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Moral codes and moral tensions : an examination of compliance officers’ morality and moral functioning Kihl, Lisa Adeline 2003

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MORAL CODES AND MORAL TENSIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS' MORALITY AND MORAL FUNCTIONING by LISA ADELINE KIHL B.S., Lewis-Clarke State College, 1989 M.S., Eastern Washington University, 1992 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Educational Studies Faculty of Education) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard • I THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 2003 ©Lisa Adeline Kihl, 2003 A B S T R A C T The purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I compliance officers' conceptions of morality and moral functioning. Critics of N C A A intercollegiate athletics maintain that the Association's strict legislative and rules systems deter N C A A stakeholders from making thoughtful moral judgments. Current research supports this assumption for studies examining various sport stakeholders' moral functioning show that they reason to the level of the rules or employ a rule book conception of morality (cf Beller & Stoll, 1995; Malloy, 1991; Timmer, 1999). Walker et al. (1995) and Walker (2000a) argue that our understanding of people's every day moral experiences has been limited by the theoretical dominance of cognitive moral psychology in studies investigating people's morality. Walker et al. (1995) maintain that moral functioning research should be redirected to examine people's real-life moral experiences within a holistic theoretical framework. Such a framework provides an inclusive perspective from which to examine the interrelationships between morality and moral functioning. Based on this argument, a Contextualist practical reasoning framework using the works of Coombs (1984, 1997), Dworkin (1977, 1985, 1986), Frankena (1980), Wallace, (1988, 1996), and Winkler (1993) was used to investigate how compliance officers conceptualized morality and reasoned about hard cases. A purposeful-intensity sampling technique was employed, compliance officers from each of the Pacific-10 Conference member institutions participated in this study. Using an interview guide, face-to-face interviews were carried out with each of the participants. The goal was to document the complicated and diverse nature of participants' understandings of morality, the negotiations and strategies they used in working within compliance, and the ways in which they considered N C A A and Conference standards, values, and beliefs in their rule interpretations and adjudications of difficult moral problems. The study examined how the participants thought about right and wrong, their moral perceptions and sensitivities, and their practical reasoning. It was found that, specifically, the compliance officers displayed individual normative systems that were comprised of two predominant moral codes (professional and personal). The value structures underpinning their respective moral codes were similar yet independent from the NCAA's and the Pac-10 Conference's. The participants' personal and professional moral codes also seemed to create tensions in their efforts to determine right from wrong, fulfill their role, and make rule interpretations. As well, compliance officers displayed individual moral perceptions and sensitivities, which informed their discernment of case particulars. In addition, the findings showed that compliance officers employed three approaches to rule interpretations: a literal approach, working within the gray approach, or a spirit of the rules approach. Furthermore, they used one discretionary strategy in obtaining an official interpretation as they used caution in obtaining an official Conference/NCAA interpretation if they believed the interpretation would place their institution and disadvantage. The potential rule infractions (major or secondary) influenced the i i type of rules approach or use of discretion they used. Lastly, the analysis showed that, in resolving hard cases, the compliance officers appealed to specific standards of practical reasoning. The type of problem, the compliance officers' conceptions of morality, along with N C A A and Conference standards, beliefs, and values all influenced the types of standards used to resolve moral problems. Thus, the findings highlighted the significance of examining holistically the interrelationships among people's understandings of morality, their moral perceptions and sensitivities, and their moral functioning It is suggested that future research should explore other athletic administrators' conceptions of morality, their understandings of moral and athletic concepts, and their applications in decision-making. These findings also point to the feasibility of the NCAA's deregulation proposal, as it was argued that all rules require interpretation and deliberation, and should be resolved within the boundaries of the NCAA's legislative system and political morality. iii A C K N O W E L E D G E M E N T S This research project would not have been accomplished without the assistance and support of several people. I would first like to acknowledge and sincerely express my gratitude to the one who made this possible you know who you are- thank you. I would also like to thank my research supervisor, Dr. Patricia Vertinsky and my committee members, Dr.'s Ian Wright, Robert Sparks, and Lucie Thibault. I appreciate your "teachings" and the amount of the time and guidance you provided in assisting me through this process. I hope to pass on your knowledge and expertise in the future to my students. This study also would not have been made possible without the cooperation of and giving from the Pac-10 Conference compliance officers. Thanks for taking a risk and for making this research experience so educational and interesting. I would also like to sincerely thank Dr. Lisa Kikulis for her encouragement and support throughout the writing phase of this dissertation. I hope you realize how crucial those words of encouragement were in motivating me to persist and complete this project. Academia is extremely fortunate of your return. Last, I would like to thank my friends Debbie, Grace, Karry and Brian, Ginny, my Ph.D. colleague Kathy, and my family-Dad and "The Giblers" for being so supportive, for loving me, and being patient with me throughout my Ph.D. program. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract •. 1 1 Acknowledgements I v Table of Contents v List of Tables x List of Figures x ' Chapter One: The Problem is "You Athletic Administrators Just Reason like the Rules"! 1 The National Collegiate Athletic Association 3 The NCAA 's Legislative System 4 Striving for Rules Compliance and Enforcement 6 Evolution of Institutional Compliance Officers 6 The Pacific 10 Conference 7 The Pac-10's Approach to Compliance and Enforcement 8 The NCAA's Moral Point of View 10 Resolving NCAA Hard Cases 11 Moral Functioning Research 13 Statement of the Problem 15 Research Questions ] 6 Overview of the Theoretical Approach 17 Application of the Theoretical Framework 18 Organization of the Dissertation 18 Chapter Two: Review of Related Literature 20 Dominant Theoretical Approaches and the Study of Morality: An Overview 20 Lawrence Kohlberg 's Theory of Moral Judgment 20 James Rest's Theory of Moral Development 21 The Neo-Kohlbergian Approach 23 Limitations of Cognitive Moral Developmental Approach 26 "Ethical" Decision-Making Model: Jones' Issues Contingent Model 29 Haan 's Interactional Theory of Morality 30 v Studies Relating to Sport Stakeholders' and Professionals' Moral Functioning 34 Athletes' Moral Reasoning 34 Coaches' Moral Reasoning 38 Athletic Administrators' Moral Reasoning 39 Professionals' Moral Reasoning 41 Assessing levels of professionals' reasoning 42 Investigating influencing factor of moral functioning 43 Summary 45 Chapter Three: Theoretical Approach 46 Morality 46 Contextualism... 48 Practical Reasoning 50 Moral Reasoning 52 Moral Perception and Sensitivity 53 Standards of Practical Reasoning 55 Deciding Among Acceptable Alternatives 56 Resolving Moral Uncertainties 58 Individual and Social Deliberations 61 Dworkin's Theory of Interpretation 66 Dworkin's Theory of Resolving Hard Cases 67 Summary 70 Chapter Four: Research Methodology 71 Overview and Critique of Moral Reasoning Research Methodologies 71 The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) 71 The Defining Issues Test (DIT & DIT2) 73 Interviews and Recall of Moral Problems 75 Questionnaires and Real-Life Moral Problems 76 Real-Life Moral Problems and Interviews 77 Research Design 79 v i Researcher's Role 80 Pilot Study 85 Setting 87 Selection of Participants 88 Data Collection 89 Data Analysis 92 Trustworthiness and Limitations 94 Summary 95 Chapter Five: Compliance Officers' Characteristics and their Thoughts about 96 Morality The Participants 97 Compliance Officers: Roles and Responsibilities 99 Thinking About Right and Wrong 100 Professional Moral Code 101 Personal Moral Code 103 Care and fairness 103 Maintaining trust 105 Moral Tensions 108 Tensions when Deciding Right from Wrong 108 Tensions and Fulfdling their Compliance Officer Role 110 Tensions and Rule Interpretations 113 Moral Intuition 114 Hiding Behind the Rules 115 Summary U7 Chapter Six: Compliance Officers' Discernment of the Particulars 118 Compliance officers' Approaches to Rule Interpretations 118 Moral Perception and Sensitivity 125 Definition of a Moral Problem 125 Recall Moral Problems 127 v i i Scenario Moral Problems 132 "Academic Assistance " scenario 132 "Church's Charity " scenario 137 "Drug Testing" scenario 141 Understanding Compliance Officers' Individual Moral Perceptions and Sensitivities in Relation to Theory 144 Summary 149 Chapter Seven: Compliance Officers' Resolutions of Practical Moral Problems: Determining The Right Course of Action! Practical Reasoning and Recall Problems 150 Scenario Practical Reasoning 156 Academic Assistance Scenario 157 Andy's resolution of Academic Assistance x 57 Sandy's resolution of Academic Assistance 161 "Church's Charity " Scenario 163 Mike's resolution of "Church's Charity " 163 Erica's resolution of "Church's Charity " 165 Terri's resolution of "Church's Charity " 168 "Drug Testing " Scenario 170 Dave's resolution of "Drug Testing " 170 Matt's resolution of "Drug Testing " 170 Standards of Practical Reasoning 172 Deciding Among Morally Acceptable Alternatives 173 Sufficiency and accuracy of information 174 Undistorted values 175 Inclusiveness of envisioned alternatives and their consequences 176 Rational consideration 177 Resolving Moral Uncertainties 178 Summary 179 v i i i Chapter Eight: Conclusion 180 Summary of the Research 1 go Thoughts About Morality \ g \ Moral Perception and Sensitivity 1 g2 Practical Reasoning 183 Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 184 Where Do We Go From Here? Recommendations for Future Research \ gg Considerations for Policy and Practice 1 g7 The Challenge of Diversity: Institutional Philosophies and Moral Characters 1 g7 Support for NCAA Deregulation? ] g9 Support for National Discussions: Defining the Meaning of Terms 190 Developing Member Trust and Accountability 191 Regional Rules Compliance Seminars: Addressing Moral Tensions 191 Final Comment 192 References 193 Appendix A Interview Guide 204 Appendix B Scenarios and Standards of Practical Reasoning 208 Appendix C Applicable N C A A Rules & Principles 222 Appendix D Definition of a Moral Problem 232 Appendix E Recall Moral Problems 234 Appendix F Academic Assistance Scenario 239 Appendix G Church's Charity Scenario 242 Appendix H Drug Testing Scenario 246 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development 22 Table 2: Variances Between Kohlberg and Neo-Kohlbergians 25 Table 3: Features of the D1T Moral Judgment Schemas 26 Table 4: Haan's (1978) Five Levels of Interpersonal Morality 33 Table 5: Standards of Practical Reasoning ; 56 Table 6: Resolving Individual Judgments 63 Table 7: Resolving Social Judgments 65 Table 8: Participants' Level of Degree Completed 98 Table 9: Participants' Administrative Experience 98 Table 10: Practical Reasoning Standards Used By Participants 173 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: N C A A Governance Structure 5 Figure 2: Pacif ic-10 Conference 8 Figure 3: Jones' (1991) Issue-Contingent Mode l 30 x i CHAPTER ONE The Problem is "Athletic Administrators Just Reason like the Rules"! Throughout the history of the governance of American intercollegiate athletics, incidences of rule violating behavior have been prevalent. The intercollegiate athletics governing body, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), has typically responded to these rule violations by implementing legislation to combat them.1 Many Association officials perceive the NCAA's notion of legislating behavior as a method of creating stability and, more importantly, an equal playing field for organizational stakeholders. Unfortunately, the Association's attempts to legislate behavior have been less than successful as N C A A statistics show that major2 violations by N C A A Division I (DI) members during the past 10 years averaged 14.3 infractions per year and secondary3 violations have grown from a total of 189 in 1990 to a total of 1,328 infractions in 1999 (NCAA, 2001). The end-result of the NCAA's highly formalized legislative system is a cumbersome and contradictory operations' Manual (Zimbalist, 1999). Many critics of the NCAA's extensive rules system believe that intercollegiate athletic administrators determine the Tightness or wrongness of an act based on a rule book approach or a strict interpretation of the rules (Gough, 1994; Lumpkin, et al., 1999; Sperber, 1991). In particular, Lumpkin et al. (1999, p.75) contend that N C A A "coaches, administrators, athletes, and others have regarded ethical conduct as synonymous with only the written rule, meaning that the spirit of the rule did not exist." Gough (1994, p.3) early supported these sentiments as he believes the N C A A ' s stringent and complex legislative rules' system fosters, "myopic, legislative attitudes that harm and hinder thoughtful ethical judgment". He further contends that: ... N C A A policy has become so rule-dependent, so comprehensive, and so situation-specific that athletic administrators, coaches and support staff under its auspices are increasingly not required to make ethical judgments. Larger, more ethically significant questions regarding, for example, what courses of action are in student-athletes' best interests-relative to particular times, places and contexts-have given way to questions regarding literal observance of one-size-fits-all rules . . . (p. 4) Furthermore he adds: 1 Zimbalist (1999, p. 4) reported that the N C A A Manual has, "grown in size from 161 pages in 1970-71 to 579 • pages in 1996-197 (and the pages increased in size from 6 x 8 lA inches prior to 1989 to 8 Vi x 11 inches after). In 1989-99, the Manual became so long that the N C A A broke it into three volumes, with 1,268 pages (some are repeats)." 2 A major violation is defined as, "all violations other than secondary violations are major violations, specifically including those that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive advantage" ( N C A A Manual, 2000-2001, Article 19.02.2.2, p. 314). 3 A secondary violation is defined as a "violation that is isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal recruiting competitive or other advantage and does not include any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit. Multiple secondary violations by a member institution, may collectively be considered as a major violation" ( N C A A Manual, 2000-2001, Article 19.02.2., p. 313). 1 . . . the NCAA's legalistic atmosphere requires not so much the higher faculty of what moral philosophers sometimes call practical wisdom (i.e., the knowledge of how to exercise ethical judgment in particular cases) but the mere ability to recognize, interpret and follow formal rules. The great danger here, of course, is that operating primarily or solely according to the latter, low order ability can eventually prevent individuals from, as we say, doing the right thing, (p. 4) Ronald Dworkin (1985, 1986) however, argues in his theory of "interpretivism" that an individual can never really possess a "true" rule book conception of the law, as all rules require interpretation and deliberation in making ajudgment. Fundamental to Dworkin's claim of "interpretivism" is that judges' decisions should reflect the Constitution and thus, the intentions of the "Framers" or lawmakers. In resolving hard cases,4 interpretive judges are required to research interpretations and judgments of past cases. In order to make ajudgment that reflects the overall Constitution, judges should decide how relevant concepts were defined in past cases and examine the current meanings of these concepts in relation to the present case. Dworkin (1985, p. 159) states, "He [the judge] must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own." In relation to the N C A A , athletic administrators would resolve practical moral problems (that relate to the rules) by assessing the intent of the rules, by defining certain terms in their present context (e.g., "equal treatment" or "amateurism"), and by assessing past applications of these terms. Upon assessing these factors, an administrator would make his/her judgment by considering if an action: was consistent with the definition and application of these concepts, was in concert with the NCAA's notion of fairness, reflected the intent of the rules, and was consistent with the N C A A legislative system as a whole. For example, a compliance officer is confronted with a situation where a football coach, "Coach Jackson", contacted a student-athlete who had signed a letter of intent to participate on another N C A A DI institution's football team but was considered a "gray shirt"5 for the academic year. The football player wanted to come and play for Coach Jackson at his N C A A DI institution. However, N C A A recruiting rules state that a coach cannot contact a student-athlete at another institution unless he/she was a nonrecruited student-athlete, or the student-athlete was released from their letter of intent from the original institution, and the student-athlete made the first contact with the coach (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). Coach Jackson's actions have created a practical moral problem for their institution's compliance officer, as he/she must determine if the Coach's contact with the football player was a violation of N C A A rules. Adhering to Dworkin's (1977, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases, a compliance officers' judgment should reflect the Association's legislative system, and the overall philosophy of N C A A recruiting and eligibility rules, and principles. The problem with Dworkin's theory, 4 The application of the rule is problematic as there is "no settled rule that dictates a decision either way" (Dworkin, 1977, p. 83). 5 A gray shirt athletic is one who defers enrollment at an institution until after the completion of a sports season, in this case, the football season. 2 in relation to the N C A A , lies in attempting to make sense of the NCAA's legislation system and decipher what the Association really means when they refer to the term an "equal playing field". In consideration of the above arguments and the proposed issues regarding moral judgment, the purpose of this study was to examine N C A A compliance officers' morality and moral functioning, specifically compliance officers from the Pacific 10 (Pac-10) Conference. This first chapter is organized with the intent of providing background information about the parent Association (the NCAA) and Conference in which the selected compliance officers' function. The next section provides an overview of theoretical approaches and moral reasoning research, which aims to introduce the reader to contemporary understandings of how cognitive moral psychology has shaped the field. The following sections outline the study's problem statement and the central goal of the study, which is proceeded by the research questions that guided the investigation. An overview and application of the theoretical approach was next provided to introduce how the research was framed and related to compliance officers' work related moral thinking. The chapter concludes with a detailed description of the organization of the dissertation. This section endeavors to provide a road map describing and providing a rationale for the dissertation's structure. The next section describes the N C A A , its governance and legislative systems, and outlines a rationale for the creation and implementation of the compliance officer position by N C A A members. The historical account of the creation and implementation of the position of compliance officer is critical to gaining an understanding of the existing tensions and complexities surrounding the Association's notion of an equal playing field. These tensions and complexities in defining an equal playing field directly relate to compliance officers' interpretations and deliberations of hard cases. The National Collegiate Athletic Association Operating in the form of a democracy and displaying a commitment to self-governance, the N C A A is a private voluntary organization that has approximately 977 member institutions of which 124 have Division I membership. The N C A A is divided into three divisions: I, II, III, with Division I being further divided into Divisions I-A (DI-A), I-AA (DI-AA), and I-AAA (DI-AAA). Division I classifications are based on the size of a football program, with DI-A being the largest and highest level of competition and where DI-AAA classifications do not sponsor a football program (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). Each level of classification is subject to a different constitution and a separate set of operating and administrative bylaws. DI-A has the most stringent set of operating bylaws and administrative procedures and the highest level of competition of the three divisions. The N C A A has 115 active member institutions in DI-A and a reported 2001-02 operating budget of $228,337,000 (www.ncaa.org, 2002). Thirty-six conferences compete in Division I athletics with only 11 of those 3 conferences sponsoring DI-A football. Conference membership is generally divided on the basis of geographical regions. Under the executive council, the organizational structure of the Association is departmentalized into three divisions each with a board of directors and management council. The aim of such a structure is to provide each division with autonomy in decision-making and in managing individual divisional needs (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). The Association's organizational structure is composed of four hierarchical levels with an executive committee at the highest level of governance holding the most authority (Figure 1). Several Association wide committees also exist to address issues that affect all members of the N C A A and perform duties necessary to the ongoing operation of the organization. Association wide committees are comprised of members from each of the NCAA's divisions and the subdivisions of Division I. The Executive Committee is composed of appointed institutional chief executive officers (College and University Presidents) with eight members representing Division I-A Conferences and institutions. The Executive committee oversees Association-wide issues and aims to ensure that "each division operates consistently with the basic purposes, fundamental polices, and general principles of the Association" (www.ncaa.org, 2002). The Division I governance system is based on Conference representation. Division I governance is overseen by an 