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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Journey into the world of the school : high school students’ understandings of citizenship in B.C. and… Lévesque, Stéphane 2001

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J O U R N E Y I N T O T H E W O R L D O F T H E S C H O O L : H I G H S C H O O L S T U D E N T S ' U N D E R S T A N D I N G S OF C I T I Z E N S H I P I N B . C . A N D Q U E B E C by Stephane Levesque B . A . , Universite Laval, 1995 M A . , Universite Laval, 1997 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E OF D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S Department of Educational Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A Apr i l 2001 © Stephane Levesque, 2001 In p resen t ing this thesis in partial fu l f i lment of the r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e at the Univers i ty of British C o l u m b i a , I agree that the Library shall m a k e it freely available for re fe rence and study. I further agree that p e r m i s s i o n fo r extens ive c o p y i n g of this thesis for scholar ly p u r p o s e s may be g ran ted by the h e a d o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r by his o r her representat ives . It is u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n of this thesis for f inancial gain shall no t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t of €OHcyAT)&^C. SfUDiJS T h e Un ivers i ty of Brit ish C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T Regional, multicultural, and national divergences in Canadian politics and education have contributed to the emergence of different forms of nationalism, identity, and citizenship in Canada. The practice and content of secondary education in B.C. and Quebec illustrate this general proposition. Two multi-ethnic high schools, one in Quebec (Montreal) and one in B.C. (Vancouver), provide a window into Quebec history (grade 10) and B.C. social studies (grade 11) classrooms. These classes are used to examine how students construct and understand their citizenship. Key concepts (citizenship rights, participation, pluralism, collective identity) guided this research. Using a multiple case study design, this qualitative study employed multiple data collection. In addition to the analysis of the documentary record, I observed and interviewed B.C. and Quebec high school students, history and social studies teachers, and finally staff from each school. The study generated findings on citizenship education practice and learning. In both provinces, citizenship education is the raison d'etre of history and social studies. Despite divergent programs and teaching approaches, teachers at both sites recognize the necessity of preparing students for the exercise of democratic citizenship. Students at both sites accord importance to the key citizenship concepts introduced in their history/social studies classes. Yet, contrasts emerge in the findings between francophone Quebecois and anglophone British Columbian students, particularly in terms of collective identity. The findings suggest that theoretical discussions on multicultural and multinational citizenship in political theory does not adequately take into account all the complex views of B.C. and Quebec student informants. This study concludes with further research into the study of students' conceptions of citizenship. T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ii T A B L E OF CONTENTS iii Acknowledgements vi INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter outline 6 CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 9 A Canadian experiment 9 Nationalism and federalism 11 The meaning of citizenship and Canadian citizenship 15 Two views of Canada and Canadian citizenship 21 The purpose of this study 35 Review 46 CHAPTER 2: T H E ORIGINS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP 46 The roots of 'liberal' citizenship 46 Citizenship, state, and community 49 Citizenship and legitimacy 56 The modem conception of freedom 59 The commitments to democracy 61 The nature of a multinational state 64 Review 73 CHAPTER 3: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN CANADA: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 76 Citizenship education in democracy 76 The meanings of curriculum 84 Selection of studies 87 Review of research 8 8 Review 116 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 119 On the nature of qualitative inquiry 119 Case study design 124 This study 128 Validity, reliability, and ethics 140 Review 145 CHAPTER 5: DESCRIPTION OF THE B.C. HIGH SCHOOL AND SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHERS 147 Description of the school 148 Social studies teachers and their teaching styles 154 iii Conclusion 175 CHAPTER 6: B.C. STUDENTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF CITIZENSHIP 180 On Canada, Canadians, and rights 180 On cultural pluralism and multiculturalism 184 On participation 191 Conclusion 197 CHAPTER 7: DESCRIPTION OF THE QUEBEC HIGH SCHOOL AND HISTORY TEACHERS 200 Description of the school 201 History teachers and their teaching styles 208 Conclusion 231 CHAPTER 8: QUEBEC STUDENTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF CITIZENSHIP 235 On Canada, Quebec, and rights 235 On cultural pluralism and interculturalism 241 On participation 248 Conclusion 255 CHAPTER 9: ON CANADA, QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY: VIEWS F R O M B.C. A N D QUEBEC STUDENTS 259 On nationalism and patriotism 261 On Quebec, B.C., and Canada 277 Conclusion 290 CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 294 Review of this study 294 Review of the findings 299 Implications of this study and further research 317 BIBLIOGRAPHY 325 Appendix A Detailed chronological chart of the research process for 350 the B.C. case study Appendix B Schematic description of B.C. participants 351 Appendix C Detailed chronological chart of the research process for 352 the Quebec case study Appendix D Schematic description of B.C. participants 353 Appendix E Typical general observation excerpted from the B.C. case study 354 i v Appendix F Typical specific observation excerpted from the Quebec case study 357 Appendix G List of general questions to participants 360 Appendix H Informed consent form (teacher/administrator) 365 Appendix I Informed consent form (student) 366 Appendix J Formulaire de consentement (enseignant/administrateur) 367 Appendix K Formulaire de consentement (etudiant) 368 V ACKNOWLEDGMENT The origins of this thesis go back to my masters degree at I'Universite Laval in 1995-1997.1 found few studies conducted in Canadian history/social studies education on the complex process of learning citizenship in class on the differences between students of the 'two solitudes' at the turn of this century. In 1997,1 then took two major decisions that transformed my whole life (and the life of my wife): studying Canadian students' conceptions of citizenship in an English Canadian university 5000 km away from my 'patrie.' No one completes a doctoral dissertation on their own, particularly in a second language: I am no exception. I would have not completed this task without the support of my advisor, Donald Fisher, and my committee members, Peter Seixas, J. Donald Wilson, and David Coulter who diligently read and commented over the past few years both on my work and English skills, always pushing me to improve. I also want to thank the other faculty members and staff of the department of Educational Studies who encouraged me to pursue my doctoral studies. Special thanks should also be offered to the staff, teachers, and students of both schools who voluntarily agreed to participate in this research. Finally, I want to offer my gratitude to my wife, Martine, who not only welcomed this incredible venture but has loved and supported me for 10 years. This dissertation is dedicated to 'citizen' William, born in 1999 in British Columbia, the child of two francophone Quebecois. William, monfils, I'avenir t'appartient! I N T R O D U C T I O N "Without citizens, democracy is a hollow shell. Without public schools and univer-sities, citizenship is an empty boast." Benjamin R. Barber (1997, p. xi) "The greatest title any one of us can ever hold is Citizen." [U.S.] National Council for the Social Studies (2000) Political theorists have long argued that the future o f democratic states is dependent on the education o f their citizens. Democratic societies, notes Barber (1997), are sustained only by hard work. The knowledge, attitudes, and skills that permit citizens to think, deliberate, participate, and ultimately live democratically are not innate; they have to be learned. Public education1 helps develop the civic competencies, or 'virtues,' essential to citizenship in a democracy. Schools have thus been identified as the critical link between education and citizenship, and the locus from which democratic citizens emerge. Education has a political dimension that relates to given societies. In the 1990s, there has been a flurry o f interest in the concepts of'citizenship' and 'education' in both English Canada and Quebec (Sears, Clarke & Hughes, 1998; Levesque, 1997). Pluralism, identity politics, civic apathy, regionalism, and the resurgence o f nationalism in Quebec have compelled politicians, scholars, policy-makers, and educators to accord an important role to these issues. Unable to make informed judgments about issues o f democracy, nationalism, identity, and pluralism, many Canadians could be tempted to turn to simple answers, to slogans, or to nostalgia for a 'mythical' world. More gravely, they could simply withdraw from the public sphere, convinced that nothing can be done to solve our problems. A s 1 Kymlicka (1998) notes, more and more Canadians are disillusioned with the basic institutions and principles that underlie the Canadian state. If pluralism is perceived as a threat to our ability to act collectively as citizens (Granatstein, 1998; Gwyn, 1995; Bissoondath, 1994), the real difficulty for the survival of our democratic state is the tension between Quebecois and English Canadians. The relationship between these historical 'nations' remains the most serious threat to the stability and survival of Canada. In this thesis, I use the terms 'English Canada' and 'English Canadians' to refer to the non-Quebecois, non-Franco-Canadians, non-Aboriginal English-speaking majority. I prefer it to the other term commonly used in Quebec, the 'Rest of Canada,' which wrongly refers to a set of disconnected individuals having nothing in common except language. The central advantage of accepting the term, both in Quebec and in the English-speaking provinces, is that it makes clear that the reference of 'English' is neither to individuals nor their country of origin, but to a common feature of the entire anglophone society (see Angus, 1997). Similarly, I use the term 'Quebecois' to refer not only to the descendants of French-Canadian colonists — the so-called pure-laine — but to all those who live and participate in the French-language nation in Quebec, regardless of ethnic descent. Except for a minority of strong Quebec sovereignists, the term 'Quebecois' is commonly and also legally used in that province as an inclusive term of political membership, not in the restrictive, ethnic sense as implied by some (Webber, 1999).2 From the historical dual view of Canada, Quebecois regard their country as a 'multinational' state; that is, a state made up of distinct national groups. In the view of most Quebecois, the structure of Canadian society and the character of Canadian public education must recognize this reality. English Canadians, for their part, have been slow to fully understand the significance of these differences, their implications, and how differing conceptions of the nation and the state might be incorporated into Canadian citizenship. Many English Canadians rally around 2 multiculturalism, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and national standards in education without realizing the degree to which their aspirations and values conflict with Quebecois' ideas of citizenship, nationalism, and education. A minority of Canadians have come to realize that their multicultural conception of citizenship, based on the nation-state, is not acceptable for Quebecois, and if not altered could lead to the breakup of the country. They reason that if democracy is to survive in this century we all need to take Quebec nationalism much more seriously. The world, says Taylor (1993), "needs other models to be legitimated in order to allow for more humane and less constraining modes of political cohabitation" (p. 183). Resnick (1997b) in his Twenty-First Century Democracy adds that Canadians need to start thinking of organizations and possibly political structures "that go beyond the nation-state" (p. 129). Rather than trying, through policies and public institutions, to make Quebecois 'real' Canadians, we should focus on "identifying the benefits that [all] Canadians [could] gain from living in a multinational federation" (Kymlicka, 1998, pp. 180-181). This referent implies recognizing English Canadians and Quebecois for what they are (nations), and for what they have done in the building of their country. But, the survival of a democratic, multinational state like Canada is complicated. It requires various civic competencies or virtues from its citizens. Without the knowledge and skills necessary to analyse, criticize, and participate, and the attitudes and abilities to tolerate, respect, and share a sense of solidarity, a democracy becomes unstable and difficult to govern. Citizenship education contributes to the development of those competencies. In Canada, schools have historically played an important role in this political project despite the fact that under the Constitution education falls within provincial jurisdiction. But, if regional tensions between English Canadian provinces have not impeded the teaching and learning of Canadian citizenship, 3 the 'national' divergences between Quebec and English Canada have historically led to different views of Canada, citizenship, nationalism, and history in education. Students in our schools, at the turn of this century, are the leaders of tomorrow; those who will shape this large, regionally divided, multi-ethnic, and multinational country. School history, social representations, historical experiences, language and many other factors play a key role in the construction of their collective memory and conceptions of citizenship. As a Quebecois d'origine, born in rural francophone Quebec and now living in British Columbia (B.C.), I believe that we urgently need to know (1) what teachers formally and informally present to high school students in citizenship education, and more importantly, (2) what students learn from these classes in English Canada and Quebec. Two multi-ethnic high schools, one in Quebec (Montreal) and one in B.C. (Vancouver), provide a window into history and social studies classrooms. These classes will be used to examine how students construct and understand citizenship in light of their schooling experience. The classrooms are chosen since much of the burden of Canadian citizenship education has officially been assigned to history (grade 10) in Quebec and social studies (grade 11) in B.C. In our multinational state, such inquiries ought to receive significant attention as they have serious implications for the future of our democracy. Our history can tell us that, so far, we have managed to live together in relative peace (Morton, 1997). We have adapted our political institutions, policies, cultures, and schools to changing circumstances and new aspirations related to our pluralistic society. We have also moved away from conservative democracy, dominated by governments and representatives, to a more participatory form of democracy driven by citizens, interest groups, and nations (Ignatieff, 2000a) Yet, it seems today that many Canadians have lost the will and confidence to learn from their past experiences. I believe that we have to be inventive in finding new ways to enable our 4 multi-ethnic and multinational state to survive and flourish. This dissertation looks at how young Canadians envisage their lives as citizens in light of their experience in B.C. and Quebec schools. Taking a socio-constructivist perspective (see Saint-Onge, 1993), this research assumes that what is transmitted in class is not passively assimilated by students but reinterpreted and reconstructed in light of their own understandings, representations, and past experiences. We need to understand students' thinking — what they believe and understand when they enter and leave the classroom — if we are to know more about citizenship education. This dissertation begins with two presuppositions. First, it assumed that the 'nation' and 'state' remain central institutions for the life of democratic citizens. As Kennedy (1993) has noted, many of the most important international or domestic issues we face as citizens, both individually and collectively, continue to be addressed within the established institutions of sovereign states. In comparison to other types of organizations, the state is (so far) the chief provider of the rights, freedoms, autonomy, equality, peace, justice, and prosperity of its members. Of course, a democratic state cannot guarantee that all its citizens will inevitably be happy, prosperous, healthy, wise, or just. To attain these ends, as Dahl (1998) notes, is "beyond the capacity of any government, including a democratic government" (p. 60). But despite its limitations, the democratic state is a far better organization than any attainable alternative to it. In addition, nations remain one of the most important poles of identification for the majority of citizens. They contribute actively to the establishment of social cohesion, fraternity, and legitimacy necessary to stable democracy. In other words, if democracy is the 'rule of the people,' then, the members of this 'people' must not only decide and act together, but must form a unit of collective decision and action. This implies a certain degree of cohesion so that members will know, listen, respect, and understand one another. Both the nation and the state are these days under attack by transnational trends such as global economy, human rights, and 5 ecological movements. Yet, no other political model has emerged to replace them (Kennedy, 1993, p. 167). A new interdependence might be emerging, Ignatieff (2000b) adds, "but there is no discernible alternative to the nation state as the chief provider of foreign and domestic security for human populations" (p. 176). Commerce, human rights, and ecology may be borderless, but human beings are not. They need a secure territory in which to live in and to preserve their freedoms. These freedoms can only be provided by sovereign states. Studying citizenship education, then, necessarily implies analyzing the nation and the state in which citizens live. Second, this thesis assumes that public schooling is a good thing for our democratic societies. Schools are large and expensive institutions, and for certain businessmen, their functions could be better served by the private sector and twenty-first-century technology. Yet, public schools remain the best place to introduce the young to the world of learning and to the world of democratic citizenship. It is in school that students officially learn to become citizens. In the words of Postman (1996), "public school will endure since no one has invented a better way to create a public" (p. 197). This thesis is divided into ten chapters. In chapter 1,1 discuss some historical and political issues of citizenship and citizenship education in Canada. Drawing on the works of Taylor, Kymlicka, Resnick, and other political theorists, I show that Quebecois and English Canadians have developed different understandings of Canadian citizenship (multicultural and multinational) based on their divergent conceptions of the nation and the state. I close the chapter with a discussion on the understandings of citizenship in Canadian schools to show that we have very little information on what actually happens in citizenship education classrooms or on how students view and construct their citizenship. 6 Chapter 2 outlines the origins of modem citizenship. It shows how rights and freedoms, community membership, commitments, legitimacy, and recognition are central aspects of modem citizenship, particularly in multinational states such as Canada. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of citizenship education in democracy and a review of the evidence that our two historical nations have utilized different conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education. The review of literature is based on studies conducted in English Canada and Quebec and having direct bearing on this research. The review also includes two international case studies on citizenship education, one including Canada.3 In chapter 4, I discuss the methodology employed in this thesis. I present the aim of this study and explain why I decided to conduct a qualitative inquiry, using a multiple-case study design. I also discuss my position as a researcher, the selection of the cases, the methods for collecting data, and some concerns regarding validity; reliability, and ethics in case studies. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the B.C. case study. Chapter 5 draws on insights gained from my general and specific observations, interviews with teachers and administrators, and document analysis to set the context for better understanding students' conceptions of citizenship as found in one B.C. high school (in the greater Vancouver area), and more specifically in social studies grade 11 classes. Based on student interviews, document analysis and observations, chapter 6 looks at B.C. grade 11 students' own conceptions of citizenship, at how their schooling experience affect their understandings of citizenship. The focus is upon the key concepts presented in chapter 2: citizenship rights, cultural pluralism, and participation. Chapters 7 and 8 present the Quebec case study in light of my general and specific observations, interviews with teachers, administrators, and students, and document analysis. Chapter 7 sets the context for understanding students' conceptions of citizenship. It focuses on citizenship education practices as found in one francophone Quebec high school (ecole 7 secondaire) in Montreal, and more specifically in grade 10 history classes. Chapter 8 looks at Quebec students' understandings of citizenship, at how in light of their schooling experience they understand citizenship in terms of the key concepts presented earlier. Chapter 9 makes a comparative study of both B.C. and Quebec students' understandings of their national identity, nation, and citizenship. This chapter, drawn from the analysis of the two case studies, provides a comparative analysis of B.C. and Quebec students' understandings' of national identity, nation, and citizenship Finally, in the concluding chapter (chapter 10), I review the whole thesis with specific emphasis on the findings. I first provide a brief review of the problem investigated, the purpose of the study, and the justification for investigating it. Then, I review the findings of this research and briefly discuss the implications of this study for citizenship education in Canada and for further research in the area. 1 In this research I use the terms 'public education' and 'public schooling' interchangeably. A l though I recognize that education, which we a l l get f rom simply l i v ing wi th others, is different f rom the formal learning process i n school, I think the two terms can be used i n this research without confusion because they both refer to a 'public' process that can only be associated to schooling. Saying this is not to say, however, that education for citizenship cannot be found i n general education. Rather, I want to argue that for the purpose of this research both public education and public schooling refer to the same learning activity that occurs i n our public schools. 2 In this thesis, I use Quebecois and Eng l ish Canadians i n order to be able to generalize about those two entities. A s several commentators have observed, Canada cannot be understood as a nation-state because some of its inhabitants do think of themselves l inguistically, culturally, and even legally constituting national communities of their own. I do recognize, however, that these 'national' communities are diverse and (often) fragmented and, as such, cannot be reduced to a single ethnic view. 3 Two comparative case studies on citizenship education were being conducted i n Quebec when this research was written. The first one, led by Dr. Y u k i Shiose of the University de Sherbrooke, focuses on how students become citizens i n Quebec and Japan public schools; see Hauenschild (1998). The second one is directed by McAndrew, Bourgeault, and Page, f rom the Universite de Montreal, focuses on citizenship education practices as found i n Quebec and Ontario (see Hebert & Page\ 2000). 8 C H A P T E R 1 I . R E T H I N K I N G C I T I Z E N S H I P A N D C I T I Z E N S H I P E D U C A T I O N Ll A Canadian experiment A pair of twins is separated at birth. One is sent to an English-Canadian family in Vancouver, the other is raised in a French neighbourhood in Montreal. After 18 years, the English brother manages to trace his French brother in Quebec. In an unprecedented outpouring of emotion, he visits him a couple of days before the Referendum of October 1995 — with free airfares offered by Air Canada for the occasion — to tell him how much he loves him. At first, they are delighted to be in each other's company, and to rediscover, as it were, their lost half. But within a couple of hours, they find each other's company irritating. The English brother speaks a very fast English and masters only a few words in French. The French brother, who has never been in English Canada, is extremely disappointed to discover that his lost half is unable to communicate in French. When the English brother tells him that speaking Chinese is more an asset than speaking French for people in Vancouver, the French brother angrily refuses to believe it. He cannot understand and accept that there is great pressure to make French no more important than other minority languages. Soon, they are sitting in silence in a bar on St. Catherine Street, both thinking that it might have been better if they had never met. Beyond the 'accident' of having the same neglectful parents, they seem to have little in common. Then, the girlfriend of the French brother comes out and meets the two brothers who are, according to her, identical. The English brother realizes that she has red hair like his own girlfriend, and smells the same pleasant odour, obviously the perfume Estee Lauder. He notices also that they have both ordered the same beer, Molson. More confused then ever, he discovers that they both like the same music, Celine Dion, Sarah McLachlan, Shania Twain, and both share a passion for hockey, although the French brother is a Canadiens' fan and the English brother 9 cheers for the Canucks. Finally, when the English brother says what he wants to do later, the French brother discovers that they have chosen the same field of study, education. Take a state, say Canada, and settle it with two nations. Ensure that these two nations have different philosophies, cultures, and languages. Attempt to guarantee that the people of each nation have common, but also separate institutions such as schools, and are told for generations different stories about their country. Centuries later, ask one of the nations (the smaller one) to vote on the possibility of creating its own nation-state. Will it decide to go on its own or stay with its half part? This theoretical question leads to another: do Quebecois and English-Canadians have similar conceptions of the nation, the state, and citizenship? To English-Canadians, as suggested by Dion (1976), these concepts are directly related to the notion of 'nation-state,' the combined people of a country. Membership in and allegiance to the state are synonymous with membership and allegiance to the nation. But to Quebecois, these concepts are seen very differently. For them, citizenship means membership and allegiance to state via membership and allegiance to a constituent element of the state, in this case, la nation quebecoise. Being Canadian, for Quebecois, is being a member of a socio-geographical entity, Quebec, contributing to the whole. Their citizenship is officially Canadian but their national identity (or allegiance to the nation) is Quebecois. This is the reason why, for example, the national holiday of Quebecois (originally for French-Canadians) is not July 1, the date of Canadian Confederation, but it is June 24, la fete de la St-Jean-Baptiste. In this sense, they have multiple allegiances since they belong to both a state and a nation, but not to a nation-state. For Quebecois, 'nation' and 'state' are conceptually distinct. The former refers to the sociological community (see Bouchard, 2000), the latter to the sovereign political framework within which the nation can be democratically free. But, if we want to go deeper into the bases of citizenship, we need to understand more about the concepts of nationalism and federalism. 