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Democracy, the role of schools in a democracy and the role of democracy in schools Nicolidakis, Maria 2000

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DEMOCRACY, THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN A DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN SCHOOLS by MARIA NICOLIDAKIS B.Sc, The University of British Columbia, 1992 B.Ed., The University of British Columbia, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Educational Studies) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL 2000 © Maria Nicolidakis, 2000 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of / ^ T x t C ^ p P l&c Sr~u C M P = T The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date QM-'A 14. #000 u ABSTRACT This thesis is in two parts. First, the relationship between different models of democracy is explored to determine if certain forms are more democratic than other forms. Second, the relationship between the more democratic models and schools is examined. This research draws on literature from Political Science, Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Education. In the first part of the thesis, the Representative, Participatory, Capitalist and Liberal forms of democracy are compared and contrasted. Components of the Representative and Capitalist Democracies were found to exist quite prominently in today's society. Unfortunately, these two forms are not found to be the more democratic forms. The Participatory and Liberal Democracies are, respectively, close cousins to the Representative and Capitalist Democracies and are found to be more democratic. The Participatory and Liberal Democracies can be realised more fully if autonomy in the private sphere and participation in the public sphere are fostered. Schools can play an important part in promoting autonomy and participation for a democracy. The roles of schools in a society, which Dewey explored, all allow for autonomy and participation. There needs to be a Political Education to foster participation and a Social Education to foster autonomy. Autonomy and participation can be realised by teaching critical thinking and competent dialogue in schools. Any such education, to be justified, must not infringe on parents' rights. To promote critical thinking and competent dialogue, structures in the school need to be democratic. The structures which need to be democratised include authority and how teachers teach the hidden and prescribed curricula. Authority needs to be more democratic by including the input of parents, teachers, the state, and students in their final years of secondary school. Teachers are an important link to teaching the prescribed and hidden curricula. They need to understand the importance of competent dialogue and critical thinking whenever they teach students. This understanding needs to be stressed in teacher-training programs. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Acknowledgements iv CHAPTER 1. AN INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 2. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 4 2.1 Representative Democracy 7 2.2 Participatory Democracy 10 2.3 Liberal Democracy 14 2.4 Capitalist Democracy 22 2.5 Conclusion 29 CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN A DEMOCRACY 33 3.1 Dewey's View on Functions of Schools and The Great Sphere 34 3.2 Parents' Rights 39 3.3 The Tools for the Great Sphere and an LPD 43 3.4 Critical Thinking and Competent Dialogue 44 3.5 Social Education: Fostering Autonomy 48 3.6 Justifying a Moral Education 53 3.7 Political Education: Fostering Participation 55 3.8 Conclusion 57 CHAPTER 4. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN SCHOOLS 59 4.1 Paternalism and Authority 60 4.2 Educators for an LPD 65 4.3 Conclusion 68 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 70 Bibliography 73 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all of the members on my committee for all their help. A special thanks goes to Dr. Jerrold Coombs who guided me through writing this thesis from the beginning. Without your help, I probably would have not reached this stage. To Dr. Pamela Courtenay-Hall, your thorough reading of my final draft provided me with much to think about both within the context of my thesis and without. To Dr. Murray Elliott, your suggestions, encouragement and comments were excellent and were of great help towards the end. Without input from each of you, this thesis would not have been finished. As well, to Dr. LeRoi Daniels, my independent examiner, thanks for your always intriguing questions at the oral exam. I would like to thank people who were brave enough to read my paper in very early drafts: my brother-in-law Kevin Soulsbury, my older sister Helen Soulsbury and especially my colleague Dave Tambellini who read more than one draft. I would also like to thank my younger sister Sophia Nicolidakis whose timely suggestions of going out to each sushi were always welcome. I would especially like to thank my parents, Tony and Vasso Nicolidakis. A simple thanks can in no way be enough to express how deeply grateful I am to you. Your continued love and support through good times and bad have made me realise how lucky I am to have you both as parents. Lastly, I would like to thank my son Yannis whose reminder to "make a happy face" at critical times drove me to persevere and finish. I hope, Yannis, that in writing this thesis, I can become a better and more understanding parent (not to mention having more time to make play-dough trains together). 1 CHAPTER 1. AN INTRODUCTION What models of democracy are there? Are there forms of democracy which are more democratic than others? What is the relationship between schools and democracy? What are the roles of schools in a democracy? What ought to be the role of democracy in schools? Is it possible to nurture components of the more democratic models in schools? How can this be done? These are the main questions which I will discuss in this paper. To answer these questions, I need first to define the different models of democracy. The models which I will explore fall under two main rubrics: political and social. The first category, the political, is intended to include the models of democracy that exist as a bridge between the people and the people's government. The two models under this category are Representative Democracy and Participatory Democracy. The second category, the social, refers to models that denote different patterns of social interaction. The two models that fall under the second category are Capitalist Democracy and Liberal Democracy. In each category, I intend to compare the more democratic models with the less. The less, in my opinion, is listed first in each category. My choice to investigate different models, as opposed to focussing on one particular model, needs explanation. In both its political and social dimensions, our society appears to tend toward the less democratic forms of democracy. It would be counter-productive to focus on the less democratic when I should be focussing on the more democratic. It also seems counter-intuitive to focus on forms of democracies which are more democratic, but are not represented in the real world. Consequently, I thought it best to examine both the actual yet less democratic models and the more democratic yet not existing models. Delineating the models will help when I discuss the relationship between schools and democracy. All schools have many roles in any society. The role of schools in a democracy I will investigate is the role schools need to play to maintain or improve a democracy. First, I will look at what students need to be taught in order to become citizens in a democracy. What goes on in schools which will foster a democratic character? It is important to note that schools teach a class of people, children and teenagers, who are not considered to be true citizens; for, "we 2 are subjects long before we are citizens" (Lucas, 1975, p. 50). The forms of democracy which I will describe exist for adults-not for the young people attending schools, where paternalism exists. Therefore, in the second part of this analysis, I must justify the rights of schools to educate specifically for a democracy over any rights that parents may have in refusing such an education. To specify the role of schools in a democracy is not sufficient in actualising the role. Therefore, it is important to consider the role democracy needs to play in schools. The section on the role of democracy in schools will explore which structures need to be operated democratically. Schools play a major part in every child's life through the obvious direct method of exposing him or her to many different concepts. Schools also indirectly influence students. The hidden curriculum consists of subtle structures in a school such as how the curriculum is taught, when school takes place, the hidden and visible hierarchies that exist, and how teachers mete out punishment or measure achievement. Does democracy play a role in how many of these structures are developed in a school? I suspect that some forms of democracy do play a role. Unfortunately, the role is both limited and the form of democracy is not one which I believe to be optimal. This paper is in two parts. First, I set out a basis of the different models of democracy. Representative Democracy in the political sphere and Capitalist Democracy in the social sphere are, I believe, the dominant forms in our society today. These two forms are neither the only models that exist nor are they far from what I consider to be more democratic forms. I will show that the more democratic models are Liberal Democracy in the social sphere and Participatory Democracy in the political sphere. My second chapter will define the four models of democracy I have chosen to explore: Representative Democracy, Participatory Democracy, Liberal Democracy and Capitalist Democracy. Within each model, I will look at how the democracy is structured to show the differences between the pairs in each category. This will help with the second part of my paper which turns to the role of schools in a democracy and the role of democracy in schools. In my third chapter, I will discuss what ought to be the role of schools in a democracy. Schools have specific functions that are general in any society. What are the specific roles that 3 are important for the more democratic forms of democracy? The specific roles need to have practical applications in the school for the roles to be legitimised. These practical applications will take me to the fourth chapter where I will investigate the role of the more democratic forms of democracy in schools and what schools can do to foster the more democratic forms of democracy through their structure. This will be done by looking at the structure of schools, what is taught in both the hidden and prescribed curricula and how educators themselves are taught to teach. In my conclusion, I hope to convince the reader that although the practical applications will not transform the forms of democracy that already exist, the practical applications will allow for a movement towards more and better participation in the political sphere and a better sense of personal rights and autonomy in the social sphere. 4 CHAPTER 2. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY Different perceptions of the meaning of democracy are evident. When I asked different people the simple question, "What is a democracy?", different answers were given. The first common answer was "one person, one vote." A second answer was, "the freedom of getting information and choosing on issues after one has become fully informed." The fact that people have preferences for different interpretations of democracy is in itself interesting. James L. Hyland (1995) calls the distinction a person makes between a more democratic situation and a less democratic situation an "intuitive grading." He explains: The answer, I would suggest, lies in the concept of procedurally or institutionally guaranteed political equality where this is interpreted as equal effective rights to participate in the determination of the authoritatively binding outcomes. Equality of power in determining the outputs of the decision-making procedure is obviously at the centre of our intuitive differentiation, (p. 53) Democracy must create a level playing field for all to have equal rights, freedoms and the opportunity to participate in any decision-making. Unfortunately, not all forms do this equally well. Some readers may feel that certain forms of democracy described in this chapter seem the antithesis of what a democracy is or ought to be. The models of democracy which I will discuss are separated along a spectrum to show possible extremes. It is important to note that there is overlap, and that the models of democracy are hardly discrete. By separating out the models into political and social, I am suggesting that one of each may co-exist at any one time. It is how they are coupled that makes the difference between a less or more democratic society. When reading different authors describing democracy, one can clearly see that there are extremes along more than one continuum. The first continuum exists between the two categories: the political and the social. There are those who believe that democracy is merely a process in the political domain that exists in the form of a government and its institutions. On the other side, there are those who believe that democracy is more than a process, that democracy should be a way of life. Schumpeter (1942) and Dewey (1966) are two writers who easily fit these extremes. Schumpeter (1942) in his work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy claims that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 5 individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). Whereas John Dewey (1937) in The Democratic Form states that "democracy is much broader than a special political form, a method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected offices" (Dewey in Lakoff, 1996, p. 166). Dewey (1966) explains further: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own. (p. 87) The question whether democracy is a way of life or merely a political process seems to be one of the problems in defining democracy. In this chapter, Representative Democracy and Participatory Democracy are contained within the political. These models describe different ways for citizens to communicate with or to be an actual part of the government. The social models, Liberal Democracy and Capitalist Democracy, go beyond focussing on government and provide different guidelines for a way of life. In describing each form of democracy, it is important to note that the world was quite a different place two hundred years ago. It was almost impossible for the architects of our modern day system to imagine our world today. To paraphrase Santayanas' famous quotation that those who do not know the past are condemned to repeat it (and repeat it badly), we must keep in mind that the instantiation of any form of democracy is fairly recent. The mainly oligarchic and elitist political systems which existed before may occur again if we are not careful. For, "the story of democracy is as much a record of failures as of successes: of failures to transcend existing limits, of momentary breakthroughs followed by massive defeats, and sometimes of Utopian ambitions followed by disillusionment and despair" (Dahl, 1989, p. 312). I will briefly explore historical aspects of the models of democracy only when necessary and only to better understand why it is that we have them now. Without some historical basis, some models of democracy may seem quite ridiculous and quite unfaithful to the ideal of "the rule by the people" and may make us question why indeed the word democracy is used to describe them at all. 6 When researching the definition of democracy, I realised that an accurate definition is virtually impossible; for, as Hyland (1995) states: it is more accurate to say not that I am going to define what it is to be "a democracy", but rather that I am going to define what "democratic" is to mean, with the definite implication that, operating with a scalar concept, we will be locating things along the spectrum of the more or less democratic, (p. 50) It is important to note that the four models which I will look at are not all the models that exist. There are models and viewpoints such as the feminist critique of democracy which question gender subordination in any model of democracy, and in turn, the legacy this creates in our schools. My intention in exploring only the Representative, Participatory, Liberal and Capitalist models of democracies is to move from what I believe to be less democratic forms to more democratic forms-even if the actual movement is minuscule according to some critiques. I must also add that I do not offer any new insights of what democracy ought to be; as, that in itself would require volumes and would undermine the task of exploring the relationship between democracy and schools. To assist in defining the different models of democracy mentioned above, I will use characteristics which will help with the question "What is more or less democratic"? When appropriate to help with the definition, I will use Dryzek's (1996) characteristics to explore each of these models of democracy. He chooses three characteristics: the franchise of a democracy, the scope of a democracy and the authenticity of a democracy. He defines the characteristics as follows: The franchise is made up of those who have the right to participate-usually in the form of the right to vote, but it also can take the form of participating in other aspects of public life. Scope is the "domains of life under democratic control" (p. 6). Authenticity means that any place where democracy is said to exist, it is "substantive rather than symbolic, informed rather than ignorant, and competently engaged" (p. 7). As well as these three characteristics, I will explore the differences of the pairs under each rubric. Last, I also want to include Hyland's (1995) guideline to better understand democracy: "the closer the approximation to political equality, equality of power in the determination of the final outcomes, the higher the 7 degree of democracy" (p. 54). These factors will help in arguing which forms are more democratic. 2.1 Representative Democracy When democracy was being first described as a legitimate form of government, the early proponents of Representative Democracy argued that the only workable form was a representative form because of the question of size of both the territory and the populace: In the eighteenth century, writers began to see what the Levellers had seen earlier, that by joining the democratic idea of rule by the people to the non-democratic practice of representation, democracy could take on a whole new form and dimension...Within a few years, what De Tracy, James Mill, and James Madison had correctly seen as a revolutionary transformation of democracy was taken for granted: it was obvious and unarguable that democracy must be representative...Thus the idea of democracy, which might have perished with the disappearance of city-states, became relevant to the modern world of nation-states. Within the far larger domain of the nation-state, new conceptions of personal rights, individual freedom, and personal autonomy could flourish. (Dahl, 1989, p. 30) It has taken 200 years for Representative Democracy to be questioned as a legitimate or workable form of democracy. "Representative Democracy" can be viewed almost as an oxymoron. The literal meaning of democracy paired with the word representative may seem odd. In this case, a "representative" democracy appears to mean that one's concerns are being presented by others as opposed to concerns being expressed by oneself. Representative Democracy seems to be an extreme case of democracy which works only on a political level. For many, the political form of democracy is the most concrete form of an actual democracy that we have. In our "heterogeneous societies, a primarily representative form of government is the only practical form of political democracy. Where representation is understood as virtual or mandatory, it enables citizens to delegate specific authority to accountable officers" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 176). It is understandable why one may think of democracy as simply something political and associated only with the state; for, as populations grow, it is virtually impossible to envision a direct democracy of the type that existed, at least partially, in classical Athens. 8 The franchise of Representative Democracy is its voters. An active franchise, however, is made up of those in the franchise who realise that it is not the ability to vote that is important but the act of voting itself that is important-and then they actually do go and vote. Those who can vote have few criteria: the person must be of legal age, the person must be of sound mind, the person must be a legal citizen of the country. Someone who can take part in voting either by birth or through legislation is called a "legal citizen." Because not all legal citizens vote, the group that does vote is rarely as large as the group that can vote. This one fact limits the authenticity of Representative Democracy. The direct connection between the political and the "represented" franchise is the habit of voting. If that process fails, then the scope of Representative Democracy is weakened as the scope is only partial. One purpose of voting is to establish some leadership to oversee the everyday working of the nation-state. The elected government will make important and sometimes difficult decisions which may in turn limit the freedom of the franchise-regardless if those who can vote do vote: Democratic societies are a special dilemma in that the concern for popular participation in government must be balanced by a recognition of the need for political leadership of a kind that will make use of knowledge and abilities superior to those of most voters, induce them to confront hard choices, and propose and carry out policies designed to address public needs which may impose unpopular burdens and sacrifices. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 32) The ballot is the only direct voice that the population has in the working of the state. Voting is where the scope of Representative Democracy exists. At Representative Democracy's worst-when people who can vote do not vote-authenticity virtually disappears. There is no real place for democracy to emerge among the people in the franchise. As "citizens lose faith", voting as a way of voicing one's opinions becomes weakened as less of the franchise's opinions are heard. One very important reason for this is that as the population increases, more people vote for the one person who will represent them in the government. This dilution of votes creates cynicism among the voters. Simple mathematics shows this: if fifty people are voting for a candidate, one person's voice is 1/50 of the total needed to choose the candidate who will represent the group. If the winning candidate is 1 of 9 100 successful candidates, an individual's voice is (1/50)*(1/100) = (1/5000). The greater the number of people who can vote for a representative, the weaker the vote. It may appear true that if people choose not to vote, then a vote increases its weight; however, there is usually a fixed number of people who can vote, and that is the number which should determine the weight of a person's vote. In this way, if everyone votes in a riding, and the riding is very large, the weight of the vote is diluted. If only one person votes in a riding, the one vote carries all the weight and the vote does not give a true indication of the people in the riding. This concern, described by Anthony Downs, is called "the paradox of rational voting" (Downs in Hyland, 1995 p. 257). "If citizens are assumed to be rational calculators, why they should vote at all in large constituencies is a puzzle, inasmuch as individual votes make little difference to the outcome?" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 189). To make matters worse, once the voting process is over, the populace returns to silence while the elected parties do their job of trying to govern. For Representative Democracy to work after the voting process is over, the franchise must ensure that the right to vote is not taken away during the reign of the current government. It is important to remember that both Hitler and Mussolini used the institution of free and fair elections in order to get elected; but, once elected, they abolished these basic institutions. The populace must keep informed for the duration of the winning party's term; as, "it is easy to see that the ability of a person to be a relatively autonomous, and hence genuine, contributor to a decision-making process is critically dependent on access to relevant information" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 43). The ability and the desire to be informed is a possible scope which will aid in maintaining authenticity. In democracies, everything depends upon how well citizens regulate their own lives, how wisely they choose representatives to exercise the powers of government, and whether they have the good sense to endorse policies that promote the general welfare, rather than only their own narrow and immediate self-interest...When people do not take the trouble to inform themselves adequately about the public business or even to vote, they risk making the democratic process an unworkable sham, and they need to be reminded of their failings. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 281) Although keeping informed is important, it may not necessarily affect policy other than allowing an individual to change her mind on deciding for whom she will vote in the next election. Keeping 10 informed will help a person choose in the voting process; however, it does not allow for participating in decisions about political issues. Does Representative Democracy create a true sense of equality among its franchise? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that Representative Democracy ideally does not discriminate against people voting other than on account of age or mental infirmity. No, in the sense that after the voting process is over, the franchise has no way of taking part in the decision-making of any actual issues. Equality fails as a hierarchy is created: those who can take part in making decisions, and those who cannot. At best, Representative Democracy is a rather weak form of democracy. The only reason Representative Democracy does not fall into autocracy is that, periodically, one has the chance to vote out the current government. The problems that typically occur in Representative Democracy limit its authenticity. If a large portion of the populace does not vote, then one really wonders, "what is the mandate of those who are voted in"? After the voting process is over, the franchise must then try to maintain some link with the government by keeping informed. Voting is the only area where the scope of democracy exists. If the franchise is an informed, interested group, then Representative Democracy can be moderately successful. If the franchise is apathetic with regard to both keeping informed and voting, then one may question whether a Representative model is a completely sufficient form of democracy. 2.2 Participatory Democracy After exploring the Representative model, I was not surprised to find people who are advancing the notion of Participatory Democracy. Instead of those ruling having minimal contact with those being ruled, all people will have the opportunity to take part actively in deciding on issues; for, "participation not only helps people to construe the phenomenon of government as a form of action rather than merely a kind of event, but leads them to criticize from the standpoint of agents rather than spectators" (Lucas, 1975, p. 142). Unlike Representative Democracy, the citizens are allowed a voice. It is true that not every person should or, indeed, could be heard all of the time; however, those who feel that they have a stake in the outcome of a decision should 11 have the right to be heard. For instance, if the laws were to be reviewed as to what minimum sentencing should be allowed for sex-offenders, victims would probably want some input into determining the minimum sentence. A person who has never been a victim or who has no experience with either sex-offenders or victims would be less likely to wade in with an opinion. In that sense, a democratic decision is one taken after full and fair discussion in which all sides of the question are examined and everyone with anything to contribute has been allowed to have his say. And again, a decision is arrived at democratically if those making it have taken into account what has been said and are trying to reach a reasonable consensus with which everyone can agree. (Lucas, 1975, p. 108-109) Unlike Representative Democracy, Participatory Democracy allows the franchise to have a say in the actual issues. The Athenian model of democracy may be closest to Participatory Democracy. In the Ancient Athenian Polis, people were divided into two types: "the idiotes or private individuals and the polites or public citizen" (Berry, 1989, p 1). People who did not participate were viewed in a negative manner as idiotes. The Ancient Athenians, in their theoretical exploration of the nature of the polis or city-state, developed a positive picture of the "political." Because of the positive emphasis placed on the political life, the "idiotic" life was devoid of any politics. Therefore, people who were citizens and who did not participate in the decision making were considered idiots: It is this pejorative sense that further makes the term [idiote] apt since it points up the critical nature of the assessments of Western society. But it is more precisely appropriate because the critique centres on the individualism of these societies - they are depicted variously as alienated, selfish, competitive, possessive, apathetic and so on. Hence although there are other meanings of "individualism" it is clear that in this sense it is a term of reproach...in addition, the critics juxtapose this unsavoury condition to a positive alternative that emphasizes society, community, participation and the like. (Berry, 1989, p. 2) Unlike the Representative form of democracy, it is clear that people comprising the Participatory form are not simply voters. With the small, exclusive franchise of the city-state growing to the large inclusive franchise of a nation state, there had to be changes in the idea of how government was going to be run. The Athenian citizen at that time was part of an elite group who made up a very small 12 part of the populace. Because Representative Democracy has strayed so far from the Ancient Greek model so as to resemble it very little, the proponents of a more Participatory model readily condemn our current Representative model: What we have called "thin democracy", then, yields neither the pleasures of participation nor the fellowship of civic association, neither the autonomy and self - governance of continuous political activity nor the enlarging mutuality of shared public goods - of mutual deliberation, decision, and work. Oblivious to that essential human interdependency that underlies all political life, thin democratic politics is at best a politics of static interest, never a politics of transformation; a politics of bargaining and exchange, never a politics of invention and creation; and a politics that conceives of women and men at their worst (in order to protect them from themselves), never at their potential best (to help them become better than they are). (Barber, 1984, p. 25) How did the modern day model of Representative Democracy stray so far from the ideals presented in Athens? The answer rests with the size of the franchise-as was discussed in the Representative Democracy section~and also with how the notion of man was developed at the time. There has always been a historical divide between the few who are in power and the many who are not. The Representative model is no different in that it reaffirms a hierarchy that once separated the monarchy and her subjects. As such, one had to consider how effective the common people would be in taking part in governing. The fear, no doubt, was that there would be a mob mentality among the lesser educated. The proponents of Representative Democracy may have thought that most men were potentially created equal but that the potential of many was not realised because of the lack of education. Another reason was that decision-making is hard work. The belief was that: many people do not want - and should not be told that they ought to want - to devote more time and energy to [decision-making] than they have to. They have their own lives to lead, and should be allowed to do so without undue pressure to participate very much in public affairs. (Lucas, 1975, p. 160) Representative Democracy is much less work for those not in power. Those who want to become representatives can run for government and do much of the decision-making. The rest would just be represented. Voting was enough participation for most people because of their inherent disinterest with public affairs. The ideal of Participatory Democracy does not see these fundamental beliefs as embodied in Representative Democracy. 13 In Participatory Democracy, citizens can become better developed: If we do not know what the reasoning is that lies behind some decisions we are liable to misconstrue it as something alien, and possibly hostile, to us. If we have taken part in reaching it, then...we shall understand it and may construe it as our own, and therefore regard it not as an alien event, to be resisted, circumvented or manipulated, but as an expression of our own personality and aspirations, to be supported and defended. A decision publicly arrived at is better understood and likely, therefore, to be better carried out. (Lucas, 1975, p. 141) The hierarchy that exists between those who rule and those who are ruled is broken. The one distinguishing factor that separates the Representative from the Participatory model is the respect that must exist between the citizens and its government. This is because the people make up an integral part of the government and decision-making process. Representative Democracy manages to reduce participation by the populace. Participatory Democracy argues that the citizenry is made up of interested citizens who want a right to say what they think and who also want to be heard. This results in greater authenticity than the Representative form. It also makes the Participatory model far more substantive, as the citizens no longer face the paradox of rational voting. Participatory Democracy also begets more participation; for, according to Rousseau: Once the participatory system is established...it becomes self-sustaining because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the system is to work successfully are those that the process of participation itself develops and fosters; the more the individual citizen participates the better able he is to do so. (Pateman, 1970, p. 25) Participatory Democracy fosters participation and openness. Representative Democracy does not: those in the franchise vote periodically and laws are passed without much more say from the franchise. Participatory Democracy completely changes that situation as it allows for its citizens to take a part in the government. How can we get from a Representative model to more of a Participatory model? To do so does not necessitate a complete dismissal of a Representative system. It is impossible to have a Participatory form of democracy such as existed in Athens because of the size of the franchise. Yet it is very simple to include the notion of participation in the political realm. Mandatory education has weakened the argument that the normal citizen is incapable of participating. Of course, the type of education provided is an important criterion in deciding 14 whether we accept Representative Democracy or a model closer to Participatory Democracy. As well, the argument that when the franchise is large, there is no alternative to Representative Democracy is also less convincing now than even five years ago. Certain inventions, such as e-mail and the Internet, have made the question of size less relevant. Because of the speed with which one can now obtain important information, it is almost impossible for our representatives to act with complete impunity. Take, for example, the recent failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (M.A.I.). An agreement that our government negotiated in secret with other countries was capsized once a few sharp citizens, such as Maude Barlow, used the Internet as a tool for people to access the document. Representative Democracy, with the help of technology, can perhaps include more participation and openness. 2.3 Liberal Democracy The two models of democracy just described are forms of political governance. Liberal Democracy introduces an idea of self-actualisation that the current political model, the Representative model, does not. Personal rights are developed in Liberal Democracy. The unfortunate reality is that the distinct structures, called the private and public spheres, have quite different manifestations depending on which type of right, personal or property, is emphasised. To understand how Liberal Democracy manages to be a way of life, one must explore how certain structures were developed. To do this, it is important to explore the notion of natural rights and how the individual was first described by Locke: Natural law had earlier been used primarily as a way of emphasizing obligations, rather than the rights that individuals might claim against interference from others or from governments. Locke portrayed society as a collection of atomistic individuals each endowed by their Creator with enough rationality to understand the moral law and its corollaries, which he declared to be natural rights. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 103) The natural rights which were attributed to man would allow one to become an individual as defined by one's self in one's own right. All individuals were connected not by artificial constructs such as the state, but rather "in humanity, as distinct from a state, man's capacities 15 would be liberated...the emancipated individual was to become the organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society" (Dewey, 1966, p. 92). The problem that immediately existed was "the complete and harmonious development of all powers, having as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive humanity, required definite organization for its realization" (Dewey, 1966, p. 93). The notion of a public sphere was therefore introduced: Because they would lack a common judge to decide disputes, and might be blinded to the dictates of the moral law by self-interest and passion, this condition was bound to be precarious and full of "inconveniences"...To avoid these inconveniences, Locke reasoned, they would join in a social compact consisting of an exchange of promises, or a set of mutual obligations, to respect each other's natural rights. In order to assure that the terms of the pact were kept, the contractors would also agree to establish a fiduciary instrument of government, a legislature that would be bound by the terms of the compact. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 103) Therefore, Liberal Democracy distinguishes between the public and the private sectors: The basic outline of the liberal democratic synthesis is familiar; a distinction between two spheres is postulated, the two spheres usually being referred to as "the public" and "the private", with the clear implication that government action, as binding and legitimately calling on coercive implementation in the case of non-compliance, is itself valid and legitimate only in the public sphere. The private sphere is the domain of individual autonomy. The democratic element of the synthesis insists that even within its sphere of legitimacy, government action is only legitimate, in the fundamental sense, when it is thoroughly democratic. (Hyland, 1995, p. 149) The private sector is not as rigid as the public sector. The private sector is up to debate as to how it should be defined. C. B. Macpherson (1977) in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy pinpointed two quite different sides to Liberal Democracy when trying to explain why he was writing about the "life and times" of Liberal Democracy. He questions whether or not Liberal Democracy has managed to reach the end of its possibilities: "Yes", if the liberal democracy is taken to mean, as it still very generally is, the democracy of a capitalist market society (no matter how modified that society appears to be by the rise of the welfare state); but "Not necessarily" if liberal democracy is taken to mean, as John Stuart Mill and the ethical liberal-democrats who followed him in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took it to mean, a society striving to ensure that all its members are equally free to realize their capabilities. Unfortunately, liberal democracy can mean either. For "liberal" can mean freedom of the stronger to do down the weaker by following market rules; or it can mean equal effective freedom of all to use and develop their capacities. The latter freedom is inconsistent with the former, (p. 1) 16 The two types of Liberal Democracy that Macpherson describes will be explored separately as I believe that the capitalist form of Liberal Democracy has evolved enough to have its own section titled Capitalist Democracy. The form of democracy which I will currently explore is the latter focussing on the role of personal rights. The public sector is very rigid in Liberal Democracy: it can exist only to keep the environment suitable for the private individual to maximise her potential through individual autonomy. The public must also be democratic in nature: it must be held accountable to the franchise. Typically, Representative Democracy fills this role; for, the democratic nature of the public is tied to a democratic process, which is what Representative Democracy supplies. As we shall later see, Representative Democracy in the public sector is not the strongest safe-guard that Liberal Democracy has to keep the environment suitable for the private individual to maximise her potential. The public as a structure is where the decision-making process occurs. The government, government institutions and government bureaucrats all take part in this process. This is the political arm of Liberal Democracy. The question now is, "Who makes up the public"? To properly ascertain who makes up the public, it is important to examine who makes up the private sphere; for, in the private sphere, one finds the lowest common denominator-the individual. When the individual is defined, the notion of autonomy becomes very important. To be characterised as autonomous, an individual would have to meet certain criteria. When describing autonomy, the notions of interest and aims must be defined. To define autonomy, it is important "to establish a presumption that in making individual or collective decisions each adult ought to be treated-for purposes of making decisions-as the proper judge of his or her own interests...the presumption is assumed to be binding" (Dahl, 1989, p. 100). Dewey described three ways that the word interest could be used, "(i) the whole state of active development (ii) the objective results that are foreseen or wanted and (iii) the personal emotional inclination" (Dewey, 1966, p. 126). From these three possible readings, the most important in the 17 development of autonomous individuals is a combination of two of his descriptions of interest in the order of (iii) and then (i). Dewey elaborates on the third type of interest: When we speak of a man interested in this or that the emphasis falls directly upon his personal attitude. To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert to care about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self in an object. (Dewey, 1966, p. 126) By allowing a person to follow his interest, one then flows into Dewey's first description of interest, "An occupation, employment, pursuit, business is often referred to as an interest. Thus we say that a man's interest is politics, or journalism, or philanthropy" (Dewey, 1966, p. 126). Once a person has found what it is that interests him, he should then develop that interest. In other words, he should follow the path that leads him to his vision of the good life. Allowing a person to develop his interest is to allow the person to have aims that are not completely influenced externally, but are strongly influenced internally. Dewey's definition of a good aim has the following characteristics: (1) The aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing conditions...it must be based upon a consideration of what is already going on; upon the resources and difficulties of the situation... (2) the aim as it first emerges is a mere tentative sketch. The act of striving to realize it tests its worth...An aim must, then, be flexible; it must be capable of altering to meet circumstances. (3) the aim must always represent a freeing of activities...The only way in which we can define an activity is by putting before ourselves the objects in which it terminates...The different objects which are thought of are means of directing the activity...The object is but a phase of the active end, - continuing the activity successfully. This is what is meant by the phrase, used above, "freeing activity". (Dewey, 1966, pp. 104-105) The interest is the reflective portion of developing an autonomous individual, while the aim is the active portion. For an individual to be considered autonomous, both must be evident. An aim that is without interest is an external aim and cannot produce individual autonomy. An interest without any aim is called a dream, and it too cannot produce an individual who is autonomous. A simple example of an external aim is if a parent wants an offspring to become a doctor when the son instead has the capability and interest to become an opera singer. If the son acquiesces to his parents' wishes, and at no point becomes interested in the medical profession, then he was unduly influenced by an external aim and is not autonomous. If the son wants to be an 18 opera singer, but cannot realise the dream because of his inability to sing, then the criterion of aim cannot be met. This is not to say that if one's individual interest cannot be met, then one cannot be autonomous. As stated before in Dewey's second criterion, an aim must also be flexible. If the son, however, changes his mind and still decides to go into the field of opera, but as a critic, he has met the criteria. He has still stayed true to his interest and has been able to carry out his aim and hence can be considered truly autonomous. There is one last ingredient to autonomy other than interest and aim. The two together are still insufficient in the Liberal Democracy construct which recognises the notion of a public sphere. Take for example someone who has an interest in jewellery and who has the aim of starting a collection. The person has friends who work in a jewellery store, and thus has access to jewellery, so he starts to steal the jewellery. His interest and his aim have been fulfilled; however, he has also hurt others in the process. A person who exercises her autonomy must do so with an eye to the effects of her actions on others; for, autonomy does not imply that liberty is a right for everyone to do as he or she pleases, regardless of effects upon others, or that all moral values are relative to individual judgment. It implies only that people mature enough to be responsible for their actions and adequately educated in the use of their faculties should enjoy the opportunity to set their own rules and determine their own destinies, both in making judgment of a personal nature and in cooperating with fellow citizens to set rules for social interaction. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 163) Autonomy occurs when a person is free to realise one's interests and follow one's aim to realise that interest. Responsibility is important, as autonomy must not affect another person's right to autonomy: the state of liberty was not a state of license, the right to freedom is not the right to do whatever one wishes. It is the right to do as one chooses, providing that one's actions are in accordance with the natural moral law, and, of course, do not infringe the natural rights of others. This restriction is essential for self-consistency. A right is a claim against others, and I can only have a claim against others if they have specific obligations to me, at the very minimum, not to interfere with me in the pursuit of that to which I have a right. But if everyone is said to have a right to do as they please, no one has any obligations to anyone else and so no one will be in a position to claim any rights against others' potential actions. (Hyland, 1995, p. 151) The last ingredient of autonomy is therefore responsibility. Responsibility creates a moral autonomy: 19 Responsibility and autonomy are different in this crucial respect. Autonomy can be forfeited but responsibility cannot. Since responsibility is a consequence of man's capacity for choice, human beings cannot give up or forfeit responsibility for their actions. They can, however, refuse to acknowledge or take responsibility for their actions... moral autonomy is simply taking responsibility for one's actions. (Dahl, 1989, p. 43) Autonomy has different purposes in the public and private sectors. The public sector deals with laws and legislation for the good of all. Part of the public sector's role is to protect a private person's autonomy from outside forces or infringements on one's rights. The process that allows this is the democratic process in the form of different governmental bodies voting for or against an issue. In the private sector, one is allowed to develop his autonomy, but must be responsible for his actions. There must be some recognition of the public's good when one develops his autonomy, and his right to autonomy is protected by the public process of democracy. If individual autonomy, or a private individual's interest, were to take precedent over any form of citizenship, or public interest, then there would be no responsibility of individuals to the group, and anarchy could easily occur. In the other direction, if citizenship, which is concerned with the public domain, were to take precedence over individual autonomy, which is concerned with the private domain, then a mass mentality would exist where everybody would have to do what is in the public's best interest even if it is against his or her private interest-a mark of a totalitarian state. Instead of these extremes, Liberal Democracy has as its basis personal rights in the form of autonomy, or, more specifically, personal rights with a responsibility to others which creates a moral autonomy. From the lowest common denominator of the autonomous individual, one is then able to form groups which are essential for the public sphere. The interconnectedness of individuals and groups in a democracy is evident; for, If one views the problem from the point of view of the "individual", one will inevitably raise the question, on the one hand, of the individual's relation to groups, and in the other hand, of his or her position toward democracy...if one focuses on groups, one cannot escape questions about the place that individuals occupy in these groups, nor questions about the place that democracy plays in a group...If finally, one views the question from the standpoint of democracy, one inevitably comes up against its relations to the groups that make up society, and to the individuals that make up groups. (Chapman, 1993, pp. 15-16) 20 The individuals who make up the group must do so as free individuals. There must not be any coercion or dependence. The coerced individual would not truly have an interest in the goal of the group. A group of coerced or dependent participants is merely an association. Whether or not such a joining is determined to be a group or an association, the joining still remains within the domain of the private sphere. A family, therefore, is in the private domain and need not be in any way democratic. It can be autocratic, paternalistic, liberal, or anything within reason; for, structures which are simply covers for slavery are not options. The public is also considered to be a group. Just as a private group, the public is also made up of autonomous individuals. An individual in the public domain has the role of citizen. Citizens "are actors, the individual actors in contemporary democracies ... and they participate in the public arena through the definition and realization of common interests" (Chapman, 1993, p. 17). A citizen in the public sphere is a person who has consciously decided to be aware of what is occurring around her. Unlike the legal citizen status granted to a person through birth or immigration, no one can be forced to be a citizen through voting or being an elected representative. The hope is that a person will make the decision to become an active citizen. What distinguishes groups in the private and public spheres are common interest and structure. In the private sphere, the common interest can be anything and the structure of the group may not be democratic. In the public sphere, the common interest must be the state itself and the structure ought to be democratic. The public, in the form of government, must also be as limited as possible in making decisions that affect one's private life. The rights of the individual will often take precedence over the good of the society. The distinction between the times when a person is a private individual or when a person is a public citizen is important. The citizen in the public sector must have goals that are conducive to maintaining a democracy; the individual in the private sector may not act in a manner conducive to democracy when forming a private group. When an individual is in the public, although he is acting or has goals specifically for the good of all, he does not forfeit his autonomy. In Liberal Democracy, it is safe to also say that the autonomous individual takes precedence over the citizen; for, "The emphasis of Liberal Democracy is on the autonomy of the 21 individual rather than on either communal or plural autonomy. The paramount concern of liberal democrats is therefore how to protect the rights of the individual from abridgment or interference by majorities or coercive social groups" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 99). It is easy to see that although an individual can be a citizen, she must always be considered an autonomous individual first. In conclusion, Liberal Democracy has the sub-structures of private and public. The franchise fits into the structure through first being individuals in the private sphere. Individuals who can pair their interest with an aim and temper the two with responsibility are autonomous individuals. Autonomous individuals who have common interests can choose to form or become members of groups. Groups in the private sphere may or may not be democratic in nature. Groups in the public sphere, however, need to be democratic. If individuals join together in a public group through coercion or without choice, then the individuals have had their autonomy taken away and therefore the group is not a legitimate group in a Liberal Democracy. The group of autonomous individuals who participate in the political arm of Liberal Democracy and have the common interest of the state are called citizens. The group has the special name of being the public. Not all people living in the state are active citizens often by choice. The public must be accountable to the whole and must maintain the democratic institutions. The fact that the public needs to be democratic and the private sphere does not poses an interesting dilemma for autonomy. If a person chooses not to fulfil the role of citizen, she is relegated to the private sphere where undemocratic groups exist. How does the idea of personal rights through autonomy become affected? The answer depends on how Liberal Democracy is described. The kind of Liberal Democracy described above allows for the development of personal rights; however, that is only one particular definition of Liberal Democracy. Some believe it includes the concept of property rights: the liberal ideal is a modulated concept of human individuality: (1) admire distinct personhood, but persist in developing a basis for shared public life and legitimate social authority, (2) promote protection of the individual, but in a context of democracy, in which the public will is supreme, although minority rights are also respected, and (3) recognize the importance of private property and market economics as part of individual liberty. (Barash, 1992, p. 176) 22 Next, I will explore how property rights are emphasised in the model called Capitalist Democracy. 2.4 Capitalist Democracy Liberal Democracy deals with personal rights by only describing where individuals and groups fit into the structures of the private and public spheres. In the private sphere, an individual can develop her autonomy. In the public sphere, a person can become part of the group called the public by taking part in the workings of the state through voting or governing. The most obvious difference between the aforementioned Liberal Democracy and the form of Liberal Democracy that I will describe in this section is the emphasis on rights: Liberal Democracy deals with personal rights and autonomy, while the form of Liberal Democracy that will be described in this section emphasises the notion of property rights. As the emphasis on rights changes, the distinct structures of public and private also change; in fact, the distinction becomes blurred. This form of Liberal Democracy will be called Capitalist Democracy because of its emphasis on property rights and free market capitalism in the form of competitive struggle to produce and consume. Capitalist Democracy is identified in both the private (economic) and public (political) spheres. Capitalist Democracy was "formulated in 1942, by Joseph Schumpeter, in a few chapters of his influential book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy" (Macpherson, 1977, p. 77). Capitalist Democracy will probably make the most sense as a system simply because it is recognisable in today's world. It is not surprising that the man who first proposed this model was an economist who had worked all his professional life with market models. Nor is it surprising that the political theorists (and then the publicists and then the public) took up this model as a realistic one, for they also have lived and worked in a society permeated by market behaviour. Not only did the market model seem to correspond to, and hence to explain, the actual political behaviour of the main component parts of the political system-the voters and the parties; it also seemed to justify that behaviour, and hence the whole system. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 29) The change from the abstract notion of personal rights and autonomy to a more concrete notion of property rights did not go smoothly. In Capitalist Democracy, there is an attempt to equate 23 property rights, in the form of labour, with personal rights, in the form of consuming. This coupling has caused a lot of conflict as personal rights and property rights are not entirely compatible, and must be separated. The resulting clash of rights is elevated to a central dynamic of liberal democratic capitalist societies by two fundamental historical tendencies. The first is the expansionary logic of personal rights, progressively bringing ever wider spheres of society - the management of the economy and the internal relationships of the family, for example - under at least the formal if not the substantive rubric of [Capitalist] Liberal Democracy. The second tendency concerns the expansionary logic of capitalist production, according to which the capitalist firm's ongoing search for profits progressively encroaches upon all spheres of social activity, leaving few realms of life untouched by the imperatives of accumulation and the market. (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, p. 29) Property rights have come to mean capitalist production, which should exist only in the private sphere. Why has the notion of property rights become associated with capitalist production? Historically, property rights are an important part of the development of the liberal democratic theory. It originally meant the right to own property; however, the notion of property rights gave way to the notion of free-market soeiety that eventually transformed into a society where amassing and competing for capital was of prime concern at almost all levels of that society. The liberal philosophers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, sueh as Jefferson and Rousseau, dreamed of "a society where everyone had, or could have, enough property to work on or work with, a soeiety of independent producers...not a society divided into dependent wage-earners on the one hand, and on the other, land and eapital owners on whom they were dependent" (Maepherson, 1977, p. 16). With the finding of the supposedly "New World", there was enough land for all. However, the ability to own land was restricted to very few people. For those who eould own land, personal rights could be developed as one was able to be self-sufficient. This changed as the democratic philosophers of "the seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal...fully aeeepted capitalist market relations" (Macpherson, 1977, p. 20). Instead of owning land, a person eould sell his ability to work for a fare wage or start a business in a free-market. If one was a worker, the notion was that one had "the right to 'opportunities' for work, 24 and the right to'receive and possess' the fruits of one's labor" (Baumann, 1986, p. 131). This in turn created a middle ground in the scale of wealth: the middle class or the bourgeoisie. Someone who was not a landowner could achieve a sense of self worth by earning a living. If one could earn his living, the person could then be independent in aspects of his life. A person can achieve self-worth by consuming goods or commodities. The bourgeois worked not to become autonomous or gain certain personal rights; they worked in order to buy their wants--luxury items which were not necessary to their day to day living. This created only a perceived independence and autonomy as the bourgeois were able to consume items that were once beyond their means. The ability among the newly created middle class to consume created the notion of supply and demand and the notion that businesses are at the mercy of those who have the money to buy the products. This was to balance the power between those who own and those who work, "Entrepreneurs and consumers were assumed to be rational maximizers of their own good, and to be operating in conditions of free competition in which all energies and resources were brought to the market, with the result that the market produced the optimum distribution of labour and capital and consumer goods" (Macpherson, 1977 p. 79). Unfortunately, it did not take long for critics to show that the supposed balance of power between those who are labourers and those who are owners, and therefore employers, is tenuous at best and lopsided at worst. Because of this shaky existence, the idea that property rights, through capitalist production, could beget personal rights, through consuming, was shown false by Marx. Marx first pointed out the obvious criticism to the balance of power between the labourer and owner or employer. The problem is as follows: The brain, muscles and nerves of a laborer constitute, as it were, a fund or stock of potential labor...This fund or stock Marx looks upon as a sort of substance that exists in a definite quantity and in capitalist society is a commodity like any other...Now since the labor in that sense...is a commodity the law of value must apply to it. That is to say, it must in equilibrium and perfect competition fetch a wage proportional to the number of labor hours that entered into its "production."...But once the "capitalists" have acquired that stock of potential services they are in a position to make the laborer work more hours -render more actual services - than it takes to produce that stock or potential stock. They can exact, in this sense, more actual hours of labor than they have paid for. Since the resulting products also sell at a price proportional to the man-25 hours that enter into their production, there is a difference between the two values...which necessarily and by virtue of the mechanism of capitalist markets goes to the capitalist. This is the Surplus Value. (Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 26-27) The labourer was being exploited by the owner. The owner used the human labourer to gain capital. This is what creates a capitalist. While the labourer may be satisfied with consuming things, the capitalist's main interest is in amassing wealth, or capital. Since the capitalist is only interested in capital, he will compete and do whatever it takes to ensure that he can amass it: be it through hiring non-union labour or using cheap foreign labourers to cut the cost of production and increase the overall profits. Marx simply questioned how a labourer could possibly be free in any sense if the labourer was being exploited by the capitalist. If one could ensure that the capitalist system of economics would stay in the private domain, then one would not have to worry about it becoming a political system and this section would be merely conjecture. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The structure of private and public that exists in Liberal Democracy described in the previous section do exist in Capitalist Democracy. Nevertheless, there is an argument that makes it obvious that the delineation that was quite easy to see in the section on Liberal Democracy does become blurred when describing these structures in the Capitalist model. Liberal social theory's arbitrarily asymmetric treatment of state and economy stems, we believe, from the untenable notion that the capitalist economy is a private sphere - in other words, that its operation does not involve the socially consequential exercise of power. Most liberals go on to argue that the economy, perhaps with suitable state regulation, should remain private. This, however, is beside the point, for if our argument is correct, the capitalist economy is not now a private sphere, and the basic issue concerns its proper organization as a public sphere. Recognizing this fact, we believe, renders political economy relevant to the historical concerns of groups who have struggled for the consistent extension of personal rights to the economy. (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, p. 67) The personal rights of the individual are now being extended to corporations. As a corporation is not a person, it can not literally, or legally, have personal rights. Instead, the corporations have usurped the notion of personal rights and have tried to redefine it in terms of property rights through consumption. The public sector has become parallel to the private sector. So in the political model, politicians and voters were assumed to be rational maximizers, and to be operating in conditions of free political competition, with the result that the market-like political system produced the optimum distribution 26 of political energies and political goods. The democratic political market produced an optimum equilibrium of inputs and outputs - of energies and resources people would put into it and the rewards they would get out of it. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 79) The private interests of capitalists and consumers are all found in the public sphere as well. This creates a democracy that tries to erase the public and private spheres that exist in Liberal Democracy. One must remember that in Liberal Democracy, the public sphere must be accountable to its franchise through democracy. In the private sphere, where individual autonomy should be developed, responsibility is important. As there is no real difference between the two spheres in Capitalist Democracy, there is virtually no scope; for, the non-democratic aspects of the private sphere have leached into the democratic process of the public sphere. The current political system, Representative Democracy, further creates this degradation of the public sphere: The main stipulations of this model are, first, that democracy is simply a mechanism for choosing and authorizing governments, not a kind of society nor a set of moral end; and second, that the mechanism consist of competition between two or more self-chosen sets of politicians (elites), arrayed in political parties, for the votes which will entitle them to rule until the next election. The voters' role is not to decide political issues and then choose representatives who will carry out those decisions: it is rather to choose the men who will do the deciding. (Macpherson, 1977, p78) Representative Democracy coupled with Capitalist Democracy holds no hope for any true authenticity for the franchise because "elections and interelection activity are of trivial importance in determining policy" (Macpherson, 1977, p. 81). In Liberal Democracy, the individual had the distinction of being autonomous in the private sphere and acitizen in the public sphere. This is altered in Capitalist Democracy. The notion of the individual does exist, but the individual is not considered autonomous. The individual is instead isolated: The emergence of this isolated individual did, needless to say, have its positive side, the emancipator implications of which are emphasized by liberal doctrine, with its constitutive concept (myth?) of the sovereign individual. But there was also another side. In a sense, the creation of the sovereign individual was the price paid by the "labouring multitude" for entry into the political community; or, to be more precise, the historical process which gave rise to capitalism, and to the modern "free and equal" wage labourer who would eventually join the 27 body of citizens, was the same process in which the peasant was dispossessed and deracinated, detached from both his property and his community, together with its common and customary rights. (Wood, 1995, p. 209) These isolated individuals, in a market society, are encouraged to see everyone else as competition. As with any form of competition, there are winners and losers. The freedom that capitalism was supposed to bring eventually created individuals who realised that, when it came to competition, they may end up the loser, "The protection of each in his 'own' is the sine qua non of market life and interaction. This liberty is therefore basically a liberty against others, who are seen as antagonists rather than companions in the pursuit of happiness" (Baumann, 1986, p. 136). The individuals realise that personal rights exist in a way that is contrary to the notion of individual autonomy-they must be completely self-interested. One can have internal interests and aims, however there can be no responsibility towards the group. If someone is naive enough to show some responsibility, he may lose out by those who are less scrupulous. In such a society, the following logo becomes a mantra of sorts, "Second place is the first loser" (No Fear T-shirt). There can be no groups, as there must be some form of loyalty; therefore, the citizen is virtually absent. The isolated individual cannot form any sort of loyalty, as she is forced to go wherever she can to keep her "property rights" as a worker: When a board of directors decides to close a plant, it is engaging in an allocation of values that is public, binding, and, functionally speaking, authoritative. It is making "public policy". The public effects of the policy are apparent in altered patterns of claim on government; altered patterns of community finance; reassignment of workers from Youngston, say to Houston or San Diego; altered patterns of enjoyment of constitutional rights and ultimately an altered quality of public life. (Baumann, 1986, p. 151) Isolated individuals understand that there is no role as a citizen in Capitalist Democracy, "There is no nonsense about democracy as a vehicle for improvement of mankind. Participation is not a value in itself, nor even an instrumental value for the achievement of a higher, more socially conscious set of human beings. The purpose of democracy is to register the desires of people as they are, not to contribute to what they might be or might wish to be" (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 78-79). 28 In Capitalist Democracy, an isolated individual is a "rational maximized or a chooser. An individual chooses the best path for a job, she chooses her clothes, and she tries to choose how she will vote. The choosing is done with the full knowledge that she may not get a job in the field that she has trained in, that her clothes may be out of fashion within a week, and that her vote for candidate X will affect her life as much as a vote for candidate Y. Capitalist Democracy relegates choice to an arena of personal autonomy ostensibly devoid of developmental potential. Although favored liberal institutions - market and ballot box - are praised as sensitively attuned to expressing the wills of consumers and citizens, this sensitively fails to extend to a most central area of personal control; that is, the choices determining how individuals are to develop their preferences, their capacities for social participation, and their abilities to make informed decision. [Capitalist] liberalism claims that the marketplace and the ballot box allow people to get what they want. But [capitalist] liberalism is silent on how people might get to be what they want to be, and how they might get to want what they want to want. (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, p. 125) The isolated chooser realises that there is very little control that she can have in her life. The individual cannot gain independence. Everything is tied to the ability to buy, and if one cannot work, one cannot buy. The dependence between worker and capitalist production is absolute. Capitalist Democracy is distinguished from Liberal Democracy by emphasising property rights over personal rights. Historically, property rights shifted from the notion of actually owning property to capitalist production and consumption. Thus, the individual has shifted from a possible independent landowner to a worker. An owner can realise the "fruits of his labour" by consuming goods that are luxuries instead of just needs. The middle class is created. If an owner is successful and starts amassing wealth, she is considered to be a capitalist. The problem is if the owner amasses capital on the backs of workers. A worker, therefore, is exploited and cannot be considered free. Capitalists have the ability to market their products so that consumers will favour that product. The better the resource base to market, the better chance the product will succeed. Therefore, consumers are not acting free; rather, they are manipulated buyers. The strength of the capitalist to sway opinion does not happen only in the private sphere but also in the public sphere. An objective form of democracy in the public sphere does not exist as a result of owners having a strong influence on government economic 29 policy. Politicians are marketed just like products and the people in the franchise choose. In such a society, individuals become isolated, competitive, self-interested, dependent choosers. The only reason why this form remains a democracy is the uninspiring ability to vote for a government that will rule and make decisions irrespective of the franchise. To a considerable extent, Capitalist Democracy in the social sphere and Representative Democracy in the political sphere are the forms of democracy that currently exist. 2.5 Conclusion It is probably not practical to try and change the world from the lesser democratic forms, the Representative and Capitalist, into the more democratic forms, the Liberal and Participatory. However, we should make more of an effort to include the Liberal and Participatory forms in our world. To see where they may fit in, we need to see how they have failed to gain popularity. The hope of Participatory Democracy is to create a stronger sense of the citizen and the public group through participation, thereby having a stronger say in the actions of the government. Unfortunately, after the original inception of democracy in Athens, where participation by citizens was cultivated to an extent that those who did not participate were "idiotes", Participatory Democracy has not existed. Liberal Democracy also has not met with success; for, although it did define personal rights and autonomy and citizens who should participate, it did not adequately deal with the strength of property rights and capitalist production. Liberal Democracy allows capitalism to exist in the private sphere because of the definition of the private sphere: groups in the private sphere need not be democratic. The early proponents of Liberal Democracy did not intend for capitalism to also overtake the public sphere. They intended to have autonomous individuals form groups with the common interest of the state and be called citizens. Instead, Capitalist Democracy became so strong in the private sphere that it spilled into the public sphere thereby creating isolated individuals who are unable to form common interests that would benefit the state. Competition between the individuals would get in the way. Unfortunately, as the Capitalist model became a reality, it became obvious 30 that there was no notion of the public as a cohesive group that is important in the definition of Liberal Democracy. Capitalist Democracy was strengthened because of how the political arm of Representative Democracy disenfranchises its citizens. This results from the weakness of the public in having any real say in the dealings of the government: [There were] few illusions about the actual democratic system, or about the democratic quality of a society dominated by motives of individual and corporate gain. The root difficulty lay not in any defect in the machinery of government but in the fact that the democratic public was "still largely inchoate and unorganized" and unable to see what forces of economic and technological organization it was up against. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 73) Simply expressing the notion of citizens in terms of government and personal rights did not take into account the overpowering reality of property rights and the overpowering strength of capitalist production. In an almost Darwinian move, the expert competitors of Capitalist Democracy simply took over: What the twentieth-century developmental theorists did not see, as we have noticed, was the extent to which the system had survived by reducing the responsiveness of governments to electorates. It was the developmental theorists' failure to see this that enabled them to postulate an overriding citizen rationality and build it into their descriptive model. And it was their putting this in their descriptive model that left them wide open to the shattering attack of the mid-twentieth-century empirical political scientists. In the end, it was the failure of the developmental theorists to see the difference between the actual democratic system which was very much like a market, and their idealistic developmental hopes that led to the failure. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 76) The struggle against the structure of Capitalist Democracy is simply to go against the status quo, is contrary (at least implicitly) to one of the most strongly entrenched presuppositions of social and political theory and ideology in the West: that you must make a choice, compromise, or trade-off between individuality and community; between the heroism of self-sacrifice and the rational selfishness of the buyer-and-seller in the market. (Horowitz, 1988, p. 14) The notion of choosing between two physical items is so couched in Capitalist Democracy that it is no wonder that when one chooses between the two, the "rational selfishness of the buyer and seller" wins out over the autonomous individual and the participating citizen. Participatory Democracy, coupled with Liberal Democracy, tries to strengthen both the notion of a person's autonomy and her right to participate in the governing of her country. All people are individuals, but they do not necessarily have to be isolated as is encouraged in 31 Capitalist Democracy. One "is not restricted to the level of the solitary individual because...human beings are inherently gregarious and in need of society...they are incapable of achieving autonomy,...for years after leaving the womb. Even as adults, they depend upon others and owe all others with whom they enter into relationships of mutual benefit a due regard for their right to the same degree of autonomy they claim for themselves" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 165). The failure of Liberal Democracy is due to the alienation of the public resulting in part from Representative Democracy. Representative Democracy does not allow for the citizens to have a very strong voice in their public lives. Capitalist Democracy then rules people's private life by circumventing any true interests and turning private citizens into mere consumers. If citizens have a stronger voice in their public life, they will become more empowered in their private lives. This in turn will allow private citizens to explore their own interests: Personal involvement in the participatory process may "significantly change one's attitude, perspective and value priorities." The effect of participation, and here is the reinforcing tie with the idea of community, lead... to our development as "social beings." [The] argument rests on this notion of "development." However, this argument reposes on a reading of shared understanding not as the product of debate but as a discovery. [It] states that participation is valuable because it enables 'the individual to discover his real needs" and these real needs are themselves discovered through "the intervening discovery of himself as a social human being." (Shapiro, 1990, p. 76) This, in turn, would allow for the inclusion of Liberal Democracy and the creation of autonomous citizens. If a person is allowed to have a greater say in all aspects of his private life, and especially in the workplace which currently defines a person's life, then self-actualisation can occur. As we need to live in groups, being able to have a say in how the group will act allows a person to decide on an opinion and express it: Men must co-operate in associations to satisfy their needs... by looking at "the motives that hold men together in association" and the "way in which men act through association in supplement and complement to their actions as isolated or private individuals"..."the object of social organization is not merely material efficiency, but also essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members." Self expression involves self-government and this means that we must call forth the people's full participation in the common direction in the affairs of the community...the individual is most free where he co-operates with his equal in the making of laws. (Pateman, 1970, p. 36) Undoubtedly, participation is a lot of work. Yet I believe that a person who chooses not to participate in the world around him will invariably give up the right to participate in his future. 32 It may be easier to live in Representative Democracy and to allow the government to make major decisions that may or may not affect the quality of one's life. It may also be easier to live in Capitalist Democracy where property rights are what determine a person's happiness through consumption. It may be easier to live in Representative Democracy in the political sphere and Capitalist Democracy in the social sphere (CRD), but is it as fulfilling as expressing an opinion that is strongly believed and knowing that those in charge will give it some weight? Is acquiring things more fulfilling than finding out what makes life worth living? Living in a democracy needs to be work. The freedom and autonomy that democracy brings do not come easily and need vigilance on the part of the franchise to continue their existence. The only models that allow for this are Participatory Democracy in the political sphere and Liberal Democracy in the social sphere (LPD). Why has the populace allowed itself to live in the less democratic Representative and Capitalist models? Perhaps one needs to investigate how people are normalised. It is time to explore both the role of schools in a democracy and the relationship between democracy and schools. If an education is passive and reactive (listening and responding) then the CRD will undoubtedly continue. If an education is dynamic and proactive (listening, thinking, questioning) then perhaps the CRD will no longer be as acceptable; perhaps there will be a move towards people becoming autonomous individuals and people needing to participate more in the decision-making of the government. 33 CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN A DEMOCRACY Given our current social organisation, which leans heavily in the direction of a CRD, the role of schools seems to be primarily that of enabling students to participate in the capitalist economy. Schools, in this current context, cannot be a place where autonomy is fostered because much is geared towards the job market, not towards allowing a student to discover her interests. Schools and, by extension, the creation of an individual, become associated with work. This is due to the hegemony of the Capitalist model described in the previous chapter as "certainly, we must be honest about the ways power, knowledge, and interest are interrelated and made manifest, about how hegemony is economically and culturally maintained" (Apple, 1990, p. 161). There is considerable pressure for everyone to succeed. Students try to get into courses that will allow them to go into post-secondary institutions and work hard in these courses to get good marks. Students who do well are automatically praised through awards. Students clearly view schooling as necessary for getting ahead in life: People with ambition have always viewed education as a way to get ahead. But today's students may care more about grades than any previous generation. A remarkable 96% of Canadian and American high school students plan to continue on to post-secondary education, says David Robitaille, an education professor at the University of British Columbia. "All of them talk about how difficult it is to get any kind of decent job without it." (Time, Vol. 152, p. 54) Ironically, we do see the notion of production-not capitalist production so to speak, but a very good pre-cursor. Students understand that in order to get ahead, they need to get results in school first. Is this the only role which schools play in a democracy? If we are to remain within a CRD, then there is no need to change. If we want to include the ideas of autonomy and participation, the foundations of an LPD, then schools do need to teach students quite differently. In this chapter, I will describe what should be the role of schools in a democracy. I will first set out by exploring Dewey's ideas on the role of schools and how these roles relate to autonomy and the ability to participate. It is important to keep in mind that the criteria which were used in the previous chapter to define autonomy are finding and developing one's interest, 34 having an aim to achieve that interest and a responsibility towards others and their interests and aims. Interest, aim and responsibility need to flourish in schools to allow for people to develop and pursue their own visions of the good life. After exploring Dewey's roles and how autonomy and participation are linked to them, I will then attempt to justify these roles of schools in a democracy, as they are not without controversy. Last, I will describe what must be taught in schools to foster autonomy and participation. 