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Personal autonomy and compulsory liberal education Partridge, Yolande Mary 1979

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PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY LIBERAL EDUCATION by YOLANDE MARY PARTRIDGE B.Ed., The University of British Columbia, 1972 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Faculty of Education) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1979 ©Yolande Mary Partridge, 1979 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 E-6 B P 7 5-5 1 I E ABSTRACT The aim of t h i s thesis i s to j u s t i f y on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l education on child r e n . In opposition to the incr e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l views of many educational t h e o r i s t s i n the " s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge" t r a d i t i o n , i t i s argued that l i b e r a l education benefits students because i t contributes towards the development of personal autonomy. ~Personal autonomy i s accepted as both an e x t r i n s i c and an i n t r i n s i c good, and i t s development i s taken as the most defensible aim of compulsory education. Because compulsory education c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s a student's prima  f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference, the thesis considers the kinds of cases i n which the r i g h t to non-interference can be j u s t i f i a b l y overridden. It presents an argument for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r -vention based on the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s through consent. Because t h i s argument permits us to impose an enormous range of studies and a c t i v i t i e s on students, some c r i t e r i o n i s required to help us choose c u r r i c u l a r components. The development of personal autonomy i s chosen as that c r i t e r i o n . Three conditions are taken as necessary f o r the presence of personal autonomy: freedom of choice, r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , and strength of w i l l . Breadth and depth of knowledge i n the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s are considered necessary f o r s a t i s f y i n g the r a t i o n a l -r e f l e c t i o n condition of autonomy, and compulsory l i b e r a l education i s taken as the best way to help students obtain breadth and depth of knowledge. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i v INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I LIBERAL EDUCATION 9 II NON-INTERFERENCE 25 1. The Right to Non-interference 25 2. Overriding the Right to Non-interference 35 A. The Enforcement of Morality 36 B. Preventing Harm to Others 38 C. Cases of Consenting to the Fo r f e i t u r e of a Right 39 D. J u s t i f y i n g Paternalism 45 III PERSONAL AUTONOMY 61 1. The Meaning of 'Personal Autonomy' 61 A. Freedom of Choice 65 B. Rational R e f l e c t i o n 68 C. Strength of W i l l 74 2. The Value of Personal Autonomy 75 3. R i v a l Candidates 86 IV AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY LIBERAL EDUCATION 89 1. White's Proposals 89 A. S p e c i f i c Components 100 B. Objections to White's Components 106 2. L i b e r a l Components and Personal Autonomy 109 V PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 130 BIBLIOGRAPHY 15? i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am very g r a t e f u l to Dr. J e r r o l d Coombs, Dr. Le Roi Daniels, and Dr. Murray E l l i o t t f o r t h e i r generous assistance i n the preparation of t h i s thesis. i v INTRODUCTION Many educators question the value of a t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l a r t s curriculum f o r students. Some propound the view that c h i l d r e n should study only what they want to study. The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to j u s t i f y from a purely p a t e r n a l i s t i c point of view the imposition of a compulsory l i b e r a l arts curriculum on students i n school. The grounds on which people argue about what should be taught i n schools are numerous and varied. Sometimes they argue from consider-ations concerning the promotion of worthwhile states of mind as, for example, do Paul H i r s t and R. S. Peters. Others, such as John White, emphasize the promotion of personal autonomy. S t i l l others suggest that the i n i t i a t i o n of students into the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s i s undesirable because i t leads to the suppression of lower socio-economic groups by the established order. One notices, however, a common thread among most of the discussions about what should be taught i n schools: i t i s the b e l i e f that course content should be determined with students' best i n t e r e s t s i n mind. Hence, the whole enterprise of education may be viewed as p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n nature. Any interference i n people's l i v e s — p a t e r n a l i s t i c or other w i s e — needs to be j u s t i f i e d . Chapter one i s a b r i e f , selected survey of the l i t e r a t u r e f o r and against the imposition of a l i b e r a l arts cur-riculum on students. Chapter two i s an attempt to e s t a b l i s h condi-tions under which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference 1 2 may be overridden. I conclude i n chapter two that there are good grounds for viewing many kinds of educational interference i n c h i l -dren's l i v e s as morally p e r m i s s i b l e — a rather uninteresting conclusion i n i t s e l f , but a necessary piece of groundwork i f we accept that every-one has a prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference. Because I am advocating a compulsory l i b e r a l , arts curriculum from the point of view of students' best i n t e r e s t s , our b e l i e f s , about what i t i s worthwhile for ch i l d r e n to learn must be examined. This i s the task of chapter three. There I suggest that i n the absence of conclusive arguments to show that any p a r t i c u l a r pursuit simply more worthwhile than any other, people ought to be allowed (from the purely self-regarding point of view) to be t h e i r own f i n a l judges of what i s worth pursuing and what i s not. Non-autonomous persons, how-ever, are not i n a very good p o s i t i o n to judge for themselves what i s worth pursuing and what i s not. Personal autonomy, I suggest, i s almost always e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for everyone; i . e . , i t i s a univ e r s a l i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . i n the Rawlsian sense. In chapter four I argue that a l i b e r a l arts curriculum i s of major importance i n helping students become autonomous persons, and i n chapter f i v e some p r a c t i c a l implications of the study are considered. It should be made clear that I am not neces s a r i l y defending i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d state intervention i n the l i v e s of c h i l d r e n f or educational purposes, although I think a good defence can be made f o r such intervention. Instead, I am defending the imposition of c e r t a i n kinds of learnings (for want of a better term) on c h i l d r e n . To ask 3 whether the state has the ri g h t to compel students to go to school i s to ask a question about the source of the authority of the state, an issue I do not explore. My j u s t i f i c a t i o n for a l i b e r a l arts c u r r i c -ulum i s intended to hold whether or not the state has very much authority and whether or not there i s a state at a l l . Even i f there were no government as we know i t , we could propose components for a compulsory educational curriculum to guide whomever undertook the education of students. Nor do I argue the case that we are morally required to educate chi l d r e n i n the way that we are morally required to perform some p a t e r n a l i s t i c acts for chi l d r e n such as feeding, c l o t h i n g , and housing them. But such a case could, I think, be argued s u c c e s s f u l l y . My arguments i n favor of a compulsory l i b e r a l arts curriculum are, of course, prima f a c i e arguments—not conclusive ones. The d i s -t i n c t i o n between prima f a c i e argument and conclusive argument i s a d i s t i n c t i o n I borrow from Brian Barry (1965, pp. 31-32). Barry says that an argument i n favor of X i s not a conclusive one when i t could be overridden by other more important considerations (which o r d i n a r i l y occur o n l y . i n abnormal circumstances). Although i t can be over-ridden, a prima f a c i e argument i s an argument that purports to be, under normal conditions, the most important and s i g n i f i c a n t argument. Although I am t r y i n g to j u s t i f y a compulsory l i b e r a l arts educa-t i o n , i t should be pointed out that compulsion does not imply coer-cion. Many classroom teachers r e g u l a r l y impose compulsory a c t i v i t i e s on students without ever r e s o r t i n g to the use of coercive techniques 4 sueh as threats, bribes, and punishments. To what extent and under what circumstances the use of coercive techniques i s morally permis-s i b l e i s a question I s h a l l have to leave aside. In other words, I am not here concerned with exploring e f f e c t i v e means for ensuring curriculum implementation, but with e s t a b l i s h i n g , as far as possib l e , what ought to constitute the content of a; compulsory curriculum. In various places throughout the thesis I re f e r to the j u s t i f i c a - t i o n of compulsory l i b e r a l education and to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of pater-n a l i s t i c interference. In chapter three I t r y to j u s t i f y our adoption of personal autonomy as a personal i d e a l . The concern of t h i s thesis i s not, of course, with the meaning of ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' but with the task of j u s t i f y i n g — i . e . , with f i n d i n g the actual reasons f o r the judgments and actions with which we are concerned.* It may be thought that the task of j u s t i f y i n g , as opposed to t a l k i n g about the notion of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i s an undertaking that cannot be f r u i t f u l l y conducted u n t i l a l l conceptual confusions have been cleared away. But t h i s i s an extreme and, I think, untenable p o s i t i o n . Although the business of conceptual analysis i s p r i o r to the enterprise of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the sense that we have a better chance of doing a good job of j u s t i -f i c a t i o n a f t e r the relevant conceptual problems have been cleared away, one who i s interested i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n need analyze only those concepts which are e s s e n t i a l to making h i s case. That i s , he needs to resolve *For a useful discussion of the meaning of ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' see Paul Taylor's Normative Discourse, pp. 68-188. 5 o n l y those c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n s which s t a n d i n the way of h i s d e v e l o p -i n g an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h I emphasize the r a t h e r obvious d i s t i n c t i o n between j u s -t i f y i n g a v a l u e judgment and t a l k i n g about what i t means to j u s t i f y a v a l u e judgment, I am aware t h a t one i s u n l i k e l y t o develop an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h o u t some c o n c e p t i o n o f what an adequate j u s t i f i c a -t i o n c o n s i s t s o f . Conse q u e n t l y , I have adopted the c r i t e r i a o f adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n p r e s e n t e d by Benn and P e t e r s . These c r i t e r i a a r e r e l a t i v e l y n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l and a c c o r d w i t h the average p e r s o n ' s i n t u i t i o n o f what counts as a good j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The c r i t e r i a s t a t e t h a t any r e s t r a i n t must s t a n d up to o b j e c t i o n s of the f o l l o w i n g t y p e s : ( i ) i n the case o f a p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e s t r a i n t , t h a t the a c t i n q u e s t i o n i n f r i n g e s no r u l e ; ( i i ) i n t h e case o f a g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r a i n t , by a r u l e , 1. t h a t t h e o b j e c t o f the r u l e i s bad; 2. t h a t w h i l e the o b j e c t o f t h e r u l e i s good, the means proposed cannot r e a s o n a b l y be expe c t e d t o a t t a i n i t ; 3. t h a t though the o b j e c t i s good, and the proposed means would s e c u r e i t , i t i s not of s u f f i c i e n t importance t o warrant the degree of r e s t r a i n t p r o p o s e d . (1959, p. 262) As Benn and P e t e r s p o i n t o u t , t h e s e a r e f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than g u i d e s f o r conduct. I n a p p l y i n g f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e s t h e s u b s t a n t i v e d e t a i l s must be s u p p l i e d . The s u b s t a n t i v e d e t a i l s i n c l u d e t h e p r o -posed conduct, the a t t e n d a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and an e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t o f t h e proposed r e s t r a i n t . We s h a l l t u r n t o t h o s e d e t a i l s v e r y s h o r t l y . In o n t o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e s t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t i s made 6 between questions about what there i s and questions about what a given statement or theory says there i s . Quine points out that although i t i s l i t t l e wonder that o n t o l o g i c a l controversy should tend i n t o controversy over language (we withdraw to the semantical plane i n order to f i n d common ground on which to argue), we must not jump to the conclusion that what there i s depends on words. He says: T r a n s l a t a b i l i t y of a question into semantical terms i s no i n d i c a t i o n that the question i s l i n g u i s t i c . To see Naples i s to bear a name which, when prefixed to the words 'sees Naples', y i e l d s a true sentence;" s t i l l there i s nothing l i n g u i s t i c about seeing Naples. (Quine, 1961, p. 16) Somewhat s i m i l a r l y , questions about what we ought to teach i n schools are not e s s e n t i a l l y l i n g u i s t i c questions. No amount of analysis of the meanings of words w i l l r e l i e v e us of the burden of making one value judgment over another i n the end. The concern of t h i s thesis i s not with the meta-question of what i t means to make a value judg-ment but with making and defending one. This i s not to suggest, of course, that the reader w i l l f i n d no analysis of key concepts i n the t h e s i s . A lengthy analysis of the notion of personal autonomy, f o r example, forms a c e n t r a l part of the thesis on which the success of the larger work depends. The task of j u s t i f y i n g the compulsory imposition of a l i b e r a l a r t s curriculum on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds i s , I believe, a very important one. For one thing, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference has been a highly neglected area i n philosophy. One would think t h i s topic should be of c e n t r a l concern to philosophers of education, yet so far very l i t t l e has been published on i t . In 7 t h i s t h e s i s , an argument for p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference based on the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s i s presented. If i t i s successful i t may help to f i l l t h i s gap i n the educational l i t e r a t u r e . But there are other gaps which, i n the process of o f f e r i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for l i b e r a l studies, the thesis helps to f i l l as w e l l . Very l i t t l e has been written analyzing the notion of personal autonomy—another topic which, one would think, ought to be of c e n t r a l concern to philosophers of education. In the t h e s i s , a f a i r l y d e t a i l e d analysis of that concept i s presented. In addition, some important arguments are brought forward against the view that l i b e r a l studies n e c e s s a r i l y introduce or re-enforce bias because they are the tools of the power e l i t e . These arguments are important because the view that a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t -ies are possible seems to be gaining i n popularity and influence, and i t i s , I believe, an i l l - f o u n d e d view. It may be h e l p f u l to the reader i f the argument of the thesis i s summarized i n advance. That way, the c e n t r a l parts of the thesis can be kept i n focus as the reader proceeds. The argument has s i x major premises: 1. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference can be over-ridden when the following conditions hold: (a) The i n d i v i d u a l consents to f o r f e i t h i s r i g h t and h i s consent i s not caused by the i n t e r f e r e n c e nor i s i t the r e s u l t of his being i r r a t i o n a l , i . e . , having d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s , i r r a t i o n a l compulsions and the l i k e . or There i s a reasonable expectation that the i n d i v i d u a l would consent i n the future i f he were r a t i o n a l and i n possession of the information relevant to j u s t i f y i n g the interference. (b) The interference promotes the good of the i n d i v i d u a l i n some way, t h i s good i s more s i g n i f i c a n t than the harm r e s u l t i n g from the interference, and the interference i s e i t h e r necessary to or i s the best way of promoting the good. 8 (c) The interference i s not morally objectionable on grounds other than i t s i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t to non-interference. 2. Because the imposition of a wide v a r i e t y of studies and a c t i v -i t i e s (including l i b e r a l studies) could meet the conditions s p e c i f i e d i n (1) above, and since any curriculum can accommodate only a l i m i t e d number of studies and a c t i v i t i e s , some c r i t e r i o n i s needed for i d e n t i f y i n g the most s i g n i f i c a n t goods to be pro-moted for students. 3. The development of personal autonomy i s the good to be promoted by compelling students to study the l i b e r a l a r t s . It i s assumed that such development i s s u f f i c i e n t l y valuable to outweigh any harm that i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t from compelling students to take l i b e r a l arts studies. (Freedom'of w i l l , r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , and strength of w i l l are taken as necessary conditions f o r personal autonomy.) 4. The development of personal autonomy i s a more desirable or s i g -n i f i c a n t educational objective than any other that might be secured by imposing other sorts of studies. I t i s assumed that there i s l i t t l e reason to believe that the a c t i v i t i e s excluded by the imposition of l i b e r a l studies are l o g i c a l l y or emp i r i c a l l y necessary to the development of autonomy. 5. A l i b e r a l arts curriculum, when taken as a set of attainments, i s necessary to the development of personal autonomy because i t i s necessary to the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , i . e . , i t i s not possible to secure any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c -t i o n without such attainments. 6. A l i b e r a l arts curriculum, when taken not as a set of attainments but as a set of courses of study (taught by whatever methods are deemed e f f e c t i v e and d e s i r a b l e ) , i s the best way of achieving r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . Therefore, we are j u s t i f i e d i n imposing l i b e r a l arts curriculum on students for t h e i r own good. CHAPTER I LIBERAL EDUCATION The b o u n d a r i e s o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n a r e l o o s e l y d e f i n e d , but as H i r s t has su g g e s t e d , whatever e l s e a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s , i t i s not a v o c a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n , not an e x c l u s i v e l y s c i e n t i f i c e d u c a t i o n , and not a s p e c i a l i s t e d u c a t i o n i n any sense. H i r s t argues, however, t h a t the meaning o f ' l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n ' i s not e n t i r e l y n e g a t i v e l y d e r i v e d , and t h a t t h e r e i s a p o s i t i v e concept o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n based f a i r l y and s q u a r e l y on the n a t u r e o f knowledge i t s e l f ( H i r s t , 1975, p. 30). I s h a l l argue l a t e r t h a t H i r s t ' s d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e forms o f knowledge does not p r o v i d e us w i t h a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s , but I s h a l l r e l y l a r g e l y on t h i s d e l i n e a t i o n t o h e l p p i c k out t h e k i n d o f c u r r i c u l u m I w i s h to j u s t i f y . Such a c u r r i c u l u m i n c l u d e s t h e study of mathematics, s c i e n c e , t h e a r t s , h i s t o r y , and p h i l o s o p h y . One might argue whether h i s t o r y , f o r example, i s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , o r whether t h e r e i s such a t h i n g as r e l i -g i o u s knowledge t h a t ought to r e c e i v e a t t e n t i o n as w e l l . These a r e im p o r t a n t i s s u e s but they need not be r e s o l v e d b e f o r e we attempt t o j u s t i f y imposing a c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s t h a t c o n s i s t s l a r g e l y of th e h u m a n i t i e s , mathematics, and s c i e n c e , r a t h e r than v o c a t i o n a l or t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g . I n so f a r as a t r a d i t i o n a l academic c u r r i c u l u m 9 10 can be distinguished from a vocational or t e c h n i c a l curriculum, a f a i r l y loose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r a l education should not be problematic. Neither the idea that a l i b e r a l education i n some way frees the mind nor the idea that a l i b e r a l education should be compulsory for a l l students i s new. In h i s Republic Plato advocates the com-pulsory imposition of something l i k e a l i b e r a l education on students. A l l students, he believed, should be taught reading, w r i t i n g , poetry and drama (highly censored for younger students), and gymnastics. Students would then branch out, depending on t h e i r natural a b i l i t i e s , to pursue the m i l i t a r y a r t or the sciences and d i a l e c t i c — t h e search f o r a fundamental p r i n c i p l e that explains a l l of- r e a l i t y . Eventu-a l l y each student would be sent into the state to perform the func-tions best suited to h i s a b i l i t i e s . Plato has a three-part j u s t i -f i c a t i o n f o r h i s theory of education based on e t h i c a l , metaphysical, and epistemological concerns: 1. He holds that the j u s t state and the j u s t i n d i v i d u a l are good. The goodness of a member of a class i s the resemblance between i t and i t s f o r m — i . e . , i t s Idea which ex i s t s i n a supernatural realm. The Form of human beings i s the pattern i n t o which the parts of the soul f a l l when each i s f u l l y developed. The Form of the state i s the pattern into which the parts of the state f a l l when each part performs i t s proper function. In so f a r as the i n d i -v i d u a l comes to resemble the Form of humanity he i s good and j u s t , and i n so f a r as the state comes to resemble the form of states 1 1 i t i s good and ju s t as w e l l . Plato's education system was designed to achieve Goodness i n both the i n d i v i d u a l and the State. 2. Plato held that to some extent no i n d i v i d u a l can help but possess the three a b i l i t i e s of reason, appetite, and s p i r i t , and no state can help but perform the three functions of l e g i s l a t i o n , economic production and d i s t r i b u t i o n , and law enforcement. These a b i l i t i e s and functions, he believed, are required by the supernatural Forms. Hence Plato has a metaphysical explanation for the fact s about human nature and society upon which he rests his educational recommendations. 3. Plato held that we cannot know the world of sense experience; we can know only the Forms i n t h e i r l o g i c a l connections. The entir e realm of becoming i s a copy of the supernatural realm of the forms. Thus the pursuit of knowledge i s not an i n f a l l i b l e guide to Re a l i t y , but i t i s better than r e l y i n g on mere opinion, prejudice, and s u p e r s t i t i o n . Although t h i s b r i e f summary of the grounds on which Plato j u s t i f i e d l i b e r a l education hardly does j u s t i c e to h i s theory, few would attempt to support a compulsory l i b e r a l education f o r students today with doctrines of metaphysical and epistemological Realism l i k e those of Plato. When we say today that someone has a Platonic notion of education we usually mean either than he has a preconceived notion of the Good which a p a r t i c u l a r kind of education helps one to obtain, or that the enterprise of education ought to be conducted by 12 h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s o r t i n g students into appropriate s l o t s . In the fourth century, St. Augustine made another s i g n i f i c a n t attempt to j u s t i f y l i b e r a l education. Augustine proposed u n i v e r s a l compulsory l i b e r a l education as.the means for achieving s a l v a t i o n i He included the study of philosophy and theology i n h i s curriculum for only the most r a t i o n a l students—those destined for pos i t i o n s i n the church—because he held that the only requirement for s a l v a t i o n i s true b e l i e f (not knowledge) about the nature and order of the universe and about God's r e l a t i o n to man. Augustine believed that the l i b e r a l a r t s should be taught i n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e manner because true b e l i e f can be most e f f i c i e n t l y achieved through i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . There have been many v a r i a t i o n s throughout the centuries on the C h r i s t i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r l i b e r a l education introduced by Augustine, but s i g n i f i c a n t and i n t e r e s t i n g secular attempts to j u s t i f y compulsory l i b e r a l education have not been advanced u n t i l modern times. Of these I s h a l l b r i e f l y discuss the pos i t i o n s of P h i l i p Phenix i n Realms  of Meaning (1964), Paul H i r s t i n " L i b e r a l Education and the Nature of Knowledge" (1974, pp. 30-53), and Robin Barrow i n Common Sense and  the Curriculum (1976). In r e s t r i c t i n g the discussion to the works of philosophers, I s h a l l not discuss such w e l l known defenses of l i b e r a l education as the Harvard Committee Report: General. Education  i n a Free Society (1946), but t h i s i s not to suggest that no valuable i n s i g h t s are contained i n that report or others l i k e i t . P h i l i p Phenix argues that there is a f i n i t e number of ways i n which human beings order t h e i r experiences i n the world. He says the d i s t i n c t realms through which experience becomes meaningful are symbolics, empirics, e s t h e t i c s , synnoetics (personal knowledge), e t h i c s , and synoptics. Each realm has i t s own subdivisions. Symbolics and synoptics are subdivided as follows: It i s Phenix's p o s i t i o n , very roughly, that c h i l d r e n ought to be i n i t i a t e d into a l l s i x realms f o r the simple reason that human experience becomes meaningful through these and only these perspec-t i v e s . It i s desirable, holds Phenix, that human experience be meaningful, i . e . , that destructive skepticism, depersonalization, and a l i e n a t i o n are counteracted. The way to achieve t h i s aim, suppos-edly, i s by i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the s i x basic realms of meaning. Phenix's p o s i t i o n i s i n t e r e s t i n g and worthy of attention, but we s h a l l have to rej e c t i t as a guide f o r picking out c u r r i c u l a r components for at le a s t three reasons: 1. I t i s not clear that Phenix i s correct i n his claim that there are s i x and only s i x realms of meaning and that t h e i r differences have been a r t i c u l a t e d c o r r e c t l y . 2. Even i f there were only s i x realms of meaning, what reason could ^/Ordinary language Symbolics "~ Mathematics >Nondiscursive symbolic forms (signals, bodily gestures, r i t u a l , dreams, etc.) .History Philosophy 14 there be for imposing a l l s i x realms on students? Why must every student learn to order h i s experience i n a l l s i x ways? Phenix does not r e a l l y o f f e r us an answer to t h i s question. I n i t i a t i o n into the realms of meaning i s , for Phenix, more l i k e an unques-tioned s t a r t i n g point than anything e l s e . 3. Phenix seems to assume that i n i t i a t i o n into the realms of meaning i s the s o l u t i o n — o r at l e a s t a major part of the s o l u t i o n — t o the problems of destructive skepticism, depersonalization, and psycho-l o g i c a l a l i e n a t i o n . This i s , I think, an untenable p o s i t i o n . The claim that one's mental health improves i n d i r e c t proportion to one's a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge i s , to say the l e a s t , a l i t t l e rash.' E i t h e r i t i s a questionable empirical g e n e r a l i z a t i o n or i t presupposes a notion of mental health we need not accept. Similar i n many ways to Phenix's categorization of realms of meaning i s H i r s t ' s categorization of forms of knowledge. H i r s t has argued that a l l the knowledge we have can be broken up into l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t categories: mathematics, science (physical science), aesthetics, personal knowledge, morality, r e l i g i o n , philosophy, and h i s t o r y — a l t h o u g h h i s t o r y i s deleted from H i r s t ' s later(1974) account. H i r s t o f f e r s four necessary and j o i n t l y s u f f i c i e n t conditions f or d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a form of knowledge: 1. Each form of knowledge must have i t s own p e c u l i a r concepts. 2. Each form must have a d i s t i n c t l o g i c a l structure. 3. The statements of each form must be testable i n some d i s t i n c t way against experience. 4. Each form develops i t s own p a r t i c u l a r techniques f o r exploring 15 experience and t e s t i n g the truth of i t s statements. P a r a l l e l to Phenix's view that i n i t i a t i o n into the realms of meaning enables the student to get "meaning" from experience i n a l l p ossible ways, we have H i r s t ' s view that the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge i s the development of mind i t s e l f . The same point i s made, I think, i n a d i f f e r e n t context by J . F. Bennett when he says " . . . a person's r e a l i t y i s l a r g e l y an epistemic matter—how much there i s of him i s la r g e l y to be measured by how much he knows. . . . " (Bennett, 1975, p. 18). I t could be argued that i n so f a r as we value the develop-ment of mind we w i l l value i n i t i a t i o n into the l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge. Who could be opposed to the development of mind? Objections a r i s e , however, s i m i l a r to those we made i n considering Phenix's realms of meaning: 1. It i s simply not clear that there are only seven (or eight) l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge, nor i s i t cl e a r that i f there are d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge they are i n fact the ones that H i r s t picks out. For example, many people think there i s no such thing as r e l i g i o u s knowledge. What grounds could there be f o r including r e l i g i o n i n the l i s t but not, say, transcen-dental meditation? I am not, of course, t r y i n g to claim that H i r s t is. wrong—only that he has not made h i s case, though since we are searching for good grounds on which to base a l i b e r a l education, i t can r e a l l y make no difference to us whether H i r s t i s wrong or whether he i s r i g h t but simply has not made h i s case. 16 E i t h e r way, we are without good'grounds on H i r s t ' s account.