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Historical perspective : an analysis and application in education Fourdraine, Leonard Conrad 1979

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION IN EDUCATION by LEONARD CONRAD FOURDRAINE B.A., Acadia University, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Educational Foundations We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November 1979 ©Leonard Conrad Fourdraine, 1979 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t n f CoQCAnotJflri Toot-»j>A-n oos The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V6T 1W5 D E - 6 B P 75-51 1 E ABSTRACT Scholars interested i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective (perhaps using d i f f e r e n t terminology) stress i t s importance for various reasons. Only E r i k Eriksbn, however, has systematically described h i s t o r -i c a l perspective and i t s development i n the i n d i v i d u a l . The thesis begins with a review of the l i t e r a t u r e , continues with a d e f i n i t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and an explanation of i t s con-siderable importance both h i s t o r i c a l l y and v i s a_ v i s the develop-mental theories of E r i k Erikson and Jean Piaget. The education system arguably o f f e r s the best locus and means for developing young people's h i s t o r i c a l perspective. High school h i s t o r y presents a p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e . Here, the methods of conceptual analysis and of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may l i n k up to the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. A survey of the l i t e r a t u r e and an exploration of the educational a p p l i c a t i o n of these a c t i v i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n high school h i s t o r y courses, conclude the discussion. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 SECTION I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10 A. Recent Interest i n the Topic of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 10 1. E r i k Erikson's Views on H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 10 2. Other E f f o r t s to Define H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 17 a. C o n f l i c t i n g terminology 17 b. Defining and describing h i s t o r i c a l perspective . 18 3. The Importance of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective . . . 25 a. Changing h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n the western world 26 b. The purpose of developing a wider h i s t o r i c a l perspective 31 B. The Development of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 35 1. In the Individual 35 2. On a Large Scale 40 3. Using the Education System 41 II CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 52 A. The Pedagogical Value of Conceptual Analysis . . . 53 B. Four Main Types of Conceptual Analysis 56 C. Conceptual Analysis and the Study of History . . . 59 D. Using Conceptual Analysis i n High Schools 62 E. Applying Conceptual Analysis to High School History 63 1. Common Usage Analysis 63 2. H i s t o r i c a l Analysis 65 3. Depth Analysis . . . . . 70 <, F. Possible Objections to the Use of Conceptual Analysis i n the Study of History 73 G. Getting Conceptual Analysis Ready for the Classroom 76 1. Long Term Strategy 76 2. Applied to Five Approaches to the Teaching of History 84 3. Role of the Teacher 87 4. Role of the School Environment 88 i i i 5. Possible Learning A c t i v i t i e s Outlined 89 6. Evaluation 90 III JUSTIFICATION 94 A. The Pedagogical Value of J u s t i f i c a t i o n 95 B. Current Approaches to J u s t i f i c a t i o n 98 1. Robert Ennis 98 2. Paul Taylor 99 3. G i l b e r t Ryle 102 4. John Wilson 103 5. Peter MacPhail, et a l 105 6. R. F. Dearden 105 7. Dogmatism and Relativism 106 C. Possible Application of these Approaches to High School Education 107 D. A Proposed System of J u s t i f i c a t i o n for Use i n High Schools 112 1. What Can be J u s t i f i e d ? 112 2. What Can and Should be J u s t i f i e d i n High Schools? 115 3. Three Types of Methods f or J u s t i f i c a t i o n s . . . 120 Language Based Methods 120 Authority Based Methods 129 Experience Based Methods 131 4. Problems Relating to the Use of J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n High Schools 133 5. Some Conclusions 135 E. J u s t i f i c a t i o n and the Teaching of History 136 1. J u s t i f i c a t i o n as a H i s t o r i c a l Phenomenon . . . 137 2. Ap p l i c a t i o n to the Study of History 138 3. Relevance to Five Main Trends i n the Teaching of History 139 4. Adapting High School History Courses to Include J u s t i f i c a t i o n 140 5. What May Require J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the Study of History? 142 6. The Three Types of Methods for J u s t i f i c a t i o n Applied to the Study of History 146 a. Language based methods 146 b. Authority based methods . . . 147 c. Experience based methods . . . 149 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 i v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Diagram 1 The Four Main Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 36 2 The Relationship between J u s t i f i c a t i o n s and Explanations 95 3 Taylor's Stages of J u s t i f i c a t i o n of Value Judgments . . . 101 v INTRODUCTION This thesis introduces " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" as one aspect of the developmental theories of Erikson and Piaget, then shows the use i n high school of doing conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n to expand students' h i s t o r i c a l perspective, encourage cognitive and psycho-social development, and to sharpen students' h i s t o r i c a l reasoning a b i l i t y . (key d e f i n i t i o n s follow l a t e r ) * * * * * * This thesis i s highly exploratory, hopefully providing good reasons for l a t e r empirical t e s t s . 1. " H i s t o r i c a l perspective" has not been studied extensively, nor have "conceptual a n a l y s i s " and " j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " 2. While E r i k Erikson claims there i s a d i r e c t l i n k between " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" and psycho-social (including moral) development, he i s notoriously lax i n supplying empirical evidence. 3. A l i n k between cognitive development and the development of a h i s -t o r i c a l perspective appears to ex i s t but has not as yet been empir-i c a l l y established. 4„ Even i f there were an established connection between cognitive and psycho-social development on the one hand and " h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e " on the other, no one has as yet made the attempt to l i n k these with conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 5. To judge by the l i t e r a t u r e and from teaching experience, conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n have not been rigorously applied i n high school classes, generally, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s t o r y classes; nor has much been said about whether the e f f o r t to do so could and should be made. A. The Purposes of This Thesis may be L i s t e d as Follows: 1. To review recent work on h i s t o r i c a l perspective, conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 2. To propose a t h e o r e t i c a l connection between development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and Piaget and Erikson's theories of human development, and with public education. 3. To explain how conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n contribute to expansion of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and to cognitive as w e l l as psycho-social development—especially the former. 4. To out l i n e ways i n which conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be applied to high school education i n general and the teaching of hi s t o r y i n p a r t i c u l a r . B. The Thesis Operates on Three Levels: 1. It o f f e r s an overview of recent developments In 'western' thought and h i s t o r y — s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to theories about h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e and the development theories of Erikson and Piaget. 2. On a general educational l e v e l a a new purpose for high school education i s proposed: enlarging the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of adolescents through the use of two new weapons i n the educational arsenal: conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 3. S p e c i f i c attention i s focussed on the subject of h i s t o r y to see i f conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n belong i n the classroom. 3 In general, the thesis proceeds from the t h e o r e t i c a l to p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n . It might aptly be s u b t i t l e d : From 'Could be true' to 'Could and should be done'! C. Not Included i n the Thesis are: 1. Moral development, mentioned only i n passing, even though the subject matter of t h i s thesis may apply; 2. no e f f o r t to trace " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" as a h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon throughout the h i s t o r y of the western world; 3. as a synthesis—examining and combining various theories and seeking a p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n — t h e thesis afforded l i t t l e occasion for a thorough analysis of terminology, or for a study of ph i l o s o p h i c a l and psychological problems i n developmental theory; 4. there i s no thorough analysis of the terms 'concept' and ' j u s t i f i c a -t i o n , ' only a review of the l i t e r a t u r e , e s t a b l i s h i n g working d e f i n i -tions . D. What i s H i s t o r i c a l Perspective? 1. Human History: What humans have thought, sai d , and done. 2. The Study of History: The study of what humans have thought, s a i d , and done, when, where, and why. 3. The D i s c i p l i n e of History: Methods evolved i n the western world for the r e t r i e v a l , s o r t i n g , and judging of h i s t o r i c a l data, for making correct generalizations from them, and for presenting them i n written form. 4. The Subject of History: The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d attempt to pass on to the next generation findings from the study of h i s t o r y and the a b i l i t y and willingness to use the methods of the d i s c i p l i n e of h i s t o r y . H i s t o r i c a l Perspective: L i t e r a l l y a broad understanding, or over-view of what humans have thought, said, and done, when, where and why. This overview spans s e l f , others, the p h y s i c a l and c u l t u r a l (including p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , etc.) world we l i v e i n and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l of these through the past, present, and future. I t includes examining these from every conceivable angle: s c i e n t i f i c , psychological, p h i l o s o p h i c a l , s o c i o l o g i c a l , a r t i s t i c , l i n g u i s t i c , etc. and with a l l a v a i l a b l e t o o l s . Development of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective: This may be subdivided as follows: a. Expanding Identity: H i s t o r i c a l perspective for any i n d i v i d u a l begins at b i r t h with one's own h i s t o r y . While remaining at the center of t h e i r psychological universe, t h e i r i d e n t i t y expands to include family, t r i b e , nation, race, and, ultimately, humanity. The extent, i n t e n s i t y , and e f f e c t s of each l e v e l of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n vary. .; enormously, depending on a complex array of f a c t o r s . b. A Sense of Time: Studies have shown that a sense of time develops i n a sequential, h i e r a r c h i c a l order roughly following general cognitive development."'" Infants quickly forget t h e i r hurts and have no awareness of seasons, s p e c i a l days, or the passage of a year. A B r i t i s h study indicates that adolescents, on the other hand, already have a range of " r e a l i z e d " time 2 expanding f i v e years into the past and the future. A f u l l grasp of h i s t o r i c a l chronology stretching from the distant past through the present and into the future does not appear possible u n t i l l a t e adolescence. A Sense of Change and of Continuity: On the one hand human hi s t o r y seems to follow many varied patterns—some even say laws—but on the other, events and people can be t o t a l l y unpredictable. Great changes can come about very s w i f t l y or time can seem to stand s t i l l i n c e r t a i n times and places or i n one's own l i f e . Understanding of change and continuity once 3 again appears to follow cognitive development. This includes an understanding of cause and e f f e c t , and concepts such as evolution and revolution as well as progress. An Understanding of H i s t o r i c a l Concepts: History has l i t t l e jargon but terms such as empire, c o n s t i t u t i o n , war and peace etc. are frequently encountered i n h i s t o r i c a l studies. It appears quite clear that the understanding of these concepts i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the l e v e l of cognitive development. Developing S k i l l s for the Study of History: Experience, acquired knowledge, c r i t i c a l s k i l l s , l i t e r a r y s k i l l s , the methods provided by the d i s c i p l i n e s , a l l contribute to studying human h i s t o r y on the microscopic and we l l as macroscopic l e v e l (such as, res p e c t i v e l y , t r y i n g to determine the s i z e , shape, composition, and construction methods of the Roman Gladius versus determining whether or not humans are warlike by nature) and being able to j u s t i f y one's conclusions. Growing Awareness of the Paradox of W i l l and Fate i n Human Existence: Humans are simultaneously actors and acted upon, c o n t r o l l e r s of our environment and of others as well as co n t r o l l e d 6 by them, aggcessarsfand victims, creators and creations. g. Growing Awareness of the Enormous Complexity of Human History: P h y s i c a l l y and mentally, humans are f a r more complex than the f u l l extent of human knowledge—as i s the universe we l i v e i n . Nor are f u l l knowledge and understanding ever possible. Yet humans can continue to push forward the f r o n t i e r s of knowledge by asking new questions, inventing new methods, by exposing 'old' questions and answers to these new methods, and by extending our knowledge of human l i m i t a t i o n s . h. Growing Awareness of the H i s t o r i c a l Nature of H i s t o r i c a l Studies: The desire to study human hi s t o r y , the methods developed to do so, what i s studied and why,are a l l functions of a p a r t i c u l a r time and place i n h i s t o r y themselves. The wr i t i n g of h i s t o r y i t s e l f has a h i s t o r y and so does the language i t i s written i n . This i n turn a f f e c t s how conclusions are reached and hence the conclusions themselves. The purpose for studying and w r i t i n g h i s t o r y also a f f e c t s the conclusions reached—witness Nazi Germany or any national h i s t o r y written by a n a t i o n a l i s t , or any hi s t o r y of the world written by a communist, r e l i g i o u s zealot, etc. As was recently remarked, "the u t i l i t y of hi s t o r y i s perspective" (Hickman, p. 22). Hence one main purpose, i f not the main purpose of teaching the subject of hi s t o r y i s to help young people to develop t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e — t h e i r broad understanding of human h i s t o r y i n i t s t o t a l i t y . 7 E. A D e f i n i t i o n of Conceptual Analysis Analyzing how a word i s commonly used and analyzing i t s d e f i n -i t i o n (s) as we l l as i t s h i s t o r y . F. A D e f i n i t i o n of J u s t i f i c a t i o n Giving reasons for decisions, actions, points of view, values, answers, c o l l e c t i v e or i n d i v i d u a l reactions, questions and j u s t i f i c a -tions based on an examination of the language used, a u t h o r i t i e s invoked, and human experience. G. The Relationship between Conceptual Analysis and J u s t i f i c a t i o n 1. J u s t i f i c a t i o n i s part of the macroscopic perspective. In a j u s t i -f i c a t i o n , as many factors as possible should be considered, leading i n turn to larger questions of cause and e f f e c t , morality, proper use of reason, and so on. 2. Conceptual analysis i s part of the microscopic perspective—examining constituent parts i n every expanding d e t a i l . 3. Both tasks are i n f i n i t e l y complex i n the sense that unless an a r b i t r a r y cut-off point i s established they could expand ad in f i n i t u m . 4. J u s t i f i c a t i o n and conceptual analysis are not mutually exclusive, however. As w i l l be seen, j u s t i f i c a t i o n can and does involve conceptual analysis when examining the language of a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n conceptual analysis arguments and conclusions have to be j u s t i f i e d . 8 FOOTNOTES Cf. Barbara D. Bateman, Temporal Learning (San Raphael: Dimensions Publishing, 1968), e s p e c i a l l y Chapter II (pp. 10-22). 2 J. Cohen, C. E. M. Hansel, and J . Sylvester, "An Experimental Study of Comparative Judgements of Time," B r i t i s h Journal of Psychology, 45(1954): 108-114. 3 Cf. G. Jahoda, "Children's Concepts of Time and Histor y , " Educational Review, 15(1963): 87-104. 4 Cf. R. N. Hallam, "Piaget and Thinking i n History,' i n New Movements i n the Study and Teaching of History, Martin B a l l a r d , ed. , (London: Temple Smith, 1970), pp. 162-178. Warren L. Hickman, "The Erosion of History," S o c i a l Education, 43, 1(1979): 22. SECTION I IN SEARCH OF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10 A. Recent Interest i n the Topic of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective In recent years considerable attention has been paid by h i s t o r i a n s , philosophers, and other assorted scholars to the topic of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. A number of voices have been ra i s e d to expound on the importance of the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n humans. The reasons given vary, but a l l share a sense of urgency. The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to explore the l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t e d to t h i s t o p i c , to explain what i t means and why indeed ' h i s t o r i c a l perspective' i s of v i t a l concern today and, mainly, to out l i n e two approaches for encourag-ing the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n high school students through the use of conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n the teaching of h i s t o r y . 1. E r i k Erikson's Views on H i s t o r i c a l Perspective a. When examining the work of E r i k H. Erikson, the well known German-American psychoanalyst and h i s t o r i a n some time ago, my i n t e r e s t i n ' h i s t o r i c a l perspective' began. As a young man, Erikson was a student of Sigmund Freud. He has been i d e n t i f i e d with psychoanalytical theories of human development ever since. Indeed, many consider Erikson the pre-eminent represen-t a t i v e of psychoanalysis i n North America."'" Yet he i s far from one-sided i n h i s approach to development. Erikson discerns eight general stages i n the human l i f e cycle from b i r t h t i l l death i n which are com-bined patterns of cognitive, p h y s i o l o g i c a l , s o c i a l , emotional, and 2 moral development. His willingness to range beyond the dogmatism of Freud has led him to produce books on Luther and Gandhi and to display a l i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n s o c i a l and world problems. According to Erikson, psychoanalysis has an obvious a f f i n i t y for h i s t o r y . The psychoanalytical method i s e s s e n t i a l l y h i s t o r i c a l — c l a r i f y i n g r i g i d unconscious inner obstacles stemming from past h i s t o r y 3 which obstruct emerging decisions i n the patient's present h i s t o r y . H i s t o r i c a l changes or c r i s e s are relevant for the psycho-social develop-4 ment of the i n d i v i d u a l and hence to the psychoanalyst; the psycho-analyst must take into account the "Umwelt" as a pervasive actuality."' Historians can use the methods and i n s i g h t s gained from psychoanalysis, j u s t as the l a t t e r can learn from h i s t o r i a n s . Erikson claims that h i s main i n t e r e s t at present i s "the r e l a t i v -i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e h i s t o r y and of c o l l e c t i v e h i s t o r y . " ^ Luther and Gandhi are seen as good examples of " H i s t o r i c a l Persons": 8 those who wish to shape, change, or influence t h e i r own times. This made them e s p e c i a l l y s u i t a b l e f or examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e h i s t o r y across time and across cultures. Erikson means to use h i s h i s t o r i c a l research to help to prove the 9 universal v a l i d i t y of his stage theory of psychosocial development. b. But there i s more to Erikson's i n t e r e s t i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between psychoanalysis and h i s t o r y than earning academic accolades. His claim that psychoanalysis should go beyond adapting i n d i v i d u a l s to "the h i s t o r i c a l " by providing "the conceptual means for an adult to recognize his s t a t u s — i n h i s t o r i c a l change and h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the next generation""^ shows that Erikson has more than a touch of the messianic! More s p e c i f i c a l l y , Erikson believes that psychoanalytical techniques and insi g h t s can somehow encourage development of a sense of h i s t o r y , which i s a v i t a l aspect of psychosocial development linked with cognitive and moral development. This, i n turn, i s supposed to 12 be c r u c i a l to how we cope with l i f e and 'save' the world for our descendants. Erikson explains the development of a sense of history as follows: In childhood humans are much more conscious of outer experiences than inner ones. It i s b a s i c a l l y a passive, receiving process—". . . each ind i v i d u a l being stamped with . . . early experiences i n space and time and at f i r s t sharing them with a small c i r c l e of i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e 12 language we learn helps to transmit the common experience to a l l . " In adolescence. With the advent of formal thinking, adolescents develop certain modes of hypothetical and deductive thought. This then triggers a growing awareness of the relationship between the outer and the inner l i f e . Thus, cognitive development forms a basis for the development, i n l a t e r adolescence, of the h i s t o r i c a l perspective, which makes room not only for imaginative speculation about a l l that could have happened i n the past, but also a deepening concern with the narrow-ing down of vast p o s s i b i l i t i e s to a few alternatives, often resolved only by a " t o t a l i s t i c " search for single causes.-^ Young people begin to r e a l i z e the strong, deterministic influence of the "Umwelt" i n their l i v e s and become more conscious of thei r own i r r e v e r s -i b l e roots. The search for meaning i n ind i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e history begins at th i s time, as does the persistent questioning of authorities, rules, and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 14 "In youth then, the l i f e history intersects with history." At thi s juncture we enter the mainstream of our society and the world, however they are constituted. The main c r i s i s of adolescence entails finding an ide n t i t y consonant with childhood experience, with rapidly changing patterns of awareness of present experience, and also with the r e a l i s t i c and i d e a l i s t i c expectations of the future."'""' 13 Adult l i f e ought to see an ever r i s i n g awareness of our inner l i f e , of our h i s t o r i c a l existence as a member of a family, r e l i g i o u s denomina-t i o n , nation, culture, etc., and the way these intertwine i n the present as w e l l — r e f l e c t i n g the past, d i s t a n t , and near, and a n t i c i p a t i n g the future for ourselves, others, and future generations. Awareness i s the key: "only he who comprehends the nature of i r r e v e r s i b l e h i s t o r i c a l t ruth can attempt to circumvent or withdraw from i t . " ' ' " 6 c. It i s cl e a r that the a c q u i s i t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l perspective plays a c r u c i a l r o l e i n Erikson's comprehensive theory of human develop-ment which a r t f u l l y blends i n s i g h t s from psychology, sociology, p h y s i o l -ogy, anthropology, and h i s t o r y . To summarize: Xl) Development does not take place i n a vacuum, but must always be seen from a perspective combining the inner and outer world: s e l f (mind and body) as i t reacts to and acts upon i t s e l f , others and the Umwelt [ i . e . , the physical and c u l t u r a l world we i n h a b i t ] . (.2) Development has another h i s t o r i c a l dimension. It takes place i n time and i s both i r r e v e r s i b l e and cumulative. One pole or f l u x i s the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of change and the other, the equal c e r t a i n t y of continuity. Hence any examination of development must proceed from a h i s t o r i c a l perspective spanning past, present, and future. (3) Psycho-social development does not always go smoothly. Problems are caused by the medusa of repressed childhood fears and anxieties and by the anxiety r a i s e d by increasing change i n our modern world. These problems are of a ' h i s t o r i c a l ' nature. The bedrock of Erikson's theories i s his perspective as a healer: he would rather prevent than cure. This i s accomplished by adjusting people to r e a l i t y . The magic formula i s deceptively simple: i t i s e s s e n t i a l 14 to r a i s e h i s t o r i c a l awareness, e s p e c i a l l y from adolescence onward. If t h i s i s done, then psycho-social development w i l l proceed normally. (4) Erikson's highest p r i n c i p l e i s the s u r v i v a l of mankind: "Good things are those which seem to have been necessary for what, indeed, has survived.""^ He i d e n t i f i e s the dangers to human s u r v i v a l : i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with "Pseudo-species," such as t r i b e s , nations, creeds, and classes which o f f e r young people a glorious and hallowed v i s i o n of i t s e l f as being the 18 best representatives of the human species to l i v e and die f o r . Equally dangerous i s dogmatic relativism—what Erikson c a l l s preoccupa-19 t i o n with Protean personality — which i s one way to respond to the pressures of l i v i n g i n a ra p i d l y changing society. Adolescents can also develop a negative i d e n t i t y by j o i n i n g gangs, taking drugs, drop-20 ping out of school, or adopting a welfare mentality. Adults face the temptation of succumbing to moralism and ideologies. Moralism i s morality "predicated on supe r s t i t i o n s and i r r a t i o n a l inner mechanisms 21 which ever again undermine the e t h i c a l f i b e r of generations." Ideologies, based on d i f f e r e n t t r i b a l and nationa l pasts, have brought great disasters and massive bloodshed as they b a t t l e d for world, na t i o n a l , and regional supremacy. According to Erikson, the great advances i n science and technology of the past century threaten human s u r v i v a l i n two ways. F i r s t of a l l , the methods of mass destruction which are the byproducts, are so varied and potent that the customary struggles between competing "pseudo-species" and ideologies cannot be allowed to continue. Erikson r e f e r s to t h i s as 22 "the l e t h a l factor i n the universe." Secondly, e x i s t i n g i d e n t i t i e s 15 are threatened as world wide communications, standardizing (e.g., "going metric"), c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , and mechanization bring about massive c u l t u r a l changes, which i n turn a f f e c t e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the family, schools, and churches. The r e s u l t s of a massive fear of loss of iden-23 t i t y , playing as i t does on our most basic anxieties, are to be feared. 24 Our society can no longer promise s t a b i l i t y , s e c u r i t y , and i d e n t i t y . To Erikson there i s only one so l u t i o n to a l l these problems. Individual s u r v i v a l as well as that of the human race demands that i n d i -v i d u a l human i d e n t i t i e s be anchored i n healthy psycho-social development. Normal development—enabling persons to respond p o s i t i v e l y to problems and changes—in turn depends on the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e . H i s t o r i c a l perspective demands a person's " i n s i g h t into h i s 25 t o t a l h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n at a c e r t a i n moment i n h i s t o r y . " Today that means recognizing that change i s the chief r e a l i t y of l i f e , that fixed t r a d i t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s are going or gone and that moralism, ideology, and pseudo-species form the ultimate threat to s u r v i v a l due to the " l e t h a l f a c t o r " represented by science and technology. This development of a h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s supposed to lead to the eventual absorption of moral and i d e o l o g i c a l orientations by an e t h i c a l one: "a unive r s a l sense of values assented to with some insig h t and 26 some responsible f o r e s i g h t , " which can only emerge from "an informed 27 and i n s p i r e d sense for a more i n c l u s i v e human i d e n t i t y . " Humans need t h i s "new and young sense of ethics which values the v i t a l moment i n 28 r e l e n t l e s s change." It must become part of the i d e n t i t y of one man-kind. For Erikson, u n i v e r s a l ethics i s not the product of a s p e c i f i c culture or derived from any universal p r i n c i p l e but from a c l e a r 16 perception of h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y . He challenges us to open our eyes and minds, f e e l i n g c e r t a i n that we w i l l then 'see' how r i g h t he i s : the world r e a l l y i s that way today; people's problems r e a l l y stem from these sources; making i t possible for people to develop normally w i l l enable them to save themselves and the world they l i v e i n . d. F i n a l l y , i t i s important to point out three important features of h i s t o r i c a l perspective a l a Erikson. Erikson places equal stress on the r e a l i t y of change and continuity. His experience as a psychoanalyst made him aware that what continues i n us and our society as well as change causes problems for his patients. The psycho-social theory embodies change and continuity i n one theory of human development. The biographies of Gandhi and Luther are also used to r e i n f o r c e t h i s view. Even i n our age of change Erikson sees continuity i n the sense that change has become the norm. A second major aspect of Erikson's h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s i t s ' v e r t i c a l ' nature: combining past, present, and future. Both psycho-analysts and h i s t o r i a n s stand accused of being too e x c l u s i v e l y backward looking. Erikson seeks to r e s t o r e a more balanced and dynamic view of h i s t o r y . Then, there i s also a 'horizontal' dimension to Erikson's h i s t o r -i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — o f equal importance—which stresses analysis-in-depth of any event or moment i n time. Erikson prefers the labels "macro-scopic" and "microscopic" to describe the long-range ' v e r t i c a l ' perspec-t i v e and the in-depth h o r i z o n t a l perspective, r e s p e c t i v e l y : "we should always include i n our world view what we can see with macroscope and „29 microscope. In order to f u l l y appreciate Erikson's i n s i g h t into the nature, 17 development, and importance of what he c a l l s h i s t o r i c a l perspective, i t i s necessary to compare h i s views with those of others who have showed an i n t e r e s t i n t h i s concept. 2. Other E f f o r t s to Define H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e — E r i k s o n i n  Perspective a. There i s vast disagreement about what to c a l l that which Erikson describes as " h i s t o r i c a l perspective." The term " h i s t o r i c a l consciousness" seems to be far more p o p u l a r — e s p e c i a l l y among those with >ed t .,31 30 German extraction. Other expressions that have recently been used by more than one author are "a sense of .history" or " h i s t o r i c a l sense, 1 32 33 " h i s t o r i c a l mindedness," " h i s t o r i c a l a t t i t u d e , " and " h i s t o r i c a l 34 awareness." Singular nomenclature originates from some w e l l known 35 names: Toynbee refe r s to our " h i s t o r i c a l horizon," Barraclough 36 describes the " h i s t o r i c a l approach," Collingwood t a l k s about " h i s t o r -37 i c a l thinking" at some length, while h i s countryman, Plumb, delineates an i n t e l l e c t u a l process r e q u i r i n g imagination, c r e a t i v i t y , and empathy 38 with the simple ap p e l l a t i o n of " h i s t o r y . " Reinhold Niebuhr and 39 Ortega Y. Gasset have referred to, r e s p e c t i v e l y , " h i s t o r i c a l wisdom" 40 and " h i s t o r i c reason" to describe how we see ourselves and the world around us i n a temporal sense. That these terms are to some extent interchangeable i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the way that John Weiss uses " h i s t o r i c a l consciousness," "sense of 41 h i s t o r y , " and "awareness of h i s t o r y " on one page. Lukacs uses " h i s -42 t o r i c a l thinking" and " h i s t o r i c a l consciousness" i n r e c i p r o c a l fashion, Conkin and Stromberg interchange " h i s t o r i c a l awareness" and " h i s t o r i c a l 43 mindedness," while Gustavson on d i f f e r e n t occasions does the same with 44 " h i s t o r i c a l mindedness" and "sense of h i s t o r y . " 18 The noted American h i s t o r i a n , Crane Brinton, i s one of only two 45 other men to use the term " h i s t o r i c a l perspective." The other i s 46 Martin Sleeper, who acknowledges his i n t e l l e c t u a l debt to Erikson. It i s curious to note that none of the authors examined thought to j u s t i f y t h e i r choice of words i n t h i s matter. And since none of the terms mentioned above have wide currency i t takes l i t t l e courage to state that " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" w i l l henceforth be used to the exclusion o f — y e t to i n c l u d e — a l l others. The choice of " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" i s s t r i c t l y a r b i t r a r y , based on nothing more than the recognition of Erikson's considerable and l a r g e l y unrecognized contribution to the understanding of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Other than that, terms such as " h i s t o r i c a l mindedness" or " h i s t o r i c a l consciousness" would serve j u s t as w e l l . b. The task of defining and describing h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t than choosing a name for i t . There i s no semblance of agreement among the authors examined, nor i s there even any detectable trend. The fa c t that there has never been any academic discussion or controversy on t h i s issue probably accounts for t h i s . This seems para-doxical since those who have written about h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — e v e n though usually i n p a s s i n g — g e n e r a l l y speaking stress i t s importance i n our l i v e s ! For instance, the Swiss philosopher, Jaspers, c a l l s " h i s t o r -i c i t y " — h i s version of h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — " t h e a l l pervasive cate-47 gory of human l i f e and thought." Ortega Y. Gasset stresses that We need a comprehensive perspective, foreground and background, not a maimed scenery, a horizon stripped of the lure of i n f i n i t e distances. Without the a i d of the c a r d i n a l points we are l i k e l y to lose our way.48 More recently, Stromberg argues that we need a h i s t o r i c a l perspective to 49 confer meaning to our l i v e s . The reasons vary, but a l l believe that having a h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s e s s e n t i a l to our existence i n some way. But what is_ h i s t o r i c a l perspective? There are various ways i t has been categorized. Common Sense: Jacques Barzun likens the " h i s t o r i c a l sense" to common sense, describing i t as a quick, i n t u i t i v e , unemotional awareness of "what f i t s . " " ^ David Thomson also uses the expression "good „51 sense. A Type of Awareness: Not at a l l i n t u i t i v e but consciously experienced. This i s divided into f i v e sub-categories. To Barra-clough and Lukacs having a h i s t o r i c a l perspective means being aware of your i d e n t i t y . Lukacs uses the words self-consciousness, self-know-52 ledge, and self-awareness to describe what he means by t h i s , summar-i z i n g i t as a "pragmatic but unsystematic knowledge of humans about 53 other humans" based on experience. Barraclough t a l k s about an i d e n t i t y that i s universal i n scope and s p i r i t spanning past, present, 54 and future. A sense (or awareness) of continuity i s stressed by some as the key to h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Conkin and Stromberg state b l u n t l y that i t i s a recognition of c o n t i n u i t i e s . G o l o Mann concurs: the important thing i s "an understanding of the chains of events, of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , of transformations, innovations, the persistence of the 56 o l d within the new." Others, on the contrary, i n s i s t that an awareness of change underlies a "true" h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Robert V. Daniels devotes the f i r s t chapter of h i s book Studying History to t h i s theme,^ while J. H. Plumb speaks of the destruction of the past and acceptance of change and the complexities of human l i f e as v i t a l to 20 h i s t o r i c a l perspective. A balance i s struck by those who equally stress change and continuity as exemplified by Brinton's d e f i n i t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l perspective as the "awareness of how wide human experience has been, how complex human nature i s , and how men are a l i k e and predictable as well as 58 unlike and unpredictable." A Type of Attitude; A t y p i c a l advocate of th i s approach i s the Dutch h i s t o r i a n , Rieter Geyl, who, along with such luminaries as Frank Manuel, David Thomson, and J . H. Plumb, contends that "the c r i t i c a l f a c u l t y , " " ^ " c r i t i c a l s p i r i t , " 6 ^ or "persistent r e f l e c t i o n and thoughtful 61 questioning" i s the p r i n c i p a l ingredient of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Another Dutch h i s t o r i a n , J . H. Huizinga, echoing a viewpoint associated with the " s c i e n t i f i c , " Rankean approach to the w r i t i n g and study of hi s t o r y so prevalent i n the l a t e nineteenth and early twentieth century, 62 lauds the objective s p i r i t , "based on an absolute conviction of t r u t h , " as the prime component of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. A Type of Thinking: According to Collingwood, a l l humans have an idea of h i s t o r y : "an idea which every man possesses as part of the 63 f u r n i t u r e of h i s mind" and becomes conscious of with maturity. Yet h i s t o r i c a l thinking i s r e l a t i v e to each i n d i v i d u a l , society, and era: i t has i t s own h i s t o r y as a self-dependent, self-determining, and s e l f -64 j u s t i f y i n g form of thought. As such i t includes c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s , d i f f e r e n t types and l e v e l s of awareness, based on knowledge experience and language s k i l l s and an o v e r a l l world view. In h i s main work, e n t i t l e d The Idea of History, Collingwood pursues t h i s l i n e of thought, r e i t e r a t i n g at the f i r s t h i s premise that " h i s t o r y , l i k e theology or natural science, i s a s p e c i a l form of thought" 6"' and then tra c i n g the development of European h i s t o r i c a l thinking from the Greeks and Romans 21 u n t i l Europe i n the early 1900's, extrapolating from the work of c e r t a i n great thinkers. Recently E. Kahler has reexamined t h i s theme i n a s i m i l a r manner. He traces the emergence of h i s t o r i c a l consciousness i n the western world u n t i l the present—showing greater i n t e r e s t i n 66 general h i s t o r i c a l developments. Erikson r e s i s t s the temptation to define h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n any narrow way. His view i s the widest, most i n c l u s i v e : s t r e s s i n g both continuity and change, recognizing the: importance of i d e n t i t y formation i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Like Manuel and Plumb he stresses the dangers of dogmatism and the value of realism. Yet he balances 6 7 t h i s with a denial of the r e l a t i v i s m advocated by such as Conkin. For while h i s t o r y cannot help but be a destructive yet necessary force which sweeps away the ideologies, i n s t i t u t i o n s , and patterns of ages 6 8 p a s t — t o borrow Plumb's argument — E r i k s o n recognizes that we also need a h i s t o r i c a l past, an i d e n t i t y , knowledge of how things are changing, 69 and, above a l l , to f i n d a meaning i n l i f e . The German, Koselleck, c a l l s t h i s "the paradox of h i s t o r y , w h i c h cannot be resolved. On the one hand the past i s irrevocably gone and, i n t h i s age of rampant r e l a t i v i s m , i s not mourned; yet the past e x i s t s i n the present—both i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y and contains the future: It l i m i t s c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s — i s present i n our speech, i t shapes our conscious as w e l l as our unconscious mind, our customs, our i n s t i t u t i o n s and those who c r i t i c i z e them.73-So even those who seek to f i n d meaning by denying i t — a s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s are prone to do—do so for reasons that have t h e i r roots i n past events: they are products of the past themselves. Their s t y l e of thinking and speech follow i n t e l l e c t u a l developments t r a c i n g back many centuries. In the words of Ortega Y. Gasset: 22 Man, thanks to h i s power of memory, accumulates h i s past; he possesses i t and makes use of i t . Man i s never the f i r s t man, but begins his l i f e at a c e r t a i n l e v e l of accumulated past.'