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The 'new thinking' and Soviet intervention in Third World regional conflicts : the case of Angola and… Tettey, Wisdom John 1991

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T H E 'NEW THINKING' AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THIRD WORLD REGIONAL CONFLICTS: T H E CASE OF A N G O L A AND ETHIOPIA by WISDOM JOHN T E T T E Y B.A. (Hons.), University of Ghana, 1988 Grad. Dip., University of Ghana, 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF MASTER OF ARTS in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1991 ©Wisdom John Tettey, 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 30th August, 1991. DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT Since Gorbachev entered the Kremlin, there have been dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy. One area in which these changes, enshrined in the 'new thinking,' have had a tremendous impact concerns regional conflicts. This study analyzed the impact of the changes on the Angolan and Ethiopian conflicts in which the USSR was deeply involved. It also assessed the Soviet response to the two situations, following the emergence of the 'new thinking,' to determine its uniformity or otherwise. The changes in foreign policy led to Soviet disengagement from the two conflicts. The practical manifestations of the 'new thinking's' prescriptions did not, however, emerge until sometime in 1988 ~ three years after the reforms were enunciated. The reasons underlying Soviet retrenchment in these areas included the desire to seek political solutions to regional conflicts, the deideologization of inter-state relations, the new emphasis on mutually beneficial economic alliances, and the avoidance of superpower confrontation. The Soviets, thus, put pressure on their clients to make them seek peaceful solutions to the conflicts. Such pressures took the form of troop and military experts withdrawal, curtailing military assistance, etc. Moscow also extended overtures to the factions fighting its clients in order to solicit their cooperation. However, whereas the Southern African and Ethiopian-Somali conflicts were eventually resolved, the civil war in Ethiopia escalated and culminated in a violent overthrow of the government in Addis Ababa. Soviet moves towards a negotiated peace in Southern Africa were quicker and firmer than those concerning Ethiopia. This was due, partly, to the fact that until 1988 Ethiopia still held more strategic value for Moscow than did Angola. i i i Furthermore, the military situation deteriorated faster for the MPLA than it did for the Mengistu regime. The Angolan government was also more receptive to the peace process than was Addis Ababa. On the whole, the study concluded that the 'new thinking' caused significant reversals in Soviet intervention in the two regional conflicts. It was noted, however, that while Moscow used similar policies to promote peace in the two areas, these differed in terms of detail and timing. It is the contention of this study that, in the future, the Soviet Union is unlikely to intervene in regional conficts to defend Marxist-Leninist client regimes and movements, and to project its power. Its involvement in the Third World will rather take the form of expanding ties with more advanced developing economies, from which it can derive benefits. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v DEDICATION vi CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 Operational Definition of Concepts 4 References 6 CHAPTER TWO 'OLD AND NEW THINKING' IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 7 References 17 CHAPTER THREE A N G O L A 19 The Old Thinking and its Manifestations 19 Reconceptualization of the Angolan Conflict 25 Impact of the 'New Thinking' On Conflict with South Africa 29 Impact of 'New Thinking' On National Reconciliation 35 Conclusion 40 References 43 CHAPTER FOUR ETHIOPIA 46 Background to Soviet Involvement in the Horn 46 Soviet Conceptualization of the Ethiopia Revolution, the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict, and Intervention 49 Background to the Eritrean Conflict and Soviet Intervention 57 Reconceptualization of the Conflict in the Horn and Soviet Involvement 61 Impact of the 'New Thinking' on the Ethiopia-Somali Conflict 65 Conclusion 73 References 76 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION 80 Implications for Soviet Third World Policy 89 References 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 94 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Paul Marantz, for his invaluable comments, suggestions, criticisms and words of encouragement. My thanks also go to Prof. Brian Job, my instructor and a member of the examination committee, for his useful comments concerning this work. To my numerous friends and fellow graduate students, without whose useful suggestions and emotional support this study might not have seen the light of day, I say a big "thank you." I very much appreciate their contributions which were of tremendous value to me. My final thanks go to the University of British Columbia whose Graduate Fellowship enabled me undertake this study. I must indicate, though, that I am singularly responsible for any shortcomings that the work might contain. DEDICATION To my family, for its support, and to my God, to whom goes all the praise and glory. 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The world has witnessed dramatic changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy since Gorbachev acceded to the Kremlin leadership in 1985. In the area of foreign affairs the most obvious policy changes have been manifested in the transformation of East-West relations from one of intense rivalry to that of significant harmony. This transformation is evidenced by a series of agreements in arms control, socio-cultural and scientific cooperation, as well as expansion in economic interaction between the two blocs. Whereas East-West relations, and superpower relations in particular, seem to be the area of most noticeable and far-reaching change, following Gorbachev's advent on the world scene, there are other spheres of international affairs where the changes embarked upon by the new Kremlin leadership have had tremendous impact. One such sphere involves interaction between the Soviet Union and the Third World. Here, changes of great and increasing significance have shaped Soviet policy, especially as regards regional conflicts ~ the focus of this study. The result has been policy reforms such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Soviet-supported withdrawal of Vietnamese and Cuban troops from Kampuchea and Angola respectively, as well as the Kremlin's backing for the electoral process in Nicaragua in 1990 that culminated in the removal of the Sandinistas from power. These reversals in Soviet Third World policy have evolved from Gorbachev's twin reform program of domestic restructuring (perestroika) and 'new political thinking' (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie) which emerged as reactions to domestic socioeconomic stagnation and inordinate Soviet power projection abroad. 2 Of these new concepts, the 'new thinking' serves as the main fulcrum of ideas determining the Soviet Union's contemporary interactions with the developing world. The aim of this work is to look at any policy changes emerging from the 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy that have taken place regarding that country's involvement in the regional conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia. It is also to ascertain the impact of such changes on the conflicts. Furthermore, the study will compare Soviet policy toward these African countries to measure the uniformity and consistency, or otherwise, in the 'new thinking's' response to the two conflicts. An attempt will be made to explain the reasons behind the similarities and/or differences in the two cases. The essence of the work is, therefore, to test the validity of the argument that the 'new thinking' has resulted in significant changes in the USSR's intervention in the two regional conflicts and that its responses to the two situations have been similar. Angola and Ethiopia are comparable for several reasons. They have both been Soviet client-states with Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and single Vanguard' parties. Added to this is the fact that the two governments were fighting internal rebel insurgencies in civil wars that traversed the whole period of their rule. They both had external conflicts to contend with. Another interesting similarity is that, in addition to Soviet support, the MPLA and the Mengistu governments enjoyed immense assistance from the USSR's allies and surrogates. The two conflicts were embedded in environments in which the superpowers have modest interests, what George refers to as 'low-intensity symmetry'/ Further to these similarities, the two countries exhibit certain differences that offer a basis for understanding any variations in Soviet attitudes (under the 3 rubric of the 'new thinking') to their individual conflicts. Among these is the fact that whereas the actors in the Ethiopian civil war were all Marxist, the Angolan conflict pitches a Marxist government against a pro-Western organization. As far as the geostrategic positions of the two countries are concerned, Ethiopia seems to be more attractive because of its proximity to the Middle East where the USSR has a lot of economic, political and strategic interest. In terms of the economic viability of the two states, however, Angola offers more prospects because of its ability to sustain itself relatively better than Ethiopia. Its oil resources make it less of a burden for the Soviet Union than Ethiopia. In this era of prudent cost-benefit analysis in Soviet interaction with the developing world, potentials for economic interdependence could significantly dictate Soviet interest, and involvement, in propping up its client-governments in the Third World. This study consists of four chapters in addition to the introduction. Chapter Two will examine the 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy as it relates to the Third World, attempting to distinguish it from earlier perspectives, in terms of doctrine and practice. The next two chapters will contain case studies of the two regional conflicts. Chapter Three will give a brief background to the conflict in Angola and examine pre-Gorbachev Soviet involvement in it. A look will then be taken at the attitude of the USSR to the situation in that country since the advent of the 'new thinking'. Finally, an attempt will be made to evaluate whether these Soviet attitudes have resulted in an escalation or deescalation of the conflict. The fourth chapter will deal with Ethiopia, using the same format that was applied in the case of Angola. 4 The final chapter will draw conclusions from the study by comparing the effect of the "new thinking" on the conflicts in the two African countries and determining whether current Soviet foreign policy toward Third World conflicts is selective or uniform. Reasons will be explored to explain any such selective or 'blanket' policy. Operational Definition of Concepts 'Changes,' as used in this study, refers to the revisions in Soviet foreign policy introduced by the Gorbachev leadership and crystallized in the 'new thinking.' 'Impact' connotes the consequences (intended and unintended, latent and manifest, direct and indirect) that the changes have generated. Unlike 'influence' which may be ephemeral, depending on "the mood and condition of individual Third World leaders,"^ 'impact' refers to durable effects, proceeding from incremental changes. These effects are "not readily manipulable and . . . are discernible . . . at the subregional, regional or global levels of the international system."^ As used here, therefore, the term will embrace the effects of the 'new thinking' on such phenomena as Soviet commitments, activism and priorities in the conflicts, as well as on the perceptual and attitudinal orientations of the combatants and other powers that have stakes in the conflicts. 'Intervention' has not been able to evoke a generally acceptable definition and has been described by Gallie as an "essentially contested concept."^ Various definitions of this concept have been offered by Oppenheim, Rosenau and Little, but each of these lacks the capability to encapsulate the diverse range of activities exhibited by the USSR in the conflicts under study.^  5 For our purposes, the concept will be broadly defined as a purposeful and calculated act by the Soviet Union to influence conflicts in the Third World by means of instruments spanning overt and covert economic and military assistance, and direct application of military force. It also involves efforts to shape or support the domestic and foreign policies of its allies that have implications for the conflict. 6 REFERENCES 1. Alexander George, "Superpower Interests in Third Areas," in Roy Allison and Phil Williams, Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 108. 2. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Stategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990);p. 230. 3. Ibid. 4. W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in Black Max, ed., The Importance of Language (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 121. 5. See Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 1; James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 292; R. Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), p. 8. 7 CHAPTER TWO 'OLD AND NEW THINKING' IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY To understand what is new in Gorbachev's Third World policy, especially as regards regional conflicts, it is important to have an insight into antecedent Soviet policies in that realm and the reasons behind their espousal and application. The juxtaposition of the 'old' and the 'new' thinking will help explain the motivation behind the current changes by bringing out the shortcomings of the former. It will further assist in deciphering the fundamental or tactical nature of these changes through an estimation of the depth and extent of their difference from pre-Gorbachev policy. As noted by Cox, comprehending the present assumes a knowledge of the past.^  During the post-war period the Third World emerged as the major theater of active East-West rivalry. Unlike Stalin, whose tangential concern for the issue of colonization only found expression at United Nations forums, Khrushchev adopted a conscious and elaborate policy that was meant to serve as a centripetal force, drawing countries of the Third World into the Soviet ambit. This policy took the form of economic largesse, military assistance, and political and diplomatic support for national liberation/independence movements and governments of developing countries. This approach formed part of the Soviet Union's efforts at expanding its influence and improving its overall strategic position vis-as-vis the West. The Third World was considered as having value for the USSR in terms of providing a "potential strategic reserve which may be helpful in achieving ascendancy over a rival or attaining world dominance." This policy orientation supports Waltz's assertion that "in a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of 8 concern to both of them. Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern."*' This quest for hegemony was encouraged and sustained by internal circumstances in the Third World itself which was characterized by conflicts among rival factions fighting for power within individual countries, and also between countries engaged in adversarial confrontations for dominance and security in various subregions of the world. Intervention in such conflicts was construed as offering immense opportunities for geostrategic advancement and was therefore exploited by the Soviet Union in its competition with the West. Thus, the pre-Gorbachev era witnessed Soviet intervention in various places, including the Congo, Laos, Cuba and Vietnam with the purpose of assisting its clients and ideological allies gain victory, and consequently allowing the USSR to enjoy 'the accretion of local privileges.' With regard to the origins and significance of civil and regional conflict in the Third World, the Brezhnev era offered explanations that are fundamentally at variance with those espoused by the 'new thinking'. Conflicts in the developing world were construed to be the product of 'imperialist' attempts to torpedo the realization of national and social liberation — goals considered germane to the building of socialism.^ With reference to Africa, Brezhnev asserted: Instability in Africa is . . . caused by external forces that are trying to prevent African peoples from choosing that path which they consider most appropriate. These forces are trying to set some African countries against others; they kindle and fan discord, and provoke quarrels over problems which came to the African peoples from colonial times. The phenomenal escalation of Soviet involvement in the Third World during the Brezhnev period is attributable to a number of reasons. From its unpleasant experiences in the Congo and during the Cuban missile crisis, where inferior military capability and preparedness caused setbacks to the establishment of influence, the Soviets realized that there was the need to militarily shore up any 9 interests and influence that they had in the Third World if these were to be sustained. This enterprise was therefore religiously pursued. To improve its power projection capabilities, the USSR vehemently embarked on the development of overseas basing facilities, with a simultaneous emphasis on the employment of military aid to client regimes and groups to advance its foreign policy goals. A fundamental motivation behind these interventionary actions by the USSR was a desire to project a deterrent capability that would not only deter its adversaries but would also attract clients. Colonel Kulish explicitly stated this when he said in 1972 that "the very knowledge of a Soviet military presence" could restrain "the imperialists and local reaction."** A study by Soviet academic specialists also emphasizes the deterrent purpose of these actions: Presently, the capitalist circles, when planning any interventionary action are obliged to take into account not only factors such as the internal situation of the potential target of aggression, the extent of their economic and strategic interests, the military possibilities, and the possible internal repercussions of the actions, but also a whole group of different considerations. And among the most important of these is the possible reaction of the Soviet Union and other socialist governments to any such adventure.' This assertive incursion of the Soviet Union into the Third World, and its subsequent involvement in the conflicts there, was facilitated in part by the development of its military capabilities to a level at par with the United States', thereby providing it with a global reach comparable to that of Washington. The confidence that this parity engendered was inflated by the low profile assumed by the United States in the developing countries, resulting partly from the Vietnam debacle and the domestic political trauma caused by the Watergate scandal. Under these circumstances it was easy for Moscow to take advantage of the political developments taking place in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1970s. These included the demise of the Lusophone empire in Africa and the consequent struggle for power between pro-Marxist and other liberation 10 consequent struggle for power between pro-Marxist and other liberation movements. Marxist-oriented regimes also came to power in such places as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Nicaragua, making it easy for the USSR, on the basis of ideological affinity, to extend its influence there. The new self-assurance and confidence of the Soviet Union in intervening in developing countries is reflected in the Brezhnev constitution's section on foreign policy which explicitly and militantly declared its ideological goals in foreign policy. In earlier periods, ideological goals were the responsibility of the Party and they were clearly divorced from official state policy due to the negative and threatening responses they attracted. The 1977 constitution, however, institutionalized a two-track approach to foreign policy under which the Soviet Union sought to conduct 'normal' inter-state relations with other countries while simultaneously engaging in activities meant to undermine capitalist states and to establish socialist client states. This approach was "considered sacrosanct until the advent of Gorbachev's 'new political thinking.'"8 Brezhnev's employment of the two-track approach was rooted in the belief that, unlike Europe where pursuit of the 'class struggle' was inimical to Soviet security, the fledgling Third World countries offered enormous opportunities for advancing Soviet influence, power and ideology at little risk. The first sphere dealt with East-West relations and was premised upon the policy of 'peaceful coexistence' within the context of detente. The second sphere, involving the Third World, operated on a different set of principles that was not circumscribed by the Soviet understanding of detente. The underlying principles in this sphere included 'proletarian internationalism'; support for wars and movements of 'national liberation'; 'fraternal assistance'; supporting the emergence of 'socialist-oriented' regimes and sustaining them through the extension of political, economic and military assistance. 11 The most explicit manifestation of this policy found expression in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. That action was partly motivated by the Soviet Union's desire for secure borders that could be guaranteed by a subservient regime in Kabul. Besides this strategic reason, the invasion was also aimed at supporting an ideological ally, thereby reflecting the importance of class interests and ideology in Soviet foreign policy calculations. In the Soviet view the experience of the revolutionary liberation struggle of the peoples shows that at critical moments solidarity with a victorious revolution calls not only for moral support, but also for material assistance including, under definite circumstances, military assistance Today, when there exists a system of socialist states, it would be simply ridiculous to question the right to such assistance To refuse to use the possibilities at the disposal of the socialist countries would signify virtually evading performance of the internationalist duty and returning the world to the times when imperialism could throttle at will any revolutionary movement. Under Brezhnev, therefore, internal development was totally subordinated to 'internationalist' ideals. The Soviet government "abandoned the priority of internal development, ruptured the sequential relationship between coexistence and expansion and substituted a strategy of simultaneous coexistence with the West (detente) and support for revolution in the Third World (expansion)."