AN EXPLORATI0N *0F EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS AN APPROACH TO CURRICULUM EVALUATION by JOHN PETER ROTHE A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTORATE OF EDUCATION in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Centre for the Study of Education Administrat ion, Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia) We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY' OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Spring, 1979 © John Peter Rothe i In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of this thes is fo r f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Depa rtment The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Research Supervisor - Pr o f e s s o r T. Aoki ABSTRACT This study explores the conceptualization of an approach for evaluating socia l studies curriculum that i s grounded in the interpret ive paradigm. The approach ca l led ex i s t en t i a l phenomenology, grew out of a c r i t i c a l examination of the assumptions and p r a c t i c a l i t i e s of contemporary evaluation techniques, ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological l i t e r a tu re and ethno-graphic research. It re f l ec t s i m p l i c i t concerns recently found in curri^. culum, evaluation and sociology discourse. Ex i s tent ia l phenomenological inquiry assumes that individual 's assign perso'haTmea'nings to d i f fe rent s i tuat ions in which they are immersed. Meanings that are usually hidden or taken-for-granted by members of the everyday world are made problematic in th is study. For example, as I wr i te the abstract to the thesis I give i t meaning re f l ec t i ng the reason that I wr i te i t . The meanings I assign influence how I wr i te . Once this theme i s expanded to a socia l studies s i t ua t i on , the meanings students and teachers assign to various classroom phenomena are seen to play a s i g n i -f i can t role in "how they do what they do". S i tuat ional meanings are grounded in the basic ex i s ten t i a l pheno-menological assumption that when a teacher or student chooses a project (seeing an act as complete), he has explainable reasons for having made a choice in re la t ion to his project. The reasons suggest meanings a student or teacher assigns to a dimension of soc ia l studies. Information gathering procedures undertaken at Z Senior Secondary School are out l ined. Ethnographic techniques such as interviewing, interpret ing and describing were applied within the evaluatee-as-co-evaluator framework. Precise accounts of planning, greeting, enter ing, interviewing, ve r i f y i ng , interpret ing and describing are provided. Transcribed interviews are included to i l l u s t r a t e conversations that occurred in interview sessions. Interpretations based on "passive, immediate, responsible and transcendent areas of being" indicate that students and teachers base the i r everyday classroom a c t i v i t i e s on hidden meanings. Once meanings were i i uprooted, described and made avai lable to teachers and students, both groups took time to r e f l e c t upon them. Through discussions between part ic ipants and .myself, teachers and students c r i t i c a l l y questioned the i r assumptions and perspectives, and projected desire for change. They proposed that ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological research be expanded and that the results be forwarded to decision-makers. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page I PERSPECTIVES AND PURPOSES 1 RESEARCH, ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION 2 S im i l a r i t i e s and Differences 2 Evaluation from an Emerging Perspective 4 Evaluation and Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenology 6 PURPOSES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 7 Purposes of the Study 7 Research Questions 7 ASPECTS AND OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 8 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I 11 II NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE EVALUATION PARADIGMS 12 NORMATIVE PARADIGM OF EVALUATION 13 Va l i d i t y and R e l i a b i l i t y 14 Interests in Knowledge 15 Implied View of Education 17 The View of Man 19 Normative Evaluation L i terature 21 Evaluation as Measurement 22 Evaluation as Judgment 23 Evaluation as Decision-making 24 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued CHAPTER Page THE INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM OF EVALUATION , 27 • • Ve r i f i ca t i on 30 Interests of Knowledge 32 View of Education 33 View of Man 35 Ethnographic Research Methods in the Interpretive Paradigm 37 Part ic ipant Observation as Research ' Method . 38 Ethnomethodology as Research Method 41 Conversational Analysis as Research Method 43 Phenomenological Sociology as Research Method 45 Summary 48 Interpretive Evaluation L iterature 48 COMPLEMENTARITY 51 The Development of the Concept 51 The Physical Sciences 51 The Social Sciences 53 Psychology 56 COMPLEMENTARITY IN EVALUATION 58 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II 61 III EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASE OF THIS STUDY 70 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY 71 Ex i s tent ia l i sm 71 Phenomenology 72 v TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued CHAPTER Page Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenology 73 EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS REASONING 74 Choice 76 Pract ica l Reasoning 77 Responsibi l i ty 78 Being and Becoming 79 EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL MEANING 80 EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS PRAXIS 81 Praxis 81 D ia lec t i c Time 82 Past 83 Presence 83 Future 83 PERSONAL PRAXIS 84 SUMMARY • • 88 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III 89 IV SITUATIONAL PROCEDURES 94 CONCEPTS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE RESEARCH APPROACH 94 Situation 94 Exter ior Dimension of a Classroom 95 Inter ior Dimension of a Classroom 95 The Evaluatee as Co-Evaluator 96 ENTRY AND DATA COLLECTION 96 Preparing for Entry 96 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued CHAPTER Page Presenting Sel f and the Study 97 Negotiating Entry and Arrangements 98 • - Interviewing • ••• '• 99 Questions • • • 102 Student Questions 103 Teacher Questions , 104 FOLLOW UP AND DATA VERIFICATION 104 F i r s t Draft Write-ups:" 105 Common-Sense Ve r i f i ca t i on 105 SUMMARY 106 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 107 V FRAMEWORK FOR PRESENTATION • AND INTERPRETATION . 110 I N T R O D U C T I O N " • no Interpretation 110 Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenological Framework I l l Organization of Interview Data 113 DESCRIPTIONS OF GRADE NINE STUDENT-TEACHER MEANINGS 114 Students on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s 114 Teacher on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s •' 118 Students on Evaluation • 122 Teacher on Evaluation 126 Students on Expanded Context 127 Teacher on Expanded Context 130 Summary 132 v i i TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued CHAPTER Page DESCRIPTIONS OF GRADE TEN STUDENT-TEACHER MEANINGS 134 Students on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s 134 Teacher on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s 139 Students on Evaluation 142 Teacher on Evaluation 145 Students on Expanded Context 146 Teacher on Expanded Context 152 Summary 154 DESCRIPTIONS OF GRADE ELEVEN STUDENT-TEACHER MEANINGS 157 Students on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s • 157 Teacher on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s 163 Students on Evaluation 167 Teacher on Evaluation 169 Students on Expanded.Context 170 Teacher on Expanded Context 176 Summary 179 VI SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 182 SUMMARY 182 CONCLUSIONS 184 Students, Teachers and Social Studies 185 Passive Area of Being 185 v i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued CHAPTER Page Immediate Area of Being 186 Responsible Area of Being 187 Transcendent Area of Being 188 The Use of Evaluatee as Co-evaluator Framework 189 IMPLICATIONS 189 Data Gathering Within the Interpretive Paradigm 190 Complementarity 190 Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenology and Meaning 19,1. The Evaluatee as Co-Evaluator 191 Personal Involvement 192 BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 APPENDICES , 218 NOTES ON THE FORMAT OF THE TRANSCRIPTS 219 A TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH FIVE GRADE NINE STUDENTS 220 B TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH GRADE NINE SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHER 231 C TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH SIX GRADE TEN STUDENTS 239 D TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH GRADE TEN SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHER 257 E TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH FOUR GRADE ELEVEN STUDENTS 263 F TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH GRADE ELEVEN SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHER 289 G FEEDBACK FROM CHAIRMAN OF SOCIAL STUDIES 296 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my appreciation to the fol lowing ind iv idua l s : Dr. T. Aoki, who guided my graduate program and served as advisor in the development of the thes i s . .. Dr. .G. ...Kel sey, who.served.„as coTadvisor, helped shape, my .wr i t ing, and made extra e f fo r t s to see the successful completion of the thes i s . Dr. R. Turner, who provoked me to think about soc io log ica l methodology. Drs. I. Housego, K. Stoddart and D. Wil l iams, for t he i r suggestions and questions. Dr. W. Werner, who provided insp i rat ion and r e v i t a l i z a t i o n at key moments. Pat Fraser and J i l l Anderson, who typed the thesis with thoughtful -ness. Dave Smith, Lou Dryden, Graham Gal let.and .Art ;Schwartz who helped shape my thinking in ex i s tent i a l i sm, evaluation, and educational research. Special appreciation i s expressed to may wife Ann, who understood the need to achieve, and who was patient and in sp i ra t iona l during my many predicaments and moods resu l t ing from many hours of frustrated study. I am also deeply indebted to my mother and father who were always supportive. x Chapter I PERSPECTIVES AND PURPOSES In everyday usage evaluation means making judgments: in education evaluation involves making judgments about a s o c i a l , public a c t i v i t y . To make judgments relevant information must be co l l ec ted , assembled and presented in some orderly form. The information becomes a key component of responsible decision-making. There is currently a debate in the f i e l d of education evaluation as to what comprises relevant data. Some authors such as Popham (1977), Wilcox (1977), Shoemaker (1975) and Alk in (1974) advocate standardization tests based on reductionism. A reduct ionist approach seeks to reduce problems to the i r smallest and most s c i e n t i f i c a l l y analyzable components. Other authors such as Carini (1975), Hein (1975) and Patton (1975) i n s i s t on a broader evaluation data-gathering approach which involves i nd i v idua l s ' perceptions that are less susceptible to measurement. They favor a h o l i s t i c approach --one which i s based on the be l i e f that problems must be discussed in the i r natural context, as a whole. Curriculum evaluation, which involves judgments about a curriculum, is performed in a soc ia l environment. Hence i t concerns integral parts of school organization within a s ingle pol icy unit (Hein, 1975). It could be argued that a complex of s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , physical and economic factors should be recognized. According to Hein : An education program that, for example, increased reading scores for chi ldren at the expense of physical health would be highly unl ike ly to be acceptable, no matter what the standardized test resu l t showed. S im i l a r l y , any program or innova-t ion that disrupted the health of the school system or the functioning of the community would have serious problems; the judgments about i t would r e f l e c t t h i s , regardless of what the i n t e l l e c tua l growth and development of indiv idual chi ldren might be. (1975:22) .2 The richness and complexity of curriculum in the classroom is wider than what can be measured (Eisner, 1974b),. It i s part of th i s r i c h -ness and complexity to which this study addresses i t s e l f . This thesis explores the conceptualization of an approach for evaluating socia l studies curriculum that i s grounded in the interpret ive paradigm. In order to c l a r i f y the background of the study i t w i l l be useful f i r s t to examine what evaluation i s , and what distinguishes i t from assessment and research. Secondly, i t i s necessary to understand some of the philosophical and associated methodological features of an approach to evaluation which has emerged over the past f i ve years and which i s used in the present study. The statement of the purpose of the study follows these explanations and the chapter concludes with a description of some procedural features involved in the study, the i r implications for the way the thesis i s wr i t ten , and an overview of the contents of each chapter. RESEARCH, ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION S im i l a r i t i e s and Differences The present state of a f f a i r s in education suggests that there are no c lear d i s t inct ions between research, assessment and evaluation. Although the three concepts interre late, they can be distinguished as " ideal s tates " . For example, Hemphill (1969) states there is s o l i d agreement over the assumption that the broad objective of educational research is to add to the knowledge of present practices and methods of education. Less agreement is evident as to whether new knowledge created by educational research should have some immediate usefulness, or whether such research is s u f f i c i e n t l y j u s t i f i e d by the potential value of any new knowledge or by the sa t i s fac t ion of any " i d l e cu r i o s i t y " . D ist inct ions between "applied research" and "basic research" are often based on considerations for the possible usefulness of spec i f i c new knowledge (Hemphill, 1969). According to Helmstadter (1970) and Best (1977), research in education i s a problem solving a c t i v i t y which leads to new knowledge and truths ,. by using such methods of inquiry as observation, description and analysis to explain what happens under certain circumstances. .3 The broad purpose of assessment i s to acquire an understanding of "what i s " in a s i t ua t i on . Brandes (1974) and Sanders and Cunningham (1974) bu i ld on th i s conception by suggesting that assessment of a s i tuat ion can be arr ived at in d i f ferent ways. For example, external c r i t e r i a (e.g., check marking, testing) may be employed to gain information about student achieve-ment in a program or about parental att itudes towards the objectives about a program. Internal information can be gained by " inspecting the program i t s e l f " . Included in this c r i t e r i on is descr ipt ive information 'of the program ent i ty (stated behavioral object ives, materials and proposed a c t i v i t i e s ) . Yet another means of a r r i v ing at an assessment is by means of contextual information which covers the description of the conditions under which a program functions. Classroom environment, pupil character i s t i c s and forms of interact ion are examples of information that are recognized as being relevant to this c r i t e r i o n . Evaluation studies provide a basis for making decisions about a lternat ives and, therefore, in undertaking an evaluation study one usually addresses himself to questions of u t i l i t y . Hemphill supports the u t i l i t y perspective when he wr i tes : Regardless of the lack of precis ion in th ink ing, . providing information for choice among a lternat ives remains the basic and u t i l i t a r i a n purpose of evaluation studies (1969:190)-Harris presents an a l l encompassing focus on the purpose of evalua-t ion by out l in ing i t s broad objective as : ...the systematic process of judging the worth, d e s i r a b i l i t y , effect iveness, or adequacy of something according to def in i te c r i t e r i a and purposes. The judgment i s based upon a careful comparison of observa-t ion data with c r i t e r i a standards. Precise def in i t ions of what i s to be appraised, c lea r l y stated purposes, spec i f i c standards for the c r i t e r i a t r a i t s , accurate observations and measurements, and log ica l conclusions are the hallmarks of v a l i d evaluation (1968:95). From one perspective the act of e x p l i c i t valuing i s a subsequent a c t i v i t y a f te r data have been gathered (Steele, 1977). This i s education evaluation's major difference from education assessment. Assessment per se i s the employment of research procedures to develop an understanding about a program. Although judgments are i m p l i c i t in the adoption of the research A approach, no e x p l i c i t judgment i s placed on resu l t ing information. When judgments are made on assessment by some c r i t e r i a of worth, e x p l i c i t evalua-t ion occurs. The design of an assessment for evaluation demands the best of research methodology and analysis.^ Evaluation from an Emerging Perspective Conventional evaluation data-gathering techniques have usually been student achievement tes t s , att i tude measures, survey questionnaires, pre-defined observations and interviews. Many recent writers on evaluation, however, have argued that a broader approach to evaluation data-gathering is des irable. For example, House, Stake, Magoon and McDermott understood the need for expanded sources of descr ipt ive information by recommending " i n t u i t i o n i s t / p l u r a l i s t " (House, 1978), "case study" (Stake, 1978), "construct! "v i s t ic " (Magoon, 1977), and "const i tut ive ethnographic" (McDermott, 1977) approaches to evaluation data-gathering. In par t i cu la r Stake declares: I believe that i t i s reasonable to conclude that one of the more e f fec t i ve means of adding to understanding for a l l readers w i l l be by approxi-mating through the words and i l l u s t r a t i o n s of our reports, the natural experience acquired in ordering personal involvement« (1978:5). Greater emphasis on h o l i s t i c descr ipt ive data brings with i t a re-conceptual ization of the evaluator ' s aims and ro les. Proposing episodic, s ub j e c t i v i s t i c procedures, Stake contends that: When explanation, proposit ional knowledge, and law are the aims of inqu i ry , the case study w i l l often be at a disadvantage. When the aims are understanding, extension of the experience and increase in conviction in that which is known, the disadvantage disappears. (1978:6). Stake supports the soc io log i s t Becker (1968) by stat ing that: . . .frequently...everyday-1ife perspective w i l l be superior fo r discourse among scholars for they too often share among themselves more of ordinary experience than of special conceptualization (1978:6). • 5" House (1978) suggests that i n t u i t i o n i s t / p l u r a l i s t evaluation procedures based on s ub j e c t i v i s t i c ( interpret ive) epistemology are required to obtain va l i d insights within the frame of reference of the group in which the evaluator works. S im i l a r l y , McDermott (1977) emphasizes the employment of research procedures which allow evaluators to look care fu l l y at how teachers and students "make sense" of each other, within the l im i t s provided by the context of the i r community. Tacit knowledge, or knowledge which l i e s i m p l i c i t in a s i t ua t i on , should be sought by the evaluator who, by using such procedures, seeks to go beyond e x p l i c i t knowledge resu l t ing from conventional evaluation data-gathering procedures. As evaluation i s i n tent iona l l y context-bound, findings are interpreted in context. Like Stake, House notes that: The s ub j e c t i v i s t i c methodology tends to be n a t u r a l i s t i c . I t aims at n a t u r a l i s t i c general iza-t ion (based on the experience of the audience); i s directed more at non-technical audiences l i k e teachers or the general pub l ic ; uses ordinary language and everyday categories of events; and is based more on informal than formal log ic . Informal interviews and observations, often written up as case studies, are the favor i te data co l l ec t i on devices (1978:9). Evaluative inquiry approaches that educators l i k e Stake, House, Magoon and McDermott discuss f a l l within the interpret ive paradigm described, in Chapter II. These techniques are based on the fol lowing epistemological view of v a l i d i t y described by House: Va l i d i t y i s conceived as being re la t i ve to the conditions of the human mind e i ther because of universal l im i ta t ions on the way people think or because of personal l im i tat ions (in the o b j e c t i v i s t ' s framework, v a l i d i t y often i s conceived as predict ing one observable category from another)...Subjective v a l i d i t y means that truth is r e l a t i ve to human nature and perhaps even to pa r t i cu la r humans. What i s va l i d for one person may not be va l id for another . (1978:8). Evaluation approaches within the interpret ive paradigm and detai led by educators such as Magoon, McDermott, House and Stake, provide the basis for this exploratory study, which applies ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology to evaluation. .6 Evaluation and Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenology The philosophical pr inc ip les of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology and the invest igat ive techniques of ethnography provide the foundation for the development of the approach to curriculum evaluation used in th i s study. The intention is to raise to a conscious leve l , insights which selected existential-phenomenologists have provided. Ex i s tent ia l phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Ricoeur, Ponty, Kierkegaard, and Ortega have added to an understanding of what i t means to be human. Their or ientat ion in ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology has led to the reconceptualization of evaluation as an integrated and re la t iona l way of thinking. This rethinking involves viewing man as always being- in-a-s i t ua t i on , as act i ve ly engaged in a d i a l e c t i c of personal and socia l meaning, giving and discovering in each s i tuat ion (G iorg i , 1971a). Teachers and students are always engaged in a socia l s i tuat ion when par t i c ipat ing in soc ia l studies classrooms. They are co-developers of numerous tasks which have meaning for a member-in-the-classroom. Giorgi concurs by emphasizing that: ...The meaning that aids the learning s i tuat ion is not the already constituted meanings that words have, but rather the very spec i f i c and concrete meaning that the item assumes for the subject by v i rtue of the task and s i t ua t i on , and i t is one that has to be freshly const ituted by the subject-. (1971b: 96). In the soc ia l sett ing of a classroom, meanings which indiv iduals assume and assign to aspects of the class w i l l change as circumstances change. Such meanings const itute a person's understanding of the everyday world of a school classroom and influence the teaching, learning, knowing and doing that occurs (Rothe, 1978). This point is i l l u s t r a t e d by Scheler ' s (1954) discussion on human labour. The phenomenon of human labour i s not only a response to environmental condit ions, but i s also based on value or ientat ion. What labour means to the labourer helps to .de.termirie his att i tude towards i t . S im i l a r l y , what soc ia l studies classroom experiences mean to students and teachers helps to determine the i r att i tude towards the program. Their a t t i tudes , in turn, a f fect learning and in s t ruct ion . Uncovering meanings may be accomplished by using a process of exp l icat ion (G iorg i , 1971b). The purpose of the present study i s derived from this focus. .4 PURPOSES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS Purposes of the Study 1. To conceptualize a procedure of inquiry in education which results in knowledge about people's da i ly a c t i v i t i e s in schools. 2. To develop a philosophical basis for an evaluation data-gathering methodology which l i e s within the interpret ive paradigm. 3. To develop a data-gathering methodology which l i e s within the interpret ive paradigm. 4. To use such a methodology to y i e l d knowledge about s i tuat iona l ' meanings of students: and teachers in i socja^ ' Research Questions The fol lowing questions provide a framework for the approach to the invest igation:. 1. How are interpret ive evaluation approaches d i f fe rent from normative evaluation approaches? Can they be seen as complementary? (Chapter I I, NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE EVALUATION'PARADIGMS)' 2. How can an ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological l i ne of reasoning be developed which serves as the epistemological basis for exp l icat ing meaning while maintaining a d i a l e c t i c re lat ionship with people's situatedness and personal engagement? • (Chapter I I I, EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHICAL BASE •OF THIS STUDY) •8 3. How can ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology be employed in a soc ia l studies s i tuat ion? (Chapter IV, SITUATIONAL PROCEDURES) 4. What s i tuat iona l meanings are revealed by employing the ex i s ten-t i a l phenomenological framework in a s i tuat ion? (Chapter V, FRAMEWORK: FOR-PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION) Each of these four questions i s answered within a separate chapter rather concurrently throughout the study. than ASPECTS AND OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS The thesis is wr i tten in a mu l t i - d i a l e c t i c s ty le whereby philosophical reasoning and empirical practice are changing and have changed over time. As the thesis developed, the author 's perspective changed,.,resul t ing in further thesis changes. The thesis changes in turn influenced the author 's point of view, resu l t ing in more changes. This process-oriented form of thinking and wr i t ing creates a s i tuat ion for ongoing growth of the conceptual'development of the study, the pract ica l data-gathering procedures, the thes i s , author, and reader. Since the study is grounded in interpretat ion and descr ipt ion i t i s bounded by ethnographic and ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological parameters. Such terms as meaning, freedom, choice", r e spons i b i l i t y , being, becoming, s i t ua t i on , project, understanding, i n te rpretat ion , motive, reason, v e r i f i c a t i o n , va l i da t i on , data and framework are used within the context of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology and/or ethnography. Imprecision-of-match with the meanings which these terms may have in the conventional ("normative") paradigm of evaluation i s l i k e l y to occur and, unless the reader is aware of th i s p o s s i b i l i t y , he may f ind himself assuming incons istent, incomplete or d istorted character-i zat ions . Care has been taken to use such terms as far as possible in contexts which make the i r meaning c lear. .9 Conceptual tools consistent with the frame of reference employed by evaluators within the interpret ive paradigm have been chosen.. Transforma-tion of the procedures to the frame of reference employed by evaluators operating within the normative paradigm is epistemological ly inconsistent and w i l l cer ta in ly resu l t in d i storted views regarding v a l i d i t y , o b j e c t i v i t y , r e l i a b i l i t y and prec is ion. A r i s t o t l e ' s caution, that in any inquiry the "prec i s ion" to be expected must be in proportion to the nature of the subject in question, should be heeded. For example, mathematical meaning is precise, whereas in people's da i ly l i ves meanings in s i tuat ions change with circumstances (Rothe, 1978). Dilthey elaborates: The human studies are thus founded on th i s re lat ion between l i ved experience, expression, and understanding. Here for the f i r s t time we reach a quite c lear c r i t e r i on by which the del imitat ion of the human studies can be de f i n i t e l y carr ied out. A study belongs to the human studies only i f i t s object becomes accessible to us through the att i tude which is founded on the re lat ion between l i f e , expression and understanding., (c i ted in Stake, 1978:6). In most theses, i t i s assumed that the researcher detaches himself from the substantive issues of the study (Wilson, 1977). Consistency with ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology requires the ' f i r s t person' viewpoint. The object, thes i s , reveals i t s e l f through the w r i t e r ' s personal involvement. It has a qua l i ta t i ve character which is related to the author 's personal l i f e . At present i t i s the w r i t e r ' s measure of a l l things. To reta in fa ithfulness with the author's tota l commitment and involvement and to the philosophical assumptions of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology the thesis i s largely written in the f i r s t person. The thesis contains s ix chapters. This f i r s t chapter has introduced the study through a b r i e f description of s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between research, assessment and evaluation, and an emerging perspective of evaluation. The descriptions were followed by an out l ine of the ph i l o -sophical bases and methodological implications of evaluation and ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology. This was followed by the purposes of the study and research questions. Chapter II serves as a l i t e r a tu re review which progresses towards establishment of the study's conceptual thrust. I t is divided into three d i s t i n c t sections. The f i r s t section deals with normative evaluation .10 l i t e r a t u r e . The second section includes l i t e r a tu re which i l l u s t r a t e s research approaches in the interpret ive paradigm. The th i rd section integrates both paradigms to i l l u s t r a t e that a complementary portrayal of education phenomena i s possible and des irable. The interpret ive paradigm provides the methodological basis for the employment of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological reasoning outl ined in Chapter I I I. This chapter also includes an in-depth descr ipt ion of a d i a l e c t i c reasoning which underlies th i s study. Chapter IV describes the development and employment of an informa-tion gathering method within the interpret ive paradigm. Chapter V presents the interpreted descriptions resu l t ing from the data thus gathered. The s ixth and f i n a l chapter i s divided 'into summary , conclusions and implications sections. The structure of the thesis includes extended footnotes which are found at the end of each chapter for the reader's convenience. It --is-K-intended further te c l a r i f y selected ideas. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I 1 Although educational research and evaluation resemble each other, there i s an awareness that each i s a f i e l d in i t s own r ight . Glass, for example, summarizes the major d i s t inct ions between evaluation (evalua-t ive inquiry) and research (elucidatory inqu i ry ) : a) Motivation of the Inquirer. Elucidatory inquiry is pursued to sa t i s f y cu r i o s i t y , whereas evaluative inquiry i s undertaken to solve pract ica l problems. b) Objective of the Search. Elucidatory inquiry seeks conclusions; evaluative inquiry leads to decisions. c) Laws versus Description. Elucidatory inquiry is the search for laws, while evaluative inquiry seeks to describe a pa r t i cu la r thing with respect to one or more scales of value. d) Role Explanation. Elucidatory inquiry involves •manipulation of spec i f i c components of independent var iables. Evaluative inquiry does not search for general laws on which explanations of schooling can be based. e) Autonomy of Inquiry. Elucidatory inquiry must be free to fol low leads which pique the cur io s i t y of those who know most intimately the aspirations of the d i s c i p l i n e . Evaluative inquiry is undertaken at the request of a c l i e n t who expects that par t i cu la r questions -wi l l be answered. f ) Properties of the Phenomena which are Assessed. Elucidatory inquiry is an attempt to assess s c i e n t i f i c t ru th , while evaluative inquiry attempts to assess the worth of a thing. g) "Un iver sa l i t y " of the Phenomena Studied. Elucidatory inquiry in education uses concepts that are r e l a t i v e l y permanent, applicable to schooling everywhere. Evaluative inquiry is concerned with phenomena that may not be widely shared. h) Salience of the Value Question. The difference between elucidatory and evaluative inquiry is one of degree, not of kind. i ) Investigative Techniques. Elucidatory and evaluative inquirers work within the same inquiry paradigm...both must include s k i l l development in general research methodology. (Glass, 1972:3-18) For addit ional information s ign i fy ing the difference between education research and education evaluation, see Best (1977:14-16), Steele (1977:30-35) and Hemphill (1969:189-221). Chapter II NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE EVALUATION PARADIGMS Worthen and Sanders (1973) suggest that most evaluation i s the co l lec t ion and use of information to judge educational programs. The evaluator interprets educational s i tuat ions and programs from a def in i te perspective. The data he generates, c l a s s i f i e s and defines are products in part of the evaluator ' s i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t assumptions, b e l i e f s , interests and approaches (Werner, 1977). Judgments made upon the data r e f l e c t a par t i cu la r frame of reference or point of view representative of a def in i te paradigm. In a Kuhnian sense, paradigm refers to a group's d i s c ip l i na ry frame of reference. It consists of a matrix of ordered elements including ru les , concepts, def in i t ions of r e a l i t y , approaches, b e l i e f s , commitments to certain procedural c r i t e r i a , and heur i s t i c and ontological models (whose function is to supply a group with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors). These elements help determine what w i l l be accepted as explana-tions and as so lut ions . ' Other elements included in a paradigm are symbolic generalizations (statements of law, pr inc ip le and theory), techniques of log ica l and mathematical manipulation, and values i m p l i c i t l y derived through time from a research exemplar (Kuhn, 1970:184-192; Werner, 1977:33). In th i s study evaluation methodology w i l l be considered within the context of two d i f f e ren t , yet complementary paradigms--the normative and the in terpret i ve . Features and assumptions of the normative and interpret ive paradigms of; evaluation have been distinguished to provide a c learer under-standing of the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological perspective which is- grounded in the interpret ive paradigm. The f i r s t part of the chapter explains the normative paradigm and some relevant evaluation l i t e r a t u r e . The second part c l a r i f i e s the interpret ive paradigm, describing i t s a l ternat ive methodologies and relevant evaluation l i t e r a t u r e . F i n a l l y , both paradigms are conceptually integrated to i l l u s t r a t e the i r complementarity. .12. NORMATIVE PARADIGM OF EVALUATION The term "normative" i s not used in the sense of "p re sc r ip t i ve " (that i s , specifying an ideal norm of conduct), but rather to emphasize one kind of s t rateg ic role of norms in evaluation reasoning. Within the normative paradigm, complex soc ia l phenomena are viewed as patterned arrangements of rule-governed interact ions among indiv idual actors (Wilson, 1970). Evaluation explanations in th is paradigm take a deductive form character i s t i c of the natural sciences. They are e s sent ia l l y based on the quant i f icat ion of phenomena (Patton, 1975). Major theoret ical approaches in normative evaluation l i t e r a tu re r e f l e c t relevant features of a pattern of act ion. They account for dispo-s i t ions that have been acquired by the i nd i v idua l . The disposit ions may be at t i tudes , intent ions, -sentiments',,- conditioned responses, need disposit ions or sanctioned expectations to which the indiv idual i s subject (Wilson, 1970: 57-58). Interaction between indiv iduals i s subject to the role expectations imposed by the i r respective statuses (C icoure l , 1971). Inkeles (c i ted in Merton, 1957:249-276), Homans (1945), and Becker J-l-968) specify- that in order to. account for. patterns.of action in terms of \ disposit ions and expectations, i t i s necessary to adopt ( i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y ) a model of the actor that indicates how disposit ions are acquired and modified, and how the actor ' s d isposit ions are related to observed act ion. Interaction is accounted for by ident i fy ing structures of expectations and complexes of d i spos i t ions. Thus the actors ' observed manners of action can be discussed in terms of the properties spec i f ied in the evaluator ' s model and can be explained in terms of the i den t i f i ed disposit ions and expectations (Wilson, 1970). Explanations in the normatiye paradigm are usually in deductive form. They are often seen by evaluators as empir ica l ly described facts that are deduced l o g i c a l l y from theoret ical premises in conjunction with already given empirical conditions. Assumed theoret ical premises of evaluation explana-tions consist of assumptions embodied in the evaluator ' s model of teacher, student and postulates of education he adopts. The given conditions .14 ( s i tuat ional influences) might then be recognized by the evaluator as features of the phenomenon rather than problematic influences for • invest igat ion. While th i s l i n e of thought i s not always employed through-out evaluation inqui ry, i t remains the major ideal discourse about theory and methodology in the normative paradigm (Patton, 1975; Ca r i n i , 1975). The d i s t i nc t i on between the normative and other paradigms i s best seen through an examination of certa in features of the kinds-of .knowledge and understanding which are appropriate to the normative as d i s t i n c t from other paradigms. Thus i t may be noted that the normative paradigm i s based on a par t i cu la r epistemological grounding in which the v a l i d i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y of knowledge is meaningful. Further, to use the normative paradigm is to assume a -part icu lar . interest in.knowledge, view of education and nature of man (Habermas, 1971). The fol lowing sub-sections amplify each of these-part iculars and-prepare the way for a f i na l sub-section in which the l i t e r a t u r e of normative evaluation i s examined. Va l i d i t y and R e l i a b i l i t y Va l i d i t y is an important concept of measurement in the normative paradigm. There are two basic approaches to va l idat ion . One approach employs a log ica l analysis concerned with t r a i t measurement; th i s i s e s sent ia l l y a judgmental analys is. The other.approach concerns c r i t e r i on measurement (Wiersma, 1975:171-177), and i s attent ive to content and construct v a l i d i t y . Kaplan (1964:377), Kerlinger (1964:190), Helmstadter (1970:296-300), Best (1977:188-189), and Wiersma (1977:168-175) write that log ica l analysis i s used for content v a l i d i t y . Content v a l i d i t y refers to the extent to which test items r e f l e c t the academic d i s c i p l i ne or behavior upon which the study i s b u i l t . Included in content v a l i d i t y are face v a l i d i t y (what an instrument appears to measure), sampling v a l i d i t y (what s p e c i f i c a l l y defined universe of behavior is adequately sampled by the instrument in question), and f a c to r i a l v a l i d i t y (to what extent a given instrument measures various content areas). Of the types of v a l i d i t i e s mentioned, construct v a l i d i t y is perhaps the most cent ra l . Construct refers to the theoret ical t r a i t being measured, not the technical construction of test items (Wiersma, 1977:168-175). .15 Construct v a l i d i t y i s best described by Messick: . . . a l l measurement should be construct referenced. A measure estimates how much of something an indiv idual displays-or possesses. The basic question i s , "What is the nature of something?" It may be answered by re fer r ing to evidence in support of pa r t i cu la r a t t r i -butes, processes, or t r a i t s construed to underlie and • determine task performance (1974:8). While v a l i d i t y i s attent ive to the questions of whether the i n s t ru -ment measures what i t purports to measure and