18-member Board of Directors made up exclusively of college and university presidents. The Board has the final vote on Division I legislative matters and is also responsible for delegating responsibilities to the Management Council, approving the annual budget, and insuring ethnic and gender diversity among its membership (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). The Division I Management Council, which reports to the Board, consists of athletic administrators and faculty athletics representatives who are authorized to make recommendations to the Board and to manage any responsibilities assigned to them. Several committees and cabinets also report to the Division I Management Council. Division I cabinets report directly to the Management Council and are responsible for academic affairs, championships, eligibility and compliance, and competition. Division I committees report directly to a cabinet and include rules and sports committees. The NCAA's Legislative System The N C A A is considered a quasi-legal organization in which governance and legislative practices, consistent with the Association's Constitution, reflect the norms and values of their members (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). The NCAA's Constitution articulates the following Association functions: purposes and fundamental policy, principles for conduct, membership, organization, legislative authority and process, and institutional control. Additionally, the NCAA's legislation is a comprehensive statute with operating and administrative bylaws that provide rules and regulations supporting the purpose of the Association (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). Specifically, the operating bylaws include the following rules and regulations to address the following issues: ethical conduct, conduct and employment of athletics 4 Figure 1 N C A A Governance Structure 6 <4C ASSOCIATION WIDE COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Eight I-A members from Division I Board of Directors Two I-AA members from Division I Board of Directors Two I-AAA members from Division I Board of Directors Two members from Division II Presidents Council Two members from Division III Presidents Council EX OFFICIO members NCAA President Chairs of Divisions I, II, & III Management Councils DIVISION I BOARD OF DIRECTORS Members Institutional CEOs DIVISION II PRESIDENTS COUNCIL Members Institutional CEOs DIVISION III PRESIDENTS COUNCIL Members Institutional CEOs DIVISION I MANAGEMENT COUNCIL Members: Athletic Administrators Faculty athletics representatives DIVISION II MANAGEMENT COUNCIL Members: Athletic Administrators Faculty athletics representatives DIVISION III MANAGEMENT COUNCIL Members: Institutional CEOs Athletic Administrators Faculty athletics representatives DIVISION I COMMITTEES & CABINETS DIVISION II COMMITTEES SPORTS AND RULES COMMITTEES DIVISION III COMMITTEES W % 6 Taken from http://wwwl,ncaa.org/membership/governance/assoc-wide/executive_committee/index.html 5 personnel, amateurism, recruiting, eligibility, financial aid, awards, benefits and expenses for enrolled student-athletes, playing and practice seasons, establishment and control of championships and other events sanctioned by the N C A A , procedures for administrating and enforcing bylaws and the constitution, division membership, committees, and certification. Administrative regulations, executive regulations, enforcement policies and procedures, as well as athletics certification policies and procedures are listed under administrative bylaws (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). Based on the N C A A ' s Constitution the N C A A acts as its own regulatory and rules enforcement body (Davies, 1994). Striving for Rules Compliance and Enforcement During the 1980s, several high profile athletic programs (e.g., Southern Methodist University, Kentucky University, The University of Nevada at Las Vegas, and the University of Oklahoma) were found guilty of major rules violations. These instances of major rules violations led to a call for N C A A members to impose greater accountability and institutional control over their sport programs. Specifically, the Southern Methodist University (SMU) football program received the "death penalty"7 for repeated rule violations. The SMU's death penalty was a result of the N C A A bowing to the public and media pressures to seriously address such major rules violators. In addition to implementing more stringent legislation and rules systems, the N C A A also implemented three key rules compliance and enforcement procedures. First, the N C A A required that each member institution undergo a self-study every ten years including a report on their commitment to rules compliance. Second, the Association developed a "rules interpretation data base" that provided "correct" rule interpretations for its member institutions. Third, the implementation of these compliance and enforcement procedures resulted in N C A A member institutions creating position within the athletic department that oversaw the administration of these N C A A rules compliance and enforcement procedures, which are referred to as compliance officers.8 Evolution of Institutional Compliance Officers At the 1985 N C A A convention in Dallas, Texas, N C A A members passed a series of strict penalties for member institutions that violated Association rules (Blum, 1992). In the subsequent year, the N C A A created a compliance services department. This department disseminated educational materials about how to achieve rules compliance and conducted institutional program reviews (self-study) for each member institution. The implementation of stricter penalties for rules violations and the call for greater , institutional control led many big-time sport programs to create compliance coordinator positions. 7 The death penalty refers to the barring of a program from competition for two or more seasons and places severe restrictions on the athletic department and specific sport program as a penalty for displaying a consistent pattern of major rules violations and lacking 'institutional control' (Davies, 1994). 8 Compliance officers are assigned a variety of titles, such as compliance coordinator, Associate Athletic Director of Compliance, and so forth. However, those in the position are commonly referred to as compliance officers and thus I will use this term. 6 Compliance coordinators (or more commonly referred to as compliance officers) were responsible for reviewing records, investigating possible rules infractions, collecting documents required by the N C A A , and acting as liaisons between the athletic department, conference, and N C A A compliance services. Compliance officers' were also responsible for educating institutional stakeholders on rules and compliance (Blum, 1992). N C A A compliance efforts have increased considerably since the 1985 Convention. For example, in 1991, the National Association of Athletics Compliance Coordinators was formed. Several major Conference offices have also created and implemented a compliance and enforcement unit, including the following major Conferences: the Pac-10, the Big Ten, the Atlantic Coast, the Big East, the Southeastern, and the Big 12. The Pac-10 is perceived by other member Conferences as being more strict and systematic in their approach to rules compliance. The following section provides an historical account of the evolution of the Pac-10 Conference detailing critical events that have significantly influenced the current Conference's cultural traditions and approach to rules compliance. The Pacific-10 Conference On December 2, 1915, University faculty members founded the Pacific Coast Conference (PCC). The initial membership of the PCC consisted of four schools: the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Oregon, Oregon State College (now Oregon State University) and the University of Washington (Seaborg, 2000). In a period of 11 years, the Conference grew to include Washington State University, Stanford University, the University of Southern California, the University of Idaho, the University of Montana, and the University of California, Los Angeles (Pac-10 Handbook, 2001-2002). As previously stated the PCC disbanded in 1959 and formed the Athletic Association of Western Universities (AAWU). In 1962, the A A W U added Washington State University and changed its name to the "Big Six", and in 1964 became the "Big Eight" with the additions of Oregon and Oregon State. Renamed the Pacific-8 in 1968, the Conference expanded to include the University of Arizona and Arizona State University in 1978 and was renamed the Pac-10. At present, the Pac-10 Athletic Conference is one of 32 N C A A DI-A conferences. The Pac-10 has ten member schools (See Figure 2).9 Each school sponsors ten men's and 11 women's sports. The conference is also a member of the Mountain Pacific Sports Federation in five other men's sports and two other women's sports (Pac-10 Handbook, 2001-2002). 9 The following institutions are members of the Pac-10: University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona; Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona; the University of California, Berkeley, California; the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon; Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon; Stanford University, Palo Alto, California; the University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California; the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California; the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; and Washington State University, Pullman, Washington. 7 The Pac-10's Approach to Compliance and Enforcement The founding faculty members of the PCC wrote the charter and became self-appointed governors of the organization. The Constitution states the following Conference goals: To establish and maintain high standards of scholarship and sportsmanship in the institutions which are members of the Conference, and in those coming under its influence; to promote intercollegiate athletics; to maintain such regulation and supervision of athletic sports governed by it as to keep athletic activities the incidental and not the principal feature of university and intercollegiate life. (Quoted in Seaborg, 2000, p. 21) Figure 2 Pacific-10 Conference Prior to 1959, the Conference had a reputation for demanding a strict approach toward rules compliance (Thelin, 1994). The Conference had a fulltime commissioner, a formal code of conduct, a reporting system for athletic infractions, and regular meetings where issues such as rules violations were discussed. Reportedly, many of the member institutions' power boosters were frustrated with the Conference's strict approach to rules compliance and its centralizing authority. In 1959, the PCC disbanded and five universities (California, Stanford, Southern California, U C L A , and Washington) formed the A A W U . Rather than operating with a commissioner, the A A W U operated with an executive director, and adopted an honor system towards rules compliance. This honor system was a policy of institutional application of the rules and the member institutions operated on "mutual trust and confidence" (Byers, 1995; Seaborg, 2000). However, one of its member institutions (University of California, Berkeley) committed serious rules violations. In 1971, two Berkeley football players reportedly were admitted to the institution without qualifying grades. Byers (1995) maintained that the Conference's mutual trust policy was inadequate to appropriately address Berkeley's recruiting violations. 8 In 1971, the Conference therefore, decided to re-establish central compliance procedures and rules enforcement. The 1971 reorganization of compliance has led to the present structure of rules compliance, along with their current philosophy towards rules compliance and enforcement. Noteworthy, the Conference continues to operate based on the notion of mutual trust and confidence. The veracity of this notion is a debatable issue. The Conference Handbook (2001-2002, p. 10) states: This Conference is formed for the purpose of establishing an athletic program to be participated in by the members on the basis of mutual trust and confidence and based upon high standards of scholarship and sportsmanship. The Pac-10 Conference's approach to compliance is unique. Currently, the Pac-10 has a comprehensive enforcement program that conducts its own investigations of allegations of major violations. The Pac-10 Handbook (2001-2002, p. 44) explains the importance of conducting its own compliance program: The Conference believes that by conducting its own compliance program it can best serve its members through timely investigation and resolution of potential enforcement matters. Such a Conference program recognizes the unique personality of each Conference member and its athletic program. In most instances, the enforcement program processed its own cases before forwarding their findings and recommendations for penalties to the N C A A (Mathews, 2003). The Pac-10 Conference office recommends to the N C A A any penalties/sanctions for rules violations by its members. The Conference's approach to compliance and enforcement has earned them a reputation as a Conference that "cares about rules compliance" (http://sports.espn.go.com, 2001). The Pac-10 Conference office has two positions in charge of compliance issues: Assistant Commissioner, Governance & Enforcement, and Assistant Commissioner, Compliance. The Assistant Commissioner for Compliance is the key authority regarding Conference compliance issues. The Pac-10 Handbook (2001-2002, p. 44) however, states that the Commissioner serves as the "official interpreter of rules and regulations prescribed in the conference handbook. The Commissioner is also responsible for obtaining and disseminating N C A A rules interpretations [sic] to Conference member institutions. The compliance and enforcement staff members assist the Commissioner in administrating these interpretative duties. In addition to the Pac-10 Conference Commissioner for compliance, the N C A A also has a membership services division that assists its members in understanding and complying with the Association's legislation. Each respective member institutions' athletic department is also independently organized. Some athletic program compliance officers are under the authorities of both the institutional and athletic administrations, while other compliance officers are solely under the authority of the athletic department. 9 In, the first section of this chapter, I questioned the ability of athletic stakeholders, specifically compliance officers, to employ a rule book approach to their moral judgments. Based on Dworkin's (1977, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases I have maintained that all rules require interpretation and that hard cases should be resolved in consideration of the NCAA's overall legislative system and political morality. The prior sections provided the reader with an account of the Association's legislative system and the role of compliance work. The following section describes the NCAA's political morality, which I refer to as its moral point of view. Gaining an understanding of the NCAA's moral point of view is critical in acquiring an appreciation of how compliance officers utilize this viewpoint in resolving hard cases. The NCAA's Moral Point of View Frankena (1980) contends that a society possesses a morality when the majority of its individual members agree to a considerable extent about a common moral point of view.10 Due to the fact that the N C A A has over 1000 members who have agreed to abide by the Association's legislative system and Operating Bylaws, I maintain that the majority of N C A A stakeholders support a similar moral point of view to the NCAA's . Additionally, the Pac-10 Conference's moral point of view reflects the NCAA's . The Pac-10's standards of conduct are similar to the NCAA's , which are expressed in the Conference Handbook (2001-2002) and reflect Conference decision-making. According to Frankena, the moral point of view is a social endeavor in which individuals or groups make evaluative judgments based on the consideration of other people/sentient beings. In a similar vein, Dworkin's (1985) concept of "political morality" parallels Frankena's (1980) moral point of view, in that society defines morality based on its notions of justice and fairness. The N C A A has three central moral standards, which are clearly articulated in the N C A A Manual (2001-2002). First, member institutions' competitive athletic programs are designed to be a vital part of their educational system (NCAA Manual, 2001-2002). Second, a clear demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sport must be observed. Third, member institutions should adopt and adhere to the Association's legislative and rules systems in order to uphold the idea of fairness and to create a level playing field for its members to compete in. Thus, the NCAA's moral point of view or political morality requires that N C A A DI athletics should be conducted in accordance with the educational mission of institutions, within the notion of amateurism, and within the parameters of Association rules. While moral standards by the N C A A have clearly been identified, the commercialization of intercollegiate sports has led to the increasing distance between athletics programs and education, while also blurring the line between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports. Commercialization's 1 0 Frankena's (1980) notion of the moral point of view is explained in more detail in Chapter three. 10 effects on college athletics have been well documented (cf. Sperber, 1991; VanderZwaag, 1998; Zimbalist, 1999). "Big Business" universities and colleges have athletic departments with budgets ranging from $40 million to $70 million dollars. Specifically, success in Division I-A football and men's basketball provides a considerable financial benefit to the university (Eitzen, 1999; Zimbalist, 1999). The N C A A financially rewards athletic programs for participating in, and winning Bowl games and likewise in the N C A A basketball tournament." The financial gain from winning increases an athletic department's overall budget. Increased resources provide enhanced quality of travel, meals, equipment, medical assistance, and improved facilities, as well as enhancing the university's reputation. As a result, these successful schools are able to recruit talented student-athletes, and attract high caliber coaches who garner long-term success. Media, licensing, and clothing apparel contracts may also produce additional revenue for the athletic department/university.12 It is these acts of commercialization in college athletics that has created particular tensions among various athletic stakeholders regarding the purpose of college sports and their decision-making practices (cf. Eitzen, 1999; Thelin, 1994; Zimbalist, 1999). These tensions have led to issues regarding the educational mission of N C A A DI institutions, what constitutes amateurism, and what constitutes appropriate compliance with N C A A rules. This also begs the question, as to whether N C A A members' rule interpretations and justifications should reflect a "spirit of the rules" rather than a rigid "letter of the rules" approach. Resolving N C A A Hard Cases In resolving hard cases, similar to the previously mentioned gray shirt example, critics of N C A A athletic stakeholders (Gough, 1994; Lumpkin, et al., 1999; Sperber, 1991) have argued that these stakeholders would employ a literal approach in resolving such a case. That is, compliance officers' should determine the legality of recruiting a gray shirt athlete by examining the meaning of the rules. The rules state that a gray shirt athlete is a recruited athlete. A coach from another athletic program cannot contact recruited athletes. Therefore, Coach Robert's actions violate N C A A rules. However, as previously stated, Dworkin (1977, 1986) contends that a rule book approach is restrictive in resolving hard cases. His theory suggests that compliance officers should employ an interpretive approach in resolving hard cases. In this vein, compliance officers' resolution of the gray shirt problem entails examining the overall legislative system and its political morality. Even though the athlete was a "recruited athlete", a compliance officer would want to determine whether he attended practices and whether he associated 1 1 In 1999, each team in the Rose Bowl received $33 Million (Eitzen, 1999). 1 2 For example, Notre Dame University had a 5 year-$45 million contract with the NBC network to televise their football games, and the Pacific Ten Conference had a $10 million contract with the ABC network to televise conference games where the money is distributed amongst member schools (Eitzen, 1999). In 1994, the University of Michigan earned $6 million in licensing revenue and in 1998, the University of Arizona signed a 5 year-$7 million contract with Nike (Zimbalist, 1999). 11 with the coaching staff or other team members. The rules clearly state that coaches should not contact recruited athletes. The compliance officer would have to determine if Coach Roberts contacted the student-athlete, and if so, why he contacted him. If communication between the two coaches occurred, the compliance officer would to examine what circumstances led Coach Roberts to determine that the athlete was not a member of the team. Given this information and Coach Robert's actions, the compliance officer would also consider if an unfair advantage was gained by Coach Robert's program. Furthermore, given recruiting policies and transfer rules, the compliance officer would also have to decide whether Coach Robert's actions were consistent with these standards. Asking these kinds of questions, examining case particularities, and examining Association recruiting rules and procedures reflects Dworkin's interpretive approach. Compliance officers who engage in rule interpretations and deliberations are making practical judgments (Coombs, 1997; Gall, 1945; Wallace, 1988). Wallace (1988) contends that practical judgments are required when people are confronted with uncertainty about the right course of action. When making practical judgments in highly formalized contexts (e.g., sports management, the military, and the law) the rules themselves also inform the standards of reasoning an administrator employs. Administrators' judgments, including compliance officers, are informed by their practical knowledge in relation to their work context. The body of practical knowledge that compliance officers have developed includes: understanding of pertinent organizational rules, policies, and procedures, understanding the intent of N C A A , Conference, and institutional the rules, understanding previous rule interpretations, understandings of different N C A A , Conference, and institutional concepts (e.g., in relation to Coach Robert's case-a compliance officer would need to determine what constitutes a recruited athlete, and decide if a gray shirt student-athlete is considered a recruited athlete), past compliance, athletic administrative, general administrative, and other experiences. The knowledge developed in compliance work is specialized and to address each problem compliance officers encounter, they will draw on their "compliance" know how, skills, values, and beliefs to assist them in their deliberations and judgments. The character13 of a reasoner also influences practical judgments (Aristotle, 1976; Dewey, 1910; Gall, 1945). Gall's (1945) study on judges and practical judgments argued that a judges' character informed their practical judgments. He states: The character of the judger—his philosophical orientation, characteristic attitudes, personal qualities, biases, predilections and prejudices-in short, his deeply habituated traits of thought and conduct-operates as an integral part of the process . . . gives an explanation as to how two judges using the same scientific method can arrive at opposite conclusions about an objective situation, (p. 32) 1 3 Gall (1945, p. 33) defines a reasoner's character as, "[d]eeply habituated traits of thought and conduct which, for the discipline of practical judgment, are subsumed under the term character, include all aspects of the judger's pattern of reaction-his integrity, courage, sincerity, devotion to duty, tolerance, temperament, orientation, as well as beliefs and prejudges which he may bring to bear on a given case". 