Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

A psychodynamics of value: developmental, multicultural, and psychotherapeutic implications Neuhasler, Angela E.F. 1993

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-ubc_1993_spring_neuhasler_angela.pdf [ 5.54MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0054080.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0054080-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0054080-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0054080-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0054080-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0054080-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0054080-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0054080-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0054080.ris

Full Text

A PSYCHODYNAMICS OF VALUE:DEVELOPMENTAL, MULTICULTURAL, AND PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONSbyANGELA E.F. NEUHAUSLERB.A., SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, 1986A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinFACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Counselling Psychology)We accept this thesis as conformingTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember, 1992©^Angela E.F. Neuhausler, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature Department ofThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate ,2'3 DE-6 (2/88)iiABSTRACTThis thesis presents a developmental and psychodynamic modelof value that attempts to identify generic elements which areviewed as essentially transcultural. The central concept is thatthe self has the innate tendency to assign a value to itsinteraction with objects relative to their need-fulfillingfunction. That is, the self is first aware of the value of anobject to itself; and secondarily becomes aware of the object inand of itself. This model rests on the assumption that the needfor self-cohesion is fundamental and that the cathection of valuecan largely be seen as a function of meeting this need;particularly in early developmental stages. However, the valueattached to objects may vary and this model distinguishes threegeneric forms of such value relativization: a) Developmental; b)Situational; and, c) Systemic-Institutionalized. This studydiscusses in detail how such relativization of value at allstages of development results in the experience of ambivalenttensions that can potentially threaten the sense of self-cohesion. It is suggested that this condition motivates thedevelopment of intrapsychic structure in three fundamentaldirections: a) The differentiation of ego functions; b) Thedevelopment of superego structure; and, c) Defensive splitting ofself and objects. The latter will tend to be emphasized wherethe self feels overwhelmed at the task of integrating a new andmore complex awareness of the relativized objects of value. Thismodel is presented within a developmental framework whichiiiincludes: a) The Preoedipal Stage; b) The Oedipal Stage; c) TheAdolescent Stage; and, d) The Adult Stage.^Finally, this studyspecifically considers the cross-cultural context as particularlyrelevant because it is in this context, this thesis maintains,that the psychodynamics of value are often most graphicallyobserved.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT PageiiivTABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ^  vCHAPTER ONE^Introduction ^  1Origins of the Study  1Objective of the Study  6Significance of the Study  10CHAPTER TWO^Literature Review ^  14Overview  14Psychoanalytic and Object Relations Theories ^ 15Intrapsychic Structures  16The Id ^  16The Ego and the Experiencing Self ^ 17The Superego and the Ego Ideal  20Developmental Object-relations Model of the self 22Development of the Superego and Ego Ideal ^ 27The Familial Context ^  36The Crosscultural Context  41The Cultural Unconscious ^  41Individualism and Collectivism ^ 46Cultural Dislocation Experience  55Crosscultural Models of Development ^ 57Conclusion ^  62CHAPTER THREE^A Model for the Psychodynamics of Value^64The development of Values and Standards in the Self ^ 65The Preoedipal Stage of Development ^ 66The Developmental Dynamic  80The Psychodynamic Model of Value  83The Oedipal Stage of Development  85Superego Splitting and Developmental Time ^ 97The Adolescent Stage of Development ^ 98The Adult Stage of Development  117Conclusion ^  133CHAPTER FOURREFERENCESAreas of Application and Implications forFuture Research ^  135152VACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to express my gratitude to my thesis committeefor their invaluable suggestions and support for this project.Particulary, I want to thank Dr. Westwood for his encouragementand the many fruitful discussions that helped crystallize thepresented model.I would like to thank my husband for introducing me to thevalue of contemporary psychoanalytic theory and for our manycreative discussions. A special thanks to my children; Alissa,Aren and Gabriel for their tolerance with their busy mother. Ialso want to thank my parents for the validation they gave me asa child and their encouragement to pursue academic goals.1CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTIONORIGINS OF THE STUDY This study focuses on universal valuing processes that mayshed some light on the potential compromise formations that theself engages in when struggling with choices between competingvalues and standards. Interest in this area arises out ofpersonal experiences that involved cultural dislocations where Iexperienced intense relativization of previously held values andstandards. The experience that was especially dramatic for me andmy family was our translocation from the Catholic-Hispanicculture of Mexico to Canada's westcoast in the late sixties. Thechange not only affected each one of us on an individual level,but also the entire family system shifted from being fairlyfunctional to being somewhat dysfunctional.For my father, probably one of the most painful aspects ofthe translocation was the loss of his high profile professionalrole. In Mexico, he had been a successful businessman and a wellknown musician who taught at a local University. With the moveto Canada my father lost the validation from his music fans, inaddition to being unable to resume teaching because he lacked theprofessional qualifications. For my father then, the moveresulted in his experiencing intense relativization of previouslyvalued behaviours and self-representations that could no longer2be enacted and validated in his new cultural context.For me, the move suddenly changed me from a carefree teenagerto having to function as the adult in the family that gaveemotional support and nurturance to both my parents. This rolereversal initially prevented me from focusing on my own feelings.It was only after a few months, when my parent's emotional stateimproved, that I started to get in touch with my own feelings ofisolation, sadness and confusion.When I started high school, I began to experience muchconfusion and anxiety around deciding what was appropriate socialbehaviour in my new cultural niche. I experienced greatambivalence that revolved around vacillation between two sets ofmoral codes and standards, one that was instilled in me from theMexican culture, the other from my new peer group. Suddenly, thevalues that I had held as absolutes were being challenged by thecompeting values of my new cultural context. For me, it was along and painful process before I was able to comfortablyintegrate the Hispanic-Catholic values with the new Canadianvalues and regain a sense of self-cohesion out of the feelings offragmentation and dissolution that I initially experienced withthe cultural translocation, and the subsequent relativization ofmy values and standards.Interest in the topic of values and their social-psychological dynamics also stems from my clinical encounters inworking with families who were experiencing severe parent-teenconflict. In such families a great deal of conflict revolved3around the teenager's rejection of parental values and standardsin favour of another set, usually associated with a peer group.The rejection of family tradition can of course be amanifestation of the separation-individuation process thatusually intensifies upon entering adolescence, where adoptingdifferent values from the parents serves the youth as a vehiclefor expression of differentness. Tyson (1990) makes reference tothe phenomenon of the teenager's family becoming a battlegroundof values and standards. She suggests that when the teenagerexperiences uncomfortable feelings such as guilt, anxiety, rageand shame because parental values seem irreconcilable with newlyadopted ones, the self may mobilize defense mechanisms such asdenial of introjected parental values and regression, where theself externalizes through projection, previously internalizedsuperego functions. By these processes, the teenager changes anuncomfortable internal superego conflict into an external one,which is now experienced as self-righteous defiance towards thetargets of his/or her projections, usually an authority figuresuch as parents and teachers. Tyson views this as a normaldevelopmental step that should serve as a signal to the parentsto begin delegating more of their parental authority to the childin order for the child to practice becoming more responsible.Unfortunately, a significant number of parents that I worked withtake their child's rejection of their values and standards as apersonal rejection and react by becoming more punitive andcontrolling with their children. Therapeutic interventions with4these families involved education on the developmental needs ofteenagers related to such separation-individuation processes.However, I also found it useful to increase awareness in eachmember of the role that values play, as things in themselves, inthe psychic economy of individuals and their families, as well asrelated social systems.From my clinical experience, the 'generation gap' wasespecially intense in 'cross-cultural families' where theteenager would reject 'wholesale' the traditional values of hisor her ethnic background in favour of mainstream values. Thesignificance of this phenomena is supported by Atkinson (1989)who in his developmental model of identity for minorities,discusses a stage where the individual rejects his ethnicidentity in preference for an identity based on mainstreamideals; a stage which Atkinson referred to as the "ConformityStage". Considering this issue in terms of the dynamics betweenconflicting value systems was another thread that led me topursuing this study.I also observed that crosscultural teenagers that feltstrong familial loyalty but also valued the mainstream culture,would experience a great deal of ambivalence in relation to whatthey perceived as conflicting sets of values and standards. Someof these youths dealt with the ambivalence by "acting out" bothsets of values and standards, but in different social contexts.To help explain this kind of inconsistent behaviour in relationto values and standards, I was led to consider Wurmser's (1978)5description of a defense mechanism he referred to as "superegosplitting" which he defines as:"A functional inner disparity, within the superegostructure, that leads to rapid vacillations betweenacknowledgement and acceptance of some standards and theabrupt (conscious and unconscious) denial and disregard ofthe same standards of behaviour at different times indifferent circumstances. (Wurmser, 1978)."From my clinical observations, family systems that heldtheir values and standards in an absolutist fashion and whichalso differed greatly from mainstream values, frequently hadmembers that exhibited the kind of superego splitting describedby Wurmser. This was especially true for teenagers, but I alsoobserved similar superego splitting in some of the parents,especially where one spouse had acculturated to a greater extentthen the other spouse, to the mainstream values. These cross-cultural parents, like their children, seemed to feel 'caught'between the two cultures.I also observed that such family systems may also developsubgroup disjunction in relation to values and standards thatreflected a dichotomy between the family tradition versus the"outside culture". This usually involves collusion among variousmembers of the family, giving rise to subgrouping within thefamily system where each group follows a different set of valuesand standards. For example, in the traditional patriarchalfamily systems that I have encountered clinically, I frequentlyobserved the presence of secret alliances between the mother and6her children who would covertly defy the father's values andstandards in his absence. Frequently in such systems the motherassumes the role of mediator and placator, where she is in effecttrying to harmonize two sets of conflicting views of good andbad, right and wrong. I also observed in some of thesepatriarchal families, that a teenager's separation-individuationprocess which manifested as rebellion against the father'sauthority, could serve the mother as a vehicle of empowerment inher own process of separation-individuation from the patriarchy,where she begins to demand a different power distribution withinthe family system. This demand is then justified by referring tothe competing views of 'right and wrong' which have becomeapparent due to the relativization of traditional value systemsin the cross-cultural context.Questions that arose from the above observations includedthe following: a) What is the relationship between drives andneeds, and the self's valuing processes? b) How does developmentaffect the valuing processes? c) What mechanisms, processes, anddynamics are involved in value relativization?^d) How does theself deal with ambivalence towards competing values?^e) Howdoes the self react to the loss of a valued object?.Searching for answers to such questions began to lay thefoundations for the development of a psychodynamic model ofvalue.OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 7This thesis will attempt to formulate a comprehensive andintegrated psychodynamic model of value, where the focus is onuniversal mechanisms involved in the self's valuing processes.This will be done within the theoretical framework ofcontemporary psychoanalytic, object relations, and, selfpsychologies. Contemporary psychoanalytic theory was chosenbecause it offers one of the most rich and detailed set ofdevelopmental theories available, which focuses on intrapsychicphenomena. This model, like the psychoanalytic orientation, willhave the basic assumption that the self is by nature a conflictedentity that is continually being motivated by opposing drives andneeds. Therefore, the self is perceived as continually trying tofind a compromise to the opposing inner tendencies which usuallyinvolves the mobilization of defenses and/or development ofintrapsychic structure.Special attention will be given to the development of thesuperego, which is conceptualized by modern psychoanalytic theoryas a psychic system with relatively stable functions that sets upand maintains ideals, values and prohibitions (Milrod, 1990). Inparticular, this study will look at 'intrasystemic superegoconflicts' that can arise from simultaneous attraction tocompeting values that seem irreconcilable to the self; which thencan result in the implementation of defense mechanisms such assuperego splitting. It will also focus on the positive aspects ofintrasystemic conflicts due to value relativization, such asdifferentiation of ego functions and superego structure building,8that occurs with an integration of conflicting values.The proposed psychodynamic model of value will also attemptto integrate into its framework, concepts derived from selfpsychology. The reason for choosing this particular orientationis because I share their perspective that the ongoing subjectivestates of the experiencing self are in themselves, very powerfulmotivators in individual functioning (Moore and Fine, 1990). Inparticular, this thesis will rely on Kohut's notion that one ofthe most basic needs of the experiencing self is the maintenanceof a sense of "self-cohesion" or psychic continuity, and theavoidance of disintegrative-fragmentation feelings related to theloss of self-cohesion.This model will also be based on object-relations theoriesbecause I agree with their assumption that the self instinctuallyseeks social relatedness and that development takes place withinthe relational realm, where intrapsychic structures result fromthe internalization of early relationships with significantothers (Luepnitz, 1988, St. Clair, 1986). Also accepted is theview that the self attaches an affective tone to its interactionwith objects, and that self-representations covary with object-representations, based on the quality of this affective tone.A relevant construct for the proposed model will beSandler's (1989) notion that the self has the innate tendency toattach value, that is, to "value-cathect" objects relative totheir need-fulfilling functions for the self. This study willexplore the relationship between the value-cathexis of objects9and self-cohesion. It will also look at mechanisms and processesthat the self might engage in when self-cohesion is threatenedwith the loss of valued objects, or, by the relativization ofvalues that were previously regarded as absolutes. Parens (1989)suggests from research on young children that "conflicts ofambivalence" in relation to valued objects are nodal points inthe development of ego functions and superego structuring, but,may also lead to the defense mechanism of splitting.The proposed psychodynamic model of value will attempt tointegrate the above theoretical orientations within adevelopmental framework that begins with prototypical valuingexperiences at the preoedipal stage, then moves on to otherexamples of value conflicts experienced in the oedipal,adolescent and adult stages of development.This study will specifically examine the possible effects ofa crosscultural context on development, where relativization ofvalue is intensified because of the inevitable exposure tocontrasting values. I believe that crosscultural examples ofvalue conflicts serve as a 'magnifying glass' that may provideinsights into universal mechanisms and processes involved in theself's valuing processes, which may not be as readily observablein the mainstream population.This thesis will also deal with the psychodynamics of valuein group systems, such as the familial context and the culturalcontext at large, and the recursive relationships between theindividual and the collective. Specifically, it will draw10parallels between collective double standards and individualsuperego splitting, and the relational dynamics within groupsthat sustain such value contradictions in a culture. Hall (1977)refers to this process as "extension transferences", wherecultural development results in the establishment ofinstitutionalized standards that persistently conflict alonggender, age, socioeconomic, and ethnic lines.This paper will also address modern man's challenge ofincreased value relativization due to the fast-paced changeswithin our world communities. According to Gergen (1991),contemporary man finds himself in the predicament of beingsaturated with so many competing values, that it has made thetask of value assimilation and integration increasingly moredifficult. For many, the way out from this confusion isdefensive overidentification with perceived absolute values thatallow for little tolerance towards differentness.Modern man faces the incredible challenge of narrowing theconflicting differences among the various world communities sothat collectively we may have a better chance to overcomechallenges such as world pollution and nuclear disaster thatthreaten the survival of our entire ecosystem. And, with adeeper understanding of our 'value conflicts', we might be ableto focus more on our commonalities and increase understanding andtolerance for many forms of cultural variation.