UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Personal autonomy and compulsory liberal education Partridge, Yolande Mary 1979

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PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY LIBERAL EDUCATION by YOLANDE MARY PARTRIDGE B.Ed., The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972 M.A., The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1976  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Faculty of Education)  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1979  © Y o l a n d e Mary Partridge, 1979  E-6  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives.  It is understood that copying or publication  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  BP  7 5-5 1 I E  ABSTRACT  The aim of t h i s t h e s i s  i s to j u s t i f y on p a t e r n a l i s t i c  compulsory i m p o s i t i o n o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on c h i l d r e n . to the i n c r e a s i n g l y the " s o c i o l o g i s t  grounds the  In o p p o s i t i o n  i n f l u e n t i a l views o f many e d u c a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s i n  o f knowledge" t r a d i t i o n ,  i t i s argued t h a t l i b e r a l  e d u c a t i o n b e n e f i t s students because i t c o n t r i b u t e s towards the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy. ~ P e r s o n a l autonomy i s accepted  as b o t h an e x t r i n s i c  and an i n t r i n s i c good, and i t s development i s taken as t h e most d e f e n s i b l e aim of compulsory  education.  Because compulsory e d u c a t i o n c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s facie right  to non-interference, the t h e s i s  i n which the r i g h t  a student's  prima  c o n s i d e r s the k i n d s o f cases  t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be j u s t i f i a b l y o v e r r i d d e n .  I t p r e s e n t s an argument f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c v e n t i o n based on the f o r f e i t u r e o f r i g h t s  through  consent.  inter-  Because  t h i s argument p e r m i t s us to impose an enormous range o f s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s on s t u d e n t s , some c r i t e r i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o h e l p us choose curricular  components.  The development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s chosen  as t h a t c r i t e r i o n . Three c o n d i t i o n s a r e taken as n e c e s s a r y p e r s o n a l autonomy: s t r e n g t h of w i l l .  freedom of c h o i c e , r a t i o n a l  f o r t h e presence o f r e f l e c t i o n , and  Breadth and depth o f knowledge i n the t r a d i t i o n a l  d i s c i p l i n e s are considered necessary  for satisfying  the r a t i o n a l -  r e f l e c t i o n c o n d i t i o n o f autonomy, and compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s taken as the b e s t way to h e l p s t u d e n t s o b t a i n b r e a d t h and depth of knowledge.  ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  i i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  iv  INTRODUCTION  1  Chapter I II  LIBERAL EDUCATION  9  NON-INTERFERENCE  25  1.  25  The Right t o N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  2.  III  O v e r r i d i n g t h e Right t o N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e A. The Enforcement o f M o r a l i t y B. P r e v e n t i n g Harm t o Others C. Cases of Consenting t o t h e F o r f e i t u r e of a Right D. J u s t i f y i n g P a t e r n a l i s m PERSONAL AUTONOMY  35 36 38  1.  The Meaning o f 'Personal Autonomy' A. Freedom of Choice B. R a t i o n a l R e f l e c t i o n C. S t r e n g t h of W i l l The Value o f P e r s o n a l Autonomy R i v a l Candidates  61 65 68 74 75 86  AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY LIBERAL EDUCATION  89  2. 3. IV  1.  2. V  White's P r o p o s a l s A. S p e c i f i c Components B. O b j e c t i o n s t o White's Components L i b e r a l Components and P e r s o n a l Autonomy  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  39 45 61  89 100 106 109 130  BIBLIOGRAPHY  15?  iii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I am v e r y Daniels,  g r a t e f u l to Dr. J e r r o l d Coombs, Dr. Le R o i and Dr. Murray E l l i o t t  assistance  i n the preparation  f o r t h e i r generous  of t h i s  iv  thesis.  INTRODUCTION  Many educators  question the value of a t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l  curriculum f o r students.  Some propound t h e view t h a t c h i l d r e n  study o n l y what they want to study. justify  arts should  The purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o  from a p u r e l y p a t e r n a l i s t i c p o i n t of view the i m p o s i t i o n o f a  compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m on students i n s c h o o l . The  grounds on which people  argue about what should be taught i n  s c h o o l s a r e numerous and v a r i e d . ations concerning  Sometimes they argue from c o n s i d e r -  t h e promotion o f worthwhile s t a t e s of mind a s , f o r  example, do P a u l H i r s t and R. S. P e t e r s .  Others,  emphasize t h e promotion o f p e r s o n a l autonomy.  such as John White,  S t i l l others  suggest  t h a t the i n i t i a t i o n o f students i n t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s i s u n d e s i r a b l e because i t l e a d s t o the s u p p r e s s i o n of lower s o c i o economic groups by the e s t a b l i s h e d o r d e r .  One n o t i c e s , however, a  common t h r e a d among most o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n s about what should be taught i n schools:  i t i s t h e b e l i e f t h a t course content s h o u l d be  w i t h s t u d e n t s ' b e s t i n t e r e s t s i n mind. of  determined  Hence, the whole e n t e r p r i s e  e d u c a t i o n may be viewed as p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n n a t u r e . Any  i n t e r f e r e n c e i n people's  needs t o be j u s t i f i e d .  Chapter  lives—paternalistic  or o t h e r w i s e —  one i s a b r i e f , s e l e c t e d survey o f  the l i t e r a t u r e f o r and a g a i n s t t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a l i b e r a l a r t s r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s .  Chapter  two i s an attempt to e s t a b l i s h  t i o n s under which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t 1  cur-  condi-  to non-interference  2  may  be o v e r r i d d e n .  I conclude i n c h a p t e r two  t h a t t h e r e are good  grounds f o r v i e w i n g many k i n d s of e d u c a t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n c h i l dren's  l i v e s as m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e — a r a t h e r u n i n t e r e s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n  i n i t s e l f , but a n e c e s s a r y p i e c e of groundwork i f we one has a prima  accept t h a t e v e r y -  f a c i e r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Because I am a d v o c a t i n g a compulsory l i b e r a l , a r t s c u r r i c u l u m from the p o i n t of view of s t u d e n t s ' b e s t i n t e r e s t s , our b e l i e f s , about what i t i s worthwhile is  f o r c h i l d r e n t o l e a r n must be examined.  the t a s k of chapter t h r e e .  There I suggest  t h a t i n the absence  of c o n c l u s i v e arguments t o show t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r p u r s u i t more worthwhile  than any o t h e r , people  ought to be allowed  p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g p o i n t of view) to be t h e i r own what i s worth p u r s u i n g and what i s n o t .  almost  simply (from the  f i n a l judges  of  Non-autonomous p e r s o n s , how-  e v e r , are not i n a v e r y good p o s i t i o n t o judge worth p u r s u i n g and what i s n o t .  This  f o r themselves  what i s  P e r s o n a l autonomy, I suggest, i s  always e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile  f o r everyone;  u n i v e r s a l i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . i n the Rawlsian  sense.  i.e., i t is a  In chapter f o u r I  argue t h a t a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m i s of major importance s t u d e n t s become autonomous persons, and  i n helping  i n chapter f i v e some p r a c t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s of the study are c o n s i d e r e d . I t should be made c l e a r t h a t I am not n e c e s s a r i l y  defending  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the l i v e s of c h i l d r e n f o r e d u c a t i o n a l purposes, such i n t e r v e n t i o n .  a l t h o u g h I t h i n k a good defence  can be made f o r  I n s t e a d , I am d e f e n d i n g the i m p o s i t i o n of  k i n d s of l e a r n i n g s ( f o r want of a b e t t e r term) on c h i l d r e n .  certain To  ask  3 whether t h e s t a t e has the r i g h t t o compel students to ask a q u e s t i o n about the source i s s u e I do n o t e x p l o r e . ulum i s intended  t o go t o s c h o o l i s  of the a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e , an  My j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c -  t o h o l d whether or n o t t h e s t a t e has v e r y much  a u t h o r i t y and whether o r n o t t h e r e i s a s t a t e a t a l l .  Even i f t h e r e  were no government as we know i t , we c o u l d propose components f o r a compulsory e d u c a t i o n a l c u r r i c u l u m t o guide whomever undertook the education Nor  of students. do I argue t h e case t h a t we a r e m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d t o educate  c h i l d r e n i n t h e way t h a t we a r e m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e d t o perform some  p a t e r n a l i s t i c a c t s f o r c h i l d r e n such as f e e d i n g , c l o t h i n g , and housing them.  But such a case c o u l d , I t h i n k , be argued s u c c e s s f u l l y . My arguments i n f a v o r of a compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s  a r e , o f course,  curriculum  prima f a c i e a r g u m e n t s — n o t c o n c l u s i v e ones.  The d i s -  t i n c t i o n between prima f a c i e argument and c o n c l u s i v e argument i s a d i s t i n c t i o n I borrow from B r i a n B a r r y  (1965, pp. 31-32).  Barry  says  t h a t an argument i n f a v o r of X i s not a c o n c l u s i v e one when i t c o u l d be o v e r r i d d e n by o t h e r more important occur  o n l y . i n abnormal c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) .  considerations  (which o r d i n a r i l y  Although i t can be o v e r -  r i d d e n , a prima f a c i e argument i s an argument t h a t p u r p o r t s  t o be,  under normal c o n d i t i o n s , the most important  argument.  and s i g n i f i c a n t  Although I am t r y i n g t o j u s t i f y a compulsory l i b e r a l a r t s educat i o n , i t should be p o i n t e d out t h a t compulsion does n o t imply cion.  Many classroom  on students without  teachers  r e g u l a r l y impose compulsory  ever r e s o r t i n g t o t h e use of c o e r c i v e  coer-  activities techniques  4  sueh as t h r e a t s , b r i b e s , and punishments. what c i r c u m s t a n c e s  To what e x t e n t and under  the use o f c o e r c i v e t e c h n i q u e s i s m o r a l l y  s i b l e i s a q u e s t i o n I s h a l l have t o l e a v e a s i d e .  permis-  I n o t h e r words, I  am not here concerned w i t h e x p l o r i n g e f f e c t i v e means f o r e n s u r i n g c u r r i c u l u m implementation,  but w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g , as f a r as p o s s i b l e ,  what ought to c o n s t i t u t e the content o f a; compulsory c u r r i c u l u m . In v a r i o u s p l a c e s throughout  the t h e s i s I r e f e r t o the j u s t i f i c a -  t i o n o f compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference.  I n chapter t h r e e I t r y t o j u s t i f y our a d o p t i o n  of p e r s o n a l autonomy as a p e r s o n a l i d e a l .  The concern of t h i s  thesis  i s n o t , of course, w i t h t h e meaning o f ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' but w i t h the t a s k o f j u s t i f y i n g — i . e . , w i t h f i n d i n g t h e a c t u a l reasons f o r t h e judgments and a c t i o n s w i t h which we a r e concerned.*  I t may be thought  t h a t t h e t a s k o f j u s t i f y i n g , as opposed t o t a l k i n g about the n o t i o n o f justification,  i s an u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t cannot be f r u i t f u l l y  u n t i l a l l c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n s have been c l e a r e d away. an extreme and, I t h i n k , untenable  position.  Although  conducted But t h i s i s  the b u s i n e s s  of c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s i s p r i o r t o the e n t e r p r i s e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the sense  t h a t we have a b e t t e r chance o f doing a good j o b of j u s t i -  f i c a t i o n a f t e r the r e l e v a n t c o n c e p t u a l problems have been c l e a r e d away, one who i s i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n need a n a l y z e o n l y those which a r e e s s e n t i a l t o making h i s case.  That  concepts  i s , he needs t o r e s o l v e  *For a u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f the meaning o f ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' see P a u l T a y l o r ' s Normative D i s c o u r s e , pp. 68-188.  5 only  those  ing  conceptual  an adequate Although  tifying value  confusions which  judgment,  judgment  consists  relatively  intuition state  and t a l k i n g  of h i s develop-  distinction  a b o u t what  of.  some c o n c e p t i o n  Consequently,  adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n are  the r a t h e r obvious  I am a w a r e t h a t one i s u n l i k e l y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n without tion  i n t h e way  justification. I emphasize  a value  stand  presented  counts  t h a t any r e s t r a i n t  t o develop  o f what a n a d e q u a t e  I have adopted  by Benn and P e t e r s .  stand  a  an adequate justifica-  the c r i t e r i a of These  criteria  the average  person's  as a good j u s t i f i c a t i o n . must  jus-  i t means t o j u s t i f y  n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l and a c c o r d w i t h  o f what  between  The  criteria  up t o o b j e c t i o n s o f t h e f o l l o w i n g  types: (i) (ii)  i n the case of a p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r a i n t , that t h e a c t i n q u e s t i o n i n f r i n g e s no r u l e ; i n t h e case o f a g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e s t r a i n t , by a rule, 1. 2. 3.  that the o b j e c t of the r u l e i s bad; t h a t w h i l e t h e o b j e c t o f t h e r u l e i s g o o d , t h e means proposed cannot r e a s o n a b l y be expected t o a t t a i n i t ; t h a t though t h e o b j e c t i s good, and t h e proposed means w o u l d s e c u r e i t , i t i s n o t o f s u f f i c i e n t importance t o warrant the degree of r e s t r a i n t proposed. (1959, p . 262)  As  Benn and P e t e r s p o i n t o u t , t h e s e  guides  f o r conduct.  details posed object very  In applying formal p r i n c i p l e s  must b e s u p p l i e d .  conduct,  are formal p r i n c i p l e s  the attendant  o f the proposed  The s u b s t a n t i v e d e t a i l s circumstances,  restraint.  We  shall  rather  the substantive include the pro-  and an e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e turn t o those  details  shortly. In  ontological  disputes there  than  i s a distinction  that  i s made  6 between q u e s t i o n s about what t h e r e i s and q u e s t i o n s about what a g i v e n statement although  or theory says t h e r e i s .  Quine p o i n t s out t h a t  i t i s l i t t l e wonder t h a t o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y s h o u l d  i n t o c o n t r o v e r s y over language (we withdraw to the s e m a n t i c a l  tend  plane  in  o r d e r to f i n d common ground on which to a r g u e ) , we must not jump  to  the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t what t h e r e i s depends on words. T r a n s l a t a b i l i t y of a q u e s t i o n i n t o s e m a n t i c a l i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the q u e s t i o n i s l i n g u i s t i c . i s to bear a name which, when p r e f i x e d to the Naples', y i e l d s a t r u e sentence;" s t i l l t h e r e l i n g u i s t i c about s e e i n g Naples.  He  says:  terms i s no To see Naples words 'sees i s nothing  (Quine,  1961,  p.  16)  Somewhat s i m i l a r l y , q u e s t i o n s about what we  ought t o t e a c h i n s c h o o l s  are not e s s e n t i a l l y l i n g u i s t i c q u e s t i o n s .  No  amount of a n a l y s i s of  the meanings of words w i l l r e l i e v e us of the burden of making  one  v a l u e judgment over another  thesis  is  i n the end.  not w i t h the meta-question  The  concern  of what i t means to make a v a l u e  ment but w i t h making and d e f e n d i n g  one.  judg-  T h i s i s not to suggest,  course, t h a t the reader w i l l f i n d no a n a l y s i s of key thesis.  of t h i s  concepts  of  i n the  A l e n g t h y a n a l y s i s of the n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l autonomy, f o r  example, forms a c e n t r a l p a r t of the t h e s i s on which the s u c c e s s  of  the l a r g e r work depends. The  t a s k of j u s t i f y i n g the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of a  liberal  a r t s c u r r i c u l u m on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds i s , I b e l i e v e , a v e r y important  one.  For one  t h i n g , the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of  paternalistic  i n t e r f e r e n c e has been a h i g h l y n e g l e c t e d a r e a i n p h i l o s o p h y . would t h i n k t h i s t o p i c should be of c e n t r a l concern of  One  to p h i l o s o p h e r s  e d u c a t i o n , y e t so f a r v e r y l i t t l e has been p u b l i s h e d on i t .  In  7  t h i s t h e s i s , an argument f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e based on f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s i s p r e s e n t e d . to f i l l  t h i s gap  I f i t i s s u c c e s s f u l i t may  i n the e d u c a t i o n a l  literature.  But  there  gaps which, i n the p r o c e s s of o f f e r i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t u d i e s , the t h e s i s h e l p s t o f i l l written one  analyzing  would t h i n k ,  education. is  ought to be  In the  presented.  of p e r s o n a l  other  liberal  Very l i t t l e has  been  autonomy—another t o p i c which,  of c e n t r a l concern to p h i l o s o p h e r s  thesis, a f a i r l y  help  d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of t h a t  of concept  In a d d i t i o n , some important arguments are brought  forward a g a i n s t re-enforce  the n o t i o n  as w e l l .  for  are  the  the view t h a t l i b e r a l s t u d i e s n e c e s s a r i l y i n t r o d u c e  b i a s because they are the t o o l s of the power e l i t e .  or  These  arguments are important because the view t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t ies it  are p o s s i b l e seems to be  in popularity  and  influence,  and  i s , I b e l i e v e , an i l l - f o u n d e d view. It  is  gaining  may  be h e l p f u l to the r e a d e r i f the argument of the  summarized i n advance.  That way,  the c e n t r a l p a r t s  can be kept i n f o c u s as the r e a d e r proceeds.  The  thesis  of the  argument has  thesis six  major p r e m i s e s : 1.  An i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be o v e r r i d d e n when the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s h o l d : (a) The i n d i v i d u a l consents to f o r f e i t h i s r i g h t and h i s consent i s not caused by the i n t e r f e r e n c e nor i s i t the r e s u l t of his b e i n g i r r a t i o n a l , i . e . , having d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s , i r r a t i o n a l compulsions and the l i k e . or There i s a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l would consent i n the f u t u r e i f he were r a t i o n a l and i n p o s s e s s i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n r e l e v a n t to j u s t i f y i n g the i n t e r f e r e n c e . (b) The i n t e r f e r e n c e promotes the good of the i n d i v i d u a l i n some way, t h i s good i s more s i g n i f i c a n t than the harm resulting from the i n t e r f e r e n c e , and the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y to or i s the best way of promoting the good.  8 (c)  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  The i n t e r f e r e n c e i s not m o r a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e on grounds o t h e r than i t s i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . Because the i m p o s i t i o n of a wide v a r i e t y of s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g l i b e r a l s t u d i e s ) c o u l d meet the c o n d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d i n (1) above, and s i n c e any c u r r i c u l u m can accommodate o n l y a l i m i t e d number of s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s , some c r i t e r i o n i s needed f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the most s i g n i f i c a n t goods t o be p r o moted f o r s t u d e n t s . The development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s the good to be promoted by c o m p e l l i n g s t u d e n t s t o study the l i b e r a l a r t s . It i s assumed t h a t such development i s s u f f i c i e n t l y v a l u a b l e t o outweigh any harm t h a t i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from c o m p e l l i n g s t u d e n t s to take l i b e r a l arts studies. (Freedom'of w i l l , r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , and s t r e n g t h o f w i l l a r e taken as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r s o n a l autonomy.) The development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s a more d e s i r a b l e or s i g n i f i c a n t e d u c a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e than any o t h e r t h a t might be secured by imposing o t h e r s o r t s of s t u d i e s . I t i s assumed t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e reason to b e l i e v e t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s excluded by the i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s are l o g i c a l l y or e m p i r i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y to the development of autonomy. A l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , when taken as a s e t of a t t a i n m e n t s , i s n e c e s s a r y t o the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy because i t i s n e c e s s a r y to the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , i . e . , i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o s e c u r e any s i g n i f i c a n t degree o f r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n without such a t t a i n m e n t s . A l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , when taken not as a s e t of a t t a i n m e n t s but as a s e t of courses of study (taught by whatever methods a r e deemed e f f e c t i v e and d e s i r a b l e ) , i s the b e s t way of a c h i e v i n g rational reflection. T h e r e f o r e , we a r e j u s t i f i e d  on students f o r t h e i r own  good.  i n imposing l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m  CHAPTER I  LIBERAL EDUCATION  The Hirst  boundaries  has suggested, whatever  a vocational not  of l i b e r a l  education,  a specialist  that  education  and t h a t  based  fairly  1975,  p. 3 0 ) .  else a liberal  i n any s e n s e .  there  education'  and s q u a r e l y I shall  argue l a t e r  imposition  shall  l a r g e l y on t h i s I wish  of mathematics, might  arts  arts  curriculum,  g i o u s knowledge t h a t important justify  issues  imposing  education (Hirst,  pick  Such a c u r r i c u l u m  f o rthe  on s t u d e n t s ,  includes  the study  t h e a r t s , h i s t o r y , and p h i l o s o p h y .  o r whether  ought  there  to receive  i s a necessary i s such a t h i n g  a t t e n t i o n as w e l l . before  a curriculum  consists  on s t u d e n t s  that  rather  I n so f a r as a t r a d i t i o n a l 9  but I  out the kind o f  b u t t h e y need n o t be r e s o l v e d  training.  negatively  of l i b e r a l  curriculum  h u m a n i t i e s , mathematics, and s c i e n c e ,  technical  however,  a justification  delineation to help  to j u s t i f y .  and  H i r s t ' s d e l i n e a t i o n of the  argue whether h i s t o r y , f o r example,  liberal  the  i s not e n t i r e l y  us w i t h  of a l i b e r a l  science,  education,  H i r s t argues,  that  b u t as  i s , i t i s not  on t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge i t s e l f  compulsory  curriculum  defined,  education  i s a p o s i t i v e concept  forms o f knowledge does n o t p r o v i d e  rely  are loosely  n o t an e x c l u s i v e l y s c i e n t i f i c  t h e meaning o f ' l i b e r a l  derived,  education  One  part  of a  as  reli-  These a r e  we  attempt t o l a r g e l y of  than v o c a t i o n a l or academic  curriculum  10 can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a v o c a t i o n a l or t e c h n i c a l c u r r i c u l u m , a fairly  loose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r a l  education  should n o t be  problematic. Neither  the i d e a t h a t a l i b e r a l  the mind n o r t h e i d e a t h a t a l i b e r a l for  a l l students  i s new.  education education  i n some way f r e e s should be compulsory  I n h i s R e p u b l i c P l a t o advocates the com-  p u l s o r y i m p o s i t i o n o f something l i k e  a liberal  All  s t u d e n t s , he b e l i e v e d , should be taught  and  drama ( h i g h l y censored  education  on s t u d e n t s .  reading, w r i t i n g , poetry  f o r younger s t u d e n t s ) , and gymnastics.  Students would then branch out, depending on t h e i r n a t u r a l to  abilities,  pursue the m i l i t a r y a r t o r t h e s c i e n c e s and d i a l e c t i c — t h e  for ally  a fundamental p r i n c i p l e t h a t e x p l a i n s a l l of- r e a l i t y .  search  Eventu-  each student would be sent i n t o t h e s t a t e to perform the f u n c -  t i o n s best s u i t e d to h i s a b i l i t i e s . fication  f o r h i s theory  and  epistemological  1.  He h o l d s  P l a t o has a t h r e e - p a r t  of e d u c a t i o n based on e t h i c a l ,  justi-  metaphysical,  concerns:  t h a t the j u s t s t a t e and the j u s t i n d i v i d u a l a r e good.  The  goodness of a member of a c l a s s i s t h e resemblance between i t  and  i t s form—i.e.,  The  Form o f human b e i n g s  i t s Idea which e x i s t s i n a s u p e r n a t u r a l  realm.  i s the p a t t e r n i n t o which the p a r t s of  the s o u l f a l l when each i s f u l l y developed.  The Form of the  s t a t e i s the p a t t e r n i n t o which t h e p a r t s of t h e s t a t e f a l l when each p a r t performs i t s proper  function.  I n so f a r as t h e i n d i -  v i d u a l comes t o resemble the Form of humanity he i s good and j u s t , and  i n so f a r as t h e s t a t e comes t o resemble t h e form of s t a t e s  11  it  i s good and j u s t as w e l l .  designed  P l a t o ' s e d u c a t i o n system was  t o a c h i e v e Goodness i n both the i n d i v i d u a l and t h e  State. 2.  P l a t o h e l d t h a t t o some e x t e n t no i n d i v i d u a l can h e l p b u t p o s s e s s the t h r e e a b i l i t i e s o f reason, a p p e t i t e , and s p i r i t , and no s t a t e can h e l p but perform  the t h r e e f u n c t i o n s of l e g i s l a t i o n ,  economic p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n , and law enforcement. These a b i l i t i e s and f u n c t i o n s , he b e l i e v e d , a r e r e q u i r e d by t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l Forms.  3.  Hence P l a t o has a m e t a p h y s i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n  for  the f a c t s about human n a t u r e and s o c i e t y upon which he r e s t s  his  e d u c a t i o n a l recommendations.  P l a t o h e l d t h a t we cannot  know t h e world of sense  experience;  we can know o n l y the Forms i n t h e i r l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s .  The  e n t i r e realm o f becoming i s a copy o f the s u p e r n a t u r a l realm o f the forms.  Thus the p u r s u i t o f knowledge i s not an i n f a l l i b l e  guide t o R e a l i t y , but i t i s b e t t e r than r e l y i n g on mere o p i n i o n , p r e j u d i c e , and s u p e r s t i t i o n . Although justified  t h i s b r i e f summary o f t h e grounds on which P l a t o  l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n h a r d l y does j u s t i c e t o h i s t h e o r y , few  would attempt  t o support a compulsory l i b e r a l  education f o r students  today w i t h d o c t r i n e s o f m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l R e a l i s m those of P l a t o .  When we say today  like  t h a t someone has a P l a t o n i c  n o t i o n of e d u c a t i o n we u s u a l l y mean e i t h e r than he has a p r e c o n c e i v e d n o t i o n o f the Good which a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of e d u c a t i o n h e l p s one t o o b t a i n , or t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e o f e d u c a t i o n ought t o be conducted by  12 h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s o r t i n g students i n t o appropriate s l o t s . In the f o u r t h c e n t u r y , S t . Augustine made another attempt  to j u s t i f y l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n .  Augustine  significant  proposed  universal  compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n a s . t h e means f o r a c h i e v i n g s a l v a t i o n i He i n c l u d e d the study of p h i l o s o p h y and  theology i n h i s curriculum  f o r o n l y the most r a t i o n a l s t u d e n t s — t h o s e d e s t i n e d f o r p o s i t i o n s i n the c h u r c h — b e c a u s e he h e l d t h a t the o n l y requirement i s true b e l i e f  for salvation  (not knowledge) about the n a t u r e and o r d e r of the  u n i v e r s e and about God's r e l a t i o n t o man.  Augustine b e l i e v e d t h a t  the l i b e r a l a r t s should be taught i n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e manner because t r u e b e l i e f can be most e f f i c i e n t l y a c h i e v e d through There have been many v a r i a t i o n s throughout  indoctrination.  the c e n t u r i e s on  the  C h r i s t i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d by  Augustine,  but s i g n i f i c a n t and i n t e r e s t i n g s e c u l a r attempts  compulsory  to j u s t i f y  l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n have not been advanced u n t i l modern t i m e s . these I s h a l l b r i e f l y d i s c u s s the p o s i t i o n s of P h i l i p Phenix o f Meaning (1964), P a u l H i r s t i n " L i b e r a l E d u c a t i o n and Knowledge" (1974, pp. the C u r r i c u l u m  (1976).  Of i n Realms  the Nature of  30-53), and Robin Barrow i n Common Sense and In r e s t r i c t i n g the d i s c u s s i o n to the works  of p h i l o s o p h e r s , I s h a l l not d i s c u s s such w e l l known defenses l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n as the Harvard  Committee Report:  i n a Free S o c i e t y (1946), but t h i s i s not t o suggest  of  General. E d u c a t i o n t h a t no v a l u a b l e  i n s i g h t s are c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t r e p o r t o r o t h e r s l i k e i t . P h i l i p Phenix  argues  that there  is  a f i n i t e number of ways i n  which human b e i n g s order t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s i n the w o r l d .  He  says  the  d i s t i n c t realms through which e x p e r i e n c e becomes m e a n i n g f u l a r e symbolics,  empirics,  e s t h e t i c s , synnoetics  e t h i c s , and s y n o p t i c s . Symbolics and s y n o p t i c s  (personal  knowledge),  Each realm has i t s own s u b d i v i s i o n s . are subdivided ^/Ordinary  Symbolics "~  as f o l l o w s :  language  Mathematics >Nondiscursive symbolic forms ( s i g n a l s , b o d i l y g e s t u r e s , r i t u a l , dreams, e t c . )  .History  Philosophy I t i s Phenix's p o s i t i o n , v e r y be  initiated  roughly,  t h a t c h i l d r e n ought t o  i n t o a l l s i x realms f o r the simple reason that human  e x p e r i e n c e becomes m e a n i n g f u l through these and o n l y tives.  these p e r s p e c -  I t i s d e s i r a b l e , h o l d s Phenix, t h a t human e x p e r i e n c e be  meaningful, i . e . , that d e s t r u c t i v e skepticism, a l i e n a t i o n are counteracted.  d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n , and  The way t o a c h i e v e t h i s aim, suppos-  e d l y , i s by i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the s i x b a s i c realms of meaning.  Phenix's  p o s i t i o n i s i n t e r e s t i n g and worthy o f a t t e n t i o n , but we s h a l l have t o r e j e c t i t as a guide f o r p i c k i n g out c u r r i c u l a r components f o r a t l e a s t three 1.  reasons:  I t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t Phenix i s c o r r e c t i n h i s c l a i m t h a t are s i x and o n l y s i x realms o f meaning and t h a t t h e i r  there  differences  have been a r t i c u l a t e d c o r r e c t l y . 2.  Even i f t h e r e were o n l y s i x realms o f meaning, what r e a s o n  could  14 t h e r e be f o r imposing a l l s i x realms on students? student  l e a r n to order h i s experience  Why  must every  i n a l l s i x ways?  Phenix  does not r e a l l y o f f e r us an answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n .  Initiation  i n t o t h e realms of meaning i s , f o r Phenix, more l i k e an t i o n e d s t a r t i n g p o i n t than a n y t h i n g 3.  unques-  else.  Phenix seems t o assume t h a t i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the realms of meaning i s the s o l u t i o n — o r at l e a s t a major p a r t o f the s o l u t i o n — t o the problems of d e s t r u c t i v e s k e p t i c i s m , d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n , and logical alienation.  T h i s i s , I t h i n k , an u n t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n .  The c l a i m t h a t one's mental h e a l t h improves i n d i r e c t  proportion  to one's a c q u i s i t i o n o f knowledge i s , t o say the l e a s t , a rash.'  psycho-  E i t h e r i t i s a questionable  little  e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n or  i t presupposes a n o t i o n of mental h e a l t h we need not  accept.  S i m i l a r i n many ways to Phenix's c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of realms of meaning i s H i r s t ' s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of forms of knowledge.  Hirst  argued t h a t a l l the knowledge we have can be broken up i n t o distinct  categories:  mathematics,  a e s t h e t i c s , p e r s o n a l knowledge, history—although  science  has  logically  (physical science),  morality, r e l i g i o n , philosophy,  h i s t o r y i s d e l e t e d from H i r s t ' s l a t e r ( 1 9 7 4 )  and  account.  H i r s t o f f e r s f o u r n e c e s s a r y and j o i n t l y s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a form of  knowledge:  1.  Each form of knowledge must have i t s own p e c u l i a r c o n c e p t s .  2.  Each form must have a d i s t i n c t  3.  The statements of each form must be t e s t a b l e i n some d i s t i n c t against  4.  logical structure.  experience.  Each form develops i t s own  p a r t i c u l a r techniques  f o r exploring  way  15  e x p e r i e n c e and t e s t i n g the t r u t h of i t s statements. P a r a l l e l t o Phenix's view t h a t i n i t i a t i o n i n t o t h e realms o f meaning enables t h e student t o get "meaning" from e x p e r i e n c e i n a l l p o s s i b l e ways, we have H i r s t ' s view that t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f knowledge i s the development o f mind i t s e l f . in a different  The same p o i n t i s made, I t h i n k ,  context by J . F. Bennett when he says " . . . a person's  r e a l i t y i s l a r g e l y an e p i s t e m i c m a t t e r — h o w much t h e r e i s of him i s l a r g e l y t o be measured by how much he knows. . . . " (Bennett, 1975, p. 18).  I t c o u l d be argued t h a t i n so f a r as we v a l u e t h e d e v e l o p -  ment o f mind we w i l l v a l u e i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the l o g i c a l l y forms of knowledge.  distinct  Who c o u l d be opposed t o t h e development o f mind?  O b j e c t i o n s a r i s e , however, s i m i l a r t o those we made i n c o n s i d e r i n g Phenix's realms o f meaning: 1.  I t i s simply not c l e a r t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y seven ( o r e i g h t ) logically distinct  forms o f knowledge, n o r i s i t c l e a r t h a t i f  there are d i s t i n c t  forms o f knowledge they a r e i n f a c t t h e ones  t h a t H i r s t p i c k s out.  F o r example, many p e o p l e t h i n k t h e r e i s  no such t h i n g as r e l i g i o u s knowledge. be f o r i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o n i n the l i s t dental meditation?  What grounds c o u l d  there  but n o t , say, t r a n s c e n -  I am n o t , of c o u r s e , t r y i n g t o c l a i m  that  H i r s t i s . w r o n g — o n l y t h a t he has n o t made h i s case, though s i n c e we a r e s e a r c h i n g f o r good grounds on which t o base a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n , i t can r e a l l y make no d i f f e r e n c e t o us whether H i r s t i s wrong o r whether he i s r i g h t but simply has not made h i s case.  16  E i t h e r way, 2.  we  are w i t h o u t  good'grounds on H i r s t ' s  account.*  Even i f we were to accept H i r s t ' s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n as we  might q u e s t i o n why  we  the forms of knowledge.  legitimate,  should i n i t i a t e every student i n t o a l l Are t h e r e not some a s p e c t s of the mind  we would want to develop more than o t h e r s ?  I f so, then we  need  some c r i t e r i o n f o r d e t e r m i n i n g which forms of knowledge are more important to  than o t h e r s .  The  t a s k of chapter t h r e e i s , i n e f f e c t ,  i s o l a t e t h a t c r i t e r i o n , but r a t h e r than approach t h a t t a s k as  an upshot  of the l i m i t a t i o n s of H i r s t ' s p o s i t i o n , I approach i t  l a t e r from an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t Robin Barrow suggests u t i l i t a r i a n basis.  t h a t we  angle. p i c k out e u r r i c u l a r content on a  An a c t i v i t y , a p u r s u i t , or a way  of l i f e i s d e s i r -  a b l e , says Barrow, i n so f a r as i t promotes p l e a s u r e and pain.  "But,  s t a t e s , "we  minimizes  i n a s s e s s i n g the degree of p l e a s u r e promoted," he  have to take account  of the e x t e n t , i n t e n s i t y , d u r a t i o n  and f e c u n d i t y of p l e a s u r e " (Barrow, 1976,  p. 92).  The  utilitarian  h y p o t h e s i s , he says, f i t s not o n l y the f a c t s of our e x p e r i e n c e a l s o our l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s .  Barrow uses the  but  maximization-of-  p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e to p i c k out compulsory e u r r i c u l a r components not unlike t r a d i t i o n a l school c u r r i c u l a . falls  The  c u r r i c u l u m he  proposes  into four stages:  The primary stage i n v o l v e s h e a l t h t r a i n i n g , moral t r a i n i n g , and the development of numeracy and l i t e r a c y . The secondary stage i n v o l v e s i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , mathem a t i c s , the f i n e a r t s , h i s t o r y , l i t e r a t u r e and r e l i g i o n . The  *For f u r t h e r c r i t i c i s m s of H i r s t ' s views see E l i z a b e t h "Forms of Knowledge," 1972.  Hindness,  t e r t i a r y stage i n v o l v e s the c o n t i n u e d study of h i s t o r y and l i t e r a t u r e and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of v o c a t i o n a l and s o c i a l s t u d i e s — a l l as compulsory elements. In a d d i t i o n i t i s at t h i s stage t h a t a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , such as c l a s s i c s , cookery, c a r p e n t r y , modern languages and the c o n t i n u e d study of such t h i n g s as mathematics, the f i n e a r t s and the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , are made a v a i l a b l e . The quaternary stage adds p h i l o s o p h y as a compulsory study t o the c o n t i n u i n g programme of the t e r t i a r y s t a g e . (Barrow, 1976, We  p.  107)  need not l o o k at the d e t a i l s of the compulsory c u r r i c u l u m Barrow  proposes because t h e r e are at l e a s t two p r i n c i p l e i s unacceptable content.  The  first  reasons why  the p l e a s u r e  as a b a s i s f o r p r e s c r i b i n g c u r r i c u l u m  i s t h a t even i f we  d i d accept  of p l e a s u r e as our u l t i m a t e v a l u e i t i s a d i f f i c u l t  the  maximization  (perhaps  impos-  s i b l e ) e m p i r i c a l problem to a s c e r t a i n what t h i n g s should be  taught  i n s c h o o l s i n o r d e r . t o maximize the p l e a s u r e and minimize the p a i n i n people's ways.  lives.  That  D i f f e r e n t people  difficulty,  obtain pleasure i n d i f f e r e n t  though, does not i n i t s e l f amount to a v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l o b j e c t i o n to the u t i l i t a r i a n t h e s i s because whatever b a s i s our c h o i c e s might have we i c a l questions. is  that u t i l i t y  The  as such.  s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n to the u t i l i t a r i a n  do not n e c e s s a r i l y agree t h a t we  I f we  the maximization  to f a c e d i f f i c u l t  r e a l l y v a l u e d a way  of l i f e  thesis high-  ought t o a c c e p t  t h a t i s conducive  to  of p l e a s u r e above a l l e l s e then we would have no  o b j e c t i o n to a Brave-New-WorId k i n d of e x i s t e n c e . have profound  empir-  (happiness, p l e a s u r e , e t c . ) i s not always our  e s t v a l u e , and we it  can expect  o b j e c t i o n s to Brave New  t h a t t h e r e are some t h i n g s we  But  i n fact  World f o r the simple  v a l u e above and beyond the  we  reason  maximization  of p l e a s u r e — o u r p e r s o n a l autonomy, f o r example, about which I s h a l l  18  have more to say l a t e r . for  So we must r e j e c t  d e t e r m i n i n g c u r r i c u l u m content and  the u t i l i t a r i a n  l o o k f o r a more a c c e p t a b l e  B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g w i t h t h a t t a s k we  s h o u l d , perhaps,  b r i e f l y at some of the arguments adduced by those who sory l i b e r a l education.  criterion  look  oppose compul-  H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e r e have been a number of  p h i l o s o p h e r s — ' L o c k e and Dewey, f o r example—who have opposed versal,  one.  compulsory, l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n .  There i s , however,  unilittle  p o i n t i n our t r y i n g t o d i s c u s s a l l p o s i t i o n s opposed t o compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n , so we w i l l r e s t r i c t contemporary One  o u r s e l v e s to two  influential  views.  such view i s t h a t course content s h o u l d depend l a r g e l y  student i n t e r e s t .  L e t t i n g the c u r r i c u l u m be determined  by  student  i n t e r e s t i s sometimes c o n s i d e r e d the p r o g r e s s i v e t h i n g to do. l e a s t two  responses  can be made t o t h i s c l a i m .  born w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r p a r c e l of i n t e r e s t s . r e s u l t of the k i n d s of e x p e r i e n c e s we  I n t e r e s t s a r i s e as a  have i n l i f e .  The  up i n a home where beer and  l a t t e r c h i l d may  A child  by books and  u l a t i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n , w i l l p r o b a b l y have r a d i c a l l y  stimulation.  At  F i r s t , no one i s  up w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a c t i v e people, surrounded  from a c h i l d brought  on  different  brought stiminterests  s k i t t l e s p r o v i d e the  not be i n t e r e s t e d i n the most  c r e a t i v e achievements i n a r t , music, l i t e r a t u r e , mathematics, s c i e n c e , and p h i l o s o p h y , but can't we  as educators  didn't before exist?  a l l o w the c u r r i c u l u m t o be determined  pupil interest  I f we  c r e a t e i n t e r e s t s where they by  a l o n e , what chance does a c h i l d have of ever coming to  know the r i c h n e s s of i n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t s i f he has not a l r e a d y been  19 somehow i n t l a t e d them, a c h i l d I  am  s u r e we  should  we  outside  chooses h a v e no  not  at  the  school?  to r e j e c t right  least  to  own  aware o f  sake? the  Peters that  the  One  physics,  and  so  because proper world  forth,  do  the various  has  forms of  might  not  academic  a r e not  school.  This  these As  The  evant,  they  teach.  p e r h a p s we  to decide  about  not  Rather ought  l a c k of  for  to pursue  for is  to  t o a l l our us  about  has  attempts  are not  the world,  initiated  to  the  surprising,  to  look at  initiated one  any  sees  to  life,  f o r many c l a s s r o o m into  than  condemn a c a d e m i c  s u b j e c t s as  look  seriously  i l l effects  at  the  into  i n ordin-  on  how  conclusion  subjects  initiated  the  students  effect  proper  academic  superficially  acad-  world  initiate  irrelevant  into  of  lives  the  been  having  then  curriculum i s  philosophy,  subjects helps  m o r e one  81-107)  understanding  literature,  subjects are  be  arts  t h e more s i g n i f i c a n c e  themselves have been o n l y v e r y jects  but  ( 1 9 7 3 , pp.  a liberal  one's b e l i e f s  thought  adequately  should  that  I f present  feel  students  into  thought,  t h i n k or that  him;  o p p o r t u n i t y u n l e s s he  enormous r e l e v a n c e  light.  students be  on  opportunity  an  know  intellectual pursuits,  Initiation"  of h i s t o r y ,  events.  traditional  come t o  eventually like  shows a  one's f e e l i n g s .  o b j e c t s and  into  lives,  initiation  forms of  as  complaint  study  in a different  change so  ary  The  has  preferences  have such  i n "Education  to students'  emic s u b j e c t s .  they would  he  options.  commonly h e a r d  irrelevant  f o r c e our  does not  available argues  a e s t h e t i c and  give-.-children the  themselves which a c t i v i t i e s their  If, after  but  that  at teachers the  sub-  irrelof  the  20  b l i n d l e a d i n g the  blind.  A second view a r i s e s from a growing s c h o o l of thought t h a t argues against l i b e r a l education  from a M a r x i s t p e r s p e c t i v e .  such people as M i c h a e l Apple, W a l t e r F e i n b e r g ,  It includes  and M i c h a e l  sometimes r e f e r r e d to as s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge.  Young—  T h e i r main  line  of argument seems to r e s t on the view t h a t because a l l knowledge i s man-made, not  only i s t h e r e n o t h i n g  s a c r e d about i n i t i a t i n g  i n t o t r a d i t i o n a l forms of knowledge, but  students  a l s o i t i s downright o p p r e s -  sive. One  of M i c h a e l Apple's concerns i s the problem of the h i d d e n  curriculum—especially  the s u b t l e and  s u b v e r s i v e ways i n which i t  c o n t r i b u t e s to the maintenance of the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r . b a s i c c l a i m i n "What Do  Schools  Teach?" (1977) i s t h a t the type  knowledge s e l e c t e d f o r the c u r r i c u l u m and  t r a n s m i t t e d through  h i d d e n c u r r i c u l u m i s c o n s e r v a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r and perpetuation life.  He  of the s t a t u s quo  His  in political,  quotes M i c h a e l Young who  of  the  c o n t r i b u t e s to  s o c i a l , and  economic  says t h e r e i s a  . . . d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between access to power and the o p p o r t u n i t y to l e g i t i m i z e c e r t a i n dominant c a t e g o r i e s and the process by which the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such c a t e g o r i e s to some groups enables them to a s s e r t power and c o n t r o l over o t h e r s . (Apple, 1977, p. 30) Apple adds: In advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , s c h o o l s become p a r t i c u l a r l y important as d i s t r i b u t o r s of t h i s c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l and p l a y a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n g i v i n g l e g i t i m a c y t o c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s and forms of knowledge. (Loc. c i t . )  the  21 Young speaks of 'dominant c a t e g o r i e s ' and Apple speaks of both ' c a t e g o r i e s ' and 'forms o f knowledge'.  The n o t i o n o f c a t e g o r y i s  v e r y obscure so I s h a l l have t o i g n o r e i t c o m p l e t e l y .  But t h e r e i s  not the same d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the n o t i o n of forms of knowledge. it  i s c l e a r t h a t P a u l H i r s t ' s forms of knowledge  (religion,  Here  philosophy,  l o g i c , p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e , a e s t h e t i c s , h i s t o r y , knowledge of o t h e r or something l i k e them a r e i m p l i e d .  minds)  In the a r t i c l e from which Apple  quotes Young above, Young speaks d i r e c t l y of P a u l H i r s t ' s forms of knowledge.  He says t h a t c r i t i q u e s of p h i l o s o p h e r s of e d u c a t i o n  start  from . . . c e r t a i n a p r i o r i assumptions about the o r g a n i z a t i o n (or forms) of knowledge . . . t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s f o c u s e i t h e r on new t o p i c - b a s e d s y l l a b i which n e g l e c t these 'forms of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' , or on new c u r r i c u l a f o r the s o - c a l l e d ' l e s s a b l e ' or 'Newsom c h i l d ' which they argue a r e c o n s c i o u s l y r e s t r i c t i n g them from a c c e s s to those forms of u n d e r s t a n d i n g which i n the p h i l osopher's sense a r e ' e d u c a t i o n ' . The problem w i t h t h i s k i n d of c r i t i q u e i s t h a t i t appears t o be based on an a b s o l u t i s t concept i o n of a s e t o f d i s t i n c t forms of knowledge which correspond c l o s e l y t o the t r a d i t i o n a l areas of the academic c u r r i c u l u m and thus j u s t i f y , r a t h e r than examine, what a r e no more than the s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t r u c t s of a p a r t i c u l a r time. It i s important t o s t r e s s t h a t i t i s not ' s u b j e c t s ' which H i r s t r e c o g n i z e s as the s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d ways t h a t t e a c h e r s o r g a n i z e knowledge, but forms of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t i t i s claimed a r e ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' d i s t i n c t . The p o i n t I wish t o make here i s t h a t u n l e s s such n e c e s s a r y d i s t i n c t i o n s or i n t r i n s i c l o g i c s a r e t r e a t e d as p r o b l e m a t i c , p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m cannot examine the assumptions of academic c u r r i c u l a . (Young, 1977, p. 23) The t r o u b l e i s t h a t Young does not t e l l us i n what way c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of the forms of knowledge atic.  Hirst's  should be t r e a t e d as problem-  Does he mean t h a t because the forms of knowledge a r e s o c i o -  h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t r u c t s they a r e somehow l a c k i n g i n v a l i d i t y ?  Why  does he lament the f a c t t h a t we i n t e r p r e t our e x p e r i e n c e through t h e  use  of such c o n s t r u c t s ?  of h i s t o r y ( i . e . ,  Since n e a r l y a l l our concepts have some s o r t  some time and p l a c e i n which the c o n c e p t u a l  distinc-  t i o n was f i r s t made as w e l l as changes i n concepts through time) then our  conceptual  structs.  d i s t i n c t i o n s are n e c e s s a r i l y s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l  con-  We might ask Young how e l s e we a r e t o i n t e r p r e t our e x p e r i -  ence i f n o t through s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l A l s o i n the excerpt  constructs.  above, Young accuses H i r s t and o t h e r s o f  h a v i n g an " a b s o l u t i s t c o n c e p t i o n "  of the d i s t i n c t  forms o f knowledge.  He p r o b a b l y means t h a t H i r s t has some m e t a p h y s i c a l view of t h e forms of knowledge as p a r a l l e l s t o some k i n d o f e x t e r n a l Lockean world'.  I f so, h i s a c c u s a t i o n  'real  i s i l l founded, as H i r s t makes c l e a r  i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge and t h e development of mind.  H i r s t says t h a t t o a c q u i r e knowledge i s t o come t o have a  mind, and t h a t t h e mind i s not "an e n t i t y which s u i t a b l y d i r e c t e d by knowledge comes t o take on the p a t t e r n o f , i s conformed t o , some external r e a l i t y " adds:  (1974, p. 4 1 ) .  " I t i s however no l o n g e r  In discussing l i b e r a l  education  supported by e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  he  and meta-  p h y s i c a l doctrines that r e s u l t i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the various  forms of knowledge" (1974, p. 41).  It i s possible  that  Apple and Young have i n c o r r e c t l y i n f e r r e d from t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e forms of knowledge have n o t h i n g  t o do w i t h some k i n d o f r e a l world  beyond t h e w o r l d of t h e senses, t h a t t h e forms of knowledge  therefore  c o n s t i t u t e an a r b i t r a r y c a t e g o r i z a t i o n scheme which we ought t o change, so t h a t people whose e x p e r i e n c e s a r e not made i n t e l l i g i b l e by reference  to the c r i t e r i a  f o r t r u t h inherent  i n each.of the  traditional status, But  forms  o f knowledge w i l l  any q u e s t i o n  about whether  c a n n o t do s o .  traditional the  we  ogists  o f mind"  cannot—on  i s foolish t h e grounds  gation  that  we  ought ones,  history,  say, constitutes  forms  no  a l t e r n a t i v e to the t r a d i t i o n a l c l e a r what A p p l e means b y  clearly main  does  n o t mean f o r m s  c a n d i d a t e he o f f e r s  realistic At  approach  t h i s point  i f sociolof some  knowlobliargue  knowledge, of basic  A p p l e makes a f e w s t a b s  o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t he o f f e r s  forms  'forms  of  a categorization  o f knowledge f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e forms  form  i snot  science,  A l t h o u g h we m i g h t  a fundamental  in  not  history,  This  then they a r e under  s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge has produced  that the  they are the  t o l e g i t i m i z e forms  to offer candidates f o r this role.  whether  t o man,  e t c . , h a v e no m i n d , b u t i t i s t o s u g g e s t t h a t  o f knowledge h o l d  i f i n fact  a r t i c u l a t i o n s whereby  ( H i r s t , 1974, p. 4 1 ) .  p e r s o n s who h a v e n o t s t u d i e d  edge o t h e r t h a n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l  "a  ones  o f knowledge a r e " t h e b a s i c  achievements  suggest that  philosophy,  no  we  schemes.  t o l e g i t i m i z e o t h e r forms o f  the t r a d i t i o n a l  And I b e l i e v e  forms  ought  w h o l e o f e x p e r i e n c e h a s become i n t e l l i g i b l e  fundamental to  share of wealth,  and power, by l e g i t i m i z i n g o t h e r c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  knowledge and d e l e g i t i m i z e we  get t h e i r f a i r  o f knowledge.  Again, i t i s  o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' , but he  o f knowledge  i n Hirst's  sense because t h e  f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e form of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s  to the nature of c o n f l i c t "  i t might  the  scene so f a r .  Plato  and  a justification  for i t .  be u s e f u l  (1975,  t o summarize  p. 1 1 5 ) .  the s e t t i n g of  had b o t h a c o n c e p t i o n o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n His justification  i s i n a d e q u a t e as i s  24 t h a t of h i s d i s c i p l e , Augustine.  Contemporary w r i t e r s l i k e H i r s t and  P h e n i x — w h e n p u s h e d — r e a l l y have no j u s t i f i c a t i o n a t a l l :  they t r y t o  make t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge do the j o b f o r which a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s needed.  Barrow o f f e r s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , but i t i s a j u s t i -  f i c a t i o n we cannot a c c e p t . of  A c u r s o r y l o o k a t contemporary  l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t opponents have no coherent and  convincing j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r their p o s i t i o n either. to  critiques  impose l i b e r a l s t u d i e s on s t u d e n t s  I f we a r e going  i n s c h o o l s , however, then we  ought t o have an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r doing so. a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h e t a s k t h i s t h e s i s i s designed Any  Providing  such  t o do.  j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r compulsory e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d , I t h i n k ,  s t a r t by j u s t i f y i n g t h e o v e r r i d i n g o f a person's interference.  r i g h t t o non-  The i m p o s i t i o n o f compulsory l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n  v i o l a t e s t h a t r i g h t , and u n l e s s our reasons  clearly  f o r v i o l a t i n g i t are  a c c e p t a b l e t h e r e i s no p o i n t i n d i s c u s s i n g what form our i n t e r f e r e n c e should take.  But t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m has  not been completed simply by showing' t h a t i t . i s m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e . Many k i n d s o f i n t e r f e r e n c e i n c h i l d r e n ' s l i v e s a r e m o r a l l y s i b l e t h a t have l i t t l e  o r no e d u c a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , e.g., making a  c h i l d brush h i s t e e t h b e f o r e he goes t o bed.  What we need t o s o r t  out a r e those k i n d s o f i n t e r f e r e n c e s t h a t a r e p r i o r i t i e s tional  purposes.  permis-  f o r educa-  CHAPTER I I  NON-INTERFERENCE  The  purpose o f chapter  two i s t o f i n d good grounds f o r t h e r i g h t  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e , and t o suggest  c o n d i t i o n s under which the r i g h t  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e may be o v e r r i d d e n .  The p o i n t s I s h a l l make a r e  about prima f a c i e r i g h t s o n l y and n o t about a c t u a l r i g h t s .  1.  The Right t o N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e We should keep i n mind t h a t t h e r e a r e two ways o f t a k i n g t h e  expression  'X has a r i g h t t o Y" .  the e x p r e s s i o n  One t h i n g t h a t might be meant by  'X has a r i g h t t o Y' i s t h a t as a matter o f f a c t  there  i s some e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e whereby X i s guaranteed some e n t i t l e m e n t to Y.  I f you make a term d e p o s i t of $1000 a t a bank t h a t pays a  simple r a t e of i n t e r e s t o f n i n e p e r cent per annum, then the bank guarantees t h a t i t w i l l pay you $90 p e r annum f o r i n v e s t i n g your money t h e r e . $1000.  You a r e e n t i t l e d  t o $90 f o r l e t t i n g the bank use your  I n other words you have a r i g h t t o $90.  On t h i s  conception  of r i g h t s , t o say t h a t X has a r i g h t t o Y i s t o make an e a s i l y f i a b l e empirical claim.  veri-  E i t h e r t h e r e i s o r t h e r e i s not some  e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e whereby X i s guaranteed Y.  But we a r e not always  t a l k i n g about e s t a b l i s h e d guarantees when we t a l k about r i g h t s .  If  we say X has the r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t we a r e not n e c e s s a r ily  saying anything  about e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e s whereby X i s i n f a c t  25  26 guaranteed of treatment w i t h r e s p e c t .  The c l a i m  'X has the r i g h t t o  be t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t ' i s q u i t e compatible w i t h a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n which X i s v e r y seldom t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t . because  Such a c l a i m ,  i t need not have a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h what i s i n f a c t t h e c a s e ,  i s making some s o r t of statement about what ought On t h i s account, t h e statement  t o be the case.  'X has the r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d w i t h  r e s p e c t ' means the same as 'X ought  t o be t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t ' o r  'We s h o u l d have some e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e whereby X i s i n f a c t with respect'.  treated  Although I am not c e r t a i n t h a t t h e l i m i t s o f what we  can s e n s i b l y mean by 'X has a r i g h t t o Y  1  a r e exhausted by the two  accounts I have g i v e n , I b e l i e v e t h a t they a r e . n a t u r a l r i g h t s may suggest a t h i r d  Believers i n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but s i n c e c l a i m s  about n a t u r a l r i g h t s need t o be cashed out i n terms of what ought t o be the case i n t h e w o r l d , t h e r e i s no need rights.  f o r us t o c o n s i d e r n a t u r a l  On the account I am o f f e r i n g , , an o r d i n a r y c l a i m about  such as 'X has t h e r i g h t  rights  t o a guaranteed annual income', f o r example,  can be taken i n e i t h e r o f two ways:  as a c l a i m about what i n p r a c t i c e  X i s guaranteed t o have or as a p r e s c r i p t i o n about what X i n p r a c t i c e ought  t o be guaranteed. What then a r e we t o make o f the meaning of the c l a i m t h a t  have the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e ? of  people  We might mean t h a t , as a matter  f a c t , t h e r e i s some guarantee t h a t p e o p l e w i l l not be i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h under normal c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t t h e r e i s some s o r t of guarantee t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s f r e e c h o i c e s w i l l be r e s p e c t e d — o r we might mean t h a t t h e r e ought  t o be a guarantee t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e ' s c h o i c e s w i l l  27 not be f o r c e d upon us w i t h o u t good r e a s o n .  I n e i t h e r case we can  ask whether t h e p r a c t i c e o f g u a r a n t e e i n g n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e t o p e o p l e i s a good i d e a , and whether everyone ought  t o be a f f o r d e d t h i s  right.  I t c o u l d be suggested t h a t p e o p l e possess t h e r i g h t t o noni n t e r f e r e n c e o n l y i n so f a r as they a r e r a t i o n a l . t i o n i s p r o b a b l y untenable on t h e grounds  But t h i s  sugges-  t h a t we would, I t h i n k ,  r e g a r d i t as wrong t o d e p r i v e even madmen o f d o i n g what they want t o do u n l e s s we have an a c c e p t a b l e reason f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h them. How then can we determine who has the r i g h t who has not? beings?  t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e and  Do a l l human b e i n g s have t h i s r i g h t ?  Or a l l s e n t i e n t  M i c h a e l T o o l e y o f f e r s us a t h e o r y o f r i g h t s which, i f we  accept i t ,  p r o v i d e s grounds  among o t h e r s , have no r i g h t have such a r i g h t .  f o r t h e view t h a t v e r y young b a b i e s , t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e w h i l e p o l a r bears do  P r o f e s s o r T o o l e y o f f e r s us an account o f what  c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n o f A's r i g h t t o X. note i s t h a t u n l e s s something  An important p o i n t t o  c o u l d count as a v i o l a t i o n o f A's r i g h t  to X, i t would make no sense t o say t h a t A has a r i g h t  t o X.  Tooley  c l a i m s t h a t an a c t i o n can c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of A's r i g h t a t time T t h a t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s S o b t a i n at time T* i f and o n l y i f one o f the following conditions 1.  2.  obtains:  The a c t i o n i s performed a t time T, i t p r e v e n t s s t a t e of a f f a i r s S from e x i s t i n g a t time T*, and i n d i v i d u a l A d e s i r e s at time T t h a t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s S o b t a i n a t time T*; The a c t i o n i s performed a t some time T , i t p r e v e n t s s t a t e of a f f a i r s S from e x i s t i n g at time T*, and a l t h o u g h i n d i v i d u a l A i s i n c a p a b l e o f d e s i r i n g a t time T e i t h e r t h a t S o b t a i n o r t h a t S n o t o b t a i n a t time T*, A d i d d e s i r e a t time T t h a t S o b t a i n a t time T*, where T i s t h e moment of time immediately p r e c e d i n g the time i n t e r v a l i n which A i s i n c a p a b l e of d e s i r i n g e i t h e r t h a t S e x i s t or t h a t S n o t e x i s t a t time T*. (Time T* may be e i t h e r simultaneous w i t h 1  1  28'  T, or l a t e r than T ) . . . The a c t i o n i s performed a t some time T and p r e v e n t s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s S from o b t a i n i n g a t time T*, and a l t h o u g h i n d i v i d u a l A does n o t d e s i r e a t time T t h a t S o b t a i n a t time T*, e i t h e r because A i s i n c a p a b l e of h a v i n g t h e d e s i r e a t t h a t time, o r because t h e r e i s some r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t A does not possess a t t h a t time, t h e r e i s some l a t e r time T at which A w i l l e x i s t and a t which he w i l l d e s i r e t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s S e x i s t a t time T* . . . . . . The e s s e n t i a l i d e a [ o f c o n d i t i o n 4] . . . i s simply t h a t a c t i o n s t o which an i n d i v i d u a l does not o b j e c t — e i t h e r because he i s i n c a p a b l e of d e s i r i n g a t the time t h a t they not o c c u r , or because he l a c k s r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , or because h i s d e s i r e s have been 'warped' by p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r p h y s i o l o g i c a l factors—-may n e v e r t h e l e s s v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t s i f t h e r e i s some time a t which he i s or w i l l be c a p a b l e of w i s h i n g t h a t t h e a c t i o n had not been performed, and a t which he would so w i s h i f he had a l l the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n and had n o t been s u b j e c t e d t o i n f l u e n c e s t h a t d i s t o r t e d h i s preferences.  3.  1  1  4.  (Correspondence, 1973, pp. 420-424) Condition j e c t ' s present subject's  one above covers cases t h a t a r e determined by a subdesires.  Condition  past d e s i r e s , such as cases i n v o l v i n g the r i g h t s o f persons  who a r e dead or u n c o n s c i o u s . depend on a s u b j e c t ' s of f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s . subject's e.g.,  two covers cases t h a t depend on a  Condition  three  covers cases t h a t  f u t u r e d e s i r e s , e.g., cases i n v o l v i n g the r i g h t s Condition  f o u r a p p l i e s to cases i n which a  r i g h t s a r e v i o l a t e d because of c e r t a i n p o t e n t i a l d e s i r e s ,  cases o f v i o l a t i o n of t h e r i g h t s of s l a v e s who have been  t i o n e d i n some way o r another t o condone d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t  condithem-  selves . I f T o o l e y ' s a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , then n o n - r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s such as madmen and young c h i l d r e n possess the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r ence t o t h e extent  t h a t they d e s i r e , have d e s i r e d , w i l l d e s i r e , o r  would d e s i r e not t o be i n t e r e f e r e d w i t h .  Newborn b a b i e s ,  however,  29  p r o b a b l y do not possession  possess the r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  of c e r t a i n r e l e v a n t  h a v i n g d e s i r e s , and  newborn b a b i e s possess very  sense to c l a i m t h a t a new  infants—normally actual r i g h t — i s  The  can  enough to d e f e a t  such r i g h t s .  i s unacceptable.  The  life.  T h i s would not  it.  When a theory  have two  of t h i s  c h o i c e s — w e can  kind  either  thinking  been i n c o n s i s t e n t i n  r e a l l y possess the s e r i o u s r i g h t to  imply t h a t k i l l i n g an i n f a n t would be  permissible;  i t simply  neces-  means t h a t i f such a k i l l i n g  were to count as a v i o l a t i o n of anyone's r i g h t s i t would count as v i o l a t i o n of someone e l s e ' s r i g h t s — n o t the i n f a n t ' s . example, who if  that  the r i g h t to l i f e on newborn  the r i g h t to l i f e has  t h a t i n f a n t s do not  s a r i l y morally  fact  or somehow b r i n g the phenomena i n t o l i n e w i t h i t .  about newborn b a b i e s and and  as  non-interference),  l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e would l e a d us to conclude t h a t our  the past  count  to the p o i n t where the prima f a c i e r i g h t becomes an  to e x p l a i n the phenomena we  r e j e c t the theory  (or to  born baby has  as i t stands T o o l e y ' s theory  most people adamantly want to c o n f e r  fails  A more  s u b j e c t o f mental s t a t e s  Tooley would c l a i m t h a t s i n c e n o t h i n g  a v i o l a t i o n of a newborn baby's r i g h t to l i f e  But  concepts.  s e r i o u s r i g h t to l i f e on the grounds t h a t i t does not  experiences.  i t makes no  few  t h a t a newborn i n f a n t does not  possess the concept of a s e l f as a c o n t i n u i n g and  the  concepts i s a n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e to  s t a r t l i n g c l a i m i s Tooley's b e l i e f possess any  because  a  A parent, f o r  wants the i n f a n t to l i v e s u f f e r s a v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s  i t is killed.  Since such a p o s i t i o n i s a l i t t l e too b i z a r r e f o r  most p e o p l e ' s t a s t e , our n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n i s to r e j e c t T o o l e y ' s  30 theory r a t h e r than adapt our t h i n k i n g t o f a l l i n t o l i n e w i t h i t . Still,  I t h i n k t h e r e i s something t o be l e a r n e d from T o o l e y ' s  insight-  f u l way of c o n n e c t i n g r i g h t s w i t h d e s i r e s , but we w i l l have t o l o o k elsewhere f o r arguments s u p p o r t i n g the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . I t can be p l a u s i b l y c l a i m e d , as M i l l  c l a i m s i n h i s essay On  L i b e r t y , t h a t t h e r e i s great u t i l i t a r i a n b e n e f i t t h a t accompanies t h e observance o f the p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . ally inclined  People  a r e gener-  to be h a p p i e r when they a r e p e r m i t t e d t o pursue t h e  means and ends o f t h e i r c h o i c e .  Few people want to be ordered  or s u b j e c t e d to t h e a r b i t r a r y w i l l o f someone e l s e .  about  Even v e r y young  c h i l d r e n f e e l i n s u l t e d and r e s e n t f u l i f t h e i r o p i n i o n s a r e always d i s c o u n t e d , i f they a r e t r e a t e d l i k e o b j e c t s i n s t e a d o f people. Great  s a t i s f a c t i o n i s gained not o n l y i n t h i n k i n g f o r o n e s e l f and  making one's own d e c i s i o n s but i n b e i n g t r e a t e d by o t h e r s as someone who i s capable o f t h i n k i n g f o r o n e s e l f and making one's own d e c i s i o n s . Although  many o f us would agree w i t h M i l l , h i s c l a i m t h a t g e n e r a l  happiness and  i s i n c r e a s e d when people a r e allowed t o pursue the means  ends of t h e i r c h o i c e ( M i l l e x c l u d e s  c h i l d r e n and b a r b a r i a n s how-  ever) i s a c o n t i n g e n t c l a i m ;  i t i s t h e r e f o r e open t o r e f u t a t i o n  through  i n t h i s case t h e r e i s , perhaps, a  counter e v i d e n c e — a n d  s i z e a b l e amount o f counter Most people  evidence  t h a t c o u l d be produced.  a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h E r i c Fromm's view t h a t human  b e i n g s a r e b a s i c a l l y a f r a i d of p u r s u i n g the means and ends o f t h e i r choice. insecure.  Fromm's p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e s i s i s t h a t freedom makes p e o p l e People would r a t h e r be l e d by o t h e r s than determine  their  own  destinies.  for  them.  They p r e f e r to have someone e l s e take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  No doubt  t h i s i s t r u e of a l l o f us to some extent i n our  l i v e s , and some people may of  even p r e f e r to a c t non-autonomously most  the time, but i t i s always p o s s i b l e t h a t people who  fear  freedom  can be taught to be autonomous and to d e r i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n from making autonomous c h o i c e s .  On the o t h e r hand, people can a l s o be taught t o  enjoy domination by o t h e r s .  So we  s t i l l have the e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n  of which s t a t e l e a d s to the g r e a t e s t happiness.  But even i f M i l l i s  r i g h t t h a t autonomy b r i n g s more happiness than does domination, h i s utilitarian  argument does not p r o v i d e us w i t h any c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i -  c a t i o n f o r the p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e because happiness) i s taken as the u l t i m a t e g o a l of l i f e ,  i f utility  (or  then n o n - i n t e r f e r -  ence w i l l be v a l u e d o n l y i n so f a r as i t i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n promoting human h a p p i n e s s .  I f Brave New  a l t e r n a t i v e to our p r e s e n t way  World were a t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y of l i f e  t h e r e would no l o n g e r be  need t o adhere t o the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . of are  us are not p r e p a r e d t o buy  viable  But s i n c e most  i n t o a Brave-New-World way  not p r e p a r e d to opt f o r happiness at any p r i c e .  any  of l i f e ,  we  T h i s i s not t o  d i m i n i s h the importance of the e m p i r i c a l c l a i m t h a t observance  of the  p r a c t i c e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e does i n f a c t c o n t r i b u t e to human h a p p i ness, but i t i s t o suggest t h a t i f we  seek a c o n c l u s i v e argument i n  f a v o r of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e we must a g a i n l o o k elsewhere. We is  might  t r y l o o k i n g at Rawls' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  a p r i n c i p l e any r a t i o n a l l y  l i v e by i f he  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d person would choose  were choosing a way  of l i f e from behind a " v e i l of  to  3'2  ignorance"  (1971).  That  p r i n c i p l e s f o r people  i s , says Rawls, i f we were c h o o s i n g a s e t of  to l i v e by, knowing t h a t we w i l l have to occupy  some p o s i t i o n i n the world but not knowing what t h a t p o s i t i o n w i l l we  be,  would n a t u r a l l y p r e f e r observance of the r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  f o r everyone i n o r d e r to ensure t h a t our own w i l l be r e s p e c t e d . ciple is justified persons  from behind  We  may  r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  q u e s t i o n Rawls' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a p r i n -  i f i t would be chosen by r a t i o n a l l y a v e i l of i g n o r a n c e , but even i f we  self-interested agree w i t h  Rawls on t h i s p o i n t i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t r a t i o n a l l y ,  self-  i n t e r e s t e d persons would choose t h a t everyone l i v e by the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference.  Some d a r i n g i n d i v i d u a l s might be w i l l i n g to a l l o w  the p r a c t i c e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e o n l y f o r the v e r y r i c h or the v e r y powerful  on the gamble t h a t they might o b t a i n some p r i v i l e g e d  i n the w o r l d .  So we  are s t i l l without  position  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p r a c -  t i c e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . We  might a l s o l o o k at R.  argument.  He  S. P e t e r s ' w e l l known t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  c l a i m s t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i s  l o g i c a l l y presupposed by-a  commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y  r a t i o n a l l y d e c i d i n g what one ought to do. one who  i s s e r i o u s l y concerned  i n the sense of  A c c o r d i n g to P e t e r s , any-  w i t h answering q u e s t i o n s of p r a c t i c a l  p o l i c y must demand the freedom to do what t h e r e are good reasons doing.  