* 2. Even i f we were to accept H i r s t ' s categorization as legitimate, we might question why we should i n i t i a t e every student into a l l the forms of knowledge. Are there not some aspects of the mind we would want to develop more than others? If so, then we need some c r i t e r i o n for determining which forms of knowledge are more important than others. The task of chapter three i s , i n e f f e c t , to i s o l a t e that c r i t e r i o n , but rather than approach that task as an upshot of the l i m i t a t i o n s of H i r s t ' s p o s i t i o n , I approach i t l a t e r from an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t angle. Robin Barrow suggests that we pick out e u r r i c u l a r content on a u t i l i t a r i a n basis. An a c t i v i t y , a pursuit, or a way of l i f e i s d e s i r -able, says Barrow, i n so f a r as i t promotes pleasure and minimizes pain. "But, i n assessing the degree of pleasure promoted," he states, "we have to take account of the extent, i n t e n s i t y , duration and fecundity of pleasure" (Barrow, 1976, p. 92). The u t i l i t a r i a n hypothesis, he says, f i t s not only the facts of our experience but also our l i n g u i s t i c conventions. Barrow uses the maximization-of-pleasure p r i n c i p l e to pick out compulsory e u r r i c u l a r components not unlike t r a d i t i o n a l school c u r r i c u l a . The curriculum he proposes f a l l s into four stages: The primary stage involves health t r a i n i n g , moral t r a i n i n g , and the development of numeracy and l i t e r a c y . The secondary stage involves i n i t i a t i o n into the natural sciences, mathe-matics, the f i n e a r t s , h i s t o r y , l i t e r a t u r e and r e l i g i o n . The *For further c r i t i c i s m s of H i r s t ' s views see El i z a b e t h Hindness, "Forms of Knowledge," 1972. t e r t i a r y stage involves the continued study of h i s t o r y and l i t e r a t u r e and the introduction of vocational and s o c i a l s t u d i e s — a l l as compulsory elements. In addition i t i s at t h i s stage that a wide v a r i e t y of options, such as c l a s s i c s , cookery, carpentry, modern languages and the continued study of such things as mathematics, the f i n e arts and the natural sciences, are made a v a i l a b l e . The quaternary stage adds philosophy as a compulsory study to the continuing programme of the t e r t i a r y stage. (Barrow, 1976, p. 107) We need not look at the d e t a i l s of the compulsory curriculum Barrow proposes because there are at least two reasons why the pleasure p r i n c i p l e i s unacceptable as a basis f o r p r e s c r i b i n g curriculum content. The f i r s t i s that even i f we did accept the maximization of pleasure as our ultimate value i t i s a d i f f i c u l t (perhaps impos-s i b l e ) empirical problem to ascertain what things should be taught i n schools i n order.to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain i n people's l i v e s . D i f f e r e n t people obtain pleasure i n d i f f e r e n t ways. That d i f f i c u l t y , though, does not i n i t s e l f amount to a very s u b s t a n t i a l objection to the u t i l i t a r i a n thesis because whatever basis our choices might have we can expect to face d i f f i c u l t empir-i c a l questions. The serious objection to the u t i l i t a r i a n t hesis i s that u t i l i t y (happiness, pleasure, etc.) i s not always our high-est value, and we do not n e c e s s a r i l y agree that we ought to accept i t as such. If we r e a l l y valued a way of l i f e that i s conducive to the maximization of pleasure above a l l else then we would have no objection to a Brave-New-WorId kind of existence. But i n fact we have profound objections to Brave New World f o r the simple reason that there are some things we value above and beyond the maximization of p l e a s u r e — o u r personal autonomy, for example, about which I s h a l l 18 have more to say l a t e r . So we must r e j e c t the u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n f o r determining curriculum content and look for a more acceptable one. Before proceeding with that task we should, perhaps, look b r i e f l y at some of the arguments adduced by those who oppose compul-sory l i b e r a l education. H i s t o r i c a l l y , there have been a number of philosophers—'Locke and Dewey, for example—who have opposed u n i -v e r s a l , compulsory, l i b e r a l education. There i s , however, l i t t l e point i n our t r y i n g to discuss a l l positions opposed to compulsory l i b e r a l education, so we w i l l r e s t r i c t ourselves to two i n f l u e n t i a l contemporary views. One such view i s that course content should depend l a r g e l y on student i n t e r e s t . L e t t i n g the curriculum be determined by student i n t e r e s t i s sometimes considered the progressive thing to do. At le a s t two responses can be made to t h i s claim. F i r s t , no one i s born with a p a r t i c u l a r parcel of i n t e r e s t s . Interests a r i s e as a r e s u l t of the kinds of experiences we have i n l i f e . A c h i l d brought up with i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a c t i v e people, surrounded by books and stim-u l a t i n g conversation, w i l l probably have r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s from a c h i l d brought up i n a home where beer and s k i t t l e s provide the stimulation. The l a t t e r c h i l d may not be interested i n the most creative achievements i n a r t , music, l i t e r a t u r e , mathematics, science, and philosophy, but can't we as educators create i n t e r e s t s where they didn't before exist? I f we allow the curriculum to be determined by p u p i l i n t e r e s t alone, what chance does a c h i l d have of ever coming to know the richness of i n t e l l e c t u a l pursuits i f he has not already been 19 somehow i n t l a t e d o u t s i d e the s c h o o l ? I f , a f t e r he has come t o know them, a c h i l d chooses to r e j e c t a e s t h e t i c and i n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t s , I am s u r e we have no r i g h t t o f o r c e our p r e f e r e n c e s on him; but s h o u l d we not a t l e a s t g i v e - . - c h i l d r e n the o p p o r t u n i t y to d e c i d e f o r themselves which a c t i v i t i e s they would e v e n t u a l l y l i k e t o p u rsue f o r t h e i r own sake? One does not have such an o p p o r t u n i t y u n l e s s he i s aware o f the a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s . P e t e r s argues i n " E d u c a t i o n as I n i t i a t i o n " (1973, pp. 81-107) t h a t t h e commonly he a r d c o m p l a i n t t h a t a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m i s i r r e l e v a n t t o s t u d e n t s ' l i v e s , shows a l a c k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of acad-emic s u b j e c t s . The s t u d y of h i s t o r y , l i t e r a t u r e , p h i l o s o p h y , p h y s i c s , and so f o r t h , has enormous r e l e v a n c e t o a l l our l i v e s because p r o p e r i n i t i a t i o n i n t o t h e s e s u b j e c t s h e l p s us to l o o k a t the w o r l d i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . As one's b e l i e f s about the w o r l d change so do one's f e e l i n g s . The more one has been i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h e v a r i o u s forms of thought, the more s i g n i f i c a n c e one sees i n o r d i n -a r y o b j e c t s and e v e n t s . I f p r e s e n t attempts t o i n i t i a t e s t u d e n t s i n t o t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f thought a r e not h a v i n g any e f f e c t on how s t u d e n t s t h i n k or f e e l about the w o r l d , then the p r o p e r c o n c l u s i o n might be not t h a t academic s u b j e c t s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o l i f e , but t h a t s t u d e n t s a r e not a d e q u a t e l y i n i t i a t e d i n t o academic s u b j e c t s a t s c h o o l . T h i s s h o u l d not be s u r p r i s i n g , f o r many c l a s s r o o m t e a c h e r s themselves have been o n l y v e r y s u p e r f i c i a l l y i n i t i a t e d i n t o the sub-j e c t s they t e a c h . Rather than condemn academic s u b j e c t s as i r r e l -e v ant, perhaps we ought to l o o k s e r i o u s l y a t the i l l e f f e c t s of t h e 2 0 b l i n d leading the b l i n d . A second view arises from a growing school of thought that argues against l i b e r a l education from a Marxist perspective. It includes such people as Michael Apple, Walter Feinberg, and Michael Young— sometimes referred to as s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge. Their main l i n e of argument seems to rest on the view that because a l l knowledge i s man-made, not only i s there nothing sacred about i n i t i a t i n g students into t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge, but also i t i s downright oppres-si v e . One of Michael Apple's concerns i s the problem of the hidden c u r r i c u l u m — e s p e c i a l l y the subtle and subversive ways i n which i t contributes to the maintenance of the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order. His basic claim i n "What Do Schools Teach?" (1977) i s that the type of knowledge selected for the curriculum and transmitted through the hidden curriculum i s conservative i n character and contributes to the perpetuation of the status quo i n p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic l i f e . He quotes Michael Young who says there i s a . . . d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between access to power and the opportunity to l e g i t i m i z e c e r t a i n dominant categories and the process by which the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such categories to some groups enables them to assert power and control over others. (Apple, 1977, p. 30) Apple adds: In advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , schools become p a r t i c u l a r l y important as d i s t r i b u t o r s of t h i s c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l and play a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n giving legitimacy to c e r t a i n categories and forms of knowledge. (Loc. c i t . ) 21 Young speaks of 'dominant categories' and Apple speaks of both 'categories' and 'forms of knowledge'. The notion of category i s very obscure so I s h a l l have to ignore i t completely. But there i s not the same d i f f i c u l t y with the notion of forms of knowledge. Here i t i s clear that Paul H i r s t ' s forms of knowledge ( r e l i g i o n , philosophy, l o g i c , p h y s i c a l science, aesthetics, h i s t o r y , knowledge of other minds) or something l i k e them are implied. In the a r t i c l e from which Apple quotes Young above, Young speaks d i r e c t l y of Paul H i r s t ' s forms of knowledge. He says that c r i t i q u e s of philosophers of education s t a r t from . . . c e r t a i n a p r i o r i assumptions about the organization (or forms) of knowledge . . . t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s focus either on new topic-based s y l l a b i which neglect these 'forms of understand-ing', or on new c u r r i c u l a f o r the so-called 'less able' or 'Newsom c h i l d ' which they argue are consciously r e s t r i c t i n g them from access to those forms of understanding which i n the p h i l -osopher's sense are 'education'. The problem with t h i s kind of c r i t i q u e i s that i t appears to be based on an a b s o l u t i s t concep-t i o n of a set of d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge which correspond c l o s e l y to the t r a d i t i o n a l areas of the academic curriculum and thus j u s t i f y , rather than examine, what are no more than the s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l constructs of a p a r t i c u l a r time. I t i s important to st r e s s that i t i s not 'subjects' which H i r s t recognizes as the s o c i a l l y constructed ways that teachers organize knowledge, but forms of understanding, that i t i s claimed are 'necessarily' d i s t i n c t . The point I wish to make here i s that unless such necessary d i s t i n c t i o n s or i n t r i n s i c l o g i c s are treated as problematic, p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m cannot examine the assumptions of academic c u r r i c u l a . (Young, 1977, p. 23) The trouble i s that Young does not t e l l us i n what way H i r s t ' s categorization of the forms of knowledge should be treated as problem-a t i c . Does he mean that because the forms of knowledge are socio-h i s t o r i c a l constructs they are somehow lacking i n v a l i d i t y ? Why does he lament the fa c t that we i n t e r p r e t our experience through the use of such constructs? Since nearly a l l our concepts have some sort of h i s t o r y ( i . e . , some time and place i n which the conceptual d i s t i n c -t i o n was f i r s t made as well as changes i n concepts through time) then our conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s are necessa r i l y s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l con-s t r u c t s . We might ask Young how else we are to in t e r p r e t our experi-ence i f not through s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l constructs. Also i n the excerpt above, Young accuses H i r s t and others of having an " a b s o l u t i s t conception" of the d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge. He probably means that H i r s t has some metaphysical view of the forms of knowledge as p a r a l l e l s to some kind of external Lockean 'real world'. If so, h i s accusation i s i l l founded, as H i r s t makes clear i n h i s discussion of the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge and the development of mind. H i r s t says that to acquire knowledge i s to come to have a mind, and that the mind i s not "an e n t i t y which s u i t a b l y directed by knowledge comes to take on the pattern of, i s conformed to, some external r e a l i t y " (1974, p. 41). In discussing l i b e r a l education he adds: " I t i s however no longer supported by epistemological and meta-physi c a l doctrines that r e s u l t i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l organization of the various forms of knowledge" (1974, p. 41). It i s possible that Apple and Young have i n c o r r e c t l y i n f e r r e d from t h e i r b e l i e f that the forms of knowledge have nothing to do with some kind of r e a l world beyond the world of the senses, that the forms of knowledge therefore c o n s t i t u t e an a r b i t r a r y categorization scheme which we ought to change, so that people whose experiences are not made i n t e l l i g i b l e by reference to the c r i t e r i a for truth inherent i n each.of the t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f knowledge w i l l get t h e i r f a i r s h a r e of w e a l t h , s t a t u s , and power, by l e g i t i m i z i n g o t h e r c a t e g o r i z a t i o n schemes. But any q u e s t i o n about whether we ought t o l e g i t i m i z e o t h e r forms o f knowledge and d e l e g i t i m i z e the t r a d i t i o n a l ones i s f o o l i s h i f i n f a c t we cannot do so. And I b e l i e v e we c a n n o t — o n the grounds t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge a r e " t h e b a s i c a r t i c u l a t i o n s whereby the whole o f e x p e r i e n c e has become i n t e l l i g i b l e t o man, they a r e t h e fundamental achievements o f mind" ( H i r s t , 1974, p. 41). T h i s i s not to suggest t h a t p e r s o n s who have not s t u d i e d h i s t o r y , s c i e n c e , p h i l o s o p h y , e t c . , have no mind, but i t i s to suggest t h a t i f s o c i o l -o g i s t s of knowledge h o l d t h a t we ought t o l e g i t i m i z e forms o f knowl-edge o t h e r than t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ones, t h e n they a r e under some o b l i -g a t i o n t o o f f e r c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h i s r o l e . A l t h o u g h we might argue whether h i s t o r y , say, c o n s t i t u t e s a fundamental form of knowledge, no s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge has produced a c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f b a s i c forms o f knowledge f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A p p l e makes a few s t a b s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e forms o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , but he o f f e r s no a l t e r n a t i v e t o the t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge. A g a i n , i t i s not c l e a r what A p p l e means by 'forms o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' , but he c l e a r l y does not mean forms of knowledge i n H i r s t ' s sense because t h e main c a n d i d a t e he o f f e r s f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e form of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s "a r e a l i s t i c approach t o t h e n a t u r e o f c o n f l i c t " (1975, p. 115). At t h i s p o i n t i t might be u s e f u l t o summarize the s e t t i n g of th e scene so f a r . P l a t o had b o t h a c o n c e p t i o n o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t . H i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s i n a d e q u a t e as i s 24 that of h i s d i s c i p l e , Augustine. Contemporary writers l i k e H i r s t and Phenix—when p u s h e d — r e a l l y have no j u s t i f i c a t i o n at a l l : they t r y to make t h e i r conception of knowledge do the job for which a j u s t i f i c a -t i o n i s needed. Barrow of f e r s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , but i t i s a j u s t i -f i c a t i o n we cannot accept. A cursory look at contemporary c r i t i q u e s of l i b e r a l education indicates that opponents have no coherent and convincing j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r p o s i t i o n e i t h e r . I f we are going to impose l i b e r a l studies on students i n schools, however, then we ought to have an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n for doing so. Providing such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s the task t h i s thesis i s designed to do. Any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r compulsory education should, I think, s t a r t by j u s t i f y i n g the overriding of a person's r i g h t to non-interference. The imposition of compulsory l i b e r a l education c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s that r i g h t , and unless our reasons f o r v i o l a t i n g i t are acceptable there i s no point i n discussing what form our interference should take. But the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a compulsory curriculum has not been completed simply by showing' that i t . i s morally permissible. Many kinds of interference i n children's l i v e s are morally permis-s i b l e that have l i t t l e or no educational s i g n i f i c a n c e , e.g., making a c h i l d brush h i s teeth before he goes to bed. What we need to sort out are those kinds of interferences that are p r i o r i t i e s for educa-t i o n a l purposes. CHAPTER II NON-INTERFERENCE The purpose of chapter two i s to f i n d good grounds f o r the r i g h t to non-interference, and to suggest conditions under which the r i g h t to non-interference may be overridden. The points I s h a l l make are about prima f a c i e r i g h t s only and not about actual r i g h t s . 1. The Right to Non-interference We should keep i n mind that there are two ways of taking the expression 'X has a r i g h t to Y" . One thing that might be meant by the expression 'X has a ri g h t to Y' i s that as a matter of fac t there i s some established p r a c t i c e whereby X i s guaranteed some entitlement to Y. If you make a term deposit of $1000 at a bank that pays a simple rate of i n t e r e s t of nine per cent per annum, then the bank guarantees that i t w i l l pay you $90 per annum for investing your money there. You are e n t i t l e d to $90 f o r l e t t i n g the bank use your $1000. In other words you have a r i g h t to $90. On t h i s conception of r i g h t s , to say that X has a r i g h t to Y i s to make an e a s i l y v e r i -f i a b l e empirical claim. Either there i s or there i s not some established p r a c t i c e whereby X i s guaranteed Y. But we are not always t a l k i n g about established guarantees when we t a l k about r i g h t s . If we say X has the r i g h t to be treated with respect we are not necessar-i l y saying anything about established practices whereby X i s i n fact 25 26 guaranteed of treatment with respect. The claim 'X has the r i g h t to be treated with respect' i s quite compatible with a state of a f f a i r s i n which X i s very seldom treated with respect. Such a claim, because i t need not have anything to do with what i s i n fac t the case, i s making some sort of statement about what ought to be the case. On t h i s account, the statement 'X has the r i g h t to be treated with respect' means the same as 'X ought to be treated with respect' or 'We should have some established p r a c t i c e whereby X i s i n fact treated with respect'. Although I am not c e r t a i n that the l i m i t s of what we can sensibly mean by 'X has a ri g h t to Y 1 are exhausted by the two accounts I have given, I believe that they are. Believers i n natural r i g h t s may suggest a t h i r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but since claims about natural r i g h t s need to be cashed out i n terms of what ought to be the case i n the world, there i s no need for us to consider natural r i g h t s . On the account I am offering,, an ordinary claim about r i g h t s such as 'X has the r i g h t to a guaranteed annual income', f o r example, can be taken i n either of two ways: as a claim about what i n p r a c t i c e X i s guaranteed to have or as a p r e s c r i p t i o n about what X i n p r a c t i c e ought to be guaranteed. What then are we to make of the meaning of the claim that people have the r i g h t to non-interference? We might mean that, as a matter of f a c t , there i s some guarantee that people w i l l not be i n t e r f e r e d with under normal c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t there i s some sort of guarantee that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s free choices w i l l be r e s p e c t e d — o r we might mean that there ought to be a guarantee that other people's choices w i l l 27 not be forced upon us without good reason. In eit h e r case we can ask whether the pr a c t i c e of guaranteeing non-interference to people i s a good idea, and whether everyone ought to be afforded t h i s r i g h t . It could be suggested that people possess the r i g h t to non-interference only i n so f a r as they are r a t i o n a l . But t h i s sugges-t i o n i s probably untenable on the grounds that we would, I think, regard i t as wrong to deprive even madmen of doing what they want to do unless we have an acceptable reason f o r i n t e r f e r i n g with them. How then can we determine who has the r i g h t to non-interference and who has not? Do a l l human beings have t h i s right? Or a l l sentient beings? Michael Tooley o f f e r s us a theory of ri g h t s which, i f we accept i t , provides grounds for the view that very young babies, among others, have no r i g h t to non-interference while polar bears do have such a r i g h t . Professor Tooley o f f e r s us an account of what constitutes a v i o l a t i o n of A's ri g h t to X. An important point to note i s that unless something could count as a v i o l a t i o n of A's r i g h t to X, i t would make no sense to say that A has a r i g h t to X. Tooley claims that an action can constitute a v i o l a t i o n of A's r i g h t at time T that state of a f f a i r s S obtain at time T* i f and only i f one of the following conditions obtains: 1. The action i s performed at time T, i t prevents state of a f f a i r s S from e x i s t i n g at time T*, and i n d i v i d u a l A desires at time T that state of a f f a i r s S obtain at time T*; 2. The action i s performed at some time T 1, i t prevents state of a f f a i r s S from e x i s t i n g at time T*, and although i n d i -v i d u a l A i s incapable of d e s i r i n g at time T 1 either that S obtain or that S not obtain at time T*, A did desire at time T that S obtain at time T*, where T i s the moment of time immediately preceding the time i n t e r v a l i n which A i s incapable of d e s i r i n g either that S exist or that S not ex i s t at time T*. (Time T* may be either simultaneous with 28' T, or l a t e r than T). . . 3. The action i s performed at some time T 1 and prevents state of a f f a i r s S from obtaining at time T*, and although i n d i v i d u a l A does not desire at time T 1 that S obtain at time T*, either because A i s incapable of having the desire at that time, or because there i s some relevant information that A does not possess at that time, there i s some l a t e r time T at which A w i l l e x i s t and at which he w i l l desire that state of a f f a i r s S e x i s t at time T* . . . 4. . . . The e s s e n t i a l idea [of condition 4] . . . i s simply that actions to which an i n d i v i d u a l does not o b j e c t — e i t h e r because he i s incapable of d e s i r i n g at the time that they not occur, or because he lacks relevant information, or because h i s desires have been 'warped' by psychological or p h y s i o l o g i c a l factors—-may nevertheless v i o l a t e his r i g h t s i f there i s some time at which he i s or w i l l be capable of wishing that the action had not been performed, and at which he would so wish i f he had a l l the relevant information and had not been subjected to influences that d i s t o r t e d h i s preferences. (Correspondence, 1973, pp. 420-424) Condition one above covers cases that are determined by a sub-j e c t ' s present desires. Condition two covers cases that depend on a subject's past desires, such as cases i n v o l v i n g the r i g h t s of persons who are dead or unconscious. Condition three covers cases that depend on a subject's future desires, e.g., cases involving the r i g h t s of future generations. Condition four applies to cases i n which a subject's r i g h t s are v i o l a t e d because of c e r t a i n p o t e n t i a l desires, e.g., cases of v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t s of slaves who have been condi-tioned i n some way or another to condone dis c r i m i n a t i o n against them-selves . If Tooley's analysis i s correct, then non-rational i n d i v i d u a l s such as madmen and young c h i l d r e n possess the r i g h t to non-interfer-ence to the extent that they desire, have desired, w i l l d e sire, or would desire not to be interefered with. Newborn babies, however, 2 9 probably do not possess the r i g h t to non-interference because the possession of c e r t a i n relevant concepts i s a necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e to having desires, and newborn babies possess very few concepts. A more s t a r t l i n g claim i s Tooley's b e l i e f that a newborn infant does not possess any serious r i g h t to l i f e on the grounds that i t does not possess the concept of a s e l f as a continuing subject of mental states and experiences. Tooley would claim that since nothing can count as a v i o l a t i o n of a newborn baby's r i g h t to l i f e (or to non-interference), i t makes no sense to claim that a new born baby has such r i g h t s . But as i t stands Tooley's theory i s unacceptable. The f a c t that most people adamantly want to confer the r i g h t to l i f e on newborn i n f a n t s — n o r m a l l y to the point where the prima f a c i e r i g h t becomes an actual r i g h t — i s enough to defeat i t . When a theory of t h i s kind f a i l s to explain the phenomena we have two choices—we can e i t h e r r e j e c t the theory or somehow bring the phenomena into l i n e with i t . The l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e would lead us to conclude that our thinking about newborn babies and the r i g h t to l i f e has been inconsistent i n the past and that infants do not r e a l l y possess the serious r i g h t to l i f e . This would not imply that k i l l i n g an infant would be neces-s a r i l y morally permissible; i t simply means that i f such a k i l l i n g were to count as a v i o l a t i o n of anyone's r i g h t s i t would count as a v i o l a t i o n of someone else's r i g h t s — n o t the i n f a n t ' s . A parent, for example, who wants the infant to l i v e suffers a v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s i f i t i s k i l l e d . Since such a p o s i t i o n i s a l i t t l e too b i z a r r e for most people's taste, our natural i n c l i n a t i o n i s to r e j e c t Tooley's 30 theory rather than adapt our thinking to f a l l into l i n e with i t . S t i l l , I think there i s something to be learned from Tooley's i n s i g h t -f u l way of connecting r i g h t s with desires, but we w i l l have to look elsewhere f o r arguments supporting the r i g h t to non-interference. It can be p l a u s i b l y claimed, as M i l l claims i n h i s essay On  Libe r t y , that there i s great u t i l i t a r i a n benefit that accompanies the observance of the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference. People are gener-a l l y i n c l i n e d to be happier when they are permitted to pursue the means and ends of t h e i r choice. Few people want to be ordered about or subjected to the a r b i t r a r y w i l l of someone else. Even very young chil d r e n f e e l i n s u l t e d and r e s e n t f u l i f t h e i r opinions are always discounted, i f they are treated l i k e objects instead of people. Great s a t i s f a c t i o n i s gained not only i n thinking f o r oneself and making one's own decisions but i n being treated by others as someone who i s capable of thinking for oneself and making one's own decisions. Although many of us would agree with M i l l , h i s claim that general happiness i s increased when people are allowed to pursue the means and ends of t h e i r choice ( M i l l excludes children and barbarians how-ever) i s a contingent claim; i t i s therefore open to r e f u t a t i o n through counter evidence—and i n t h i s case there i s , perhaps, a sizeable amount of counter evidence that could be produced. Most people are f a m i l i a r with E r i c Fromm's view that human beings are b a s i c a l l y a f r a i d of pursuing the means and ends of t h e i r choice. Fromm's psychological thesis i s that freedom makes people insecure. People would rather be led by others than determine t h e i r own d e s t i n i e s . They prefer to have someone else take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for them. No doubt t h i s i s true of a l l of us to some extent i n our l i v e s , and some people may even prefer to act non-autonomously most of the time, but i t i s always possible that people who fear freedom can be taught to be autonomous and to derive s a t i s f a c t i o n from making autonomous choices. On the other hand, people can also be taught to enjoy domination by others. So we s t i l l have the empirical question of which state leads to the greatest happiness. But even i f M i l l i s r i g h t that autonomy brings more happiness than does domination, h i s u t i l i t a r i a n argument does not provide us with any conclusive j u s t i f i -c ation for the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference because i f u t i l i t y (or happiness) i s taken as the ultimate goal of l i f e , then non-interfer-ence w i l l be valued only i n so f a r as i t i s instrumental i n promoting human happiness. If Brave New World were a technologically v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to our present way of l i f e there would no longer be any need to adhere to the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference. But since most of us are not prepared to buy into a Brave-New-World way of l i f e , we are not prepared to opt for happiness at any p r i c e . This i s not to diminish the importance of the empirical claim that observance of the prac t i c e of non-interference does i n fact contribute to human happi-ness, but i t i s to suggest that i f we seek a conclusive argument i n favor of non-interference we must again look elsewhere. We might t r y looking at Rawls' contention that non-interference i s a p r i n c i p l e any r a t i o n a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d person would choose to l i v e by i f he were choosing a way of l i f e from behind a " v e i l of 3'2 ignorance" (1971). That i s , says Rawls, i f we were choosing a set of p r i n c i p l e s for people to l i v e by, knowing that we w i l l have to occupy some p o s i t i o n i n the world but not knowing what that p o s i t i o n w i l l be, we would n a t u r a l l y prefer observance of the r i g h t to non-interference f o r everyone i n order to ensure that our own r i g h t to non-interference w i l l be respected. We may question Rawls' contention that a p r i n -c i p l e i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t would be chosen by r a t i o n a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d persons from behind a v e i l of ignorance, but even i f we agree with Rawls on t h i s point i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y true that r a t i o n a l l y , s e l f -interested persons would choose that everyone l i v e by the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference. Some daring i n d i v i d u a l s might be w i l l i n g to allow the p r a c t i c e of non-interference only f o r the very r i c h or the very powerful on the gamble that they might obtain some p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n i n the world. So we are s t i l l without a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the prac-t i c e of non-interference. We might also look at R. S. Peters' well known transcendental argument. He claims that the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference i s l o g i c a l l y presupposed by-a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y i n the sense of r a t i o n a l l y deciding what one ought to do. According to Peters, any-one who i s s e r i o u s l y concerned with answering questions of p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y must demand the freedom to do what there are good reasons for doing. If we j o i n with other r a t i o n a l beings i n seeking answers to those questions we must demand freedom for them as w e l l . But Peters i s wrong i n suggesting that one i s l o g i c a l l y required to demand freedom for others by simple v i r t u e of the fact that one s e r i o u s l y asks the question 'What ought I to do?'. A l l that seems to be l o g i c a l l y required i s that one demand freedom of action f o r oneself to pursue what there are good reasons for pursuing. One may not be very wise i n not demanding freedom for others as well as oneself, but the requirement of freedom for others i s not obviously needed to maintain l o g i c a l consistency. But maybe there i s an i n d i r e c t way i n which one could be l e g i t i m a t e l y accused of l o g i c a l inconsistency i f one s e r i o u s l y asks the question 'What ought I to do?' while demanding freedom for one-s e l f but denying i t to others. The inconsistency l i e s i n the fact that the P r i n c i p l e of Equality (no d i s t i n c t i o n s without relevant differences) requires that one cannot demand freedom for oneself without also demanding i t f o r others because to do so would be to make d i s t i n c t i o n s without relevant d i f f e r e n c e s — a n d observance of the P r i n c i p l e of Equality i s i t s e l f required by a commitment to r a t i o n a l -i t y , f o r i t i s the P r i n c i p l e of Equality which gives point to prac-t i c a l reasoning (Peters, 1966, pp. 120-126). There would be no point i n asking for reasons unless one were committed to non-a r b i t r a r i n e s s or no d i s t i n c t i o n s without relevant d i f f e r e n c e s . This being so, the question of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the r i g h t to non-interference i s as odd as the question 'Why be r a t i o n a l ? ' . Just as one cannot s e r i o u s l y ask 'Why be r a t i o n a l ? ' without already being committed to r a t i o n a l i t y , neither can one ask 'What ought I to do?' without already being committed to the p r a c t i c e of non-interference. On t h i s view, commitment to the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference does 34 not require j u s t i f i c a t i o n any more than a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y requires i t . In short, Peters shows that i n so far as we are com-mitted to seeking good reasons f o r acting i n one way rather than another, we are committed to the p r a c t i c e of non-interference. And who could be opposed to seeking good reasons? The r i g h t to non-interference, then, should be regarded as a basic s t a r t i n g point that i s used to help j u s t i f y various other r i g h t s and p r a c t i c e s . In f a c t , the exercise of any r i g h t always either protects or r e s t r i c t s the l i b e r t y of someone, and usually i t does both. In addition, i t should be pointed out that some people believe that a s a t i s f a c t o r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the r i g h t to non-interference can be made on moral grounds as required by the p r i n c i p l e of respect for persons. In response to t h i s b e l i e f we might ask why the p r i n -c i p l e of respect for persons i s less i n need of j u s t i f i c a t i o n than the righ t to non-interference. Perhaps i t i s not, but most people would probably agree that the p r i n c i p l e of respect for persons i s the fundamental moral p r i n c i p l e from which a l l other moral p r i n c i p l e s are d e r i v e d — a t l e a s t when morality i s considered as interpersonal (or in t e r - s e n t i e n t being) morality. To have respect for persons i s to have respect for the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s to pursue t h e i r own pur-poses, aims, and i n t e r e s t s i n the manner they choose. To i n t e r f e r e with the free choices of another without adequate reason i s to treat that person as a means to some end of ours rather than as an autonom-ous end -in himself. It i s to tr e a t him as less than a person i n the f u l l sense of that word. In other words, the moral r i g h t to non-interference i s l o g i c a l l y implied by the p r i n c i p l e of respect for persons. Since the r e s t r i c t i o n of one's l i b e r t y i s a prima f a c i e a f f r o n t to the moral p r i n c i p l e of respect for persons, good reasons must be given for i n t e r f e r i n g with an i n d i v i d u a l ' s free choices. In other words, the onus of proof i n cases of interference l i e s with those who would i n t e r f e r e . We now turn to the question of what con-s t i t u t e s a good reason for interference. 