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 11The experience of value relativization and value conflictsis an inescapable process that we will all encounter numeroustimes in our lifespan, especially in our increasingly changingworld. Therefore, increased understanding of the psychologicaland social dynamics related to valuing processes can besignificant in helping us formulate preventative-educationalprograms that give us skills for dealing with the consequences ofcompeting value systems on different levels of human experience.Also, since the proposed model is within a developmentalframework, it may have significance in the formulation of stageappropriate childrearing practices that can facilitate resolutionof instances of developmental relativization of value. This maythen help move the child forward towards developing self-capacities that enable her or him to adapt more effectively tosubsequent situations involving competing and conflicting values.Since this model emphasizes transcultural valuing processes,it may also have significance in helping us understand valuedifferences and conflicts between ethnic groups. It canpotentially help us see beyond the values themselves, and insteadfocus us on common psychodynamics that are related to all values.And, by recognizing the commonalities in our psychodynamicexperience related to value, rather than just arguing about thecorrectness of specific values themselves, we may move a stepcloser to peaceful crosscultural encounters that are an enrichingexperience for all parties.Another potential field for application of this model is in12the clinical setting where it may serve as a source of usefulconstructs for the formulation of hypotheses that help explainmaladaptive behaviour which is intrinsically related to valuingprocesses. As clinicians, the model points to a set of questionsthat we can ask our clients related to their struggles withvalues in the different dimensions of their lives. This processcan potentially sharpen our perception of intrasystemic superegoconflicts and splits at the individual level, and valuedisjunctions in family systems or therapeutic groups. Suchawareness might help us design therapeutic interventions that atthe individual level, aid in the differentiation of ego functionsand superego structure building that will facilitate adaptivevalue integration, and at the collective level will help increasegroup cohesion.A particularly relevant area of application for a modeldealing with the psychodynamics of value would be in counsellingindividuals to come to terms with a catastrophic life event. Insuch instances established operating values are often abruptlyrelativized in terms of their continued priority given a drasticchange of personal circumstances. For example, an individualthat suddenly becomes blind, will most likely experience lossesat many different levels of functioning which may include career,hobbies or simple activities like driving. These losses will mostlikely result in the individual experiencing dramaticrelativization of previously held values because the newcircumstances may negate fulfilment of drives, needs and wishes13through the organization of values that existed prior to thecatastrophic injury. For such an individual, the counsellingprocess that is informed about the psychodynamics related to thefunctioning of value in the psychic economy as a dimension ofconcern separate from the content of values, may be able tobetter facilitate the transition from one organization offunctional values to another.In the chapter that follows an extensive literature reviewwill be discussed that presents relevant theories related to thedevelopment and functioning of values and standards in selfexperience. This literature review will be followed in chapterthree by the proposed psychodynamic model of value which will bepresented within a developmental framework. The last chapter willexpand on the significance of this study, areas of application,and future directions for research and refinement of the theory.14CHAPTER TWOLITERATURE REVIEWOVERVIEW This literature review will focus on three main areas whichfor the purposes of this thesis have relevance tounderstanding the development of and conflicts between values andstandards; on and between different levels of psycho-socialexperience. These three areas are: a) Psychoanalytic and relatedobject relations theory; b) Theories of familial functioning;and, c) Cross-cultural psychology. The review and subsequentintegration of relevant aspects of these three theoreticaldomains will lay down the foundation for a proposed model of thedynamics of conflicted self-experience in relation to values,with emphasis on the cross-cultural setting.One basic assumption of this model is that there existuniversal transcultural processes in the development andadjustment of the self to change involving values, and thatthese are usefully understood, for the purposes of this study, interms of the above mentioned theories.For example, psychoanalytic and object relations theory willbe drawn on to provide several basic mechanisms and processes,such as "value-cathexis", "separation-individuation", and "super-ego splits" among others, which will be used to understand thegeneration, experience, and course of conflicts between valuesand standards. These mechanisms and processes identified in the15psychoanalytic and object relations literature, will also be usedto understand some of the relationships between the intrapsychic,familial, and cultural levels of conflicted functioning involvingvalues.Similarly, several theories of familial functioning will bediscussed in order to describe the lived interface betweenintrapsychic and cultural levels of conflict between values andstandards. These will include theories of familial functioningwhich focus on 'inter-generational' dynamics, 'loyalty' dynamics,and 'values' conflict.Finally, a selected review of concepts and processes in thearea of cross-cultural psychology will be used to highlight thenature of conflict between differentially constructed worldviews. Contemporary thinking on the theory of 'Constructivism'itself, will be briefly mentioned in terms of how it applies tocross-cultural conflict; specifically, the inherent tensionbetween abstract cultural symbols and values, and lived self-experience.PSYCHOANALYTIC AND OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES This section will review the recognized intrapsychicstructures acknowledged by both classical and contemporarypsychoanalytic theory. As well, the developmental course ofthese structures as seen from the contemporary psychoanalyticperspective will be reviewed. This will be done with particular16emphasis on the development and functioning of the superego asthe intrapsychic locus of values and standards. In addition,special attention will be given to the literature dealing withthe adolescent stage of development because it is regarded as aperiod particularly sensitive to conflict between values andstandards.Intrapsychic StructuresFrom the classical psychoanalytic perspective, Freud'sstructural theory of the psyche conceives of three intrapsychicagencies: a) the id. b) the ego, and, c) the superego (Pine,1990). In addition to these, neo-psychoanalytic object relationstheory has added detailed consideration of d) the ego ideal, ande) the self (Settlage, 1990). The following is a description ofcontemporary psychoanalytic understanding of these fivefunctional intrapsychic structures, with comment as to theirsignificance for this study.The IdThis term designates the physiologic level of the psyche thatgives rise to the instinctual needs and action tendencies withinthe person. These instinctual tendencies function as motiveforces within the individual, which 'drive' behaviour; with orwithout our conscious acknowledgement. In psychoanalytic theory,17the function of behaviour is 'drive reduction', through theattainment of instinctual goals. Some of the physiologic basedinstinctual goals recognized by contemporary psychoanalytictheory include; feeding, attachment, sensual gratification,cognitive gratification, aggression, and procreation. The drivesof the Id are symbolically represented in the psyche as wishesand fantasies with feelings of pressured impulse towardsfulfilment. The phenomenological content of this symbolic levelof drive representation is highly influenced by cultural context(Freud, 1913; Jung, 1939; Emde, 1988; Pine, 1990).Therefore, for our purposes here, the concept of the Idpoints to generic human needs which may be transcultural, eventhough the relative meaning and differential emphasis of thesebasic needs by specific cultures may be different. Consequently,this implies a basic intervention strategy which will be drawnout in more detail in chapter three. Namely, the identificationof generic needs which may in fact be common to parties caught upin conflicts related to values and standards; but which at thelevel of everyday communication are understood and spoken of inidiosyncratic ways highlighting differences rather than thecommonalities.The Ego and the Experiencing SelfThe ego in essence is seen as controlling motility,perception, cognition, self-regulating capacities (eg. self-18esteem , anxiety levels), mobilization of defenses, andmediation between wishes, moral standards and the demands of theexternal world (Sandler,1985).Of particular importance to this study, is the ego defenseof splitting by which the experiencing self separates sets ofexperiences from the main body of experience. Kohut (1971)recognizes two different kinds of splitting, the "horizontalsplit" which involves keeping out of consciousness unacceptableideas and feelings through the defense mechanism of repressionand, the "vertical split" by which the person maintainsawareness of contradictory feelings and ideas but notsimultaneously.The ego is also considered, in classical psychoanalytictheory, as the seat of consciousness and self experience althoughmany functions are performed by processes out of awareness. Thus,two levels of description are implied in the definition of theego; an experiential level, which leads to representations ofself and objects, and, a non-experiential level, which functionsas a silent processor, synthesizer, and regulator of selfexperience (St. Clair, 1986). This distinction between the ego astotally synonymous with experienced self-identity, and the ego asa set of processing functions was established most rigorously byHartmann (1939) with his acknowledgement of 'wired-in' egoprocesses such as perception and memory. In contemporarypsychoanalytic thinking this dichotomy has developed into viewing'ego psychology' as related to but distinguishable from 'self19psychology', where the former deals with ego functions, such asreality testing; and the latter, deals with the experiencingsubject and the quality of self-experience in the here and now(Pine, 1991). These two levels of description may be seen ascombined in Erikson's term "ego identity" (1959), where egoprocesses combined with the quality of experience in culturallylabelled roles are brought together.Contemporary self psychology perceives the experiencing selfnot as a constituent of the ego, as classical psychoanalytictheory does, but as a "superordinate structure", whose ongoingsubjective states are, in themselves, powerful motivators inindividual functioning (Moore and Fine, 1990). Wolf defines theexperiencing self as a:"Self-propelling, self-directed, and self-sustaining unit,which provides a central purpose to the personality and gives asense of meaning to the person's life...activities that shape theindividual's life are all experienced as continuous in space andtime and give the person a sense of selfhood as an independentcentre of initiative and independent centre of impressions.(Wolf, 1988)."According to Kohut (1987), one of the most fundamental needsof the self is to maintain integrated functioning which carrieswith it, a felt sense of "self-cohesion" and continuity acrossspace and time, as opposed to a sense of fragmented functioningwhich can be experienced from mild disconcertedness to dread ofdisintegration. When feelings of fragmentation and/ordissolution reach unbearable levels, the self resorts to theimplementation of defense mechanisms in an attempt to re-establish a sense of self-cohesion.20A central concern of this study will be the self'ssubjective experience of conflicts between values and standardswhich can potentially threaten its sense of self-cohesion, asdefined above by self psychology. Therefore, interest in thisstudy is focused on the self-experience within any culturallylocated ego identity. One of the central tenets of this thesis isthat conflicted self-experience related to values and standardsin different social and cultural contexts, with subsequentthreats to self-cohesion, is a powerful and basic motivator ofpatterns of functioning, which this study will attempt todescribe in chapter three.The Superego and the Ego IdealThe superego is conceptualized by modern psychoanalytic theoryas a psychic system with relatively stable functions that setsup and maintains ideals, values and prohibitions (Milrod, 1990).Freud's psychology distinguished two different constituentswithin the superego: a) introjected directives, admonitions andprohibitions; and b) a collection of ideals and wished for goalswhich he named the "ego ideal".In contemporary psychoanalytic and object-relationstheories, the ego ideal is now considered as a separateintrapsychic structure distinguishable from the superego becauseideals and wished for goals have been recognized as significantmotivators of behaviour in and of themselves. However, for the21needs of this study the ego ideal will be discussed together withthe superego, while recognizing that it is a distinguishableelement of the superego structure.Although the superego is a hypothetical structure itsderivatives are readily observable in the form that ismetaphorically described as the "inner voice of conscience", thejudge within us, that can make us feel guilty and fearful when wetransgress our internalized moral guidelines. Similarly, whenthe self concept is perceived as being drastically different fromideal self-images associated with the ego ideal it leads tofeelings of inadequacy and shame with a resulting loss in self-esteem, and, related fears of being rejected and abandoned byothers. Conversely, self-judgements congruent with internalizedideal standards may lead to inner superego approval with theaccompanying feelings of pride, self-respect, and elevation ofself-esteem (Milrod, 1990).In Freud's tripartite theory of the psyche continualconflict is seen to take place between the three agencies whichare perceived as separate centres of initiative. Thus, classicalpsychoanalysis would speak of the ego being at odds with the idor the superego, as if three separate entities were competing forexpression. However, present psychoanalytic and object-relationspsychology has shifted the experience of conflicts and initiativeto within the experiencing self (Sandler, 1985).The construct of the superego is especially relevant to thisstudy because it represents the intrapsychic locus where values22and idealized images of the individual's familial and culturalcontexts become organized and embedded. Most importantly, it isrecognized by both Tyson (1990) and Wurmser (1978) for example,that the superego is rarely devoid of intrasystemic conflictwithin its own structure, since most individuals will have atsome point in their development, internalized conflicting valuesand standards. As will be discussed further in chapter three,when such 'intrasystemic superego conflict' reaches unbearablelevels for the experiencing self, that self may mobilize defensemechanisms such as superego splitting to regain a sense of self-cohesion.Developmental Object-relations Model of the SelfDevelopment of the self as understood by object-relationstheorists takes place within the context of relationships withsignificant others (Luepnitz, 1988; Pine, 1990; St.Clair 1986).One of the primary motivating factors assigned to the self is theneed for attachment. This need is perceived as being prewired inthe neonate and not dependent on association with drive reductionthrough libidinal or aggressive gratification as postulated byclassical theory (Pine, 1990). Thus, the neonate isconceptualized as an active self, that instinctually seeks socialrelatedness as an irreducible dimension of its existence.Kernberg (St.Clair, 1986) postulates that the formation ofintrapsychic structures (enduring psychological patterns) results23from the internalization of early relationships withsignificant others. He used the concept of "internalized objectrelation" to signify the mental representation that the selfmakes of its relationships. Kernberg distinguishes threeconstituents of the internalized object relation: an image of theobject (significant other), an image of the self in relation tothe object, and a 'feeling' or affect disposition linking the twoimages. He suggests that these early internalized objectrelations become integrated and gradually consolidate into theevolving structures of the id, ego and superego. Implicit in thistheory is the view that the experiencing self defines itself inrelation to others. This view is also held by Erickson (1959) whosees identity formation as taking place within the context ofrelationships.The neonate, according to developmental object-relations, isperceived as being 'constructivist' in that the internalrepresentations that it makes of objects (persons), self andevents may be distorted, reshaped, and divided by the perceiver'sunconscious operations. These internal images, bound by affect,have a determinant influence upon current and future behaviourand put their stamp on how new experiences are internalized(Pine, 1990).Many object-relations theorists believe that the neonate isinitially incapable of distinguishing self from non-self(Luepnitz, 1988; St. Clair, 1986). Thus, it is hypothesized thatthe earliest representations of the self are fused with24representations of significant others who are experienced asextensions of the self (Mahler, 1972; Kohut, 1977). For example,if a mother is perceived as loving and nurturing by the infantwho lacks the cognitive understanding that the mother is aseparate centre of initiative, it will introject the mother'srepresentation as a self-image of being nurturing and lovingitself. Conversely, if the young child perceives the mother asaggressive it will interpret it as an aspect of itself with aresulting aggressive self-image. Kohut (1977) used the term"selfobject" to refer to persons or objects that provide a"psychological function" for a self, such as soothing orrecognition; but which are not experienced as separate from theself. Persons providing such functions for a self are experiencedas extensions of the self, or again, selfobjects.Kohut (1985) also makes mention of "cultural selfobjects",that is, cultural symbols, values, institutions, idolizedpeople, that perform the psychological function of regulatingself-cohesion and self-continuity. Since the self ispsychologically fused to these cultural self-objects, a perceivedthreat to them is experienced as a direct attack on the self,leading to the expression of narcissistic rage and aggression.In current affairs, one only has to switch on the television tosee exemplified, this kind of rage between various ethnic groupswhich is still so prevalent and destructive. The concept of"cultural selfobjects" will be expanded upon in chapter three,and related to conflicted self-experience with values and25and standards in the crosscultural context.According to Kohut, differentiation of the self fromselfobjects is seen as resulting from tolerable non-traumaticfrustration levels where the selfobject falls short of, ordelays gratification of the self's needs. This process of"optimal frustration" leads the self to perceive the selfobjectsas separate and paves the way to the emergence of a "cohesiveself" that takes over the functions previously performed by theselfobjects. For example, a young child who is hungry and whosemother fails to feed it right away, might discover a way tosoothe itself by sucking its own finger. Thus, the child haslearned to take over the function of self-soothing. Conversely,if a mother overindulges the child continuously, not allowing itto feel frustration, that child will form a self-concept ofomnipotence, in which the mother is perceived as an extension ofthe self where the process of self-differentiation will behindered. This may carry into adulthood where the person willhave fluid boundaries that become enmeshed with significantothers making it difficult for that self to distinguish its ownthoughts and feelings from others.Kohut (1977) conceptualizes the emerging self of the neonateas being "bipolar". One pole is the "grandiose exhibitionisticself" that is characterized by its self-centred perspective andfrom which emanate basic strivings for recognition and power. Theother pole is the "ideal parental imago" which is formed by theneed of the young child to perceive the selfobject (primary26caretaker), which at this early phase of development isexperienced as an extension of the self, as also being allpowerful and perfect, maintaining the original feelings ofperfection and omnipotence. If the development of the selfproceeds normally, the grandiose pole of the self becomes tamedin its exhibitionism and grandiosity and becomes merged into acohesive personality that has healthy ambitions that strivetowards realistic goals. However, the need to be accepted andrecognized remains a basic need of the self. Conversely, as thematuring self begins to recognize the ideal selfobject as aseparate centre of initiative, aspects of the ideal parent imagobecome part of the superego structure providing ideals andstandards that give direction to the ambitions and goals. If theyoung child fails to receive proper care, the grandiose self andthe ideal parent imago pole can remain isolated from the rest ofthe growing intrapsychic structure and remain unaltered, or,arrested in its development; and therefore, still be strivingfor the expression of archaic needs.Kohut postulated that for the healthy development of the self,the young child needs caretakers that empathically respond tothe child's needs to instill in it a sense of efficacy and power.Also, the young child needs early selfobjects to respond to themirroring needs of the grandiose self pole. Simply put, thechild needs to experience admiration and wonderment from itsparents. The young child whose grandiosity is