I f we  j o i n w i t h o t h e r r a t i o n a l beings  those q u e s t i o n s we  i n s e e k i n g answers to  must demand freedom f o r them as w e l l .  i s wrong i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t one  for  But  Peters  i s l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e d to demand  freedom f o r o t h e r s by simple v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t one  seriously  asks the q u e s t i o n  'What ought I t o do?'.  l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e d i s that one  A l l t h a t seems to  demand freedom o f a c t i o n f o r o n e s e l f  t o pursue what t h e r e are good reasons f o r p u r s u i n g . v e r y wise i n not but  logical  i s not  not  be  oneself,  o b v i o u s l y needed to  i n which one  l e g i t i m a t e l y accused of l o g i c a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y i f one  s e l f but  may  consistency.  But maybe t h e r e i s an i n d i r e c t way  the q u e s t i o n  One  demanding freedom f o r o t h e r s as w e l l as  the requirement of freedom f o r o t h e r s  maintain  be  'What ought I to do?'  denying i t to o t h e r s .  could  s e r i o u s l y asks  w h i l e demanding freedom f o r one-  The  i n c o n s i s t e n c y l i e s i n the  t h a t the P r i n c i p l e of E q u a l i t y (no d i s t i n c t i o n s without d i f f e r e n c e s ) r e q u i r e s t h a t one  be  fact  relevant  cannot demand freedom f o r o n e s e l f  w i t h o u t a l s o demanding i t f o r o t h e r s because to do so would be make d i s t i n c t i o n s without r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s — a n d  to  observance of  P r i n c i p l e of E q u a l i t y i s i t s e l f r e q u i r e d by a commitment to  the  rational-  i t y , f o r i t i s the P r i n c i p l e of E q u a l i t y which g i v e s p o i n t to  prac-  t i c a l reasoning  ( P e t e r s , 1966,  no  point i n asking  f o r reasons u n l e s s one were committed to  a r b i t r a r i n e s s or no being  120-126).  so, the q u e s t i o n  of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the r i g h t as the q u e s t i o n  cannot s e r i o u s l y ask  'Why  'Why  non-  without already being  This  to non-  be r a t i o n a l ? ' .  Just  be r a t i o n a l ? ' without a l r e a d y  being  committed to r a t i o n a l i t y , n e i t h e r can one  On  There would be  d i s t i n c t i o n s without r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s .  i n t e r f e r e n c e i s as odd one  pp.  ask  'What ought I to  committed t o the p r a c t i c e o f  as  do?'  non-interference.  t h i s view, commitment to the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  does  34 not r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n any more than a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y requires i t .  In s h o r t , P e t e r s shows that i n so f a r as we  m i t t e d t o s e e k i n g good reasons f o r a c t i n g i n one way another, we who  rather  are comthan  a r e committed t o the p r a c t i c e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e .  c o u l d be opposed to s e e k i n g good reasons?  And  The r i g h t t o non-  i n t e r f e r e n c e , then, s h o u l d be regarded as a b a s i c s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s used to h e l p j u s t i f y v a r i o u s o t h e r r i g h t s and p r a c t i c e s . f a c t , the e x e r c i s e of any r i g h t always  that  In  e i t h e r p r o t e c t s or r e s t r i c t s  the l i b e r t y of someone, and u s u a l l y i t does both. In a d d i t i o n , i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t some people b e l i e v e t h a t a s a t i s f a c t o r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be made on moral grounds as r e q u i r e d by the p r i n c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons.  In response to t h i s b e l i e f we might  ask why  the p r i n -  c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons i s l e s s i n need o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n the r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Perhaps  than  i t i s n o t , but most people  would p r o b a b l y agree t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons i s the fundamental moral p r i n c i p l e from which a l l o t h e r moral p r i n c i p l e s derived—at  are  l e a s t when m o r a l i t y i s c o n s i d e r e d as i n t e r p e r s o n a l (or  i n t e r - s e n t i e n t being) m o r a l i t y .  To have r e s p e c t f o r persons i s to  have r e s p e c t f o r the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s t o pursue t h e i r own poses, aims, and i n t e r e s t s i n the manner they choose. w i t h the f r e e c h o i c e s of another without adequate  To  pur-  interfere  reason i s t o t r e a t  t h a t person as a means to some end of ours r a t h e r than as an autonomous end -in h i m s e l f . full  I t i s to t r e a t him as l e s s than a person i n the  sense of t h a t word.  In o t h e r words, the moral r i g h t  to non-  interference i s logically persons.  i m p l i e d by the p r i n c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r  S i n c e the r e s t r i c t i o n of one's l i b e r t y i s a prima  a f f r o n t t o the moral p r i n c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons, good  facie reasons  must be g i v e n f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l ' s f r e e c h o i c e s . In o t h e r words, the onus o f proof i n cases of i n t e r f e r e n c e l i e s those who  would i n t e r f e r e .  We now  with  t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n o f what  con-  s t i t u t e s a good r e a s o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e .  2.  O v e r r i d i n g the Right to N o n - I n t e r f e r e n c e I b e l i e v e a l l the cases i n which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s prima  right  facie  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be j u s t i f i a b l y o v e r r i d d e n by someone  e l s e can be s l o t t e d i n t o a t h r e e - p a r t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme.  The  t h r e e k i n d s of cases a r e sometimes m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e but they are not n e c e s s a r i l y so.  They a r e :  a)  cases of e n f o r c i n g m o r a l i t y  b)  cases of p r e v e n t i n g harm to o t h e r s , and  c)  cases o f c o n s e n t i n g to the f o r f e i t u r e o f a r i g h t .  T h i s i s not to say, o f course, t h a t a l l cases of e n f o r c i n g m o r a l i t y or p r e v e n t i n g harm or f o r f e i t i n g a r i g h t , j u s t i f y our Each o f the t h r e e k i n d s of cases i n which the r i g h t ence may  interference.  to n o n - i n t e r f e r -  be o v e r r i d d e n p r o v i d e s o n l y prima f a c i e grounds f o r i n t e r -  f e r e n c e which do not become a c t u a l grounds w i t h o u t a t l e a s t  the  p r o v i s o t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e does not do more harm than good. s h a l l d i s c u s s each of the t h r e e k i n d s of cases i n t u r n .  I  36 A.  The Enforcement o f M o r a l i t y I am r e s t r i c t i n g m o r a l i t y here to i n t e r p e r s o n a l m o r a l i t y — t h a t  is,  t o t h e view t h a t b o t h not harming p e o p l e and r e l i e v i n g t h e i r  f e r i n g a r e fundamental to m o r a l i t y . morality  (provided  On. t h i s view the enforcement of  the enforcement does not do more harm than good)  would be a c c e p t a b l e example,  suf-  to most p e o p l e .  r e l i g i o u s tenets or majority  Other bases of m o r a l i t y — f o r o p i n i o n — d o not p r o v i d e  on which the enforcement of m o r a l i t y would be  a view  acceptable.  The P r i n c i p l e o f E n f o r c i n g I n t e r p e r s o n a l M o r a l i t y i s the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the l i b e r t y of an i n d i v i d u a l ought prima f a c i e to be fered with  i f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s conduct i s m o r a l l y wrong.  grounds can t h i s p r i n c i p l e be j u s t i f i e d ?  On what  Is i t a s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e by v i r t u e of the meaning of 'moral as M i l l thought i t was?  Surely not.  be d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s  of m o r a l i t y .  i s always s u b j e c t  inter-  wrongness'  As we have j u s t seen t h e r e I t might be the case t h a t  to moral censure of some s o r t i f o n l y from  can one  oneself  when one a c t s immorally, but the r i g h t t o e n f o r c e m o r a l i t y does not appear t o a r i s e from t h e meaning o f the term 'moral wrongness'. where then does i t a r i s e ?  The s t r o n g e s t  From  argument i n f a v o r of the  enforcement of m o r a l i t y i s the view t h a t people have the r i g h t t o p r o t e c t and p r e s e r v e  t h e i r own  i s analogous to the way  e x i s t e n c e and w e l l - b e i n g  i n a way  i n which an i n d i v i d u a l has the r i g h t  that  to employ  v a r i o u s means of s e l f - d e f e n s e i f h i s e x i s t e n c e or w e l l - b e i n g i s threatened.  ( T h i s i s not t o argue, however, t h a t groups have the  r i g h t t o defend and p r e s e r v e  the e x i s t e n c e  of the group as such.)  If  37  you  meet  a murderer  you  beat  him  have and in  the  over  r i g h t to  case of  sons have the are  attacked  ing  immorality  ing  their  whatever prima  It  own  thesis. (as  morality) society, that moral  beings') to  and  the  only  act without  others  their  best  defend  or without  be  own  to  in a society The  issue  regard  f a r as at  other  stake.  adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n as  an  what  to  his  own  i n stopping  defendthat  ought  is actually  actual the  tangential  morality, (or  of  enforcement  of  on  the  an  other  immorally  part  is  a  sentient definition,  other  people's  stopping  i n t e r e s t s , people are others  of  morality,  issue  i s , by to  to  enforcement  interpersonal  i n opposition  best  and  in distinguish-  only  t o be  per-  they  course,  i n d i v i d u a l i s sometimes r i g h t i n  collectively  interests.  of  act  Similarly  immoral  self-defense  people's To  existence  Thus p r o h i b i t -  of  as  the  take  regard  account  you  groups of  involved  i s whether  i t does—with  whether  themselves  immense and  s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n and  interpersonal  that  i m m o r a l and  are  and  right.  suggest,  problems  as  own  ranks.  protecting  i s not  ask  down,  themselves whether  their  persons This  from a c t i n g against in acting  and  t o w h a t some p e o p l e  i n so  Just  right  It i s clear  circumstance  i n t e r e s t s are  interests.  persons.  case of  I believe  On  issue  of  important  c o u n t s as  is.  have t h i s  society regards  opposed  not  you  prohibited.  The  do  i s clear that  powers t h a t  given  shoot you  preserve your  existence.  i n any  we  to  and  from w i t h i n  the  morality  i n self-defense,  r i g h t to p r o t e c t  is a  i s about  yourself  groups  i n g b e t w e e n what  the  s t r e e t who  head  protect  f a c i e t o be  immoral  the  the  well-being. the  on  from a c t i n g  sometimes  against  38  At  t h i s p o i n t , the q u e s t i o n c o u l d be asked why  the r i g h t of  persons t o defend themselves s h o u l d be taken as more s e l f - e v i d e n t the  right  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e .  No doubt i t s h o u l d not be,  than  especially  s i n c e the r i g h t of persons to defend themselves i s a sub-case of the r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n general.  Once the r i g h t  to non-  i n t e r f e r e n c e has been a c c e p t e d , however, the prima f a c i e r i g h t o f persons to defend themselves immediately f o l l o w s . to  the acceptance o f the r i g h t  s e c t i o n , we  are j u s t i f i e d  S i n c e we were l e d  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the p r e v i o u s  i n a c c e p t i n g the r i g h t of persons to defend  themselves as not i n need of j u s t i f i c a t i o n h e r e . B.  P r e v e n t i n g Harm to Others There are many cases i n which we would agree t h a t p e o p l e ' s  dom to  of conduct ought  to be c u r t a i l e d on the grounds  free-  that i t i s harmful  o t h e r s whether or not moral wrongness i s i n v o l v e d .  Mill's  c i p l e of L i b e r t y s t a t e s t h a t the freedom of a c t i o n of an  Prin-  individual  ought prima f a c i e to be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h i f and o n l y i f the conduct i n q u e s t i o n causes harm t o o t h e r s .  But perhaps we  should d i s t i n g u i s h  between conduct t h a t causes harm t o o t h e r s and conduct t h a t may regarded as h a r m f u l though i t does not i t s e l f  cause harm.  capable a d u l t w i l l i n g l y r e f u s e s to r e s c u e a drowning nearby swimming p o o l , f o r example, even though l i t t l e  be  If a  c h i l d from a or no danger i s  posed t o the r e s c u e r , we would want to c a l l the conduct h a r m f u l , but we  do not have a case o f conduct t h a t d i r e c t l y causes harm.  most of us would p r o b a b l y agree t h a t i f t h e r e were some way p e l l i n g such an a d u l t to r e s c u e the c h i l d  Because of com-  then he should be so  39 compelled, we would p r o b a b l y want to amend M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e freedom  o f a c t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l  w i t h i f and o n l y i f the conduct  ought prima f a c i e t o be  to  "The  interfered  i n q u e s t i o n i s harmful, t o o t h e r s . "  The d i s t i n c t i o n between " i s h a r m f u l " and "causes harm" p r o b a b l y does not matter v e r y much i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , however, so I s h a l l simply subsume a l l conduct  t h a t causes harm t o o t h e r s under the  broader heading of h a r m f u l conduct.  The more important  distinction  t o be made i s between conduct  t h a t i s m o r a l l y wrong and conduct  i s generally harmful.  the former are always  latter,  While  the l a t t e r are not always  accidentally  seriously  because  the event was  ness.  We  cases of the former.  I f someone over  harm the person he knocks down, but  an a c c i d e n t he i s not g u i l t y o f moral wrong-  c o u l d e a s i l y imagine c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which we would be  fully justified  i n b a r r i n g people from u s i n g dangerous  not o n l y f o r t h e i r own as w e l l .  cases of the  t r i p s and f a l l s down s t a i r s knocking someone e l s e  as he f a l l s , he may  that  O f t e n we  stairwells  p r o t e c t i o n but f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of o t h e r s  are j u s t i f i e d i n i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h p e o p l e ' s l i b e r t y  to prevent a c c i d e n t s or o t h e r h a r m f u l o c c u r r e n c e s t h a t are not  neces-  s a r i l y m o r a l l y wrong. C.  Cases of Consenting t o the F o r f e i t u r e I f an i n d i v i d u a l  forfeit  that r i g h t  i n d i v i d u a l might e i t h e r , we altogether.  of a R i g h t  has a prima f a c i e r i g h t he can i n most cases  i f he so chooses.  L e a v i n g a s i d e cases i n which an  choose not to e x e r c i s e a r i g h t but not t o f o r f e i t i t  are concerned w i t h cases i n which a r i g h t I f , f o r example, some p a r t i c u l a r  i s g i v e n up  customer  has the r i g h t  40 to be s e r v e d next  at a department s t o r e counter because he has  been  w a i t i n g i n l i n e l o n g e r than anyone e l s e , he can choose t o f o r f e i t t h a t r i g h t i f he wishes.  Perhaps the customer behind him i s loaded down  w i t h p a r c e l s , so he generously s t e p s a s i d e l e t t i n g the next be served f i r s t .  The  w h i l e the second is  I t c o u l d be argued  to be s e r v e d f i r s t  to be s e r v e d f i r s t all  customer cannot  then r e c l a i m h i s r i g h t  customer i s b e i n g s e r v e d .  gone f o r e v e r .  right  first  Once f o r f e i t e d , a  particular  i s not gone f o r e v e r s i n c e he r e g a i n s the  one  f o r the o t h e r — t h e r i g h t  person and a f t e r someone e l s e .  customers have  t o be s e r v e d b e f o r e some  So the f o r f e i t e d r i g h t i s i s bestowed  i t s place. T h i s i s not to suggest  our r i g h t s  i f we  so choose.  t h a t we have the power to f o r f e i t Perhaps our r i g h t  t o freedom of  f o r example, i s not something we would have the r i g h t if  right  a f t e r the customer behind him has been s e r v e d , but  indeed gone f o r e v e r , though i n the example a t hand another in  right  t h a t our generous customer's  t h a t has r e a l l y happened i n such a case i s t h a t two  exchanged r i g h t s  customer  i t were w i t h i n our c a p a c i t y to do so.  In f a c t , the r i g h t  t o freedom of thought  a l l of thought,  to g i v e up  That i s a debatable may  even issue.  not be a coherent n o t i o n .  The p o i n t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , however, i s to l e n d p l a u s i b i l i t y t o the c l a i m t h a t some r i g h t s gest t h a t the r i g h t  can be f o r f e i t e d through  consent,  When we is  to  sug-  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e t h a t i s o v e r r i d d e n i n the  of compulsory e d u c a t i o n seems c l e a r l y to be a r i g h t f e i t e d through  and  t h a t can be  case  for-  consent. i n t e r f e r e w i t h someone whose r i g h t t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  f o r f e i t e d through  consent we  are not, s t r i c t l y  speaking,  overriding  41  that  persons'  right.  He  has  mind, t h e r e talking  about  We  be  this  and So  do  that  by  as  not  liberal  consent  no  i s to to  solely  need get  to  our  the  has  keep  such  this  in  convenience  of  i n cases  fact  a justification  of  with  the the  a  of  i s prima  a right  that  children's lives to educate  value  of  right  that the  that  o b j e c t i o n to using  trying  about  from the  to  them.  liberal  can  this i s that If  they  education  non-interference.  a right  can  compulsory  be  forfeited  imposition  of  education.  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  to  so,  children  fact  that  justifying should  that  compulsory  (The  task  liberal can  of  not  chapters  i n general  an  education  to  That  task.  consent  to  to the  their the  someone c o u l d  be  to  liberal  forfeit  education  Suppose f o r the  child,  and  forfeiture  b e n e f i t t o do  compulsory expected  to  this  so,  to  consent  general  their then  i m p o s i t i o n of to  child.  conclusion.)  i f in of  on  moment  a b e n e f i t f o r the  i s t o l e a d us  i s a b e n e f i t f o r the  when i t i s t o  inclined  b e l i e v e i t b e n e f i t s them  i s i n fact  four  to consent  are  i m p o s i t i o n of  impossible  and  people  when t h e y  compulsory  three  expected  expected  education.  be  education be  the  liberal  non-interference be  a s we  seems t o b e  obvious  discuss  right  can  longer  to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  to  their  people  of  no  to non-interference  The  the  If  long  ourselves  education  Given  do  As  for interfering  t h e s i s would be  consent  right  consent.  always  problem  through  the  grounds  t h e r e w o u l d be our  i t up.  right  compulsory  through  consideration  s i n c e he  consent.  have s a i d  children  give  harm i n a v a i l i n g  through  forfeited  to  o v e r r i d i n g the  infringed  did,  to non-interference  chosen  i s no  forfeiture  facie  right  right people  liberal the  to  imposition not,  of a l i b e r a l  however, s u f f i c i e n t  on h i m .  consent  required  those  violation  nor harmful  the following l i n e  t h a t we  their  right  their  that l i b e r a l  asked  to grant  this  liberal  of the  I  the case  suggest,  as p a r t of a s a t i s f a c t o r y  expect  people  jus-  education:  t o consent recognize  to f o r f e i t  that i t i s  t o do s o , a n d education  i s good  f o r people  c l a i m f o r t h e moment.  can be brought  (The r e a d e r i s  The p u r p o s e o f chap-  t o r e c o g n i z e t h e good o f  e d u c a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e consent a liberal  immoral  other  on  as a r e s u l t  imposition of l i b e r a l  given that imposing  good  (on grounds  t h r e e and f o u r i s t o argue f o r i t s a c c e p t a n c e . ) , and  given that students  right  consent)  I t i s further  i n general.  t o n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e when t h e y  given  ters  to others  can reasonably  own g o o d  free  to non-interference—otherwise  of reasoning  f o r the compulsory  Given  for  4.  right  immorality  education  (or expected  us t o t o r t u r e him.  t o do w i t h  of a person's  tification  3.  permit  having  begs t h e q u e s t i o n )  2.  a liberal  t h a t o u r i n t e r f e r e n c e t o be n e i t h e r immoral  than  then,  f o r our imposing  t o be t o r t u r e d , b u t h i s consent  would not n e c e s s a r i l y  other  grounds  i f he b e l i e v e d i n i t s b e n e f i t s , i s  I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t someone c o u l d , o f h i s own  choice,  1.  education,  (on grounds  education  than  those  f o r t h e compulsory  on s t u d e n t s  related  to non-interference) nor harmful reasons  t o t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e , and i s neither  to overriding the  t o o t h e r s , t h e n we  imposition of l i b e r a l  have  education  students. T h e r e a r e two p o i n t s a b o u t  this  argument  t h a t s h o u l d b e empha-  43 sized.  F i r s t , we  s h o u l d n o t i c e t h a t number t h r e e above reads  t h a t s t u d e n t s can be brought to r e c o g n i z e the good of l i b e r a l and t h e r e f o r e to consent  to the i n t e r f e r e n c e . . . . "  "Given education  This implies  t h a t t h e r e must be a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between r e c o g n i z i n g the good of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and  c o n s e n t i n g to the i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Consent t h a t  i s the r e s u l t o f i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n i n g , or b e l i e f s t h a t have been d i s t o r t e d i n some o t h e r way under duress  i s e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e d out.  i s not genuine consent;  a p p r o p r i a t e k i n d s of  i . e . , i t i s not g i v e n f o r the  reasons.  Second, where the phrase be made f o r s u b s t i t u t i n g  ' l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n ' appears,  ' v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g ' or  ' t e c h n i c a l e d u c a t i o n ' , and effect  Consent g i v e n  a case c o u l d  'athletic training'  the argument might work j u s t as w e l l .  or  So i n  the. argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s permits much more than  the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n .  The next major s t e p i n  the argument, t h e r e f o r e , i s to i s o l a t e some c r i t e r i o n t h a t w i l l h e l p  us  p i c k out c u r r i c u l a r components from the v e r y wide range of s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s t h a t the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s p e r m i t s us impose on c h i l d r e n .  The  t a s k of. chapter t h r e e i s to argue f o r the  development o f p e r s o n a l autonomy as t h a t c r i t e r i o n . a r e o t h e r matters S i n c e we  to be  p a t e r n a l i s m and  there  the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l  f o r t h e i r own  p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n nature.  But f i r s t  considered.  are p r o p o s i n g  c a t i o n on students  to  edu-  good, our argument i s e s s e n t i a l l y  So some e x c u r s i o n i n t o the l i t e r a t u r e  i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n might be u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t .  on Very  l i t t l e has been w r i t t e n on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m i n g e n e r a l ,  44  a l t h o u g h many a r t i c l e s have been w r i t t e n on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m i n p a r t i c u l a r cases ( i n law and m e d i c i n e , f o r e x a m p l e , — b u t oddly enough, i n e d u c a t i o n ) .  We  not,  s h a l l l o o k a t the g e n e r a l l i t e r a t u r e  on  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m , s p a r s e as i t i s , l e a v i n g a s i d e quest i o n s i n medicine and i n law t h a t are not c e n t r a l t o our t o p i c . we  In i t  s h a l l f i n d s t r o n g support f o r the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e o f  r i g h t s presented i n t h i s s e c t i o n .  Before turning to that  literature,  however, t h e r e i s an i n t e r e s t i n g o b j e c t i o n to the t h r e e - p a r t  classifi-  c a t i o n I have o f f e r e d t h a t has been suggested t o me by J . R.  Coombs.  The o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t t h e r e might be a f u r t h e r k i n d o f case i n which person's l i b e r t y may  be o v e r r i d d e n — n a m e l y ,  the k i n d of case i n which  we aim t o promote the p u b l i c good or w e l f a r e . taxes f o r the b u i l d i n g and maintenance  We  are compelled to pay  of p u b l i c roads and  highways,  f o r example, and t h i s i s a case of promoting the p u b l i c good. laws which  e n f o r c e compulsory  Perhaps  t h a t they prevent harm o r r e l i e v e  a case can be made, however, f o r subsuming  k i n d of case under those cases i n which we to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Clearly  t a x a t i o n f o r b u i l d i n g roads and highways  are not j u s t i f i e d on the grounds suffering.  a  consent to f o r f e i t  this our  right  Indeed, t h a t i s John Locke's s o l u t i o n t o the  problem of the source of the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e .  The argument from  the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s does not seem t o work as w e l l i n t h i s c o n t e x t , however, as i t does i n the case of j u s t i f y i n g l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n . c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two  cases i s t h a t we  e n t i t l e d t o expect p e o p l e to consent t o f o r f e i t i n t e r f e r e n c e , thereby g i v i n g the s t a t e something  The  are not as  t h e i r r i g h t t o nonof a b l a n k check, as  45 we  a r e e n t i t l e d to expect people to consent to a much more l i m i t e d  k i n d of i n t e r f e r e n c e — c o m p u l s o r y  education.  In any  case,  mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , the q u e s t i o n of the source a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e i s an unanswered q u e s t i o n osophy which we  of  the  in political  phil-  s h a l l have to l e a v e a s i d e .  I t c o u l d be ous  as I have  thought by someone t h a t compulsory s t u d i e s of  vari-  s o r t s a r e needed to promote the p u b l i c g o o d — e . g . , economic  growth and  p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , or i t c o u l d be thought t h a t  s t u d i e s are needed to prevent  harm to o t h e r s .  But  compulsory  anyone h o l d i n g  such b e l i e f s would have to produce c o n v i n c i n g arguments to show t h a t we  are j u s t i f i e d  grounds.  i n imposing l i b e r a l s t u d i e s on s t u d e n t s  on  Without such arguments, however, the compulsory  of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s seems to r e s t comfortably  these imposition  on the n o t i o n of  I f o t h e r arguments were produced, the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of s t u d i e s c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d D.  Justifying Paternalism  one has  Paternalism i s o f t e n viewed as u n d e s i r a b l e .  i s sometimes to make a derogatory  o f t e n r e s e n t someone who  who  takes  own  decisions.  liberal  perspective.  p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e n t i o n s or t h a t he a c t s  towards o t h e r s We  from more than one  consent.  Saying  t h a t some-  paternalistically statement about  presumes to know what i s good f o r us  him. and  i t upon h i m s e l f to d e p r i v e us of the l i b e r t y to make our P e o p l e who  t r e a t us t h a t way  are t r e a t i n g us,  we  t h i n k , l i k e c h i l d r e n — l i k e p e o p l e i n c a p a b l e of d e c i d i n g what i s i n t h e i r own  best i n t e r e s t s .  The  negative  connotations  surrounding  n o t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m are t h e r e because p e o p l e o f t e n a c t  the  46 p a t e r n a l i s t i c a l l y towards each other when they are not d o i n g so.  The  meaning of  justified  n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s are not, however, p a r t of  in the  'paternalism'  any more than the n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s  sur-  rounding  'communism' or  ' c a p i t a l i s m ' are p a r t of the meanings of  those  terms.  We  would do w e l l to guard a g a i n s t  an unsympathetic  attitude  towards t r y i n g to f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e — an a t t i t u d e which c o u l d  a r i s e simply from the n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s  of  the word. The  first  t a s k o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s to d e f i n e what i s to count  paternalistic interference. paternalism rights.  I t can be  argued t h a t not  a l l acts  as  of  i n t e r f e r e w i t h l i b e r t y of a c t i o n or even w i t h prima f a c i e  Donald Davidson s a y s :  p a t e r n a l i s t i c a c t s are not only those i n which one i s f o r c e d to do something he doesn't want to do, but a l s o those i n which t h e r e i s an a l t e r n a t i v e act which a f f e c t s the donor e q u a l l y and which the b e n e f i c i a r y p r e f e r s ; f o r example, g i v i n g p e o p l e food vouchers i n s t e a d of money when the l a t t e r would be p r e f e r r e d . (From an u n p u b l i s h e d paper e n t i t l e d " F a t h e r s and Sons". As quoted i n C a r t e r , 1977, p. 133.) The  f o l l o w i n g example i s o f f e r e d by  only need p a t e r n a l i s m  not  Gert and  i n v o l v e any  one's l i b e r t y of a c t i o n , but  Culver  to show t h a t  not  attempt to i n t e r f e r e w i t h some-  i t need i n v o l v e no  attempt t o  control  the b e n e f i c i a r y ' s b e h a v i o u r e i t h e r : Mr. N, a member of a r e l i g i o u s s e c t t h a t does not b e l i e v e i n b l o o d t r a n s f u s i o n s , i s i n v o l v e d i n a s e r i o u s automobile a c c i dent and l o s e s a l a r g e amount o f b l o o d . On a r r i v i n g a t the h o s p i t a l , he i s s t i l l c o n s c i o u s and informs the d o c t o r of h i s views on b l o o d t r a n s f u s i o n . Immediately t h e r e a f t e r he f a i n t s from l o s s of b l o o d . The d o c t o r b e l i e v e s t h a t i f Mr. N i s not g i v e n a t r a n s f u s i o n he w i l l d i e . Thereupon, w h i l e Mr. N i s s t i l l u n c o n s c i o u s , the d o c t o r arranges f o r and c a r r i e s out the blood t r a n s f u s i o n . (Gert and C u l v e r , 1976, p. 46)  47 There a r e other  cases i n which i t would be d i f f i c u l t  t o construe the  p a t e r n a l i s t i c a c t as an a c t of i n t e r f e r e n c e o f any k i n d . case i n which a v e r y her  only  Imagine a  o l d woman i s l y i n g on h e r deathbed t h i n k i n g about  son whom she has n o t seen f o r y e a r s .  She asks about him and  someone a s s u r e s h e r t h a t h e r son i s happy and s u c c e s s f u l though::it i s w e l l known t o a l l b u t t h e mother t h a t he has j u s t been sentenced t o a l i f e t i m e i n p r i s o n f o r m u l t i p l e rape and murder. l y i n g as an a c t o f p a t e r n a l i s m , of i n t e r f e r e n c e . with the question  We would count t h e  I t h i n k , b u t i t i s n o t c l e a r l y an a c t  I s h a l l n o t be concerned i n . t h i s t h e s i s , however, o f whether a l l a c t s o f p a t e r n a l i s m  i n t e r f e r e with  someone's freedom o r someone's prima f a c i e r i g h t s because t h e r e i s no question  t h a t t h e k i n d of p a t e r n a l i s m  education—constitutes it  I am concerned w i t h — c o m p u l s o r y  an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c h i l d r e n ' s l i b e r t y .  So  i s l e s s important t o do an a n a l y s i s of t h e concept o f p a t e r n a l i s m  than i t i s t o adopt some r e a s o n a b l e d e f i n i t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r ference  t h a t w i l l enable us t o c a p t u r e t h e c e n t r a l  The  cases.  d e f i n i t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e t h a t I s h a l l adopt  i s the general  d e f i n i t i o n used by Rosemary C a r t e r i n h e r a r t i c l e  " J u s t i f y i n g Paternalism" paternalism  (1977).  She says t h a t t h e c e n t r a l cases o f  a r e ones i n which t h e p r o t e c t i o n o r promotion of a sub-  j e c t ' s welfare  i s t h e primary r e a s o n f o r attempted o r s u c c e s s f u l  c o e r c i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e , w i t h an a c t i o n o r s t a t e of t h a t p e r s o n . d e f i n i t i o n i s very  c l o s e t o t h e one o f f e r e d by G e r a l d  w e l l known a r t i c l e " P a t e r n a l i s m " Dworkin s t a t e s , "By p a t e r n a l i s m  This  Dworkin i n h i s  ( i n Wasserstrom, 1970).  In i t  I s h a l l understand r o u g h l y t h e  48  interference with  a person's  referring  exclusively  or  of  values  definition cized  on  given  that  of  his  only  because  of mind  with  a sharp  from  doing  wish  t o smoke o r right  other  justified heroin of  both  f o r the  c o u l d be reason  action.  them f r o m  be  do  doing  do so  not  interferto  t o keep  o f t e n t h i n k we  from  good.  people have  There  are  interference is  compulsory  the  play  him  very  example h e r e .  justified  involving  not  own  of  crucial.  o t h e r hand, mature  for their  whereas  total  the  strongly object—the  c r i t e r i o n f o r s e p a r a t i n g the  sum  chooses  hesitate  inter-  students'  that p a t e r n a l i s t i c  think paternalistic  a suitable  is  cases—usually  argue  I f , on  some p e o p l e  some p e o p l e  the  etc.)  the  This i s  interference with  If a three-year-old child  good.  i t allows  of  t o be  a  Still,  liberty  of  criti-  already  paternalistic,  of mind  either  involves either  interference.  dispositions,  d r i n k o r o v e r e a t , we  a d d i c t s might  paternalism.  I think  as  state  us w o u l d  interests,  to count  l a r g e numbers  f o r h i s own  i n which  and  kind of  o r w i t h m a t c h e s , we  to prevent  cases  some o t h e r  reasons  needs,  108).  t h a t p a t e r n a l i s m always  attitudes,  justified.  knife  so  restrictive  a person's  w h i c h most o f  i s wholly  p.  although  i n educational contexts  clearly  ence  unduly  interference with  knowledge, b e l i e f s ,  children—in  purposes  s t a t e s of mind  (taking  There are  the  or  (Ibid.,  by  seems p r e f e r a b l e t o D w o r k i n ' s b e c a u s e  people's  Dworkin allows important  clear  liberty  definition  as  justified  good, h a p p i n e s s ,  coerced"  f o r our  g e n e r a l grounds  ference with  states  being  suffice  i t i s not  of a c t i o n  to the w e l f a r e ,  person  would  restriction Carter  the  liberty  So we  treatment need  unjustified  of  some  sort  cases  of  49 John S t u a r t M i l l argues i n On L i b e r t y t h a t p a t e r n a l i s m i s absolutely unjustified. still  Of course M i l l ' s views on p a t e r n a l i s m a r e  thought by many t o have v a l i d i t y  nificant  t h a t not v e r y much has been w r i t t e n i n o p p o s i t i o n t o M i l l on  the t o p i c of p a t e r n a l i s m . 1971;  today,* and I t h i n k i t i s s i g -  Feinberg,  formidable  1971;  There a r e some n o t a b l e  Hart,  exceptions  (Dworkin,  1962), but on the whole M i l l remains a  opponent of p a t e r n a l i s t s .  Mill  says, " . . . n e i t h e r one  p e r s o n nor any number o f persons i s warranted i n s a y i n g t o another human c r e a t u r e of r i p e y e a r s his  t h a t he s h a l l not do w i t h h i s l i f e f o r  own b e n e f i t what he chooses t o do w i t h  i t " (1956 e d i t i o n , p. 9 3 ) .  M i l l ' s argument i n f a v o r of t h i s .position-"-'is the u t i l i t a r i a n argument t h a t s i n c e , i n g e n e r a l , each i n d i v i d u a l i s t h e best  authority  on what i s good f o r h i m s e l f , t h e p r a c t i c e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e has g r e a t e r u t i l i t a r i a n b e n e f i t s than a p r a c t i c e o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c f e r e n c e would have.  This u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n  c a r r y much weight as a knock-down argument a g a i n s t however, mainly because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s ing  inter-  does n o t r e a l l y paternalism  connected w i t h  calculat-  the h a r m f u l and b e n e f i c i a l consequences t h a t might r e s u l t  i n the  l o n g r u n from any g i v e n case of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n . But offers.  the u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s not t h e o n l y one M i l l  In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e i s a s t r a i n i n M i l l which suggests t h a t  paternalism  i s wrong i n and o f i t s e l f r e g a r d l e s s of i t s consequences.  Feinberg recognizes  t h i s s t r a i n i n M i l l when he says:  *See Tom Beauchamp's defense of M i l l i n " P a t e r n a l i s m i o u r a l C o n t r o l , " 1977.,  and Behav-  50 What [ f o r M i l l r e a l l y ] j u s t i f i e s the a b s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e i n p r i m a r i l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g a f f a i r s i s not t h a t such i n t e r f e r e n c e i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g and l i k e l y (merely l i k e l y ) t o cause more harm than i t p r e v e n t s , but r a t h e r t h a t i t would be an i n j u s t i c e , a wrong, a v i o l a t i o n of the p r i v a t e s a n c t u a r y which i s e v e r y person's s e l f ; and t h i s i s so whatever the c a l c u l u s of harms and b e n e f i t s might show. (Feinberg, But  f o r a l l t h i s we must remember  p. 108)  t h a t M i l l i s t a l k i n g about people of  " r i p e " y e a r s i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Mill  e x c l u d e s c h i l d r e n and b a r b a r i a n s from the c a t e g o r y of those who  should  be g i v e n  the b e n e f i t s of the f u l l  s t a t u s of personhood.  