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The right of prisoners to education Bastion, Arlene 1987

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THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO EDUCATION by ARLENE BASTION B.A., U n i v e r s i t y Of Malaya, 1973, M.Ed., U n i v e r s i t y Of Malaya, 1 976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department Of S o c i a l And E d u c a t i o n a l S t u d i e s We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA J u l y 1987 © Arlene B a s t i o n , 1987 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. S o c i a l and E d u c a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 A u g u s t 14 1987 Date DE-6(3/81) i i A b s t r a c t Punishment i s an acknowledged method of e n f o r c i n g the law. Forms of punishment may d i f f e r , but the main aims remain the s a m e — f i r s t , to discourage t r a n s g r e s s i o n of the law, thus m a i n t a i n i n g order i n s o c i e t y . Second, i t i s hoped, by some at l e a s t , t h at p r i s o n e r s w i l l be reformed by or d u r i n g t h e i r punishment. T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about the s t a t u s and l e g a l r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s who are su b j e c t to the dominant form of punishment i n C a n a d a — i n c a r c e r a t i o n . The qu e s t i o n s a r e : Can p r i s o n e r s continue to be regarded as persons and r i g h t - h o l d e r s during i n c a r c e r a t i o n ? Can p r i s o n e r s , then, have a r i g h t to education? I f so, should such a r i g h t be made a l e g a l r i g h t ? The answer one gi v e s to these que s t i o n s c l e a r l y has important bearings on the s t a t u s of p r i s o n e r s d u r i n g t h e i r i n c a r c e r a t i o n . It i s argued that p r i s o n e r s r e t a i n t h e i r s t a t u s as persons while i n c a r c e r a t e d , that they do have r i g h t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the r i g h t to education, and that such a r i g h t should be made a l e g a l r i g h t . J u s t i c e d i c t a t e s that only r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s or j u s t cause can provide a c c e p t a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r w i t h h o l d i n g r i g h t s from p r i s o n e r s . That punishment i s being i n f l i c t e d on c e r t a i n persons does not o f f e r / p r o v i d e adequate grounds f o r denying t h e i r r i g h t to ed u c a t i o n . Indeed, a l e g a l r i g h t to education i s warranted to ensure t h e i r access to ed u c a t i o n . Thus, the f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n i s that a p a r t from the l o s s of r i g h t s necessary to p r o t e c t s o c i e t y and the p r i s o n , and i n order to f u l f i l the c r i t e r i a of punishment, p r i s o n e r s continue t o hold r i g h t s h e l d by other persons, i n p a r t i c u l a r the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s defended by c o n s i d e r i n g arguments that p r i s o n e r s have a moral r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . These ar e : 1 . The Argument from I n c a r c e r a t i o n 2 . The Argument from The E f f e c t s of Punishment 3. The Argument from Punishment of Persons 4. The Argument from F r a t e r n a l O b l i g a t i o n 5. The Argument from S o c i a l E f f e c t s 6. The Argument from B e n e f i t s to the C o l l e c t i v e 7. The Argument from E q u a l i t y The second p r o p o s i t i o n that t h i s r i g h t ought to be made a l e g a l r i g h t r e s t s e s s e n t i a l l y on three premises: 1 . That education can c o n t r i b u t e to the s u c c e s s f u l achievement of the goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 2 . However, education i s not c o n s i d e r e d a p r i o r i t y . 3. As i t now stands, there i s no e f f e c t i v e way to e n f o r c e and s u s t a i n education i n p r i s o n s . With a l e g a l r i g h t to education, p r i s o n e r s would have some b a s i s f o r o b j e c t i n g to inadequate e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s . A l e g a l r i g h t would safeguard f a i r treatment and ensure equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s to e d u c a t i o n . i v Table of Contents A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgement v Chapter I INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter II PENITENTIARY EDUCATION IN CANADA 16 Chapter I I I BACKGROUND REVIEW OF RIGHTS 32 Chapter IV THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 81 Chapter V THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO EDUCATION 103 Chapter VI CONCLUSION 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY 138 V Acknowledgement I wish to acknowledge the a s s i s t a n c e of the Department of S o c i a l and E d u c a t i o n a l S t u d i e s . I wish to thank Ms. Angela Runnals, and S t a f f of the Computing Centre. I am a l s o g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r Stephen Duguid f o r h i s c o n s t r u c t i v e comments. I w i l l always be indebted to P r o f e s s o r L e r o i B. D a n i e l s , and to P r o f e s s o r J e r r o l d Coombs, and P r o f e s s o r Murray E l l i o t , f o r t h e i r a d v i c e , encouragement, i n s p i r a t i o n , and f a i t h i n me. And to my mother and f a t h e r , and to my f r i e n d s , my h e a r t f e l t a p p r e c i a t i o n of your support and l o v e . Many persons helped p u l l me through t h i s long h a u l . They were the diamonds i n the dark. 1 I. INTRODUCTION The d i s s e r t a t i o n has two major t a s k s . The f i r s t i n v o l v e s p r e s e n t i n g arguments e s s e n t i a l l y moral i n nature, showing why p r i s o n e r s have at l e a s t a moral r i g h t to ed u c a t i o n . I t i s argued that p r i s o n e r s are persons. Persons are r i g h t - h o l d e r s . Among the r i g h t s h e l d by persons i n our s o c i e t y are c e r t a i n r i g h t s to educ a t i o n . Nothing about i n c a r c e r a t i o n argues i n favour of t a k i n g t h i s r i g h t away from p r i s o n e r s . Rather, t h e i r d i g n i t y as persons and t h e i r s p e c i a l s t a t u s as p r i s o n e r s demands r e c o g n i t i o n of at l e a s t a moral r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . The d i s s e r t a t i o n then d i s c u s s e s whether t h i s moral r i g h t ought to be made a l e g a l r i g h t . While pris o n - b a s e d education programs e x i s t , i t i s p o s t u l a t e d that c e r t a i n aspects or components are pr o b l e m a t i c . L e g i s l a t i n g p r i s o n e r s ' o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education might ameliorate these problems. While I b e l i e v e that the arguments o f f e r e d here are p l a u s i b l e w i t h i n any s o c i e t y , I w i l l set my arguments a g a i n s t the background of Canadian c o r r e c t i o n s p r a c t i c e . Where a p p r o p r i a t e and a v a i l a b l e , r e f e r e n c e s w i l l be made to the p e n i t e n t i a r i e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. T h i s chapter o u t l i n e s the background to the two main arguments of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . I t o u t l i n e s the grounds f o r reg a r d i n g p r i s o n e r s as persons and r i g h t h o l d e r s , and e x p l i c a t e s the assumptions u n d e r l y i n g the c l a i m that p r i s o n e r s ' moral r i g h t s to education should be made l e g a l r i g h t s . A b r i e f account of the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system w i l l be given i n chapter two. Chapter three c o n t a i n s a background review of 2 r i g h t s , while chapter four examines some arguments which can be used to j u s t i f y the r i g h t to education f o r persons i n g e n e r a l . In chapter f i v e , arguments to j u s t i f y the r i g h t to education s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r p r i s o n e r s are r a i s e d . Chapter s i x concludes the d i s s e r t a t i o n . I t must be noted that the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s not i n the business of e s t a b l i s h i n g e m p i r i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s . The d i s s e r t a t i o n i s e x p l o r a t o r y i n nature. I t l a y s the grounds for ac c o r d i n g a l e g a l r i g h t to education without p u r p o r t i n g to have produced i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e arguments f o r such a p o l i c y : ...there i s a l s o a p l a c e and f u n c t i o n i n our i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e f o r a l e s s complete work, c o n t a i n i n g u n f i n i s h e d p r e s e n t a t i o n s , open q u e s t i o n s and problems, . as w e l l as a main l i n e of argument... (Nozick, 1974, p. x i i ) PRISONERS AS PERSONS AND RIGHTHOLDERS The a b i l i t y to c l a i m r i g h t s i s e s s e n t i a l to a l l human beings. F e i n b e r g (1979) imagines a world without r i g h t s c a l l e d N o w h e r e s v i l l e . The c i t i z e n s of Nowheresvilie need not be unhappier than persons with r i g h t s , but having no n o t i o n of 'what i s t h e i r due,' are g r a t e f u l f o r anything done f o r them (1979, p. 82). Even when they are t r e a t e d badly, they 'do not think to l e a p to t h e i r f e e t and make rig h t e o u s demands a g a i n s t one another' (1979, p. 84). According to Fe i n b e r g , the people of N o w h e r e s v i l l e lack the 'personal d i g n i t y ' (1979, p. 87) of 3 persons because they do not have r i g h t s . L a cking r i g h t s , they do not know how t o , and are unable to make c l a i m s . F e i n b e r g regards the a b i l i t y to make c l a i m s as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the d i g n i t y , s t a t u s , and s e l f - r e s p e c t human beings have as persons (1979, p. 87). Indeed, he suggests that r e s p e c t f o r persons might be simply respect f o r t h e i r r i g h t s (1979, p. 87). Without the a b i l i t y to c l a i m r i g h t s , we are unable to demand red r e s s when we t h i n k that we are being u n f a i r l y t r e a t e d . Being able to a s s e r t r i g h t s thus becomes a very important p a r t of our d i g n i t y as persons. I t p r o v i d e s us with s e l f - r e s p e c t because we know there are l i m i t s to how other persons can t r e a t us, and i f these l i m i t s are exceeded, we are e n t i t l e d to o b j e c t . I t i s thus a s s e r t e d that r i g h t s and the a b i l i t y to c l a i m r i g h t s are e s s e n t i a l to the d i g n i t y and s e l f - r e s p e c t of persons. Some r i g h t s belong to a l l human beings, and some may be claimed only by persons. Human beings who do not possess the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of persons, such as r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , cannot c l a i m those r i g h t s of persons which are dependent upon such a t t r i b u t e s . For example, the apparent lack of m a t u r i t y of young c h i l d r e n i s c o n s i d e r e d by some a r e l e v a n t reason f o r r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r r i g h t to freedom. S i m i l a r l y , the mentally d e f i c i e n t may not c l a i m the r i g h t to c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s as can other human beings, because they lac k the c a p a c i t y to use these o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n a r e s p o n s i b l e way. For example, they might not have the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s to freedom as other human beings. I t w i l l be argued that p r i s o n e r s are human beings as w e l l 4 as persons. They possess any r i g h t s which can be claimed by human beings as human beings, and any r i g h t s which can be claimed i n p a r t i c u l a r by persons. A r i g h t which can be claimed by a l l human beings i s the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d with respect due the s t a t u s and d i g n i t y of human beings. T h i s means that human beings have the r i g h t to be always t r e a t e d f a i r l y , f o r any u n f a i r treatment or i n j u s t i c e would be a v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r d i g n i t y as human beings. T h i s r i g h t i s ' i n a l i e n a b l e , ' because a l l human beings, i n c l u d i n g p r i s o n e r s , can never be deprived of i t . P r i s o n e r s are a l s o persons. What d i s t i n g u i s h e s persons as persons i s much debated. I w i l l adopt the view, common to most, i f not a l l , that persons are ab l e to use reason. A second proposed f e a t u r e i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Persons, whatever e l s e d i s t i n g u i s h e s them, are c u l p a b l e — t h e y can be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a t l e a s t some of t h e i r a c t i o n s . A l a t e r chapter argues that only persons - accountable beings - can be punished. Another f e a t u r e of persons d e r i v e s from t h e i r p o s s e s s i n g b e l i e f s , d e s i r e s , wants, and i n t e n t i o n s . Since these f e a t u r e s are a l s o assigned by some to dogs and f i s h (Dennett, 1976, p. 181), persons must be a l s o capable of 'second order v o l i t i o n s ' (p. 192), of having ' b e l i e f s about the b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s of o t h e r s ' : ...men may a l s o want to have (or not to have) c e r t a i n d e s i r e s and motives. They are capable of wanting to be d i f f e r e n t , i n t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s 5 and purposes, from what they are . . . No other animal . . . appears to have the c a p a c i t y f o r r e f l e c t i v e s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n t h a t i s manifested in the formation of second-order d e s i r e s . . . (Dennett, 1976, p. 192) L i k e the s t a t e of being human, personhood i s a l s o a permanent s t a t e so long as one r e t a i n s the e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s . T h i s means that even those who have done something m o r a l l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e are s t i l l persons. They must be punished f o r t h e i r o f f e n c e s and t h e i r v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t s of o t h e r s , but they do not cease being persons and c l a i m a n t s of r i g h t s , and t h e r e f o r e must s t i l l be t r e a t e d with regard and respect as human beings and persons. Punishment i n v o l v e s the d e p r i v a t i o n of c e r t a i n r i g h t s , such as the d e p r i v a t i o n of l i b e r t y / m o b i l i t y , but does not e n t a i l the d e n i a l of v a r i o u s other r i g h t s . In chapter f i v e i t w i l l be put f o r t h that p r i s o n e r s r e t a i n the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of other members of s o c i e t y 'except those n e c e s s a r i l y removed or r e s t r i c t e d by i n c a r c e r a t i o n ' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986). P r i s o n e r s as human beings and persons, then, have a r i g h t to be t r e a t e d with f a i r n e s s , and with d i g n i t y and r e s p e c t . They should be punished in a manner which r e c o g n i z e s t h e i r d i g n i t y and s t a t u s as persons. T h i s e n t a i l s t h e i r being allowed to hold r i g h t s which others have unless j u s t cause be given f o r t h e i r d e n i a l . Thus, with r e f e r e n c e to the r i g h t to education, unless t h i s r i g h t can be shown to be f a i r l y f o r f e i t t e d during 6 punishment, denying i t to p r i s o n e r s would be a v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s as human beings - and persons - to be t r e a t e d f a i r l y . PRISONERS AND THE LEGAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION Ought p r i s o n e r s to have a l e g a l r i g h t to education? The argument presented i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t i n nature. Chapter two, i n p a r t i c u l a r , through i t s review of the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system i n Canada, s u p p l i e s the b a s i s of t h i s argument. B r i e f l y , there may be many commendable p e n i t e n t i a r y education programs. At the same time, doubts have been expressed about the p r o v i s i o n and q u a l i t y of education as a b e n e f i c i a l component of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . One example i s an opinio n that 'education i s ' r e l a t i v e l y unimportant,' and occupies 'only a rather marginal f u n c t i o n of p r i s o n s ' (Cosman, 1981, p. 11). Another opi n i o n i s that the education being provided i s 'inadequate i n terms of q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y ' (Ontario I n s t i t u t e f o r Studie s in Education Review [OISE], 1978, p. 4). According to a previous d i r e c t o r of the C o r r e c t i o n s S e r v i c e of Canada [CSC], the bureaucracy of the CSC at that time decided that education was not a r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s (Cosman, p e r s o n a l communication, Oct.1985). The Canadian C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e A s s o c i a t i o n (1985) i n i t s development of standards f o r a d u l t c o r r e c t i o n s came to the same c o n c l u s i o n . It i s being claimed that such a f a c t o r , whether something i s p e r c e i v e d as a r i g h t , makes a d i f f e r e n c e i n the way persons a ct toward i t . Because education i s not recognised as a r i g h t i n some p e n i t e n t i a r y 7 c i r c l e s , f o r example, might be a reason f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n i t s implementation. T h i s f a c t o r a l s o i m p l i e s p r i s o n e r s have no l e g a l grounds f o r seeking a c t i o n i n the event of v a l i d complaint a g a i n s t the p e n i t e n t i a r y system. For example, even i f they are p r e s e n t l y e n j o y i n g e x c e l l e n t e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s , they have no grounds with which to c h a l l e n g e d e c i s i o n s to reduce or terminate e d u c a t i o n a l programs. T h i s means t h a t , l i k e the c i t i z e n s of No w h e r e s v i l i e , they are made dependent upon the good w i l l of ot h e r s , such as the l e g a l bureaucracy, f o r the p r o v i s i o n of something to which they are mo r a l l y e n t i t l e d . Other persons, non-prisoners that i s , appear to have r e l a t i v e l y unproblematic access to education. C e r t a i n f a c t o r s , such as g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n , or lack of funds, may impede t h i s a c c e s s . But, a c c o r d i n g to the Report of Canada on the implementation of The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenant on Economic, S o c i a l  and C u l t u r a l R i g h t s , the 'Government of Canada' supports measures taken 'to promote the f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n of the r i g h t s of everyone to education' (Feb. 1985, p. 4). With re f e r e n c e to the implementation of the r i g h t to a primary education, a s s i s t a n c e i s provided persons who have d i f f i c u l t y with access to education (p. 5). The same measures are re p o r t e d as being taken f o r the r i g h t to secondary and higher education (p. 6). For example, f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e i s provided i n the form of loans , tax exemptions, s c h o l a r s h i p s , and summer employment (p. 7). O p p o r t u n i t i e s of access to education would thus appear i n 8 the main entrenched w i t h i n s o c i e t y . On the whole, i f non-p r i s o n e r s have grounds f o r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , they can seek the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the law f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n and r e d r e s s . P r i s o n e r s do not occupy such a p o s i t i o n . They cannot seek the support of the law f o r b e t t e r educat i o n . T h i s c o u l d be because i t i s not g e n e r a l l y accepted that p r i s o n e r s can c l a i m r i g h t s , l e t alone the r i g h t to educ a t i o n . Yet the Canadian Charter of Righ t s and Freedoms (1984) promises " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees" of e q u a l i t y r i g h t s . If t h i s turns out to be so, such a r i g h t might enable p r i s o n e r s to continue to c l a i m r i g h t s other than those thought necessary to punish them or p r o t e c t s o c i e t y . I t allows them to c l a i m r i g h t s which other members of s o c i e t y possess. T h i s i m p l i e s that i f education i s being p r o v i d e d members of s o c i e t y , then the r i g h t to e q u a l i t y i d e a l l y makes i t a v a i l a b l e to e v e r y o n e — i n c l u d i n g p r i s o n e r s . Along such l i n e s , i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to q u e s t i o n whether a l l p e n i t e n t i a r i e s i n Canada can boast of adequate e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s . As w i l l be seen i n Chapter two, some d i s c r e p a n c i e s e x i s t between e d u c a t i o n a l programs i n men's and women's p r i s o n s and between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n s . I t i s only f a i r t h a t good programs are made a v a i l a b l e to a l l and s a t i s f a c t o r y standards maintained throughout. Entrenching a l e g a l r i g h t to education would help ensure t h a t a l l p r i s o n e r s can c l a i m the same standards of q u a l i t y i n programs. P r i s o n e r s are i n a s i t u a t i o n where i t can be expected that other persons w i l l be h o s t i l e to them. For example, i t i s 9 p o s s i b l e that p r i s o n guards would be h o s t i l e to the idea of p r i s o n e r s having a r i g h t to education, when they might f e e l they themselves have no such r i g h t . A r i g h t to education c o u l d ensure that p r i s o n e r s are not i n t e r f e r e d with i n any e f f o r t s they might take to be educated and reformed, and that they s t i l l r e c e i v e the same kind of e d u c a t i o n a l b e n e f i t s , or access to education, as other persons. P o s i t i v e consequences of having a l e g a l r i g h t to education are a l s o d e r i v e d from;, being able to c l a i m the p r o v i s i o n of e d u c a t i o n a l programs which can r e s u l t i n some of those b e n e f i t s and advantages u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to e d u c a t i o n . T y p i c a l l y , education i s a s s o c i a t e d with c e r t a i n improvements and changes for the b e t t e r . These b e n e f i t s can take many forms. A person may be taught to perform a s k i l l and thus become more employable. Chapter four w i l l e l a b o r a t e how a prominent f e a t u r e of R.S.Peters' c r i t e r i a of education i s that education i s as s e s s a b l e by i t s betterment or improvement of persons i n c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l or c o g n i t i v e ways. He sees a ' l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' i n s t a t i n g that a person had been educated, but had not changed f o r the b e t t e r (1966, p. 3 ) . S i m i l a r l y , Frankena d i s d a i n s from terming anything education 'unless i t f o s t e r s or i s intended to f o s t e r d e s i r a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n s ' (1965, p. 6). M u l t i p l e conceptions of ' d e s i r a b l e ' d i s p o s i t i o n s have been promoted through the ages. A common i d e a l which has permeated the many s h i f t s and changes has been that of the " s e l f -betterment" of human beings (Brumbaugh and Lawrence, 1963, 10 p. 9). Thus no matter what i n d i v i d u a l changes are advocated as being d e s i r a b l e f o r education, the n o t i o n of development and and improvement of persons with education has remained c o n s i s t e n t . Whether i t be knowledge, s k i l l s or v a l u e s being conveyed, one can u s u a l l y i n f e r that they have a c q u i r e d a s t a t e of mind c o n s i d e r e d as an improvement or development over t h e i r p r e v i o u s s t a t e , that they are able to t h i n k and reason i n a more mature way. T h i s i s why the n o t i o n and p e r s p e c t i v e of education as seeking to b r i n g about d e s i r a b l e changes i s s i g n i f i c a n t in the p r i s o n c o n t e x t , where d e s i r a b l e changes are l i k e l y to be needed. There are many ways in which a person can change and develop. Many t h i n g s can a l s o be done w i t h i n an e d u c a t i o n a l process to help persons change and develop. In t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , the changes and improvements sought f o r p r i s o n e r s are r e l a t e d to the development of mental and i n t e l l e c t u a l prowess, o v e r a l l with becoming more informed and r a t i o n a l persons. There i s no reason why p r i s o n e r s , i f exposed to these o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r developing i n these ways, might not a l s o improve i n these ways, e s p e c i a l l y i f such improved ways of t h i n k i n g and reasoning were to c o n t r i b u t e toward d e c r e a s i n g t h e i r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s . P r i s o n education programs can be formulated with t h i s aim in view. Chapter f i v e w i l l d i s c u s s an example, that of the U n i v e r s i t y Education Program run by Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y . T h i s program e x e m p l i f i e s how the c r i t e r i a of education and those goals deemed as being p a r t i c u l a r l y b e n e f i c i a l to p r i s o n e r s can be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a program. I t must be noted, though, that 11 these g o a l s and the c r i t e r i a they represent can u n d e r l i e any kind of education programs i n p r i s o n . The concern of the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s that any program must be c o n s c i o u s l y geared to a c h i e v i n g some of the g o a l s of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , mainly those d i r e c t e d at r e l e a s i n g p r i s o n e r s who are l e s s i n c l i n e d to commit crimes. Some p r i s o n e r s r e q u i r e only to l e a r n a u s e f u l (and ^honest) trade to be a b l e to keep themselves (honestly) employed. I t i s feared, however, that programs which only focus on o c c u p a t i o n a l s k i l l s and job placement w i l l r e s u l t i n j o b - h o l d i n g c r i m i n a l s r a t h e r than reformed c r i m i n a l s . Duguid s t a t e s : . . . C o r r e c t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s are j u s t i f i e d i n r a i s i n g the p o i n t that education of p r i s o n e r s might j u s t l e a d to educated c r i m i n a l s . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important when the education programs are p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l , career or j o b - o r i e n t e d i n t h e i r c o n t e n t . . . (1987, p. 7) No d i r e c t e m p i r i c a l equation i s being made between education and improvement. There i s no guarantee that persons who p a r t i c i p a t e i n e d u c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s or 'tasks' w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y achieve the success of becoming educated persons. What i s being s t a t e d i s that education aims to b r i n g about d e s i r a b l e changes in persons, and to f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r development along commendable l i n e s . I t would be l o g i c a l l y odd to engage persons in e d u c a t i o n a l t a s k s , but be i n d i f f e r e n t to whether they b e n e f i t from these a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s thus 1 2 important that education programs in p r i s o n measure up to t h i s concept of education i n order to ensure an o r i e n t a t i o n toward change and betterment. Admittedly, evidence i s sparse, and skeptism present r e g a r d i n g changes in c h a r a c t e r and p e r c e p t i o n s as the r e s u l t of being educated. The only e f f e c t s which can be measured might be the i n c r e a s e i n grade l e v e l (Duguid, 1987, p. 7). An analogy i s p o s s i b l e with n o n - i n c a r c e r a t e d persons. That they may never be genuinely changed in c h a r a c t e r should only suggest, l i k e other i n s t a n c e s of u n s u c c e s s f u l t e a c h i n g , that teaching methods and approaches might be wrong, or i n a p p r o p r i a t e , but not that the aims or r a t i o n a l e i t s e l f i s m i s d i r e c t e d . The goals of education s t i l l remain worthwhile, v a l i d , and meaningful. The t o o l s of education may not guarantee c h a r a c t e r , they are n e v e r t h e l e s s powerful supplements to i t s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . As quoted by the Education and T r a i n i n g Calendar of the CSC: ...Although we may l a c k the instruments to p r e d i c t a c c u r a t e l y the impact of education, apart from other p e r s o n a l i t y and s o c i a l f a c t o r s , on f u t u r e success, i t i s known t h a t education i s h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with success of people in the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n . . . (1982, p. B5) There i s no necessary connection between being educated, 'changed,' and avoiding/committing crime. But the a m e l i o r a t i o n 1 3 of crime i s too important a problem to be l e f t to chance. Thus one must seek those a c t i v i t i e s which are guided by the d e l i b e r a t e i n t e n t i o n of b r i n g i n g about d e s i r a b l e changes i n persons. I t i s p o s s i b l e that education, because i t i s d e l i b e r a t e l y geared to develop persons i n t e l l e c t u a l l y may h e l p p r i s o n e r s broaden t h e i r mental c a p a c i t i e s and h o r i z o n s , provide more a l t e r n a t i v e s , i n c r e a s e t h e i r c a p a c i t y to be r a t i o n a l , i n c r e a s e t h e i r awareness of how t h e i r a c t i o n s a f f e c t o t h e r s . I t i s suggested that e s t a b l i s h i n g a l e g a l r i g h t to education w i l l i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d that these p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s of education are f u l l y u t i l i z e d , and accorded due a t t e n t i o n and p r i o r i t y . A c cording to the c r i t e r i a of R. S. Peters (to be e l a b o r a t e d i n chapter f o u r ) , one does not c a l l a person educated unless s/he has shown some s o r t of development in these ways. The f u n c t i o n of education i s : ...to l i b e r a t e the mind, strengthen i t s c r i t i c a l powers, inform i t with knowledge and the c a p a c i t y f o r independent i n q u i r y , engage i t s human sympathies, and i l l u m i n a t e i t s moral and p r a c t i c a l c h o i c e s . . . ( S c h e f f l e r , 1973, p. 139) T h i s n o t i o n of education performs a more i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n the development of p r i s o n e r s ' i n t e l l e c t u a l and mental competencies. Such a n o t i o n of education i s seen as being i n t e g r a l to any 1 4 e f f o r t s and processes which aim to indeed educate and reform p r i s o n e r s . Thus, w i t h i n a p r i s o n context with i t s d i v e r s i t y of programs and g o a l s , i t ensures the genuine e d u c a t i o n a l worth and value of these programs. CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTER A p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n can serve many purposes. Chapter two w i l l show t h a t these purposes have s h i f t e d i n d i r e c t i o n and emphasis over time. Regardless of changes in p u b l i c pronouncements or l a b e l s , an important goal has always been the hope that p r i s o n e r s w i l l cease to commit crimes. Whether r e f e r r e d to as reform, r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , r e i n t e g r a t i o n , e t c . , education has o f t e n been c o n s i d e r e d among the more promising f a c i l i t i e s and s e r v i c e s f o r h e l p i n g p r i s o n e r s improve themselves i n some way, e i t h e r by becoming more C h r i s t i a n , more moral, more l i t e r a t e , more employable, but always with the u l t i m a t e hope th a t they abandon t h e i r c r i m i n a l l i f e s t y l e . Other methods can undoubtedly achieve such changes. I t i s ed u c a t i o n , however, that i s the focus of study. The case i s made f o r a l e g a l r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s to education i n order to ensure p r i o r i t y a t t e n t i o n to education, i n order that i t s b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s can be f u l l y f e l t . While p e n i t e n t i a r y education programs are a v a i l a b l e , there i s some m i s g i v i n g that the system i s perhaps not o p e r a t i n g as f u l l y and e f f i c i e n t l y as i t c o u l d . A p o s s i b l e reason c o u l d be that while a u t h o r i t i e s may recognize the p o t e n t i a l of educat i o n , because education i s not a p r i o r i t y , i t i s e a s i l y s h e l v ed and n e g l e c t e d . Because i t i s not a r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s , there i s no one to whom 15 anyone need answer to f o r t h i s lack of a t t e n t i o n . I t remains to the r e s t of the d i s s e r t a t i o n to f i n d the grounds to v a l i d a t e such a c l a i m . 