not mirrored bythe caregiver will lack vitality in pursuing goals. Such a child27might exhibit this by being unmotivated in exploring the worldaround it, resorting instead to combating the feelings ofdeadness by compulsive behaviours such as headbanging andmasturbation. These behaviours are commonly observed withchildren in institutions, such as orphanages, where there isimpersonal and minimal contact with a caregiver (Spitz, 1945).That same child as an adult might also indulge in compulsiveactivities, as a way of regulating the self combating feelings of'falling apart' due to a failure to form a cohesive sense ofself. This person may also be "mirror hungry", constantlyseeking attention from others to counteract their low sense ofself-esteem. They may have a strong need to find "alteregos",selfobjects that are perceived as having similar characteristics.They need such selfobjects to confirm their own reality andcontinuity of self existence.For the purposes of this study then, these developmentalobject relations theories of the self suggest that the cohesionof self experience is variable and effected by developmentalcircumstances. The focus of this study looks specifically at thedevelopment and variability of self cohesion in relation tovalues and standards.Development of the Superego and Ego IdealSandler (1989) believes that the self is innately "prewired"to attach an affective value to its object representations, and28that this emotional charge gives all objects their significanceto the ego. He also views the differential valuing of relationalexperiences as being intrinsically linked to feelings of "safetyand well-being". Thus, according to his terminology, the objectbecomes positively value-cathected when the self in relation tothe object experiences increased levels of well being. As willbe discussed in greater detail in chapter three, these "value-signs" that the self attaches to its relational experiences areintimately linked to the development of the superego structure.Tyson's (1990) model of superego development postulates thatits formation starts within the first year of life. Researchsuggests that children as young as nine months have alreadydeveloped the capacity to understand prohibitions and commands.Early superego introjects are dichotomous in nature where theprimary caretaker is internalized both in the form of'forbidding-punishing images' and as 'pleasure-giving images'.She notes that introjects may differ considerably from the actualexternal objects, since the child may exaggerate and distort theprohibiting and threatening aspects of the parents.Compliance to the early introjects is mainly motivated by thelove for the parents and the fear of punishment and abandonmentby them if the self does not adhere to their standards. If thechild experiences a basically loving and responsive caretaker itwill facilitate the child's acceptance of parental authority.However, if the reciprocity between the child and caretaker isseverely disrupted, the toddler might have difficulty accepting29the parent's limits resulting in impairment of superegodevelopment.The young child, before the age of five, still lacks acoherent, stable internal moral agency. At this early age, thechild will only feel remorse if it is caught in the act oftransgression. Freud postulated that the child has to identifywith the parents first, before the superego can function as aninternal control that is also active in the absence of theauthority (Sandler & Freud, 1985). Identification is defined as aprocess whereby the self internalizes various traits andattitudes from a selfobject into the core personality (Moore andFine, 1990). Freud thought that this process of identificationtakes place during the oedipal period of development around theage of five. During that time the incestuous wishes towards theopposite-sex parent intensify. This creates conflicting feelingsof both love and hatred for the same-sex parent. High levels ofanxiety are also present because the child fears repercussionsfor its incestuous fantasies. The ambivalent feelings andanxiety act as powerful motivators for further identificationwith the feared same-sexed parent. This process results in theintegration of the early introjects into a more consolidatedsuperego structure. The child's superego can now repressincestuous wishes from expression and feel again love for bothparents. This marks the beginning of the latency period wherechildren potentially begin to feel remorse when they betray theirmoral standards even in the absence of an external authority30(Tyson, 1990).Ideally speaking, for the child to successfully resolve theoedipal conflict the parent should empathically adapt to thechild's superego developmental needs rather then set arbitraryrules. If the standards set by the parents are too high, and thechild experiences constant failure, it will result in the childdeveloping a poor self-image. Also, the child's fear ofrejection by its parents might lead it to introject theperfectionistic standards of the parents and become overlycompliant and obsessive. As an adult, such a child might becomean overachiever but feel inadequate because the achievements willalways fall short in the face of the internalized perfectionisticstandards. Conversely, if the parents are inconsistent in theirdisciplining, and set limits or rules that they themselves do notfollow, the child will have difficulty identifying with suchparents, and thus, the establishment of inner controls will behindered. In the worst case scenario, the child might as anadult, have a psychopathic personality that seems to feel noremorse for crimes. The need for appropriate parenting increasesat critical points in the development of the self. This isespecially true when the self enters puberty (Tyson, 1990). Theonset of puberty initiates a new developmental phase for the selfwhich, according to Erikson (1959), has the task of reevaluatingearlier identifications towards forming an identity of its own,which should be consolidated by early adulthood.Bowen's theory (Gurman and Kniskern, 1991) also postulates31that the healthy teen has the natural tendency towardsdifferentiation from the parents, striving towards self-definition and self-regulation. Specific to superegodevelopment, the teenager has the task of becoming increasinglyhis own authority, and responsible for himself and his actions.Therefore, gradual detachment from parental authority and idealstandards is necessary for further superego development. Aparallel process of separation by the parents should take place,where they must now gradually give up authority over their childand allow differentiation to unfold (Tyson, 1990).Relinquishing parents as ideal selfobjects and figures ofauthority may lead the adolescent to experience intense feelingsof grief (Tyson, 1990; Sandler, 1985). To cope with the loss, theteen usually transfers attachment needs to peers who function asalteregos to help him regulate his self-esteem by mirroring hisgrandiosity. The self also looks at this time for new idealselfobjects who can function as auxiliary superegos such assports heroes, movie stars, and group leaders (Sandler, 1985).This process of differentiation from the parents can alsocreate painful feelings of guilt on the part of the teenager,since it involves rejection of some aspects of the parents. Thisis especially true of the youth who experiences the parents asbeing disapproving and resistant in accepting his emergingdifferentness. To explain these painful feelings of guilt, Nagy(1987) proposes that human beings experience a deep "filialloyalty" towards their ancestors that motivates the self to32become like its predecessors. Thus, Nagy suggests a powerfulethically felt dimension that propels us towards becoming likeour parents; that can potentially, stunt the opposing impulsetowards differentiation from them. Silverman (1982) has alsosuggested that adherence to tradition through support oftransgenerational values and beliefs is a basic intrapsychicmeans of experiencing psychological oneness or self-cohesiveness.Of central importance to this study in relation tounderstanding the development of the superego and its functioningin regard to maintaining self-cohesion, is Hartmann's (1939)seminal concept of "change of function". Hartmann introducedthis term as the means of explaining the development of"secondary autonomous functions" of the ego. That is, egofunctions that were originally born of conflict, then come tohave independent function of their own. For example, Beres(1971) describes a situation where a person may initially usethe defense of intellectualization to cope with conflicts oversexuality, which later serves as the basis for a scholarlyattitude, which has functional effectiveness independent ofmanaging sexual conflicts.The point is, the function of the original defense hasundergone a change, acquiring effect for the person independentof its first function. This study can be seen as examining thechange of function that cathexis of value undergoes, where itwill be claimed that originally it often functions to maintainself-cohesion, and then with time and experience can undergo a33change of function. This occurs where for example, cathexis ofpositive aspects of other and self early in development in orderto maintain self-cohesion, undergo a change of function overdevelopmental time, and become objects of value or systems ofvalue in and of themselves. These objects of value or systems ofvalue then become focused on more or less exclusively in terms ofcontent, as opposed to any psychological function they mightstill perform at some level for the person.This leads to the suggestion that the superego is in effectan ego function that becomes secondarily autonomous overdevelopmental time through Hartmann's process of change offunction.^The point of this study is to suggest that we areoften blinded by this change of function, to the fact that valuesthroughout development, continue to function at a some level as aprimary means of maintaining self-cohesion. That is, through thechange of function we loose sight of the primary function ofcathexis of value in the psychic economy, which is themaintenance of self-cohesion, and instead focus on the content ofvalue systems.^This study will suggest that focusing on theprimary psychological function of values as well as the contentof values, can potentially provide a basis for resolution ofconflict involving values on many levels in human life.According to Tyson (1987) reorganization of thesuperego structure during adolescence, where the task is tointegrate the parental values with the newly adopted ones,usually starts with a regressive move on the part of the self34which deals with the conflicting superego introjects bydisavowing the previously internalized values and standards ofthe parents, and, through the process of projectiveidentification, deposits those unwanted aspects of itself on toanother person. The recipients of the teenager's disavowedsuperego content are usually the parents, teachers and otherprominent authority figures. By this process, the youth changesa painful internal conflict, that creates feelings of shame,guilt and anxiety, into an external one, where he finds himselfnow in constant battle with authority figures, especially theparents, but, feels righteous in his defiance.Another way that the teenager may deal with intrasystemicsuperego conflicts, is for the youth to "act out" different setsof values and standards alternatively depending on the socialcontext. That is, the youth follows parental values andstandards within the family context and switches to a differentset of values and standards when in the presence of the peergroup. Wurmser (1978) makes reference to this phenomenon anddefines it as a "superego split" which he describes as:"A functional inner disparity, within the superegostructure, that leads to rapid vacillations betweenacknowledgement and acceptance of some standards and theabrupt (conscious and unconscious) denial and disregard ofthe same standards of behaviour at different times indifferent circumstances".Some individuals may carry on their "chameleon likebehaviour" into adulthood, continually shifting and taking on thecharacteristics of the particular group that they find themselveswith in the present moment. Erikson (1959) refers to such a35"other-directed" individual as "identity diffused".Horowitz (1987) in his theory also describes the self'scapacity to shift into distinct recurring states of being.Shifting from one state to another is accompanied by a change inself-representation, representation of the other, and patternsof processing information and affects. Shifts are triggered bycognitive and affective dissonances experienced by the self whichmobilize the defenses for dissociation into a new state.Horowitz conceptualizes the process of dissociation on acontinuum, the extreme of which would be a multiple personalitydisorder. Federn (1952) put forward a similar concept of theself's capacity to shift into different "ego states". Throughhis clinical work he found evidence that ego states of earlierdevelopmental periods remain throughout life as potentiallyrecurrent.The concept of superego splits becomes especially relevantin this study. Since I believe that crosscultural teenagers areespecially prone to these splits, examples will given from thispopulation to demonstrate the functioning on superego splitting.In chapter three, finer distinctions will be made on the kindsof superego splits that may manifest themselves with thisparticular population and possible intrapsychic, familial andsociocultural antecedents to them.If development follows along optimal lines the young adultwill have integrated to some extent, intrasystemic superegoconflicts, and in the process have developed an individualized,36flexible and stable superego structure that functionscompassionately in its guidance and judging of the self. This ofcourse, is an ideal picture since many adults end up with asuperego structure that contains conflicting ego ideals andmorals. Additionally, the self through the process of regressioncan at any point in the lifespan reactivate early parentalintrojects, moral directives and ideals.As can be seen, passage into adulthood is a tumultuousprocess for most teenagers, where conflicting impulses of theself propel it towards differentiation from parents on the onehand, and identification with them on the other hand. The socialcontext, especially the family system, is inextricably linked tothe lines of development that the process of individuation cantake. In the next section, a closer look will be given to thefamily system as a whole, and the kinds of regressiveinterlocking defenses that may be put into place by theindividual family members when they experience a threat to thecohesiveness of the family unit as a whole.THE FAMILIAL CONTEXT Present object-relations theory as applied to family therapyholds the view that to understand the dynamics of a familysystem, at least three generations of that family have to betaken into account (Nagy, 1991, Luepnitz, 1988). This is due tothe fact that families frequently tend to exhibit similar37problems to those of the previous generation. Freud (as cited byLuepnitz, 1988) observed that as adults we tend to unconsciouslyreproduce with our own children, the relationships we had withour parents; and, that with our spouses we tend to recreate therelationship our parents had with each other. Freud's term,"repetition compulsion" is applicable here. One reason we tendto repeat dysfunctional patterns is because they are familiar tous and we assume them to be universal. Additionally, theunconscious, which is irrational, believes that by recreatingearlier traumas it eventually will lead to mastery of suchpainful experiences (Luepnitz, 1988). Thus the child who growsup comforting a depressed mother as an adult might gravitatetowards marrying a similar woman because it feels familiar tohim, and second, out of the hope that this time he will besuccessful in rescuing a loved one out of a depression.Transgenerational repetition can also be the result ofidentification with the parent and as mentioned earlier, filialloyalty plays an important role in this process. Additionally,identification with a parent is more likely to occur if the youngchild perceives a parent to be powerfully aggressive orthreatening in some way. Freud referred to this process asidentification with the aggressor which is precipitated by thehigh levels of anxiety one experiences around such a person(Sandler & Freud; 1985). The classic example would be the sonwho had a father that was physically abusive with his mother andhimself, and as an adult, repeats the cycle of violence with his38own wife and children. His wife might have come from an abusivehome herself, where she was a victim which prompted her tounconsciously choose an abusive partner in an effort to masterher own childhood trauma. Thus, the interlocking needs of thecouple end up recreating scenarios in their own family systemwhich replicate those they experienced in their family of origin.Object-relations therapy believes that the less awarenessone has of one's own past and roots, the more likely one is torepeat the dysfunctional patterns and as a result, pass them onto the next generation. Therefore, one of the primary goals oftherapy is to increase awareness of any unconscious behaviourpatterns.According to Luepnitz (1988) generational transmission ofdysfunctional patterns occurs through processes involvingcollusive projective identifications by one or several members ofthe family. In this process, the family may make one singlemember the sole carrier of their disavowed affects such as angeror anxiety. Conversely, the singled out member might alsocollude with the family system by taking on that role, andbecoming the symptomatic member of the family; or the scapegoat.For example, a wife might be very angry at her distanthusband but be unable to express this directly because she wastaught in her family of origin that anger is an unacceptableemotion. This woman might then have a teenage daughter, that inthe past was used by her as a confidant to whom she expressedher unhappiness with her marriage, and that lately, has been39rebellious towards the father. The daughter's anger towards thefather then, could become the "hook" for the mother'sprojective identification, where the daughter feels consciouslyand unconsciously delegated to express the mother's repressedanger to the father, because of her loyalties to the mother.That is, the mother may be unconsciously setting up circumstancesthat lead to angry confrontations between her daughter and herhusband. The teen, through non-verbal cues of the mother, isaware of the mother's vicarious satisfaction in the daughter'sovert expression of anger towards the father, and thus,collusively and largely unconsciously is taking on the role ofenacting the mother's projective identification of covert angerthat she is unable to express to her husband. Additionally,other members of the family might collude in this arrangement anduse the same daughter for projective identifications involvingtheir own anger and frustrations.The above family is also an example of what Nagy (1991) refersto as a "transactional role reversal" where the teenage daughteris being "parentified" by the mother into the adult role of beingher confidant and comforter.^Nagy would also say that theabove teenager has been put in the very difficult predicament ofa "split filial loyalty", where the youth's loyalty towards themother is at the cost of her loyalty towards her father. As aresult, this daughter might become more and more symptomatic andoppositional towards all members of the family.