^ The pre-Gorbachev perception of conflict and the fact that indigenous Third World conflicts were raised to the level of ideological competition for supremacy constrained any efforts at superpower cooperation, coordination and negotiation on regional security issues. It was in the midst of this relationship between the USSR and the developing world that Gorbachev emerged on the scene to institute significant changes in Soviet foreign policy, under the rubric of the 'new thinking', which seem to have a lot of implications for the Third World. Among these changes are the conciliatory foreign policy stance toward the West as well as the deemphasis of ideology in Soviet-Third World relations. The linkage between foreign and domestic 12 policy that these changes entail, coupled with the fact of a collapsing national economy and threats of political disintegration in the Soviet Union have immense significance for Third World conflicts. The 'new thinking' could be generally construed as involving three fundamental components. The first is the 'revitalization' of Soviet foreign policy through a rejection of the initially impressive but eventually questionable and unsustainable aspects of Brezhnev's policies. Those policies included trying to establish pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World, financially and militarily supporting them, as well as attempting to match or displace Western influence in those areas. The new philosophy also seeks to inject greater flexibility in Soviet foreign policy implementation and to deemphasize the role of ideology in policy formulation. Thus, the 'new thinking' calls for compromise and pragmatism while eschewing confrontation. Secondly, the 'new thinking' introduced such new concepts and issues as 'common global problems' and 'interdependence' into the foreign policy agenda. These concepts identify certain issues that affect humanity as a whole, and advocate global cooperation and coordination of efforts to deal with them. Finally, it reconceptualizes Soviet perceptions of the international system, international security and national defense away from a mutually exclusive zero-sum game to a symbiotic 'positive sum' one. The emphasis is thus on security for all and not security at the expense of another. This new foreign policy philosophy has resulted in a reassessment of the Third World and the USSR's relations with it. In contrast to the 1961 Party Program that evinced great prospects for Third World development and optimism in the Soviet Union's role in that process, the 1986 Program manifested a retraction of Soviet involvement in a generally unviable developing world. Moscow did not only make 'Progressive states' aware of their sole responsibility for building a new 13 society, but also informed them of the important place of 'neo-colonialism' and 'imperialism' in Third World development. ^ The USSR now acknowledges that capitalist structures and processes are necessary for any meaningful economic progress in countries of the South. This development stemmed, in part, from the disappointing performances by the Soviet Union's clients in terms of building stable political systems and viable economies. Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Kampuchea, for example, exhibited a glaring inability to support themselves. The new policy outlook therefore not only reconceptualizes basic Soviet strategy and purpose, but also engages in a more accurate and reliable empirical assessment of Third World situations. An important dimension of the 'new thinking' is the renewed impetus given to the argument, rife in the immediate post-Khrushchev era, that the Soviet Union's internal socio-economic development must take precedence over the country's internationalist duty to the developing world. By ensnaring itself in a dogmatic attachment to the various permutations of 'national liberation' and claims of building socialism, Moscow drained out a lot of its resources, thereby debilitating its economy. It is estimated that before 1985 the Soviet Union spent between $4 billion and $6 billion a year on Cuba and Vietnam alone. ^  The discontent with subordination of Soviet domestic policy to foreign policy aspirations was vividly implied in Maleshenko's complaint that "in terms of the share of military expenditures in the GNP we are outstripping the Americans by approximately 50 percent. Conversely, in terms of health care expenditures we are behind the US by a factor of2.5."13 With the changes, however, Soviet foreign policy would be determined by 'national interest' and would be based on traditional cost-benefit analysis. According to Shevardnadze: 14 We must enhance the profitability of our foreign policy and achieve a situation in which our mutual relations with other states burden our economy to the least possible extent. This new conceptualization of Soviet relations with the Third World has had enormous repercussions on regional conflicts. Not only has a new perception of regional conflict emerged, but the Soviet Union's role in it has been redefined. The concept of 'regional conflict' was, before Gorbachev, considered ideologically anathema to Soviet thinking and was construed (together with other concepts such as 'low intensity conflicts', 'counterinsurgency' wars and 'local wars') as Western attempts to morally equate Soviet support for movements and regimes of 'national liberation' with American support for reactionary regimes and counterrevolutionary movements. ^ Under the 'new thinking,' these conflicts no longer attract the Marxist-Leninist ideological evaluation by which the protagonists are labeled 'reactionary' or 'progressive' on the basis of their ideological character. Instead of a monocausal attribution of Third World conflicts to the machinations of imperialist forces, as was the case in the past, Gorbachev acknowledges that "regional conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America are spawned by the colonial past, new social processes, or the recurrences of predating policy, or by all three." ^ Soviet writers have even held the USSR culpable for some of these conflicts, conceding that their country heightened "the level of military danger by advancing on the West's positions."^ They also argue that our direct and indirect entanglement in regional conflicts brings about enormous losses, exacerbating overall international tensions, justifying the arms race and hampering mutually beneficial ties with the West. These new perspectives have resulted in a repudiation of the conviction that socialism will inevitably triumph over capitalism, and in the disavowal of Clausewitz's dictum which has been replaced by the axiom: 'security is indivisible.' 15 Gorbachev contends: Universal security in our time rests upon the recognition of the rights of every nation to choose its own path of social development.... A nation may choose either capitalism or socialism. This is its sovereign right. Nations cannot and should not pattern their life either after the US or the Soviet Union. Hence, political positions should be devoid of ideological intolerance. There is thus an invocation of supraclass concepts that appeal to common interests which are said to be qualitatively superior to those presented by class notions. Therefore, in place of an image of a world immersed in inevitable combat between different social systems, there has emerged one characterized by mutuality of interests and in which conflicts are resolvable. Gorbachev declared in a statement reminiscent of Khrushchev: Economic, political and ideological competition between capitalist and socialist countries is inevitable. However, it can be and must be kept within the framework of a peaceful competition which necessarily envisages cooperation. . . . This understanding of_a dialectical unity of opposites fits into the concept of peaceful coexistence. It has been the conviction of the Soviet leadership that the conflicts in the developing world have the potential for escalating into superpower confrontation and, therefore, call for reassessment. The USSR would no longer use ideological indicators to determine and support its allies as part of the superpower rivalry, but would advocate peaceful settlement of all those conflicts. Shevardnadze stated this position clearly when he said: The 'image of the enemy' in all its dimensions impedes the restructuring of international relations on the principles of morality and civilization. Having set out to lessen confrontation, we say to capitalist countries: 'let us be honest opponents but not enemies. If you are ready to settle our disputes peacefully, we can even be partners. 1 The 'new thinking' further advocates the noninterference of the superpowers in the internal conflicts of the developing nations. In essence, the new 16 foreign policy philosophy calls for a rejection of what Primakov describes as the horizontal spread of confrontation between the USSR and the USA, and between the East and the West. This is because, "under present day conditions the growth of one armed conflict often triggers eruptions in other zones." These changes in Soviet attitude toward Third World regional conflicts are the products of domestic and external circumstances. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, A.C. Adamishin revealed the domestic pressures behind the changes when he said: The current priority was to implement a radical restructuring of Soviet society, and for this purpose we need a calm situation in the world. . . .[W]e need there to be no wars, especially wars near our borders/*' With this desire in mind, it was deemed necessary to cut back on Soviet involvement in regional conflicts, especially because with the Reagan Doctrine in force, any such engagement would only worsen the country's already deteriorating economic situation. In brief, it could be said that the "new thinking", as it relates to this study, connotes the demilitarization of regional conflicts and the adoption of political means for solving them; the deideologization or secularization of interstate relations and making them contingent on mutuality of interests; and upholding the principle of nonviolability of the sovereignty of Third World states and non-interference in their internal political processes. 17 REFERENCES 1. Michael Cox, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, vol 27, no. 1 (Feb., 1990), p. 1. 2. Dj. Jerkovic, "Comments on the Change," Review of International Affairs, vol 12, no. 260 (Feb. 1961) p. 9. 3. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addiaon-Wesley, 1979), p. 171. 4. S. Neil MacFarlene, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security," in Kurt M. Campbell and S. Neil McFarlene, eds., Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London, New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 7. 5. Ibid, p. 8. 6. V.M. Kulish,(ed.), Voennaya Sila i Mezhdunarodnyie Otnoshenyia[Military Force and International Relations], cited in Alvin Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 133. 7. V.A. Kremynyuk, V.P. Lukin and V.S. Rudnev, S.Sh^i i Razvivayushchiesie Strany 70-gody [The USA and Developing Countries in the 1970s], cited in Alvin Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy, p. 155. 8. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' and Foreign Policy," in J. Valenta and F. Cibulka .,eds., Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 29. 9. "New Solidarity with the Afghan Revolution," New Times, no. 3 (Jan. 1980), pp. 9-10. 10. Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' and Foreign Policy," p. 25. 11. "The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A New Addition," New Times.no. 12 (1986), p. 43. 12. R.S. Litwak, "Soviet Policies in the Third World: Objectives, Instruments, Constraints," in Roy Allison and Phil Williams, eds., Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 37. 13.1. Maleshenko, "The Country's Interests: Imaginary and Real," Kommunist. no. 13 (1989), as translated m Joint Publication Research Service, Kommunist. no. 13 (1989), p. 77. 14. Vestnik Ministerstva Innostrannikh Del SSSR. no. 2 (1987),, p. 31. 15. Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' and Foreign Policy," p. 29. 18 16. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking of Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 173-174. 17. Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations," Literaturnaya Gazeta. May 18, 1988, as translated in FBIS, Daily Report. May 20, 1988, p. 6. 18. Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 (1988), p. 8. 19. Gorbachev, Perstroika, p. 143. 20. Ibid., pp. 147-148. 21. Vestnik Ministerstva Innostrannvkh Del SSSR. no. 15 (August 1988), pp. 27-46. 22. Allison and Williams, Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World, p. 18. 23. Ibid, p. 19. i 19 CHAPTER THREE ANGOLA Though the Soviet Union had close links with some African countries such as Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Egypt and Somalia in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was its intervention in the Angolan civil war, especially since 1974, that marked the emergence of that superpower on the African continent with dramatic assertiveness. In fact, Angola became the unique theater in the superpower sweepstakes and undoubtedly reflects Rosenau's observation that major powers "test each other's strength and contest each other's influence through involvement in the internal wars of small neutral nations." * The Soviet involvement in Angola stemmed from certain ideological conceptions and pragmatic considerations that operated within the framework of superpower competition. In addition to ideological motivations, the USSR was driven by what Berridge terms the propaganda interest, the strategic interest, the spoiling interest, the status interest, and the economic interest. THE OLD THINKING AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS The Soviet intervention in Angola was motivated by several factors stemming from the 'old thinking' that characterized the pre-Gorbachev era. Principal among these was the desire to extend Marxist influence throughout the Southern African sub-region. The success of this effort was expected to result in other gains. These included acquisition of strategic bases in the area, the spread of Soviet influence throughout Africa and, consequently, a decline of American prestige. Also vital to the USSR's designs was the need to undermine Chinese influence on the continent. Moscow's Angolan enterprise was partly shaped by economic considerations as well, though these were not predominant. 20 It was considered an obligation, under Moscow's 'internationalist duty,' to prop up the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) faction in the anti-colonial struggle against Portugal and in the civil war that raged throughout the country in the countdown to independence. Soviet support for the MPLA was determined mainly by the latter's Marxist ideology and was further enhanced by the movement's multiracial and transtribal character.** The importance of ideological affinity in Soviet calculations is revealed in President Podgorny's message to Augustino Neto in 1975, after Angola's independence, requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations: Fulfilling its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union has invariably been on the side of the struggling people of Angola and has given all-round assistance and support to their patriotic forces. The USSR also sought to use its support for the MPLA as a propaganda device to engineer leftist change in that country and Africa as a whole. Since the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) were receiving South African support in one form or the other, they were alienated from the rest of the continent which was against the apartheid regime. Thus, Soviet support for the MPLA, which was anti-Pretoria, was expected to endear Moscow to the rest of Africa by increasing its visibility in the 'struggle' against apartheid. This was also likely to give it an edge over the US and China, which were allied with the South African-supported groups, in terms of influence on the continent. It is revealing to note that when the USSR resumed the flow of aid to the MPLA in 1974 after a brief suspension, it channeled its initial shipment of arms, worth $6 million, to the organization through the OAU's African Liberation Committee.^ After the establishment of the MPLA government in Luanda, the USSR continued its propaganda campaign by redefining the conflict as a case of external 21 aggression against a sovereign state. The Soviet press claimed that "under the guise of a 'civil war,' intervention by imperialist and neocolonialist forces has begun in Angola" and that "a conspiracy is being planned against Angola, on which there focus today the interests of NATO strategists, international cartels and the South African racists."^ This new perception of the Angolan situation not only justified Moscow's further assistance to the MPLA, but also earned it an honorable standing in African countries (most of which had recognized the Angolan government) as a supporter of national sovereignty ~ a phenomenon cherished by African leaders. The West, which was construed as violating Angola's sovereignty, was, on the other hand, mostly viewed with contempt. The USSR's intervention in Angola was dictated in part by a desire to gain and shore up its strategic interests in the subregion. In the Kremlin's scheme of things, victory by the Marxist forces in Angola would offer brighter opportunities for the establishment of a cordon sanitaire of pro-Soviet states in the subregion over which it would exercise leverage. The use of Angola as a logistic depot would ensure expeditious and effective channeling of military and other forms of assistance to such pro-Soviet liberation groups as the African National Congress (ANC), Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), to accelerate their victory. In addition to this limited sub-regional strategic objective, Moscow was also intent on using Angola as a base for enhancing its military capability against the West, especially the US. By gaining access to Angolan ports and airfields, the USSR's naval and air capabilities in the South Atlantic would be enriched and the vulnerability of Western oil tankers and other commercial transport to Soviet forces would be increased.^ The importance of Angola for military purposes became even more biting and urgent after June 1977, when Guinea, which hitherto provided the Soviets with facilities for aerial surveillance of the South Atlantic, terminated that 22 privilege. This change in Guinean policy followed the improvement of its relations with the West. Another motivation behind Moscow's support for the MPLA, at least in the period immediately preceding Angola's independence, was the quest to curtail Chinese influence in the Southern African region. In the early 1970s, Chinese influence in such places as Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and over such groups as the F N L A and UNITA, far outstripped that of the Soviet Union. Indeed in 1974, total Soviet aid to Africa, which amounted to $17 million, was insignificant compared to Chinese assistance to the continent, valued at $237 million.8 With Sino-Soviet rivalry at a very high level, the Soviet Union deemed it imperative to stop the upswing in Chinese influence if it was to gain any foothold in the region. As noted by Albright, although with some exaggeration, "the main factor behind the USSR's initial decision to back the MPLA in Angola in early 1975 seems to have been a desire to prevent the Chinese from becoming the outside power in Southern Africa. The Soviets also had some economic benefits to derive from 'installing' and maintaining a Marxist government in Angola. This contention is borne out by the immense fishing rights enjoyed by the USSR in Angola's territorial waters. It could, however, not gain access to the oil and mineral resources that are basically controlled by Western interests. Implicit in securing these aforementioned interests is the achievement of the 'spoiling' and 'status' interests. The former, which Berridge defines as undermining the non-economic interests of the West and China at very low cost, would become a matter of course when the other interests become firmly established. The effect of this entrenchment of Soviet interests in the region is the 23 enhancement of its overall power projection capability, thereby reinforcing and giving credibility to its claim to superpower parity with the US. With these purposes in mind, the Kremlin provided the MPLA with the necessary logistic and diplomatic support that it needed, first to secure the reins of government in Angola and then to entrench its hold on power, crush all opposition and achieve political stability. Although Moscow had been providing the MPLA with military assistance since 1964, it was in 1974, after a brief suspension of such aid following factional bickering within the movement, that Soviet intervention in that country assumed a more direct character and an expanded scope. During the period after 1974, not only did the Soviet Union become vigorously involved in the war, but it also created the circumstances for its allies and surrogates, such as East Germany and Cuba, to play a more assertive and consequential role. Between 1975 and 1976, Soviet assistance to the MPLA soared from $60 million, in 1972-1974, to about $400 million. 1 0 From November 1975 to March 1976, about twenty ships and seventy flights transported materiel and thousands of Cuban troops to Angola. 