16 I I . PENITENTIARY EDUCATION IN CANADA The tasks of the d i s s e r t a t i o n are to d i s c u s s the grounds f o r a moral r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s t o education, and the grounds f o r l e g i s l a t i n g t h i s r i g h t . While i t i s b e l i e v e d that the arguments used w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i n c a r c e r a t e d persons elsewhere, the Canadian p e n i t e n t i a r y education system i s the main backdrop to the d i s c u s s i o n . A focus of the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h i s system might, with the l e g i s l a t i o n of the r i g h t to education, perform or operate more e f f i c i e n t l y than at pr e s e n t . A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM In Canada, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o r r e c t i o n s i s shared by the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments. The C o n s t i t u t i o n Act  1867 ( E k s t e d t , 1984, p. 44) e s t a b l i s h e d p r o v i n c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over p r i s o n s and r e f o r m a t o r i e s , and f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over p e n i t e n t i a r i e s . The terms p r i s o n s , r e f o r m a t o r i e s , and p e n i t e n t i a r i e s are 'not d e f i n e d , ' and a c t u a l l y 'carry l i t t l e more inherent meaning' than 'places of secure custody' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper Two, 1986, p. 3). A d i f f e r e n c e , however, l i e s i n the d u r a t i o n of sentences. Offenders with more than two years sentence are i n c a r c e r a t e d w i t h i n f e d e r a l p e n i t e n t i a r i e s , and those with s h o r t e r sentences in p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The d i s s e r t a t i o n concerns a l l inmates. The j u d i c i a l s p l i t has to be kept i n mind when d e s c r i b i n g education programs when i t may be r e l e v a n t whether one i s r e f e r r i n g to e i t h e r the p r o v i n c i a l or f e d e r a l system. But the system i s not as c l e a r cut as i t i s made out to sound. We are informed that Canada's 1 7 c o r r e c t i o n a l system i s 'complex, h i g h l y d i v e r s e , d i s p e r s e d and segmented' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 4). Approximately 12,000 inmates are i n 60 f e d e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . A f u r t h e r 7,000 f e d e r a l o f f e n d e r s are on some form of c o n d i t i o n a l r e l e a s e . P r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 'house' approximately 20,000 inmates, with about 20% in custody on remand. At any time, there are approximately 77,000 s e r v i n g n o n - c u s t o d i a l d i s p o s i t i o n s ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review, Working Paper One, 1986, p. 5). F e d e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s can a l s o range from maximum s e c u r i t y i n s t i t u t i o n s with comparatively ' l i t t l e programming or inmate movement,' to farm and f o r e s t r y camps, and community c o r r e c t i o n a l c e n t r e s . P r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are even 'more d i v e r s e ' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 5). A BRIEF REVIEW OF PENITENTIARY EDUCATION PROGRAMS The Calendar of S t u d i e s (1982-83) of the Education and T r a i n i n g D i v i s i o n (CSC) s t a t e s the f o l l o w i n g programs a v a i l a b l e in medium and maximum s e c u r i t y p r i s o n s : B a s i c Adult E d ucation, Upgrading Courses, Secondary School Programs, V o c a t i o n a l Programs, Community C o l l e g e Courses and U n i v e r s i t y Courses. At the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , education i s s t a t e d as being p r o v i d e d ( M i n i s t r y of the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , 1980, p. 7) among other a c t i v i t i e s and programs. The a c t u a l a v a i l a b i l i t y of e ducation, however, seems to vary. The P r i n c e George Regional C o r r e c t i o n a l Centre has a school program which pro v i d e s academic upgrading (p. 15). In the Vancouver I s l a n d Regional C o r r e c t i o n a l Centre, there i s 'a d e f i n i t e need' to develop a 18 'wider range of programs in work, l i f e s k i l l s t r a i n i n g , e ducation' (p. 9). The Lakeside C o r r e c t i o n a l Centre f o r Women i s expanding programs, a p p a r e n t l y , to i n c l u d e academic and v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g (p. 12). More a c t i v i t i e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i v e use are seen to be needed in the Lower Mainland Regional C o r r e c t i o n a l Centre. Inmates on the whole are a l s o educable persons. In g e n e r a l , they are s a i d to be 'under-educated i n comparison with other Canadian a d u l t s , ' (Education and T r a i n i n g , CSC, 1985, p. 6), but there i s no evidence that d i s a b i l i t y i s a problem, or that inmates are incapable of l e a r n i n g (p. 7). Education - along with other a c t i v i t i e s - began to be p r o v i d e d i n p r i s o n s c o i n c i d i n g with more humane goals and conceptions of punishment. For example, as e a r l y as 1851, education was conceived of as a t o o l of reformation (OISE Review, 1978, p. 22). In B r i t i s h Columbia, more c u r r e n t l y , the p o l i c y i s a p p a r e n t l y to be as 'humane as p o s s i b l e , ' with the p r o v i s i o n of programs and a c t i v i t i e s i n work, r e c r e a t i o n , education, l i f e s k i l l s , and s p i r i t u a l development ( M i n i s t r y of the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , 1980, p. 7). S e c t i o n 2.10 of the P e n i t e n t i a r y S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s s t i p u l a t e s t h a t 'programs of academic and v o c a t i o n a l education' s h a l l be designed as f a r as p o s s i b l e : ...to prepare inmates, upon d i s c h a r g e , to assume t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as c i t i z e n s and to conform to the requirements of the law... 1 9 (Education and T r a i n i n g , CSC, 1980, p. 2) The P e n i t e n t i a r y Act has a l s o s t a t e d that e d u c a t i o n a l programs w i l l be p r o v i d e d among others 'to p r o t e c t the p u b l i c and a s s i s t i n d i v i d u a l o f f e n d e r s by r e t u r n i n g them to s o c i e t y b e t t e r equipped to l e a d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t a b l e l i v e s ' (Education and T r a i n i n g , CSC, 1985). The Commissioner's D i r e c t i v e on the  Education of Offenders (CSC, 1987) a l s o s t a t e s that o f f e n d e r s should be encouraged to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p r o v i n c i a l l y a c c r e d i t e d programs which w i l l h e l p improve t h e i r knowledge and s k i l l s . The F i r s t Report of the Task Force on the M i s s i o n and  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Development of the C o r r e c t i o n s S e r v i c e of Canada a l s o promises programs to h e l p o f f e n d e r s 'serve t h e i r time p r o d u c t i v e l y ' and which are 'most l i k e l y to a s s i s t them to become law-abiding' (Task Force, 1984, p. 21). The concern of the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s with the adequacy and q u a l i t y of programs pro v i d e d . The next s e c t i o n i s an attempt to look i n t o t h i s matter. A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF PENITENTIARY EDUCATION An o b s t a c l e to o b t a i n i n g a concrete and c o h e s i v e p i c t u r e of the system as a whole i s that c r i t i q u e s encountered sometimes apply to only the f e d e r a l system, and sometimes only apply to p a r t i c u l a r programs w i t h i n the f e d e r a l system. There thus seems to be a l a c k of any comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n of a l l p r i s o n education programs. The most recent seems to be the OISE Review (1978). Hudson t e l l s us t hat between 1945 and 1967 only e i g h t s t u d i e s d e a l t with education and t r a i n i n g i n p r i s o n s (1981, 20 p. 163). According to Ekstedt (1984, p. 185) as w e l l , 'Few e v a l u a t i o n s have been conducted on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p e n i t e n t i a r y education programs i n Canadian i n s t i t u t i o n s ' (1984, p. 185). There are c e r t a i n f a c t o r s , s i t u a t i o n s , and i s s u e s e v i d e n t , however, which i n d i c a t e c e r t a i n problem areas. The main statement made by the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s , a f t e r a l l , that education ought to be made a v a i l a b l e to a l l p r i s o n e r s i n Canada, so i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t that only some persons can re p o r t s a t i s f a c t o r y e d u c a t i o n a l experiences. D i f f e r e n c e s : F e d e r a l and P r o v i n c i a l One of the s i t u a t i o n s seen as e x i s t i n g , and r e v e a l i n g cause for concern are the d i f f e r e n c e s between education i n f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n s , and the d i f f e r e n c e s i n education f o r men and women. C e r t a i n ' d i f f e r e n c e s ' are i n e v i t a b l e , such as those that must a r i s e as a r e s u l t of d i f f e r e n c e s i n d u r a t i o n of sentence. In the d i s s e r t a t i o n , the argument i s not that a l l p r i s o n e r s r e c e i v e the same programs. I t i s that whatever education i s being p r o v i d e d should be adequate, worthwhile, and de s e r v i n g of the term 'education.' It should not be mere p e r f u n c t o r y p r o v i s i o n , which i s l i k e l y to occur i n a short-term p r i s o n . Although inmates in these p l a c e s may only be 'passing through,' programs, can s t i l l be p o s i t i v e and c o n c r e t e . Good programs might a l s o motivate p r i s o n e r s to seek other worthwhile e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s once they leave p r i s o n . More e d u c a t i o n a l resources and f a c i l i t i e s have j u s t been seen to be r e q u i r e d i n c e r t a i n p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n s . No 21 s u b s t a n t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n e d u c a t i o n programs are a v a i l a b l e beyond d i s g r u n t l e d comments and o p i n i o n s c o l l e c t e d at random. For example, c e r t a i n p r o v i n c i a l educators have expressed unhappiness at the la c k of adequate resources and m a t e r i a l s . One teacher r e l a t e s having to f i g h t the B r i t i s h Columbia Teachers F e d e r a t i o n f o r m a t e r i a l s other p r i s o n e r s , as w e l l as non-prisoners were o b t a i n i n g ( C o r r e c t i o n s Education A s s o c i a t i o n Conference, Feb. 1987). Any l a c k of emphasis on education w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l system i s j u s t l y a t t r i b u t e d to the s h o r t e r sentence. A higher turnover of p o p u l a t i o n i s an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the a l l o c a t i o n of resou r c e s . Inmates might not be around long enough to reap the f u l l b e n e f i t s of programs. The c a l l f o r the r i g h t to education, however, i s made for a l l inmates. As Chapter three w i l l show, i t i s p o s s i b l e that one may never need to a s s e r t one's r i g h t s - - u n l e s s threatened, or when r e q u i r i n g the servi c e s / g o o d s granted by the r i g h t . However, i f indeed the standards of education i n p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are lower, the r i g h t to education w i l l enable a l l inmates to demand equal standards of education as elsewhere. D i f f e r e n c e s : Men and Women For reasons of a smal l e r p o p u l a t i o n , and a supposedly s h o r t e r sentence, education f o r women p r i s o n e r s i s s a i d to be poor. The Calendar of S t u d i e s of the Education and T r a i n i n g D i v i s i o n of the CSC (1982-83) c i t e s f o l l o w i n g courses as a v a i l a b l e at the f e d e r a l P r i s o n f o r Women: Basic Adult Education, Pre-secondary Language and Mathematics, Secondary 22 A r t , B i o l o g y , Chemistry; Data P r o c e s s i n g , Family S t u d i e s , O f f i c e Procedures, P h y s i c s , General Science, Typing, I n d u s t r i a l Sewing, Uph o l s t e r y , Woodworking. An e v a l u a t i o n of the programs, however, by the 1979 OISE Report to the S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l , does not seem so encouraging: ...When v i s i t i n g the P r i s o n f o r Women, one may be t o l d that there i s a f u l l range of day and evening programs and a c t i v i t i e s , . . . one may even assume that there i s a f a i r amount of inmate involvement . . . . However, a f t e r spending some time with inmates and s t a f f , one i s sh a r p l y aware "of the grave d i s c r e p a n c y  between s t a t e d p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s . . . (Sandeman, 1981, p. 389) While t h i n g s may have improved s i n c e the w r i t i n g of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r e p o r t , some doubts can n e v e r t h e l e s s s t i l l be r a i s e d about women's education i n p r i s o n s - - e s p e c i a l l y at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . A p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n educator has s t a t e d that women have to give up t h e i r s o - c a l l e d r i g h t of access t o educa t i o n i f they d i d not want to be t r a n s f e r r e d away from 'home' ( C o r r e c t i o n s Education A s s o c i a t i o n Conference, Feb. 1987). The Canadian Human Rights Commission (1981) found that 'women are v i c t i m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n the f e d e r a l p e n i t e n t i a r y system' as w e l l ( E k s t e d t , 1984, p. 325). At the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , the M i n i s t r y of the Att o r n e y - G e n e r a l ' s study on In c a r c e r a t e d Women i n B r i t i s h Columbia P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s 23 (1978), and the Report of the B r i t i s h Columbia Royal Commission  on the I n c a r c e r a t i o n of Female Offenders (1978), both found i n e q u a l i t i e s between programs f o r men and women p r i s o n e r s (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 324). The 'problem of female o f f e n d e r s ' has indeed 'reached c r i t i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s ' (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 322). Two p a r t i c u l a r problems are ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l programming' and 'lack of a v a i l a b l e r e s e a r c h ' (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 322). The p o p u l a t i o n of women p r i s o n e r s may be much smaller than men. Cost e f f e c t i v e n e s s might j u s t i f y the p r o v i s i o n of a narrower range of programs. However: ...Natural j u s t i c e and human r i g h t s demand un r e m i t t i n g e f f o r t s to b r i n g e q u a l i t y of treatment for female p r i s o n e r s , however d i f f i c u l t t h i s may appear... (Sandeman, 1981, p. 388) A statement has been made that 'the news i s bad on the whole p e n i t e n t i a r y education f r o n t ' ( J u b i n v i l l e , 1983, p. 2). The D i r e c t o r of Education and T r a i n i n g d e c l a r e d that the ' p r i o r i t y given to education i s i n s u f f i c i e n t ' (OISE Review, 1978, p. 68). A study done by the Canadian A s s o c i a t i o n of Adult Education (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 187) r e p o r t s ' i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to education v a l u e s , ' and 'education f o r r e s p o n s i b l e decision-making.' Cosman's o p i n i o n i s that p e n i t e n t i a r y education i s mainly provided 'as p r e p a r a t i o n for employment' (1981, p. 38), or as a ' t i m e - f i l l i n g ' a c t i v i t y . to r e l i e v e boredom.' 24 . . . P e n i t e n t i a r y education i n Canada has been c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a general l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n genuine e d u c a t i o n a l achievement, by inadequate standards of teacher s e l e c t i o n and t r a i n i n g , . by a l a c k of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n matters of c u r r i c u l u m , a l a c k of d i s c i p l i n e and s t r u c t u r e . . . (1981, p. 40) He t h i n k s that even the academic education provided i s ' l a r g e l y a matter of ' s k i l l - t r a i n i n g . ' C e r t a i n problems have been seen to beset the system. Ekstedt r e p o r t s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y q u a l i f i e d teachers and ' d e f i c i e n t c u r r i c u l a ' (1984, p. 184). T h i s has a l s o been repo r t e d by the OISE Review (1978, p. 75) and the Canadian A s s o c i a t i o n of Adult Education (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 187). P h y s i c a l f a c i l i t i e s are s a i d to be inadequate i n most i n s t i t u t i o n s ( Ekstedt, 1984, p. 184). The B e l l Report (Hudson, 1981, p. 160) found 'inadequate space, s t a f f and m a t e r i a l s ' a cause for concern. Many of these i s s u e s have been i d e n t i f i e d as ' r e q u i r i n g a t t e n t i o n i n the e a r l y 1800's' (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 58) d e s p i t e numerous reforms attempted through the y e a r s . Problems s t i l l i n e x i s t e n c e are 'the need f o r meaningful work and v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g and education programs' (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 59). D i v e r s i t y and Complexity Another s i t u a t i o n i n d i c a t i v e of the need f o r a r i g h t to education to s t a b i l i z e a f f a i r s i s the d i v e r s i t y and complexity 25 of the system i t s e l f (as mentioned e a r l i e r ) . For example, we are informed of the 'gross i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , l a c k of standards and a r b i t r a r i n e s s ' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 5) . The la c k of coherence w i t h i n the system i t s e l f might thus be a p o s s i b l e f a c t o r in i n f l u e n c i n g the way programs such as education are viewed and c a r r i e d out. With s p e c i f i c regard to education, Dennison sees an enormous ' v a r i e t y and q u a l i t y ' i n education programs ac r o s s the count r y : . . . I t i s f a i r to say that there are a number of e x c e p t i o n a l programs i n v o c a t i o n a l , academic and c u l t u r a l areas which are a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the system, but they are s p a r s e l y l o c a t e d . In some i n s t i t u t i o n s no e d u c a t i o n a l programs are o f f e r e d . . . (1979, p. 2) The vastness of the region and the j u d i c i a l s p l i t between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p r i s o n s might e x p l a i n why c o - o r d i n a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n are hard to a c h i e v e . Some d i f f e r e n c e s w i l l be i n e v i t a b l e . But i t i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h between these and those d i f f e r e n c e s which can be avoided, the continued e x i s t e n c e of which i s u n f a i r to p r i s o n e r s as persons. For example, i f c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , such as to a good education of worth and value are p r o v i d e d i n some p e n i t e n t i a r i e s , they must be p r o v i d e d a l l p r i s o n e r s , u n l e s s there i s good reason not to do so. 26 C o n f 1 i c t s Another s i t u a t i o n which might have some i n f l u e n c e upon the implementation of education programs i s the p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t between the purported goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . In 1969, the Ouimet Committee Report c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to the c o n f l i c t of aims i n d e a l i n g with o f f e n d e r s as a major problem f o r c o r r e c t i o n s ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper Two, 1986, p. 10). There are a l s o a p p a r e n t l y c o n f l i c t s between the r e h a b i l i t a t i v e goals of p r i s o n and with 'the other concerns f o r s e c u r i t y and c o n t r o l ' ( E k s t e d t , 1984, p. 185). C o r r e c t i o n a l o f f i c e r s are u s u a l l y l o o k i n g a f t e r the custody and c o n t r o l of the inmates while treatment s t a f f are i n v o l v e d i n h e l p i n g inmates develop ' s e l f -i n i t i a t i v e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' (Ekstedt, 1984, p. 222). Accord i n g to Hudson: . . . C o n f l i c t between concerns f o r s e c u r i t y , custody and i n s t i t u t i o n a l maintenance o i n e v i t a b l y o v e r r i d e concerns about the q u a l i t y of the e d u c a t i o n a l programs p r o v i d e d . . . (1981, p. 166) M i l l e r a l s o t h i n k s that education w i l l always have to 'compete with other c o r r e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ' (1978, p. 235). Another attendant and r e l a t e d problem might be the changes and l a c k of p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n among these goals themselves: ...Over the years a number of goals f o r 27 c o r r e c t i o n s have seen the l i g h t of day, r e f l e c t i n g d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view on what the b a s i c philosophy of c o r r e c t i o n s should be... (Task Force, 1984, p. 10) T h i s Report i s of the o p i n i o n that a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p o l i c y statements and goals i s that they are seldom ' i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the programs or i n pl a n n i n g processes' (p. 10), being more u s u a l l y found i n textbooks and committee r e p o r t s r a t h e r than i n l e g i s l a t i o n or bindin g d i r e c t i v e s . The Sawatsky Report i s o l a t e s 'the lack of a c l e a r program s t r a t e g y ' (1985, p. 12) and ' i n s t a b i l i t y w i t h i n programs' as i s s u e s that need t a c k l i n g . Apparently many v a r i e d responses were obtained to the q u e s t i o n whether the CSC had a c l e a r progam s t r a t e g y (p. 12). A group of persons f e l t that there were 'too many c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n program approaches' to enable anyone to conclude whether or not there was a 'coherent and c o n s i s t e n t program s t r a t e g y ' (p. 12). A s i m i l a r s t o r y i s t o l d by the CSC: ...Each program i n i t s own way i s a monument to some problem of the past, o f t e n designed on an ad-hoc b a s i s and t a r g e t t e d to a s i n g l e problem without much r e f e r e n c e to other programs that may address s i m i l a r problems... (1985, p. 3) Accord i n g to the Sawatsky Report, the 'continuous program change' which has o c c u r r e d over the l a s t twenty f i v e years has 28 been d e t r i m e n t a l to implementation of programs (1985, p. 13). For example, impact of changes can take months or years to be f e l t . But j u s t when 'an e q u i l i b r i u m has been reached,' 'programs are changed again.' Another negative r e s u l t of the constant changeover i n p o l i c y and programming i s that no br e a t h i n g space i s allowed f o r thorough assessment of program e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Another drawback i s that c o r r e c t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s can seldom become the ' d r i v i n g f o r c e ' of the S e r v i c e s (Task Force, 1984, p. 10). A good i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s problem might be the s h i f t of i n t e r e s t away from reform and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n as goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . R e f o r m - - e s p e c i a l l y in terms of s p i r i t u a l development used to be an e a r l y ' c e n t r a l purpose' of p r i s o n s (Cosman, 1985, p. 3). Today the word i s h a r d l y mentioned. R e h a b i l i t a t i o n was o f f i c i a l l y r e a f f i r m e d with the recommendations of the Fauteux Committee (Ekstedt, 1984, p..183), but f e l l i n t o d i s f a v o u r i n the 1970's ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 20). T h i s a t t i t u d e c u r r e n t l y p r e v a i l s among some c i r c l e s . Today, the 'Oppor t u n i t i e s Model' i s dominant. I t pr o v i d e s o f f e n d e r s with o p p o r t u n i t i e s to 'improve t h e i r e d u c a t i o n a l , v o c a t i o n a l and s o c i a l s k i l l s . ' I t moves away from the r e h a b i l i t a t i v e i d e a l of tr a n s f o r m i n g p r i s o n e r s t o p r o v i d i n g them with an environment conducive to t h e i r l e a r n i n g how to be r e s p o n s i b l e ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 11). On the t o p i c of change, h i n t s that the O p p o r t u n i t i e s Model c o u l d be modified are a l r e a d y present (Task Force, 1984, 29 p. 11). I t i s f e l t that more a c t i v e m o t i v a t i o n and encouragement should be given p r i s o n e r s to p a r t i c i p a t e in programs. Another c u r r e n t emphasis i s on the t e a c h i n g of l i t e r a c y s k i l l s . T h i s i s part of the idea of equipping p r i s o n e r s to l i v e more r e s p o n s i b l y and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t l y . The Education and T r a i n i n g D i v i s i o n of the CSC (1985, p. 2) recommends the 'highest p r i o r i t y ' be p l a c e d upon f u n c t i o n a l l i t e r a c y , while the Sawatsky Report (1985, p. 34) c a l l s f o r i n c r e a s e d funding f o r l i t e r a c y , recommending that i t be compulsory. CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTER Although no a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e can be drawn of p e n i t e n t i a r y education, c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s do e x i s t which may i n f l u e n c e education programs. For example, the s h i f t i n g p o l i c i e s of c o r r e c t i o n s can cause a lack of purpose and d i r e c t i o n w i t h i n education programs. The l a c k of c o - o r d i n a t i o n and c o n f l i c t between the v a r i o u s g o a l s might a l s o a f f e c t implementation of programs such as e d u c a t i o n . D i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t e s p e c i a l l y in standards of implementation and q u a l i t y of programs p r o v i d e d . P e n i t e n t i a r y e d u c a t i o n cannot be f a i r l y l a b e l l e d , then, as being i n t o t a l d i s a r r a y , but i t i s not t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , e i t h e r . Some of the problems seen as e x i s t i n g might be due to the f a c t t h a t education i s not c o n s i d e r e d a p r i o r i t y , to be attended to only a f t e r other matters have been s e t t l e d . Thus the very p r o v i s i o n of education as w e l l as the a t t e n t i o n p a i d i t w i l l always depend on what what the other concerns of i n c a r c e r a t i o n are. But a t t e n t i o n must be p a i d e d u c a t i o n , f o r 30 while education may not represent a goal of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s i s an i n t e r e s t of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . I t f a c i l i t a t e s some of the f u n c t i o n s and goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , indeed, the l o g i c a l purpose of education i s viewed as to ' r e f l e c t the purpose of the c u s t o d i a l regime as a whole' (Baxendale, 1980, p. 84). I t s prominence in p r i s o n s must t h e r e f o r e be upheld. Thus, p r i s o n e r s being a b l e to c l a i m l e g a l r i g h t s to education would ensure that education w i l l not be shelved i n attempts to c a r r y out other g o a l s . I t would guarantee education a p l a c e d e s p i t e the changes made in p r i o r i t i e s of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . It would ensure that those purposes which education serves, f o r example, those goals d i r e c t e d at the p e r s o n a l development of o f f e n d e r s , are always kept i n view. In s h o r t , a l e g a l r i g h t to education helps s t a b i l i z e e ducation programs w i t h i n the system. They w i l l not be i n danger of being t r u n c a t e d , or lessened i n importance, no matter what other goals or p o l i c i e s might be. S e c u r i t y of s o c i e t y and custody of the o f f e n d e r are prime f o c i of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . T h i s i s understandable. They should not be allowed, however, to dominate, or push a s i d e the other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y those h e l p i n g the o f f e n d e r 're-enter s o c i e t y . ' Indeed, the two goals might be i n t e r t w i n e d , f o r s o c i e t y i s a l s o p r o t e c t e d through the r e i n t e g r a t i o n of o f f e n d e r s i n t o the community as law-abiding c i t i z e n s . Education can thus f a c i l i t a t e both g o a l s — t h r o u g h s t r e n g t h e n i n g p r i s o n e r s ' o p p o r t u n i t i e s to r e s i s t crime, i t p r o t e c t s s o c i e t y by r e l e a s i n g persons who have l e a r n e d to do other t h i n g s with t h e i r l i v e s . 31 There are perhaps times when the s e c u r i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n i s at stake, when other goals must be l a i d a s i d e . Apart from t h i s , there i s a c t u a l l y no reason why harmony should not be p o s s i b l e between g o a l s . Our review has i n d i c a t e d the p r o p e n s i t y of s e c u r i t y goals to overshadow o t h e r s . There should be a way, then, of e n s u r i n g that other goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n r e t a i n t h e i r importance. Education has been suggested as a way of a c h i e v i n g these other g o a l s , mainly by augmenting a p r i s o n e r ' s r e s i s t a n c e to crime. Education i s thus a c e n t r a l component of that goal of h e l p i n g p r i s o n e r s r e t u r n to s o c i e t y as more law-abiding c i t i z e n s . I t has been mentioned how such a goal has undergone changes i n terminology. I t has a l s o been mentioned, however, that no matter the term, education remains as one of the keys to a b e n e f i c i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 32 I I I . BACKGROUND REVIEW OF RIGHTS The d i s s e r t a t i o n aims to assess the case f o r a l e g a l r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n f o r p r i s o n e r s . T h i s r i g h t can be b e t t e r understood a g a i n s t a background of i s s u e s and problems a s s o c i a t e d with r i g h t s i n g e n e r a l . T h i s chapter t h e r e f o r e aims t o : a) F i n d out the meaning of a r i g h t . b) I l l u m i n a t e the issues/problems that must be con f r o n t e d in order to understand the s p e c i f i c r i g h t to educa t i o n i t s e l f . R i g h t s can be claimed i n many circumstances. My concern i s with the use of ' r i g h t ' as i t occurs i n 'X has the r i g h t to Y.' I w i l l address three q u e s t i o n s . I. What i s expected by whom and of whom when such c l a i m s are made? T h i s i s d i s c u s s e d i n the s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d , " The Nature and Meaning of R i g h t s . " I I . What d i f f e r e n t kinds of r i g h t s are t h e r e ? — t h a t i s , the l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t kinds of r i g h t s which may be claimed. T h i s i s examined i n the s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d , " C a t e g o r i z a t i o n of Ri g h t s . " I I I . What reasons or grounds can be given f o r such a claim? Because r i g h t s p l a c e s e r i o u s burdens upon people, one does not c l a i m r i g h t s without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i s the t h i r d s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d , " J u s t i f i c a t i o n of R i g h t s . " I. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF RIGHTS These can be e x p l a i n e d from two p o i n t s of view: A. That of the r i g h t - h o l d e r B. That of other persons who i n t e r a c t with the r i g h t - h o l d e r 33 A. RIGHTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE RIGHT-HOLDER 1. R i g h t s and Freedom Freedom has o f t e n been suggested as one of the main t h i n g s r i g h t s p r o v i d e us with. Having a r i g h t sometimes a l l o w s persons to do t h i n g s and sometimes allows them to r e c e i v e c e r t a i n t h i n g s . In the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n on " C a t e g o r i z a t i o n , " I w i l l r e f e r to the former ( r i g h t s to do) as Act ion r i g h t s , and the l a t t e r ( r i g h t s to r e c e i v e ) as R e c i p i e n t r i g h t s . With respect to A c t i o n r i g h t s (that i s , r i g h t s to do X), i t might be suggested that persons were ' f r e e ' to do whatever i t i s t h e i r r i g h t p ermits, without r e s t r i c t i o n . I f we say A has the r i g h t to do X, we mean A must be f r e e to do X, that i s , A cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y be coerced i n t o c a r r y i n g X out. Freedom, then, seems u s e f u l in understanding the notion of a c t i o n r i g h t s . I t i s not, however, a p p r o p r i a t e f o r d e s c r i b i n g Rec i p i e n t r i g h t s . I t i s more a p p r o p r i a t e to say of these that possessors of such r i g h t s have e x p e c t a t i o n s — w h i c h are l e g i t i m i z e d by p o s s e s s i o n of the r i g h t . For example, i f one has a r i g h t to unemployment insura n c e , one has grounds f o r expecting to r e c e i v e t h i s allowance. At the same time, others must expect to p rovide i t because of the r i g h t of persons to r e c e i v e i t . Freedom i s , however, c e n t r a l to understanding what a c t i o n r i g h t s a r e , although the two concepts remain d i f f e r e n t from each other. L i n k i n g r i g h t s to freedom a l s o causes problems. I t i s p o s s i b l e to q u e s t i o n , f o r example, whether or not i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to h o l d that one has a r i g h t when one might not c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y be f r e e to e x e r c i s e i t . T h i s d i s p u t e i s 34 sometimes expressed as a r i s i n g from the d i f f e r e n c e between Formal and A c t u a l r i g h t s . I t i s asked, i f one l e g a l l y or mor a l l y has a r i g h t , but i s unable to e x e r c i s e i t , then i s i t not meaningless to say one has the r i g h t ? Some w r i t e r s , such as Bentham would l i k e to make t h i s the r u l e ( i n Cranston, 1967, p. 44). I am persuaded to the c o n t r a r y . The f a c t that we sometimes are not a c t u a l l y f r e e to act on our r i g h t does not mean that freedom cannot be a part of what one u s u a l l y or normally expects from a r i g h t . The argument that r i g h t s must be a c t u a l to be ' r e a l ' r i g h t s has proved p a r t i c u l a r l y troublesome i n d i s c u s s i o n s about r i g h t s to e ducation. Because f u l f i l m e n t of such r i g h t s i s u s u a l l y dependent upon the p r o v i s i o n by others of resources and f a c i l i t i e s , i t has sometimes been thought that there can be no such r i g h t . T h i s dependency upon other persons suggests a r e s t r i c t i o n upon one's freedom. And because r i g h t s can e x i s t only where the r i g h t - h o l d e r a c q u i r e s c e r t a i n freedoms, i t i s thought that there cannot be a r i g h t to edu c a t i o n . T h i s way of t h i n k i n g f a i l s to recognize that a r i g h t to education can imply both n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e and p r o v i s i o n . Rights can be seen to possess t h i s dual nature, that i s , they can be both an a c t i o n and a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . A r i g h t to education, at l e a s t in some i n s t a n c e s , can i n v o l v e both freedom to study and unhindered access to advi c e and r e s o u r c e s . Thus i f resources are u n a v a i l a b l e , or persons u n w i l l i n g to provide a c t i v e support, r i g h t - h o l d e r s can s t i l l c l a i m the freedom to do what they can to educate themselves. Within p r i s o n s , assuming that a u t h o r i t i e s 35 do not wish to supply programs to p r i s o n e r s , they cannot impede p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to seek education from persons who might be w i l l i n g to h e l p them, f o r example, through correspondence c o u r s e s , or the r e c e i v i n g of l i t e r a t u r e through the m a i l . Compulsory education i s another i s s u e . The compulsory attendance of persons at schools does seem to c o n t r a d i c t the n o t i o n of a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . I t seems odd to s t a t e that one was being coerced i n t o doing something that one was supposedly f r e e to do, and f r e e to choose to do. One response might be that compulsory education i s u s u a l l y found at primary l e v e l s of educ a t i o n , that i s , education f o r the young. For these, t h e i r freedom to other r i g h t s i s i t s e l f l i m i t e d . The young supposedly l a c k experience and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and cannot enjoy c e r t a i n r i g h t s such as the obvious r i g h t to freedom. T h i s p a t e r n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e i s e q u i v a l e n t to s t a t i n g that c h i l d r e n then do not have a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . An i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s might be that only a d u l t s do. Such a c l a i m i s too g e n e r a l . A b e t t e r response i s thus as f o l l o w s . The next s e c t i o n w i l l show that a c o r o l l a r y of r i g h t s i s that of d u t i e s . Having a r i g h t p l a c e s a duty upon someone e l s e to respect our r i g h t . Sometimes, the duty we have toward others means they have a r i g h t to c l a i m the performance of t h i s duty. But i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e that we can have a duty to do something which o b s t r u c t s our r i g h t , as with a duty which represents a more s u p e r i o r and c o m p e l l i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In such an i n s t a n c e , the e x e r c i s e of our r i g h t must take a secondary p o s i t i o n . Moral d u t i e s are o f t e n of t h i s nature. But r i g h t s and d u t i e s , although 36 i n t e r r e l a t e d , are separate e n t i t i e s , and thus they can c o - e x i s t , such as i n the instance of a duty to be educated e x i s t i n g at the same time as having a r i g h t to be educated. If the duty to be educated i s c o n s i d e r e d as a more important f a c t o r i n i n f l u e n c i n g one's d e c i s i o n s , then t h i s duty must p r e v a i l over the r i g h t . In the case of the very young, or anyone who so needs to be educated, i t can be s a i d that they owe i t to s o c i e t y to educate themselves in order that they can be independent of s o c i e t y and c o n t r i b u t e to i t s progress as r e s p o n s i b l e c i t i z e n s / p e r s o n s . Young c h i l d r e n may be regarded as not ready yet to c l a i m the f u l l freedom of t h e i r r i g h t to education, because they f i r s t have to honour t h e i r duty to be educated. As the chapter w i l l show soon, not e x e r c i s i n g our r i g h t s does not mean we no longer have them. Freedom s t i l l remains an i n t e g r a l component of r i g h t s , d e s p i t e the f a c t that there might be r e s t r i c t i o n s upon t h i s freedom, or the presence of more compelling p r i o r i t i e s . Where p r i s o n e r s are concerned, f o r example, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n education programs should remain t h e i r c h o i c e . The 1977 Report of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, f o r example, r e i t e r a t e d the view that education was e q u i v a l e n t to work, and inmates should be a b l e to choose between the two (Dennison, 1979, p. 1). P r i s o n e r s are persons who have the a b i l i t y to reason, and make d e c i s i o n s and c h o i c e s . P r o v i d i n g them with the freedom to choose to p a r t i c i p a t e i n education programs i s only to respect them as persons. A s s o c i a t i n g r i g h t s , a c t i o n r i g h t s at l e a s t , with a concept 37 l i k e freedom does c r e a t e some problems. Yet i t seems unavoidable. To s t a t e that X has an a c t i v e r i g h t without i m p l y i n g , at l e a s t i d e a l l y , that X has some freedom to enjoy t h i s r i g h t , appears meaningless. Flathman (1976) puts i t a p t l y : ...A has a r i g h t t o do X and t h e r e f o r e he i s , i n some sense of f r e e , f r e e to do~X... (p. 145) Acc o r d i n g to Hart (1979) and Wellman (1980), i t would be d i f f i c u l t to understand the concept of r i g h t out of the context of freedom. Hart (1979, p. 17) sees an e s s e n t i a l connection between r i g h t s and a ' c e r t a i n d i s t r i b u t i o n of human freedom.' I would, t h e r e f o r e , l i k e to suggest as primary f e a t u r e s of r i g h t s , t h a t they imply e i t h e r the freedom to do, or the e x p e c t a t i o n to r e c e i v e , or both. As i n d i c a t e d i n chapter one, a r i g h t to education would p r o v i d e c e r t a i n advantages to p r i s o n e r s , as compared with t h e i r being granted education only as a s e r v i c e or p r i v i l e g e . One of these advantages i s that p r i s o n e r s would at l e a s t be able to demand n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to o b t a i n an education. T h i s i s an important f e a t u r e because i t must be remembered that the freedom of p r i s o n e r s w i l l a l r e a d y be c u r t a i l e d i n other ways, as a r e s u l t of t h e i r i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 2. Rights and Choice I f the r i g h t h o l d e r i s free to e x e r c i s e a r i g h t , then the r i g h t - h o l d e r has a c h o i c e r e g a r d i n g the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t . 38 T h i s l a r g e element of i n d i v i d u a l d i s c r e t i o n i s 'perhaps the s i n g l e most d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e of the concept' (Flathman, 1976, p. 71). I t i s odd to s t a t e that one has ' a r i g h t to do something that one cannot choose not to do' (Flathman, 1976, p. 76). Flathman a l s o s t a t e s that choice must be present in the d e c i s i o n , on the p a r t of those who have to honour the r i g h t , to d i s c h a r g e o b l i g a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e that persons, i f d i s s a t i s f i e d with the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the i m p o s i t i o n of the o b l i g a t i o n s , can r e f u s e to d i s c h a r g e them. T h i s f o r him i s the d i f f e r e n c e between being o b l i g a t e d , and being compelled. When one i s compelled to do something, one has to do i t even i f there i s no v a l i d j u s t i f i c a t i o n g i v e n . But when d i s c h a r g i n g o b l i g a t i o n s , one i s a b l e to choose not to do so, i f one f i n d s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n inadequate. And with r i g h t s , one must be o b l i g a t e d , and not compelled. My d i f f i c u l t y i s imagining persons who do resent p r i s o n e r s as r i g h t - h o l d e r s , but who n e v e r t h e l e s s d i s c h a r g e o b l i g a t i o n s because they 'respect' the r i g h t and these o b l i g a t i o n s . One would thi n k they do so because the law compels them t o . But perhaps what Flathman i s emphasizing i s that one has the c h o i c e of r e f u s i n g to d i s c h a r g e o b l i g a t i o n s . D e s p i t e the f a c t that they are o b l i g a t i o n s , one can s t i l l choose to f i n d them unwarranted. Such a c h o i c e , however, does expose one to c r i t i c i s m and s a n c t i o n s i f one i s unable to e x p l a i n one's d e c i s i o n (p. 77). Thus, f o r persons who have to f a c i l i t a t e the r i g h t to 39 education f o r p r i s o n e r s , i d e a l l y , they do so out of re s p e c t f o r the r i g h t , a c c e p t i n g the o b l i g a t i o n as a r i s i n g from the r i g h t . If prepared to face the consequences, however, a c c o r d i n g to Flathman, they need not do so. 3. Rights and Consequences Rights a l s o engender consequences - f o r the r i g h t h o l d e r -and those around him. These consequences are u s u a l l y i n the form of advantages f o r r i g h t h o l d e r s , and disadvantages f o r some others who might have to respect the r i g h t by g i v i n g up something to the r i g h t - h o l d e r . We would have no need f o r r i g h t s , say, alone on a desert i s l a n d . Thus we are not j u s t c l a i m i n g r i g h t s so much as that others should acknowledge these r i g h t s : . . . I f no one e l s e i s a f f e c t e d by X, there i s no need f o r a warrant f o r doing i t and to c l a i m a r i g h t would be an empty g e s t u r e . . . (Flathman, 1976, p. 80) With education, one claims not only the a c t i v e r i g h t to engage in education, but more, one cl a i m s that c e r t a i n o t h e r s should co-operate with r i g h t h o l d e r s by p r o v i d i n g the resources necessary--that i s , as a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . The consequences of r i g h t s , e s p e c i a l l y in terms of consequences f o r others, can be s t a t e d as being o b l i g a t o r y . I t has been s a i d that r i g h t s 'generate c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s on the p a r t of oth e r s ' (Montagu, 1980, p. 372). The nature of 40 these o b l i g a t i o n s - sometimes termed d u t i e s or c o r o l l a r i e s - are e s s e n t i a l to the meaning and study of r i g h t s . They w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n a separate s e c t i o n . Chapters one and two have suggested that p r i s o n e r s — l i k e the c i t i z e n s of F einberg's (1979) No w h e r e s v i l i e , are h a r d l y i n a p o s i t i o n to "bargain" f o r anything, l e t alone to impose o b l i g a t i o n s on others to do t h i n g s f o r them. This may e x p l a i n the u n c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n of p e n i t e n t i a r y education. Because there i s no r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n , there are no grounds f o r p r i s o n e r s to make i t o b l i g a t o r y upon.others to improve t h e i r e d u c a t i o n . 4. Rights and P r o t e c t i o n Rights a l s o p r o t e c t us from i n t e r f e r e n c e , or t h r e a t . While t h i s may never occur, the p o i n t i s that when threatened, we can use the f a c t of our r i g h t s to p r o t e c t us from unwarranted i n t e r f e r e n c e . Consider p r i s o n e r s as an example. They have been found g u i l t y and are i n c a r c e r a t e d . They o f f e r , i n f a c t , paradigms of the p o i n t of r i g h t s . Because t h e i r circumstances leave them open to unwarranted i n t e r f e r e n c e by o t h e r s , they may p a r t i c u l a r l y r e q u i r e the p r o t e c t i o n of a r i g h t from such i n t e r f e r e n c e . The ' r a i s o n d ' e t r e ' of r i g h t s , as Flathman suggests, i s the ' p r o t e c t i o n of unpopular forms of a c t i o n ' (1976, p. 96). I t i s suggested, then, t h a t r i g h t s provide us with a sphere of p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e encroachment. 5. Rights and S o c i e t y Rights are a l s o a ' s o c i a l phenomenon' (Flathman, 1976, p. 65). They are ' p e o p l e - o r i e n t e d ' (Flathman, 1976, p. 80). 41 They must be p a r t of a s o c i e t y which acknowledges such a p r a c t i c e , and binds i t by r u l e s which determine the nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n . For r i g h t s can only be e f f e c t i v e i f they are accorded respect w i t h i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . P r i s o n e r s have broken the law. The f a c t t h at they are s t i l l human beings and persons has been s t r e s s e d . S o c i e t y cannot, then, ignore them, or t h e i r r i g h t s . On one hand, communities can be urged to be i n v o l v e d i n g e t t i n g these r i g h t s recognized, f o r t h i s i s one way r i g h t s can be implemented in s o c i e t y , when s u f f i c i e n t numbers s t a r t a g i t a t i n g f o r them. At a recent CEA Conference (Feb. 1987), f o r example, many p r o v i n c i a l educators s t a t e d that they depended on community groups to o b t a i n b e n e f i t s f o r p r i s o n e r s . On the other hand, the r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s to education i s a part of s o c i e t y ' s p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s . T h i s makes i t o b l i g a t o r y upon s o c i e t y to recognize t h i s r i g h t . The r i g h t s of p r i s o n e r s are as much pa r t of the f a b r i c of s o c i e t y , as much as p r i s o n e r s are s t i l l p a rt of s o c i e t y . T h e i r education i s a l s o p a r t of the education system of other members of s o c i e t y , and must merit the same amount of a t t e n t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Summary 1. Some r i g h t s provide us with c e r t a i n f r e e d o m s — a c t i o n r i g h t s . 2. Other r i g h t s provide us with e x p e c t a t i o n s to r e c e i v e c e r t a i n goods or s e r v i c e s - - r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s . 3. R i g h t - h o l d e r s are f r e e to e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t s , and those d i s c h a r g i n g o b l i g a t i o n s a l s o possess a c e r t a i n amount of 42 freedom i n choosing whether or not to di s c h a r g e t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n . 4. Righ t s always have consequences f o r o t h e r s . These consequences are u s u a l l y i n the way of advantages f o r h o l d e r s , and disadvantages f o r c e r t a i n o t h e r s . These we w i l l c a l l the c o r o l l a r i e s of r i g h t s . 5. Ri g h t s p r o t e c t us from i n t e r f e r e n c e . 6. Righ t s are always part of a p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s , and can only e x i s t w i t h i n a s o c i e t y which acknowledges such a p r a c t i c e . These f e a t u r e s are i n t e r r e l a t e d . While there may be other important f e a t u r e s of r i g h t s , the ones d i s c u s s e d are co n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a l to the is s u e s which a r i s e from c o n s i d e r i n g a r i g h t to education, e s p e c i a l l y f o r p r i s o n e r s . B. RIGHTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OTHER PERSONS In s e c t i o n A, i t was s t a t e d that a c t i o n r i g h t s provide r i g h t - h o l d e r s with freedom. T h i s s e c t i o n now d i s c u s s e s how r i g h t s can r e s t r i c t the freedom of o t h e r s . There i s an ' e s s e n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n ' between r i g h t s and 'the j u s t i f i e d l i m i t a t i o n of one person's freedom by another' (Hart, 1979, p. 17). T h i s d i s c u s s i o n c e n t r e s , then, on the c o r o l l a r i e s of r i g h t s . It might be accepted that r i g h t s are always accompanied by c o r o l l a r i e s , but what these c o n s t i t u t e i s of t e n d i s p u t e d . Two main p e r s p e c t i v e s a re: 1. That r i g h t s must have d u t i e s as c o r o l l a r i e s 2. That r i g h t s can have c o r o l l a r i e s other than d u t i e s The two views represent d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s as to which r i g h t s 43 are a u t h e n t i c r i g h t s . The f i r s t view can be d e s c r i b e d as a 'narrow' view--only to d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t from the l a t t e r 'broad' view. Both views hinge upon 'duty.' 'Duty' i s used ambiguously. Sometimes i t i s used as a ge n e r i c term to cover a l l c o r o l l a r i e s ; on other o c c a s i o n s i t r e f e r s to one s p e c i a l type of c o r o l l a r y . The ' narrow ' view holds that only r i g h t s which imply d u t i e s of the l a t t e r k i n d are ' r e a l l y ' r i g h t s . Speaking g e n e r a l l y , a duty i n t h i s s p e c i a l sense c a r r i e s with i t a s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n to c a r r y out some a c t i o n . An o b l i g a t i o n merely not to i n t e r f e r e with someone's a c t i o n ( s ) i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y demanding to count as a duty, and thus, on the narrow view, the person c o u l d not be s a i d to have a r i g h t . T h i s i s why sometimes a c t i o n r i g h t s are not always accepted as ' f u l l ' r i g h t s , and are termed as ' l i b e r t i e s . ' The 'narrow' view of r i g h t s thus sees r i g h t s as always c o r r e l a t i n g d i r e c t l y with s p e c i f i c d u t i e s . Some p h i l o s o p h e r s are q u i t e f l e x i b l e as to the nature of these d u t i e s , as long as they are seen as d u t i e s . But here t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y ceases, f o r u n l i k e the 'broad' view of r i g h t s , they are not prepared to accept c o r o l l a r i e s of r i g h t s which are not d u t i e s . Thus, whether of p r o v i s i o n , or n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e , r i g h t s f o r t h i s 'narrow' school of thought must always engender d u t i e s . The ' broad ' view of r i g h t s a l l o w s f o r c o r o l l a r i e s other than d u t i e s . T h i s means that consequences of r i g h t s are a c c e p t a b l e besides d u t i e s , whether of p r o v i s i o n or n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . I now e l a b o r a t e each view. 44 a) The 'Narrow View' In N a t u r a l Law theory, i t was commonly assumed that r i g h t s and d u t i e s c o - e x i s t e d as part and p a r c e l of t h i s law: ...For example, a law which r e q u i r e s A to f u l f i l h i s c o n t r a c t with B, or a law which f o r b i d s A to a s s a u l t B, l a y s a duty on A and c o n f e r s a r i g h t on B... (Raphael, 1967, p. 55). T h i s view that there i s a c o r r e l a t i v i t y between r i g h t s and d u t i e s i s a t r a d i t i o n a l one. I t i s t y p i f i e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s l i k e Bentham who, a c c o r d i n g to Lyons (1979, p. 58), c o n s i d e r e d r i g h t - h o l d e r s as always the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of someone e l s e ' s duty. Lyons quotes him s a y i n g that ' i t i s by imposing o b l i g a t i o n s or a b s t a i n i n g from imposing them, that r i g h t s are e s t a b l i s h e d or granted* (1979, p. 59). On the other hand, Mayo holds that c o r r e l a t i v e d u t i e s are i n c u r r e d only by ' p e r f e c t ' r i g h t s where the f u l f i l m e n t of the r i g h t r e s t s upon s p e c i f i c persons, i n c o n t r a s t to ' s o - c a l l e d imperfect r i g h t s ' where 'no s p e c i f i c person has a duty to g i v e ' what one has a r i g h t to (1967, p. 72). Mayo f u r t h e r t h i n k s that p e r f e c t r i g h t s - and thus c o r r e l a t i o n s with d u t i e s - occur only in 'the l i m i t e d c l a s s of d u t i e s and r i g h t s generated by undertakings [ i t a l i c s ] - - i n c l u d i n g promises and c o n t r a c t s ' (p. 73). D i s c u s s i o n 45 The 'narrow' view of r i g h t s i s p l a u s i b l e because one does c l a i m r i g h t s i n order that i t becomes o b l i g a t o r y that other persons do something about i t . We c l a i m r i g h t s : we are not j u s t making p o l i t e requests. Using the f o r c e of our r i g h t , we are a c t u a l l y a s s e r t i n g our w i l l upon others so that they comply with our r i g h t . T h i s was c l e a r even when d e s c r i b i n g r i g h t s from the p o i n t of view of the r i g h t - h o l d e r : . . . I t i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y to s t a t e that one i s e n t i t l e d to do something, or r e c e i v e something, but then to deny that anyone e l s e has o b l i g a t i o n s to l e t one do i t or p r o v i d e one with i t . . . (Milne, 1979, p. 29). Feinberg p e r c e i v e s 'duty' as being whatever i s 'due' someone e l s e (1979, p. 79). F o l l o w i n g t h i s , a l l c o r o l l a r i e s would be ' d u t i e s ' to the extent that c o r o l l a r i e s are always 'due' r i g h t s . Many use t h i s view as the b a s i s to r e j e c t a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n , s t a t i n g that no s p e c i f i c persons are a v a i l a b l e to bear the d u t i e s . P r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to education c o u l d be an empty c l a i m f o r t h i s reason. T h i s view r e s t r i c t s r i g h t s to only those c a t e g o r i e s which c o r r e l a t e d i r e c t l y and s p e c i f i c a l l y with some duty, c a s t i n g doubt upon c a t e g o r i e s of r i g h t s which do not. Lyons' suggestion i s more reasonable, that v a r i o u s kinds of r i g h t s w i l l c o r r e l a t e with v a r i o u s o b l i g a t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t ways (1979, p. 59). The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n w i l l show that there can be more than one category of r i g h t a v a i l a b l e , and each i s as v a l i d as the other. 46 'Rights' 'do not d i f f e r i n degree; no one r i g h t i s more of a r i g h t than another' (Feinberg, 1979, p. 88). T h i s w i l l be seen to be a more a p p r o p r i a t e view f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to education, b) The 'broad' view F o l l o w i n g Hohfeld (1919), Flathman (1976) c a t e g o r i z e s r i g h t s a c c o r d i n g to the c o r o l l a r i e s they imply. Only what Flathman terms as ' r i g h t s i n the s t r i c t sense' would give r i s e to s p e c i f i c d u t i e s . N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e , or what Flathman terms as a ' n o - r i g h t ' i s not a duty, but i s a c o r o l l a r y n e v e r t h e l e s s . Rights which engender such c o r o l l a r i e s he c a l l s ' l i b e r t i e s . ' Flathman c i t e s the l i b e r t i e s h e l d a g a i n s t a u t h o r i t y , such as freedom of speech, of the p r e s s , and of a s s o c i a t i o n , as examples of how l i b e r t i e s can a c t u a l l y represent a ' d i s t i n c t and s i g n i f i c a n t s p e c i e s of r i g h t s ' (1976, p. 44). These cannot be termed as r i g h t s i n the s t r i c t sense, however. Although 'there i s a sense' i n which c o r r e l a t i v e d u t i e s are present--mainly 'not to l e g i s l a t e a g a i n s t ' the l i b e r t i e s , these are not s p e c i f i c c o r r e l a t e s of the l i b e r t i e s , but rather 'the p e r f e c t l y general duty' of a government 'not to exceed the a u t h o r i t y granted to them' (1976, p. 45). What i s important about Flathman's view i s that i t accepts l i b e r t i e s as r i g h t s , 'the only d i f f e r e n c e ' being that there i s 'no o b l i g a t o r y act that f a l l s upon the Bs or Cs through A's l i b e r t y ' (1976, p. 39). I t i s c o n t r a r y to the 'narrow' view which does not regard l i b e r t i e s as r i g h t s , because they do not have a s t r i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p with s p e c i f i c d u t i e s . I t i s a l s o the 47 more s i g n i f i c a n t view f o r the t h e s i s because i t all o w s a r i g h t to education where the only expected c o r o l l a r y would be t h a t r i g h t - h o l d e r s were l e f t u n r e s t r a i n e d i n t h e i r e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t . Lyons' (1970) ideas are a k i n to Flathman's. He argues that there i s a d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n between c e r t a i n kinds of r i g h t s and d u t i e s , and v i c e v ersa - i n cases of s t r i c t r i g h t s - h e l d a g a i n s t o thers, where d u t i e s are expected or 'owed' (1970, p. 47). He p o s t u l a t e s a s i t u a t i o n where Bernard owes A l v i n ten d o l l a r s . T h i s means A l v i n has a r i g h t to be p a i d - - s p e c i f i c a l l y by Bernard. Bernard at the same time has a corresponding o b l i g a t i o n to pay A l v i n s p e c i f i c a l l y . T h i s r e p r e s e n t s a case of a 'determinate' c o r r e l a t i o n where a ' r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n e n t a i l one another' (Lyons, 1970, p. 46). Lyons reasons that j u s t because others are p r o h i b i t e d from i n t e r f e r i n g with some A's doing some X, i t does not f o l l o w that A has a r i g h t to do X (1972, p. 50). There are o r d i n a r y l e g a l and moral p r o h i b i t i o n s w h i c h ( s e r v e as p r o t e c t i o n , but which do not l o g i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e with r i g h t s . Persons are under such o b l i g a t i o n s even when we do not have such r i g h t s (Lyons, 1979, p. 52). This supports the 'broad' view, then. Although r i g h t s sometimes do c o r r e l a t e with d u t i e s or o b l i g a t i o n s , we cannot i n f e r that there are r i g h t s j u s t because there are d u t i e s or o b l i g a t i o n s , or v i c e v e r s a . Benn and P e t e r s (1959, p. 88) are supporters of the broader view. While seeing r i g h t s as being ' c o n d i t i o n a l upon the performance of d u t i e s , ' they agree that these d u t i e s can e i t h e r 48 be of ' a c t i v e performance,' or 'at l e a s t , n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e ' (1959, p. 89). They use 'duty' i n the g e n e r i c sense, that i s . Kerr a l s o seems to accept t h a t the d u t i e s attendant upon r i g h t s can i n c l u d e d u t i e s of being o b l i g a t e d not to i n t e r f e r e , or d u t i e s of being o b l i g a t e d to provide something (1978, p. 167). Hart c a t e g o r i z e s r i g h t s which always c o r r e l a t e with d u t i e s , such as a g a i n s t s p e c i f i c persons, as ' s p e c i a l r i g h t s ' (1979, p. 20). Examples are r i g h t s which a r i s e out of c o n t r a c t s , agreements. He a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s a 'general' r i g h t h e l d a g a i n s t a l l men, where there i s a c o r r e l a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n 'not to i n t e r f e r e ' (1979, p. 23). Hart's (1979) " s p e c i a l " r i g h t s (which generate s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n s ) are s i m i l a r to Flathman's r i g h t s i n the s t r i c t sense. "General" r i g h t s , i n c u r r i n g d u t i e s of non-i n t e r f e r e n c e a g a i n s t everyone, are s i m i l a r to Flathman's concept of l i b e r t i e s — w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e being that Flathman does not c o n s i d e r n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e as a duty. It i s not so important whether or not we term non-i n t e r f e r e n c e as a duty, f o r I am more i n t e r e s t e d i n the c o r o l l a r i e s of the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . I have chosen, t h e r e f o r e , to f o l l o w Flathman (1976) and other views which d i s t i n g u i s h between c o r o l l a r i e s which c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by others (these I w i l l c a l l ' d u t i e s ' ) and other c o r o l l a r i e s which, although having impact on o t h e r s , do not c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s way of d e a l i n g with c o r o l l a r i e s w i l l enable me to e x p l a i n why a r i g h t to education can ( f o r a u t o d i d a c t s , f o r example) be a r i g h t even though i t imposes no duty on others ( i n 49 Flathman's [1976] term, r i g h t s as l i b e r t i e s ) . Yet i t w i l l a l s o allow me to argue that i n the case of education f o r p r i s o n e r s , i f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t , then resources e t c . , must be made a v a i l a b l e and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , d u t i e s must be p l a c e d on o t h e r s to p r o v i d e i t . The r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s to education, in s h o r t , can have both a duty of p r o v i s i o n and a c o r o l l a r y of non-i n t e r f e r e n c e . CONCLUSION TO "THE NATURE AND MEANING OF RIGHTS" Rights always give r i s e to c o r o l l a r i e s . These are i n the form of what others are expected to do f o r us, or to r e f r a i n from doing. R i g h t s , however, are a u t h e n t i c a t e d on the s t r e n g t h of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n we can o f f e r . They can e x i s t f o r reasons other than i t s being someone's duty to do something, and v i c e v e r s a . I t i s maintained that p e n i t e n t i a r y education might be improved i f p r i s o n e r s had the r i g h t to c l a i m i t . T h i s s e c t i o n has been necessary, through d i s c u s s i o n of what r i g h t s are, and what we might do with them, to show how well-founded such a c l a i m might be. The d i s c u s s i o n has shown that r i g h t s do ensure that r i g h t h o l d e r s are allowed the freedom to p r a c t i s e whatever t h e i r a c t i o n r i g h t s c a l l f o r . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important f o r p r i s o n e r s , because they are i n a p o s i t i o n where c e r t a i n of t h e i r freedoms are a l r e a d y being r e s t r i c t e d . A r i g h t would ensure that they be allowed the freedom to engage in education by p r o v i d i n g at l e a s t p r o t e c t i o n from n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . T h i s n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e has been shown to be a v a l i d c o r o l l a r y of r i g h t s . At the same time, i f necessary and p o s s i b l e , r i g h t s 50 would a l s o impose o b l i g a t i o n s upon those concerned to take the r e q u i r e d a c t i o n to implement the r i g h t . I t has a l s o been noted that r i g h t s and d u t i e s are separate e n t i t i e s , and even i f o f t e n r e l a t e d to each other, t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not necessary. R i g h t s and d u t i e s can a l s o co-e x i s t . I t i s p o s s i b l e to have a r i g h t to be educated at the same time as one must a l s o observe a duty to be educated. I I . CATEGORIZATION OF RIGHTS A. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Rights can be c l a s s i f i e d i n many d i f f e r e n t ways. Four r e l e v a n t c a t e g o r i e s a r e : 1. INALIENABLE AND CONTINGENT RIGHTS 2. ACTION AND RECIPIENT RIGHTS 3. LEGAL AND MORAL RIGHTS 4. HUMAN AND PERSON RIGHTS Throughout the t h e s i s , I w i l l make use of these d i s t i n c t i o n s i n e x p l i c a t i n g what would be i n v o l v e d i n a r i g h t to ed u c a t i o n . B. E x p l i c a t i o n 1. INALIENABLE AND CONTINGENT RIGHTS  I n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s are r i g h t s which: i ) Can never be taken away from us i i ) We can always choose not to e x e r c i s e i i i ) We can never waive, or t r a n s f e r These r i g h t s have been a l s o d e s c r i b e d as ' i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e , ' 'absolute.' T h i s means t h a t : ...no matter what the circumstances may 51 be, a person p o s s e s s i n g such a r i g h t i s f u l l y j u s t i f i e d i n demanding, a s s e r t i n g or e x e r c i s i n g , and o t h e r s always wrong i n denying him, h i s r i g h t . . . (Melden, 1977, p. 1) Some p h i l o s o p h e r s view human r i g h t s as i n a l i e n a b l e , and c i t e the r i g h t to l i f e as an example. D i s c u s s i o n T h i s category r e p r e s e n t s a major way human r i g h t s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been addressed, and consequently c r i t i c i z e d . I t i s important because i n a l i e n a b i l i t y i s sometimes used as a c r i t e r i o n f o r the a u t h e n t i c i t y of r i g h t s . The n o t i o n of i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s has a long h i s t o r y . Hobbes was one who claimed that c e r t a i n r i g h t s such as that to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of l i f e , were i n a l i e n a b l e , because they were human beings' r i g h t , as w e l l as p a r t of t h e i r nature ( P o l i n , 1967, p. 18). T h i s concept has a l s o had a p a r a l l e l h i s t o r y of s c a t h i n g c r i t i c i s m . Some p h i l o s o p h e r s have begun to regard the n o t i o n of r i g h t s being i n a l i e n a b l e as a 'mindless d o c t r i n e , ' and 'an absurd i d e a ' (Melden, 1977, p. 2). I t i s now being questioned 'whether there i s any s p e c i f i c r i g h t or value' which can be ' u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y or a b s o l u t e l y v a l i d i n a l l c o n c e i v a b l e circumstances' ( N i e l s e n , 1968, p. 573). Hart t h i n k s that sometimes 'c o e r c i o n or r e s t r a i n t ' i s ' j u s t i f i e d ' by s p e c i a l circumstances (1979, p. 15). D a n i e l s suggests that such a c l a i m does not mean a r i g h t cannot be 'abrogated under any circumstances,' but r a t h e r that ' i t i s always r e l e v a n t i n 52 d e c i d i n g what one ought to do i n d e a l i n g with the person who has the r i g h t ' (1977, p. 1 ) . The q u e s t i o n whether r i g h t s are i n a l i e n a b l e i s important because i t i s sometimes proposed that r i g h t s have to be i n a l i e n a b l e in order to merit regard as genuine. But as Melden s t a t e s , 'the s t a t u s of r i g h t s ' i s 'not compromised' j u s t because i t has to y i e l d to 'other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' (1972, p. 493). I adhere to such an o p i n i o n , which I w i l l maintain whenever the qu e s t i o n of the a u t h e n t i c i t y of r i g h t s i s r a i s e d . Contingent r i g h t s are r i g h t s which: i ) We have as a r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r context, circumstance, such as the r o l e s that we are as s i g n e d . These are, t h e r e f o r e , r i g h t s which are dependent upon extraneous f a c t o r s . i i ) We can l o s e or waive ac c o r d i n g to changes i n the s i t u a t i o n , or our r o l e s . i i i ) We can choose not to e x e r c i s e . These r i g h t s can a l s o be termed as ' c o n d i t i o n a l . ' There are at l e a s t two kinds of contingent r i g h t s . Some, as we have seen, e x i s t only where c e r t a i n r o l e s e x i s t . Others are not t i e d to r o l e s but are i n s t i t u t i o n a l or l e g a l r i g h t s which can j u s t i f i a b l y be granted only where c e r t a i n minimum circumstances, o f t e n economic circumstances, make the g r a n t i n g of such r i g h t s d e f e n s i b l e . Thus while any r i g h t , even i f i n a l i e n a b l e , can be o v e r r i d e n , "mininum-circumstance" r i g h t s are r i g h t s which are not so much o v e r r i d e n as made impossible where circumstances provide an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s to make the g r a n t i n g 53 of such r i g h t s s e n s i b l e . For example, a r i g h t to adequate food w i l l , i n g e n e r a l , be more important than a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n — where circumstances f o r c e us to choose between them. A r i g h t to education i s a good example of a contingent r i g h t . I t i s always contingent upon circumstances, s i t u a t i o n s , and f a c t o r s . Role r i g h t s are a l s o a good i l l u s t r a t i o n . C e r t a i n r o l e s p r o v i d e a p p r o p r i a t e circumstances f o r c e r t a i n r i g h t s . The r i g h t s are contingent because they cease to be once we cease to hold those r o l e s . We can e i t h e r a u t o m a t i c a l l y assume these r i g h t s with our r o l e s , as supposedly parents do, or they might be c r e a t e d or bestowed upon us to f a c i l i t a t e the e f f e c t i v e c a r r y i n g out of our r o l e s . E ducation i s sometimes j u s t i f i e d as a r o l e r i g h t . For example, Kerr (1978, p. 173) t h i n k s that 'one simply cannot f u l l y undertake the r o l e of c i t i z e n ' without a c e r t a i n l e v e l of education. Prima F a c i e Rights The term 'prima f a c i e ' i s a l s o o f t e n encountered i n r i g h t s l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s i s a way of t a l k i n g about any kind of r i g h t , r a t h e r than a way of c a t e g o r i z i n g r i g h t s . I t i s used by d i f f e r e n t people i n d i f f e r e n t ways. I t i s sometimes c o n t r a s t e d with i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s , and confused with contingent r i g h t s . The term can be used i n s i t u a t i o n s whenever there i s a presumption of a r i g h t , about which, however, we are u n c e r t a i n : a) Whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence or j u s t i f i c a t i o n to support the r i g h t b) Whether there are any reasons or circumstances which might o v e r r i d e the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t 54 But "prima f a c i e " i s a l s o used to c h a r a c t e r i z e r i g h t s which: i ) May always have to concede to more p r e s s i n g p r i o r i t i e s i i ) Are ' d e f e a s i b l e , ' or ' o v e r r i d e a b l e ' i i i ) Are r i g h t s the s t a t u s of which we are u n c e r t a i n about, for example, the r i g h t to education i t s e l f Prima f a c i e r i g h t s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s . The l a t t e r , as we have seen, are r i g h t s which w i l l always re p r e s e n t r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Prima f a c i e r i g h t s are not c o n t i n g e n t r i g h t s , e i t h e r . With c o n t i n g e n t r i g h t s , the award of the r i g h t depends upon other f a c t o r s . I f c e r t a i n f a c t o r s operate, c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t , then the r i g h t would e x i s t . With prima f a c i e r i g h t s , one i s unsure whether one i s j u s t i f i e d i n a s s e r t i n g or e x e r c i s i n g i t . Here i s what two p h i l o s o p h e r s have to say about r i g h t s and the term 'prima f a c i e ' : . . . A l l human r i g h t s have a prima f a c i e v a l i d i t y i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which they are r e l e v a n t , but they are not a b s o l u t e l y or c a t e g o r i c a l l y b i n d i n g on conduct i n any case although they must always be c o n s i d e r e d . . . (Hook, 1980, p. 71) Blackstone (1968) s t a t e s : ...To say t h a t a r i g h t i s prima f a c i e i s 55 to say that i t cannot always be cashed i n , that other moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may on occasion p r o p e r l y o v e r r i d e i t . . . (p. 71) Perhaps, then, two senses of 'prima f a c i e ' may be i s o l a t e d . In one sense, i t means that a person i s c e r t a i n about the e x i s t e n c e of a r i g h t , but i s u n c e r t a i n whether or not there might be reasons to o v e r r i d e the r i g h t . In the other sense, the person a l s o t h i n k s that a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t may h o l d i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , but i s u n c e r t a i n whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence to f u l l y support t h i s b e l i e f . Any r i g h t c o u l d be prima f a c i e in e i t h e r sense because prima f a c i e , while not a sense of r i g h t ( f i r m l y s t a t e d by Melden, 1972; 1977), i s l i k e an o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e that any r i g h t c o u l d have. Having r i g h t s does not mean one i s always c e r t a i n about t h e i r e x i s t e n c e or the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of e x e r c i s i n g them. With the r i g h t to education, there may be v a l i d grounds f o r c l a i m i n g t h i s r i g h t , but one might be unsure whether circumstances or reasons might, in t u r n , i n v a l i d a t e these grounds. S i m i l a r l y , the term 'contingent' allows us to h o l d that there c o u l d be a r i g h t to education—whenever circumstances or c o n d i t i o n s are f o r t u i t o u s . 2. ACTION AND RECIPIENT RIGHTS These r i g h t s embody one of the more b a s i c d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t a l k about r i g h t s - - r i g h t s to a c t i o n , that i s a c t i o n r i g h t s , and r i g h t s to r e c e i v e c e r t a i n b e n e f i t s , that i s rec i p i e n t r i g h t s . Examples of the former are the r i g h t s we have to do c e r t a i n 56 t h i n g s without anyone i n t e r f e r i n g . One might have the r i g h t to take a walk i n the park, or play t e n n i s and not f o o t b a l l . Examples of R e c i p i e n t r i g h t s are welfare r i g h t s . They are r i g h t s to r e c e i v e c e r t a i n types of goods and s e r v i c e s , or r i g h t s to be i n c e r t a i n s o c i a l and economic p o s i t i o n s . They a r i s e from a concern f o r man's we l f a r e , but there may be grounds to apply them to such other beings as animals. Most of the time, because one stands to r e c e i v e t h i n g s from t h i s r i g h t , they are s a i d to be a c t u a l l y c l a i m s a g a i n s t persons to provide the form of a s s i s t a n c e r e q u i r e d . T h i s i m p l i e s a corresponding c o r r e l a t i v e duty, which sometimes causes welfare r i g h t s to be viewed as e n t i t l e m e n t s , and not as genuine r i g h t s ( P e f f e r , 1978, p. 67). D i s c u s s i o n Some problems with these c a t e g o r i e s a r e : i ) As d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y , an issue which a r i s e s from the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t i o n and r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s has to do with the nature of the c o r o l l a r i e s which a r i s e from these c a t e g o r i e s of r i g h t s . R i g h t s with c o r o l l a r i e s which are not s t r i c t d u t i e s are not regarded by some as a c t u a l . R e c i p i e n t r i g h t s are o f t e n p e r c e i v e d i n t h i s way. These r i g h t s r e q u i r e p r o v i s i o n of goods. If these cannot be made the s p e c i f i c duty of s p e c i f i c persons, they are c o n s i d e r e d by some as i m p r a c t i c a l . Yet views are a l s o a v a i l a b l e which h o l d r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s to be the only genuine r i g h t s , because they do r e q u i r e such s p e c i f i c d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n . In t h i s case, a c t i o n r i g h t s are not regarded as genuine because they do not r e q u i r e any s p e c i f i c d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n . Chapter four w i l l r e v e a l arguments which q u e s t i o n 57 the v a l i d i t y of education on the grounds that i t i s viewed as a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . In my o p i n i o n , there i s no q u e s t i o n that both c a t e g o r i e s , although c o n t a i n i n g r i g h t s to d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , and consequently r e s u l t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s , are each as v a l i d as the o t h e r . Each occurs because there are d i f f e r e n c e s with what we want fronT our r i g h t s — b e i t the freedom to do, or to r e c e i v e . More important, there i s a l s o the p o s s i b i l i t y that r i g h t s possess the dual nature of being both a c t i v e and p a s s i v e - - a s has been envisaged with the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . 3 . LEGAL AND MORAL RIGHTS Legal and Moral r i g h t s are c a t e g o r i z e d a c c o r d i n g to how the ensuing c o r r e l a t e s (such as d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s ) are to be e n f o r c e d , and what the source, or grounds, of these c o r r e l a t e s a r e . Legal r i g h t s are r i g h t s enforced by the law, and moral r i g h t s are supported by moral r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s . These c a t e g o r i e s are important because i t i s a l e g a l r i g h t to education f o r p r i s o n e r s which i s being maintained. Moral approbation i s sometimes co n s i d e r e d i n e f f e c t i v e as a method of enforcement. I t has been suggested that p e n i t e n t i a r y education l a c k s d i r e c t i o n , which might be because i t i s not c o n s i d e r e d a p r i o r i t y of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . I f , however, p r i s o n e r s c o u l d look to the law to enforce a t t e n t i o n to education, the s i t u a t i o n might improve. I t i s i n part i n view of the s t a t u s of p r i s o n e r s and of p e n i t e n t i a r y education that a l e g a l r i g h t i s c o n s i d e r e d to be l i k e l y to be more e f f e c t i v e than a moral r i g h t . At the same time, there i s no doubt about the importance or 58 a u t h e n t i c i t y of moral r i g h t s . The f a c t that t h e r e are p r i s o n e r s persons who broke the law - i s evidence t h a t the law i s sometimes i n e f f e c t i v e i n stopping persons from v i o l a t i n g i t s laws. Moral or community censure can a l s o be f e l t q u i t e a c u t e l y . I t i s a l s o important t o emphasize the importance of moral r i g h t s because i t i s when a moral r i g h t achieves 'widespread r e c o g n i t i o n i n a community's co n s c i o u s n e s s , ' that 'there i s e s t a b l i s h e d a corresponding l e g a l r i g h t ' (Young, 1976, p. 20). T h i s i s what i s being advocated f o r p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to education, that i t i s important enough to now be enforced and guaranteed by law. My q u e s t i o n i s whether a l l r i g h t s have equal e f f e c t i v e n e s s in g e t t i n g r e s u l t s . I have maintained that I see s e v e r a l kinds of r i g h t s as being e q u a l l y v a l i d , and important. Sometimes too, occasions a r i s e when c e r t a i n r i g h t s w i l l be abl e to exert more fo r c e than can others in demanding r e c o g n i t i o n , and gen e r a t i n g a c t i o n s r e q u i r e d to implement the r i g h t . I p o s i t the p e n i t e n t i a r y e d u c a t i o n a l system as such an o c c a s i o n . 4. HUMAN AND PERSON RIGHTS There can be two ways of t a l k i n g about these c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t way can be termed as ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' and the second, as 'evaluative.'- The ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' approach i s a good way of d e l i n e a t i n g r i g h t s belonging to human beings and persons, i n c o n t r a s t say, to a n i m a l / i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The b a s i s of the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n r e s t s upon the a t t r i b u t e s of human beings and persons. No judgements are made nor any j u s t i f i c a t i o n given about what r i g h t s these human beings ought to have. T h i s task 59 i s l e f t to the second approach. Here, the c o n d i t i o n s and nature of human beings and persons are presented as grounds f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of r i g h t s . The t h e s i s w i l l use both approaches. T h i s s e c t i o n on " C a t e g o r i z a t i o n " w i l l c o ncentrate on the ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' way. A t t r i b u t e s of the r i g h t - h o l d e r s who form the b a s i s of the c a t e g o r i e s w i l l be d e s c r i b e d . The ' e v a l u a t i v e ' approach w i l l be used i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n on j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r i g h t s . A DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS Human Righ t s are r i g h t s which a l l human beings have, i n c l u d i n g person r i g h t s . They are a l l those r i g h t s 'enjoyed by people simply as people' (Benn, 1978, p. 54). A term sometimes used to d e s c r i b e such r i g h t s i s ' u n i v e r s a l . ' Another more t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s that such r i g h t s are i n a l i e n a b l e , a b s o l u t e . I t has a l r e a d y been suggested that t h i s may be u n r e a l i s t i c . The t h e s i s does propose, however, that i_f there i s an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t which human beings have, i t would be the r i g h t of a l l human beings to be t r e a t e d with the d i g n i t y and respect of human beings. D i s c u s s i o n The d i f f i c u l t i e s which a r i s e from t h i s category a r e : i ) The q u e s t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s category and Na t u r a l R i g h t s i i ) P o t e n t i a l confounding of human r i g h t s with w e l f a r e r i g h t s i ) Human Ri g h t s and N a t u r a l R i g h t s The importance of Na t u r a l R i g h t s l i e s in i t s being perhaps 60 a forerunner of the concern f o r human r i g h t s . I t i s easy to confuse the two. Both r e s t upon a premise of being e s s e n t i a l to the proper s t a t e of man. N a t u r a l r i g h t s , by themselves, c r e a t e c o n f u s i o n . They seem to have been p e r c e i v e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways through the ages. T h e i r o r i g i n s are a t t r i b u t e d to Locke and other C l a s s i c L i b e r a l s . These p h i l o s o p h e r s advocated N a t u r a l Rights as r i g h t s belonging to man a u t o m a t i c a l l y , as pa r t of h i s inherent nature, and t h e r e f o r e , i n a l i e n a b l e , and i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e . They were seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y important to p r o t e c t man from oppression and e x p l o i t a t i o n by governing a u t h o r i t i e s , or those i n power. But N a t u r a l r i g h t s have a l s o been seen to come from God, or D i v i n e Law. There i s a wealth of t r a d i t i o n behind N a t u r a l r i g h t s . I w i l l , however, focus on Human Rights because t h i s i s how education has t y p i c a l l y been viewed. ( i i ) Human, Person, and Welfare R i g h t s These c a t e g o r i e s are sometimes mistakenly equated. The con f u s i o n a r i s e s because many human r i g h t s are r i g h t s to we l f a r e . The problem i s that not a l l human r i g h t s are welfare r i g h t s . Some a l s o acknowledge welf a r e r i g h t s f o r animals. T h i s t h e s i s i s i n t e r e s t e d i n human r i g h t s , however. That t h e r e might be other kinds of r i g h t s belonging to other beings does not p r e s e n t l y concern me. A DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO PERSON RIGHTS The idea that human beings can c l a i m r i g h t s because of t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s as human beings has j u s t been d i s c u s s e d . While a l l human beings possess - and are perhaps to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d 61 by - these f e a t u r e s , there are c e r t a i n other f e a t u r e s which some human beings do not have. T h i s n e c e s s i t a t e s a category of Person R i g h t s . Benn t e l l s us persons have 'a c e r t a i n kind of s e l f -awareness' (1978, p. 66). They are a l s o ' c o n c e p t u a l l y equipped to envisage a l t e r n a t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . ' T h i s view i s s i m i l a r to what seems to have been emphasized from the time of Locke to present day analyses such as Dennett (1969) and Downie and T e l f e r (1965). I t seems agreed upon that persons are r a t i o n a l and r e s p o n s i b l e agents. Kant i s o l a t e s r a t i o n a l i t y or the posse s s i o n of a r a t i o n a l w i l l as the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of persons (1970, p. 155). 0 S i m i l a r l y , Peters says that persons are 'centres of v a l u a t i o n , d e c i s i o n , and c h o i c e ' (1966, p. 133). In Chapter one, i t was a l s o mentioned how they must be capable of t h i n k i n g about t h e i r thoughts, d e s i r e s , b e l i e f s , e t c . (Dennett, 1976; D a n i e l s , 1971). There are p o s s i b l y other f e a t u r e s to persons. For i t s purposes, the d i s s e r t a t i o n emphasizes that persons are able to reason, t h i n k , p l a n , make d e c i s i o n s , and are r e s p o n s i b l e agents who are su b j e c t to moral judgement. Such c r i t e r i a are u s u a l l y met by most human beings. E x c e p t i o n s are p o s s i b l y the mentally r e t a r d e d , the insane, and comatose. There are a l s o human beings born with p o t e n t i a l f o r these q u a l i t i e s , but who have not developed y e t , such as c h i l d r e n . These c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d as ' p o t e n t i a l ' persons. G e n e r a l l y , a l l human beings are persons, or have the p o t e n t i a l to be. The d i s t i n c t i o n helps us account f o r the 62 d i f f e r e n c e between human beings who are mere b i o l o g i c a l organisms, and human beings who are moral and s o c i a l beings, that i s , 'morally concerned and m o r a l l y accountable' (Melden, 1959,p. 61). The d i s t i n c t i o n i s a l s o needed when a l l o c a t i n g c e r t a i n r i g h t s . We w i l l soon see how c e r t a i n r i g h t s are j u s t i f i e d f o r persons on account of t h e i r being c o n s i d e r e d r e s p o n s i b l e agents. At the same time, r i g h t s are j u s t i f i e d f o r human beings because they possess supposedly common needs and i n t e r e s t s . P i s c u s s i o n D i s c u s s i n g t h i s category of persons i s necessary to emphasize that persons are r e s p o n s i b l e and r a t i o n a l agents. Only persons can be h e l d answerable f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s - and consequently - pun i s h a b l e . T h i s w i l l be the b a s i s of an argument used to j u s t i f y the r i g h t to education f o r p r i s o n e r s (see chapter f i v e ) . I t i s a l s o necessary to j u s t i f y a l l o c a t i n g p r i s o n e r s the r i g h t s of persons. Human beings are unable to enjoy a l l the r i g h t s which persons have because they lac k c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of persons. For example, they are unable t o account f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s , and cannot c l a i m r i g h t s to c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s open to persons. While they w i l l always be ab l e to c l a i m equal treatment as human beings - that i s - with respect and d i g n i t y -they cannot, say, c l a i m the r i g h t persons might have of access to o p p o r t u n i t i e s to edu c a t i o n . CONCLUSION TO "CATEGORIZATION OF RIGHTS" The d i s c u s s i o n has shown that education o f f e r s an area 63 where the v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s come together i n complex ways. I t has been seen how i t i s p o s s i b l e to c a t e g o r i z e education as both an a c t i o n r i g h t , and a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . The l e a r n e r i s not a p a s s i v e r e c e p t a c l e , but i s i n v o l v e d as an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the process of e d u c a t i o n . Thus, one might not only r e q u i r e r i g h t s to o b t a i n e d u c a t i o n a l resources - that i s , r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s - but a l s o r e q u i r e the freedom to be l e f t alone to i n t e r a c t with these - that i s , as a c t i o n r i g h t s . T h i s p e r c e p t i o n of education helps s u b s t a n t i a t e the case f o r a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . One of the problems with a r i g h t to education i s that i t has too o f t e n been seen merely as a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t , thereby r a i s i n g the problems o f t e n b e l i e v e d to accompany such r i g h t s , such as the absence of persons to provide what i s to be r e c e i v e d . Even i f one s u b s c r i b e d to the n o t i o n of s e l f - e d u c a t i o n , one would s t i l l need resources and other persons to produce the r e s o u r c e s . Even p r i s o n e r a u t o d i d a c t s r e q u i r e f o r t h e i r f u r t h e r e d u c a t i o n , p r o v i s i o n of such resources as books. The m a j o r i t y of p r i s o n e r s , however, c l e a r l y need much more - almost c e r t a i n l y t e a c h e r s - and perhaps i n d i v i d u a l t u t o r i n g i f they are to have a chance to f u r t h e r t h e i r e d u c a t i o n . In t h i s sense, then, education cannot proceed by i t s e l f . T h i s i s why I s t r e s s that t h i s i s not the only aspect of e d u c a t i o n . I t ignores the component which depends upon the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the l e a r n e r . As Peters (1966, p. 20) suggests, 'the w i t t i n g n e s s and v o l u n t a r i n e s s ' of the l e a r n e r are a l s o important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n the process of e d u c a t i o n . 64 I am t h e r e f o r e i n t e r e s t e d i n s o r t i n g out the merits of p o s s i b l e arguments t h a t there must not only be l e g a l requirements of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e , but a l s o l e g a l d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n of s i g n i f i c a n t r e s o u r c e s . In support of such a stand, I have a l s o i n v e s t i g a t e d the c o r o l l a r i e s of r i g h t s , where i t was concluded that the c o r o l l a r y of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e was as v a l i d as the c o r o l l a r y of a duty of p r o v i s i o n by s p e c i f i c bodies. Both c o r o l l a r i e s come i n t o p l a y due to the nature of education f o r p r i s o n e r s . On one hand, we might see p r i s o n e r s as needing very extensive support, that i s , the education envisaged f o r them i s more of a r e c i p i e n t nature, because of the r e s t r i c t i o n s of t h e i r confinement and dependence upon o t h e r s . But on the other hand, i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e that they need only minimal support, that i s , even i f no help i s forthcoming, they have an a c t i o n r i g h t to be l e f t alone to do what they can to get an e d u c a t i o n . Thus, even i f no one was w i l l i n g to provide or do anything about p r i s o n e r s ' education, they s t i l l maintain the r i g h t to the freedom to attempt to educate themselves, as do other persons, n o n - p r i s o n e r s . As we w i l l see, because p r i s o n e r s are p r i s o n e r s - with a l l the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by i n c a r c e r a t i o n - i t becomes necessary to make the r i g h t a l e g a l r i g h t i f p r i s o n e r s are to have the chance to e x e r c i s e i t . I t i s thus s p e c i f i c a l l y as a l e g a l r i g h t that the case f o r education i s being examined. The u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s i t u a t i o n of p e n i t e n t i a r y education suggests that p e n i t e n t i a r y education i s too dependent upon persons f e e l i n g they have only a moral o b l i g a t i o n , i f any, toward p r o v i d i n g 65 e d u c a t i o n . At present, there i s no b i n d i n g law to which persons must answer f o r f a i l u r e to implement what can be co n s i d e r e d as a r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s . The d i s s e r t a t i o n a l s o examines an argument f o r the r i g h t to edu c a t i o n , f o r both p r i s o n e r s and non-prisoners, although s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r the former, on grounds of e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . Thus, i f education i s a Person r i g h t , then a l l persons, i n c l u d i n g p r i s o n e r s , have t h i s r i g h t — o f equal o p p o r t u n i t y to educ a t i o n . I I I . JUSTIFICATION OF RIGHTS The pre s e n t d i s c u s s i o n w i l l : 1. D i s c u s s how r i g h t s have u s u a l l y been j u s t i f i e d 2. D i s c u s s the problems that accompany such attempts T h i s i s necessary t o : 1. Introduce p o t e n t i a l ways of j u s t i f y i n g the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . 2. F o r e c a s t the i s s u e s that w i l l be encountered when attempting to j u s t i f y the r i g h t to education i n pa r t i c u l a r . I am c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t e d i n those c a t e g o r i e s which concern the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . These are Human R i g h t s , and Person  R i g h t s . In summary, human r i g h t s can be d e s c r i b e d as r i g h t s b e l o n g i n g to human beings. Person r i g h t s are f u r t h e r i s o l a t e d because of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s d i s t i n c t i v e of persons which are r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s when c l a i m i n g / a l l o c a t i n g c e r t a i n r i g h t s . I t i s s a i d t h a t persons are r a t i o n a l , s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g , and r e s p o n s i b l e . 66 AN 'EVALUATIVE' APPROACH TO HUMAN AND PERSON RIGHTS T h i s s e c t i o n uses the ' e v a l u a t i v e ' approach to understanding human and person r i g h t s . In reviewing the s t r a t e g i e s which have been used to j u s t i f y these c a t e g o r i e s , s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made to the kinds of q u e s t i o n s or is s u e s r a i s e d which ought to be c o n s i d e r e d when attempting to j u s t i f y a r i g h t to ed u c a t i o n . A. ARGUMENTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 1. Argument from Needs and I n t e r e s t s Human Rights are sometimes j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that they f u l f i l man's most b a s i c needs and i n t e r e s t s . A c c o r d i n g to K l e i n i g , they are 'those minimum c o n d i t i o n s under which human beings can f l o u r i s h ' (1978, p. 45). P e f f e r suggests the urgency of such n e e d - r e l a t e d r i g h t s ' i f we are to s u r v i v e and to have any s o r t of l i f e worth l i v i n g ' (1978, p. 80). Raphael's r a t i o n a l e i s 'that one cannot e x e r c i s e the i n i t i a t i v e of a human being,' or 'indeed remain a human being at a l l , ' u nless c e r t a i n b a s i c needs are taken care of (1969, p. 115). Wasserstrom c l a i m s the n e c e s s i t y f o r r i g h t s to 'develop one's c a p a b i l i t i e s and to l i v e a l i f e as a human being' (1971, p. 179). Barnhardt s t a t e s that because members of a community are expected to conform t o c e r t a i n r u l e s and a s p i r a t i o n s of s o c i e t y , there has to be a minimal l i m i t of means, s t a t u s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and l i b e r t y 'below which the de p r i v e d w i l l be given every o p p o r t u n i t y to prevent themselves from f a l l i n g ' (1969, p. 338). D i s c u s s i o n One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of such an argument i s that there 67 i s no ' f i x e d p r i n c i p l e ' f o r what are regarded as needs and what are not (Raphael, 1967, p. 65). 