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The process and level of military intervention in the states of tropical Africa, 1960-1971 1973

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c. f THE PROCESS AND LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA, 1960-1971 by DANIEL LATOUCHE Bacc. , Sc. S o c , Un i v e r s i t e de Montreal, 1964 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department, of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OT BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1973 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ( i ) ABSTRACT THE PROCESS AND LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA, 1960-71 by Daniel Latouche Chairman: Michael D. Wallace Recent studies on p o l i t i c a l development and m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s have tended to explain p o l i t i c a l i ntervention by the armed forces of developing countries by examining ei t h e r the organizational charac- t e r i s t i c s of the m i l i t a r y establishments or the development context i n which these m i l i t a r y establishments operate. This study presents the view that while corporate factors may explain the process of intervention i n the short run, changes taking place i n the s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l environment can best explain the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y i n tervention e x i s t i n g i n a s p e c i f i c country. A f t e r the presentation of a b r i e f survey of the l i t e r a t u r e and the elaboration of an a n a l y t i c a l g r i d , Part II of t h i s study surveys the major organizational transformations which have aff e c t e d A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y forces and which can serve to explain t h e i r decision to intervene a c t i v e l y i n the p o l i t i c a l process. This h i s t o r i c a l ( i i ) reconstruction of the process of m i l i t a r y intervention l e d to an explanation which stresses the v u l n e r a b i l i t y rather than the strength of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y organizations as the major reason f o r t h e i r involvement i n p o l i t i c s . Because of the nature of t h e i r output, t h e i r recent creation and the permeability of t h e i r boundaries, A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y organizations are shown to be e a s i l y threatened by changes taking place i n t h e i r environment. M i l i t a r y coups occur when a m i l i t a r y organization decides to use i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l weight to modify i t s environment so as to insure i t s corporate s u r v i v a l . Part III of t h i s study investigates by a quantitative methodology some of the changes taking place i n the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l environment of T r o p i c a l A f r i c a to determine i f they can be correlated with the present l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention i n these states. Six major environmental changes were i d e n t i f i e d (economic development, s o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , party i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , government penetration and s o c i a l c o n f l i c t ) and operationalized through the use of f a c t o r a n a l y s i s . The l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention was operationalized by examining the extent to which a m i l i t a r y establishment breaks out of i t s organizational boundaries to occupy roles outside those normally associated with i t s defence function. Data on the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention was c o l l e c t e d f o r each year of the 1960-71 period and then aggregated into a f i n a l index of m i l i t a r y intervention f o r the 32 states of T r o p i c a l A f r i c a . Three a n a l y t i c techniques were then used on these data. ( i i i ) By simple b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n i t was established that the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention was p o s i t i v e l y associated with the l e v e l of i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t and of party i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n a given s o c i e t y . Levels of government penetration and of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n were also associated with the dependent v a r i a b l e , but i n a negative way and at a less s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l . When step-wise regression analysis was employed, the same res u l t s emerged. Furthermore, the s i x independent variables taken together explained 40 per cent of the variance i n the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention. Using the technique of dependent analysis developed by Boudon, i t was established that only the l e v e l of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t made a d i r e c t and substantial contribution to the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention. The influence of the other variables was apparently dependent on th i s l a s t v a r i a b l e . In conclusion, i t i s stressed that the process of m i l i t a r y intervention i s amenable to an organizational and h i s t o r i c a l analysis and that the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l environment i n which a m i l i t a r y establishment operates can make a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to an understanding of the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention e x i s t i n g i n the states of Tropical A f r i c a . (Thesis Supervisor) (iv) TABLE OF CONTENT INTRODUCTION PART I MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE AND A FRAME- WORK OF ANALYSIS CHAPTER 1. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA. A STUDY OF THE LITERATURE 8 The Organizational Approach to M i l i t a r y Coups i n the States of Tro p i c a l A f r i c a .- 10 1. The orientation'to violence of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat 11 2. The national o r i e n t a t i o n of A f r i c a n armies as cause of coups d'etat 13 3. The s o c i a l background of the o f f i c e r corps as a cause of coups d'etat 14 4. The corporate format of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat 18 5. The i d e o l o g i c a l format of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat 21 The Developmental Approach to M i l i t a r y Coups i n the States of Tro p i c a l A f r i c a 28 Notes and References to Chapter I 51 CHAPTER II THE MILITARY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 55 (v) The M i l i t a r y Organization as an Open System and an I n s t i t u t i o n 55 M i l i t a r y Intervention as an I n s t i t u t i o n a l Response 68 The Organizational Parameters of the Process of M i l i t a r y Intervention 73 1. The nature of the organization's output 73 2. The stage of development of the organi- zation 74 3. The permeability of the organization's boundaries 76 4. The in t e g r a t i o n of sub-units i n the organization 78 The Environmental Parameters of the Level of M i l i t a r y Intervention 79 1. The complexity of the environment . . 79 2. The nature of environmental changes . 81 Notes and References to Chapter II 88 PART II THE PROCESS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF AFRICAN MILITARY ORGANIZA- TIONS CHAPTER III THE AFRICAN ARMED FORCES AS ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 90 The Pre-Colonial and T r i b a l M i l i t a r y T r a d i t i o n i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a 90 The A f r i c a n C o l o n i a l Forces and European Do- mination (1880-1945) 91 The A f r i c a n C o l o n i a l Forces and the T r a n s i t i o n to Independence (1945-58) 106 (vi) The Transformation into National Armies (1958- 63) 139 P o l i t i c a l Interventions by A f r i c a n M i l i t a r y Organizations (1963-70) 162 Notes and References to Chapter III 181 PART III THE LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CHAPTER IV THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL INTERVENTION BY THE AFRI- CAN MILITARY FORCES, 1960-71: DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF A CAUSAL MODEL . . . 