1 1 Soviet military supplies to its client included quite sophisticated weapons like MiG-21s, tanks, rocket launchers, ground-to-ground missiles, anti-aircraft guns, etc. Soviet-supplied aircraft were manned by Cuban pilots, and although they did not engage in combat, they helped defend the capital which was controlled by the MPLA after the Alvor Accords fell through.1^ In addition to the provision of arms and ammunition to its client, the USSR and its allies provided military training to the members of the MPLA. Between December 1974 and March 1975, at least 200 members of the movement were given military training in the USSR and East Germany.1 3 24 These forms of assistance were instrumental in helping the MPLA win the pre-independence war with the other liberation movements because they gave it a clear military advantage and dominance over its rivals. In fact, the involvement of the Cubans in direct combat "began to produce a noticeable effect" by the middle of November 1975.14 It could even be argued that the suspension of Soviet assistance to the MPLA in 1974 was partly responsible for its eventual unity and its common effort against its rivals. Knowing that the resumption of much needed assistance was predicated on adherence to Moscow's demand that the three factions unite, they decided to close their ranks, thereby strengthening their position, as a collective, beyond what it would have been had the divisiveness persisted. It is instructive to note that during the civil war the Soviets were uncompromising in refusing to discuss a political settlement when it was obvious that their ally-liberation movement would clinch a military victory. This is revealed by their negative response to a US overture for joint superpower efforts to end the war. When, for example, Kissinger raised this issue at the SALT negotiations in Moscow in 1975, Brezhnev avoided it by insisting that "Angola was not his country and [so] he had no intention of discussing it with Kissinger." ^ The USSR served as the coordinator of the East European effort to gird the MPLA in its fight for victory. This involved transporting military hardware and human expertise from the socialist countries. Moscow, presumably, influenced its allies to support the MPLA. This contention seems plausible in view of the fact that most of its European allies did not appear to have personal stakes in the conflict. The Soviet Union thus contributed to the triumph of the MPLA by employing "a global network of influence to support a military intervention in an obscure area of the globe far away from its periphery." ^ 25 Soviet support for its client consistently continued to pour into Luanda. In the fifteen years since the beginning of the Angolan conflict, Moscow backed the MPLA with about 1,100 advisers and at least $800 miUion a year in military aid.1^ THE ERA OF THE 'NEW THINKING' Reconceptualization of the Angolan Conflict This situation of intense Soviet intervention in the pre- and post-independence conflict in Angola began to change following the emergence in the Kremlin of a reformist leadership. Underlying this metamorphosis is the concept of the 'new thinking' which has not only restructured Soviet doctrine regarding its relations with Third World allies, but has revised its foreign policy practices in those areas as well. Why has Moscow decided to reduce its commitment to its long-standing client for which it has expended billions of dollars? The principal reason for this shift in policy is the realization by Moscow that a pragmatic evaluation of the Angolan conflict should take precedence over 'ideological duties.' This evaluation took into consideration the possibility of military victory for the MPLA, the likelihood of superpower confrontation, and the effect of continued Soviet involvement on its domestic economy. Other considerations factored in included the chances of building socialism in Angola and the sub-region as a whole, as well as the implications of the war for Soviet prestige and respect in the region. The Soviets became aware that the war against UNITA was unwinnable by military means and that continued sponsorship of the MPLA government would not promote the realization of the objectives it set itself at the beginning of its involvement. Among these was the 'battlefield objective' which was to "assist the MPLA in gaining control of Angola's entire territory."18 As noted by Savimbi, it had 26 become obvious "after 15 years of war that there was an impasse, no one could achieve a military victory." ^ Aware of the inefficacy of continued Soviet support for Luanda, the Kremlin began to reverse its stand of non-compromise on the conflict that characterized the Brezhnev years and began pressing for a negotiated settlement. The novelty in the Kremlin's stance is explicitly evidenced in a statement by a spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1989: Now more than ever, everyone who is involved in the intra-Angolan conflict must show political realism and make every effort to promote the peacemaking initiatives which have been endorsed by Africa and offer a realistic chance to eliminate one of the most dangerous hotbeds of regional and international tension. The inability of government forces to rout UNITA is due to several factors. Principal among these is the improvement inthe latter's fighting capabilities following the commitment of the US Administration, as expressed in the Reagan Doctrine, to a policy of sustaining rebel movements that were fighting pro-Soviet regimes, and the consequent repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985. The resumption of overt American assistance to UNITA, which started at about the same time that the new Soviet leadership came into power, coupled with consistent South African military support for the rebels, stretched the endurance of the combined Angolan-Cuban forces. The disastrous defeat of government forces in the fall of 1987 reflected the new military balance in the conflict. The intensity of the rebel and South African offensive had been gathering so much momentum that it led to low morale and defection among the Cuban troops. According to former Cuban General Del Pino, "the numerous disasters in Angola and over 10,000 casualties over the past 12 years have caused the Cuban high command to call Angola 'Cuba's Vietnam,' a Svar that is lost'."^ The 'new thinking's' conviction that low-intensity conflicts do not augur well for the superpower rapprochement that the USSR is seeking with the US called 27 for flexibility on Moscow's part in settling the Angolan problem peacefully. President Bush's recommitment to the Reagan policy regarding UNITA might have signalled to the Soviets that no lull in the conflict could be envisaged and that continued Soviet involvement would only escalate it, since that was likely to court further American support for the rebels. Furthermore, it dawned on the Kremlin that any attempt to deal with the reinvigorated rebel insurgency would escalate the cost to it of maintaining the Angola government and thus defeat its aim of cutting down expenditure on Third World clients. At a time when the Soviet Union itself is in deep economic crisis, it could not afford to maintain its high military aid to Luanda. In 1988, the cost to Moscow of supplying its client with military equipment alone was between $1 and $1.5 billion. 2 2 Moscow became increasingly convinced that it was wishful thinking to expect that socialism would be successfully established by the Vanguard party' in Luanda since the country was inextricably attached to the capitalist international economic system anyway. It was, thus, considered an unrewarding adventure to continue propping up such a party militarily when the purpose for which that support was being extended has been established to be a mirage: In countries with the rudiments of capitalism, such as Angola or Mozambique, the revolutionaries who came to power had no particular difficulty in committing themselves to a socialist orientation and carrying out important changes in the superstructure. . . . But these countries have so far been unable to create a basis ... adequate to the people's democratic (or even the national democratic) stage of the revolution. In fact, the Soviets themselves have come to accept that the system they were supporting the Angolan government to fight, namely capitalism, was unquestionably necessary for any meaningful development. It was also acknowledged that the conception of socialism as the *wave of the future' was a myth. Thus, Angola was encouraged by the USSR to abandon rigid socialist principles and vanguardism, and 28 get assimilated into the international capitalist division of labor/ 4 The Soviets now concede: The experience of several socialist-oriented countries, including 'second-generation' ones (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and others) has shown that disregard of the laws of commodity-money relations may cause a slump in labor productivity, disproportions m trade and curtailment of production, which can be very dangerous to a national democratic revolution. This change in Soviet policy away from gaining strategic advantage in Southern Africa by military means and towards enhancing the USSR's reputation in the region through improved socio-economic performance by its clients has been emphasized by Gorbachev. During talks with President Chissano of Mozambique in Moscow in August 1987, he said: Soviet policy [was] not directed toward obtaining a unilateral advantage in Southern Africa.. . . Future aid . . . would concentrate more on humanitarian and economic projects rather than on the supply of weapons. The Soviet decision to disengage from Angola is presumably also due to the recognition of the Soviets that the deteriorating socio-economic situation in that country could harm its reputation in the region as whole. In fact, even before the USSR called for a reorientation of Angola's economic policy, socialism had begun to 'lose face,' and Luanda had already embarked on the course of getting assimilated into the world capitalist economy by joining the IMF and the World Bank. This was because socialism had not brought the socio-economic panacea needed for national development. Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Angola's Foreign Minister, disclosed this when he stated: The biggest mistake we made was to make the state sector larger and larger when we did not have the capacity to manage it. There will be a big reduction in the state's participation in the economy. The Kremlin was receptive to the echoes of dissention, resounding in various areas parts of the world, such as Eastern Europe Afghanistan, etc., against Soviet interventionism. This, together with its own desire to get accepted into the 29 commity of nations, presumably drove the Soviets to attempt dissociating themselves as fast as possible from any situation that may court disaffection for them. Hence, Gorbachev's shift towards 'humanitarianism', aimed at placing priority (in inter-state relations) on common human values and civilization. The Soviets could not be expected to be oblivious to the embarrassing impact on the Angolan people of such UNITA statements as: The MPLA-Labor Party was installed in power by the Soviets and the Cubans who invaded our country in 1975, bringing the Angolan people only death, hunger, misery, mourning, nakedness, despair and many other ills that turned ounpotentially rich Angola into one of the biggest beggar countries in the world. 2 8 Impact of the 'New Thinking' On Conflict with South Africa On the basis of the 'new thinking' and the pragmatic assessment of the situation in Angola that it engendered, Moscow initiated, supported and implemented a series of actions that made tremendous contributions toward reshaping the direction of the regional conflict. This section will first analyze the practical contributions that the 'new thinking' has made toward peace in the Southern African sub-region as a whole (i.e., between Angola-Cuba and South Africa). The next section will look at its impact on the civil war between Luanda and UNITA. It is plausible to argue that the new Soviet foreign policy orientation has had profound implications for the peace efforts in Southern Africa. Chester Crocker, former US Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, acknowledges that since 1986 Moscow has persisted in its efforts aimed at securing a settlement of the conflict engulfing Angola, Cuba and South Africa.^ Notwithstanding the fact that efforts toward the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa were initiated by Luanda and subsequently upheld by Cuba, 3 0 the path that culminated in the final pact was greatly enhanced 30 by the Soviet Union. After the May 1988 'exploratory talks' in London between Angola and Cuba, on the one hand, and South Africa, on the other, the Soviets indicated their support for the idea of peace talks. Anatoly Adamishin, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister, expressed this to Chester Crocker at a meeting in Lisbon, citing the Afghan precedent as a basis for such a move. A high-ranking Soviet official reiterated this position, asserting that the superpowers could guarantee such a process which "could take many forms, with a role for the U N because of its heavy involvement in the Namibian independence process."-** The intense desire of the USSR to promote a political solution to the Angola-South African conflict is evidenced by the fact that it, at least on two further occasions in early June 1988 and early August 1988, publicly repeated the offer for joint US-Soviet cooperation in guaranteeing the process.^ The fact that Moscow suggested a role for the U N attests to the change in its foreign policy. In the past, the USSR rarely relied on global institutions as instruments of its foreign policy. Its officials now concede that their country's attitude toward the world body has been mistaken, and hence emphasize multilateralism over unilateralism in dealing with an interdependent world. Following the Lisbon meeting between Crocker and Adamishin at which an outline peace plan for Angola was discussed, the issue surfaced again at the US-Soviet summit in Moscow between late May and early June 1988. At this latter meeting, 29 September was agreed upon as the target date for reaching a settlement on the Angola-South Africa conflict.^ The fact that the Angolan issue was discussed at the Moscow summit is an indication of flexibility in Soviet perceptions regarding regional conflicts and the acceptance of the link between superpower detente and Third World conflicts. This development is a significant departure from the uncompromising stance of Brezhnev on the same issue when it was raised by Kissinger over a decade earlier. 31 While conceding that the US, through Chester Crocker, played a significant role in the Angola/South Africa peace process, it must be acknowledged that the whole effort might not have succeeded without Soviet involvement. Unlike in earlier periods when the Soviet Union was likely to want a dominant role in any discussions regarding conflicts in which it was involved, Moscow agreed to a subordinate role in the negotiations ~ that of an observer. With its emphasis on the political settlement of the conflict rather than on the show of force by the superpowers, it ceded the more prestigious role of a mediator to the US, which had in the past been excoriated as an imperialist power, responsible for most regional conflicts. The Soviets were present at every stage of the negotiations, making positive contributions to ensure a final settlement.3'* This observation is corroborated by dos Santos who praised the Kremlin for its "positive influence in the acceleration of the conclusion of the agreement.10 J Moscow is credited with encouraging the MPLA government, publicly and in private, to "pursue the efforts made under American chairmanship to reach agreement over the parallel withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops."3** It has been confirmed that Soviet flexibility and advocacy of new perspectives on regional conflicts helped soften some of the uncompromising and obdurate positions of the MPLA. This is contained in a statement by a Central Committee member of Angola's ruling party who said the new Soviet policy orientation "helped to undermine the advocates of war within the MPLA while strengthening the position of those favoring a political settlement."''' Similar pressure was brought to bear on the Cubans. Soviet ability to keep Havana in line is not surprising. While it is arguable whether the Cubans have acted in Angola as a Soviet pawn or as an independent agent, there is no doubt that Cuban military activity in Angola has been made possible because of Soviet military and economic assistance to it. This leverage, for example, made Havana succumb to 32 Moscow's pressure on it to negotiate with the South Africans during the June 1988 round of talks in Egypt/ 8 According to a December 26, 1988 article in Time magazine, "US officials credit the Soviets for employing 'cajolery and arm-twisting' that made the Cubans and the Angolans more flexible, particularly during the crucial round of talks at which a withdrawal timetable was worked out." It is indeed true that "the Cubans must operate within the parameters set by the Kremlin, and -an can exceed them only with the Kremlin's help. 7 The new flexibility in Soviet dealings with South Africa was reflected in the revocation of its intransigence concerning the latter's involvement in peace negotiations. In Gorbachev's opinion, it was necessary to take account of the interest of "all those who have been drawn into the conflict."4^ The 'new thinking's' conception of a positive-sum game between the superpowers in a world of interdependent interests seems to have enhanced the resolution of the conflict. The Soviets demonstrated this conviction through their pronouncements which encouraged US support for a negotiated settlement. According to Adamishin, we think we have common interests with America in stability in the region, and that sometimes we can take useful steps with the Americans. That the Soviets made a significant contribution to the positive outcome of the regional peace effort is borne out by the fact that Soviet diplomats closely involved in the process convinced Crocker to delink the negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa from the issue of an internal settlement with U N I T A . 4 2 The December Accords would presumably not have taken off if the two conflicts had been linked. This is because the Cubans and the Angolans were not prepared, at the time, to welcome UNITA's involvement in the talks "despite pressures from the Soviets and some African leaders [and] Savimbi offered his own set of proposals on a ceasefire, an interim government and elections".43 All these 33 would have complicated and, possibly, stalled the talks. It is significant to note that it took the MPLA government and UNITA another two and a half years to reach some definite agreement on internal peace. The Soviets chalked up further diplomatic success by persuading Crocker to agree to the role of Cuba as a major player in the negotiations.44 The acceptance of a major role for Cuba made it easy for Castro to pull out of Angola without 'losing face.' Its withdrawal would then be seen as a product of Havana's own willingness to pull out, as a result of negotiations in which it was a participant, rather than as an 'eviction.' Furthermore sidelining Cuba, which was the main force that kept the MPLA in power, could have jeopardized the peace process. Havana still had considerable leverage over Luanda, and it could have manipulated this to force the Angolan government to stall the negotiations. Threatening to unilaterally pull out of Angola at the beginning of the talks, for example, would have left the government vulnerable to rebel and South African attack - something the MPLA would not have dared to expose itself to. It can also be argued that South Africa's readiness to take part in the talks was partly "influenced by the recent political developments world-wide, in particular the accords and agreements on Afghanistan."4^ As the Soviet Union gained credibility as a genuine agent of peaceful settlement of conflicts and as its 'deideologization' of foreign policy became manifest, it was easier for Pretoria to view calls for a political settlement of the regional conflict as trustworthy and worth supporting. In fact, by the beginning of the talks, the spectre of a 'communist onslaught' on South Africa was already fading.4** With a new dose of commitment and trust injected into the negotiations, partly as a result of Soviet efforts, the peace plan produced significant dividends. 34 Following the July 1988 meeting in New York between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the US, a 'statement of principle' was agreed upon. According to it, the US was to cease support for UNITA, South Africa was to accept U N prescriptions for granting independence to Namibia, while Cuban and South African troops were to pull out of Angola. This tentative statement of purpose assumed an even more optimistic character when, in early August 1988, in Geneva, an explicit sequence of actions was defined for a comprehensive regional peace settlement. Under this plan, a ceasefire was to come into effect on August 8, 1988, pending the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by September 1 of that year. The implementation of U N Security Council Resolution 435, outlining measures toward Namibia's independence, was to commence on November 1,1988. Though South African forces were reported to have departed by the end of August, the implementation of Resolution 435 was held back because of delays in agreeing on a specific schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal. Further negotiations led to an agreement in mid-November. The negotiations were finally sealed on December 22 1988, in New York, when a tripartite accord was signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, and the first two countries signed a bilateral agreement. With these Accords, the Namibian independence process was set in motion, leading to independence in March 1989. Cuba undertook to implement a phased withdrawal of its estimated 50,000 troops from Angola that was to be completed by July 1991. This exercise was completed two months ahead of schedule. In accordance with the accords, an estimated 6,000 members of the African National Congress were compelled to leave Angola because Luanda made a commitment not to allow its territory to be used for destabilizing Pretoria. The immense Soviet contribution to the December 1988 settlement is explicitly confirmed by Chester Crocker. He praised the "hard work and professional 35 dedication of Soviet officials' ' who played an "important and constructive role. 0 The Soviet efforts, and their reciprocation by the US, were, indeed, "a test in practical cooperation between the superpowers."4^ Impact of 'New Thinking' On National Reconciliation The Soviet effort to promote the settlement of regional conflict in Southern Africa has not been limited to Angolan/Cuba-South African conciliation. It also extends to the internal conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA, though this took a relatively longer period to deal with. In August 1988, just a few months after the declaration of Soviet intent to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict involving Angola and South Africa, Moscow initiated moves toward promoting peace between Luanda and the UNITA rebels. Adamishin expressed the Soviet desire to seek an end to the conflict by impressing on the MPLA government the need to "start dialogue with Savimbi by sitting around a table."