^ When Koselleck i n s i s t s the paradox of h i s t o r y cannot be resolved, he means that both sides of the argument are v a l i d , and that a choice cannot be made between them. As Ortega Y. Gasset b l u n t l y warns, "breaking the continuity with the past, wanting to begin again, i s a 73 lowering of man and a plagiarism of the orangutan." On the other hand, Collingwood i n s i s t s that h i s t o r i c a l thinking i t s e l f i s r e l a t i v e : 74 " h i s t o r i c a l thought i s a r i v e r i n which none can step twice": i t s methods change, questions change, knowledge changes, mental habits, l i f e s t y l e s , etc. This leads to the r e a l i z a t i o n that i t i s f a l l a c i o u s to make generalizations about the course of human h i s t o r y i n i t s t o t a l i t y or about i t s meaning:^ we create our own meaning, as Nietzsche pointed 76 out a century ago. Erikson tackles the paradox by straddling i t — a c c e p t i n g both sides of the argument. He does not appear to be unduly worried about the phil o s o p h i c a l implications of t h i s stance, p r e f e r r i n g instead to r e l y on his c l i n i c a l experience for j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Normal psycho-social devel-opment r e s u l t s i n a recognition of the force of change as w e l l as of continuity on one's existence. S i m i l a r l y , a balance i s struck between dogmatism and r e l a t i v i s m , realism and idealism. Ideal l y these should remain i n dynamic balance from adolescence onward. I t i s Erikson's contentions that when t h i s balance i s not achieved i n the f i r s t place or upset i n l a t e r l i f e , that problems ensue for the i n d i v i d u a l and that i f t h i s should occur on a massive scale human s u r v i v a l as such i s threatened. Even though none u n t i l Erikson thought to examine h i s t o r i c a l perspective from a developmental point of view, Erikson's views on the subject c l e a r l y belong to the mainstream of western thought. I t s components could be described as an amalgam of the views expressed by authors previously mentioned. Like Collingwood, he believes i n the r e l a t i v i t y of h i s t o r i c a l thinking and that i t is_ a p a r t i c u l a r type of thinking d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to cognitive development. Like Barraclough, Toynbee, Gustavson, Pirenne, and many others, he accepts the relevance of the past f o r our present and future. Yet he shares the conviction of such as Weiss, Daniels, and T o f f l e r that an awareness of change must be a part of everyone's i d e n t i t y today. With Manuel and Niebuhr he recognizes the i n c r e d i b l e complexity of human h i s t o r y , s t r e s s i n g the search for r e a l i t y and avoidance of any form of c e r t a i n knowledge. Like Nietzsche, Erikson concludes that i f we do not f i n d a meaning f or l i f e as a part of normal i d e n t i t y formation that we w i l l impose some meaning ourselves; unlike Nietzsche, he i s more aware of the unfortu-nate consequences when an i n d i v i d u a l i s out of tune with h i s society and times. The way i n which Erikson handles the paradox of h i s t o r y as described i n some d e t a i l by Koselleck and K a h l e r ^ and recognized by 78 others such as Marc Bloch, i s reminiscent of what the English poet, Keats, describes as negative c a p a b i l i t y : ". . . when a man i s capable of being i n un c e r t a i n t i e s , mysteries, doubts, without an i r r i t a b l e 79 reaching a f t e r fact and reason." Erikson's perception of h i s t o r i c a l perspective has much i n common with that of J. H. Plumb. They share with others a recognition of the i n f i n i t e complexity of human h i s t o r y and the importance of change and realism. But, more importantly, they have a common insig h t into the 24 two edged nature of one's h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — b o t h destroyer and provider of meaning—an endless and constant struggle. Both men are o p t i m i s t i c about the future of mankind, however, and see the emergence of a u n i v e r s a l , a l l i n c l u s i v e i d e n t i t y as our i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e s a l v a t i o n . In summary: Using Erikson's views p r i m a r i l y , since they are the most f u l l y developed, h i s t o r i c a l perspective ref e r s to the way we per-ceive our t o t a l h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . As previously mentioned, t h i s includes a v e r t i c a l dimension spanning past, present, and future, and a 8 1 h o r i z o n t a l one focussed on the present. A l l humans possess t h i s h i s t o r i c a l perspective from the moment they become conscious of them-selves and t h e i r surroundings. It consists of a c t u a l i t y — l i v e exper-ience and c o n c e p t u a l i t y — t h e generalizations we form about those experiences. How we form generalizations and what conclusions are reached i s determined mainly by the legacy of one's society on the one hand and by the extent of cognitive development on the other. As cognitive development progresses from infancy to adolescence the average human becomes capable of formal thinking. From t h i s moment on there i s i n theory no l i m i t on conceptuality, as l i f e becomes a s e r i e s of i nsoluble paradoxes. For instance, adolescents wish to develop a d e f i n i t e i d e n t i t y of t h e i r own but are faced with the r e a l i z a t i o n that much of whatever i d e n t i t y i s formed does not o r i g i n a t e with them; not only that, but a d e f i n i t e i d e n t i t y may be a l i a b i l i t y i n an age of f l u x such as ours—making i t d i f f i c u l t to adjust to rapid change. When looking for meaning i n l i f e the adolescent has to resolve questions such as "Which comes f i r s t , s e l f or society?" and "Are a l l values r e l a t i v e ? " or "Is there such a thing as objective r e a l i t y ? " The 25 questions have no end and the r e a l i z a t i o n comes that each 'answer' i t s e l f leads only to further questions. But t h i s i s only i n theory. What a c t u a l l y happens depends usually on the society and times, even though i t need not per se. It i s very d i f f i c u l t to break with patterns of generalization one has been exposed to since b i r t h , e s p e c i a l l y since they are b u i l t into the very language we use. So awareness of one's h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — being able to see i t for what i t i s , r e a l i z i n g i t s r e l a t i v e 'width' and 'depth' compared with that of others and with what i t might be i d e a l l y , understanding i t s genesis, contributing factors and current general d i r e c t i o n — i s of necessity very l i m i t e d for most people, even though everyone has a h i s t o r i c a l perspective. We tend to take for granted how we think and are not w i l l i n g to attempt such a complex task as examining our h i s t o r i c a l perspective or lack s u i t a b l e standards of comparison. The 'Catch-22' of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s that only those with a r e l a t i v e l y highly developed l e v e l of awareness of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l perspective are capable of examining i t for the purpose of expanding that awareness and the perspective. 3. The Importance of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective Today Erikson i s also i n tune with the various h i s t o r i a n s and p h i l o s -ophers interested i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n h i s i n s i s t e n c e that i t i s not merely a p h i l o s o p h i c a l or psychological c u r i o s i t y v for academics, to be buried under the occasional Ph.D. t h e s i s . The consensus i s that there i s a need for the average person to expand t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l perspective and to r a i s e t h e i r awareness of that perspective. The common perception, shared by Erikson, i s that we are l i v i n g i n an age of great change and that human i n a b i l i t y to mentally keep up with 26 these changes as well as the changes themselves are responsible f o r a fundamental a l t e r a t i o n i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective as well as a host of problems. a. Changing H i s t o r i c a l Perspective i n the Western World. Right now we are either at an in-between stage of human history—when the pre-v a i l i n g h i s t o r i c a l perspective of the past few centuries found i n the western world i s seen to be inadequate, but has not been r e p l a c e d — o r at a new stage which frightens a l l but a few who attempt to describe i t . A l l are unanimous i n proclaiming the death of the 'old' perspective. Collingwood traces the o r i g i n s of the previous h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e back to the early seventeenth'century and gives i t s two main 82 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as a f a i t h i n science and i n h i s t o r y . The path of science and technology since that time has been w e l l charted and i s widely known. The average person i s less aware how Europeans "acquire 83 a new habit of thinking h i s t o r i c a l l y " even though, as Collingwood i n s i s t s , i t s influence i n human l i f e "has permeated and to some extent 84 transformed every department of thought and ac t i o n . " During the past three hundred years the study of h i s t o r y has developed i t s own d i s t i n c t methodology, earned status as a major d i s c i p l i n e r e s u l t i n g i n an honored place i n public education and h i s t o r i a n s became figures of na t i o n a l and occasionally of i n t e r n a t i o n a l importance. The f a s c i n a t i o n for h i s t o r y was r e f l e c t e d i n considerable attention from the media and i n popular art and l i t e r a t u r e . The developments i n the f i e l d s science and h i s t o r y f i l l e d a void l e f t by the loss of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h a f t e r the Reformation and the succeeding century of r e l i g i o u s intolerance and warfare, and could them-selves reach a peak of r e l i g i o u s fervour at times. John Weiss points 27 out that what happened was not merely the creation of a modern h i s t o r i c a l consciousness, but, that f o r the people of the nineteenth century especi-a l l y : History was no mere word or concept, but a vast r e s e r v o i r of governing force and l a w — a true ding an s i c h — s h a p i n g the various ages, epochs and eras of world c i v i l i z a t i o n . In other words, h i s t o r y was somehow conceived of as i t s e l f a creative force. H i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y and messianic optimism combined i n the writings of the philosophers, Hegelian i d e a l i s t s , Marxian s o c i a l i s t s , and assorted S o c i a l Darwinists.^ 6 The new f a i t h i n the human a b i l i t y to create r e a l progress foun-dered i n the trenches of World War I. Crane Brinton mentions that there have always been i n d i v i d u a l s " f o r whom the study of h i s t o r y seems 87 88 unprofitable, even v i c i o u s " —Weiss mentions Nietzsche -^but the general ver d i c t of western c i v i l i z a t i o n made them exceptions. But the r e a l i t i e s of two i n c r e d i b l e blood baths within a span of three decades, the stark f a i l u r e to control the economy during the hungry t h i r t i e s , the barbaric b r u t a l i t y of S t a l i n ' s Russia and H i t l e r ' s Germany, the world destructive p o t e n t i a l of modern science and technology and the scourge of cancer, etc., have caused a t e r r i b l e disillusionment with our a b i l i t y to plan, co n t r o l , and d i r e c t our future. It l e f t us shaken and insecure f o r . . . i n s p i t e of the enlarged sense of h i s t o r y we i n h e r i t e d from the th e o r i s t s of the l a s t century, they i n fac t l e f t us i l l equipped to understand the dark and threatening products of h i s t o r i c a l change i n our time.89 Thus, according to Tuveson, we have l o s t our f a i t h i n h i s t o r y : "The confidence i n hi s t o r y has been an e s s e n t i a l prop to the psyche and 90 i t s crumbling has l e f t a void." Ortega Y. Gasset describes how our loss of f a i t h has further aggravated t h i s . The chief f a i l u r e of 28 science has been i t s f a i l u r e to come up with a comprehensive point of v i e w — i t does not explain man, even though i t has uncovered much f a c t u a l 91 information. Lukacs observes that while the s c i e n t i f i c progress of man has slowed down to a mechanical crawl—few great inventions have taken place.the l a s t few decades and our standard of l i v i n g i s no longer expected to show any dramatic i n c r e a s e — o u r fear of the consequences of European genius has mounted to the point where we a c t u a l l y contemplate 92 the p o s s i b i l i t y of world destruction. What i t a l l adds up to i s the r e a l i z a t i o n that while there has been progress i n s c i e n t i f i c and h i s t o r -i c a l knowledge and i n technology, there has riot been a su b s t a n t i a l change i n humanity: we are no wiser and no better. Our increased understanding of nature and human h i s t o r y has brought no greater under-93 standing between humans: no genuine communication and s o l i d a r i t y . The r e s u l t s of the shattering of f a i t h i n science and h i s t o r y can be observed i n a l l l e v e l s of society. Those who have an i n t e r e s t i n the study and w r i t i n g of hi s t o r y report that i n sp i t e of a continuing stream of h i s t o r i c a l publications and public i n t e r e s t i n hi s t o r y packaged for public consumption, young 94 people do not tend to value h i s t o r i c a l knowledge, show a d e c l i n i n g 95 i n t e r e s t i n taking h i s t o r y courses, and that classrooms harbour 96 i n d i f f e r e n c e and even h o s t i l i t y . Some even question i f the teaching 97 of h i s t o r y i s j u s t i f i e d today. There are signs of growing disquiet i n the h i s t o r i c a l profession too. In a recent p o l l only 20% of hi s t o r i a n s responding found the state of t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e i n s a t i s f a c t o r y 98 condition. Manuel claims that h i s t o r i a n s s u f f e r from an i l l defined 99 discontent to which they have not responded i n any worthwhile fashion. Huizinga bemoans the retreat of h i s t o r i c a l k n o w l e d g e , B a r r a c l o u g h how 29 the best minds are turning away from h i s t o r y , a n d Kitson Clark the fa c t that h i s t o r i a n s are d i s t r u s t e d for having given i n to t h i s tempta-t i o n of using h i s t o r y to further nationalism, fascism, and other i d o l s of the popular mind.^^^ Throughout the population of the western world a marked decline i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective has been noted. A group of modern German h i s t o r -103 ians has investigated the r i s e of a h i s t o r i c a l tendencies — d e s c r i b e d as follows: Resignation and a l i e n a t i o n , apathy and d i s i n t e r e s t , departure and f l i g h t from h i s t o r y . . . characterize the r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and h i s t o r y . . . . History as i t happens i s so impenetrable, so dark and incomprehensible that man increasingly searches for extra-temporal points and reference and f i n a l l y attempts to exempt himself from h i s t o r y e n t i r e l y . Barzun notes that one consequence of t h i s i s the c u l t of the new or f u t u r i s m — c r e a t i n g the impression that the past "does not speak i n an important way to the contemporary way.""'"^ "' A number of other authors 106 note the same trend and share h i s conclusion that the h i s t o r i c a l sense i s feeble or non existent i n modern populations."'"^ Another 108 a h i s t o r i c a l trend i s dubbed presentism., Gustavson explains t h i s as the lack of v e r t i c a l perspective: for many people today h i s t o r y only i_ . « 109 s t a r t s at b i r t h . A n t i - h i s t o r i c a l tendencies have also appeared. Young people want to know what they can learn from a deplorable past."'""'"^  A loathing of the past i s contained i n Valery's dictum that "History w i l l j u s t i f y any-thing. It reaches p r e c i s e l y nothing, for i t contains everything and 111 furnishes examples of everything." This mood i s magnified i n B u t t e r f i e l d ' s observation that "History i s a l l things to a l l men—she i s 112 a h a r l o t and a h i r e l i n g . . . . " This loathing of h i s t o r y seems 30 113 representative of more than j u s t two i n t e l l e c t u a l s . F i n a l l y , there i s a common conviction that there i s r e a l l y no meaning or pattern to l i f e any more, that t h i s i s a time of d i s c o n t i n -u i t y , of change run a m o k . T h e cry arises "Where do we f i n d 116 meaning i n l i f e now?" This i n turn negatively a f f e c t s i d e n t i t y formation. History i s seen as e s s e n t i a l for i d e n t i t y formation since "a remembered past becomes part of our s e l f i m a g e , ^ and without a v e r t i c a l perspective of h i s t o r y "we have no r e a l knowledge of who we 118 are and how we came to be." Erikson agrees with t h i s and devotes much e f f o r t to analyzing t h i s t o p i c . Only e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s argue that the new h i s t o r i c a l perspective has already a r r i v e d — t h a t e x i s t e n i a l i s m i n fact ±s_ that perspective. Indeed, they welcome the change, arguing that the old perspective was long overdue for retirement. John Weiss speaks of i t as "nothing but an alienated, awesome, f e a r f u l and undeserved respect paid to something 119 c a l l e d h i s t o r y which, as Ding an Sich surely never existed?" or "the great prejudice about the mere flow of time from the Bourgeois 120 era!" He goes so far as to c a l l the previous h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l , i n the sense that i t stressed idealism at the 121 expense of realism. A l l e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s share t h i s view. Meyer-hoff, for example, blames "the sickness of modern man" on the f a i l u r e to discover the meaning and pattern of existence or Utopia as promised 122 by various eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers. The cure i s 123 man's l i b e r a t i o n from theology, philosophy, and natural science. We must come to r e a l i z e that there i s no meaningful structure or law i n h i s t o r y , that human h i s t o r y i s not moving toward any p o s i t i v e goal, that a l l our values and i d e a l s are conditioned h i s t o r i c a l l y and are therefore 31 124 s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d and r e l a t i v e to each i n d i v i d u a l and time and place. In short, we must learn to see h i s t o r y for what i t i s , rather than as we wish i t to be. What Meyerhoff and others such as Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood, Popper, and Ortega Y. Gasset prescribe as the only desirable h i s t o r i c a l perspective comes close to the i d e a l perspective: open-ended—not hedged by i d e a l s , natural and h i s t o r i c a l laws, e t c . , — s t r e s s i n g v e r t i c a l as well as h o r i z o n t a l perspective, recognizing the important r o l e of h i s t o r i c a l awareness, and the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i t y of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. The question that remains i s : why should one bother? If the old ideals and dogmas have been l a r g e l y destroyed, then what purpose could developing a keen h i s t o r i c a l perspective have i n one's l i f e ? b. The Purpose of Developing a Wider H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. As has been noted, Erikson i s also aware of these trends i n the western world—though; he seems to lack i n s i g h t into t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l antecedents — a n d they worry him deeply. His main fear i s that the a h i s t o r i c a l and a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l trends w i l l become s u f f i c i e n t l y deeprooted to adversely a f f e c t i d e n t i t y formation on a massive scale, causing untold personal misery and threatening human s u r v i v a l . The s o l u t i o n prescribed by Erikson i s nothing less than a new h i s t o r i c a l perspective c o n s i s t i n g of a highly developed h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l perspective to provide r e a l i s t i c i n s i g h t into human nature and h i s t o r y and a universal ethics to give meaning to l i f e . Erikson does not embrace the status quo as an acceptable or desirable a l t e r n a t i v e the way the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s do, for the same reason as Niebuhr: we seek the completion of the meaning of l i f e beyond 32 the fragmentary r e a l i z a t i o n of meaning we c u l l from h i s t o r y and l i f e by 125 . ,. ourselves. The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t argument i s a strong one: And because [the] preponderant, a l l encompassing trend i n hi s t o r y i s the opposite of permanence and continuity, because i t s :essence today i s r a d i c a l progressive change of a l l that e x i s t s , therefore i t i s impossible to f i n d i n hi s t o r y something of universal v a l i d i t y . - - 6 Hence we should dispense with c e r t a i n t y and with f a i t h and ourselves create whatever meaning we wish for our i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s . N.iebuhr observes that t h i s i s not r e a l i s t i c : a subjective, r e l a t i v i s t i c meaning for l i f e does not s u f f i c e the average person. Barzun delineates modern man's dilemma c l e a r l y . On the one hand the study of h i s t o r y checks the tendency toward hasty absolutes and exercises the sense of a l t e r n a t i v e s — regarded as v i t a l by the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . Against the absurdity of grand schemes of causation and explanation and the yearning for Utopia, 127 the only educative force i s a wide h i s t o r i c a l perspective. But on the other hand, even able, subtle,., and dedicated minds crave the comfort 128 and s e c u r i t y of f i n a l i t y and cer t i t u d e . E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s generally f a i l to address themselves to t h i s dilemma. Conkin admits to the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x i s t e n t i a l despair, but sees a well developed h i s t o r i c a l perspective as a s u f f i c i e n t source of ego i d e n t i t y ; the remembered past cannot help but become a part of our s e l f image and t h i s may "expand oneself, give new and af f i r m a t i v e meaning to one's l i f e , i n s p i r e one to great e f f o r t s and provoke both s e l f -129 assurance and community l o y a l t y . " This i s because e x i s t e n t i a l i s m admits to both continuity and change. Recognizing "the spectacle of continuity i n chaos and attainment i n the heart of disorder" i s supposed 130 to be a highly formative experience. Barzun believes that i n pers-pective souls the awesome spectacle of human h i s t o r y , "the thought of 33 131 men l o s t to time . . . w i l l . . . take care of every ego urgency." The problem i s how to acquire the necessary h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Weiss looks at the dilemma r e a l i s t i c a l l y . While touting the value of a w e l l developed h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n today's world—"we would not be so shocked and disturbed by . . . h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l change, had 132 we an h i s t o r i c a l consciousness adequate to events" — h e fears that "we have i n h e r i t e d the great prejudice about the flow of time from the Bourgeois era" because h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s not highly developed i n most people so they have no choice except to look for the meaning of 133 l i f e to previous obsolete models. This i s exactly what Erikson i s t a l k i n g about when he warns of the dangers of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with pseudo-species, moralism, and ideologies. The second objection to the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t point of view, then, i s that, with r e l a t i v e l y few exceptions, people possess a very narrow h i s t o r i c a l perspective, and are confused about the world they l i v e , the purpose they serve i n i t , and by the r a p i d i t y of change. This leads to the development of what Erikson c a l l s negative i d e n t i t y — ' d r o p p i n g out' i n any number of ways or s t r i k i n g out b l i n d l y i n confusion, fear, or rage. In e f f e c t e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s l i m i t e d to the e l i t e , who are able to escape the a h i s t o r i c a l and a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l storm ranging around them. Therefore e x i s t e n t i a l i s m can also not be considered the new h i s t o r i c a l perspective, though i t may become that i n time. The t h i r d way i n which e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s are u n r e a l i s t i c i s i n t h e i r s i l e n c e on the topic of world destruction. One must assume that, l i k e Erikson, Toyhbee^^^ and o t h e r s , t h e y are aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y of world destruction, but simply don't share t h e i r sense of urgency. Lukacs, for instance, claims that the day of doom can be postponed or 34 ended "by the sheer q u a l i t y of our determination to l i v e . .' . a q u a l i t y of consciousness involved, i r r e t r i e v a b l y , with our h i s t o r i c a l way of 136 thinking [which] may yet become Europe's greatest g i f t to mankind." Erikson agrees with t h i s but goes further. While others speak vaguely about univ e r s a l i d e n t i t y , Erikson i s quite s p e c i f i c i n declaring i n d i -v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e s u r v i v a l to be the ultimate p r i n c i p l e of human existence around which a l l p r a c t i c a l and moral issues should revolve. For people to share Erikson's v i s i o n they need to expand t h e i r v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l perspectives. However, t h i s i s not happening today. From a purely developmental point of view a l l people are equally capable of expanding t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l perspective, but s o c i e t a l factors have a determining influence i n s t i f l i n g or encouraging that p o t e n t i a l . But the current state of the western world has led to a t e r r i b l e f r u s t r a t i o n for those well meaning men: and women who envision an enlarged h i s t o r i c a l perspective as the key to our sa l v a t i o n as a race. The t e r r i b l e upheavals of the past hundred years have broken the common f a i t h i n science and h i s t o r y , making i t possible for us to see ourselves and our h i s t o r y i n a much more r e a l i s t i c l i g h t . This i s counterbalanced by the strong and i r r a t i o n a l a h i s t o r i c a l or a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l reaction which makes i t impossible to r e a l i z e the new p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r human develop-ment. This period of our h i s t o r y somewhat resembles that of Europe during the 1500's: the period following the Reformation was one of the more bloody and v i c i o u s i n European h i s t o r y — o n e of great p h y s i c a l and mental turmoil and s t r i f e following the collapse of C h r i s t i a n unity. The benefits of greater freedom of thought and expression made possible by t h i s gigantic upheaval only began to be r e a l i z e d a century l a t e r with the s c i e n t i f i c r evolution and eventually the enlightenment. 35 The p r i n c i p a l difference between t h i s previous collapse of a f a i t h strong enough to be considered a common h i s t o r i c a l perspective and the present one, i s that there may not be time to wait for the ' i n e v i t a b l e ' f r u i t s of a new awakening. The current state of turmoil i n the western world, which shows no signs of lessening, coupled with the varied methods of mass destruction that are now a v a i l a b l e create a t e r r i f y i n g danse  macabre with the end of c i v i l i z a t i o n as we know i t and perhaps even humanity as a possible outcome. A general f a m i l i a r i t y with the world s i t u a t i o n i s a l l that i s needed to convince one that t h i s i s more than the usual round of m i l l e n a r i a n anxiety that p e r i o d i c a l l y emerges. Hence the messianic tone of Erikson's message. We may indeed need a Messiah! B. The Development of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective Having described the nature of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and the urgency with which the development of an enlarged h i s t o r i c a l perspective amongst the general population i s regarded, i t i s time to attend to a more p r a c t i c a l question: How can t h i s be done? In f a c t , there are two questions here: (1) How does h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n the i n d i v i d u a l develop and how can t h i s development be stimulated? (2) How does the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of a group of p e o p l e — a t r i b e , society, or nation—develop and how can t h i s development be stimulated? 1. Development of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective i n the Individual Only Erikson has a f u l l y developed theory on t h i s t o p i c . As previously explained, he considers i t a part of cognitive development 36 a l a Piaget. In other words, i t would not be possible to develop h i s -t o r i c a l perspective very far without reaching the formal l e v e l of think-ing. The other l i m i t a t i o n on the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s of a s o c i a l nature: everyone i s born and raised i n a society already possessing i t s own h i s t o r i c a l perspective, which i s part of t h e i r heritage. Erikson also explained i n great d e t a i l the important r o l e t h i s h i s t o r i c a l perspective plays i n i d e n t i t y formation, f o r better or worse. To f a c i l i t a t e the task of deciding ' if_ and how development of h i s -t o r i c a l perspective can be stimulated by an outside agency, h i s t o r i c a l perspective w i l l be analyzed i n more d e t a i l . Diagram 1 serves the purpose of an ou t l i n e . Developmental Aspects < What i t Is > So c i a l Aspects 4* H i s t o r i c a l Perspective: Awareness of P r a c t i c a l Aspects What i t Might Be >• Ideal Aspects Diagram 1: The Four Main Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective a. Developmental Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. The development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s determined and l i m i t e d by ce r t a i n b i o l o g i c a l and psychological fa c t o r s . The most obvious of these i s the l i m i t a t i o n on human experience imposed by the senses: there i s much we are simply unable to experience. Modern science and technology have remedied t h i s to some extent by creating machines to extend our senses or to provide us with information about the world 37 beyond our sense. There i s no reason to believe that t h i s w i l l not continue. How we generalize from experience i s l i m i t e d by the widely accepted schedule of cognitive development which has made Piaget, i t s discoverer, famous. Piaget argues that h i s schedule has u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n and that even though t h i s natural process can be retarded, i t cannot be speeded up much. The prime task of educators i s to see that a l l young people are given the opportunity to develop normally. Therefore, they are i n d i r e c t l y also responsible for development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective, which i s dependent on normal cognitive develop-ment . Erikson's p a r t i c u l a r contribution to the developmental aspect i s his recognition that the emergence of h i s t o r i c a l perspective also f o l -lows psycho-social development, such as the growing awareness of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the inner and outer l i f e that occurs during adol-escence i n a l l s o c i e t i e s . Hence Erikson's concern that psycho-social development must take place normally--i.e., follow the normal pattern from infancy to old age that he has observed on a world wide basis. If i t does not, i t w i l l adversely a f f e c t the continued development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and therefore one's mental balance. Psycho-s o c i a l development i s very d i f f i c u l t to c o n t r o l , however, since so much a f f e c t s i t . The v a r i a b l e of cognitive development appears to be the only one open to manipulation. b. S o c i a l Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. Their influence i s undeniable. Where we grow up l i m i t s our horizon i n more than j u s t the geographical sense. Our experience and f i r s t hand knowledge derives from our immediate environment. There may be a basic pattern by which 38 thinking develops, but our c u l t u r a l Umwelt determines the language we use, d i r e c t s our attention and shapes our a t t i t u d e s , values, goals, and i d e a l s to a large extent. The content of our thinking and the language used to express our thoughts do not o r i g i n a t e within ourselves. Universal patterns of cognitive and psycho-social development r e f e r only to p o t e n t i a l . S o c i a l factors determine to a considerable degree how much of t h i s p o t e n t i a l i s r e a l i z e d . For example, i n the western world there i s no unanimity whether or not i n d i v i d u a l p o t e n t i a l should be given the opportunity to develop to the f u l l e s t . Our humanistic heritage causes us to favour development of human p o t e n t i a l i n general, but thus f a r only e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have placed i n d i v i d u a l development f i r s t . From a p r a c t i c a l standpoint, the knowledge that s o c i a l factors greatly influence the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s not very u s e f u l . I t should be possible to describe an i d e a l society i n which h i s t o r i c a l perspective can be developed to the f u l l e s t and then proclaim one's inte n t i o n to turn t h i s dream into a r e a l i t y ! Other than that, a l l that can be done i s to become more aware of the r o l e of society on one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Educators could c e r t a i n l y play a r o l e i n t h i s . c. P r a c t i c a l Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. It i s possible to speculate on the usefulness of one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n compar-ison with another or with the one prevalent i n society. H i s t o r i c a l perspective can be studied h i s t o r i c a l l y t r a c i n g how i t changed and what purpose i t served. From a p h i l o s o p h i c a l point of view one can specu-l a t e on which h i s t o r i c a l perspective would be the most useful at any point i n time including the present. In t h i s manner the student would gain greater awareness of' his own perspective and simultaneously extend i t i n a h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l d i r e c t i o n . A l l such a c t i v i t i e s would be eminently s u i t a b l e f o r the classroom at a high school and u n i v e r s i t y l e v e l , and i n d i r e c t l y t h i s i s being done i n h i s t o r y and l i t e r a t u r e classes already. d. Ideal Aspects of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. The perfect h i s t o r i c a l perspective w i l l always remain impossible to achieve. I t would e n t a i l having complete knowledge of human h i s t o r y past and present, f u l l understanding of a l l i t s complexities and of human nature including one's own. Part of t h i s would be f u l l awareness of the h i s t o r i c a l nature of h i s t o r i c a l perspective: how both i n d i v i d u a l s and the groups they form develop that perspective, the optimum conditions f o r develop-ment and the ultimate l i m i t a t i o n s on h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Perfect knowledge, understanding, and awareness are ideals to s t r i v e f o r . Since human h i s t o r y i s an ongoing process, attainment of these i s of necessity an open-ended task. The most d i f f i c u l t c h a l -lenge would be to overcome the l i m i t a t i o n s of language and the other a t t r i b u t e s of one's current perspective, which of necessity r e f l e c t s that of one's society. Having some idea of other h i s t o r i c a l perspectives besides one's own and of an i d e a l perspective i s e s s e n t i a l i f a person i s going to expand or transcend t h e i r own perspective: i t i s important to have points of reference and a goal—even i f that goal i s impossible to a t t a i n . Just knowing what one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s does not s u f f i c e , nor can i t be done without a knowledge of a l t e r n a t i v e s . Now i t i s possible to see what Erikson i s proposing i n a proper l i g h t . Contrary to what some e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s may fear, he i s not 4 0 proposing a new Utopia. His universal ethic and a l l i t e n t a i l s f a l l s under the category of p r a c t i c a l aspects of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. I t i s not meant i n the sense of 'universal truth' but i n recognition of what he perceives as a universal threat to the human race. Erikson i s o f f e r i n g a s o l u t i o n to two enormous contemporary problems: the prob-lems caused by a h i s t o r i c a l and a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l modern trends for the i n d i v i d u a l and also the p o s s i b i l i t y of doomsday.. This should i n no way be construed as a permanent cure for human i l l s , though he does believe that accepting h i s theories would be one step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . The two goals one i s l e f t with are: — to f a c i l i t a t e normal cognitive development — to increase knowledge and awareness of the four main aspects of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. 