2. Overriding the Right to Non-Interference I believe a l l the cases i n which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference can be j u s t i f i a b l y overridden by someone el s e can be s l o t t e d into a three-part c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme. The three kinds of cases are sometimes mutually exclusive but they are not n e c e s s a r i l y so. They are: a) cases of enforcing morality b) cases of preventing harm to others, and c) cases of consenting to the f o r f e i t u r e of a r i g h t . This i s not to say, of course, that a l l cases of enforcing morality or preventing harm or f o r f e i t i n g a r i g h t , j u s t i f y our interference. Each of the three kinds of cases i n which the r i g h t to non-interfer-ence may be overridden provides only prima f a c i e grounds for i n t e r -ference which do not become actual grounds without at l e a s t the proviso that the interference does not do more harm than good. I s h a l l discuss each of the three kinds of cases i n turn. 36 A. The Enforcement of Morality I am r e s t r i c t i n g morality here to interpersonal m o r a l i t y — t h a t i s , to the view that both not harming people and r e l i e v i n g t h e i r suf-f e r i n g are fundamental to morality. On. t h i s view the enforcement of morality (provided the enforcement does not do more harm than good) would be acceptable to most people. Other bases of m o r a l i t y — f o r example, r e l i g i o u s tenets or majority o p i n i o n — d o not provide a view on which the enforcement of morality would be acceptable. The P r i n c i p l e of Enforcing Interpersonal Morality i s the p r i n -c i p l e that the l i b e r t y of an i n d i v i d u a l ought prima f a c i e to be i n t e r -fered with i f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s conduct i s morally wrong. On what grounds can t h i s p r i n c i p l e be j u s t i f i e d ? Is i t a s e l f - e v i d e n t , a n a l y t i c proposition true by v i r t u e of the meaning of 'moral wrongness' as M i l l thought i t was? Surely not. As we have j u s t seen there can be d i f f e r e n t conceptions of morality. It might be the case that one i s always subject to moral censure of some sort i f only from oneself when one acts immorally, but the r i g h t to enforce morality does not appear to a r i s e from the meaning of the term 'moral wrongness'. From where then does i t arise? The strongest argument i n favor of the enforcement of morality i s the view that people have the r i g h t to protect and preserve t h e i r own existence and well-being i n a way that i s analogous to the way i n which an i n d i v i d u a l has the r i g h t to employ various means of self-defense i f h i s existence or well-being i s threatened. (This i s not to argue, however, that groups have the r i g h t to defend and preserve the existence of the group as such.) If 37 you meet a murderer on the s t r e e t who i s about t o shoot you down, and you beat him over the head i n s e l f - d e f e n s e , we do not ask whether you have the r i g h t t o p r o t e c t y o u r s e l f and p r e s e r v e your own e x i s t e n c e and w e l l - b e i n g . I t i s c l e a r t h a t you have t h i s r i g h t . S i m i l a r l y i n t h e case of groups of p e r s o n s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t groups o f p e r -sons have the r i g h t to p r o t e c t and d efend themselves whether t h e y a r e a t t a c k e d from w i t h i n or w i t h o u t t h e i r own r a n k s . Thus p r o h i b i t -i n g i m m o r a l i t y i s a case of persons p r o t e c t i n g themselves and d e f e n d -i n g t h e i r own e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s not to s u g g e s t , o f c o u r s e , t h a t whatever the powers t h a t be i n a s o c i e t y r e g a r d as immoral ought prima f a c i e to be p r o h i b i t e d . The problems i n v o l v e d i n d i s t i n g u i s h -i n g between what s o c i e t y r e g a r d s as immoral and what i s a c t u a l l y immoral i n any g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e a r e immense and o n l y t a n g e n t i a l t o the t h e s i s . The i m p o r t a n t i s s u e i s whether the a c t u a l enforcement of m o r a l i t y (as opposed to what some p e o p l e t a k e to be the enforcement of m o r a l i t y ) counts as s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n and s e l f - d e f e n s e on the p a r t o f s o c i e t y , and I b e l i e v e i t d o e s — w i t h r e g a r d t o i n t e r p e r s o n a l m o r a l i t y , t h a t i s . On t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l account of m o r a l i t y , an i s s u e i s a m oral i s s u e o n l y i n so f a r as o t h e r p e o p l e ' s ( o r o t h e r s e n t i e n t b e i n g s ' ) i n t e r e s t s a r e at s t a k e . To a c t i m m o r a l l y i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , t o a c t w i t h o u t adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t s . J u s t as an i n d i v i d u a l i s sometimes r i g h t i n s t o p p i n g o t h e r s from a c t i n g a g a i n s t h i s own b e s t i n t e r e s t s , p e o p l e a r e sometimes r i g h t i n a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y i n s t o p p i n g o t h e r s from a c t i n g a g a i n s t t h e i r b e s t i n t e r e s t s . 38 At t h i s point, the question could be asked why the r i g h t of persons to defend themselves should be taken as more sel f - e v i d e n t than the r i g h t to non-interference. No doubt i t should not be, e s p e c i a l l y since the r i g h t of persons to defend themselves i s a sub-case of the r i g h t to non-interference i n general. Once the righ t to non-interference has been accepted, however, the prima f a c i e r i g h t of persons to defend themselves immediately follows. Since we were led to the acceptance of the r i g h t to non-interference i n the previous section, we are j u s t i f i e d i n accepting the r i g h t of persons to defend themselves as not i n need of j u s t i f i c a t i o n here. B. Preventing Harm to Others There are many cases i n which we would agree that people's f r e e -dom of conduct ought to be c u r t a i l e d on the grounds that i t i s harmful to others whether or not moral wrongness i s involved. M i l l ' s P r i n -c i p l e of Liber t y states that the freedom of action of an i n d i v i d u a l ought prima f a c i e to be i n t e r f e r e d with i f and only i f the conduct i n question causes harm to others. But perhaps we should d i s t i n g u i s h between conduct that causes harm to others and conduct that may be regarded as harmful though i t does not i t s e l f cause harm. If a capable adult w i l l i n g l y refuses to rescue a drowning c h i l d from a nearby swimming pool, for example, even though l i t t l e or no danger i s posed to the rescuer, we would want to c a l l the conduct harmful, but we do not have a case of conduct that d i r e c t l y causes harm. Because most of us would probably agree that i f there were some way of com-p e l l i n g such an adult to rescue the c h i l d then he should be so 39 compelled, we would probably want to amend M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e to "The freedom of action of an i n d i v i d u a l ought prima f a c i e to be i n t e r f e r e d with i f and only i f the conduct i n question i s harmful, to others." The d i s t i n c t i o n between " i s harmful" and "causes harm" probably does not matter very much i n the present context, however, so I s h a l l simply subsume a l l conduct that causes harm to others under the broader heading of harmful conduct. The more important d i s t i n c t i o n to be made i s between conduct that i s morally wrong and conduct that i s generally harmful. While the former are always cases of the l a t t e r , the l a t t e r are not always cases of the former. If someone ac c i d e n t a l l y t r i p s and f a l l s down s t a i r s knocking someone else over as he f a l l s , he may s e r i o u s l y harm the person he knocks down, but because the event was an accident he i s not g u i l t y of moral wrong-ness. We could e a s i l y imagine circumstances i n which we would be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d i n barring people from using dangerous s t a i r w e l l s not only for t h e i r own protection but for the protection of others as w e l l . Often we are j u s t i f i e d i n i n t e r f e r i n g with people's l i b e r t y to prevent accidents or other harmful occurrences that are not neces-s a r i l y morally wrong. C. Cases of Consenting to the F o r f e i t u r e of a Right If an i n d i v i d u a l has a prima f a c i e r i g h t he can i n most cases f o r f e i t that r i g h t i f he so chooses. Leaving aside cases i n which an i n d i v i d u a l might choose not to exercise a r i g h t but not to f o r f e i t i t e i t h e r , we are concerned with cases i n which a r i g h t i s given up altogether. I f , for example, some p a r t i c u l a r customer has the r i g h t 40 to be served next at a department store counter because he has been waiting i n l i n e longer than anyone else, he can choose to f o r f e i t that r i g h t i f he wishes. Perhaps the customer behind him i s loaded down with parcels, so he generously steps aside l e t t i n g the next customer be served f i r s t . The f i r s t customer cannot then reclaim h i s r i g h t while the second customer i s being served. Once f o r f e i t e d , a r i g h t i s gone forever. It could be argued that our generous customer's ri g h t to be served f i r s t i s not gone forever since he regains the r i g h t to be served f i r s t a f t e r the customer behind him has been served, but a l l that has r e a l l y happened i n such a case i s that two customers have exchanged r i g h t s one for the o t h e r — t h e r i g h t to be served before some p a r t i c u l a r person and a f t e r someone else. So the f o r f e i t e d r i g h t i s indeed gone forever, though i n the example at hand another i s bestowed i n i t s place. This i s not to suggest that we have the power to f o r f e i t a l l of our r i g h t s i f we so choose. Perhaps our r i g h t to freedom of thought, for example, i s not something we would have the r i g h t to give up even i f i t were within our capacity to do so. That i s a debatable issue. In f a c t , the r i g h t to freedom of thought may not be a coherent notion. The point of t h i s discussion, however, i s to lend p l a u s i b i l i t y to the claim that some r i g h t s can be f o r f e i t e d through consent, and to sug-gest that the r i g h t to non-interference that i s overridden i n the case of compulsory education seems c l e a r l y to be a r i g h t that can be f o r -f e i t e d through consent. When we i n t e r f e r e with someone whose r i g h t to non-interference i s f o r f e i t e d through consent we are not, s t r i c t l y speaking, overriding 41 t h a t p e r s o n s ' r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e s i n c e he no l o n g e r has such a r i g h t . He has chosen to g i v e i t up. As l o n g as we keep t h i s i n mind, t h e r e i s no harm i n a v a i l i n g o u r s e l v e s of the c o n v e n i e n c e of t a l k i n g about o v e r r i d i n g the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n cases of f o r f e i t u r e through consent. We have s a i d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e t h a t i s prima  f a c i e i n f r i n g e d by compulsory e d u c a t i o n seems to be a r i g h t t h a t can be f o r f e i t e d through consent. The obvious o b j e c t i o n to u s i n g t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n as grounds f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h c h i l d r e n ' s l i v e s i s t h a t c h i l d r e n do not always consent to our t r y i n g t o educate them. I f they d i d , t h i s t h e s i s would be s o l e l y about the v a l u e of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and t h e r e would be no need t o d i s c u s s the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . So our problem i s to get from the f a c t t h a t a r i g h t can be f o r f e i t e d t h r o u g h consent t o a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n . G i v e n the f a c t t h a t i n g e n e r a l p e o p l e a r e i n c l i n e d t o f o r f e i t t h e i r r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e when they b e l i e v e i t b e n e f i t s them t o do so, j u s t i f y i n g t h e compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on c h i l d r e n s h o u l d not be an i m p o s s i b l e t a s k . Suppose f o r the moment t h a t compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s i n f a c t a b e n e f i t f o r t h e c h i l d . (The t a s k of c h a p t e r s t h r e e and f o u r i s to l e a d us t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . ) I f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s a b e n e f i t f o r the c h i l d , and i f i n g e n e r a l p e o p l e can be e x p e c t e d t o consent t o t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e i r r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e when i t i s t o t h e i r b e n e f i t to do so, then p e o p l e can be e x p e c t e d t o consent to the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n . That someone c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o consent t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n , i f he b e l i e v e d i n i t s b e n e f i t s , i s n o t , however, s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r our imposing a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on him. I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t someone c o u l d , of h i s own f r e e c h o i c e , consent t o be t o r t u r e d , but h i s consent (or expe c t e d c o n s e n t ) would not n e c e s s a r i l y p e r m i t us t o t o r t u r e him. I t i s f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d t h a t our i n t e r f e r e n c e t o be n e i t h e r immoral (on grounds o t h e r than those h a v i n g to do w i t h i m m o r a l i t y as a r e s u l t of t h e v i o l a t i o n o f a person's r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e — o t h e r w i s e t h e case begs t h e q u e s t i o n ) n o r h a r m f u l t o o t h e r s i n g e n e r a l . I s u g g e s t , then, the f o l l o w i n g l i n e of r e a s o n i n g as p a r t of a s a t i s f a c t o r y j u s -t i f i c a t i o n f o r the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n : 1. Given t h a t we can r e a s o n a b l y expect p e o p l e t o consent t o f o r f e i t t h e i r r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e when they r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t i s f o r t h e i r own good t o do so, and 2. g i v e n t h a t l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s good f o r p e o p l e (The r e a d e r i s asked t o g r a n t t h i s c l a i m f o r t h e moment. The purpose of chap-t e r s t h r e e and f o u r i s t o argue f o r i t s a c c e p t a n c e . ) , and 3. g i v e n t h a t s t u d e n t s can be brought t o r e c o g n i z e t h e good of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e consent t o the i n t e r f e r e n c e , and 4. g i v e n t h a t imposing a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on s t u d e n t s i s n e i t h e r immoral (on grounds o t h e r than those r e l a t e d t o o v e r r i d i n g t h e r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e ) n o r h a r m f u l t o o t h e r s , then we have good reasons f o r t h e compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on s t u d e n t s . There a r e two p o i n t s about t h i s argument t h a t s h o u l d be empha-43 s i z e d . F i r s t , we should notice that number three above reads "Given that students can be brought to recognize the good of l i b e r a l education and therefore to consent to the interference. . . . " This implies that there must be a causal connection between recognizing the good of l i b e r a l education and consenting to the interference. Consent that i s the r e s u l t of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , conditioning, or b e l i e f s that have been d i s t o r t e d i n some other way i s e f f e c t i v e l y ruled out. Consent given under duress i s not genuine consent; i . e . , i t i s not given for the appropriate kinds of reasons. Second, where the phrase ' l i b e r a l education' appears, a case could be made for s u b s t i t u t i n g 'vocational t r a i n i n g ' or ' a t h l e t i c t r a i n i n g ' or 'technical education', and the argument might work j u s t as w e l l . So i n e f f e c t the. argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s permits much more than the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l education. The next major step i n the argument, therefore, i s to i s o l a t e some c r i t e r i o n that w i l l help us pick out c u r r i c u l a r components from the very wide range of studies and a c t i v i t i e s that the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s permits us to impose on c h i l d r e n . The task of. chapter three i s to argue for the development of personal autonomy as that c r i t e r i o n . But f i r s t there are other matters to be considered. Since we are proposing the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l edu-cation on students for t h e i r own good, our argument i s e s s e n t i a l l y p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n nature. So some excursion into the l i t e r a t u r e on paternalism and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n might be useful at t h i s point. Very l i t t l e has been written on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of paternalism i n general, 44 although many a r t i c l e s have been written on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of pater-nalism i n p a r t i c u l a r cases (in law and medicine, for example,—but not, oddly enough, i n education). We s h a l l look at the general l i t e r a t u r e on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of paternalism, sparse as i t i s , leaving aside ques-tions i n medicine and i n law that are not c e n t r a l to our t o p i c . In i t we s h a l l f i n d strong support for the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s presented i n t h i s section. Before turning to that l i t e r a t u r e , however, there i s an i n t e r e s t i n g objection to the three-part c l a s s i f i -cation I have offered that has been suggested to me by J . R. Coombs. The objection i s that there might be a further kind of case i n which a person's l i b e r t y may be overridden—namely, the kind of case i n which we aim to promote the public good or welfare. We are compelled to pay taxes for the b u i l d i n g and maintenance of public roads and highways, f o r example, and t h i s i s a case of promoting the public good. C l e a r l y laws which enforce compulsory taxation f o r b u i l d i n g roads and highways are not j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that they prevent harm or r e l i e v e s u f f e r i n g . Perhaps a case can be made, however, for subsuming t h i s kind of case under those cases i n which we consent to f o r f e i t our r i g h t to non-interference. Indeed, that i s John Locke's s o l u t i o n to the problem of the source of the authority of the state. The argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s does not seem to work as well i n t h i s context, however, as i t does i n the case of j u s t i f y i n g l i b e r a l education. The c r u c i a l difference between the two cases i s that we are not as e n t i t l e d to expect people to consent to f o r f e i t t h e i r r i g h t to non-interference, thereby giving the state something of a blank check, as 45 we are e n t i t l e d to expect people to consent to a much more l i m i t e d kind of interference—compulsory education. In any case, as I have mentioned i n the introduction, the question of the source of the authority of the state i s an unanswered question i n p o l i t i c a l p h i l -osophy which we s h a l l have to leave aside. It could be thought by someone that compulsory studies of v a r i -ous sorts are needed to promote the public good—e.g., economic growth and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , or i t could be thought that compulsory studies are needed to prevent harm to others. But anyone holding such b e l i e f s would have to produce convincing arguments to show that we are j u s t i f i e d i n imposing l i b e r a l studies on students on these grounds. Without such arguments, however, the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l studies seems to rest comfortably on the notion of consent. If other arguments were produced, the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l studies could be j u s t i f i e d from more than one perspective. D. J u s t i f y i n g Paternalism Paternalism i s often viewed as undesirable. Saying that some-one has p a t e r n a l i s t i c intentions or that he acts p a t e r n a l i s t i c a l l y towards others i s sometimes to make a derogatory statement about him. We often resent someone who presumes to know what i s good for us and who takes i t upon himself to deprive us of the l i b e r t y to make our own decisions. People who treat us that way are t r e a t i n g us, we think, l i k e c h i l d r e n — l i k e people incapable of deciding what i s i n t h e i r own best i n t e r e s t s . The negative connotations surrounding the notion of paternalism are there because people often act 46 p a t e r n a l i s t i c a l l y towards each other when they are not j u s t i f i e d i n doing so. The negative connotations are not, however, part of the meaning of 'paternalism' any more than the negative connotations sur-rounding 'communism' or 'capitalism' are part of the meanings of those terms. We would do well to guard against an unsympathetic a t t i t u d e towards t r y i n g to f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e — an a t t i t u d e which could a r i s e simply from the negative associations of the word. The f i r s t task of t h i s section i s to define what i s to count as p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference. It can be argued that not a l l acts of paternalism i n t e r f e r e with l i b e r t y of action or even with prima f a c i e r i g h t s . Donald Davidson says: p a t e r n a l i s t i c acts are not only those i n which one i s forced to do something he doesn't want to do, but also those i n which there i s an a l t e r n a t i v e act which a f f e c t s the donor equally and which the b e n e f i c i a r y prefers; for example, giving people food vouchers instead of money when the l a t t e r would be preferred. (From an unpublished paper e n t i t l e d "Fathers and Sons". As quoted i n Carter, 1977, p. 133.) The following example i s offered by Gert and Culver to show that not only need paternalism not involve any attempt to i n t e r f e r e with some-one's l i b e r t y of action, but i t need involve no attempt to c o n t r o l the beneficiary's behaviour e i t h e r : Mr. N, a member of a r e l i g i o u s sect that does not believe i n blood transfusions, i s involved i n a serious automobile a c c i -dent and loses a large amount of blood. On a r r i v i n g at the h o s p i t a l , he i s s t i l l conscious and informs the doctor of h i s views on blood transfusion. Immediately thereafter he f a i n t s from loss of blood. The doctor believes that i f Mr. N i s not given a transfusion he w i l l die. Thereupon, while Mr. N i s s t i l l unconscious, the doctor arranges for and c a r r i e s out the blood transfusion. (Gert and Culver, 1976, p. 46) 47 There are other cases i n which i t would be d i f f i c u l t to construe the p a t e r n a l i s t i c act as an act of interference of any kind. Imagine a case i n which a very old woman i s l y i n g on her deathbed thinking about her only son whom she has not seen for years. She asks about him and someone assures her that her son i s happy and successful though::it i s wel l known to a l l but the mother that he has j u s t been sentenced to a l i f e t i m e i n prison for multiple rape and murder. We would count the l y i n g as an act of paternalism, I think, but i t i s not c l e a r l y an act of interference. I s h a l l not be concerned i n . t h i s t h e s i s , however, with the question of whether a l l acts of paternalism i n t e r f e r e with someone's freedom or someone's prima f a c i e r i g h t s because there i s no question that the kind of paternalism I am concerned with—compulsory ed u c a t i o n — c o n s t i t u t e s an interference with children's l i b e r t y . So i t i s less important to do an analysis of the concept of paternalism than i t i s to adopt some reasonable d e f i n i t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r -ference that w i l l enable us to capture the c e n t r a l cases. The d e f i n i t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference that I s h a l l adopt i s the general d e f i n i t i o n used by Rosemary Carter i n her a r t i c l e " J u s t i f y i n g Paternalism" (1977). She says that the ce n t r a l cases of paternalism are ones i n which the protection or promotion of a sub-j e c t ' s welfare i s the primary reason f o r attempted or successful coercive interference, with an action or state of that person. This d e f i n i t i o n i s very close to the one offered by Gerald Dworkin i n hi s well known a r t i c l e "Paternalism" ( i n Wasserstrom, 1970). In i t Dworkin states, "By paternalism I s h a l l understand roughly the 48 i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a person's l i b e r t y of a c t i o n j u s t i f i e d by r e a s o n s r e f e r r i n g e x c l u s i v e l y to t h e w e l f a r e , good, h a p p i n e s s , needs, i n t e r e s t s , or v a l u e s of the p e r s o n b e i n g c o e r c e d " ( I b i d . , p. 108). I t h i n k e i t h e r d e f i n i t i o n would s u f f i c e f o r our purposes a l t h o u g h b o t h c o u l d be c r i t i -c i z e d on g e n e r a l grounds as unduly r e s t r i c t i v e f o r t h e r e a s o n a l r e a d y g i v e n t h a t i t i s not c l e a r t h a t p a t e r n a l i s m always i n v o l v e s e i t h e r a r e s t r i c t i o n of l i b e r t y or some o t h e r k i n d of i n t e r f e r e n c e . S t i l l , the C a r t e r d e f i n i t i o n seems p r e f e r a b l e to Dworkin's because i t a l l o w s i n t e r -f e r e n c e w i t h p e o p l e ' s s t a t e s of mind to count as p a t e r n a l i s t i c , whereas Dworkin a l l o w s o n l y i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h l i b e r t y of a c t i o n . T h i s i s important because i n e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t e x t s i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h s t u d e n t s ' s t a t e s o f mind ( t a k i n g a p e r s o n ' s s t a t e o f mind to be the sum t o t a l o f h i s knowledge, b e l i e f s , a t t i t u d e s , d i s p o s i t i o n s , e t c . ) i s c r u c i a l . There a r e c l e a r l y l a r g e numbers of c a s e s — u s u a l l y i n v o l v i n g c h i l d r e n — i n which most of us would argue t h a t p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r -ence i s w h o l l y j u s t i f i e d . I f a t h r e e - y e a r - o l d c h i l d chooses to p l a y w i t h a sharp k n i f e or w i t h matches, we do not h e s i t a t e t o keep him from d o i n g so f o r h i s own good. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, mature p e o p l e w i s h to smoke or d r i n k or o v e r e a t , we do not v e r y o f t e n t h i n k we have t h e r i g h t t o p r e v e n t them from d o i n g so f o r t h e i r own good. There a r e o t h e r cases i n which some p e o p l e t h i n k p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d and some p e o p l e s t r o n g l y o b j e c t — t h e compulsory tr e a t m e n t of h e r o i n a d d i c t s might be a s u i t a b l e example h e r e . So we need some s o r t of c r i t e r i o n f o r s e p a r a t i n g t h e j u s t i f i e d from the u n j u s t i f i e d c a s e s of p a t e r n a l i s m . 