'Men do not share a f i x e d nature,' and thus one cannot determine ' f i x e d ends' that they must n e c e s s a r i l y pursue i n f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s nature (MacDonald, 1970, p. 49). According to C r i t t e n d e n , human beings are capable of such a 'broad range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , ' that i t would be unsafe to use such an indeterminate nature as the b a s i s of r i g h t s (1973, p. 3). These comments suggest a lack of concrete ground for determining what needs are b a s i c . C e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h e r s do o f f e r c r i t e r i a f o r b a s i c needs, such as that they 'be r e l a t e d to f u r t h e r i n g some s t a t e of a f f a i r s , ' or be so ' c r u c i a l that without adequate s a t i s f a c t i o n of these needs,' the human being 'would s u f f e r some fundamental harm' (Sutton, 1978, p. 103). I t can s t i l l be c h a l l e n g e d , however: ...How can poss e s s i o n of a common human nature, a common humanness, given the vagueness of the content . . be a ground f o r . . . e q u a l i t y of treatment, of r e s p e c t , and the l i k e ? . . . (McCloskey, 1978, p. 30) White does not see a l o g i c a l connection between a need g i v i n g r i s e to a c l a i m , and the need forming the b a s i s of r i g h t s (1984, p. 125). He a l s o does not think that r i g h t s are based on the need i t s e l f , but ra t h e r on what i t r e p r e s e n t s , that i s , on the worth, v a l u e , and b e n e f i t s i t bri n g s to man--when he has had these needs f u l f i l l e d . The r i g h t s would not (on t h i s account) 68 stem from needs, but from the good they b r i n g , and there i s no necessary l o g i c a l connection between something being f o r man's good, and h i s c l a i m i n g a r i g h t to i t . While r i g h t s are among the more potent ways of e n f o r c i n g , or p r o t e c t i n g our needs and i n t e r e s t s , they are not the only way. S a t i s f a c t i o n of needs can be a l s o a matter of humanity, benevolence, g e n e r o s i t y . Lucas t h i n k s that equal treatment of human beings, or that we do not, i n g e n e r a l , t o r t u r e each other, e t c . , has l i t t l e to do with adherence to p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l i t y , but stems more from humanitarian reasons (1971, p. 141). Another c r i t i c i s m i s that there seems to be a gap between b a s i c ' s u r v i v a l ' needs and the idea that one has r i g h t s to t h e i r f u l f i l m e n t . Wasserstrom f o r one, i s unsure how the ways i n which men are supposed to be a l i k e 'advances an argument f o r the achievement of human r i g h t s ' (1971, p. 116). Seeing a l a c k of c l a r i t y i n these ways to s t a r t with, he f i n d s m i s s i n g the necessary ' p l a u s i b l e intermediate premises' which connect the two. T h i s i s a very popular argument a g a i n s t human r i g h t s . I t i s sometimes seen as an ins t a n c e of the N a t u r a l i s t i c F a l l a c y . T h i s i s not, of course, unique to arguments found a g a i n s t human r i g h t s , but i s commonly used i n philosophy to i n d i c a t e that c e r t a i n 'assumed' connections are a c t u a l l y unfounded. In t h i s argument a g a i n s t human r i g h t s , i t i s used to p o i n t out that j u s t because human beings possess c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s , we do not have s u f f i c i e n t reason to c l a i m they ought to be given c e r t a i n t h i n g s . To do so would be to go i l l i c i t l y from the d e s c r i p t i v e 69 to the e v a l u a t i v e , from ' i s ' to 'ought.* These are the s o r t s of d i f f i c u l t i e s which a r i s e from attempts to j u s t i f y human r i g h t s u s i n g some 'antecedent f e a t u r e of human e x i s t e n c e ' (Hook, 1980, p. 82). 2. Argument from the Equal Worth and D i g n i t y of Man V l a s t o s b e l i e v e s there are two main asp e c t s to human beings i n which they do not d i f f e r from one another, t h e i r ' w e l l -being,' and 'freedom' (1973, p. 312). These two aspects are inherent to the nature of human beings, f o r they do not i n v o l v e the d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s which i n d i v i d u a l s enjoy. Consequently, each one's w e l l - b e i n g and freedom i s 'as v a l u a b l e as any ot h e r ' s ' because the value of each i s the same, 'quite independently' of 'the t h i n g s they happen to choose' (1973, p. 313). T h i s leads V l a s t o s to a b e l i e f ' i n the prima f a c i e e q u a l i t y of man's r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g and freedom.' Such an argument ' a b s t r a c t s ' human beings from the e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s of me r i t , c o n t r i b u t i o n to s o c i e t y , e t c . I t forms the foundation of v a r i o u s human r i g h t s , and welfar e r i g h t s , to which everyone i s e n t i t l e d 'simply qua the f a c t t h a t he i s human' (Blackstone, 1968, p. 620). D i s c u s s i o n The premise that human beings are 'equal' i n s h a r i n g b a s i c needs and i n t e r e s t s , or i n t h e i r inherent value as human beings, o f t e n u n d e r l i e s c l a i m s f o r human r i g h t s . Such a view of human beings i s normative: ...To say that a given person i s human not 70 only c l a s s i f i e s him a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i v e c r i t e r i a but a l s o p r e s c r i b e s general modes of treatment f o r him.. (Blackstone, 1968, p. 625) One has to accept a c e r t a i n p i c t u r e of human beings i n order to accept the p o s t u l a t i o h that they have such r i g h t s . Benn (1971) o f f e r s an i n t e r e s t i n g v a r i a t i o n on t h i s argument. He p r e f e r s to think that i t i s b e t t e r presented as an argument from equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s , rather than equal treatment. Benn does not t h i n k that t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Argument from E q u a l i t y g i v e s enough a t t e n t i o n to i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s of persons. For example, e l i t i s t m o r a l i t i e s acknowledge i n t e r e s t s of c e r t a i n groups, but i n t h e i r promotion of i n t e r e s t s of a p a r t i c u l a r group they do not give equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n to everyone's i n t e r e s t s (1971, p. 158). Thus Benn sees the need to 'have everyone's i n t e r e s t s c o n s i d e r e d a l o n g s i d e those of everyone e l s e l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n ' (1971, p. 157). We w i l l not, f o r example, be a b l e to t r e a t i m b e c i l e s i n the same way as we do other human beings, but Benn's p r i n c i p l e ensures that we w i l l s t i l l g i v e the same c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s t o l i v e a decent l i f e , as much as we would our own. Benn's argument i s u s e f u l to support c l a i m s f o r p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t s . P r i s o n e r s have committed crimes and w i l l have to be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n some r e s p e c t s from n o n - p r i s o n e r s . But, as w i l l be argued l a t e r , there are l i m i t s to t h i s d i f f e r e n t 71 treatment. Benn's p r i n c i p l e ensures that d e s p i t e t h i s d i f f e r e n t treatment, the common i n t e r e s t i n l i v i n g as a decent human being that p r i s o n e r s s t i l l share with other non-prisoners w i l l r e c e i v e a t t e n t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In other words, d e s p i t e the f a c t they w i l l be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n some unavoidable ways, t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as human beings must s t i l l be c o n s i d e r e d e q u a l l y with o t h e r s . OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Both the arguments, that i s from "Needs and I n t e r e s t s , " and "Equal Worth and D i g n i t y , " operate from the premise of man's common needs and i n t e r e s t s . I t i s only the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these needs and c a p a c i t i e s which d i f f e r s . In the Argument from Needs and I n t e r e s t s , these needs and i n t e r e s t s are u s u a l l y s p e c i f i e d as being b a s i c and fundamental requirements of man, while i n the second argument, these needs and i n t e r e s t s are seen as being a more i n t r i n s i c and i n e x t r i c a b l e part of the nature of human beings. The f i r s t argument i s a l s o a c t u a l l y the grounds of the second. In other words, the common nature of human beings i s p o s t u l a t e d as the reason why they should be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y with regard to the p r o t e c t i o n and enhancement of t h i s common nature. I think that what i s being argued f o r i s not so much the d i r e c t p r o v i s i o n of goods and s e r v i c e s as much as a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y of l i f e c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e to our d i g n i t y and s t a t u s as human beings. A l l human beings have at l e a s t some of the same basic needs and i n t e r e s t s and would enjoy a l i f e a c c o r d i n g to the standards represented by t h i s q u a l i t y of l i f e . T h i s 72 q u a l i t y of l i f e i s c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a l to m a i n t a i n i n g our d i g n i t y and respect as human bein g s . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , argued that i t i s the r i g h t of a l l human beings to be accorded the treatment which can enable them to maintain t h i s standard of l i f e . How these arguments are s t a t e d i s a l s o important. S t a t i n g that human r i g h t s are accorded because we are human, exposes us to the dangers of using t h i s nature to c l a i m t h a t we ought to have c e r t a i n r i g h t s f o r t h i s reason. T h i s i s unwarranted. I suggest that the arguments go f u r t h e r than p o s t u l a t e humanness as the b a s i s of r i g h t s , but r a t h e r , that everyone's r e q u i r i n g the same s o r t s of r i g h t s makes them 'equal.' T h i s would be the reason f o r a c c o r d i n g them s i m i l a r r i g h t s without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . There i s , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n n e c t i o n to be made between the two arguments. I t seems odd to s t a t e that a l l human beings have these common needs, e t c . , but to a c c o r d r i g h t s to only some. As C r i t t e n d e n (1976) s t a t e s : ...To a s s e r t that something i s a human r i g h t i s to p r e s c r i b e that i n t h i s respect a l l men are to be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . . . (p. 39) As M i l l e r sees i t , 'The l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of need i s the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y ' (1976, p. 143). The arguments above are u s e f u l to support the c l a i m made i n i t i a l l y i n chapter one and elsewhere that a l l human beings 73 have the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d with the d i g n i t y and respe c t of human beings. Such a r i g h t , as has j u s t emerged, i s u n q u a l i f i e d - or to use a term mentioned before - i n a l i e n a b l e . L a t e r c h a p t e r s w i l l a l s o show how the philosophy expressed i n these two arguments becomes the foundation f o r an argument to c l a i m the r i g h t to education f o r p r i s o n e r s . B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS 1. Argument from No S p e c i f i c Person/Duty Human Rights are sometimes d e f i n e d as 'a c l a i m on behalf of a l l men' (Mayo, 1967, p. 77). T h i s g i v e s r i s e to the c r i t i c i s m that there i s 'no s p e c i f i c person with a duty to give me what I have a r i g h t t o . ' The phrase ' a l l men' i s h e l d to be vague, making such c l a i m s v o i d . T h i s argument r e f l e c t s the i s s u e r a i s e d b e f o r e of the q u e s t i o n a b l e a u t h o r i t y of r i g h t s which do not have s p e c i f i c d u t i e s as c o r r e l a t e s . D i s c u s s i o n Two p o i n t s may be o f f e r e d t o counter t h i s argument: 1. Human Rights may i n c l u d e c l a i m s to wel f a r e , which would be r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s r e q u i r i n g the di s c h a r g e of d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n . But human r i g h t s can a l s o c o n t a i n r i g h t s to a c t i o n , such as the popular r i g h t to freedom which does not r e q u i r e any s p e c i f i c c o r r e l a t e beyond n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . Flathman's (1976) p o i n t may a l s o be r e c a l l e d , that although only r e q u i r i n g non-i n t e r f e r e n c e , a r i g h t remains a r i g h t . It i s p o s s i b l e that the broad category of human r i g h t s c o n t a i n a l l the kinds of r i g h t s human beings can c l a i m , and human beings can c l a i m more than one kind of r i g h t . 74 2. a) Mayo suggests that i t i s not that 'no s p e c i f i c person/persons has a duty,' but these are 'not r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e ' (1967, p. 73). Some attempts to c i t e d e f i n i t e p l a c e s and persons p l a c e s a duty on a l l human beings. Sutton (1978, p. 105) i n t r o d u c e s the n o t i o n of 'group r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ' Morin (1981) argues i t on the b a s i s of f r a t e r n a l o b l i g a t i o n , b r o t h e r l y l o v e , e t c . Flathman suggests that i n such a s i t u a t i o n , ' i t i s incumbent upon a l l members of the p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s to which he belongs to respect those r i g h t s ' (1976, p. 89). Flathman l a b e l s such members the 'Cs' and the 'Ds.' The Cs are those i n p o s i t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y , where i t i s part of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to ensure respect f o r c e r t a i n r i g h t s , f o r example, the p o l i c e (1976, p. 91). The Ds g e n e r a l l y or u s u a l l y do not h o l d such s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y ; they are those members of s o c i e t y who, although having no s p e c i f i c duty to respect c e r t a i n r i g h t s , undertake the o b l i g a t i o n to ensure respect of the r i g h t . They do so because they think they have an o b l i g a t i o n as i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , r e s p o n s i b l e c i t i z e n s , and members of the p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s . If there are enough i n t e r e s t e d Ds, they may form themselves i n t o some formal or organized body such as Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l or the B r i t i s h Columbia C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Assoc i a t i o n . Thus, t h i s counterargument accommodates r i g h t s as claims a g a i n s t everyone, and accepts them as r i g h t s even i n the absence of s p e c i f i a b l e persons to bear d u t i e s . b) Mayo promotes the idea that 'agents of government' 75 (1967, p. 79) have to perform d u t i e s on behalf of a l l c i t i z e n s . I t i s thus the St a t e ' s duty o f : .. . s e c u r i n g and guaranteeing, to the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e number of persons, the e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e development of the c a p a c i t i e s of p e r s o n a l i t y . . . (Barker, p. 136) T h i s argument r e f l e c t s the debate between those who contend that r i g h t s ought to engender s t r i c t d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n or non-i n t e r f e r e n c e , and those who hold that i t i s s u f f i c i e n t that r i g h t s have other c o r o l l a r i e s . Support or r e j e c t i o n of human r i g h t s depends on which view of r i g h t s one supports. 2. Argument from U n i v e r s a l i t y The arguments f o r human r i g h t s s t r e s s that r i g h t s being claimed f o r human beings on the grounds of t h e i r being human beings have to be c l a i m a b l e f o r everyone. They have to be the 'the r i g h t s of a l l people at a l l times i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ' (Cranston, 1967, p. 49). In the minds of some, t h i s requirement i s so onerous as to make such, claims untenable. I t i s argued, t h e r e f o r e , that human r i g h t s cannot a s p i r e to the s t a t e of being v a l i d r i g h t s . D i s c u s s i o n I t h i n k human r i g h t s are u n i v e r s a l - - t o the extent that they are recommended goals that everyone ought to t r y to a t t a i n , 'a common standard of achievement f o r a l l peoples and nat i o n s ' 76 (Benn and P e t e r s , 1959, p. 101). Advocating r i g h t s f o r human beings on the grounds that they are human beings means that we would l i k e to see these r i g h t s a t t a i n e d by a l l human beings. That they cannot always be so a t t a i n e d does not mean they are dubious r i g h t s . Summary T h i s review of how human r i g h t s can be j u s t i f i e d has helped us a n t i c i p a t e the s t r a t e g i e s f o r j u s t i f y i n g the r i g h t to educati o n , e s p e c i a l l y f o r p r i s o n e r s . A p a r t i c u l a r l y worthwhile argument i s the "Argument from Equal Worth and D i g n i t y . " C. ARGUMENTS FOR PERSON RIGHTS Person R i g h t s are a l l o c a t e d to persons on the b a s i s of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s they possess. Human beings possess c e r t a i n common i d e n t i f y i n g t r a i t s . These can be used sometimes to j u s t i f y treatment and a c t i o n s d i f f e r e n t from others who do not have these, f o r example, animals. There are some f e a t u r e s , however, which some, but not a l l , human beings possess. Person r i g h t s d e r i v e from such f e a t u r e s . They are s p e c i f i c r i g h t s a l l o c a t e d to competent a d u l t human beings, that i s , r a t i o n a l agents who are able to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s : ...The s p e c i a l f e a t u r e of persons seems to provide a ground for a s p e c i a l set of moral c l a i m s ( n a t u r a l or human r i g h t s ) which are a p p r o p r i a t e only f o r such c r e a t u r e s and not for any other animals... 77 (Murphy, 1978, p. 231) Kerr holds that c e r t a i n 'person' r i g h t s are grounded i n 'conceptions of what i t i s to be a person.' She c o n s i d e r s these as 'minimal l i b e r t i e s or e n t i t l e m e n t s . ' They enable us to l i v e 'not j u s t i n a raw, p h y s i c a l sense,' but a l s o i n a 'normatively loaded sense that c u l t u r a l l y and s o c i a l l y based d e f i n i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e ' (1978, p. 169). We are not merely b i o l o g i c a l organisms, but are a l s o 'purposing, s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e ' moral agents ( K l e i n i g , 1978, p. 30). D i s c u s s i o n T h i s argument can be c r i t i c i z e d i n the same way as the "Argument From Needs and I n t e r e s t s " used t o j u s t i f y Human R i g h t s . In s h o r t , the same u n q u a l i f i e d " n a t u r a l i s t i c " l e a p i s made, an e m p i r i c a l premise leads to a normative c o n c l u s i o n . Melden p r o v i d e s a d i f f e r e n t route of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . F eatures of persons s t i l l remain the b a s i s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . But the s p e c t r e of the N a t u r a l i s t i c F a l l a c y i s removed because r i g h t s are seen as a pa r t of these f e a t u r e s . Consequently: . . . i t i s l o g i c a l l y i m p ossible f o r anyone, o n e s e l f , or anyone e l s e to do anything that would d e p r i v e one of t h i s moral p o s s e s s i o n without d e p r i v i n g one of one's s t a t u s as a person... (1977, p. 167) Melden sees human beings as moral agents and persons l i v i n g i n a moral community. There i s one b a s i c r i g h t which these 78 moral agents have, the r i g h t to 'pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s ' (Melden, 1977, p. 167). T h i s r i g h t i s t i e d to t h e i r unique nature as moral agents. The problem I have with t h i s argument i s that I am u n c e r t a i n whether Melden c a t e g o r i z e s human beings as d i f f e r e n t from persons. He does s t a t e that t h i s b a s i c r i g h t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from other human r i g h t s , because these other human r i g h t s are the r e s u l t of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Examples would be the r i g h t to medical a i d , e d u c a t i o n , e t c . Put b r i e f l y , Melden's view appears to be there i s one b a s i c , fundamental, i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t which persons/human beings have - that i s the r i g h t to pursue one's own i n t e r e s t - and other human r i g h t s which are the r e s u l t of s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e s . Only the former i s bound up with our s t a t u s as human beings. CONCLUSION TO "JUSTIFICATION OF RIGHTS" With regard f i r s t to human r i g h t s , they have been c a t e g o r i z e d and j u s t i f i e d as r i g h t s which human beings can c l a i m because they r e q u i r e these r i g h t s to be human beings. Education i s commonly c a t e g o r i z e d i n t h i s way. I t i s suggested, however, that education i s more a p p r o p r i a t e l y a person r i g h t . Human r i g h t s are u s u a l l y b a s i c r i g h t s claimed f o r human beings on the grounds of needs and i n t e r e s t s . While everyone might be able to b e n e f i t from a ba s i c education, t h i s e d u c a t i o n can be accomplished only a f t e r the b a s i c p h y s i c a l amenities have been taken care o f . Education cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be a " b a s i c " human r i g h t . I t i s p o s s i b l y best viewed as a contingent r i g h t . I have chosen to view human r i g h t s broadly as a l l or any 79 r i g h t s proper f o r human beings to have. Person r i g h t s would be subsumed under t h i s category. But I have a l s o chosen to view them i n a more 'narrow' way, when I suggest that the only r i g h t a human being might c l a i m as a human being, i s the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d with d i g n i t y and r e s p e c t . I t i s p o s s i b l e to regard such a r i g h t as e s s e n t i a l because i t p r e s c r i b e s the l i m i t s to p o s s i b l e i n d i g n i t i e s we can s u f f e r as human beings. T h i s r i g h t can never be ignored, and w i l l always be r e l e v a n t i n the treatment of human beings. I t i s thus ' i n a l i e n a b l e . ' Such a view of human r i g h t s , and of t h i s r i g h t i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s c e n t r a l to the t h e s i s , because of the premise that p r i s o n e r s have the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d f a i r l y and with d i g n i t y and r e s p e c t . I t i s a l s o a premise that p r i s o n e r s are persons. A category of person r i g h t s has a l s o to be accounted f o r , which only persons as r e s p o n s i b l e agents can c l a i m . While 'we recognize almost a l l human beings as persons,' we a l s o 'recognize c o n d i t i o n s that exempt human beings from personhood' (Dennett, 1976, p. 175), f o r i n s t a n c e , being t o t a l l y insane, or i r r e v e r s i b l y comatose. Persons as r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s can and must have r i g h t s by which they can e x e r c i s e t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . They a l s o r e q u i r e a c e r t a i n range of freedom that ought to be pe r m i t t e d a r e s p o n s i b l e person who would i d e a l l y use t h i s freedom with d i s c r e t i o n . T h i s does not mean that persons need r i g h t s to demonstrate t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Rather, r i g h t s are pa r t of t h e i r personhood, as much as being r e s p o n s i b l e i s . I t i s as 80 though they r e q u i r e r i g h t s i n order to be to be able to act r e s p o n s i b l y as r e s p o n s i b l e agents. T h i s i s why Flathman c i t e s as a 'paradigm' r i g h t - h o l d e r i n d i v i d u a l s who are capable of ' s e l f - d i r e c t e d , a s s e r t i v e conduct' (1976, p. 72). CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTER In t h i s chapter I have d i s c u s s e d some t h i n g s we need to know about r i g h t s to c a r r y the t h e s i s forward. One concern of the d i s s e r t a t i o n has been the q u e s t i o n whether a r i g h t to education can improve the q u a l i t y of p e n i t e n t i a r y e d u c a t i o n . Thus we needed to i n v e s t i g a t e what r i g h t s are, and what they can do. We a l s o needed to note some of the problems i n v o l v e d i n c l a i m i n g such a r i g h t , as w e l l as some of the grounds f o r j u s t i f y i n g t h i s r i g h t . 81 IV. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION Chapter three explored the nature of r i g h t s and how one co u l d j u s t i f y v a r i o u s kinds of r i g h t s . I t i s assumed that i f good grounds can be found for c l a i m i n g that p r i s o n e r s have a r i g h t to educat i o n , a l a r g e p a r t of the case f o r making t h i s r i g h t a l e g a l r i g h t would have been e s t a b l i s h e d . T h i s chapter examines the arguments u s u a l l y advanced to e s t a b l i s h such a r i g h t . I t begins with an e x p l i c a t i o n of the concept of educat i o n . THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION The concept of education d i s c u s s e d here i s not unique to p r i s o n e r s . However, what i s envisaged f o r p r i s o n e r s , by way of content or programs, while based on such a concept, must be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r p r i s o n e r s . As a n a l y z e d by Peters (1966), and H i r s t and Pete r s (1970), what i s d i s t i n c t i v e about the concept of education i s that i t embodies the c r i t e r i a which can be used to d i s t i n g u i s h processes, a c t i v i t i e s , aims, end-products as e d u c a t i o n a l . P e t e r s argues that c e r t a i n ' s p e c i f i c achievements and s t a t e s of mind' (1966, p. 5) form the b a s i s by which one can i d e n t i f y a person as 'educated': ...The c e n t r a l cases of ed u c a t i o n are cases i n which the i n d i v i d u a l who i s being educated i s being l e d or induced to come up to some standard; to achieve something... (166, p. 16) 82 The c r i t e r i a recommended ar e : (1) ...that 'education' i m p l i e s the t r a n s m i s s i o n of what i s worthwhile to those who become committed to i t ; (2) that 'education' must i n v o l v e knowledge and understanding and some kind of c o g n i t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e which are not i n e r t ; . . . (1966, p. 20) These c r i t e r i a i n d i c a t e what educated persons are l i k e : 1. They possess knowledge, both i n depth and breadth of understanding. T h i s means t h a t , a s i d e from p o s s e s s i n g a body of knowledge as a mere c o l l e c t i o n of f a c t s , they a l s o possess the necessary 'conceptual scheme' by which they can have 'some understanding of the "reason why" of t h i n g s ' ( P e t e r s , 1966, p. 8). Educated persons h o l d a ' c o g n i t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e ' (p. 12). They are transformed by what they know. The knowledge they possess makes a d i f f e r e n c e to t h e i r outlook on l i f e . I t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e i r 'way of l o o k i n g at t h i n g s ' (p. 8). Educated persons a l s o care about being able to give reasons and evidence to support what they know. 2. The knowledge i s made up of t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d worthwhile and d e s i r a b l e . These c r i t e r i a emphasize t h a t , while knowledge i s important, how one possesses i t , and what one i s able to do with i t , are a l s o important. C r i t t e n d e n (1973) supports such a view: ...Education i s d i r e c t l y concerned not simply 83 with d i s c r e t e bodies of knowledge . . . but with the way they f i t together i n the experience of the l e a r n e r , and with the i n f l u e n c e of t h i s . on the outlook and the manner of a c t i n g that c o n s t i t u t e a person's l i f e s t y l e . . . (p. 12) S c h e f f l e r (1973, p. 60) maintains that education aims to 'humanize and c i v i l i z e , ' while H i r s t and P e t e r s (1970, p. 57) a s s e r t that an educated person possesses not only c e r t a i n 'human e x c e l l e n c e s ' such as autonomy, i n t e g r i t y , but a l s o some 'knowledge and understanding' upon which these are based. Both P e t e r s (1966) and S c h e f f l e r (1973) a l s o d i s c u s s c r i t e r i a f o r the assessment of the mode or modes used i n e f f o r t s to educate people. These are e s s e n t i a l l y moral c r i t e r i a . While they are important to a f u l l understanding of the concept of educati o n , they are l e s s c e n t r a l to the t h e s i s and w i l l not f u r t h e r be d i s c u s s e d . Peters' (1966) approach to t h i s concept i s r e l e v a n t f o r p r i s o n e r s . The i m p l i c a t i o n s which are p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l f o r p r i s o n e r s l i e i n : 1. The n o t i o n of an educated p e r s p e c t i v e as a transformed outlook on l i f e 2. The no t i o n of education as worthwhile and d e s i r a b l e Education can provide p r i s o n e r s with what they might have missed i n the way of knowledge e s s e n t i a l to s u r v i v a l i n modern s o c i e t y . I t can a l s o p r o v i d e the chance to develop c r i t i c a l thought, and independent judgement: 84 ...Education serves both to pass on the v a r i e d h a b i t s of mind that make up c i v i l i z e d c u l t u r e and, at the same time, to form . autonomous p a r t i c i p a n t [ s ] i n that c u l t u r e . . . ( S c h e f f l e r , 1973, p. 60) This account by P e t e r s and others of the concept of education i s not simply t h e i r ideas of what education i s . They a l s o amount to a r e f i n e d a n a l y s i s and coherent r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the way one important sense of the concept of education f i g u r e s i m p o r t a n t l y i n our language. Thus, by "education," I w i l l mean e f f o r t s to h e l p people a t t a i n the a b i l i t i e s and d i s p o s i t i o n s needed to meet the s o r t of c r i t e r i a these authors have i d e n t i f i e d . 'We would not c a l l a person 'educated' who had not developed along such l i n e s ' ( P e t e r s , 1966, p. 5). There are other senses of e d u c a t i o n . Two are p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to produce c o n f u s i o n about what i s meant by a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . One i s the sense in which we engage i n education i n order to prepare o u r s e l v e s f o r a trade or o c c u p a t i o n . In many cases, i t i s more a p p r o p r i a t e to c a l l t h i s " t r a i n i n g . " But i t too i s a c r i t e r i a l sense of e d u c a t i o n — i n t h i s case the c r i t e r i a are those r e q u i r e d to perform w e l l i n an o c c u p a t i o n . It i s a l s o p o s s i b l e that t r a i n i n g programs encapsulate broader e d u c a t i o n a l g o a l s . As mentioned i n chapter one, i t i s p o s s i b l e that the conveyance of s k i l l s be accompanied by e f f o r t s to broaden the mental and i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a c i t i e s of l e a r n e r s . In t h i s way, t r a i n i n g programs in v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s or l i t e r a c y can be c o n s i d e r e d as e d u c a t i o n — i f they i n c o r p o r a t e e d u c a t i o n a l g o a l s . 