^0 Presumably, partly because of these pressures, the Angolan government offered a 12-month amnesty to all UNITA members except the top leadership of the movement. President dos Santos announced that he was prepared to attend a regional conference to discuss the conflict. These gestures attracted a positive response from Savimbi who undertook to uphold a unilateral moratorium on offensive military operations until mid-July 1989, by which time African leaders were expected to arrange an internal peace settlement. The willingness of the belligerents to end the civil war led to a conference in Luanda, attended by eight African leaders, aimed at resolving the conflict. As a follow-up to the Luanda conference, both sides met at Gbadolite, in Zaire, in June 1989, under the chairmanship of President Mobutu. In attendance 36 were 18 African Heads of State. Dos Santos agreed to direct talks with Savimbi, something he had refused for years. Consequently, a ceasefire was signed. To demonstrate the 'new thinking's' support for political solutions to regional conflicts, Gorbachev sent a message to dos Santos praising the Gbadolite Accord. The message expressed the Soviet conviction that the accord reflects a growing understanding of the need for political solutions to conflicts that arise - not solutions based on the use of force. The Soviet Union views the accord as a valuable contribution to ihe process of eliminating a dangerous hotbed of tension in Southern Africa. Messages were also sent by the Kremlin to African leaders who contributed to the conference, emphasizing the need to put an end to foreign interference in Angola's domestic affairs. Unfortunately, this ceasefire did not hold and Savimbi announced the resumption of hostilities, partly because of ambiguities about whether he should go into temporary voluntary exile. There were also recriminations between UNITA and the government, with each side accusing the other of violating the accord. Following the breakdown of the truce, Savimbi toughened his conditions for peace negotiations. He now asked for the creation of an African peace-keeping force to oversee a renewed ceasefire and for the institution of multiparty democracy in Angola. However, with the change in the international environment concerning regional conflicts and the upsurge in superpower rapprochement and cooperation, Savimbi's stand was not supported by the US. He was rather given a restrained reception when he visited Washington in October 1989. Without withdrawing military support for its protege, the US strongly urged the UNITA leader to "go back to the bargaining table . . . [and] work with President Mobutu and others in the C I region to foster the peace process. 37 President Bush expressed support for a ceasefire and face-to-face negotiations, and ultimately for free and fair elections. After the Washington trip, UNITA agreed to resume peace talks with Luanda. It is worth noting that following the inability of the Gbadolite conference to ensure a negotiated settlement, the US and the USSR consented to cooperate in reviving the stalled peace talks and consequently ending the civil war. At an August 1990 meeting between Shevardnadze and Baker in Siberia, Angola was high on the agenda, and they agreed to "encourage their allies to work out their differences."-" This Soviet cooperation with the US shows the USSR's recognition that the resolution of Third World regional conflicts is an integral part of the calculus for reaching superpower rapprochement. After the Siberia meeting, discussions between lower-level diplomats of the two countries continued on the Angolan issue. With this joint commitment, the US and the Soviet Union took part directly in Angola's internal peace talks for the first time in Lisbon in October 1990. The presence of the two patrons of the belligerents is said to have created a "more favorable atmosphere at the talks" than would otherwise have been the case.^4 The superpowers readily accepted an invitation from the two sides to join an international force with responsibility for working out logistics and overseeing a truce. As disclosed by Leonid Sofanov, counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in the US, Moscow and Washington thereafter assumed a deep involvement in the negotiations.^ In an effort to come up with a conclusive negotiating position for the two factions before the decisive sixth round of talks in January 1991, Shevardnadze and Baker held separate discussions with leading officials of the Angolan government and UNITA. For the first time in the history of the civil war, the USSR accepted Savimbi as a legitimate political leader and recognized the need to guarantee a role for his organization in the Angolan political process.^ This change 38 in the Soviet perception of UNITA, which was crystallized in a 45-minute meeting between Shevardnadze and Savimbi at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, presumably lent credence to the Kremlin's claim that it was serious about peace. These diplomatic efforts by the superpowers contributed to a narrowing of the chasm in MPLA and UNITA positions regarding peace. In late October 1990, the MPLA Central Committee endorsed a program allowing for multiparty democracy and announced that general elections would be held within three years of a peace settlement. Though the latter part of the announcement fell short of UNITA's demand for elections within six months of a truce, the whole pronouncement was considered a major breakthrough. As a further move to ensure a quick transition to peace, Moscow pressed for the adoption of the 'triple zero option,' a proposal under which military support for the two factions from the US, the USSR and South Africa would cease. In addition to this, neither UNITA nor the government was to accept weapons from any source. Washington, however, rejected this in the belief that it would benefit only Luanda. Consequently, the House Intelligence Committee secretly approved continuation of aid to UNITA. Moscow nevertheless undertook to cut down on its military assistance to Luanda and indicated that it wanted to end military supplies for which Angola owed the Soviet Union at least $2 billion/ 8 According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet expenditure on the Angolan conflict plummeted from a colossal $1,000 million a year, before 1989, to about $500,000 in 1990.59 The commitment of the Kremlin to secure national reconciliation, and to subordinate patron-client relations to it, is reflected in the change in its behavior of supporting Luanda on all issues. It condemned the Angolan government for the failure of the February 1991 talks in Lisbon, and critcized it for introducing a previously undiscussed condition into the negotiations, i.e., that the meeting should 39 set a definite date for a ceasefire. This severe castigation was directed solely at the Angolan government, even though UNITA had also destroyed chances of an early agreement by insisting that there could be' no talk of a ceasefire prior to the final withdrawal of Cuban troops. It seems quite plausible to say that the gradual withdrawal of Soviet diplomatic and military support for the MPLA government, at a time when the Bush Administration was still firmly behind UNITA, injected further moderation into the negotiating position of its client. The desperation engendered by the Soviet policy changes in Angola is expressed by Nathan Shamuyariya, Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister: While diplomatic solutions were preferable, by disengaging militarily and in the face of continued American support for UNITA, Moscow had pulled the rug from under the feet of the Angolans. Some diplomatic shuffling by the two patrons, after the February impasse, apparently paved the way for the final agreement. US representatives attended the UNITA Congress in Jamba where they presumably urged Savimbi to agree to a ceasefire. At about the same time Vladimir Kuznetsov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Africa Directorate, visited Luanda, most probably to persuade Angola to sign a peace plan. Not long after these visits with the two factions in the civil war, a de facto ceasefire came into effect on May 15, 1991, and this was followed by a formal signing of a peace agreement in Lisbon on May 31, 1991. Present at the signing ceremony were Javier Perez de Cuellar, U N Secretary General, James Baker, US Secretary of State, and Alexander Bessmertnykh, Soviet Foreign Minister. Under the agreement, a U N force of 600 men was expected in Luanda in June to monitor the ceasefire. A Joint Political and Military Commission made up of representatives of the USSR, the US, Portugal, the MPLA government and UNITA will organize a 50,000-member armed forces out of the rebel and 40 government forces. This Commission will be assisted by Britain and France. Both sides will provide half the 40,000-member army, while the government will supply all the 6,000-strong airforce and the 4,000-man navy, because UNITA has only ground forces. The Commission has further responsibility for preparing Angola for internationally supervised elections in the second half of 1992. As a result, Jonas Savimbi returned to Luanda in July, the first time in at least fifteen years. Moscow and Washington have also undertaken to cease suppling the two factions with weapons/2 Thus the 'new thinking' engendered another successful effort at ending regional strife in the Third World. In recognition of the significant role played by Soviet policy, Baker expressed American gratitude to Moscow for its cooperation in "resolving yet another issue that once deeply divided our countries but that now unites us in common purpose."^ Savimbi also acknowledged the 'new thinking's' contribution when he stated that "the winds of democracy in Eastern Europe had not only robbed the MPLA of key allies amongst the deposed governments [whose demise was precipitated by the new Soviet policies], but had also blown into Africa, encouraging change from below."^4 CONCLUSION The foregoing exposition indicates that the conceptual reformulations enshrined in the 'new thinking' spurred a change in Soviet perceptions and policy actions regarding regional conflict in Southwestern Africa. The intense desire for the regulation of conflict led to superpower cooperation, demonstrating a retreat from Leninist principles which envision an inevitable struggle between capitalist and socialist states. There was thus a subordination of the themes of ideological affinity and international class struggle to universal principles reflecting the interest 41 of an interdependent world. The result was a positive movement toward peace in Angola. It must be conceded, though, that while the 'new thinking' contributed significantly to changes at the international or systemic level as well as in the local theater of hostilities, it was not the sole determinant of the de-escalation in the conflict. Changes in the military balance in the conflict (as a result of the Reagan Doctrine and its implications for UNITA's strength), the escalation in South Africa's military offensive, and the US's mediation efforts which started before the initiation of the 'new thinking,' were all catalysts to the peace process. Efforts of African leaders and the Angolan government's own realization of the need for change in ideology and its quest for peace also made it possible for the settlement of the conflict to take shape. Since the effects of these factors on the conflict are beyond the scope of this study they will not be exhaustively explored. The crux of the matter is that the 'new thinking' acted as a big facilitator of the peace process in Southwestern Africa. An analysis of Soviet contributions to the resolution of the conflict shows, however, that the 'new thinking' did not immediately incite a change in pre-Gorbachev policy toward Angola. The concrete manifestations of change in policy began to emerge only around 1988. After Gorbachev assumed office, he showed continuities in the old Soviet commitment to its client, rationalizing them by appeals to the same conceptual formulations that characterized the earlier period. In 1986, he stated: The Soviet Union is at one with the selfless struggle of the Angolan people, who are defending their sovereignty and their progressive social system. We are fulfilling and will continue to fulfill, firmly and steadfastly, our commitment.... No one should have any doubt on this score. At a time when the 'new thinking' had started ushering in a new era in superpower relations, and the Soviet Union had started, at least at the rhetorical 42 level, advocating peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, it still clung to the 'old thinking' as far as Angola was concerned. As recently as 1988, just before the Soviets became genuinely attached to peace in Angola, Shevardnadze stated that "our cooperation with Angola is not in question and we see no reason to change our position."66 Thus, between 1987 and 1988, Angola received large amounts of Soviet military assistance. For example, in 1987: hundreds of Soviet transport flights in Angola took place . . ., moving heavy arms and war materials — reportedly also including ground-to-air missiles — from the capital of Luanda to Huambo in south-central Angola, possibly for an offensive against South African-backed rebels. ' Moscow even upgraded Angola's radar network during the early stages of the peace negotiations. Soviet assistance in the early years of the Gorbachev administration was not limited to supplies of military equipment. Soviet military personnel were also in the field assisting the MPLA government's war effort. During the summer of 1987, when a major MPLA offensive against UNITA took place, government and Cuban forces were under the direct command of Soviet General Konstantin Shaganovitch and his aide, General Mikhail Petrov.68 The General Shaganovitch was the highest-ranking Soviet officer to serve outside Europe or Afghanistan. That the Soviets continued to exhibit behavior reminiscent of the Brezhnev era suggests that Moscow was not ready to abandon its client very fast, especially in the face of continuing flow of assistance to UNITA from the US and South Africa. Gradual disengagement, nevertheless, came as a result of several factors including the 'new thinking.' Without the changes in Soviet policy it is doubtful whether the other factors, on their own, could have facilitated a de-escalation of the conflict in the region under consideration. 43 REFERENCES 1. James Rosenau, "Introduction," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 6. 2. Geoff R. Berridge, "The Superpowers and Southern Africa," in Roy Allison and Phil Williams, eds., Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 208. 3. Arthur J. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 8. 4. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 27, no. 45 (1975), p. 17. 5. Zaki Laidi, The Superpowers and Africa -- The Constraints of Rivalry 1960-1990 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 65. 6. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 27, no. 45 (1975), pp. 15-16. 7. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 73 8. Ibid., p. 106. 9. Ibid., p. 101. 10. Karen L. Puschel, "The USSR and Lusophone Africa," in The USSR and Marxist Revolutions in the Third World (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987), p. 33. 11. Kurt Campbell, "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique," in Kurt M. Campbell and S. Neil McFarlane, eds., Gorbachevs Third World Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 212. 12. Cited in Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 28. 13. Ibid, p. 17. 14. Africa South of the Sahara, 1991 (London: Europa Publications Ltd, 1990), p. 235. 15. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 91. 16. Paul Vanneman and Mark James, "Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," in Strategic Review, vol. 4, no. 3 (Summer 1976), p. 96. 17. New York Times. September 17,1990, p. A3. 18. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 147. 19. West Africa. 6-12 May 1991, p. 726. 20. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 41, no. 36 (1989), p. 21. 44 21. Peter Clement, "The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Balance Sheet," in Carol Saivetz, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 163. 22. New York Times. Jan. 11, 1989, p. A10. 23. Alexei Kiva, "Socialist Orientation: Reality and Illusions," International Affairs. 1988,vol. 7 (July 1988), p. 86. 24. Michael McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev," Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (March 1990) p. 172. 25. Vladimir Lee and Georgy Mirsky, "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," Asia and Africa Today, vol. 4 (1988), p. 64. 26. Colin Legum, "Africa After Gorbachev's Rise to Power: Angola and Ethiopia," in Jiri Valenta and Frank Cibulka, eds., Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 165. 27. New York Times. Jan. 29, 1989, p. E 23. 28. Cited in New York Times. Jan. 11,1989, p. A10 29. McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process," p. 182. 30. New Times. 1989, no. 1, p. 11. 31. Geoff Berridge, "Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords," International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 3 (Summer 1989), p. 478. 32. The London Times. Aug. 10, 1988, p. 8. 33. Africa South of the Sahara 1991, p. 237. 34. Newsweek. July 25, 1988. 35. Izvestiva. Nov. 4, 1988, p. 1. 36. Legum, "Africa After Gorbachev's Rise to Power," p. 164. 37. McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process," p. 183. 38. Peter Younghusband, "Moscow Pressures Cuban Negotiators," The Washington Times. June 27, 1988, p. 8. 39. William Durch, cited in Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 19. 40. Pravda. Oct. 19,1988, p. 1. 41. Legum, "Africa After Gorbachev's Rise to Power," p. 165. 42. McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process," p. 183. 45 43. Donald Rothchild, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and the Options for President Bush on Africa," Issue, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1989), p. 12. 44. McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process," p. 183. 45. New Times. Aug. 1988, p. 9. 46. The Independent. March 12,1988. p. 6. 47. Los Angeles Times. Dec. 14, 1988, p. 18. 48. Manchester Guardian Weekly. Jan. 1,1989, p. 8. 49. Ibid. 50. L.L. Fituni, "Thoughts on An Angolan-Namibian Settlement," Issue, vol. 17, no. 1 (1988), pp. 19-20. 51. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 40, no. 34 (1989), p. 33. 52. New York Times. Oct. 6,1989, p. 5. 53. Ibid., Sept. 17, 1990, p. A3. 54. Ibid., Oct. 2,1990, p. A5. 55.Ibid. 56. Ibid, Dec. 13,1990, p. A25. 57. Ibid, Sept. 17, 1990, p. A3. 58. The World Today, vol. 47, no. 5 (1991), p. 73. 59. Africa Confidential, vol. 32, no. 12 (1990), p. 2. 60. The World Today, vol. 47, no. 5 (1991), p. 73. 61. Ibid. 62. New York Times. June 1,1991, p. 1. 63. Ibid, p. 2. 64. West Africa. 6-12 May, 1991, p. 726. 65. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 38, no. 19 (1986), p. 15. 66. The Guardian. March 25, 1988, p. 12. 67. Washington Post. Apr. 11,1987, p. 22. 68. Campbell, "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa," p. 219. 46 CHAPTER FOUR ETHIOPIA The conflicts to be dealt with in this section, in which the Soviet Union intervened, are the Ethiopia-Somali conflict and that pitting the government in Addis Ababa against internal 'liberation' movements. Emphasis on the latter conflict will be on the Ethiopia-Eritrea strife because of the lack of adequate documented information on the other internal forces of dissention. The time frame within which the USSR's intervention will be evaluated will be limited to the period since the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974. The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia is an interesting occurrence that was precipitated by a twist in the internal political setting of the latter and, consequently, its foreign policy orientation. Ethiopia was transformed from a strong US ally, through a stage of overlapping alliances with both superpowers, to a firm disciple of the Soviet Union and a dogmatic advocate of socialism. The context within which the Soviets intervened in the conflicts will be put into perspective with a brief background discussion. Background to Soviet Involvement in the Horn The Horn of Africa for a long time figured considerably in Soviet strategic calculations. The importance of this region assumed an even greater significance in the late 1960s, as a result of a confluence of events. These included the British decision to withdraw its sea fleet from the 'East of Suez' and the subsequent leasing of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) to the US in December 1966 for defence purposes. 