3.1 Dewey's View on Functions of Schools and The Great Sphere Dewey investigated extensively the role of schools in a society and people's lives. Schools and education, according to Dewey, have four distinct functions or roles which he discusses under the terms: necessity of life, social function, direction, and growth. If these functions are appropriately fulfilled, autonomy and participation will result. Autonomy and participation are the main elements for a Liberal and Participatory Democracy (LPD). When describing education as a necessity of life, Dewey points out that in any society, a child must learn what has gone on before in order to re-create and perhaps better that society. When the society was based on hunting, children needed to learn to hunt from parents or older members of the group. If the children could improve the manner in which one hunted, then that skill would be passed on to the next generation and also improved, Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standard, opinions, from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive. (Dewey, 1966, p. 3) In a larger society a child could not learn directly from her parents everything that she needed to know. The structure of schools came into being and education became formalised. This new structure of schools also brought with it the possibility of choice; for, In "tradition-directed" cultures...the extent to which the meaning of life depends upon one's own choice is meagre because tradition so often precludes choice. The interests which befit specific roles are narrowly demarcated and roles are allocated according to customs which leave little space for individual predilections. One is born to be a warrior, hunter, and so forth. Such cultures are rapidly fading and our distance from them is partly evidenced by the assumption 35 we are apt to make that the meaning of one's life is something one creates in part (or fails to create) rather than something that is just found in immemorial and unchangeable traditions. (Callan, 1988, p. 31) It was no longer necessary to continue or improve only the specific tasks of your direct ancestors. As such, the component of autonomy that necessity of life affects is interest. A child may not be interested in the hunting that his ancestors have always done. The child may be interested in agriculture. This subtle change allows the beginnings of autonomy; as, one is able to have a choice in what to continue from many other traditions. When education is taken to be a social function, Dewey describes the school as a "special environment...The only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment" (Dewey, 1966, p. 19). The environment is made up of three elements. First, as our world is very complex, it is broken up into understandable bits for a child to grasp. As the child grows, so does the complexity of the environment. Second, the environment is selective; for "selection aims not only at simplifying but at weeding out what is undesirable" (Dewey, 1966, p. 20). Third, "it is the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into contact with a broader environment" (Dewey, 1966, p. 20). This third element is especially important when one considers developing the autonomy of a child; for, "though it is not logically inevitable that new academic achievements will increase our options, where there is an accession of ability in what we learn-and that is almost invariably true even where learning is abstruse and theoretical-then we are necessarily able to do what we could not do before... In [this way], the acquisition of knowledge and skills can contribute to self-rule by increasing our freedom" (Callan, 1988, p. 59). It is important that children are exposed to as many different ideas and subjects as possible so that they may develop their interests and decide how to live their lives in the best possible manner. This means that a compulsory education can be justified, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 36 When education is described as a direction, it means that youth need guidance to help them decide what to do with their lives; it is the school's function to allow for "the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided" (Dewey, 1966, p. 23). Children should be able to develop any talents they may have. Direction is the same as aim; direction will allow a child to achieve her interest. Developing one's talents is also very important when fostering autonomy, "This...suggests some general observations about the relation between the kind of learning for which schools are especially suited and the cultivation of autonomy...discovering some hidden ability in oneself, such as the native talents of a great artist, opens up options which a lack of self-knowledge had previously closed" (Callan, 1988, p. 59). When developing one's talents, Dewey does not mean that a child should develop whatever talent he wants. Society, according to Dewey, still plays an important role, and children must "refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action to a common result, and gives an understanding common to the participants" (Dewey, 1966, p. 39). I do not think that Dewey meant this as a limit. He only meant that the talent should not be anti-social. This means that there must be participation with other children to find out what constitutes social and anti-social talents. It also means that a child needs to be responsible for her actions so as not to limit other people's ability to develop their own interests. The direction which the schools currently provide should not be used to make the environment of a school the same as an adult's workplace. When Dewey describes education as direction, he carefully chooses the word: Of these three words, direction, control, and guidance, the last best conveys the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided; control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought to bear from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled; direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continuous course, instead of dispersing aimlessly. (Dewey, 1966, p. 23) Although Dewey eventually picks the word direction over guidance, it is questionable if direction is the better choice. The important emphasis which Dewey places is on the idea of neutrality-something which will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter. Yet, a direction 37 cannot be neutral. In the same sentence, he states that "those directed are led in a certain continuous course." If those directed have no say in what way they will be directed, how does that not make the direction anything but "from without"? If those who are directed do not resist, does that make it any less like control? Guidance, however, allows a certain control of the person who is being directed. If a person is guided towards an end, there seems to be less of a sense of coercion as there does when a person is directed towards an end. If there is a partnership between the one guided and the one guiding, a notion of participation will also result. I would also add that this role in schools should become increasingly limited the older the student grows. Schools should provide guidance to a point. Students should be allowed the flexibility to continue or not continue along a path in later grades. "Students are likely to be at least quite close to having a sound appreciation of what is in their educational interest during the latter years of attendance. In that event, it is reasonable to suppose that they can be trusted to decide competently on some important matters concerning their own education" (Callan, 1988, p. 130). The last function of schools which Dewey describes is growth. Dewey writes that: Power to grow depends upon need for others and plasticity. Both of these conditions are at their height in childhood and youth. Plasticity or the power to learn from experience means the formation of habits. Habits give control over the environment, power to utilize it for human purposes. Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background of growth; the latter constitute growing. Active habits involve thought, invention, and initiative in applying capacities to new aims. They are opposed to routine which marks an arrest of growth. Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact. (Dewey, 1966, p. 53) Growth is carefully nurtured in the beginning by forming the proper habits. There are two possibilities from the habits a child has established in school: either to stop and simply fall into a routine, or to use the habits as a starting point for exploring and adapting new ideas. If a child falls into routine, the habits she has gained are considered to be bad habits: the student is passive. Only when the habits are used in the second possibility is growth achieved. This means that growth is dynamic, and the result will often include change. Students should not 38 leave schools with the thought that school was merely an arbitrary hurdle which had to be climbed in order to get to another level: Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is continuous leading into the future. If the environment, in school and out, supplies conditions which utilize adequately the present capacities of the immature, the future which grows out of the present is surely taken care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Because the need of preparation for a continually developing life is great, it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich and significant as possible. (Dewey, 1966, p. 56) To make the present experience as significant as possible, a student must also have the proper habits which will allow him to reflect. If one can do this, one can become autonomous, "The autonomous life is supposed to be the meticulously examined life; it is one that revolves around the giving and seeking of reasons" (Callan, 1988, p. 30). This is important when considering the requirement of responsibility. By reflecting on one's interest and aim, one realises that there may be more than one path to reach the interest. Responsibility requires that the child choose the best path that does not affect another's achievement of an interest. In each of these functions, one can see that there is the possibility for fostering autonomy. If the functions are done well and consciously, a child can find and develop her interests, have an aim to achieve that interest and is responsible to others when achieving that interest. If we allow the necessity of life to be an improvement as opposed to a straight transmission of the society's norms, then greater choice will result and a child may find her interest among the choices. If the social function does allow for a special environment which allows children to rise above their social standing, that too will allow for more possibility of choice. If direction is used to attain the interest, the child becomes more autonomous. If a student is able to gain the ability to reflect on her interest and aims, then growth will occur and the child will be acting responsibly. Since none of these roles are done in isolation, a child also needs to know how to participate with other children and with her teacher to attain autonomy. It is a mistake to think of these functions as a linear path that goes up a mountain. They are more akin to the shells of an onion with the function of necessity of life being the outer shell 39 and growth being in the centre. These functions are essentially the layers of what has been described as the "Great Sphere" by Ackerman: The entire educational system will, if you like, resemble a great sphere. Children land upon the sphere at different points, depending on their primary culture; the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that permits them to glimpse the deeper meanings of the dramas passing on around them. At the end of the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right to locate himself at the very point from which he began - just as he may also strike out to discover an unoccupied portion of the sphere. (Ackerman in Callan, 1997, p. 132) The permeability of the layers is akin to the structure of schools: the more permeable they are, the easier it is for a child to move around the sphere. Structures in schools, and the role democracy plays, will be discussed in the next chapter. I will currently limit myself to what needs to be taught to foster the four functions which will collectively be called the great sphere. The great sphere's main target is to foster autonomy and participation with others: The essential demand is that schooling properly involves at some stage sympathetic and critical engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with the culture of the family or religious or ethnic group into which the child is born. Moreover, the relevant engagement must be such that the beliefs and values by which others live are entertained not merely as sources of meaning in their lives; they are instead addressed as potential elements within the conceptions of the good and the right one will create for oneself as an adult...to understand ethical diversity in the educationally relevant sense presupposes some experience of entering imaginatively into ways of life that are strange, even repugnant, and some developed ability to respond to them with interpretive charity, even though the sympathy this involves must complement the tough-mindedness of responsible criticism. (Callan, 1997, p. 133) Before I can continue, I must justify why it is that school, as opposed to the family, is a place where the great sphere can also be explored; as "parents' rights, unlike ideals of group identity that might conflict with considerations of parents' and children's rights or the proper ends of political education, provide powerful objection to the imposition of schooling as the great sphere" (Callan, 1997, p. 135). Once I have explored the argument that parents' rights are not being infringed upon by fostering the great sphere in schools, I will then proceed to discuss what needs to be taught in schools for there to be the opportunity for autonomy and growth. 3.2 Parents' Rights Callan (1997) poses the question of parents' rights in the following manner: 40 To claim on behalf of parents a right to educational choice is to say that they have an interest in the education of the children of sufficient weight to warrant the imposition of duties on others regarding the protection or promotion of that interest...What is the moral content or scope of the right and when (if ever) should we set aside its requirements? (p. 136) In one answer to this question, Gutmann (1987) simply states that both parents and the society at large have a role in educating democratically, "Moral education in a democracy is best viewed as a shared trust of the family and the polity, mutually beneficial to everyone who appreciates the values of both family life and democratic citizenship" (p. 54). I doubt that anyone would argue that schools have the monopoly of educating children. Parents play a vital role in this. In a perfect world, her answer would be sufficient. Her response, however, skirts the issue that some parents may simply feel that they have a monopoly on teaching their children everything aside from reading, writing and arithmetic. Educating democratically (i.e. in the context for an LPD) will require the fostering of autonomy and participation through the great sphere. Parents' beliefs may not coincide with educating in the great sphere; as, parents may worry that their children may be exposed to and may eventually agree with beliefs contrary to their own. When arguing where parents' rights may be set aside, one does not simply argue that autonomy is inherently important. As important as fostering autonomy in children is for an LPD, it too is an insufficient argument to reject all other possible interpretations of what constitutes the good life. "If the personal sovereignty to which an adult can justly lay claim sometimes protects goods other than autonomy, and we lack any decisive reason to suppose that autonomy must outweigh these other goods, a child's prospective interest in sovereignty cannot be reduced to a prospective interest in autonomy above all else" (Callan, 1997, p. 151). It is not enough to simply write that we must protect children's rights, as future citizens, to develop and exercise autonomy. We might be tempted to construe the basic liberties that sustain the moral powers of citizens in part as rights designed to conduce to the optimal realization of autonomy...[However] we cannot infer that the scope of actual and prospective rights to personal sovereignty under a just constitution would be designed so as to conduce to the maximal development of autonomy...the autonomy argument cannot be a satisfactory way of reconciling parents' actual and their children's prospective interests in sovereignty. (Callan, 1997, pp. 148-149) 41 The reason for this is that one can forfeit autonomy and still live a version of the good life. An obvious example is when a female becomes a nun or a male becomes a monk. The rules inherent to both of these occupations make it very difficult to say that these occupations are autonomous. The viewpoint is wrong if one specifically looks only at the end result to say whether or not a person has lived the good life. It is not only the end result that is important, but how one comes to choosing the end result and whether both the choice and the end result is satisfying to oneself after reflection. Nevertheless, the important question which must be asked is, "Who makes the ultimate choice of what a child's interests should be: the child or the parent"? The way which Callan approaches the answer to when can we set aside the rights of parents hinges on how the end result is chosen. Whether or not a child grows up to be an Orthodox Jew is not important. What is important is whether the child chose that path without the coercion from a parent, "the option of vetoing that education [which the great sphere would promote] cannot belong within the scope of parents' rights so long as those rights are construed in a manner that eschews parental despotism" (Callan, 1997, p. 152). Parental despotism may be looked at as a cancerous form of paternalism. Paternalism, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, is "the claim or attempt by a government, company, etc., to take responsibility for the welfare of its people or to regulate their life for their benefit" (OED, 1993). Parental despots seek to control a child's life absolutely. The subtle difference between a parent who is paternalistic and one that is despotic is that a despotic parent is not truly looking after her child's best interest, but wants to maintain her power over the child. The parent simply believes that if a child is exposed to anything different from the parent's belief, the child may reject his parent's belief. Therefore the despotic parent wants to take away the opportunity of choice from the child for the rest of the child's life. If parents do not want their children to be exposed to the great sphere, which will encourage the ability for their children to pursue "their distinctive vision of the right and the good" (Callan, 1997, p. 155), then they want their children to be either "deferential" or "ethically servile." 42 A child who is deferential is one whose parents "ensure control of [the] child's conduct on all matters of fundamental ethical significance, and with that end in view, [the parent] will instil the belief in [the] child that she must always obey me" (Callan, 1997, p. 153). The ethically servile child is different only in the aspect in which she is created. Instead of instilling deferential servility, I rear my child so that as an adult she maintains an ignorant antipathy towards all alternatives to the ethical ideal I inculcated during childhood. By an "ignorant antipathy" I do not just mean a lack of information combined with an aversion to what one does not know. I mean a settled affective disposition to refuse to register whatever reason might commend in the objects of one's antipathy, even if, at some later date, one might acquire much knowledge about them...She may enumerate her rights correctly, talk eloquently about their meaning, and prize them as highly as anyone reasonably could. Yet in a deep sense she remains subordinate to my will because the choices I made in moulding her character effectively pre-empt serious thought at any future date about the alternative to my judgment. (Callan, 1997, pp. 153-154) Neither the deferential child nor the ethically servile child has much difference in the end result: adults who are continually compliant "with another's will" (Callan, 1997, p. 154). What Callan (1997) shows is if a parent moulds a child that is either deferential or ethically servile, then the parent seriously affects the ability of the child to choose what sort of life can be led. This is not to say that we replace the deferential or ethically servile child with the autonomous one, only that the elements of the Great Sphere should not be rejected: The great sphere certainly requires a level of autonomous development above the condition of mere agency; but on no account does it demand commitment to reasoned self-rule as the apogee of human development. The lesson it teaches is that each of us must learn to ask the question of how we should live, and that how we answer it can be no servile echo of the answers others have given, even if our thoughts commonly turn out to be substantially the same as those that informed our parents' lives...to be reared in a manner that instils ethical servility is...to be denied one of the developmental preconditions of adult rights - viz. a level of autonomous development sufficient to overcome the vice of ethical servility, (pp. 154-155) Therefore, the answer to the question which Callan first posed is quite simple: A parent's rights can be forfeited over a child's interests if the parent is despotic in that the parent wants power over the child's future ability to choose. Introducing students to the great sphere becomes an important function of schools for a democracy. The elements of Dewey's functions are all contained within the great sphere. A parent should not shield her child from schooling in the great sphere; for, "efforts to render their 43 children servile will constitute a violation of the child's rights" (Callan, 1997, p,155). As the great sphere cannot be rejected, any Public policies designed to ensure that the schooling children receive adheres to the pattern of the great sphere may often be an effective, even a necessary way of safeguarding their rights while at the same time honouring the rights of parents and contributing to the proper ends of political education. (Callan, 1997, p. 157) The great sphere is important in allowing the functions of schools that Dewey outlined. All of those functions can promote autonomy which is an important factor in an LPD. "The open-ended growth of autonomy will require at some point an education that encourages the kind of learning promoted by the great sphere" (Callan, 1997, p. 148). Therefore, the question that now must be answered is, "How can the great sphere be realised in schools"? 3.3 The Tools for the Great Sphere and an LPD What must students learn for a Liberal-Participatory Democracy (LPD) to exist? To answer this question, it is important to remember that an autonomous person is essential for Liberal Democracy and a participating citizen is needed for the existence of Participatory Democracy. Autonomy and participation must somehow be brought together in schools without detracting from each other. Autonomy is not synonymous with individualism in the sense of people portraying discrete atoms. An autonomous person is one who has formed his or her beliefs and interests independently without any outside coercion, has aims to achieve that interest and is responsible. Beliefs and interests are formed after much thought and consideration of different viewpoints. This allows a person to form a vision of the good life compatible with her beliefs and interests. An autonomous person must also be responsible enough to change, or shift, her vision of the good life. Dialogue with others is essential for a person to remain autonomous. An autonomous person should not be isolated. There must be participation with others in the social sphere. On the political level, participation is meaningless unless those who participate have chosen to do so and have come to their ideas and beliefs as autonomous individuals. Participation of autonomous people in the political realm of decision-making and governing is what makes an LPD inclusive: everyone must not only have the right to 44 form opinions autonomously in the social sphere but also have the right to participate in making those opinions heard in the political sphere. Having the right to something is not sufficient to carrying out those rights. This is obviously apparent whenever people who can vote do not vote. People in an LPD must be given tools to develop their autonomy and develop proper ways in which to participate. Schools must be used in an LPD to foster both autonomy and participation. Both social and political education must exist in schools. This can be done in two ways. First, schools need to educate socially by including a moral education that helps students develop autonomy and responsibility, which requires, among other things, fostering respect for others, empathy, caring and the ability to recognise the flourishing and suffering of others. Of course, moral education must be carefully thought out. It must avoid advancing a certain vision of a good life above all others. This is against the idea of autonomy and differing visions of the good life. A social education in an LPD must be flexible enough to allow for autonomy in the sense of competing visions of a good life. Second, schools need to educate politically by fostering not only the idea of participation but also the ability to participate. Fortunately, a social education, which promotes autonomy, will also educate politically as it includes the ability to participate as will be shown later in this chapter. Before setting out what constitutes a social and political education, I want to lay a foundation. Both the social and political education need to contain a way of thinking and a way of speaking, therefore, I want to briefly explore "critical thinking" and "competent dialogue." 