49 John Stuart M i l l argues i n On Li b e r t y that paternalism i s absolutely u n j u s t i f i e d . Of course M i l l ' s views on paternalism are s t i l l thought by many to have v a l i d i t y today,* and I think i t i s s i g -n i f i c a n t that not very much has been written i n opposition to M i l l on the topic of paternalism. There are some notable exceptions (Dworkin, 1971; Feinberg, 1971; Hart, 1962), but on the whole M i l l remains a formidable opponent of p a t e r n a l i s t s . M i l l says, " . . . neither one person nor any number of persons i s warranted i n saying to another human creature of r i p e years that he s h a l l not do with h i s l i f e for hi s own benefit what he chooses to do with i t " (1956 e d i t i o n , p. 93). M i l l ' s argument i n favor of t h i s .position-"-'is the u t i l i t a r i a n argument that since, i n general, each i n d i v i d u a l i s the best authority on what i s good for himself, the p r a c t i c e of non-interference has greater u t i l i t a r i a n benefits than a pr a c t i c e of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r -ference would have. This u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n does not r e a l l y carry much weight as a knock-down argument against paternalism however, mainly because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s connected with c a l c u l a t -ing the harmful and b e n e f i c i a l consequences that might r e s u l t i n the long run from any given case of p a t e r n a l i s t i c intervention. But the u t i l i t a r i a n consideration i s not the only one M i l l o f f e r s . In addition, there i s a s t r a i n i n M i l l which suggests that paternalism i s wrong i n and of i t s e l f regardless of i t s consequences. Feinberg recognizes t h i s s t r a i n i n M i l l when he says: *See Tom Beauchamp's defense of M i l l i n "Paternalism and Behav-i o u r a l Control," 1977., 50 What [for M i l l r e a l l y ] j u s t i f i e s the absolute p r o h i b i t i o n of interference i n pr i m a r i l y self-regarding a f f a i r s i s not that such interference i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g and l i k e l y (merely l i k e l y ) to cause more harm than i t prevents, but rather that i t would be an i n j u s t i c e , a wrong, a v i o l a t i o n of the pri v a t e sanctuary which i s every person's s e l f ; and t h i s i s so whatever the calculus of harms and benefits might show. (Feinberg, p. 108) But f o r a l l t h i s we must remember that M i l l i s t a l k i n g about people of " r i p e " years i n h i s discussion of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference. M i l l excludes ch i l d r e n and barbarians from the category of those who should be given the benefits of the f u l l status of personhood. In e f f e c t M i l l allows p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference i n the a f f a i r s of ch i l d r e n , but he does not o f f e r very much i n the way of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t . Perhaps he thinks the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s se l f - e v i d e n t : i . e . , undoubtedly there would be enormous d i s u t i l i t i e s i f chi l d r e n were not frequently made the objects of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference. Children, unlike adults, are not the best judges of what i s good for them. Be that as i t may, i t should be mentioned that M i l l allows one exception to h i s p r o h i b i t i o n against p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference f o r persons of r i p e years. I bring i t forward because i t could be regarded as an important pointer towards grounds on which p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference might be j u s t i f i e d for chi l d r e n as w e l l as for adults. The exception i s the case of s e l l i n g oneself into slavery. M i l l says: By s e l l i n g himself f o r a slave, he abdicates h i s l i b e r t y ; he foregoes any future use of i t beyond that s i n g l e act. He therefore defeats, i n h i s own case, the very purpose which i s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of allowing him to dispose of himself. He i s no longer free; but i s thenceforth i n a p o s i t i o n which has no longer the presumption i n i t s favor, that would be 51 afforded by h i s v o l u n t a r i l y remaining i n i t . The p r i n c i p l e of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be f r e e . It i s not freedom to be allowed to alienate h i s freedom. (1946 e d i t i o n , p. 92) This exception of M i l l ' s suggests a p r i n c i p l e for allowing p a t e r n a l i s -t i c i nterference: p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference i s j u s t i f i e d i n so f a r as the interference protects the freedom of the b e n e f i c i a r y . This i s an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y , but immediately an enormous problem a r i s e s — t h e problem suggested by Isaiah B e r l i n i n h i s Two Concepts of  Freedom. The problem of using protection of freedom as a c r i t e r i o n to j u s t i f y paternalism i s that often associated with a Marxist concep-t i o n of freedom or with r e a l - w i l l theories. The danger that accom-panies an endorsement of p o s i t i v e freedom, as i t i s c a l l e d , i s t h i s : If a_ holds a view about what human beings are l i k e i n some i d e a l , f r e e , s e l f - a c t u a l i z e d s t a t e , then a. w i l l regard b_ as unfree i f b_ does not meet a.'s c r i t e r i a of s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n . _b may i n fact have no desire to become what a. regards as free or s e l f - a c t u a l i z e d . In such a case a. would claim that b_ lacks the appropriate desire because b_, being unfree, has no conception of what human beings were "meant" to become. a. then, i n a l l h i s "benevolence", might take i t upon himself to force b_ to be " f r e e " . The protection-of-freedom c r i t e r i o n i s unacceptable as a j u s t i -f i c a t i o n of paternalism not only because of the dangers of p o s i t i v e freedom, but also because i t could lead to objectionable interference connected with the notion of negative freedom. Cigarette smoking, fo r example, leads to shorter l i f e spans and d e b i l i t a t i n g disease, so a good case can be made that we are protecting someone's ph y s i c a l 52 freedom (freedom from disease) i f we prevent him from smoking or from taking food and drugs t h a t might damage his health. In f a c t , there are a l l kinds of constraints that we might protect people against for t h e i r own good i f we are allowed to i n t e r f e r e with t h e i r pursuits i n order to protect t h e i r freedom. Adopting the protection of freedom c r i t e r i o n as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p a t e r n a l i s t i c intervention could c l e a r l y r e s u l t i n an unacceptably excessive number of cases of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference i n people's l i v e s . To be f a i r to M i l l , however, i t should be pointed out that he was not using 'freedom' i n the quotation on page 50 i n either the p o s i t i v e or the negative sense outlined above. Instead, he was using 'freedom' as a rough synonym for ' l i b e r t y ' . The next question to be asked, therefore, i s whether the p r o t e c t i o n - o f - l i b e r t y c r i t e r i o n fares any better than protection of freedom. But i t d'Oes not. If we accept that everyone has a prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference, and i f someone f r e e l y chooses to give up h i s l i b e r t y , then we are u n j u s t i f i a b l y overriding h i s r i g h t to non-interference by protecting his l i b e r t y when he has f r e e l y chosen to give i t up. If we paternal-i s t i c a l l y protect someone's l i b e r t y f or him against h i s (free) w i l l , then we are c l e a r l y putting our own preferences ahead of h i s without s u f f i c i e n t cause. Because of the dangers of using e i t h e r protection of freedom or protection of l i b e r t y as a c r i t e r i o n for j u s t i f y i n g paternalism we might consider Dworkin's suggestion that "the basic notion of consent i s important and seems to be the only acceptable way of t r y i n g to 53 d e l i m i t an a r e a o f j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m " (1970, p. 119). Consent i s c l e a r l y r e l e v a n t t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s m on t h e grounds t h a t i t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o expect p e o p l e t o consent t o i n t e r f e r e n c e t h a t i s good f o r them p r o v i d e d they b e l i e v e i t i s good f o r them. Dworkin's view t h a t consent s h o u l d p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e j u s t i -f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m i s de v e l o p e d i n d e t a i l by Rosemary C a r t e r . C a r t e r o f f e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m : Consent, o r the d i s p o s i t i o n t o consent upon r e q u e s t o r upon the r e c e i p t of c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , i s n e c e s s a r y and, i f none of a, b, or c h o l d , s u f f i c i e n t f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m : (a) the a c t r e q u i r i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n by consent i s c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h a t c o n s e n t ; (b) t h e consent would have been w i t h h e l d o r would be withdrawn i f the s u b j e c t ' s d e s i r e s , p r e f e r e n c e s o r b e l i e f s had not been d i s t o r t e d ; * (c) the consent would have been w i t h h e l d or would be withdrawn upon t h e r e c e i p t of r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n . (1977, pp. 137-138) There a r e many problems i n v o l v e d i n j u d g i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of subse-quent consent, but I t h i n k i t would be s a f e t o assume t h a t t h o s e who are unable t o e n v i s a g e a v e r y wide range o f p r o b a b l e s h o r t and l o n g term consequences f o r a c t i o n s ( t h i s i n c l u d e s most c h i l d r e n ) would be more l i k e l y t o o f f e r consent t o p a s t p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n a t some f u t u r e time than o t h e r s , so i t i s p r o b a b l y s a f e t o assume t h a t t h e r e a r e more cases of j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n (on *Because i t may be a l i t t l e odd to speak of d i s t o r t e d d e s i r e s or p r e f e r e n c e s , f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t e d t o t h i s p o i n t w i l l p r o c e e d i n terms o f d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s a l o n e . The i n t e n t o f (b) i s not r e a l l y a f f e c t e d by t h i s change, because any sense we can make out of t h e n o t i o n o f a d i s t o r t e d d e s i r e o r p r e f e r e n c e can be cashed out i n terms of d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s . 54 Carter's account) i n the a f f a i r s of c h i l d r e n than i n the a f f a i r s of adults. There are two kinds of possible counter examples that we should consider to the above claim that .consent i s both necessary and s u f f i c -ient to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of paternalism. The f i r s t i s an objection to the necessity of consent and the second i s an objection to i t s suf-f i c i e n c y . The f i r s t becomes apparent i f we imagine, for example, a case i n which someone i s about to leap to h i s death from the side of a high bridge and a passer-by p h y s i c a l l y intervenes by p u l l i n g the p o t e n t i a l s u i c i d e v i c t i m over the r a i l i n g to safety. If subsequent consent were not forthcoming either i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n the subject's d i s p o s i t i o n , then we would have to conclude that the pater-n a l i s t i c intervention was not j u s t i f i e d — a conclusion which many people would f i n d unacceptable. There are two ways of dealing with t h i s problem: either give up the view that consent i s necessary f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c intervention or agree that the case before us c o n s t i -tutes a case of unj.ustified paternalism. We could, I believe, adopt the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e while holding the act of intervention to be morally unobjectionable a l l things considered. The important e l e -ment i n " a l l things considered" i s the i n t e r f e r e r ' s b e l i e f that consent w i l l be forthcoming or would be forthcoming i f the subject's b e l i e f s had not been d i s t o r t e d . But the problem with adopting t h i s stance i s that the act of paternalism described above i s an act which we would normally want to describe as j u s t i f i e d paternalism on the grounds that there are good reasons for the interference. Therefore, 55 the C a r t e r c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d be m o d i f i e d t o cover cases i n which f u t u r e a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n but i s n o t consent i s A a c t u a l l y f o r t h c o m i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , the c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d be amended to co v e r cases i n which consent would be a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n i f the s u b j e c t ' s b e l i e f s were not d i s t o r t e d . We need t h i s amendment j u s t i n case our p o t e n t i a l s u i c i d e v i c t i m i s known to be i n c u r a b l y i n s a n e ; or j u s t i n case we know i n advance t h a t some s t u d e n t s , because of some k i n d of mental d i s o r d e r , would not g i v e t h e i r l a t e r c o n s e n t . t o the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n o f e d u c a t i o n . The k i n d o f case which p r e s e n t s a prima f a c i e o b j e c t i o n t o the s u f f i c i e n c y of the consent c r i t e r i o n i s the k i n d o f case i n which some-one a c t s p a t e r n a l i s t i c a l l y , say, i n d r i v i n g an i n t o x i c a t e d guest home from a p a r t y i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which he i s m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d f o r some r e a s o n t o s t a y a t home. Suppose h i s young daughter i s v e r y i l l and t h e r e i s no one e l s e i n t h e house t o l o o k a f t e r h e r . In such a c a s e i t might be argued t h a t d r i v i n g t h e f r i e n d home c o u l d not be a case of j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e because i t i s not m o r a l l y j u s t i - ^ . f i e d , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . A g a i n , t h e r e a r e two a l t e r n a t i v e s : e i t h e r consent i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s m o r an a c t o f j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m i s not n e c e s s a r i l y m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . A g a i n , we c o u l d a c c e p t the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e on the grounds t h a t the f e a t u r e s of t h e a c t of d r i v i n g the f r i e n d home t h a t make i t wrong, have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the l i b e r t y of the i n t o x i c a t e d f r i e n d . That the a c t i s p a t e r n a l i s t i c i s , i n i t s e l f , u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e . But i t i s m o r a l l y wrong on o t h e r grounds, and we a r e not i n c l i n e d t o d e s c r i b e an a c t as j u s t i f i a b l e i f i t i s 56 morally wrong. Therefore, the Carter c r i t e r i o n should be modified further to exclude cases l i k e the one involving the intoxicated party-goer. We can do t h i s by adding the further proviso that the proposed p a t e r n a l i s t i c act should not be morally wrong (or, more generally, harmful to others) on grounds other than those r e l a t i n g to overriding the b e n e f i c i a r y ' s r i g h t to non-interference. By now the reader w i l l have noticed a very i n t e r e s t i n g conclu-sion. The argument that we have used for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the compulsory imposition of l i b e r a l education—the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s — i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the modified Carter c r i t e r i o n above. So i t r e a l l y makes no differe n c e whether we r e f e r to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n we are using for compulsory l i b e r a l education as the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s or the argument from the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference. I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same argument. Of course there remains the problem of the unlikelihood of consensus over how much and what kind of interference people can be reasonably expected to consent to (as we discussed i n connection with Rawls i n chapter one), so i n a sense the above j u s t i f i c a t i o n of paternalism does not t e l l us everything we would l i k e to know. But i t i s , I think, the best we can do. Besides, the fact of u n l i k e l y consensus over how much and what kind of interference people can be reasonably expected to consent to i n general, i s not r e a l l y a problem for us because we are dealing with a p a r t i c u l a r case i n w h i c h — i f the argument of chapters three and four i s successful—consensus does not seem u n l i k e l y . We might b r i e f l y consider how p a r t i c u l a r cases other than the compulsory imposition of a l i b e r a l arts curriculum would fare against the modified c r i t e r i o n for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of paternalism that I am suggesting we adopt. With M i l l ' s example of s e l l i n g oneself into slavery I think we could construct a set of circumstances i n which we would be forced by our c r i t e r i o n to be more lenient than M i l l and to allow someone to s e l l himself i n t o slavery i f he so chooses. What i f that were the only way someone could secure freedom for his c h i l d r e n , for example? S i m i l a r l y , i n the case of s u i c i d e . Unless one were to take the implausible stance that anyone who decides to commit su i c i d e i s s u f f e r i n g from d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s or perceptions, then we would have to accept that there are cases of i n t e r f e r i n g with the act of s u i c i d e that are cases of u n j u s t i f i e d paternalism, and i n the absence of a theory about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y the stance that anyone who decides to commit suicide i s s u f f e r i n g from d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s or perceptions, i s unacceptable. I mention these cases mainly to show that our c r i t e r i o n does not open the door to p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference as widely as one might at f i r s t suppose. S t i l l , i t does make room f o r an enormous number of possible components for a compulsory curriculum. I t c e r t a i n l y allows i n i t i a t i o n into any one of the t r a d i t i o n a l academic subject matters to be j u s t i f i e d on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds. How many people who have learned to see the world from an h i s t o r i c a l point of view, say, would not now give t h e i r consent to t h e i r i n i t i a l i n i t i a t i o n into the study of history? How 58 many people who have learned to think s c i e n t i f i c a l l y regret t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n into that subject? How many people who have acquired s e n s i t i v i t y to a v a r i e t y of nuances i n various art forms would want to be without t h i s kind of enrichment i n t h e i r l i v e s ? To some extent we are supposing here that compulsion w i l l be successful, i . e . , that students w i l l achieve the h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e , w i l l learn to think s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , etc. But of course, such attainments cannot be compelled. No one can guarantee success. So what we are j u s t i f y i n g i s the imposition of c e r t a i n studies, not suc-cesses. Since having the successes i s probably necessary for subse-quent consent, however, a reasonable expectation of success i s necessary on our part before we are j u s t i f i e d i n imposing a compulsory l i b e r a l education on students. Obviously, we are unable to say exactly what percentage of students w i l l learn to think h i s t o r i c a l l y or s c i e n t i f i c a l l y given the best teaching we can manage. How to think h i s t o r i c a l l y or s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i s something students w i l l l e a r n i n varying degrees anyhow. But we ought not to pre-judge the issue by assuming we cannot be successful i n getting students to achieve the attainments we are a f t e r . Even a l i t t l e success i s better than none, and as we s h a l l see i n l a t e r chapters at least some success i s neces-sary for the development of personal autonomy. It i s probably true that many adults regret time spent i n school enduring boring lectures and tiresome written assignments, but i t i s possible that i f students were i n i t i a t e d into subject matters by competent, enthusiastic teachers who are themselves immersed i n t h e i r 59 f i e l d s , then much of the tedium that often accompanies the p r a c t i c e of education would disappear. Acquiring knowledge i n any area i s not simply a matter of learning f a c t s — o n e must also come to see the r e l a -tionships between the facts and to understand the underlying p r i n -c i p l e s that bind them together. Only then can one's knowledge make a difference to how one sees and f e e l s about the world, and only then can one be said to be t r u l y i n i t i a t e d into a subject matter. It i s the compulsory i n i t i a t i o n of students into realms of knowledge that we s h a l l consider, not compulsory subjection to poor teaching methods. So the empirical claim that many people do i n fact regret having been compelled to study t r a d i t i o n a l academic subjects (and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to guess what percentage of the population that might include), i s no objection to the claim that compulsory i n i t i a t i o n into t r a d i t i o n a l academic realms i s prima f a c i e j u s t i f i a b l e on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds. But an academic curriculum i s not the only kind of curriculum t h a t might be prima f a c i e j u s t i f i a b l e on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds. Convincing cases could be made, I think, using our c r i t e r i o n , i n favor of the compulsory i n i t i a t i o n of students into thousands of a c t i v i t i e s included within such categories as arts and c r a f t s , vocational t r a i n i n g , physical f i t n e s s , and so f o r t h . Because there are only f i v e or s i x hours i n the average school day we could not hope to f i t into a compulsory curriculum a l l the components that might be acceptable on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds. So, from the wide range of e u r r i c u l a r p o s s i b i l i t i e s we have to make choices about what we should teach i n schools. I argue i n chapter -three for the 60 adoption of personal autonomy as the c r i t e r i o n to help us make these choices. CHAPTER I I I PERSONAL AUTONOMY The main purpose of th i s chapter i s to argue for the promotion of personal autonomy as the c r i t e r i o n to help us narrow the range of cur-r i c u l a r components that the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s permits us to impose on students. Before t h i s can be argued, however, a f a i r l y d e t a i l e d analysis of what i t means to be autonomous should be supplied. 1. The Meaning of 'Personal Autonomy' Autonomy has to do with s e l f - r u l e . Inspection of the o r i g i n of the word reveals that the Greek word autonomia was commonly applied to the c i t y s t ate. The state had autonomia i f i t was a self-governing independent e n t i t y , free from external rules and controls. We often speak of an autonomous nation i n reference to a self-governing country, a country that has p o l i t i c a l independence. When we speak of a colony gaining i t s independence or autonomy from a mother country, we some-times speak of the dependent state gaining i t s freedom. 'Freedom' used i n t h i s sense does not nec e s s a r i l y imply the absence of constraint for private c i t i z e n s , however, since a s t r i c t d i c t a t o r s h i p may also be a free country i n the sense that i t i s a p o l i t i c a l l y independent nation. 61 62 'Autonomy' may be used a l s o i n r e f e r e n c e t o i n s t i t u t i o n s . We may speak o f an autonomous s c h o o l ( e . g . , a p r i v a t e s c h o o l o r a p a r o -c h i a l s c h o o l , independent o f the p u b l i c s c h o o l system), u n i v e r s i t y , or r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n . The term i s used i n b i o l o g y i n r e f e r e n c e t o p a r t s o f t h e nervous system f o r m e r l y thought t o f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e c e n t r a l nervous system, and i t i s used i n botany t o r e f e r t o a c o n d i t i o n which r e s u l t s from i n t e r n a l c auses. The t a s k o f t h i s s e c -t i o n i s t o e x p l i c a t e t h e n o t i o n o f autonomy or s e l f - r u l e i n r e f e r e n c e t o p e r s o n s . D i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e i n a n a l y s i n g the concept o f p e r s o n a l autonomy because o r d i n a r y usage does not p r o v i d e c o n s i s t e n t and c l e a r -c u t examples of how the term 'autonomy' i s a p p l i e d i n r e f e r e n c e t o p e r s o n s . The f o l l o w i n g e x p l i c a t i o n i s based p a r t l y on common usage and p a r t l y on the u s e f u l n e s s o f the d e f i n i t i o n i n the e d u c a t i o n a l s e t t i n g . The concept of p e r s o n a l autonomy and t h e p o p u l a r i t y of t h e term 'autonomy' a r e o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t o Kant: A man was autonomous i n Kant's view i f i n h i s a c t i o n s he bound h i m s e l f by m o r a l laws l e g i s l a t e d by h i s own r e a s o n , as opposed to b e i n g governed by h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s . And no doubt Kant i s t h e s o u r c e f o r P i a g e t ' s employment of the term. (Dearden, 1972, p. 448) Our a n a l y s i s o f the concept o f p e r s o n a l autonomy ( h e n c e f o r t h t o be r e f e r r e d t o s i m p l y as autonomy) goes beyond Kant's view t h a t one i s autonomous i f he b i n d s h i m s e l f by m o r a l laws l e g i s l a t e d by h i s own r e a s o n , t o i n c l u d e t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n which one might b i n d h i m s e l f by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of a e s t h e t i c s , e t i q u e t t e , e x pediency, prudence, e t c . The concept o f p e r s o n a l autonomy i s no doubt i n t i m a t e l y 63 connected with the concept of moral agency, but many si t u a t i o n s a r i s e i n which autonomy can be exercised out of the moral realm. Among teachers who value the promotion of autonomy as an educa-t i o n a l objective, there i s often a great deal of confusion over what autonomy e n t a i l s , and how i t may be properly taught, promoted, devel-oped, or i n s t i l l e d . Some teachers mistake manifestations of some-thing resembling a state of anomie i n students f o r the exercise of autonomy. Others often accept as fact the assumption that the best way to develop autonomy i n students i s to treat them as i f they are already autonomous. In some cases, students are given a carte blanche to decide f o r themselves what they w i l l do, as i f the a b i l i t y to make autonomous decisions comes n a t u r a l l y to those who are given the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Teachers who make t h i s assumption seem to be equating freedom of choice with autonomy while ignoring the other necessary conditions. Conceivably, i n d i -viduals could require sound structure and fir m d i r e c t i o n to measure themselves against, so to speak, before they are able to reach a highly autonomous l e v e l of development. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s that development i n achieving autonomy could be impaired as a r e s u l t of the imposition of too much freedom of choice at an early age. In any case, the educator must be aware that since people are not auton-omous when they are born, and since many people reach old age without a t t a i n i n g very high l e v e l s of autonomy, some learning process which i s not purely maturational i s involved i n becoming autonomous (Peters, 1973b, p. 176). The teacher must, of course, concern himself with those methods of teaching and learning which most e f f e c t i v e l y enhance t h i s process. Although considerations about e f f e c t i v e methodology are empirical matters, some l i g h t may be shed on them by the analysis of the concept of autonomy and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s promotion as an educational objective. Whether the work of the philosopher can provide very much assistance to the empirical researcher or not, we may be c e r t a i n that valuable educational research on how autonomy may be promoted i s v i r t u a l l y impossible without a clea r understanding of the kinds of conditions included and excluded by the concept. Frankena describes the autonomous person as someone who i s "capable of judging, acting and thinking on h i s own i n a r t , h i s t o r y , science, morality, etc." (Frankena, 1973, p. 30). Riesman says: The autonomous are those who on the whole are capable of conforming to the behavioural norms of t h e i r s o c i e t y — a capacity the anomics usually l a c k — b u t are free to choose whether to conform or not. (Riesman, 1954, p. 40) Our task i s to unpack what i t means to say that someone i s capable of judging, acting, and thinking on h i s own, and what i t means to say that someone i s capable of conforming and yet free to choose otherwise. Autonomy, or s e l f - r u l e , i s i n d i r e c t opposition to the notion of heteronomy, r u l e by others. Heteronomy may take the form of passiv-i t y on the part of someone who rather thoughtlessly does what he i s t o l d to do, or believes what he i s t o l d to b e l i e v e — b y advertisers, o f f i c i a l s , or anyone who i s able to influence him. This other-directed person t y p i c a l l y takes hi s cues from other people. It might be more accurate to describe what he does as reacting rather than acting. Heteronomy sometimes takes the form of p a s s i v i t y , but i t can also take the form of act i v e neurosis or psychosis as i n extreme cases of obsession or other kinds of dementia. Such an inner-directed person i s ruled by i n t e r n a l i z e d 'others' i n such a way as to preclude the use of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . The inner-directed person i s heteronomous to the extent that he i s ruled by factors which, though not external to him, are external to his own r a t i o n a l l y and j u s t i f i a b l y held b e l i e f s . Three conditions appear to d i s t i n g u i s h the autonomous from the heteronomous person. A. Freedom of Choice Inherent i n the concept of personal autonomy i s the notion of freedom of choice. The problem of freedom from the hard or soft determinist p o s i t i o n need not concern us here. The contention that a l l acts have causes i n no way i n t e r f e r e s with the d i s t i n c t i o n we make between unavoidable a c t s — t h o s e acts to which reasons make no d i f f e r e n c e — a n d those acts i n which neither overt nor covert compul-sion i s s i g n i f i c a n t . When we speak of f r e e l y chosen acts, we are speaking of those acts f o r which the agent has causally operative reasons as opposed to r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s . As Benn and Peters point out, we do not a t t r i b u t e the exercise of autonomy to anyone whose freedom of choice i s constrained either outwardly or inwardly, i . e . , either o b j e c t i v e l y or subj e c t i v e l y (Peters, 1973b, p. 122). The objective conditions of:freedom of choice include a l l those conditions which are external to the agent. They t y p i c a l l y imply the absence of c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l constraints. A 66 p e r s o n can h a r d l y be s a i d t o be e x e r c i s i n g autonomy o r freedom o f c h o i c e i f i t i s demanded of him a t gunpoint t h a t he hand over t h e c o n t e n t s of h i s w a l l e t t o a t h i e f . I n such a case t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s f o r freedom of c h o i c e a r e not s a t i s f i e d . The absence of such c o n d i t i o n s i s u s u a l l y more r e a d i l y apparent than the absence of subj e c t i v e c o n d i -t i o n s . The s u b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of freedom o f c h o i c e i n c l u d e a l l t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s which a r e i n t e r n a l t o the agent. P e t e r s c l a i m s t h e s u b j e c -t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f freedom o f c h o i c e a r e absent i n any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s : 1) i f one i s d r i v e n towards a p a r t i c u l a r g o a l as a drug a d d i c t o r a l c o h o l i c i s d r i v e n t o seek r e l i e f from some p r e s e n t con-d i t i o n o f a c u t e d e p r i v a t i o n , 2) i f one i s i n c a p a b l e of c o n s i d e r i n g consequences b e f o r e d e c i d i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n as a h y s t e r i c would be i n c a p a b l e o f d o i n g , 3) i f one cannot change one's b e l i e f s i n t h e l i g h t o f new and r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e as a p a r a n o i d or someone s u f f e r i n g from o t h e r k i n d s of o b s e s s i o n s and d e l u s i o n s would be unable t o do, 4) i f changes i n one's b e l i e f s f a i l t o produce changes i n one's d e c i s i o n s as i n the case of the psycho p a t h , and 5) i f changes i n one's d e c i s i o n s f a i l t o produce changes i n one's a c t i o n s as i n the case of the k l e p t o m a n i a c or some o t h e r k i n d o f c o m p u l s i v e . ( P e t e r s , op. c i t . , pp. 123-124) George du M a u r i e r ' s T r i l b y O ' F a r r e l l , f o r example, c o u l d h a r d l y be s a i d t o be a c t i n g autonomously i n p u t t i n g on m u s i c a l performances t h a t r e p e a t e d l y moved h e r au d i e n c e t o t e a r s because w h i l e she was under t h e h y p n o t i c i n f l u e n c e o f S v e n g a l i the s u b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of freedom of c h o i c e were m i n i m i z e d i f not a l t o g e t h e r a bsent. T r i l b y d i d what she was t o l d t o do and t h a t i s a l l she d i d . Q u e s t i o n s about changes i n h e r b e l i e f s a f f e c t i n g changes i n her d e c i s i o n s as w e l l as changes i n h e r d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g changes i n h e r a c t i o n s do not even a r i s e . She f o l l o w e d S v e n g a l i as b l i n d l y as anyone c o u l d . P e t e r s does not s t a t e whether he i n t e n d s h i s l i s t t o be exhaus-t i v e , but i t appears to c o v e r a l l t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n which we n o r m a l l y withdraw i m p u t a t i o n s of m o r a l o r l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e grounds t h a t the agent c o u l d have a c t e d o t h e r w i s e . H i s l i s t s p e c i -f i e s f i v e k i n d s of c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which the causes of a p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n s not o n l y l i e w i t h i n the p e r s o n h i m s e l f but a l s o r e s u l t i n u n a v o i d a b l e r e s p o n s e s . A c t i n g under the i n f l u e n c e of h y p n o s i s , b rainwashing, i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n i n g , i n s a n i t y , and so f o r t h , f a l l s w e l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f h i s l i s t . Freedom of c h o i c e i n the sense t h a t i m p l i e s the absence of r e l e v a n t forms of o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e c ompulsion i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the e x e r c i s e of autonomy, but i t i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . Imagine the s i t u a t i o n of someone who t h o u g h t l e s s l y adopts h i s b e l i e f s , v a l u e s , m o r a l s , e t c . , from the d i c t a t e s of major-i t y o p i n i o n i n the community where he l i v e s , o r from the a d v e r t i s i n g media, or even from h i s b e s t f r i e n d s . When he makes a d e c i s i o n based on one of h i s b e l i e f s or v a l u e s , he may w e l l be e x e r c i s i n g freedom of c h o i c e i n the sense t h a t i t i s d e s c r i b e d above, but we would h e s i t a t e to r e f e r to him as an autonomous d e c i s i o n maker because h i s b e l i e f s a r e i n some sense not h i s own; they have been adopted s i m p l y because someone e l s e says so r a t h e r than because the agent h i m s e l f h o l d s them t o be t r u e f o r good reasons of h i s own. Something e l s e i s n e c e s s a r y then, b e f o r e we can c a l l a p e r s o n autonomous—namely, some degree of 68 r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . B. Rational R e f l e c t i o n The Oxford English d i c t i o n a r y defines ' r e f l e c t i o n * as the action of deep and serious consideration and ' r a t i o n a l ' as having the f a c u l t y of reasoning as w e l l as exercising one's reason i n a proper manner, having sound judgment, being sane and sensible, etc. The term ' r a t i o n a l ' comes from the L a t i n r a t i o meaning reason. The adjectives ' r a t i o n a l ' and 'reasonable' are often used interchangeably i n everyday usage and even i n ph i l o s o p h i c a l discourse. Professor Pole uses 'the r a t i o n a l ' synonymously with 'reason' i n h i s a r t i c l e "The Concept of Reason" (1972). He opposes ' r a t i o n a l ' , however, only to 'non-r a t i o n a l ' , reserving the term ' i r r a t i o n a l ' to r e f e r to people who reason but who reason very poorly. Max Black, on the other hand, uses ' i r r a t i o n a l ' to mean something rather d i f f e r e n t from 'unreason-able' ("Reasonableness", 1972). Black points out a f i n e shade of differen c e between the two concepts when he says, ". . .we t a l k about an ' i r r a t i o n a l impulse', but surely n o t — o r not so f r e e l y — about an unreasonable impulse" (Op. c i t . , p. 201). Black implies that ' i r r a t i o n a l ' r e f e r s not to poor reasoning but to the absence of reasoning. But i f ' i r r a t i o n a l ' r e f e r s not to poor reasoning but to the absence of reasoning, then the phrase ' i r r a t i o n a l impulse' appears to be redundant because an impulse i s t y p i c a l l y characterized by the absence of reasoning. In any case, i n saying that r a t i o n a l r e f l e c -t i o n i s a necessary condition of autonomy we are saying