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Context to a conversation : the contribution of science to sustainable forestry Cushon, Geoffrey Harold 1995

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CONTEXT TO A CONVERSATION:THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENCETO SUSTAINABLE FORESTRYbyGEOFFREY HAROLD CUSHONB.Sc.F.(Hons.), LakeheadUniversity, 1980M.Sc., University ofBritish Columbia, 1985A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOROF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESINTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGYAND SOCIETYWe acceptthisthesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember 1995© Geoffrey Harold Cushon, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment ofthe requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agreethat the Ubrary shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I furtheragree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes maybe granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives, It is understoodthat copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall notbe allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)DepaiL5:e5;1’viiThe University of Bntish ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Df.DE-6 (2/88)UABSTRACTThe currently topical problemsofforest management areissues oftrans-science. Theycan be framed in the language ofsciencebut they cannot beresolved in the languageofscience. They involve historically contingent phenomenaforwhich predictive certainty is notpossibleandthey involve issues ofmoral, aesthetic and economic value.What is the role ofscience in contributingto the public debate on what arefundamentally social issues such asclear-cut logging orthe preservation ofold-growth forests?Ahistory and philosophyofscience, in general, and ecological science, inparticular, ispresented thattracesthe transition, overthe last halfcentury, from apositivist science ofuniversal, timeless, predictable orderto a science that attempts to interpret local, particularaspects ofnature. The former relieson identil,’ing restricted spatio-temporal scales thatfacilitate prediction whilethe latter focuses on an understanding ofthe causal relationswithininterrelated systems that facilitate explanation ofsystem properties. A kind ofcontextualordialectical holism is advocatedwherein system components are considered in the context ofthe whole and thewhole is considered as an epiphenomenon resulting from causal interactionofthe parts.A historyofforest science is presentedthat identifies sustained yield forestry as aconstruct ofpositivist science. Recent insightsby ecological science, into the complexity andcontingency offorest ecosystems, reveal the limitationsofthissimplified view. Moreover, theapplication ofa single large-scale strategy such as sustained yield forestryto managing forestsin British Columbia contained value assumptions that no longerreflectthe full rangeofvaluesthat the public express.The currentlytopical debates on clear-cutting, logging in municipal watersheds andover-cutting are offered as examples ofhow questions offact and questions ofvalue becomelinked. Althoughthese debates have been carried on in thelanguage ofscience they areessentially social issues and cannot be resolved by science.111The roleofscience in contributing to the resolution ofsocial issues, such as thedevelopment ofa sustainable forestry, is not to develop specific solutions but to contribute tothe social dialogue in a subservient fashion. Science can characterize the context in whichdisagreements about matters ofvalue take place. Science can use its experimental protocols tohelp society construct living experimentsthat allow us to learn ourway into the future.Science can take part in an equitable conversation on sustainable forestrythat will facilitateabetterunderstandingofthe beliefs and values ofthe human component offorestedecosystems.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract.iiTable ofContentsivList ofFiguresviAcknowledgementsVii1. INTRODUCTION12. WHAT IS SCIENCE?122.1 Ordering the Objects ofSense162.2 The Causal Structure ofthe World172.3 A CritiqueofScientific Reductionism202.4 Explanation and Prediction 252.5 Is Science aMethod? 342.6 The Objectivity ofScience 403. ECOLOGY AS SCIENCE443.1 The Nature ofEcological Phenomena 473.2 What do Ecologists Study?503.3 What Kind ofScience is Ecology? 573.4 Ecology and Society 634. THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC FORESTRY664.1 An Art ofNecessity674.2 Scientific ForestryReachesNorth America774.3 Introduction ofSustained Yield to British Columbia 824.4 Forest Yield Regulation in British Columbia 895. THE TROUBLE WITHNORMAL985.1 The Forest orthe Trees1005.2 What is aNormalForest? 1055.3 The Myth ofCertainty113V5.4 SustainableForestry.1166. TRANS-SCIENTIFIC FORESTRY1236.1 Is Clear-cuttingBadForest Practice?1246.2 Is Logging Appropriate in MunicipalWatersheds? 1306.3 Are British ColumbiaForests BeingOver-cut? 1356.4 Bridging Two Cultures1407. CONTEXT TO A CONVERSATION1478. LITERATURECITED152viLIST OF FIGURES4-1. The rotation agethat maximizes forest growth 714-2. The normal forest 734-3. British Columbia annual forest harvest (1915-1993) 975-1. Ecosystem classificationunits in the Coastal Western Hemlock biogeoclimaticzone (CWH, very wet maritime subzone (vm), submontane variant (vml) 1206-1. Results ofa survey ofBritish Columbia Professional Foresters conductedbyForestry Canada 137viiACKNOWLEDGMENTSI havebeen blessed with an outstandingsupervisory committee who deserve a greatdeal ofthe credit forwhat I have accomplished andlittle ofthe blame. They are Ed Levy, AlChambers, Lee Gass, Carl Walters and FredBunnell. Michael Church deserves specialmentionforbeing a paragon ofwhat a research supervisorshould be.The illustrations were prepared by SkookerBroome. Simon Ellis provided considerableeditorial and desktop publishing expertise.Others who made significantcontributions in the genesisofthis work include:D’arcyDavis Case, Jerry Carlson, Ann McGee,DonaldMcLennan, Ann Mills, StaffanLindgren, BobVihnanek, PeterMarshall and Olav Slaymaker.My biggest fans were my Mother and Father,Evelyn and Allan Cushon. Mythanks fortheir constant support and encouragementofmy academic pursuits.11. INTRODUCTIONHumans are cognitive and social animals with the capacity toplan individual andcollective actions. Accordingly, we seek toestablish grounds or constraints to guide whatthese actions might best be. There are, in general, twoapproaches to defining such grounds.The oldest is the processofforming and understanding interpersonal beliefs and values andconstructingamoral code by whichto guide ouractions. On the Christianview, forexample,acting in accordancewiththe Ten Commandmentspromises rewards in the afterlife forwhateverdiscomfortwe might have to bear here and now.The second approach to grounding rightaction is based, not on beliefs and values,but on ostensible facts, on what is. This is the worldofscience. The scientific world-viewengendered a profound shift in ourapproach to life. The older moral systems were concernedwith helping us to bearour fate, but science broughtwith it the promise thatwe mightcontrol destiny. Ifwe could classify the objectsofsense and determine formulae describingtheirrelations, we could predict their future states and manipulate them to suit our desires.Science promised a kindoftangible foresight.There are different kindsofknowledge, but in the modernworld the kindofknowledge we invariably seek, when facedwith a dilemma concerning the material andcircumstantialworld around us, is scientific knowledge. While we tend to thinkofscience asbeing complementaryto moral beliefs, our desire for certainty here and now and formaterialwell-being in a perilousworld lends disproportionate influence to the promise ofcertaintyapparently offered by science. Whenquestioned about the developmentofa governmentpolicy on global warming, the thenAmerican President George Bushwas quoted as saying“whatwe need is facts, the stuffthat science is made of’. Similarly, the British ColumbiaMinisterofForestswas interpreted, in a 1991 newspaperarticle, as saying that2“environmentalistswhowant to stop logging ... should make theirarguments based onscience ratherthanemotion”.It iseasy to imagine everyday problemsofwhich the resolutions lie within thedomainofscience. IfI feel ill I can visit a doctorwho has abattery ofclinical testsdevelopedby medical scientiststhat candetermine ifI am infected by apathogen. On theotherhand ifI amtrying to decidewhetherornot my religious beliefsallow me to acceptthemedicationthe doctorprescribes sciencewill have little bearing on my decision.How I choose to dealwith illness is typical ofmost, ifnot all, ofthe importantissuessociety faces. They are characterized by ablendofostensible facts, andbeliefsandvalues.This medicine may kill the pathogen but is that an approach I want to take in attempting tocure my illness? A chemicalpesticide may kill a potentiallydestructive insect but do I wantchemicalpesticide-use aspartofmy way oflife? Can science show that logging canbeenvironmentally benign and, evenifit can, would I ratherhaveanundisturbednaturalforest?All the currently topical issuesofenvironmentalmanagement display thischaracteristic blendofostensible fact and value. Theylead to two distinct butcomplementary questions. How canwe manage ourenvironment,and how dowewant tomanage ourenvironment? Using forestry as anexample, the central questionofthisthesiswill be to explore the role ofscience, both historical and current,in the broadercultural issueofdetermining public policy. What kindofknowledge can science offerabout thefirstquestion and how does it bearon the second? What is the role ofscience when factand valuebecome interwoven?The scientific traditionwe have inherited has beenprofoundly influenced by theempiricismofFrancis Bacon, the rationalismofDescartes and by the positivistphilosophyexpounded by Comte, Mach, Spencer, Pearsonand others. The positivists believed that‘“Activists rally to save B.C. trees”, the Vancouver Sun, Monday, December 16, 1991,pageB6.3knowledge was to be exhausted in a descriptionofthe co-existence and successionoftheobjectsofsense. The aimofscience was to predict the future by making inferences fromregularities evident in observable phenomena.Onthe positivistview, science was the only legitimate means to gain knowledge ofthe worldand consequently the means by which to determine our collective actionsintheworld. As there is...noway to gain knowledge ofthe universe except throughthe gateway ofscientific method... (Pearson 1892 [1957 ed.], p.l’7)we must await the contributionofscience to resolve conflicting argumentsaboutthe worldand the environment around us.The positivistphilosophy was anextensionofthe rationalistprogramofDescartes.Toulmin (1990) suggeststhat the triumphofrationalismwas an intelligible responseto anhistorical crisis.[Descartes]...opened up forpeople in his generation a real hope ofreasoningtheirway out ofpolitical and theological chaos, at a time when no one elsesaw anything to do but continue fighting an interminable war. (Toulmin 1990,p.71, author’s italics)Descartes’ rationalist programand its offshoot, scientific positivism, promised a meansofresolving the conflictbetween different beliefsystems and providing the foundation forarational reorganizationofhuman society. It wasbelieved that the applicationofscientificmethod to all aspectsofhumansociety would improve the qualityoflife.On the positivistview, then, socialproblems must be translated into the language ofscience for theireffective resolution. In Richard Rorty’s (1979, p.316)words:Residual disagreementswillbe seento be “non-cognitive” or merely verbal,orelse merely temporary - capable ofbeing resolvedby doing somethingfurther.For some the truth claims ofscience are tied to methodology which removes them fromtheinfluence ofsocial and historical context. This has allowed scientific knowledge to beportrayed as objective, value-neutral and absolute.4In recent timesperceptionsofscience and the role science plays in determininghumanaffairs have changed. The controversy overspraying insecticideforthe Gypsy mothin British Columbia has been offered as one example ofthe growingdistrustofscientificauthority2.In contrast to the positivist claims forscience, thescientific world-view has beenportrayed as a relativistpositionthat is inherently boundup in the project ofexploiting anddominating nature (Leiss 1972) ormore generallyas a tool for legitimating variousideologicalpositions. Aronowitz (1988) argues that the norms and methodologyofscienceare not self-evident and that science is best understood as a socially constructeddiscoursethat legitimates its power by presenting itselfas truth.Yetwhile there is academic questioning ofthelegitimacy ofscientific knowledge andofthe disproportionate influence ofsciencein human affairs, and a growingpublic distrustofscientific authority, there is also a growing demandformore andbetter scientificknowledge to solve the profound difficulties societyfaces. There is a persistent public outcryfor improved scientific understanding ofhealth issuessuch asAIDS and cancer, andenvironmental issues such as pollutionand resource depletion.Even those who take thepositionthat science is simply amanifestationofthe ideology ofexploiting nature clamor forscientific knowledge that shows the harmony and sanctityofnature, and thusjustifiestheirown ideological position.The growing public awarenessofenvironmental health issues, engenderedinpart bythe environmental movementthat beganin the fiftiesandsixties, roughly surrounding thepublication, in 1962, ofRachel Carson’sSilentSpring, has focussedattentionon scientificecology as the means by which to resolvesuch issuesas renewable resource depletion, airandwaterpollution, and global warming:...ecologists, like doctors...are notjust scientists enquiring into naturalsystemsbut...have...become - and society has forcedthemto be - the custodiansofthose systems. (Sagoff, 1982,p.17)2“Growing distrustofauthority shows through the spray, professorssay”, theVancouverSun, Thursday, April 16, 1992, page Al.5Ecology, like medical science, economics, sociology, and other integrating sciences,hascome face to face withthe obstacle ofproducing the tight causal proofs orexperimentalevidence that are generally considered to constitute scientific knowledgewhile providingremedies forthe ills ofthe environment.The reductionistapproach and the predictive ideal advocated by scientific positivismhave not proven successful in developing predictivemodels forecological phenomena. Asmostecologists recognize, ecological systemsare open,complex, contingent andevolutionary, producing interactive processesthat cannotbe predicted fromanunderstandingoftheircomponent parts. It isextremely difficult, arguably impossible,to produce the kindofcertain, predictive knowledge that societyhas come toexpect. The deterministic ideal ofscientific positivismhangs overthe head ofscientificecology in spiteofexpanding scientificunderstandingofecological uncertainty.One manifestationofthe growing scientific, socialand political awareness ofenvironmental issues has been the introduction, bythe World Commission on Environmentand Development (WCED) ofthe concept ofsustainabledevelopmentand subsequentdialogue thereon. The basic premise ofsustainabledevelopment is thateconomicdevelopment must be considered in relationto, andconstrained by environmental issues:From space, we see a small and fragile balldominatednot byhumanactivityandedifice but by apatternofclouds, oceans, greenery, and soils.Humanity’sinability to fit its doings into thatpattern is changingplanetary systemsfundamentally. Many such changes are accompaniedby life-threateninghazards. This new reality, fromwhich there is noescape, must be recognized-and managed. (WCED l9W7,p.l)The conceptofsustainable development as advanced by WCED containsa tacitrecognition ofthe failure ofscience and technology toresolve social issues such as thegrowing numberofpoorand hungry people on the planet, the stabilityand resilience oflocalcommunities, and the rightsoffuture generations inthe debateonwhat to do now. Thisrecognition is not an indictmentofscience but a questioningofthe mannerinwhich science6can be applied to the resolutionofsocial issues. It suggeststhatwe must address social issuesin a social context and redefine the role ofscience ininforming the dialogue. Scientificunderstandingofthe ecological systemswe dependon iscritical but it must be used in thecontextof..ourcultural and spiritual heritages [which] reinforce oureconomic interestsand survival imperatives. (WCED 1987, p.1)The social and environmentalproblems that the World Commission on Environmentand Developmenthoped to addresswith a philosophyofsustainable development are similartothose faced inthe early partofthis century when sustained yieldforestry was introducedto NorthAmerica. These problems included uncheckedexploitationofforestswith noattentionto renewal, community instability, uncertaintimbersupplies and the destructionofnon-commodityenvironmentalvalues. The developmentofsustainedyield forestry, inGermany in the last century, and its introduction to British Columbia in thiscentury, willprovide the context for my discussionofthe role ofscience in addressing social issues.Sustainedyield is partofwhat has been called scientific forest management. The ideaofscientific forest managementhas its roots in positivistphilosophy in the 19th andearly20th centuries and in the progressive conservation movement evidentatthe turnofthiscentury foradvocacy ofwhich Theodore Roosevelt is remembered.Atthe heartoftheprogressive conservation movementwas the positivist ideal that science, and its handmaidentechnology, could decide the courseofresource development. Conflictsoverresource usecould not be resolvedpolitically, as “partisan debate couldnot guarantee rational andscientific decisions” (Hays 1959, p.3).Conservationistsenvisaged, eventhough they did not realize their aims, apolitical system guided by the ideal ofefficiency and dominated by thetechnicianswho couldbest detennine how to achieve it. (Hays 1959, p.3)When the WCED published its report, Our Common Future, in 1987, the AssociationofBritish Columbia ProfessionalForesters (ABCPF) respondedwith a memo to British7Columbia politicians. The responsewas that throughpoliciesofsustainedyieldandmultipleuse forestryB.C. Professional Foresters have been practicingsustainable developmentlong before it became popular forothers to be interested in this concept.(ABCPF, 1988)Sustainedyield forestry is a kindofattempt to addresseconomic development in thecontextofecological sustainability. Set in its historical context it represents a rationalattempttoprevent resource degradation. More recently, recognitionofecological complexityand contingency andofthe inabilityofscience to address issuesofvalue expose flaws in thestrategy ofsustainedyield forestry.NorthAmerican modelsofsustainedyield in forestry and fisheries have been basedon the conceptofmaximumsustained yield as deduced fromsingle-speciespopulationmodels (eg. Larkin 1977, Chambers and McLeod 1980). Decisions regarding themanagementofwhole ecosystems have been made by determining the maximum rate ofproductionofthe commodity species, while ignoring the dynamicsofthe underlying systemthatengenderproductivity.While sustainedyield forestry was adopted toaddress social aswell as technicalconcerns, the assumptionwas that social concernswould be met as a consequence ofproducing the maximumvolume ofwood fibre. Otherproducts and values associatedwiththe forestwere considered secondary tothisoverriding goal. Asanarrow technocraticsolution, sustainedyield forestry imposed the beliefthat managing forests forthe maximumcontinuous supplyofwood fibre would satisI,’ all othervalues thatpeople holdwith respectto the forest.Ourhuman desires forcertainty and material well-beingencourage the positivistquest forpredictive certainty. Butecological phenomenahave a creativeelement as aconsequenceofevolutionand contingency. A sense ofcertainty in nature, the ability toaccurately forecast its future states, is an illusion, ratherthan a reality. The assumption that8we canunderstand and resolve problemsofenvironmental management in the language ofareductionist, mechanistic scienceofcertainty requires re-evaluation. Science has made greatstrides toward anunderstandingofcomplex systemsthrough stochastic modelling, throughsimulation and through a general acceptance ofthe complexity and interconnectedness ofnatural systems. These strides suggest that the degree ofcertainty bywhichwe can forecastthe consequencesofourinterventions in nature is limited.To the unpredictability inherent in nature, in its most fundamental and mostintegrative states, we must add the uncertaintyofhuman individual and socialbehavior.Overthe last centuty the province ofBritish Columbia has been settled largely byEuropeanpeopleswithanagrarian background. The descendantsofthese peopleare in the processofconstructing a forest-dwelling culture, developing beliefs, values and relationshipswithnature that bearon how they may choose to manage theirenvironment.John Dewey described aspectatortheotyofknowledge,ofwhich science is the primeexample, as being concernedwiththe search forwhat isfoundational, and thus, eternal innature. Onthe otherhand, he noted that:The realmofthe practical is the regionofchange, andchange is alwayscontingent; it has in it anelement ofchance thatcan not be eliminated.(Dewey, 1929,p.16)In the abstract, certain knowledge may be possible,but in the real world, we canneverknow forcertain the outcome ofour actions. Wemust manage for the unexpected. Thecomplex, contingentand evolutionary nature ofecologicalsystems, including the notableunpredictabilityoftheirdrivingweather systems, and thethinking, dreaminghumanpopulationsembedded in them, make these systems fundamentallyunpredictable. To resolvethe conflict betweena notion ofcertain, abstract knowledge,and the art ofpractical livinginthe face ofa variety ofkinds ofuncertainty, science andsociety must seeka new relationbetweenanexpanding knowledge ofecologicalcomplexity and the socialproblemswe face.9Forestry, and resource management science in general, are in a state offlux asweapproachthe twenty-first century. This state offlux is related in part to changes in ourconceptionofscience and its role in the broader cultural milieu. The concept ofsustainabledevelopment implies that there is a social dimension and abroadertime frame to beconsidered ineconomic development activities such as forest management. Gifford Pinchotrecognized this social dimension, in a sense, when he recalled his studies in France andGermanywithhis mentor, Dr. DietrichBrandis:Dr. Brandisnever let his pupils forgeta greattruthwhichmost Gennanforesters had never grasped - in the long runForestry cannot succeed unlessthe peoplewho live in and nearthe forest are for it and not against it. (Pinchot1947, p.17)Positivist science has failed to resolve forestry issues because ofits inability toincorporate ecologicaluncertainty and because it fails to recognize that the goals andaspirationsofpeople cannot be formalized and resolved in a scientific context. Thecontributionofecological science to resource-use issues, such as forestry, has been limitedinthe past by its inability to provide the kind ofpredictive model held as the standard ofpositivist science. Were it possible forecology to provide predictive certainty it wouldentailreducing the problemfarbelow the level ofsocial relevance. An acceptance ofthe integratednature ofecologicalphenomena, and the uncertaintyengendered by contingency indicate thatforests must be managed as whole entities. People comprise an important component ofecosystems andenvironmental issues are not strictly scientific issues.Stephen Toulmin sees science at the end ofthe 20th century as beginning to loosen itspositivist ideals:Claims to certainty...are at home within abstract theories, and so opentoconsensus; but all abstraction involvesomission, turning a blind eye toelements in experience that do not lie withinthe scope ofthe giventheory,and so guaranteeing the rigorofits formal application. (Toulmin 1990, p.200)10.scientific inquirywill increasingly shift fromabstract lawsofuniversalapplicationtoparticulardeciphermentsofthe complex structuresand detailedprocessesembodied in concrete aspectsofnature. (Toulmin1990, p.204)I will begin this study by examining the idealsofscience and the kindofknowledgescience can offer. In Chapter 3, I will considerthescienceofecology in the lightofthisreevaluationofscience, considerwhy its application toresource-use issues hasbeen limitedand illustratewhy it is the necessarygrounding formanaging nature.Toulmin’s perceived shift in the ideals ofscience canbe discerned in the evolutionofforest science and in its application in BritishColumbia. Chapter4 will focuson the historyofforest science and, particularly, the conceptofsustainedyield forestry, fromits roots in18th and 19th century Germany, to its introductionand development in BritishColumbia.Sustainedyield forestry provides auseful andwell-studiedexampleofthe traditionaltechnocratic approachto the problemsofresource management. It alsoexemplifies themiscast relation between scienceand society. Chapter 5 will includea critique ofthe mainassumptions ofsustainedyield forestryand recentdevelopmentsthat signala change in ourperceptionofforestsand the consequencesofhuman agency on them.In Chapter 6 I will describe three currentissues in British Columbiathat scienceisexpectedto resolve. Whilescience may have much to contributethey are allessentiallysocial issues that must be addressedin a social context. Inwhat mannercanscience bemandated to assist societyin resolving these issues? Howdo questionsoffact and questionsofvalue become linked in ourattempts atresolution?The ideal that sciencecould improve the qualityoflife is anoble one. The resolutionofenvironmental issuesin the practical world, in the worldofdoing, requires that science beresponsive and subservienttothe dialogue on appropriate actionratherthan attempting tocreate illusory modelsofcertainty that predetermine social andpoliticaldecisions. Sciencecan provide background information,maps, inventories, explanationsofwhat hasoccurredandpossibilitiesofwhatmight occur that can provide context to thesocial processbut not,incontext, assured predictions.Science can use its critical attitude and its methodsofmodelling11andexperimental design to help us design living experiments thatyield knowledge as wemove into the future. We can use science to live adaptivelyin anevolvingworld.Science cannot determinewhat it is right forus todo, but it can play an importantpart in the democratic dialogue onappropriateaction. Science can provide not certainknowledge, but clues as to how ourstorywillproceedinto the future. These cluesenlightenthe dialogue by suggesting options, by providing anunderstandingofnature’s capacity torespond to our needs, by providing contextto the conversation.122. WHATIS SCIENCE?What kindofknowledge does science produce? How canandhow should scientificknowledge be used to informdecisionmakers and influence human affairs?What is science?Before considering the argumentspertinent to answering these questions itseemsreasonable towonderwhy the questionsare relevant in the firstplace. Docompetingprojectsclaimthe name science? Is there a social dimension tothe production and use ofscientificknowledge such thatwe mustplace bounds onwhatwe call science andscientificknowledge? While the questionwhat isscience has, forthe most part, beenaddressed inthecontextofthe formerquestion, seeking, forexample, to separate physics fromastrology,letme suggest that the latterquestion is by far the morecritical. Science is immenselyinfluential in the constructionof20th century society. Any attempt to analyze and addressthe nature ofsocial issues must lookat the contributionofscience and thenature ofscientificinquiry and knowledge.Science has come under fire, in recenttimes, as being a socially constructed discoursefor legitimating the influence ofcertain ideologicalpositions: forexample, bysocialistswhoclaimthat science is atool for legitimating capitalism, byfeminists forwhom science is themeansoflegitimating patriarchy, and by environmentalistswho claimthat science is atoolfor legitimating the dominationofnature.A defense againstthese claims might be alongthe linesthat science is merely thepursuitofunderstanding and this is inherently a good thing, it is humanandnatural. This lineofreasoning seems acceptable but it is not clearthat this iswhat is at stake when science isattacked as ideology. It makes sense to me to considertwo aspects ofscience,science asthepursuitofunderstanding, and science as atool forusing natureto satisly ourneeds. FrancisBacon, who championed science for its practical merits, as ameansofmastering nature, wasaware ofthisdistinction:13Just as the visionoflight itselfis something more excellent andbeautiful thanits manifold use, sowithoutdoubt the contemplationofthings as they are,without superstitionor imposture,withouterroror confusion,is in itselfanoblerthing than awhole harvestofinventions.’The problemthen seems to be to definescience in away thatemphasizes this noblerpurposewhile clariljing its mandatein influencing the courseofhuman affairs. Science maybeinherentlygoodbut still havebadconsequences.The objective ofscience is to find patternin nature, to suggest some orderthatenlightensus regarding the phenomenawe experienceeachday. Aristotle distinguishedbetweenessential and accidentalbehavior in nature. Traditionallyscience has acknowledgedthe latter, but the effortsofscience have beenfocussed on characterizingthe former. Theprojectofmodern sciencehasbeen to abstract generalprinciples from specific factsin ordertoexplain and make predictionsabout the phenomenaweobserve in the natural world.Quantumtheory, forexample,is anattemptto generalize thebehaviorofnature at themolecular, atomic and sub-atomiclevel. Evolutionary theoryattempts to generalize theprocessesofnatural selectionand organic evolution. The generalizationor theory serves as aframeworkto organizeand relate observationsofactual sense data.Consider, again, President Bush’scomment, “What we needis facts, the stuffthatscience is made of’. That thereare factspre-supposesthere tobe an objective world outsideus that has apattern,anorderthat canbe discerned.President Bush’s claimalso implies thatscience can achievesome immutable truth,an ideal ofcertainty uponwhichrational actioncan be based. While thefirst idea is necessary forany conceptionofscience, theidealofcertainty hasbeen increasinglycompromised in the lasthalfcentury. ButwhileChalmersreportsthatmodern science has replacedthe utopian aim forcertaintyby therequirement ofcontinualimprovementorgrowth(Chalmers 1990, p.36),the politicaldesire forcertaintyis still imposedon scientists.As quoted in Thomson (1922).14The idealofpredictive certainty based on a deterministic worldorderis a cornerstoneofa positivist view ofthe world. Positivismis grounded in the rationalismand mechanicalphilosophy ofDescartes and the empiricismofHume (Bhaskar 1989). The termpositivismwas coinedby Comte in the firsthalfofthe nineteenth century andelaborated on byMach,Spencer, Pearson and others. Positivismhas takenmany forms, including the logicalpositivismdeveloped inVienna, in the1920s, by Schlick, Carnap, Neurathand others(Hacking 1983). For my purposesI will considerpositivismas aphilosophyofscience thathas the following features:1. Knowledge consists in, and only in, the descriptionofthe co-existence andsuccession ofthe phenomenaofsense. A statementis meaningful only ifit canbeverified empirically. Consequentlyall statements that have no meansofverificationare metaphysical, metaphysical statementsare meaningless, and scientific methodisthe only source ofcorrect knowledgeabout reality.2. There is no causality in nature, only whatHume called constant conjunction, theconstancy withwhichone event followsanother. The goal ofscienceis to developlawsdescribing such regularities.3. Explanation andpredictionare symmetrical(Harre 1985). Given an acausal viewofthe world, science cannotexplainwhy anevent occursexceptto say that it doesoccurin some regularway. Science is eitherentirelyunconcernedwithexplanation, itsgoalbeing to predict the future states ofaphenomenon by describing its successionwithlaw-like generalizations (eg. Pearson1892) or, alternatively, toexplain aphenomenon is simply to be able topredict its future states asa necessaryconsequence ofthe laws that govern it, theso-calleddeductivist model ofexplanation(eg. Hempel 1966).The positivists madeexplicit thatthe aimofsciencewas to provide knowledgeofwhat happensbut notwhy, skepticismabout the existence ofcauses rendering thelatterquestion moot. In Comte’swords:Ourbusiness is - seeing how vain is any researchinto what are called causes,whether firstor final - topursue anaccuratediscovery ofthese laws, withaview to reducingthemto their smallestpossiblenumber.22quoted in Hacking (1983, p.47).15But descriptive knowledge is vaguely dissatis1iing; we alsowant to understandwhy.While Comte was concernedwith the question why as the search for firstor ultimate causeshe ignored the possibility thatevents might be explained by purely physicalcausalantecedents. The goalofreducing scientific laws to theirsmallestpossiblenumber is also adismissal ofthe possibility ofcausal interactionsthat create contingenciessuch that newphenomena arise out ofthe interactionofprior phenomena.By why I meanthe set ofcauses and antecedent conditionsthat resultin aphenomenon. What series ofevents lead to thiseventoccurring here and now. While in asomewhatdifferent sense than Comte, werecognize, now, that science cananddoes provideexplanationsofnatural phenomenaand many philosophersand scientistsbelieve the primarygoal ofscience to be thatofunderstanding why thingshappen in this restricted sense.My discussionwill consider assumptions made by scienceregarding theway inwhichthe world is constructed. I will beginwith a discussionofhow science attempts todescribe the objectsofsense and then, through discussionsofcausationand scientificreduction, consider how science can characterize relationsbetween the objectsofsense. Iwillthenconsider the issue ofwhether the goal ofscienceis to predict ortoexplainandtheimportance ofthat issue forthe social role ofscience.The third majortopic inthis chapterwill be anexpositionofscientific method.I will addressthe questionwhether science can belegitimated solely by its method. I will closewith somecomments on the social context ofscience. Towhatextent can science be construed as an objective, value-freemode ofinquiryand inwhat sense is its objectivity constrained by its place inthe broadersphere ofhumanculture. My purpose here is to develop a viewofscience thatwillenlightenthe subsequentdiscussionofecology as science and ecologyas a source ofknowledge formanaging humanagency in the environment.162.1 Ordering the ObjectsofSenseKnowledge beginswith the recognitionofdifferencesand ofsimilarities. The firststeptowards knowledge isto provide a systematic descriptionofthe circumstances in whichrecognitionswill occur:.the first step in wisdom isto knowthe thingsthemselves;this notionconsists in having a trueideaofthe objects; objects are distmguishedandknownby classifying them methodicallyand giving them names. Therefore,classification and name-givingwillbe the foundation ofourscience.3The classificationoftheobjectsofsense into categoriesoflike andunlike may berelatively discrete and obvious.To make a crudeexample, it seems unproblematicto say thata tree is different thananewt (although abiologist can tell us muchabout their similarity). Inmany cases, a useful classificationrequires the interpositionofsomeconceptual structurethat influences the perceptionofdifference. It would be difficultto understand how acaterpillarand a butterfly couldbe the same beingwithout an understandingofthe processofpupation. The species isthe basic unit oftaxonomic classification, generallyreferring to agroup oforganisms capable ofproducingviable offspring as a resultofbreedingamongthemselves. Speciesoforganiclife often appearsimilarbut are classifieddifferently basedon interpretations ofmorphology,physiology, ecology and/or genestructure. Some differentspeciesofnewt, forexample, canphysicallymate and reproduce, but areexcluded fromdoing soby the evolutionofaconvoluted mating dance inwhichthe male must follow thefemale precisely in orderto fertilizethe eggs.Other speciesoflife appear to haveevolved fromthe same strainfollowing theirseparation by the exigenciesofgeology, andhave continued the process ofevolutionforgreater or lesser periodsoftime. Thejackand lodgepole pines(Pinus banksiana Lamb. andPinus contorta Dougl. ex Loud.,respectively)ofNorthAmericaarebelieved to have beenseparated by the upliftofthe Rocky Mountains causing theirisolation and differentevolutionary pathways. Morerecently these two species have beenfound to formnaturalLinnaeus in the Systemanaturae, as quoted in Lesch (1990,p.75).17hybrids in Alberta, Canada (Fowells 1965) creating a conundrumfor the botanicalsystematist.That the objectsofthe materialworld areless discrete thanas theywere viewed inthe immutable pre-scientific world or the mechanisticworld ofscientific positivism,becomes clearerwhenwe consider more complexentitiessuch as soil fonnations orplantassemblages. These may be relatively discrete,ifseparated by the effectsoflandform, orrelatively continuous, when forexampleoccurring on the same mountain slope. Theissue ofclassification, in the latter case, entailsdefining arbitrary boundaries, based on functionalchanges, that are not discrete in space or time. Whilethere may be real differencesbetweendifferent soil types therewill alsoexistsoilsthatencompass characteristicsoftwoor moreclasses. How such anomalies are classifiedwilldepend, to a large degree, onthe conceptualortheoretical framework the classifierbrings to the system, and in some cases onpracticalconcerns relatedto the problemsofclassificationor the purpose ofthe classification.Ourperception ofthe fact, i.e.,the individual soil, is constrainedby the language theory affordsus for interpreting it. In otherwordswe cannot see a humo-ferric podzol untilwehavecreated the category withinourtheories ofsoil genesis.What we come to experience isa dialectic betweenwhat is really there andwhatweexpect to see, between objective reality andtheoretical interpretation, betweenperceptionand the language ofrepresentation. ConsiderHanson’s (1958) oft-quotedexample. DidTycho Brahe and Copernicus see the samesun? One believed it to be moving across thehorizonwhile the other believed it to befixed in the sky, the earth a spinningball in orbitaround it.2.2 The CausalStructureoftheWorldThe attempt to understand relationsbetweenthe objectsofsense has led to a longdebate about the nature ofcausation. The failure to discernwhat Hume called a necessaryconnection between cause andeffect ledhimtopostulate that causes are only constant18conjunctions. When an eventoftype A occurs, say striking aredball with the cueball, aneventoftype B alwaysensues, inthis case motion is imparted to the redball. Thepositivistview was thatwe should not seek for causes in nature,but forregularities or constantconjunctions. We cannot, on this view,explainwhy an eventoccurs, that is, answertheintuitive question whywith abecause, but only describethe antecedent conditions thatprecede it.To say thatwe have found the explanationofanevent is only to say that theevent can be deduced froma general regularity.4In everyday life, we seek to understandwhy thingshappen, and an appropriateanswer to awhy-questionbeginswith the word “because”.causal explanationshave truth built into them. When I infer from aneffectto a cause, I amaskingwhat made the effect occur, what broughtit about. Noexplanationofthat sort explains at all unless it does present a cause.