3.4 Critical Thinking and Competent Dialogue The notion of critical thinking must be embedded within the curriculum regardless of who sets the curriculum. Critical thinking is not merely "analysing" a particular set of results or a passage from a text; for, "the mere fact that someone is analysing an issue does not mean the they are doing it critically. In fact, the consequence of our collective failure to teach critical thinking are student analyses that fail to detect dubious assumption, contain many fallacious and unsupported statements, and reveal close-minded, prejudicial attitudes" (Case, 1997, p. 180). Critical thinking, "is sometimes contrasted with problem solving, decision making, issue analysis 45 and inquiry. [The authors] see these latter terms for rational deliberation as occasions for critical thinking" (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 3). The tools of critical thinking are: habits of mind, background information (subject matter), thinking strategies, critical thinking vocabulary, and criteria for judgement (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993). Although all of the tools are important, I will focus on habits of mind and criteria for judgement as they seem especially important to the idea of autonomy. Habits of mind encompass: • open-mindedness (willingness to withhold judgment and seek new evidence or points of view when existing evidence is inadequate or contentious, and willingness to consider evidence against one's view and to revise one's view should the evidence warrant it); • fair-mindedness (willingness to give fair consideration to alternative points of view and commitment to open, critical discussion of theories, practices and policies where all views are given a fair hearing); • desire for truth (commitment to having justified beliefs, values and actions); • independent-mindedness (the willingness and personal strength to stand up for one's firmly held beliefs); • an inquiring attitude (an inclination to question the clarity and support for claims one is asked to accept); • respect for high quality products and performances (appreciation of good design and effective performance); • an intellectual work ethic (commitment to carrying out relevant thinking tasks in a competent manner). (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 11) Habits of mind are important to autonomy simply because they allow a person to develop her interests. With practice and with exposure to others and their viewpoints, a person will be able to challenge her own viewpoint and eventually either reaffirm her viewpoint or change it altogether. To properly judge other viewpoints, as well as one's own, it is essential for a student to judge what is being said. There are five types of judgements that require critical thought: • judgments about descriptive claims - challenges directed at reaching well-founded accounts or descriptions of the nature of the physical world or our person and social experience; • judgments about values - challenges directed at deciding what would be the most defensible or reasonable goal or value to pursue; 46 • judgments about logical/meaning relations - challenges directed at finding a solution to a problem of logic or meaning; • judgments about plans - challenges directed at determining the most effective way of achieving a given goal or desired end; • judgment-in-action - challenges requiring on-the-spot judgments about how to enhance the quality of a product or the success of a performance (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 7) Students who are able to distinguish the types of judgements become more conscious of any argument and understand better the arguer's viewpoint. There must be dialogue between the teacher and the student and also between students when any subject is taught. Students must feel respected by others to feel comfortable to ask questions. A class that is too frightened to ask for help from the teacher is a class where self-esteem cannot grow. Self-esteem is when people have "favourable opinions of themselves" (White, 1983, p. 27). A person who is frightened to ask questions does not have a favourable sense of the self. Instead of lecturing, discussion should be utilised as it allows students to carefully outline their ideas so that another person can understand: One cannot simply "discuss" or "have a discussion". Discussion is always discussion of, about or on something. There is always a subject, question, matter or issue which is "under discussion", and the central function of discussion is the improvement of knowledge, understanding and/or judgment on the matter with is under discussion. (Bridges, 1979, p. 14) Discussion allows for participation and also for the ability to think critically, as "decision-making which proceeds through the process of group discussion affords opportunities for the improvement of judgment which other decision making procedures lack" (Bridges, 1979, p. 152). Open discussion has the following attributes: • Subject matter not prohibited - The matter upon which dissuasion may be desired is not withheld from discussion by any form of prohibition - it is "open for discussion" • Open-mindedness - those engaged are open - in the sense of open-minded, ready to listen to others, to accept criticism, to set aside their own prejudices and presumptions and to entertain imaginative speculation • No opinion prevented - The discussion is open to all (relevant?) arguments, evidence points of view and criticism. 47 • Accessible to all persons - The discussion is in principle open to all persons within the group and from the outside. • Uninhibited by time - The discussion is open in the sense that it is not inhibited by the time available in which to pursue, to sort and where possible to accommodate different opinions. • Conclusion or learning outcomes open - The discussion is one in which the conclusion or learning outcomes are open. (Bridges, 1979, pp. 68 -74) These elements seem to mirror those of Critical Thinking as conceptualised by Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels. The only difference between critical thinking and competent dialogues is that the latter is done orally. On a personal level, as a math teacher, I find that one of the most oft-heard questions is, "Why do I have to learn this"? This is usually asked when I am teaching the ever-inspiring polynomial section. I sympathise with my students' question. The majority of mathematics cannot be critically analysed, unless one argues that mathematics was not discovered, but in fact created on certain premises which as yet have not been shown to be false. What I should also teach is a course in statistics. The reason for this is quite simple, as a T-shirt a student once wore read, "There are lies, damn lies, and then there are statistics." All one needs to do is read statistics out of context to be completely misled. There are also many other branches of mathematics which may spark a student's interest in this subject: topology, chaos theory and fractals, number theory and many others. We must emphasise courses that allow opportunity for critical thinking before students take the speciality courses which focus only on algebra, analytical and co-ordinate geometry and trigonometry. These particular areas are focused on because they are necessary for the calculus taught in post-secondary institutions. Where do critical thinking and discussion take place in schools? These happen in two places: both the prescribed and the hidden curriculum. The prescribed curriculum (what is being taught) and the hidden (how the school is run and how the curriculum is taught) must complement each other. Critical thinking is important for the development of autonomy in students. This means that the teacher herself must value critical thinking, otherwise the teaching of knowledge is separated from the teaching of critical thinking ... becoming an add- on or enhancement if and when the subject matter of the curriculum (or in the textbook) has been covered... Not onlydpes this positioning 48 relegate critical thinking to a low status, but it reinforces the dangerous impression that critical thinking is a task that is undertaken from time to time, if time permits. (Case, 1997, p. 180) People need to engage in critical thinking to become competent and critical analysers of what are considered "critical challenges" which are "the tasks, questions or problematic situations that provide the impetus and context for critical thinking" (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 2). The hidden curriculum must be consciously geared toward a social and political education. The curriculum must foster critical thinking and allow time for discussion and dialogical competence. I will now explore how critical thinking and discussion through competent dialogue are used to create autonomy in a social education and participation in a political education. 3.5 Social Education: Fostering Autonomy Autonomy is not a concrete stage of development such as walking and talking. Autonomy is carefully developed in the individual by the individual and, one hopes, encouraged by parents and teachers. An autonomous individual is one who can pursue his or her vision of a good life. As described in the Liberal Democracy section, an autonomous person needs to have both an interest, which is not forced upon him, and an aim, which will allow the person to carry out the interest, and enough responsibility to not limit other people's vision of the good life. The view of autonomy in education, however, has been disputed: Many philosophers have held that autonomy is an achievement...there is sharp disagreement about what exactly is required. Callan (1988), for example, holds that an education for autonomy requires significant attention to the child's current interests. If so, then education for autonomy must be significantly child centered. Others, J. P. White (1973,1982), for example, have emphasized that autonomy depends on a well-developed breadth of understanding and a curriculum designed by adults to produce it. (Strike, 1991, p. 435) The tension which exists is with who dictates what is learned. Callan tends to sway towards the child while J. P. White, according to Strike, tends to favour the adult. Are the two completely mutually exclusive? Dewey delineates the two in the following manner: Subdivide each topic into studies; each study into lessons; each lesson into specific facts and formulae. Let the child proceed step by step to master each one of these separate parts, and at last he will have covered the entire ground. The road which looks so long when viewed in its entirety is easily traveled, considered as a series of particular steps..The child is simply the immature 49 being who is to be matured; he is the superficial being who is to be deepened; his is narrow experience which is to be widened. It is his to receive, to accept. His part is fulfilled when he is ductile and docile. Not so, says the other sect. The child is the starting-point, the center, and the end. His development, his growth, is the ideal. It alone furnished the standard. To the growth of the child all studies are subservient; they are instruments valued as they serve the needs of growth. Personality, character, is more than subject-matter Not knowledge or information, but self-realization, is the goal. (Dewey, 1963, p. 8-9) Is either model more correct than the other? This question becomes irrelevant if whatever is taught does not connect with the child. Dewey makes it clear that when adults dictate the lessons for students, three "evils" are created: In the first place, the lack of any organic connection with what the child has already seen and felt and loved makes the material purely formal and symbolic...The second evil is...the lack of motivation. There are not only no facts or truths which have been previously felt as such with which to appropriate and assimilate the new, but there is no craving, no need, no demand..The third is that even the most scientific matter arranged in the most logical fashion, loses this quality, when presented in external, ready-made fashion. (Dewey, 1963, pp. 24-25) This does not mean that a teacher should merely be led by whatever it is that interests a young child. Dewey disagrees with this as well: "It will do harm if child-study leave in the popular mind the impression that a child of a given age has a positive equipment of purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand. Interests in reality are but attitudes toward possible experiences; they are not achievements" (Dewey, 1963, p. 15). A young child should be guided by adults, simply because "The child lives in a somewhat narrow world of personal contacts. Things hardly come within his experience unless they touch, intimately and obviously, his own well-being, or that of his family and friends. His world is a world of person with their personal interests, rather than a realm of facts and laws" (Dewey, 1963, p. 5). At a young age, it is important to have an adult-led curriculum only in the sense that students need to be exposed to subjects that the children would not otherwise pursue. It would seem odd that a student who enjoyed mathematics, but hated learning how to read, would learn mathematics and its symbolic language and perhaps symbolic logic, but not how to read books. The teacher's job to make sure that she can link the material to the student's world. There must be a connection between what a child is taught and the child's world: 50 If the subject-matter of the lessons be such as to have an appropriate place within the expanding consciousness of the child, if it grows out of his own past doing, thinking, and sufferings, and grows into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or trick of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist "interest." The psychologized is of interest - that is, it is place in the whole of conscious life so that it shares the worth of that life. But the externally presented material, conceived and generated in standpoints and attitudes remote from the child, and developed in motives alien to him, has no such place of its own. (Dewey, 1963, p. 27) There must be a time when a child's interests dictate what courses she wants to pursue. The freedom to focus on one's interest does occur to some extent in universities when students select majors. This also happens to a much lesser degree in secondary schools when a student is allowed to pick electives. As such, there is a balance between both an adult-led and a child-led curriculum; but, both are useless unless whatever is in the curriculum can connect with the students. There must also be a balance between a child's interests and a compulsory curriculum. "Imagine what it would be like to lose all your interests. You would no longer be the same person, except in superficial respects, because your interests would be a life felt to be virtually meaningless. Certainly there would be no room for strong evaluation, and things could be intrinsically valued only in the most attenuated sense" (Callan, 1997, p. 30). It is important that teachers do guide whenever it seems that a very young child will not learn something by himself. However, if a senior secondary student decides not to do his homework in French because he had an important basketball game, then the student made a choice of what interested him over what did not. Unfortunately for the French teacher, it must be remembered that a student's interests should be taken into consideration whenever possible. It is through one's interests that a person will develop her aims and her autonomy; for "the strongly autonomous self is to be distinguished from others partly by a level of rationality at which the motivational structure is developed in a realistic fashion and occurrent desires are regulated in the same manner" (Callan, 1988, p. 31). A person's interest and aim must be within reason as they must be tempered with responsibility: The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that men are responsible for their actions. From this assumption it follows necessarily, as Kant pointed out, that men are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are 51 capable of choosing how they shall act. Being able to choose how he acts makes a man responsible, but merely choosing is not in itself enough to constitute taking responsibility for one's actions. Taking responsibility involves attempting to determine what one ought to do, and that...gains upon one the additional burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, and so forth. (Wolff, 1976, p. 12) This means that a child must realise that his interests and aims do have repercussions. Responsibility is a value which we hope tempers autonomy to create a moral autonomy. Responsibility is also very useful when introducing a moral education; a child must learn how her viewpoints may affect other children's lives. The moral education must not try to override whatever a student has brought with her if she has values which in no way limit other people's vision of the good life. If a child has values which can limit other children's vision of a good life, such as racism, then a moral education needs to create a plateau of understanding between the young racist's beliefs and why his beliefs may hurt others. A moral education hinges on the ability to move through different forms of "moral languages." In order to create a plateau of understanding between people with different viewpoints, certain basic concepts must be agreed upon so that chaos does not ensue. Strike (1993) calls these base concepts "moral precepts": 1. Tolerance of diversity and freedom of conscience 2. Equality of rights and interests 3. Participation and consent as legitimating factors in decision making 4. Respect for [the rule of] law 5. Fair procedures for resolving disputes (p. 181) These moral precepts are "a language of overlapping consensus...characterized by a set of considerations that all agree to count as relevant" (p. 181). Strike defines two types of moral languages that give way to a third. The "primary moral speech" is couched in a person's heritage and initial viewpoints. By not completely excluding what a child brings with him or her, a child's initial viewpoint is not over-ridden. The public speech is what is used "to talk to each other about common concerns, despite the fact that we may deeply disagree about much that is central to our lives" (Strike, 1993, p. 180). The synthesis of the two is what he calls "hermeneutical speech" which has "several purposes. The first is understanding. Part of the process of understanding other 52 people is to be able to grasp how they think about their lives. The second is reciprocity. Reciprocity involves the capacity to put oneself in another's place. The third purpose is criticism" (Strike, 1993, p. 184). The ability to criticise is important for autonomy. "An adequate opportunity to appraise one's primary language requires the opportunity to listen to criticism and to encounter alternative perspectives, and must involve the possibility of defection" (Strike, 1993, p. 185). Understanding, reciprocity and criticism can be taught in schools by teaching critical thinking. Teaching critical thinking is imperative if one wants to have a world where tolerance exists. It is important to re-state the critical thinking must not be taught as a simple technique that will fit in nicely with one particular unit. It is not simply teaching a child "how to think": The proposal for teaching students how to think but not what to think depend on the assumption that there is a language for making value judgments that is independent of particular viewpoints or communities and that can thus serve as an arbiter among them. This view of rationality has been thoroughly criticized in philosophy. It is time for educators to give up on it. (Strike, 1993, p. 177) Just as merely teaching students "what to think" may result in indoctrination, it is not possible to only teach "how to think." This does not mean that the answers which will result after critical thinking are the same; it means if two children, who have opposing viewpoints, can even begin to discuss, without the discussion degrading into a shouting match, the moral precept of tolerance has been met. Providing opportunities or ways for challenging a student's own viewpoint should not be ignored just because it may make the student change his viewpoint. It may also allow the student to strengthen his viewpoint or interests. Thinking obviously results in viewpoints being held. However, providing tools for enforcing or discarding those viewpoints is important in developing autonomy. Critical thinking, I believe, does this. One very apt definition of critical thinking is "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1991, p. 6). Only once critical thinking has occurred can Strike's "hermeneutical language" as a form of open discussion be useful. Critical thinking and discussion provide the tools for a moral education: 53 the development of moral character involves learning to reason morally - critical intelligence facilitates moral maturity; that teaching clear thinking about moral problems was the basic aim of moral education; that free and open discussion of selected moral situations was the basic aim of moral education. (MacNiven, 1988, p. 286) Yet, why does this not happen in schools already? In my experience of teaching Grade 12 courses which have Provincial Exams at the end, education has become a form of simple transmission: (Antonio):...In teaching, questions have been forgotten. Teachers and students alike have forgotten them, and, as I understand it, all knowledge begins from asking questions. It begins with what you, Paulo, call curiosity. But curiosity is asking questions! I have the impression - and I don't know whether you will agree with me - that today teaching, knowledge, consists in giving answers and not asking questions. Paulo: Exactly! I entirely agree with you. It's what I call the "castration of curiosity". What we see happening is a movement in one direction, from here to there, and that's it. There is no come-back, and there is not even any searching. The educator, generally, produces answers without having been asked anything! (Freire & Faundez, 1989, p. 35) There are so few questions. By allowing students to question, dialogue will begin. As well, anyone who knows the typical three year old would know that asking the simple question, "Why?" is the most natural thing in the world. Schools should not be party to stunting a student's need to ask questions. 