12 Over time, the institution in which a reasoner works will shape his/her character (Gall, 1945; Solomon, 1992). In this case, compliance officers' interpretations and deliberations will be informed by the overall norms, values, beliefs, and strategic approaches employed by the NCAA to address difficult problems such as the gray shirt issue. Compliance officers' approaches to interpreting and deliberating about NCAA rules are thus influenced, not only by NCAA rules, but also by their philosophical orientation or character, and institutional values. Dworkin (1977, 1986), however, argues that in resolving hard cases14 an individual's judgment should not be influenced by his/her own character or political morality. In this vein, compliance officers would not be entitled to employ their own moral beliefs or values in deciding hard cases, unless these beliefs or values are in accord with the rules. However, compliance officers' moral characters will inform their understandings of the NCAA legislative system and their notion of fairness. During rule interpretations and deliberations, compliance officers might experience tensions when complying with NCAA rules, such as when they perceive the rules to be unfair or prevent them from doing the right thing. They must however, continue to abide by the rules. These tensions and the difficulties they pose for managing athletics have not been extensively studied in the past and thus warrant further research. Moral Functioning Research Moral reasoning research in professional fields (e.g., sport management, law, business, and the military) has been heavily influenced by cognitive developmental psychology. In particular, approaches to the topic have tended to be framed within Kohlberg or Rest's theories and their associated methodologies (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rest, 1979, 1986). For example, studies that have measured athletic administrators' and other professionals' moral reasoning were framed within Kohlberg's or Rest's theories and employed their methodologies to quantify morality (Daicoff, 1996; Malloy, 1991; Timmer, 1999; White, 1992). These researchers found that professionals' moral reasoning in highly formalized organizations was equivalent to preconventional or conventional levels on Kohlberg's scale or reflected the maintaining norms level on Rest's (1986) schema model. That is, professionals' reasoning reflects organizational rules and standards of behavior. Research on athletes' moral reasoning has also focused on measuring the level of moral reasoning (Beller & Stoll, 1995; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986a, 1986b; Hall, 1981). These studies all reported similar findings as they reported that athletes displayed lower levels of moral reasoning then non-athletes. This literature supports Gough's (1994) and Lumpkin et al.'s (1999) arguments that individuals in highly competitive intercollegiate athletics contexts reason to the level of the rules or are 1 4 Dworkin (1977, p. 83) defines a case as a hard case, "when no settled rule dictates a decision either way" 13 restricted in engaging in thoughtful moral judgment. These ethicists argue that the context restricts reflective or practical judgment because organizational rules define moral behavior. Walker et al. (1995) and Walker (2002a) however, argue that cognitive moral development's approaches (such as those of Kohlberg & Rest) to the study of moral functioning have "stagnated" the field because of their conceptual skew and biases. These cognitive moral developmentalists have defined morality along one philosophical domain (e.g., justice, care, or empathy) and they have focused on quantifying moral reasoning. Walker (2002a) expressed his concern with cognitive moral psychology's approach to moral functioning research when he argued that cognitive developmental psychology tended to focus on the study of moral rationality, underpinned by formalist traditions in moral philosophy and neglected to consider personality factors in moral reasoning (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rest, 1979, 1986). Walker (2002a, p. 65) also argued that "the field has been preoccupied with the interpersonal aspects of morality that regulate our relationships with each other while ignoring the intrapsychic aspects that pertain more to our basic values, lifestyle, identity, and character." Morality is both an interpersonal and intrapersonal endeavor. Morality relates not only to what kind of life we should strive to realize but also how we should relate to people. People's moral characters influence how their relationships with other people are realized. Therefore, morality and moral functioning research should examine people's morality within a comprehensive theoretical and methodological framework. More specifically, morality and moral functioning research should focus on examining people's virtues, their daily interactions with people and moral experiences, and how these moral features are realized in their decisions. This position provides the framework for this study of compliance officers' morality and moral functioning. Moral functioning is multifaceted and, in this study, is based on Walker's (2002a) definition-the dynamic interplay of thought, emotions, and behavior in decision-making. Moral thinking involves the combination of values and emotions that ultimately leads to our decisions. Walker's (2002a) definition of moral functioning accepts the interdependent and interactive nature of these three mechanisms (thought, emotion, & behavior). Additionally, in this study moral functioning also includes moral perception and sensitivity, which refers to accurately identifying a moral problem, understanding why the problem is moral, and being able to accurately distinguish morally salient features (Blum, 1994; Kekes, 1989). In contrast, Kohlberg's theory of moral development separates thought and emotion. His research focused on measuring cognition and justice based reasoning. Walker (2002a) disagrees with Kohlberg, maintaining that people's moral thoughts and emotions are interconnected and inform our moral actions. Thus, the study of morality and moral functioning cannot appropriately be carried out unless these mechanisms are researched in unison. Wallace (1988) and Winkler (1993) also contend that traditional philosophical approaches to studying morality and moral reasoning are limited in helping people address practical problems. In particular, Wallace (1988, p. 92) argues that morality "itself is something that moves and changes" and 14 that "moral considerations are irreducibly multiple." Traditional philosophical approaches, such as principle-based theories (e.g., Kant or Rawls), assume that fixed, unchanging rules or methods can provide explicit directions in resolving difficult practical moral problems. Wallace (1988, p. 50) rejects these claims arguing that the "solution of practical moral problems requires a pragmatic and Contextualist approach", which "directly addresses" more appropriately the multiple and complex nature of everyday moral problems." A Contextualist practical reasoning approach advocates for the resolution of everyday moral problems through "practical considerations", including the examination of rules, policies, beliefs, values, and through the interpretation and application of appropriate moral concepts. Cognitive moral development's dominance on moral reasoning research has led to studies being conducted that are framed from one independent theory (justice) and focused on using one method (measuring moral reasoning) that have resulted in the current restricted view of our understanding of morality and moral functioning (Walker et al., 1995; Walker 2002a). The literature provides little insight into how individuals in highly formalized contexts think about right and wrong, define various moral concepts, interpret moral problems (their moral perceptions and sensitivities), and understand morality and moral concepts that inform their moral perceptions and sensitivities, and influence their moral reasoning. While the contribution of this body of research (cognitive developmental psychology) has been monumental, Nucci (2002) and Walker (2002a), argue that the shift to investigating morality and moral functioning from people's day-to-day experiences15 and from a broader prospective is equally important. Therefore, this call to examine people's real-life morality and moral functioning from a holistic perspective underpinned the rationale for the study and its design. Statement of the Problem In this study, I have argued that, even though compliance officers work in extremely formalized organizations, they engage in thoughtful moral deliberations. Critics of the NCAA's strict and cumbersome rules argue that these rules have defined athletic stakeholders' morality and moral judgments (Gough, 1994; Lumpkin et al., 1999; Sperber, 1991). Moral reasoning research supports these critics' arguments as studies have typically used "a" theory of justice and sought to quantify moral reasoning suggesting that athletic stakeholders reason to the level of the rules (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986b; Malloy, 1991; Timmer, 1999). I maintain, however, that naturally athletic stakeholders reason to the level of the rules because they are required to abide by and uphold organizational rules and policies. The findings of this study will demonstrate that compliance officers' moral functioning is an extensive and complicated process in which their individual conceptions of morality inform: the types of problems they 1 5 Nucci's (2002) and Walker's (2002) arguments were outlined in the September (2002), Journal of Moral Education, 31(3) special issue on the Minnesota approach to morality. 15 deem to be moral, their approaches to rule interpretations, and their resolution of practical moral problems. Moreover, the findings suggest that compliance officers used several approaches to rule interpretations, supporting Dworkin's (1985, 1986) theory that all rules require interpretation. Distinct from the previous theoretical approaches and research designs used in morality research, this study examined compliance officers' morality and moral functioning using a holistic theoretical approach and interpretive qualitative research method. In this dissertation, a holistic approach refers to the examination of the interactive nature of moral functioning. Moral functioning entails several interrelated processes, including an understanding of right and wrong, moral perceptions and sensitivities, and standards of practical reasoning. Employing such an approach enabled me to display the interconnection between compliance officers' conceptions of morality with their moral functioning. Based on this holistic approach and chosen method, in this study I argued that compliances officers' conceptions of morality were broadly defined and included various values. Additionally, their deliberations were informed by their respective moral codes, which influenced their moral perception and sensitivities, including how they interpreted and deliberated about N C A A and Conference rule interpretations. N C A A and Conference rules and principles were significant factors in compliance officers' interpretations and deliberations resolution of hard cases; nevertheless, their personal moral characters were evident in their judgments. Research Questions To date no sport management research has examined N C A A athletic administrators' (specifically compliance officers) morality and moral functioning framed within a holistic theoretical approach. In considering the theoretical and methodological concerns discussed above and in light of this gap in the sport management literature, my research was informed by the following research questions: 1. What are Pac-10 Conference compliance officers' conceptions of morality? 2. What issues do Pac-10 Conference compliance officers perceive in their work to be moral? 3. What approaches do Pac-10 Conference compliance officers' use to resolve the moral issues they experience in their work? 4. How are Pac-10 Conference compliance officers' conceptions of morality reflected in their deliberations about the moral problems they experience in their work? 5. How do Pac-10 Conference compliance officers' reason in hard cases relating to N C A A rules? 16 Overview of the Theoretical Approach In addition to Dworkin's (1977, 1985, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases, and Frankena's (1980) theory of morality, this study was also informed by a Contextualist approach to practical reasoning based upon the works of Wallace (1988), Winkler (199,3), and Coombs (1984, 1997). Contextualist practical reasoning maintains that problems should be resolved in consideration of the "concrete circumstances" of a particular situation (Winkler, 1993, p. 344). Considerations are based on appealing to relevant historical antecedents, social and cultural conditions, institutional and professional norms, beliefs, and values, and by using comparative case analysis. Resolving practical problems requires making judgments that are formulated based on the most reasonable solution to a problem through a case-driven and inductive process that strives to fulfill relevant standards of good thinking. Relevant standards of good reasoning inform how individuals deliberate about real-life moral problems and provide warrants for their judgments. Winkler (1993) argues that the values held in these standards of reasoning inform our practices and that "moral judgments are justified by defending themselves against objections and rivals" (p. 360). Moral judgments are determined by assessing the reasons of alternatives and their consequences. These judgments are made based on the assessment of which set of reasons most realize the values and beliefs people hold. Practical reasoning is therefore, comparative, meaning that judgments are made based on whether the course of action is "more or less desirable in relation to alternative courses of action" including the alternative of not acting or deciding not to change an existing program. The soundness of practical reasoning is evaluated by assessing the reasons (or premises) for making a judgment. Assessing which set of reasons holds more weight or which alternative is more supported by the best argument is the basis for making a practical judgment. Coombs' (1984, 1997) outlines these standards, which provide practical standards for defending against objections and rivals. This conception of moral reasoning was most appropriate because the focus of this study was on N C A A DI-A compliance officers' morality and moral functioning. Compliance officers employ practical reasoning in their deliberations of hard cases relating to their duties, including interpreting and deliberating about N C A A rules. Reasoning about difficult moral problems requires an accurate recognition of the problem, a clear understanding of why a problem is deemed moral, and a careful consideration of the alternatives in making a judgment. Hence, my study aims to show that a Contextualist notion of moral reasoning is a realistic conception of how compliance officers' engage in moral reasoning about difficult moral problems (such as the grayshirt scenario) where such features as, N C A A rules, work related obligations, Association, professional, and personal values, inform their moral interpretations, deliberations, and judgments. 17 Application of the Theoretical Approach N C A A DI-A compliance officers work within a specific quasi-legal and athletic context. Similar to legal professionals, one of the roles of a compliance officer is to interpret and deliberate about problems that relate to Association rules. This approach outlined above allows for a holistic examination of N C A A DI-A compliance officers' morality and moral thinking in such a highly competitive and legalistic athletic environment. Frankena's (1980) conception of morality is inclusive allowing for pluralistic understandings of right and wrong. The conception of moral reasoning informing this study was selected over more traditional moral philosophy frameworks (such as utilitarianism or Rawls' notions of justice) for two main reasons. First, compliance officers deal with practical problems in varying degrees of complexity. In simple cases, where the rules strictly apply they will still utilize practical reasoning standards in deciding an appropriate course of action (Coombs, 1984, 1997; Dworkin, 1977, 1985; Winkler, 1993). Compliance officers, however, sometimes encounter hard cases. In resolving hard cases, compliance officers are required to make rule interpretations and justifications. Compliance officers cannot merely research the answer in the "data base". Resolving these cases requires employing standards of practical reasoning, which are context-related or case specific. Second, a Contextualist approach, as I have defined it, is most appropriate for studying N C A A DI-A compliance officers' moral functioning because this framework provides a holistic examination of their morality and moral reasoning in this athletic context. This theoretical approach addresses Walker et al.'s (1995) appeal for empirical research that explores how people experience morality on a day-to-day basis. This approach provides a holistic explanation of morality and moral functioning, from how people define right and wrong, to what kinds of problems they deem moral, and how they resolve these problems within a highly formalized intercollegiate athletic context. A Contextualist approach to moral reasoning, furthermore, is a realistic conception of how compliance officers deliberate in hard cases where such features as N C A A rules, obligations, and values, inform their moral judgments. Organization of the Dissertation The remainder of the dissertation is structured in the following manner. Chapter two provides an overview and critical examination of the dominant theoretical approaches employed to examine sport stakeholders' and business, legal, and military professionals' moral reasoning. Additionally, a review of related literature on sport stakeholders' and identified professionals' moral functioning highlighting how the cognitive moral development's philosophical assumptions of morality and their focus on quantifying morality have shaped our understanding of the interrelated nature of morality and moral functioning is provided. The aim of the critique and literature review is to demonstrate first, the limitations of the 18 theoretical approaches that have framed moral functioning research and second, to highlight our narrow understanding of sport stakeholders' morality and moral functioning. The literature review and its r findings provide the basis for the selection of the theoretical framework, which is the focus of chapter three. Based on the literature review, an argument is provided maintaining that people's morality and their moral functioning should be framed within a holistic theoretical approach. This chapter aims to delineate a holistic theoretical approach by describing a pluralist definition of morality and describes a comprehensive picture of moral functioning and the interdependent nature between the two phenomena. Chapter four describes the research methodology, which was selected on the basis of a detailed account and critique of previous data collection methods. Additionally, this chapter outlines the selected research design, and a description of how the data was collected and analyzed. Chapters five, six, and seven present an analysis of the compliance officers' morality, moral perceptions and sensitivities, and practical reasoning. In these analysis chapters, I have presented the major findings that demonstrate: first, in chapter five the findings relating to compliance officers' understandings of right and wrong and the tensions they experienced in weighing their moral values in making moral judgments is reported. The significance of these findings is to illustrate the independent nature of compliance officers' normative systems. Moreover, the findings are presented to recapture their moral points of view, and how they interpreted and deliberated about N C A A hard cases. Second, in chapter six, the findings relating to compliance officers' approaches to rule interpretations and moral perceptions and sensitivities are discussed. This chapter illustrates the interconnected nature between compliance officers individual normative systems and their different moral perceptions and sensitivities, including their approaches to rule interpretations. Last, chapter seven provides a description of compliance officers' practical reasoning. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how compliance officers' conceptions of morality, their moral perceptions and sensitivities, Association standards, values, beliefs, and historical concepts, in addition to the context of the problem, informed their reasoning and the standards of practical reasoning met. Chapter eight concludes the dissertation by presenting a synopsis of the findings and major conclusions, providing implications for policy and practice, and discussing recommendations for future research. 19 CHAPTER TWO Review of Related Literature In chapter one, I argued that research on morality and moral functioning has been significantly influenced by the cognitive-developmental paradigm. Morality has been narrowly defined along one philosophical theory and researchers have concentrated on measuring people's levels of moral reasoning. Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981, 1984), Norma Haan's (1977, 1978), and James Rest's (1979, 1986a) and Rest et al.'s (1999) theories of moral development have been most prevalent in framing and analyzing studies on sport stakeholders' and professionals' moral functioning (cf. Elm &• Weber, 1994; Jones & McNamee, 2000; Walker et a l , 1995). This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents an overview of the dominant theoretical approaches (that is, the theories of Kohlberg, Rest, Haan, along with Jones' (1991) decision-making model) used to date in the study of sport stakeholders' and professionals' moral functioning. Included in this overview is a general critique, highlighting the limitations of these theoretical approaches as they relate to the exploration of professionals' (namely N C A A compliance officers) morality and moral functioning. The second section presents a review of related literature, which critically examines research on the moral functioning of athletes, coaches, athletic administrators, and professionals (i.e., law, military, & business). The purpose of the critique is twofold: first, to demonstrate the gap in the research relating to sport stakeholders' morality and moral functioning, and second to emphasize the narrowing influence of cognitive moral psychology's assumptions on how morality and moral functioning research has been theorized and conducted. Dominant Theoretical Approaches to Moral Functioning Research: An Overview Lawrence Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Judgment Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) theory of moral judgment is built on Piaget's (1932/1965) research regarding children's attitudes toward rules and authority. Piaget theorized that children's understandings of right and wrong were based on their respect for social order. He developed a stage theory of cognitive development suggesting that children's structures of reasoning were consistent across ages. Piaget linked this notion of cognitive development with moral development by suggesting that a child's logical thinking precedes moral development. Improved moral reasoning, therefore, only becomes possible with advanced cognitive reasoning. Piaget believed moral development occurred in two stages: (1) heteronomous-morality of constraint, and (2) autonomous-morality of cooperation. Kohlberg believed that moral development was more complex, lengthier, and more gradual than Piaget's theory. Similar to Piaget, Kohlberg (1981, 1984) conceived moral development as progression 20 through stages of successively more complex forms of reasoning about issues. He conducted a longitudinal study of boys' moral reasoning about hypothetical moral dilemmas. This research led to his theory of moral development, which articulates a three-level (preconventional, conventional and post-conventional), six-stage hierarchy model of moral development (Table 1). The notion of stage development is the central assumption to his theory. Moral development occurs in an invariant, culturally universal, and six-stage sequence. Each stage is qualitatively different, forms a structural whole, and describes a more complex structure of moral thinking. Furthermore, each stage of moral thinking also represents a separate and coherent theory of justice that is applied in resolving conflict situations. Individuals' progress through these stages one at time and stages cannot be skipped. The concepts of structure and content are distinguished. The structure of people's reasoning is the focus of moral judgment as, "it is the form that exhibits developmental regularity and generalizability within and across individuals" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2). Structures explain the reasoning or the "why" a judgment is made. The content of people's reasoning reflects their values, the "what" of a judgment. The reasons given for explaining what one should do are representative of the different stages of moral development. According to Kohlberg (1984), the principle of justice is the primary virtue and is the central concept in his depiction of moral judgment. Although he describes four moral orientations: (a) general and normative order or impartial following of rules and normative roles, (b) utilitarian maximizing of the welfare of each person, (c) perfectionist seeking of harmony or integrity of the self and the social group, and (d) fairness, balancing of perspectives, maintaining equity, social contract; the principle of justice underlies all of these orientations. The universal principle of justice is assumed to consistently apply across cultures and gender. In summary, Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment explicates a six-stage theory of moral development reflecting the progression of people's one-sided reliance on authoritarian claims to social concerns, to universal justice claims. Each stage reflects a distinctive orientation in resolving moral problems and the stages are invariant and universal. Kohlberg's theory reflects one aspect of moral psychology that involves the resolution of moral conflict problems. James Rest's Theory of Moral Development Rest (1986b, p.l) contends that, "morality is rooted in the social condition and the human psyche." Morality refers to "how humans cooperate and coordinate their activities in the service of furthering human welfare, and how they adjudicate conflicts among individual interests" (Rest, 1979, p. 3). Morality is considered a social condition because people live in groups and their actions affect each other. Rest (1986b, p. 1) argues that the "function of morality is to provide basic guidelines for determining how conflicts in human interests are settled [sic] and for optimizing mutual benefit of people living together in groups." Furthermore, he contends that our actions are guided by first principles of. 21 Table 1 Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development16 1. Preconventional Level The child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Stage 1: Punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4). Stage 2: Instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. 2. Conventional Level Maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. Stage 3: Interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice". Stage 4: Law and order orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, maintaining the given social order for its own sake. 3. Post-Conventional Level There is clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application separate from the authority of the groups and persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. Stage 5: Social contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. There tends to be a focus upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility. Outside of the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the official morality of the American government and constitution. Stage 6: Universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. social organization that prescribe distributive and procedural justice Morality is rooted in the human psyche as Rest maintains that people possess natural tendencies to be moral and to engage in moral behavior. He believes there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 1 6 Kohlberg (1975, p. 671). 22 people's moral development evolves in relation to social cognitive development. People possess innate capacities where empathy, forming relationships, and self-concept evolve through social experiences. Thus, Rest (1986b, p. 3) perceives morality as a "particular type of social value", relating to how people cooperate and coordinate activities to ensure human welfare and resolve moral conflicts. Rest (1994a) believes that moral development entails more than just six stages and moral judgment. The focus is on examining people's everyday moral experiences and the psychological processes that occur when people act morally. Based on his extensive research, he developed a four-component model (hereafter referred to as FCM) that includes four inner psychological processes that together gave rise to outwardly observable behavior (Rest, 1979, 1986). He rejects the idea that the psychology of morality consists of one variable or process. These processes (namely cognition, affect, & behavior) are interrelated hence each component involves varying kinds of interaction between thought and emotion (Rest, 1986b). The F C M has demonstrated that resolving real-life moral conflicts is more than just the application of the universal principle of justice. Furthermore, Rest (1979, 1986) does not claim that people deliberate in a linear fashion. Rather he argues that the four components are presented in a linear fashion for clarity in explaining these processes. Briefly, the F C M entails: 1. Moral sensitivity: being aware that a moral problem exists, interpreting a situation, and interpreting how people's actions affect other people. This entails role taking and empathy as one must imagine cause-effect chains of events. 2. Moral judgment: judging which action would be most justifiable in a moral sense. 3. Moral motivation: degree of commitment to taking the moral course of action, valuing moral values over other values, and taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes. 4. Moral character: persisting in a moral task, having courage, overcoming fatigue and temptations, and implementing subroutines that serve a moral goal. The Neo-Kohlbergian Approach Over a span of 25 years of research, Rest and his colleagues have refined their theory of moral development, which has led to what is referred to as the neo-Kohlbergian approach (Rest et al., 1999, 2000). Like Kohlberg, they agree on the following starting points, that is, there is an emphasis on cognition, the personal construction of basic epistemological categories (e.g., rights, duties, justice, and social order) is highlighted, moral maturity is assumed to be developmental (i.e., "differences occur in moral orientation and in advances in cognition where higher is better in a philosophical and normative-ethical sense" [Rest et al., 2000, p. 382]), and the developmental change is characterized as shifting from conventional to postconventional moral thinking. Rest et al. (1999, 2000) identified five central limitations to Kohlberg's overall approach. First, Kohlberg's theory is too focused on moral judgment, overlooking how people actually function in moral 23 situations. Second, Kohlberg's stages are broadly abstract representations of lifetime moral maturity. The abstract nature of these stages limits the usefulness in resolving everyday morarconflicts. Third, Kohlberg over emphasizes the principle of justice as representing higher levels of moral thought. His conception of justice thus focuses on addressing macro-moral issues. Macro-moral issues are concerned with formal structures of society versus micro-moral issues, which focus on personal, everyday relationships. Even with his revised stage six, which includes both the principles of justice and benevolence, critics contend that these two principles do not represent the complete scope of morality in everyday life (Blasi, 1990; Habermas, 1990; Pritchard, 1991). Fourth, Kohlberg's theory is based on examining people's resolution of hypothetical dilemmas about problems of conflict. These dilemmas narrow the scope of the types of moral problems people encounter on a daily basis or how they resolve real life moral problems (Walker et al., 1995; Wallace, 1989). Finally, Kohlberg believes that his stages of moral judgment are universal. His rejection of cultural relativism ignores the idea of a common morality that suggests that morality is socially constructed. Kohlberg's notion of universal stages has received much criticism as socially constructed moralities can and do undergo scrutiny and debate by societal members (Rest et al., 2000). Given these criticisms, the neo-Kohlbergians have revised Kohlberg's theory, which has led to their current theory of moral development. Similar to Kohlberg's theory, moral judgment structures are actively constructed by the individual and follow a developmental sequence (Rest et al., 1999). The point of departure however, starts with their rejection that moral thinking develops through stages. They contend that moral development occurs through the active construction of schemas, which are general knowledge structures that reside in long-term memory and facilitate information processing. Moral schemas are notions of "how roles are organized into a society wide cooperative structure" (Rest et al., 1999, p. 137). Kohlberg defines cognitive structures in terms of operations, that is, stages reflect more complicated moral thinking. In contrast, the neo-Kohlbergians define cognitive structures in terms of content, meaning "people develop insofar as their concepts are more complicated and normatively adequate" (Rest et al., 1999, p. 137). The neo-Kohlbergians have replaced Kohlberg's stages with schemas to "signal differences from Kohlberg's conception of "hard" moral stages" (Rest et al., 2000, p. 384). Moral development is viewed as shifting distributions rather than developing in a hierarchical fashion. Shifting distributions suggests that when people resolve moral conflicts they will call upon various parts of their moral knowledge, rather than the moral knowledge from one stage. Neo-Kohlbergians also reject Kohlberg's notion of separating structure and content in moral reasoning. Rest et al. (2000, p. 384) contend that schemas represent both "conceptions of institutions and role systems in society", meaning schemas represent varying levels of structure and content in people's reasoning. Kohlberg defines content only in terms of social institutions Schemas also represent a common morality that is socially constructed. Kohlberg postulates that universality is representative of stages, whereas the neo-Kohlbergians consider cross-cultural similarity an empirical question (these differences are illustrated in Table 2). 24 Table 2 Variations Between Kohlberg and Neo-Kohlbergians Feature Kohlberg Neo-Kohlbergian Cognitive structures Operations Content Development Stages Schemas Endorses Hard Stages Shifting distributions Stages Universal Common Morality Distinguishes between Yes No Content and structure The second major revision has replaced Kohlberg's six stages with three schemas, called structures (Table 3): Personal-Interest schema (derived from Kohlberg's stage 2 and 3), Maintaining Norms schema (derived from Kohlberg's stage 4), and the Postconventional schema (derived from Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6). These "three moral schemas are developmentally ordered ways of answering the macro question (how do people get along with people who are not friends, kin or personal acquaintances, i.e., how to organize society-wide cooperation)" of how to resolve moral conflicts where institutions and established practices create injustices (Rest et al., 2000, p. 386). Walker (2002b, p. 361) suggests that the idea of a common morality is ethically relative, since morality "reflects the shared ideals and circumstances of the community." A common morality is defined as "a social construction, evolving from the community's experiences, particular institutional arrangements, deliberations and the aspirations that are voiced at the time and which win support of the community" (Rest et al., 1999, p. 301). Walker (2002b, p. 361) argues that Rest et al.'s (1999) notion of a common morality is characterized in general terms and not explicitly based on any recognizable moral philosophy and is a shift from Kohlberg's universal model of moral development (Walker, 2002b). Neo-Kohlbergians emphasize the personal construction of basic social justice categories (i.e., rights, duty, justice and social order), maintaining the focus on the study of macro-morality. This distinction between macro-morality and micro-morality is problematic because face-to-face relationships with others (macro-morality) and people's individual values (micro-morality) are interrelated with maintaining a virtuous lifestyle and interacting with people that work within the formal structures or institutions that exist within society (Walker, 2002b). For example, people's values are fundamentally linked with maintaining notions of free speech, due process, equity in organizations, or preventing nondiscriminatory work practices. Rest et al. (1999, 2000) criticized Kohlberg's concentration on the study of macro-moral issues, yet the neo-Kohlbergians also study morality from a macro perspective. This. 25 Table 3 Features of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) Moral Judgment Schemas17 Schema Features Personal-Interest schema Arbitrary, impulsive co-operation Self-focused Advantage to self is primary Survival orientation Negotiated co-operation Scope includes others who are known In-group reciprocity Maintaining Norms schema Need for norms Society-wide view Uniform categorical application Partial society-wide reciprocity Duty orientation Postconventional schema Appeal to an ideal Sharable ideals Primacy of moral ideal Full reciprocity Rights orientation focus contradicts the purpose of the F C M , which proposes to provide a comprehensive picture of moral functioning. Furthermore, Walker (2002b) has argued that the distinction between macro-and micro-morality has yet to be debated for its philosophical validity. At best, "anything beyond a somewhat superficial distinction can be maintained given the interdependencies between living a virtuous life, relating to others with integrity and interacting with secondary institutions of society within a moral framework" (Walker, 2002b, p. 360-361). In summary, Rest's theory of moral judgment and the neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral thinking is an expansion of Kohlberg's theory. Rest (1979, 1986a) suggests that moral judgment has four main processes, as defined in his F C M of moral functioning. Morality is based on social justice and moral maturity occurs in schemas. While the neo-Kohlbergian approach encompasses moral thought, emotion, and action, there continues to be a focus on cognition and macro-morality. Limitations of Cognitive Moral Developmental Approach Cognitive moral developmental theory is grounded on the assumption that moral judgment is based on principled reasoning occurring in sequential, hierarchical, and universal stages. Three main assumptions guide cognitive moral development theory. First, even though developmentalists disagree on 1 7 From Rest et al. (1999) and Narvaez and Bock (2002, p. 307) 26 the specific characteristics of certain stages of moral development, they do agree that moral maturity (the highest stage of morality) has a start and an end point, (albeit idealistic) that is perceived as the highest stage of morality (Crittenden, 199.0; Gough, 1995). Second, moral maturity is conceived in terms of reasoning ability that is measured by the structure (form) and not the content of reasoning. Analysis of moral judgment is focused on why a person believes ajudgment versus what they believe in making a judgment. Third, moral judgments or moral maturity are based on a specific moral principle such as justice, or care and responsibility. Finally, cognitive moral developmental theories are founded on the notion that moral judgment is limited to moral conflicts and excludes moral relevance problems. Moral conflict problems occur when two or more competing values conflict in a concrete situation (Kohlberg, 1975). Moral relevance problems occur in situations where persons are not sure which concept applies to the resolution of a moral problem (Wallace, 1988). Even though the advancement of moral psychology is quite evident, Walker et al. (1995) indicate that this, ... influence has given the study of moral development a particular skew, which may constrain our ability to develop a more holistic understanding of moral functioning and its development, and perhaps it can no longer be considered a progressive research enterprise, (p. 373) Criticisms of these individual moral development theories (Kohlberg, Rest, & Gilligan) are well documented (cf. Blum, 1994; Crittenden, 1990; Gough, 1995). I will broadly outline the general concerns identified in the previous paragraph regarding cognitive moral development theories, as these concerns were most pertinent to this study. First, the claim that moral development occurs through universal and invariant stages has not been empirically supported (Blum, 1994; Crittenden, 1990; Rest et al., 1999). The explication of the various stages has not been clear. More specifically, the conceptions of higher stages of reasoning have been problematic (Crittenden, 1990). Boyd (1989) argues that content descriptions of very complex structures of judgment create ambiguities and make scoring questionable. In relation to the empirical support of stage theories, Crittenden (1990) accepts that Kohlberg's first four stages can be supported empirically. However, he maintains that "within the account as a whole, the conception of forms of maturity, beyond stage four is particularly problematic" (p. 83). Kohlberg has received harsh criticism for the lack of empirical evidence, supporting stages five and six, post-conventional thinking. Rest et al.'s (1999) revamped theory of moral development does, however, provide empirical support for post-conventional thinking. Second, cognitive moral development emphasizes the importance of examining the structure (form) of moral reasoning rather than the content. "Structure" refers to the way a person organizes the characteristics of a moral conflict or how a person reasons through a problem. Whether the answer is right 27 or wrong is not intended to be the focus of moral reasoning. This is problematic as Blum (1994) argues that how a person reasons through a problem will be influenced by what the person recognizes as the morally salient features of a situation. For example, i f an athletic director recognizes a situation as consisting of features representative of racial inequities, then his/her moral perception will influence the structure of his/her reasoning. Blum (1994) and Crittenden (1990) argue that separating content and structure in moral reasoning is impossible. The values and reasoning used to justify a person's moral judgment are interrelated and cannot be separated. For example, a compliance officer might believe that verification of information is important prior to declaring a student-athlete ineligible. The values of respect, accuracy of information, and procedural ethics, underlie the compliance officers' reasoning not to declare student-athletes ineligible prior to the completion of their research. Analyzing the structures of the compliance officer's reasoning independently from the content is problematic because these two features of moral functioning are interconnected and cannot be broken down into individual components (Blum, 1994; Crittenden, 1990). Third, Blum (1994) argues extensively that Kohlberg's principled approaches to moral judgment have three major flaws. First, moral perception is not recognized in principled morality. Blum argues that morality constitutes the accurate perception of a situation and identification of the morally salient features. Second, principled morality does not take into consideration the moral capacity that informs one that a particular situation falls under a given principle as an important feature of morality. Third, morality represents the ability to appropriately apply a principle in making a judgment. Even though Rest (1979, 1986) includes interpretation of a moral situation in his F C M , his definition of moral perception differs from Blum's (1994). Interpreting a situation refers to imaging all possible courses of action and their consequences. Accurately identifying the existence of a moral problem is not critical during interpretation of the situation rather, Rest (1986b) argues that the focus relates to a person realizing that his/her actions could affect other people. This definition of moral sensitivity does not explicitly include the importance of accurately recognizing the existence of a moral situation and understanding the different levels of moral saliency within the situation. In addition, Rest et al. (1999, 2000) and cognitive moral developmentalists in general, do not overtly state that the way a person perceives a situation as moral and his/her ability to identify the morally salient features is related to the general features of that person's character and moral make-up (Blum, 1994; Sherman, 1989). Furthermore, there is no explicit recognition that a person's moral make-up and moral perception inform the moral reasoning process. Finally, cognitive moral development theories are also problematic because they only pertain to problems of moral conflict and exclude problems of relevance (Wallace, 1988). Wallace (1988) maintains that problems of relevance arise when we are uncertain whether a concept applies to a situation. Contextualist notions of moral problems include both problems of conflict and relevance. These require acknowledging the "existence of many different moral considerations reflecting the complexity of human life and the variety of problems faced in living such a life" (Wallace, 1988, p. 54). Suggesting that 28 individuals only encounter one type of moral problem provides a limited notion of what constitutes a moral problem. "Ethical" Decision-Making Model: Jones' Issues Contingent Model In the business ethics realm, several researchers have engaged in theoretical and empirical studies examining managers' moral decision making1 8. Dissatisfied with normative approaches to moral decision-making in organizations, several scholars have developed what they refer to as positive ethical decision-making models (cf. Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; Trevino, 1986). Normative approaches to decision-making describe what should happen in resolving moral problems whereas positive models describe "what actually happens" when managers are confronted with moral problems (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000, p. 185). The theoretical assumptions identify critical constructs that aid in furthering the understanding of the elements that have the most significant effect on people's moral decision making in organizations. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986) developed ethical decision making models for marketing managers. Trevino (1986) and Jones (1991) provide general business ethical decision-making models. Jones' model is the most comprehensive as it is an extension of all three models (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Trevino, 1986) and Rest's (1979, 1986) F C M (Jones, 1991; Loe et al., 2000). Jones' (1991) Issue-Contingent Model integrates Rest's (1979, 1986a) four moral processes, moral intensity, and environmental factors that influence moral decision-making. Underpinning this model are two key definitions (Figure 3). First, Jones' (1991, p. 367) defines a moral issue as the result of a person's action, which results in harming or benefiting others. Ethical decisions are those which are "both legal and morally acceptable to the larger community" (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Jones (1991) uses the terms moral and ethical interchangeably. Moral intensity refers to the characteristics of the moral issue itself, excluding the characteristics of the moral agent and the organizational context (Jones, 1991). Moral intensity affects every component of moral decision-making and behavior, including: "magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect" (Jones, 1991, p. 372). Unlike contemporary moral philosophers (cf. Blum, 1994; Kekes, 1989; Sherman, 1989) who discuss moral perception and sensitivity, Jones' (1991) conception of moral intensity does not include a moral reasoner's moral character. Organizational factors refer to group dynamics, authority factors, and socialization processes and influence the establishment of moral intent and moral behavior. Jones' (1991) description of what constitutes an organizational factor is vague. In his explanation, he refers to other scholars' understandings of organizational factors. For example, he indicates that Trevino's (1986) and Ferrell and Gresham's (1985) models include situational variables. The reader is left to presume his model also includes these same variables. 1 8 Most business ethicists use the term ethical decision-making. 29 Figure 3 Jones' (1991) Issue-Contingent Model 1 9 Figure 3 Jones' (1991) starting point is the FCM (Rest, 1979, 1986). The recognition of a problem initiates the process. An individual proceeds to make a moral judgment, establish moral intent, which leads to moral action. These processes are affected by moral intensity and organizational factors. While Rest's (1979, 1986) F C M has sound validity and reliability scores, the limited empirical research using Jones' (1991) Issues-Contingency Model (cf. Loe et al., 2000; Paolillo & Vitell, 2002) has not provided sound support for the validity and reliability of Jones' model. Whereas it is clear that organizational factors affect managers' moral functioning, these have not been adequately fleshed out. In addition, there is not a clear connection between organizational factors and how they inform moral decision-making, as conceived by Jones, and as conceived by moral philosophers (e.g., organizational and moral intensity factors). Further, the collapsing of the moral and the legal is problematic as it is clearly the case that a particular legal decision could be construed as immoral. Haan's Interactional Theory of Morality Haan's (1977, 1978, 1983) interactional model of morality employs everyday morality as its starting point. Morality is deemed a social and emotional dialectic where people resolve moral conflicts through practical reasoning (Haan, 1985; Haan, Aerts, & Cooper, 1985). People determine moral truths based on their intersubjective agreements (Haan, 1978). Morality is also defined as balancing self-interests with others' interests. Haan et al. (1985, p. 38) posit that "people with moral dilemmas are actors 1 9 Adapted from Jones (1991, p. 379) 30 involved in real or imagined dialogues and negotiate moral claims so that balanced, equalized relations with others can be achieved or established." The focus is on how people engage in moral interaction in concrete situations, which leads to moral action (deciding to act). People's moral interactions are understood to be a form of moral action. Three central concepts underpin Haan's model (1978, 1983; Haan et al., 1985): moral balance, moral dialogue, and moral levels. The first two concepts relate to the interpersonal approach to resolving practical moral problems. Moral balance is when people are in basic agreement (explicit or implicit) about respective rights and obligations. For example, a compliance officer is said to be in moral balance with a coach about a rule interpretation when they are in basic agreement about the correct interpretation and application of the rule. In contrast, moral imbalance is the result of people who are in disagreement about mutual rights and responsibilities. A moral imbalance can occur when a compliance officer holds a different and more conservative interpretation of a rule than a coach. When people are in disagreement about how to resolve a moral conflict Haan (1985) suggests that they engage in moral dialogue (i.e., the use of any kind of communication-verbal or nonverbal-to convey one's perspective, needs, wants, and desires) to restore moral balance. Haan (1978) posits, that people engage in dialogues with each other with intents of achieving new or maintaining old moral balances, which may represent compromises or identifications of mutual interests, in order to protect and enhance their sense of themselves as moral beings among other beings, (p. 287) The compliance officer and coach would attempt to resolve their difference of a rule interpretation by engaging in dialogue: to explain their respective interpretations, to explain how they formulated their interpretation, and with the aim of reaching an agreement and deciding the most appropriate rule interpretation given Association and Conference rules. This shift to resolving moral conflicts through intersubjective agreements, therefore, rejects Kohlberg's notion that people make independent moral judgments based on the application of generalized universal principles. Moral levels, the third concept articulated by Haan, refer to the quality of dialogue developed and used by participants engaged in moral interaction. This interpersonal dialogue leads to moral development, which defines a person's ability to participate in complex dialogue. People's increased ability to engage in skilled dialogue is evolutionary. Through practice, people improve their ability to resolve moral conflict through various forms of communication. Moral development is therefore, the "gradual accruing personal social skill and tangible power, which then allows the social disequilibrium of moral conflict to be more sensitively resolved" (Haan et al., 1985, p. 997). In resolving moral conflict, people consider situational specifics and sociopsychological aspects of the participants, including their emotions, moral understandings, motivations, and cognitions. This notion of moral development is based on the assumption that young children can understand basic human reciprocity. The essential ingredient 31 of moral development, therefore, contains skills and tangible resources that are used in dialogue to resolve conflict problems. According to Haan (1978, 1983), five levels define moral development (see Table 4). Each level illustrates a different understanding of appropriate structuring and engagement of moral balance and dialogue. The Assimilation Phase contains the first two levels where a person thinks that moral balances should be made that give preference to one's own needs and wants. The Accommodation Phase contains levels three and four. During dialogue, people seek to provide more to the exchange of ideas than they receive and they have a greater ability to perceive the needs and desires of others. The Equilibrium Phase encompasses level five. People engaging in this standard of dialogue give equal recognition to all parties' interests. The model employs the concept of ego processing. Ego processes perform two psychological tasks: first, they manage the contribution of various psychological structures (e.g., moral and cognitive structures); and second, they manage internal functioning with environmental experience. Ego processes shape people's moral perceptions,and sensitivities and organize the weighing, organizing, deliberation, and acting on moral information. The interactional model also explains how certain ego regulations come into play to aid in seeking moral balance. There are two sets of ego processes: ego coping and ego defending. Ego coping involves addressing stress in an appropriate manner. Ego defending processes are triggered to facilitate one to maintain a coherent sense of self and can include behavior that is rigid or distorting. A person's moral action reflects his/her ability to engage in ego coping processes. Unlike Kohlberg's levels and stages, Haan's theory incorporates phases and levels. These phases and levels represent a range of cognitive and affective abilities, thoughts, and emotions, which are necessary in achieving fair and impartial moral agreements. Haan's phases and levels are not irreversible and invariant. She argues that people will not always respond consistently across various situations. The type of problem, the context, and case particularities all inform moral dialogue. Haan, therefore, rejects Kohlberg's notion of a universal morality and argues that situational characteristics will influence people's use of levels (lower and higher) of dialogue. Haan's (1978, 1983; Haan et al., 1985) interactionalist model represents moral action. This claim is problematic. Haan suggests that moral dialogue is moral action. She does not distinguish whether or not deciding not to act on one's judgment, which was formulated from moral dialogue, represents a person who is continuing to "do" moral action. This lack of clarity of whether deciding not to act is representative of moral action is perplexing. Coombs (1984, p. 3) posits that practical reasoning usually infers the "intention to do what there is good reason for doing." His notion of moral action also includes deciding not to act or going against one's intent because of a weakness of will . Jones and McNamee (2000) argue that moral action and moral reasoning are two distinct concepts. They argue that i f we accept Haan et al.'s (1985, p. 68) notion that dialogue is the structure of all moral activity then "Haan's theory is one of moral action only i f we study actual moral dialogue" (Jones & McNamee, 2000, p. 138.). 32 Table 4 Haan's (1978) Five Levels of Interpersonal Morality Assimilation Phase Level one: Power balancing. The person is unable to sustain a view of others' interest apart from self-interest. The person vacillates between compliance with others when forced and thwarting others when able to do so. Balances reflect self-interest except for situations where the self is indifferent or forced to compromise. Level two: Egocentric balancing. The person is able to differentiate others' interests from self-interest but does not understand that both may coincide in a mutual interest. People are viewed as essentially self-interested and out for their own good. To get what one wants, trade-offs or compromises are made. Accommodation Phase Level three: Harmony balancing. The person differentiates others' interest from self-interest but assumes that a harmony of these interests can be found because most people are believed to possess altruistic motives. Balances are sought that rest on good faith of all. People of bad faith are disapproved and dismissed from moral consideration. Level four: Common-interest balancing. The person differentiates all parties' self-interests from the common interest of the group. Balances of compromise are sought that conform to the system-maintenance requirements of the group. Because the moral culpability of all is recognized, externally regulated patterns of exchange are sought that benefit all while limiting personal vulnerability. Equilibrium Phase Level five: Multi-interest balancing. The person differentiates all parties' self-interests from the common interest of the group in a search for situationally specific moral balance that will optimize everyone's interest. In such a search, the person recognizes the need to consider the specific values, desires, strengths, and vulnerabilities, of the parties involved. Solutions may achieve harmony of interests or may represent compromises of interest, whatever the particularities of the situation and participants allow. Given this point, Haan's work is more illustrative of how people engage in actual everyday moral dialogues (moral reasoning processes), and not moral judgments. Haan's theory is also problematic in its emphasis on moral development and measurement of moral maturity. Similar to the criticisms of cognitive development approaches argued earlier, Haan assigns participants a score that reflects levels of reasoning regarding hypothetical dilemmas, and normative group scores (Haan, 1977). She is critical of Kohlberg's approach yet her scoring does not adequately address her criticisms since she neglects to provide a comprehensive picture of participants' conceptions of morality and their moral functioning. Finally, her theory only acknowledges the existence Taken from Haan (1978, p. 288) and Bredemeier and Shields (1986, p. 15-16). 33 of one type of moral problem (i.e., moral conflict), which, as previously stated, overlooks the existence of problems of relevance (Haan, 1977, 1983). Given the above outlined theories and their respective limitations, this study was framed using a holistic theoretical approach. As stated in the previous chapter, the theoretical approach incorporates Frankena's (1980) theory of morality, Coombs (1984, 1997), Wallace (1988, 1996), and Winkler's (1993) theories of practical reasoning, and Dworkin's (1977, 1985, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases. In corporation, these theories allowed for a broad conception of morality that permitted pluralistic notions of right and wrong, individual moral perceptions and sensitivities, and allowed for the examination of compliance officers' resolution of practical moral problems, including hard cases, in relation to related organizational standards, values, beliefs, rules, and polices, and personal values and beliefs. The next section will present the findings of relevant studies that used the theories outlined in this section to study sport and professional stakeholders' moral functioning. Studies Relating to Sport Stakeholders' and Professionals' Moral Functioning The research investigating sport stakeholders' morality and moral functioning is limited. The majority of studies on sport stakeholders have focused on measuring moral reasoning (Beller, & Stoll, 1995; Bredemeier & Shields, 1986a, 1986b; Goeb, 1997, Malloy, 1991; Timmer, 1999). Some researchers have sought to discover the types of moral problems athletes, coaches or athletic directors have experienced and their resolutions to these problems (Bergmann Drewe, 1999, 2000; Thompson, 1992). Studies on professionals' (business, law, & military) moral functioning have received much more attention. This research has focused on measuring moral reasoning (Landwehr, 1982; Weber, 1996; White, 1997) while contemporary research has shifted toward investigating factors that influence moral functioning (cf. Armstrong, 1996; Butterfield, Trevino & Weaver, 2000; Carlson, Kacmar, & Wadsworth, 2002). The next section will present an overview and critique of the related research on morality and functioning of athletes, coaches, athletic administrators, and professionals. This section is not intended to present a comprehensive account of all related literature on sport and professional stakeholders' moral functioning. Rather the aim was to provide a general picture of what is understood regarding sport stakeholders' and professionals' morality and moral functioning, and what remains unexplored. Athletes' Moral Reasoning Studies examining athletes' levels of moral reasoning have sought to demonstrate the connection between sport participation and lower moral maturity (Beller & Stoll, 1995; Bredemeier & Shields, 34 1984a, 1984b, 1986a, 1986b; Hall, 1981; Priest, Krause, & Beach, 1999). The findings reported, rather boldly, that sport participation leads to less developed moral reasoning. Beller and Stoll (1995), Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1984b, 1986a, 1986b), Hall (1981), and Priest et al. (1999) found that non-athletes have higher reasoning scores than athletes. These researchers also found that athletes used different types of moral reasoning in resolving sport and general life moral problems21 (Bredemeier & Shields, 1984b; Hall, 1981). Hall (1981) studied intercollegiate athletes' moral reasoning in resolving sport-specific and general social dilemmas. Using Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) theory of moral development and his Moral Judgment Questionnaire, the findings showed that athletes' stages of moral development were lower than their age group norms, and athletes' stages of moral development were lower in resolving sport specific situations than in social situations. Similarly, Bredemeier and Shields (1984b) examined high school and intercollegiate athletes (basketball players and swimmers) and non-athletes' moral reasoning and found that the athletes used different levels of moral reasoning when deliberating about hypothetical sport-related and everyday moral problems. Based on Haan's (1978; Haan et al., 1985) interactional model of moral development they reported that all participants' levels of moral reasoning used to resolve the sport problems were lower than the levels used to resolve everyday moral problems. Based on these findings they conjectured that the context of the sport one participants in elicits lower levels of moral reasoning, rather than participating in sport, in general, elicits lower levels of moral reasoning. Based on Bredemeier and Shields (1986a, 1986b) findings they suggest that athletes employ different levels of moral reasoning in resolving moral problems in sport settings versus in social settings. Bredemeier and Shields (1986a, 1986b, 1995) refer to the reasoning employed in sport contexts as game reasoning or bracket morality. Bracketed morality is defined as "a legitimated, temporary suspension of the usual moral obligation to equally consider the needs and desires of all persons" (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986b, p. 257-258). These findings support the argument that the context along with its supporting norms, values, rules, and standards inform moral reasoning. Bredemeier and Shields (1986a) proceeded to examine the moral maturity of high school (basketball players) and intercollegiate athletes (basketball players and swimmers) versus non-athletes in resolving sport and real life moral problems. Using Haan's (1978; Haan et al., 1985) interactional model of morality, they reported that no difference in moral maturity existed between high school athletes and non-athletes' moral reasoning. Female high school athletes were more morally mature than their male counterparts. The college non-athletes displayed higher moral reasoning scores than the athletes. Basketball players' scores were significantly lower than the non-athletes and swimmers. Intercollegiate swimmers' moral reasoning scores did not differ from non-athletes scores. A l l athletes scored lower on the sporting reasoning than on the real life reasoning problems. Bredemeier and Shields argue that the type of sport, contact versus non-contact, might influence an athlete's moral reasoning. They further 2 1 General life moral problems refer to everyday moral experiences or nonsport situations. 