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Managing a harvestable resource : individual transferable harvest quotas in the Lake Huron commercial.. Jaffray, Beverley Ann 1994-12-31

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MANAGINGA HARVESTABLERESOURCE:INDIVIDUALTRANSFERABLEHARVESTQUOTASIN ThE LAKEHURON COMMERCIALFISHERYbyBEVERLEYANN JAFFRAYB.A., YorkUniversity, 1979M.A., The Universityof Toronto, 1981A THESIS SUBMITFEDIN PARTIAL FULFILMENTOF THE REQUIREMENTSFOR THE DEGREEOFDOCTOR OFPHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTYOF GRADUATESTUDIESINTERDISCIPLINARYSTUDIES (RESOURCEMANAGEMENTSCIENCE)We acceptthis thesis as conformingt the requiredstandardTHE UMVERSITYOF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril 19930Beverley Ann Jaffray,1993In presenting this thesisin partial fulfilment ofthe requirements for an advanceddegree at the Universityof British Columbia, Iagree that the Library shall make itfreely available for referenceand study. I further agreethat permission for extensivecopying of this thesis forscholarly purposes maybe granted by the head of mydepartment or by his orher representatives.It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesisfor financial gain shall notbe allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department ofThe University of BritishColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate/,d//c/DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTMuch has been written on the theoretical implications and postulatedimpacts ofindividual transferable harvest quotas (ITHQ), but there have been fewempirical studiesof the development and implementation process, the impacts of thisprocess and theimpacts of ITHQ in a Great Lakes fishery. In 1984, Ontario implementedITHQ forselected commercial fish species. The objectives of thisstudy are: (1) to identify andunderstand the impacts of ITHQ; (2) to detail the linkages between these impactsand theapplication of fisheries management interventions derived from the bioeconomicmodel(which is the theoretical origin of ITHQ); and (3) to further our understandingof theprocess of ITHQ development and implementation and the impacts ofthis process ofdevelopment and implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives inthe comanagement theory of resource management and in three policy processmodels.The study area was the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron commercialfishery.Data were obtained from annual harvest reports filedby commercial fishers over the1980-1985 time period and through interviews with commercial fishers,fisheriesmanagers and scientists. Data on 1986-1989 harvest amounts and valueswas alsoobtained from the provincial data base.In the two years following ITHQ implementation, there was little traceableimpacton either the harvest amounts or values of the two principal commercialspecies, butthere was a trend toward a reduction in capacity of the fishery. ITHQ’smost importanteffects appears to have been on the organization of labour andcapital in the fishery.Commercial fishing activities have not generated major instabilities; it isthe ecologicalphenomena that most affect harvest amounts, species and values.Other policy impacts, however, are complex and difficult to identify and analyze.Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the social impacts from changes inthe structure of the industry are intricate; and some aspects of policy implementation may11be too inflexible. Analysis of qualitative data suggests several conclusivelinkagesbetween the process of ITHQ development and implementation and itseffectiveness. Inthis regard, adequacy of stock assessment information, effectivenessof consultation andlevel of attention to social context were found to be of importance.The co-management model was found to providea strong basis for explanationand understanding of the impacts of the process of ITHQdevelopment andimplementation in the community of resource users because therelationships itincorporates overtly address decision-making processes relatedto the adaptation of newideas, arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extentof change. Theco-management model suggests that incorporation of resourceusers’ collective strengthsand organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developedandimplemented cooperatively with resource users would lead tomore efficient, effectiveand sustainable management regimes. Transaction costs, in particular,may besignificantly reduced in a co-managed fishery where specifiedcommunity characteristicsexist.Development and implementation processes for ITHQ in Lake Huronwere viewedas the interaction of rational, incremental and interest group decision-making processes.Findings suggest that social issues of autonomy, equityand a broad basis ofunderstanding are as important as those of economic efficiency, and thatif not dealt with,these issues can significantly impact the efficacy of managementinterventions.This study is significant because it addressesanalysis of common propertyproblems through utilizing the analytical powers derived frommodels dealing withbiological, economic and political relationships to examinea regulatory policy applicationin a field situation (after Ostrom 1992).111TABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT . iiTABLE OF CONTENTS ivLIST OF FIGURES .viiLIST OF TABLES viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix1.0 INTRODUCTION 11.1 Objectives 21.2 Rationale for the Study . . 41.3 Statement of the Problem 41.4 The Study Area 51.5 Definition of Individual Transferable Harvest Quota 51.6 Organization of the Thesis 62.0 SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE, ITS INTERPRETATION ANDAPPLICATION 72.1 The Common Property Paradigm 82.1.1 Definition 82.1.2 The common property paradigm as adapted for fisheries . 102.2 Development and Application of the Bioeconomic Model inFisheries Management 122.2.1 Biological models in fisheries management 132.2.2 The bioeconomic model 142.2.3 Interpretation and application of the bioeconomic models . 182.3 Rationale For and Use of Individual Transferable Harvest Quotasin Fisheries Management 202.3.1 The case for ITHQ 212.3.2 Applications of ITHQ 26Management Concerns 26Social Impacts 302.4 The Co-Management Model 342.4.1 Defmition of co-management 342.4.2 Errors in understanding commons systems 352.4.3 Features of co-management regimes . . 462.4.4 Sub-section summary and conclusion . . 482.5 Policy Process Models 492.5.1 The rational actor model 50iv2.5.2 The incrementalmodel532.5.3 The interest group model582.6 Chapter Summary andConclusion603.0 DATA COLLECTION653.1 The Quantitative Data663.1.1 Source and limitsof the quantitative data663.1.2 Method of analysisof quantitative data .673.2 The Qualitative Data683.2.1 Source and limits ofthe qualitative data703.2.2 Selection of respondentsand interview strategy703.2.3 Method fOr analysisof qualitative data723.3 Summary and Conclusion744.0 A CRITICAL EVALUATIONOF DEVELOPMENTANDIMPLEMENTATION OFITHQ754.1 Developmentof Quota Regulation754.2 Trends in Lake Huron’sCommercial Fish Stocks774.2.1 Historical trendsin the Lake Huron commercialharvest . 774.2.2 Recent trendsin the Lake Huron commercialharvest . . . 794.2.3 Conclusionsand implications on stock management814.3 Development and Implementationof ITHQ814.3.1 Policy objectives forOntario’s commercial fisheries. . . . 814.3.2 Why ITHQ WasImplemented and the Roleof theCommittee on Modernizingthe Commercial FisheryinOntario834.3.3 Determination of spatialdistribution of implementationofITHQ884.3.4 The allocation process90Determination of time of implementation92Determination of theamount of allocation94The role of the Lake HuronQuota Review Committee. . . 95Determination of changesin ITHQ amount974.3.5 Incidental catchand government stocking programs994.4 Analysis of the PolicyProcess1024.4.1 The impact ofincremental decision making1024.4.2 The influence ofspecial interests1044.5 Summary and Conclusion1055.0 RESULTS OF ANALYSISOF QUANTITATIVE ANDQUALITATIVEDATA1075.1 Results of the Analysisof Quantitative Data1075.1.1 Overharvestand the price of fish1085.1.2 Overcapacity and organizationof the industry116VNumber of commercial fishing operations116Changes in the number of operationsrelative to theirharvest and investment amounts.117Total investment1205.1.3 Employment1205.2 Results of Analysis of QualitativeData . 1245.2.1 Changing quotaallocations1245.2.2 Uncertainty and quotatransfer . . 1275.2.3 Spatial distribution . . .1295.2.4 Problems in calculatingallocations1315.2.5 Incidental catch1335.2.6 Limits on fishers’ decision-making1375.2.7 Marketing quota value1415.2.8 Seasonal patterns of harvest. . . 1435.3 Summary and Conclusion1446.0 ITHQ IMPACTS AND MODELSOF PUBLIC POLICY1476.1 Predicted Impacts1476.2 Alternative Explaination of Impacts. . . 1516.3 Summary and Conclusion1567.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS1587.1 Research Objectives and ITHQ Objectives1607.2 Principle Findings1617.3 Principle Findings of PolicyProcess Analysis of ITHQDevelopment and Implementation1627.4 Principle Conclusions from Co-managementTheory Analysis . . 1647.5 Relation to Current Research171BIBLIOGRAPHY174APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE ANNUAL COMMERCIALFISHING REPORT.... 184APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE185APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTSAND AFFILIATIONS191viLIST OF FIGURESFigure 2.1:Figure 2.2:Figure 2.3:Figure 2.4:Figure 4.1:Figure 5.1:Figure 5.2:Figure 5.3:Figure 5.4:Figure 5.5:Figure 5.6:Figure 5.7:Figure 5.8:Figure 5.9:Figure 5.10:The Bioeconomic Model15The Rational Model52The Incremental Model55The Interest Group Model59Quota Areas in Lake Huron89Average Price per Pound and Total Harvest of Whitefish,1980-1985109Total Harvest and Total Value of Whitefish,1980-1985 110Total Harvest and Total Value of Whitefish,1986-1989 111Average Price per Pound and Total Harvest ofChub, 1980-1985113Total Harvest and Total Value of Chub, 1980-1985114Total Harvest and Total Value of Chub, 1986-1989115Total Number and Percentage of Small and LargeCommercialFishing Operations on Lake Huron, 1980-1985118Percentage Changes in Numbers of Operations byInvestment andHarvest Categories, 1980-1985119Total Investment in Commercial Fishing Operationson LakeHuron 1980-1985121Number of Persons Employed in the Lake HuronCommercialFishing Industry, 1980-1985123viiLIST OF TABLESTable 4.1: Sport Fish Planted in Lake Huron,1980-198785Table 6.1: Predicted Impacts148Table 6.2: Unpredicted Impacts152viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI am grateful to the Ontario Ministryof Natural Resources, Ontario RenewableResources Research Grant Program forthe funding which allowed me to initiateworkon this project (Dr. A. P. Grima, Universityof Toronto, principle researcher).To allthose who assisted me during the courseof the project, I extend my sincereappreciation.ix1.0 INTRODUCTIONThis research describes and analyzes expected and unintended outcomesof theindividual transferable harvest quota (ITHQ) policy in the Canadian portion ofthe LakeHuron commercial fishery.This chapter introduces the research topic, briefly describes the researchobjectives, rationale, problem statement, and the geographical, temporal and conceptualparameters, and outlines the organization of the study.Fisheries management is just beginning to recognize and incorporate informationon Canada’s Great Lakes fisheries derived from the social sciences. In the past,managers of fisheries have relied on biological data bases built on stock assessment andnarrowly selected environmental indicators. More recently, in accordance with aninternational agreement to encompass an “ecosystem approach” (i.e. Great Lakes WaterQuality Agreement 1978) (IJC 1978) and a general shift towards a more holistic,environmentally-oriented perspective, these managers have incorporated a broader,systemic approach in their management decisions. Coincident with this shift in thinkingis the growth of societal interest in environmental and resource management, andincreasing pressures on the fishery.These pressures have taken many forms. Some of the more significant originatefrom societal uses of the fishery resource and habitat. Activities such as waste disposal,agricultural practices and near-shore developments have impacts on the environment, interms of water quality degradation and destruction of habitat. Increased harvesting bycommercial and sport fisheries and predation by lamprey (first introduced into the GreatLakes through activities associated with commercial shipping) constitute additionalstresses originating in human activities.1These stresses may often act synergistically, creatinga complex, interactiveenvironment hostile to the fishery. It has been apparentfor some time thatbiologicalinterventions alone (e.g. conservation-oriented measuresto protect spawning)are aninadequate management tactic, and that effectivemanagement practicesmust encompasssocietal as well as biological aspects of management.In working tomaintain a healthyfishery, managers are explicitly seeking a range ofmanagement solutions which takeaccount of socially embedded contributing factors, notbiological ones alone.Initial steps towards an understanding of how bothnatural and social sciences cancontribute to resource management are encouraging.An important part of the researchpresented in this document is a case study examinationof the application of a policystrategy derived from the bioeconomic model’ ofresource management which dependson inputs from both biological and social sciences.1. 1 ObjectivesThis study examines the implementation of ITHQin the management of the LakeHuron commercial fishery. The objectives of the studyare:(1) to identify and understand the impacts of ITHQ itself;(2) to detail the linkages between these impacts and the applicationof fisheriesmanagement interventions derived from the bioeconomicmodel (which isthe theoretical origin of ITHQ); and(3) to further our understanding of the process of ITHQ development andimplementation and the impacts of this processof development andimplementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectivesin the co-managementtheory of resource management and in three policyprocess models.1Usage of the definite article notwithstanding, the versionpresented in this thesisis a very simplified version of the bioeconomic model.2These objectives will be met by pursuing the following lines of inquiry.(1) Describing the theoretical background, and the process by which ITHQwas developed as a management strategy.(2) Assessing ITHQ with reference to the theoretically expected advantages(i.e. effectiveness in controlling capacity, distribution of benefits,adaptability to changing conditions in technology, reduced administrativecomplexity, and provision of increased security for fishers about theirfishing rights) and extensive data requirements (i.e. requirement for stockassessment data, need for species-specific quotas, difficulties in adjustmentof quotas),2as well as some new findings in the area of social impacts(i.e. autonomy, market innovation, etc.).(3) Utilizing the analytical approaches of the incremental and interest groupmodels of public policy to understand how the process of policydevelopment and implementation can affect ITHQ policy outcomes so thatthe outcomes may either vary from those expected or may be alternativelyexplained.The theoretical constructs behind ITHQ do not always transfer easily to the realworld (Larkin 1977; Regier and McCracken 1975). This research does not evaluate theability of alternative models of public policy to explain what happened. Rather, it appliesa variety of models in order to better understand how theoretically derived managementoptions may work in application.2These criteria are similar to those discussed by Pearse (1980) and others (e.g.Anderson 1987; Beddington and Rettig 1984; Scott and Neher 1981).31.2 Rationale for the StudyThis case study examines the impacts of the implementation of a theoreticallyderived regulatory strategy (i.e. ITHQ3)in the Lake Huron commercial fishery.Muchhas been written on the theoretical implications and postulated impacts of ITHQ, butthere have been few empirical studies of the process and impacts of ITHQ in a GreatLakes fishery (Berkes and Pocock 1987 is a notable exception. Studies from elsewhereare cited in section 2.3.2).The method of this case study incorporates some elements of a sociological oranthropological case study (i.e. open-ended interviews with key actors) and complementsthis qualitative information with broader statistical descriptions of the economic andbiological components of the fishery. The method of this thesis combines the strengthsof biological, economic and institutional analyses to address some of the weaknesses inprevious research.1.3 Statement of the ProblemThe specific research questions are:(1) what were the impacts of ITHQ (over the study period) and the processof development and implementation of ITHQ in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery; and(2) how does the co-management process of resource management and thedescriptive powers of selected public policy models help to improveunderstanding of ITHQ as a management option?ITHQ refers to a harvest allocation assigned to a commercial fishing licence,specific to species and area. ITHQ, as regulated by the government of the province ofOntario, can be transferred through sale, lease or repossession by government.41.4 The Study AreaThe commercial fishery in the Canadian portionof Lake Huron4 is thearea ofstudy. The period 1980-1985 brackets the implementation5of ITHQin the fishery. TheLake Huron commercial fishery supports a relatively modestnumber of fishingoperations (less than 100), and is based on two principalcommercial species, whitefish(Coregonus culpeaformis) and chub (Coregonus spp.). Theseconditions, together withrecent efforts focusing on Great Lakes’ fishery management, andthe initiation of ITHQin the Lake Huron fishery, make it an attractive choicefor a study of this type.1.5 Definition of Individual Transferable Harvest QuotaITHQ is defined as an exact allocation of a number ofpounds of a specific speciesof fish. The allocated number of pounds of the specified speciescan legally be harvestedand sold. The allocation is attached to the commercialfishing license issued by theprovince of Ontario. One or more commercial fishing licensesmay be held by: (1) anindividual; (2) jointly by individuals; and (3) a business enterprise.Any license can haveITHQ for one or more species of fish. Allocations are fully divisible, andany portionof the allocation can be transferred to any entity,at any time, at any price, by sale orlease at the discretion of the ITHQ holder. Only another provinciallylicensedcommercial fisher can proceed to harvest the fish specified in thetransferred ITHQ. Forthe purposes of sale or lease, ITHQ is usually valued on the basisof a per pound price,generally related to the unprocessed value of a poundof fish. No official records arekept of transfer prices among fishers and it is likely that intra-familytransfers may occurat a nominal price. From time to time, the provincial government maypurchase an‘Hereafter, except when otherwise specified, “LakeHuron” will refer to theCanadian portion of the Lake Huron fishery, including the south basin, the Georgian Baybasin and the North Channel.ITHQ policy was approved in 1983 and first tookeffect in the 1984 season.5allocation and/or an entire commercial fishing operation and records of thesetransactionsare confidential.1.6 Organization of the ThesisThe research is presented in seven chapters. The firstchapter introduces theresearch problem and the study area and states the study objectives.The second chapterpresents a review of selected fisheries management and publicpolicy literature withreference to how this literature has been interpreted and applied by managers. The thirdchapter describes the quantitative and qualitative data used for this research and themethods of data collection and analysis. The fourth chapter reviews the policy context,describing the background and development of ITHQ in the Lake Huron commercialfishery. The fifth chapter presents the results of analysis of the data. The sixth chapterreviews the results of the analysis of the empirical and qualitative data associated withITHQ with reference to selected models of public policy and resource management. Theseventh chapter outlines some conclusions and implications of this research. Referencesfor the research are listed in the bibliography.There are three appendices. Appendix 1 contains a sample of an annualcommercial fishing report (Form CF. 8A), the source of part of the quantitative data base.Appendix 2 details how the interview schedule for the qualitative data base wasdeveloped, and lists the interview questions. Appendix 3 lists interview respondents andtheir affiliations.62.0 SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE, ITS INTERPRETATION ANDAPPLICATIONDevelopment of an understanding of the social and economic impacts of ITHQon commercial fishing operations in Lake Huron is enhanced by an analysis of eventsusing selected models of resource management and the public policy process. It is thusof particular importance to this study to review the literature on specific regulatoryaspects of fisheries management, as well as the literature on selected resourcemanagement and public policy models that may offer some insight into importantinfluences on regulatory impacts. The intent is to:(1) understand the origins, management options and experiences related to thedefinition and resolution of fisheries management problems with regard toharvest regulation;(2) examine selected resource management and public policy process modelswith a view to combining some of their analytical strengths andovercoming some of the conceptual limitations associated with specificmodels;(3) derive from these models a composite of explanations of relevance to theresearch problem;(4) review the relationships among these explanations; and finally,(5) theorize as to how the relationships in the commercial fishery mayrespond to changes in the regulatory environment.The first part of this chapter examines the theoretical underpinnings of fisheriesmanagement, as derived from biological and bioeconomic models. These models areseen to be based on an idealized, rational approach to decision making. The assumptionsunderlying this rational approach have had a critical influence on how fisheriesmanagement problems are defined and solved. The chapter also examines managers’evolving interpretations of the relationships expressed in these models, and how theseunderstandings have been expressed in fisheries management practice.7Recent literature on co-management of fisheries resources hasargued that a broadrange of contextual factors influence the way policy is developedand implemented, andhow well it will work. The literature review in this chapterexamines alternativemodelsof policy development and discusses a co-management model ofresource use that ismoreconsistent with a broad, inclusive approach to policy-making.Each of these models offers some insight into the policydevelopment processand/or policy, the potential outcomes resulting from the policy,or the process ofimplementation. As with almost any model, each explains at leastone composite ofdecisions, impacts and/or interactions very well, but must be adjustedor augmented whenseeking a comprehensive explanation. In general, these variousresource managementand public policy models are useful in this studyto construct an understanding of ITHQdevelopment, implementation and impacts.Incremental and interest group models of policy making reflectand incorporatea wide range of contextual factors that influence policy development and thus determinepolicy outcomes. Therefore, these approaches more realistically representaspects of thepolicy process and aid in understanding policy outcomes.2.1 The Common Property Paradigm2.1.1 DefinitionFor the purposes of this discussion, four categories of property rights withinwhich common-property resources are held are definedas follows (Feeny et al. 1990).(1) Open access. The absence of well-defined property rights, in whichaccess is unregulated, free and open to everyone.(2) Private property. The rights (usually exclusive and transferable) toexclude others and to regulate the use of the resourcevested in a specificentity (e.g. individual, corporation).8(3) Communal property. Rights to the resource are heldby an identifiablecommunity of interdependent users who can excludeothers and regulateuse by members of the community.(4) State property. The rights tothe resource are vestedexclusively ingovernment, which regulates resource access anduse.The term “community” refers to a “community ofinterest,” which is a group ofindividuals who have a shared interest or point ofview with respect to resources orproperty. The basis of this shared interest maybe influenced by geography (i.e. theindividuals live in an place where the resource or propertyis very important to theirlives) or activity (i.e. the individuals may not live near the resourceor property, but stillwish access to the resource).Basic to the bioeconomic and other related models isa notion of exploitation ofopen access resources that has come to be associatedwith the concept of the “tragedy ofthe commons” (Hardin1968)6.In this version of the common propertyparadigm, acommon property resource is defined as open access (i.e. onethat is available to aspecific community or group of users, so that it is impossibleto exclude any particularmember of the group from using the resource). As interpretedby Hardin (1968), thismodel ascribes destructive overuse of common propertyto the unequal distribution ofbenefits and disbenefits which can occur in a common propertysituation. A central(though often unstated) assumption of this model is that resourceuse is open access.Hardin (1968) popularized the concept in grappling withthe potential resource useconflict generated by projected population pressures. Hardinused the example ofunrestricted grazing-rights in an hypothetical (and,by Hardin’s assumptions open access)6Hardin (1968) did not distinguish between openaccess systems and communalproperty and thus confuses the few genuinely open access systems with those that haveentry restrictions.9village “commons.” He described theeconomic calculus as follows: in thissociallystable situation, an individual herder would realizea positive utility of nearly + 1 fromthe addition of one animal to the herd, whileany negative utility throughover-grazingis only a fraction of -1, leaving the rationalherder to conclude that thesensible courseis to add another animal to the herd. Eventually,the addition of toomany animalsoverburdens the common resource, withthe tragic result of a ruined grazingarea. Inorder to avoid similar desecration of our commonproperty resources, Hardin calledforlegislated allocation of these resources.This “tragic” interpretationof the commonproperty paradigm has been an enduring conceptualframework in resource management.2.1.2 The common property paradigmas adapted for fisheriesBerkes7 (1985) has adapted Hardin’s“tragedy of the commons” conceptforfisheries.Consider a body of water which hasa certain finite capacity for fishproduction. If the first fishermanor the first few fishermen find fishingprofitable, their success will attract other fishermen.In this way, moreand more boats will enter the fishery, someof them belonging to existingfishermen who have turned into multiple boat-ownersto increase theirindividual capacities. With the increasedfishing effort, the individualcatches of fishermen per unit of fishing effort expendedwill fall, and atsome point over-fishing will occur --inevitably when the total yieldexceeds the natural ability of the fish populationsto renew themselves ona sustained basis.The principal adaptations of Hardin’s conceptualizationof the tragedy of the commonsto fisheries are the analogues of (1) overgrazingto overharvesting and (2) additionalanimals to additional vessels and gear(i.e. overcapacity). Within this framework, thecalculus of the resource use generally remains thesame.‘Berkes (1985) prefaces this adaptationwith acknowledgement that Hardin’s (1968)idea was based on the assumptions of “unrestrictedgrazing-rights in a hypotheticalvillage ‘commons,’ and the collective tragedy causedby the rational individual greed ofthe cattle owners.”10In both open and limited-access fisheries, fishers can realizeshort-term benefitsin catching fish before their competitors. Racingto harvest the greatest amountof fishcan, however, result in many inefficiencies, including over-sizedand over-equippedboats, too many fishers, and the harvesting of fish of lesser marketvalue and thosenotyet sexually mature. Even limiting entry to the fishery throughrestricting the numberof commercial licenses may not be effective if thelimitation comes into force afterthefishery has attracted several fishing units (Regier andGrima 1985).Two major schools of thought have developed inrelation to the basic “tragedy ofthe commons” notion popularized in Hardin’s work. One was the bioeconomicmodelof resource management. The concepts of allocated resource rightsand governmentintervention to administer the regime of rights play importantroles in the managementsystems typically derived from the bioeconomic model.A second, less precisely defined, resource management model, theco-managementmodel, emphasizes the range of management options available alonga strong-to-weakercontinuum of community-shared ownership/management of resources. Co-managementsystems typically include a degree of government involvement in amanagementpartnership, but with somewhat less reliance on government interventionsthan evidencedin management systems derived from the bioeconomic model. The bioeconomicmodelemphasizes competition rather than cooperation, and assumes supremacy ofindividualismrather than communitarianism (Berkes and Farvar 1989). Sections 2.2.,2.3 and 2.4review selected literature of relevance to both of these schools.In summary and conclusion, this section has defined the common propertyparadigm and its relation to the bioeconomic and co-management modelsof resourcemanagement. Within the common property paradigm, institutional and regulatorymechanisms can be applied to address overall management problems. As interpreted inthe bioeconomic model, problems of overcapacity and overharvesting are attributed toopen access and the lack of ownership of the resource. Fisheries are viewedas being11consistently overexploited, unlike private property, which can be protected (or exploited)by its owner(s). Some social scientists, economists in particular, have thus suggested thatmanagement problems of this nature ought to be addressed through the allocation ofexclusive private property rights to resources (Pearse 1988a). Scott (1973; Scott andNeher 1981) has suggested that exclusive private property rights in combination withmarket mechanisms should be left to allocate resources rationally over time.The co-management model of resource use suggests a role for collective propertyrights in resource management and emphasizes the potential for building community-based institutional arrangements for resolving resource management problems (Ostrom1990). In this approach, fisheries might be viewed as communal property, to be utilizedaccording to mutually understood, accepted and monitored agreements or regulations,within some degree of government oversight.The process by which a policy is developed and implemented also influences itseffectiveness and the range of policy impacts. The theoretical basis for this is examinedin section 2.5, in a review of the literature on three policy process models.2.2 Development and Application of the Bioeconomic Model in FisheriesManagementThis section outlines the development of the bioeconomic model, tracing itsorigins in biological and social science and reviewing the application of fisheriesmanagement interventions derived from this model of resource use.122.2.1 Biological models in fisheries managementBiological models focus on biological and environmentalfactors affectingfishstocks. These models address concerns related to the biology ofthe organism,ecologicalhabitat relationships and especially reproductive and predatorybehaviours. Theindicators in biological models were specific measuresof water temperature, biologicaloxygen demand, population dynamics, predation and thelike. The managementinterventions suggested by biological models related primarilyto protection ofreproduction through season and area closures andsize limits.Management systems consistent with biologically-based remediesfirst focused onconservation. Subsequently, management initiatives included measuresto protectimmature fish and safeguard reproduction (e.g. seasonal closures;areal limitations)(Needler 1979). Historically, fisheries managers attempted tocontrol human and animalpredation through a range of interventions, including lamprey control programs,harvest(e.g. limiting amount of harvest for a particular fishery) and gear restrictions(e.g. meshsize). In this way, managers sought to control variables associated withresource users’interference with fish reproduction. These types of managementinterventions areconsistent with the cause-effect relationships suggested in thebiological models thatprovided a basis for managers’ understanding of the fishery.These biological investigations did not adequately addressthe economic and socialfactors prevailing on resource users in their relations to the fishery. Inapplication to areal world fishery, under a regime limiting the total amountof harvest, one of theunwelcome responses to regulations directed at the protectionof reproduction was anincrease in fishing capacity. In order to catch the most fish withinthe allowed window,fishers could purchase vessels with increased storage capacity and more powerfulengines, and equip their boats with more lethal gear and additional crew. In effect, theycould increase the capacity of the fishing fleet. The fleet would then be less efficient,however, as much of this capacity would be underutilized (i.e.inefficient) except for13season openings, or other windows ofopportunity.8 In addition, pressure ofincreaseddebt loads would prompt fishers to request increases in the allowableharvest, so that theymight have a chance to increase their revenue. The resultingsituation wouldbe theopposite of that intended by management interventions.2.2.2 The bioeconomic modelThe bioeconomic model posited a set of relationships,based on economicbehaviour of the enterprise and the known biologyof the resource, that modelled theobserved tendency of resource utilization over time, givena range of market responses,and the likely results of this utilization on the continuedviability of the resource. (SeeFigure 2.1.) This “second generation” model is muchmore of a hypothetical model.It is not directly derived from empirical measures,but rather from the theoreticalrelationships among the variables that had been measured andstudied in earlier models.A major advance was that it asserted a pattern of use that would reachequilibrium9at,or very close to, a harvesting level which, if unregulated, couldbe consistent with acollapse of the fish stocks and permanent damageto the resource. (See Grima andBerkes 1989 for a detailed description of the sustained yield concept inresource science.)The bioeconomic model thus contributes to resource managementtheory in itsconceptualization of a commonly held belief about commercialfishing; “althoughfisheries in an early stage of development may show high returns,or mature fisheriesSThe implied meanings are those of the bioeconomist, not thoseof the enterpriseoperators.I. e. bionomic equilibrium, where the valueof the sustainedcatch is no greater than the cost of the factorsemployed toharvest it, and all the potential resource rent is thusdissipated. In the more valuable fisheries, this equilibriumcondition is reached only when the stocks aredepleted.