whether the data mean what the researcher thinks they mean, r e l i a b i l i t y concerns the questions of whether the study is r ep l i cab le , and whether the s c i e n t i f i c findings are consistent.:-. An instrument i s r e l i ab l e to the extent that i t measures accurately and consistently from one time to another. Merton (1957), Deutscher (1973) and Best (1977) agree that researchers (or evaluators) operating out of the normative paradigm are preoccupied with problems of r e l i a b i l i t y . Faithfulness to r e l i a b i l i t y appears to be a basic concern in the production of knowledge within normative research (Ker l inger, 1964). Emphasis on r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y as technical research parameters i s one kind of cognitive interest in knowledge further described in the fol lowing sub-secti on. Interests in Knowledge Evaluators within the normative paradigm most often view programs as means-ends re lat ions . Based on a means-ends rat ionale the evaluator ' s emphasis on applied techniques (means) i s tantamount to suggesting, advis ing, guiding, recommending and/or d i c ta t ing how programs can be improved in terms of increased student learning (frequently measured by test scores), the e f f i -ciency of resource a l l o ca t i on , and.the p r ed i c t ab i l i t y of goal attainment. The corpus of knowledge employed i s j u s t i f i e d according to i t s pract ica l benefits to certain people (Blum, 1970). Blum emphasizes th i s point by asserting that: . . .a corpus of knowledge cannot be defined and warranted unless the objects of knowledge (members of society) are able to use such knowledge as normative orders... • This.means that producers "of knowledge can be expected to meet c r i t e r i a of adequacy only i f they respect (and perhaps share) the point of view of those soc ieta l members who w i l l employ such knowledge (1970:120). Research techniques such as pre- or post - test ing, systems analys i s , cost/benefit analys i s , and questionnaires sugg*erst;/a t e c h n i c a l i n t e r e s t i n ^ knowledge (Gurvitch, 1971). Gurvitch explains that technical knowledge i s : ...both e x p l i c i t , inasmuch as i t i s transmitted, and i m p l i c i t , inasmuch as i t is involved in p ract i ce , s k i l l and dexter i ty . On the other hand, technical knowledge has a much wider domain than the manipula- t ion of matter. I t i s that knowledge which is concerned with every kind of e f fec t i ve manipulation--a r t i f i c i a l and subordinate, but tending to become independent and valued as such--precise, transmiss ible, and innovative, i t s acquis i t ion i s inspired by desire to dominate the worlds of nature, humanity, and soc iety, in order to produce, destroy, safeguard, organize, plan, communicate and disseminate (1971:29)1 (Emphasis added) As Gurvitch impl ies, the information produced through normative evaluation methods places a high value on cer ta in ty , expanding the power of technical control (Habermas, 1971; Apple, 1974). The l i s t e d techniques f a l l within Habermas' empi r i ca l -ana ly t ica l approach to research, which incorporates technical cognitive in teres t s . As Habermas pos its : ...The log ica l structure of admissible systems of propositions and the type of conditions for corrobora-t ion suggest that theories of the empirical sciences disclose r e a l i t y subject to the const i tut ive interest in the possible securing and expansion, through i n f o r -mation, of feedback-monitored act ion. This i s the cognitive interest in technical control over o b j e c t i -f ied processes (1971:309). In Toward A Rational Society Habermas (.1970a) describes the i n s t ru -mental action that results from technica l ly produced information. He notes Instrumental action i s governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge. In every case they imply conditioned predictions about observable events, physical or s o c i a l . The conduct of rat ional choice is governed by strategies based on analyt ic knowledge. They imply deductions from preference rules (value systems) and decision procedures; these propositions are e i ther correct ly or incor rect ly deduced. Purposive-rational action rea l izes defined goals under given conditions (1970:354). .17 Rational decisions fol low answers to questions such as, "Is there a corre lat ion between means and ends?" "What is the cost per unit as compared with other programs or with provincia l costs?" "Are the means e f fect i ve ? " "How are the inputs organized to achieve operational goals?" and "Can we predict with any degree of accuracy the e f fect the program w i l l have on subsequent achievement?" Bar f ie ld captures the interest in knowledge assumed in the norma-t ive paradigm of evaluation by ind icat ing that a "person's re lat ionship to the world become technology, that which enables us to make nature do our bidding" (Ba r f i e ld , 1966:138). In terms of evaluation, the interests an evaluator has in knowledge may influence the view he has towards education, explained in the next subsection. Implied View of Education Assumed in the normative evaluation focus i s a be l i e f in the l e g i t i -macy of education as a formal i n s t i t u t i o n with soc ieta l authority to soc i a l i ze young people (Ross, 1969; Berger and Berger, 1975). According to Durkheim: : The man whom education must rea l i ze in us is not the man such as nature made him, but such as society wants him to be, such as i t s internal structure demands him to be... . Thus our pedagogical ideal i s explained by our socia l s t ructure, jus t as that of the Greeks and Romans could be explained by the organization of the i r c i t y (c i ted in de Coppens, 1976:76). The virtues and ideals the education system stresses are usually recognized by evaluators as the work of society since society; draws the por t ra i t of the 'Ideal Man.' which re f lec t s i t s organizat ion, structures and processes (de Coppens, 1976). Education's moral foundation is formed by pressuring students to conform to the i n s t i t u t i ona l i z ed way of l i f e (Vandenburg, 1971). Under soc iety ' s auspices the tota l process of education consists of i n s t i t u t i ona l and cognitive aspects. Von Bertalanffy (1950) concurs by suggesting that the i n s t i t u t i ona l form of education abolishes indiv idual discr imination and decision-making and replaces i t by universal conditioned reactions. Evaluators who adopt th is be l i e f pre-suppose that education i s * the "transmission" of cognitive knowledge and s k i l l s in as .18 e f f i c i e n t a process as possible (iVandenburg, 1971; Apple, 1975). Belth concurs: The improvement of ways in which this transmitted knowledge information i s retr ieved and made pertinent in a given present with increasing e f f i c i ency , accuracy, and dispatch, i s what is meant by education... • (1965:1). The evaluator ' s view of education as a transmission process may be compared to a systems theo r i s t ' s description of a thermostat which: ...shows a goal directed a c t i v i t y . From i t s repertoire of ' po s s ib le ' a c t i v i t y , i t i s said to make a ' s e l e c t i o n ' by adjusting a ' c o n t r o l ' or ' sw i tch ' on the basis of ' informat ion ' as to the d i spar i ty or 'mismatch' between the current state of a f f a i r s and what is termed ' g oa l - s t a te ' . The a c t i v i t y selected is ' c a l cu la ted ' to reduce d i s -par i ty (McKay, 1962:90). When the 'thermostat as system 1 i l l u s t r a t i o n i s placed alongside the fol lowing descr ipt ion offered by Apple, the analogy becomes highly cred ib le: Evaluation usually f i t s into a systems management model that looks something l i k e th i s : we define a program's educational objectives (preferably in measurable terms); proper experiences are developed and organized to bring the student from point A to point B (from not meeting objectives to meeting them); evaluation occurs along the way and at the completion, comparing results to other programs or to the discrepancy between goals and performance; and this evaluation gives feedback to make the system function more smoothly and e f f i c i e n t l y . In essence, i t i s an i ndus t r i a l production mode of schooling (1974:9). Teachers are seen by these evaluators as 'key components of the educa-t ional system. They aid the system to become maximally e f f i c i e n t in the production of e f f i c i e n t people who, in turn, are bel ievedto guarantee an e f f i c i e n t society (Callahan, 1962). As is appropriate for an e f f i c i e n t society, education i s concerned with the transmission of knowledge that w i l l have pract ica l use for l i f e (Berger and Berger, 1975). Beneath the concern for the input, throughput, and output of information, is a pa ra l l e l implied view of the individual v i s -a -v i s society which i s explained in the fol lowing pages. The View of Man According to de Coppens (1976),the work and or ientat ion of a thinker is affected by a " subtheoret ica l " and " a x i o l o g i ca l " set of meta-physical be l ie f s that are formed pr io r to:-,- and independent of his endeavours. Evaluators within the normative paradigm can be compared to Gouldner's description of a soc io log i s t : Like i t or not, and know i t or not, soc io log ists w i l l organize the i r researches in terms of the i r p r io r assumptions; the character of sociology, to know what a sociology i s , therefore requires us to ident i f y i t s deepest assumptions about man and society. For these reasons i t w i l l not be to i t s methods of study to which I w i l l look for an under-standing of i t s character, but rather to i t s assumptions about man and society (1970:28-29). The nature of man underlying the normative paradigm has i t s roots in natural or s c i e n t i f i c r ea l i smJ Being a l i v i n g organism with a w e l l -developed nervous system, man belongs f i r s t of a l l to a species of animals (Kel lner, 1964:41; Jaspers, 1965:31). Diderot, D'Alembert, Vo l t a i r e , Condi l lac, and La Mettrie provided the foundation for the claim that consciousness emerges from a being's b io log ica l organism (de Coppens, 1976). Kant (1900) in part adopted the Enlightenment c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of man as object and moral being. This thesis was conceptually Expanded" by Durkheim and Znaniecki. Durkheim, for example, applied Kant's s c i e n t i f i c perspective to sociology, while Znaniecki employed Kant's moral perspective of man in the social sciences (Bruyn, 1966; Coser, 1973). The normative paradigm is rooted in Durkheim's perspective on man. According to Durkheim (1933) man is a two-storey house composed of a lower biopsychic stratum and a sui generis psychosocial superstructure. The psychosocial part of man and a l l of man's values and ideals are products of society. Human beings are human only by l i v i n g i n , through and for the soc ia l group to which they belong; the co l l ec t i ve l i f e fashions and trans-forms the i r i n te l l i gence , moral, conscience, re l ig ious b e l i e f s , and i d e a l i s t i c aspirations. ; as* well as the means by which they may be rea l ized (Aron, 1968; Coser, 1971; de Coppens, 1976). .20 Locke (1894) also assumed man to be but a creature of his environ-ment. I f the environment (which may be equatedwith Durkheim's society) is good, his character w i l l be molded for the good; i f i t i s bad, so w i l l he be (Drews and Lipson, 1971). Skinner 's (1968) behavioral interpretat ion of man evolved largely from Locke's man as mechanism thesis (or man as tabula rasa). His view paral1 el ' s ,MacKay's (1962) assertion that man is a "ship that is a f u l l operating system, but must be act i ve ly steered according to information on i t s deviations from i t s true course." These fundamental conceptions support normative evaluation thought. Evaluators within the normative paradigm set a high p r i o r i t y on measuring student achievement of pre-determined and external ly imposed ends. Prominent educators such as Mager (1962) and Popham (1974) ass i s t the quest for evaluative data by establ i sh ing procedures for precisely defining cognitive object ives. This precis ion helps the evaluator measure, t e s t , and feedback'.information into the school system. It i s easy to see how an overr iding concern about ends can suggest the manipulation of a student 's behavior towards the expectations of an interest group (Do l l , 1972; Apple, 1975). The evaluator ' s pre-dispos it ion towards a means-ends interpretat ion of programs further suggests that the re lat ion of means-ends i s u n i l a t e r a l , proceeding exclus ive ly from ends to means (Dewey, 1916). This s i gn i f i e s that a l l aims or purposes are directed and control led by the end with only those aims that are consistent with the end having worth. Such a concept may give the evaluator, program developer, and administrator a certain moral super ior i ty that students in the a c t i v i t y do not have (Dewey, 1916; Do l l , 1972). Curriculum developers, administrators and evaluators l i k e students and teachers to undergo modification of which students.and teachers might .not be the source (Do l l , 1972). Students and teachers are expected to become what external sources prescribe. External sources have the authority to do th i s . ~ They view-the essential ' character or the essence of students and' teachers as a-universal because the essence of man needs to be idea l l y developed into a c o l l e c t i v e essence (Durkheim, 1933; Simmel, 1950). " The view suggested to underl ie normative evaluation i s that man should become what external designs d ic ta te . Altruism i s to rule over egoism (Comte, c i ted in de Coppens, 1976). Ideal ly man's psychosocial being i s a microcosm of the social structure. He interna l i zes v soc iety ' . s c o l l e c t i v e ideals and uses rat ional and manageable means to rea l i se and ob jec t i f y them (Durkheim, .21 1933). According to Skinner (1969), man should become an automatic re f lex of the group. In school, the student's role in r ea l i z i ng objectives has been that of a receiver. Doll (1972), Huebner (1975)McDonald (1975), and Apple (1975) suggest that the student is expected to receive habits, t r a i n i ng , encultura-t i o n , and indoctr inat ion before he is considered to have a va l i d point of view o r i s allowed to function as an active agent. He becomes what Simmel refers to in the fol lowing statement: Concrete man i s reduced to general man: he is the essence of each indiv idual person, jus t as the universal laws of matter in general are embodied in any fragmentary matter, however s p e c i f i c a l l y i t be formed (1950:67). The student w i l l eventually become a universal ized man, f u l l y adjusted, introverted,-and in f u l l harmony with society (Berger and Berger, 1975). Durkheim (1963) suggests that universal man is the ideal towards which education aims. The basic assumptions about v a l i d i t y , interests in knowledge, views of education and man provide an i m p l i c i t framework within which an evaluator operating out of the normative paradigm approaches evaluation. They play a major role in how evaluation is conceptualized. In the-next sub-section an out l ine i s provided of some re levant -eva luat ion ' l i te ra tu re describing three major schools o f thought within the normative paradigm.. The writ ings reviewed are generally f a i t h f u l to the assumptions explained above. Normative Evaluation L i terature The implied commonalities of v a l i d i t y , interests in knowledge, views of education, and views of man are not unlike the three schools of thought i den t i f i ed by Worthen and Sanders (1973)as "evaluation as measurement", "evaluation^as*judgment", and"evaluation as decision-making". Although each has a d i f fe rent de f in i t i on of evaluation and d i f fe rent purpose for evaluating programs, a l l three share a fundamental f a i t h in measurement and a l l three are grounded in assumptions underlying the normative paradigm of evaluation. The headings introducing the three schools of thought are intended to provide analyt ica l ' rather than complete d i s t i nc t i on s . .22 Evaluation as Measurement. Proponents of evaluation as measurement define evaluation as being synonymous with psychometric test ing or the administration of standardized tests (Taylor and Cowley, 1972). For example, Stufflebeam notes that evaluation is perceived as a: ...science of instrument development and interpre-tat ion that mitigates the recognition of value judgments and r e s t r i c t s the co l l ec t i on of evaluation information to variables for which measurement tests ex i s t (1972:11). Use of measurement devices resu l t in scores and other indices that are capable of mathematical and s t a t i s t i c a l manipulation. This makes possible the handling of masses of data and comparisons of indiv idual or classroom scores with group norms (Guba, 1973). The most notable educator of the 'evaluation as measurement' school of thought is Tyler. Ty le r ' s (1950) measurement focus seeks to establ ish the congruency between student performance data and c l ea r l y spec i f ied object ives, rather than program worth. Walbesser (AAAS Commission on Science Education, 1965) claims that the locus of evaluation should be course improvement. He proposes that objectives be organized into a h ierarch ica l structure i l l u s t r a t i n g how the achievement of an objective at one level i s dependent upon the achievement of a constituent objective at a lower l e v e l . If objectives are more s pec i f i c , prerequis ite learning d i f f i c u l t i e s can be analyzed more precisely and the def ic ient portion of the curriculum can be pinpointed more exactly (Mackay and Maguire, 1971). Glaser (1968) suggests that evaluation should analyze and specify educational objectives and learning outcomes since the ultimate aim i s to improve educational attainment. To measure student performance, and re late academic standing within a group, Glaser developed a competence c r i t e r i on achievement tes t . Like Glaser, Su l l ivan (1969) emphasizes the u t i l i t y of pre-planned objectives and inst ruct iona l sequences in curriculum evaluation. His major concern, test ing acquired student behaviors and c a p a b i l i t i e s , allows teachers to comprehend behaviors which learners are expected to perform as a d i rect resu l t of classroom in s t ruc t i on . Sul l ivan (1969) maintains that th is procedure results in va l i d assessment of expected, post- instruct ional behaviors and gives indicat ions of ins t ruct iona l effect iveness. .23 It i s Cronbach however, who Taylor and-Cowley (1972) describe as being the f i r s t evaluator within the "evaluation as measurement" school of thought to broaden the t rad i t i ona l measurement approach by incorporating several new instrumentation techniques. He recommends use-of item sampling, subject sampling, prof ic iency measures, att i tude measures, and follow-up studies to ident i f y aspects of the curriculum where revis ion is most desirable,and to ascertain what changes the curriculum produces % (Cronbach, 1972). To accomplish these object ives, Cronbach proposes group comparisons to determine post-course performance of behavioral objectives (Mackay and Maguire, 1971). Worthen and Sanders (1973) and Taylor and Cowley (1972) i dent i f y Cronbach as the precursorof the 'evaluation as judgment" school of thought. His writ ings are believed by these authors to have influenced Scriven and Stake, two mainstays of the 'evaluation as judgment" school of thought. Evaluation as Judgment. Evaluators who adhere to the evaluation as judgment school of thought conceptualize evaluation as the discr imination of the worth of a program. The evaluation process includes obtaining informa-tion for use in judging the worth of a program, product, procedure, object ive, or the potential u t i l i t y of a l ternat ive approaches designed to obtain spec i f ied objectives (Worthen and Sanders, 1973). Judgment is a continuous unstructured approach re ly ing almost en t i r e l y on the opinion of highly qua l i f i ed ind iv idua l s , or teams within or external to the school system (Farquhar and McCuaig, 1972). Judgment by experts provides the basis for future decisions about adopting, modifying or abandoning the curriculum. Scr iven 's paper, The Methodology of Evaluation (1967) provided judgmental evaluators with a defined conceptual system of evaluation. According to Scriven (1967), evaluation plays a role (obtaining judgments) in curriculum development, decision-making, and course improvement. What-ever the r o l e , goals are always the same--to estimate value, merit , or worth, and to judge the curriculum being evaluated [Mackay and Maguire, 1971). Scriven (1967) divides evaluation roles into the domains of formative and summative evaluation. The former is designed to obtain judgements for the purpose of improving a. program while i t i s in a state of development. .24 Summative evaluation i s designed to obtain judgments regarding the ultimate worth of a; program already operating (Lange, 1974). The formative evalu-ator needs to work in harmony with the curriculum designer, while the summative evaluator must be free of any c o n f l i c t of in teres t . Scr iven 's broadened systematic evaluation map s t i r r ed numerous other evaluators to develop sub-systems with in the system. Stake's (1967) e c l e c t i c model subdivided data co l l ec t i on sources into three potential data units - - "antecedent" (conditions p r io r to teaching), " t ransact ion" ( a c t i v i t i e s occuring during teaching), and "outcomes" (results of the program). Descriptions and judgments are made in each data unit. The wide data co l lec t ion net included variables relevant to the relat ionships among antecedents, transactions, and outcomes. Stake's goal was to determine the degree of re lat ionship and agreement of the various classes of data. Taylor and Maguire's (1966) evaluation framework, based on a re lat ional -sequent ia l approach to curriculum development, is intended to suggest variables to be measured, judgments to be made, and contingencies to be determined. The model has two components: a measurement component and a value-assessment. The measurement c r i t e r i on describes goals, environment, personnel, methods, outcomes and determinations of the relat ionships among them. The value component includes co l lected judgments of qual i ty and appropriateness of the goals, strategies and outcomes (Mackay and Maguire, 1971). It should be noted that sound judgments are also a major concern in the evaluation as decision-making school of thought. Evaluators, however, believe in a t i g h t l y structured information-gathering system, which provides rat ional bases for making judgments in decision s i tuat ions . Further c l a r i -f i ca t i on of the evaluation as decision-making school of thought i s made in the fol lowing paragraphs. Evaluation as Decision-making. Within th i s school of thought evaluation is defined as a process of ident i f y ing and co l l ec t i ng information to ass i s t decision-makers in choosing among avai lable decision a lternat ives (Guba, 1973). In A l k i n ' s terms: Evaluation is the process of ascertaining the decision areas of concern, se lect ing appropriate information, and co l l ec t i ng and analyzing inform-ation in order to report summary data useful to decision-makers in se lect ing among a lternat ives (1969:2). .25 Evaluators operating within the decision-making mode are repre-sentative of general systems strategies (Lange, 1974). Techniques subsumed under systems approaches are based on highly rat ional notions (Churchman, 1968). Rat iona l i ty takes on a major emphasis since evaluation is regarded by f a i t h f u l wr i ters as a science of providing information for decision-making (Stufflebeam, 1972). Although the nomenclature and emphasis vary, Burnham (.1973) suggests that there are elements which appear repeatedly in systems l i t e r a t u r e . The commonalities are: 1. State the system's object ives. This refers to the outcomes of the system or sub-system being evaluated. 2. Establish a c r i t e r i on measure. The objective should be measurable or quant i f iab le to some extent. The more spec i f i c the object ive, the better the measure, and the more rigorous the evaluation. 3. Define the relevant var iables. These are usually categorized as uncontrollable (constraints) and contro l lab le (decisions) var iables. 4. Explicate the interact ions between var iables. How are the variables interrelated? 5. Analyze the in ter re lated variables in some technical model and enter the values each variable can assume. 6. Evaluate the so lu t ion , or the objective funct ion, the input/ output r a t i o s , the extent of goal attainment or simply the log ic of a flow chart through the use of some decision ru le . (1973:245) Pa ra l l e l to Burnham's descr ipt ion of system's commonalities, Stufflebeam (1972) developed a t i g h t l y structured framework ca l led CIPP which represents context, input, process and product evaluation. Context evaluation is a con-tinuous assessment within an agency. Stufflebeam designed context evaluation to provide data for decisions which reduce discrepancies between desired levels of achievement and actual level of achievement (Farquhar and McCuaig, 1972; Lange, 1974). Discrepancies are i den t i f i ed as needs. Input evaluation provides information to help decide whether outside assistance is required to meet object ives, what strategies should be employed, and what resources should be used in implementing the chosen strategy. Process evaluation i s designed to provide periodic feedback af ter strategy implementation in order to detect or predict defects in the procedural design or implementation. Product evaluation involves determining program effectiveness by re la t ing outcomes to object ives, context, input and process (Stuffelbeam, 1972). Increased sophist icat ion in systems evaluation continued with Provus (1969) and Alk in (1969). Provus (1969) i s concerned with maintaining qual i ty control standards for educational projects. To achieve that aim, he enumerates four states, design, i n s t a l l a t i o n , process and product. During each stage the evaluator ' s task in conjunction with the project s t a f f i s to delineate a set of standards which can be used as a basis for compari-son with project or program performance. After i den t i f i c a t i on of discrep-ancies, program personnel may terminate the program, proceed to the next stage, or make program adjustments (Provus, 1972). A lk in (1969) maintains that the role of curriculum evaluation is pr imar i ly an adjunct to decision-making. Problem se lec t ion , program selec-t i o n , program operat iona l i zat ion, program improvement, and program c e r t i f i c a t i o n are important decision areas for improvement of in s t ruct ion. Corresponding to these decision areas are f i ve evaluation requirements: (1) needs assessment to examine the gap between spec i f i c goals and ex i s t ing s i tuat ions , (2) program planning to assess a program's potential for success, (3) implementation to c o l l e c t information on program implementation, (4) progress evaluation to modify programs, and (5) outcome evaluation ( s imi la r to summative evaluation) which relates to program c e r t i f i c a t i o n (A l k in , 1969). Alk in c i tes administrators who desire to evaluate the i r school programs as major users of his model. Systems evaluation is s t i l l the major operational and conceptual thrust in evaluation. For example, Rippey's model of evaluation, which he terms transactional evaluation, focuses on: ...the system, not the c l i e n t or the services rendered by the system.. .v.•The variables re la te to the s o c i a l , psychological, and communication aspects of the system (1973:3). Carter concludes that: ...a systematic accumulation of facts for providing information about achievement.of program requis ites and goals re la t i ve to e f f o r t s , effect iveness, and e f f i c i ency within any stage of the program is required (1973:12). .27 Irvine elaborates the technical aspect of the systems perspective requirement: . . .better data are needed. But, beyond t h i s , better ways of handling and analyzing data are needed. Comprehensive systems for c o l l e c t i n g , c o l l a t i n g , and analyzing data and reporting the resu l t ing information must be developed. They must be designed to obtain relevant data, process i t appropriately, and de l i ver i t to the decis ion-maker in usable form (1976:13). Although the evaluation as decision-making l i t e r a tu re presently enjoys academic popular i ty, l i t e r a tu re within an a l ternat ive paradigm i s emerging. More writers now dist inguish between evaluation methods in the normative paradigm and interpret ive paradigm. The next section des-cribes some fundamental be l ie f s underlying the interpret ive paradigm, relevant data gathering methods, and some of i t s evaluation l i t e r a t u r e . THE INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM OF EVALUATION Schutz posits the fol lowing statement which may be seen as providing a basis for the interpret ive paradigm: ...common sense knowledge of everyday l i f e i s s u f f i c i en t for coming to terms with fellow-men, cu l tura l objects, socia l i n s t i tu t i on s - - i n b r i e f with soc ia l r e a l i t y . This i s so because the world (the natural and social one) i s from the outset an intersubject ive wor ld. . . (1973:54). Schutz asserts that in common sense thinking we take for granted our actual or potential knowledge of the meaning of human actions and the i r products. Because common sense thinking i s largely taken for granted, exper ient ia l research approaches are needed which penetrate subjective mean-ings that actors attach to the i r own behavior and to the behavior of others , (Coser, 1971). Verstehen is a pa r t i cu la r common-sense form equivalent to subjective interpretat ion and understanding (Abel, 1974). It emphasizes meanings things have for socia l actors. These meanings are necessary for the subjective understanding of soc ia l phenomena (Truzz i , 1974). Verstehen, or subjective understanding, is based on a method which follows the emotional sequence of a person and arr ives at the i nd i v i dua l ' s i n terpretat ion. Thus .28 within the parameters of th i s study Verstehen is regarded as the integral conceptual component of the interpret ive paradigm which accounts for the d i a l e c t i c re lat ionship between' interpretat ion and understanding. Concentrating on Verstehen, Dilthey developed a methodological base 3 ca l led Geisteswissenschaft which includes indiv idual h i s t o r i c a l truths and uniformities arr ived at by abstract generalizations and value judgments (Hodges, 1944; Di l they, 1961). Dilthey states: . . . i t i s through the process of understanding that l i f e in i t s depth is made c lear to i t s e l f , and on the other hand we understand ourselves and others only when we transfer our own and other people's l i f e , (Di l they, c i ted in Truzz i , 1974:17). Weber recognizes the cruc ia l role of subjective understanding in determining the adequacy of soc io log ica l explanations of soc ia l phenomena (Bruyn, 1966). According to Schutz (1973), Weber's concept of sub jec t i -v i t y requires further c l a r i f i c a t i o n since i t i s used by d i f fe rent parties in a d i f fe rent sense. C r i t i c s , fo r example, believe subject i v i ty to mean understanding another man's action based on pr ivate, uncontrollable and unver i f iable i n t u i t i o n . Thus understanding refers to the observer's private value system (Schutz, 1973). Weber, however, suggests that understanding is subjective because i t s goal i s to discover what the actor means in his s i t ua t i on , in contrast to the meaning which his action has for the actor ' s partner or a neutral observer (Weber, 1949). Schutz confirms the epistemo-log ica l basis for Weber's notion of understanding, asserting that: James, Bergson, Dewey, Husserl, and Whitehead agree that the common-sense knowledge of everyday l i f e is the unquestioned but always questionable background within which inquiry starts and within which alone i t can be carr ied out. It is th i s Lebenswelt, as Husserl ca l l s i t , within which, according to him, a l l s c i e n t i f i c and even log ica l concepts o r i g inate; i t i s the social matrix within which, according to Dewey, unc la r i f i ed s i tuat ions emerge, which have to be transformed by the process of inquiry into warranted a s s e r t ab i l i t y ; and Whitehead has pointed out that i t i s the aim of science to produce a theory which agrees with the experience by explaining the thought objects constructed by common sense through the mental constructs or thought objects of science. For a l l these thinkers agree that any knowledge of the world, in common sense thinking as .29 well as science, involves mental constructs, syntheses, general izat ions, formal izat ions, i d e a l i -zations spec i f i c to the respective level of thought organization (1973:57). Exploration of the general pr inc ip les according to which man in da i ly l i f e organizes his experiences, espec ia l ly those of the social world, is the f i r s t task which evaluators within the interpret ive paradigm should face. Blumer notes the fol lowing which can be regarded as a prerequis ite for doing evaluation within the interpret ive paradigm: Since action is forged by the actor out of what he perceives, in terpret s , and judges, one would have to see the operating s i tuat ion as the actor sees i t , perceive objects as the actor perceives them, ascertain meanings in terms of the meaning they have for the actor, and fol low the actor ' s l ine of conduct as the actor organizes i t - - in short, one would have to take the role of the actor and see the world from his standpoint (1969:542). Str ike may be seen as expanding on Blumer when he suggests that an advocate (evaluator) working out of the interpret ive paradigm should under-stand that: Men have purposes and emotions, they make plans, construct cu l tures , and hold certain values, and the i r behavior is influenced by such values, plans, and purposes. In short, a human being l i ve s in a world which has 'meaning' to him, and, because his behavior has meaning, human actions are i n t e l l i g i b l e in ways that the behavior of non-humans i s not (1972:28). Accounts from f i e l d sources are treated as descriptions of patterns of action or of expectations or disposit ions in which the evaluator is interested. These accounts are interpretat ions on the part of indiv iduals providing the information. In order to construct a descr ipt ion as a basis for analys i s , the evaluator should see through these accounts to ident i f y the underlying pattern ref lected (C icoure l , 1964). The evaluator ' s descrip-t i on , then, i s an interpretat ion depicting meanings of an action rather than i t s form. The evaluator attempts to perceive an action in terms of the actor ' s intent ion. He adopts an active involved role where: . . . ins ight may be regarded as the core of soc ia l knowledge. It i s arr ived at by being on the inside of the phenomena to be observed... :T-t is p a r t i c i -pation in an a c t i v i t y that generates i n te re s t , purpose, point of view, value meaning, and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , as well as bias (Wirth, 1949:xxi i ) . Because the evaluator i s subject ively involved on the inside of the phenomenon under study, the concept of v e r i f i c a t i o n , interests in knowledge, and views of education and man d i f f e r from those in the normative paradigm. They serve as basic assumptions upon which interpret ive research methods such as part ic ipant observation, ethnomethodology, conversational analysis and phenomenological analysis are b u i l t . The basic assumptions underlying the interpret ive paradigm and the research methods developed provide the focus for recent evaluation l i t e r a t u r e . They also serve as bases for construction of the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological approach developed in th is thes i s . The fol lowing sub-sections explore these assumptions and research procedures and pave the way for an examination of some of the l i t e r a tu re of interpret ive evaluation. Ve r i f i ca t i on According to Bruyn (1966), v e r i f i c a t i on takes place only within a defined perspective (a theoret ical framework) which sets down conditions for knowing those types of r e a l i t y i t is designed to explore. B i t tner (1973) suggests that in the physical sciences canons of ob jec t i v i t y are placed upon the object of study. Faithfulness to ob jec t i v i t y requires the object to become removed from the common sense r e a l i t y . In the human sciences, however, e f for t s are made to do ju s t i ce to rea l i t ie s -as - they-are (B i t tner , 1973:110). Schutz states that "there ex i s t severa l , probably an i n f i n i t e number of various orders of r e a l i t y , each with i t s own special and separate sty le of existence" (1973:135). Real ity is a qua l i ty with which we endow the object in terms of the attention and be l i e f we give to i t . I t fo l lows, therefore, that r e a l i t y as apprehended by the researcher changes as his concerns and attention are modified (Werner, 1977). Our sense of r e a l i t y and the par t i cu la r mode-of-being-in-the-world in which we pa r t i c i pa te , both undergo modification with .31 sh i f t s in perspective. Though we must stand in some re la t ion to an object, that re la t ion can vary as we experience and define i t s meaning d i f f e ren t l y (Werner, 1977). The object under study does not change, but the researcher's experience of i t d i f f e r s with a s h i f t in perspective. According to Bruyn (1966), soc ia l r e a l i t i e s discovered outside the framework of behaviorism, neo-posit ivism, or structural-functional ism, and the i r accompanying methodo-log ica l t rad i t ions cannot be known s c i e n t i f i c a l l y by sc ient i s t s who s t r i c t l y adhere to these methods. New discoverable r e a l i t i e s would not be considered legit imate or ' f a c t u a l ' by s c ien t i s t s who ident i f y the i r science with preva i l ing theory and methodology (Bruyn, 1966:267). The researcher who i s interested in new discoveries about the soc io-cu l tura l world of man must be w i l l i n g to make discoveries which can be understood and ve r i f i ed by others at the level of his procedure without expecting that other levels w i l l y i e l d equivalent substantiation ( M i l l s , 1959). Such a researcher usually recognizes that he must operate with common sense assumptions made by people in the everyday world. Thus he real izes that he cannot expect to quantify descr ip-tions of social phenomena and remain epistemological ly consistent i f t he i r nature (essence) is qua l i t a t i ve . Rather than va l idat ing procedures and f ind ings, evaluators working from the interpret ive paradigm ver i f y the i r representation of what i s happening according to whether the results of an inquiry f i t , make sense, or are true to the understanding of ordinary actors in the everyday world (Psathas, 1973:12). Psathas proposes three rigorous examinations for data v e r i f i c a t i o n : Test One : a) Are the findings f a i t h f u l and consistent with the experiences of those who l i v e in the s i tuat ion? b) Are the findings f a i t h f u l representations, descr ipt ions, accounts, or interpretat ions of what those who o rd ina r i l y l i v e those a c t i v i t i e s would themselves recognize to be true? c) I f second order constructs were translated into f i r s t order .constructs to which they re fe r , would the observer 's report be recognized as a va l i d and f a i t h f u l account of "what the act iv i ty^, is r ea l l y l i k e ? " Test Two Armed with "only" the knowledge gained from reading the account presented by the observer, would someone else be able to understand what he was seeing when confronted with the actual l i f e -wo r l d r e a l i t y of the events described? Test Three : Can the reader become a player after having read the rules? (1973:12) In the interpret ive paradigm ve r i f i c a t i on is accomplished in terms of the meanings shared by ind iv idua l s . Attempting to develop empathy with par t i c ipants , the evaluator approaches data subject ive ly , taking a h o l i s t i c perspective on evaluation (Patton, 1975). The ve r i f i c a t i on procedures described play a major role in how an evaluator defines r e a l i t y and what assumed knowledge and interests of knowledge he has. Interests of Knowledge The aim of researchers within the interpret ive paradigm is to under-stand the day-to-day r e a l i t y of indiv iduals and the common-sense world which equips them with spec i f i c bodies of knowledge. The researcher's interact ion with others in everyday l i f e i s , therefore, constantly affected by his common par t i c ipat ion in the avai lable stock of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann,- 1966). Mannheim emphasizes that knowing in the interpret ive paradigm is a fundamen-t a l l y co l l e c t i ve enterpr ise, presupposing a "community of knowing which grows pr imar i ly out of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious" (1926:28). Personal knowledge which the researcher gains,must be conveyed to other non-participants through language, and more e x p l i c i t l y through meta-phors, analogies, parables, fab les, simple s to r i e s , and/or concrete 5 i l l u s t r a t i o n s (Bruyn, 1966; Bodgan and Taylor, 1975). Habermas suggests that th i s knowledge has the fol lowing human interes t : ...