^She may do thisunconsciously in the hope that by taking on the posture of40opposition, she will align the parents back together by focusingthem on her, instead of their poor relationship. Thus, the teenattempts to resolve her split filial loyalty through what Nagyterms "loyal opposition", while appearing on the surface to be"disloyal". Furthermore, the same teen might overtly reject herfamily of origin and cease contact with them, yet as an adultmight indirectly remain loyal to her father by becoming like him,aloof and distant in her own intimate relationships. Thisphenomenon is referred to by Nagy as "invisible filial loyalty"which, according to him is a chief factor in thetransgenerational repetition of family and marital dysfunction.Underneath all of this, the experienced ambivalence betweenloyal adherence to the different transmitted values in differentrelationships painfully threatens the cohesion of theintrapsychic self, which must ultimately resort to defensiveoperations such as superego splitting, in order to reduce suchtension. For the purposes of this study these familial processesare centrally important because it is the view of this thesisthat the mechanism of superego splitting, and the relatedpsychodynamics of value in fact, develop and function with theirpersistent and individualized content originally and primarilywithin the family system. Because of this central role of thefamilial context in the development and maintenance of superegosplitting, examples demonstrating the dynamics of this mechanismwill largely involve family systems.The above described conceptual constructs for the41understanding of family dynamics become especially useful inexplaining the observations of family configurations that I haveencountered in working with crosscultural families. The outsidestresses encountered by these families can be enormous:discrimination, economic hardship, and exposure to alien values,all of which can change a previously functional family into adysfunctional one. In the next section, a selected reviewof crosscultural developmental models will be discussed, as wellas factors that may facilitate or hinder cultural adaptation.THE CROSSCULTURAL CONTEXT The "Cultural Unconscious"Hall (1976) in his book Beyond Culture points out to us thatthe development of the self is deeply affected by its culturalcontext. He perceives the individual from birth being programmedby its culture, resulting in the establishment of a psychicsystem that he refers to as the "cultural unconscious". Thisinternal structuring has profound effects on the way individualswithin a culture will organize and give meaning to theirexperience. Hall reminds us that:"Culture always determines where to draw the lineseparating one thing from another. These lines arearbitrary, but once learned and internalized, they aretreated as real."These culturally ingrained "patterns of contexting" takeplace largely at unconscious levels, especially if society at42large is consistently congruent in most ways with the programmedpatterns. Thus, the self is for the most part unaware that aculturally based system of controls is in place, that organizesits experience and therefore, assumes erroneously its culturallybound experience to be universal rather than relative to socialtime and place. As a result, when the person encounters theculturally different he or she will tend to judgeethnocentrically, denying the possibility of a different culturalpattern or experience.^For example, in some cultures direct eyecontact with a figure of authority is considered a disrespectfulact, while a counsellor from a western culture might diagnosesuch a behaviour as reflecting insecurity, lack of maturity andself-esteem.As societies evolve into more complex systems, the "culturalunconscious" is externalized in the form of institutions such asgovernments, judicial and educational systems, art forms andcultural rituals that because of their concretization in theseexternal forms increasingly binds societies to the meanings inthe "cultural unconscious" which the "extensions" represent.Hall perceives these external cultural systems or, "extensions"of human values and ideas, as developing emergent properties oncethey have been externalized, which can then evolve into somethingother than what they were initially intended for. For example,Albert Einstein did not intend to formulate theories that wouldresult in the building of a nuclear arms industry generatinghighly toxic wastes that can potentially destroy much of the43ecosystem. This demonstrates that the effects of extensions cannever fully be predicted, and that the systems when once inplace can take on a momentum of their own, sometimes making itvery difficult to stop or reverse a destructive extension of man.These emergent effects of extensions leads to considerationof another phenomenon that Hall refers to as "extensiontransference" whereby a culture confuses the extension with theprocess being extended. These extensions are reductionistic innature and always give us an incomplete picture of the processfrom which they arise. As will be discussed in chapter three,many values that are held as absolutes, are often "extensiontransferences" of need-fulfilling processes. Consider forexample the establishment of gender roles, which at a particulartime and place might have been adaptive for survival but thatwith the passage of time, have become confused as innatedifferences between the sexes.According to Hall, the amount of cultural programming variesgreatly across cultures and he places them on a continuum from"low context" to "high context" societies. The latter ischaracterized by considerable programming of its members thatresults in stable efficient and fast communication modes. Thus,the actual explicit transmitted part of the message is usuallyshort, efficient, and fast, but only in interaction with asimilarly programmed self. To an outside observer of thatculture, the coded, explicit message might convey a verydifferent meaning. For example, in the Chinese culture, which44Hall considers a high context society, when an individual says tosomeone else that they have a "bad heart, it is understood inthat culture that the person is experiencing a great deal ofemotional pain, while a psychiatrist in our western culture mightconsider this as a symptom of hypochondria. High contextcultures frequently communicate through art forms to conveyinformation and to unify the people, giving them a sense ofbelonging. High context communication also develops in familysystems, where a great deal of culturally specific information istransmitted through indirect verbal and nonverbal cues. Anexample would be the mother-infant dyad that can become highlysynchronized in meeting each other's needs with the use ofefficient, short cues which may specific to childrearingpractices of different cultures. The point is, family systemscan develop highly idiosyncratic modes of communication that maybe uncodable to an outsider.At the other end of the continuum, a "low context"communication pattern would be one where most of the informationis conveyed in the explicit message and where little programmingis necessary by the receiver to discern the information. Anexample of a low context communication style would be a professorteaching an introductory psychology course where meanings andterms are explicitly spelled out; while in a graduate course, hemight use a more high context pattern with a higher degree ofembedded meanings. Cultures that Hall considers as low contextare the German, Swiss, and Scandinavian.45For the purposes of this thesis the relevance of the highand low contexting of different cultures involves thedifferential structuring of culturally specific superegos and theidea of relativization of values and standards at the culturallevel. We can view the concept of contexting in cultures asreferring to the patterning of semantic codes, in terms of thelayers of complexity of embedded meanings, values and standardsthat maintain the cohesion of experience at both intrapsychicstructural and systemic-institutional levels. The superego inother words, in both its intrapsychic form, and its externalizedform as institutions of social regulation, can be seen as themain vehicle of the cultural unconscious. Thus therelativization of values and standards in a crosscultural contextwill significantly impact the superego intrapsychically andcollectively potentiating threats to both self and groupcohesion. The implication of high and low differences incontexting implies the necessity of considering in depth, thesuperego of any individual or group caught up in therelativizations of a crosscultural situation. For, culturaldifferences in value and meaning attached to transcultural taskssuch as childrearing, gender assignment, identity formation, andidentity achievement may have different degrees of elaboration ineither a high or low cultural context. This supports the needfor a developmental model of the psychodynamics of value in orderto move towards this depth of understanding of conflicts betweenvalues and standards in a crosscultural setting. Examples of46such threats to both self and group cohesion engendered by valuerelativization in crosscultural contexts will be discussed inchapter three.Individualism and CollectivismBecker (1973) believes that man is driven by two basicimpulses: a) The Agape motive which refers to man's need totranscend his existential isolation by identifying and mergingwith something larger then himself such as kinship groups,religious affiliation, country etc., thus giving him or her notonly a sense of vicarious power and safety through the groupidentification, but also a feeling of belonging and self-cohesion. And, b) The Eros motive which represents the impulsein man for individuation, for developing uniqueness that isrecognized and praised by others, and the development of self-powers. If man gives in too much to his Agape impulse, he mayfail to develop his self-capacities and talents and riskexploitation by others, while if he follows the Eros impulse toan extreme, he runs the risk of becoming narcissistic, self-absorbed and isolated from his community.The agape motive fits well with Kohut's (1985) notion of"cultural selfobjects" which refers to cultural figures, symbols,and myths that function to maintain the continuity of the self atindividual and group levels. As Kohut says, without these kindsof cultural selfobjects supporting psychosocial continuity "There47is no group self.". With the help of this concept of culturalselfobject joined with the notion of agape as a basic humanmotive for union with something larger than the individual self,in order to maintain the sense of cohesion and continuity of theself, we are able to speculate about the disruption of thesefunctions and motives in a crosscultural situation. Clearly,cultural selfobjects will be highly valued at a conscious level,although their psychological function of maintaining self-cohesion and continuity, this thesis claims, is largelyunconscious. Therefore, if a person or group finds itself in acrosscultural setting that does not support, or in fact, openlydevalues the set of cultural selfobjects that has psycho-historically functioned to provide psychosocial continuity, wecan predict severe threats to self-cohesion, and resultingdefensive reflexes such as superego splitting. This situationcertainly supports the need for a model of the psychodynamics ofvalue that takes into account these processes which can cause agreat deal of upheaval in crosscultural settings; and which thisthesis claims, have not been adequately acknowledged to date.In terms of the Eros motive, the need to individuate andbecome particularized in a masterful and unique yet admired way,that acknowledges the certainty of value of an individualexistence, fits well with the recursive developmental task ofmanaging and integrating ambivalence, as established levels ofself-cohesion become relativized under the continual press ofthis motive. This also supports the need for a developmental48view of the model of the psychodynamics of value, which will bepresented in chapter three.As Triandis (1990) points out, we should not considerindividualism (Eros motive) and collectivism (Agape motive) asbeing mutually exclusive, but as being able to coexist in optimalbalance within a society. Of course the relative emphasisplaced on the expression of the Agape and Eros impulse variesgreatly across cultures. Societies that place emphasis on theAgape impulse are considered collectivist cultures while onesthat emphasize the Eros impulse are considered individualist.Of interest to this study is the view of Triandis whodescribes different patterns of values as associated withcollectivistic and individualist societies.^Those associatedwith collectivist societies are: reciprocity, obligation,security, duty, tradition, compliance to socially prescribedroles, dependence, harmony, obedience and respect forhierarchical authority, and commitment to collective goals thattake priority over individual ones. Individualistic societies onthe other hand, are characterized by values such as self-actualization, differentiation, competitiveness, self-reliance,autonomy, equality in social relationships and individual goalstake priority over collective goals.Spence (1990) considers our North American culture as havingembraced individualism to an extreme, creating a fragmentedsociety of narcissistically self-absorbed individuals withnarrow, self-centred goals, who feel alienated and lack a sense49of belonging to society at large apart from the immediate family.Luepnitz (1988) also suggests that the isolation of ourwestern nuclear family places a great burden on the mother who ina sense has taken the place of the community, especially withyoung children. This void in communal relating in our societyhas unfortunately created a fertile ground for the appearance ofexploitive cultish religious, political, and even dysfunctionaladolescent peer groups that take advantage of the universal needfor cultural selfobjects that function to ensure self-cohesionand psychosocial continuity.In general, intergenerational relations are much strongerwith collectivists where the elderly and young actively interactwith each other.^In such societies the social unit isfrequently the extended family, spanning three or fourgenerations who might live together in the same household andcooperate financially. The power differential in such familiesis usually hierarchical where the authority resides with theeldest male. In some cultures such as India, the eldest femalealso has great power over the management of the household wherethe younger females and children have to obey her authority. Incontrast, our western culture encourages children upon reachingadulthood to "fly the nest" and become financially independentof their parents.^Also, our elderly for the most part havelittle say about participation in their children andgrandchildren's lives.Childrearing practices by collectivists from our vantage50point might seem intrusive. The level of interaction bycaregivers and children is high compared to our standards,allowing for little privacy and discouraging independence.Children are taught to seek guidance from their elders and to becompliant with their advice. Cooperation, unquestioned obedienceand duty by the children are rewarded while aggression anddefiance are severely punished. In some cultures, this includesphysical punishment, and reflects the belief that being aresponsible parent can involve hitting the child, whileabstaining from physical punishment would be considered childabuse; while of course, in our culture the reverse is true.Ironically, even though our western culture professes to valuechildrearing without physical punishment, physical abuse andneglect of our children has reached epidemic proportions.These differences in patterns of family values andfunctioning occurring between individualist and collectivistcultures may need to be taken into account when dealing with theinevitable process of relativization of value that will occur ifthey are transplanted to a crosscultural context.Triandis and others have also researched differences in selfdefinition among collectivist and individualist cultures.Constructs such as "private, public and collective self" havebeen used for comparison. The "private self" refers to self-definitions based on personal attributes, internal states andbehaviours; (eg.: "I am an unfaithful person" , "I am happy"etc.). The "public self" relates to how others perceive us (eg.:51"Others think I am generous, "People think I am happy"). Thecollective self consists of self-definitions that relate one toan ingroup: (eg.: "I am a Canadian", "I am a catholic", "I am amother"). Evidence suggests that collectivists define themselvesmore frequently in terms of collective self-definitions thenindividualists do. For example, a study that compared samplesfrom Illinois, Hawaii and China found that the Chinese who areconsidered highly collectivistic, scored the highest incollective self-definition, while the Hawaiians scored lower butsignificantly higher then their American counterparts who areconsidered most individualistic (Triandis, 1990).Also, research by Triandis suggests that there are greaterdiscrepancies in collectivists between the private and thepublic self then in individualistic societies. The difference isespecially striking when Americans (individualists) are comparedto Japanese (collectivists). Doi (1986) partially explains thegreat discrepancy between the private and public self in theJapanese by taking into account their great emphasis on harmonywithin social relationships. Thus, they are taught from an earlyage the art of public politeness where one does what is sociallydesirable even though privately one might feel or act quitedifferently.Here, for the purposes of this study, we can observecultural differences between individualistic and collectivistsocieties in the comfort and acceptability of using a privateself as a means of dealing with conflicts between contextualized52values and standards, and the resulting intrapsychic tensionsculturally setup within the superego. In fact, in chapter threethe concept of a private self will be developed as a way ofdefensively managing conflicts between values and standards andthe superego tensions they generate. Moreover, we can see thathaving an awareness of culturally based differential comfort withusing a private self for dealing with superego conflicts isuseful to have, in order to avoid ethnocentric judgements thatcan be experienced as blame around the use of this superegodefense, as a means of maintaining self-cohesion in situations ofconflict between values and standards. It should be kept in mindhowever, that this point is meant to apply to the level ofclinical intervention while the larger issue of the possibilityof moving towards an integrated value system for the human race,which transcends local contexts which, in fact, may haveinstitutionalized self-destructive value systems remains open.According to Triandis (1990) morality in general isperceived differently in collectivist and individualistcultures. In the former they tend to consider their ingroup normsas morally correct and absolute when compared to the rules ofother ingroups. However, in terms of a collectivist mind-set,collectivists may tend to feel that morality only applies whendealing with the ingroup, and find it acceptable to applydifferent values and standards, sometimes quite extreme, tooutgroups. This is supported by the view that collectivists aresaid to exhibit a greater degree of relativism in their moral53judging within the ingroup, depending on the context of thetransgression and the social status of the individual. From ourwestern perspective we might judge such cultures as having 'moraldouble standards' although our own culture exhibits many of itsown moral inconsistencies, we just seem to be in many instances,in denial of their existence. For example, we like to believethat in our society, justice is equal for all, but the reality ofthe situation is that if one is a minority and poor, chances aregreater that justice may be differentially applied.Wurmser (1978) has described the phenomenon of such socialdouble standards as largely unconscious "cultural splits".Another example of a "cultural split" in our society is that eventhough we value individualism to an extreme, in many instances wehave expected women to sacrifice their personal goals, just asthe collectivist mind-set might, for the interests of childrenand husbands. Triandis (1990), Luepnitz (1988) and others havemade reference to the striking parallels between socialexpectations of gender roles and the different expectations ofindividualist and collectivist societies. In other words, theysee a division along gender lines of the application ofcollectivist and individualist values. We might consider this interms of a cultural split where the ambivalence generated byconflicts between values and standards as applied to genderroles, has been historically dealt with by institutionalizingexpectations of sex roles. Consequently, when these roles arequestioned, as is being done in our contemporary culture, threats54to the self-cohesion of both sexes can be predicted, due to therelativization and disruption of the established "culturalunconscious" in individual and externalized superego structures.When counselling the culturally different, it is importantto take into account the degree of individualism/collectivism ofthe client's culture of origin for general reasons, as well asfor dealing with conflicts between values and standards. Manytimes individuals from collectivist societies are misdiagnosedby westerners as being dependent, enmeshed and undifferentiatedfrom their families. These issues also become relevant withparent-teen conflict in crosscultural families. Frequently Ihave encountered parents that have strong collectivist valueswhile their teenagers who have assimilated the western culturemore readily, have developed strong individualist tendenciescreating severe conflict within the family. Additionally, someof the parents, even years after they have immigrated, are stilldealing with the shock of cultural dislocation in the move from acollectivist society to an individualistic one. Finally, itseems clear that the dimension of individualism/collectivism in acrosscultural context is important to keep in mind as a means ofevaluating the specific ways in which self-cohesion can bethreatened and defended against through such mechanisms assuperego splitting.The next section will explore some of the multidimensionallosses that immigrant clients might experience; and which setupthe relativization of previously established value systems.55Cultural Dislocation ExperienceThe term "culture shock" has been extensively used in theliterature to describe the observed distresses that immigrantsexperience when coming in