(Pearse 1980)14I—Cl,0C-)Cl)wzLULU--- MSYHARVESTINGEFFORTMEY MaximumEconomic YieldMSY MaximumSustainableYieldBE Bionomic EquilibriumFIGURE 2.1: TheBloeconomicModel. Source:Grimaand Berkes 1989MEY—\—‘F/Max/RentsTotal CostBETotalRevenuesEE215may be highly profitable following new developments in markets or technology,theytend, inexorably, toward . . . economic stagnation” (Pearse 1980). As Pearse(1980)notes, this state of stagnation “is fundamentally a problem of excessive costs, resultingfrom employment of more labour and capital than is necessary to harvest thecatch.”This is the inefficiency which leads to the “tragedy of the commons.”Using a fisheries example, Pearse (1980) summarizes the economic analysis ofthe open access category of the common property model, emphasizing the role of theconcept of “resource rent” as a pivotal factor in understanding how we can managerenewable resources:Economicaly valuable fish stocks are, by definition, capable ofyielding harvests of a value greater than the costs of harvesting. Thissurplus or net value is referred to as resource rent.He continues:The process can be explained briefly as follows. Whenever afishery yields rent, and no agency appropriates this surplus, it will accrueto the fishing enterprises as profits (in excess of the minimum returnrequired to cover the cost of existing capital and entrepreneurship). Ifaccess to the fishery is unrestricted, these profits will, in the long run,attract additional entrants to the fishery and induce existing enterprises toexpand their fishing power. A profitable fishery is therefore unstable. Asthe fleet expands, the catch of individual fishing units will decline aslarger numbers compete for the yield, especially if the stocks arediminished under the increased fishing pressure. This process willcontinue until, on the average, the earnings of fishing units are reducedto the minimum required to cover the costs of the labour and capital theyemploy. At that point, the fishery reaches a state referred to as abionomic equilibrium, where the value of the sustained catch is no greaterthan the cost of factors employed to harvest it, and all the potentialresource rent is thus dissipated. In the more valuable fisheries, thisequilibrium condition is reached only when the stocks are depleted.Adopting this bioeconomic model, the “tragedy of the commons” may bediscussed in terms of the ability of valuable fisheries to yield resource rent only up to thepoint where the stock is depleted. In order to avoid stock collapse, some form of16management intervention is necessary. Inpractice, this is often agovernmentintervention, in the form of regulation.Combining knowledge accrued inthe development of fishstock populationmodelswith a theoretical economic measure ofunits of “fishing effort,”resource economistsdeveloped the bioeconomic model (Schaefer1957; Gordon 1954; Scott 1979).Schaefer(1953), Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955)were three of the earliestto formulate the openaccess type common property resource theoryfor fisheries. The biologicalSchaefer(1953) model shows a production or yieldfunction in relation to fishing effort.In thismodel, the underlying population responsiblefor this yield function is seento grow whenthe natural rate of growth exceedsthe reductions from the combinedeffects of naturalmortality and fishing effort. UnderSchaefer’s logistic, this yield is at itsmaximum whenthe population biomass is half its maximumsize. It is the yield from fishingeffort thatis of interest to economic analysts,however, not the magnitudeof the underlyingpopulation whose maximum size does notcorrespond with the highest yield.None theless, the Schaefer model showed thatincreased fishing effort can result inan increasedyield only up to a maximum, the maximumsustainable yield (MSY), afterwhich furtherincreases in effort result in a loweryield (and a possible strain on thereproductivecapability of the population).The static’° economic modeldeveloped by Gordon has its originsin thebiological Schaefer-logistic model (Mitchell1979). Gordon’s (1953)seminal articleintegrating the unique aspectsof fisheries owing to the biologicalbehaviour of fish andthe open access nature of the resourcewas an important step in thedevelopment of10It is’static’ in the sense that “the Gordonmodel does not take into account thedynamic nature of economic forces,for example, changes in prices due to increaseddemands for fish products, and fishingcosts that do not necessarily occur at a constantrate” (Mitchell 1979). Mitchell (1979)describes ‘dynamic’ economic analysisas using“discount rates, which in effectmeasure how society regards or values presentconsumption in comparison with futureconsumption, . . . [and] indicates whether itmakes sense to underexploit or overexploitthe resources.” (Mitchell 1979).17fisheries economics.The economic model, first expoundedby Gordon,introducedeconomic variablesto the biological model. This wasdone by turning theproductionyield function into a total revenuefunction and by introducinga total cost function’1,assumed to be increasing linearlywith fishing effort, whichencompassesall costs,including alternative returnsto the factors of production.In economics,the economicoptimum occurs when netreturns are greatest: whenthe marginalrevenue equalsmarginal cost. Based on this, the economicoptimum level ofexploitation is, in Figure2.1, MEY. The economicoptimum in this model indicatesthat this is at a lower levelof landings than the MSY.The MEY level is where thefactors of productionare mostefficiently employed, in thatany incremental increase inreturns to the factors ofproduction would be offsetby the increased cost. The basicthesis of the Gordonmodel,“that uncontrolled exploitationof a common property [ access] resourceleadsto overexploitation and pooreconomic returns has neverbeen refuted” (Mitchell 1979).Most importantly, the economicmodel indicated that in instancesof free entry, economicforces could lead to overexploitationin both a biologicaland economic sense,but theeconomic optimum wouldbe at a level of exploitationless than the MSY.Moresophisticated dynamic analysesby Scott (1955) have shownthat economic forces couldlead to even greater overexploitationof resources than theGordon model shows (Mitchell1979).2.2.3 Interpretation and applicationof the bioeconomic modelsFor the purposes of thisresearch, the important distinctionbetween the Schaeferand Gordon models is howthey have been interpretedby managers. In the past, whenthe management focus was biological,and directed towardsconservation, the model wastaken to indicate that fishingeffort should not exceed theMSY level. This level wasalso, “erroneously consideredthe optimum economiclevel of exploitation by biologists”‘‘Total cost’ includes: allfixed costs; all operatingcosts; “normal” profits; andall opportunity costs (i.e. alternativereturns to thefactors of production).18(Mitchell 1979).The principal attractionof the static economicmodel tofisherymanagers concernedwith conservation isthat MEY occursat a lowerlevel ofexploitation than MSY.Thus the goals ofconservation wereassumedto be reinforcedby the application of rational,economic criteriato the decision-makingprocess.A more dynamic approachis exemplified, forexample, in thework of Pearse(1980). This equilibriummodelling approachis based onthe biologically-determinedstock-growth/stock-sizerelationship, linkingeconomic andbiological factors,andassigning a fixed amountof the stock to eachunit of fishing effort.Modelling biologicaland economic forcesinfluencing the fisheryillustrates howa profitable fisherycouldattract additional fishingeffort (in theform of more fishersand/or more vesselsandgear), to the pointwhere individualfishers’ harvest amountsmay decline.If thiscontinues, the fisherswould be makingonly enough moneyto cover theircosts. Thisbreakeven point,at which the harvestvalue is no greaterthan the costof obtaining it,is represented in themodel as the bionomicequilibrium (denotedas BE, see Figure2.1.).This is an economicallyinefficient situation.In this theoreticalstate of equilibrium,forthe fishery as a whole,the value of theharvest is no greaterthan the cost of harvestactivities. This leadsto both biological andeconomic problems:the former exemplifiedby overfishing and lowersustainable yields,the latter by low returnsand incomes andno rent from fishing (Mitchell1979). For thisreason, this is alsoan inherently unstablestate for the economicactivities associatedwith the fishery.If there are anyfewer fish(e.g. stock collapse),fishers will leave thefishery (even if onlytemporarily). If thereis a greater numberof fish (e.g. largeyear class in anyof the principalcommercialspecies), more entrantswill be attractedto the fishery.Economic inefficiencyis manifestedmost commonly in thefishery in the formof excess harvest capacity.For fisheriesmanagers, excessharvest is seen as a regulatoryproblem requiring limitationson capacity.Thus, interventionsderived from the causalrelationships defined inthe bioeconomicmodel focus on increasingthe efficiency of alimited number of resourceusers throughreducing overall capacityand limiting entry.19The instruments for achieving this are consistent with the restrictions prescribed bythebiological model: season and area limits, restrictions on vessels and gear, licensestocontrol entry and limitations on harvest species and amounts. Two principal methodswere suggested for the latter: overall, species-specific harvest restrictions for the fisheryor allocation of individual harvest quotas. In this way, economic models utilized thebasic biological assumptions, but focused on capacity, suggesting interventions thatmanipulate this factor primarily by limiting entry and harvest amount.In summary, this section has explored the bioeconomic model of resource use.Early efforts in fisheries management focused on biological and environmental factorsaffecting fish stocks, and related primarily to protection of reproduction through seasonand area closures and size limits. Economic models looked at market context and thebehaviour of supporting factors affecting decisions about how and how much harvestingwas done. Economists have thus suggested management interventions relating to fishingeffort (e.g. entry limitations, vessel and gear restrictions, harvest limitations).Combining knowledge accrued in the development of fish stock population models witha theoretical economic measure of units of fishing effort, resource economists developedthe bioeconomic model. Analysis of this model suggests that allocation to fishers ofindividual shares of the harvest (i.e. ITHQ), which would combine exclusive propertyrights (including the ability to transfer ownership, through sale or lease) with harvestlimitations, is a promising management intervention to address problems of overharvestand overcapacity.2.3 Rationale For and Use of Individual Transferable Harvest Quotas in FisheriesManagementThis section reviews the theoretical arguments for ITHQ as a regulatoryintervention effective in limiting inefficiencies in commercial fishing. The strengths andweaknesses of ITHQ in application are also examined. ITHQ is different from harvestlimitation regulations that pertain to a fishery as a whole, in that ITHQ introduces the20concept of individual ownership of the resource. By imposing ITHQ, a specific share(s)of the resource is linked to each individual enterprise, or decision-making unit, thereby(so the theory goes) encouraging individuals to become more efficient (in terms ofmatching their harvest capacity with their allocations), usually within a pre-existingregulatory framework of season, area and entry restrictions.2.3.1 The case for ITHQThe bioeconomic model as described above implies a particular set ofrelationships which are helpful to managers in understanding how we use our fisheryresource. Overharvest and overcapacity are recognized problems in fisheriesmanagement. Based on the theory of resource use presented in the bioeconomic model,economists have examined a range of interventions for their effectiveness in fosteringcustodianship of the resource and removing economic incentives that encourageoverfishing.Much of the ITHQ literature comprises theoretical discussion and predictionregarding the potential advantages, disadvantages, methods and potentially successfulcombinations of an array of direct and indirect’2regulatory options (e.g. Moloney andPearse 1979; Mitchell 1979; Clark 1980). This literature is examined here, and thefollowing section (2.3.2) looks more closely at actual experiences with ITHQ.Three major reports on Canada’s commercial fisheries cite government allocationof exclusive property rights, in the form of ITHQ, as an innovative addition to the12Direct methods of regulation are those which directly control the amount of fishharvested, such as limits on harvest. Indirect methods of regulation are those whichattempt to control fishing effort by manipulating some of the inputs (e.g. gear and vesselrestrictions) and/or opportunities (e.g. area and season restrictions) to the harvest of fish.21existing range of management interventions (Kirby1982; Pearse 1982; Pearse1988).13They also examine the effectiveness of entry limitation,buy-back programs,overallharvest quotas and a variety of royalty schema as meansto address the troublingissuesof overcapacity and overharvest.Pearse (1982) reviews the Pacific fishery. Thereport addresses aset of problemsrelated to resource use, as well as problems relatedto regulation. Excessive fleetdevelopment, linked to unrestricted accessto the fishery as an open access resource,isidentified as the main barrier to economicallyefficient exploitation of the commercialfisheries of the Pacific coast. The report’srecommendations of imposition of entrylimitations and quota regulation, areparticularly directed to address this specificformulation of the problem. The report’srecommendations are aimed at:keeping fishing capacity in balance withthe resources available,encouraging the fleet’s structure to developefficiently, providing securityto fishermen and vessel owners, enabling thegovernment to adjust fishingprivileges as conditions change, recovering forthe public the returns fromresources in excess of reasonable returnsto fishermen and vessel owners,and simplifying administration.(Pearse 1982)The primary regulatory measures suggestedwere entry limitation (and entryfees) andquota regulation (such as ITHQ). These methodsof direct regulation were intendedtoencourage fleet rationalization andpermit the relaxation or abolition of muchof theintricate, indirect regulation imposed on vessels,gear and fishing times. With resourcerent thus assured, royalties were also recommended,in order to capture a portion of thisrevenue for the public purse. Explicitresource allocation among competingusers wasalso recommended.In examining Canada’sAtlantic fisheries, Kirby (1982) identifiesthe “commonproperty problem” as underlying mostof the difficulties in the harvesting sector of the13The recommendations in OMNR andOCCF 1982, a major report on Ontario’scommercial fisheries, are detailed in section4.3.2.22commercial fishery. Specifically, he cites the existence of too muchharvesting capacity,relative to (then) current and anticipated resource availability,to generate adequateannual incomes and adequate returns on investment for fishermen.He recommendslimited-entry provisions and discusses the advantages ofquota regulation:while the institution of a system of quota licenseswould result, overtime, in some reduction in the number of fishermen . . .. the incomes ofthose remaining in the fishery will rise. . . . In addition, thequota licencesystem would enable fishermen to obtain moreeconomically efficientvessels, while simultaneously freeing them froma great deal of theregulatory burden to which they are now subjected.This would allowmore technological innovation and hence a reduction inharvesting costs.The creation of exclusive property rights to the fishery’4 throughallocation of harvestquotas is intended to create conditions whereby fishers canminimize operating costs byovercoming the competitive effects of the open access natureof the fisheries. With anassured share of the harvest, fishers do not haveto invest in additional capacity. Theycan harvest their allocation with the optimum amount of effort,without having to raceto compete with other fishers.Identifying “common property” as the sourceof the problems shown by thebioeconomic model suggests manipulation of property rightsas a feasible managementoption (Scott 1955; Pearse 1982). Manipulationof this type can take the form ofdefinition and allocation of exclusive property rights, such asquota regulation. Quotaregulation is identified as the most promisingmeans of regulating the catch andpromoting fleet rationalization. Moloney and Pearse(1979) suggest quota regulationcould be expected to maximize resource rents and permit thegains to be distributedflexibly. Pearse (1988) suggests the outstanding advantageof ITHQ to be eliminationof the basic cause of overcapacity in the fishing industry,which he sees to be the14Although in the Great Lakes the inshore fisheries (i.e.seines, hooks, pound nets,trap nets, hoop nets) all had quasi-property rightsto particular locales since sometime inthe 19th century, ITHQ explicitly assigns comprehensive(i.e. specifying a maximumharvest) property rights to harvest amount (H. A. Regier, pers.comm. 1992).23existence of incentives to individual fishers to protect and increase their share ofthecatch.If ITHQ works as the bioeconomic fisheries theory predicts, harvest wouldbecontrolled within a predetermined amount, prompting changes in resource users’behaviour, such that capacity would be reduced and therefore the remaining capacitywould be utilized more efficiently (Grima and Berkes 1989). (No timeframe isspecified.) Some resource users would be prompted to retire their operations and leavethe fishery because not all operations would be able legally to harvest enough fish tocover their costs and provide a reasonable profit. This would allow a reallocation andconsolidation of ITI-TQ with fewer, and therefore more efficient operations.A reduction in capacity will be measured by a reduction in the amount and valueof vessels and gear involved in the fishery (with a concomitant reduction in the numberof fishing operations). Control of harvest will be indicated by the amount of harvest ofprincipal commercial species. Efficient utilization of capacity will be indicated by atrend towards those enterprises with lower investment, or capacity, harvesting lesseramounts of fish than those with a higher investment, and those with a higher investmentharvesting greater amounts. These hypotheses, suggested by the theory/model, areexamined in chapter five.Reviewing several previous studies, Townsend and Wilson (1988) report that, innearly every open access fishery examined, there was excessive investment in harvestingcapacity, low economic returns to fishermen, and increasing signs of stock decline.These conclusions are consistent with interpreting the relationships modelled in thebioeconomic model to suggest overharvest and overcapacity as the two principalproblems in fisheries management (Pearse 1988; Scott 1979; Townsend and Wilson1988).24Clark (1980) has developed a model of the commercial fisheryto predict theconsequences of various methods of regulation, including : (1) totalcatch quotas; (2)vessel licenses (for the purpose of limiting entry); (3) taxes on catch);and (4) allocatedcatch quotas (analogous to ITHQ) (or effort). Based ona general model of the open-access fishery, his findings indicate that the customary methods ofpreventing depletionof fish stocks (i.e. total catch quotas, closed seasons,etc.) generally lead to expansionof fleet capacity. Typically, managers then respondby tightening existing restrictions(e.g. shortening the fishing season). ITHQ, however, are predictedto be theoreticallyequivalent to taxes in terms of economic efficiency, and both arethought to be capable,in principle, of optimizing exploitation of the common-propertyfishery. Cautioningagainst a too literal interpretation of the theoretical equivalenceof taxes and allocatedquotas, Clark supports the benefits of direct control over harvest providedby ITHQ.In summary, the theoretically predicted advantages of ITHQcan be categorizedfrom the sources cited in section 2.3. 1 as follows.(1) Operational advantages, including: (a) reduced vessel andgear regulation; (b)increased technological innovation;(c) reduction in the number of vessels andamount of gear; and (d) opportunity for better logistical planningfor seasonalprice and processing opportunities. These benefits wouldaccrue principally tothose fishers remaining.(2) Economic advantages, including:(a) increased incomes for those remaining inthe fishery; (b) reduced harvest costs; (c) security regardingharvest share forfishers; and (d) removal of incentives to protectand increase catch share (i.e.removal of competition that could be harmfulto fish stocks). These benefitswould accrue principally to those fishers remaining.(3) Administrative advantages, including:(a) direct control of harvest; (b)opportunity to raise revenue through fees androyalties; (c) ease in modificationof regulation; and (d) reduced administrative costs (e.g. particularly in the areaof enforcement). These benefits would accrue principallyto managers (andindirectly to the ultimate owners of the resource,the public).25Many theoretical investigations indicate that in removing the incentiveto competefor available stocks, ITHQ can be expected to facilitatereaching thefisheriesmanagement objectives of reducing overcapacity and overharvest.The findings of theresearchers cited in this section hint at some additional,“administrative and enforcementcosts.” The potential confounding influence of problems likelyto accompany thetransition of ITHQ from theory to practice, however, have notbeen directly addressed.2.3.2 Applications of ITHQLittle empirical research has been publishedon the subject of ITHQ. Havingexamined the theoretical expectations associatedwith ITHQ, however, this section goeson to outline some of the significant research on implementing andoperationalizing ITHQin a variety of fisheries worldwide.Management ConcernsThe practice of fisheries management derivesfrom managers’ woridview of thefishery and resource users. Managers havea conceptual model of the fishery in whichthey see causal relationships. In orderto manage the fishery, they select, from amongthese causal relationships, components they think willrespond to manipulation, or thatcan be manipulated. Choices that result from those decisionsdetermine the policyinstruments that are introduced.In the past, fisheries management was thoughtto be solely within the purview ofbiological science. Accordingly, managersproposed biological mechanisms to deal withthe special problems it posed. In effect, this led managersto formulate biologicalsolutions for problems that were, in fact, rooted in the institutionalframework ofresource development. The institutional natureof these problems becomes particularlyevident in cases where entry into fishing activities is relativelyeasy or where fishingeffort is not effectively regulated. Where initial management responses focusedalmostexclusively on a concern for conservation -- “protect the youngand do not interfere with26reproduction” (Needler 1979) -- overdependence on biological solutions created furthermanagement problems.Regulation to protect spawning (i.e. minimum sizes of fish to beretained,minimum net sizes, closed seasons and area limitations), while generally effective inconserving the fishery, has typically also resulted in increased competition within thecommercial fishing industry. Thus, each fisher purchased more and better gear in ordereither to ‘outfish’ competitors or to make work safer or more comfortable. Thissituation, defined as overcapacity, has led to an increase in effective fishing effort,bringing a new round of regulations on engine power, length of fishing season, size ofboat, and other components of the fishing effort, as managers attempt to reduce pressureon fish stocks.In 1986, New Zealand implemented an individual transferable quota (ITQ) systemfor selected inshore fish species to “promote conservation of stocks and to improve theeconomic efficiency of the fishing industry.” Dewees (1989) surveyed 62 commercialfishers and fishing company managers as well as 14 fisheries managers to assess the 1986implementation of ITQ with regard to perceived problems and benefits and ITQ’s effecton the fishing industry. Dewees found that 77% of the fishers reported makingsubstantial changes in their business in response to ITQ. Changes in fishing methods andreductions in costs (cost minimization strategies were not specified) and effort resultedin maximizing revenues received for their harvest. These two changes were seen to beconsistent with the theoretically predicted behaviours associated with ITQ. The twomajor revenue-maximizing strategies were development of innovative on-board handlingmethods and harvest of non-quota species.The most significant problems with ITQ included: (1) discarding of incidentalcatch for which the fisher had no quota and culling of the harvest to insure that only thehighest priced portion of the harvest was landed; (2) enforcement difficulties to do withstopping illegal and unreported sales, enforcement at sea, harassment for minor offenses27and strained industry/governmentrelations; (3) business-relatedconcerns withaggregation of quotas by large fishing companies,cutbacks in fishers’potential catch,such that their business was uneconomical; and (4)a set of issues related tothe high costof ITQ, including economic barriers to young people enteringthe fishery, theincreasedcapitalization required to obtain an adequate quotaand to change fishingpractices tomaximize prices received for fish, and the high priceof quota. Dewees concludes:“After 6 months under ITQs, 56% of the fishermenand 100% of the agency staffinterviewed felt this new system of managing fisherieswould be successful.” Withspecific reference to the difficulties encountered inNew Zealand’s attempt to converttheory into practice, Dewees’ concluding recommendationsfocus on the importance of:(1) education and communications; (2) understandingthe benefits, problems andconsequences of ITQ before implementation;(3) equitable allocation and appeal systems;and (4) adequate administrative resourcesto support costs associated with necessaryinformation and reporting systems, transitionto the new system of ITQ and additionaldaily operational and assessment activities.Dewees’ recommendations are consistentwith other research in fisheriesmanagement which has identified improved stockassessment and enforcement of amuch-simplified set of regulationsas principal requirements for successfulimplementation of quota regulation in limited-entryfisheries. Robinson (1986) pinpoints“catch monitoring and enforcement . .. as the potential ‘Achilles heel” ofa quotaregulation system for the Australian southern Bluefin Tunafishery. Similarly, indiscussing development of management measuresto control commercial fish harvest inOntario, Haxell (1986) details the interdependenceof stock assessment and adjustmentof quotas. He goes on to stress the importanceof ensuring compliance with regulationsand licensing conditions related to: (1) incidental(i.e. non-quota, sport fish species)catch and (2) the enforcement of individual quotas.Clark and Duncan (1986), in reviewing the impactof ITHQ policies in NewZealand’s fisheries management, describe “the flouting ofquotas due to inadequate28monitoring, enforcement and penalties” as the reason for “strong support withinthefishing industry for rigorous enforcement and severe penalties.” Theauthors alsoemphasize the connection between stock assessment and quota enforcement, throughtheuse of selective logbook monitoring of catch/effort to detect changes instock abundance.Similarly, agreement on assessing and partitioning stock declines,licensing, and otherrestrictions were key issues in Fraser’s (1986) description of the development ofenterprise allocations in the offshore groundfish fishery in Atlantic Canada. In atheoretical exploration of policy alternatives for controlling fishing effort, Crutchfield(1979) also identified enforcement as the most pressing administrative problem inimplementing ITHQ.Anderson’s (1987) analysis of “the economic problem of running a fishingagency” supports the significance of enforcement and co-operation among managers andresource users in a fisheries management regimen (“monitoring is the real driving forcebehind management”). Citing a far-reaching literature on the economics of fisheriesmanagement,15 he points out that “only a very small part deals with enforcementissues.”In his own analysis, Anderson (1987) finds the type and amount of monitoringrequired can be very extensive for instruments such as ITHQ. In fact, he concludes thatdespite their production inefficiencies, indirect restrictions (i.e. gear and areas, etc.) maynot be as undesirable in an overall sense as commonly believed. He argues ease ofenforcement and effectiveness in influencing fishers’ behaviour as their main strengths.Anderson suggests that this literature:15The question of which types of controls will meet economic efficiency or otherobjectives has received considerable attention (Crutchfield 1961; Rettig and Ginter 1978;Pearse 1979; Sturgess and Meany 1982; and Anderson 1986, Chapter 6). The questionof how non-compliance, avoidance and other illegal activities, and enforcement costsaffect the economically efficient level of fishing and the relative efficiency of the variouscontrol types has only recently been analyzed. (Sutinen and Andersen 1985; Andersonand Lee 1986; and Milliman 1986).29• . . has clearly shown that one difference between quotas [i.e. totalallowable catch], gear restrictions, closed areas, etc., on the onehand andthose instruments which try to limit effort (i.e., taxes,transferableindividual quotas, etc.) on the other is the efficiency with whicheffort isproduced (Rettig and Ginter 1978; Pearse 1979; and Sturgessand Meany1982).Experience with ITHQ in Manitoba has led to criticism oftransfer of “accessrights” (i.e. quota allocations) where the result is a windfall profit to the first generationof allocation holders (MNR n.d.). However, the authors of the MNR (n.d.)report agreethat judicious reallocation can improve viability of a fishery by: (1) allowingharvestrights to be matched with production capacity of equipment; (2) allowing fisherstoincrease individual harvest levels (income) without decreasing theharvest levels availableto fellow fishers; and (3) providing fishers with greater flexibility to respondto seasonalprice differentials, availability of fish, and cost of operation and equipment (MNRn.d.).The MNR (n.d.) conclusions are consistent with the findings of other researcherson thesubject of allocation of exclusive property rights to commercial fisheries resources(Kirby1982; Munro 1982; Pearse 1982; Scott 1979).Social ImpactsFisheries regulation, based on the bioeconomic model described above,does notadequately encompass the social factors that may support or confound regulatoryefforts.There is, however, considerable agreement amongst fisheries economiststhat thesocioeconomic rationale for decision-making by fishers needs tobe better understood(Charles 1988). Given the amount of research directedto measures of “fishing effort,”Opaluch and Bockstael (1984) argue that “the fishermen’s decision as to effortlevel isperhaps the most important type of behaviour to be understood.” Similarly, Karpoff(1985) offers quantitative evidence that non-pecuniary factors are important to anunderstanding of decision-making behaviour of fishers, particularly low-revenue fisherswho are so often the targets of economically-driven efforts to “rationalize” a fishery (inthat these efforts at rationalization tend toward consolidation of several smaller (i.e. low30revenue) operations into a fewer number of economically “efficient” unit sizes.) Thisconcern for the impact of ITHQ on small fishers is shared by Crutchfield (1979) in hisdiscussion of the social impacts of fishery regulation.Social impacts associated with small-scale fishers are a focus of Berkes aidPocock (1990) in their review of diversity in Great Lakes fisheries. Their researchexamines aspects of the regulatory environmentthat have encouraged larger-scalefisheries to the detriment of small-scale ones. In particular,they cite implementation ofITHQ in the Lake Erie commercial fishery as initiating atrend of small-scale fisherybuy-outs that has since continued. In comparinglarger-scale Lake Erie with LakeOntario fishing operations, they find that “small-scale LakeOntario fisheries are capital-and energy-efficient. . . [and] obtained almost twice asmuch fish per unit of fuel energyused and created three times as manyfishing jobs per unit of investment.” As importantaspects of managing resource allocation and user groupconflicts, the authors’ identify:(1) flexible quotas; (2) the ability to switch fishinggear often to accommodate seasonalcycles; and (3) negotiation approaches to manageuser group conflicts.Crutchfield (1979) also gave some consideration to the social impacts offisheryregulation, and he emphasized the importance of undertaking a quota repurchasesystem,in order to protect small-scale operators andisolated fishing communities whoseefficiency is lower. In particular, he cautioned againstan abrupt implementation ofITHQ. He saw ITHQ as a “drastic departure in regulatory techniques,” that couldhavecomplex and uncertain impacts on the individual.He concluded that “any system toreduce excess capacity in a marine fishery will be suboptimalin a formal economicsense” and sets a modest goal for such management interventions:rationalizationprograms should aim, first and foremost, not just to reducemanagement costs, but toproduce net benefits. (No timeframe specified.) He feelsthat this goal can be achieved,but only if resource users, managers and researchersin the field can develop adequateprogram design criteria and implementation procedures.31The economic logic of the “common property problem,” (i.e. open access)describes a situation in which competition for resourcesplays a crucial role in resourcedepletion. This reasoning is consistent with theoretical formulations that argue for theimportant role of exclusive property rights, such as are embodied in ITHQ, in providingincentives for efficiency by internalizing social costs. However, Anderson and Hill(1988) point out that the process of defining and enforcing such property rights mayeliminate or reduce potential gains from their creation. Although theyfocus primarilyon the prediction of how different processes of defining privateproperty affect efficiency,their conclusion is pertinent to ITHQ in fisheriesunder certain institutional arrangements, the establishment ofprivate rights to resources can leave a society no better off than whenrights were held in common. In other words, . . . rent dissipation .can result in the process of private property establishment.Anderson and Hill conclude that gains from the assignmentof exclusive property rightscan be lost in efforts to define and enforce them. Further,this is more likely to be thecase when the rule makers are not those who wouldbenefit from an increase in resourcerent. They warn us that removing the inefficiencyof open access through privatizationor other entry restrictions can simply shift dissipation of resource rent fromfishers’operations to the administrative arena.In a review of the flaws and limitations of thebiological approach to resourcemanagement, Freeman (1989) finds orthodox reductionist,“linear” thinking (e.g. as inthe bioeconomic model) inadequate for the solutionof resource management problemsof an ecological nature. He suggests rather, thatwe look to the local level to manageresource systems. He cites two important advantages:access [through oral tradition] to a lengthy time-seriesof data byspecies, season and locality, in addition to extensive information thattendsto emphasize relationships between speciesand various environmentalparameters.He continues:32First, such an empirically-basedapproach represents a movement awayfrom the highly abstract modellingtechniques currently in vogueamongmanagers -- techniques that depend uponlarge inputs of unknown,andoften unknowable, data.Second, this tradition-basedapproach isespecially significant as it relies upon dataand techniques ofanalysis thatlocal resource users can control and utilizein real time,so as to takelocally sanctioned corrective actions witha minimum of delay. Andthird,it moves the focus of responsibilityfor management tothose with thegreatest direct stake in the sustainableutilization of the resourcestock.Freeman concludes that resource management canbe improved through cooperationbetween resources users and managers. Theobjectives would be to overcome someofthe serious limitations of mechanisticapproaches in investigating natural processesandto develop more effective managementinstitutions in order to ensure sociallyawaresustainable utilization of resources.In concluding an extensive reviewof fishery regulation, Beddington andRettig(1984) stress the importance of recognizing thelimitations of the science of fisheries.They express the belief that successful programs offisheries management will involvea mix of regulatory and other devices, and see no pointin seeking a mixture which willprovide some perfect solution for all time. Thedevelopment of variable economic andsocial situations, and unpredictability in the behaviourof fish resources, are cited asprincipal reasons for maintaining flexibilityin fishery regulation. Finally, they call forthe involvement in the management process of fishersand others engaged in the fishingindustry. Aside from facilitating management flexibility,an initiative of this type wouldreduce the likelihood of costly and difficult enforcementof misunderstood or unpopularmeasures.In summary and conclusion, the following are emergingas the most significantissues in the transition of ITHQ fromtheory to practice: (1) the need for reliableinformation on actual landings and stock assessment;(2) the requirement for separatequotas for each stock needing management, (inorder to maintain areal licensingrequirements); and (3) assessment problems with timingand quantification in adjusting33quotas in fisheries in which stocks fluctuate widely and unpredictably.For fisheriesmanagers, addressing these issues means substantial increases in effortsdirected towardsmonitoring, enforcement, stock assessment and liaison with resourceusers.The major critiques of ITHQ application focused on failures inimplementationrelated to lack of support and acceptance from resource usersaffected by ITHQ. Thisis seen to result from an inadequate or ineffective administrativeinfrastructure to supportITHQ. ITHQ may work effectively to address problems of overharvest andovercapacityonly as part of a pre-existing administrative network. It cannot evoke sucha network.The important components of this network are cited above; assessment, monitoringandenforcement are seen to be the most significant. As part ofa new regulatory regime,ITHQ was seen to require more extensive communication and consultation effortsthanis usual in fisheries management.2.4 The Co-Management Model2.4.1 Definition of co-managementThe co-management model describes a cooperative decision-making processofresource management based on collective property rights (but exclusive of thosenotbelonging to the collectivity). In this model, resource users are incorporatedassignificant decision makers. Policy is developed and implemented notby the regulatoryagency alone, but by the agency in cooperation with resource users. Governance of thecommon resource rests, at least to some degree, with the resource users.’6 The role ofthe regulatory agency thus becomes more one of setting an institutional definition for thegroup of resource users in order to protect the resource base from degradation through16Resource users often have more power in decisions about use rights than they doin decisions about access rights, and thus may often “co-manage” within a context set byoutsiders.34incursion, while the details of resource policy are determined primarily by the users ofthe common resource.Recent work by anthropologists and other social science researchershas focusedon social and institutional arrangements for the management of communalpropertyresources.’7 This research has raised questions regarding the equity and efficacy ofresource management systems based on individual property rights (McCay and Acheson1987; Pinkerton 1989; Berkes 1985). Some of these researchers (e.g. Peters 1987;Grima and Berkes 1989) question basic assumptions of the common property model (e.g.the absence of historical and institutional analyses; definition of commons, as distinctfrom open-access, regimes; and the role ascribed to the individual). In general, thisapproach leads to a reexamination of existing, community-based resource use regulation(e.g. Acheson 1989; Pinkerton 1987), and identification of institutional arrangements formanaging resources which incorporate the strengths of these types of indigenous, local-level systems. Clearly, these researchers see limitations in the extent to which Hardin’s(1968) example of a theoretical commons accurately portrays resource managementproblems in some cases.2.4.2 Errors in understanding commons systemsIn their critique of resource managers’ efforts to maximize resource rents, comanagement theorists suggest that the theoretically derived solutions can encountertransitional problems when applied in the real world. This thesis is examined in chapterfive.17In practice, there are virtually no major fish resources which are truly open-access“commons” (Berkes 1985). In those fisheries where access and other limitations are inplace but there are no individual harvest limitations, the collection of resource usersgranted access could be considered to be a “collectivity,” using the common resource.35Acheson’s (1989) case study of the Maine lobsterindustry challenges theproposition that the users of common-property resourcesdisplay no interest in the long-term well-being of those resources. Assumptionsof destructive self-interest (i.e. that“the users of common property are interested onlyin short-term material gain and thatthey cannot or will not erect institutions to preserve the resources on which theirlivelihood depends”) underlie common property theory as it is applied to fisheries(Acheson 1989). Acheson’s descriptionof the lobster fishers’ self-defined territorialrights and their efforts to conservethe resource belie these assumptions. In his view, the“tragic” common property model suggests that “resourcessuch as fish can only bepreserved through draconian and not very democraticgovernment action” and“economists interested in the management of suchresources see salvation only in theinstitution of private property.” Achesondistinguishes communal ownership from privateownership, and emphasizes the former’s potentialfor conservation. In the Maine lobsterindustry, the fishers now workwithin an innovative management strategy that involvesboth local and state mechanisms. At the local level, they have bothinformal and illegalentry limitations through the territorial system.At the state level, they have comanagement with the state of Maine based onlegislation which reflects their successfullobbying efforts. Many management effortsof this kind, however, are only in theformative stages.In reviewing thinking on open access and communalcommon property models,Peters (1988) identifies a number of recurrentweaknesses: (1) the confusion ofcommunal systems with open-access regimes;(2) the individualist bias of interpretivemodels; (3) the tendency to misspecify the relation betweenindividual property rights andother systems of rights to resources; and (4) the absence ofhistorical and institutionalanalyses which would provide an interpretive context.Confusion of communal systems with open accessregimes does not distinguishsituations in which a limited number of ownersare co-equal in their rights to usetheresource (i.e. a communal system)from an open-access system, in which there areno36features of exclusion. This confusion leads tothe incorrect assumption that there are norestrictions or limitations on the numbers of those who use common property.Dominance of individualistic models has confounded interpretation of commonproperty systems because they are not valid models for collective decision-malcing.Taking an example from game theory, the “Prisoner’s dilemma” produces a“noncooperative” solution in which two rationally motivated individuals will act in theirown self-interest, but their own ultimate disadvantage. This individualistic model is nota model for interdependent, group, or collective action, and does notexplain socialsystems that can affect use of a communal resource.Misspecification of the relation between individual property rights and othersystems of rights to resources overlooksthe influence of “conflict among users andamong different rights and competing uses in a situation of political and economicchange” (Peters 1988). For example, Thompson (1976) suggests that a long processofcommercialization in which owners of private land used the English commons as a“freegood” for their large flocks of sheep to the detriment of those commonerswithout accessto private land explains the eighteenth century enclosure movementmore accurately thancollective careless use and overgrazing.Peters (1988) explains the popularity of the allocation of propertyrights as asolution to many resource management problems as follows:The shortcomings of models premisedon the behaviour of “rational”individuals to explain such essentially social systems as theorganizationof a common resource are compounded by the tendency of sometheoriststo invest these models with a normativecast. They assume a necessaryconnection between communal rights and the inefficient or destructive useof resources on the one hand and individualproperty rights and theefficient use of such resources on the other. This hierarchicaloppositionthus justifies the development of private rights to propertyin order toavert tragedies of the commons.37She cites “empirical studies that contradict the assumption that private propertyguarantees responsible and efficient management of resources” (Peters 1988, p.177).In refuting the logic of private property as the panacea for over-exploited commonproperty resources, Gilles and Jamtgaard (1981) identify two questionable assumptions.The first is that the benefits derived from converting common range intoprivate pastures will exceed the costs. The second is that persons whosesurvival depends upon the maintenance of common pastures are incapableof acting collectively to protect these resources. An examination ofexisting common systems reveals that under many circumstances theelimination of common pastures is neither feasible nor desirable. Inaddition, it is clear many pastoralists have developed ways to protect andeffectively utilize common pastures, just as agriculturalists have learnedto manage collectively owned irrigation systems.The authors go on to cite three empirical examples of properly managed communalpastures (i.e. one from the Peruvian Andes, one from the Swiss Alps and one frompastoral Africa).Consistent with this approach, recent research in resource management finds thebioeconomic model and the ideology and practice associated with it to lead to “exploitivedevelopment” (Regier, et al. 1989). Arguing the case for “sustainable redevelopment,”the authors cite “the complexity and ecosystemic processes together with the expandingand intensifying impacts by humans on ecosystems” as contributing to a trend towardinstitutional adaptation. This trend is seen to take the “generalized