In e f f e c t  M i l l a l l o w s p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e a f f a i r s of c h i l d r e n , but he does not o f f e r v e r y much i n the way o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t . Perhaps he t h i n k s  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s s e l f - e v i d e n t :  t h e r e would be enormous d i s u t i l i t i e s made the o b j e c t s  i f c h i l d r e n were not f r e q u e n t l y  of p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference.  a d u l t s , are not the b e s t  i . e . , undoubtedly  Children,  judges of what i s good f o r them.  unlike Be t h a t  as i t may, i t should be mentioned t h a t M i l l a l l o w s one e x c e p t i o n h i s p r o h i b i t i o n against years.  to  p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e f o r persons of r i p e  I b r i n g i t forward because i t c o u l d be regarded as an  important p o i n t e r  towards grounds on which p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e  might be j u s t i f i e d The  exception  f o r c h i l d r e n as w e l l as f o r a d u l t s . i s the case of s e l l i n g o n e s e l f  into slavery.  says: By s e l l i n g h i m s e l f f o r a s l a v e , he a b d i c a t e s h i s l i b e r t y ; he f o r e g o e s any f u t u r e use of i t beyond t h a t s i n g l e a c t . He t h e r e f o r e d e f e a t s , i n h i s own case, the v e r y purpose which i s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a l l o w i n g him to d i s p o s e of h i m s e l f . He i s no longer f r e e ; but i s t h e n c e f o r t h i n a p o s i t i o n which has no l o n g e r the presumption i n i t s f a v o r , t h a t would be  Mill  51 a f f o r d e d by h i s v o l u n t a r i l y remaining i n i t . The p r i n c i p l e of freedom cannot r e q u i r e t h a t he should be f r e e not to be f r e e . I t i s not freedom to be allowed to a l i e n a t e h i s freedom. (1946 e d i t i o n , p. 92) This exception  of M i l l ' s suggests a p r i n c i p l e f o r a l l o w i n g p a t e r n a l i s -  t i c interference:  paternalistic interference i s j u s t i f i e d  i n so f a r  as the i n t e r f e r e n c e p r o t e c t s the freedom o f the b e n e f i c i a r y . i s an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y , but a r i s e s — t h e problem suggested by Freedom.  The  immediately an enormous problem  I s a i a h B e r l i n i n h i s Two  Concepts of  problem of u s i n g p r o t e c t i o n of freedom as a  to j u s t i f y p a t e r n a l i s m  This  criterion  i s that often associated with a Marxist  t i o n of freedom or w i t h r e a l - w i l l t h e o r i e s .  The  concep-  danger t h a t accom-  p a n i e s an endorsement of p o s i t i v e freedom, as i t i s c a l l e d , i s t h i s : I f a_ h o l d s a view about what human b e i n g s a r e l i k e i n some i d e a l , s e l f - a c t u a l i z e d s t a t e , then a. w i l l r e g a r d meet a.'s c r i t e r i a of s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n .  b_ as u n f r e e i f b_ does not _b may  i n f a c t have no  d e s i r e to become what a. r e g a r d s as f r e e or s e l f - a c t u a l i z e d . a case a. would c l a i m t h a t b_ l a c k s the a p p r o p r i a t e being  unfree,  become.  has  no  conception  free,  In such  d e s i r e because b_,  of what human beings were "meant" t o  a. then, i n a l l h i s "benevolence", might take i t upon  himself  to f o r c e b_ to be " f r e e " . The  protection-of-freedom  f i c a t i o n of paternalism freedom, but  not  c r i t e r i o n i s u n a c c e p t a b l e as a  o n l y because of the dangers of p o s i t i v e  a l s o because i t c o u l d  l e a d to o b j e c t i o n a b l e  connected w i t h the n o t i o n of n e g a t i v e f o r example, l e a d s  justi-  to s h o r t e r  life  a good case can be made t h a t we  freedom.  spans and  interference  C i g a r e t t e smoking,  d e b i l i t a t i n g disease,  are p r o t e c t i n g someone's p h y s i c a l  so  52 freedom (freedom from d i s e a s e ) t a k i n g food and are a l l k i n d s t h e i r own order  i f we  prevent him  from smoking or  drugs t h a t might damage h i s h e a l t h .  of c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t we  good i f we  In f a c t ,  might p r o t e c t p e o p l e a g a i n s t  A d o p t i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of  c r i t e r i o n as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n c l e a r l y r e s u l t i n an u n a c c e p t a b l y e x c e s s i v e p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e i n people's  was  not  'freedom' i n the q u o t a t i o n  p o s i t i v e or the n e g a t i v e using  for  freedom could  number of cases of  lives.  f a i r to M i l l , however, i t should  using  there  are a l l o w e d to i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r p u r s u i t s i n  to p r o t e c t t h e i r freedom.  To be  from  be p o i n t e d  on page 50  sense o u t l i n e d above.  out  that  i n either  Instead,  'freedom' as a rough synonym f o r ' l i b e r t y ' .  The  he  next  he  the was question  to be asked, t h e r e f o r e , i s whether the p r o t e c t i o n - o f - l i b e r t y c r i t e r i o n f a r e s any we and  b e t t e r than p r o t e c t i o n of freedom.  accept t h a t everyone has  But  i t d'Oes not.  a prima f a c i e r i g h t to  non-interference,  i f someone f r e e l y chooses to g i v e up h i s l i b e r t y , then we  u n j u s t i f i a b l y o v e r r i d i n g h i s r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  by  his  I f we  l i b e r t y when he has  i s t i c a l l y protect then we  freely  are c l e a r l y p u t t i n g our  sufficient  chosen to g i v e i t up.  someone's l i b e r t y f o r him own  against h i s  preferences  If  are  protecting paternal-  (free) w i l l ,  ahead of h i s without  cause.  Because of the dangers of u s i n g e i t h e r p r o t e c t i o n of freedom or p r o t e c t i o n of l i b e r t y as a c r i t e r i o n f o r j u s t i f y i n g p a t e r n a l i s m might c o n s i d e r  Dworkin's s u g g e s t i o n  i s important and  seems to be  we  t h a t "the b a s i c n o t i o n of consent  the o n l y a c c e p t a b l e  way  of t r y i n g to  53  delimit  an area  of j u s t i f i e d  clearly  relevant  paternalism"  to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  that  i t seems r e a s o n a b l e  that  i s g o o d f o r them p r o v i d e d  Dworkin's view fication Carter  that  consent  of paternalism  offers  t o expect  of paternalism  people  they  (1970, p . 1 1 9 ) .  on t h e grounds  t o consent  to interference  b e l i e v e i t i s good  should  play  i s developed  a central role  i n detail  the following conditions  Consent i s  f o r them. i n the j u s t i -  by Rosemary  Carter.  f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of  paternalism: C o n s e n t , o r t h e d i s p o s i t i o n t o c o n s e n t upon r e q u e s t o r upon t h e r e c e i p t o f c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , i s n e c e s s a r y and, i f none o f a, b, o r c h o l d , s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s m : (a)  t h e a c t r e q u i r i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n by c o n s e n t i s c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r that consent; t h e consent would have been w i t h h e l d o r would be withdrawn i f t h e s u b j e c t ' s d e s i r e s , p r e f e r e n c e s o r b e l i e f s had n o t been d i s t o r t e d ; * t h e consent would have been w i t h h e l d o r would be withdrawn upon t h e r e c e i p t o f r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n .  (b)  (c)  (1977, pp. 137-138) T h e r e a r e many p r o b l e m s quent are  consent, but I think  unable  to envisage  term consequences  to offer  some f u t u r e  time  than  a r e more c a s e s  a very  consent others,  (this to past  in  terms o f d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s  affected of  by t h i s  t o assume t h a t  i n c l u d e s most paternalistic  so i t i s p r o b a b l y  * B e c a u s e i t may b e a l i t t l e preferences,  the probability  wide range o f probable  of j u s t i f i e d  or  notion  i n judging  i twould be s a f e  f o ractions  more l i k e l y  there  involved  paternalistic  short  of subsethose  who  and l o n g  c h i l d r e n ) would be intervention at  safe  t o assume  that  i n t e r v e n t i o n (on  odd t o speak o f d i s t o r t e d d e s i r e s  further discussion related to this alone.  point w i l l  proceed  The i n t e n t o f (b) i s n o t r e a l l y  c h a n g e , b e c a u s e a n y s e n s e we c a n make o u t o f t h e  of a distorted desire or preference  distorted beliefs.  c a n be cashed  o u t i n terms  54 C a r t e r ' s account) i n the a f f a i r s of c h i l d r e n than i n the a f f a i r s  of  adults. There are two  kinds  of p o s s i b l e counter  examples t h a t we  c o n s i d e r to the above c l a i m t h a t .consent i s both n e c e s s a r y i e n t to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m . to  the n e c e s s i t y of consent and  ficiency.  The  The  first  and  should suffic-  i s an o b j e c t i o n  the second i s an o b j e c t i o n to i t s s u f -  f i r s t becomes apparent i f we  imagine, f o r example, a  case i n which someone i s about to l e a p to h i s death from the s i d e of a h i g h b r i d g e and  a passer-by p h y s i c a l l y i n t e r v e n e s by p u l l i n g  p o t e n t i a l s u i c i d e v i c t i m over the r a i l i n g consent were not  forthcoming  to s a f e t y .  either implicitly  I f subsequent  or e x p l i c i t l y  i n the  s u b j e c t ' s d i s p o s i t i o n , then we would have to conclude t h a t the nalistic  i n t e r v e n t i o n was  not j u s t i f i e d — a  people would f i n d u n a c c e p t a b l e . t h i s problem:  e i t h e r g i v e up  There a r e two ways of d e a l i n g w i t h the view t h a t consent i s n e c e s s a r y  t u t e s a case of u n j . u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m .  We  a l l things considered.  ment i n " a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d " consent w i l l be b e l i e f s had stance we  forthcoming  c o u l d , I b e l i e v e , adopt  important  i s the i n t e r f e r e r ' s b e l i e f  But  i s t h a t the a c t of p a t e r n a l i s m  would n o r m a l l y  The  or would be forthcoming  not been d i s t o r t e d .  for  consti-  the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e w h i l e h o l d i n g the a c t of i n t e r v e n t i o n to unobjectionable  pater-  c o n c l u s i o n which many  p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n or agree t h a t the case b e f o r e us  morally  the  i f the  be ele-  that subject's  the problem w i t h a d o p t i n g  this  d e s c r i b e d above i s an a c t which  want to d e s c r i b e as j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m on  grounds t h a t t h e r e are good reasons f o r the i n t e r f e r e n c e .  the  Therefore,  55 the  Carter  criterion  a reasonable consent be  be  The  kind  sufficiency acts  there  on  and  we  we know i n a d v a n c e  a prima  facie  i s the kind  o f case  need  i s known t o that  some  the friend  Again,  guest  i s very  her.  i l l  I n such  there  i t i s not morally a r e two  i t wrong, have n o t h i n g  could accept  t o do w i t h  friend.  That  and  a  case  justi-^ .  alternatives:  f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  we  home  o b l i g a t e d f o r some  of paternalism  paternalism i s not n e c e s s a r i l y morally Again,  some-  home c o u l d n o t b e a c a s e o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e because  unobjectionable.  their  i n which  an i n t o x i c a t e d  the l a t t e r  the features of the act of d r i v i n g  are not i n c l i n e d  We  objection to the  Suppose h i s young d a u g h t e r  of the intoxicated  itself,  should  reasonable  victim  i n w h i c h he i s m o r a l l y  that driving  things considered.  liberty  suicide  say, i n driving  i s not s u f f i c i e n t  that  would be a  i n t h e house t o l o o k a f t e r  an a c t o f j u s t i f i e d  t h e grounds  future  imposition of education.  criterion  a l l things considered.  t h a t make  in  a t home.  paternalistic  consent  i n which  of mental d i s o r d e r , would n o t g i v e  of case which presents  i s no o n e e l s e  either  all  i n case  the compulsory  might be argued  fied,  or just  i n circumstances  to stay  cases  were n o t d i s t o r t e d .  our p o t e n t i a l  paternalistically,  justified  or  i n case  of the consent  from a party reason  i n which consent  b e c a u s e o f some k i n d  consent.to  t o cover  In addition, the c r i t e r i o n  i f the subject's b e l i e f s  incurably insane;  later  it  cases  amendment j u s t  students,  one  forthcoming.  amended t o c o v e r  this  be m o d i f i e d  expectation but i s not  isAactually  expectation  should  justified,  alternative  the friend  home  i n t e r f e r i n g with the  the a c t i s p a t e r n a l i s t i c i s ,  B u t i t i s m o r a l l y wrong on o t h e r  t o d e s c r i b e an a c t as j u s t i f i a b l e  grounds,  i fi t is  56 m o r a l l y wrong.  T h e r e f o r e , t h e C a r t e r c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d be m o d i f i e d  f u r t h e r t o exclude cases l i k e t h e one i n v o l v i n g the i n t o x i c a t e d p a r t y goer.  We can do t h i s by adding the f u r t h e r p r o v i s o t h a t t h e proposed  p a t e r n a l i s t i c a c t should n o t be m o r a l l y wrong ( o r , more g e n e r a l l y , harmful  to o t h e r s ) on grounds other than those r e l a t i n g t o o v e r r i d i n g  the b e n e f i c i a r y ' s r i g h t  to non-interference.  By now the reader w i l l have n o t i c e d a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g c o n c l u sion.  The argument t h a t we have used  f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the  compulsory i m p o s i t i o n o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n — t h e f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s — i s c r i t e r i o n above.  argument from the  e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the m o d i f i e d C a r t e r  So i t r e a l l y makes no d i f f e r e n c e whether we r e f e r  to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n we a r e u s i n g f o r compulsory l i b e r a l  education  as the argument from the f o r f e i t u r e o f r i g h t s or t h e argument the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e .  from  It i s essentially  the same argument. Of course t h e r e remains t h e problem of the u n l i k e l i h o o d o f consensus over how much and what k i n d o f i n t e r f e r e n c e people can be r e a s o n a b l y expected  t o consent  t o (as we d i s c u s s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h  Rawls i n chapter one), so i n a sense t h e above j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s m does n o t t e l l us e v e r y t h i n g we would l i k e t o know. it  i s , I t h i n k , the b e s t we can do.  But  B e s i d e s , the f a c t o f u n l i k e l y  consensus over how much and what k i n d o f i n t e r f e r e n c e people can be r e a s o n a b l y expected  t o consent  t o i n g e n e r a l , i s n o t r e a l l y a problem  f o r us because we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r case i n w h i c h — i f t h e argument o f c h a p t e r s t h r e e and f o u r i s s u c c e s s f u l — c o n s e n s u s does n o t  seem u n l i k e l y . We  might b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r how  p a r t i c u l a r cases  other  than  the  compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m would f a r e a g a i n s t the m o d i f i e d  c r i t e r i o n f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m t h a t I  s u g g e s t i n g we  adopt.  s l a v e r y I t h i n k we  With M i l l ' s example of s e l l i n g o n e s e l f i n t o  c o u l d c o n s t r u c t a s e t of circumstances  would be f o r c e d by our  for  example?  someone c o u l d secure  so chooses.  we  t h a t anyone who  Unless  decides  is  s u f f e r i n g from d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s or p e r c e p t i o n s ,  to  accept  t h a t t h e r e a r e cases  What i f  one were to  to commit s u i c i d e then we  would have  of i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the a c t of s u i c i d e  of u n j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m ,  and  i n the absence of a  theory  about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and  stance  t h a t anyone who  decides  to  freedom f o r h i s c h i l d r e n ,  S i m i l a r l y , i n the case of s u i c i d e .  take the i m p l a u s i b l e stance  t h a t are cases  i n which  c r i t e r i o n to be more l e n i e n t than M i l l and  a l l o w someone to s e l l h i m s e l f i n t o s l a v e r y i f he t h a t were the only way  am  rationality  the  to commit s u i c i d e i s s u f f e r i n g from  d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s or p e r c e p t i o n s ,  i s unacceptable.  I mention  these  cases mainly to show t h a t our c r i t e r i o n does not open the door to p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e as w i d e l y Still,  as one might at f i r s t  suppose.  i t does make room f o r an enormous number of p o s s i b l e components  for  a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m .  one  of the t r a d i t i o n a l academic s u b j e c t matters to be j u s t i f i e d  p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds. world  How  I t c e r t a i n l y allows  many people who  i n i t i a t i o n into  have l e a r n e d to see  from an h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, say, would not now  consent to t h e i r i n i t i a l  give  i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the study of h i s t o r y ?  any  on the their How  58  many people who initiation  have l e a r n e d t o t h i n k s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  i n t o that subject?  sensitivity  How  many people who  regret  have a c q u i r e d  to a v a r i e t y of nuances i n v a r i o u s a r t forms would want  to be w i t h o u t t h i s k i n d of enrichment To some extent we  in their  lives?  are supposing here t h a t compulsion w i l l  s u c c e s s f u l , i . e . , that students w i l l a c h i e v e the h i s t o r i c a l tive,  will  l e a r n to t h i n k  scientifically,  a t t a i n m e n t s cannot be compelled. what we  are j u s t i f y i n g  cesses. quent  No one  etc.  be  perspec-  But of c o u r s e , such success.  So  i s the i m p o s i t i o n of c e r t a i n s t u d i e s , not  suc-  can guarantee  S i n c e h a v i n g the successes i s p r o b a b l y n e c e s s a r y f o r subse-  consent, however, a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of success i s  n e c e s s a r y on our p a r t b e f o r e we  are j u s t i f i e d  l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n on s t u d e n t s . e x a c t l y what percentage or  their  scientifically  historically  assuming we  g i v e n the b e s t t e a c h i n g we  anyhow.  i s something  But we  a  compulsory  are unable to say historically  can manage.  How  to t h i n k  students w i l l l e a r n i n  ought not t o pre-judge  the i s s u e by  cannot be s u c c e s s f u l i n g e t t i n g students to a c h i e v e the  a t t a i n m e n t s we and as we  O b v i o u s l y , we  of s t u d e n t s w i l l l e a r n to t h i n k  or s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  v a r y i n g degrees  i n imposing  shall  are a f t e r .  Even a l i t t l e  success i s b e t t e r than none,  see i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s at l e a s t some success i s neces-  s a r y f o r the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy. I t i s p r o b a b l y t r u e t h a t many a d u l t s r e g r e t time spent i n s c h o o l enduring b o r i n g l e c t u r e s and t i r e s o m e w r i t t e n assignments, p o s s i b l e t h a t i f students were i n i t i a t e d competent, e n t h u s i a s t i c t e a c h e r s who  but i t i s  i n t o s u b j e c t matters  are themselves  by  immersed i n t h e i r  59 f i e l d s , then much of the tedium t h a t o f t e n accompanies e d u c a t i o n would d i s a p p e a r . simply  the p r a c t i c e o f  A c q u i r i n g knowledge i n any a r e a i s n o t  a matter o f l e a r n i n g f a c t s — o n e must a l s o come t o see t h e r e l a -  t i o n s h i p s between t h e f a c t s and to understand t h e u n d e r l y i n g c i p l e s t h a t b i n d them t o g e t h e r .  prin-  Only then can one's knowledge make  a d i f f e r e n c e t o how one sees and f e e l s about t h e w o r l d , and o n l y then can one be s a i d t o be t r u l y i n i t i a t e d  i n t o a s u b j e c t matter.  It i s  the compulsory i n i t i a t i o n o f s t u d e n t s  i n t o realms o f knowledge t h a t  we s h a l l c o n s i d e r , n o t compulsory s u b j e c t i o n t o poor t e a c h i n g methods. So t h e e m p i r i c a l c l a i m t h a t many people do i n f a c t r e g r e t having compelled t o study t r a d i t i o n a l academic s u b j e c t s  been  (and i t i s d i f f i c u l t  to guess what percentage of the p o p u l a t i o n t h a t might i n c l u d e ) , i s no o b j e c t i o n t o the c l a i m t h a t compulsory i n i t i a t i o n i n t o t r a d i t i o n a l academic realms i s prima f a c i e j u s t i f i a b l e on p a t e r n a l i s t i c But an academic  c u r r i c u l u m i s not the o n l y k i n d o f c u r r i c u l u m  t h a t might be prima f a c i e j u s t i f i a b l e on p a t e r n a l i s t i c Convincing  grounds.  grounds.  cases c o u l d be made, I t h i n k , u s i n g our c r i t e r i o n , i n  f a v o r o f the compulsory i n i t i a t i o n o f students  i n t o thousands of  a c t i v i t i e s i n c l u d e d w i t h i n such c a t e g o r i e s as a r t s and c r a f t s , v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , p h y s i c a l f i t n e s s , and so f o r t h .  Because  there  are o n l y f i v e or s i x hours i n the average s c h o o l day we c o u l d not hope t o f i t i n t o a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m a l l the components t h a t might be a c c e p t a b l e  on p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds.  So, from the wide  range of e u r r i c u l a r p o s s i b i l i t i e s we have t o make c h o i c e s what we should  teach i n schools.  about  I argue i n chapter -three f o r t h e  60  a d o p t i o n of p e r s o n a l autonomy as the c r i t e r i o n to h e l p us make t h e s e choices.  CHAPTER I I I  PERSONAL AUTONOMY  The personal  main purpose of t h i s chapter i s t o argue f o r t h e promotion o f autonomy as t h e c r i t e r i o n t o h e l p us narrow t h e range o f c u r -  r i c u l a r components t h a t t h e argument from t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f r i g h t s p e r m i t s us t o impose on s t u d e n t s . a fairly  B e f o r e t h i s can be argued, however,  d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f what i t means t o be autonomous should be  supplied.  1.  The Meaning o f 'Personal  Autonomy'  Autonomy has t o do w i t h s e l f - r u l e .  Inspection  o f the o r i g i n of  the word r e v e a l s t h a t t h e Greek word autonomia was commonly a p p l i e d t o the c i t y s t a t e .  The s t a t e had autonomia i f i t was a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  independent e n t i t y , f r e e from e x t e r n a l r u l e s and c o n t r o l s . speak of an autonomous n a t i o n i n r e f e r e n c e a country t h a t has p o l i t i c a l independence. gaining  We o f t e n  to a self-governing  country,  When we speak of a c o l o n y  i t s independence or autonomy from a mother c o u n t r y , we some-  times speak of t h e dependent s t a t e g a i n i n g i t s freedom.  'Freedom'  used i n t h i s sense does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h e absence of c o n s t r a i n t f o r p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s , however, s i n c e a s t r i c t d i c t a t o r s h i p may a l s o be a f r e e country i n t h e sense t h a t i t i s a p o l i t i c a l l y nation. 61  independent  62 'Autonomy' may  speak  chial  of  school,  independent  organization.  of the nervous  the central  to  autonomy  formerly  system,  arise  the term  does  The t a s k  or s e l f - r u l e  The f o l l o w i n g e x p l i c a t i o n  and  on t h e u s e f u l n e s s  to r e f e r  to a  of this  sec-  i n reference personal  c o n s i s t e n t and  i s applied i n reference  i s based  partly  of the d e f i n i t i o n  or  independently  the concept of  not provide  'autonomy'  persons. partly  i n botany  i n analysing  paro-  i n reference to  to function  causes.  o f autonomy  or a  We  system), u n i v e r s i t y ,  i n biology  thought  from i n t e r n a l  to institutions.  a private school  and i t i s used  o r d i n a r y usage  e x a m p l e s o f how  (e.g.,  The t e r m i s u s e d  Difficulties  because  i n reference  of the p u b l i c school  i s to e x p l i c a t e the notion  persons.  cut  results  also  school  system  nervous  c o n d i t i o n which tion  be used  o f an autonomous  religious parts  may  on common  clearto usage  i n the educational  setting. The c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n a l 'autonomy'  autonomy  are often attributed  and t h e p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e t e r m  t o Kant:  A man was a u t o n o m o u s i n K a n t ' s v i e w i f i n h i s a c t i o n s h e b o u n d h i m s e l f b y m o r a l l a w s l e g i s l a t e d b y h i s own r e a s o n , a s o p p o s e d t o b e i n g governed by h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s . A n d no d o u b t K a n t i s t h e s o u r c e f o r P i a g e t ' s employment o f t h e t e r m . ( D e a r d e n , 1972, p . 448) Our a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n a l referred  to simply  autonomous reason, by  as autonomy)  i f he b i n d s  himself  goes  beyond  by m o r a l  to include those s i t u a t i o n s  autonomy  laws  i n which  (henceforth  Kant's  view  legislated one m i g h t  considerations of a e s t h e t i c s , e t i q u e t t e , expediency,  etc.  The c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n a l  autonomy  i s no d o u b t  that  t o be one i s  b y h i s own bind  himself  prudence,  intimately  63 connected  w i t h t h e concept  o f moral agency, but many s i t u a t i o n s  i n which autonomy can be e x e r c i s e d out of the moral Among t e a c h e r s who v a l u e t h e promotion  arise  realm.  o f autonomy as an educa-  t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e , t h e r e i s o f t e n a g r e a t d e a l o f c o n f u s i o n over what autonomy e n t a i l s , and how i t may be p r o p e r l y taught, promoted, d e v e l oped, o r i n s t i l l e d .  Some t e a c h e r s mistake m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f some-  t h i n g resembling a s t a t e o f anomie i n students f o r t h e e x e r c i s e o f autonomy.  Others  way t o develop  o f t e n accept as f a c t t h e assumption  autonomy i n s t u d e n t s i s t o t r e a t them as i f they a r e  a l r e a d y autonomous. blanche  t h a t the b e s t  In some c a s e s , s t u d e n t s a r e g i v e n a c a r t e  t o d e c i d e f o r themselves  what they w i l l do, as i f the a b i l i t y  to make autonomous d e c i s i o n s comes n a t u r a l l y t o those who a r e g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x e r c i s e freedom o f c h o i c e . t h i s assumption  Teachers who make  seem t o be e q u a t i n g freedom of c h o i c e w i t h autonomy  w h i l e i g n o r i n g the other n e c e s s a r y  conditions.  Conceivably,  indi-  v i d u a l s c o u l d r e q u i r e sound s t r u c t u r e and f i r m d i r e c t i o n t o measure themselves  a g a i n s t , so t o speak, b e f o r e they a r e a b l e to r e a c h a  h i g h l y autonomous l e v e l of development.  Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t  development i n a c h i e v i n g autonomy c o u l d be impaired as a r e s u l t o f the i m p o s i t i o n o f too much freedom o f c h o i c e a t an e a r l y age.  In  any case, t h e educator must be aware t h a t s i n c e people a r e n o t autonomous when they a r e born, and s i n c e many people reach o l d age without a t t a i n i n g v e r y h i g h l e v e l s of autonomy, some l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s which i s n o t p u r e l y m a t u r a t i o n a l i s i n v o l v e d i n becoming autonomous ( P e t e r s , 1973b, p. 176).  The t e a c h e r must, o f c o u r s e , concern h i m s e l f w i t h  those methods of t e a c h i n g t h i s process.  and  l e a r n i n g which most e f f e c t i v e l y enhance  Although c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r s , some l i g h t may of the concept of autonomy and an e d u c a t i o n a l provide may  be  objective.  about e f f e c t i v e methodology  be  shed on them by  Whether the work of the p h i l o s o p h e r  c e r t a i n that valuable  the k i n d s  of c o n d i t i o n s  "capable of j u d g i n g , science, morality,  educational  impossible included  Frankena d e s c r i b e s  analysis  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s promotion  v e r y much a s s i s t a n c e to the e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h e r  be promoted i s v i r t u a l l y  the  and  research  on how  can  or not,  we  autonomy  may  without a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of excluded by  the  concept.  the autonomous person as someone who  a c t i n g and  as  t h i n k i n g on h i s own  e t c . " (Frankena, 1973,  p. 30).  is  in art, history, Riesman  says:  The autonomous are those who on the whole are capable of conforming to the b e h a v i o u r a l norms of t h e i r s o c i e t y — a c a p a c i t y the anomics u s u a l l y l a c k — b u t are f r e e to choose whether to conform or not. (Riesman, 1954, Our  task i s to unpack what i t means to say  judging,  a c t i n g , and  t h i n k i n g on h i s own,  someone i s c a p a b l e of conforming and  p.  40)  t h a t someone i s c a p a b l e of and what i t means to say  that  y e t f r e e to choose o t h e r w i s e .  Autonomy, or s e l f - r u l e , i s i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to the n o t i o n heteronomy, r u l e by o t h e r s .  Heteronomy may  i t y on the p a r t of someone who t o l d to do, officials,  or b e l i e v e s what he or anyone who  take the form of  rather thoughtlessly  i s a b l e to i n f l u e n c e him.  advertisers,  This  other-  d i r e c t e d person t y p i c a l l y takes h i s cues from other p e o p l e . might be more a c c u r a t e  passiv-  does what he i s  i s t o l d to b e l i e v e — b y  to d e s c r i b e what he does as r e a c t i n g  of  It rather  than a c t i n g . it  Heteronomy sometimes takes t h e form of p a s s i v i t y , but  can a l s o take the form of a c t i v e n e u r o s i s  extreme cases o f o b s e s s i o n  or other kinds  or psychosis  o f dementia.  as i n Such an  i n n e r - d i r e c t e d p e r s o n i s r u l e d by i n t e r n a l i z e d ' o t h e r s ' i n such a way as t o p r e c l u d e  t h e use o f r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n .  p e r s o n i s heteronomous t o the extent  The i n n e r - d i r e c t e d  t h a t he i s r u l e d by f a c t o r s  which, though not e x t e r n a l t o him, a r e e x t e r n a l t o h i s own r a t i o n a l l y and  j u s t i f i a b l y held b e l i e f s .  Three c o n d i t i o n s appear t o d i s t i n g u i s h  the autonomous from t h e heteronomous p e r s o n . A.  Freedom o f Choice Inherent i n t h e concept o f p e r s o n a l  freedom o f c h o i c e .  autonomy i s the n o t i o n o f  The problem of freedom from the hard or s o f t  d e t e r m i n i s t p o s i t i o n need n o t concern us h e r e . all  a c t s have causes i n no way i n t e r f e r e s w i t h  make between u n a v o i d a b l e a c t s — t h o s e difference—and  The c o n t e n t i o n  the d i s t i n c t i o n we  a c t s t o which reasons make no  those a c t s i n which n e i t h e r o v e r t nor c o v e r t  sion i s s i g n i f i c a n t .  that  compul-  When we speak of f r e e l y chosen a c t s , we a r e  speaking o f those a c t s f o r which the agent has c a u s a l l y  operative  reasons as opposed t o r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s . As Benn and P e t e r s p o i n t out, we do n o t a t t r i b u t e t h e e x e r c i s e of autonomy t o anyone whose freedom of c h o i c e i s c o n s t r a i n e d outwardly or i n w a r d l y ,  either  i . e . , e i t h e r o b j e c t i v e l y or s u b j e c t i v e l y  ( P e t e r s , 1973b, p. 122).  The o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of:freedom of  c h o i c e i n c l u d e a l l those c o n d i t i o n s which a r e e x t e r n a l t o t h e agent. They t y p i c a l l y imply  t h e absence o f c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s .  A  66 person if  can hardly  be s a i d  i t i s demanded  his  wallet  of him a t gunpoint  to a thief.  freedom of choice is  u s u a l l y more  t o b e e x e r c i s i n g autonomy o r f r e e d o m o f that  he h a n d  over  I n such a case the o b j e c t i v e  are not s a t i s f i e d .  r e a d i l y apparent  the contents of conditions f o r  The a b s e n c e o f s u c h  than  the absence  choice  conditions  of subj e c t i v e  condi-  tions . The  subjective  conditions tive  conditions  of freedom o f c h o i c e  which a r e i n t e r n a l to the agent.  conditions  o f freedom o f c h o i c e  Peters  a r e absent  include claims  a l l those the  subjec-  i n any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g  circumstances: 1)  i f one i s d r i v e n towards a p a r t i c u l a r g o a l as a d r u g a d d i c t o r a l c o h o l i c i s d r i v e n t o s e e k r e l i e f f r o m some p r e s e n t cond i t i o n of acute deprivation,  2)  i f one i s i n c a p a b l e o f c o n s i d e r i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s b e f o r e d e c i d i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n a s a h y s t e r i c w o u l d be i n c a p a b l e o f d o i n g , i f o n e c a n n o t c h a n g e o n e ' s b e l i e f s i n t h e l i g h t o f new a n d r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e a s a p a r a n o i d o r someone s u f f e r i n g f r o m o t h e r k i n d s o f o b s e s s i o n s and d e l u s i o n s would be u n a b l e t o do, i f changes i n one's b e l i e f s f a i l t o produce changes i n one's d e c i s i o n s as i n t h e c a s e o f t h e p s y c h o p a t h , and i f changes i n one's d e c i s i o n s f a i l t o p r o d u c e changes i n o n e ' s a c t i o n s a s i n t h e c a s e o f t h e k l e p t o m a n i a c o r some other kind of compulsive.  3)  4) 5)  (Peters, George du M a u r i e r ' s be  said  that  t o be a c t i n g  repeatedly  under  moved  the hypnotic  freedom of choice did  what  about  s h e was  changes  Trilby  told  i n putting  her audience  to tears  of Svengali  were m i n i m i z e d  on m u s i c a l  the subjective  a f f e c t i n g changes i n her  s h e was  conditions  absent.  i s a l l she d i d .  hardly  performances  because while  i f not altogether  t o do a n d t h a t  i n her b e l i e f s  123-124)  O ' F a r r e l l , f o r example, c o u l d  autonomously  influence  op. c i t . , pp.  of  Trilby  Questions decisions  as  well  not  as  changes  even a r i s e . Peters  tive,  but  She  i t appears  fies  that  five  actions  the  kinds  not  unavoidable  to  Svengali  as  could  have a c t e d  l i e within  responses.  the  legal  i n which  the  under  well within Freedom of  relevant  the  choice  forms of  condition  for  condition.  the  exercise  Imagine the  opinion  i n the  the  on  his beliefs  choice to are  i n the  sense  r e f e r to him  as  an  i n some s e n s e n o t  someone e l s e t o be  true  s a y s so  we  can  etc.,  of  the  compulsion i t i s not  we  speci-  person's  result  own;  rather  may  so  forth,  or  absence is a a  call  his  a person  own.  of  necessary  sufficient  d i c t a t e s of  from the  major-  advertising  When he  makes a d e c i s i o n  well  e x e r c i s i n g freedom  be  above, but  we  they have been adopted  than because of  in  hypnosis,  would  the  Something e l s e i s  of  beliefs  simply  agent h i m s e l f  based  hesitate  autonomous d e c i s i o n maker b e c a u s e h i s his  the  thoughtlessly  from the  lives,  i t i s described  f o r good r e a s o n s  then, before  he  exhaus-  list a  also  someone who  friends.  or v a l u e s ,  that  implies  autonomy, b u t  s i t u a t i o n of  from h i s best  but  of  i n s a n i t y , and  subjective  morals,  t o be  do  list.  community w h e r e he  even  of  of  could.  His  influence  sense that  and  values,  media, or one  of h i s  i n the  objective  adopts h i s b e l i e f s , ity  limits  anyone  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on  causes  person himself  Acting  actions  list  otherwise.  brainwashing, i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n i n g , falls  his  i n her  s i t u a t i o n s i n which  of moral or  circumstances  b l i n d l y as  intends  cover a l l those  imputations  of  a f f e c t i n g changes  s t a t e w h e t h e r he  agent  only  decisions  followed  does not  normally withdraw grounds  i n her  because  holds  them  necessary  a u t o n o m o u s — n a m e l y , some d e g r e e  of  68  rational B.  reflection. Rational Reflection  The Oxford E n g l i s h d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s ' r e f l e c t i o n *  as the a c t i o n  of deep and s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n and ' r a t i o n a l ' as h a v i n g t h e f a c u l t y of r e a s o n i n g as w e l l as e x e r c i s i n g one's reason i n a proper manner, h a v i n g sound judgment, b e i n g sane and s e n s i b l e , e t c .  The term  ' r a t i o n a l ' comes from the L a t i n r a t i o meaning r e a s o n . ' r a t i o n a l ' and 'reasonable' a r e o f t e n used usage and even i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e . r a t i o n a l ' synonymously w i t h Reason" (1972).  