(Personal knowledge) discloses r e a l i t y subject to a const i tut ive interest in the preservation and expan-sion of the i n te r sub jec t i v i t y of possible act ion-or ient ing mutual understanding. The understanding of meaning is directed in i t s very structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding derived from t r ad i t i o n . This we shal l c a l l the pract ica l cognitive i n te re s t , in contrast to the technical (1971:301). With respect to evaluation, programs are seen by evaluators as sets of multiple meanings and r e a l i t i e s . The evaluators ' approach towards the program emphasizes mutual understanding and communication. As Patton wr i tes : Quite a d i f fe rent strategy is required where evalu-ation is aimed at serving and informing teachers and program pract i t ioners about progress and funct ioning, areas of competence and confusion, anx iet ies , fee l ings , and practices which may be related to maxi-mizing what the school program has to o f fe r . Evalua-tions that are to be useful to spec i f i c practioners must be focused at the local l e v e l . They must include description and analysis of local sett ings. They must take account of what happens in programs on a day-to-day basis. We pa r t i cu l a r l y need to describe context, treatment, and outcomes in ways that are understandable, meaningful and relevant to p ract i t ioner s . The major value of th is kind is i t s contribution to program development, not i t s l abe l l i n g of successes and fa i l u re s (1975:38). The interests of knowledge underlying interpret ive evaluation pro-cedures require a broader view of education. This expanded view of education is described in the next sub-section. View of Education Standards of the actor, his way of making de f i n i t i on s , are the bases of act ion, and...actions are the bases of i n s t i t u t i on s . An i n s t i t u t i on (e.g.', education) must in some way be experienced to continue or change, and thus an i n s t i t u t i on can be said to ex i s t at the level of in teract ion. Further, interact ion must occur before the i n s t i t u t i o n can be said to ex i s t at a l l , even for i t s own sake, and in i t s own macroscopic terms (McHugh, 1968:11). According to Berger (1963) and Berger and Luckman (1967) i n s t i t u t i on s provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned, in forms deemed desirable by society. Although i n s t i tu t i on s are producers of human a c t i v i t y , they are experienced as an external r e a l i t y ; that i s , an i n s t i t u t i on is something outside the i nd i v i dua l , real in a way d i f fe rent from the r e a l i t y of the i nd i v idua l ' s thoughts, fee l ings , or fantasies (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Berger and Berger, 1973). Inst i tut ions generally manifest themselves in c o l l e c t i v i t i e s containing considerable numbers of people. It should be emphasized that the re lat ionship between man and the i n s t i t u t i on is a d i a l e c t i c a l one. Man and the i n s t i t u t i on interact with each other. The product acts back on the producer (Holzner, 1967; Berger and Luckman, 1967). Patterns of i n s t i t u t i ona l i n te rac t ion , however, are documented by the actor in his immediate, ongoing s i tuat ions , allowing him to integrate temporally d iscrete events by giving them a baseline of meaning. The-actor thereby ascribes order to the general environment (Mannheim, 1952). So i t i s with education. Within the interpret ive paradigm education is a s i tuat iona l r e a l i t y or educative environment (Vandenberg, 1971; Huebner, 1975). The educative environment i s comprised of teachers and students who d i f fe ren t i a te materials, objects, language and symbols, and behavior in various meaningful ways (Huebner, 1975). The classroom is not "a s i tuat ion as i t might appear to some omniscient and d is interested eye, viewing a l l i t s complex interdependencies and a l l i t s endless contingencies" (Mclver, 1937:295). Rather, i t i s "comprised of those elements of the objective s i tuat ion seen by the student and teacher to af fect any of his action or ientat ions " (Stebbins, 1975:295). Classrooms are settings wherein actors give programs a var iety of meanings. To understand what education means s oc i a l l y and personally, the evaluator should understand the formative qua l i ty of the a c t i v i t y that takes place, rather than the act ive learning outcomes (Macdonald, 1975). Thus he interprets education in terms of the relevance and meaning i t has for p a r t i -cipants. Since the evaluator in the interpret ive paradigm sees education as s i tuat iona l i n te rac t ion , his re spons ib i l i t y is to expl icate the structures of meaning of human consciousness which are inherent in a c t i v i t i e s (Macdonald, 1975). Education arid the loca l s i tuat ion are inseparable, since man i s viewed as always acting within de f in i te s i tuat ions . View of Man Within the interpret ive paradigm, the indiv idual i s recognized as the fundamental unit and ultimate socia l r e a l i t y (Weber, 1949). According to Weber (1949) and Ortega (1958), man is a biopsychic and psychosocial being.with physical as well as social needs; but behind the animal and the socia l part of man stands the undefinable and unknowable mystery of man's s p i r i t u a l nature and being. Man, as Mead ind icates, has a being he ca l l s s e l f which has: . . .a development; i t i s not i n i t i a l l y there at b i r th but arises in the process of social experiences and a c t i v i t y , that i s , i t develops in the given i n d i v i -dual as a resu l t of his re lat ions to that process as a whole and to other indiv iduals within that process (1934:199). It i s acknowledged that an intimate re lat ionship ex ists between the interpret ive paradigm and ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology ( i . e . , ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology as a school of thought). Heidegger's concept "Existenz" i s equatable to Mead's " s e l f " . Heidegger expresses man's proper mode, that which makes man man, in terms of "Ex i s tenz" , i . e . , "standing out toward". In order to rea l i ze himself, man has to "come out" of.himself (King, 1964; Kockelmans, 1965). He i s e s sent ia l l y directed to the world and therefore each manifestation of his being a-man i s a way to relate himself act i ve ly to the world. Man is pr imordial ly and es sent ia l l y an intersubject ive inten-t iona l being. Intent iona l i ty and i n te r sub jec t i v i t y form the bases of man in the interpret ive paradigm. Husserl interpreted by Bachelard (1968:163), states that the world exists as i t i s for consciousness, for the person as the mediating subject. But any inquiry into the consciousness a person has of the world recognizes immediately that the world i s regarded as the world of a l l persons. I t i s an objective world, i . e . , as the world va l i d for one, for a l l , and for everyone. Hence there i s an intersubject ive const i tut ion of the world. With respect to man as intent ional being, Werner summarizes the topic succ inct ly : Every consciousness is of something, man stands in some re lat ionsh ip to the world, actors act with respect to an object. This directedness implies an ontology of mind as a subject-object re lat ionship rather than as a self-contained ent i ty in which subject is separate from object. Though consciousness is of something, the subject can be related to the object in various ways, and thereby can impose selected meanings upon i t s referent. Meaning is imposed upon the world by ordering and by interpret ing i t through d i f f e r i n g schemes and by acting upon i t according to d i f f e r i n g projects. In various acts of con-sciousness an object i s presented in th is way or in that way to consciousness; consequently, th is intent ional character of experience makes the phenomenon of perspective possible. This premise of intentional i t y , implies that an actor does not simply have perspectives, but perspectives in re la t ion to some object of intent ion. (-1977:15-16). Only through his f a m i l i a r i t y with the world does man become himself. His being i s being-in-the-world.^ (Heidegger, 1962; Kockelmans, 1970). Frankl suggests that to understand the phrase being-in-the-world properly, one must recognize that being human profoundly means being engaged and entangled in a s i t ua t i on , and confronted with a world whose ob jec t i v i t y and r e a l i t y is in no way detracted from the sub jec t i v i t y of that "being" who is " in - the-wor ld " (1969:41). According to Heidegger (1962), Jaspers (1965), and Mi c a l l ef (1969), man's being-in-the-world cannot be conceived of as a f ixed quantity recurring in types.^ Instead, the essence of man is in constant movement: he cannot remain as he i s . He finds him-se l f cont inual ly changing his socia l condition while being changed by the socia l condit ion. 8 Man presses beyond his own givenness (Jaspers, 1965:51) . In so doing man gives meaning to the world and to others. As Frankl (1969:52) states., "being human means being in the face of meaning to f u l f i l l - and value to. r e a l i z e . . . .." Only man. is free -to shape his-own character, and to •• be responsible for what he may have made out of himself (Frankl, 1969). In interpret ive evaluation indiv iduals in a classroom are recognized as autonomous people with indiv idual biographies and perspectives, who give personal meaning to circumstances, objects, and other people in that c lass -room. Their actions are seen as purposeful. Evaluation descriptions r e f l e c t those assumptions about students and teachers as ' peop le - i n -a - s i t ua t i on ' . .37 The l i s t e d assumptions provide an i m p l i c i t framework for research approaches within the interpret ive paradigm. Descriptions of important research methods which r e f l e c t these assumptions and have become the focus for interpret ive evaluation writ ings are included in the fol lowing paragraphs. Ethnographic Research Methods in the Interpretive Paradigm Ethnography includes research procedures used in "gett'ing to know" a group of people. It includes observing and par t i c ipa t ing in t he i r a c t i v i t i e s ta lk ing with them, and noting various signs and a r t i f a c t s t y p i c a l l y associ -ated with one group or another (Sanders, 1976). The purpose of ethnographic methods is to uncover s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , or personal patterns. This generally involves an ana lyt ic description of a cohort 's behavior in terms of a soc ia l se t t i ng , organization, or culture (Sanders, 1976). To arr ive at an under-standing of the observed group's patterns of behavior, the researcher may incorporate a range of research methods depending upon his study purpose. These methods, described by Cicourel (1964), Denzin (1970 c),. .and Bogdan and Taylor (1975) as qua l i t a t i ve methods, refer to procedures which produce descr ipt ive data: people's own written or spoken words and observable behavior. Techniques are directed at h o l i s t i c settings and the indiv idual within those sett ings ; that i s , the subject under study, be i t an organization or an i nd i v i dua l , i s not reduced to an i so lated variable or to an hypothesis, but i s viewed instead as a part of a whole (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975:4). Qual i tat ive methods allow the researcher to know people personally and to use that knowledge as they develop the i r own world de f i n i t i on s . A researcher employing qua l i t a t i ve methods becomes part of the observed f i e l d of act ion. He brings with him a set of relevances or meaning structures which or ient his interpretat ion of whatever environment l i e s within his visual f i e l d (C icoure l , 1964:50). According to Schutz: The observational f i e l d of the socia l s c i e n t i s t , . . . namely the socia l r e a l i t y , has a s pec i f i c meaning and relevance structure for the human beings l i v i n g , acting and thinking therein. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted th i s world which they experience as the r e a l i t y of the i r da i ly l i v e s . It i s these thought objects of theirs which determine the i r behavior by motivating i t . The thought objects constructed by the socia l s c i e n t i s t , in order to grasp th i s socia l r e a l i t y , have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men l i v i n g the i r da i ly l i f e within the i r socia l world (1954:266-269). When the invest igator interprets sett ings, he is faced with several problems. F i r s t , he must interpret the subjects ' actions (or the i r report about the i r actions) according to the structures of relevance of everyday l i f e . Secondly, he must simultaneously maintain a theoret ical perspective which incorporates the actor ' s structures of relevance while entertaining a separate set of relevances that permit his interact ion with the actor. Th i rd ly , the observer must temporarily drop his s c i e n t i f i c att i tude in order to study man among fellowmen (C icoure l , 1964:51; Schutz, 1971:31). Various methods, appropriate to the researcher 's r o l e , the re lat ionship between the actor and researcher, type of data desired, and purpose for the research, w i l l be explained. Although there i s some overlap between part ic ipant observation, ethnomethodology, conversational analysis and phenomenological sociology, each is treated under a separate paragraph heading in order to provide greater conceptual c l a r i t y . Part ic ipant Observation as Research Method. Kluckhohn has provided the or ig ina l and now c l a s s i c statement about part ic ipant observation. She describes i t as "...conscious and systematic sharing insofar as circumstances permit, in the l i f e a c t i v i t i e s and, on occasion, in the interests and affects of a group of persons" (1940:331). The part ic ipant observer attempts to adjust to a complex set of re lat ionsh ips , norms, and b e l i e f s , acted before him (Sanders, 1975). To guide his observations, the researcher uses his conceptual framework. For instance, i f a soc io log i s t i s using a structured framework, he assumes that behavior i s regulated by a set of sanctioned rules. If a rule is broken, i t i s expected that those who observe the rule v io la t ion w i l l become upset and w i l l impose sanctions. With such a framework, the part ic ipant observer may begin to look for behavior that upsets those around him. Pattern(s) oft behavior may take.many forms, but they are a normal part of the subjects ' l i f e (Bruyn, 1966). The part ic ipant observer 's role i s affected by the research design, the framework of the study, and the a b i l i t i e s of the par t i cu la r researcher to assume tasks acceptable as a natural part of the s i tua t i on . Junker (I960) describes four roles which the part ic ipant observer may assume according to the design and purpose of the study. Portions of th i s typology, outl ined below, have been adopted by Cicourel (1964:43-44), Bruyn (1966:15-16), and Gold (1970:370-380): Complete Par t i c ipant . In th is r o l e , the observer's a c t i v i t i e s as such are wholly concealed. The f i e l d worker is or becomes a complete member of an in-group, sharing secret information guarded from outsiders. His freedom to observe outside the in-group system of relat ionships may be severely l im i ted . Such a role tends to block perceptions of the workings of reciprocal re lat ions between the in-group and the larger socia l system. It i s not easy to switch from this to another role permitting observation of the deta i l s of a larger system. Part ic ipant as Observer. In th i s r o l e , the f i e l d -worker's observer a c t i v i t i e s are not wholly concealed, but are "kept under wraps" or subordinated to a c t i v i t i e s which give other people in the s i tuat ion the i r main bases for evaluating the f ieldworker. This role may l i m i t access to some kinds of i n fo rma l— . . t i o n , , ! especia l ly at the secret l e v e l . Precisely how he " rates " as a. pseudo-member w i l l a f fect the f i e l d -worker's a b i l i t y to communicate below the level of publ ic information. Observer as Par t i c ipant . The observer 's role a c t i v i t i e s are made pub l ic ly known at the outset, are more or less pub l i c l y sponsored by people in the s i tuat ion studied, and are in tent iona l l y NOT "kept under wraps". The role may provide access to a wide range of information; even secrets may be given to the fieldworker when he becomes known for keeping them, as well as for guarding conf ident ia l information. The invest igator might con-ceivably achieve maximum freedom to gather information, but only at the price of accepting maximum constraints upon his report ing. . . • Complete Observer. The observer describes a range of roles. At one extreme, the observer hides behind a one-way mirror, perhaps equipped with sound f i lm f a c i l i t i e s , and at the other extreme, his a c t i v i t i e s are completely publ ic in a special kind of theoret ical group where there are, by consensus, "no secrets" and "nothing sacred" (Junker, 1960:35-39). .40 According to Junker (J960), at least four groups of variables interact to define or subtly a f fect observers' soc ia l ro les : (1) conditions inherent in the s i tuat ion of observation pr io r to the f i e l d worker's entry, (2) conditions a r i s ing from the a b i l i t i e s , i den t i t y , self-understanding, reference group attachments, theoret ical o r ientat ion, and other character i s -t i c s of the f i e l d worker entering the s i t ua t i on , (3) modifications through time that occur in the s i tuat ion i t s e l f , as an ongoing soc ia l process, including the effects of the f i e l d worker's a c t i v i t i e s , and (4) changes in the observer himself, as an organic item, as a person, role playeri soc ia l s c i e n t i s t , and so on. The part ic ipant observer 's primary aim is to determine social patterns out of behavior that is t y p i c a l , pers i s tent, t r an s - s i t ua t i ona l , and transpersonal (Humphreys, 1975; Sanders, 1976). To accomplish t h i s , the part ic ipant observer must have good rapport with the subjects. Since he spends considerable time with them, he must win the i r t rust and confidence (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). Rapport involves being n o n - c r i t i c a l , interested in what the subjects do and say, and most importantly, being genuinely open to an understanding of how they see and experience the i r socia l world (Denzin, 1970c,« Sanders, 1976). Becker (1958) i den t i f i e s four stages in part ic ipant observation. They are: 1. Selection of problems, concepts, indices and the i r de f i n i t i on s . 2. : Some estimate of the frequency and d i s t r ibu t ion of the phenomena under study. ' 3 . - A r t i cu l a t i on of indiv idual findings with a model of the organization under invest igat ion. 4. '; Problems of inference and proof. (1957:3-17) 9. Incorporating these stages into Denzin's (1970c), descr ipt ion of research a c t i v i t i e s produces a more tota l p icture. Documents are co l lected and analyzed; interviews are conducted; informants are sought out for the i r unique perspectives; d i rect par t i c ipat ion in the group's a c t i v i t i e s i s employed; and introspect ion, as well as d i rect observation are u t i l i z e d . .41 In summary, part ic ipant observation has been one research focus in the interpret ive paradigm. It provides a descr ipt ion of the da i ly a c t i v i t i e s of people, which serves as a basis for interpretat ion of human act ion. Ethnomethodology as Research Method. Ethnomethodologists are interested in the socia l order that appears to indiv iduals in t he i r da i ly 1ives. The ethnomethodologist bases his work on the fol lowing assumptions, o r i g i n a l l y formulated by Schutz (1971)^: 1. The world, as i t presents i t s e l f to the member operating under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the att i tude of everyday l i f e , i s h i s t o r i c a l and organized. It did not appear with the member's b i r t h ; i t w i l l not perish with his death. At the outset the world i s experienced pretheoret ica l ly as the preva i l ing and pers istent condition of a l l members' projects. It furnishes .'.resistant "object ive structures" which must be reckoned with i n ' a p r a c t i c a l l y adequate fashion i f action projects are to be successful ly ef fected. 2. Everyday l i f e att i tude sustains pa r t i cu la r doubts, but never global doubts that the existence of the world is never brought into question as an essential requirement for any par t i cu la r doubt. The world and i t s objective const i tut ion are taken-for-granted. 3. Everyday a c t i v i t i e s and the i r perceived connected features imply that they may be understood and acted upon in p r a c t i c a l l y s u f f i c i en t ways by competent employment of appropriate proverbs, paradigms, motives, organizational charts, and the l i k e . 4. In the att i tude of everyday l i f e the member finds out that what he needs to know i s r e l a t i ve to the pract ica l requirements of his problems. His c r i t e r i a for adequacy, rules of procedures, and strategies for achieving desired . ends are only as good as they need to be. 5. The world offers i t s e l f as an a p r i o r i r e s i s t i v e , r e c a l c i -t rant , and massively organized structure into which a member must gear himself. 6. For the lay and professional invest igat ion of everyday l i f e , the socia l world presents i t s e l f as an exter io r f i e l d of events amenable to lawful invest igat ion (c i ted in Zimmerman and Po l lner , 1970:84-87). .42 The ethnomethodologist's basic concern becomes the penetration of normal s i tuat ions of interact ion (Denzin, 1970a). If the objective r e a l i t y of soc ia l facts i s to be transformed from a p r inc ip le to an object of inquiry, then i t i s necessary that the researcher suspend contemporary con-ceptions of what relevant soc io log ica l problems are, and how they may be solved (Zimmerman and Po l lner , 1970). The researcher must treat the objective r e a l i t y of socia l facts as problematic, or as Garfinkel exp l icates , he must t rea t : ...every feature of sense, of f ac t s , of method, for every pa r t i cu la r case of inquiry without exception, as the managed accomplishment of organized settings of pract ica l act ions, and.. .part icu lar determinations in members' practices of consistency, planfulness, r e l e -vance, or reproductabi l i ty of the i r practices and resu l ts . . .as acquired and assured through pa r t i cu l a r , located organization of a r t fu l practices (1967:32). The ethnomethodologist employs the keyhole approach, viewing subjects without reference to his owrr taken-for-granted assumptions --(-Ga-rf i-nkel'T'l 967). Adopting the ro le of stranger, t reat ing the common-sense world as problematic, the researcher attempts to become part of the construction of a common-sense r e a l i t y . ^ He attempts to bracket his own common-sense assumptions to study how common-sense is used in everyday l i f e . Thus the phenomenon as near as possible i s made ava i lab le in i t s own r i gh t . The ethnpmethodologist i s concerned with how members of society go about the task of seeing, descr ibing, and explaining order in t he i r immediate world (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970). He is interested in members' accounts as phenomena and, s p e c i f i c a l l y , with how such phenomena are accomplished. Cur ios i ty about. r a t i o na l i t y of accounts is not an interest in enumerating the 'substantive features that give an account.its rat ional character ' , but wholly an interest in how, i . e . , v ia what methods, that r a t i o na l i t y is made avai lable as a for -a l l -pract ica l -purposes ' o b j e c t i v e ' , ' f a c t u a l ' property of an account (Stoddart, 1977). The ethnomethodologist's task i s to 'determine ' , ' f i nd ou t ' , 'd iscover ' the manner in which something occurred from the member?' 12 points of view... Members' ru les , norms, terms, or explanations are seen as indexical, which is to say that they have meaning in a par t i cu la r s i tua t ion . This meaning however may not be the same in another s i tua t i on . 0 To remedy the indexica1ity of a s i t ua t i on , or i dent i f y members' rules and norms, the ethnomethodologist can employ various f i e l d methods, some of which are adapted from part ic ipant observation. Techniques comprising the ethnomethodological method include observation of a l l kinds, f i lm ing , the use of tape recorders, examinations of l e t te r s and documents, and many more (Morris, 1977). Garfinkel has developed a technique whereby the researcher produces confusion, anxiety, bewilderment, and disorganized interact ion in order to discover what i s otherwise hidden; the common-'sense everyday rules of socia l interact ion (Bogdan and Taylor, 1967). Three conditions in quasi-experimental f i e l d studies were created: 1. The s i tuat ion i s structured in such a way that the person being studied could not interpret i t as a game, an " ' experiment, a deception, or a play. 2. The person i s given i n s u f f i c i e n t time to reconstruct the s i tuat ion on his own terms. 3. The person i s forced to make whatever new def in i t i ons he can by himself (no aid i s given by the invest igator ) . (Garf inke l , 1967:54). In essence, ethnomethodologists are concerned with the procedures by which structures of meaning are made meaningful. They look at members' practices for constructing and maintaining socia l meaning, an approach s im i la r to conversational analysis explained next. : Conversational Analysis as Research Method. Closely related to ethnomethodology i s the method of conversational analys i s . Garfinkel (1967), for example, studies what people say, the accounts they give, in order to see how the structure of the s i tuat ion - - i t s substantive , features - - i s produced and maintained, the manner in which i t comes to "make sense" for part ic ipants . He indicates that people make a s i tuat ion " sens ib le " for themselves and for others by t e l l i n g about i t . Quasi-experiments that he de l iberate ly set up to disrupt the flow of interact ional a c t i v i t i e s are designed as demonstrations of the practices used by persons to restructure "sensibleness" (Morris, 1977:56). Conversational analysts such as Sacks (1963, 1972), Schegloff (1972), Schenkein (1978), Speier (1972), and Turner (1974) are also pre-occupied with s i tuat ions as ongoing constructions, produced and reinforced by members' ordinary practices in a var iety of s i tuat ions (Attewell,1974). The .44 empirical studies, however, are directed toward spec i f i c features of conversational exchanges. Defending the ' s o c i o l o g i c a l ' base of this research, Speier remarks that conversational exchanges are: . . . s o c i a l l y organized sets of speech events... Cultural competence in using conversational procedures provides a procedural basis for the ongoing character of that culture (1972:398). He suggests that a study of the procedures in conversational 13 exchanges provides a powerful clue to the nature of social organization. Conversational analysts agree that the content of meaning i s s i t ua -t i o n a l , that meaning is generated in a s i tuat ion and is r e f l ex i ve l y reinforced in accounts and ta lk . Unlike . t rad i t iona l ethnomethodologists, conversational analysts deviate by assuming that the practices by which structures of meaning are made to appear real within a s i tuat ion are the same 14 across s i tuat ions . Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, and Turner claim that structural aspects such as, for example, " turn-tak ing" in conversation, are not l im i ted to s i tuat iona l conversation, but can be found in other kinds of interact ion l i k e interviews, t r i a l s , classrooms, and therapy sessions. Turn-taking is un iversa l ; i t i s not t ied to context (Morris, 1977; Turner, 1978). As indicated e a r l i e r , the conversational analyst generally adopts the same f i e l d work stance as the ethnomethodologist. For data analysis he uses himself as a resource in order to make sense of such features as questions, 15 i n v i t a t i on s , answer, etc . (Turner, 1978). Conversational analysts seek ways in which orderl iness in s o c i a l ' l i f e i s structured by language (Speier, 1972). What people say, and the way they say i t , provides important clues for discovering how what is said by people 1 g i s shaped by and shapes t he i r soc ia l world (Morris, 1977). Researchers are less interested in the content of ta lk than in i t s form, structure or coherence. According to Morris (1977), the importance of conversational analy-s i s l i e s in i t s discovery of the coordinated character of socia l interact ion and the expectations associated with th i s coordination. In order to acquire necessary data, the conversational analyst goes into the f i e l d using tape recorders or video-tapes. After transcr ib ing conversation he commences analysis to uncover i t s structure and coherence. This reveals the structural organization of interact ional conversation. Phenomenological Sociology as Research Method. In the words of Schutz: The primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social r e a l i t y . By the term socia l r e a l i t y I wish to be understood, the sum tota l of objects and occurrences within the social cu l tura l world, as experienced by the common sense thinking of men l i v i n g the i r da i ly l i ve s among t he i r fellowmen, connected with them as manifold re lat ions of i n te ract ion . It i s the world of cu l tura l objects and socia l i n s t i tu t i on s into which we are a l l born, within which we have our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. From the outset, we, the actors on the socia l scene, experienced the world we l i v e in as a world both of nature and of cu l tu re , not as a private but as an intersubject ive one, that i s , as a world common to a l l of us, e i ther actual ly given or potent ia l l y accessible to everyone; and this involves intercommunication and language (1971:53). As Schutz impl ies, actors are immersed in a human world permeated with meaning. The place of knowledge and explanation i s , therefore, taken by understanding and in terpretat ion. Psathas (1973) asserts that such objective r e a l i t i e s as soc iety, groups, community, and formal organizations are subject ively experienced by the ind i v idua l . These subjective experiences are int imately related to the subsequent external izat ion and ob jec t i f i c a t i on procedures in which humans engage as they think and act in the socia l world. At i t s core phenomenology represents the e f f o r t to describe subjective experience (Bruyn, 1966; Psathas, 1973). Human experience of the world is that i t i s a world of meaningful objects and re lat ions . Perception cannot be l im i ted to sensory experiences, but must include the s t ructures .of - meaning experienced by a subject knowing that which i s being perceived (Di l they, 1961; Psathas, 1973). According to B i t tner (1973), phenomenological sociology builds on an understanding of the const i tut ion of meaning in the s o l i t a r y ego, moves to the exploration of conditions that account for interpersonal ly shared meanings, and leads to a f u l l y fledged study of the phenomena of objective culture l i k e law, language, i n s t i t u t i o n s , etc. In other words, phenomenological sociology i s concerned with the way in which unit ies of meaning are intended, the genesis of ident i ty and d i f ference, and the formation of a r e a l i t y in which d i rect apprehension i s the basis for the s c i e n t i f i c as well as mundane world .46 (Natanson, 1973; Zaner, 1973). Phenomenological soc io log i s t s , unlike ethnomethodologists are interested in the content of meaning for the actors, or the description of the subject ' s r e a l i t y as i t appears to him. They study the content of structures of meaning. Phenomenological soc io log i s ts recognize that a l l consciousness i s consciousness "of" something (where something i s not to be taken l i t e r a l l y to mean an ex i s ten t i a l object) . They concentrate on the i nd i v i dua l ' s f i e l d of perception. Researchers should be as f a i t h f u l to V: the experiences studied as possible (Psathas, 1973). They should remain : open to a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s present. Presuppositions about the events or a c t i v i t i e s being studied are set aside and assumptions, theor ies, be l ie f s and prejudices do not remain unexamined (Wagner, 1973). There can be no unc r i t i ca l acceptance of assumptions since they structure the observed world (B i t tner , 1973). Phenomenological soc io log i s t s too must grasp the i r subjects ' perspectives and understand the d i s to r t i ve tendencies which the i r own special perspective tends to introduce (B i t tner , 1973; Wagner, 1973). Phenomenological descr ipt ion requires that phenomenological soc io log ists e i ther adopt completely, or in part, the phenomenological method (Bruyn, 1966). It i s a way of posing questions and searching for answers. According to Natanson^ : 1. There is a recognition that phenomena are immediately given states of a f f a i r s rather than empirical pos i ts . 2. It i s agreed that attending to the phenomena in both descr ipt ive and analyt ic terms i s the proper task of the invest igator. 3. It i s accepted that essences are the prime source of.-, .knowledge. (1973:25). Spiegelberg developed Husserl ' s phenomenological epoche (suspen-sion of judgment) in The1 Phenomenological Movement (1965). He i den t i f i ed in sequence the fol lowing s i x steps which can be employed as s ingular methods or a complete systematic method. 1. Direct explorat ion, analys i s , and descr ipt ion of par t i cu la r phenomena, as free as possible from un-examined presuppositions, aiming at maximum i n t u i -t i ve presentation : I shal l c a l l th i s ' descr ipt ive phenomenology'. 2. Probing of these phenomena for typ ica l structures or essences and for the essential re lat ions within and among them; th i s can be ca l led 'phenomenology of essences ', or even shorter but, perhaps, more r i s k i l y , essential (e idet ic ) phenomenology. 3. Giving attent ion to the ways in which such phenomena appear, e.g., in d i f fe rent perspectives or modes of c l a r i t y , to be ca l led here 'phenomenology of appearances'. 4. Studying the processes in which such phenomena become established (constituted) in our conscious-ness, often labeled as ' cons t i tu t i ve phenomenology'. 5. Suspending be l i e f in the r e a l i t y or v a l i d i t y of the phenomena, a process which may be considered as i m p l i c i t in the preceding phases,, though l a te r Husserl in s i s ted on i t s e x p l i c i t performance as basic for phenomenology; in short, ' reductive phenomenology'. 6. F i n a l l y , as introduced by Heidegger and, to some extent, Sartre, a special kind of phenomenological i n te rpretat ion , designed to unveil otherwise con-cealed meanings in the phenomena, which he ca l led 'hermeneutic phenomenology'. (1970:18-19) Spiegelberg qua l i f i e s use o~f. th i s method : In d ist inguishing these s i x types of phenomenology and arranging them in sequence I would l i k e to point out that there are essential connections between them. These do not prevent one's adopting only some, and pa r t i cu l a r l y the e a r l i e r ones, without t he i r successors (1970:19). Bruyn (1966) concurs with Spiegelberg, commenting that most soc log i s t s working within the interpret ive paradigm employ only the f i r s t three steps. Summary. The l i s t e d reasearch methods in the interpret ive para-digm employ s im i la r f i e l d methods for acquiring data, yet the i r intents and frameworks of analysis d i f f e r . Part ic ipant observation as a method determines social patterns out of typ ica l social behavior. F ie ld methods such as interviewing, observation and document analysis used in part ic ipant observation are also employed in tota l or in part in ethnomethodology, con-versational analysis and phenomenological sociology. However, the ethno-methodologist's purpose i s to search for everyday procedures by which meaning structures are made meaningful, whereas the conversational analyst ' s aim is to discover c l ues for how what people say i s shaped, or shapes the i r social world. F i n a l l y , the phenomenological s oc i o l og i s t ' s concern is a person's r e a l i t y and the meaning i t has for him. These ethnographic research methods are becoming recognized as a l ternat ive approaches in evaluation. Some evaluators have broadened the conceptual horizon of evaluation to include research approaches in the interpret ive paradigm. The fol lowing sub-section provides an overview of relevant evaluation l i t e r a t u r e in th i s paradigm. Interpretive Evaluation L i terature MacDonald presents a broad character izat ion of evaluation with in the interpret ive paradigm: Evaluation serves decisions about educational provis ion. It does so by observing and describing educational programmes. Evaluators make known to those who have legit imate claims upon the i r serv ices, something of the circumstances, values, processes, and effects of educational programmes. They seek to perform the i r task, to present the i r r e su l t s , in ways which...enhance understanding of the r e l a t i o n -ships between circumstances, values processes, and ef fects of programmes. Sound decisions about educa-t ional provisions always require attention to the interdependence of circumstances, act ion, and conse-quence. Sound evaluation designs r e f l e c t th i s requirement (1976:1). MacDonald favours evaluation through case study methods for integrated portrayals of programs in act ion. ". Portrayal" is, a bridging concept between the arts and socia l science. MacDonald (-1976) suggests that portrayals appeal to evaluators who want to make educational programs more comprehensible to the non-research community, and more accessible to the diverse patternings of meanings, s ign i f icance and worth through which people o rd ina r i l y evaluate soc ia l l i f e . Such portrayal, demands considerable observer ins ight and persp icu ity. To describe a "recognizable r e a l i t y " evaluation requires research devices outside the conventional repertoire (Par lett and Hamilton, 1976; MacDonald, 1976). The search fo r recognizable descr ipt ion of a c lass -room's unique cha rac te r i s t i c s , complex human events, and contextual deta i l s reca l l s Jackson's utterance that: Classroom l i f e , in my judgment, is too complex an a f f a i r to be viewed or talked about from any single perspective. Accordingly as we try to grasp the meaning of what school i s l i k e for students and teachers, we must not hesitate to use a l l the ways of knowing at our disposal (1968:vi i ) -Lort ie (1975) writes that schooling is long on prescr ipt ion and short on descr ipt ion. 0He5s%ggests that before'^reasonablei decisions are made, a c lear understanding of the subjective world of people within a school r e a l i t y i s required. Sjorgan's ed i t o r i a l comment on the debut of AERA Monograph Series Numbers 6 and 7 on Curriculum Evaluation (1974) suggests .a l ternate research foundations for that understanding: To a great extent, thought in educational evaluation methodology continues in terms of the research models used in psychology...These models contain s pec i f i c a -t ion of data and information requirements for con-tinuous and pervasive evaluations of educational programs... The experienced evaluator observes that the var iety of data and information needs in educa-t ional i n s t i tu t i on s requires the s k i l l s , methods, and insights of not only psychology but the socia l sciences and the humanities as well (1974:1). The AERA Monograph Series 6 and 7 is designed to stimulate movement toward studies of problems and issues bas i ca l l y considered a pr inc ipa l area of anthropology (Sjorgen, 1974). Magoon (1977) affirms the need for a construct! 