195 The Measurement of M i l i t a r y Intervention . . . 200 The I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Environmental factors 211 1. The l e v e l of economic development and mi- l i t a r y intervention 213 2. The l e v e l of s o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n and mi- l i t a r y intervention 237 3. The l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and m i l i t a r y intervention 246 4. The l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a - t i o n and m i l i t a r y intervention . . . . 248 5. The l e v e l of government penetration and m i l i t a r y intervention 251 6. The l e v e l of i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t and m i l i - tary intervention 255 V a l i d i t y and R e l i a b i l i t y of the Indices . . . 259 Notes and References to Chapter IV 274 ( v i i ) CHAPTER V EMPIRICAL RESULTS: BIVARIATE AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 278 B i v a r i a t e Analysis 282 Step-wise Regression Analysis 293 Notes and References to Chapter V 328 CHAPTER VI EMPIRICAL RESULTS: DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS . . . 332 The Dependence Approach to Causal Modelling . 332 The Findings of the Causal Model 345 The Dynamics of the Causal Model 350 The Content of the Causal Model 360 Notes and References to Chapter VI 387 CHAPTER VII INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS . . . 390 P o l i t i c a l Parties and C o n f l i c t s during the Struggle f o r Independence 394 Parties and C o n f l i c t s a f t e r Independence . . 411 Notes and References to Chapter VII 423 CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 424 An Environmental Paradigm 424 The Process of M i l i t a r y Intervention . . . . 429 The Level of M i l i t a r y Intervention 436 C r i t i c a l Assessment and Future Research . . . 443 APPENDICES BIBLIOGRAPHY ( i x ) LIST OF TABLES TABLE I MILITARY EXPENDITURE BY GREAT BRITAIN ON ITS MILITARY FORCES, 1950-59 (IN POUNDS) . . . 108 TABLE II MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SELECTED BRITISH TERRITORIES,' 1955-60 (IN POUNDS) 110 TABLE III DAILY PAY FOR EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN OFFICERS IN THE GHANAIAN REGIMENT IN 1954 (IN GHANAIAN SHILLINGS) 114 TABLE IV NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION BY COUNTRY (1960-71) 197 TABLE V DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS OF MILITARY INTERVEN- TION BY PERIOD AND TYPE (NUMBERS AND PERCEN- TAGES) 199 TABLE VI ANNUAL INDEX OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS BY COUN- TRY (1960-71) 205 TABLE VII LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION BY TWO SCALING METHODS 209 TABLE VIII THEORETICAL, EMPIRICAL AND OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE DEFINITION OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 227 TABLE IX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF THE INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 232 TABLE X CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 12 INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 234 TABLE XI ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT . . . . 235 TABLE XII ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 245 TABLE XIII ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION . . . 249 TABLE XIV ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION . 252 (x) TABLE XV ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT PENETRATION . . . 256 TABLE XVI ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT . . . . . . 260 TABLE XVII FACTOR SCORES OF EACH COUNTRY BY THE SIX COM- POSITE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 261 TABLE XVIII ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF ALL INDICATORS . . . . 266 TABLE XIX CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE IN- DICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBILIZA- TION 269 TABLE XX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 270 TABLE XXI CORRELATION OF THE COMPOSITE INDEPENDENT VA- RIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 283 TABLE XXII CORRELATIONS OF BASIC INDICATORS AND THE DE- PENDENT VARIABLE 285 TABLE XXIII STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE SIX COMPOSITE VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS 301 TABLE XXIV COMPARISON OF THE CORRELATION AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPOSITE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE . . . . 302 TABLE XXV STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 9 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT INDEX 305 TABLE XXVI STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 8 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBILIZA- TION INDEX .306 TABLE XXVII STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 4 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTI- CIPATION INDEX 310 ( x i ) TABLE XXVIII STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 4 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF PARTY INSTITUTION- ALIZATION INDEX 311 TABLE XXIX STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 5 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT PENE- TRATION INDEX 312 TABLE XXX STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 7 BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT INDEX 313 TABLE XXXI COMPARISON OF THE CORRELATION AND REGRESSION COEF- FICIENTS OF THE BASIC INDICATORS 315 TABLE XXXII STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING ALL INDICATORS OF EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 320 TABLE XXXIII STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE 6 BEST BASIC PREDICTORS 321 TABLE XXXIV SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE BIVARIATE AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 324 TABLE XXXV THE SYSTEM OF DEPENDENCE EQUATIONS 337 TABLE XXXVI CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE INDEPENDENT COMPOSITE VARIABLES 344 TABLE XXXVII DEPENDENCE COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIA- BLES IN THE CAUSAL MODELS 346 TABLE XXXVIII COMPARISON OF THE CORRELATION, REGRESSION AND DEPEN- DENCE COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPOSITE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 348 TABLE XXXVIX COEFFICIENTS OF TOTAL INDIRECT EFFECT FOR EACH OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLES 351 TABLE XL DIFFERENT PATHS OF INDIFFERENT EFFECT ON THE DEPEN- DENT VARIABLE FOR EACH OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLES 352 TABLE XLI DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE ECONOC 362 ( x i i ) TABLE XLII DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION INSTEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE MOBILI 364 TABLE XLIII DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION INSTEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE PARTIC . . 366 TABLE XLIV DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION INSTEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE INSTIT . . 367 TABLE XLV DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT PENETRATION INS- TEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE PENETR . . . 368 TABLE XLVI DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS USING THE BASIC INDICATORS OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT INSTEAD OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLE CONFLI 369 TABLE XLVII COMPARISON OF THE CORRELATION, REGRESSION AND DEPENDENCE COEFFICIENTS OF THE BASIC INDEPEN- DENT VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 370 TABLE XLVIII INDIRECT EFFECT OF THE COMPOSITE VARIABLES THROUGH THE LEVEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT AS MEASURED BY ITS BASIC VARIABLES INSTEAD OF CONFLI . . 