47 These events attracted Moscow's concern. One reason for this was the Soviet Union's geographical proximity to the new American presence in the Indian Ocean. As Davydov et al. have stated: Since the Polaris A-2 and A-3 missiles with which US submarines are now armed have an operational range of from 3,000 to 4,500 kilometres, they represent a definite threat to the security of many states, including the Soviet Union, regardless of what ocean these submarines are in. In terms of distance, the Soviet Union's southern borders from the Indian Ocean are only 1,200 to 1,500 kilometres which means that a large part of Soviet territory is within range of Polaris missiles.. . . With the replacement of the Polaris by the Poseidons [in 1966], whose range is up to 5,000 to 6,000 kilometres, the strategic value of the Indian Ocean from this point of view is even greater. With the fifty-year lease of the BIOT to the US, and the subsequent development of an American communications, air and naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, the 'aggressive intentions' of Washington assumed an even more threatening character in Moscow's perceptions: It should be noted that the US military command selected Diego Garcia for its central stronghold in the Indian Ocean because it was felt that this island could ensure dominance in the Indian Ocean with a minimum of armed force. And this corresponds to the Nixon doctrine on the nature^)f US armed forces' participation in establishing a 'balance of power' in Asia / For this reason, Moscow embarked on a plan to station its expanding navy in the Indian Ocean to balance the American presence and as part of its overall program to strengthen its navy through the acquisition of port facilities around the world. It must be added though that the Soviets were not just interested in balancing American capabilities in the area, but also wanted a stronghold in the region to be used to deny the US, in particular, and the West, in general, economic 3 access. Denying the West access to this region was a strategic imperative in view of the fact that it obtained the bulk of its oil supplies from there. Furthermore, sea lanes there were very significant not only for the West's military fleet but for its 48 commercial vessels as well. Soviet influence in the region was therefore expected to cripple the Western economies. It was basically for these reasons that the USSR invested in such countries as Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia. These investments, however, suffered major setbacks in the early 1970s. In July 1971, Soviet support for a pro-communist abortive coup against Numeiri resulted in strained relations between Moscow and Khartoum. Twelve months later, Sadat ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet military advisers and experts because, among other reasons, the USSR was reluctant to supply Cairo with offensive weaponry. Subsequently, the Soviets were denied the use of Egyptian airfields, and their access to a number of Egyptian ports such as Alexandria, Said and Mersa Matruh was largely circumscribed. In the midst of these developments, the USSR clung to its position in Somalia into which it pumped colossal military assistance. Moscow assisted Mogadishu in undertaking a major military build-up. This included extensive modernization of the Somali Army and the refurbishing of its air and naval facilities. Between 1974 and 1977, it gave Somalia over $300 million in arms, exceeding US military assistance to Ethiopia by $120 million.4 For its assistance to Somalia, the Soviet Union gained naval facilities at Berbera and access to Somali airfields. About 1,400 Soviet military personnel were stationed in that country by 1974.^  Through these relations the USSR got involved in the long-standing conflict between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. It was its military assistance to Siad Barre that improved the capability of the Somali Armed forces over those of Ethiopia, thereby giving Somalia the confidence to adopt military options for absorbing the Ogaden. 49 Soviet Conceptualization of the Ethiopia Revolution, the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict, and Intervention The USSR, in its characteristic ideological rhetoric, hailed the Ethiopian revolution of September 1974 as a further demonstration of the tilt in the 'correlation of forces' in favor of socialism and professed its support for it. It is instructive to add, however, that this affirmation of support was not immediate. Taking cognizance of the long-standing links between the US and Ethiopia, Moscow was cautious about striking a deep relationship with Addis Ababa. This was due to the uncertainty about whether the new regime would maintain the previous level of cordiality with Washington and whether the latter would continue its commitments to the former. With the passage of time Soviet conviction that the new administration in Addis Ababa was showing reliable proclivities toward socialism began to grow. This was mainly due to the lull in relations between the new Ethiopian government and the US following the latter's lack of enthusiasm in dealing with the soldiers in Addis Ababa and its unwillingness to prop up their military arsenal.6 The US, in the face of intensified fighting in Eritrea, rejected the government's request for $30 million worth of arms and ammumtion, and instead offered it weapons worth $7 million/ Washington's position was partly due to fear of Eritrean reprisals against its installations in that province and its access to the ports of Assab and Massawa. Furthermore, it wanted to prevent adverse reactions from its Arab friends who were supporting the Eritreans. Soviet hopes for an amenable leadership in Ethiopia must have been significantly aroused by the declaration of the 'national democratic revolution' in Ethiopia. This program advocated a "people's democratic republic" rooted in a "firm foundation for the transition to socialism" under the guidance of a "party of the 50 proletariat."0 A further demonstration of this new ideological orientation was expressed by a member of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC): Our irreversible aim is socialism and when we speak of socialism we mean scientific socialism based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship. Thus, in April 1976, Moscow expressed its preparedness to assist this potential ally, asserting that: The strength of the Ethiopian revolution lies in its very inevitability in the maddens its enemies and is a source of satisfaction for the true friends of the new Ethiopia." u Retracting from the Leninist belief that the military is class-based and that its reactionary or revolutionary credentials were contingent on its class affiliation, the Kremlin now contended that the upper echelons of the military institution were relatively independent of class: Although representatives of the propertyless toilers are rare among the officer corps, it is, as a whole well acquainted with the needs and sentiments of the 'common people' and better still with the views and temper of the petty bourgeoisie and professional sections. In the absence of any viable political opposition, the army was considered to be the only institution capable of synthesizing the aspirations of all segments of the population. On the basis of this class-free conception of the military and Moscow's perception of it as embodying positive values, the administration in Addis Ababa was construed as a potential ally and the coup was justified: The advantages of the army as against political parties is obvious if one compares the sources of financing the parties, which are limited and not always reliable, with the resources allocated to maintaining the army. The army is a state organization, which receives the funds for its support entirely from the state budget. It does not need to worry about the business situation in the country, nor about the financial power of the bourgeoisie. This position was supported by the Soviet media which elevated the 1974 overthrow of the emperor beyond the level of ordinary coups d'etat, emphasizing world revolutionary uninitiated, 51 that it was not an "ordinary military coup" but "a landmark in the revolutionary transformation of society." ^  Haile Selassie's political demise was supported in Moscow where his regime was portrayed as a concrete monument of those "regimes that serve as conductors of imperialist influence."^4 Ethiopians were seen as a people suffering the atrocities and indignities of constitutional absolutism which was the epitome of "corruption, bribery, embezzlement of public funds and the abuse of power [which] became standard of everyday life."^ It needs to be emphasized that whereas these ideological analyses and perceptions of the regime-change in Ethiopia were overtly held up as the reasons for the Soviet cultivation of the PMAC, other more consequential motivations underlay Moscow's cuddling of Addis Ababa. Principal among these was the strategic importance of Ethiopia and the Horn in general, as has earlier been noted. The naval facilities and privileges accorded the Soviet navy, as a result of the Treaty of Friendship with Somalia, were considered inadequate and of limited strategic value for Moscow's purposes. The facilities along Somalia's coast were assessed to lack the necessary deep-sea configurations and could not be compensated for by additional Soviet facilities in Aden. The Soviets were thus intent on acquiring the Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawa which offered better prospects for the effective operation of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets succeeded in achieving their desires when they gained military access to these key ports as well as airfields which provided logistic and reconnaissance support for the Soviet fleet. They also had access to the Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea and a floating dry dock for maintaining combatants as large as destroyers. The effect of this new affinity between the two countries was the extension of Soviet assistance to the new regime in Addis Ababa. The bulk of this was military aid that was meant to enable the PMAC to deter, and if necessary repel, external 52 aggression as well as combat internal dissention. In this vein, a secret arms agreement was signed between the two countries under which the USSR was to deliver materiel worth $100 million to the Dergue.1** The Soviet-Ethiopia relationship took on an even more rigorous character when Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was known in Moscow for his pro-Soviet stance and strong advocacy of Soviet-style socialism, assumed the leadership of the Dergue in February 1977. Anatoly Ratonov, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, assured Mengistu of Moscow's firm support for him within hours of the change in leadership.-^ Soviet desires appeared to have been fully satisfied when the Ethiopians expelled all American military advisers and closed down the Kagnew communications station and other US facilities in April 1977. With these developments, Soviet enthusiasm and hopes were boosted, and it extended an arms package valued at $385 million to Mengistu in May 1977.18 There was such a marked acceleration in Soviet arms deliveries that by late summer of that year five planeloads of military hardware were landing at Addis Ababa airport every week. This new alliance was considered by Moscow as a further step toward building a conglomeration of socialist states in the Red Sea area. It was also viewed as an impetus for resolving the chronic dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. Soviet belief in this regard is represented in Sherr's statement that: The choice by both countries of a non-capitalist path of development with an orientation toward socialism has for the first time after many years of alienation and hostility inspired the hope of a peaceful, friendly settlement of differences between brotherly African nations. However, Somalia, Moscow's long-standing ally in the Horn, became apprehensive of the prevailing trends and registered its disapproval of the Kremlin's new role in Addis Ababa. The USSR, deeply engrossed in its scheme for a broad constellation of 'progressive' states in the region, tried to allay Mogadishu's fears 53 and attempted to iron out the differences between these local antagonists. It offered an ideologically-based explanation for the differences, blaming colonialism for initiating the conflict and for fueling it through neocolonialist intrigues. A meeting among the region's pro-Soviet states was thus held in Aden in 1977 at the instigation of the USSR. Here, Fidel Castro presented a Soviet proposal for a Marxist-Leninist confederation embracing Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen and Djibouti. The effort was fruitless. Siad Barre instantly rejected any such idea, insisting that Somalia would consider it only when the irredentist aspirations of its people were satisfied. This refusal of Somalia to accede to the formation of a 'socialist commonwealth' and the continued flow of Soviet arms to Addis Ababa led to a strain in relations between Moscow and Mogadishu. At about this time the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), operating in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, surfaced with renewed military potency to fight against the Dergue and secure the incorporation of the area into Somalia. This movement was assisted by Somalia and its operations were coordinated with that of the Somali army. Not only was the WSLF given arms by Mogadishu, but its members were provided with military instruction, under Somali auspices, in the Soviet Umon, Cuba and North Korea. To preempt any ascendancy in Ethiopian military capabilities, that was likely to result from increased flow of Soviet arms, and hence forestall the curbing of its irredentist designs, Somalia decided to embark on a direct offensive against Ethiopia. It was, in the main, taking advantage of its relative military superiority over Ethiopia. In the opinion of Siad Barre no-one can guarantee us that once his regime is consolidated and his army strengthened, Mengistu will consent to negotiate the territorial conflict between us so as to find a solution that complies with the wishes of the Somali people in the Ogaden. 54 On 23 July 1977, Somalia invaded the Ogaden and by September of that year the whole disputed territory, with the exception of two strategic towns, Harar and Dire-Dava, was in its hands. In fact, the two towns survived the Somali onslaught because of the 10,000-strong Cuban troops protecting them. Moscow was caught in a dilemma as to which of its clients in this conflict it should side with. Eventually it decided in favor of Ethiopia. Several reasons account for this twist in Soviet alignment in the Horn away from Somalia. Ethiopia, apart from reasons of better port facilities, also had an edge over Somalia because it was perceived as larger and potentially richer. These characteristics were considered important for political and economic reasons. The implications of siding with a country that had a population of 35 million (the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa and ten times that of Somalia) was obvious to the Kremlin. In addition to offering a demographic advantage for spreading socialist ideas, Ethiopia's population offered a potentially larger market for the Soviet economy than did Somalia. It was also speculated that the country had abundant natural resources from which the USSR could benefit. Moscow believed that Ethiopia had a great deal of political influence on the continent, through the OAU, and could thus be used to attract the confidence and support of other countries in Africa. In Soviet calculations: The Ethiopian revolution can have a very important international role to play. Its success can largely promote the anti-imperialist struggle and not only in Africa. There will also be a contribution to the socialist transformation of the world. Imperialism is aware of this and that is why it has been using its agents within and outside the country to undermine the development of our revolution/-5 Whereas Ethiopia was perceived as an asset, Somalia was considered a liability because of its diplomatic isolation following its violation of the O A U Charter's principle of nonviolability of national borders at independence. 55 The Ethiopian revolution was hailed as the only event in Africa in the 1970s that "strictly belonged to the regular channel of Marxist-Leninist theory and politics."24 This was due not only to the pre-revolutionary feudal political history it shared with the Soviet Union but also its Marxist socio-economic policies. It was thus considered ideologically more proximate to the USSR than was Somalia, whose foreign policy was basically shaped by the principles of non-alignment. On the basis of these considerations, Addis Ababa exerted a stronger force of attraction on the Soviets who were prepared to sacrifice their old ally for the new opportunities offered by the new alliance. In the circumstances, the USSR began to rationalize its support for Addis Ababa by appealing, occasionally, to norms of international ethics and, basically, to ideology. Somalia, which had been praised as a 'comrade-in-arms' and as being "at one in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism,"2^ was now charged with being an imperialist lackey: The true pro-imperialist countenance of the Somali aggressors has come to light and is now visible to the entire world, especially_since the Somalis have embarked on the well-trodden path of anti-Sovietism. These perceptions of Somalia's actions in the Ogaden were traded around in spite of Soviet awareness of the fact that those activities were not the product of imperialist manoeuvres but were expressions of Somalia's vision of, and quest for, a 'Greater Somalia'. The USSR's pronouncements about an imperialist connection were thus basically an instance of exploiting ideology as a post-factum justification for its instrumental motives in the Horn. Soviet support for Ethiopia was also explained in terms of international law: When Somali troops invaded the territory of Ethiopia, the USSR sided with the victim of aggression, proceeding from the fundamental principles of its foreign policy, and at the request of Ethiopia is giving the country the appropriate material and technical assistance. 56 In response to this conception of the conflict, arms deliveries to Somalia were cut at a time when Ethiopian arsenals were being stocked. Spare parts shipments for Soviet-supplied military equipment in Somalia ceased and technical aid dropped. In July 1977, about 1,200 Soviet advisers and military personnel were withdrawn from Somalia and flown directly to Ethiopia to gird its defenses. In November 1977, the Somalis reacted to these changes in Soviet behavior by expelling all Soviet military advisers and abrogating the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between their two countries. Soviet response to the Somali invasion was indeed tremendous. It is estimated that in November 1977 the USSR transported over one billion dollars worth of arms, about 12,000 Cuban combat troops from Angola and Cuba, and about 1,500 Soviet military advisers to Ethiopia.2^ Another massive flow of arms from the USSR, by air and sea, reached Ethiopia in December 1977. This was complemented by about 1000 military experts from the Warsaw Pact under the command of General Petrov, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces. Earlier in the year, as part of Moscow's collaborative and coordinated effort with its allies, General Arnaldo Ochoa, Cuba's Deputy Minister of Defense, brought about 200 Cuban advisers and instructors to Addis Ababa to instruct the Ethiopians on how to operate the Soviet weapons.30 A further 20,000 Cuban troops were flown in to help the Ethiopian government combat the Somali incursions 3 1 Security advisers from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also took up the operation of the Dergue's internal security system and the training of Soviet-equipped People's Militia for house-to-house combat. To coordinate and regulate these operations, the USSR launched a military communications satellite, Cosmos 964. 57 The coordinated onslaught against Somalia by the socialist fraternity, under Soviet direction, is particularly revealed in the operation and composition of the Special Defense Committee or War Council established in Ethiopia. It consisted of eight Russians, four Ethiopians and three Cubans, and served as the 'think-tank' for the military operations in the Ogaden. This large scale Soviet intervention in the conflict changed the fate of the belligerents. Together with Cuban combat troops in the frontline, the Ethiopian Army repelled the Somali advancement and subsequently routed the invading forces. Siad Barre was compelled to announce the withdrawal of his forces in March 1978. It is revealing to note that the combined pro-Ethiopian forces were under the command of General Petrov. The Soviet intervention in this conflict and its propping up of the Mengistu government did not cease with the formal ending of the Ogaden war. It continued far into the next decade and was instrumental in giving Ethiopia the upper hand in subsequent clashes with Somalia. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the USSR expended about $7 billion worth of military aid to Ethiopia between 1978 and 1987.-*-* Consequently, Ethiopia's army became the largest and best-equipped in sub-Saharan Africa. Addis Ababa, by the end of 1987 had the support of between 1,200 and 1,400 Soviet military advisers, 4,000 Cuban troops and 300 East German advisers stationed on its soil.-*^ Background to the Eritrean Conflict and Soviet Intervention Following the 1941 defeat of Italy in the Horn of Africa by the British, Italy's colony of Eritrea was placed under a British provisional administration. Subsequently, in 1950 the United Nations mooted the idea that Eritrea become a federated state within the Ethiopian empire. The Soviet Union, however, opposed this idea and called instead for complete Eritrean independence: 58 The USSR has consistently supported the proposal that Eritrea should be granted independence and has continued to do so.... We base our argument on the fact that all peoples have a right to self-determination and national independence. The U N must take a decision which will satisfy the longing of the Eritrean people for independence and freedom from national aggression. ^ The Soviet delegate to the U N further asked: How is it possible to talk about compromise if it has been adopted without the consent of the concerned people, i.e., without the participation of the Eritrean people?3" Soviet opposition notwithstanding, the 'federal' idea was implemented on September 11, 1952. It must be remarked that at this time Haile Selassie was a strong ally of the US and this configuration of alliances partly explains the Soviet position, meant to deny Ethiopia, and consequently the US, any influence in Eritrea. A decade later, through the machinations and intimidation of the Ethiopian government, the Eritrean Assembly voted to end the federation and for the incorporation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian empire. ' This decision drew the disapproval of a number of Eritreans and almost immediately the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had been established in September 1961 to resist Ethiopian domination, launched the war for independence. The Soviets supported the ELF's aspirations through the 1960s into the early 1970s, albeit largely through third parties. They refrained from openly and directly arming the Eritreans because of the lack of support for the secessionist movement in Black Africa. Surrogates like Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Cuba, Somalia and South Yemen were nevertheless encouraged by the Kremlin to provide assistance to the organization. ° With the establishment of a friendly regime in Addis Ababa after the 1974 coup, however, Moscow wanted to avoid a clash between the secessionists and the government. It, therefore, proposed a political rather than a military solution to the conflict that would result in Eritrea becoming a federal state enjoying political, 59 cultural and administrative autonomy within Ethiopia — a proposal it had rejected since the 1950s. These efforts were stalled following the assassination of General Aman, the PMAC leader, who was understanding of and receptive to Eritrean desires. Mengistu's Dergue adopted a military approach to settle the nationalities issue in Eritrea. In November 1974 it stationed an extra 5,000 troops in the province to crush any insurrection. This led to an escalation of the conflict. The E L F and the breakaway Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF) attracted a lot of support from such Red Sea and Persian Gulf states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and Kuwait. The flow of military assistance from these sources enhanced their capacity for intensive conventional combat with government troops. The liberation movements thus rejected the Dergue's nine-point plan, which promised immediate autonomy to the people of the Eritrean administrative region, insisting on the recognition of their right to self-determination. The plan was condemned as a hoax. Between 1974 and 1977, the EPLF took control of almost the whole territory under dispute, repelling Ethiopian government troops' counter-offensives on three occasions/9 An Eritrean victory looked imminent. In the circumstances Moscow changed its perceptions of the liberation struggle that it had supported, at least diplomatically, for many years. The liberation movement was now conceived of and portrayed as a reactionary force trying to derail the progressive accomplishments of the Marxist government. The US was accused of manipulating the organization for its own imperialist ends: Now when a national democratic revolution is taking place in Ethiopia, bringing with it fundamental social and economic transformations, the US is interested in the converse, i.e., in weakening and dismembering of revolutionary Ethiopia. For this reason, American diplomacy is encouraging internal counterrevolutionaries composed of monarchists, feudal lords, reactionary tribal leaders and separatists of all types . . . to take advantage of this difficult situation in Ethiopia to realize their great power designs. 