two things: 1) that one must have reasons f o r one's behaviour, and 69 2) that one's reasons must be good ones. Let us deal with (1) and (2) i n turn. Imagine that we meet someone who has ju s t run up seventeen f l i g h t s of s t a i r s to the upper storey of a large o f f i c e block, and we ask him, "Why didn't you take the elevator?" Our normal expecta-t i o n i s that we w i l l be given an answer i n d i c a t i v e of some consciously held, causally operative reason f o r the action such as, "The elevator was too crowded," or "I needed the exercise," or "There i s no elevator i n t h i s b u i l d i n g . " I f , however, the response we receive i s "I don't know. I have no idea why I did that," then we would regard the action as impulsive or perhaps as compelled, but not as autonomous. The action may have been motivated by some unconscious drive, but unconscious drives are causes of actions, not reasons for acting. Reasons are considerations which the actor takes into account i n hold-ing c e r t a i n b e l i e f s , proving c e r t a i n points, etc. That r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n requires one to have reasons for one's choices does not mean that one's reasons must be s i l e n t l y reviewed by an agent each time he performs an action. Many of our actions are performed i n a somewhat habitual manner. Having reasons and con-s t a n t l y reminding oneself of those reasons are two d i f f e r e n t matters. One might not be consciously mindful of the reasons why one gets out of bed as the alarm clock rings at seven o'clock each morning, but very l i k e l y one could supply the reasons i f asked to do so. Rational r e f l e c t i o n requires that one must have reasons f o r acting but not that one be constantly mindful of them. That a r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e p e r s o n must have re a s o n s f o r h i s a c t i o n s i s e a s i l y g r a n t e d , but i t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o show t h a t one's rea s o n s must be good ones. What counts as a good r e a s o n f o r a c t i n g i n a c e r t a i n way o r f o r h o l d i n g a c e r t a i n b e l i e f and what does not? To l o o k f o r someone's t e l e p h o n e number i n the d i r e c t o r y when you know, f o r example, t h a t he has no t e l e p h o n e i s one of B l a c k ' s paradigm cases of u n r e a s o n a b l e a c t i o n v e r g i n g on the i r r a t i o n a l . Another i n s t a n c e of u n r e a s o n a b l e a c t i o n might be t o c o m p l a i n t h a t someone i s u n g r a t e f u l f o r an i n j u r y you have done him ( B l a c k , 1972, p. 201). In e i t h e r case the i n d i v i d u a l concerned might have reasons f o r what he does, but he does not r e f l e c t upon them, presumably, or he would r e a l i z e t h a t h i s reasons a r e i n a d e q u a t e . We do not r e g a r d the c o m p l e t e l y u n r e f l e c t i v e p e r s o n as s e l f - d i r e c t e d . The f i r s t r e q u i r e -ment of a good r e a s o n , t h e n , i s t h a t i t be d e l i b e r a t e d upon by the agent. O b v i o u s l y , some c o u r s e s of conduct a r e of s u f f i c i e n t import (such as c h o o s i n g a r e l i g i o n , a c a r e e r , or a m a r r i a g e p a r t n e r ) t o r e q u i r e much more d e l i b e r a t i o n than o t h e r s . In time of c r i s i s o r emergency, though, t h e r e i s o f t e n no time to d e l i b e r a t e upon one's reasons f o r a c t i n g — n o time to weigh up the pros and cons o r t o con-s i d e r a l l the p o s s i b l e consequences o f one's a c t i o n i n d e t a i l . Someone who i s good a t r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n would be a b l e t o d i s t i n -g u i s h t h ose cases i n which a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of d e l i b e r a t i o n i s c a l l e d f o r from those i n which i t i s n o t . I t i s p o s s i b l e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t one c o u l d r e f l e c t upon one's rea s o n s f o r a c t i n g w i t h o u t b e i n g autonomous; so a person's r e a s o n i n g must conform to c e r t a i n minimum standards or else we are l i k e l y to regard him as indoctrinated, mentally retarded, demented, psychotic, conditioned, or what have you. The standards to which one must con-form are those of o b j e c t i v i t y , relevance, l o g i c a l consistency, i m p a r t i a l i t y , etc. To be r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e i s to assess b e l i e f s and behaviors at l e a s t to some extent, n o n - a r b i t r a r i l y . One's a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y on one's p r i n c i p l e s , aims, motives, goals, and so on, presupposes the presence of some s e t t l e d and undisputed c r i t e r i a by means of which one i s able to examine the v a l i d i t y of the point of view or course of action being r e f l e c t e d upon. Of course one can ask such questions as "Why bother taking a l l the relevant data into consideration when making a decision?" or "Why bother t r y i n g to be l o g i c a l l y consistent?" but, as Feinberg points out, " I f we take autonomy to require that a l l p r i n c i p l e s are to be examined afresh i n the l i g h t of reason on each occasion for d e c i -sion, then nothing resembling r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n can ever get started " (Feinberg, 1973, p. 166). The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t considers reason to be a threat to autonomy on the grounds that i f an i n d i v i d u a l becomes a slave to the demands of such reasonable p r i n c i p l e s as l o g i c a l consistency, the i n d i v i d u a l becomes a "mere passive onlooker of s e l f - p r o p e l l e d reasonings" (Dearden, 1972, p. 450). Several responses might be made to t h i s kind of claim. F i r s t , i f an i n d i v i d u a l chooses to make use of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i n deciding on a course of action at the expense of the s a t i s f a c t i o n of h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s , he i s indeed exercising auton-omy i n making that decision. This response i s not wholly s a t i s f a c -tory, however, since i t allows autonomy to be a t t r i b u t e d to those acts which are not r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t e d upon as well as those that are. Second, i f the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t wishes to equate the unreasonable, anomic character with the autonomous person, then there would be no point i n holding up such a chaotic condition as either a personal i d e a l or an educational objective. Third, we simply cannot make i n t e l l i g i b l e the notion of a . c r i t e r i o n l e s s choice. If one did not make use of s e t t l e d rules and p r i n c i p l e s i n making decisions and examining b e l i e f s , one's judgments would be a r b i t r a r y , based only on whim or impulse. A state of cognitive anomie can hardly be consid-ered desirable.. Making use of s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s to guide one's reasoning i s not only no threat to autonomy but a p r e r e q u i s i t e to i t . One who engages i n r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n then, not only has reasons for h i s actions, but deliberates upon them (or has at some time deliberated upon them) to see i f they measure up to c e r t a i n standards, i . e . , c e r t a i n rules and p r i n c i p l e s . His conduct i s t y p i -f i e d by exercising an a b i l i t y to consider the consequences of h i s actions before he acts, to a l t e r his b e l i e f s i n the l i g h t of new e v i -dence, and to change h i s attitudes as circumstances change. The r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person t r i e s to be objective and does not make unnecessary judgments on the basis of i r r e l e v a n t and inadequate e v i -dence. He i s able to a r r i v e at non-arbitrary conclusions r e s u l t i n g from r e f l e c t i v e deliberations as opposed to the a r b i t r a r y whims of the undeliberative agent. This i s not to say that whoever r e f l e c t s r a t i o n a l l y w i l l always make the most reasonable decision, but he w i l l at l e a s t be aware of what the most reasonable decision appears to be to him. One may decide to follow a whim or an impulse i n any number of s i t u a t i o n s , but an i n d i v i d u a l acts autonomously i n such cases to the extent that he has engaged i n r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n before making a decision to act unreasonably or i r r a t i o n a l l y i n any given circum-stance. If an i n d i v i d u a l did.not go.through the process of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n before deciding to abandon the enterprise and follow a whim instead, we would be i n c l i n e d to c a l l him an impulsive or an anomic character, although i t would be d i f f i c u l t to decide i n any p a r t i c u l a r circumstances whether one i s anomically following a whim or autonomously doing so. The question a r i s e s as to what degree of o b j e c t i v i t y or l o g i c a l consistency i s necessary i n one's reasonings before one can be a t t r i -buted with acting or thinking autonomously. Although i t may be impossible to draw a mathematically precise l i n e to d i s t i n g u i s h cases where r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s present but of very poor q u a l i t y from those i n which we would s a y : i t i s absent altogether, i t does not follow that the d i s t i n c t i o n s we normally make i n t h i s regard ought to be disregarded. We do not require that one's b e l i e f s be true or one' reasonings wholly accurate before we a t t r i b u t e the possession or exercise of autonomy to him. For example, a person could spend t h i r t y years studying the pyramids of Egypt and eventually a r r i v e at an elaborate theory about how they were constructed. The theory 74 might be f a l s e , but we would not deny that the agent had presented us with a good example of autonomous thinking simply because his theory i s f a l s e . Neither f a l s e b e l i e f s nor errors i n judgment n e c e s s a r i l y constitute a threat to autonomy i n the way that.an i n a b i l i t y to d i s -t i n g u i s h what might count as a reason for acting from what would not count as a reason for acting constitutes such a threat. Besides freedom of choice and r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n there i s at lea s t one other condition necessary to the possession of personal autonomy. Where there i s no strength of w i l l to carry through with the choices one has made there can be no autonomy. We need not get into the debate here about whether there ever r e a l l y are any gaps between judgment and action. We frequently experience such gaps i n our everyday l i v e s . No doubt the case could be made that there i s an inverse c o r r e l a t i o n between the frequency of such gaps i n one's l i f e and the exercise of s e l f - r u l e . C. Strength of W i l l The presence of strength of w i l l i n any given s i t u a t i o n seems to depend to some extent upon the presence and strength of counter-i n c l i n a t i o n s . I f counter-inclinations o f f e r r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e i n t e r -ference with one's purposes, goals, aims, or decisions, then one i s usually a t t r i b u t e d with having determination and strength of w i l l . I f one i s e a s i l y swayed by counter-inclinations one i s said to be weak-willed. The weak-willed person i s closer to a state of anomie than a stronger-willed counterpart because h i s b e l i e f s , values, p r i n -c i p l e s , i n c l i n a t i o n s , etc., are constantly i n c o n f l i c t . The values of the s t r o n g - w i l l e d p e r s o n have been s y s t e m a t i c a l l y o r d e r e d i n t o a h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e of w e l l d e f i n e d p r i o r i t i e s . The s t r o n g e r -w i l l e d p e r s o n i s the one we o f t e n r e f e r t o as t h e s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e d p e r s o n . T h i s i s not to suggest t h a t the s t r o n g - w i l l e d , s e l f -d i s c i p l i n e d p e r s o n w i l l never e x p e r i e n c e c o n f l i c t . O f t e n i t seems t h a t the more one engages i n r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n the more one i s l i k e l y to e x p e r i e n c e c o n f l i c t . The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s t r o n g -w i l l e d and the w e a k - w i l l e d p e r s o n , however, i s t h a t the s t r o n g -w i l l e d p e r s o n u s u a l l y r e s o l v e s h i s c o n f l i c t s and dilemmas or a t l e a s t comes to terms w i t h them, so t h a t a new s t a t e o f e q u i l i b r i u m r e s u l t s , e n a b l i n g the i n d i v i d u a l t o make autonomous d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t l i v i n g i n a p e r p e t u a l s t a t e of i n n e r t u r b u l e n c e . Weakness of w i l l i s p r o b a b l y caused, at l e a s t i n p a r t , by an i n a b i l i t y t o put b e l i e f s , v a l u e s , g o a l s , p u rposes, i n c l i n a t i o n s , e t c . , i n t o h i e r -a r c h i c a l p a t t e r n s out o f which p r i o r i t i e s a r i s e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e w e a k - w i l l e d p e r s o n i s e a s i l y swayed by whims and i m pulses which ru n c o n t r a r y t o h i s reasoned p r i n c i p l e s . "The s t r o n g - w i l l e d man," says P e t e r s , " l i k e the i n d e p e n d e n t l y minded man, s t i c k s t o h i s p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e f a c e of r i d i c u l e , o s t r a c i s m , punishment and b r i b e s " ( P e t e r s , 1973b, p. 125). 2. The V a l u e of P e r s o n a l Autonomy In t h i s s e c t i o n I argue t h a t we ought to adopt p e r s o n a l a uton-omy as the most important aim o f compulsory e d u c a t i o n . I argue t h a t p e r s o n a l autonomy has b o t h e x t r i n s i c v a l u e and i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . I 76 suggest not only that autonomy JLS very widely more highly valued for i t s own sake than other possible candidates for the aim of compulsory schooling, but also that i t ought to be more highly valued f o r i t s own sake than other possible candidates (e.g., happiness or knowledge fo r the sake of knowledge) because of i t s intimate connections with our notions of human dignity and s e l f - r e s p e c t . Of course we would not want to argue that there i s no more to the business of education than the development of personal autonomy, because c l e a r l y autonomous people can continue to educate themselves or to be educated by others long a f t e r they have become autonomous. Rather, the argument i s that the development of personal autonomy i s the best c r i t e r i o n for us to use i n picking out components for a compulsory curriculum j u s t i f i e d on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds.. In e f f e c t , I am arguing that the e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c worth of personal autonomy exceeds the e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c worth of other values that might be adopted as aims of compulsory education. Something has i n t r i n s i c value, says Paul Taylor, i f i t i s a f e l t or perceived q u a l i t y of experience that i s valued for i t s own sake (1961, pp. 19-32). I s h a l l follow Taylor i n t h i s use of ' i n t r i n s i c value.' The experience of being an autonomous person, of being i n charge of one's l i f e , i s c l e a r l y an experience that can have i n t r i n s i c value i n t h i s sense. Something that has e x t r i n s i c value, on the other hand, has value only i n a d e r i v a t i v e sense. Taylor (op. c i t . ) distinguishes among three kinds of e x t r i n s i c value: inherent value, instrumental value, and con t r i b u t i v e value. Personal autonomy has inherent value i n so far as i t has the capacity to produce i n us a q u a l i t y of experience which has i n t r i n s i c value for us. It has instrumental value i n so far as i t i s a means to a desirable end, and i t has contributive value i f i t i s part of a whole that has i n t r i n s i c , inherent, or instrumental value.* F i r s t , we w i l l consider the e x t r i n s i c rewards of autonomy. It could be argued, for example, that the promotion of autonomy w i l l have economic and material benefits f o r the c h i l d i n a society where the production of goods depends i n large measure on i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e and resourcefulness. Because they choose f r e e l y , r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y , and exercise strength of w i l l , autonomous persons may have the capac-i t y for more i n i t i a t i v e and resourcefulness than non-autonomous pe r s o n s — a t l e a s t i n so far as non-autonomous persons are lacking i n knowledge. It could also be argued that autonomous people are needed to form the cortex of the e n t i r e body p o l i t i c i f the human race i s to progress i n a worthwhile d i r e c t i o n . People are generally aware of the problems of increasing p o l l u t i o n , over population, a l i e n a t i o n , i n f l a t i o n , the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear weaponry and the l i k e , but so f a r very l i t t l e has been done to remedy these s i t u a t i o n s . We can assume that autonomous people are better equipped to seek solutions to problems than non-autonomous people because r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s usually required to f i n d solutions to problems. Freedom of choice and strength of w i l l are further required to implement *The interested reader might pursue these d i s t i n c t i o n s further by consulting not only Taylor (op. c i t . ) , but also Baylis ( i n Taylor, 1967), Lewis (1946), and Von Wright (1963). 78 s o l u t i o n s . Another argument about the m e r i t s of t h e promotion o f autonomy might be r e f e r r e d t o as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n argument. On t h i s account autonomy can be viewed as e x t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e i n so f a r as i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o an i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e (e.g., s a t i s f i e d ) s t a t e of mind, or i t can be re g a r d e d as i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e i n so f a r as the e x p e r i e n c e of b e i n g an autonomous p e r s o n i s v a l u e d f o r i t s own sake. E i t h e r way, t h e c l a i m b e f o r e us i s t h a t the promotion o f autonomy i s important because i t i s important t o human h a p p i n e s s or human s a t i s f a c t i o n — s o m e t h i n g we v a l u e v e r y h i g h l y . We have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n argument t o some e x t e n t i n r e l a t i o n to our presumption i n f a v o r of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e (see pages 30-31). There the p o i n t was made t h a t i t i s an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n whether t h e p r a c t i c e o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e ( i n t h i s c a s e — t h e promotion o f autonomy) l e a d s t o v e r y much human s a t i s f a c t i o n , and as an e m p i r i c a l c l a i m i t c o u l d be d e f e a t e d by c o u n t e r e v i d e n c e . S t i l l , t h e c l a i m t h a t autonomy c o n t r i b u t e s t o human s a t i s f a c t i o n need not be t r u e i n e v e r y p o s s i b l e c a s e f o r i t t o l e n d s u p p o r t t o t h e view t h a t the promotion of autonomy i s a d e s i r a b l e t h i n g . F o r t h e sup-p o r t we want, the r e a d e r need o n l y r e f l e c t on whether he f i n d s i t more s a t i s f y i n g t o be an autonomous p e r s o n or a p a s s i v e r e c i p i e n t o f f o r c e s o u t s i d e h i m s e l f . That i t i s more s a t i s f y i n g t o be an autonomous p e r s o n than a non-autonomous one i s not a new i d e a . In f a c t , i t i s p r o b a b l y as o l d as p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f . I n r e l a t i v e l y modern t i m e s , i t has p l a y e d a c e n t r a l r o l e not o n l y i n the e t h i c s of 79 u t i l i t a r i a n s such as John Stuart M i l l , but also, s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, i n the thought of philosophers such as Spinoza. Parts I I I , IV, and V of Spinoza's great work, The E t h i c s , are f u l l of statements about the c o r r e l a t i o n s between joy and autonomy (or Spinozist freedom as i t might be called) on the one hand, and sadness and p a s s i v i t y on the other. Rawls makes use of the s a t i s f a c t i o n argument (roughly) i n r e l a t i o n to autonomy by r e f e r r i n g to i t as the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n -c i p l e (Rawls, 1971, pp. 424-433). The A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e , the truth of which Rawls accepts as given, says that human beings enjoy the exercise of t h e i r innate or trained a b i l i t i e s , and t h i s enjoyment increases the more the capacity i s r e a l i z e d , or the greater i t s complexity. Rawls says: Presumably complex a c t i v i t i e s — a c t i v i t i e s that require more r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n and hence more autonomy—are more enjoy-able because they s a t i s f y the desire for v a r i e t y and novelty of experience, and leave room for feats of ingenuity and invention. They also invoke the pleasures of a n t i c i p a t i o n and surprise, and often the o v e r a l l form of the a c t i v i t y , i t s s t r u c t u r a l development, i s f a s c i n a t i n g and b e a u t i f u l . Moreover, simpler a c t i v i t i e s exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s t y l e and personal expression which complex a c t i v i t i e s permit or even require . . . . (1971, p. 427) The A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e does not say that complex a c t i v i t i e s are more enjoyable than simple ones because they require more auton-omy, but a causal connection i s not r e a l l y required for the point Rawls makes to be u s e f u l to us. If complex a c t i v i t i e s require more autonomy (because they require more r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n ) than simple ones, then by helping people to become more autonomous we are at l e a s t giving them access to s a t i s f a c t i o n s that would not otherwise be open t o them. Autonomy does not guarantee s a t i s f a c t i o n , b u t i t a t l e a s t makes g r e a t e r s a t i s f a c t i o n p o s s i b l e . Even i f the A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e i s thought to be f a l s e , I t h i n k we would agree t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f autonomy opens up a w i d e r range of a c t i v i t i e s f o r enjoyment than would o t h e r w i s e be a v a i l a b l e to. us. Autonomy i s i m p o r t a n t not o n l y because i t l e a d s to economic and m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s , s o l u t i o n s t o s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l problems, p e r s o n a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , and o t h e r t h i n g s we v a l u e v e r y h i g h l y , but a l s o because i t i s fundamental t o the p o s s e s s i o n of human d i g n i t y or worth. Our a p p r o v a l of p e o p l e ' s a c t i o n s i n c r e a s e s i n d i r e c t p r o p o r -t i o n to the degree to which autonomy i s p r e s e n t . We might, f o r example, applaud a s t u d e n t f o r e n r o l l i n g i n a d i f f i c u l t c o u r s e i n c h e m i s t r y i f s e v e r a l e a s i e r a l t e r n a t i v e s were open to him, but we would c o n s i d e r the c h o i c e to have l e s s e r worth i f the s t u d e n t ' s f r e e -dom were l i m i t e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he i s r e q u i r e d to t a k e e i t h e r c h e m i s t r y o r p h y s i c s , and e n r o l l i n g i n t h e c o u r s e would not n e c e s s a r -i l y c a r r y any m e r i t a t a l l i f i t were compulsory. We r e g a r d o b e d i e n c e to a u t h o r i t y when i t i s done f o r a r e a s o n , as more m e r i t o -r i o u s than a c o n d i t i o n e d r e s p o n s e to a badge or a u n i f o r m . I f t h e r e a s o n f o r obedience has been t h o u g h t f u l l y r e f l e c t e d upon, such t h a t i t s groundings i n moral o r p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a r e c l e a r , we would u s u a l l y r e g a r d t h e a c t of o b e d i e n c e as p o s s e s s i n g more worth than an a c t of obedience which i s f u l f i l l e d s i m p l y t o . a v o i d punishment. We approve more o f the r e f l e c t i v e than the t h o u g h t l e s s i n d i v i d u a l . A l s o , we r e g a r d t h e same a c t of o b e d i e n c e as more p r a i s e w o r t h y when i t i s done from the exercise of strength of w i l l rather than from personal preference or i n c l i n a t i o n . To possess human dig n i t y i s to be a person i n the f u l l sense of the word. Not a l l human beings could be f u l l y described as persons. "'Person' i n our usage i s a more precise term than 'human being' implying the possession of capacities (to be self-determining and r u l e - f o l l o w i n g ) . . . ." (Downie and T e l f e r , 1969, p. 35). To be both self-determining and rul e - f o l l o w i n g is. what i t means, very loosely, to be autonomous. I f 'to be a person' can be loose l y equated with 'to be autonomous', then the moral p r i n c i p l e of respect f o r persons becomes loosely synonymous with respect f o r a being with capacity f o r personal autonomy. To show respect f o r others i s to take t h e i r behavior s e r i o u s l y and to assume that i t i s r a t i o n a l , i . e . , that reasons rather than r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be supplied by the agent f o r i t , and part of what i t means to have respect f o r one-s e l f i s to engage i n purposive behavior without undue dependence on others. B. F. Skinner and other psychological behaviorists hold that the d i s t i n c t i o n we make between human beings and persons, between acts which are manifestations of greater and les s e r degrees of human worth and di g n i t y , i s a d i s t i n c t i o n we should not make, since a l l behavior i s g e n e t i c a l l y and environmentally determined. From t h i s point of view, the elements of human v o l i t i o n are environmentally determined, too. One cannot escape the control of factors which determine one's behavior whether those factors are d e l i b e r a t e l y designed by others or randomly determined by forces which are less apparent. Some kinds of controls r e s u l t i n b e n e f i c i a l consequences and some do not. Instead of branding a l l control as wrong, which i s nonsense anyway, says Skinner, we should simply eliminate those forms of control which have undesirable consequences and encourage those forms of control that are b e n e f i c i a l (Skinner, 1971, p. 43). But Skinner's argument can be defeated i n at l e a s t two ways. F i r s t even i f everything including the elements of human v o l i t i o n i s environmentally determined, we f i n d i t very useful, to make d i s t i n c -tions among d i f f e r e n t kinds of behaviors depending, on the nature of the determining factors involved. We f i n d i t useful to d i s t i n g u i s h between those acts which are r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t e d upon, f or instance and those which are not, even i f we believe that an agent could not have acted otherwise without the circumstances of h i s action being d i f f e r e n t . We use such d i s t i n c t i o n s as bases for p r a i s i n g and blaming, and for encouraging and discouraging c e r t a i n kinds of behaviors that we consider to be more b e n e f i c i a l or detrimental than others. The point here i s that we do not require 'X could have acted otherwise' to mean 'even i f a l l the circumstances of the s i t u a t i o n had been exactly the same X could have acted otherwise' i n order to continue making the useful d i s t i n c t i o n s we have made i n the past. Second, i f a l l behavior i s a matter of responding to s t i m u l i or sets of s t i m u l i which are simply responses to other sets of s t i m u l i , then there i s a strong sense i n which we are a l l the pawns of forces beyond ourselves, so by Skinner's own argument the i n t r o -duction of any new stimulus i n t o the system (that i s not already a response within the system from some other stimulus within the system, ad infinitum) i s l o g i c a l l y impossible. What w i l l be w i l l be. Not only does t h i s point of view defeat Skinner's suggestion about our c o n t r o l l i n g the environment, but taking i t to heart has the unhappy consequence of destroying human motivation and i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e . Skinner also suggests i n Beyond Freedom and Dignity, that we should concentrate on making better environments instead of better people (Op. c i t . , p. 20). Surely Skinner regards people as part of the t o t a l environment—as p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e s t i m u l i . If t h i s i s so we are improving the environment f o r everyone by improving i n d i -v i d u a l s , i . e . , by making i n d i v i d u a l s more autonomous. One of the most important j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of the promotion of autonomy from the educator's point of view l i e s i n the fact that there i s a close conceptual connection between what i t means to be educated and what i t means to be autonomous. I t could be argued that the notion of autonomy i s l o g i c a l l y connected to the concept of education. "Educating people suggests developing i n [them] states of mind which are valuable and which involve some degree of knowledge and understanding" (Hirst and Peters, 1970, p. 13). What does i t mean to suggest that knowledge i s a necessary condition of education? Obviously, i f a person possesses a s k i l l or a knack i n a p a r t i c u l a r area, no matter how valuable a knack i t 84 i s , some a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n i s r e q u i r e d b e f o r e we would have s u f f i -c i e n t grounds f o r c a l l i n g t h a t p e r s o n educated. The educated p e r s o n must a l s o p o s s e s s a c e r t a i n amount of i n f o r m a t i o n . A r o s e gardener, f o r example, would have t o have d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r o s e s , optimum c o n d i t i o n s f o r growth, and the e f f e c t s on growth p a t t e r n s produced by v a r y i n g c l i m a t i c changes, s o i l c o n d i t i o n s , e t c . The mere p o s s e s s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n , though, i s a l s o i n s u f f i -c i e n t f o r someone to be c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e d as an educated p e r s o n . An u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among t h e f a c t s which comprise one's r e p e r t o i r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n on r o s e s would a l s o be r e q u i r e d , i . e . , what i s needed i s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the "reason-why" of t h i n g s . P e o p l e who have g a i n e d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the " r e a s o n -why" o f t h i n g s w i t h r e g a r d t o growing r o s e s a r e d e s c r i b e d as knowledgeable i n botany, or i n t h a t b r a n c h of botany i n which the r o s e grower s p e c i a l i z e s . H a ving knowledge i s o f t e n r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g t r u e b e l i e f and an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the e v i d e n c e which w a r r a n t s i t . "Having knowledge, then , i n v o l v e s h a v i n g r a t i o n a l b e l i e f , s u p p o r t e d by ; r e a s o n s " (Coombs, 1975, p. 7 ) . The important p o i n t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c o n n e c t i o n between autonomy and e d u c a t i o n i s t h a t h a v i n g b e l i e f s u p p o r t e d by r e a s o n s , which i s an i n h e r e n t p a r t of the knowledge c o n d i t i o n o f e d u c a t i o n , i s c e n t r a l t o t h e second c o n d i t i o n of autonomy, r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . J u s t i n case i t i s suggested t h a t the argument f o r the promotion of autonomy ought t o be d i s r e g a r d e d on the grounds :that the p r o m o t i on of m o r a l agency i s o v e r r i d i n g l y i m p o r t a n t , i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t autonomy i s c e n t r a l t o moral agency. C l e a r l y one cannot be m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s b e h a v i o r u n l e s s h i s c h o i c e s a r e f r e e l y made, but some c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s a l s o r e q u i r e d . I f , f o r example, one were to r e f r a i n from t a k i n g someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y because one has been c o n d i t i o n e d not to t a k e a n o t h e r ' s p r o p e r t y , then one i s not r e f r a i n i n g from s t e a l i n g , but o n l y from t a k i n g someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y . ' S t e a l i n g ' , l i k e o t h e r moral terms, i n v o l v e s t h e n o t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y which i n t u r n i n v o l v e s freedom o f c h o i c e and some degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . Whether the element of m o r a l language under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s ' s t e a l i n g ' , ' k i n d n e s s ' , 'meanness', or 'murder', the n o t i o n o f moral agency does no t a p p l y t o p e o p l e i n whom r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s l a c k i n g ( u n l e s s i t can be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d to be p r e s e n t ) . B e f o r e we s e t a s i d e the d i s c u s s i o n of the v a l u e of autonomy, i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t t a l k i n g about the i n t r i n s i c worth of autonomy does not n e c e s s a r i l y commit us to b e l i e v i n g i n the worth of autonomy i n any s t r i c t , o b j e c t i v i s t sense. We a r e a t l i b e r t y t o use the language of i n t r i n s i c worth and take e i t h e r an o b j e c t i v i s t o r a s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n . There a r e i n t e r e s t i n g arguments f o r b o t h of these p o s i t i o n s , though c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f them i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y f a r beyond t h e scope of t h i s t h e s i s . We s h a l l see, however, t h a t t h e t o p i c a r i s e s a g a i n i n r e l a t i o n t o J . P. White's compulsory c u r r i c u l u m d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r f o u r . Some f u r t h e r p o i n t s about the language of i n t r i n s i c worth w i l l then be made. 8 6 3. R i v a l Candidates As we have mentioned, some people might think that while autonomy i s a p l a u s i b l e candidate as the f i n a l aim of compulsory schooling, there are r i v a l candidates with equally v a l i d claims for occupying the same p o s i t i o n . There are several aims, I think, that might be con-sidered as j u s t i f i a b l e (arguing from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s ) and as worthwhile as the pursuit of autonomy. Happiness, for example, could be considered such an aim. So could knowledge for the sake of knowledge, or experience for the sake of experience. But there i s a good reason why personal autonomy i s a better aim for compulsory schooling than such r i v a l candidates. The argument has three parts: 1) There are no conclusive arguments to show that any p a r t i c u l a r value simply i ^ more worthwhile than any other. We can o f f e r good reasons for adopting some value as more worthwhile than another (as I have done i n the previous section with personal autonomy), but i n so doing we are only t r y i n g to convince others that they should adopt the value i n question as worthwhile. We have no hope of proving to others that any p a r t i c u l a r value simply i s more worthwhile than any other. There i s no reason i n p r i n c i p l e , for example, why some f u l l y r a t i o n a l person could not f i n d combing h i s h a i r a l l day a worthwhile thing to do. We might think i t regrettable that he finds such a value so worth-while, and we might disagree with him that i t i s worthwhile, but we could not s t r i c t l y accuse him of making a mistake. This point w i l l be argued i n more d e t a i l i n chapter four i n connection 87 w i t h J . P. White's c u r r i c u l u m f o r the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy. 2) In th e absence of c o n c l u s i v e arguments to show t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s i m p l y jLs_ more w o r t h w h i l e than any o t h e r , p e o p l e ought t o be a l l o w e d (from the p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g p o i n t of view) to be t h e i r own f i n a l j u d g e s of what i s worth v a l u i n g and what i s n o t . This f o l l o w s from the presumption i n f a v o r of the r i g h t t o non-i n t e r f e r e n c e . 