'v ist approach. Applied to evaluation, this.-would require refocusing educational data gathering •by. employing ethnographic methods. Anethnographie approach would enta i l an .50 extensive descr ipt ive and interpret ive e f f o r t to explain the complexity of classroom phenomena (Magoon,^1977:653). The construct! 'vist approach is based on three basic assumptions. The f i r s t i s that the subjects of study must, at a minimum, be considered knowing beings, and that the knowledge they possess has important consequences for how behaviors or actions are interpreted. The second assumption is that behavior is aimed towards some end. Teaching and learning are best understood as purposely constructed by the subjects; adequate study demands accounting for meaning and purposes. The th i rd assumption is that human beings have a highly developed capacity to develop knowledge by organizing complexity rap id ly , to attend to meanings of complex communications and to reconstruct elaborate social roles (Magoon, 1977:652). * Snow's (1973) Handbook of Research on Teaching challeng;%:..educatibha,1 researchers and/or evaluators to f ind new and better metaphors for studying teaching. Snow'(\1973). recommend s. that researchers observe teachers .and students as active constructors of. the i r knowledge and rules." They are, often, capable of autonomous acts based on the i r appl ications of knowledge and rules...,-. Par let t and Hamilton (1976) support " i l l uminat i ve eva luat ion" , a socia l anthropological approach to evaluat ion, which they believe represents a paradigm s h i f t . Aoki concurs when he advances that: ...the use of an ethnomethodological approach in SURT (Study of Urban-Rural Transit ion)...enabled program development to be viewed as a dynamic h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l , and cu l tura l process, a view not possible with the standard psychometrically oriented approach to evaluation (1977:55). Erickson (1973) agrees that exploration of an a l ternat ive path for inquiry i s des irable. Wilson (1977) further acknowledges the growing interest in the use of anthropological techniques for educational and psychological evaluation research. He suggests that the new ( interpret ive) paradigm i s based on two sets of hypotheses about human behavior. Together, the na tu ra l i s t i c -eco log i ca l hypothesis and the qua!itative-phenomenological 18 hypothesis provide a strong rat ionale for ethnographic methods. Robinson (1974), Carini (1975) and Patton (1975) also c a l l for an understanding of classrooms as they are to ch i ld ren, teachers and parents. Understanding may be reached through pers istent observation and shared analysis of the events as they happen (Robinson, 1974). The evaluation act needs to be seen as a system of negotiations or interre lat ionsh ips between the evaluator and the subjects. These wr i te r s , representative of the interpret ive paradigm, c a l l for descr ipt ive interpret ive accounts of programs-in-use in classrooms. Although some have an i n t e l l e c tua l and: professional interest in qua l i ta t i ve research methods, they are not opposed to normative methods. According to Matson (1964), both research paradigms are mutually exclus ive, but mutually " to lerant " when considered as opposite sides of the same coin - d i f f e r i n g faces of the same r e a l i t y . They may be regarded as complementary research or evaluation approaches for a given phenomenon. In the next section com-plementarity w i l l be explored and related to curriculum evaluation. COMPLEMENTARITY The .development of the concept .complementarity can be traced to. the physical sciences, social sciences "and'psychology. Detailed examination of each 1ine of development of complementarity allows for a more ins ight fu l discussion of i t s appl icat ion to evaluation. -The Development of the Concept Development of complementarity can be traced o r i g i n a l l y to the physical sciences. Over the years i t became an accepted concept in the soc ia l sciences and psychology. The evolutionary development of complementarity is explained in the fol lowing paragraphs.y . The Physical Sciences. In the late 1930's Bohr, a famed Danish phys ic i s t , explored the elementary properties of l i g h t and matter. He found that: The e luc idat ion of the paradoxes of atomic physics has disclosed the fact that the unavoidable i n te r -action between the objects and the measuring instruments sets an absolute l i m i t to the p o s s i b i l i t y of speaking of a behavior of atomic objects which i s independent of the means of observation (1958:25). Bohr was faced with an epistemological problem. Descriptions of experiences had assumed sharp d i s t inct ions between the behavior of objects and the means of observation. Yet phenomena, l i k e indiv idual atomic processes, by the i r very nature are e s sent ia l l y determined by the interact ion between the objects in question and the measuring instruments necessary for de f i n i t i on of experimental arrangements. Forced to examine more c losely the question of what kind of knowledge can be obtained concerning the objects, Bohr concluded that: Information regarding the behavior of an atomic object obtained under def in i te experimental condi-tions may, however, according to a terminology often used in atomic physics, be adequately charac-ter i sed as 'complementary' to any information about the same object obtained by some other experimental arrangement.:. Although such kinds of information cannot be combined into a s ingle picture by means of ordinary concepts, they represent indeed equally essential aspects of any knowledge of the object in question which can be obtained in th i s domain (1958:26). Bohr suggests that waves and par t i c le s are complementary since both are required for a complete explanation, but they are mutually exclusive i f applied at the same time (Heisenberg, 1971). As Matson i l l u s t r a t e s : They are l i k e two faces of an object that can never be seen at the same time but which must be v i sua l i zed in turn, however, in order to describe the object completely (1965:147). De Brogl ie (c i ted in Matson, 1965) explains that whenever facts are described in any f i e l d of observation, the observer deals on the one hand with a r e a l i t y always i n f i n i t e l y complex and f u l l of an i n f i n i t y of shades, and on the other hand, with an understanding which forms more r i g i d and abstract concepts. The fol lowing statement by "Teilhard de Chardin expands, De B rog l i e ' s contention: The time has come to rea l i ze that an interpretat ion of the universe--even a pos i t ive one--remains unsatis-factory unless i t covers the i n t e r i o r as well as the exter io r of things: mind as well as matter. The true physics i s that which w i l l , one day, achieve the inclus ion of man in his wholeness in a coherent picture of the world (1959:147). Phys ic i sts such as Born (1932) and Compton (1935) agree by suggesting that complementarity, in physics, has a human referent. Bui lding on the conception of human referent, Matson proposes that complementarity's c ruc ia l meaning in human a f f a i r s i s ana log ica l . Complementarity highl ights the mutually antagonist ic, but pecu l ia r l y cognate re lat ionsh ip between the t rad i t i ona l s c i e n t i f i c method and the method known to social science as subjective.understanding and.interpre-tat ion (1965:151). The Social Sciences. Although the physical sciences stimulated an appreciation of complementarity in the social sciences, i t s epistemolo-g ical development began in philosophy, history and sociology. Heinrich R ickert , a neo-Kantian philosopher, published Kulturwissen-schaft and Naturwissenschaft in 1900 (English t rans la t ion : Culture and Science). He suggests that a l l science i s an elaboration of construction of formless matter. He develops the idea of two s c i e n t i f i c types of science, destinguished by the kind of elaboration to which matter i s subjected (Aron, 1868). The natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) tend towards the construction 19 of a system of laws. The second type of s c i e n t i f i c construction i s character-20 i s t i c of the h i s to r i ca l sciences or the sciences of cu l ture. For Di l they, mind and nature are a unity, each organic^o ^lve"other-• He reasons that the natural sciences are bas i ca l l y d i f f e ren t from the social sciences since the data of human minds are given, not derived (Truzz i , 1974). Truzzi summarizes D i l they ' s postulates as fol lows: The natural sciences seek abstracted explanatory ultimates whereas the social sciences seek immediate understanding through ins ight into the i r raw data. Humanistic and a r t i s t i c insights are the goals of the social sciences, and these are achieved not through the methods of the natural sciences but only by the means of empathetic i den t i f i c a t i on with the values and meanings examined in the minds of social actors. This i s the process of subjective understanding,or interpretat ion (Verstehen), and we achieve such understanding through a process of ' r e l i v i n g ' social events (1947:9). Adopting Rickert and D i l they ' s concepts of Kulturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, Weber (1947, 1949) deveTop^svthe'broad sbeipTogi-cal approach described as Verstehen (Finch, 1949; T ruzz i , 1974), His version of Verstehen is based on the premise that men have purposes and emotions; they make plans, construct cu l tures, hold certa in values, and the i r behavior i s influenced by.values, plans, and purposes. B r i e f l y , a human being l i ves in a world which has meaning to him; because his behavior has meaning, human actions are i n t e l l i g i b l e in.ways that the behavior of non-human objects i s not ( S t r i ke , 1972:28). Nevertheless, Weber recognized that beside the premises of Verstehen are equally true premises that human behavior i s governed by laws. An act ion, therefore, is explained when i t can be subsumed under such laws, and such laws are confirmed by empirical evidence (S t r ike, 1972). Weber states that an action can be understood r a t i ona l l y or empath-e t i c a l l y (subject to Verstehen). Actions are r a t i ona l l y understood when "we a t ta in a completely c lear i n t e l l e c tua l grasp.of the action elements in the intended context of meanings" (Weber, 1949:91). Str ike (1972), interpret ing Weber (1947), proposes that rat ional understanding is possible when persons employ mathematically or l o g i c a l l y related propositions in reasoning,, or where persons correct ly carry out a process according to accepted modes of thinking. One can rational.ly understand a person's actions when they are seen as the resu l t of means-ends reasoning which i s governed by log ica l rules Weber suggests that we understand many cu l tura l objects in th is way. For example, the existence of rules of chess is a condition of our under-standing a certa in s i tuat ion in the game as being in check or a certain move as cas t l ing (S t r ike, 1972:30). To help understand an action r a t i o na l l y , 2T Weber (1949) has expl icated sets of rules to serve as ideal types. On the other hand, Weber (1949) suggests that empathetic understandin is appropriate where rat ional understanding i s impossible. Subjects of concern are ultimate values and i r r a t i ona l actions based on such-emotions as. love, anger, envy, and pride (S t r i ke , 1972). Concerning those emotive states, Weber explains: The more we ourselves are susceptible to them, the more readi ly can we imaginatively part ic ipate in such emotional reactions as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, love, enthusiasm, pr ide, vengefulness, l o ya l t y , devotion, and appetites of a l l sorts , and thereby understand the i r r a t i ona l conduct which grows out of them (1947:90-93). Weber discriminates between.rational understanding and empathetic understanding. When an action is subsumed under some empirical law, one explains i t ; but when the action i s seen as warranted by acceptable reasons, i t i s understood CSinha, 19.61) Str ike sees both views as compatible or complementary for a complete understanding of the action (1972:38). Interpreting Weber, St r ike.expla ins: ...Weber holds that actions are understood when they are seen to conform to rat ional c r i t e r i a or by imaginatively projecting oneself into another person's experience we can understand his emotions and the i r connections with his behavior (1972:39). Polyani roots the concept complementarity in the social sciences -with the fol lowing statement: The most important pair of mutually exclusive approaches to the same s i tuat ion is formed by the a l ternat ive interpretat ions of human a f f a i r s in terms of causes and reasons. You can t ry to repre-sent human actions completely in terms of the i r natural causes... ." If you carry th i s out and regard the acting of men, including the expressions of the i r convict ions, wholly as a set of responses to a given set of s t i m u l i , then you ob l i te rate any grounds on which the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of those actions or convictions could be given or disputed. You can in te rpret , for example, in terms of the causes which have determined my action of wr i t ing i t down, or you may ask for my reasons for saying, what I say. But the two approaches - - in terms of causes and reasons - - mutually exclude each other (1951:22). More recent ly, Bruyn has introduced the concept complementarity when considering approaches to knowledge. • He pos its : The soc ia l s c i en t i s t i s now in a pos it ion to add another dimension of knowledge to provide an even sounder base for his f i e l d of study. This dimen-sion ( interpret ive) l i e s in the personal r e a l i t i e s and symbolic meanings in the data of research which can i l luminate t rad i t i ona l dimensions of both fact and theory... . Its ( interpretive) function i s to complement t rad i t i ona l approaches to knowledge (1966:175). Bruyn sums up complementarity in the social sciences by out l in ing the fol lowing methodological assumptions about soc ia l s c i e n t i f i c knowledge: 1. There is a knowable, communicable soc iocultural r e a l i t y which can be described through the constructs of socia l - :/56 theory in conjunction with the findings of social research. 2. This r e a l i t y has an objective and subjective dimension, both of which must be understood by the socia l s c i en t i s t to have an adequate understanding of i t . 3. Theoretic coherence, empirical consistency, and exper i -V ; e n t i a l consensus are the generic terms of r e i f i c a t i o n upon which the adequacy of social s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s based. 4. Social s c i e n t i f i c knowledge draws upon three sources of mind - - reason, sense, and i n t u i t i on - - for d i f fe rent types of understanding, yet a l l three function together in any single act of knowing. 5. A high degree of s t a t i s t i c a l p robab i l i ty and socia l , ant ic ipat ion of the future, along with understanding as an end in i t s e l f , i s what can be expected through the ve r i f i c a t i on of knowledge. 1 a) Although propositional or mathematical statements can aim toward perfect cor re lat ions , they cannot necessari ly achieve them. ' b) Although descr ipt ive statements at the level of meaning can aim towards perfect ident i ty of ex i s -tent meanings, they cannot necessari ly achieve them. c) In e i ther case an approximate s t a t i s t i c a l and/or personal understanding of the phenomenon is achieved; these two types of understanding may be considered together as complementary forms of research knowledge. ' (1966:175). Discussion of rat ional and empathetic understanding i s also pre-valent in psychological wr i t ings . The fol lowing paragraphs explain comple-mentarity within the d i s c i p l i ne of psychology. Psychology. Maslow (1954) expounds on the need for background under-standing in order to achieve a proper interpretat ion of a spec i f i c behavior. More adequate interpretat ion requires a general point of view, a h o l i s t i c , funct iona l , dynamic, and purposive approach that complements an atomist ic , . taxonomic, s t a t i c , causal, simple mechanical perspective (1954:27). .57 Maslow acknowledges that the two approaches are not discrete dichotomies but tend to coalesce into two unitary, but contradict ing world views (1954:27). Phenomenological and ex i s ten t i a l psychologists have recently acknowledged the relevance of complementarity "in: psychological research. Kesiel indicates that empirical psychology demands an e i de t i c counterpart i in order to expl icate the ultimate sense of perception, emotion, i 22 imagination, consciousness, and meanings already operating (1970:257). Coombs and Snygg, suggesting complementary psychological research approaches o f fe r the fol lowing explanations: Human behavior may be observed from at least two very broad frames of reference: from the point of view of an outs ider, or from the point of view of the behaver himself. Looking at behavior in the f i r s t ; " way we can observe the behavior of others and the s i tuat ions in which such behavior occurs. It i s poss-ib le to attempt the explanation of behavior.in terms of the interact ion of the indiv idual and the s i tuat ions in • which we have seen him operating. This i s the ' ob jec t i ve ' or ' e x te rna l ' frame of reference. The second approach ! seeks to understand behavior by making i t s observations from the point of view of the behaver himself. It attempts to understand the behavior of the indiv idual in terms of how things 'seem' to him. This frame of reference has been ca l led the ' pe rceptua l ' , ' pe r sona l ' , , or 'phenomenological' frame of reference (1959:16). Giorgi (1971a) suggests that psychologists include exper ient ia l and behavioral data to tap the richness of man as he ex i s t s . Insofar as behavior and experiences are d i f f e ren t , the manner in which these aspects of man become data for psychology must also d i f f e r . Behavior becomes datum when i t s relevant aspects are measured, and experience becomes datum when subjects meaningfully describe the relevant aspects of the experimental s i tuat ion (G iorg i , 1971a:50-58; Sardel lo, 1971:30-50; van Eckartsberg, 1971:66-68). Van Eckartsberg (1971) and van Kaam.(.1969) recommend an ecological viewpoint to describe the functioning of l i f e structures in human i n te r -action and shared experience, as well as indiv idual experience. Idea l ly , a researcher should s t r i ve for exhaustive observation complemented by exper ient ia l meaning. S imi la r l y in education evaluations knowing the meanings that students and teachers give to learning s i tuat ions enriches understanding of the investigated phenomena. COMPLEMENTARITY IN EVALUATION Evaluation writers have t yp i c a l l y treated normative and in terpret ive evaluation procedures as methodologically exclus ive. The question of which evaluation procedure the evaluator chooses has usual ly been an either/or decis ion. For example, proponents of the normative evaluation paradigm high-l i g h t the product iv i ty of normative techniques which provide data for answering questions re la t ing to cost-effect iveness, means-ends co r re la t ions , organiza-t ional e f f i c i ency and p r ed i c t ab i l i t y . Evaluators f a i t h f u l to th i s form of evaluation stress the power of s imp l i f i ca t i on through s t a t i s t i c a l processes. S imp l i f i e r s help the evaluator by reducing phenomena to something comprehendable. According to W i l l i s : For the most part, quantitat ive evaluation aims at general understanding. Start ing with a number of cases and ident i fy ing and quantifying a l imi ted number of factor s , a typical study might o rd i na r i l y derive s t a t i s t i c a l correlat ions between factor s , and s t a t i s t i c a l p robab i l i t i e s that such corre lat ions occur or do not occur by chance (1978:7). Normative techniques are useful in dealing simultaneously with a large number of cases. Their basic value in any pa r t i cu la r study depends on the s ign i f icance and explanatory power of the factors i d e n t i f i e d , the degree to which s t a t i s t i c a l s ign i f icance corresponds to other forms of s ign i f icance, and the worthwhileness of the derived general izat ions ( W i l l i s , 1978). Evaluators working within the normative paradigm s t r i ve for va l i d and r e l i a b l e research procedures and f indings. They are concerned about the meaning of the data co l l ec ted , instrumentation employed, r e p l i c a b i l i t y of the data-gathering procedure and consistency of f ind ings. The evaluator ' s emphatic attentiveness to these pr incipal cardinals of evaluation i s based on a s c i e n t i f i c epistemological structure dealing with concepts, judgments and systems. If the evaluator i s f a i t h f u l to the cardinals of normative evaluation, his f indings w i l l add to the system of log ic already defined. .59 Hence he achieves c r e d i b i l i t y with in the world of normative evaluators/ researchers. Most evaluators within the interpret ive paradigm highl ight the inherent weakness of normative evaluation. They c r i t i c i z e the l im i ta t ions of normative evaluation without adequately r e f l e c t i n g on the benef its. For example, one popular l im i ta t i on often highlighted i s that the assumptions underlying normative evaluation often tend to be obscured by the research techniques ( W i l l i s , 1978). Hence findings may appear to be r e l a t i v e l y object ive, s c i e n t i f i c and free from personal b ias, although assumptions and biases have gone into the creation and select ion of instruments. Another focus for c r i t i c i s m i s that normative evaluation does not ask or answer many basic questions dealing with personal meaning and soc ia l s ign i f icance ( W i l l i s , 1978). It does not provide adequate information about background descriptions concerning programs-in-use, student and teacher spoken a t t i tudes , the i r meanings towards the program, unintended outcomes, and classroom interact ion. Many evaluators within the interpret ive mode admit to the i r recon-c i l a b l e tension between the concept of absolute v a l i d i t y and the empathy an evaluator must make use of when he interprets educational phenomena. The everyday world of the classroom changes hour by hour, day by day. Individuals change as the i r biographies change. Hence r ep l i c ab i 1 i t y of evaluation research procedures is questioned by many evaluators within the interpret ive paradigm. The assumption underlying this study, however, is that every aspect of an educational program holds at least as many truths as there are evaluators. Educational phenomena need to be looked at from several points of view rather than one perspective exclusive of another. Although normative and interpret ive evaluation are methodologically and epistemological ly -exclus ive, placed in a complementary framework they provide a more h o l i s t i c picture of education phenomena. Eisner, referr ing to in terpret ive descr ip-tions as " t h i c k " descr ipt ions, provides the fol lowing example which out l ines the essence of complementarity in evaluation: . . .a behavioral description of an eye l id c los ing on the l e f t eye at the rate of two closures per second could be described in just that way. But a thick description of such behaviors within the context of a cu l tura l subsystem could be described as a wink. The meaning of a wink, espec ia l l y i f .60 the person at the other end is someone of the opposite sex is en t i re l y d i f fe rent from a descr ipt ion of eye l id closures at the rate of two closures per second (1975:20-22). I f a person wishes to determine nervousness, eye disease, or a l e r t -ness, he might desire s t a t i s t i c a l information such as the number of eye closures per second. If an indiv idual wishes to discover forms of i n te rac t i on , body language, or attentiveness, he would prefer to have a descr ipt ion of eye closure in a context where symbolic meaning and t r ad i t i on are understood. One point of view without the other presents a pa r t i a l p ic ture. So i t i s in evaluation. One method should not be seen as exclusive of another. Normative procedures are attentive to the s t a t i s t i c a l analysis where the evaluator ' s design and f i na l report emphasizes what can be measured e f f e c t i v e l y , given modest resources. Interpretive procedures r e f l e c t the nature of the program, with f i d e l i t y to the many perceptions and expectations of i t . Together they present a more h o l i s t i c por t raya l . The fol lowing chapter outl ines a philosophical basis for an evalu-ation data-gathering methodology with in the in terpret ive paradigm which looks at educational phenomena from an ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological point of view. Although normative evaluation findings ( s t a t i s t i c a l analyses) are beyond the scope of th is study, the ex i s tent i a l phenomenological approach to evaluation should be recognized as complementary to normative procedures. .61 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II ' Ke l lner categorizes realism as rat ional and natura l . Rational realism is further divided into c l a s s i ca l realism (sometimes known as c l a s s i -cal humanism) and re l i g ious realism (often referred to as scholast ic i sm). The basis of realism is not a be l i e f in the r e a l i t y of matter. The universe, for the r e a l i s t , i s not an i l l u s i o n but rather something that r ea l l y and concretely ex i s t s . It ex ists in i t s own r i gh t , independently of the mind (Kel lner, 1964:40-41). Over the past ten years Stake has become increasingly attent ive towards usage of ethnographic descriptions (case studies) in evaluation. ^Geisteswissenschaft is s imi la r in meaning to Kulturwissenschaft further discussed on page 67. 4 Dilthey further develops the concept "understanding" as a process for grasping meaning. It is a mental operation that can be defined in terms of other mental operations. Understanding rests on what might be ca l led an inside view of the human nature which we a l l possess (Di l they, 1961:39). Palmer (1967) notes that understanding should not be conceived of as something to be possessed, but rather as a mode or constituent element of being-in-the-world. It i s primordial and incorporates a ' s l i g h t i n g ' of things, of fel low men, of the world as a whole, and of man's mode of existence (Kockelmans, 1972). The fol lowing Heideggerian thought aff irms Palmer's premise: In mere encountering of something, i t i s understood in terms of a t o t a l i t y of involvement; and such seeing hides in i t s e l f the exp l ic i tness of the assignment re lat ions which belong to that t o t a l i t y . . . . When something within-the-world i s encountered as such, the thing i n question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and th i s involve-ment i s one which gets l a i d out by the in terpretat ion (Heidegger, 1962:191). Thus a person's primordial understanding of the world means that the chaotic order of the world i s overcome, that unity and interconnection enter the world, and that man can move in th is world on the basis of i t s trans-parency (Luijpen, 1974). For example, a person's understanding of a house is such that i t enables 'comprehending' of ' a l l ' houses. Understanding establishes unity in the f i e l d of presence of the existent subjects-as-cogito (Luijpen, 1974). I f a person stands in r e a l i t y 'without primordial understanding', that r ea l i t y is for him a chaotic agglomerate of concrete, i nd i v i dua l , and unique things. I f an ind iv idual does not 'understand' what a house i s and every house i s , then each house i s an enigma for him (Heidegger, 1962). In more pragmatic terms, human beings possess i n t u i t i v e understanding of the everyday world p r io r to formal conceptual ization. Three d i f fe rent levels of i n t u i t i v e understanding may be dist inguished (Strasser, 1963). The f i r s t level i s composed of p r e - s c i en t i f i c f a m i l i a r i t i e s . For example, .62 a s c i en t i s t has experiences of time and space before he begins to experiment with them. The second level of i n t u i t i v e understanding i s formed by the understanding of certa in forms of behavior. Strasser interprets the fol lowing passage by Mclver as i l l u s t r a t i n g this l e v e l : Let us assume we are witnesses of a scene. We see that the man flees and that the crowd 'pursues' t h i s . Note that we do not f i r s t see a ' locomotion 1 and then draw conclusions from i t , but on the contrary we immediately see the f l i g h t as well as the pursuit. Higher animals, e.g., dogs, are l ikewise capable of th is kind of i n t u i -t i ve ' seeing ' (1963:163). Net t le r ' s statement that "even a dog knows whether he has been kicked or was tripped upon" i l l u s t r a t e s the second level of understanding (1970:40). The th i rd level of i n t u i t i v e understanding involves certain forms of mimetic expressions (Strasser, 1963). B r i e f l y , th i s leve l re f l ec t s an under-standing of expressions of joy, aggression, fear, sadness, and cheerfulness. A small c h i l d i s sens i t ive to the smile or frown of i t s mother and reacts in a f r iend ly fashion to the smile, but anxiously to the frown. This i l l u s t r a t e s a natural attunement to the surrounding world. Plessner states emphatically: The question of whether someone is angry, jealous, sad, happy, j o v i a l , whether he i s ashamed, whether he is sorry or merely acts as i f he is rea l l y f i l l e d with th i s a f f ec t i on , th i s question is sett led within the framework of the actual s i tuat ion by the consideration of the h o l i s t i c character i s t i c s of behavior (1953:141). According to Heidegger (1962), when en t i t i e s within-the-world are d i s -covered - - that i s , when they have come to be understood - - they have meaning. Interpretation i s grounded in primordial understanding. Interpretat ion, the work of thought, consists of deciphering the 'hidden meaning' of the apparent meaning within l i t e r a l meaning (Ricoeur, 1973). Such interpretat ion involves the indiv idual researcher with his ent ire humanity, including his emotional l i f e . He empathizes with the respondents, yet remains within the sphere of cognitive relat ionships and does not i n fe r moral relevance (Strasser, 1963). Empathy is not a mysterious or mystical act. It i s something which people constantly practise and have to pract ise in da i ly l i f e , v i z . , the emotional or co-emotional grasping of values and norms which are decis ive for others (Weber, 1949). The empathetic approach enables a researcher to understand at a higher level the conduct of fel low men (Weber, 1949; Bruyn, 1966; Abel, 1974). For example, a p sych ia t r i s t has to deal with a paranoic. So f a r as diagnosis and therapy are concerned, i t i s , of course, not at a l l desirable that the psychi-a t r i s t share the feel ings of his patients. The greater his t r a n q u i l i t y , the better he w i l l work. If one un rea l i s t i c a l l y assumes that the psych ia t r i s t does not at a l l know what anxiety i s , espec ia l ly the anxiety one has when feel ing persecuted, one would be unable to make an adequate diagnosis and apply an e f fec t i ve therapy (Strasser, 1963). To comprehend understanding more thoroughly, a b r i e f descr ipt ion of understanding within the normative paradigm i s usefu l . Within the normative paradigm, understanding is viewed as a ' bas i c ' research aim. I f , as Kerlinger (1964) suggests, theory formulation is the ultimate aim of empirical research, explanation and understanding become sub-aims. According to Rudner (1966), a researcher has acquired the understanding appropriate in science when he has achieved a causal explanation of the type of event invest igated. .63 To arr ive at a sat i s factory s c i e n t i f i c understanding the s c i e n t i s t part ic ipates in in terpretat ion. In the s t r i c t sense of Rudner (1966) and Hempel (1966), the s c i e n t i s t interprets data resu l t ing from the methodological chain, in order to enhance understanding. The researcher takes the results of analys is , makes inferences pertinent to the research re lat ions studied, and draws conclusions about these re lat ions (Ker l inger, 1966; Best, 1977). In short, a researcher operating in the normative paradigm interprets as he analyzes the data (Kuhn, 1964). For example, when one computes a coe f f i c i en t of co r re la t ion , one almost immediately infers ( interprets) the existence of a re lat ion and draws out i t s s igni f icance for the research problem as one orders, breaks down, and manipulates the data (Ker l inger, 1966; Helmstadter, 1971). Interpretation within the normative paradigm culminates in conditional probabil ist ic statements of the " I f P, then Q" kind (Nagel, 1939; Ker l inger, 1966; Hempel, 1966). Such statements are enriched when they are qua l i f i ed in such ways as " I f P, then Q, under the conditions R, S, and T" (Popper, 1959; Ker l inger, 1964). These kinds of probabil istic statements are employed in conventional psychology. The statements are based on Ogden's (1923) thesis that once a context has affected an indiv idual in the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the context w i l l cause him to react in the way in which he reacted before. Without such recurrence or pa r t i a l uniformity no pred ict ion, no inference, no recognit ion, no inductive genera l izat ion, no knowledge or probable opinion as to what i s not immediately given*would be poss ible. These factors a l l const itute understanding within the normative paradigm (Ogden, " "C l i f ford Shaw uses the fol lowing description to i l l u s t r a t e how a description can be wr itten to allow exper ient ia l understanding of what cons t i -tutes the movement of boys into delinquency. One of the gang members says: When we were shop l i f t i ng we always made a game of i t . For example we might gamble on who could steal the most caps in a day or who could steal in the presence of a detective and then get away. We were always daring each other that way and thinking up new schemes. This was the best part of the game. I would go into a store to steal a cap, by t ry ing on one and then when the clerk was not watching walk out of the s tore, leaving the old cap. With the new cap on my head I would go into another store, do the thing as in the other s tore, getting a new hat and leave the one I had taken from the other place. I might do this a l l day and have one hat at night. It was fun I wanted, not the hat. I kept th i s up for months and then began to s e l l the things to a man on the west s ide. It was at th is time that I began to steal for gain. (1948:5). Through this descr ipt ion we understand juven i le delinquency at a personal leveL because the elements of excitement, daring challenges, pleasure, and chance that enter into a game are universal and can be reproduced exper i -ent ia l ly in the mind of the professional observer. .64 uHeidegger interprets his being-in-the-world in the fol lowing way: The compound expression being-in-the-world indicates in the very way we have coined i t , that i t stands for a unitary phenomenon... . The phenomenal datum which our expression indicates i s one which may in fact be looked at in three ways... . The fol lowing items may be brought out for emphasis: (1) F i r s t , the in-the-world. With regard to th is there arises the task of inqui r ing into the ontological structure of the world and def ining the idea of worldhood as such. (2) Second, that ent i t y in which every case has being- in-the-world as the way in which i t i s . Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when one asks the question "Who?" (3) Being-in ( in-sein) as such. We must set forth the ontological const i tut ion of inhood (Inheit) i t s e l f . . . upon any of these cons t i -tut ive items s i gn i f i e s that the others are emphasized along with i t ; th i s means that in any such case the whole phenomenon gets seen. For addit ional commentary see Heidegger (1957:26-31), King (1964:70-98), Langan (1959), Harris (1967:170-176), Kockelmans (1970:24-30). 'According to Jaspers (1965:30-32), man i s ; he ex i s t s . He finds him-se l f in the world with other human beings. S im i l a r l y , Schutz (1971:20-33) and Natanson (1974:33-78) suggest that the world i s experienced by the se l f as being a world for oneself, fo r others and of others. Fellowmen appear to the s e l f in d i f fe rent ways, which corresponds to d i f f e ren t cognit ive sty les by which the s e l f perceives and apprehends the other ' s thoughts motives and actions. Further, Jaspers (1965:33-35) believes that man should not be conceived of as defined essences. He notes that man often i s defined as the organism that talks and thinks (zoon logon echon); as the organism that creates i t s own society in the form of the c i t y - - pol i s - - ruled by law (zoon po l i t i k on ) ; as the toolmaker (homo faber) ; as the tool user (homo loborans); or as the organism that maintains i t s existence by common industry (homo economicus). Sartre> on the other hand, relates man's essence to ro le and the unstable nature that resu lts when one sees himself ent i re l y in a s t a t i c r o l e . He i l l u s t r a t e s the s i tuat ion in the fol lowing descr ipt ion of a waiter: ...the waiter in the cafe can not be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that th i s inkwell i s an i nkwe l l , or the glass i s a glass. He cannot form r e f l e c t i v e judgments or concepts concerning his condit ion. He knows wel l what i t "means": the obl igat ion of getting up at f i ve o ' c lock , of sweeping the f l oo r of the shop before the restaurant opens, or s ta r t i ng the coffee pot going, etc. He knows the rights to which he i s allowed: the r ight to the t i p s , the r ight to belong to a union, etc. But a l l these concepts, a l l these judgments refer to the transcendent. It i s a matter of abstract p o s s i b i l i t i e s , of r ights and duties conferred on a "person possessing r i gh t s " . And i t i s precise ly th i s person who I have to be ( i f I am the waiter in question) and who I am not. It i s not that I do not wish to be th i s person, or that I want th i s person to be d i f f e ren t . But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It i s a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be only in representation. But i f I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but th i s nothing i so lates me from him. I can not be he, I can only play at being him; that i s , imagine to myself that I am he.. . in vain do I f u l f i l l the functions of a cafe waiter. I can be he only in the neutral ized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechani-ca l l y making the typ ica l gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary cafe waiter through those gestures taken as an analogue... (1956-.59-60). For addit ional reference on role taking see Cicourel (1970:4-49), Dawe (1971:542-555), and Jehenson (1973:219-251). In terms of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology, man pressing beyond his own givenness refers to the concept becoming. Becoming is further discussed on page 78. "Becker (1958:652-653) and Cicourel (1964:48-50) describe four stages of part ic ipant observation in greater d e t a i l . (1) In the f i r s t stage, decisions about problems, concepts and indicators are made. Three tests can be used to check items of evidence. The f i r s t concerns the c red i -b i l i t y of informants; i t checks whether the informant might have reasons for l y i ng , concealing information, or for misstating his role in the event or his a t t i tude toward i t , and whether the informant actua l ly witnessed the event or is basing his description on other channels of information. The actor ' s perspective is important. A second test i s ca l led "volunteered or directed s ta te -ments". It questions the spontaneity of the responses, whether they are made to coincide with the observer 's presence or whether questions have influenced the respon-dent's remarks. The th i rd te s t , the observer-informant-group equation, takes into account the observer 's role in the group - - whether his research is done incognito or as an intensive part ic ipant - - and how this might influence what he w i l l see and hear as an observer. (2) In the second s tate, the researcher decides the frequency and d i s t r ibu t ion of data re la t ing to problems, concepts, and ind icators . What w i l l const itute evidence w i l l be determined. The invest igator attempts to account for the t y p i c a l i t y of his observations, the i r frequency, and importance in the group studied. Quantitative accounts of the organization are possible in th i s stage. (3) The t h i r d stage integrates the various f indings into a descr ipt ion of the events under study. Becker notes that in th i s stage the observer seeks a common-sense framework which f i t s the obtained data. .66 (4) In the fourth stage, the observer rechecks, where necessary, the framework in accordance with his data. Here he decides how he w i l l present his f ind ing . 