P r o f e s s o r P o l e uses 'the  He opposes ' r a t i o n a l ' , however, o n l y t o 'non' i r r a t i o n a l ' t o r e f e r t o people who  reason but who reason v e r y p o o r l y .  Max B l a c k , on the o t h e r hand,  ' i r r a t i o n a l ' t o mean something  able'  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y i n everyday  'reason' i n h i s a r t i c l e "The Concept of  r a t i o n a l ' , r e s e r v i n g the term  uses  The a d j e c t i v e s  ("Reasonableness", 1972).  rather different  from  'unreason-  B l a c k p o i n t s out a f i n e shade o f  d i f f e r e n c e between the two concepts when he s a y s , ". . .we  talk  about  an ' i r r a t i o n a l impulse', but s u r e l y n o t — o r not so f r e e l y —  about  an unreasonable  that  impulse"  (Op. c i t . , p. 201).  Black implies  ' i r r a t i o n a l ' r e f e r s not t o poor r e a s o n i n g but t o t h e absence of  reasoning.  But i f ' i r r a t i o n a l ' r e f e r s not t o poor r e a s o n i n g but t o  the absence o f r e a s o n i n g , then t h e phrase to be redundant  because an impulse  absence o f r e a s o n i n g .  ' i r r a t i o n a l impulse'  appears  i s t y p i c a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e  I n any case, i n s a y i n g t h a t r a t i o n a l  reflec-  t i o n i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f autonomy we a r e s a y i n g two t h i n g s : 1)  t h a t one must have reasons f o r one's b e h a v i o u r , and  69 2)  t h a t one's reasons must be good  Let us d e a l w i t h  ones.  (1) and (2) i n t u r n .  Imagine t h a t we meet someone who has j u s t r u n up seventeen f l i g h t s o f s t a i r s t o the upper  s t o r e y of a l a r g e o f f i c e b l o c k , and  we ask him, "Why d i d n ' t you take the e l e v a t o r ? "  Our normal  expecta-  t i o n i s t h a t we w i l l be g i v e n an answer i n d i c a t i v e of some c o n s c i o u s l y held, causally operative  r e a s o n f o r t h e a c t i o n such a s , "The e l e v a t o r  was too crowded," or " I needed t h e e x e r c i s e , " or "There i s no e l e v a t o r in this building." know.  I f , however, the response we r e c e i v e i s " I don't  I have no i d e a why I d i d t h a t , " then we would r e g a r d the  a c t i o n as i m p u l s i v e  or perhaps  as compelled, but not as autonomous.  The a c t i o n may have been m o t i v a t e d by some unconscious d r i v e , but unconscious d r i v e s a r e causes of a c t i o n s , not reasons f o r a c t i n g . Reasons a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which t h e a c t o r takes i n t o account i n h o l d -  ing c e r t a i n b e l i e f s , proving  certain points, etc.  That r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n r e q u i r e s one t o have reasons f o r one's choices  does not mean t h a t one's reasons must be s i l e n t l y reviewed by  an agent performed  each time he performs  an a c t i o n .  i n a somewhat h a b i t u a l manner.  Many of our a c t i o n s a r e Having reasons and con-  s t a n t l y reminding o n e s e l f o f those reasons a r e two d i f f e r e n t One might n o t be c o n s c i o u s l y m i n d f u l  of the reasons why one gets out  of bed as the alarm c l o c k r i n g s a t seven o ' c l o c k very  l i k e l y one c o u l d supply  the  matters.  each morning, but  reasons i f asked t o do so.  R a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t one must have reasons f o r a c t i n g but not that one be c o n s t a n t l y m i n d f u l  o f them.  That  a rationally  actions  i s easily  reasons  must b e  reflective  granted, but  good  ones.  i t i s more d i f f i c u l t  What  in  a c e r t a i n way  To  l o o k f o r someone's t e l e p h o n e  for  example,  cases  that  he  has  no  In  either  he  does,  f o r an case  but  realize  that  completely  telephone  a c t i o n might  injury  you  does not  h i s reasons  unreflective  o f a good r e a s o n ,  reflect  then,  as  a l l the p o s s i b l e  guish  cases  those  called  f o r from It  reasons  than  consequences  i s good a t r a t i o n a l  one's  acting  what d o e s  of B l a c k ' s  to complain  not?  We  Another  that  are  others.  p.  not  and  r e f l e c t i o n w o u l d be  the  first  require-  u p o n by  the import  partner)  to  of c r i s i s  to d e l i b e r a t e  o f one's a c t i o n  would  sufficient  In time  the pros  f o r what  regard  The  of  201).  o r he  deliberated  conduct  time  someone i s  have reasons  do  know,  paradigm  ( B l a c k , 1972,  might  t o w e i g h up  Someone who  for  irrational.  i t be  t h e r e i s o f t e n no time  and  a c a r e e r , or a marriage  r e q u i r e much more d e l i b e r a t i o n  sider  be  i s that  choosing a r e l i g i o n ,  for acting—no  reason  self-directed.  ( s u c h as  reasons  the  are inadequate. person  t o show t h a t  u p o n them, p r e s u m a b l y ,  O b v i o u s l y , some c o u r s e s o f  though,  i s one  concerned  agent.  emergency,  belief  h a v e done h i m  the i n d i v i d u a l  he  a s a good  for his  number i n t h e d i r e c t o r y when y o u  a c t i o n v e r g i n g on  of unreasonable  ungrateful  counts  for holding a certain  of unreasonable  instance  ment  or  p e r s o n must h a v e r e a s o n s  upon  cons in  one's  or to  i s possible,  i n which  able to  distinis  i t i s not.  of course, that  f o r acting without  con-  detail.  i n w h i c h a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f d e l i b e r a t i o n  those  or  one  could r e f l e c t  b e i n g autonomous;  upon  so a p e r s o n ' s  one's reasoning  must conform  to c e r t a i n minimum standards or e l s e we  are l i k e l y  to  r e g a r d him as i n d o c t r i n a t e d , m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d , demented, p s y c h o t i c , c o n d i t i o n e d , o r what have you.  The standards to which one must  con-  form are those of o b j e c t i v i t y , r e l e v a n c e , l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y , impartiality,  etc.  To be r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e i s to a s s e s s b e l i e f s  and b e h a v i o r s a t l e a s t to some e x t e n t , n o n - a r b i t r a r i l y . One's a b i l i t y  to r e f l e c t  r a t i o n a l l y on one's p r i n c i p l e s ,  m o t i v e s , g o a l s , and so on, presupposes  aims,  the presence of some s e t t l e d  and undisputed c r i t e r i a by means of which one i s a b l e t o examine the v a l i d i t y o f the p o i n t o f view o r course o f a c t i o n b e i n g r e f l e c t e d upon. Of course one can ask such q u e s t i o n s as "Why  bother t a k i n g a l l the  r e l e v a n t d a t a i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n when making a d e c i s i o n ? " or  "Why  b o t h e r t r y i n g t o be l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ? " but, as F e i n b e r g p o i n t s out, " I f we  take autonomy t o r e q u i r e t h a t a l l p r i n c i p l e s are to be  examined a f r e s h i n the l i g h t of reason on each o c c a s i o n f o r d e c i s i o n , then n o t h i n g resembling r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n can ever get started"  ( F e i n b e r g , 1973,  The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  p.  166).  c o n s i d e r s reason to be a t h r e a t to autonomy  on the grounds t h a t i f an i n d i v i d u a l becomes a s l a v e to the demands of such r e a s o n a b l e p r i n c i p l e s as l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y , the becomes a "mere p a s s i v e onlooker of s e l f - p r o p e l l e d (Dearden,  1972,  k i n d of c l a i m .  p. 450).  individual  reasonings"  S e v e r a l responses might be made t o t h i s  F i r s t , i f an i n d i v i d u a l chooses  to make use o f  r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i n d e c i d i n g on a course of a c t i o n at the expense  of the s a t i s f a c t i o n of h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s , he omy  i n making t h a t d e c i s i o n .  T h i s response i s not w h o l l y  t o r y , however, s i n c e i t a l l o w s which are not  i s indeed e x e r c i s i n g autonsatisfac-  autonomy to be a t t r i b u t e d to those a c t s  r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t e d upon as w e l l as those t h a t  Second, i f the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t wishes to equate the  are.  unreasonable,  anomic c h a r a c t e r w i t h the autonomous person, then t h e r e would be point i n holding  up  such a c h a o t i c c o n d i t i o n as e i t h e r a  i d e a l or an e d u c a t i o n a l intelligible make use  objective.  T h i r d , we  simply  the n o t i o n of a . c r i t e r i o n l e s s c h o i c e .  of s e t t l e d r u l e s and  personal  cannot make I f one  did  p r i n c i p l e s i n making d e c i s i o n s  examining b e l i e f s , one's judgments would be  A s t a t e of c o g n i t i v e anomie can h a r d l y be  ered  Making use  reasoning  i s not  One  who  o n l y no  i f they measure up  s t a n d a r d s , i . e . , c e r t a i n r u l e s and  principles.  dence, and  to c o n s i d e r  His  has at some  conduct i s t y p i -  the consequences of h i s  he a c t s , to a l t e r h i s b e l i e f s i n the l i g h t of new  to change h i s a t t i t u d e s as c i r c u m s t a n c e s change.  unnecessary judgments on the b a s i s of i r r e l e v a n t and He  consid-  to c e r t a i n  r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e p e r s o n t r i e s to be o b j e c t i v e and  dence.  only  d e l i b e r a t e s upon them (or has  time d e l i b e r a t e d upon them) to see  actions before  on  a p r e r e q u i s i t e to i t .  engages i n r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n then, not  f i e d by e x e r c i s i n g an a b i l i t y  and  of s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s to guide one's  t h r e a t to autonomy but  reasons f o r h i s a c t i o n s , but  not  a r b i t r a r y , based only  whim or impulse. desirable..  no  i s a b l e to a r r i v e at n o n - a r b i t r a r y  evi-  The  does not make  inadequate  evi-  conclusions r e s u l t i n g  from r e f l e c t i v e d e l i b e r a t i o n s as opposed to the a r b i t r a r y whims of  the u n d e l i b e r a t i v e agent.  T h i s i s not to say t h a t whoever r e f l e c t s  r a t i o n a l l y w i l l always make the most r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n , but he at l e a s t be aware of what the most r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n appears to him.  One  may  d e c i d e to f o l l o w a whim or an impulse  will  t o be  i n any number  of s i t u a t i o n s , but an i n d i v i d u a l a c t s autonomously i n such cases to the extent t h a t he has  engaged i n r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n b e f o r e making  a d e c i s i o n t o a c t unreasonably stance.  o r i r r a t i o n a l l y i n any  given circum-  I f an i n d i v i d u a l d i d . n o t go.through the p r o c e s s of  r e f l e c t i o n b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o abandon the e n t e r p r i s e and whim i n s t e a d , we would be i n c l i n e d  follow a  t o c a l l him an i m p u l s i v e or an  anomic c h a r a c t e r , although i t would be d i f f i c u l t p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s whether one or autonomously d o i n g  rational  to d e c i d e i n any  i s a n o m i c a l l y f o l l o w i n g a whim  so.  The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as t o what degree of o b j e c t i v i t y or consistency i s necessary  i n one's r e a s o n i n g s b e f o r e one  buted w i t h a c t i n g or t h i n k i n g autonomously. i m p o s s i b l e t o draw a m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  Although  can be i t may  those i n which we would s a y : i t i s absent  be d i s r e g a r d e d .  We  attribe  p r e c i s e l i n e to d i s t i n g u i s h  where r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s p r e s e n t but of v e r y poor q u a l i t y  f o l l o w t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n s we  logical  cases  from  a l t o g e t h e r , i t does not  n o r m a l l y make i n t h i s r e g a r d ought t o  do not r e q u i r e t h a t one's b e l i e f s be t r u e or  r e a s o n i n g s w h o l l y a c c u r a t e b e f o r e we e x e r c i s e of autonomy to him.  a t t r i b u t e the p o s s e s s i o n or  For example, a person c o u l d spend  t h i r t y y e a r s s t u d y i n g the pyramids of Egypt an e l a b o r a t e t h e o r y about how  one'  and  e v e n t u a l l y a r r i v e at  they were c o n s t r u c t e d .  The  theory  74 might be f a l s e , but we would not deny t h a t the agent had p r e s e n t e d us w i t h a good example o f autonomous t h i n k i n g simply because h i s t h e o r y is  false.  N e i t h e r f a l s e b e l i e f s nor e r r o r s i n judgment n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t t o autonomy i n the way t h a t . a n i n a b i l i t y t i n g u i s h what might count count  as a reason  to d i s -  f o r a c t i n g from what would n o t  as a reason f o r a c t i n g c o n s t i t u t e s such a t h r e a t . Besides  freedom of c h o i c e and r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n t h e r e i s at  l e a s t one o t h e r c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s a r y autonomy.  t o the p o s s e s s i o n o f p e r s o n a l  Where t h e r e i s no s t r e n g t h o f w i l l t o c a r r y through  the c h o i c e s one has made t h e r e can be no autonomy.  with  We need not get  i n t o the debate here about whether t h e r e ever r e a l l y a r e any gaps between judgment and a c t i o n . our everyday  lives.  We f r e q u e n t l y e x p e r i e n c e  such gaps i n  No doubt t h e case c o u l d be made t h a t t h e r e i s  an i n v e r s e c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e frequency  o f such gaps i n one's  l i f e and the e x e r c i s e of s e l f - r u l e . C.  S t r e n g t h of W i l l The  to  presence  of s t r e n g t h of w i l l i n any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n seems  depend t o some extent upon the presence  inclinations.  I f counter-inclinations offer relatively  f e r e n c e w i t h one's purposes,  little  inter-  g o a l s , aims, or d e c i s i o n s , then one i s  u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d with having If  and s t r e n g t h o f c o u n t e r -  d e t e r m i n a t i o n and s t r e n g t h of w i l l .  one i s e a s i l y swayed by c o u n t e r - i n c l i n a t i o n s one i s s a i d t o be  weak-willed.  The weak-willed  person  i s c l o s e r t o a s t a t e of anomie  than a s t r o n g e r - w i l l e d c o u n t e r p a r t because h i s b e l i e f s , v a l u e s , c i p l e s , i n c l i n a t i o n s , etc., are constantly i n c o n f l i c t .  prin-  The v a l u e s  of  the  strong-willed  hierarchical willed  i s the  This  disciplined that  structure  person  person.  the  p e r s o n have been  one  i s not  m o r e one  willed  and  willed  person usually  living  the  caused,  beliefs,  values,  archical  patterns  contrary Peters, in  the  The  as  this  the  personal  the  his  self-disciplined  conflict.  them, so  of  least  that  Often  the  and  m o r e one  a new  the  s t a t e of  is strong-  strong-  dilemmas  turbulence.  or  at  equilibrium  i n part,  by  an  i n a b i l i t y to  inclinations,  s w a y e d by  principles.  etc.,  whims and "The  i n d e p e n d e n t l y m i n d e d man,  r i d i c u l e , ostracism,  will  put  into  hier-  Therefore,  the  impulses which  strong-willed sticks  punishment  without  Weakness o f  of which p r i o r i t i e s a r i s e .  i s easily  i t seems  t o make a u t o n o m o u s d e c i s i o n s  inner  purposes,  self-  d i f f e r e n c e between the  conflicts  a  stronger-  strong-willed,  reflection  into  and  man,"  to h i s  run says  principles  bribes"  (Peters,  125).  Value  In omy  of  as  The  p e r s o n , however, i s t h a t  state  reasoned  " l i k e the  1973b, p .  2.  person  to h i s  face  out  The  individual  goals,  to  the  in rational  resolves  at  refer that  ordered  priorities.  experience  conflict.  i n a perpetual  weak-willed  never  terms w i t h  enabling  probably  often  weak-willed  comes t o  results,  is  experience  defined  suggest  engages  to  the  we  to  person w i l l  likely  least  of w e l l  systematically  of  Personal  section  most  I argue  important  autonomy h a s  Autonomy  both  aim  t h a t we of  ought  compulsory  extrinsic  value  to  adopt  personal  education. and  auton-  I argue  i n t r i n s i c value.  that I  76 suggest not o n l y t h a t autonomy JLS v e r y w i d e l y more h i g h l y v a l u e d f o r i t s own  sake than other p o s s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s f o r the aim of compulsory  s c h o o l i n g , but a l s o t h a t i t ought t o be more h i g h l y v a l u e d f o r i t s own  sake than other p o s s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s  (e.g., happiness  or knowledge  f o r the sake of knowledge) because of i t s i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n s our n o t i o n s of human d i g n i t y and  self-respect.  Of course we  with would  not want to argue t h a t t h e r e i s no more t o the b u s i n e s s of e d u c a t i o n than the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy, because c l e a r l y autonomous people can c o n t i n u e t o educate  themselves  l o n g a f t e r they have become autonomous.  or t o be educated Rather,  by  others  the argument i s  t h a t the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s the b e s t c r i t e r i o n f o r us to use i n p i c k i n g out components f o r a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m justified  on p a t e r n a l i s t i c  the e x t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c and  grounds..  In e f f e c t , I am a r g u i n g t h a t  i n t r i n s i c worth of p e r s o n a l autonomy exceeds the  i n t r i n s i c worth of other v a l u e s t h a t might be  as aims of compulsory  adopted  education.  Something has i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , says P a u l T a y l o r , i f i t i s a felt  or p e r c e i v e d q u a l i t y of e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s v a l u e d f o r i t s own  sake (1961, pp.  19-32).  ' i n t r i n s i c value.' of b e i n g i n charge  The  I s h a l l f o l l o w T a y l o r i n t h i s use of e x p e r i e n c e of b e i n g an autonomous person,  of one's l i f e ,  i s c l e a r l y an e x p e r i e n c e t h a t can  have i n t r i n s i c v a l u e i n t h i s sense.  Something t h a t has  v a l u e , on the other hand, has v a l u e o n l y i n a d e r i v a t i v e Taylor value:  (op. c i t . ) d i s t i n g u i s h e s among t h r e e k i n d s of i n h e r e n t v a l u e , i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e , and  extrinsic sense.  extrinsic  contributive value.  Personal  autonomy has  inherent value  i n so f a r as i t has  to produce i n us a q u a l i t y of e x p e r i e n c e for  us.  I t has  d e s i r a b l e end, t h a t has  instrumental  and  i t has  intrinsic,  F i r s t , we  value  which has  capacity  intrinsic  value  i n so f a r as i t i s a means to a  c o n t r i b u t i v e value  i f i t i s p a r t of a whole  i n h e r e n t , or i n s t r u m e n t a l  w i l l consider  the  value.*  the e x t r i n s i c rewards of autonomy.  It  c o u l d be argued, f o r example, t h a t the promotion of autonomy w i l l have economic and m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s f o r the c h i l d production  i n a s o c i e t y where  of goods depends i n l a r g e measure on i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e  and  resourcefulness.  and  e x e r c i s e s t r e n g t h of w i l l , autonomous persons may  ity  f o r more i n i t i a t i v e and  persons—at knowledge.  the  Because they choose f r e e l y , r e f l e c t  resourcefulness  rationally,  have the  capac-  than non-autonomous  l e a s t i n so f a r as non-autonomous persons are l a c k i n g i n I t c o u l d a l s o be argued t h a t autonomous p e o p l e are needed  to form the c o r t e x of the e n t i r e body p o l i t i c i f the human r a c e i s to progress  i n a worthwhile d i r e c t i o n .  People are g e n e r a l l y aware of  the problems of i n c r e a s i n g p o l l u t i o n , over p o p u l a t i o n , a l i e n a t i o n , inflation, f a r very  the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weaponry and  the l i k e , but  l i t t l e has been done to remedy these s i t u a t i o n s .  We  so  can  assume t h a t autonomous people are b e t t e r equipped to seek s o l u t i o n s to problems than non-autonomous people because r a t i o n a l i s u s u a l l y r e q u i r e d to f i n d s o l u t i o n s to problems. c h o i c e and  reflection  Freedom of  s t r e n g t h of w i l l are f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d to implement  *The i n t e r e s t e d reader might pursue these d i s t i n c t i o n s f u r t h e r by c o n s u l t i n g not o n l y T a y l o r (op. c i t . ) , but a l s o B a y l i s ( i n T a y l o r , 1967), Lewis (1946), and Von Wright (1963).  78 solutions. Another  argument  might be r e f e r r e d autonomy  as  t o an i n t r i n s i c a l l y  or i t c a n be regarded of being  i s important  an autonomous p e r s o n  because  We h a v e a l r e a d y i n relation  us i s t h a t  i t i s important  considered  p r o m o t i o n o f autonomy) l e a d s  c l a i m t h a t autonomy true i n every  that  fact,  than  i t i s probably  modern t i m e s ,  the promotion of  t o human h a p p i n e s s  argument  need  t o some  i t i s an e m p i r i c a l (in this  case—the  evidence.  f o r i t t o lend support  That  need not  on whether he f i n d s i t or a passive  recipient t o be an  a n o n - a u t o n o m o u s o n e i s n o t a new i d e a .  i t has p l a y e d  a central  role  Still,  F o r t h e sup-  i t i s more s a t i s f y i n g  as o l d as p h i l o s o p h y  and as  t o the view  i s a desirable thing. only r e f l e c t  or  of non-interference  by c o u n t e r  t o b e an autonomous p e r s o n  autonomous p e r s o n  i n so f a r  t o v e r y much human s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  p o s s i b l e case  forces outside himself.  state  f o r i t s own  c o n t r i b u t e s t o human s a t i s f a c t i o n  p o r t we w a n t , t h e r e a d e r  of  i s valued  of non-interference  t h e p r o m o t i o n o f autonomy  more s a t i s f y i n g  satisfied)  highly.  i n favor  e m p i r i c a l c l a i m i t c o u l d be d e f e a t e d  the be  very  account  i n so f a r asi t  T h e r e t h e p o i n t was made t h a t  q u e s t i o n whether t h e p r a c t i c e  an  On t h i s  worthwhile  the satisfaction  to our presumption  (see pages 30-31).  (e.g.,  as i n t r i n s i c a l l y  human s a t i s f a c t i o n — s o m e t h i n g we v a l u e  extent  argument.  worthwhile  E i t h e r way, t h e c l a i m b e f o r e  autonomy  o f t h e p r o m o t i o n o f autonomy  t o as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n  the experience  sake.  the merits  c a n be viewed as e x t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e  contributes of mind,  about  itself. not only  In  In r e l a t i v e l y i n the ethics of  79 u t i l i t a r i a n s such as John S t u a r t M i l l , but  also, surprisingly  enough, i n the thought of p h i l o s o p h e r s  such as S p i n o z a .  IV, and  V of Spinoza's great work, The  E t h i c s , are f u l l of statements  about the c o r r e l a t i o n s between j o y and  autonomy (or S p i n o z i s t freedom  as i t might be the o t h e r .  c a l l e d ) on the one  Rawls makes use  hand, and  Parts I I I ,  sadness and  p a s s i v i t y on  of the s a t i s f a c t i o n argument  (roughly)  i n r e l a t i o n to autonomy by r e f e r r i n g to i t as the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n ciple  (Rawls, 1971,  pp.  424-433).  t r u t h of which Rawls accepts  The A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e ,  as g i v e n ,  says t h a t human b e i n g s enjoy  the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r i n n a t e or t r a i n e d a b i l i t i e s , and increases  the  this  enjoyment  the more the c a p a c i t y i s r e a l i z e d , or the g r e a t e r i t s  complexity.  Rawls  says:  Presumably complex a c t i v i t i e s — a c t i v i t i e s t h a t r e q u i r e more r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n and hence more a u t o n o m y — a r e more e n j o y a b l e because they s a t i s f y the d e s i r e f o r v a r i e t y and n o v e l t y of e x p e r i e n c e , and l e a v e room f o r f e a t s of i n g e n u i t y and invention. They a l s o invoke the p l e a s u r e s of a n t i c i p a t i o n and s u r p r i s e , and o f t e n the o v e r a l l form of the a c t i v i t y , i t s s t r u c t u r a l development, i s f a s c i n a t i n g and b e a u t i f u l . Moreover, s i m p l e r a c t i v i t i e s exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s t y l e and p e r s o n a l e x p r e s s i o n which complex a c t i v i t i e s permit or even r e q u i r e . . . . (1971, p. 427) The  A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e does not  are more e n j o y a b l e omy,  but  than simple  a causal connection  ones because they r e q u i r e more auton-  i s not r e a l l y r e q u i r e d f o r the  Rawls makes to be u s e f u l to us. autonomy  say t h a t complex a c t i v i t i e s  point  I f complex a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e more  (because they r e q u i r e more r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n ) than  ones, then by h e l p i n g people to become more autonomous we l e a s t g i v i n g them access  to s a t i s f a c t i o n s t h a t would not  simple  are at otherwise  be  open t o least  them.  Autonomy d o e s n o t  makes g r e a t e r s a t i s f a c t i o n  principle  i s thought  possession of enjoyment  than would  material  worth.  Our  to  the  example,  would dom  ily  its  act  degree  to which  a student  and  t h i n g s we  autonomy  to the  i t leads  to economic  environmental value very  i s present.  problems,  at  enrolling  in a difficult  i f the  i n the  regard  has  i n moral the  obedience  been  a c t of  which  obedience  is fulfilled  a p p r o v e more o f  the  reflective  A l s o , we  the  same a c t  regard  than  philosophy as  regard  a s more  of obedience  meritoIf  the  upon, such clear,  we  that  would than  t o . a v o i d punishment.  thoughtless  free-  necessar-  p o s s e s s i n g more w o r t h  simply the  are  we  either  t o a badge or a u n i f o r m .  or p o l i t i c a l  in  but  course would not  thoughtfully reflected  for  student's  We  or  propor-  course  i s r e q u i r e d to take  a l l i f i t were compulsory.  conditioned response  f o r obedience  might,  a l t e r n a t i v e s were open t o him,  t h a t he  and  h i g h l y , but  We  t o a u t h o r i t y when i t i s d o n e f o r a r e a s o n , a  for  p o s s e s s i o n o f human d i g n i t y  for enrolling  extent  the  to. u s .  c h o i c e to have l e s s e r worth  merit  groundings  of  to s o c i a l  people's  o r p h y s i c s , and  than  usually  that  agree  actions increases i n direct  c a r r y any  reason  would  approval of  were l i m i t e d  rious  Aristotelian  the  c o n s i d e r the  obedience  available  i t at  Even i f the  range of a c t i v i t i e s  only because  other  i f several easier  chemistry  not  but  i t i s fundamental to  applaud  chemistry  and  I t h i n k we  a wider be  solutions  satisfaction,  because  tion  i s important  benefits,  personal  otherwise  satisfaction,  possible.  false,  autonomy o p e n s up  Autonomy  also  t o be  guarantee  an We  individual.  as more p r a i s e w o r t h y  when  it  i s done from t h e e x e r c i s e of s t r e n g t h of w i l l r a t h e r than from  p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e or i n c l i n a t i o n . To possess human d i g n i t y i s t o be a person i n the f u l l of the word. persons.  sense  Not a l l human b e i n g s c o u l d be f u l l y d e s c r i b e d as  "'Person' i n our usage i s a more p r e c i s e term than 'human  b e i n g ' i m p l y i n g the p o s s e s s i o n of c a p a c i t i e s and r u l e - f o l l o w i n g ) .  ( t o be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  . . ." (Downie and T e l f e r , 1969, p. 3 5 ) .  To  be both s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g and r u l e - f o l l o w i n g is. what i t means, v e r y l o o s e l y , t o be autonomous.  I f 'to be a p e r s o n ' can be l o o s e l y  equated w i t h 'to be autonomous', then t h e moral p r i n c i p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons becomes l o o s e l y synonymous w i t h r e s p e c t c a p a c i t y f o r p e r s o n a l autonomy.  f o r a being with  To show r e s p e c t f o r o t h e r s i s t o  take t h e i r b e h a v i o r s e r i o u s l y and t o assume t h a t i t i s r a t i o n a l , i.e.,  t h a t reasons r a t h e r than r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be s u p p l i e d by  the agent  forit,  and p a r t of what i t means t o have r e s p e c t f o r one-  s e l f i s t o engage i n p u r p o s i v e b e h a v i o r w i t h o u t undue dependence on others. B. F. Skinner and o t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l b e h a v i o r i s t s h o l d t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n we make between human b e i n g s and p e r s o n s , between a c t s which a r e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of g r e a t e r and l e s s e r degrees of human worth and d i g n i t y , i s a d i s t i n c t i o n we s h o u l d not make, s i n c e a l l b e h a v i o r i s g e n e t i c a l l y and e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y determined. p o i n t of view, determined,  the elements  too.  From t h i s  o f human v o l i t i o n a r e e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  One cannot escape  the c o n t r o l o f f a c t o r s which  determine one's b e h a v i o r whether those f a c t o r s a r e d e l i b e r a t e l y  designed by o t h e r s o r randomly determined apparent.  by f o r c e s which a r e l e s s  Some k i n d s of c o n t r o l s r e s u l t i n b e n e f i c i a l  and some do not.  consequences  Instead of b r a n d i n g a l l c o n t r o l as wrong, which  i s nonsense anyway, says S k i n n e r , we should simply e l i m i n a t e those forms o f c o n t r o l which have u n d e s i r a b l e consequences and encourage those forms o f c o n t r o l t h a t a r e b e n e f i c i a l  ( S k i n n e r , 1971, p. 4 3 ) .  But S k i n n e r ' s argument can be d e f e a t e d i n a t l e a s t two ways.  First  even i f e v e r y t h i n g i n c l u d i n g the elements of human v o l i t i o n i s e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y determined, t i o n s among d i f f e r e n t  we f i n d i t v e r y u s e f u l , t o make d i s t i n c -  k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s depending, on the n a t u r e o f  the d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d .  We f i n d i t u s e f u l t o d i s t i n g u i s h  between those a c t s which a r e r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t e d upon, f o r i n s t a n c e and  those which a r e not, even i f we b e l i e v e t h a t an agent  have a c t e d o t h e r w i s e without different. blaming,  the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  could not  of h i s a c t i o n b e i n g  We use such d i s t i n c t i o n s as bases f o r p r a i s i n g and  and f o r encouraging  and d i s c o u r a g i n g c e r t a i n k i n d s o f  b e h a v i o r s t h a t we c o n s i d e r to be more b e n e f i c i a l or d e t r i m e n t a l than others.  The p o i n t here i s t h a t we do not r e q u i r e 'X c o u l d have  a c t e d o t h e r w i s e ' t o mean 'even i f a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i t u a t i o n had been e x a c t l y the same X c o u l d have a c t e d  of the otherwise'  i n order to c o n t i n u e making t h e u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n s we have made i n the p a s t . Second, i f a l l b e h a v i o r i s a matter  of r e s p o n d i n g  or s e t s o f s t i m u l i which a r e simply responses s t i m u l i , then t h e r e i s a s t r o n g sense  to s t i m u l i  to other s e t s of  i n which we a r e a l l t h e pawns  of f o r c e s beyond o u r s e l v e s , so by S k i n n e r ' s own argument t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any new s t i m u l u s i n t o t h e system ( t h a t i s not a l r e a d y a response w i t h i n the system from some other s t i m u l u s w i t h i n t h e system, ad i n f i n i t u m ) i s l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . be.  What w i l l be w i l l  Not o n l y does t h i s p o i n t of view d e f e a t S k i n n e r ' s  suggestion  about our c o n t r o l l i n g the environment, but t a k i n g i t t o h e a r t has the unhappy consequence of d e s t r o y i n g human m o t i v a t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l initiative. Skinner a l s o suggests  i n Beyond Freedom and D i g n i t y , t h a t we  should c o n c e n t r a t e on making b e t t e r environments i n s t e a d o f b e t t e r people  (Op. c i t . ,  p. 20).  S u r e l y Skinner regards p e o p l e as p a r t o f  the t o t a l e n v i r o n m e n t — a s p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e s t i m u l i . so we a r e improving  If this i s  the environment f o r everyone by improving  indi-  v i d u a l s , i . e . , by making i n d i v i d u a l s more autonomous. One o f t h e most important  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of the promotion o f  autonomy from the educator's p o i n t of view l i e s  i n the f a c t t h a t  t h e r e i s a c l o s e c o n c e p t u a l c o n n e c t i o n between what i t means t o be educated  and what i t means t o be autonomous.  I t c o u l d be argued  t h a t the n o t i o n of autonomy i s l o g i c a l l y connected of e d u c a t i o n .  " E d u c a t i n g people  t o the concept  suggests d e v e l o p i n g i n [them]  s t a t e s of mind which a r e v a l u a b l e and which i n v o l v e some degree of knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g "  ( H i r s t and P e t e r s , 1970, p. 13).  What does i t mean t o suggest c o n d i t i o n o f education?  t h a t knowledge i s a n e c e s s a r y  O b v i o u s l y , i f a p e r s o n possesses  a skill  or a knack i n a p a r t i c u l a r a r e a , no matter how v a l u a b l e a knack i t  84 is,  some a d d i t i o n a l  cient must for  grounds also  condition  for calling  possess  that  a certain  person  amount o f  The  cient  f o r someone t o b e  comprise  by  information.  of the  i . e . , what  things.  interrelationships o f i n f o r m a t i o n on  i s needed  P e o p l e who  i s an  have gained  an  knowledgeable grower  i n botany,  i n that  an  gardener, different  effects soil  insuffi-  educated  of  understanding  person.  facts  r o s e s would  which  also  the  on  conditions,  i s also  among t h e  person  be  "reason-why"  of the  "reason-  r o s e s a r e d e s c r i b e d as  branch  of botany  i n which  the  specializes.  Having  knowledge i s o f t e n  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  involves  having  1975,  p.  The  7).  b e t w e e n autonomy reasons, which  regarded  as h a v i n g  the evidence which warrants  then,  education,  or  rose  the  understanding  o f t h i n g s w i t h r e g a r d t o growing  rose  A  changes,  d e s c r i b e d as  suffi-  educated  i n f o r m a t i o n about  varying climatic  correctly  one's r e p e r t o i r e  required,  why"  The  mere p o s s e s s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n , t h o u g h ,  understanding  of  would have  o f r o s e s , optimum c o n d i t i o n s f o r g r o w t h , and  growth p a t t e r n s produced etc.  b e f o r e we  educated.  example, would have t o have d e t a i l e d  kinds  An  i s required  rational  important  and  i s an  i s central  belief,  point  supported  to the  second  i t . by  of  the  having b e l i e f the knowledge  condition  of  "Having  and knowledge,  reasons"  ;  i n establishing  education i s that inherent part  true belief  (Coombs,  connection  supported condition  autonomy,  by of  rational  reflection. Just of  i n case  autonomy ought  i t i s suggested t o be  that  d i s r e g a r d e d on  t h e argument the  f o r the  grounds :that  the  promotion promotion  of  moral  that  agency  autonomy  morally  taking  t h e n one  be  autonomy d o e s autonomy  topic  out  i n any  pointed  one  cannot  like  us  objectivist  of t h i s  worth  involves  terms,  freedom the  of moral  agency  i s lacking  does  (unless i t  of t h e v a l u e o f autonomy, i t  and  the i n t r i n s i c to b e l i e v i n g  sense.  We  take e i t h e r  consideration  thesis. t o J . P.  We  i n chapter four.  Some f u r t h e r  intrinsic  worth w i l l  made.  worth  i n the  of worth  are at l i b e r t y an  to  objectivist  arguments  for  o f them i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y  shall  White's  discussed  t h e n be  from  'stealing',  There are i n t e r e s t i n g  again i n relation  only  Whether  is  reflection  about  commit  though  else's  present).  talking  position.  freely  other moral  reflection.  the d i s c u s s i o n  of i n t r i n s i c  but  i n turn  consideration  be  required.  someone  from s t e a l i n g ,  which  out  to take another's  'murder', t h e n o t i o n  strict,  the scope  not  are  i s also  taking  'Stealing',  under  that  these p o s i t i o n s ,  arises  from  of r a t i o n a l  not n e c e s s a r i l y  a subjectivist  beyond  reflection  of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  set aside  the language  both of far  property.  language  pointed  Clearly  conditioned  r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d t o be  should  or  been  'meanness', o r  B e f o r e we  use  has  a p p l y t o p e o p l e i n whom r a t i o n a l  c a n be  of  for rational  some d e g r e e  of moral  'kindness',  agency.  i s not r e f r a i n i n g  the notion  c h o i c e and  element  not  one  someone e l s e ' s  involves  to moral  one w e r e t o r e f r a i n  because  property,  i m p o r t a n t , i t s h o u l d be  for h i s behavior unless h i s choices  some c a p a c i t y  f o r example,  property  of  i s central  responsible  made, b u t If,  i s overridingly  points  see, however, t h a t compulsory about  the  curriculum  the language  of  86  3.  Rival As we  Candidates have mentioned, some people might t h i n k t h a t w h i l e autonomy  i s a p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e as the f i n a l aim of compulsory s c h o o l i n g , t h e r e are r i v a l c a n d i d a t e s w i t h e q u a l l y v a l i d same p o s i t i o n .  