374 TABLE XLIX SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS .' 383 ( x i i i ) LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 46 FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION PER YEAR . 198 FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF THE ANNUAL LEVEL OF MILITARY IN- TERVENTION FOR TROPICAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES, USING TWO SCALING METHODS 211 FIGURE 4 CAUSAL MODEL OF THE LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVEN- TION. 334 FIGURE 5 CAUSAL MODEL INDICATING THE MOST IMPORTANT CAU- SAL RELATIONSHIPS 347 FIGURE 6 CAUSAL MODEL INDICATING ONLY THOSE DEPENDENCE COEFFICIENTS WHICH ARE .40 353 FIGURE 7 MAJOR CAUSAL PATHS OF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 355 FIGURE 8 MAJOR CAUSAL PATHS OF THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL MOBI- LIZATION 356 FIGURE 9 MAJOR CAUSAL PATHS OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 357 FIGURE 10 MAJOR CAUSAL PATHS OF THE LEVEL OF PARTY INS- TITUTIONALIZATION 358 FIGURE 11 DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS WITH V18 REPLACING ECONOC . 377 FIGURE 12 DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS WITH V19 REPLACING ECONOC . 378 (xiv) LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX I DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION BY COUNTRY 446 APPENDIX II NAME, DEFINITION AND SOURCE OF THE BASIC VARIA- BLES 447 APPENDIX III BASIC INDICATORS USED TO CONSTRUCT THE COMPO- SITE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 456 APPENDIX IV THE BOUDON METHOD OF DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS 463 (XV) WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS It i s a pleasure to record the many debts incurred i n the preparation of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . I would f i r s t l i k e to thank Morris Janowitz who provided the o r i g i n a l idea f o r t h i s d i s s e r t a - t i o n . Later Michael Wallace, Jean Laponce, Robert Jackson and Kai H o l s t i provided many suggestions and insights concerning the study. Michael Wallace, i n p a r t i c u l a r , devoted many hours from his homes i n Vancouver and Ann Arbor, to the task of supervizing a thesis concerned with A f r i c a , but written mainly i n Vancouver, Chicago or Montreal. I also owe large debts to the researchers of the A f r i c a n National Integration Project of York University who provided the empirical data f o r t h i s study. F i n a n c i a l a s s i s - tance made a v a i l a b l e by the Canada Council also allowed me to complete the research f o r t h i s study. Without the programming expertise of Ronald Alepin, few of the ca l c u l a t i o n s i n t h i s study could have been performed c o r r e c t l y . My thanks also go to Linda C o l l i e r , Fern M i l l e r and Paula LaPierre who p a t i e n t l y read over e a r l i e r versions of the manuscript and i d e n t i f i e d some of i t s most obvious flaws. 1 INTRODUCTION At the time of t h i s w r i t i n g (June 1972), there have been 26 successful m i l i t a r y take-overs and 18 attempted coups among the 32 countries of T r o p i c a l A f r i c a since 1960. If only because of t h e i r number, such overt m i l i t a r y interventions have become an important aspect of A f r i c a n p o l i t i c s . However, even more important than i t s frequency, i s the t o t a l l y unexpected nature of t h i s phenomenon. Barely a decade ago, no one predicted a p o l i t i c a l r o l e of any kind f o r the new A f r i c a n armies. History textbooks completely ignored t h e i r existence (Brunschswlg, 1963; C h a i l l e y , 1968); nor were they mentioned to any extent i n the f i r s t bibliographies on the armed forces of developing 1 nations (Blankstein, 1964; Land, 1964; Lissak, 1964). One early study of sub-Saharan A f r i c a suggested that A f r i c a n countries "lack what many new states of the former c o l o n i a l world have had, namely, an army which. . . could be c a l l e d i n , or could take over (Coleman, 1962, p. 359)." This same study concluded that A f r i c a n armies were u n l i k e l y to follow the lead of t h e i r L a t i n American and Middle Eastern counterparts, but would instead l i m i t themselves s t r i c t l y to t h e i r defence r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As l a t e as 1965, one observer could s t i l l conclude that more than any other continent at any time i n world hi s t o r y " A f r i c a i s led by pen-wielding i n t e l l e c t u a l s , rather than by the modern equivalent of s a b e r - r a t t l i n g men on horseback (Van Den Berghe, 1965, p. 12)." In the same vein Gutteridge predicted that A f r i c a n armies would not intervene i n p o l i t i c s 2 because they "lack the necessary professional cohesion and have not s u f f i c i e n t t e c h nical know-how to be regarded as uniquely capable of running 2 a country (1965, p. 144)." This prognosis was supported by apparently strong empirical evidence. A f r i c a n armies had no indigenous m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n nor, as i n L a t i n America, did they have a long h i s t o r y of c a u d i l l i s m . Secondly, A f r i c a n armies had played no r o l e i n the struggle f o r independence and thus had not reached a p o s i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l prominence. F i n a l l y , many A f r i c a n national armies had formally been created only months before independence was achieved and did not control a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the national budget. Moreover, i n 1960 the A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l systems did not exhibit any signs of immediate collapse which would be l i k e l y e i t h e r to necessitate 3 or f a c i l i t a t e a m i l i t a r y intervention. Having led t h e i r countries to independence, A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t leaders appeared f i r m l y i n co n t r o l . If any problems of p o l i t i c a l leadership were foreseen i t was expected that they would come from the a u t h o r i t a r i a n and charismatic nature of the new n a t i o n a l i s t s ' leadership rather than from any lack of strength. Also p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , p a r t i e s , l e g i s l a t u r e s and c i v i l s e rvice, had a l l evidently survived both the transplant to A f r i c a n and the t r a n s i t i o n from colo n i a l i s m to national independence. They seemed u n l i k e l y to collapse 4 i n the near future. While many foresaw the very r e a l problems of e l i t i s m , corruption, t r i b a l i s m and underdevelopment, even the most p e s s i m i s t i c 5 observers did not foresee the danger of m i l i t a r y intervention. Yet, by 3 1970 the m i l i t a r y were i n f u l l p o l i t i c a l c ontrol i n ten countries and had 6 a c t i v e l y intervened i n the p o l i t i c a l process of eight more. This rapid transformation of the A f r i c a n armies from a s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y to a p o l i t i c a l r o l e i s the subject of t h i s study. What forces, both within the m i l i t a r y organizations and i n the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l environment, brought about t h i s transformation? Can the s p e c i f i c impact of each set of f a c t o r s be i d e n t i f i e d ? Was the collapse of the organizational boundaries of the A f r i c a n armies already inherent i n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the c o l o n i a l A f r i c a n regiments? How important were the i n t r i g u e s of the former c o l o n i a l powers? Can the s p e c i f i c factors which determine the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention be i d e n t i f i e d ? These" are the basic questions which the study seeks to answer. A study of the process of the m i l i t a r y ' s entry to the p o l i t i c a l arena