contact with their new environment. AsIshiyama (1992) points out, cultural dislocation is not only feltin the intercultural realm but also in the intrapsychic contextof the individual, sometimes shaking the very foundations of hisidentity. This supports this studies views on threats to self-cohesion that can occur in crosscultural contexts with conflictsbetween values and standards.Ishiyama conceives the self in terms of five distinct butinterrelated levels: 1) The "physical self" which corresponds tothe individual's body, health, instincts, drives etc.; 2) The"familial self" which refers to the self in relation to thefamily and its membership and role within it ; 3) The"sociocultural self" which includes social and gender roles andreligious, racial and ethnic affiliations ; 4) the "transculturalself" which corresponds to the authentic and unique selfexperienced in close interpersonal relationships; and 5) the"transpersonal" self which refers to the self in relation to adeeper inner consciousness, god or a supernatural power.Potentially then, with a cultural dislocation theindividual not only experiences the loss of his or her homelandand its cultural symbols, but also may experience other lossessuch as leaving family members and valued friends behind, change56in social status, loss of a social role, and change in familialrole. These kind of losses coupled with being in a strangeculture with different customs and language can create in theindividual feelings of uprootedness, inadequacy, loneliness andisolation. In the clinical setting, crosscultural clients willfrequently exhibit clinical depressions, psychosomatic disorders,and identity crisis and confusion. From the point of view ofthis study of the psychodynamics of value, these disruptions ofthe self on different levels can be seen as the effects of therelativization of value in a crosscultural context.Ishiyama also notes that if the individual does not findnew sources of validation in the host culture, the self mayengage in compensatory neurotic behaviours which include drug andalcohol abuse, delinquent behaviour, foreclosure to the newculture and regressive fixation to traditional ways oroverassimilation of the host culture, and abusive behaviourtowards others in an attempt to gain self-validation. Culturaldislocation can have a profound effect on a family systemfacilitating the creation of dysfunctional patterns such as rolereversals, protective processes such as scapegoating,enmeshment, and power differentials that are exploitative.Again, these observations of Ishiyama on defensive reactionscan be seen as supporting this studies views on defensiveattempts at maintaining threatened self and group cohesion in acrosscultural context; as will be discussed in the next chapter.The next section will present some developmental models of57identity formation that have been proposed for individuals thatexperience a crosscultural context. In the best case scenario,crosscultural encounters offer an opportunity for integration ofworldviews and value systems, through activation of dialecticalconsideration of their differences and similarities whichpromotes the opportunity for personal growth and expansion thatpotentially integrates both cultures at a more inclusive level.However, this study maintains, the very process that promises somuch, that is, the relativization of contextual value, also,because of threats to self-cohesion and resultant defensiveoperations can deteriorate into worse case scenarios whereintolerance, bigotry, and violence can be the outcomes.Cross-Cultural Models of DevelopmentEarly developmental models for minority groups had their rootsin the works of Black social scientists and educators. Cross(1971) and Jackson (1975) both developed models that delineatethe process of identity formation for the young black person thatmoves from an initially preferred 'White' frame of reference to apositive Black frame of reference. Although these models arespecific to blacks, other writers have observed similar processeswith other minorities. Atkinson, Morten, and Sue (1989) haveintegrated some of these models and come up with a five stagedevelopmental process of identity formation for minorities thathave to adjust to cultural oppression by a dominant group. The58following is a description of these stages.A) Conformity Stage.This stage is characterized by the minority individual beingstrongly identified with the dominant culture's values which areprized, while denying his own culture. The self-esteem of thisperson is usually low and accompanied with shame for thetraditional customs of his ethnic group. He tries to divorcehimself from his roots and to fit into the social circles of themainstream culture.B) Dissonance Stage.At this stage, denial of one own's culture begins to breakdown. This process might be precipitated by the individualencountering racism on a personal level and encountering membersof his own ethnic group that he admires who do not fit thestereotypes held by the mainstream culture. The individual beginsto question the attitudes and beliefs of the dominant culture andstarts seeing positive attributes in his ethnic group. Mixedfeelings of shame and pride are felt towards one's roots.C) Resistance and Immersion Stage.During this stage, the pendulum swings towards globalidentification with one's own people and complete rejectiontowards the dominant culture. Here, the individual feels shameand guilt for having previously denied his cultural heritage.This is coupled with feelings of anger, mistrust and disliketowards the majority group, which now, is perceived as oppressivetowards one's own minority group. Racial self-hatred is59transformed into racial pride.D) Introspection Stage.The individual begins to experience feelings of discontentand discomfort towards some aspects of his minority culture whileat the same time that he begins to value again some qualities ofthe dominant group. He might start feeling restricted in theexpression of his own individuality with the minority group thatoften demands submergence of individual autonomy and thought. Theperson experiences at this stage, much internal turmoil andstruggle with self-definition, trying to integrate his conflictedcultural self.E) Integrative Awareness Stage.At this stage of the process, the individual will havedeveloped a unique identity through selective identificationswith both cultures. The person now experiences a strong senseof pride in his cultural heritage without unequivocal acceptanceof all its standards and values. Also, such an individual willhave an attitude of openness and appreciation for other culturesincluding the mainstream culture.The authors of this five stage model warn us that the abovesequence of identity development is not universal to everyminority person. Some individuals might never leave theconformity stage while others might skip some stages or regressback to earlier ones. However, they point out that from theirclinical experience, a great majority tend to follow thissequence.60The relevance of this model lies in seeing it as supportingthis studies view of both the defensive reactions to threats toself-cohesion in a crosscultural setting, as well as thesuccessful integration of conflicts between values and standardsdue to relativization, over time. The initial stages in themodel can be seen as reflecting defensive superego splits, whilethe later stage can be seen as reflecting the subsequentintegration of these splits.Berry (1990), proposed four different outcomes to the processof acculturation and also identified individual andsociopolitical variables that may influence the path ofacculturation chosen by a particular person. The proposed modesof acculturation are as follows:A) Assimilation Path.The individual who follows the path of assimilation does notwant to retain his cultural identity and readily embraces thecharacteristics of the new culture. This individual would besimilar to the one described by Atkinson et al at the ConformityStage. Factors that may influence this outcome may be the degreeof tolerance and acceptance by the mainstream culture to theparticular minority group. For example, a teenager that hasexperienced racism in school might develop a sense of shametowards his cultural heritage and as a result reject itcompletely in favour of the mainstream culture, which heperceives as more prestigious and desirable.B)Separation Path.61This person retains his cultural heritage and stronglyrejects the values of the mainstream culture. This path ofacculturation is facilitated if the minority culture has a wellestablished ethnic community with support systems in themainstream culture. For example, a Hindu immigrant in Vancouverfrom India may follow the separation path because he has a wellestablished network available to him. This outcome is similar tothe Resistance and Immersion stage of the previous model. Thismay be seen as a form of defensive cultural split in order tomaintain self-cohesion along established lines in the person'scultural unconscious.C) Marginalization Path.This individual has little possibility of culturalmaintenance, often because there are unavailable support systemsfor his culture in the new society. Also, because of possiblediscrimination and exclusion in the mainstream culture, thisperson avoids integration and becomes marginalized in his newenvironment. This path of acculturation is considered the moststressful where threats to self-cohesion are defensively managedthrough avoidant narrowing of one's life sphere excessively.D) Integration Path.This individual preserves some degree of cultural integrity atthe same time that he participates and becomes an integral partof the mainstream social network. This outcome is similar to theIntegrative Awareness stage of the previously mentioned model.The authors point out that acculturation modes may vary62across domains of behaviour. Thus, an individual may seekassimilation in the workforce, integration in his social network,while following the separation mode in his religious beliefs.What is important for the purposes of this study though, isthat Barry's model also can be seen as reflecting management ofboth defensive operations and integration of conflicts betweenvalues and standards which threaten self-cohesion in acrosscultural setting; which this study proposes to look at fromthe perspective of a general model of the psychodynamics ofvalue.Chapter three will discuss some transcultural mechanisms andprocesses that may account for the different patterns describedby the above authors; which this study views as 'phenotypicalexpressions' of a more generic psychodynamics of value. Also,universal processes of change will be suggested that account fordevelopment in the crosscultural context along potentiallydifferent lines, one of which is the model suggested by AtkinsonMorten and Sue.CONCLUSIONThis literature review has attempted to give an overview ofsome transcultural processes in the development of the self thatmay have particular relevance to conflicts between values andstandards with the goal of establishing the relevance ofproposing a developmental model of the psychodynamics of value.This led to consideration of familial and intergenerational63stresses in the process of crosscultural adaptation, because thisstudy maintains that the crosscultural context acts like a'magnifying glass' for observing psychodynamics related toconflicts between values and standards. Therefore, this reviewalso looked at models of development specific to individuals whobelong to cultural minorities. This review has also begun todescribed what are believed to be universal processes, such asthe relativization of value, and defense mechanisms, such assuperego splitting, that the self uses to cope with threats toits cohesion.The hypothesis to be supported in this thesis is that thisunderstanding of how self-cohesion is threatened and defended canbe effectively applied to understanding and working with thedevelopmental conflicts that arise between loyalties to familialtraditions and individuation in development generally, and alsoin a crosscultural context specifically. To this point, emphasiswas placed on the development and intrasystemic dissonance withinthe superego, because it is the seat of our cultural values andideals; and therefore, the intrapsychic structure that may bemost affected in conflicts between values and standards;developmentally and situationally.Aspects of these reviewed elements will lay down thefoundations for a proposed developmental model of thepsychodynamics of value generally, and the functioning of thepsychodynamics of value in a crosscultural context specifically;and suggest forms of intervention that emerge from this model.64CHAPTER THREEA MODEL FOR THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF VALUEThis chapter will attempt to develop a model demonstratingthe functioning of the psychodynamics of value across fourdevelopmental stages of life: 1) Preoedipal; 2) Oedipal; 3)Adolescence; and 4) Adulthood. In the preoedipal stage a basicdynamic related to value, self-cohesion, and development will beidentified, which will be discussed in terms of its functioningin different forms throughout the four stages of life. Thesection on the oedipal stage will consider the psychodynamics ofvalue as related to the formal consolidation of the superego-egoideal structure as the inner agency of values and standards, thatalso represents cultural and gender definitions of value. Thissection will also deal with the beginnings of distinct superegosplitting given the formal consolidation of the superego-egoideal structure in the oedipal stage. The adolescent stage willdeal with developmental pressures on the psychodynamics of valuerelated to the re-emergence of the separation-individuationprocess, including the issue of group membership in adolescence.As well, the adolescent section will deal in more detail with thedynamics of value as related to horizontal and vertical superegosplitting. The final section will consider the stage ofadulthood where the model for the psychodynamics of valuepresented here will attempt to be applied to broader systemic-65institutional and cultural issues.Throughout these four sections cross-cultural issues will beconsidered, because the cross-cultural context by its natureinvolves conflicts in values and standards, and so cangraphically demonstrate the psychodynamics of value.The Development of Values and Standards in the Self This model assumes that the self's development of valuesand standards takes place in the relational realm. In the courseof normal development, initially, the familial context becomesthe matrix from which the self abstracts values and standards,where standards may be seen as gradations of particular ordifferent values. However, since the familial context reflects tosome extent the values and standards of its cultural context, theself, from the very beginning cannot escape the internalizationand introjection of values and standards from its culture. Thus,where Freud (1933) writes of the child's superego that "...itbecomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resistingjudgements of value which have propagated themselves in thismanner from generation to generation."; he is suggesting that thetransmission of cultural values and standards across generations,is preserved mostly through identification with the parents. Thefollowing is a discussion of related universal processes andmechanisms by which the self evolves intrapsychic structures that66incorporate values and standards and which greatly affect thefunctioning and choices in behaviours of the self. Theseprocesses and mechanisms for the development of the self inrelation to value will be drawn out and discussed concurrently interms of their significance to the psychodynamics of value at thecultural level. This will set the stage for the discussion of thepsychodynamics of value as specifically related to the culturallevel in the final section below.The Preoedipal Stage of Development It is believed that the experiencing self from the firstmoments of awareness is already "prewired" to process incomingstimuli in a constructivist fashion (Stern, 1985). This leads tothe creation of mental representations of objects which do notnecessarily reflect their actual nature, for these early imagoesmay be distorted, split, or fused with other self and objectrepresentations. According to object-relations theory thisinitial stage of undifferentiated self and object representationsis related to the basic assumption that the self is programmedinnately to associate an affective tone to its interactions withobjects, and that self-representations covary with object-representations, based on the quality of this affective tone(Greenspan, 1989; Kernberg, 1976). As discussed earlier,theorists such as Mahler and Kohut believe the neonate initiallylacks an emotional and cognitive awareness of its separateness67from other objects, and therefore, perceptions of them can becognized by it as self-representations. Thus, images of theprimary caretaker and the affective tone attached to them can beexperienced as emotionally charged self-images in symbioticfashion.The claim, for our purposes here, is that in this preoedipalperiod we can deduce the roots of a psychology of value, andsubsequently, a psychodynamics of value that once uncovered andcast in the terms of value, we can follow throughout development.Indeed, it is the claim of the thesis presented here that we canobserve many individual and social phenomena more usefully forthe purposes of understanding and intervention in terms of apsychodynamics of value.For in the preoedipal period, the object-relationalemphasis on the structuring effect of the quality of affectivetone can be seen as amounting to the shaping effect of concrete'good and bad' experiences.^At this stage good and bad areessentially defined, or more correctly, experienced, in relationto need fulfilment. That is, the 'good' object satisfies, andthe 'bad' object frustrates basic needs; while the 'good' selfexperiences satisfaction, and the 'bad' self experiencesfrustrated basic needs. In real terms it is a small, butsignificant step to conclude that these are prototypical valuingexperiences.Here, Sandler's concept of "value-cathexis" can be seen asa central mechanism in what is being considered as a psychology68of value. In this regard Sandler writes:"By 'value'...we do not refer specifically to moral value,but the term is used rather in the sense of feelingqualities which may be positive or negative, relativelysimple or extremely complicated. It is these affectivevalues, sign-values, so to speak, which give allrepresentations their significance to the ego (Sandler,1989)."Freud (Moore and Fine,1990) first hypothesized the conceptof 'Bezetzung' (translated as 'cathexis'), which refers to theself binding emotionally charged psychic energy to a mentalrepresentation of an object, because it functions as a regulatorof some drive or need and thus, has some value to the self.Freud used the metaphor of an amoeba whose plasma tentacles reachtowards particles of food to incorporate them as part of theself. This metaphor also reminds us of Kohut's selfobjects, whichare objects that the self uses as auxiliary providers of psychicfunctions that complement its own psychic apparatus.Most significantly, for Kohut, the emotionally chargedattachment, the valuing of such selfobjects, is fundamentallyrelated to the self's experience of increased self-cohesion andcontinuity in relation to that object. Here, "self-cohesion"refers to the experienced sense of integrated functioning asopposed to the sense of fragmented functioning. Wolf writes:"The cohesive self describes the relatively coherentstructure of the normally and healthily functioning self.The fragmented self describes the lessened coherency of theself resulting from faulty selfobject responses or fromother regression producing conditions. Depending on thedegree of fragmentation, it can be experienced along acontinuum from mildly anxious disconcertedness to the panicof total loss of self structure.... Self psychologyrecognizes as the most fundamental essence of humanpsychology the individual's need (1) to organize his or her69psychological experience into a cohesive configuration, theself, and (2) to establish self-sustaining relationshipsbetween this self and its surround that...maintain...thestructural coherence...of the self. (Wolf, 1988)."Sandler also views the differential valuing of relationalexperiences as being intimately linked to feelings of "safetyand well-being" related to keeping arousal at an optimal levelwhich is seen as the emotional prerequisite for the developmentof integrated functioning, and which is clearly an experiencesimilar to Kohut's sense self-cohesion. The point is, we seethat developmentally value becomes from the first related tothose objects which we associate with maintaining our self-cohesion.In other words for the neonate, the primary caretakerbecomes value-cathected, or, a cathected object of high value,just because it functions to maintain self-cohesion and ward offthe existential anxiety of disintegration of the experiencingself through the regulation of basic needs such as hunger,thirst, validation, safety, soothing, tension reduction, and soon. Developmentally, this is