3.6 Justifying A Moral Education It has been argued that there is a "paradox of moral education in democratic societies" (MacNiven, 1988, p. 286). In essence, if we promote a moral education, we may end up promoting one good life above all others. In democracy, there needs to be autonomy which means there is more than one version of the good. The reason the paradox exists is that there is a fine line between indoctrination and a moral education. The way which a moral education has been distinguished from indoctrination is: moral education and moral indoctrination are not the same thinking;...moral education is consistent with the principle of freedom of thought which moral indoctrination is not;...is moral education always a form of moral indoctrination? The answer is no, because indoctrination is incompatible with any genuine form of teaching and learning. To be successful, any form of moral education must address the learning as if he/she were a moral agent (a creature who is autonomous and rational and who can make up his or her mind for himself or 54 herself and act accordingly) or a potential moral agent (a creature who will develop into a moral agent). Moral education presupposes that humans are moral agents or potential moral agents; hence, it implies respect for freedom of conscience. (MacNiven, 1988, p. 286) For a moral education to develop, a moral agent will need to understand what are moral values. Values are "principles or moral standards of a person or social group; the generally accepted or personally held judgment of what is valuable and important in life" (OED, 1993). Morals are "of or pertaining to human character or behaviour considered as good or bad; of or pertaining to the distinction between right or wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings.the rules of right conduct" (OED, 1993). It is important that the words "morals" and "values" are not interchanged and to realize that not all values are moral ones. Morals deal with right and wrong; values deal with what a person or a society has accepted as worthwhile. Moral values are only a small part of what constitutes the category called values. For instance, there are aesthetic values as well. Moral concepts become values only once they have been accepted by a person or the greater society as worthwhile: the moral concept is valued. For example, sobriety is morally right in Islamic countries and is valued, whereas it is neither a moral nor a value in Western countries. Those practising Islam in Western countries, however, still hold this as a religious value. The moral concept of autonomy must be recognised not simply as a general value, but as a moral one: Consider the following list of moral concepts: "honor," "redemption," "autonomy," "sacrifice," "character," "justice," "authenticity," "utility." These are concepts that have their linguistic homes in different moral outlooks. They are rich resources for characterizing moral phenomena. When we reduce them all to so many "values," we impoverish moral speech. We are then only able to say that children should have values and to hope they will have good ones. But we cannot talk about them in any sophisticated way. When educators learn to talk the language of values, they make themselves morally deaf. A language for the description of moral phenomena in which the main noun is "value" is about as useful for ethics as a language in which the only noun was "stuff would be for physics. (Strike, 1993, p. 180) If we accept that Liberal Democracy is possible, it is essential that the "moral concept" of autonomy becomes a value and is recognised as a value which is also a moral value. Accepting 55 and distinguishing autonomy as a moral value forms only part of any moral education; it is also important to recognise what are considered democratic values as well for a political education. 3.7 Political Education: Fostering Participation The second half of educating in an LPD is a political education. This means in part to teach a curriculum in a way that allows for participation. "A political education that meets the challenge will teach the young virtues and abilities they need in order to participate competently in reciprocity-governed political dialogue and to abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as citizens" (Callan, 1997, p. 28). I take reciprocity-governed political dialogue to be the ability to talk back and forth between the government and its citizens. Fortunately, critical thinking and competent discussion through dialogue are also important in a political education which I will show below. Also important to a political education is the fostering of democratic values. I would like to return now to the idea of values and its role in educating in an LPD and to the question of specifically democratic values. Strike (1991) states that "because claims about justice are moral claims and, presumably, a subset of value claims, liberalism is not neutral about all values. Liberal discourse on this topic assumes a distinction between notions about right conduct...and notions about the nature of good lives, and insists on governmental neutrality about only the latter" (p. 432). Although this quotation emphasises the role of government in where it should and should not be neutral, the role of schools in neutrality is no different; therefore, schools do have a stake in promoting "good conduct" by fostering certain types values as long as they do not interfere with the formation of autonomy. I have already discussed the importance of moral values in a social education. There are also democratic values in a political education to consider. To provide for Strike's moral precepts, to allow students to critically think, and to discuss issues, certain democratic values need to be fostered as well. Patricia White (1996) explored democratic values which she felt are necessary for any education: 56 It lies in developing social confidence in those very values that are disruptive of stable hierarchy, those values that cause one to question the justifiability of compelling some to serve the interests of others. It lies in developing social confidence in the importance of a concern for the value of each person combined with a reflectiveness about social matters that, directed at hierarchies of power, leads to the unmasking of their attempts to compel assent to social arrangements. Democratic societies frame their social arrangements in the light of these values, and they need to feel a robust confidence in them as the values definitive of democracy. (White, 1996, p. 13) The democratic values she seeks are not ones that cause a particular view of a good life to take precedence over others. The values which White feels are important for democracy, and I will say for an LPD, are: hope, confidence, courage, self-respect, self-esteem, friendship, honesty, and decency. These democratic values are critical in enabling students to respect others and to point out unjust social arrangements. These democratic values are all possible dispositions in that they reflect ways of "dealing with others" (OED 1993) which promotes participation and understanding. They are important values in creating a fair environment for the classroom. In fact, it is necessary for critical thinking as well. "Developing a supportive community where inquiry is valued and expected may be the most important factor in nurturing critical thinking" (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 19). Is it possible for the shy child to break out of her shell without confidence being valued? How is her view of the good life altered if she has been bullied by others who do not understand the value of friendship and decency? These values, coupled with Strike's "moral precepts" are powerful tools to allow critical thinking and competent dialogue through discussion in the classroom. To participate, one must be able to communicate effectively. This means having the ability to discuss issues properly. Dialogical competence is the ability to talk about, reason about, and experience appropriate phenomena via a certain set of concepts. When students achieve dialogical competence in ethical discourse, what they are doing is learning to do what they already know how to do, but learning to do it in a more sophisticated and conscious way. This learning involves the ability to see the world in a certain way as well as the ability to talk about it in a certain way. (Strike, 1993, p. 105) The set of concepts Strike (1993) describes are the ability to move from "strategic language...concerned with means to realize assumed ends" and "Ethical language [which] is concerned with the appraisal of ends or with decision about whether a particular course of 57 action is right" (p. 104). Students will then see the world differently; for, if they can "conceptualize a problem in a new way, [they] are able to see it in a new way" (p. 104). Finally, students will be able to talk about the world in a certain way as "the process of discussion, when things go well, involves a move from what students intuitively know or feel to more articulate and explicit formulation of their intuitive knowledge" (p. 104). Dialogue is how to foster the political education in an LPD. To think critically about issues, to understand one's viewpoint and that of others and to participate in discussion can happen at any level. The ability to participate in such a manner prepares a person to participate in political decision-making-if this ever becomes necessary or an autonomous decision. Critical thinking and competent dialogue complement and feed off the other. To be able to critically think about something is only half of the picture in both moral education and in educating in an LPD. It is clear that competence in dialogue and discussion is the second half. Critical thinking must not be done only inside one's head or on paper. Competent dialogue and discussion are essential to test what one has critically thought about. Conveying the outcome of what one has critically thought is an important tool in thorough critical thinking. "Public discussion serves as the crucial testing ground for argument-revealing weaknesses and illogicalities in one policy after another until such time as there emerges a proposal which seems to withstand critical onslaught and survive the tests of evidence" (Bridges 1975, p. 85). After a student has critically thought through a problem, it seems odd that only the teacher will benefit by reading an essay. Discussion will widen the audience. Critical thinking and competent dialogue through discussion aide in both the political education and the social education for an LPD. 3.8 Conclusion The combination of all four of these functions, as a Necessity of Life, as a Social Function, as Direction, and as Growth, can be combined to promote the great sphere. By moving through the great sphere, a child may attain autonomy. A deferential or ethically servile child is produced by despotic parents. It is perhaps important to note that while a deferential child is actively moulded by a parent, an ethically servile one is consciously not, Those who instil that 58 attitude may themselves often be examples of the Ethically Servile Child...Nothing in the vice of ethical servility prevents one from graduating to the role of Despotic Parent without transcending the vice that one's own Despotic Parent inculcated during childhood" (Callan, 1997, p. 154). Because of this, the great sphere is very important. A parent's right is not infringed upon by allowing the great sphere to be a form of schooling as the "right to veto the great sphere could not belong in the scope of parents' rights, since children would be morally entitled to such schooling by virtue of its vital role in the development of their autonomy" (Callan, 1997, p. 149). The type of schooling which the Great Sphere allows is both social and political. Both of these forms of education rely on critical thinking and discussion through competent dialogue. Moral and democratic values need to also be promoted. A child must be able to use all these tools effectively in order for schools to educate in an LPD. Critical thinking and competent dialogue will allow a child to reflect and argue in order to maintain that his interests and aims are responsible. The school's structure needs to support such an education. 59 CHAPTER 4. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN SCHOOLS This chapter is intended to complement the previous one. The previous chapter, the role of schools in a democratic society, attempted to lay out what is, and what ought to be, the functions of schools in a democracy. The question that now must be asked is, "What structures in schools need to be more democratic to allow for critical thinking, competent dialogue and the possibility of the great sphere"? The structures which I will focus on are authority and paternalism and how the teacher learns to teach. Some argue that one cannot create "democracy" by trying to teach how one can be "democratic." The problem the critics see is that the relation between schools and democracy may not be as straightforward as one may be led to believe: although modern theorists have sometimes proposed that a "democratic personality" is either necessary to, or is produced by, democratic institutions, attempts to define the distinctive qualities of a democratic personality and to verify its relation to democratic regimes or practices have not met with much success. (Dahl, 1989, p. 92) Is it even possible that one can educate today's children to become tomorrow's democratic citizens? To those who cannot see past a CRD, the answer is, "No" because it is impossible to conceive the world any differently than it is now: hegemony acts to "saturate" our very consciousness, so that the educational, economic and social world we see and interact with, and the commonsense interpretations we put on it, becomes the world tout court, the only world...hegemony refers to an organized assemblage of meaning and practices, the central effective and dominant system of meanings, values and actions which are lived. (Apple, 1990, p. 5) In other words, anything else would simply be "far too radically democratic for many" (Bridges, 1979, p. 125). However, for those who believe that an LPD is possible, the answer is, "Yes." We must do away with a reactive, static environment which asks students to regurgitate, without thinking, from a prescribed curriculum. Accepting the status quo only caters to the CRD. Since those in authority bring to students what is accepted, this must be the first structure which needs to be explored. 60 4.1 Paternalism and Authority The first chapter described the life of an adult under different forms of democracy. The lives of children are quite different under each form. Children are not accorded the same rights as adults. Children live under a form of dictatorship-one that is hopefully benevolent-called paternalism. The question which needs to be asked is, "Where is paternalism justified, if at all"? Paternalism, in its most expansive definition, is used on those who are deemed not to know their own interests and who must be told what is in their best interest. To reiterate the difference between paternalism and despotic parents, despotic parents never want their children to have a choice, paternalism is when those in authority want to protect children from what is not in their best interest. For example, I recall that when I was in elementary school, students were not allowed off the school property during the lunch break without a note from their parents. After witnessing a child rush off the school grounds during lunch hour, run between two parked cars, and getting hit by another car, I could understand why. To be justified, paternalism "must not only have been in the interests of the coerced but that the paternalist must respect the persons who were coerced as individuals with purposes of their own and as equals in importance if not in knowledge or experience" (Chamberlin, 1989, p. 74). Do all forms of paternalism run contrary to democracy? The answer to this question depends on the model of democracy involved. The CRD is much more accepting of non-justified paternalism than the LPD. This is because there are very strong authority figures in the capitalist and the representative models. In the capitalist model, there is the employer over the labourer. In the representative model, authority exists for those who rule over those who are ruled. Although Representative Democracy and Capitalist Democracy are not the only forms of democracy, they are perpetuated in order to create stability, "Certain conditions are necessary if the [current] democratic system is to remain stable" (Pateman, 1970, p. 14). Schools mimic this authority as students are heavily directed by the curriculum and their teachers in order to get jobs, "When a boy is asked what he wants to be, he is really being asked which already existing social role he wishes to adopt as an adult" (Wolff, 1976, p. 74). Currently, there are authority figures in both the adult and the child's life. Children in schools, according to Pateman 61 (1970) are educated in such a way "to account for existing facts of political behaviours and attitudes, and, at the same time, not endanger existing democratic systems by giving rise to unrealistic, and potentially disruptive, expectations" (p. 11). An adult's life in the LPD ought to be devoid of any paternalism because of autonomy in the liberal model, and the notion of participation in the decision-making process in the participatory model. The authority figures in an LPD are not as prominent because individuals are supposed to be able to develop autonomy in the private sphere. The public sphere, where the government exists, should include participation with its citizens. Is paternalism justified anywhere in an LPD? Can Paternalism be justified in these democratic models? The critics of Paternalism couch their fears in the following manner: In paternalism, the judgment of someone else as to what is in my interests has priority over mine, and because her judgment is very likely to be worse than mine, the act of compulsion is almost certain to do more harm than good...People are the best judges of their own interests not because (or not only because) they are especially good at it, but because the competition is so awful. (Callan, 1988, p. 107) Callan's belief seems to be that no one else can best judge what is in an individual's interest other than that individual. This should definitely be true for an adult in an LPD; however, it is not clear if this is true for the very young. A stronger form of paternalism in education is justified for very young children in an LPD because it may, in the end, protect them from catastrophic choices that may affect them later in life. Simple examples of this is telling children not to run between two parked cars. Compulsory education is also important, for it may develop a child's interest in a subject, or it may give the students the tools she needs to develop her interest. It will also introduce a child to other viewpoints and make her responsible when becoming interested in something. "Paternalistic compulsion is justified rf it renders the compelled individual more autonomous or maximizes her liberty" (Callan, 1988, p. 111). The older a child gets, however, the less important paternalism should be. There must be some faith that as the student gets closer to graduating from secondary school they have also become more responsible. Students should be allowed more flexibility in making responsible autonomous decisions based on what are her interests and aims for movement through the great sphere. 