2. Development of H i s t o r i c a l Perspective i n a Group of People No one has any theories on t h i s topic at t h i s time. Yet i t seems to be the more v i t a l of the two questions. There seems l i t t l e doubt i n the minds of those who write about h i s t o r i c a l perspective that i t i s possible to r a i s e the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t ways. Unless t h i s can be done on a n a t i o n a l — e v e n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l — s c a l e , however, the salutary e f f e c t s may not be noticeable. The only method for a large scale e f f o r t to increase h i s t o r i c a l perspective that may be e f f e c t i v e would be to u t i l i z e the education system. In a sense the schools of the western world are a l r e a d y — though u n w i t t i n g l y — c o n t r i b u t i n g to expanded h i s t o r i c a l perspective by encouraging cognitive development. If a conscious attempt were made to enlarge h i s t o r i c a l perspective the r e s u l t s might please even Erikson! 4 1 Though i t i s the obvious medium for Erikson's message—captive audience, young and s t i l l impressionable; the a b i l i t y to reach many people quickly and e f f e c t i v e l y — t h e r e must be a reason why Erikson has thus f a r ignored t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . In a way i t i s s u r p r i s i n g that he has: the age group he i s most knowledgeable about are adolescents, yet he says nothing about t h e i r education and i t s r o l e i n t h e i r development. One reason f o r t h i s neglect must be Erikson's own f a i l u r e to design actual strategies f o r the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. He has nothing to o f f e r educators besides general theories which only some would be f a m i l i a r with. Erikson may also be aware of another p r a c t i c a l problem: the e x i s t i n g curriculum f i l l s up a l l a v a i l a b l e time s l o t s . In order to l i b e r a t e time on an already f u l l schedule, curriculum designers and administrators w i l l have to be presented with precise and pressing reasons why developing h i s t o r i c a l perspective should be con-sidered an important educational objective and also with w e l l planned i n s t r u c t i o n a l materials and classroom s t r a t e g i e s . C l e a r l y these do not e x i s t at t h i s time, and Erikson has neither the time nor the i n c l i n -ation to tackle t h i s vast enterprise. 3. Using the Education System for the Development of H i s t o r i c a l  Perspective The remainder of t h i s thesis i s devoted to the task of o u t l i n i n g some ways i n which the education system can be u t i l i z e d f o r the task of developing h i s t o r i c a l perspective. There i s not much material to work with. Erikson i s not the only 'expert' on h i s t o r i c a l perspective to ignore the question of p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n , though his sins of omission may be considered the more serious because of h i s greater t h e o r e t i c a l expertise. The only vague 42 points of consensus are that the education system i s a s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e for the purpose—no others are even suggested—and that the subject of h i s t o r y i n p a r t i c u l a r leads i t s e l f to the development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n youngsters. A few vague suggestions may follow, but nothing further. For example, Erikson's d i s c i p l e , Martin Sleeper, sug-gests that the psychological d i s p o s i t i o n s of students and the proper i n t e l l e c t u a l analysis of h i s t o r i c a l knowledge must be integrated i n 137 order to merge the c o l l e c t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l past. This may be an accurate transposition of Erikson's theories to the f i e l d of education, but i t i s of precious l i t t l e help to the interested teacher, p r i n c i p a l , or curriculum designer. Golo Mann i s more s p e c i f i c when he prescribes reading good h i s t o r y , a knowledge of chronology, exposure to many primary sources, and to the great p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues of h i s t o r y such as theories of causation, great man or the c y c l i c a l or l i n e a r nature of 138 human hi s t o r y . Stromberg and Barraclough on the contrary, consider t h i s approach e n t i r e l y too microscopic and reminiscent of the o l d -fashioned, dry-as-dust, teaching-history-as-a-discipline approach to 139 today's students and so objectionable. Some advocate a more i n t e r -d i s c i p l i n a r y version of the subject of h i s t o r y as the best route to an 140 improved h i s t o r i c a l perspective, others wish to reduce a l l profes-141 s i o n a l emphasis and stress relevance. Manuel explains i n consider-able d e t a i l why most of the h i s t o r y written i n t h i s twentieth century i s not f i t to teach: the grand new v i s t a s produced by Marxist h i s t o r i -ans and others are castigated as pseudo h i s t o r i e s and fantasies; s t r e s s i n g e t h n i c i t y or nationalism (e.g., 'Canadian' studies or 'black' hi s t o r y ) i s p l a i n l y e v i l ; pragmatic h i s t o r y i s too u n r e a l i s t i c — t h e r e are no easy lessons; relevance and contemporaneity i s dismissed as a 43 'cop-out', while the new q u a n t i t a t i v e - s t r u c t u r a l i s t emphasis i s dehuman-142 i z i n g . What ^s. f i t for student consumption i s l e f t unclear. The only useful hints f or the classroom are provided by Hallam, who stresses the connection between cognitive development and that of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Sound suggestions he makes include not making h i s t o r y too abstract for students under 14 because they have not reached 143 the l e v e l of formal operations yet. Those who are capable of formal thought should be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y challenged i n a vigorous way such as exposure to varied and contrasting points of view through debates, discussions, and written work that demands r e f l e c t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a -144 txon. The only method widely advocated as b e n e f i c i a l to stimulating devel-opment of h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s conceptual analysis. Kitson-Clark sees conceptual analysis as v a s t l y important to the study of h i s t o r y , as 145 146 does Plumb: for the development of the human mind i n general, 147 e s p e c i a l l y for developing habits of methodical doubt. Koselleck and 148 Conkin and Toulmin a l l laud the use of conceptual analysis, even though they have no suggestions as to how. Gustavson i s most enthusiastic i n his endorsement. He considers language oriented a c t i v i t i e s such as conceptual analysis as "natural devices for a r t i c u l a t i n g student's 149 growing sense of the time dimension i n t h e i r l i v e s and community." It appears then that conceptual analysis can contribute towards a t t a i n i n g the f i r s t of the two major goals: to f a c i l i t a t e cognitive development. How concepts are used i s considered an accurate i n d i c a -t i o n of the current l e v e l of cognitive development, and conceptual development i s a major aspect of cognitive development. Hence stimu-l a t i n g i t w i l l stimulate cognitive development i n general. Conceptual 44 analysis should also be useful i n increasing knowledge and awareness of the four main aspects of h i s t o r i c a l perspective, e s p e c i a l l y regarding the use of language: by examining the language we use we are i n e f f e c t examining our h i s t o r i c a l perspective. I f i t should lead to greater awareness of and a more c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards the way we and others use language and are used by i t , h i s t o r i c a l perspective w i l l i n t h i s way have been expanded. As the methods of conceptual analysis are usually quite s p e c i f i c — i n f a c t f a r too s p e c i f i c f or Barzun's liking"*""^—they need to be balanced by a more general method of i n t e l l e c t u a l stimulation s u i t a b l e for creat-ing mental dilemmas and to be applied i n discussions, essay, etc., as Hallam suggested. Obviously there i s no agreement on the best approach— one that would be sui t a b l e to develop the speculative side of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and also help to form an overview of how h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e i s shaped by developmental and s o c i a l influences. J u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t w i l l be argued, provides such a method. Conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n make a perfect tandem. The l i n g u i s t i c p r e c i s i o n of conceptual analysis can deal with the micro-scopic and help to keep the language of j u s t i f i c a t i o n under close r e i n . The explanations and generalizations i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n tend towards the macroscopic—seeking to e s t a b l i s h the connections and to f i n d the over-view—and provide a reason for the existence of the c r i t i c a l s k i l l s of conceptual analysis. A ease w i l l be made for incorporating conceptual analysis and j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as described, i n the high school curriculum i n general, with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on t h e i r relevance for the teaching and le a r n -ing of h i s t o r y . Hopefully t h i s w i l l improve the general l e v e l of high school education, provide a needed stimulus to the study of h i s t o r y and succeed i n r a i s i n g the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of adolescents. FOOTNOTES "4l. T. H a l l , and J. V. Davis, Moral Education i n Theory and  Prac t i c e (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975), p. 99. 2 Erikson c a l l s t h i s psycho-social development. 3 E. Erikson, Insight and Res p o n s i b i l i t y (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 206. 4 Ibid.; also E. Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 23. ^Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s , p. 24. E. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1950), pp. 403-4. ^Kai T. Erikson, ed., In Search of Common Ground (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1973), p. 79. g R. E. Evans, Dialogue with E r i k Erikson (New York: Harper and Row Publ. 1967), p. 42. 9 10 Cf., I b i d . , p. 23. K. T. Erikson, op. c i t . , p. 86. "'""'"E. Erikson, Dimensions of a New Identity (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 91. 12 13 Ibid., p. 93. Erikson, Insight and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , p. 171. "*"^ E. Erikson, "Youth, F i d e l i t y and D i v e r s i t y , " Youth, Change and  Challenge, E. Erikson, ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 1-23, 20. "*""*Ibid. "^Erikson, Insight and Re s p o n s i b i l i t y , p. 172. "^Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s , p. 41. 18 Erikson, Dimensions, pp. 96-7. Cf. E. Erikson, L i f e History  and the H i s t o r i c a l Moment (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1975), pp. 102, 206. 19 Erikson, Dimensions, pp. 106-8. 20 Ibid ., pp. 108-110. Also, Evans, op. c i t . , pp. 38-40. 21 Erikson, "Youth, F i d e l i t y and D i v e r s i t y , " p. 22. 22 Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s , p. 42. 23 Erikson, Childhood and Society, pp. 412-3. 47 24 Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s , p. 43. 25 Erikson, In Search of Common Ground, p. 87. 26 Erikson, L i f e History, p. 207. 27 Erikson, Insight and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , p. 242. 28 Erikson, Identity, Youth and C r i s i s , p. 39. 29 Erikson, Dimensions, p. 30. 30 Cf. E r i c h Kahler, The Meaning of History (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968 [1964]), p. 188; K a r l Lowith, Meaning i n  History (Chicago: The University Press, 1949), p. 2; John Lukacs, H i s t o r i c a l Consciousness (New York: Harper and Row Publ., 1968); Golo Mann, "The History Lesson," Encounter, 39, 2(1972): 26; Frank Manuel, Freedom from History (New York: New York University Press, 1971), p. 10; John Weiss, "Adam Smith and the Philosophy of A n t i -History," Tlie_JJsje^_of:_JlJ^o_ry_1_ H. V. White, ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968), p. 15. 31 Cf. Jacques Barzun, C l i o and the Doctors (Chicago: Uni v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 103-4; F. G i l b e r t , "European and American Historiography," History, J . Higham, L. Krieger and F. G i l b e r t , eds. (Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice H a l l Inc., 1965), p. 378; Johan Huizinga, Now and Ideas (Cleveland: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 50. 32 Cf. Paul K. Conkin and Roland N. Stromberg, The Heritage and  Challenge of History (New York: Harper and Row Publ. 1971), preface, p. i v ; C. Gustavson, "History f o r Today," The Soc i a l Studies, 67, 4, p. 178. 33 Cf. P i e t e r Geyl, Encounters i n History (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961), p. 275; David Thomson, The Aims of History (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), p. 102. 34 Cf. Paul K. Conkin, "The Challenge of History," i n The Heritage  and Challenge of History, p. 237; John Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 15. 35 Cf. Arnold Toynbee, "Widening our H i s t o r i c a l Horizon," New  Movements i n the Study and Teaching of History, Martin B a l l a r d , ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), pp. 50-60. 36 Geoffrey Barraclough, History i n a Changing World (Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 1955), p. 29. 37 R. G. Collingwood, "The H i s t o r i c a l Imagination," i n The P h i l o s - ophy of History i n our Time, Hans Meyerhoff, ed. (Garden C i t y : Doubleday and Company, Inc., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), p. 67. 38 J. H. Plumb, The Death of the Past (London: MacMillan, 1969), 12. 39 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The D i v e r s i t y and Unity of History," i n The Philosophy of History i n our Time, Hans Meyerhoff, ed., p. 331. 40 Jose Ortega Y. Gasset, History as a System (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1962 [1941]), p. 78. ^Hfeiss, op. c i t . , p. 15. ^Lukacs, op. c i t . , pp. 7, 13. 43 Conkin and Stromberg, op. c i t . , pp. i v , 237. 44 Gustavson, op. c i t . , p. 178; and C. Gustavson, A Preface to  History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955). 45 Crane Brinton, The Shaping of Modern Thought (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1966), p. 17. 46 Martin Sleeper, "The Uses of History i n Adolescence," i n Youth  and Society, 4, 3(1973): 260-1. ^ K a r l Jaspers, "The Unity of Histo r y , " i n The Philosophy of  History i n our Time, Hans Meyerhoff, ed., p. 331. 48 Ortega Y. Gasset, op. c i t . , p. 13. 49 P. S. Stromberg, "The Heritage of History," i n The Heritage  and Challenge of History, p. 118. "^Barzun, op. c i t . , pp. 102-4. "'"'"Thomson, op. c i t . , p. 105. 52 53 Lukacs, op. c i t . , p. 13. I b i d . , p. 7. 54 Barraclough, op. c i t . , pp. 19, 27-8. 55 Conkin and Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. xv. 56 Mann, op. c i t . , p. 26. 5 7Robert V. Daniels, Studying History (Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-H a l l Inc., 1966), pp. 3-12. 58 59 Brinton, op. c i t . , p. 17. Geyl, op. c i t . , p. 275. ^Plumb, op. c i t . , p. 12; Manuel, op. c i t . , p. 17. 6X 62 Thomson, op. c i t . , p. 102. Huizinga, op. c i t . , p. 49. ^Collingwood, op. c i t . , p. 84. ^ I b i d . , p. 83. 6 5 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: Oxford Univer-s i t y Press, 1961 [1946]), p. 7. 66 Cf. E. Kahler, The Meaning of History. 67 68 Conkin, op. c i t . , pp. 234-42. Plumb, op. c i t . , p. 14. 69 Ibid ., pp. 16, 18. ^ R e i n h a r t Koselleck, "Wozu noch H i s t o r i e ? " H i s t o r i s c h e Z e i t - s c h r i f t , 212, 1(1971): 13. ^~*"Ibid. ^ O r t e g a Y. Gasset, op. c i t . , p. 8. ^ I b i d . , p. 81. ^Collingwood, "The H i s t o r i c a l Imagination," p. 84. 75 76 Cf. Jaspers, op. c i t . , p. 345. Cf. Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 30. ^ C f . Kahler, op. c i t . , pp. 181-193. Kahler traces the h i s t o r y of the paradox as one main theme of h i s book. 78 Cf. Kahler, op. c i t . , p. 13. 79 Quoted by C. Olson i n The Special View of History (Berkeley: Oyez, 1970), p. 14. 80 Plumb, op. c i t . , pp. 144-5. 81 Cf. Plumb, op. c i t . , pp. 141-3; and also the Gustavson, "His^ tory for Today." 82 Collingwood, "The H i s t o r i c a l Imagination," p. 67. 83 T, ., 84T, 85 T T . _ _ Ibid. Ibid. Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 15. 86 87 Ibid ., p. 17. Brinton, op. c i t . , p. 14. ^Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 17. ^ I b i d . , pp. 15-16. 90 E. L. Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1964), p. 203. 91 Cf. Ortega Y. Gasset, op. c i t . , pp. 169-186. 92 Lukacs, op. c i t . , pp. 305-14. 9 3 Jaspers, "The Unity of History," pp. 337-8. 94 Conkin and Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. i v . 9 5 Cf. Mary P r i c e , "History i n Danger," History (Vol. L I I I , Oct. 1968, pp. 342-7). 96 Jurgen Herbst, "Review Essay on New Movements i n the Study and  Teaching i n History," History and Theory, 11, 11(1972); 97. 97 Koselleck, op. c i t . , p. 1. 98 Bernard Berelson, Graduate Education In the U.S. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 212. 99 Manuel, op. c i t . , pp. 5, 11-16. 100,, . . 101 . , ^ . Huizxnga, op. c i t . , p. 51. Barraclough, op. c i t . , p. 1. 102 George Kitson-Clark, "The C r i t i c a l H i s t o r i a n , " i n The Dimen- sions of History, Thomas N. Guinsberg, ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971), pp. 8-11. 103 Cf. Koselleck, op. c i t . ; A. Heuss, Vorwst der Geschichte (Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959); K. Zimmermann, "Euber Einige Probleme der Gegenwartigen Geschichte," Saeculum, 14(1963): 17; Bethold Riesterer, "K a r l Lb'with's A n t i - H i s t o r i c i s m , " i n The Uses of  History, H. V. White, ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968), pp. 153-174. 104 Translated from K. Zimmermann, op. c i t . , p. 17. Barzun, op. c i t . , p. 5. 106 Cf. Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. 102; Manuel, op. c i t . , p. 10. 107,, _ _ 108T , . Barzun, op. c i t . , p. 5. Lukacs, op. c i t . , p. 4. 109 Cf. Maier, op. c i t . ; Gustavson, "History f or Today," p. 26. "'""'"^ Herbst, op. c i t . , p. 97. "'""'"''"Quoted i n Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. 100. 112 Also quoted i n Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. 100. 113 Cf. Koselleck, op. c i t . ; Mann, op. c i t . , p. 26. "'""'"^Barraclough, op. c i t . , pp. 4-5, 7, 12-13. "'""'"^ David Trask, "A Note on Relevance and Histor y , " C l i o , 1, 3(1972): 34-9. "'""'"^ Plumb, op. c i t . , p. 18. "'""'"^ Conkin, op. c i t . , p. 234. "'""'"^Daniels, op. c i t . , p. 3. "'""'"^ Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 30. 120.... o-, 121 T, Ibid ., p. 31. I b i d . , p. 16. 122 Hans Meyerhoff, "Introduction to the Meaning of Histor y , " Part IV of The Philosophy of History i n our Time, p. 291. 123 Cf. W. Dilthey, "The Dream," The Philosophy of History i n our Time, Meyerhoff, ed., pp. 37-43. X 2 ^ f- X 2 5 Ibid., p. 41. Neibuhr, op. c i t . , pp. 318-9. 126 Translated from K a r l Lowith, "Het Noodlot van de Vooruitgang, 1 i n Het Begrip Vooruitgang, E r i c h Burck, ed. (Amsterdam: Wetenschap-p e l i j k e U i t g e v e r i j N.V., 1966), p. 18. 127 128 Barzun, op. c i t . , p. 133. Ibid., p. 146. 129 130 Conkin, op. c i t . , p. 235. Barzun, op. c i t . , p. 124. 1 " l l 132 133 Ibid., p. 140. Weiss, p. 16. Ib i d . , p. 30. 134 Toynbee, op. c i t . , p. 60. 135 Cf. Lukacs, op. c i t . , pp. 313-15; Plumb, op. c i t . , p. 17. X 3 6 X 3 7 Lukacs, op. c i t . , pp. 314-5. Sleeper, op. c i t . , p. 273. 138 Cf. Golo Mann, op. c i t . ; Barzun, op. c i t . , pp. 123-133. 139 Stromberg, op. c i t . , p. 102. • ^ G i l b e r t , op. c i t . , p. 378; Koselleck, op. c i t . , p. 14. 141 G. Connell-Smith and H. A. Lloyd, The Relevance of History (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1972), p. 5. ^^Manuel, op. c i t . , pp. 11-16. X A 3 Hallam, "Piaget and Thinking i n History," p. 168. ^^Ibid _ . , pp. 171-4. "^''Plumb, op. c i t . , p. 137. 1 ^ 6 K i t s o n - C l a r k , op. c i t . , pp. 8-11. ^ 7 I b i d . , p. 14. 1 ^ 8 C f . Koselleck, op. c i t . , p. 15; Conkin, op. c i t . , p. 246; Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972), p. 2. 149 Gustavson, "History f o r Today," p. 26. Barzun, op. c i t . , pp. 152-/. SECTION II CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN EDUCATION AND THE TEACHING OF HISTORY 5 3 A. The Pedagogical Value of Conceptual Analysis Concept formation i s an e s s e n t i a l aspect of cognitive development. In the language of educational psychology a concept i s a mental con-s t r u c t , represented by a spoken and written word which describes some-thing perceived or believed. Children often acquire concepts by observing older persons. Concepts are said to be le a r n t ; yet we never stop learning about concepts and how they are used. Our a b i l i t y to think and to communicate with others i s therefore connected with our conceptual development. (1) At f i r s t humans grasp and use only simple concepts representing concrete objects and immediate experience (e.g., "hand," or "hungry"). (2) From early adolescence onward they become capable of handling more abstract concepts (such as "government"), understanding the connec-tions between concepts ("government," "prime minister," "law" etc.) and manipulating concepts at a conscious l e v e l . This follows the pattern of cognitive development as outlined by Piaget. As such, the pattern should immediately i n t e r e s t educators, who, a f t e r a l l , wish to f a c i l i t a t e , encourage, and d i r e c t proper cog-n i t i v e development. The same i s true of conceptual development, for a va r i e t y of reasons. David Ausubel stresses the v i t a l importance of properly under-standing the concepts we use, when he remarks that anyone who r e a l l y gives i t much thought cannot help but conclude that "Man l i v e s i n a world of concepts rather than a world of objects, events and si t u a t i o n s . . . r e a l i t y , f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking i s experienced through a conceptual 54 or c a t e g o r i c a l f i l t e r . " ^ He explains i n more d e t a i l : When someone, for example, t e l l s us that he sees a "House," he i s not r e a l l y communicating his actual experience, but . . . an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that r e f l e c t s the c u l t u r a l consensus regard-ing the e s s e n t i a l . . . a t t r i b u t e s of "House" . . . i f he a c t u a l l y t r i e d to communicate h i s detained cognitive experi-ence, i t would not only take him h a l f a day, but he would s t i l l be unable completely to express i n words many of i t s more subtle advances.^ What worries Ausubel, as i t worries others, i s that i f we don't compre-hend t h i s process we may lose a c e r t a i n degree of freedom. John Wilson expresses i t c l e a r l y : "Instead of using language, we are i n a r e a l sense used by i t : we allow words to guide our thinking, instead of guiding our 3 thinking consciously or c r i t i c a l l y . " This appears somewhat farfetched. A f t e r a l l one could not pos-s i b l y think consciously about each word used: how and when i t was acquired; i n what way i t i s meant to be understood, alone and i n context with the other words; what meaning i t might convey to anyone l i s t e n i n g , and so on. If we did, concepts would cease to be of much use. But, on the other hand, John Wilson i s correct i n h i s claim that we are i n a r e a l sense used by the language we use. Our concepts are a l l borrowed. They do r e f l e c t the " c u l t u r a l consensus," what i s believed by those amongst whom we grow up. And there are times when we should think "consciously o r . c r i t i c a l l y " about our choice of words as well as those of others. Indeed, discussions would be impossible without doing so. And, most importantly, we are held accountable to others for our choice of words, for our thoughts and ideas as were the actions that follow them. When we are asked to describe, explain, hypothesize, or j u s t i f y , i t becomes important to be able to think consciously and c r i t i c a l l y . Yet as John Dewey points out, even adults "are capable of using even 55 precise verbal formulae with only the vaguest and most confused sense of 4 what they mean." One of the putative goals of high school education i s to teach students to think c r i t i c a l l y . At the core of each of the d i s c i p l i n e s taught i n high school and u n i v e r s i t y l i e s the systematic questioning and c r i t i c a l examination of some aspect of human experience. However, these d i s c i p l i n e s often become highly compartmentalized and dogmatic. There i s a tendency f o r the educated to allow t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e s to do t h e i r thinking f o r them. Thinking consciously and c r i t i c a l l y requires openness to doubts and questions. Finding "the tru t h " prevents further question-ing, further development, and greater excellence. John Passmore, i n h i s a r t i c l e "On Teaching to be C r i t i c a l " l i n k s what he c a l l s ' c r i t i c a l thinking' to a character t r a i t : "To c a l l a person c r i t i c a l i s to characterize him, to describe h i s nature. . . It i s not meant to be confused with the s k i l l f u l and habitual questioning for the sake of questioning that Socrates d i s l i k e d so much i n the Sophists. Passmore emphasizes the point that c r i t i c a l thinking i s not merely a s k i l l to be acquired but above a l l r e f l e c t s a "philosophy of l i f e . " Contrary to what R. S. Peters c l a i m s , 7 the e x i s t i n g d i s c i p l i n e s are not ends i n themselves, they should be and can be used to develop systematic doubt and c r i t i c a l thinking (both the attitude and s k i l l s ) . They can also provide students with important data, methods f o r organizing those data and the tools f o r independent study. Conceptual analysis, fundamental as i t i s to d i s c i p l i n e d use of language, should be a cornerstone of any e f f o r t to encourage c r i t i c a l thinking i n senior high school courses. C r i t i c a l thinking requires a high l e v e l of consciousness i n the use of language. This i s equally t r u e f o r such d i s p a r a t e d i s c i p l i n e s as E n g l i s h , s c i e n c e , or h i s t o r y . Adding c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s t o the c u r r i c u l a r o f f s p r i n g of t h e s e d i s c i -p l i n e s i n h i g h s c h o o l w i l l ensure t h a t the important concepts used by each a r e not passed on unexamined. In t h i s manner we w i l l not be si m p l y used by language (the p a r t i c u l a r language of each d i s c i p l i n e i n t h i s case) but w i l l become c a p a b l e o f m a n i p u l a t i n g i t to our own use. That i s the i d e a , i n any c a s e . B. Four Main Types o f C o n c e p t u a l A n a l y s i s However, one p r a c t i c a l problem t o be r e s o l v e d i s how to t e a c h c o n c e p t s . Or can one? L. S. Vygotsky warns t h a t " d i r e c t t e a c h i n g of 9 c o n c e p t s i s i m p o s s i b l e and f r u i t l e s s . " Common sense would seem t o r e i n f o r c e t h a t judgement. Imagine a t e a c h e r s a y i n g t o h i s s t u d e n t s "Now, our concept f o r today, 'Freedom' c o n s i s t s o f . . . e t c . e t c . " One o b j e c t i o n to t h i s method, as John W i l s o n t e l l s us, i s t h a t - " a n a l y s i s of c o ncepts i s e s s e n t i a l l y an i m a g i n a t i v e p r o c e s s : c e r t a i n l y i t i s more o f an a r t than a science.""'"^ T h i s i s so because t h e r e can be no meaning o f a word, or concept o f a n y t h i n g p e r s e — t h e r e i s o n l y g e n e r a l agreement which i s c o n s t a n t l y changing."'""'" Each word i n any language has an ongoing h i s t o r y . There a r e a number o f d i f f e r e n t ways i n which c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s can be conducted. (1) I t i s p o s s i b l e to do a H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s of a con c e p t : determine i t s common usage today and compare t h i s w i t h i t s common usage i n another time and p l a c e . There a r e w e l l d e v e l o p e d t e c h n i q u e s 12 a v a i l a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h common usage and h i s t o r i a n s c o u l d use s i m i l a r t e c h n i q u e s w i t h t h e w r i t t e n and p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l s at t h e i r 57 disposal. The o v e r a l l r e s u l t would be a common usage chart stretching over a c e r t a i n time span. This kind of h i s t o r i c a l analysis might throw l i g h t on b a f f l i n g problems such as why the Greeks, who fought f a n a t i c a l l y for t h e i r own freedom, saw nothing wrong with slavery. Current Usage Analysis i s useful up to a point. It serves to o u t l i n e the perimeter of concepts such a 'house.' But 'freedom' creates much more d i f f i c u l t y since i t i s cloaked i n emotional and i d e o l o g i c a l camouflage—leaving psychological as well as c u l t u r a l factors to consider. Also, on a more mundane l e v e l , students may not respond well to the repeated a p p l i c a t i o n of an eight to ten step technique to a long l i s t of concepts. F i n a l l y , there i s no guarantee that doing t h i s w i l l r e s u l t i n learning. Robert Gagne states that an i n d i v i d u a l cannot be said to have a minimal a t t a i n -ment of a concept unless he can demonstrate that he can "generalize the concept to a v a r i e t y of s p e c i f i c instances of the class that 13 have not been used i n learning." Depth Analysis of concepts would seem to o f f e r more promise for use i n the classroom. I t o f f e r s a depth lacking i n the current usage analysis. Being open-ended, f i r s t the meanings most commonly assigned to the concept are established and analyzed. Then the r e s u l t s of the f i r s t process are i n turn analyzed, etc. There are always further aspects to analyze, whereas h i s t o r i c a l and current usage analysis tend to provide answers (e.g., "This i s how Athenian Greeks defined 'Freedom' i n 300 B.C.," "This i s how we use the word 'Culture'"). Analyzing language i s a current preoccupation for many philosophers, but t h e i r rigorous methods are not s u i t a b l e for 58 the average classroom. However, a less microscopic version which gives students a good taste of what l i n g u i s t i c analysis i s a l l about, could be arranged. ( 4 ) Another form of conceptual analysis, Typological Analysis, cannot be considered seriously at this time. I t would e n t a i l dividing con-cepts into different types and teaching students to recognize them. At t h i s time there i s s t i l l too much confusion about what a concept 1 4 i s to start devising.