form of comanagement or joint management [Dorcey, 19861” (Regier, et al. 1989). Emphasizingthe significance of growing awareness of the complexity and unpredictability of managingnatural systems, Regier, et al. (1989) go on to point out the inappropriateness ofdoctrinaire ideological preoccupations with ownership and access questions, suggestinginstead, a more community-based, self-regulatory approach. In particular, attempts toremediate impacts of exploitative regulation of the resources of the NorthAmericanGreat Lakes are cited as an example:38As summarized in Regier [1986b], we have had to move from exploitivedevelopment to sustainable redevelopment; . . . from relianceongovernment to community-based self-help; from laissez-faireto moreequitable regulation and husbandry of resources. (Regier, et a!. 1989).Critical of the belief in the market as guarantor of efficient use anda regard forefficiency as the sole criterion of a “correct” set of property rights,DeGregori (1974)argues for the importance of historical and institutional analysis. By pointing out “thehistoric factors of privilege that give some market power and . . . leave otherspowerless,” he illustrates how lack of contextual analysis can confound analysis ofresource use.Peters (1988) also finds “romanticized notions of a precommercial, precapitalistpast when communal rights preserved the land and permitted all to use it on an equalfooting” to be as overly simplistic and deterministic as Hardin’s (1968) common property“tragedy.” She postulates that it is the critical role assigned to the individual whichdistinguishes these two types of models. In the “tragedy” model, individual well-beingis in opposition to the social context. In the idealized communal model, the two areidentical: the individual is a non-actor, blending into a preordained social order. Petersargues for a middle ground, the “social embeddedness of a commons,” and suggests thatalternative models put forward by some political scientists, anthropologists andeconomists better explain the interaction between “socially and politically embeddedcommons [common property]” and the “individual calculus.” Such models mayincorporate elements of cooperation among, as well as within, societal entities, such asgovernment agencies at various levels and communities of resource users.Peters concludes that the “tragedy” of a commons emerges not from an absenceof social ties between the individual user and others, but from competing rights andclaims to legitimate use. If this is true, then the practice of resource management wouldbenefit from a deeper understanding of the social origins of this competition, and its usein the development of acceptable regimes of sustainable resource use.39Ostrom (1990) advocates the use of institutional arrangements originating,at leastin part, from the resource users themselves, arrangements that do not dependentirely onimposition of full private property rights or centralized regulation byexternal authorities.In reviewing three influential models18 frequently used to providea foundation forrecommending state or market solutions, she finds them usefulfor “explaining howperfectly rational individuals can produce, under some circumstances,outcomes that arenot “rational” when viewed from the perspective of all those involved.” Specifically,there are four problems with these models:First, the individuals using CPRs [common-pool resources] are viewed asif they are capable of short-term maximization, but not of long-termreflection about joint strategies to improve joint outcomes. Second, theseindividuals are viewed as if they are in a trap and cannot get out withoutsome external authority imposing a solution. Third, the institutions thatindividuals may have established are ignored or rejected as inefficient,without examining how these institutions may help them acquireinformation, reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, and equitablyallocate appropriation rights and provision duties. Fourth, the solutiOnspresented for “the” government to impose are themselves based on modelsof idealized markets or idealized states. (Ostrom 1990)In instances where conditions do not approximate the “extreme assumptions” utilized bythe models, however, these special models cannot predict outcomes (Ostrom 1990). Shefinds it inappropriate to apply models that assume no communication, and no capacityto change the rules, to management of smaller-scale “common pooi resources.”Ostrom (1992) argues:“that when a small number of homogeneous users share similar norms anda low discount rate, live near a resource, and are involved in manysituations together, the likelihood of their finding better rules forgoverning their commons [shared resource] is increased.”She recognizes that other factors also affect the likelihood of success: (1) attributes ofthe resource; (2) the impact of external economic market factors; and (3) of the18The models are: (1) the tragedy of the commons; (2) the prisoner’s dilemmagame; and (3) the logic of collective action. Ostrom (1990) sees the free-rider problem“at the heart of each of these models.”40government external to the community (Ostrom 1992). In particular, she sees the roleof government as significant in facilitating or hampering the capacity of individualstoachieve, monitor and enforce agreements. Ostrom (1992) concludes that:Without some specialists who monitor, record information and interpretthe rules in a consistent way, the shared community of understanding canso erode that the rules become meaningless. If the specialists are notthemselves subject to review by others -- including all members of thecommunity -- their shared understanding of the rules can also disintegrateand be replaced by a local despotism. Thus, I would argue that neithercommunity nor enforcers are sufficient. Both are needed, and both canenhance the other. [emphasis added]Singleton and Taylor (1992) put forward an argument about common propertyresources based on an analysis of the “transaction costs of solving a collective actionproblem.” “Transaction costs” are defined as the costs of: “identifying the possibilitiesfor mutual gains and those of them which are Pareto-optimal; negotiating an agreementon one of them and monitoring and enforcing it.” They conclude that these costs arelower where specified community characteristics exist (i.e. (1) shared beliefs; (2) stableset of members; (3) expectation of continuing interaction; and (4) direct and multiplexinteractions) exist, thus creating a situation of “mutual vulnerability.” Singleton andTaylor (1992) acknowledge that “as the strength of community varies [as measured bythe degree to which the defining characteristics are present], we would expect to movethrough a range” of resource management systems -- the strongest communities exhibitingmore fully decentralized management and the regulatory agency taking a more prominentrole where community is weaker. They see co-management “taking the form of anoverall agreement, mediated and partly monitored and enforced by the state, whichallows the subgroups to regulate their own members’ behaviour consistently with theagreement” (Singleton and Taylor 1992).In her review of several examples around the world of successful collectivemanagement of environmental resources, McKean (1992) specifies the characteristics ofregimes that circumvent tragedy. Shared characteristics include: (1) well defined41communities of eligible user-managers; and (2) clear, easily enforced rulesthat areenvironmentally cautious (i.e. constrain resource use). There were strikingdifferences,however, in how the harvested supply of the resource wasdistributed. Distributionsystems ranged from hierarchial systems of rights with unequalallocation of the resourceto very egalitarian systems that assign equal shares by lottery.Although McKean (1992) found some variability incharacteristics typical to usersof communal resources, some general features prevailed:(1) users must be present, and able to contribute(sale of shares may beallowed, but only to other eligible users of the communal resource, nottooutsiders);(2) communal control was exerted over the number of users;(3) users had to convene regularly to make decisions about managingthecommunal resource;(4) independent jurisdiction over the management ofthe commons (i.e.protected from interference in its management of thecommunal resourcefrom other resource users or jurisdictional bodies -- insome exampleswhere this protection was unavailable or ineffective, resource usersutilized illegal means to protect their resource); and(5) detailed, readily enforceable regulations both to restrict use whenenvironmental health of the communal resource is threatened and to keeptrack of contributions and withdrawals from the commons.These attributes contributed to efficiency of communal managementby reducingtransaction costs inherent in mobilizing the resource users to make decisionsand rules(Ostrom 1982) and providing a measure of control over potential free-riders.In terms of distribution of rights, McKean (1992) distinguishes three differentkinds of rights: (1) eligibility for a share and participation in decision making; (2)entitlement to a share in the flow of income; and (3) entitlement to a share of the capitalstock itself, or some portion of the proceeds when the resources are sold or subdivided42into private parcels. Inequality in eligibility for rights to communal resources was almostuniversal and, McKean (1992) hypothesizes, probably essential, in resolving tensionsarising as user communities grow in size and new members wish for a share of theresource. Unequal distribution of eligibility functions by:keeping the number of co-owners of the commons manageably small,but buying the cooperation and allegiance of groups large enough todestroy the commons when they become sufficiently angry at beingdisenfranchised -- [this] seem[s] to require inequality between co-ownersof the commons and non-owners, and to encourage some additionalstratification between senior co-owners and junior co-owners. (McKean1992)Distribution of the products of the communal resource was generally by rules thatwould distribute these products in direct proportion to private holdings, thus againreproducing existing inequalities in private wealth)9 McKean (1992) cites, forexample, several instances of hierarchial division of products of the commons based onprivate holdings. This “neutral distribution rule (one that does not alter the distributionof private wealth),” is economically efficient (1) in reducing transaction costs; (2)signifying a balance between costs and benefits to individuals of using the commons; and(3) maximizing production levels from private holdings (in instanceswhere there wasa ratio between various private and common components of the productive system).McKean (1992) has little to say with respect to distribution of the proceeds whencommunal resources are partitioned or sold off to private buyers, but suggests thategalitarian rules awarding equal shares may be usual. She reiterates that the importantdistinctions are among fundamental rights, management practices and distribution at thetime of partition.19Some exceptions are cited, in which the products of the commons are dividedintoequal shares, but the predominant practice is determined to be that entitlement toproducts of the commons was almost always based on private holding andthusreproduced the inequality in private wealth (McKean 1992).43Grima and Berkes (1989) examinethe theoretical bases and allocativeinstrumentsfor both community-based resourcemanagement and an alternative,managementbycentral government agencies. They arguethat the need to allocateresources,“eitherthrough the market process, communalagreement, kingly fiator coercive decision”iskey to making resource management consistentwith an ecosystemapproach. Somecombination of instruments is likelyto be required under bothprivate and communalownership.For example, the government needsto regulate the activities of private-resource users; the communityneeds to enforce regulationsto members.Regulation, monitoring, policingand enforcement -- allthese are theinstruments of ‘mutual coercion’.The rhetoric of the ecologicalromanticsand of the hard-nosed economistsdiffer; the instruments forallocatingrights-to-use are quite similar. (Grimaand Berkes 1989)They note that there has beenlittle progress in integratingcommunity-level andgovernment-level management measures.Grima and Berkes (1989)go on to suggestthat, in addressing common propertyproblems, the creation ofcommunal-property rightsconsistent with traditional andneotraditional practices, wherethey exist, is a moreeffective management approach than‘top down’ solutions.Berkes’ (1985) findsthat Lake Erie fishers make informalarrangements todistribute resource rights amongthemselves and that thesecommunity managementmeasures can extend beyondgovernment regulation.2°In LakeHuron, the indigenoussystem of “gentlemen’s agreements”broke down about 1982, whenthere were some newentrants to the fishery whose goals anddebt loads were significantlydifferent from thoseof many of the traditional Lake Huronfishers.In creating property rights forindividual users, ITHQ canbe inconsistent withtraditional practices. Local-levelmanagement, such as Grima andBerkes propose,20This was true of Lake Erie onlyprior to 1979. From 1980to 1984, with manynew entrants, there wasa free-for-all in the commercialfishery.44generally results in the creation of communal rights. It also has the advantage oflinkingthe consequences of management decisions more closely to those who dependmost onthe resource.Pinkerton (1980) discusses the use of allocated vessel quotas(a form of ITHQ)and argues that, in order to achieve their full long-run potential infacilitating resourceconservation and efficiency, the quotas must be community-based and nontransferable.She reports on the Japanese experience, in which transfer of quota to parties notprimarily interested in fishing had a deleterious impact on the ability of the remainingfishermen to bring to bear the community pressures which had earlier curbed over-fishingand illegal practices.2’Another potential weakness of the strict application of the property rights solutionto fisheries management is that it overlooks the long tradition in Canada of socialplanning as part and parcel of resource regulation. A strong argument for inclusion ofsocial planning in resource management in Canada is an instrumental one; policies whichdo not account for social factors are likely to be ignored, opposed or merely ineffective.Whillans and Berkes (1986) point out that fishery regulation may meet with considerableresistance from fishers when the regulations are not seen to be maintaining the social andeconomic benefits of the fishery. Karpoff (1987) developed a model of fishery regulationthat incorporates realistic “self-interest” objectives of fishers. He describes thepersistence of many traditional fishery regulatory techniques (e.g. restricted access andlimitations on the use of capital equipment) despite theory and data that demonstrate“suboptimality,” and suggests that such regulations are the natural products of sociopolitical processes, reflecting the “redistribution of wealth that is favoured by themajority of fishermen in the regulatory body’s jurisdiction.”21In this regard, it would be interesting to observe on-going developments in theLake Erie fishery. Carling-O’Keefe, a large multi-national corporation, now ownsOmstead Foods Ltd., formerly a family-owned harvesting and processing operation oflong standing in the Lake Erie fishery.452.4.3 Features of co-management regimesIn working to study more closely co-managementideas and theirapplicationtoresource management, theorists have identified anumber of features typicalor desirableto co-managed resource regimes. These characteristicsdelineate managementsystemscapable of equitably coordinating inputs of both resourceusers and managers. Thefollowing list summarizes salient characteristics ofco-management, drawn from both thetheoretical and case study literature.(1) Reliance on cooperative (ratherthan competitive,) approaches to resourceuse (as discussed in section 2.4) This qualityexemplifies thecommunitarian aspects of resourceuse decision making, in contrastto therational arguments towards individual propertyrights (Peters 1988).(2) Political independence (‘McKean1992) and definition ofpropertyrightssuch as to limit access (‘Grima and Berkes 1989)These features serve toprotect the resource users from interferenceand challenges to theirmanagement authority (McKean 1992)andto restrict access to the resourceto a pre-defined community (Grima and Berkes 1989).Grima and Berkes(1989) see some combination of instrumentsas likely to be required underboth private and communal ownership: “Forexample, the governmentneeds to regulate the activities of private-resourceusers; the communityneeds to enforce regulations on members.”(3) Resource-users’ input to the regulatory process(Buck 1989) and shareddecision making (Pinkerton 1989b)These related concepts include: thepractice of (a) individuals’ and groups’ provisionof comment during rulemaking, and information and opinionsto elected representatives (e.g.Chesapeake Bay fisheries); and mayresult in (b) altering the relationshipsamong the actors in the fishery (betweenfishers and government, as wellas among individual fishers and fishers’ interestgroups), allowing a46community of users to reduce the costs of sharing a resource, whilecapturing the benefits which can accrue to collective users (Ostrom 1977;Ostrom and Ostrom 1977).Lobbying and negotiation with regulatory bodies and resourcemanagers also addresses power sharing in institutional arrangements forresource management. Pinkerton (1989b) emphasizes the importance ofdecentralizing management decisions in fostering “more appropriate,efficient and equitable management.”(4) Joint peiforinance of management functions22 to compare dfferentsystems of co-management (Pinkerton 1989b and co-operation betweenthe government and others and among scientists of different institutionsand agencies and between scientists, fishers and managers in the form ofshared decision making and responsibilities in managing the resource(McCay 1989) Systems in which some, but not necessarily all,management functions are performed jointly may still deliver some of thebenefits of co-management, and/or have potential for more comprehensiveco-management. McKean (1992) also emphases the importance of users’involvement in setting, monitoring and enforcing rules governing resourceuse. Ostrom (1992) supports an emphasis on the role of external“specialists” as an important one in supporting co-management.22Pinkerton (1989b) defines these management functions as:(1) data gathering and analysis .. .;(2) logisticalharvesting decisions, such as licensing, . . . timing, .location, . . . and vessel or gear restrictions . . . ;(3)harvest allocation decisions . . . ;(4) protection fromhabitat or water quality damage by other water resourceusers .. .;(5) enforcement of regulations or practicesguiding harvesting logistics . . . ;(6) enhancement andlong-term planning . .. ;and (7) broad policy decisionmaking.47(5) Varying systems ofdistribution of rights andshares of the resource, suchthat inegalitarian and/or egalitarian traits support economic efficienciesor reduce the incentive to harvest heavily (McKean 1992) “Neutral”distribution rules that maintain inequities can reduce transaction costs andmay reflect resource users contributions. Egalitarian rules can invert the“free-rider” dynamic, creating a disincentive to overzealous harvest.2.4.4 Sub-section summary and conclusionThis section has focused on literature that explores the contextual socialandoperational factors in resource management, looking carefully at some of the assumptionson which ITHQ is based and at factors affecting implementation of ITHQ. Comanagement researchers see the failure to recognize and incorporate resourceusers’collective strengths and organization as a major weakness in the policies basedon thebioeconomic model, from which ITHQ is derived. They seethe root of this failure tobe the assumption that competition for a common resourcewill be destructive, and thatexclusive property rights will remedy the situation. Proponents of co-managementpropose an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed andimplementedcooperatively with resource users, and have identified characteristics typicalof sucharrangements. By incorporating some of the strengths oftraditional resource use systems(e.g. cooperation, reciprocity), it is thought thatsuch community-derived managementsystems, particularly those that are supported by anexternal governing agency, arepotentially more efficient, effective and sustainable management regimes.The bioeconomic literature resulting from the melding of biological andeconomicresearch reflects a strong theoretical approach but a weak on when applied.In general,this literature acknowledges, but does not examine, the importance of contextualsocialand operational factors in resource management. The bodyof literature created bymaritime anthropologists, cultural ecologists and culturally-oriented commonpropertytheorists, on the other hand, does examine theoretical and practical socialfactors, but48here the emphasis is predominantly descriptive and socio-political. The approaches takenin these two bodies of literature have tended to meet in varying prescriptive measures forresource management, but they have not directly addressed some of the obviousrelationships to do with the transition from a strict “tragedy of the commons” paradigmto more community-based and user-influenced resource development. The failure toaddress these transitional impacts stems in part from the paucity of empirically-basedassessments of selected biological, social, administrative and economic conflicts andchanges that result from the imposition of new or modified regulatory regimes. As aresult, a valuable data set on process-related impacts in implementation of resourceregulation has not been fully utilized.2.5 Policy Process ModelsA considerable amount of the foregoing discussion on the specifics ofimplementing ITHQ refers to the problems encountered in transition from theory topractice (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Fisheries researchers have linked these problems tothe processes by which ITHQ was developed and implemented. The literature reviewedaddressed some of the theoretical and actual advantages and consequences of ITHQ, andidentified some of the problems encountered in its implementation. This section nowgoes on to introduce literature that questions some of the assumptions on which policymeasures such as ITHQ are based. The commons research reviewed here has contributedto our understanding of the positive aspects of collective, cooperative decision making,and the confusions that can result from a poor understanding of how property rightsfunction in cooperative resource use (section 2.4). Some fisheries researchers andadvocates of co-management identify the important influence of policy process andunderstanding of social context on the efficacy of resource use policy such as ITHQ.Policy process models are relevant to analysis of the consequences of ITHQ in that theyhelp explain not only the decision to adopt ITHQ but, more importantly, whyimplementation of ITHQ occurred as it did, and thus, how “deficiencies” inimplementation have affected the fishery.49This section identifies anddescribes three perspectives which provideinsight intothe adoption and implementationof ITHQ in the Canadian portion of theLake Huroncommercial fishery. These perspectivesare exemplified in: (1) the rationalactor model,an idealized, rational decision-making process;(2) incrementalism, aconservative policyprocess, in which policy changes in only smallsteps; and (3) interestgroup theory,which depicts the policy processas a power struggle among various interestsectors. Inillustrating alternative views of the policyprocess, these models helpto explain howITHQ came to be developed and implemented inthe way that it was. Deficienciesin themethod of ITHQ development and implementationpartially explain the observedconsequences of ITHQ.Each of these models offersome insight into the mannerof how policyalternatives gain prominence andare selected and implemented. Eachtheory explainsat least one group of decisions and interactionsvery well, but mustbe adjusted oraugmented when seeking a comprehensiveexplanation. As utilized inthis study, themodels are largely complementary,(as opposed to competing). By drawingon this arrayof conceptual models it is possibleto create a more informative analysis of the decisionmaking and impacts associated with thedevelopment and implementation of ITHQ.2.5.1 The rational actor modelThe rational actor model, with itsoperative assumptions of rationality, sharessome commonalities with the bioeconomicmodel that resource economists havedeveloped for the management of renewableresources. (See Figure 2.2.)Rationality refers to consistent,value-maximizing choice within specifiedconstraints. The power of the theoryof rational action derives from its rigor. Policyis considered rational when it ismost efficient, or when objectives andactions/consequences are clearly linked. Thisidea of efficiency, according to Dye(1972), involves 11...the calculation of allsocial, political, and economic values sacrificed50or achieved by a public policy, not just those which can be measured by quantitativesymbols” (emphasis in original). Dye (1972) outlines the theoretical imperatives of theprocess by which a rational policy is selected (see Figure 2.2):policy makers must: (1) know all of the society’s value preferencesand their relative weights; (2) know all of the policy alternatives available;(3) know all of the consequences of each policy alternative; (4) calculatethe ratio of achieved to sacrificed societal values for each policyalternative; (5) select the most efficient policy alternative.These assumptions lend power to any model. Downs (1967) elaborates:If a theorist knows the ends of some decision-maker, he can predictwhat actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he calculates themost reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) heassumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision-maker isrational.This rigor depends on assumptions that are too restrictive for many empirically orientedapplications. For example, an assumption of comprehensive rationality entails anaccurate mapping of consequences resulting from the choice of any alternative actionor policy. The rational actor model also accommodates an alternative assumption of“limited rationality,” which permits consideration of a more limited range of informationand alternatives.The bioeconomic model stipulates, within the rigorous rational model, a situationof limited rationality. This none the less confines analysis to a narrow range of valuesand consequences within which value-maximizing activity can be identified (Allison1971).51INPUTAll resourcesneeded forpure—rot onol typrocessAl! dotoneeded forpure—rationalityprocessOUTPUTPure—rotional itypolicy (policies)FIGURE 2.2: TheRational ModelSOURCE: Dye 197252In exploring the influence of often unrecognized assumptions on analysesofpolicy decisions, Allison (1971) identifies the classical rational actor model as the basicframe of reference used by many analysts.23 As Allison (1971) explains,conceptualizing policy makers “as if they were centrally coordinated,purposiveindividuals provides a useful shorthand for understanding problems of policy.”Hecontinues:But this simplification -- like all simplifications -- obscures as well asreveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact ofbureaucracy: the “maker” of government policy is not one calculatingdecisionmaker [sic] but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations andpolitical actors. (Allison 1971)He argues that the rational actor model must be supplemented (“if not supplanted”) byframes of reference that focus on the organizations and political actors involved in thepolicy process.In reference to economic theory and the policy process, Lindblom (1959)recognizes these same limitations, and suggests a remedy:Only in relatively restricted areas does economic theory achievesufficient precision to go far in resolving policy questions; its helpfulnessin policy-making is always so limited that it requires supplementationthrough comparative analysis.2.5.2 The incremental modelThis section describes the incremental model of public policy and its contributionto understanding implementation of ITHQ.The incremental model recognizes the practical limitations of the classic rationalactor model and describes a more realistic process of decision making. The rational23Although Graham Allison’s (1971) seminal work, Essence of Decision, focuseson foreign policy, his thinking and conclusions have been widely applied to policyanalysis in many fields.53model assumes that the ideal solution,once identified, is persuasiveto all involved inthedecision making process. Thus the “politics”of decision making becomeimmaterial.Lindblom (1959) outlines twofactors that limit the usefulnessof classicalanalysis inpolicy making: (1) a great deal of informationon all possible alternativesis required;and (2) the analysis is at too large a scale forapplication to a policyprocess that movesthrough small changes. Incrementalanalysis economizes onthe need fordata and directsattention to the information that is relevantto the crucial choicesfaced by policy makers.In general, Lindblom (1959) findsit unrealistic to assumethat policy makers: (1) reviewthe whole range of existing and proposedpolicies; (2) identify societalgoals; (3) researchthe benefits and costs of alternativepolicies in terms of the ratioof benefits to costs; andthen (4) make a selection onthe basis of all relevant information.Incrementalism describespolicy making as a continuationof past activities, withonly minor modifications (see Figure2.3). First presented andfurther articulatedbyLindblom (1959 and 1979)to explain decision making usedby public administrators,incrementalism describes adecision-making methodbased on successive limitedcomparisons that achieveschange by small steps. Lindblom(1979) distinguishesthefollowing three types of incrementalanalysis.(1) Simple incrementalanalysis, which is limitedto consideration of alternativepolicies all of which are onlyincrementally different fromthe status quo.(2) Disjointed incrementalism, whichis marked by a mutually supportingset ofsimplifying and focusing stratagems,including simple incrementalismand thefollowing:(a) limitation of analysisto a few familiar policy alternatives;(b) an intertwining of analysisof policy goals and other values withtheempirical aspects of theproblem;(c) greater analytical preoccupationwith ills to be remediedthan positivegoals to be sought;(d) a sequence of trials, errors,and revised trials;541910Policy IncrementPast PolicyCorn rnittmentsFIGURE 2.3: TheIncremental ModelSOURCE: Lindblom, 19591940 1950 1960 197055(e) analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possibleconsequences of a considered alternative; and(f) fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policymaking.(3) Strategic analysis, which is limited to any calculated set of stratagems to simplifycomplex policy problems, in a short-cut of the conventionally comprehensive‘scientific’ analysis.The strength in disjointed incrementalism lies in its recognition of theimpracticalities inherent in policy making along the lines of the classical rationalactormodel, and its description of a more conservative24 decision-making processdisposed to maintaining existing institutions (Dye 1972). These strengths are exemplifiedin the following characteristics, inherent to incrementalism (Dye 1972).(1) Existing programs, policies and expenditures are considered as a base, andattention is concentrated on new programs and policies and on increases,decreases, or modifications of current programs.(2) There is seldom the time, intelligence or resources to investigate all of thealternatives to existing policy.(3) As the consequences of completely new or different policies are uncertain,previous policies are accepted as legitimate.(4) There may be heavy investments in existing programs which precluderadical change.(5) Politically expedient agreement is more readily reached when discussionfocuses on increases or decreases in budgets or modifications to existing,not new, programs.24The term “conservative” is used throughout in the sense of adverse to rapid orradical change.56The incremental model is related to the concept of “satisficing,” as popularized by Simon(March and Simon 1958), wherein people will settle for a less than a totally efficientsolution, one that is “good enough.”The incremental model does not assume a comprehensive survey of the variousalternatives. It models a decision-making process that builds in a limited, self-referencing way, upon what has gone before. Thus there are a number of recognizedlimitations in the incremental model. First, it does not include a review step for allrelevant values, and may lead to oversight of appropriate policies because they are notsuggested by the preceding chain of policy. This type of omission would most seriouslyaffect policy making during a time when there was a significant shift in societal values,such as in the 70s, when environmental issues were first becoming significant in policymaking, but had not previously been major considerations. Second, information may beexcluded arbitrarily. This would result from a focus on information of relevance toprevious policy, rather than on a new definition of the policy problem. Third, it assumesa fragmented approach to policy making. Given that only a limited policy area is givenconsideration, the incremental model describes a policy process that is detached fromdevelopments in other areas which might affect or be affected by developments in thearea under study.As elucidated by Lindblom (1979), these exclusions are deliberate, systematic anddefensible. He sees that “ . . . carefully considered disjointed incrementalism is animprovement on conventional attempts at formal completeness that always lapse, forcomplex problems, into undefensible makeshifts.” In any form of analysis, informationwill be excluded, the choice between comprehensiveness and disjointed incrementalism,is thus between accidental, uninformed incompleteness on one hand and deliberate,informed incompleteness on the other. Lindblom (1979) defends fragmentation of policymaking as a method of curbing power and raising the level of information and rationalitybrought to bear on decisions. Lindblom’s defense of incrementalism introduces theconcept of power into the decision-making process, and offers a method of diffusing its57impacts. The process by which this is achieved is by selecting alternatives that (1)minimize risk by making only small changes and (2) seek consensus in the process ofselecting alternatives.2.5.3 The interest group modelThis section describes the development of interest group theory and its role in ourunderstanding of public policy.As expounded by Truman (1951), group theory, or as termed here, interest grouptheory, begins with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central fact ofpolitics. Individuals with a common interest band together formally or informally topromote their demands with policy makers. According to theorists of this tradition,individuals are important in politics only when they act on behalf of group interests. Thegroup thus becomes the link between the individual and policy makers. In relation tointerest group actions, Dye (1972) identifies the task of the political system as that ofmanaging group conflict by (1) establishing rules; (2) arranging compromises andbalancing interests; (3) enacting these compromises in the form of policy; and (4)enforcing these policies.Interest group theory is a model in which equilibrium is determined by therelative strength of influence of interest groups competing to sway public policy (seeFigure 2.4). Changes in the relative influence of the various interest groups would beseen in policy modifications which reflected the wants of the more powerful group(s).The most effective groups tend to (1) have strength of numbers, relative to other groupsactive in the interest area; (2) represent members who closely share similar attitudestowards the issues affecting group interests; (3) have adequate economic andorganizational resources to communicate effectively with their membership and thegeneral public; (4) have effective leadership; and (5) have access to policy makers.58—,ofGroupB Influence of Group AFIGURE 2.4: The Interest Group ModelSOURCE: Dye, 1972///I’Alternative PolicyPositionsPublic PolicyEquilibrium59As outlined by Dye (1972) the major characteristics of the policy process fromthe group theory perspective are: (1) policy makers are responding to group pressuresthrough bargaining, negotiating and compromising among competing demands ofinfluential groups; (2) a large, nearly universal latent group favours the statusquo, andcan be motivated to support it; (3) individuals may be affiliated with a number ofdifferent groups, and this moderates the demands of groups, who must avoid offendingtheir members who have other group affiliations; and (4) competition among groupsoperates to check the influence of any single group.In the interest group model, the power and influence of the interest group is usedto maintain or challenge existing policies. Change is instigated from outside the statusg. In the incremental model, power is vested at the centre, with the status quo, asrepresented by existing programs and policies, and changes originate from this centre.2.6 Chapter Summary and ConclusionHardin’s discussion of the “tragedy of the commons” popularized an enduringinterpretation of the common property paradigm in resource management (1968). Twomajor schools of thought refer to this paradigm. One is the bioeconomic model ofresource management. A second resource management model, the co-managementmodel, emphasizes community-shared stewardship of resources, including governmentas a management partner, but with somewhat less reliance on government interventionsthan evidenced in management systems derived from the bioeconomic model.These two approaches differ conceptually. The bioeconomic model emphasizescompetition and supremacy of individualism and the co-management modelcommunitarianism (Berkes and Farvar 1989). This pivotal difference between theseapproaches hinges on the need to specify exclusive property rights. In developing theco-management model, commons researchers specify a common property resource asbeing utilized in common by a distinct group of individuals. The approach reflected in60the assumptions that form the basis of the bioeconomic model assumes a commonproperty resource is “open access,” without specific ownership. The most importantdistinction between the assumptions of these two approaches is that the bioeconomicmodel assumes a common property resource as open access and the co-managementmodel defines a common property resource as accessible only by a specific group.The bioeconomic model of resource use has been a dominant paradigm inresource management for the past twenty years. Relying on this model as a rationale forintervention to control the expansion and deployment of fishing capacity (Pearse 1980),fisheries managers have promulgated policy, supporting regulations and administrativeinfrastructure consistent with its precepts. Based on an understanding of interrelatedbiological and economic forces illustrated in the bioeconomic model, fisheries managershave suggested interventions to reduce harvest capacity and protect fish stocks.The relatively recent emphasis on co-management systems of resource use hasmeant that very little interdisciplinary research exists on the possible impacts oftheoretically-derived, property rights-based regulations (such as ITHQ) with respect to:(1) the impacts of the process of developing and implementing these regulations; and (2)the impacts of these regulations on the resource, resource users, and resourcemanagement. This thesis begins to address this need by examining and analysing theITHQ-related changes in the organization and management of the Lake Huroncommercial fishery that occurred between 1980 and 1985, and assessing the impacts ofthese changes and the impacts of the process by which ITHQ was developed andimplemented. Assessing the processes of ITHQ development and implementationexamines, to the extent that they are evident, the nascent aspects of co-management inthe Lake Huron fishery during the study period.In the transition from theory to practice, ITHQ encounters a number of significantproblems. The most pressing of these problems include: (1) the need for reliableinformation on landings and for consistent, accurate stock assessment; (2) the61requirement for separate quotas for each stock needing management; (3) allocation/equityissues; and (4) assessment problems with timing and quantification in adjusting quotas.In practical terms, addressing these issues means substantial increases in monitoring,enforcement, stock assessment and liaison with resource users.Co-management researchers see the failure to recognize and incorporate resourceusers collective strengths and organization as a major weakness in ITHQ assumptions.They see the root of this failure to be the assumption that competition for a commonresource will be destructive (as exemplified in the “tragedy of the commons”), and thatexclusive property rights will remedy the situation. Proponents of co-managementpropose an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed and implementedcooperatively with resource users. By incorporating some of the strengths of traditionalresource use systems (i.e. cooperation, reciprocity and husbandry of the resource), it isthought that such community-derived management systems would be more efficient,effective and sustainable management regimes.The bioeconomic model is very good at defining specific important biological andeconomic interrelationships, and the narrow range of economic performance likely to beobserved in nearly all mature, unregulated fisheries (Pearse 1980). The bioeconomicmodel is not a decision-making model. It does not address a number of significantaspects of policy development and implementation. The creation and implementation ofpolicy requires an understanding of the range of forces that are brought to bear in thepolicy process. The complex processes of negotiation and compromise that underlie theattainment of consensus are the management of influence, and are better illustrated byexamination of the models of decision making explored in this study.This extended literature review has surveyed work relating to: (1) theoreticalaspects of biological, bioeconomic and co-management models of resource management;and (2) the results of implementation of management systems derived from thesetheoretical models, in particular the use of ITHQ to address problems of overharvest and62overcapacity in fisheries. Analysis of this literature indicates that in implementation,ITHQ does not always work as theoretically predicted, and focuses attention on problemsrelating to administrative, enforcement and social/cultural aspects of the process of ITFIQdevelopment and implementation. Review of selected policy process models picks up onthis thread of concern regarding the process aspects of ITHQ development andimplementation. In so far as these policy process models help to explain how ITHQcame to be developed and implemented in the way that it was, the analysis provides anexplanatory link between the theoretical expectations of ITHQ and the observedconsequences of its application, as illustrated in this case study.Based on the literature review presented in this chapter, the specific issues to beaddressed in the case study are as follows.