10 1.2 Nationalism andfederalism Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world, yet its definition is somewhat contested. There seems to be no 'scientific' definition of the nation on which we can all agree. Some equate nationalism with national sentiment, others with national ideology and common language, others again with independence movements. A difference also exists between those who stress the 'cultural' rather than the 'political' aspects of nationalism. Although there are various definitions of nationalism in the literature (see Gellner, 1997; Hutchinson & Smith, 1994; Greenfeld, 1992), I think Ignatieff (1993) provides the most appropriate and explicit one for this thesis. For him, nationalism is a modern political doctrine which holds that (1) the world's peoples should be divided into free nations (or peoples), and (2) these nations should have the right to self-determination, either as self-governing units within existing states or as nation-states of their own. Ignatieff adds that nationalism is also a 'cultural ideal' which claims that while men and women have different identities, it is the nation that provides them with their primary form of belonging (patriotism). As a 'moral ideal,' nationalism also implies that people could fight or sacrifice their life to protect the collectivity and its common good against perceived enemies, internal or external. These claims (political, cultural, moral), as Ignatieff (1993) indicates, underwrite each other. The moral claim that nations are entitled to be defended depends on the cultural claim that the needs they satisfy for security and protection are uniquely important. The political ideal that people should struggle for nationhood depends on the cultural claim that only nations can satisfy these needs.1 Finally, the cultural idea underwrites the political claim that these needs cannot be satisfied without self-determination (either through a multinational polity or nation-state). Each of these claims is, of course, contestable and understood differently by different people. This is one of the reasons why nations are 'imagined communities,' in Anderson's terms. They are imagined because "members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, 11 or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). So people imagine what it is that they have in common, and through this shared imagining, people become members of the same nation.2 But not all collectivities that consider themselves culturally or linguistically distinct necessarily constitute nations. What distinguishes nations, says Weber (1994), is their commitment to a political project. This political project has for goal the development and flourishing of a national or 'societal culture.' Relying on Kymlicka (1998), I refer to a national/societal culture as a territorially concentrated public culture centered on a shared language used in common social, economical, political, and educational institutions (see Kymlicka, 1998, pp. 27-28). Participation in this culture, as Kymlicka (1998) argues, "provides [its members] access to meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities — social, educational, religious, recreational, economic — encompassing both public and private spheres" (p. 27). This political project of securing a national culture requires the use of, and the control over, a variety of socio-political powers and institutions. This is one reason why nationalists claim they must to be self-governing. But if nationalism presupposes 'self-determination,' that is, that people should rule themselves, some nations have voluntarily or sometimes involuntarily (because of conquest or annexation) decided to achieve their collective goals within the framework of a larger entity, such as a federation. This is the case of Quebecois, Catalans in Spain, Flemish in Belgium, and Scots in the United Kingdom (although this is not officially a federal state).3 All forms of nationalism vest political authority in the people (also a synonym of the nation) but not all nationalist movements create democratic regimes. Some movements, while based on a doctrine of'popular sovereignty,' exclude individuals from their definition of the nation based on ethnic criteria (for example, Serbian nationalism). The history of the twentieth century provides many examples of the possible connection between nationalism and racism. For 12 many people, the connection between the two concepts is clearly related to wars and authoritarian militarism. Many opponents of nationalism are disturbed by its connection to warfare. They contend that a sense of belonging to the nation "feeds belligerence and dulls our sense of the importance of shunning unnecessary violence" (Nathanson, 1993, p. 133). Nationalism would be a dangerous ideology, "the most ubiquitous, explosive, and intractable [problem] at the end of the twentieth century" (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994, p. 11). The recently ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo are reason enough to support this view. Consequently, many critics of nationalism have rejected all forms of nationalism and nationalistic feelings (patriotism) because they are too often negative, dangerous, and unworthy. For example, Tolstoy (1968), writing in Russia at the turning of the 20th century, argued that nationalism would conflict with morality. Because it requires special duties toward our fellow national members — that we ought to treat them better than we treat people in general — nationalism clashes with our basic moral principles of equality for all human beings. Patriotism becomes nothing more than 'national egoism,' sanctioning actions and attitudes that are condemned at the individual level. Faced with such dangers, some are tempted to discard the concept of nationalism altogether. * However, for various Canadian scholars such as Kymlicka (1998), Resnick (1997a), Derriennic (1995), and Taylor (1993) nationalism is compatible with treating all the citizens of a particular territory as equal community members. In this view, nationalism harmonizes with liberal democracy, and ethnic tolerance. Nation-building projects, Kymlicka (1998) insists, "are a fundamental, defining feature of modern democratic states" (p. 29) since democratic institutions (and social programs) are more likely to develop and endure in a country that is fairly stable and homogeneous in terms of language, history, and culture. That being said, we must keep in mind that nations tend to attribute to themselves a greater degree of homogeneity than their members actually display. This is the reason why 13 Miller (1995b) argues that we should think of a national culture in terms of "a set of overlapping cultural characteristics — beliefs, practices, sensibilities — which different members exhibit in different combinations and to different degrees" (p. 85). If we want to study nationalism as a modern, liberal phenomenon, we need to make a clear distinction between two types of nationalism: civic and ethnic. Civic nationalism, like Quebec nationalism (see Derriennic, 1995), maintains that the nation should be composed of all members, regardless of race, color, gender, ethnicity. This nationalism is called 'civic' because it envisages the nation as a territorial community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united with a shared set of liberal values, practices, and institutions. In this sense, the community is a political unit in which the individuals are equal members committed to protect citizenship rights and promote the community's common good. According to civic nationalists, what holds a nation together is not common roots or ancestry, but the common will of a people to be self-governing. In other words, it is inclusive of all community members and it assumes that members are all equally and legally qualified and competent to rule themselves. Ethnic nationalism, on the contrary, claims that "an individual's deepest attachments are inherited [usually by common ancestry], not chosen" (Ignatieff, 1993, p. 8). One is born into a particular ethnic nation and cannot simply abandon this identity for another one. Because common ethnicity, by itself, does not create social cohesion, ethnic nationalist regimes tend to be more authoritarian than civic nationalist regimes. Ethnic nationalist regimes sometimes appear to be democratic, but their institutions and governments always favour one ethnic group over others. As a result, not all members are considered 'politically equal.' Unlike nationalism, federalism is not a political ideology, but a particular way of sharing political powers among peoples and governments within a single state (Ignatieff, 1993). It provides meaningful self-realization and self-government for peoples living in a state, especially if the country is of vast size, multi-ethnic, and regionally divided (see Jackson & Jackson, 1997, 14 p. 200). For philosophers like Montesquieu and Rousseau, federalism was perceived either as a way to preserve the principles of the separation of powers (as in Switzerland) or as a means of reconciling efficacy with participatory democracy. Federalism would have for them the potential of uniting people of different regions for certain ends, such as defense, while preserving their independence or autonomy for others, like language. In Canada, certain scholars have argued that federalism was adopted by the Fathers of Confederation because prime minister Macdonald's idea of a legislative union was totally unacceptable to French-Canadians in Lower Canada who refused to become a minority ruled by the British-Canadian majority. If Canadian federalism was, at its origins, conservative and somewhat hostile to Rousseau's views on popular support, many Canadians, particularly in Lower Canada and the Maritimes, had strong regional or national consciousness which made it "next to impossible to create a strong legislative union. As Resnick (1990) puts it: The main reason federalism was adopted at all, despite Macdonald's clear preference for a legislative union, was recognition that "the people of lower [sic] Canada" [...] would never assent to this. Canada, in other words, had to come to terms with its national question, (p. 233) 1.3 The meaning of citizenship and Canadian citizenship Like nationalism and federalism, citizenship is "an extremely flexible concept" (Alejandro, 1998, p. 9) meaning different things to different people. At one level, it simply refers to a legal contract binding individuals to respect the law of a state. Legal definitions often relate to naturalization processes or ways of accepting incoming citizens into the state (see the discussion in Tilly, 1995). For others, citizenship is also understood as a set of ideals that represent what citizens ought to be and how they ought to live in order to enjoy the full rights and freedoms of citizenship (Osborne, 1996). 15 The difficulty with the concept of citizenship is that it refers to both an ideal and a pragmatic notion. Political philosophers have for a long time engaged in debates about the differences between moral or value judgements (trying to answer questions like 'what ought I to do?') and practical or empirical judgements (related to question such as 'what can I do?')4 In answering the question 'what is citizenship?' scholars inextricably make judgements that depend heavily on their values, on what we believe is good, right, or desirable for us and for others. Here, citizenship is purely an 'ideal,' a moral claim about how things should be from a moral point of view. But when we try to decide 'what kind of citizenship is the more appropriate for us,' as Canadians, we still depend on moral judgments but we rely much more on evidence and empirical judgements based on beliefs about causal connotations and limits. Citizenship becomes a concept that we apply to particular circumstances and particular people(s), place(s), and institutions. In this thesis, I will refer to both moral and practical judgements. In the first parts, I will discuss citizenship more as an 'ideal' (what I believe is desirable for us). But as we will move along in the thesis, we will encounter a mixture of value judgments and empirical judgments, particularly in the two case studies. When asking people (students, teachers, administrators) what they understand by citizenship, we have to keep in mind that participants rely both on moral and practical judgments to construct their answers to such a theoretical concept. During the 1990s, a number of researchers defined the concept of citizenship (see Miller, 1995a; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) or offered a theory of citizenship (Janoski, 1998). As suggested by Gagnon and Page (1999), the concept of citizenship, particularly in Canada, historically refers to more than a legal status. Citizenship is a social role which is partly, but not wholly, defined in terms of various rights. It means something more than merely being subject to the laws of a given state. 16 In this thesis, I define citizenship as a desirable activity where the quality of one's citizenship is a function of rights, participation, and membership in the affairs of the communities and state to which one belongs. Citizenship, here, is not simply a passive status conferred by the state but an 'activity,' which implies a set of practices or commitments that support the rights provided by the state to all its citizens.5 This means that citizens are not simply passive beneficiaries of various civil, political, and social rights. Rather, they have to participate actively to protect what they value both as individuals and collectivities, for example, their freedoms. Since citizens are, by definition, members of a particular ration and state; they also have to establish their rights, freedoms, autonomy, and development (both personal and collective) within the limits of a defined territory. As Janoski (1998) notes, "citizenship is an act of closure about a group of people it calls citizens, and consequently states and societies are very particular about whom they call citizens" (p. 46). The particular relationship between citizens and their state, as Cairns (1999) explains, is extremely important because "[it reinforces] the idea that it is 'their' state — that they are full members of an ongoing association that is expected to survive the passing generations" (p. 4). Similarly, it is important that citizens develop a sense of collective identification as valued and equal members of a political community. Here, citizenship reinforces solidarity and empathy necessary for stable democracy. As Tamir (1995) puts it, it allows for a certain degree of cohesion, respect, trust, sympathy, security, and transparency that can facilitate the participation of citizens in public affairs. Yet, we accept today that membership in a given state is to be found at various levels, not only in a direct relationship to the state (see Page, 1996). So citizenship necessarily involves a respect of pluralism and a commitment to the many communities to which one belongs (local, provincial, ethnic, national). Some scholars (Kymlicka, 1995; Spinner, 1994) have shown that in order to have a full, inclusive citizenship, citizens must be able to express their particular identities. This implies a capacity for citizens to 17 act as free persons in both the private and public spheres (schools, religious organization, professional associations, interest groups).6 The notion of citizenship used in this thesis takes into consideration the key components (rights, pluralism, participation, and membership) that are found in different political regimes. It is applicable to traditional, homogeneous nation-states as well as to multi-ethnic and multinational states. My notion of citizenship is thus inclusive of the many ethnic, national identities and communities that compose our modem states. But because no one is born into a particular conception of citizenship, citizens must possess the necessary civic competencies, or 'virtues,' to play an active role in public affairs. Here, competencies (also known in French as savoir-mobilisef) refer to a set of various knowledge, attitudes, and capacities that are mobilized at a given moment for a specific task (see Perrenoud, 1998). Competencies, then, not only depend on the construction, transmission and appropriation of knowledge, attitudes, and capacities but take their full meaning in the action. Furthermore, competencies are seen as 'transversal,' in that they should be developed not only in one school subject but in all school activities. From this perspective, the entire school environment can contribute to the development of these competencies. For Gellner (1994), the minimal requirement for full citizenship and effective moral membership is literacy. "Only a person possessing [certain competencies] can really claim and exercise his rights, can attain a level of affluence and style of life compatible with current notions of human dignity" (Gellner, 1994, p. 56).7 Gellner's idea is not new. Public education has historically placed a significant role in this 'political enterprise' (Oldenquist, 1980). Historically, the task of educating everyone to become citizens was too important and too vital to be left to the private sector. "Both the scale of the educative enterprise and its essential uniformity dictate that it be assumed by the state" (Taylor, 1997, p. 33). But, the historical link 18 between public education and the state is not necessarily endless. It needs to be continually analyzed, questioned, and reaffirmed In Canada, both the concepts of citizenship and citizenship education have been greatly revitalized in the 1990s. The Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology conducted an extensive investigation into Canada citizenship in 1993 (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 1993), while the federal department of Canadian Heritage recently sponsored a range of related research (Kaplan, 1991a; Kaplan 1991b, Kymlicka, 1992; Sears & Hughes, 1994; Gagnon & Page, 1999). In Quebec, the Council Superior of Education dedicated its 1998 annual report to Citizenship Education. Books, such as Kaplan's (1993) Belonging: The Meaning and Nature of Canadian Citizenship, Taylor's (1993) Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, Kymlicka's (1998) Finding Our Way, and Cairns' Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism, as well as two editions of Canadian journals on citizenship education (Canadian and International Education, December 1996; Canadian Social Studies, Spring 1997) and two major conferences of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada on the topics of citizenship and history education are evidence of growing interest among academics in the areas of citizenship and citizenship education.8 All these initiatives culminated in the foundation of a Canadian Citizenship Education Research Network (CERN) in 1998; a research network which brings together a group of interested researchers, policy-makers, practitioners and stakeholders to carry out an agenda on citizenship education in Canada (see Hebert & Page, 2000). Why all this activity? Two chief factors account for this renewed interest in citizenship and citizenship education in Canada: pluralism and nationalism. The pluralism in our society poses many challenges to citizenship. With the increasing diversity of Canada's population, Canadian citizens are in the process of adopting a more disparate set of identities, as evidenced by their ethnic affiliations, their class identities, their religious allegiances, their sexual 19 orientations, their views of personal life, and their ideas about liberal democracy. Kymlicka (1995) refers to such culturally diverse countries as 'polyethnic' states. Recently, the increased pluralism of our society has even fuelled the belief among certain Canadians that 'things are out of control.'9 For some commentators (Gwyn, 1995; Bissoondath, 1994), pluralism and its official recognition — via multiculturalism and multicultural education programs — threatens the shared conception of citizenship that Canadians have managed to achieve. More importantly, multiculturalism, according to these critics, promotes a fragmentation of Canadian society (so-called 'ghettoization') and critically endangers our 'shared way of life.' As a result, some observers have even suggested that a moratorium on immigration was essential to assimilate "last decade's scarcely-restrained human flood" (McFeely & Grace, 1994, p. 6). Such criticisms are rooted in the belief that immigrants or members of ethnic minorities are seeking unjust privileges from 'our' society, while simultaneously refusing to integrate into it. This backlash, says Granatstein (1998), "comes from the widespread realization that it [multiculturalism] will erode the history and the heritage that Canadians share" (pp. 92-93). Interestingly, there is no evidence to support this argument. As Kymlicka (1998) has noted, available empirical evidence suggest precisely the opposite: multiculturalism and multicultural education help promote integration into the broader parameters of Canadian society. Compared to other countries having no such policy, Canada fares much better in terms of naturalization rates, political participation rates, residential segregation rates, and official languages acquisition. What might be at issue, however, is not so much the degree of integration into Canadian society as the type of society into which immigrants are integrating. Much of the opposition to multicultural citizenship possibly comes from the fact it suggests a very different conception of the Canadian nation than the older ideal common before World War II. In this sense, the matter at hand is not so much integration but the character of Canada and the meaning of Canadian citizenship. 20 This point might even be truer with regard to Quebec. Quebecois claim to have a distinct national language and culture, political institutions, and collective rights which seem alien to many English-Canadians. The multicultural citizenship promoted in English-Canadian schools has done little to alter the sense of national difference of Quebecois or to win their sympathy for Canada. The results of the Quebec Referendum of October 30, 1995 were so close (50.6 percent voted Non and 49.4 percent voted Out) that many Canadians realized how necessary it was to do something to keep the country together. Having long assumed that the Non forces would win easily, as prime minister Chretien implied, many English-Canadians were shocked by the results. This referendum, says Beiner (1998), "was profoundly traumatizing for English Canada [...]. [It is] like learning that the country has just had a death sentence passed upon it" (p. 193). Moreover, McRoberts (1997) notes that most English-Canadians did not understand why so many Quebecois favoured the sovereignist option. But almost 50 percent of Quebecois (over 60 percent of francophones) were so dissatisfied with the reactions of English-Canadians to constitutional changes that they were prepared to leave the country. For Ignatieff (1993), most Quebecois have never needed Canada as a nation. Many of them are now convinced they do not even need it as a state. In this context, several organizations such as the Dominion Institute and Celebration Canada were created by English-Canadians to analyze 'what went wrong' and foster a greater sense of belonging to Canada. The Dominion Institute, for example, has sponsored several pan-Canadian surveys in 1997, 1998, and 1999 that revealed a large number of English-Canadians and Quebecois students (and adults) lack both civic and historical knowledge of their country.10 1.4 Two views of Canada and Canadian citizenship Since its creation as a state in 1867, Canada has experienced different types of nationalism and federalism largely because of the historical tensions between English and 21 French-Canadians. At the time of Confederation, francophones, mainly but not exclusively found in the province of Quebec, identified with a Canadien nationality dating back to New France. This nationality relied heavily on the survivance of the French language, Catholic religion, and a rural environment and economy. As Martel (1998) puts it in his historical analysis of French Canada: The accent [of the French-Canadian identity] was on cultural and religious dimensions, that is the French language and the Catholic faith. These elements were associated with an idealized lifestyle in a rural environment and an agricultural vocation thought most likely to guarantee the survival of French Canada, (p. 6) The British Conquest of 1759 did not produce this Canadien nationality but it contributed to the attachment of francophones to their distinct religion, culture, and language. The 1774 Quebec Act, which recognized the seigneurial system, Catholic religion and the French legal system (Code Napoleon) of Canadiens, and the 1791 Constitutional Act, which established representative democracy and the creation of Lower Canada (Quebec), formalized the link between francophones and their distinct nationality. As two Canadien delegates sent to London in 1784 to propose the creation of two Canadas put it in a letter to their compatriotes: Le gouvernement [britannique] concoit aisement que nous formons la generalite des individus de notre province. La disproportion de dix-neuf a un est trop frappante pour n'etre pas observee par la partie genereuse et impartiale du reste de la nation [...] Nous sommes done, ainsi que vous le voyez, suffisamment encourages a croire que, si nous desirons fortement un amendement du bill de Quebec, nous l'obtiendrons et que, si nous croyons que l'etablissement d'une maison d'assemblee dans laquelle nous serions 22 indistinctement admis, notre religion et nos lois prealablement conservees, nous l'obtiendrons egalement. (Adhemar et De lisle in Lacoursiere, 1995, p. 456) After 1791, several French/English conflicts erupted in Lower Canada on linguistic, religious, and cultural grounds. The most significant one was the Rebellion of the Patriotes in 1837-1838, which led to Lord Durham's report. For Durham, French/English dualism was the heart of the problems in the colony. In one passage of his famous report he declared: "I expected to find a contest between a government and a people, I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state" (Durham as quoted in McRoberts, 1997, p. 5). The solution, for Lord Durham, needed to bring peace and order was the amalgamation of the two Canadas to assimilate the Canadien nation; a nation, according to him, with no history, no literature, and accordingly, no future. But even with the Act of Union of 1840, which abolished the two Canadas and placed francophones in a precarious situation of assimilation, the Canadiens maintained even more ardently a distinct nationality that frustrated the British-Canadian settlers. Indeed, at the time of Confederation most English-Canadians did not have a typically Canadian nationality. Unlike French-Canadians, their national identity transcended the boundaries of Canada. They saw themselves as members of a British nationality established in a new colony, and later Dominion. This British-Canadian nationality referred essentially to white, anglophone Protestants, loyal to the British Empire. With time, the term Canadien was appropriated to designate all residents of Canada, francophone and anglophone. To distinguish themselves from anglophones, francophones then began to adopt a Canadiens frangais identity. In his analysis of Quebec history, Lacoursiere (1995) comments on this situation in Lower Canada: "Ceux qui, depuis 1760, ont choisi de venir s'etablir dans la province de Quebec, portent toujours le nom d'Anglais ou d'anciens sujets. Quelques-uns commencent a s'appeler 23 Canadiens, appelation reservee jusqu'ici aux nouveaux sujets d'origine francaise" (p. 461). Yet, as Brunet (1954) has noted, many francophones continued to called themselves Canadien and assumed that the term designated their own distinct nationality. In the late 19th and early 20th century, a number of factors contributed to the elaboration of various identities within the Canadian federation. Not only English-Canadians started to adopt a purely Canadian identity, especially after World War I, but within the French-Canadian nation differences emerged between Quebec and francophones communities outside Quebec (Martel, 1998). A whole series of events led French-Canadian political elites to question the foundation and viability of a single nation canadienne-frangaise. Among these was the hanging of Louis Riel in 1885, the abolition of the dual school system in Manitoba in 1890, the inability of the federal government to guarantee the rights of French-Canadian Catholics in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, as well as in B.C. since 1871 and, finally, the controversial Regulation 17 adopted by the government of Ontario in 1912 which prohibited French-language instruction beyond the first two years of schooling. To preserve the rights of all French-Canadians and assure