1 0 The att i tude of everyday l i f e i s described by Schutz (1973) as "the common-sense wor ld " , "world of da i ly l i f e " , and "everyday wor ld" . Natanson suggests that these descriptions are variant expressions for the inter - subject ive world experienced by man (1973:xxvi i ). The common-sense world is the arena of socia l act ion; within i t men come into relat ionships with each other and try to come to terms with each other as well as them-selves. Garfinkel (1967), Wilson (1970), Zimmerman and Pol lner (1970), and Natanson (1973) recognize that the world is taken-for-granted. The structures of da i l y l i f e are not themselves recognized or appreciated formally by common-sense. ^ F o r l i t e r a tu re describing the soc io log ica l concept of stranger see Znaniecki (1936), Wood (1969),' Simmel (1971), and Schutz (1973). 12 The text has drawn heavily on a paper presented by Stoddart (1977) to Sociology 476 at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. 13 Cicourel has expanded language to include kinds of communication other than speech, e.g., the manual sign language and f inger spe l l i ng of the deaf (see Cicourel and Boese, 1972:32-61). He terms th i s emphasis ' cognit ive sociology ' (C icoure l , 1973). His concern i s with the in terpret i ve procedures in interact ion that ex i s t even without the use of ta lk (C icoure l , et a l , 1974: C icoure l , 1964, 1968; Cicourel and Boese, 1972). Based on Schutz (1971) and Garfinkel (1967), Cicourel formalizes the fol lowing features as basic to a l l i n te ract ion : (1) F i r s t , a l l signers (or speakers-hearers) re ly upon a rec ip roc i t y of perspectives, whereby part ic ipants in communicative acts presume that the i r mutual experiences in the interact ion scene would be the same even i f they were to change places. (2) When we f i l l in elements assumed to be deleted from the deep structure yet intended by the other speaker or s igner, the idea i s that an et cetera property i s operative: the communicants make use of undisclosed deta i l s and presumed larger contexts of meaning. (3) A l l communication presumes that the speaker's or hearer 's s o c i a l l y stored knowledge is organized into normal form t yp i f i c a t i on s of objects, motivations, goals and action patterns mediated by the language and para-language of the part i cipants. (4) Everyday communication requires the part ic ipants to presume considerably more meaning than carr ied by the ta lk (sign system) i t s e l f . The production and comprehension of utterances and/or signs are embedded with in a larger .67 horizon of meanings, which can give r i se to various po ten t i a l i t i e s because of the occasion of use of the signs or utterances, social character i s t i c s the part ic ipants at t r ibute to each other and the i r r e l a -t ionship to one another, temporal features experienced by the actors, and the social knowledge the p a r t i c i -pants invoke as "what anyone knows" in attempting to recover, construct, or imagine the meanings to be considered relevant to the interact ion (C icoure l , 1972: 44-46; 1973:34-39). For addit ional l i t e r a tu re which refers to the features mentioned see Ba r -H i l l e l (1954), Conklin (1955), Frake (1962), Garfinkel (1967), Sacks (1967) and Schutz (1971). '^The concept of invariance i s employed to explain un iver sa l i t y of aspects in conversation. It may appear thata-contradict ion develops between index i ca l i t y which refers to meanings t ied to s i tuat ions and invariance which indicates that procedures are t rans-s i tuat ional and universal. Zimmerman and Pol lner (1970) handle the index ica l i ty - invar iance paradox by expanding on the "concept stock of knowledge". For further information see Schutz (1971), Berger and Luckman (1967), and Schutz and Luckman (1973). Each ind iv idual possesses a stock of knowledge which he'brings to a s i t ua t i on . This stock of knowledge i s not shared, intersubject ive knowledge. Somehow, each part ic ipant with his or her indiv idual stock of knowledge comes to share an "occasioned corpus", that i s , a body of knowledge which is assembled in and from the s i tuat ion and which is unique to that s i tua t ion . This occasioned corpus of knowledge i s i ndex i ca l , but the " family of pract ices" used to make the s i t ua -t ion understandable presumably transcends the s i t ua t i on . It i s these practices that are invar iant. Methodography is a research vehicle designed to search for the invar iant practices which make features of sett ing observa-ble. For a descr ipt ion of the method, see Zimmerman and Pol lner (1970: 90-98) and Morris (1977:50-60). Much of the information on conversational analysis has been adopted from Dr. Turner's 1977/78 Sociology lectures held at the Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver, B r i t i s h Columbia. , uThe conversational analyst ' s interest i s largely based on Aust in ' s thesis that through analysis of ordinary language we gain knowledge of the r e a l i t i e s of the world the language talks about. He states: When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what s i tuat ions , we are looking...not merely at words, but also at the r e a l i t i e s . We use the words to ta lk about; we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of . . . the phenomena (1970:182). For further information, see Austin (1962). Although essences are regarded as prime sources of knowledge, they have to date no s o l i d de f i n i t i on in the social sciences (Bruyn, 1966). Husserl f e l t that essence i s not a qua l i ty buried in the nature of things, destined to .68 reveal i t s e l f l i k e the oak from the acorn (Husserl c i ted in Welch, 1941:179). Essence i s not empirical in that i t i s temporal and pa r t i cu l a r ; although essence is embodied in empirical f ac t , i t s real form pers ists beyond time and space. For example, the perception of redness i s an essence which must be in tu i ted to be understood (Farber, 1967; Spiegelberg, 1976). According to Bruyn (1966), Husserl ' s examples of essences are largely categories of philosophy, such as unity, m u l t i p i c i t y , i den t i t y , e t c . , so part of the work of the socia l phenomenologist becomes one of interpret ing anew the meaning of essence in socia l theory. Scheler (1954) believed essence could be expressed in a concrete concept like " f e l l ow fee l i ng " . I t can be understood symbol ical ly by a non-part ic ipant through references to his own personal experiences in a s i t ua t i on . " "Ecological psychologists claim that i f one hopes to generalize research f indings to the everyday world where most human events occur, then research must be conducted in settings s im i la r to those that the researchers hope to generalize about, where those same forces that w i l l one day act are not interrupted (Wilson, 1977). Jackson (1968) and Lort ie (1975) speak of s im i l a r concerns. Those who work within the qua l i t a t i ve or phenomenological approach assert that the soc ia l s c i en t i s t cannot understand human behavior without understanding the framework within which subjects interpret the i r thoughts, fee l ings , and action (Wilson, 1977). Bruyn (1966) adds that to know merely the fact that fee l ing s , thoughts, or actions ex i s t i s not enough without knowing the framework within which they f i t . The soc ia l s c i e n t i s t must come to understand how a l l those who are involved interpret behavior, in addition to the way he or she as s c i e n t i s t interprets i t from his/her objective outside perspective. Moreover, since subjects cannot always a r t i cu l a te the i r perspectives, the researcher must f ind ways to cu l t i va te awareness of the latent meanings without becoming overly soc ia l i zed and unaware as most part ic ipants may be (1966:13). "Naturwissenschaft;'refers to a system of laws of a mathematical nature. The ideal type of natural science i s Newtonian or E insteinian physics or modern nuclear science in which concepts designate objects constructed by the mind. The system is deductive, s ta r t ing with laws or pr inc ip les which are abstract, simple and fundamental (Rickert, 1900; also in Aron, 1968). ^ u In "Kulturwissenschaff. 'the mind does not t ry to form formless matter gradually into a system of mathematical re l a t i on s ; i t establ ishes a s e l e c t i v i t y within matter by re la t ing matter to values (Aron, 1968:231). Kulturwissen-schaft has a s im i l a r meaning as Dilthey's "Geisteswissenschaff and Weber's "Verstehen". For addit ional information see Weber (1947, 1949), Hodges (1944), Dilthey (1961), Aron (1968), Bruyn (1966), and Coser (1971). Bergson (1949) also distinguishes two d i f fe rent ways of knowing "a th ing " . The f i r s t way he ca l l s i n t u i t i o n . By i n t u i t i on Bergson means the kind of i n t e l l e c t ua l sympathy where one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in i t and consequently inexpress ible. .69 Analysis i s the operation which reduces the object to objects already known; that i s , to elements common to both i t and other objects. To analyze i s to express a thing as a function of something other than i t s e l f (Bergson, 1949: 20-35). Weber's expl icat ion of an ideal type i s developed on the presuppo-s i t i o n that an ideal type generally c l a s s i f i e s which actions would be rational for an agent holding certain values or purposes in certa in circumstances (1949:92). Schutz expands on Weber's use of ideal types in the fol lowing descr ipt ion: The s c i en t i s t observes certain events with in the soc ia l world as caused by human a c t i v i t y and he begins to establ i sh a type of such events. Afterwards he co-ordinates with these typ ica l acts typ ica l "because motives" and " in -order - to motives" which he assumes as invar iable in the mind of an imaginary actor. Thus he constructs a personal ideal type, which means the model of an actor whom he imagines as g i f ted with a consciousness. But i t i s a consciousness r e s t r i c ted in i t s content only to a l l those elements necessary for the performance of the typ ica l acts under consideration. These elements i t contains completely, but nothing beyond them. He imputes to i t constant " in-order-to motives" corresponding to the goals which are rea l ized within the soc ia l world by the acts under consideration; furthermore, he ascribes to i t constant "because motives" of such a structure that they may serve as a basis fo r the system of the pre-supposed constant " in -order- to motives"; f i n a l l y , he bestows on the ideal type such segments of l i f e plans and such stocks of experiences as are necessary for the imaginary horizons and backgrounds of the puppet actor (1971:17-19). 2 2 K e s i e l ' s need for e ide t i c psychology is based on Merleau-Ponty's version of perceptual Gestalt which symbolizes a category i r reduc ib le to either subject or object, but nevertheless involving both. Ponty suggests that psychology already i m p l i c i t l y includes a r e f l e c t i on on the fundamental notions which supply ultimate meanings to facts observed and re lated (Kes ie l , 1970: 251-271). For further information see Ponty (1974) and O 'Ne i l l (1970). Chapter III EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASE OF THIS STUDY Underlying research methodology are phi losophical l ines of reasoning which substantiate research procedures used. In th i s study ex isten-t i a l phenomenological reasoning serves as the basis upon which data-gathering methodology and interpret ive descriptions are constructed. In order to provide the reader with the philosophical foundation supporting the study, th i s chapter out l ines ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological reasoning as the basis for the study. Spiegelberg speaks of hermeneutic phenomenology when describing human uses of phenomenology. He suggests s ix uses of phenomenology. This study is designed to expand on the l a s t step ca l led hermeneutic phenomenology.^ Hermeneutics i s defined as an interpretat ion of the 'sense' underlying certain phenomena.2 It i s an interpret ive procedure designed to unveil hidden meanings (Spiegelberg, 1967:695). Spiegelberg (1967) suggests that the writ ings of Heidegger e x p l i c i t l y demonstrate hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger notes: The methodology in meaning of phenomenological descr ip-tion i s interpretat ion (auslegung, lay ing open). The logos of phenomenology of Dasein has the character of "hermeneuenn" (to i n te rp re t ) , through which are made known to Dasein the structure of his own being and the authentic meaning of being given in his (pre-conscious) understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein i s a hermeneutic in the or ig ina l sense of the word, which i t designates th i s business of interpretat ion (1962:37). Langan (1959), Spiegelberg (1965), Schrader (1967), Kockelmans (1972) and Luijpen (1974) c l a s s i f y Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology. In order for the substance of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology to be better understood, the f i r s t three parts of th i s chapter describe the development of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology, i t s use as grounding and i t s r e l a t i on -ship to meanings for th i s study. The fourth part i l l u s t r a t e s ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology as the author 's praxis in carrying out th i s project. 70 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY Ex i s tent ia l phenomenology is a synthesis of ex i s tent ia l i sm and phenomenology. To c l a r i f y the reader 's understanding of my interpretat ion of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology, each of these aspects of the concept is d i s -cussed under a separate heading in the fol lowing paragraphs. A th i rd sub-section presents the synthesis implied by the tota l concept of ex i s tent i a l phenomenology. Ex i s tent ia l ism The roots of ex i s ten t i a l philosophy are found in the nineteenth century writ ings of Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky. Central to the i r thoughts are an emphasis on the ex i s ten t i a l i nd i v i dua l , a revolt against phi losophi-cal system bu i ld ing , and a ca l l for a consideration of man in his concrete s i t ua t i on , including his cu l ture, h i s tory , re lat ions with others and the meaning of personal existence (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974). Ex i s tent ia l i sm is not intended to be s c i e n t i f i c , but rather to awaken people to a special way of l i f e , referred to as "authentic existence" (Spiegelberg, 1967). Ex i s tent ia l thoughts made the i r philosophical debut in philosophical l i t e r a tu re as e x p l i c i t reactions against a contention held by Hegel that a l l indiv idual 3 perception could be reduced to a systematic denominator (Stern, 1967). Rejecting Hegel's philosophical reductionism, Kierkegaard maintains that the existent par excellence is the ind iv idual who emerges in sadness and so l i tude, in doubt, exaltat ion and passion; th i s i s the indiv idual whom Hegel's ph i l o -sophical system does not mention. T h e i s t i c a l l y , man is a subject who i s only authent ical ly himself in his re lat ionsh ip to the God of revelat ion. Existence is absolutely o r i g i n a l , : ' rad ica l ly personal and unique (Kierkegaard, 1944). ' Dostoyevsky's work can be seen as an aff i rmation of Kierkegaard's man is subject thes i s . In his work Dostoyevsky1 makes the point thatman i s nothing but what.he makes of himself. Every truth and every action implies both an environment (world in which man decides what he is and what others are) : 72) and human sub jec t i v i t y . These aff irmations provide a basis for the modern e x i s t e n t i a l i s t question, "What does i t mean to say 'I am'?" Knel ler (1963) and van Cleve (.1963) suggest that man i s the deter-miner of his own nature and definer .of .his own values in the real world, the world of the ex i s t i ng . Ex i s tent ia l man continuously chooses what he i s and i s to become (Jaspers, 1965). The withdrawal of his previous supports (such as, for example, God) evokes a t e r r i b l e burden of re spons ib i l i t y (Knel ler , 1963; Luijpen, 1969). Man alone, therefore, must answer for what he is and is to become in a world that includes other men. The thesis that the world is a world for a l l men i s also found in phenomenology, out l ined in the next sub-section. Phenomenology The phenomenological standpoint i n s i s t s that the indiv idual as consci -ousness inhabits an intersubject ive world, a world for everyone. Husserl (c i ted in Strasser, 1963) argues that there i s a s e l f or ego that ' i nhab i t s ' consciousness and is in some sense responsible for consciousness of the world. Based on Brentano's exp l icat ion of i n ten t i ona l i t y in psychic exper i -ences, Husserl developed his central phenomenological thes i s , that conscious-ness i s intent ional (Ricoeur, 1975). It i s always directed toward something, either, a material object (e.g., house), an unreal object (e.g., f r i g h t ) , or an ideal object (e.g., number). Consequently a phenomenon i s an object as . i n tu i ted (or i n tent iona l l y experienced) by a consciousness. Whether the phenomenon i s real or unreal (a perceivable object ) , whether i t is true or fa l se (an assertable or deniable object ) , or whether i t ex ists in some .other sense (e.g., in the sense that a prime number between seven and thirteen e x i s t s ) , i s a question which analysis and descr ipt ion of the phenomenon i t s e l f (the intent ional object) need not determine (Solomon, 1972:20). No d i s t i nc t i on can.be drawn between the phenomenon and the object-i n - i t s e l f . For example, i f I perceive a car, then the car as a phenomenon and the c a r - i n - i t s e l f are one and the same. But i t must be remembered that the phenomenon is inseparably connected to experience, for i t i s a phenomenon-because i t is an object as experienced (Spiegelberg, 1967; Solomon,-1972). To help describe our world without any assumptions Husserl developed a 4 method of phenomenological reduction or. "epoche".. The phenomenologist attempts to adopt as his f ixed po l i cy an att i tude of neu t ra l i t y , v i s -a -v i s his own continuous bel iev ing in the world. This means he attempts to look at what he sees without imposing presupposed interpretat ions. According to Zaner (1973), the indiv idual o f f i c i a l l y dissociates himself from his actual pos i t ions, regarding his intent ional objects purely as "what I believe i n , " and "what I see". He makes e x p l i c i t the t a c i t i n tent iona l l y objective world as.a whole, act i ve ly d i s soc iat ing himself from his fundamental and continuously val idated be l i e f s . In requir ing that indiv iduals make ef for t s to suspend the i r assumptions (referred to as "bracketing" in phenomenology), Husserl desires people to stop simply be l iev ing , but to s ta r t looking at the i r own be l ie f s in order to see what i t i s for them to believe in the i r own existence, the world and God (.Solomon, 1972). Contrary to the ex i s ten t i a l pos it ion Tin which a philosophy of existence is non - s c i en t i f i c , Husserl believed that the phenomenological method could change philosophy into a rigorous science, a coherent system of propositions (Spiegel-berg, 1967). According to Stern (1967), th is i l l u s i o n was destroyed by the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t dissenters among his d i s c i p l e s . The dissidents maintained that the phenomenological method could only be employed within the l im i t s of the philosopher 's existence. Dissenters, referred to as ex i s ten t i a l phenomenolo-g i s t s , believed that philosophy cannot be a rigorous science and philosophical truth cannot have the universal depersonalized character of s c i e n t i f i c t ruth . The emerged confluence is referred to by Ricoeur (1966) as ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology. Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenology The ex i s tent i a l phenomenologist sh i f t s the emphasis away from Husserl 's question, "What is knowledge?" to the question, "What i s i t to be a person?" Ex i s tent ia l phenomenologists look for universal conceptual features such as meaning, project , freedom and s i tuat ion that are necessary for humanness. Whereas Husserl saw the transcendental phenomenologists' tasks as describing the l i ved world from the viewpoint of detached observers, ex i s ten-t i a l phenomenologists i n s i s t that observers cannot separate themselves from the world. Ex i s tent ia l phenomenologists fol low the implications of the .74 doctrine of the i n ten t i ona l i t y of consciousness. Since consciousness is always consciousness of something, the world is the correlate of conscious-ness. In other words the indiv idual as intentional consciousness i s insepar-able from the soc ia l aspects of human experience. For ;ex i s tent ia l phenomen-o log i s t s , the modalities of conscious experience are also the ways we are in 5 the world (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974). Heidegger (1962) considers that within the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological mode of th ink ing, a person is both a being-in-the-world and a being-conscious-of-the-world. His view emphasizes man's dual character, "being shaped and giving shape." Man is made by the world in which he comes into being and, as he develops his a b i l i t i e s and powers, he gives shape to the world, to himself and to others. In da i ly l i f e , man gives meaning through his purposes in the world. By immersion in d i f fe rent s i tuat ions , man continuously searches fo r ident i ty and f u l f i l l m e n t through freedom and responsible choice (Heidegger, 1962; Ricoeur, 1975). In his search for personhood, other people are indispensable. Consequently, man's being-in-the-world is a co-exist ing being whereby he decides what he i s and what other people are (Jaspers, 1965). Heidegger-(1962), Jaspers (1965) and Ricoeur !s-.( 1975) ex i s tent i a l phenomenological thesis that man is an intersubject ive, ex i s ten t i a l being has seldom been applied to education. I f i t i s to be so appl ied, i t i s important that certain s t rateg ic concepts - - freedom, s i t ua t i on , choice, pract ica l reasoning, being and becoming are understood in the context of that app l icat ion. The c l a r i f i c a t i o n of these terms is fundamental to the, exp l icat ion of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology as the philosophical grounding of th is study.,- and is d ea l tw i t h in the fol lowing sect ion. EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS REASONING Freedom, s i t ua t i on , choice, pract ica l reasoning, r e spons ib i l i t y , being and becoming are interpreted as the most central concepts for fundamental s i tuat iona l meanings. They are ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological concepts which are needed for a r r i v ing at a person's s i tuat iona l meanings. They serve as the cornerstones upon which research questions (Chapter i v ) are developed, and meaning interpretat ions (Chapter V) are arr ived at. Although every indiv idual i s independent and unique, his freedom is circumscribed by conditions which his pa r t i cu la r s i tuat ion imposes. A typ ica l s i tuat ion i s characterized by a person's pos it ion in the world: a l l the obstacles he meets, the help he receives, and the resistance he has to overcome in order to reach his aims [Stern, 1967). Strasser 0963) suggests that s i tuat ions ar i se out of environments when human intentions [projects) are present. Within any spec i f i c segment of space and time, an indiv idual i s confronted with persons, things, condit ions, and relat ions which are indispensable in the pursuit of his po ten t i a l i t y . Yet, each s i tuat ion consists of factors which d i a l e c t i c a l l y restruct or enhance man's freedom "from" and man's freedom " t o " . An indiv idual d i a l e c t i c a l l y s t r ives within conditions of given s i tuat iona l and soc i a l frameworks, without opposing'constraining external forces to the indiv idual (Wagner, 1976). The d i a l e c t i c • between man's intentions and re la t ion to s i tuat iona l freedom can be c l a r i f i e d by the fol lowing i l l u s t r a t i o n : In 1804 Saint Bruno went to establ i sh himself as a hermit in a savage region of the French Alps. By the very fact that Saint Bruno seeks a place where he and • his companions can devote themselves undisturbed to the i r meditations, the environment (physical geography) ceases to be an environment. The saint asks the mountains and valleys a question: "Where can I establ i sh myself as a hermit?" The mountains and val leys reply, a l be i t word-le s s l y . They reply by what they are. Thus there begins a d i a l e c t i c , in which things are involved negatively and po s i t i ve l y . They are opposed to, or in favour of a , certa in human intent ion. They are " u se fu l " , " sa fe " , "harmful", "unsu i table" , "dangerous". Precisely because things arrange themselves, as i t were, around an inten-t i o n , a " s i t ua t i on " is born (Strasser, 1963:274). A s i tuat ion ex ists in re la t ion to one's project (referred to by Strasser as in tent ion) ; when s t r i v i n g towards a goal, one attempts to transcend the bounds of a s i tuat ion (Sartre, 1956). The r e a l i t y of a s i tuat ion i s revealed to an indiv idual in terms of how i t res i s t s or aids his project. Sartre offers the fol lowing analogy: A big mountain, for instance, offers tremendous resistance i f my free project is to bu i ld a r a i l r oad , for then I have to dig a tunnel through i t . On the other hand, i t i s a big help i f my free project is to 1 see the surrounding landscape. Only in the l i g h t of my free project is th i s mountain e i ther an obstacle or ! a help; in i t s e l f , i t i s neutral (Stern, 1967:145). In da i ly r e a l i t y indiv iduals are re s t r i c ted to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s avai lable "for choice. For example, classroom freedom is not "acosmic freedom". Rest r i c t ions , objective and'undeniable s i tuat iona l f ac t s , are always present. Government agencies,. special in terest groups, educational t rad i t ions 'and anonymous soc ieta l expectations reduce freedom of choice in pedagogical and learning s i tuat ions . Depending on one's perspective or project, r e s t r i c t i on s may become catalysts of freedom. For example, the curriculum guide i s a government document which formally r e s t r i c t s the. topics or content of i n s t ruc t i on , time a l l o t ted for course coverage, and resources for use. Despite these r e s t r i c t i o n s , teachers and students develop programs and a c t i v i t i e s related to the guidel ines. In terms of ins t ruct iona l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , teachers make c r i t i c a l pedagogical and knowledge choices which a f fect the i r relat ionships to the students, student futures, and the i r own standing in the teaching profession. Students may respond to the curriculum content with confidence i f they are aware of i t s relevance to the i r future. I f t he i r fee l ing s , in tu i t ions and thoughts do not correspond to 'what"is expected ', feel ings of unease or pass iv i ty may occur. Ult imately, however, people have the freedom to make that choice. Choice L i fe presents people with choices. In da i ly a c t i v i t i e s indiv iduals continuously choose, often without knowing which a l ternat ive course i s best. As Ortega states : There is in man...the inescapable impression that his l i f e , and with i t his being, is something which has to be chosen. The fact is amazing; because i t means that, unlike a l l other en t i t i e s in the universe, which have a being that i s given to them ready made and by v i r tue of which they e x i s t , i . e . , because of which they already are what they are, man i s almost inconceivably a r e a l i t y which ex ists without having a being irremediably being pref ixed, who congruently i s not yet what he i s but must choose for himself his own being. How w i l l he choose i t ? Because he w i l l imagine in his own mind many types of possible l i v e s . . . • He w i l l , doubtless, notice that some of them at t rac t him more (Stern, 1967:49). •77 But what i s meant by choice? On the one hand Husserl (1966) concep-tua l izes choice as an i nd i v i dua l ' s encounter with open and problematic poss i -b i l i t i e s . Open p o s s i b i l i t i e s seem i r re levant , since they have no.speci f ic weight and are a l l equally possible. Individuals select from things they take for granted in biographical ly and s oc i a l l y determined s i tuat ions . Simple i l l u s t r a t i o n s are a person choosing to eat with a fork, drink from a glass, or wash with soap. On the other hand, Husserl notes that at any time a person may f i nd himself placed among problematic a l te rnat i ves . He then r e l i e s upon his preferences to determine the course of his future conduct (Shutz, 1970). The problematic p o s s i b i l i t i e s the indiv idual encounters or ig inate in doubt, since they may be in contest. To choose, therefore, means to be aware - - or to have the d i spos i t ion of becoming aware - - that a l ternat ives are open and that one of these w i l l be chosen (Koestenbaum, 1977). Since ind i v idua l s ' da i l y a c t i v i t i e s are based on Jaspers ' "-Ich w#hle" (I choose), rather than Descartes' "Cogito", each indiv idual i s a chooser. A man always becomes something; in choosing with passion he chooses to become himself (T i ryak in, 1962). Choosing enables the indiv idual to come to an understanding of what he r ea l l y i s , or i s - to -be. What matters, therefore, i s not only "what" a person decides upon, but also "how" and "why" he decides. In ex i s tent ia l phenomenological terms, the pract ica l reasoning for the "how" and "why" helps an indiv idual interpret a person's meanings in a s i tuat ion . Pract ica l Reasoning An indiv idual chooses his projects on the basis of pract ica l reasoning. In\.the l a s t analys i s , decisions, (or completed acts of "having made choices") need to be j u s t i f i e d . Reasoning i s a way of j u s t i f i c a t i o n (Jehenson, 1973). The reasons need not be log ica l (or reconstructed as in the ana lyt ic -empir ica l mode), but rather p r a c t i c a l , personal, and s i t ua t i ona l l y relevant to the ind iv idua l . For example, in a classroom there are numerous p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; whenever a teacher or student makes a choice, he engages in pract ica l reason-ing about why he chose 'one 'poss ib i l i ty 'over ' -another. Pract ica l reasoning may be conceptualized as choice and action directed towards,(intended, towards) the accomplished act. Intentional action and choice can be explained in terms of motives, in the sense of "reason for act ing" (Ricoeur, 1975; Schutz, 1973), When a person gives a reason he means; He asks you to consider the action in a certa in l i g h t , to place i t in a certa in perspective, to consider i t as... . To state a motive Cin the sense of reasoning) is to give a meaning which can be communicated verbal ly to another person and understood by him; the motive (reason) makes the choosing such and such (Jehenson, 1973; Ricoeur, 1975). To allege a motive (reason) i s to c l a r i f y what one does in the eyes of others and in one's own eyes. Greene (1967) affirms the importance pract ica l reasoning has for uncovering meanings in the classroom. Reasoning c l a r i f i e s and binds together the elements which emerge in the teacher 's and student's experience. Pract ica l reasoning i s the " locus" of meaning and constitutes the meanings an indiv idual gives to his immediate s i tuat ion (Jehenson, 1973); therefore, meanings in a classroom can be investigated through pract ica l reasoning under-ly ing educational choices. Responsib i l i ty The indiv idual takes re spons ib i l i t y for his choices. In ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology, re spons ib i l i t y i s regarded as a given. To feel responsible i for one's action is not merely a desirable frame of mind, but is the recogni-t ion of a fact of human existence, a fact that follows d i r e c t l y from an i nd i v idua l ' s understanding of freedom (Koestenbaum, 1977). According to Frankl (1959), responsibleness i s the very essence of authentic human existence. I f questioned, the indiv idual needs to answer for himself and accept f u l l re spons ib i l i t y for his choice. Stern 's interpretat ion of Sartre characterizes the s i tuat ion succ inct ly : When I choose, I incur an awesome re spons ib i l i t y not only toward myself, but toward other people as w e l l , I fo r when I make a choice I make a decision for a l l those in the orb i t of my own behavior and experience (1967:67). Since choosing a project is always an adventure into the future, a person must accept the re spons ib i l i t y of potent ia l l y r e s t r i c t i n g future f ree-doms. For example, as a high school student an indiv idual may choose the project of becoming a medical doctor. He accepts the re spons ib i l i t y of enro l l ing in "prescribed courses", doing "x" hours of schoolwork, and spending "y" years at a medical co l lege. Thus the student 's future project to become a doctor .79 relates to a decision made 'in the present. His being a student and becoming a doctor are i n t r i c a t e l y re lated. Being and Becoming Being is a person's fundamental involvement within de f in i te s i tuat ions encountered in his l i f e . Being i s comprised of choosing and reasoning within • any "here and now". An i nd i v i dua l ' s being consists in his becoming. Man i s not so much what he i s , as.he is what he is not. Man continuously s t r ives to transcen-dant heights. He is a horizon of p o s s i b i l i t i e s which manifest themselves h i s t o r i c a l l y in concrete s i tuat ions . Man i s what he has become; he i s what he w i l l become; but even more, he i s the transcending source of s t i l l further becoming^ Man i s a subject who is not merely concerned about being free ' to b e ' , but being free to rea l i ze open p o s s i b i l i t i e s which const itute his becoming.. Thus, becoming is a higher r e a l i t y than being, since no present r e a l i t y is the "be a l l and end a l l " . Man is forever immersed in "having to be" (Heidegger, 1962). Becoming is a process of t rans i t i on from a p o s s i b i l i t y in the mind to an ac tua l i t y in the. wholeness of a person. For example, a teacher may take his class on a f i e l d t r i p to a ghost town. A student, i f l e f t to his own explor-a t i on , may stop before a grave marked only by a cross made of two branches. At that moment he may feel speechless. As he stands by an "unknowngrave" he may see his present l i f e as being a h o l i s t i c part of a past b u i l t by unknown men who had future dreams. He s i l e n t l y re f lec t s upon the present and the future when he himself may become a being in an .unknown grave. Thus he may g r e f l e c t upon the meaning of his present existence. Ex i s tent ia l phenomenologists support the l i ne of reasoning that d i f fe rent s i tuat ions imply d i f fe rent meanings for people. Within s i tuat ions indiv iduals choose future projects upon which they act , and for which they take re spons ib i l i t y . Underlying t he i r choices are reasons which suggest meanings people assign to s i tuat iona l experiences. Since human meaning is the key component of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology, i t i s described in the fol lowing sect ion. Combined, the aforementioned ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological concepts provide the reasoning for the interview questions on pages 103 and 104 and the interpretat ion o f ex i s tent ia l phenomenological'meaning'described in the following section. EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL MEANING Ex i s tent ia l phenomenologists suggest that speaking subjects usually desire to bring i m p l i c i t structures of meaning of the i r experience to e x p l i c i t expression (Ponty, 1964). Language is the means through which they most often convey meaning; i t i s seldom a source of meaning (Heidegger, 1962; Kockelmans, 1972). Since ex i s ten t i a l phenomenologists believe men to be sources of meaning, they interpret abstract r e i f i e d symbols (such as 'poverty ' ) as people experiencing everyday s i tuat ions (Ponty, 1964; Kockelmans, 1972). To expl icate meanings of 'poverty ' ex i s ten t i a l phenomenologists ask indiv iduals to describe t he i r world of poverty, rather than extract information from a t yp i f i ed soc ia l construct whose meaning i s represented in l i n g u i s t i c analys i s , s t a t i s t i c s , or graphs. Through self-awareness, man reaches out to establ i sh meaning through his encounter with the world. . He sees the world as parts unveil ing them-selves one at a time. For example, in a park a man may f i r s t see a lake, then trees, shrubbery and animals. He gives meaning to each segment of the experienced world by organizing the world as a world-for-man. Since man cannot be separated from the world, d i a l e c t i c a l l y man's existence becomes meaningful through his re lat ion with the world, while the existence of the world becomes meaningful through i t s re lat ion to man (MicaTTef , 1969). Through th i s re lat ionsh ip man and the world establ ish a dialogue. When man asks the question, the world gives the answer, but neither the question nor the answer makes sense separately (Strasser, 1963). Meaning is also apparent in the d i a l e c t i c between man and man. The world which the indiv idual encounters is shared by. other men. Encountering the world-for-man, people encounter not only a world of things, but also a world of men, for they encounter each-other-encountering-the-world (Heidegger, 1962; Jaspers, 1965; M ica l l e f , 1969). 7 The sense of d i a l e c t i c a l encounter that man has with other men and things in the world i s a pa r t i cu l a r l y s i gn i f i can t formulation for th i s study. Conceptually, i t legitimates my opening the in tens i ty of my I-amness that uncierliesf. the project of thesis wr i t i ng . The next section c l a r i f i e s my present being as i t d i a l e c t i c a l l y relates to past beings and beings to come. With the p l a s t i c i t y of time, i t i l l u s t r a t e s that change, emotions and i n t e r -subjective encounterings are forever present. EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS'PRAXIS Development of the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological framework was not accomplished in a vacuum. Encounters with predecessors and contemporary authors slowly developed my philosophical th inking. It was never my intention that ex i s tent i a l phenomenological reasoning transcend the concreteness of people acting in s i tuat ions . Instead, I hoped that i t would r e f l e c t an authentic view of the world-as-seen-by-man. However, one can never be sure that a philosophical l i ne of reasoning has i t s covered-up-ness neutral ized (Strasser, 1963). To neutral ize a person's pre-givens or potential one-sided perspective underlying any l i ne of reasoning, requires the process of praxis within the structure of d i a l ec t i c s (Craib, 1976). According to Mannheim (c i ted in Coser, 1971), systems of ideas need to undergo prax i s , or continuous referencing of- ideas to the i r embeddedness in social structure. -This need is expanded in~the fol lowing paragraphs. Praxis Praxis i s pragmatic thought within a dynamic interconnectedness of g thought and action (Mannheim, 1936; Simmel, 1950; Dallamayr, 1973). It i s an intent ional interconnectedness between theory-practice and pract ice-theory. Praxis i s an on-going r e f l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y whereby both practice and theory undergo change. Each influences and in turn is influenced by the other. According to Vranicki (1975), theory of i t s e l f i s the imagining of a l imited consciousness. Action without re f l ec t i on on motives and re spons ib i l i t y may be described as inauthentic a c t i v i t y . Prax is , therefore, " i s a reconstruction which, instead of muti lat ing opposing elements, permits scrutiny of the complex relat ionships between theory and engagement" (Merleau-Ponty, 1965) ; Ar i s ing from rigorous praxis i s a progressive, authentic.changing- knowledge (Strasser, 1963;. F re i re , ;1974).. Dallamayr (1973) describes such ar i s ing knowledge as qua l i t a t i ve change Whereby paradoxes and contradict ions become functions for t o t a l i z i n g and constructive synthesis. Man generally mater ial izes his existence, not in h i s theoret ica l knowledge,, but in his concrete doing, acting and making - - i n his " p r a c t i c a l " concern with things and fellowmen (1<ockelmans, 1972). Man theorizes not in i so l a t i on from fel low men and situations.; but in re la t ion to p r a c t i c a l , immediate, sensuous re lat ionsh ips. . He is a social and h i s t o r i c a l being continuously immersed in presence (Di l they, 1961). This view of d i a l e c t i c temporality underlying praxis i s a fundamental component of th i s study, and requires closer invest igat ion. D ia lect i c Time According to M ica l l e f (1969), time should not be considered as se r i a l chunks of past, present and f u t u r e , ^ but as the awareness of a sequence in which we ex i s t . I t i s an uninterrupted progress of the present, what was present constantly becoming the past, and the future becoming the present (Di l they, 1961:98).