^.classification models for distinguishing d i f -ferent types. Nor does there seem to be much educational value i n cataloguing the r e l a t i v e d i f f i c u l t y or significance of concepts^ or i n trying to establish systematic h i e r a r c h i c a l networks between 1 6 concepts. The f i r s t three kinds of conceptual a n a l y s i s — h i s t o r i c a l , current usage, and depth a n a l y s i s — a r e suited to the average classroom. Select-ing just one method and using i t exclusively would probably not be wise since i t would give an unbalanced picture of what conceptual analysis consists of. So any comprehensive attempt at conceptual analysis ought to combine a l l three. From the above, i t appears that not only i s conceptual analysis possible i n the high school classroom, but i t i s also desirable from a general pedagogical point of view. Vygotsky pointed out that "concept formation i s the result of a complex process i n which a l l the basic i n t e l l e c t u a l functions take place."''"7 I t i s a key aspect of cognitive development. Conceptual analysis, then, can be seen as an excellent means of furthering cognitive development i n general. More s p e c i f i c -a l l y , i t provides excellent s k i l l s for c r i t i c a l thinking. I t can be usefully applied to any existing d i s c i p l i n e at the high school l e v e l 59 and can help to counteract some of the dogmatism these are g u i l t y . o f . F i n a l l y , i t may bring students to the point where they can a c t u a l l y do_ h i s t o r y , science, and so on, i n the f u l l sense of the d i s c i p l i n e s . C. Conceptual Analysis and the Study of History Conceptual analysis can r e a d i l y be applied to the study of h i s t o r y , and v i c e versa. (1) As alluded to previously, concepts—as a l l aspects of language—have a dynamic h i s t o r i c a l dimension. They have a past, present, and future; are subject to change; can be created or wither away through lack of use. They have a dual i d e n t i t y : as general h i s t o r i c a l phenomena, changing from society to society as well as i n d i v i d u a l phenomena, reborn i n each i n d i v i d u a l l i k e the Phoenix r i s i n g from i t s own ashes. Our l i n g u i s t i c inheritance shapes us as we shape i t — a t r u l y symbiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p . R e a l i z i n g the dynamic and symbiotic nature of language as i t r e l a t e s to you i s part of developing a h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Gustavson, for example, remarks that language oriented a c t i v i t i e s such as provided by conceptual analysis are "natural devices for a r t i c u l a t i n g students' growing sense of the time dimension i n t h e i r l i v e s and 18 community." Besides b e n e f i t t i n g the development of a sense of h i s t o r y , conceptual analysis n e c e s s a r i l y a s s i s t s i n the w r i t i n g and study of h i s t o r y . (2) Historians most often deal with written sources of information: studies by previous h i s t o r i a n s and primary sources. They have to be aware that the language used by people i n previous times and places r e f l e c t s t h e i r current usage, which could d i f f e r s i g n i f i -6 0 cantly from ours. Establishment of the common usage of c e r t a i n key terms i s e s s e n t i a l i n order to reach adequate conclusions. In studying a period of h i s t o r y the same problem e x i s t s : the utterances of people from the past and t h e i r written records cannot be judged only by the l i n g u i s t i c standards of our time and society. Students of h i s t o r y must be equally c a r e f u l with the explanations and judgements offered by the h i s t o r i a n s they read. The accounts written by h i s t o r i a n s frequently use concepts such as " r e l i g i o n , " "government," "war," "c u l t u r e , " "success," etc. etc. But students and teachers r a r e l y stop to examine them very c l o s e l y , because written h i s t o r y has l i t t l e i n the way of a professional jargon, and these concepts are common currency today. If asked to explain what a " r e l i g i o n " or "country" i s , many high •.school students would"have d i f f i c u l t i e s . This r e f l e c t s the f a i r l y narrow h i s t o r -i c a l perspective expected of most adolescents. Yet the vast majority of these concepts are important ones i n our own l i v e s and i n our society. For example, when a neighbour informs us that "the government i s out to get me," he expresses an important f e e l i n g , one that i s l i k e l y to have some influence on h i s d a i l y existence (his u l c e r , h i s conversations). But i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d he would have d i f f i c u l t y explaining j u s t what or who i t i s that i s t r y i n g to get him, and how and why. Adolescents are capable of r e f l e c t i n g upon the common usage of words; but they need to be shown how to analyze concepts and also have to learn why they should be able to. A mature adult should have a good understanding of key concepts used i n our society or at least the a b i l i t y to analyze such concepts i f the s i t u a t i o n requires i t . I f he does not, h i s h i s t o r i c a l 61 perspective remains l i m i t e d : he i s unable to r e f l e c t on h i s own use of language or that of others, and i s used by language rather than using i t . Making conceptual analysis a part of the learning of h i s t o r y can f u l f i l l a double purpose: i t can help i n gaining more accurate ins i g h t into the past and i t i s v i t a l i n expanding h i s t o r i c a l perspective. (5) One more way i n which conceptual analysis can serve the study of h i s t o r y i s by making philosophy of h i s t o r y more accessible and acceptable f o r classroom use. History, l i k e any other d i s c i p l i n e , has a t h e o r e t i c a l side. Usually t h i s side i s ignored by students and writers of h i s t o r y a l i k e . Philosophers of h i s t o r y attempt to come to grips with such varied issues as: How are events caused? Is there such a thing as a h i s t o r i c a l fact? Is the study of h i s -tory a science or an art? To what extent can and should a h i s t o r i a n be objective? Does human h i s t o r y have a beginning? Is there such a thing as a "great man"? When are events, or the people who figure i n them, bad or good? The attempt to resolve these questions often revolves around the use of key concepts which must be c l e a r l y understood before any answers can be formulated. This i n turn requires conceptual a n a l y s i s . I t i s no wonder that c l a s s -room teachers, curriculum designers, and p r o f e s s i o n a l h i s t o r i a n s shy away from t a c k l i n g such questions and leave them to the p h i l o s -ophers! However, the current techniques of conceptual analysis are not so rigorous that only the i n i t i a t e d and b r i l l i a n t few can handle them. There i s a general but misguided reluctance amongst educators to consider " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " techniques as useful for the high school classroom. Techniques for analyzing language have 62 vast a p p l i c a t i o n f or many learning a c t i v i t i e s — n o t only i n the f i e l d of h i s t o r y . The mental block that e x i s t s against t h e i r . u t i l i z a t i o n can be overcome by f i r s t recognizing t h i s u t i l i t y and then by exposing educators to the techniques i n question. Once teachers f e e l comfortable with these techniques they w i l l also be more i n c l i n e d to include some purely t h e o r e t i c a l content i n t h e i r classes. This w i l l give students a more complete picture of the subject they are studying, develop t h e i r c r i t i c a l thinking a b i l i t y , and add to t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l perspective. D. Using Conceptual Analysis i n the Teaching of High School History Studies have shown that Piaget's l e v e l s of cognitive development and conceptual development p a r a l l e l each other. In one study, c h i l d r e n 19 of varied age l e v e l s were asked what a king was. The youngest would give answers such as "Lives i n a c a s t l e far away," containing mostly i r r e l e v a n c i e s and non-essentials. An eight year old's "A famous man out of a r o y a l family" pinpoints some concrete aspects. "Ruler of a country" shows the p a r t i a l recognition of formal q u a l i t i e s of an early adolescent. Whereas "A person who may r u l e h i s country by himself, with others or as a figurehead" i l l u s t r a t e s a mature l e v e l of formal operations, showing the r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between a person and h i s society. This indicates that the use of conceptual a n a l y s i s — r e q u i r i n g the a b i l i t y to operate at the formal l e v e l — s h o u l d be l i m i t e d to students fourteen years of age or older. When a student reads "The south allowed the p r a c t i c e of slavery" the two concepts, "the south" and "slavery," must be explicated by the teacher before the statement can 63 make sense to a student. What a teacher does at t h i s point should depend on the student's l e v e l of cognitive development. I t would be a waste to explain to eight year olds that "slavery i s an offence to basic human d i g n i t y " or that "the south was a romantic i d e a l that translated i t s e l f into a c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . " Not u n t i l students reach the age of formal operations (14 onward) should the teacher begin to explore the f u l l range of implications of a concept with expectations of success. So for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, concep-t u a l analysis must be l i m i t e d to high school students. Teachers w i l l need to set aside s u b s t a n t i a l time to work with students i f conceptual analysis i s to become a worthwhile a c t i v i t y . Adolescents may have the cognitive a b i l i t y to undertake i t but i t does not come na t u r a l l y . One possible and workable strategy involves s e t t i n g aside one year when a concerted e f f o r t i s made to introduce students to conceptual analysis. Grade nine (age 14) may be the best year for t h i s : most students w i l l have matured s u f f i c i e n t l y to perform at the formal l e v e l of operations. E. Applying Conceptual Analysis to the Study of High School History Three types of conceptual a n a l y s i s — a l l b r i e f l y described p r e v i -o u s l y — a r e s u i t a b l e f or t h i s age group. 1. Common Usage Analysis Recognized procedures for t h i s method are already a v a i l a b l e , such 20 as that outlined by John Wilson and modified s l i g h t l y here. Typic-a l l y , t h i s proceeds as follows: a. I s o l a t i n g Questions of Concept. Is a concept being examined? " L i b e r a l democracy," for example consists of two concepts combined to 64 form a p o l i t i c a l i d e a l . Examining that i d e a l would f i r s t require the analysis of each concept separately and then probing the connection made between the two, which involves j u s t i f y i n g a value judgement. This i s not recommended for beginners. On a lower l e v e l , i t may simply involve looking at a sentence such as "Elizabeth II i s the monarch of England" and being able to pick out the word monarch as the concept which needs to be examined. b. Cataloguing the Concept. L i s t i n g what i s currently included i n common usage. This may include such a c t i v i t i e s as asking students what they know about the word "monarch" and pooling the answers, or looking up the meaning i n d i f f e r e n t d i c t i o n a r i e s . An assignment might be: ask f i v e adults what they think the word "monarch" means and record the r e p l i e s . c. Ordering the Concept. E s t a b l i s h i n g what i s a more or l e s s common use. Charts can be drawn up to help sort through the c o l l e c t e d r e p l i e s , keeping track of the d i f f e r e n t points of view and how often each one occurs. Then ;the :collated information can be examined. This involves e s t a b l i s h i n g primary, secondary, and peripheral uses of the concept as well as eliminating incorrect usage. d. Model Cases. Finding r e l i a b l e cases and examining t h e i r com-mon features. Monarchs from any period of h i s t o r y can provide the model: Queen Eliz a b e t h I I , Hammurabi, Charlemagne., Ghengis Khan, etc. e. Contrary Cases. What i s not an instance? Again the examples can come from any h i s t o r i c a l era. Why i s P i e r r e Trudeau not considered to be a monarch? Why not I d i Amin? Why not you and me? f. Borderline Cases. Examining l o g i c a l l y contiguous cases and also odd cases and exceptions. Napoleon Bonaparte placed the crown on h i s own head. Bokassa I declared himself to be an emperor. Were those men "monarchs"? J u l i u s Caesar was Roman Emperor i n everything but name. Should he be considered as having been a monarch? Or, at what point must the unborn (and only) son of a recently dead king be considered as being a monarch? While a foetus at the moment of h i s father's death? At birt h ? At a t t a i n i n g the age of majority? g. Invented Cases. Inventing cases quite outside ordinary experience, for example: If upon learning to communicate with dolphins we discovered that one of them claimed to be world emperor, should we regard t h i s as a v a l i d instance of "monarchy"? What would t h i s depend on? h. Related Cases. I d e n t i f y i n g other concepts c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the one being examined. Examples would be "king," "queen," "emperor," "czar," "shah," "throne," "crown," "absolute monarchy," etc. For e s t a b l i s h i n g common usage only, the second and t h i r d steps are e s s e n t i a l . Whether or not any of the others are included depends e n t i r e l y on such variables as a v a i l a b l e class time, student i n t e r e s t , the type of concept examined, and the t r a i n i n g or i n c l i n a t i o n s of the teacher. But students should be exposed to the enti r e procedure at lea s t several times during the school years. 2. H i s t o r i c a l Analysis No formal procedure for conducting a h i s t o r i c a l analysis of a concept exists at present. But e s s e n t i a l l y a l l i t e n t a i l s i s placing common usage i n a larger h i s t o r i c a l framework spanning past, present, and future. In terms of encouraging c r i t i c a l thinking and expanding h i s t o r i c a l perspective i t i s important that h i s t o r i c a l analysis be used alongside of common usage analysis. The l a t t e r lacks any recognition 66 of continuity or change—merely delineating current usage. Its exclus-ive use would deny students the chance to recognize that concepts are dynamic h i s t o r i c a l phenomena. There are various types of h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s : a. Current Individual Perception. What i s the current "status" of the concept f o r a p a r t i c u l a r person? This can be seen as contribut-ing s i g n i f i c a n t l y to widening h o r i z o n t a l perspective, because i t includes recognition of how others use the concept. — P e r s o n a l usage at the moment: "I think 'freedom' means . . . etc." This may involve a more or less lengthy self-examination u t i l i z -ing some of the techniques from common usage analysis. — P o s i t i v e or negative connotations: "Freedom i s a very good thing." Obviously a c a p i t a l i s t and a communist w i l l react quite d i f f e r -ently to the word "freedom." To the l a t t e r i t may be worse than a swear word. Often times we may use a word such as "freedom" without being consciously aware of the negative or p o s i t i v e emotive charge we pack into i t . We are even less aware of why we should f e e l t h i s way: Why does Ivan say "freedom" with such obvious distaste? How i s i t d i f f e r e n t from the way other Russians use the word and what accounts for the d i f -ference of s i m i l a r i t y ? — P e r c e p t i o n of how known others use the concept: "My mom says freedom i s . . . etc." Or: "I don't think Dad believes i n freedom, the way he tal k s about i t . " This i s e s s e n t i a l before any dialogue can occur. Like A and B, th i s i s not d i f f i c u l t - to e s t a b l i s h . Students can do these i n assignment form.. — P e r c e p t i o n of common usage: "Most people around here think that freedom means . . . etc." This e n t a i l s ascertaining that students know 67 what common usage i s . What they think common usage i s may simply be the r e s u l t of t h e i r own projections. — P e r c e p t i o n of world wide usage: "Russians regard freedom as . . . etc." This i s much more d i f f i c u l t : to e s t a b l i s h . Teachers could s e l e c t c e r t a i n readings which r e f l e c t the way other groups of humans see the concept "freedom," and ask students to analyze these. — P e r c e p t i o n of d i f f e r e n t perspectives: "A student, m i l l i o n a i r e , minister, prisoner, hockey player, a l c o h o l i c , c i t y dweller, p s y c h i a t r i s t , etc., thinks freedom i s . . . etc." This can r e a d i l y be done i n class and should be enjoyed by the students. Excellent for discussions. — P e r c e p t i o n of i d e a l usage: " I d e a l l y 'freedom' should mean . . . etc." Not useful for a l l concepts, but i t would work w e l l with "freedom." Also excellent for discussions and debates. b. Previous Usage. How was the concept used i n previous times? This type of h i s t o r i c a l analysis encourages expansion of the v e r t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l perspective. — A u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l perspective: "How did I formerly think about freedom?" This can be applied to c e r t a i n aspects of current i n d i v i d u a l usage, namely ..personal usage ..positive and negative connotations ..perceptions of how known others used the concept ..perception of common usage ..perceptions of d i f f e r e n t perspectives — B i o g r a p h i c a l perspective: "How did A r i s t o t l e define freedom?" Based on written records i t i s possible to examine how men such as Confucius, Buddha, Jesus C h r i s t , Plato, John Locke, Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson, K a r l Marx, etc., used a concept l i k e "freedom." It should be possible i n a number of cases to contrast the way "freedom" was used 68 at an e a r l i e r stage i n l i f e with a l a t e r one. This i s important, because students must r e a l i z e that there i s no such thing as a 'Marxian concept, of freedom', but that h i s thoughts about freedom changed with age and experience, j u s t as ours do. Concepts are not s t a t i c — a point that i s often overlooked by h i s t o r i a n s and h i s t o r y teachers. — P r e v i o u s common usage: "How did Athenian use of 'freedom' con-t r a s t with that of the Spartans around 450 B.C.?" Fortunately people such as the Greeks and the Romans l e f t much written material behind them which can be examined to e s t a b l i s h common usage. The e f f o r t to do. t h i s would also be an opportunity for the students to do some h i s t o r i c a l sleuthing on t h e i r own, giving them a chance to deal with the problems that h i s t o r i a n s face when looking for and examining sources. — H i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l perspective: "What does Toynbee think the Greeks meant by 'freedom'?" Examining a question l i k e that can t e l l us much about the Greek way of thinking and i t also t e l l s us a l o t about h i s t o r i a n s . I t should not be d i f f i c u l t to f i n d a h i s t o r i a n who does not share Toynbee's viewpoint. A s i m p l i f i e d version of t h i s i s to compare what a number of textbooks have to say about Rousseau's theories about freedom. Once again, c o n f l i c t s should be easy to f i n d . E s t a b l i s h i n g why these c o n f l i c t s occur would be more challenging. The lesson to be learnt i s that everyone looks at h i s t o r y from t h e i r own p e r s p e c t i v e — which i n turn leads to a debate over subjective versus objective h i s t o r y and other related questions. Previous usage analysis can be done at greatly varying l e v e l s of d i f f i c u l t y . It can contribute i n many ways to the learning of h i s t o r y : from exposure to new f a c t u a l information, gaining i n s i g h t i n the work of h i s t o r i a n s , discussion of important h i s t o r i c a l theories to generally 69 expanding one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective. c. Future Usage. What changes i n the use of a concept might be predicted f o r the future? More speculative than the previous two, t h i s can follow the same subdivision as the section on current i n d i v i d u a l usage. It allows students to put together what they have c u l l e d from previous usage and current usage and make a projection for future use. Science f i c t i o n novels such as Orwell?s 1984 could be g a i n f u l l y employed to provide a basis f o r comparison. Not too much time should be spent on t h i s , but i t would be most relevant for the students and i s not to be l e f t out. d. H i s t o r i c a l Importance. How do concepts a f f e c t the l i v e s of people? Concepts are among the constituents of values and i d e a l s , which, i n turn, shape the world of words and phys i c a l action. There can be no doubt that theories of freedom borrowed from such as Rousseau or Jefferson have had a d i r e c t impact on human h i s t o r y — t r i g g e r i n g t r i v i a l arguments as well as c o l o s s a l bloodbaths. Three ways of examining h i s -t o r i c a l importance are as follows: — A u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l perspective: "How have concepts such as freedom influenced our l i f e — d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ? " Examples can be taken from our immediate environment ("Why must we obey school rules?") or can be generally applicable to our society ("Why are there any rules at a l l ? " ) It i s v i t a l that students become aware of the l i n g u i s t i c i n h e r i -tance imposed on them as they develop from infancy and how that i n h e r i -tance a f f e c t s them. — P a s t perspective: "What r o l e has the idea of freedom played i n shaping the American Revolution?" "How many wars, revolutions, etc., have been fought i n the name of freedom?" This leaves teachers a great 7 0 deal of scope: there i s a wealth of material on which to draw. — F u t u r e perspective: "How may freedom be important to, or others i n the future?" This perspective i s useful i n that i t helps to provide a balanced h i s t o r i c a l perspective stretching across past, present, and future. Obviously the h i s t o r i c a l analysis of a concept could occupya l o t of class time. The teacher must decide the extent to which (s)he wishes to delve into i t . It does leave much scope for imaginative and e x c i t i n g learning a c t i v i t i e s . Most important, though, i s the p o s i t i v e c o n t r i -bution h i s t o r i c a l analysis can make to expanding students' h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Excellent p r a c t i c e of c r i t i c a l s k i l l s i s also provided. 3. Depth Analysis (or L i n g u i s t i c Analysis) Current usage analysis and h i s t o r i c a l analysis examine the way concepts are used. But they do not dig deeply into the concept i t s e l f . Depth analysis does. I t stems from the r e a l i z a t i o n that dic t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s as well as personal usage and common usage (past and present) of concepts are a l l composed of more words: defining one word may require f i v e , ten, or more words. Two problems emerge: the choice of words can be challenged and the d e f i n i t i o n frequently contains words which i n turn need to be examined. I f , for example, i t i s claimed that a c i v i l i z a t i o n .21 i s "A society possessing organized learning, 1 i t i s open to attack i n two ways: a. Questioning the Concepts Used. To make the d e f i n i t i o n of a c i v i l i z a t i o n , t w o new c o n c e p t s — " s o c i e t y " and "organized learning"—were introduced. So the f i r s t question must be: "What do you mean by 'society' and 'organized learning'?" In a l l l i k e l i h o o d the d e f i n i t i o n s for these concepts w i l l lead to further d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Grosset 71 Webster dic t i o n a r y , f or example, i s g u i l t y of c i r c u l a r argument when i t 22 states that a society means "the members of a c i v i l i z a t i o n . " "Organized learning" i s not a simple concept e i t h e r : learning i s 23 defined as "knowledge acquired through study," so then "knowledge" and 2 "study" must be defined. "Organized" adds "systematized or arranged." Up to t h i s point then a c i v i l i z a t i o n i s "the members of a c i v i l i z a t i o n possessing systematized or arranged knowledge acquired through study." This may continue for some time! When the d e f i n i t i o n s given by other sources are also taken into consideration, t h i s task becomes i n f i n i t e l y complex. b. Questioning the Choice of Words. What does i t mean to "possess" learning? If i t i s a possession, where i s i t ? If much "learning" i s forgotten, how can we be said to possess i t then? Or does i t only apply to that which we can r e c a l l ? How does a society possess learning? Must a l l i t s members share t h i s knowledge or w i l l one member s u f f i c e ? Etc. etc. To explain language, language must be used which i n turn requires explanation and j u s t i f i c a t i o n using language which i n turn . . . etc. In spite of i t s i n f i n i t e complexity, depth analysis can r e a d i l y be used with students as young as 14. A usual s t a r t i n g point i s common usage (established by the class) or simply a dict i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n . Depth analysis then proceeds by l e v e l s . Level One: — Q u e s t i o n i n g the concepts used i n established common usage or the dict i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n by exposing them to either common usage anal-y s i s or a d i c t i o n a r y pursuit (one or more d i c t i o n a r i e s ) . Both can be used, of course, but only at a higher grade l e v e l or with superior 72 students. — Q u e s t i o n i n g the choice of words. I t i s not easy to ask good questions of an established common usage or dictio n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a concept. Strong teacher guidance i s e s s e n t i a l at f i r s t . —Combining both l e v e l s . Questioning the concepts used w i l l l i k e l y lead to d i f f e r e n t , longer d e f i n i t i o n s which are worded d i f f e r -e n t l y — o f t e n s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t to warrant questioning the choice of words. S i m i l a r l y , questioning the choice of words may cause new concepts to be used and examined. In short, the two main a c t i v i t i e s of depth analysis should not take place i n i s o l a t i o n from each other. —Forming a new d e f i n i t i o n . The goal of the three l e v e l s i s to e s t a b l i s h a new improved d e f i n i t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g the concensus of the c l a s s . F i r s t , the old d e f i n i t i o n s or common usage are taken apart, and then, t r y i n g to take into account these c r i t i c i s m s and questions, a new one must be formed. The choices made must be j u s t i f i e d . Level Two: The e n t i r e process i s repeated with a new d e f i n i t i o n . I f the concept i s not a complex one (such as "king") most fourteen year olds can handle l e v e l two. Higher l e v e l s can be attempted with older students. c. • Questioning the Questioner. A t h i r d kind of depth analysis can be used f o r the study of h i s t o r y . Writers i n ancient as we l l as modern times often analyzed key concepts i n t h e i r own thinking or those used by important contemporaries or past luminaries. Where a v a i l a b l e , we can analyze t h e i r analysis. And much i s a v a i l a b l e ! Some suggested steps are: — E s t a b l i s h the point of departure: the.key concept and i t s 73 d e f i n i t i o n . In other words: What was being analyzed? — D e s c r i b e the type of analysis being used: What does the anal-y s i s consist of? For example, Socrates preferred questioning the choice of words and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which backed up t h i s choice. — D e s c r i b e the argument. Follow the main l i n e of argument and state the proffered conclusion. — A n a l y z e the analysis. Were the questions asked good ones? What other questions could and/or should have been asked? How did the author j u s t i f y h i s conclusions? This type of depth analysis i s only recommended for older students. To make i t us e f u l f o r the classroom, the teacher would have to pre-sel e c t and examine each source. F. Some Objections to Using Conceptual Analysis in.the Study of History One charge that can be l e v e l l e d against conceptual analysis i n general and depth analysis i n p a r t i c u l a r i s that i t means doing p h i l o s -ophy and not h i s t o r y . But, even granting t h i s as true, that does not necessitate throwing i t aside. I f economics, science, mathematics, theology, geography, sociology, and recently also, psychology, are thought to lend i n s i g h t s and assistance to the write r and student of hi s t o r y , then why not philosophy? What other d i s c i p l i n e can deal with the language encountered and used by h i s t o r i a n s , and presented to h i s t o r y students, i n an organized way? Language i s used to convey information, to express a point of view, to explain, to j u s t i f y . Philosophy provides the tools needed before we can examine the language others and we our-selves use. And, as pointed out already, becoming conscious of and learning to examine language i s a key aspect of cognitive development as 74 well as being v i t a l to the development of a h i s t o r i c a l perspective. So using these three kinds of conceptual analysis has a value f a r extending beyond the f i e l d of h i s t o r y alone. Another argument against including conceptual analysis i n a high school h i s t o r y curriculum centers on the time f a c t o r . History teachers are often hard pressed to cover the designated tasks for the year. How then could they squeeze i n a large (or even small) dose of conceptual analysis? F i r s t , they must become convinced that doing conceptual analysis i s a highly worthwhile a c t i v i t y for h i s t o r y students. Then c a r e f u l planning must be done. Three main options are a v a i l a b l e : a. Conceptual analysis i s included when time allows and a s u i t a b l e occasion presents i t s e l f . Even t h i s i s preferable to not doing concep-t u a l analysis at a l l . Fortunately, the subject of h i s t o r y provides ample opportunities. Before the s t a r t of the school year (or term, or unit of work) the teacher could select important concepts re l a t e d to the work to be covered. Then appropriate methods of conceptual analysis can be chosen. A l l t h i s can then be f i t t e d into a rough schedule. b. A d e f i n i t e amount of time could, be set aside (e.g., "two periods per c y c l e " or "40% of classtime") for conceptual analysis. This requires a l o t of planning and a f a i r l y clear idea on the part of the teacher as to what they wish to accomplish i n conceptual a n a l y s i s , how to go about t h i s and how to combine t h i s with the "normal" h i s t o r y . c. More extreme would be to base the e n t i r e h i s t o r y course on conceptual analysis. This can be done, but would require the permission of educational a u t h o r i t i e s . One possible example would be to se l e c t s i x or more concepts basic to the subject matter to be covered during the year and to spend a l l classtime analyzing these concepts i n various ways. 75 The ancient and medieval h i s t o r y course could have sections e n t i t l e d " c i v i l i z a t i o n , " " r e l i g i o n , " "government," "war," "empire," "power," "cu l t u r e , " and "society" i n which a l l important aspects of Greek, Roman, feudal, renaissance and reformation h i s t o r y are covered, even i f not i n chronological order. At t h i s point the charge can be made that the d i s c i p l i n e of h i s t o r y i s only being used as means to an end, rather than as an end i n i t s e l f : the subject of h i s t o r y serving as a v e h i c l e for c e r t a i n kinds of cognitive development regarded by some as desirable. To R. S. Peters, t h i s i s 25 anathema. He believes that learning should focus on acquiring the basic information and concepts as w e l l as the method of scholarly inquiry c o n s t i t u t i n g each d i s c i p l i n e . However, i t can be argued that h i s t o r y i s not a d i s c i p l i n e i n the same sense that science i s . Some h i s t o r y teachers may present t h e i r subject as " f a c t u a l " i n nature, but h i s t o r i a n s are generally w i l l i n g to admit that t h e i r work can never even approximate L. von Ranke's i d e a l of reproducing past events wie es e i g e n t l i c h gewesen i s t . Unlike science,there i s always an a i r of uncertainty pervading h i s t o r i c a l research, where evidence i s generally second or t h i r d hand and piecemeal. Philosophers and h i s t o r i a n s have long argued whether or not the " d i s c i p l i n e " of h i s t o r y i s a science or an a r t . It i s safest to agree with Watts' suggestion that i t shares i n both: History l i e s i n the debatable land between the arts and the sciences. The basic mode of h i s t o r y , the h i s t o r i c a l response, i s akin to an aesthetic experience. Yet h i s t o r y i s not, l i k e the a r t s , a truth creating a c t i v i t y : i t i s a science i n that i t i s a truth-seeking a c t i v i t y . ^ 6 The f i n a l point against the charge of " p r o s t i t u t i n g the d i s c i p l i n e of h i s t o r y " i s that pedagogically there i s nothing wrong with using high school h i s t o r y courses for encouraging cognitive development i n 76 students. Any educator w i l l admit that cognitive development i n general takes p r i o r i t y over production of min i - h i s t o r i a n s . And the two need not be a n t i t h e t i c a l . John Passmore notes that the study of h i s t o r y can be used to provide students with important data and methods f or organizing those data i n conjunction with encouraging aspects of cognitive development such as acquiring c r i t i c a l s k i l l s and an a t t i t u d e of system-. , 27 atxc doubt. A more serious objection to adding the dimension of conceptual analysis to current methods of teaching high school h i s t o r y i s that many teachers would not f e e l competent or i n c l i n e d to implement t h i s . Very few h i s t o r y teachers have had any exposure to methodical conceptual analysis. And many would f e e l daunted by i t s " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " nature. But on the p o s i t i v e side, teachers have been exposed to a v a r i e t y of approaches to the teaching of hi s t o r y i n recent years and many have experimented with new materials, textbooks, and teaching methods. They w i l l accept changes more r e a d i l y today. Also, much work can be done to "package" conceptual a n a l y s i s — r e a d y for use i n the classroom. G. Getting Conceptual Analysis Ready for the Classroom 1. A Long Term Strategy f o r the use of conceptual analysis i s essen-t i a l . This i s true f o r the high school curriculum i n general and also for the high school h i s t o r y program. At t h i s point a few general remarks w i l l have to s u f f i c e f o r the former task. The f i r s t , and most important point, i s that conceptual analysis can be applied to any high school s u b j e c t — n o t only to h i s t o r y . The study of any subject can benefit from the insigh t s conceptual anal-y s i s provides regarding i t s methods, key concepts, and pro f e s s i o n a l jargon. Secondly, any subject can be used as a v e h i c l e for cognitive development—not only the study of h i s t o r y . But the type of conceptual analysis and extent of i t s use would have to vary for each subject. Much pioneering work remains to be done i n t h i s area. A general frame-work for the use of conceptual analysis at the high school l e v e l would include an o u t l i n e of basic objectives, chief strategies and the r o l e of each subject i n t h i s plan. A long term strategy f o r the use of conceptual analysis for the study of high school h i s t o r y requires: ..An o u t l i n e of a v a i l a b l e methods of conceptual analysis and recom-mendations for t h e i r applications to students ranging i n age from fourteen to eighteen. This has already been dealt with (cf. Section II D and II E) . ..An o u t l i n e of the main concepts to be covered during a 3-4 year period (from Grade 9 or 10 up to Grade 12) and what can and should be done at each grade l e v e l . One example of how t h i s can be done w i l l follow. In i t , nine categories of concepts have been designated. Each of these contains a number of concepts considered important f o r explaining the h i s t o r y we have created and the kind of creatures we are. a. Time related concepts: Time Past, Present, Future Change, Continuity Evolution, Revolution Beginning, End Old, Young, New Long, Short I n f i n i t y H i story* Schedule, Calendar Some of these concepts have an obvious relevance to the study of h i s t o r y . The teacher can begin any h i s t o r y course by asking what does a student a c t u a l l y study, when said to be studying "history"? A l l  events that ever occurred? Important events only? Established 78 events—ones we know about? Or are they studying a method for explain-ing events? Perhaps a l l four? History teachers must be expected and prepared to deal with a set of questions about the nature of what they teach. However, concepts such as "beginning" probably escape the attention of many students and teachers of h i s t o r y . When a textbook states: "The f i r s t World War began i n 1914," i t i s not usual to question the meaning of the word "began." I t i s a word frequently encountered i n hi s t o r y textbooks and i n common parlance. We take i t for granted. But what does i t mean for an event to begin? How can one p a r t i c u l a r moment be chosen to represent the "beginning" of World War I? Was i t the moment Gavrilo P r i n c i p ' s b u l l e t struck the Austrian Crown Prince at Sarajevo on June 28th, 1914? Was i t when Aust r i a declared war on Serbia July 28th or when Germany declared war on Russia August 1st? What about the German attack on France through Belgium on August 3rd or England's d e c l a r a t i o n of war on Germany the next day? What standards are there f o r judging when any war begins? When a country begins? When a golden age begins? When an empire begins? When a r i v a l r y begins? Progress? A government? A r e l i g i o n ? Freedom? C i v i l i z a - tion? The l i s t i s enormous, and a l l items may be examined separately. A unit of "beginning" might be an excellent way to study World War I, to p r a c t i c e various s k i l l s i n conceptual analysis and to expand one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective simultaneously. Time concepts are of utmost importance i n the study of h i s t o r y i n general and to our perception of own existence i n p a r t i c u l a r . 79 b. Space rel a t e d concepts: Space Earth, Solar System, Universe Matter, Energy Large, Small Heavy, Light I n f i n i t y Boundary Concepts connected with space describe the stage upon which temporal events take place. Of these large and small are the most frequently used i n a h i s t o r y c l a s s . c. Nature related concepts: Nature Land, Sea,, A i r Science, Laws (of nature) Human, Animal, Plant Hunting, Fishing, Farming Climate L i f e , Death The natural world around us i s d i r e c t l y relevant to the study of hi s t o r y . Indeed, a l l human h i s t o r y could be described as the e f f o r t to learn from, co-exist with, escape the bonds of, or tame nature—depending on your perspective. A unit of farming could r e a d i l y be combined with studying how the f i r s t c i v i l i z a t i o n s came about. The study of Darwin's theories and t h e i r impact on our modern world can go hand i n hand with a unit on the d i s t i n c t i o n between human, animal, and plant, or on the nature of l i f e and death. d. Mind-Body concepts: Body, Brain, Mind, Soul, S p i r i t Perception Emotion In s t i n c t Conscious, Subconscious, Unconscious Thought Health, I l l n e s s The human actor on the stage of e x i s t e n c e — o n whom students of hi s t o r y l a v i s h t h e i r a t t e n t i o n — i s a complex creature. Philosophers and s c i e n t i s t s have yet to e s t a b l i s h the precise nature of the i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p between the human body, brain, and mind. This s i t u a t i o n 80 i s further complicated by postulating the existence of a human soul or s p i r i t , which somehow connects us with a s p i r i t world inhabited by God or gods, as well as d e v i l s , demons, angels, and a host of other unearthly beings. Most humans who ever l i v e d have believed i n the existence of the human soul and i n some kind of s p i r i t world. These r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s have profoundly affected human h i s t o r y . For example, r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e s motivated the Egyptian pharaohs who b u i l t the Pyramids as well as those Viking warriors who courted death i n b a t t l e i n order to earn immortality i n V a l h a l l a . Since the subject matter of high school h i s t o r y courses includes statements about and analysis of motivations, students would benefit from exposure to the analysis of mind-body concepts. It would make them aware of the vexing complexity of questions of ( motivation: how humans learn to perceive, think, and react to the world around them. Students are also interested i n these concepts because they r e l a t e so obviously and d i r e c t l y to t h e i r own l i v e s . e. Value r e l a t e d concepts: Good, Bad, E v i l Right, Wrong Beauty, Ugliness Importance Hero, V i l l a i n Moral, Immoral, Amoral There are not many concepts i n t h i s category, but they are extremely important f o r the study of h i s t o r y . Historians at times judge events and t h e i r e f f e c t s i n terms of good or bad, ri g h t or wrong, and those men and women from the past deigned s u f f i c i e n t l y important to merit i n d i v i d u a l attention are frequently cast i n the mold of hero or v i l l a i n . By r e f e r r i n g to a c e r t a i n king of England as " A l f r e d the Great," teachers and authors of textbooks leave no doubt regarding which 81 group he i s meant to belong to. "The v i l l a i n y " of such as Stalin.and H i t l e r , A t t i l a and Nero i s equally unquestioned. The study of h i s t o r y has a valuing and moral side which, even though highly c o n t r o v e r s i a l , should not be ignored. It i s an important side of human development which schools ought not to neglect. The analysis of value re l a t e d concepts within a regular h i s t o r y course o f f e r s a p r a c t i c a l way to deal with t h i s . Any topic i n a senior high h i s t o r y course o f f e r s an opportunity to deal with valuing and moral issues. It i s r e l a t i v e l y easy to plan for the i n c l u s i o n of value related concepts i n the h i s t o r y curriculum. f. Attainment re l a t e d concepts: Survival Progress* Power Heaven, Nirvana, etc. Culture, Quality B e l i e f , Knowledge, F a i t h Property, Money Wealth, Poverty Freedom,* Slavery* Eq u a l i t y * Winning, Losing, Success, F a i l u r e Right, P r i v i l e g e Peace Happiness Love The f i r s t s i x would f i t a course covering ancient and medieval h i s t o r y very n i c e l y , while the l a t t e r could r e a d i l y be dealt with i n a course on North American or modern European and world h i s t o r y . Most events i n human h i s t o r y , as described i n textbooks, involve the e f f o r t to a t t a i n some kind of goal. Our stone age ancestors struggled for s u r v i v a l , St. Augustine wished to have f a i t h , Alexander the Great fought for world peace, and the men of the renaissance sought a r e v i v a l of Greek and Roman culture. Many of these goals would be of i n t e r e s t to adolescents, since many of them are attempting to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own p r i o r i t i e s i n l i f e . g. Enabling concepts: W i l l Fortune, Luck, Fate • Language, Mathematics Technology,* Machine Fact, Knowledge, B e l i e f , Dogma Values, Ideals, P r i n c i p l e s , Morals Weapon, Army,* Navy* P l a i n , Strategy S k i l l s Strength, Weakness Once goals are established, the means to r e a l i z e these goals must be acquired. For example, to spur Europeans on to j o i n the Crusades, Pope Urban II presented c e r t a i n facts concerning the treatment of P i l -grims to the Holy Land, appealed to ideals of c h i v a l r y , established new dogma ( k i l l i n g Moslems meant doing God's work), i n i t i a t e d c a r e f u l - p l a n -ning and strategy and ordered the formation of a huge army. Landing an astronaut on the moon was made possible by advanced American technology. Knowledge, the a b i l i t y to communicate, and the w i l l to persevere a l l contributed towards success throughout the ages. Analysis of enabling concepts can be inserted i n any senior h i s t o r y course. h. Action related concepts: Cause, E f f e c t Create, Destroy Unite, Divide Discover, Invent Question, Answer, Explain, J u s t i f y Examine, Study, Measure Work, Occupation War,* Revolution* Attack, Defend E x p l o i t a t i o n Exploration A l l of these are commonly used by h i s t o r y teachers and i n h i s t o r y texts. They can e a s i l y be matched with h i s t o r i c a l events and persons to be studied, and should also be included at a l l grade l e v e l s i n high school. 