60 The Soviet Union reneged on its earlier support for the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination and contended: Scientific socialism has never viewed secession as a political fetish, as an aim in itself, stripped of a class-mindedness and social expediency. Marxist-Leninists emphasize not the close interconnection between the solution of problems of national statehood and the attainment of socialism, but also the point that socialism comes first. Pliable Soviet doctrine was thus interpreted to fit Soviet desires of the time, namely to avert internal strife that could disrupt the smooth functioning of the allied regime in Addis Ababa. It must be noted that these ideological interpretations of the internal situation were, basically, smokescreens to cover the Soviet Union's own pragmatic calculations of the implications of an Eritrean victory for its new investment in the Horn. The fact that the Eritrean liberation movements were receiving support from Arab countries that were American allies caused Moscow some anxiety and apprehension. An Eritrean victory was likely to deprive Moscow of its facilities in Assab and Massawa (located on Eritrean territory) - facilities which gave the Soviet presence in Ethiopia strategic rationality. The effect of these new perspectives on the Eritrean conflict was the unprecedented commitment of arms and manpower by a socialist power to "negate the cause of a revolution which it once supported as a just one."42 Direct Soviet involvement in the conflict intensified by the close of the 1970s when two Soviet generals commanded the operations of government forces and between 150 and 250 Soviet officers were in action on every battlefield.43 The USSR engaged in occasional shelling of EPLF positions from battleships, thereby preventing the movement from taking the port of Massawa. Between 1977 and 1978, for example, when the guerrillas were in control of three fourths of Massawa, two Soviet warships bombarded the Eritrean positions. The early 1982 'Red Star Campaign' against the Eritreans was also orchestrated by Soviet military experts. 61 This upsurge in Soviet involvement changed the overall balance of the war, as the Eritreans could not withstand the tactical sophistication of Soviet officers as well as the increased efficiency of the heavy weapons deployed: Sophisticated intelligence gathering by Soviet-piloted helicopters and MiG jets as well as satellite photographs, provided the Soviet planners with the means to organize the campaign. General Petrov, who ran the successful USSR-backed Ethiopian campaign against Somali forces in the Ogaden . . . was the top commander of the Ethiopian ground forces in the Eritrean campaign, while another Soviet general commanded the Air force. It is interesting to note that the USSR's reversal of policy relating to the Eritrean issue led to a switch in alignment toward Ethiopia by its allies. South Yemen, for example, which had made port faculties available to the EPLF suddenly ceased this privilege and sent a mechanized division of its armed forces to Eritrea to shore up the strength of government forces. Its pilots flew Soviet-supplied MiG fighters, operated tanks and artillery, as well as engaged in reconnaissance missions.4^ Further evidence of support by the socialist fraternity for Addis Ababa, galvanized and coordinated by Moscow, is portrayed by the following revelation: Soviet and East German engineers are believed to have built flanking roads for the Ethiopian tanks to come up behind Eritrean lines. The Eritreans were caught in a pincer thrust by tank forces crewed by Ethiopians and Cubans, supportedby artillery and rocket units operated by East Germans and South Yemenis. " THE ERA OF 'NEW THINKING' Reconceptualization of the Conflict in the Horn and Soviet Involvement The reconsideration of Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts as well as the philosophical and pragmatic reasons undergirding those actions has not spared Moscow's policy toward Ethiopia. Consonant with its policy of seeking peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, the new Kremlin leadership now decries and eschews the use of force as a means of settling disputes in the Horn. While in Addis 62 Ababa, delivering a message from Gorbachev to Mengistu, Karen Brutents expressed the conviction that the way to the elimination of tension in the area in the Horn of Africa lies through solution to the existing problems by political means on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their internal affairs on th£- part of external forces and the development of good neighborly relations. ' Although such Soviet rhetoric is not new and has in the past diverged from practice, subsequent events attest to the relative sincerity of this statement. There is, therefore, a new perspective on the dispute in the region. Rather than consider that hotbed of tension as one pitting ideologically antagonistic forces against each other in a zero-sum game that must be won at all costs, the Kremlin now sees it as an impediment to a common peace necessary for human civilization, thereby requiring joint solution. The Soviets acknowledge that the belligerents are differentiated more along "national, ethnic, tribalist, religious, caste and clientele [lines than by] class character."48 Several factors account for this reorientation of Soviet policy in the Horn, not least of which is the 'new thinking's' perceptions of regional conflicts. With the 'new thinking's' integration of domestic and foreign policy, the Kremlin began to reassess the impact of its Ethiopian policy on the environment within the Soviet Union. It became clear that the involvement in Ethiopia was a heavy burden on the Soviet economy. Between 1978 and 1988, for example, the Soviet Union expended over $7.5 billion in military assistance to Addis Ababa 4 ^ It was thus decided to stop this presumably unviable enterprise. Following the increasing deemphasis of confrontation between East and West, the Kremlin did not see the sense in clinging to this pyrrhic asset in Ethiopia. As the military-strategic essence of propping up Ethiopia receded, it became obvious that this country held no value for the Soviet Union and could only be a liability that must not be entertained: 63 Every Soviet person working in Ethiopia knows that we [Soviets] are unhkely to get anything from this country in exchange for our military assistance. Instead of extensive Soviet involvement in Ethiopia serving as a demonstration of its commitment to that country and thus deterring any American encroachment there, it rather attracted the stationing of a US Rapid Deployment Force in the region. This gave the US the capacity for rapid military intervention. Morover, with the current emphasis on building the economic dimension of its superpower status, the Kremlin was not prepared to engage in an adventure the sustenance of which means more expenditure. In the face of these developments and the Kremlin's conviction that low-intensity conflicts have the potential to evolve into superpower confrontation, Moscow decided to rethink its interventionary activities in the region. It is worth noting that the Horn is an integral part of the global configuration of military forces and any change in this sub-system would have direct repercussions for the overall structure of peace in the larger system. The Soviets thus began to advocate policies that would abort the conditions for any superpower explosion. The new focus in Soviet thinking on the need to elevate 'humanitarianism' above 'expansionism' and ideological victory led to a reevaluation of the conflicts in the Horn. The carnage that the wars brought not only registered their senselessness on the new Kremlin leadership but also embarrassed it in the sense that it was engaged in bringing death, indignity, hunger and privation to ordinary people for whom socialism is supposed to be a liberator and an expeditious path to development. In Gorbachev's opinion: It is immoral to throw hundreds of millions of dollars into the development of homicide Jsic) means when millions starve and are devoid of everyday necessities. This reassessment underlay the reluctance of the Kremlin to continue indefinite military support for Mengistu because there cannot be a separation of 64 defense issues from the political, economic and social challenges facing the country. Gorbachev acknowledges that the Ethiopian people need peace to tap their "broad opportunities [and] to display their constructive potential."^ Unlike the Brezhnev era, when the rnilitary regime in Addis Ababa was held up as a paragon of socialist virtue and practice, the period of the 'new thinking' has produced a new image of the Mengistu government. The Soviet press, which had extolled the military regime in the past, now castigated it as a near-equivalent of Bokassa and Amin in terms of "venality, brutality and irrationality."^3 New Times, for example, describes Ethiopia as engulfed in "an authoritarian model of barrack-type socialism [where] any opposition to the regime was ruthlessly suppressed."^4 These new perspectives on the regime are products of the glasnost characteristic of the 'new thinking'. At a time when Moscow itself was trying to shed these traits, it could not bear the embarrassment and the disaffection of its people and the world by condoning these practices. The revolutionary capabilities of 'democratic revolutionary' military regimes began to be questioned and echoes of Mirsky's arguments of the mid-1970s began to reverberate: To consider the army as the leading force of the anti-capitalist revolution and as the leader of society in the socialist-oriented countries would be a serious error [because] the corporate interests of the privileged military elite make it an opponent of radical trends. •* It also became obvious to Moscow that a military solution to the internal conflicts was a mirage and that rather than cling dogmatically to such an approach, it made more political sense to seek a negotiated settlement. This was explicitly brought to Mengistu's attention. The Ethiopian army was increasingly losing large numbers of tanks to the liberation movements, and a Soviet diplomat even claimed that "the rebels were more efficient in using the Soviet-made arms that they captured from Ethiopian troops than the army."^ 65 The set-backs being experienced by government forces were largely due to the lack of morale and the exhaustion of the conscript and teenage-dominated army. As a rebel division commander asserted: Without troop morale, air and military weapons can't mean anything. A major factor is morale. Theirs [Ethiopian army's] is totally flat, zero. . . . Their new recruits are not well-trained. Even physically, they are underaged, they cannot fight. Olthe 60 POWS taken at the battle last year, 80 % were under the age of 16. ' The government's situation in 1989 was worsened by the fact that, unlike the past where local populations offered only covert aid to the 'rebels', they gave open support. This involved carrying supplies and taking part in ambushes. Government-supplied weapons were turned on its own forces by local people during the Ethiopian army's retreat from Inde Selassie in 1989. Impact of the 'New Thinking'on the Ethiopia-Somali Conflict Following these changes in Soviet conceptions regarding the situation in the Horn, Moscow encouraged talks between Ethiopia and Somalia. The path toward restoration of peaceful relations between the two countries was cleared by Barre's disclosure that Somali-US relations were getting cold and that he was interested in a rapprochement with the USSR. The confluence of the 'new thinking' and the concomitant pressure on Ethiopia to negotiate, plus Somali willingness to improve relations with its former patron, contributed to the January 1986 face-to-face meeting between Mengistu and Barre ~ the first in ten years. The Kremlin was quick to signal its endorsement of the talks aimed at resolving the territorial dispute and called for the speediest establishment of a stable peace and good neighborliness. As a consequence of this meeting, a joint Ethiopia-Somali ministerial committee was set up to work out the modalities for normalizing relations. The committee, however, faced obstacles to its smooth functioning as a result of the 66 Ethiopian insistence that any further discussions should be contingent on Somali acceptance of current internationally recognized borders. The result was the suspension of negotiations and a clash between the armies of the two countries in February 1987. The USSR reacted by employing its leverage over Ethiopia to get it to return to the talks. Mengistu was invited to the Kremlin for 'consultations' in April 1987. During this meeting Gorbachev is reported to have severely criticized the Ethiopian leader for ruining the peace efforts by his diplomatic inflexibility. This pressure to negotiate was sustained, and in July 1987 Karen Brutents delivered a message from Gorbachev telling Mengistu: Improve your relations with your neighbors and persuade them to withdraw support for insurgent movements. Establish peace so you can get on with the task of development. ° Concurrent with these Soviet efforts to inject accommodating attitudes into the Ethiopian leadership, Moscow made diplomatic moves to regain the confidence of Somalia as a non-partisan actor and to encourage it to seek peaceful means of settling the dispute. According to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was intent on shedding 'outdated stereotypes' about Somalia because of the unacceptability of orthodox approaches to national security, with power politics being preferred to sober considerations and political boldness; the old habit of seeking to satisfy one's rights and interests at other people's expense. Thus the foreign ministers of the two countries met in October 1978, in New York, and agreed on the restoration of pre-1977 friendly ties. Another meeting followed in November-December 1986 when a Somali delegation, headed by its foreign minister, visited Moscow at the Soviets' invitation for discussions, including those related to the conflict in the Horn. These persistent efforts notwithstanding, Mengistu did not commit himself to reviving the peace talks until early 1988. This reluctance on his part was, presumably, due to the expansion in the network of its arms suppliers. In late 1987, 67 for example, it signed a new arms and weapons agreement with Yugoslavia. It is also contended that certain hardline, conservative elements in the Soviet political establishment gave Mengistu the impression that the 'new thinking' was just an ephemeral phase in Soviet political history. These elements denounced the portrayal of Ethiopia as militaristic, and considered the 'new thinking' as sacrificing that country to international and regional reaction.6^ In the final analysis, however, Addis Ababa succumbed to compromise with Mogadishu largely as a direct result of the unfavorable military situation on the battlefield, rather than Soviet pressure. Mengistu and Barre held talks in Djibouti in March 1988, and this was followed by a meeting between the Ethiopian foreign minister and the deputy Somali Prime Minister in Mogadishu. The result of the deliberations was a ten-point agreement, signed on April 4, 1988. According to the agreement, the two sides were to restore diplomatic relations; to cease all subversive and destabilizing acts against each other; implement a phased withdrawal of their troops to at least six miles from the extant border; and to exchange prisoners of war. Furthermore they were to eschew force or the threat of its use in settling disputes between them 6 1 Though the terms of this agreement cannot be said to have been fully observed, it was to a large extent honored by the two sides as far as direct confrontation between them was concerned. The peace settlement was received with overwhelming satisfaction in Moscow, which urged mutual cooperation between countries in the Horn for solving perennial problems, such as famine, drought and other calamities. According to Adamishin: Common sense and political realism have triumphed. Military confrontation took too much of the efforts and resources so badly needed for the development of the region. . . . I believe the settlement of the Somalian-Ethiopian conflict to be a good example to follow, not only for that region -for Ethiopia and the Sudan especially ~ but for other hot spots on the 68 continent. Such conflicts ought to be settled in the spirit of new thinking, in keeping with the charter of the Organization of African Unity. 6 2 Although Soviet efforts might not have been the direct propellant of the peace settlement, they did contribute significantly toward it. This was ensured through the restoration of confidence in Somalia regarding Moscow's 'good intentions' and the signals to Ethiopia about the long-term likelihood that continued intransigence might attract Soviet political and economic reprisals. The importance of the Soviet contribution was suggested by Barre who said the "renewal of [Somali] cooperation with the USSR may have shown a positive influence" in the settlement.6** Impact of the 'New Thinking' on the Civil War in Ethiopia The Soviets also showed a practical demonstration of their determination to end the internal strife in Ethiopia. Through private and public pressure, Addis Ababa's major benefactor compelled it to negotiate a resolution of the domestic conflict which Moscow convinced itself was militarily unwinnable. In March 1989, for example, Viktor Chebrikov, former head of the KGB and a Politburo member, was reported to have given Mengistu a 'dressing down' in Addis Ababa. Chebrikov impressed on his host the necessity for using peaceful channels to end the war and for a new attitude toward economic and social problems. This incident drove Mengistu to accede to negotiations with the liberation movements for the first time. 6 4 The efficacy of Soviet pressure is implicitly noted in Mengistu's statement that his government's decision to negotiate was determined in part by its allies' "friendly recommendations and we were convinced of their sincerity and expediency."6*' Convinced that economic development in the Third World was dependent to a large extent on good relations with the West, and that for peace to prevail in the region the US had a prominent role to play, Moscow encouraged its client to 69 improve links with the West, especially the US. This was impressed on Mengistu during a 1988 visit to Moscow because such improvement was deemed necessary for promoting peace and consequently relieving the Soviets of the now unwanted burden of sustaining Ethiopia. This action on the part of the Soviets was part of their larger design to coordinate their diplomacy with Washington in resolving Third World conflicts. The conflict in the Horn assumed an important place in superpower discussions. Following talks between Gorbachev and Bush in June 1990, for example, the US and the USSR announced the success of a joint effort aimed at persuading the Ethiopian government to stop bombing the Eritrean-held port of Massawa so as to enable food aid enter the country. Bush also accepted Gorbachev's proposal to support a U N conference to deliberate on the Ethiopian conflict. These developments opened the way to further negotiations between the government and the EPLF in 1989. The government conceded a number of procedural issues whereas the EPLF accepted the offer of mediation by former US President, Jimmy Carter. Preliminary negotiations were held in Atlanta, in September 1989, and they were followed by another round in Nairobi, in November 1989. Though substantive discussions were scheduled for April 1990, it was obvious that the process was due for a false start because of the unwillingness of either side to compromise on the issue of Eritrean independence. The April discussions were further jolted by the EPLF capture of Massawa in February 1990, which deflated any motivation on the part of the liberation movement to negotiate. This is quite ironic in that at a time the Soviets and others were withdrawing support for the government to make it talk peace, the Eritreans were taking advantage of Addis Ababa's weakening capabilities to chalk up military victory for themselves. 70 In October 1990, two senior US officials met secretly with the government and the Eritrean separatist guerrillas to rejuvenate the peace talks. Following these discussions, Tesfaye Dinka, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, declared that the "two world powers and others could contribute toward peace by helping to break the deadlock and resume the negotiations."