^ Consider what happens when I s i t down in a chair. Having sat down I get out of my cha i r . to go through the door. The future act of going through the door gives character to my having sat down and leaving the chair now. The past and the future meet in the present, or as Terryakin states, " I-face-the-future-now-in-the-view-of-what-I-have-been-before" (1962:110). Time is personal temporal involvement. M ica l l e f notes: I am aware of being in time insofar as I am a specimen of matter-in-process but insofar as I am aware of my-se l f as a s e l f (1969:100). Jacques (1970) proposes that to be aware of my be.ing-in-time suggests 12 I ex i s t " i n " the present, yet "stand out" from i t to be aware of i t . He wri tes: Man's experience of his own existence i s an experience in and of time. As he stands out from himself in awareness he meets both being and himself in time. For man there i s no escaping from time, for time constitutes his being as being-in-the-worl d. There is no being that i s free from time or outside i t . Time and being are , inseparably l inked together... ; Our provis ional aim i s to interpret time as the possible horizon for any under-standing whatsoever of being (1970:45). My being-in-process-in-time includes a dynamic interconnectedness between past, present and future. .83 Past. My past i s my having been, a "gone that i s s t i l l there". The past cannot manifest i t s e l f unless there i s a future (Kockelmans, 1965). So I contemplate the past as l i ved and foresee the future as planned, as I see myself through the sequence of time (M ica l le f , 1969). The "having been" i s not something d i s t i n c t from me, i t i s what I have been and what I s t i l l am in some way; i t i s that which having been i s s t i l l present, that which is present as having been (Heidegger, 1962). What i s ca l led the past is something which was once present to me, regarded as past from the standpoint of my now, but s t i l l retained as such by memory (Heidegger, 1962; Kockelmans, 1965). My now i s the presence. • Presence. Time i s a sequence, but the moment of time i s presence. I always l i v e in presence, described by Clay (1960) as "specious time": the experience of any given "moment". On the one hand presence pre-supposes the future as ant ic ipat ion of man's p o s s i b i l i t i e s . On the other hand, presence returns to "what has been". The realness of man i s his being "here and now", which i s always temporal (Nietzche, 1927). Presence i s always now, which must be conceived in terms of something which is e a r l i e r s t i l l , and from which 13 every now (future) stems (Heidegger, 1962). Luijpen contributes a concise descr ipt ion of presence, pa r t i cu l a r l y as to how i t re lates to the future: . . . i n every presence, there i s a retent ion, "now" present, of a past presence and a "protent ion " , "now" present of a future presence (1969:242). Future. The future i s something which we ant ic ipate from our presence, something which we expect as a p o s s i b i l i t y that can or w i l l become a present r e a l i t y (Kockelmans, 1965). The future i s a set of unfolding p o s s i b i l i t i e s towards which a person projects. In other words, i t i s an oncoming present and real ized p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the past. By employing the d i a l e c t i c of time as a sense-making veh ic le , I intend to develop a basis on which to describe the praxio log ical development of thought and.action that I underwent to a r r i ve at the moment of thesis wr i t ing . That very moment of experience i s not simply an awareness of what i s now, but also contains within i t s e l f an awareness .of what i s past and what i s to come. .84 PERSONAL PRAXIS When I arr ived at the Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia in September 1976, members of the Evaluation Contract Team for the Provincia l Assessment of Social Studies in B r i t i s h Columbia suggested that I explore the ex i s ten t i a l dimension of man in the Social Studies evaluation project. I accepted the challenge and began to immerse myself into Kierkegaard's wr i t ings. A pos it ion paper based largely on Kierkegaard's realms of being was developed and subsequently presented to the Management Committee. This group, comprised of professional educators, school trustees and B r i t i s h Columbia Min ist ry of Education personnel, was in charge of overseeing evaluation a c t i v i t i e s . Part way through the discussion of the posit ion paper, I rea l i zed the committee members' f rust rat ions at try ing to place ex i s tent i a l thought within the i r conventional framework of thinking. I t did not f i t . I attempted, therefore, to become more f a i t h f u l to the members' s i tuat ion by redefining ex i s tent i a l concepts in common-sense language. At the same time, the committee members sensed my f ru s t ra t ion in the interpretat ion venture. In conversation, the committee members and I showed signs of moving towards a "we" re la t ionsh ip , whereby they and I made some attempts to acquire a greater empathetic under-standing of each others ' points of view. Having nervously presented the ex i s tent i a l l i ne of reasoning to a group of lay people, I ref lected upon the need for greater common-sense grounding of meta-existential concepts and a more rigorous philosophical l i ne of reasoning. A subsequent expansion of the l i t e r a t u r e search in ex i s ten-t i a l i sm Ted to a rev i s ion of much of my thinking. A question a r i s ing out of the conversation with the Management Committee was, "How can ex i s tent i a l ism be construct ively employed in classroom research?" After a second posit ion paper was written and presented to the committee members they again reacted. At th i s time, the i r r e a l i t y as committee members reading a report on ex i s tent ia l i sm had changed. They had previously experienced my gropings with ex i s tent ia l i sm. This second report, therefore, became more than just a written account. I t represented an important part .85 of me. As the group members rea l i zed the personal importance of the report they oriented themselves to ex i s tent ia l i sm as being more an a r t i c u l a t i on of my personal world. 1 The committee members desired to learn more, and in the i r search for more knowledge they became, more committed to seeing ex i s ten t i a l research p i loted in schools. They posed valuable questions about the re lat ionsh ip between ex i s tent i a l research, the indiv idual and the classroom. I was thoughtful, yet excited. A major transformation was occurr ing. Individual members of the committee related to me how they were anguishing over the meaning of education and evaluation in l i g h t of the i r academic biographies. Their responses were encouraging. After a lengthy discussion with key personnel I became more and more convinced that ex i s tent ia l i sm could provide a major influence in evaluation. Pract ica l advice, c r i t i c i s m and general comments a key un ivers i ty professor and members of the Management Committee offered, and personal; j^ef lectiqns;'qn- ; past-wri tings inf luenced." -me to change parts of the philosophical structure, and retrace the history of my thinking. I projected outward by attempting to conceptually l i n k ex i s ten-t i a l i sm (which I changed to ex i s tent ia l phenomenology), evaluation, and the cu l tura l realm of. a classroom. The future became a r ea l i z a t i on of the past, when the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological approach to evaluation was p i loted in f i ve B r i t i s h Columbia locat ions. I t was personally f u l f i l l i n g and academically f r u i t f u l to l i s t e n to student and teacher reactions. Several teachers commented on how our interactions offered them new perspectives. Two teachers confided that the i r att i tude towards students would change. They desired more information on ex i s tent ia l phenomenology. Students often spoke of how the i r perception of school, teachers and social studies took on a more pos i t ive meaning. They f e l t a ne'ed to speak to someone who would not pre-judge the i r comments. Both teachers and students desired to part ic ipate in more ex i s tent i a l phenomeno-log ica l research a c t i v i t i e s in the i r schools.. They asked numerous questions and offered many helpful suggestions for future research. Once the social encounters with teachers and students became a past, I ref lected upon the trust that part ic ipants showed me. Hence I became more sensit ive toward meanings and feel ings teachers and students had about the i r schools. , This mattered to me then, as i t matters to me now. I ant ic ipated a new future. .86 The encouraging feedback I received from people in the f i e l d and the advice given to me by a un ivers i ty professor inc i ted a " l eap " . I decided to make the ex i s tent ia l phenomenological dimension of curriculum evaluation a thesis project. This encompassing commitment motivated me to restructure the pract ica l research approach I previously used. The questions used in the p i l o t ing procedures underwent modif icat ion. Past research a c t i v i t i e s made me aware of the need for opportunities which would permit the inclus ion of s i tuat ional relevant questions during the interview. A lso, I rea l ized that ex i s tent ia l phenomenological analyses of interview responses requires language which retains fa i thfu lness to the respondents' s i tuat ions . During the next two weeks I f in i shed describing the s i tuat ions researched in the p i l o t study. The reports were written and presented to the Management Committee. A f ter the panel members reviewed the reports and witnessed my emotions and fee l ings , they appeared to develop a greater sense of worth towards the project. They discussed past a c t i v i t i e s and future strategies. Since committee members sensed that the ex i s tent i a l phenomeno-log ica l dimension would be academically f r u i t f u l , they decided to include i t in future formal assessment a c t i v i t i e s . This recognition motivated me to increase my reading in philosophy and sociology. Through renewed exploration of the l i t e r a t u r e I became aware of the need for refinement in data-gathering techniques. Hence I redeveloped the interview questions. During th i s time I received negative feedback from members of the Faculty of Education at the Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia. This forced me to examine at great depth, ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology and research. Although such feedback resulted in much disappointment, anguish, and anxiety one -university professor advised that I r e f l e c t upon facu l ty c r i t i c i s m , and transform i t from an obstacle to an a id . Hence I employed the facu l ty members' negative comments as guideposts for development of a philosophical l i n e of reasoning that would be defensible. In Spring 1977, ex i s tent ia l phenomenology was formally included as a component of the Provincial Assessment of Social Studies in B r i t i s h Columbia. With other members of the Contract Team, fieldwork was done in f i v e school d i s t r i c t s in B r i t i s h Columbia. Af ter the information-gathering process came the analyses in which attempts were made to grasp ind i v idua l s ' experiences. Personal c on f l i c t s arose because of technical r igour demanded of an i evaluation report for the Ministry of Education and s i tuat iona l fa i thfu lness .87 desired by the par t i c ipat ing teachers and students. I f e l t e t h i c a l l y ob l i ga -ted to authent ica l ly describe the school s i tuat ions I had v i s i t e d . Yet I had to maintain a techn ica l l y appropriate wr i t ing s t y l e . This inner c o n f l i c t resulted in countless interact ions with d i f fe rent Evaluation Contract Team members, project editors and the consultant for the B r i t i s h Columbia Ministry of Education. Each written draft became a revised d ra f t , as each revised draf t underwent further changes. I acted upon the drafts as they acted upon me, to again act upon them. Because of many interact ions with people and past wr i t ings , my wr it ing s ty le began to change. As the drafts neared completion, the Management Committee reviewed them. This became another anxious moment for me. Fortunately, the i r suggestions for rev is ion were, constructive and could eas i l y be incorporated in future write-ups. Equally important however, several committee members confided'about the pos i t ive influence ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology had on them. We discussed the difference between, the school as a system of e f f i c i ency , and the school as a s i tuat ion of meaningful human in teract ion . After I completed the f i na l write-ups, my having-to-be in education became part of my having-been in the evaluation project. Changes would be required i f a sat i s factory doctoral research approach was to become a r e a l i t y . Close interact ions with two professors helped prepare the way for re f in ing the philosophy sect ion, so that i t became conceptually consistent with the information-gathering dimension. During th i s time one professor conceded that my commitments, sh i f t i ng moods and countless f rust rat ions about re la t ing ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology to education offered him a new perspective. He encouraged me to proceed. A second professor began to take a greater interest in my project. His encouragement and academic advice gave me addit ional incentive for continued e f f o r t . 1 A t a certa in time I presented the culmination of past a c t i v i t i e s and future p o s s i b i l i t i e s to the Program Advisory Committee. This was my f i r s t opportunity to formally defend the ex i s tent ia l phenomenological l i ne of reasoning before an.academic audience. Questions about the philosophy and i t s re lat ionsh ip to research methodology were ra ised. These questions forced me to think about the re lat ionsh ip between ex i s tent i a l phenomenology and pract ica l educational research. With the help of a sociology professor I explored l ink ing ethnographic data-gathering methodology with ex i s tent i a l i .88 phenomenology. This became a f r u i t f u l experience. I am presently wr i t ing the thes is , r ea l i z i n g that my "now" of wr i t ing has i n t r i n s i c reference to the past and to the future. As I wr i te , I reconstruct my past in terms of my perspective with in presence. Future ex i s tent ia l phenomenological writ ings w i l l continue to undergo changes as they become the presence and move towards the past. I t i s a continuous process, forever ingrained in change. My moment of wr i t ing w i l l have become a "gone" that i s s t i l l present for whoever w i l l read these writ ings (myself included). Hence i t may become the focus of another person's future p o s s i b i l i t i e s . SUMMARY Ex i s tent ia l phenomenological reasoning i s incomplete without committed se l f - re f1ect ion by part ic ipants . In the development of the thesis each new s i tuat ion requires(ed) new choices to be made. How and why these decisions for change were made, suggested d i f fe rent meanings I assigned at the time of deciding. These meanings, in turn, influenced my thesis development a c t i v i t i e s . This form of d i a l e c t i c ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological thinking underlies the study. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III After b r i e f l y mentioning the s i x formal steps of the phenomenolo-gical method (see treatment in Chapter I I ) , Spiegelberg pos its: The f i r s t three steps have been accepted, at least i m p l i c i t l y , and practised by a l l those who have aligned themselves with the Phenomenological Movement.; the l a te r ones only by a smaller group. There i s , in f a c t , no reason why even the very f i r s t step should not be adopted by i t s e l f , regardless of the l a te r ones. Thus the g e s t a l t i s t s , in declaring t he i r pa r t i a l s o l i -dar i ty with phenomenology, usually accept only the p r inc ip le of descr ipt ive research without subscribing to the invest iga-t ion of essences and essential r e l a t i o n s . . . . This method ( i s presented) as a series of steps of which the l a te r w i l l usually presuppose the e a r l i e r ones, yet not be necessari ly entai led by them (19.67:659) (emphasis added). On page 699 Spiegelberg mentions that other invest igat ive approaches have undertaken several of the steps with considerable success. Throughout The Phenomenological Movement Volume II, Spiegelberg indicates that d i f fe rent authors adopt d i f fe rent stages of the phenomenological method for the i r purposes'. He notes: Breaking up this estimate for the main branches of the Phenomenological Movement today, one might add: Trans-cendental phenomenology is at the moment i t s most contro-vers ia l branch... . E x i s t en t i a l phenomenology, i.;e.,V a-'phenomenology which is based on the perspective of incar -nated man and project, seems to be at the moment i t s most f l our i sh ing branch... . It seems l i k e l y that concrete descr ipt ive analysis w i l l enter even into nonphenomeno-log ica l philosophies as an essential procedure. This applies even more to f i e l d s outside philosophy proper, such as psychology (1976:642). Wittgenstein i s described by Spiegelberg as a genuine descr ipt ive phenomenologist. Ortega is regarded as a phenomenologist, although he "bent i n t u i t i v e phenomenology in the d i rect ion of a systematic analysis guided by his conception of human l i f e , hence he adopted i t only in a very conditioned manner" :(Spiegelberg, 1967:626). Spiegelberg i den t i f i e s Marcel as a pheno-menologist because Marcel 's objective is an analyt ic descr ipt ion of the contents of experience. (See Marcel, 1965:154-176). Simone de Beauvoir i s mentioned by Spiegelberg because she explored the relat ionships of essences within novel form (.1967:417). It appears that Spiegelberg 1s examples of writers/authors employing only parts of the phenomenological method legitimates" th i s thes i s , in terms" of adopting" the ex i s tent ia l phenorriehological step as i t s basis. , Hermeneutics becomes an ontology of understanding and interpretat ion (Di lthey, 1961). For hermeneutics, Schleiermacher looked for a foundation in the conditions pertaining to a l l dialogue, and Dilthey attempted to use understanding as a power of man through which l i f e meets l i f e . Yet under-standing in Dilthey was not un iversa l ized, for he cherished the idea of an .90 " h i s t o r i c a l " understanding separate from, the s c i e n t i f i c , Heidegger takes the f i na l step and defines the essence of hermeneutics as the ontological power of understanding and interpretat ion which renders possible the d i s c l o -sure of the being of things and u l t imately of the po ten t i a l i t i e s of Dasein's own being (Palmer, 1969:129-130). For further readings on hermeneutics see Heidegger (1962), Hirsch : (1967), Harris (1967), Kockelmans (1972), and Gadamer (1976). According to Stern, i t i s the fol lowing dehumanizing, i d e a l i s t i c pronouncement made by Hegel which served as a cata lyst fo r Kierkegaard's subjective response: Being, pure being without any further determination... i s pure indeterminateness and vacu i ty . . . .Nothing, pure nothing... is complete emptiness, without determination or content. Nothing...is the same lack of determination as pure being... . Pure being and pure nothing are- then the same (.cited in Stern, 1967:20). Kierkegaard (1944) rejected Hegel's solvent "mediation" of these oppo-s i t i ons by means of an automatic d i a l e c t i c process which deals with timeless ideals and hollow genera l i t ie s . He defines "existence" in>opposition to the Hegelian system-of l o g i c , s t i l l ' in use by contemporary ex i s tent i a l philosophers (Stern, 1967): : For an in depth description of epoche, see pages 45-46. Strasser defines the fol lowing philosophical underpinnings as the key bases of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenology: (1) Ex i s tent ia l phenomenology i s characterized by ontological bearings. For Husserl, being - i s being an object.. He believed that a systematical ly developed transcendental phenomenology would be true and genuine universal ontology. ... J The - concept object-being brought-forth sha rp ' c r i t i c i sm from Heidegger (referred to in th is study as an ex i s ten t i a l phenomenologist). Heidegger declared that ontology i s characterized precise ly by i t s phenomenological rather than i d e a l i s t i c o r ientat ion , and added that i t i s the phenomen-o l og i s t ' s duty to make manifest what does not present i t s e l f at f i r s t . (2) Heidegger and Sheler affirmed that i t i s man who gives various beings the i r sense of being, not an impersonal trans-cendental consciousness suggested by Husserl. He made i t c lear that the mode of being of that which is man, stands out sharply against the modes of being of a l l other beings. (.3) Husserl claimed that bodil iness is placed within the frame-work of the universal problem of the const i tut ion of objects by the transcendental consciousness. Ponty, Sartre and Heidegger disagreed, s tat ing that the consciousness inhabits a real world, takes part in me-you re la t i on s , is s t i r r ed by emotions and anxiety, and bound up in c o n f l i c t s . Consciousness i s an involved consciousness (/involved in cosmos, history and soc iety) . (4) Husserl followed the Cartesian argument which posits the s ta r t of philosophy as a presupposit ionless, absolute zero beginning. The ex i s ten t i a l phenomenologist argues that the moment a philosopher begins to r e f l e c t , he has already engaged in the world, human society, language, conscience, h i s tory , etc. Consequently, onto-log ica l presuppositions are j u s t i f i e d by what is onto log ica l l y unfolded, c l a r i f i e d and understood. (5) Ex i s tent ia l phenomenology is founded upon the basic assumption that the existence of man is an attempt to rea l i ze oneself in freedom. Man's existence can only be characterized in terms of his potential p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are extremely personal designs, owing to which he i s always further than he actual ly i s . Man always "designs himself" towards something he has in view (1967:341-350). Ricoeur s imp l i f i e s Strasser ' s ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological assumptions and adds the important concept of i n te r sub jec t i v i t y . He suggests the fo l low-ing three emphases as being important: (1) Importance of the body - The body is man's basic mode of being in the world. Consciousness is embodied conscious-ness. One must view the consciousness and body as an intimate connection, d i f f i c u l t to express because the body -soul dualism is so f i rmly ingrained in everyday modes of expression. (2) Intersubject iv i ty - To be bodily i s to ex i s t in a world inhabited by other persons. To be with other persons is at the same time to become aware of one's freedom as well as i t s l i m i t a t i o n , in that one must constantly take the other indiv idual into account. The socia l context in which one finds himself i s also part of one's being-in-the-world. (3) Freedom and Choice - To ex i s t as a person is to choose f ree ly . Consciousness i s not inserted in the causal chain giving r i se to an interpretat ion of freedom only as choice, but also as openness to p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Freedom does not mean arb i t rary freedom but s ituated freedom, freedom in a context involving not "only the present but also the past and future. Man becomes aware of his freedom in the choices he makes and the actions he performs, for which he is t o t a l l y responsible. It i s not freedom in a negative sense as 'freedom from... ' but a pos i t ive freedom towards a mu l t i -p l i c i t y of p o s s i b i l i t i e s (Ricoeur, 1967:202-212; Stewart and Michunas, 1973:65-70). An account of ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological reasoning has appeared in Rothe, P. ' E x i s ten t i a l Phenomenology as a Dimension of Eva luat ion ' , In Evaluation in a New Key T. Aoki (ed.), Vancouver: Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruct ion, Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1978. .92 7The section on meaning and education has appeared in Rothe (1978). The prax io log ica l l i ne of thinking is s im i l a r to Simmel's soc io log ica l method (1950). Throughout his work Simmel stressed both the connections and tensions between the indiv iduaband society. The i nd i v i dua l ' s dual re la t ion with society whereby he is determined by society as he ex ists for society as well as fo r himself, and whereby he i s both a product of society and a l i f e from an autonomous centre, i s s im i l a r to the re lat ionsh ip between thought and act ion. Thought and action i s a unity of ex te r i o r i za t i on and i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n . Thought i t s e l f i s the imagining of a l imi ted consciousness. Action without r e f l e c t i ve thought results in aimless a c t i v i t y (Vran ick i , 1975). y The,relationship between thesis and ant i thes i s can be equated to Ponty's (1964") re lat ionsh ip between log ica l ob jec t i v i t y and carnal i n t e r -s ub jec t i v i t y . . Ponty states that in tercorporea l i ty culminates in (and i s changed into) the adventof "blosse Sachen" without our being able to say that one of the two orders is primary in re la t ion to the other. The pre-objective order i s not primary, since i t i s established (and f u l l y begins to ex i s t ) only being f u l f i l l e d in the founding of l og i ca l ob j ec t i v i t y . Yet l og i ca l ob jec t i v i t y is not s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ; i t i s l imited to consecrating the labors of the pre-object i ve layer, ex i s t ing only as the outcome of the "Logos of the esthet ic world" and having value only under i t s supervision. ' L o g i c a l ob j e c t i v i t y derives from carnal i n te r sub jec t i v i t y on the condition that i t has been fo r -gotten as carnal i n t e r sub jec t i v i t y , and i t i s carnal i n te r sub jec t i v i t y i t s e l f which produces th is forgetfulness by winding i t s way toward, . l og i ca l object-i v i t y . Thus the forces of the const i tut ive f i e l d do not move in one d i rect ion only; they turn back upon themselves (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:173). ' MTime i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceptualized in one of two ways. The f i r s t view arises out of Ar i s tot lean deduction and Newtonian physics. Time, a pre-cise descr ipt ion of measured motion and change, i s a one-dimensional continuum ex i s t ing independently of>and outside things and man. A l l phenomena and events take a f ixed and a p r i o r i predictable place by v i rtue of a universal causal determinism (Kockelmans, 1975). The second popular conception of time evolved from Hume and Locke. Time i t s e l f i s the essence of man's inner conscious l i f e , which is nothing but a merging succession of moments of consciousness or contents of conscious-ness, separate but connected through association (Kockelmans, 1975). A continuation of D i l they ' s stream of thought is that the present is the f i l l i n g of a moment of time with r e a l i t y . This i s experience, in con-t ras t to the memory of i t , or to the wishes, hopes, expectations and fears about something which may be experienced in the future. This f i l l i n g up with r e a l i t y i s what pers ists continuously as time progresses, though the content of experience i s constantly changing. This progressive f i l l i n g up with r e a l i t y along the l i ne of time character i st ic, of the present, in contrast to ideas of what has been experienced and. may yet be experienced, this constant sinking backwards of the present into the past and the becoming present of that which a moment ago we s t i l l expected, wanted,; or feared, of that which was only in the region of ideas - th i s is the character of real time (Di l they, 1961:98). .93 ""Jacques interprets Heidegger's concept of presence. He comments: In every presence there is an ant ic ipatory openness to the future... ' - .* The presence of -my experience i s .a .unity of past, present, and future, held together by my standing outside that of which I am actua l ly part. To put i t crudely, the subject grasps a handful of time and holds together past, present and future in a variegated un i ty . . . -Indeed in every experience what we expect i l luminates what we have already experienced, and what we have already experienced colours the coming into presence of the future. There i s a gestalt in our awareness of time as wel l as in our construction of space (1970:40-43). '""Heidegger interprets time as being i n f i n i t e . He suggests that: ...time presents i t s e l f proximally as an uninterrupted sequence of "nows". Every "now", moreover, i s already e i ther a " ju s t now" or a " for thwith " ("Jedes Je t z t i s t auch schon ein Soeben bzw, Sofort"). I f in character time we s t ick pr imar i ly and exclus ive ly to such a sequence, then in p r inc ip le neither beginning nor end can be found in i t . Every l a s t "now" as "now" is always already a " for thwith " that is no longer ("ein Sofort-nicht-mehr"); thus i t i s time in the sense of the "no-longer-now" - in the sense of the past. Every f i r s t "now" is a " ju s t now" that i s not yet ("ein Soeben-noch-nicht"); thus i t i s time in the sense of the "not-yet-now" - in the sense of the ' f u t u r e ' . Hence time is endless "on both sides now" (1962:476) . i Chapter IV SITUATIONAL PROCEDURES In applying an ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological approach to the study of soc ia l studies classrooms, certa in procedures are ca l led for in d i f fe rent phases of the data co l l ec t i on process. These procedures rest on some important concepts fundamental to the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological approach.. This chapter f i r s t describes the concepts of " s i t ua t i on " and "the evaluatee as co-evaluator". The data co l lec t ion a c t i v i t i e s may be broadly c l a s s i f i e d as f i r s t , tho se having to do with entry and i n i t i a l interviews, and second, those concerned with follow-up and data v e r i f i c a t i o n . These two broad c l a s s i f i c a t i on s each form the subject of a major section of the chapter. CONCEPTS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE RESEARCH APPROACH Two basic concepts which help provide the foundation for the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological data-gathering approach are " s i t u a t i o n a l " and "the evaluatee as co-evaluator". They are defined in the fol lowing sub-sections . S ituat ion Each human encounter i s in a segment of the world to which each person involved gives meaning. The segment-of-the-world-for-man constitutes a s i t u -at ion. The s i tuat ion i s comprised c o l l e c t i v e l y by members in the everyday world.,, through the i r pa r t i cu l a r i n ten t i ona l i t y - - t he i r i n tent s , and projects (Novak, 1975). The s i tuat ion of concern in th is study i s the social studies classroom, conceptualized into exter io r and i n t e r i o r components. i .94.-Exter ior Dimension of a Classroom - The classroom represents a s i tuat ion within wider contexts of school and community. Within the school and neighborhood students and teachers are exposed to d i f fe rent people and events of community l i f e . Geographical l oca t ion , economic l e v e l , p o l i t i c a l c l imate, industry, transportat ion, and rac ia l or socia l patterns may influence the meanings students and teachers ascribe to school and classrooms (Chamberlin, 1969). For example, several grade eleven students interviewed suggested that po l i c ie s regarding teacher h i r ing influence the qua l i ty of teachers in the i r social studies program. As a resu l t a social studies program may ' -well be experienced by students according to the type of teacher hired at the administrative l e v e l . This would influence the meanings students assign to social studies. Inter ior Dimension of a Classroom - The i n t e r i o r dimension of a c lass -room is a sett ing in which students and teachers plan and organize a segment of the world. As such, i t becomes inseparably connected with student and teacher intentions and po ten t i a l i t y . I t becomes the program-in-use, consist ing of the interactions which students and teachers have with ideas, objects and events. 1 The classroom, consist ing of happenings, occurrences, events and encounters within a stream of time flowing in continuous p l a s t i c i t y , i s a micro-world of potential meanings (Rasmussen, 1974). Each person in the c las s -room responds to things, events, ideas, other persons, and groups in numerous ways and assigns a var iety of meanings. The reservoir of meaning(-s) has a formative j;nf 1 uence on what students and teachers appropriate from the i r educational experiences (Chamberlin, 1969). For example, students in grade nine and ten expressed feel ings of submission/ dominance when they were assigned written exercises by a teacher. Their meanings of soc ia l studies appear to be heavily influenced by the i r passive meanings .assigned to the teacher 's in s t ruct iona l or organizational s t y l e . The meanings students gave to th i s one i n t e r i o r dimension of the classroom had sustaining s ign i f icance for the i r future classroom actions. Since students and teachers give meanings in a s i t ua t i on , the evaluatee as co-evaluator concept must also be recognized as being relevant to the s i tua t i on . The Evaluatee As Co-Evaluator To the extent that man is a co-const itutor of his experience, a congruent framework needs to be developed which is sens it ive to the exper i -ence. Man behaves in accordance with experiences he has with other persons, objects and events. According to Fisher (1971), man is an active agent in his relat ionships with other people. F i sher ' s assumption means that students, teachers and I, the researcher, co-constitute the experience of interviewing. The tota l process leading to descriptions of meaning is a co-involvement activity,whereby the interview and follow-up descriptions are accomplished in " t r u s t " through contributions made by part ic ipants . The evaluatee as co-evaluator framework consists of co-advisement, sharing impressions, wr i t ing everyday language and interviewee.designation of report audience. Co-adVisement happens when the interviewer and interviewee discuss the i r perspectives on the study and the interview s i tua t i on . Writing everyday language refers to the descriptions a r i s ing from the analyses of the interviews. They are wr itten in a s ty le which is understandable by interviewees. F i n a l l y , interviewee designation of report audience re f lec t s the underlying t rust supporting the interview, whereby participants-.are informed about-the' information that w i l l be disclosed .to audiences. The evaluatee as co-evaluator framework served as the broad parameter within which data co l lec t ion and ve r i f i c a t i on procedures occurred; ENTRY AND DATA COLLECTION Since I intend to describe teacher and student meanings within the s i tuat ion of a soc ia l studies classroom embedded in the context of a school and community, I recognize the need to go to the s i tuat ion where teachers and students spend much of t he i r time. Procedures describing entry and data co l l ec t i on in a school s i tuat ion are described in the fol lowing sect ion. Preparing for Entry Preparation for doing research in a school required evaluating possible school s i tuat ions which would be suitable proper s i ze , .97 s ta f f s o c i a b i l i t y , soc ia l : studies course.offer ings, the~school 's approachabil ity and a c ce s s i b i l i t y (.distance) and time tab l ing. Using these features as a framework, 1 could assess 1the f e a s i b i l i t y of a school in re lat ion to personal l im i ta t ions such as. time, mob i l i t y , and finances. To rea l i ze entry in a school I was attent ive to a suggestion made by Schatzman and Strauss (.1973), Becker (1973), and Humphreys (1975) that the researcher should become acquainted with a person who is in a pos it ion to share information about general character i s t i c s of people in the s i tua t ion . The pre-entry information helps a researcher become aware of whom to approach and how the approach i s to be achieved. Preliminary information about people's general routines in the s i t ua t i on , inside statuses, history of internal relat ionships and key people, helps avoid future embarrassments or surprises for everyone, including the researcher. As Schatzman and Strauss suggest: Thus to know in advance of negotiation about routines, social structures, cr ises and the r e a l i t i e s of f ac t i on -alism is to be at considerable advantage in the nego-• t i a t i on that must fol low [1973:20). Since I established residence in Vancouver one and one-half years ago, there had been l i t t l e opportunity to meet teachers and administrators a f f i l i a t e d with Vancouver schools. Fortunately, however, a woman my wife met at work was married to a school psychologist. After several socia l meetingsi he and I became fr iends. Early in 1978 the psychologist offered to introduce my research ideas to the school administration and teaching s t a f f at Z School. Their response was pos i t i ve . I subsequently questioned the psychologist more thoroughly about features of the school. Sa t i s f i ed with the school ' s proximity, a v a i l -able personnel, course o f fer ings , t ime-tabl ing and administrat ion, I undertook the next step towards entry. Presenting Self and the Study Schatzman and Strauss (.1973) refer to the second entry step as presenting s e l f and study. Before presenting oneself to key people in a s i t u -a t ion , the researcher should prepare a statement which i den t i f i e s himself, his organizational a f f i l i a t i o n , his study objectives and his anticipated procedures (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973; Cicourel et a l , 1974). Schatzman .98 and Strauss out l ine: Copies of the document (written statement) sent along to others in the organization w i l l not only uniformly inform key persons but w i l l also forewarn them, and thereby prevent surprise and embarrassment — surprise from encounter without adequate preparation and embar-rassment from l a te r forgett ing the stranger 's i den t i t y , purposes and even authorization (1973:24). In my case, a care fu l l y worded statement was prepared for the research o f f i ce of the c i t y Public School system. In order to obtain formal permission for entering a school, the psychologist had done some preliminary invest iga-t ion with members of the c i t y Public School research o f f i ce to determine the formal parameters within which a research request needs to be wr i t ten. At the same time I engaged in person-to-person communication with a key person in the Public School research o f f i c e . He advised that admission for entry would probably be granted i f the Z Senior Secondary School administration offered i t s approval. In add i t ion, he requested that a parent consent form be devised for d i s t r ibu t ion to students' parents so that formal parental authorization for student j par t i c ipat ion could be obtained. The consent forms were developed by the psychologist, a univers i ty professor, and