances The hermeneutic tradit ion holds that acts o f interpretation at once reveal and conceal the wo r l d o f the interpreter, maintaining, in corol lary, that an interpreter may only encounter the wo r l d accord ing to the necessarily l imited possibil it ies permitted by their specific social ization. However , in his development o f contemporary hermeneutics in Being and Time, He idegger at once challenges and endorses the tota l iz ing nature o f historicity. Wh i l e he does concur that the real izat ion o f a total ly objective ground for human knowledge wou l d be impossible, he also contends that by questioning from wi th in the immediacy o f one's own tradit ion, one can achieve a certain clarity about the reveal ing and conceal ing prejudices o f such understand ing—in explor ing the most basic assumptions o f one's interpretations, one can attain some sense o f one's history, o f how oneself and one's wo r l d came to ' show up ' in the manner they presently do. L ikewise , as we inquire into the onto logy o f musical performance, as we challenge our most basic assumptions about l ive music, and thus our understandings o f its component par ts—mus ica l sounds, musical works , performers, and aud iences—we are pul led into a genealogical examination o f how these entities came to 'be' the things they presently are. Fo l l ow ing Heidegger, our investigation suggests that the Western interpretation o f being as constant presence-at-hand—from P la to ' s forms through to Descartes ' cogito—and its corol lary visual ism o f pure behold ing erects a theory o f knowledge that is i l l-suited to thematize sound in its essential evanescence. Represent ing sound such that it fit this visualist paradigm has accelerated the drift towards precisely the 12 antinomy which marks our contemporary understanding of musical performance: the duality of work and event. Without question, the sense of sight has dominated Western epistemology. The eye, it has generally been assumed, is the conduit of reality. Beginning to think about the sonic, and undertaking an engagement with the world of sound in its various manifestations immediately unfolds as a remarkably unusual and difficult task, the arduousness and novelty of which suggests a history of its gradual, systematic neglect. As Walter J . Ong reminds the reader in his book, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, in some periods aurality still enjoyed a strong, though marginal, role despite the influence exerted by the written word: [H]earing rather than sight had dominated the older noetic world in significant ways, even long after writing was deeply interiorized. Manuscript culture in the west remained always marginally oral. Ambrose of Milan caught the earlier mood in his Commentary on Luke (iv. 5): 'Sight is often deceived, hearing serves as guarantee.' In the west through the Renaissance, oration was the most taught of all verbal productions and remained implicitly the basic paradigm for all discourse, written as well as oral. Written material was subsidiary to hearing in ways which strike us today as bizarre.... At least as late as the twelfth century in England, checking even written financial accounts was still done aurally, by having them read aloud. (119) Yet, despite this somewhat astonishing resilience of aurality, the roots of our contemporary visualism have long been firmly secured in the grammar of epistemology. Probing the etymologies of these words shows that epistemic experience—coming to know or understand something—is always troped by the sense of sight. Quoting St. Augustine, in Being and Time Heidegger spells out the obvious visual privileging in everyday speech as we persistently replace the phraseology of the other senses with that of sight: '"See how that sounds,' 'See how that is scented,' 'See how that tastes,' 'See how hard that is'" (215). And pertinent to a discussion of musical performance, even in the everyday rhetoric of live musical events, one talks of going to 'see a concert,' of going to 'see a show.' Speaking of this visualist history, 13 Reiner Schurmann notes in his book, Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, that "s ince the classical Greeks, to think is to see. T o k n o w is to have seen, and to attain evidence is. . . ' to have seen w e l l ' " (65). A casual glance into the history o f Western thought bears out this bond between v is ion and knowledge, a substantial amount o f phi losophical inquiry having been l imited to what D o n Ihde calls in Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound "the realm o f mute objects" (50). A s the immediacy o f sense-experience disappears in a metaphysical drift towards the abstract, Ihde notes that in the phi losophy o f Ar istot le, P lato, and Descartes, visual ity remains the ground and peak o f their concepts o f knowledge, their epistemologies: P la to 's theory o f knowledge rotates around a discussion o f immutable forms; Ar is tot le 's acclamation o f sight as the sense most keenly suited to discern difference (and therefore to access knowledge) is pivotal; and Descartes ' geometr ic spatiality o f wo r l d as res extensa could be nothing other than silent. Know ledge is insofar as there is stasis. This, says Heidegger, is the essence o f metaphysics: Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are.... That which enduringly remains, really is.... Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp. (BT 128-9). In fact, in her book, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music, L y d i a Goeh r appropriately discloses that "Descartes produced a rationalistic and mathematical ly based concept ion o f musical principles o f acoustics and harmony in his Musicae Compendium..."—for Descartes, and those who wou l d fo l l ow his interpretation o f the wo r l d as res extensa, sound wou l d l ikewise continue to be interpreted as stillness (139). 14 A s He idegger explains in his essay, "The A g e o f the W o r l d P i c ture , " the epochal understanding o f being invests itself into every facet o f human interpretation and guides the manner in wh i ch the wo r l d w i l l show up for those who l ive wi th in any part icular age: Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish that age.... The whole of modern metaphysics taken together, Nietzsche included, maintains itself within the interpretation of what is to be and of truth that was prepared by Descartes. (115,127) Sound, in and o f itself being invisible and transient, is especial ly problematic for a Cartesian theory o f knowledge wh i ch depends upon, as He idegger states, being as constant presence-at-hand, a subject set apart f r om wor l d as res externa. In order to be suitably understood wi th in this subject-object f ramework, sound must be ever more removed f rom its ephemeral essence and into its representation as a visual phenomenon, that is, to be apprehended, measured, and known, it must be placed into, in Ihde's words, the 'realm o f mute objects.' A lbe i t in mot ion before the advent o f Cartesian metaphysics, this has been precisely the history o f its transformation in musical as we l l as non-musical domains: a steady drift f r om that wh ich is heard to that wh i ch is visual ized on the musical staff, the osci l loscope, and the spectrum analyzer. It was the posit iv ist ic energy transfer model that conceived l istening as s imply a chain o f physical vibrations terminating in a nerve impulse, and the stimulus-response mode l pioneered by the founder o f modern psychophysics, Gustav Fechner, wh ich, as Ba r r y Truax maintains in his book, Acoustic Communication, led to "the modern scientif ic dist inct ion between the 'object ive' acoustic parameters, such as intensity, frequency and waveform, and their psychoacoust ic, 'subject ive' counterparts, namely loudness, p i tch and timbre, respect ively. . ." (5). T o sound is attributed inherent, objective properties o f its own, now 15 capable o f being rendered in visual terms and wh i ch correspond to subjective categories o f experience. In the wo r l d o f music, posit ivists l ike De r y ck C o o k e in his Language of Music wou l d later appropriate the same f ramework in an attempt to forge equal ly t idy relationships between musica l structures and semantic meaning, a project only made feasible under the domin ion o f the score as wri t ten notat ion (34). In his book, Musica Practica, M i chae l Chanan observes this un ion o f v i s ion and power when he claims that the authority acquired by the score evidently has a good deal to do with the role which it affords in musical intelligence to the process of vision. The basic vocabulary is largely derived from the sphere of optical phenomena: notes are high or low, they move up and down, they are separated by an interval, etc. (71) Silent, enduring, knowab le—as a visual mark, sound and music come to rest in the same presence as the Cartes ian object, and in this settlement, l ikewise sit in concealment from their phenomenal vo i c ing in time. A n d just as Ong charts a shift in human communicat ion and human interpretation wh i ch parallels the rise o f literacy, so can a paral lel transformation o f musical l istening be observed to accompany the rise o f a musical l iteracy, the rise o f the score. T o explain the scope o f this shift, Chanan shares an anecdote in wh i ch he describes the diff iculty B e l a Ba r t ok and Zo l tan Koda l y had in transcribing their o w n 1906 field-recording o f some Hungar ian fo lk music: When it came to transcribing what they'd recorded, they discovered that conventional notation wasn't equal to the job. It required modification to capture the quarter-tones, for example, which the phonograph revealed directly to the ear as characteristic of this music but 'cultured' Western hearing all too easily failed to register. The drift of this argument is inescapable. Notation erected a block in the Western ear against the inner complexities of non-Western musics. A strange kind of deafness appeared in the most sophisticated ears.... Under the hegemony of notation, the Western psyche came to fear the embrace of what it repressed, and responded to any music which manifested this repressed material as if it were a threat to civilization. (77) To be clear, ' cu l tured ' Western hea r i ng—o f wh i ch Ba r t ok and K o d a l y wou l d certainly be exemp la ry—d id not so much 'fai l to register' the quarter-tones, for example, o f non-Western musics, but rather found itself unable to assimilate these ' interst it ia l ' sounds into its 16 theoretical system. Chanan, however, is much clearer in the latter ha l f o f the passage as he charts the ' inescapable drift o f this argument': as aurality is increasingly counter-balanced w i th visuality, sound begins to announce itself accordingly. Indeed, as this anecdote suggests, the hegemony o f no ta t i on—wh ich stands germane to the hegemony o f v is ion under a Cartesian metaphys ics—exerts an almost tota l iz ing pul l over a general musica l ontology, not so problematical ly for those musics whose practices include its sovereignty, but rather problematical ly for those musics wh i ch operate without constant recourse to its authority. Chart ing one o f the key extensions o f the score's hegemonic influence, in Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music, S imon Fr i th lauds the poignancy o f Goehr ' s metaphor o f the museum o f imaginary wo rks as it applies to popular music: And the power of this metaphor is reflected in the musicological approach to popular music: the first task is transcription, the translation of sound into score, whether the score of an imaginary event (most contemporary recorded music is not performed but constructed) or an improvised one (Ornette Coleman is said to have looked aghast at a transcription of one of his solos, knowing that he would be quite unable to play it). (259) To be clear, transcr ipt ion and formal analysis o f the musical structures o f even those musics which, as Fr i th intimates, cou ld be considered inappropriate targets, constitutes no serious transgression in itself; it is rather, as Chanan argues, the exc lus ion o f all other approaches to music, to other musics, that contributes to an impover ished understanding o f their meaning through the marginal izat ion o f what may be called, under a posit ivist paradigm, 'extra-musica l ' aspects o f presentation: The discipline of musicology derives both its efficacy and its closure from analysing the formal qualities of music inscribed in its notation, which elicits a highly technical language to match the music's complicated internal properties. This language seems to foreclose and dissolve away the discussion of music in almost any other terms (except perhaps emotional).... (38) Or, as Susan M c C l a r y and R i chard Leppert put it in the introduct ion to the book they edit, Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception: 17 The only one of the arts that has remained largely untouched by [the new critical] redefinitions of method and subject matter in its academic discipline is music. For the most part, the discourse of musical scholarship clings stubbornly to a reliance on positivism in historical research and formalism in theory and criticism, with primary attention still focused almost exclusively on the canon, (xii) It is first w i th in the transformation o f ephemeral sound into enduring mark that the severance is anticipated, but it is, as Heidegger w i l l again reiterate, the greater course o f Western metaphysics wh i ch is ult imately responsible for the separation o f w o r k and event. A s this visualist metaphysics culminates in the age o f the world-picture, as framed, as distinct, as a wor l d represented by humanity " i n the sense o f that wh i ch has the character o f object," humanity itself is first separated from its wo r l d ( A W P 132). In enumerating the most important extensions o f this severance, He idegger then appropriately notes that art too undergoes a concomitant transformation in its ontological status as it moves into "the purv iew o f aesthetics. That means that the art w o r k becomes the object o f mere subjective exper ience.. ." (116). E cho i ng He idegger 's assertion, Goehr describes that, in the wo r l d o f music, this new understanding in, or perhaps as, aesthetics, produces the musica l art object, the musical 'work ' : At the end of the eighteenth century, changes in aesthetic theory, society, and politics prompted musicians to think about music in new terms and to produce music in new ways. Musicians began to think about music as involving the creation, performance, and reception of not just music per se, but of works as such. The concept of a work first began to serve musical practice in its regulative capacity at this time. Musicologists and other historians of music have dated this development much earlier, usually as far back as the sixteenth century, (iii) A s she traces the extensions o f this turn, Goehr appropriately grounds the discussion in terms o f a w i l l to secure the legit imacy o f musical art, a w i l l that produced a pure, independent, enduring musica l object d ivorced f rom the superfluous contexts o f its reception: Of all the changes in meaning the concept of serious music has undergone throughout its history, none has been more far-reaching in its effect than that which moved musical understanding away from 'extra-musical' towards 'musical' concerns. Before 1800 the pivotal question in philosophical thought about music, 'what is music?' asked for specification of music's extra-musical function and significance.... 18 The transformation gave rise to a new view of music as an independent practice whose serious concerns were now claimed to be purely musical. The emerging practice became specifically geared towards, and evaluated in terms of, the production of enduring musical products. It was only with the rise of this independent conception of music, in other words, that musicians began to think predominantly of music in terms of works. (122-3) Paradoxical ly, the concept o f the 'purely mus ica l ' was generated out o f the desire to transcend the tyranny o f the visual, that is, to pr ior i t ize a more serious listening, but the corol lary onto logy o f the musical object wou l d thereafter strengthen the visual i ty o f music 's own theoretical apparatus. A s there existed no concept o f the 'purely mus ica l ' neither cou ld there be an oppos ing category o f the 'extra-musica l '—these two classes can only be born equipr imordial ly w i th the idea o f an independent musical work; but this d iv is ion is also itself a beginning, and w i l l gradual ly bear the myr iad dualities that mark our contemporary understanding o f musical performance. A s Goeh r contends, as late as the 1700s, the modern social dynamics o f musical activity govern ing the creation, performance, and reception o f musical wo r k s had yet to reach their most robust form, and thus a mult itude o f dichotomies were yet to emerge: audience/performer, rehearsal/performance, l istening t ime/social iz ing time, and concert space/social space are some o f the most conspicuous dualities wh i ch d id not exist pr ior to this aesthetic shift. The Birth of the Musical Work and its Audience The contemporary picture o f silent, attentive audiences who sit in sharp dist inction to performers, and listen to rehearsed and perfected musical wo r k s that stand apart from the social ity o f everyday life, and thus require a specific amount o f t ime and a dedicated space for their proper presentation, is a result o f the idea that music ought to be conceived o f in terms o f independent works . Wi thout the work-concept, music does not occupy the exalted status o f an art wh i ch exists simply for its own sake, but rather accompanies, and thus 19 remains spatially, temporal ly, aesthetically, and acoustical ly subordinate to, the social occasions it is meant to enhance. Prev ious to this new aesthetics, explains Goehr, music is altered and adapted accord ing to the circumstances o f each part icular event, and those in attendance are free to socialize, sing along wi th, applaud, become bored wi th, and, ultimately, initiate the music 's arrest wi thout any conscience for its apparent sovereignty: Compositions were interrupted partly because they were not performed in concert halls devoted to their performance. Usually musical performances were background affairs within a church or court. As accompaniment either to serious or frivolous activities, they were rarely the immediate focus of attention. That fact was obvious given the behaviour of their audiences. Even the term 'audience' is misleading here, for music was not so much listened or attended to, as it was worshipped, danced, and conversed to. It was quite to be expected that audiences would applaud, chatter during, and sing along with a performance. Thus at one of Handel's performances there were 'shouts and acclamations at every pause.' At another time there were several 'disorders interrupting' the performance. (192) Goehr is clear to convey the relationship between mus ic 's onto logica l status and the social behaviour dur ing its 'presentation.' A n d whi le there is undoubtedly a wider scope o f social tendencies in wh i ch to contextual ize the change towards a more reserved audience conduct (i.e., the rise o f the Bourgeo is ie dur ing the Enl ightenment), these more general social trends cannot be understood independently o f corol lary epistemic changes o f the per iod. The deif ication o f reason played an integral role in shaping modern aesthetics, and thus also in first creating the not ion o f the musical work, and second, in prescribing the means o f its legit imation: more elaborate notational systems strengthened the concept o f the wo r k as a 'rea l ' entity. Indeed, the more fervently the enduring permanence o f the w o r k is secured through ever more r igorous notation, the more regimented become the set o f behaviours necessary for its proper appreciation, and the more f i rmly secured become those dualities wh ich have come to inform our common-sense understanding o f musical performance today. The most significant o f these dualities is the separation o f audience and performer. 20 This separation—now most obviously expressed in the conventional spatial arrangement dividing audience from performer—has its origins in the new status of the musical work and is, thus, at base, not so much a division of physical space as it is one of perceived performative agency. As the level of specialized knowledge and skill required of the performers steadily increases, so too does the perceived importance of their role in the unfolding of the musical event; and, as the audience becomes increasingly alienated from the performer in their musical illiteracy, the perception of their role in the performance is likewise diminished. Describing this illiteracy in performative terms, in the "Music and Class Structure in the United States" chapter of his Studies in Musicology 1935-1975, Charles Seeger recounts the abysmal state of musical competence in the general population: [I]n America today, the vast majority of the population is virtually incapable of using either a normal oral music tradition on the one hand or an effective music literacy on the other. Few persons, whatever their economic, educational, or social status, can perform any music beyond the level of the simplest item of near-folk or folk-popular repertory, that is, of a six-year-old competence, in any but a mongrel mixture of styles. (232) Ideological issues over aesthetic simplicity notwithstanding, Seeger's comments point to the inarguable fact that most Westerners who choose to engage with music do so primarily as listeners and not as performers. However, an important detail must not be passed by in the lamentation over this apparent morass of musical skill: not only do most people lack competence in performance, but they also have an equally feeble grasp of musical rudiments and the associated vocabulary with which to conceptualize this music they enjoy so much. And yet, the force of their enthusiasm for and during this listening is just as likely to match that of the musically educated whose formal knowledge would outweigh theirs tenfold. As quoted by Frith, Nicholas Cook discloses his bewilderment upon observing that the degree of enthusiasm one may lend music seems to bear no correlation to the obviously lopsided split between the musically educated and the non-educated: 21 What I find perplexing, and stimulating, about music is the way in which people—most people—can gain intense enjoyment from it even though they know little or nothing about it in technical terms. (PR 253). That the type o f aff i l iation that, as Seeger suggests, most enthusiasts have w i th music has come to be perplexing and stimulating again i l luminates the hegemonic influence notat ion has exerted over a general musical on to logy—th i s confus ion can only arise w i th the special ized knowledge o f a musical grammar that is inextricably l inked w i th a wr i t ten score. B u t g iven the grossly uneven distr ibution o f technical knowledge, our sympathies w i th this confus ion should be equally puzz l ing. A s Fr i th quotes the words o f F rank Sibley, the burden lies in the hands o f the opposite camp: it is not the imprecis ion and indeterminacy o f the non-technical that bears any tenuous relation to musical pleasure, but rather the formal ized, technical approach that struggles to offer a sufficiently r ich sense o f our appreciation: Sibley's point is that "purely musical" descriptions (more or less technical accounts of what is "actually" heard) "fail to articulate what, following others, I have been calling the 'character' and qualities of music, and do little to explain why music may engage us as appreciative listeners—which is why non-musicians and musicians alike employ figurative characterizations." (PR 263) The purely musical and the extra-musical compose the two sides o f what is, in effect, a dialectic o f power: the space o f music becomes the site o f a silent struggle over performative agency, over exactly what and who matters, that is, over who controls the event. T o be more specific, the issue at stake is not so much the unequivocal d iv is ion between those who are mak ing the music and those others who are there to watch and listen, but it is rather the perceived ineffectuality o f the audience as co-creators o f the meanings o f the musical events they are a part o f that contributes to an impover ished understanding o f musical performance. A s musica l wo rks take on a k ind o f static air, they become detachable f rom the events they now sustain, and thus, so too does the audience, feeling that it plays but a marginal role 22 in the way the music will unfold, a component capable of being inserted and removed without consequence to the character of the 'works' the musicians perform. Notice that, according to comments from independent interviews with jazz musician Keith Jarrett and Steve Albini, guitarist of minimalist rock trio Shellac, in performances which operate without the ontological conception of the fixed musical work, the audience plays a significant role in shaping the character of the event: The audience is much more part of the music than they think.... When we say no photography and they decide to take photos anyway, they think they're detached from the performance. They never allow themselves to realize that they have something to do with what happens on stage, especially with improvisation. Audiences play a large role and it can be positive or it can be not positive. (Jarrett) Very few of our songs even have a definite arrangement that stays the same from day to day.... Some of this experimentation takes place on stage, which forces us to make decisions on the spot, without too much deliberation.... The best thing about playing live is feeling that you're part of a big communal experiment that involves the band and the audience as participants. I'm always curious what's going to happen, and when I am surprised, I am delighted. (Shellac) Jarrett's opening remark pinpoints the key issue: audiences have come to largely underestimate their own participatory role in these types of musical events—this is the distance modern aesthetics has prescribed for the proper reception of works—and, as they both go on to say (and Albini to later show through the anatomy of Shellac's performances), this disconnected understanding can express itself in a host of negative ways. Indeed, although their musical styles and respective degrees of improvisation may differ somewhat, Jarrett and Albini have remarkably similar analyses of these audience/performer relations, both strongly asserting that, from the perspective of the performers, the success of the event is absolutely bound up with the nature of this interaction. For Jarrett explicitly, and for Albini more implicitly, these relations exert some sway over 'what happens on stage' (which is to say, presumably, the playing of, and communication between, the musicians) and thus, albeit in some generally unascertainable manner, contribute to the character of the music being 23 performed. However , whi le the behaviour o f the audience undoubtedly has some influence upon the sound o f the music, and is important, in part, for this role, expressing this part ic ipat ion solely in these terms ult imately negates the very impetus o f its inc lus ion in the discussion, namely, to challenge the not ion that musical performance is nothing more than the presentation o f sound to an audience. E v en posit ing a rec iprocal communicat ion between the musicians and the audience (and between the musicians themselves), to maintain that some particular aspect o f musical performance is important only insofar as it affects the sound o f the music itself is to preserve—in fact, to fo r t i f y—the legit imacy o f the 'purely mus ica l ' as the key benchmark o f a successful musical event. Whatever the nearly infinite number o f mit igat ing factors, whether audience behaviour, performer psychology, or temperature o f the concert space—one cou ld attempt to account for such possibi l it ies ad absurdum—expressing their influence solely in terms o f musical output misrepresents the real complex i ty o f the contingencies o f musical performance. Wh i l e such an approach purports to incorporate the radical ity o f context and contingency, it actually eradicates those entire categories as currently expressed, that is, it erases the domain o f the extra-musical, and continues to set musical sound as the sole arbiter o f meaning, and the listener as only a receiver o f acoust ic messages. Indeed, whi le it is certainly conceded that there exist better and worse interpretations/performances o f a g iven musical work , that is, that the autonomy o f the w o r k is necessarily mediated in its being-executed by a musician, audience presence is not generally acknowledged to be an important part o f performative contingency. However , a common example f r om the concert wo r l d shows that the k ind o f audience presence during a performance plays an integral role for the manner in wh i ch this music w i l l be interpreted to 24 manifest itself, the manner in wh i ch it w i l l come to affect those who are there as participants: contrast the power one feels dur ing a sparsely-attended afternoon soundcheck w i th the much greater impact o f the later evening performance at wh i ch there may be hundreds or thousands in attendance—despite the congruity o f the musical work(s) , the consistency o f the musician(s) and the constancy o f the performance space, these two 'performances' emerge as incontestably different events, and thus, a sense o f audience presence, o f being-there w i th other listeners, l ikewise emerges as an unquestionably crucial component. A n d yet, this simple anecdote wh i ch suggests, quite plainly, that some understanding o f context, event, and social ity is necessary for a thorough account o f musica l performance, is l ikely to seem a radical pronouncement. What is this being-with others at a musical performance? Doe s mood play an integral role in these relations? What about bodies, their spatial arrangements, and their movements? The sights and sounds o f others? Is this social ity marked by relations o f power or their temporary suspension? Is it important to understand the way in wh i ch the affair was framed from wel l before the event off ic ia l ly began? In fact, pursuing this l ine o f thought means challenging the precise methodo logy that those in the domains o f acoustic science and aesthetics al ike have employed in their quest for the truth about sound: in all these cases, the observer seeks to put a distance between her/himself and the phenomenon, by bracket ing off, as much as possible, the context o f its occurrence. Aural Modes: Sound In and Out of Context T o re-iterate the same in Heidegger ian terms, conceptual iz ing sound and music wi th in a subject-object relation presupposes, just as Descartes ' endorsement o f mathematics, first, the idea o f being as constant presence-at-hand, and thus, the mode o f pure, distanced beholding w i th wh i ch it must be apprehended. This approach to the acoust ic wor ld , wh i ch 25 has come to seem quite natural, proceeds under the guidance o f a methodo logy wh i ch actually covers over the everyday immediacy o f experience: in order to understand what sound ' is, ' and how it comes to affect us, it and its effects must be studied in isolation, apart f r om their wor ld ly , environmental contexts and instead in terms o f their theoretical, abstract properties. A s Truax contends over the course o f his book, this has been as true o f noise as it has been o f music: "The scientif ic method has achieved its results through an experimental methodology that a l lows observable phenomena to be studied in isolat ion from the variables that normal ly compl icate most situations" (3). However , as Truax explains the essential impetus for his ' communicat iona l ' model , to remove sound from the condit ions o f its wor ld ly operation is to remove the cr it ical dimension o f its meaning, stressing that a "sound means something partly because o f what produces it, but mainly because o f the circumstances under wh ich it is heard" (xi i; my gloss). Exp lo r i ng the scope o f context and cont ingency thus marks the essence o f a more comprehensive, r icher understanding o f acoustic experience: What distinguishes a model as communicational, in contrast to those arising within the study of a particular system (e.g., linguistic, musical) is the inclusion of the pragmatic level, that is, the notion of context. For instance, music is traditionally analyzed for how it is structured, not how it functions socially. Communicational meaning can only be assessed when a message is understood within its context. The meaning of a message can differ when it occurs within a different context, and conversely, two different messages may have the same meaning within a single context. (What does a piece by Debussy mean when heard in a supermarket?). (Truax 158) And , as F r i th quotes L u c y Green 's situational understanding o f music as occurrence: Both experience of the music and the music's meanings themselves change complexly in relation to the style-competence of the [listener], and to the social situations in which they occur.... [M]usic can never be played or heard outside a situation, and every situation will affect the music's meaning. (PR 250) Green's comments elicit precisely the key point that many o f mus ic 's interpreters miss altogether: we are always in some situation, musical ly or otherwise, and to the extent that one attempts to ignore these contingencies, w i l l thus offer an associatively l imited portrait o f its 26 meaning. However , account ing for the anatomy o f these contexts is a boundless task—there is simply no l imit to the possibi l i ty o f inclusion. However , if, in pragmatic terms, we pursue an understanding o f sound, music, and performance in wh i ch we include those most relevant micro-and-macro locat ions o f culture, history, corporeal ity, space, mood , and power we w i l l gain a better understanding o f the musical event as a space o f contingency, communicat ion, and community. 