35 concluded that caution be exercised in generalizing about their previous assumption concerning the connections between sport participation and moral reasoning. Swimmers showed no significant difference in moral reasoning scores when compared to non-athletes. Bredemeier and Shields postulated that contact sports encourage situationally specific moral reasoning that create more morally salient issues; this provides one explanation for the basketball players' lower levels of reasoning. Bredemeier and Shields (1986a, 1986b) further suggested that the highly formalized context of sports restricts individuals from formulating high-level moral responses. In a follow up study, Bredemeier and Shields (1986b) showed that, when people deliberate about sport moral problems, their reasoning is more egocentric than when they reason about everyday life moral problems. One hundred high school and college basketball players were interviewed and asked to resolve two scenarios about everyday life moral problems and two scenarios relating to sport moral problems. The findings showed that the basketball player's moral reasoning about the sport scenarios diverged from their reasoning about the everyday life problems. Thus, the sports' contextual features influenced the athletes to engage in "bracketed morality" that was different from their everyday life moral reasoning. Essentially, decisions are made on what is in the best interest of the team and adhering to rules. Bredemeier and Shields' (1986b) notion of game reasoning suggests that athletes' understandings of right and wrong were only related to various egocentric related virtues-winning and gaining an advantage. Bredemeier and Shields (1986a, 1986b) assertion that in sport related moral problems athletes use egocentric and immature moral reasoning is problematic, and perhaps an unfair claim. Organizational standards and rules, in addition to other contextual features (including organizational values, norms, and beliefs) act as guidelines that help organizational members in their decision-making. People, in highly formalized contexts (law, sport, medicine, and business) are expected to uphold these organizational rules and standards, even when they are opposed to certain rules or the rules are discriminatory. For example, i f judges do not like certain rules, they are not at liberty to dismiss them, and create their own. If they wish to change the rules, they must follow prescribed legislative procedures. In a similar vein, if compliance officers do not agree with the outcome from the application of a particular N C A A rule, they do not possess the freedom to ignore N C A A mandated sanctions. Bredemeier and Shields' (1986a, 1986b) claim also suggests that when necessary, individuals involved in sports should disregard the rules and reason at the post-conventional level. This view is perhaps impractical. When people decide to participate in an activity, it is a free choice. They also agree to abide by the rules, policies, and procedures that are formulated by organizational members. Once more, i f a person does not agree on certain rules, policies or procedures, then he/she should follow appropriate avenues to revise these regulations. Research should seek to gain a better understanding of how individuals' (athletic stakeholders) conceptions of morality inform their reasoning in relation to the rules rather, than arguing that these stakeholders engage in different or inferior reasoning. One final criticism of Bredemeier and Shields' (1986a, 1986b) assertion, relates to their mode of 36 data collection. Moral dialogue that occurred in a game situation was not observed. Data was collected through interviews about moral dialogues o f real life' moral problems. These dialogues might differ from the dialogue that takes place in real sporting events. The data collection method detracts from Haan's theory of moral dialogue in everyday experiences (Jones & McNamee, 2000). Certain theorists suggest that people reason differently in resolving hypothetical versus real-life moral problems, and in resolving different types of real-life moral problems (cf. Krebs & Denton, 1997; Walker et al., 1995; Wark & Krebs, 2000). For example, athletes are expected to reason differently about a third party's moral problem versus a moral problem they have experienced. In essence, people interpret and experience moral situations differently. These differences are believed to relate to individuals' personal experiences, personal beliefs and values, and cognitive abilities. Moral philosophers, such as Blum (1994), Kekes (1989), and Sherman (1989), also endorse Wark and Kreb's (2000) and Walker et al.'s (1995) arguments. They maintain that people's moral characters, experiences, background, along with the type of problem, and the social context of the problem, all influenced their moral judgments. Beller and Stall's (1995) and Priest et al.'s (1999) studies found similar results to Hall (1981) and Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1986a). Beller and Stoll (1995) examined the moral reasoning of high school athletes and non-athletes. They showed that athletes had lower moral reasoning abilities than non-athletes on the Hahm-Beller Values Choice Inventory (HBVCI). Priest el al. (1999) in a longitudinal study on college athletes, demonstrated that over a four-year period college student-athletes' moral reasoning scores were lower than intramural student-athletes' scores on the H B V C I . Based on these findings, they proposed that length of participation in collegiate sports resulted in decreased levels of moral development. The H B V C I is a 21-question instrument that measures "cognitive knowing" in the sport context (Hahm, Beller, & Stoll, 1989). Thus, this instrument focuses on moral reasoning and not moral action/behavior. Informants are asked to rank, on a five-point Likert scale, how they might reason about various hypothetical sport moral scenarios. Using a deontological theory of moral reasoning, Hahm et al. (1989) contend that the measure has high validity and reliability scores. Gough (1995) and Holowchak (2001) both questioned the gross assumptions that underscore cognitive-moral development research (i.e., moral development occurs in stages, distinction between structure and content, and the notion of moral correctness). Gough (1995) criticizes Hahm et al. for claiming that the H B V C I and their research contains scientific objectivity and value-free conclusions. He argues this claim is impossible as the nature of their research is "so deeply and inescapably value-laden and normative" (Gough, 1995, p. 14). He concludes that in order to claim that sport morality research is scientific, it must present descriptive analyses of athletes' responses to moral questions. Bergmann Drewe (1999) investigated Canadian Interuniversity athletes' interpretations of what makes a situation "ethical" and how they resolved the problems they encountered. A hermeneutic approach using moral theory and moral philosophy was employed in the analysis. The findings indicated 37 that the athletes had difficulty defining an "ethical dilemma". Their definitions of ethical dilemmas were categorized into these broad areas: rule breaking, deciding between right and wrong, harming the nature of the sport, and preparation for competition (e.g., taking drugs). Athletes' resolutions to their moral dilemmas were represented in the broad categories defined by moral theory and/or moral philosophy: doing unto others as you would have them do unto you, fairness, respecting others, not hurting the team, respect for the game, and fear of getting caught. Bergmann Drewe's (1999) study provides important insights into these athletes' understandings of what constitute a moral problem and their approaches to resolving one. These findings are limited, however, as she did not ask the athletes how they determined right from wrong. Asking this question would have provided a better understanding and a more holistic picture of the athletes' understandings of morality and how this informed their moral perceptions, sensitivities, and moral reasoning. More recently, Hartung (2001) has explored the role of context in the moral decisions of college athletes. Using social cognitive learning theory, he asked athletes to reason about real life moral problems they had experienced and about sport related moral problems. Contrary to Bredemeier and Shields (1986a, 1986b) findings, he found that the context of the problem was not a consideration in athletes' reasoning. The types of moral problems identified by the athletes related to the rules, personal choice, and honesty. However, Hartung's (2001) assertion that contextual factors did not inform athletes' reasoning is problematic, since rules and personal choice factors are contextual and particular rules relate to specific circumstances, likewise, with personal factors. The athletes did not consider consequences in their deliberations. He reported that decisions were based on benefits and self-interest, which contradicts his argument that the athletes did not consider consequences in their considerations. The main considerations in resolving the problems included self, indifference, a disregard for authority, and a sense of invincibility. Hartung's (2001) findings emphasized the importance of examining people's experiences and understandings of moral problems from their own perspectives. Coaches' Moral Reasoning Research relating to coaches' morality and moral functioning is another understudied area. Duquin (1984) provided one of the earliest studies of moral reasoning in sport when she explored male and female coaches', and athletes' and non-athletes' rationales for making moral judgments. Participants were asked to resolve five scenarios where moral problems existed between athletes and members of an athletic organization. They were asked to determine if an injustice existed, and if it did, they were asked to rate the extent and then to determine responsibility. The findings illustrated that respondents' rationales differed in the type of justice appealed to, the attribution of responsibility, and the moral precepts emphasized. Five categories of moral rationales emerged from their answers with the ethic of care and self-interest being most prominent. The findings were analyzed using an asymmetrical power relationship approach that highlighted the difference in rationales between coaches and athletes. 38 In a follow-up to her 1999 study, Bergmann Drewe (2000) examined ethical issues experienced by coaches and how they resolved these. The findings suggested that coaches' perceptions and resolutions of ethical issues varied from athletes' perceptions and resolutions of ethical issues. Coaches identified the following kinds of ethical issues: intentionally harming opponents, pushing the rules,22 pushing athletes,23 and the potential to develop intimate relationships with their athletes. The coaches' problems focused on addressing hard cases such as determining where the line was drawn between hurting someone versus playing hard. In resolving these problems, the coaches considered their own personal moral values and what was in the best interest of the athlete or the team. Differences between the athletes' and coaches' perceptions and resolutions of ethical issues related to the notion of autonomy. The coaches' coaching philosophy influenced whether or not the athletes' felt that they were able to independently resolve the problems they encountered. Athletes who played for authoritarian coaches were less likely to feel empowered to resolve problems. In contrast, athletes who played for democratic coaches felt more empowered to resolve their own problems. Contradicting Duquin's (1984) and Bergmann Drewe's (2000) findings, Goeb (1997) study reported no significant difference between NCAA DII athletes' and coaches' cognitive moral reasoning. Fifty-six coaches and 366 students representing 28 sport teams completed the HBVCI. Differences in moral reasoning scores were reported between male and female student-athletes, with female athletes displaying higher levels than male athletes. The importance of these findings is questionable because of theoretical and methodological issues previously identified. Athletic Administrators' Moral Reasoning Unfortunately, athletic administrators' morality and moral functioning is an extrememly unstudied area. Malloy (1991), Thompson (1992), and Timmer (1999) have conducted the most notable studies in relation to my study. Malloy (1991) researched physical education majors' moral reasoning which showed they reasoned at Kohlberg's pre-conventional and conventional levels. Thompson (1992) studied high school female athletic directors' recalled moral problems, which showed they experienced problems relating to eligibility, discipline, and personnel. The participants predominantly used the principle of justice to resolve their moral problems. Timmer's (1999) study on NCAA Dil i athletic directors showed that religiosity and educational level significantly influenced their moral reasoning about sport-related problems. Malloy (1991) studied the moral development of Canadian physical education university students. Students' reasoning about hypothetical moral problems reflected both the preconventional and conventional levels on Kohlberg's model of moral development. Malloy (1991) concluded that the sporting environment fosters rule-bound behavior, limiting thoughtful moral thinking and judgment. 2 2 "Pushing the rules" refers to engaging in gamesmanship. 2 3 "Pushing athletes" refers to situations when coaches demand athletes to perform at an exceedingly high level. 39 Furthermore, he maintained that sport leaders should not rely solely on the rules or consequences to resolve moral problems. Malloy's (1991) study had several limitations in relation to its research design and implications. First, a convenience sample of students was used for data collection. Newman and Kreuger (2003) insist that convenience samples (e.g., student samples) can seriously misrepresent and distort populations. The findings from convenience samples cannot be generalized (Newman & Kreuger, 2003). Second, participants only reasoned about hypothetical moral problems. As stated earlier, the context and type of problem necessitate different interpretations and deliberations. Third, the theoretical framework developed by Malloy (1991) is problematic, as outlined in the above critique about cognitive moral development theory. Fourth, Malloy's (1991) description of data collection and analysis is incomplete. The method of data collection is unclear and the level of expertise of those who engaged in data analysis was not reported. The validity and reliability of the study, therefore, are problematic. Fifth, the participants were students and we are unaware of their athletic administrative experience or depth of knowledge. Experience in, and background knowledge of an organization's policies, rules, and regulations will influence consideration of the alternatives (Coombs, 1997). Finally, the implications of the study are problematic. Malloy is critical of participant's reasoning to the level of the rules or policies. Surely, Malloy would not want participants to disregard the rules. Formalization in sport organizations is generally necessary to create a "level-playing field" and provide stability. If organizational members seek to change rules for whatever reason then appropriate avenues should be followed. Suggesting that sport administrators' moral reasoning is restrained by sport policy/rules does not take into consideration that members abiding by the rules are justifiable. Studying how sport administrators reason in hard cases and their application of sport policy/rules would be more useful in furthering our understanding of their moral functioning. Thompson's (1992) examination of high school female athletic directors' moral reasoning explored the moral problems they experienced in their work and the ethical principles utilized to resolve these problems. Using an interview guide, Thompson (1992) carried out face-to-face interviews with seven women. Four thematic moral problems were identified from the interviews: eligibility, discipline, personnel, and gender. Athletic directors resolved these problems based on: rights and responsibilities, utilitarianism, justice, enlightened egoism, and social contracts. The principle of justice was the most dominant standard that influenced their judgments. The participants also described how their personal moral values would often conflict with their professional moral code. These findings support the notion that athletic administrators work within a framework where organizational rules and their personal moral codes informed their moral judgments. Timmer (1999) conducted a correlational study examining the influence of educational level, religiosity, and years of athletic administrative experience on N C A A Dil i athletic directors. Using the HBVCI and the Gladding, Lewis, and Adkins Scale (1981) of religiosity, 121 Di l i athletic directors were surveyed. The results showed that religiosity and educational level are significant predictors of athletic 40 directors' moral reasoning about sports. Experience as an athletic director did not influence moral reasoning; however, collectively all three variables (religiosity, educational level, and experience) significantly informed the athletic directors' moral reasoning. The findings contradict both Beller and Stoll's (1995) and Priest el al.'s (1999) findings where they found that athletes' moral reasoning scores decreased in relation to the number of years they participated in interscholastic or intercollegiate sport. Context is an important factor to consider in relation to these findings. A N C A A Dil i athletic director operates under less formalized conditions, less emphasis is placed on winning, and has less financial pressures than a N C A A DI or DII athletic director. Different contexts might change how an athletic administrator would resolve moral problems (Walker et al., 1995; Wark & Krebs, 2000). The HBVCI scenarios are also hypothetical and not context specific to athletic administration. These research findings have important implications about assumptions made regarding athletic administrators' moral functioning and directions for future research. Malloy's (1991) and Timmer's (1999) research was conducted using the theoretical assumptions of Kohlberg. The research findings, while important, have only confirmed what is already known about moral functioning theory (that is, people in formalized organizations reason at Pre-Conventional and Conventional levels and various personal characteristics inform moral reasoning). Malloy's (1991) and Timmer's (1999) research findings raise more questions about athletic administrators' morality and moral functioning, such as what other moral values inform how athletic administrators decipher right from wrong, what role do these moral values have in their moral functioning. Thompson's (1992) findings are significant, as they have provided further understandings about the various moral precepts that female high school athletic directors used in resolving their moral problems. Additionally, her findings have provided insights about the participants' moral perceptions and sensitivities as she discovered the types of problems they deemed moral. Even though Thompson's (1992) research has added to our understandings of athletic administrators' morality and moral functioning, future research should seek to provide a more holistic picture of athletic administrators' morality and moral functioning. Professionals' Moral Reasoning In general, studies measuring professionals' moral reasoning in highly formalized organizations (law, military, and business) have predominantly employed cognitive developmental (Kohlberg and Rest), theoretical approaches, and methodological designs (cf. Daicoff, 1996; Weber, 1990; White, 1997). These studies have demonstrated that professional's moral reasoning reflects the Pre-Conventional and Conventional Levels on Kohlberg's scale or on Rest's model. 41 Assessing levels of professional's moral reasoning. Studies investigating attorneys' moral reasoning indicated that their reasoning paralleled Kohlberg's Conventional level, stage four-law and order orientation (Daicoff, 1996; Landwehr, 1982). Utilizing Kohlberg's theory of moral development, Landwehr (1982) examined 195 attorneys' moral reasoning based on written responses of how they would resolve three scenario problems. The results indicated that attorney's moral development disproportionately (90.3%) reflected stage four (law and order), while 7.2 percent reflected stage three (interpersonal concordance). Landwehr criticized lawyers' rule or obligatory type of reasoning. He felt people using stage four reasoning would be less likely to question the legal system and less likely to advocate for social change. He supported the attorney's commitment to upholding and providing stability within the legal system while indicating that social change should come from others. Studies measuring business managers' moral reasoning were consistent with Landwehr's (1982) findings, as managers' moral judgments reflected Kohlberg's preconventional and conventional levels (Weber, 1990, 1996; Weber & Wasieleski, 2001). Similar findings were also reported by Weber's (1990) and Weber and Wasieleski's (2001) investigations of managers' moral reasoning. Using Kohlberg's theory of moral development, they demonstrated how managers' reasoning reflected Conventional levels on Kohlberg's scale. Managers reasoned at both stages three and four in their resolution of business related dilemmas and of Kohlberg's (1981) Heinz dilemma. Noteworthy, Weber and Wasieleski (2001) indicated that the context of the problem, the managers' type of work (managerial vs. technical), and the industry they represented (manufacturing vs. service) were all factors that informed their reasoning. Daicoff (1996), in addition, reported that attorneys' values, the type of problem, and its context all informed their reasoning. Daicoff (1996) surveyed 212 attorneys' reasoning concerning five different real life moral problems. Where a code of Rules and Regulations was pertinent to the scenario, the attorneys' reasoning resembled the code. Where problems were not related to a code of rules and regulations attorneys' reasoning did not reflect the code, their judgments were informed by personal values/standards. Unfortunately, because data collection was limited to a questionnaire and no questions were included to discover the types of values the participants held, no data was collected that described the values/standards the participants considered when making their decisions. In another highly formalized context, White (1997) examined the relationship between organizational design and ethics in the United States military. Rest's DIT was used to operationalize Kohlberg's theoretical framework as he surveyed 480 US coast guard personnel to determine if the US military's rigid hierarchy restricted people's moral development. The results indicated that military members' moral development was lower than the general population and reflected value judgments that resembled obedience, discipline, and heteronomy. White (1997) defended the lower scores of the military saying they were not necessarily deficient and were actually a desirable characteristic of military personnel. He argued that performing military duties was tough and "in order to carry out its difficult and 42 deadly mission, the military places a high emphasis on discipline and obedience . . . this emphasis is at the expense of individualism, autonomy, and ultimately moral development" (White, 1997, p. 69). White (1997) further argued that bureaucratic institutions such as the military could not realistically allow administrators to act autonomously or question the rules/orders as per Kohlberg's post-conventional level. Acting autonomously conflicts with the mission of the military. Thus, in certain contexts (such as in sport) Conventional reasoning is more appropriate and fulfills the purpose of the organization. Investigating influencing factors of moral functioning. In the business realm, the moral reasoning literature is broad. Studies have attempted to investigate variable influences on business managers' moral reasoning (cf. Armstrong, 1996; Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Derry, 1989). These studies can be categorized into the following: awareness24, individual factors (such as age, gender, moral philosophy, education, Nationality, and moral development), organizational factors (such as codes of ethics, rewards & sanctions, and culture & climate), and moral intensity25 (Loe et al., 2000; Ford & Richardson, 1994). Several studies investigating managers' awareness of moral problems have reported a significant connection among various personal, environmental factors and moral perceptions and sensitivities (Armstrong, 1996; Butterfield et al., 2002; Davis, Johnson, & Ohmer, 1998; Dubinsky, Jolson, Marvin, Michaels, Kotabe, & Lin, 1992; Shaub, Finn, & Munter, 1993). Dubinsky et al. (1992) found that salespeople have different understandings of what constitutes a moral problem, while Armstrong (1996) discovered that cultural environment influenced marketing students' moral perceptions and sensitivities. In a related study, Shaub et al. (1993) reported that Certified Public Auditing Accountants' ethical orientations influenced moral perceptions and sensitivities. In two recent studies, Butterfield et al. (2002) and Davis et al. (1998) examined factors that influenced people's ability to recognize morally ambiguous situations (hard cases). Their findings illustrated that the magnitude of consequences, working in a highly competitive context, and perceived social consequences influenced people's ability to identify moral problems. Limited empirical research exists that examines the influences of personal and professional values on managers' moral decision-making. Moral and business theory contends that people's personal and professional values underpin their moral reasoning. However, there is a void in the research supporting this notion. Derry (1989), Fritzsche (1995), and Singhapakdi and Vitell's (1993) studies all endorse that an agent's moral code informs his moral reasoning. Derry (1989) examined the predominant moral orientations of male and female managers' resolutions to moral conflicts. They found that one third of the participants had never experienced a moral conflict at work, that justice-based reasoning was the Awareness refers to moral perception and sensitivity. 2 5 Moral intensity in business ethics literature refers to "the extent of issue-related moral imperatives in a situation" (Jones, 1991, p. 372). 