83 : i . Organization related concepts: Organization Family, Tribe Nation, Country Empire, Colony Society, Class Government* Religion, Church Denomination, Sect Trade, Industry Education C i v i l i z a t i o n Custom, Rule, Law When a h i s t o r y teacher i n i t i a t e s a discussion on "the future of our country," i t would be useful f i r s t to e s t a b l i s h what sort of concept of "country" students have. It i s c e r t a i n l y no simple task to e s t a b l i s h at what precise moment a group of people can be c a l l e d a country. One's d e f i n i t i o n of country would undoubtedly a f f e c t the viewpoints expressed on the teacher's topic and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n offered for those views. Questioning the d e f i n i t i o n would i n turn lead to questioning of the views expressed. Most of these are s u i t a b l e for fourteen year olds. Many of the concepts on one of the above l i s t s or another are i n t e r -r e l a t e d and the manner i n which they are placed i n c e r t a i n categories can r e a d i l y be questioned. For example, i s " r i g h t s " an attainment concept, or does i t belong among the enabling concepts? Or both? Does "science" belong more to the nature or to the organization r e l a t e d con-cepts? The concepts l i s t e d here must not be considered as " f i n a l " e i t h e r . The main purpose of t h i s exercise i s to i n d i c a t e what can be done to organize a l i s t of concepts important to the study of h i s t o r y . It also provides teachers with a l i s t of concepts to choose from and a general idea how one concept r e l a t e s to others. Very few of the above concepts t y p i c a l l y receive a n a l y t i c a l atten-t i o n i n Canadian or American classrooms. A " t y p i c a l " h i s t o r y class 8 4 studies i n d e t a i l only those marked with an a s t e r i s k . Over a three or four year period i t should be possible to cover a majority of the con-cepts l i s t e d . Coordination between teachers of d i f f e r e n t grade l e v e l s would be e s s e n t i a l to prevent exclusive emphasis on only one or two categories of c o n c e p t s — a l l are valuable i n helping us understand our h i s t o r y ( c o l l e c t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l ) . 2. Various Approaches to the Teaching of History are currently i n use. B r i e f consideration of each w i l l show which type of h i s t o r y course i s best suited f o r conceptual analysis. Brubaker, Simon and Williams, i n t h e i r recent (1977) review of current practices i n the f i e l d 28 of s o c i a l studies detected f i v e main trends i n the teaching of h i s t o r y . a. Knowledge of the Past as a Guide to Good C i t i z e n s h i p . This was the t r a d i t i o n a l approach to h i s t o r y teaching u n t i l about twenty years ago. It has come under f i r e because of charges of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , student boredom with a d e s c r i p t i v e approach, recognition that facts are quickly forgotten, and a growing r e l a t i v i s t i c , present-oriented a t t i t u d e towards h i s t o r y among the general population. This approach r e s t r i c t s the study of h i s t o r y to contemplation of the past as reconstructed and has no i n t e r e s t i n the present or future. Conceptual analysis cannot contribute anything to h i s t o r y studied i n t h i s fashion. Teaching students to become worthy c i t i z e n s of t h e i r country e n t a i l s providing them with the " r i g h t " f a c t s , a t t i t u d e s , and values. Conceptual anal-y s i s , on the other hand, i s an open-ended process i n which every "answer" i s subjected to further scrutiny. A clever sophist could use the methods of conceptual analysis to "prove" h i s or her p o s i t i o n . In other words, they could carry the analysis to a c e r t a i n point and then declare: "As you can see, t h i s c l e a r l y shows that . . . etc." But 85 that i s contrary to the s p i r i t of c r i t i c a l thinking, which i s anathema to any dogmatic stance. b. Student-Centered History treats the student as the source of content: with curriculum and i n s t r u c t i o n based on h i s or her nature, needs, knowledge, and i n t e r e s t s . "Educating the whole person" i s i t s laudable aim. There are two reasons, however, why that aim may be d i f f i c u l t to achieve. High school students do not have a s u f f i c i e n t measure of s o c i a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l maturity to be able to determine what educational experi-ences are most s u i t a b l e and b e n e f i c i a l f o r them. Few adolescents would suggest that conceptual analysis was an important part of his cognitive development and hence should be part of the high school curriculum. Indeed, few w i l l know of conceptual analysis. U n t i l adulthood, develop-ment requires firm, i n t e l l i g e n t , and compassionate guidance. On the other hand, conceptual analysis may be compatible i n s p i r i t with student-centered h i s t o r y , since i t s value l i e s i n aiding the natural development and s a t i s f y i n g the innate c u r i o s i t y of each i n d i v i d -ual student. A f t e r a l l , the analysis of " h i s t o r i c a l " concepts (see those l i s t e d above) brings the student face to face with themselves as unique i n d i v i d u a l s as w e l l as h i s t o r i c a l creatures, shaped by forces o r i g i n a t i n g i n the distant past. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y valuable f o r adolescents struggling to e s t a b l i s h an i d e n t i t y i n our complex world. c. R e f l e c t i v e Inquiry stresses methods of problem solving. Rational inquiry i s the key to i t . One reason for r e l i a n c e on reason i s rapid change, which i s held responsible f o r the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of old standards, values, and i n s t i t u t i o n s . Students without guides to action for adult l i f e require r a t i o n a l means of coping with problems. Once 86 again a vast d i s p a r i t y i n point of view divides educators. R e f l e c t i v e inquiry assumes that answers can s t i l l be found and that r a t i o n a l i t y (based on l o g i c ) can help to provide them. Conceptual analysis, on the other hand, i s not a s t r i c t l y r a t i o n a l , l o g i c a l procedure, nor i s i t s purpose to provide answers of any.kind. The continuity of language i s as important as the way i t changes. R e f l e c t i v e inquiry i s a h i s t o r -i c a l : i t claims that the old i s no longer r e l e v a n t — t h a t the continuity of h i s t o r y has been snapped by the violence of recent change. Only the immutable laws of l o g i c stand unshaken. If t h i s i s true, then conceptual analysis i s useless to r e f l e c t i v e inquiry. d. History as a D i s c i p l i n e focusses on learning i t s basic con-cepts and the methods of scholarly inquiry. I t i s widely assumed that somehow t h i s learning w i l l " t r a n s f e r " to the student's adult l i f e . Surely t h i s i s taking much for granted? A f t e r a l l , h i s t o r y i s not a d i s c i p l i n e with a d e f i n i t i v e set of inquiry methods. Nor has i t a technical language—instead using ordinary language as i t s chief v e h i c l e of expression. Also, no one has ever been able to show that there i s some kind of " t r a n s f e r " from studying h i s t o r y as a d i s c i p l i n e to adult l i f e , or what i s transferred. As i t i s applied i n the classroom, i t does not provide an adequate h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e — s i n c e only the past receives much attention. The general development and the needs of students are generally ignored i n the e f f o r t to pass on the " d i s c i p l i n e " i n t a c t to the next generation. On the p o s i t i v e side, conceptual analysis can r e a d i l y be added to the study of h i s t o r y as a d i s c i p l i n e . And the methods of scholarly inquiry can be seen as us e f u l for those students who wish to pursue an i n t e r e s t i n h i s t o r y — t h e i r own and that of o t h e r s — o u t of school. Conceptual analysis can also use these 87 methods, such as when conducting a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l ysis. e. History as S o c i o - P o l i t i c a l Involvement i s the most recent approach to gain support among h i s t o r y teachers. Using the values c l a r i f i c a t i o n theories of Raths, Harmin and Simon, i t s proponents argue that teachers and students of h i s t o r y must be a c t i v e l y involved i n the "valuing process" i n order for the l a t t e r to cope with, c o n f l i c t i n adult-hood. Learning may involve inquiry techniques, but l i n k s up to the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l community outside the classroom, where the student may act on a professed b e l i e f . Such a system pays scant attention to cog-n i t i v e development, since the chief purpose of education i s to a s s i s t students to work out t h e i r b e l i e f s and values. Unfortunately, t h i s allows l i t t l e time for contemplating the past and the future: only:the present i s said to matter. Perhaps current usage analysis would be tolerated under such a system but other kinds of conceptual analysis would not be considered "relevant." Occasionally h i s t o r y teachers are unaware what curriculum planners wish for the students who take the courses they design. But t h i s should not be d i f f i c u l t to f i n d out. The planners could then decide for themselves whether or not conceptual analysis i s consonant with the kind of h i s t o r y they advocate. 3. The Role of the Teacher i s one more aspect to consider. Teach-ers have to: —choose the concepts to be analysed — p l a n when to i n s e r t them i n the h i s t o r y course — s e l e c t which methods are most sui t a b l e for each concept — p r e p a r e students how to use these methods — d i r e c t the i n - c l a s s analysis — p l a n i n - c l a s s or homework assignments — d e v e l o p a method for evaluating the work done by students i n conceptual analysis 88 Obviously much i s asked of the teacher. . The main strategies of conceptual analysis are not d i f f i c u l t to use per se. But t h e i r use i n the classroom i s mentally very demanding. Detailed planning i s neither necessary nor desirable since the analysis of each concept w i l l proceed d i f f e r e n t l y — d e p e n d i n g on such factors.as a v a i l a b i l i t y of time, student i n t e r e s t , i t s importance to the h i s t o r y under study, and so on. But t h i s same lack of s p e c i f i c planning adds an element of uncertainty to classroom proceedings. The teacher needs to be i n co n t r o l , but yet must allow students to do_ the analysis as far as i s reasonable: the exercise i s for them. The a t t i t u d e of the teacher i s , then, of importance. Conceptual analysis i s an open-ended procedure r e q u i r i n g a high degree of w i l l i n g -ness and a b i l i t y to examine thoroughly and openly one's own thinking. In t h i s the teacher has to be a model f or h i s or her s t u d e n t s — e s p e c i -a l l y by demonstrating a willingness to avoid dogmatism and to s t r i v e f o r and reward excellence. 4. The Role of the School Environment i s equally important. 'Progressive schools' try to provide t h e i r ' c l i e n t s ' with a freer and hence happier school l i f e — l e a v i n g much to the i n i t i a t i v e of the i n d i -v i d u a l student. They often ease rules and r e s t r i c t i o n s and downplay competition, and excellence i n academic accomplishment. However high-minded the motives f o r es t a b l i s h i n g such schools, competition and the drive for excellence at least' do not depress cognitive development. And cognitive development remains the chief goal of.high school educa-t i o n . Many students would rather not do conceptual analysis i f given a choice. I t i s mentally demanding, even i f i t i s not d i f f i c u l t . That i t i s h e l p f u l i n acquiring important c r i t i c a l s k i l l s and a s s i s t s i n expanding one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective w i l l not carry much weight with the average student. Just as elementary school students are not con-sulted about t h e i r views towards the learning tasks they have recently become capable of performing, neither should adolescents be consulted about whether or not they wish to do conceptual analysis or any other task that makes an important contribution to t h e i r cognitive development. Acquiring c r i t i c a l thinking s k i l l s demands constant v i g i l a n c e regarding s e l f , others, society, and the world (past, present, and future). I t i s not wholly pleasurable: i t makes us question and even d i s t r u s t our-selves and the world around us. Education, i n t h i s sense, i s "a kind of violence that a man does . . . to himself for the health of h i s 29 s o u l . " Despite i n i t i a l resistance from students, teachers and administrators have an o b l i g a t i o n nonetheless to take a firm hand i n d i r e c t i n g the cognitive development of high school students i n t h e i r care. They should do everything they can do to encourage students to take an increasingly active r o l e . This might mean explaining what various learning a c t i v i t i e s — i n c l u d i n g conceptual a n a l y s i s — c o n t r i b u t e to t h e i r own mental development. Students should know what the pur-pose of t h e i r school education i s . 5. Learning A c t i v i t i e s associated with conceptual analysis can vary a great deal. a. The organization of conceptual analysis lends i t s e l f to work- sheets as i n - c l a s s assignments or as homework. The worksheet would indic a t e which a n a l y t i c a l tasks are to be performed and leave an appro-p r i a t e amount of blank space for t h e i r completion. Students could check, discuss, and f i l e them with the rest of t h e i r h i s t o r y work. 9 0 Students often f e e l more comfortable doing an analysis i f they have something tangible and organized to act as t h e i r guide. b. Note taking i s useful when the en t i r e class and teacher are involved i n analysing a concept. Worksheets are too l i m i t i n g f o r t h i s , because unexpected 'angles' always crop up. Keeping the work organized and on;target i s the teacher's j o b — a n important one, since the notes must be well organized to be of service to the student. c. Conceptual analysis lends i t s e l f very well to class discus- sions . Once again the r o l e of the teacher i s p i v o t a l : leading discus-sions i s a demanding task. Discussions i n a v a r i e t y of formats are useful; some students respond better and more r e a d i l y to o r a l a n a l y s i s . If most of the work were done v i a worksheets and note taking, students who do not do well i n written work or who lack the necessary d i s c i p l i n e to do i t , would not have a chance to redeem themselves. 6. Evaluation presents a problem, because generalized and empiric-a l l y tested classroom experience i n Canada i s lacking. Some general guidelines might include these: a. Worksheets could be marked-on the basis of e f f o r t , complete-ness, and the q u a l i t y of the work done (for instance, the number and q u a l i t y of examples given). Methods of assessing student contributions to any discussion could be borrowed, modified, or improvised for the p a r t i c u l a r requirements of argument about concepts. Notes taken can e a s i l y be graded. Marks for the above need not be numerical. Letter grades, or more general designations " e x c e l l e n t , " "good," " f a i r , " and "poor"—would be more appropriate. 91 b. In most instances conceptual analysis w i l l be but one aspect of a high school h i s t o r y course. There i s l i t t l e reason, then, to produce marks for every conceptual analysis students make. c. Conceptual analysis can be incorporated into tests or exams. Students may be asked to dp a spontaneous analysis of a concept not previously analyzed, to show t h e i r mastery of newly acquired s k i l l s . Exams could ask for analysis of previous usage and h i s t o r i c a l importance as well as depth a n a l y s i s . Examples: (1) Explain Thomas Jefferson's use of the word freedom (based on h i s writings) as applied to the c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n between 1763 and 1776. How t y p i c a l was i t ? (2) Analyze Thomas Jefferson's use of the word freedom as a j u s t i f i c a -t i o n for revolutionary action. Conceptual analysis might be s i m i l a r l y combined with essay-type assignments. More precise methods of evaluating d i f f e r e n t kinds of conceptual analysis must await further classroom experience. At the moment, a marriage between the study of h i s t o r y at the high school l e v e l and conceptual analysis of any kind i s only at the conceptual/experimental stage. 92 FOOTNOTES "T)avid P. Ausubel, Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View (New York: Holt, 1968), p. 505. 2 Ibid., pp. 505-6. 3 John Wilson, Thinking with Concepts (London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963), p. 39. 4 As quoted i n Peter M. Martorella, Concept Learning i n the S o c i a l  Studies (Scranton: Intext Educational Publishers, 1971), p. 43. ^John Passmore, "On Teaching to be C r i t i c a l , " Education and the Development of Reason, R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), p. 418. 6 I b i d . ^R. S. Peters, "Mental Health as an Educational Aim," Aims i n Education: The Phi l o s o p h i c a l Approach, T. R o l l i n s , ed. (Manchester Univ e r s i t y Press, 1964), p. 88. g Cf. Paul H i r s t , " L i b e r a l Education and the Nature of Knowledge," Education and the Development of Reason, R. F. Dearden, P. M. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), pp. 405-6. 9 L. S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 8. "^Wilson, op. c i t . , p. 33. "*""*Tbid. , p. 54. 12 Cf.. Wilson, op. c i t . , pp. 23-4. 13 Robert Gagne, The Conditions of Learning (New York: Holt, 1965), p. 136. 14 15 Cf. Martorella, op. c i t . , pp. 12-14. Ibid ., pp. 63, 65. 16 17 Vygotsky, op. c i t . , p. 22. Ibid ., p. 58. 18 Gustavson, "History for Today," p. 180. 19 E. A. Peel, "Some Problems i n the Psychology of History Teaching," Studies i n the Nature and Teaching of History, W. H. Burston and D. Thompson, eds. (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 159-172. 20 Wilson, op. c i t . , p. 15. 21 The Grosset Webster Dictionary, New Revised E d i t i o n , C. F. Chadsey and H. Wentworth, eds. (Grosset and Dunlap, Inc., 1970 [1947]), p. 105. 93 22 Ibid p. 536. 23 Ibid., p. 344. 24 Ib i d . , p. 414. 25 Peters, op. c i t p. 88. 26 D. G. Watts, The Learning of History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 51. 27 Passmore, op. c i t . , pp. 429-30. 28 D. L. Brubaker, L. H. Simon, and J. W. Williams, "Conceptual Framework for S o c i a l Studies Curriculum and In s t r u c t i o n , " S o c i a l Educa- t i o n ;Vol. 41, 3 (March 1977): 201-5. 29 Arturo F a l l i c o , " E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and.Education," [1954] i n Nature, Aims and P o l i c y , A. Dupuis, ed. (Chicago: Un i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press, 1970), p. 169. SECTION III JUSTIFICATION IN EDUCATION AND THE TEACHING OF HISTORY 95 A. The Pedagogical Value of J u s t i f i c a t i o n It must f i r s t be pointed out that "explanation" and " j u s t i f i c a -t i o n " are not the same thing—even though they are often confused i n common speech. For example, when a person i s asked "please explain your actions," that inquiry could r e f e r to how something was done or why i t was done. J u s t i f i c a t i o n r e f e r s to the l a t t e r . Instead of saying "why did you do that?", one can substitute " j u s t i f y what you did". Another cause for confusing "explanation" and " j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " as A. P h i l l i p s G r i f f i t h s points out, i s that c e r t a i n reasons we give are both explanations and justifications,"'" e s p e c i a l l y i f we t r y to give an account of the various factors which influenced that action. For example, when the teacher asks Suzy why she punched Bobby i n the nose, her account of what happened and why w i l l l i k e l y include both an explan-ation of the circumstances and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for her actions simultan-eously. This can be i l l u s t r a t e d i n schematic form. Awareness of Factors A, B, C, and D P r i n c i p l e s P, Q and R led to Action X A. Bobby has been picking on S a l l y B. S a l l y i s a f r a i d of Bobby C. I caught Bobby s t e a l i n g S a l l y ' s lunch D. He wouldn't put i t back P. You shouldn't s t e a l Q. It i s n ' t nice to b u l l y people R. One bad deed deserves another X. So I punched Bobby i n the nose to teach him a lesson and to make him put S a l l y ' s lunch back. Diagram 2: The Relationship between J u s t i f i c a t i o n s and Explanations The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of an action frequently contains an explanation of the circumstances involved: what and how something happened (tracing 96 the chain of events) i s c l a r i f i e d before i t i s established why people acted as they did. To summarize: most j u s t i f i c a t i o n s include (indeed require) explanations. The reverse i s not true. Hence j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s generally a more sophisticated mental a c t i v i t y . The urge and a b i l i t y to " j u s t i f y " one's b e l i e f s or actions i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to o v e r a l l cognitive development. As a c h i l d ' s mental horizon expands with age i t demandsimor.e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s from others, j u s t as the c h i l d i t s e l f i s required to j u s t i f y more of i t s actions (at f i r s t ) and b e l i e f s ( l a t e r ) . The s k i l l s with which the r e p l i e s of others are examined and t h e i r own j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are fashioned, i s correlated with t h e i r l e v e l of cognitive (or " i n t e l l e c t u a l " ) development. I f Piaget i s r i g h t , i t means that u n t i l the age of fourteen few or no c h i l d r e n are able to use abstract concepts or a f u l l y developed system of l o g i c i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . From t h i s age onward, t h e i r l e v e l of s k i l l i n j u s t i f i c a -t i o n would depend on how quickly and how well abstract thinking and l o g i c are incorporated with e x i s t i n g mental s k i l l s . Here i s where the education system can make a p o s i t i v e contribution to cognitive development i n general, and the a b i l i t y to j u s t i f y i n p a r t i c u l a r . (It i s taken for granted that stimulating cognitive development i s an important goal of education.) For, as Piaget pointed out, of the four factors which, influence movement from one stage of cognitive development to the next, three can be strongly influenced by schooling: p h y s i c a l experience, s o c i a l transmission,, and the cycle of equilibrium. For example, schooling can have a major impact on language development. And i t can provide the learning experiences which cause di s e q u i l i b r i u m and' hence the search for a new equilibrium. The precise place and r e l a t i v e importance of " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " i n the Piagetian schema of cognitive development i s not clear at t h i s point i n time. But what is_ c l e a r , i s that " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " plays an enormously important r o l e i n d a i l y l i f e — b o t h f or young and o l d . Most humans hear and say "why?" several times i n the course of a day. How we respond, and 'process' the responses of others, has a d i r e c t bearing on our s e l f -concept, on r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others, success or f a i l u r e i n given s i t u a -t i o n s , etc. So quite apart from the general contribution that learning how to j u s t i f y and being given the opportunity to p r a c t i c e d i f f e r e n t methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n high school may have on cognitive develop-ment i n general, there i s also a very d i r e c t , p r a c t i c a l value i n that i t may help us cope better with day to day l i f e . J u s t i f i c a t i o n also plays a p i v o t a l r o l e i n decisionmaking. When faced with various solutions to a dilemma we do w e l l to think the s i t u a -t i o n over: analyzing the roots of the problem, as well as the conse-quences of various possible a l t e r n a t i v e s and attempting to understand the many factors that influence to process of choice (such as i d e a l s , p r i n -c i p l e s , emotions, environmental, s o c i a l , and h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s , etc.) When a decision i s made we l i k e to f e e l that the p a r t i c u l a r choice has a better j u s t i f i c a t i o n than the other a l t e r n a t i v e s . Indeed, others (employers, family members, etc.) may demand such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Many of the a c t i v i t i e s students are asked to perform i n school require some form of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For example, an elementary school teacher may ask a student "what lesson can we a l l learn from t h i s story?", followed by "why did you choose that answer?" or "why do you think answer A. i s better than answer B?" A l l high school courses involve a considerable amount of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Teachers expect students to j u s t i f y or "back up" the conclusions reached i n t h e i r lab 98 books, the solutions given to math problems, t h e i r analysis of a poem, novel, p o l i t i c a l system, or the point of view expressed i n an essay, etc. Most of these j u s t i f i c a t i o n s include explanations. High school teachers w i l l begin to i n s i s t on better q u a l i t y j u s t i f i c a t i o n s — w h i c h i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r marking. B. Current Approaches to J u s t i f i c a t i o n A l l our actions, decisons, ideas, b e l i e f s , analyses, etc., are e l i g i b l e for j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Indeed, we are a l l c a l l e d upon to explain and j u s t i f y our thoughts and actions frequently. Problems s t a r t , how-ever, when the question i s asked: "Is that j u s t i f i c a t i o n a good one?" Obviously standards are necessary. E f f o r t s have been made to systemat-i z e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . As w i l l be seen, they vary considerably—having only a greater or l e s s e r r a t i o n a l element i n common—and a l l are lacking i n various ways. 1. Robert Ennis stresses the l i n g u i s t i c aspects of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For him, j u s t i f i c a t i o n means examining the statements made i n defense of 2 an action. To do t h i s , he advocates a four step approach: a. Determine what type of statements were used: value, empirical, conceptual, or miscellaneous performative. b. Determine what evidence or reasons are offered i n i t s favour. c. Evaluate the evidence or reasons g i v e n — u s i n g appropriate methods from the d i s c i p l i n e s as well as r a t i o n a l procedures. d. Appraise the strength of the argument from basic evidence and reasons to the conclusion. Ennis pays p a r t i c u l a r attention to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of value 3 statements, which uses a d i f f e r e n t method for the t h i r d step: apply a general p r i n c i p l e and examine the consequences—trying "to show as c l e a r l y 99 as possible the q u a l i t y of human l i f e that would e x i s t , given adherence 4 to the p r i n c i p l e " — t h e n do the same thing with other p r i n c i p l e s and compare the r e s u l t s . But Ennis i s not sure i f t h i s r e a l l y constitutes a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , because the p r i n c i p l e s appealed to might be based on either one of the extremes of r e l a t i v i s m and/or absolutism—which he would l i k e to avoid.^ So he recommends using t h i s method only for l i m i t e d , p r a c t i c a l value questions such as "where should the dump be located?" What Ennis i s saying then, i s that since a l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s have the form of statements, the language of these statements can be examined to see i f the evidence and reasons offered add up to a reasonable argu-ment. The evidence can be analyzed according to the standards estab-l i s h e d by appropriate d i s c i p l i n e s and the reasons by l o g i c a l standards. A l l that remains then, i s to ensure that a correct conclusion i s reached from the screened evidence and reasons. 2. Paul Taylor advocates a complex four step process which also concentrates on evaluating statements. The ultimate goal i s to deter-mine to what extent our statements are based on r a t i o n a l choice. Taylor points out that choice sometimes means " s e l e c t i n g one thing rather than another," but that i t could also mean "a preference for doing one thing rather than another." Here i t can be confused with 'deciding'. The doing sense of choosing could be the r e s u l t of emotions, or whims, whereas deciding " i s the outcome of d e l i b e r a t i o n which resolves a doubt i n one's mind." 7 'Choosing as deciding' involves j u s t i f i c a t i o n — j u s t as any decision making does. It i s important to Taylor that t h i s form of choosing be the r e s u l t of r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n — e s p e c i a l l y i n ;the area of value statements: . . . utt e r i n g a value judgment i s always a r a t i o n a l act. It presupposes i t s own j u s t i f i a b i l i t y . The reason f o r t h i s i s that a value judgment contextually implies a reasoning process i n which something has been evaluated. To judge the value of something . . . i s a claim that something i s the cause. . . . Such an association i s the outcome of a process of evaluation Q and may always be challenged. This i s an important point because most j u s t i f i c a t i o n s contain value statements. In fac t they are often a c r u c i a l part of a j u s t i f i c -a t i o n . Suzy's explanation and j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i t t i n g Bobby on the nose come to mind here (see diagram 1). And, whereas there are estab-l i s h e d methods f or dealing with explanations, both i n giving appropriate examples and i n using proper reasoning, value statements have no such established methods. This i s why Taylor concentrates much e f f o r t on developing a system f o r evaluating value statements. The r e s u l t i s a 9 10 four step process which i s summarized neatly by L. Daniels (diagram 3). This method goes beyond that advocated by Ennis i n i t s a b i l i t y to deal with a l l value judgments—not only those of a l i m i t e d , p r a c t i c a l nature. V e r i f i c a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n also d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y from Ennis' method of evaluating value judgments. Ennis measures the worth of a value statement by examining i t s e f f e c t s i f applied i n d a i l y l i f e as compared to other possible values. Taylor measures value statements by placing them i n a hierarchy of p r i n c i p l e s — i n which some have primacy over o t h e r s — a n d then examining the reasoning used i n t h i s process using established standards such as the rules of v a l i d inference and of r e l e -vance. In other words, the reasoning used i n weighing one p r i n c i p l e against another must i t s e l f be j u s t i f i e d ! This i s v i t a l to understanding the serious problems e n t a i l e d i n any e f f o r t at j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For any such e f f o r t i s i t s e l f subject to Conditions of Rational Choice Stage Four: Reasoning about Reasoning Stage Three: / J u s t i f i c a t i o n Of Reasoning < RATIONAL CHOICE / Rules of V a l i d Inference Rules of Relevance / Method of Reasoning •< VINDICATION Value System i n Hierarchy Stage Two: Reasoning about P r i n c i p l e s Stage One: VALIDATION > Appeal to a Higher P r i n c i p l e / Standards, Rules VERIFICATION • Adopt a P r i n c i p l e Value Judgment Diagram 3: Stages of J u s t i f i c a t i o n of Value Judgments 1 0 2 j u s t i f i c a t i o n . One can imagine the teacher saying to Suzy: "And why do you think that was the r i g h t way of dealing with Bobby?" Any answer that Suzy gives may require further j u s t i f i c a t i o n , etc. A f i n a l stand-ard must be established, i t seems. I f not, who i s to say that one j u s -t i f i c a t i o n i s superior to another: the one with the most steps, perhaps? That f i n a l standard to measure j u s t i f i c a t i o n s against i s very e l u s i v e , however. Ennis believes that what we know about day to day l i f e should be the f i n a l a r b i t e r . Taylor, on the other hand, believes that t h i s i s a very dangerous p r a c t i c e because i t implies that one way of l i f e may be superior to another: one would have to e s t a b l i s h a hierarchy of ways of l i f e and measure one's j u s t i f i c a t i o n s against i t . As Taylor points out: We a c t u a l l y never can know with ce r t a i n t y which way of l i f e i s most j u s t i f i e d . There i s therefore every reason to develop and further the highest degree of subjective r a t i o n a l i t y we are capable of. Developing the capacity for subjective r a t i o n a l i t y , whether i n everyone or i n oneself alone . . . i s a l i f e t i m e endeavour. x x The d i s t i n c t i o n s between subjective and objective r a t i o n a l i t y i s c r u c i a l . Taylor r e a l i z e s that objective r a t i o n a l i t y ("the immutable laws of l o g i c " ) cannot act as the f i n a l measure of a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For, as Paul H i r s t explains, to r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y a r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n (one based on objective r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s ) i s a c i r c u l a r procedure: r a t i o n a l pursuits have a b u i l t - i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Besides, anyone can r e j e c t objective r a t i o n a l i t y as a f i n a l standard for judging a j u s t i f i c -a tion. Subjective r a t i o n a l i t y i s measured by the degree to which you can give good reasons for your explanations and values rather than whether or not good reasons for those values e x i s t at a l l . " ^ 3. Taylor's fear that r a t i o n a l procedures may be misused i n the e f f o r t to j u s t i f y i s echoed by G i l b e r t Ryle, who warns that we should not 103 consider the various r a t i o n a l procedures involved i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n as the goal of j u s t i f i c a t i o n but only as a means. Ryle distinguishes between t h e o r e t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y — " o u r capacity, small or great, to think 13 thoughts, that i s , to operate from and with propositions," and p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y — " o u r capacity, great or small, to conduct our-14 selves according to . . . p r i n c i p l e s i n the warm world of ac t i o n . " He sees j u s t i f i c a t i o n as a form of p r a c t i c a l reason which can, i f so desired, u t i l i z e t h e o r e t i c a l reasons as w e l l as other procedures, but which i s not a mere offshoot of t h e o r e t i c a l reason. The danger comes, as Ryle remarks, when we trea t t h e o r e t i c a l reason as the cause of human nature's being human nature; or when we treat a l l our doings as the ef f e c t s of some of our pr o p o s i t i o n a l doings and a l l our f a u l t s as v i s i b l e f o o tprints l e f t i n the mud by the privy commission of i n a r t i c u l a t e f a l l a c i e s . Ryle demonstrates the dangers of considering only the l i n g u i s t i c aspects of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For that reason Taylor's subjective r a t i o n -a l i t y must not be confused with Ryle's p r a c t i c a l reason, because the former i s s o l e l y judged by language re l a t e d standards, whereas Ryle makes i t clear that p r a c t i c a l reason i s also connected with a consistent set of p r i n c i p l e s we evolve from our d a i l y experiences. ("It i s j u s t i -f i e d because i t works for me as I can c l e a r l y show you.") Ryle i n t r o -duces a u t i l i t a r i a n standard f o r j u s t i f y i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , even though t h i s i s not the sole c r i t e r i o n to be considered. 