(Cartwright 1982, p.114)The shatteringofawindow pane is causedby a ballstriking it. Turning a light switchreleases a causal process, the transmission ofelectrical energy,thatexplains why a lightappears. The evolutionofmorphologicalcharacteristics in a species ofplant oranimal iscaused by that species’ interactionswith a changingenvironment overrelatively long periodsoftime.Skepticism about the realityofcausesand anacceptance ofa constant conjunctionattitude to causationwasencouraged, unintentionally perhaps, bythe successofNewton’stheory ofgravitation. AlthoughNewton’stheory successfully describedthe phenomenonofgravity it offered notangible connection betweencause and effect. Liebniz’s rejectionofNewtonian mechanicswas motivated by hisobjection to the occultist ideaofaction-at-adistance. The positivist solutionwas,ratherthanaccept the theory as incomplete, to decidethat all causal laws are mere regularities.Discoveringthe connection between cause andeffectwas amatter beyondthe scope ofhuman inquiry.This characterizationofthepositivist view is provided by Hacking (1983, p.’I7).19The specterofaction-at-a-distancewas subsequently removed by Einstein’stheoriesofrelativity:Gravitational fields have physical reality, and gravitationalinfluences arepropagated as waves traveling at a fmite velocity through such fields. (Salmon1984, p.242)Although gravitationalwaves have notbeen detected asyet, there seems to be sufficientindirect evidence tojustify ourbeliefin theirexistence5.Hertz’sexperimentaldetectionofelectromagnetic waves, whichremoved the problemofaction-at-a-distance inMaxwell’selectromagnetic field theory, providesadditionalevidencethat we canexpectto discovercausal explanations, inthe macroscopic world at least6.The ideaofa causal process propagated throughtime and space providesthenecessary connection between cause and effect.Causal processes transmitenergy, information, structure, and causalinfluence; they also transmitpropensities toenter into various kindsofinteractions under appropriate circumstances. (Salmon 1984, p.261)Some causes may be detenninistic, that is they may be sufficient and/or necessaryto theeffects they precipitate, but others seem clearly to be probabilistic. Whenwe saythatcigarette smoking causes cancerwe recognize that smoking doesnot always cause cancerand thatnon-smokers also contract cancer. The evidence thatmore smokersthannonsmokers contract lung cancersuggests that smoking has a propensityto cause lung cancer.Smoking, by itself, is neithera necessary nor a sufficient cause oflungcancer.While smoking may be found to be part ofa setofsufficient causesofcancer, thereare many examplesofwhat appearto be irreduciblystochastic processes atwork in theuniverse. A carbon 14 atom has, apriori, a probabilityof1/2 ofemitting anelectron andbeing transfonned into nitrogenwithin a period of5,730years. Similarly, experiments inSee, forexample, Davies (1980).6in quantumphysics forces us to recognizethe possibilitythat someevents may not be completely determined by precedingcauses. For adiscussion see Salmon(1984, pp.242-259).20Mendelian genetics illustrate how cross-fertilizationof, forexample, peaplantsproduce 3/4redblossoms and 1/4 white blossoms.A probabilistic view ofcausationis suggested for two reasons. First,there appeartobe ineluctably stochasticforces atworkin theworld. Second, for awiderange ofcomplexphenomena it may be logicallypossible but practically unfeasibleto determine thenexus ofcausesrelevantto aneffect.We can characterizeonlythe likelihood for a certainevent tooccur.The constant conjunctionviewofcausality shouldbe discarded,I believe, fortworeasons. Salmon’s explicationofa causal processthat canpropagate causal influencethroughspace and time providesthe necessaiy connectionthatHume failed to discernbetweencauseand effect. Second, viewingcauses as propensities,as giving us an understandingofthelikelihood foranevent tooccur, allowsus to viewcauses as neithersufficientfor nornecessary to theireffects.A constant conjunction cannotbe inferred from aneffect,but wecan use scientific generalizationsto consider the rangeofcauses having apropensityto resultinthe observedevent. Wemight, in principle, findthefull set ofcausesofa given case oflung cancer, but it seems tome needlessly restrictive tosay that the only legitimatecausalexplanationis one thatwouldpredictevery caseoflung cancer.2.3 A Critique ofScientificReductionismThe ideaofa causal processand ofmultiple, interactingcausal processes isimportantin relation to the ideaofscientificreductionism. Thepositivist ontology ofatoniisticeventsand closed systems supposesthat phenomena canbe explainedby reducing themto theirconstituentpartsand ultimately to the levelofphysico-chemical processes.Onthis view,complex systemsdisplayno emergentpropertiesrelevantto an understandingofthe system,understandingensuing solelyfromadescriptionofthe functionalpropertiesoftheconstituents.21Froma positivistpoint ofview the biologicalsciences may be merelyprovincialsciences, having generally failed to producedeterministic, law-like generalizations like thoseofthe classical sciences. The theories andexplanationsofbiology will ultimately be reducedto the lawsofphysics and chemistry. Forthe scientificpositivist, the idealofsciencewas.to define phenomena in termsofmovements and forcesthat obeyeduniversal laws - that is, lawswhich werenot in any way restricted in time orspace norsubject to any exceptions. (Mayr 1988, p.9)The biological and social sciences and, arguably,eventhe physical sciences, withtheiracceptanceofprobabilistic laws and irreducibly stochasticprocesses, have failed to live up tothis ideal. This failure suggests that a different grounding forscience is required.Hempel, in 1966, noted that...it is clearthat at present, at any rate, the descriptionofbiologicalphenomena requires the use not onlyofphysical and chemical terms, but ofspecificallybiological terms that do not occur in the physico-chemicalvocabulary. (Hempel, 1966,p.102)However, he concluded that.mechanism...as a heuristic maxim, as aprinciple forthe guidance ofresearch...enjoins the scientist topersist in the search forbasic physicochemicaltheoriesofbiological phenomena ratherthan resign himselfto theview that the concepts and principlesofphysics and chemistry are powerlessto give an adequate account ofthe phenomenaoflife. (Hempel 1966,p.106)Inthe 19th and early 20th centuries, biologistshad posited metaphysicalvitalforcesorteleologicalexplanations, inorderto account for the uniquenessoforganic life (Mayr1988). It now seemspossible to account forthe phenomenaofthe livingworld ona causalview ofthe world. Biological and ecological phenomena conformto the lawsofphysics andchemistry but display unique behavior that cannotbe fullyexplainedby the concepts andprinciplesofphysics and chemistry. Salmon’sexplicationofcausalprocesses, propagatingand interacting through space andtime, gives us the means to acknowledge the uniquenessofthe biological world.22The uniquenessofthe biologicalworld is the resultoffour factors:1. The capacityoflivingthings to propagate causal influence via historically acquiredinformationencoded in their gene structure,2. Theirorganizationinto hierarchical structureand the propagationofnew causalinfluence through causal interactions at each level oforganization,3. The subjection ofbiologicalentities and systems to causal influence from irreduciblystochastic processes operating throughout the universe, and4. The capacityoflivingthings to propagate causal influence in response to contingentinformation acquired viasensory processes.Physical systems appearto conformto points 2 and 3. Astronomical galaxiesand theearth’s crust, forexample, appear toevolve in contingentways. They share the abilitytostore historically acquired information. Biological systems have the additional featuresofDNA-programmed responsesto stimuli andat higher levelsoforganizationthe novelprocessesofbehavior.An individual organism is the result ofthe interactionofgenetically coded historicalinformationwith itsenvironment. Understanding orexplaining the occurrence ofanorganismrequires knowledge ofnotjust its functional characteristics but ofthe historicalcontext inwhich these characteristics developed. The processofnatural selection, by whichchange as an adaptation toenvironment can be encoded and propagatedcausally throughtime, lends an additional historical aspect to biologicalphenomenanotpresent in theinanimate world.The organic world is organized into complex and homeostatic, hierarchicalsystems:The hierarchical structurewithin an individual organismarises fromthe factthat the entities at one level are compounded into new entities at the nexthigher level - cells into tissues, tissues into organs, and organsinto functionalsystems. (Mayr 1988, p.14)Other levelsoforganization include organs into organisms, organisms into populations,populations into communitiesand communities intoecosystems. Counterto the assumptionsofpositivism, biological systemsare open systemsthat, in spite ofinputs and outputs,23display elaborate feedback mechanisms that result ininternal homeostatic control. In asimple predator-prey system, forexample, predation providesnegative feedbackthat maycounterhigh fecundity in the prey species and maintain the systemwithin some domainofstability. Purely physical systems share this feature in anelementaiy way. Forexample, awater reservoir stores information and its response, outflow, is contingentupon the storage.This represents ahomeostatic tendency.Biological and ecological systems are composedofmany interactive parts. They arethemselves contingent, in that a perturbation in one partofthe systemwill haveconsequencesthroughout the system. Unique effects are caused by the interactionsbetweencomponents. Forexample, the populationdynamicsofa species ofbacteriathat breeds inowl pelletswill dependon the interactionbetween owls andmice7.To go one step further,the abundance ofa certain speciesofplant might dependon the availabilityofsome tracemineral made available by bacterial breakdownofthe owl pellets.Given that interactionsbetweenentities have causal efficacy, causal processeswill bepropagated, in integrated systems, that cannot be understood froman understanding oftheircomponent parts alone, without considering how components interactwitheachotherandwiththeirenvironment. This suggestsa kindofdialectical holismbetween component andsystemthat is distinct fromobscurantistholistic views suchasvitalismor finalism. There isno need toposit some ideal organizing force. As Levins and Lewontinpoint out, idealisticholismshares a common faultwith reductionism:.they see “true causes” as arising at one level only, with other levels havingepistemological but not ontological validity. Clementsian idealismseesthecommunity as the only causal reality, with the behaviorsofindividual speciespopulationsas the direct consequenceofthe community’s mysteriousorganizing forces... Reductionisim..seesthe individual species, orultimatelythe individuals (orcells, or molecules...), as the only “real” objects, whilehigher levelsare againdescriptionsofconvenience without causal reality.(Levins and Lewontin 1985, p.135)The example is fromLevins and Lewontin (1985, pp.135-136).24Inordertounderstand ecological systemsorsocial systems, we need to recognizethatcausal efficacy is not limited to somefi.jndamental unit. Bothreductionismand idealisticholismfailtorecognize the emergenceofnew properties at each leveloforganizationandthat thewhole exerts causal influenceon the parts as the partsinfluence the whole.This complex, contingent and evolving biologicalworld is then subject to interactionwiththe seemingly stochastic forcesofweather, geology andgalaxy. Randomevents imposeonthe order in away that cannotbe understood or predicted fromanunderstandingoftheentities composing the system. Evenwith complete biologicalunderstanding, whichappearsimpossible to achieve given thecontingent andevolutionaryqualitiesofbiological systems,the unpredictabilityofweatherpatterns and otherenvironmentaleffects make the completereductionofbiologicalphenomenato physico-chemical lawsan unachievable ideal.Innature the arrow oftime is real.Higher level organisms altertheirbehaviorthrough cognition andlearning and behavioral adaptationsmay be encoded through naturalselection. The interactionofcausal processes resultsinemergentproperties that lendacreative andunpredictableelementtobiologicalphenomena.We can comprehend a greatdeal about geological formationsor the appearanceofnew organic speciesby retrodiction,butwe cannot predict,forexample, the shape ofMt. St. Helensafterthe nexteruptionortheappearanceofa new strainofvirus.To have any understandingofthese phenomena requiresa holistic and historical view. Thewhole influencesthe partsas the parts influence the wholeand the systemmust be understoodas a dialecticalwhole thatis changing its configurationthroughtime in no simple pattern.The reductionistprogramhas provenextremely successfulin certain branches ofscience, notably physics, chemistry,molecularbiology and microbiology.Understandingofa systemrequiresanunderstandingofits components andofthe immanentforcestowhich itis subject. But at any leveloforganizationnew phenomenamay ariseas aresultofcontingencies. Contingencies arepropagatedby the interactionofcausal processes. Bybreaking the system into parts these interactionsare obscured. A reductionistprogramis25critical to understanding complex phenomenabut can neverprovide more thanpart ofthepuzzle.2.4 Explanation and PredictionThe aimofscience, forthe scientific positivist, is to finduniversal, deterministic lawswhichallow absolute prediction:The LawsofNature are man’s descriptive formulae ofuniformitiesofsequence, whichenable himto say, “Ifthis, thenthat”. (Thomson 1922,p.1168)The testofa scientific theory, onthis view, is its ability to make reliable predictions. On apositivist viewexplanationandprediction are symmetrical. Explaining aphenomenon is topredict its occurrence as a necessary consequence ofone or more law-like generalizations,the so-calleddeductivist orcovering law model ofscientific explanation(Hempel andOppenheim 1948). Prediction followsas a consequence ofsuecessfi.il explanation.Ona causal view ofscientific explanation asymmetries appearbetweenpredictionandexplanation. In ecology and the social sciences, forexample, we seemto be able toexplainwhy things happened the way they did, by retrodiction, without necessarily beingable topredict their future occurrences. Onthe other hand statistical correlationsthat are notbasedon causal relationsallow us to make predictionswithout any understandingofwhy thepredictionswill hold. Although predictionwill alwaysbe an important aimofscience,predictive certainty as the idealofscience belies the realityofnature. Endeavoring toexplain, to seekanunderstandingofthe phenomenawe experience, allowsus to recognizethe limits ofourability to control nature while giving us some capacity to anticipate and actin the face offundamental uncertainty. In the following discussion I will illustrate thedifferencesbetweenexplanationand predictionand argue thatexplanation is a morefundamental goal ofscience thanprediction.26Inthe biological and socialsciences, universal, deterministic laws have beenelusive8.Generalizations in these disciplines tendto be probabilistic, often having numerousexceptions, and tend to apply to geographically orotherwise restricted contexts.Generalizations might describe, forexample, the basicprocess ofevolutionary change, thehabitat requirementsofa species ofanimal or thedynamicsofinteractionbetween species.As these generalizations are conditional, habitat requirementsmay be slightly different atdifferent geographic locations orwithindifferentpopulations. Anomalies may occursuch asthe observationofa species occupying a hithertounknown habitat9.Similarly, the two-species interaction may be different in differenthabitats and/or may be profoundlyinfluenced in certain settingsby athird,fourth or fifth species. These kindsofgeneralizationsare subject to change via specific processesofevolution and/ortheemergence ofparticular contingencies.Suchconditional generalizations identify a regularity or cause “withoutknowingwhat the conditions are which are necessary for its causal efficacy” (Scriven1959, p.481).By identifyingthe relevant conditions apast event may be successfully explainedand theconditionsthat might lead to future occurrences anticipated.To say that the extinctionofthe Irishelk’° is to beexplainedby the swamping ofitshabitat, is to say that given a relevant set ofcircumstances, flooding caused theextinction.These circumstances might includeaspects ofclimate and terrain, and morphologicalfeaturesofthe animal thatprevented it from coping successfullywith its altered habitat.Other contingencies, such as the presence ofapredator, could have caused the extinction hadthey happened to occur. But inthis specific case we supposethatwe have anexplanationthatFor auseful discussionofthe nature ofgeneralizationsin the biological sciences see Mayr(1988) and in the social sciences see Maclntyre (1984).An interesting butunsubstantiatedexample isprovidedby a logger’s reportofa spotted owlfound nesting in an abandoned automobile.Preservationofthe spotted owls’ preferredhabitat, old-growth forest, has reducedthe area available forcommercial forestry in OregonandWashington, USA, creating a livelyconflictbetween loggers and environmentalists.10Thisexample is from Scriven (1959).27fits the facts aswe know them. In the future, ifwewere to perceive a similar speciesofanimal, having similarhabitat requirements, incircumstances similar to those ofthe Irishelkat the time ofitsextinction, we mightanticipate a similarevent. In this new situation,however, we face an assortment ofnew ecologicalcontingencies including, perhaps, ananimal that has developed behavioral and morphologicalfeatures different thanthe Irish ellc.Thus, extinction may not occur in thisnew case, while an extinction may occur in othercircumstances beyond ourexperience.The account given above suggeststhat the attempt to develop fixed, deterministiclaws may have limited application in at least some branchesofscience. Knowledge oftheliving world must continue to grow and change as organic systems keep changing andslipping away. Our inability to make firmpredictions, in such circumstances, seemsto bearlittle on the quality ofourknowledge. Toexplain the inability ofa science to producepredictive tools as indicative ofits immaturityas a science is facile. While the ability ofascientific discipline to forecastthe future improves as the discipline develops, the limitsofpredictive powerare ultimately imposed by the complex, contingent and evolutionary natureofthe phenomena, towards an understanding ofwhich biology and ecology have madeenormous strides.While I have arguedthat valid scientific explanations are possible withno guaranteeofprediction, it seemsequally clearthatprediction is possiblewithout explanation.Giventhe elevationofthe sun, forexample, we can predict the heightofa flagpole fromthe lengthofits shadow11.Clearly, the shadowdoesnotexplain the heightofthe flagpole. Toexplaininvolves identi1jingthe causal process involved, light fromthe sun passing or being blockedby the flagpole before casting a shadow when it reachesthe ground.In antiquity the tides could be reliably predicted. But not until Newtonproposed aconstant conjunctionwiththe cycles ofthe moon, and the mechanismofgravity, was itThe flagpole example is attributed to Sylvain Brombergerby Salmon (1984).28possible toexplain how they occurred. Even still, there was little reasonto believe thatwecouldexplain why the tidesoccurred in termsofproximal causes, until the theoreticalproposal, in the 20th century, ofgravitational fields thatprovided a causal connection.For an example fromecological science consider the use ofempirical correlationswith lake processes such as eutrophication. The correlationbetweenphosphorus loading andbiomassproduction can statistically account for the variation in productivity in lakes in thenorth temperate zone. But predictions fora particular lake may be substantiallywrong.Moreoverthe statistical correlation ignoresother systempropertiesthat may be critical tounderstanding aparticular lake. Lehman (1986) describes anexample wherein scientists usedempirical models to predict phosphorus concentrations in Northern Manitoba lakes subjecttohydro-electric development. While the models may have successfully predictedphosphorusconcentration, the actualecosystemalterations included fishery collapse, unacceptablemercury contamination, and excessive shoreline erosion. The model used could neitherpredict norexplain the unexpected results. In Lehman’s (1986, p.1161)words:...ifwe do not knowwhy aparticularrelationship conforms to the data, wecannot guesswhen itwill fail orifthe failure wouldbe catastrophic.Prediction requiresonly consistent correlation, not an identificationofcauses,althoughprediction may follow on causal explanation. Prediction, as the idealofscience,encourages us to ignore the openness and uncertainty in nature, and to lookonly forcertainty, forconstant conjunction. Simple correlationproducesa kindofillusion, asuperficial knowledge that overstatesourability to influence and control natural processes.The quest to answerwhy deepens ourunderstanding ofthe way the worldworks and forces arecognition that contingencies create the opportunity forunexpected results.In an important bookon the philosophy ofbiology, Elliot Sober argues thateventhough improbable events may be explained and that indeterminism may be a reality, ourstandardofexplanation should still be oriented toward a deterministic ideal:29.anexplanation need not be a prediction,but one property that makes anexplanation good is that it facilitatesprediction. (Sober1987. p.146)The deterministic ideal ofpredictivecertainty is a poorand potentially dangerousstandard for science fortwo reasons. First, there are numerousexamplesoflowprobabilityevents that appearto be ideally explained. Second it encouragesusto favorexplanationswitha high degree ofpredictive certainty when, in fact,explanations with low predictive powermay provide far more realistic characterizationsofthe phenomena in question. I will addressfirst the issue oflow probability explanation, leavingthe latter question to the endofthissection.There are numerous examples, fromphysicsandbiology, ofrelatively improbableevents that appeartobe completely explained. Radioactive decayevents in long-livedisotopes, forexample, are highly unlikely statistical events that nevertheless occurwithmeasurably high precision.Irreducibly stochastic events occur in the biological world as well. Suppose aMendelian genetic experiment employingpeablossomsproduces 3/4red blossoms and 1/4white blossoms. Exactly the same circumstances explainbothevents, althoughno individualevent can be predictedwith certainty. Is the occurrence ofa red blossombetterexplainedthan the occurrenceofawhite blossombecause it is more likely? In this case we apparentlyknow exactlywhy the 3:1 ratio occurs. There are no additional circumstancesthat mightcomplete ourexplanation in a fashionthatwould allow absolutepredictionofindividualevents. It appears that the occurrence ofawhite blossomis aswellexplainedas a redblossom.A deterministic ideal encouragestheview that science is not concernedwiththeexplanationofindividualevents but only with identilyingregularities. Thisview isunacceptable fortwo reasons. First, it is bythe anomalousevent thatwe expand ourunderstanding ofnature. Searching forregularityleadsus to reduce noisealthough variation30in perceived regularities frequently leadsto the discovery orconfirmationofadditionalcausal processes.Consideranexample, again from Salmon (1984,p.118):.the famouselectrondiffractionexperimentsofDavisson and Germer gaverise to statisticaldistributionsofscatteredelectronsthatwere quite puzzlingand quite outofharmonywiththe results Davissonpredicted on the basisofhis theory.These experiments were conducted in 1923 and repeated in 1925 before the puzzledDavisson, at a conference in Oxford, heard Born cite themas confirmatory evidence fordeBroglie’selectronwaves.Salmon documents anotherexample fromgenetics, involving controlled breeding ofred-eyed male fruit-flies withwhite-eyed females. In 200ofthe matings, the expecteddistributionof 1:1 white-eyedprogeny to redwasobserved. But in six matings almost all theprogeny were red-eyed. The investigators, ratherthan accepting that the regularity still held,recognizedthat anexplanationofthe anomalous phenomenonrequired “an investigationofthe chemical mechanisms ofthe ‘cheating genes” (Salmon 1984,p.118).The second objectionto the argument that science is not concernedwiththeexplanationofindividualevents is simply that it ignores a majoraspect ofthe scientificenterprise.We want to knowwhy aparticulardamcollapsed, orwhy aparticularairplanecrashed, orwhy aparticularsoldier contracted leukemia, orwhy aparticularteenagerbecame ajuvenile delinquent. (Salmon 1984,p.119)To say that science is not concernedwith specific events but onlywithregularities, isdiscordantwith a majormotivationofscience and, moreover, with the important role scienceplays in human affairs.Placing the onus on science to produce predictive toolsplaces it in aparadoxicalpositionwith respectto reality. The reality is that generalizations in the biological and socialsciencesmay inherently be predictivelyweak and that no law-like generalizations maybe31obtainable. To the complexity,contingency andevolutionary qualitiesofbiological systems,Maclntyre (1984) adds fourkindsofsystematic unpredictability inhuman affairs:1. Our capacity forradical conceptual innovation.2. The unpredictability ofmy futureby me.3. The game-theoreticnature ofsocial interactions.4. Contingency insocial systems.Undersuch circumstances I see noreason to suppose that generalizationswithhighpredictive power should be inherentlybetterthanthose with lowerpredictive power.Maclntyre cites anexample fromeconomicsthat makesthe point clear:forecasts produced on the basisofthe moresophisticated economic theoryfor OECD since 1967 haveproduced less successful predictions thanwouldhave been arrived at by using the common-sense,oras they say, naivemethodsofforecasting rates ofgrowthbytaking the average rate ofgrowthforthe last tenyears as a guide or ratesofinflationby assuming that the nextsix monthswill resemble the last sixmonths. (Maclntyre 1984, p.89)Simple correlations mayprovide betterpredictive tools but they lead us no furthertoward anunderstandingofthe dynamic nature ofthe systemand ofwhy its properties aredifficult to predict. While useful aspracticaltoolstheybeg the questionofwhy thepredictions hold and cannotexplain the circumstancesunderwhichpredictionswill fail.Predictivepower asthe sole standard forscienceencouragesus to remain naive and searchfor statistical regularitieswithhighpredictive power in the short-termbut negligibleexplanatorypower in the long-term.This is not to imply that more complex,realisticmodels arepreferable under allcircumstances. Predictive power isstill an important criterion forevaluating the adequacyofscientific models. Ludwig and Walters (1985)provide anexample fromfisheriesmanagement where a simpler, less realistic modelprovidesbetterestimatesofsurplusproductionbecause ofinadequate informationforparameterestimation ina complex, morerealistic model. The less complex model mayperformbetter as a forecasting tool becauseit32makes fewer incorrect assumptions aboutnoise in the system. In this case it still describes abasic causal relationbetween surplus productionand catch per uniteffort that reflectsthestate ofknowledge with respect to a specific fisheryand provides a useful management tool.An increase in model complexityunjustified by adequate knowledge ofits significancecreates an illusionofknowledge where infact additional research is required.The search forcorrelation, forlaws that couldpredict future events, without askingwhy, has produced much mischief. The attemptto correlate race with intelligence creates adangerous illusionofracial superiorityeven though more insightful research suggests thatthe correlations are due, in large part, to socialandenvironmental factors and to the nature ofthe testsofintelligence used. The turnofthe centuryscienceofeugenicswas regardedas avalid scientific enterprise in its time, appearing on manyuniversity curricula. Eugenicistssupported a hereditarianview ofsuch characteristics asdrunkenness and simplemindedness,and sought correlationsbetween such features and astatisticalanalysisofphysicalmeasurementthat might lead to selectivelybreedingout these characteristics (Farrall 1985).Around the turnofthis century, Karl Pearson, forexample,advocated measures toencourage England’s betterstockto have largerfamiliesand prevent its degeneratestockfrommultiplying. The goalwas toincrease the national efficiency and improve England’schances in the “struggle ofrace against race and nationagainstnation”2.In retrospectwe cansee that a hereditarian view fails to account forthe full range ofcausesofintelligence orsobriety, forthe causal interactionswith society and environmentthat alter human behaviorsuch that some characteristicsare passed on and somenot. The ideal ofcertainty encouragesthe eugenicist kindofview over onethat might say it is less clearthat we canpredict suchtraits as intelligence or sobriety. Theconsequence can be a gross restrictionofbasic humanrights.12These are Pearson’swords as quoted inFarrall (1985, p.303).33The search forpredictive power in forestryproduced the conceptofthe normal forestwhichwill be discussed in more detail in Chapters4 and 5. The conceptofthe normal forestbeganas anabstraction forthe purpose ofsimplif,’ing the problems offorest measurement.Fromthis grew the ideaofsimplifying the forest itselfforeconomic reasons and to simplifyyield forecasting (Lowood 1990). The potential losses in biodiversity accompanying asimplificationofthe spatial and temporal diversityofthe forest, prior to any inquiry into itsimportance, may create long-termproblems for the integrity offorestecosystems.We live in a perilousworldwhere the contingenciesofpopulation growth andenvironmental limits require us to actand science provides the most accessible informationto guide that action. Wewant to predict the harvest offarms, forests and fisheries, theincidence ofdisease, trends in the economy and the outbreakofwars. We can, and do, makeuse ofpredictive indices that have little explanatory power. But the predictionswe producerarely match ideally the realworldwe face:long-termprophecies can be derived fromscientific conditionalpredictionsonly ifthey apply to systemswhich can be described as well-isolated,stationary, and recurrent. These systemsare very rare in nature; and modemsociety is surely not one ofthem. (Popper 1963, p.339)We need to develop ourunderstandingofnatural systems inorderto understand thecircumstances inwhich ourpredictions fail. We must be waryofthe consequencesofprediction and leam to adjust and adapt as contingencies interpose onourpredictive models.In certainareas ofscience, molecularbiology forexample, thepositivist paradigmsofreductionismand determinism have provenextremely successful. But any general model ofscience hasto account forphenomenaat the macroscopic level as well. Prediction is afundamental partofthe scientific process and a critical aspect ofsociety’s mandate toscience. But the idealofpredictive certainty, to the extentthat it informs public policy, hasbeenthe source ofmany damaging illusions. A better ideal forscience, in my view, is that itconstantly andenergetically seek to broaden, deepenand re-evaluate ourunderstandingof34reality, a realitywritten in causalprocesses, propagated and interacting through space andtime.2.5 Is Science aMethod?The claimhas beenmade that the positive benefitofscience and the source ofitsdemarcation fromotherknowledge-seekingactivities are defined by its method:.those whowishto defend some privileged status forscientificknowledge...attemptto define some universal,ahistorical methodology ofscience which specifiesthe standards againstwhichputative sciences are to bejudged. (Chalmers 1990,p.11)The scientific positivist who arguesthat a meaningftil statement is one that can beempirically verified, and that scientificmethod is the way to gainempirical verification,might claimthat scientific method is the only wayto gain correct knowledge ofreality.On a standard textbookdefinitionofscientific method (e.g.Dellow 1970 orWilson1952), scientific knowledge beginswiththe collectionofdata, via observationandcontrolled, replicatedexperiments. The data are thensystematizedorordered until suchpointas an hypothesis can be posited, through inductiveinference, that might explain the apparentorder. The testofanhypothesis is a compañsonofits consequencesorpredictionswithempirical evidence. Predictions are made by deductive inference.If...repeatedexperiments show thatthe predictionsare consistently verified,the hypothesis iselevated to the dignity ofa law, and it can be used as afoundation for furtherwork. (Dellow 1970, p.22, author’sitalics)The processofhypothesis formation is the processofdiscovery in science. Onemethod by which hypotheses are generated is by inductiveinference. This involvesreasoningfrom specific information to moregeneral conceptsorprinciples. This may involve passiveobservationofinstancesofsimilarity, difference andco-variance, it may involvecomparison, it may involve the Baconianmethodofintervening in asystem and observingthe effectsor it may involve the use ofcontrolled, replicatedexperiments. Inthe lattercasethe aim is to limit the influence ofextraneousfactors in orderto more clearly see the35relationsofinterest. Hypotheses may also be developed on the basisofanalogy or metaphor.The mechanical philosophy ofDescartes is a large-scale metaphoror heuristic that hasgeneratedcountless scientific hypotheses.Hempel (1966) arguesthatthe processofhypothesis formation requires creativeimaginationand is not necessarily rational. Asanexample he offers Kekule’s discoveryofthe structureofthe benzene ring in adreamabout snakes. Similarly, Kepler’s study ofplanetary motion is said to have been inspiredby his interest in mystical doctrines and hisdesire to demonstrate the musicofthespheres (Hempel 1966).Anexaminationofthe processofhypothesis formation invites skepticismaboutauniversal scientific method. One way to remove this skepticism is to place the rationality anduniversalityofscience elsewhere in the processofscientific activity.scientific objectivity is safeguardedby the principle thatwhile hypothesesand theories may be freely invented andproposedin science, they can beaccepted into the bodyofscientific knowledge only ifthey pass criticalscrutiny, which includes in particularthe checkingofsuitable testimplicationsby careful observation orexperiment. (Hempel 1966,p.16,author’s italics)Popper (1963), whowas centrally concernedabout the logicalproblemofinduction,takes a similarposition. Hypothesesare to be seen as myths and the rationality ofscienceconsists only in its unflaggingly critical attitude toward suchmyths. A theory is neverconsidered to be true, it can onlybe falsifiedby flinging it againstthe world in a systematicway. To be scientific, an hypothesis must have deductive consequences that can be testedagainstempiricalevidence. Popper solved the problemofinduction by removing it as apartofrational science. On his view hypotheses could not be confirmed, as this involvesinductive inference, but only falsified given the success or failureoftesting its deductiveconsequencesagainstempiricalevidence.Butwhat is avalid testofan hypothesis? Whendo we decide that a theory orhypothesis hasbeen falsified and by what criteria do we decide to discard it? Chalmers36argues that Popper’s criteria, indeed allattempts to provide such criteria, fail to account forthe history ofscience.Chalmers offers Newton’sastronomy as anexample ofatheory facedby observationsincompatible with it butwhichpersevered and had a“dramatically successful career”.Similarly, Maxwell recognized that hiskinetic theory ofgases “could not possibly satisfy theknownrelation between the two specific heatsofallgases”3.However, Chalmers (1990,p.18) points out thatAllofthe considerable successesofthe kinetic theoryoccurredafterthedifficulty for the theorywas appreciated. (author’sitalics)Maclntyre’sexample fromeconomics, offered inthe lastsection, providesevidence ofahypothesis that has highexplanatory powereven though its test consequences failto matchreality. Inecology, deductive inferences frequently fail to match upwithempiricalevidencebecause oftransientor contingent conditions. Inpractice themodel is not discardeduntil itcan be determined that the failure is due to the model andnot to unforeseeable contingenciesinthe ecological systemtowhich the model doesnot apply. Themodel orhypothesis maystill provide meansofunderstanding the unexpected results. In 1990 record lowharvestsofcoho salmon in British Columbiawere not predicted by populationecologists. However, it isbelieved that the salmon changed their migratory route in apreviouslyunobservedway,perhapsdue to anElNino14event, suchthatthey were captured inAmericanwaters’5.Theunexpected result may be used to improvethe model by inductive inference.Thatthe deductive model ofscience is the only model is disputed by Kaplan:.we know the reason for something eitherwhenwe canfit it into a knownpattern, orelse whenwe can deduce it fromother known truths. (Kaplan1963, p.132)13As quotedby Chalmers (1990,p.18) from Maxwell’s firstpaperon the subject in 1859.