85 The other sense i s the i n s t i t u t i o n a l sense—where the term "education" i s used, f o r example, to r e f e r to a school system. When we ask, f o r example, 'Have they completed t h e i r education?', we may mean roughly 'Have they passed a l l the grades i n the s c h o o l system?' It i s not always easy to t e l l whether or not people who have w r i t t e n about r i g h t s to education have intended the o c c u p a t i o n a l or the educated person (EP) sense of e d u c a t i o n . Indeed there can be c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r l a p between these two senses of e d u c a t i o n . A c q u i r i n g b a s i c l i t e r a c y , f o r example, i s u s u a l l y a step toward both. And some occupations (lawyers, perhaps) r e q u i r e q u i t e advanced education i n the educated person sense to succeed. Unless there i s c l e a r evidence to the c o n t r a r y i n what they have w r i t t e n , I w i l l assume that they are t a l k i n g e i t h e r about education (EP) or those c r i t e r i a of the o c c u p a t i o n a l sense which are the same as the EP sense. In any event, I am not here p r i m a r i l y concerned with a s s e s s i n g the m e r i t s of arguments f o r a r i g h t to education i n e i t h e r the o c c u p a t i o n a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l senses. I am concerned with whether or not i t can be shown to be d e f e n s i b l e to have a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n - - i n the sense analyzed by P e t e r s , and adhered t o , i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . Education, in t h i s sense, can be achieved to v a r y i n g degrees or ' l e v e l s . ' One can be more or l e s s educated. What i s e s s e n t i a l i s t h a t programs, whatever t h e i r c o n t e n t , ' c o n t a i n elements which are l i k e l y to produce (given a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the part of the student) an i n c r e a s i n g a b i l i t y to meet the c r i t e r i a of educated persons. 86 For example, a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of o u t l o o k , a reaching of h e i g h t s never dreamt of, supposedly d e p i c t s an educated person (Peters, 1966, p. 178). The s p e c i f i c p e n i t e n t i a r y programs run f i r s t by the U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , and l a t t e r l y by Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , are examples of such an e d u c a t i o n . However, l i t e r a c y and v o c a t i o n a l programs which e x i s t w i t h i n the c o r r e c t i o n s system may count as part of a p r i s o n e r s ' education provided they seek to meet the a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i a . A. ARGUMENTS FOR THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 1. Argument by ' d e r i v a t i o n ' T h i s argument might be termed as a " d e r i v a t i v e " argument because i t attempts to j u s t i f y a r i g h t to education by showing that i t i s i m p l i c i t i n other s o r t s of human or welfare r i g h t s . It i s p o s t u l a t e d that human beings have needs which must be met i f they are to s u r v i v e and l i v e a l i f e worth l i v i n g . I t i s f u r t h e r claimed that they have r i g h t s to whatever f a c i l i t i e s are necessary to secure such a l i f e . E ducation i s claimed as one of these f a c i l i t i e s . At l e a s t a minimal l e v e l of education i s v i t a l to our s u r v i v a l and our chances f o r l i v i n g a decent l i f e . Bandman s t a t e s that the only hope there i s to get a ' f u l l r i g h t to an education' i s to get more r i g h t s ' i n ' education (1977, p. 296). These would be r i g h t s which ' i n v o l v e or imply an education,' such as 'the u n i v e r s a l r i g h t to a job, to s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . ' A l l of these imply 'the d e r i v a t i v e r i g h t to education' (p. 291). S i m i l a r l y , Imber and Namenson argue fo r a 'set of f a c t s and s k i l l s which a l l persons have a r i g h t to have 87 the o p p o r t u n i t y to l e a r n ' (1983, p. 105). These are e s s e n t i a l to the l e a r n i n g of f u r t h e r s k i l l s , and to coping with the c o m p l e x i t i e s of modern l i f e . The r i g h t to education i s thus d e r i v e d from the most fundamental of a l l r i g h t s - - t h e r i g h t to l i f e . D i s c u s s i o n In t h i s argument, education i s being j u s t i f i e d under some major category of r i g h t . What would happen i f these c a t e g o r i e s themselves are s u b j e c t to c r i t i c i s m ? For example, education i s c a t e g o r i z e d o f t e n as a human r i g h t . But i t has been seen that human r i g h t s are o f t e n c r i t i c i z e d as being i m p r a c t i c a l , e t c . To pla c e education w i t h i n these c a t e g o r i e s i s to render i t s u b j e c t to the same c r i t i c i s m . For example, a b e l i e f i n the r i g h t to education must be preceded by a b e l i e f i n a r i g h t to r e a l i z e the 'economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l r i g h t s i n d i s p e n s a b l e ' f o r our ' d i g n i t y ' and ' f r e e development' of our p e r s o n a l i t y ( O l a f s o n , 1973, p. 173). Arguments forwarded to j u s t i f y education as an i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t on i t s own merit are u n l i k e l y to be s u f f i c i e n t . The r i g h t to e ducation i s contingent upon a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l c o n t e x t — 'dependent on the c o n d i t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n and time' (Imber and Namenson, 1983, p. 103). T h i s f a c t i s a reason f o r a l l o c a t i n g education 'second f i d d l e ' or 'secondary s t a t u s ' (See the "Argument from R e l a t i v e Importance" i n the s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d , "Arguments Agains t the Right to Education" l a t e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r ) . E d u c a t i o n , as we saw i n chapter t h r e e , can never be a fundamental r i g h t . I t i s not necessary, f o r example, f o r 88 p h y s i c a l s u r v i v a l . What might be maintained, i n s t e a d , i s that although education can never be fundamental, or b a s i c , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s can be j u s t i f i e d as a 'second group' r i g h t (Imber and Namenson, 1983, p. 103). Assuming that fundamental and b a s i c needs such as food and water have been s a t i s f i e d , then persons have grounds for c l a i m i n g r i g h t s to develop and enhance the q u a l i t y of l i f e , or to a v o i d what might be c a l l e d " s o c i a l death." In other words, education i s j u s t i f i e d as a contingent r i g h t , not a d e r i v a t i v e one. 2. Argument from Needs and I n t e r e s t s T h i s argument attempts to j u s t i f y education on i t s own m e r i t s , and not as a r i g h t belonging to another more major category. Education i s viewed as a t o o l necessary to equip man with whatever s k i l l s and a b i l i t i e s he needs to s u r v i v e , or to develop h i m s e l f , as a human being. To quote Bandman, 'Education i s v i t a l to one's complete development, m o r a l l y and o c c u p a t i o n a l l y and to the q u a l i t y of one's l i f e ' (1977, p. 291). T h i s i m p l i e s that one needs education i n order to be a b l e to s u r v i v e . Imber and Namenson c i t e 'Chief J u s t i c e Warren's encomium i n Brown vs. Board of Education (1954 at 493) ' t h a t : ...In these days, i t i s d o u b t f u l that any c h i l d may reasonably be expected to succeed i n l i f e i f he i s denied the o p p o r t u n i t y of an e d u c a t i o n . . . (1984, p; 107) C r i t t e n d e n sees some s o r t of process of education as 89 e s s e n t i a l to i n i t i a t e members of s o c i e t y i n t o the ways of l i f e , understanding, and meanings of s o c i e t y (1973, p. 47). He does not c o n s i d e r education a luxury or an 'adornment,' but a 'necessary i n g r e d i e n t ' (p. 47) to being a human being. He t h i n k s a c e r t a i n form of l i b e r a l education so v i t a l f o r human e x i s t e n c e , that everyone 'should have an adequate o p p o r t u n i t y to engage i n some form of l i b e r a l e ducation' (p. 47). He b e l i e v e s that one ought to be at l e a s t exposed or allowed the op p o r t u n i t y to be i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h i s form of education, i n order that one can r e a l i z e o n e s e l f ' s i g n i f i c a n t l y qua human.' Everyone ought to have the r i g h t to at l e a s t o p p o r t u n i t i e s to be exposed to such a form of ed u c a t i o n . I t i s d e f i n i t e l y i n the i n t e r e s t s of most people to r e c e i v e a b a s i c e d u c a t i o n . The problem i s that many people get by without such an education. Does one r e q u i r e an education to ob t a i n food and water? I t i s a l s o i n the i n t e r e s t of a needy stranger to be given ten d o l l a r s , but ' i t i s h a r d l y p l a u s i b l e that he has a r i g h t to i t ' (Melden, 1979, p. 105). Even though i t might be acknowledged that one i s i n d i r e need of something, that something can be provided without i t s being a r i g h t of that person. Needs do not imply r i g h t s . To respond to t h i s , one c o u l d suggest, as before, that while there i s perhaps no r i g h t as such to educat i o n , because one i s a person (or p o t e n t i a l person) with these same b a s i c needs and i n t e r e s t s as a l l persons, one should have the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s as anyone e l s e to s a t i s f y them. T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s , as i t were, the b a s i c r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n — e q u a l i t y of 90 e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y . I t does not e s t a b l i s h any spec i a l c l a i m s which might be made by p a r t i c u l a r persons or groups of persons. Such a r a t i o n a l e underpins the next argument. 3. Argument from E q u a l i t y T h i s argument r e s t s upon the assumed e q u a l i t y of a l l human beings i n terms of i n t r i n s i c value and worth, and in the po s s e s s i o n of c e r t a i n b a s i c needs and i n t e r e s t s . T h i s e n t i t l e s them e i t h e r to c e r t a i n r i g h t s which everybody has, or at l e a s t the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s as everybody e l s e to f u l f i l those e s s e n t i a l requirements to t h e i r l i v e s as human beings. I f education i s being provided, i t should be made a v a i l a b l e to everyone, unless there i s a r e l e v a n t reason to the c o n t r a r y . Such reasoning i s seen as 'the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of m o r a l i t y , i f not r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f (Wasserstom, 1971, p. 117). It i s ' i r r a t i o n a l ' to deny to persons the same s o r t s of goods and s e r v i c e s , u n l e s s r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s can be found to d i s t i n g u i s h them: . . . I f p a r t i c u l a r e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s are p r o v i d e d to any of s o c i e t y ' s members, they become - under s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s -the r i g h t of a l l members of the s o c i e t y . . . (Imber and Namenson, 1983, p. 97) Thus, although education i s not a r i g h t per se, a l l i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n a s o c i e t y have a r i g h t to equal access to e d u c a t i o n — a n d t h i s on the grounds that everyone has the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d 91 f a i r l y . P i s c u s s i o n T h i s argument does not c l a i m a d i r e c t r i g h t to edu c a t i o n . I t excludes c l a i m s to s p e c i f i c goods l i k e e d u c a t i o n a l programs, c a l l i n g i n s t e a d f o r ' u n q u a l i f i e d access f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l s to a l l e d u c a t i o n a l programs' (Imber and Namenson, 1983, p. 98). I t c l a i m s that i f education i s being made a v a i l a b l e , then everyone has the r i g h t to the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s as the next person i n o b t a i n i n g t h i s e d u c a t i o n . Everyone possesses c e r t a i n common p r o p e r t i e s , among them some c a p a c i t y to b e n e f i t from ed u c a t i o n . As such, everyone has the same r i g h t of o p p o r t u n i t y of access to t h i s e d u c a t i o n . If education i s one of the f a c t o r s i n the development of human beings, a f a c t o r i n the progress s o c i e t y makes, then everyone who possesses the f e a t u r e s of being l i k e l y to b e n e f i t from such advantages ought to have the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s to r e c e i v e these a d v a n t a g e s — i f they are being made a v a i l a b l e to o t h e r s . T h i s n o t i o n of a common p l a t f o r m of needs, i n t e r e s t s , d i g n i t y , worth and value i s an a p p r o p r i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . I t makes i t a 'grave a f f r o n t to j u s t i c e ' (Cranston, 1967, p. 52) to exclude p r i s o n e r s from the same s o r t s of o p p o r t u n i t i e s as other human beings. T h i s argument w i l l be d i s c u s s e d again i n chapter f i v e . 4. Argument from Roles Education can a l s o equip persons to cope with c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c r o l e s . For example, a teacher r e q u i r e s some kind of education i n teaching s k i l l s to f a c i l i t a t e her r o l e as teacher. 92 In the same way, i t i s sometimes suggested that human beings have r o l e s as human beings. Two such r o l e s are that of c i t i z e n and r e s p o n s i b l e moral agent. The education that i s r e q u i r e d i n order t h a t the f u l l p o t e n t i a l of these r o l e s can be f u l f i l l e d i s c o n s i d e r e d as a r i g h t , because one cannot expect persons to operate f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y i n these r o l e s without p r o v i d i n g them the o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o develop the c a p a c i t i e s f o r doing so. D i s c u s s i o n The problem with t h i s argument i s that the r o l e of c i t i z e n , e t c . , i s not the only r o l e that human beings have. We do not have r i g h t s to the educa t i o n and knowledge necessary to f u l f i l a l l our r o l e s . Reference to "The Argument from Equal O p p o r t u n i t y " might solve t h i s problem. The Argument s t a t e s that everyone should have the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s as everyone e l s e to the education that i s p r o v i d e d . For example, we do not have r i g h t s to be d o c t o r s . But we do have the r i g h t to the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to be d o c t o r s i n that medical education i s pro v i d e d . Although such o p p o r t u n i t i e s are a v a i l a b l e , however, many w i l l not be able to use them because they are unable to meet the standards c o n s i d e r e d as r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y . 5. Arguments from D u t i e s a) Argument from the S o c i a l C o n t r a c t b) Argument by B i r t h The o v e r a l l t h r u s t of these arguments i s to rebut the disavowal of education as a r i g h t because there can be no c o r o l l a r y duty to pr o v i d e e d u c a t i o n . These arguments attempt a defence of education by c i t i n g examples of p l a u s i b l e duty-93 h o l d e r s , such as the government, s o c i e t y i n g e n e r a l , and generations of s o c i e t y . a) Argument from The S o c i a l Contract T h i s argument i s founded upon c e r t a i n r i g h t s being bestowed as the r e s u l t of an "agreement" between s o c i e t y and i t s members. P e f f e r proposes a category of r i g h t s c a l l e d " ' S o c i a l Contract R i g h t s ' " which belong to i n d i v i d u a l s by v i r t u e of t h e i r being members of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y at a p a r t i c u l a r time' (1978, p. 65). These r i g h t s are guaranteed us by the s o c i e t y i n which we l i v e , 'given the p r i n c i p l e s of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e and other b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s . ' Examples are the ' r i g h t to a f r e e education, to adequate h e a l t h care, to a f a i r t r i a l ' (1978, p. 66). One c o u l d a l s o e x p l a i n t h i s agreement which s o c i e t y has with i t s members i n the f o l l o w i n g way. S o c i e t y , or the s t a t e , undertakes to educate i t s c i t i z e n s so that they can be r e s p o n s i b l e and c o n t r i b u t i n g members of s o c i e t y / t h e s t a t e . I t would b e n e f i t the s t a t e / s o c i e t y to have such members. They t h e r e f o r e have a duty to educate c i t i z e n s , which p r o v i d e s c i t i z e n s with grounds f o r c l a i m i n g a r i g h t to t h i s education which can b e n e f i t the s t a t e of which they are members. What b e n e f i t s the s t a t e and s o c i e t y supposedly b e n e f i t s the members who c o n s t i t u t e i t . A form of t h i s argument occurs i n "The Argument from B e n e f i t s to the C o l l e c t i v e " i n chapter f i v e . A v e r s i o n of i t a l s o appeared i n the p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d "Argument from Roles." D i s c u s s i o n The main d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s argument i s that i t may 94 presume too much on the i n c l i n a t i o n of many governments to undertake such t a s k s . I t a l s o assumes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources to educate c i t i z e n s . I t i s as though the presence of governments presupposes and f u l l y guarantees the r i g h t , or i s a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r the r i g h t . But even e f f e c t i v e governments do not always have the resources to guarantee access to educ a t i o n . At best, then, t h i s argument makes i t p o s s i b l e to make cl a i m s upon governments to make education a p r i o r i t y when times are p r o p i t i o u s , and resources are a v a i l a b l e . P r i s o n e r s , f o r example, might use t h i s argument to c l a i m adequate education f o r themselves i f the government appears to have adequate re s o u r c e s , and i s extending these to other members of s o c i e t y , b) Argument by B i r t h O l a f s o n (1973) t h i n k s that there i s a duty c o r r e l a t i v e with b r i n g i n g a c h i l d i n t o the world to nurture and n o u r i s h i t . There i s , i n h i s o p i n i o n , a l s o a c o l l e c t i v e duty i n c u r r e d by members of a s e n i o r generation - who have managed to reach adulthood only through someone f u l f i l l i n g the duty to tend to them - to r e t u r n the compliment by c a r i n g and p r o v i d i n g f o r the succeeding g e n e r a t i o n . D i s c u s s i o n A flaw with t h i s argument i s t h a t i t d e a l s with education only as a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t , r e q u i r i n g 'the p o s i t i v e support and expenditure of re s o u r c e s ' (1973, p. 175). T h i s overlooks that aspect of educa t i o n as an a c t i o n r i g h t , r e q u i r i n g only non-i n t e r f e r e n c e , i f needs be. T h i s argument may a l s o be more 95 a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c h i l d r e n , but not so f o r p r i s o n e r s as a d u l t persons. I f we h o l d someone to. be s u f f i c i e n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to f e e l i t l e g i t i m a t e to i n c a r c e r a t e them f o r what they have done, we are a l r e a d y r e g a r d i n g them a_s persons. They w i l l thus need s p e c i f i c a l l y an education to improve them and even reform them, but not the nurture or c a r i n g that we o f f e r to c h i l d r e n . There might be p r i s o n e r s who are immature or i l l i t e r a t e , but our t h e s i s concerns p r i s o n e r s as r e s p o n s i b l e agents. Another problem a r i s e s from the duty we might have to be educated. It has been r e i t e r a t e d that having a duty to do something does not e r a d i c a t e our r i g h t to i t . A duty e s p e c i a l l y a moral duty - can superscede the p r a c t i c e of a r i g h t . Before being able to c l a i m the f u l l freedom of e x e r c i s i n g one's r i g h t to education, one might f i r s t have a duty to submit to a form of education to teach us how to be r e s p o n s i b l e about our r i g h t , and which i s an e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e to c l a i m i n g our r i g h t . T h i s q u e s t i o n of d u t i e s , however, i s not only problematic i n i t s e l f , i t a l s o r a i s e s d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s which I cannot d i s c u s s here because I am i n v e s t i g a t i n g r i g h t s to education, not d u t i e s . The Argument might be u s e f u l i f we i n c l u d e p r i s o n e r s i n the category of the 'generation' which i s to r e c e i v e e d u c a t i o n , that i s , the g e n e r a t i o n which r e q u i r e s the h e l p of the o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n to r e c e i v e an education to h e l p them mature, grow, develop. I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e that i f p r i s o n e r s leave p r i s o n as educated persons, they w i l l c o n s i d e r i t t h e i r duty to h e l p others as w e l l , thus f u l f i l l i n g the c o n t r a c t between 96 g e n e r a t i o n s . B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 1. Argument from D u t i e s (or the Nature of Education) T h i s argument r e v o l v e s around the a l l e g e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between r i g h t s and d u t i e s . The problem was sketched p r e v i o u s l y in the s e c t i o n on "The Nature and Meaning of R i g h t s . " I t i s a l s o the crux of an argument a g a i n s t human r i g h t s e n t i t l e d "Argument from No S p e c i f i c Persons/Duties." The u n d e r l y i n g premise i s that r i g h t s must incur d u t i e s - - s p e c i f i c d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n . While there may be c e r t a i n r i g h t s such as the r i g h t to p r o p e r t y where the duty of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e s u f f i c e s , e d ucation, however, ' r e q u i r e s the p o s i t i v e support and expenditure of resources by o t h e r s ' (Olafson, 1973, p. 175): ...Any case we c o n s t r u c t with a view to showing that there i s a r i g h t to education must be a case showing that some person/persons have a duty to support and a s s i s t the education of the persons f o r whom the r i g h t i s claimed... (p. 175) The problem with education i s that i t i s not p o s s i b l e to see where these d u t i e s f a l l . D i s c u s s i o n T h i s argument r e s t s upon a p e r c e p t i o n of education as a r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . However, as I have argued p r e v i o u s l y when the same c r i t i c i s m was made of human r i g h t s , r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s are 97 not the only v a l i d category of r i g h t s . D u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n are a l s o not the only v a l i d c o r o l l a r i e s of r i g h t s . And with s p e c i f i c regard to education, i t must a l s o be remembered that the 'Janus' nature of education renders i t c a t e g o r i z e a b l e as both an a c t i o n and r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . I have a l s o c o n s i d e r e d p r e v i o u s l y whether the S t a t e , as the agency which imprisons persons, can be regarded as the agency which should c a r r y c o r r e l a t i v e d u t i e s , e t c . , should p r i s o n e r s be granted a r i g h t to educat i o n . 2. Argument from R e l a t i v e Importance T h i s argument claims that education possesses only secondary importance. I t always has to concede to more urgent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The importance of education i s acknowledged as an instrument of development and progress, but t h i s importance i s subordinate to - i f , indeed, not dependent on - other concerns. A r i g h t to education (even at the b a s i c l e v e l ) w i l l be d e f e n s i b l e only when persons or s o c i e t i e s have reached a c e r t a i n l e v e l of p h y s i c a l comfort and/or development. As d e s c r i b e d i n the s e c t i o n on c a t e g o r i e s of r i g h t s i n chapter t h r e e , education can be p e r c e i v e d as a c o n t i n g e n t r i g h t because i t s award i s dependent upon circumstances and s i t u a t i o n s . I t can a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d as being prima f a c i e because there i s u n c e r t a i n t y about i t s s t a t u s or i t s e x e r c i s e . The a u t h e n t i c i t y of such r i g h t s i s c h a l l e n g e d . I t i s argued that w i t h i n the economy of a c u l t u r e , i t s demands have such a f r a g i l e b a s i s , that i t would be m i s l e a d i n g to c a l l i t a r i g h t . A r i g h t to education i s thus r e j e c t e d because i t i s s u b j e c t to 98 supplanting--and r i g h t s are not r i g h t s , i t i s argued, i f they can be so e a s i l y d i s m i s s e d . D i s c u s s i o n Two counterarguments are p o s s i b l e . R i g h t s to e q u a l i t y of access to education cannot be so e a s i l y d i s m i s s e d , because they represent a s p e c i a l aspect of a fundamental r i g h t to j u s t i c e . And i f i t were necessary to make such r i g h t s l e g a l r i g h t s there would be, at l e a s t prima f a c i e , strong grounds to j u s t i f y them. Where the q u e s t i o n i s one of ' p r a c t i c a l i t y , ' I have have alr e a d y granted that a r i g h t to education i s a c i r c u m s t a n t i a l r i g h t . Thus the most that t h i s argument shows i s that sometimes other t h i n g s may be more important than e d u c a t i o n . But t h i s does not c a s t a s p e r s i o n s upon education, or the r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . A l e g a l r i g h t t o education can be granted without i t s being e x e r c i s e d - - f o r whatever reason. The same goes for a l l other r i g h t s . OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION The major arguments a g a i n s t a r i g h t to education r e s t mainly upon c l a i m s t h a t : i ) No persons can be found upon whom to p l a c e the necessary duty of p r o v i s i o n i i ) E d u c a t i o n i s only of secondary importance to the welfare or s u r v i v a l of persons These arguments show c l e a r l y how ways of c a t e g o r i z i n g the r i g h t to education i n f l u e n c e the d i r e c t i o n of one's argument. As we have j u s t seen, some of these ways of c a t e g o r i z i n g education are o b s t a c l e s to the r e c o g n i t i o n of education as a 99 genuine r i g h t . One need not, however, accept these ways as the only a l t e r n a t i v e s . For example, t h i s t h e s i s i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the p l a u s i b i l i t y that education can be a l e g a l r i g h t or a ' r i g h t i n the s t r i c t sense' (Flathman, 1976) i n order that a l l those 'troublesome' d u t i e s of s p e c i f i c persons then become o b l i g a t o r y f o r c e r t a i n b o d i e s . It i s a l s o suggested that r e s t r i c t i n g education s o l e l y to the category of r e c i p i e n t r i g h t s ignores i t s b i n a r y nature. Education can be both an a c t i o n and r e c i p i e n t r i g h t . Thus arguments which attempt to r e f u t e education as a p a s s i v e process e l i c i t i n g only d u t i e s of p r o v i s i o n are m i s d i r e c t e d . CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTER Th i s chapter has shown that important as education i s , i t i s not an undisputed r i g h t . The main reason f o r t h i s i s that the r i g h t t o education can be supersceded by more compelling c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , such as u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of r esources, or a moral duty to be educated. The arguments which support the r i g h t to education are thus mainly s u p p o r t i v e of i t as a contingent r i g h t . T h i s f e a t u r e , however, does not make i t any l e s s a r i g h t . Chapter three made t h i s c l e a r . The c o n t i n g e n t , or c o n d i t i o n a l s t a t u s of c e r t a i n r i g h t s i s not s u f f i c i e n t reason to c o n t e s t or doubt them. But are there good grounds to l e g i s l a t e such a r i g h t ? In Canada, o p p o r t u n i t i e s of access to education are seemingly p r o t e c t e d and guaranteed by the law f o r the m a j o r i t y of persons. But not a l l are so favoured. P r i s o n e r s are p r e s e n t l y excluded. T h e i r r i g h t to education at the most i s a moral r i g h t . 100 S i m i l a r l y , other p a r t s of the world may be a f f l u e n t and developed, but see education as something p r o v i d e d out of moral goodness and o b l i g a t i o n . I propose, however, that a case f o r a l e g a l r i g h t can be made along the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s . F i r s t , i t can be maintained t h a t persons should have the r i g h t to o b t a i n an education should they wish i t . J . S. M i l l a s s e r t s i n 'On L i b e r t y ' that i t i s l e g i t i m a t e f o r anyone to do as he wishes, as long as i t does not harm others, or inconvenience them (1973). T h i s i s an argument f o r a r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . I f people want to educate themselves, they have a r i g h t to do so as long as they do not disadvantage o t h e r s . The d i s c u s s i o n so f a r would support such a r i g h t because a c t i o n r i g h t s have been shown to be v a l i d c a t e g o r i e s of r i g h t s . Because, however, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r kind of r i g h t to education i s good only f o r that p o r t i o n of a p o p u l a t i o n a b l e to educate themselves, i t i s not so a p p r o p r i a t e i n s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r i n g guidance. What i s proposed i n s t e a d i s that although b a r r i e r s do e x i s t t o claims f o r a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n , i t i s hard to argue a g a i n s t a r i g h t of persons to r e c e i v e the same kind of o p p o r t u n i t i e s as other persons, i n p a r t i c u l a r , o p p o r t u n i t i e s to a c q u i r e t h i n g s necessary to the s t a t u s and d i g n i t y of persons. A l l human beings have the r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d with d i g n i t y and r e s p e c t , and one of the ways that such a r i g h t i s manifested f o r persons i s a r i g h t to e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . In other words, i f o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education are being p r o v i d e d , a l l persons 101 should have the same kind of access as other persons. There w i l l n a t u r a l l y be d i f f i c u l t i e s i f one wishes to extend t h i s r i g h t to p r i s o n e r s . Many of these d i f f i c u l t i e s have a l r e a d y become evident through p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n s . For example, some might c o n s i d e r the c l a i m that members of s o c i e t y have a r i g h t of o p p o r t u n i t y to education as f a r c i c a l , because as in the case of higher education, f o r i n s t a n c e , many are r e s t r i c t e d by an i n a b i l i t y to meet r i s i n g t u i t i o n f e e s . In t h i s very r e a l i n s t a n c e , i t can be countered that i f the i m p o s i t i o n of high fees i s b a r r i n g too many from a higher education, those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s i m p o s i t i o n are v i o l a t i n g the r i g h t s of persons to an e d u c a t i o n . They are p r o v i d i n g e d u c a t i o n — b u t only to a l i m i t e d e l i t e a b l e to a f f o r d i t . T h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply that other persons do not have t h i s r i g h t , but ra t h e r that t h e i r r i g h t i s being v i o l a t e d . The same goes f o r persons unable to r e c e i v e an education because they are i n f a r - f l u n g r u r a l o u t p o s t s . I t i s the duty of the government, i n making education a v a i l a b l e to others, to honour the r i g h t of these persons t o educati o n , by ens u r i n g that they are not excluded from o p p o r t u n i t i e s to e d u c a t i o n . But t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s about p r i s o n e r s . If one c o u l d show that p r i s o n s and j a i l e r s were u n i v e r s a l l y , or even i n the main, p l a c e s and people who are advocates of t h i n g s l i k e e ducation f o r p r i s o n e r s , that the p r i s o n system bent much e f f o r t toward the e d u c a t i o n a l betterment of the inmates, then the case f o r l e g a l r i g h t s to education would be much weakened. But i f we assume that the s o c i a l circumstances of p r i s o n s and the 1 02 a t t i t u d e s of t h e i r j a i l e r s makes i t u n l i k e l y t hat p r i s o n e r s w i l l be given e i t h e r the needed f a c i l i t i e s or s u i t a b l e freedom from i n t e r f e r e n c e , then we have at l e a s t a p l a u s i b l e case to make education a l e g a l r i g h t . 