their survival, the politician and founder of Le Devoir newspaper, Henri Bourassa, proposed to his compatriotes in English Canada a different framework for understanding the Canadian federation. Instead of viewing Confederation as a pact between colonies, he offered the notion of a 'double compact,' a pact between two peoples: French and English. In 1903, Bourassa explained his views in the Nationaliste newspaper: Notre nationalisme a nous est le nationalisme canadien fonde sur la dualite des races et sur les traditions particulieres que cette dualite comporte. Nous travaillons au developpement du patriotisme canadien qui est a nos yeux la meilleure garantie de l'existence des deux races et du respect mutuel qu'elles se doivent. (as quoted in Lacoursiere, 1997, p. 42) 24 But the recognition and survival of this political concept of a French-Canadian nation could only be achieved through concerted actions by the federal and all provincial governments. Leaders of all French-Canadian institutional networks had to cooperate more closely to create a sense of solidarity and form a unit of collective decision and action. Despite the good will of many French-Canadian politicans, clergy, and laymen in the first half of the 20th century to create a national institutional network (the Ordre de Jacques-Cartier also known as 'La Patente'), a major split occurred between Quebec and the francophone communities outside Quebec in the second half of the 20th century. In the late 1950s, various modernization factors contributed to the development of different forms of nationalism in Canada. In the heart of French Canada (Quebec), some scholars in academic circles reconceptualized the notion of la nation canadienne-frangaise. Historians like Fregault, Seguin, and Brunet proposed a definition of national identity in Quebec that differed significantly from the one echoed by historians of earlier generations such as Groulx. For Brunet (1954), non-territorial national duality was doomed. He proposed, therefore, a vision of Canadian duality based on territorial national entity. Quebec would become the central agent of collective action and identification for French-Canadians. In this view, francophone minorities in English Canada were inevitably destined to be assimilated into the English-Canadian (or American) nation. In the 1960s, the notion of a French-Canadian nation was gradually replaced by a Quebec nation — and even the 'state of Quebec'fZ 'Etat quebecois) — for francophone Quebecois (see Martel, 1998). Initiated by the Liberal government of Lesage, with the slogan /'/ faut que ga change in 1960, the Quiet Revolution (La Revolution tranquille) led to long needed social, political, and economic reforms that contributed to the emergence of a new modern identity connected to a liberal political ideology. In their analysis of the premises of the Quiet Revolution, Linteau et al. (1989) note that this key period is characterized by: 25 Des intellectuels, des artistes, des syndicalistes et des homrnes politiques [qui] contestent ouvertement le duplessisme. lis denoncent le climat ideologique etouffant, qualifie de "grande noirceur". S'inspirant tantot de personnalisme chretien, tantot du keynesianisme, tantot de l'internationalisme qui fleurit apres la guerre, ils reclament une modernisation de la societe, de ses valeurs et de ses institutions. Us veulent plus de justice sociale et une large ouverture sur lemonde. (p. 210) In focusing exclusively on the province of Quebec, francophone Quebecois could think of themselves less as a minority in Canada and more as a Quebec collectivity within their "territorial network" (Balthazar, 1996, p. 82). With the historical assault of English-Canadians on French language and education outside Quebec, French-Canadians in Quebec realized that if they were to survive, it would be as a society within their own province. Only in Quebec, where French-Canadians were the overwhelming majority, was it possible to imagine "the full economic, social, and cultural institutions of a modern society functioning in the French language" (McRoberts, 1997, p. 32). In the 1970s, Rene Levesque and the members of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) argued that full sovereignty was necessary to shape the province into a secure French-speaking nation-state, while agreeing to respect minority rights for anglophones. O'Keefe (1998) suggests that the historical pattern of assimilation among francophones outside Quebec has increased dramatically over the last 30 years making some Quebecois fear they could face a similar situation.11 In this context, for Quebecois the Quebec government came to be the primary tool for collective actions. The new 'state of Quebec' became a 'good' in itself. For Fortin, writing about the proponents of a modern Quebec nationalism during the Quiet Revolution, "leur ideologic du progres et du developpement s'appuie sur une conception egalitaire de la societe et sur l'idee 26 qu'il faut donner a l'Etat [quebecois] un role predominant" (Fortin as quoted in Resnick, 1990, p. 65). The strategy was, therefore, to make Quebecois maitres chez nous, and only through the intervention of the provincial government could Quebec promote its modern 'common good.' The originality of the strategy was the combination of Quebec nationalism with liberalism. As noted by several observers (McRoberts, 1997, Dion, 1975), the Quiet Revolution can only be seen as an expression of liberal ideals. The government replaced the Catholic clergy as the leading institution in the collective lives of Quebecois. Francophone ownership of the economy increased drastically as salaries caught up with those of anglophones, a confident new bourgeoisie emerged, French became the official language of the province (Bill 101), and finally Quebecois, moving from la survivance to I'epanouissement, recognized the pluralistic nature of modern Quebec. Crown corporations such as Hydro-Quebec, the Societe Generate de Financement, the Caisse de Depots, and a growing number of Quebec private firms like Bombardier, Lavalin, Quebecor, and Power Corporation came to symbolize the new industrial, modern Quebec. In education, the Liberal government honoured one of its campaign promises by initiating in 1961 a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education with an extremely broad mandate authorizing a complete examination of all types and levels of education in Quebec. The Parent Commission — in the name of its chair Monseigneur Parent, vice-rector of Laval University — spent seven months in public hearings and several others collecting extensive data on education in North America and Europe. In 1963, the Commission published its first report dealing primarily with the control and organization of the education system (see Stevenson, 1970). It recommended the creation of a secular Ministry of Education which would be the source of authority for both private and public education (francophone and anglophone). It also recommended the appointment of a Superior Council of Education to advise the Minister of Education and to act as a means of communication between the public and the government. 27 Following most recommendations of the Parent Commission, the government passed in 1964 the famous Bill 60 which established for the first time since 1875 a Ministry of Education. "Bill 60," claims Stevenson (1970), "represented the heart of the education revolution in Quebec" (p. 476). More importantly, one member of the Commission, Rocher (1989), argues that Bill 60 and the reform of education that followed constituted nothing less than the core of the whole Quiet Revolution. As he puts it: A cette epoque-la, la reflexion sur la reforme de l'enseignement se trouvait a toucher la fine pointe du changement social, economique et culturel qui marquait ce qu'on appelait deja "la Revolution tranquille". C'est vers l'enseignement que Ton se tournait surtout, parce qu'on croyait que pour changer la societe, edifier un Quebec nouveau, il fallait rebatir le systeme d'enseignement de nouvelles assises. On croyait volontiers que le systeme d'enseignement avait une grande influence sur 1'avenir economique et culturel d'une nation. (Rocher, 1989, pp. 47-49) Following Bill 60, the Parent Commission presented other recommendations (in its volumes U, JJJ, IV, V, and Report) dealing with the programmes of studies, the organization of public and private schools, and post-secondary education. According to the Parent Commission, education and more specifically teaching was to aim at individual instruction, overall development of the child, and the stimulation of creativity among students. Overall, the Parent Commission typically adopted the features of neo-progressive educational reforms taking place in English Canada and the United States at the time. Despite some controversies (especially with the clergy), and slowdowns in the implementation of the recommendations after 1966, the reform of education represented a revolutionary project for the modernization of Quebec society. Not only did it lead to the 28 creation of a secular Ministry of Education, but to the birth of a complete public education system, from kindergarten to university, with serious concern for social equality. Even today, Quebec continues to be one of the provinces with the most generous system of student loans (for Quebecois) and with the lowest fees for post-secondary education. In this context, the government of Quebec came to be "the moteur principal of the new Quebec nation" (McRoberts, 1997, p. 32). With the death of French Canada, Quebecois, particularly francophones, feel the Quebec government looks after their interests better than the federal government. As a result, they are correspondingly more attached and loyal to the former. Pinard (1978), supporting this view, once argued that "if there is a system of dual loyalties, loyalty to Quebec nevertheless seems often much stronger than loyalty to Ottawa" (p. 12). With such a set of dual loyalties, patriotism for Canada never spread to the whole Canadian population as in traditional nation-states, even after the liberalization of Quebec society.12 What this means is that Quebecois have adopted a conception of Canadian citizenship which sustains their national culture and identity while allowing them to remain officially Canadian. Their sense of belonging to the sovereign state (Canada) is, thus, combined with a strong attachment to and participation in what might be called their 'national province,' Quebec. For their part, English-Canadians also developed a liberal-civic nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. But, unlike Quebec nationalism, Canadian nationalism, is closely tied to the federal state and has evolved differently. With a population less and less British, repetitive waves of immigrants coming from all over the world (not exclusively from the Western Europe), and the increasing importance of Canada internationally, the sense of a British nationality (already in serious decline) atrophied among English-Canadians during the second half of 20th century. Following World War n, the federal government adopted the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1946, appeals to the Privy Council in London were abolished in 1949, and for the first time in Canadian history a Canadian, Vincent Massey, was appointed governor-general in 1952. The 29 British term 'Dominion' was quickly discarded and replaced by the 'Government of Canada' as the federal government started to play a more active (and national) role not only in Canadian politics and social affairs but also in international relations (see Resnick, 1990). By and large, the old British-Canadian nationalism — clearly expressed by the first prime minister Macdonald who once proudly claimed 'A British subject I was born, a British subject I shall die' — was replaced with a new conception of Canadian nationalism directly attached to the development of the Canadian state and pan-Canadian social programs and policies. As Resnick (1990) puts it in his study of nationalism and federalism in Canada: [I]n English Canada, nationalism remains closely tied to the federal state [...] [It] remains linked to governmental programs and policies, and the key debates — from free trade to foreign policy to public v. private ownership — typically revolve around the use (or misuse) of state power, (p. 220) In the early 1960s, despite the massive post-war expansion of the federal government, the Liberal federal government of prime minister Lester B. Pearson tried to accommodate Quebec nationalism. Unlike his predecessor, prime minister Louis St-Laurent, Pearson's political strategy was to adopt a vision of Canada that would respect the dualistic view held by French-Canadians. As he stated in Quebec city in 1963, right in the middle of the Quiet Revolution. "While Quebec is a province in this national confederation, it is more than a province because it is the heartland of a people: in a very real sense it is a nation within a nation" (Pearson as quoted in McRoberts, 1997, p. 40). The same year, he established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, originally suggested by a leading Quebec intellectual and editor of Le Devoir newspaper, Andre Laurendeau. The mandate of the so-called 'B and B Commission' was to inquire into and report on the steps that should be taken "to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races [...]" (Royal Commission 30 on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965, p. 151). In its first volume, the Commission suggested that bilingualism was necessary for all the institutions shared by Canadians. Official bilingualism was essential to the 'equal partnership' between the founding peoples. Similarly, it recommended that Canada be organized on the principle of biculturalism, defining culture as "a driving force animating a significant group of individuals united by a common tongue, and sharing the same customs, habits, and experiences" (Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, 1967, p. xxxi). For the Commission, the equal partnership meant not only the equality of citizens but also the equality between the founding national communities. Yet, the arrival in 1967 of a young French-Canadian intellectual and founder of the magazine Cite Libre, Pierre E. Trudeau, changed the dualist approach of the Liberal government of Pearson. First as minister of justice, and then as the successor of prime minister Pearson, Trudeau — apparently speaking for all French-Canadians — offered a vision of Canada radically different from his predecessor. Rejecting the principles of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, he presented a set of ideological views not just on Quebec and Canada, but on politics in general. At the center of his ideology was the supremacy of the individual in liberal democracy. For him, Canada could not be understood as a pact between nations because certain groups of people would get a special role or status within the federation; something unacceptable at the individual level. "Seule la personne humaine," he once claimed, "est porteuse de droits; la collectivite peut seulement detenir ces droits, qu'elle exerce en fiducie, pour ces membres et a certaines conditions" (1998, p. 92). Prime minister Trudeau was explicitly opposed to Quebec nationalism. A nationalist movement, according to him, not only opposed his understanding of liberal democracy but offered only a limited future to French-Canadians. As he put it in 1968, "the people of Quebec don't want special status, treatment or privilege. They don't need a wheelchair or a crutch to get along" (Trudeau as quoted McRoberts, 1997, p. 74). 31 Prime minister Trudeau offered all Canadians a vision of their country based upon pan-Canadian bilingualism, a sense of justice, individual rights, and respect of diversity. To achieve his goal, he first contributed to the adoption of the Official Languages Act in 1969, he then opposed biculturalism by adopting a policy of multiculturalism in 1971, which recognized all cultures not only the two historical ones. As he stated in 1971, "toute personne qui habite au Canada fait maintenant partie d'un groupe minoritaire [...]. Nous n'avons pas d'autre choix que de tolerer nos differences respectives [...]. Notre societe est aussi nuancee que coloree. Elle est multiculturelle" (Trudeau, 1998, p. 152). But his central achievement was the patriation of the Constitution in 1982 and the adoption of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Clearly, the Trudeau's strategy was to create a pan-Canadian identity through official bilingualism, respect of diversity, and a constitutional charter. In this context, Quebec would be treated just like any other province, a province of multilingual and multicultural Canadian citizens. In his analysis of prime minister Trudeau, McRoberts (1997) rightfully argues: [T]he Trudeau government tried to confront Quebec nationalism head on and to replace it with a Canadian identity. By and large the federal government acted as if Quebec were simply a province like others, and avoided policies that threatened to suggest otherwise, (p. 76) In Quebec, this new pan-Canadian strategy has not gone uncontested. Multiculturalism was denounced from the outset because it represented a negation of the 'two nations' suggested by the 'B and B Commission' and central to the Quebecois conception of Canada. As Rocher put it in 1976: French-Canadians have struggled for generations to have bilingualism accepted [...] By separating bilingualism from biculturalism, the Trudeau government is betraying all the hopes French-Canadians might have placed in 3 2 bilingualism, as they conceived it — that is, clearly tied to its symbol and essential condition, biculturalism. (p. 52) Similarly, in protecting individual rights and official languages throughout Canada, prime minister Trudeau thought Quebecois would cease looking to the Quebec government as the only protector of their national interests, and start placing their confidence in the federal government, their 'national' government. If minority language rights were protected throughout the country, then "the French-Canadian nation would stretch from Maillardville in British Columbia to the Acadian community on the Atlantic coast" (McRoberts, 1997, p. 65). But this 'national unity' strategy designed to transform how Quebecois see their country and themselves has largely failed. Ironically, this strategy initiated by a French-Canadian has gained strong adherents outside Quebec, especially among the Canadians of neither British nor French origin. But many Quebecois have systematically rejected this multicultural strategy with two official languages as a definition of their place in the federation. For Quebecois, Canadian federalism is understood as a way for accommodating the national aspirations of a people composing the state, while providing the economic, military, and sociopolitical benefits of participation in a sovereign state (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 135). In this sense, many Quebecois (a majority so far) think that Canadian federalism allows them enough 'self-realization,' that they do not need an independent state in order to rule themselves and protect their societal culture. For them, federalism is a way of guaranteeing equality of peoples, d'egal a egal, without being fully sovereign. Canadian federalism has, so far, allowed Quebecois substantial powers regarding education, language, culture, manpower, and irnrnigration to sustain their national culture and promote solidarity and equality of opportunity in the public and private sectors, while allowing Quebecois to preserve their historical attachment to Canada and Canadian institutions. 33 Consequently, for Quebecois a federal state refers to "a form of political organization in which [federal] governmental institutions are capable of maintaining order and implementing rules or laws (through coercion if necessary) over a given population and within a given territory" (Jackson & Jackson, 1998, p. 16). States are, therefore, defined in terms of their relation to power and sovereignty. So, Canada is clearly a state but not necessarily a nation because the population forming the state lacks group affinity and a single national culture.13 As Resnick (1994) points out, "[t]he evolution of Canada since 1867 has been not from colony to nation but from dominion to state" (p. 70). So, for Quebecois, Canada is sociologically speaking a 'multinational' federation, that is, a federal state made up of various national cornmunties. On the other hand, most English-Canadians have a "territorial conception of the federation" (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 136). Federalism is adopted because it provides a means by which a single national community (Canadian) can divide and diffuse power to the territorial entities (provinces). As I have argued, the federal system is very useful in the case of a population resident on a large territory, and with strong regional affiliation, because it reduces the 'danger of tyranny,' and provides greater room for provincial or regional accommodations. In this sense, English-Canadians conceptions of national identity included all Canadian members, whatever their language or culture, from sea to sea. Their loyalty to Canada is premised on the view that "all Canadians form a single nation, and that the federal government should act to express and promote this common national identity [and citizenship]" (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 141). They reject asymmetrical federalism, that is, the idea of a special status for Quebec, because it is contrary to the equality of individuals and provinces, and, more importantly, it threatens their conception of a pan-Canadian national identity which includes all Quebecois despite their different languages or cultural identities. Because of this view, many English-Canadians do not understand or recognize that Quebecois have a distinct national identity related to their history, language, culture, and institutions. As Webber (1993) concludes, 34 to have a real country for English-Canadians implies that people "should not be treated as French-Canadians or English-Canadians, or even aboriginal or non-aboriginal Canadians [...]. They must be Canadian first, each treated, under the constitution, simply as Canadian" (p. 142). This is the reason why many English-Canadians claim that the federal government should enforce 'national standards' for social programs and public services, including public education. They view support for national standards as a basis for a pan-Canadian citizenship. Francis (1997) notes that national standards and national programs have replaced the railway (Canadian Pacific Railway) in the imagination of English-Canadians as a symbol of Canadian unity. But, as McRoberts (1997) observes, this pan-Canadian vision of nationalism and federalism does not really help the debate. On the contrary, it may just contribute to the destruction of the 'two solitudes.' As prime minister Pearson put it in his Memoirs: "By forcing a •- centralism perhaps acceptable to some provinces but not to Quebec, and by insisting that Quebec must be like the others, we could destroy Canada" (Pearson, 1975, p. 239). 1.5 The purpose of this study The survival and flourishing of a democratic state is a complicate matter. As Canadians know, democracy is not a natural form of political association. It requires various civic competencies from its citizens: the literacy required to understand the different communities and state in which citizens live, the ability to think critically and address upcoming issues, the sense of solidarity necessary to act collectively as free, democratic citizens, and the empathy that permits people to accommodate others, these are not innate human properties. They must be learned. Citizenship education provides a means to prepare students for their fiiture lives as democratic citizens. As Audigier (1999a) rightly notes: [Les] jeunes qui sont aujourd'hui [en fan 2000] a l'Ecole auront le monde en charge entre 2010-2015 et 2050-2060 [...]; nous ne les formons pas pour 35 repondre aux questions d'hier, mais a celles qu'ils auront a resoudre demain, nous les formons pour que ces reponses respectent un ensemble de principes et de valeurs autour de la citoyennete democratique et des droits de l'homme [sic], (p. 6) Public schools have historically been considered as places where young people formally learn about citizenship and, in so doing, construct both their personal and collective identities. By the 20th century, Osborne argues (1999), it had been clear to democratic governments that public school systems "were intended above all to turn children into useful citizens" (p. 9). "De Condorcet a Jefferson, en passant par une quantite de penseurs et d'educateurs," Audigier (1999a) adds, "le lien Ecole, citoyennete, democratic est fondateur. L'Ecole et, en son sein, I'education a la citoyennete ont pour finalite la formation d'un 'bon citoyen"' (p. 6). The Canadian experiment I presented in the introduction of this chapter suggests that both brothers had legally the same citizenship. Even if one brother was from Montreal and the other from Vancouver, they were both legally members of the same state: Canada. However, their understandings of the concept seemed quite different at first sight. Although they were relatively young, their values, knowledge, and representations of society, as well as their collective memory, had been greatly influenced by several agencies such as the family, peers, media, and schools. For Sigel and Hoskin (1981), adolescence is not likely to be a 'peak period' for political engagement. But, it is the period when democratic beliefs become firmly anchored, when political awareness acquires structure, and when political preferences are developed to enhance the likelihood of active, informed adult citizenship. This significance is eloquently described by Adelson: "Adolescence is where serious politics begins and where, in many cases, it ends" (as quoted in Sigel & Hoskin, 1981, p. 15). Scholars like Dewey (1916) and later Coleman (1965) insisted that this relationship between citizenship and education is historical. Following Plato and 36 Aristotle, they have affirmed principles embodied in the phrases 'As is the state, so is the school,' or 'What you want in the state, you must put into the school.' Research in the area of political socialization, that is, the study of political learning, confirms that schools greatly influence the political orientations and attitudes of students (see Easton & Dennis, 1969). Hess and Torney (1970), determined that the school "stands out as the central, salient, and dominant force in the political socialization of the young child" (p. 74). The influence of family is, of course, considerable but, in their opinion, much less than it has been assumed by many researchers. Gellner (1994) concludes that if the family facilitates the task of education, it is public schooling and its medium of instruction, that is, a common public language, that create citizens. For Postman (1996), what makes public schooling important for the state is not so much that it is publicly funded or that schools serve a public, but rather it establishes us as a 'public' By trying to build the right kind of public, schools contribute toward strengthening the virtues necessary for the survival and health of our democratic societies.14 In many ways, the school engenders the civic competencies indispensable for democratic citizens. Barber (1992) argues that "formal schooling [is] our sole public resource: the only place where, as a collective, self-conscious public pursuing common goods, we try to shape our children to live in a democratic world" (pp. 14-15). Since the introduction of public schooling over a century ago, Canadians have consistently perceived schools as a "powerful shaper of citizenship" (Osborne, 1996, p. 31). As the Manitoba Minister of Education put it in 1916: The reason why the state assumes to interfere is two-fold. First, it does so for its own protection. Boys and girls, the citizens of the future, must be qualified to discharge the duties of citizenship. Second^ the state interferes in education for the benefit of the children themselves, who must [be] fitted to aid 37 themselves so that they may not become a charge on the public, (as quoted in Osborne, 1996, p. 33) This concern with citizenship in public schools, particularly in Western provinces with their more heterogeneous population, was, until the 1960s, directly connected to the perceived necessity of assimilating everyone into ethnic definitions of Canadian citizenship, modelled on the majority anglophone population (so-called 'Anglo-conformity') for English-Canadians and on French, Catholic and rural-agricultural traditions for French-Canadians in Quebec. School subjects such as history, civics, and social studies were assigned a prorninent role in this enterprise (see Clark, 1997). All these subjects were designed, not only to convey knowledge, but to create a sense of national identity and patriotism (Osborne, 1997b). As Stearns, Seixas, and Wineburg (2000) put it: "Given the inherent moral implications of any historical narrative, insofar as school history engages with and shapes a collective memory, it is inherently political [...]" (P-9). If school history was — and continues to be — a tool for nation-building, Western provinces (including B.C.), influenced by the creation of the discipline of'social studies' in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, decided to combine material from history, geography, and other social sciences into a single subject area (see Davis, 1995). Other provinces, including Quebec and Ontario, have preferred to maintain the tradition of distinct school subjects such as history and geography.15 But whether it is through history or social studies, all provincial governments, including Quebec, have considered these schools subjects as central to the formation of 'good' citizens. On the one hand, history and social studies programs, in all provinces have moved away from the earlier rhetoric of British-Canadian or French-Canadian nationalism and have accepted that Canada is a country of cultural, religious, and regional differences. Human rights and law-38 related education have also received more attention in the official curriculum (Tomkins, 1986). These subjects are seen as new elements in the definition of citizenship and citizenship education. On the other hand, Sears and Hughes (1996) argued that the concept of citizenship is presented in uniform terms in citizenship education. The country continues to be viewed as a nation made up of ten equal provinces having no need to recognize the special demands of Quebecois and aboriginal peoples (see Sears, Clarke & Hughes, 1998). For them, Canadians and Canada are still presented in 'conservative terms' in citizenship education. For example, until very recently, British Columbia's social studies curricula presented Canadian history as "the development of Canada as a nation" (B.C. Ministry of Education, 1988, p. 53). Similarly, the Alberta social studies curriculum (grade 8) states in its rationale that "the study of history and geography in the Western Hemisphere will provide students with an increased understanding of Canada as a North American nation and contribute to the requirements of citizenship" (Alberta Department of Learning, 1989, p. 14). More interestingly, in the section on issues and inquiry questions, the same curriculum encourages teachers to ask students "How did Canada become a nation?" (ibid, p. 17). This means that in the curriculum all Canadians are seen as equal members of the same nation, despite their different languages and cultures. Many of these recent documents give a greater place to French-Canadians in the building of Canada. For example, the Ontario Canadian and World Studies curriculum (1999), recommends a better "understanding of the main steps in the development of French-English relations" (p. 25). None of these official documents encourages English-speaking teachers or students to reconsider their understandings of Canada as a multicultural nation-state. Rather, they obscure the tensions between Quebec and English Canada in discussions about cultural pluralism and diversity (see Levesque, 2001). Similarly, in these documents the term 'nation' has often been replaced with 'community,' 'society,' or 'democracy.' 