27 CHAPTER II R H Y T H M AND R ISK: THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE WILL TO POWER Harnessing Dionysus We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality—just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations. (Nietzsche, BoT 33) First published in 1872, it is in The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, that Nietzsche shares some of his most valuable insights on musical experience, attempting to articulate its essential difference from, as well as its relation to, an experience of the plastic arts. In order to demonstrate this relation, Nietzsche opts to place the reader amidst a variety of contrasting situations—as he will do later in The Will to Power—so that he may show, by analogy, the separate but intermingling worlds of Apollo and Dionysus—Nietzsche goes, so to speak, to the phenomenon, to music as a collective event. Before moving on to include the more communicative frenzy he explores in his physiological aesthetics of the later text, The Will to Power, it is first necessary to have some sense of his overall project in The Birth of Tragedy, where he first introduces the essential elements of the dialogue. Written prior to his break with Wagner, The Birth of Tragedy is appropriately dedicated to him: it is often as bombastic as the music of his mentor, its prose what Walter Kaufmann dubs in the translator's introduction as "occasionally hyperromantic and turgid" (BoT 4). But like Wagner's music—or perhaps all music in general—it is a book of and for certain moments—a point about the text Kaufmann also makes. Indeed, while the number of themes and avenues Nietzsche explores in this text is beyond discussion here, another quote from Kaufmann sets concisely the task at hand: 28 Indeed, it is one of Nietzsche's central points in the book that we cannot do justice to the achievements of the Greeks and the triumph of those powers of restraint he calls the Apollinian unless we first behold the unrestrained Dionysian energies that the Greeks managed to harness. (BoT 4) As Kaufinann so aptly puts it, the question is precisely how to channel this energy, how to understand and harness the volatility and vitality of Dionysus. Nietzsche first urges us to look back into the history of Greek art in order to gain a better understanding of art's function and meaning in our own (post)modern era. He argues that, unlike ourselves, the Greeks did not understand art in terms of concepts but rather, "in the intensely clear figures of their gods," Apollo and Dionysus (BoT 33). For Nietzsche, the corresponding terms 'Apollinian' and 'Dionysian' can be understood not only as separate art-worlds but also as art-impulses originating in nature, as psychological perspectives, and as psychological effects. By first understanding their exclusive domains and then their brilliant union in Attic tragedy, Nietzsche wants to re-initiate a tragic world-view that affirms life in its inevitable suffering. He begins his project with an explanation of the Apollinian domain. For Nietzsche, the purely Apollinian art-impulse is best represented by an analogy to dreams and manifests itself most accurately in the firmly-articulated plastic art of sculpture. As spectators of this art we are significantly engaged with and delighted by its appearance yet still remain within the boundaries of a will-oriented, subject-object dichotomy; thus "we still have... the sensation that it is mere appearance" (BoT 34). Apollo then is the tranquil and tranquil/z/«g "soothsaying god," the harbinger of the most spectacular "beautiful illusion[s]... which make life possible and worth living" (BoT 35). As Nietzsche stresses in this work, "existence and the world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BoT 141). Indeed, for Nietzsche, the Apollinian/Dionysian duality extends beyond a model for the understanding of art, but is 29 really an equivocal tension rooted in nature itself ( B o T 38). F o r Nietzsche, a necessary part o f our relationship to the wo r l d o f culture is a faith, a trust in the "principium individuationis... and we might cal l Apo l l o h imsel f the glor ious divine image o f [this pr inc ip le]" ( B o T 36). W i th i n the Apo l l in ian perspective we are able to augment our everyday existence by engaging in beautiful i l lusions whi le stil l retaining our necessary subjective wi l l , a w i l l that a l lows us to continue our rational activity and comportment w i th in c iv i l i zed society. Throughout N ietzsche 's descript ion o f the Apo l l in ian there exists a sense o f the Kant ian beautiful, o f permanence, o f an almost pathological comfort in stillness. Indeed, in order to grasp the nature o f the Apo l l in ian impulse "we must keep in mind that measured restraint, that f reedom f rom the wi lder emotions, that ca lm o f the sculptor g o d " ( B o T 35). The D ionys ian art-impulse reveals i tself in all that is the antithesis o f the Apo l l in ian: the excess and ecstasy o f intoxicat ion, orgiastic frenzy, and the intangibi l i ty o f musical art ( B o T 33,36). D ionysus introduces us to "the emotional power o f the tone, the un i form f l ow o f the melody, and the utterly incomparable wo r l d o f harmony" that "seeks to get behind all phenomenon" ( B o T 40, 104). Through these devices, D ionys ian music exerts a profoundly intoxicat ing effect and wi th in this "narcot i c" spell we experience the col lapse o f the subject-object antinomy. Where the Apo l l in ian experience o f the plastic arts (or language) preserves this subject-object dist inction, the experience o f D ionys ian music is marked by its (temporary) rupture: [A]t this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian, which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of intoxication.... Under the influence of the narcotic draught, of which the songs of all primitive men and peoples speak,... these Dionysian emotions awake, and as they grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness. 03oT 36) The effect o f this col lapse is such that the listener feels not only unif ied w i th other human beings but also reconci led w i th nature and as "pr imord ia l being i t s e l f ( B o T 36, 104). A s 30 Nietzsche writes, "under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son" (BoT 37). When the Apollinian "veil of maya" is torn aside in a musical frenzy, Dionysus is revealed as the primordial ground of existence in all its "terror" and "absurdity" (BoT 40, 60). Nietzsche first praises Dionysian ecstasy, but then points to the moment of its own annihilation as something that confronts us in a very disturbing manner (BoT 19). As the Dionysian rapture dissipates and the everyday, empirical world that was momentarily transcended now reappears, it is seen with a new and "nauseated" understanding of our own powerlessness—our will to action is paralyzed. Where we were once happily deluded by Apollo's illusion we are now tragically aware of the contingency and "absurdity of existence" (BoT 60). Thus, as Nietzsche reminds us from the beginning of the text, the question remains for Dionysus and Apollo to be seen in their complex interrelation, that is, in an antagonistic strife within a parallel structure (BoT 33). Important to retain in our model of performance, Nietzsche's understanding of musical intoxication provides more than just a pleasurable experience: both destructive and revealing, it is a productive rupture in which listeners affirm their sense of belonging to one another: [N]ow all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or impudent convention have fixed between man and man are broken. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community. Q3oT 37) Nietzsche quite clearly suggests that there is at least a temporary suspension of hierarchical relationships between the participants of such a rapture. He is right in asserting the musical event as quite an extraordinary space in just this manner—there do seem to be moments, if 31 only for a br ie f per iod, or perhaps a mult itude o f br ie f periods, in wh i ch the event reaches an almost supra-pol it ical plane. In listening together and perhaps dancing together, a shared sense o f communi ty is felt between people who wou ld otherwise remain quite alienated from one another—'necess i ty ' and ' impudent convent ion ' in the everyday wo r l d o f (what N ietzsche refers to as) culture make this encounter between strangers or loose acquaintances exceedingly diff icult. This unique state is accompl ished through the tensions between the Apo l l in ian and Dionys ian. Where everyday l inguistic discourse preserves the principal o f individuation, and thus an unequal power dynamic between people, N ie tzsche 's descript ion o f music is appropriately permeated w i th a language o f access. Thus, in terms o f tragedy, language "can express nothing that did not already l ie hidden in the vast universal ity and absoluteness in the mus i c . . . " ( B o T 55). Transmissions from the Dead: The Will to Power as a 'Text' Satisfying though N ietzsche 's courageously juveni le account o f Rausch may be, this, however, is not N ie tzsche 's f inal wo r d on the subject o f musical in tox ica t ion—but then, neither are his aphorisms in The Will to Power. In the editor 's introduct ion to the book, Wal ter Kau fmann is keen to remind the reader that, despite its contemporary appearance as a unif ied text, The Will to Power in its current fo rm is not the book N ie tzsche himsel f ever intended to publ ish and is actually compr ised o f a col lect ion o f random notes wr i t ten between 1883 and 1888, wh i ch were then posthumously organized and publ ished by his sister, E l isabeth Forster-Nietzsche. Yet , wi th in his invective condemning the chronic and wi l l fu l misrepresentations o f N ietzsche in relation to this work , Kau fmann also asserts the value o f its study. A s he writes, "there is no need to downgrade N ie tzsche 's notes because they are mere notes... [but] these notes obviously do not represent his final v i ews " ( W P xv i ) . Indeed, 32 Kaufrnann's most vehement cr i t ic ism is levied at those who have mistakenly dubbed The Will to Power N ie tzsche 's " c rown ing achievement," his magnum opus, and thus suggest reading the text on terms who l l y unwarranted by the wo r k i t se l f—Kaufrnann 's ambivalence warns the reader to approach the text accordingly. The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power: The Dionysian as Communication Despi te the very disjunctive nature o f the text, examining N ie tzsche 's comments on aesthetic experience in The Will to Power contributes to a more comprehensive picture o f his views on musical ecstasis first and rather ambit iously presented in The Birth of Tragedy. Between these texts arcs an i l luminating continuity o f the D ionys ian. Indeed, N ie tzsche 's discussion o f the aesthetic state in The Will to Power seems remarkably unfocused on, even decidedly avoidant of, expected and typical analyses o f works o f art, but this is only the progression o f his aesthetics proc la imed in the Birth of Tragedy: "[I]t is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the wor l d are eternally justified!''—he is, after all, someone who extends the not ion o f 'a r twork ' to include the Prussian off icer corps as we l l as the Jesuit order ( B o T 52; W P 419). Perhaps attempting to convey the depth, breadth and importance o f an artistic rapture, N ietzsche operates largely by analogy, first prob ing seemingly unrelated realms before announcing their respective affinities w i th artistic experience. Indeed, pervasive throughout N ie tzsche 's discussion in Part I V o f B o o k III are descriptions o f what cou ld be described as a dilated sensory pellucidity, germane, but by no means exclusive to, the realm o f artistic creation and aesthetic experience. In fact, a lthough Part I V o f The Will to Power bears the title 'The W i l l to Powe r as A r t , ' in aphor ism #801 N ie tzsche seems keen on first posit ing a certain kinship between what may be considered disparate human drives, moods, and heightened states: "sexuality; intoxicat ion; feasting; spring; v ic tory over an 33 enemy, mockery; bravado; cruelty; the ecstasy of religious feeling" (421). Before moving on to assert the express animality of such an upwelling in this aphorism and the next, he reiterates as fundamental the ingredients of the "witches' brew" first mentioned in The Birth of Tragedy, declaring that in all the heightened states there are "three elements principally: sexuality, intoxication, cruelty—all belonging to the oldest festal joys of mankind" (BoT 40; WP 421). From the elements in the aforementioned list, Nietzsche asserts, the aesthetic state is thus comprised. A plethora of musical forms and styles elicit interpretations which point to an explicit sexuality, a narcotic adulteration and/or the kind of hubris associated with violent domination—certainly not all, but many forms of music feature the overall rise-climax-fall trajectory easily mapped onto these domains. However, unlike many commentators on music, Nietzsche is not only interested in outlining musical representations of such drives, that is, in the interpretation of a musical 'text,' but also in engaging with the question of how, within the participation of an actual musical event, these drives are thus arranged, experienced, and expunged in a listening audience, indeed, how they are performed. Richard Schacht declares the key importance of this point in his Nietzsche: Nietzsche does not take the notions of transfiguration and illusion to apply only to works of Apollinian and Dionysian art conceived as object [sic] of aesthetic experience, but rather also to the subjects of such experience insofar as they become absorbed in them.... The entire significance of art is missed, for him, if one does not recognize that the consciousness of those experiencing these art-forms undergoes a transformation analogous to that occurring in their creation; and that the experiencing subject's very psychological identity thereby is in a sense transfigured, even if only temporarily.... (492) Schacht is keen to stress that Nietzsche's analysis of art in The Birth of Tragedy does not begin and end with the metaphorical description of some isolated art-object, but neither does it start and finish with only a psychological transformation. Nietzsche's seemingly tangential accounts of various ecstases above serve as a provisional contextualization of musical 34 performance, and thus suggest not only a psychological , but also a physio logica l and corporeal placement w i th in the musical even t—in musical performance, the D ionys ian is most intensely experienced amidst the drives and bodies o f others. N ie tzsche 's analysis is perhaps most applicable to those musica l events in wh i ch there exists the structural and historical possibi l i ty o f an intense, col lect ive experience, those in wh i ch the anarchic is not merely represented musical ly, but also enacted physical ly. The N o r t h Amer i can and European rock festival scenes wh ich first emerged in the '60s and have continued to the present are certainly exemplary o f N ie tzsche 's c l a im—wr i t h i ng bodies o f those intoxicated by sound and/or substance seem to tread an ambiguous dist inct ion between an erotic bonding and masochist ic self-cruelty. N ietzsche 's same tr iad o f drives (sexuality, intoxicat ion, feasting) cou ld easily be appl ied to var ious industrial, metal, punk, and skinhead/Oi! performances in wh i ch audience members (primari ly male) who participate in the scrum k n o w n as 'the pit ' justi f iably expect and revel in the (most ly playful) administering and receiv ing o f physical pain. A n d yet, as N ietzsche also states (and as it is apparent to the observer o f such a display), f rom out o f this strange melee comes pleasure. Clear ly, N ietzsche wishes to relay a sense o f an animalistic possession, an altered state in wh i ch certain physical and mental faculties enjoy a simultaneous sharpening and heightened awareness wi th in a loss o f cultural inhibit ion, a k ind o f bl issful forgett ing. Indeed, there is a remarkable conf lat ion o f the inhuman and the superhuman in N ietzsche 's description, an almost mechanistic brand o f the chaotic that, paradoxical ly, suggests a k ind o f organic, feral volati l i ty. In addressing the nature o f rapture in this manner, N ie tzsche answers his own question posed in his Attempt at a Self-Criticism f rom The Birth of Tragedy: "Where does that synthesis o f god and bi l ly goat in the satyr point? What experience o f himself, what 35 urge compelled the Greek to conceive the Dionysian enthusiast and primeval man as a satyr?... Visions and hallucinations shared by entire communities or assemblies at a cult?" (21). Capturing the sexuality in the escalating momentum of such a seizure, Nietzsche writes that intoxication is: the feeling of enhanced power; the inner need to make of things a reflex of one's own fullness and perfection; the extreme sharpness of certain senses, so they understand a quite different sign language—and create one— ... extreme mobility that turns into an extreme urge to communicate; the desire to speak on the part of everything that makes signs—; a need to get rid of oneself, as it were, through signs and gestures; ability to speak of oneself through a hundred speech media—an explosive condition.... [A] compulsion and urge to get rid of the exuberance of inner tension through muscular activity and movements of all kinds; then as an involuntary co-ordination between this movement and the processes within (images, thoughts, desires)—as a strong stimuli from within—; inability to prevent reaction; the system of inhibitions suspended, as it were. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, affect) is accompanied by vascular changes and consequentiy by changes in color, temperature and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its "suggestion mentale ".... (WP 428-9) Here, in the Will to Power, and earlier in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche offers a decidedly Freudian model of human drives annexed with his own intensified emphasis on the physiological signs of their kinesis: Inwardness grows as powerful drives that have been denied outward release by the establishment of peace and society seek compensation by turning inward in concert with the imagination. The thirst for enmity, cruelty, revenge, violence turns back, is repressed;... the drives are transformed into demons whom one fights, etc. (WP 202-3) Musical experience, for Nietzsche, disrupts this circularity and re-channels these drives into an outward expression. Nietzsche's picture of the listener is thus one of psycho-physiological dynamism, of circulating, combustible energies stored/repressed in cultural necessity and released explosively in a performed return to the primordial home. Indeed, the exemplary musical experience, for Nietzsche, is this return, one that, in its greatest intensity, would transport the listener out of a constrained and artificial everyday world of culture, and back into the liberating anarchy of nature. Such descriptions of musical transcendence in The Birth of Tragedy reflect this well-documented, rather ubiquitous concept that sound exists as the 36 mediating force between this, the wor l d o f culture, and the 'other ' wor ld , that o f nature and spirit: And now let us imagine how into this world, built on mere appearance and moderation and artificially dammed up, there penetrated, in tones ever more bewitching and alluring, the ecstatic sound of the Dionysian festival; how in these strains all of nature's excess in pleasure, grief and knowledge became audible, even in piercing shrieks; and let us ask ourselves what the psalmodizing artist of Apollo, with his phantom harp-sound, could mean in the face of this demonic folk-song! (46) Nietzsche shows a clear reverence for these moments when the wo r l d o f 'culture' (understood in terms o f an adherence to reason and conformity to social norms) is ruptured, penetrated by the comparat ively untamed and more intense expression o f emot ion associated w i th the 'natural, ' the animal. N ietzsche foregrounds the not ion that it is in the fear o f this i n tens i ty—of its uncertain express ions—that humanity has become domesticated in the soothing security o f a herd moral ity. N ietzsche instead calls for us to compose ourselves out o f this more erratic uncerta inty—he calls for us to embrace a more dynamic rhythm. From a superior viewpoint one desires the contrary: the ever-increasing dominion of evil, the growing emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest natural powers—the affects—into service. (WP 208) Admittedly, the potential ly fomenting quality o f such passages may make for a rather apprehensive endorsement o f N ietzsche 's understanding ( i f for any at all): such a mode l evokes an unquestionably dangerous determinism rife w i th the possibi l i ty o f violence and abuse, but is disturbingly unconcerned w i th any associated mora l culpabi l i ty. N o t to dismiss these concerns, and perhaps only to increase any present queasiness, we ought to examine in greater detail N ie tzsche 's c la im that an enviable enhancement o f the communicat ive functions is enjoyed through musical intoxicat ion, that a more refined, improved sensory epistemology emerges wi th in this state. 37 Although it is often assumed that Nietzsche's aesthetics ultimately funnels into a narrow, perhaps even solipsistic, physiological reductionism, there also exists an opposite, radiating trajectory which situates this physiology in its thoroughly communicative role: The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures—it is the source of languages. This is where languages originate: the languages of tone as well as the languages of gestures and glances. The more complete phenomenon is always the beginning.... Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding.... One never communicates thoughts: one communicates movements, mimic [sic] signs, which we then trace back to thoughts. (WP 427-8) Although here he is addressing art experience in general, it is difficult not to interpret these comments as but a slightly more magnified account of the Dionysian scene presented in his early work. Catalyzing an extraordinary system of relations not carried out through linguistic means, musical performance unfolds in this interplay of bodily communication amongst the audience—as audience members rendered largely reticent by the volume and social significance of the performance, our bodies become sites of physical communication for and with other listeners, simultaneously transmitters and receivers of a multitude of'signals.' The momentum of our intoxication is one that, in part, gathers its intensity from an involvement within these audience relations, the manner in which we are, in some way, 'possessed' by these other listeners—the Dionysian scene, after all, is one of collective force, not individual aesthetic delight. Expressing this momentum in typically hyperbolic fashion, Nietzsche first tries to convey the sense of a certain cowardice, of a lame and feeble paralysis in those who resist indulging in the totality of such an intoxication: "But of course such poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called 'healthy-mindedness' looks when the glowing life of the Dionysian revelers roars past them" (BoT 37). In short, Nietzsche claims that life is indeed enhanced, that we can actually improve through such a possession. 38 Affirming Transgression: The Volatility of the Crowd F o r Nietzsche, musical performance opens a space in wh i ch new and extraordinary possibil it ies o f human relations, that is, different possibi l it ies from the tempered rhythms o f everyday life, have an opportunity to emerge. The value o f such a possession is measured precisely in terms o f its divergence from common, potential ly banal modes o f discourse. Our own improvement is then congruent w i th the degree o f this col lect ive divergence, w i th the radical ity o f the social experiment, and thus, at bottom, w i th its risk. F r o m out o f this r isk emerge all the most powerfu l and aff irming moments o f musical elat ion that have long been described to bond communit ies o f listeners. Bu t , as risk, this volat i l i ty also harbours the potential for danger. It is foreshadowed in the acerbic arrogance o f N ie tzsche 's comments about the 'g low ing l i fe ' o f the D ionys ian revelers: it is the momentum o f their possession that carries them roar ing past the others, but it is only b l ind luck that keeps them from carrying straight on through and trampl ing those not caught up in their drive. A s E l ias Canett i contends in his book, Crowds and Power, there is inhering in any gathered mass the seeds o f its possible eruption: "The destructiveness o f the c rowd is often ment ioned as its most conspicuous quality, and there is no denying the fact that it can be observed everywhere, in the most diverse countries and civ i l izat ions" (19). T o lend endorsement to the liberating nature o f this N ietzschean anarchism, to let it stand as the art iculat ion o f an intense and transcendent musical ecstasis, is to endorse the undeniable l ike l ihood that some performances w i l l either erupt into, or specif ical ly declare themselves to be, sites o f violence, abuse, and dominat ion. It may sound extreme, but a few contemporary examples show that this is not merely a hypothetical concern, or the dramatiz ing o f an alarmist. C i t i ng the paradigmatic example 39 which outlines the dangers of sanctioning a boisterous, ecstatic feeling of community in music, David Schwartz reminds the reader in his book, Listening Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture, that racist German skinheads draw the energy for their prescribed violence from the collective frenzy of their performances: [0]ne of Oi's long-term effects in its listeners is the production of a sense of community for skins in Germany. Its most common short-term effect is that it is sometimes used to incite acts of terror against foreigners.... (101) An intimate feeling of community and an absolutely explicit mandate for terror, however, are by no means requisite in inflaming the violent impulse of the crowd: musical performance can also ignite the same will amongst total strangers. An Associated Press article from July 1999 describes that, in the wake of its finish in flames and rioting, the drug and alcohol fueled "Woodstock 1999" held in Rome, NY, had state police confirming reports of four alleged rapes (one apparently occurring in the mosh pit of the main stage during Limp Bizkit's performance) in addition to a number of other sexual assaults (Police). The article goes on to quote volunteer David Schneider's testimony on the number and the collective nature of these assaults: [These women] were pushed [into the mosh pit] against their will and really raped. From my vantage point, it looked initially like there was a struggle, and after that there were other people holding them down. It seemed like most of the crowd around was cheering them on. (Police) We may here recall Nietzsche's comments made in his genealogy of the Dionysian, his description of its pre-Greek, barbarian past in festivals which "centered in extravagant sexual licentiousness, whose waves overwhelmed all family life and its venerable traditions; the most savage natural instincts were unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always seemed to me to be the real witches' brew" (BoT 39). 40 However , this same internally-focused brutality, in wh i ch the v io lence o f the c r owd is turned inward on itself, exists not only amongst the anonymity o f the mass event, but is present even in decidedly smaller brands o f performance. In his article/interview " G G A l l i n , The F irst Amendment, and the L a w , " Joe Cough l in relays a summary descr ipt ion o f the notor iously vio lent performances o f since-deceased punk nihilist G G A l l i n to include nudity, bloodshed, onstage defecation (which Allin frequently eats and/or flings at the crowd), and the very real threat of personal injury; people do tend to panic, after all, and scramble for doors, among other things. Most of the blood, however, is Allin's own, drawn usually by his own hand. He pummels his face with microphones or shoves them up his ass, cracks bottles over his head and carves himself up with the remnants, dives into furniture, you name it. Often, the uninitiated will attack him as well, but Allin's immunity to pain invariably sends them scurrying. (Allin) Descr ib ing the nature and value o f his performances dur ing an interview on the Jerry Springer Show on M a y 5, 1993, A l l i n casually declares w i th N ietzschean conv ict ion his beneficent role in harming others: " I f y ou get raped at my show, you ' re probably better o f f for i t " (Jerry). A l l i n revels in his self-confessedly mercenary and unrelenting v i ew o f human relations, steadfastly objecting to any sense o f communion w i th indiv idual or audience in either private or performance domains (A l l in) . In terms o f contemporary musical performance, there does not exist, fo r audience and performer alike, a more definit ive and consistently recurr ing incarnation o f danger than a G G A l l i n show. E a c h performance explicit ly, and rather paradoxical ly, centers on construct ing a space o f unrestrained freedom, and thus, in Nietzschean fashion, embraces the malice erupting wi th in it: negative l iberty finds no ground amidst the D ionys ian scene. Indeed, the Dionys ian is just the opposite: it is the space wh i ch affirms al l possibi l it ies associated w i th intensity, inc luding acts o f cruelty. However , wi th in this absence o f constraint, its posit ive corol lary enjoys a run o f the ful l gamut o f possibil it ies, forever expressing i tsel f in entirely 41 unpredictable ways: here, it erupts in the terror of violence and sexual assault, but elsewhere fosters a more nurturing sense of community. Affirming Culture: The Articulation of Community In order to understand the manner in which musical performance can bind an otherwise fragmented crowd of people, a rather detailed account of the event and those attending—including a description of the time prior to and following the actual performance—is necessary. Without a sense of these details, we risk a rather uninformative reiteration of the long-asserted maxim that music has the power to bind people together, and possibly forego what may be a rare opportunity to gain a more thorough grasp of this enigmatic process. Providing a clear example of exactly this power, Barbara Andersen, former editor of Vancouver's Discorder magazine, recollects a specific performance of The Need which closed the first night of a three-day conference for young feminist activists in Seattle, Washington in the summer of 1996: DiPasquale: Describe to me the circumstances of The Need show in Seattle. Andersen: The show was actually on the first night of a three-day conference at an activist community centre.... There were not a lot of older women or minority women.... There were a few tables set up and people selling, or rather, disseminating things.... I think it was uncomfortable for everybody because nobody knew what was supposed to be going on.... There were various discussions and bands that were mostiy pretty bad.... There were maybe 20 or 30 people at the place at the peak.... [The Need] had some fans who had come just to see them, who hadn't been there earlier, who were older, and kind of more flamboyant, and more dressed up, and more multi-ethnic than the crowd was at that point, and were very loud and aggressively supportive. So they set up in the middle of the room instead of at the back of one of the walls like the other bands had done.... So they played, and people got really excited about it.... They had the audience in a circle around them.... People just got really super amped and were jumping around.... It was all women at that point... The music was good but they made mistakes all the time, and whenever they would make mistakes they would stop the song and start back at the beginning or stop it altogether.... So it was very chaotic and ruptured music that didn't have any long ecstatic periods, but I think that made it more exciting. It was also very different from a lot of the bands we were hearing that weekend.... You could tell they were trying to do something experimental. D: So did their performance change the mood of the conference in any way? A: It made it worth sitting around and being incredibly bored for hours and I was in a much better mood than when I started.... It was fun and it also broke the ice with a lot of people 42 who were there, and I got to talking to them and having a friendly-ish rapport with them and it made it possible to sort of develop relationships. D: How do you think that happened? A: I think it just lightened the mood. Watching bands that aren't very good or entertaining is kind of like work, and in the context of this conference where it was kind of like supporting each other, it was like you were doing your job by standing there and clapping or being excited or just standing there and watching the band.... A lot of those bands are hard to evaluate outside of that context, that community context, or that community social work perspective [laughs]. D: What was it about The Need's performance that sparked this conference into a place where people became a little more comfortable with one another? How do you suspect that their performance broke the ice? A: I think the fans that they brought or that showed up just for them were important because they were kind of goofy and outspoken and they maybe provided models for behaviour that people didn't have, like that you didn't have to be deadly serious, and you could heckle the band and you weren't going to hurt their feelings and make