(As identified in section 2.3.1.)•Reduction in capacity. Measured by a reduction in the amount and valueof vessels and gear involved in the fishery (with a concomitant reductionin the number of fishing operations).• Control of harvest. Indicated by the amount of harvest of principalcommercial species.• Efficient utilization of capacity. Indicated by a trend towards thoseenterprises with lower investment, or capacity, harvesting lesser amountsof fish than those with a higher investment, and those with a higherinvestment harvesting greater amounts.(As identified in section 2.3.2.)•Elements of administrative infrastructure such as monitoring, enforcementand stock assessment.•Communication and consultation with resource users in policydevelopment and implementation.(As identified in section 2.4.)•Roles of resource managers and users in co-operative development andimplementation of regulatory interventions.63(As identified in section 2.5.)•Management of power through processes of negotiation and compromise.643.0 DATA COLLECTIONThis chapter describes the sources of, rationale for, and strengths and limitationsof the data utilized in this research.The ideal evaluative process begins with a set of hypothesized causal relationshipsthat relate to a realm of policy choice. Evaluation of ITHQ is an attempt to understandthe impacts on existing conditions that are associated with the introduction of this policy.Impacts can be expected or unanticipated. In the context of this study, the primarycausal relationships are derived from the bioeconomic model. The outcomes of ITHQwill also be examined using the filter of three policy process models to discern whetherthe results of ITHQ are better explained by the rational process factors or by some of theless well defined elements associated with the development and implementation of policy.The incremental model of the policy development process defines some of these elementsas attributable to a conservative process of incremental changes, in which previousconditions are very influential in defining new policy. Interest group theory models apolicy process based on influence and bargaining, in which political and social strengthsof interest groups or sectors are instrumental in policy development and implementation.A major impetus for examination of fishery policy is the requirement for anunderstanding of the objectives and behaviour of fishing communities and individualfishers as an aid to development of economic policies and regulations in fisheries(Charles 1988). The method of this case study incorporates quantitative and qualitativeanalysis. Qualitative information from key actor interviews, written and other sources,and quantitative information such as broad statistical descriptions of the economic andbiological components of the fishery are utilized. This research uses all availableorreadily produced data on a wide range of impacts for the purpose of providinginformation for distinguishing the early impacts of ITHQ regulation.The data set is described below.653.1 The Quantitative DataIn chapter two, the assumptions and causal relationships that underlay thedevelopment and implementation of ITHQ were explored. It is suggested that in an openaccess common property resource the tendencyis for equilibrium to beachieved at thepoint where total revenue equals total cost, and all resource rents have been dissipated.This equilibrium point is associated with conditions of overharvest and overcapacity inthe fishery. Overharvest is related to attempts to maximize the total revenue ofindividuals or firms and to reduce the economic inefficiencies related to overcapacity.Overcapacity is a competitive response of individuals or firms to the existence of indirectregulatory devices such as those that control gear, season and area.In theory, ITHQ addresses the perceived problem of open access in commonproperty resource use by creating exclusive property rights. This should reduce the needfor excess capacity, since the fisher is assured some defined share of the resource. Inaddition, control of the total annual harvest should reduce the likelihood of overharvestif levels are appropriately defined.To examine the impact of ITHQ on harvest and capacity this study analyzed dataon: (1) number and association of licensed operations; (2) harvest amounts; (3) harvestvalue; (4) investment; and (5) employment. The specific variables measured were: (1)number of licensed operations; (2) harvest amount and value of whitefish and chub; (3)investment in vessels and gear; and (4) number of persons employed.3. 1. 1 Source and limits of the quantitative dataA statistical description of major elements of the fishing industry isdrawn fromharvest and investment reports the government required the commercialfishers to fileannually until 1986 using Form CF.8A (Form CF.8A is obsolete, seeAppendix 1).Analysis of these time series data supplies a picture of the significant harvestand66investment trends in the industry before and immediately following the introduction ofindividual transferable harvest quotas. Empirical descriptions of changes in the numbersof fishing operations, harvest amounts and values of the two principal species,employment, and existing and new investments in gear and vessels, make an importantcontribution to the interpretation of ITHQ impacts.The time series of the data is short (i.e. generally four years preceding, and twoyears following quota regulation) and there are relatively small numbers of commercialfishing operations on Lake Huron (e.g. ranging from a peak of 86 in 1980, to a low of58 in 1985). The findings of this preliminary research are presented as tentativefactorsonly, and probable linkages are interpreted with caution. The analysis, however, doesindicate some initial trends in ITHQ impacts.OMNR has continued to collect data on the commercial fishery, utilizing since1986 a modified instrument. For this and other reasons, the quantitative data setcompiled for this research is not perfectly compatible with the post-1985 OMNRCommercial Fish Harvest Statistics data base. Nevertheless, the 1986-1989 harvestamounts and value of harvest from this data base are depicted graphically in section 5. 1.1in order to give some indication of changes in these data since the conclusion of the studyperiod.3.1.2 Method of analysis of quantitative dataEmpirical information on the numbers of fishing operations, harvest amounts andvalues of the two principal species, and existing and new investments in gear andvesselswas derived from the OMNR Form CF.8A, Annual Commercial FishingReport,completed by each fisher in the study area. Copies were obtained from OMNR ofthecompleted forms for all commercial fishing operations, for the years 1980 to1985inclusive. In order to preserve confidentiality, the reports were coded withnumericalidentifiers for each operation.67A data record (defining the case, record number, variable name, variable label,value range, value label and field) was designed to compile the information from thereports onto Fortran coding forms. Seven, eighty-column records were required for eachcompleted report. The coded information was then transferred (in verified form) tocomputer tape for analysis.The data set was ‘cleaned’ through a series of checks for logical errors, including,but not limited to, searches for inappropriate maximum and minimum values, errors indata field parameters and random comparisons with selected original reports.Analysis of the data set utilized SPSSx25 to assess variable distribution, developdata categorization and compute frequency, average and percentage statistics.3.2 The Qualitative DataAlthough the causal relationships defined in the bioeconomic model have beeninterpreted to indicate that the development and implementation of ITHQ should controlharvest and capacity, the co-management model described earlier argues that theassumptions of individual economic rationality inherent in the bioeconomic model areunrealistic. This criticism suggests that the outcomes of ITHQ may be a function of themanner of development and implementation and administration of the policy process.Impacts attributable to the policy process are not easily accessed by way of aggregatequantitative data.This key research component of the study was addressed through a series of openended interviews with fourteen senior and intermediate level fisheries researchers andmanagers in Ontario as well as twenty-one representatives of a major user ofthe25SPSSXUser’s Guide, Edition 2, 1986.68resource, the commercial fishers (see Appendix 3: Interview Respondents andAffiliations).26 Consistent with accepted research methods in policy analysis (Patton andSawicki 1986), key actor interviews were used to gather information on ITHQ policybecause: (1) it is a new topic in the study area; (2) there is little written information onthe Lake Huron commercial fishery; (3) respondents were reluctant to put certain answersin writing; and (4) quantitative information on investment and harvest practices isincomplete. Key actor interviews were considered to be the best of a number ofalternative methods for obtaining comparable information. Other methods consideredwere associated with significant drawbacks. Structured questionnaire delivered in personby the author (would not be accepted by many respondents asconfidential andanonymous, could overlook significant information). Mailback survey (assumes literacyon the part of the respondent, would be associated by many respondents with “thegovernment,” would not be accepted by many respondents as confidential andanonymous, requires a large sample size). Use of a number of interviewers (wouldintroduce inconsistency in delivery of the interview and recording of responses).Facilitated workshop(s) (would not be anonymous or confidential, the formal structurewould be intimidating to some respondents, would not allow an in-depth discussion ofas broad a range of topics).The data provide qualitative descriptions of: (1) fishing and marketing practices;(2) attitudes towards ITHQ development and implementation; and (3) expected andunexpected impacts of ITHQ.26The analysis in this section focuses most closely on the results of the interviewswith the commercial fishers. Information from interviews with fisheries managersandscientists, although important in interpreting the results of the interviewswith thecommercial fishers, was most useful in piecing together the policy context, asreviewedin Chapter 4.693.2. 1 Source and limits of the qualitative dataThe interview schedule is organized under eight governing areas ofinquiry.Areas one and two focused on an understanding of the causal relationships andthebehaviour modifications that could be logically anticipated. Areas three and four lookedat the perception of change introduced by ITHQ. Area five queried the process ofconsultation. Areas six, seven and eight examined details of the response to the wayITHQ was developed and implemented. (See Appendix 2 for the interview schedule anddetails of its development.)The interview schedule comprised open-ended questions based on a modifiedversion of the Guttman mapping sentence (Shye 1978; Guttman 1972). (See Appendix2.) The interview schedule was not structured as a survey. Therefore, the result is nota highly structured empirical data set in which any pair of observed attitude andinformation profiles is perfectly comparable. The information collected through theselengthy key actor interviews provided primary information on the impacts of ITHQ andthe impacts of the process of ITHQ development and implementation on the fishery. Italso provided an interpretive context for analysis of the fisheries data base.3.2.2 Selection of respondents and interview strategyPotential respondents were identified on the basis of the following primarycriteria: (1) involvement with commercial fishing in Lake Huron; (2) involvement inITHQ development and implementation; (4) positions as industry and/or governmentspokespersons; and (5) agreement to be interviewed. Individual managers and scientistswere identified on the basis of the following secondary criteria: (1) general managerialor scientific responsibility for aspects of commercial fishing in Lake Huron; (2)involvment in ITHQ development and implementation, both at head office and in thedistrict offices through inquiries at Fisheries Branch, OMNR. A listing of commercialfishers in Lake Huron was obtained from OMNR. Individual fishers were selected from70this list on the basis of the following secondary criteria: (1) location, size and type ofoperation; (2) fishers who had initiated legal action against OMNR on the subject ofITHQ and/or were themselves the object of legal action initiated by OMNR on thesubject of ITHQ; (3) the functional economic linkages (i.e. fishers who fish their severallicenses and vessels as one operation) among license holders that were not evident fromthe listing of individual licenses; and (4) individuals who fit the above criteria andrequested to be interviewed.Willing respondents were approached on the basis of their involvement with thedevelopment and implementation of quota regulation on the lake. Not all respondentswere equally familiar with all of the issues covered in the interview schedule, and sotheir responses varied widely in subject and depth. For example, fishers spoke mostknowledgeably about the changes that affected them personally. Respondents wereselected as informed representatives of the people most involved and affected by thepolicy. In order to study a wide variety of possible impacts, respondents were chosento represent a breadth of circumstances (e.g. small and large operations, processors,producers, scientists, managers and enforcement personnel).The interviews took place in the respondents’ place of work or their home. Allinterviews and follow-up conversations were conducted exclusively by the author.Sometimes respondents’ family members or colleagues would sit in on the interview andoffer comment or prompt the respondent. In general, respondents were unguarded indemeanour and eager to provide information on their views and behaviours. Mostinterviews took two hours or longer. Where appropriate, additional time was availablefor a tour of fishers’ and processors’ facilities and equipment. Both the respondent andthe interviewer had a copy of the interview schedule, which was used as a discussionguide, although respondents were encouraged to introduce additional topics if theywished. In general, few wholly new topics were broached, and variation amonginterviews was mostly in terms of variance in emphasis on different topics. Theinterviewer took extensive notes throughout the interview. The interview process71extended beyond a one-time only run-through of the interview schedule. Asissuesbecame defined in more detail, they were cross-checked through telephone orface-to-faceconversations with other respondents and in written documentation. Seldom didany oneindividual ever relate “the full story” of a particular situation orissue. Where thefollowing analysis is based on confidential interview sources,quotes are anonymous; aprimary reason for this is that most sources asked that the interviewsremain confidential.The sources, however, are cited where possible and appropriate.While the results of the interviews did not cause revision of thestudy objectives,they did confirm the significance of distinguishing the impacts of ITHQ from the impactsof the process aspects of ITRQ development and implementation. Fishers in particularwere at pains to distinguish their opinions of ITHQ itself, from how ITHQ wasdeveloped and implemented.Beyond general references to harvest of more or fewer fish, or receipt/expectationof a better or worse price at one time or another, quantitative data was not used in theinterviews.3.2.3 Method for analysis of qualitative dataFollowing an accepted method in informant investigation, information garneredthrough key actor interviews was reviewed in reference to informationfrom officialdocuments, academic literature, historical information and reports (Savatsky and Freilich1981). After selecting those traits central to the inquiry, results were compared andcontrasted in order to suggest any change owing to ITHQ. This analysis of field researchfindings (in the form of key actor responses) enabled exploration of less quantifiable, buthighly revealing parameters of ITHQ impacts.The key actor interview method is a highly cost-effective field technique.Following field work and the amassing of background data, key actor interviews can be72effectively analyzed without the barriers of many computerized analyses. Further, themethodology has the advantages of an open ended process capable of yielding intensivedata on many aspects of the research question, a broad scope of information for minimalcost, and a flexibility to allow development of hypotheses based on intensive personalcontact (Savatsky and Freilich 1981).Interview responses were analyzed inductively. The patterns, themes andcategories of analysis emerge from the raw responses, rather than being decided priorto data collection and analysis (Patton 1987). Two patterns emerged from analysis of thedata: (1) categories developed and articulated by respondents to organize presentationof particular themes; and (2) categories or patterns for which respondents did not havelabels or terms, for which such terms were generated. Themes in regard to ‘incidentalcatch’ are examples of the first category. Themes referring to ‘autonomy’ are examplesof the second category.As described in Appendix 2, the interview schedule was structured in a certainway in order to cover a specific range of topic areas. To preserve the integrity of theinterview responses, the analysis is presented in the same order as the topics in theinterview schedule, with specific reference to the questions pertaining to each issue.This analysis followed an established procedure in analysis of qualitative interviewdata (Patton 1987; Savatsky and Freilich 1981). The effort at uncovering patterns,themes and categories was a creative process requiring considered judgments about whatis really significant and meaningful in the data. Once identified, either using respondentgenerated constructions or analyst-generated constructions, these dimensions describelinkages between processes and outcomes in ITHQ implementation. These linkages area fundamental issue in policy analysis (Patton 1987). This analysis describes the causallinkages suggested by, and believed by, respondents. While the literature in this fieldacknowledges that insights derived by this method must be qualified (as in this study),73they are, nevertheless, accepted as informed and data-based hypotheses, grounded in fieldobservations (Patton 1987). As such, they provide valuable information about ITHQ.3.3 Summary and ConclusionThe data base for this study included information from key actor interviews,written and other sources, as well as quantitative information on the economic andbiological components of the fishery. The quantitative data base was compiled from thecompleted Annual Commercial Fishing Report forms (Form CF.8A). It providedinformation on harvest amounts, species and values, numbers of fishing operations,employment and investment. The qualitative data base was compiled from key actorinterviews with fishers and fisheries managers and scientists. It provided information onassociation of licensed operations, changes in fishing and marketing practices, attitudestowards ITHQ development and implementation, and expected and unexpected impactsof ITHQ.744.0 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATIONOF ITHQThis chapter describes chronologically the important issues and the backgroundand contextual factors that influenced the introduction and implementation of ITHQ inLake Huron. While the subject of this research is the impacts of ITHQ, and notspecifically the adoption nor the subsequent changes to the policy, this discussion is nonethe less essential for understanding the ITHQ policy. It is useful in understanding boththe substance of the policy changes and the processes by which they came about. Whilethe process by which ITHQ policy came about and the specific measures adopted do notdirectly explain the consequences in the fishery of those policies, they do have an indirectinfluence. For example, in the Lake Huron case, it may be that some of theconsequences of ITHQ in the fishery are the result of deficiencies in implementation, andthat these deficiencies, in turn, stem from the process by which the policies were chosenand implemented.Reference to “the industry” indicates a range of commercial fishery participantsincluding: fishers, processors and wholesalers.4.1 Development of Quota RegulationIn response to concerns about overfishing and declining fish stocks in the GreatLakes, fisheries managers are seeking to control or reduce pressure on fish stocks. Inthe past, the most frequently employed methods have been indirect controls on seasons,gear and areas to limit the fishing effort of commercial fishers, and achieve themanagement goal of protecting fish stocks. Indirect controls have proved unwieldy,expensive to enforce and obey, and have been evaded on occasion. In some instances,legislation has been inconsistent and ineffective. For example, in the early1980s,regulations requiring 6.55 cm mesh size for perch nets was intended to limit the sizeofharvested fish to 20 cm. Dockside, at least one half of the perch harvested with these75nets were under 20 cm. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources(OMNR) lost severallegal cases regarding measurement of the fish, whichalthough measuring 20 cm whenfirst caught, shrank below the legal limit after severalhours out of the water.In the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron fishery, fishers and managersanticipated individual transferableharvest quotas in 1982, and expected legislation in1983, and first came into effectin the 1984 season. Quota regulation is part of aprovincial fisheries modernizationprogram initiated to safeguard the continued viabilityof commercial and sport fish stocks. The quotas are attached tospecific fishing licenses,and can be sold or leased subject to the area, gear andseason conditions listed on thelicense. Since 1985, ITHQ appear as conditionsof the commercial fishing licence.In the history of Great Lakes fisheries, there have beentimes when too manypounds of fish were taken from thefishery too quickly (Whillans and Berkes 1986).Looking back as far as the 1790s, Whillansand Berkes outline several boom-and-bustcycles in Great Lakes fisheries, includingintense harvest of specific species and thecollapse of lake trout and lake whitefish stocksin the upper Great Lakes. In the periodleading up to the implementation of ITHQ, the potentialfor over-harvest existed in theLake Huron commercial fishery, in the formof gear and vessel capacity. For fisheriesmanagers, the challenge was one of determining asustainable level of resourceharvesting, equitably allocating it, and monitoring compliancewith the managementsystem.In order to assess the usefulness of quotaregulation in managing the fishery,managers and fishers need toknow its impact on how fishers run their operations,thechanges in the amount and value of the commercialharvest, as well as its advantages anddisadvantages. While it is still too soon to assessdefinitively the impact of quotaregulation on the fish community, the processof allocating and administrating individualtransferable harvest quotas has already had important effectson the commercial fishery.764.2 Trends in Lake Huron’s Commercial Fish StocksThe fishery resource is important to the province of Ontario. In 1984 there wereclose to 1,000 commercial fish licensees, who directly employed over 2,000 personsannually. These fishers harvest approximately 60million27 pounds of fish a year, witha landed value of nearly 30million dollars (Pope 1984). Lake Huron is the secondlargest of the Great Lakes and the fifth largest lake in the world. The lake has supporteda commercial fishery since the late 1800s and ranksthird among the Great Lakes incommercial fish landings. The major species in the commercial harvest are primarilywhitefish (Coregonus culpeaformis; also termed lake whitefish), chub (Coregonus spp.);and secondarily, yellow perch (Perca flavescens; also termed perch) andyellow pickerel(Stizostedion vitreum vitreum; also termed walleye). In 1980, for example,the harvestof these species alone totalled just over 2,000,000 lb.,with a landed value ofapproximately $2,300,000 (OMNR n . d.).4.2. 1. Historical trends in the Lake Huron commercial harvestAccording to Berst and Spangler (1973), the Lake Huron commercial harvest wasnearly constant from the early l900s until the mid-1930s, when lamprey (Petromyzonmarinus) predation affected whitefish, lake trout (Salvelinus namaycush) andsucker(Moxostoma spp. and Catostomus commersoni; also termed white or common sucker)landings. They cite an almost steady decline in total production continuing through1966,accompanied by an increase in the proportion of (then) lowervalued species28 (e.g.chub and perch) (Smith 1968). The most dramatic decline was in thelake trout and chub27All weights are cited in imperial units (1 kg. = 2.2 lb.).28Marketed smoked, chub are now a valued commercial species, and yellowperch,marketed to the “finger food’tindustry for battering, have commanded a goodprice since1977.77populations, but other species (e.g. whitefish, sucker, sauger [Stizostedion canadensçj,walleye) also declined in the 1940 to 1966 period.After the mid-1930s, Berst and Spangler (1973) describe an overall trend ofdecline in commercial fish stocks in Lake Huron,and attribute this principally to earlyover-exploitation (of sturgeon [Acipenser fulvenscens; also termed lake sturgeon] andwhitefish in the U.S. fishery, following the 1928 introduction of the deep-water trapnet29) and sea lamprey predation (of lake trout, burbot [Lota lota; also termedling],chub, whitefish, and suckers). The impact of lamprey predation was significant becausein removing high level carnivores such as lake trout and burbot, the lamprey triggereda dramatic succession of changes in the populations ofother species (Smith 1968).Forage species, too small to fall prey to lampreys (e.g. smelt [Osmerus mordax; alsotermed American smelt], alewives [Alosa pseudohareng] and chub)and other largespecies which share a relatively early sexual maturity (e.g. rainbow trout [Salmogairdneri], whitefish, white suckers and burbot)have persisted.Although comprehensive records do not exist, fluctuations in thewhitefishpopulation have been attributed principally to exceptionally strong year classes (e.g. 1943and 1981), rather than to precipitous declines (Berst and Spangler 1973; OMNR n.d.).(Berst and Spangler also describe the sudden decline in the 1942 whitefish catch in theU.S. fishery, and attribute it to the continuing intensive fishery for lake troutwhichexploited whitefish as an incidental species.) In contrast, chub declined rapidly after1961, and appeared to be on the verge of collapse in the early l970s (Smith1970). Thehistoric yield of this species from 1911 to 1940 was over 11.4 million lb. (OMNR 1979).29The deep-water trap net was outlawed several years afterits introduction (H.A.Regier, pers. comm. 1992).784.2.2 Recent trendsin the Lake Huron commercialharvestIn retrospect, it isapparent that ITHQ wasimplemented during a period ofrelative stock abundancein the Lake Huroncommercial fishery. The1984 commercialharvest in the Canadianwaters of Lake Huronwas 6.1 million lb., and it hassince beenestimated that the futureannual sustainable fishyield for the lake could be11.4-12.1million lb. (OMNR 1988c).Further:The reported harvest [ofwhitefish] from Ontario watersof the LakeHuron basin in 1985was 2.284 million lbs., up4.7% from 1984, andsecond only to 1983’srecord production. Since1977, harvests have allexceeded one millionlbs., a level not previouslyreached during thiscentury. (GLFC 1986)In the Georgian Bay basin,also, the implementationof quota regulation is operatinginthe context of increasedbiological production.For 1985, the same reportcites an 80%increase in total reportedharvest of whitefishin the Georgian Bay basinover theprevious year. Similarly,although the NorthChannel whitefish harvestin 1985 dropped5.7%, the overallproduction 1982-1985 hasbeen well above theharvest reported at anyother time since1922.The GLFC reportfurther states that in theLake Huron basin, total chubharvestreported in 1985was down from that of 1984,and well below the quotatotal of1,286,000 lb. In theGeorgian Bay basin,however, the chub harvestincreased to thehighest level reportedsince the 1971-1976 period.The perch harvest totalsin the whole of the LakeHuron fishery declinedandwere all belowthe quota limits.79The optimistic pronouncements in the Lake Huron Committee Meeting report(GLFC 1986) are followed by the assertion30:Although now regulated by quotas, the commercial fishery is evidently notseriously constrained as reported harvests in all quota areas were againbelow the amounts allocated.ITHQ implementation occurred at the beginning of a time period of seemingly boomingstocks in several of the commercial species under quota allocation. This presents asituation in which allocations have been calculated on the basis of lesser stocks andtherefore outdated or imprecise information.The provincial government’s 1988 management plan for Lake Huron describedthe lake and the fishery in generally optimistic terms: “Lake Huron is still oligotrophicand can support all species native to the lake.” (OMNR 1988c). Nevertheless, the plandoes sound a cautionary note in regard to the stresses generated through activities whichimpact the resource both indirectly:inshore environmental impacts include agricultural runoff, localizedhabitat alteration, water flow regulation in tributary streams and the St.Mary’s river, and airborne contamination, and may be limiting in someareas.and directly:Important changes to the fish community include the near extinction of thelake trout, reduced stocks of walleye, and the partial replacement of nativelake herring and chub by the introduced non-native species, alewife andsmelt. These changes, the result of overfishing, sea lamprey predation,and competition, have considerably reduced the combined sport andcommercial harvest from historical levels.30It could be argued that the abundance explained why there was no reduction in theharvest; i.e. that had the stock been less abundant, allocations would have been lowerand would have effected a reduction in harvest. In addition, the problem of overharvest,which ITHQ is designed in part to remedy was not an on-going problem in Lake Huron.804.2.3 Conclusions and implications on stock managementAs the history of the fishery attests, since thelate 1800’s, various factorsincluding commercial fishing activities in Lake Huron have been significant in managingthe fishery. Despite management efforts, fish stocks have been subject to greatfluctuations, and managers can expect continuing unpredictable variation in stocks. Thisvariability is an important factor in interpreting the efficacy of ITHQ in thefishery.Managers’ abilities to adapt ITHQ to this variability will affect fishers’ perceptionsofthe reliability of the scientific basis for allocations. These perceptions will affectfishers’support for ITHQ and ultimately the amount of effort required for monitoringandenforcement.4.3 Development and Implementation of ITHQThis section describes the process by which provincial ITHQ was developed andimplemented in the Lake Huron commercial fishery.4.3. 1 Policy objectives for Ontario’s commercial fisheriesThe ideal research situation would involve a policy that represents a dramaticallydifferent approach from prior practice, embodies clearly specified goals,and wherepredicted impacts would be measurable with sound techniques (Cingranelli, et al.1981).The situation in the Lake Huron fishery did not meet these lofty ideals. In fact,policygoals for ITHQ were only vaguely specified and only a small sub-set of theimpacts(predicted and unpredicted) are readily measurable.Implementation of ITHQ was a component of a comprehensivemanagementinitiative aimed at “modernizing” Ontario’s commercial fisheries. There isa single,seminal, document in the public domain which states the objectives ofmodernization,viz., Report of the Committee on Modernizing Ontario’s Commercial Fishery(OMNR81and OCCF 1982) (also known as the “Blue Book”). In this document, the only statementof policy objectives for modernization (and by inference, for ITHQ) is specificallyreferred to as an explication of “major areas of concern.” These “concerns” were:(1)development of a rationale for the industry; (2) enhanced resource predictioncapabilities;(3) harvest regulation; and (4) licensing (i.e. limiting entry) (OMNR and OCCF 1982).While this statement of policy objectives does not provide an ideal basis fromwhich to begin an evaluation, it is the only one available. Because there is no otherofficial documentation of a statement of policy objectives, more explicit definition ofwhat managers expected to achieve (i.e. their policy objectives) must be inferred fromother sources. These sources include additional documentation such as, speeches,Hansard, internal communications (e.g. committee meeting minutes, standing committeereports), papers delivered at conferences by the managers involved, academicpublications, etc., as well as information obtained through key actor interviews. Notsurprisingly, this results in variation in phrasing, emphasis and definition as the policy(or, as sometimes specified, the program) objectives are reiterated in a number ofdifferent contexts. The following paragraph presents a statement of OMNR’s policyobjectives for ITHQ that was abstracted from a review of the information sources listedabove.According to a speech delivered by the Minister, “the primary goal of themodernization program must be ‘conservation of fish species,”3’and the most evidentresult of modernization is the establishment of ITHQ (Pope 1984). In Lake Huron, theindividual transferable harvest quotas were instituted with the general goals of controllingcommercial harvest and managing fish stocks. This was meant to be a change fromOntario’s reliance on more indirect methods to manage the fish harvest (e.g. closed‘This phrase, which occurs nowhere else in the policy documentation of ITHQ, istaken to mean “control of harvest amounts and species.” In the context of the Minister’spreceding remarks, it is likely that he was referring to sport fish species of value to bothsport and commercial interests.82fishing seasons, closed fishing areas, size limits on catch, restrictions on the type of gearused, etc.) (Pope 1984). In synthesis, the specific objectives of ITHQ can be stated as:(1) control the amount of fish harvested;(2) control the species of fish harvested;(3) reduce harvest capacity;(4) simplify fishery regulation and thereby enforcement; and(5) facilitate selective spatial distribution of commercial fishing in order toameliorate user group conflicts.4.3.2 Why ITHQ Was Implemented and the Role of the Committee on Modernizing theCommercial Fishery in OntarioThis section describes how ITHQ was developed and implemented in the LakeHuron commercial fishery.In December 1980 the Deputy Minister of OMNR appointed a committee to assessthe administrative system of the province’s commercial fishing industry. This was inresponse to the urging of fisheries managers and commercial fishers, many of whom feltthat the existing system of regulation was out-moded and ineffective. The Committee onModernizing the Commercial Fishery in Ontario was charged with the task of considering“the major issues of concern and recommending an administrative system that wouldrecognize contemporary societal and industry expectations in as simple, rational anddirect a fashion as possible” (OMNR and OCCF 1982). The involvement of bothgovernment and industry representatives was an integral part of the committee’s charge.The Ontario Council of Commercial Fishermen (OCCF, now the Ontario Fish Producers’Association) the only province-wide association of fish producers, was asked to nominatemembers to the committee, with representation from all the Great Lakes, northwesternOntario and Lake Nipigon.The committee recognized four major areas of concern:83i) a rationale for the industry;ii) resource prediction;iii) harvest regulation;iv) licensing. (OMNR and OCCF 1982)This succinct list of concerns encompassed questions on the fundamentalright ofthe commercial industry to exist and the future viability of the province’sfisheries, aswell as the basic issues of allocating harvests and limiting entry to thefishery. Theseissues are strategically linked. It is important to define the purpose of industry activitiesand the extent of the available resource base, in order to make decisionsabout who mayhave access to the resource and how much of the resource they may utilize. Theexpectations of those who already share the resource must also be taken intoaccount byfisheries managers.As a basis for negotiation, the industry required the government’s commitmentto a continuing, viable commercial fishing industry. In recent years there had beenvociferous lobbying for the elimination of commercial fishing on the part of sport fishinginterests. The provincial government has responded with high profile stocking programs(see Table 4.1) and the 1987 institution of a resident sport fishing licence (OFPA 1987b).Under increasing political pressure generated by the sport fishers’ lobby, the commercialfishing industry needs explicit recognition of the industry’s right to a shareof theresource. (See chapter five for a discussion of allocation between sportand commercialfishing interests.) Reliable resource prediction and political affirmation are essentialtofair resource allocation, as is a comprehensive informationbase. Once this foundationis established, regulatory reform can follow.In 1980, when plans for the Committee on Modernizing the Commercial Fisheryin Ontario were first initiated, the publicity garnered by promotion of this idea, togetherwith some serious setbacks owing to fluctuations in fish stocks and the repercussions ofthe banning of consumption of some important commercial species in the Lake Huronfishery (owing to contamination with chlorinated hydrocarbons), had lent an embattled84TABLE ‘1.1 : Sportfish plantedin Lake Huron,1980—1987YearNumber of Fish19871,493,00019861,451,0001985 1,258,0001984 1,131,0001983 977,00019821,110,0001981 811,0001980751,000N.B. Species include: lake trout, splake/laketrout backcross, walleye andsmallmouth bass.Source: OMNR85atmosphere to the committee’s deliberations. The Lake Erie fishery was in the mostcritical state, with serious problems of overexploitation of smelt and perch populations.It was the situation on Lake Erie which really provided the impetus for the formation ofthe committee and the development and implementation of ITHQ as a provincial policy.In Lake Huron, there were some disturbing fluctuations in the whitefish stocks, but themajor problems were related to market gluts and subsequent low prices. Although thepotential for overharvest existed in the Lake Huron commercial fishery (in the form ofovercapacity), as demonstrated by the harvest data presented in section 4.2.2, overharvestwas not a problem in the Lake Huron commercial fishery at the time ITHQ wasdeveloped and implemented. There were also some contaminant problems in the(southern) Lake Huron basin fishery (i.e. excluding Georgian Bay and the NorthChannel). During the 1970-1977 period, for example, walleye were unfit for humanconsumption owing to high levels of mercury. Following pollution abatement,commercial harvest resumed, and 1977 was an excellent year for this commercial species(471,689 lb.). In contrast, the following year landings were poor lake wide (190,910 lb.)