39 Unfortunately, recent studies in citizenship education discuss the issue only in terms of policy statements and curricula. Since the publication of Hodgetts' report on civic education 30 years ago (Hodgetts, 1968), "we have very little information on what is actually going on in [English-Canadian and Quebec] classrooms, or on how students or teachers see things" (Osborne, 1994, p. 27). Studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s are concerned with official curricula, policy statements, and textbooks, which often convey to students some forms of ideal citizenship. Few scholars in the last two decades have spent time in English-Canadian and Quebec classrooms studying citizenship education, and more importantly, how these ideas become part of students' lives. Studies have attempted to reduce the problem to content analysis and to equate official curricula with the taught and the learned curricula (Cuban, 1993). For Sears (1996b), there is some indication that classroom practice may not be consistent with policy in citizenship education. Literature in this area confirms that there is a gap between 'policy' and 'practice.' As a result, what happens in classrooms with regard to citizenship education "is an area in which extensive study is needed" (Sears, 1996b, p. 125). The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and understand (1) what teachers formally and informally present to high school students in citizenship education, and, more importantly (2) what students learn from these classes in B.C. and Quebec. More specifically, the research theory and the model of analysis for the study are based on both the literature in political theory and citizenship education. In reviewing literature in these areas, particular attention is given to that dealing with the relationship of citizenship to the Canadian state and to Canadian education, in both English Canada and Quebec. This research is a qualitative inquiry (Eisner, 1998; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992), using a multiple-case study design (Yin, 1994). Two multi-ethnic high schools, one in Quebec and one in B.C., will provide a window into history and social studies classrooms. These classes will be 40 used to examine how students construct and understand their citizenship in light of their experience in school. The choice of multi-ethnic schools is clearly related to my interest in pluralism and nationalism in public education. In this study, 'multi-ethnic' refers to schools where the dominant language spoken is either French or English, and the student population represents the cultural diversity of our Canadian urban centers. The classrooms are chosen since much of the burden of Canadian citizenship has officially been assigned to history (grade 10) in Quebec and social studies (grade 11) classes in B.C. (see Osborne, 1996; Laville, 1997). In Quebec, Montreal was chosen because it is the most multi-ethnic and predominantly francophone city in North America. Founded by Paul de Chomedey de Maisonneuve in 1642 (as Ville-Marie), it was until the 1980s, the economic heart of the country and the place of grandiose national projects (Expo 67) (see Morton, 1997). Today, the Montreal region receives the greatest majority of Quebec immigrants. Ethnocultural and linguistic diversity now characterizes the Montreal public school system. In 1996-1997, 38.3 percent of students in this region reported a mother tongue other than French, English or an Aboriginal language, compared to 8.2 percent of students in Quebec generally (MEQ, 1998a, p. 3). The Ministry of Education has adopted in 1998 a plan of action to support actively all Montreal schools and provide more resources to schools with a high percentage of students with cultural, language, and learning difficulties. For English Canada, the reasons for choosing B.C. as the English-Canadian province are both personal and political. Having spent over three years in this Western province, I have had the opportunity to meet people, establish links, and exchange various ideas and point of views on many topics such as politics, race relations, environmental issues, and (the lack of a common) history. All these formal and informal discussions gave me a valuable experience of how British Columbians think and live in their day-to-day life. B.C. is the largest western province. Though slightly smaller in area and population than Quebec and Ontario, it has emerged in recent years as a third force in Confederation (Friesen, 1999, p. 67). In the last fifteen years the population 41 and economy of B.C. have grown constantly, making Vancouver, its metropolis, the most prominent multi-ethnic urban center west of Toronto (Friesen, 1999). The Lower Mainland, for which Vancouver serves as the urban core, accounts for greater than half of the 4 million of B.C. residents and offers a vibrant mixture of ethnic groups16; around 25 percent of the province's population is of foreign origin, and this percentage doubles in some areas of the Lower Mainland (see Jackson & Jackson, 1998, p. 102). Although English Canada embraces several regions, B.C. offers an interesting 'regional culture.' Many English-Canadians, particularly on the West Coast, strongly oppose special status for Quebec. They are asking for better representation in the federal system, as well as an equality of all provinces, including Quebec.17 For Jackson and Jackson (1997): A dominant perception of Canada's national needs has been built around the concept of two founding peoples because of the long historical relationships between French and English-Canadians. This is not, however, the western vision of Canada. Since the population is ethnically varied and relatively new to the West, the people do not tend to state their interests in terms of early history of central and eastern Canada, (p. 103) Based on his recent analysis of B.C. regionalism and Canadian politics, Resnick (2000) adds that this Western province has clearly developed a strong sense of regional distinctiveness flowing from "its geographical position, its resource economy, its historical development, and its idiosyncratic political traditions" (p. 20). While a small minority supports a sovereignist option for B.C., most British Columbians assume they are first and foremost Canadian citizens. Their regional culture, although distinct, is part of English-Canadians' imagined community that they call Canada. 42 1.6 Review This study deals with the question of the understandings of citizenship education in English-Canadian and Quebec high schools. Citizenship has many different moral and practical meanings for citizens. Consequently, when we speak of education for citizenship, misunderstandings often arise, particularly between our two historical national groups. I assume that if Canadian schools have to teach about citizenship, we must urgently reconsider our conceptions of citizenship based on the nation-state model. Citizenship has to be viewed as a unifying democratic force, not a divisive element for citizens forming the state. This means adapting our public schools and citizenship education programs and practices to both the multicultural and multinational realities of Canada. But, to do so, we must first have a clearer sense of both the actual citizenship education practices and students' understandings in both English Canada and Quebec. "By neglecting the slow process of formal education," Hodgetts (1968) claims, "a society can fail to provide the public support, the basic consensus, needed to ensure its stability. In other words, it can fail, as we seem to have in the relations between our two major linguistic communities, to encourage the skilled and contemporary public opinion needed to resolve deep-seated differences [...]" (p. 14). I hope this thesis has the potential to further our understanding of citizenship education as found in history and social studies classrooms in Quebec and B.C. 1 Many critics of nationalism strongly oppose the principle that if citizens have multiple identities, national identity should take priority over the others. They argue that such a belief implies (1) that one's nation is superior to others; and (2) that one's own nation enjoy greater benefits than other nations. Nathanson (1993, p. 189) argues, however, that the claim of anti-nationalists is hard to accept today. On the one hand, many of the 'goods' that citizens experience appear to have meaning apart from their connection to the larger community. For instance, the love of children for parents appears to be a 'good' independent of its contribution or connection to the well-being of the nation. The same is true of the 'good' of friendship and compassion. On the other hand, one could argue for the priority of national identity because the nation provides a framework within which conflict between individuals and between groups can be resolved. If everyone puts family loyalty first, for example, and refuses to defer to the 4 3 judgement of the nation, there could be no social order. No one could live securely in their national community. This last argument for national 'supremacy' has some force especially in traditional nation-states. In multinational states, it is possible that the security of national members depends also on the authority of a 'supranational' entity, namely the state. In this case, national feelings must be coupled with a sense of belonging to the state. This is the reason why Taylor argues that Quebecois have dual allegiances. They belong to both a nation (Quebec) and a state (Canada), but not necessarily to a nation-state. They have some sort of transnational allegiances which bind them to Canada and Canadians. 2 This is not to say, however, that nations are 'masquerades,' or collectivities based on falsity and invention. As Anderson notes, all communities should not be distinguished by their falsity/genuineness but by their style in which they are imagined. After all, communities, whether they are nations or villages of face-to-face contacts, are imagined or mentally constructed. The contacts people have with outsiders, or their relations and connections to people they do not know, are all based on people's imaginings. 3 Kymlicka (1995) argues that the United States could also be included since there are some small 'isolated' national minorities (e.g., Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, native Hawaiians) found within the limits of the state. He adds, however, that most American political theorists treat their country as a 'polyethnic' state rather than a truly 'multinational' state. 41 have drawn freely from Robert Dahl's discussion of democracy and citizenship for this section (see Dahl, 1998, pp. 26-32). 51 use the term 'commitment' rather than duty or obligation since it refers to a moral engagement of citizens to assume particular roles or functions in a democracy. Duties and obligations often invoke the spectre of coercion and totalitarism because they are viewed as imposed by the state and, thus, do not allow for assent and dissent. 6 In this research, I refer to the 'public sphere' in relation to the 'private sphere.' The public sphere represents a realm of dynamic and responsive public discourse and actions between the state and individuals. It includes also voluntary organizations, political parties, interest groups, and the market. In contrast, the private sphere, which relies on the right to privacy, consists of family life, networks of friends, and personal properties. As Janoski (1998) indicates, in many countries these two spheres tend to overlap so that the state is involved in some aspects of the private sphere (e.g., preventing child abuse, education), while parts of the state are sometimes treated as 'private' (e.g., intelligence agency, secret police, military units). 7 For instance, Delli Carpini andKeeter (1996) in What Americans Know About Politics And WhyltMatters argue that a democratic system based on civic participation requires "underestimated amount of citizen input" (p. 3), and that factual knowledge about politics is a "critical component of citizenship" (p. 3), one that is essential if citizens are to take advantage of the civic opportunities afforded to them. 8 To this, one could add the Fall 2000 issue of Education Canada on democracy and education, as well as the November/December 1998 issue of Vie pedagogique on citizenship education. 9 For a good discussion of pluralism and race relations in the Canadian context, see the dissertation of Puttagunta (1998). 1 0 The Dominion Institute is an advocacy group created in 1997. It is committed to foster awareness of the links between civic, history and Canadian identity. The Fall 1997 Angus Reid survey, commissioned by the Institute, 44 concluded that 45 percent of respondents failed the exam immigrants have to pass to become Canadian citizens. As an example, one i n three did not know that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the constitutional document that protects Canadian individual rights. Similar ly , for the Canada Day celebration of 1998, an Angus Reid survey concluded that only one in two Canadian respondents could answer a list of 20 'basic' historical and polit ical questions about their country. For more information, see Kennedy (1997), Campbel l (1997), and Bauch (1998). 1 1 The results o f the 1996 census show that outside Quebec, the francophone population declined 0.6 % (to 970,000) between 1991 and 1996. More than three-quarters (76 %) of francophones outside Quebec l ived in New Brunswick and Ontario. In both provinces, the proportion of francophones declined during the last f ive years (see Statistics Canada, 1997). On ly i n Quebec d id the proportion of francophones increase (2.8%) during that period. 1 2 In 1993, the Consei l Superieur de l 'Education (CSE) of Quehec presented an extensive report on the integration of immigrants i n Quebec schools i n which the C S E states that Quebec has a distinct 'common culture' based on : French as the off icial language; a Judeo-Christian cultural tradition; a legal system based on Br i t i sh common law and French c i v i l law along with a charter of rights; a parliamentary democracy based on freedom and equality of citizens; and, an economic system that includes private enterprise but also state-operated companies (see C S E , 1993, p. 72). 1 3 Fo l l ow ing this l ine o f argument, Ignatieff (1993) concluded i n his analysis o f Quebec nationalism that "[the] Canadian federation's essential problem has always been that Francophone Quebecois identify Quebec as their nation and Canada as their state, whi le Engl ish-speaking Canadians identity Canada both as their nation and as their state" (p- 148). 1 4 Obviously not only democratic regimes have understood this principle. Autocratic countries around the world continue to teach their young members to become compliant and loyal 'subjects' o f the state, undermining a l l chances o f a democratic revolution. See the discussion of Gutmann (1989) on Undemocratic Education. , s Dav is (1995) notes, however, that Ontario was also influenced by the Amer ican social studies movement between 1937 and 1957, particularly at the elementary levels. 1 6 I n this thesis, I use the terms 'ethnic groups,' 'ethnocultural groups,' and ' immigrant groups' interchangeably to refer to the (minority) groups of people formed through indiv idual acts of immigrat ion to Canada. A s it is commonly accepted i n the literature, these minority groups do not include aboriginal and French-Canadian 'national ' groups wh ich have always rejected such a classification for them because of their distinct collective goals and aspirations. F o r a more extensive discussion between 'ethnic' and 'national ' groups, see K y m l i c k a (1998, pp. 6-8). 1 7 A s an example o f this anti-Quebec sentiment on the West Coast, 68 percent of B . C . residents (one of the strongest oppositions) voted ' N o ' i n the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord , w h i c h recognized i n part the particular status o f Quehec (Resnick, 2000, p. 16). 45 CHAPTER 2 H. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP In this chapter, I will discuss the origins of modern citizenship and the influence of liberalism on the evolution of the concept (section 1). Modern citizenship, I will argue, necessarily implies a direct relationship between citizens, community, and state (section 2). This direct-access relationship leads me to a discussion on the importance of legitimacy for the survival and stability of democratic regimes (section 3), and the conception of freedom necessary for such communities to develop and flourish (section 4). However, if self-government implies rights, freedom, and autonomy, a democratic state also requires a certain degree of commitment on the part of its citizens (section 5). The demands of commitment imply another notion, recognition, essential to individuals and collectivities, particularly in states with more than one national group (section 6). 2.1 The roots of 'liberal' citizenship Philosophers agree that first conceptions of democratic citizenship began with the Greeks and their notion of the polis, about twenty-five hundred years ago. Classical Greece was not a country as we understand it today. The sovereign states of Greece (because there were many) were essentially 'city-states,' the most famous being Athens. These city-states were governed by an 'assembly' in which all citizens were entitled to participate. As Dahl (1998) suggests, it is the Greeks, probably the Athenians, who coined the term 'democracy,' or demokratia, from the Greek demos, the people, and kratos, to rule.1 The current conception of citizenship, as we understand it today in our democracies, is bound up with the development of'modern social conditions' (Sears, 1996b). The British theorist Marshall (1965) was one of the first post-war scholars to offer an articulated liberal 46 theory of citizenship. In his analysis of the United Kingdom, Marshall proposed a typology of citizenship rights (and obligations) that, he claimed, were necessary to the full and equal treatment of every member of a liberal society, the so-called 'logic of equality.'2 This treatment embodies an ideal of social justice where everyone is to enjoy redistributive entitlements, such as free health care and public schooling. The way to ensure this equality (and the integration) of citizens into a liberal society is through according all individuals a set of rights. In Marshall's analysis, citizenship rights are divided into three categories: civil, political, and social. Civil rights arose in the 18th century and provided individuals protection from such things as arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. They also gave individuals the entitlement to a fair trial and due process if charged with a crime. Political rights arose in the 19th century. They accorded primarily the right to vote, to run for office, and to participate in public affairs (to men only at first). Social rights were established in the 20th century with the emergence of the welfare state. They embody the right to organize unions, to attend public school, to obtain social security and compensatory treatments like insurance and pension. Marshall (1965) argued that when any of these rights are violated, people will be marginalized and unable to participate fully in society. The extension of these rights to a wider range of people in western democracies has been a long and difficult process involving sometimes violent struggles. The liberal theory of citizenship elaborated by Marshall has sparked debates in many countries around the world. Commenting on Marshall's theory, Bottomore (1992) argues that political and civil rights have long been established only for adult, white males living in western societies. In Canada, for example, half of the population, that is, women, were deprived of political rights until the 20th century (see Strong-Boag, 1996). Racism was also another important barrier to full citizenship rights. In The Vertical Mosaic, Porter (1965) exposed the problem that some groups, like ethnic minorities, were systematically excluded from a full recognition and participation in the Canadian society.3 .  47 Another concern for the development of liberal citizenship has been the connection with capitalism. Some contemporary liberals (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960) have argued that respect for private property and very limited government actions are prerequisites for citizenship. Hayek (1960) argues that "all coercive action of government must be unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables the individual to plan with a degree of confidence which reduces human uncertainty as much as possible" (p.222). For Hayek (1960), governments are dangerous coercive institutions because they intervene in the economy Other scholars (Carnoy & Levin, 1985; Bowles & Gintis, 1976) suggest that "capitalism allows some individuals to gain economic power over others unfettered by democratic authority and that it creates a sector of society that operates nondemocratically" (Strike, 1991, p. 418). For them, capitalism is inconsistent with democracy because it perpetuates economical inequalities (see Dougherty & Hammack, 1990).4 As a result, some liberal thinkers like Rawls (1971) and Dworkin (1984) advocate certain welfare rights that Hayek opposes. We see that the terms 'equality' and 'inequality' as well as 'liberty' may take a variety of forms when discussing citizenship depending on the perspective adopted. This is one reason why Resnick (1990) suggests that one must go back to political theory to come to terms with the modern nature of citizenship (and the state). Resnick discusses five theories of the state, aspects of which he argues are present in modern democracies. He labels these (1) aristocratic, (2) republican, (3) the philosophy of order, (4) liberal, and (5) democratic. Each of the five theories includes a conception of the citizen's place and role within the state. The aristocratic theory of the state assumes that "there is a small group of people, by reason of birth or training, [that] is especially fit for the business of rule" (Resnick, 1990, p. 13). Plato is a good example of this approach, arguing that those with the necessary knowledge and quality of character, namely the philosopher-kings, are fit or destined to rule over others. Republican theory looks to "some balance or mixture in the state, as between social classes or political institutions" (Resnick, 1990, 48 p. 17). Classical Republicans, such as Cicero and Montesquieu, speak the language of a mixed constitution where the power of the legislative, executive, and judicial are separated from each other. For the philosophers of order, Bodin, Hobbes, and Thucydides, the state is "the incarnation of a supreme temporal or moral authority, which forces potentially recalcitrant citizens or subjects to obey its higher commands" (Resnick, 1990, p. 19). The liberal theory of the state emphasizes "the representative and limited character of state authority and the existence of a significant sphere of individual liberty — political, economical, and religious — for the citizens" (Resnick, 1990, p. 23). Theorists like Locke emphasize the importance of private property and strongly defend the notion of limited government and individual rights. Finally, the democratic theorists of the state emphasize "economic and political equality, significant citizen participation in the political sphere, and popular sovereignty as the source of state authority" (Resnick, 1990, p. 29). There are, according to Resnick, two figures who are representative of democratic theory: Rousseau and Marx. For Resnick (1990), all five theories contribute to our understanding of modern citizenship. He argues that from aristocratic theory, we learn about the importance of leadership; from republicanism comes the importance of separation of power; from the theory of order comes a sobering reminder that democratic dreams or ideas alone may not always allow for effective decision-making; from liberalism we learn the importance of individual rights and the inevitability of representation, and finally from democratic theory comes the sense of community and participation of citizens in collective affairs. 2.2 Citizenship, state, and community For Taylor (1997), the key element in the development of modern citizenship is the shift from "hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access societies" (p. 36). The modern notion of citizenship implies a direct relationship between individuals and the state. The 49 fundamental way of belonging to the state is not dependent on or mediated by any organizations such as the kingdom. While in 'societies of orders,' to use Tocqueville's expression, individuals belonged to the society via belonging to some components such as the fief, modern individuals stand, alongside their fellow-citizens, in direct relationship with the state that is "the object of our common allegiance" (Taylor, 1997, p. 36). The directness of access to the state abolished the heterogeneity of hierarchical belonging typical of monarchies, despotisms, and aristocracies; it made everyone equal. It substituted the homo hierarchicus with the homo cequalis. Williams (1961) in The Long Revolution traces the outlines of this shift in terms of vocabulary used for describing the 'experience of membership,' which he related to the connection between individuals and their national community.5 In hierarchical societies, individuals were represented by the role of'subjects.' As he states: The subject, at whatever violence to himself, has to accept the way of life of his society, and his own indicated place in it, because there is no other way in which he can maintain himself at all [...] It is not his way of life, in any sense that matters, but he must conform to it to survive [italics in the original]. (Williams, 1961, p. 87). By contrast, individuals in direct-access societies are described as members. In its modern sense, it is a useful way of describing individuals' positive identification with the community in which they live. As Williams (1961) puts it: "[t]he member of a society feels himself to belong to it, in an essential way: its values are his values, its purposes his purposes, to such an extent that he is proud to describe himself in its terms" (p. 85). The individual is, therefore, conscious of himself as a member of a community to which he belongs. If changes are necessary, he will contribute to its discussion and coming into effect. To the member, society is his own political community, while to the subject, society is an imposed system in which his place is determined. 