them cry, you could actually joke around and act silly and that everyone had to loosen up a bit. And so they loosened people up... There's also an understandable amazement that even women who are involved in feminist art have when they see women who are either very technically skilled or very creatively driven, who have a very forceful vision. A lot of the music that was being made in that community was very same-ey... and muddy, and maybe kind of wishy-washy, like it didn't really know where it was going—it didn't really have to go anywhere because it was just the act of making music that was the statement in the first place. It was more important that it was women making it than the actual content of the music. That was what things were being evaluated on the basis of. [The Need] weren't incredibly technically skilled, but they were original, which was amazing. According to Andersen, The Need's performance—with its comparative originality, presence, and strength of vision—changed the mood of the conference from an uneasy boredom to at least a space of relative social ease. Aesthetically, it articulated, in a way that perhaps language was unable to, a commonality they shared and a purpose for their conference. However, as she contends, the band's refusal to play through their mistakes meant that their performance offered no extended periods of musical ecstasis and that its success was as much due to the participation of a few boisterous audience members as it was their ventures into experimentalism. Andersen describes a scene of visible excitement, and even its physical expression from the audience, but nowhere in her comments is the suggestion that this performance initiated, in Nietzschean terms, anything as radical as a 43 return to nature, a return to the pr imordia l home. It seems, rather, that it was actually an intensif ication o f presence in the wo r l d o f culture, indeed, an art iculat ion o f exactly their place as a specific communi ty wi th in a culture that t ook place dur ing this performance. Andersen's descr ipt ion o f this part icular musical space thus sits rather restlessly wi th in a Nietzschean f ramework o f musical performance, demanding greater breadth to account for the myr iad contingencies suggested in her analysis. Stress Fractures: Nietzsche's Conflicts A s a result o f the Apol l in ian/Dionys ian strife, there is still, in terms o f human agency, an undeniable tension between an indiv idual and a col lect ive intox icat ion in Nietzsche 's work . N ie tzsche 's account points to an exert ion and increase o f indiv idual strength whi le simultaneously partaking in a col lect ive transformation gesturing towards homogenizat ion. A s N ietzsche observes in The Will to Power: The condition of pleasure called intoxication is precisely an exalted feeling of power— The sensations of space and time are altered: tremendous distances are surveyed and, as it were, for the first time apprehended; the extension of vision over greater masses...; strength as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as suppleness and pleasure in movement, as dance, as levity and presto.... (WP 420-1) A n d yet, another sketch o f N ie tzsche 's thoughts on musical performance sends a message o f subordination: The will to unity (because unity tyrannizes—namely, over the listener, spectator); but inability to tyrannize over oneself concerning the main thing—namely in regard to the work itself (omitting, shortening, clarifying, simplifying). Overwhelming through masses (Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine). (WP 448) A l though the Nietzschean model articulates the volat i l i ty and intensity o f a collective, communal experience, the complex i ty and diversity o f such express ions—being composed f rom out o f a host o f personal, cultural, and historical cont ingenc ies—expands beyond the scope o f this model 's binary opposit ions. N ie tzsche 's vaci l lat ing descript ions o f the Apo l l in ian and D ionys ian forces, and his still uneasy settlement on the dissonance o f their 44 coupl ing in The Birth of Tragedy, betray a cognizance o f this tension, but even in his recognit ion that the musical rapture o f D ionysus remains framed within and by the cultural mi l ieu o f Apo l l o , N ie tzsche 's account gives only the provis ional suggestion o f culture as a mediating force in the musical possession itself, over look ing the finer details o f its operation and focusing only on the moments o f its apparent exodus. A l though he himsel f revels in this transcendence as a partial destabil ization o f the d ichotomy itself, the not ion that the listener oscil lates exclusively between nature and culture, who l ly leaving the one to be in the other, is a somewhat crude model . Wi thout question, there is a strong, transformative quality in the musical event, out o f wh i ch new possibil it ies o f communicat ion can be real ized; but rather than mark ing or preserving these kinds o f dualities, it ought to be conce ived as i l luminating a simultaneous experience o f both, or perhaps o f suggesting a temporary fusion. It is the destructuring o f these sorts o f dichotomies that Heidegger is able to achieve in Being and Time. P rob ing his more developed hermeneutics w i th an attention to the shortcomings o f Nietzsche 's mode l can contribute to a richer understanding o f musica l experience not as an escape f rom, but rather, an i l luminat ion of this 'wor l d o f culture.' N ie tzsche 's understanding o f D ionys ian rapture as an ecstatic bl iss in wh ich one stands temporar i ly outside o f oneself, as a cl imact ic punctur ing o f c iv i l i zat ion 's vei l in wh i ch one regains an aff i l iat ion w i th a more pr imordia l , col lect ive nature, though in its own manner a revel ing in the destructuring o f Cartesian dichotomies is for He idegger stil l exemplary o f the strongest metaphysical prejudice, an inverted P laton ism wh i ch merely extols the sensuous in displacement o f the supersensuous ideal. In many ways, He idegger is quite just i f ied in describing N ietzsche as "the last metaphysician o f the Wes t " ( W P K M 8). Indeed, for Heidegger, uphold ing the not ion that one could enjoy the k ind o f possession and collapse 45 described by N ie tzsche wou l d necessarily presuppose the posit ing o f its opposite: a state o f unmediated and unadulterated being, a static, P laton ic purity. Sti l l , even w i th this perpetual tension at every turn, N ietzsche has managed to place us inside the musical event, has suggested that the site o f performance is one o f col lect ive audience communicat ion as much as it is one o f individual aesthetic delight. A n d although it is generally phrased in terms o f internal drives, N ietzsche does address a certain corporeal element in this sense o f communion w i th other listeners. Perhaps the greatest element in his analysis o f music is the sense that its value is consummate w i th the degree o f departure f rom the everyday—mus i c is capable o f catalyzing a space o f unpredictable and unique social relations for some per iod o f time. E v e n whi le retaining the vital components in N ie tzsche 's mode l o f performance, an examination o f He idegger 's hermeneutics o f l istening, mood, attunement, and art can destabil ize the N ietzschean confl ict paradigm that, as Andersen 's example has shown, obstructs a more differentiated understanding o f the musical event. There is in musical exper ience—and perhaps in the D ionys ian i t se l f—a broader range o f possibil it ies, a wider hor izon o f the pr imordia l , that Heidegger w i l l articulate in his discussion o f l istening. 46 CHAPTER III HEIDEGGER'S AURALITY Heidegger as Musical Thinker Vas t l y different as they are stylistically, He idegger 's o w n phi losophica l focus shows a clear respect for N ietzsche 's phi losophical approach. Ev ident not only from his systematic four-volume w o r k on Nietzsche but also visible more generally in his re-visitat ion o f certain themes, He idegger is (especially in Being and Time), l ike Nietzsche, concerned w i th problems o f interpretation in terms o f everyday experience. Everyday aural experience is one o f the themes He idegger re-visits throughout his phi losophical career, urg ing a re-acquaintance w i th the often-over looked wo r l d o f sound. However , germane to our cultural-historical bl ind spot in relat ion to the sonic is the lack o f attention paid to He idegger 's own provis ional hermeneutics o f l istening appearing in his texts. Desp i te his comments on acoustic experience in Being and Time, "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " "The W a y to Language," as we l l as " L o g o s " — a theme spanning a significant por t ion o f his phi losophical ca ree r—a more developed theory o f He idegger 's aurality in relat ion to the musical event has yet to be constructed. Wh i l e Ihde's explorat ion into the phenomenology o f l istening certainly furthers our understanding o f He idegger 's acoustic sensibilities, he stops short o f combining it w i th He idegger 's descriptions o f being-with in Being and Time, and communi ty in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t . " A s w i l l become clear as our analysis moves on, some crit ics l ike John R. Covach , R i chard Cochrane, and M i chae l E ld red see how He idegger ' s hermeneutics can be applied specif ical ly to a more contextual model o f music, but none observe h ow his wo r k may coalesce into an important, detailed theory o f audience relations in musical 47 performance. Indeed, it is not immediately obvious that this could ever be a successful enterprise: Heidegger never really engages with music in any rigorous fashion. Heidegger takes a much different approach to sonic experience than Nietzsche, not investigating music with quite the same explicitness or intensity, but certainly gesturing towards a kind of quiescent musicality in everyday listening. It is clear that Heidegger does not 'know' music in the manner Nietzsche does: from the inside out, as a composer of at least passable merit. Nevertheless, in clear contra-distinction to the visual, geometric epistemology of Descartes, Heidegger urges a re-acquaintance with the often-neglected world of sound as part of our 'knowledge.' This is not to suggest that Heidegger derides our sense of sight as inherently inauthentic, or somehow responsible for our contemporary (Cartesian) interpretation of Being, but there is a noticeable sonic motif running through his work that evinces an increasing sensitivity and thoughtfulness towards human listening, an engagement with sound not often found in the works of other philosophers. Outlining this general trajectory of Heidegger's aurality in his book, Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger, David Halliburton declares his ambition to examine "the meaning of Heidegger's growing concern with music, with dance, with the language of gesture, with Eastern modes of thinking and presentation" (200). Indeed, entwined within Heidegger's discussions of some of his most major themes— communication, mood, belonging, and truth—are strands of this aurality. Tracing the development of his acoustic sensibility not only reveals its explicit presence at some of the most pivotal moments of his thought, but as the fundamental metaphor for his project of destructuring the antinomies of metaphysics. Despite his infamous Kehre, his turn away from a single, unified understanding of Being and towards a more pluralistic, differentiated idea of 48 more localized human practices, he never stopped pursuing new, imaginative formulations to challenge the disjunctive picture of human experience erected by Western metaphysics (Dreyfus, HFSAP). And although it is generally assumed that Heidegger's thought can be divided according to this turn, with the theme of human listening he remains remarkably consistent, at times giving near-verbatim repetitions of his earlier formulations. The change in his acoustic sensibility can only be expressed as an intensified interest, not as a departure. If, cursorily, we consider that sound is transient and immersive, that music catalyzes an ecstatic unity amongst its listeners, and that listening is receptivity, Heidegger's affinity for the sonic, as becoming, as unifying, as unbidden, seems rather appropriate: hearing is the sense that overcomes distance. It is this de-severance that is, as Halliburton contends, the essence of Heidegger's 'poetic thinking': The strain, and hence the pathos of Heidegger's poetic thinking, arises partly from the desire to evoke a sense of the unity of things that has been turned, by metaphysics, into a disunity and opposition; hence, by the measure of metaphysics, the resulting discourse must itself appear contradictory. (19) Listing more specifically the various facets of this project, Schurmann counts Heidegger's attentiveness to the aural among his integral aims: The same methodic retreat makes it necessary to dismiss the dualism of subject and object; to construe phenomenology as interpretation rather than reflection; to follow the arrival and withdrawal of things in the horizon of world instead of remaining riveted to entities constantly present; to sap the prestige of seeing over hearing; finally, to deconstruct the theories of the constitution of universals for consciousness. (69-70) In first tracing Heidegger's aurality and then extending his understanding of human listening into his own description of the art event, the hegemonies of metaphysics which have been named as the underpinning of an impoverished model of musical performance from the outset can be destructured and replaced with a more comprehensive, contextual, and differentiated account of the musical event. In every component of this analysis—in listening, communication, being-with others, and art as event—mood and attunement emerge 49 as the central themes o f inquiry and must therefore be comprehensively understood from the outset, i f a coherent synthesis o f his earlier and later thought is to be achieved in a f inal model o f performance. Primordial Being-in-the-World F r o m the outset o f Being and Time, He idegger provides recurr ing reminders as to the importance o f tak ing the pr imordia l , the elemental, the primary, as the hor i zon o f his examination. These 'modes o f being, ' formerly associated by N ie tzsche w i th D ionys ian rapture now become quite radical ly displaced amidst He idegger 's hermeneutics: access to the pr imordia l is no longer only possible through cataclysmic intoxicat ion, but is instead permeated throughout Dase in 's everyday being-in-the-world. There is a sense in wh i ch this theme o f pr imordia l i ty rests wi th in his greater ontologica l project in somewhat corol lary fashion. L i k e N ie tzsche 's D ionys ian 'ground o f existence,' the funct ion o f the pr imordia l in He idegger can l ikewise be characterized in terms o f its transparency, not in the sense o f clarity and expl ic it presence, but just the opposite: l ike a pane o f glass wh i ch makes visible the landscape outside, but must itself recede f rom view; it is crucial , perpetual ly operative, but invisible, and thus concealed f rom ready apprehension. He idegger is, however, more for thcoming in addressing the enigmatic nature o f his onto logica l project as it relates to his understanding o f phenomenologica l method. He idegger takes the brute possibi l i ty o f even posing the quest ion o f Be i ng to suggest that we are already operat ing w i th at least a provis ional sense about the proper hor i zon o f inquiry, a vague gl impse o f phenomenologica l procedure that w i l l maneuver from within, and thus i l luminate, Dase in "as it is proximally and for the most part—in its average everydayness" ( B T 37-8). Th rough a phenomenologica l investigation, He idegger seeks to "arr ive at those pr imordia l experiences in wh i ch we 50 achieved our first ways o f determining the nature o f Be i ng—the ways wh i ch have guided us ever since" ( B T 44). He idegger 's project then, in terms o f pr imordial i ty, is thus to examine this pr imary and perpetual mode o f interpretation to uncover its structure in its funct ioning 'transparency.' Convey ing this k ind o f elemental, accessible understanding, He idegger ' s comments on Dase in and temporal i ty in D iv i s i on T w o o f Being and Time are perhaps i l lustrative o f such a pr imord ia l focus. A s Heidegger wishes to re-institute Dase in 's c ircadian reference to time, "the ' then' w i th wh i ch Dase in concerns itself gets dated in terms o f something wh i ch is connected w i th gett ing bright, and wh i ch is connected w i th it in the closest k ind o f environmental invo lvement—namely, the r is ing o f the sun" ( B T 414). A s John Sall is puts it in his book, Echoes: After Heidegger: [S]uch a dating is distinctively public: it introduces a publicly available measure, the sun, a "natural clock," which then motivates the production of clocks in the usual sense. It is thus that Dasein's reckoning with time is, first of all, neither environmental nor mathematical but rather astronomical, solar, taking its measure from the sky. (68) True, any precise sense o f the pr imordia l still remains (and w i l l perhaps always remain) rather apocryphal, but f rom this example we can see that He idegger 's focus does indeed i l luminate those normal ly 'transparent' foundations o f our everyday interpretations such that they at least take on a k ind o f translucent presence: quietly and constantly, the k ind o f light that shines at each moment situates us wi th in a certain space in the trajectory o f our day. The task for a pr imordia l understanding o f sound is then to employ He idegger 's phenomenologica l method, w i th its vague yet expansive hor izon o f pr imordial i ty, in order to regain our more elemental aff i l iation w i th the sonic, one since concealed by the pervasive scientism o f the contemporary 'wor ld-picture. ' A s Nietzsche expresses the D ionys ian in terms o f music, this pr imordia l i ty indeed becomes available through He idegger ' s aurality: 51 It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening [Horchen] becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perceptions of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. (BT 207) Heidegger 's acoustic pr imordial i ty, l ike N ietzsche 's D ionys ian, is permeated w i th a language o f access and immediacy, but it is also something that is at once myster iously concealed through its concomitant mis t rust—i t has been, in a sense, repressed. However , the sheer scope o f He idegger 's pr imordial i ty flattens and extends that o f Nietzsche. It is in this foundat ion o f Dase in 's pr imordia l hearing that He idegger 's acoustic hor izon caps N ietzsche 's peaks o f musical ecstasis. Rare ly in an appropriately 'art i f ic ial and compl icated frame o f mind to hear a pure noise,' Dase in 's sonic possession, its attunement w i th a meaningful wo r l d o f sound, is all but perpetual, and thus, in its o w n ecstatic l ibration, bisects the baseline pur i ty o f N ie tzsche 's non-ecstatic wo r l d o f culture and the escalating rapture o f his ecstatic wo r l d o f nature—phenomenolog ica l l istening becomes our point o f access to a much broader understanding o f the pr imordia l (BT 207). Desp i te Der r ida ' s crit ique o f Heidegger 's phonocentr ism in his Of Grammatology, a temporary re-order ing o f the senses in wh ich a phenomenological ly-based hearing plays a pr imary role w i l l a l low us to re-visit and re-interpret the D ionys ian in a contemporary context. The Place of Sound and Mood in Being and Time In order to fo l l ow his aurality properly, to understand all the var ious extensions that He idegger 's account o f human listening can provide for a more differentiated understanding o f musical performance, it is first necessary to have a sense o f his general a im in Being and Time, as he seeks to lay bare the structure o f Dase in as ' thrown project ion, ' as the being that finds itself already in a wor l d that demands it continual ly interpret i tsel f and its wo r l d 'as' something (BT 185). 52 The crux o f He idegger 's project in his magnum opus o f 1926, Being and Time, is to destabil ize the var ious d ichotomies—mind/body, subject/object, nature/culture, theory/practice, etc.—assoc iated w i th our Cartesian wor ld-v iew, a framework so deeply ingrained that it now enjoys all the natural immediacy o f common sense. He idegger crit ic izes the history o f Western metaphysics w i th its inquiry only into, as he puts it, the 'Be ing o f beings' and urges us to re-discover, to again think about, the forgotten quest ion o f ' Be i ng ' itself. A t the outset He idegger asserts that, in order to challenge this metaphysics, he wishes to raise a different question, the question o f a proper onto logy wh i ch w i l l be performed from out o f a different methodologica l approach. Heidegger rejects the methods o f traditional ontology wh i ch have been used to study only the Be i ng o f be ings—as bracketed o f f from the everyday—in order to yie ld some indubitable foundat ion for human knowledge. Instead, Heidegger turns toward a methodology that w i l l focus on our being- involved wi th, and our comportment towards, objects and entities in the everyday wo r l d as they show themselves in the context o f such encounter ing—for Heidegger, this is phenomenology. Rather than focus on the objects themselves, posit ing them (as Descartes does) as distinct, separate, space-time locations, He idegger wishes to make the very context, the relationships between, the being-involved wi th, his subject o f inquiry. He idegger believes that, pr ior to theory and theoriz ing, the wo r l d is intell igible upon a complex background o f shared practices, our 'being-in-the-world, ' and cannot be sufficiently understood wi th in these Cartesian dichotomies. H i s examination from wi th in these practices shows that, a lthough it is possible to engage w i th objects from a distanced perspective o f pure beholding, that is, to study the Be i ng o f beings, this is actually a derivative mode o f encountering that only seems l ike the most immediate and natural way o f apprehending 53 because Being has been so systematically misinterpreted as something static, as constant presence-at-hand. More common during one's day is to be involved in shared practices, to cope, to comport oneself towards objects and other human beings without any strong evidence that supports a constant theorizing about one's activity; in terms of objects, things do not show up with the estranged purity of a 'mere' object-thing, but rather, first and for the most part as the familiar and ready-to-hand. As Dasein, we are always interpreting the world, always taking "something as something" and thus, in terms of our sonic interpretations, are not generally in the "very artificial and complicated frame of mind to hear a 'pure noise'" but instead hear the sound of the ready-to-hand: we hear the "motorcycle as a motorcycle" (BT 189, 206,7). Heidegger describes this immediacy in "The Origin of the Work of Art": "Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves" (152). To use Ihde's terms, Heidegger attempts to retract sound from the 'realm of mute objects,' and once again let it speak as a worldly phenomenon. As described from the outset of this discussion, our seemingly innocuous interpretations of sound and music as things present-at-hand has been shown to have profound effect on the social relations of musical performance— understanding this immediacy of sound and music as ready-to-hand will contribute significantly to the overcoming of the metaphysical distance responsible for the contemporary picture of performance thus ingrained. For Heidegger, this kind of everyday encountering is as radically historical as - Dasein's own existentiell understanding of itself at any particular moment: transient, as the present arises out of a particular past in terms of some possible future. As a historicized and historicizing entity which interprets, Dasein discloses its world not in a mode of detached, theoretical reflection but from within the scope of its ever-present moods, those states that 54 allow the wo r l d to show up 'as something' at all. A s Hubert L. Drey fus puts it in his book, Being-in-the-World, as this entity wh i ch is attuned moodwise to its wor ld , Dase in always encounters things " in some specif ic way, as attractive, threatening, interesting, bor ing, frustrating, etc." (175). Indeed, it is through the anarchic uncertainty o f these moods that the ready-to-hand, and thus the sounds of those famil iar entities, w i l l show up as mattering: Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself [sich schon angewiesen] to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance.... It is precisely when we see the 'world' unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. (BT 177) Heidegger is prepared to declare this pre-cognit ive immediacy o f mood more primary, more acute, and more thorough than the subsequent rational theor iz ing general ly pr iv i leged as the process o f true understanding: "[T]he possibil it ies o f disclosure wh i ch be long to cognit ion reach far too short a way compared w i th the pr imordia l disclosure be longing to moods, in wh ich Dase in is brought before its Be i ng as ' there ' " ( B T 173). Th is dist inct ion between the phenomenological pr ior i ty o f mood and the derivative qual ity o f that k ind o f beholding wh i ch makes a concerted effort to diminish its role in interpretat ion—to isolate sound and music from their c on tex t—w i l l prove key in executing our crit ique o f acoustics and aesthetics alike. He idegger 's hermeneutics, moreover, can also help us articulate, in a much more pro found manner, the posit ions o f those crit ics who are clearly on the trai l o f a phenomenological understanding o f aural experience. Resonance: An Attunement to Context In asserting Dase in and wo r l d as a relationship o f attunement, He idegger sets himself apart f r om the phi losophical tradit ion which, in its interpretation o f being as constant presence, cou ld only portray the uncertainty and capriciousness o f m o o d as an obstacle to be 55 overcome, to be, as much as possible, cast aside so that an objective observer might observe an objective wor ld . But , for Heidegger, this objectivity o f either Dase in or wo r l d is an il lusion: moods (and Dase in 's thrownness into a wor l d that has been interpreted for it already) in form the nature o f our everyday interpretations to a much greater extent than we may be wi l l i ng to accept. Counter ing this underestimation o f mood, Drey fus contends that "far f r om being fleeting as the tradit ion has supposed, moods settle in l ike the weather and tend to perpetuate themselves. F o r example, when I am annoyed, new events, even those wh i ch when I am joy fu l show up as chal lenging or amusing, show up as grounds for further annoyance" ( B i W 174). The pervasiveness and constancy o f these var ious moods make for a fundamental dif f iculty in discerning, w i th absolute precision, their respective natures and the manner in wh i ch they influence, or perhaps, constitute, our interpretations, but " in every case Dase in always has some m o o d " ( B T 173). L i k e Cartesian accounts o f objects as things present-at-hand, analogous theories o f sound— in psychoacoust ics and music theory a l i k e — seeking to forge an inextricable l ink between specif ic sounds and specif ic affects ignore this phenomenologica l (and thus equivocal) ground o f interpretation that is almost always at play. In fact, it is this k ind o f mechanistic theory o f correspondence [Ubereinstimmung] that He idegger seeks to undermine through a discussion o f the interrelationship o f vo ice [Einstimme] and mood [Stimmung] as a 'felt sense' or attunement [Bejindlichkeii]. In his book, Poetics of Resistance, M i chae l R o t h quotes a key passage from He idegger ' s essay, "What is Ph i losophy?" , in wh i ch he insists, somewhat paradoxical ly, that the precision o f correspondence is founded on attunement: Philosophia is the expressly accomplished correspondence which speaks insofar as it considers the appeal of the Being of being. The correspondence listens to the voice of the appeal. What appeals to us as the voice [Stimme] of Being evokes our correspondence... Being as such determines speaking in such a way that language is attuned (accorder) to the Being of being. Correspondence is necessary and... always attuned \gestimmtes], and not just 56 accidentally and occasionally. It is an attunement [Gestimmtheif]. And only on the basis of the attunement (disposition) does the language of correspondence obtain its precision, its tuning [Be-stimmtheit]. As something tuned and attuned [ge-stimmtes und be-stimmtes), correspondence really exists in a tuning [Stimmung]. (131) A t once eschewing the rigidity o f conventional notions o f correspondence and yet still retaining an adequate connectedness, it is He idegger 's appeal to our acoust ic sensibilities o f attunement that immediately enriches our sense o f correspondence as a relat ion that we free according to the contingencies o f interpretation. A s the etymologies o f the words associated w i th 'attunement' suggest, it is through mood [Stimmung] that this resonance is felt. He idegger 's acoustic wor ld , then, is one that is composed out o f many different voices that converge w i th and resonate w i th many different m o o d s — n o t correspondence between wo rd and thing, but a contingent and ephemeral event as a coming-into resonance w i th a vo i ced mood, as a relat ion w i th a context. Indeed, it is because our hearing so acutely places us ' somewhere '—phys i ca l l y and existent ia l ly—that He idegger exploits a number o f tel l ing etymologies in the German wh i ch elicit this essential l ink between hearing and situatedness. La te r in his career, in " Logos , " He idegger offers the reader the str ikingly close connect ion between the verb, hbren (to listen) and the verb gehdren (to belong). In Being and Time, however, he chooses to exploit the express musical i ty and aurality in the 'Stimm- root (referring to vo ic ing, tuning) o f Stimmung (now mood, but or ig inal ly referring to the tuning o f a musical instrument) together w i th the 'befind root (referring to place, situatedness) in order to convey the essential not ion that it is as mood that Dase in is attuned to itself in its context: An entity of the character of Dasein is its "there" in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself [sich befindet] in its thrownness. In an attunement [Befindlichkeit] Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has [gestimmtes Sichbefinden]. (174) 57 (Here, and hereafter, Macquar r ie and Rob inson 's per iodic translation o f Stimmung and Befindlichkeit as 'state-of-mind' shall instead be rendered as 'mood ' or 'attunement' in order to preserve the musica l overtones in the German.) In his book, The Role of Mood in Heidegger's Ontology, B r u ce W. Ba l l a rd is able to gather precisely the essential aspects o f mood as this contextual izat ion: In Heidegger's own use of the 'Stimm-' stem, the musical meaning is undoubtedly primary. The most important point to be gathered from this usage is that attunement is always being tuned to. Attunement is only possible as a relation within a context. As a basic state of Dasein then, it expresses an essential contextualization, Being-tfiere. The musical tuning metaphor also brings out the pre-cognitive, pre-intellectual nature of mood. (28) W i t h mood as the nexus o f his not ion o f interpretation, He idegger formulates a situated understanding o f everyday acoustic experience that can be extended into an equally contextual understanding o f musical performance. N o t only central to interpretation generally, but a l so—as intimated in the etymologica l history o f the Ge rman Stimmung as the tuning o f a musica l i n s t rument—of paramount importance to a discussion o f acoustic experience, mood plays a major role in those components o f He idegger ' s thought that w i l l prove most useful for our discussion: l istening, communicat ion, musica l l istening, and being-w i th others ( B T 172 f.3). Indeed, mood is the language o f our attunement as being-in-the-wor ld , our most elemental and pr imordia l means o f disclosure. Understanding its importance in Dase in 's being-in-the wor ld , aurality is thus the central concern o f He idegger ' s analysis o f communicat ion as shared attunement (MitBefindlichkeif) in Being and Time. H i s assertion o f communicat ion as this social ly available, shared understanding suggests a mode l that can be later appl ied in formulat ing the operations o f a collective attunement during musical performance. 