1 03 V. THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO EDUCATION Chapter four set out a range of arguments to support a l e g a l r i g h t to education. While education i s g e n e r a l l y an e s t a b l i s h e d s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , i t i s not commonly accepted as a r i g h t of p r i s o n e r s . We have reviewed the arguments f o r e d u c a t i o n a l r i g h t s g e n e r a l l y as p r e p a r a t i o n f o r reviewing t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the s p e c i f i c case of p r i s o n e r s . T h i s chapter i n v e s t i g a t e s the grounds f o r such a c l a i m . Only i f there are such grounds can we reasonably expect a uniform system of education f o r p r i s o n e r s to become e s t a b l i s h e d and accepted. Only then w i l l p r i s o n e r s (as with other members of s o c i e t y ) have the same 'recourse when t h e i r v a l i d c l a i m s go u n s a t i s f i e d ' (Imber and Namenson, 1983, p. 102). C e r t a i n i s s u e s must f i r s t be s e t t l e d : I. I t must be shown that education and punishment are not incompatible. T h i s i n v o l v e s c l a r i f y i n g the meaning of punishment. I I . I t must a l s o be shown that education can enhance the f u n c t i o n s of i n c a r c e r a t i o n as the s e l e c t e d form of punishment. Th i s i n v o l v e s c l a r i f y i n g the meaning of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , and education, and then d i s c u s s i n g the ways education can c o n t r i b u t e toward a b e n e f i c i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n . I. EDUCATION AND PUNISHMENT In order to show how a r i g h t to education can be accommodated w i t h i n a p e r i o d of punishment, we must f i r s t d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the meaning and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of punishment. Punishment, as most a p t l y p o i n t e d out by Peters 104 (1966, p. 173), means imposing something unpleasant on someone who has done something wrong. T h i s unpleasantness can only j u s t i f i a b l y be imposed upon a g u i l t y p a r t y , the o f f e n d e r , and no one e l s e . Lucas (1971) and Quinton (1969) are of the same o p i n i o n . C r i t e r i a are a v a i l a b l e which can be used to i d e n t i f y an a c t i v i t y as punishment. A p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n i s punishment i f i t i s : a) Unpleasant or p a i n f u l b) For the reason of an o f f e n c e c) Of persons g u i l t y of the o f f e n c e d) Delegated by an a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y (Benn and P e t e r s , 1959, p. 174). While we may have d i f f i c u l t y i n c e r t a i n cases d e c i d i n g whether something counts as punishment, I s h a l l assume that we are d e a l i n g with l e g i t i m a t e and f u l l cases of punishment. J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such a p r a c t i c e begins when we q u e s t i o n why such a p r a c t i c e should e x i s t . Not everyone, however, agrees that j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s needed. Goldman argues that because p r i s o n e r s have v i o l a t e d the r i g h t s of o t h e r s i n t h e i r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s , 'they have l o s t or f o r f e i t e d t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e demands that o t hers honor a l l t h e i r formerly h e l d r i g h t s ' (1979, p. 43). P r i s o n e r s b r i n g the punishment upon themselves by choosing to engage in c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . Other w r i t e r s have argued that notwithstanding the nature of p r i s o n e r s ' p r i o r a c t s , punishment must be j u s t i f i e d because i t i n v o l v e s a r e s t r i c t i o n of t h e i r l i b e r t y and an i n f l i c t i o n of unpleasantness upon them. 105 I adhere to the view that j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s necessary. C l e a r l y , some a c t i o n must be taken to demonstrate e f f e c t i v e l y s o c i e t y ' s d i s a p p r o v a l of those who break i t s laws. Lucas c l a i m s t h a t punishment i s e f f e c t i v e i n e n f o r c i n g , i n c u l c a t i n g , or e x p r e s s i n g a system of law, conventions, customs, r u l e s or moral p r i n c i p l e s (1971, p. 230). S i m i l a r l y , f o r Gahringer, punishment i s viewed as 'part of the language of the law,' because i t makes known what ' i s e s s e n t i a l to a s o c i a l order' (1969, p. 292). Besides communicating what the r u l e s are, something needs to be done to discourage people from breaking these r u l e s , to make them compensate f o r t h e i r crimes, and to motivate them to maintain law and order. Important a l s o i s the hope that p r i s o n e r s w i l l r e a l i z e t h e i r e r r o r s and know how to av o i d them. These are some reasons f o r pu n i s h i n g persons. The form which punishment takes, be i t d e t e n t i o n , or l e v y i n g of f i n e s , e t c . , i s meted out to r e a l i z e these aims. Education must be c o n c e p t u a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from punishment because education never s e t s out to be d e l i b e r a t e d l y unpleasant or p a i n f u l . Punishment does and must. Pain i s a d e l i b e r a t e p a r t of the meaning of punishment. We d e f i n i t e l y cannot want to educate p r i s o n e r s as punishment. Rather we i n c a r c e r a t e them f o r punishment, and then p o s s i b l y educate them d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . The pa i n of punishment may teach a l e s s o n , but t h i s s o r t of i n c i d e n t a l s i d e - e f f e c t i s not con s i d e r e d as e d u c a t i o n . Education can, however, c o n t r i b u t e to a more s u c c e s s f u l c a r r y i n g out of some of the o b j e c t i v e s of punishment. One thus 106 educates i n order that some of these goals can be f u l f i l l e d . , For example, punishment i s s a i d to discourage present o f f e n d e r s from committing more crimes. In the s e c t i o n which e l a b o r a t e s e d u c a t i o n f o r p r i s o n e r s , i t w i l l be seen how one hopes that such d e t e r r e n c e from f u t u r e crime i s the r e s u l t r a t h e r of a change of p e r s p e c t i v e and reasoning. P r i s o n e r s are a l s o punished i n the hope of making them b e t t e r . Chapter two showed the term 'reform' sometimes being used i n t h i s c o n t e x t . Reform has h i s t o r i c a l l y been focussed on inherent and i n t r i n s i c changes of c h a r a c t e r through c e r t a i n kinds of " e d u c a t i o n a l " programs. For example, i t was thought t h a t a C h r i s t i a n education would 'reform' persons i n t o s e e i n g the e r r o r of t h e i r ways (OISE Review, 1978, p. 22). Of course reform i s not the guaranteed outcome of e i t h e r education or punishment. I t i s only the hoped-for r e s u l t of t r e a t i n g p r i s o n e r s ' c o n s t r u c t i v e l y , ' that i s , a r r a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s of punishment so that 'there i s some p o s s i b i l i t y of a person being reformed' ( P e t e r s , 1966, p. 178). Claims are a l s o made that punishment i s j u s t i f i a b l e to p r o t e c t s o c i e t y from c r i m i n a l s at l a r g e , to p r o t e c t c r i m i n a l s from themselves. I t i s j u s t i f i e d by b e n e f i t s to s o c i e t y on the whole. Education as a d e t e r r e n t agent can h e l p serve t h i s u t i l i t a r i a n premise. If o f f e n d e r s and p o t e n t i a l o f f e n d e r s are 'put o f f ' from a l i f e of crime, then s o c i e t y b e n e f i t s i n the long run. The focus i s now on the r o l e of education w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c form of punishment, that of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . I I . EDUCATION AND INCARCERATION 107 I n c a r c e r a t ion I n c a r c e r a t i o n i s a kind of punishment. Other kinds are f i n e s , f l o g g i n g , s t a r v a t i o n , and q u a r t e r i n g . I n c a r c e r a t i o n or imprisonment r e f e r s to the p e r i o d of r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n imposed upon persons d u r i n g which they are removed from normal s o c i e t y . During t h i s p e r i o d of i s o l a t i o n , they lose t h e i r l i b e r t y and other r i g h t s thought necessary to p r o t e c t the i n s t i t u t i o n and the s o c i e t y . T h i s p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n i s t h e i r punishment. C e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s are a t t r i b u t e d to i n c a r c e r a t i o n . Common are those of custody, p r o t e c t i o n , reform, and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n (see chapter two). Chapter two r e v e a l e d that education has always been advocated f o r p r i s o n e r s . The only q u e s t i o n s are about the type of education to be provided and the s e r i o u s n e s s of commitment to i t s implementation. The Education and T r a i n i n g D i v i s i o n of the CSC s t a t e s t h e i r .mission as being to 'provide genuine o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r academic and v o c a t i o n a l education to inmates who are able to b e n e f i t from them' (1980, p. 2). Hervieux-Payette sees education at the 'heart of the p r i s o n f u n c t i o n , ' and that a l l ' p r i s o n business i s e d u c a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s ' (1981, p. 40). The d i s c u s s i o n now focusses on the kind of education which i s envisaged as being able to b e n e f i t p r i s o n e r s d u r i n g i n c a r c e r a t i o n . Education "Education" can be q u i t e an ambiguous term. Sometimes i t i s used to p i c k out i n s t i t u t i o n s or programs organized to produce c e r t a i n kinds of l e a r n i n g i n or by people. In a d d i t i o n , 108 i t i s used to r e f e r to c e r t a i n kinds of growth, maturation, e t c . , implying as Pete r s t e l l s us, 'some change f o r the b e t t e r ' (1966, p. 178). The d i s s e r t a t i o n adopts t h i s l a t t e r approach. The area of educa t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s t a s k s , a c t i v i t i e s , p r ocesses, designed t o h e l p persons f u l f i l t o some degree the c r i t e r i a of what an educated person i s . Such a person i s seen to have achieved c e r t a i n standards of e x c e l l e n c e — e s s e n t i a l l y c o g n i t i v e e x c e l l e n c e s . Persons' conduct, a c t i o n s , judgements, and f e e l i n g s are a f f e c t e d by t h e i r e d u c a t i o n . They w i l l possess knowledge which i s not r e s t r i c t e d to u t i l i t a r i a n or v o c a t i o n a l purposes, nor merely knowledge of one d i s c i p l i n e or f i e l d . They w i l l a l s o be able to e x p l a i n , understand, and use t h i s knowledge in other c o n t e x t s . The o v e r a l l r e s u l t intended i s a d e s i r a b l e change f o r the b e t t e r . 'Education i n i t s essence' ' i s pre-eminently and uniquely concerned with l e a r n i n g and human development' (Cosman, 1985, p. 19). These notions of education can o f f e r a sound r a t i o n a l e f o r p r i s o n e d u c a t i o n . I t has been mentioned how i t would be odd to i n c a r c e r a t e persons without p r o v i d i n g some o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r ad a p t a t i o n to n o n - c r i m i n a l l i f e . I t would be odd not to t r y to change or develop them i n some way to decrease t h e i r p r o p e n s i t y to commit crimes. P r i s o n e r e d u c a t i o n a l requirements vary, and so do programs. For example, common programs are i n l i f e s k l l l s , Basic Adult Education, and l i t e r a c y . These programs do good i n t h e i r own ways. No one can deny the advantages of being l i t e r a t e , or i n becoming a more marketable person. Sometimes these s k i l l s are 109 a l l a person r e q u i r e s f o r s u r v i v a l as a n o n - c r i m i n a l . The t h i n g i s , education i s not j u s t the t e a c h i n g of f a c t s and s k i l l s . I t i s a l s o not j u s t ' s c h o o l i n g or t r a i n i n g . ' I t i s : ...a matter of developing the c a p a c i t i e s of the student f o r dynamic i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y and a c t i v e moral judgement... (Cosman, 1985, p. 22) If education i s to t r u l y attempt to develop persons, they must be p r o v i d e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s to develop t h e i r minds and i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s , besides j u s t a c q u i r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . As has been cautioned b e f o r e , the danger i s that i f some education programs do not extend t h e i r aims beyond the d e l i v e r y of s k i l l s , there may not be s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r those s o r t s of changes deemed as p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e f o r p r i s o n e r s . T r a i n i n g programs may not provide p r i s o n e r s with much scope for development as 'educated' persons. But i t i s p o s s i b l e that t h i n k i n g a b i l i t i e s be conveyed when tea c h i n g persons how to read and w r i t e . Thus whether i t be l i t e r a c y or l i f e s k i l l s as content, p e n i t e n t i a r y education must be 'education f o r t h i n k i n g and f o r c h a r a c t e r , not merely content' (Duguid, 1981, p. 100). It must be o r i e n t e d to provide p r i s o n e r s with o p p o r t u n i t i e s to 'make d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n s in f u t u r e , d e c i s i o n s which w i l l not l e a d to f u r t h e r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y ' (Duguid, 1981, p. 136). Education i s being proposed as a way of e n l a r g i n g the context out of which a p r i s o n e r frames h i s / h e r l i f e d e c i s i o n s . 1 10 T h i s context might c o n t a i n , f o r example, a l t e r n a t i v e s to c r i m i n a l c h o i c e s . I t i s b e l i e v e d that the way a p r i s o n e r t h i n k s and reasons dominates a l a r g e expanse of t h i s c o n t e x t , and thus ed u c a t i o n programs should be d i r e c t e d l a r g e l y to improving t h i s t h i n k i n g and re a s o n i n g . Other i n f l u e n c e s upon t h i s context are suggested as being 'poverty, lac k of o p p o r t u n i t y , l i m i t e d i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t i o n , . . . f a m i l i a l f a c t o r s , ' amidst other s o c i a l or economic f a c t o r s (Ross and Fabiano, 1985, p. 11). Education may not change such f a c t o r s but i t can p o s s i b l y a l t e r the way a person responds to such s i t u a t i o n s : . . . C r i m i n a l s a c t by making d e c i s i o n s i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s and those d e c i s i o n s are in l a r g e p a r t formed and determined by the c o g n i t i v e , e t h i c a l , and a t t i t u d i n a l make-up of the i n d i v i d u a l . Change that and d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n s should f o l l o w . . . (Duguid, 1981, p. 153) Ross and Fabiano a l s o suggest that the root of c r i m i n a l behaviour i s the p r i s o n e r s ' view of the world, how s/he understands and c o n s i d e r s other persons' f e e l i n g s , and values (1985, p. 11). One would expect e d u c a t i o n a l programs to c o n t a i n components which address these f a c t o r s . We do have some idea what programs to accomplish t h i s should be l i k e . On the one hand, we have e m p i r i c a l evidence that people who have followed c e r t a i n types of programs of study 111 have changed i n these ways. On the other hand, we have l o g i c a l grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g that programs must i n c l u d e those m a t e r i a l s whose mastery comprise the very changes we seek. Perhaps the best recent example of t h i s idea i s the argument set out by Paul H i r s t (1974). The g i s t of t h i s argument i s that there are c e r t a i n 'forms of knowledge' which can be, indeed, must be conveyed through l e a r n i n g . These forms do not represent mere ' c o l l e c t i o n s of i n f o r m a t i o n . ' They are ra t h e r the main ways of 'understanding experience which man has achieved' (1974, p. 38). Each form has i t s unique grammar and terminology, i n v o l v i n g the 'development of c r e a t i v e imagination, judgement, t h i n k i n g , communicative s k i l l s ' (1974, p. 38). According to H i r s t , an educated person would have a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of mastery i n a l l these b a s i c forms of understanding. Examples are ' d i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e s ' such as mathematics or philosophy ( H i r s t , 1974, p. 46). H i r s t ' s ideas are best t y p i f i e d by a standard l i b e r a l a r t s program, c o n t a i n i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l humanities d i s c i p l i n e s . Such a program i s p a r t i c u l a r l y advantageous to p r i s o n e r s ' development because i t s c e n t r a l aim i s the development of mind through exposure and immersion i n the v a r i o u s forms of knowledge. Involvement with such d i s c i p l i n e s p r o v i d e s p o t e n t i a l f o r development because they represent d i v e r s e ways of t h i n k i n g and experience. For example, i t does seem p l a u s i b l e that a s u b s t a n t i a l focus on forms which d i r e c t l y address s o c i a l , e t h i c a l and l e g a l matters may have more c o n s i d e r a b l e p o s i t i v e impact on p r i s o n e r s ' outlook, p e r c e p t i o n s , and a t t i t u d e s . 1 12 A p a r t i c u l a r example i s the program run by the U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a from 1973, and s i n c e 1984, by Simon Fr a s e r U n i v e r s i t y . Such a program operates on the assumption that p r i s o n e r s s u f f e r from c e r t a i n d e f i c i t s i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l , moral, and s o c i a l s p h e r e s — f o r example, i n the area of t h i n k i n g s k i l l s , reasoning a b i l i t i e s , and r o l e - t a k i n g a b i l i t i e s (Duguid, 1980, p. 5). A f u r t h e r assumption i s made that there i s a c o n n e c t i o n between such s k i l l s and behaviour in s o c i e t y . The program aims to r e b u i l d and augment these a b i l i t i e s i n p r i s o n e r s . S i m i l a r U n i v e r s i t y programs are run by L a v a l U n i v e r s i t y i n Quebec and Queen's U n i v e r s i t y i n O n t a r i o . Education i s not proposed as the panacea. I t i s not expected that education by i t s e l f w i l l work wonders. But because e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s are designed to b r i n g about d e s i r a b l e changes in persons, they can be geared to achieve t h i s g oal of b r i n g i n g about such changes i n p r i s o n e r s . For example, i t can be designed to change the way p r i s o n e r s understand the world, developing them i n t o more r a t i o n a l beings with an i n c r e a s e d a b i l i t y to understand t h e i r world. I t may at l e a s t strengthen t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n s to a v o i d crime, through the development of r e s p o n s i b l e p a t t e r n s of t h i n k i n g and a c t i n g . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t can i n c r e a s e 'the l e v e l of e t h i c a l knowledge and moral reasoning a b i l i t y ' (1981, p. 143). D i s c u s s i o n The above d i s c u s s i o n focussed on the workings of a concept of education i n p r i s o n s . I t i s not being s t a t e d that p r i s o n e r s have a r i g h t to t h i s e d u c a t i o n . I t i s claimed that p r i s o n e r s 1 13 have a r i g h t to a worthwhile, adequate, and uniform system of e d u c a t i o n — i n the same way that non-prisoners o b t a i n . Some of the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s of what t h i s s o r t of education might be has j u s t been o u t l i n e d above. These p r i n c i p l e s and the concept of education they support can underpin any of the d i v e r s e education programs found w i t h i n the system. For example, p r i n c i p l e s such as the 'commitment to the development of c o g n i t i v e t h i n k i n g and moral reasoning* (Dennison, 1980, p. 103), or the 'emphasis on the s t r u c t u r e d development of s o c i a l and i n t e r p e r s o n a l understanding' (Education and T r a i n i n g , CSC, 1985, p. 8) are t r a n s f e r a b l e to other e d u c a t i o n a l programs. E v a l u a t i o n s of the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned programs at the U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a and Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y (Ayers, 1981; Ayers, et a l . , 1981) r e p o r t changes in a t t i t u d e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s , v a l u e s , maturation, and o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . Elsewhere Ayers s t a t e s : ...that our ex-students who have gone back i n t o s o c i e t y have . . . r e - e s t a b l i s h e d themselves as r e s p o n s i b l e persons... (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 198) A p a r t i c i p a n t of a U n i v e r s i t y p e n i t e n t i a r y program t e l l s us that i t : ...enables p r i s o n e r s to g i v e 'going s t r a i g h t ' some c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . helps men develop a 114 p e r s p e c t i v e which permits them to see themselves not only as i n d i v i d u a l s but as c i t i z e n s . . . (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 194) Fox informs us that evidence e x i s t s which i n d i c a t e that e d u c a t i o n programs, besides d e v e l o p i n g p r i s o n e r s ' work s k i l l s , 'enhance p r i s o n e r s e l f - r e s p e c t , and s t i m u l a t e p r i s o n e r thoughts r e g a r d i n g t h e i r f u t u r e i n the community': ...the b e n e f i t s of education reduce the s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n of i n c a r c e r a t e d o f f e n d e r s , g i v e s o f f e n d e r s new, r e a l i s t i c but n o n - c r i m i n a l access to the world of work and the o p p o r t u n i t y s t r u c t u r e s of s o c i e t y . . . (Fox, 1986, p. 51) These statements may be accused of being e i t h e r f l i m s y , i s o l a t e d or random statements. I t seems too that 'Useful e v a l u a t i o n s of c o r r e c t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n , here and elsewhere, are s a d l y l a c k i n g ' (OISE Review, 1978, p. 44). Worse, there i s the dismal and much quoted o p i n i o n represented by Martinson (1974) that 'nothing works.' The premises of the d i s s e r t a t i o n , however, do not r e s t c h i e f l y upon evidence, or e m p i r i c a l data. I t does seem odd to t a l k of a c c o r d i n g r i g h t s on the b a s i s of the evidence of b e n e f i t s . Sometimes, b e n e f i t s are claimed as r i g h t s , f o r example, w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s . They are c o n s i d e r e d important enough to be safeguarded by r i g h t s . But the r i g h t i s not accorded upon 1 15 evidence that these b e n e f i t s do indeed accrue from having the r i g h t . I t i s d e r i v e d from p r i n c i p l e s such as respect f o r persons. The b e n e f i t s are co n s i d e r e d as v i t a l f o r persons to have simply as persons. One hopes everybody w i l l experience the b e n e f i t s , but whether t h i s a c t u a l l y happens i s not d e c i s i v e in the awarding of the r i g h t . Education i s a l s o an area where i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to c o l l e c t r e l e v a n t evidence. The changes d e s i r e d through education need not be v i s i b l e . As mentioned p r e v i o u s l y as w e l l , education has both 'task' and 'achievement' senses. One can have r i g h t s to ta s k s , a c t i v i t i e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s , but not to success. Success i s not guaranteed or presupposed when undertaking t a s k s . Thus, although one may hope f o r success, t h i s i s not a major c o n s i d e r a t i o n when a c c o r d i n g r i g h t s . I t i s being a s s e r t e d , t h e r e f o r e , that education, because i t i s u s u a l l y geared to develop persons i n c e r t a i n ways, can be b e n e f i c i a l to p r i s o n e r s . There i s some evidence that p r i s o n e r s are helped through education to a v o i d crime. T h i s success, however, i s not an argument i n i t s e l f , as a l r e a d y mentioned. One cannot have a r i g h t to success, e s p e c i a l l y i n an area l i k e education, where there cannot be gains without p a i n s . Some more ap p r o p r i a t e arguments are now d i s c u s s e d . I l l . ARGUMENTS FOR PRISONERS' RIGHT TO EDUCATION Some of the foundations to these arguments have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d , b r i e f l y , t h a t : 1. Education can f i t i n t o the j u s t i f i c a t o r y framework of punishment, as w e l l as be a worthwhile component of 1 1 6 i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 2. Education must be recognized as a l e g a l r i g h t to ensure s e r i o u s and c o n s i s t e n t implementation. 3. I f o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education are a v a i l a b l e to a l l human beings as a r i g h t , there i s no prima f a c i e reason to exclude p r i s o n e r s , e s p e c i a l l y i f one i s concerned that j u s t i c e and f a i r n e s s p r e v a i l . Some other arguments are now examined: 1. Argument from I n c a r c e r a t i o n T h i s argument i s based upon the premise, f i r s t s t a t e d i n chapter one, that i n c a r c e r a t i o n with the l o s s of l i b e r t y i s s u f f i c i e n t punishment: ...the essence of p r i s o n i s d e p r i v a t i o n of l i b e r t y f o r the breaking of law, . d e p r i v a t i o n of food or h e a l t h or of books i s u n j u s t . . . (Mabbott, 1973, p. 383) F u r t h e r punishment would be inhumane. The B r i t i s h Columbia C i v i l L i b e r t i e s A s s o c i a t i o n P o l i c y Paper on the R i g h t s of P r i s o n e r s (1981) quotes the M i n i s t r y of the S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l as s t a t i n g , in 1973, that there i s no l e g a l a u t h o r i t y f o r f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s or punishment. S c h a r f ' s (1981) argument i n support of such a p o s i t i o n i s d e r i v e d from Rawlsian (1971) p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s argued t h a t moral p r i n c i p l e s , or s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , are best decided through an ' o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . ' T h i s i s a h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n where 1 1 7 persons (that i s r a t i o n a l agents) meet to choose p r i n c i p l e s , r u l e s , and p r a c t i c e s , which w i l l govern t h e i r s o c i e t y . They operate under a ' v e i l of ignorance,' that i s , they do not know what t h e i r own p o s i t i o n s w i l l be, or how these would be a f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n s they make. Because everyone i s ' s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d , ' everyone would want to ensure p r o t e c t i o n from major l o s s e s and harms, and no one would design schemes 'to favour h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n ' ( S c a r f , 1981, p. 234). Applying t h i s philosophy to punishment, Scharf suggests the r i g h t to education need not be ' l o s t . ' Rights to be forsaken are only those deemed harmful (Scharf, 1982, p. 82). Thus r i g h t s granted to the r e s t of s o c i e t y , such as the r i g h t to education, must belong to the inmate 'unless s o c i e t y can show them incompatible with common welf a r e . ' In t h i s argument, a p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n ought not to deprive p r i s o n e r s of any more r i g h t s than i s necessary to f u l f i l the purpose of punishment. ' V i o l a t i n g s p e c i f i c r i g h t s of o t h e r s does not e n t a i l l o s i n g one's own r i g h t s ' (Goldman, 1979, p. 44). A p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , with the l o s s of the r i g h t to l i b e r t y , should thus be c o n s i d e r e d as s u f f i c i e n t punishment. Education, or access to education i s a r i g h t of other persons. There i s no reason then to d e p r i v e p r i s o n e r s of t h i s r i g h t , e s p e c i a l l y as has been emphasized throughout, education can be s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to b e n e f i t them. Chapter two suggested the l i k e l i h o o d of education being perhaps ignored f o r other p r i o r i t i e s , or perhaps even being shelved should p o l i c i e s change. Standards must be s e t , and kept t o , to ensure that 118 programs are c o n s i s t e n t l y d i r e c t e d by t r u l y e d u c a t i o n a l and worthwhile g o a l s . 2. Argument from The E f f e c t s of Punishment Education can a l s o help a m e l i o r a t e the d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s of punishment. Nietzsc h e f o r example, thought p r i s o n makes men hard and c o l d (1973, p. 259), and P e t e r s terms i t 'the most potent device f o r estrangement' (1966, p. 179). Eisenberg (1985, p. 8) c i t e s Goffman's (1961) premise that the i n f l u e n c e of an i n s t i t u t i o n upon i t s i n h a b i t a n t s i s such that they must i n e v i t a b l y become pa r t of i t s moral codes. I f t h i s i s the case, i t looks as though the p r i s o n i t s e l f w i l l work a g a i n s t i t s very r a i s o n d'etre unless adequate a t t e n t i o n be p a i d to the a c t i v i t i e s of imprisonment. A p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n can be regarded as an i n t e r i m p e r i o d between committing a crime, and r e t u r n i n g to the law-a b i d i n g world. What happens duri n g t h i s p e r i o d i s very important. Scharf i s quoted by Duguid (1980, p. 37) as saying that a c r i m i n a l l e a v i n g p r i s o n with 'the same s o c i a l conscience' with s/he they entered, 'faces a c o n t i n u i n g p r o b a b i l i t y of remaining m o r a l l y a l i e n a t e d from s o c i e t y . ' I t seems only l o g i c a l that steps be taken to ensure that t h i s i n t e r i m p e r i o d i s w e l l -spent, with o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r education and reform being p r o v i d e d the p r i s o n e r . The importance of ensuring that p r i s o n e r s leave ' i n a reasonable s t a t e of mind' (Mabbott, 1970, p. 383) has been c o n s t a n t l y upheld as a sound o b j e c t i v e of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . What p r i s o n e r s undergo w i t h i n i s so l i k e l y to i n f l u e n c e what they are 1 19 l i k e when they come out. The p o t e n t i a l of education f o r i n f l u e n c i n g persons f o r the b e t t e r has been d i s c u s s e d . E d u c a t i o n thus becomes an important asset of i n c a r c e r a t i o n : ... At the very l e a s t , an o f f e n d e r ' s p r i s o n experience must not make i t impossible f o r him to r e t u r n to the community: indeed i t must a c t i v e l y put him i n the way of the means of doing so... (Lord B e l s t e a d , 1980, p. 69). Education can be one of these means. I t has a l s o been suggested that i t i s 'our duty to c o u n t e r a t t a c k ' the d e m o r a l i z i n g e f f e c t s of punishment (Ewing, 1929, p. 89). If t h i s i s so, can not such a duty be used as grounds fo r p r i s o n e r s to c l a i m a r i g h t to programs which are geared to a m e l i o r a t e such negative e f f e c t s ? Can t h i s mean a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n as one of these programs? Accor d i n g to Ayers, the t r a d i t i o n a l . p r i s o n does not set any goals beyond custody and c o n t r o l , and l a c k s 'the elements of experience r e q u i r e d f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l , s o c i a l , and moral growth' (1981, p. 76). A p r i s o n e r makes the statement that 'prisons produce l i t t l e e l s e than p r i s o n e r s ' (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 43). Education might be the key f a c t o r in changing t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Imprisonment might serve i t s most u s e f u l f u n c t i o n by p r o t e c t i n g s o c i e t y through 'secure confinement,' but i t w i l l f a i l even i n t h i s purpose i f t h i s goal i s met 'at the expense of r e t u r n i n g o f f e n d e r s to s o c i e t y the worse f o r having been i n c a r c e r a t e d ' (Task Force, 1984, p. 49). 