50 Barber (1984) offers an interesting point of view on the roles of members in such a community. He argues that individual members are transformed, through their participation in common work, into 'citizens of the community.' A community of citizens owes the character of its existence to what its constituent members have in common and therefore cannot be treated as a mere aggregation of individuals. The strong democratic community is not (at least initially) an association of friends, because the civic tie is a product of conflict and inadequacy rather than of consensus. But that community cannot remain an association of strangers because its activities transform men and their interest. (Barber, 1984, p. 232) For Barber, citizenship and community are therefore two aspects of a single political reality. "Men [sic] can only overcome their insufficiency and legitimize their dependency by forging a common consciousness" (Barber, 1984, pp. 216-217). A community is more than a mere association of individuals or strangers; it constitutes a common culture, which is for him the precondition of our moral autonomy, that is, our capacity to form independent moral convictions. The term community describes therefore "a desired level of human relationships. The community, as a body with some common values, norms, and goals, in which each member regards the common goals as her own, is a good in itself' (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992, p. 7). Walzer (1992) adds that membership is a "social good" (p. 66) because all of us have goals that we cannot attain by ourselves, but only by cooperating with others who share similar aims. Similarly, the identity of each person — the personhood or the 'self —has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in the community. What I am, therefore, is in key part influenced by my family, my surroundings, and my community. As a result, if the community is part of the shaping of our individual lives, then, it cannot be removed from our 51 existences. Personal and social identities in modern democracies are chosen by individuals, but they are greatly influenced by the communities people inhabit. These communities, in Taylor's words, correspond to the 'horizon within which one is capable of taking a stand.' For him, the identity of a person is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide a framework within which one determines what is good, valuable, or what he/she can endorse or oppose. Identity and community membership are, thus, two sides of the same coin.6 In the same way, Touraine (1994) argues that modern citizenship, stemming from the French Revolution, is inextricably related to community membership. In this sense, community, as a substitute for the French word communaute, is represented by a sense of membership, that is a common identification with fellow-members of a defined territory and a willingness to participate actively in building that collectivity. Belonging, as he clearly states, may have little to do with democracy. There is little 'democratic consciousness' in the way a soldier strongly belongs to his regiment. However, community membership implies more than belonging. It favours a due respect for individual rights and the equality of members, and envisages a common future in terms of genuine common participation. He states, "la defense de la communaute contre un pouvoir autoritaire peut etre un agent de democratisation si elle se combine avec l'oeuvre de modernatisation au lieu de considerer celle-ci comme une menace pour elle" (Touraine, 1994, p. 31). All members should be treated as if they possess equal opportunities to participate in governing the community. Coll (1994) adds that modern individuals, unlike members, do not necessarily belong and participate actively in the community. They only possess personal rights and freedoms that they wish to secure. For him, "Pindividu, comme etre autonome, n'est pas tenu de faire partie d'une communaute, mais d'etre un de plus, de facon anonyme, dans l'ensemble de la collectivite" (Coll, 1994, p. 189). In this sense, being a member of a democratic community means more than 52 being subject to the laws of a state or being a 'free rider' only benefiting from the community. As Miller (1992) puts it: The citizen has to see himself as playing an active role in determining his society's future, and as taking responsibility for the collective decisions that are made. He must be politically active, both in the sense of informing himself about the issues currently under discussion and in the sense of participating in decision-making itself. Moreover, he cannot regard politics merely as an arena in which to pursue his private interest. He must act as a citizen, that is a member of a collectivity who is committed to advancing its common good [italics in the original], (p. 96) Being a citizen means, therefore, being committed to participate actively (and having equal opportunities beforehand) for personal and common purposes. If citizenship is invoked in the defence of rights and freedoms, Marshall (1965) reminds us that the corresponding 'duties' cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, the ways in which authoritarian regimes have utilized state commitments in the past have led many (liberal) people to suspect their duties or commitments to democracy preferring to emphasize individual rights. For example, patriotism, or the attachment of people to their patria (nation), is necessary to a stable democracy, but the concept has become a taboo topic after the totalitarian regimes of the inter-war years. More recently, in light of what happened in countries like the former Yugoslavia, critics have reaffirmed that patriotism is nothing more than an impediment to liberal democracy since it would presuppose a blind love of state domination, a belief in the superiority of one's country, and an automatic support for military actions and racist behaviors toward others. Put differently, patriotism goes against the independent critical thinking skills necessary to democratic citizenship. 53 Most scholars prefer to use expressions such as 'community membership' 'belonging' and 'allegiance,' which they think do not have unwelcome allusions to some forms of extreme patriotism. In this thesis, patriotism is not understood as a passive acceptance of state actions. On the contrary, it a positive commitment of citizens which binds them to their national community and state and reinforces communal actions. I concur with Nathanson (1993) who proposes that citizens in democratic states (nation-states or multinational states) view the concept of patriotism on a continuum (from weak to strong) and adopt moderate forms of'responsible patriotism,' which respect and even encourage a critical attitude of citizens. Responsible patriotism allows for both assent and dissent, dropping by the same token aspects of negative or extreme nationalism. This form of belonging also respects fundamental individual rights necessary to liberal democracy. In short, as Nathanson asserts, a moderate patriotism is morally defensible since a sense of personal identification with the community, a special concern for its well-being, and a willingness to sacrifice to promote the common good are part of any democratic ideal. Considering the relevance of community membership for liberalism, Callan (1997) proposes a form of 'liberal patriotism' in order to promote the ties of solidarity necessary for a pluralistic, just democracy. Callan offers an original construction of a personal attachment to political community on Rawls' principles of rational pursuit of individual good and the reasonable pursuit of justice. Callan makes the distinction between sentimentality, which he links to a patriotic emotion imposed (or 'not paid for'), and liberal patriotism. The latter refers to a personal sense of belonging to the polity based on critical reasoning, autonomy, and acceptance of justice. Endorsing the necessity of some political structures and associations for the survival of liberalism, Callan implicitly accepts the modern state and patriotic loyalty as important elements of liberal democracy: "a state-centred patriotism might continue to be an important ideal to perpetuate in our public cultures [...]" (Callan, 1997, p. 129). 54 Not everyone agrees with this understanding of community membership, even in its liberal form. Most liberal thinkers argue that this communitarian approach to community membership, and the moral particularity it affirms, opens the way to prejudice and intolerance. Furthermore, they think that such a community goes against "the idea that government must not take sides on moral issues " (Dworkin, 1985, p. 205). Based on the premise that liberal societies are founded on individual autonomy, they propose communities and institutions that will assure "the protections and benefits one needs in order to have the freedom to both define and to pursue that form of life one determines is best for oneself (DeLue, 1989, pp. 48-49). For these liberals, a community must be governed by principles that ultimately do not presuppose any particular conception of the 'good life' so as to leave its members as free as possible to choose their own values and ends, even if this implies letting people choose a passive way of life, such as being a 'free rider' (see Kymlicka, 1999).7 For Kant, shared institutions and procedures, such as the separation of powers and a fair justice system, allow individuals to pursue their own interest, while resolving the problem of state oppression. As cultures and communities around the world seem to 'liberalize,' Kantian liberals argue that community membership is either a element of the private sphere or something in the process of being replaced by more universal communities. As Kymlicka (1995) notes, "many liberals believe that people's interest in cultural membership is adequately protected by the common rights of citizenship, and that any further measure to protect this interest are illegitimate" (p. 107). But, communitarians reply that we cannot justify political arrangements and create allegiance (patriotism) without reference to common purposes or goals. We cannot, in democratic societies, conceive ourselves without reference to our role as citizens, that is, as members in a common life (Taylor, 1989). If communities are more liberal than they used to be, most community members around the world continue to value their cultural and national 55 membership. Far from displacing national allegiance, liberalism has, in many ways, increased the sense of community membership among people. Furthermore, I think it is totally incoherent to believe that state decisions on national/ cultural issues such as language, public holidays, state symbols, and so forth do not involve the recognition and support of particular communities. Relying on Gellner, Taylor argues that states are inescapably involved in a nation-building process: If a modern society has an "official" language, in the fullest sense of the term — that is, a state-sponsored, -inculcated, and -defined language and culture, in which both economy and state function — then it is obviously an immense advantage to people if this language and culture are theirs, (p. 34) 2.3 Citizenship and legitimacy A direct-access relationship also implies another central concept of democracy, namely: legitimacy. Since Weber's delineation of three types of legitimacy (traditional, bureaucratic and charismatic) several scholars (Taylor, 1993; Resnick, 1990; Carnoy, 1984; Williams, 1961) who have discussed theories of the state argue that legitimacy is especially relevant for modern societies. Although the term was first used in the 17th century to assess regimes, it is clear, for Taylor (1993), that modern industrial societies are not only the fruit of an unprecedented degree of disciplined, dedicated, innovative productive activity, but also the result of effort of their members. Legitimacy is more than mere recognized legality; in fact, legitimacy can occur in the absence of legal authority. De Gaulle had legitimacy without legality. For Resnick (1990), relying on Norberto Bobbio and Sergio Cotta, one element in definitions of legitimacy bears particular attention: "Whatever is founded on values and recognized as such by public opinion is legitimate" (p. 121). 56 Citizens have beliefs and attitudes toward the community they make up. The society has legitimacy when members so understand and value it that they are willing to assume the disciplines and burdens which membership entails. Legitimacy declines when this willingness fails. In this sense, the danger of instability and breakdown arises when there is a risk of "legitimation crisis" (Taylor, 1993, p. 64). Several modern states have suffered from a legitimation crisis. For example, the German thinker Habermas (1973) — 'traumatized' like many German scholars by the crisis of legitimacy of the 1930s — makes it central to his analysis of the state and his conception of'constitutional' patriotism. To illustrate, Bergeron (1990) cites a conversation between General Ludendorff and Weber in 1919. To the question 'what do you mean by democracy?,' Weber in a humorous way responded that "[d]ans une democratic, le peuple elit son chef auquel il accorde sa confiance. Ensuite, l'elu dit au peuple de fermer sa gueule et d'obeir. Peuple et parti n'ont plus a intervenir" (as quoted in Bergeron, 1990, p. 244). For Bergeron, force and authority, like tradition, might create its own legitimacy without any measure of popular support. But in the long run, the support of the population is essential to the stability of any democracy. As Resnick (1990) argues: All states, in the long run, like to consider their authority as grounded in popular support. It is when such support is put into question by elements of the military, the working class, the peasantry, student movements, or the bourgeoisie — in short, by important social forces — that one can speak of a crisis of legitimacy [...]. (Resnick, 1990, p. 121) In Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation, Benhabib (1989) discusses legitimacy in terms of'public conversation.' She suggests that we cease thinking of the public realm in terms of the domain of legislative state activity. For her, we must 57 consider the respublica as a 'public thing' that can be shared by all citizens. Sharing by all, for her, means that certain issues become matters of public conversation. While respecting the limit between the public and the private sphere, she thinks every citizen can engage in a deliberative process about what they think is good for them. All communication action "entails symmetry and reciprocity of normative expectations from group members" (Benhabib, 1989, p. 152). To become a member of the group or the community involves our being treated in accordance with such reciprocity.8 Respect is an attitude and a moral feeling acquired through the process of public deliberation. When respect ceases to be an aspect of our life experience and leads to the breakdown of mutuality, a society runs the risk of a legitimation crisis. In Canada, Webber (1993) has offered a similar argument. In talking about English, French, and Aboriginal peoples, he claims that "[w]e value our country because we value the particular character of its public debate" (p. 192). The point of Weber, Resnick, and Benhabib is that in despotism, legitimacy carries less important weight — at least until the point where oppression drives subjects to revolt—while in democracy, the everyday political operations must call on an 'ever-present fund' of positive identification (Taylor, 1993). The laws have to be seen as reflective and entrenching the dignity of citizens, to be in a sense "extensions of themselves" (Taylor, 1989, p. 165). Furthermore, with the establishment of the welfare state, democratic states have increasingly been perceived by citizens as ultimately responsible for social exchange. Legitimacy rests on a widespread belief among citizens that the exchange system is working properly and provides benefits to all its members. 'Ideological factors' such as the role of public education, Resnick (1990) adds, play an important role in this political process of positive identification with the state. Through the teaching of a national history and a national language, schools implicitly help create various forms of legitimacy. They may even, in the long run, contribute to a crisis of legitimation in questioning values, traditions, and institutions that are in place. But if 58 we want to go deeper into the bases of legitimacy, it is necessary to understand more about the modern conception of freedom.9 2.4 The modern conception of freedom In a democracy, we accept that citizens ought to enjoy an extensive array of 'liberties' or 'freedoms,' such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of thought. Most people agree that citizens ought to exercise some control over their destiny. This conception of freedom that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries — and clearly expressed by Rousseau — implies that "the free subject becomes someone who follows an internal purpose and who owes no a priori allegiance to a pre-existing order but gives it only to structures that were created by his or her own consent" (Taylor, 1993, p. 69). When people can do that which nature inclines them to do and when they live together under the assistance of institutions that they create, they experience themselves as free. Rousseau's assertion in Du contrat social is that people need "une forme d'association qui defende et protege de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associe, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant a tous, n'obeisse pourtant qu'a lui-meme et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant" (as quoted in Touraine, 1994, p. 61). For him, men are born free but are everywhere in chains by autocratic states. People can protect their rights and freedoms from state abuse only if they participate fully in determining the conduct of their governments. Freedom is sustained only by hard work from citizens. Some quickly conclude that freedom means 'doing anything I want or choose as I please.' Actions should not be impeded by anything external to the individual. But, as Barber (1992) argues, freedom in a democracy is relational and depends on a nexus of social linkages. When it is contextualized as a feature of identity, it implies having a voice in the community's political life, which shapes one's and others' lives. It is also connected with common possibility and self-realization. In his analysis of American education, Barber (1992) puts it this way: 59 [I]t has been easy to think of freedom in theory as freedom from somebody or something and to conclude that that is all there is to freedom [... ] Yet in the setting of human development and civil society, freedom is closely connected with community, with common possibility, and with self-realization in contexts that are inevitably social, (p. 25) Following this line of argument, freedom is applicable to individuals and groups of individuals as a whole (communities) which give them a sort of collective liberty. The community is justified because it fulfils people's needs, desires and purposes. In this sense, the community protects members from insecurity, intolerance and even dictatorship since these 'evils' tend to flourish mostly "where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions undone" (Sandel, 1984, p. 7). For Mill (1972), writing in the 19th century, individual freedom is tied to membership in one's national community. For him, free democratic institutions are, therefore, to be found in nation-states. As he puts it, "[it] is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities" (Mill, 1972, p. 233). A similar approach was adopted by his compatriot, Lord Durham, who came to Canada during the Rebellion of 1837-1838. Durham wrongfully thought that the only way to 'free' the Canadiens was to assimilate them, so as to give all Canadiens the British 'virtues' and, thus, create a more homogeneous and liberal British Canadian nation. But, as Rousseau intended, a free society also recognizes and protects the 'dignity' of the citizen; that is, the ability of a person to affect his or her own condition. Otherwise, the community could lead — as we saw in Canada with the Report of Lord Durham — to "a slippery slope to totalitarian temptations" (Sandel, 1984, p. 7). Freedom involves, therefore, a notion of citizen capacity to act both individually and collectively. 60 Several features flow from this definition of freedom, including the equality of individuals, fundamental individual rights, and popular sovereignty. The American and French Revolutions invoked the idea that a nation could exist prior to and independently of its political entity, the state. In that sense, free people came to be self-governing people; people who can affect their destiny, their condition. We pass from L'Etat c'est moi of Louis XTV to L'Etat c'est le peuple (see Conner, 1978). But even before these two historical revolutions, Rousseau had provided important arguments for the inalienability of popular sovereignty. In his words, "[s]overeignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will[... ]. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all" (as quoted in Resnick, 1990, p. 89). Unlike Burke (and others), who rooted political sovereignty in the hands of'King/Queen-in-Parliament,' Rousseau and his followers rooted sovereignty more directly in the people. Freedom of citizens led to popular sovereignty. Governmental authority became subordinate to the overriding 'will of the people.' Such a democratic system helped people to protect their own fundamental interests and freedoms from state abuse. More importantly, it provides the maximum opportunity for people to exercise moral responsibility, to adopt moral principles and personal conceptions of the good life after reflection, deliberation, and consideration of the alternatives and their consequences. 2.5 The commitments to democracy For Taylor, this vision of the free individual goes back to the Renaissance in Italy and Machiavelli's tradition of civic humanism. He notes that the nature of free, democratic society requires a certain degree of engagement or more precisely commitment on the part of its citizens. Traditional despotism asked people only to obey the law without any allegiance to the political entity. But a democratic state has to ask for more. "For a democratic polity to exist," Pateman (1970) notes, "it is necessary for a participatory democracy society to exist, i.e. a society where 61 all political systems have been democratised and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas" (p. 43). What commitments do citizens have in democracy? This is a very difficult question to answer since commitments are sometimes vague, or applied differently by different societies. Political and citizenship theorists, as Janoski (1998) notes, have been inclined to ignore the roles and functions of citizens, preferring to concentrate on citizenship rights. Certain communitarians (Pateman, 1970; Taylor, 1989; Janoski, 1998), however, have addressed the question of balancing rights with commitments. Taylor (1989), for instance, argues that a 'participatory' democracy requires that its members be motivated to make the necessary contributions: of wealth (in taxes), sometimes blood (in war), and it expects always some degree of participation in the process of governance. For example, a democratic society where the level of participation falls below a certain point ceases to be legitimate in the eyes of their members.10 So when beliefs in legitimacy are not widely shared, social benefits weaken, and regimes lose stability or simply break down. Janoski (1998) suggests that the three different types of rights described by Marshall can correspond to civil (or 'legal' for him), political, and social commitments of citizens. The legal commitments include the respect of law duly made by government, the respect of other's rights, and the respect and cooperation with legal authorities (police, courts). The political commitments refer to the participation of citizens in politics, the necessity of being informed and critical, the protection of the state and the common good from (internal and external) threats, and the commitment to protest against governments that violate citizenship rights. Finally, social commitments include pursuing education to the best of one's ability, pursuing a career to the benefit of both the individual and the society, and helping the less fortunate. By linking rights with commitments (or 'obligations' for him), Janoski (1998) does not suggest that the existence of particular rights is predicated on the simultaneous presence of commitments, nor that 62 commitments are related to rights in a one-to-one contractual manner. He only argues that commitments, like rights, should not be vague feelings but clear responsibilities. Hence, a participatory democracy requires relatively strong commitments on the part of its members to survive and flourish. The roots of totalitarianism, for Avineri and De-Shalit (1992) and Janoski (1998), lie in limiting access to civil society, in alienating people from public debate and public activity.11 For them, the 'malaise' of modern societies is the atrophying of citizens' power. In the same way, Barber (1984) argues that action in common is the unique province of citizens. Democracy is neither government by the majority nor representative rule. It is citizen self-government. Participation is less a way of linking previously or 'naturally' autonomous persons to an artificial and sovereign collectivity than it is of characterizing and legitimizing the provisional autonomy that real men and women living under conditions of actual dependency can elicit from the social milieus in which they are embedded. (Barber, 1989, p. 63) This view of democracy sees the task of creating free citizens as a matter of building harmony between individual aspirations and autonomy, social and collective responsibility. Modern citizenship implies, therefore, an understanding of the 'good life' that goes beyond the thought of Kant, that is, the ability of each person to decide for him or herself a view of the 'good life.' Kantian liberals are often blamed, not without reason, for their imbalance between individual rights and socio-political commitment. As Miller (1995b) notes, such liberals are inclined "to see little intrinsic value in public life and political participation. They attach most value to individuals pursuing their aims in private or in voluntary associations with others" (p. 194). Unlike Kant's view, the nature of the 'good' in a participatory democratic society requires that it be sought in common. Following Hegel, Sandel (1984) argues that people cannot justify political 63 arrangements without reference to common purposes and ends. Moreover, people cannot conceive their personhood (the self) without reference to a common life. From this view, the common good is not constituted out of individual goods, but as something that no individual could accomplish or attain alone. Not only is it secured collectively, but people could not produce it any other way. Friendship is an example of a common good that is shared by people, but cannot be gained individually. Put differently, the common good is what we value and share collectively like language. 