(OMNR n.d.).In reviewing the modernization report, industry representatives themselvesexpressed reservations about the final recommendations. The most prominent of theserecommendations included suggestions that: (I) the rationale as stated in OMNR andOCCF (1982) (quoted on previous page) be adopted; (2) deficiencies in assessment offish stocks be remedied; (3) transferable harvest quotas, to be determined by local jointindustry-OMNR committees, be introduced for each licensee; and (4) no more licensesbe issued (although new licenses could be issued for new sorts of fisheries if these wereto develop). To these recommendations, industry representatives added the followingcaveats to their support for the committee’s final report:•The structure of the ministry’s management system must berevised with central control at Queen’s Park.3232OMNR head office, located at Queen’s Park.86•Present fish stock assessment capability is notadequate. Theremust be upgrading.•There must be enhanced enforcement in order to assure properquota control. (OMNR and OCCF 1982)Although the principles of enhancedassessment and enforcement were supported by allcommittee members, the industry’s last minute inclusionof the condition for centralcontrol in effect nullified their support ofthe program. At that time, decentralizedmanagement was integral to OMNR’s managementstrategy. Ministry programs andpolicies are routinely administrated through theministry’s 48 district offices, andexceptions are not made for any single program.Released in April 1982, the committee’sreport was a rallying cry for theindustry. It declared that the commercialfishery “does make a substantial contribution[to the provincial economy] andwhen viewed in some local and regional contexts, it hasa very significant impact”(OMNR and OCCF 1982). In particular, the commercialfishery was cited for its: (1) provision of accessfor the general public to Ontario’s foodfish; (2) contribution to local economies; (3)role in stock assessment; and (4)enhancement of fish-community stability throughbalanced harvesting. These importantthemes emerge repeatedly in building anunderstanding of how individual transferableharvest quotas impact the Lake Huron fishery.These themes emphasize the view ofitself that the industry seeks to promote: that itis a leader in husbandry of the resource,in partnership with the ministry. This description suggestssome of the elements of comanagement. In these terms, itis easy to see that the commercial fishers’ exclusionfrom the development of allocation formulae,and the subsequent imposition of theseformulae without adequate consultation would causesome problems in acceptance ofITHQ.874.3.3 Determination of spatial distribution of implementation of ITHQThe first step in allocating the Lake Huron commercial fishery was to divide thefishery into “quota areas.” (See Figure 4.1.) These geographical divisions were thenassigned an area quota, or allowable biological catch (ABC) for each species designatedunder quota regulation. Officially, the quota areaswere determined in reference to:(1) the three-basin morphology of the lake;(2) existing statistical and assessment divisions;(3) lines of latitude and longitude on a five minutegrid;(4) existing administrative units;(5) fish stocks and habitat; and(6) the traditional areas that commercial fishers were licensed to fish.In 1982, OMNR put forward proposed quota areas for discussionwith the commercialfishers in the form of a short report, distributed from the district offices. Theseproposals were discussed, some adjustments were made, and the boundaries finalized in1982. The quota areas which resulted from this process reflected both the boundariesof the traditional fishing areas and those of a pre-existing grid system the ministry hadbeen using as a basis for its stock assessment program. This territorial division createdone of the first problems in the implementation of individual transferable harvest quotas.Although the boundaries of the traditional fishing areas were considered in delineationof quota areas, some fishers were significantly displaced from their traditional areas.Problems owing to these displacements were one of the unanticipated side effects of themanner of ITHQ implementation.The ABC was determined on the basis of the ministry’s fisheries assessmentinformation. This information base is developed from three sources: (1) the monthlyreports filed by commercial fishers detailing their harvest; (2) a sampling programof thecommercial catch; and (3) index netting. (For a more detailed discussionof theministry’s assessment program, see OMNR 1984.) The monthly reportssuppliedinformation on the total pounds of fish of each species harvested under eachcommercial88CC_\7NC2LU’(&.4sttflic’ IF/W1—jf—rjCy,,GalS sLH1r GORBAVj1’cC., G82JICIia. / —1H2G84PARRY! LH3G83G8SSOUND‘5204(15SLH4G86CG87•500’TOBERMG89G88( —U154fl4-c tQbLI-f 7GB1OGOll44_3a_1H50C -LI-feLHQ#SARNIAFIGURE 4c1 Quota Areas in Lake HuronSOURCE licence. With the cooperation of individual fishers, the ministry also runs anonboard program of sampling the commercial catch, to gather more detailed informationon the size, age and feeding preferences of the fish. The purpose of the index nettingprogram is to provide trend-through-time information on the fishery. The methodologyof this latter program requires the setting of standardized nets at the same locations,depths and times each year. The index netting program provides information that givesa relatively accurate picture of fish stock population dynamics over a longer (e.g. 10year) time period, and the program is not meant to provide absolutely accurateinformation on the abundance of fish stocks. Taken together, in this descending orderof utility, interpretations of these three sources of information were the bases forassignment Of a species-specific ABC to each of the quota areas in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery. Discretionary judgments were also important in assessing therelative strengths and weaknesses of fish stocks in the fishery. For example, as chubstocks were judged to be weakened and just beginning a recovery, the allocations of thesespecies were purposely kept low.4.3.4 The allocation processThe next phase in developing individual transferable harvest quotas was thedetermination of the criteria and method for allocating the commercial fishery resource.In the Lake Huron fishery, the ministry’s primary means of consultation were: (1)discussions with the members of the Committee on Modernizing the Commercial Fisheryin Ontario, both before and after (but not during) designation of allocation formulae; and(2) negotiations with OFPA local associations. Organized throughout the province ona lake-by-lake basis, these local meetings were to be a one-time activity, with anyadjustments in quota allocation to be implemented independently. The purpose of thisconsultation initiative was to determine the basis upon which individual quotas were tobe set.90The prominence given to the commercial fishing industry’s contributions tofisheries management in the modernization report emphasized the necessity of meaningfulconsultation with industry representatives in revamping fisheries administration. TheOFPA is the only association of fish producers claiming provincial representation, andas such plays a significant part in OMNR’s consultation initiatives. An association of 19member groups throughout the province, the OFPA also promotes the production andmarketing of Ontario’s freshwater fish products. Effective advocacy and representationof the industry with government and other groups is one of the association’s primarygoals. Supporters and critics alike have noted that the association’s claim torepresentation is sometimes hampered by a small budget, poor communications and lackof consensus within the organization itself.In participating in the quota development meetings that followed the release of themodernization report, for example, the OFPA representatives on the committee did notalways have the resources to consult effectively with their constituency members. Thishindered communications within the organization, and presented difficulties for memberswho were not making a special effort to keep up with developments to voice their viewsas fully as they otherwise might. This situation was further confounded by some degreeof confusion and inconsistency on the ministry’s part in assembling assessment data anddeveloping the criteria for allocating individual transferable harvest quotas to individuallicensees. As a result, fishers were not notified of their quota allocations until spring of1984. At this time ITHQ had already been in effect since January of that year.Berkes and Pocock (1987) quote as follows from an OCCF (OFPA) brief to theMinister, dated August 1985:During the spring and summer of 1983 the Ministry was warned [by theOCCFj that they were trying to move too fast without proper consultationwith the industry. During the summer of 1983 a series of disastrousmeetings with fishermen were held. The fishermen were told the quotashad been approved by the OCCF -- without reference to the three provisoswe insisted must be included with the report. The industry view is that91those meetings did not represent an honest effort at consultation, andquotas were presented as a fait accompli. (OCCF 1985)Some fishers were surprised and disappointed by their quota allocations. Manyfelt that their allocations did not accurately reflect (or account for mitigating factors in)either their past harvests or the potential of their operations or the fishery. Moreimportantly, some fishers, principally those with smaller or part-time operations, fearedthat inadequate allocations might force them out of business; they might not be able toharvest enough fish to keep their businesses profitable.If allocations were based on a fisher’s past performance (i.e. the amounts of fishof various species harvested over representative previous years), why would the resultantquota allocation not support “business as usual?” One commonly offered explanation isthat the fishers in this position had been under-reporting their catch in years used forcalculation of the individual transferable harvest quotas. Independence and lack ofregimentation are often mentioned as characteristic advantages of commercial fishing asan occupation (Beddington and Rettig 1984). It was common knowledge that somefishers, on some occasions had under-reported their catch. There is no way to prove ordisprove this explanation, but neither can it be totally discounted in interpreting theimpacts of quota allocation. Poor past performance was also attributed to chance factorssuch as illness and weak market incentives for some species.33Determination of time of implementationThe timing of ITHQ implementation also influenced allocation amounts. In theLake Huron fishery, uncertainty was increased by the politically dictated timing of ITHQimplementation. The provincial government had been working inconclusively on ageneral set of species-specific formulae as a basis for fishery allocation throughout theFor example, chub markets were very poor in 1981, one of the years used incalculating past harvest totals. This is discussed in more detail in chapter five.92Great Lakes. At this point, the Hon. Alan Pope, then Minister of Natural Resources,directed that allocations be calculated separately for each of the Great Lakes, andimplemented on an accelerated schedule. This decision was taken against the advice ofsenior fisheries managers. The minister decided to adopt ITHQ in Lake Huron, wherethere was no immediate problems with overharvest, in part as a matter of policyconsistency, not as a requirement to prevent over-exploitation. In the Lake Huroninstance, this politically dictated need for immediate implementation forced hastypreparation of allocations based on inadequate assessment information. This had anindirect influence on ITHQ impacts, in that there was little time for adequate stockassessment or consultation and ITHQ became more closely associated with sport fishinginterests.The timing of ITHQ implementation was a matter of political expediency.34 TheMinister represented a northern Ontario riding in which tourism and recreation is animportant economic sector. Sport fishing is an important contributor to the tourismindustry in Ontario’s north, with tourist lodge operators, charter boat operators andrecreational fishers, alone, contributing over half a billion dollars to the provincialeconomy annually (Pope 1984). These user groups were demanding measures to ensurea stable sport fishery resource, in order to facilitate long term business decision makingand planning for recreational pursuits. Pope (1984) states specifically that it was inresponse to pressure from these groups that the Ontario government instituted ITHQ withsuch urgency.Up to this point, consultation on quota regulation was limited totheOCCFIOMNR joint committee (which recommended quota regulation in principal, butdid not review any policy details such as allocation methods or timing). Additionalconsultation initiatives (e.g. Lake Huron Quota Review Committee, consultationon thesubject of ITHQ in the Lake Huron Management Committee, etc.) wereprimarilyreactive in nature, dealing with problems associated with the initial implementationofITHQ.93Determination of the amount of allocationIn theory, the formulae used in allocating the Lake Huron fishery gaveto eachfisher a percentage of the harvest based on past harvest totals (i.e. pastperformance).For example, if the fisher traditionally caught 15% of the whitefish harvestedwithin acertain quota area, the new allocation would be 15% of the whitefish ABC.Thispercentage was to be set, and unchangeable, as it was intended to be usedto allocatefuture increases and reductions in quota amounts. For example, if there were to be a 5%reduction in the ABC for whitefish, in a particular quota area, the individual describedabove would lose 5% of the previously assigned allocation.In practice, individual transferable harvest quota allocations have been adjustedvia two mechanisms: (1) direct appeal to the Lake Huron Quota Review Committee (inthe past); or (2) through the OMNR district offices, by assignment of additional quotaon a basis, in response either to changes in the calculation of the weight of fish,or to perceived increases in fish stock abundance.Another form of allocation is achieved through “buyouts,” in which OMNRmakes a cash purchase of an individual fisher’s vessel, gear and licence, thereby retiringthe operation, and by default, reallocating the “retired” quota to the sport fishery. Whilesome commercial fishers unreservedly welcome the opportunity to cash in theiroperations, others would like to remain active in the industry. There is also someindustry support for reallocation of the government-purchased quota within thecommercial fishing industry. Still others feel that the buyout program in general is athreat to a viable commercial fishing industry. ITHQ facilitates the use of “buyouts” asa management option by placing a specific value on the harvest potential of an operation.This, in turn, indirectly affects how ITHQ impacts the fishery. In the Lake Huronfishery, the greatest number of buyouts have been in the Georgian Bay area. Thispopular tourist area has been plagued by conflicts between commercial and sport fishers.Georgian Bay is periodically stocked with sport fish species, and this makes it difficultfor some commercial fishers to avoid substantial incidental harvest of non-target species.94In this fashion, ITHQ are perceived by some to be linked more closely to the sportfishers’ goals than to the maintenance of a viable commercial fishing industry.The role of the Lake Huron Quota Review CommitteeThe short-lived Lake Huron Quota Review Committee was established in directresponse to the fishers’ protestations about their quota allocations. The committee wasset to provide an informed and balanced settlement of disputes relating to individualtransferable harvest quotas, and all recommendations were made through the chairman,F.E. Fry, an independent fisheries scientist. The other two committee members, R.Christie, a senior OMNR manager and W. MacKenzie, an industry representative putforward by the OFPA, acted as resource persons. Appointed by the Minister of NaturalResources, the committee was adjunct to the line administration of the ministry. Thisthree person committee heard their first cases in June of 1984 and in the Lake Huronfishery, their deliberations were completed by September of the same year. Acommercial fisher wanting to meet with the committee could make an appointmentthrough an OMNR district office. The proceedings of the committee were held inprivate. Recommendations on each case were communicated by letter, directly to theMinister. Any implementation of recommendations was through the district offices, atthe behest of the Minister. The committee members confirmed35 that they did notreceive any formal notification of the fate of their recommendations. If any officialguidelines or terms of reference were set for decisions on the committee’srecommendations, they were not communicated to the public or to the committeemembers.In rendering decisions on adjustments in the amounts, species and areaassignments of allocated quota, the committee’s deliberations and rationales wereabsolutely confidential. Not even the fishers concerned were advised of the reasoningF. E. Fry, pers. comm., June 28, 1988; R. Christie, pers. comm., March 21,1988; W. MacKenzie, pers. comm., August 6, 1987.95leading to the decision on their own cases. One rationale for this strict confidentialitywas the personal and confidential nature of the information that some of the fishersbrought to the committee. In some instances, financial and other highly sensitive records(e.g. possibly the implied under-reporting) were presented in support of requestsfor achange in allocated quota. Although the need for a certain degree of confidentialityisgenerally recognized, some fishers who regarded the ministry’s decision to be unfairwould like to know more about the thinking that led to the government’s decision in theircases. This secrecy contributed to the divisive atmosphere of mistrust andcompetitiveness that was one of the impacts of ITHQ implementation.At about the same time as this committee was concluding its work, a group offishers from Lake Erie took OMNR to court, challenging the provincial government’sright to regulate through the use of quotas in a federal jurisdiction. Berkes and Pocock(1987) neatly summarize the issue.In October, the Ontario Supreme Court ruled that quotas weretechnically not valid. However, the MNR obtained permission to allowquotas to remain in effect until their appeal was heard. A week later,MNR officers seized catches from two boats belonging to one of theproponents, charging that the catches were over the quotas. However, theappeal court upheld the earlier decision that the provincial quotas wereunconstitutional and that Ontario was enforcing fish quotas “without lawfulauthority.”The de facto lifting of quotas placed the majority of fishermen ina difficult position because they regarded a “free-for-all” as a threat toboth the market and fish stocks. In late October, several fishermen andlocal associations announced they would voluntarily honour thequotas.[36]At the same time, the MNR adopted emergency measures toprotect the stocks by prohibiting all commercial fishing for two of thespecies, under Section 6 of the Ontario Fishery Regulations, under the36This point highlights an important aspect of the Lake Erie situation: the fisherswho brought suit were recent entries to the Great Lakes and had not accepted theevolving traditions predominant in the fishery. These newcomers flouted not onlygovernment regulations but also existing fishery conventions.96federal Fisheries Act.37 This created an additional strain on relationsbetween MNR and the fishermen. Shortly thereafter, quotas werereimposed by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans by an order-in-council. One consequence of the federal involvement wasthepublication of [Lake Erie] quotas in the Canada Gazette, thus ending thesecrecy.Berkes and Pocock conclude the saga:In February 1985, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in favour of theMNR, stating that quotas were legal and that the authority to impose themhad been properly delegated from the federal to the provincialgovernment, thus ending the minor constitutional crisis precipitated by fishquotas.Determination of changes in ITHQ amountIn 1985, OMNR supplemented the existing Lake Huron Management Committee,with a Liaison Committee, directed specifically to meeting what the ministry’s seniormanagement recognized as a continuing need for dialogue. The membership of theLiaison Committee was set by the Lake Committee chairman, and the fisheries managersand commercial fishers (put forward by the OFPA as industry representatives) on thecommittee were to anticipate potential management problems and use their meetings asa forum for discussion and communication between the ministry and the industry. In thisway, it was hoped that some of the worst problems of the past might be avoided.Administration of individual transferable harvest quotas has been a topic of continuingdiscussions for the Liaison Committee.Quota adjustments are also administrated through the OMNR district offices. In1987, for example, whitefish quotas in the Lake Huron basin were temporarily increased7% (approximately 250,000 lb.) in response to commercial fishers’ reports of boomingpopulations. This increase was rescinded at the end of the year. Additionally, thereAn error in the original source has been corrected with the permission of theauthors.97have been further incremental percentage adjustments to specific quota allocations,owingto changes in the conversion factors used to calculate the differences between dressed andround weights for whitefish and lake trout.38There have also been some significant decreases in quota allocations. The1989chub allocation, for example, was decreased by 15%. It was felt that the initialallocations had been calculated on the basis of unusually high harvest levels, and thisdecrease was seen to bring the chub allocation back in line with the ABC. There wasalso a 15% decrease in perch allocations in the south end of Lake Huron. The allocationfor this species had been increased by 30% in 1986, and it was felt that the stocks couldnot support the continued high harvest rates.In 1988, negotiations between the ministry and representatives of the Lake Huroncommercial fishers resulted in a proposed procedure for adjusting quotas for the 1989season. Under this proposal allocations for quota areas would be increased or decreased,in usual circumstances, a maximum of 10% from the previous years’ level, based onpopulation trends (not absolute numbers) in the ministry’s analysis of assessment data.Under exceptional circumstances, quotas may be adjusted by a larger percentage.Negotiation of issues of importance to interest groups also played a significantpart in ITHQ development. Over the generations, individual commercial fishersdeveloped specific temporal and spatial harvest patterns particularly suited to theirvessels, gear and the geography of their area. In some instances, new quota areas andITHQ allocations and concomitant shifts in areas where sport fish species were planted,were inconsistent with these traditional patterns. Where the trade-off value of certainrights and traditions was not readily quantifiable, negotiated solutions were reached. For38The ministry calculated quota allocations on round weight. Those fishermen whotraditionally reported their whitefish and lake trout harvest in dressed weight sought anadjustment in their quotas to reflect the discrepancy in their assigned harvest quota.98example, OMNR planted sport fish species in a traditional commercial fishing area,displacing commercial harvest activities, but offered an ITHQ allocation in an alternativearea. In another example, commercial fishers made voluntary changes in the timing oftheir harvest activities in exchange for modified allocations.In practice, the ITHQ allocations are the result of compromise. Neither of thetwo interest groups was able to achieve fully its ultimate goals, nor were fisheriesmanagers. Commercial fishers no longer predominate in some traditional areas, andcontinue to negotiate on the issue of incidental catch. There will no doubt be perpetualbargaining for modifications to allocations. Sport fishers have not managed to have gillnetting banned, and must share some species and areas with commercial fishers.Fisheries managers cannot make allocation decisions in isolation and must accommodatethe social and economic concerns of importance to these resource user interest groups.4.3.5 Incidental catch and government stocking programsResource use conflicts affect many user groups, as well as fishery managers intheir efforts to allocate the resource. In 1985, approximately 20% of adult resident sportfishers were members of a national or provincial wildlife organization or other localmembership club (OMNR l988a). In some cases, sport fishing interest groups such asOntario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) have experienced a degree of successin wielding political pressures to support their demands for exclusive access to fisheryresources and/or their attempts to make commercial fishing so inefficient that it is nolonger profitable. The recent successes of sport fishing groups are due in part to asustained public relations effort supported by numerous sports writers and publications(notably, John Power’s Outdoors column in the Toronto Star, Ontario’s largestcirculation paper). (The commercial fishers have not developed a program of similarbreadth and profile.)99For example, there is conflict over the advisability of continuing the LakeHuroncommercial fishery. Some particularly vocal members of the sport fishers’fraternityhave publicized the idea that the operations of the commercial fishing industryseriouslyinterfere with sport fishing businesses and recreational pursuits.The followingdeclaration from an OFAH Position Paper on Commercial Fishing inOntario (OFAH1987a) is a typical example of the views and attitude of this organization in regardto thecommercial fishing industry.The government of Ontario must take immediate action to ban the use ofgill nets for commercial fishing (with the possible exception of sets forwhitefishes [sic.] over 250 feet deep);The M.N.R. should continue the policy of buying out commercialfishermen where there are conflicts with other resource users, or wherestocks are threatened by such fishing. Such buy-outs should be at fairmarket value, with licenses being terminated and total area quotas beingreduced appropriately;The M.N.R. should designate additional locations where commercialfishing should be disallowed, especially where such fishing endangersstocks of sport fish or unduly interferes with other resource users;The manufacture of gill nets in Ontario and the importation of gill netsinto Ontario should be banned. Gill nets acquired by the M.N.R. throughseizure or buy-out must not be sold to commercial fishermen.There is a longstanding competition between commercial and sport fishers foraccess to the fishery resource. This competition is most acute in certain areas(e.g.Georgian Bay) and where it involves the salmonid species especially sought afterby sportfishers. To some extent, individual transferable harvest quotas were thoughtto addressthis problem by explicitly allocating a portion of the fishery to the commercial fishingindustry and specifying the number of pounds of each species that maybe soldcommercially.Only since ITHQ implementation have efforts been made to define the scope ofthe incidental catch problem on Lake Huron, and quantify the amount of fish involved.100The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resource’s (OMNR) report on incidental catch on LakeHuron finds that through placement of nets at depths and in locations where knowledgeand experience indicate the target commercial species is likely to be concentrated,commercial fishers can be very successful in avoiding sizeable incidental catches (OMNR1988b). The average weight of non-commercial salmonids caught in gill nets is estimatedto be only 1.8% of all commercial landings inLake Huron, principally from the mainbasin of Lake Huron and in Georgian Bay.39 Whilethis small percentage supportsclaims for the specificity of gill nets, it also demonstratesthat at least a minimalincidental catch is unavoidable.The ministry has undertaken stocking programs in certain areas. There are alsosignificant stocking programs in U.S. waters. Forexample, OMNR reports that over arecent five year period, annual plantings in Lake Huron by the State of Michiganaveraged 3.0 million chinook, 0.46 millioncoho, 0.51 million brown trout and 1.26million lake trout (OMNR 1988b). Over the same time span, Ontario plantedannuallyapproximately one million lake trout backcross and lake trout (see Table4.1). Wherethese artificially stocked areas overlap licensedcommercial fishing areas, commercialfishers confirm that it can be difficult or impossible to set nets for whitefishwithoutcatching lake trout (including backcross) or to target chub and at the sametime avoid asizeable harvest of splake. It is the incidental catch ofthese planted game fish (largelyunsaleable, owing to harvest quotas) which fuels conflictbetween these two importantuser groups. The commercial fishers say that they quota allocations whichmatch the amount of their incidental catch, so that theycan sell the fish. OFAHdocumentation states that sport fishers would like gill netting banned, and mandatoryliverelease of all incidental catch from impoundment gear (OFAH 1987b).The report does not address the significance of this percentage in relationto thesport fish harvest, and so no conclusions can bedrawn on this point.101Ontario’s fishery regulations were extensively revised as of 1989. Although theresulting regulatory regime may well appear to be simplified, this in itself does notnecessarily indicate a reduction in restrictions on commercial fishing. For example,sincethe 1989 reforms took effect, some restrictions that used to be embodied inregulations,are not in the revised Act, but the same restrictions appear as conditions on commercialfishing licenses. While such administrative action does reduce the actual number ofregulations, it in no way reduces the degree of regulation.In explicitly quantifying the portion of the fishery allocated to commercial harvest,ITHQ became part of the incidental catch issue. The distribution of benefits between thesport and commercial fishers, and among the commercial fishers was made more explicit.Sport and commercial fishers could cite specific amounts of harvest that may have beengranted to one or another fisher or interest sector, although there was no reliable stockassessment by which to evaluate the fairness of the allocations. In effect, this explicitallocation increased administrative complexity by adding a new layer of organization.In addition, this new layer of organization required closer monitoring and stricterenforcement of the commercial harvest. A pilot project replacing monthly with dailyreporting of harvest was implemented in 1985, bringing with it a need for increasedfrequency of monitoring and enforcement. Clearly, problems with incidental catch haveseriously affected ITHQ implementation.4.4 Analysis of the Policy Process4.4.1 The impact of incremental decision makingThe incremental model of public policy making is well suited to assist inunderstanding the process of developing and implementing ITHQ. While thebioeconomic model helps to identify underlying environmental and economic forcesaffecting the Lake Huron fishery, aspects of the process by which fisheries managementdecisions are reached appear to conform to an incremental pattern, rather than a rational102model. Many important management decisions have been conservative, fragmented andpolitical. Implementation of ITHQ can be characterized as conservative and incrementalon the basis of managers’ calculating allocations from available information about pastharvest amounts. (Formulae for species-specific allocations are based on fishers’previous harvest amounts.) Under usual circumstances, active consideration ofallocations is limited to changes to the previous year’s amount, and only a smallpercentage (up to 10%) of increase or decrease is considered. (Both initial allocation andthe methods of changing allocations are discussed in sections 4.3.4 and 5.2.1.) ITHQis also seen to be conservative in that it accepts and builds upon much of the existingregulatory framework of season and area limitations concerned with protection ofreproduction and safeguarding of sport fishers’ interests. Allocations are not reviewedas a whole every year, in the sense of reconsidering the value of existing baseallocations. (Although in some cases, allocations for a specific species may becomprehensively reviewed.) Managers are seldom required to defend allocations thatexceed those current, but reduced allocations may require extensive documentation.The incremental model of the policy process illustrates how moderate changes aresuggested by foregoing policy and can be more easily implemented. In facilitatingbuyouts, ITHQ may be an example of this, as it is consistent with the pre-existing buyoutpolicy.The allocations are also somewhat fragmented in that decision making is limitedto quantitative allocations of specific commercial species. This may be because theselimitations have administrative advantages for managers. First, discussion is limited tothe realm of fisheries science, where managers feel most comfortable. Second, it ismuch easier to agree on a small addition or decrease to a single species allocation thanit is to analyze the broad impacts of ITHQ implementation, some of which may beoutside of the administrative areas of the decision-making agency. Third, it institutes asystem of compromise; individual fishers who may realize a net benefit from oneparticular set of allocation decisions may hesitate to protest the unfairness of another setof allocation decisions by which they are not directly affected.103ITHQ implementation is very political. In the absence of reliable stockassessment information, effective implementation of ITHQ may be a matter of specialinterest groups and their representatives granting their political acceptance of ITHQallocations.4.4.2 The influence of special interestsITHQ deeply affects specific interests. For example, aside from its obviousimpact on commercial fishing interests, by making an explicit allocation to thecommercial fishing sector, ITHQ makes an implicit allocation to the sport fishery.Implementation of ITHQ in Lake Huron also further empowered another interest group,fisheries managers, by providing a regulatory instrument by which to shift commercialfishing effort among and within species in a specific areal pattern. Interest group theoryprovides an instructive lens for examination of ITHQ. The significant effects of interestgroup activities on resource management policy development, implementation andassessment are not accounted for in the rational model. In describing the process ofimplementing ITHQ in the Lake Huron commercial fishery, chapter four shows how thisprocess was influenced by two major interest groups, the commercial and sport fishers,as well as the fisheries scientists.4°In its emphasis on the roles of power and influencein the policy process, the interest group model lends insight into how these interests wereable to affect the decision process. Bargaining, negotiating and compromise wereprominent aspects of decision making. Implementation of ITHQ involved bargainingbecause managers did not have adequate assessment and resource use data to supportallocation decisions. Some initial amounts and areal limits of allocations weresubsequently modified on the basis of bargains struck with commercial fishers.°Chapter three includes a discussion of the role of sport fishers in determiningthetiming of ITHQ implementation and the need for creation of the Lake QuotaReviewCommittee to accommodate commercial fishers needs.104The sport fishers’ lobby, as represented by the OFAH, surpasses the Ontario FishProducers’ Association in terms of the effectiveness criteria identified by Dye (1972),yjz.: (theOFAH) (1) has a larger membership; (2) with a cohesive set ofgoals andvalues regarding sport fishing; (3) has resources for extensive membershipconsultationand public communications; (4) has a high profile leadership withexcellent mediaconnections; and at least over the time period immediately preceding the implementationof ITHQ, (5) superior access to and influence on policy makers, in particular theMinister of Natural Resources (OMNR 1988a; Toronto Star 1988; DFO 1987). TheOFAH has 73,000 members and represents 429 fish and game conservation groups.OFAH has a laudable record of involvement in conservation projects and has been aneffective lobby to various government agencies (O.C. 1376/89).4.5 Summary and ConclusionITHQ were instituted as part of a provincial fisheries modernization program.At that time, there was thought to be the potential for overharvest in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery, in the form of excess capacity. Program objectives included controlof the amount and species of fish harvested, reduction in harvest capacity, simplifiedregulation and capacity to ameliorate user group conflicts. Some of the consequences ofITHQ are the result of deficiencies in the implementation of ITHQ, and thesedeficiencies, in turn, stem from the process by which the policy was chosen andimplemented.ITHQ allocations were based on a fisher’s past performance. Development andimplementation of ITHQ was significantly influenced by:(1) inadequate consultation on policy development;(2) lack of consensus among commercial fishers;(3) uncertainties in assessment information;(4) administrative changes in the boundaries of licensed fishing areas;(5) hasty implementation; and105(6) secrecy and lack of routinization in post-implementation allocationadjustments.In explicitly quantifying the portion of the fishery allocated to commercialharvest,and defining the distribution of benefits between the sport and commercialfishers andamong the commercial fishers, ITHQ has become entangled in theincidental catch issue.Problems with incidental catch have seriously affected ITHQ implementation.Clearly, the manner of development and implementation has a significantinfluence on the effectiveness and impacts of ITHQ. This research finds the developmentand implementation of ITHQ in Lake Huron to be the result of the interaction of rational,incremental and interest group decision-making processes. This “mixed model” approachto policy development and implementation is consistent with the conclusions of Allison(1971). Further, this policy development is seen to take place in the context ofcomplexsocial and environmental conditions that impact on decision making.The process of ITI-IQ development and implementation emphasized thesignificance of communications, consultation and compromise. Available informationwas imperfect, political circumstances dictated the need for immediate measures, andresource user interest groups were pressing for achievement of conflicting goals.1065.0 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATAThis chapter presents the results of analysis of both the quantitative and qualitativedata sets.5.1 Results of the Analysis of Quantitative DataThis section presents an analysis and interpretation of the major relationshipsamong the quantitative variables. Interpretation of the results is cautious owing to therelatively short time series. Where possible (i.e. harvest and value data) the data basehas been supplemented with information for additional years.4’ Though the data remainlimited, this analysis provides important information on the initial stages of ITHQimplementation that cannot be obtained anywhere else.42If ITHQ works as fisheries’ theory predicts, harvest would be controlled withina predetermined amount, prompting changes in resource users’ behaviour, such thatcapacity would be reduced and therefore the remaining capacity would be utilized moreefficiently (Grima and Berkes 1989). Simply put, does the data set support a conclusionthat ITHQ constrains two principal problems in the general management of manyfisheries: overharvest and overcapacity?‘As detailed in section 3.1.1, OMNR has continued to collect data on thecommercial fishery, utilizing since 1986, a modified instrument. For this and otherreasons, the quantitative data set compiled for this research is not perfectly compatiblewith the post-1985 OMNR Commercial Fish Harvest Statistics data base.Nevertheless,the 1986-1989 harvest amounts and value of harvest from this data base are depictedgraphically in this section in order to give some indication of changes in these datasincethe conclusion of the study period. The ‘Source” annotation for eachgraphic identifiesthe depicted data base.42Dollar values are presented as ‘current.’ Owing to the relatively lowrate ofinflation over the study period, transposition to ‘constant dollars’ wouldnot havesignificant impact on the analysis or conclusions.1075. 1.1 Overharvest and the price of fishOne of the theoretically expected outcomes of ITHQ is control of harvest withina predetermined amount. Although there is no evidence of overharvest, analysis ofchanges in total harvest of the principal commercial species in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery should give some indication of whether ITHQ controlled the amountof fish harvested. Thus, tracing fluctuations in the amount of harvest and selling priceof the two major commercial species in the fishery, and interpreting these changes in thecontext of other limiting factors, would give some indication of the impact of ITHQ onthe total harvest and the income obtained from this harvest.Whitefish is the major commercial species in the Lake Huron fishery. With theexception of the large harvest in 1983, the post-quota harvests of this species have beenslightly greater than those of the preceding four years (see Figure 5. 