1 20 3. Argument from Punishment of Persons The main p o i n t of t h i s argument s t r e s s e s that i t i s persons - and human beings - who are being punished. Persons are r a t i o n a l agents, accountable f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . The p r i s o n e r has been viewed as ' r a t i o n a l , a d e c i s i o n maker, and of course, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s a c t s ' (Duguid, 1980, p. 5). Punishment, then, can o n l y be of persons, because only persons are r e s p o n s i b l e agents. ' I t seems almost a semantic t r u t h , ' says Walker, 'that the i r r e s p o n s i b l e cannot be punished' (1969, p. 280). Barker a f f i r m s , the 'presumption of punishment i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ' and thus, the ' r i g h t of o f f e n d e r s to be t r e a t e d as r e s p o n s i b l e agents and punished as such' (1965, p. 179). T h i s makes i t at l e a s t l o g i c a l l y odd to c l a i m p r i s o n e r s are pu n i s h a b l e , but not persons. I t would be p o i n t l e s s p u n i s h i n g those who have done something wrong through no f a u l t of t h e i r own. The p o i n t of punishment on those who u n j u s t i f i a b l y v i o l a t e the r u l e s i s to discourage the v i o l a t i o n of the r u l e s . Thus, punishment can only be of those v i o l a t o r s who are capable of g u i d i n g t h e i r a c t i o n s by the r u l e s (Gert, 1973, p. 95). A p r i s o n e r might have acted i r r e s p o n s i b l y by v i o l a t i n g some law. A p e r i o d of punishment ought, t h e r e f o r e , to be used to h e l p p r i s o n e r s become more r e s p o n s i b l e beings, to h e l p them see the p o i n t of the r u l e s , and to f o l l o w them. I t ought, t h e r e f o r e , to c o n t a i n programs which are d i r e c t e d toward t h i s end. Education i s upheld as such a program. C r i m i n a l a c t i o n i s no j u s t reason to f o r f e i t a l l r i g h t s , or degrade persons, e s p e c i a l l y with regard ' f o r example, [ t o ] the 121 r i g h t to be t r e a t e d as a person,' which i s 'not f o r f e i t a b l e ' ( W i l l i a m s , 1978, p. 187). A j u s t system of punishment ' t r e a t s human beings as persons' ( M o r r i s , 1970, p. 125), remembering t h a t they have the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d f a i r l y and with d i g n i t y , even while being punished. Thus i f other persons i n s o c i e t y r e c e i v e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education to improve and develop themselves, so should p r i s o n e r s : . . . i f a person i s ' s u f f i c i e n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to answer and be punished f o r h i s conduct, he has the r i g h t to e x e r c i s e every a v a i l a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y to . . . make r e p a r a t i o n f o r h i s o f f e n c e , and to r e s t o r e h i s r e p u t a t i o n and s t a t u s i n the community... (Doyle, 1969, p. 61) 4. Argument from F r a t e r n a l O b l i g a t i o n T h i s argument t r i e s to f i n d support f o r p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to education i n 'a human o b l i g a t i o n to f r a t e r n i t y , b r o t h e r l y l o v e , ' ' c h a r i t a b l e a c t i o n toward f e l l o w man' (Morin, 1981, p. 27). The fundamental b a s i s of t h i s o b l i g a t i o n i s the ' d e s i r e and the w i l l to do good even to those we f e e l do not deserve i t . ' There i s thus a r i g h t to education not because 'the law says so, but because the law of moral o b l i g a t i o n says so' (1981, p. 28). I would not completely d i s c r e d i t such a high-minded l i n e of argument. However, i t assumes f a r too c o n s i d e r a t e and humane an a t t i t u d e toward p r i s o n e r s on the p a r t , f o r example, of p r i s o n guards or indeed of the p u b l i c at l a r g e . We must, of course, 122 appeal to higher p r i n c i p l e s to j u s t i f y r i g h t s , but t h i s must be accompanied by other arguments. 5. Argument from S o c i a l E f f e c t s A c c o r d i n g to t h i s argument, c i t i z e n s can demand that those imprisoned become l e s s l i k e l y than they were be f o r e to repeat t h e i r o f f e n c e s . T h i s i s the r e s u l t of an agreement which c i t i z e n s have with s o c i e t y , whereby c i t i z e n s can expect p r o t e c t i o n from r e p e t i t i o n of o f f e n c e s . How can t h i s r i g h t of s o c i e t y bear on the r i g h t s of p r i s o n e r s ? I f s o c i e t y has the r i g h t f o r a change i n p r i s o n e r s for the b e t t e r , t h i s would imply more a duty of p r i s o n e r s to make the change. We are concerned here with p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t s and not d u t i e s . I t c o u l d be that p r i s o n e r s might have a duty to be educated, but, then, what i s being i n v e s t i g a t e d i s not t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , but that of a r i g h t to be educated. I t might, however, be argued that p r i s o n e r s are a l s o members of s o c i e t y . They r e q u i r e p r o t e c t i o n — p e r h a p s from avenging members of s o c i e t y , but a l s o from t h e i r own p r o c l i v i t y to commit crime. T h i s can be done through education which suggests ways of overcoming such a p r o c l i v i t y . Then too, as proposed e a r l i e r , i f other c i t i z e n s can c l a i m the r i g h t to be educated on the grounds that t h i s education i s r e q u i r e d f o r them to be able to c o n t r i b u t e to s o c i e t y , and i f the government has a duty of educating i t s c i t i z e n s , i t owes t h i s duty to a l l i t s c i t i z e n s — i n c l u d i n g p r i s o n e r s . In chapter three, i t was shown that r i g h t s need not always c o r r e l a t e with d u t i e s . A government's duty, however, to educate 1 23 i t s c i t i z e n s , might represent an o c c a s i o n of a duty c o r r e l a t i n g with a r i g h t of persons - and thus p r i s o n e r s - to be so educated. The government can be seen as being cognizant of such a duty, as d e p i c t e d i n v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l s t i p u l a t i o n s mentioned i n chapter two i n p a r t i c u l a r . For example, the Task Force s t a t e s that the CSC recognizes a 'duty to a c t f a i r l y ' by ' c o n t r o l l i n g o f f e n d e r s ' and ' h e l p i n g them' (1984, p. 19). I t sees h e l p i n g p r i s o n e r s as d e v e l o p i n g ways and means that can enhance t h e i r chances of l i v i n g u s e f u l l i v e s . I t has a l s o been s t a t e d t h a t : ...The p e n i t e n t i a r y system s h a l l provide f o r treatment of p r i s o n e r s , the e s s e n t i a l aim of which s h a l l be t h e i r r e f o r m a t i o n and s o c i a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . . . ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper Two, 1986, p. 13) If these do represent government ambitions i n c o r r e c t i o n s , i t provi d e s grounds f o r p r i s o n e r s , as the o b j e c t s of these aims, t o c l a i m m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n of these aims i n a p p r o p r i a t e programs such as e d u c a t i o n . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , p r i s o n e r s ' r i g h t to demand i t . 6. Argument from B e n e f i t s to the C o l l e c t i v e 'The p r o v i s i o n of post-secondary e d u c a t i o n looks to the long-term b e n e f i t s ' of such programs f o r both the p r i s o n e r and s o c i e t y (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 206). I f a decrease i n crime does r e s u l t from e d u c a t i o n a l programs, s o c i e t y w i l l benef i t : 124 . . . p r o v i d i n g . . . e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p r i s o n e r s i s as much i n the i n t e r e s t s of the gene r a l Canadian p o p u l a t i o n as of the p r i s o n e r s . . . (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 205) Such an argument echoes the U t i l i t a r i a n argument i n that b e n e f i t s which education can b r i n g to p r i s o n e r s are extended to s o c i e t y . Evidence of the b e n e f i t s f o r p r i s o n e r s has a l r e a d y been presented. Students with the p e n i t e n t i a r y education programs at the U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a and Simon Fr a s e r U n i v e r s i t y a s s e r t that 'the s o c i a l b e n e f i t s ' of education cannot be ' o v e r s t a t e d ' (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 133): ...only when c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s become en l i g h t e n e d e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l c r i m i n a l s r e t u r n to s o c i e t y as b e t t e r men and c i t i z e n s . . . (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 134) Gahringer's p o i n t i s that punishment should address the i n d i v i d u a l wrongdoer i n such a way that s o c i e t y too can b e n e f i t (1969, p. 299). If education can become a f u l l y f u n c t i o n i n g part of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , then, both the goals of educating p r i s o n e r s to become r e s p o n s i b l e persons, and of ensuring s o c i e t y that p r i s o n e r s who r e t u r n to s o c i e t y are educated, can be achieved. 7. Argument from E q u a l i t y The p r e v i o u s arguments claimed that one does not cease being a person, or l o s e one's worth as a human being because of 1 25 a crime or o f f e n c e a g a i n s t the r e s t of s o c i e t y . P r i s o n e r s as persons, and members of the moral community, apart from the l o s s of r i g h t s necessary to meet the requirements of punishment, must continue to r e c e i v e the same r i g h t s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s to r i g h t s t h a t non-prisoners might have. T h i s argument, then, allows p r i s o n e r s to c l a i m the same kind of e q u a l i t y of c o n s i d e r a t i o n and treatment as other persons. T h i s c l a i m of e q u a l i t y has been argued f o r i n v a r i o u s ways. In chapter f o u r , we encountered V l a s t o s ' (1973) n o t i o n . There i s a common p l a t f o r m of i n t r i n s i c worth and d i g n i t y which c o u l d p r o v i d e persons with grounds f o r c l a i m i n g the same kinds of treatment necessary to p r o t e c t and enhance t h i s i n t r i n s i c worth. Everyone e l s e can c l a i m r i g h t s to be t r e a t e d with r e s p e c t , as c r e a t u r e s p o s s e s s i n g t h i s worth'and d i g n i t y . Another way of j u s t i f y i n g t h i s kind of equal treatment between and among persons i s suggested by Pete r s (1966). Peters suggests we use p r a c t i c a l reasoning t o determine c e r t a i n general p r i n c i p l e s to be used whenever s i t u a t i o n s a r i s e . T h i s means l o o k i n g f o r reasons why we ought to choose a c e r t a i n way of a c t i n g over another. T h i s means that there are ' p r i n c i p l e s i n advance' which w i l l h e l p us ' d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e n e r a l ' what are good or bad reasons for whatever c h o i c e we make. These general p r i n c i p l e s determine and ensure c o n s i s t e n c y in whatever d e c i s i o n s we make, mainly that whatever i s being decided i n a s i t u a t i o n X must hold f o r another e x a c t l y s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n Y, unless there are r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n s i t u a t i o n Y: 1 26 . . . I f reasons hold i n one s i t u a t i o n then they h o l d i n another unless f u r t h e r reasons can be advanced which i n d i c a t e a r e l e v a n t reason... (1966, p. 51) Th i s f o r Peter s i s the 'formal p r i n c i p l e of f a i r n e s s or j u s t i c e . ' I t underpins h i s no t i o n of e q u a l i t y — t h a t ' d i s t i n c t i o n s should be made i f there are r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s and that they should not be made i f there are no r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s ' (1966, p. 51). T h i s p r i n c i p l e 'condemns a r b i t r a r i n e s s ' (Peters, 1966, p. 53). I t s u p p l i e s c r i t e r i a to ensure that d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s concerning o t h e r s , e s p e c i a l l y those a l r e a d y disadvantaged, or those who are l i k e l y to be u n f a i r l y t r e a t e d , are made from t h i s vantage p o i n t of f a i r n e s s and j u s t i c e . T h i s h i g h l i g h t s the importance of the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y f o r p r i s o n e r s . They are i n that p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n of having done some harm to s o c i e t y , and s o c i e t y might l i k e to see them disadvantaged. T h i s p r i n c i p l e maintains l i m i t s upon the disadvantages imposed upon them. I t reminds us that p r i s o n e r s are s t i l l persons, with the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d f a i r l y as persons. I t i s acknowledged that i n c a r c e r a t i o n i s a r e l e v a n t reason f o r d e p r i v a t i o n of c e r t a i n r i g h t s , but not of, f o r example, a r i g h t l i k e that of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education, e s p e c i a l l y of the s o r t that can b e n e f i t them. The case i s strengthened i f members of s o c i e t y a l r e a d y have o p p o r t u n i t i e s to education; then p r i s o n e r s , as persons, should a l s o have s i m i l a r o p p o r t u n i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of 1 27 P e t e r s ' idea that only r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s can l e g i t i m a t e l y r e s u l t i n d i f f e r e n t treatment. Chapter one suggested that the 'normal r i g h t s of a c i t i z e n ' do ' i n c l u d e the r i g h t of access to an education of good q u a l i t y ' (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 206). Chapter two a f f i r m e d t h a t education i n p r i s o n was 'given a low p r i o r i t y ' (Duguid and Hoekama, 1985, p. 206). T h i s i m p l i e s that p r i s o n e r s are not r e c e i v i n g the same r i g h t of o p p o r t u n i t y of access to education as the r e s t of the p o p u l a t i o n . T h i s v i o l a t e s the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y because there i s no r e l e v a n t reason f o r t h i s . P r i s o n e r s ought to be given t h i s r i g h t , then, so that they can c l a i m b e t t e r programs such as other members of s o c i e t y seem to be g e t t i n g . Even i f non-prisoners d i d not have t h i s r i g h t , p r i s o n e r s ' i n c a r c e r a t e d s t a t e puts them i n a p o s i t i o n to c l a i m i t . Melden's philosophy i s that human beings are moral agents belonging to a moral community (1977, p. 214). M o r a l l y flawed as persons may be, they s t i l l remain members of the community, d e s p i t e the 'extreme v a r i a b i l i t y ' of t h e i r s t a t e . Members of the moral community who have d e v i a t e d ought to have the r i g h t to be shown ways of r e t u r n i n g , i n s t e a d of being dropped f o r t h e i r d e v i a t i o n . P r i s o n e r s , t h e r e f o r e , need o p p o r t u n i t i e s of r e t u r n i n g to the community. T h i s i s an o f f i c i a l l y p roclaimed f u n c t i o n of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . I t a l s o adheres to the maintenance of f a i r n e s s and j u s t i c e . The C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One quotes the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Commitee as s t a t i n g that ' J u s t i c e f o r inmates i s a p e r s o n a l r i g h t ' (1986, p. 25). 1 28 Hervieux-Payette a l s o s t a t e s : . . . E d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y i n p r i s o n i s not based only on s o c i e t y ' s d e s i r e to reform the c r i m i n a l , but a l s o on a s o c i a l committment to e d u c a t i o n a l f a i r n e s s i n a j u s t s o c i e t y . . . (1985, p. 187) CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTER I t i s the Argument from E q u a l i t y which i s c e n t r a l to the t h e s i s . I t forges many of the l i n k s between arguments. For example, i n both the "Argument from I n c a r c e r a t i o n , " and the "Argument from the Punishment of Persons," i t was argued that p r i s o n e r s should not be de p r i v e d of any r i g h t s apart from those which must be suspended to p r o t e c t themselves, the i n s t i t u t i o n , and s o c i e t y . They should, t h e r e f o r e , r e t a i n the same r i g h t of op p o r t u n i t y to education which other persons a p p a r e n t l y have. Even i n S c h a r f ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rawls' S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , persons i n v o l v e d i n t h i s C o n t r a c t are i n t e r e s t e d i n choosing p r i n c i p l e s and making d e c i s i o n s which are f a i r to a l l , and punishment i s not c o n s i d e r e d a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r i n d e p r i v i n g p r i s o n e r s of a r i g h t to e d u c a t i o n . 1 29 VI . CONCLUSION Two main arguments have been made i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . The f i r s t i s moral i n theme. P r i s o n e r s are persons with the r i g h t to be t r e a t e d with the d i g n i t y and respect due persons. I t i s 'the r i g h t of every human being to be t r e a t e d as a human being and not t h i n g . ' Such a r i g h t to be t r e a t e d as a person i s : ...a fundamental human r i g h t belonging to a l l human beings by v i r t u e of t h e i r being human. I t i s a l s o an i n a l i e n a b l e . . . r i g h t . . . (MacDonald, 1970, p. 51) P r i s o n e r s possess t h i s r i g h t because: ...Even a c r i m i n a l , though he has l o s t merit and may deserve punishment, does not become wo r t h l e s s . He cannot be cast out of humanity... (MacDonald, 1970, p. 57) Such a r i g h t enables p r i s o n e r s to c l a i m the r i g h t to a f a i r punishment. T h i s means that p r i s o n e r s are e n t i t l e d to c l a i m r i g h t s which other persons have which need not be l o s t because of the c o n d i t i o n s of punishment and i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 'The r e a l punishment of imprisonment i s the l o s s of l i b e r t y ' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 16). T h i s moral premise u n d e r l i e s the next statement of the d i s s e r t a t i o n , that the r i g h t 130 to education i s a r i g h t that p r i s o n e r s ought to have d u r i n g i n c a r c e r a t i o n , and that t h i s r i g h t ought to be made l e g a l . The grounds f o r t h i s statement are d e r i v e d from the consequences of being a b l e to c l a i m such a r i g h t , and not being a b l e t o . For example, because c e r t a i n b e n e f i c i a l n o t i o n s have become a s s o c i a t e d with e d u c a t i o n , there should be some p o s i t i v e consequences r e s u l t i n g from e n f o r c i n g programs which i n c o r p o r a t e such n o t i o n s . Primary among these i s the n o t i o n of education as an i n i t i a t o r of change and development i n persons. R.S.Peters r e l a t e s education to 'some s o r t of processes i n which a d e s i r a b l e s t a t e of mind develops' (1965, p. 90), i . e . , i n worthwhile and v a l u a b l e ways. Some of these d e s i r a b l e changes are a broadening of outlook, a deeper i n s i g h t i n t o understanding o u r s e l v e s and our r e l a t i o n s h i p with o t h e r s , a sharpening of our mental and i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s , and the a b i l i t y to use these to guide us i n t o making sound and r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s . These s o r t s of development in persons can be f o s t e r e d through any kind of education program. I t thus f i n d s i t s home w i t h i n a p r i s o n context where many kinds of education programs are a l s o necessary to c a t e r to the many v a r i e d a b i l i t i e s of p r i s o n e r s . I t a l s o f i n d s i t s home where such changes are d e s i r a b l e — i f not r e q u i r e d . To be educated i s to ' t r a v e l with a d i f f e r e n t view' ( P e t e r s , 1967, p.8). P r i s o n e r s with t h e i r involvement i n crime have i n d i c a t e d that t h e i r c u r r e n t mode of ' t r a v e l l i n g ' i s somewhat f a u l t y — a t l e a s t as s o c i e t y views i t . It can t h e r e f o r e be i n f e r r e d t h a t p r i s o n e r s r e q u i r e to be shown other more s o c i a l l y and m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e modes of ' t r a v e l l i n g ' 131 which l e a d them away from the road to p r i s o n . A l e g a l r i g h t to education c o u l d secure f o r p r i s o n e r s those education programs d e l i b e r a t e d l y designed to present o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the kinds of changes and development deemed d e s i r a b l e i n a p r i s o n context. If p r i s o n e r s are able to b e n e f i t from such o p p o r t u n i t i e s , t h e i r development i n t o more moral and r e s p o n s i b l e persons b e n e f i t s s o c i e t y , f o r such persons are l e s s l i k e l y to commit crimes. Confidence has been expressed that 'an important component of s u c c e s s f u l programs' has been e s t a b l i s h e d by c o r r e c t i o n a l r e s e a r c h to be 'an e d u c a t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n ' (Education and T r a i n i n g , CSC, 1985, p. 8). The consequences of being able to c l a i m a l e g a l r i g h t to education can a l s o be seen as b e n e f i t t i n g the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system i t s e l f . At the moment, education appears to be an o f f i c i a l s t i p u l a t i o n of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . A review of the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system (chapter two), however, suggests some seeming i n s t a b i l i t y in the p r o v i s i o n and a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of programs. Questions which can be r a i s e d are mainly, whether a l l p r i s o n e r s are r e c e i v i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s to b e n e f i t from programs as some other p r i s o n e r s might be, and whether programs are themselves geared to achieve these b e n e f i t s f o r p r i s o n e r s , and whether the penal education system, as a whole for p r i s o n e r s , c o u l d be s a i d to be as r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e as that of non-prison soc i e t y . Chapter two i n p a r t i c u l a r showed grounds f o r the view that not a l l p e n i t e n t i a r i e s c o u l d boast s a t i s f a c t o r y education programs, and that the education system as a whole s t i l l had i t s 1 32 problems. Indeed, Morin and Cosman t h i n k that most s t u d i e s , whether o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s or i n f o r m a l accounts by p r o f e s s i o n a l educators, would t e s t i f y that programs are 'mostly of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y , ' manifested i n : mediocre and p o o r l y t r a i n e d s t a f f , low e x p e c t a t i o n s , poor e d u c a t i o n a l achievement, watered-down c u r r i c u l a , weak s u p e r v i s i o n , l a c k of e d u c a t i o n a l c o u n s e l l i n g , . . . inadequate r e s o u r c e s . . . (1984, p. 12) Chapter two a l s o i n d i c a t e d how inconstancy i n d i r e c t i o n and r a t i o n a l e , as r e f l e c t e d i n changing p o l i c i e s and goals of i n c a r c e r a t i o n , c o u l d be a problem f o r the education system as w e l l . The p o s i t i o n of the CSC on p e n i t e n t i a r y education, f o r example, i s s a i d to be very confused' (Morin, 1981, p. 171). At the moment, there i s even u n c e r t a i n t y about whether and how education i s being used: ...The extent to which education and t r a i n i n g has been u t i l i z e d as a sy s t e m a t i c , u n i v e r s a l l y accepted approach to inmate b e h a v i o u r a l change i s open to c o n j e c t u r e . . . (Dennison, 1979, p. 4) How can a l e g a l r i g h t to education a m e l i o r a t e such a s i t u a t i o n ? What would be the consequences of being a b l e to c l a i m such a r i g h t f o r the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system? A 1 33 r i g h t to education for p r i s o n e r s i n themselves as persons and r i g h t - h o l d e r s ensures that they can c l a i m o p p o r t u n i t i e s to educat i o n which i s worthwhile no matter the changes i n s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s . They c l a i m t h i s r i g h t r e g a r d l e s s of b e n e f i t s and a d v a n t a g e s — j u s t as other persons in s o c i e t y . It i s a l s o suggested that i t would become incumbent upon a u t h o r i t i e s to ensure that programs do indeed measure up to some standards of what education i s . There has to be some assurance and guarantee that i t i s education which i s being p r o v i d e d . The p o t e n t i a l f o r change and development i s i m p l i c i t w i t h i n the concept of ed u c a t i o n . But such a p o t e n t i a l can only be r e a l i z e d i f programs are so geared toward i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . At the moment, even i f "education" programs are a v a i l a b l e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t , as cautioned by the OISE Review (1978, p.44), there i s a tendency to l a b e l e v e r y t h i n g which occurs i n a classroom as ed u c a t i o n . Yet not e v e r y t h i n g which does occur can be a c t u a l l y termed as educ a t i o n . The concern has alre a d y been expressed p r e v i o u s l y that i f programs do not encapsulate broader e d u c a t i o n a l g o a l s , they w i l l not be able to a f f e c t the reasoning and i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s of p r i s o n e r s , which are prime t a r g e t s of a t t e n t i o n i n genuine e d u c a t i o n a l programs. With p r i s o n e r s , 'the c h a r a c t e r of the education they r e c e i v e i s the c e n t r a l p o i n t ' (Duguid, 1981, p. 143). Thus, i t i s very important that a t t e n t i o n be p a i d the f a c t t h a t i t i s education p r o v i d e d . One c o u l d query whether present education programs are r e a l l y education or t r a i n i n g programs. T r a i n i n g programs, or other s o r t s of 'education' programs might be v a l u a b l e i n t h e i r 1 34 own ways, but they mainly aim to prepare persons f o r employment, or to equip them with a given s k i l l . I f they do not c o n s c i o u s l y i n c o r p o r a t e broader e d u c a t i o n a l g o a l s , they w i l l remain as t r a i n i n g programs, because they do not attempt to do anything e l s e . If the u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e of c o r r e c t i o n s i s the t u r n i n g away of persons from crime, and the development of persons more equipped to a v o i d c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s , being able to c l a i m a l e g a l r i g h t to education i s a p o s s i b l e way to ensure that i t i s education which i s being p r o v i d e d , and not j u s t t r a i n i n g programs, or worse, a p e r f u n c t o r y p r o v i s i o n of something to pass the time. A l e g a l r i g h t to education would enable p r i s o n e r s to c l a i m the k i n d of education which i s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r them, f o r example, programs geared to develop them i n t o more moral and law-abiding persons. Without t h i s r i g h t , p r i s o n e r s and concerned p e r s o n n e l / p u b l i c c o u l d not complain about standards or the q u a l i t y of the education being provided. The world of N o w h e r e s v i l l e p i c t u r e d people without r i g h t s o b t a i n i n g s e r v i c e s . They had no grounds fo r complaint i f the s e r v i c e ceased, or d e t e r i o r a t e d . They were o b t a i n i n g the s e r v i c e as a p r i v i l e g e , and not as t h e i r r i g h t , and thus were expected to be content and g r a t e f u l . Such a p o s i t i o n i s demeaning to p r i s o n e r s , who even though wrong-doers and o f f e n s i v e to s o c i e t y , are s t i l l persons and r i g h t - h o l d e r s . They thus ought to be allowed to c l a i m enforcement of proper education programs as t h e i r r i g h t . T h i s would give them grounds fo r c h a l l e n g i n g d e c i s i o n s 1 35 which are d e t r i m e n t a l to the p e n i t e n t i a r y education system, such as perhaps, d e c i s i o n s to terminate worthwhile education programs. T h i s would i n turn make d e c i s i o n makers more wary of what they do for they have to answer f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y those which v i o l a t e the r i g h t to educ a t i o n . They would a l s o have to be more v i g i l a n t about the standards of the programs they are p r o v i d i n g , f o r now p r i s o n e r s w i l l be able to seek re d r e s s f o r inadequate and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y programs. Because such a r i g h t w i l l be c l a i m a b l e by a l l inmates, any inmate who f e e l s u n f a i r l y t r e a t e d w i l l a l s o be able to seek answers from the law rega r d i n g u n f a i r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . In chapter two, for example, women p r i s o n e r s were s a i d to have grounds f o r such a complaint. A woman inmate i s p r e s e n t l y seeking j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n because she a l l e g e s that women p r i s o n e r s are not r e c e i v i n g the same s e r v i c e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s as male p r i s o n e r s . T h i s i s seen as a v i o l a t i o n of the e q u a l i t y guarantees provided by the Charter of Righ t s and Freedoms (Van.Sun, Apr. 18, 1987, p. A7). A f e a t u r e a t t r i b u t e d to the system as a whole i s i t s v a stness, i t s ' s t r u c t u r a l complexity' ( C o r r e c t i o n a l Law Review Working Paper One, 1986, p. 6). Accor d i n g education the s t a t u s of a l e g a l r i g h t might a l s o help s t a b i l i z e the system as a whole, f o r i f everyone was able to c l a i m steady, s a t i s f a c t o r y , and c o n s i s t e n t p r o v i s i o n of proper education programs, then, at l e a s t i n that sphere of c o r r e c t i o n s aimed to ' c o r r e c t ' p r i s o n e r s , there w i l l be i n t e g r a t i o n and c o n s i s t e n c y . The d i s s e r t a t i o n has been founded upon the moral p r i n c i p l e s 1 36 of j u s t i c e , f a i r n e s s , and respect f o r persons. On many oc c a s i o n s , these p r i n c i p l e s are s u f f i c i e n t l y potent agents of enforcement and a c t i o n . Sometimes, however, the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the law i s r e q u i r e d to i n s t i l adherence to these p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s p o s t u l a t e d that the s i t u a t i o n of p e n i t e n t i a r y education r e p r e s e n t s one of these o c c a s i o n s . P r i s o n e r s are s t i l l persons and members of s o c i e t y d e s p i t e t h e i r having to be i s o l a t e d from s o c i e t y . I f other persons are enjoying steady and s t a b l e p r o v i s i o n of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with the above mentioned p r i n c i p l e s to deprive p r i s o n e r s of such o p p o r t u n i t i e s . The Canadian C r i m i n o l o g i c a l J u s t i c e A s s o c i a t i o n s t a t e s that the goal of i t s Manual of Standards i s to 'ensure that p r i s o n e r s have access to academic and v o c a t i o n a l programs e q u i v a l e n t to those i n the community' (1985, p. 59). I t i s t h e r e f o r e a n e c e s s i t y that the r i g h t to education be l e g a l l y e n f o r c e a b l e , so that a l l p r i s o n e r s can be guaranteed t h i s access to ed u c a t i o n - -and which some are being denied. As M i l l e r sees i t , p r i s o n e r s ' i n p r i n c i p l e ' do r e t a i n a l l r i g h t s , but ' i n p r a c t i c e , the reverse i s o f t e n t r u e , ' f o r example: ...Courts and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s view c r i m i n a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n as a f o r f e i t u r e of e d u c a t i o n a l r i g h t s . . . (1978, p. 230) Such a s i t u a t i o n i s compounded by the i n a b i l i t y of p r i s o n e r s , t h e i r lack of a defense mechanism, to improve t h e i r 1 37 e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Moral p r i n c i p l e s appear i n s u f f i c i e n t , and j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n seems necessary, then, to ensure the p r o v i s i o n of an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r education to inmates which i s equal to that of the r e s t of s o c i e t y : ...A p r i s o n e r can reasonably expect . a q u a l i t y education to be h i s due i n a . j u s t s o c i e t y i n that c o n v i c t i o n of a s e r i o u s f e l o n y cannot reasonable d i m i n i s h a person's r i g h to expect r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y in s o c i a l goods, i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s . . . (Scharf, 1981, p. 231) There are t h e r e f o r e no grounds to deny p r i s o n e r s a l e g a l r i g h t to education, e s p e c i a l l y i f resources are a v a i l a b l e , i f education does not harm the i n s t i t u t i o n or s o c i e t y , indeed i s found to be a b e n e f i c i a l component of i n c a r c e r a t i o n . 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