58 Listening as Openness, Communication as Shared Attunement Heidegger 's not ion o f communicat ion functions much differently than contemporary models espoused by phi losophers camped on either side o f the internalism/externalism debate, whose models rely on the subject/object dist inct ion and the not ion that 'word-things' are used to express intentional states between such subjects. He idegger expl ic i t ly challenges this c ommon explanation, contending that "communicat ion is never anything l ike a conveying o f experiences, such as opinions or wishes, f r om the interior o f one subject into the interior o f another" ( B T 205). Instead o f focusing on the beliefs, desires, and intentional states o f individuals as expressing a strict correspondence between w o r d and thing, He idegger understands the possibi l i ty o f communicat ion as grounded in its publ ic life as discourse: "The existential foundation of language is discourse or talk" ( B T 203). A n d although the discursive communicat ion Heidegger describes is certainly the most common, everyday k ind o f occurrence, its ontologico-existential structure includes the r ich complexi ty o f any oral discourse: the musical i ty o f speech, being-with others, mood , hearing, and silence. Whi le , as He idegger states, "Language can be broken up into word-Th ings wh i ch are present-at-hand," this does not offer, as he w i l l later put it in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, an adequate understanding o f its wor ld ly operat ion ( B T 204; my gloss): Language is not identical with the sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary; instead, because language, so far as it is, is as the Dasein is, because it exists, it is historical. (208) Heidegger continual ly resists the k ind o f stability these abstractions wou l d offer, and instead always stresses the ephemerality and contingency o f language's wor ld l y ex istence—indeed, it is the aspects and operations o f these situated voic ings that He idegger attempts to account for in his analysis o f discourse. Ong, in his examination o f oral communicat ion, is equally as 59 adamant to resist the r igidity o f l inguist ic meaning, and his crit ique offers a provis ional sense o f how this wor ld l iness is, in part, constituted: The oral mind is uninterested in definitions. Words acquire their meanings only from their always insistent actual habitat, which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other words, but includes also gestures, vocal inflections, facial expressions, and the entire human, existential setting in which the real, spoken word also occurs. (47) Whi le the physical ity o f gestures and facial expressions w i l l most certainly be an important component in examining audience relations later as we examine Foucault , Ong ' s int imation o f the musical i ty o f speech or 'voca l inf lect ions' opens up the possibi l i ty to first analyze how this musical component wo rks to appropriate what is, for Heidegger, the essential aspect o f discourse, namely, mood. Assert ing the expl ic it musical i ty o f these 'voca l inf lections,' Truax declares that [p]eople usually refer to this aspect of spoken language by such terms as "voice quality"; or "tone of voice," or simply "it's not what you say, but how you say it."... Sometimes it is called the "musical" aspect of speech, because it involves inflection (pitch contours), rhythm, phrasing, emphasis (or accent), punctuation, timbre (or sound quality), silence (rests), and even cadences—exactiy those variables which are used to describe a single voice melody. (33) A slightly different formulat ion o f the vernacular mantra Truax describes above (' it 's not what y ou say. . . ' ) , He idegger is expl ic it to declare these aspects o f speech, its musical aspects, to be the ' indicator ' o f mood in everyday discourse as we l l as the essential domain o f ' poe t i c a l ' c ommun i ca t i on : Being-in and its attunement [des befindlichen] are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of the talk, 'the way of speaking.' In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's mood [Befindlichkeit] can become an aim in itself. (BT 205) Despite the possible Cartesian overtones in this arc o f 'poet ical discourse, ' that is, in the suggestion o f intentional content in his remarks about the ' communicat ion. . . o f one's mood , ' He idegger is generally quite vigi lant to portray mood not as something first held by one and then conveyed to another, but rather as something reciprocal ly appropriated out o f the 60 hermeneutic o f being-in-the-world as being-with. Indeed, the first g l impse o f the true radical ity in He idegger 's analysis is his avowal that all these contingencies o f oral discourse themselves take place wi th in and also articulate a pre-existing 'shared attunement' (Mitbefindlichkeii) as being-with: Through [discourse] a shared attunement [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared,' and so does the understanding of Being-with... In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. (BT 205) Whereas common models o f l inguistic communicat ion posit understanding as the result o f some assertion, He idegger recurrently stresses that understanding is something that is shared and shared already, declaring that "on ly i f there is some co-understanding beforehand o f what is said-in-the-talk... is there a possibi l i ty o f estimating whether the way in wh i ch it is said is appropriate to what the discourse is about thematical ly" ( B T 207). Drey fus rightly names this sense o f shared understanding as the key value in He idegger 's sense o f l inguistic operation: Heidegger's important insight is that everyday communication cannot be understood on this Cartesian model of messages sent from one isolated mind to another. Heidegger would point out that such an account treats language as a context-free code. It leaves out the essential fact that linguistic communication is possible only on the background of a shared world. Q3IW 221) However , as provis ional ly indicated in Heidegger 's not ion o f attunement and his descript ion o f discourse as a foundation, this shared situatedness entails something even more radical: l inguistic communicat ion is grounded upon an understanding that is yet more pr imordia l , as "voca l utterance... is not essential for discourse" ( B T 316). Indeed, Ha l l ibur ton keenly observes both the depth and breadth o f He idegger 's analysis to include not only wow-linguistic forms o f communicat ion but to stress that it is in fact the pre-exist ing nature o f understanding in being-with, as that shared attunement wh i ch already is, that a l lows for linguistic utterance to exist as one o f the possible forms o f discourse: 61 In discourse the act of utterance is not decisive: if I am dealing with you in a social situation, language as discourse transpires as long as I understand you, whether or not either of us speaks aloud, and I can perfectiy well "hear what you are saying" in the sense of understanding what you "really" mean, even if you remain silent. (10) Ant ic ipat ing his later descript ion o f Dase in as essentially de-severant, as the entity wh i ch is disposed to br ing things close, He idegger appropriately turns his discussion towards "an existential possibi l i ty wh i ch belongs to ta lk ing i t se l f—hear ing" to explain this being-attuned to others ( B T 206): Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 03T 206) Later in his career, He idegger goes on to say expl ic it ly what is only impl ied in this passage: this characteristic reversal in wh i ch 'acoust ic percept ion' is 'based on hear ing' really casts hearing in relat ion to belonging. E cho i ng his earlier formulat ions from Being and Time in wh i ch he describes the pr imordia l i ty o f proper hearing as hearkening in " L ogo s , " He idegger again casts sound in this everyday famil iarity as he moves towards the revealing etymological l ink between 'hear ing' and 'be longing' ( B T 207): We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e. our bodies are equipped with ears because we hear. Mortals hear the thunder of the heavens, the rusding of the woods, the gurgling of fountains, the ringing of plucked strings, the rumbling of motors, the noises of the city—only and only so far as they always already in some way belong to them and yet do not belong to them. We are all ears when our gathering devotes itself entirely to hearkening, the ears and the mere invasion of sounds being completely forgotten. So long as we only listen to the sound of a word, as the expression of a speaker, we are not yet even listening at all. Thus, in this way we never succeed in having genuinely heard anything at all. But when does hearing succeed? We have heard [gehort] when we belong to [gehdren] the matter addressed. (65-6) Indeed, sounds speak o f the activity o f others, o f events that are tak ing place that, even in their seeming remoteness, still in some ambiguous way include us, impl icate us as part o f them. Descr ib ing Hen ry Dav i d Thoreau's account o f sound in Walden, Sall is suggests in his 62 Echoes that this acoustic inclusiveness becomes most apparent dur ing moments o f seeming distance f rom 'the wo r l d ' : In the chapter of Walden entitied "Sounds" he celebrates the undisturbed solitude and stillness of his summer reverie amidst the sounds of the woods. He tells, too, of the intrusive sound of the railroad... and he tells how even in his retreat this sound kept him linked to society. (4) It is only in these moments o f keen perspicuity and reflection, often in concert w i th somewhat extraneous circumstances, that sound even comes to be considered a key vo ice in our sense o f belonging. A n d perhaps nowhere is this role more str ikingly and tragical ly felt than in those whose wor lds have been so radical ly altered by a severe loss o f hearing. Descr ib ing one particular study o f the patients in the Deshon A r m y Hosp i ta l , in his essay, "The Sonic Env i ronment o f C i t ies ," M i chae l Southworth relays the overwhe lming sense o f loss and separation wh i ch fo l l owed as a result o f their deafness: Their life was a ceaseless pantomime in which it was difficult to maintain the feeling of being part of the world. Loss of sound had cut important links with life and they felt detached. The world seemed dead and had lost its forward motion; it was much less demanding and nervous. Al l of them felt a poignant loss of background sounds, especially of nature, which had been almost unnoticed before deafness. They experienced great anxiety in crowds or traffic because important auditory danger cues were absent. The psychological effects of sudden deafness were more severe than those suffered by persons who had suddenly become blind. Deep depression resulted, characterized by undefined feelings of loss, lack of alertness, sadness, loneliness, and paranoid tendencies. (51) A s He idegger attempts to convey in those passages from Being and Time and " Logos , " and as is apparent from the above account, sound is crucia l to how we come to sense our physical and existential placement wi th in the wor ld . It is only now that we can understand what Heidegger proc la ims at the outset o f his discussion: "D iscourse is existentially equipr imordial w i th attunement [Befindlichkeit] and understanding" ( B T 203). Indeed, through an examinat ion o f He idegger 's everyday aurality, we have gathered together all the most essential concepts for a more comprehensive model o f musical performance as a space o f social communicat ion; we have, in fact, laid the g roundwork to more ful ly understand the 63 complex operations o f the D ionys ian first offered by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. B y retaining He idegger ' s interrelated understanding o f mood, l istening, and shared attunement as we continue our phenomenologica l crit ique into the domain o f aesthetics, we w i l l be able to w o r k o u t — i n a much more detailed manner than N i e t z s che—the process o f audience consol idat ion he describes in his account o f the D ionys ian. From the Everyday to the Musical Much, from morning onward, Since we became a conversation and hear from one another, Have human beings undergone; but soon (we) will be song. (HbTderlin qtd. in Heidegger, WTL424) Inc luded by Heidegger in his later essay, "The W a y to Language," these lines from Fr iedr ich Ho lder l in ' s "Ce lebrat ion o f Peace" make an apt commentary not only on this particular essay, but also on the course o f Heidegger 's aurality as it develops over his career, as we l l as the trajectory o f our o w n project as we try to appropriate this acoustic sensibility for a better understanding o f musical performance: it begins in l istening and conversation, but sees on the hor i zon the promise o f song. Fo l l ow ing the l inguist ic focus o f the hermeneutic tradit ion, He idegger is committed to the idea that it is through the reveal ing openness and conceal ing resistance o f language that the wo r l d is a l lowed to show up for an historical people. A n d whi le he describes humanity's l inguist ic essence—inc lud ing his discussion o f the paramount importance o f names, words, talk, saying, and speech—in many different ways, one passage f rom "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " suffices to capture the space it occupies in his thought: "Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to wo rd and to appearance. On ly this naming nominates being to their Be i ng from out of their Be ing . Such saying is a project ing o f clearing, in wh i ch announcement is made o f what it is that beings come into the open as" (198). Or, as he puts it more poetical ly in his 64 notor iously obscure d ictum f rom "Let ter on Human i sm," "Language is the house o f Be ing . In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create w i th words are the guardians o f this home" (217). B u t even in this later essay, the fundamental structures o f au ra l i t y—o f sound and silence, hearing and l istening—re-emerge as he sets out on 'the way to language.' A f te r repeating his earlier mantra on the communicat ive power o f silence from Being and Time, that "[o]ne can speak, speak endlessly, and it may all say nothing. A s opposed to that, one can be silent, not speak at all, and in not speaking say a great deal ," He idegger proceeds w i th an understanding o f vo ice he has been reluctant to fo l l ow in the past, one that wou l d cast music as the r inging o f Ereignis ( W T L 408): The saying is the mode in which propriation speaks. Yet mode is meant here not so much in the sense of modus or "kind"; it is meant in the musical sense of the melos, the song that says by singing. For the saying that propriates brings what comes to presence out of its propriety to a kind of radiance; it lauds what comes to presence; that is, allows it in its essential unfolding. (WTL 424) A s voice, we move from speech to song, and in song, encounter an al ight ing that shines. Here too is where we w i l l make the shift to music, where we w i l l extend our explorations o f everyday l istening into musical performance. In many cases it w i l l be a series o f parallel shifts we w i l l make, in wh i ch we w i l l carry the knowledge and concepts from our previous investigations into further explorations o f musical performance. Sound is an ephemeral event, and so too is the musical one. Sound does not pr imari ly show itsel f as an object, and therefore neither does music. Sound gathers us in belongingly, and thus, so too does music. Sound matters most pr imordia l ly as mood, and thus, so too does music. D iscourse is not most pr imordial ly language but shared attunement, and thus, w i l l show itsel f to be part o f the social ity o f performance. However , the phenomenological perspective wh i ch suggests, in a provis ional sense, the manner in wh i ch aspects o f everyday l istening may contribute to an 65 understanding o f musica l l istening also directs our ear to the important ways in wh i ch these two types o f hearing can differ and even osci l late in their extremes. Sound and Source: Being-in the Music The most fundamental difference between the vo ice o f the everyday and the vo ice o f music was anticipated in He idegger 's passage on the 'radiance' o f 'the saying that says by singing': in visual terms, song is an alighting, a shining that i l luminates ' things' in a way that everyday sound does not. A s Ihde contends, in everyday l istening, "ordinar i ly, sounds are taken directionally. The hammering f rom next door is heard as from next door. The sparrow's song in the garden presents itself from the garden," but, in contrast, the most intense moments o f musical l istening are marked by a bl issful loss o f this point-source directionality and are replaced w i th a sense o f envelopment ( L V 76): In the overwhelming presence of music which fills space and penetrates my awareness, not only am I momentarily taken out of myself in what is often described as a loss of self-awareness which is akin to ecstatic states, but there is a distance from things. The purity of music in its ecstatic surrounding presence overwhelms my ordinary connection with things so that I do not even primarily hear the symphony as the sounds of the instruments.... This ecstasy is also the occasion for an illusory phenomenon, the temptation toward the notion of a pure or disembodied sound. In the penetrating totality of the musical synthesis it is easy to forget the sound as the sound of the orchestra and the music floats through experience. Part of its enchantment is in obliteration of things. A counter-variable illustrates this: a philosopher friend who now knows he is going deaf told me that he first noticed this ailment when he experienced loss of interest in music. He described the music as becoming "distant... objecdike... over there apart from me." It had begun to lose its surrounding, penetrating quality for him. (LV 77) These are the most definit ive moments o f musical l istening: when music takes on this immersive immediacy and becomes ful ly present, so massive that it ' i s ' seemingly wi thout source. T o be clear, the sounds o f hammering that come ' f rom next door ' and the sounds o f the symphony one attends are obvious ly not analogous in terms o f point-source spatiality or vo l ume—the compar ison is meant to il lustrate the degree to wh i ch everyday l istening and musical l istening can differ at their extremes. A s Ihde goes on to explain further, this 66 difference cannot be attributed exclusively to the nature o f the sounds themselves, but is compl icated signif icantly by the l istening attitude wi th in wh ich they are heard: [I]f I put myself in the "musical attitude" and listen to the [everyday] sounds as if it were music, I may suddenly find that its ordinary and strong sense of directionality, while not disappearing, recedes to such a degree that I can concentrate upon its surrounding presence. Contrarily, when listening to the orchestra and in the highest moments of musical ecstasy, I can (perversely, perhaps) by an act of will also raise the question of directionality; and while I continue to be immersed in the sound, there also emerges a strong sense of direction. (LV 76) Indeed, this variable attitude o f the listener plays a key role in determining the type o f directional ity and spatiality some particular music may have: one cou ld conceivably find more musical interest in the rhythms, exhalations, and percolat ions o f the dishwasher than in the annoying song that, as bothersome, is heard as coming from the radio. Bu t , however mercurial the circumstances o f its occurrence, this fact remains: to hear the musical at its most power fu l is to hear something quite different, or perhaps, to hear something quite differently, f r om the sounds o f the everyday. Simi lar examples wou l d bear out a comparable cont inuum between everyday speech and song where a similarly ambiguous d iv is ion exists in the centre, but is adequately clear at each extreme. However , to extrapolate upon Heidegger 's analysis o f communicat ion in expl ic it ly musical terms, this attuning power o f music, wh i ch is to say its power to attune as mood, might here and elsewhere be easily and erroneously attributed to the mus ic itself, and not understood in its rec iprocal resonance w i th its context. In fact, as we continue to examine the relationship between music, mood, and event in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " the stubborn resil ience o f the art-object is encountered at every step. The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon Based on a three-part lecture from 1936, in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " Heidegger embarks upon the general task N ietzsche first set out to accompl ish in The Birth of 67 Tragedy: to re-visit the Greeks and their art concepts in order to re-vital ize and re-interpret art and its forces for a contemporary wo r l d bound to the precepts o f aesthetics (now an aesthetics o f 'experience' to wh i ch N ietzsche had been an enthusiastic contr ibutor) (140). In fact, in an editor 's note to the essay, K r e l l contends that "[t]o some extent the who le o f the present essay may be v iewed as a response to the Nietzschean Der Wille zur Macht als Kunsf ( O W A 193). Indeed, He idegger 's main objective in this essay is to urge a re-evaluation o f our contemporary concept o f art as first determined by the rise o f aesthetics in the 18 t h century, that is, to challenge the not ion that art is something created by a self-contained, autonomous artist who wishes to express a feel ing or emot ion in the created work, and that this work , as such, (and this is the point to wh i ch K r e l l refers) exists in order to elicit sensual pleasure in the spectator. He idegger spends a considerable amount o f t ime discussing the essential misdirect ion o f this starting point, clear in his assertion that we shall never unravel the mystery o f art as long as this not ion o f its object-being is preserved. Ant ic ipated in our preparatory remarks on the historical product ion o f the sound object and its place in aesthetics, He idegger (as expected) contends here that it is a metaphysics o f constant presence wh i ch initiates and maintains the sovereignty over this theory o f art: "The way in wh ich aesthetics v iews the artwork f rom the outset is dominated by the tradit ional interpretation o f all be ings" ( O W A 164). Indeed, whi le departing from his earlier texts in some important ways, He idegger nonetheless makes explicit, though variant, gestures towards the 's ignposts ' o f his earlier thought. The general structuring o f the discussion, is, for example, one that unfolds in famil iar accordance w i th that o f Being and Time: a crit ique o f metaphysics through an examination o f how objects have come to show up for us at present, and how they were understood much differently by the Greeks. Fo l l ow ing his 68 methodology in that text, He idegger begins his essay by interrogating (and thus exposing) the metaphysical foundations o f our var ious 'thing-concepts' so that we may first "decide whether the w o r k is at bot tom something else and not a thing at a l l . . . . That is why it is necessary to k n o w about these thing-concepts, in order thereby to take heed o f their provenance and their boundless presumption, but also o f their semblance and self-evidence" ( O W A 164, 157). I f the general themes o f his analysis remain familiar, so too do the counter-examples he chooses to i l luminate the shortcomings o f tradit ional ontology. Desp i te the many discontinuities between this text and Being and Time, the themes o f sonic experience and mood remain a marginal but crucia l part o f his not ion o f interpretation, and serve as counter-examples in precisely the same ways, and for precisely the same ends. In fact, in his opening crit ique o f these thing-concepts, He idegger first returns immediately to the pre-cognit ive disclosure o f mood , and then to the de-severance o f hearing. Wh i l e al leging the violence done in thematiz ing "the thing as a bearer o f its characteristics," He idegger contrasts the limits o f (misinterpreted) reason w i th the pr imordia l perspicuity o f mood , and in so doing, implicates this acuteness as a relevant vo ice in the dialogue on art ( O W A 150): But in defining the essence of the thing, what is the use of a feeling, however certain, if thought alone has the right to speak here? Perhaps, however, what we call feeling or mood, here and in similar instances, is more reasonable—that is, more intelligendy perceptive— because more open to Being than all that reason which, having meanwhile become ratio, was misinterpreted as being rational. (OWA 151) A s his deprecation o f this metaphysical beholding continues into the account o f the "thing as nothing but the unity o f a manifo ld o f what is given in the senses," He idegger repeats, almost verbatim, his earlier formulat ions on hearing as hearkening in Being and Time ( O W A 151): We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistiing in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the 69 door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly. (OWA 151,2) H e finally closes his preamble on the inadequacy o f our thing-concepts by conc luding that the "dist inct ion o f matter and fo rm is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics" ( O W A 153). B u t in attempting to thematize the essence o f the artwork, to grasp, in this case, that wh i ch is "sonorous in a musica l compos i t ion," we discover that the paradigm o f aesthetics wh i ch prescribes interpreting the art object as this formed matter actually negates the very quality it seeks to uncover ( O W A 145): Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectification of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will. (OWA 172) Heidegger neglects to provide a musical analogue to his visual example o f the co lour that is represented in terms o f its wavelengths, but we might imagine that an analogy could be drawn between his example and the formal aspects o f a score, or the sonic frequencies wi th in a piece o f music. In Heidegger's Philosophy of Art, Jul ian Y o u n g r ightly observes that "[ f jor Heidegger, then, the ult imate ground o f the t r iumph o f the aesthetic v i ew o f art is the imperial ism o f reason, the tr iumph o f the v iew that science (in the broad, German sense), and science alone, has access to t ru th"—th i s is the thrust o f He idegger ' s deviations into the domin ion o f our var ious thing-concepts: to show that aesthetics is a metaphysics is a scientism (14). T o demonstrate, i f in the fo l l ow ing passage f rom Y o u n g ' s book in wh i ch he first introduces, quotes, and then comments on E r w i n Panofsky 's def init ion o f the aesthetic state, we replace the references to aesthetics w i th the equivalent term denot ing the wor lds o f 70 science or phi losophy, it becomes apparent that no disservice is done to a tradit ional understanding o f any o f these disciplines. In all these cases, truth is decontextual izat ion: What is the 'aesthetic state'? According to the tradition Heidegger holds to be dominant in the modern age, the hallmark of the proper reception of art is, in Kant's word, 'disinterestedness'. Here, for example, is the famous art historian, Erwin Panofsky: It is possible to experience every object, natural or man-made, aesthetically. We do this when we just look at it (or listen to it) without relating it, intellectually or emotionally, to anything outside itself. When a man looks at a tree from the point of view of a carpenter, he will associate it with various uses to which he might put the wood; and when he looks at it from the point of view of an ornithologist, he will associate it with the birds that might nest in it. When a man at a horse race watches the animal on which he has put his money, he will associate its performance with his desire that it may win. Only he who simply abandons himself to the object of his perception will experience it aesthetically. On an aesthetic approach such as this, the essential thing about aesthetic experience is decontextualization. We attend to the object of perception in and for itself, abstract, that is, from every relation it may have to our intellectual and practical interests. (9-10) Where He idegger often appears to execute his phi losophy f rom out o f a Zen- l ike quiescence, in contrast to Panofsky ' s prescr ipt ion for this pure, nearly transcendent objectivity, He idegger 's understanding o f Dase in in its fluctuating moods looks posit ively turbulent. Whi le He idegger 's analysis o f our var ious thing-concepts seems, at first, a wayward tangent, the substitutions performed in this passage again suggest that here, in the domain o f art, r ing the echoes o f his poignant crit ique in Being and Time: i f it is not first and foremost out o f disinterest that Dase in encounters a meaningful wo r l d but rather most pr imordia l ly and acutely out o f the 'as structure' o f mood, then the same perspect ival distance prescribed by the phi losopher in thematiz ing the object, and the scientist in thematiz ing nature, w i l l be the same distance that leads us away f rom our most immediate aff i l iat ion w i th the meaning o f art. A nd , just as He idegger endeavours to employ a language in Being and Time that wou l d proffer the possibi l i ty for overcoming this distance, so too does he re-interpret the decidedly visualist, distanced terms o f art apprec iat ion—viewing, spectating, seeing, l ook ing a t—in to a unif ied and uni fy ing term that closes this gap through the richness and polysemy o f its 71 connotations, a w o r d that elicits the essence o f the paradoxical ly resolute al lowance o f Gelassenheit. Encapsulat ing all o f this is the term 'preserving, ' a yie ld ing that entitles and shelters. A l though understanding the ful l import o f this term goes we l l beyond phenomenologica l encountering, one important aspect o f its negative definit ion was foreshadowed in his earlier comments on the stubborn wi thdrawal o f art under the specious dominion o f science: " M o s t o f all, knowledge in the manner o f preserving is far removed f rom that merely aestheticizing connoiseurship o f the wo r k ' s formal aspects, its qualities and charms" ( O W A 193). Fo l l ow ing Heidegger, John R. Covach notes in his article, "Destructur ing Cartesian Dua l i sm in Mus i c a l Analys is ," that the sensibil ity o f this latter methodology i s—as we have seen at every stage along the sound-music c o n t i n u u m — determined by the thoroughgoing guidance o f the isolated acoustic object: [M]usic theorists and analysts tend to assume that the musical work is an object, even if it is a richly faceted one. We have a tendency to "measure" works according to objective standards: on the most fundamental level we speak of intervals, rhythms, or timbres—all aspects of the physical make-up of sounds that can be measured empirically. Other aspects of music that are less physically tangible—aspects such as form, harmony, counterpoint, voice leading, and motive—are sometimes thought of as if they were physical properties that operate according to certain kinds of laws. (Covach) A l so appropriat ing He idegger in order to destabil ize this understanding, D o n Ihde and Thomas F. Slaughter assert the derivative nature o f these interpretations and argue, instead, for the phenomenologica l foundat ion o f musical experience in their article, "Studies in the Phenomenology o f Sound: L is ten ing": "I hear an octave," or, "that is a chord composed of A# and F," are examples of statements which may mistake a conceptual classification for direct description. "That is a loud noise," or, "That's screechy," are examples of the ordinary response prior to phenomenological reduction. (233) E v e n as the musical ly educated can, in precise and r igorous terms, explain the anatomy o f a 'screechy,' and perhaps therefore 'eerie,' or 'grat ing ' phrase, this 'wor l d l y ' interpretation o f 72 its character—-as eerie, as grat ing—remains the elemental ground o f meaningful musical experience, and is, from the very outset, the mot ive behind a technical d iscussion o f its constituent aspects. Cons idered in exactly this context o f a musical pr imordial i ty, an earlier quote f rom He idegger ' s discussion on the disclosure o f mood in Being and Time asserts that this trajectory o f meaning is impossible to reverse: "Pure beholding, even i f it were to penetrate to the innermost core o f the Be i ng o f something present-at-hand, could never discover anything like that which is threatening'1' ( B T 177; my gloss). It is only in its 'wor ld ly ' character that music initiates the most intense moments o f its appreciation: great pains must be undertaken to conceal that wh ich most immediately strikes us as 'threatening,' 'pensive,' or ' joyous ' in its sounding. These interpretations o f mus ic 's 'character, ' as Fr i th paraphrases the words o f F rank Sibley, are not adjectives feebly tagged on to 'true' musical understanding (shown as technical l iteracy), but rather, can be the mark o f an appreciat ion and 'understanding' unshared by those who cou ld offer a complete picture o f its theoretical properties: As Sibley suggests, someone could describe a piece of music perfectly accurately in technical terms while being quite unable to appreciate it; while someone quite unable to read music can perfectiy well convince us that they've "understood" a work: they make sense of our own experience of it through their figurative description. This is the job of the rock critic, for example. (PR 263) A l though Fr i th 's use o f the terms 'appreciate' and 'understand' is somewhat unclear, the thrust o f his argument must not be misconstrued as a deris ion o f the musical ly educated, and a valor izat ion o f the non-educated. T o be clear, the point o f suggesting the importance o f an elemental attunement to music is not to extend a naivist pr iv i leging o f musical i l l iteracy, but to suggest, rather, that most everyone, by virtue o f being social ized into a culture in wh ich music plays an important and variegated role, is capable o f 'understanding' music: we hum and hum along to our favourite songs, dance to that wh i ch moves us, feel the tension as the 73 allegro tr i l l o f strings accompanies some pivotal moment o f a f i lm, and refuse some particular music when it elicits something inappropriate for the situation at hand. This is He idegger 's pr imordia l i ty as it announces itself w i th in a musical context: this is musical hearkening, the 'hearing wh i ch understands.' A l though Fr i th 's argument is hampered by cl iched concepts, his blunt declaration o f our everyday musical ' knowledge ' demonstrates this hearkening: " [W]e may not be able to tell the difference between a major and a minor chord, but we do k n o w when a piece turns sad" ( P R 109). T o be clear, we may be more faithful to Fr i th 's intention i f we change the wo rd ' te l l ' (which cou ld be confused w i th 'sense') to the w o r d 'name' (which captures unequivocal ly the essence o f technical knowledge). W e must also be careful to stress that it is not the piece itself that is sad, but rather the mood-response it may evoke for