3) In h e l p i n g p e o p l e t o become autonomous we are h e l p i n g them to be b e t t e r j u d g e s of what i s worth v a l u i n g and what i s n o t , whereas i n s i m p l y h e l p i n g them t o be happy (even i f we knew how t o do t h i s ) , or to g a i n as many e x p e r i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e , or to a c q u i r e knowledge f o r the sake of knowledge, we a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y h e l p i n g them to be b e t t e r j u d g e s of what i s worth v a l u i n g and what i s n o t . A l l o w i n g p e o p l e t o be t h e i r - o w n f i n a l j u d g e s of what i s - w o r t h v a l u i n g does n o t , of c o u r s e , e n t a i l t h a t we must compel them to s t u d y t h i n g s t h a t w i l l make them b e t t e r j u d g e s . The r e a d e r w i l l r e c a l l t h a t the q u e s t i o n about whether we a r e o b l i g e d to compel s t u d e n t s to s t u d y t h i n g s t h a t w i l l make them b e t t e r j u d g e s i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t has been s e t a s i d e . The argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s , i t s h o u l d be remembered, s u g g e s t s o n l y t h a t we a r e p e r m i t t e d t o compel c h i l d r e n to study t h i n g s t h a t w i l l make them b e t t e r j u d g e s . I am a r g u i n g , however, n o t o n l y t h a t we a r e p e r m i t t e d t o impose c e r t a i n s t u d i e s on s t u d e n t s , but a l s o t h a t i t i s d e s i r a b l e to do so f o r t h e s t u d e n t ' s b e n e f i t . The argument f o r v a l u i n g autonomy over and above r i v a l c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e f i n a l aim of compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s t h a t autonomy h e l p s one not o n l y t o be a b e t t e r judge of what i s worth-w h i l e , but a l s o t o s e c u r e what one b e l i e v e s to be w o r t h w h i l e (because s t r e n g t h of w i l l i s the a b i l i t y t o c l o s e the gap between judgment and a c t i o n ) — a d v a n t a g e s which r i v a l c a n d i d a t e s do not a f f o r d . Of c o u r s e not a l l the good of autonomy i s to be s e c u r e d by t h e compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s . I argue i n th e next c h a p t e r t h a t l i b e r a l s t u d i e s c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n c o n d i t i o n o f autonomy, and I l a r g e l y i g n o r e the o t h e r two c o n d i t i o n s . I f and when we l e a r n what k i n d s of p u r s u i t s c o n t r i b u t e to t h e d e v e l o p -ment of freedom of c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h of w i l l , t h e n , a l l t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , we s h a l l have a ready-made j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of those p u r s u i t s as w e l l . T h i s c h a p t e r has been concerned w i t h what ' p e r s o n a l autonomy' means, why autonomy i s i m p o r t a n t , and why we ought t o adopt i t as t h e f i n a l aim of compulsory s c h o o l i n g over o t h e r p o s s i b l e aims. In the next c h a p t e r we w i l l examine one r e c e n t attempt i n the l i t e r a t u r e t o show how a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s to the a c q u i s i t i o n o f p e r s o n a l autonomy, and a new argument o u t l i n i n g some of the connec-t i o n s between l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and p e r s o n a l autonomy w i l l be o f f e r e d . CHAPTER IV AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY' LIBERAL EDUCATION This chapter consists of two parts: an examination of J . P. White's compulsory curriculum, and an analysis of the connection between l i b e r a l education and personal autonomy. White's proposals are worthy of our attention because he i s the only contemporary philosopher of education to propose a compulsory curriculum for the e x p l i c i t purpose of making students autonomous persons. White not only uses the language of personal autonomy but also adopts autonomy as the only j u s t i f i a b l e aim of compulsory education from the purely self-regarding ( p a t e r n a l i s t i c ) point of view. We w i l l see that White's notion of personal autonomy i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from the notion presented i n the previous chapter; hence, h i s reasons f o r proposing compulsory l i b e r a l education are somewhat d i f f e r e n t from ours as w e l l . A f t e r a b r i e f exposition of White's proposals, a less daring but more j u s t i f i a b l e thesis w i l l be presented. 1. White's Proposals White bases hi s upholding of personal autonomy as the only j u s t i f i a b l e ( p a t e r n a l i s t i c ) aim of compulsory education on consider-ations about what we are e n t i t l e d to regard as worthwhile. We w i l l see that White equates what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r 89 90 i t s own sake with what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. By so doing, White i s o f f e r i n g a d e s c r i p t i v e account of a p r e s c r i p t i v e term. Because White's argument rests on the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y we s h a l l have to r e j e c t i t as i t stands i n the end, but i n the meantime i t w i l l be useful for us to see how he proceeds. White o f f e r s the example of our depriving a drunken man of a kn i f e with which he has been playing on the grounds that he might harm himself, to show that i n such a case we think we have a pretty good idea of what would harm the man—physical pain or damage (White, 1973, p. 17). Suppose though, suggests White, that we f i n d out that the man had decided that he would commit sui c i d e by stabbing himself while drunk. If we knew his decision to commit s u i c i d e had been a r a t i o n a l one then we would lose confidence that p h y s i c a l damage i s not worthwhile for that person. "Our normal confident b e l i e f , " says White, "that p h y s i c a l damage harms a person rests on the assumption that such damage hinders him i n s a t i s f y i n g h i s wants: i f what he wants—as an end, not a means—is to die, then being stabbed is- not harmful because i t i s worthwhile to him" (Op. c i t . , p. 17). This seems to imply, says White, that what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for someone i s what he wants for i t s own sake. As White points out, however, there are some problems with t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n . A drunkard playing with a knife (and not wanting to commit suicide) might want to play with i t for i t s own sake, but i f on sobering up he i s grate-f u l to us f o r having taken the knife away from him, then i t would be odd to consider h i s playing with the knife as i n t r i n s i c a l l y worth-91 while. So he t r i e s to lead us to the conclusion that X i s i n t r i n -s i c a l l y worthwhile not j u s t i f i t i s wanted for i t s own sake, but i f on r e f l e c t i o n i t i s wanted for i t s own sake. One problem with t h i s analysis i s that what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n at time t j for i t s own sake may be d i f f e r e n t from what i s wanted on further r e f l e c t i o n at time t 2 - This i s not to suggest that there i s a problem i n X being i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile at one point i n time, but not i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile at another—there i s no reason why an a c t i v i t y that i s valued on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake at time t\ may not be valued on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake at time t 2 — t h e problem i s rather that X may be thought to be wanted for i t s own sake given a c e r t a i n amount of r e f l e c t i o n on the matter, while given more r e f l e c t i o n i t may not be wanted for i t s own sake. How much r e f l e c t i o n i s enough? White handles the problem as follows: . . . the want i n question must be judged i n terms of an i d e a l . In the i d e a l case what i s wanted for i t s own sake on r e f l e c t i o n i s what a man would want f o r i t s own sake, given at l e a s t (a) that he knows of a l l the other things that he might have preferred at that time and (b) that he has c a r e f u l l y considered p r i o r i t i e s among these d i f f e r e n t choices, bearing i n mind not only h i s present s i t u a t i o n but also whether he i s l i k e l y to a l t e r h i s p r i o r i t i e s i n the future. ((b) e f f e c t i v e l y rules out any preference adopted i n a state of depression, euphoria, etc.: a depressed person i s shut off by h i s depression from considering c e r t a i n options which would otherwise be open to him.) (Op. c i t . p. 20) I think White would agree that we should not be too s t r i c t about re q u i r i n g that condition (a) be met before allowing that someone knows what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for him because condition (a) might i n fa c t never obtain. How could we ever be sure of knowing 92 a l l the other things which we might have preferred at the time i n question? There must be an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of things that one might have chosen, so i t would be impossible for us to be aware of them a l l . But i f condition (a) cannot be met then neither can con-d i t i o n (b) because (b) requires consideration of p r i o r i t i e s among  these d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e s — t h a t i s , among a l l the things one might have preferred at the time i n question. We could, therefore, amend (b) to read: "that he has c a r e f u l l y considered p r i o r i t i e s among a l l the other things which he might have preferred from among the a v a i l -able options, bearing i n mind not only h i s present s i t u a t i o n but also whether he i s l i k e l y to a l t e r h i s p r i o r i t i e s i n the future." The upshot of t h i s i s that i f one f a i l s to r e f l e c t on a l l the a v a i l a b l e options because one does not know what the options are, then even though the rest of condition (b) obtains one may be wrong i n b e l i e v i n g that something i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for oneself. Thus i n t r i n s i c worth i s supposed to be intimately connected with wants and desires but not with spur-of-the-moment whims and impulses. But what are the objections to White's equation ( i . e . , the amended version of White's equation) of what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worth-while for someone with what he wants on r e f l e c t i o n f or i t s own sake? Robin Barrow (1976) objects to t h i s account on the grounds that i t leads to some co u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e conclusions, such that i f people on r e f l e c t i o n want to comb t h e i r h a i r a l l day u n t i l they die of starva-t i o n , then combing t h e i r h a i r a l l day i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for them. The reason we might be i n c l i n e d to accept such a case as a .counter-example, however, i s simply that most of us do not value combing our h a i r a l l day i n any p o s i t i v e way, and our natural assump-t i o n i s that no sane person could have values so r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from our own. But i t would be wrong of us to take t h i s p o s i t i o n . There i s no reason i n p r i n c i p l e why a r a t i o n a l person might not f i n d combing h i s h a i r a l l day a worthwhile thing to do. Barrow's more serious objection i s that wanting something on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake i s a necessary condition for an a s c r i p t i o n of i n t r i n s i c value but not a s u f f i c i e n t condition. The argument he o f f e r s i n support of t h i s p o s i t i o n i s the following: It i s possible that on r e f l e c t i o n I want to eat sweets. Because I am aware of a l l the negative consequences of eating sweets I can only assume that I want to eat sweets f o r t h e i r own sake, but I c e r t a i n l y do not regard eating sweets as i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. Therefore, wanting some-thing f or i t s own sake i s not the whole story about i n t r i n s i c worth. But here again Barrow's counter example seems not to hold up. In the case of eating sweets i t i s not the eating of the sweets we value for i t s own sake, but the taste of the sweets that we value or the sensory experience of eating the sweets. If eating seaweed gave us the same sensory experience as eating sweets then we would eat sea-weed, not sweets. So t h i s example proves only the t r i v i a l truth that what i s e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile i s not to be equated with what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. S t i l l , Barrow has an important, general point to make i n opposition to White. He charges White with not e s t a b l i s h i n g that i t 94 i s meaningless or f a l s e to claim that any pursuit i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y valuable other than by the c r i t e r i o n that a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l would on r e f l e c t i o n want to engage i n i t . White has produced no argument at a l l , says Barrow, to show that some pursuits such as science, for example, may not be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s may f e e l about them. Barrow i s r i g h t , of course, but s t i l l we might ask where the onus of proof r e a l l y l i e s . If someone wants to claim that some things such as science are i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s may f e e l about them, then he ought to produce arguments to show why we should accept t h i s p o s i t i o n . Unfortunately, Barrow does not purport to have any such arguments, but we might look at the arguments of Peters, M i l l , and Moore on t h i s point. We have already met Peters' w e l l -known transcendental argument i n t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference. Peters says that by simply asking the question "Why do t h i s rather than that?" (e.g., Why include one thing i n the curriculum and not the other?) we are committed to the worthwhileness of the pursuit of c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s such as science and philosophy. This i s what Peters says: the person who asks such a question must already have a serious concern for t r u t h b u i l t into h i s consciousness. For how can a serious p r a c t i c a l question be asked unless a man also wants to acquaint himself as well as he can of the s i t u a t i o n out of which the question a r i s e s and of the facts of various kinds which provide the framework of possible answers? The various t h e o r e t i c a l enquiries are explorations of these d i f f e r e n t facets of h i s experience. To ask the question 'Why do t h i s rather than that?' s e r i o u s l y i s therefore, however embryonically, to be committed to those enquiries which are defined by t h e i r serious concern with these aspects of r e a l i t y which give context to the question which he i s asking. (Peters, 1966, p. 164) 95 Peters i s r i g h t that people concerned with what there are good reasons for doing are committed to r a t i o n a l i t y , but i t does not follow that a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y e n t a i l s a commitment to the serious study of the d i s c i p l i n e s of science and philosophy. To whatever extent i t might be true, i f i t i s true at a l l , that subjects l i k e science and philosophy are i n t r i n s i c a l l y valuable to us provided we se r i o u s l y ask the question 'What ought we to include i n the curriculum?' the p o s s i b i l i t y that one might value other kinds of a c t i v i t i e s (e.g., f o o t b a l l and soccer) equally with the more theoret-i c a l ones i s not precluded by a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y . Of course Peters would agree that they are not precluded. His point i s only that they are not required as are the more t h e o r e t i c a l studies. But i n any case, i t i s s t i l l open to us to disagree with Peters that the t h e o r e t i c a l pursuits are i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. His transcen-dental argument does not give us a v a l i d argument of the sort we are looking f o r . At most i t shows that t h e o r e t i c a l pursuits are, to some degree, e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile: they are instrumental i n helping us answer the question "Why do t h i s rather than that?" M i l l argues that although pleasure i s the highest good, some pleasures are of greater worth than others. Poetry, he suggests, i s of greater i n t r i n s i c worth than pushpin. In making t h i s claim he i s not o f f e r i n g the commonly held view that poetry leads to more enjoy-ment than pushpin; i . e . , that the pursuit of poetry has more bene-f i c i a l consequences than the pursuit of pushpin (although he holds t h i s to be t r u e ) — h e i s instead making the claim that poetry i n i t s e l f 96 i s more worthwhile than pushpin. The argument he o f f e r s i n favor of accepting poetry as i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile and not accepting pushpin as such i s t h i s : given someone who knows both kinds of pursuits he w i l l always choose poetry over pushpin i f given a choice. But t h i s argument of M i l l ' s i s unacceptable for at le a s t two re l a t e d reasons: 1) The empirical claim that people who know both poetry and pushpin ( i f given a choice) always choose poetry might be f a l s e , and 2) even i f i t were true of everyone i n the world: who knows both poetry and pushpin that the former i s always chosen over the l a t t e r , i t does not follow that no counter-instance w i l l a r i s e tomorrow. Besides, we are simply not e n t i t l e d to make the jump from a claim about what people f i n d to be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile to what i s i n fact worthwhile. So M i l l ' s views about i n t r i n s i c worth w i l l not stand up eith e r . Nor w i l l any p o s i t i o n resembling Moore's i n t u i t i o n i s m help us very much. As White points out, Moore has claimed that . . . we know by i n t u i t i o n that the pursuit of beauty and ( i n his case) of personal a f f e c t i o n are the highest goods. But what i f others come out with d i f f e r e n t i n t u i t i o n s ? Suppose i t i s i n t u i t i v e l y obvious to me that mystical contemplation i s the summum bonum and that personal a f f e c t i o n i s way down the scale: how could one support Moore's i n t u i t i o n s against mine or v i c e versa? (White, 1973, p. 10) So White has some good grounds for h i s claim that i t does not seem to make much sense to talk, about the i n t r i n s i c worth of something without considering how people f e e l about i t — a n d besides how people 97 f e e l about i t he believes there does not seem to be much else to consider. This i s what White says: Suppose there i s a man who wants only one thing, X, f o r i t s own sake. He has r e f l e c t e d thereon, s a t i s f y i n g the demands of the i d e a l s i t u a t i o n . Every choice but X he finds abhorrent. Would i t make sense to ask, 'True, he wants X on r e f l e c t i o n for i t s own sake, but i s X r e a l l y i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile?' The question implies that, granted something i s of i n t r i n s i c value, t h i s must be other than X. But everything else besides X he finds loathsome: perhaps, we might add, i t makes him p h y s i c a l l y or mentally i l l to engage i n i t . How could i t be, we might ask, that anything of the kind could be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for him? What would be meant by claiming this? Once again we reach the point, by a more dramatic route, that the onus i s on the skeptic to say what he means. (Op. c i t . p. 20) We must grant to White that i t i s at l e a s t c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e to claim that something could be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile even i f no one ever valued i t , though i t may not be l o g i c a l l y inconsistent. Be that as i t may, Barrow cannot con s i s t e n t l y allow that such things as science could be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s might f e e l about them because he argues (1976, p. 81) that White's c r i t e r i o n i s necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t f o r an a s c r i p t i o n of i n t r i n -s i c worth—so the feelings of i n d i v i d u a l s do count for something. In claiming that White's c r i t e r i o n i s necessary but not s u f f i -cient for an a s c r i p t i o n of i n t r i n s i c worth, Barrow o f f e r s no sugges-tions f o r expanding the c r i t e r i o n to make i t adequate. If Barrow thinks i t makes sense to suggest that what we might want on r e f l e c -t i o n f o r i t s own sake might be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile, then he ought to i n d i c a t e at l e a s t i n general terms what the difference i s between wanting something on r e f l e c t i o n for i t s own sake and i t s being 98 i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. I f Hare i s correct, saying 'X i s i n t r i n -s i c a l l y worthwhile' i s p r e s c r i p t i v e , whereas saying X i s desired on r e f l e c t i o n i s not, so the meaning of 'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' cannot be equated with the meaning of 'X i s desired on r e f l e c t i o n ' . Even though 'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' and 'X i s desired on r e f l e c t i o n ' are not i n t e n s i o n a l l y equivalent, they could, however, be extensionally e q u i v a l e n t — t h a t i s , those items to which the phrase ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' applies might be those and only those items to which the phrase 'desired on r e f l e c t i o n ' applies. But how could we know whether or not t h i s i s true? White's equation of 'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' with 'X i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n for i t s own sake' i s important i n h i s account because he argues that the business of education i s to put people into a p o s i t i o n i n which they can know and acquire the things they want on r e f l e c t i o n f o r t h e i r own s a k e — a p o s i t i o n which he counts as one of autonomy. I f people are autonomous, on White's account, they are better able to pick out what i s worthwhile for them. For White then, autonomy i s e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile—a means to obtaining what i s i n -t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile—which, he suggests, varies from person to person. White holds that i f one does not know what he wants for i t s own sake a f t e r considering the options, no one else can t e l l him what he wants. I t i s probably true, as White says, that at times someone else might be the better judge of what a person r e a l l y wants f or i t s own s a k e — i n a case when one's desires are unconscious or repressed, f o r example, a p s y c h i a t r i s t might know better than the person concerned 99 what t h a t p e r s o n r e a l l y w a n t s — b u t " t he p s y c h i a t r i s t c o u l d n ot be the f i n a l judge on what I r e a l l y wanted. I t i s o n l y when I avow t h a t he is:r'i:gh't t h a t h i s c l a i m becomes j u s t i f i e d . . ." (Qp. c i t . , p. 21). At t h i s p o i n t i t might be h e l p f u l t o c l a r i f y the d i f f e r e n t senses of i n t r i n s i c worth as they have a r i s e n so f a r . In c h a p t e r t h r e e I argued f o r the i n t r i n s i c worth o f autonomy. There, the n o t i o n o f i n t r i n s i c worth was taken t o a p p l y t o a f e l t or p e r c e i v e d q u a l i t y of e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s v a l u e d f o r i t s own sake. I t was argued t h a t the e x p e r i e n c e o f b e i n g an autonomous p e r s o n i s c l e a r l y an e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s w o r t h w h i l e i n t h i s sense, and i t was argued f u r t h e r t h a t autonomy i s fundamental t o our n o t i o n s o f human worth and d i g n i t y . The e x p e r i e n c e o f h a v i n g worth and d i g n i t y i s a l s o c l e a r l y an e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s h i g h l y v a l u e d f o r i t s own sake. In the p r e s e n t c h a p t e r we have seen t h a t White takes t h e term ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e ' as a synonym f o r 'what i s wanted on r e f l e c -t i o n f o r i t s own sake'. Barrow c o r r e c t l y o b j e c t s t o White's d e s c r i p -t i v e account o f a p r e s c r i p t i v e term. S i n c e we can s e n s i b l y ask 'Even though X i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake, i s i t r e a l l y w o r t h w h i l e ? ' , t h e term ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e ' cannot be equated i n meaning w i t h 'what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake'. ( T h i s i s Moore's famous open q u e s t i o n argument.) But n e i t h e r Barrow nor anyone e l s e has produced a c o n v i n c i n g argument t o show t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r p u r s u i t i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e even i f i t i s not wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake. So the e d u c a t o r who i s con-cerned w i t h p i c k i n g out i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e a c t i v i t i e s i s caught 100 i n a bind: i f he picks out what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n for i t s own sake, he runs the r i s k of not picking out what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile, but what else can he do? He has no way of i s o l a t i n g which a c t i v i t i e s ( i f any) are i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whether or not they are wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r t h e i r own sake. But there i s a very simple s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem that a sane and sensible educator who i s concerned with picking out e u r r i c u l a r components can take. He can stop t a l k i n g about the notion of i n t r i n s i c worth (unless he s t i p u l a t e s how he i s going to use the term); and he can concentrate instead on what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n (of the best sort that we can muster) for i t s own sake, or on q u a l i t i e s of experience that are valued for t h e i r own sake, and so f o r t h . We simply cannot argue convincingly for the i n t r i n s i c worth of anything unless we specify i n what sense the notion of i n t r i n s i c worth i s to be taken (as we did i n chapter three). Although White's compulsory curriculum i s a curriculum for the development of autonomy, he o f f e r s very l i t t l e by way of analysis of the notion of autonomy. He i s content, i t seems, to equate autonomy with knowing how to obtain what one wants on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake. S t i l l , h i s notion of autonomy i s s i m i l a r enough to the one presented i n chapter three that i t would be worth our while to see what kind of compulsory curriculum he proposes. A. S p e c i f i c Components White considers the question of what kind of curriculum c h i l -dren should follow i n schools and what i t s end-points should be under two headings: knowledge of p a r t i c u l a r types of a c t i v i t y and 101 knowledge of ways of l i f e . In discussing knowledge of p a r t i c u l a r types of a c t i v i t y (omitting such a c t i v i t i e s as l y i n g i n the sun, which might be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile for some people, but not educationally worthwhile because they require very l i t t l e learning) White says they can be divided exhaustively into two classes: 1) those i n which no understanding of what i t i s to want X i s l o g i c a l l y possible without engaging i n X, and 2) those i n which some understanding of what i t i s to want X i s l o g i c a l l y possible without engaging i n X. White's c r i t e r i o n f o r determining whether a person has 'some under-standing of X' i s the a b i l i t y to give ei t h e r a correct i n d e n t i f c a -or a correct verbal account of what i t i s to engage i n X. t i o n of cases of X,^ On t h i s basis i t can be c l e a r l y seen that understanding what i t i s to communicate through language, f o r example, i s c l e a r l y a d i f f e r e n t matter from understanding what i t i s to climb mountains. In the former case a person incapable of communicating through language does not possess the concepts ei t h e r to explain what communication i s or to be able to pick out examples of people communicating through language. One can, however, possess the concepts necessary to explain what i t i s to go mountain climbing or pick out instances of mountain climbing, without having a c t u a l l y engaged i n t h i s a c t i v i t y . Besides communication i n general, White includes the following i n his l i s t of Category I a c t i v i t i e s (the l i s t i s not intended to be exhaustive): 1) Engaging i n pure mathematics. Because mathematical concepts are defined i n terms of other mathematical concepts one cannot understand such concepts without being i n s i d e the d i s c i p l i n e . That i s , one cannot understand pure mathematics without a c t u a l l y engaging i n mathematical a c t i v i t y . 2) Engaging i n the exact phy s i c a l sciences. Because the concepts of physical s c i e n c e — e . g . , mass, f o r c e — a r e analysable only i n terms of other s c i e n t i f i c concepts, these concepts are u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to someone outside the d i s c i p l i n e . 3) Appreciating works of a r t . Here i t i s the aesthetic response that i s important—not knowledge of a l o t of t i g h t l y interdefined aesthetic concepts. The concept of such a response i s i t s e l f s u i  generis. One cannot come to understand what i t i s to view an object or an event from the aesthetic point of view without already having been i n i t i a t e d into t h i s way of thinking and f e e l i n g . How does one come to be i n i t i a t e d i n the f i r s t place? Through being exposed to works of art by s e n s i t i v e guides, says White, u n t i l one comes to perceive aesthetic objects for oneself. But there i s also another reason why White includes art i n h i s l i s t of Category I a c t i v i t i e s . What counts as art i s a disputed question. "Art" i s an e s s e n t i a l l y contested concept. Art may be thought to be that which embodies s i g n i f i c a n t form or expresses emotion or reveals metaphysical truths. "To study the a r t s , " says White, " i s i n t e r  a l i a to become aware of the multiple and c o n f l i c t i n g c r i t e r i a of 103 value which are e s s e n t i a l features of these f i e l d s . It i s not clear how someone who had never studied them could conceivably have t h i s awareness. 4) Philosophizing. Although philosophizing has i t s own te c h n i c a l concepts, these are not cen t r a l to the a c t i v i t y since one can p h i l -osophize without them. To do philosophy i s to come to look at the concepts one already possesses (time, thought, pleasure, etc.) from a d i f f e r e n t s t a n c e — a higher-order point of view. To do t h i s i s to begin to do philosophy. P h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y i s quite u n i n t e l l i -g i b l e to the non-philosopher. The following are White's Category II a c t i v i t i e s (the l i s t i s not intended to be exhaustive): 1) Speaking a foreign language. As long as one has a native l a n -guage one can gain some understanding of what i t i s for people to speak some other language even though one cannot a c t u a l l y do so. 2) Cricket and other organized games. The concepts of c r i c k e t and other organized games can be learned without a c t u a l l y playing them. 3) Cookery, sewing, carpentry, etc. The concepts of these a c t i v -i t i e s can e a s i l y be made i n t e l l i g i b l e to the onlooker who does not ac t u a l l y engage i n them. 4) Painting p i c t u r e s , w r i t i n g poetry, composing or performing music, etc. One can understand what i t i s to do these things without a c t u a l l y doing them, as long as one knows what pi c t u r e s , poetry, music, etc., are. 5) Vocational a c t i v i t i e s l i k e being an accountant or working on an 104 assembly track. 