‘‘ElNino events involve aperiodic warming ofocean currentsin the Pacific Ocean andassociated changes in characteristic weather.‘Frompersonal communicationwith Gordon Hansand DanaAtagiofthe Fisheries Institute,UniversityofBritish Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.37Kaplanprovidesexamplesofthe pattern method inbehavioralpsychology. Thismethodinvolvesexplaining aneventby identif’ing it as partofan organizedwhole. ConsidertheextinctionofIrishelk ona pattern model. We cannot predictthe extinction as a deductiveconsequence ofevolutionarytheory. But ifwe thinkofevolutionas apattern operatinginnature we can explain the extinctionby saying bow it fitsinto the patternofevolution.Moreover, the successful explanationofthe extinction lends inductivesupport to the generaltheory ofevolution.The argument has beenmade thatevolution is not a scientifictheorybecause it does not fit the deductivemodel (Peters 1976).Sober (1987) providescompellingevidence to the contrary, butevenifevolutionary theory doesnot fit the deductivemodel, itssuccess asa scientific theoryisevident in its explanatory power.Arguably, the extinctionofIrish elk canbe consideredas a deductive consequence,by retrodiction, ofevolutionarytheory. Todo sowe are required toconstrue the rulesofdeductive inference ina way ratherdifferentfromthe rules fordeductiveinference sciencehas traditionally followed.On Hempel’s (1966) view,forexample, a deductiveinference is anecessary consequenceoflaw-like generalizationsandinitial conditions. Inecologyorsociology where no law-likegeneralizationshave appeared,deductive inference wouldappearto follow a differentmodel. As a resultofcontingencymodel predictions neverideally match reality. The theoryormodel must be continuallyadjusted by inductiveinference as a resultoftest consequences.Nelson Goodmansuggests thatthis may not be aproblem:Principlesofdeductiveinference arejustifiedby their conformitywithaccepted deductive practice.Theirvalidity dependsupon accordance with theparticulardeductive inferenceswe actually sanctionand make. Ifa rule yieldsinacceptable inferences,we drop It as invalid. (Goodman1965, p. 63-64)Goodman’s remark soundscuriously to me likejusti1iingthe rulesofdeductiveinference by induction. In fact, inductiveand deductive logic bothplay important roles in theprocessofscience:38...ifwe were to reject induction, there wouldbe noway inwhich anyscientific generalization could be established on the basisofempiricalevidence. (Salmon 1984, p.249)Inductive inference plays an important role in the creationofhypotheses and in the processofdeveloping theory. Asthe deductive consequencesofa theory are comparedwithevidencethere is aprocessofinductionby enumerationthat contributes to the overall acceptability ofthe theory. Deductive inference and inductive inference are bothnecessary tools thatinterplay in the process ofscientific inquiry.Dellow indicated that the standardofsciencewasto discover law-likegeneralizations. That this standard may be unachievable by many scienceswithoutcompromising theirability to broadenourunderstandingofnature is indicative ofthe wayscientific standards have changed throughtime. As ourunderstandingofthe worldhasgrown, ourexpectationsofknowledge about it has had to keep pace. FollowingHume,science sought to discoverconstant conjunctionbetween cause andeffect but, aswe haveseen, Newton’s gravitational theory made it fashionable to be agnostic regardingcausesandseekcorrelations. I have argued that contemporary science andphilosophy have solved, atleast at the macroscopic level, the Newtonianproblemofaction-at-a-distanceandtheHumeanproblemofcausal connection. The aimofscience, as I see it, is to discoverthenetworkofcausal processes that can provide an understandingorexplanationofnaturalphenomena. Events at the sub-atomic level suggestthatouraprioriview ofthe worldmaychange yet. Action-at-a-distance in quantumphysics may ultimately be explainedby thediscoveryofsome mechanism currently unknownto us or, on theviewofthe distinguishedphysicist StevenWeinberg, it may be accounted for by a geometric descriptionofnature ofan unfamiliarvariety:• ..1 strongly suspect that ultimatelywe will find that the four-dimensionalnature ofspace-time is another one ofthe illusory concepts that have theirorigin in the nature ofhuman evolution, but that must be relinquished asourknowledge increases.1616quoted in Salmon (1984, pp.258-259).39The various methods and the changing standards ofscience support the argument thatno universal, ahistorical method ofscience is to be found. No regimented definitionofscientific method seems able to account forthe complexity ofthe scientific process:Science has not one aimbut many, and its development has passedthroughmany contrasted stages. It is therefore fruitlessto look for a single, all-purpose ‘scientific method’: the growthandevolutionofscientific ideasdepends on no one method and will always call forabroad rangeofdifferentenquiries. Science as awhole - the activity, its aims, its methods and ideas -evolves by variationand selection. (Toulmin 1961, p.17)Chalmers arguesthatthe methods ofscience are relative to historically contingentstandards. Methods and standards canbeevaluatedby the extent to whichthey serve the aimofscience:How the aimofscience is to be evaluated is certainly relativeto otheraimsand interests, but once that aim is adopted, then the extent to whichvariousmethods and standards serve it is not a matterofsubjectiveopinion, but amatterofobjective fact to be practically established. (Chalmers 1990, p.8)Nagel (1961) sees the difference between science and common sense as lying in itscritical attitude. There is no special set oftechniquesor rulesofdiscovery that can guaranteethe successofthe scientific enterprise; there is only..the deliberate policy ofscience toexpose its cognitive claimsto the repeatedchallenge ofcritically probative observational data. (Nagel 1961, p.12)Nagel argues that no setofrules can guarantee satisfactory explanations noreliminate everypersonalbiasor source oferror..no antecedently fixed set ofrules can serve asautomatic safeguards againstunsuspected prejudicesand other causesoferror that might adversely affectthe course ofthe investigation. (Nagel 1961, p.13)We might reasonably conclude that.the scientist has no othermethod than doing hisdamnedest.17‘This quote is attributedto P.W. Bridgman by Kaplan (1963, p27).40How can science be characterized, ifnot by its method? The aimofscience is toexplain the events that occur in the world around us, by developing general knowledge thatcan be interpreted in specific cases. As Chalmersargues, the methodsofscience can beobjectivelyevaluated ontheirpractical merits in contributing to thisaim. Bad ortrivialscience is to be distinguished not on the basisofits failure to adhere to appropriate methodsbut for its failure to contribute to acceptable causal explanationsofthe phenomenaweexperience. The objectivityofscience cannot be guaranteed by method but only supportedby anopenand critical mind.2.6 The ObjectivityofScienceWhat is the nature ofscientific knowledge? On one hand science is viewed as purerationality and objectivity, seeking to describe the world as it is. Ifwe acceptthat oursensualexperience ofthe world is real and that it correspondsto an objective reality, science is nomore thanthe attempt todescribe and explainthat reality. At this level there is subjectivityinscience because there is no possibility for scientistsofsensing the worldin away that is notconditioned by theirexperience asan individual in a society. At another level science is seenas being subjective because it is grounded in particular, historical situationswhere it hasserved the prevailing ideology. Anenvironmentalistmight argue that science has beenmandated to develop meansofexploiting and dominating nature and ourknowledge ofnature is skewedby this emphasis.Marcello Cmi (1991) writesthatscientific knowledge is neitherpure objectivity norpure subjectivity. Itsimply reflects, in its fonns and in the means it utilizes forrepresentingnature, the influence and conditioningofthe surrounding social context.Expressed in different terms, science providesuswith an image ofthe worldthat hasbeenconstructed and is continually remodeled through a selectionofthose aspectsofthe surrounding realitywhich, indeterminate social andhistorical conditions, appearproblematic to the community ofthose who areinvolved in this enterprise. There is no doubt that this image incorporatesobjective propertiesofwhat lies outside - ifitwere not so, our species already41would have beenextinct for some time - but it remains animage constructedby and for us. (Cmi 1991, p.40)Science and scientists do notjusttry tounderstand theworld, they also live in it. Theobjectivity ofscience is compromised, in a sense, becausescience is a social enterprise.Science is sanctioned and funded by the societyofwhich it is a part. Scientists are humanbeingswith individual social and moralpointsofview. The choice ofphenomenato studyandthe approach to that study may reflect thevaluesofthe scientist, ofa society in aparticularhistorical context and/orthe concernsofa ftrnding agency. While scientists maystrive to be objective and value-free thehistorical contextwithinwhich they operateinfluences the kindsofquestionsthey mayask.The science ofeugenicswas a legitimate scientificenterprise in its time thatcontributed to our current understanding ofhuman genetics. But the motivationfor a scienceofeugenics came fromelements in a fadingempire thatblamed its decline onthe inherentmoral laxity ofthe inferiorraceswho nonethelessbred at a disproportionatelyhigh rate.Science mandated to discoverameansofbreeding drunkenness outofthe Britishpeople isunlikely to discoverthe full range ofcauses having apropensity to result in drunkenness.There are manyexamplesofhow scientificresearchcan be mandatedby fundingsources and othersocial institutions.Simberloffnoted that the Ecosystem StudiesProgramoftheAmerican National Science Foundationhad twice the budgetbut only halfthe proposalsofthe GeneralEcology Program.He argued.that the ecosystemparadigm is seductiveoneconomic grounds alone,independent ofeitherphilosophical orbiological considerations. (Simberloff1980, p.29)A clearerexample is providedby the agriculturalmechanization suitbrought againstthe University ofCalifornia in the 1980s.The suit, whichwas decided in favouroftheclaimant, argued that research conducted at the UniversityofCaliforniawas skewedtowards‘This infonnationwaspresented in a lecture by DavidNoble ofDrexel University,Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at the RobsonSquare Media Center, Vancouver, B.C., November27, 1987.42the agro-corporationsand could not be used by small farmers. The university was orderedtoprepare a plan forresearchdesignedto help the whole spectrumofthe public.As an example ofscientific innovationthathad negative benefits forthe ruralagriculture community considerthe mechanicaltomatoharvester. It reduced the unit cost ofharvesting tomatoesbut its prohibitive capital cost made it compatible onlywitha highlyconcentrated and extensive style ofgrowing. The numberoftomato growers in Californiadeclined fromroughly four thousand inthe early 1960s to some six hundred in the 1970switha reductionofanestimated 32000jobs19.The artifactual consequence was a profoundalterationofthe social fabric ofrural California.The mannerby whichscientific research is mandated can skew ourperceptionofreality. Forest researchhas focussed ondeveloping growthand yield modelsofcommercialtree species, on breeding programs to improve the genetic make-up ofthese species and onsilvicultural techniques for improving their growth and yield. The mandate forscience wasto find ways to increase theyield ofmerchantable wood fibre. What has resulted is an imageofthe forest as a simplified tree farm. In recentyearsresearch in the remaining primaryforest hasbegunto reveal how little this image capturesofthe complexities offorestecosystems. This researchhas been motivated in partby theenvironmental movementbutalso by concerns thatthe current stateofscientific knowledge about the forest and thecurrent levelofpractice are inadequate to sustain forests capable ofproducing thewide rangeofamenitiesthatwe currently enjoy.Scientists are largely motivatedby a compelling desire to attempt to understand thephenomenaofthe world around them. To a certainextent the kindsofquestionsthat scienceasks and the state ofscientific knowledge will reflect the mandate providedby uiindingagencies and ultimately, in ademocratic society, the public. The desire toextract morewealth from forestsproduced the image ofthe simplifiedconiferplantationwhereenergy is19thisexample is fromWinner(1980).43notexpended on otherspecies. Public and scientific concerns over thisagenda have helped tocreate a new mandate to research forests in a more holistic fashion.The history ofscience providesexamplesofscience conducted in spite ofits socialand historical context and in spite ofthe oppositionofthe prevailing ideology.Galileo,Newton, Darwin and Einsteinconductedtheirresearcheson mechanics, planetary motionand naturalevolutionnot to topple the prevailingviewsbut rather, with gravemisgivingsregarding the consequencesoftheir findings. Galileowas censured by the Inquisitionfor hisworksupporting the heliocentric cosmology. Darwinoriginallyplanned not topublish hisworkbecause offears it would upset hiswife’s Christian sensibilities.Theireffortsare theresultofattempting to see the world “without superstitionor imposture”. Being open to thephenomenaand being critical ofmy preconceptions,biases and personal ideology are theonly sense I have ofwhat it meansto be objective.The formsofscience are designed to helpme see objectivelybut make no guaranteeofthe objectivityofmy findings.I have presented science as an activity that attemptsto develop general knowledgethat can be used to interpret specific instances.For integrated sciences, at least, there isalwaysvariation between generalizationand reality. Science is both a theoreticaland aninterpretive discipline. Thesignature ofscience is a critical attitude towards its currentstateofknowledge.Science is acultural activity and islargely mandated by the society withinwhich itexists. A growing awarenessofthe impactsofhuman activity on the globalenvironmenthasfocussed attention on the scienceofecologyas the means to ameliorate environmentaldegradation. I will turn next to theissueofecology as science and issuesofspecialsignificance to the scientific study ofthe environment.443. ECOLOGY AS SCIENCEThe study ofnature and the search for pattern and harmonywithin it go back, nodoubt, as long as people have had occasion towonder. The termecology comes fromtheGreekwordoikos meaning house. The beginningsofecology as a science are rooted in theDarwinian revolutioninbiology whichpromoted a slow shift in perceptionoftheworld asfixed, orderly and immutable to aperceptionofthe world as orderly, in a sense, but at thesame time contingent, and thus dynamic. The Germanbiologist Ernst Haeckel’searlydefmitionofecology in 1870 still containsthe essence ofmodern scientific ecology:[Ecology involves]...the investigationofthe total relations ofthe animal bothto its inorganic environment and to its organic environment - in aword,ecology is the studyofall the complex interrelations referred to by Darwin asthe conditionsofthe struggle forexistence.’Ecology is a science ofthe relationships between living beingsand other living beings andwiththeirenvironment. As a consequence, it is a polymorphic discipline, encompassingpureand applied science involved in the study ofplants and animals living in marine andterrestrial environments.A growing bodyofevidence, coupledwithpublic recognitionofthe impact ofhumanity on its environment, have raised the profileofscientific ecology as a means ofunderstanding the global environmentand mitigating biotic impoverishment and ecologicaldegradation. Asthe 21st century approacheswe are facedwiththeeffectsoflarge-scaleindustrialpollution, natural resource depletionand speciesextinctions due to habitatdestruction. The limits ofthe environment impose on ourgrowthas a species and as aculture.The expectationsplacedonecology have beentemperedby itsperceived inability tomake substantial contributionsto the resolutionoftheenvironmentalproblems confronting‘Asquoted in Kormondy (1976, p.x).45us. Some writers have suggested that this state ofaffairs is due to thejuvenile nature ofecology as science2.On this view, ecology eitherhas not yet developed a comprehensivetheoretical frameworkfromwhich predictive tools can be constructed; orwastes too mucheffort developingtheory without enough attentiontoempirical generalization.In spite ofthese methodologicaldebates, G. M. Woodwell, forexample,argues that.there is a difference ofseveral ordersofmagnitude betweenwhatwe knowabout nature and whatwe do about managing ourwastes. (Woodwell 1989,p.15)Ifwe know more about natural systemsthan we put to use, whatare the barrierstothe implementationofecological knowledge?One is ourbasic human aversionto change.Ecological knowledge often suggeststhatwe must alterorlimitwhatmay be culturallyingrained and/or lucrative activities. It is difficult to tellfishersthey cannot fishor loggersthey cannot log. It is difficult to impose costsonorshut downan industry that contributesemployment andtaxdollarsto the national economy.The fact that ecological knowledge is easy to questionprovidesa second, moretangible obstacle to its application. Ecological systemsare extremely complex, contingentand historical in nature. Each new problemmust be treated asa unique experimentwithoutexact controlsorreplicates. The complexity and contingencyofecological phenomenapreclude a reductionist approach. Knowledge abouta systemmustbe accumulatedbyformalizedtrial anderrormethods and adjusted constantly as newcontingencies arise.Ecological knowledge comes not in the formoftight causal proofs,ofconstant facts,but in the formofa story about the present, based on the presentand recentpast, thatsuggests how the story may proceed into the future. A good storyis based onempirical data,on causal relations, onboththeoretical and empirical generalizationsand on experience.Theproject ofecological science is to build up a kit ofconceptual tools,boththeoretical andempirical, that facilitate the telling ofauseful and plausible story. A good story ofanykind2See, forexample, Peters (1991) and MacFadyen (1975).46correctly interprets the available facts butthe totality offacts regarding ecologicalphenomenamay be beyond ourreach for fundamental and practical reasons. The nature ofthe subject, in this case ecologicalphenomena, may not permit the kindofcertainknowledgeacclaimedby positivist philosophy as the goal ofscience.The integrityofecological science has also been questioned because ofits confusionwith various ecologisms. Elements in the environmental movement have, sometimesjustifiably, sometimes questionably, appropriatedecological knowledge to ground moral andpolitical positions. The conceptofecology has beenbroadenedto include notjust the scienceofecology but anunsecuredbeliefthat any change ordisturbance to the natural world iswrong. This normative use ofthe wordecology clearly transcends the scientific quest tounderstand nature and cloudsthe issue ofecology as science. The emphasisofthis chapterwill be onecology as science.The chapterbeginsby characterizing the nature ofecological phenomenaandwillillustrate how ecological knowledge is constrained by the nature ofits subject matter. Thebriefhistoiy ofecology has beendominated by two debates thatwillbe discussed in theremainderofthe chapter. The first debate centers around the assumptionthatthere is anappropriate object ofstudy forecological science. Shouldecologists study organisms,populations, communities orecosystems? The seconddebate revolves around the questionofhow to study ecologicalphenomena. Isecology inductive science ordeductive science,empirical science ortheoretical science?Bothofthese debates are based, in my view, onamisguided adherence to thepositivist ideology that dominatedecological thought until around the middle ofthis centuiyand is still prevalent. In the first halfofthis centuryecology was concernedwith developinguniversal theory thatwould provide predictive certainty. Emphasiswas on findingtheappropriate methodsand spatiotemporal scale by which universal pattern couldbe identified.By recognizing that universal pattern and, thus, predictive certainty are beyond the sights ofscientific ecology we can move beyond these debates and re-assess the kindofknowledge47that ecology canprovide. Thiswill lead to a more productive role forecology in the socialdebate on human agency in the environment.Ecology provides conceptual tools in the formofconditional generalizations that canbe used to interpret specific contexts. The nature ofthe phenomenaprecludesthe attainmentofuniversal, certain knowledge by ecological science. The extremeenvironmentalmovementand the extreme industrial movementmake the same mistake in assuming thatsome kindofcomplete scientific knowledge dictateswhatour future course mustbe.Environmentalistsuse science to support an agendaofpreservationwhile industrialists usethe same science to support anagendaofexploitation. The kindofknowledge thatecologycanproduce is ratherdifferentand suggestsa more subservient and supportive role forecology in the socialprocess ofpublic policy-making.3.1 TheNatureofEcological PhenomenaEcology covers a field so wide that a reductionist approach is tempting. But no onefundamentalunitofstudy can account forthe complexityofecological phenomena. Inphysics, chemistry and many aspects ofbiology the unitofstudyis relatively discrete. Theecologist, however, must copewith a muchlargerrange ofobservation classes. In ordertodevelop an understanding ofecological phenomena, theecologist must have athoroughgrounding in physics, chemistry and biology, and thenaddress the interactionbetweenindividual and environment, the dynamicsofpopulationsofindividuals, andofinteractingpopulations, and the flowofenergy and nutrients in the environmentin relationtointeracting populations.Thatecology cannot agree on a single unit ofstudy is a consequenceofthe hierarchyofcomplexity and notjust a symptomofill-healthor immaturity in ecological science. Thepopulation, the community and the ecosystem are levels ofabstraction that have produceduseful concepts forunderstandingecological phenomena. But no one type ofobservation48class can be expected to uni1,’ ecological science. Theecologist must retain a broadperspective evenwhile focussing on specific aspectsofthe more complexsystem.In addition to being complex, ecologicalphenomenaare, in G.G. Simpson’s term.configurational:The unchanging propertiesofmatterand energy... are immanent in thematerial universe. The actual state ofthe universe orofanypartofit at agiven time, its configuration, is not immanent and is constantly changing.(Simpson 1963,p.24, author’s italics)The interactionswithin and betweenpopulations andcommunitiesoforganisms and theenvironment result in new causal processes that cannot be foreseen from an understandingofthe immanentpropertiesofthe system. Ecologicalphenomena are historical phenomena andecological science is notjust the quest for immanent properties but also the interpretationofhistory. The trajectories ofpopulations, communities and ecosystemsare not linear. It ispossible, forexample, to know the mechanisms ofseed dispersal in aplant community butnot be able to predict the arrangement ofthe plant community. Seeds may be dispersedbywind but then be subject to secondary dispersal by animals. Contingency lends a creativedimensionto ecological phenomenathat, by itself, places thembeyond the scope ofdeterministic science.While the configurationofecological phenomena is dynamic in response tocontingencies, the componentsofecological phenomenaare themselves in a constantprocessofchange in response to contingencies. Change occursthroughorganic evolutionwhichinvolves random genetic mutationand natural selection in response toenvironmentalcontingencies. Change alsooccursthroughthe capacityofliving things to propagate causalinfluence in response to contingent informationvia sensory processes. Many speciesoforganisms have the ability to learn new behaviors andto teachthese behaviors to theiroffspring. Behavioral adaptations by individualswill in turn affect the structureofpopulations and communities.49Ecological phenomenaare subjectto the unpredictabilityofvariousenvironmentalagents. Global and local weatherpatterns may be deterministic but in a chaotic way. Theymay be statistically predictable oververy large spatiotemporal scales although there appearsto be sporadic randomnesseven at this scale. At local, particular levelsofscales the chaoticbehaviorofweathermay be intractable to prediction. We may be able to predict thatlightning stormswill occurbut notwhere lightningwill strike andwildfireswill start.Weatherandweather-relatedevents suchas storms, wildfires and insectepidemics arecritical forcesoperatingonecologicalphenomena. While the larger forces atwork in theecosphere, wind and ocean currents, continental drift and mountain building, may bepersistentoverrelatively short times, their consequences for local, particularecologicalphenomena may be far less predictable.The study ofecological phenomena, thus, entails the search for immanentpropertiesgoverning ecosystembehaviorbut also the historical determinantsofconfigurationalsequences. Ecology, like geology, sociology andeconomics, differs fromphysics orchemistry in that it is a historical science. Ecologistsstudy specific aspectsofecologicalphenomena in orderto construct theory, principles, concepts, and laws thatcanbe used toexplainorunderstandwhyecologicalphenomenaare structured in the way they are and howthey might proceed into the future.Ultimately nature is historically-bound; it is an unreplicable experiment. It isnecessary tobound nature in space and time to develop an understandingofconcrete aspectsofit. The issue ofspatiotemporal scale is critical to an assessmentofthe predictability ofecological phenomena:•..ecology cannot set up a single spatiotemporal scale thatwill be adequate forall investigations. Asa result, ecologistsmust be careful not toextrapolatefrom any single type ofobservation to the nature ofthe underlying system.(O’Neill et al. 1986, p.19)At small spatiotemporal scales, where the phenomenacan be abstracted to a small numberofcomponents, ecological systems appear to be essentially deterministic (P1mm 1991, O’Neill50et al. 1986). Population dynaimcsofsingle species and two-species interactions, forexample, have been successfully modelled in the short-term at least (Kingsland 1985).Similarly, veiy large number systems, where there is a large numberofcomponents that areindependent andessentially identical, appear to be statisticallypredictable. The behaviorofgases follows this model.Ecological phenomena fall into the category ofmiddle numbersystems (O’Neill etal.1986). As scale is expanded the interactionsbetween componentsofthe systembecomeincreasingly critical tounderstanding the dynamicsofthe system (Pimm 1991).There are too many components to describeeach by a singleequation; thereare notenoughto simply average properties. (O’Neillet al. 1986, p.44)Structured interrelationshipsproduce contingencies and local, particularphenomenaare also subject to contingencies as a result ofchaotic weather-related effects. Thesecontingenciesencourage evolutionary and behavioral changes in organismsthatare inpartrandom. Takenall together, the implication is that a certain degree ofstochasticity oruncertainty is anessential featureofecological phenomena.Certainty is beyond the graspofecology andecologists must continuallyre-assessand adjust their interpretationofecological phenomena. Like the Bhuddist novice theecologist must learn to live withthe questionratherthan hopingfor an ultimate answer.3.2 What Do Ecologists Study?In his classic treatise on humanity and nature, Glacken (1967, p.413)wrote:I amconvinced that modemecologicaltheory, so importantinourattitudestoward nature and man’s interference with it, owes its origin to thedesignargument: The wisdomofthe creator is self-evident, everything in thecreation is interrelated, no living thing is useless, and allare related one to theother.Perhaps the oldestecological theory is the ideaofa balance-of-nature. The birthofecology as a science corresponds to the transformationofthis idea “fromadivinelyorderednature to an order generatedby nature itselfviaevolution” (McIntosh 1980, p.204). The51debate surrounding the ideaofharmony or balance in nature and about how to study thenaturalworld began, inearnest, with Gleason’s (1926) individualistic conceptofthe plantformationand the challenge it posed for Clements’ (1916) supraorganismic model ofplantformation.The formation, community, association, coenose or society were concepts applied inthe searchfor fundamental unitsofrecurring groupsofspecies (McIntosh 1985). The processofchange in ecological formations had been recognized in the late 19th century, notably byThoreau, whoprovidedthe termsuccession, and by Warming in 1895, in his OecologyofPlants, anearly classic in theecological literature (McIntosh 1980). Cowles, who studied theforestsofthe easternUnited States around the turnofthe 20th century, wasthe firstpersonto systematically study the successionofplantcommunities, endeavoring to discover lawsthatwould govern the processesofchange. McIntosh sums up Cowles’ contributionbynoting that he...established the phenomenaofplant succession as fundamentaltoecologicalthought, but the laws and theory he sought remainelusive to this day.(McIntosh 1980, p.208)Inspired by Cowles, Clements formulated what he consideredto be adeductiveuniversal systemto describe ecological succession. Clements believed the plant communityto be integrated like an individual organism. He postulated an orderly succession inwhichpioneerspecies are establishedon a disturbed site and subsequently change the environment,facilitating the establishmentofseralspecies. As a group ofspecies replaces another, thehabitat is increasingly controlledby the organisms, leading to a stable, self-reproducing,climax community.Clementswas influenced, by his ownadmission, by the positivismand organismicphilosophy ofHerbert Spencer. The idea that ecologicalunitswere organismic wholes, theproperties and successionofwhich could be describedby deterministic laws and theory, wasseductive to ecologists at atime “when Comtian Spencerianpositivismwas almost a religion52to scientists” (Worster 1977,p.212). In viewing the plant community as an organismic wholeand as the fundamental unit ofecological inquiry, Clements’ holismwas a kindofnaivereductionism. The complexities ofecological phenomenawere reduced to a singlespatiotemporal scale fromwhichpredictive models could be developed.Clements’ positivist view ofplant communities and the promise ofdeterministicmodelsofplant succession were alsoofinterest to the growing community ofpeopleinterested in forestry (Rodgers 1951). They fittedwell with the ideasof19th century Germanforestrywhichwere attracting interest in the United States at the turnofthe 20th century.The Clementsianview ofsupraorganismic communities asevolving integratedentitieswithhomeostatic properties formedthe dominant view inAmericanecology priorto 1950(McIntosh 1985).The challenge to Clements’ holistic determinism came from Gleason, whobelieved.that the associationwas a productoflargely chance arrival oforganismsselected by acontinuously varying environment and held that the resultsofsuccession need not follow in any orderly, predictable way. (McIntosh 1980,p.211)Gleason’s questioning ofthe objective reality ofthe plantassociationwaspublishedthreetimesbetween 1917 and 1939 but was largely ignored until Ca. 1950 when it beganto beusedby anew generationofecologiststo attackthe Clementsianparadigm (Simberloff1980, p.17).The supraorganismwasattacked as afortuitous abstraction and the assumptionthatthe community causes its owndevelopmentand persistencewas criticizedas anaprioriexplanation, ratherthan anempirically derived mechanism. Raup (1981, p.1), forexample,described his disaffectionwiththe successiontheoryofClements and Cowles:.Jbeganto be suspiciousofClements’ emphasisonbiological succession as asystemfor interpreting the historyofthe vegetation in any given spot... Ibegan towonderwhetherany “dynamic” interpretationofpresent vegetationcould be projectedbackward or forwardthroughthe changes in landform,climatesand soils thatwe know have occurred since the ice disappeared,many ofwhichare still going on.53Clements’ idea ofthe plant community as a supraorganism held out the hope ofadescriptionofthe vast complexityofnatural systems. The resurrectionofGleason’s ideaswas, in effect, an acceptance that what orderwas apparent in nature could best be accountedforby studying the populationsthat made up an assemblage. The new populationecologywas reductionist in a different sense than Clements’ idealistic holism. Populationswerethought to represent an integration ofthe forcesofnatural selection and thus, no aprioriessential forces needed to be posited to account forecosystembehavior. Anecosystemcouldbe viewed as the sumofits populations and their interactions.Simberloff(1980) saw the demise ofClementsianecology as a victory formaterialismoveressentialism. There are twoways to interpret this claimofvictory. It couldbe seen as supporting areductionist view; aplantand/oranimal community is an assemblageofpopulations, not a supraorganism. A secondway to understand the succession oftheGleasonian paradigmis that while ecologistsacceptedthatecosystems or communities orassemblagesdisplayed emergentproperties, they believed that the best way to produce theoryandpredictive models and develop an understandingofthe whole wasthrough a reductionistapproach.The workofLotka, Volterra, G.F. Gause and Pearlearlier in the century hadproduced a bodyofmathematical theory to describe populations and two-speciesinteractions. The successofRaymond Pearl’sworkon humandemography, Chapman,Nicholson, and Andrewarthaand Birchon insect populations, and Graham’s modelling offishpopulationsprovidedpowerful tools for managing natural populations thatwere socioeconomically important (Kingsland 1985). Thus, therewere practical concerns that gaveimpetus to the new theoreticalpopulationecology aswell as the desire ofecologiststodevelop apredictive science along the linesofphysics and chemistry. Pearl, who had beenprofoundly influenced by Pearson’s The GrammarofScience and later studiedwithPearson in London, took the positivist view that the logistic curvewas a lawofnature(Kingsland 1985).54Hutchinson and MacArthurexpanded the use ofmathematical theoiy to the studyofcommunities. MacArthuracknowledged the complexityofecological systems and therole ofhistory and contingency but believed that forecology to becomeascience it must search forpattern:We use ournaturalist’sjudgment to pick groups large enough forhistory tohave played a minimal role but smallenough sothatpatterns remainclear.