62 If paternalism exists, there must be some inherent authority over education. Gutmann (1987) delves deeply into authority and schools. She describes three models: the family state, the state of families and the state of individuals. The family state gives the authority of education to the state, "The purpose of education in the family state is to cultivate that unity by teaching all educable children what the (sole) good life is for them and by inculcating in them a desire to pursue the good life above all inferior ones" (p. 23). Gutmann rejects the family state because it "attempts to constrain our choices among ways of life and educational purposes in a way that is incompatible with our identity as parents and citizens" (p. 28). This goes against the notion of growth and the ability to become truly autonomous as "the state's educational role cannot be defined as realizing the good life, objectively defined, for each of its citizens" (p. 28). The state of families simply gives the authority to educate to the parents, "Theorists of the state of families typically justify placing educational authority in the hands of parents" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 28). This too is rejected as "the strongest argument against the state of families is that neither parents nor a centralized state have a right to exclusive authority over the education of children...the educational authority of parents and polities has to be partial to be justified" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 30). This takes away from the social function which Dewey describes as children will not be socialised into anything but into the habits and cultures of their family. If parents have complete control of their child's education, then there will be no "special environment" where a child can experience other viewpoints. The state of individuals is an attempt to bridge the two previous authorities, "The state of individuals thus responds to the weakness of both the family state and the state of families by championing the dual goals of opportunity for choice and neutrality among conceptions of the good life" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 34). This sounds promising. Nevertheless, this too is rejected, since, The problem in using education to bias children towards some conceptions of the good life and away from others stems not from pretense on the part of educators to moral superiority over children but from an assertion on their part to political authority over other citizens who reject their conception of virtue. Neutrality is no more acceptable a solution to this problem than the use of education to inculcate a nonneutral set of virtues. (Gutmann, 1987, p. 36) 63 Gutmann accurately states that neutrality in teaching exists only for those students and teachers whose viewpoints coincide. Neutrality should be further explored as there are many arguments for and against the idea of neutral teachers. An arguments for neutrality is as follows: The teacher [is renounced] as an 'expert' capable of solving by authority all issues about values that arise in discussion because he ought to see his authority in terms of commitment to rationality and the application of impartial criteria. His authority ought to be based on a procedural impartiality. Procedural neutrality is entailed by procedural impartiality in publicly controversial areas. Impartiality is the criterion which guides the way he handles his own. Procedural neutrality expresses a teacher's commitment not to use his authority to promote judgments which go beyond impartial criteria of rationality...any teacher committed to rationality and democratic values could not, without contradicting himself, attempt to use his authority to promote his particular commitment when others can make alternative commitments on equally relevant grounds. He is obliged to respect the rights of colleagues, parents and students to disagree with him. The carrying out of such an obligation in relation to the rights of others is expressed in the use of the idea of neutrality as a criterion of teaching in publicly controversial areas. (Elliott, 1975, p. 110) To illustrate his point, Elliott uses Nazism in W.W.II. He writes: Let us suppose the boy...had a teacher who used his authority to promote his belief that the pacifist attitude was the only morally valid one to adopt in response to the threat of Nazi Germany. Such a position could not necessarily be conclusively defended by resort to impartial criteria. If he was impartial he would have to admit that alternative judgments could be made on equally relevant grounds. The educationally defensible position for him to adopt is to allow the principle of impartiality to demarcate the parameter of his authority. He certainly has a duty to get his students to test the relevance of their reasons by submitting them to criteria of relevance. But he has no rational grounds for using his authority to promote judgements about situations and acts which go beyond these criteria and involve individual judgement. (Elliott, 1975, p. 110) Let us take his W.W.II example a step further to illustrate why neutrality is sometimes detrimental. If the example was instead the Holocaust, and the teacher had the view that killing Jews is wrong is it possible for the teacher to remain neutral if a student hands in a paper which used supposed facts at the time revealing Aryan superiority? There are four reasons why the answer is "No." The first is that Dewey, when describing social function explicitly writes that it is selective and is important in "weeding out what is undesirable" (Dewey, 1966, p. 20). The viewpoint of the Holocaust is undesirable. Would it be an "educationally defensible position" for a teacher to be neutral in such a case? The second reason is that a teacher has a responsibility to make sure that members of her class are not harmed. In the case of the 64 Holocaust, that means Jews, Gypsies and Homosexuals. Third, those who promoted the Holocaust were hardly neutral. The propaganda which was used was very clever in manipulating people's viewpoints. This carries through to the present where students are exposed to many views which are not neutral. Businesses make it a point to hire marketers to sway the public's view to buy their products. The neutral stance on the part of the teacher plays into a CRD. This is because there is no counter-balance to oppose the view that students see on the TV. The fourth and final reason is that if viewpoints, which are the antithesis of democracy, are allowed to take hold, one wonders how long democracy would have to survive. The best form of authority, according to Gutmann, settles on the idea of a democratic state of education. The democratic state of education: recognizes that educational authority must be shared among parents, citizens, and professional educators even though such sharing does not guarantee that power will be wedded to knowledge, that parents can successfully pass their prejudices on to their children, or that education will be neutral among competing conceptions of the good life...A democratic state is committed to allocating educational authority in such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to participating in democratic politics, to choosing among (a limited range of) good lives, and to sharing in the several sub-communities, such as families, that impart identity to the lives of its citizens. (Gutmann, 1987, p. 42) This form of authority most accurately describes the LPD. Authority is shared by many so that many visions of the good life are possible within reason. By sharing the authority, participation will also result. Unfortunately, the only part that is missing in Gutmann's shared authority is students in senior grades. As stated before, students in the higher grades need to have some authority in their education. In the democratic state of education, authority is not hidden with the notion of "neutrality." Paternalism already exists in the form of compulsory education. Paternalism is realised because there is an authority. The role of democracy in schools is essential in deciding how the authority is manifested. As a child goes through her school years, the less oppressive the authority, the more possibility of promoting the great sphere. This will then lead a path towards becoming an autonomous and participating individual as an adult. 65 Probably the greatest authority that a student has within the schools structure is her teacher's. In the end, it is the relationship between the teacher and the student that must be investigated. For teachers to teach "good habits" essential for autonomy and participation, the teacher must not only teach critical thinking and competent dialogue, but model it herself. "Teachers who model critical thinking practices are more likely to foster the desired intellectual resources in their students" (Bailin, Coombs, Case & Daniels, 1993, p. 19). This mean that the teacher must have these "good habits" before she enters the classroom to teach. 4.2 Educators for an LPD To foster schooling in the great sphere, both a moral education and a political education must exist in schools. Both a moral and political education are possible in the hidden and prescribed curricula. Both the hidden and prescribed curricula need to be revised in order to adapt to critical thinking and competent discussion. Currently, the prescribed curriculum does not lend itself to direct moral or political education. There are perhaps only a few subjects, namely English and social studies, where critical thinking and discussion through competent dialogue can be taught directly. This is largely due to the fact that the government mandates what must be taught. When we allow the government, or anyone else, to fix the curriculum without teacher participation, three problems occur. The first is that teachers are forced to teach certain concepts. These topics may or may not be of interest to students-or the teacher. If something does spark the interest of the class, the teacher may be forced to deal with it quickly because of time constraints. The second problem is that the fixed curriculum in no way prepares teachers to deal with the hidden curriculum: a teacher is supposed to teach the right things, the right way, to the right people, at the right time, against the backdrop of the complexity and ongoing quality of ethics and developmental psychology, the disagreements and dissimilar expectations among parents as to what is to be taught, the variety of religious background and expectations among the students, and the packages of materials provided by the various governments and curriculum designers. (Carter, 1988, p. 296) 66 The third problem is a combination of the previous two. When the curriculum is fixed, teachers learn a methodology which neglects the importance of the moral and political education contained within the hidden curriculum. If teachers are in large part political agents, if teaching is at heart a moral and political endeavor and only secondarily a matter of technique or segment matter or teaching to the test, then there are significant implications for how teachers need to be prepared. Teacher preparation programs limited to the acquisition of an undergraduate major followed by an add-on program of various methods classes combined with a student teaching experience are clearly inadequate and wrong. Teacher preparation programs must be grounded in something more than pedagogy or tricks of the trade. (Soder, 1996, p. 247) Is it enough to simply know one's subject area? Is it enough to complete a program and know how to "manage" a class? One hopes that teachers do not carry the belief that teaching is merely to teach concepts as facts: There are some sorts of teaching situations in which the question of the pupil's deciding something for themselves does not really arise...Let us suppose, for example, that I am trying to teach someone to do something...If I am trying to teach you... to drive a car of play the French horn, there may be a good deal of theory involved. But nonetheless my aim in teaching is to get you to do something. And when you can do it reasonably efficiently, then you can perfect your technique by practice, rejecting some of my teaching if you find it better to do so...A great deal of what one teaches at school is in fact of this kind...Reading and writing are indeed often spoken of as "skill" and it is acknowledged that in teaching them we are teaching children how to do something, but a great deal of mathematics must also be learned as a matter of skill or technique; and in the case of language, the aim is also to teach people how to talk, write, or translate. (Warnock, 1988, p. 178) Driving a car is filled with situations which a person cannot be explicitly taught. Teaching elementary mathematics is filled with possible critical challenges. One example is trying to adequately explain zero. For teaching facts to change, the prescribed curriculum which is government driven should be questioned by teachers. Teachers who have not been hand-picked by those in power need to take part in the decision-making process of a curriculum. By allowing any teacher to be a part of the decision-making process, the process has become more participatory. This may allow a change in the curriculum that would see subjects other than English and social studies including both critical thinking and competent dialogue. The hidden curriculum is probably a more rich forum to promote the great sphere: There are several different ways teachers serve as both moral agents and moral educators. They can be quite directive, teaching morality outright-a form 67 of instruction often called didactic instruction. When it becomes heavy handed or highly ideological, it is often considered indoctrination. Rather than specific instruction in morality, teachers can teach about morality, as might be the case in courses on world religions, philosophy, civics, or sex education. A third way to undertake moral education is to act morally, holding oneself up as a possible model-at first a model to be imitated, later a model that will be influential in guiding the conduct of one's students. (Fenstermacher, 1990, p. 134) Since neither of the first two ways applies, only the third one is viable. As this is not part of the prescribed curriculum, it is part of the hidden curriculum. The most important link to a political education and a moral education is how the teacher teaches the hidden curriculum. To foster participation in the great sphere, teachers should not be taught critical thinking and competent discussion through dialogue as a simple technique that will come in handy when teaching a certain unit. A teacher should already have these abilities-even if the teacher has never called them "critical thinking" or "discussion through competent dialogue." Soder (1996) points out that "teachers spend some 75 percent of their higher education time taking courses in the departments of the arts and sciences" (p. 247). Two questions follow from this fact. The first is, "Can a person become qualified after one year of teacher training to teach a subject because she has learned a subject"? The second question is, "Have the university subjects been taught in a critical manner which allows for discussion"? I believe that, for the most part, the answer to both of these questions is, "No." First, the fact that teachers may have become experts in certain fields does not make them teachers. "We may too easily lose sight of the fact that teaching is defined not by the technical skills of its practitioners but by the educative intentions and moral purpose with which they undertake their work" (Fenstermacher, 1990, p. 139). Teachers also need a moral education. They too must transcend their "primary moral speech" to be able to get to a "hermeneutical speech." If they do not do this, is it possible for them to recognise moral language? Transcending one's "primary moral speech" may take time; however, it is important for fostering the autonomy and participation needed for an LPD. So much is expected of teachers who may never have taken courses in philosophy, ethics, or religion, yet find in teachers' college that almost no time is spent examining the strengths and weaknesses of the alternative positions, clarifying concepts, and making evident the main hopes and aims of moral education of whatever sort. Rather, time is spent looking at the "materials" and 68 trying to find ways of making the transmission of such materials exciting, engrossing, and (apparently) relevant. (Carter, 1988, p. 296) The teacher must make an effort to make the hidden curriculum unhidden and allow "the teacher as moral educator...conscious of his or her manner, expanding and acting critically on it, striving whenever and wherever possible to be a more moral person and a better moral educator. Teachers' manners as moral persons are as vital to their work as teachers as their mastery of the subjects they teach and their skill as instructors in the classroom" (Fenstermacher, 1990, p. 136). There must not be "an unwillingness to argue that there are after all certain texts, certain fundamental notions that all teachers must have as part of their basic working knowledge if they are to fulfill their responsibilities as teachers in democracy" (Soder, 1996, p. 260). What is important to educating secondary school students in an LPD should also be important to educating school teachers. This means that the subjects taught in post secondary institutions should also provide opportunity for critical thinking and competent discussion. This is not true for just those who may become teachers but for all students in such institutions. Teachers are an important part of fostering an LPD. Without their efforts, it is impossible to foster an LPD in schools. 4.3 Conclusion Authority in schools and how educators are taught to teach play important roles in the ability for schools to foster the great sphere. The more democratic the structures of authority are, and the greater the ability for teachers to truly have the ability to critical think and competently discuss issues, the greater the chance that the great sphere will be fostered in schools. If those in authority are only the parents or only the state, then only certain viewpoints will be advanced. It is not correct to completely neutralise these two authorities either. The only legitimate authority is one which is democratic. A democratic authority will include the state, educators and parents. Although Gutmann does not originally include students into her framework I believe that students in the senior grades of secondary school are capable of taking on some authority as well. 69 When teachers are taught to educate for an LPD, they too must have the ability to critically think and competently discuss issues. They must be able to distinguish between a student's primary moral language, and hermeneutical language. Teachers must be willing to hear these forms of languages in both the prescribed and hidden curriculum. This, therefore, needs to be part of any teacher-training program. Teachers are the main link between a child and the possibly of moving along the great sphere. Teachers must be willing to accept this fact, otherwise autonomy and participation will be jeopardised. If autonomy and participation are jeopardised, then so to will the possibility of an LPD. 70 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION In this thesis, I have attempted to answer seven questions. The first two questions, "What models of democracy are there?" and "Are there forms of democracy which are more democratic than others?" were answered in the second chapter. I explored the relationship between political forms of democracy and social forms of democracy. The social forms were the Capitalist and Liberal Democracies and the political forms were the Representative and Participatory Democracies. What I found is that the Liberal and Participatory forms are the more democratic forms because they more adequately hold the criteria of "the closer the approximation to political equality, equality of power in the determination of the final outcomes, the higher the degree of democracy" (Hyland, 1995, p. 54). The Liberal and Participatory forms of democracy manage this by allowing autonomy in the private sphere, which contain the criteria of interest, aim and responsibility, and allowing participation in the public sphere. Allowing personal autonomy yields more political equality than being an isolated consumer in the Capitalist Democracy because autonomous people are also responsible people and can form groups. Isolated people cannot. Participation allows for more equality in the determination of the final outcomes than merely voting in the Representative Democracy. Although I was able to compare more democratic forms from less, I by no means included all possible forms and critiques of democracy. The reason for this is because I also needed to deal with the relationship between democracy and schools. It would have been difficult to include all critiques. For my purpose, my hope was that by building Liberal Democracy on a definition of autonomy which included developing one's interest, allowing one to aim to achieve one's interest and being responsible in doing so, I made it as inclusive as I could. I do believe, however, that future study in the importance of feminist critique to Liberal Democracy would improve the argument by yielding yet more inclusive and democratic models. The second half of my paper attempted to answer the main question, "What is the relationship between schools and democracy"? In the third chapter, I focused on the question "What are the roles of schools in a democracy"? In answering this question, I explored Dewey's 71 functions of necessity of life, social function, direction, and growth which I then collectively called the great sphere. The great sphere is realised in schools by teaching critical thinking and methods of competent dialogue. This does not come without controversy because parents may feel threatened by the great sphere. Parents need to remember that it is not within their rights to circumvent the ability of their children from having a full life to one where their children are ethically servile or deferential. The great sphere and the tools of critical thinking and competent dialogue are vital for a child not to be ethically servile or deferential. Critical thinking and competent dialogue allow for students to challenge their own viewpoints or simply reaffirm them. Both critical thinking and dialogue also attempt to bridge the gap between students with opposing views by giving all students the tools to speak and think. Of course, this is impossible without teaching the importance of certain moral precepts such as moral values and democratic values. These must also be included, otherwise students will not be able to hear each other or some will simply be too afraid to participate in any discussion. A social education attempts to foster the ability of a child to become autonomous. A political education attempts to foster the ability of a child to participate. In my fourth chapter, I answered the last two question, "Is it possible to nurture components of the more democratic models in schools?" and "How can this be done"? The components which need to be nurtured are autonomy and participation. This can be done by looking at who makes up the authority of schools, what is taught in the prescribed and hidden curricula and finally what teachers have been taught to make sure that they too are critical thinkers who can discuss competently. Authority needs to be democratic. This means that it should be as inclusive as possible to include the state, parents, educators and even senior students in secondary school. Teachers should always be allowed to participate in writing the curriculum. Teachers should also ensure that critical thinking and competent dialogue become integral parts of the courses they teach-not by having discrete topics such as "critical thinking and statistics", but by subsuming these elements into the course. 72 Teachers, as the direct link between students and the great sphere, must also be wary of what occurs in the hidden curriculum. Teachers must always be ready to recognise moral speech, and whether it is primary or hermeneutical. For teachers to have the ability of recognising a student's speech, the must be adequately taught to recognise their own primary and hermeneutical speech. There is a very strong relationship between democracy and schools. This needs to be recognised by everyone: the state, parents, educators and students. If we do not realise the importance of democracy, we forget the legacy of many historical figures who forged the path towards a democracy which included autonomy and participation. 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