may a l s o be relevant to a number of more general issues. To begin with, i t i s hoped that some of the problems connected with the creation of v i a b l e A f r i c a n states w i l l be r a i s e d i n a more systematic context. The concept of development which has served as the major a n a l y t i c a l t o o l f o r the study of the p o l i t i c s of L a t i n American and Afro-Asian states has recently come under attack because of i t s close a s s o c i a t i o n with the Western h i s t o r i c a l experience, and because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s connected 7 with i t s systemic and empirical a p p l i c a t i o n . The following analysis of m i l i t a r y coups, although i t does not formally make use of the concept of development, may contribute to t h i s debate by f a c i l i t a t i n g the 4 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of those epistemological and empirical conditions under which the concept of development can contribute p o s i t i v e l y to an under- standing of one aspect of the p o l i t i c a l process i n the non-Western world, 8 namely m i l i t a r y coups. Second, by o f f e r i n g a systems-oriented a n a l y t i c a l g r i d and by using i t to analyze the h i s t o r i c a l development of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y organizations, i t i s hoped that a new paradigm f o r the study of p o l i t i c a l intervention of the armed forces of developing countries may r e s u l t . There are now two such competing research s t r a t e g i e s . The f i r s t applied mainly by s o c i o l o g i s t s , emphasizes the bureaucratic, professional and i d e o l o g i c a l aspects of the m i l i t a r y as a modern profession to explain i t s p o l i t i c a l involvement. The second research strategy, put forward mainly by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , emphasizes those aspects of the s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l environment i n which the armed forces operate. Neither s o c i o l o g i s t nor p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have dismissed the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i n k s between the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and the organizational v a r i a b l e s , but the precise nature of these l i n k s has yet to be s p e c i f i e d . Thirds, we hope that t h i s study w i l l show the f e a s i b i l i t y of i n t e g r a t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l approaches of h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l 5 analysis with the most recent breakthroughs i n quantitative methodology. To the extent that these questions can be answered there i s a fourth area to which t h i s study may contribute, that of the sociology of s o c i a l organizations. What parameters determine the permeability of an organization's boundaries? What are the consequences f o r the in t e r n a l functioning of an organization of a r a d i c a l modification i n that organization's goals? How can an organization use i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l weight to redefine i t s environment? This study f a l l s into three parts. The f i r s t reviews the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l approaches to the study of m i l i t a r y intervention and then suggests a framework within which both approaches can be integrated to allow f o r a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between those factors which set i n motion the process of m i l i t a r y intervention and those factors which determine the l e v e l at which m i l i t a r y intervention w i l l e x i s t i n a given A f r i c a n country. Seeking to answer the f i r s t of these questions, Part II provides a de t a i l e d examination of the A f r i c a n armed forces as organizations and i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e i r c o l o n i a l o r i g i n s , t h e i r transformation into national armies and the changes undergone a f t e r independence. Part III attempts to i d e n t i f y i n an empirical and causal fashion those factors i n the A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l and socio- economic environment which determine the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y intervention e x i s t i n g i n each A f r i c a n country. NOTES AND REFERENCES TO INTRODUCTION When simple c i t a t i o n s are involved we used the author's name and p u b l i c a t i o n date i n the text. The f u l l t i t l e s can be found i n the bibliography. An exception was made f o r Debates of L e g i s l a t i v e Assemblies which are f u l l y c i t e d i n the text. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not l i m i t e d to American or B r i t i s h observers. In a colloquium held at Dijon i n December 1962, the French s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t Leon Hamon expressed the view that A f r i c a n armies were u n l i k e l y to re b e l : Je c r o i s que les organismes p o l i t i q u e s ont p r i s une avance trop f o r t e dans 1'occupation du pouvoir; par su i t e de circonstances locales l'armee aura, me semble-t'il, trop peu d'occa- sions de se couvrir de prestige et de l u s t r e . (Hamon, 1966, p. 104). S h i l s (1962) has expressed s i m i l a r views i n a 1959 colloquium sponsored by the Rand Corporation. The Congolese episode of 1960 was seen only as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the t o t a l f a i l u r e of the Belgian c o l o n i a l experience, not as the fore-runner of s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s to come (Hoskyns, 1961; Weiss, 1965). On A f r i c a n one-party r u l e and the controversy as to i t s contribution to p o l i t i c a l development see Coleman and Rosbers (1964), Hess and Loewenberg (1964), Morgenthau (1964), and Zolberg (1964). On the problems of charismatic p o l i t i c a l leadership see Apter (1969), Mazrui (1967) and Tiger (1964). On western p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r t r a n s f e r to A f r i c a see Burke (1967), P r i c e (1967) and Riggs (1964). One area where d i f f i c u l t y was an t i c i p a t e d was the new e l i t e s being formed i n the u n i v e r s i t i e s . On t h i s problem see Dubois (1965), Lloyd (1966) and Wallerstein (1965). The f i r s t group includes Burundi, Central A f r i c a n Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and the Upper Volta. The second group includes the Congo-Kinshasa, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, S i e r r a Leone and Tanzania. For a comprehensive c r i t i q u e of the concept of development as i t i s used by the majority of American s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s see Baran (1957). Throughout t h i s study, the expressions "under-developed countries", "Third World" or "developing nations" w i l l be used interchangeably. No s p e c i f i c i d e o l o g i c a l connotation i s attached to any of these terms. The term A f r i c a w i l l also be used to describe what i s not properly speaking A f r i c a but Black Sub-Saharan A f r i c a . PART I MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 8 CHAPTER I MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE LITERATURE The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to examine the various hypotheses and theories which attempt to explain the occurence of m i l i t a r y coups i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a . The reader may f i n d that few f u l l - s c a l e theories of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups are given any close a t t e n t i o n while several minor attempts at explanation of t h i s phenomenon are analyzed i n some d e t a i l . The reasons f o r t h i s emphasis are both p r a c t i c a l and methodolo- g i c a l . An extensive search of the l i t e r a t u r e revealed that the major t h e o r e t i c a l contributions to the study of c i v i l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s