There are s e v e r a l aims, I t h i n k , t h a t might be  s i d e r e d as j u s t i f i a b l e  be c o n s i d e r e d such an aim. knowledge, or e x p e r i e n c e  There a r e no  as  Happiness, f o r example, c o u l d  So c o u l d knowledge f o r the sake of  f o r the sake of e x p e r i e n c e .  candidates.  The  But  argument has  c o n c l u s i v e arguments to show t h a t any  v a l u e simply i ^ more worthwhile than any good reasons another  con-  there i s a  p e r s o n a l autonomy i s a b e t t e r aim f o r compulsory  s c h o o l i n g than such r i v a l 1)  the  (arguing from the f o r f e i t u r e of r i g h t s ) and  worthwhile as the p u r s u i t of autonomy.  good reason why  c l a i m s f o r occupying  other.  three p a r t s :  particular We  can  f o r a d o p t i n g some v a l u e as more worthwhile  (as I have done i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n w i t h  autonomy), but  i n so doing we  offer than  personal  are o n l y t r y i n g t o convince  others  t h a t they should adopt the v a l u e i n q u e s t i o n as worthwhile. have no hope of p r o v i n g to o t h e r s t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r simply i s more worthwhile than any i n p r i n c i p l e , f o r example, why  other.  value  There i s no  reason  some f u l l y r a t i o n a l person  not f i n d combing h i s h a i r a l l day  We  could  a worthwhile t h i n g to do.  We  might t h i n k i t r e g r e t t a b l e t h a t he f i n d s such a v a l u e so worthw h i l e , and we we  might d i s a g r e e w i t h him  c o u l d not s t r i c t l y accuse him  t h a t i t i s worthwhile,  of making a mistake.  but  This  p o i n t w i l l be argued i n more d e t a i l i n chapter f o u r i n c o n n e c t i o n  87 w i t h J . P.  White's c u r r i c u l u m  for  the  development  of  personal  autonomy. 2)  In  the  value  absence of  arguments to  s i m p l y jLs_ m o r e w o r t h w h i l e  allowed own  conclusive  (from the  final  follows  purely  judges  from the  t h a n any  self-regarding  o f what  show t h a t other,  point  i s worth v a l u i n g  presumption  i n favor  of  and the  any  particular  p e o p l e ought  to  be  o f v i e w ) t o be  their  what  This  right  i s not. to  non-  interference. 3)  In  helping  better in  people  judges  t o become a u t o n o m o u s we  o f what  simply helping  this),  or  to  them t o be  gain  as  knowledge f o r the helping  things that study  that  will  question  things  been set should  p e o p l e t o be  does n o t ,  the  that  aside.  be  of  study  course,  entail  will The  to  arguing,  however, not  t h a t we  are  not  or  be  whereas  knew how  argument  that  only but  will  that  also  we  that  must The  judges  from the  suggests only  judges  obliged  make them b e t t e r  things  students,  final  judges.  a b o u t w h e t h e r we  remembered,  on  i s not,  possible, are  them t o  to to  do acquire  necessarily  o f what i s w o r t h v a l u i n g  their-own  make them b e t t e r  children  studies  judges  what  ( e v e n i f we  k n o w l e d g e , we  better  helping  and  not.  Allowing valuing  happy  and  many e x p e r i e n c e s a s  sake of  them t o be  what i s  i s worth v a l u i n g  are  o f what  c o m p e l them t o reader w i l l  to  compel  we  are  of  study  recall  students  i s a question  forfeiture  that  is-worth  that  rights,  permitted  to  to  has  it compel  make them b e t t e r  judges.  I  are  impose  certain  permitted  to  i t is desirable  to  do  so  for  am  the  student's rival  benefit.  candidates  autonomy h e l p s while,  but  strength  not  compulsory chapter  If  and  a l l the  shall  This means, why aim  of  those  has  we  gap  do  autonomy  studies.  I largely  will  a  liberal  education  personal  a u t o n o m y , and  between l i b e r a l  a new  (because and  afford.  I argue  secured  i n the  rational other  by  then,  next  reflection  two  conditions. develop-  a l l things  f o r the  the  being  compulsory  well.  and  w i t h what why  s c h o o l i n g over  e x a m i n e one  i s worth-  between judgment  i s t o be  s t r e n g t h of w i l l ,  above  i s that  worthwhile  not  ignore the  and  of p u r s u i t s c o n t r i b u t e to the  i s important,  show how  tions  of  been concerned  compulsory  o f what  b e l i e v e s t o be  s t u d i e s c o n t r i b u t e to the  p u r s u i t s as  education  a b e t t e r judge  candidates  liberal  c h o i c e and  autonomy  chapter  compulsory  have a ready-made j u s t i f i c a t i o n  chapter  of  of  to c l o s e the  good  l e a r n what k i n d s  freedom of  imposition  t o be  rival  o f autonomy, and  e q u a l , we  next  not  i m p o s i t i o n of  when we  ment o f  final  which  that l i b e r a l  condition  only  aim  i s the a b i l i t y  action)—advantages course  final  f o r v a l u i n g autonomy o v e r  t o s e c u r e what one  of w i l l  Of  argument  f o r the  one  also  The  we  other  recent  'personal  ought  autonomy'  t o adopt  i t as  p o s s i b l e aims.  attempt  i n the  In  literature  the the to  c o n t r i b u t e s to the a c q u i s i t i o n  of  argument  connec-  education  and  outlining  some o f  the  p e r s o n a l autonomy w i l l  be  offered.  CHAPTER IV  AUTONOMY AND COMPULSORY' LIBERAL EDUCATION  T h i s chapter c o n s i s t s of two p a r t s :  an examination  of J . P.  White's compulsory c u r r i c u l u m , and an a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n n e c t i o n between l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n and p e r s o n a l autonomy.  White's p r o p o s a l s  a r e worthy of our a t t e n t i o n because he i s the o n l y contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r of e d u c a t i o n t o propose a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m f o r the explicit  purpose o f making s t u d e n t s autonomous p e r s o n s .  White not  o n l y uses t h e language of p e r s o n a l autonomy but a l s o adopts autonomy as t h e o n l y j u s t i f i a b l e self-regarding  aim of compulsory e d u c a t i o n from t h e p u r e l y  ( p a t e r n a l i s t i c ) p o i n t o f view.  We w i l l  see t h a t  White's n o t i o n o f p e r s o n a l autonomy i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t notion presented  i n the previous chapter;  p r o p o s i n g compulsory l i b e r a l ours as w e l l .  White's  e d u c a t i o n a r e somewhat d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e s i s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d .  Proposals  White bases h i s u p h o l d i n g justifiable  hence, h i s reasons f o r  A f t e r a b r i e f e x p o s i t i o n of White's p r o p o s a l s , a l e s s  d a r i n g but more j u s t i f i a b l e  1.  from t h e  of p e r s o n a l autonomy as the o n l y  ( p a t e r n a l i s t i c ) aim o f compulsory e d u c a t i o n on c o n s i d e r -  a t i o n s about what we a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e g a r d as worthwhile. We w i l l see t h a t White equates what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r 89  90 i t s own  sake w i t h what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile.  By so d o i n g ,  White i s o f f e r i n g a d e s c r i p t i v e account of a p r e s c r i p t i v e Because White's  term.  argument r e s t s on the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y we  shall  have to r e j e c t i t as i t stands i n the end, but i n the meantime i t w i l l be u s e f u l f o r us t o see how  he proceeds.  White o f f e r s the example of our d e p r i v i n g a drunken man k n i f e w i t h which he has been p l a y i n g on the grounds h i m s e l f , to show t h a t i n such a case we  of a  t h a t he might harm  t h i n k we have a p r e t t y good  i d e a of what would harm the m a n — p h y s i c a l  p a i n or damage (White,  p. 17).  t h a t we  man  Suppose though, suggests White,  f i n d out t h a t  1973, the  had d e c i d e d t h a t he would commit s u i c i d e by s t a b b i n g h i m s e l f  w h i l e drunk.  I f we knew h i s d e c i s i o n t o commit s u i c i d e had been a  r a t i o n a l one then we would l o s e c o n f i d e n c e that p h y s i c a l damage i s not worthwhile f o r t h a t p e r s o n . White,  "Our normal c o n f i d e n t b e l i e f , "  " t h a t p h y s i c a l damage harms a p e r s o n r e s t s on the  t h a t such damage h i n d e r s him i n s a t i s f y i n g h i s wants: w a n t s — a s an end, not a m e a n s — i s h a r m f u l because  sake.  (and not wanting  f u l to  This  worthwhile  As White p o i n t s out,  however, t h e r e a r e some problems w i t h t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n .  to p l a y w i t h i t f o r i t s own  i f what he  (Op. c i t . , p. 17).  t h a t what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y  f o r someone i s what he wants f o r i t s own  playing with a knife  assumption  to d i e , then b e i n g stabbed is- not  i t i s worthwhile t o him"  seems t o imply, says White,  says  A drunkard  to commit s u i c i d e ) might want  sake, but i f on s o b e r i n g up he i s g r a t e -  us f o r h a v i n g taken the k n i f e away from him, then i t would  be odd t o c o n s i d e r h i s p l a y i n g w i t h the k n i f e as i n t r i n s i c a l l y  worth-  91 while.  So he t r i e s to l e a d us to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t X i s i n t r i n -  s i c a l l y worthwhile not j u s t on r e f l e c t i o n  i f i t i s wanted f o r i t s own  i t i s wanted f o r i t s own  sake.  One  sake, but i f  problem w i t h  this  a n a l y s i s i s t h a t what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n at time t j f o r i t s own sake may time t 2 -  be d i f f e r e n t  from what i s wanted on f u r t h e r r e f l e c t i o n at  T h i s i s not to suggest t h a t t h e r e i s a problem i n X b e i n g  i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile at one p o i n t i n time, but not i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile a t a n o t h e r — t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why v a l u e d on r e f l e c t i o n  f o r i t s own  on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own X may of  an a c t i v i t y t h a t i s  sake a t time t\ may  not be v a l u e d  sake a t time t 2 — t h e problem i s r a t h e r  be thought to be wanted f o r i t s own  sake g i v e n a c e r t a i n  amount  r e f l e c t i o n on the matter, w h i l e g i v e n more r e f l e c t i o n i t may  be wanted f o r i t s own h a n d l e s the problem as  sake.  How  much r e f l e c t i o n i s enough?  that  not White  follows:  . . . the want i n q u e s t i o n must be judged i n terms of an i d e a l . In the i d e a l case what i s wanted f o r i t s own sake on r e f l e c t i o n i s what a man would want f o r i t s own sake, g i v e n at l e a s t (a) t h a t he knows of a l l the o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t he might have p r e f e r r e d a t that time and (b) t h a t he has c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d p r i o r i t i e s among t h e s e d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e s , b e a r i n g i n mind not o n l y h i s p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n but a l s o whether he i s l i k e l y t o a l t e r h i s p r i o r i t i e s i n the f u t u r e . ((b) e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e s out any p r e f e r e n c e adopted i n a s t a t e of d e p r e s s i o n , e u p h o r i a , etc.: a depressed person i s shut o f f by h i s d e p r e s s i o n from c o n s i d e r i n g c e r t a i n o p t i o n s which would o t h e r w i s e be open to him.) (Op. c i t . p. I t h i n k White would  agree t h a t we  r e q u i r i n g that condition  s h o u l d not be too s t r i c t  (a) be met  i n f a c t never o b t a i n .  How  about  b e f o r e a l l o w i n g t h a t someone  knows what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile f o r him because might  20)  c o u l d we  condition  (a)  ever be sure of knowing  92 a l l the o t h e r question?  t h i n g s which we  might have p r e f e r r e d a t the time i n  There must be an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of t h i n g s t h a t  might have chosen, so i t would be i m p o s s i b l e them a l l . dition  But  f o r us to be  i f c o n d i t i o n (a) cannot be met  one  aware of  then n e i t h e r can  con-  (b) because (b) r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i o r i t i e s among  these d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e s — t h a t  i s , among a l l the t h i n g s one  have p r e f e r r e d at the time i n q u e s t i o n . (b) to r e a d : the o t h e r  " t h a t he has  c o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , amend  c a r e f u l l y considered  p r i o r i t i e s among a l l  t h i n g s which he might have p r e f e r r e d from among the  able options, bearing whether he  We  might  i n mind not  only h i s present  avail-  s i t u a t i o n but  i s l i k e l y to a l t e r h i s p r i o r i t i e s i n the f u t u r e . "  upshot of t h i s i s t h a t i f one o p t i o n s because one  fails  to r e f l e c t  one  may  a r e , then even  be wrong i n b e l i e v i n g  t h a t something i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile f o r o n e s e l f . i n t r i n s i c worth i s supposed to be d e s i r e s but not w i t h  The  on a l l the a v a i l a b l e  does not know what the o p t i o n s  though the r e s t of c o n d i t i o n (b) o b t a i n s  also  Thus  i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h wants  spur-of-the-moment whims and  and  impulses.  But what are the o b j e c t i o n s to White's e q u a t i o n  (i.e.,  the  amended v e r s i o n of White's equation) of what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile  f o r someone w i t h what he wants on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  sake?  Robin Barrow (1976) o b j e c t s to t h i s account on the grounds t h a t i t l e a d s to some c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , r e f l e c t i o n want to comb t h e i r h a i r a l l day t i o n , then combing t h e i r h a i r a l l day f o r them.  The  reason we  might be  such t h a t i f people  u n t i l they d i e of s t a r v a -  i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile  inclined  on  to accept  such a case  as a .counter-example, however, i s simply t h a t most of us do not v a l u e combing  our h a i r a l l day i n any p o s i t i v e way,  and our n a t u r a l assump-  t i o n i s t h a t no sane person c o u l d have v a l u e s so r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from our own.  But i t would be wrong of us to take t h i s p o s i t i o n .  There i s no r e a s o n i n p r i n c i p l e why combing  a r a t i o n a l p e r s o n might not  find  h i s h a i r a l l day a worthwhile t h i n g to do.  Barrow's more s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t wanting something on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  sake i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r an a s c r i p t i o n  of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e but not a s u f f i c i e n t  condition.  o f f e r s i n support of t h i s p o s i t i o n i s the f o l l o w i n g : t h a t on r e f l e c t i o n I want to eat sweets.  The argument he It i s possible  Because I am aware of a l l  the n e g a t i v e consequences of e a t i n g sweets I can o n l y assume t h a t I want t o eat sweets f o r t h e i r own  sake, but I c e r t a i n l y do not r e g a r d  e a t i n g sweets as i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. t h i n g f o r i t s own  T h e r e f o r e , wanting some-  sake i s not the whole s t o r y about i n t r i n s i c  But h e r e a g a i n Barrow's  worth.  counter example seems not t o h o l d up.  In  the case of e a t i n g sweets i t i s not the e a t i n g of the sweets we v a l u e f o r i t s own  sake, but the t a s t e of the sweets t h a t we v a l u e or the  sensory e x p e r i e n c e of e a t i n g the sweets.  I f e a t i n g seaweed gave us  the same sensory e x p e r i e n c e as e a t i n g sweets then we would weed, not sweets.  So t h i s example proves o n l y the t r i v i a l  eat s e a truth  t h a t what i s e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile i s not to be equated w i t h what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile. Still,  Barrow has an i m p o r t a n t , g e n e r a l p o i n t t o make i n  o p p o s i t i o n to White.  He charges White w i t h not e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t i t  94 i s meaningless or f a l s e to c l a i m t h a t any p u r s u i t i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e o t h e r than by the c r i t e r i o n t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r would on r e f l e c t i o n want to engage i n i t .  individual  White has produced  argument at a l l , says Barrow, to show t h a t some p u r s u i t s such s c i e n c e , f o r example, may p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s may c o u r s e , but If  no as  not be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever f e e l about them.  Barrow i s r i g h t ,  s t i l l we might ask where the onus of p r o o f r e a l l y  of lies.  someone wants to c l a i m t h a t some t h i n g s such as s c i e n c e a r e  i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s may about them, then he ought to produce arguments to show why accept  this position.  have any Mill,  feel  we  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Barrow does not p u r p o r t  should to  such arguments, but we might l o o k at the arguments of P e t e r s ,  and Moore on t h i s p o i n t .  We  have a l r e a d y met  Peters' well-  known t r a n s c e n d e n t a l argument i n t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference. "Why  P e t e r s says t h a t by simply a s k i n g the q u e s t i o n  do t h i s r a t h e r than t h a t ? " (e.g., Why  c u r r i c u l u m and not the o t h e r ? ) we of  i n c l u d e one  t h i n g i n the  a r e committed to the worthwhileness  the p u r s u i t of c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s such as s c i e n c e and  philosophy.  T h i s i s what P e t e r s  says:  the person who asks such a q u e s t i o n must a l r e a d y have a s e r i o u s concern f o r t r u t h b u i l t i n t o h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s . For how can a s e r i o u s p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n be asked u n l e s s a man a l s o wants to a c q u a i n t h i m s e l f as w e l l as he can of the s i t u a t i o n out of which the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s and of the f a c t s of v a r i o u s k i n d s which p r o v i d e the framework of p o s s i b l e answers? The v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l e n q u i r i e s are e x p l o r a t i o n s of t h e s e d i f f e r e n t f a c e t s of h i s e x p e r i e n c e . To ask the q u e s t i o n 'Why do t h i s r a t h e r than t h a t ? ' s e r i o u s l y i s t h e r e f o r e , however e m b r y o n i c a l l y , to be committed to those e n q u i r i e s which are d e f i n e d by t h e i r s e r i o u s concern w i t h these a s p e c t s of r e a l i t y which g i v e context to the q u e s t i o n which he i s a s k i n g . ( P e t e r s , 1966, p. 164)  95 Peters i s r i g h t reasons  t h a t people  concerned  w i t h what t h e r e are good  f o r doing are committed to r a t i o n a l i t y , but  t h a t a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y e n t a i l s study  of the d i s c i p l i n e s  of s c i e n c e and  i t does not f o l l o w  a commitment to the s e r i o u s philosophy.  To whatever extent i t might be t r u e , i f i t i s t r u e at a l l , t h a t s u b j e c t s l i k e s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y are i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e to us p r o v i d e d we  seriously  ask the q u e s t i o n 'What ought we  to i n c l u d e i n  the c u r r i c u l u m ? ' the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one might v a l u e o t h e r k i n d s of activities  (e.g., f o o t b a l l and s o c c e r ) e q u a l l y w i t h the more t h e o r e t -  i c a l ones i s not p r e c l u d e d by a commitment to r a t i o n a l i t y . P e t e r s would agree t h a t they are not p r e c l u d e d .  case, i t i s s t i l l  theoretical  studies.  His  transcen-  d e n t a l argument does not g i v e us a v a l i d argument of the s o r t we At most i t shows t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l  degree, e x t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile: answer the q u e s t i o n "Why  But  open to us to d i s a g r e e w i t h P e t e r s t h a t the  p u r s u i t s are i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile.  looking f o r .  course  His point i s only  t h a t they are not r e q u i r e d as are the more t h e o r e t i c a l i n any  Of  are  p u r s u i t s a r e , to some  they are i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g us  do t h i s r a t h e r than t h a t ? "  M i l l argues t h a t a l t h o u g h p l e a s u r e i s the h i g h e s t good, some p l e a s u r e s are of g r e a t e r worth than o t h e r s . of  g r e a t e r i n t r i n s i c worth than pushpin.  not o f f e r i n g  P o e t r y , he suggests, i s In making t h i s c l a i m he i s  the commonly h e l d view t h a t p o e t r y l e a d s to more enjoy-  ment than pushpin;  i . e . , t h a t the p u r s u i t of p o e t r y has more bene-  f i c i a l consequences than the p u r s u i t of pushpin this  to be t r u e ) — h e  (although he  holds  i s i n s t e a d making the c l a i m t h a t p o e t r y i n i t s e l f  96 i s more worthwhile  than p u s h p i n .  The argument he o f f e r s i n f a v o r of  a c c e p t i n g p o e t r y as i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile as such i s t h i s : w i l l always  and n o t a c c e p t i n g p u s h p i n  g i v e n someone who knows both k i n d s o f p u r s u i t s he  choose p o e t r y over pushpin i f g i v e n a c h o i c e .  argument o f M i l l ' s i s u n a c c e p t a b l e f o r a t l e a s t two r e l a t e d 1)  reasons:  The e m p i r i c a l c l a i m t h a t people who know b o t h p o e t r y and pushpin ( i f g i v e n a c h o i c e ) always  2)  But t h i s  choose p o e t r y might  even i f i t were t r u e o f everyone  be f a l s e , and  i n t h e world: who knows both  p o e t r y and pushpin t h a t the former i s always  chosen over the  l a t t e r , i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t no c o u n t e r - i n s t a n c e w i l l  arise  tomorrow. B e s i d e s , we a r e simply not e n t i t l e d t o make t h e jump from a c l a i m what people f i n d t o be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile worthwhile.  So M i l l ' s views about  about  t o what i s i n f a c t  i n t r i n s i c worth w i l l n o t s t a n d up  either. Nor w i l l any p o s i t i o n r e s e m b l i n g Moore's i n t u i t i o n i s m h e l p us v e r y much.  As White p o i n t s o u t , Moore has claimed t h a t  . . . we know by i n t u i t i o n t h a t the p u r s u i t of beauty and ( i n h i s case) of p e r s o n a l a f f e c t i o n a r e the h i g h e s t goods. But what i f o t h e r s come out w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t u i t i o n s ? Suppose i t i s i n t u i t i v e l y obvious t o me t h a t m y s t i c a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n i s the summum bonum and t h a t p e r s o n a l a f f e c t i o n i s way down the s c a l e : how c o u l d one support Moore's i n t u i t i o n s a g a i n s t mine o r v i c e v e r s a ? (White, 1973, p. 10) So White has some good grounds f o r h i s c l a i m t h a t i t does n o t seem t o make much sense t o t a l k , about  the i n t r i n s i c worth o f something  w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g how people f e e l about  it—and  b e s i d e s how people  97 f e e l about i t he b e l i e v e s t h e r e does not seem to be much e l s e t o consider.  T h i s i s what White s a y s :  Suppose t h e r e i s a man who wants only one t h i n g , X, f o r i t s own sake. He has r e f l e c t e d t h e r e o n , s a t i s f y i n g the demands of the ideal situation. Every c h o i c e but X he f i n d s a b h o r r e n t . Would i t make sense to ask, 'True, he wants X on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake, but i s X r e a l l y i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e ? ' The q u e s t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t , granted something i s of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , t h i s must be o t h e r than X. But e v e r y t h i n g e l s e b e s i d e s X he f i n d s loathsome: perhaps, we might add, i t makes him p h y s i c a l l y or m e n t a l l y i l l to engage i n i t . How c o u l d i t be, we might ask, t h a t a n y t h i n g of the k i n d c o u l d be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile f o r him? What would be meant by c l a i m i n g t h i s ? Once a g a i n we r e a c h the p o i n t , by a more d r a m a t i c r o u t e , t h a t the onus i s on the s k e p t i c to say what he means. (Op. c i t . p. 20) We must grant to White t h a t i t i s a t l e a s t c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e t o c l a i m t h a t something c o u l d be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile even i f no one ever valued i t , i t may,  though i t may  not be l o g i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t .  Be t h a t as  Barrow cannot c o n s i s t e n t l y a l l o w t h a t such t h i n g s as s c i e n c e  c o u l d be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whatever p a r t i c u l a r might f e e l about them because he argues  individuals  (1976, p. 81) t h a t  White's  c r i t e r i o n i s n e c e s s a r y but not s u f f i c i e n t f o r an a s c r i p t i o n of i n t r i n sic worth—so  the f e e l i n g s o f i n d i v i d u a l s do count f o r something.  In c l a i m i n g t h a t White's c r i t e r i o n i s n e c e s s a r y but not c i e n t f o r an a s c r i p t i o n of i n t r i n s i c worth, Barrow  o f f e r s no  t i o n s f o r expanding the c r i t e r i o n t o make i t adequate.  suffisugges-  I f Barrow  t h i n k s i t makes sense to suggest t h a t what we might want on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  sake might be i n t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e , then he ought  to i n d i c a t e at l e a s t i n g e n e r a l terms what the d i f f e r e n c e i s between wanting something on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  sake and i t s b e i n g  98  i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile.  I f Hare i s c o r r e c t , s a y i n g 'X i s i n t r i n -  s i c a l l y worthwhile' i s p r e s c r i p t i v e , whereas s a y i n g X i s d e s i r e d on r e f l e c t i o n i s n o t , so the meaning of 'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y  worthwhile'  cannot be equated w i t h the meaning of 'X i s d e s i r e d on r e f l e c t i o n ' . Even though  'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y  worthwhile' and 'X i s d e s i r e d on  r e f l e c t i o n ' a r e n o t i n t e n s i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t , they c o u l d , however, be e x t e n s i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t — t h a t  i s , those items t o which  the phrase  ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' a p p l i e s might be those and o n l y those items to which the phrase  ' d e s i r e d on r e f l e c t i o n ' a p p l i e s .  But how c o u l d  we know whether o r n o t t h i s i s t r u e ? White's  e q u a t i o n of 'X i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile' w i t h 'X i s  wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own sake' i s important i n h i s account because he argues t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s o f e d u c a t i o n i s t o put p e o p l e i n t o a p o s i t i o n i n which  they can know and a c q u i r e the t h i n g s they want on  r e f l e c t i o n f o r t h e i r own s a k e — a p o s i t i o n which he counts as one of autonomy.  I f people a r e autonomous, on White's  account, they a r e  b e t t e r a b l e t o p i c k out what i s worthwhile f o r them.  F o r White then,  autonomy i s e x t r i n s i c a l l y w o r t h w h i l e — a means t o o b t a i n i n g what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile—which,  he s u g g e s t s , v a r i e s from p e r s o n t o p e r s o n .  White h o l d s t h a t i f one does not know what he wants f o r i t s own sake a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the o p t i o n s , no one e l s e can t e l l him what he wants.  I t i s p r o b a b l y t r u e , as White s a y s , t h a t a t times someone  e l s e might be the b e t t e r judge of what a person r e a l l y wants f o r i t s own s a k e — i n a case when one's d e s i r e s a r e unconscious o r r e p r e s s e d , f o r example, a p s y c h i a t r i s t might know b e t t e r than the person concerned  99  what  that  final  person  judge  o n what  is:r'i:gh't t h a t At senses three  this  point  worth  worth  further  an e x p e r i e n c e t h a t  worthwhile'  f o r i t s own s a k e ' .  tive  account though  worthwhile?',  nor  There, the or perceived I t was  t h e term  and i t was  and d i g n i t y  v a l u e d f o r i t s own  term.  that  White  objects  S i n c e we  on r e f l e c t i o n  'intrinsically  'what i s w a n t e d  cerned with p i c k i n g  i s also  takes  t h e term  cannot  f o r i t s own  sake.  out i n t r i n s i c a l l y  reflecdescrip-  i s i t really be  even  sake'. Barrow  t o show t h a t  any  i f i t i snot  So t h e e d u c a t o r who worthwhile  equated  But n e i t h e r  a c o n v i n c i n g argument  f o r i t s own  on  can s e n s i b l y ask  worthwhile'  worthwhile  worth  sake.  f o r i t s own s a k e ,  on r e f l e c t i o n  i s intrinsically  on r e f l e c t i o n  argued  t o White's  famous o p e n q u e s t i o n a r g u m e n t . )  pursuit  i s clearly  a s a s y n o n y m f o r 'what i s w a n t e d  anyone e l s e has produced  wanted  sense,  Barrow c o r r e c t l y  X i s wanted  i s Moore's  particular  In chapter  t o o u r n o t i o n s o f human  i s highly  of a prescriptive  meaning w i t h  (This  i n this  t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r we h a v e s e e n  tion  in  so f a r .  to apply to a f e l t  i s fundamental  he  the d i f f e r e n t  o f autonomy.  The e x p e r i e n c e o f h a v i n g w o r t h  'intrinsically  'Even  to c l a r i f y  i s v a l u e d f o r i t s own s a k e .  i s worthwhile  autonomy  dignity.  In  worth  taken  n o t be t h e  . . ." (Qp. c i t . , p . 21).  t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f b e i n g an autonomous p e r s o n  that  clearly  be h e l p f u l  was  could  I t i s o n l y when I avow t h a t  as they have a r i s e n  of experience that that  wanted.  f o r the i n t r i n s i c  experience that  and  i t might  of intrinsic  argued  "the psychiatrist  h i s c l a i m becomes j u s t i f i e d  I argued  quality  wants—but  I really  of i n t r i n s i c  notion  an  really  activities  i s coni s caught  100 in  a bind:  i f he p i c k s out what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  sake, he runs the r i s k of not p i c k i n g out what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile,  but what e l s e can he do?  which a c t i v i t i e s  ( i f any)  He has no way  of  isolating  are i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile whether or  not they are wanted on r e f l e c t i o n f o r t h e i r own  sake.  But  there i s  a v e r y simple s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem t h a t a sane and s e n s i b l e educator who take.  i s concerned  w i t h p i c k i n g out e u r r i c u l a r components  He can stop t a l k i n g about the n o t i o n of i n t r i n s i c worth  (unless he s t i p u l a t e s how  he i s going to use  the term);  c o n c e n t r a t e i n s t e a d on what i s wanted on r e f l e c t i o n s o r t t h a t we experience  can muster) f o r i t s own  sake,  t h a t a r e v a l u e d f o r t h e i r own  and he  or on q u a l i t i e s  sake,  and  u n l e s s we be taken  of  so f o r t h .  Although  anything  d i d i n chapter t h r e e ) . White's compulsory c u r r i c u l u m i s a c u r r i c u l u m f o r the  development of autonomy, he o f f e r s v e r y l i t t l e the n o t i o n of autonomy. w i t h knowing how Still,  He  by way  of a n a l y s i s of  i s c o n t e n t , i t seems, to equate autonomy  to o b t a i n what one wants on r e f l e c t i o n f o r i t s own  h i s n o t i o n of autonomy i s s i m i l a r enough to the  one  i n c h a p t e r t h r e e t h a t i t would be worth our w h i l e to see  what k i n d of compulsory c u r r i c u l u m he A.  We  s p e c i f y i n what sense the n o t i o n of i n t r i n s i c worth i s to (as we  presented  can  (of the b e s t  simply cannot argue c o n v i n c i n g l y f o r the i n t r i n s i c worth of  sake.  can  Specific  proposes.  Components  White c o n s i d e r s the q u e s t i o n of what k i n d of c u r r i c u l u m c h i l dren should f o l l o w i n s c h o o l s and what i t s end-points two  headings:  should be under  knowledge of p a r t i c u l a r types of a c t i v i t y  and  101  knowledge of ways o f l i f e . In  d i s c u s s i n g knowledge o f p a r t i c u l a r types o f a c t i v i t y  ( o m i t t i n g such a c t i v i t i e s as l y i n g i n the sun, which might be i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile worthwhile because  f o r some p e o p l e , but not e d u c a t i o n a l l y  they r e q u i r e v e r y l i t t l e  l e a r n i n g ) White says  they can be d i v i d e d e x h a u s t i v e l y i n t o two c l a s s e s : 1)  those i n which no u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what i t i s t o want X i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e without engaging  2)  i n X, and  those i n which some u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what i t i s t o want X i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e without engaging  i n X.  White's c r i t e r i o n f o r d e t e r m i n i n g whether a person has 'some unders t a n d i n g of X' i s t h e a b i l i t y t o g i v e e i t h e r a c o r r e c t or t i o n of cases of X,^  indentifca-  a c o r r e c t v e r b a l account o f what i t i s to engage i n X. On t h i s b a s i s i t can be c l e a r l y seen  that  u n d e r s t a n d i n g what i t i s t o communicate through language, f o r example, i s c l e a r l y a d i f f e r e n t matter from u n d e r s t a n d i n g what i t is  t o climb mountains.  I n the former case a person i n c a p a b l e of  communicating through language  does n o t possess the concepts  either  to  e x p l a i n what communication i s o r t o be a b l e to p i c k out examples  of  people communicating through language.  One can, however, possess  the concepts n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a i n what i t i s t o go mountain c l i m b i n g or  p i c k out i n s t a n c e s o f mountain c l i m b i n g , w i t h o u t h a v i n g  engaged i n t h i s  actually  activity.  Besides communication i n g e n e r a l , White i n c l u d e s the f o l l o w i n g in  his list  of Category I a c t i v i t i e s  (the l i s t  i s not i n t e n d e d t o be  exhaustive): 1)  Engaging  i n pure mathematics.  Because mathematical  d e f i n e d i n terms of other mathematical  concepts one cannot  such concepts without b e i n g i n s i d e the d i s c i p l i n e . cannot  concepts are understand  That i s , one  understand pure mathematics without a c t u a l l y engaging i n  mathematical  activity.  2)  i n the exact p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s .  Engaging  Because the concepts  of p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e — e . g . , mass, f o r c e — a r e a n a l y s a b l e o n l y i n terms of other s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s , these concepts are u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to someone o u t s i d e the d i s c i p l i n e . 3)  A p p r e c i a t i n g works of a r t .  Here i t i s the a e s t h e t i c  t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t — n o t knowledge of a l o t of t i g h t l y  response  interdefined  a e s t h e t i c concepts.  The  generis.  come to understand what i t i s to view  One  cannot  concept of such a response i s i t s e l f s u i an  o b j e c t or an event from the a e s t h e t i c p o i n t of view without a l r e a d y h a v i n g been i n i t i a t e d does one exposed  i n t o t h i s way  come to be i n i t i a t e d  of t h i n k i n g and f e e l i n g .  i n the f i r s t p l a c e ?  Through b e i n g  to works of a r t by s e n s i t i v e g u i d e s , says White, u n t i l  comes to p e r c e i v e a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t s f o r o n e s e l f . another reason why activities.  White i n c l u d e s a r t i n h i s l i s t  c o n t e s t e d concept.  A r t may  of Category I "Art"  be thought t o be  which embodies s i g n i f i c a n t form or expresses emotion metaphysical truths.  one  But t h e r e i s a l s o  What counts as a r t i s a d i s p u t e d q u e s t i o n .  i s an e s s e n t i a l l y  How  that  or r e v e a l s  "To study the a r t s , " says White, " i s i n t e r  a l i a to become aware of the m u l t i p l e and c o n f l i c t i n g c r i t e r i a of  103  v a l u e which a r e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of these f i e l d s .  I t i s not c l e a r  how someone who had never s t u d i e d them c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y have t h i s awareness. 4)  Philosophizing.  concepts,  p h i l o s o p h i z i n g has i t s own  technical  these a r e n o t c e n t r a l to the a c t i v i t y s i n c e one can p h i l -  o s o p h i z e without concepts  Although  them.  To do p h i l o s o p h y i s t o come t o l o o k a t the  one a l r e a d y possesses  (time, thought,  p l e a s u r e , e t c . ) from  a d i f f e r e n t s t a n c e — a h i g h e r - o r d e r p o i n t of view. b e g i n to do p h i l o s o p h y .  To do t h i s i s t o  Philosophical activity i s quite u n i n t e l l i -  g i b l e to the n o n - p h i l o s o p h e r . The  f o l l o w i n g a r e White's Category  II activities  (the l i s t i s  not i n t e n d e d t o be e x h a u s t i v e ) : 1)  Speaking  a f o r e i g n language.  As l o n g as one has a n a t i v e l a n -  guage one can g a i n some u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of what i t i s f o r people to  speak some other language even though one cannot a c t u a l l y do so. 2)  C r i c k e t and other o r g a n i z e d  games.  