2.6 The nature of a multinational state Many political theorists have argued that states should, as far as possible, be organized in such a way that their members share a common identity and societal culture which binds them together despite their diverse private or ethnic allegiances. Miller (1995b) argues that there are good ethical reasons to believe that individuals must owe respect and commitments to their national compatriots that are more extensive than those they owe to mankind in general. Seeing myself as a member of a family or nation, I feel a loyalty to the group, and this expresses itself in my giving special weight to the interest of fellow-members. These loyalties and responsibilities are seen as mutual. I expect other members of my community to give special weight to my interest in the same way as I give special weight to theirs. But this does not imply that the relation between members is one of strict reciprocity. For various reasons, it may be impossible for an individual in the community to return the favour. The point is that obligation of "ethical reciprocity" arises from the practices of "mutual aid" (Miller, 1995b, p. 105). The argument raised by Miller (1995b) is that national communities form socio-political sites on which more formal systems of reciprocity and loyalties can be established. They trace out the socio-geographical limits of people who are well disposed to one another, and this makes it easier to create a civil society and practices of mutual obligation, and responsibilities. For him, 64 as well as for many other nationalists, democracy is government 'by the people, for the people,' and this is possible if the people is a 'people,' or a nation. Free peoples are to be found in nation-states. However, what happens if the limits of the state do not correspond to the limits of the nation? In other words, how should we respond to multiple national communities within a single state? Historically, minorities (ethnic or national) were dealt with by coercive assimilation measures or by segregation or deportation by the state such as the deportation of over 7000 French Acadiens in 1755 by the British (commonly known as Le Grand Derangement) or, more recently, Kosovo Albanians from Serbia in 1999. If it is next to impossible to eliminate the sense of community membership among national members — especially when they are annexed — it is imperative to find political arrangements that go beyond assimilation or simply imposing common citizenship rights on national groups, which would only perpetuate their feeling of collective marginalization. As the nineteenth-century British writer, Lord Acton (1922) suggested in his critique of Mill 's theory of the nation-state, multinational states, through political arrangements like federalism, are democratically preferable to nation-states since they embody more skeptical and perhaps less patriotic citizens who will check more carefully the abuse of state power, particularly in terms of culture and language. Because multinational states embody multiple political communities fighting for their own survival and their political autonomy, these states need to acknowledge in one way or another the existence of counter-traditions to survive and to avoid constant civic wars. This helps prevent the tyranny of the majority. A multinational state, then, provides — at least theoretically — a better framework than the nation-state for managing diversity and sustaining liberal democracy. But the cohabitation of multiple national communities within in a single state, as Canadians know, is far from being an easy enterprise. It requires cooperation, dialogue, and 65 accommodation. The threat of secession seems to be always present. National groups, unlike immigrants or ethnic minorities, demand not only rights to preserve their heritage, but claim to have inherent rights to self-government. They want to rule themselves on a given territory, without being necessarily fully sovereign. This situation sometimes creates tensions between the federal (or central) government and the provincial ones. While the former wishes to use its power to preserve unity, equality, and stability, the latter claims to have the necessary means to achieve its national and democratic goals if the interference is minimal. Countries with more than one national group cannot be understood as nation-states since 'nation' and 'state' are both conceptually distinct (see chapter 1). With the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, the term nation-state has come to be applied indiscriminately to all states. In his survey of 132 countries (as of 1971), Connor (1994) found that only 12 of them (9.1 percent) could justifiably be described as nation-states. In this context, he notes that the terms 'nation' and 'national' have been equated to 'state' and 'statal' affairs, as found in expressions like the 'United Nations' and 'international relations.' "Where nation and state coincide," he notes, "their verbal interutilization is inconsequential because the two are indistinguishably merged in popular perception" (Connor, 1994, p. 39). In reality, we cannot substitute the word 'nation' for 'state,' particularly in countries with groups of people who see themselves as distinct communities and want to be recognized as such. Ignatieff (1993) notes that belonging to a national group also means being understood (inside) and recognized (outside). To belong is to understand the tacit codes of the people you live with, and it is to know that, in return, you will be understood without having to explain yourself. People, in short, "speak your language" (Ignatieff, 1993, p. 10). This is the reason why the protection of a nation's language is such a deeply emotional nationalist cause. It provides the essential form of belonging, which is to be understood by others. In his analysis of pluralism and multi-ethnicity in Canada, Driedger (1996) points out that collective identification can be a 66 positive attachment to a group with whom the individuals believe they have shared characteristics related to factors such as territory, culture, institutions, historical symbols, ideology, or charismatic leadership. In the case of Quebec, he concludes that Quebecois have maintained a distinct language and culture; they have definitely remained a 'distinct people' with the will to fight for their identity, and to think of themselves as a nation. Taylor (1993), more explicitly than Driedger (1996), identifies culture and as essential elements for our identity. It becomes very important that we be recognized for what we are, not only as individuals but also as collectivities. For him, recognition (including self-recognition) is a sine qua non of flourishing in a participatory democracy. He argues," [d]ue recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need" (Taylor, 1992, p. 26). If this is denied or set at naught by those who surround us, it is extremely difficult to maintain an horizon of meaning by which to identify ourselves. Similarly, for people to be responsible for the future of their country and participate in it, they must be recognized for who they are. The discourse of recognition has, therefore, become familiar on two levels: in the private sphere, where we understand our own personal identities; and in the public sphere, where politics of equal recognition play a greater role for communities. Taylor (1992) concentrates on one aspect of this: the public recognition of national communities. He says that mutual recognition between groups has come to be a crucial issue in modern politics because of the nature of modern democratic societies. They are ultimately ruled by the citizens who are equal and autonomous. Our identity is what defines us as human agents. The recognition is the acceptance of ourselves by others in our identity. We may be recognized as 'equal citizens' and still be unrecognized in our identity. In other words, what is important to us in defining who we are may be quite unacknowledged in the public life, in our society, even though we have the same citizenship rights. 67 In the case of groups viewing themselves as 'nations,' the recognition they are seeking is of 'peoples.' For other groups, like women and gays/lesbians, the demand is "to recognize a category of citizens with a particular life-situation" (Taylor, 1993, p. 191). Some of them increasingly see themselves as having not only common interests or biological dispositions but a quasi-common way of life. In all these cases the issue to be dealt with is one of justice denied. For Canadian women and gays/lesbians, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed equality between individuals and gave the assurance that they would no longer be marginalized.12 But for Quebec nationalists, says Taylor (1993), the real fuel for independence is the discourse of recognition and the rhetoric, where words like fierte and humiliation have a big place. The denial of recognition is, therefore, a key issue, which may lead to instability and disunity. If democracy requires a respect of citizenship rights and a commitment to the principle of political equality, a democratic state having more than one national group also demands a system of adequate powers and recognition for each community so as to respect the principle of self-government so crucial to national minorities. Kymlicka (1998) argues that Quebecois feel attached to their country because they helped to build the country, from sea to sea, and because they have continued to play an active role in the governing of Canada as a whole. "They are proud to be Canadians because they have played a visible, often decisive, role in making Canada the country it is today" (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 178). More importantly, Letourneau (2000b) argues that Quebecois, who have adopted a collective identity derived from diverse cultures, feel Canadian because of one aspect of their double-sided identity he calls 'the canadianity' (la canadianite) of Quebecois. According to him, this aspect is defined in terms of the positive and unique historical experiences of Quebecois in the development of a liberal, democratic binational state based on representation, dialogue, accommodation, conciliation. Indeed, to say that Quebecois are part of a distinct nation is not to 68 deny that they are also Canadian citizens, with a sense of belonging to their federal state. As Letourneau puts it: La canadianite renvoie au potentiel de regeneration du pays par usage, emprunt ou exploitation des propensions, des inclinations et des obligations a la conciliation des contraires contenues dans le processus de sa formation historique. [Elle] est en quelque sorte cette disposition a l'accueil des discordances et a la mediation manifestee dans 1'histoire du Canada par ses acteurs [...] [L]a canadianite apparatt comme se qui ressort aux possibilites d'avenir du Canada dans la reconnaissance du caractere melodieux de ses dissonances — et dans l'assomption aussi de sa dualite structurante. (Letourneau, 2000b, p. 118) As an example of this dual allegiance expressed by Letourneau, on the eve of the 1995 referendum, a survey conducted in Quebec showed that 49 percent of Quebecois who said they would vote Oui to sovereignty wished to remain Canadian citizens. More importantly, two Quebecois out of three wanted to keep the Canadian dollar in an independent Quebec (see Pare, 1995, p. 51). In 1999, another Quebec survey revealed that 63 percent of respondents declared they would remain in Canada if they had to choose between status quo and independence (see Letourneau, 2000b, p. 112). Clearly, the great majority of Quebecois are not ready to quit their country and abandon, by the same occasion, the historical links they have with Canada.13 However, recent events in Canadian politics, such as Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, have led many of them to believe they are not adequately recognized for who they are as a 'people,' which reinforces their sentiment of alienation. As Derriennic (1995) puts it: 69 Les arguments "le Canada ne fonctionne plus" et "il faut en finir" ne peuvent etre efficaces que si les circonstances leur donnent [aux souverainistes] une certaine apparence de credibilite. De 1990 a 1992 ils ont eu le vent en poupe. (p. 60) What is the real basis for democratic stability, and perhaps unity, in a multinational state? In a nation-state, the answer is relatively simple. In our multinational state, stability and unity cannot be based on a shared identity, derived from commonality of history, language, or ancestry. Stability and unity, for Kymlicka (1998) and other Canadian scholars, have to be based on accommodation. The fact we have commitments to our fellow-national members that are more extensive than those they have to others does not imply that we cannot share a state with others who have different national allegiances. It only suggests that national groups must have the necessary powers and recognition for the survival and flourishing of their societal culture. Kymlicka (1995) notes that "people from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated" (p. 189). Citizens can share a state in this sense, and yet share very little in term of ethnicity, religion or language. Political arrangements, such as federalism, can provide a framework for the coexistence of multiple nations within a common state. Following the resignation of premier Bouchard in January 2001 (and his constat d'echec), the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) presented its preliminary report Quebec's Choice: Affirmation, Autonomy, and Leadership in which the committee members argue: A universal aspect of federalism is that it allows distinct communities or specificities that exist in only one part of a state to be respected and recognized. Thus, it is possible to affirm Canada's identity while leaving 70 Quebec's intact: these two identities are perfectly reconcilable, compatible and complementary in a federal context. (QLP, 2001, p. 20) For Kymlicka (1998), if Canada is to survive, we all need to take nationalism more seriously, especially the Quebec one. Trying to ignore or downplay the reality of Quebecois national identity can only intensify our constitutional problems, fuel rivalries, and give rise to detrimental movements like 'partition.' One way to help create a more cohesive and stable democracy in Canada is to adopt forms of citizenship which take into consideration both our cultural and national differences. According to certain Canadian scholars (see Kymlicka, 1998; Resnick, 1997b; McRoberts, 1997; Balthazar, 1997; Taylor, 1993), this is perhaps the only possible way to preserve our pluralistic and liberal democracy while giving Quebecois a fair national place in the Canadian federation. Canada, McRoberts (1997) argues, "contains distinct collectivities that see themselves as nations and possess the institutional and cultural distinctiveness usually implied by the term. Canada might be better understood as a 'multinational' entity" (p. 161). Kymlicka (1998) adds that the first step in applying this conception of multinational citizenship implies that English Canadians cease to promote a 'pan-Canadian identity' based essentially on equal citizenship rights and freedoms and multiculturalism. Similarly, they must cease to think that the federation is made up of ten equal provinces and three territories and start to recognize officially that Quebec needs a 'special status' to preserve and promote its national distinctiveness. In short, this model implies that we reorganize our state to better reflect both the multicultural and multinational character of Canada. If democracy requires a commitment to the principle of equality of individuals and respect for difference, a democratic multinational state also demands a system of adequate powers for each national entity so as to respect the principle of self-government. According to Kymlicka (1998), Canadians have shown, in the last years, a 71 greater willingness to consider 'special status' for First Nations than for Quebec for reasons he links to Canadians' strong sense of being guilty for the historical mistreatment of aboriginal peoples. But this sense of guilt should not hide the fact that other Canadians also feel as distinct national communities and want to be recognized as such in the federation. The second step in applying a multinational conception of citizenship is to provide Quebecois with enough autonomy and self-realization necessary for their national and political survival. According to Resnick (1997b), Balthazar (1997), and McRoberts (1997), federalism can meet the needs of multiple national communities. For McRoberts (1997), the needs of Quebecois "can be met through arrangements that give them autonomy for certain purposes — in other words, federalism" (p. 261). So for him, if we are to adopt a multinational conception of Canadian citizenship, we must show Quebecois that they do not need to become a sovereign entity in order to rule themselves. For political, cross-cultural, historical, and economical reasons, it might be more appropriate to maintain and adapt socio-political structures that favour cooperation and accommodation rather than confrontation and disintegration. Federalism offers a political framework that favours, at least theoretically, respect of diversity and shared autonomy (and sovereignty) rather than conformity and exclusion. Following this line of argument, Resnick (1997b) assumes that Canadians must reconsider their traditional conception of citizenship based on the nation-state model. If Quebecois and English Canadians are members of different nations, citizenship must necessarily recognize not only cultural but also national identities. This implies that Canadians would have a shared citizenship, with common rights and commitments, but distinct national or cultural allegiances. Increasingly, we need to think of ourselves as "bearers of multiple identities" (Resnick, 1997b, p. 129). This conception implies accepting that not all Canadians share either one conception of belonging (patriotism) or the same attitudes toward their country. There must be a way of acknowledging and recognizing that Quebecois think of themselves as Canadian and 72 participate in the public life of their nation and their state because they are members of an entity contributing to the whole. For him, what Canadians need is to make these principles more explicit, particularly in education. 2.8 Review In this chapter, I traced the modern conception of citizenship. I have argued that a 'free* democratic society requires the respect of various (civic, political, social) rights, a certain degree of commitment on the part of its citizens, and a sense of community membership. The demands of community membership, I asserted, raises concerns about the roles of the state, and more precisely, the importance of legitimacy in participatory democracy. I concluded this chapter by analyzing the nature of citizenship in a multinational state. I showed that it is imperative for the stability and unity of such a state to find socio-political arrangements, such as asymmetrical federalism, that favour cooperation, dialogue, respect, and accommodation rather than confrontation. If Canada is to survive, we urgently need to recognize non-traditional forms of citizenship which better reflect both the multicultural and multinational character of Canada. "[T]oo often," Kymlicka (1998) concludes, "we have adopted the wrong standard for measuring unity and allegiance. We have defined unity and loyalty as the elimination of the very idea of secession. This is not a reasonable or realistic standard for any multination state, including Canada" (p. 180). 1 About the time demokratia was introduced in Greece, it also made its appearance in the city of Rome. Romans, however, chose to call their political system a 'republica,' from res, meaning affairs in Latin, and publicus, for public. A republic was the 'affairs' that belong to the people of Rome. For a better discussion of the origins of citizenship and democracy, see Adcock (1959). 2 What I call 'liberal* or 'liberalism' in this section has little to do with any political party that operates under that name. Liberalism is understood as political theory, largely inspired by Locke and Kant, of limited government providing institutional entitiements (rights) for personal freedom, autonomy, and membership (see Kymlicka & 73 Norman, 1994; Rosenblum,1989). For various reasons, liberalism has taken different forms over time. For a better discussion of liberalism, see Dworkin (1984) and Kymlicka (1989). 3 The situation of Canada is not at all a particular case. In the United States, for instance, slaves, 'free blacks,' and Native Americans were for centuries deprived of many of the 'inalienable rights' essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thomas Jefferson, one of the authors of the Declaration of Independence, himself owned slaves. See Dahl (1998, pp. 62-63). 4 Many 'neo-Marxists' (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy & Levin, 1985; Baudelot & Establet, 1971) also critique public schooling in capitalist societies. Bowles and Gintis (1976), for instance, have argued that despite the rhetoric of public education, schools in capitalist society reflect the hierarchical structure of the capitalist firm and reproduce the inequalities of a capitalist class system (theory of reproduction). Opposing the democratic citizenship theory of Dewey, they argue "(i]n promoting what John Dewey once called the 'social continuity of life,' by integrating new generations into the social order, the schools are constrained to justify and reproduce inequality rather than correct it" (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p. 102). However, much of the critique of neo-Marxists has been abandoned in recent years. Although the reasons are complex, Strike (1991) argues that one central factor is that the critique came to be seen as "too firmly embedded in a kind of Marxist determinism that left the revolution to the laws of history and that provided little space for human agency and comprehending resistance" (p. 455). 5 Since no single meaning is attached to the term 'community,' I should mention that, unless specified otherwise, this term refers to a group of people, also called a nation, who have a common societal culture and identity. 6 For a better analysis of the interpretation of modern identity, see the collection of Laforest and De Lara (1998). 7 Kymlicka (1999) is careful, however, to mention that community membership is central to the survival of democracy. But, he is not sure to what extent a liberal democracy should impose on its members a sense of common membership while respecting the principles of personal autonomy. 8 This comment gives rise to a discussion on the role of language. This element is often neglected in political theory. The need for common deliberation implies that people can communicate and be understood, and this requires a common language. It is not surprising that imposing an official language on people (including immigrants) has always been one of the first tasks of the state. As Deutsch (1994) claims, membership in a community consists in wide complementarity of social communication. "It consists," he notes, "in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wide range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders" (p. 27). 9 There does not seem to exist any distinction in meaning between the words 'freedom' and 'liberty'. Both refer to the French word 'liberti' (liber, in Latin, means free), so we can use them interchangeably. For a good discussion of the two concepts, see 'Liberty and Liberties' in Hayek (1960). 1 0 As an example, Resnick (1990) suggests that Canadian society suffers from a surfeit of institutional legitimacy. "Canada," he argues, "has had an overdose of Burkean-type legitimacy, stemming from our political leaders' unwillingness to risk turning over some power to the people in whose name they rule" (Resnick, 1990, p. 105). 1 1 Janoski (1998) defines civil society as "a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions" (p. 12). This conception of civil society, applicable to all countries, is divided into four interactive components: the state sphere, the private sphere, the public sphere, and the market sphere. 74 1 2 This is not to say, however, that all women, gays/lesbians, or other non-ethnic groups are fully satisfied with the provisions of the Charter. As noted by Kymlicka (1998), some of these groups (like ethnic groups) now seek group-specific form of recognition, affirmation, and political participation. 1 3 For a critical analysis of Quebec nationalism and the dual allegiance of francophone Quibecois, see Delisle (1998). 75 C H A P T E R 3 H J . C I T I Z E N S H I P E D U C A T I O N I N C A N A D A : A R E V I E W O F L I T E R A T U R E The analysis of the nature of citizenship opens the door to a discussion on the implications for public education, and more precisely for citizenship education. In light of the discussions and debates around the nature of citizenship and citizenship education, it is important to understand if ideologies, found in the literature in citizenship education, recognize the unique features of our multinational state. In this chapter, I will review the evidence that our two historical communities have had different conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education. To do so, I first need to present and discuss the nature and meaning of citizenship education in democracy (section 1) and the various meanings and interpretations of curriculum in education, explaining the relations between these different interpretations (section 2). In section 3,1 will present the studies I review in this chapter and explain why I chose them. This will lead me to review the works in citizenship education as found in Quebec and English Canada, including two international case studies. Finally, I will provide a brief critical analysis of both the conclusions and the methodology of the studies under consideration. 