4. John Wilson finds much lacking i n the way Ennis and Taylor approach j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Not that he disagrees with Taylor's concept of subjective r a t i o n a l i t y — i t i s what was l e f t out that bothers Wilson. Like Ennis, he stresses the importance of considering consequences and i n addition he emphasizes the notion of in t e n t i o n , the r o l e of f e e l i n g s , 104 unconscious drives, the e f f e c t of s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l forces, a person's 16 s o c i a l s k i l l s as well as the r i g h t kind of attitudes and d i s p o s i t i o n s ! Wilson proposes the following process of j u s t i f i c a t i o n : ' ' " 7 a. What was the reason for acting? (Intentions) b. Do these reasons take other people into consideration? (Consequences) c. Are the reasons given above l o g i c a l l y consistent? (Objective r a t i o n a l i t y ) d. Do a. and b. display s u f f i c i e n t psychological awareness, perceptive-ness and imagination? (Awareness of s e l f , others, society, h i s t o r y , etc.) e. Does d. also display s u f f i c i e n t rationalism? (Subjective r a t i o n a l i t y ) f. Was proper care shown i n the use of 'authorities'? Wilson's method does not have a ' f i n a l ' standard to measure j u s t i -f i c a t i o n a g a i n s t — p r e f e r r i n g a v a r i e t y of rather disparate standards which sometimes act as a check on each other. Prime enemies to proper j u s t i f i c a t i o n are pinpointed: absolutism 18 and relativism—enemies shared with Ennis and Taylor. Another enemy— not shared t h i s t i m e — i s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n : since much of our behaviour originates at the subconscious and unconscious l e v e l we often manufacture reasons when asked f o r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Indeed, Wilson thinks that much of our behaviour i s r a t i o n a l i z e d rather than r a t i o n a l and that using the above process—which gives a c e n t r a l r o l e to awareness—will help to turn us into more r a t i o n a l people. This he regards as a never ending task: To unravel a l l these (subconscious psychological, s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s ) , to make him properly aware of what he f e e l s , to free him from those compulsions and f a l s e b e l i e f s which prevent him from behaving reasonably, i s obviously an endless task, but there i s no other way.x" 105 In a more recent book Wilson adds his equivalent to Taylor's v a l i d a t i o n and v e r i f i c a t i o n and also conceptual analysis to h i s arsenal 20 of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The former had to be added to cover for inade-quacies i n dealing with value aspects of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Conceptual analysis was added because of the way i t helps to r a i s e awareness of the language used i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 5. A B r i t i s h group headed by Peter MacPhail, J . R. Ungoed-Thomas and H. Chapman c r i t i c i z e s most current forms of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e i r exclusive concern with verbal forms, warning that t h i s "could e a s i l y become an escape mechanism, a neurotic preoccupation defending us from 21 a l l the demands of r e a l i t y . " They propose a method of j u s t i f i c a t i o n revolving around the consequences of an action: a. Does i t show Reception a b i l i t y : the a b i l i t y to l i s t e n , look, pay attention to others? b. Does i t show Interpretive a b i l i t y : the a b i l i t y to accurately i n t e r -pret the messages others send? c. Does i t show Response a b i l i t y : the a b i l i t y to decide on and adopt appropriate r e a c t i o n s — t o meet another's need? d. Does i t show Message a b i l i t y : the a b i l i t y to translate appropriate 22 reactions into c l e a r l y transmitted unambivalent messages? Empathy and communications s k i l l s are the backbone of t h i s method. Rational procedures are eliminated altogether. 6. Another perspective on j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s presented by R. F. Dearden, 23 who proclaims the basic d i s c i p l i n e s as the proper means of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . a. Identify what i s being j u s t i f i e d . b. Select the d i s c i p l i n e s most appropriate for dealing with t h i s j u s t i -f i c a t i o n . 106 c. Use the standards established by these d i s c i p l i n e s for analyzing the evidence presented and reaching s u i t a b l e conclusions. This i s s i m i l a r to what Ennis proposes, but with the r a t i o n a l pro-cedures contingent on t h e i r assigned r o l e i n the d i s c i p l i n e s selected. The objection to t h i s approach i s i t s i n a b i l i t y to deal with value aspects of j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a n d i n e v i t a b l y most j u s t i f i c a t i o n s have that element b u i l t into them. Quite possibly the common confusion between the terms 'explanation' and ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' alluded to previously, accounts for t h i s oversight. 7. Other approaches to j u s t i f i c a t i o n have commonly been practiced. For some i n d i v i d u a l s the problems entailed i n j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r j u s t i f i c -ations are resolved quite e a s i l y by embracing some form of dogma which prescribes what i s r i g h t or wrong and good or bad. No thinking i s required i n th i s kind of j u s t i f i c a t i o n — o n l y b l i n d f a i t h . This s o l u t i o n i s as old as human h i s t o r y . Here we have the 'absolutism' so despised by Ennis, Taylor and Wilson: absolute t r u t h removes the necessity to use l o g i c , screen evidence, analyze key concepts, etc. In the twentieth century r e l a t i v i s m has offered another escape from rigorous thinking and s e l f searching. This approach to l i f e denies that there are any ' f i n a l truths' or superior methods to measure our j u s t i f i c a t i o n s against and with. A l l circumstances, events, and people are unique. Everything must be judged on i t s own merits. And especi-a l l y these days—when rapid changes are transforming the seemingly stable world humans once inhabited and making the old i n s t i t u t i o n s and old ways of thinking obsolete (even harmful, because i t means " f a l l i n g behind the times," or " l o s i n g touch with r e a l i t y " ) — r e l a t i v i s m must seem to many to be the only appropriate way to think. 107 It could be argued that r e l a t i v i s m and absolutism do not merit con-s i d e r a t i o n as approaches to j u s t i f i c a t i o n , since they require no s k i l l , no a n alysis, no s e l f examination—only the acceptance of a f i n a l author-i t y or of the t o t a l absence of a u t h o r i t i e s . But, when challenged, the person who quotes authority may attempt to j u s t i f y that authority i n some fashion. S i m i l a r l y , the ' r e l a t i v i s t ' could make a good e f f o r t to j u s t i f y h i s or her denial of any f i n a l a r b i t e r — p o s s i b l y by appealing to experience, or by analyzing the shortcomings of e x i s t i n g standards of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C. The Role of Current Approaches to J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the High School  Curriculum Taylor and Wilson are both eager to place more emphasis on j u s t i f -i c a t i o n i n the high school curriculum. 1. Taylor speaks of the pursuit of subjective r a t i o n a l i t y (measured by the degree to which good reasons are given regardless of whether good reasons e x i s t at a l l ) , as a Socratic quest that we must learn to devote 24 ourselves to for our own good and that of mankind. He does not i n d i -cate what r o l e he wants schools to play i n t h i s quest, however. That Taylor i s aware of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the system of j u s t i f i c a t i o n he out-l i n e s i s obvious from his admission that the l a s t two l e v e l s (Vindication and Rational Choice) are beyond the reach of high school students: "Only the l o g i c i a n and epistemologist carry out such an examination 25 c a r e f u l l y and systematically." On the other hand, he believes that the f i r s t two l e v e l s are within the reach of anyone i f they would only make the e f f o r t . A l l i n a l l , Taylor does not provide any useful guidelines for educators who might be interested i n h i s approach to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 1 0 8 The approach has further l i m i t a t i o n s . It i s u s e f u l i n re s o l v i n g value r e l a t e d dilemmas and i n placing b e l i e f s , i d e a l s and values i n perspective with other, often c o n f l i c t i n g , ones. But very l i t t l e of t h i s i s done at the high school l e v e l . Nor does i t r e a d i l y f i t i n with any of the e x i s t -ing ' d i s c i p l i n e s ' which s t i l l underlie most high school subjects. Also, both teachers and students would l i k e l y f i n d Taylor's approach to j u s t i -f i c a t i o n rather daunting i n i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l requirements. 2. Wilson also believes that schools should play an important r o l e 2 6 i n turning us into more r a t i o n a l and hence more 'autonomous' beings who are no longer at the mercy of a l l those forces (psychological, s o c i a l , and h i s t o r i c a l ) which shape our l i v e s from the moment of b i r t h . Through learning to j u s t i f y , we are supposed to become aware of these forces and no longer allow them to s h o r t - c i r c u i t the reasonable behaviour we are 27 a l l capable of. However, Wilson's e f f o r t s to produce a comprehensive system of j u s t i f i c a t i o n has created some problems for educators looking for ways to apply i t i n the classroom. His tendency to lump u t t e r l y unlike a c t i v i t i e s into a single process prevents i t s active use as one coherent method of j u s t i f i c a t i o n : Taylor's v e r i f i c a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n , concep-t u a l analysis, examining the use of a u t h o r i t i e s , subjective r a t i o n a l i t y , objective r a t i o n a l i t y , and analysis of awareness are a l l combined. One advantage of t h i s system i s that i t can tackle any type of j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; i t can j u s t i f y decisions, support actions that have already taken place, b e l i e f s , i d e a l s , c r i t i c i s m s , and also j u s t i f y any analysis or j u s t i f i c a -t i o n . The only one of those a c t i v i t i e s to which students and teachers may have had any previous exposure, however, i s the examination of author-i t i e s . And Wilson does not concern himself with t r a n s l a t i n g h i s system 109 into a su i t a b l e curriculum design or even how i t might be t a i l o r e d to e x i s t i n g programs. 3. MacPhail and cohorts are sharply c r i t i c a l of Wilson and Taylor's approach to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . They f e e l that the rigorous nature of t h e i r respective systems could very well drive a wedge between students and any 28 teachers brave enough to t r y to teach such a process of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 29 "Behaviour i s caught, not taught" i s the motto they proclaim. Teachers can provide students with p o s i t i v e feedback when they make an e f f o r t to empathize and act properly and can also provide "occasion f o r the analysis, p r a c t i c e , and discussion of interpersonal communication." The basic s k i l l that i s to be acquired through these a c t i v i t i e s i s "the 30 a b i l i t y to get on with others." It i s not at a l l c l e a r , however, that t h i s should be one of the goals of high school education. And neither i s i t clear what schools could do to provide a sui t a b l e atmosphere to enable students to 'catch' the a b i l i t y to get along with others: what i s a su i t a b l e occasion for sharpening interpersonal communication and how does t h i s f i t i n with the e x i s t i n g high school program? Standards would have to be estab-l i s h e d f o r judging the progress of students—not 'paper standards' which' can be manipulated by a clever student, but standards which apply to observed, spontaneous behaviour. As yet, these standards do not e x i s t . And even i f teachers made an e f f o r t to create such methods for observing students, i t i s not clear that the r e s u l t s would have any v a l i d i t y i n pre d i c t i n g behaviour outside the school. 4. Ennis' methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n are also beyond the reach of high school students, since they require a working knowledge of the methods used by various d i s c i p l i n e s and of appropriate r a t i o n a l procedures. 110 His approach to j u s t i f y i n g value statements appears more accessible to high school students since i t involves applying general p r i n c i p l e s to ' r e a l l i f e ' s i t u a t i o n s and then judging the 'quality of l i f e ' that would r e s u l t from adherence to such p r i n c i p l e s . However, the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of adolescents i s i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d not wide enough to make t h i s any more than an exercise i n attempting to enlarge that h i s t o r i c a l perspective: no j u s t i f i c a t i o n based on such l i m i t e d knowledge and exper-ience can be considered very s a t i s f a c t o r y . 5. The u t i l i t a r i a n element i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n introduced by Ryle can r e a d i l y be understood by high school students, but i s more sui t a b l e f or adults since they have a much broader range of experience to draw upon. Adolescents simply have not had much opportunity to develop a consistent set of p r i n c i p l e s based on d a i l y experience. Ryle i s not clear about the r o l e of t h e o r e t i c a l reason i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n e i t h e r . C e r t a i n l y most high schools do not set aside much class time for honing s k i l l s at operating from and with propositions, so high school students l i k e l y could not meet Ryle's standards whatever they might be. 6. Dearden's approach—stressing the e x i s t i n g ' d i s c i p l i n e s ' as the backbone of j u s t i f i c a t i o n — w o u l d appear to o f f e r a greater opportunity fo r a p p l i c a t i o n i n the high school classroom. Indeed, i t takes place i n high schools already. For example, a math teacher expects students to j u s t i f y the answers they give to algebra problems by r e f e r r i n g to methods and theories which are part of the d i s c i p l i n e of mathematics. S i m i l a r l y , a chemistry teacher teaches a s c i e n t i f i c method to enable students to j u s t i f y the conclusions reached i n experiments. Each sub-j e c t has i t s own methodology which must be taught to students before they can be expected to meet the teachers' standards. I l l One enormous d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s approach to j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s that i t i s a v a r i a t i o n of absolutism, where the standards established by some are invoked as a u t h o r i t a t i v e f or a l l . The s o - c a l l e d d i s c i p l i n e s are presented to high school students as closed systems with j u s t i f i c a t i o n based on authority. This causes problems with high school students, who have recently become capable of challenging a u t h o r i t i e s and who f a i l to see the relevance of learning how to j u s t i f y t h e i r analysis of a poem or ..their solutions to a math problem: i t does not help them i n j u s t i f y -ing a l i f e s t y l e , a b e l i e f , or a course of action. The d i s c i p l i n e s cannot cope with that kind of j u s t i f i c a t i o n since they bear l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p with d a i l y experience. On the other hand they are not t o t a l l y useless e i t h e r . I f , for example, a mayor i s t r y i n g to j u s t i f y h i s choice for l o c a t i n g the dump he might very well choose to consult s c i e n t i f i c experts who can use t h e i r methods to provide v i t a l data regarding s o i l conditions, etc. The d i s c i p l i n e s should be used as sole means of j u s t i f i c a t i o n only within the confines of that d i s c i p l i n e . Otherwise they ought to be regarded as only one of many too l s . 7. Absolutism and Relativism have both found a home i n north American high schools. As mentioned, the d i s c i p l i n e s are presented as rather dogmatic and a u t h o r i t a r i a n branches of learning. Relativism i s not d i r e c t l y a part of the high school curriculum; but i n d i r e c t l y i t does influence what takes place i n the classroom. Prayers and s c r i p t u r e readings have been banned by the courts because they may offend the b e l i e f s of some. Teachers tend to shy away from dealing with value r e l a t e d issues a r i s i n g from t h e i r subject for the same reason. 1 1 2 8. Some conclusions can be drawn at t h i s point: — C u r r i c u l u m planners and other educators have not given much thought to the r o l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n high school education. — I f any coordinated attempt at j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s taking place i n high schools, i t i s mainly re l a t e d to e f f o r t s to teach the methods of one of the d i s c i p l i n e s which are s t i l l regarded by many as the backbone of a high school program. — T h e r e are various philosophers and educators who are interested i n encouraging more j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n schools and who o f f e r t h e i r own theories as to the most appropriate methods. — T h e r e i s l i t t l e agreement among these t h e o r i s t s . — T h e methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n currently advocated have not been applied to the classroom as yet. There i s some doubt whether or not they can be applied i n the average high school classroom. And even i f i t were possible to do so, some would question why schools should devote time to analysis of p r i n c i p l e s , consequences, propositions, words, or l e v e l s of awareness, etc. D. Systematizing the Approaches to J u s t i f i c a t i o n for High School One task that can be performed immediately i s to impose some order on the welter of approaches, goals, and possible applications concerning j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 1 . What Can be J u s t i f i e d ? Much of the confusion surrounding t h i s topic stems from the fac t that j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be demanded for so many varied mental and physical a c t i v i t i e s , as the following o u t l i n e i n d i c a t e s . A l l these may involve or require j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 113 a. Decision making. Attempting to resolve some kind of dilemma. Dilemmas can be very d i f f e r e n t i n nature, hence j u s t i f y i n g a f i n a l choice may require a v a r i e t y of methods to s u i t each dilemma: a p r i n c i p a l who must decide whether or not to suspend a student w i l l approach the making of h i s decision very d i f f e r e n t l y from the man t r y i n g to j u s t i f y the purchase of a new automobile, the student t r y i n g to decide whether a poem i s good or not, or the chess player pondering h i s best move. b. Actions. Once an action has occurred we may be asked to j u s t i f y i t . Obviously there are many d i f f e r e n t kinds of actions, with which we may have a greater or le s s e r degree of involvement. One can also attempt to j u s t i f y the actions of o t h e r s — p a s t or present. So many factors could influence the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of an action: what t r i g -gered i t , i t s e f f e c t s , whether i t was lawful or not, the language s k i l l s of the person doing the j u s t i f y i n g , the r o l e of emotions, whether or not i t was spontaneous or planned, etc. C l e a r l y no s i n g l e approach to j u s t i f i c a t i o n could adequately deal with a l l of these v a r i a b l e s . c. Points of view, b e l i e f s , i d e a l s , p r i n c i p l e s , a way of l i f e . A l l of these may require j u s t i f i c a t i o n . They are also l i k e l y to be involved i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of actions and d e c i s i o n s — i n turn requiring j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For example, when Mr. A r e p l i e s that he gave away a l l h i s money because he believes that sharing i s the highest i d e a l humans can aspire to, Ms. B may we l l ask: "Why do you think that?" One serious problem with j u s t i f y i n g points of view, b e l i e f s , i d e a l s , and p r i n c i p l e s i s that there i s a great deal of difference between j u s t i f y -ing a p r i n c i p l e as a person acts on i t and j u s t i f y i n g i t s written or verbal expression i n i s o l a t i o n from an actual s i t u a t i o n . The former might best be j u s t i f i e d by trac i n g i t back to a serie s of experiences 114 which led the person to formulate a p r i n c i p l e , while the l a t t e r could be better dealt with by using Taylor's v e r i f i c a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n proce-dures or by Ennis' p r o j e c t i o n of what qu a l i t y of l i f e would r e s u l t i f such a p r i n c i p l e were practiced widely or j u s t by the i n d i v i d u a l . d. Answers, knowledge, f a c t s , conclusions. These a l l have the mark of ce r t a i n t y conferred on them i n deference to some authority, a u t h o r i t a t i v e procedure, or accumulation of experience. Nonetheless, they may s t i l l require further j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A u t horities can c e r t a i n l y be challenged, and others may have had c o n f l i c t i n g experiences. Then, again, there i s the matter of examining the language that i s used i n supporting the claim to knowledge, reaching a conclusion, or formulating an answer. e. C o l l e c t i v e creations. Laws, customs, organizations, and i n s t i -tutions (such as governments, churches, the family, school, e t c . ) , culture, important methods and procedures (such as the s c i e n t i f i c method systems of l o g i c and l e g a l procedures) a l l play a key r o l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n , j u s t as the existence of each one of these and any e f f o r t to change them i s open to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . This includes the d i s c i p l i n e s , and the other methods used i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . These would vary for each society and would a f f e c t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n accordingly. f. Questioning, doubting. Our i n c l i n a t i o n to question and doubt i s p a r t l y what makes i t necessary to devise methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Each time we question something, t h i s may also require j u s t i f i c a t i o n , such as "Why are you questioning my motives?" It i s not always easy to know why we question or cast doubts. Youngsters question out of c u r i -o s i t y . Policemen and lawyers question out of professional necessity. For others, questioning may simply be a part of the games people play. 115 g. J u s t i f i c a t i o n s . Just as the necessity of and the methods used i n a j u s t i f i c a t i o n may be questioned, so may l i n e s of argument that are developed, a-nd'ico.no.lusions d r a w n — a l l are i n t e g r a l parts of a j u s t i -f i c a t i o n . As has already been indicated, t h i s i s an endless process. New methods must be created to j u s t i f y e x i s t i n g ones, to v a l i d a t e argu-ments and to weigh conclusions—these new methods must i n turn be j u s t i -f i e d , new methods are created for that purpose, etc. 2. What Can and Should be J u s t i f i e d i n High Schools? It i s not d i f f i c u l t to show that high schools can and already do play a r o l e ( a l b e i t l a r g e l y unintentional and haphazard) i n j u s t i f i c a -t i o n for adolescents. Going down the l i s t : a. Decision making. This i s part of the every day l i f e of any student—both i n and out of school. High schools w i l l at times pride themselves i n providing opportunities for students to exercise t h e i r judgment by allowing an a c t i v e student c o u n c i l , permitting students to form clubs, run intramural programs, operate newspapers, be on d i s c i -p l i n a r y councils, act as student p o l i c e , etc. However, these students must at a l l times be ready and able to j u s t i f y the decisions they make to the ultimate a u t h o r i t i e s i n the school. In the courses they take, students also encounter various kinds of decision making: which courses to take, how much work to do and when to do i t , what i s the best method for doing an assignment or t e s t , whether or not to cheat or copy. Students do not tend to ponder such questions for long, even though the consequences of t h e i r f i n a l choice can be major. If experience i s the best teacher, then enabling students to make decisions i n high school should be encouraged. Unfortunately these students are not shown how to j u s t i f y t h e i r choices: what i s an 116 appropriate j u s t i f i c a t i o n for a c e r t a i n type of decision and the s k i l l s to carry i t out. Nor would that be an easy task! b. Actions. High school students are held accountable for t h e i r actions while i n school. Absence must be j u s t i f i e d , as does unusual behavior. But t h i s works both ways: students can also ask teachers and administrators to j u s t i f y t h e i r actions. Appeal to authority i s frequently encountered i n these j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , while students may supply f a l s e information or use emotional appeals i n order to have t h e i r j u s t i -f i c a t i o n accepted. In any case, there i s r a r e l y any e f f o r t made to se r i o u s l y r e f l e c t on how students, teachers, and administrators should j u s t i f y t h e i r actions and what events should require such j u s t i f i c a t i o n . If there were, i t might prevent some of the paranoia and i l l f e e l i n g s that can make school l i f e d i f f i c u l t . c. Points of view, etc. Both teachers and students have ample opportunity to express b e l i e f s , discuss i d e a l s , compare ways of l i f e , etc., i n a high school environment. Both i n a formal classroom s i t u a t i o n and i n more informal exchanges. Subjects such as anthropology, law, sociology, h i s t o r y , p o l i t i c a l science, and English are eminently s u i t a b l e for t h i s , and other subjects can be made to lend themselves to t h i s i f a teacher so desired. Merely exchanging points of view r a r e l y s a t i s f i e s an adolescent, however. They w i l l wish to defend t h e i r own b e l i e f s and to question and challenge those of others. The a b i l i t y to j u s t i f y comes i n very handy for t h i s purpose. And i f students:are not very good at s t i c k i n g up for t h e i r own b e l i e f s at f i r s t , they can improve r a p i d l y by observing and copying the techniques of others and by acquiring more information. Schools provide an excellent arena for t h i s verbal skirmishing and teachers often provide time and opportunity for students 117 to further t h e i r s k i l l s and increase t h e i r knowledge. Nevertheless i t i s doubtful that any more than a f r a c t i o n of curriculum designs include "providing opportunities for acquiring and exercising s k i l l s at j u s t i -f i c a t i o n " as an educational objective for any high school course. d. Answers, knowledge, f a c t s , conclusions. A l l these receive a great deal of attention i n high schools. Most learning a c t i v i t i e s provided, aim towards solving problems, drawing conclusions, giving answers, and accumulating knowledge of facts and c e r t a i n methods rel a t e d to the subject matter they study: methods for solving problems, for ascertaining f a c t s , for analyzing short s t o r i e s , poems, etc., and of course, study methods. Even so, j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a l l these does not receive much attention and r a r e l y goes beyond quoting the proper author-i t i e s . This i s a p i t y , because students may learn a great deal about the s c i e n t i f i c methods through examining why i t was created, why i t i s useful today and why students should be taught t h i s p a r t i c u l a r method. It can c e r t a i n l y be argued that encouraging b l i n d adherence to authority through our educational system has negative e f f e c t s for the i n d i v i d u a l as well as the society they l i v e i n . S t r i c t l y from a consumer's point of view alone, i t i s v i t a l to be able to pinpoint clever attempts to manipulate our thinking and actions. And most adults are aware of what may r e s u l t from b l i n d adherence to a p o l i t i c a l or r e l i g i o u s authority. Teaching young people various methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l provide them with the r e q u i s i t e s k i l l to question and some a b i l i t y to judge the answers they receive. This c e r t a i n l y i s useful i n l a t e r l i f e . e. C o l l e c t i v e creations. Often our actions simply follow cus-toms, or r e f l e c t e x i s t i n g rules and laws established by the organizations and i n s t i t u t i o n s which enable a society to function. The education 118 system i t s e l f i s sueh a creation. The others also play a large r o l e i n our high schools. After a l l , schools serve to prepare students for l i f e i n society at large. Young people should be f a m i l i a r with a l l these c r e a t i o n s — b e aware of how they came to be, how they compare with those of other s o c i e t i e s , and how they are changing. A l l school sub-j e c t s serve i n some way to prepare us for our r o l e as adult c i t i z e n s . For example, mathematics and science would be stressed i n s o c i e t i e s which count on s c i e n t i s t s and mathematicians to help to r a i s e the c o l l e c -t i v e standard of l i v i n g and which wish to remain or become competitive i n commercial and m i l i t a r y matters. Societies i n which there i s a very strong group or national i d e n t i t y w i l l l i k e l y stress the teaching of h i s t o r y . J u s t i f i c a t i o n does not play an important r o l e i n the high schools' attempts to pass on the baton of 'good c i t i z e n s h i p ' to the next genera-t i o n . Our government may be examined to f i n d out how i t works; other forms of government may be described; but teachers r a r e l y f e e l obligated to j u s t i f y t h e i r own views on our government and neither are they l i k e l y to ask students to j u s t i f y , their'image and b e l i e f s about i t . When a teacher asks students: "Is Canada a s o c i a l i s t country? J u s t i f y your answer," the ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' expected probably consists of quoting a given d e f i n i t i o n and checking to see i f Canada f i t s i t — r e q u i r i n g , r e s p e c t i v e l y , the memorizing of a d e f i n i t i o n , some f a c t u a l r e c a l l , and s u f f i c i e n t cognitive advancement to be able to connect the two. These days one has to wonder i f j u s t i f i c a t i o n might not merit an expanded r o l e i n ' c i t i z e n s h i p ' education. Organizations and i n s t i t u -tions are subjected to rapid changes, cultures are no longer i s o l a t e d from cross p o l l i n a t i o n , laws and rules must be more f l e x i b l e than ever, 119 our l e g a l p r o c e d u r e s appear i n a d e q u a t e to meet changing demands. A l s o , c i t i z e n s appear more i n t e r e s t e d i n 'doing t h e i r own t h i n g ' r a t h e r than f o l l o w i n g 'the good o l d ways': an i d e n t i t y c r e a t e d by and f o r y o u r s e l f may s e r v e us b e t t e r than one p r o f f e r e d by a p r e v i o u s g e n e r a t i o n . Rampant r e l a t i v i s m a l s o makes i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o u p h o l d one form of government or one method f o r d e a l i n g w i t h c r i m i n a l s , e t c . , as 'the b e s t ' f o r a l l c i t i z e n s . The p o i n t i s t h a t i f young p e o p l e a r e taught v a r i o u s methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n they have an a l t e r n a t i v e t o e i t h e r a c c e p t i n g on a u t h o r i t y what a s o c i e t y has t o o f f e r or c h a l l e n g i n g and r e j e c t i n g any such s t a n d a r d s . I t o f f e r s them the t o o l s t o shop and compare and t o p i e c e t o g e t h e r a m e a n i n g f u l i d e n t i t y t o f a c e l i f e i n t h i s w o r l d of o u r s . We have to have some s t a n d a r d s to j udge our d e c i s i o n s , a c t i o n s , b e l i e f s , e t c . , by. f . Q u e s t i o n i n g , d o u b t i n g . T e a c h e r s a s s i g n q u e s t i o n s and s t u d e n t s a r e encouraged t o ask q u e s t i o n s , y e t n e i t h e r c u s t o m a r i l y i n v o l v e s j u s t i -f i c a t i o n . T e a c h e r s p r e f e r ' f a c t f i n d i n g ' q u e s t i o n s i n t h e i r c l a s s r o o m s : they f e e l p r e p a r e d t o h a n d l e t h e s e , and t h e s e q u e s t i o n s d i s a p p e a r when an answer i s p r o v i d e d . Q u e s t i o n s about b e l i e f s , d e c i s i o n s , a c t i o n s , e t c . , a r e much more d i f f i c u l t t o d e a l w i t h s i n c e t h e r e may not be a s i m p l e answer r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e and any r e s p o n s e can l e a d to a l e n g t h y e x p l a n a t i o n and j u s t i f i c a t i o n which can always be c h a l l e n g e d i n t u r n . Both t e a c h e r s and s t u d e n t s can b e n e f i t from s t o p p i n g t o r e f l e c t on what i s b e i n g q u e s t i o n e d and why. Perhaps the unspoken r e a s o n f o r a q u e s t i o n such as "what were the t h r e e causes of the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n ? " i s " I t i s easy t o mark the answer and I have to have some marks f o r my s t u d e n t s . " And when a s t u d e n t asks "Why do we have to study b i o l o g y ? " the i n t e n t i o n may be t o get t h e t e a c h e r ' s goat or s i m p l y t o waste c l a s s 120 time r a t h e r than t o l e a r n a n y t h i n g about the u s e f u l n e s s o f b i o l o g y . Too o f t e n question-and-answer i s a m i n d l e s s r i t u a l p l a y e d out by t e a c h e r s and s t u d e n t s . I f b o t h were expected t o j u s t i f y the q u e s t i o n s asked, the q u a l i t y o f e d u c a t i o n would b e n e f i t g r e a t l y . g. J u s t i f i c a t i o n s . Whereas i t i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e t o a n a l y z e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o s c h o o l work, t h i s r a r e l y , i f e v e r , o c c u r s . The ' d i s c i p l i n e s ' a r e p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s : as l o n g as p r e -s c r i b e d methods and pr o c e d u r e s a r e used p r o p e r l y , answers and c o n c l u s i o n s a r e a c c e p t e d . S u b m i t t i n g the methods themselves t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s not seen as n e c e s s a r y . On t h e o t h e r hand, s t u d e n t s c o u l d b e n e f i t g r e a t l y from d o i n g j u s t t h a t : i t would g i v e them a much c l e a r e r n o t i o n of t h e h i s t o r y , n a t u r e , and purpose of t h e ' d i s c i p l i n e ' i n t h e p a s t , p r e s e n t , and f u t u r e . 