The concepts  o t h e r o r g a n i z e d games can be l e a r n e d without 3)  Cookery, sewing, c a r p e n t r y , e t c .  of c r i c k e t and  a c t u a l l y p l a y i n g them.  The concepts  of these  activ-  i t i e s can e a s i l y be made i n t e l l i g i b l e to the onlooker who does not a c t u a l l y engage i n them. 4) etc.  P a i n t i n g p i c t u r e s , w r i t i n g p o e t r y , composing or p e r f o r m i n g One can understand  what i t i s t o do these t h i n g s  a c t u a l l y doing them, as l o n g as one knows what p i c t u r e s ,  music,  without poetry,  music, e t c . , a r e . 5)  Vocational a c t i v i t i e s  l i k e b e i n g an accountant  or working on an  104 assembly 6)  track.  Non-vocational a c t i v i t i e s  l i k e b r i d g e , b i n g o , f i s h i n g , mountain  climbing, e t c . I t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t some Category  II activities  (e.g., #4 above) depend upon i n i t i a t i o n i n t o Category In  f a c t a l l presuppose  some presuppose  i n i t i a t i o n into l i n g u i s t i c  more than t h i s as w e l l .  I activities.  communication but  One c o u l d n o t understand  what i t i s t o be a poet or a m u s i c i a n without some u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the a r t s .  Nor c o u l d one understand what i t i s t o t e a c h p h y s i c s  w i t h o u t some u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p h y s i c s .  Many o t h e r dependency  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the c a t e g o r i e s c o u l d be t r a c e d . The c u r r i c u l a r consequences of White's d i s t i n c t i o n a r e p r o b a b l y clear.  Category  must be compelled education. Category  I activities,  t o engage i n t o some extent as p a r t of t h e i r  basic  Students must come t o have some u n d e r s t a n d i n g of  II activities  as w e l l , but t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be gained  without a c t u a l l y engaging sufficient  says White, a r e those which s t u d e n t s  i n Category  u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Category  II activities. II activities  One can g a i n  t o know  (perhaps  not f o r c e r t a i n , but t o have a p r e t t y good i d e a a t l e a s t ) whether one wants t o pursue  the a c t i v i t y  or n o t .  Pictures, films, verbal  accounts, and o b s e r v a t i o n s of these a c t i v i t i e s  i s enough t o g i v e one  the r e q u i r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . White sees n o t o n l y engaging coming t o engage i n Category about  d i f f e r e n t ways of l i f e ,  i n Category  I a c t i v i t i e s and  I I a c t i v i t i e s , but a l s o coming t o know as e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s of a  compulsory  105 c u r r i c u l u m f o r autonomy. of h i s t o r y , among other  I t i s i n t h i s r e s p e c t he t h i n k s the study  t h i n g s , has an important  r o l e to play.  D i f f e r e n t ways o f l i f e suggested by White i n c l u d e (nor i s t h i s intended 1.  list  t o be e x h a u s t i v e ) : A w a y o f l i f e devoted t o t h e p u r s u i t of t r u t h , i n s c i e n c e , history, etc. A way o f l i f e devoted t o a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y . A way o f l i f e devoted t o o t h e r s ' good: the a l t r u i s t i c way of l i f e . A way o f l i f e devoted t o p h y s i c a l prowess o r adventure. A way o f l i f e devoted to p h y s i c a l p l e a s u r e s more b r o a d l y understood. A r e l i g i o u s way of l i f e , premised on the b e l i e f t h a t t h i s l i f e i s o n l y a p r e p a r a t i o n f o r an a f t e r - l i f e . A l i f e devoted t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of goods. A l i f e devoted t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of power over o t h e r s . A way o f l i f e devoted t o r e f l e c t i o n on how one should l i v e . A way o f l i f e devoted t o d o m e s t i c i t y . A way o f l i f e devoted t o p u b l i c a f f a i r s . The a s c e t i c way of l i f e . A way of l i f e based on a Thoreauesque r e t u r n t o n a t u r e . A way o f l i f e based on one's s u r r e n d e r i n g t o someone e l s e the d e c i s i o n about what s o r t of l i f e one should l e a d .  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.  (White, op. c i t . , p. 44) We a l s o have to ensure, says White, t h a t l e a r n i n g about the d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s and ways of l i f e makes a d i f f e r e n c e to how students  view t h e i r world  of t h e i r l i v e s .  and how they  f e e l about v a r i o u s  aspects  White does not say e x a c t l y how t h i s k i n d of i n t e -  g r a t i o n i s t o be a c h i e v e d — p r e s u m a b l y  t h a t i s an e m p i r i c a l  but he p o i n t s out t h a t t h i s aim i s p e r f e c t l y compatible  question—  with e i t h e r  a t o p i c - c e n t r e d c u r r i c u l u m or a c u r r i c u l u m based on s u b j e c t m a t t e r s taught  l a r g e l y i n independence o f each  other.  White would a l s o i n c l u d e i n a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m some way of b r i n g i n g students w i t h t h e i r own.  t o c o n s i d e r other p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t s i m p a r t i a l l y  T h i s k i n d o f moral i n t e g r a t i o n i s s u r e l y d e s i r a b l e ,  106 and  i f we knew how t o a c h i e v e i t by m o r a l l y u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e means I  am sure we would want t o do so. of not  I t i s , however, o u t s i d e the r e a l m  a p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g compulsory c u r r i c u l u m and as such i t i s central  to this  thesis.  As a f i n a l aspect o f h i s compulsory c u r r i c u l u m , White would a l s o i n c l u d e what he c a l l s a " p r a c t i c a l component."  What he means  by t h i s i s t h e p r a c t i c a l knowledge one must have i n order t o a c h i e v e one's ends.  Without t h i s component  the student may be equipped f o r  l i f e i n a world i n which t h e r e a r e no o b s t a c l e s t o a c h i e v i n g one's ends but he would not be equipped f o r the r e a l w o r l d .  Says White:  . . . i t i s not enough t o have got one's ends i n t o some k i n d of o r d e r : t o be more than a dreamer, one has t o have some i d e a o f how these ends may be a t t a i n e d , o f the o b s t a c l e s i n t h e i r way, o f how these o b s t a c l e s may be overcome, and o f which ends a r e i m p r a c t i c a b l e s i n c e the o b s t a c l e s i n t h e i r way a r e unsurmountable. (White, op. c i t . , p. 55) By p r a c t i c a l s u b j e c t s White does n o t mean such a c t i v i t i e s as a r t s and c r a f t s , c a r p e n t r y , o r c o o k i n g . not  P r a c t i c a l p u r s u i t s would  n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e any p h y s i c a l s k i l l .  They would  include  s t u d i e s about l e g a l , f i n a n c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and p s y c h o l o g i c a l m a t t e r s — s t u d i e s which would h e l p one t o understand the means o f o b t a i n i n g one's ends. B.  O b j e c t i o n s t o White's Components  White's d i s t i n c t i o n between Category I and Category I I a c t i v ities  can be o b j e c t e d t o on a t l e a s t  two grounds.  First,  i t could  be argued t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n f a l l s a p a r t because a l l a c t i v i t i e s belong i n Category I .  A b a s k e t b a l l devotee c o u l d argue t h a t one  cannot r e a l l y come to understand b a s k e t b a l l u n t i l one played  t h a t game.  basketball  U n l e s s one  has  had  has  actually  the e x p e r i e n c e of  playing  (perhaps s e v e r a l e x p e r i e n c e s of p l a y i n g b a s k e t b a l l )  one  can o n l y grasp the e x t e r n a l s of :the game—not the essence of i t . Clearly  one  cannot have f i r s t  b a s k e t b a l l i f one  has  what i s r e q u i r e d .  hand knowledge of what i t i s to p l a y  never p l a y e d ,  but  f i r s t hand knowledge i s not  A l l t h a t White i s a f t e r  of an a c t i v i t y — e n o u g h  i s some u n d e r s t a n d i n g  to make an i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e  about whether  one would want to choose the a c t i v i t y as a worthwhile p u r s u i t f o r oneself.  This, I think, i s possible.  r e a l l y destroy  White's  So t h i s o b j e c t i o n does not  position.  Second, i t c o u l d be argued that the d i s t i n c t i o n because a l l a c t i v i t i e s belong i n Category I I . c o u l d be  seen as a mere e x t e n s i o n  p l a n t s and b u t t e r f l i e s as White p o i n t s out,  and  asking  Science,  of such a c t i v i t i e s as 'Why?' q u e s t i o n s  Category I a c t i v i t i e s may  Category I I a c t i v i t i e s but  falls  i t does not  f o r example, collecting  about them.  of them and  o b j e c t i o n does not But point.  there  other  r e a l l y destroy  f o l l o w from t h i s t h a t  forms of a c t i v i t y .  White's d i s t i n c t i o n  are other more s u b t l e o b j e c t i o n s  John McPeck argues t h a t the way  distinction  i t i s c i r c u l a r , and  o v e r l o o k e d the d i s t i n c t i o n the o n l y c o n s i s t e n t  But  have t h e i r r o o t s i n  can have enough u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Category I a c t i v i t i e s to between i n s t a n c e s  apart  one  discriminate So  this  either.  to White on  this  i n which White s t a t e s  the  t h a t even when the c i r c u l a r i t y i s  i s impracticable.  interpretation  He  argues f u r t h e r t h a t  of a l l t h a t White says about  this  108 d i s t i n c t i o n would f o r c e him d o c t r i n e of " v e r s t e h e n "  to defend  (1977, pp.  some v e r s i o n of the i n d e f e n s i b l e  138-145).  There i s no need f o r  us to d w e l l on the i n t r i c a c i e s of these arguments, however, because b e s i d e s the o b j e c t i o n s to the d i s t i n c t i o n s between Category Category to  I I a c t i v i t i e s t h e r e a r e many o t h e r more apparent  I and  objections  White's p r o p o s a l s t h a t c o u l d be made—most of them r e s u l t i n g  the f a c t t h a t we activities.  from  a r e unsure of the consequences of p u r s u i n g many  Hence, many important  q u e s t i o n s remain unanswered.  Which s t u d i e s from among the wide range of o p t i o n s are the ones  we  should p i c k out as c o n t r i b u t i n g to the a c q u i s i t i o n of p r a c t i c a l k n o w l e d g e — i . e . , the know-how one needs i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e one's ends? How  How  i s integration  many Category  (or c o g n i t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e ) to be  I I a c t i v i t i e s are there?  number of p o s s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s then how  are we  aware o f ? and  How  right  i s needed?  We  doing t h a t . is  of  view.  algebra in  or i s the g e n e r a l category of mathematics a l l t h a t c o u l d go on but t h e r e i s p r o b a b l y of any  t a s k , but t r y i n g to put forward  p r o v i d e s the more important  challenge.  The  little  point i n  e d u c a t i o n a l theory  a d e f e n s i b l e theory  c h a l l e n g e cannot  i n t h i s t h e s i s , but some s p e c i f i c s u g g e s t i o n s  about what we  Are  to be i n c l u d e d i n the l i s t  P o i n t i n g out the shortcomings  an important  f u l l y met  ought to make s t u d e n t s  I a c t i v i t i e s are there?  geometry, f o r example, e n t i t l e d  t h e i r own  infinite  (or what seems to us an i n f i n i t e number)  to p i c k out which ones we many Category  I f t h e r e i s an  achieved?  be  can be made  ought to teach i n s c h o o l s from the s e l f - r e g a r d i n g p o i n t  109 2.  L i b e r a l Components and P e r s o n a l Autonomy The  t a s k of t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o show how l i b e r a l  education  c o n t r i b u t e s t o the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i n a way t h a t p h y s i c a l and v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , f o r example, do not.  Compared t o  the t a s k of s p e c i f y i n g a l l the e u r r i c u l a r components one might i n c l u d e i n a c u r r i c u l u m f o r autonomy as White has t r i e d t o do, the t a s k o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s a much more modest one.  The aim here i s  o n l y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e importance o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i n the d e v e l o p ment o f p e r s o n a l autonomy. components one might i n c l u d e  The t a s k o f s p e c i f y i n g a l l t h e e u r r i c u l a r i n a c u r r i c u l u m f o r autonomy i s , I  t h i n k , beyond our r e a c h because t h e r e a r e so many e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d which have not y e t been answered.  We noted  earlier, for  example, t h a t the p s y c h o t i c i s not autonomous no matter how much knowledge he may have because he l a c k s freedom o f c h o i c e , but we do not know e x a c t l y what k i n d s o f l e a r n i n g s and what k i n d s of e x p e r i e n c e s result  i n the a c q u i s i t i o n o f freedom i n the r e l e v a n t sense.  Nor do  we know how to ensure t h a t the knowledge c h i l d r e n a c q u i r e w i l l make a d i f f e r e n c e t o how they see and f e e l about the w o r l d . how t o ensure t h a t judgment gets transformed  Nor do we know  into action.  Still,  t h e r e a r e some very g e n e r a l k i n d s o f recommendations we can make about what s t u d e n t s ought t o l e a r n i n s c h o o l s i n the i n t e r e s t s of d e v e l o p i n g p e r s o n a l autonomy. Because the development of freedom o f c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h of w i l l are p s y c h o l o g i c a l matters, they can be developed,  t h e r e i s l i t t l e we can say about how  but t h e r e a r e some u s e f u l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t s  110 t h a t we  might make about the development of r a t i o n a l  Even t h i s i s p a r t l y  an e m p i r i c a l matter i f we  a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person has mind, but one  has  achieved  i t i s c l e a r t h a t one  knowledge or b e l i e f s  t i v e about.  How  i s no  cannot be  rationally  reflective to be  r e f l e c t i v e enough to be  reflec-  forward.  We  autonomous.  of a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m  would do b e t t e r to a v o i d  arguments (which are bound to be elements of a c u r r i c u l u m  rationally  I t h i n k , to assume t h a t some complete  uncontroversial specification  to  There i s a  People can be more or l e s s  t h e r e f o r e more or l e s s  unless  autonomous?  d e f i n i t i v e answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n .  I t would be n a i v e ,  c o u l d be put  ration-  some k i n d of i n t e g r a t e d s t a t e of  to be r e f l e c t i v e w i t h and  s l i d i n g s c a l e involved here. r e f l e c t i v e and  agree t h a t the  much and what k i n d of knowledge i s s u f f i c i e n t  make a p e r s o n r a t i o n a l l y Surely there  reflection.  and  f o r autonomy  hairsplitting  i n c o n c l u s i v e anyhow) about which  such as White's ought to be r e t a i n e d , which  ought to be omitted and which non-elements ought to be added to list,  and  i n s t e a d to c o n s i d e r  i n general  one  c u r r i c u l u m White s u g g e s t s — w h i c h i s r o u g h l y , sory l i b e r a l a r t s education  f o r everyone.  to defend a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m or something l i k e i t , the r a t i o n a l cannot be met.  I t should  a n c i e s between any  be  important p a r t of very The  roughly,  the the  a compul-  t a c k I s h a l l take i s  on the grounds t h a t without i t , r e f l e c t i o n c o n d i t i o n of autonomy  emphasized t h a t t h e r e may  l i b e r a l arts curriculum  components of the best  possible curriculum  t h a t might b e ) , but we  s h a l l simply  and  the  discrep-  cognitive  f o r autonomy  have to i g n o r e  be  (whatever  such p o s s i b l e  Ill d i s c r e p a n c i e s because we cannot  t e l l e x a c t l y t o what e x t e n t t h e  study o f h i s t o r y , f o r example, c o n t r i b u t e s towards the development of autonomy or whether one might a c h i e v e the same l e v e l of autonomy through  some other study i n s t e a d .  thing clear:  being able to r e f l e c t  But I hope t o make a t l e a s t one r a t i o n a l l y at a reasonable  level  r e q u i r e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e dose o f l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n no matter how t h e p r e c i s e boundaries  of that notion are defined.  The aim of the remainder important  o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o show why i t i s  f o r t h e development of autonomy t h a t s t u d e n t s l e a r n s c i e n c e ,  h i s t o r y , mathematics, l i t e r a t u r e , p h i l o s o p h y , and so f o r t h .  The  elements of a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n a lump sum, so t o speak, and some g e n e r a l c l a i m s w i l l be made about them. No doubt some v e r y u s e f u l c l a i m s about p a r t i c u l a r elements of a l i b e r a l arts c u r r i c u l u m — h i s t o r y , f o r example,—could the concerns general.  be made, but  of t h i s t h e s i s a r e c o n f i n e d t o l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i n  With s o c i o l o g i s t s o f knowledge opposing  the compulsory  i m p o s i t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f knowledge on s t u d e n t s on t h e grounds t h a t the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f knowledge i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g h i g h e r soci-economic suppress  groups  lower ones, and w i t h p o p u l a r t h e o r i s t s s u g g e s t i n g both t h a t  students ought to be allowed t o choose t h e i r own c u r r i c u l a and t h a t academic s u b j e c t s have no r e l e v a n c e i n s t u d e n t s ' l i v e s , t h e r e a r e good reasons  f o r t r y i n g t o defend  i t seems  the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n  of a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m i n g e n e r a l on s t u d e n t s , as opposed t o d e f e n d i n g t h e i n c l u s i o n o r e x c l u s i o n o f some p a r t i c u l a r element i n  112 the c u r r i c u l u m . We  s h o u l d keep i n mind t h a t the p o i n t s made here about  e d u c a t i o n have n o t h i n g to do w i t h t e a c h i n g methods.  liberal  I t would be  wrong t o assume t h a t a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n must be equated w i t h a t r a d i t i o n a l l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n system c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p a s s i v i t y on the p a r t of s t u d e n t s , a l t h o u g h the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n between the two i s perhaps  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e f o r the r e a s o n t h a t l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been conducted  i n an a u t h o r i t a r i a n manner.  The  a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t y l e of t e a c h i n g i s p r o b a b l y a throw-back to the time of S t . Augustine who  advocated  grounds t h a t o n l y t r u e b e l i e f salvation.  a u t h o r i t a r i a n t e a c h i n g methods on the (not understanding) i s r e q u i r e d f o r  In any case, a good l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s p e r f e c t l y  compatible w i t h the g e n t l e s t of t e a c h i n g methods and the keenest activity  of mind on the p a r t of p u p i l s .  We sometimes hear i t s a i d of the i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e s t h i n g s as they h e l p to l i f t  a person's s p i r i t  such  above the w o r l d , or  they equip one's mind to e n t e r the w o r l d and perform i t s t a s k s . What we need to know, however, i s e x a c t l y what i t i s about p h i l o s o p h i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge t h a t enables a person to be more r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e than, say, knowledge of f o o t b a l l , c a r p e n t r y , automobile engines, or pot throwing, enables him t o be. The answer l i e s ,  I t h i n k , i n the f a c t t h a t knowledge of f o o t b a l l ,  c a r p e n t r y , automobile engines, or pot throwing, l o g i c a l l y  cannot  i n v o l v e a v e r y deep understanding of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the b i t s of knowledge about  f o o t b a l l , carpentry,  113 engines, o r pots w i t h o u t b e i n g  knowledge i n the t r a d i t i o n a l  For example, someone might be a h i g h l y s k i l l e d pots,  disciplines.  thrower of c l a y  and t h i s s k i l l might i n v o l v e not only knowing-how but a l s o a  c e r t a i n amount o f knowing-that.  I f such knowledge i s going t o con-  t r i b u t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o one's a b i l i t y t o r e f l e c t  r a t i o n a l l y , however,  then i t would i n c l u d e not o n l y knowledge o f the d i f f e r e n c e s between kinds  of c l a y s , which i n t u r n would i n v o l v e knowledge o f weather and  s o i l conditions  t h a t produce the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , but a l s o some  degree o f a e s t h e t i c s e n s i t i v i t y which i n t u r n would i n v o l v e knowledge of human f e e l i n g s and emotions. be,  The more r e f l e c t i v e one i s going t o  t h e more one has t o have a s t o r e o f knowledge from the e s t a b l i s h e d  d i s c i p l i n e s , and t h e more t h a t knowledge has t o make a d i f f e r e n c e t o how one sees and f e e l s about t h e w o r l d . Not ledge few  o n l y do s k i l l s  i n themselves i n v o l v e l i t t l e  depth of know-  (understanding o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) , but  s k i l l s have a v e r y wide range o f c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t .  As  Peters  points out: There i s very l i t t l e t o know about r i d i n g b i c y c l e s , swimming or g o l f . I t i s l a r g e l y a matter o f 'knowing how' r a t h e r than o f 'knowing t h a t ' , of knack r a t h e r than o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Furthermore what t h e r e i s t o know throws v e r y l i t t l e l i g h t on much e l s e . In h i s t o r y , s c i e n c e , o r l i t e r a t u r e , on the o t h e r hand, t h e r e i s an immense amount t o know, and, i f i t i s p r o p e r l y a s s i m i l a t e d , i t c o n s t a n t l y throws l i g h t on, widens, and deepens one's view of c o u n t l e s s other t h i n g s . ( P e t e r s , 1973, p. 95) The quotation  phrase " i f i t i s p r o p e r l y  a s s i m i l a t e d " i n the above  i s important because i t i s p o s s i b l e , o f c o u r s e , f o r someone  to be a student o f t h e v e r y b e s t  l i b e r a l education  we can p r o v i d e and  s t i l l n o t become a v e r y education  can p r o v i d e  being  I t i s enough t o show t h a t w i t h o u t a l i b e r a l  of some s o r t one cannot become a v e r y  I say v e r y  A liberal  no guarantees, and i t would be too much t o  expect t h a t i t c o u l d . education  r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person.  r e f l e c t i v e person.  r e f l e c t i v e because as Dearden p o i n t s out n e a r l y every human  i s an e x e r c i s e r of autonomy t o some e x t e n t ,  "Even i n a c t i n g under the s t r i c t e s t  orders,  no matter how  small.  some minimal a c t i v e  i n t e l l i g e n c e i s c a l l e d f o r " (Dearden, 1972, p. 460).  Even i f one's  e n t i r e l i f e were l i v e d by f o l l o w i n g some e x t e r n a l l y imposed s e t o f r u l e s , one i s o f t e n r e q u i r e d  t o d e c i d e whether a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n  i s an i n s t a n c e where a g i v e n r u l e a p p l i e s o r not. guage i n a n y t h i n g  other  some minimal a b i l i t y one  The use o f l a n -  than a p a r r o t - l i k e f a s h i o n r e q u i r e s a t l e a s t  to r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l l y .  i s a r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e person  So the extent  t o which  (and an autonomous person) i s  c e r t a i n l y a matter o f degree. In c o n s i d e r i n g how much r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n and how much i n the way of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s i s enough f o r t h e e x e r c i s e o f autonomy t o any  s i g n i f i c a n t degree, we can be h e l p e d by l o o k i n g a t M i c h a e l  Oakeshott's d i s t i n c t i o n between i n f o r m a t i o n Oakeshott suggests t h a t the v a r i o u s  and judgment  (1967).  a b i l i t i e s which c o n s t i t u t e what  we may be s a i d t o know a r e made up o f i n f o r m a t i o n  and judgment.  I n f o r m a t i o n i s a matter of i m p e r s o n a l f a c t s , s p e c i f i a b l e i n p r o p o s i tions.  Judgment, however, i s u n s p e c i f i a b l e i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form.  Judgment i s t h a t p a r t o f knowledge which enables us t o i n t e r p r e t information,  t o d e c i d e upon i t s r e l e v a n c e ,  to recognize  what r u l e t o  115 a p p l y , and  t o d i s c o v e r what a c t i o n p e r m i t t e d  the c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  be performed  by  the r u l e s h o u l d ,  (op. c i t . , p. 168).  Paul  makes e s s e n t i a l l y the same p o i n t as Oakeshott when he  in  Hirst  says:  A l l knowledge i n v o l v e s the use of symbols and the making of judgments i n ways t h a t cannot be expressed i n words and can o n l y be l e a r n t i n a t r a d i t i o n . The a r t of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n and the development of a p p r o p r i a t e e x p e r i m e n t a l t e s t s , the forming of an h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n and the assessment of i t s t r u t h , the a p p r e c i a t i o n of a poem: a l l of these a c t i v i t i e s are h i g h a r t s t h a t are not i n themselves communicable simply by words. ( H i r s t , 1974,  p.  45)  Oakeshott argues that t h i s element of knowledge t h a t i s not communicable simply by w o r d s — j u d g m e n t — c a n n o t be a c q u i r e d i n a vacuum;  t h a t i s , i t cannot be a c q u i r e d i n i s o l a t i o n from  information  because i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e s  the raw m a t e r i a l f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  d e c i s i o n s , r e c o g n i t i o n s , and  so f o r t h .  language of h i s t o r y , p h i l o s o p h y , expressly provided  U n t i l one  can speak the  s c i e n c e , e t c . , i n a manner not  f o r by the l i t e r a t u r e of those  l a c k i n g i n the a b i l i t y to make judgments i n those  d i s c i p l i n e s , one areas.  Having judgment, as Oakeshott i s u s i n g the term, i s h a v i n g ability belong  to t h i n k w i t h  i n the p r e s e n c e of those who  to use and  simply  enjoy  have i t .  a matter of l e a r n i n g how  information.  But  i t i s something l e a r n e d  l e a r n i n g to think i s not,  to judge, to i n t e r p r e t and  I t i s a l s o a matter of l e a r n i n g to  recognize  the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s of d i s i n t e r e s t e d c u r i o s i t y ,  p a t i e n c e , i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty, exactness, doubt, and  the  an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which  to the d i f f e r e n t modes of thought, and  he says,  is  elegance.  industry,  concentration,  In a d d i t i o n , i t i s a matter of a c q u i r i n g  the  disposition truth  and  to submit to r e f u t a t i o n ,  justice.  individual ance.  And  intelligence  above a l l , i t i s the (which he  Individual intelligence  a c c o r d i n g to the  rules,  but  and  says Oakeshott, "but can  d e t e c t the  c i t . , p.  can  judgment and  readily the  i n i t i a t i o n into can  i d i o m of  see  the  has  to  overhear i n i t a mind at work  thought, we  the  rational the  have understood n o t h i n g "  c o n n e c t i o n between what Oakeshott  r e f l e c t i o n c o n d i t i o n of autonomy.  l i t e r a t u r e of  then i n i t i a t i o n i n t o  r e q u i r e d b e f o r e one reflection.  the  disciplines  If  i s required  before  can  the  l i t e r a t u r e of  a c h i e v e any  T h i s i s not  significant  to suggest t h a t the  the  disciplines  degree of  acquisition  be  that r a t i o n a l  is  of mere  r a t i o n a l , r e f l e c t i o n can  acquired.  of  rational  pursued f o r many months or y e a r s b e f o r e  .  I t i s to suggest, however,  r e f l e c t i o n r e q u i r e s much more than mere i n i t i a t i o n  into  l i t e r a t u r e of each d i s c i p l i n e . The  c o n n e c t i o n between l i b e r a l s t u d i e s and  f u r t h e r emphasized by  Hirst  and  Taylor.  rational  Hirst  the  mind i n r a t i o n a l knowledge;  knowledge i n the  t h a t i s , the  traditional disciplines  i s the  reflection  (1974) has  t h a t a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n i s concerned d i r e c t l y w i t h the of  (op.  calls  i n f o r m a t i o n ought to be  is  utter-  i n some sense r i s e above t h a t l i t e r a t u r e to make judgments  one's own,  the  the  not  freedom l e f t by  l i s t e n to what a man  of  175).  We  one  u n l e s s we  to d e t e c t  c h o i c e made,  a r e a of  may  love  at work i n every  i s seen i n the  "We  l e a r n i n g the  ability  c a l l s style)  w i t h i n the  n e g a t i v e o p e r a t i o n of r u l e s . say,"  as w e l l as  argued  development  very a c q u i s i t i o n acquisition  of  a  of  r a t i o n a l mind.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, however, t h a t H i r s t ' s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p u r s u i t of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s v e r y from the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f f e r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s .  different  H i r s t b e l i e v e s that  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p u r s u i t of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s somehow built  r i g h t i n t o the e n t e r p r i s e of p u r s u i n g  it.  He  says:  To q u e s t i o n the p u r s u i t of any k i n d of r a t i o n a l knowledge i s i n the end s e l f - d e f e a t i n g , f o r the q u e s t i o n i n g i t s e l f depends on a c c e p t i n g the v e r y p r i n c i p l e s whose use i s f i n a l l y b e i n g c a l l e d in question. (Op. This j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s i n s u f f i c i e n t  cit.,  f o r our purposes, of  because even i f a s k i n g the q u e s t i o n  'Why  p.  42)  course,  pursue l i b e r a l s t u d i e s ? '  presupposes some commitment to the p u r s u i t of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s , i t need only presuppose commitment of a v e r y embryonic s o r t .  It is  p o s s i b l e to be committed to r a t i o n a l i t y by wanting a sane and s e n s i b l e answer to the q u e s t i o n  'Why  pursue l i b e r a l s t u d i e s ? ' without  ment to the s e r i o u s p u r s u i t of knowledge i n each of the  commit-  rational  disciplines. Taylor  (1961) contends t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to make r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e s among ways of l i f e u n l e s s one impartial.  H i s enlightenment  i s free, enlightened,  c o n d i t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t one  and have  i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge ( s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y ) , i m a g i n a t i v e knowledge (achieved through a wide v a r i e t y of p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , of  h i s t o r y , biography,  r e l i g i o n , and  anthropology,  and  s o c i o l o g y , the study  the a p p r e c i a t i o n of the f i n e a r t s ) , and  knowledge ( f i r s t  hand e x p e r i e n c e  unable to g i v e c h i l d r e n f i r s t  of a way  the  of l i f e ) .  hand experiences  reading of  practical We  may  be  of ways of l i f e ,  but  118 through a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , T a y l o r would argue, we can c l e a r l y help  them t o a c h i e v e  some degree o f enlightenment.  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , one o f T a y l o r ' s c o n d i t i o n s f o r the i m p a r t i a l i t y c o n d i t i o n of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e i s the absence o f b i a s i n the c h o i c e . He says a c h o i c e i s unbiased  t o the extent  that  ( i ) the chooser's  u p b r i n g i n g was n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n , ' ( i i ) the chooser's e d u c a t i o n liberal,  and ( i i i ) the person's e x p e r i e n c e  was  of l i f e up t o the time o f  c h o i c e was o f c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i e t y , r i c h n e s s , and depth (op. c i t . , p. 172).  The important  that a l i b e r a l education  point f o r this thesis i s Taylor's  claim  c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e absence o f b i a s .  That  c l a i m i s somewhat c o n t r o v e r s i a l , so i t should be examined i n some detail.  C l e a r l y the absence o f b i a s i s r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e any  s i g n i f i c a n t degree o f r a t i o n a l  reflection.  E a r l i e r i n the t h e s i s some o f t h e views o f the " s o c i o l o g i s t o f knowledge" p o s i t i o n were d i s c u s s e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g the n o t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e forms of knowledge.  Now i s the time t o e l a b o r a t e the  case a g a i n s t proponents of t h a t p o s i t i o n . have seen, i s t h a t l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n duces o r r e - e n f o r c e s and  class bias.  T h e i r b a s i c c l a i m , as we  i s o p p r e s s i v e because i t i n t r o -  T h i s c l a i m d i r e c t l y opposes T a y l o r  the view o f t h i s t h e s i s that a l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n  i n f l u e n c e , not an o p p r e s s i v e  one.  i s a liberating  Popper (1962, p. 216) suggests  t h a t s o c i o l o g i s t s o f knowledge i n v i t e the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i r own methods to themselves w i t h an almost i r r e s i s t i b l e h o s p i t a l i t y : a l l utterances  are expressions  i f  o f c l a s s b i a s , then so a r e the u t t e r -  ances o f s o c i o l o g i s t s o f knowledge.  119  I  am  arguing  reflection, are  such  claims  but  that  the  things  liberal  "sociologist  as  alternative  is  that  educators  which  are  less  r e s t r i c t i v e and  ality  we  only  are  because  thought  I am  to  s e e k out  makes a r e  against. speaks  of  uses  the  term  more v e r s a t i l e  i s not  Apple's  forms  of  I f we  'rationality'  we  of  I single of  immediately  possible?  t h a n we  the  typical  forms  that  there basic  rationality  121).  fairly  different  rationality  rational is  of  forms of  ( 1 9 7 5 , p.  It  for  One  m o r e humane t h a n  he  arguing  be  ought  the  forms of  to  rationalities.  using  claims  i s needed  knowledge" p o s i t i o n  to  i n which Apple appears  of  accustomed  A p p l e means when he different  education  rationout  Apple  the  school  clear  what  rationality. examine  see  that  the  the  might have expected.  of  Are contexts  word He  talks  about: 1)  a c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y t o d a y (1975 b , p. 121)  2) 3) 4)  e t h i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y (op. c i t . , p. 126) b u r e a u c r a t i c r a t i o n a l i t y ( o p . c i t . , p. 134) new r a t i o n a l i t i e s and t e c h n i q u e s t h a t make f u r t h e r control and d o m i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s by an i n s t r u m e n t a l and t e c h n i c a l i d e o l o g y p o s s i b l e (op. c i t . , p. 143) t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f e d u c a t i o n a l s c h o l a r s (op. c i t . , p . 143) t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e v a i l i n a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s l i k e o u r own (op. c i t . , p. 147)  5) 6) 7)  technical  8)  scientific  From t h e s e  examples  'rationality' term  rationality  as  little  rationality i t appears  i t should  'rationality'  as  harm done, but  extreme r e l a t i v i s m  (1975  at  a  be  the  c,  p.  less  that  Apple  efficacious  115)  i s not  using  the  I f A p p l e were m e r e l y 'point  terminology of  than  105)  c i t . , p.  used.  heart  is  (op.  synonym f o r  Apple's  that  the  of is  view'  of  using  t h e r e would  indicative  "sociology  term  of  the  knowledge"  the be  position.  I t i s , of c o u r s e , the. r e l a t i v i s t  p o s i t i o n I wish to argue  a g a i n s t , not the misuse of synonyms. When we  speak of the c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y or the s t a n d a r d s  of r a t i o n a l i t y , we  are u s u a l l y r e f e r r i n g t o some commitment to the  b a s i c laws of l o g i c such as the law of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n , the law of the excluded m i d d l e , and so f o r t h . logic.  There are no a l t e r n a t i v e laws of  By these standards a person i s i r r a t i o n a l to b e l i e v e b o t h P  and not P, f o r example, i f he makes no attempt to a l t e r h i s b e l i e f s when the i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s brought to h i s a t t e n t i o n . d i s r e g a r d the laws o f l o g i c , we seriously.  I f we  blatantly  cannot expect our views to be taken  A g a i n s t the n o t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  Popper  (op. c i t . ) argues t h a t the methods of s c i e n c e are p u b l i c p o s s e s s i o n s , not p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s .  