some particular listener. Indeed, as hearkening, this musical l istening is also a resonance wi th in a specif ic context. A s He idegger w i l l make explicit in his analysis o f art as event, understanding musical performance requires an understanding, as comprehensive as possible, o f the context o f its presentation. B u t wrest ing free from the pul l o f this enduring musical object, the 'work , ' is a struggle that even those who c la im to have grasped the contingencies o f its product ion are often unable to w in . Exp l o r i ng these particular pitfalls encountered in the w o r k o f Chanan and Covach w i l l prevent us f rom making the same mistakes as we move our analysis further into He idegger 's discussion o f the art event. A l though the seeds o f a more radical understanding o f music are certainly present in their work , the periodical ly misdirected conclusions drawn by Chanan and Covach exemplify the i l lusory nature o f such victories. Chanan, for example, is unquestionably tuned in to the social ity o f music, and, on the whole, extends arguments cal l ing for its legit imacy and proper 74 understanding, but is nonetheless periodical ly lured back into a f ramework in wh i ch the musical w o r k stil l persists as the sole arbiter o f meaning: In neither case can meaning really be stabilized and foreclosed, because music, like the uttered word—as opposed the word in the dictionary—leads a socially charged life, which always tastes of the concrete circumstances. Every actor knows that the same words can be uttered in an infinite number of ways.... If this is the case with words, which have definite meanings, how much more so with music, where intonation is everything? (42) Though on the surface a crit ique o f the shortcomings o f posi t iv ism, Chanan's analysis is in fact only a vei led example o f precisely this l ine o f thinking: to argue that musica l meanings change accordingly w i th measurably different intonations is but to shift the threshold o f its appl icat ion further along the spectrum, away from the abstract value o f the sounds themselves and onto the infinite ways they are able to be sounded—in both cases, the total ity o f meanings, however boundless, is thought to be derived from some posi ted musical object. A truly radical stance against pos i t iv ism challenges that meanings can change not only according to the infinitesimal differences in the sounds themselves, but also ineluctably along w i th the extra-musical contingencies o f their presentation. A somewhat humourous anecdote from an uncommon opportunity to compare three consecutive concerts by the same musicians w i l l demonstrate the importance o f this point. Three separate shows played by Shellac dur ing the final weekend o f January, 2001 at The Kn i t t i ng Factory in L o s Angeles, Ca l i forn ia prov ided a rare and remarkable space o f compar ison for consider ing the importance o f the extra-musical contingencies o f musical performance. The overal l mood at each o f these shows was, from the very start o f these events, something quite distinct from the two others. Wh i l e the first show on Saturday evening held a certain air o f anticipation, and Sunday evening's performance, by contrast, was embroi led in one o f unmistakable bell igerence, it was the events o f Sunday morn ing 75 which exempl i f ied the way that the social moods o f a musical event are intimately bound up w i th its social possibil it ies. Th is unscheduled Sunday morn ing show 'began' at ten o ' c l ock in the morning. The occurrence that marked this beginning, however, was not the sounding o f the band's first note, but was the assembly o f all the attendees into the lounge area o f the venue to await the delivery o f breakfast: 40-dozen K r i s py K r eme brand donuts furnished at the band's expense. The news—and the eventual de l i v e r y—o f the donuts init ial ly el icited amongst the concert-goers a sense o f that same uneasy gratitude one feels towards the person who has just extended one a k ind favour, but w i th w h o m one is not very wel l -acquainted—there was, at first, a general hesitancy, even a sense o f disbel ief and mistrust, that made people resist opening the boxes to take one o f the donuts. They ate their first l ike it was stolen. When the humour o f it all over took these sheepish feelings, it turned out to be a wonder fu l l y—and apparently necessary—disarming gesture. So d id arranging for the comedian who, posing as an actual priest, d id some off-colour jokes and call-and-response set-ups w i th the audience before the band came out on stage. The band cont inued the comedy w i th the real-life tales of, first, the mix-up in ordering and p ick ing up the donuts, and then in exchanging w i th the audience stories o f former donut-and-coffee binges. This communicat ion between band and audience in these moments was unusual ly friendly, quite unl ike that o f the previous night. In fact, most everything about the event was unusual: the time o f day, the free donuts, the comedian, the lack o f intoxicated audience members, the lack o f an abundance o f audience members, the lack o f audience chatter when the band wasn' t playing, the lack o f canned music to fill periods o f 'wai t ing, ' the lack o f an opening band, and most generally, the fact that, at eleven 76 o' c lock on a Sunday morning, we were all about to subject ourselves to the music o f one o f the most decisive and punishing syncopated rock bands out t h e r e—a giant, i ronic smirk hung over the who le affair. The experiment, however, turned out to be an absolute success: the buoyant atmosphere sensed at the start o f the show was carr ied throughout the entire performance. The difference between these events cou ld never be accounted for in purely musical terms. A n d yet, despite our reading o f Heidegger wh i ch has led us to explore the extra-musical contingencies musical performance, Covach ' s (provis ional ly) He idegger ian pursuit o f a 'wor ld ly ' understanding o f music periodical ly veers back into the domain o f the purely musical. H e is certainly keen to understand the crux o f He idegger ' s argument and its potential appl icat ion for a better understanding o f music: Covach recognizes that a Cartesian metaphysics has, in its hegemonic primacy, obstructed a more elemental, pr imordia l understanding through wh i ch we are first and most authentically invo lved w i th our wor ld , and thus, f r om wh i ch any theoretical understanding o f music has thus derived. However , although he thus claims to challenge this perspective and argue for a more situated, contextual understanding o f musical experience, the components in his network stil l remain musical works , wh ich, albeit n ow interlace more enigmatical ly as they f o rm the structure o f various "musica l wor lds , " nonetheless, stil l sit in isolat ion f r om the contingencies o f their presentation. The scope o f his crit ique still encloses only a dualistic ant inomy o f wo r k and event: "The musica l wo r l d o f a piece is a number o f other wo r k s that f o rm a k ind o f backg round—a body o f other pieces that create a purely musical context for some particular p iece" (Covach; my gloss). 77 In his article, "The Ideal F ou r M inu tes and Thirty-Three Seconds: Response to Covach , " R i cha rd Cochrane recognizes this shortcoming and, tak ing Covach ' s not ion o f a 'musical wo r l d , ' appropriately broadens its scope to reflect He idegger ' s o w n radical ly historical understanding o f art not as static, enduring object, but as a specific, contextual event. In reformulat ing Covach ' s not ion o f a musical wor ld , Cochrane shows immediately his grasp o f the issue by temporal iz ing such a wo r l d as a transient space: It is absolutely essential that this space is not considered to be a static space.... [And] we can see that it must be a mobile space, if only because Dasein is necessarily temporal, and so therefore is all musical experience.... [A musical world] is certainly constituted from musical experiences (what else could constitute it?), yet it does not contain works of music. It is, rather, a space created by experiences of music, engagements with music as "equipment," as environment. Thus, it is an aesthetic space.... Thus the musical world, although still subjective, is nevertheless social and political. (Cochrane) Cochrane sees the radical understanding o f music that a Heidegger ian crit ique points towards, the descr ipt ion o f the histor ic ized event that He idegger w i l l later offer in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " : the definitive elements o f musical experience are musical moments, not musical works . Indeed, as "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " moves towards its finality, He idegger gradual ly abandons references to 'wo rk s ' as the locus o f this truth, recogniz ing that "however zealously we inquire into the wo r k ' s self-sufficiency, we shall still fai l to find its actual ity as long as we do not also agree to take the w o r k as something worked , effected. T o take it thus lies closest to us, for in the wo rd 'wo rk ' w e hear what is w o r k e d " (183). Indeed, as intimated throughout our discussion on the pervasiveness o f the musical object, our analysis is being propel led towards understanding musica l performance as a unique social space, bound to the context o f its occurrence. Hav i ng prepared He idegger 's hermeneutic understanding o f everyday listening, communicat ion, mood , and attunement, 78 returning to "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " Being and Time, and The Will to Power as Art, wi l l extend these themes into a portrait o f var ious audience relations in the musica l event. From Sound to Ereignis: Gathering and Sheltering In "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " He idegger contends that, in its greatest incarnation, encountering art (and thereby musical performance) is not so much a private experience w i th some art-object as it is a cultural-historical event (Ereignis), a happening o f truth as the ' founding leap' (Ur-sprung) wh i ch articulates a community. Ereignis is a common wo rd in German, where it means 'event,' 'occurrence, ' or ' incident ' but becomes, for the middle Heidegger, the term for the 'wor ld ly ' vo i c ing o f truth as gathering, a disclosure that un fo lds—and unfolds on l y—a l ong w i th preserving as Gelassenheit. A s event, and not object-thing, art has no local izable or ig in in the genius o f some creator, and no pure expression as the w o r k thus produced; rather, it occurs as entities normal ly secluded in everydayness are brought together in an open al lowance: The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creators. But it is the work that makes the creators possible in their essence, the work that by its own essence is in need of preservers. If art is the origin of the work, this means that art lets those who essentially belong together at work, the creator and the preserver, originate, each in his own essence. (OWA 196) P laced in the context o f musical performance, He idegger 's descr ipt ion o f the event as a 'belonging together' o f creators and preservers, and as grounding "being for and w i th one another" suggests a certain degree o f sociality, o f a communicat ion that t ransp i res—and here the not ion o f discourse as shared attunement first established in Being and Time makes itself heard—pr io r to, or somehow outside of, language ( O W A 193). It is precisely in terms o f this situated attunement that Schi i rmann explains the relationality o f Ereignis: In Heidegger's thinking there exists, for lack of a better term, a pervasive mutuality in which all aspects pertaining to artistic creation—artist, art work, audience, and art itself—occur in concert, each tuned to the other, so that the happening of art, the happening of truth through art, comes from the fourfold totality or it does not come at all. (45) 79 And , again echoing He idegger 's descr ipt ion o f discourse as shared attunement, Chanan too describes the musica l event precisely in terms o f an al inguist ic 'social d ia logue': Music is performance art. What does this mean apart from gate-money, deficits, impresarios, agents, copyrights, trades unions, the financial (and emotional) insecurity of rank-and-file musicians? It means the break, the rupture, the abyss between the world of these social agents and the space of music itself, where the form of interaction is embodied differently: through a language of sonic gesture that begins and ends beyond words. Music is a form of social communication; musical performance is a site of social intercourse, and a form of social dialogue. (23) A l though Chanan's comments suggest a congruency w i th He idegger 's mode l o f everyday communicat ion in Being and Time, he is also clear that the performative event, as such, is the space in wh i ch everydayness is seized upon differently, in wh i ch a different f o rm o f dialogue takes place. A n d whi le the social ity Chanan describes seems to propel the discussion towards a richer understanding o f performance as a space o f social discourse, his insinuation o f the cleanliness o f this rupture points towards some unsettl ing extensions. Indeed, in Chanan's descript ion o f what constitutes the rift between these two wor lds, that the social mechanisms wh i ch set up the event are severed f rom the event itself in its unfold ing, there exists the same conf l icted dual ity o f N ie tzsche 's model. Such accounts fail to recognize that the manner in wh i ch the event is framed f rom the outset plays a significant ro le in determining the possibil it ies o f the social relations that may occur with in it. F r o m the variant descriptions o f performance relations o f Woods t o ck '99 to G G A l l i n to The Need , it is apparent that the trajectory o f these events maintains a certain grounding in the social apparatus they arise f rom. Wh i l e He idegger 's account o f the art event also stresses a transformation of, even a transportation out of the everyday, in " Logos , " He idegger also explains that every gathering always takes place under the guidance o f the ' fore-gathering' [Vor-lese]: [G]athering is more than mere amassing. To gathering belongs a collecting which brings under shelter.... 80 It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to coordinate their work to the sheltering, and—gathered together with that end in view—first begin to gather. The gathering [die Lese] requires and demands this assembly. This original coordination governs their collective gathering. (61-2) Heidegger 's declaration in the first l ine o f this passage announces the issue: 'gathering is more than mere amassing.' Unde r Chanan's v iew, the specif ic social discourse o f each particular performance wou l d have to generate itself out o f such a physical amassing o f listeners. Chanan's comments, however, broach once again the key issue o f audience presence, specifically, the quest ion o f the col lect ive relations that N ie tzsche addressed only provis ional ly in terms o f the D ionys ian throng. T o return to the soundcheck/performance case at the opening o f the discussion, hinging the contrast on the physical presence o f others certainly makes intuit ive sense: the difference between these two musica l 'presentations,' obviously, lies in the number o f people there to observe them. Indeed, the physical presence o f these other listeners seems, at first, to be the variable on wh i ch this cont ingency rests, but reducing other audience members to a set o f bodies, a regiment o f space-fil lers, offers a crude and cr ippled understanding o f what is a more equivocal co-preservat ion o f the event. True, a complex interplay o f our senses—visual , acoustic, olfactory, and to vary ing or even non-existent degrees, tacti le and s a vo r y—wo rk in largely unconsc ious operat ion to ascertain the presence o f other listeners dur ing a performance. However , pr ior to the increase in visual stimuli, the rise in c rowd noise, the change in humidity, temperature, smell, and the expanded opportunity o f touch ushered in by bolstering the size o f the audience, encapsulating all o f these are the demarcat ion o f the performance as a performance and the concomitant phenomenological ground o f being-with other listeners at that performance. B y establishing the phenomenologica l pr ior i ty o f being-with others at a musical performance, we can 81 i l luminate, in a more precise way, the scope o f this contingency to inc lude the myr iad possibil it ies o f audience relations wh i ch surface f rom this elemental ground. In his discussion o f Dase in and its spatiality in Being and Time, He idegger wo rks to show that, in their everydayness, other Dase in are not pr imari ly interpreted in their brute physical occurrence, but rather in terms o f their contextual, existential being-in-the-world. He idegger seems entirely just i f ied in often reiterating his own caveat against such interpretations: Theoretically concocted 'explanations' of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too easily; but over against such explanations we must hold fast to the phenomenal facts of the case... namely, that others are encountered environmentally. (BT 155) A n d yet, unl ike objects tha t—accord ing to Dase in 's particular mode o f concern—osc i l la te between showing up as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand entities, He idegger contends that being-with other Dase in cannot be proper ly understood wi th in either o f these two ordinary categories. Indeed, encountering other Dase in—though as radical ly contextual as Dase in 's involvement w i th other entit ies—nonetheless remains distinct from other types o f involvement in its being manifest from out o f a selfsame existential locat ion: Thus Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite different from equipment and Things, but which also—in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves—are 'in' the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are 'in' it by way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it. (BT 154) A s He idegger contends in his i l lustration o f such existential priority, in meeting a co-worker "we meet them 'at work , ' that is, pr imari ly in their Be ing- in-the-wor ld," and l ikewise i f we see someone "just standing around," we interpret this not entirely indifferently, but in terms o f "an existential mode o f B e i n g " — i n short, "the other is encountered in his Dase in-wi th in the w o r l d " ( B T 156). Thus, in Heidegger ian terms, those other members in the audience are 82 encountered as other Dasein in that context, as there along with us, also participating in the preservation of that particular performance in its being set out in such and such a fashion (BT 156). Indeed, it is out of this shared existential ground, and not first and foremost from a common physical location, that various sorts of audience relations are able to emerge. Moments of Resonance: The Audience In and Out of Attunement Just as discourse transpires as the social being-with that understands a shared situation as mood, so too it is mood that is the attuning force of the audience at a musical performance. Indeed, attending a live musical performance is not only a listening-to, that is, a privative exchange between one's own mood and musical sound, but it is also a listening-with other participants, and in this manner becomes a nebulous and contingent space of communication with the moods of other listeners as much as an absorption in one's own. Comprised of a number of individual listeners who are—at any given moment during that performance—each a site of their own musical and personal contingencies of the past and present, such relations will play themselves out amidst the moods of these individual audience members: boredom, consternation, contentment, or elation, a circulating energy of vastly different (even competing) moods both constitutes and transforms the possibilities of any particular musical event. As Heidegger declares, "we are never free of moods" and "when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood" (BT 175). As such, over the course of the performance, it is possible that each individual in the audience will undergo various unique mood changes of varying intensities. However, despite what may seem, at times, a precariously solipsistic account of individual mental states which we alone may determine and control, some of Heidegger's comments suggest that it is not so much that we have moods, but more accurately, that moods have us: " A mood assails us. It comes neither 83 from 'outside' nor from 'inside,' but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being" (BT 176). In The Will to Power as Art, Heidegger broadens and clarifies his earlier, provisional sketch of this equivocality to include a more distinctly public and even more corporeal mediation of our moods, suggesting that our environmental context always exerts a kind of magnetic pull on our moods, urging them towards a resonance with this public situation: We do not "have" a body; rather, we "are" bodily... But because feeling, as feeling oneself to be, always just as essentially has a feeling for beings as a whole, every bodily state involves some way in which the things around us and the people with us lay a claim on us or do not do so.... Mood is never merely a way of being determined in our inner being for ourselves. It is above all a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be attuned, in this or that way in mood. Mood is precisely the basic way in which we are outside ourselves. But that is the way we are essentially and constantiy. (99) This being-with other listeners grounded in its existential priority, our corporeal involvement in the audience now emerges not as the sole fulcrum of audience presence, but as the inextricable interface of this attunement—immersed within a crowd of other listeners, we are, in this dyad of body and mood, situated within a hermeneutic circle of affecting and being-affected by these other listeners, and as such, co-create the unfolding of the musical event itself. Most often during a musical performance—even as we are inevitably affected by the presence of other listeners—the trajectories of individual moods may not intersect in any significant manner, or may, in this intersection, express only a uniform boredom with the banality of the affair, but sometimes, albeit for brief, fleeting moments, the sense of a more powerful resonance amongst the crowd makes for a kind of audience cohesion. A mood of elation arising in the assembled crowd, we help carry, and are carried by, the momentum of this collective energy. Eliciting this sense of group unity, Dreyfus quotes Heidegger's comments on the thoroughly captivating power of social moods: A—as we say—well-disposed person brings a good mood to a group. In this case does he produce in himself a psychic experience, in order then to transfer it to the others, like the way 84 infectious germs wander from one organism to others?... Or another person is in a group that in its manner of being dampens and depresses everything; no one is outgoing. What do we learn from this? Moods are not accompanying phenomena; rather, they are the sort of thing that determines being-with-one-another in advance. It seems as if, so to speak, a mood is in each case already there, like an atmosphere, in which we are steeped and by which we are thoroughly determined. (BiW 171) Diffuse, enveloping, total iz ing: our own mood is seized upon and transformed through this part ic ipat ion in a group mood. However , He idegger 's comments here evoke not only the manner in wh i ch one partakes in an eruption o f a col lect ive ecstasy, but also points, more foundationally, to our earlier supposit ion as to the contingency o f the event's enjoinment as that specif ic event. In being demarcated as a particular type o f concert catering to a particular segment o f the populat ion, there is, set out ' in advance,' a certain m o o d to the performance which, as He idegger states in the passage above, wou l d determine and delimit the scope o f these relational possibil it ies, the sheltering o f the 'fore-gathering.' A s He idegger contends o f interpretation, "Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation w i l l be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-concept ion. A n interpretation is never a presupposit ionless apprehending o f something presented to us " ( B T 192). A self-containing volat i l i ty, mood is at once the anarchic and unpredictable force o f l iberation, and the constraining and coercive boundary o f such possibil it ies. In its greatest intensity, the col lect ive mood o f elat ion dur ing a musical performance is thus l ikewise both the expression, and the founding art iculat ion of, what is in many ways a pre-exist ing commun i ty—indeed, it is the site and manner o f its gathering. A f te r all, what is communi ty i f not a concept o f affect? Be long ing-to is not a matter o f shared physicality, but rather a shared social mood. A l though stil l of fer ing only a provis ional mention o f communi ty in Being and Time, Heidegger states clearly, at many different points, that authentic being-with cannot be predicated on physical prox imity alone: 85 Pasein's] historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for its destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. (BT 436) A s Schi i rmann notes, however, He idegger 's sense o f communi ty and the events in wh i ch they become articulated becomes stronger after the Kehre; In the writings after Being and Time, the concept of being-there (Dasein) signifies less and less the individual and increasingly collectivities and peoples—for example, "the historical being of the Greeks." The term designates the situatedness of a Menschentum or a community. (155) Indeed, although this foundat ion o f bodi ly attunement in mood is who l l y absent f rom the discussion and he again resists using the term 'communi ty ' as such, in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " He idegger recognizes that art is the gathering force wh i ch erects a space for such an attunement. In "He idegger and Foucau l t on the Subject, Agency and Pract ices," Dreyfus draws out a loca l sense o f communion He idegger wants to set w i th in a more grandiose trajectory o f a people's destiny and 'histor ical existence' ( O W A 202): For everyday practices to give meaning to people's lives and unite them in a community something must collect the scattered practices of the group, unify them into coherent possibilities for action, and hold them up to the people. The people can then act and relate themselves to each other in terms of this exemplar. And the object that performs this function best Heidegger calls a work of art. (HFSAP) Or, in He idegger 's o w n words: The origin of the work of art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people's historical existence—is art. This is so because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical. (OWA 202) Stochastic and momentary, the vo ic ing o f this col lect ive Dase in articulates " a being such as never was before and w i l l never come to be again" ( O W A 187). A s Sch i i rmann reminds us, to "retr ieve it historical ly is to recover the event o f presencing only mediately.... That is why we w i l l never k n o w what the Incan monuments and jewels truly meant for their users" (158). However , despite the thoroughgoing historical ity o f the event, it also initiates a gathering, a 86 space o f shared attunement tha t—even in all its radical micro-cont ingencies—nonetheless evanesces a long an arc that manages to contain it as an event. Heidegger on Nietzsche: Dionysus as Horizon Hav i ng outl ined both the portrait o f N ie tzsche 's D ionys ian in The Birth of Tragedy, and a Heidegger ian interpretation o f audience relations based on his account o f mood, l istening, and being-with, we are now prepared to understand the ful l scope o f their confrontat ion over the nature o f the Dionys ian. A s Y o u n g simultaneously declares their relation and their rift, "Translated into He idegger 's language, what N ie tzsche understood was that music possesses, in fact to a consummate degree, the power to be an Ereignis-exper ience"—the sub-text is, o f course, that He idegger resisted what N ie tzsche embraced so emphatical ly (170). Indeed, in The Will to Power as Art He idegger ' s cr it ic isms o f Nietzsche 's enthusiasm mainly conf i rm the suspic ion that He idegger is a l inguistic, at most, a poetic thinker, not a musical one. B u t investigating He idegger 's aural ity has, rather paradoxical ly, i l luminated the depth and essence o f N ietzsche 's endorsement o f music in its essential difference f rom the plastic arts: the musical event, l ike the ephemeral sounds around wh ich it revolves, gathers listeners belongingly into a space o f shared attunement. So intimately composed o f and sustained by evanescent sound, musica l performance thus unfolds in t ime much differently than does a painting, a sculpture, or, He idegger 's most conspicuous example, a Greek temple. In Musical Elaborations, E d w a r d Said reminds us that "one can reread a book, or revisit an exhibit ion: it makes no sense to 'revis i t ' a concert.... [CJoncert occasions are always located in a uniquely endowed site" (x ix). However , as Said wou l d no doubt be the first to agree, reading a book and vis i t ing an exhibit ion are just as much unique, transitory 'performances' as attending a concert: each o f these encounters 87 unfolds in some specif ic situation, and thus, can never be ' rev is i ted ' in the same way again. B u t his intention here is quite l ike ly to il lustrate the fact that the musica l event is composed o f a temporal i ty and evanescence that is yet more essential than the art encounter wh ich centers on a tangible, physical ly enduring 'object. ' N o n e o f this is to suggest that other art f o rms—and , in fact, even other kinds o f events—do not also become the founding articulation o f communit ies, only that music, being o f sound, wh i ch is evanescent, wh i ch does gather belongingly, wh i ch is immersive in its most exceptional moments, catalyzes an event that can become the extension o f all these attributes: unique, social ly communicat ive, moving. In fact, far from arguing that the musical event alone enjoys this funct ion, Y o u n g factit iously challenges the plural ity o f 'art ' that He idegger 's understanding o f Ereignis entails: "Is a concept o f art accord ing to wh i ch a Greek temple, a medieval altarpiece, a Palestr ina Mass , a footbal l match, a rock concert, and perhaps something not too unl ike a Nuremburg rally, might al l count as 'ar tworks, ' an artif icial cobbl ing together o f disparate things?" (18). F r i th too points to the similarity between the space o f music and other communal events before declaring that, coupled w i th its direct emotional intensity, it is music 's abstract malleabil ity that sets it apart from other events o f its k ind: The experience of pop music is an experience of placing: in responding to a song, we are drawn, haphazardly, into affective and emotional alliances with the performers and with the performers' other fans. Again, this also happens in other areas of popular culture. Sport, for example, is clearly a setting in which people directiy experience community, feel an immediate bond with other people, articulate a particular kind of collective pride.... But music is especially important to this process of placement because of something specific to musical experience, namely, its direct emotional intensity. Because of its qualities of abstractness (which 'serious' aestheticians have always stressed) music is an individualizing form. We absorb songs into our own lives and rhythms into our own bodies; they have a looseness of reference that makes them immediately accessible. (MS 139) Aga in , Fr i th 's last lines about the accessibil ity o f music echo N ie tzsche 's point in The Birth of Tragedy, but He idegger sees the space o f art and communi ty as more diffuse (as Y o u n g satirizes somewhat in the passage above). A n d yet, as broad as it may be, the unfo ld ing o f 88 this space also manages to sit in dist inct ion to the everyday. Indeed, despite He idegger 's relentless dismantl ing o f Cartesian epistemology, one duality He idegger seems wi l l ing to maintain is that between the wo r l d o f the everyday, and the wo r l d opened up, in event, by the wo r k o f art: even as his hermeneutics o f mood and l istening show how the everyday still grounds the unfo ld ing o f the musical event, there is preserved a recognit ion o f a certain and extraordinary shift that sets it apart f rom the comparat ive banality o f Dase in 's everyday coping. Though admittedly more strongly demarcated in N ie tzsche 's Apo l l in ian/Dionys ian dichotomy, it is in asserting this difference between the everyday and the art event that N ietzsche and He idegger come into a partial congruency—they share a similar understanding o f our typical, everyday relations w i th others and the role that art plays in transforming, even i f only temporari ly, the nature o f those relationships. In his characterist ical ly dramatic fashion, N ie tzsche points to the manner in wh i ch the encapsulating presence o f music catalyzes a feel ing o f communi ty amongst individuals whose relations in the social wo r l d are more typical ly marked by that o f alienation: Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or 'impudent convention' have fixed between man and man are broken. Now with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. (BoT 37) F o r Nietzsche, the col lect ive part ic ipat ion in the energy o f the performance forces a temporary rupture o f structural power in wh i ch human relations take place on what cou ld be described as a supra-pol it ical p lane—perhaps in being col lect ively si lenced, even somewhat physio logical ly manipulated by the total ity o f the event, everyday power-relat