3. I n v e n t o r y of D i f f e r e n t : Methods of J u s t i f i c a t i o n A v a i l a b l e At t h i s p o i n t i t may be u s e f u l t o t a k e a l o o k a t what methods a r e a v a i l a b l e t o anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n e n c o u r a g i n g more j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n h i g h s c h o o l s . Three broad c a t e g o r i e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d : language based methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h o s e based on a u t h o r i t y , and t h e d i s c i p l i n e s and methods based on d a i l y l i f e : awareness, p e r s p e c t i v e and e x p e r i e n c e . A l l known methods o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f i t w i t h i n one o f t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s , b u t , as w i l l be p o i n t e d out l a t e r , they a r e not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . S o r t i n g out t h e methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t o t h r e e groups s e r v e s a p r a c t i c a l purpose: when i t comes t o c h o o s i n g a method of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t h e l p s t o f o c u s the c h o i c e t o , f i r s t , t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e c a t e g o r y and t h e n t o t h e s p e c i f i c method(s). Language based methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . These a l l f o c u s on examining the language of a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The assumption i s t h a t i f 121 key concepts used i n a j u s t i f i c a t i o n are not adequately defined or mis-used, and i f arguments and conclusions lack l o g i c a l consistency, then the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f i s inadequate. The l e v e l of s k i l l and aware-ness used i n operating from and with propositions and i n choosing and manipulating words determines the quality of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a. Theoretical reason refers to operating from and with propositions. We normally learn to do this before reaching school age. At i t s most basic l e v e l i t i s the a b i l i t y to complete a number of sentences that c o l l e c t i v e l y convey a clear meaning. At i t s most complex l e v e l i t requires the rigorous application of l o g i c a l principles to the construc-t i o n and analysis of arguments. Most often we use theoretical reason without stopping to r e f l e c t , i n the course of normal communication. Rational s k i l l s are not taught per se at any l e v e l below univer-s i t y . So the l e v e l of s k i l l students a t t a i n depends primarily on that of available models. I f parents are conscious of the d i f f i c u l t i e s entailed i n developing and j u s t i f y i n g arguments and display a certain l e v e l of r a t i o n a l s k i l l s , they w i l l i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d pass these on to thei r children. Teachers are also important as models. I f the l e v e l of s k i l l at operating from and with propositions i n a family i s gener-a l l y low, the teacher-models a c h i l d i s exposed to may offer the only opportunity and incentive to develop to a higher l e v e l . Theoretical reason w i l l always have to be considered an important factor i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n , since i t invariably involves formulating argu-ments or drawing conclusions. However, i t should not be necessary for schools to teach theoretical reasons as a separate subject since many of the s k i l l s involved are acquired 'by osmosis' through role models, normal language development, reading, watching t e l e v i s i o n , etc. 122 Besides, through i t s regular curriculum, high schools already expose students to such tasks as l i s t i n g and evaluating evidence and reasons (Ennis). Taylor's d i s t i n c t i o n between subjective and objective reason i s u s e f u l i n judging the use of t h e o r e t i c a l reason i n a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . On the one hand the j u s t i f i c a t i o n may display improved comprehension and use of r a t i o n a l s k i l l s on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l , while o b j e c t i v e l y i t may not be very good. This i s a f a m i l i a r problem for teachers, because both must be taken into account when evaluating school work such as essays, problem solving tasks, or lab reports, etc. b. Conceptual analysis i s mentioned only by Wilson. It must be given serious consideration as a method of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , however. The language used i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s i s given general scrutiny (to check i f arguments 'add up', or i f s u i t a b l e evidence i s used, etc.) but key concepts are r a r e l y examined. For example, the conclusion that "revo-l u t i o n s are j u s t i f i e d i f they are fought for freedom" should only be reached a f t e r the author has thoroughly explained what he means by "r e v o l u t i o n " or "freedom." Certa i n l y not a l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s need involve conceptual a n a l y s i s , but most could. Using conceptual analysis forces us to stop and r e f l e c t on the language we construct our j u s t i f i c a t i o n s with. It also provides a means of j u s t i f y i n g or c r i t i c i z i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Various methods of conceptual analysis have been d e t a i l e d i n Section II so that teachers can choose those most s u i t a b l e for each classroom s i t u a t i o n , subject matter, age of students, etc. c. Techniques of questioning were not mentioned by any of our author-i t i e s on j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Yet a l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n involves j u d i c i o u s use 123 of questioning; indeed without an urge to question, j u s t i f i c a t i o n would not be necessary. There are complex techniques of questioning such as those evolved by s c i e n t i s t s or psychologists. But for use i n the c l a s s -room some 'common sense' techniques w i l l do. — L e a r n i n g when to question. For example, when should a j u s t i f i c a t i o n be expected or demanded? Even though anything can be questioned, common sense would indi c a t e that to be a f u t i l e exercise. Most students, how-ever, tend to the other extreme: apathy has recently ( i n 1978) been described as the common denominator of high school students. One sug-gestion that has been made to counteract t h i s i s to present c u r r i c u l a r materials i n a more open-ended, less a u t h o r i t a r i a n , discipline-bound way. Good examples of t h i s are the inquiry approach to h i s t o r y and the new math. But i t i s too early to t e l l i f these have had the desired e f f e c t of stimulating more i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y . One key to t h e i r success would be to allow students to help i n creating the questions rather than merely responding to them. A question b l i t z could be a good way to s t a r t students o f f : set a topic and ask them s i n g l y , i n groups, or c o l l e c t i v e l y to come up with as many questions as possible. Many v a r i -ations are possible on t h i s theme. Certain types of questions can be c a l l e d f o r ("only why questions"); groups of re l a t e d questions ( a l l on one aspect, for example) can be compiled. The point i s , that when students are given the opportunity to ask questions and observe others doing the same, they w i l l develop a more i n q u i r i n g perspective. — L e a r n i n g about what constitutes a good question. Teachers must follow up a question b l i t z by showing students how to sort questions into d i f f e r e n t categories (how, what, when, why, who, where, i f ) to eliminate i r r e l e v a n t questions; how to phrase them more e f f e c t i v e l y ; 124 and by s e t t i n g up standards to judge how good a question i s . Some pos-s i b l e standards are: Is i t c l e a r l y worded? Is i t relevant to many people? How wide or narrow i n scope i s i t ? Is i t d i r e c t l y or p e r i -pherally related to the topic? How much r e f l e c t i o n does i t show? How much awareness or i n s i g h t does i t show? — L e a r n i n g to follow up on questions. Question chains can be established where each question i s followed by a c l o s e l y related question. This procedure i s useful to show the difference between the increasingly microscopic d i r e c t i o n that questioning can take and the macroscopic. It i s also h e l p f u l i n learning how to e s t a b l i s h a causal chain. — L e a r n i n g how to question facts or answers. Students must be shown how even the surest " f a c t " (one plus one equals two; the B a t t l e of Hastings was fought i n 1066; Abraham L i n c o l n was a good man; I exist) can be questioned, and how every answer can lead to further questions (e.g., "What i s matter?" " A l l matter consists of atoms." "So what do atoms consist of?" etc.) This i s v i t a l : many students never think to challenge a generally accepted fact or the answer of an authority. F i r s t , they must r e a l i z e that i t i s possible to do so, and that anyone can learn to do so. Teacher can show them how. — L e a r n i n g to question arguments, conclusions and choice of words are two aspects of questioning that have already been dealt with separately. In toto the above techniques of questioning constitute the language * based side of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n based on the d i s c i p l i n e s and authority. The d i s c i p l i n e s have taken on an aura of authority over the years, even though they are e s s e n t i a l l y systems of inquiry. a. The methods of the d i s c i p l i n e s are taught as a part of the high 125 school curriculum, and have already been established as u s e f u l i n j u s t i -f i c a t i o n by Ennis, Wilson and Dearden. b. Factual information i s an e s s e n t i a l ingredient of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A l l subjects i n high school are a source of f a c t u a l information, and most teachers take the task of t r a n s f e r r i n g knowledge quite s e r i o u s l y . Perhaps more could be done i n teaching fact f i n d i n g s k i l l s , i n organiz-ing and quantifying data, and i n how to deal with c o n f l i c t i n g f a c t u a l information. These would contribute to s k i l l s i n l o c a t i n g , s o r t i n g , using, and weighing evidence to support a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . c. Theories, p r i n c i p l e s , prejudice, f a i t h , and dogma play an important r o l e i n creating a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The theory of evolution, for example, may be used as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for aggressive behavior: "After a l l , i t i s s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t . " Religious, s c i e n t i f i c , economic dogma, etc., have t r a d i t i o n a l l y played a prominent r o l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . High school courses can be designed to i l l u s t r a t e these various sources of a u t h o r i t y — t o show students the tremendous v a r i e t y that i s a v a i l a b l e to them. Furthermore, teachers can point out to students how and why these strong b e l i e f s c o n f l i c t at times. This e n t a i l s learning how to unearth a v a r i e t y of a u t h o r i t i e s , how to rate them for r e l i a b i l -i t y , t h e i r relevance for what i s being j u s t i f i e d , and for t h e i r subjec-t i v e or objective o r i e n t a t i o n . d. Laws, r u l e s , customs and other codes of conduct such as the ten commandments or Buddha's e i g h t f o l d path also have the heavy weight of authority, whether they r e f e r to doing mathematics, playing games, h a l t i n g at a stop sign, cooking raw meat, or the decision not to k i l l . A l l education i n north America i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y quite concerned with 'right conduct.' In high school, students are given the 126 opportunity to examine laws, r u l e s , customs, and other codes of conduct on a comparative basis through courses i n English, h i s t o r y , geography, sociology, p o l i t i c a l science, law, and anthropology. Psychology could be added to t h i s l i s t and other subjects such as modern languages, the sciences, a r t , music, family l i f e , or home economics could r e a d i l y be modified to warrant i n c l u s i o n . Teachers could make a point of showing the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r -ences, why these occur and how they can play a key r o l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Perhaps teachers should explain the theory of r e l a t i v i s m as one method for dealing with these codes of conduct as well as p r i n c i p l e s , important theories, dogma, etc. To summarize: the content of f a c t u a l knowledge, the methods of each d i s c i p l i n e , strong b e l i e f s , and codes of conduct can be conveyed to students. A l l a u t h o r i t i e s can be examined, compared, and rated. Rating them can be done i n a v a r i e t y of ways. Methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n based on everyday and h i s t o r i c a l experi- ence. Our own experiences, our l e v e l s of awareness, and the perspectives we form cannot help but have a great e f f e c t on when, why, and how we j u s t i f y . Experience comes f i r s t . 'Awareness' r e f e r s to our a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t on our experiences, while 'perspectives' are formed from the r e l a t i o n s h i p s observed between what we experience and become aware of. As a c h i l d grows, i t becomes capable of ranging ever farther (mentally) i n h i s t o r i c a l time and i n i t s phy s i c a l and c u l t u r a l environment. Exper-ience, awareness, and perspectives are locked i n a symbiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n f i n i t e complexity and p o t e n t i a l f or change. The act of j u s t i f i c a -t i o n represents a microcosm of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p : personal experiences combined with awareness of our Umwelt and our place i n i t are consciously u t i l i z e d to support a c e r t a i n perspective. The v a r i a b l e s involved may be i n f i n i t e i n t h e i r complexity and number, but t h i s does not prevent the attempt from being made or a conclusion from being reached. Ryle, Ennis, Wilson, MacPhail, etc., are quite correct i n i n s i s t i n g that t h i s aspect of j u s t i f i c a t i o n not be ignored. Otherwise j u s t i f i c a -t i o n would take place e i t h e r i n a vacuum—based on nothing more substan-t i a l than the manipulation of language—or i n a second hand store o f f e r -ing predigested approximations of ' r e a l i t y ' or d e f i n i t i v e , guaranteed, tried-and-true methods for constructing answers. In other words: j u s t i f i c a t i o n must r e l a t e to 'the warm world of action' i n some fashion. This can be done i n various ways. a. Analysis of intentions can be used for j u s t i f y i n g actions, how d e c i -sions are reached, questioning, c o l l e c t i v e creations such as an education system or laws and i n j u s t i f y i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Some ways i n which intentions can be analysed are: Analyzing what the i n t e n t i o n i s . As h i s t o r i a n s know, t h i s i s not always easy to e s t a b l i s h . Even f o r our own actions we can r a r e l y be sure what the f u l l range of motives i s or when we are merely r a t i o n a l i z i n g . Analyzing r a t i o n a l i t y or relevance. In the case of the former i t must be established i f there i s a l o g i c a l connection between the i n t e n t i o n and that which caused the i n t e n t i o n to be formulated. Then i t must be shown how the i n t e n t i o n r e f l e c t s a problematic s i t u a t i o n . Rating intentions. In judging intentions a l t e r n a t i v e s can always be considered. These can also be rated for r a t i o n a l i t y and relevance. Juding intentions. This can involve p r a c t i c a l as well as moral considerations: are they sensible, workable, and morally j u s t i f i a b l e ? In order to weigh intentions, many f a c t o r s — p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s o c i a l , h i s t o r i c a l , l i n g u i s t i c , moral, etc.,--must be considered, making i t a d i f f i c u l t and ultimately inconclusive enterprise. I t simply i s not 128 possible to cover a l l angles; but then, t h i s seems to t y p i f y any e f f o r t i n v o l v i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The analysis of intentions would be p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to high school English and h i s t o r y courses. The intentions of authors, h i s t o r -ians, and h i s t o r i c a l figures have fascinated those who study h i s t o r y and English. b. Analysis of consequences applies to a l l manner of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . This i s also a hugely complex task r e q u i r i n g a high l e v e l of s e l f -knowledge, insig h t s into personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , empathy, a wide h i s t o r -i c a l perspective, and well-developed thinking s k i l l s . As such, i t could make quite a valuable contribution to a high school education through such courses as environmental science, sociology, law, h i s t o r y , geography, p o l i t i c a l science, and English, which a l l concern themselves with the consequences of human b e l i e f s , creations, and actions. Four suggestions for analyzing consequences are: L i s t i n g of possible consequences. This i s not time consuming. Students l i s t as many possible consequences as they can within a ce r t a i n time l i m i t . Rating of consequences i n such categories as l i k e l y - u n l i k e l y , good-bad, important-insignificant, i n t e n t i o n a l , a c c i d e n t a l , etc. Detailed analysis can trace the casual chain leading to the conse-quences and on to further ones, or i t can be used to j u s t i f y how a consequence i s rated. Analyzing short-term or long-term aspects of consequences. Some-times consequences do not become obvious for quite some time; one consequence may t r i g g e r a series of others over a lengthy time period or a consequence may simply span centuries. Students can be asked to d i s t i n g u i s h between long and short-term consequences. Those of a long-term nature require a much more sophisticated h i s t o r i c a l perspective when analyzed. c. Analysis of causes i s relevant to most high school subjects, can proceed i n a s i m i l a r fashion as analysis of consequences: It 129 L i s t i n g of possible causes. Rating of causes. Detailed Analysis. To t h i s can be added: Analysis of the v a r i e t y of factors which shape events, b e l i e f s , questioning, etc. An attempt should be made to uncover as wide a.range as possible to i l l u s t r a t e the complexity of casual analysis. This leads to 'big' questions such as what the r o l e of free w i l l i s i n our existence, and others. These a c t i v i t i e s are not only relevant to the subject matter dealt with i n high schools, but students should f i n d them of personal i n t e r e s t because they r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to t h e i r own existence. So the science teacher can happily do h i s part by teaching students to trace casual chains i n chemistry lab and' students benefit by being exposed to a new way to look at t h e i r own l i v e s and the world around them. d. Analysis of experience. Recalled experiences, d i r e c t observations and the experiences which others r e l a t e to us f i n d t h e i r way into most j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . We ought to be conscious of t h i s r o l e as of every other aspect of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Analysis of how we experience explores the l i m i t a t i o n s of our senses i n general and can be applied to s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s as w e l l . Analysis of what we experience i s a task f a m i l i a r to policemen, reporters, judges, etc. The problem i s that we can unknowingly deceive ourselves and others. Emotions, p h y s i c a l , and geograph-i c a l f a c t o r s , prejudice, etc., a l l a f f e c t how we perceive what we experience and t h i s colors our j u s t i f i c a t i o n s i n turn. Tech-niques of comparison and cross checking have long been used to v e r i f y r e l i a b i l i t y . Science concerns i t s e l f greatly with how and what humans experi-ence; so do many wr i t e r s , h i s t o r i a n s , theologians, e t c . , — i n t h e i r own way. If a l l high school courses would pay s p e c i f i c attention to t h i s t o p i c , adolescents would receive considerable i n s i g h t into themselves and t h e i r fellow humans. 130 e. Analysis of awareness i s quite d i f f i c u l t . The 'outer' world i n i t s b i o l o g i c a l , geographical, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , p o l i t i c a l manifestations cannot be ignored. Neither can the 'inner' world of the mind with i t s conscious, subconscious, and unconscious layers and i t s use of language— constructed to f a c i l i t a t e thought and communication, but d i r e c t i n g i t simultaneously. Wilson and MacPhail speak b l i t h e l y about, empathy playing a key r o l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It i s , however, only one facet of awareness and neither has a very clear idea how to test for empathy or how to encourage i t s development. This gives a broad i n d i c a t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n analyzing 'awareness'. The process of awareness—how and why we become conscious of the many factors that shape our l i v e s — i s also shrouded i n mystery. Thus f a r psychology and neurosurgery have not been able to unravel the nature of t h i s process. What one i s aware of, and the l e v e l of that awareness, plays a v i t a l r o l e i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n as w e l l as i n education. For example, no one w i l l j u s t i f y anything unless they are aware of a need to do so. The content of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f i s l i m i t e d by awareness of what i s relevant'to include i n the l i n e of knowledge, p r i n c i p l e s , f e e l i n g s , etc., and of appropriate methods. Education i s undoubtedly supposed to serve the purpose of increasing geographical, h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l , moral, and s e l f awareness, etc. There are only two ways i n which one can test one's l e v e l of aware-ness i n any respect: by drawing up a l i s t of what we should be aware of and r a t i n g ourselves, and by comparing ourselves with others we are f a m i l i a r with. These are ultimately not very s a t i s f a c t o r y , but when we rate ourselves there must be a standard of either an i d e a l or p r a c t i c a l 131 nature. For example, i f the ..teacher asks "Why do wars happen?" The reply can be rated i n comparison with a f u l l range of possible answers or i n comparison with what average students that age know and under-stand. This i s very d i f f i c u l t f o r people to do by and for themselves, however. What can high schools do? Mainly, they can give students more opportunities to compare themselves to i d e a l standards and to t h e i r own peers. Any subject w i l l do. Analyzing d i f f e r e n t categories of awareness. I t w i l l lessen confusion i f students are assis t e d i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g various categories of awareness. H i s t o r i c a l awareness would r e f e r to how something came to be. L i n g u i s t i c awareness r e l a t e s to the conscious use of language. S o c i a l awareness had to do with how we perceive others, our e f f e c t on others, and our percep-tions of how others perceive and a f f e c t us. Many other cate-gories are possible. Analyzing d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of awareness. As we mature, we discover that l i f e i s not as simple as i t seems: i f answers and facts are s c r u t i n i z e d c a r e f u l l y problems a r i s e , new answers are found, which i n turn can be probed and found wanting. Techniques f o r q u e s t i o n i n g — o u t l i n e d previously'—work wonders i n making students r e a l i z e how much more there i s they have not even begun to consider. The analysis of causes, intentions, and consequences also c o n t r i -butes to expansion of our awareness. f. Analysis of perspective. A l l people develop perspectives on l i f e and l i v i n g as t h e i r experience and awareness grows. E s s e n t i a l l y i t i s the formation and recognition of patterns i n our existence—-real or imagined. I t i s natural f o r humans to impose order on t h e i r experi-e n c e s — a s u r v i v a l t r a i t which allows us to react quickly to s i t u a t i o n s . As pointed out i n Section I, there are two main types of perspective that a l l humans develop. Our v e r t i c a l perspective l i n k s development of s e l f and the world of humanity through past, present, and future. Our h o r i z o n t a l perspective r e f e r s to the way we perceive r e l a t i o n s h i p 132 with the ongoing 'outer' world beyond ourselves and also to our inner l i f e : recognizing our b e l i e f s , language patterns, personality, goals, etc., and how these influence and are influenced by the i n f i n i t e l y com-plex world around us. Analyzing perspective can proceed i n various ways: Analyzing the process of perspective formation i n general or i n a s p e c i f i c case. C l a r i f y i n g a perspective: Making a clea r formulation of a per-spective. Distinguishing d i f f e r e n t categories such as one's p o l i t i c a l , economic, or r e l i g i o u s perspectives. Contrasting d i f f e r e n t categories of perspectives to t r y to fathom t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . Analyzing the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 'inner' and 'outer' aspects  of a perspective. A good example of t h i s i s Ennis' suggestion that one's p r i n c i p l e s should be compared with other possible p r i n c i p l e s and must be judged by the q u a l i t y of l i f e that would ensue i f t h i s p r i n c i p l e were widely adhered to. Judging a perspective for i t s point of o r i g i n — i n other words was i t begged, borrowed, or stolen, imposed, the r e s u l t of experience, or any combination—for i t s scope (broad or narrow), for i t s negative or p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s , o b j e c t i v i t y of s u b j e c t i v i t y , etc. The number of factors a f f e c t i n g one's perspectives are i n f i n i t e i n number and complexity. Since perspectives are always changing, anal-yzing them i s also a never ending task. Every other method of j u s t i f i -cation can and should play a r o l e i n the analysis of perspective, hence no s p e c i f i c techniques were mentioned above. It i s scarcely necessary to stress the important r o l e perspective plays i n education. Much time i s spent i n c u l c a t i n g the perspectives of a u t h o r i t i e s and these days high school students are given more oppor-tunity to develop t h e i r own p e r s p e c t i v e s — b e they p o l i t i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l , etc. 133 4. Problems Relating to the Use of J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n Education The problems are many and the answers are few. The main problem related to fi n d i n g a place for j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n our school i s i t s incred-i b l e complexity. This raises issues such as: a. Which methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n should be used i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a -tion? There are no guidelines a v a i l a b l e . Teachers are e s s e n t i a l l y on th e i r own i f they wish to 'do' j u s t i f i c a t i o n with t h e i r classes. b. What i s a good or acceptable j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? One which u t i l i z e s a l l three basic methods before reaching" a conclusion? One which considers a l l angles? This also raises questions about the r e l a t i v e merits of the various methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n outlined above. c. When does a j u s t i f i c a t i o n end? Being an open-ended process, j u s t i -f i c a t i o n can continue ad infi n i t u m . How i s one to know when enough i s enough? d. Can and should d i f f e r e n t categories of j u s t i f i c a t i o n be combined? They are often complementary. For example, when a student i s attempting to j u s t i f y h i s or her analysis of a poem, language based methods obviously play a b ig r o l e , but those based on authority can also be used: expert analysis of a c e r t a i n poet or s t y l e of poetry can be quoted. Besides t h i s , the f e e l i n g s of the analyst, the intentions of the poet, what caused t h i s p a r t i c u l a r poem to be created, a comparison with s i m i l a r types of poems and themes and how the poem r e f l e c t s the p r e v a i l i n g Z i e t g e i s t are a l l topics r e l a t i n g to awareness and perspective. It does not require much e f f o r t to combine a l l three. For example, success i n conceptual analysis and questioning are d i r e c t l y linked with our experience, awareness, and perspective: considerable knowledge and ins i g h t are required. And i n a sense, a l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s authority 134 based, for the r a t i o n a l use of language i s based on man-made rules dating back to Ancient Greece, while, according to modern psychology, our aware-ness and perspectives are shaped to a great degree by our immediate family and our society. Problems s t a r t only when the time comes to decide on the r e l a t i v e input from each broad category, where to begin, how one should be used to balance and augment another, where to end the process of j u s t i f i c a -t i o n , etc. Other problems remain as w e l l : e. The reasons for paying closer attention to j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n high school education can always be challenged. There are undoubtedly people who regard teaching-about-justification-to-enable-students-to-expand-t h e i r - h i s t o r i c a l - p e r s p e c t i v e contrary to how they perceive the r o l e of high school education. And while few would question the value of l a n -guage based methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for an adolescent's cognitive development, and though most would recognize authority based methods as being relevant to the e x i s t i n g ' d i s c i p l i n e s ' , those methods based on experience, awareness, and perspective are a l i e n to the average educator. Certa i n l y the combination of the three into one system of j u s t i f i c a t i o n must be considered unusual at best. f. On a more p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , problems also p r o l i f e r a t e . Teachers have much more leeway i n determining how they teach and.to a l e s s e r extent, what i s taught, than ever before. Most teachers, however, would shrink from pioneering a path through the Hyrcanian wood of j u s t i f i c a t i o n unaided. A great deal of work remains to be done to earn j u s t i f i c a t i o n a regular s l o t i n the high school curriculum. Even then, the t r u l y open-ended nature of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may defeat the most earnest e f f o r t s to package 135 i t neatly for classroom consumption: l i s t i n g the causes of World War I i s one thing, j u s t i f y i n g your answer i s quite something else! Setting up a system of evaluation might w e l l represent the ultimate test of one's s k i l l at j u s t i f i c a t i o n : such a system has to have stan-dards which i n turn must be j u s t i f i e d . But how can a u t h o r i t a t i v e standards be established f or measuring someone's attempt to u t i l i z e an i n f i n i t e l y complex process? If doing the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t , then judging the worth of someone else's j u s t i f i c a t i o n — l a c k i n g a perfect knowledge of what went into that j u s t i f i c a t i o n — i s much more so. The language and authority related parts of a j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be judged with some d i f f i c u l t y but how does one judge experience, awareness, or perspective? And since j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ought to contain a l l three main elements, how can anyone say i f they are present i n the correct propor-tions? The point here i s that we do judge other people's and our own j u s t i f i c a t i o n s by whatever standards we wish. But a general system of evaluation must be v a l i d for a l l — a n d t h i s appears to be impossible to a t t a i n . Naturally teachers w i l l be dubious towards any new approach where the accomplishments seen cannot be quantified. 5. Conclusions In s p i t e of t h i s welter of problems some conclusions can be made at t h i s time. a. The p o t e n t i a l gains i n expanding the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of adolescents and i n encouraging t h e i r cognitive development would d i c t a t e that a concerted e f f o r t be made to investigate the p o s s i b i l i t y of making j u s t i f i c a t i o n an i n t e g r a l part of the high school curriculum. b. The evidence compiled above indicates that j u s t i f i c a t i o n can play a 136 key r o l e i n almost any high school subject and that more precise methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n than those which presently e x i s t can be formulated and applied i n the average classroom. c. There i s no one r i g h t method of j u s t i f i c a t i o n which can be applied across the board. Rather, j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a t r i c k y amalgam of formu-l a t i n g the language to be used i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n , the use of author-i t i e s , drawing on experience, and examining l e v e l s of awareness and various perspectives. If any of these i s missing, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s l e s s than s a t i s f a c t o r y . Other than that, no system for evaluating j u s t i f i c a t i o n currently e x i s t s . d. Any analysis of a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s an open-ended process which can be a r b i t r a r i l y ended, but never completed. Common sense and necessity are the only a v a i l a b l e guides i n deciding when a j u s t i f i c a t i o n should be terminated. e. J u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a two-edged process: i t cuts both ways. The methods used to e s t a b l i s h a j u s t i f i c a t i o n are also capable of destroying i t . It i s t h i s q u a l i t y that makes i t invaluable for the development of c r i t i c a l thinking s k i l l s . Since j u s t i f i c a t i o n can and does take place at any l e v e l of cognitive development i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to inves-t i g a t e i t s possible r o l e i n stimulating cognitive dissonance: i t s two-edged nature may create considerable mental c o n f l i c t . E. J u s t i f i c a t i o n and the Teaching of History The study of h i s t o r y i n high school seems to hold singular promise as a v e h i c l e for learning about j u s t i f i c a t i o n , while j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f o f f e r s many opportunities for 'doing h i s t o r y 1 . 137 1. J u s t i f i c a t i o n as a H i s t o r i c a l Phenomenon a. J u s t i f i c a t i o n commonly occurs i n interchanges between humans, between i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r society, on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l between coun-t r i e s , or as as an i n t e r n a l process within the i n d i v i d u a l . This i s true for a l l times and places. It should be possible to write a h i s t o r y of j u s t i f i c a t i o n which compares the r e l a t i v e importance of j u s t i f i c a t i o n as a way of l i f e and how j u s t i f i c a t i o n took place i n d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . For example, did they stress authority to the exclusion of awareness and experience? And, more s p e c i f i c a l l y : what p r i n c i p l e s underlay the choice of authority and why? b. Each e f f o r t at j u s t i f i c a t i o n has i t s own h i s t o r y which includes causes, the actual process of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as well as the e f f e c t s . c. Making a j u s t i f i c a t i o n and j u s t i f y i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n both require awareness of factors which influence the process i t s e l f — m a i n l y of the language s k i l l s used, the a u t h o r i t i e s , d i s c i p l i n e s , and facts quoted, as well as one's own experience, awareness, and perspectives. Gaining awareness of a l l these i s an open-ended task: directed inwardly and outwardly. It i s also a h i s t o r i c a l process, simultaneously stretching h o r i z o n t a l l y i n the here-and-now-—encompassing the i n t e r r e l a t i n g inner and outer world—and stretching v e r t i c a l l y across the past, present, and future. In other words, language, a u t h o r i t i e s and awareness a l l e x i s t i n the ongoing world of human h i s t o r y . Origins can be traced, the present status can be established, and projections can be made for the future. The wider one's h i s t o r i c a l perspective, the more complex the act of j u s t i f i c a t i o n becomes. 1 3 8 2. J u s t i f i c a t i o n : Useful f o r the Study of History a. Just as h i s t o r i c a l perspective greatly influences j u s t i f i c a t i o n , the reverse i s also true. E f f o r t s made at j u s t i f i c a t i o n can contribute to the expansion of the h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l perspective i n adolescents as w e l l as adults, by increasing knowledge, language, and c r i t i c a l s k i l l s and awareness of the multitudinous forces at work i n one's l i f e . b. The addition of j u s t i f i c a t i o n to a c t i v i t i e s associated with the study of h i s t o r y may help to erase the dry-as-dust image h i s t o r y evokes i n the . minds of some. c. More important: much of the work done by h i s t o r i a n s , plus what i s contained i n h i s t o r y textbooks and studied i n high school h i s t o r y classes can benefit from and requires j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Much of the work done by h i s t o r i a n s serves to support t h e i r theo-r i e s about and portrayals of periods, people, and events from the past. It can be, and frequently i s , attacked for lacking i n accuracy, informa-t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w r i t i n g s k i l l s , organization, argumentation, perspective, and awareness! Studying modern h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g , there-fore, can o f f e r many lessons i n how others j u s t i f y t h e i r l i f e work. Historians use a good cross-section of techniques: evaluating author-i t i e s , c a r e f u l l y constructing l i n e s of argument, and, above a l l , attempt-ing to present a w e l l balanced h i s t o r i c a l perspective: a keen knowledge of the casual l i n k s between people and events and an accurate perception of that period of time i n a l l i t s complexities from more than j u s t our twentieth century point of view. History teachers try to pass on the f r u i t of t h i s labour to t h e i r young charges. This learning process provides many opportunities for 139 the p r a c t i c e of varied j u s t i f i c a t i o n techniques, as w i l l be shown sh o r t l y . Students can be asked to construct t h e i r own j u s t i f i c a t i o n s as w e l l as examining and attempting to j u s t i f y those of h i s t o r i a n s and h i s t o r i c a l figures or j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of these. 3. J u s t i f i c a t i o n : Relevance to Five Main Trends i n the Teaching  of History These f i v e approaches have already been outlined i n the previous 32 section. Hence comments w i l l be b r i e f . a. Knowledge of the past as a guide to good c i t i z e n s h i p . This t r a d i -t i o n a l approach i s too d e s c r i p t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e to have any room for j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It provides precious l i t t l e opportunity for argument or r e f l e c t i o n . b. Student-centered h i s t o r y i s also not r e a l l y s u i t a b l e as a v e h i c l e for j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Students require a great deal of guidance i n l e a r n -ing about j u s t i f i c a t i o n — i t i s simply too complex to expect them to pick i t up by osmosis. c. R e f l e c t i v e inquiry stresses the l i n g u i s t i c and r a t i o n a l aspects of j u s t i f i c a t i o n to the exclusion of the other two. There i s no reason, however, to assume that the other two elements could not be added with r e l a t i v e ease. d. History as a d i s c i p l i n e . Teaching students to think l i k e h i s t o r i a n s and to emulate t h e i r methods o f f e r s considerable opportunities for prac-t i c i n g varied methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as shown j u s t previously. e. History as s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l involvement. Stimulating awareness of one's s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l environment i s the main object of t h i s approach. It does not involve rigorous a n a l y t i c a l techniques and de-emphasizes the relevance of the past i n our quickly changing modern world—hence down-140 playing the r o l e ' a u t h o r i t i e s ' should have i n our existence today. Thus i t could scarcely be considered a s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e for teaching about j u s t i f i c a t i o n . None of the current approaches to the teaching of h i s t o r y contain a f u l l y developed system of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A combination of r e f l e c t i v e inquiry and studying h i s t o r y as a d i s c i p l i n e could provide such a system. In other words, i n order to make room for j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n high school h i s t o r y classes, a t o t a l l y new approach to the study of h i s t o r y i s not necessary. 