43 predominant justification for decisions, and that there was no correlation between gender and moral orientation. These studies overall, showed that both managers' values and the type of moral problem influenced moral judgment (Derry, 1989; Fritzsche, 1995; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1993). Personal characteristics, such as education, age, and socio-cultural background, also inform managers' moral reasoning (Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Davis, Johnson, & Ohmer, 1998; Wimalasiri, Pavri, & Jalil, 1996; Wimalasiri, 2001). Wimalasiri et al., (1996) and Wimalasiri (2001) both used Rest's D1T and reported that age, education, and religious affiliation influenced managers' justifications; however, these personal demographic characteristics reportedly did not influence moral judgment levels. Interestingly, Elm et al. (2001) reported that age, education, and gender influenced moral reasoning. Much controversy exists regarding gender and moral judgments. Some researchers believe that gender informs moral reasoning/ moral orientation (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) while others believe that gender is not a factor (Walker, 1991; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Wark and Krebs (1996, p. 229) argue that, "people may invoke different forms of moral judgment in response to different types of moral dilemmas." People's invariant normative systems influence moral judgments. Further research can only assist in enhancing our understandings of this issue. Considerable research has been conducted investigating the various organizational factors influencing managers' moral decision-making. The majority of studies show conflicting findings about specific factors that actually influence moral decisions. The literature however, does support the claim that organizational factors as a whole do influence managers' moral reasoning. Barnett, Cochran, and Taylor (1993) and Kaye (1992) suggested that formal policies generate increased levels of perception and subsequent reporting of violations. Glenn and Van Loo (1993) and Bruce (1994) indicated that codes of ethics are important and necessary for an organization. Noteworthy, codes of ethics are not as effective as organizational support and education in preventing unethical behavior (Bowie & Duska, 1990). However, McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield (1996) reported that codes of conduct are positively associated with ethical behavior. Contemporary moral functioning research has generally focused on examining the impact of moral intensity on managers' moral decision-making (Carlson, Kacmer, & Wadsworth; 2002; Harrington, 1997; Paolillo & Vitell, 2002; Singer & Singer, 1997). Harrington (1997) and Singer and Singer (1997) showed that according to situational characteristics, individuals respond differently to moral issues. Similarly, Paolillo and Vitell (2002) suggested that issue/situational factors influence moral decision-making and personal factors had limited influence on moral decision-making. However, Carlson et al. (2002) found that individuals' close relationships (proximity) to a moral situation significantly impacted his/her moral judgments. The closer a manager was related or involved in a moral problem the greater a manager's moral perception of the problem. 44 Summary In summary, the theoretical assumptions of Kohlberg, Rest, and Haan have heavily influenced the research on sport stakeholders and certain professionals. In general, morality has been narrowly defined and the appraisal of moral development has been predominant, and therefore, the literature is characterized by two central claims: one, sport stakeholders tend to reason to the level of the rules, and two, they reason differently about sport issues than in their reasoning regarding real-life moral problems. Current research also indicates that coaches and administrators experience different types of moral problems. In the professional domain, however, research has sought to examine the personal and organizational factors that influence decision-making. The findings suggest that various features of a moral problem, organizational policies, and professionals' moral values inform decisions. One critical component absent from the research is that all of these studies have neglected to explore the connection between people's morality and moral functioning; that is, employ a holistic examination of sport stakeholders' and professionals' morality and moral functioning. The call for enhancing our knowledge about how athletic administrators, in particular compliance officers, think about right and wrong, what kinds of problems they deem to be moral, and how they resolve practical moral problems is imperative. Given the above outlined theories and their respective limitations, and the pertinent literature about sport stakeholders' and professionals' moral functioning, I have chosen to examine compliance officers' morality and moral functioning using a theoretical approach that is more holistic in nature. As stated in the previous chapter, the theoretical approach incorporates Frankena's (1980) theory of morality, Coombs (1984, 1997), Wallace (1988, 1996), and Winkler's (1993) theories of practical reasoning, and Dworkin's (1977, 1985, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases. In corporation, these theories allowed for a broad conception of morality that permitted pluralistic notions of right and wrong, the presentation of individual moral perceptions and sensitivities, and allowed for the examination of compliance officers' resolution of practical moral problems, including hard cases, in relation to organizational and personal standards, values, beliefs, rules, and polices. In the next chapter, this theoretical approach is described at length. 45 CHAPTER THREE Theoretical Approach In chapter two, I outlined the predominant theoretical approaches that have informed studies on sports stakeholders' and professionals' moral functioning. Historically, these approaches have advanced our understanding of their moral thinking, while simultaneously narrowing our understanding of sports stakeholders' and professionals' moral functioning (Walker et al., 1995; Walker, 2002a). These theoretical approaches (stemming from Kohlberg and Rest) have fragmented contemporary understandings of sports stakeholders' and professionals' conceptions of morality and how they resolve hard cases. The focus on quantifying moral functioning has over shadowed the significance of examining the interdependent nature of people's morality and moral functioning. In this chapter, I suggest a theoretical approach that addresses the concerns raised about the current narrow approach to the study of morality and moral functioning. My theoretical approach was selected based on the assumption that morality and moral functioning is an interdependent phenomenon. People's morality and moral functioning are interconnected, meaning that a person's understanding of right and wrong, the problems they deem moral, and how they resolve hard cases are interrelated and inform each other. Given the above assumption, and as previously stated, the theoretical approach that informed this study included Frankena's conception of morality. Frankena (1980) maintains that morality is a social endeavor that has both interpersonal and social implications. Morality informs people's social interactions, regulates their behavior, and assists in the adjudication of their problems. My theoretical approach also includes Contextualist practical reasoning. Contextualism was defined according to the theories of Winkler (1993) and Wallace (1988), who assert that problems should be resolved in consideration with the particularities of a case, along with considering relevant historical, social, institutional, and cultural standards pertaining to a situation. Rational choices are based on people's understandings and applications of moral concepts and their supporting reasons; hence, practical reasoning includes moral reasoning. Practical judgments, including moral judgments, are formulated based on fulfilling certain standards of reasoning (Coombs, 1984, 1997). Finally, Dworkin's (1978, 1985, 1986) theories of interpretation and resolving hard cases also informed this study by providing a basis for examining how N C A A DI-A compliance officers interpret and deliberate about hard cases they encounter in their work. In this chapter, these theories are explicated. Morality In this study when I am speak of morality, I am referring to thinking about answering first order substantive questions about what is right or wrong, or what is good or bad (Frankena, 1980). Frankena (1980) defines morality as: 46 a normative system in which evaluative judgments of some sort are made, more or less consciously, from a certain point of view, namely from the point of view of a consideration of the effects of actions, motives, traits, etc., on the lives of sentient beings as such, including the lives of others besides the person acting, being judged, or judging (p. 26). This conception of morality suggests that an individual's normative system is a social endeavor that involves the consideration of other individuals and sentient beings, and avoidance of harm in determining what is morally good, bad, right or wrong. To assist people in answering first order questions about what is good or bad or determining what is right or wrong, Frankena (1980) contends that people possess an individual moral code or road map. This moral code-normative system-consists of "a set of moral beliefs" that an individual or society subscribes to" (Frankena, 1980, p. 17). Frankena (1980) maintains that an individual's moral beliefs are based on various moral values or principles that she/he accepts to possess certain significance and directs how one should live his/her life.26 For example, a compliance officer's individual moral code consists of a variety of moral values that could include justice, fairness, honesty, responsibility, equality, empathy, respect for life, respect for people, respect for rules and laws, respect for authority, and so forth. These values or principles assist a compliance officer in making moral judgments in their work. Drawing from Frankena's (1980) theory, each compliance officer's moral code consists of a set of values or principles that is independent from another compliance officer's moral code. Similarities might exist between the two compliance officers' moral codes yet distinct differences would be notable. Frankena (1980, p. 17) also accepts the existence of "many moralities" within an individual's moral code, such as a professional morality, a personal morality, a legal morality, or a religious morality. Frankena (1980) also maintains that individuals and societies can possess moral points of view that do not necessarily reflect one another. An individual's moral viewpoint can vary from his/her society's moral viewpoint. For example, a compliance officer's moral beliefs and values might vary from his/her athletic department's moral beliefs and values about what is morally right or wrong, or morally good or bad. A compliance officer's moral make-up is formulated over time based on his/her experiences, background, social interactions and influences, institutional influences. Typically, a compliance officer's general moral point of view will be analogous with the athletic department's general moral point of view that he/she is a member as one could assume that person would choose not to work within that organization. Their moral viewpoints however, could differ when deciding what is morally right, wrong, good or bad in certain hard cases because the athletic department and the compliance officer might espouse different moral beliefs or values. Individual societies' moral codes can also vary from other societies or from 2 6 Frankena (1980, p. 23) refers to Moral Gens, which he explains is a "neutral term for all sorts of general ethical statements: rules, precepts, principles, ideals, etc." and informs individuals or society about how to interact with one another. 47 "larger society" in their moral point of view. One athletic department's moral point of view might vary from another athletic department's moral perspective. For example, Oregon State University's athletic department's moral code more than likely varies from the University of Arizona's, which varies from the University of California, Berkeley's. These institution's moral viewpoints also vary from the Pac-10 Conference's, which also varies from the N C A A ' s moral point of view. Differences between these organizations' moral points of view are not to be perceived as one society's morality to be normatively "better" than another society's. Rather, the main point of emphasis is that Frankena's (1980) conception of the moral point of view is broadly defined, which accepts the notion that differences exist among individual and societal understandings of right and wrong within a pluralistic society. Contextualism Contextualism, also known as particularism (McDowell, 1979; Wallace, 1996; Wiggins, 1987), developed as a response to scholars in the related areas of professional ethics, moral education, and moral philosophy who were questioning the relevance and applicability of ethical theory in guiding people's moral judgments (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Winkler, 1993). Specifically, these scholars questioned the perceived emphasis given to Kantian deontological moral theorizing and the supremacy place on the principles of justice (Baier, 1994; Blum, 1980; Gilligan, 1982; Murdoch, 1970; Noddings, 1984). This emphasis placed on the principle of justice is believed to be an inadequate representation of moral theorizing as this principle masks the complexities of human relationships, (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) understanding the importance of emotion (Blum, 1980; Nussbaum, 1990) and camouflages the inequalities among people (Kozol, 1991; Young, 1990). In resolving practical problems, an ethical theory approach suggests that moral decisions are justified using a "top-down" application of a general rule (principle, ideal, right, ethical theory) to a particular case. Using the top-down approach, justification is deductivist in nature, as a decision is defended by demonstrating that it falls under a particular rule, which is derived from a particular principle, and the principle is grounded in a particular ethical theory (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Nash, 2002; Winkler, 1993). This top-down model is perceived as problematic as it over simplifies the complex nature of real-life moral problems (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Winkler, 1993). Winkler (1993, p. 354) contends that top-down models overlook "the complexities of interplay between our understanding of practical issues and our understanding of principles." Furthermore, this approach assumes that certain ethical theories and principles take priority over institutional rules, traditional practices and case judgments (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Ethical principles and rules are said to be too abstract and do not allow for the consideration of case particularities (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; 48 Wallace, 1988; Winkler, 1993). Contextualism, in contrast, uses a "bottom-up" or inductive approach to moral justification Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Winkler, 1993). The starting point is moral interpretation and assessment of case particularities, then comparative case analysis is used which assists in deriving at a decision. Principles are derived from the decision and provide normative force to our justifications (Winkler, 1993; Wallace, 1996). Contextualism posits that practical problems should be resolved in consideration of the concrete particularities of a situation (Wallace, 1988; Winkler, 1993). Winkler (1993) emphasizes justification as the key factor in addressing real-life moral problems as judgments are justified by appraising them "against objections and rivals" (Winkler, 1993, p. 360). In contrast to ethical theory approaches to resolving practical moral problems, the justification process is essentially case-driven and inductive in nature where the goal is to "seek the most reasonable solution to a problem" which is conducted within a framework that is comprised of various standards, that are informed by relevant "central cultural values and guiding norms, professional functions, obligations, and legal precepts" (Winkler, 1993, p. 360). For example, a compliance officer confronted with a situation where one of the men's basketball staff communicated with a prospect student-athlete who was attending a summer-certified event as a spectator. The prospect was traveling with a participating team but was not actually partaking in any of the event activities.27 In resolving this problem and deciding if a N C A A violation had occurred the compliance officer would gather all necessary background information, including N C A A rules and policies, talking with relevant people to identify and assess the accuracy of the information. Specifically, he/she is seeking to determine whether the prospects actions were within N C A A recruiting guidelines. Using N C A A rules as a guideline and perhaps comparing past cases, the compliance officer is attempting to determine if the coach's actions were within the rules and decide i f a rule violation has occurred. Based on the information collected and assessed, the compliance officer has inductively made a judgment, versus making a deductive judgment and justifying his/her decision based from a starting principle of guilt (violation occurred) or innocence (no violation). The justification process in Contextualist practical reasoning "is a matter of adapting and readjusting" our strategies, understanding our/the concepts, our values and beliefs, or principles we espouse, when we are confronted with problematic cases (Wallace, 1988, p. 122). Wallace (1988, p. 123) maintains that, the strategies and "their associated values do not remain fixed" when resolving practical problems. Rather, this approach necessitates the continual intelligent ability to modify relevant concepts and strategies, as "such changes require further adjustments" in novel circumstances. The justification process is continual because people's interpretations and deliberations in resolving hard cases are based on them drawing on their knowledge, reflecting on their understandings of applicable strategies, concepts, 2 7 In basketball, NCAA bylaws do not permit any institutional coaching staff member to communicate with a prospect who is participating in a summer-certified event unless the prospect was not participating in any activities. See NCAA Bylaws 13.1.6.3 (contacts subsequent to national letter of intent signing or other written commitment) and 13.1.7.2.1-(b) (additional restrictions-basketball) [NCAA Manual, 2003-04). 49 values, and norms, and contemplating how these relevant factors were utilized to resolve similar cases. This type of reasoning is not simply a matter of following the rules, for example. Contextualism requires people to draw upon their practical knowledge, which informs them in deciding the correct interpretation and application of a rule in specific situations. Contextualism's guiding assumption, therefore, is the understanding and accurately modeling of practical moral reasoning (Winkler, 1993). The notion of complete grand ethical theories is rejected by Contextualism, as these normative theories are perceived to be incompatible to the moral life (Winkler, 1993). Winkler (1993, p. 360) maintains that normative theories seek to outline basic principles, which ideally inform "the whole of the moral life." Normative theories assume the existence of perfect moral justification where judgments are based on placing a particular case under a principle that has supreme normative power. Contextualism, conversely, argues that morality is a social instrument, which serves "certain very general ends, within the context of real time, pervasive uncertainty, and continually evolving historical circumstances" (Winkler, 1993, p. 360). Morality is assumed to consist of a heterogeneous collection of various norms, practices, beliefs, or a collection of practical knowledge that guides our actions in different situations (Wallace, 1988, 1996). Wallace (1988, p. 54) also notes that Contextualism "accepts the existence of many different moral considerations reflecting the complexity of human life and the variety of problems in living such a life." When people encounter problematic cases, they generally do not rely on one specific moral principle/value to help guide their decision. People will draw upon their moral points of view, which as Frankena (1980) suggests encompasses a broad range of moral values/principles. Based on this assumption, moral considerations are believed to exist as "phenomena internal to individuals" (Wallace, 1988, p. 55). Wallace (1988) claims that a moral consideration is a character trait and thus is an internal "learned disposition that exists within an individual that develops to formulate a person's practical knowledge. Character traits refer to "complex learned dispositions consisting of know-how, skills, concerns, values, and commitments" (Wallace, 1988, p. 55). Overtime, individuals develop their practical knowledge through moral learning as they gain knowledge from other people about the various means of addressing issues. How these elements are incorporated in order to resolve practical problems within Contextualism's guiding assumptions is further outlined in the next section on practical reasoning. Practical Reasoning Contemporary theorizing about practical reasoning in ethics often takes Aristotle as a point of departure. (Kant, 1969; Maclntyre, 1984; Mill, 1957; Rawls, 1971). The theory of practical reasoning used in this study was based on the works of Jerrold Coombs (1984, 1997) and James Wallace (19988, 1996). Practical reasoning describes standards of good reasoning that inform how individuals do and 50 should deliberate about real-life moral problems. Suggested standards provide reasoners with the capability to provide sound justifications for their decisions, which as Winkler (1993) and Wallace (1988) contend is the focus of Contextualist practical reasoning. Coombs (1997, p. 1) defines practical reasoning as "any reasoning about the desirability of actions, practices, policies, and programs of action", including "reasoning about the morality of the wisdom of pursuing a course of action and its overall desirability." This conception of practical reasoning includes moral reasoning because circumstances that place moral importance to ajudgment imply that the decision is conceived to be normatively right or wrong, or normatively good or bad. Reasoning about the desirability of actions also assumes that all actions are motivated by values and beliefs. Coombs' (1984) contends that practical reasoning entails two types of reasons, which are internal in nature. He states practical reasoning: involves deciding what to do as the result of considering two logically different kinds of reasons: (1) motivating reasons in the form of value standards accepted by the agent, and (2) beliefs about the degree to which the actions under consideration fulfill or fail to fulfill the value standards, (p. 3) An individual's decision is based on the values that underpin reasons and beliefs that a specific judgment will fulfill certain value standards. Judgments possess an internalist character because our values and beliefs influence our rationally chosen way of life. However, as previously explained judgments are also made in consideration of relevant facts, institutional norms and values, legal precepts, obligations, and standards of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning standards are underpinned through the justification process. Practical reasoning is essentially comparative, as judgments are made based on whether a course of action is "more or less desirable in relation to alternative courses of action including the alternative of not acting" (Coombs, 1984, p. 3). The soundness of practical reasoning is evaluated by assessing