i n developing countries (Janowitz, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Levy, 1962; S h i l s , 1962) made l i t t l e or no mention of the A f r i c a n s i t u a t i o n . At the same time, because they are a r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon, A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups have not yet been the subject of systematic empirical studies. Nor have they given r i s e to any major t h e o r e t i c a l analyses. As a r e s u l t , the a v a i l a b l e l i t e r a t u r e consists l a r g e l y of short case-studies or j o u r n a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The o r i e n t a t i o n of t h i s survey also aims to avoid some of the most common errors of s i m i l a r surveys. For example no attempt w i l l be made to demonstrate the uniqueness or s u p e r i o r i t y of the subsequent study. The aim i s not to a r r i v e at an exhaustive evaluation of the current state of research on the causes of m i l i t a r y intervention, but only to define 9 those coordinates which place t h i s p a r t i c u l a r study within the frame-work of the wider research e f f o r t now i n progress. Instead of assessing the empirical v a l i d i t y of selected explanations of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups t h i s survey w i l l attempt to show that a close r e l i a n c e on western models of m i l i t a r y professionalism and p o l i t i c a l development has led to the adoption of two basic, but d i s t o r t e d , explanations of the phenomenon of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups. In the process i t w i l l become cl e a r that these two explanations would benefit from an i n t e g r a t i o n of some of t h e i r elements. One group of researchers have stressed the i n t e r n a l character- i s t i c s of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y establishments as the cause of t h e i r i n t e r - vention i n the p o l i t i c a l process. By p r o j e c t i o n of the organizational format of European armies, A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s are presented as modern, cohesive, n o n - p o l i t i c a l and professional organizations whose intervention i s guided by a concern f o r the nation and i t s s u r v i v a l . This approach w i l l be designated as the organizational explanation. The second approach has emphasized the process of s o c i a l , eco- nomic and p o l i t i c a l development as the cause of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups. In t h i s case i t has been suggested that A f r i c a n countries have under- gone rapid s o c i a l and economic transformation, putting increased demands on the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which have proven unable to f u l f i l l these demands. M i l i t a r y coups are seen as the r e s u l t of t h i s breakdown or threatened breakdown i n the o v e r a l l process of modernization. This approach w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as the developmental explanation. 10 Among s o c i o l o g i s t s and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s these organizational and developmental explanations are not as mutually exclusive as t h i s survey would tend to i n d i c a t e . To some extent the differences have been over-emphasized i n order to make more e x p l i c i t and coherent t h i s presenta- t i o n of an ever-expanding f i e l d of research. These two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n f a c t share a common v i s i o n of the causal l i n k between A f r i c a n armies and t h e i r decision to intervene p o l i t i c a l l y . Both in t e r p r e t a t i o n s p i c t u r e the m i l i t a r y as being involun- t a r i l y drawn to intervene i n order to lead t h e i r country back on the road to modernization and i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y . As we w i l l attempt to show, t h i s v i s i o n does not appear to correspond to the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y and thus may have given r i s e to questionable generalizations on the phenomenon of A f r i - can m i l i t a r y coups. The Organizational Approach to M i l i t a r y Coups i n the States of T r o p i c a l A f r i c a Accepting the assumption that "compared with other i n s t i t u t i o n s and bureaucracies, the m i l i t a r y establishment has a v a r i e t y of common organizational features (Janowitz, 1964, p. 28)," m i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s have selected f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the m i l i t a r y ' s i n t e r n a l structure as predictors of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l behavior: t h e i r f u n c t i o n a l and national d e f i n i t i o n s , the s o c i a l background of t h e i r o f f i c e r corps and t h e i r corporate and i d e o l o g i c a l formats. The following sections w i l l examine the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of A f r i c a n s p e c i a l i s t s as to the influence of each of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on m i l i t a r y interventions i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a . 11 1. The o r i e n t a t i o n to violence of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat Because armies are oriented toward the exercise of violence, e i t h e r threatened or a c t u a l , they are s a i d to possess a close control over the instruments of t h i s violence. According to Janowitz (1964) t h i s control provides the m i l i t a r y with both the p o s s i b i l i t y and the pretext f o r a m i l i t a r y coup. A coup i s thus never outside the realm of p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the m i l i t a r y as i t would be f o r a group of doctors or lawyers, because to succeed i n staging a coup, the m i l i t a r y does not need to mobilize s k i l l s and resources not normally a v a i l a b l e to i t . Janowitz therefore argues r i g h t l y that f o r the m i l i t a r y there i s nothing extraordinary i n thinking about a m i l i t a r y coup, since the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a c t i o n i s inherent i n the concern with violence of any m i l i t a r y establishment. This perspective has been accepted by a number of students of A f r i c a n coups who suggest that western observers have exaggerated the impact of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups because a s i m i l a r event would be so traumatic i f i t was to take place i n Europe or North America. For example, as Lantier points out: II ne faut pas trop s * i l l u s i o n n e r sur des h i s t o i r e s de kepis ou de chapeaux mous qui, en Afrique, n'ont pas grande s i g n i f i c a t i o n . Les regimes m i l i t a i r e s ne d i f f e r e n t guere des autres que par l e gout qu'ont leurs dirigeants pour l e s uniformes, les dorures et le s decorations (Lantier, 1967, p. 171). 