(MacArthur 1972, p.177)MacArthur’s approach remainedreductionist, in a sense, in searching fora levelofscale where invariantpatternwill emerge.The dichotomy between Clements and Gleasonbeginsto dissolvewhenthe effectsofspatiotemporal scale are introduced. Clements addressed temporaldynamicswhile ignoringspatial variability. Gleason tookthe opposite approach,emphasizing spatial patternwith lessattention to temporal concerns (O’Neillet al. 1986).Ineffect they were addressing differentaspectsofthe same problem.The difficulty ofaddressing ecological phenomena at appropriate spatiotemporalscalesencouraged the developmentofthe ecosystemconceptand the introductionofsystemstheory to ecology. Tansley introduced the term ecosystemin a 1935 paper in thejournalEcology:But the more fundamental conception is, as it seems tome, the whole system(in the sense ofphysics), including not only the organism-complex, but alsothe whole complexofphysical factors forming whatwecall the environmentofthe biome - the habitat factors inthe widest sense.It is the systems so formedwhich, fromthe pointofviewoftheecologist, are the basic unitsofnature on the face ofthe earth.These ecosystems, aswe may call them, are ofthe most variouskindsand sizes. They formone categoryofthe multitudinous physical systemsofthe universe, which range fromthe universe as awhole downto the atom.3Lindemann, and later E.P. and H.T. Odumelaborated the trophic-dynamic aspectsofecosystems, focussing on trophic organizationand the movementofenergy andnutrients inAs quoted in Golley (1993, p.8).55the system (McIntosh 1985). Emphasiswasplaced on theecosystemas the fundamental unitofstudy forecology:Ecosystems are real... they have in themcertain general structural andfunctional attributesthat are recognizable, analyzable and predictable.(Kormondy 1976, p.1)E.P. Odum, rather like Clements, described the ecosystem as orderly, directional andpredictable, being controlledby organisms. The ecosystemconsistsofbiotic and abioticelements that form a unitofco-evolution. The study ofecosystems introducedthermodynamics, general systems theoty and informationtheory to ecology. Various writersargued that “systems analysis is the scientific method itself’ (McIntosh 1980, p.228).Odum’sidealistic holism, like Clements’ organismic holism is a kindofnaive reductionism.Thepositivist ideal is still present in the search for invariant pattern.In a recent decades there hasbeen a shift inecology from idealistic holismtowhat Levinsand Lewontin (1985)calldialectical holismand Norton (1991) calls contextual holism.A system consists oftwoormore interacting components surroundedby anenvironmentwithwhich it may or may not interact (O’Neill etal. 1986). Systems areeveryday componentsofhuman existence, notjust inecology, but in the worldofmachinesand social institutions. Ecosystems display organized complexity although componentsdonot have a common aimand the idea that the ecosystemcan be conceptualized asa systemdoes not imply any aprioricommitment to the ecosystemasa supraorganism.Anecosystemmay preserve an internal configurationwith slow gradual alterations in that configuration:The ecosystem is still a systemevenifit is conceptualized as having a quitedifferent organizationthan the organism. (O’Neillet al. 1986, p.39)The ecosystem is a levelofabstraction atwhichpattern in biotic organizationandabiotic processes, and historical contingencies can be recognized. Ecosystemssuch as lakesandwatersheds are relatively discrete in space and are functionally integrated. They are,however, not necessarily orderly or predictable. They are still partofthe wholebiospherewhere new contingencies arise.56Anecosystem is not a functional whole that determines the behaviorofitscomponents nor is it simply the sumofits components. It is a level oforganization thatshows structural uniformity while integrating basic physical, chemical and biologicalprocesses in a historical context. The ecosystem integrates lower levelsoforganization suchas atom, cell, organism and biotic assemblage. New systemspropertiesemerge at each leveloforganization in response to interacting causal processes. Anecosystem is best understoodas adialecticalwhole (Levins and Lewontin 1985) where the parts influence the whole as thewhole influences the parts. Norton (1991) callsthis contextual holism. The parts must beunderstood in the context oflargersystems and nowhole is “reified” as absolute.In a substantial review, O’Neill et al. (1986) noted that muchofcontemporaryecology canbe divided into population/communityecology and process/functional orecosystemecology:Population-community ecologists tend to view ecosystems as networksofinteracting populations. The biota are the ecosystemand abiotic componentssuch as soil or sediments are external influences. (O’Neillet al. 1986, p.8)In anextreme form, the functional approach implies thatenergy flow andnutrient cycling are somehow more important or more fundamentalthan thebiotic entitiesperforming the function. (O’Neill et al. 1986,p.10)They emphasized that few ecologists fall into eitherextreme ofthe spectrum, but the specificproblemsthat interest themdraw them in one directionorthe other.Both approaches, however, have limitations suchthat neither can provide an adequateconceptualizationofthe ecosystem. To understand the structure and functionofanecosystem it is necessary to understand the dynamicsofthe biotaand the flowofenergy andinformationamongst them. To manage a forest, forexample, we need to know the growthpatternsoftree species, theircommunity dynamics, and the mechanicsofenergy and nutrientflow that make growthpossible. Ecologically sound managementofresourcesrequiresknowledge from both approaches.57Populationecology, communityecology and functionalecology allproduce usefulinformation in the context ofdifferent spatiotemporalscalesand different questions weaskofnature. The species, the population, the community, and theecosystemare all levelsofabstractionthat are useful in different contextsofenquiry. Eachlevelofspatiotemporalscale, in the contextofhigher levelsofscalewithinwhichit operates, tellspartofthe story.The ecosystemprovidesa useful level ofintegrationformanaging environmentalintervention. It allowsusto considerthe impacts ofharvesting populations,forexample,within abroaderphysical perspective. Theecosystemlevel also provides alevel ofabstractionatwhichwe canconsiderothervalues thathumansderivefromnature. As anexample, one ofthe most useful tools for managingforests in British Columbiaisbiogeoclimatic classification, a systemthatsuccessfully integratespopulation/communityideaswith functionalecologywhilerecognizing theecosystemasthe fundamental unitofforest management(Klinka 1979). Public debatesonwildlife, water quality, aesthetics,wilderness conservation, old-growthpreservationandtimberextractioncan all be conductedwithin anecosystemperspective(e.g., CommissiononResourcesandEnvironment 1993).Ecologists generally maintainan ecosystemperspective regardlessofwhetherthey dobehavioral, population, community,or functionalecology. it is importanttounderstand theecotypic variationwithin species,how populations are regulatedand how they interact, andhowenergy and nutritionflowwithin the system. Whilefocussing on smallerdetailsecologistsand managers mustbe aware ofthe largercontextwithinwhichthey operate.3.3 What Kind ofScienceis Ecology?The positivist quest forpredictivecertainty has fostered alengthy debate onwhatkindofscience ecology is; theoreticalorempirical science, inductiveor deductive science.Some ecologists have arguedthatthe progress ofecologyhas been limited by the lackofastrong theoretical basis by whichtoorganize and relate the glut ofdata,simple principles anddiverse mathematicalmodels it has produced, and that58.ecology will not come ofage as a science until it has a sound theoreticalbasis... (Maynard Smith 1974, p.6)Similarly, Rosenzweig argues thatAs sciences mature, they develop a hypothetico-deductivephilosophy. Theyprogress by generating hypotheses and disproving them in controlledexperiments. (Rosenzweig 1976, p.T79)Tempering the enthusiasm forgeneral theory inecology hasbeenthe recognitionthatthe complexity and contingency evident inecological phenomena may limit the kindoftheory possible....the natural desire for general theory by ecologistsmay be frustrated by theabsence ofa masterplan and the great diversityofrelationships. (McIntosh1980, p.199)Sagoff(1984) has argued that theoretical models are abused andover-used inecologyand have not beenparticularly useful inexplaining natural systems. Ecology might not beable toprovide universal theory capable ofexplaining and predicting the orderofnaturalevents and it might indeed “be more useful ifitwere construed as a more political, historical,intuitive, and interpretive discipline” (Sagoff 1982).Another schoolofthought withinecology holdsthatthere are two kindsoftheory:The firsttype, forwhich I retain the termempirical theory, is the type oftheory that merely predictsthe future statesofa system. Often it is no morethan the expressionofthe correlationbetweentwo state variablesofa system.The second typeoftheory also predicts, but it goesbeyond mere prediction. Itpurports to explain to us why the systembehaves as it does. (Rigler 1982,p.1324)Rigler (1982) arguesthatecology needs to develop a strong base ofempirical theory in ordertobecome apredictive science. This view echoes the positivist ideal by implying thatprediction is the main concernofscience.Rigler (1982), however, misusesthe termtheory by applying it to statisticalregularity. Theory is the meansby which statistical regularities are explained:Theories are usually introducedwhenprevious study ofaclassofphenomenahas revealed a systemofuniformitiesthat can be expressed inthe formof59empirical laws. Theories then seek toexplain those regularitiesand, generally,to afford a deeperand more accurate understandingofthe phenomenon inquestion. (Hempel 1966, p.70)The kinetic theory ofgases, forexample, explainsawide variety ofempirically establishedregularities “...as macroscopic manifestationsofstatistical regularities in the underlyingmolecularand atomic phenomena” (Hempel 1966,p.71). Successiontheory attempts toexplain observed regularities in different aged plant communities on similar sites. Theidentificationofempirical regularities and the constructionoftheory to explain them are twoaspectsofthe process ofscience.At the heart ofthese arguments are twoproblemsthat have facedecology throughoutthe century. First, ecological theory is always underdeterminedwithrespectto reality.Ecological phenomena are fundamentally historical phenomena. New phenomenaoccur thatvary in significantways fromthose whichprecededthem. It is difficult toproduceunequivocal empiricalevidence for theoretical constructsthrough hypothesis testing.On the otherhand, endless streamsofdataand correlations are meaninglesswithoutthe organizational framework that theory provides:Scientists are perennially aware that it is best notto trust theory until it isconfirmedbyevidence. It isequally true, as Eddington pointed out, that it isbest not to put too much faith in facts until they have been confirmed bytheory. This iswhy scientistsare reluctant to believe in ESP in spite ofindisputable facts. Onlywhena reasonable theory can account forthese factswill scientistsbelieve them. (MacArthur 1972, p.253-254)Theory is the means by whichwe seekto explainthe phenomenathatwe experience, to askwhy things happen theway they do. The ideaofapurely empirical science comes fromaskeptical position about causes. Fromthis position, as I have described in chapter 2, theprojectofscience is to make predictive generalizations. But it now seems possible tosubscribe to a causal view ofthe world and look forthe set ofcausal processes andinteractionsthat result in aphenomenon, in otherwords, askwhy the phenomenonofinterestoccurred.60Theoiy in ecology takes a different form thanthat ofa universaldeductiveframework. Theory, forecology, is the nexusofprinciples,concepts, models, andempiricalgeneralizations that ecologistsuse to interpretspecific contingentphenomena.Science, forthe ecologist, must be theoretical, empirical and interpretiveall in the same breath.Tostrengthen the point let me turn to the questionofinductive and deductive science.I have argued in Chapter 2 that inductionand deduction aremodesoflogic that are bothnecessary to the scientific enterprise. Whatdoes it meanwhenecology is referredtoasinductive science ordeductive science? Inone sense the questionseems tohinge onwhetherthere is a mechanical orderorCartesian-style rationalityin nature suchthat we can developtheoretical constructsand deduce their necessaryconsequencesas testable hypotheses.Thisexercise might be described as theoreticaldeductive science. Iforder inthe natural world isabsent, or is apparent onlyin restricted spatiotemporal scales,we are reduced to describingnatural history, the characteristicsofdifferent speciesand short-tenntrends in theirrelations.Thisproject might be described asinductive, empirical science.Platt (1964) and Sagoff(1984)have championed the methodsofinductive inferenceas the gateway to success forscienceand scientific ecology, respectively.Paine’s (1980)researchon intertidal communitiesis offered by Sagoff(1984) asanexampleofthesuccessful applicationofinductive inference to anecologicalphenomenon. But Paine’suseofinductive inference inexploringmultispecies interactionswasundertaken aspartofhiscontribution to the developmentoffoodweb theory:The central significance ofwebsis derived fromthe fact that thelinksbetween species are ofteneasily identified and the resultanttrophicscaffolding providesatempting descriptorofcommunity structure.Ifthisstructure is in any fashion related tothe persistenceofnaturalcommunities ortheir stability, howeverdefined,thenwe are dealing with issuesofvitalecological significance. (Paine 1980,p.667)61The empirical, inductive aspect ofPaine’s research is an importantpartofhis attempt todevelop theoiy that might provide “...a realistic frameworkforunderstanding complex,highly interactive, multispeciesrelationships”(Paine 1980, p.682).Inductive, empirical, natural histoiy-type investigationsare the meansby whichafoodweb is constructed. The objective istodevelop conceptsthat describethe processesofspecies interactionsand community regulation thatcan be used toexplore othersystemsorcommunities. Ecological theory comesin the formofconditional generalizationsthat canbeused to interpret the behaviorofspecific systems.The theoretical construct, inthis case, thefoodweb, provides a meansoforganizing datacollection and generating hypothesesregarding the organization andlinkages in the system.Foodweb theory providesideas aboutthe kindsofrelationships thatare possible in a systembutthe structure ofany given systemrequiresempirical investigationwhich may expose newkinds ofrelationships. The utilityoffoodweb and otherecological theorydepends on an ongoing dialecticbetween theory anddata.Anotherexampleofthe dialecticbetween data and theoryis the use ofnon-linearordynamic population modellingin what has been called adaptiveresource management(Walters 1986). Theuse ofnon-linearmodelsmakesexplicit that growthorrecruitment inaresource population is alwaysa functionofits currentcondition. Ateachtime stepthe modelupdates the conditionofthe stockbased on its priorstate. The complexityofthe underlyingbiological and physical systemsthat causes high levelsofnatural variability and the paucityofdata may make the modelinitially predictivelyweak, buteach new year’s datais used toimprove the model byfine-tuningparametersor replacing it with a moreappropriate model.This approach accepts thatthe biological reality willgradually slip awayfromthemathematical abstractionand adapts accordingly by comparingdeductive consequencestoempirical dataand re-approximatingmodel parametersorthe modelitselfby inductiveinference. Adaptive modellingprovides an alternative to thedifficultiesofmonitoringmanagement experimentswithcontrolsor replicates. Systematic trialand errorprobingto62determine optimum levelsofresourceuse can be conducted with dynamicmodels asamonitoring tool.Order is present, in nature, as a resultofnatural selection and co-evolutionencouragingwell-defined typesofbehavior in individual organismsand in relationshipswithinand between organismsin response toeach other and tothe environment.In addition,ecosystems conformto the immanentlawsofphysics andchemistry. Disorderis alsopresentasaconsequence ofthe plasticityofindividual organismsthat allowsopportunisticbehaviorin response to environmental variablesand interactionswithother organisms. Inaddition, theprocessesofevolutionand co-evolutionare ongoing. Asno twopiecesofthe landscapearealike, it is not surprising thatno two assemblagesofplantsand animalsare alike. Ecosystemsdisplay difference and similarityin theirstructure, functionand temporalprocess.By inductive inference andspeculation theories canbe constructed thatattempttoexplain how the systemoperates. The occurrenceofunforeseeable contingencieslimits thepredictivepowerofecological theory.The model ortheorymust be adjusted inductivelyinan iterative fashionandcalibrated to specificcontexts. Deductivemodels inecologydo nottake the formofa mathematicalorlogical syllogism.Theirpredictions arenot mathematicalorlogical necessities. Whatthey do is allow thegenerationofhypothesesthatprovideopportunitiestoexpandourunderstanding byfostering a dialecticbetweendeductivelyinferred generality and inductivelyinferredparticulars.Raup argued, in 1950, thatwe needed to knowmuch more aboutthenatural historyofspecies in ordertomanage ourexploitationofthem. It has provenequally necessary todevelop an understandingofthe relations betweenspecies and the physicalqualitiesofthesystems inwhich theyreside. A variety ofapproachesand levelsofinvestigationareappropriate toa science that covers as enormousa range ofphenomenaasecology. RobertMacArthurwarnedecologistsnot to become obsessedwithmethods or intellectualapproaches but toencouragea variety ofdifferent waysofresearch. Recognizingthe63complexity and variability ofthe natural world, he was also concerned about the search forgenerality in theory:A well-knownecologist remarked thatany pattern visible in my birds but notin his Paramecium would not be interesting, because, I presume, he felt itwould not be general... the structure ofthe environment, the morphology ofthe species, the economicsofspecies behavior, and the dynamicsofpopulation changesare the fouressential ingredientsofall interestingbiogeographic patterns. Any good generalizationwill be likely to build in allthese ingredients, and a bird patternwould only be expected to look like thatofParamecium ifbirds and Paramecium had the same morphology,economics, dynamics, and found themselves inenvironmentsofthe samestructure. (MacArthur 1972, p.1)3.4 Ecologyand SocietyThe naturalworld is a complex and contingent phenomenon that is irrevocably boundin history. Ecological science has developed a bodyofknowledge regardingmany differentaspectsofnature that is useful in interpreting the behaviorofspecific contextswithin thenatural world. Populationmodels, forexample, are useful fordetermining harvest ratesbutthe population is partofa largersystemthat interactscausallywiththepopulation such thatmodelswill hold, without adjustment, only in the short-term.The studyofthe communityprovidesvaluable insight into the relationsbetweenpopulations butis subject to the sameconstraints. Population and community ecology, in the contextofthe ecosystem,provideimportantpartsofthe story in the attempt to successfullyexplainecologicalphenomena.It has been useful to view ecological complexity froma systems perspective.Ecosystems are systems, but are open, and are evolving in a non-linearfashion. Thecomplexityofecosystems makes it difficult topredict their future stateswith certainty.Theecosystem, nevertheless, is the best level ofintegration forevaluating the diverse valuesthatpeople holdwith respect to nature. People are partofecosystems; theiractionsare anecessary part ofcontingentexplanationswithin ecology. The ecosystem is, forthisreason,the level atwhichenvironmental management is mosteffectively conceptualized.64The uniquenessofecosystems and their inherentuncertainty make it difficult to learnby using anexperimental approach involving controlsand replication. One response to thisdilemma is the conceptofadaptive environmental management4.This approachemploysdynamic systems models asmonitoring tools for trial and errorprobing in managementexperiments. The benefit to science is thatecological simulation models canbetested in therealworldwhere they can be made more rigorous by comparisonwithactual results.Management can be improved by using anexperimentalprotocol that makesmanagement alearningexperience.Science, and scientific ecology, capture many aspects oftheway the worldis. Thenaturalworld is subject to contingency and its configurationis constantly changing. There ismuch that science can say about specific aspectsofnature but thereis much about nature ofwhich science can say little. Science cannot,forexample, ascribe value to nature. Peopleascribe values to nature and the aspects ofnature thatscienceexplores are influenced by thevalues society imposes on nature at a given timein history. In thisway society providesthemandate forscience.Ecology, forexample, cannot say thatbeauty is more valuable than lumber. Ecologycannotprove thatthere is abalance or harmonyin nature. Ecology as science cannot providea grounding forthe argument that man is sinning againstnature by destroying her idealorganizing forces. Science can say much about the consequencesofdifferentactions.Arguments aboutwhat it is right orwrong todo are arguments that transcend science.Science, and scientific ecology, candescribe and explain theprocesses resultingindesertification, lakeeutrophicationor atmospheric pollution.Scientific ecology can make usawareofthe extent towhichweare changing the natural capital onwhichwe dependtomake our humaneconomy and human culturefunction. Ecology can help us address theseissueswhen and ifwe decide to address them. Ecologycannot tell us it is a sin not to do so.See, forexample, Holling (1978), Walters(1986), and Hilborn and Walters (1992).65The developmentofscientific forestiy has been strongly influenced by the positivistidealofcertainty. The limitationsofecology asapredictive science have thus limited itscontributions to the managementofforests. In recentyearsa growing recognitionofecologicaluncertainty, and a realizationofits importance in the managementofforests,hasbrought changes to the practice offorestry. These shiftingperceptionsofforestsand forestryecho changes inourperceptionofscience and its capacity to characterize thephysicalworld,and changes in the values that society seesevident in nature. Anabridged historyofscientific forestry and its current state offlux in British Columbiawill be the subjectofthenext two chapters.664. THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC FORESTRYThe applicationofscience to forests and the ideaofscientific forest managementwere encouragedby two developments in post-Renaissance Europe. One was the recognitionofthe economic value offorests. With the riseofliberal capitalism, forests became valued asarich source ofcommodity goods. The second idea came fromthe evolving positivistideology. Science wasthe means to ensure the efficientorganizationofsociety and themanagementofresources.The development ofascientific forestry tookplace primarily in the 19th century atthe heightofEuropean culture’s faith in Cartesian “rationality” and scientific positivism.Oneofthe forefathersofNorth American forestry, Bernhard Fernow, described forestry as...the applicationofscientific methods in the productionand reproduction ofwood crops.’The science he described, at the turnofthe century, wasascienceofpredictable order, theahistorical science ofthe positivist philosophy.The cornerstone ofscientific forest managementhas been the concept ofsustainedyield forestry. Asdefined by the Society ofAmerican Foresters:[Sustainedyield] asapplied to apolicy, method, orplanofforestmanagement, implies continuous productionwith theaimofachieving, at theearliestpractical time, an appropriate balance betweengrowthand harvest,eitherby annual orsomewhat longerperiods.The historyofscientific forestry isessentially the historyofsustainedyield forestry.The developmentofrules and models forachieving sustainedyield forestry mirrors,in manyways, the developmentofscience and scientific ecology overthe last twocenturies. Theconcept ofsustainedyield forestry reached NorthAmericawhen themain interest in forestswasas a source ofeconomic wealthbut the need forregulationoftheirexploitationwasbeing recognized. What follows is a briefhistory ofthe developmentofscientific forest1Asquoted in Rodgers (1951, p.53).67management and its introduction to NorthAmericawithparticular focus on BritishColumbia. The main purpose will be to illustrate the positivist influence on the developmentofscientific forestry at a time whenecological sciencewas in its infancy.4.1 An ArtofNecessityForestry is anart bornofnecessity, as opposed to artsofconvenience and ofpleasure. Only when a reduction in the natural suppliesofforest products,under the demands ofcivilization, necessitatesthe applicationofart orskill orknowledge in securing a reproduction, orwhenunfavourable conditionsofsoil or climate induced by forest destructionmake themselves felt does the artofforestry make its appearance. (Fernow 1913,pp1-2)Throughout human history, wood has beenaprimary source offuel for cooking,heating and smelting, andofbuilding materials forhouses and boats. BothPlatoandLucretiuswrote thatwoodwas the prerequisite forcivilization. The destructionofforestsdue to over-usewas the main factor in the decline ofthe MesopotamiaofGilgamesh,Mycenaean Greece and bronze age Crete2.The defeatofAthens in the Peloponnesian Warswas largely due to its inability to procure shiptimberand• ..the rise and decline offuel supplies in Rome closely paralleled the fortunesofthe Empire itself. (Perlin 1991, p.128).Records fromthe ancientworld describe attempts to regulate the cuttingofforestsbut these appearto have been short-lived, typically being interruptedbywarand changingpolitical associations. Timber shortageswere facedby lookingelsewhere for new timbersuppliesthrough conquestor negotiation.In medieval Europe, there are examples oftownsand villagesthat managed coppicestands on a sustainedyieldbasis3.But the general concept ofa regulatedsustainedyieldmanagementofforests did not appearuntil the endofthe Thirty YearsWar(1618-48),2The history offorest use in the Mediterranean is discussed in Thirgood (1981) and Perlin(1991).See, forexample, Heske (1938) and Perlin (1991).68which historians conventionally take to signal the endoffeudalismand the emergence ofthenation-state, and the beginningofthe Age ofEnlightenment.The bloody trailofdestruction left by the Thirty Years War left Europe confused anddiscouraged, and her forests depleted. Withno resolution to the religious conflicts thatprecipitated the warand the Peace ofWestphaliamainly the resultofthe exhaustionoftheresourcesofthe combatants, the citizensofEurope were hungry for stability and a sense ofcertainty. The rationalismexpoundedby Descartes, and its success, later in the century, inthe mechanistic world-viewprovided by Newton, offered the meansofre-grounding thepoliticalworld in a more stable fashion (Toulmin 1990). The nation-statewasviewed as anatural partofthe cosmoswith the monarch as God’s representative onearthand loyalsubjectsbeneath in anaturalhierarchy ofsocial structure:.abstract, context-free...modernscience - as itactuallycame into existence -wonpublic support around 1700 forthe legitimacy it apparently gave to thepolitical systemofnation-states as muchas for its power toexplainthemotionsofplanets, or the rise and fall ofthe tides. (Toulmin 1990,p.128,authortsitalics)The Age ofEnlightenmentbrought about the applicationofscience and mathematicsto theproblemsofeconomics, administration and social practice.The depletionoftimbersupplies inthe 17th century led to the first modern writingson forestry. Thirgood (1983) suggeststhatthe firstwrittendescriptionofsustained yieldforestry appeared in John Evelyn’sSylvaof1664. Evelyn’sprincipleswere appliedsporadically with some successbut had little lasting impact (Thirgood 1983).Forthe rootsofscientific forestry we must turn to Germany in the 18th and 19thcenturies. German-speaking Central Europe in the 18th centurywas a loose federationofduchies, kingdoms and free cities. Timbershortages and the breakdownoffeudalismfollowing the Thirty YearsWarencouragedthe developmentofan institutional device tobring orderto the use offorests (Lee, 1982). With the move to amercantilistic statecontrolledeconomy, the control offorests by the feudal estate was gradually replacedby69state control. The economic philosophyofmercantilismregarded the state as an individualmerchant. The mercantilistic state was a closedeconomy inwhich the state might grow richby exporting more than it imported. Accordingly, high importtariffswere imposed andeffortswere taken to create self-sufficiency in naturalresources4.The bureaucratizationofthe state financial apparatus required a science ofstate finances forthe management offiscaladministrationand resource management. The new scienceofstate administrationbecameknown, in Germany, asthe cameralsciences (Kameralwissenschaflen). Fromthe cameralsciences came the beginnings ofscientific forestry (forstwissenschaft).Forstwissenschaft, as it developed, was decidedly mathematically-basedandtheoretically-oriented:Atthe Cameral College in Kaiserslautern, forexample, mathematicswas oneofthe subjects requiredofevery student, and “empiricists” wishing toproceedstraighttopractical studieswithoutthispreparationwere notwelcome.(Lowood 1990, p.321)The earliest methods forregulating forestswere area-based. On an area-based system,forestersestimated the growth cycle, whatwe now call the rotation, and thenpartitioned theforest into divisionsequal to the numberofyears in the growth cycle. Thismethod wasadequate forrelatively short growthperiods typical ofcoppice farming and periodic clearingofunderwood. But the areal division ofthe forest ignored the difference between sites andthe increasingvariation involume yield in older stands. Otherproblems included theinflexibility ofthe systemto adjustmentsofthe cut and, perhaps most seriously, annualyields could not be predictedover the growing cycle. Forthe fiscal planning andmanagement required by the new bureaucracy, it wasnecessary to know the amount oflumber and fuelwood to be harvested.Recognitionofthese problems motivated interest in developing techniques formeasuringtree volume and developing volume-based forestregulation. By the endoftheMy discussionofmercantilismand its relationto forestry is based onHaley (1966) and Lee(1982).7018th century, German foresters, led by Heinrich Cottaand Georg Hartig, hadworked outsteps fordetermining, predicting, and controlling forest production.Cottadevelopedexperience tableswhich gave empirically-derivedvolume estimates for standard-sizedtrees:Fromsummary investigationsbased entirely onverifiedjudgment, wegothroughvarious stages to more exact investigations, firstofindividual trees,thenofthe supply, growth, and yield-determinationofindividual stands, andfinally ofwhole forests.5By the turnofthe 19th century, forest science waswellestablished, bothacademically and practically, in the German states. Themaintenetsofthis rational synthesisof”calculationand cameralism” were the twin conceptsofthe regulatedornormalforestandsustainedyield:...the idealofthe “regulated forest” proclaimed thepreservationofthe forest’smaximumyieldundera sound systemofforesteconomy. (Lowood1990,p.333)The rationalismofthe modemworld and its off-shoot,the nation-state, requiredcertainty and stability and the Grailofscientificforestry, as it entered the 19th century,became sustainedyield. The goal offorest management,forHartig, Cottaandtheirfollowers, wasto “deliverthe greatestpossible constantvolume ofwood”6.To achieve the greatest possible constantvolumeofwood, orthe maximum sustainedyield, the practice developedofharvesting stands at thepointwhere the meanannualincrementwas maximized (Figure 4-1). Asa tree reaches maturity, wood increment beginsto gradually decreasebecause oftheenergy the tree mustexpend onmaintenance. Thereforethe rotationwas set at the point in timewhenthe currentannual incrementdeclinesto meetthe meanannual increment, at which point themarginal rate ofreturnequals zero. Themanagementproblem is thenhow to regulate the forestin suchaway thatequal annualvolumesofwood are reaching the rotationage. Thesolutionwasto re-structure the abnormalCotta, as quoted in Lowood (1990, p.331).6Hartig, asquoted in Lowood (1990, p.338).71Stand age (years)IIrotation volume/0400Stand volume300(cubic metersper hectare)200100400300Rateof growth(cubic metersper hectare200peryear)100100Stand age (years)150Maximum meanannual incrementmean annualincrement0 50 100 150Figure4-1. The rotation age that maximizes forest growth72forest into anormalforest, a forest having a numberofannual harvest blocksequal to therotation.A standard definitionofanonnal forest is offered by Brasnett (1953):A nonnal forest is an ideally constituted forestwith such volume oftreesofvarious ages so distributed and growing in suchaway thatthey produce equalannual volumesofproduce which can be removed continuously withoutdetrimentto future production. (see Figure 4-2)The conceptualizationofthe normal forestwasoriginally a consequence oftheproblemsofforest measurement. By abstracting the forest into standard classesoftrees andignoring the vast diversityofthe forest, measurement couldbe facilitated. Experience tableswere developedthat gave volumes, derived stereometrically, geometrically orby sampling,forthe standardtree, by size and age class. Froma few samples itwas supposedthat thewhole forest could be characterized (Lowood 1990).In the 19th century twoevents had importanteffectson German forestry. Cameralismgradually gave way toeconomic liberalism, and coal beganto replace wood as the primaryfuel forheating and smelting. With decreased pressure on the forests for fuel, there was amove to replace mixed-wood, multi-aged forestswith monocultural, even-aged forestsofspruce andpine that hadbetter formand physical qualities, and consequently higher value,fortimber. With the simplificationofthe forest, the normal forestwas transformed fromuseful abstractionto reality:The German forestbecame an archetype for imposingondisorderly nature theneatly arranged constructsofscience. ...In the handsofa suitably trainedforester, mathematical orderand practicalutilitybecame one enterprise.