I, and were l a te r mailed to the Public School research o f f i ce and Z.Senior Secondary School administration. Within two weeks a representative of the research o f f i ce sanctioned the study. The next step, referred to as 'negotiat ing en t r y ' , could :npw/be undertaken. Negotiating Entry and Arrangements Theoret ical ly each person in a s i tuat ion must be negotiated with in a s i tuat ion (Becker, 1970). Since people's pr ivacies are " invaded", any t a c t i c a l e r ro r , blunder, or socia l crudity can complicate a worthy project (Junker, 1960). Mindful of t h i s , I asked the psychologist to arrange a day and time for preliminary discussions with the Z Senior Secondary School administrat ion, socia l studies department head, and interested socia l studies teachers. On January 25, 1978, I entered the school. The psychologist formally introduced me to the pr inc ipa l and v i ce -p r i n c i pa l . After a short discussion with the administrat ion, both the pr inc ipal and v ice-pr inc ipa l were s a t i s f i ed with the study intents. - .99 The psychologist then introduced me to the chairman of the socia l studies department. He, in turn, allowed me to meet the teachers who had consented to pa r t i c ipa te . A f ter a short meeting with the teachers, the chairman of the socia l studies department and I agreed on a day for i n t e r - : viewing, which would, least inter fere with the school ' s time schedule. He also offered to d i s t r ibute the parent consent forms and devise the interview schedule. Because of the successful pre-entry negotiations, people in the school sanctioned my a r r i v a l . The psychologist and school nurse offered a private room for interviewing. The room proved desirable since students in the school held a pos it ive view of the nursing f a c i l i t i e s and, therefore, f e i t comfortable entering that f a c i l i t y . In addit ion, the room was located in an area where minimum outside interference could occur while interviews were in progress. • The chairman of the socia l studies department presented the interview schedule he had planned. I concurred with his organization so as to cause the least possible amount of school t ime-tabl ing disturbance. This i s in keeping with Junker's (1960) suggestion that the f i e l d worker finds i t advisable to move fast and according to plan. Elaborate i n s t i t u t i ona l time scheduling should ^motivate the researcher to ge t - i n , get along, and get out in rather short and wel l -def ined periods of time. The onus is on the f ieldworker to " f i t i n to " the school rout ine, rather than change the school routine to " f i t i n " with the researcher 's plans. Although I had suggested that f i ve students comprise an interview group, the chairman of socia l studies organized three groups of students, with f i ve students in the grade nine group, s ix students representing grade ten, and four students from grade eleven. The three groups were interviewed in the morning. The chairman's planning enabled indiv idual interviews of each group's respective soc ia l studies teachers during his/her afternoon spare period. This arrangement caused the least disturbance to the school 's routine and provided the basis for interview procedure. Interviewing i To establ ish a confluence or co-const itut ion of the evaluation exper-ience, I, the invest igator , had to be aware of the asymetr ical i ty of the interview s i tuat ion (Labov, 1973). According to Labov, asymetr ical i ty is .100 evident when students who are interviewed are thrown into a s i tuat ion with a strange person. They immediately assume that anything they say may be held against them. Students have learned a number of devices to avoid saying anything which they sense may be used against the i r wishes by the interviewer. To help overcome the sudden one-to-one encounter of students with a strange adult,, I o r i g i n a l l y requested "that students be in groups of approximately f i v e . In small groups students can r e t a i n s comfortable group s i tuatedness, yet have ample opportunity to voice indiv idual opinions i f they so desire (Becker, 1971). By conversing informally with each group, opportunities ar ise for presentation of var iat ions in perspectives and attitudes, and for d i s t ingu i sh-ing between shared and var iable perspectives (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973). Since the soc ia l s i tuat ion between student and adult i s a powerful deter-minant ,of verbal behavior, the interviewer creates opportunities so that students feel comfortable conversing with an adult. Entering a trustworthy re lat ionsh ip with students (and to a lesser degree, with teachers) becomes an important strategy for acquiring meaningful information. Proper greeting is recognized by Labov (1973) as being the f i r s t major step. Consistent with Labov's suggestion, I make e f fo r t s to s i t amongst students rather than aside from them. As Labov (1973) impl ies, the spat ia l arrangement ( physical distance )- between-interviewer and ~ interviewees may influence the form of in teract ion that occurs. Junker (I960 ) proposes that a conscious seating* arrangement i s a major requis i te for successful interviewing. Once everyone was seated, I introduced myself as a un ivers i ty student to students, rather than as a teacher or researcher. According to Junker (1960), the interviewer who has the a b i l i t y and opportunity to ident i f y with the students has a greater chance of receiving free and open responses. A student (univers ity student) interviewing other students (high school students) makes the s i tuat ion i m p l i c i t l y more comfortable for group members. • Before interviewing teachers , I introduced, myself as a former teacher, thereby implying . that I was aware of problems, goals and jargon teachers share. This introduction helped break down soc ia l bar r ie r s . Once a personal introduction was accomplished, I outl ined reasons for the interview, intended anonymity of the respondents, requests for audio-taping and p a r t i -cipant ^validation of data in terpretat ion. After concluding the introduction and out l i ne , the interview proper began. -.101 A l l po r t 0942) , Becker and Geer (1957), Cicourel (.1964) arid Benjamin (1969) suggest that interviewers, while interviewing, should expose as much of the i r humanness as possible; As Benjamin explains: He (interviewer) should neither behave l i k e a puppet nor l i k e a technician. He should cast aside any mask, facade or other professional equipment that creates barr iers between the interviewees and himself. He should bring himself into the . . . interv iew in so open a manner that the interviewee.: may eas i l y f ind him and through him come closer to himself and others (1969:55). Throughout the interview the interviewer should feel his way into the interviewees' internal frames of reference, making every e f f o r t to see the world through the i r eyes in order to atta in the best possible understanding of the i r perspective. The s en s i t i v i t y required for a successful interview demands my awareness of e l i c i t a t i o n procedures. According to Gumperz (1970) and Eastman (1975), e l i c i t a t i o n procedures depend to a large extent on the interv iewer ' s knowledge of the cu l tura l norms and behavior patterns of .the group interviewed. The r ight question must be asked at the r ight time. Gumperz (1970) believes that the success of interviewing r e l i e s heavily on "shared knowledge" (e.g., knowledge students and teachers have which the interviewer may also have). Shared knowledge may serve as the reservoir which an interviewer may draw upon to develop additional questions at s t rateg ic times. For example, based on shared knowledge acquired through former teaching experience, I recognized the part parents play in student learning. While interviewing a group of grade nine students, I e l i c i t e d addit ional informa-tion from students re la t ing to parents (utterances 174-188) . I recognized that "parents"' was a s i gn i f i can t enough topic for students to fur ther discuss the issue at the time of o r ig ina l question.ing.ci While interviewing a group of. grade ten students, I desired greater response about courses students would prefer instead of social studies (utterance 135). Although th i s question was unintended at the outset of the interview, i t was formulatedb.ecause of an unexpected s h i f t in the topic of conversation. F i n a l l y , when grade eleven ' students were discussing socia l studies topics they had covered during the school term, they made numerous reference to the concept " i n te re s t i ng " (utterance 39).. As the interviewer, I f e l t i t appropriate to ask students how they define interest ing to help develop a "common world of discourse", .102 (utterance 40). Junker (.1960) and Cicourel (.1964) best explain "common world of discourse", stat ing that through s i nce r i t y and interest the 2 interviewer can impart recognition to the people he i s interviewing. If the interviewer recognizes the interviewee's need to feel important and 3 worthwhile, the "common world of discourse" takes on greater meaning. Topic switching (.for example., grade eleven student interview, utterances 80-100) and answer extensions ( for example, grade eleven teacher interview, utterance 50) in the interviews helped acquire maximum data because the interviewees were presented opportunities to change or expand conversational topics important to them. By conversing about subjects relevant to them, interviewees feel more comfortable, enhancing maximum expression and feel ings of worth. Open-ended s i t ua t i ona l l y relevant questions also f a c i l i t a t e i n te r -viewee comfort and freedom of expression. The type of questions asked can enhance or retard interviewee responses. Question development is important to the success of any interview and is described in the fol lowing paragraphs. Questions The open-ended questions used in th i s study evolved and were revised out of discussions held with students and teachers during the Prov inc ia l Assessment of Social Studies in B r i t i s h Columbia p i l o t sessions. Although the questions are open to revis ion depending on the interview locat ion , timing and circum-stances, the thrust of the questions remains the same. They are designed to seek reasons underlying project choices. Student questions are directed pr imar i ly to subject matter (curriculum knowledge), pedagogical matter (classroom teaching a c t i v i t i e s ) , school matter, and evaluation. S im i l a r l y , teacher-oriented questions pertain to curriculum, resources, pedagogy, community, classroom in te rac t i on , personal biography and evaluation. The open-ended question format imposes l i t t l e r e s t r i c t i on on the respondent. (The question of time, however, becomes relevant i f one i n te r -views in a t i g h t l y routined school.) Such questions are more f l e x i b l e and allow for probing i f th i s i s des irable. Probing includes s t rateg ic inclus ion of secondary questions which help c l a r i f y or ig ina l answers and e l i c i t further concerns of s i tuat iona l i n teres t . One spec i f i c example is evident in the grade nine student interview. In utterance 46, K focuses on the school .103 l i b r a r y . I posed additional questions based on l i b ra r y f a c i l i t i e s in l a te r grade ten and eleven student and teacher interviews. The l i b r a r y proved to be a s i gn i f i can t focus of.meaning.students and teachers give to socia l studies in 1 Senior Secondary School. This unanticipated focus arose because the open-ended nature of questions helped f a c i l i t a t e broad answers. The formal questions I employed in the interviews are categorized into student and teacher, components. They were not necessari ly covered in the order out l ined, or in the precise wording i l l u s t r a t e d . Timing for questions, personal nervousness and my assumed relat ions with interviewees determined the actual formulation and order of questions in the interviews. Nevertheless, the fol lowing questions formed the nucleus of the interviews: Student Questions.> Students were asked the fol lowing open-ended questions: (1) What are some of the topics you have studied th i s year? (2) Of a l l the socia l studies topics studied, which one(s) would you choose for further study? Why? (3) Of a l l the soc ia l studies topics studied, which one(s) would you not choose for further study? Why? (4) What does social studies mean to you? Why? (5) Why did you choose soc ia l studies as one of your courses? (6) Do you think compulsory courses help or hinder students? Why? (7) What student a c t i v i t i e s would you include in a social studies class? Why? (8) What student a c t i v i t i e s would you exclude ' in a socia l studies class? Why? (9) How do you think socia l studies today relates to your future? Why? . (10) How do your experiences in socia l studies class compare to experiences in other classes? Why? (11) Should students be evaluated? Why? (12) For whose benefit are you evaluated? (13) What evaluation method(s) should be included and/or eliminated from socia l studies classes? Why? . 104 Teacher Questions • Teachers were asked the fol lowing open-ended questions: (1) Wi l l you describe the topic you are presently teaching in soc ia l studies? Why? (2) What teaching approaches did you decide on using? How did you decide on this? (3) What materials and/or resources are you using? Why? (4) Describe some student a c t i v i t i e s in your social studies c lass . Why did you choose to employ these a c t i v i t i e s ? (5) What does soc ia l studies mean to you? (6) If given complete freedom in choosing soc ia l studies subject matter, what would you choose to include? What teaching methods would you decide on using? Why? (7) How do you evaluate students in soc ia l studies? Why do you evaluate th i s way? (8) Why did you choose socia l studies as a teaching area? (9) Would you describe b r i e f l y the philosophy of your school? How do you think soc ia l studies re lates to th i s philosophy? (10) What role does soc ia l studies play in the future of students? Why? In order to reta in good f a i t h with the interviewees I spent approxi-mately f i f t een minutes a f ter each interview i l l u s t r a t i n g how I would interpret and describe responses. Short discussions ensued during which teachers and 4 students asked about the interpret ive framework. At th is time I reaffirmed my intent ion to return in two weeks to present part ic ipants with interview transcr ipts and f i r s t draft descr ipt ions. Students and teachers involved in the interview sessions desired to meet again and discuss the f i r s t draft documents. FOLLOW UP AND DATA VERIFICATION After.completion of the interviews and post- interview conversations I engaged in f i r s t draft write-ups and common-sense ve r i f i c a t i on procedures. These procedures are intended to maintain a " t r u s t " re lat ionship between interviewer and interviewees, whereby each person contributes to the f i na l descr ipt ions. Because of the importance of the fol low up and data v e r i f i -cation procedures to th i s research, they are described in the fol lowing sub-sections . F i r s t Draft Write-ups The f i r s t drafts of the interview transcr ipt ions and interpret ive descriptions became a l o g i s t i c a l adventure. I wanted to complete the f i r s t draft interpret ive descriptions within two weeks of the interviews. By completing and presenting part ic ipants with f i r s t draft write-ups in the time a l l o t t e d , I hoped to take advantage of i nd i v idua l s ' short-term r e c a l l . As a re su l t , I spent approximately eighty hours transcr ib ing the interview conversations. I wished to retain as c lea r l y as possible the flow of ta lk that occurred. Following the t ranscr ip t ions , i t took approximately one hundred hours for them to be interpreted, organized and wr i t ten . Since the accounts were intended to be reviewed and cr i t iqued by respondents, the des-cr ipt ions needed to be written in everyday language so as to maintain .. epistemological and common-sensical consistency with ac to r s - i n -a - s i tua t ion . To allow for part ic ipant review and c r i t i que I needed to return to the school with the f i r s t draft write-ups, which I consequently d id. Common-Sense Ve r i f i ca t i on Two days before returning to Z Senior Secondary School, I re-negotiated the time or re-entry and discussion procedures with the chairman of socia l studies. Two weeks fol lowing the or ig ina l interviews, I presented the documents to par t i c ipat ing student groups and teachers. During the f i r s t hour the teachers and I discussed potential over-statements, unintended s imp l i f i c a t i on s , possible t ranscr ipt ion errors , and language usage. An act ive discussion ensued af ter an oral review of the reports with teachers. Teachers, as a group, ref lected upon and discussed the i r past a c t i v i t i e s and the i r perceived relat ionships with students. Teachers were happy with the interpretat ions and requested that I undertake the same a c t i v i t i e s next year with a l l soc ia l studies teachers. The chairman of socia l studies wished to have access to the research procedure and act ivate th i s form of invest igat ion next year. .106 In separate group meetings I reviewed with students the t ran sc r ip t s , e x i s t e n t i a l phenomenological framework, and my interpretat ions according to the four areas of being. The grade eleven students discovered several t rans-c r ib ing errors which were immediately revised. A l l three groups, however, expressed agreement with the descriptions and desired access to the f in i shed dra f t s . Some l i v e l y discussion took place when students reviewed the pro-; ceedings of the interviews. Grade eleven, part ic ipants requested that I r e - ' turn and speak for a morning or afternoon on the f indings. I promised to do so. During the v i s i t to the school I informed part ic ipants of the audience for the information, the amount of information that would be d i sc losed, and reassured respondents.of the i r anonymity. The students f e l t that the greatest impact had already been made, since teachers had access to. the i r views. They recommended that members of the c i t y School Board receive copies of the f i n a l drafts of the descr ipt ions. At th i s time I suggested that part of the nego-t ia ted agreement for permission for school entry hinged on the c i t y Public School System research o f f i ce requir ing the f indings. F i n a l l y , I confirmed that any disclosure of the information beyond "thesis demands" and o f f i c i a l c i t y Public School Board requests, required no t i f i c a t i on and consent of part ic ipants . SUMMARY Students and teachers were pleased with the research procedures that were employed and the write-ups that followed. Consistent with e x i s t e n t i a l -phenomenology and ethnographic research, part ic ipants approved of the input they had in developing the descriptions of meanings. They f e l t that the interview organizat ion, questions and v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures allowed for worthwhile exchanges of information, feel ings of substantial contr ibut ion, and exposure to d i f fe rent knowledge. The product, or interpret ive descriptions of classroom meanings which resulted from the ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological research procedures are described in the fol lowing chapter. They have been ve r i f i ed by part ic ipants and hence provide descriptions of meanings which interviewees appear to assign to d i f fe rent dimensions of socia l studies. .107 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV Utterances have been numbered and refer to the appropriate parts ofj the transcr ipts in the appendices. 2 ~ • • Hyrnes'(1972, Kockelmans (1972); and Labov (1973). speak extensively of the need to combine s incerely socia l relat ionships and information sharing in conversation. Labov in pa r t i cu l a r , ac t i ve l y pursued proving his thesis that verbal behavior of students contractual ly l inked with the interviewer-student in te rac t ion . The fol lowing excerpt from a t ranscr ipt between an interviewer speaking with an eight-year-old black boy named Leon in New York i l l u s t r a t e s an interview with l i t t l e concern about the interview context. Cr What i f you saw somebody k i c k i n ' somebody else on the ground or using a s t i c k , what would you do i f you saw that? Leon Mmmm Cr I f i t was supposed to be a f a i r f i ght -Leon I don't know Cr You don't know? Would you do anything?...huh?. I can ' t hear you. Leon No. Cr Did you ever see somebody got beat up real bad? Leon .Nope... Cr Well - uh - did you ever get into a f i ght with a guy? Leon Nope Cr That was bigger than you? Leon Nope Cr You never been in a f ight? Leon Nope Cr Nobody ever pick on you? Leon Nope Cr Nobody ever h i t you? Leon Nope Cr How come? Leon Ah 'on ' know Cr Don't you ever h i t somebody? Leon Nope Cr (incredulously) You never h i t nobody? Leon Mhm Cr Aww, ba-a-abe, you a i n t 1 gonna t e l l me that. . 108 When Leon was questioned about a more neutral subject, Labov found the same pattern of responses. Af ter Labov reviewed the record of his interview with Leon he decided to change the socia l s i tuat ion with Leon and interview him again. In the next interview with Leon, Labov made the fol lowing changes: (1) Clarence (the interviewer) brought along a supply of potato chips, changing the interview into something more in the nature of a party. (2) The interviewer brought along Leon's best f r i end , e ight-year-old Gregory. (3) He.reduced the height imbalance by having Clarence get down on the f l o o r . . . . t he interviewer dropped from 6 '2 " to 3 '6". (4) Clarence introduced taboo words and taboo top ics , and proved to Leon's surprise that one can say anything into our microphone without any fear of r e t a l i a t i o n . The resu l t of these changes i s a s t r i k i n g difference in the volume and s ty le of speech. Cr Is there anybody who says your moma drink pee? Leon (rapidly and breathlessly) Yee-ah! Greg Yup Leon And your father eat doo-doo for breakfas ' ! Cr Ohhh!'. 1 (laughs) Leon And they say your father - your father eat doo-doo for dinner! Greg When they sound on me, I say CBS Cr What do you mean? (Greg ^ o n 9 ° Booger-snatch (laughs) Greg And sometimes I ' l l curse with BB Cr What's that? Greg Black boy! (Leon - crunching on potato chips - Oh tha t ' s a MBB) Cr MBB what's that? Greg Mexican Black Boy Cr Oh... Greg Anyway Mexicans i s same l i k e white people, r ight? Leon And they ta lk about Al lah In the section on f i ght ing monosyllabic answers were no longer used, and Gregory cuts through Leon's facade in a way that the interviewer alone was unable to do. Cr Now you said you had th i s f i g h t , now, I wanted you to t e l l me about the f i ght that you had. .109 Leon I a i n ' t had no f i gh t (Greg Yes you did Cr You said you had one! You had a f i ght with Butchie. Greg An' he say Gar land...an 'Michael (Cr An' Barry (Leon I d i ' n ' , you said that, Gregory! (Greg you d id. (Leon You know you said that (Greg You said Garland remember that? (Greg You said Garland! Yes you did (Cr You said " tha t ' s r i gh t " Greg He said Mich- an 1 I say Michael (Cr Did you ever have a f i ght with Garland? (Leon Uh-uh Cr You had one and he beat you up too! Greg Yes he d id ! Leon No I di - I never had a f i ght with Butch. Examples of shared knowledge and timing are evident in the interview transcr ipts included in Appendix A. See Chapter V for a complete descr ipt ion of the ex i s ten t i a l phenome-nological framework and the descriptions based on this framework. Chapter V FRAMEWORK FOR PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION INTRODUCTION The interview transcr ipt ions resu l t ing from the research procedures described in Chapter IV were interpreted according to ex i s tent i a l phenomeno-log ica l areas of being. To provide a foundation for the interpret ive descriptions in th i s chapter, an account of interpretat ion and ex i s tent i a l phenomenological areas of being are provided. This i s followed by an explanation of the organization of interview data and by descriptions of meanings interpreted from the grade nine, ten and eleven students and teacher interview data. Interpretation According to Palmer (1969), the meaning of interpretat ion i s making sense out of what happens. This i s the meaning of interpretat ion used in th i s study. It lays open what is hidden. It brings things from concealment. As Palmer suggests: What appears from the object i s what one allows to appear and what the thematization of the world at work in his understanding w i l l bring to l i g h t . I t i s naive to assume that what i s " r e a l l y there" i s " s e l f -evident". The very de f i n i t i on of what i s presumed to be sel f -ev ident rests on a body of unnoticed pre-suppositions, which are present in every interpret ive construction (1969:136). Heidegger (1964) recognizes the importance of pre-suppositions in interpretat ions in his descriptions of an apple tree. The apple tree has d i f fe rent ways in which i t reveals i t s e l f . For example: The peasant, ant ic ipat ing the harvest looks at i t with d i f fe rent eyes from the a r t i s t who discovers colour values and the excitement of a net of c r i s s -crossing gnarled branches... . A botanist w i l l see something else again, interpret ing the phenomenon before him in terms of learned c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . . . . .110. .1.11 A boy might see yet another thing: perhaps a tree to climb or a branch to swing from.'.. '.., (Heidegger c i ted in Harries, 1967:173). As the peasant interprets the apple tree according to assumptions of his everyday l i f e , and the botanist interprets the tree according to presuppositions underlying Botany ;• so I interpret data based on assumptions of everyday l i f e and on'my understanding' of ex i s tent ia l :. phenomenology. Data are relevant with respect to the researcher 's purpose-at-hand. My purpose i s to interpret the interview transcr ipts according to intersubject ive understanding of the world and my understanding of ex i s ten-t i a l phenomenological areas of being. Interview responses are essential data, since they are products of symbolic language which discloses our world as a l i f e -wo r l d (Gadamer, 1969). Accordingly, th i s thesis stresses understanding through language and not understanding of language. The ex i s ten t i a l phenomenological framework is • based on the interviewee's and interv iewer ' s competence as users of language. The ex i s tent i a l phenomenological framework applied to the interview responses was developed to indicate differences in meanings students and teachers give to t he i r contextual s i tua t ion . The framework is described in the fol lowing sect ion. Ex i s tent ia l Phenomenological Framework With the help of student and teacher conversations about classroom experiences previously held during the Provincial Assessment of Social Studies (see Chapter IV) and from the philosophical foundations discussed in Chapter I I I , a framework was developed to indicate the differences in meaning which students and teachers give to the i r contextual s i t ua t i on . These mean-ings are suggested in the responses which part ic ipants gave to the open-ended, choice-oriented, s i tuat iona l - re levant questions used in the interview. The framework i s comprised of four regions of being, surrounding the personal s e l f of an ind iv idua l . These four areas of being may be labe l led "Pass ive", "Immediate", "Responsible" and "Transcendent", and may be thought of as successively c loser to the centre of se l f . .112 Pr ior to explaining the four areas of being, a word of caution i s needed. The concept of meaning within an area of being does not involve any s t a t i c connotation as though a person had to se lect one of these areas as a home to l i v e i n , to s t a r t from or. return to. The areas of being are not s t a t i c , s o l i d i f i e d categories, but rather f l e x i b l e , flowing and d i a l e c -t i c a l l y inter-twin ing regions of being which involve every one of us. Within a s ingle day a person may adopt d i f fe rent meanings. There i s , fu r ther -more, the problem of enclaves; meaning belonging to one region of being may be enclosed by another. As the circumstances in a s i tuat ion change, or are changing, and as the s i tuat ion changes, the meanings change. As one aDproaches transcendence, each successive area of being subsumes i t s outer area of being, and overcomes i t s perceived obstacles. The framework is out-l ined below and i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 1. Figure 1. Areas of Being . 113 The four areas of being are defined in the fol lowing manner : (a) Passive Area of Being. This area is farthest from a person's inner being. In th is instance a person becomes an object for another person. An indiv idual views his re lat ionship with others in terms of patterns of domi-nance by avoiding the recognition that he is the creator of his own values. Instead, one perceives 'va lues ' as given in the things and i n s t i tu t i on s of the s i t ua t i on . A person i s not, therefore, the source or creator of his own choices, but finds his meanings outside his inner being. (b) Immediate Area of Being. In th i s area a person is only concerned about instants of new pleasure and new experience to f i ght o f f boredom. Only the present i s of paramount importance. The person takes no re spons ib i l i t y for the choice made. The person i s .only concerned about his personal pleasurable, sa t i s f y ing moment. (c) Responsible Area of Being. This area is closer to the centre of a person's inner being. A person makes choices and assumes f u l l re spons ib i l i t y for them. A person takes ser iously the re spons ib i l i t y of decisiveness and self-determination. He makes his choices with concern for other people's welfare since he real izes other people are affected by his decis ions. (d) Transcendent Area of Being. This area is nearest to a person's sense of inner being . A person experiences an i n tens i f i ed expression of the v i s i b l e world. He bases his choices on i n t u i t i v e and s p i r i t u a l grounds rather than s t r i c t l y empirical ones. He prizes such qua l i t i e s as harmony with his fel low man, soc ia l j u s t i ce and re l ig ious idea l s . Organization of Interview Data When I began to analyze the interview data I was confronted with the task of organizing the descriptions into sections which could be eas i ly under-stood by the reader yet concentrate ion a.major focus of the interview. F i r s t I set t led on a major d iv i s ion between students and teachers. By treat ing each group separately I could become more attent ive to the uniqueness of meanings which the teachers, as d i s t i n c t from the students, assign to various aspects of social studies. After experimenting with numerous a l ternat ives I f i n a l l y sett led on the fol lowing sections for making sense of grade nine, ten and eleven interview data: Students on Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s ; Teacher on Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s ; Students on Evaluation; Teacher on Evaluation; Students on Expanded Context; Teacher on Expanded Context; and Summary. These broad categories appear to cover the spectrum of interview.discussion. They r e f l e c t the major topics of conversation that occurred during the grade nine, ten and eleven teacher and student interviews. In the next three sections interpret ive descriptions of meanings resu l t ing from grade nine, ten and eleven interviews about socia l studies are provided. They are presented successively by grades and are organized according to the previously discussed sections. At the end of each grade's description of meanings is a summary which presents an overview of the meanings students and the i r teacher assign to d i f fe rent dimensions of socia l studies. In order to i l l u s t r a t e the interview data upon which interpretat ions had been done, segments of conversations are included in the text. These segments have been extracted from the complete transcr ipts found in the appendices. Utterances have been numbered and refer to the appropriate parts of the t ranscr ipt s . Meanings of symbols in t ranscr ipt parts are included in the appendices. DESCRIPTIONS OF GRADE NINE STUDENT-TEACHER MEANINGS Students on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s Grade nine students interviewed indicated that the Industr ial Revolu-t i o n , Japan, Germany and the Ruhr Valley were soc ia l studies topics they had studied during the 1977-78 academic year. This information served as the basis for the fol lowing interview question: 9 PR So a l l of those soc ia l studies topics that you've studied now...aah: that you can think of th is year, which ones would you choose to study further? and what I am rea l l y interested in is your reasons why. I f none, f i ne , i t doesn't matter. Several students suggested that Europe and Japan are socia l studies topics they would include for further study. Reasons for the i r choices var ied. For example, R i ' s response was: 15 Ri Other places someday y o u ' l l want to travel to. Ri ind icated interest in future t r a ve l . Travel l ing may be interpre-ted as an a c t i v i t y people engage in for excitement, enjoyment or re laxat ion. Within the context of R i ' s response i t appears doubtful that he meant t r a ve l l i n g for business. The student 's a t t ract ion towards t r ave l l i n g as a recreational a c t i v i t y suggests a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. K b u i l t on R i ' s utterance and presented the fol lowing comments: 19 K Aah: well 0), w e l l , we don't r e a l l y . . .1 ike we're here... we don 't know what actua l ly i s going on over there then i f . ..we bring in the schools we get a better idea what is going on over t he re . . . l i k e the i r customs the way the i r government i s run. 20 PR Well why i s that important then? 21 K Well l i k e you know ours ours government i s n ' t perfect. Theirs i s n ' t perfect. Even i f they could integrate them in...we 'd probably get a better government sytem ( ). K i l l u s t r a t ed his interest in learning about other countries of which he has l i t t l e knowledge. He focused on customs and governments. His desire for learning indicates a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. When K was asked by the interviewer to expand on his reasons, he indicated that knowledge of foreign customs and governments might be integrated into the Canadian government system. This could contribute to development of better government. The decisiveness of K's reasons re f lec t s a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. When the topic of conversation sh i f ted to socia l studies topics which the students would select to exclude from study in the future, students focused on classroom pedagogy. The fol lowing segment of conversation i l l u s -trates the comments: 26 K I t ' s hard to say because...you know depending on the teachers. Some teachers you know, get aah: t h e y ' l l teach us something and then t h e y ' l l you know, t h e y ' l l jus t throw in or give a bunch of notes, and you just copy s tu f f s t ra ight off the board you know. I t ' s boring. 27 PR Aha: . 28 K Depends on the teacher. 29 PR O.k. what 's, what do you mean i f I was going to ask you now what you mean by boring? 30 K Well s i t t ing fhere every day and wr i t ing downj 31 D (Your everyday questions and answering l i k e we're doing r ight now. (laughter) ~ .Tl6 32 K This whole deal I guess...you 1re r i gh t , s h e ' l l , you know, s h e ' l l s h e ' l l e i ther give us worksheets or s h e ' l l make us do reports. 33 D Questions on the boards I 34 Ri I And copy a f te r the chapter. 35 D And that ' s what we do. Copy out the questions, answer and copy out the answers. 36 Ri We don't even go over the answers. We don't even know i f they are r ight or not. So i t s ( ) boring. Based on the included segment of discuss ion, i t appears that teacher strategies provide a major focus for student interpretat ions of social studies. Students indicate that wr i t i ng notes and answering questions are a c t i v i t i e s which make subjects boring. K's utterance that students " . . . j u s t copy s tu f f s t ra ight o f f the board", implies K's awareness of a c t i v i t i e s that may be more desirable then " j u s t " copying notes. Boredom i s also implied by the structure of D's reply:•• 35 D And that ' s what we do. Copy out the questions, answer and copy out the answers. D's patterned response, "copy out the questions, answer and copy out the answers" implies a routine in soc ia l studies. Routineness and boredom as described by students suggest meanings within the Passive Area of Being. Students interpreted partieipationin .classroom a c t i v i t i e s as meeting require-ments expected by the i r teachers. They didnot appear to see much value in a c t i v i t i e s for t he i r own interests or projects. Further in the interview several students displayed ades i re to escape boredom and assign meanings within the Responsible Area of Being. An ind ica -t ion is R i 1 s utterance: 36 Ri We don't even go over the answers. We don't even know i f they are r ight or not. So i t s ( ) boring. Ri expressed concern about the teacher not providing opportunities for her to discover mistakes she might have made in her assignments. Her use of "even" suggests that she recognizes something needs to be done (checking answers) but is not presently happening. It appears that since the socia l studies teacher does not review student assignments, Ri cannot properly,evaluate her answers. .Thus the class is boring to her. It seems reasonable to suggest that i f the teacher did provide time for a question-answer review, Ri would be more s a t i s f i ed since she could recognize possible errors. Ri appears to take ser iously her re spons ib i l i t y to answer questions co r rect l y . She indicated a desire to give meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. But, with . 1 1 7 respect ' to the present s i t ua t i on , she assignedmeaningswithin the Passive Area of Being. Boredom v i s -a -v i s teaching methods again became a focus of student attention in utterance 44: 44 K This i s a l l ( ) in Japan. We d idn ' t see any f i lms t r i p s only...nothing you know, j u s t s t ra ight questions, and we got about twenty s i l l y worksheets, and that ' s i t . As in previous student comments, the concept ' j u s t ' i s used. "Just s t ra ight questions" implies that K recognized a c t i v i t i e s which may be of greater value to him. He described worksheets as being s i l l y . His comments indicate a s h i f t in meaning between the Passive and Immediate Areas of Being. K appeared to recognize that present a c t i v i t i e s have minimal importance to him, and he questioned why displays such as f i lms t r i p s were, and presently are not employed by his teacher. Answering questions was a focus of conversation when students d i s -cussed classroom a c t i v i t i e s they would exclude or include in future social studies classes. K and Ri pinpointed questions and answers as a c t i v i t i e s to be excluded, but they l a t e r qua l i f i ed the i r responses. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d in the fol lowing segment of conversation: 114 Ri Questions and answers. 115 PR O.k. You'd exclude questions and answers. 116 K Not a l l together... 117 Ri Not, yeah...because you'd l i k e l y need it...know what i s going on and that...by questions...but not so many of them. These f i r s t three weeks we've done maybe about f i f t y questions. I t ' s so many. It gets boring. Ri re-evaluated her previous comments by ind icat ing that i t i s the qua l i ty of questions the teacher assigns that makes social studies boring. Based on student comments i t appears that the quantity of questions a teacher assigns, the mundaneness of repeatedly answering questions, the compulsory nature of assignments, and the lack of answer reviews contribute to student interpretat ions of boredom. Combined, they provided a central focus for students assigning social studies classroom a c t i v i t i e s meanings within the Passive Area of Being. When students discussed classroom a c t i v i t i e s which they would include in future socia l studies classes, D selected more group work. K. concurred .118 with D, providing the fol lowing explanation:: 102 K Because you've' got your opinion and someone else has the i r own opinion, and you can combine opinions. OPINIONS I guess, you can get a better answer. K suggested that group work affords students opportunities where they can become acquainted with a greater var iety of opinions. By combining opinions students may be able to arr ive at more complete answers. K's desire to be in a posit ion whereby he can develop more thorough answers indicates a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Ri,.however, haej d i f fe rent opinions, expressed in the fol lowing section of discourse: 103 Ri F ie ld s , and going...probably f i e l d t r i p s and that l i k e going out to see things aah that you learn about. 