1). Over this sametime period (again excepting 1983), the total value of the harvest has stayed in relativelythe same proportion to the total harvest (see Figure 5.2); the price per pound has variedonly slightly (see Figure 5.1). Additional data on whitefish harvests from 1986-1989show a consistent trend; total harvest and total value of the harvest are relativelyevenlyproportioned (see Figure 5.3). These harvests also are greater than those in the yearsimmediately preceding ITHQ implementation.Harvest amounts and harvest/price relationships change little either beforeorfollowing the implementation of quota regulation. The harvest amount differed fromtheallocation: aggregate harvest amounts remainedbelow the levels set by managers bothbefore ITHQ (when there was a lakewide harvest quota) and after ITHQ implementation.Therefore, the fact that harvest levels remain below ITHQ levels is notnecessarily108FIGURE5.1AveragePriceperPoundandTotalHarvestofWhitefish,1980-1985C40 302O1.0MillionsofPounds0.01980YearAveragePriceperPound$1 $08 $0.6 $0.4 $0.2 $01985TotalHarvestIDollarsperPound1981198219881984Source:OMNRCH8AFIGURE5.2TotalHarvestandTotalValueofWhitefish,1980-1985MillionsofDollarsTotalHarvestTotalValueMillionsofPounds4.0 ao$4.0 $3.0 $2.0 $1.0 $0.0198019811982198319841985YearSource:OMNRCF.8AFIGURE5.34.0 3.0,1986-Value1989$4.0 $3.0 $2.0 $1.0 $0.0TotalHarvestTotalValueMillionsofPoundsMillionsofDollarsYear1986198719881989Source:OMNRCommercialFishHarvestStatisticsevidence that ITHQ alone, has effectedlakewide control of the harvest or affected theselling price of whitefish, in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery.43Chub is the second most important commercial species.In contrast to the mostlymodest increases in harvest of whitefish, harvest ofchub has increased dramatically overthe study period (see Figure 5.4). (Fear of mercurycontamination, particularly in theGeorgian Bay area, may partially account for the lowharvest levels in the early 1980s).The sharpest increase was from the 1980-1982period to 1983. Harvest levels peakedin 1984, the first year of quota regulation, andalthough slightly reduced from theprevious year, 1985 harvest levels continued to topthose of all of the pre-quota yearsunder study. Chub prices and total value ofthe harvest were highest in 1984, the peakharvest year (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Additional dataon chub harvests from 1986-1989continue this two year “trend;” total harvestand total value of the harvest are greaterthan those in the years immediately preceding ITHQimplementation (see Figure 5.6).The sale price of this species has varied little sinceITHQ, despite the greaterharvest levels. This suggests that the demand forthis species may have increased also.Again, quota regulation may be doing no morethan previous regulatory regimes tocontrol harvest levels.‘It is possible, however, that some individuals wereconstrained by ITHQ. Overtime, any such individuals cantry to increase their allocations through purchase orleaseof additional quota. If thisredistribution were to take place, the expectationwould bethat the lakewide allocationwould be met.112FIGURE5.4AveragePriceperPoundandTotalHarvestofChub,1980-1985Source:TotalHarvestIDollarsperPoundMillionsofPoundsAveragePriceperPound1.4 1.2 1.00.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.01980H H U)$1.2 $1 $0.8 $0.6 $0.4 $0.2 $019851981198219831984YearOMNRCF.8AFIGURE5.5TotalHarvestandTotalValueofChub,1980-19851.4 1.2 1.00.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0N’lillionsofPoundsYeartvlillionsofDollars$1.4 $1.2 $1.0 $0.8 $0.6 $0.4 $0.2 $0.0TotalHarvestTotalValue198019811982198319841985Source:OMNRCF.8AFIGURE5.6rce:OMNRCommercialTotalHarvestTotalValueFishHarvestStatisticsTotalHarvestandTotal1986-1989MillionsofPoundsValueofChub,MillionsofDollars2.01.5 1.00.5 0.0ci]$2.0 $1.5 $1.0 $0.5 $0.01986198719881989Year5.1.2 Overcapacity and organization ofthe industryAnother of the theoreticallypredicted outcomes of ITHQ is a reduction inovercapacity, such thatremaining capacity would be utilized more efficiently. One ofthe principal objectives ofITHQ is to control harvest capacity in the commercialfishery. Individual investmentin vessels and gear is a measure of harvest capacity.The shifts in such investmentsand changes in the number of commercial fishingoperations in the fishery over thestudy period may attest to the effectiveness ofITHQin reducing harvest capacity.The bioeconomic modellinks these shifts to returns received forfishing effort,specifically, to the relationship betweentotal revenue (harvest x price) andtotal cost (costper unit of fishing effort).Information on individual investment andthe value ofindividual harvests asmeasures of economic benefit areanalyzed to show how harvestcapacity and the returns to fishingeffort have shifted since the introductionof ITHQ.Given the relationshipsspecified in the bioeconomic model, a theoreticallypredictedoutcome of ITHQ implementationwould be an egress of inefficient,non-viableoperations, accompanied by a concomitantconcentration of capital linked tohigh valueharvests. The fishing operationswith the greatest level of investmentand harvest valuewould most likely also have harvestedthe greatest number of poundsof the two majorcommercial species.Number of commercial fishing operationsThe number of commercial fishingoperations in the Lake Huroncommercialfishery dropped from over 86 in1980 to less than 60 in 1984, the firstyear after theThe objective of reducing harvestcapacity in the commercial fishery is a provincewide policy objective. Problemsof excess capacity were mostacute in the Lake Eriecommercial fishery. As discussedin section 5.2, reported harvestsin all quota areas inLake Huron were below the amountsallocated in both 1984 and 1985,owing to factorsunrelated to capacity (e.g. environmental,social, economic). It isstill instructive,however, to examine shiftsin the amount and distribution of harvestcapacity within theLake Huron commercial fishery.116implementation of ITHQ, and slightly in the next year (see Figure 5.7). The overallreduction in the number of operations is consistent with theoretically predicted outcomesregarding reductions in harvest capacity and concentration in the industry. A logicalinference is that some harvest capacity is being retired, and remaining capacity is beingmore fully utilized.Changes in the number of operations relative to their harvest and investment amountsSince the implementation of quota regulation, an increasing percentage of thoseoperations reporting the greatest harvests also report the greatest investment in vesselsand gear (not including monies spent on quota lease or purchase for which data areunavailable) (by 1985, only 6% of operations in the ‘low’ harvest category reportedinvestments over $100,000, as compared to 1980, when the comparable figure was 13%,see Figure 5.8). Over the study period the percentage of operations with reportedinvestment under $100,000 and in the ‘low’ harvest category has decreased from 53%in 1980 to 30% in 1985. The percentage of operations with reported investment of lessthan $100,000 in the ‘medium’ or ‘high’ harvest categories has grown (from 17% in1980 to 20% in 1985). (This may be an indication of more efficient use of fishingcapacity, and from a theoretical point of view, considered to be a positive outcome ofITHQ.) Looking at all investment levels, there was a general movement out of the ‘low’harvest category (66% in 1980, compared to 46% in 1985), consistent with a divisionof the harvest among fewer fishers.Over the study period, there has been a growing percentage of operations withreported investments over $100,000 (29% in 1980, and 32% in 1985). Operations inthese investment categories are also increasingly evident in the two highest harvestcategories (16% in 1980 and 36% in 1985).Although assessing impacts of ITHQ from a somewhat different perspective,related results in Berkes and Pocock’s (1990) study of diversity of commercial fisheries117FIGURE 5.7Total Number and Percentage Small andLarge Commercial Fishing Operationson Lake Huron, 1980 - 1985Number of Operations% Lrg,/Sm. Operations1100--80%60%40- --- 40 %-20%20-Total dollar value vessels, gear, shore installationsSm. = 99,999 or lessLrg. - 100,000 or greater0-I1980 1981 1982 1983 19841985Year# OperationsI% Large Operations*% SmaH Operations1 May exclude 0-5 operations forwhich data were unavailable.Source: OMN CF.8A118611C’)0-SC)CD0zC)11>!1[L33C’)CDIIIr\)01P3ocri-CDCDzo0 CD-oOCD00—00——II—CD-DD(DO(DO—(DO0C)0DOO000C’)000000C,,0-‘0-SCD•P3CD-.C’)CDCD(DCD.—CDCDC’)CDCDI,;ii:Ih1I:-°CD<0CDCDr4_3)CDt 0DCD—cD,m______(iD0(ØOco!I—IF’)(Ojco0PC’)-ICDC,,F-.0C’)-o00.Co0CD-4.CoC.)0•0CCDin Lakes Erie and Ontario indicate thatITHQ has encouraged larger-scale operations tothe detriment of “small-scale operations[that] were more efficient in their use of energyand capital and created more employment[per unit of investment] than larger-scaleoperations.”Total investmentThe general trend in the changes intotal investment over the study period showsa high point in 1983, somedecline to 1984 and relative stability through to 1985 (seeFigure 5.9). This pattern is similar tothose in the total number of operations(Figure5.7) and the total harvest andtotal value of whitefish (Figure 5.2). Thepost-ITHQ,1984 and 1985 levels of total investmentare less than those of the previous years in thestudy period. It is unclear,however, how much of this reduction can be attributed toITHQ. ITHQ was legislated in 1983,for certain implementation in 1984. In spite ofthis, 1983 was the peak investment yearin the study period. It is likely, for example,that the bountiful whitefish harvestof 1983 spurred some of that year’s increasedinvestment through providing availablecash for upgrades that may have been postponedover the previous few years.The post-1983 decrease in total investment is consistentwith the reduction in the numberof commercial fishing operations on the Lake.5.1.3 EmploymentChange in employment is another measureof how ITHQ may achieve thetheoretically predicted outcomeof reducing overcapacity, such that remaining capacitywould be utilized more efficiently.In some respects, employment in thefishery is ameasure of “capacity,” and assuch, would be expected to decline with theadvent ofITHQ. Although the numberof persons employed in each operation is reportedin theannual report (Form CF.8A),reliance on this sole source ofinformation can bemisleading. Owing to the nature ofcommercial fishing, it is often a familyconcern,involving thousands of hoursof unattributed labour (e.g. telephone calls tomarket thecatch; cleaning and mendingnets; initial processing of the harvest; etc.).120‘NFIGURE5.91TotalInvestmentinCommercialFishingOperationsonLakeHuron1980-1985MillionsofDollars198019811982‘198319841985YearDollars1Excluding0-5operationsforwhichdatawereunavailable.Source:OMNRCF.8AOver the study period, 1982 was the year of peak employment, with almost 450persons employed in the Lake Huron commercialfishing industry (see Figure 5. 10). Thedecline from this peak is most steep in theyear immediately following ITHQimplementation. This decline contrasts with the increases in the harvest amounts andvalue of the two principal commercial speciesover the same time period(see Figures5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5). Over this period, there was a reduction in the percentage ofoperations with substantial investments in vessels and gear, but relatively low harvesttotals (i.e. the very inefficient firms where total cost and total revenue relationshipswerenot favourable). Assuming a relatively stable familylabour contribution, these two setsof changes support the contention that existing employmentand investment are beingused more efficiently to achieve an increasing harvestand harvest value. Given thatthese relationships were observable at least two yearsbefore the implementation ofITHQ, however, no conclusions can be drawn asto what extent the new regulatoryregime has contributed to these changes.Little has been written on empirical observations of the relationshipbetweenemployment and ITHQ in the Great Lakes. In referenceto Lakes Ontario and Erie,Berkes and Pocock (1990) note that small-scale operationscreated more employment perunit of investment than the larger-scale operationsthat are encouraged by ITHQ.Consistent with the findings of this research, a22% reduction of the labour force in theLake Erie fishery in 1984 is attributed to a reductionin the number of crew employedand to the elimination of entire crews, as boats were drydockedto facilitate consolidationof ITHQ to one boat (Berkes and Pocock 1987).The preceding analysis highlights some of the emerging trends in selectedquantitative aspects of the post-ITHQ Lake Huroncommercial fishery. The followingsection, details the methodology and analysis of thequalitative data base.1221Includinglicenceholder,mayexclude1operationforwhichdataareunavailable.Source:OMNRCF.8APersonsFIGURE5.101NumberofPersonsEmployedinLakeHuronFishingIndustry1980-1985NumberofPersons500400 300 200100019801981198219831984Year19855.2 Results of Analysis of QualitativeDataThis section presents a descriptiveand interpretive analysis of the major themesand issues emerging fromthe qualitative data.45 As discussed in section 4.3.1, ITFJQwas intended to affect selected aspectsof commercial harvest activities. ITHQ tookeffect in a complex context, however,and the new regulatory regime affected a broadspectrum of activities andfactors associated with the commercial harvest. Variousregulatory, social and cultural aspectsof the fishery reflected impacts owing to theimplementation of ITHQ. This sectionexamines some of the impacts not predicted onthe basis of interpretation of the relationshipsmodeled in the biological and economicmodels.Analysis of the qualitative data examines a thesissuggested by the co-managementcritique of resource managers’ efforts tomaximize resource rents: that theoreticallyfeasible solutions can encounter transitionalproblems when applied in the real world.5.2.1 Changing quota allocationsTheorists often cite “administrative ease” as abenefit of ITHQ. Hard informationon the government’s and the fishers’administrative costs was unavailable forthis study.In lieu of such financial information,two qualitative indicators of administrative easewere identified: (1) consistencyin administration of ITHQ; and (2) ease and rapidityofresponse to resource users’ and managers’requirements. The following analysisofinterview respondents’ comments ontheir dealings with ITHQ defines problemsand alsoways to improve the administrationof ITHQ.uWhere anonymous quotes are used,they were taken from interviews conductedby the author, not for attribution.124Sometimes the managers’ and fishers’ contrasting objectives and perceptionscreate misunderstandings in the implementation of ITHQ. The questions in areas one andtwo of the interview schedule examinedthe level of awareness of, and perceivedreliability of, the causal relationships defined in the biological and bioeconomic models.Biological models of stock status do not produce exact figures of fish abundance, but theyare useful to indicate trends. Different models give varying results for the same fishpopulations, and all models have errors associated with the numbers they produce.Fisheries managers rely on such models to predict trends in fish stocks.46 From timeto time, OMNR assessment information indicates certain conditions unfavourable to thecommercial fishery pertain in the fishery, such as a small year class of a certain speciesor an absence of a particular size of whitefish. If this happens, and then there is aserendipitous commercial harvest of a plentitude of the supposedly absent year class, orsize of fish, contradicting the prediction, this news will soon travel through the region.Such informal communication contributes to the belief that OMNR’s assessments areerroneous (most commonly in underestimating the fish populations). Analysisofinterview data indicates that all fisheries managers can be uncomfortable in increasingquotas because an increase on the basis of a short time series of data may resultinputting too much harvest pressure on the stock. This statement of managers’ views isfurther substantiated by OMNR FisheriesBranch representatives presentations andcontributions to discussions at the 1989 OFPA Annual Meeting. Similarly, at the samemeeting, most fishers substantiated the conclusion drawn from analysis of interviewresponses: that they are equally ill at ease with decreases because a significantdecreasecould substantially reduce their income and they might not readily beable to return tothe former, larger quota. During the period of a field visit to a prosperous southernDuring the period immediately preceding the implementation of ITHQ andduringthe field work portion of this research, the OMNRdid not have a working data base forthe Lake Huron fishery. (A senior fisheries manager confirmed, “Quotaswere based onhurried calculations based on formulaefrom the Minister. Our own records were insome disarray.”) This situation is now rectified and stock assessmentmodels areroutinely utilized for prediction of trends in stock fluctuations in LakeHuron.125Lake Huron commercial fishing/processing operation, for example, OMNR assessmentofficials were widely quoted by commercial fishers asreporting an absence of “jumbo”whitefish. In the same week, the author observed that this processor was marketing live“jumbos.” In the spring of 1988, when OMNRrefused to adjust whitefishquotasupward, whitefish were reportedly so plentiful inLake Huron that one Southamptonfisher reported unintentionally netting whitefish when just washing nets in the lake.Apocryphal incidents such as these are thought to be commonplace, and have contributedto a lack of confidence in the scientific assessment dataon which quota adjustments arebased. The commercial fishers interviewed usuallyask for increases in their quotaallocations on the basis of an observed abundance offish. When this is in contrast toofficial assessment information, an increase from OMNR is unlikely.The contrast of the specific limits set by ITHQ with the uncertainties of perceivedand/or inadequate stock assessment tends to emphasize an ongoing fisheries managementproblem. Management is complicated by the necessity for managers toderive speciesallocations from uncertain historical assessment data,months in advance of theirimplementation. Along with a reluctance on the part of managers to makemid-seasonadjustments to quota allocations, these implementation problems have complicatedpolicymaking and hindered the effectiveness of ITHQ. Explained one fisheries managerwithlakewide responsibilities,“There is more management now, it is more difficult and more time isspent. Before [ITHQ] management was keeping track of the number ofyards [of net] on a license and there was less day to day work.Enforcement was minimal. Besides, commercial fishing reportsare notfully accurate as to the area of catch, so the data base suffers.”Thus management cannot be said to be more consistent or less burdensomeadministratively. At the time of this research, contrary to theoreticalpredictions, ITHQhad not eased administration. An additional factor is the weaknessesof the necessaryscientific foundation, as the allocations were at least partly arbitrary, andthis hasheightened the politics associated with ITHQ.1265.2.2 Uncertainty and quota transferArea three of the interview schedule looks at the factors affecting the perceptionof quotas as a management tool. Uncertainty about how allocations might be changedby government fiat has led to a number of interrelated unanticipated impacts. Four ofthe individuals interviewed (coincidentally, all licensed to fish in the northern area of thelake), reported that prior to ITHQ implementation, they had fished only sporadically(owing to poor health, personal inclination, poor markets, poor stocks, etc.) and soreceived small quotas. Understandably, respondents in this position voiced dismay atseeing this portion of their life’s work reduced to the relatively little they could realizefrom the sale or lease of their quota. An additional three of the fishers interviewedspecifically said that they would like to “cash in” their fishery. Having observed orheard about other fishers negotiating increases in their quota, or benefiting from stockassessment-based increases, however, they are holding on to their allocations, in thehopes that they will realize a higher “cash in” value. For example, one prosperous PortElgin fisher/processor confirmed that his aggressive efforts to purchase perch ITHQ in1986 were prompted by that year’s 30% increase in overall perch quotas. (In turn, theOMNR decision to make a 30% reduction the following year may have caused somedisappointment on the part of the new owners of the reduced quota.) Alternatively, asreported by a frustrated willing purchaser in the Parry Sound area, in some instances,significant quota may be being held (but not fished), and the allocation is not beingharvested. In particular, this individual complained that “the majority of quota shouldgo to the most active fishermen” if there were to be any increases. Opportunity costsare the only penalties an individual would sustain in retaining an unused quota allocation.As a secondary impact, this is constraining the more active fishers in the area. Theymight like to expand their operations, but cannot purchase or lease the unused quota intheir area. From the point of view of the government, there is no biological (i.e.scientific) basis for assigning any additional allocation to the fishery. This stymies theindividual fisher, and confounds fisheries management in the affectedareas. And theresultant harvest does not reflect the potential of the fishery. From thefishers’ point of127view, necessary government decisions greatly complicate“ownership” and “economic”calculations. This situation is analogous to “owning”(and selling/buying) a piece ofproperty, the size of which is/can be changed by government(and is changedregularlyand without warning).Although most of the fishers interviewed did not want to sell or lease their ownquota, those with larger harvesting or harvesting/processing operations reported obtainingadditional quota by these methods. In general, both managers and fishers interviewedsaw this practice to be beneficial for both the biologicaland economic management ofthe commercial fishery. Fishers support for the sale of quota was limited tothosetransfers that allowed the allocation to remain activewithin the commercial fishery.None of the fishers interviewed supported the “retirement” or government buyback ofquota without replacing the equivalent allocationin another area. “Buyback is no good,”noted a Southampton fisher, “licenses are lost, the commercial fishery becomesweakerand the sport fishery will become the focus of the bureaucracy.”At one point in the formulation of ITHQ there was some discussionof how todeal with unutilized quota allocations. A commercial fisher representativeon the jointOMNR/OCCF committee said that the committee tabled the suggestion that ifallocationswere not used or were under-used for a period of time, and without just cause,the quotawould be reallocated to other fishers. The representative explained that doubtsregardingthe exact terms of the provision (what would constitute under-utilization,for how long)and how such a rule might affect fishing effort, resulted inthe proposal being shelved.The currency of this idea, however, does seem to have some effect onfishers’ behaviour.A dissatisfied Southampton area fisher claimed thathe was “fishing more now thanbefore, because I don’t want to lose any quota. I was doing OK before, butnow I haveto meet the quota figure.”Berkes and Pocock (1987) relate that in 1984, fears that a fisher would losetheunused portion of a quota contributed to market flooding in the volatile LakeErie128fishery, and led to the near bankruptcy of several processors in the winter of 1984-1985.Dewees (1989) also found problems with quota transfer, and recommended that suchtransfer be facilitated, so that the industry can efficiently manage quota holdings.Under the conditions present in the Lake Huron fishery at the time of ITHQimplementation, quota regulation brought into being a wholly new management problemthat would not exist without the creation of ITHQ. The regulation introduced an elementof uncertainty for fishers about their fishing rights. Additionally, the possibility ofreallocating ITHQ has opened up a new area of decision making about the distributionof benefits from the fishery. Again, administrative details can have a confounding effecton how well ITHQ works to achieve maximum resource rents and to reduceovercapacity.5.2.3 Spatial distributionAny analysis of the distribution of fishing effort is confounded by inconsistentmanagement actions (e.g. planting of sport fish species in various and variable areas) andchanges in the geographical definition of management units coincident with theimplementation of ITHQ. It is nevertheless worthwhile to discuss how interviewrespondents see redefinition of the geographical areas in which they are licensed hasaffected their operations. Area four of the interview schedule deals with perceptions ofthe scope of change introduced by ITHQ and the management of this change.Over the years, commercial fishers had developed traditional areal fishing patternswithin their licensed areas. With the introduction of quota regulation, quotas wereassigned to area divisions as re-determined by OMNR. As reported by interviewrespondents, one of the results of this spatial reorganization of the fishery was thatallocations assigned to some of the newly designated quota areas (see Figure 3. 1) wereinconsistent with traditional fishing patterns, leaving some fishers with only a very smallquota allocation (based on past performance) for areas in which they had inthe past129expended very little effort, and excluding them from fishing in areas in which they hadhad years of substantial harvests. Initially, the fishers’ past performance in these newly-excluded areas was not used in the calculation of their quota allocation. This situationwas crucial for a number of North Channel area fishers, who reported that they had “leftoff fishing [in a local near-shore area] to keep out of the way of the tourists [i.e. sportfishers] and to give the [chub] stocks a break. And now we don’t have any quota in thatarea, even though we fished there for eighty years.” Some fishers who took the one-timeopportunity of applying to the Lake Huron Quota Review Board to remedy situationssimilar to this one reported that they received additional quota allocations and/or adjustedlicensed areas. These increases were based on the fishers’ overall past performance andnot on any biological assessment of the new areas. The objective of these adjustmentswas to allow the fishers to maintain their level of business. Analysis of interviewresponses indicates that fishers disadvantaged by the area reorganization, who did notapply for an adjustment or who did not receive the adjustment they sought, remaindisgruntled.In practice, some fishers throughout the lake reported that the grid limitationswere just too restrictive. A Manitoulin Island fisher/processor said that “Some areas aretwice as productive [as others], but I can’t fish there and I have to stay in less productivewaters.” A Georgian Bay area fisher expressed a more cynical approach: “I report mycatch the way they want to hear it,” implying a certain liberty in his reporting. “Arearestrictions are not enforced up here. I catch where there are the most fish, regardless.Area restrictions are wrong; you should take fish where they are most plentiful” said aBruce Peninsula fisher. In the southern part of the lake, a fisher/processor tackled theproblem by “fishing fifteen separate fisheries [licences] as one business.”Contrary to the expected provision of increased security for fishers about theirfishing rights, changes in fishers’ usual licensed fishing areas brought an element ofuncertainty to those fishers who were displaced from their traditional fishing areas. Thissituation was particularly acute where fishers were assigned allocations in areas that were130unsuitable for commercial harvest activities owing to planting of sport fish species andthe fisher did not have additional ITHQ in an alternativearea. Little has been writtenon either the theoretical or applied spatial aspects of the distribution of allocations, butclearly there are cases when traditional harvest patterns are important considerations inoperationalizing ITHQ. This problem highlights one weakness of one assumptioninherent in the bioeconomic model -- the assumption that fisheries stocks arehomogeneously distributed in spatial terms. (They are not.)5.2.4 Problems in calculating allocationsITHQ is an “information hungry” method of regulation. In order to work astheoretically predicted, allocations must be based on adequate assessment information.Unfortunately, in the Lake Huron fishery, the information available at the timeallocations were calculated was incomplete. As well as pointing out the need for revisedmethods of monitoring and enforcement, this problem has implications for thedistribution of benefits among the commercial fishers. The final questions in area fourof the interview schedule focused on the level of awareness and perceptions aboutthemethod of calculation of allocations.A North Channel fisher recounted that “Thirty years ago, one tourist operator hadthe Bayfield Sound area restricted and it’s still out of bounds today, even though thelodge doesn’t even exist any more and there’s lots of whitefish there. The governmentnever did any assessment there, so it has no past and therefore no future.”Archaicadministrative conditions such as this one would unnecessarily limit both the areasforwhich stock assessment information is available and, in areas wheresignificantcommercial stocks exist, the amount available for ITHQallocation to the commercialfishery. “Pope [former Minister of Natural Resources] put thecart before the horse.”declared a Manitoulin Island fisher/processor. “You shouldhave the assessment first,and then the quota.” This individual went on to citespecific weaknesses in assessmentprocedures. “MNR did not sample in March, April, November or December,”he said.131“Their data doesn’t representthe fishery. There were changesin personnel, and thisintroduced biases in the samplingprogram and in interpretation.” The ITHQmanagement option would beperceived to be working more fairly and effectively ifadequate assessment and administrativereview occurred before ITHQ was implemented.Based on interview analyses, itis clear that in some instances commercial fishersharbour suspicions of the stated reasonsfor collection of information on the amounts andsale prices of past harvests. Aware ofthis scepticism of government“prying,” interviewrespondents contend that somefishers have under-reported their harvests.Naturally, ifdeflated figures were used asa basis for calculation of individualtransferable harvestquotas, the resultant allocationscould not truly reflect the pastharvests. While there canbe little sympathy for individualswho may have chosen tolie, it is unfortunate that byunderreporting harvest, theymay have diminished the sizeof quota for honest fisherstoo. Underreporting of harvestwould, of course, result in a reductionof the historical,lakewide totals utilized in the allocationformulae.Co-management theorists point outthat management systems dependingmore fullyon community regulation havethe potential of internalizing some ofthe high informationand transaction costs (Grima andBerkes 1989). These costs would beinternalized bydependence on traditionalinformation about the biologicallimits of the resource whichhave been learnt by experience,and use of the requisite social coercive mechanisms,suchas peer pressure and adherenceto tradition, to force compliancewith expected harvests(Grima and Berkes 1989).1325.2.5 Incidental catch47Questions in area five of the interviewschedule sought information onrespondents’ perceptions ofthe consultation activities associated with ITHQ developmentand implementation. In the context ofthis discussion, consultation activities refer to theability of actors to participatein decision making and the political ramifications of theseactivities in an interest group context.Like many natural resources, the fisheryhas been subject to pressures ofutilization. The three areaswhere conflicts between sport and commercialfishingactivities are most clearly manifestare: (1) numbers; (2) timing; and (3) spatialdistribution. In regard to the numbers of sportfishers wanting to use the resource, sportfishing in Ontario is a major recreationalactivity. Anglers fished a total of about 34.4million days in 1985 (OMNR 1988a).Temporal distribution of sport fishingeffort is another source of pressure:Most fishing (85%) occurred during theperiod April through September.During that time 83% of resident and 96%of nonresident effort wasexpended. More than half ofall effort (54%) occurred duringJuly,August, and September. (OMNR1988a)As is the spatial distribution:the southern, central and southwestern (includingthe study area) regions ofthe province were the most heavily fishedfor sport (OMNR1988a). In particular, picturesqueGeorgian Bay offers a wider varietyof popular sportfishing opportunities than can be foundin Lakes Ontario and Erie, for example,(including the chance toangle for lake trout, rainbow trout and salmon)and is immenselypopular with sport fishers. The GeorgianBay fishery has also attracted a powerfulsport“vSection 4.3.5 discusses a 1988 provincialgovernment study of incidentalcatch inLake Huron.133fisher lobby and the GeorgianBay area is home to OntarioFisherman, a popular bimonthly publication targeted tosport fishers.This situation has led to growingconflicts between sport and commercial usersof the fishery resource.Interview responses substantiatethis view. Several respondentsreported making modificationsin their harvest patterns(timing and area) in order toaccommodate pressuresfrom sport fishers. “I don’t fish in-shore atall in July,” a PortElgin area fisher explained, “justto keep out of their [sport fishers]way. If they seeeven one commercial fishingboat, and they’re having a bad day,they think [its because]you’ve caught all the fish.”Similarly, four North Channel/ManitoulinIsland area fishersreported that they voluntarilyavoid popular sportfishing areas during the tourist season.An OMNR fisheries managerwith lakewide responsibilitiesdescribed sport fishers’perceptions that “the commercialfishermen are purposelyfishing salmon. This isinaccurate. For example,in Sauble Beach, the whitefishfishery is confused with thesalmon fishery. Anglersthink the nets are blockingthe fish runways, then they get theirexpensive gear caughtin the nets and object tothem.”Some commercial fishersbelieve the implementation ofITHQ has exacerbatedfriction with the sportfishery. One of the long standingchallenges for commercialfishers has been to targetspecific species of commercialvalue while at the same time,avoiding “incidental” catchof an unwanted or unsalablespecies. (This type of targetingis possible becausefish species have a specific verticaldistribution in the lake waters.)However, a portion of almostevery “set” is discarded, givenaway or, if there is amarket, sold for a few cents apound as animal feed. Interviewrespondents report thatfor the most part, theincidental catch is considered to be agreat nuisance, requiringtimeand labour to cull from thesaleable harvest. “The anglers areclaiming that commercialfishermen are purposelycatching [planted] salmon. Thisisn’t true. They areoily andsmell bad, strictly a trophyfish. And they have big teeththat do a lot of damageto thenets.” complainedone Parry Sound area fisher. Atother times, however,respondentsconcur that a portion ofthe incidental catch may be gamefish that are sought afterby134sport fishers and which, if there were not quota restrictions, would besaleable by thecommercial fishers. A North Channel fisher describedhow “in trying to keep awayfrom pickerel I can’t fish as freely for [target species]perch. Once I reach the limit [ofincidental catch allocation] I have to keep a running tab, including the conversion48 toavoid going over. I have to keep some quota forany incidental catch of quota fish, evenwhen I’m fishing for another kind of fish.” It is this‘truly’ incidental catch that is thesource of conflict.The implementation of ITHQ has interacted withthis problem in a complex way.For example, often commercial fishers fish very specificgrounds within their licensedarea. In areas of favoured whitefish or chub groundswhich are also popular for sportfishing for (planted) salmonid stocks, the stage is setfor conflict. Under thesecircumstances, the commercial fishers interviewed contendthat they cannot harvest theallocation of quota species without risking a substantial harvest of non-quota,sport fishspecies. The government has made some effort to mitigate the conflictthrough allocationof very small quotas of the sport fish species, thusmaking saleable at least a portion ofany incidental catch. Some commercial fisherswould like to be able to sell all of theirincidental catch. “What’s the point in wasting it?”is an accurate paraphrase of manyrespondents’ comments. Commercial fishersfrom areas where sport stock were plantedreported that they have voluntarily stopped fishingcertain of their traditional areas inorder to avoid substantial incidental catch of non-quotasport fish. It is not economic forthe commercial fisher to expend effort and resourcesif a significant part of the harvestis not saleable. In turning to alternative fishing grounds,however, the commercial fishermay bear additional risks and costs, includingmore dispersed stocks, greater travellingdistance and an increased exposure to possibleinclement weather. A Georgian Bayfisher, caught in a “catch 22” position described arearestrictions that limited him “tofishing off-shore for chub. This is less efficient thanwhat I was doing before, catching48Quota is allocated in round weight, this fishermarkets much of his harvestdressed.135whitefish and splakein-shore. Off-shore, thereis less schooling, and I haveto use moregasoline and four times asmuch gear to producethe same amount of money.” In thisparticular case, OMNRplanted splake inthe in-shore area where this individualtraditionally harvestedwhitefish and chub,and to avoid substantial incidental catch, hehad to relocate. Thiscase was examinedbut unresolved by the 1984 Lake Huron QuotaReview Committeeand the fisher was seekingredress (i.e. “concessions with respect toterritory and splake quotas”)through the courts atthe time of the interview.Dewees (1989) cites problemswith discarding of non-quotafish, but in thiscategory, he includesnot only sport species, butcommercial species culledfrom theharvest in order toensure that only thehighest priced portion of afisher’s catch waslanded. Additionalconflicts between commercialand sport fishers include illegalsaleof fish by sportfishers, competitionfor the allocation of fish,and the effects ofrecreational fishingon the resource (Dewees1989). Berkes and Pocock(1990) refer to“the presence of a powerfulsport fishing lobby resultingin the elimination of commercialfisheries from someareas and marginalizationin other areas [of the Great Lakes].”Inan earlier discussionof “people problems” inimplementation of ITHQin the Lake Eriecommercial fishery, Berkesand Pocock (1987) identifysport fishers as “important,butsubordinate partiesin the quota developmentprocess.”Sport fishers remaininfluential in policy developmentsaffecting the commercialfishing industry. Somerespondents feel that it waspromised that the implementationofITHQ would reducethe need for those gearrestrictions that areunrelated toconservation, but thishas not been the case.Commercial fishery policymust operate ina complex social milieu.For example, in responseto continued lobbying effortson thepart of the sportfishers’ fraternity, OMNRimposed an additionalmesh-depthrestriction49 on perchnets in the Lake Huronfishery (OMNR 1988b).This regulationis unrelated toconservation and is solelyaimed at reducingthe incidental catchof‘Phased in over athree year period, to correspondwith the lifespan ofgill nets.136salmonids (OMNR 1988b).Clearly, ITHQ, alone, was thought tobe insufficientregulation, and thus ITHQ havenot done away with other regulations.5.2.6 Limits on fishers’ decision-makingAreas six, seven and eight inthe interview schedule examined details of theresponse to the way ITHQ was developedand implemented. To ascertain how adaptableITHQ has been to real world conditions such aschanges in technology, costs, prices andavailability, interview respondentswere asked about their risk managementdecisionsrelated to enforcement, allocationand ITHQ administration. Perceivedease inreallocation and transfer is taken as ameasure of ITHQ adaptability becauseit can belinked to acquisition of specificgear and vessel types, costs, prices and availability.Inoverview, the extent to which fishers’can make business decisions that include ITHQ asa manageable variable reflectsthe extent to which the policy has become apart of theindustry.The fact of quota allocation affects thecommercial fishers’ decision-makingenvironment in three distinct ways.First, in contrast to the traditional independenceassociated with commercial fishing,fishers are accountable to fisheries managersfor eachpound of fish they harvestand market. Coupled with uncertainties about losingeventemporarily unutilized quota, fishersno longer feel free to alter their harvestefforts.Second, in defining harvestlimits, ITHQ specifically defines theresale value of acommercial fishing operation.Third, fishers ability to switch their efforts toalternativespecies are constrained. Theseissues are discussed below.An individual transferable harvest quotamay be too small to support a business.Aside from the reasons mentioned above,respondents cited additional explanationsas towhy this is so. In some instances, thereare specific reasons why thepast performanceharvests were below the usual harvestsor less than could be supported by thefish stocks.The reasons vary, but a common patternwould be poor health or temporaryalternative137employment on the partof the licence holder, leading to reducedor no reported harvestin the years used for calculationof past performance figures.Poor markets or a healthadvisory on certain commercialspecies could also lead to a lesserharvest of a particularspecies in a defined time period.The legacy of such situations is especially troublesomein instances where ayounger member of the familywishes to assume greaterparticipation in the family’scommercial fishing business, but is constrained by asmallquota allocated on the basisof an older person’s previous part-time efforts.Accordingto one North Channelfisher, “My son bought alicence, gear and a boat off a retiringfisherman, but there wasonly a very small quota asthe licence was not used much. Mybrother and me sold himsome of our quota, otherwise hewould not have survived.”Some retiring fisherswho may have chosen tofish only part-time in recent years,andwho wish to sell their operationsfind the value limited by the amountof their individualtransferable harvest quota.Dewees (1989) also reportedconcerns that cutbacksin fishers’ potential harvestunder ITHQ make theirbusiness uneconomical. Someof the fishers he interviewedpreviously fished full-time, butsubsequently changed theiroperations to part-timebecause their quotas wereless than their harvest capacity.With the implementationof ITHQ, fishers became accountableto fisheriesmanagers on a pound bypound, species by speciesbasis for their harvest. Quotaregulation suddenly introducedan element of accountability thatwas not previouslypresent, and in so doing,some respondents feel it hasimpinged on an important elementof the commercialfisher’s traditional independence.This independence allowed fishersto lay off fishingin order to take advantage ofshort-term, profitable, non-fishingemployment opportunities,or for any other reason. Conversely,they could make ashort-term increase intheir effort (and harvest)if they so desired. Before quotaregulation, the individualfisher was free to harvest moreor less of any given species(within the ABC) fromone year to the next, withonly the short-term consequence ofvarying income.With the advent of quota regulation,variations in the amountsand138species harvested can have more long-termramifications for a fisher’s livelihood.