12 Although i t i s always possible to discover reasons which explain the m i l i t a r y ' s actions, these reasons, according to Decalo (1965) and Snyder (1969), are only post-facto reconstructions based on a l o g i c which r a r e l y corresponds to actual events. As noted by Corpierre (1966) the coup i n A f r i c a should not be seen as a trauma- t i c p o l i t i c a l event but simply as a "routine m i l i t a r y exercise (p. 44)." According to O'Connell (1967) i n our search f o r a r a t i o n a l explanation we may have overdramatized a phenomenon which has simply replaced e l e c t i o n s as the most e f f i c i e n t and troublesome means of 1 e f f e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l change. These authors suggest that m i l i t a r y coups have taken place i n A f r i c a because i t i s both possible and easy f o r the army to carry them out. E m p i r i c a l l y t h i s hypothesis has received some support because of the absence of any discernable pattern i n the instances of m i l i t a r y take-over i n A f r i c a . Large and small countries, r a d i c a l and conservative governments, and former French and B r i t i s h colonies have a l l been the targets of such coups. However, t h i s hypothesis eventually leads to an impasse: i f coups are the r e s u l t s of a random process there must s t i l l be some explanation as to why they have occurred repeatedly i n c e r t a i n countries and never i n others. Because of t h i s f a c t i t would appear that i n Tr o p i c a l A f r i c a control over the instruments of violence i s a necessary but not a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the occurrence of a coup. In f a c t the basic aim of t h i s study w i l l be to show that A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y interventions are not the r e s u l t of a random process but of a set of causes, both i n 13 the m i l i t a r y organization i t s e l f and i n the p o l i t i c a l environment, which w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d and discussed below. 2. The national o r i e n t a t i o n of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat The o r i e n t a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y as a national i n s t i t u t i o n i s frequently mentioned by m i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s as a second major cause of m i l i t a r y coups i n developing nations. Janowitz (1964) and Welch (1960) both suggested that the m i l i t a r y ' s ethos of p u b l i c service and i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the nation-state often prompts i t to intervene when the s u r v i v a l or even simply the s t a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l process i s judged to be threatened. S i m i l a r l y , ' Lefever suggests that A f r i c a n armies being "a more v i v i d symbol of sovereignty than the f l a g , the c o n s t i t u t i o n or the parliament (Lefe- ver, 1970, p. 21)," constitute an adequate and a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to corrupt c i v i l i a n leadership. In A f r i c a n states t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the army as a national i n s t i t u t i o n has often been viewed as a p a r t i c u l a r l y important parameter of i t s decision to intervene because of the presumed weakness of the c e n t r a l government and the absence of any other i n s t i t u t i o n capable of making a s i m i l a r claim. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h i s v i s i o n of the m i l i t a r y as a symbol of national unity and as a repository of national v i r t u e s i s shared by A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y leaders. For example the young army o f f i c e r s who staged the t h i r d Dahomey coup i n 1968 talked of t h e i r " s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s before the Nation and before History (Afrique Nouvelle, Dec. 27, 1967)." In Upper Volta, Colonel Lamizana spoke of the army as the "incarna- t i o n of Upper Voltan nationhood (Afrique, 53, March 1966, p. 12)." In Mali, the army considered i t s e l f the symbol of the Malian v i r t u e s 2 of courage, dynamism and autarchy. According to o f f i c e r s and m i l i - tary s o c i o l o g i s t s a l i k e , the army, because i t i s the symbol of national independence and national unity, i s forced to intervene when national unity i s threatened by s o c i a l unrest or when the i n t e - g r i t y of the country i s being undermined by outside a g i t a t o r s . As we w i l l note at length below t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y coups does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the causes of a coup and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of the coup. By i d e n t i f y i n g themselves with national unity and national independence the new m i l i t a r y leaders are not so much expressing a concern f o r these goals but an uneasiness over the lack of popular support and the lack of legitimacy f o r t h e i r action. The s o c i a l background of the o f f i c e r corps as a cause of coups d'etat Because of the importance of s o c i a l class i n the western s o c i o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n , the s o c i a l o r i g i n of the o f f i c e r corps has often been looked upon as the major cause of m i l i t a r y coups. Jano- witz (1964) believes that the r u r a l and middle-class o r i g i n of the o f f i c e r s i n developing countries i n e v i t a b l y leads them to adopt a fundamentalist a t t i t u d e i n t h e i r v i s i o n of s o c i a l problems. These problems are seen as consequences of the corruption, f r i v o l i t i e s and lack of dedication of p o l i t i c a l leaders rather than as a r e s u l t 15 of i d e o l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s . Because they come from a d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l milieu, m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s have developed very l i t t l e empathy f o r the c i v i l i a n e l i t e s and t h e i r way of solving pro- blems. Therefore they have l i t t l e reluctance i n r e p l a c i n g them since such a move i s r a t i o n a l i z e d as bringing an end to a decadent and corrupt administration. However, Janowitz's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the l i n k between the o f f i c e r s ' s o c i a l o r i g i n s and t h e i r decision to intervene i s not shared by a l l m i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s . Pye (1962a, 1962b) has suggested that i t i s the s i m i l a r i t i e s , not the differences, i n the s o c i a l o r i g i n s of the c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y leaders that can lead the army to intervene, as i n the Burmese coup of 1958. In t h i s case the close s o c i a l and personal bonds between the c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y leaders, led the o f f i c e r s to f e e l as intimately acquainted with the problems of the country as the p o l i t i c i a n s . As a r e s u l t they did not hesitate to replace them by staging a success- f u l coup. The most elaborate presentation of the " s o c i a l o r i g i n " i n t e r - pretation of m i l i t a r y coups i s Nun's (1967, 1968). He suggests that i n L a t i n America the s u r v i v a l of a landed a r i s t o c r a c y combined with the rapid extension of e l e c t o r a l suffrage confronts the middle class with the problem of competing f o r power with both the upper and lower classes. In the b a t t l e f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , the middle class cannot depend on the support of either the trade unions, which 16 are predominantly of working-class o r i g i n , or of the l e g i s l a t i v e bodies, which are usually c o n t r o l l e d by the ari s t o c r a c y . They can only count on the army which, because of the middle class o r i g i n of i t s o f f i c e r corps, w i l l act as "one of the better, i f not the best, structured i n s t i t u t i o n of the middle classes (Nun, 1968, p. 176)." Recent empirical findings cast some doubt as to the empirical v a l i d i t y of t h i s hypothesis as applied, although i n d i f f e r e n t ways, 3 by both Janowitz and Nun. For example, at the end of his de t a i l e d study of the B r a z i l i a n m i l i t a r y , Stepan concludes that the socio- economic o r i g i n of the o f f i c e r s corps i s only a secondary cause of m i l i t a r y intervention: For most o f f i c e r s so many l i f e experience and career pattern variables intervene between t h e i r entry into the m i l i t a r y school system . . . and t h e i r promotion to colonel or general 25 or 35 years l a t e r that the d i r e c t impact of socio- economic o r i g i n has been considerably weakened (Stepan, 1970, pp. 54-5). Stepan found that the recent p o l i t i c a l experience, duties and l i f e - s t y l e s of o f f i c e r s were better predictors of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l behaviour than t h e i r class o r i g i n . . In A f r i c a , because of a lack of information on the s o c i a l background of o f f i c e r s the s o c i a l o r i g i n hypothesis has yet to be 4 emp i r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d . However, i t has been suggested that the t r i b a l and not the s o c i a l o r i g i n of the o f f i c e r s i s an important v a r i a b l e i n explaining t h e i r p o l i t i c a l behaviour. 