104 PR What's, what...why would you want that? 105 Ri Because i t ' s j u s t not out of a notebook...and taking notes. You're there. That you, that you...not being having fed to you jus t pages. So you can see for yourself I guess. Hmm:: Ri suggested that f i e l d t r i p s should be included in social studies. She would l i k e to see things she has studied. Based on her comments, i t appears that Ri desires experiences with l i t t l e commitment or decisiveness for her future projects. She wants to escape the world of books and notes in order to experience another dimension of the world. R i ' s reasons for se lect ing f i e l d t r ip s suggest a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. Teacher on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s Classroom'subject matter and a c t i v i t i e s were also discussed with the grade nine socia l studies teacher. When he^discussed the topic he presently teaches, he stated: 2 B In socia l studies nine I'm doing topographic maps with the kids r ight now and map s k i l l s . 3 PR And why are you teaching th is ? 4 B I'm teaching i t because that . . .we l l bas i ca l l y as I get into urban geography and geography twelve physical geography there is a l o t of map usage and I found that the f i r s t couple of years I was here I was having to sort of teach the s k i l l s fo r the f i r s t time and the kids r ea l l y d i dn ' t get a good under-standing. I f e l t that i f I started at nine grade nine level and sort of followed i t through grade ten, eleven and twelve, by the time they got to grade eleven and twelve they 'd be able .119 to interpret photos better. . . so an get a better basis fo r the urban part of geography... Part of grade eleven on socia ls and for physical geography they 1 ve...o.k. they ' re r ea l l y have an understanding of how to work with a i r photos and top maps, plus I think the kids can use them outside map s k i l l s , outside the classroom,.finding locat ions, getting ideas on aah, you know...going from one place to another. I know I d i dn ' t learn that t i l l I'was quite o l dand I think i t i s a good s k i l l for them to get. Mr. B teaches topics which develop a f i rm basis for grade nine students to become successful in high school socia l studies. According to the teacher, introducing basic geography s k i l l s in grade nine w i l l help students " in terpret photos bet te r . . . ( to ) get a better basis for the urban part of geography... (which i s ) part of grade eleven soc ia l s and physical geography." Because the geography section of the grade eleven soc ia l studies course is comprised of "Population" and "Urbanizat ion" , Mr. B. desired' that students acquire an early understanding of map s k i l l s to provide them with better chances for .success;in future grades. Mr. B's select ion of topics which are intended to serve as a basis fo r future student academic success,indicates a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. In addit ion, Mr. B. proposed that s k i l l s such as in terpret ing photos and topographic maps are useful in a student 's everyday l i f e . Exposure to these s k i l l s enables students to locate geographical areas with greater ease. Consistent with his reasoning Mr. B. added as an a f t e r -thought: 8 B ...I f ind though the reasons I do teach maps on...maybe I should have mentioned this before because I teach at the begin// the f i r s t month when I get the kids because they can get concrete answers from the maps. They can get r ight answers, and I f ind tha t ' s a good way to s ta r t socia ls with them...to have them doing something pos i t ive where they can get pos i t ive things and then that sort of encourages them or sort of gets them...maybe turn on to soc ia l s . Then maybe the other things I do won't seem to be as threatening to them. That's now I ' l l always teach maps f i r s t to a l l my classes. In his reply Mr. B. included student confidence as an addit ional reason for teaching maps. Map assignments help students achieve tangible or concrete answers. This encourages and motivates students, thereby making socia l studies less threatening. In his comment the teacher expressed concern about the students ' sense of worth in a soc ia l studies c lass . Mr. B's atten-tiveness to student self-image suggests a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. r- .120 Commenting on how he selected his teaching approaches, Mr. B. stated: 6 B Aah: I'm aah...o.k. on my own I decided to ba s i ca l l y . . . I don't know where I even I jus t picked up the idea of looking at top maps and g g.. . just looking at the maps and from the topographic maps us'ing the question.. .just question sheets from topographic maps and now I ' l l do a couple o f f i e l d exercises with the kids with compass d i rec t ions . . .o r drawing the i r own topographic maps by going outside and looking at an area and sketching i t . But aah you know I jus t sort of fumbled over things. I wanted to t ry and cover and look for things on my own. Mr. B's utterance indicates repeated use of minimization procedures. By responding that he " . . . ju s t picked up the idea of looking at top maps, jus t looked at the maps...and jus t used question sheets," Mr. B. evaluates his a c t i v i t i e s as minimal achievements. If Mr. B. had excluded repet it ious use of the term ' jus t ' , the suggested a c t i v i t i e s would be interpreted as having greater i m p l i c i t worth than they presently have. The term ' j u s t ' indicates an assumed re lat ionsh ip of a category with other categories which are perceived by the speaker to have greater worth or value. As the utterance i s presented in the interview, Mr. B. minimized, the importance of his reasons for having selected certa in teaching approaches. He made- no comment about having Ghosen inst ruct iona l methods which decidedly benefit his students or himself. Hence his response suggests a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. Near the conclusion of his utterance Mr. B. reinforced-the interpreted meaning by explaining that he " . . . j u s t sort of fumbled over things," such as compass direct ions and map sketches. Subsequent to his responses Mr. B. was asked by the interviewer to discuss the success of his teaching methods. Mr. B. noted.that his teaching approaches probably did not contribute to greater student learning success. Instead, the type of learner a student has been and/or presently is,determines his/her rate of academic success. The fol lowing reply i l l u s t r a t e s Mr. B'.s reasoning: 8 B ...I don 't know i f i t ' s any more successful or not because the same sort o f . . . the same kids pass and f a i l no matter what, you know...what type of unit you teach. Mr. B. proposed that ins t ruct iona l procedures he presently employs are equally successful as approaches he previously used. He perceived his present teaching a c t i v i t i e s as having no greater student learning, value than approaches he previously used. Mr. B's apparent sa t i s fact ion of.employing teaching .T21 strategies which are as e f fec t i ve as other methods,without ind icat ing a consideration of future inst ruct iona l methods which may prove more productive for students or the teacher, suggests a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. Classroom a c t i v i t i e s which Mr. B. included.in social studies are contouring, i n te rpo la t ion , drawing topographic p r o f i l e s , developing topogra-phic maps from given d i rect ions , f i e l d exercises and/or compass bearings. His reason for including such student a c t i v i t i e s was to present students with tangible a c t i v i t i e s in socia l studies. As mentioned ea r l i e r , Mr. B's percep-tion was that concrete classroom a c t i v i t i e s in grade nine should help students in grade eleven and twelve geography. This concern for students' academic welfare implies a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. When Mr. B. discussed the socia l studies content and teaching approaches he would include i f he were given tota l freedom, he made the fol lowing comments: 30 B AAHM I would (1) I, I...a general answer I think i s I ba s i ca l l y bas i ca l l y would teach things that kids could re late to. A l l r ight things l i k e aah urban geography, physical geography, that aah that type of thing. Aah: from a h i s t o r i c a l point of view (1) i f I could choose from a h i s t o r i c a l point of view I'd sort of look at from a world problem point of view. Aah problems in the Middle East things l i k e the Panama Canal, those types of things. I 'd do i t from a point of view where you know...from... kids have aah...kids can get something concrete something . relevant to the i r l i f e s t y l e . In geography and history maybe they can s ta r t to answer some of the questions that are going through the minds of people now in regards to p o l i t i c s . . . l i k e things l i k e Panama, Middle East, that type of thing. Aah how would I teach i t ? 33 B I 'd l i k e to teach the course, h istory i f I could...teach history part of the course.. . I 'd teach i t from aah analyzing things l i k e speeches, h i s t o r i c a l documents, not past h i s t o r i -cal documents, present h i s t o r i c a l documents. By that way you'd probably get...go back into h istory and f i nd out why people are speaking th i s way of things l i k e the Panama Canal... things l i k e the Middle East. They have to have some relevance in the background. But bas i ca l l y from documents. As Mr. B. mentioned previously in the interview,he finds i t benef ic ia l to employ concrete rather than conceptual topics for i n s t ruct ion . He also indicated', however, that geography and history topics should be relevant to students ' l i f e s t y l e s . Mr. B. proposed,that i f social studies was made more relevant to students, they may be able to provide answers to questions con-cerning internat ional p o l i t i c a l s i tuat ions such as the Middle East and Panama .122 Canal. Mr. B. would se lect document analysis as the major teaching a c t i v i t y for th is purpose. He ant ic ipated that students would be provided with oppor-tun i t i e s whereby they could uncover reasons underlying current world issues. Mr. B. appearedto focus on the'student as decision-maker' theme. Along with document analysis he included s imu la t ion -ac t i v i t i e s such as mini-parliaments and mini-senates. As he stated: 37 B Mini-parliaments and mini-senates would create opportunities whereby students are placed in decision-making ro les. Later Mr. B. implied that h i s t o r i c a l research and simulation a c t i v i t i e s are -'productive for making decisions on a global scale. The teacher 's intent ion of having students solving global problems suggests a question, of f e a s i b i l i t y . Could Mr. B. bring about the global state of a f f a i r s his students aim at? Would Mr. B's students be prepared to carry the weight of re spons ib i l i t y and commitment for making decisions on internat ional a f fa i r s ? It seems doubtful! Thus, from a f e a s i b i l i t y perspective, Mr. B's comment indicates a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. If Mr. B., however, believed.that student decision-making on global a f f a i r s contributes to increased student learning, worth and/or relevance, his comments would suggest meanings within the Responsible Area of Being: 37 B Aah, hones// aah: I I want to get them in the framework of may// maybe decision making and maybe l e t t i n g them be the deci-, sion makers instead of l e t t i n g the U.S. government...1 ike being in regards to the Panama Canal. If I took t h a t . . . l e t them makethe dec i s i on . . . l e t them have aah: aah sort of aah...I don't know. Workshop, or sort of a mini-pariiament or mini-senate or whatever. They you know form some type l i k e that and l e t them decide what should be done. And I and you know by do// analyzing the speeches, things that are going on now. They're obviously.going to have to go back and f ind the other facts also. But I, I want them to be put in the role of a decision maker from a h i s t o r i c a l point of view and a geog// geographical point of view. I think he...what I said already. Its jus t that they can re late to things in the i r environment. Students on Evaluation The students interviewed generally agreed that they should be evaluated. The fol lowing segments of conversation feature the students' descriptions of evaluation: 149 PR O.k. aahm, should students be evaluated? (.3) 150 Ri In socials? 151 PR Yeah. •..1.23 152 Ri Yeah. 153 PR Why? 154 Ri Because i f they weren't they wouldn't do noth ing. (3) 160 K Well l i k e aah i f aah, i f you . . . l i ke i f you you know we do... we go by terms hey (PR - aha).what a student does f i r s t term r i ght , he should be evaluated by t h i s . . . h i s second term should be evaluated by his f i r s t term...not by...o.k. you get a guy you know, brains, s t ra ight A 's he sh// hey, Tike he shouldn't get an A. And just because a k id doesn't know ha l f as much as him, get an E. He should be evaluated on his work, his speed plus his progress. 164 K What he learns not what somebody else has learnt. (6) 166 W Yeah, I agree with that. Aahm I think you should be evaluated. 168 W Well ( ) you wouldn't r ea l l y bother learning you know. What's the use of having a subject. 169 Ri I t ' s nice to know where you stand and how well you 're doing. Like when you get a good mark i t makes you feel good, r ight? (PR - aha) So then I guess you t ry and work. 170 PR Does i t make you feel good just for a short while or does i t make you feel good f 1 171 Ri Sometimes i t makes you try and keep i t up, and then i f you get a bad mark you try and work up. Then you (1) work on. 172 K It can turn you o f f too. 173 Ri Yeah i f you get a r ea l l y bad mark then you say forget i t , I can ' t do t h i s . But i f you get something l i k e C- you t ry and work i t up to a C or C+. Although most students in the group agreed on the necessity of evaluat ion, the i r reasons underlying necessity d i f f e r . For example, Ri assumed: that students are not s u f f i c i e n t l y motivated to be academically responsible. According to Ri, i f students are not evaluated they "would not do anything". She impl ied that students are not the source of the i r school a c t i v i t i e s . Students work in school because of evaluation. External evaluation becomes, therefore, the vehicle for accomplishment. R i ' s response suggests a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. Later Ri bu i l t on her or ig ina l comment by speaking of "good fee l ing s " . It appears that receiving good marks makes her feel good, which in turn motivates her to work harder. A bad mark i s interpreted by Ri as an ind icat ion to try harder and accomplish more. R i ' s perspective on classroom evaluation should be interpreted in re la t ion to her given school context. Student evaluation i s generally a s o c i a l l y accepted f a c t - o f - l i f e in schools. It may be interpreted as a s i t u -ational boundary which influences student freedom of act ion. Evaluation can, therefore, be recognized by students as e i ther a hindrance or a help towards accomplishment of the i r chosen projects. Ri interpreted student evaluation as a legit imate r e s t r i c t i o n on her freedom but one she can use to acquire personal sa t i s fact ion and greater achievement. R i ' s comments, therefore, r e f l e c t her power to overcome meanings within the Passive Area of Being. K's interpretat ion of evaluation also suggests e f f o r t to s h i f t his meanings from the Passive Area of Being; K accepted evaluation as a given point upon which classroom work i s based. In l a te r comments, however, K suggested that students be evaluated according to the i r own standards rather than according to expectations set by others. In K's view students should be evaluated on the i r own work, speed and progress. K's concern about the f a i r -ness of evaluation practices suggests a meaning towards the Responsible Area of Being. W c lear l y interpretedevaluation as being the cata lyst fo r learning. Sheques-tiohned-theneed for students to study materials i f no evaluation i s done. W's response indicates a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. When students were asked about evaluation methods they would include in socia l studies, K was interruped by Ri who focused on K's unfinished answer: 190 K A student's program or his own j 191 Ri I Yeah i t should be l i k e a progress on your aahm that you have to get to a certain point. So that you could be. s i t t i n g there studying forever and not even get anywhere. At least you should be able to get somewhere. Ri interjected that evaluation should be based on a person's indiv idual performance, according to achievement of a pre-defined goal. This procedure would indicate how successful a student has been in accomplishing a goal. Ri implied that the goal should be set by some person other than herse l f . Although Ri was presented with an opportunity to se lect any evaluation method she preferred, her choice pertained to student achievement of pre-defined object ives. R i ' s choice and reasons may be interpreted as r e f l ec t i ng a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. The fol lowing segment of conversa-t ion reinforces R i ' s meaning: 193 Ri Because you can ' t stay on the same thing forever. If you haven't got something to push you you 're not gonna go anywhere. Sort of l i k e having aahm, a certain amount of projects a year and s tu f f l i k e that. So i f you 're sure you 're gonna get them done, not jus t say there i s nothing I have to do...aahm I ' l l jus t do whatever I feel l i k e i t . .125 185 PR 186 K 187 PR 188 Ri 194 PR So the id// the idea you have to do something makes you do i t . I f I was to take away that you wouldn't do i t ? 195 Ri No not l i k e . . . l i k e you might do i t but not a l l of i t . . . l i k e you wouldn't completely give up on i t . . . j u s t work not doing the. whole thing. Ri suggested that she requires another person to push her to accomplish some-thing. W concurred with Ri"by commenting: 199 W Aahm I don't know. Like you need something you know that says i f you don't do t h i s , th is is going to happen. Because you r e a l l y . . . W's hesitancy to recognize herself as i n i t i a t o r of her own a c t i v i t i e s re f lec t s a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. The need for external reinforcement became a major focus of conversation when the interviewer related evaluation and parents: Do you l i k e to see your parents aah have an ambition for you in terms of marks? Oh yeah, yeah. Or would you rather leave i t a l l up to yourself? No. Parents have to do something, cause I know that maybe... I know that maybe i f my dad was on my back I might not be the student I am now. I don't know i f I 'd be any better or any worse, but i t s ju s t aahm...know i f I 'd be the kind of student I am now. Ri believed that her parents should pressure her to achieve at times. Yet extreme parental pressure or expectations may have a negative e f fect on the student. The following utterance i l l u s t r a t e s her qua l i fy ing remark: 182 Ri Yes, because say, l i k e , aah everybody i s . . . I heard a l o t of people say l i k e you can only you end up to a d i f fe rent plane. People get up to that plane at d i f fe rent rates (PR - aha) and i f you've been an A student unt i l now, that ' s as high as you can go. Then maybe in grade ten that won't be an A student and may only be a B student. So you can ' t stay at an A student forever...an// your parents get a l l on your back and y e l l i n g at you. Then you go even more down and i t don't work. As described previously, Ri .accepted evaluation as a legit imate school circumstance, objectives as basic referents;, and parents as supporters and re inforcers . The meanings she assigns to evaluation continuously s h i f t . Her unquestioned acceptance of evaluation and externa l ly - set expectations i n d i -cate a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. R i ' s recognition that extremes may make i t unbearable for her to work within her patterned a c t i v i t i e s .126 suggests a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. Ri l a t e r implied that she has no desire to become more passive. D's answer is less complicated. In the fol lowing segment of conver-sation he b lunt ly stated that his classwork is based on his parents: 174 PR How do your parents re late to th is ? Do they look at your... 175 D Geez Christ you f a i l and you 're dead. 178 PR So do you f ind yourself working for your parents or for yourself? 179 Ri Well | 180 D I For your parents. D's comments r e f l e c t a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. Teacher on Evaluation During the interview Mr. B. discussed how and why he evaluates students in socia l studies. He indicated that one major evaluation focus is student da i ly exercises, notebooks and small scale projects. By focusing on these student products Mr. B. presents each student wi.th a ready-made opportunity to pass. To provide equi l ibr ium Mr. B. gives students examina-tions whereby they are not presented with ready access to passing. The • reasons underlying the teacher 's decision on assignments and examinations are expressed in the fol lowing utterance: 50 B I, I don't...yeah I guess I am evaluating, but I am real ly.... by co l l ec t i ng da i ly exercises that type of th ing.. . I 'm t ry ing to use the type of progress they reach whether they ' re understanding concepts. I am not, I I don't know i f I'm evaluating from the da i ly exercises, saying hey here's where we're weak, here's where we have to review'some type of things... that type of thing. I think, i f I evaluate them and I want a mark for them I test them. But for da i ly exercises or i f I give them a major project. . .but i f I want to see how I'm doing or whether t h e y ' l l understand i t , then that ' s why I'm doing the da i ly exercises. But i f I wanta... If I r ea l l y want to grade my kids I 'd give them more tests and more projects. But I think the da i ly exercises I c o l l e c t ju s t for a basis of knowing where they are r e a l l y . . . * Mr. B. appeared concerned about students' c apab i l i t i e s to understand the concepts he teaches. He ant ic ipated discovering student weaknesses by assigning students da i ly exercises. This procedure may allow him'to: become - -more attent ive-to learning areas which require-additional- at tent ion. Mr. B.. assumed that by being attent ive to students' weak areas, students w i l l have a better chance to pass examinations and be promoted. Mr. B's concern . suggests a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Promotion systems in-education are i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sanctioned -structures :.taken'for granted by students;, teachers, administrators and parents. They are- large ly based?on the apparent adequacy, of a studeht.is understanding df prescribed materials 1; I t appears tha.t Mr. B. i s committed to providing his students with opportunities for being promoted. At the same time, Mr. B. decided.to use da i ly exercises to measure his own teaching performance. This form of se l f -evaluat ion suggests a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Students on Expanded Context A focus for student meaning outside the immediacy of the socia l studies classroom yet l inked to the classroom was the school l i b r a r y . The school l i b ra r y became a topic of discussion while students were expressing opinions about social studies subject matter. The fol lowing utterances made by K opened the floodgates of conversation: 46 K Yeah we had to do a project on i t you know...you go to the l i b r a r y , you can ' t take nothing out of the l i b r a r y . That sort of s tu f f . 47 PR Why is that? 48 K Well books are too expensive, and a l l th i s sort of s tu f f . And you take i t out, you take i t out for one night and you know they expect you to get a l l your information in one night. - Then you 're ins i s ted on runback, you know. You're going back to the l i b r a r y every morning, signing out the book, reserving i t , going back a f te r school getting the book and then you know...that sort of s tuf f . . .and i t s ju s t then the teacher sometimes w i l l give you problems. H e ' l l give you one period to work on i t in class and then h e ' l l s ta r t something new. You're at home doing, doing the s tu f f she gives o f f the board and then you try to do the project at the same time. It appears that the school l i b r a r y ' s book-borrowing pol icy influences the type of a c t i v i t i e s in which grade nine socia l studies students are or are not engaged. Student comments about l i b r a r y pol ic ies,which they feel obligated to obey suggest meanings within the Passive Area of Being. D expanded the l i b r a r y focus by ind icat ing that books the l i b r a r y loans out are outdated: .128 51 D But now there is a new l i b r a r y they might bring in some new books. I t ' s what they r ea l l y need. Ri on the other hand focused on the l i b r a r y ' s f ine system as an extreme form of contro l : 52 Ri Our l i b r a r y i s so cheap. I owe a do l l a r because I d i dn ' t bring my book back on time. Fine systems are an accepted feature of any l i b r a r y . R i , however, questioned the reasonableness of the school l i b r a r y f ine po l i cy . She implie. more lenient approach toward overdue books may be acceptable. In t o t a l i t y i t appears that the students, interviewed .-interpreted, various features of the school 1 ibrary -as -contro l . Their interpretat ions suggest meanings within the Passive Area of Being. When students were asked by the interviewer to compare the i r exper i -ences in social studies to experiences in other classes, a long s i lence prevai led. F ina l l y K took re spons ib i l i t y for breaking the s i lence and the fol lowing segment of conversation ensued: 135 K I guess i t ' s the same usual routine; as the whole questioning thing again. 136 Ri No i t s not. Other classes we aahm, we learn what what's already there or something 1 ike...you ' re working with things and in soc ia l s you 're ju s t looking at things that ' s already happened aah:: 137 K Yeah in soc ia l s you you you . . . l i ke you 're studying the past, where in English and s tu f f l i k e that you 're ... aahm you're you ' re . . . to feel more updated you know. 138 PR O.k. what do you think i s more important in terms of your own l i f e ? 139 D I 'd say English i s more important. 140 K The more updated s tu f f . 141 D Yeah. 142 K Because we're not going back to the future. Well we're not going into the past. We're going into the future. I'm getting myself messed up. 143 PR D, do you have anything to add on? (7) 144 PR Say, you would agree with K would you? 145 D Aha, aha. 146 PR G i r l s too? 147 Ri Uhu. 148 W Yeah. *129 K's interpretat ion of socia l studies as routine was based on question-answer procedures employed by the socia l studies teacher. Ri disagreed. She explained that in other classes students work with updated topics while in socia l studies students " ju s t look" at the past. Ri defined English as an example of an updated course she perceives to be important. According to Ri arid.D, people l i v e in the present and.project into the future. Hence i t i s important to study happenings of today. Neither student considered the d i a l ec t i c . r e l a t i on sh i p between past, present and future. Their concern en t i r e l y for the present. It appears, therefore, that they give meanings within the Immediate Area of Being when, comparing social studies to other school courses. While students related social studies to other school subjects they focused on the compulsory nature of courses. The i n t e r -viewer became sens i t ive to the opportunity and asked students: 79 PR ...aah: do you think that compulsory courses help students or hinder you? Numerous student repl ies focused on the re lat ionship between what a student i s and what he can become. For example: 92 K Yeah aahm: l i k e of you d i d n ' t . . . i f the the they l e f t i t up to the students, they, most of th them would be taking shop;, hey? They'd do nothing. No Engl ish, nothing. You go out and t ry to f i nd a job and you you couldn ' t even write r ight. . . then i f you had to keep a, keep a record they wouldn't be able to spe l l anything r ight? or do anything with that. K suggested that i f students were provided with opportunities to decide on school subjects they would probably select courses with l i t t l e academic rigour. K re lated.that i f students were given the re spons ib i l i t y to decide on workload they would do "nothing". D supported K's feel ings with his e a r l i e r response: 83 D Well you you'd be here taking a l l the easy s tu f f . D and K implied that students "as they are" are s a t i s f i ed with assigning meanings within the Immediate Area of Being. Students l e f t to t he i r own devices would search for ephemeral easy moments in school l i f e . K inserted the -idea that a student's future project may be a par t i cu la r occupation. Most occupa-tions are defined according to the t r a i n i ng , a b i l i t y or knowledge a potential employee requires. To meet employers'job expectations, students require certa in mental and/or physical developments. K related mental preparation to compulsory courses. Several students suggested that although compulsory courses are re s t r i c t i on s on present freedom, they can be interpreted as aids . 130 for accomplishing future projects. These views suggest meanings within the Responsible Area of Being. Ri proposed.that one's future project may be univers i ty. To meet formal univers i ty entrance standards students must pass certain compulsory courses. This form of reasoning suggests that Ri i s concerned about the future with.respect to commitments she i s prepared to make in the present. Hence she suggests a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Although students appear to assign compulsory courses meanings largely within the Responsible Area of Being, they appeared'to give d i f fe rent meanings when discussing the grade nine social studies course and i t s re lat ion to students' future. When students were asked to relate socia l studies to the i r future they answered: 125 D If you 're going to travel i t might. 126 PR Travel i s important? How, how is i t going to help? 127 D Well they t e l l you...deal with Japan or something l i k e that. You f ind out, f ind out what they do. 128 Ri Customs espec ia l l y . (7) 129 PR Anything else? (7) 130 Ri I guess we're rea l l y not sure yet. Nobody has ever r ea l l y to ld us what i t does. I don't know because in math...o.k. you need that for taxes and th i s and that. Socials i t s . . . I don't know heeheehee. A central focus underlying student comments is that socia l studies content in grade nine is important for t r a ve l l i n g . Working knowledge of a country such as Japan can become useful when one travels to that country. Travel l ing as: a focus of reasoning re f lec t s a meaning within the- Immediate Area of Being. After two seven-second si lences Ri concluded that students had given l i t t l e thought to the re lat ionsh ip between social studies and students' futures. Teacher on Expanded Context Responding to the re lat ionsh ip between present grade nine socia l studies and students' futures,. Mr. B. exclaimed: 54 B Great ro le! I think the most important thing in social studies is decision making...to be allow// to allow the ch i l d ren . . . allow the students an idea of what things...see i t from a .131 h i s t o r i c a l point of view not from a geographical point of view...but urban geography, population geography,,.they're gonna have to make decisions in the i r l i f e . They're gonna have to vote and part ic ipate in making those decisions and I think socia ls can be looked at from the point of view of a decision making subject. Aah exposing the kids to h i s t o r i -cal decision making, present day decision making...and maybe then analyzing and maybe c rea te . . . I ' d l i k e to think that I create interest in things, Tike maybe i n f l a t i o n , industr// development, where people should develop, where people should aah bu i ld f ac to r i e s , that type of thing i'n my course. I 'd l i k e to think that ' s the type of thing I present to them. Maybe I present to them..maybe I present say...hey this i s an example of a factory in Japan, a l l the po l l u t i on , that type of th ing, o.k? Mr. B. implied that students w i l l need to make decisions in the i r future l i v e s . He saw social studies as being a useful tool for decision making. By creating an interest in local issues Mr. B. believed students would become active and "question...types of things". I t appears that by making social studies interest ing Mr. B. creates an atmosphere whereby s tu -dents give meanings within the Immediate Area of Being. However, he i m p l i c i t l y suggested interest as a f i r s t step for motivating students to accept greater re spons ib i l i t y for future decision making. The l a t t e r suggests a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Concerning personal biography, Mr. B. offered the fol lowing reason as to why he chose soc ia l studies as a teaching area: 46 B Aah that ' s a good point because f i r s t of a l l I chose p.e. and science at the elementary level and aah I...but my major in aah, in univers i ty was history and now I teach geography. I teach...I bas i ca l l y l i k e geography for the reason that i t s . . . I feel i t s more relevant to the k ids. More concrete things that they can get hold of and grasp. And so in that way i t s not a d i f f i c u l t subject to teach as long as you present i t properly to them. And I think I wanted something that was more concrete too in elem// elementary 'school. I found there was...I f e l t l i k e a babys i tter. I wasn't being challenged from a mental point of view l i k e I am now. Here I am being more challenged from an academic point of view. The kids bring up more questions where, because of my major in h istory I have to think in geography and maybe go ( ) I think i t s more stimu-la t ing teaching geography, although I f ind industry st imulating too. Throughout the utterance Mr. B. made reference to evaluative phrases such as "not a d i f f i c u l t subject " , "being challenged", and " s t imulat ing " . These phrases, r e f l ec t i ng reasons for teaching socia l studies, indicate a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. Also, socia l studies was Mr. B's second choice. Once he became a teacher, Mr, B. changed teaching projects because he desired a greater personal challenge than was avai lable in elem-entary school. He s t r ived to achieve his project of teaching secondary socia l studies taking re spons ib i l i t y for the project. This change re f lec t s a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. Summary Several students interviewed in grade nine suggested that socia l studies topics they would prefer to study are countries such as Japan. They believed-that such knowledge would help when they travel abroad. This l i ne of reasoning indicates meanings within the Immediate Area of Being. Mr. B., on the other hand, preferred to teach geography and h i s t o r i c a l development of world problems. These topics afforded students the opportunity toT make global-.decisions. Since students undoubtedly would not take "world" re spons ib i l i t y^ fo r the i r decis ions, Mr. B 1 s suggestion indicates meanings within the Immediate Area of Being. 'During-the time of interviewing, how-ever,- Mr'."-- B: .taught topographic maps and map s k i l l s by bas i ca l l y using question sheets and f i e l d exercises. He taught map work to help students gain confidence and acquire s k i l l s which w i l l be useful in future academic and non-academic a c t i v i t i e s . His reasons for teaching a spec i f i c topic indicate a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. When Mr. B. presented reasons for his decision to use current teaching s t rateg ies , he indicated minimal personal commitment, implying meanings within the Immediate Area of Being. Social studies a c t i v i t i e s such as questions and answers appeared to be a major focus for student meanings. Student comments about being " forced" to undertake a c t i v i t i e s not relevant to the future or interest ing at the moment, imply meanings within the Passive Area of Being. Boredom was mentioned repeatedly. Boredom, however, was described by students in d i f fe rent ways. For example, one student explained boredom in terms of the socia l studies teacher assigning research reports. This indicates a meaning within the Passive Area of Being. Another student suggested that such classroom a c t i v i -t ies as copying notes makes socia l studies boring. In th i s case, boredom based on lack of interest in a c t i v i t i e s or subject matter implies a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. A th i rd student.defined boredom in terms of the soc ia l studies teacher f a i l i n g to review answers.to questions asked in .133 social studies assignments. This view implies a meaning within the Passive Area of Being, although the student appears to desire giving meanings within the Responsible Area of Being. With respect to evaluation most students interviewed agreed to i t s necessity. Several students indicated that without someone evaluating the i r work, they would not work with as much e f f o r t . In other words, teachers and parents should determine goals to be;achieved. These reasons imply meanings within the Passive Area of Being. One-student argued that al though evaluation i s a fact of school l i f e , she gains pleasure from achieving high marks. Her response suggests a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. A second student proposed that evaluation be based on a student's indiv idual achieve-ment rather than on a comparison with other students. This comment re f lec t s a meaning within the Responsible Area of Being. The teacher employs regular assignments -and examinations as evalu-ation procedures. The former are used to discover where student weaknesses are, while the l a t t e r are applied for f i n a l marks. The teacher appears committed to giving students every opportunity to pass and continue success-f u l l y in school. This concern implies a meaning with in the Responsible Area of Being. An unanticipated focus of meaning in social studies was the l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s . Library borrowing p o l i c i e s , qua l i t i e s of books and f ine po l i c ie s ;were factors responsible for students hes i tat ing to use the l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s in social studies. The passive meanings that they gave to the l i b r a r y appeared to inf luence-potential research a c t i v i t i e s , i i i social studies. Expanding the soc ia l studies context, most students interviewed thought l i t t l e about the relevance of soc ia l studies as being of major impor-tance to students' decision making roles in the future. When asked why he chose socia l studies as his teaching area, the teacher indicated that socia l studies was a second choice. He chose socia l studies because of teaching ease, personal challenge, and st imulat ion. These reasons suggest a meaning within the Immediate Area of Being. .VI 34 DESCRIPTIONS OF GRADE TEN STUDENT-TEACHER MEANINGS Students on Classroom Subject Matter and A c t i v i t i e s Grade ten students interviewed i den t i f i ed B r i t i s h Columbia, Geology, the Gold Rush, and Farming as general topics they had studied in socia l studies during the past year. Although the group of students was asked to choose socia l studies topics they would include for further study, R's answer focused on exclus ion: 8 R Geography, we haven't started studying history yet , but I think I ' l l probably drop geography and keep on going with hi story. 9 PR F i r s t the h i s to ry , why? 10 R I don't know, you know, because I'm probably you know going to t ry to be a lawyer when I grow up right? And I don't think I'm going to need geography r ight now. Maybe I w i l l aah I ' l l probably take i t next year. I don't know i f I have to but I probably w i l l and drop i t in grade twelve. R interpreted the present as re la t ing to his future, namely, becoming a lawyer. He imp l i ed tha t knowledge of history i s necessary to become a lawyer. R related-today ' s subject areas with tomorrow's needs. Hence his utterances s
UBC Theses and Dissertations
An exploration of existential phenomenology as an approach to curriculum evaluation Rothe, John Peter 1979
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