which sets of reasons (or premises) hold more weight or which alternative is supported by the prevailing argument (Coombs, 1984). Consistent with Contextualism's emphasis on the justification process in resolving practical problems, Coombs' (1984, 1997) practical reasoning also emphasizes the justification process as one attempts to fulfill standards of reasoning. For example, a practical problem might entail a compliance officer deciding whether to report a possible rule violation where an athletic department booster bought a student-athlete a $55 lunch. The student-athlete and the booster had been friends prior to the student-athlete's enrollment. The two parties involved had lunch together on a regular basis prior to the student-athlete's enrollment and continued doing so after the athlete's enrollment. Both parties were aware of N C A A rules that stipulate that people associated with the athletic department cannot buy student-athletes meals. The compliance officer must decide whether he/she should report the violation or provide a verbal warning to the two parties. In addition, the problem constitutes a 51 moral problem because he/she must decide whether choosing to report or not to report the possible violation is morally right or morally wrong. Practical reasoning, therefore, entails collecting relevant information, assessing reasons, scrutinizing relevant values, and making a decision based on the reasons (Coombs, 1997). In relation to the above example, the compliance officer's decision is determined by which set of reasons fulfill his/her values (e.g., the compliance officer's values adhering to N C A A rules, honesty, the magnitude of the situation, and the right of a booster to buy a student-athlete lunch. The compliance officer would have to determine which set of values most support his/her decision to report or not report the booster's lunch). These standards of reasoning entail both evidential and conceptual claims that require standards identified in the critical thinking literature (Bailin, Case, Coombs, & Daniels, 1999a, 1999b). Standards of practical moral reasoning will be further delineated in succeeding sections on moral reasoning, moral perception and sensitivity, and standards of practical reasoning. Moral Reasoning As previously defended, practical reasoning includes moral reasoning in instances where a nomiative importance is placed on a judgment. For example, a compliance officer deciding whether to document all conversations with athletic department stakeholders could entail moral reasoning i f the compliance officer believed that not keeping detailed and accurate records was wrong. Practical reasoning, as previously defined, entails making a decision based on two types of reasons: a) motivating reasoning and b) beliefs that a decision fulfills certain value standards. Since moral reasoning involves practical reasoning, subsequently moral justifications are also based on these two types of reasons. Motivating reasons are determined through appraising empirical or definitional claims, which ensures that practical reasoning is well grounded, accurate, and reasonably comprehensive. Based on these appraisals a judgment is made that displays the set of reasons that support the soundest argument. For example, the N C A A values the standard of amateurism in competition and believes that allowing "professional athletes"28 to participate in N C A A DI competition is unfair. Given this belief, the N C A A has determined that International N C A A DI student-athletes, who have received prize money for winning various event (s) are deemed professionals, and thus lose a portion of their N C A A eligibility. The N C A A ' s judgment that International N C A A DI student-athletes who receive prize money for winning sporting events are deemed professional athletes is based on a set of reasons that value the notion of amateurism. The N C A A ' s reasons mostly likely include: (a) the Association believes that a clear demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sport must exist. Allowing athletes to accept prize money blurs 2 8 Professional athlete being defined in this instance as any athlete receiving money for his/her athletic talents outside of intercollegiate athletic or educational scholarships. 52 the line between intercollegiate athletics and professional sport; (b) the Association believes that member institutions should adopt and adhere to the Association's legislative and rules systems in order to create an equal playing field for its members to compete in. Permitting student-athletes to accept and keep prize money creates an unfair advantage for those athletes because they possess more resources to aid their training. Allowing athletes to accept and keep their prize money also is a violation of N C A A rules and contradicts the principles under which the Association operates. These types of reasons, combined, generally support the N C A A ' s decision. Assessing beliefs and, to what degree these beliefs realize value standards, is the second type of reasoning that inform decisions. A reason for making a decision implies two conditions. First, an individual holds certain beliefs about the characteristics and consequences of the action; and second, an individual has a principle/rule for making ajudgment. It is the belief that a decision has a particular consequence that motivates the individual to make a decision. This belief becomes a reason for the decision when the consequence is something the individual values or wants. People's beliefs act as motivating reasons for people's wants and values. In the above amateurism problem, the N C A A ' s beliefs about the nature of amateurism will act as motivators in determining the standards of amateurism that should be upheld. Upon the N C A A assessing their beliefs about amateurism in this context, they would also have to assess if allowing International student- athletes to compete in N C A A DI-A athletics fulfills or fails to fulfill the value standard defined as amateurism. The N C A A ' s beliefs about what constitutes amateurism will act as motivating reasons and influence their judgment on how this rule should be applied in relation to International N C A A DI-A student-athletes' eligibility. Included in this deliberation is the N C A A ' s attempt to select the alternative that is supported by the best or most compelling reasons. Finally, sound moral reasoning is also characterized by deliberations that are initiated by certain value principles and empirical beliefs that are justifiable. Justification of a judgment requires that the factual beliefs-being appraised in reasoning meet two conditions: "they must be true or at least well supported by the bulk of available evidence; and they must be comprehensive enough to encompass all of the morally relevant features of the situation" (Coombs, 1980a, p. 18). Moral Perception and Sensitivity Engaging in moral reasoning first requires accurately recognizing the existence of a moral problem (cf. Blum, 1994; Coombs, 1998; Kekes, 1989). In the previous example regarding the booster providing a student-athlete a meal, if the compliance officer did not accurately understand N C A A rules and standards he/she would most likely overlook the potential rules violation by the booster and the student-athlete. Blum (1994) states: Although an agent may reason well in moral situations, uphold the strictest standards of impartiality for testing her maxims and moral principles, and be adept at deliberation, unless she perceives her moral character accurately, her moral principles and skill at 53 deliberation may be for naught, (p. 30) Moral perception is the accurate recognition or consciousness of a situation as being moral (Blum, 1994; Kekes, 1989; Sherman, 1989). Moral sensitivity or making moral discriminations is accurately recognizing the salient features of a moral situation. Individuals' moral perceptions and sensitivities are related to their moral characters, histories, experiences, education, and so forth (Blum, 1994; Kekes, 1989; Sherman, 1989). Organizational norms, standards of behavior, rules, and values also inform organizational members' moral perceptions and sensitivities. Therefore, compliance officers' moral discriminations are interrelated with their moral make-up, their personal and professional experiences, their backgrounds, N C A A rules, norms, values, and standards of conduct. Based on an individual's background, experiences, contextual features, and moral make-up, he/she will be more aware of perceiving particular situations as being moral in relation to these moral characteristics (cf. Kekes, 1989; Murdoch, 1970, Sherman, 1989). People's understandings of moral concepts and therefore, their interpretation of situations are informed by their moral learnings. Kekes (1989) asserts that people's understandings of moral concepts is learnt by observing how the concept was conceptualized and applied in past cases, in addition to their formal and informal education. For example, a compliance officer's understanding of gender equity is related to his/her teachings of the meaning of the concept -gender equity and through their observation of the application of gender equity principles in previous cases. Consequently, individuals' relationships to a moral problem also influence their understanding and application of moral concepts. Kekes (1989) posits that: A large part of the complexity of moral situations comes from the participation in them of the people who need to judge them. The ways in which they participate and judge are intertwined, they change together, and they reciprocally form each other, (p. 131) The compliance officer who has experienced a Federal gender equity audit will have a different conception of the meaning and application of gender equity than a football coach from a highly ranked football program who has not experienced such an audit, or in cases where male athletes have had their sport program cut to apparently meet Title IX gender equity compliance requirements. Moral sensitivity is interconnected with moral perception and our emotions. People's ability to identify the salient features of a situation is based on their understandings of moral concepts. Sherman (1989) contends that people see not only through their understanding of moral concepts but also from their emotional awareness. People develop relevant points of view for discrimination because of their emotional dispositions. Individuals notice through feeling. Emotions inform what we see and how we see. Blum (1994) and Sherman (1989) also maintain the existence of varying degrees of saliency. People will understand some features of gender equity, for example, but not recognize other features. Different aspects of a person's moral reality and emotional awareness will aid in their ability to identify various 54 levels of saliency in a moral situation. Sherman (1989, p. 29) adequately summarizes this point by stating, "a given circumstance may have multiple descriptions, and yield competing ethical claims to equally virtuous individuals who simply see things differently as a result of having developed the virtues differently within their lives." Moral perception occurs prior to making a moral judgment29 in moral reasoning. Blum (1994, p. 31) defines "moral judgment" as the process that bridges the gap between moral rules and principles, and particular situations. In this study, moral judgment is the result of accurately recognizing the existence of a moral problem and the morally salient features, deliberation, judgment making, and action30 (Blum, 1994; Kekes, 1989, Sherman, 1989). This conception of moral reasoning illustrates how a reasoner's individual thoughts and feelings are an interdependent part of practical reasoning and provide one with an explanation as to why two people who are similar in age, experience, education, and historical and social backgrounds will often make varying interpretations and judgments about a particular situation. Standards of Practical Moral Reasoning Practical moral reasoning occurs in a variety of contexts. The context of a problem will also inform the standards of reasoning used in practical moral deliberations (Coombs, 1997; Wallace, 1988). Coombs (1997) has outlined the standards of sound practical reasoning in three different contexts: deciding among acceptable alternatives, resolving any emerging moral uncertainties, and group (social) and individual deliberations (see Table 5). The aim in striving to meet these standards is to gain confidence in our decisions and trust that our decision is justified. Practical reasoning problems range on a continuum from simple to difficult practical problems. Simple moral problems are less complex and the consequences of a judgment are less significant, meaning there are less possible alternatives and their related consequences to consider, and the magnitude of the problem is minor. A compliance officer who is asked to interpret and apply the institutional countable contest31 rules is an example of a simple problem. At the other end of the continuum, a compliance officer might be faced with an extremely difficult practical problem such as being forced by his/her superior to manipulate information to help a team/their program gain an advantage or he/she is requested to define and apply certain N C A A rules, such as relating to amateurism, recruiting, or academic assistance. Blum (1994, p.3) defines "moral judgment" from Henry Richardson's notion of "specification" of norms "in which an initial general norm is brought to bear on the specific situation in question by means of a more particularized norm that both counts as a modification of the original one (preserving its original moral thrust), and at the same time makes it clearer than the original norm which act should be performed in the current situation". 30That is, if one decides to act. 3 1 NCAA rules define what constitutes a countable contest for an institution (NCAA Manual, 2002-2003, p. 218). 55 Table 5 Standards of Practical Reasoning I. Deciding among morally acceptable alternatives and their consequences: Gathering all necessary background information: Assessing the information: Standard of sufficiency of information Standard of accuracy of information Standard of undistorted values Standard of rational consideration Standard of inclusiveness of envisioned alternatives II. Resolving moral uncertainties: Problems of Conflict Standard of value preservation Standard of consistency Standard of universalizability Problems of Relevance Standard of consistency Standard of universalizability III. Individual and social deliberations: Individual Judgment: Standards of greatest benefit Standard of moral acceptability: *Standard of impartiality * Standard of consistency * Standard of universalizability Social Judgment: Standards of greatest benefit: *Standard of just distribution Standard of moral acceptability: * Standard of impartiality *Standard of consistency * Standard of universalizability Deciding Among Acceptable Alternatives Practical reasoning judgments are based on reasoners' values and their belief that the judgment made will realize these values. The purpose of meeting this standard of deciding among acceptable alternatives is to gain confidence in the values that underlie our decisions and determine if the judgment is supported by good reasons. Coombs (1984, 1997) articulates several important standards for gaining confidence in our judgments and assessing the motivating reasons for a decision. The first step is gathering all the pertinent background information-and meeting the standard of sufficiency of information. Research is carried out to identify any related policies, rules, procedures, values, beliefs, and laws related to the situation. Collecting as much related data and case specifics as possible is required in meeting this standard. In the rule violation case, the compliance officer would first gather all necessary background information. This would entail researching all pertinent information about rules and 56 definitions of concepts the Association has about extra benefits. In addition, he/she would conduct interviews with relevant people to gain further understanding of the scope and nature of the problem. Upon gathering all necessary information, the compliance officer would assess what group(s) of people is/are involved (e.g., the booster, any coaches, other athletic department administrators, and the student-athlete[s]). The compliance officer would assess which values pertain (e.g., extra benefits, established prior relationships, institutional control, and determining the classification of the violation-secondary or major). The compliance officer would proceed to evaluate the information using four main standards: accuracy of information, undistorted values, inclusiveness of envisioned alternatives, and rational considerations. Assessing the accuracy of information is accomplished through critically verifying empirical claims and the accuracy of definitions of terms, determining if beliefs (such as extra benefits) are warranted, and appraising the evidence or claims supportingthe beliefs and the credibility of relevant authorities. For example, the compliance officer would verify the nature of the relationship between the booster and the student-athlete, and determine if there was sufficient evidence to support their prior relationship. He/she would also question the two parties belief that their actions were within the parameters of N C A A rules. The compliance officer would also assess his/her beliefs about the nature of the relationship, the intent of the rules, and his/her responsibility to report N C A A violations. Asking these types of questions, aids in fulfilling the standards of practical reasoning, which would ultimately aid in the compliance officer making a sound decision. Meeting the standard of undistorted values requires imagining the outcome if a value was realized, imagining if a disvalued state of affairs was realized, reflecting on experiences to examine how one acquired the value, and scrutinizing these values to ensure the values are genuine. In relation to the rule violation example, the compliance officer would need to imagine what some of the consequences would be if he/she did not report the violation versus reporting the violation. Should the compliance officer-explain the rules and give each party a warning? What if another institution discovers the potential violation and reports them to the N C A A . What if the compliance officer reports the violation and the institution is sanctioned for having a lack of institutional control? Asking, deliberating about, and answering these kinds of questions will aid the compliance officer in gaining confidence that the reasons for his/her decision are based on genuine value standards. Identifying all possible alternatives and the desirability of their consequences meets the standard of inclusiveness of envisioned alternatives. Coombs (1997) believes that failing to think of alternatives might result in overlooking a more appropriate option. Similar to judging the adequacy of background information, contextual factors are also used to appraise the possible alternatives and their outcomes. In regards to our Booster buying the student-athlete lunch example, the compliance officer should think of as many plausible alternatives courses of action and their outcomes as possible, followed by, assessing their 57 prior relationship, i f there was a special circumstance, or other contextual features that might be considered in making a decision. Finally, the standard of rational consideration "requires persons to make a reasonable attempt to identify the alternative that would contribute most to realizing the way of life they genuinely want" (Coombs, 1997, p. 6). Borrowing from Taylor (1961), Coombs (1997) argues that by selecting a particular alternative a person is selecting a particular way of life in which they wish to live. Taylor (1961) suggests that selecting a rational choice that aims for a certain way of life must meet three conditions: it should be free or uncoerced, it should be enlightened or aware of other alternative ways of being, and it should be impartial or free from indoctrinated beliefs or unsubstantiated prejudices. Referring back to the Booster example, the compliance officer would consider what kind of life the compliance officer wishes to live and decide whether to report the incidence. The compliance officer might choose to report the incident because he/she wishes to be honest and responsible in his/her position. However, depending on the culture of the athletic department, he/she might or might not be respected by the athletic department staff and his/her decision might contribute to working in a hostile environment. In contrast, the compliance officer might choose not to report the incident, as he/she believes that it is more beneficial to address the issue by talking to the respective parties and educating them about N C A A rules. The compliance officer perceives this approach as creating a work environment that is educational and cooperative rather than a legalistic atmosphere that is institutional and authoritative. The set of reasons why the compliance officer would choose or choose not to report the Booster for buying a student-athlete a $55 lunch would support the kind of life he/she wishes to pursue. Resolving Moral Uncertainties Wallace (1988) argues that moral problems come in two forms: problems of conflict and problems of relevance. Problems of conflict occur when two or more moral concepts that a person holds, come into conflict with each other. This is the case when one moral concept a person accepts clearly points toward one course of action, while another moral concept, which also is equally valued, suggests an opposing course of action. Problems of conflict also can arise in cases where two or more people's goals differ but a decision must be made. For example, an athletic department needs to have the college's gymnasium scoreboards replaced. The athletic director operates on a very limited budget. This year's athletic budget falls short in allowing the athletic department to purchase a new scoreboard. The athletic director is faced with a conflict problem when the local brewing company (where many students' parents receive employment) has offered to replace and maintain the gymnasium's scoreboards (without the company's logo) free of cost for the next 5 years. While the brewing company can solve the problem of the budget shortfall by replacing the scoreboards, the athletic director is concerned that alcohol companies should not be associated with educational institutions. If the athletic director accepts that college sports programs should not be associated with alcohol companies, but he/she also accepts that a local company 58 has the right to give back to the community when there is an obvious need/then the athletic director is forced to choose between these competing options and if at all possible, strive to realize both competing values. Moral relevance problems arise when we are not sure if a given moral principle or concept applies in a particular situation. Problems of relevance generally occur in new situations (ones we have not experienced before) and when we are uncertain if a moral principle/concept is applicable. For example, can N C A A DI-A International student-athletes who earn prize monies for winning or competing in an event yet gives their money to their coach, be classified as professional athletes? This is an example of a problem of relevance, as it is unclear how the moral concept (amateurism) applies in this situation. For example, we may accept the moral belief that professional athletes should not be eligible to participate in N C A A DI-A athletics, but be unsure about whether or not an individual who gives their prize money to their coach, counts as a professional athlet