ions lack means o f exercise and are thus rendered ineffectual. The metaphor o f the freed slave elicits this level ing power o f the event. L ikewise , for Heidegger, Dasein, in its everydayness, remains ensnared wi th in what is only a facade o f togetherness, carr ied a long in the 89 anonymous idle chatter o f das Man in wh ich "under the mask o f '/or-one-another,' an 'agawsr-one-another ' is in p lay" ( B T 219; my gloss). He idegger reminds us that when Dase in "gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putt ing on a disguise, Be i ng -with-one-another must fo l l ow special routes o f its o w n in order to come close to Others, or even to 'see through them' ["hinter s ie" z u kommen] " ( B T 161). Wh i l e He idegger is not particularly for thcoming in Being and Time about describing these 'special routes,' his comments later in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " outline—unequivocally so—a space o f authentic togetherness. Foreshadowed in these comments from his earlier work , it is in The Will to Power as Art that He idegger clearly shows his rather anxious relat ion to N ie tzsche 's characteristical ly sporadic (though no less potent) physio logica l conceptions o f aesthetic feeling, especially when it comes to the fervency o f a musical rapture. T o be clear, He idegger is wi l l ing to endorse affect as v i ta l for the power o f art, but not on N ietzsche 's terms o f D ionys ian frenzy, a rapture wh ich, despite N ie tzsche 's fanatic praise o f Rausch as an ecstatic, communal unif ication, stil l remains, for Heidegger, ensconced wi th in a fundamental ly Cartesian metaphys ics—art as aesthetics becomes another occasion o f technology, the slave o f a necessarily dualistic, ' l ived experience.' Specif ical ly cr i t ic iz ing Wagner ian opera in its overt gesture towards what is, for Heidegger, a shal low col lect iv ism, He idegger condemns this w i l l to dominate as the quintessential expression o f such a metaphysics: But beyond such sheer quantitative unification, the artwork should be a celebration of the national community, it should be the religion... Music in the form of opera becomes the authentic art.... What is wanted is the domination of art as music, and thereby the domination of the pure state of feeling—the tumult and delirium of the senses, tremendous contraction, the felicitous distress that swoons in enjoyment, absorption in "the bottomless sea of harmonies," the plunge into frenzy and the disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive. The "live experience" as such becomes decisive. The work is merely what arouses such experience.... That the music could assume such preeminence at all has its grounds in the increasingly aesthetic posture taken toward art as a whole—it is the conception and estimation of art in terms of the unalloyed state of feeling and the growing barbarization of the very state 90 to the point where it becomes the sheer bubbling and boiling of feeling abandoned to itself. (WPA 86-8) Simi lar examples o f disdain abound in the text. He idegger expresses repeatedly his contempt for the dynamic, untamed, even volat i le essence o f D ionys ian frenzy by employ ing a language o f strain, fervor, and mutab i l i ty—though w i th different intentions, He idegger manages to capture quite we l l the unrelenting tenacity, the almost feral qual ity in N ietzsche 's earliest formulat ions o f rapture from The Birth of Tragedy. True, He idegger does seem to capitulate briefly, even declaring the possibi l i ty o f Rausch to be a temporary, almost therapeutic sanctuary that actually stands in opposition to technicity: " A n d yet such arousal o f frenzied feel ing and unchaining o f 'affects' cou ld be taken as a rescue o f ' l i fe, ' especially in v i ew o f the g row ing impoverishment and deterioration o f existence occasioned by industry, technology and f inance.. ." ( W P A 88). However , his comments immediately fo l l ow ing this rather unexpected fissure show that this is only his ruse to denigrate as merely pedestrian such a rapture o f escape. In keeping w i th his affinity for things l inguistic, He idegger again gives the final and decisive wo rd to the meditat ive w i th an alternative language o f ca lm and tangibil ity: "R i s ing on swells o f feel ing wou l d have to substitute for a sol idly grounded and articulated posit ion in the midst o f beings, the k ind o f thing that only great poetry and thought can create" ( W P A 88). Clear ly, He idegger is try ing to formulate an understanding o f feeling, o f affect wh i ch does not suffer f r om the var ious pitfalls o f a Cartesian metaphys ics—as always, he seeks to further destabil ize the common dichotomies o f mind/body and nature/culture generally associated w i th the Cartesian 'wor ld-picture. ' However , in attempting to overcome the hegemony o f this understanding and yet retain a sense o f art's pro found importance, He idegger tries to leave behind the usual sites o f art's power o f a f fec t—emot ion , feeling, 91 physio logica l change—and, c i t ing N ietzsche 's own reflections on the rift, shifts the focus onto the dissonant f r ic t ion between art and truth. Heretofore, He idegger has not only been unrestrained in imbuing his analysis o f Nietzsche w i th his o w n phi losophica l language and formulat ions but has seemingly attempted to execute, w i th an almost feroc ious tenacity, a project o f assimilation. Awa r e that he is 'massaging' N ie tzsche 's text, He idegger attempts a br ief just i f icat ion in the midst o f a discussion o f 'the grand style': " F o r every great thinker always thinks one jump more original ly than he directly speaks. Ou r interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by h im " ( W P A 134). A n d yet, strangely, here Heidegger resists re-visit ing the relationship between art and truth discussed in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t , " that is, o f art as a setting-into w o r k o f truth, as an event. Instead, he rests w i th his brief, earlier comments about the primacy, captivation, and histor ical ground ing o f art for Dasein: " A r t is not just one among a number o f items, activities one engages in and enjoys now and then; art places the who le o f Dase in in decis ion and keeps it there" ( W P A 125). Fo l l ow ing Nietzsche, but here managing to mute his characteristic exuberance, Heidegger also contends that a certain di lat ion o f the communicat ive faculties takes place in the aesthetic state: We do not dwell alongside the event as spectators; we ourselves remain within the [aesthetic] state. Our Dasein receives from it a luminous relation to beings, the sight in which beings are visible to us. The aesthetic state is the envisionment through which we constantly see, so that everything here is discernible to us. Art is the most visionary configuration of will to power. (WPA 139) In a footnote to this passage, K r e l l makes clear that the translation o f durchsichtig as 'v is ionary' cou ld be "otherwise rendered as ' l uc id ' or 'persp icuous ' " and, as such, contains not a connotat ion o f ' t h e v isua l ' in art, o f ' v i s u a l art,' but o f the "envis ionment, das Sichtige, that art opens up for beings" ( W P A 139). In these passages, He idegger ' s tentative relation to N ietzsche 's not ion o f Rausch again becomes apparent—where N ie tzsche is quite prepared to 92 endorse an ecstasis o f possession, understood as a vertical rise and fal l, He idegger wo rks to manipulate art 's power fu l ' ho ld ' over the spectator, its captivation, into a horizontal lucidity, an attunement border ing on the meditative. In doing so, He idegger neutral izes al l the most satisfying anarchic, explosive heights o f N ietzsche 's musical ecstasis. However , it is in this tempering o f N ie tzsche 's swing between nature and culture that He idegger ' s analysis also revises the ahistor ical , largely acultural shortcomings in N ie tzsche 's theory and suggests a more thorough, and itself satisfying, picture o f how something like a D ionys ian frenzy might transpire. In its o w n quiescent way, applying He idegger 's not ions o f everyday l istening, being-with, and m o o d to an understanding o f musical performance yie lds a more differentiated picture o f its possibil it ies, that is, it manages to capture the true volat i l i ty o f the event which, for the most part and in most cases, may never erupt into united frenzy, but w i l l rather unfo ld as a space o f vaci l lat ing moods perhaps brought to moments o f resonance—in acoustic terms, this space wou l d be a series o f osci l lat ing hums and drones rather than a maelstrom o f explosions and crescendos. He idegger again manages to compress and thus broaden N ietzsche 's anarchism such that it permeates even the banal, but despite this vapor izat ion o f Nietzsche 's intensity, there remains in the br ie f moments o f communi ty cohesion a strong sense o f the same freedom Nietzsche extols in the Dionys ian, o f the temporary and blissful escape enjoyed in overcoming the social obstacles o f the everyday. True, He idegger 's is a decidedly less active brand o f physical abandon—his is an understanding that sits precariously on the edge o f a para lys is—but there emerges in both thinkers the same extraordinary perspicuity sparked in the musical event, the same feverish openness o f 93 communicat ion in wh i ch life is enhanced and communit ies find a means o f their expression. A s N ietzsche writes: The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures—it is the source of languages. This is where languages originate: the languages of tone as well as the languages of gestures and glances. The more complete phenomenon is always the beginning: our faculties are subtiized out of more complete faculties. But even today one still hears with one's muscles, one even reads with one's muscles.... Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding. Empathy with the souls of others is originally nothing moral, but a physiological susceptibility to suggestion.... (WP 427-8) And , to compare this passage from Heidegger 's reading o f Nietzsche: [E]nhancement of force must be understood as the capacity to extend beyond oneself, as a relation to beings in which beings themselves are experienced as being more fully in being, richer, more perspicuous, more essential.... Enhancement is to be understood in terms of mood: to be caught up in elation—and to be borne along by our buoyancy as such.... It means above all an attunement which is so disposed that nothing is foreign to it, nothing too much for it, which is open to everything and ready to tackle anything—the greatest enthusiasm and the supreme risk hard by one another. With that we come up against a third aspect of the feeling of rapture: the reciprocal penetration of all enhancements of every ability to do and see, apprehend and address, communicate and achieve release. (WPA 100) Considered relationally, the wo rks o f N ietzsche and Heidegger share in p l a c i ng— in a more precise and comprehensive manner than when approached in d i s t inc t ion—mus ica l listeners wi th in a l ive event, and thereby challenge the hegemonic understanding o f the isolated ar twork as the locus o f meaning: being-there w i th other listeners becomes an integral part o f musical meaning. Wha t this model points towards is thus a new aesthetics o f musical performance not based on the enduring meaning o f a static work , but rather one attempting to account for the myr iad contingencies associated w i th its presentation. Genre and Community The dist inct ion between 'wo rk ' and 'event' has precluded the importance o f these contingencies as contr ibutors to the musical meanings o f l ive performance: it has generally been assumed that 'meaning' resides in the 'work . ' However , i f this is indeed an oversimpl i f icat ion o f the case, and it is more accurately one o f the factors in the meaning o f a 94 performance, then the corol lary not ion o f kinship by aesthetic genre is l ikewise an oversimpl i f ied approach to the organizat ion o f mus i c— i t is wi thout quest ion a convenient way o f categor iz ing music, but in terms o f l ive performance and its gathering force for a particular community, it can all too easily offer a distorted picture o f these events. Speaking o f precisely this r isk as it applies to the contemporary state o f popular music, A l b i n i makes an impl ic it case for a more differentiated understanding o f music wh i ch includes its context wi th in a network o f specif ic social relations: There has always been a legitimate underground. The difference now is that some of the mainstream music is stylistically similar to some common antecedents in underground music. You can listen to records on major labels that get played on the radio and think, "Wow, some of this sounds like The Stooges or The Ramones or whatever." That does not mean that in any way those people are operating in the legitimate underground or are common in any way with those people in the mainstream. (Shellac) Music ians, in their act ivity o f rehearsing, recording, tour ing, and performing, operate with in certain music communit ies who themselves operate wi th in certain venues, spaces, and networks o f personal contacts, and who themselves have certain ways o f relating w i th one another: each musical community, l ike any community, has its o w n part icular set o f codes, values, and rules. However , as A lb in i r ightly notes, to those outside o f these specific networks, kinship may appear closer than it is, because stylistically, even in terms o f a fairly nuanced sub-genre, an entirely quantifiable dist inct ion may be exceedingly diff icult, i f not impossible, to articulate. F o r example, local Vancouve r band M e r c u r y the Winged Messenger is styl istical ly close to the epic metal o f I ron Ma iden , but the people who cram the front r ow o f Me r cu r y shows are not l ike ly the same people who frequent the c i ty 's metal bars: the members o f this band are networked with in the diverse indie-rock scene o f Vancouver and the identity o f their enthusiasts fo l lows accordingly. A n d to return to Andersen's detailed account o f The Need show in Seattle, even though this band cou ld be 95 categorized as a somewhat experimental brand o f epic prog-metal and might thus share common elements w i th H a w k w i n d and/or K i n g Cr imson, in all facets o f their operations, these bands exist in and cater to entirely different networks and communit ies: understanding The Need ' s music, their performances, their reason for being the musicians they are, as anything other than f i rmly ensconced wi th in a communi ty o f lesbian punk youth and a radical gender pol i t ics wou l d be to grossly misconstrue their presence as a band. Styles and influences col l ide and transf igure—the two members o f the band have matching Judas Priest tattoos and sport the fashion signifiers o f the metal genre—but their respective communit ies barely feel the breeze o f the other in the crossing o f network routes. W e can only imagine how things at their Seattle performance cou ld have been different were there a different blend o f people there to preserve it. T o grasp the host o f cont ingenc ies—personal , historical, and cu l tura l—that contr ibuted to the community-enhancing success o f The N e e d show Andersen describes near the beginning o f the discussion is to grasp the ful l import o f Heidegger 's puzz l ing hermeneutic c ircuitry wh i ch states that art is itself the founding leap: The origin of the work of art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people's historical existence—is art. This so because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is becomes historical. (OWA 202) Indeed, as we have demonstrated, musical performance, l ike other l ive events, partakes o f this historic ity in a consummate fashion, but the question o f technology, what in the case o f music is the quest ion o f infinitely repeatable sound, must be addressed i f we are to ful ly understand the social relations o f performance. Fo l l ow ing At ta l i , we w i l l explore the scope o f these changes init iated by the var ious technologies o f repetit ion. M u s i c a l P e r f o r m a n c e i n the A g e o f T e chn i c i t y The communal functions of music did not disappear with the demise of tribal society; on the contrary, until now every type of human society has succoured them. But as the millennium draws to a close, the conditions of musical life are radically different. Music is with us all the 96 time, but is made by relatively few, and most of it is not heard as live performance at all. (Chanan 24) We no longer live in a world of purely ephemeral sound. Phonographic (and now electroacoustic) technology has transformed what was a single listening into a potentially repeatable event. Seemingly simple, but the sound of everyday life changes accordingly, and with it so does the sound, time, and space of music: in its greatest scope, this is primarily a technology of spatio-temporal displacement. Music, once partaking in this ephemerality of sound, no longer exists solely as live performance, but becomes a near-omnipresent force in the listener's soundscape. The variegated prevalence of technology initiates a continuing process of change in our ontology of music, such that, despite their appearance as discrete realms, live performance, in its ephemerality, and electroacoustic technology, in its capability of repetition, more accurately reveal themselves to be part of a complex, tensile interpenetration. Looking at Attali's Noise: The Political Economy of Music in concert with the writings of Derrida, Heidegger, and Truax to examine the impact of this shift reveals not only how musicians and listeners explicitly interact with this technology of repetition, but how it is, even in its absence, also brought to 'presence' in performance, in the home, and in the recording studio, perpetually transforming musical experience in a host of oscillating tensions of artifact/evanescence, visuality/aurality, sociality/solitude, agency/subjection, and resistance/domination. Technologies of Disruption It was on December 6, 1877 that Thomas Edison used his phonograph—a needle and a rotating cylinder covered in tin foil—to make the first successful recording and replication of human speech (Thompson 133). Although this technology of repetition has since become so prevalent within the soundscape of our everyday lives that we have now integrated as 97 commonplace its metaphysical power o f displacement, its emergence ushered in what was, and remains, in acoust ic terms, no less than a fundamental d isrupt ion o f t ime and space. It is an obvious but perhaps stil l somewhat neglected tru ism to suggest that, pr ior to the advent o f even the crudest sound record ing and repl icat ion technology, sound, any sound, had never been exactly replicated, was not replicable, had never been dis located or disembodied from its original sou r ce—sound and source were always temporal ly and (to the extent that sound wou ld have at least originated at the source) spatially synchronous. In his article, " Aud i o A r t in the D e a f Century," Doug las Kar in relays an equivocal blend o f violence, desecration, and power in this simple act o f sound reproduct ion: Phonography wrenched the voice from its production in the throat, in a dual act of violation and theft, but then lodged it, like an echo without a landscape, in a mechanical memory. Sound was stolen only to be returned to its owner over and over again. Thus the surprise of Edison upon hearing the first recording: 'I was never so taken aback in my life.' (302) This power is indeed one o f extirpation: it is a technology to first mark and then to remove sound for transplant elsewhere, and, in this act o f displacement, throws into crisis the entire spatio-temporal scope and purpose o f musical performance. What was an inextricable l ink between sound and source meant that, understanding the term in the broadest sense, music was its performance: it was, as we say now, ' l ive. ' F r o m the perspective o f the listener, to hear music, whether casual practice, or explicit performance, was to hear the sounds o f musicians playing at that moment and in that space—even music pour ing from an open w indow, or from the doorway o f a club spoke o f the l iv ing, o f life. Heretofore, an ontology o f music is one o f context, not ubiquity; it is one o f process, not possession; it is one o f occasion, not banality, but the new technology o f repetit ion delivers a new onto logy o f music, and thus, o f l ive musical performance itself. 98 The definit ive change seems rather simple: sound has become a mark, an inscription, and not merely in physical resemblance as the grooves o f a record, but more signif icantly in its new status o f permanent reserve, a dutiful attendance able to be ordered into act ion at a wh im. Such command is precisely what indicates the present constel lat ion o f Be i ng He idegger describes in "The Quest ion Concern ing Techno logy": "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its o w n standing. W e call it a standing-reserve [Bestand]" (322). However , as Der r ida ' s analysis o f oral and literary marks in "Signature, Event, Contex t " elucidates, the shift this technology seems to initiate is never total, but instead operates in a perpetual interplay o f presence and absence: This structural possibility of being severed from its referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its context) seems to me to make of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as we have seen, the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged "production" or origin. And I will extend this law even to all "experience" in general, if it is granted that there is no experience of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks. (318) To put this into a discussion o f musical technology and its impact on performance, these new marks, these noises, leave mnemonic traces in our understanding o f music. Thus, this technology's mediat ing role is not simply l imited to its operat ion in the enhancement o f a given performance, or the manner in wh i ch it affects and determines how a given piece o f music is recorded, but extends beyond these such that its pervasiveness has so significantly altered the onto logica l understanding o f music and its performance, that it is, even in its absence, equivocal ly present. This technology creates a situation where its traces manifest themselves, br ing the technology to bear upon even the moments o f its conspicuous invisibil ity. S oun d t r a c k s : T h e U b i q u i t y o f A m p l i f i e d S o u n d 99 A l though Ed i son ' s invent ion initiated this fundamental shift in our acoust ic ontology, the introduct ion o f electrical record ing and ampl i f icat ion wh i ch sought to improve upon the quality o f sound reproduct ion and repl icat ion is really what n ow reigns as the technology o f our musical l ives. T ruax describes this electroacoustic technology as that wh i ch is concerned with the energy transfer from acoustic to electrical forms, a process called transduction, as well as the subsequent processing and/or storage of the resultant audio signal.... It is generally assumed that the electroacoustic process ends with the conversion of the signal back into acoustic, audible form via a loudspeaker. (7) In its myr iad applications, this technology provides the possibi l i ty fo r a k ind o f musical omnipresence in wh i ch a host o f everyday activities and experiences are now accompanied by what cou ld be considered a musical soundtrack. In the home, not only do stereos and personal computers overt ly del iver music from either radio stations or from a variety o f recorded media, but the other major technological vo ice o f the household, the television, dispenses musical sound somewhat more insidiously: at any random moment throughout the broadcasting day here in Vancouver , flipping through 50 channels (wi th a v iewing o f approximately two seconds each) suggests that sometimes as many as ten, but often only as few as five channels, w i l l not feature some fo rm o f music being employed to construct either the background mood o f a program/commercia l , or exist ing as the expl ic it spectacle itself. This quasi-omnipresence continues outside the home w i th the same equivoca l blend o f active and passive forms o f l istening attention: automobiles provide music to those on the inside and the outside o f the vehicle; the shopping mal l has background level music piped throughout the interior and immediate exterior o f the complex, w i th some businesses dispensing a louder, more foreground level o f music presumably ho ld ing a greater appeal for their specific clientele; and restaurants, bars and clubs almost always feature some k ind o f music which, accord ing to the atmosphere and nature o f the establishment, w i l l be played at 100 accordingly appropriate vo lumes—the list cou ld go on to include the music wh ich accompanies the workp lace, elevator rides, convenience store shopping, banking, strolls d own the sidewalks in commerc ia l districts, mobi le phone rings, sport ing event lulls/intermissions, and hold ing for service on the telephone. M u s i c no longer requires direct human agency for its performance, and thus transcends the former constraints o f t ime and space that del imited the possibi l it ies o f its presentation. However , electroacoust ic technology does not only serve to plural ize opportunit ies for musical l istening outside o f conventional performance, but has also become an integral component in its funct ioning system. A l though our famil iarity w i th electroacoustic technology renders it fair ly invisible during the performance itself, this technology, in its mani fo ld uses, is obvious ly in constant operation dur ing many varieties o f performance, is what makes many forms o f contemporary music at al l poss ib le—nei ther rock, nor rap, nor electroacoustic music i tsel f cou ld exist or be presented independently o f this technology. F r i th points to this degree o f integration between music and electroacoust ic technology in his article " Towards an Aesthet ic o f Popu lar Mus i c , " maintaining that any understanding o f modern music necessitates an engagement w i th this relationship: The history of twentieth-century popular music is impossible to write without reference to the changing forces of production, electronics, the use of recording, amplification and synthesizers, just as consumer choices cannot be separated from the possession of transistor radios, stereo hi-fis, ghetto blasters and Walkmen. (135) Wi th the except ion o f the drum kit, the typical rock outfit employs instruments that are almost entirely electric, sound-making objects that were never intended for purely acoustic sound, but were designed specif ical ly to convert these acoustic vibrat ions into an electric signal for ampl i f icat ion and/or manipulation. L ikew ise , contemporary D J s and turntablists belonging to all genres depend on this same technology to convert k inet ic energy from the 101 turntable stylus into electrical energy for amplification, and electroacoustic composers use this technology to first record, or even engineer sounds electrically/digitally before further manipulating them for their compositions, which are, in turn, heard via external loudspeakers. However, even the plethora of instruments which have been designed for delivering a pleasant, unamplified, and audible sound are now often amplified using either a conventional magnetic pickup (e.g., acoustic guitar, double bass) or microphones (e.g., drums, sitar) in order to meet the volume required in a given performance space. Amplification technology has indeed made it possible to transcend the acoustic limitations of both the instruments and the concert space—performances for 100,000 fans would be impossible without it. However, there is a strange and unsettling corollary to this powerful expansion: the perceived need for amplification in the performance space has grown to now include the most intimate of settings, such that, more often than not, voice and instrument will be amplified even in a small cafe. In addition to being a background voice of everyday life, this technology is now almost invariably present in performance as well. T h e T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f M u s i c a l Space In his book, Attali conducts a genealogy of Western music (art and popular) in order to understand the implications of this technological shift, charting the transformation from music's origins within a collectively experienced simulacrum of ritual sacrifice, into the birth of the audience/musician dichotomy in representation, and then into the inception of the technological era and the concomitant burgeoning of repetition. This technological turn no less radical, Attali illustrates how representation has not been totally supplanted by repetition, that there still remains a contemporaneous co-existence of the two. In delineating their respective boundaries, Attali points to the inherently singular, ephemeral nature of the 102 former, in contrast to the mass-produced banality o f the latter: " In representation, a wo r k is generally heard only once— i t is a unique moment; in repetit ion, hearings are stockp i led" (41). H i l l e l Schwartz relays the astonishing statistics f rom this era o f representation in his book The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles: Around 1900, there was drama enough just in hearing a long piece of music repeated. "The zealous concert-goer," wrote a commentator in 1908, "living at a metropolitan center, would hear in a decade perhaps ten performances of Beethoven's Third and Fifth Symphonies, four performances of one of Mozart's last three symphonies, as well as of Schubert's Unfinished and Schumann's First and Second." (375) M u s i c — n o w recast as object in addit ion to process—opens a host o f new physical and social arrangements, one o f the most important o f wh i ch is the spatial conf igurat ion o f its audience: solitary l istening becomes possible. Thus, A t ta l i pr imari ly conceptual izes this technology in terms o f its power to actually transform, and, in a sense, immobi l ize, the tradit ional social relations o f music appreciat ion in erecting what is, in contrast, a new system o f musical consumpt ion based on the isolated experience and fetishized prestige o f the indiv idual: In this network, each spectator has a solitary relation with a material object; the consumption of music is individualized, a simulacrum of ritual sacrifice, a blind spectacle. The network is no longer a form of sociality, an opportunity for spectators to meet and communicate, but rather a tool making the individualized stockpiling of music possible on a huge scale. Here again, the new network first appears in music as the herald of a new stage in the organization of capitalism, that of the repetitive mass production of all social relations. (N 32) Throughout his text, At ta l i relays an unquestionable concern for the loss o f social ity in music, that its new possibi l it ies o f presentation have rendered undesirable or ineffectual the community-enhancing funct ion o f l ive performance. Wh i l e it may seem that At ta l i ' s lamentations (though based on accurate descriptions o f the new listening) are perhaps misguided yearnings for musical relations wh i ch still thrive around the wor ld , namely, those o f l ive musical performance, in fact, people's attitudes towards performance and their o w n agency as amateur musicians were altered signif icantly by the advent o f repetit ive listening. In her article, "Mach ines, Mus i c , and the Quest for Fidel i ty: Ma rke t i ng the Ed i son 103 Phonograph in Amer i ca , 1877-1925," Em i l y Thompson contends that available technologies o f sound reproduct ion d id indeed temper the attendance o f l ive musical performance and the w i l l for amateur music-making in the home: As phonographic technologies provided a means to mass-produce identical recordings of musical performances, people increasingly experienced music not by attending unique live performances or by producing music themselves in their homes but instead by purchasing recordings, carrying them home, and reproducing the music on machines in their parlors, whenever and as often as they desired. (132) Despite early fears that it wou l d be supplanted by our affinity for secure, automated repetition, and despite the plethora o f present choices for l istening to recorded music, l ive musical performance stil l enjoys an indisputable popularity: on any night o f the week, in almost any major centre, people are hold ing and attending l ive concerts o f var ious styles and sizes, and testimonials o f the rare but intense experiences they have in these performances remain an inadequate expression o f their magnitude. A n d yet, there is only partial solace to be taken in the stil l undeniably strong pulse o f l ive performance both quantitatively, in the brute facts o f its occurrence, and qualitatively, in its always unpredictable but resilient power o f affect and aff irmation. Wh i l e even the fierce integration o f electroacoustic technology into daily practices o f music l istening may seem to stand in contradist inct ion to l ive performance, a new onto logy o f music thus erected operates to pervade what often seems an autonomous realm. Simultaneously elucidating this autonomy and interrelation, At ta l i bo ld ly contends that the lure o f possessing music has g rown stronger than our satisfaction w i th its evanescence: The love of music, a desire increasingly trapped in the consumption of music for listening, cannot find in performance what the phonograph record provides: the possibility of saving, of stockpiling at home, and destroying at pleasure. (N 84) This technology, wh i ch cannot be understood independently o f a coro l lary ontology, alters significantly the concept o f what a musical performance can and ought to be, a not