critical because it is generallyagreed that such an experiential state of self-cohesion isnecessary for the practicing and optimal maturation of egofunctions (Shapiro & Stern, 1989).Sandler also recognizes that the value-cathexis of an objectcan vary in intensity, depending on the situational context. Hewrites:"I want to ... tie a further pair of loose ends together byadding the proposition that the value cathexis - andtherefore the attractiveness - of an activity or an object70is a variable quantity; it can even vary from one moment tothe next....In every situation of anxiety, for instance,there is a reaching toward the object that can providesafety, and this applies as much to the introjects as toexternal objects (Sandler, 1989)."That is, objects of high value related to the self's senseof cohesion and continuance can be experienced as more or lessvaluable depending on the bio-psycho-social circumstances.Sandler gives the example of a toddler where the value-cathexisfor the mother increases greatly (Freud would say that the motherbecomes "hypercathexed") in the presence of a stranger, which isdeduced from observing the clinging behaviour of the childtowards the mother in such situations. Objects also can become"decathected" in degree. For example a teenager that reliesless and less on the mother for a sense of cohesion andconstancy, instead turns to a peer group that now becomes value-cathected because it is the developmentally new relational realmthat can provide a sense of self-cohesion and constancy to theself.This variability in value-cathexis is of critical importancebecause it is the claim of this thesis, that it underlies allchange in values throughout development. That is, thedevelopment of value requires this kind of variability inemotional investment, for the neonate would be hostage to itsfirst attachments and never be able to move past any loss of anykind, were there not such variability in value-cathexis. Indeed,the emotional investments of the process of value-cathexis arerevealed in the pre-odepial period as inherently relative to71their need-fulfilling function; where perhaps the most basicpsychological need is for the sense of self-cohesion related toan empathic, or, I-Thou context. In other words, originally,value is relative to need where the objects of value can change,while it is the needs of the human psyche which may be absoluteand persist in basic ways (Ishiyama, 1989). At the culturallevel as well, a culture would never be able to evolve withoutvariability in value-cathexis.What this suggests, is that there is throughout humandevelopment, on both individual and collective levels, a constanttension between experiential values which meet needs in theimmediacy of present contexts, and abstract or symbolic valueswhich have been carried over from the contexts in which they wereoriginally need fulfilling, and which may or may not be needfulfilling in these later contexts. In short, there is aconstant tension between dynamic and static value relative to thegrowth of both persons and cultures.For example, the evolving self can not only value-cathectconcrete objects such as an attachment figure or a family group,but also moves developmentally toward more abstract objects,which can include complex self and object-representations, aswell as cultural beliefs, aesthetics, morals, and whole systemsof values and standards; yet all of these may in fact remainrelative to their ability to meet basic needs; with the need forthe maintenance of self-cohesion being the central one focused onhere. This issue of the objects of value being interchangable in72relation to the needs they meet is recognized in developmentalpsychology where it is generally agreed that adoption will bemore experientially successful the earlier it occurs, with lessresidue from competing attachments, or, value-cathexis,interfering with the new bond.However, a significant question arises when it comes to theinterchangeability or intermingling of one set of culturalsymbols and values with another, for conflict, often of theextremest kind, is the norm rather than the exception in thissituation. While when dealing with an adoptive culture, theintegration into the new cultural environment may be lessconflicted the earlier this occurs developmentally for anindividual, this process may in fact, still be complicated by thetransmission of abstract cultural values through the superego ofthe ethnic parents or the ethnic community. In other words, evena preoedipal cross-cultural child is unavoidably exposed to twocultural value systems, one in the family and one in the hostculture, which not only in effect compete for the emotionalinvestment of the child, but which also inevitably relativize thevery perception of value itself for the child.Here, what the cross-cultural situation highlights is thefact that values only come from two places; experience andauthority, where those that come from authority are alreadyabstractions from past experience representing traditionalpatterns of need fulfilment; while those that come fromexperience represent creative contact with the reality of present73psycho-social situations be they culturally unitary or diverse.This, in effect, is the basis of all generational conflict, whichmay be heightened in a cross-cultural context. As Erikson (1989)says, this ever present tension between experiential and abstractvalue comes to a head in teenage years, where he sees theadolescence questioning of established values as the creativehope of every culture for better adaptation to current realities.While a preoedipal child is sheltered within the ethnicfamily in a cross-cultural situation from wholesale influences ofthe value system of a host culture, they will inevitably becomeincreasingly aware of differences in what is designated as 'good'by the family versus the larger social surround. A variablewhich may make this process more or less problematic is thedegree to which the ethnic parents maintain their values in someabsolute fashion, which are clearly relativized in the eyes ofthe maturing child. What I want to suggest here, is that thistype of static presentation of ethnic values to the preoedipalchild in a cross-cultural situation, will potentially set thestage for more superego splits in later stages. In other words,to the extent that ethnic parents do not deal with valueintegration into the host culture, this will create more valueconflicts for the child in later developmental stages.In understanding the ethnic parents resistance to dealingwith value relativization, a parallel may be drawn here relatingto Sandler's comment about the clinging behaviour of the toddlerin the face of stranger anxiety. What we can perhaps see in the74observation of the tendency to ethnic isolation within a hostculture, is the clinging to ethnic cultural forms and values inthe face of xenophobia and lack of validation of establishedconnections between cathected value and self-cohesion. What I amtrying to say, is that at the cultural level of variability invalue-cathexis, we may be dealing with the same psychodynamics ofvalue that are operative at the pre-oedipal stage.^For, wherethe child's development is centrally about integrating a self-cohesive balance between 'good' and 'bad', past and present,representations of experiential and abstract value that are livedas self and world; so at the adult cultural level, the same taskpersists in order to maintain self-cohesion. This task ofsorting out how the basic human need for self-cohesion isbalanced between experienced value and symbolic or abstractvalue, stands out in particularly high relief in a cross-culturalsetting.For the preoedipal child, gradually through the self'sinevitable experience of frustration of needs or drives by theobject-mother, it begins to recognize the 'other' as separatefrom itself, even though the self may remain fused with someaspects of the object. Thus, even though the young child beginsto recognize its mother as a separate centre of activity aroundthe end of year one, enmeshment of boundaries at this stage ofdevelopment remains high. The separation-individuation processfrom the parent, in the normal course of development, is agradual process, and possibly never total in the lifespan of an75individual.Here for our purposes, it is useful to note thatchildrearing practices, which may be seen as culture bound waysof establishing patterns in the connections between value andself-cohesion, can have a profound impact on this separationprocess. For example, one might postulate that in cultures suchas the Vietnamese (Waxier-Morrison, 1990), where young babies areusually not allowed to cry but instead are held and soothed, thatthis may prolong the merger or symbiotic phase with the mother,with differentiation of the self from the primary caretakertaking place at a later age when compared to western children.Alternately, one could argue that in our own culture, where someparents have short maternity/paternity leaves of absence, thatthis might trigger, in some of these children, an early beginningof the separation process that is situationally out of synchronywith the developmental needs of the child. One might postulate,that early separation from the mother, may force an earliershift from experiential value in the initial attachment, to morereliance on abstract value in order to maintain establishedlevels of self-cohesion.For example, a client's sixteen month old toddler wasexperiencing great distress when she was placed in the care of ababysitter because the mother had to go back to work. Everyday, when dropped off at the babysitter's, the child would screamand exhibit clinging behaviour towards the mother. Also, thetoddler, who had been disciplined with "time-out", began to tell76her mother: "Mammy bad, go to room". The child had also began towet her pants again after being toilet trained and hercommunication patterns changed from verbal to more gutturalsounds. One can speculate that the change of caretakerthreatened the child's sense of self-cohesion which resulted inthe regressive behaviour. My client, on the advice of a friend,gave her daughter a picture of herself and a cotton swatchscented with her perfume and these "transitional objects"improved the toddler's behaviour greatly. For the toddler, itrepresented a shift towards abstract valuing for the maintenanceof self-cohesion, where the "transitional objects" becamesymbols that represented the mother. Here, we see theprogressive development of maintaining self-cohesion by symbolicmeans, which is increasingly the case as we move towardsadulthood.In addition to demonstrating the progression of attachmentto symbolic means of maintaining self-cohesion, this example of ashift from established experiential value to substitute abstractvalue, can also be seen as another instance of what I have beencalling the relativization of value. For example, in the abovecase, the child's sense of the 'good mother' is relativized interms of there now being competing 'good' things which meet thesame basic needs for soothing, attachment, and self-cohesion;and, the 'good mother' is also relativized in terms of being nowexperienced as the 'bad' rejecting mother. In short, there is aquantitative and a qualitative relativization of the original77value attached to the 'good' mother as need fulfilling. Thiskind of relativization of value, I see as a prototype of valueconflicts throughout life, for the child must be in conflict withthese competing senses of what is valuable related to the samebasic needs.^Later life is filled with competing valuesclaiming to meet the same needs, for example, the 'many roads tosalvation'; as well as many instances of, at one time,experientially 'good' objects of value somehow becoming 'bad' forme, for example, cigarettes, my ex-husband, the NDP party, and soon. One way out of this confusion of relative and competing'goods', I am claiming, is to focus on their common function inmaintaining self-cohesive experiencing in any present context,rather than the value itself, in any absolute abstract way, dueto the idealization (a form of value-cathexis) of traditionalauthorities which promote these various values.This concept of the relativization of value is central tothe model being developed here. While this notion is related tothe variability of value-cathexis discussed above; the criticalexperience in such relativization of value for the preoedipalchild, I believe, is what Parens (1989) has described as the"conflict of ambivalence". Parens postulates, based on hisobservational research of young children, that the experience ofthe "first conflicts of ambivalence" are nodal points in thedevelopment of ego functions and superego structuring. Hewrites:"We inferred again and again, with subjects 9-16 months old,that conflict between mother and child led to the emergence78of an intrapsychic conflict within the child, a conflictdue to ambivalence...and it is, in fact, in consequence ofthe emotional valuation of the object that thisinterpersonal conflict creates the necessary conditions forthe development of an intrapsychic conflict: the wish todestroy an object of great emotional value....This conflictof ambivalence leads to a most salutary development: thisis where the ego's work of coping with taming, andmodifying hostile destructiveness begins...tointernalize that object's dictates (Parens, 1989)."With increasing development, the original overridingpositive value for the mother as selfobject is relativized inrelation to the mounting experience of her as also frustrating.This tension of ambivalence creates a psychodynamic within thechild in regard to the perception of the valued object and itsrelation to established levels of self-cohesion. In order tomaintain at least a partial awareness of the good object and theself-cohesion related to it, the child is led to an intrapsychiccrossroad, where one direction leads to an integration of theambivalent perceptions and subsequent cognitive-affectivedifferentiation and development, and, another direction leads tothe splitting of consciousness in an attempt to deny and defendagainst the cohesion threatening tension of ambivalence. For asParens also notes, "The ego can protect against the anxietyengendered by overwhelming helplessness in the face of suchopposing feelings...and the dread of destroying the need-satisfying symbiotic object may lead not so much toneutralization as to splitting of this emerging ambivalence(Parens, 1989)".Parens is thus describing the original core of a79psychodynamic that I believe repeats itself in different formsthroughout development. What remains consistent or recursivethroughout the various forms of this psychodynamic, this thesisclaims, is the attempt to protect threatened self-cohesion as thevalue-cathected objects that have come to be associated with itare relativized.^The resulting ambivalence is then as muchabout maintaining the consistency of the self, as it is aboutmaintaining any consistent and absolute sense of the objects ofvalue the self feels dependent upon for its cohesion. In short,it is as much and perhaps more about maintaining self-constancy,as it is about maintaining object constancy.This model of the psychodynamics of value, while it ismotivated by the attempt to maintain self-cohesion in relation tothe objects of value associated with it, is also aboutdevelopment itself in three fundamental directions. As Parensobserves, this conflict generates (1) the differentiation of egofunctions in order to "cope with, tame, and modify" the resultinganxiety and aggression; (2) the development of superegostructures through defensive "internalization of dictates" andaspects of the ambivalently perceived object; and (3) potentialfixation-regression in defensive splitting, where ego functioningis overwhelmed in its attempts to maintain self-cohesion at thetask of integrating a new and more complex awareness of therelativized object of value (See figure I).Here in the preoedipal stage, these first conflicts ofambivalence as we have seen, are examples of what I want to refer80to as (a) developmental relativizations of value. That is,established value is relativized because of developmentalpressures. I would also suggest that there are two other typesof relativization of value that are useful to recognize. Theseare (b) situational relativizations of value, where situationsrather than development leads to an awareness of existing valueas less than absolute as contrasted with other values that appearto meet the same needs. A third type of relativization is alsopossible to identify here, (c) systemic-institutionalizedrelativization, where conflicts and double-standards related tovalue have been carried over from historic situations, inabstract form, and function as 'policies', stated and unstated,specific to family and group systems as well as social andcultural institutions. For example, in a patriarchal familysystem the young child's perception of gender value becomesrelativized by awareness of differences in valuing the sexes.Additional examples of this level of potential valuerelativization can be seen in political and religious ideologieswhich will be dealt with in the final section of this chapter.We can now model the core psychodynamic showing therelationship between the ambivalence of relativized value anddevelopment, originally occurring in the preoedipal stage.The Developmental Dynamic(FIGURE I)82With this dynamic developmental model established we can nowmove on to more fully consider prototypical splitting in thepreoedipal stage as the precursor of superego splits in laterstages of life. For, as Parens contends, the beginnings of theinternalization of "maternal dictates" starts to occur at the endof year one, out of these initial conflicts of ambivalence; but,the consolidation of the superego proper, in terms of a moredifferentiated system of facilitating-limiting functions,rewarding-punitive functions, and the direction-giving functionand structure of the ego ideal, does not crystallize until thestage of oedipal resolution (Milrod, 1990).The splitting occurring in defense of self-cohesion at thepreoedipal stage is still quite global and emotional, in terms ofpartitioning awareness of self and object; as in the exclamationsof 'Mammy bad' and 'Mammy good'. As development of ego functionproceeds cognition comes to contain and integrate more of thetensions of ambivalence related to value relativization, allowingthe self to maintain self-cohesion through more differentiationand compartmentalization of perceptions of 'good' and 'bad',where splitting of values and standards becomes more localizedwithin the superego structure. However, no matter howcognitively differentiated values and standards become, thebasic human need for self-cohesion consistently persists as adynamic emotional stake in relation to perceived conflictsbetween values and standards. From the developmental modelpresented above we are now able to extract a psychodynamic model83of value.With this prototypical model for the psychodynamics of valueidentified in the preoedipal stage, we can now follow itsfunctioning in different contexts, throughout subsequent stagesof development, with oedipal stage considered next.The Psychodynamic Model Of Value(Figure II)85OEDIPAL STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT According to psychoanalytic theory as the child becomesaware of gender differences, around the age of three, it usuallydevelops incestuous wishes towards the opposite-sexed parent.These ambivalent feelings of love and hatred for the same-sexedparent, and fantasies of repercussions for the incestuous wishesare believed to propel the child towards identification with thesame-sexed parent. It is also seen as a critical period for theconsolidation of the superego and ego ideal proper into acoherent structure that begins to function in the absence of anexternal authority. At this time, the ego ideal becomes moredifferentiated from the facilitating-prohibiting and rewarding-punitive functions and assumes a direction giving role related toa set of wished for ideal images (Milrod, 1990). As well, Freudbelieved that the oedipal period is a focal point in theinternalization of the cultural context by identification withthe parent's superego, a process which facilitates themaintenance of tradition across generations.For purposes related to the psychodynamics of value then,the oedipal stage involves three particularly relevantdevelopments: 1) The formal consolidation of the superego andits related structure the ego ideal, as a more cognitive-affectively differentiated set of values and standards, whencontrasted to the more global and affective prototypical valuingexperiences of the preoedipal stage. 2) The consolidation of86these values and standards, in large part around culturallyconstrued gender value; where the oedipal resolution can be seenas a mechanism whereby value relative to gender roles becomesinternalized and transmitted to the next generation. 