6) Non-vocational a c t i v i t i e s l i k e bridge, bingo, f i s h i n g , mountain climbing, etc. It should be pointed out that some Category II a c t i v i t i e s (e.g., #4 above) depend upon i n i t i a t i o n into Category I a c t i v i t i e s . In f a c t a l l presuppose i n i t i a t i o n into l i n g u i s t i c communication but some presuppose more than t h i s as w e l l . One could not understand what i t i s to be a poet or a musician without some understanding of the a r t s . Nor could one understand what i t i s to teach physics without some understanding of physics. Many other dependency re l a t i o n s h i p s between the categories could be traced. The c u r r i c u l a r consequences of White's d i s t i n c t i o n are probably c l e a r . Category I a c t i v i t i e s , says White, are those which students must be compelled to engage i n to some extent as part of t h e i r basic education. Students must come to have some understanding of Category II a c t i v i t i e s as w e l l , but t h i s understanding can be gained without a c t u a l l y engaging i n Category II a c t i v i t i e s . One can gain s u f f i c i e n t understanding of Category II a c t i v i t i e s to know (perhaps not for c e r t a i n , but to have a pretty good idea at least) whether one wants to pursue the a c t i v i t y or not. Pictures, f i l m s , verbal accounts, and observations of these a c t i v i t i e s i s enough to give one the required understanding. White sees not only engaging i n Category I a c t i v i t i e s and coming to engage i n Category II a c t i v i t i e s , but also coming to know about d i f f e r e n t ways of l i f e , as e s s e n t i a l aspects of a compulsory 105 curriculum for autonomy. I t i s i n th i s respect he thinks the study of h i s t o r y , among other things, has an important r o l e to play. D i f f e r e n t ways of l i f e suggested by White include (nor i s t h i s l i s t intended to be exhaustive): 1. Away of l i f e devoted to the pursuit of t r u t h , i n science, h i s t o r y , etc. 2. A way of l i f e devoted to a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y . 3. A way of l i f e devoted to others' good: the a l t r u i s t i c way of l i f e . 4. A way of l i f e devoted to ph y s i c a l prowess or adventure. 5. A way of l i f e devoted to physical pleasures more broadly understood. 6. A r e l i g i o u s way of l i f e , premised on the b e l i e f that t h i s l i f e i s only a preparation f o r an a f t e r - l i f e . 7. A l i f e devoted to the a c q u i s i t i o n of goods. 8. A l i f e devoted to the a c q u i s i t i o n of power over others. 9. A way of l i f e devoted to r e f l e c t i o n on how one should l i v e . 10. A way of l i f e devoted to domesticity. 11. A way of l i f e devoted to public a f f a i r s . 12. The a s c e t i c way of l i f e . 13. A way of l i f e based on a Thoreauesque return to nature. 14. A way of l i f e based on one's surrendering to someone else the decision about what sort of l i f e one should lead. (White, op. c i t . , p. 44) We also have to ensure, says White, that learning about the d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s and ways of l i f e makes a differ e n c e to how students view t h e i r world and how they f e e l about various aspects of t h e i r l i v e s . White does not say exactly how t h i s kind of i n t e -gration i s to be achieved—presumably that i s an empirical q u e s t i o n — but he points out that t h i s aim i s p e r f e c t l y compatible with either a topic-centred curriculum or a curriculum based on subject matters taught l a r g e l y i n independence of each other. White would also include i n a compulsory curriculum some way of bringing students to consider other people's i n t e r e s t s i m p a r t i a l l y with t h e i r own. This kind of moral i n t e g r a t i o n i s surely desirable, 106 and i f we knew how to achieve i t by morally unobjectionable means I am sure we would want to do so. It i s , however, outside the realm of a purely self-regarding compulsory curriculum and as such i t i s not c e n t r a l to t h i s t h e s i s . As a f i n a l aspect of h i s compulsory curriculum, White would also include what he c a l l s a " p r a c t i c a l component." What he means by t h i s i s the p r a c t i c a l knowledge one must have i n order to achieve one's ends. Without t h i s component the student may be equipped for l i f e i n a world i n which there are no obstacles to achieving one's ends but he would not be equipped for the r e a l world. Says White: . . . i t i s not enough to have got one's ends into some kind of order: to be more than a dreamer, one has to have some idea of how these ends may be attained, of the obstacles i n t h e i r way, of how these obstacles may be overcome, and of which ends are impracticable since the obstacles i n t h e i r way are unsurmountable. (White, op. c i t . , p. 55) By p r a c t i c a l subjects White does not mean such a c t i v i t i e s as arts and c r a f t s , carpentry, or cooking. P r a c t i c a l pursuits would not n e c e s s a r i l y require any phys i c a l s k i l l . They would include studies about l e g a l , f i n a n c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and psychological m a t t e r s — s t u d i e s which would help one to understand the means of obtaining one's ends. B. Objections to White's Components White's d i s t i n c t i o n between Category I and Category II a c t i v -i t i e s can be objected to on at l e a s t two grounds. F i r s t , i t could be argued that the d i s t i n c t i o n f a l l s apart because a l l a c t i v i t i e s belong i n Category I. A basketball devotee could argue that one cannot r e a l l y come to understand basketball u n t i l one has a c t u a l l y played that game. Unless one has had the experience of playing basketball (perhaps several experiences of playing basketball) one can only grasp the externals of :the game—not the essence of i t . C l e a r l y one cannot have f i r s t hand knowledge of what i t i s to play basketball i f one has never played, but f i r s t hand knowledge i s not what i s required. A l l that White i s a f t e r i s some understanding of an a c t i v i t y — e n o u g h to make an i n t e l l i g e n t choice about whether one would want to choose the a c t i v i t y as a worthwhile pursuit for oneself. This, I think, i s possible. So t h i s objection does not r e a l l y destroy White's p o s i t i o n . Second, i t could be argued that the d i s t i n c t i o n f a l l s apart because a l l a c t i v i t i e s belong i n Category I I . Science, for example, could be seen as a mere extension of such a c t i v i t i e s as c o l l e c t i n g plants and b u t t e r f l i e s and asking 'Why?' questions about them. But as White points out, Category I a c t i v i t i e s may have t h e i r roots i n Category II a c t i v i t i e s but i t does not follow from t h i s that one can have enough understanding of Category I a c t i v i t i e s to discriminate between instances of them and other forms of a c t i v i t y . So t h i s objection does not r e a l l y destroy White's d i s t i n c t i o n e i t h e r . But there are other more subtle objections to White on t h i s point. John McPeck argues that the way i n which White states the d i s t i n c t i o n i t i s c i r c u l a r , and that even when the c i r c u l a r i t y i s overlooked the d i s t i n c t i o n i s impracticable. He argues further that the only consistent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l that White says about t h i s 108 d i s t i n c t i o n would force him to defend some version of the indefensible doctrine of "verstehen" (1977, pp. 138-145). There i s no need for us to dwell on the i n t r i c a c i e s of these arguments, however, because besides the objections to the d i s t i n c t i o n s between Category I and Category II a c t i v i t i e s there are many other more apparent objections to White's proposals that could be made—most of them r e s u l t i n g from the fact that we are unsure of the consequences of pursuing many a c t i v i t i e s . Hence, many important questions remain unanswered. Which studies from among the wide range of options are the ones we should pick out as contributing to the a c q u i s i t i o n of p r a c t i c a l knowledge—i.e., the know-how one needs i n order to achieve one's ends? How i s i n t e g r a t i o n (or cognitive perspective) to be achieved? How many Category II a c t i v i t i e s are there? If there i s an i n f i n i t e number of possible candidates (or what seems to us an i n f i n i t e number) then how are we to pick out which ones we ought to make students aware of? How many Category I a c t i v i t i e s are there? Are algebra and geometry, for example, e n t i t l e d to be included i n the l i s t i n t h e i r own r i g h t or i s the general category of mathematics a l l that i s needed? We could go on but there i s probably l i t t l e point i n doing that. Pointing out the shortcomings of any educational theory i s an important task, but t r y i n g to put forward a defensible theory provides the more important challenge. The challenge cannot be f u l l y met i n t h i s t h e s i s , but some s p e c i f i c suggestions can be made about what we ought to teach i n schools from the self-regarding point of view. 109 2. L i b e r a l Components and Personal Autonomy The task of t h i s section i s to show how l i b e r a l education contributes to the development of personal autonomy i n a way that p h y s i c a l and vocational t r a i n i n g , f o r example, do not. Compared to the task of spe c i f y i n g a l l the e u r r i c u l a r components one might include i n a curriculum for autonomy as White has t r i e d to do, the task of th i s s e ction i s a much more modest one. The aim here i s only to e s t a b l i s h the importance of l i b e r a l education i n the develop-ment of personal autonomy. The task of spe c i f y i n g a l l the e u r r i c u l a r components one might include i n a curriculum f o r autonomy i s , I think, beyond our reach because there are so many empirical questions involved which have not yet been answered. We noted e a r l i e r , for example, that the psychotic i s not autonomous no matter how much knowledge he may have because he lacks freedom of choice, but we do not know exactly what kinds of learnings and what kinds of experiences r e s u l t i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of freedom i n the relevant sense. Nor do we know how to ensure that the knowledge c h i l d r e n acquire w i l l make a diff e r e n c e to how they see and f e e l about the world. Nor do we know how to ensure that judgment gets transformed into action. S t i l l , there are some very general kinds of recommendations we can make about what students ought to learn i n schools i n the i n t e r e s t s of developing personal autonomy. Because the development of freedom of choice and strength of w i l l are psychological matters, there i s l i t t l e we can say about how they can be developed, but there are some useful p h i l o s o p h i c a l points 110 that we might make about the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . Even t h i s i s p a r t l y an empirical matter i f we agree that the r a t i o n -a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person has achieved some kind of integrated state of mind, but i t i s clear that one cannot be r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e unless one has knowledge or b e l i e f s to be r e f l e c t i v e with and to be r e f l e c -t i v e about. How much and what kind of knowledge i s s u f f i c i e n t to make a person r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e enough to be autonomous? Surely there i s no d e f i n i t i v e answer to t h i s question. There i s a s l i d i n g scale involved here. People can be more or less r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e and therefore more or less autonomous. It would be naive, I think, to assume that some complete and uncontroversial s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a compulsory curriculum for autonomy could be put forward. We would do better to avoid h a i r s p l i t t i n g arguments (which are bound to be inconclusive anyhow) about which elements of a curriculum such as White's ought to be retained, which ought to be omitted and which non-elements ought to be added to the l i s t , and instead to consider i n general one important part of the curriculum White suggests—which i s roughly, very roughly, a compul-sory l i b e r a l arts education for everyone. The tack I s h a l l take i s to defend a l i b e r a l arts curriculum on the grounds that without i t , or something l i k e i t , the r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n condition of autonomy cannot be met. I t should be emphasized that there may be discrep-ancies between any l i b e r a l arts curriculum and the cognitive components of the best possible curriculum for autonomy (whatever that might be), but we s h a l l simply have to ignore such possible I l l discrepancies because we cannot t e l l exactly to what extent the study of h i s t o r y , f o r example, contributes towards the development of autonomy or whether one might achieve the same l e v e l of autonomy through some other study instead. But I hope to make at le a s t one thing c l e a r : being able to r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y at a reasonable l e v e l requires a considerable dose of l i b e r a l education no matter how the precise boundaries of that notion are defined. The aim of the remainder of t h i s section i s to show why i t i s important for the development of autonomy that students learn science, h i s t o r y , mathematics, l i t e r a t u r e , philosophy, and so f o r t h . The elements of a l i b e r a l a r t s curriculum w i l l be considered i n a lump sum, so to speak, and some general claims w i l l be made about them. No doubt some very useful claims about p a r t i c u l a r elements of a l i b e r a l arts c u r r i c u l u m — h i s t o r y , f o r example,—could be made, but the concerns of t h i s thesis are confined to l i b e r a l education i n general. With s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge opposing the compulsory imposition of t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge on students on the grounds that the compulsory imposition of t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge i s instrumental i n helping higher soci-economic groups suppress lower ones, and with popular t h e o r i s t s suggesting both that students ought to be allowed to choose t h e i r own c u r r i c u l a and that academic subjects have no relevance i n students' l i v e s , i t seems there are good reasons for t r y i n g to defend the compulsory imposition of a l i b e r a l arts curriculum i n general on students, as opposed to defending the i n c l u s i o n or exclusion of some p a r t i c u l a r element i n 112 the curriculum. We should keep i n mind that the points made here about l i b e r a l education have nothing to do with teaching methods. It would be wrong to assume that a l i b e r a l education must be equated with a t r a d i t i o n a l l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n system characterized by p a s s i v i t y on the part of students, although the psychological association between the two i s perhaps understandable for the reason that l i b e r a l education has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been conducted i n an au t h o r i t a r i a n manner. The aut h o r i t a r i a n s t y l e of teaching i s probably a throw-back to the time of St. Augustine who advocated a u t h o r i t a r i a n teaching methods on the grounds that only true b e l i e f (not understanding) i s required f o r sal v a t i o n . In any case, a good l i b e r a l education i s p e r f e c t l y compatible with the gentlest of teaching methods and the keenest a c t i v i t y of mind on the part of p u p i l s . We sometimes hear i t said of the i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e s such things as they help to l i f t a person's s p i r i t above the world, or they equip one's mind to enter the world and perform i t s tasks. What we need to know, however, i s exactly what i t i s about philosoph-i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge that enables a person to be more r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e than, say, knowledge of f o o t b a l l , carpentry, automobile engines, or pot throwing, enables him to be. The answer l i e s , I think, i n the fact that knowledge of f o o t b a l l , carpentry, automobile engines, or pot throwing, l o g i c a l l y cannot involve a very deep understanding of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the b i t s of knowledge about f o o t b a l l , carpentry, 113 engines, or pots without being knowledge i n the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s . For example, someone might be a highly s k i l l e d thrower of clay pots, and t h i s s k i l l might involve not only knowing-how but also a c e r t a i n amount of knowing-that. I f such knowledge i s going to con-t r i b u t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y to one's a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y , however, then i t would include not only knowledge of the differences between kinds of cl a y s , which i n turn would involve knowledge of weather and s o i l conditions that produce the d i f f e r e n t kinds, but also some degree of aesthetic s e n s i t i v i t y which i n turn would involve knowledge of human feeli n g s and emotions. The more r e f l e c t i v e one i s going to be, the more one has to have a store of knowledge from the established d i s c i p l i n e s , and the more that knowledge has to make a di f f e r e n c e to how one sees and f e e l s about the world. Not only do s k i l l s i n themselves involve l i t t l e depth of know-ledge (understanding of r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) , but few s k i l l s have a very wide range of cognitive content. As Peters points out: There i s very l i t t l e to know about r i d i n g b i c y c l e s , swimming or g o l f . It i s l a r g e l y a matter of 'knowing how' rather than of 'knowing that', of knack rather than of understanding. Furthermore what there i s to know throws very l i t t l e l i g h t on much else. In h i s t o r y , science, or l i t e r a t u r e , on the other hand, there i s an immense amount to know, and, i f i t i s properly assimilated, i t constantly throws l i g h t on, widens, and deepens one's view of countless other things. (Peters, 1973, p. 95) The phrase " i f i t i s properly assimilated" i n the above quotation i s important because i t i s possible, of course, f o r someone to be a student of the very best l i b e r a l education we can provide and s t i l l not become a very r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person. A l i b e r a l education can provide no guarantees, and i t would be too much to expect that i t could. I t i s enough to show that without a l i b e r a l education of some sort one cannot become a very r e f l e c t i v e person. I say very r e f l e c t i v e because as Dearden points out nearly every human being i s an exerciser of autonomy to some extent, no matter how small. "Even i n acting under the s t r i c t e s t orders, some minimal active i n t e l l i g e n c e i s c a l l e d f o r " (Dearden, 1972, p. 460). Even i f one's en t i r e l i f e were l i v e d by following some externally imposed set of r u l e s , one i s often required to decide whether a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i s an instance where a given r u l e applies or not. The use of l a n -guage i n anything other than a p a r r o t - l i k e fashion requires at le a s t some minimal a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y . So the extent to which one i s a r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person (and an autonomous person) i s c e r t a i n l y a matter of degree. In considering how much r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n and how much i n the way of l i b e r a l studies i s enough for the exercise of autonomy to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree, we can be helped by looking at Michael Oakeshott's d i s t i n c t i o n between information and judgment (1967). Oakeshott suggests that the various a b i l i t i e s which constitute what we may be said to know are made up of information and judgment. Information i s a matter of impersonal f a c t s , s p e c i f i a b l e i n proposi-ti o n s . Judgment, however, i s unspecifiable i n pr o p o s i t i o n a l form. Judgment i s that part of knowledge which enables us to i n t e r p r e t information, to decide upon i t s relevance, to recognize what r u l e to 115 apply, and to discover what action permitted by the r u l e should, i n the circumstances, be performed (op. c i t . , p. 168). Paul H i r s t makes e s s e n t i a l l y the same point as Oakeshott when he says: A l l knowledge involves the use of symbols and the making of judgments i n ways that cannot be expressed i n words and can only be learnt i n a t r a d i t i o n . The art of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n and the development of appropriate experimental t e s t s , the forming of an h i s t o r i c a l explanation and the assessment of i t s truth, the appreciation of a poem: a l l of these a c t i v i t i e s are high arts that are not i n themselves communicable simply by words. (H i r s t , 1974, p. 45) Oakeshott argues that t h i s element of knowledge that i s not communicable simply by words—judgment—cannot be acquired i n a vacuum; that i s , i t cannot be acquired i n i s o l a t i o n from information because information provides the raw material for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , decisions, recognitions, and so f o r t h . U n t i l one can speak the language of h i s t o r y , philosophy, science, etc., i n a manner not expressly provided for by the l i t e r a t u r e of those d i s c i p l i n e s , one i s lacking i n the a b i l i t y to make judgments i n those areas. Having judgment, as Oakeshott i s using the term, i s having the a b i l i t y to think with an appreciation of the considerations which belong to the d i f f e r e n t modes of thought, and i t i s something learned i n the presence of those who have i t . But learning to think i s not, he says, simply a matter of learning how to judge, to i n t e r p r e t and to use information. I t i s also a matter of learning to recognize and enjoy the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s of d i s i n t e r e s t e d c u r i o s i t y , patience, i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty, exactness, industry, concentration, doubt, and elegance. In addition, i t i s a matter of acquiring the d i s p o s i t i o n to submit to r e f u t a t i o n , as w e l l as learning the love of t r u t h and j u s t i c e . And above a l l , i t i s the a b i l i t y to detect the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e l l i g e n c e (which he c a l l s style) at work i n every u t t e r -ance. Individual i n t e l l i g e n c e i s seen i n the choice made, not according to the r u l e s , but within the area of freedom l e f t by the negative operation of r u l e s . "We may l i s t e n to what a man has to say," says Oakeshott, "but unless we overhear i n i t a mind at work and can detect the idiom of thought, we have understood nothing" (op. c i t . , p. 175). We can r e a d i l y see the connection between what Oakeshott c a l l s judgment and the r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n condition of autonomy. If i n i t i a t i o n into the l i t e r a t u r e of the d i s c i p l i n e s i s required before one can i n some sense r i s e above that l i t e r a t u r e to make judgments of one's own, then i n i t i a t i o n into the l i t e r a t u r e of the d i s c i p l i n e s i s required before one can achieve any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . This i s not to suggest that the a c q u i s i t i o n of mere information ought to be pursued for many months or years before . r a t i o n a l , r e f l e c t i o n can be acquired. I t i s to suggest, however, that r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n requires much more than mere i n i t i a t i o n into the l i t e r a t u r e of each d i s c i p l i n e . The connection between l i b e r a l studies and r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s further emphasized by H i r s t and Taylor. H i r s t (1974) has argued that a l i b e r a l education i s concerned d i r e c t l y with the development of the mind i n r a t i o n a l knowledge; that i s , the very a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge i n the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s i s the a c q u i s i t i o n of a r a t i o n a l mind. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, however, that H i r s t ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the pursuit of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s very d i f f e r e n t from the j u s t i f i c a t i o n offered i n t h i s t h e s i s . H i r s t believes that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the pursuit of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s somehow b u i l t r i g h t into the enterprise of pursuing i t . He says: To question the pursuit of any kind of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s i n the end s e l f - d e f e a t i n g , for the questioning i t s e l f depends on accepting the very p r i n c i p l e s whose use i s f i n a l l y being c a l l e d i n question. (Op. c i t . , p. 42) This j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s i n s u f f i c i e n t for our purposes, of course, because even i f asking the question 'Why pursue l i b e r a l studies?' presupposes some commitment to the pursuit of l i b e r a l studies, i t need only presuppose commitment of a very embryonic so r t . I t i s possible to be committed to r a t i o n a l i t y by wanting a sane and sensible answer to the question 'Why pursue l i b e r a l studies?' without commit-ment to the serious pursuit of knowledge i n each of the r a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s . Taylor (1961) contends that i t i s impossible to make r a t i o n a l choices among ways of l i f e unless one i s fre e , enlightened, and i m p a r t i a l . His enlightenment condition requires that one have i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge (science and philosophy), imaginative knowledge (achieved through a wide v a r i e t y of personal experience, the reading of h i s t o r y , biography, anthropology, and sociology, the study of r e l i g i o n , and the appreciation of the f i n e a r t s ) , and p r a c t i c a l knowledge ( f i r s t hand experience of a way of l i f e ) . We may be unable to give c h i l d r e n f i r s t hand experiences of ways of l i f e , but 118 through a l i b e r a l arts curriculum, Taylor would argue, we can c l e a r l y help them to achieve some degree of enlightenment. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , one of Taylor's conditions for the i m p a r t i a l i t y condition of r a t i o n a l choice i s the absence of bias i n the choice. He says a choice i s unbiased to the extent that ( i ) the chooser's upbringing was nonauthoritarian,' ( i i ) the chooser's education was l i b e r a l , and ( i i i ) the person's experience of l i f e up to the time of choice was of considerable v a r i e t y , richness, and depth (op. c i t . , p. 172). The important point for t h i s thesis i s Taylor's claim that a l i b e r a l education contributes to the absence of bias. That claim i s somewhat c o n t r o v e r s i a l , so i t should be examined i n some d e t a i l . C l e a r l y the absence of bias i s required to achieve any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . E a r l i e r i n the thesis some of the views of the " s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge" p o s i t i o n were discussed i n considering the notion of a l t e r n a t i v e forms of knowledge. Now i s the time to elaborate the case against proponents of that p o s i t i o n . Their basic claim, as we have seen, i s that l i b e r a l education i s oppressive because i t i n t r o -duces or re-enforces class bias. This claim d i r e c t l y opposes Taylor and the view of t h i s thesis that a l i b e r a l education i s a l i b e r a t i n g influence, not an oppressive one. Popper (1962, p. 216) suggests that s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge i n v i t e the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e i r own methods to themselves with an almost i r r e s i s t i b l e h o s p i t a l i t y : i f a l l utterances are expressions of class b i a s , then so are the u t t e r -ances of s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge. 119 I am a r g u i n g t h a t l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s needed f o r r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , but t h e " s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge" p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e r e a r e such t h i n g s as a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s . One of A p p l e ' s b a s i c c l a i m s i s t h a t e d u c a t o r s ought to seek out forms of r a t i o n a l i t y which a r e l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e and more humane than the forms of r a t i o n -a l i t y we a r e accustomed to u s i n g (1975, p. 121). I s i n g l e out A p p l e o n l y because the c l a i m s he makes a r e f a i r l y t y p i c a l of t h e s c h o o l of thought I am a r g u i n g a g a i n s t . I t i s not i m mediately c l e a r what Apple means when he speaks of d i f f e r e n t forms of r a t i o n a l i t y . A r e d i f f e r e n t forms of r a t i o n a l i t y p o s s i b l e ? I f we examine the c o n t e x t s i n which A p p l e uses the term ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' we see t h a t the word appears to be more v e r s a t i l e than we might have e x p e c t e d . He t a l k s about: 1) a c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t i s l e s s t h a n e f f i c a c i o u s today (1975 b, p. 121) 2) e t h i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y (op. c i t . , p. 126) 3) b u r e a u c r a t i c r a t i o n a l i t y (op. c i t . , p. 134) 4) new r a t i o n a l i t i e s and t e c h n i q u e s t h a t make f u r t h e r c o n t r o l and d o m i n a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups by an i n s t r u m e n t a l and t e c h n i c a l i d e o l o g y p o s s i b l e (op. c i t . , p. 143) 5) the r a t i o n a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l s c h o l a r s (op. c i t . , p. 143) 6) t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e v a i l i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s l i k e our own (op. c i t . , p. 147) 7) t e c h n i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y (1975 c, p. 105) 8) s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y (op. c i t . , p. 115) From t h e s e examples i t appears t h a t Apple i s not u s i n g the term ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' as i t s h o u l d be used. I f A pple were me r e l y u s i n g the term ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' as a synonym f o r ' p o i n t of view' t h e r e would be l i t t l e harm done, but A p p l e ' s t e r m i n o l o g y i s i n d i c a t i v e of the extreme r e l a t i v i s m a t t h e h e a r t of the " s o c i o l o g y of knowledge" p o s i t i o n . It i s , of course, the. r e l a t i v i s t p o s i t i o n I wish to argue against, not the misuse of synonyms. When we speak of the c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y or the standards of r a t i o n a l i t y , we are usually r e f e r r i n g to some commitment to the basic laws of l o g i c such as the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and so f o r t h . There are no a l t e r n a t i v e laws of l o g i c . By these standards a person i s i r r a t i o n a l to believe both P and not P, for example, i f he makes no attempt to a l t e r h i s b e l i e f s when the inconsistency i s brought to h i s attention. I f we b l a t a n t l y disregard the laws of l o g i c , we cannot expect our views to be taken se r i o u s l y . Against the notion of a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s , Popper (op. c i t . ) argues that the methods of science are public possessions, not pr i v a t e enterprises. I f a s c i e n t i s t obtained r e s u l t s by methods other than those that are p u b l i c l y v e r i f i a b l e (though perhaps only by s p e c i a l i s t s ) there would be no reason for us to take h i s findings s e r i o u s l y . Popper speaks disparagingly of the mysticism of the i r r a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n : "Who shows greater reverence for mystery," he asks, "the s c i e n t i s t who devotes himself to discovering i t step by step, always ready to submit to the f a c t s , and always aware that even h i s boldest achievement w i l l never be more than a stepping stone for those who come a f t e r him, or the mystic who i s free to maintain anything because he need not fear any t e s t ? " (op. c i t . , p. 245). Stephen Toulmin argues at length against the r e l a t i v i s t p o s i -t i o n that t r i e s to allow for a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n h i s book, 121 Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g : ( 1 9 7 2 ) . He h o l d s the n o t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s t o be i n c o h e r e n t on t h e ground t h a t : r a t i o n a l i t y i s an a t t r i b u t e , not of l o g i c a l or c o n c e p t u a l systems as such, but o f the human a c t i v i t i e s o r e n t e r p r i s e s of which p a r t i c u l a r s e t s of c o n c e p t s a r e the temporary c r o s s -s e c t i o n s : s p e c i f i c a l l y , o f the p r o c e d u r e s by which the con-c e p t s , judgements, and f o r m a l systems c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d i n those e n t e r p r i s e s a r e c r i t i c i z e d and changed. (Op. c i t . , p. 