(Lowood 1990, p340-41)The goalofmost forest managers, to this day, is to regulate the yieldofthe forest in afashion so designed as to achieve anormal forest.Before the endofthe 19th century, twoquite different challengeswere offeredto theGerman ideal ofsustainedyield forestry, bothofwhich influence the current debate in NorthAmerica. The first, by aneconomist, wasan argument that forests shouldbe managed not by73Figure4-2. The Normal Forest. Each schematic tree represents thevolume oftrees at various ages distributed in such a way thattheyproduce equal annual volumes forharvest.IForestYieldAge —*74theircapacity for growthbut on the criterionoffinancial return. The second challenge,froma very differentposition, expressed the concernthatthe quest fornormalityandfinancialreturnwere compromisingthe biologicalintegrityofthe forests.As transportationand communication improved,and coal became the primary fuelfor cooking and heating, local communitieswere no longer asdependentonthe timbersupplies in their immediatevicinity.Inthe spiritofliberal capitalism,Wood had changed froma carefi.illyrationedessential material to anordinarycommodity, the productionofwhichshould be governed largely by financialconsiderations. (Heske 1938, p.37)The new schoolofeconomic thought, ledby Pressler, arguedthat the practiceofharvesting stands to maximize yieldwaseconomically inefficient.Each forest stand shouldbe considered as aseparate financial undertakingand cutting should take place whenthevalue ofthe increment ceases torepresenta satisfactory returnonthe capital value oftimberand land. Pressleradvocated the conversionofmixed high forest to pure sprucefortheproductionofpitwoodand pulpwoodon short rotations (Brasnett1953). According to Heske(1938) these argumentswere largelyignored by German forestersexceptto the pointofrecognizing the importanceofevaluating the profitability offorest management.The debatesurrounding economic rotationversusphysical rotationremains contentiousto this day.Pressler’s arguments did lendimpetusto the practice ofconvertingmixed high forestto spruce orpine monocultures. Thispracticewasapplied in Bavaria, Bohemia,Austria, andthe German-speaking cantonsofSwitzerland, and in this century inScandinavia and theUnited Kingdom. Towardsthe endofhis life Cottaexpressed concernaboutplantingpurespruce standsoutside theirnatural habitatwhere they became susceptible towind, drought,and insect attack(Brasnett 1953). In Heske’s(1938) words:Unquestionably, there was at firstan increase inthe money income.But theeven-agedplantationsofa singlespecies (“monocultures”) were contrary tonature. Sooneror later, they showedserious defects, such as soildeteriorationand decreased rate ofgrowth, lessened resistanceto animal and plantparasites, and increased liability toinjuries from snow, hoarfrost, andwind.75As foresters gainedbetter knowledgeofthe natural sciences, however,theyrealized that forestrywhichis to be truly profitable in the longrun can nevercontravene natural laws butmust be based upon them. (Heske1938, p.39)Spruce is generally a nutrient-demandingspecies and may dependon the nutrient-richleaflitterofbeech and otherhardwoodsto maintainthe nutrient statusofthe soil. Insects,diseases, and animal damage are typicallymore damaging in uniform standsbecause ofthecontinuousavailabilityofthe hostand possibly becauseofstress inducedby nutrientdeficiency (Stoszek 1988).In mixed stands the effects maybe dispersed and mitigatedbyincreasedpredatordiversity (Schowalter1989). Wind damage is typicallymore severe ineven-agedpure stands ofsprucebecause ofits characteristicallyshallow rooting habit androot connections intheupper soil layers (Fowells 1965).Ifone tree falls it may pull severalothers downby the roots.In multi-aged standswitha layered canopy the intensityandeffectsofwind may be mitigated.In the last quarterofthe 19th century,Karl Gayer argued that forestershad torecognize the biological factorsthat control the life oftheforest. Gayer’s emphasis onpractical common senseand holistic, natural forestry wasopposed to the...one sided striving fornormalityand the mathematical calculationsofprofit.This school demanded that the forestbe treated in accordancewithbiologicallaws, i.e.; mixed forest instead oftheschematic culture ofpure stands;retentionofthe soil-improvingbroadleafspecies, especiallybeech; naturalregenerationinsteadofclear-cuttingwithartificial seeding or planting;anduneven-aged formofforestinplace ofthe forest composedofschematicallyarrangedeven-aged stands. (Heske1938, p.40)Gayer’sBackto Naturemovementhad aprofound influenceon German forestry. His ideaswere adopted throughout southernGermany and inthe German speakingcantonsofSwitzerland, and in France led toBiolley’s Methode du Controle(Haley 1966).Closely connected to Gayer’s ideaswas theDauerwald(continuousforest)movementthat appeared afterthe turnofthe 20th century. The continuous forestmodelwasbased on...recognitionofthe fact that the forest isnot merely an aggregationofindividual trees, but is an integrated,organic entity... Healthofthe forestand76lasting maximumproductionoftimberare possibleonly ifallpartsoftheforestentity functionwithout hindrance. (Heske1938, p.42)To Dauerwald advocates schematic monocultures lacked “harmonious” structureand internalresistance toexternal dangers. Accordingly, the continuousforestmovement believed thatclear-cutting, whichbrought about the destruction ofcountlessmembers ofthe cooperativewhole, shouldbe replacedby single-tree selectionmethods that retained the intact forest(Heske 1938).At the time ofHeske’swriting in 1938, there wasavigorous debate in Germanforestryabout the problemsofmonoculture and how to cultivate healthyforests. Land tenurepatterns in Germany allowed the developmentofavariety ofstyles offorestry andadebate,based on actualexperience, ofthe merits ofeach. The Prussian Governmentadvocatedtheideaofthe continuous forest and the abandonment ofclear-cut systems (SchindlerandGodbe 1993) These reformswere, ofcourse, interruptedby World War II and the forestssuffered severely, duringthe conflict, fromover-use.In the 1950s the cause ofnature-minded forestry was takenup bya groupofforesters and forest ownerswho practicedcontinuous forestryon state experimental andprivate forests. The debate betweeneven-aged,clear-cut systemforests and continuous forestsis againcurrent in Germany following heavystorms in 1990 that reportedly causedproportionatelygreaterdamage ineven-aged stands(Schindlerand Godbe 1993).German scientific forestry appearsto have developedas a kindofscientificpositivism. The emphasis on mathematical precisionand theprogramofsimplification toalloweffectivepredictionechothe explicitly positiviststatementsofthe French Comte andthe English Pearson. The debate betweenthe forestas anaggregationoftreesandthe forestas an integrated, organic entityprovides apreface, ofsorts, to the debate betweenClementsand Gleason in the 1920s and the current debates about forest practiceworldwide.774.2 Scientific Forestry Reaches North AmericaAmerican forests had beenexploited since colonial times for local fuel consumption,homebuildingand land clearing for farming, and also to supply the shipbuilding industriesofwestern Europe. Exploitationacceleratedwith the growthofthe Americanpopulationandthe developmentofindustry. Pinchot remarkedthat in the last halfofthe 19th centuryPublic opinion heldthe forests inparticularto be inexhaustible and in theway. (Pinchot 1947, p.1)But by this time, concernwasbeginning to be expressed about the devastationofAmerican forests. In 1850, 25%ofthe land areaofthe United Stateswas forested; by 1870this figure isestimatedto have been reduced to 15% (Perlin 1991). Forests in the Eastern andLake stateswere largely depleted. Recognitionofthe importance offorests toAmericanprosperity came roughly at the same time. Writing on the destructionofthe forestsofWisconsin, Increase Laphamnoted, in 1867, thatFew persons...realize...the amount we owe to the native forests ofour countryforthe capital andwealthourpeople are now enjoying...without the fuel, thebuildings, the fences, furniture and [a] thousand utensils, and machines ofevery kind, the principal materials forwhich are takendirectly fromtheforestswe should be reduced to a conditionofdestitution.1The time was ripe for the introductionofideas aboutmanaging forests for continuousproduction.Germanic scientific forestry and the ideaofsustainedyield forestry were introducedto NorthAmerica around 1900 by Bernhard Fernow and Gifford Pinchot8.Fernow wasaGerman foresterwho came toAmerica, in 1876, to many anAmericanwoman he had metwhile studying forestry at Muenden in the state ofHannover. Femow was the firstprofessional forester in North Americaand was influential in introducing the ideaofaprofessionofforestry and promoting forestry education in both the United States andAs quoted in Perlin (1991, p.354).The roles ofPinchot and Fernow in introducing German forestry to NorthAmericaarediscussed in Lee (1982), Twight (1988) and Miller (1989).78Canada. He worked at various timesas a private consultant,as Chiefofthe Forestry Divisionofthe United States DepartmentofAgriculture and asthe first Directorofthe New YorkCollege ofForestiy at Cornell University andofthe Forestry School at Pennsylvania StateCollege. In 1907, Fernowwas appointed deanofthe firstforestry school inCanada at theUniversity ofToronto (Rodgers 1951).In 1902, Fernowproduced the firstAmericantextbookonforesteconomics,EconomicsofForestry. He declaredthe “ideal ofthe forester” as[A] forest so arranged thatannually, forever, the same amountofwoodproduct, namely, thatwhich grows annually...may be harvested.9Fernow’s restatementofthe sustainedyieldprinciple has become partofthe orthodoxy ofprofessional forestry in NorthAmerica.Althoughthe science ofecology was in its infancy at the turnofthe 20th centuryFernow referred to forestry as “appliedecology”. Cowles, Clements and othersweredeveloping a rudimentary knowledge ofthe ecological characteristicsofforest trees inthenortheasternUnited States. Fernow is reported to have welcomed the appearance ofClements’ ResearchMethods in Ecology in 1905 and recommended it to foresters (Rodgers1951).While Fernowwas the first to introduce the ideasofscientific forestry to NorthAmerica, Gifford Pinchotwas the prime mover in putting them intopractice. Pinchotdecided to become a foresterat atimewhentimberwas somethingto be got rid of:“Howwouldyou like to be a forester?” asked my foresighted Father onefortunate morning in the summerof1885,justbefore I wentto college. It wasan amazing question forthatday and generation - how amazing Ididn’t beginto understand at the time. When it wasasked, not a singleAmerican had madeForestry his profession. Notan acre oftimberlandwasbeing handled underthe principlesofForestry anywhere inAmerica. (Pinchot 1947, p.1)Pinchot went to Yale and took courses he believed wouldbe relevantto forestry andthen spent several years in France and Germany studying the most advanced forestAs quoted in Behan (1978).79practices’°. Upon his return in 1892 he took charge oftimbermanagement on the Biltmoreestate in North Carolina. In 1898 Pinchot followed Fernow as Chiefofthe DivisionofForestry, laterthe BureauofForestry in the DepartmentofAgriculture. Under his leadershipthe Bureau moved from an agency that merely dispensed informationto one that activelypromoted sustained-yieldpractices.Pinchot’s goalwasto educate the public and the private forest industry aboutscientific forest management. He offered the servicesoffederal foresters todraw upmanagement plansand by 1905 owners ofsome three millionacreshad applied forassistance. Pinchot undertook inquiries into forest fire destruction in orderto convincelumbermenthat fire protection would pay. He studied tree planting and advised forestowners about reforestationproblems. He also initiated management on federal forest lands.The idealsofscientific forest managementchampionedby Pinchotwere well suitedto theprogressiveconservation movementwhich reached its zenithduring the presidency ofTeddy Roosevelt. At the turnofthe 20th century the United Stateswere undergoingturbulent timeseconomically and socially as the frontierdisappeared. The conservationistspreached thegospelofefficiency, a rational, scientific approach to managementwhichwouldeliminate waste by regulating the applicationofharvesting effort and making the systemproduce to its highestpotential (Hays, 1959). For some the progressive conservationmovementwas merely the attempt to bring soundbusinesss principles to managing thenations’ resources but it was also a kindofmoral crusade. Lee (1982) argues thatpartoftheappealofsustainedyield forestry was asa symbol ofbiological continuity during a timeofsocial upheaval.The principlesofthe conservation movementwere consistentwith some ofthedominant intellectual ideas ofthe day, notably scientific positivism. The conservation‘°My discussionofGifford Pinchot comes from Pinchot (1947), Pinkett (1970) and Hays(1959).80movementreflectedthe positivist ideal that the democratic process couldn’t guaranteerational and scientific decisions. Science was the meanstodetermine rightaction:People tookcomfort in the idea that the world ran like precision clockwork-and not only couldbe fully understood throughthe pursuitofscience, butcould also be fine-tunedby humanbeings for optimal performance. (Shidelerand Hendricks 1991, p.22)Like the German cameralists, the conservationistsenvisioned centralized controlofresourcesandtheir management by atechnical bureaucracy.Pinchot and Roosevelt expanded the national forest reserves andpromotedrational,scientific forest management as part ofthe conservationist philosophy. A NationalConservationCommissionwas appointed in 1908 withthe mandate ofinventorying all thenatural resourcesofthe nation. Butafterthe defeatofRoosevelt in the 1909election interestinprogressive conservation and sustainedyield forestry flagged.By the early 1900s the forestsofthe Eastern States, Lake Statesand Southern Stateshad largely been depleted and speculators beganto lookto the west for new sources ofvirgintimber. The shift offocusto timberspeculation in the Northwestern states carriedwith it thedebate about sustained yield forestry. The new championofsustainedyieldwas DavidT.Masonwho had graduated in 1907 fromthe new Yale SchoolofForestry that Pinchot hadhelped toestablish at his alma mater. In the 1920s Masonestablished himselfas aconsultingforester in the Northwestern United Stateswhere he helped to developprivate land sustainedyieldprograms forthe CrownWillamette Paper Company (later CrownZellerbach) and theWeyerhauserTimberCompany among others (Richardson 1983).As a lobbyist Mason argued that sustainedyield forest managementwasthe way topromote stabilizationofthe national timber supply, the forest industry, and the localcommunities that depended on forestjobs. He believed that sustainedyield managementwouldpromote the conservationofwater, soil, climate and recreationopportunities (Masonand Bruce 1931). Mason’s positionwas a continuationofthe progressive conservationphilosophy ofPinchot and Teddy Roosevelt:81...asound planofforest conservation...[and]...the national timber supply canbe provided most efficientlythroughsustainedyield forest management.(Mason and Bruce 1931, p.5, author’s italics)The Great Depressionhelped to re-stimulate interest in conservationand sustainedyield forestry. Franklin Roosevelt’ssupport fora national reforestationprogramwasacontributing factor in his 1933 presidentialelection victory (Patton 1994). The newgovernment instituted the Civilian ConservationCorpswhichput people to work in theforest, building roadsand trails, fighting fires, andplanting trees.The long debate over sustained yield managementon the National Forests hadbecome focussedon the ideaofcooperativemanagement. Masonacted as a lobbyist forthelumber companies in tryingto implement this idea (Richardson 1983). Public lands would beaddedto company lands to create a sustainedyieldunitthatwouldbe managedby agreementbetweenthe Forest Service and the lumbercompany. Thisplanwasenshrined as theSustained Yield Forest ManagementAct of1944. Industry proposals to develop cooperativesustainedyield unitswere successfullyopposed by small local contractors and labor groupsand only one suchunitwasestablished(Lee 1982). The conceptofcooperative forestmanagement had considerably more success in British Columbia later in the 1940sin theformofResource Management Agreements (later, Tree Farm Licences).Sustainedyield forestry re-appeared as apublic issue in the United Statesin the1960swiththe emergenceofthe modemenvironmental movement and its opposition tounregulated harvestingon public lands (Lee 1982). Despite itsextended history,the legalrequirementofsustained yield forestryon public lands was notenacted until The MultipleUse and Sustained YieldActof1964. Since that time sustainedyield policy hasbeenunderconstant challenge, particularly from foresteconomists following on theideas ofeconomicefficiency put forward by Pressler. Consequently the Forest ManagementActof 1976authorizesdepartures from nondeclining even-flow policy (Lee 1982).824.3 Introduction ofSustained Yield Forestryto BritishColumbiaThe histoiy offorestry in British Columbiais fairly typical forNorthAmerica Landclearing forhomesteading followedby unregulatedexploitation forprofitwerebasedon theperception that the forestswere effectivelylimitless. Around the turnofthe 20thcentury theNorthAmericantimber mdustiy discoveredthe richtimberresources ofthe PacificNorthwest settingoffa kind oftimberboom.The rapidexpansion in the cutting oftimberinBritish Columbiaexposed the need to assessthe abilityofthe province to regulate theexploitationoftimber.In 1909 the first Royal Commissionon forestry in British Columbia (known astheFulton Commission, afterthe ChiefCommissioner,F.J. Fulton) was convened to addresshow best to dispose ofcrowntimber in a fashionthatwouldprovide maximumbenefit to theprovince. The commissionaddressed concernsabout the wastage ofwooddue to lowutilization standards, the destruction offorestsby fire, andparticularly the problemoflicensing anddispensationoftimberrights.The report recognized the economicvalue oftheresource and the need to regulate itsexploitation.The forests ofBritish Columbiawere stillso vast at this time that in the reportoftheCommission, preparedby M.A. Grainger,theCommissionerscommented thus:Two thingsare therefore plain; one,thatthe value ofstanding timberinBritish Columbia is destined to riseto heights that general opinionwouldconsider incredible today; the other, thatunder careful management heavytaxationneed never fallupon the populationofthe province. (BritishColumbia 1910, p.20)At this time the AmericanConservationMovementwas in fullbloomandaffectedthe public attitude toward forestryin Canada(Haley 1966). The CanadianForestryAssociationwas formed in 1900 withaplatformofpromoting forest conservation.Aroundthe turnofthe century, the Dominiongovernment created almost 10 million acresofDominiontimberreserves following the leadofthe United States DepartmentofAgriculture.In 1906 a forestry conference was convenedin Ottawa that included addressesby manyof83the leading NorthAmerican foresters including Fernowand Pinchot. Among itsrecommendationswere the developmentofa nationalforest policy, the establishmentofprovincial Forest Services and the promotionofthe aimofsustained production (Haley1966).The idealsofthe conservation movement are echoed inthe reportofthe FultonCommission:The natural advantagesofourcountry must remainunimpaired,the publicrevenue and the lumbering industry must both be protected, inotherwords, asoundpolicyofforest conservationmust be established. (British Columbia,1910, p.67)Inpreparing their report the commissionershad metwithFernow andPinchot andemployedOverton Price as a consultant to help Graingerdraft the legislationthat became BritishColumbia’s Forest Act (Orchard 1964). Price hadworkedwith Pinchotat the U.S. ForestService and had also served on Roosevelt’s National Conservation Commission.The passing ofthe Forest Act in 1912 made no explicitprovisionfor sustainedyieldmanagement but in Section 12(1) includedprovision forthe establishmentofprovincialforests for “the perpetual growingoftimber” (BritishColumbia 1912). The ForestActalsoprovided forthe establishmentofa Forest Branchwithin the DepartmentofLands. Thefirstchiefforesterwas H.R. MacMillanwho had been a classmate ofMason’sat Yale (Richardson1983). MacMillan, withthe assistanceofPrice, organized the new Forest Branchonthemodelofthe United States Forest Service (Orchard 1964) whichFernow and Pinchot hadbuilt on the modelofthe Prussian Forest Service (Twight 1990). The responsibilitiesoftheForest Branch included overseeing the dispositionoftimberand managingthe newprovincial forest reserves.MacMillanrequested thatthe federal govermnent conduct a surveyofthe forestresources in British Columbia. In 1918, the CanadianCommissionofConservation releasedthe publicationForestsofBritish Columbia by Whitford and Craig. Whitfordwas anAmericanecologistwho had been recommended for apositionwith the Commissionof84Conservationby Fernow. ForestsofBritish Columbia provides a detailedestimate oftheextentofthe forest resources ofthe province, a reviewofthe current state ofmanagement,and a descriptionofthe characteristic features and rangeofthe maintimber species. Thereport also offers an interesting re-statementofthe conservationist ideal:All the effortsofthe Dominionmust be devoted to productionand economy.The vast resourcesofCanada, towhich the term‘illimitable’has been sofrequently applied, because oflackofknowledge, must be turned to someuseful purpose. Untilled fields, buried mineralsor standing forests are ofnovalue except for thewealthwhich, through industry, canbe producedtherefrom. (Whitford and Craig 1918, p.1)Afterthe ForestActwaspassed in 1912 the rateofcuttingofforest land increasedwhile forest practices, including regenerationofthe new forest,remained generally poor(Haley 1966). The Forest Branch, inits annual reports, beganto express concern over thecondition ofthe forests and overcuttingon the coast:...the objectofcreating Provincial Forests is to keep the areas permanentlyproductive. Not only mustwe leave the area in a condition forregenerationbut we must also guard against too rapid cutting, orwe will have notpermanentbut periodic productionwith long lapses oftime between one cropand the next. (BritishColumbia Forest Branch 1925, p.81)MacMillanhad staffed the Forest Branch, to a largeextent, with students ofFernow’s fromthe UniversityofToronto. Trained in the principlesofGerman scientific forestry, theybecame the main advocatesofasustainedyieldpolicy. Sustainedyield managementplansformany ofthe Provincial Forestswere prepared although it was not possibletoregulatetimber sales in a fashion thatwould conformto these plans (Haley 1966).In 1937 the Forest Service released a comprehensive report, TheForestResources ofBritish Columbia authored by F.D. Mulholland. The purpose ofthis report was to bring up todate the 1918 workofWhitford and Craig. Mulholland’s report presented resultsofanewprovincial forest inventory and offered commentaryon British Columbia’sforest policy.Mulholland was an Englishmaneducated in forestry at the UniversityofEdinburghand wasa staunchproponent ofsustainedyield forestry (Bishopand Bishop 1988). In his analysisof85British Columbia’s forests Muiholland argued that uncheckedexploitationofthe forest mustend:Management fora sustainedyield isessential forthe permanentprosperity ofBritish Columbia’sgreatest industryand it demandsimmediate attention. Ifitis not introducedbefore the present large forest revenues havedisappeared, itis doubtful ifcapitalwill be available forthe extensive rebuildingofdenudedforestswhichwill then be necessary. (Muiholland1937, p.12, my italics)The changes in forestpolicy suggestedby Muihollandand his superior, the chiefforester C.D. Orchard, prompted PremierJohn Harttoappoint aone-man commission,in1943, to investigate the stateofBritish Columbia’s forests.Sustainedyield forestrywasformally adopted as the basisofBritish Columbia forestryas a resultofthe reportofthecommissioner, Mr. Justice G.M. Sloan. Establishmentofthe Royal Commissionwasmotivatedby several factors.The Forest Service had advocated theadoptionofsustainedyield forestry forsome time. The largertimberfirms, facedwith competitionfromthe Balticand Scandinavian nations, weredemanding greatersecurityoftenure tojustilj investmentinutilization facilities (Pearse 1976).Inaddition, the CCFprovincial party, whichhad beenkept outofpower in 1941 bya Liberal-Conservative coalition, wasdemandingnationalizationofthe forest industry.Marchak(1983) argues that sustainedyieldwasadopted becauseThe CCF could be “tamed” bya forestpolicy of“sustainedyield”conservation, and the same policy, advocatedby the large companies, wouldundermine both the competitionfromsmall loggers and theappealofsmallcompanies to the public, sincethe small loggers could not advocateorsurviveonmore restrictive legislation. TheB.C. Forest Service supported thelargecompanies in theirpresentationsto the first Sloan Commission, assuming,asthe companiesargued, that largertimber holdings and longer-termharvestingrightswould allow them toplanand therefore implementsustainedyieldprinciples. (Marchak 1983,p.Y7)The Forest Service was facedwith theproblemoftrying to correct the errorsofthepast. Large areas ofland wereheld in temporary tenuresfromaround the turnofthe century.These tenures which included timberleases, timber licences and timberberths gavethe86holder the right to cut timberand no responsibility toensure regeneration, the land revertingto the crownaftercutting. Large portionsofthe mainland coast and VancouverIslandwereheld in temporary tenuresproviding an obstacle to the implementationofsustainedyieldmanagement. The new proposal wasto combine crown landwith landunder temporarytenure and landownedoutrightby forest companies into coherent management units held inlong-term, renewable tenure by the forest companies. The restriction on companies thatentered into these new agreements was that they practice sustainedyield forestry on thewhole unit (Pearse 1976).Largercompanieswere favored because they couldprovide the capital necessary toconstruct large-scale processing facilitiesand create lastingemployment forthe growingpopulation. The contributionofprivate industry to the developmentofforest management inBritish Columbiawasdeemedessential as the province did not have the resources toundertake the enterprise and to do so would contravene “...the democratic and free-enterpriseprinciplesofthe country” (Orchard 1952, p.21).On the evidence presentedto him, Sloan argued forthe adoptionofsustained yieldforestry andemphasized the ideaofyield maximization:the sands are running out and the time is now uponuswhenthe presentpolicy ofunmanaged liquidationofour forestwealthmust give way to theimperative conceptofaplanned forest policy designed to maintainour forestsupon the principle ofsustainedyield production. (Sloan 1945, p.10)That thenmust be our objective: To so manage our foreststhat all ourforestland is sustaining a perpetualyieldoftimberto the fullest extentofitsproductive capacity. (Sloan 1945, p.l2’7)The way to achieve sustainedyieldwas to liquidate the existing decadent forest andtransform it into a managed ornormal forest:it is the objectofsustained-yield managementto bring irregularities [inwood flow] into balance over relatively shortperiods, so as to minimizeinterference withthe establishmentofa regular series ofage-classes in thenext rotation. (Sloan 1956, p.223)87sustained-yield..,cannot be reacheduntil our maturetimberon the Coast iscut and the area now covered by that oldgrowth - whichmightjust as well bein piles in a lumber-yard as inthe forest, so far as increment is concerned - isgrowing a new forest. (Sloan 1945, p.129)The prevailingmentality at the time wasthatold-growthforestswere rottingon thestump.They were producing no appreciable growth and wereat risk to infestationby insects anddisease, and towild-fire. Sloan arguedthat sustainedyield managementwas not onlydesirable fortimberyield regulationbut would alsoenhance othersocial andbiophysicalamenities fromthe forest:sustainedyield policy, perpetuatingour forest stands, willnot only providea continuity ofwoodsupply essential to maintainour forest industries,primaly and secondaiy, with consequent regional stability ofemployment,butwillensure a continual forest cover adequate toperformthe invaluablefunctionsofwatershedprotection, streamfiow and run-offcontrol, and thepreventionofsoil erosion. (Sloan 1945, p.128)Inorderto implement the new policy Sloan recommendedradical changesto theforest tenure system. Ratherthan having land revertto the crown after logging, headvocatedthe allocationofCrown timberto private industry in long termtenures. Secure tenure wouldallow the implementationofsustainedyield forestry and motivate capitalexpendituretodevelop processing facilities for the long-term. The Forest ManagementAgreements betweengovernmentand industry that resulted have had a lasting impact onforestry in B.C. Theywere the fore-runnersoftoday’s Tree Farm Licences.Sloanalso recommendedthatunalienated Crown land beorganized into “publicworking circles”, which came to be known as Public Sustained YieldUnits, to be managedby the government on a sustained yield basis. Thesewould provide timber for smallercompanies and independent loggers “...withneither the means nor the inclinationto manageforest areas” (Haley 1966, p.210).Sloan had recommended that anotherRoyal Commissionbe appointed10 years henceand in 1956 the second Sloan Commissionwaspublished. It wasessentially are-statementofthe sustainedyield philosophy, dealing with problems in administratingthe changes brought88aboutby the 1945 Commission. One ofthe recommendations by Sloan in 1956 was theexpansionofartificial regenerationprogramsand silviculture in general. This led to thedevelopmentofa more extensive nursery programand researchon provenance, geneticimprovement and site preparation in the late 1950s and 1960s (Knight 1990). The standardtextbookon silviculture forthat time offersapositivist approximationofthe purpose ofsilviculture:The forestershouldwork forthe goodofthe forest as anentity, not forthe sake ofthe forest itself, but to ensure that it will remaina permanentlyproductive sourceofgoodsand benefits to the ownerand to society.The reasons [forpracticing silviculture] are economic and mainlyinvolve attempts to produce more useful foreststhan nature can and to dosoin far less time. (Smith 1962, pp.2-3)The 1950s and 1960swere also the time ofthe pioneeringworkofthe forestecologistVladimir Krajina. Hisresearchwas a majorcontributionto anunderstandingoftheecological characteristicsofforest trees that could facilitate silviculture practice (Weetman1982). Moreover, Krajinawas largely responsible forbringing an ecosystemperspective onforests to British Columbia (Klinka 1979).In the 1960s and 1970s new concerns about the state offorest managementbegantoappear. Licenseeswere concerned about over-regulation in termsofharvestingpractices,forestry practices and resource use. The public, ledby the modemenvironmentalistmovement, began toexpress concern about the impactsoftimbermanagementonnon-timbervalues and the protectionofthe naturalenvironment.Moreover, questions arose concerning the ability ofsustainedyield forestry toprovide the fullest long-termeconomic and social benefitsfromthe forest resource andtoenhance theirproductive capacity. These concerns led to theRoyal Commission on Forestryof1976 headedby Peter H. Pearse, aneconomist at the UniversityofBritish Columbia. Oneofthe main resultswas a restructuringofthe tenure systems for forest licensing thatclarifiedto some extent the rolesofgovernment and industry. Changes brought about bythe Pearse89Commission form the basisofforest management in BritishColumbiatoday andwill bediscussed in more detail in the concluding section.4.4 ForestYield Regulation in BritishColumbiaIn orderto achieve sustainedyield forest managementas formulatedby Sloan(1945,1956) the forestwould have to be normalizedwith aneven gradationofage-classes.Theprovincialforestswere predominantly old-growthtimberandtheobjectivebecame to drawdown the inventoryofold-growthtimber in a fashionthatwouldensure near-equal annualorperiodic harvestsduring the transitionto normality, and ensure thatthe old-growthtimberwould last until second growthtimberwasready forharvest.From 1945 until 1977 annual allowablecuts on the Public SustainedYield Units andmost Tree FarmLicenseswere calculated using theHanzlik formula. The formulawasdevelopedby E.J. HanzlikoftheUnited States Forest Servicefordetermining the annualallowable cut in forestssuch as those ofthe Pacific Northwestthat containedapreponderanceofmature ageclasses. While the Hanzlikformula is no longerused foryieldforecasting in British ColumbiaI will describe it in some detailfortwo reasons. First, itprovides a simple meansofillustrating the basic assumptionsthat go into forest regulation.Second, the rate ofcuthas changed very little sincenew techniqueswere adoptedin 1977and the new techniquesare little more than elaborationsofthe Hanzlik concept.Thus, theHanzlik formula representsan importantpart ofhow we gotwhere we are today.I will thendescribe the changes inyieldregulationbrought aboutby the Pearse Commission.90The Hanzlik formula’ calculatesthe annual allowable cut as:AAC=Vm/R+Iwhere: Vm = the volumeofmature and over-mature timberofage R orgreaterR = rotation, orperiodofyearsrequired to establishand grow timbercrops to a specified conditionofmaturity.I = meanannual increment, oraverage annual rate ofgrowththroughout the rotationoftimber lessthan the rotationage R.Inordertomaximize increment the rotationage isestablished foreach stand type asthe time when the average annual rateofgrowth achieves its highest rate orculminationpoint. Trees, as a rule, produce proportionately lesswood as they age andallocate more oftheirenergy to maintaining foliage and root systems. In termsofmerchantable wood volume,forest stands canbe modelled by the logistic growth curve (Figure 4-1). The traditionalforestry idea is that trees mature at the culminationpoint before decadence sets in. Thevolume ofmature stands is then the volumeofstands ofan age past the culmination point.Average increment on immature stands is calculated as the culmination volume orvolume atrotation age divided by the rotation age. Culminationvolume is predicted fromgrowthandyield models.The first growth models for the province, developed by the B.C. Forest Service (nowthe MinistryofForests), were empirical, hand-drawn volume over age curves. The nextdevelopment was the constructionofChapman-Richards non-linear growth modelsbased onthe logistic growthmodelsdeveloped by the schoolofpopulationecology:V =b1(l—where V = volumeA = stand agebi,b2,b3 = regression coefficients.The original reference forthe Hanzlikformula is Hanzlik(1922). See also Chambers and McLeod(1980) andBritishColumbia ForestService (1971).91The Province was stratified into 12 ForestInventory Zones, 17 GrowthType Groups andfour site classes (good, medium, poor,low). Usingplot data fromvariously aged naturalstands, equationswere constructed that predict merchantablevolume as a functionofstandage foreach stratum.More detailed, variable density yieldequationshave now beendeveloped foreachcommercial species by including site index,average basal area(m2)per ha and average standdiameter as additional variables in the basic Chapman-Richardsequation. Basal area anddiameterprovide a measure ofstocking and density.Site index is a relative measure ofgrowthpotential that provides an indicatorofsite quality. Site index is determined byestimatingthe average height oftreesat a certain reference age on a givensite. In BritishColumbia the reference age is 50 years as indicatedat breast height (l.3m).Variable densityyield models are constructed using sample plot dataandrefinedusing permanent sample plotsand stem analysis. Permanentsample plots are re-measuredatperiodic intervalstodetermine the patternofgrowth. Stemanalysisinvolvesdissectingindividual trees and counting the growth rings at intervals upthe stemto determine the age atwhich the tree reached a certain height. Tree height shows a strongcorrelation with volume.The yield models are forstands that are composedofpredominantlyone species. Formixed species standsvolume isestimated usingproportionsofthe predictions foreachspecies assuming that there is no interactionbetween species that affects theirpatternofgrowth. Forexample, ifthe stand is 60% Douglas-firand 40%Hemlockthe estimate ofvolume would be 60% ofthe estimate for apure Douglas-firstand and 40% ofthe estimatefor a hemlock stand.In additionto the estimate ofallowable annual cut givenby the Hanzlik formula, anareavolume allotment checkwas used. Thisprocedure involved analgorithmwhichrunsthrough one rotationat the indicatedAACto see ifit is sustainable throughout the projectedrotation age and ifa sufficient volume ofsecond growthwas ready at the end ofthe rotation.The AAC could then be adjusted upwardsor downwards to ensure sustainability.92The AAC could also be adjusted fornon-recoverable losses or landsthat may be lostfromproduction during the rotation. Losses may be dueto land alienation forother purposes,logging roads, regenerationdelays, stand treatment losses, breakage, insects, disease, andfires.Calculation using the Hanzlik formulaor the more current simulationtechniquesprovides the indicatedAAC. The actualAAC is then determined by the chiefforesterbasedonadditional considerationswhich include the economic and social conditions in theprovince.Since the Royal Commissionof1976 and the subsequent new Forest Actof1977,themethods forregulating the yield and forcalculating the annual cut have changed in BritishColumbia. Pearse (1976) argued for changesto the systemofyield regulation by noting thatat the time ofhiswriting allowable cuts in most ofthe Public Sustained YieldUnits in theprovince contained numerous conservative biases. He suggestedthat utilization standardswould improve in the more uniformmanaged forests and that growthrates tended to beunderestimated for several reasons. Growthwasestimated fromexisting stands whilemanaged stands were expected to add volume considerably faster. The productivity oflandoccupied by mature timbermay fall shortofits potential for new crops. Improved utilizationstandards and growth might also shorten rotation ages.In additionto biases in the physical assumptions surrounding sustainedyield, Pearsenoted some economic limitationsofthe policy. Considerationofthe interest on capital andothereconomic considerationswould shorten rotations increasing timber supply in the shorttermat least. Delaying the harvestofold-growth standswas thought to impose costs on thecitizensofBritish Columbia because it delayed the economic benefits and postponed “newgrowth on lands now occupied by stagnant timber”. Theequal annual yields also limitedtheflexibility to respond to changing markets and economic climates. In general, Pearse arguedthat the yield regulationpolicy in place at the time implied thatthe future would be like thepast:93While prognostications about future trends in silviculture, industrialtechnology, and othervariablesunavoidably involve some speculation, fewwould argue that the best assumption is that they will remain unchanged; yetthis is implied in the presentallowable cut policy. (Pearse 1976, p.232)I recommendthat the sustained yield policy be directed more systematicallytowardenhancing industrial and environmental values. This calls fora shift inemphasis, fromthe traditional effort to achieve maximumequal annualharvests fromall the province’stimberland, to attainmentofthe fullest long-runeconomic and social benefits fromavailable forest resourcesandtoenhancementoftheirproductive capacity. (Pearse1976, p.Y73)The newprocedure forregulating the rateofcut that resulted involvedthe use offorest estate modelsdesigned to optimize timberflow. Since the late I970s there hasbeenashiftto more flexible simulationmodels that allow fora considerationofnon-timbervalues.This innovation has allowedpolicy makers to consideralternative ratesofcut, different land-use options, differentintensitiesofmanagementon different partsofthe land baseandotherfactors in the determinationofcut. The next step, currently underway, is the developmentofspatially-based simulation modelsthat willgive foresters more flexibility to actuallymanagethe landscape. A spatial data basein the formofa Geographic InformationSystem(GIS) isin preparation and groundwork fora new provincialforest inventory is underway.One ofthe recommendationsofthe Pearse Commissionwas that Public SustainedYield Units be re-organized into largerTimber SupplyAreas (TSAs). The rationalewas thatthe new systemofTSAswouldmake more sense administrativelyby organizing the forestestate around processing facilitiesand forest tenures. Yield regulationby TSAwould alsoimprove flexibility by scheduling harvestand managementactivitiesovera largerarea:Imbalance in certain characteristicssuch as age and species distribution cancreate supply problems ifthe harvest rateis calculated forsmall areas.’2Re-organizing the Provincial forest into largeradministrative unitsprovided theadded benefitofallowing an increasein AAC at a time when “...shortfalls inAAC within12B.C. Ministry ofForests. 