*'** Subsequently, Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs met with his Soviet counterpart, Yuri Yakalov, and Moscow agreed to cede the chairmanship of any future mediation efforts to Washington. The Soviet Union contented itself with the role of an observer as was the case with Angola. The two sides further expressed their mutual support for federalism as the answer to conflicts in the region.*'8 Moscow also discussed the peace process with the EPLF in an effort to demonstrate that it was not partisan in its desire for peace. In this vein, Yuri Yakalov met with the Secretary General of the EPLF, Issayas Aferworki, in London in July 1989. This portrayal of sincerity was buttressed by the Soviet declaration that there would be a review of the 1986 arms agreement with Ethiopia. Through such highly-placed officials as its ambassador to Addis Ababa and its Deputy Premier, Anatoly Adamishin, Moscow stated that that agreement will be the "last in its present form and scale. Future arms supplies will be more limited."**8 The USSR had long given indications of such disengagement when Gorbachev told Mengistu: Soviet involvement in Ethiopia Vas a product of Brezhnev's years of stagnation, a period and policies we have broken away from. . . . Our unqualified military and economic commitment cannot continue much further.'69 That such statements were not just mere rhetoric is proved by Soviet actions. In February 1990, at a time when the Ethiopian army was being pushed 71 back from the garrison town of Mekele by the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF), thereby cutting its chain of supply from the capital to Eritrea, the Soviets 70 withheld the ammunition needed to hold on to this strategic town/" Moscow decided to divert the use of its AN-24 transport planes, hitherto used to deploy Ethiopian military units and supplies, to humanitarian purposes such as carting American-supplied sorghum to needy areas. This was at a time when about 120,000 government troops defending Asmara needed 500 tons of military supplies and food 71 a day to sustain their capabilities.'1 Further to the shrinking military supplies, Moscow withdrew its military personnel and advisers from the combat areas of Eritrea and other northern regions of Ethiopia in 1990. They were either sent to Addis Ababa or back to the USSR. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, G.I. Gerasimov rationalized his country's action by arguing: Soviet-Ethiopian military cooperation is aimed at promoting the development of the Ethiopian armed forces for the purpose of repelling outside aggression. Soviet military specialists working in Ethiopia are being used for the same purpose-Naturally, their functions do not include taking part in the internal conflict.' These Soviet actions accentuated the heavy blow that the withdrawal of all Cuban military personnel in 1989 had dealt the Ethiopian government. With Havana's pull-out, which was a manifestation of the world-wide reversal of the socialist community's 'internationalist duty', the Ethiopian army started losing large quantities of its tanks that had been manned by Cubans. The contagion of the 'new thinking' was not lost on the GDR as well. This country, which was responsible for Ethiopia's national security, decided to disengage in 1990, thereby depriving Addis Ababa of advanced expertise and weakening its security apparatus. Also, following Honecker's fall, the GDR announced that it would not supply weapons to Ethiopia 73 anymore.IJ 72 Soviet reassessment of its Ethiopian involvement has not been limited to its military intervention. It has engulfed the economic sphere as well. With a crumbling economy at home, the Kremlin is no longer prepared to engage in ideological philanthropy which would not benefit its economy. Thus, since May 1989, it has sold oil to Ethiopia at world market prices instead of the 20% discount rates that characterized earlier periods.^4 This economic pragmatism has been followed by other East European countries such as Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria and Poland which have ceased providing assistance to Ethiopia on concessionary terms.^ With a defense expenditure of about 60% of GNP in 1988, the withdrawal of these preferential trade practices obviously worsened the already critical economic situation in Ethiopia, resulting in further discontent, disaffection and agitation, the repercussions of which are increased political instability. These developments compelled the government to return to the stalled talks in February 1991. American officials acknowledge that the Ethiopian government's presence was largely due to pressure from the Soviet U n i o n 7 6 The Soviets did not, however, take part in these talks because of deep suspicions by the EPLF which accused them of depriving Eritreans of their independence by supporting the government. Although the Soviet Union played no direct part in the talks, there is no doubt that its actions created the conditions for the peace process to proceed. According to American officials, the significant role being played by the US in the 77 peace process is due to the diminished role of the Soviet Union in the region. During the Cold War era, an American involvement in negotiations within a Soviet sphere of influence would have been unlikely. Furthermore, American involvement was made easier by the waning Marxist ideological fervor of both the EPLF and the TPLF, resulting mainly from the negative reputation that the reform movement in Eastern Europe has carved for 73 that ideology. This loss in socialism's appeal made the movements more amiable towards Washington. As Herman Cohen notes: If this [i.e., the call for negotiations] had happened five years ago, we wouldn't have been involved because in the Cold War, it would have been hard to work with Marxists. . . . Even two years ago it was hard for me to work with SWAPO. TheJrig difference now is that people talk about Marxism and people laugh.' ° Realizing his precarious military situation, Mengistu attempted to save his rule by instituting changes in his government. He dropped hardliners and appointed liberals to influential positions, hoping that this would appease the liberation movements. The National Assembly also passed a peace plan that called for a transitional government, legal guarantees for opposition parties to operate, and a total amnesty for all political prisoners and refugees. This package did not, however, satisfy the guerrillas, who pressed on with their encroachment on government-held areas. By May 1991, it was obvious that the liberation fighters would soon capture the capital. The US then struck a deal with Zimbabwe to offer asylum to Mengistu, while Lt. Gen. Tesfaye Gebre Kidan was appointed acting president. This plan, it was hoped, would promote the peace process since Mengistu, who was considered the main obstacle to peace, had been replaced by a liberal. This aim was not achieved since the liberation movements wanted to remove all vestiges of the Addis Ababa government irrespective of any changes in leadership. They pressed on and the capital eventually fell to the Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), dominated by the TPLF. CONCLUSION The preceding discussion shows that the 'new thinking' promoted a review of Soviet policy in Ethiopia that led to the debilitation of the Mengistu government and its consequent overthrow. 74 The restoration of peace between Somalia and Ethiopia was promoted at a faster rate than was the case with the internal conflict. The former case was, presumably, due to the desire of the two governments to do away with any external threats that could worsen their ability to deal with escalating destabilization by internal anti-government forces. National reconciliation was delayed because of Mengistu's reluctance to heed Moscow's call for negotiations with the internal liberation movements. By the time he was ready to talk, the reduced Soviet support for him had weakened his forces and given the rebels the military advantage which made them more inclined to a military, rather than a political, solution. As Girma Beshah, Mengistu's English-language interpreter lamented, the military success of the guerrillas was due to the fact that Mengistu obstinately resisted the plans of Gorbachev to follow perestroika and make peace with the northern separatist guerrillas. "He [Mengistu] listened to Erich Honecker's speeches instead about hoWjthe Soviet experience wasn't relevant to the German Democratic Republic. Trickles of military support from Israel and North Korea, as well as encouragement from conservative politicians in the USSR, also goaded him to resist initiating any peace efforts until it was too late. This delay in reaching a negotiated settlement of the internal conflict need not be blamed only on the Ethiopian government, at least before 1988, but also on the Soviets. Presumably, the Soviets were uncertain about prospects for genuine superpower rapprochement and hence the wisdom of abandoning their facilities in Ethiopia, until sometime in 1988 when the demise of the Cold War seemed clear. In fact, when Reagan raised the possibility of talks over Ethiopia during the 1988 summit in Moscow, Gorbachev was reported to have brushed aside the issue." The Soviet pressure on its client to negotiate did not mean it was totally abandoning it. According to US sources, the USSR continued to give Addis Ababa 81 $750 million in annual military aid even though it had substantially cut its support. 75 This continued support, which might have been in keeping with the 1986 arms agreement between the two countries, must have created doubts among the guerrilla groups about Soviet credibility as far as peace was concerned. This might explain their preference for military rather than diplomatic means of resolving the conflict when the battlefield balance was in their favor. They could not guarantee that the Soviet efforts were not tactical gimmicks. All these circumstances notwithstanding, it is indisputable that the 'new thinking' did eventually contribute to the peace process through the various doctrinal and practical reformulations of Soviet foreign policy toward Ethiopia. It is my contention that notwithstanding the important implications of other conditions for Moscow's reassesment of its role in the Horn (such as the US's stationing of a Rapid Deployment Force in the region), their impact on Soviet foreign policy review might not have been felt if the 'new thinking' had not emerged. After all, similar circumstances (e.g., US support for Somalia and a favorable military balance for the liberation movements) had prevailed at one time or the other since the Soviet Union intervened in the Horn and yet they caused no policy reverses. 76 REFERENCES 1. Y.P. Davidov, V. Zhurkin, and V.S Rudnev, eds, Doktrina Niksona, cited in Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 84. 2. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Indian Ocean in the Plans of Imperialism," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 (1974), p. 117. 3. Colin Legum, "USSR Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Andrej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds. The Soviet Union and the Third World - The Last Three Decades (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 240. 4. Paul B. Henze, "Getting a Grip on the Horn," in Walter Laqueur, ed. The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the World (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 168. 5. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 140. 6. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 416. 7. Donald Petterson, "Ethiopia Abandoned? An American Perspective," International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 627-645. 8. Africa Research Bulletin. April 1976, pp. 3391-2. 9. Bethanu Bayeh, "From Federalism to People's Democracy," World Marxist Review, no. 8 (1976), p. 38. 10. USSR government statement of April 1976, cited in Legum, "USSR Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 241. 11. G. Mirskiy, "Developing Countries: the Army and Society," New Times, no. 48 (1969), cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 77. 12. R.E. Sevortyan, Armiya v Politicheskom Rezhime Stran Sovremenogo Vostoka, cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 77. 13. Moscow Radio, October 5 1974, cited in Patman, The USSR in the Horn of Africa, p. 151. 14. Moscow Radio, December 18 1974, cited in Patman, The USSR in the Horn of Africa, p. 163. 15. New Times, no. 30, July, 1976, p. 16. 16. Washington Post. March 5, 1978. 17. Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 107. 18. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Rex Collings, 1977), p. 94. 77 19. E. Sherr, "Novyye rubezhi Somali," cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 197. 20. Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, p. 83. 21. Siad Barre, cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 210. 22. See G. Galperin, "Ethiopia: Some Aspects of the Nationalities' Question," The African Communist, vol. 83, (4th Quarter, 1980), pp. 53-61. 23. B. Bayeh, "The Ethiopian Revolution: A Hard Period," World Marxist Review. no. 4 (April 1978), p. 55. 24. S. Sergeyev, "Ethiopia Starts a New Life," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5 (May 197)9, p. 16. 25. V. Sofinsky, "Somalia on the Path of Progress," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 (November 1974), p. 65. 26. V. Kudryavtsev, "Dark Spots on the Globe," cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 226. 27. Pravda. Jan. 22, 1978, p. 3. 28. New York Times. July 19,1977, p. 7. 29. Dmitri K. Simes, "Imperial Globalism in the Making: Soviet Involvement in the Horn of Africa," The Washington Review [Special Supplement]. (May 1978), p. 35. 30. M. Ottaway and D. Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire and Revolution (New York: Africana, 1978), p. 168. 31. Legum, "USSR Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 241. 32. Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea, A Pawn in World Politics (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991), p. 250. 33. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 259. 34. Christopher Clapham, Transformation in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 229. 35. Cited in James Firebrace and Stuart Holland, Never Kneel Down (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), p. 48. 36. Lars Bondestam, "External Involvement in Ethiopia and Eritrea," in Basil Davidson, L. Cliffe and B.H. Selassie, eds., Behind the War in Eritrea (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), p. 66. 37. For details on this see J. Firebrace and S. Holland, Never Kneel Down, pp. 20-22. 38. Yohannes, Eritrea - A Pawn in World Politics, p. 248. 78 39. Dan Connell, "The Changing Situation in Eritrea," in Behind the War in Eritrea, p. 56. 40. V. Krudryavtsev, cited in Neil S. MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security," in Kurt Campbell and N.S. MacFarlane, eds, Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 7. 41. G. Galperin, "Ethiopia: Some Aspects of the Nationalities' Question," p. 57. 42. Bereket Habte Selassie, "From British Rule to Federation and Annexation," in Behind the War in Eritrea, p. 46. 43. Connell, "The Changing Situation in Eritrea," p. 56. 44. Ibid. 45. Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 90. 46. Ibid, p. 93. 47. Cited in Mark Katz, "The Evolution of the Brezhnev Doctrine Under Gorbachev," in Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas, p. 54. 48. "Revolution and Reform in the National Development of Eastern Countries," Asia and Africa Today, no. 1 (1986), p. 58. 49. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 298. 50. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 42, no. 13. (1990), p. 32. 51. Cited in M. Volkov, "Militarization versus Development," Asia and Africa Today, no. 5 (1987), p. 9. 52. Cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 290. 53. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's "New Political Thinking' and Foreign Policy," in J. Valenta and F. Cibulka, eds, Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 38. 54. African Recorder, vol. 29, no. 5 (1990), p. 8041. 55. Cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 285. 56. New York Times. May 21, 1989, p. 9. 57. New York Times. February 24, 1999, p. A15 58. Cited in Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 291. 59. Interview with Gorbachev, New Times, no. 22 (May 198)8, p. 7. 60. New Times, no. 11 (1987), pp. 16-17. 79 61. African Research Bulletin (May 1987), p. 8837. 62. Interview with A. Adamishin, New Times, no. 21 (1988), p. 19. 63. Pravda. June 27,1988, p. 7. 64. New York Times. March 22,1989, p. 1. 65. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 41, no. 30 (1989), p. 30. 66. African Confidential, vol. 31, no. 21 (1990), p. 8. 67. African Confidential, vol. 31, no. 35 (1990), p. 7. 68. African Confidential, vol. 29, no. 13 (1988), p. 2. 69. African Confidential, vol. 30, no. 4 (1985), p. 4. 70. The African Review, 1990 (Edison, N.J.: Hunter Publishing Inc.), p. 85. 71. New York Times. July 21, 1990, p. 1. 72. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 42, no. 6, 1990, p. 24. 73. African Recorder, vol. 29, no. 5, p. 8048. 74. African Confidential, vol. 32, no. 2 (1991), p. 3. 75. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 42, no. 13 (1990), p. 32. 76. New York Times. Jan. 30,1991, p. A2. 77. New York Times. May 26, 1991, p. 6. 78. New York Times. May 31, 1991, p. A6. 79. New York Times. June 7, 1991, p. A4. 80. Colin Legum, "Africa After Gorbachev's Rise to Power: Angola and Ethiopia," in J. Valenta and F. Cibulka, eds., Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts, p. 167. 81. New York Times. Oct. 24, 1990, p. A9. 80 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION The purpose of this work was to determine what policy changes have taken place in the Soviet Union's involvement in the two regional conflicts studied and to assess their impact on the wars. An attempt has been made to address that in the preceding two chapters. In this section, I will try to compare Soviet policy toward the regional conflicts to determine whether they were consistently and uniformly applied to the two cases or not. A comparative look will also be taken at the impact of the policies on the various actors as well as on the conflicts themselves. Finally, the study will delve into the prospects for Soviet involvement in Third World regional conflicts. It was evident from the case studies that Moscow did indeed review its relations with the belligerents in the various conflicts. To a large extent, the reasons underlying this new behavior in Soviet policy were the same. These included the 'new thinking's' orientation toward demilitarization of regional conflicts and the search for political solutions to them; the secularization or deideologization of interstate relations; emphasis on mutually beneficial alliances; and avoidance of superpower confrontation. Soviet actions in the two areas very much parallel each other. As far as the external conflicts are concerned, the initiatives were taken by the belligerents and then supported and promoted by the USSR. The resolution of the internal conflict in Angola was, however, largely initiated by African leaders whereas peace negotiations regarding the domestic strife in Ethiopia were due to circumstances emanating mainly from Soviet pressure. The Soviet Union not only firmly exerted pressure on its allies in the two regions to compel them to pursue peaceful resolution of the disputes, but it also 81 extended gestures of goodwill to the other factions to induce in them trust and hence predispose them to negotiations. The post-1988 period saw the discussion of both conflicts at the superpower level ~ a major departure from earlier Soviet practice — thereby giving them the salience and urgency needed to attract the US-Soviet cooperation necessary for promoting negotiated settlements. Moscow and Washington also made provision for U N participation in both the Southern African and intra-Ethiopian peace processes. However, the world body could not play any substantive role in the latter case because of the inability of initial negotiations to promote conditions for a truce of the type that happened in Angola which would allow for U N participation. In the two situations, the Soviets encouraged their allies to pursue peace and buttressed this by practical actions, such as troop withdrawals and the cutting down of military assistance. Not only did they cut down on logistical and manpower supplies to the clients, but they also severely criticized the clients for any action on their part that was likely to jeopardize the peace process. In both cases, Moscow did not play a direct role in the negotiations aimed at achieving peace. It did, nevertheless, take part in the Southern African negotiations as an observer, whereas its role in the Horn was limited to a "backroom . . . [one of] supporting and encouraging political solutions to the conflicts but not participating in the negotiations."1 It must be noted though that the Soviet application of the 'new thinking' regarding these two regional conflicts took place in two stages. The first stage which can be dubbed 'the era of rhetorical gimmicks' stretched from 1985 to early 1988. During this period the USSR's profession of the 'new thinking' was not backed with practical manifestations of the new foreign policy prescriptions. In both cases, therefore, there were no serious and measurable indications of Soviet retrenchment and disengagement. 