ion that 104 displays itself to be remarkably consistent w i th At ta l i ' s comments on the listener's compuls ion for material artifact i f we examine careful ly the practice o f mak ing unsanctioned recordings o f l ive performances, or, 'boot legs. ' Capturing the Live: Exclusions, Deferrals, Future Pleasures Dur i ng the last o f their three L A performances, Shellac were (as usual) confiscating temporar i ly the record ing devices, and permanently the cassette tapes o f those attempting to make bootlegs o f the performance. The result ing dialogue that t ook place dur ing one o f their signature question-and-answer periods i l luminates the tension between the ephemerality o f the event and what reveals i tself to be a ferocious desire to capture and possess it: Thwarted bootlegger to bassist Bob Weston: "Will I get my tape back at the end of the show?" Bob Weston to bootlegger: "No. It will be destroyed." Guitarist Steve Albini to bootlegger. "What you've just done is remove yourself from everyone else around you. What you're doing now is working on your own little project for the internet, which you can do at home." Bob Weston to bootlegger: "This is it. This is the show." (Shellac performance) Cynics wou l d suggest that the band was merely trying to protect their autonomy over the nature and sale o f their 'product, ' but given A lb in i ' s notor ious ly steadfast, quasi-socialist wo r k ethos, the fact that the members o f the band have other ful l-t ime jobs and do not consider themselves to be professional musicians but instead, as A lb in i puts it in the interview w i th Sweeney, "part o f the underground o f hobbyist music ians," perhaps there are also other more significant motives behind the seizures (Shel lac). Wes ton ' s last remark in the exchange suggests an opening into the tension between the l ive event and the repeatable one: "Th is is it. Th is is the show." Weston ' s blunt appeal to the obvious seems to carry w i th it an impl ic i t sense o f evanescence, that document ing this event for a later re-visitation debases the very quality that 105 makes it special, namely, that it disappears. A l though the band performed three times in the short span o f 24 hours, one o f the would-be bootleggers stil l felt compel led to hurl rather v ic ious and profane insults at Wes ton upon the return o f his record ing dev ice—three l ive performances were, in their ephemerality, inadequate in compar ison to the chance for material artifact. A s At ta l i declares in the above quote, the new w i l l fo r permanence and possession, for product, now exceeds the fulf i l lment derived from the intrinsical ly fleeting nature o f l ive sound. Aga in , even in its seeming absence, in the live event, the technology o f repetit ion makes itself present. There is, however, another k ind o f presence manifest dur ing the performance which, i f A lb in i is correct in his charges against boot legging, wou l d not be committed to tape. W i th in this suggestion lies an impl ic i t crit ique o f posit iv ist ic interpretations o f music, a questioning o f the not ion that a self-contained entity, the work , operates independently o f its performed context. T o understand this different fo rm o f 'presence' not predicated upon the physical occurrentness o f either the work , or the audience, we can return to Heidegger 's hermeneutics ofEreignis and preserving in "The Or ig in o f the W o r k o f A r t " : "Preserv ing the wo r k does not reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into the truth happening in the work . Thus it grounds being for and w i th one another as the historical standing-out o f human existence in relation to unconcealment" ( O W A 193). In l ight o f He idegger 's relational understanding o f art experience, A lb in i ' s comments about the self-excluding essence o f boot legging elucidate a quiet resil ience, a resistance to repetit ion inhering in the hermeneutic unfo ld ing o f meaning in the performance itself, a meaning wh i ch is radical ly mercurial, shifting, contingent upon the presence, not understood in terms o f physical occurrence, but rather the engaged there-ness o f the audience members 106 themselves: paradoxical ly, one seeks to capture an event that, in the very act o f this attempted capt ivat ion itself, becomes at least partial ly negated through a concomitant self-exclusion. A c co rd i ng to A lb in i , the boot legger was, in Heidegger ian terms, attempting to ' reduce' the col lect ive preservation o f the l ive performance d own to his o w n 'private experience,' one entirely bound up w i th precisely the k ind o f schema He idegger seeks to destabilize, namely, an object-oriented not ion o f art borne o f modern aesthetics. One acquaintance o f mine, reflecting on her o w n past instances o f successful boot legging, surmised that there had been a strong correlat ion between the shows she chose to boot leg and her lack o f enjoyment o f the l ive show itself. In retrospect, my o w n attempts at boot legging have yie lded a similarly anaesthetized experience o f these performances. Or iented towards the future moment when one can resurrect this music, the need to engage w i th the event no longer shows up w i th the same urgency. Presence, and the j oy in experiencing that ' now ' is, it seems, deferred in order to dwel l w i th in a different k ind o f pleasure: an equivoca l blend o f the delight in transgression and covetous, object fetishism o f a rare and supposedly fleeting event. Furthermore, this record ing to wh i ch the boot legger directs his or her enthusiasm, w i l l , because o f the technical l imitat ions o f such clandestine recording, be o f such poor audio quality that one wou l d doubtful ly ever g ive it a second or third l i s ten—what is important is the reserve quality, the knowledge that the event cou ld be re-visited i f so desired, the security that one holds a secret cache o f experience 'just in case.' There exists a k ind o f perverse, P latonic asceticism in all this, in wh i ch a vorac ious w i l l for permanence, for that wh i ch is knowable, attempts to make consolat ion for the tragic disappearance o f the fugitive. W e may recall this process o f deferral in the self-exclusion o f boot legging when At ta l i declares that "w i th records, as w i th all mass product ion, security 107 takes precedence over freedom; one knows nothing w i l l happen because the entire future is already laid out in advance. Identity then creates a mimicry o f desire and thus rivalry; and once again repetit ion encounters death" ( N 121). Vision and Voice: Debating Authenticity and Agency in 'Live' Performance The preceding example shows quite clearly the manner in wh i ch a technology o f repetit ion, even in its supposed absence, brings itself to presence: terms l ike ' l ive ' and 'performance' are cast into ambiguity, into their o w n osci l lat ion o f presence and absence. The complex i ty wh i ch emerges in conjunct ion w i th the prol i ferat ion o f sound record ing and sound reproduct ion technology notwithstanding, the boundaries o f what qualifies, and what fails to qualify, as a musical performance are still fundamental ly ambiguous. A plethora o f acoustic events wh i ch operate independently o f electroacoustic technology evoke this equivocal ity; w i th vary ing degrees o f human agency: the sung tones o f a priest to a congregation, the church bells wh i ch are rung out over a bust l ing market, the wai l ing ambulance siren that brings traff ic to a standstill, and the train wh i ch pul ls into a station ful l o f commuters cou ld all arguably be included at some posi t ion a long the performance cont inuum. Exper imenta l 'performers, ' in setting up col lect ive l istenings to just these sorts o f real-world phenomena, have been impl ic i t ly questioning convent ional categorizations o f music and its performance for many years. In its inaugural issue (c i rca 1995), the Br i t i sh music fanzine, Obsessive Eye, lists three such exercises, part o f the "F ie ld Tr ips Thru Found Sound Env i ronments" wh i ch took place in N e w Y o r k state dur ing the '60s: " A n audience expecting a convent ional concert or lecture is put on a bus, their palms are stamped w i th the wo rd ' l isten,' and they are taken to and thru an existing sound environment" (Obsessive). A l though no further descr ipt ion o f the f ield trips is given, the publ icat ion does provide the 108 year, month, and locat ion o f the l istening events as: Conso l idated Ed i s on P o w e r Station, N e w Y o r k C i ty , in February 1963; Hudson Tubes (subway) between 9 Street Stat ion and Pavon ia in M a r c h 1967; and N e w Jersey Powe r and L igh t P owe r Plant, South Amboy , N e w Jersey, in July 1968. The performer becomes the person who initiates the col lect ive l istening experience, who transforms an insensate background noise into a foreground performance of, i f not music, at least somewhat meaningful, communicat ive sound. However , this re-definit ion o f performer and performance occurred we l l before the '60s, and is best exempl i f ied in the radical experimental ism o f Amer i can composer John Cage. In his article, "He idegger 's Ho lder l i n and John Cage," M i chae l E l d r ed contends that Cage 's explorat ions in the contingencies o f musical performance as exhibited in works l ike his "Imaginary Landscape," a piece in wh i ch the arbitrary t ime and place o f its performance determines the sound o f twelve different radios each o f wh i ch constantly moves among several random frequencies (and may or may not correspond to any station), and paradigmatical ly in his infamous " 4 ' 3 3 " , " in wh i ch the performer performs only silence, manifests and articulates the musical event as this spatio-temporal demarcation, the naming o f the sonic event as a performance: " M u s i c is thus redrafted as l istening to what happens in a t imespace f rame" (Eldred). Paradoxical ly, the listener too becomes a 'performer ' as their part ic ipatory l istening also articulates this musical locat ion. E ld red quotes composer Robert Ashley's impromptu musings as they appeared in J i l l Johnston's 1962 rev iew o f Cage 's book Silence: " [T]he ult imate result wou l d be a music that wouldn't necessarily invo lve anything but the presence o f people. That is, it seems to me that the most radical redefinit ion o f music that I cou ld think o f wou l d be one that defines 'mus ic ' wi thout reference to sound" (Eldred). However , despite the wel l-documented nature o f Cage 's experiments, as we l l as those o f his 109 contemporaries and his fo l lowers, popular consciousness has been largely unwi l l ing to assimilate this new schema o f performance and instead, stil l operates w i th in a f ramework determined by most ly visual cr i ter ia—the question o f performativ ity is the question o f physicality. P e r f o r m a t i v i t y as Phy s i c a l i t y T o determine whether a g iven acoustic event meets the cr iter ia o f a performance, the first quest ion is inevitably one o f human agency: "Is anybody doing anything?" However , this ambiguous phrasing more accurately stands for a more detailed enquiry: " T o what degree are someone's actions responsible for the sounds we hear?" It becomes immediately obvious that the very not ion o f 'performance' is so inextricably bound w i th a sense o f active gesture, enactment, mot ion, o f something we discern through a pr imar i ly visual means, that it is diff icult to separate the sound o f music f rom the human movements responsible for its character. This visual i ty in mind as we turn towards the technological realm o f performance, its scope and intensity o f appl icat ion become clear i f we examine attitudes towards the use o f prerecorded sounds, or even entirely prerecorded works , in contemporary musical events. T o vary ing degrees, many teen pop acts, rock bands and D J turntablists al ike make use o f prerecorded sounds or samples dur ing their l ive performances. F o r some, the prerecorded component is the instrumentation whi le the singing remains l ive; for others, it may be the converse; it may even be the entire performance itself. In many cases, no effort is made to conceal this d isembodied sound; in other cases, it is deemed necessary. In these latter cases, rarely any dissention is vo i ced by the audience when this performance features some semblance that it is happening at that moment and as a direct result o f their physical 110 gestures—many audiences either do not know, or do not care that M i l l i Van i l l i ' s singing, or the D J ' s scratch w izardry is, in terms o f its l ive quality, a wel l-orchestrated i l lusion, mot ion synched to music prov ided by a D A T cassette. A s Truax declares, the reason for this is obvious: "The sophist icat ion o f modern recording studio techniques cannot, in fact, be easily reproduced live; hence, the frequent dissatisfaction when the l ive experience cannot match the prerecorded one wh i ch the listener has come to prefer. . ." (116). A s M i l l i Van i l l i proved during the pivota l moment when their samplers crashed and their prerecorded vocals began bark ing out a gl itch-ended loop, some audiences wou l d quite admittedly prefer the k ind o f standardized security o f the repeated: the audience merely laughed at the spectacle's col lapse as the panicked duo f led the stage in embarrassment. The band was humil iated, but the c rowd shrugged it o f f (Behind). At ta l i is thus absolutely correct to declare that little by little, the very nature of music changes: the unforeseen and the risks of representation disappear in repetition. The new aesthetic of performance excludes error, hesitation, noise. It freezes the work out of festival and the spectacle; it reconstructs it formally, manipulates it, makes it abstract perfection. (N 106) A n d whi le the semi-i l lusory nature o f this l ive performance certainly does not negate the affirmative qual ity o f the event for that audience, those performances wh i ch must be prerecorded, namely, those o f electroacoustic music, rarely receive the same charitable treatment when categorized in terms o f their performativity. The comparat ively slight movements required o f an electroacoustic composer whi le performing a piece register be low the performance threshold for some, levying charges against its existence as 'merely prerecorded. ' However , assuming the popular rumour that some turntablists use a prerecorded tape to ensure a quality performance, audiences seem entirely content to class a D J concert as performance largely because o f the hand movements synched to the prerecorded tape (unbeknownst to the listeners), whereas electroacoust ic performances, in 111 their lack o f deceit about the prerecorded nature o f the work , seem to evoke a greater skeptic ism even though the composer is mix ing and f ine-tuning the piece to mesh w i th the performance space as the audience hears it, as it is being 'per formed. ' Qu i te l ike ly a latent schema stil l ingrained by music 's pre-technological origins in l ive playing, the criteria being applied is clearly that o f gesture. Conversely, where an examinat ion o f electroacoustic technology usual ly exhibits it to be a mediating force for l ive performance, in this case it is the or iginal onto logy o f l ive music wh i ch disrupts the technological . Or , is it indeed the case o f a technological understanding mediat ing that o f the l ive? A r e listeners n ow so accustomed to the fact that disembodied sound f rom a loudspeaker no longer denotes direct human agency that, in the absence o f bo ld physical gestures, the signif icat ion o f death overrides that o f life? Is the cyn ic ism we feel in the insincerity o f repeated sound, those vo ices you hear in the labyrinth o f everyday telecommunicat ions that y ou now understand as a semblance o f language, is that so strong that we have no faith in the sincerity o f the technological? What emerges f rom this analysis is a thorough interpenetrability, a complex intermingl ing o f the l ive and technologica l realms, suggesting a de-stabil ization o f their respective autonomies, that there are no longer any pure ontologies o f ' l i v e ' and ' technolog ica l ' to speak of. Cage 's "4'33"," demonstrates that performance is a spatio-temporal l istening locat ion first demarcated by the performer, and then enacted and completed only in col laborat ion w i th an audience. In Heidegger ian terms, the musical w o r k unfolds as an event in its co-creat ion by creator and preserver alike. A n d yet, despite this re-instigation o f the sonic, a paradigmatic example o f the hermeneutic co-creat ion o f musical performance shows that a certain visual ity still stands as crucial for the success o f l ive performance. When wa lk ing towards my class from the parking 112 lot at S imon Fraser Univers i ty, I heard the sound o f bagpipes in the distance, p laying for a few moments and then disappearing again. A l though I had to wa lk in that d irect ion anyway, I not iced that I felt (not at al l surprisingly) drawn to this music. I cont inued wa lk ing and was soon able to see two pipers facing an area o f grass that sits on the precipice o f a grassy square known as the Academic Quadrangle. A s I kept wa lk ing towards my class, these two pipers were soon f lanked by a few more who jo ined in the sporadic and impromptu bursts o f music. A l though all the pipers wo re the tradit ional stockings, ki lts and jackets, their casual pacing motions and intermittent playing made it obvious that they were not, at the moment anyway, performing in any serious manner, that is, there seemed to be good evidence to suggest that it wou l d not have been demarcated, in advance, as a performance. The presence o f what looked to be a professional photographer who began setting up his equipment some 15 metres away seemed to conf i rm this suspicion: this was some k ind o f photo shoot, not a concert. I sat down on the stairs surrounding the grassy area to enjoy the sounds and not iced that others had done, and were cont inuing to do, the same—despi te its impromptu, casual nature, this music was cal l ing people to witness, summoning them to, as He idegger describes, 'preserve' these sounds. Tota l ly unexpectedly, these sounds catalyzed the concurrent self-fabrication and unfo ld ing o f a musical performance (in the Cagean sense). Strangely, the very unperformative quality o f this event, w i th its constant osci l lat ion o f silence and playing, afforded the possibi l i ty for a rather unique l istening experience rife w i th the opportunity for almost cl inical observations, potentials for comparisons between the vo ice o f the everyday wor ld , and the vo ice o f the musical. Perhaps an obvious fact, or perhaps an over ly dramatic interpretation to uphold, but when the pipers wou l d play, ' things' wou l d change drastically. The normal ly banal background sounds o f the wind, birds, traffic, and distant construct ion 113 noise were drowned out by the vo lume and magnitude o f the bagpipes, only to rush back in again, now somewhat obtrusively, when the pipers wou l d stop playing. A n d again, when the pipers wou l d start up, their music acted to contain the space and the people in it. That space, during some o f the musical moments, showed up in its hol ism, as mak ing sense, only to dissolve again into the fragmented nature o f the everyday when the music wou l d stop. W o u l d there have been a 'performance' wi thout those who sat down to preserve this? W o u l d anyone have sat down to preserve this had the sounds been del ivered by two loudspeakers rather than a handful o f pipers? D o we have here one possible interpretation o f music that involves, as Robert Ash ley mused, nothing but the presence o f people? Despi te the success o f Cage 's experiments wh i ch show that a more complex epistemology o f performance is at play, the visual component wi th in this schema again manifests itself as cruc ia l to a concept o f l ive performance. Wh i l e it is possible that the sound quality o f l ive bagpipes exceeds their reproduced, amplif ied sound, it stil l seems that the greater appeal for the audience is the sense o f gesture, human agency, o f a reassurance o f life. There is a sincerity associated w i th the presence and sound o f those performers that quite justi f iably abates when replaced by disembodied, and thus potential ly repeated, sound. However , g iven the aforementioned commingl ing o f technological and l ive ontologies, it is also not surprising that, even dur ing this wonderfu l ly spontaneous, evanescent musical event I was enjoying so much, my thoughts also wandered into the domain o f repetit ion: "I should really try and get a C D o f this pipe band." B u t again, the situation resists such a simple explanation: at the same time, it is the hol ist ic experience o f this event wh i ch fuels the desire for its s imulacrum in solitary home listening. S t ud i o Sepa ra t i ons 114 A s this technology transforms the social relations o f musica l consumpt ion in the home, and, more equivocal ly, in l ive performance itself, its advance has seen it l ikewise disrupt the ' l iveness' o f performative relations in the studio as we l l . A n d yet, this project o f capturing the intensity o f the l ive is a dubious proposi t ion f rom the outset. Anyone who has attempted to record sound, whether musical or otherwise, in the hopes o f repl icat ing it 'as it happened' knows the futi l i ty o f this exercise: there are only greater and lesser degrees o f authenticity, never an attainment o f its purity. St i l l , at one point in history, record ing was, even in its inevitably mediat ing role, a documentat ion o f a performance (wi th or without an audience), w i th musicians playing simultaneously, as they wou l d for a group o f listeners. However , the rupture o f space and t ime already in operat ion soon intensifies, investing itself into the recordable performance i tse l f Be fo re a further extension to include the variable o f time, audio engineering first d issolved the performance-oriented, spatial arrangement o f the musicians into separate, more manageable acoustic spheres. In his article, "The ' sound ' o f music: Techno log ica l rat ional izat ion and the product ion o f popular mus ic , " Pau l Theberge quotes F. Everest ' s remarks on the somewhat equivocal but detrimental effects o f spatially and acoustical ly separating musicians in the recording studio: As musicians are separated from each other physically and acoustically, something tends to be lost in the music in the effect the musicians have on each other. The intangible 'something' that makes a group successful is undermined to a certain extent.... Physical separation, extremely dead studio acoustics, opaque baffles, and isolation booths achieve channel separation all right, even to the extent that the musicians often cannot hear one another. (102) Simi lar comments f rom other musicians expressing this inexpressible ' loss ' seem almost ub iqu i tous—the vital i ty wh i ch unfolds whi le the group plays together as a who le becomes muted, dul led, a s imulacrum o f their or iginal cohesion. There is here another gl impse that the energy in performance resists being captured. However , a lthough this record ing technology has at this point only restructured the spatial arrangement o f the musicians, a severance o f 115 their temporal unity is soon to fo l low. A s Theberge is keen to point out, this spatial separation wh i ch offers the possibi l i ty o f a clean track, free o f bleed from other instruments, later extends into the domain o f t ime to enact a further 'c l in ic izat ion ' o f the studio and a final dissection o f col lect ive performance. A n exponential intensif ication o f the disrupt ion in t ime and space made possible by Ed i son ' s phonograph, mult i-track technology (first invented by L e s Pau l in the late '40s) uses the same principle o f mark ing and transplanting to concoct an i l lusion o f a singular, acoustic event which, in fact, never t ook place (Roberts). Ana logous to erecting a bui ld ing from the bot tom up, this technology a l lows musical wo rks to be constructed piece by piece, layer by layer, to ensure not only channel separation, but more importantly, that the best performance from each o f the musicians is captured for the recording. In its most extreme application, musicians who have never met, or are now no longer l iv ing, can exist in col laborat ion on an album. The social ity that was once inherent in music in all facets o f its product ion—re lat ions between audience members, relations between audience and musician, and relations between the musicians themselves—appropr iate ly disintegrates first w i th in the studio, and later in the end result towards wh i ch this entire enterprise points: home listening. However , this disintegration o f the social, although complete in the studio, resists a total dissipation in the wo r l d outside the studio, in the wo r l d o f music enthusiasts. Res i l i ence: T h e L i v enes s o f the L i v e At ta l i cr it ic izes this dissolut ion o f col lect ive part ic ipat ion spawned by the system o f repetit ion, contrast ing it w i th the new spatial arrangement o f music consumpt ion in wh i ch "the listener in front o f his record player is now only the solitary spectator o f a sacrif icial vest ige" ( N 120). And , whi le it is indisputable that electroacoustic technology exerts this 116 transfigurative power, an abil ity to reduce the formerly col lect ive nature o f musical l istening down to what cou ld be considered as the most abstract form, At ta l i ' s mode l systematically excludes the value in the social interdependence wh i ch surrounds this admittedly isolated act: concerts, conventions, and casual conversations w i th other music enthusiasts still accompany, possibly even enhance, this solitary, introverted l istening. E v e n as the locus o f music moves, v i a fetish w i th material artifact into the l iv ing rooms o f the individual and away f rom the social ity o f the ritual, these consumers stil l operate w i th in var iously-s ized communit ies bonded by a common interest and part ic ipat ion in consumpt ion and performance alike. Fragmented, shifting, surrogate, and thus themselves evanescent, these communit ies transcend geographic prox imity and instead revolve around the hub o f musical interest, one that is, also admittedly, most often ensconced wi th in a system o f economic exchange. W i t h the except ion o f some underground bartering networks o f music fans ( including Napster and similar technologies), and rare and/or small performances organized as free events, invo lv ing oneself in music is to involve oneself in the exchange o f capital. Init iation into many music communit ies requires only the means to acquire the specific, definitive accoutrements o f a g iven league: seminal recordings on sanctioned formats, associated magazines/literature, appropriate fashion, and concert t ickets are available to anyone possessing the desire and the means to obtain them. In short, identity can, and must, be claimed through choice o f purchase. In explor ing the possibi l i ty o f a true alternative, it seems impossible to stop short o f espousing either a complete, systemic restructuring o f capital exchange or its converse, a radical ly hermetic, isolated existence free o f any social communicat ion w i th others. I f to be a music appreciator in the West is to necessarily be a music consumer, i f one's identity as a 117 music enthusiast, or even as a caricatured type o f music buff, is pr imari ly forged and sol idif ied wi th in a host o f economic relations, then the choice o f what k ind o f commerc ia l networks one becomes invo lved in stands as the fundamental domain, the only opportunity o f resistance. At ta l i , however, sees these relations as pr imari ly inauthentic, arguing that, pr ior to their soothing effect o f community, they are first and foremost an endemic expression o f the k ind o f fear leveraged against the consumer in the momentum o f repetit ion's o w n social system: Repetition becomes pleasurable in the same way music becomes repetitive: by hypnotic effect.... [IJn a society in which power is so abstract that it can no longer be seized, in which the worst threat people feel is solitude and not alienation, conformity to the norm becomes the pleasure of belonging, and the acceptance of powerlessness takes root in the comfort of repetition. (N 125) The diff iculty, however, is accurately discerning what the nature o f this no rm is, what constitutes b l ind conformity, or innovative venture; what constitutes the mainstream, and what the marg ina l—be long ing to any community larger than onesel f beckons charges o f simply conforming to one's own subcultural norm. B u t these associations, necessarily based upon shared social practice, are what lend our l ives meaning. T o ral ly against them on the premise that they hinder f reedom is to participate in a self- imposed exile, to believe in the Enl ightenment myth o f the unencumbered self, and thus, to marginal ize the importance o f the very social ity A t ta l i seems to embrace. Paradoxical ly, this false concept ion o f self seems to be part o f the foundat ion for the alternative music practice At ta l i espouses. A l though At ta l i ' s denigration o f object fetishism and isolated consumpt ion o f recorded music is clearly predicated on a pr iv i leging o f the social, col lect ive, and thus communicat ive aspect o f l ive musical performance, his v is ion o f resistance at first seems based on a similar auto-aurality: 118 [W]e can envision one last network, beyond exchange, in which music could be lived as composition, in other words, in which it would be performed for the musician's own enjoyment, as self-communication, with no other goal than his own pleasure, as something fundamentally outside all communication, as self-transcendence, a solitary, egotistical, noncommercial act. (N 32) H i s v is ion o f the new compos i t ion is the anti-Dionysian: an Apo l l i n ian narcissism engaged in a metaleptic chain. Wh i l e he does concede that the w o r k o f this new composer may be heard by others, its own creative glance wou l d now be f ixed inward, rather than towards a l ive audience, or potential audio consumer. However , as the book funnels into the f inal chapter dedicated to sketching out the f ramework o f this new composi t ion, A t ta l i ' s model o f self-enclosing creativity opens somewhat to include the part ic ipat ion and appreciat ion o f others, implor ing us to create our own relation with the world and try to de other people into the meaning we thus create. That is what composing is. Doing solely for the sake of doing.... Playing for one's own pleasure, which alone can create the condition for new communication. (N 134) To be fair, A t ta l i ' s pessimism and precariously-balanced indiv idual ism seem entirely just i f ied and reasonable upon witnessing, even for f ive minutes, the state o f mainstream music today. A n d his prophesies for this new compos i t ion have been remarkably true: a burgeoning o f independent record labels, a resurgence in amateur music-making, and even the advent o f an entirely new musical vocabulary v ia computer-based composi t ion, fo l lowed (at their o w n paces) the publ icat ion o f his book. However , the scope o f this change also depends on where one fixes one's glance. 'P lay ing for one's o w n pleasure' and 'do ing solely for the sake o f do ing ' have never really disappeared, but survived wherever and whenever someone whist led a tune, drummed out a pattern w i th their fingers, or played the f iddle w i th their family in the kitchen. O f course, even at this suggestion, At ta l i has opportunity to interject: wh i ch tune were they whist l ing? In how many famil ies d id the fiddle playing 119 subside, or even stop? Aga in , the l ive and the technological intermingle in a perpetual dialectic o f un r e s t—o f Apo l l i n ian sol ipsism and D ionys ian ritual. In analyzing the complex interplay between the ontologies o f the l ive and the technological there exists an indisputable ambiguity o f their autonomies—indeed, their dist inction remains more than dubious. A n d yet, there are interstices o f resistance against repetit ion wh i ch inevitably occur: certainly there are networks o f 'new composers ' who are, i f not operating completely outside a capitalist system o f exchange, ho ld it at bay and maintain their pr ime focus, as At ta l i suggests, on the act o f music-making. B u t the resistance against repetit ion is even more than human resolve: to crudely appropriate Heidegger 's recurrent formulat ion o f essence, it is the liveness o f the l ive: the l ive is a resistance. It is a resistance because it is unnecessary, inefficient, and unpredictable. It is the countervai l ing force wh i ch balances the w i l l fo r its converse: necessity, efficiency, pred ictab i l i ty—dr ives wh i ch mark this age o f technicity in its own essence. E v en in some o f the most steadfast attempts at turning l ive performance into repet i t ion—independent ly o f conscious human subvers ion—this energy was able to maintain a resil ience against mass-produced repetition: the example o f the boot legger at the Shellac show; the rare and magnif icent breakdown in technological consistency wh i ch yie lded noise out o f a concerted arrangement for its absence; Everest ' s comments about the loss o f that certain, inexpressible something in spatially separating performers in the studio; the spontaneous preservation o f the pipe band wh ich catalyzed the creation o f a performance (one that wou l d have to be l ive and not recorded); and those events wh i ch are recorded, but stil l exist as representat ion—al l display this resistance. Desp i te the transformation o f the l istening publ ic 's attitudes into what seems an almost ubiquitous preference for mass-produced repetit ion, our o w n resil ience is required 120 to preserve and foster the seeds o f resil ience inhering in the music i tsel f so that we may, as At ta l i puts it, "make the free and revocable choice to interl ink w i th another's code—that is the right to compose one's l i fe" ( N 132). 