1978. “Yield regulationwithin timbersupplyareas.” Victoria:The Ministry. As quoted in Chambers and McLeod(1980).94Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYIJs) [were]surfacing” (Chambers andMcLeod 1980).Dowdie (1976)provides anexplanationofhow increases to theAACwerepossible:Suppose, to take a simplifiedexample,we startwithtwo areas:A and B...assume areaA contains only over-maturetimberstandswithazeronetgrowth rate and B contains thrifty,immature stands growingrapidly.The initial harvest rate onA would be the total inventolyvolumedividedby the rotationage. AreaB would not haveany harvestsince all itstimber is less thanrotationage.By the simple actofcombiningA and B intoa single planning unit, harvestcan be increased. Growth ratesonarea B wouldmake it possible to liquidate theold growth inventoryon areaA at a fasterrate.Section 7 ofThe ForestActof1977 (ConsolidatedNovember 10, 1992) describestherelevant considerationsin the calculation ofallowableannual cut:7. (3) Indeterminingan allowable annual cut underthis section the chiefforester, despiteanything to the contraryin anagreement listedin section 10, shall consider(a) the rate oftimberproductionthat may be sustainedon the area, taking intoaccount(i) the compositionofthe forest and itsexpected rateofgrowth on thearea;(ii) the expectedtime that itwill take the forestto become re-establishedonthe area following denudation;(iii) silvicultural treatmentsto be applied to the area;(iv) the standardoftimberutilization andthe allowancefordecay, waste andbreakageexpected tobe appliedwithrespect totimberharvestingonthearea;(v) the constraintson the amountoftimberproducedfromthe areathatreasonably can be expectedby use ofthe area forpurposesotherthantimberproduction;and(vi) any other informationthat, in his opinion, relatesto the capacityoftheareatoproduce timber,(b) the short and long termimplicationsto theProvince ofalternative ratesoftimberharvesting fromthearea;(c) the nature, productive capabilitiesand timberrequirementsofestablished andproposed timberprocessing facilities;(d) the economic andsocial objectivesoftheCrown, asexpressedby the minister, forthe area, forthe generalregion and for the Province;and(e) abnormal infestationsin and devastations of, and majorsalvage programsplannedfor, timberon the area.The above factors are takeninto account in a timbersupplyanalysis undertakenforeachTSA. Timber supply analysisis undertakenby the MinistryofForests with inputfromthe95timber industry andotherrelevant resource agencies. The goal is to plan a sustainable levelofharvestwhileensuring that other resource values are incorporated into timbermanagementplanning.A numberofmanagementoptions foreach TSA are defmed. Foreachoption alongterm sustained yield analysis is undertaken. The MultipleUse Yield Calculator(MUSYC)’3hasbeenused althoughthe Ministiy ofForests is currently switchingtoan in-housesimulation model. With sustainedyield as a constraint, the model has five categoriesofinformationas inputs:1. the timber harvesting land base, defined by a land base analysis,2. growth andyield assumptions,3. management assumptions,4. funding restrictionsand costsofmanagement, and5. timberharvesting assumptions.The outputs fromthe model are:1. schedulesofharvest,2. reportson silviculture regimes,3. the long run sustainedyield,4. schedulesofmanagement costs, and5. a descriptionofthe changing structureofthe inventory.Timber supply analysis is an iterative process.Options are developed until they meetthe goalsofthe Ministry ofForests andother concerned resource agencies. Afterreviewing areport on resource options, the ChiefForester, with advice fromRegional and Districtstaff,selects an optionandestablishesaprovisionalAAC forthe TSA.The Pearse report recognized the potential fora “faildown” in the rate ofharvest.While old-growth stands have a lowerrateofincrement thanyounger foreststhey haveaccumulatedwood for a much longerperiodoftime. Forexample, a coastal old-growthforest might have a standing volume of500m3/haand aculminationvolume at 100yearsof‘MUSYC was developed by the U.S. Forest Serviceformanagementplanning on theNational Forests.96300m3/ha(Forestry Undergraduate Society 1983). Totransform lOOhaofold growth to abalanced age distributionwith maximumage 100 requires cutting 500m3peryearuntilyear100 whenthe annual cutwill fall to300m3.The Hanzlik formula forecasts a smoothreduction in cutoverone and a halfrotationsalthough he suggested thatthe rate ofcutcouldbe accelerated ifthe surplus at the endofone rotationwouldbe too great (Hanzlik 1922).The BritishColumbiapolicy has beento accelerate the cut in orderto liquidate old-growthtimber in one rotation. This results in a more abrupt faildown at the endofthe firstrotation.While improvedyields and utilization standards in managed standsmay off-setthepotential falidowneffect, there are significantuncertaintiesabout thesustainability ofthecurrent rate ofcut. The recommendationsofthePearse commissionencouraged increases tothe rate ofcut (Figure4-3) that have continuedto the present. The aimofmaximizing theyield is still the single most important factordriving forestmanagement in British Columbia.The indicated annual allowable cut has beenbetween70 and 80 millionm3forthelast decadewhile the MinistryofForests suggests thatthe long run sustainableyield,undercurrent managementpractices, will fallwell belowthe current level (British ColumbiaMinistry ofForests 1984). Reductionstothe AAC in severalTimber Supply Areasaroundthe province in the last several years,and the public controversies surrounding thesereductions and other forestry-related issues, suggestthatwe are reaching the pointofnecessitythat Fernow, quoted at the beginningofthis chapter, called the birthstone offorestry.Forestry in British Columbia ispossibly the largestscale applicationofthe Germancameralist forest program in the world. Almost the entireforested land base ofthe provinceis organized into a small numberoflarge managementunits forthe purpose ofmaximumsustainedyield management and are under the ultimatecontrol ofa single technicalbureaucracy. In the next chapter I will discuss howchanges in the valuesofthe humanconstituentsofBritish Columbia’s forestsand changes in scientific understanding offorestsare forcing changes in British Columbia’s forestpolicy.97100E80C0EI40-.0EIzC0I II1900 19201940 1960 19802000YearFigure 4-3. British ColumbiaAnnualForestHarvest (1915-1993).Sources: 1915-1944 Sloan (1945),usingconversion of240 bd. ft.= I cu. m.(Larry Sluggett, TimberHarvestingBranch,B.C. Ministry ofForests, pers. comm.).1945-1992 HarvestData,TimberHarvesting Branch, B.C. MinistryofForestsand B.C. Ministry ofForestsAnnualReports.1993 CompendiumofForestry Statistics, 1993,Canadian Council ofForestMinisters, Ottawa,1994.985. THE TROUBLE WIThNORMALApproximately halfofthe land base ofBritishColumbia, an area covering47.9million ha, is forested. Roughly 94%ofthe total forested land base inBritish Columbia ispublicly owned. Currentlyabout 22.7 million haofcrown land is managedfor commercialforestry onthe principle ofmaximumsustainedyield. Some 2.7 millionhaare held inprivate ownershipand the remamderis consideredeconomically inoperable (Travers 1993).The mandate ofBritish Columbiaforestry has been to maximize the economicbenefitsto the province and to encourageindustrialdevelopmentandjob creation. Theintentions andeffectsofthe Sloan Commissionsand the Pearse Commissionwere topromote large-scale industrialforestry. This agenda has come under increasing scrutiny inrecent decades fortwo reasons.The firstwas the growing public awarenessofunpleasant side effects to the programofmaximumsustainedyield forestry. People became concernedwiththe disappearance offorests and the appearanceofwhat theyconsidered to be large, unsightly clearcuts. Thisspawned anenvironmental movementwithinBritish Columbiadevoted entirely to forestryissues.The second reason for scrutinyofBritish Columbia’s forest policy was theappearance ofa new bodyofscientificknowledge generated fromanecologicalperspective.While this may have predatedpublicenvironmental awareness it was given a strong impetusby the growing public and consequentpoliticalconcern. Ecologistsbeganto talkaboutforests as complex, dynamic, interconnected,adaptive ecosystems as opposed toaggregationsoftrees. Research appearedonold-growth forests that portrayedthemasdynamic and self-renewingratherthanas unproductive and decadent. Fisheriesbiologistsbeganto characterizethe effectsofloggingpractice on streamhabitatofanadromous fishesandwildlife biologistsexpressedconcern over the loss and fragmentationofhabitat for99forest-dwelling animals.On a more technical level concernarose overwhetherinfactwecould meet the stated agendaofsustaining the yield. Thenet effect has beento place pressureon government, industry, andthe professionofforestry to developnew initiatives.The conceptofsustainedyieldcould have a very general meaning,but in itsdevelopment in forestry it has takenona very specific meaning. In generalsustainedyieldcould mean managing a systemsuchthat some quality(ies) ofthe systemcan be sustainedwhile maintaining the system insome desired state. A forest could be managedto produce asustainedyieldofquality drinkingwater, to maintaina certain quality ofwildlife habitat, orsimply to sustain the integrity ofthe ecosystem.Sustainedyield forestry, as ithasevolvedoverthe last two hundredyears,makes itsgoal the productionofthe maximum,sustainable volume ofmerchantablewood fibre. Theobjectivesofthisenterprise arethe restructuringofthe forest intothe idealized normalforestand the developmentofgrowthmodels ofcommercial species. Thefocus ofresearchhasbeen on the silvics ofcommercialtree species, their growth rates, siterequirementsand themeans required fortheirregeneration.The conceptofsustainedyield forestryand its companion, the normal forest, containassumptions that mirror,in a sense, the assumptions ofpositivistscience:1. The reductionistassumptionthat growthmodels ofcommercialtimber species, designedto facilitate predictionofyield, somehowcharacterize the performance ofthe wholesystem.2. The assumption thatwe can improve on nature; that,forexample, old growth forests aredecadentand require replacementwithhealthyyounger stands.3. The assumptionthat future forestswill be like thoseused to generate predictive models,or the myth ofcertainty.Ecology, at the present time,with itsemphasis ondialectical orcontextual holismand the recognitionofuncertaintyoffers some alternativeways ofthinking about forests thatchallenge the received view oftraditional forestry. In thischapter I willpresent some ofthechallengesposed byecologistsand ecologically-minded foresters.Many ofthese ideas are100speculative and not welldocumentedbut I have tried to present ideas that are, in my opinion,at least plausible. My purpose is notto advocate any one view offorests or forestry but toconsider the manner inwhichthe appearanceofanew body ofscientific insight hasinfluenced the public debate on forestry.The challengesposed by scientific knowledge and publicenvironmental awarenesshave resulted in a seriesofnew policy initiativesthat put constraintsonthe central goal oftimber management. These include strategies for protected areas and forold-growthpreservation, and the developmentofa forestpractices code. The currentpolitical rhetoric onforestry is focussedonthe ideaofsustainable forestry as partofa programofsustainabledevelopment. Some aspectsofthese recent developmentswillbe discussed in the conclusiontothis chapter.5.1 The Forest ortheTreesWhat levelofunderstandingofforestecosystems do single species growth modelsprovide? A forest is much more than apopulationoftrees. Heske (1938, p.41) tells us thatbythe earlypartofthis century German foresters had learned by experience that.the forest is not merely an aggregationofindividual trees, but is anintegrated, organic entity, comprising all the innumerable living organismsthatexist fromthe rootsdeep in the groundto the crowns that sway high inthe sunlight, fromthe smallest soil microbe to age-old tree veteran.Ecological systems are integrated, and contingent, suchthat disturbance ofone partofthesystemwill affectotherparts. As contingencies themselves cannot be predictedwithcertainty, the predictability ofthe developmentofforestecosystemswill diminishwithtimefromthe point ofprediction.The problemofextrapolating from the growthmodel ofa single species to a generalmodel ofthe performance ofthe underlyingsystemlies at the heartofthe polemic between101functional orecosystemecology and populationorcommunityecology’.Ecosystemecologyhas focused on energyflow, nutrient cycling and otherecosystemprocesses, essentiallyignoring species dynamics.Population and communityecology, on the otherhand, focusonthe diversity, distributionand interactions ofspecies.From the time ofClementsandGleason (see Chapter 3), the debatehas raged overhow to develop an understandingofcomplex ecological phenomena.Population orcommunityecologistswouldargue that an understandingofspecies and species dynamicsare pre-requisiteto any understanding ofthe largersystem. The functionalecologistarguedthat asecosystems areintegrated systems, propertiesofthe whole such asenergy andnutrient flow are critical.The designofinterventionsinecological systems, such asforests, requires integrationofknowledge fromboth approaches. Knowledge ofspeciesand species dynamics is criticaltounderstandingtheirrole innutrient andenergy dynamics.Knowledge ofenergy andnutrient dynamics is criticalto understanding the structure and functionofthe systemand thesignificance ofeach species.Ecosystemunderstanding comesfromknowledge ofthedynamicsofspecies andthe flow ofenergy and nutrientswithin andbetween species, andofthe patternofecosystemson the landscape. Muchofthe recent advance inecologicaltheorycomes fromrecognizingthe necessity ofintegratingthe two approaches (Paine 1980, Pimm1991, ONeill et al. 1986).In British Columbia forestry,the standardpractice has beento use single-speciesgrowth models topredictrotationages ordisturbance cyclesforwhole ecosystems.However, knowledge ofenergy and nutrient cycling fromecosystemecology suggests thatthe processes essentialto maintaining productivity maynot, in all cases, be sustained on thecycle ofdisturbance projectedby the reductionist single-speciesmodel (Kimmins 1974).‘My discussionofthepopulation/community andecosystemecology distinction andtheneed for integrationofthe two approaches is based on Carney(1989), O’Neill et al. (1986),MacFadyen (1975) andMcIntosh (1985).102Following a disturbance such as clear-cut logging, nutrient capital is lost through logremoval andthrough leachingofnutrients fromthe soil by drainage waters while the site isnot fully occupied. The amountoftime required forthe site to recoup these nutrient lossesmay affect its capacity to produce trees at the same rate aspriorto disturbance.The mechanisms bywhich a site conservesor addsnutrient capital are provided, inmany cases, bywhat have been consideredeconomically uninteresting componentsofthesystem. Forexample, nitrogen and other nutrients neededby trees are typically accumulatedby seral weedspeciesthat invade new clearings and prevent the lossofthese nutrients vialeeching. In forestry, the singular focus on tree growthand the desire to condense the timerequired to produce commercialwoodproducts makes this re-establishment phase afterforest harvesting an inconvenience. While seral species may contribute to the maintenanceoflong-termsite productivity they also compete withyoung crop trees. Left to nature theestablishmentofthe new forest and the stockingofthe new stand may not meet the standardsofcurrent managementpractice. Herbicides, slashburning and mechanical site preparationhave beenemployedto slow the establishmentofbrush, promote the growthofcrop treeseedlings, and shortenthe regenerationperiod. These treatments, however, may acceleratethe loss ofmineral nutrients by removing nutrient-retaining seral species andby reducing thehumus layerwhere mineral nutrients are stored. Traditional forestry practice has consideredonly the negative impactsofseral weedspecies in trying to reduce the regeneration delayportionofthe rotation age. Sustainable forestry, on my view, requires more carefulconsiderationofthe positive ecosystemfunctions that seralweed species perform.Many forests include in their compositiontree species that are considered undesirablefromaneconomical pointofview. One strategy for improving the yieldofthe forest hasbeen to attempt to improve the stocking ofcommercially more desirable tree species throughartificial regeneration and post-planting spacing treatments. The potential importance ofeconomically less valuable tree species in the processofnutrient cycling has been ignored. InGermany, forexample, removal ofthe soil improving Beech and the establishmentofeven-103aged plantationsofa single speciesreportedly resulted in soildeterioration, decreasedgrowth and lessenedresistanceto insects and diseases (Heske 1938).In northern Ontario, white spruce(Piceaglauca (Moench) Voss) commonlygrows inassociationwithtrembling aspen(Populus tremuloidesMichx.). White spruce is a relativelynutrient-demanding species (Fowells 1965) andthe nutrient-richaspen leaflitter may play animportant role inmaintaining the productivityofthesite. Attempting to grow white spruceas amonoculture may havenegative impacts on the productivity ofsuch sites.In southwestern B.C., Douglas-fir (Pseudotsugamenziesii (Mirb.) Franco) commonlygrows on lowerelevation seepage sites in associationwithredalder (Alnus rubra Bong.).Since the alder competes for growing space, agreatdealofeffort has gone into developingtechniques forremoving it withherbicides and manualbrushing techniques. Red alder,however, is anitrogen-fixing species that contributesto the nutrient-richness ofthe site(BinIcley 1983). Whateffect its removal may have,over one or more commercial crops isdifficult to measure, but it should be a considered inassessing the projectedproductivity ofDouglas-fir stands. Moreover, alternative treatmentscould be considered. A short rotationofalderwiththinning and underplanting is one possibility.Underplantingofmore shadetolerant species such as grand fir (Abiesgrandis (Dougi. ex D. Don)Lindl.) andwesternredcedar (Thujaplicata Donn ex D. Don in Lamb.)has been attempted operationallyon suchsites.On the northcoastofBritish Columbiared alderandblackcottonwood(PopulustrichocarpaTorr. & Gray) grow on river floodplains in associationwith Sitka spruce (Piceasitchensis (Bong.) Carr.). Sitka spruce typically grows inthe understory ofthe fastergrowinghardwoods forthe first 30 to 50 yearsuntil the shorterlived species beginto die out. One ofthe benefits to the spruce trees is thatthe shade providedby thehardwood overstoryapparently protects it from attackby the spruce weevil(Pissodesstrobi Pk.), an insectthatfeeds in the terminal leader and causes diebackofat least two years’ growth (Wood andMcMullen 1983). In the KitimatValley, southofTerrace,B.C., herbicide removalofthe104hardwoodoverstoryappearsto be related to anepidemic infestationofspruce weevilthat hasresulted ina decades long regenerationproblem.In 1993 and 1994 I was involved inestablishingoperational trials designed togrow Sitka spruce under amanaged hardwoodoverstory.The growth models currently in use were constructedusing data from forest standsdominated by one species. In fact, most stands aremixturesoftwoor more species. Mixedspecies standsexhibit differentpatterns ofstand structurethando pure stands and theassumptionthat single-species models can be usedproportionately is questionable. Mixedspecies models have beendeveloped forthe QueenCharlotte Islands and southeastern BritishColumbiaand more research inthis area is likely.The growth models used in British Columbia include asite variable (site index) thatattempts to account forvariability insite quality. Site index is a measure ofthe heightofsitetreesat an index age. Forexample, the potential for height growthat age fifty might be 40mon a good site while only 15mon apoor site.Typically site indices for specific stands areunknown and must be estimated fromgeneralized site indexcurvesprepared from sampledata. The curvesprovide mean data forgood, mediumandpoorsites by forest type. Treegrowth potential is likely to be far more variable thanthis simple site classification canaccount for(Monserud 1988).Biogeoclimatic site classification, as being developed inBritish Columbia, can reducethe unexplained variance in site productivity (Greenet al. 1989). By developing indicesofsite productivity by site association2,variationdue to soil, topographic position, elevationand aspect may be accounted for. Variation in growthrates, as a consequence ofgenotypicvariation, may also be explainedto agreaterdegree by such an approach (Monserud 1988).Inspite oftheir limitations, relativelysimple volume as a functionofage models arestill the mostuseful predictive tools availablefor forecastingproductivity. Process models2Site association is one ofthe basic units ofthe biogeoclimatic classification system. See thelast sectionofthis chapter for a more detaileddescription.105while critical to developing an understandingofecosystem function,have generally proventobe too complicated, containing too many assumptions and too many parameters that can’tbe reliably estimated, toprovide useful forecasting tools forplanning.The fundamental limitationofgrowthmodels is that they are merely descriptionsofhow forest stands have grown in the pastbut not why forest growth is possible. Bothkindsofmodels may be relevant in the processofplanning forest management ifconsidered ashypotheses and there is continual interplay betweenpredictionand monitoringofthepredictions in the real world. An adaptive frameworkwould allow forthe adjustment ofmodels as new information accrues.5.2 What is aNormal Forest?The agendaofBritish Columbia forestiy, since the Sloan Commissionof1945, hasbeento liquidate the residual old-growth forest. This includes very old forests (perhaps 300to 1000 years old) on the coast and overmature forests (generallybetween 150 and 250 yearsold) in the interior. Femow introducedGerman forestry to NorthAmerica in this way:The objectofforest regulation, then, is to prepare forthe change ofanabnormal forest into a normal forest.3The idea behindthe normalforestwasto organize the forest in suchaway as to allow forregularcutting cycles. After removing the old forest it could be replacedwitha moreorderly, efficientplantation forest.The relevant definitionforthe word normal offered by Webster’s dictionary is“conforming to a type, standard, or regularpattern”. Modernecological understandingoftheforest as an integrated system has generated new ideasthat questionwhether the currentconceptionofthe normal forestwill produce resultsthat satisfy the desiresofsociety.One ofthe key assumptions in forest management is the determinationofrotationage. At what age should a standbe harvested? In British Columbia the policy choice hasFromFernow’s EconomicsofForestiypublished in 1902, as quoted in Haley (1966).106beento harvest at thephysicalrotation (Figure 4-1) wheremaximum sustained yield (MSY)might be realize&Three otherconsiderations that might go into apolicydecision about rotation age arediscussed in most standardtexts on forest management4:1. The technicalrotation refers to the age most economicallysuitable forproducing certainwoodproducts. Veneerlogs might require a lengthened rotationwhile ifthestand is tobe grown forpulpwood a shorterrotation than MSY might beappropriate.2. Thefinancialrotation maximizes the net presentworthofthe forest land. Net presentworth is determined by subtracting the discounted valueofall anticipated costsofgrowing the forest fromthe discountedexpected revenue. The conceptsofsoilrent andfinancial rotationwere developed in 19th century Germany by Pressler and MartinFaustmann. The financial rotation is generally shorter than the physical rotationdepending on the interest rate chosen.3. Thepathologicalornaturalrotation is basedon the silvical qualities ofthe tree speciesthat dominate the stand. SpeciesofAbies, forexample, are susceptible to heart rots androtations shorterthan the physical rotation may maximize the useable wood volume.Otherspecies may become susceptible to insect or disease infestations past a certain age.All these considerations focus on tree growthandwoodproduction. A changingscientific conceptionofthe forest and anexpanded awarenessofthe variety ofamenitiesitoffers suggest otherrelevant considerations in the choice ofrotationage. Kimmins (1974)has suggested the ecologicalrotationas the cycle ofdisturbancethat sustains essentialecosystemprocesses. Other considerationsmight be the maintenanceofforests in a conditionthat optimizes quality waterproduction, wildlife habitat, biodiversity,aesthetic beauty orsome measure ofecosystem integrity. The temporal frequency andthe spatial patternofdisturbance will have a significanteffect on these nonconsumptiveforest attributes. Anyconsiderationofarotation raises questionsofvalue.In abriefprepared forthe MinisterofForests in 1963 theGreaterVancouverWaterDistrict captured the thenprevalentdismissalofold growth forest:see, forexample, Davis (1966), Brasnett (1953) andthe Forestry Undergraduate Society(1983).107The decadent forests covering the watercatchment areas, with a heavy cedarcontent and a high incidence ofsnags coupledwith the frequencyoflightningactivity, constitute a continuing and increasing firehazard. The recentinfestationofthe balsamwoolly aphid has nowspread overthe entirewatershed area and forwhich no counter measureshave yet been found, isyearly adding more snags to an alreadyunsatisfactory condition.These conditions call for the immediate startofa scientificprogramofmanagementofthe forestswithin the watersheds. By applyingthe principlesofgood forest management the watersheds canbeimproved. (GVWD 1963)The word “decadent” means a state ofdecay ordecline.Ifa stand is decadent it couldbe argued that it is reasonable to replace it with ayoungstand. But a growing body ofevidence suggests thatold-growth stands are not adequatelydescribed by the concept ofdecadence. Old-growthstands are dynamic and in manycases display propertiesofresiliencythatenable themto absorb stresses and recover fromdisturbance.The process ofnormalizingthe forest involves simplifying its structure and biodiversity,and potentially decreasing itsresiliency (Franidinet al. 1987).Old-growth forests are thought to be susceptible topests, insects anddiseasepathogens, that cause tree mortality andwood decay. Ourknowledge offorests, andsubsequent understanding offorest insects and diseases, hasdeveloped froma desire toextractproducts from the forest. Webster’s Dictionarydefines a pest as “a plant or animaldetrimental to man”. Thus, no organism is apest in itself, but only in the context inwhich itaffects human life, or resources usedby humans, in a significantly negative manner.The study ofinsects and diseases inforestry has focussedprimarily onorganisms aspestsoftimberproduction and quality. There are abundantexamplesoforganisms that fromone pointofview are pests but in another context arebeneficial. Dwarfmistletoes(Arceuthobium spp.) are parasitic plants that may cause asignificantreduction in the growthrate and utilizationpotential oftrees (Baranyayand Smith 1970). Dwarfmistletoe brooms,however, may also provide nesting and refugehabitat for birds and small mammals (Tinnin1984). While mistletoes may besignificant pests in the contextoftimberproduction, theymay contribute positivelyto forest ecosystem biodiversity.108Ambrosia beetles aresmallwood-boring insectsthatattackdowned logs and reducethe attractivenessofsawn lumber.McLean (1985) estimated that ambrosiabeetles cost thecoastal B.C. lumber industiy Can.$65million in quality reduction in 1980-81. Fromanotherpointofview ambrosia beetles play an importantecological role:They are often among thefirst insectsto invade the dead orrecentlyinjuredtissuesofa tree. The ambrosia fungusthat they introduce starts theslowprocessofbreaking down thewood, and the vacated beetle galleries offerentrance courts for other saprophytic fungi.(Lindgren 1990, p.8)Pathogensare generally considereddestructive whenwoodproduction is theprimarygoalofmanagement. Fromanotherpoint ofview, the actionofforestpathogensmayincrease both spatial and temporaldiversity and are important actors in forestdevelopment.Inmoister climatesofintenor B.C.,van der Kamp (1991) suggests that rootdiseasepathogens may be majoragentsofdiversityby breaking upuniform landscape into avarietyofforest types:.the combinationofcover in the surroundingconifer stands and browseavailable in the root disease centers mayprovide nearoptimum conditionsformoose and deer. Also, these root diseasescreate a constant supplyofsnags inall stagesofdeterioration, thusprovidingessential habitat for cavity nestingbirds... the root diseasescreate special habitats that may favourplant andanimal speciesnot well adaptedto living in dense, even-aged, coniferousstands. (vander Kamp 1991, p.354)In addition, wood decay fungi,which recycle carbon,create special niches both in living trees,snags, down logs, stumps androtting rootswhichmay be essential forthesurvival ofsome animal and plantspecies. (vander Kamp 1991, p.354)Similarly, Stoszek (1988) argues thatoutbreaksofdefoliating insects such astheDouglas-firtussock moth andthe western spruce budworm.are indicative offorestecosystems understress fromthe nutrientlimitationscaused by natural or management-inducedfactors... the maineffects [ofdefoliation] on the host tree arethe reductionofleafareaand carbohydratesynthesis. Reductionofleafarea increasespenetrationoflight andprecipitationto the forest floor, temporarilyincreasing available moisture,109microbial activity, and cyclingofnutrients. The non-hosttreesbenefit mostfrom such changes.(Stoszek 1988, p.258-259)Althoughwe cannot knowthe processofa thousandyearcyclethere isevidence thatCoastal old-growth forests havethe capacity to renew themselvesfromwithin. Insectand/ordisease mortality creates gaps inthe canopy that allow young treestoenterthe stand. Thestructure and compositionofthestand may change over time butthroughthis processofgapreplacementa shifting mosaic ofstructural units persiststhat increasesthe range ofhabitatsandpromotes high,stable biodiversity (Franidinet al. 1987)In spite ofthe supposeddecadenceofold growth forests,insectand diseaseinfestations canbe more problematic inthe more uniform, structurally simpler secondgrowth forests. Disease fungi, forexample,may reachpersistently highlevels followinglogging orstand spacing,causing highmortality in seedling andsapling stage trees (Fincketa!. 