If a scientist  o b t a i n e d r e s u l t s by methods  o t h e r than those t h a t are p u b l i c l y v e r i f i a b l e  (though perhaps o n l y by  s p e c i a l i s t s ) t h e r e would be no r e a s o n f o r us to take h i s f i n d i n g s seriously. irrationalist  Popper  speaks d i s p a r a g i n g l y of the m y s t i c i s m of the  tradition:  "Who  he asks, "the s c i e n t i s t who  shows g r e a t e r r e v e r e n c e f o r mystery,"  devotes h i m s e l f t o d i s c o v e r i n g i t step  by s t e p , always ready t o submit to the f a c t s , and always aware t h a t even h i s b o l d e s t achievement w i l l never be more than a s t e p p i n g stone f o r those who  come a f t e r him, or the m y s t i c who  m a i n t a i n a n y t h i n g because he need not f e a r any t e s t ? "  i s f r e e to (op.  cit.,  p. 245). Stephen Toulmin argues at l e n g t h a g a i n s t the r e l a t i v i s t  posi-  t i o n t h a t t r i e s to a l l o w f o r a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n h i s book,  121  Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g : ( 1 9 7 2 ) . rationalities  t o be  He  incoherent  holds  on  the  the  notion of  ground  alternative  that:  r a t i o n a l i t y i s an a t t r i b u t e , n o t o f l o g i c a l o r c o n c e p t u a l s y s t e m s a s s u c h , b u t o f t h e human a c t i v i t i e s o r e n t e r p r i s e s of which p a r t i c u l a r s e t s of concepts are the temporary c r o s s sections: s p e c i f i c a l l y , o f t h e p r o c e d u r e s by w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t s , j u d g e m e n t s , and f o r m a l s y s t e m s c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d i n t h o s e e n t e r p r i s e s a r e c r i t i c i z e d and c h a n g e d . (Op. Toulmin i s saying that to  consider.  there simply  T h i s view can  best  a r e no  be  cit.,  alternative  explained  p.  133)  rationalities  i n h i s own  words:  Questions of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' are concerned, p r e c i s e l y , not w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l d o c t r i n e s that a m a n — o r p r o f e s s i o n a l g r o u p — a d o p t s a t any g i v e n t i m e , b u t r a t h e r w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s on w h i c h , and t h e manner i n w h i c h , he i s p r e p a r e d t o c r i t i c i z e and c h a n g e t h o s e d o c t r i n e s a s t i m e g o e s o n . The r a t i o n a l i t y o f a s c i e n c e ( f o r i n s t a n c e ) i s e m b o d i e d , n o t i n the t h e o r e t i c a l systems c u r r e n t i n i t at p a r t i c u l a r times, b u t i n i t s p r o c e d u r e s f o r d i s c o v e r y and c o n c e p t u a l change through time. (Op. The  upshot  of  this  the b a s i c laws  of  inheritance.  The  t h a t we  logic core  and  there  i s a core  rules  remains  of  same p o i n t  of philosophy  i s made b y  J . R.  of education.  of  as  and  p.  rationality  language) which  stable,  could s e n s i b l y b r i n g forward  The nature  i s that  cit.,  there are  (including  is a  communal  no  candidates  possible alternatives  Coombs i n d i s c u s s i n g He  84)  to i t .  the  says:  To do p h i l o s o p h y o f e d u c a t i o n i s t o u s e some e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f what i t i s t o b e r a t i o n a l i n m a k i n g a s s e s s m e n t s a b o u t w h a t c o u n t s as r a t i o n a l , s e n s i b l e , e t c . t h i n k i n g a b o u t e d u c a tion. What I am c a l l i n g a n e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n c l u d e s sets of d i s t i n c t i o n s , techniques of a n a l y s i s , k i n d s o f arguments and t h e l i k e w h i c h a r e r e g a r d e d as w o r t h while. One's e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y m u s t b e j u s t i f i e d i n r e f e r e n c e to the c o r e meaning of r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s c o r e c a n be e x p l i c a t e d , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , i n terms o f s u c h t h i n g s a s a d h e r i n g t o t h e b a s i c c a n o n s o f l o g i c and r u l e s of language. G i v e n any p a r t i c u l a r e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t o f  122 r a t i o n a l i t y , i t i s u n l i k e l y we c o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y where the core ends and the e l a b o r a t i o n b e g i n s . I t i s not c l e a r to me, f o r example, whether such t h i n g s as L e i b n i z ' s law and Occam's r a z o r are p a r t s of the core or p a r t s of v a r i o u s e l a b o r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s of r a t i o n a l i t y . Our i n a b i l i t y to draw c l e a r b o u n d a r i e s i n t h i s matter should not be taken as grounds f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no core of d e s c r i p t i v e meaning to the concept of r a t i o n a l i t y , though t h i s i s what some proponents of " s o c i o l o g y of knowledge" would have us b e l i e v e . I f t h a t i s r i g h t , a l t e r n a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t i e s do not impossible i s not  e x i s t , and  i t is  f o r anyone to c r e a t e such an a l t e r n a t i v e at w i l l .  to suggest, however, t h a t t h e r e  This  i s no p o s s i b l e w o r l d i n which  the core of r a t i o n a l i t y i s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the a c t u a l w o r l d . Quine has  shown i n h i s "Two  r a t i o n a l core  Dogmas of E m p i r i c i s m "  i s not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v i o l a t e .  t h a t the r a t i o n a l core  point  is  the simply  i s a communal i n h e r i t a n c e which i t i s not  p o s s i b l e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to change. our  The  t h a t even  accepted r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e  I f , f o r example, I were to  i n developing  the t h e s i s , on the grounds t h a t I am  operating  the c e n t r a l argument of according  to some  alternative rationality,  then no  the argument.  s e n s i b l e p e o p l e argue (or t r y to argue)  according  Sane and  t o accepted r u l e s of  sane and  s e n s i b l e person could  follow  inference.  What a l l t h i s b o i l s down to i s t h a t i n i t i a t i o n i n t o s t u d i e s i s not  ignore  liberal  only compatible w i t h r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , but  also a  p r e r e q u i s i t e to i t . I t c o u l d be  suggested t h a t g i v i n g s t u d e n t s a v a r i e t y - o f -  e x p e r i e n c e c u r r i c u l u m might g i v e them as much or more to about than the b o o k i s h o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t a l i b e r a l a r t s would p r o v i d e ,  but  reflect  curriculum  at l e a s t t h r e e responses c o u l d be made to  this  123 suggestion: 1) to  There seems t o be l e s s reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t s u b j e c t i n g s t u d e n t s as many d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e w i l l improve  reflective abilities  or even g i v e  their  them a b e t t e r chance o f h a v i n g  g r e a t e r r e f l e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s than a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m would enable them t o have. without 2)  One can have a wide v a r i e t y o f e x p e r i e n c e s  g a i n i n g v e r y much b r e a d t h and depth of knowledge.  Besides;  Dewey's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we l o o k a t knowledge i t s e l f as the sum-  t o t a l o f human e x p e r i e n c e would l e a d us t o t h i n k t h a t by s u b j e c t i n g s t u d e n t s t o a compulsory l i b e r a l access t o more e x p e r i e n c e  e d u c a t i o n we a r e i n f a c t g i v i n g them  ( a l b e i t v i c a r i o u s ) than any i n d i v i d u a l  c o u l d p o s s i b l y hope t o a c q u i r e f i r s t hand i n a l i f e t i m e .  There a r e  simply not enough hours i n a day or days i n a l i f e t i m e f o r each person  t o i n v e n t the wheel a l l over a g a i n .  experience  (as opposed t o the second  No doubt some f i r s t  hand  hand e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l  s t u d i e s ) of v a r i o u s s o r t s i s as important  t o the development o f  r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n as t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , but we c o u l d not make t h i s c l a i m about f i r s t hand e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l .  Subjection  to  a v a r i e t y of e x p e r i e n c e s p r o v i d e s no guarantee  t h a t one w i l l come  to  see r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among events i n the w o r l d .  S u b j e c t i o n t o a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m p r o v i d e s no such e i t h e r , but a t l e a s t :the v e r y s u b j e c t matter  guarantee  o f l i b e r a l s t u d i e s is_  r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f many d i f f e r e n t k i n d s . 3)  Even i f c e r t a i n v a r i e t i e s of e x p e r i e n c e — e . g . ,  e d u c a t i o n through  g e t t i n g an i n f o r m a l  t r a v e l l i n g around the w o r l d and meeting people whose  124 ways of l i f e  are d i f f e r e n t  from our own—were j u s t as e f f e c t i v e i n  g e t t i n g people to be as r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e as i s a l i b e r a l  arts  c u r r i c u l u m , we have to be r e a l i s t i c about what k i n d of s c h o o l i n g i s f e a s i b l e f o r .children.  A good l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n can e a s i l y  be  had w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of a c l a s s r o o m at not too e x o r b i t a n t a c o s t , whereas a r r a n g i n g f o r l a r g e numbers of s t u d e n t s t o i t r a v e l the world would be v e r y c o s t l y and v e r y i n c o n v e n i e n t .  B e s i d e s , we  have b e t t e r  reason to b e l i e v e t h a t a good l i b e r a l e d u c a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s more to the development of autonomy because of the i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n s between autonomy and b r e a d t h and depth of knowledge. We  o f t e n hear p o p u l a r t h e o r i s t s speak d i s p a r a g i n g l y about keep-  i n g s t u d e n t s w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of f o u r classroom w a l l s , as i f by doing we were d e p r i v i n g s t u d e n t s of important world.  But  i f what we  Immanuel Kant  are concerned  (and o t h e r s l i k e him)  t h i n k e r t h a t he d i d without of Kbnigsberg,  then we  e x p e r i e n c e s i n the  w i t h i s autonomy, and i f  c o u l d become the autonomous  ever t r a v e l l i n g more than t e n m i l e s out  ought to remain h o p e f u l about the  of a c c o m p l i s h i n g a v e r y great d e a l w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of  possibility classroom  walls. I have argued  e a r l i e r that without  or something l i k e i t , cannot be met.  a l i b e r a l arts curriculum,  the r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n c o n d i t i o n of autonomy  In the second  t o l a s t paragraph  I have s a i d o n l y  t h a t l i b e r a l a r t s s t u d i e s c o n t r i b u t e more to the development of autonomy than l i k e l y c o m p e t i t o r s . these two  so  The apparent  c l a i m s should be e x p l a i n e d .  I f we  i n c o n s i s t e n c y of  c o n c e i v e of a  liberal  education indeed  i n terms of  a liberal  autonomy.  education  to  certain  liberal  education than  Questions satisfied As for  we  the  of  a  liberal can  to c o n t r i b u t e to  arise  the  at  this  helping students  also  required.  But  the  choices  b r e a k down on choice  and  recalled  and  of  i s a t a s k t h a t depends  in  t h a t on  p a g e 66  c o n d i t i o n s of  E v e n i f we  accept  up  put  the  l e a r n i n g s and  without  do we to  of  developing  know how  into  i s an  the kinds  of  and  of  choice are  i t stands,  experiences  to us.  weakness o f counted  as  unsettled question.  freedom of as  available  s h o u l d be  above, P e t e r s ' l i s t  list  to ensure  judgments  yet  Because  distinctions"between free  c l o s e i n s p e c t i o n , what  subjective  kinds  not  between s t r e n g t h of w i l l  s t r e n g t h of w i l l  and  development  s t r e n g t h of w i l l  that the  choice  the  c h o i c e and  argued  of  sufficient  out  freedom of  empirical findings  will  we  ensure  that students w i l l  cases  do  grow up  b e i n g hampered  i n which  not  of  be the  presented. know what grow  outlines.  with by  will  freedom  that students Peters  and  It will  a b s e n t , was  simply  compulsions  a c t i o n without  be  task of p i c k i n g  t h a t c o n t r i b u t e towards  unfree  can  e x e r c i s e o f autonomous t h i n k i n g i s n o t  are  plausibly  of  t o become a u t o n o m o u s t h i n k e r s .  components  c a n be  a  development  p o i n t a b o u t w h e t h e r we  eurricular  l a r g e m e a s u r e on  sub-  pursuits.  with merely  of w i l l  as  i s that  the  then  of  education say  possession of personal autonomy—freedom  strength  it  understanding),  f o r the p o s s e s s i o n  t h e m o s t we  i s more l i k e l y  might  have seen,  conceive  s t u d i e s , then  other  (theoretical  i s necessary  I f , h o w e v e r , we  jection  autonomy  attainments  the  Nor  ability  t o o many  126 counter-Inclinations.  By the same token, i t c o u l d be argued t h a t we  don't r e a l l y know how t o ensure that s t u d e n t s w i l l become r a t i o n a l l y r e f l e c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s e i t h e r , but a t l e a s t we. can see t h a t w i t h o u t some b r e a d t h and depth of knowledge r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s i m p o s s i b l e . A good l i b e r a l a r t s program cannot guarantee t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge t h a t makes a d i f f e r e n c e t o how one sees and f e e l s about the w o r l d — t h a t , no doubt, i s why we sometimes say no one can t e a c h anybody a n y t h i n g — b u t we would be n a i v e t o hope f o r guarantees.  The  most we can hope f o r i s a t l e a s t some measure o f s u c c e s s w i t h n e a r l y everyone and l a r g e measures o f s u c c e s s w i t h a few. I t has been suggested t o me by Murray E l l i o t t  that  because  someone might be a b l e to a c h i e v e c o n s i d e r a b l e c o g n i t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e ( i n P e t e r s ' sense) though he has been i n i t i a t e d matter—chemistry, f o r example—there  i n t o o n l y one s u b j e c t  i s a problem about whether  ought to i n i t i a t e s t u d e n t s i n t o a l l t h e l i b e r a l a r t s or whether  we we  ought t o opt f o r depth i n some a r e a a t the expense of b r e a d t h . The problem of depth v e r s u s b r e a d t h i s something o f a p e r e n n i a l dilemma, but g i v e n t h a t we a r e d e f e n d i n g compulsory e d u c a t i o n f o r the development for  o f p e r s o n a l autonomy, a good case can be made, i t seems,  c h o o s i n g as much depth as p o s s i b l e i n each o f t h e l i b e r a l  over g r e a t e r depth i n a s i n g l e a r e a . how much of a s c i e n t i f i c  The reason i s t h i s :  arts  no matter  ( f o r example) genius we might produce i n  o p t i n g f o r depth over b r e a d t h , i t i s d o u b t f u l whether we c o u l d  attri-  bute someone who i s unable t o see events i n the w o r l d from a v a r i e t y of  p o i n t s o f view w i t h the c a p a c i t y f o r the k i n d of r a t i o n a l  reflection  127  we  are a f t e r .  Events  In the world are not j u s t s c i e n t i f i c  events;  they are a l s o h i s t o r i c a l events, p o l i t i c a l events, r e l i g i o u s etc.  Events are important not j u s t  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , but  also  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , a e s t h e t i c a l l y , e c o n o m i c a l l y , m o r a l l y , and o t h e r ways as w e l l . one  To have knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a r e a i s to be d e p r i v e d of a v a r i e t y of ways of  one's e x p e r i e n c e . e x p e r i e n c e then we  I f we  events,  i n many i n only  interpreting  are d e p r i v e d of ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g  our  a r e not f r e e to make c h o i c e s and d e c i s i o n s based  on those i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . might otherwise be.  Hence, we  are not as autonomous as  we  T h i s i s not to suggest, of c o u r s e , t h a t the  development of e x p e r t i s e i n one a r e a i s u n d e s i r a b l e because i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y a c h i e v e d at the expense of the development of b r e a d t h i n a v a r i e t y of a r e a s ; concerned  i t i s merely  to suggest  t h a t i n so f a r as we  w i t h the compulsory i m p o s i t i o n of s t u d i e s f o r the  ment of autonomy, we  ought not t o t e a c h j u s t math and  or j u s t music and p o e t r y , but a l l of these.  are  develop-  s c i e n c e , say,  Because the development  of e x p e r t i s e i n a s i n g l e area r e q u i r e s enormous p e r s o n a l commitment on the p a r t of the l e a r n e r , the development of e x p e r t i s e i n a s i n g l e a r e a might b e s t be l e f t  as something the l e a r n e r i s f r e e to  attempt  a f t e r h i s compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s over. B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of some p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s study, i t might be h e l p f u l a t t h i s stage to r e - s t a t e the main p o i n t s of the argument as i t appeared introduction:  i n the  128 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  An I n d i v i d u a l ' s prima f a c i e r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be o v e r r i d d e n when the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s h o l d : (a) The i n d i v i d u a l consents to f o r f e i t h i s r i g h t and h i s consent i s not caused by the i n t e r f e r e n c e nor i s i t the r e s u l t of h i s b e i n g i r r a t i o n a l , i . e . , h a v i n g d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s , i r r a t i o n a l compulsions, and the l i k e . or There i s a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l would consent i n the f u t u r e i f he were r a t i o n a l and i n p o s s e s s i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n r e l e v a n t to j u s t i f y i n g the i n t e r f e r e n c e . (b) The i n t e r f e r e n c e promotes the good of the i n d i v i d u a l i n some way, t h i s good i s more s i g n i f i c a n t than the harm r e s u l t i n g from the i n t e r f e r e n c e , and the i n t e r f e r ence i s e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y to or i s the b e s t way of promoting the good. (c) The i n t e r f e r e n c e i s not m o r a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e on grounds other than i t s i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t to n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . Because the i m p o s i t i o n of a wide v a r i e t y of s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g l i b e r a l s t u d i e s ) c o u l d meet the c o n d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d i n #1 above, and s i n c e any c u r r i c u l u m can accommodate only a l i m i t e d number of s t u d i e s and a c t i v i t i e s , some c r i t e r i o n i s needed f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the most s i g n i f i c a n t goods to be promoted f o r s t u d e n t s . The development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s the good to be p r o moted by c o m p e l l i n g students to study the l i b e r a l a r t s . It i s assumed t h a t such development i s s u f f i c i e n t l y v a l u a b l e to outweigh any harm t h a t i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t from c o m p e l l i n g students to take l i b e r a l a r t s s t u d i e s . (Freedom of w i l l , r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , and s t r e n g t h of w i l l are taken as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r s o n a l autonomy.) The development of p e r s o n a l autonomy i s a more d e s i r a b l e or s i g n i f i c a n t e d u c a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e than any o t h e r t h a t might be secured by imposing other s o r t s of s t u d i e s . I t i s assumed t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e reason to b e l i e v e t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s excluded by t h e / i m p o s i t i o n of l i b e r a l s t u d i e s are l o g i c a l l y or e m p i r i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y to the development of autonomy. A l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , when taken as a s e t of a t t a i n m e n t s , i s n e c e s s a r y to the development of p e r s o n a l autonomy because i t i s n e c e s s a r y to the development of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , i . e . , i t i s not p o s s i b l e to secure any s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n without such a t t a i n m e n t s . A l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m , when taken not as a s e t of a t t a i n ments but as a s e t of courses of study (taught by whatever methods are deemed e f f e c t i v e and d e s i r a b l e ) , i s the b e s t way of a c h i e v i n g r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e , we  are j u s t i f i e d  i n imposing a l i b e r a l a r t s c u r r i c u l u m  on  129 students  for their  Since tion  such so. tion  good.  the purpose of the t h e s i s  of a l i b e r a l  obvious  own  practical  arts  c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s  implication  a c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s Still,  i t may  a little  bit.  has been  to j u s t i f y for their  o f t h e w o r k i s t h a t we i n schools  i f we  own  should  i s the task of chapter  imposi-  good,  the  impose  are not already  be u s e f u l t o e l a b o r a t e on t h i s That  the  doing  general implica-  five.  CHAPTER V  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  In t h i s chapter we and  teacher  l o o k at some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r  teachers  t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of imposing on students a compulsory  l i b e r a l arts curriculum.  I am  t h a t students o b t a i n broad and  assuming not  only that i t i s d e s i r a b l e  deep knowledge of academic s u b j e c t s  but  also that t h i s i s p o s s i b l e . Some i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s view should mentioned, i t should  be  be  taught, not how  b e s t method of i n i t i a t i n g  moral  In a d d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h we involve advocating  to l e a r n . mission  No  one  I t i s a presumption i n  i t should  be  taught.  The  students i n t o a body of knowledge i s to  determined v i a e m p i r i c a l and  does not  have  i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a presumption  i n f a v o r of t r a d i t i o n a l t e a c h i n g methods. be  As we  remembered t h a t a presumption i n f a v o r of a  t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l arts curriculum  f a v o r of what should  clarified.  be  considerations.  have been emphasizing compulsion,  this  coercive techniques f o r g e t t i n g students  supposes t h a t c h i l d r e n should  i f they p r e f e r h o p s c o t c h to h i s t o r y .  be beaten i n t o sub-  A l l t h a t i s meant by  compulsory s u b j e c t matter i s s u b j e c t matter t h a t students cannot choose to make or to miss i n the way one  that high  school  students choose  e l e c t i v e r a t h e r than another. There i s a p o p u l a r o b j e c t i o n t h a t i s o f t e n brought  130  131 forward to counter p r o p o s a l s l i k e the one for  I am making.  example, r a n a f u l l page advertisement  The B.C.T.F.,  i n the Vancouver Sun  p r e s e n t t h i s o b j e c t i o n and o t h e r s t o the p u b l i c i n 1976 p r o v i n c i a l government of B.C. The o b j e c t i o n i s t h i s : all  proposed  when the  core c u r r i c u l u m .  students a r e i n d i v i d u a l s and i f we  the same k i n d of c u r r i c u l u m we  viduality.  a compulsory  g i v e them  a r e denying s t u d e n t s t h e i r  indi-  S u r e l y i t i s not' d e s i r a b l e , so the argument goes,  make everyone  a r o b o t i c carbon copy of everyone  to  else.  White  to calls  t h i s o b j e c t i o n a f a m i l i a r D a i l y T e l e g r a p h k i n d of argument t h a t i s more propaganda than argument. to  expose i t s i n a d e q u a c i e s .  A v e r y b r i e f response  should  As White s u g g e s t s , one cannot  suffice  rationally  pronounce o n e s e l f f o r or a g a i n s t u n i f o r m i t y u n t i l one knows i n what r e s p e c t people a r e s a i d to be u n i f o r m . same i n matters  of p e r s o n a l s t y l e , then l i f e would l o s e much of i t s  r i c h n e s s and c o l o u r . of  affairs;  I f everyone were always the  That would s u r e l y be a v e r y u n d e s i r a b l e s t a t e  but on the o t h e r hand, u n i f o r m i t y i s indeed  desirable  when i t comes t o standards o f , say, t r u t h f u l n e s s or honesty. case the whole r a i s o n d ' e t r e of compulsory by the account  l i b e r a l arts education i s ,  I am o f f e r i n g , to get s t u d e n t s t o the stage when they  can i n f a c t t h i n k f o r themselves cut  In any  as i n d i v i d u a l s .  o f f from the more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  forms of thought  t h e i r o p t i o n s are s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d . b e l i e v e t h a t carbon-copy  When people are and  I t seems r e a s o n a b l e to  t h i n k i n g would be more l i k e l y  among non-autonomous persons  activity  to r e s u l t  than autonomous ones.  It w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t i n chapter t h r e e the enhancement of  freedom was r e j e c t e d as a b a s i s f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e on the grounds t h a t f o r c i n g people t o be f r e e can l e a d t o u n a c c e p t a b l e consequences of freedom, and i t might  on b o t h the p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e accounts seem t h a t t h e i m p o s i t i o n of compulsory  c u r r i c u l u m t o make people autonomous i s s i m i l a r l y a case o f f o r c i n g people t o be f r e e .  But t h e r e i s an important fundamental  between the two k i n d s of c a s e s .  difference  I n imposing t h e development of  autonomy on s t u d e n t s we a r e not imposing any p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f b e l i e f s or v a l u e s on them.  We a r e not r e g a r d i n g them as u n f r e e i f they h o l d  one s e t o f p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and v a l u e s , say, r a t h e r than another, or if  they have a s p i r a t i o n s i n one p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n r a t h e r  another.  I f our view of freedom were freedom  than  i n a more M a r x i s t  sense, however, then f o r c i n g people t o be f r e e would i n v o l v e r e g a r d i n g them as u n f r e e i f they d i d not h o l d c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e v a l u e s and beliefs.  Compelling people t o be autonomous i s n o t l i k e t h a t .  It  i s a matter o f imposing c e r t a i n p u r s u i t s on s t u d e n t s u n t i l they a r e a b l e to d e c i d e r a t i o n a l l y both what they want t o do and which cons t r a i n t s they want t o impose on themselves. whether we i n c l u d e X i n a compulsory  The q u e s t i o n about  c u r r i c u l u m becomes a q u e s t i o n  about whether X i n f a c t c o n t r i b u t e s t o the a c q u i s i t i o n o f autonomy. I t i s n o t a t a l l an i s s u e about what people would v a l u e i f they were r a t i o n a l o r i f they were n o t c o n s t r a i n e d .  So imposing a  compulsory  c u r r i c u l u m on s t u d e n t s t o make them autonomous i s n o t open t o t h e same o b j e c t i o n s as the M a r x i s t p o s i t i o n on f o r c i n g people t o be f r e e . A f o u r t h p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t a compulsory  liberal  arts  133 education numbers the  f o r everyone  of students  inclination  etc.  With  i n our schools  regard  to capacity,  i n making  students  do n o t h a v e  what  that  given  i n g methods sufficient  from  of  students  of environment  a l s o be t r u e  their  but that  immersed  i n a compulsory  liberal  arts  Of  course  towards  the kind  necessary  that  of curriculum  adopted  that  academic  teach-  students i s  arts  numbers  subjects,  methods were  from  s t u d e n t s who  Besides,  an e a r l y cannot are presently  c h i l d r e n who a r e  from t h e b e g i n n i n g the whole question  extent  beside  will of  the point.  i f s t u d e n t s were n a t u r a l l y  we w o u l d  true  of  large  P e r h a p s we  program  inclined  i m p o s e o n them, b u t i t i s n o t  t h e y be so i n c l i n e d .  One a l t e r n a t i v e t o a p r e - a r r a n g e d often  t o study  i s to a large  i t would be p r e f e r a b l e  be  theoretical pursuits.  i s not to say that  come t o h a v e t h e same i n c l i n a t i o n s . i n c l i n a t i o n s of students  o f most  i f i t i s true  change t h e i n c l i n a t i o n s o f most  i n our s c h o o l s ,  curriculum  I t might  ability  i n the l i b e r a l  enrolled  the  an academic  i n c l i n a t i o n s would be d i f f e r e n t .  successfully  we a r e  l a r g e numbers o f  i f the r i g h t teaching  and s t u d e n t s were s t e e p e d  history,  and t h e r i g h t k i n d  the innate  that  the capacity nor  science,  ability.  do n o t h a v e t h e i n c l i n a t i o n  i t could  age,  that  to handle  i s concerned,  are large  i t i s not clear that  t o g e t them o n t h e i n s i d e o f many  f a r as i n c l i n a t i o n  found  claim  i s innate  the beginning  As  then  the capacity  the right kind  literature,  however,  the empirical  i s meant b y c a p a c i t y  aim because there  who h a v e n e i t h e r  t o study mathematics,  justified  if  i s an u n r e a l i s t i c  compulsory  curriculum  that i s  i s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e White r e f e r s t o as t h e ' c a f e t e r i a '  134 c o u n s e l l o r - g u i d e d system which he b e l i e v e s i s t y p i c a l of n o r t h schools. choose  American  The main o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s approach  i s that i f c h i l d r e n  t h e i r own c u r r i c u l a they a r e not l i k e l y  t o choose what they  would choose on r e f l e c t i o n i f they understood  the a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s .  I f s t u d e n t s a r e guided by s c h o o l c o u n s e l l o r s i n c h o o s i n g c e r t a i n opt i o n s over o t h e r s , then they a r e i n l a r g e measure a t the mercy o f people who may not be e d u c a t i o n a l l y e n l i g h t e n e d . l o r s may d i r e c t s t u d e n t s to choose  Guidance  one s e t of o p t i o n s over  e i t h e r on t h e b a s i s o f what they themselves would choose  counselanother  i f they were  i n t h e s t u d e n t s ' p o s i t i o n o r on t h e b a s i s of which k i n d s of p u r s u i t s open t h e door t o "good j o b s . "  I f t h e l a t t e r , then t h e c o u n s e l l o r may  f u n c t i o n more l i k e an agent of s o c i a l c o n t r o l than a genuine of s t u d e n t s ' b e s t  promoter  interests.  The k i n d s of c u r r i c u l a r recommendations I am a r g u i n g a g a i n s t i n t h i s t h e s i s a r e not o n l y those t h a t advocate t h e ' c a f e t a r i a '  approach  but a l s o those t h a t advocate g r e a t e r v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g and l e i s u r e activity  t r a i n i n g a t t h e expense o f an academic emphasis.  Report, though  dated, might  The Newsom  s e r v e as a well-known example of t h i s  second k i n d o f recommendation.  I t i s concerned w i t h t h e s o - c a l l e d  ' l e s s a b l e ' c h i l d and i t recommends t h a t such c h i l d r e n be taught n o t h i n g of the fundamental  s t r u c t u r e of such b a s i c s u b j e c t s as  mathematics and p h y s i c s .  I t l a y s heavy emphasis on a r t s and c r a f t s ,  games, cookery, woodwork, e t c . — a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t i n v o l v e some form o f  p h y s i c a l s k i l l r a t h e r than t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  To argue, as  the Newsom Report does, t h a t c h i l d r e n of low a b i l i t y need t o l e a r n  135 such  t h i n g s a s woodwork, h o u s e c r a f t , b u s i n e s s  these  are  prejudge gram o f that  the  skills  what this  sort sort  prevents  they w i l l from  the  lead.  but  specific  basal  probably merit master  in effect  equip  students  choosing  the  taught  stories  English  regarded  as  of  the  lead.  but  they  the  A  pro-  of  life  what k i n d o f  lives  people  f o r teachers, curriculum of  the  f o r e g o i n g arguments,  made. I n e l e m e n t a r y  from  I f we  learning  i s to  controlled  be  vocabulary regarded  were to t a k e a  as  compulsory  t h i s m a t e r i a l would by works o f  literary  enough f o r c h i l d r e n  to read:  what  they  Individualized  could not  teacher  schools  into  replace the best  to  read  reading deliberate of  the  tradition.  Often  i n the  schools w r i t t e n composition  w e r e some t h e r a p e u t i c a c t o f  pouring  be  equally important.  s t u d e n t by  it  institutions  I t would not  initiation literary  implications  literature.  retained,  lives,  f o r a way  i n w h i c h c o u l d s e l d o m be  p r o g r a m s c o u l d be of  adult  persons.  replaced at a l l l e v e l s  significance.  e t c . , because  c u t s o f f l a r g e numbers o f  to read  t h e mere m e c h a n i c s o f  w o u l d be  f o r themselves  c u r r i c u l u m s e r i o u s l y much o f  h a v e t o be  and  children will  training  are normally  arts  these  suggestions might  readers—the  liberal  lives  belabour  teacher  m o d e l s o f good  in their  t o become a u t o n o m o u s  or  children  using  It effectively  need n o t  few  be  adult  would  planners, a  of  them f r o m  chance  We  they w i l l  letters,  out  of  inner thoughts  i s treated  as i f  s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n — a spontaneous  and  feelings  a p i e c e o f work t h e m e r i t s o f w h i c h a r e  r a t h e r than t o be  judged  the by  creation the  136 response of pulsory  literate  liberal  people  towards  arts curriculum  i t . ' I f we  were t o  s e r i o u s l y , s u r e l y we  expose c h i l d r e n to a v a r i e t y of w r i t i n g s t y l e s English  prose  In  so  authority obvious a  i n teaching  f a r as m i n i s t r i e s o f  curriculum  of  compulsory  ministries  of  compulsory  curriculum  For  whoever has (if  they  not  education  the  As  the  when t h e  from high a  teacher  of  that  at  We  all) a  are  content  training  that  teachers  Unfortunately, schools  but  way  wholly  of  the  bodies  the  or  ought  question  only  o f what  here,  claim  albeit  to  be  school—  concerned, i t  certified  as  to  teachers  themselves r e c e i v e d  a  ever and  t h a t many  only  having without  empirical science.  suggest  liberal  graduate not  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l essay,  of mathematics or  very  implementation.  recommend  education  prescribe  arts in  of  to  another  that  liberal  are  have not  inaccurate  is  institutions  students  whether  prescribe  curriculum  i t i s o f t e n p o s s i b l e to  or  of  children learn in of  one  prescribe  power) ought  compulsory  concerned  to  countries  need  with  for schools,  a l s o from u n i v e r s i t i e s without  Shakespearean p l a y  perhaps not  would d e l i b e r a t e l y  good m o d e l s  power t o  to have the  faculties  education  k n o w i n g much i n t h e is  the  prospective  education.  the  t h e s i s we  (or ought  com-  and  they The  administrative d i f f i c u l t i e s  f a r as  ministries  arts.  to have  this  f o r everyone.  are  curriculum  f o r whole p r o v i n c e s  power  seems u n d e s i r a b l e  read  liberal  ought  purposes of  terms, with  with  education  thesis i s that  prescribe anything  curriculum general  this  a  write.  to p r e s c r i b e a compulsory  i m p l i c a t i o n of  matter.  them t o  take  It  classroom  137 teachers have been well trained for t h e i r jobs but not many have been well educated.  Be that as i t may, i f Oakeshott i s correct  that judgment i s acquired by interacting with those who already have i t , then unless teachers are on the inside of the subject matters they teach, we cannot hope that students w i l l acquire anything beyond a very s u p e r f i c i a l understanding of the d i f f e r e n t disciplines.  If we are concerned with the development of personal  autonomy, and I have t r i e d to show i n this thesis that we ought to be very concerned with i t , then we ought to be equally concerned with the compulsory  imposition of a l i b e r a l arts  curriculum on both students and future teachers. I have tried i n this thesis to j u s t i f y the compulsory  impo-  s i t i o n of a l i b e r a l arts curriculum ( i n the H i r s t i a n sense) on the p a t e r n a l i s t i c grounds that depth and breadth of knowledge are necessary to s a t i s f y the r a t i o n a l - r e f l e c t i o n condition of personal autonomy.  Many controversial points have been raised that w i l l  continue to be controversial i n the future.  In so f a r as the argument  of the thesis i s successful, however, a case has been made against the positions of some sociologists of knowledge and popular theorists discussed i n chapter one. Teachers need no longer f e e l vaguely g u i l t y (as many have f e l t i n recent years) f o r imposing "foreign t r i p s " on students by imposing a compulsory  l i b e r a l arts curriculum  on them. The thesis raises a host of important, unanswered questions  138 for  further  study  research:  of s c i e n c e over  Could  a case  literature  (or v i c e versa)  development  o f p e r s o n a l autonomy?  experiences  c o n t r i b u t e to those  have n o t y e t c o n s i d e r e d — f r e e d o m Do we h a v e a m o r a l students?  in  What k i n d s  aspects  f o r the greater  o f s t u d i e s and  o f p e r s o n a l autonomy  achieve  to help  the attainments  questions could also  the past,  we  o f c h o i c e and s t r e n g t h o f w i l l ? develop  p e r s o n a l autonomy i n  What m e t h o d s o f t e a c h i n g m a x i m i z e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y  students w i l l related  obligation  be made f o r t h e m e r i t s o f t h e  be a s k e d .  and h o p e f u l l y a l l w i l l  we  are after?  Several  Many o f them h a v e  be a d d r e s s e d  that  arisen  i n future studies.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Apple, M i c h a e l W. 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