121 CHAPTER I V SOUND AND POWER: EXPLORING FOUCAULT 'S PERFORMATIVITY Re-interpreting Nietzsche and Heidegger: Foucault on the Disciplined Mass Despi te the overwhelming influence N ietzsche has exerted on Foucau l t ' s phi losophy, both thematically, in terms o f his focus on the exercise o f power in relat ion to the body, and methodological ly, in executing his phi losophy as genealogy, Foucau l t never explores what is for N ietzsche an essential extension o f this relation: the operations o f music in terms o f power. In fact, Foucau l t ' s few comments on music occurr ing in one o f his later interviews gesture more towards the plural ism o f the later He idegger than the explos ive frenzy o f the Dionys ian. A f te r paraphrasing N ietzsche 's enthusiasm for "the pr imord ia l pleasure to be found in inf l ict ing, and suffering, pa in" ( f rom Beyond Good and Evil), James M i l l e r (in his Passion of Michel Foucault), then contends that "Discipline and Punish recapitulated N ietzsche 's argument, but it also extended it, showing how the modern human sciences had taken over the role o f Christ ianity in discipl ining the body . . . " (219). In his 1975 work, Discipline and Punish, Foucau l t ' s analysis o f power in relat ion to the body—and , most notably for the present purposes, groups o f bod ies—is an examinat ion that conveys a sense o f human performativ i ty that who l ly surpasses the very provis ional account o f corporeal i ty suggested in the wo rks o f N ietzsche and Heidegger. Indeed, Foucau l t ' s pluralistic understanding o f these discipl inary strategies suggests an essential transience o f these techniques (that their operations are by no means l imited to a single cultural practice), and thus intimates a possible transmutabil ity into the domain o f musical performance. A s Foucaul t explores h ow the mobi l ized mas s—f r om factory workers to mil i tary t ra inees—is infused w i th power, the way that these relations o f power are, paradoxical ly, as product ive as 122 they are constraining and as anonymous as they are seemingly locatable, we can observe some parallel relations in the performing mass o f the musical event. A l t hough there are many other texts in wh i ch Foucau l t addresses the question o f the body, Discipline and Punish is the key text fo r understanding corporeal i ty in musical performance. Howeve r , to open this discussion on Foucau l t and music, we w i l l first turn to his interview w i th Bou l ez , in wh i ch he makes some comments that indicate his relat ion to the later He idegger specif ical ly in terms o f the event. Foucault on Music, Plurality, Community Modera ted by Pierre Bou l e z and appearing in Lawrence D. K r i t zman ' s Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, some o f Foucau l t ' s comments from the 1983 discussion on "Contemporary M u s i c and Its Pub l i c " betray a stance on art and community characteristic o f the middle and later He idegger (Dreyfus, H F S A P ) . A l s o urg ing us to see music as an event invo lv ing (to phrase things in He idegger 's terminology) 'creators ' and 'preservers' alike, Foucau l t first reminds us o f music 's r itual history before turning his discussion to the aff irmative qual ity o f rock: One must take into consideration the fact that for a very long time music has been tied to social rites and unified by them.... Not only is rock music (much more than jazz used to be) an integral part of the life of many people, but it is a cultural initiator: to like rock, to like a certain kind of rock rather than another, is also a way of life, a manner of reacting; it is a whole set of tastes and attitudes.... Rock offers the possibility of a relation which is intense, strong, alive, "dramatic" (in that rock presents itself as a spectacle, that listening to it is an event and that it produces itself on stage), with a music that is itself impoverished, but through which the listener affirms himself; and with [avant-garde] music, one has a frail, faraway, hothouse, problematical relation with an erudite music from which the cultivated public feels excluded. One cannot speak of a single relation of contemporary culture to music in general, but of a tolerance, more or less benevolent, with respect to a plurality of musics. Each is granted the "right" to existence, and this right is perceived as an equality of worth. Each is worth as much as the group which practices or recognizes it. (Foucault, PPC 316) In this exchange w i th Bou lez , Foucau l t is quite keen to stress the historic role o f music as a marker, a signal o f a cultural event rather than as some aggregate o f works , and in so doing, 123 begins to move the discussion away from the initial top ic o f the avant-garde and its self-segregating life and into an explorat ion o f music as a space o f communi ty identity. Foucaul t sets rock (or its specif ic sub-genres) as an important hub o f indiv idual identity, a cultural space o f affi l iations and alliances that radiates beyond the moments o f musica l reception, despi te—as he is clear to ment ion—i ts inherently deficient musical properties. Foucau l t not only rejects judg ing the value o f a particular music on its formal musica l qualities, independent o f its aff irmative role in var ious communit ies; in fact, he equates music 's value w i th this very r o l e— l i k e He idegger (and N ietzsche to a certain degree), Foucau l t shifts the focus away from the isolated work , judged accord ing to its aesthetic principles, and onto music 's role as a cultural event. A s such, Foucau l t argues for a musical plural ism, grounded in the communit ies from wh i ch these musics spring, in wh i ch they are 'preserved' and wh ich they serve to enhance. E cho i ng Foucau l t ' s remarks, F r i th too declares the space o f music as one o f identity, difference, and plurality: Music constructs our sense of identity through the experiences it offers of the body, time, and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives.... Identity is necessarily a matter of ritual: it describes one's place in a dramatized pattern of relationships—one can never really express oneself "autonomously." Self identity is cultural identity; claims to individual difference depend on audience appreciation, on shared performing and narrative rules. Such rules are organized generically: different musical genres offer different narrative solutions to the recurring pop tensions between authenticity and artifice, sentimentality and realism, the spiritual and the sensual, the serious and the fun. Different musical genres articulate differently the central values of the pop aesthetic— spectacle and emotion, presence and absence, belonging and difference. (PR 275-6) In his article compar ing the two thinkers, Dreyfus contends that for the later Foucaul t and the later Heidegger, it is the plural ity and anarchic genesis o f these types o f 'gatherings' that open the possibi l i ty for temporary ruptures in modern technicity. Desp i te Foucau l t ' s characteristical ly N ietzschean resistance in endorsing any k ind o f s tab i l i t y—of history, o f the body, o f the se l f—Drey fus declares that "the Heidegger ian picture o f the way marginal practices coalesce to fo rm stable unities comes more and more to dominate Foucau l t ' s 124 account o f the history o f the Wes t " ( H F S A P ) . Indeed, Foucau l t ' s insistence that different musics l ive as the communit ies wh i ch preserve them certainly gestures towards the centripetal inc lus ion o f He idegger Ereignis. In He idegger 's own turn towards this marginality, his not ion o f preservation becomes paradoxical ly more concentrated, more potent as it spreads out to subsume a more differentiated, more local not ion of Ereignis—a space o f relations that Drey fus appropriately sees embodied in the everyday gatherings o f friendship: "Pract ices that produce such focal things as a celebratory meal or playing music together resist the push towards dispersion wh ich is the fl ip side o f technicity's tendency toward tota l izat ion" ( H F S A P ) . In his article, "Semios is o f L isten ing: The Other in Heidegger 's Wr i t ings on Ho lde r l i n and Ce lan 's 'The Mer i d i an , ' " K r z y s z t o f Z ia rek also distinguishes the essence o f the later He idegger ' s not ion o f preserving in terms o f an aural Mitsein, declaring that "the question o f being as such or o f event (Ereignis) wou l d have to be approached f rom the point o f v i ew o f l istening and "fr iendship" w i th others rather than through the conjunct ion—the Same (das Selbe)—of being and human being (th inking)" (130). I f we concede the appropriateness o f inc luding the later Foucau l t ' s remarks on music and community, for h im and the later Heidegger, Ereignis becomes the al lowance o f zusammen(ge)hdren, 'that wh i ch belongs together, ' and finally now, as the etymology has always suggested, 'that wh i ch belongs together in l istening.' Music as Means of Political Training, Music as Means of Political Resistance Whi l e it seems that the pol i t ics o f marginal practices in the later He idegger and the later Foucau l t might yield, by way o f extrapolation, similar portraits o f the musical event, Foucau l t ' s N ietzschean focus on the body as a site o f power suggests prob ing the 'micro-physics o f power ' o f Discipline and Punish in order to better understand the corporeal 125 component o f musical performance. In fact, though not a surpris ing oversight where Heidegger is concerned but a more conspicuous omiss ion in the case o f Nietzsche, the importance o f the b o d y — a body that moves and touches—in musica l performance has been all but suppressed as a theme in our discussion. A n d yet, the entrance into a somewhat different relat ion both w i th one's o w n body, as we l l as the bodies o f other audience members, is, in some varieties o f performance, an integral part o f what sets the event as distinct f r om the everyday. Indeed, it is almost exclusively in the extraordinary events o f the day—those events that in some way stand apart f r om everyday norma lcy—that we see a temporary suspension o f the taboo against close and unnecessary physical contact w i th strangers: publ ic celebrations, demonstrations, and musical performances are the most conspicuous examples o f this social anomaly. A s Canett i explains, the prohibit ion against touch ing pervades our normal daily activities, and it is only in certain types o f gatherings and under certain circumstances that this sanction is made to recede: The repugnance to being touched remains with us when we go about among people; the way we move in a busy street, in restaurants, trains or buses, is governed by it. Even when we are standing next to them and are able to watch and examine them closely, we avoid actual contact if we can.... It is only in a crowd that man can become free of this fear of being touched.... The crowd he needs is the dense crowd, in which body is pressed to body; a crowd, too, whose psychical constitution is also dense, or compact, so that he no longer notices who it is that presses against him. As soon as a man has surrendered himself to the crowd, he ceases to fear its touch. Ideally, all are equal there; no distinctions count, not even that of sex. The man pressed against him is the same as himself. He feels him as he feels himself. Suddenly it is as though everything were happening in one and the same body. This is perhaps one of the reasons why a crowd seeks to close in on itself: it wants to rid each individual as completely as possible of the fear of being touched. (15-6) In those musical events in wh i ch the audience is expected to stand, often the normal stricture against this physical contact is ignored: it is not unusual for people to c r owd in close together even when plenty o f other space is available. F o r as long as the music plays, this physical closeness remains acceptable, but its finish ushers in a gradual re-init iat ion o f usual distance-126 standing practices unt i l the c r owd finally disperses comp le te l y—in short, the music sustains the abatement o f this rule. However , as Canett i notes, it is not this physical closeness that is the essential mark o f the c r owd—th i s spatial arrangement o f bodies exists as much in the subway car as in the cafe concer t—but rather the possible coro l lary consol idat ion o f its 'psychical const i tut ion' or mood that is the latent end and true cornerstone o f the gathering: "It is for the sake o f this blessed moment, when no-one is greater or better than another, that people become a c r o w d " (18). A n d as the music stops and the c r owd dissipates, so does the relative density o f its m o o d — t h e sense o f unity, as Canett i also contends, is at base i l lusory and ephemeral. Indeed, the history o f l ive musical performance is not only the history o f its sounds, o f its noises and o f ways o f listening, but also the history o f its mot ion, its gestures, and its behav iours—in Foucau ld ian terms, it is the history o f a physical training. Contrast the portrait o f the 18 t h century audience Goehr provides at the beginning o f our d i scuss ion—a scene o f sociality, o f request and app lause—wi th Canett i 's picture o f the contemporary concert scene founded upon physical restraint: Here everything depends on the audience being completely undisturbed; any movement is frowned on, any sound taboo. Though the music performed draws a good part of its life from its rhythm, no rhythmical effect of any sort on the listeners must be perceptible. The continually fluctuating emotions set free by the music are of the most varied and intense kind. Most of those present must feel them and, in addition, must feel them together, at the same time. But all outward reactions are prohibited. People sit there motionless, as though they managed to hear nothing. It is obvious that a long and artificial training in stagnation has been necessary here. We have grown accustomed to its results, but, to an unprejudiced mind, there are few phenomena of our cultural life so astonishing as a concert audience. (37) Where we wou l d generally speak o f the way that music determines movement, the way that it seems to 'make us move, ' Canett i 's example shows clearly that those social codes particular to each brand o f performance are able to make the audience channel, or in this case, repress, these energies accordingly. B y examining the trajectories o f power Foucau l t charts in the 127 discipl ined mass, w e can then relate this training to N ietzsche 's D ionys ian and Heidegger 's not ion o f attunement to the event—to understand it, in fact, as part o f a social mood . In Discipline and Punish, Foucau l t explores the history o f the body in terms o f its training, impel l ing the reader to recognize its instability, its contingency, in fact, to address its public agency as an instrument in var ious systems o f power. Indeed, fo l low ing N ietzsche 's tenet o f the w i l l to power as an arrangement o f drives, Foucau l t understands the body as a shift ing mult ip l ic i ty o f forces, constructed and conf igured by the anonymous and greater network o f power-relat ions in wh i ch it is perpetually invo lved. A n important part o f his project in Discipline and Punish is to question the assumption that since contemporary Western society has curtai led its use o f violent punishment as a discipl inary strategy, we have thus 'progressed beyond ' the exercise o f a crude and brutal f o rm o f dominat ion over others, past a subjection that is 'merely ' physical. Rather, f o r Foucaul t , the present age is marked by a more insidious brand o f dominat ion and subjection actual ly due in part to an i l lusory bel ief in such progress. A s Foucau l t puts it in an interview from 1977, " [PJower in the West is what displays itself the most, and thus, what hides i tsel f the best . . . " ( P P C 118). Assert ing that even where overt physical v io lence is not present and other forms o f discipline are preferred, nonetheless, " i t is always the body that is at i ssue—the body and its forces, their uti l i ty and their doci l i ty, their distr ibution and their submiss ion" (Foucault, D P 172). This prompts h im to investigate the more subtle operations o f power, mak ing detailed observations about what he calls a "new 'microphys ics ' o f power " as vis ible in the performed gestures o f the discipl ined individual, as wel l as the col lect ive, body (Foucault, D P 183). Thus, in defining the essence o f discipl ine as this emergent relat ion o f "doci l i ty-ut i l i ty," Foucaul t explains that "[gjeneral ly speaking, it might be said that the discipl ines are 128 techniques for assuring the ordering o f human mult ip l ic i t ies" ( D P 181,207). Referr ing to the mechanistic relationship to the body associated w i th the mil i tary trainee and the factory worker , Foucau l t contends that in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the disciplines became general formulas of domination.... The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was bora, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, or at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior.... [I]t defined how one may have a hold of others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience.) (DP 181-2). Foucaul t is clear to maintain that these techniques were by no means l imited to one discipl inary institution, but that he is, in fact, interested in attempting to "map, on a series o f examples, some o f the essential techniques that most easily spread from one to another" (DP 183). A s M i chae l M a h o n writes in Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject, "Other examples cou ld have come from techniques o f co lonizat ion, slavery and chi ld rearing. Thus, Foucau l t insists that discipl inary penal practices were consistent w i th general cultural pract ices" (148). T o be sure, Foucaul t does not intend to suggest that these transitive techniques are present wi th in musical performance, or any art event for that matter. However , the not ion that the body is trained, held, and made doci le w i th in a repetit ion o f coded gestures is a model that can be transposed onto an understanding o f the "ho ld over others' bodies" that N ietzsche and Heidegger have both conceptual ized through the Dionys ian and attunement, respect ive ly—seen in relation to these two thinkers, Foucau l t ' s attention to the rec iprocal relation between physical ity and social ity can broaden our model to include this component in its situatedness. 129 Indeed, there is an undeniable sense o f performativity that courses through Foucau l t ' s work, and not simply in his descriptions o f bodies in mot ion, but most important ly and essentially in his insinuation o f a certain surrogacy in these gestures, o f an agency that is as Heidegger 's Dasein, that is neither who l ly internal nor who l ly external, but ' i s ' as being-in-the wo r l d—tha t sense o f an ontological (dis)possession in wh i ch one only ' i s ' as an attempt to be some self as determined by the other. However , in his wr i t ten works , Foucau l t neglects embarking upon any significant investigation o f sound and power—indeed , it is the explorations o f movement, gesture, and the sway o f the gaze— i t is visuality—that thoroughly dominates his analysis o f power-relations. A n d yet, just as the etymologies o f the German words Stimmung and gehdren have suggested an essential musical i ty in mood and belonging, Ihde reminds us that the La t i n etymology o f the Eng l i sh 'obey' el icits an integral l ink between vo ice and the exercise o f power: The languages which relate hearing to the invading features of sound often consider the auditory presence as a type of "command." Thus hearing and obeying are often united in root terms. The Latin obaudire is literally meant as a listening "from below." It stands as a root source of the English obey. (LV 81) Foucau l t ' s concern w i th the body nevertheless remains an appropriate foca l point: power is kinetic, power moves, but power also speaks to catalyze, accompany, and announce the motions o f its systems. P owe r is articulated in the vo ice o f G o d , the vo ice o f the leader, in the sounds o f natural disasters, and in the sounds o f violence and war. Indeed, clearly showing his debt to Foucau l t ' s rhetoric, A t ta l i contends that understanding the role o f sound in the exercise o f power is key, that it is first and most elementally the sonic phenomena o f the wor ld , and not the v isual ones, wh i ch announce the operations o f power in l inguistic, social, and corporeal systems: More than colors and forms, it is sounds and their arrangements that fashion societies.... Everywhere codes analyze, mark, restrain, train, repress, and channel the primitive sounds of language, of the body, of tools, of objects, of the relations to self and others. 130 All music, any organization of sounds is then a tool for the creation or consolidation of a community, of a totality. (N 6) Sound and music then, by Foucau l t ' s own account, can be understood as disciplines, as 'techniques for assuring the ordering o f human mult ipl ic it ies. ' A s At ta l i later declares, "Mus i c , the quintessential mass activity, l ike the crowd, is simultaneously a threat and a necessary source o f legit imacy; try ing to channel it is a r isk that every system o f power must run" ( N 14). D iscuss ing the exercise o f such power in one o f Foucau l t ' s most conspicuous themes, namely, mil i tary discipline, in his book, The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich, M i chae l H . Ka te r describes rhythm precisely in terms o f its use in training soldiers to move, and thus feel, l ike a single entity: Quite apart from its military purposes in war, the march was a conditioner of totalitarian rule. "The more uniformly and rhythmically all are marching in step, the greater will be the inner unity of the troops," preached Ludwig Kelbetz; "for the musician this physical-rhythmic basic training is of particular significance." (142) Rhy thm is a discipl ine. A s discipline, it forces the audience into a Foucau ld ian doci l ity, that is, into a complacent pliability, in the same fashion as the other discipl ines: as the reference point o f performed repetit ion. A casual glance at history suggests that the power-el ites o f many pol i t ical systems have long understood music in the terms At ta l i describes above, and thus, apparently also concur w i th the conc lus ion we were able to draw out o f Foucault: as a discipl ine, music can mobi l ize a mass, and as such, can arrange these bodies into per forming sanctioned or unsanctioned motions. Unw i l l i ng to r isk 'channel ing' this volat i l i ty, governments l ike the Iranian Ayato l l ah have simply chosen to ban music altogether. Converse ly, others have elected to employ music, kept on a short rein, as another arm, or rather, another mouthpiece, o f the state. Wh i l e discussing the ideal state in the Republic, Socrates warns that "the guardians must beware o f changing to a new fo rm o f music, since it threatens the who le 131 system. A s D a m o n says, and I am convinced, the musical modes are never changed without change in the most important o f a c i ty 's l aws" (99). A n d in the Chinese "Reco rd o f M u s i c " f rom the Li chi, dated at approximately the third or second century B .C .E . , Confuc ius writes that the "the object o f the ancient k ings in their practice o f music was to br ing their government into harmony w i th those laws (o f heaven and earth). I f it was good, then the conduct (o f the people) was l ike the virtue (o f their super iors)" (106). At ta l i also notes that, in the middle ages, "Char lemagne wou l d forge the cultural and pol i t ical unity o f his k ingdom by imposing the universal practice o f Gregor ian chant, resort ing to armed force to accompl ish that end" ( N 14). However , examining the most conspicuous and thorough example o f this conjoining o f music and polit ics, Ka te r describes in detail the myr iad ways that the N a z i administration sought to invest i tself into nearly every aspect o f German musical life: From the moment it came to power in 1933, the Nazi regime was bent on receiving and coordinating musical practice in conventional institutions such as schools and even the churches as well as the family, which continued to be regarded as the smallest cell in the racially determined body politic. Music was viewed as a convenient form of cement between the rulers and their people. As Joseph Goebbels had long since found out, music possessed vast propagandistic potential through which the collective mood of the subjects could be controlled; it could also be used to dress up important nationalistic incentives for presentation to the public, and it could serve as a vehicle for various regime messages and slogans. Starting at the lowest echelon of communal living, the primary social unit of the family, the medium to effect this musical bonding was Hausmusik, that is, music performed in one's own house or home. The term Hausmusik was not an invention of the Nazis, nor of course was the actual article, but it had never before been politicized to the extent that they would attempt. (130-1) F r o m ancient Ch ina to N a z i Germany, hierarchical power has seized the opportunity to employ music as a means o f pol i t ical training. A n d yet, as we are prepared to impl icate music as the piper 's song that leads us into these descr ibed—and other more horr i f i c—ends, as we remind ourselves that it was A d o l f H i t le r ' s favourite opera, Die Meistersinger von Numberg, that sounded the beginning o f the infamous Nuremberg rallies, what we ought to be mal igning is not music at all, but rather language: it is only through language, either in the 132 text o f the w o r k itself, or in the specif ic f raming o f its presentation, that music becomes a call to terror. M u s i c is undoubtedly intoxicating, but it is most often the linguistic discourse surrounding its presentation wh i ch suggests the particular ways that this energy is to be channeled. Where we shudder in pit ied disbel ief at the frightening, nearly hypnot ic levels o f solidarity init iated by the sounds o f the Nuremberg rallies, we must also consider the gathering power that the song " W e Shal l Ove r come" held for those at the forefront o f the C i v i l R ights movement in A m e r i c a — a movement that, as R o n Eye rman and And rew Jamison declare in their book, Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in the Twentieth Century, "was a singing movement par excel lence" (171). It is because o f the manner in wh i ch this movement was framed, in musical text and cultural agenda, that the strength o f its musical sol idarity invigorates not fear, but hope. A s At ta l i notes, "W i t h music is born power and its opposite: subvers ion" ( N 6; my gloss). Or, as Foucau l t puts it in more general terms in a 1977 interview w i th Bernard-Henr i Levy , " I am just saying: as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibi l i ty o f a resistance. W e can never be ensnared by power: we can always modi fy its grip in determinate condit ions and accord ing to a precise strategy" ( P P C 123). T o take another example o f how music might serve as a space o f resistance, dur ing the '90s, the feminist-inspired punk rock movement known as R i o t G r r r l was able to mobi l ize strategies that wou l d successfully turn musical events across N o r t h Amer i ca into temporari ly aff irmative spaces. A s Theo Catefor is and E lena Humphreys relay this sense o f l iberation in "Const ruc t ing Commun i ty Identities: R i o t G r r r l N e w Y o r k C i ty " : Where women musicians in punk traditionally had found themselves objectified under the gaze of a primarily male audience, Riot Grrrl performances subverted such situations. During Double Zero's performances, band and audience were equal participants in the masquerade. (330) 133 A n d yet, this passage points to the very same paradox from The Birth of Tragedy: there seems, in this situation, a simultaneous increase and level ing o f power: increased in the Nietzschean sense o f an indiv idual 's enhanced sense o f power, but also equal ized, leveled, in terms o f indiv idual agency in the event itself. Indeed, reading Foucau l t ' s sense o f the performing body in Discipline and Punish w i th the musical event in mind suggests a more complex account o f this group dynamic. A n d whi le it is necessary to locate the individual body as the mechanism o f the performance, Foucau l t ' s rather complex, hermeneutic not ion o f power-relat ions as operative in the discipl ined mass can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding o f the body 's place wi th in the col lect ive experience o f music, within, as At ta l i puts it earlier, the 'consol idat ion o f a community. ' A s a publ ic r itual and an expression o f community, the musica l event has its own set o f codi f ied bodi ly gestures. In precisely those moments when one feels the ecstatic sense o f freedom and self-abandon in mov ing to the music, one's body is not only 'he ld ' by the power o f music but by the coded norms o f gesture pecul iar to that event. A s N ie tzsche observes, in the D ionys ian dithyramb "the entire symbol ism o f the body is cal led into play, not the mere symbol ism o f the lips, face and speech but the who le pantomime o f dancing, forc ing every member into rhythmic movement" ( B o T 40). Foucaul t discusses the simultaneously comparative, differentiating, and homogeniz ing character o f such normal izat ion: [I]t refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward which one must move.... In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences. (DP 195-6) 134 A s the micro-physics o f power is "exercised rather than possessed" it is "sometimes extended by the pos i t ion o f those who are dominated" and similarly, for v isual surveil lance in " its funct ioning.. . from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bo t tom to top and lateral ly. . ." ( D P 174,192). F o r example, in a musical event that often lauds its anarchic nature, hardcore punk performances show that they too operate accord ing to a set o f coded movements, enacted wi th in this hermeneutic o f the col lect ive. A t one o f their Vancouver shows, the lead singer o f N e w Y o r k ' s H 2 0 decreed that he wanted " to see a 'c i rc le p i t ' " at the front o f the c rowd. When the band started the next song, listeners nearest to the stage began mov ing—hal f -danc ing, ha l f - running—in a counter-c lockwise direct ion, shoving and being shoved in the me l ee—a scene perhaps resembling the D ionys ian. F o r the next two songs, this enthusiastic, ritualistic display continued. W e can only assume f rom the body language o f these listeners that they were experiencing something intense, perhaps even a sense o f frenzy, as they danced to the music. However , what looks to be an anarchic sense o f freedom is experienced wi th in a musical ly-enhanced doci l i ty. Paradoxica l ly, the indiv idual feels this exalted sense o f power in submitt ing to the music and, in a strong physical sense, other l is teners—this ecstasis is centered upon a wi l l fu l submission, a k ind o f masochist ic pleasure in subjecting oneself to, as Foucau l t states, 'a rule to be fo l l owed. ' Aga in , we are reminded that even the D ionys ian is, l ike the musical event itself, framed in its trajectory and, as such, never who l l y severed from its Apo l l in ian companion. D i ony su s Rev i s i t e d : N ie tzsche , He idegge r , F o u c a u l t The hermeneutic perspectives o f N ietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucau l t al l, in var ious ways and to var ious degrees, suggest a difference between the vo ice o f music and the vo ice o f the everyday, that a certain shift occurs when something is, for example, sung rather than 135 spoken. A n d whi le the consol idat ion o f community is a consistent theme in their discussions o f l istening and music, the enigma o f this presence amidst a radical historical ity, and, in corol lary, the equivocal relations between individual and col lect ive, are approached somewhat differently by each thinker. Sometimes employing a language all their own, and sometime appropriat ing the language o f others, these th inkers—Nie tzsche in expl ic it ly musical terms, He idegger across existential, aural, and aesthetic planes, and Foucaul t according to corporeal i ty and powe r—a l l attempt to convey a hermeneutic understanding o f col lect ive human relations that, in all these capacities, contributes to a more situated understanding o f the musical event. A s we have seen them in relat ion to each other, and in relation to those on their trai l in the disciplines o f mus ico logy and acoustic science/communication, all three thinkers help us move away from the concept o f an isolated musical w o r k and point to musical performance as an important and extraordinary event that, l iterally and metaphorical ly, gathers people together. Th is tri-partite genealogy, composed o f its own consonant and dissonant elements, offers a heterogeneous understanding o f performance as this gathering, a differentiated model that finds it scope in the congruencies and confrontations arising within, and out of, this dialogue. The p ivota l question o f this gathering, however, must be addressed—as our Heidegger ian crit ique o f N ietzsche has demonstrated—also as fusion, not only in its potential confl ict. A n d yet, as we have revisited the D ionys ian in relation to He idegger and Foucault , we have not negated its overal l intensity, but have instead shown the breadth o f its relevance to a host o f contemporary musical events: wi th in these spaces remains the possibi l i ty o f transformation and ecstasy. 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