3.1 Citizenship education in democracy Researchers in the area of political socialization have long been interested in political education (see Hyman, 1959). Political research in the 1960s and 1970s leaves little doubt that schools greatly influence the political orientation and attitudes of students (Easton & Dennis, 1969). As the final report of the Commission for the Estates General on Education in Quebec reaffirmed in 1996, socialization is an 'overall goal of public schooling.' It is in school that students learn how to exercise their citizenship (see Commission for the Estate General on 76 Education, 1996, p, 5). Such statements derive from research that has established that there is a link connecting adults' political attitudes to attitudes and behaviours formed early in life. Adult attitudes, including civic dispositions and commitments, were found to be related to attitudes and experiences in childhood and youth (see Almond & Verba, 1963). Weissberg (1974) considers that there are four distinct aspects of the school experience that help students to develop into democratic citizens. First, there are the explicit — and sometimes not so explicit — messages directly conveyed to students. Schools disciplines (more commonly known in English as 'subjects') have historically played a central role in this enterprise. In this thesis, I refer to a school discipline/subject as a "cohesive set of goals, content, methods, and practices" (Audigier, 1999b, p. 105). For Audigier, relying on Chervel (1988), a school subject is directly associated with the school culture, which is the culture developed by the school system to fulfil the missions and goals with which a given society entrusts it. Subjects have four components related to the school culture: shared knowledge, standard exercises, motivational procedures, and assessment devices. What is taught in school are subjects created by the school system to fulfil its missions, not academic disciplines as found in universities. These should be understood and examined as such. As Chervel (1988) puts it: La discipline scolaire est done constituee par un assortment a proportions variables suivant les cas, de plusieurs constituants, un enseignement d'exposition, des exercices, des pratiques d'incitation et de motivation et un appareil docimologique, lesquels dans chaque etat de la discipline, fonctionnent evidemment en etroite collaboration, de meme que chacun d'eux, a sa maniere, en liaison directe avec les finalites. (pp. 99-100) Social studies, history, and civics are all citizenship education disciplines having for their mission the creation of democratic citizens. They are, for Weissberg, the most prominent 77 example of this mode of attempted influence. Sears (1994) argues that citizenship education remains, rhetorically at least, an important role of public schooling in Canada, and the primary focus of social studies and school history in particular. Analysis of these subjects confirms that their primary goal is to provide students with an education for democratic citizenship (see Sears & Hughes, 1996; Levesque, 2001). Second, the nature of the authority relationship within the classroom and school can influence political orientations. The way the subject-matter is presented to students conveys powerful messages about the kind of citizenship that is valued inside and outside the classroom. As suggested by Cuban (1993), students are greatly influenced by teaching styles. They "imitate teachers' humor or sarcasm, or strive to be as autocratic or democratic as those adults are" (Cuban, 1993, p. 184). Pedagogy and the authority relationship are not simply an 'add-on to content,' to use Osborne's expression, but powerful instruments that reflect our underlying conceptions of citizenship. This is the reason why some progressive educators, relying on Dewey, have suggested recently that if schools are not democratic institutions, students will not adequately learn democracy (van Neste, 1999; Levin, 1998;Freie, 1997; Berthelot, 1994).1 Third, the social composition of the school environment is also a potential means of influence. As frequently advanced in discussions of racial or ethnic integration (see Levin, 1961), informal contact among students can be an important part of the educational process. Students can learn as much from one another as from teachers or textbooks.2 They can understand, for instance, why students in our multi-ethnic societies have different value systems, religions, or aspirations, and learn how to engage in deliberation and respect other points of view. This mode of learning is implicit in communities favouring the integration of ethnic minorities and lower-class citizens into 'neighbourhood schools,' that is, schools where all students from particular geographical areas (neighbourhoods) have to go. 78 Finally, Weissberg notes that student councils, extracurricular activities or clubs, such as the 4-H, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and YM/YWCA are usually justified in terms of their 'manipulative potential,' and training for democracy through participation, decision-making, and group allegiance. Sears et al. (1998) have recently suggested that most of these organizations remain active in the field of citizenship education in Canada, although only a small margin of the student population participates in them. Weissberg (1974) concludes that schools, as public agencies, do provide a tool for structuring the political orientations and attitudes of young citizens in democratic societies. Whether the attempt at influence is through direct teaching, the nature of authority relationships, the political and social mixture of a student body, or the network of extracurricular activities, the school, says Weissberg (1974), has the potential to educate students to be informed and active citizens. Political socialization research of the 1960s and 1970s (little was done afterward) was not restricted to the United States. In Canada, several researchers have conducted studies of students' political learning in the same period. The 'B and B Commission' in the mid-1960s, the growth of Quebec nationalism coupled with the Quiet Revolution, Centennial Year, the perceived 'Americanization' of Canadian society, and the rise of neo-progressive theory in Canadian education had deep effects for the study of political learning. Many scholars presented studies illuminating "many of the important problems in the study of Canadian political socialization" (Pammett & Whittington, 1976, p. ix). Hodgetts' 1968 study of civic education struck a 'whole series of sensitive nerves.' Studying the teaching of Canadian history, he found a marked ignorance of Canadian culture and institutions. Trudel and Jain (1970) found similar conclusions two years later. Other studies, in the 1970s, addressed the question of political socialization in Canada. Zureik and Pike (1975) edited two volumes on the socialization and values of Canadian society, covering a variety of topics such as political socialization among students, nationalism, 79 ethnicity, and images of Canadian identity as found in documents, and so forth. One year later, Higgins (1976) looked at Canadian children's attitudes toward Canadian institutions and authority roles relative to American ones. During the same year, Forbes (1976) studied the differences which existed between French and English-Canadians in their perceptions of national identities. In 1977, Stamp touched the question of nationalism in Canadian education. He wrongly concluded that, unlike the United States, civic education in Canadian provinces never contributed "to feelings of national pride and national understanding among Canadian youth" (Stamp, 1977, p. 29). His definitions of'nationalism' and 'national identity' were so narrowly constructed that he could not verify that English-Canadians, for instance, had a very strong national identity related to the British Empire. Finally, others have focused their studies on the nature of political socialization and its impact on schooling (see Pammett & Whittington, 1976). Oliver (1976) suggested that political education needs to make clear distinctions between 'socialization,' that is, the process which transmits the dominant culture from one generation to another, and 'politicization,' the process which induces active discontent with the political system, urging reform and transformation through political action. In the same vein, Tomkins (1977) argued that if civic education in Canada is a process of socialization, the school clearly has a responsibility for promoting greater mutual understanding, civic awareness, and participation skills and attitudes. As Osborne (1996) has noted, by the 1980s it had become widely accepted in educational circles that true citizenship had to be 'activist.' Allegiance and respect for democratic institutions were no longer enough; citizens "had to be involved in the issues confronting them" (Osborne, 1996, p. 52). While Canadian education has not entirely followed Bruner's notion of progressivism, Osborne (1996) argues that some teachers incorporated some ideas of discovery teaching, inquiry, and concern for dealing with public issues. 80 But saying citizenship education has to be activist is not to say that we no longer expect students to hold values and commitments that are generally similar to those of the community at large. Certain conditions, Pateman (1970) indicates, are necessary if the democratic system is to remain stable. Without community membership, for instance, there is no participation and no involved communication/deliberation. And, without this participation and communication/ deliberation, there is no possible stable democracy. Quigley et al. (1991) refer to this willingness of citizens to set aside personal concerns or private interests for the sake of the common good in terms of'civic virtue,' that is, those attitudes, values, and reasoned commitments of the citizen that are conducive to the healthy functioning and common good of the democratic system. Civic virtue, they note, is identified as the ultimate goal of civic education since civic dispositions and commitments of citizens are central to the nurture and strengthening of the ideals of democracy (see also Galston, 1991). One of the chief goals of school subjects, such as history and social studies, has been to transmit to students a socially shared conception of the world and history, allotting a privileged place to the study of'their' nation and country (see Audigier, 1999). However, several scholars have questioned the importance of socialization in school, viewing it at a mechanism of'social control,' a tool by which those in power (the political elite) successfully maintained their position by teaching children to accept the world as it was, so there was no point in trying to change or modify it. Liberal social reformers, feminists, trade unionists, and other marginalized groups saw in education a possible vehicle of social change, a way of favouring the critical development of students' minds (see Osborne, 1999). They have argued that if democratic societies need to socialize students into the prevailing social norms, values and attitudes, they must avoid accusations of being engaged in an indoctrination process. Unlike totalitarian regimes, democracies are much more limited in the educational methods that can be used to influence the views of their young citizens. Indoctrination denies students the right to construct their own interpretations, knowledge, and way of life, develop their personal autonomy 81 and, more importantly, violates fundamental democratic values such as freedom of thought. So, it was argued that a democracy needs to fulfill, as much as possible, the potential of each individual, according to his/her natural development; to help the student to develop in a critical way his/her social, political, and historical orientations. Otherwise, citizenship education is likely to promote an 'unreflective' patriotism, "one which glorifies the past history and current political system of the country, and which vilifies opponents of that political system [...]" (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 13). Taking a neo-progressive stand, many scholars claim that education should help students "to think critically about events and institutions" (Egan, 1992, p. 134). It should teach them what some have called the notion of'good judgement,' that is the ability to make an intelligent judgement about what it would be sensible or reasonable to believe or do (see Case & Wright, 1997). While Galston (1991) calls this 'philosophical education,' Engle and Ochoa (1988) refer to this notion as 'countersocialization,' that is, the ability of developing independent critical thinking, and individual autonomy and responsibility. Educators need to engage students in the rigorous intellectual and political process of grappling with public (and often controversial) issues. In order to develop these capacities, recent research in cognitive development have suggested that children must learn to distance themselves from beliefs they take from granted and accept to view things from other viewpoints (empathy). Egan (1992) sums up the role of education in our democratic societies. Schools should initiate students into the prevailing social norms and values of the community, that is, aiming toward a certain 'homogenization' of children as equal members, while ensuring that students graduate with a better-informed and critical understanding of the nature of the world in which they live, that is, to make students critical about prevailing norms and conventions. As he puts it: Schools today try to implement a concept of education that has so far accumulated two distinct constituents. They strive to make students share 82 prevailing values, norms, beliefs, and commitments, and they also strive to make students skeptical about prevailing values, norms, beliefs, and commitments. Put a bit tendentiously schools strive both to make students more alike and to make them more distinct. (Egan, 1992, p. 644) In this sense, we can argue that schools are "legitimate intrusive state powers" (Galston, 1989, p. 100), but limited by their own inner logic, that is the respect of democratic principles (the rule of law, the dignity of citizens, individual rights and freedoms) on which they must rely to survive. In An Aristocracy of Everyone, Barber (1992) rightly contends that one educational paradox in democracy is to place schools as much as possible within the 'real world' so as to prepare the young to be literate, responsible, and ultimately free citizens while "standing] apart from society in order to give students room to breathe and grow free from a too-insistent reality" (p. 209). Because schools by definition have to protect students' own not yet mature selves, they must be seen by society as 'guardians' of democracy; and, this implies teaching them to be citizens. To do this, schools do not necessarily have be democracies in themselves. Schools cannot legitimately force someone to love the nation and the state or to volunteer, but they surely can teach him/her what citizenship entails and requires from citizens, and thus perhaps turn a complacent or selfish cynic into an active citizen. The ways to achieve this remarkable goal in school go beyond the purpose of this section. But, for Eisner (1992), if we want to know more about what schools should teach and how, we need to consider what he calls "curriculum ideologies;" what provides direction to the functions of schools in a democratic society (see Eisner, 1992, p. 302). It should be noted, however, that there is little consensus in the literature on the meaning of curriculum in education. 83 3.2 The meanings of curriculum Miller and Seller (1990) note that the definition of'curriculum' in education offers a very wide spectrum. At one end, curriculum is seen merely as "a course of study" (p. 3), while at the other end, curriculum is more broadly defined as "everything that occurs under the auspices of the school" (p. 3). According to Cuban (1993), there are four conceptions of curriculum in education: the official curriculum, the taught curriculum, the learned curriculum, and the tested curriculum. He says that the most common strategy that policy-makers and scholars have used in the 20th century to understand what students know and do is to focus on the curriculum. But Cuban argues that curricular reforms have largely failed to transform our schools, which remain largely conservative, because the official curriculum — which is for them what state and district officials set forth — is only one of the four curricula present in schools, and for students, it may be the least influential. Cuban (1979) describes the influence of curriculum on schools and students by making an analogy between the operations of the schools and a storm at sea. Although the storm might wreak havoc on the surface of the water, at the bottom of the sea the waters remain calm and quiet. Similarly, although scholars, bureaucrats and media might be animated by new, or even radical, ideas about educational practices, teachers working alone in their classrooms quietly go about business as usual. The most important lesson to be learned from Cuban's example, says Eisner (1992), is that it is unwise to confuse the 'official curriculum' with the reality of the classroom. Thus, for Cuban (1979), if we want to know more about what schools are like, what students know and understand, we need to get closer to the phenomena. The first conception of curriculum, the 'official curriculum,' is essentially what state and district officials set forth in curricular framework and courses of study (Cuban, 1993). They expect teachers to teach it, and they assume that students will learn it. Official curricula are also 84 aligned with state-approved textbooks that teachers are directed to use. This is the curriculum that most people examine and fiddle with because they think that "teachers and students will simply fall into line" (p. 184). Studying the official curriculum is often commensurate with studying teachers' practices or students' understandings of the curriculum. However, many scholars (Eisner, 1992; Clandinin & Connelly, 1992; Miller & Seller, 1990; Freire, 1972; Dewey, 1897) have argued that teachers do not simply transmit, implement, or teach a curriculum and its objectives, nor are students only influenced by the content of the curriculum or the textbooks. Clandinin and Connelly (1992) mention that "teachers and students live out a curriculum" (p. 365). Teachers present material to the student and, when successful, make it so clear and interesting that students learn. This is why Cuban (1993) suggests that teachers, working alone in their classrooms, choose what to teach, and how to present it, that is, the 'pedagogy' (from the Greekpaidagogia, raising or teaching the child). Their choices derive from their knowledge of the subject, their experiences, from their affection or distaste of the topic and from their attitudes toward students. As a result, the model of teaching (Joyce & Weil, 1980) or the 'taught curriculum,' in Cuban's terms, differs from the official curriculum. They may overlap in certain key areas, but they may also differ substantially. Similarly, the taught curriculum also overlaps with, but differs significantly from, the "learned curriculum" (Cuban, 1993, p. 184). What students learn goes far beyond what teachers intend. Collateral learnings, in Dewey's terms, may also occur when children pick up ideas from classmates, copy their teachers' habits, or strive to be as autocratic or democratic as those adults around them are. Osborne (1991) argues that "students can learn from how we teach as well as from what we teach. [They] do learn crucial lessons from how we teach that have lasting effects" (p. 10). Recent research in cognitive development have transformed the way educators understand teaching and learning. Proponents of socio-constructivism, for instance, have questioned the traditional behaviourist approaches to education. They argue that acquiring or 85 developing new knowledge is far more complex than reproducing what is taught. Learning cannot simply be reduced to a transmission process from one person to another. Learning implies thinking, understanding, and reconstructing. Students do not simply absorb or 'record' in a passive mode what is presented in class; they are intellectually active. They reconstruct knowledge for themselves in light of their past experiences, understandings, and representations. As clearly expressed by Saint-Onge (1993), "Pactivite d'apprentissage est une activite intelligente car elle ne consiste pas a enregistrer le discours d'un professeur, mais a construire pour soi une representation utile de realties et d'activites [...]" (p. 23). This role of the learners in constructing their competencies has been recognized by scholars in history and citizenship education (see Audigier, 1999b; Seixas, 1999b, 2000). These scholars argue that students construct their own understandings and interpretations of the official and taught curricula based on their ability both to process what they receive (and perceive) and tc make links between new competencies, past experiences, and social representations. Audigier (1999b) combines with the constructivist paradigm the concept of'social representation' developed in social psychology. Students already have ideas, knowledge, and even theories that play an important role in their education. These 'representations' are not constructed in a vacuum. They are constructed according to groups in which we live. The concept of social representation implies that what students learn, reinterpret, and reconstruct is largely influenced by the social space they inhabit, so that knowing about students' representations can help understanding the ways of thinking of particular communities. As Audigier (1999b) puts it: [T]he competencies transmitted and acquired in history, geography, and civics must be studied in terms of representations. The conceptions of the world, of society, and society's relationship with nature that are taught are all collective 86 theories, socially shared constructs, whose function is to transmit and disseminate a shared culture to a social whole, (p. 98) Finally, for Cuban, what students learn in the classroom does not exactly match what is in the "tested curriculum" (Cuban, 1992, p. 184). Schools, districts and states often use tests, like provincial or national exams, to capture what students should learn from the official curriculum. For example, teachers generally take into consideration what is in the official curriculum to prepare their lessons, so the students can learn what might be asked in the exams. But, again, what is tested is only a limited part of what is intended by policy makers, taught by teachers, and, of course, learned by students. For Bloom (1981), the use of exams is essential to indicate how students have mastered or understood a particular subject. Exams, in the case of formative evaluation, are also useful to identify deficiencies in student learnings (of the official and taught curricula) that need to be corrected by the teacher. 3.3 Selection of studies The studies selected for this review are divided into three categories: (1) studies having direct bearing on citizenship education (social studies, history, civics) in English Canada only; (2) studies on citizenship education conducted in Quebec or in both English Canada and Quebec; and (3) recent case studies on citizenship education from an international perspective (one including Canada). The first category relies on Sears' review of literature in citizenship education in English Canada (as of 1994), and includes more recent studies conducted in English-Canadian education. The second category covers research in citizenship education focusing on Quebec or on both English Canada and Quebec education. Finally, the last category presents two international case studies (one including Canada) on citizenship education since no recent case study has been 87 conducted in Quebec or in English Canada in the field of citizenship education. Two comparative case studies on citizenship education were however being conducted in Quebec when this research was written. The first one, led by Shiose focuses on how students become citizens in Quebec and Japan public schools (see Hauenschild, 1998). The second one directed by Page, McAndrew, and Tessier focuses on citizenship education practices as found in Quebec and Ontario. 3.4 Review of research 3.4. J Studies conducted in English Canada In his review of research on citizenship education in English Canada, Sears (1994) notes that overall 24 studies, focused on students' knowledge, skills and attitudes, as well as on policies, curricula, and instructional approaches to citizenship education, were conducted between 1968 and 1990.3 To this list, I have added two other studies conducted in the 1990s. Sears (1994) notes in his review of literature that citizenship education is clearly seen as the central focus for the social studies curriculum in Canada (Davis, 1992; Masemann, 1989; Tomkins, 1983; Troper, 1978). Several studies (Tarrow, 1990; Masemann, 1989;McLeod, 1989; Conley & Osborne, 1983; Tomkins, 1983) show that from the 1960s to the 1980s the (official) curriculum in citizenship education in English-Canadian provinces has moved away from the "transmission of an essential British culture to the recognition of the multicultural, pluralistic nature of Canada and a focus on the skills and attitudes necessary to develop active, participating citizens" (Sears, 1994, p. 33). Other studies (Osborne & Seymour, 1988; Hodgetts, 1968), however, indicate that despite official curricular emphasis on contemporary issues, most teachers continue to teach in 'traditional ways,' emphasizing static content, the rote learning of political and historical events, and avoiding debates about contemporary controversial issues. While no direct link has been established between the research reviewed on the teaching methods and 88 student attitudes toward citizenship, the studies of Osborne and Seymour (1988) and Chamberlin (1991) suggest that students think about Canadian citizenship in activist terms. Other studies (Curtis et al., 1992; Simon, 1992; Brookes, 1990; Cummings & Danesi, 1990; Osborne, 1990; Gaskell et al, 1989; Curtis, 1988; Troper, 1978,) indicate that the way education is practised in Canadian schools (taught curriculum) continues to divide students by gender, class, and race and provide them with unequal opportunities to become active citizens in their community. In terms of student attitudes, Sears (1994) notes that research indicates "moderate support for human rights, although not at a level that researchers feel is adequate" (p. 34). Some studies (see Hodgetts, 1968) suggest that students, particularly in Quebec, tend to identify less with their Canadian nation than they do with their province or region. But, these studies are 30 years old, and were largely conducted before the increase of Canadian content in the curriculum in the 1970s and 1980s, influenced by organizations such as the Canada Studies Foundation. Finally, some studies (Kirlcwood et al, 1987; Bowd, 1978) on student attitudes and knowledge suggest that Canadian students in the 1980s had increased their knowledge of Canada's history and political institutions since the 1960s. But, as the researchers mention, it is extremely difficult to draw any definitive conclusions with these results since they did not consider the content of new curricular resources used in Canadian schools. Any number of external variables (e.g., the media) could have had an effect on the attitudes of students with regard to Canada and Canadian institutions. At least two other studies of citizenship education in English Canada can be added to the English-Canadian studies reviewed by Sears (1994). The first study, "Scarcely yet a people " State policy in citizenship education 1947-1982, was conducted in 1994-1996 by Sears (1996) and focuses on the state's involvement (federal) in citizenship education between 1947 (the Canadian Citizenship Act) and 1982 (the patriation of the Constitution). Three questions are addressed in the research: (1) what conception of citizenship formed the basis for state policy in 89 citizenship education?; (2) how did the state formulate citizenship education policy?; and (3) what means did the federal state use to implement citizenship education policy given that education is an area of provincial jurisdiction? Although many departments of the Canadian state have been involved in education, and in citizenship education in particular, the Secretary of State's Department (and its citizenship branch) is acknowledged as the most active. According to Sears, this department represents the 'unofficial' federal Minister of Education. Based on the premise that training for citizenship has always been a function of states and public schools, Sears analyzed how the federal state, through the Department of the Secretary of State, influenced provincial ministries of education and schools during this period to create a 'new' Canadian identity that was neither British nor American. The author shows that the policy of the federal state was a policy of assimilation and accommodation as a way of ensuring social stability and unity. The means the state used to implement its policy in citizenship education, according to Sears' investigation, were both official (financial inducements and bilateral agreements) and unofficial (surrogates and direct programs) (Sears, 1996, p. 20). Sears suggests that the federal involvement in citizenship education overrode the constitutional recognition of education as a provincial jurisdiction on the basis of'national interest.' In addition to direct sponsorship of particular programs (such as French immersion), the Canadian state sought to build the capacity for carrying out its policies in the future by developing pedagogical materials, institutional infrastructure and a cadre of trained teachers, despite provincial control of education. For Sears, there is considerable evidence to indicate that citizenship education, as viewed by the Canadian state, reinforced an 'elitist' conception of citizenship, which does not favour wide participation of citizens and provides a narrow view of political culture, knowledge and skills. Accent was placed on loyalty to the nation, obedience to law and to political institutions. Politics was presented as a realm for well-educated 'experts.' 90 Sears concludes that the attempts to construct a single national identity in education has been unsuccessful. The idea of forming a 'nation-state' largely failed because of the nature of the Canadian federation. Finally, the policy making process was not only elitist in nature, but it was also formed and implemented in an elitist fashion. The Canadian state carefully limited the involvement of citizens, private organizations, and the provincial governments in the making and implementation of their policies. During the same period, Clark (1995) conducted an historical study of citizenship education using B.C. textbooks. The study 'Take it away youth!' Visions of Canadian identity in British Columbia social studies textbooks, 1925-1989 analyzed the 169 social studies textbooks, approved for use in British Columbia schools from 1925 to 1989, following three turning points in education: the Putman-Weir Report (1925), the Chant Report (1960), and the establishment of the Canada Studies Foundation (in 1970). The goal of the study was to examine the different views of Canadian identity in the textbooks and how these views were redefined over time (in the three periods). A profile was created for each textbook based on eleven selected aspects of Canadian identity, regrouped under three themes: the conception of the ideal Canadian in the texts; the conception of Canada as a nation in the texts; and the conception of the student reader. Clark found that the vision of Canadian identity inherent in the textbooks changed dramatically over the period, in terms of each of the themes explored. In the Putnam-Weir era, Canadian identity involved a sense of increasing independence with an enveloping allegiance to Great Britain and its Empire. Textbooks encouraged the adoption of characteristics of good Canadian citizenship such as loyalty to both Canada and the British Empire through the use of heroic figures. The concept of Canadian identity was also gendered, in that it excluded women, but inclusive of most immigrants since they were needed to people the land. But it was exclusive of particular ethnic groups, such as Oriental immigrants, because they were viewed by the 91 majority as unable to assimilate into the mainstream. The concept also excluded aboriginal peoples, seen as unable to contribute to the progress of Canada. In the Chant era, Canada's independence from Great Britain began to be taken for granted. Textbooks were more concerned with Canada's relationship to the United States and its role on the world stage. Textbooks, she notes, saw 'anti-Americanism' as an important part of what made people 'Canadian.' But 'Canadianness,' in the texts, was inclusive of women, but only in peripheral roles (childcare, household duties). Immigrants, other than Orientals, received greater consideration. These 'new' Canadians were expected to contribute actively to the progress of their nation. Native peoples are presented in a negative way ('veritable demons'), or simply discarded from Canadian history. Finally, the Canada Studies period was characterized by two dominant movements: the promotion of Canadian nationhood, and a greater inclusiveness. Women, native peoples, immigrants of various origins, and disabled people and the elderly were included in the texts, and were generally presented positively. The Canada Studies era textbooks were 'much blander' than previous texts. She presents some explanations such as the reluctance of writers to make what could be construed as negative statements about certain groups of people, and the fact textbooks writers had many stakeholders to please, including strict provincial government textbook guidelines designed to overcome the use of prejudicial statements. 