1992, Baker 1988). The Germanexperience, discussed in Chapter4,was that managedforestswere less resilientto insects and diseases than natural stands (Heske 1938).Douglas-firtussockmothandwestern spruce budworm infestations ineastern British Columbia,Washingtonand Oregon appearto be more damaging on siteswhere high-grading5has leftdense pure standsofDouglas-fir(Schowalter 1986). The spruce weeviland the black armycutwormare examplesofinsects that were oflittle significance innatural forests but havebecome importantpestsofmanagedstands (Fincket al. 1992).The impacts ofold-growthdependent pests such as the hemlock looperand thebalsamwoolly adelgid may bemitigated by the resiliency ofold-growthforests. Thesewerethe insects that motivated theintroduction ofscientificforestmanagementin the Vancouverwatersheds. The hemlock looperattacksand causes high mortality in old-growthhemlockstands but infestations are infrequentand short induration (Turnquist 1991).High-grading is a forestry practicethat involves selective cutting ofthelargest,economicallymostdesirable stems.110The balsamwoolly adelgid is an introducedpest that caused high levelsofmortalityofAmabalis firwhen first introducedto the watersheds in the late 1950s. It has sincesubsided toendemic levels and does not appear to pose athreat to foresthealth6.The resiliencyofnatural forests to insectsand diseasesmay be due to the prevalenceofpredatorsandparasitesofinsect pests, bacterial andviral diseases, and birds that regulatethe populationsofdestructive insects. Studies fromwestern Oregon andNorth Carolinaindicate thatpredatorand parasite populations are significantly reduced followingclear-cutlogging. Herbivore biomass (primarily aphids), whichwasrelatively insignificant in mature,structurally complexecosystems, was increased dramatically inyoung stands(Schowalter1989).A structurally and functionally diverseecosystem, such asthese old-growthforests, maintainspredatordiversity and impedes herbivore success indiscovering suitable hosts and completing development. These studies suggestthatwidespread forest simplificationwill have serious consequences forpestmanagement. (Schowalter 1989, p.321)Although it is apparent that many speciesofbirdseat insects it has beendifficulttoillustrate what theireffectonpopulation size might be. A recent study conductedin ayoungMissouri Ozarkdeciduous forest providesempirical evidence that birds can significantlyreduce insect populations contributing to a significant increase intree growth (MarquisandWhelan 1994).Another important feature ofnatural forests are mycorrhirzae. The termmycorrhizarefers to the symbiotic relationship between certain fungi andplant roots (Maser 1988).Mycorrhizal fungi absorb nutrients andwater fromthe soil and translocatethemto a host plant. In turn, the hostprovides sugars fromitsownphotosynthesis to the mycorrizhal fungi. (Maser 1988, p.26)6These observations are based on surveys, in 1993, forthe balsamwoolly adelgid in theSeymourWatershed conducted by the author and Phero Tech Inc.on contract to the GreaterVancouver Regional District.111Most ofthe forest trees commonto British Columbia depend on mycorrhiza-formingfungi for nutrient uptake. Fungi represent a large amountofbiological diversity in forestecosystems. Different fungi may benefitdifferent hosts in differentways:Some mycorrhizae may be important forphosphorus uptake.Some may beimportant for lengthening root life, protectingagainstpathogens, enhancingwateruptake; some may be important in certainpH’s. (Amaranthus 1990,p.S9)Seedling survival and subsequent growthappears to be stronglyaffected by the retentionofnative populations ofsoil organisms (Amaranthus 1990). Managementactivities such asclearcutting andprescribedburning may reduce the diversity and abundance ofthesebeneficial soil organisms. Brush speciesthat invade thesite after forest clearing may sustainsoil microflora such as mycorrhizae. By eliminatingthe brush phase mycorrhizal diversitymay be reduced (Amaranthus 1990).The forestsofthe Pacific Northwest are hometo a diverse concentrationofwildlife, asignificantportion ofwhich requires mature or old-growth forests (Bunnell 1990). Habitatloss and fragmentation has raised concern about the healthofa variety ofanimalpopulations. These include the Vancouver Island marmot, caribou, grizzlybears, and anumberofspeciesofsmall mammals, reptiles, amphibians and birds (Harding andMcCullum 1994).A programofliquidating old-growth forests and replacingthemwithyounger,structurally simpler forests would appearto institutionalize the reductionofbiodiversity. TheB.C. Ministry ofForests is beginningto address these issueswith research onbiodiversityand through its proposed Old-growth Strategy and other initiatives. The importanceofpreserving old-growth forests, notjust for recreational andaesthetic reasons, but forecological reasons, is slowly being recognized. Sustaininglong-termsite productivity mayrequire the maintenance ofecosystemresiliency,its ability to absorb stress orchange withoutsignificant lossoffunction. This capacity may be related to biodiversity (Franklinet al.1987).112The argument for conserving ecosystemdiversity was best made by Aldo Leopold inhis classic, A Sand CountyAlmanac:Ifthe biota in the course ofaeons hasbuilt somethingwe like but do notunderstand, thenwho but a fool would discard seeminglyuselessparts? Tokeep evely cog and wheel is the first rule ofintelligenttinkering. (Leopold1949)Kimmins (1992), in responding to the oft-quoted Leopold, arguesthat forestecosystems contain a certaindegree ofredundancy:The ideathat the lossofa single speciesofbird orsmallmammal will resultin adramatic alteration, oreventhe eventualdestruction, ofa forestecosystem is simply not supported by the available evidence. (Kimrnins1992,p.164)The point, however, is that itmight be foolishto discardparts thatwe do notunderstand. A growing bodyofevidence suggests that some relativelyobscure parts offorestecosystems may performvaluable functions in sustaining ecosystemresiliency. Theircontributionsare notyetwell understood. The positivistargumentmight be thatwe cancompensate forthe activitiesofthese componentswithtechnologies suchas fertilizers,herbicides and nursery practice. The uncertainty surrounding theeffectsofsuch treatmentsonecosystemresiliency, the relativecosts (financial and other) and the public desire for suchsolutions requires more careful consideration.What is a normal forest? Towhat pattern should a forest conformto provide asustainable flow ofthe many and variousamenitiesthat forests offer? The conceptofthenormal forest assumes that there is some universal model ofthe pattern to whicha forestmust conform. The traditional idea is that a normalforest is one simplified, spatially andstructurally, so asto facilitate an optimum, evenandpredictable flow ofwood. Thispositivist view is at odds withourcurrent level ofecologicalunderstanding offorests. Theinterconnectedness, contingency and uncertainty inecological systems suggest that the word“normal” has little meaning at all in this context.113Forests are extremely diversejustwithin British Columbia.Coastal forests, forexample, may have a high degree ofstructural complexitydue to the infrequency oflarge-scale disturbance and the small openingscreated by windthrow, insects and diseases. In theboreal forest, where large-scale wildfiresare far more frequent,forests are far lessstructurally complex. The diversityofforests might suggest a diversityofmanagementstrategies as opposed to the uniformmodel inplace. Avariety ofstyles offorestiy may benecessary toproduce a healthy forested landscape that satisfiesthe broad range ofneeds andvalues ofits human constituents.5.3 TheMyth ofCertaintyThe scientific positivist believed in aworld that couldbe described mechanistically.Because the worldwas constructed in a classical machine-like fashion,its trajectories couldbe foreseenwith deterministic certainty. While agnosticismabout causes madeit impossibleto understandwhy things happenthe way they do, it was possible to describe nature andcreate descriptive formulae that wouldenable us to predict its future states.Sustained yield forestry, as it has evolved in British Columbia, is the productofapositivistphilosophy that viewed natural phenomena asessentially universal and ahistorical.The policy ofequal annualyields forever has created an illusionofcertainty in the face ofagrowing awarenessoflarge-scale uncertainty. Maximumsustainedyieldforestry contains thetacit assumptionthat the futurewillbe like the past.Forest management, as practicalecology, is subject touncertainty as a consequenceofecological contingency and as a consequence ofshifting social perceptions ofthe valuesinherent in forests. Ecological systemsare complex, contingent and evolutionary suchthatthey keep “slipping away and changing under us”:Rarely is it possible to predict even the short-termeffects ofmajorinterventions. Given complete biological understanding, we would still befacedwith the unpredictabilityofvarious environmental agents. (Walters andHilborn 1978, p.157).114The contingency ofecological systemsand highnaturalvariability make it difficult toknow where the MSY actually is (Larkin 1977, Sissenwine 1978) or ifit remains consistentovertime. Science may be largely incapableofpredicting safe levelsofresourceexploitationandoptimumlevelsofexploitation may best be determined by systematic trial anderror(Ludwig et al. 1993).The forest managersofBritish Columbia face significantecological uncertainties.Will clearcutting impairsoil productivity by compaction, erosionand nutrient removalviawoodextraction? Will forest ecosystems be simplified and diminished in terms ofbiodiversity in the transition to second growth forests? Will insectpredatorand mycorrhizaediversity be diminishedandwill these have long termeffects on the frequency ofherbivorous insect infestations and on tree growth, respectively? Will losses in soilbiota andundesirableplant speciesoccurandwill these losses affect soil nutrition? Will global climatechange stressecosystems andwill the transition to managed forests affect the ability offorestecosystemsto bufferthese stresses?There is areasonable doubt as to whetherthe future will be like the past. It is possibleto addressthese uncertainties to some extent throughresearchbut this may necessitatedepartures froma maximumsustained yieldpolicy and fromthe ideal ofobjective, abstractscience. The questions posed above may best be addressed by astructured learn as wegoapproach. Adaptive managementofforestecosystems requires scientists to become involvedin the practice offorest management and conceive offorestry asone large managementexperiment.To develop an understandingofforestecosystems it may be necessary to preserveportions ofnatural forest for study and comparison. Thiswould require areduction in therate ofcut and more careful monitoring ofthe effectsofmanagement activities. The role ofscience would be to designmanagement activitiesas experiments and facilitate our capacityto learn as we go. Forexample, there is currently no protocol formonitoring forestdevelopment after cutting. Yield predictions are made fromstand-level reductionist models115based on seedling regeneration butwe have little ideaifthe predictions are being met. By notmonitoring forest management activities a golden opportunity toexpand ourunderstandingofforests is lost.One ofthe consequencesofmanaging fora maximum sustainedyield is that initialyields from the resource are much higher than the long run sustainedyield (LRSY). This istypical in fisherieswhere the initial population size is above that whichwould produce themaximumsustainable yield, and in forests that are, on average, olderthan the age ofmaximummean annual increment. The problem is compounded as governments havetypically offered incentives and subsidies to new operatorswhile the resource is beingutilizedbelow the MSY (Smith 1980). In British Columbiathe short-termeconomic benefitsto the province fromtimberharvesting have historically discouraged barriers to entry into themarket (Woodcock 1990). Given the uncertainty aboutwhere the MSY actually is, it hasprovendifficult to knowwhen incentives should be removed and expansion shouldberegulated. In fisheries, the consequence has typically been an over-commitment offishingeffortresulting in over-exploitationand often failure ofthe fishery (Clark 1973; Ludwigetal. 1993).The long time frame offorestry makes it more difficultto determine when over-commitmentofeffortto the resource is occurring. Smith (1980) arguesthat to manage aresource forMSY is to manage on the verge ofconflict. Conflict comes from the changinggoals andexpectationsofresource users. In British Columbia forests, conflict overresourceuse has become the norm. It seems reasonable to suggestthat the conflict is due in part toover-commitment ofthe harvest.As we reach the transitionto second growth forests, resource options in the oldgrowth forest have become more tightly constrained. Because ofthe much smallervolumesbeing logged in past times (Figure 4-3) therewill be insufficient second growth available tosustain the current logging rates. Allowable cuts are currentlybeing reduced by theprovincial government in the transitionto the long run sustainedyield. Efforts to preserve116old-growth forests for scientific, aesthetic or cultural reasons are usually directed at areasscheduled to be loggedwithin the next ten years. The areas proposed forpreservationaresmall in terms ofthe whole forested land base but in the short termthey are critical to theforest industry. The introductionofconstraints on logging practice to conserve wildlifehabitat has furthertightened the noose. The failure to account foruncertainty in the socialdomain, the changing goals and aspirationsofpeople, has become a significantproblemforthe policy ofmaximum sustained yield forestry.Asoutlined inthe preceding discussion, there are three fundamental problemswith apolicy ofmaximumsustained yield forestry:1. The problemofextrapolating from the growth model ofa small numberofspecies to ageneral model ofthe performance ofthe underlying system.2. The effectsofmaximizing the productionofone systemcomponent onother systemcomponents.3. The assumption that the future will be like the past.In a complex, interrelated system, it is unlikely that the dynamicsofany onecomponent canprovide an understandingofthe dynamics ofthe whole. In an interrelatedsystemmaximizing the productivity ofone componentwill have significanteffects onothersystems components. In a system subject to contingency the future will not be like the past.Sustainedyield forestry has beenconcernedwitha flowofproducts and not with thestate ofthe resource. The rate ofcutwasdesigned to regulate the forest such that it mightachieve the highest rate ofgrowth. Thus, sustainedyield forestry was concerned withtheactualproductivity ofwood products and notdirectly with the inherentproductivity, orwiththe state ofthe forest at any given time (Greber and Johnson 1991). It has been assumed thatmanaging the forest to achieve the highest rate ofactual productivity would sustain theinherent rate ofproductivity, and the state ofthe forest that resultswould satisl,’ non-timbervalues. There are significantuncertaintiesunderlying this assumption.1175.4 SustainableForestryThe art and science offorestry has been undergoing profound changes in recentyearsthatwill continue into the foreseeable future. Anecosystemperspective is tacit in the movefromsustainedyields to sustainableforests:There is...anemerging consensus that forests should be viewed asecosystemsand that humanactivity in the forests should be managed within that context.(Griss 1993,P.535)The Canadian Council ofForest Ministers, representingthe Federal and Provincialgovernments, has recently announced the Canadian commitment to sustainable forests:We have strengthened ourfoundationsforconserving the natural diversity ofour forests... We have refinedourplanning and management practices toincorporate abroader range offorest uses and interests... We have refined ourability to ensure the continuedproductivity ofthe forest. (CCFM 1992)The emerging paradigmofforestry is based onan increasing awarenessoftheinterconnectedness offorestecosystems, on the view offorests as an interactive systemofplants, animals, soil, water, topography and climate:Ifyou cut a treeyou influence wildlife habitat, wateryield, fuel loading,scenic beauty, forage production, energy flow, and nutrient cycling. (Behan1990, p.15)The systems view ofecologicalphenomenahas had a significant impactontherhetoric offorestry. A systems view is implicit in the ideaofintegrated resourcemanagement (IRM)which considers non-timbervalues as at least constraintsontimbermanagement. IRM recognizes that the forest is a “unifiedecosystem, consistingofa complexofinterdependent processesand organisms” (Carrow 1994,p.19).Ecologically-based forestry and integrated resource management are key elementsofseveral recent initiatives in British Columbia forestry. These include provincial strategies forold-growth andprotected areas, and the new Forest PracticesCode7.The Forest PracticesAt the time ofwriting the Forest Practices Code had been passed in the legislature butwasin atwo month appeal period priorto itsexpectedenactment in June, 1995. My discussionof118Code incorporates muchofthe workthatwent into the developmentofthe Interior FishForestry Wildlife Guidelines and Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines. These guidelinesoutline forest practicesthat are designed to conserve fishandwildlife habitatwhile allowingfor commercial harvesting. Theirbasic philosophy is thatthe forest is a networkofconnected ecosystems on the landscape. Harvesting must be designed in away that maintainsthe quality ofwildlife habitat and overallbiodiversity by minimizing fragmentation, andproviding habitat reserves and dispersal corridors. The guidelines incorporate the idea thatmanaging forests to most closely resemble natural forests is the best way to maintainbiodiversity (Seip 1994) and othervalues.The guidelines also include aspectsofwhat hasbeen calledNewForestry(Hopwood1991). New Forestry has beendescribed by Lertzman (1990) asan attempt to define forest managementwithtimberproductionas abyproductofits primary function: sustaining biological diversity andmaintaining long-termecosystemhealth. (Lertzman 1990, p.5)The practicesofNew Forestry are designed toenhance the diversity ofmanaged stands andpromote development ofold-growth characteristics. Practicesthat havebeenproposedinclude logging methods that retain living trees, standing dead trees (snags)and fallen logs,and the establishmentofmixed species stands (Hopwood 1991).A prerequisite for landscape-based ecosystem forestry is a means ofecologicallyclassifying forest land. This has beenprovided in British Columbia by the developmentofbiogeoclimatic ecosystemclassification (BEC) (Meidingerand Pojar1991) based on studiescarried out by V.3. Krajina and his students from 1949 to 1975. In the 1970s, the B.C. ForestService began a programofecosystemstudies that continued on Krajina’s workindeveloping a classificationand descriptionofecosystemunits(Pojaret al. 1987).the code is basedon discussion papers andproposed versionsofthe standardsandregulations.119The system is based on Sukachev’s concept ofthe biogeocoenose, similarto Tansley’secosystemconcept, and the floristic theoiyofJ. Braun-Blanquet, acommunity approachtoecological analysis. Sukachev defineda forest biogeocoenose as.thatpartofthe forest uniformovera certain area in the composition,structure, and propertiesofits components, and inthe interrelationshipsamong them; that is, uniform in the plants, animals, and microorganismsinhabiting it, in the parent material, in its hydrological, microclimatic(atmosphere), and soil environmentsand the interactionsamong them; and inthe kind ofmatterand energy exchange between these components and othernatural phenomena in nature.8Sukachevemphasized the dynamic characterofthe biogeocoenose:The biogeocoenose asawhole develops through the interactionofall itsvariable components and in accordancewith special laws. The very process ofinteraction among components constantly disrupts the establishedrelationships, thereby affecting the evolutionofthe biogeocoenose as awhole.9The BEC system accounts forthe dynamic characterofecosystems by accounting forvegetative succession, site disturbance, pedogenesis and geomorphology.Classification in the BEC systemis based onvegetation, climate and soil (includingtopography and parent material). The mainunits ofclassificationare the biogeoclimaticzone, sub-zone and site unit. Classificationat the zonal level is based on regional climatecomplemented by descriptions ofprevailing pedogenic processesand characteristic plants.Zones are divided into sub-zoneson the basisofmore local climatic, pedogenic andvegetative features (Klinkaet al. 1979).Within sub-zones, site units are described by anedatopic grid (Figure 5-1) based onthe conceptsofsoil moisture regime (SMR) and soil nutrient regime (SNR). SMR and SNRreflect soilproperties suchas parent material, texture, depth and pedogenesis, andtopographic features such as slope, slope position and aspect. Forexample, lower slopesreceive seepage waterwhile an upper slope or crest tends to shed seepage water. As seepageSukachev and Dylis (1964), as quoted in Klinkaet al. (1979, p.2).Sukachev (1960), as quoted in Golley (1993, p.173).120CWHvm1 EdatopicGrid02• 03 04J•-1!01050607,08,09b, lob,:12 5113,31 hlb,14,32Figure 5-1. Ecosystemclassification units in the CoastalWestermHemlockbiogeoclimatic zone (CWH), very wetmaritime subzone (vm), submontanevariant (vml).Soil Nutrient Regimevary verypoor poor medium rich richA B C 0 ERelativevery eerie 0xeric Isubxeric 2Isubmesic 3mesic 4SiteSeriesA01 HwBa - Blueberry02 HwPI - Cladinaderately03 llwCw - Sale>04 CwHw - Sword fern05 BaCw - Foamfiowerslightly 06 HwBa - Deer ferndry07 BaCw - Salmonberry (VancouverRegiononly)08 BaSs - Devil’s club51 Avalanchetrack09b Ss - Salmonbeery (Highfluvial bench)fresh lob Act. Red-osier dogwood (Middle fluvial bench)1bAct.Willow (Lowfluvialbench)12 CwYc - Goldthread (Bog forest)13 P1 - Sphagnum (Bog woodland)moIst14 CwSs - Skunkcabbage (Swamp forest)31 Non-forestedbogvery moist32 Non-forestedfenlmarshsubhygric 5hygeic 6subhydric 7aRelative and actual SMR are defined in Appendices 6 and 7.bSMRoffloodplain sites is variableand influencedby bench height and the timing and durationofflooding.Source: Banner et al. 1993121watercarries mineral nutrients, lower slopes generally have a richer SNR. Soilfeaturessuchas texture andparent material affect the capacityofthe soil to holdwater and the availabilityofmineral cations.Vegetationreflectsand influencesthe physical conditionsofa site. The BEC systemuses Braun-Blanquet’s concept ofthe plant association in the diagnosisofthe site unit.Specieswith relatively specific site requirements are used to develop a diagnosticcombinationofspecies (Pojaret al. 1987). A descriptionofenvironmental factors aloneleaves the difficult questionofwhat their integratedeffect onplants might be:Vegetationplaysthe key role in the evaluationofsite quality because:1. it can be easily observed and objectively described; and2. it is an integratoroftheecosystem[,Jthe bestexpressionofthe combinedinfluenceofnumerous environmental factors, the biotic community itself,andecosystemhistory. (Klinkaet al. 1989, p.5)The combinationofvegetation and site providesapowerful interpretive tool fordescribing relatively uniformunits on the landscape. Experience froma certain site unit canbe extrapolatedto similarunits at other locations. The B.C. MinistryofForests hascompletedmapping ofthe province at the sub-zone level and characterized the majorsiteunits (ecosystems) withineach sub-zone. Management interpretations are being developedfor site units and growth andyield data are in the processofbeing correlated by site unit.With the developmentofspatially-based forest managementplanning tools, ecosystems canbe used as the basic planningunit for forest management.Biogeoclimatic ecosystemclassificationhas been successfullyused forwildlifehabitat classification(Hamilton 1988) and forevaluating the incidence and hazardofdisease122organisms (Beale 1987) and insect&°. Preliminary results have suggested that BEC may beuseful fordescribing the incidence and frequency offungi, including mycorrizhae”.Biogeoclimatic ecosystem classification is a deductive shell that allows us to makeinferencesabout the characteristicsofspecific ecosystems. It can be continually improvedthrough inductive inference as new information is gathered and new interpretations aremade. To be effective it mustbe continually re-evaluatedasnew contingencies arise.The BEC system is a scientific and a forest management success story. The synthesisofprocess/functionalecological theory and community ecology provides a meaningfulframework forexpanding ourunderstandingofforested ecosystems and meeting ourmanagement objectives. Vegetation alone can be fallible in site description and diagnosisbecause ofsite disturbance and the randomprocessesofmigration. Site factors alone do notreveal their integratedeffectonvegetation or the effectofvegetationon site. Biogeoclimaticecosystemclassificationaffords apowerful interpretive context fororganizing andexpandingour knowledge offorests and makespossible the practice ofsustainable forestry.10Biogeoclimatic classification has been used toevaluate the potental impacts ofmountainpine beetle, spruce beetle and gypsy moth by Phero Tech Inc., 7572 Progress Way, Delta,B.C.“Personal communicationwith Sharmin Gamiet, Mycology Resources, 356 Dafoe Rd.,Abbotsford, B.C.1236. TRANS-SCIENTIFICFORESTRYFor me, there is no way which is the waythe world is; and soofcourse nodescription cancapture it. But thereare manyways the world is, andevery true description captures one ofthem.(Goodman 1960)The positivist assumptionwasthattherewas one way the world is andthatscience was the means to describethe one way. Science wasthe way to detenninerightactionand structure the activitiesofhuman agency. Ifa conflict arises it has beentypicalto mandate more research; more sciencewould determinethe best course ofaction.The current state ofecological knowledgeposesquestions asto whetherthere arenot one but many appropriate ways tosee the world. Complex, dynamic systems maynotbe described by one ideal description. The population,the community, the ecosystemandthe gaiahypothesis are levelsofabstractionthat capture aspectsofthe historicallycontingentwhole reality.Science has developed aprotocol for inquiry thatlimits the categories that canbeaddressed. Science canconstruct anedifice ofknowledge about an objective reality at thecost ofbeing able to say much about subjectivereality. The range ofhumanbeliefs andvalues provides an additional range ofways the world appears. The world is a source ofbeauty, the world is a source ofspirituality,the world is the home ofcreatures otherthanourselves.Although science does not pronounce onbasic value questions it is mandatedbysociety to pronounce on derivative value questions.Forexample, science can say tosociety “Ifyouwant to preserve old growthforests they must be ofa certain minimumsize”. Or “Ifyou want to log in this areaandconserve scenic beauty logging could bedone in this fashion”.124The issues that forest science is asked to addresstypically involve a mixofquestionsoffact and questions ofvalue. Such issues belong inthe domainofwhatWeinberg (1972, p.209) has called trans-science:I propose the termtrans-scientWc for these questions since,though theyare, epistemologically speaking, questionsoffact and can bestated in thelanguage ofscience, they are unanswerable by science; they transcendscience.I suggest that all the major issuesofenvironmental management are trans-scientific fortwo reasons. First, ecological uncertainty makes it impossible to produce the kindofknowledge that could answerthemdefinitively. Second, “the issues themselves involvemoral and aestheticjudgements: they deal not withwhat is true but ratherwithwhat isvaluable” (Weinberg 1972, p.213).In this chapter I willoutline three major issues that dominate the currentdebateon forest management in British Columbia. What is the role ofscience in resolving theseissues? How can scientific knowledge interfacewiththe values and aspirationsofhumanculture in a frameworkthat allows rational and liveable decisions to be made. To berational they must accordwith the facts aswe know themand address the goals ofsociety. To be liveable they must accordwiththe beliefs and valuesofhuman culture.6.1 Is Clear-cutting “Bad” Forest Practice?The PremierofBritish Columbia visited Germany in 1993 to respondto thecondemnationofclear-cut logging practices in B.C. The German Greenpeace movementhas been attempting to promote a boycottofB.C. forest products as a meansofhaltingclear-cut logging.The opposition to clear-cutting is based on a blendofmatters offact and mattersofvalue. Large clear-cutswithno attentionto slope stability have causederosionandstreamdegradation. Habitat reductionand fragmentation have raised concernaboutspecies loss and reductions in biodiversity withattendant impacts onecosystem integrity.125British Columbia’s song birds are reportedly in decline and the habitatsofcaribou,grizzlybearandothermammals are threatened. Loggingofold-growth forests is havingserious impacts on lichens, insects and microbes whichmay be important in maintainingforest health (Harding and McCullum 1994). The notionofecosystemor forest health,itself, contains values that can’t be reducedto scientific analysis (Ehrenfeld 1992).For some, clear-cutting is compromising the aesthetic quality ofthe BritishColumbia landscape. The issue ofclear-cutting also raises significantmoral questionsaboutthe rights ofnon-human species and the rightsoffuture generationsofhumans.Perhaps the ultimate questionofvalue is “do we care enoughabout these issues to changeoureconomic activities in orderto address them?”. To some a successfully regeneratingclear-cut is the next logical step in a successful humanenterprisewhile to others itis agrievous insult to the landscape; something is lost that can’t be regained.What role can science play in the social debate surroundingthe trans-scientificissue ofclear-cutting. One ofthe mandates givento forest science has beento developabetterunderstandingoftheeffectsofclear-cutting on forestecosystemstructureandfunction. In the past clear-cutswere often thousandsofhectares in size spanning, in somecases, entire watersheds, islands and mountains. In the early 1980s, new guidelineslimited clear-cut size to 250 ha. More recent concerns raisedby ecological science andthe environmental movement have resulted in more restrictiveguidelines. The ForestPractices Code, whenenacted, would limit clear-cut size to40 hectares in the southernpartofthe province and 60 hectares in the north.In the past the mandate offorest science has been to promote economic activity.When logging activity first beganon the British Columbia coast in the 19th century thecommon practice was to high-grade high-value treesusing handsaws. The treeswerechosen for theiraccessibility to waterwhere they could be felled and tumbled down theslope with handjacks orwinched using steamengines into the ocean for transport. Astechnology provided power saws, trucks, railroadsand expanded markets, it became126economically efficient to harvest allthe timber in a large area. Inthe 1930s it becamecommonpractice to run a rail line upa valley and log the entire valley (Mahood andDrushka 1990). Today clear-cut loggingis still considered the safestandmosteconomically-efficient meansofextractingwood fromthe forest.In the transitionto sustained yieldforestry there also developed aquasi-ecologicalrationale forclear-cutting. The most desirable speciesfortimberhas been Douglas-fir(Pseudotsuga menziesii(Mirb.) Franco) which is relativelyintolerantofshade andprefers amineral soil seedbed (Krajinaet al. 1982). Clear-cuttingwas thought to bestmimic the large-scalewildfiresorwindthrowevents followingwhich Douglas-firappearsto most successflullyregenerate in nature. The German schoolofsustainedyield forestryprovided the additional rationale that clear-cuttingwould providethe opportunity to plantseedlings and improve the stocking and distributionofDouglas-fir inthe stand.Douglas-firand other species, notably pines (Pinus spp.) areconsideredto besuccessional or sub-climax species. They have co-evolvedto occupy a site afterdisturbance andtypically, in the absence ofdisturbance, theirabundanceis diminishedovertime. In many coastal and higherelevation interior forests awetterclimate makeswildfires infrequent. Overtime the compositionofsuch foreststends to more shadetolerant species, such as westernhemlock (Tsuga heterophylla (Raf.) Sarg.) andtrue firs(Abies spp.) that canregenerate successfully in theunderstory. Such foreststypicallyundergo gap replacement inwhichsingle treesor groupsoftrees are killed bycombinationsofdisease and windthrow and are replaced fromthe understory. In theseforest types single-treeor group selection loggingmethods1may, arguably, more closelymimic natural processes (Coates 1994).Single-tree and group selectionare standard forestry practicesthat involve maintaininga continuous forest coverby removingsingle treesorsmall groups oftrees at eachcutting cycle.127The forestsofBritish Columbia have been managed under a single regime formostofthis century. As a result, we have little experiencewith forest practices otherthanclear-cutting. The environmental movement tends to view selection silviculture as apanacea forwhat they perceive to be destructive forest practice. In 19th century Sweden,on the otherhand, clear-cutting was thought to be a panacea for centuriesofselectivecutting that had left the forest structurally and genetically impoverished. In Ontarioselective cutting ofyellow birch (BetulaalleghaniensisBritton)/ sugarmaple (Acersaccharum L.) stands, in this century, degraded stands to the pointwhere,in many cases,clear-cutand start over seemedthe bestthing to do.Clear-cutting hasbeen shownto be inappropriate in some ecosystems in BritishColumbia, notably in very hot, dry climates such as those ofthe southern interior;inothers clear-cutting may be the best choice, shortofnot cutting atall. In many cold,northern forests a thick layerofacidic organic matterdevelopsthat insulatesthe soil andpromotes permafrostorvery low summer soil temperatures. Kimmins(1992) argues thatpartial cutting may maintain low soiltemperatureswhile clear-cutting with someformofmechanical site preparation may reinvigorate soil processes and ecosystemproductivity.However, in the presence ofpermafrost, clear-cutting has the potential to createseriousinstabilitiesby altering the soil thermal regime and the soil moisture regime sufficientlyto create bog conditions. The problemsofregeneration in borealecosystems have notbeen solved no matterwhat the logging system.In my opinion, mostofthe ecosystems ofBritish Columbia couldbe managedusing any silvicultural system ifapplied appropriately. It has been a myth offorestersthat shade intolerant species could not be managedwith selection systems. Thereistestimonialevidence, fromVancouver Island, B.C., that Douglas-fir canbe successfullymanaged fortimber production on a selection system (Loomis 1990). Partial cuttingtechniques in lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta Douglas var.1atfo1ia Engelmann),128designedto reduce lossesto the mountainpine beetle (DendroctonusponderosaeHopkins), have shownpromising results inwesternMontana(McGregoret al. 1987).Barkbeetles, notably the mountainpine beetleand the spruce beetle(Dendroctonusrufipennis Kirby) infest vast areasofmature forest inthe B.C. interior.Governmentpolicy has beento clear-cutinfestedareas to salvage wood, prevent spreadofthe insects, and mitigate the potentialfire hazard. In areas such as municipalwatershedswhere a continuous forest coveris desirable it may be possible to mitigate thehazardto infestation by partial cuttingdesigned to diversii,r the overly uniformhost.Current infestations can alsobe managedby single tree removalofinfestedtreeswithorwithout semiochemically-baitedtrap trees.There are many examples, throughout theprovince, offully stocked coniferplantations following clear-cutting. Wheretimberproduction is the primary socialgoalclear-cutting may still be the best approach.Many ofthe problemsofthe pastaregraduallybeing solvedby reducing thesizeofcuts and regulating the patternofcuttingon the landscape, and by improved guidelinesfor slope stability, road-building,andstreamside protection.Some ofthe proposed “guiding principles”for timberharvesting in the newForest Practices Code areHarvestpatterns and cutbiockdesignshould reflect abalanceofbiological, social, andeconomic objectives.To achieve integrated resource managementobjectives,the prescriptionofcutblock sizes, shapes, and patterns shouldbe based on a considerationofsuch factors as windfirmness, edge effects,desired wildlife travel anddispersal corridors, fisheries-sensitivezones, aesthetic values, biologicaldiversity, rolesofecosystemcomponentsinecologicalprocesses, naturaldisturbance regimes, and the feasibleapplicationofharvesting and sitepreparation methods. (British Columbia1995, p.101)The problems ofhabitat fragmentationand lossesofhabitat diversity in the transition tomanaged forests are slowly being acknowledged.Harvestpatterns are required, underthe129Code, to incorporate a linked networkofmature timberthroughout thelandscape thatsatisfies the requirementsofwildlifehabitat and “social and recreationalvalues”. TheForest Practices Code also includesguidelines fordesignating specialmanagement areasforthe protectionofold-growth forests, recreationalvalues, wildlife habitat, streamsideand riparian areas and community watersheds.While new regulationsmayameliorate problems that have existedwith clear-cutting in the past they do little toaddressthe concernsofthose constituentswho areopposed to clear-cutting in any form.Any scientist whowould argue thatclear-cutting ispreferable to selection forestry argueswithreductionist facts against subjectivevalues.To argue in thisway involves making the positivistassumption that matters offact,suchas the economic efficiencyofclear-cuttingand the growth responses ofconiferplantations, carry more weightthanmattersofvalue, such asthe desireto maintaincontinuousforests. This involvesmisconstruing the role ofsciencein a democratic socialprocess.The questionofwhetherwe shouldbe clear-cutting orpracticingsome kindofcontinuous forestry is notessentiallya scientific question. There are mattersoffact thatmay informthe debate but they do not pre-determinethe outcome. Bothalternativeshavedifferent social, economicand ecological consequences. Scienceshould informthedebate by providing relevant informationpertainingto these consequences andbymaking society awareofthe limits ofscientific knowledgewhen attempting to explainhistorically contingentphenomena.To bejust, a resolutionofthe debate oncuttingpractice must comeas a result ofa democratic social processinwhich values are givenequal voice withfacts.Science can help society to learnfrom the choices it makes. It is now possibletodevelop landscape level GIS-basedsimulation models that could beused forprobing theeffectsofthe new regulations and otherproposals on a given landscape unit. Thiskindoftool allows a visualizationofthelandscape that could illustratewhatdifferent130management regimes might look like and could also be used as an information source inevaluating howwell management is meeting its objectives. Landscape level simulationprovides a framework for incorporatingnew informationand allows us to learnaswe go,in asystematic fashion, and adaptaccordingly.It is difficult to argue that clear-cutting is the best alternative when no alternativesare beingattempted. There is fartoo little informationon continuous forestry techniquesin British Columbiato know how well they might meetthe