4. Adapting High. School History Courses to Include J u s t i f i c a t i o n On a professional l e v e l h i s t o r i a n s are involved i n de t a i l e d j u s t i -f i c a t i o n : everything they do can be subjected to thorough a n a l y s i s . Historians often are highly c r i t i c a l of each other's work and t h i s forces them to be quite conscious of q u a l i t y c o n t r o l . Unfortunately, l i t t l e of the controversy surrounding the writing of hi s t o r y reaches the classroom. Most h i s t o r y texts shun controversy i n favor of sales and h i s t o r y teach-ers rarely, double as h i s t o r i a n s , so that they do not r e a l l y develop an a f f i n i t y for h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Besides, they must often cover a large amount of material i n t h e i r a l l o t t e d time. Historians have to face normative issues. For a good many writers 'good guys and bad guys' have to be sorted out. Napoleon must be shown to have been 'wrong' i n attacking Russia. H i t l e r has to be a v i l l a i n and Alexander the Great, a hero. Appeasement i n the 1930's must be seen as both cowardly and wrong. Other times, judgement i s not so simple: moral issues often present dilemmas. But textbooks usually display heavily muted versions of the v i v i d spectrum of human a c t i v i t y i n an e f f o r t to f i l l out the chronological framework within a prescribed 1 4 1 page-limit. A l l t h i s makes the i n c l u s i o n of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the classroom more d i f f i c u l t but not impossible. a. Even the d u l l e s t textbooks cannot avoid moral and other issues altogether. If nothing else, the events and persons from the past speak for themselves and i n v i t e our reaction. The explanations and conclusions found i n a text can be analyzed, and where attempts at j u s t i f i c a t i o n are made these can be located and examined. Students can be, and are, asked to r e f l e c t on the material presented i n a text. This i n turn o f f e r s them the opportunity to construct a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . So even the d u l l e s t h i s t o r y course can be used to pr a c t i c e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . b. However, i f textbooks were designed to stimulate thought, the teach-er's task would be much e a s i e r — l e s s would depend on t h e i r ingenuity. It would be unusual but not d i f f i c u l t to pay more attention to how h i s -torians reached t h e i r conclusions and to add c o n t r o v e r s i a l or c o n f l i c t i n g primary source material to the text. A t o p i c a l approach to the content of a text instead of s t r i c t adherence to chronology would make more de t a i l e d analysis possible and hence give students a better taste of what i s entailed i n doing h i s t o r y . c. The teacher's r o l e i s obviously p i v o t a l : learning about j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a long and d i f f i c u l t task. In a sense we never stop learning about i t . Expert guidance i s therefore e s s e n t i a l , e s p e c i a l l y at the beginning. Making teachers experts i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s an impossible task. Work-shops and s p e c i a l courses can of course be set up. But the quickest way to make i t possible to introduce j u s t i f i c a t i o n into the teaching of h i s t o r y i s to make i t 'teacher-proof: curriculum designers and authors of textbooks should have the necessary expertise to design a high school 142 h i s t o r y course with large doses of j u s t i f i c a t i o n b u i l t i n , so that the teacher only has to follow i n s t r u c t i o n s . It must be stressed that a l l t h i s can be done without d r a s t i c revisions of the ent i r e h i s t o r y program— e x i s t i n g courses can generally speaking, be r e a d i l y adapted. 5. What May Require J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the Study of History? A c t u a l l y , t h i s p a r a l l e l s the l i s t of what can and should be j u s t i -f i e d i n high schools: the ent i r e content applies to the study of h i s t o r y . a. Decision making: The study of h i s t o r y abounds i n examining d e c i -sions made by men and women i n the past, such as C h u r c h i l l ' s d e c i s i o n to r a i d Dieppe. We have the benefit of hindsight: having knowledge, the h i s t o r i c a l circumstances, what was a c t u a l l y decided, and the consequences — s h o r t term and long term. But of course we lack a true f e e l i n g of what the s i t u a t i o n must have been l i k e . Students must also make d e c i -sions of an i n t e l l e c t u a l nature: how to j u s t i f y t h e i r points of view and conclusions and then to decide what they should be. b. Actions: Students can be asked to project themselves into the p a s t — as h i s t o r i a n s must do. Then they can judge the actions and events they are studying from t h e i r own point of view, from a h i s t o r i a n ' s , or from someone a l i v e at that time. c. Points of view: Studying h i s t o r y o f f e r s ample opportunities f o r analyzing the points of view, i d e a l s , and way of l i f e of persons from the past or the present, including our own. Historians are p a r t i c u l a r l y conscious of the problems related i n expressing defending and examining b e l i e f s . The problem of anachronism would be a good example. H i s t o r -ians must describe the past i n terms i n t e l l i g i b l e to t h e i r present audi-ence, using modern language and present perspectives. They are crea-tures of t h e i r society l i k e any of us. So while h i s t o r i a n s t r y to be 143 objective i n t h e i r work, unconsciously they cannot help d i s t o r t i n g the past. It may be that by studying h i s t o r y , students inadvertently learn more about t h e i r own society than about the past! Students should be encouraged to form and examine t h e i r own b e l i e f s , i d e a l s , etc. As well as those of others, past and present. This o f f e r s ample scope for expanding t h e i r v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l perspective. d. Answers, knowledge, f a c t s , arid conclusions: Written h i s t o r y i s saturated with these. Much time i n high school h i s t o r y courses i s spent on memorizing and examining 'facts' and the conclusions h i s t o r i a n s have arriv e d at based on these f a c t s . Not many would challenge the a s s e r t i o n that students should acquire a sound knowledge of the world they l i v e i n , past and present. They should also learn how to ' c e r t i f y ' f a c t u a l i t y : once again, the methods used by h i s t o r i a n s would be most apropos. e. C o l l e c t i v e creations: i n s t i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l groupings, organizations, laws, languages, and culture receive extensive attention on the part of h i s t o r i a n s . We should a l l be aware of t h e i r vast importance i n our l i v e s : we shape them and they shape our l i v e s simultaneously. As has been alluded to previously, j u s t i f i c a t i o n can play a major part i n c l a r i f y i n g t h e i r r o l e i n the past and now. Becoming more conscious of t h i s r o l e i s a major contribution to the expansion of h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e . f. Questioning, doubting: Historians c u l t i v a t e systematic doubt as an e s s e n t i a l part of t h e i r profession. They must be s k e p t i c a l about the v e r a c i t y of t h e i r sources and of ' f a c t s ' , motives, professed i d e a l s , causes, and consequences, t h e i r own conclusions, and those of others, about points of view and of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . Unfortunately t h i s 144 systematic doubt i s not r e f l e c t e d i n the teaching of h i s t o r y to nearly the same degree. This has to change before j u s t i f i c a t i o n can become an accepted part of h i s t o r y classes: human h i s t o r y must not continue to be presented i n the same almost t o t a l l y pre-digested form i t has been u n t i l now. Even so, h i s t o r i a n s are not perfect paradigms: some shy away from moral issues, others lack i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y i n s i g h t s and s k i l l s — e s p e c i -a l l y i n the areas of psychology and philosophy—while many ignore the relevance t h e i r work may have to present and future generations. Hence, many h i s t o r i a n s display a stunted h i s t o r i c a l perspective: a v e r t i c a l perspective that ignores or b e l i t t l e s the present and future and no h o r i -zontal at a l l . As i n d i v i d u a l s , they have a normal h i s t o r i c a l perspec-t i v e , of course, but i t simply i s not evident from t h e i r work. It i s up to teachers and curriculum designers to f i l l the gap. g. J u s t i f i c a t i o n s : Up to t h i s point neither h i s t o r i a n s or teachers of hi s t o r y have paid much attention to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H i s t o r i a n s ' attempts to j u s t i f y t h e i r work are a part of t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e . Because of the nature of t h i s subject—human beings i n a l l t h e i r d i v e r s i t y — t h e y also have to pay some attention to the language they use and to the l o g i c a l procedures used i n tr a c i n g causal chains, o f f e r i n g hypotheses, s t a t i n g generalizations and giving explanations. But as W. Dray points out, hi s t o r i a n s do not have a consistent method of explanation. This l a n -guage they use and type of explanation they do o f f e r i s the kind people use i n everyday l i f e , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n i t s looseness and lack of pre-. . 33 cisxon. Teachers possibly do not f e e l the need to c r i t i c a l l y examine the r a t i o n a l procedures and language used i n the materials they are provided 145 with, such as textbooks, because h i s t o r i a n s do not display much outward concern for these. Methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n concerning experience, awareness, and perspective also do receive some attention on the part of h i s t o r i a n s . Cer t a i n l y consequences and causes are analyzed i n d e t a i l . Intentions are more d i f f i c u l t to deal with: h i s t o r i a n s do not spend much time analyzing them f o r relevance or r a t i o n a l i t y and r a r e l y rate or judge them. The l a t t e r two a c t i v i t i e s do not s u i t the s c i e n t i f i c image h i s -torians have attempted to c u l t i v a t e since Mabillon i n the 1700's. For example, intentions are hardly ever rated or judged on a moral basis by h i s t o r i a n s . When h i s t o r i a n s deal with awareness and perspective they also f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to maintain t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c posture. Knowledge of psy-chology, sociology, geography, and anthropology would be h e l p f u l and a l l lay claim to s c i e n t i f i c status. Historians have shown considerable reluctance, however, i n borrowing the theories and techniques these branches of knowledge have to o f f e r . As a r e s u l t , no methods for anal-yzing awareness and perspective exist r e l a t i n g to the study or w r i t i n g of h i s t o r y . The major complaint i n t h i s area of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s , once again, that whatever i n t e r e s t h i s t o r i a n s have i n experience, awareness, and perspective, has l i t t l e or no concern for the present. They want to become aware of how others l i v e d and saw themselves and t h e i r s o c i e t i e s , without any desire to e s t a b l i s h the relevance of t h e i r findings and methods for us today or for future generations. While i t i s easy to chastize h i s t o r i a n s for what they lack i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards j u s t i f i c a t i o n and i n t h e i r s k i l l s and methods, i t must 146 be pointed out that of a l l the d i s c i p l i n e s , h i s t o r y undoubtedly pays as much attention to j u s t i f i c a t i o n as any and uses by f a r the widest cross-section of methods. So i t i s s t i l l top choice as a v e h i c l e f or learning about j u s t i f i c a t i o n and, what i s more, can r e a d i l y be augmented to become a perfect v e h i c l e . 6. Methods of J u s t i f i c a t i o n Useful for the Study of History A l l methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n - — p r e v i o u s l y described as based on l a n -guage, authority, and experience—can be used p r o f i t a b l y i n the study of h i s t o r y : contributing to general knowledge, understanding of the r e l a -tionship between past, present,'and future, and providing i n s i g h t into the d i f f i c u l t work done by h i s t o r i a n s , so C l i o can be served well by placing emphasis on j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Each branch of j u s t i f i c a t i o n plays an equally important r o l e . a. Language based methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e oretical reason: as suggested previously, r a t i o n a l s k i l l s should not be taught d i r e c t l y at the high school l e v e l . Nor i s i t necessary to do so. What can h i s t o r y teachers do then? Offer students plenty of opportunities to operate from and with p r o p o s i t i o n s — v e r b a l l y and i n written form. Debates, assign-ments, t e s t s , essays, and discussions a l l provide t h i s and are already commonly used i n h i s t o r y courses today. Provide proper models: excerpts from primary sources, h i s t o r i c a l accounts, magazines, etc. The teacher i s probably the most important model. Analysis of written materials, such as o u t l i n i n g the basic structure of an argument, pointing out the underlying assumptions, pointing out key concepts, lo c a t i n g ' a u t h o r i t i e s ' or moral arguments, l i s t -ing the evidence provided, etc. Conceptual a n a l y s i s : t h i s was already covered i n Section IT. A l l the techniques of conceptual analysis outlined there can be used i n the study of h i s t o r y . 1 4 7 Techniques of questioning: Teachers must work hard on t h i s aspect of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , since i t does not receive much attention today. Showing students i n considerable d e t a i l how and why h i s t o r i a n s c u l t i v a t e systematic doubt. Providing students with many varied examples of controversies and feuds between h i s t o r i a n s past and present. These may concern the questioning of f a c t s , use of sources and methods, arguments and conclusions, points of view assumed and expressed, l i t e r a r y s k i l l s , awareness, and perspective shown, and others. The more va r i e t y the better. Asking students to c r i t i c a l l y examine written materials. I t i s not enough merely to recognize the basic structure of an argument or the evidence used i n supporting an argument. They must learn to judge whether or not the basic structure i s adequate or i f the evidence provided i s correct and s u f f i c i e n t . A question b l i t z or question chain provides good exercise i n learning how to question and so does conceptual a n a l y s i s . Almost any topic covered i n a high school h i s t o r y course can be u t i l i z e d f o r t h i s purpose. There i s a dual purpose i n doing a l l t h i s : to learn more about h i s t o r y and about j u s t i f i c a t i o n . b. Authority based methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The methods of  d i s c i p l i n e s : History teachers have paid r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e a t t ention to 'teaching the d i s c i p l i n e ' to t h e i r students. This ' d i s c i p l i n e ' consists of the methods and findings of h i s t o r i a n s . A case has already been made for a c t u a l l y teaching the d i s c i p l i n e i n somewhat augmented form. The study of h i s t o r y also has an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y side. A l l d i s c i p l i n e s and other f i e l d s of study are relevant to the study of h i s t o r y : they a l l have t h e i r own h i s t o r y which influences h i s t o r y at large; they examine some aspect of human existence or the world we inhabit; t h e i r information and methods often contribute to the completion of the h i s t o r -ian's task. So teachers should: 148 Thoroughly f a m i l i a r i z e students with the ' d i s c i p l i n e ' of h i s t o r y . Show students how astronomy, economics, sociology, biology, l i n g u i s t i c s , theology, philosophy, psychology, archaeology, geography, geology, anthropology, etc., a l l contribute to our knowledge and understanding of the world we l i v e i n (horizontal perspective) and to the study of the past and i t s relevance for the present and future ( v e r t i c a l perspective). Factual information: A l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s use ' f a c t s ' . A l l f i e l d s of study have t h e i r methods for c e r t i f y i n g the f a c t u a l status of i n f o r -mation. A customary r o l e for teachers i s to supervise the transfer of f a c t u a l information to t h e i r students. Putting a l l three together leads to the following suggested classroom a c t i v i t i e s : Students should be taught various fa c t f i n d i n g s k i l l s from d i f f e r -ent f i e l d s of study, and also how to test data for accuracy and how to go about organizing and quantifying them. At a more advanced l e v e l , students could be asked to analyze c o n f l i c t i n g data, analyze the relevance of data presented i n explanations, or c r i t i c a l l y examine the methods used to e s t a b l i s h ' f a c t u a l i t y ' . A l l t h i s would have to include the complex way h i s t o r i a n s handle data. Theories, p r i n c i p l e s , prejudice, f a i t h , and dogma: A l l are of great importance i n human h i s t o r y since they share intentions and d e c i -sions, causes and e f f e c t s . Consider the vast influence of A r i s t o t e l i a n astronomy, St. Paul's theology, Newtonian physics, Darwin, Marx, and Freud's theories, anti-Semitism, not to mention the major r e l i g i o n s on world h i s t o r y ! Even i n t h i s great age of change, these same forces continue to influence our l i v e s . When humans j u s t i f y t h e i r actions, intentions, and decisions, they w i l l l i k e l y also have to j u s t i f y the influence of one or more of these forces. How can h i s t o r y teachers cope with thi s ? Stating the theory etc., c l e a r l y . This i s not so simple, because c o n f l i c t i n g d e f i n i t i o n s can be given and sometimes the d e f i n i t i o n 149 can be long and complex, as i n the case of much r e l i g i o u s dogma. Analyzing the theory, etc. Conceptual analysis of key terms would be a good s t a r t . Examining i t s f a c t u a l basis could also be done. Tracing i t s h i s t o r y from beginning to end, or up to the present. This could also be applied to i n d i v i d u a l s . For example, i f someone believes i n the theory of evolution, there i s a reason for t h i s : t h i s b e l i e f originated at a c e r t a i n time and place and was encouraged by a host of other factors—some i d e n t i f i a b l e . Analyzing the e f f e c t s of a theory, etc., i n general, or on the i n d i v i d u a l . This permits much scope f o r the p r a c t i c e of h i s t o r -i c a l s k i l l s , such as lo c a t i n g instances which c l e a r l y demonstrate the influence of St. Paul's teachings on human h i s t o r y . Judging a theory, etc., for p o s i t i v e or negative e f f e c t s , for the good or e v i l i t brought about, etc. Students should have a good time with t h i s : some great dilemmas are l i k e l y to a r i s e such as comparing the Utopian intentions of Marxian theory with some of i t s Draconian a p p l i c a t i o n s . Laws, rules and customs: They can be handled i n a s i m i l a r fashion to theories and p r i n c i p l e s etc. The following learning a c t i v -i t i e s could be added: Comparison with other laws, etc., from other s o c i e t i e s and other times: major likenesses and diff e r e n c e s , raison d'etre, e f f e c t s . Analysis of effectiveness: p r e c i s e l y what were the o r i g i n a l intentions and how well were they met. c. Methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n based on experience. Analysis of intentions, consequences and causes: a l l three are very important i n the w r i t i n g and study of h i s t o r y and also i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Studying how h i s t o r i a n s deal with them would be a good s t a r t . There i s no shortage of material a v a i l a b l e . With access to an adequate l i b r a r y , teachers could b u i l d up a well rounded f i l i n g system containing suitable quotations, excerpts, a r t i c l e s , etc. Special attention w i l l have to be paid to making students aware of the problems en t a i l e d i n t r y i n g to ascribe intentions and l i s t i n g consequences and causes. Students can then be asked to analyze intentions, consequences, and causes as outlined previously. Analysis of experience: Historians do not spend much time analyzing how we e x p e r i e n c e — t h i s i s l e f t to modern science and psychology—but they 150 are experts i n analyzing what humans experience. The methods they use are s i m i l a r to those used by reporters and policemen. Analyzing how we experience—through our senses and our minds—can be done on the personal l e v e l by asking high school students to r e f l e c t on t h e i r own l i v e s . I t can also be approached by examin-ing the findings of those who have studied the subject. From a h i s t o r i c a l point of view i t would be most i n t e r e s t i n g to t r y to discover i f a l l humans experience t h e i r existence the same way or i f at other times and places there were s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . For example, were c e r t a i n senses more highly developed among prim-i t i v e people? Or are our brains larger and more capable today? What are the e f f e c t s of I.Q., culture, and environment on how we perceive ' r e a l i t y ' ? This i s of i n t e r e s t i n the study of h i s t o r y because i t would explain much i n human behaviour, past, present, and future. Analyzing what we experience can be learned by studying how h i s t o r -ians c r i t i c a l l y examine t h e i r sources. D i a r i e s , autobiographical and biographical materials, o r a l h i s t o r y , etc., a l l contain the record of human experiences. These must be analyzed for v e r a c i t y , the l e v e l of awareness they display and for perspective. An account may be t r u t h f u l i n the sense that no l i e s are being t o l d , but yet i t may lack awareness of c e r t a i n v i t a l f a c t s which throw a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t l i g h t on the s i t u a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , each primary source represents the perspective of one person. Analysis of awareness: This i s the most complex task i n j u s t i f i -cation because a l l e f f o r t s at j u s t i f i c a t i o n involve the r a i s i n g of aware-ness and what one i s aware of shapes a l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n ! Analyzing awareness means t r y i n g to discern j u s t what awareness i s , i n general, how we gain awareness and what forces influence i t and to what extent. Then we must reach an understanding of how t h i s awareness a f f e c t s our mental l i f e and actions. And, ultimately, we have to learn how awareness of the things we are aware o f — t h e a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t on our own mental processes—comes about, i s affected, and a f f e c t s our existence! This i s not something h i s t o r i a n s worry about when doing t h e i r work. And neither are high school classrooms the place to f i n d the answers. What can h i s t o r y teachers reasonably do then to point out the importance of aware-ness i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? 151 Using other methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n involves the r a i s i n g of aware-ness i n many varied ways. Teachers can show how d i f f e r e n t categories of awareness such as s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l , and l i n g u i s t i c awareness a l l have a major h i s t o r i c a l component. For example, to be conscious of the r o l e of s o c i a l theories and d i s t i n c t i o n s i n your own l i f e and that of others includes an understanding of how they came to be. Analysis of perspective: A l l humans have a v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l perspective. Everyone has a unique h i s t o r i c a l perspective which changes constantly. Yet i t shares a great deal with that of others—more so with those who share the same geographical environment and culture. This perspective helps to d i r e c t decisions and actions today as much as i n the distant past. Historians are very aware of the importance of perspective i n the study of h i s t o r y . Teachers can do a l o t i n t h i s area: History can be looked at from many varied vantage points. These can be i d e n t i f i e d by c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : whether or not they are contemporary to an event, represent a subsequent generation or someone l i v i n g today greatly a f f e c t s how one sees the event and judges i t . The age of the person would make a d i f f e r e n c e , as would t h e i r occupation, the type of society they are raised i n , t h e i r i d e a l s , r e l a t i v e proximity (p h y s i c a l l y and emotionally) to what i s being described or studied, etc. Once i d e n t i f i e d , i t can be judged by various standards: i t s scope (how narrow or broad i t i s ) i s i t more subjective or objective? for i t s point of o r i g i n for possible negative or p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s on h i s t o r i c a l perspective. This can be applied to primary sources, h i s t o r i a n s , and students of h i s t o r y a l i k e . Conclusion: These methods of j u s t i f i c a t i o n are equally methods for studying h i s t o r y . With the exception of conceptual analysis they are not very d e t a i l e d . The main purpose was to show that j u s t i f i c a t i o n and the study of h i s t o r y can be e f f e c t i v e l y combined for mutual benefi t . The lengthy and complex task of f i l l i n g i n the d e t a i l s w i l l have to wait. The great German h i s t o r i a n and philosopher, Ernst Troeltsch, once 152 remarked that there are times that i t i s more important to make a begin-34 ning than to produce the f i n i s h e d a r t i c l e . 153 FOOTNOTES A. P h i l l i p s G r i f f i t h s , "Reason and Causes," Education and the  Development of Reason, R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), p. 340. 2 R. H. Ennis, Logic i n Teaching (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., 1968), p. 376. 3 Cf. Ennis, op. c i t . , chapter 21. 4 I b i d . , p. 411. 5 lb i d . , pp. 412-17. Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-H a l l , Inc., 1961), pp. 36-7. 7 8 Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 67. 9 Cf. Ibid., chapters three to s i x . "^L. Daniels, The J u s t i f i c a t i o n of C u r r i c u l a . Unpublished paper prepared for discussion at the AERA 1971 annual meeting i n New York, p. 20. 11 12 Taylor, op. c i t . , p. 333. Ibid., p. 328. 13 G i l b e r t Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education and the Development  of Reason, R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), p. 178. 14 15 Ibid. Ibid., p. 193. "^Cf. John Wilson, Moral Thinking (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1970), pp. 29-48. 1 7 I b i d . , pp. 45-8. 1 8 I b i d . , pp. 28-9. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 85. 20 John Wilson, The Assessment of Morality (Windsor: NFER Publish-ing Co. Ltd., 1973), pp. 33, 36. 21 Peter MacPhail, J. R. Ungoed-Thomas, and H. Chapman, Moral  Education i n the Secondary School (London: Longman, 1972), p. 49. 22 Ibid., p. 63. 23 R. F. Dearden, "Autonomy and Education," Education and the  Development of Reason, R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972), p. 463. 24 25 Taylor, op. c i t . , p. 333. Ibid., p. 330. 26 27 Wilson, Moral Thinking, p. 35. Ibid. , p. 85. 154 28 MaePahil et a l . , op. c i t . , p. 49. ^ I b i d . , p. 4. " ^ I b i d . , p. 63. " ^ I b i d . , p. 15. 3 2 C f . Section I I , Part G(2). 33 Cf. W. Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-H a l l , Inc., 1964), e s p e c i a l l y chapter 2 on " H i s t o r i c a l Understanding," pp. 4-20. "^Quoted i n Barraclough, History i n a Changing World, p. v i i i . SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Introduction Bateman, Barbara D. Temporal Learning. San Raphael: Dimensions Publish-ing, 1968. Cohen, J . , Hansel, C. E. M., and Sylvester, J. "An Experimental Study of Comparative Judgements of Time," B r i t i s h Journal of Psychology, 45(1954): 108-114. Hallam, R. N. "Piaget and Thinking i n History," M. B a l l a r d , ed., New  Movements i n the Study and Teaching of History. London: Temple Smith, 1970, pp. 162-178. Hickman, Warren L. "The Erosion of History," S o c i a l Education, 43(1959): 18-22. Jahoda, G. "Childrens' Concepts of Time and History," Educational Review, 15(1963): 87-104. Section One: H i s t o r i c a l Perspective Barraclough, Geoffrey. History i n a Changing World. Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 1955. Barzun, Jacques. C l i o and the Doctors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.. Berelson, Bernard. Graduate Education i n the U.S. New York: McGraw-H i l l , 1960. Brinton, Crane. The Shaping of Modern Thought. Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1963 [1950]. Carr, E. H. What i s History? London: Penguin Books, 1964 [1961]. Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History. London: Oxford University Press, 1961 [1946]. Conkin, Paul K., and Roland N. Stromberg. The Heritage and Challenge of  History. New York: Harper and Row Publ., 1971. Connell-Smith, G., and H. A. Lloyd. The Relevance of History. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972. 155 156 Daniels, Robert V. Studying History. Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1966. Dilthey, W. "The Dream," i n Hans Meyerhoff, ed., The Philosophy of History i n our Time. Garden C i t y : Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 313-331. Erikson, E r i k H. Childhood and Society. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1950. . Dimensions of a New Identity. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1974. . Identity, Youth and C r i s i s . New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1968. . Insight and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1964. . L i f e History and the H i s t o r i c a l Moment. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1975. . "Youth, F i d e l i t y and D i v e r s i t y , " i n E. Erikson, ed., Youth, Change and Challenge. New York: Basic Books, 1963, pp. 1-23. Erikson Kai T., ed. In Search of Common Ground. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., 1963. Evans, R. E. Dialogue with E r i k Erikson. New York: Harper and Row Publ., 1967. Geyl, P i e t e r . Debates with His t o r i a n s . Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958. . Encounters i n History. Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961. G i l b e r t , F. "European and American Historiography," i n J. Higham, L. Drieger, and F. G i l b e r t , eds., History. Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1965, pp. 315-387. Gustavson, C a r l G. A Preface to History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. . History for Today. The S o c i a l Studies, 57: 178-180. H a l l , R. T., and Davis, J . V. Moral Education i n Theory and P r a c t i c e . Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975. Herbst, Jurgen. "Review Essay on New Movements i n the Study and Teach-ing of History, Martin B a l l a r d , ed." History and Theory, 11; 11(1972): 97-102. Heuss, A. Vorwst der Geschichte. G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959. 157 Huizinga, Johan H. Men and Ideas. Cleveland: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959. Jaspers, K a r l . "The Unity of History," i n Hans Meyerhoff, ed., The Philosophy of History i n our Time. Garden Cit y : Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 331-345. Kahler, E r i c h . The Meaning of History. New York: World Publishing Co., 1968 [1964]. Kitson-Clark, George. "The C r i t i c a l H i s t o r i a n , " i n Thorn. Guinsburg, ed., The Dimensions Of History. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971, pp. 7-18. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Wozu noch H i s t o r i e ? " Historische Z e i t s c h r i f t . 212, 1(1971): 1-18. Lowith, K a r l . "Het Noodlot van de Vooruitgang," i n E r i c h Burck, ed., Het Begrip Vooruitgang. Amsterdam: Weterschappelijke U i t g e v e r i j N.V. 1966 [1963], pp. 7-29. . Meaning i n History. Chicago: Un i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1949. Lukacs, John. H i s t o r i c a l Consciousness. New York: Harper and Row Publ., 1968. Maier, Hans U. "Die Abwesenheit der Geschichte," Geschichte i n  Wissenschaft und Unterricht. 21, 5(1970): 261-274. Mann, Golo. "The History Lesson," Encounter. 39, 2(1972): 23-30. Manuel, Frank. Freedom from History. New York: New York Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1971. Meyerhoff, Hans. "Introduction to the Meaning of History," i n Hans Meyerhoff, ed., The Philosophy of History i n our Time. Garden Ci t y : Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 291-292. Olson, C. The Special View of History. Berkeley: OYEZ, 1970. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. History as a System. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1962 [1941]. Plumb, J. H. The Death of the Past. London: MacMillan, 1969. Pr i c e , Mary. "History i n Danger," History. 53(Oct. 1968): 342-347. Riesterer, Bethold. K a r l Lowith's A n t i - H i s t o r i c i s m , i n H. V. White, ed. The Uses of History. D e t r o i t : Wayne State Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, pp. 153-174. 158 Sleeper, Martin. "The Uses of History i n Adolescence," Youth and  Society. 4, 3(1973): 259-274. Thomson, David. The Aims of History. London: Thames and Hudson, 1969. Toulmin, Stephen. Human Understanding, Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Toynbee, Arnold. "Widening our H i s t o r i c a l Horizon," i n M. B a l l a r d , ed., New Movements i n the Study and Teaching of History. Bloomington: Indiana Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1970, pp. 50-60. Trask, David. "A Note on Relevance and History," C l i o . 1, 3(1972): 34-9. Tuveson, E. L. Millennium and Utopia. New York: Harper Torch Books, 1964 [1949]. Weiss, John. "Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Anti-History," i n H. V. White, ed., The Uses of History. D e t r o i t : Wayne State Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, pp. 15-31. White, Hayden V. "Romanticism, H i s t o r i c i s m and Realism," i n H. V. White, ed., The Uses of History. D e t r o i t : Wayne State Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, pp. 45-58. Zimmermann, K. "Ueber einige Probleme der Gegenwartigen Geschichte," Saeculum. 14(1963): 11-24. Section Two: Conceptual Analysis Ausubel, David P. Emotional Psychology: A Cognitive View. New York: Holt, 1968. Brubaker, D. L., L. H. Simon, and J. W. Williams. Conceptual Framework for S o c i a l Studies Curriculum and Instruction, S o c i a l Education. 41, 3(1977): 201-5. F a l l i c o , Arturo. " E x i s e n t i a l i s m and Education," i n A. Dupuis, ed., Nature, Aims and P o l i c y . Chicago: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1970, pp. 162-172 ;[1954]. Gagne, Robert. The Conditions of Learning. New York: Holt, 1965. H i r s t , Paul. " L i b e r a l Education and the Nature of Knowledge, i n R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of Reason. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972, pp. 391-414. Martorella, Peter H. Concept Learning i n the S o c i a l Studies. Scranton: Intext Educational Publishers, 1971. 159 Passmore, John. "On Teaching to be C r i t i c a l , " i n R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of  Reason. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972, pp. 415-433. Peel, E. A. "Some Problems i n the Psychology of History Teaching," i n W. H. Burston and D. Thompson, eds., Studies i n the Nature and  Teaching of History. New York,: Humanities Press, 1967, pp. 159-172. Peters, R. S. "Mental Health as an Educational Aim," i n T. H o l l i n s , ed., Aims i n Education: The Ph i l o s o p h i c a l Approach. Manchester: Manchester Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1964, pp. 71-90. Watts, D. G. The Learning of History. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. Wilson, John. Thinking with Concepts. London: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Vygotsky, L. S. Thought and Language. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962. Section Three: J u s t i f i c a t i o n Daniels, L. The J u s t i f i c a t i o n of C u r r i c u l a . Unpublished paper pre-pared for discussion at the AERA 1971 annual meeting i n New York. Dearden, R. F. "Autonomy and Education," i n R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of Reason. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972, pp. 448-465. Dray, W. Philosophy of History. Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice H a l l Inc., 1964. Ennis, R. H. Logic i n Teaching. Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1968. MacPhail, Peter, J . R. Ungoed-Thomas, and H. Chapman. Moral Education  i n the Secondary School. London: Longman, 1972. P h i l l i p s , G r i f f i t h s A. "Reason and Causes," i n R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of  Reason. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972, pp. 332-347. Ryle, G i l b e r t . "A Rational Animal," i n R. F. Dearden, P. H. H i r s t , and R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of Reason. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972, pp. 176-193. Taylor, Paul. Normative Discourse. Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1961. 160 Wilson, John. The Assessment of Morality. Windsor: NFER Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973. Moral Thinking. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1970. 

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