133) T o u l m i n i s s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e s i m p l y a r e no a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s to c o n s i d e r . T h i s view can b e s t be e x p l a i n e d i n h i s own words: Q u e s t i o n s of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' a r e c o n c e r n e d , p r e c i s e l y , not w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l d o c t r i n e s t h a t a m a n — o r p r o f e s -s i o n a l g r o u p — a d o p t s a t any g i v e n time, but r a t h e r w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s on which, and the manner i n which, he i s p r e - pared to c r i t i c i z e and change those d o c t r i n e s as time goes on. The r a t i o n a l i t y of a s c i e n c e ( f o r i n s t a n c e ) i s embodied, not i n the t h e o r e t i c a l systems c u r r e n t i n i t a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s , but i n i t s p r o c e d u r e s f o r d i s c o v e r y and c o n c e p t u a l change through time. (Op. c i t . , p. 84) The upshot of t h i s i s t h a t t h e r e i s a c o r e of r a t i o n a l i t y ( i n c l u d i n g the b a s i c laws of l o g i c and r u l e s o f language) which i s a communal i n h e r i t a n c e . The c o r e remains s t a b l e , and t h e r e a r e no c a n d i d a t e s t h a t we c o u l d s e n s i b l y b r i n g f o r w a r d as p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s t o i t . The same p o i n t i s made by J . R. Coombs i n d i s c u s s i n g the n a t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h y o f e d u c a t i o n . He s a y s : To do p h i l o s o p h y of e d u c a t i o n i s to use some e l a b o r a t e d concep-t i o n of what i t i s to be r a t i o n a l i n making assessments about what counts as r a t i o n a l , s e n s i b l e , e t c . t h i n k i n g about educa-t i o n . What I am c a l l i n g an e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n -a l i t y i n c l u d e s s e t s of d i s t i n c t i o n s , t e c h n i q u e s of a n a l y s i s , k i n d s o f arguments and th e l i k e which a r e r e g a r d e d as worth-w h i l e . One's e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y must be j u s t i f i e d i n r e f e r e n c e to t h e c o r e meaning of r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s c o r e can be e x p l i c a t e d , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , i n terms of such t h i n g s as a d h e r i n g to the b a s i c canons o f l o g i c and r u l e s o f language. G i v e n any p a r t i c u l a r e l a b o r a t e d concept of 122 r a t i o n a l i t y , i t i s u n l i k e l y we could d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y where the core ends and the elaboration begins. I t i s not c l e a r to me, for example, whether such things as Leibniz's law and Occam's razor are parts of the core or parts of various elab-orated conceptions of r a t i o n a l i t y . Our i n a b i l i t y to draw clear boundaries i n t h i s matter should not be taken as grounds for concluding that there i s no core of d e s c r i p t i v e meaning to the concept of r a t i o n a l i t y , though t h i s i s what some proponents of "sociology of knowledge" would have us believe. If that i s r i g h t , a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s do not e x i s t , and i t i s impossible for anyone to create such an a l t e r n a t i v e at w i l l . This i s not to suggest, however, that there i s no possible world i n which the core of r a t i o n a l i t y i s d i f f e r e n t from that of the actual world. Quine has shown i n h i s "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" that even the r a t i o n a l core i s not necessarily i n v i o l a t e . The point i s simply that the r a t i o n a l core i s a communal inheritance which i t i s not possible for i n d i v i d u a l s to change. I f , for example, I were to ignore our accepted rules of inference i n developing the c e n t r a l argument of the t h e s i s , on the grounds that I am operating according to some al t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y , then no sane and sensible person could follow the argument. Sane and sensible people argue (or t r y to argue) according to accepted rules of inference. What a l l t h i s b o i l s down to i s that i n i t i a t i o n into l i b e r a l studies i s not only compatible with r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , but also a p r e r e q u i s i t e to i t . It could be suggested that giving students a v a r i e t y - o f -experience curriculum might give them as much or more to r e f l e c t about than the bookish o r i e n t a t i o n that a l i b e r a l arts curriculum would provide, but at l e a s t three responses could be made to t h i s 123 suggestion: 1) There seems to be less reason to believe that subjecting students to as many d i f f e r e n t experiences as possible w i l l improve t h e i r r e f l e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s or even give them a better chance of having greater r e f l e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s than a l i b e r a l arts curriculum would enable them to have. One can have a wide v a r i e t y of experiences without gaining very much breadth and depth of knowledge. Besides; 2) Dewey's suggestion that we look at knowledge i t s e l f as the sum-t o t a l of human experience would lead us to think that by subjecting students to a compulsory l i b e r a l education we are i n fact giving them access to more experience ( a l b e i t v i c a r i o u s ) than any i n d i v i d u a l could possibly hope to acquire f i r s t hand i n a l i f e t i m e . There are simply not enough hours i n a day or days i n a l i f e t i m e for each person to invent the wheel a l l over again. No doubt some f i r s t hand experience (as opposed to the second hand experience of t h e o r e t i c a l studies) of various sorts i s as important to the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n as t h e o r e t i c a l understanding, but we could not make t h i s claim about f i r s t hand experience i n general. Subjection to a v a r i e t y of experiences provides no guarantee that one w i l l come to see re l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among events i n the world. Subjection to a l i b e r a l arts curriculum provides no such guarantee e i t h e r , but at le a s t :the very subject matter of l i b e r a l studies is_ r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of many d i f f e r e n t kinds. 3) Even i f c e r t a i n v a r i e t i e s of experience—e.g., getting an informal education through t r a v e l l i n g around the world and meeting people whose 124 ways of l i f e are d i f f e r e n t from our own—were j u s t as e f f e c t i v e i n getting people to be as r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e as i s a l i b e r a l arts curriculum, we have to be r e a l i s t i c about what kind of schooling i s f e a s i b l e for .children. A good l i b e r a l education can e a s i l y be had within the confines of a classroom at not too exorbitant a cost, whereas arranging for large numbers of students t o i t r a v e l the world would be very c o s t l y and very inconvenient. Besides, we have better reason to b e l i e v e that a good l i b e r a l education contributes more to the development of autonomy because of the intimate connections between autonomy and breadth and depth of knowledge. We often hear popular the o r i s t s speak disparagingly about keep-ing students within the confines of four classroom walls, as i f by so doing we were depriving students of important experiences i n the world. But i f what we are concerned with i s autonomy, and i f Immanuel Kant (and others l i k e him) could become the autonomous thinker that he did without ever t r a v e l l i n g more than ten miles out of Kbnigsberg, then we ought to remain hopeful about the p o s s i b i l i t y of accomplishing a very great deal within the confines of classroom walls. I have argued e a r l i e r that without a l i b e r a l arts curriculum, or something l i k e i t , the r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n condition of autonomy cannot be met. In the second to l a s t paragraph I have said only that l i b e r a l arts studies contribute more to the development of autonomy than l i k e l y competitors. The apparent inconsistency of these two claims should be explained. If we conceive of a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i n terms of a t t a i n m e n t s ( t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , then i n d e e d a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the p o s s e s s i o n of autonomy. I f , however, we c o n c e i v e of a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n as sub-j e c t i o n t o c e r t a i n s t u d i e s , then the most we can say i s t h a t a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s more l i k e l y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the development of autonomy than o t h e r p u r s u i t s . Q u e s t i o n s might a r i s e a t t h i s p o i n t about whether we can be s a t i s f i e d w i t h merely h e l p i n g s t u d e n t s t o become autonomous t h i n k e r s . As we have seen, the e x e r c i s e of autonomous t h i n k i n g i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p o s s e s s i o n of p e r s o n a l autonomy—freedom of c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h of w i l l a r e a l s o r e q u i r e d . But the t a s k of p i c k i n g out e u r r i c u l a r components t h a t c o n t r i b u t e towards the development of freedom of c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h of w i l l i s a t a s k t h a t depends i n l a r g e measure on e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s not y e t a v a i l a b l e t o us. Because i t can be p l a u s i b l y argued t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n s " b e t w e e n f r e e and u n f r e e c h o i c e s and between s t r e n g t h of w i l l and weakness of w i l l b r eak down on c l o s e i n s p e c t i o n , what s h o u l d be counted as freedom of c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h of w i l l i s an u n s e t t l e d q u e s t i o n . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t on page 66 above, P e t e r s ' l i s t of cases i n which the s u b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of freedom of c h o i c e a r e absent, was p r e s e n t e d . Even i f we a c c e p t the l i s t as i t s t a n d s , we s i m p l y do not know what k i n d s of l e a r n i n g s and e x p e r i e n c e s w i l l ensure t h a t s t u d e n t s grow up w i t h o u t d e v e l o p i n g the k i n d s of compulsions P e t e r s o u t l i n e s . Nor do we know how to ensure t h a t s t u d e n t s w i l l grow up w i t h t h e a b i l i t y to put judgments i n t o a c t i o n w i t h o u t b e i n g hampered by too many 126 counter-Inclinations. By the same token, i t could be argued that we don't r e a l l y know how to ensure that students w i l l become r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s e i t h e r , but at le a s t we. can see that without some breadth and depth of knowledge r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s impossible. A good l i b e r a l arts program cannot guarantee the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge that makes a difference to how one sees and f e e l s about the w o r l d — t h a t , no doubt, i s why we sometimes say no one can teach any-body anything—but we would be naive to hope for guarantees. The most we can hope for i s at le a s t some measure of success with nearly everyone and large measures of success with a few. It has been suggested to me by Murray E l l i o t t that because someone might be able to achieve considerable cognitive perspective (i n Peters' sense) though he has been i n i t i a t e d into only one subject matter—chemistry, for example—there i s a problem about whether we ought to i n i t i a t e students into a l l the l i b e r a l arts or whether we ought to opt for depth i n some area at the expense of breadth. The problem of depth versus breadth i s something of a perennial dilemma, but given that we are defending compulsory education for the development of personal autonomy, a good case can be made, i t seems, for choosing as much depth as possible i n each of the l i b e r a l arts over greater depth i n a sing l e area. The reason i s t h i s : no matter how much of a s c i e n t i f i c (for example) genius we might produce i n opting f o r depth over breadth, i t i s doubtful whether we could a t t r i -bute someone who i s unable to see events i n the world from a v a r i e t y of points of view with the capacity for the kind of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n 127 we are a f t e r . Events In the world are not j u s t s c i e n t i f i c events; they are also h i s t o r i c a l events, p o l i t i c a l events, r e l i g i o u s events, etc. Events are important not j u s t s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , but also psychologically, a e s t h e t i c a l l y , economically, morally, and i n many other ways as w e l l . To have knowledge and understanding i n only one area i s to be deprived of a v a r i e t y of ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g one's experience. If we are deprived of ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g our experience then we are not free to make choices and decisions based on those i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Hence, we are not as autonomous as we might otherwise be. This i s not to suggest, of course, that the development of expertise i n one area i s undesirable because i t i s ne c e s s a r i l y achieved at the expense of the development of breadth i n a v a r i e t y of areas; i t i s merely to suggest that i n so f a r as we are concerned with the compulsory imposition of studies for the develop-ment of autonomy, we ought not to teach j u s t math and science, say, or j u s t music and poetry, but a l l of these. Because the development of expertise i n a si n g l e area requires enormous personal commitment on the part of the learner, the development of expertise i n a s i n g l e area might best be l e f t as something the learner i s free to attempt a f t e r h i s compulsory education i s over. Before proceeding with a b r i e f discussion of some p r a c t i c a l implications of t h i s study, i t might be h e l p f u l at t h i s stage to re-state the main points of the argument as i t appeared i n the introduction: 128 1. An Individual's prima f a c i e r i g h t to non-interference can be overridden when the following conditions hold: (a) The i n d i v i d u a l consents to f o r f e i t h i s r i g h t and h i s consent i s not caused by the interference nor i s i t the r e s u l t of h i s being i r r a t i o n a l , i . e . , having d i s -torted b e l i e f s , i r r a t i o n a l compulsions, and the l i k e . or There i s a reasonable expectation that the i n d i v i d u a l would consent i n the future i f he were r a t i o n a l and i n possession of the information relevant to j u s t i f y -ing the interference. (b) The interference promotes the good of the i n d i v i d u a l i n some way, t h i s good i s more s i g n i f i c a n t than the harm r e s u l t i n g from the interference, and the i n t e r f e r -ence i s either necessary to or i s the best way of promoting the good. (c) The interference i s not morally objectionable on grounds other than i t s i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t to non-interference. 2. Because the imposition of a wide v a r i e t y of studies and a c t i v i t i e s (including l i b e r a l studies) could meet the condi-tions s p e c i f i e d i n #1 above, and since any curriculum can accommodate only a l i m i t e d number of studies and a c t i v i t i e s , some c r i t e r i o n i s needed for i d e n t i f y i n g the most s i g n i f i c a n t goods to be promoted for students. 3. The development of personal autonomy i s the good to be pro-moted by compelling students to study the l i b e r a l a r t s . It i s assumed that such development i s s u f f i c i e n t l y valuable to outweigh any harm that i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t from compelling students to take l i b e r a l arts studies. (Freedom of w i l l , r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , and strength of w i l l are taken as necessary conditions for personal autonomy.) 4. The development of personal autonomy i s a more desirable or s i g n i f i c a n t educational objective than any other that might be secured by imposing other sorts of studies. I t i s as-sumed that there i s l i t t l e reason to believe that the a c t i v i t i e s excluded by the/imposition of l i b e r a l studies are l o g i c a l l y or e m p i r i c a l l y necessary to the development of autonomy. 5. A l i b e r a l arts curriculum, when taken as a set of attainments, i s necessary to the development of personal autonomy because i t i s necessary to the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , i . e . , i t i s not possible to secure any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n without such attainments. 6. A l i b e r a l arts curriculum, when taken not as a set of a t t a i n -ments but as a set of courses of study (taught by whatever methods are deemed e f f e c t i v e and d e s i r a b l e ) , i s the best way of achieving r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n . Therefore, we are j u s t i f i e d i n imposing a l i b e r a l arts curriculum on 129 s t u d e n t s f o r t h e i r own good. S i n c e t h e purpose of the t h e s i s has been to j u s t i f y t h e i m p o s i -t i o n of a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s f o r t h e i r own good, the ob v i o u s p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e work i s t h a t we s h o u l d impose such a c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s i n s c h o o l s i f we a r e not a l r e a d y d o i n g so. S t i l l , i t may be u s e f u l t o e l a b o r a t e on t h i s g e n e r a l i m p l i c a -t i o n a l i t t l e b i t . That i s the t a s k o f c h a p t e r f i v e . CHAPTER V PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS In t h i s chapter we look at some of the implications for teachers and teacher t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of imposing on students a compulsory l i b e r a l arts curriculum. I am assuming not only that i t i s desirable that students obtain broad and deep knowledge of academic subjects but also that t h i s i s possible. Some implications of t h i s view should be c l a r i f i e d . As we have mentioned, i t should be remembered that a presumption i n favor of a t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l arts curriculum i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a presumption i n favor of t r a d i t i o n a l teaching methods. It i s a presumption i n favor of what should be taught, not how i t should be taught. The best method of i n i t i a t i n g students into a body of knowledge i s to be determined v i a empirical and moral considerations. In addition, although we have been emphasizing compulsion, t h i s does not involve advocating coercive techniques for getting students to l e a r n . No one supposes that c h i l d r e n should be beaten into sub-mission i f they prefer hopscotch to h i s t o r y . A l l that i s meant by compulsory subject matter i s subject matter that students cannot choose to make or to miss i n the way that high school students choose one e l e c t i v e rather than another. There i s a popular objection that i s often brought 130 131 forward to counter proposals l i k e the one I am making. The B.C.T.F., for example, ran a f u l l page advertisement i n the Vancouver Sun to present t h i s objection and others to the public i n 1976 when the p r o v i n c i a l government of B.C. proposed a compulsory core curriculum. The objection i s t h i s : students are i n d i v i d u a l s and i f we give them a l l the same kind of curriculum we are denying students t h e i r i n d i -v i d u a l i t y . Surely i t i s not' desirable, so the argument goes, to make everyone a robotic carbon copy of everyone els e . White c a l l s t h i s objection a f a m i l i a r Daily Telegraph kind of argument that i s more propaganda than argument. A very b r i e f response should s u f f i c e to expose i t s inadequacies. As White suggests, one cannot r a t i o n a l l y pronounce oneself for or against uniformity u n t i l one knows i n what respect people are said to be uniform. If everyone were always the same i n matters of personal s t y l e , then l i f e would lose much of i t s richness and colour. That would surely be a very undesirable state of a f f a i r s ; but on the other hand, uniformity i s indeed desirable when i t comes to standards of, say, truthfulness or honesty. In any case the whole raison d'etre of compulsory l i b e r a l arts education i s , by the account I am o f f e r i n g , to get students to the stage when they can i n fa c t think for themselves as i n d i v i d u a l s . When people are cut o f f from the more sophisticated forms of thought and a c t i v i t y t h e i r options are severely r e s t r i c t e d . I t seems reasonable to believe that carbon-copy thinking would be more l i k e l y to r e s u l t among non-autonomous persons than autonomous ones. It w i l l be r e c a l l e d that i n chapter three the enhancement of freedom was rejected as a basis f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference on the grounds that f o r c i n g people to be free can lead to unacceptable consequences on both the p o s i t i v e and negative accounts of freedom, and i t might seem that the imposition of compulsory curriculum to make people autonomous i s s i m i l a r l y a case of fo r c i n g people to be free. But there i s an important fundamental diffe r e n c e between the two kinds of cases. In imposing the development of autonomy on students we are not imposing any p a r t i c u l a r set of b e l i e f s or values on them. We are not regarding them as unfree i f they hold one set of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and values, say, rather than another, or i f they have aspirations i n one p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n rather than another. I f our view of freedom were freedom i n a more Marxist sense, however, then f o r c i n g people to be free would involve regarding them as unfree i f they did not hold c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e values and b e l i e f s . Compelling people to be autonomous i s not l i k e that. I t i s a matter of imposing c e r t a i n pursuits on students u n t i l they are able to decide r a t i o n a l l y both what they want to do and which con-s t r a i n t s they want to impose on themselves. The question about whether we include X i n a compulsory curriculum becomes a question about whether X i n fact contributes to the a c q u i s i t i o n of autonomy. It i s not at a l l an issue about what people would value i f they were r a t i o n a l or i f they were not constrained. So imposing a compulsory curriculum on students to make them autonomous i s not open to the same objections as the Marxist p o s i t i o n on fo r c i n g people to be free . A fourth possible objection i s that a compulsory l i b e r a l arts 133 e d u c a t i o n f o r everyone i s an u n r e a l i s t i c aim because t h e r e a r e l a r g e numbers o f s t u d e n t s i n our s c h o o l s who have n e i t h e r the c a p a c i t y nor the i n c l i n a t i o n t o study mathematics, l i t e r a t u r e , s c i e n c e , h i s t o r y , e t c . With r e g a r d t o c a p a c i t y , however, i t i s not c l e a r t h a t we a r e j u s t i f i e d i n making the e m p i r i c a l c l a i m t h a t l a r g e numbers o f s t u d e n t s do not have the c a p a c i t y t o handle an academic c u r r i c u l u m i f what i s meant by c a p a c i t y i s i n n a t e a b i l i t y . I t might be t r u e t h a t g i v e n the r i g h t k i n d of environment and t h e r i g h t k i n d o f t e a c h -i n g methods from the b e g i n n i n g t h e i n n a t e a b i l i t y of most s t u d e n t s i s s u f f i c i e n t to get them on the i n s i d e of many t h e o r e t i c a l p u r s u i t s . As f a r as i n c l i n a t i o n i s concerned, i f i t i s t r u e t h a t l a r g e numbers o f s t u d e n t s do not have the i n c l i n a t i o n t o study academic s u b j e c t s , then i t c o u l d a l s o be t r u e t h a t i f the r i g h t t e a c h i n g methods were found and s t u d e n t s were s t e e p e d i n the l i b e r a l a r t s from an e a r l y age, t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n s would be d i f f e r e n t . Perhaps we cannot s u c c e s s f u l l y change the i n c l i n a t i o n s o f most s t u d e n t s who a r e p r e s e n t l y e n r o l l e d i n our s c h o o l s , but t h a t i s not t o say t h a t c h i l d r e n who a r e immersed i n a compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s program from t h e b e g i n n i n g w i l l come to have the same i n c l i n a t i o n s . B e s i d e s , the whole q u e s t i o n o f the i n c l i n a t i o n s o f s t u d e n t s i s to a l a r g e e x t e n t b e s i d e the p o i n t . Of c o u r s e i t would be p r e f e r a b l e i f s t u d e n t s were n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d towards the k i n d o f c u r r i c u l u m we would impose on them, but i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t h a t they be so i n c l i n e d . One a l t e r n a t i v e t o a p r e - a r r a n g e d compulsory c u r r i c u l u m t h a t i s o f t e n adopted i s the a l t e r n a t i v e White r e f e r s t o as the ' c a f e t e r i a ' 134 counsellor-guided system which he believes i s t y p i c a l of north American schools. The main objection to t h i s approach i s that i f ch i l d r e n choose t h e i r own c u r r i c u l a they are not l i k e l y to choose what they would choose on r e f l e c t i o n i f they understood the a v a i l a b l e options. If students are guided by school counsellors i n choosing c e r t a i n op-tions over others, then they are i n large measure at the mercy of people who may not be educationally enlightened. Guidance counsel-l o r s may d i r e c t students to choose one set of options over another eit h e r on the basis of what they themselves would choose i f they were i n the students' p o s i t i o n or on the basis of which kinds of pursuits open the door to "good jobs." I f the l a t t e r , then the counsellor may function more l i k e an agent of s o c i a l control than a genuine promoter of students' best i n t e r e s t s . The kinds of c u r r i c u l a r recommendations I am arguing against i n t h i s thesis are not only those that advocate the ' c a f e t a r i a ' approach but also those that advocate greater vocational t r a i n i n g and l e i s u r e a c t i v i t y t r a i n i n g at the expense of an academic emphasis. The Newsom Report, though dated, might serve as a well-known example of t h i s second kind of recommendation. I t i s concerned with the so-called 'less able' c h i l d and i t recommends that such c h i l d r e n be taught nothing of the fundamental structure of such basic subjects as mathematics and physics. It lays heavy emphasis on arts and c r a f t s , games, cookery, woodwork, e t c . — a c t i v i t i e s that involve some form of physic a l s k i l l rather than t h e o r e t i c a l understanding. To argue, as the Newsom Report does, that c h i l d r e n of low a b i l i t y need to learn 135 such t h i n g s as woodwork, h o u s e c r a f t , b u s i n e s s l e t t e r s , e t c . , because these a r e the s k i l l s they w i l l be u s i n g i n t h e i r a d u l t l i v e s , i s to p r e j u d g e what s o r t o f a d u l t l i v e s t h e s e c h i l d r e n w i l l l e a d . A p r o -gram of t h i s s o r t would i n e f f e c t e quip s t u d e n t s f o r a way of l i f e t h a t p r e v e n t s them from c h o o s i n g f o r themselves what k i n d of l i v e s they w i l l l e a d . I t e f f e c t i v e l y c u t s o f f l a r g e numbers o f p e o p l e from the chance to become autonomous p e r s o n s . We need n o t b e l a b o u r the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t e a c h e r s , c u r r i c u l u m p l a n n e r s , o r t e a c h e r t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the f o r e g o i n g arguments, but a few s p e c i f i c s u g g e s t i o n s might be made. In elementary s c h o o l s c h i l d r e n a r e n o r m a l l y taught to r e a d from c o n t r o l l e d v o c a b u l a r y b a s a l r e a d e r s — t h e s t o r i e s i n which c o u l d seldom be r e g a r d e d as models of good E n g l i s h l i t e r a t u r e . I f we were to take a compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m s e r i o u s l y much of t h i s m a t e r i a l would p r o b a b l y have to be r e p l a c e d a t a l l l e v e l s by works o f l i t e r a r y m e r i t and s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t would not be enough f o r c h i l d r e n t o master the mere mechanics of l e a r n i n g to r e a d : what they r e a d would be r e g a r d e d as e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t . I n d i v i d u a l i z e d r e a d i n g programs c o u l d be r e t a i n e d , but they c o u l d not r e p l a c e d e l i b e r a t e i n i t i a t i o n o f the s t u d e n t by the t e a c h e r i n t o the b e s t of t h e l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n . O f t e n i n the s c h o o l s w r i t t e n c o m p o s i t i o n i s t r e a t e d as i f i t were some t h e r a p e u t i c a c t o f s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n — a spontaneous p o u r i n g out of i n n e r thoughts and f e e l i n g s r a t h e r than t h e c r e a t i o n o f a p i e c e of work the m e r i t s o f which a r e to be judged by the 136 response o f l i t e r a t e p e o p l e towards i t . ' I f we were to take a com-p u l s o r y l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m s e r i o u s l y , s u r e l y we would d e l i b e r a t e l y expose c h i l d r e n to a v a r i e t y of w r i t i n g s t y l e s and good models o f E n g l i s h p r o s e i n t e a c h i n g them to w r i t e . In so f a r as m i n i s t r i e s o f e d u c a t i o n a r e the b o d i e s w i t h the a u t h o r i t y to p r e s c r i b e a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m f o r s c h o o l s , one o b v i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t they ought to p r e s c r i b e a c u r r i c u l u m o f compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s . The q u e s t i o n o f whether m i n i s t r i e s o f e d u c a t i o n ought to have the power to p r e s c r i b e compulsory c u r r i c u l u m f o r whole p r o v i n c e s o r c o u n t r i e s i s a n o t h e r m a t t e r . For purposes of t h i s t h e s i s we need o n l y c l a i m t h a t whoever has the power (or ought to have the power) ought to p r e s c r i b e ( i f t hey p r e s c r i b e a n y t h i n g a t a l l ) a compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m f o r everyone. We are concerned h e r e , a l b e i t i n v e r y g e n e r a l terms, w i t h the c o n t e n t of what c h i l d r e n l e a r n i n s c h o o l — not w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f c u r r i c u l u m i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . As f a r as t e a c h e r t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e c o n c e r n e d , i t seems u n d e s i r a b l e t h a t f a c u l t i e s o f e d u c a t i o n recommend to m i n i s t r i e s o f e d u c a t i o n t h a t s t u d e n t s be c e r t i f i e d as t e a c h e r s when the p r o s p e c t i v e t e a c h e r s have not themselves r e c e i v e d a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t i s o f t e n p o s s i b l e to g raduate not o n l y from h i g h s c h o o l s but a l s o from u n i v e r s i t i e s w i t h o u t e v e r h a v i n g r e a d a Shakespearean p l a y o r a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e s s a y , and w i t h o u t knowing much i n the way o f mathematics o r e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e . I t i s perhaps not w h o l l y i n a c c u r a t e to suggest t h a t many c l a s s r o o m 137 teachers have been well trained for their jobs but not many have been well educated. Be that as i t may, i f Oakeshott is correct that judgment i s acquired by interacting with those who already have i t , then unless teachers are on the inside of the subject matters they teach, we cannot hope that students w i l l acquire any-thing beyond a very superficial understanding of the different disciplines. If we are concerned with the development of personal autonomy, and I have tried to show in this thesis that we ought to be very concerned with i t , then we ought to be equally concerned with the compulsory imposition of a li b e r a l arts curriculum on both students and future teachers. I have tried in this thesis to justify the compulsory impo-sition of a li b e r a l arts curriculum (in the Hirstian sense) on the paternalistic grounds that depth and breadth of knowledge are necessary to satisfy the rational-reflection condition of personal autonomy. Many controversial points have been raised that w i l l continue to be controversial in the future. In so far as the argument of the thesis i s successful, however, a case has been made against the positions of some sociologists of knowledge and popular theorists discussed in chapter one. Teachers need no longer feel vaguely guilty (as many have f e l t in recent years) for imposing "foreign trips" on students by imposing a compulsory l i b e r a l arts curriculum on them. The thesis raises a host of important, unanswered questions 138 f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h : C o u l d a c a s e be made f o r the m e r i t s o f the stud y o f s c i e n c e over l i t e r a t u r e (or v i c e v e r s a ) f o r the g r e a t e r development o f p e r s o n a l autonomy? What k i n d s o f s t u d i e s and e x p e r i e n c e s c o n t r i b u t e to those a s p e c t s o f p e r s o n a l autonomy we have not y e t c o n s i d e r e d — f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h o f w i l l ? Do we have a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o h e l p d e v e l o p p e r s o n a l autonomy i n s t u d e n t s ? What methods o f t e a c h i n g maximize t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s t u d e n t s w i l l a c h i e v e the a t t a i n m e n t s we a r e a f t e r ? 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