landowners’ objectives. Asimple way inwhich the governmentofBritish Columbiacould address the publicprotestagainst clear-cutting would be to designate land forcontinuous forestmanagement. Some knowledge ofthe alternatives might provide abettercontext inwhich to considerthe current practice.6.2 Is LoggingAppropriate in Municipal Watersheds?The GreaterVancouverWaterDistrict (GVWD) comprises 57,971 haofownedand leased land in the Capilano, Seymourand Coquitlamwatersheds. The overridingobjective ofwatershed management is to provide qualitywater to the 1.5 millionresidentsofthe greaterVancouverarea.The debate on logging inthe watersheds goes back to the turnofthe century2.Prior to 1900 resource use in the watershedswas generally unrestrictedbut in the early1900s contrastingviews on harvestingpracticesbegan to appear. In 1926 the GreaterVancouverWater Districtwas formedwith E.A. Cleveland as ChiefCommissioner. Mr.Cleveland favoured a closedwatershed and in spite ofarguments favoring logging putforward by Professors at the University ofBritish Columbiaand commerciallogginginterests, all commercial logging operations were phasedout by1936.2My discussionofwatershed history is based on Coop (1992) and Economic andEngineering Services Inc. (1991).131The lobby to allow logging continued.The desire to log in thewatersheds wasmotivated by the highly valuable old-growthcedarand Douglas-fir. But arguments forlogging in the watershedswere based on the notion that old-growthforests were overripeor decadent, they were susceptible to insectand disease infestation,and posed a highriskfor catastrophic wildfire. A managed forest wouldbe healthierand more resistant toinsects, diseases andwildfire.After Cleveland’s deathin 1952, the pro-logging lobbygained in strength. Themainargumentbehind the argument forscientWcmanagementofthe watershedswasthat the high incidence ofsnags in old-growthforests, coupledwith the frequency oflightning, created an increasing fire hazard. Standingdead trees are more likely to ignitewhen struckby lightning. Tree mortality causedby the balsamwooly adelgid (AdelgespiceaeRatz.) leant impetus to the pro-loggingargument.The balsamwoolly adelgid, native to silver fir forestsin central Europe, wasintroduced to NorthAmerica around 1900 and discoveredin the Vancouverwatershedsin 1958 (Harris 1968). Although not a seriouspest ofEuropean firs it has causedwidespread mortality in NorthAmerican firs.In thewatersheds, amabalis fir (Abiesamabalis (Dougi. ex Loud.) Forbes) makesup4%ofthe inventoly and rarely accountsformore than 25% ofthe tree coverin a given stand. In 1967, the balsamwooly adelgidwas reported to have infected 25% ofthe amabalisfir in the watershed.Mortality by the adelgid added new snags and strengthenedtheperceptionofhighfire hazard and the generally unsatisfactory conditionofthe forest.In petitioningtheprovincial government to allow changes to the termsoftenure to allow logging, theGVWD also suggested that largertreesrequire more water forevapotranspiration,reducing the amountofwateravailable for stream flow.Since 1961 the GVWD has embarked on a programofactive forest managementbased on the principlesofsustained yield forestry. The aimofmanagement hasbeen tosalvage damaged stands and reduce the riskofmajordisturbance,such as forest fire or132insect infestation, by creating a more diverse age-class structure and a more stable forestlandscape through the implementationofsustainedyield forestry.In recentyears the anti-logging lobby has gained strength. Arguments againstlogging are based on the premise that logging and road-building increase the potential forerosionand surface run-off, and consequently a reduction inwater quality. The argumenthas been made that the filtering capacitiesofthickhumus layers and coarse woodydebris, typicalofold-growth forests, provide betterwaterquality thanclear-cuts andsubsequent managed forests.In 1991 the GVWD undertook a Watershed ManagementEvaluation and PolicyReview (EES, 1991). The study, conducted by Economic and Engineering Services Inc.,recommended that the requirementsofsustainedyield forestry, as enacted in tenureagreementswiththe Ministry ofForests in 1963, be removed. The requirement forgrowing perpetual cropsofcommercial timberwas deemedto be an encumbrance to thecentral goalofproviding quality water.The watershed review also recommended that adetailed ecological inventory,includingecosystemmapping, be conductedto provide adatabase for long-termmanagement planning. A low-level, pro-active forestwatershed management programwas advocated, that would be based on riskmanagement criteriawith respect to slopestability anderosionpotential, the incidenceofinsects and disease, fire hazardand long-termforest stability. This would involve small scale logging to replace forest stands thatare unhealthyorpose a high riskofinsect and disease infestationorhigh fire hazard.A moratoriumon logging in the watersheds has been ineffect since 1993,pending completionofthe ecological inventory and long-term vegetationmanagementplans. The public outcry against logging in the watersheds haseffectively halted activityforthe present.The debate, as it stands, is between thosewho advocate closing the watersheds tohumanactivity and letting nature take its course and those who believe that apro-active133presence in the watershed can improve the qualityofthe forest and ensure the delivery ofqualitywater into the future.The argument for logging is based on the premise that old-growth forests aredecadent or in some way unstable. The growing body ofresearchon coastal old-growthforests suggests that the impacts ofinsects and diseases are relatively insignificant.Disease does not appearto have any major impact on coastal old-growth forests (Franklinand Waring 1979, Franldinet al. 1981).The most significant insect pests in the watershedshave been the hemlock looperand the balsamwoolly adelgid. Infestationsofthe hemlock looper are infrequent andshort in durationand rarely kill all trees overextensive areas (Turnquist 1991). Thebalsamwoolly adelgid, whichcaused significant mortalitywhen first introduced intothewatersheds in the 1950s and 1960s, has subsided to endemic levels and does not appearto pose a threat to forest health3.Amabalis fir is not a dominant species in the watershedsand is more frequent in the cooler and wetter partsofthe watershedswhere an increase inthe numberofsnags is less likely to result in a significant fire hazard.Fires in coastalold-growth forests are infrequent and generally small in size. Firefrequencies in such forests vary from 150 to 500 years, becoming less frequentwithincreasing elevation(Feller 1992). Althoughthe most fire-proofstands are mature forestswhere available fuelsare at a minimum, fire hazard in coastal old-growthforests isgenerally low4.Feller (1992) notes that in the period 1953-1990 almost halfthe fires androughly 70% ofthe areaburned, in the watersheds, was due to people-caused fires. Itappears likely that left to themselves, the effectsofinsects, disease andwildfire in thewatersheds might be less or no more intrusive those oflogging.As discussed in Chapter 5, page 109.Personal communicationwith Bruce Blackwell, Consulting Forester, B.A. BlackwellandAssociates Ltd., 3087 Hoskins Rd., NorthVancouver, B.C.134While there is no compellingevidence to suggest that logging is necessary tomaintainthe integrity ofwatershed forests, neither is there compellingevidence thatlogging in the watersheds, since the 1960s, has had any significant impact onwaterquality orproduction (EES 1991). The kind ofsmall-scale logging onstable slopesadvocatedby the GVWD maydiversi&the landscape and reduce the riskofextensivewildfire and large-scale infestationsofthe hemlock looper, apparently anold-growthdependent insect. The most compellingargument for logging in thewatershedsmaybe tosimply maintainapresence to respond to naturalevents. Otherbenefits might includejobs forthe local community and logging revenue to support the GVWD infrastructureand off-set the coststowater-users.Those opposed to logging are also concernedwiththe preservationofold-growthecosystems and recognize the watersheds as one ofthe last preservesofold-growth forestin southwestern British Columbia. Currentlyabout 62% ofthe watersheds, mostly athigherelevation, is classified aswatershed reserve where current vegetationwill be leftintact. In the 1991 review, recommendationswere made to develop anold-growthstrategy including the preservationofold-growthcorridors fromvalley floors to higherelevations.On my readingofthe available informationthere are alternativewaysofaccomplishing the primary goal ofsupplying quality drinking water to the citizensofGreaterVancouver. Logging or not logging in the watersheds both have risks andbenefits. We can’t know the future and whatwe know is inconclusive. Closing thegatesmay result in a catastrophic wildfire. Logging and road-building may cause extensiveerosionand/or landslides. Not logging will ensure awilderness landscapewhile loggingwill providejobs and revenue to offset the costsofthe waterdelivery system.The single dominating purpose ofmanagement in the watersheds is to producequality water. The question, then, is whatother resource values can be realizedwithoutcompromising the overriding objective. Logging has the potential to affectwater quality135through increased sedimentationas a resultofincreased surface run-offand by the rapidleaching ofmineral nutrients such as phosphorus and nitrogen that follows vegetationremoval. Logging could be conducted in anexperimental fashion thatwould allow long-termevaluationofthe magnitude ofthese effects. One suchexperimental approachcouldinvolve paired comparisonsofadjacent streamswithin one ofthe municipal watershed orwithinan adjacentwatershed that is scheduled forlogging. Different logging regimescouldbe compared to unlogged streams by monitoring waterquality variables. Baselinedatacould be gathered fora period oftime before treatmentsbegin. Science, in thisfashion, provides aprotocol for learning as we go ratherthan as asource ofinformationforcreating final solutions (Holling 1978).The debate overwhetherornot to logwithin municipal watershedshas beenpresented fromboth sides as amatteroffact. It cannot be resolved as a matteroffactbecause to do so requires us to make assuredprognostications about historicallycontingentphenomena. Moreover, to attempt to do so belies the fact thatthis issue isessentially aquestionofvalue. Those whovalue a managed, uniform forest and therevenue it produces are pitted against those who value some sense ofthe sanctity ofold-growth forests. To attempt to resolve this debate in the language ofscience is asubversionofthe social process.6.3 Are British ColumbiaForests Being Over-cut?The annual cut in British Columbia is currently between75 and 80 million cubicmeters (Figure 4-3) and the long run sustainedyield (LRSY) is estimated to besignificantly lower at the current level ofpractice (B.C. Ministry ofForests 1984). TheMinistry ofForests has made cuts to the AAC in recent years in response to timbersupply shortages in certain regions. As we begin the descentto LRSY the debatesurrounding the issue ofovercuttingtakes on a new significance.136Environmentalistgroups have dubbed British Columbia the “Brazilofthe North”in response to the perceiveddestructionoftemperate rainforests. Thisview clearly makesthe implication that British Columbia’s forests are being overcut. On the otherhand theForest Planning Committee forthe Science CouncilofBritish Columbiahas suggestedthat the rate ofcut in British Columbia forests could be increased to 120 million cubicmetersby the year2020 and to 160 millioncubic meters in the next 60 to 80 years(Science CouncilofBritish Columbia 1989).The Forest Planning Committee recommended that a goal be setofincreasing theyieldby 50% thereby increasing the annual cut to a sustainable level of120 million cubicmeters. Thiswouldbe done by practicingbasic silviculture (plantationestablishment)onacommitted landbase of27 millionhectares, and intensive silviculture (thinning,pruning, fertilization) on good and medium siteswhichmake up roughly halfofthecurrentworking forest.In a Forestry Canada-sponsored survey ofprofessional foresters, roughly 25% ofresponding B.C. foresters believed that AACswere definitely too highwhile more than45% felt they were likely too high. Less than 5% believed that AACswere too low andaround 23% responded that they were about right (Figure 6-1). The perceptionbyprofessional forestersthatwe are overcutting comes, I believe, fromuncertainty aboutthe extent towhich the productivity ofthe forest can be increased andwhetherthis iswhat the client desires. The client in this case is the public who own the vast majority ofBritish Columbia’s forest land. Without professing to speak forprofessional foresters, Ibelieve there are a numberofsignificantproblems for an agendaofincreasing the levelofcut.Intensive silviculture treatmentssuch as brushing and weeding,juvenile spacing,thinning, pruning and fertilizationare designed to improve stocking, speciescomposition, wood quality and rate ofgrowth. There is ample evidence thatthey canhave positive effects throughout a rotation by encouraging competitive advantages for137AretheACC levelsDefinitelytoo high______________________Likelytoohigh________________________________About right____________________Likely too low -Too lowDon’t KnowJ-- i ‘ (‘ ( ‘ ‘ ‘ i ( (0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 4550Response (%)Figure 6-1. Results ofa survey ofBritish Columbia Professional Forestersconductedby Forestry Canada.Source: Association ofBritish Columbia Professional Foresters (1991)138crop trees. The magnitude ofthese effects and the effects on inherent site productivity arenot well known. Inputsofnitrogen fertilizerwill almost certainly have negative effectsonnitrogen-fixing bacteriaand other soil microorganisms that are important toproductivity in the long term. Fertilizers may also negatively affect mycorrizhal rootassociations. The controlled, replicatedlong-termexperiments necessary to illustratesucheffects have only recently begun, inpart because biogeoclimatic classification hasonly recentlyprovided a tool that allows sitesofassuredly similarecologicalpropertiesto be compared.The Forest Planning Committee (SCBC 1989) suggests that the productive forestlandbase is about 30 millionhectares and that deferrals, old-growthpreservationandwatershedprotectionwill reduce this to 27 millionhectares. Currently the managedforest is around 24 to 25 millionhectares. The difference will come, to a large extent,frommovingup the hillsides into sub-alpine forests aboutwhich little is known. Theyappearto require much longertime periods to produce new forests (Klinkaet al. 1992).Harvestingand silviculturalmethods that are successful at lowerelevations may producefardifferent results at higherelevations (B.C. MinistryofForests 1993).Another source ofdoubt about the capacityofintensive silviculture to solve ourproblems is the cost. Given the low rateofreturnon forest investments does intensivesilviculture make senseeconomically? The natural forest offers returns at a very lowcost. Will the increase in benefitsoffset the increased cost? How many new problemswill be createdby changes in forest structure that impact on the capacity ofthe forest torespond toecological contingency?Muchofthe researcheffort in British Columbia has been motivatedby theperceived need to produce more wood. Will morewood benefit the ownersofthe forestenoughto offset the lossofthe native forest or do we need to look forways to get moresocial andeconomic benefit froma reduced cut?139Ifwe could increase theyield by 50%, where would it get us? While the level ofannual cut has been in the neighborhoodof80 million cubic meters for the last decadethe actual long run sustainedyield may be closer to 60 millioncubic meters. Thiswouldsuggest that ifwe committed almost the entire accessible, productive forest in BritishColumbia, forthe primary goaloftimberproduction, a 50% increase inyieldwouldindicate anannualyield of90 million cubic meters.The idea that British Columbians should commit the vast majorityoftheirproductive forest to a single cameralist agenda is not a scientific issue as much as aquestionofvalue. Modern science cannotjustify long-term fixed solutions to problemsofenvironmental management. The argument for committing ourresources to increasingthe yield offorests is based on the beliefthatwoodproduction should be the primarygoal ofland-use and that more woodwill provide increased social benefits. The issue isnot nearly so simple.Opinions about overcutting are likely as diverse as the forests themselves. Greberand Johnson (1991) describeeight perspectives fromwhich an opinionon overcuttingcouldbe formulated. Different perspectivesarise fromdifferentways ofappreciating theforest and/or from focussing on different forest components or different amenities theforest offers. The values we hold most dearwill influence ourpoint ofview concerningthe available facts. Forexample, ifI value efficiency above all else it may bother me tosee old forests left standing that are producing no appreciable increment orto seecutovers left to brush in as a meansofprovidingwildlife browse. Fromthis perspective,overcutting will occurwhen, regardlessofthe level ofinvestment, the growth rate oftheresource cannot match the level ofexploitation. Fromanotherperspective, overcuttingmay occurwhen it impairs my ability to appreciate some otheraspect ofthe forest that Ivalue. Although arguments about overcutting are often made in the language ofsciencethey are essentiallyjudgmentsofvalue.140The rhetoric ofthe last several years suggests that a significant constituencywithin BritishColumbia sees preservationofprimary forests and biodiversity asimportant goals. Others are concerned about loss ofjobs in the forest. The mandate ofsustainable forestry puts maintaining the inherent productivityofforestecosystemsas aprimary goal. Preserving old-growth forests and constraining forest practices to conservewildlife habitat almost certainly will necessitate reductions to the rate ofcut.Maintaininglong-term site productivity may alsoencourage old-growthpreservationand lengthenedrotations. Can these goals be met without significant social costsin termsoflostjobs andtax revenue? What is the ofrole ofscience in helping society to resolve thisfundamentally social issue?6.4 Bridging Two CuituresAsunderstandingofcomplex, changing ecological systems hasexpanded, ithasbecome less clear that science canprovide the kind ofknowledge necessary to show thatthere is arightway to manage forest ecosystems. This lackofcertainty or ability tochoose between alternatives like those described in the preceding sectionsofthischapterhasprovided the greatestobstacle to an acceptance ofecological scienceas theappropriate basis for forest management.Ecosystem classificationand simulationmodels are caricaturesofreality. Theyare snapshots in time. Scientific understandingofecological phenomena is like a causalmap. It attempts to describe the networkofcauses that result inecologicalphenomena.Like a map, ecological scientific understanding attemptsto show how to get fromA to B.It may show several alternative ways to get fromA to B. Being a snapshotin time itcannot capture contingencies or configurationalchanges that have occurredsince the mapwasprepared. The map shows a road but notthe bridgewash-out or the tree fallenacrossthe road. Like a map, ecological knowledge cannot guarantee that we will get there atall.141Given the best understanding possible, a recognitionofcontingency meanswemustexpectthe unexpected, build flexibility into ourplans, be prepared to adaptto newcontingencies, new knowledge and new cultural values. Science cannot provide universalgeneralizations that dictate how the future will unfoldwithpredictive certainty but itdoes provide conditional generalizationsthat allow us to interpret the unfolding oftheworld in specific contexts. This kind ofgeneral knowledge can be used as a protocol forlearning fromthe activitieswe choose to undertake.The search foruniversal, timelessorder in nature is foiled by the historical natureofecosystems. The applicationofscientific results cannot guarantee timeless solutions tohumanproblemsbecause ofthe changing valuesofpeople. Toulmin sees this realizationas partofa substantive change in our intellectual agenda:The model of“theoretical grasp” as the formal ability to master adeductive system that describes apermanentand ubiquitous “order” innature, is giving way to a substantive ability to discoverthe local,temporary relationsembodied in one specific aspect ofnature, here andnow, in contrast to another, elsewhere, a millionyears ago. (Toulmin1990, p.204)The way to learnabout a specific aspect ofnature is to become involved with it,in a sense to live with it. Science provides the meansofmaximizing the ability to gain acertain kindofknowledge fromthe experience. Forest management must become anadaptive experiment; a livedexperience.Biogeoclimatic classificationprovides a meansofidentifying ecosystemswithsimilarstructural and functional properties. Simulation modelling is a formal procedurethat can be used to project and compare the effects ofdifferent management regimesonbiodiversity, scenic beauty, recreationand long-termecosystemresiliency insofar as ourunderstanding allows. Ultimately the only way to determine ifintensive silviculture iseffective in a specific context is to try it. Similarly the only way to determine ifselection142silviculture or continuous forestry can meet the goalsofsociety is to attempt it in anadaptive, scientific framework.There are obstacles to sucha strategy. The forested landbase ofBritish Columbiahas been committed to a single styleofmanagementand is controlled by a small numberoflarge corporations (Marchak 1983). Large-scale single agenda forestry provides fewopportunities for learning about alternatives. Anadaptive, experimental approachtoforestry suggests a smaller scale, more diversified strategy that focuses on specificcontextsand avariety ofapproachesthat maximize the opportunities for learning. Agood first step would be more adequate monitoring ofwhat is currentlybeing done in theforest. Opportunities to learn frompast practice have been lostby the failure to employanexperimental managementprotocol.Science as aprotocol for learning provides a means forclarif,’ing many aspectsofthe issues society faces. There remainthe differences inopinion resulting fromvaryingbeliefs and values. Loggers believe that the right to log is partoftheir cultural heritage.Environmentalists believe in the rightsofwilderness landscapes. Foresters believe theycan generate healthy, productive forests. All may be right fromtheirownpoint ofview.Tolerating the resulting plurality, ambiguityor the lackofcertainty is noerror, let alone a sin. Honest reflection shows that it is partofthe pricethat we inevitably pay forbeing humanbeings, and not gods. (Toulmrn1990, p.30)One way to explicitly address the ambiguity and uncertainty regarding forestmanagement is to involve the public in the decision-making process. This is the strategybehindthe establishment in British Columbiaofthe Commission on Resources andEnvironment (CORE):The government has asked the Commissionto develop and implement aworld-leading strategy for landuse planning and management as apartofa largercommitment to sustainability (CORE 1993).143The CORE process is based on the politicsofparticipationbecause...the public is demanding a more participatory role in the development ofpublic policy [and] they ensure results that better fulfill the broadpublicinterest than decisions that are shaped by the lobbying ofpowerful andvocal interests. (CORE 1993)The Commission on Resourcesand Environment has sponsored public participationprocesses for land use planning in several regionsofBritish Columbiaand publichearings fora comprehensive provincial land use plan are inprogress.A second approachto involving the public in forest policy development is to“bring more people to the placeswhere trees grow” (Carrow 1994, p.21). One suchapproach is the conceptofthe community forestwhich gives the communityresponsibility for forest managementdecision-making. The responsibilityofdecision-makingwill deepen the sense ofrelationship to the land and helppeople to betterunderstand its importance in their day to day lives. Another model that has beensuggested is the co-management model, inwhich industry, government and privatecitizensworktogetheras partners to develop meansofmanaging forests to satisfy allconcerns withthe aimoffostering..the awareness and practice oflong-term responsible stewardship ofpublic resources atthe local level (Pinkerton 1993, p.34).The valueofpublic participation is in developing culturalcapital(Folke andBerkes 1992). Cultural capital refers to our meansofrelating to nature, ofunderstandingourplace in it and the means and adaptations by whichwe act in and modify the naturalenvironment. The development ofsustainable forestry is notjust a scientific enterprisebut requires society to develop anethic ofsustainability and cultural values that promotethe developmentofa less destructive relationshipwith the ecosphere.Adaptive management, contextual as opposed to universal science, and publicparticipation all suggest that changes to the scale and agendaofBritish Columbia forestmanagement are required. The monopoly on timber rights held by the large timber144companies and the large-scale administrationofmaximumsustainedyield forestryimpose barriersto the implementationofalternative strategies and to a more directinvolvementofthe public in theirown forests. A smaller scale ofmanagement in adiversityofstyles might betterpromote the capacity to learn scientificallyand theinvolvementofBritish Columbians in the everyday practiceofforestry. Adaptivemanagement in response to public participationprovides one potentialwayofintegratingscience and human values. Science and society canworktogetherto probe how the goalsofsociety can be met.A secondway that science has contributed to the integrationofscience andhumanvalues, perhapsunintentionally and often unwillingly, is through thedevelopmentofwhat David Ehrenfeld has called bridgingconcepts. One exampleofabridgingconcept is biodiversity. While ecological science hasexpended greateffort in attemptingto operationalize this concept it has, at the same time,intuitive appeal to the largerculture. Biodiversity provides a concept by which the varietyoflife and the effectsofhumanactivity on otherspecies can be grasped.A secondexample ofa bridging concept is the notion of systems ormorespecifically ecosystems. One ofthe definitions for a systemofferedby Webster is “agroup ofinteracting bodiesunderthe influence ofrelatedforces”. Humans can recognizethemselves as one component and a critical sourceofcontingency in a complex,dynamic, interrelated system.Ehrenfeld (1992) describesthe ideaofecosystem healthas abridging concept:Health is an idea that transcends scientific definition..,it containsvaluesthat are not amenable to scientificmethodsofexploration... Health is abridging concept connecting two worlds: it is not operationalin science ifyou try to pin it down, yet it can be helpfulin communicating withnonscientists. Equally important, ifused with carein ecology, it canenrich scientific thought with the values andjudgementsthat makesciencea valid humanendeavor. (Ebrenfeld 1992)145There is amovement inecology touse health as metaphor forcataloging the Icindsofstresses thatecosystemsare subjected to and the impacts onecosystemstructureandfunction. An identificationofcommon symptoms ofecosystemdistressand the processesofecosystemresponse might lead to asetofdiagnostic principles forassessingecosystemhealth (Rapport 1989, Schaefferet al. 1988).There are problemswith this strategy. It is difficult to define a normal stateforecosystems that are in a constant state offlux as a resultofcontingency, environmentalfluctuations and natural disturbance. Undisturbedecosystemsmay show non-equilibriumdynamics or several quite different equilibriumstates.In a complex systemwith manyfunctions andprocesses an assessmentofhealth couldbe a functionofwhich aspectsofthe system are considered. While science candescribechanges to a system in response tostress the questionofwhetheror not asystemis unhealthy may be largely a questionofvaluesand interpretation.Attempting to operationalize health as a scientific toolignoresthe fact that it is avery simple intuitive notion. The main valueofthe ideaofhealth may be as an intuitive,general notionthatbridges science and humanlife. Considersome examples fromthearea ofhuman health. Ifa child reads about the destructionofthe tropical rainforest andbegins to display psychosomatic symptomsofillness a medical doctor, using thediagnostic principlesofmodern science, mightdetermine that she is healthy. Similarly,...a five-year remission fromcancer, following strenuoustreatmentofthedisease, may beequatedwith healthby medical statisticians, but notnecessarily by the patientswhose definitionofhealthembraces a far largeruniverse ofexperience. (Ehrenfeld1992)It may be possible to identiiy symptomsofdistress in specific ecosystems andtheireffects on ecosystemresiliency but thenotion ofhealth includes human values andinterpretationsthat transcend scientificdefinition. Its value is as a line ofcommunicationbetween twoworlds, a bridge between scienceand society.146Bridging concepts can help promotea strongerdialogue between scienceandsociety and facilitate the public processofdetermining what oursocial goalsshould be.Bridging conceptssuch asecosystemand health can foster anunderstandingoftheworldas a complex, interconnected system, whileinforming scientistsaboutthebeliefsandvaluesofhuman culture and helpingus all to develop anecologicalconsciousness.1477. CONTEXTTO A CONVERSATIONSocial living requires common goals orbeliefs or, failing those, a setofconstraintsthateach memberofthecommunity agreesto abide by. Ifeach memberofa society believesin the same godorsubscribes to thesame mythology conflict maybe minimal. Inwesternculture, conflict arising fromapluralityofbeliefs, moral codes and mythologieshas madesocial harmony by cultural sanctionaproblematic ideal.Forthe last several centurieswestern societyhas looked to science as an importantmeans ofpromoting social harmony. Positivistscience promised the ability topredictthefuture and control nature, and to constructa rational social order. When socialdisharmonyariseswe have lookedto science to providea resolution.Science has failed in thisrole for several reasons. First, the naturalworld is anhistorically-bound, contingent system. Thecomplexity and interrelatedness ofnaturalsystems make it impossible to predict andcontrol the future statesofnature withcertainty.The scientific positivist looked to developtimeless, universal law-likegeneralizations thatcould be used to make assuredpredictionsabout the future states ofnature. In the lasthalfcentury, science has begunto recognize theimportance ofhistorical contingencyand hasshifted its focus to attempting to understandand explain local, timely aspects ofnature.Theemphasis, in science, is shifting to thedevelopmentofconditional generalizations,based onthe causal structure ofthe phenomena,that can be used to interpretparticular cases ofnaturalphenomena.A secondproblem for science is that itcan say very little aboutbasic questionsofvalue. Social issues, like those ofenvironmental management, cannot simplybe reduced tothe language ofscience withoutextra-scientificassumptions being made. Forexample,thedebate on clear-cuttingversus continuous forestrycannot be resolved withoutassumptionsaboutwhat values the forest is being asked to provide.148Sustainedyield forestry was an attemptat ascientific solution to a social issue.Proponentsofsustained yield argued that its-implementationwould stabilize localcommunitiesby providing constantemployment, stabilize the nationaltimber supply andprotect the environment fromdegradation (Masonand Bruce 1931). Sustainedyield forestryis not badscience; itwas the science available at aparticulartime, adapted to suit aparticular historical context. In the current historical context, sustainedyield forestry hassome significant limitations. Based on a limited understandingofforestecosystems it couldnot account for the variety, complexity and dynamic nature offorests. Maximizing theproductionofa single system component has had contingent effects on other systemcomponentswith the potential foreffects on long-termsystemresiliency. There areoutstanding questions as to whethermaximumsustainedyield forestry can sustain the forestin astate that conforms with the goalsofsociety oreven, perhaps, sustain the yield.As a technocratic solution, sustainedyield could not account forthe changing goalsand aspirations ofsociety. Aswe move away fromthe frontier stage ofsocial development,society hasexpressed desires to preserve old-growth forests, wildlife populations,biodiversity in general, and scenic beauty. It has proven difficult forthe government torespond because the land base has been fully committed to the over-riding goal ofmaximumwood fibre production. Sustainedyield as a fixed solutionhas failed to account for theconstant processofchange.There are outstanding questions as to whether large-scale industrial forestry, resultingfromthe policy choices made in 1945, is providing long-termbenefits or stability to localcommunities. Travers (1993) pointsout that the numberofjobs in the forest industry hasremainedvirtually the same since theearly 1960swhile the rate ofcut has doubled. Othersmight argue that indirectemployment in, forexample, the service industry has increasedsignificantly. Are the benefitsofmaximizing the yield beingequitably distributed? Ratherthan asking how canwe produce the maximumcontinuous volumeofwood fibre forthemarket, withthe maximumprofit margin, should we be asking how we canprovide, onthis149piece ofland, workand sustenanceto the greatestpossible numberofpeople whilemaintaining the meansofproduction and the arrayofother valuesthe forestprovides?The positivist ideal ofscientific forest managementhas occludedextra-scientificassumptions about value and social benefit. To make these assumptions clear it is necessaryto address social issues in a social context. To some this suggeststhatwe shoulddiscardscience. But the rootofscience is the simple human desire to question why. The attempt tounderstand the intricaciesofthe naturalworld, in a structured, rationalway, has beenpartofhuman consciousness throughout recorded history. We could not formquestions ofvalueabout sustainability, conservationorpreservationwithoutthe image oftheworldthat scienceprovides and continually attemptsto improve. Accepting and communicating that the futurestate ofthe physical world is, to some extent, uncertaindue to ecological contingency andthat there are many areasofhumanexperience aboutwhich science can say little arenecessary steps ifscience is to regain the trustofthe public and play a constructive role inhumanaffairs.The present-day conceptofsustainable development and its corollary, sustainableforestry, have the potential to provide abridge between science and human values. TheWorld Commissionon Environmentand Developmenthas stated thatHumanity has the ability to make development sustainable - to ensure that itmeets the needsofthe presentwithout compromisingthe ability offuturegenerations to meettheir own needs. (WCED 1987, p.8)The goalsofsustainable development are very similarto the goalsthat sustained yieldforestry has failed to meet. They include maintaining the stockofecological capital,improving the distributionofincome, and reducing the degree ofvulnerability to economiccrises. These goals contain social, moral, political and ecological considerations thatprecludesustainable development frombeing a purely scientific concept. In fact science had very littleto dowiththe inceptionofthe notionofsustainable development and the claimthat151characterizing the issuesoffact, the context inwhich disagreements aboutbeliefs and valuestake place. Science can sustainthe conversation by acknowledging the meaning that otheraspectsofhumanculture bring to “bridging concepts” such as sustainable forestry, ecosystemhealthand biodiversity. Science cansustainthe conversationby providing a protocol forexpandingourunderstandingofthe effectsofspecific interventions in specific contexts.Ifneither religionnor science can provide a grounding fordetermining ouractions,what are the alternatives? The only answerthat I can offer is the simple artofconversation.We must cultivate institutions that make people the agentsofdetermining theirownpublicpolicies. Only through contact andthrough conversationcanwe learn to be tolerant of, andco-existwith, beliefs and values contrary to our own. While this process may be slow andfrustrating it is, to me, the only fair andjust possibility.Science canworkforsociety to help clarify its goals and aspirations andthinkmoreclearly about ways to achieve them. 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