82 The West, hence, just viewed the new foreign policy construct with cautious optimism ~ a kind of Svait and see' attitude. There was still no certainty as to whether the prevailing reassessments of the Brezhnev doctrine were tactical machinations or genuine efforts to build a new global order. The same skepticism was at play within factions fighting the pro-Soviet regimes. This attitude did not engender the kind of reciprocity that would have paved the way for a negotiated settlement of the conflicts before 1988. It was during the second period (i.e., since 1988) that the genuineness and reality of the structural changes enshrined in the 'new thinking' began to be seen in the USSR's policies toward Third World conflicts. It could thus be said that the first period represented a change in style and tactics, whereas the post-1988 period showed changes at the strategic level. It can presumably be inferred from the preceding discussions that similar policy tools were applied in the Soviet Union's attempt to promote the resolution of the conflicts in the Horn and Southern Africa. The question then is: Why did the efforts fail to produce a settlement of the internal conflict in Ethiopia as they did with the other disputes? Whereas the MPLA was more receptive to Soviet requests and pressures for peace, the Mengistu regime proved more reluctant and adamant. The receptivity of the Angolans promoted an attitude of flexibility and compromise that promoted a deescalation of the conflict with South Africa and, eventually, with UNITA. Mengistu's recalcitrance, however, frustrated the peace process and this accounted for the violent, rather than peaceful, resolution of the internal conflict in Ethiopia. In fact, a similar attitude delayed negotiations with Somalia and thus the settlement of the external conflict. This difference in client response to Soviet pressure is presumably due to the varying perceptions of the 'new thinking' held by the MPLA government and the 83 Dergue. It was probably obvious to the Angolans that in the prevailing circumstances of 'new thinking' and collapsing politico-economic organization in the USSR, they were not likely to enjoy the same level of assistance from their patron that they had in the past. This was especially so since the Southern African region no longer held the same strategic value to the USSR that it did previously. It was thus prudent to resolve the conflict in conditions of continued, albeit limited, Soviet support. It was better to do this than to wait until the inevitable time when the cessation of further Soviet assistance, in the face of continued US and South African support for UNITA, would leave the MPLA defeated and bereft of any concessions it would otherwise have gained through negotiations. It was also clear to Luanda that in the absence of Soviet support, partly expressed through Cuban combat forces, the Angolan forces would be no match for the South African forces. Mengistu, on the other hand, did not seem to envisage that the Soviets would withdraw support for his government. He seemed to believe, as did a lot of analysts before the 1989 collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and indubitable superpower rapprochement, that the profession of 'new thinking' was a tactical hoax. The new trends in Soviet foreign policy were viewed as reminiscent of periods in East-West detente when the Soviet Union had used advocacy and pursuance of 'peaceful coexistence' as a 'breathing space' to strengthen itself. This perception of the situation was boosted by the encouragement that Mengistu received from conservative elements in the Soviet political establishment who portrayed the 'new thinking' as a fleeting tactical construct. Furthermore, the Angolan government had no other place to turn to for military assistance to pursue the war. It could not expect any such assistance from the West, which was seeking its demise, and the socialist community, entangled in political and economic trouble, was no longer prepared to shoulder any such 84 burden. The best option, in the circumstances, seemed to be the pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. Unlike the Angolans, however, the Ethiopian government still had other sources of military support it counted on. At a time when the Soviets were disengaging, the North Koreans were resolutely training and providing equipment to the Ethiopian army. As part of the deal to get Ethiopian Jews into Israel, Tel Aviv also provided Mengistu with weapons, including cluster bombs, that added to his optimism that he could gain a military victory over the liberation movements, thereby defusing any motivation for a political settlement of the conflict. Moreover, the Ethiopian government probably did not believe the Soviets could suddenly do without their facilities in the country. Moscow and Addis Ababa seemed to perceive the strategic value of Ethiopia differently in the era of 'new thinking'. Mengistu, convinced that his country still held tremendous strategic value for the Soviets presumably thought he could use that value as a leverage against the Soviets to make them maintain their support for his regime. He was, thus, not sensitive to Soviet pressures and signals of intended economic and military retrenchment. Unfortunately for him, as superpower relations thawed, the Soviets had a waning interest in Ethiopia as a vital ingredient in strategic calculations. Angola, which together with Mozambique had long resisted Soviet requests for surface or submarine naval bases, had no similar bargaining chip to manipulate and so did not commit the same mistake. It seems reasonable to argue that the Soviets contributed to the above conviction on the part of the Ethiopian government by their ambiguous actions. It appears to me that in the condition of uncertainty as to whether the end of the Cold War was realizable or not, Moscow was not prepared to suddenly abandon an important strategic asset as Ethiopia. It thus continued to prop up the regime militarily. This simultaneous practice of continuing modest military support while 85 advocating negotiation of the conflict might have given Mengistu the impression that Gorbachev's rhetoric was not to be taken seriously. This impression must have been rationalized by Soviet practice in other Third World conflicts such as Afghanistan and Cambodia. The observation from these conflicts, as of 1988, was that in situations where Gorbachev inherited commitments, the USSR had persevered and even stepped up its military support slightly.4 Analysis of Soviet disengagement from the two conflicts indicates that while Moscow was intent on achieving peace, it was not prepared to leave its clients in the lurch. Angola and Ethiopia, therefore, continued to enjoy some level of Soviet military support even while negotiations were going on. Moscow's behavior appears to be an effort to prevent a military defeat of its allies that will be a catastrophic blow to its prestige, image and credibility as a superpower. While socialism could bear the defeat of a Marxist regime by 'external aggressors,' as was construed to be the case in Granada, it could not bear the embarrassment of being vanquished by internal anti-communist forces. As Seiler correctly states: Recent Soviet doctrine argues that Western capitalism may have an inevitable role in the development of new states. But there is not yet a Soviet doctrine to rationalize a military defeat and political counterrevolution in a state to which Moscow has committed itself so extensively. Angola used continued military assistance as a bargaining chip to gain acceptance of some of its points of view by the adversary. Ethiopia, however, saw it as an indication of superior military capability that could be used to rout the enemy. By the time it realized that such assistance could not ensure victory for it, the enemy had gained the upper hand and the result was defeat for the government. The Soviet efforts toward a negotiated settlement of the Southern African conflict appears to have been pursued with more relish than that in the Horn. This difference in approach seems explicable in terms of the fact that continued Soviet involvement in Angola was predominantly premised on ideological considerations 86 rather than on defense or security interests. With deideologization of foreign policy, it was easier for Moscow to dispense with such an ally. The spread of socialism in the Southern African region was now a mirage, since most of the countries in the area had been deeply engraved into the capitalist economic system and such pro-socialist ones like Angola and Mozambique were moving fast into the capitalist camp. In these circumstances, where the USSR had no ideological gain to make and no serious security interest to compromise, it was easy to disengage. Ethiopia, on the other hand, had significant relevance for Soviet national security, which was vulnerable to the American fleet in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, until the end of the Cold War became obvious in 1989-1990. Soviet moves toward a negotiated peace in Southern Africa were quicker and firmer than those related to Ethiopia partly because the battlefield situation in the former case became.tougher for the MPLA at an earlier period (1987) than it did for the Ethiopian government (1989). With a combined South African and UNITA force (galvanized by US military support) confronting the MPLA, it became obvious to the Soviet Union that a military victory was impossible. It was thus compelled by the unfavorable military balance to seek and encourage a political settlement to the conflict. Initiatives toward an internal peace in Ethiopia seem to have been delayed presumably because the Soviet Union did not envisage an imminent defeat of its ally until 1989. Thus, while calling for a peaceful settlement of the internal conflict, Moscow did not bring any significant pressure to bear on Mengistu. It was only after 1989, when the 'rebel' forces looked capable of causing military havoc, that the Kremlin accelerated moves to resolve the conflict peacefully and backed these moves with consequential action such as troop withdrawal, cuts in logistic supply, etc. 87 It can be inferred then that although the USSR is seeking peaceful solutions to regional conflicts in which it is involved, its efforts in that direction assume an accelerated character only in circumstances where it was obvious that its client might suffer a humiliating defeat. The Afghan peace settlement is evidence of this kind of behavior. The USSR's expeditious pursuit of peace within Angola could be attributed to the fact that the UNITA forces had firm US backing. This exposed any further Soviet involvement in that conflict to a likely confrontation between the superpowers. It thus seemed expedient to take measures to forestall any such occurrence which was also likely to drain Soviet resources further. In Ethiopia, however, the likelihood of the internal confrontation degenerating into superpower collision appeared remote because the anti-government forces, due to their Marxist trappings, had no links with the US. There was, therefore, less urgency to deal with the Ethiopian case. Furthermore, because the superpowers had leverage over the belligerents in the Angolan conflict, it was easy for them to control the behavior of the latter and make them take measures consonant with the new spirit of superpower cooperation. The Ethiopian 'rebels' did not come under the control of any superpower that could force them to reciprocate any actions taken by the government under Soviet pressure. They therefore handled the whole situation at their own pace and convenience without much external pressure. The anti-Marxist forces in the Southern African conflict as well as Somalia accorded the Soviet peace overtures a lot more credibility than did the anti-government forces within Ethiopia. Using an analysis based on the mediated stimulus-response model of conflict decision making, it seems that UNITA, South Africa and Somalia tended to perceive Soviet and allied actions correctly and responded at appropriate levels that helped to resolve the conflicts. The liberation 88 movements within Ethiopia were, however, skeptical about those overtures and so proved less flexible in the negotiations. This obduracy is partly due to the mid-1970s Soviet betrayal of the cause of self-determination being pursued by the liberation movements. Soviet efforts in Angola were reinforced by the reform-minded posture of the MPLA. Luanda's realization of the failure of socialism and the need to reform its Marxist-Lemmst socio-economic and political structures dove-tailed with Moscow's own position on perestroika, glasnost and 'new thinking'. This coincidence of perspectives promoted mutual cooperation toward the resolution of a conflict that was considered an impediment to reform and national development. Mengistu was, however, less amenable to reform and compromise and stuck to conservative socialist thought which underwent only superficial changes after he abandoned Marxism-leninism in March 1990. This clash of orientations between Addis Ababa and Moscow constrained the understanding and cooperation needed to work toward peace. It was easier for the external conflicts in the two regions to be settled than the internal ones. It appears to me that a major reason for this was the positive support given Soviet efforts by the desires of the various governments. The Angolan, Ethiopian, Somali and South African governments were all desirous of ending the external feuds and concentrating on dealing with internal destabilization and dissention. Whereas the MPLA was battling UNITA, Pretoria had to contend with intensified military activity by the national liberation movements in the country. In the Horn, the Barre and Mengistu regimes were also engaged in fighting with numerous opposition forces. In the circumstances, they felt more inclined toward consolidating their internal positions, on which their political survival depended, and avoiding external confrontations. 89 In the case of Southern Africa, the Namibian independence issue and its linkage to the Angolan-South African conflict helped achieve the external settlement. The desire of the international community to see Namibia independent imposed a lot of pressure on the belligerents to agree to peace. In their battle-weary situations these pressures proved consequential. The foregoing analysis of the impact of the 'new thinking' on the two regional conflicts shows that the foreign policy reforms have caused significant reverses in Soviet intervention in those regions. It is clear, however, that the USSR, while attempting to apply similar policy instruments to the two cases, was quite selective in terms of policy detail and the timing of their application. Implications for Soviet Third World Policy An in-depth look at the evolution of Soviet involvement in the two regional conflicts studied brings to the fore a certain trend in Soviet Third World policy which provides some insight into its future relations with the South. There can be no definite assertion that a total reversion to past Soviet expansionist tendencies is impossible, because of the continuing undercurrents of disagreement between reformers and conservatives in that country concerning the retrenchment of its power capabilities abroad. Nevertheless there are certain objective conditions at play that militate against the revival of extensive Soviet involvement with radical Marxist regimes as well as revolutionary and liberation movements in the Third World. • The claim in an article in New Times that "the Soviet Union has successfully abandoned the idea of building socialism in the African jungles"6 seems to encapsulate future Soviet attitude toward the Third World as a whole. It is quite obvious that the political terrain in the developing world does not provide the conditions for Marxist 'revolutions' of the type that appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. 90 Colonialism, which provided the moral ammunition for nationalist movements to turn toward the socialist model of development, is no longer an issue of consequence as the 1990s unfold. As noted by Izyumov and Kortunov: The success of our [Soviet] foreign policy in the developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s were only partially due to the dynamic growth of the Soviet economy. A much more important role was played by the surge of the national liberation movement, as well as by the attractiveness of Marxist-Leninist ideology and direct military aid to the fighting peoples.' Furthermore, socialism as a model of development has lost its appeal to the peoples of the Third World. The decrepit state of the Soviet economy, in particular, and of socialist-oriented economies, in general, vis-a-vis the relatively better performance of newly industrialized countries (based on the capitalist model) has had a "negative impact... on the international prestige of Marxist ideology and the orientation and influence of the communist and national democratic movements in other countries."8 The tendency in the developing world is now toward market economies and democratization which are not conducive for the emergence of Marxist-Leninist movements and regimes that the USSR could support. As Soviet scholars lament: The majority of developing countries are already professing, or leaning to, the Western model of development and^econd, they are suffering not so much from capitalism as from its shortage. The current desperate economic situation of the USSR and its potential dependence on the West for revamping the economy make it unlikely that it would engage in any extensive support for Marxist regimes in the Third World. This is because the repercussions of such an action would be the withdrawal of any intended economic assistance from the West ~ a privilege the Soviets will not want to lose. The Soviets are not likely to sacrifice their own economic salvation for some Third World adventure which may not even yield any benefits to it. As Kozyrev complains: 91 Our direct or indirect entanglement in regional conflicts brings about enormous losses, exacerbating overall international tensions, justifying the arms race and hampering mutually beneficial economic ties with the West. u Furthermore, the fragmentation of the political structure of the USSR has become an issue of great urgency and seriousness with far-reaching implications for the country's existence. In this situation, the Soviet Union is likely, at least in the foreseeable future, to be more of an introvert. Even a conservative government in the Soviet Union is more likely to emphasize internal stability and unity rather than seek foreign laurels in the Third World. After all, for the USSR to maintain an effective and credible power projection capability in the Third World, it needs an internally secure political base. Malashenko's observation in this regard is very relevant: The elimination of . . . [the internal deformations of socialism] and the radical restructuring of socialist society are the most important factors in strengthening national security. The current emphasis on cost-benefit analysis in Soviet relations with the Third World is now an established phenomenon in Soviet foreign policy that is likely to be sustained. Alliances based merely on ideological affinity with the USSR are not likely to endure in the foreseeable future. An examination of current Soviet ties with Third World Marxist states such as Cuba and Mongolia indicates the veracity of this assertion. Until January 1991, Cuba paid 168 roubles a ton (based on the average world price of the previous five years) for the 13 million tons of Soviet oil it bought a year for the 1986-1990 period. 1 2 This below-world-market price enabled Cuba to sell excess oil from this quota at world market prices, earning $600 million in 1985.13 Now, however, it has to pay the current world market price for Soviet-supplied oil which has been slashed to 10 million tons a year. This year, the Soviets have also decided to buy less than the 4.5 million tons of Cuban sugar they used to 92 purchase a year, although at a slightly higher price than the 500 dollars a ton price set by the US for sugar purchases from Latin America/ 4 In Mongolia, the Soviet Union cut oil supplies by nearly half in 1990, whilst its investment in that country is to be limited to 200 million roubles in 1991-1992, compared to 480 million roubles in 1989 and 450 million in 1990.15 If these acknowledged socialist countries with a clear strategic value for the USSR (Mongolia because of its location at the periphery of the Soviet Union and Cuba because of its proximity to the US) can be denied Soviet largesse in the name of economic pragmatism, it is obvious that radical regimes and movements in other areas of the Third World with no such value, such as in Africa, cannot expect the USSR to intervene on their behalf in the name of socialist 'internationalist duty.' The Soviet Union is now giving high priority to mutually beneficial relations with Third World states based on "economic expediency, not ideological and political preferences."16 With these changing priorities, Soviet leaders will seek to expand ties with the newly industrialized economies of Southeast Asia, Brazil, Indonesia, etc., from which they can derive economic opportunities, rather than get entangled in unrewarding conflicts. After all the USSR's interests lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries. The genuine interest lay in ensuring a favorable international situation for profound, transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and socio-political system.1' It seems improbable, nevertheless, that the Soviet Union will abandon all its Third World commitments. It is likely to continue to maintain some level of intervention in those areas that are near its borders or that are critical to the balance of power between East and West such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. 93 REFERENCES 1. Margot Light, "Soviet Policy in the Third World," International Affairs. (April) 1991, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 276. 2. Ibid, pp. 271-279. 3. Africa Confidential. 1990, vol. 31, no. 16, p. 8. 4. Kurt Campbell, "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique," in Kurt M. Campbell and S. Neil MacFarlane, eds, Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London, New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 230. 5. John Seiler, "Soviet Prospects in Southern Africa: Great Opportunity or Growing Frustration?," in Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E . Kanet, eds. The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 374. 6. Evgeny Rusakov, "Wither Runs the Soviet Locomotive," New Times, no. 5 (1991), p. 28. 7. Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov, "The Soviet Union in the Changing World," International Affairs (Moscow) 1988, no. 8, p. 48. 8. Ibid. 9. Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 (1988), p. 6. 10. Ibid, p. 8. 11. Igor Malashenko, "The Country's Interest: Imaginary and Real," Kommunist. no. 13 (1989), as translated in Joint Publication Research Service, Kommunist. no. 13 (1989), p. 78. 12. New Times. 1991, no. 5, p. 30. 13. Background Brief (Ottawa: British Information Services), April 1991, p. 4. 14. New Times. 1991, no. 5, p. 30. 15. Background Brief [Ottawa: British Information Services], (April 1991), p. 5. 16. Andrei Kolosov, "Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5 (1990), p. 41. 17. Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations," Literaturnaya Gazeta. May 18, 1988, as translated in F.B.I.S, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 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