3) Inconsequence of the previous two developments, the oedipal stagelays the foundation for more distinct superego splitting alongthe lines of values and standards related to gender and culturein this stage, and the later ones of adolescence and adulthood.From the perspective of the psychodynamics of value, theoedipal period is one where the child moves from a largely dyadicrelativization of value within the symbiotic context of themother and child relationship, to the triadic relativizationsinvolving the father, or other 'outsiders' that compete for theemotional investments of the child. The emergence of incestuouswishes in the child triggers developmental relativization in thevaluing of both parents. The same-sexed parent's value ispotentially relativized from intense love to hatred-annihilation,while the opposite sexed parent also becomes relativized in theface of negative reactions from the opposite-sexed parent for theincestuous wishes. The conflicts in increased ambivalent feelingtowards both parents, with its accompanying disruption in self-cohesion, can potentially mobilize structure building of ego andsuperego functions that, according to Freud, should involveidentification with the same-sexed parent to establishintegration of gender identity. However, the threats to self-cohesion in the oedipal child also mobilize defenses that can87range from adaptive splitting to more serious kinds of defendingthat can potentially fixate development of the self. From theoedipal stage on, this more and more involves degrees ofsplitting within the consolidated and increasingly differentiatedset of superego values and standards for both sexes. Since muchof the relativization of value and resulting ambivalence in theoedipal stage involves the re-balancing of self-cohesion aroundculture-bound gender identification, it is useful to focus ongender development in some depth.Chodorow (1989) believes that in cultures where preoedipalchildren have the mother as the primary caretaker and the fatheris only peripherally involved, a situation is created where boysand girls will have significantly different experiences in thedegree of sameness they experience towards the person they firstknow. She believes that for females, the sense of sameness withthe mother usually leads to an extended pre-oedipal phase, whilefor males, the increasing awareness of differentness to themother and sameness to the father, pushes them into an earlieroedipal stage. Freud was well aware of the developmental lag ingirls, and erroneously interpreted it as representing theformation of a 'weaker' superego structure in girls. Convergingevidence has not proven Freud's hypothesis right. Chodorow viewsthe issue as one of intrapsychic boundaries where girls due tothe greater sense of sameness with the mother, undergo a slowerde-enmeshment of mother-daughter boundaries; and thus, there maybe delayed internalization of the superego functions. In other88words, boys' earlier awareness of differentness from the motherrelativizes their self-concept in terms of gender identity soonerthan girls, whose relativization process is delayed compared tomales.Another factor that might facilitate earlier internalizationof superego functions in boys, are childbearing practices wherethe punitive functions are relegated to the father, while mothersare allowed to be a more nurturing and less feared object for thechild. As boys begin to have incestuous wishes towards themother, the fear towards the punitive father becomes amplified(Freud's castration anxiety), thus facilitating a quickeridentification with the perceived aggressor. Girls will alsoexperience increased fear towards the mother because of theirincestuous wishes for their father, but not to the extent of thefear experienced by the boys towards their father if the motheris less expressive of disciplinary and punitive responses, and,because the direction of identification for girls is continuouswith the preoedipal object of value; the mother. Therefore, moredifferentiated identification with the mother might not be asrapid. This pattern of traditional role division in nurture-discipline parenting practices was most likely quite prevalent inFreud's time, and thus, could also partly explain his observationof a delayed oedipal stage in females.Chodorow in fact suggests that if the cultural context hashighly defined gender roles, it demands of oedipal boys that theymore quickly and completely renunciate their early preoedipal89identifications with the mother and instead now strongly identifywith the father, or some culturally idealized male image.Significantly for males then, the process of identity formationin the oedipal resolution is more abruptly discontinuous fromtheir primary object of value, while for girls, it is foundedmore on a sense of continuity with their early primary caretaker.Therefore, from the perspective of superego development, one canhypothesize a similar sharp discontinuity in the evolution of thevalue-cathections that consolidate into the super-ego idealstructure, in the oedipal stage for males; since again, themother is most likely the first idealized object. Thus, we canimagine there is more disruption of self-cohesion for males thanfemales in the oedipal stage, because of this difference inlevels of ambivalence towards the mother as the initial object ofvalue.Here we can see culture-bound pressures on males to give uptheir early ideal of wanting to become like their mother, andsubstitute it for a society's ideal male image. In terms of thepsychodynamics of value, we can see that systemically-institutionalized values in relation to gender, where a culturevalues attributes in one gender, but disapproves of them in theother, relativizes for boys the value-cathections of their early'ideal parental imago" that was abstracted from the mother. Now,instead, they are forced to consolidate in the oedipal stage, a'male' ego ideal based on a radically different ideal imagecompared to that of the preoedipal stage.90The hypothesis here, is that these young boys wouldexperience higher degrees of intrasystemic conflict related torelativized gender value within the superego-ego ideal structurethan girls would. And, since their early introjects based on theidealized mother may seem irreconcilable with society's idealmale image, integration becomes almost an impossible task. Todeal with this ambivalence of value relativization, which canthreaten self-cohesion, young males may be set up to resort tomore superego splitting through repression (horizontal split)where they deny the value and desirability of their preoedipalvalue-cathections based on the mother. However, repression isusually not permanent, and some males may later expresssymbolically, their now developmentally conflicted preoedipalvalue-cathections through a range of behaviours from homophobiato transvestitism. Or, projective identifications may occur,where these repressed early preodipal value-cathections areprojected on to current significant females, such as girlfriendsand marriage partners, which allows for safe re-experiencing ofgender values associated with the female role, which were splitoff in the oedipal resolution.One could hypothesize that girls also, during the oedipalresolution, might have to renunciate value-cathections related tothe ideal images that were abstracted from early preoedipalidentifications with the father. This is specially true if themother was experienced too negatively in terms of being hostile,unengaging, weak or inconsistent. Then the preoedipal female91might value-cathect, and turn almost exclusively to the father asthe 'ideal parental imago' from which she extracts her oedipalego ideal. For this particular type of female the degree ofrenunciation demanded by the cultural context becomes comparableto the one of males. However, the assumption here is that forthe great majority of young females, because of the peripheralinvolvement of the father, the preoedipal content of the egoideal abstracted from the mother, far outweighs the content thatis abstracted from the father. Thus, the degree of superego-egoideal splitting in girls is far less than for boys, at theoedipal resolution. Females might also potentially project on tofuture male partners, their "split off" preoedipal content, whichwould allow safe re-experiencing of aggressive behaviours ifthey were over identified with the 'nurturing' mother, at theoedipal resolution.In cultures where values are relativized according togender, that is, where what is valued in one sex is devalued inthe other, there results a suppression of basic needs and drivesin both sexes. This usually leads to a collectivecompartmentalization of human experience, or, systemically-institutionalized splits at a cultural level, where both gendersend up "acting out" for the other, the "split off" parts by wayof interlocking projective identifications. For instance, in theHispanic-Mexican culture of the fifties and sixties that I grewup in, 'good' women were denied expression of autonomy and power,while 'macho' males were discouraged from expressing dependency92needs. Thus females would function as recipients of therepressed dependency needs of the males, while they in turn,gained vicarious power through their husband's achievements.Probably many differences that are observed between thesexes are simply what Hall (1976) calls cultural 'extensiontransferences', or what I am calling systemic-institutionalizedsplits. That is, values and standards that have been invoked bya culture that has different ideals for each sex, which areeventually with time, confused as innate gender qualities.The resolution of the oedipal conflict, that is,internalization of the parent's superego may be complicated forthe child if it is being co-parented by individuals that differgreatly in their values and standards, possibly resulting insuperego-ego ideal splitting. For example, when I was five yearsold and I moved to Mexico my parents hired a nanny from ruralMexico to look after me a great deal of the time because both myparents had to work to re-establish themselves. Since this nannywas very nurturing, and my sense of self-cohesion was probablyvery fragile due to cultural dislocation and the recent loss ofmy mother's time and attention, I developed strong attachmentbonds to my new caretaker. That is, she became a highly value-cathected object for me. This, I believe, relativized for methe value of my mother's caretaking, since now I had someone elsethat was meeting similar needs to the ones that my motherpreviously had taken care of. Furthermore, relativization of mymother's care was also amplified because I soon learned that93with my nanny I could get away with behaviours that wereunacceptable to my parents. This in turn most likelyrelativized my previously held standards of "good behaviour". Todeal with the conflicting parenting styles and my resultingambivalence, I believe that I resorted to the compromiseformation of 'vertical' superego-ego ideal splitting. That is,in the presence of my nanny I would suppress and disregard thepreviously internalized values and standards that I hadabstracted from my parents, and conversely, in the presence of myparents I would suppress and disregard the values and standardsthat I internalized from the nanny. This allowed me to maintainmy self-cohesion in relation to these relativized values andstandards in both contexts.I do not remember having felt guilty in relation to my'double standard morality'. Instead, I would simply 'switchgears' depending on which authority figure was present. Onecould hypothesize that in my case, this kind of cross-culturalco-parenting which lasted throughout my latency might havedelayed to some extent, the development and integration of thelimiting-facilitating and rewarding-punitive functions within mysuperego structure. In other words, from the perspective of thepsychodynamics of value, due to the superego-ego ideal splittingwe might conclude that a comfort level was setup with 'doublestandard morality'. In fact, what became a cathected value wasmy skill at the duplicity. Clearly, if we can generalize fromthis outcome, this has significance at the cultural level if the94value for skill at duplicity becomes institutionalized. Mostimportantly, what might develop out of this type of valuerelativization is the dilution of anticipatory guilt as arestraining influence on behaviour generally, because one hasbecome 'comfortable' with simply switching gears.I believe that my particular cross-cultural parenting by thehighly value-cathected Mexican nanny also had a profound impacton my religious orientation. Even though I was born into acatholic tradition, by the time my parents moved to Mexico, myfather had already converted to an atheist position and my familyno longer went to church. However, through 'stimulus complexconditioning', that is, through exposure to the abstract symbolsand values associated with the nanny as valued object, I ended upvalue-cathecting my nanny's "pagan-catholic" beliefs andfaithfully went to church with her every Sunday. Also, with herI believed in a rich world of spiritual forces that we bothattempted to align into our service by the practice of "pagan"rituals. While in my teens, I rejected Catholisism, my "pagan"beliefs resurfaced during my twenties where I became a devoutstudent of the occult. Again, from the point of view of thepsychodynamics of value, what can be seen here is the realignmentof patterns of horizontal and vertical splitting under thepressure of value relativization in an adult stage of identityformation, related to religious and ideological values andstandards.My personal experience also serves to exemplify the95interaction of the three kinds of relativizations proposed inthis thesis, which are: a) developmental relativization ofvalue, b) situational relativization of value, and c) systemic-institutional relativization of value. That is, relativizationof values took place due to my developmental changes, such as newcognitive functions that allowed me to perceive differences invaluing that I assumed previously to be absolute. Also, thecultural dislocation, which resulted in the loss of my Germancultural symbols and exposure to Hispanic-Mexican values andsymbols, is in fact, both a situational and systemic-institutionalized relativization of value where I was exposed tocompeting sets of beliefs and moral codes of behaviour.Here for the purpose of clarity, I have given examples ofthe relativization of my values in the oedipal stage in a cross-culture situation, which demonstrates the interaction between thethree types: developmental, situational and systemic-institutional relativization of value. For in actuality, allthree types probably occur together to some degree, rather thanin isolation.With the oedipal child's increasing social circle that cannow include preschool-kindergarten and neighbourhood friends, andwith exposure to cultural sources such as media, the oedipalstage may indeed be an intense period for relativization ofvalues, contrasted to 'absolutes' previously value-cathectedwithin the family system. For most young children where theparents have been the primary caretakers and highly value-96cathected in positive ways, the ambivalence of this intenseperiod of relativization of values is dealt with throughidentification with the parents' superego during the oedipalresolution. Thus, the family tradition becomes shielded to someextent from external "contamination" throughout the latencyperiod, although to lesser degrees, as the child progressestowards puberty. This resolution of oedipal relativization ofvalue also holds true for the crosscultural child where throughthe internalization of the cultural aspects of the parent'ssuperego, the child becomes foreclosed to some extent, fromassimilating host culture values. If an oedipal child generallydoes not have a more or less positive set of value-cathectionswith the parents this might hinder internalization of familyvalues and standards, and facilitate instead, the idealizationand identification with authority figures and symbols outside ofthe family system and tradition; for example a Kindergartenteacher, or an idealized cultural figure, in order to maintainself-cohesion.As puberty sets in new developmental, situational andsystemic-institutionalized forms of relativization of value areincreasingly encountered. And, while the latency child mighthave refrained from value-cathecting outside the family traditiondue to an attitude of "moral superiority" related to havingaccepted in absolute ways the values and standards consolidatedin the oedipal resolution, the adolescent instead, can turn thefamily context in an arena of battle around values. InDegrees of Consciousness.;••• • •^•Horizontal & VerticalSuperego Splits WithinThe SelfDegrees ofCohesion .' .% •RepressionBarrierDevelopmentalTimePreoedlpal Oedipal Adolescence Adulthood97crosscultural families, the conflict of values and standards,between parents and teens, usually involves more that just the"generation gap", making it more difficult, I believe, for thoseteenagers to achieve an integrated identity around values andstandards due to continued splitting.The next section will elaborate further on a psychodynamicmodel of values and standards in relation to the stage ofadolescence, and its applicability to teenagers in acrosscultural context. Figure III is a rough graphical sketchmeant to schematize the relationships between horizontal andvertical superego splits and developmental time. As can be seen,as complexity increases with development so too does thepotential for superego splitting.Superego Splitting and Developmental Time(Figure III)98The Adolescent Stage of Development In Erikson's (1989) stage model of development, the primarytask in adolescence is to reappraise earlier identifications andattempt to integrate them into a new cohesive identity foroptimal functioning in the coming adult world. In terms of thepsychodynamics of value presented here, the stage of adolescencewill consider: 1) The types of developmental, situational, andsystemic-institutional relativization of value that occur inadolescence; 2) The relationship between the relativization ofvalue and the operation of the separation-individuation processin adolescence; 3) The issue of group membership as being amajor factor in the psychodynamics of value in adolescence; 4)The cross-cultural context as a graphically demonstrative exampleof this issue of group membership in adolescence; 5) Thedetailed functioning of horizontal and vertical superegosplitting in the stage of adolescence.For many teenagers adolescence is a difficult and painfulpassage into adulthood. The relativization of existing valuesand standards potentially threatens the very core of thepreviously consolidated identity of latency, thus, themaintenance of self-cohesion is consistently challenged in thisstage. While the relativization of value in the preoedipalperiod was typically dyadic within the symbiotic mother-childrelationship, and in the oedipal period, was triadic within themother-child-other relationship, the teenager will increasinglydeal with group relativization in the adolescent period. The99task can become potentially more difficult, at least in ourwestern culture, with the great variety of options for self-actualization, where the plethora of choices can overwhelm theteenager with the anxiety of making 'right' decisions. Gergen(1990) refers to the contemporary state of "multiphrenia", wherethere are too many options to pursue, all of which are "good"that results in a condition he calls the "saturated self". Thisis similar in psychological effect, though not cause, to Kohut'sconcept of the "overburdened self" where overstimulation canthreaten the cohesion of the self.If development progresses along normal lines the maturingself in adolescence will have developed formal cognitiveoperations allowing it to more easily shift from an egocentricand absolutist valuing mode, to an increasing awareness of thedialectical relativization of values. For example, while aparent might have been an idealized object in the superego-egoideal structure up until the latency period, maturing cognitivefunctions and wider exposure to adults outside the family groupwill allow the teenager to make more realistic comparisons andassessments of the parent. In this way the youth becomesincreasingly aware of relativization of value both within thefamily group and societal groups at large, where values andstandards that were previously taken as concrete absolutes aremore and more seen in relative terms. We might see this in termsof developmental relativization stimulating greater situationaland systemic-institutional relativization of value.100Another developmental change that I believe is universal andtranscultural, which fuels this intense period of relativizationof value in adolescence is the re-emergence of the separation-individuation process due to physical and psycho-social changes,which propel the youth towards new objects of value in order toconfirm his or her autonomy and differentness from the parents.Blos (1979) in fact, considers adolescence to be the "secondindividuation process" giving it a significance similar toMahler's 'first' separation-individuation process in earlychildhood. Here, the teen engages in the testing of the personalrelevance of the existing, abstract superego-ego ideal structureby experimenting with new experiences and behaviours. Thisexposes the adolescent to new situational contexts that canincreasingly relativize existing value-cathections creatingambivalence and resulting threats to self-cohesion. As well,because of this renewed separation-individuation process, theadolescent is more and more moved away from the family group asrepresentatives of stagnant value, towards new peer groups, andconsequently becomes aware of factions within the social fabricthat have valuing differences. From the point of view of thepsychodynamics of value, the commonly observed mood swings ofteens may be understood as the result of the increased levels ofambivalence in this intensified period of relativization ofvalue, as prior perceptions of good and bad are compared to newvalue found in new experiences. Fundamentally then, what isunderneath these the commonly observed fluctuations in adolescent101behaviour is the testing of abstract value accumulated from'authoritative' sources against personally revitalized valuefound in new experiences. Before discussing these developmentalchanges in more detail, I will attempt to make a case for theuniversality of the separation-individuation process inadolescence.From my clinical and personal experience I am inclined tobelieve that the re-emergence and intensification of theseparation-individuation process in adolescence is transcultural.Many parents that I have worked with, that came from culturesthat did not overtly exhibit parent-teen conflict, confessed tohaving had what I call 'private selves' during their teen years,that were unknown to their parents (Here, 'private self' is usedwith similar meaning as discussed in chapter two, but notrestricted to the context of 'collectivist' cultures). Withinthese private selves they committed transgressions of valuesassociated with the family group and attempted to express theirseparation-individuation needs in symbolic ways.