3.3.2 Studies conducted in Quebec or in both Quebec and English Canada In this section, I review the works of Hodgetts (1968); Trudel and Jain (1970); Kirkwood and Nediger (1983); Forbes (1976), Mercier and Beaudoin (1989), Roy, Gauthier and Tardif (1992), Guay andNadeau (1994), Osborne (1996), Tessier (1996), Laville (1997), and Granatstein (1998). 92 In 1968, Hodgetts published a report of the National History Project, a two-year investigation of Canadian history, social studies, and civics in English and French-Canadian schools. These subjects, according to Hodgetts (1968), were "regarded in Canada as the traditional academic areas in which civic education takes place" (p. 1). The study investigated various areas related to citizenship education such as student knowledge, teaching practices, classroom structures, teacher training, and auricular activities. The collection of data for this Canadian project included: (1) student questionnaire administered to 10 000 students across the country; (2) open-ended essay on the topic "What do you think of Canada?" to 1000 students in 5 provinces (Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, B.C.); (3) an hour-long student interview administered a group of 72 students from Quebec and Ontario; (4) one-and-one-half hours teacher interview of with 500 teachers of Canadian history/social studies in all 10 provinces; (5) student-teacher questionnaire administered to 14 faculties of education in both French and English Canada; (6) preliminary interview of two hours administered to 200 persons directly concerned with some aspects of Canadian studies; (7) school and classroom observations in 247 schools (951 classes) in 20 cities across the country; and, (8) examination of current literature (published articles or books) and materials from departments of education. In all areas studied, Hodgetts paints a desolate picture of Canadian citizenship education. His study points to stultifying teaching methods, the boredom of students, a dearth of good published work on Canada, and a excess of textbooks that offered bland consensus versions of Canadian history. He found that "much of the standardized Canadian history taught in these schools [was] antiquated and fundamentally useless" (p. 19). Not only were the courses "trapped within the confines of political, constitutional or military history" (p. 20), but they did not make any attempt to relate the events of the past to the problems and concerns of the present time. Hodgetts also found a total absence of any conflicting or controversial material in Canada history courses. He states that teachers were "following the noncontroversial, noninterpretative factual 93 details of the textbook" (p. 26). Perhaps the most problematic finding was that students in English and French Canada (Quebec) were presented a totally different understanding of Canadian culture and heritage. He argues that "Canadian studies in the schools of both linguistic communities do so little to encourage a mutual understanding of their separate attitudes, aspirations and interest" (p. 34). In terms of classroom observations and teacher practices, Hodgetts reports that it was the "most unique and important part of the National History Project" (p. 3). Only there it was possible to determine the extent to which theory and practices coincide. He found that 62 percent of the classrooms visited had no Canadian books other than prescribed texts, only 10 percent had Canadian historical maps on the walls. Around 50 percent of teachers observed had nothing for their work but blackboards, chalk and desks. Less than 13 percent of classrooms provided "the physical environment conducive to effective history or social studies teaching" (p. 42). Hodgetts found that 75 percent of classes observed were using one of the two traditional methods of teaching: the lecture and the assignment methods. Most of the time, he argues, students were "bench-bound listeners" (p. 44) with no chance to discuss the material. In the classes using the second method (assignment), students were involved only in the mechanical process of question -answer based on the factual recall of a few assigned pages in the textbook. Only 8.5 percent of classes observed were described as "student-centered", that is, turned in one way or another over to the students (Hodgetts, 1968, p. 50); an essential component of progressive education for Hodgetts. Students' understandings of Canadian history or Canadian studies were very limited. Facts were 'learned by rote' and quickly forgotten. Students had very few chances to develop critical thinking skills needed to "encourage an understanding and appreciation of a great many aspects of our cultural heritage" (Hodgetts, 1968, p. 75). Students had little interest in or desire to keep up with Canadian affairs. And those who did take an interest mentioned that their 94 motivating force came not from the school but from home, friends and other agencies. Hodgetts (1968) concludes that "schools are not stimulating as many young Canadians as they should to take a responsible interest in the affairs of their own country" (p. 78). For him, one direct consequence of this situation was the great political indifference or cynicism of students with regard to Canadian politics. He notes that the apathy of the great majority of students regarding Canadian studies "[was] taken out of the classes, and adversely [affected] their involvement in Canadian affairs" (p. 77). Hodgetts' study finally found that "French-speaking students in Quebec and English-speaking students from the rest of Canada [were] living in two different worlds" (p. 81). French Quebecois identified exclusively with historical figures of their own nationality, and almost totally neglected any others from English Canada. Quebec students' answers to the questionnaire revealed that they could find no reason for pride in either wars or Confederation. They took pride only in their forefathers who fought to preserve their language, customs and religion. Similarly, English-Canadian students were not really concerned with the relation between French and English-Canadians. There was, Hodgetts found, a "surprising lack of awareness of the Quiet Revolution" (p. 82) when they conducted the investigation in 1967, the very decade of the Revolution tranquille. Hodgetts looked beyond classroom teachers to Canadian universities. He stated that university professors, in faculties of education and arts, failed to adequately model appropriate teaching strategies. The major recommendation of the report called for a national initiative in curriculum development — led by the Council of Ministers of Education of Canada (CMEC) — and teacher in-service training to cope with the "rapidly changing nature of society" (p. 91). Hodgetts' report sparked a growth in interest in Canada. The federal government encouraged the creation of the Canada Studies Foundation (CSF) and offered generous funding to supplement the money available for foundations. Provincial governments began to stress Canadian studies, 95 and book publishing programs received a boost, at least until 1986 when the CSF was dismantled for funding and (perhaps) political reasons. As Sears (1994) suggests, Hodgetts study was very comprehensive and his conclusions compelling. It is one of the few Canadian studies that examines not only the official curriculum, as described by curricular documents, but also the taught curriculum (experienced by teachers in their classrooms) and the learned curriculum (experienced by students). Hodgetts argued that the only way to determine the extent to which educational theory and practice coincide was through classroom observations and interviews with students and teachers. He notes: Very few social scientists have investigated carefully what actually goes on in the classroom or lecture hall. Subject matter and teaching methods have been by-passed in favor of studies of the overall influence of the school system... direct classroom observations have not yet become a major source of information in this kind of research. (Hodgetts, 1968, p. 4) In 1968, Forbes conducted a survey (by questionnaire) on national identity in 23 schools of three provinces (Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba). Respondents were students in grade 11 and grade 12 in public high schools. The sample of schools was drawn from five urban areas: Winnipeg, Oakville, Toronto, Montreal, and Quebec City. Altogether 1825 students completed the questionnaires. In his report Conflicting National Identities Among Canadian Youth, Forbes (1968) endorsed many points made by Hodgetts. He discovered that when asked to describe themselves from the standpoint of nationality, English students typically responded quite differently than the French students. English-Canadian students called themselves 'Canadians,' while the French preferred to set themselves apart as 'French-Canadians' or 'Quebecois,' in the case of French-Canadians in Quebec. Forbes suggests that French and English-Canadian students have different 96 interpretations of nationalism. English students recognize that they are Canadian first, and only secondarily members of a particular ethnolinguistic group. Overall, 86 percent agreed with the statement "it would be better if everyone in Canada called themselves simply Canadians, instead of saying English-Canadian or French-Canadian" (Forbes, 1976, p. 303). Forbes suggests that English students tended to deny that cultural differences have any political significance. French-Canadians strongly believed, on the contrary, that they are members of one of the 'founding nations' composing the state. One of the most revealing questions of the study is about language. As Hodgetts notes, Forbes' results show that there was a lack of understanding between the two linguistic communities. He mentions that the majority of English-speaking students believed that less than 10 percent of Canadians were able to speak only French. These students think "bilingualism is a big fuss about a small problem" (p. 304). He finally concludes that the 'two solitudes' still exist in Canadian schools (p. 311). Forbes' study presents compelling results similar to the findings of Hodgetts (1968) with regard to students' knowledge and attitudes about Canada. However, unlike the research in What Culture? What Heritage?, the conclusions of this research are based exclusively on a 'paper-and-pencil questionnaire' given to 2000 students. At the request of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the so-called 'B and B Commission'), a study of history education in English Canada and Quebec was undertaken by Trudel and Jain (1970). The original plan was to make a survey of the objectives of the various teaching institutions, as well as an analysis of official courses of study, including textbooks, evaluation, and teaching strategies. For various reasons, the study was restricted to "a comparative study of Canadian history textbooks in use across the country" (Trudel & Jain, 1970, p. xi). Again, the results support many of Hodgetts' points. Each national group had a different aim assigned to the teaching of history. For English Canada, history textbooks were intended to give future citizens a political and social education and a sense of nation, while 97 Quebec textbooks aimed at inculcating a moral education. For the former group, history was a lesson in Canadian citizenship. For the latter, it turned out to be a catechism lesson or a 'grandiloquent sermon.' History education in Quebec — as for many other topics under the influence of the Catholic Clergy — was essentially preoccupied with aspects of moral education. The purpose of history was to favour the love of lapatrie. Not surprisingly, English-Canadian and Quebec textbooks had different understandings of the nation. English textbooks were totally dedicated to the nation as a whole, rather than to provinces. On the contrary, Quebec textbooks gave priority to provincial loyalty (their 'nation') over the Canadian nation. From this view, Quebecois could think of themselves less as a minority in Canada and more as a Quebec majority within their province. The authors conclude that "[w]hen we consider that today's French-speaking youth has received its historical education from these books, we can hardly wonder at the great vogue for the separatist movement among young people" (Trudel & Jain, 1970, p. 131). In the 1980s, Kirkwood and Nediger (1983) addressed the findings of Hodgetts (1968) with regard to students' knowledge and attitudes about Canada.4 The authors were interested to know if "elementary and secondary school children [knew] more about Canada than their peers in the Hodgetts' study" (p. 4). The study is a large-scale survey (by questionnaire) of the knowledge and attitudes of seventh and tenth-grade students in all ten provinces and two territories with regard to Canada. The sample included 10,821 students drawn from a random selection: 3303 in grade seven and 6418 in grade ten. The conclusions contrast with Hodgetts' findings. The students do possess a basic level of knowledge about Canada, and do possess positive attitudes with regard to their country. The attitudes and opinions appeared to be very positive with the vast majority of students feeling "very proud to be Canadian" (p. 37). Both grade seven and grade ten students had a better understanding of their country, their culture and their heritage than at Hodgetts' time. Kirkwood 98 and Nediger (1983) suggest that this change was caused by various factors. First, they argue that educators have made a concerted and successful effort at improving the quality of social studies programs. Second, the work of organizations, such as the Canada Studies Foundation, appeared to have made a positive contribution in enhancing the status of Canada studies. Finally, the contribution of various government agencies, both provincial and federal, helped to advance the cause of Canadian studies. In 1986, Mercier and Beaudoin (1989) conducted a study in the Quebec city region to assess the contemporary belief that youth are 'apolitical.' The study was based on an analysis of policy statements and curricula, interviews with 15 teachers, and questionnaires sent to 62 students from elementary, secondary and college degree (CEGEPS). Mercier and Beaudoin (1989) conclude that while there are no official citizenship education courses in Quebec, many school subjects contribute to the formation of citizens (history, geography, social and personal education). A majority of teacher interviewees favoured the status quo. The existing courses, for them, were covering issues of citizenship. A majority of students claimed to be interested in politics (provincial and federal) but teachers claimed that student interest is not always sustained. They also found that many students did not know the Canadian political system. For example, less than 20 percent of students wrote in the questionnaire that the parliamentary system was from Britain, not from the United States. In terms of identity, six percent of students considered themselves as 'Canadians,' 45 percent as 'French-Canadians,' 45 percent as 'Quebecois,' and finally three percent as 'world citizens.' Mercier and Beaudoin conclude that it is difficult, given the scale of the study, to know if citizenship education objectives found in Quebec programs are achieved in Quebec classrooms. They note that, "personne ne sait exactement ce qui ce fait en classe. Personne ne sait si les objectifs d'education politique identifies dans les programmes sont veritablement rencontres en classe" (p. 410). 99 In 1992, Roy, Gauthier and Tardif (1992) examined the evolution of history programs in Quebec from 1861 to 1981. The longitudinal study is divided into three periods: 1861-1904, 1905-1966, and 1967-1981. The theoretical framework used has two central elements: the rationale and the objectives of programs. The authors found many changes in the development of programs over the three periods. In the period of 1861-1904, history was presented as a tool for inculcating both Catholic values and a sense of French-Canadian nationhood. Based on the memorization of facts and dates, the programs focused on patriotism, Catholic values and attitudes essential to the construction of the French-Canadian nation (la nation canadienne-francaise). Very little information on English Canada was provided in the documents. History programs in the second period (1905-1964) centered even more clearly on French-Canadian nationalism, language, religion, and patriotic values. Programs had a mandate to favour la survivance of the French-Canadian 'race.' History is defined as a tool for creating 'good' patriotic and religious citizens usually through the teaching of French-Canadian heroes and martyrs who contributed to the building of the nation (or the 'race'). They mention: "ces programmes prendront la forme d'un projet de survivance de la race canadienne-francaise" (p. 12). Unlike the first period, history teachers were encouraged to help students develop capacities to apply knowledge, conduct projects, and do exercises (mostly written). Formal teaching remained the recommended approach for history teachers. The third period (1965-1981), marked a turning point in the development of history programs. With the Quiet Revolution, and the creation of a Ministry of Education, history became less associated with patriotic and Catholic justifications and more connected with the study of the past, based on historical evidence. The goal was no longer the formation of patriotic and religious French-Canadians, but the whole development of the student. Teaching methods also changed from 'traditional' (centered on the memorization of facts) to 'progressive,' focusing on the interaction between the teacher, the learner and his/her educational environment. History 100 programs continued to be a central element for structuring both the personal and collective identities of students. For example, in their analysis of the program Histoire du Quebec et du Canada (grade 10), they note that "[l]'histoire nationale repondra a ces besoins car elle 'devrait l'aider a decouvrir Penracinement (de ses appartenances sociales) dans le temps et, graduellement, rouvrir a l'ensemble de la societe a laquelle il appartient'" (p. 56). But unlike the other periods, programs offer an understanding of society which is based on modern, democratic, and pluralistic realities of Quebec and Canada. The French-Canadian nation has been replaced by a more pluralistic and liberal national community found in that province. In 1994, Guay and Nadeau (1994) published a historical study on young francophone Quebecois attitudes toward politics from 1969 to 1989. Their research is based on various Quebec surveys, as well studies in two college institutions of Quebec. Results show that young Quebecois have significantly changed their political orientations over the period. In the 1980s, say Guay and Nadeau, surveys demonstrate that students were more concerned with personal and individual matters than young Quebecois of the 1970s. Quebecois were more 'pragmatic' and less 'utopian' than the previous generation. They were more conscious of what could be done in terms of social programs and collective provisions, and what would never be achieved despite political influences. Guay and Nadeau argue also that in the 1980s, youth involvement in various public organizations, such as in the area of environment, was not only a political battle but also an individual and global one. In brief, there was more than one way to achieve the same goal, especially in terms of global issues. Finally, they suggested that Quebec nationalism was no longer seen as a collective goal of the young generation, "un projet de generation, " as they put it (p. 247). With time, they think that nationalism became more associated with 'baby-boomers' than with the students of the generation under consideration. In 1996, as part of a collection of articles on citizenship education in the journal Canadian and International Education,5 Osborne published a longitudinal study of history and 101 social studies programs in both English and French Canada (including Quebec) from 1867 to the 1990s. Based on curricula, textbooks, policy statements and historical documents, Osborne (1996) "attempts to provide a historical survey of the development of citizenship education in Canadian schools over the twentieth century" (p. 31). The study distinguishes four periods in the development of citizenship education programs in Canadian schools. The first period, 1867 to the1920s, coincides with the enforcement of compulsory schooling. Programs emphasized Canadianization of children as a vehicle of assimilationist nation-building (based on British traditions). The one exception of this nation-building enthusiasm was Quebec, which had its own understanding of the federation. This dual situation led Canadian provinces to present two different conceptions of history and citizenship. In English Canada, French was considered as a foreign language, while in French ~ Quebec curricula reflected essentially the French Roman Catholic traditions. The second period, 1920s to the 1950s, put more emphasis on preparation for "democratic living" (p. 32). Curricula and literature of the period were more concerned with technical questions of teaching strategies, and citizenship became one topic among many. It became not only a question of national identity, but also a matter of personal values. As Canada increased its autonomy from Britain, programs focused more on an awareness of Canadian distinctiveness. Osborne argues that "[hjistory textbooks displayed every confidence that Canada was a nation" (p. 45). Still, he notes that French and English Canada were still presenting two contrasting views of history. While French achievements and attributes were ignored in English curricula and textbooks, French Quebec focused essentially on the French regime, the Plains of Abraham and the survival of the French-Canadian race, The third period, from the 1960s to the 1980s, is characterized by a renewed concern for civic education in both English and French Canada. Inspired by the publication of Hodgetts (1968), schools, curricula and textbooks centered more on the nature of the Canadian 102 Confederation and the place of Quebec in Canada. The period is marked by an emphasis on Canadian studies, biculturalism and bilingualism, ethnic minorities, as well as on an active participation of citizens in public affairs. Osborne mentions, however, that little was done to bring francophone and anglophone programs and teachers together. Finally, the period corresponding to the 1990s is marked, according to Osborne, by a decrease of interest in citizenship in school. Schools and social studies programs were according a greater importance to global issues, the economy and multiculturalism, and less on national citizenship. He claims that "[i]n the face of accusations that students were illiterate and innumerate, could not compete with their peers in other countries, and lacked proper work habits, it seemed beside the point to talk about citizenship" (p. 53). In 1996, Tessier prepared a report for the Center of Ethnic Studies of the Universite de Montreal (CEETUM) on citizenship education in Canada, France, and the United States.6 Based on policy statements, curricula, and other official information, the paper is a descriptive study of the practice of citizenship education, in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes, in those countries. After presenting a review of different understandings of citizenship, Tessier (1996) suggests that unlike France, citizenship education in Canada and the United States is very decentralized. Each province or state is responsible for the education of its inhabitants. While citizenship education is officially found in social studies, history and geography courses in Canada, the United States favours civic education and social studies courses. In both cases, she claims that there are no official standards in citizenship education.7 In France, the situation is quite different. The country has had civic education courses since the 1980s, as well as history and geography courses. Like many other aspects of the France school system, programs are highly centralized. In 1996, she adds, the French ministry of education was in the process of renewing its programs to accord a greater importance to democratic principles, French values, and European issues. 103 Tessier (1996) suggests that all three countries recognize officially the importance of creating active and responsible citizens engaged in their community. She claims that, "[o]n affirme, dans tous les pays a l'etude, Pimportance de former des citoyens informes, actifs et responsables en pronant un enseignement qui tient compte de la pluralite et des conflits de la condition moderne desormais mondialisee" (p. 50). Influenced by progressive theories of education, France, Canada and the United States did, according to her study, allow for student-centered methods of teaching, the development of critical thinking, and political participation skills. Different programs or initiatives have been developed, on a regional or local basis, to favour the participation of students in the affairs of the school or the local community. However, when it comes to the knowledge essential to create citizens, many disagreements are found even within one state. She suggests that these differences might be related to tensions between the transmission of a common body of knowledge essential to favour national identity and the awareness of pluralism as a feature of modern societies. Tessier (1996) also provides an international perspective on citizenship education. In her description of citizenship education as found in the documents under consideration, she presents very interesting similarities and contrasts between France, Canada and the United States. Tessier (1996) also discusses several implications of the preliminary report of the commission on the Estates General on Education (1996), established in Quebec in 1995-1996, which had the mandate to provide the Ministry of Education with recommendations for the renewal of the education system in the province. In contrast to the study of Osborne (1996), Laville (1997) published, in a special edition of the journal Canadian Social Studies on citizenship education,8 a report in which he argues that history programs in Quebec are not really different from the history programs found elsewhere in Canada. The main objective of teaching history in Quebec, he says, is to prepare informed citizens who are capable of active and thoughtful participation in the democratic society to which 104 they belong. According to Laville, history programs in Quebec are also presenting a multicultural perspective, taking into account the pluralist dimension of Quebec's past and present. French-Canadian 'martyrs' and 'heroes' such as Dollard Des Ormeaux have been replaced by numerous groups of people who were previously ignored. This means, for Laville (1997), that history programs are less preoccupied with "teaching pre-established knowledge — without excluding it — than with having students develop their capacity to learn information and eventually construct new knowledge" (p. 23). In terms of teaching strategies, he argues that history curricula favour learning practices, problem-solving skills and inductive capacities of the learner, rather than the recitation of historical facts and dates. In brief, Quebec history programs focus less on a static content to be delivered and more on complex problem-solving skills necessary for active citizenship, just as elsewhere in Canada. Laville claims, however, that history curricula should be considered as 'suggestions for the teacher.' The teaching of history, he argues, is largely left to the discretion of teachers working alone in their classrooms. In 1998, 30 years after the publication of Hodgetts' report, Granatstein (1998) in Who Killed Canadian History? analyzed the place of history in Canadian schools and universities. According to him, nothing much has changed in history over the last 30 years. Based on several recent public surveys conducted in Canada, by organizations such as the Dominion Institute (see Evenson, 1998; Campbell, 1997, and Kennedy, 1997), he suggests that Canadian students are lamentably ignorant of their past, and when they are not, they have different understandings of Canadian history. Granatstein, a strong Canadian nationalist, claims that history is essential to create go