17 In the case of the S i e r r a Leonese coup of 1966, Cartwright (1968) notes that most o f f i c e r s were Mende while the All-People's Congress party of Premier-elect Stevens against whom the coup was directed had i t s major strength i n the non-Mende regions of the country. In Burundi, Lemarchand (1970) has pointed out that the coups of July and November 1966 marked the end of Hutu p o l i t i c a l domination and the r i s e of a new leadership of T u t s i p o l i t i c i a n s and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . Mazrui has also offered an explanation l i n k i n g t r i b a l i s m to m i l i t a r y coups, based on the following observation: For many A f r i c a n states, the golden age of modern p o l i t i c s coincided with the peak e f f o r t of nationalism. When the l a t t e r declined as a major determinant of p o l i t i c a l behavior, modern p o l i t i c s a lso declined as a n a t i o n a l i z e d phenomenon (Mazrui, 1969, p. 42). This " d e - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " of p o l i t i c s has brought with i t a strenthening of those t r i b a l or ethnic l o y a l t i e s which had, i n f a c t , never completely disappeared. Inevitably, t h i s " r e - t r i b a l i z a t i o n " has also a f f e c t e d the armed forces which have been drawn in t o t h i s new arena of c o n f l i c t e i t h e r as p a r t i c i p a n t s or a r b i t r a t o r s . Convincing as i t may appear Mazrui's thesis has yet to receive empirical support. Unfortunately u n t i l s t a t i s t i c s on the ethnic composition of the A f r i c a n armed forces are a v a i l a b l e , t h i s support 5 w i l l be lacking. But already a preliminary i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the Nigerian coups of 1966 provides an alternate explanation to what are surely the most often c i t e d examples of t r i b a l coups. Having 18 pointed out that the Ibos were over-represented i n the middle ranks, Luckham (1969) and Miners (1971) suggest that the February coup, because i t had i t s o r i g i n s i n the professional grievances of the middle ranks necess a r i l y involved Ibos as conspirators and non-Ibos as victims. In the case of the coup of July 1966, where the role s of Ibos and non-Ibos were reversed, Luckham maintains that t r i b a l reasons were important only to the extent that they "aggregated external p o l i - t i c a l c o n f l i c t s with the i n t e r n a l organizational s t r a i n s of the army (Luckham, 1969, p. 224)." In both instances i t i s suggested that corporate and not t r i b a l grievances were the immediate causes of the coup. Here again then, empirical evidence of a d i r e c t causal l i n k between the o f f i c e r s ' s o c i a l o r i g i n and t h e i r tendency to stage a coup i s lacking. The lack of s p e c i f i c information makes i t almost impossible f o r A f r i c a n i s t s to apply some of the hypotheses which have been tested i n other regions to A f r i c a n events. 4. The corporate format of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat Organizational features of the A f r i c a n armies are often mentioned as a cause of coups d'etat. According to Pye (1961) the army i s both a modern organization and a modernizing agent f o r i t s members. This organizational modernity of m i l i t a r y organizations originated f i r s t i n the need of the c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s f o r updated, professional c o l o n i a l forces which could be integrated within the 19 o v e r a l l imperial defence structure. Second, because armies are i n - herently competitive i n s t i t u t i o n s whose "ultimate function i s the test of one against each other (Pye, 1961, p. 78)," they must t r y to meet the highest i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards i f they are to survive on the b a t t l e - f i e l d . F i n a l l y , the modernity of A f r i c a n armies i s said to be insured by the presence of fo r e i g n - t r a i n e d o f f i c e r s who could implement western m i l i t a r y models without opposition since A f r i c a n armies, l i k e most armies, are free from day-to-day tests of e f f i c i e n c y . The recruitment p o l i c y u t i l i z e d within A f r i c a n armies i s supposed to extend t h i s process of modernization at the l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l s . M i l i t a r y induction moves r e c r u i t s out "of the p a r t i - c u l a r i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s of t r a d i t i o n a l l i f e and into the more impersonal and u n i v e r s a l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s of an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society (Pye, 1962, p. 80)." Both Pye and Levy (1962) believe that t h i s process of a c c u l t u r a t i o n i s c a r r i e d out more thoroughly and r a p i d l y within the army than by usual channels of education and urbanization. At the same time, because of the army's i s o l a t i o n within the s o c i a l system, t h i s a c c u l t u r a t i o n takes place within a more stable and secure environment. Contrary to school boys or job trainees, m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t s do not have to return to the family household every evening. They are not subjected to the contradictory experiences of both a t r a d i t i o n a l and modern environment. 20 According to m i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s t h i s combination of i n d i - v i d u al and organizational modernity supposedly makes f o r a c l e a r l y - defined a l l o c a t i o n of power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y at a l l l e v e l s . It also favors a degree of r a t i o n a l i t y and of e f f i c i e n c y which i s not present i n other organizations (Levy, 1962, p. 588) and the develop- ment of a " s k i l l structure which combines managerial a b i l i t y with a heroic posture (Janowitz, 1968, p. 128)." This h i e r a r c h i c a l i n f r a - structure with i t s c e n t r a l i z e d command, i t s sense of d i s c i p l i n e , i t s esprit-de-corps and i t s well developed system of i n t e r n a l and exter- nal communications i s believed to encourage the m i l i t a r y to want to impose some coherence on an unstable p o l i t i c a l order. M i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s therefore conclude that the m i l i t a r y stands out as "the only e f f e c t i v e l y organized element capable of competing f o r 7 p o l i t i c a l power and formulating p u b l i c p o l i c y (Pye, 1961, p. 84)." This v i s i o n of the army as a model of organizational e f f i - ciency and modernity has been widely used to explain A f r i c a n m i l i - tary coups. According to Rivkin (1967) outside of the r u l i n g p o l i - t i c a l party i n one-party states, the A f r i c a n army i s the only other organized, i d e n t i f i a b l e and functioning i n s t i t u t i o n or group. Newbury believes the A f r i c a n army has "a professional cohesion, an esprit-de-corps which makes i t unique" and goes on to point out that i n times of p o l i t i c a l chaos the A f r i c a n army benefits from "consi- derable administrative s k i l l s , a l o g i s t i c a l p o t e n t i a l , a communica- tions system and a well-integrated hierarchy of command which has 21 few r i v a l s (Newbury, 1967, p. 220)." F e i t (1969a, 1969b), sees the small s i z e of the A f r i c a n armies, f a r from being a deterrent