“Quota regulates our income,”said a North Channel fisher. “There’s no way to workharder and make more money.”ITHQ has impactcd the traditional methodof evaluating an operation (i.e.estimation of the potentialof an operation as represented by licensed area and vessel andgear capacity and its resale value).Since the implementation of ITHQ, the quotareflecting past performance has come tobe the most significant measure of thevalue ofa commercial fishing operation.Fishers’ decision making is also limitedbecause quotas apply to particular species.With quota regulation in place, a fisherholding substantial quota allocation in a singlespecies, and only a smallallocation of other species, has lost flexibility in decisionmaking. If harvest or sale ofthe major quota species is poor, the shortfall cannot easilybe made up through increasedharvest of alternative species. A Bruce Peninsula fisherspecializing in chub elaborated, “Theproblem is that quota puts a ceiling on how muchI can catch, and I can’tmake up for a bad year by catching more thenext year.Sometimes the amount offish is set by schooling [of fish], not by thenumber of fish inthe lake. And with the quotaI have now, I can’t switch species and so I’m morevulnerable to a health scare.”5°Should either situation occur, a fisher isrisking asubstantial reduction in earnings for thelength of time the harvest or market remainspoor. A second fisher from the same areasubstantiated this view: “I need flexibility incase there is a problemwith chub. Right now I don’t have enough whitefishquota toeven pay my winter expenses. It’s sosmall that it’s not worth buying gear to switch.”°This is a problem owing to water pollution,which is not an uncommon problemalong the highly industrialized shoresof the Great Lakes. Lake Huronis at risk not onlyby virtue of the Sarnia-areapetrochemical industrial complex, butfrom the many miningand forest products industries locatedalong the northern shores. Marketperception isalso very important: the fish neednot be contaminated, only perceivedto be at risk, forsales to be affected in one areaor another.139The option of purchasing orleasing quota in anotherspecies may be impractical (e.g. ifa specific typeof gear or vessel is required;if the capital outlay is too great) orimpossible (e.g. if none isavailable). The optionof receiving a temporary re-allocationfrom OMNR was not seento be an adequate one.“MNR is too slow.” the first BrucePeninsula fisher noted.“It takes them a year torespond to any request.” It is likely thatthis lost flexibility maylimit, not enhance,efficiency for the commercial fisher.Although the principle ofITHQ is intended tomaximize efficiency, the practical effectis, in some respects, to reduceit.Berkes’ and Pocock’s(1990) research demonstratesthat in the Lake Ontariofishery, in particular,where fishers typicallyuse five distinct techniquesand obtaineleven species offish, ability to switch vessels,gear and target species is thepredominant strategy to reduceexpenses and optimizeoperations. They see this strategyto be less critical inthe Lake Erie fishery,where fishers utilize one techniqueor gearpredominantly andrely mainly on one of twospecies (i.e. yellow perch orsmelt).Dewees’ (1989) interview subjectscited the high priceof quota as being a barriertoadapting fishing practices tomaximize prices receivedfor fish.Aside from these practicalaspects of freedom indecision making, research byBeddington and Rettig(1984) confirms the psychologicalimportance of autonomy forthecommercial fisher.For example, fishermenoften complain that theirindividual occupationalobjectives are inadequatelyconsidered when regulationsare set. Manyfishermen chose theirway of life because they wished tobe independentwhile living an outdoor life fullof challenge, with a lackof regimentation,full of a sense ofidentity, and proud of theiroccupation (Thompson1984). Further,many of them argue that theirheritage does not allowany other self-image. Theyalso want a greatdeal of flexibility inchoosing target species,size and type of vessel to operate,gear to use,what time of year (week, day,and time of day) to fish, andthe area inwhich they will fish. Such flexibilityimplies to them bothease of entryand exit from a specificfishery.140Autonomy was mentionedas a factor in theLake Huron commercial fishery.Although he said thathe still harvestedthe same amount of fish,he viewed restrictionsand governmentcontrol over the amount, typeand location of harvest as “too muchinterference.” ThisGeorgian Bay areafisher declared himself to be “so depressed bythe whole situation thatI’m thinking of gettingout.”5.2.7 Marketing quotavalueQuestions in area sevenof the interview scheduleexamined how fishing activitiesmay have changed inresponse to ITHQ.Dewees (1989) identifieddevelopment of innovativeon-board handling methodsand harvest of marketablenon-quota species astwo changes consistent with thetheoretically predictedbehaviours associatedwith ITHQ. These predictionsare alsosubstantiated in examinationof the post-ITHQ behavioursin the Lake Huron fishery.ITHQ has spurredsome changes in fishingtechnology, processingand marketing.Fishers detailedseveral innovative activitiesin their descriptions of howthey wereadapting their operationsto the constraintsand opportunities createdby theimplementation of ITHQ.These activities includeddevelopment of retailoperationsselling cooked fish,icing fish immediately to preservefreshness, and experimentswithtrap netting and saleof live fish. A ManitoulinIsland fisher/processor,for example,described how he“raised these [farmed]trout to match the sizeof the plates in therestaurant that buysthem.” The same individualsaid: “I use my freezersto controlsupply and keep thefish in better condition.”In another exampleof innovativemarketing, indicatingthe converted schoolbus onhis dock (convenientlylocated near thehigh-traffic liquorstore and adjacent to aprovincial park that attractsmany tourists) aKillarney area fisher/processorrelated that he “startedthis fish and chip businessbecausemy quota was toolow to stay in business.I put cisco [not consideredto be a commercialor sport species, andnot subject to quota restrictions]through the chipwagon and sellthem as ‘round whitefish’.”A North Channel fisherreported on his experimentsin trap141netting: “I had to doa lot of paperwork, butI finally got a crew of American Indiansover here to catch myquota with their own trap nets.I got the same amount of fish, butthey were more valuable[i.e. could be sold at ahigher price] because they’re notdamaged.” Andmarketing of non-quota species:“I found a market for mullet inMontreal and NewYork, where they make it into fishproduct. But I need to be able toproduce one tonne perday to make it worthwhile, andI can’t do that yet.” Consistentwith, but somewhattangential to a strict interpretationof the theoretical predictions of“increased efficiency,”ITHQ has been concurrentwith the development of harvest,processing and marketingtechniques which add value to theharvest and/or exploit thefishery resource morefully (e.g. development of marketsfor previously non-commercial,non-sport species).Recent advances inthe marketing of the commercial harvesthave brought a newdimension to the valuationof quota that has received littleattention in the literature.Fish harvesters andprocessors reported that theyare doing more to increase the marketvalue of their fish (e.g.icing when caught, dressing,offering uniform size, marketingto local stores andrestaurants, developingnew products, etc.). The potential“processed” value isimplicit, regardless of whetherthe fish are processed bytheharvester, and thus becomespart of the value of the quota.This means that quota maythen be transferredon the basis of the processed(not the harvest) value of thefish.Aside from tracking the saleprice of whitefish andchub, the quantitative dataavailable for this researchdo not address the effect ofquota regulation on the marketforthe commercial harvest.Fisheries managers expectedITHQ to have a stabilizingeffecton the overall marketfor Great Lakes fish. Onthe basis of interview data, however,itseems that the LakeHuron market is developingmore clearly distinguishableparts.Respondents reportedmany small, detailed adjustmentsand investigations undertakentodevelop new marketniches and add value totheir limited harvest (e.g.innovativeprocessing and marketingfor the wholesale and retailsale of non-quota speciesto thefast-food market). Inthe meantime, as indicated by Figures5. 1 and 5.3, inthe short142time over which ITHQ effects are studied here,prices for whitefish have varied littlefrom those in the immediately previous period. (Asdiscussed earlier, increases in theprices for chub can be attributed torecovery of market confidence lost owing tocontamination from water pollution and errorsin packaging leading to spoilage.)Certainly the market innovations associatedwith implementation of ITHQ cannot becategorized as “problems;” however, given thatthe Lake Huron commercial fishery wasnot immediately previously an open accessfishery, incentive to maintain quality anddevelop quality-based markets existed, and theseinitiatives could have been developedin the absence of ITHQ.5.2.8 Seasonal patterns of harvestOne of the theoretically predicted beneficial effects ofITHQ is that by assuringeach fisher a share of the harvest, the incentive toharvest large amounts of fish early inthe season would be removed, thereby creating opportunityfor a steady harvest of fishthroughout the season. Questions in area seven of theinterview schedule address thisissue. In the Lake Huron fishery, however,most interview respondents reported littlechange in their customary temporal fishing patterns.Individual predilections aside, theysaid that these patterns are largely determined by: (1) safetyconsiderations in regard toweather conditions; (2) the higher prices available duringcertain religious holidays; (3)avoidance of conflict with sport fishers; and (4)biological considerations relating to fishbehaviour (e.g. fish do not school in June, whenthere is no thermocline). Fisher afterfisher confirmed this. “There are nobig changes, I use the same amount of twine,conditions haven’t really changed. I catch thesame amount,” a North Channel fisherreported. From a Georgian Bay fisher:“I put out the same effort or maybe a bitmore[to meet the quota amount].Sometimes I have a shorter season and Iwould havecontinued if I didn’t have the quota.” And in the southbasin: “I fish to the market,notto a certain volume. My volumesand costs balance, so it is the same.” Similarremarkscan be attributed to a representative BrucePeninsula fisher: “Everything is thesame,143same time, same amount of people [employed] and same amount of fish.” Variousversions of “It really depends on the weather.” was the most ubiquitous comment.Dewees’ (1989) research identified concerns about the increased capitalizationrequired to obtain an adequate quota and to change fishing practices to maximize pricesreceived for fish (in some cases, increased prices were required to compensate for anotherwise uneconomical allocation).According to Lake Huron commercial fishers, ITHQ has not had any impact onthe timing of fishing effort. Seasonal patterns persist. For example, every whitefishfisher interviewed identified the Rosh Hashanah holiday period as a continuing importantmarket target.5.3 Summary and ConclusionThe following summarizes the principal findings of the analysis of the quantitativedata base.(1) Aggregate harvest amounts and harvest/price relationships changed littleeither before or following the implementation of quota regulation.(Harvest amounts did differ from the quota. Harvest amounts have beenless than both the previous, lakewide quota, and the subsequent ITHQallocations.) Therefore, the fact that aggregate harvest levels remainbelow ITHQ levels is not necessarily evidence that ITHQ has effectedlakewide control of the harvest or affected the selling price of whitefish.Analysis of chub harvest is also inconclusive on this point.(2) There have been reductions in the numbers of commercial fishingoperations and in harvest capacity. At the same time, there has been ashift of harvest share from the lower to higher investment categories anda modest growth in the percentage of low investment operations in the144medium and high harvest share categories. These findings may be anindication of more efficient use of harvest capacity.(3) Total investment has declined in a pattern consistent with the reduction inthe number of commercial fishing operations.(4) Employment has declined, possibly indicating that existing employmentand investment are being used more efficiently.Analysis of the qualitative data base identified the following impacts associatedwith ITHQ.(1) Since ITHQ define allowable harvest per fisher by species and amount,incidental catch is no longer legally saleable and this has been a concern.(2) ITHQ has not had any impact on the timing of fishing effort.(3) There are administrative problems in adjusting allocations to reflect stockavailability. This points to a need for revised methods of monitoring andenforcement.(4) Allocations assigned to some of the newly designated quota areas wereinconsistent with traditional fishing patterns.(5) Details of quota transfer are uncertain, and this uncertainty is affectingfishery operations.(6) The need for increased monitoring and the specific quantificationofharvest for specific species can infringe on fishers’ traditional freedomsby creating barriers to: (a) diversification of the variety of speciesharvested; (b) ready variation of fishing effort; and (c) opportunities forgrowth.(7) ITHQ has spurred some development in fishing technology, processingand marketing, including development of retail operations selling cookedfish, icing fish immediately, and experiments with trap netting and sale oflive fish.145Although the quantitative analysis may seem inconclusive, the data do indicatesome important characteristics about the Lake Huron commercial fishery and ITHQimpacts. In particular, ITHQ’s most important effects seem to have been on theorganization of labour and capital in the fishery. Harvest amounts, species and priceshave remained relatively stable.Overharvest was not a lakewide problem either before or after ITHQ. Althoughmarket conditions were not specifically studied in this research, the market for anyparticular species or fish product is understood to be one of the many contextual factors(e.g. weather, religious holidays, competition from other user groups, etc.) thatdetermine the environment within which the commercial fisher must operate.Qualitative interview data, however, suggest several conclusive findings withrespect to the process of ITHQ development and implementation and its effectiveness.Most importantly, weakness associated with a lack of: (1) recognized, adequate stockassessments to support allocation adjustments; (2) early and continuing consultation thatis fair and effective in influencing decision making and recognizes the benefits of preexisting and potential co-management efforts; and (3) efforts to anticipate and amelioratesocial impacts that resource users find undesirable. The accumulation of problems indevelopment and implementation of ITHQ ultimately contributes to an atmosphere inwhich the policy’s effectiveness and level of acceptance is compromised.1466.0 ITHQ IMPACTS ANDMODELS OF PUBLIC POLICYApplication of ITHQ in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery revealed a range ofimpacts. These impacts canbe classified as follows: (1) predicted impacts, asanticipated and explained bythe introduction of ITHQ; and (2) unpredicted impacts.This analysis utilizes these two impactcategories to link research observations withrelevant theoretical constructsfrom the bioeconomic and co-management modelsofresource management and the rational,incremental and interest group models of publicpolicy.6.1 Predicted ImpactsTable 6. 1 lists the predicted outcomesand theorized explanations that follow fromthe bioeconomic model.Prediction under ITHQ of more even temporaldistribution of fishing effort isbased on the reasoning thatwith an assured share of the catch, fisherswill not need torace to secure a share of an overallharvest. Because fishing would be spreadover thefull length of the season, marketsaturation (and the concomitant priceresponse) at seasoninception would be avoided. ITHQshould also reduce the incentive toaccumulate theexcess capacity related purely tocompetitive pressure. The principalmotivation for thistype of change would beeconomic efficiency; the same harvestcould be taken by asmaller boat, with less gearand fewer crew if the effort could bespread over a longertime. Similarly, avoidanceof market saturation would be expected tosecure more stableunit prices for the harvest.One assumption underlying the useof ITHQ to reduce fishing capacityis that theearlier excess capacity isrelated primarily to the need to competefor harvest anditoany economies of scale that mayderive from increased investment.Under this147TABLE 6.1:PREDICTED IMPACTSDESCRIPTION EXPLANATIONmore even temporal distribution • assured share ofharvest eliminatesof fishing effort possibly reducing need for intensive harvesting at thefluctuations in supply and thus beginning of the seasonpermitting more stable prices• no market saturation2. control of amount of harvest of quota • quota allocation specifies and limitsspecies legalharvest of quota species3. rationalization of industry• operations will leave the fishery becausethey cannot produce adequate revenue tocover debt and operating costsaremaining operations will buy additionalquota up to the limit of their capabilities148assumption, the logical response of the individual or operation to ITHQ is to reducecapacity and consume more time in the accumulation of harvest.The Lake Huron data indicate that pre-existing seasonal harvest patterns have notchanged with the implementation of ITHQ. Religious holidays and weather werereported to be the most important determinants in the timing of harvest activities.Religious holidays precipitate the year’s best prices for whitefish, and so fishers targettheir efforts to this time period. In most parts of Lake Huron, winter weather is toosevere to permit commercial harvest activities. In some areas of the lake, the lack of athermocline (usually in June) discourages schooling and so commercial harvest activitiesare suspended during this period. In both of these circumstances, exogenous variables(i.e. cultural factors and weather) affect the behaviour of fishers in a manner beyond thescope of the causal relationships defined in rationality-based models (i.e. bioeconomicmodel).Examination of the price data on an annual basis evidenced substantial stability(see section 5. 1.1). However, it is likely that this level of aggregation masks seasonalvariability due to cultural and natural environmental factors.ITHQ limits the harvest of designated species. It is illegal to sell extra-quotaharvest. In this way, ITHQ is thought to remove any economic benefit from harvestovercapacity accumulated solely to facilitate rapid harvest early in the season. Theevidence does not suggest ITHQ has controlled overall harvest. In achieving the goal ofcontrolling harvest, much depends on the precision with which quotas are set and theconfidence that fishers have in the reliability of scientific evidence that supportsquotaallocation. Quantitative evidence on harvest amounts shows that, for the two principalcommercial species, lakewide harvest amounts are less than the allocated amountsandhave changed little from those prior to implementation of ITHQ.149Rationalization of overall fleet capacity to a level consistent with the MEYequilibrium position is an expected outcome of ITHQ.5’ The relationships modeled inthe bioeconomic model suggest that, given stable prices, operations with more substantialvessels and gear than necessary to harvest their allocation should begin to adjust theirindividual cost functions to the new equilibrium positions dictated by their assignedallocation and unit price received.Reducing overcapacity means reduction of cost per unit of fishing effort. Theunderlying assumption is that the costs involved in commercial fishing can be readilyadjusted in small increments. Although this may be true for some aspects (e.g. it maybe possible to purchase or lease relatively small amounts of quota), in general, costadjustments must be made in substantial increments (e.g. one less vessel, crew member,etc.). Analysis of investment in vessels and gear shows that a larger number of smalloperations left the fishery with the continued application of ITHQ. Berkes and Pocock’s(1990) found a similar response in the Lakes Ontario and Erie fisheries. ITHQ, bycreating exclusive property rights in the fishery, seems to encourage fishers to tendtowards the MEY point (i.e. where marginal revenues equal marginal costs). As longas economic rent persists in the fishery, some excess capacity is consistent with thisequilibrium position.52 This is particularly true among the larger operations.51MEY represents the point of maximum profit. Thus, assuming that the lakewideallocation functions to prevent the level of exploitation of the fishery moving towards BE,where rent is dissipated, the theoretical equilibrium position should tend to MEY.52Monopolistically competitive industries tend to be overcrowded with firms,eachof which is underutilized (McConnell and Pope 1987). The assumption in this thesisisthat the fishery is more representative of a monopolistic competitive situationthan oneof pure competition.1506.2 Alternative Explaination of ImpactsThere may be other explanations for some of the impacts cited in Table 6.2.Policy derived from assumptions and hypotheses on which ITHQ is based requiresgood information, rational behaviour, mobility of resources and the capacity to makemarginal adjustments in resource inputs. The evidence presented in the Lake Huronfishery suggests that these preconditions are not always met. The fact that ITHQ issuperimposed on a range of preexisting regulatory and social conditions argues for acloser examination and better understanding of the context in which ITHQ was developedand implemented.The narrow focus of the incremental policy process does not take illegal harvestinto account. An alternative explanation for harvest not meeting allocation is that stocksof some species may have remained stable in some years, thus not providing easyopportunity for larger harvests. This factor would be largely determined byenvironmental and ecological forces. ITHQ policy’s focus on the remediation ofoverharvest and overcapacity does not readily accommodate opportunities to maximizethe benefit from a stock boom.A number of the impacts associated with the development and implementation ofITHQ can be explained by looking at the policy process. Based on the discussionpresented in chapter three, it is evident that there were serious information gaps,particularly in reference to stock assessment. In the absence of new information, thepolicy process relied on “old” information, the fishers’ past performance. Reliance onprevious experience is a feature of an incremental policy-makingprocess. It is alsoevident that social and environmental factors play a significantrole in determining theprice received. Marketing error, pollution problems and the actions of amiddleman, forexample, were particularly important to the chub market. These featuresare related toexogenous social and environmental factors, including self-regulation.1516.2:UNPREDICTED IMPACTSDESCRWTIONEXPLANATIONharvest is less than allocation• poor stocks• poor markets• area restrictions• non—reporting of harvest• uneconomic allocations held,but not utilized2. harvest of quota species increases• improved stocksover previous levels• improved markets• species specialization• previous non—reporting3. non—economic operationsremain • unrecorded valueis added to legal harvest• anticipate better prices for vessel & gear• anticipate increase in allocation• general uncertainty• obtain adequate income from lease• traditional occupation• continuing part time• temporary poor health preventsgreaterharvest• supplementary alternative employment4. seemingly economically viableoperations • area conflict withsport fishersdrop out of the fishing• emotional impacts of loss of decision—making power5. additional gear regulation• sport fishers’ lobbying6. increased administrativetasks • data requirementsfor ITHQadministration• data requirements for politicaldefense ofITHQ allocations7. formerly viable operationsreceive • exceptionallypoor harvest in years usednon—sustaining allocationsto derive allocation• previous non—reporting8. persistenceof seasonal harvest patterns• off—season (winter) harvest conditionscan be dangerous• fish do not school when there is nothermocline (summer)• religious holiday creates seasonalmarket• early season harvest captures betterprices, non—quota species can beharvested later• avoidance of conflict with seasonal sportfishers• assured, limited, abbreviated,earlyharvest allows shorter “year” andadditional non—fishing occupations• preference for traditional harvestpattern152An ITHQ-based policy assumes that allocations can be set mechanically andfairly. Initially, individual quota allocations were influenced by: (1) past performance;and (2) incomplete assessment information. Negotiated adjustment came into play later.Use of past performance and other assessment information is consistent with anincremental policy-making process, in whichpolicy changes little from that previous.Negotiated adjustment, such as through thetemporary Lake Huron Quota ReviewCommittee, was a component of the ministry’s efforts to manage interest grouppressures. In this case, accommodation of sport fishers’ urgent requests for limits on thecommercial industry (as detailed in section 4.3.4), and commercial fishers’ appeals foreconomically viable allocations were negotiated.Annual harvests of the two principal commercial species in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery are and have been less than the allocated amounts. Given theperception of overcapacity in this fishery, and the assumption that maximum harvestwould improve the profitability and efficiency of any operation, the expectation wouldbe that full allocations would be harvested. The qualitative analysis provided a numberof reasons why the harvest might be less than the allocation. Poor stocks (i.e.fewerfish) limit fishers likelihood of successful harvests. Poor markets remove the incentiveto fish, as harvest activities are uneconomical if markets are poor.In some instances,changes in areal distribution of allocations restricted fishers from their traditional harvestareas, and they did not want to fish in the new area, so they did not fish as heavily asusual, or were less successful. If harvest was not reported, it would not becounted inevaluating harvest activities. In some instances, fishers felt that their allocationsweretoo small to support harvest activities, but at the same time,they did not want to sell orlease them.For some fishers, harvest of quota specieshas increased over previous levels(while remaining under the aggregate quota allocation), even though atheoretical goalof ITHQ is to limit harvest. On occasion, allocations have been increasedtemporarilyin response to stock booms. Fishers’ decisions to specialize in a singlespecies could also153conthbute to an increase in the harvest of that species. Finally, if harvests werepreviously under-reported, complete reportingwould increase the harvest totals of thosespecies.There are still some operations remaining in the fishery which seem to beoperating in an uneconomic manner (for example,those operations categorized as havinghigh investments, but remaining in the lower harvest categories). This outcome is notexpected with ITHQ because interpretation of the relationships representedin thebioeconomic model suggests that such operations would either ceaseoperations orpurchase more quota, in order to move to a more economically efficientposition. It ispossible that some operations that seem uneconomical on the basis of harvest totals alone,are actually earning revenue from the addition of unrecorded value totheir harvest.Further, given the number of operationsleaving the fishery and the management historyof the fishery, anticipation of improved selling prices for vessels and gear (andneed formore quota) or an increase in allocation may contribute to some fishers’ reluctance tomove quickly out of the fishery. General uncertainty as to what the governmentmightdo is another explanation. In some cases, fishers maybe content to receive income fromlease of their allocation. There are also a numberof factors relating to employment, thatmay explain why these operations persist: wanting to maintainan attachment to atraditional occupation, continuing fishing as a part time occupation,temporary poorhealth preventing full time fishing and temporary alternative employment.In contrast, there are also instancesof reportedly53 economically viableoperations selling out and leaving the fishery. This would not be an expected outcomeof ITHQ, as there seems no economic reason for these operations to leave thefishery.However, causal relationships underlying the bioeconomic model address aggregate,rather than individual behaviour. Some interview respondents in this situation reportedJudged to be economically viable by the operation owners.154that area conflicts with sport fishers and the loss of decision-makingpower in theirbusiness were so discouraging that they no longerwanted to continue fishing.The ITHQ literature identifies less regulation of fisheries as one of the benefitsof utilizing direct, rather than indirect methods of regulation. The continued impositionof additional gear regulations in the Lake Huron commercial fishery, therefore, wouldnot be expected to accompany implementation of ITHQ. The imposition of thisregulation is a result of interest group lobbying efforts on the part of sport fishers.Expectations of less administration by government is one of the advantages ofITHQ that receives much attention in the literature. In practice, however, the stockassessment and harvest data necessary to maintain a responsive ITHQ system doesrequire extensive administration. For example, in some jurisdictions harvests arereported on a daily basis, instead of monthly, as formerly. It is also necessary to haveup-to-date assessment information in order to adjust overall quotas54 and to explainmanagement actions to the two major interest groups involved. Incidental catch was ahistorical issue in the Lake Huron fishery, but the implementation of ITHQ complicateddealing with it, due in part to pressure from sport fishers.Some operations received allocations too small to support viable operations.Given the use of past performance in formulation of allocations, this would not be ananticipated outcome of ITHQ. Possible explanations include exceptionally poor harvestsITHQ can be more effective if allocations can be readily adjusted. Easeofadjustment can go some distance toward ameliorating problems caused byimperfectinformation on fish stocks. Management interventions derivedfrom interpretation of a“rationally” based resource management model that depends on an extensiveinformationbase in order to accurately represent a particularresource use system, can encounterproblems in application in rapidly changing or uncertain environments.155in the years used to calculate past performance and possible previous non-reporting ofharvest.Although designation of exclusive property rights to an assured share of thefishery, as represented by ITHQ would be expected to reduce the need for early seasoncompetition for the harvest. As noted in section 5.2.8, seasonal harvest patterns persistin the Lake Huron commercial fishery. In reality, there are a number of other social andenvironmental factors that have an overriding influence on the timing of fishing activitiesin the Lalce Huron commercial fishery. Harsh weather conditions restrict winter harvestactivities, and fish availability is reduced during parts of the summer. Occurrence ofreligious holidays that create an increased demand for whitefish determine the season ofgreatest demand for this species. Some fishers curtail their activities in the summermonths, simply in order to avoid conflict with sport fishers. Some fishers, knowing inadvance the limits of their harvest, will fish hard and early and take an additional job forthe rest of the year, to increase or sustain income. Finally, some fishers just prefer tocontinue operations as they have always done.6.3 Summary and ConclusionImplementation of ITHQ depended on inadequate assessment and pastperformance information, and managers’ narrow focus on harvest allocationscharacterized the incremental aspects of the policy process that resulted in ITHQ. Thisnarrowness was detrimental because managers then failed to recognize and incorporatepersistent features of established resource use patterns that would reinforce ITHQobjectives and foster its acceptance and support in the industry (e.g. mobility withintraditional fishing areas, adherence to seasonal patterns; rapid response to changes in fishstocks, etc.). In addition, the political activities of special interest groups also affectedthe acceptance of ITHQ. For example, imposition of additional gear regulations resultingfrom sport fishers’ lobbying efforts was contrary to the lessened gear regulation156commercial fishers expected with ITHQ implementation. This contributed to anundermining of the policy’s support base in the commercial fishing industry.As the analytical focus narrows, and behaviours become more determined byidiosyncratic factors, the applicability of theoretical models can be expected to decline.A primary basis for modelling in the economic literature is the general assumption ofeconomically rational behaviour. Although understanding of the responses to marketcontrolled variables is enhanced by economic analysis, this study reveals that economicrationality is constrained by environmental, social and individual factors. Theseconstraints are most visible in the development and implementation of the policies likeITHQ, that contribute to the context within which the market must function. The comanagement model represents a system of relationships incorporating many of the socialand environmental forces that can frustrate ITHQ effectiveness. It provides a strongcontribution to our understanding of the basis for explaining the community of resourceusers because the relationships it incorporates overtly address decision-making processesrelated to the adaptation of new ideas, distribution of resource rights and benefits,arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extent of change. Owing tothe relatively short time period of this research, caution should betaken in generalizingfindings to other situations.1577.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONSFisheries management has significant impacts on important aspects of social,cultural and family life as well as on the economic and biological aspects of the fishery,but the fisheries management regime in the Lake Huron commercial fishery has beenoriented toward achieving predominantly biological and economic objectives. Becausethe ITHQ approach to resource management does not accommodate (or accommodatespoorly or inequitably), many important social, political and cultural considerations thatimpact the fishery, instruments such as ITHQ are unlikely to work entirely astheoretically anticipated. These factors contribute to a complex and volatile decision-making environment in which interest group activity, incremental decision-making, andattempts to follow “rational” decision processes, all play important roles in forgingadaptations of ITHQ and other policies.This thesis discussed an array of impacts associated with the implementation ofITHQ, and the social, environmental and economic factors that may influence theseimpacts. The broad range and sometimes contradictory nature of these impacts, and thepossible explanations for them, suggest assumptions of ITHQ are narrow and unrealistic.We need to recognize these limitations and build flexibility into policy development andimplementation processes to accommodate anticipated and unforseen impacts.The co-management model of resource use describes a set of relationships in theresource use community that can reinforce ITHQ regulation, and internalize substantialenforcement, administrative and assessment costs. Evidence for this conclusion is foundin existing practices such as the on-board assessment program, experiments with dailyreporting of harvest, and discussions in the joint OMNR-OFPA Lake Huron LiaisonCommittee. Effective self-management is also seen to be a feature of establishedresource use systems, such as exist in the Lake Huron commercial fishery. Managerscan best avail themselves of the advantages of these systems through effective158consultation and inclusion of co-management in policy development and implementation.Co-management theorists suggest an approach that builds on the strength, energyand interests inherent in the social, political andcultural context. Because it iscooperative and participatory, a greater use of the co-management approach has helpedresolve some of the “problems” affecting ITHQ implementation in Lake Huron. In theirstruggle to make ITHQ work effectively, Lake Huron fisheries managers have initiateda number of changes, includingrecasting of management decision-making processes, tomore closely resemble a “weak” co-management process (e.g. more participatorydecision making, self-regulation, consideration ofindividual needs and contributions,etc.). Without these changes (and the potential for more comprehensive co-managementembodied in them), the social, political and cultural issues exacerbated by thedevelopment and implementation of ITHQ might have been so severe as to delay orprevent effective ITHQ implementation.It has been apparent for some time that biological interventions alone (e.g.conservation-oriented measures to protect spawning) are an inadequate managementtactic, and that effective fisheries management practices must encompass economicandsocietal as well as biological aspects of management. In working to maintain ahealthyfishery, managers are seeking regulatory solutions whichtake account of sociallyembedded contributing factors, not biological ones alone.Early experience with fisheries management led managers to focus on issues ofconservation and protection of reproduction. This, in turn, led to promulgationof“indirect” regulations which employed areal and seasonal limits to protect thefishery.The effect of these regulations was to limit the efficiency of harvesting operations.Inresponse, fishers made efforts to increase their short-term harvestingcapacity, forexample, through use of larger, faster vessels with increasedholding capacity, improvedgear, high technology fish finding equipment, etc.159This experience led to an expansion of this body ofregulation to include limitson additional aspects of fishing effort, such asvessels, gear, size of fish, etc. (Whiflansand Berkes 1986). These regulations wereintended to control harvest by limitingefficiency. In response, fishersagain devised ways to circumvent this type of regulation.Thus developed a situation of point-counterpoint,as managers and fishers matched witsin continuing rounds of regulation/response.7.1 Research Objectives and ITHQ ObjectivesDerived from interpretation of the biologicaland economic relationshipsrepresented in the bioeconomic model of resource use,ITHQ can be characterized as a“rationally-based” strategy for dealing with fisheriesmanagement problems. Asformulated in application to theLake Huron commercial fishery, the strategy of ITHQwas to discourage overcapacityand limit harvest to sustainable levels and increaseefficiency by allocating an individual share of theharvest to each commercial fishingoperation. Heavy reliance was placed onOMNR district offices for policyimplementation and enforcement. Fisheries problemswere viewed as a product ofovercapacity, and it was reasoned that only a coercivestrategy would prevent overfishingand overinvestment (i.e. a reduced “economic rent”). Yetthis strategy (in Lake Huronand elsewhere) has produced many unintended consequences,and has not succeeded inmeeting fully its management goals.The objectives of this study were:(1) to identify and understand the impacts ofITHQ itself;(2) to detail the linkages between theseimpacts and the application of fisheriesmanagement interventions derived from thebioeconomic model (which isthe theoretical origin of ITHQ); and(3) to further our understandingof the process of ITHQ developmentandimplementation and the impacts of this process of developmentand160implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives in the co-managementtheory of resource management and in three policy process models.ITHQ is a “direct” method of limiting harvesteffort. Total harvest would belimited by assigning a share of the harvest to individualoperations, with the expectationthat this would encourage efficiency inthe industry (i.e. through some operations leavingthe fishery and therefore more efficient use of theremaining capacity).7.2 Principle Findings of Quantitative and QualitativeAnalysisThe results of this preliminary evaluationof ITHQ impacts in the Lake Huroncommercial fishery suggest that whileITHQ effectiveness in limiting overall harvest isuncertain, there is a trend towards a reductionof capacity in the fishery. Thequantitative data indicate that ITHQ’s majoreconomic effects have been on theorganization of labour and capital in the fishery.Commercial fishing activities will notlikely generate major instabilities; it is the ecologicalphenomena that most affect harvestamounts, species and values. Other policy impacts,however, are complex and difficultto identify and analyze.Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the socialimpacts from changes in the structure of the industryare intricate; and some aspects ofpolicy implementation may be too inflexible.One of the advantages cited in the ITHQ literature isthat the regulatory regimewould be simplified, as many of the previous“indirect” regulatory controls would nolonger be necessary. In fact, changes to the relevantregulations often involved merelyrepositioning some formerly regulatory restrictions as“conditions of licence.” Therehave also been additional area and gear restrictionssince ITHQ implementation.1617.3 Principle Findings of Policy Process Analysis of ITHQ Development andImplementationPolicy process models are relevant to analysis of the consequences of ITHQ inthat they help explain not only the decision to adopt ITHQ, but, more importantly, whyimplementation of ITHQ occurred as it did, and thus, how “deficiencies” inimplementation have affected the fishery. By drawing on an array of conceptual policyprocess models, it is possible to analyze the decision making and impacts associated withthe development and implementation of ITHQ. In so far as the policy process modelsexamined in this thesis help to explain how ITHQ came to be developed and implementedin the way that it was, the analysis provides an explanatory link between the theoreticalexpectations of ITHQ and the observed consequences of its application, as illustrated inthis case study.ITHQ reflect some of the operative assumptions of rationality as represented inAllison’s (1971) classical rational actor model. Various weaknesses of the rationalmodel’s assumptions also apply to ITHQ and the bioeconomic model from which it isderived.55 Assumptions regarding the calculation of costs and benefits, for example,are limited and unrealistic. A failure to distinguish between “open access” and“communal” systems, and the assumption of open access underlying the bioeconomicmodel, weakens application of ITHQ to the Lake Huron commercial fishery. The LakeHuron fishery, before and after the introduction of ITHQ, had restricted entry, and thusOstrom’s (1990) comments on the use of specific models (i.e. tragedy of thecommons, the prisoner’s dilemma, logic of collective action) also apply to ITHQ and thebioeconomic model:What makes these models so interesting and so powerful is that theycapture important aspects of many different problems that occur in diversesettings in all parts of the world. What makes these models so dangerous-- when they are used metaphorically as the foundation for policy -- is thatthe constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis aretaken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless externalauthorities change them.162was not the sort of commons (i.e. open access) system envisaged by Hardin (1968) andassumed by the bioeconomic model. It was therefore less susceptible to over-fishing thana genuinely “open access” system. In addition, the basicassumption of the policy makeras a rational decision maker also overlooks thesubstantial influence of community socialcontext and interest group politics (discussed in detail in section 2.5).TTHQ was applied to the Lake Huron despite the recognized absence ofover-exploitation and market saturation problems sometimesassociated with seasonal harvestpatterns.56 A resource management policy based on economiccriteria was latermodified in response to social criteria. If these modifications hadnot occurred, thepolicy would not have been workable.Interest group activity was, in fact, an important determinant intheimplementation of ITHQ, significantly influencing its timing and the spatial distributionof the allocation of commercial fishing quotas and buy-outs. Initial policy developmentwas undertaken in cooperation with commercial fishery representatives, and therehavebeen continuing efforts to work with this interestgroup in refinement and modificationsof ITHQ.Sport fishers also influenced aspects of commercial fishery regulation,particularlyin terms of area closures, buy-outs and gear restrictions. In some areas popularwithsport fishers, difficulties in providing adequate allocations to commercial fisherswithina reasonable distance of traditional fishinggrounds can be attributed to a specific conflictbetween the two groups, rather than to implications of ITHQ in general. To somedegreethe geographical distribution, species and quantity of ITHQ allocations are the resultofpolitical compromises among sport fishers, commercial fishersand fishery managers.56As detailed in section 4.3.2, the decision to adopt ITHQin Lake Huron (whereover-fishing was not a pressing problem), was taken in the interestsof policy consistency(i.e. ITHQ was in place in other Great Lakes’ commercial fisheries)and in response tointensive pressure from the sport fish lobby.163The incremental nature of the policy process has also been an important influenceon ITHQ impacts. The constraints introduced by the dependence on previous practiceand the narrow focus on allocation amounts adversely affected acceptance and supportof ITHQ and contributed to ITHQ implementation becoming associated with preexistingcontentious issues. Problems with incidental catch and spatial separation of sport andcommercial fishing activities were two such issues that complicated ITHQimplementation.7.4 Principle Conclusions from Co-management Theory AnalysisThe co-management model of resource use describes a cooperative decision-making process based on collective (but exclusive of those not belonging to thecollectivity) property rights. The operative assumptions of the co-management modeldiffer from those of the bioeconomic model principally in the latter’s assumption thatcompetition for a common resource will be destructive (as exemplified in the “tragedyof the commons”). Co-management theorists submit managers’ acknowledgement andutilization of strengths in community relationships can avoid or address some of thedifficult problems typically encountered in development and implementation oftheoretically feasible solutions to fisheries management problems, such as ITHQ. Theco-management model suggests that incorporation of resource users’ collective strengthsand organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed andimplemented cooperatively with resource users would lead to more efficient, effectiveand sustainable management regimes.Transaction costs, for example, may be significantly reduced in a co-managedfishery where specified community characteristics exist (as detailed in section 2.4.2).These characteristics create a situation of “mutual vulnerability” in which informationisshared, and resource users were readily mobilized to make decisions and rulesandprovide a measure of control over potential free-riders (Singleton and Taylor1992).These same conditions could also contribute to reduction in monitoring and enforcement164costs by utilizing community interdependencies todevelop informal arrangements withrespect to distribution of resource rights among resourceusers. As several authors pointout, exclusive governmentmanagement weakens the linkage between the consequencesof management decisions and those who depend moston the resource (Anderson and Hill1988; Anderson 1987; Crutchfield 1979; Grima andBerkes 1989). By weakening thislinkage, unnecessarily exclusive government interventionmay contribute to simplyshifting dissipation of resource rentfrom fishers’ operations to the administrative arena.The literature review in section 2.4.3 abstracted a number of featurescomanagement theorists find to be typical or desirable to co-managedresource regimes.Although co-management was not identified as amanagement goal for the Lake Huroncommercial fishery, managers and fishers turned tosome of the methods of comanagement in order to try to solve problems encounteredin implementation of ITHQ.The following identifies the extent to whichfeatures typical of co-management arepresent in management of the Lalce Huron commercialfishery.(1) Reliance on cooperative (rather thancompetitive) approaches (Peters1988). There is strong cooperation among kinship groupswho share inharvesting and processing operations, particularlyin the Georgian Bay andNorth Channel areas. Some additional, socially-oriented aspects oftheindustry, such as the chub market price-buffering57,also exist.These‘Specific to the chub fishery, interview data suggest an informal processof self-management. The chub market is relatively small andhighly specialized. Almost all thechub harvest in the Lake Huronfishery is processed by a single operation. Themanagement of this operation is committed to maintenanceof a viable chub fishery in thelake. This operation buffers fishers from local price fluctuations bypurchasing fish ata set price which is sometimeshigher than current market prices, then holding the fishuntil the market recovers and they can be profitablysold. This provides fisherswithassurance that they can sell their harvest andmaintain cash flow. The processor alsobenefits by ensuring a steady supply of product and being able to “playthe market.”This manipulation of the timing of purchase and salesoccurs within the context of the(continued...)165are examples of cooperative behaviour and not strictly co-management, asaccommodations are made only between the fishers and processors, andthere was little additional reported reciprocity among the fishers, norinvolvement of managers. As noted in the following point (2), fishers dolook to managers to provide a protective framework in the form ofrestricting access (i.e. limiting the number of commercial fishinglicenses), and enforcing compliance with ITHQ allocations (i.e. enforcingharvest limits). In areas of the fishery where competitive behaviours aremost evident, ITHQ has reinforced this mindset, by providing anadditional way to quantify this competition. Fishers strive to assemblequota allocation or to circumvent some of the constraints imposed byITHQ through changes in handling, processing and sale of non-quotaspecies.(2) Political independence (McKean 1992) and definition of property rightssuch as to limit access (Grima and Berkes 1989). The Lake Huroncommercial fishers look increasingly to managers to protect the autonomyof the agreed-upon rules and regulations (e.g. pertaining to harvestamounts and areas) and to reinforce access-limiting provisions, in orderto protect indigenous, cooperative arrangements where they exist. Inmodern times, the Lake Huron fishery has always been one of limitedaccess (as discussed in section 4.2), an important criterion of comanagement. In addition, resource users’ reactions to managers’ mistakesin their handling of ITHQ implementation have forced managers toacknowledge the need for an institutional infrastructure that is moreconducive to co-management. Management problems associated directly57( .. continued)existing regulatory regime, but is not due, as predicted, to behaviour changes onthe partof fishers.166and indirectly with ITHQ implementation contributed to a resource users’backlash, and demands for closer involvement in decisions which affectthem.(3) Resource-users’ input to the regulatory process (Buck 1989) and shareddecision making (Pinkerton 1989b; Ostrom 1977; Ostrom and Ostrom1977). Lake Huron fishery resource users have certainly providedcomment, information and opinions to elected representatives and fisherymanagers (e.g. letters, court actions, participation on the Committee onModernizing Ontario’s Commercial Fishery, appearancesbefore the LakeHuron Quota Review Committee, communications through theCommercial Fisheries Liaison Officer). The furor accompanying ITHQimplementation served to define more precisely the need for user input tothe regulatory process, and managers’ increased awareness of this needhas contributed to redefining the mandateor terms of reference for anyexisting co-management-oriented infrastructure (e.g. Lake HuronManagement Committee). Since ITHQ implementation, OMNR’splansand expectations indicate that commercial fishers may have moreeffectiveinput, earlier in the decision-making process.Fishers’ participation inshared decision making over the study period could be a first step toward“full” co-management. Although managers have always maintainedcontrol of how management problems are framed, which issuesareavailable for discussion, as well as of the timing (i.e. frequencyandduration) and intensity (e.g. degree of power sharing,range ofrepresentation of persons involved), the severity of the anticipatedandunanticipated impacts on commercial fishersprovided the fishers with agreat degree of leverage. The process of dealing with ITHQimpacts hashelped to create a permanent change in the relationshipamong managers,among the fishers and between the two groups, and hasresulted in167creation of an institutional infrastructure moreconducive to furtherdevelopment of fisheries co-management.As described in section 4.3.4, lobbying and negotiation withregulatory bodies and resource managers can be a form of co-management(Acheson 1989). Lobbying and negotiation have been an influence onresource management policy and regulation in the Lake Huron commercialfishery. The most evident impacts on resource management attributableto lobbying and negotiation are the result of sport fishers’ efforts in thepolitical sphere. For the reasons detailed in section 4.3.4, commercialfishers have been much less successful in their lobbying efforts.(4) Joint performance of management functions58 (Pinkerton 1989b).Pinkerton (1989b) has proposed that joint performance by resourceusersand managers of a number of management functions can be assessed as ameasure of co-management. McKean (1992) identified users’ involvementin setting, monitoring and enforcing rules governing resource use as acriterion for successful management of a commons resource. There isevidence of joint performance of selected management functionsin theLake Huron commercial fishery. Fishers have long been involved ingathering essential data (this could be construed as a passive role in setting58Pinkerton (1989b) defines these management functions as:(1) data gathering and analysis .. .;(2) logisticalharvesting decisions, such as licensing, . . . timing, .location, . . . and vessel or gear restrictions . . . ;(3)harvest allocation decisions . . . ;(4)protection fromhabitat or water quality damage by other waterresourceusers .. .;(5) enforcement of regulations or practicesguiding harvesting logistics . . . ;(6) enhancement andlong-term planning . .. ;and (7) broad policy decisionmaking.168harvest limits) (see section 4.3.3), but have not participated proactively inanalysis or interpretation. Recently, there has been involvement ofcommercial fishers in enforcement and monitoring (e.g. in the form ofdaily reporting), and to some extent previously, in broad policy decisionmaking (e.g. Committee on Modernizing the Commercial Fishery inOntario). Sport fishers have been involved in habitat management andhave influenced important management decisions through successfullobbying.There exist only the beginnings of what could be effective comanagement with commercial fishers in the functions that managerstraditionally hold most closely: logistical harvesting decision making;long-term planning; and harvest allocation decisions.59 While themanagement practice to date of informing resource users of managementdecisions and the rationale behind them, could be construed as informationsharing, these after-the-fact communications are not truly consultative anddo not qualify as co-management.Cooperation between the government and others and amongscientists of different institutions and agencies and between scientists,fishers and managers in the form of shared decision making andresponsibilities in managing the resource (McCay 1989). Suchcooperation between managers and commercial fishers is evident in theLake Huron commercial fishery. The establishment of the Lake HuronManagement Committee, with the deliberate inclusion of commercialfishing industry representatives and ministry staff with both scientific,The one-time Quota Review Committee, was formed in reaction to problemsencountered in ITHQ implementation that could not be resolved throughexistingmanagement systems. Because the Committee’s decision-making process andrecordswere confidential, it cannot be seen as a shared management initiative.169management and enforcement responsibilities was an initial attempt, notnecessarily to share decision making, but at least to bring a range of viewsforward for discussion. The act of establishing the committee and settinga consistent membership and meeting schedule, however, does provide thepotential for development of more cooperative fishery management efforts.The role of fisheries managers in protecting the fishery from additionalentrants (i.e. not issuing any more licenses), and in monitoring andenforcing ITHQ allocations is analogous to the “specialist” role advocatedby Ostrom (1992).(5) Varying systems of distribution60 of rights andshares of the resource(McKean 1992). With the possible exception of adjustments made as aresult of recommendations of the Lake Huron Quota Review Committee,ITHQ (i.e. entitlement to a share in the annual production of the resource)in the Lake Huron commercial fishery was initiated and implementedaccording to a neutral distribution rule, based solely on past performance(i.e. amount of harvest over a set time period). This allocation signifieda balance between costs and benefits to resource users, inthat those whobenefited also bore more of the costs of maintaining larger vessels, moregear and additional labour and operating costs. This arrangement isconsistent with McKean’s (1992) description of features of successfulsystems of common property management.With respect to eligibility for a share and participation in decisionmalcing in managing the commercial fishery, there is no formal hierarchyof rights (e.g. with senior or full rights reserved for one categoryof fisherand partial or half-rights being awarded to others). In practice,however,some fishers do assume aspects of nascent “seniority” by virtueof wealth,60The bioeconomic model does not address distributional/rights problemssuch asquota allocation.170large ITHQ allocations, age, experience, familiarity with bureaucraticsystems and/or their status as major processorsin their area. Participationin decision making thus does become hierarchial -- another featureidentified as typical of successful common property management.Rights to capital stock in the fishery, as represented by proceedsof a transaction which removes a share from the common stock, accruedirectly to the fisher involved. The “buy-out” process, in which thegovernment retires ITHQ allocations, endangers the continuance of thecommercial fishery in Lake Huron by permanently “removing” harvestshares for commercial species from the common pooi. The “buy-out”process is thus antagonistic to co-management in the commercial fishery.Although the management regime in the Lake Huron commercial fishery wasnotfully co-managed over the study period, it exhibits some aspectsof co-management. Itcannot be characterized as comprehensive co-management. Some co-managementdecision-malcing processes (e.g. negotiation, lobbying, data collection) andassumptions(e.g. limited access) are operativein the fishery, but the existing institutionalinfrastructure does not fully incorporate thesecharacteristics into a coherent comanagement system. Given the need for management ofthe social and cultural impactsof ITHQ, it is likely that co-management processeswill become more important in themanagement of the Lake Huron commercial fishery.7.5 Relation to Current ResearchMany leading commons researchers have focused on questionspertaining to thesuccessful management of common resources (e.g.McKean 1992; Ostrom 1992;Singleton and Taylor 1992). In surveying a range ofcommons systems throughout theworld, these researchers have identified overlapping sets of criteria, features,attributesand processes by which to define and analyze commonproperty management. These171include: (1) features typical to successful systems of common property management; (2)models suitable for analysis of commons management systems; and (3) necessaryattributes of “community (i.e. shared beliefs, stable membership, long-term interaction,direct and complex relations). The management system features cited by McKean (1992)as typical of such regimes are similar to those identified by Singleton and Taylor (1992):autonomy in decision making, limited/consistent membership and frequent andmeaningful opportunities for interaction. McKean (1992) also identifies minimization oftransaction costs as an important result of successful systems of common propertymanagement. The research presented here on the Lake Huron commercial fishery is toa large extent consistent with these findings. The community of Lake Huron commercialfishers, for example, has a relatively homogenous set of beliefs with respect to thecommercial fishery, stable membership, with some kinship groups resident from the turnof the century, and these have many (but not exclusively) direct relations amongthemselves with respect to management of the fishery. In this the fishers’ socialorganization approximates the definition of community that commons research suggests,and, to the extent that this is so, may be well situated to benefit more greatly from thelower transaction costs in solving management problems. Should the management regimein the Lake Huron commercial fishery move toward more fully realized co-management,decision makers may well take guidance from the several case studies of successfulcommons management.With respect to methodological approaches, Ostrom (1990) argues that “one[model] cannot encompass (at least with current methods) th[e] degree of complexity”that must be addressed “when individuals in field settings attempt to fashion rules toimprove their individual and joint outcomes.” She views models in general as“highlyparticularized” and not as “universal theories.” She also identifies scholars’ presumptionof positions of “omniscient observers able to comprehend the essentialsof how complex,dynamic systems work by creating stylized descriptions of some aspectsof thosesystems” as an “intellectual trap. . . relying entirely on models to provide thefoundationfor policy analysis.” On this basis, she calls for further theoretical inquiry that isnot172limited to model-building, but focuses on “theoretically informed empirical inquiries inboth laboratory and field settings.” This study is one such inquiry.This case study emphasizes a number of significant aspects of policy developmentand implementation, and illustrates the importance of understanding and incorporatingthe complex forces that are brought to bear in the policy process. With respect totheimportant, needed contributions identified by leading theorists, this research is significantbecause it addresses analysis of common property problems throughexamining andutilizing the analytical powers derived from models dealing withbiological, economic,and political relationships to examine a regulatorypolicy application in a field situation.Further, this work specifically examines the roleof external authorities in impedingand/or facilitating capacity of individuals tomanage shared resources, a problem alsoidentified by Ostrom (1992):It is just as important to see how largerpolitical regimes may facilitate thecapacity of individuals to achieve agreements as it is to see the importanceof community in facilitating solutions to these problems.Continuing investigations in this area canmake a useful contribution to resourcemanagement by focusing on processesof deriving and integrating managementinterventions with the support and involvement of theaffected resource users. 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Intercepting the state: dramatic processes in the assertion of localcomanagement rights. The Ouestion of the Commons: the Culture and Ecology ofCommunal Resources. Edited by B. I. McCay and J. M. Acheson. Tucson: TheUniversity of Arizona Press.Pinkerton, E.W. 1981. Managing the West Coast Fishery: Regulating the Commonsor the Community? Presentation to the Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy,Vancouver.Pope, A.W. 1984. Statement to the Legislature by the Honourable Alan W. Pope,Ontario Minister of Natural Resources. Thursday, October 18, 1984, 2:00 p.m.Regier, H.A. Annotation to the author, 1 August 1992.Regier, H.A., R.V. Mason and F. Berkes. 1989. Reforming the use of naturalresources. Common Property Resources: Ecology and Corn 111 unity-Based SustainableDevelopment. Edited by F. Berkes. London: Belhaven Press.Regier, H.A. 1986. Progress with remediation, rehabilitation and the ecosystemapproach. Alternatives 13: 445-54.Regier, H.A. and A.P. Grima. 1985. 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Some considerations of population and economics in relation tothe management of commercial marine fisheries. Journal of the Fisheries ResearchBoard of Canada 14: 669-81.Schaefer, M.B. 1953. Fisheries dynamics and the concept of maximum equilibriumcatch. Proceedings of the Gulf Caribbean Fisheries Institute, Sixth Annual Session.November, 53-64.Scott, A. and P.A. Neher, eds. 1981. The Public Regulation of Commercial Fisheriesin Canada. Economic Council of Canada. Canada.Scott, A. 1979. Development of economic theory on fisheries regulation. Journal ofthe Fisheries Research Board of Canada 36: 725-41.Scott, A. 1973. The economic theory of conservation. Natural Resource Developmentin Canada. Edited by P. Crabbe and I.M. Spry. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.Scott, A. 1955. The fishery: the objectives of sole ownership. Journal of PoliticalEconomy 63: 116-24.Shye, S. 1978. On the search for laws in the behavioral sciences. 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Fishing gear selectivity and performance.FAO Fish. Rep., (289) Suppl.2: 105-8.182Toronto Star. 1988. Alaska chinook being destroyed by gill-netters. Outdoors.Column by John Power, Saturday, October 22, 1988.Townsend R. and J.A. Wilson. 1988.An economic view of the tragedy of thecommons. The Question of the Commons: the Culture and Ecology of CommunalResources. Edited by B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson. Tucson: The University ofArizona Press.Truman, D.B. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.Whillans, T.H. and F. Berkes. 1986. Use and abuse, conflict and harmony: the GreatLakes fishery in transition. Alternatives 13: 10-8.183APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE ANNUAL COMMERCIALFISHINGREPORTANNUALCOMMERCIALFISHINGREPORT,., \.•Do not include inthis report anyinformationshown on anAnnualCommercialFishing Reportfor another licencethis yearL—ron TIIF YEAR ENDINGDFCFNnFR ICONSERVETIONOFFICERCOMMERCIAL FISHINGLICENCE NUMBERV NUMBER OF FISHERMENENGAGED IN FISHERy(WHERE OWNER ASSISTSHE SHOULD BEINCLUDEDBUT, DO NOT SI4OWMEI4ALREADYINCLUDED UNDERANOTHER LICENCE),.. IIll.. INEW CAPITAL INVESTMENT(PURCHASES DURING THE YEAR OFNEW’ EQUIPMENTNO? “USED”(OUII’MCNTIIDNOFISH CAUGHTDURING THEYFArTQUANTITYPutT?KIND1.115. PERrouno4. I4I.UEPICILCIIEI.TotAl. CO1?U. SULI.IIFADS3. CAlIF4. CATFISh17 Y1,DIESEL AND GAS ENGINES.Ot.ITSOASO EIOTOSS00. CHUIS STUI.LISC(TUGS. SOATS. CANOES. ETC.00 5.EELS0(551 NETS. TWINE, ROPES, FLOATS,WINCHES, EtC..7 00, ARE HERRINGWI4(EI.140U1( LOUIPM(N?I RADIOS,RADAII, EtC.0011. TROUT7’7” t.- 11. 1.1140(145CM IF NO NEW COUIPI4ENTPURCHASED DURING TEAR. .. 10. NTRTII(KN PIKE.. .-,. II.l’EIICIIFISHING CRAFT ORBOATS IINCLUONUO?ORI,,Y’,*U. - If.UENOISINSEG’/ Ijo/DEPARTMENT OP TflANSPOfltNo.?7/,///,// •....RI41LL.US-L..(4, flOCK5A5$5C5ApPI$NUMSER TONNAGEVALUEIS. SAUGERSL(NGTNOF BOATS (101451$- IS,SIIE(I’QIIFAD40 PUT AND OVERj(Izrtlt00 I?. SMELT—50 FEET TOSS FEET/3j7r3?1’i CSTURGEON-—UNDER 20 FEEt4”z’€) 00 IS. CAVIAR—FISHING GEAR HREPoRT ALL GEAR OH HANDUI. WIlliE SASS• LNOTHVALUESI. WHITEFISHKIND(VAROSIS siYFI.LOWPICKPIIEI.GILL-NET ;Ø7/51”d C. 43”00POUND.NIT00—__(11I• I- I.,:I.U.3.HOOP.N(? (Ho. OF P07514,5,4.1.‘/7/7/7/ 00SEINESNIONT LINES INO. OFNOOKS I0000TROLLING LINESS. OIP.NEF00S. ?RAWLS—SHORE INSTALLATIONSVALUEKINDNUMIERS: / j!%l 00LOCALrrYI..71,,2>.(LLL.L{-uitcrFREEZERS AND ICE HOUSESPIERS AND WHARVESNETSUEDSDEPARTMENTI USE/J;‘f;400AN ANNUAL COMMERCIAL FISHINGREPORT IS TO RE MADEBY EACHHOLDER. OF A COMMERCIAL FISHINGLICENCE WITHIN 30 DAYSOPTHE END OF THE YEAR REPORTED ASREQUIRED UNDERTHE GAMEAND FISH ACT, 1961.55.THIS RETURN CONTAINSA COMPI.ETE ANDCORRECT STATEMENTOF FISHING OPERATIONSCARRIED ON BY MEDURING THE YEAR.IDZAPPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULEIntroductionThe questions listed in this appendix make up the interview schedule for the keyactor interviews. The questions are directed to provincial government fisheries scientistsand managers and commercial fishers who have been involved in/affected by thedevelopment of ITHQ for the Lake Huron commercial fishery.Procedure and ConstraintsThe interviews are in the form of an informal discussion, and all questions areimplicitly open-ended, even those that seem to require only a “yes” or “no” answer. Theinterrogatories “How?” and “Why?” shadow each of the questions. In effect, eachquestion represents a subject area for discussion, rather than a pointed inquiry with theexpectation of answers from within a specific range of alternatives. This list of questionsis primarily intended as a guide for the interviewer -- the questions represent the areasto be covered in the interview. Not all participants will comment on every questiontopic. Each meeting takes approximately 2 hours. In addition, time is spent talking onthe telephone before the interview, or after, to clarify any points, or to seek therespondent’s reaction to a statement or idea suggested at a later interview by someoneelse. In total, 35 people were formally interviewed, following the attached interviewschedule.Development of the questionsThe schedule is organized under eight governing areas of inquiry:(1) ecological basis for the policy;(2) policy instruments utilized;(3) time-related factors of the policy;(4) fundamental or incremental nature of the policy changes;(5) breadth and purpose of consultation;(6) distribution of the onus for action and distribution of benefits;(7) distribution of risks; and(8) territorial scale of the policy.These governing areas of inquiry are adapted to research into ITHQ from Doern andPhidd’s (1983) generic summary of the intellectual dimensions of public policy. Thesequestions address the research problem in relation to concepts, structures and processesover the 1975-85 time period. In examining the impacts of policy changes, the currentcontext is important. For this reason, the schedule includes questions directed atdescribing the present assumptions and organization of the commercial fishing industry.185Finally, attention is directed to how changes are occurring in the industry, as well as inwhat forms these impacts are expressed.The questions under these eight areas of inquiry draw out the information neededto examine some of the ecological, organizational and management aspects of theindividual transferable quota policy. The data base built from the Annual Reportscontains the balance of the quantitative information required to describe the organizationof the fishery.A modified version of the Guttman mapping sentence technique was used indeveloping these questions. The questions are identified as to their affective (a), cognitive(c) and instrumental (i) orientation. For example, if the concept on which I wish tocollect information can be posed as the question, Has quota management improved theway you fish? I would present three separate questions: Do you approve of quotamanagement? (affective); Do you think quota management is a good method to managefisheries? (cognitive); and Has the implementation of quota management caused you tochange the way you fish? (instrumental). Each category of question plays a role in thehypothesis under study. The major purpose in using this technique was to clarify exactlywhich aspects of an issue each question was directed towards. In general, the techniqueforces more rigorous wording of the questions and reveals how well a topic is coveredby the questions.REFERENCESDoem, G.B. and R.W. Phidd. 1983. Canadian Public Policy: Ideas. Structure.Process. Toronto: Methuen Publications.Guttman, L. 1972. The Facet Approach to Theory Development. Jerusalem: IsraelInstitute of Applied Social Research. (Mimeo.)186INTERVIEW SCHEDULE1. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLEQUOTA POLICY. (N.B. It is unlikely that the commercial fishers will have much tosay on this area of inquiry.)1.1 What ideas would you say are the bases for the individual quota policy (eg.,economic, ecological, mythological)? How have these changed over time, and which arethe most significant? (c)1.2 In general, do you believe/support these ideas? (a)1.3 Do you think that these ideas are a valid basis for this policy? Why? (c)1.4 Do individual quotas1help to implement these ideas? (a)1.5 Do you think that individual quotas address, at least in part, some of the importantproblems facing fisheries management/the commercial fishing industry? (c)1.6 What other actions should be taken? (i)1.7 How have you changed your management/fishing activities since the implementationof individual quotas? (i)2. WHAT POLICY INSTRUMENTS ARE BEING USED? IN WHAT SEQUENCE?WHAT PREFERRED INSTRUMENTS ARE BEING ADVOCATED AS THEPRIMARY BASIS OF REFORM BY THE GOVERNMENT? BY OTHERINTERESThD PARTIES? WHAT IDEAS ARE INVOLVED IN THESEPREFERENCES?2.1 Right now, individual quota regulations are a major factor in how commercialfishing is managed in Lake Huron. Do you feel that the present system is better nowthan in the past when the gear and season regulations were the most significantregulations? Why? (a)2.2 How is fisheries management/fishing different than before? (i)2.3 Are these differences important? (a).Throughout, the term “individual quota(s)” refers to the individual transferablequotas presently in operation in the Lake Huron fishery.1872.4 The ministry has attempted to direct the fishing effort of the commercial fishingindustry by “buying back” some of the commercial fishing quotas. Do you think this iseffective in managing fish populations? (c)2.5 Do you feel it is appropriate for the government to intervene by buying back quotaor is it better to let the free market adjust to variations in supply? (a)2.6 What alternatives to the buyback program would accomplish the same thing? (i)2.7 What do you think about the idea of the government collecting royalties on harvest?(c)3. WHAT ARE THE TIME-RELATED FACTORS? IS THE POLICY DIRECTED TOSHORT-TERM CONCERNS OR OTHER SYMBOLIC NEEDS?3.1 Do you think the use of individual quotas is an effective method of managing fishstocks? (N.B. distinguish long run and short run effects) (c)3.2 Do you see individual quotas as a long-term policy, rather than just a temporarymeasure? (c)3.4 Do you think this is appropriate? (c)3.5 With this in mind, are you planning any changes in how you manage/fish? (N.B.distinguish on-shore/on-water) (i)4. ARE THE POLICY CHANGES FUNDAMENTAL OR INCREMENTAL?4.1 Do you think the implementation of individual quotas is a major shift from howthings were done in the past? (c)4.2 What changes would you suggest for the present policy and its implementation? (i)4.3 In calculation of individual quotas, commercial fishers received different amountsof quota. Do you know how this was done? Do you approve of this process? (a)4.4 Do you think this process was fair? (c)4.5 Quotas are calculated on a percentage of past performance basis. Does this processaffect your management/fishing? (i)4.6 Is your enterprise/do you think most enterprises are more or less profitable now thatindividual quotas are in place? (N.B. distinguish between large and small operations) (a)1884.7 Is this an improvement? (a)4.8 Sometimes individual quotas are changed. How would you like to see additionalquota distributed? How would you like to see reductions in quota distributed? (i)5. WHAT SECTORS/INTERESTS ARE CONSULTED? WHAT IS THE PURPOSEOF THIS CONSULTATION?5.1 What interests or groups do you think were involved in developing the individualquota policy? (N.B. for managers, refer to field staff) (c)5.2 Why do you think these groups were involved in the process? (c)5.3 Do you feel that this consultation process was adequate? Comprehensive? (a)5.4 How did this consultation process, or the results of this consultation influence thedevelopment and implementation of the individual quota policy? (i)6. IN IMPLEMENTING AND MODIFYING THE POLICY, TO WHAT EXTENT ISIMPLEMENTATION DEPENDENT ON PRIVATE BEHAVIOUR, AS OPPOSED TOWHAT OFFICIALS CAN DO? TO WHAT EXTENT CAN EVERYONE BETREATED EQUALLY AND TO WHAT EXTENT DO DIFFERENT BENEFICIARIESHAVE TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY?6.1 Do you think enforcement is feasible? Do you think commercial fishers can self-police the industry? Why? (c)6.2 Do you feel enforcement/self-regulating behaviour is fair? (a)6.3 What would be a better arrangement? (i)7. WHAT RISKS OR UNCERTAINTIES ARE INVOLVED? HOW ARE THEYDISTRIBUTED?7.1 Is management/fishing more predictable now that individual quotas are in place? (c)7.2 Do you prefer this? (a)7.3 How has this changed your management/fishing activities? (i)1898. WHAT ARE THE SPATIAL AND TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF THE POLICY?LAKE-WIDE, LOCAL OR REGIONAL ISSUES? (N.B. centralized vs. decentralizeddecision making and implementation)8.1 Individual quotas are administrated on a district-by-district basis. Do you think thisis appropriate? Why? (c)8.2 Is it significant that individual quotas are implemented on the district level? How doyou think this affects the way that individual quotas are assigned and how the quotas areadjusted? (i)8.3 Do you feel that district level management is fair? (a)8.4 What would be an improvement/alternative? (i)190APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS AND AFFILIATIONSCommercial Fishers and RepresentativesCarison, E., Blind River.Carison, E., Blind River.Deeg, J., Evansville.Herbert, B., Killarney.Jackson, W., Southampton.Karwaski, W., Britt.Lougheed, W., Southampton.LaBalance, M., Port Elgin.MacKenzie, W. M., member, Lake Huron Quota Review Committee and Ombudsman,Great Lakes Fish Producers.McLay, J., Port Elgin.McLay, R., Port Elgin.Menary, M., Lion’s Head.Nyman, L., Blind River.Parr, G., Parry Sound.Perks, J., Midland.Pilon, R., Southampton.Purdy, M., Sarnia.Purvis, G., Silverwater.Raney, R., Tobermorey.Waugh, J., Exec. Sec., OFPA.Witty, W., Evansville.Fisheries Managers and ScientistsBedi, N., Fisheries Economist, OMNR.Christie, R., member, Lake Huron Quota Review Committee, Lake Huron Manager,OMNR.Fry, F., Chair., Lake Huron Quota Review Committee.Holder, A., Dir., Central Region, OMNR.Loftus, K., retired Director, Fisheries Branch, OMNR.Miller, M., Fisheries Manager, OMNR.Monroe, S., Lake Huron Fishery Co-ordinator, OMNR.Payne, R., Lake Huron Fishery Assessment Unit, OMNR.Potter, B., Fish Culture Assessment Bio., OMNR.Samis, W., Fisheries Management Co-ordinator, OMNR.Sheppard, J., Enforcement Co-ord., OMNR.Tilt, J., Manager Commercial Fisheries, OMNR.Townsend, D., Commercial Fisheries Liaison Officer, OMNR.Whitney, G., Director, Fisheries Branch.191


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