to p o l i t i c a l intervention, as a c t u a l l y having contributed to the number of coups since such small forces are n e c e s s a r i l y more coherent ideo- l o g i c a l l y and less preoccupied with t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l defence r o l e than larger m i l i t a r y establishments. Markovitz sees the A f r i c a n army as the technological organization par excellence and the m i l i - tary coup as "the l o g i c a l , i f not f i n a l , culmination of the tendency 8 towards technology (1966, p. 11)." Recently Lefever has given the idea of the organizational s u p e r i o r i t y of the A f r i c a n army i t s f u l l e s t expression. A f r i c a n armies tend to be the most d e t r i b a l i z e d , westernized, integrated, and cohesive i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e i r respective states. The army i s usually the most d i s c i p l i n e d agency i n the state. It often enjoys a greater sense of national i d e n t i t y than other i n s t i t u t i o n s . In tech- n i c a l s k i l l s , i ncluding the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army i s the most modernized agency i n the country. It i s the best organized trade-union (Lefever, 1970, pp. 21-2). According to Lefever, t h i s organizational s u p e r i o r i t y i n e v i t a b l y leads to a coup "when a regime i s too weak, corrupt, or a r b i t r a r y to govern" and must be replaced by the m i l i t a r y so as to "avert d i s a s t e r or 9 e f f e c t reform (1970, p. 198)." 5. The i d e o l o g i c a l format of A f r i c a n armies as a cause of coups d'etat M i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s have also suggested that the ideology of m i l i t a r y professionalism encourages coups d'etat i n developing 22 nations. According to Janowitz, m i l i t a r y professionalism presents the o f f i c e r with an ambivalent self-image: On the one hand, the o f f i c e r ' s conceptions of honor, purpose and human nature lead him to assume that he i s a standard bearer, who embodies the superior v i r t u e s of men, yet, at the same time, he finds i t expedient and necessary to present himself as a representative man, not d i f f e r e n t from other men, and part of the mainstream of contemporary society (Janowitz, 1960, p. 229). In developing areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n countries with a long h i s t o r y of national independance, t h i s ambivalence i s fu r t h e r increased by the juxtapo s i t i o n of the o f f i c e r s ' desire to follow western m i l i t a r y models and h i s desire to be f a i t h f u l to his own m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n s and "protect himself against fo r e i g n p r i n c i p l e s (BeEri, 1969, p. 353)." In the case of Turkey, t h i s ambivalence led the m i l i t a r y to see i t s e l f both as the successor of the Ottoman m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n and as the equal of the other NATO forces. According to Ozbudun (1966) and Weiker (1963) t h i s dual image was i n f l u e n t i a l i n the Turkish army's decision to intervene i n the p o l i t i c a l arena i n 1960. S i m i l i a r l y P r i c e suggests that i n A f r i c a the o f f i c e r corps i s caught between i t s self-image as the incarnation of national values and the "reference-group i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s with the o f f i c e r corps of the ex-colonial power (1971b, p. 404)." According to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with and commitment to a set of foreign t r a d i t i o n s , symbols and values a f f e c t s the o f f i c e r s ' 23 perception and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the performance of c i v i l i a n leaders i n the immediate, post-independance period. Whatever t h e i r actual performance, the c i v i l i a n leaders w i l l be judged incompetent by o f f i c e r s whose standards of excellence l i e outside national bounda- r i e s and who see themselves as the r e a l repository of t h e i r nation's values. The o f f i c e r corps of developing countries although ambivalent i n t h e i r own self-image, tend to share a s e l f assurance as to t h e i r own c a p a b i l i t y i n d i r e c t i n g t h e i r country's a f f a i r s . Pye (1961) believes that because the day-to-day problems to which the m i l i t a r y are confronted are more c l e a r l y structured and because the ranges of a l t e r n a t i v e s i s narrower, the m i l i t a r y w i l l tend to overestimate 10 i t s capacity to f i n d solutions to t h e i r nations' problems. In Upper Volta and Dahomey, the m i l i t a r y j u s t i f i e d t h e i r interventions by r e f e r r i n g to the apparent incapacity of the c i v i l i a n governments to make decisions i n s i t u a t i o n s of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . Once i n power, the o f f i c e r s usually announce a series of quick decisions so as to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r reputation as men of action rather than thinkers. These decisions often appear to have l i t t l e relevance to the immediate c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . For example in The Central A f r i c a n Republic, on s e i z i n g power Colonel Bokassa issued f i v e edicts aimed at s e t t i n g up a new moral order: an o b l i - gation f o r a l l government o f f i c a l s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n weekly r e l i - gious services; the a b o l i t i o n of polygamy; a l i m i t a t i o n on early marriages f o r g i r l s ; an o b l i g a t i o n f o r a l l government employees to act as examples of Central A f r i c a n v i r t u e ; and the p r o h i b i t i o n of 24 tam-tam playing between sunrise and sunset, except on week-ends and holidays. In Upper Volta, the new m i l i t a r y government immediately announced the suppression of f i s c a l p r i v i l e g e s f o r ministers and c i v i l servants, the suppression of t e l e v i s i o n broadcasting and the closure of c e r t a i n diplomatic missions abroad. Along with ambivalence and self-assurance, a t h i r d character- i s t i c of the ideology of m i l i t a r y professionalism which has been linked with m i l i t a r y intervention i s the o f f i c e r s ' d i s t a s t e f o r 11 p o l i t i c i a n s and partisan p o l i t i c s . A f t e r s e i z i n g power i n 1965, Colonel Soglo claimed that the Dahomean army had intervened to put an end to the p o l i t i c a l i n - f i g h t i n g of the c i v i l i a n leaders which 12 was ruin i n g the country. P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s often seen as a dubious necessity i n which the army i s forced to p a r t i c i p a t e on a temporary basis. For example, i n 1966 Colonel A f r i f a announced that the Ghanian army " i s not there to govern but instead to prepare the way f o r a la w f u l l y representative Government of the People'(Evening News, Sept. 1, 1966)." Similar declarations are so widespread that many observers have concluded that the m i l i t a r y ' s animosity towards p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c i a n s i s an important motivation f o r intervention (Lusignan, 1969; Schneyder, 1965; T i x i e r , 1966). Thus i t i s not only the organizational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the army's corporate i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e which i s said to favour m i l i t a r y intervention but also the i d e o l o g i c a l super-structure which accom- panies i t . According to m i l i t a r y s o c i o l o g i s t s , ambivalence, s e l f - assurance and h o s t i l i t y towards p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c i a n s may a l l 25 support, i f not a c t u a l l y motivate, the m i l i t a r y ' s decision to intervene. This b r i e f survey has outlined the f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the m i l i t a r y organization which may