^When probed,most of them admitted to pleasurable feelings in what wasexperienced as self-directed behaviour mixed with anxiety, shame,and guilt feelings. Some of these parents ended up projectingtheir own split-off teenage private self, on to their adolescentchildren, some of which ended up "acting out" aspects of theseparents' projective identifications.More personally, when I was a teenager in the sixties inMexico even though overt defiance towards parents by teenagers102was almost non-existent, many of my peers developed privateselves and experimented with behaviours that were deemedunacceptable by their parents, such as having secret encounterswith boyfriends (as opposed to being chaperoned), where sexualrelations went well beyond the accepted standards. Other friendswould resort to more symbolic gestures to act out a sense ofdifferentness from their parents such as covertly readingforbidden books, or wearing makeup and clothes outside of thehome that were not allowed by the parents.The degrees and kinds of individuality and autonomy that aredesired of course, vary across cultures. Some cultures manage tocultivate strong feelings of obligation in their children,towards becoming what the parents and society at large expectthem to be. Thus, these teens "sublimate" through anticipatoryguilt, fuelled by filial loyalty, a great deal of the impulse toindividuate. Other cultures resort to external controls thatfacilitate supervision and punishment of behaviour deviant fromexpected roles. Here, fear of punishment becomes a limitingfactor in the expression of individualism. However, this pseudo-compliance to parents may in some instances only be surface andteenagers may find creative and symbolic ways to covertly defytheir parents. Here again, the use of a private self that isunknown to the parents is likely to develop in these familial andsocietal groups that, in the above ways, rigidly promote abstractvalues that are experientially removed from basic human drivesand needs, and that subsequently allow little acknowledgment or103expression of new value found in new experience by theiradolescents. Clearly, from the perspective of the psychodynamicsof value, this use of a private self for the purposes ofrebalancing self-cohesion in relation to vitalizing new value-cathections, that are felt to be unsupportable when contrasted tothe prevalent values of the family system is a basic form ofsuperego splitting.However, it is important to note that the development ofsuperego splitting in the form of a private self does not onlycome about as a reaction to an authoritarian family system orcultural group. For adolescents in general, including cross-cultural teens, an increased need for boundary setting with theirparents develops, which appears to be in the service ofprotecting autonomy and denying dependency as legitimatedevelopment needs in and of themselves. This can be deduced frombehaviours such as teens drastically reducing self-disclosures totheir parents compared to the oedipal and latency periods,wanting parents to ask permission before they enter their room,becoming very upset when parents go through their belongings evenwhen they have nothing to hide, being protective of personalnotes and journals, and, wanting their telephone conversationswith peers to be private. These observations suggest theconclusion that the development of a private self, for theprotection of autonomy, is a derivative of the reawakenedtranscultural separation-individuation process and a distinctneed in its own right. This need is perhaps related to the basic104need for self-cohesion in some ways, but is not reducible to thedefense of superego splitting as a means of maintaining self-cohesion.However, once a boundary is created in the service ofautonomy, if systemic-institutional values outside of it are seento be in too great a conflict with values felt to be morepersonally relevant on the inside of it, then the private selfcan come to function largely as a superego split, or, set ofsuperego splits. For example, I have observed that some teensthat come from authoritarian family systems tended to developwhat I call 'amplified private selves' where a great deal ofenergy and secrecy went into maintaining the boundary between thevalues and standards on the outside that were unsupportive of anew set of value-cathections on the inside.Ideally speaking, a parallel process of separation by theparents from their children should take place where theygradually give up authority over their children, to allow thedevelopment of autonomous self-capacities in their unfoldingseparation-individuation process. For, it is also an opportunityfor the parents to reassess their own cathected values andstandards, some of which can become relativized under theinfluence of the newly cathected values of their teenagers. Forinstance, several times I have observed in patriarchal familieswhere mothers are given little power, that the developmentalreawakening of the separation-individuation process in theadolescent can also spark increased need for differentiation by105the mother from her husband. A "feminist daughter" may becomean ideal selfobject for the mother, who may in effect empower themother's own liberation from the patriarchal system.However, frequently the relativization of the mother'svaluing of the patriarchal status quo, which on one hand, mightnow be seen by her as less desirable in the light of the newlycathected values, on the other hand, might also threaten hersense of self-cohesion because fulfilment of important needs arestill being provided by that system in traditionally valued ways.This might mobilize defense mechanisms in the mother to reduce avariety of possible feelings such as guilt, anxiety, loyaltyconflicts, narcissistic tensions and rage induced by thisrelativization of value. One possible way for the mother to dealwith her resulting ambivalence is the denial of her own valuefor the new need to individuate from aspects of patriarchy(horizontal superego split). Then, through projectiveidentification the mother may externalize the repressed valuefor individuation on to the daughter, who becomes the perfecthook for the mother's split-off projection, if she exemplifiesdefiant behaviour towards the patriarchal father. Thus themother vicariously fulfils her repressed need for individuation,through the daughter's rejection the patriarchal system of valuesand standards. The mother may also facilitate amplification ofthe defiance of her daughter towards the father, by giving hernon-verbal encouragements during confrontations, as well as byestablishing covert rules for the daughter that are unknown to106the father, thus supporting the development of collusive superegosplits within the family system.Support for this observation comes from Luepnitz (1988) whoalso suggests that the development of secret alliances between amother and her children in patriarchal families can occur.Again, these kinds of family systems exhibit one set of valuesand standards that are overtly acknowledged in the presence ofthe authoritarian father, but which are covertly defied withadherence to another set of values and standards by the motherand the children, all of which develop collusive 'private selves'in relation to the father and what he stands for.In cross-cultural parent-teen conflict, if the parents havehighly value-cathected their tradition, where much of theiridentity is bound up in their 'cultural self', therelativization of these traditional values and standards isstrongly resisted because the resulting ambivalence due to thisrelativization would strongly disrupt their sense of self-cohesion. This might mobilize in the parents defense mechanismsleading to their foreclosure to change where they cling moreintensely to their tradition. These parents may also react toperceived relativization within the cross-cultural context, bybecoming more authoritarian and controlling with their children,which many times can result in intensified defiance by theteenager. This can occur in either overt or covert ways,sometimes to the point that the teenager resorts to a "negativeidentity" formation that is the polar opposite of the parent, in107order to protect both autonomy and the new set of values that thecross-cultural teen has cathected in their experience of thecross-cultural context. The example of Julia, which will bedescribed later, is a clear example of this type of strategy forthe maintenance of self-cohesion in this situation.As mentioned earlier, the adolescent period is not only atrying time for the parents and the family system as a whole,but also for the teen. Relinquishing parents as idealizedattachment objects and figures of authority due torelativization, may create intense feelings of grief in theteenager. To cope with the loss of this previously cathectedsuperego-ego ideal structure, adolescents transfer their need forattachment and ideal objects of value from the parents, more andmore to idealized peers and cultural symbols outside the familytradition; such as group leaders, sports heroes and movie stars,which function as auxiliary superegos during their restructuringprocess. Usually, teenagers will take on what I call a'transitional identity', where they strongly identify with a'brand name' peer group of some sort. For example, in ourpresent western and local culture, gangs of both criminal andsocial types occur under such labels, as "Bloods", "Lotus gang",and in less dangerous forms as the "Prepies", "Skaters" or"Rockers".^Here, they will begin to wear hairstyles and clothesthat are specific to their attachment group, to reaffirm theirsense of "oneness" and self-cohesion within the group. From thepoint of view of the psychodynamics of value, established108patterns for the maintenance of self-cohesion that wereconsolidated in oedipal and latency periods, and subsequentlydisrupted by the developmental relativization of the re-emergingseparation-individuation process in early adolescence, have beenrebalanced by cathection of new values and standards related togroups outside the family system.According to Tyson (1990), superego restructuring thatinvolves the accommodation-integration of newly cathected valuesand standards from the peer group with the previouslyinternalized parental ones, usually begins with a regressivepersonification of the superego. Here, the previouslyinternalized superego-ego ideal functions and content becomeexternalized through projective identification on to an externalobject of authority. In other words, the self deals with theintrassystemic superego-ego ideal conflict by the defensemechanism of superego splitting, whereby it denies identificationwith the previously internalized values and standards (horizontalsplit), and projects the repressed content on to an authorityfigure. This process allows for the reduction of experiencedambivalence in relation to values and standards and increasesthe sense of self-cohesion. It also resolves for the youth theinternal conflict of loyalties (ie. filial loyalty vs.individuation) with the accompanying feelings of guilt, anxiety,shame and so on, which now are replaced with feelings of self-righteousness in the rejection and defiance of parental valuesand standards. This mechanism demonstrates that the defiance of109teenagers is not always conscious, but in fact, can be a sign ofopportunities for superego-ego ideal restructuring. This is auseful reframe for beleaguered parents.To clarify the early stages of superego restructuring Iwill discuss a cross-cultural family that were clients of mine,because it exemplifies so well the psychodynamics of value inearly adolescence. Julia, a 14 year old teenager from a Spanish-Catholic background came to my attention after her motherinitiated family counselling when she discovered some personalnotes from her daughter that alluded to the effect that she wasdabbling in satanism, while at the same time, her schoolperformance had taken a turn for the worst. The family historyhad been a tumultuous one, where the marriage of the motherended in a bitter divorce because the older daughter haddisclosed sexual abuse by the father. Before the breakup, thefather had been extremely authoritarian and controlling with thedaughters, especially with the one that he was abusing sexually,allowing her little socializing with her peers. Julia hadinternalized the strict standards of her father (identificationwith the aggressor), and had been a compliant and model childduring the latency period. She had also strongly cathected theCatholic beliefs, values and standards, and up to a few monthsbefore entering counselling, would willingly and diligently goto church every Sunday.However, as Julia's developmental need for separation-individuation from the mother gained momentum she transferred110her self-cohesion needs to her peer group, and began to cathecttheir values and standards which were in conflict with herearlier ones. In her particular case, she felt drawn to a groupthat dabbled in satanism partly because it offered her anopportunity to symbolically assert her differentness from hermother, who she construed as being as intolerant to drift fromtradition as her father had been. In actuality, the mother hadmuch more liberal attitudes, but because of a lack ofcommunication the daughter lacked this awareness. Julia wasprobably also drawn to the 'transitional identity' of "SatanWorshipper", that was the polar opposite of being a Catholicbecause her father had sexually abused her sister, even thoughhe espoused being a devoted Catholic, and, because her bestfriend who introduced her to satanism had also been sexuallyabused by her Catholic father. Now, she globally perceived allCatholics as "phony".In terms of the psychodynamics of value, the extremerelativization of Julia's values with the accompanying threatsto self-cohesion, created a need for horizontal superegosplitting (repression) that would allow her to deny herpreviously internalized traditional values and standards, andembrace in absolutist fashion the newly cathected ones. And,through the process of projective identification Julia projectedher now repressed values and standards, extracted in large partfrom the father, on to the mother.^She now experienced hermother similarly to the punitive-forbidding father and as a111result, resorted to the development of a "private self" thatallowed her to covertly differentiate from her distortedrepresentation of the mother.Even though Satanism and Catholicism seem polar opposites,they both provided similar functions in the maintenance ofJulia's self-cohesion. The Catholic worldview had allowed Juliato bind existential anxiety with the belief that if she chose tofollow the Ten Commandments, she would have control over entranceto heaven, the place of ultimate safety for the experientialself. While conversely, Satanism promised immortality throughalliance with the evil but all powerful forces.During one of our family sessions Julia described anightmare in which she found herself trapped in a huge house,full of darkness and evil apparitions that she was desperatelytrying to get away from. She could see her mother through barredwindows, calling her and stretching her arms out towards her butcould not find an exit to the bright outside world. This dream Ibelieve, symbolized to me, that Julia was beginning to relativizeher values again, and was now struggling to integrate her split-off superego parts.At the end of my involvement, Julia had decided to rejectCatholicism and stopped going to church, something her motherwas prepared to accept. However, she also decided to stop herinvolvement with her satanic peer group and instead began toworship a more benign God again.For the cross-cultural teenager who has value-cathected112host culture values and standards, the intrasystemic conflictwithin the superego is potentially more acute then in mainstreamadolescents, sometimes manifesting itself in more severe superegosplitting. In some extreme cases the valuing process can becomedichotomized, where what is perceived by the teenager aspositively value-cathected is personified by the peer group,while the traditional group becomes anti-cathected and becomesthe personification of all that is negative. Some cross-culturalteenagers even internalize the racist attitudes of themainstream culture towards their own ethnic group. For example,once I had a thirteen year old Indocanadian boy who defiantlyrefused to have any social contact with his ethnic group, and hadrun away from home several times, in the hope of being placed ina foster home. He also would pick fist fights with otherIndocanadian schoolmates and call them "diaperheads".In this case, the strong anti-cathecting of the ethnic groupand their tradition was partly due to the dysfunctionality ofhis family system. His father was an unemployed alcoholic whohe perceived as weak and pathetic, thus possibly hinderingidentification with the traditional values of the father.Another important factor that could have contributed to thisextreme reaction was his need for acceptance from peers that heperceived as rejecting and racist towards his ethnic group.The teenager's ambivalence towards values and standards mayalso result in the formation of vertical superego splits, wherethe self shifts (consciously or unconsciously) from valuing and113accepting one set of values and standards, to complete disregardand denial of that set, in favour of another set under differentcircumstances. For the cross-cultural teenager the verticalsuperego splitting might involve identification with parentalvalues and standards within the family context, only to beabruptly disregarded and substituted for peer values andstandards within the peer group context.To exemplify vertical superego splitting, I will use here,an example of a nineteen year old single Indocanadian femaleclient that sought counselling with the presenting problem thatshe was experiencing frequent conflicts with her boss, and, whoshe perceived as being very critical of her work performance.Her life had recently also become complicated because she washaving a secret romantic relationship with an Indocanadian whowas committed to an arranged marriage with a woman that wasstill in India.The client was still living at home with her parents who shedescribed as traditional but very loving. Her childhood had beena happy one and the parent's marriage, which was arranged by thegrandparents, seemed ideal. Her relationship with her parents hadalways been good, and she had been a model compliant child. Sheexperienced some discrimination in school, but had always felt asense of belonging and acceptance within her ethnic community.During the early stages of counselling, in some sessions,the client would express strong commitment and pride towards herethnic tradition and rationalize the impossibility of her114relationship. In that mode she would express strong filialloyalty and intense feelings of guilt for having betrayed herparents. She was also concerned of shaming herself and thefamily within the ethnic community. In other sessions she woulddisclose her wish to marry her present boyfriend, and wouldrationalize her tradition away, which was being reinforced bysome coworkers who were advising her to go with her heart. Shealso expressed feelings of anger towards her boyfriend for notstanding up to his parents and marrying her. On one occasionshe also allowed herself to express anger towards her parents formaking her feel obligated to follow the traditions.From the perspective of the psychodynamic model beingpresented here, the client seemed to have highly value-cathected her tradition including the belief in arrangedmarriages, possibly in large part because her parents had beensuch good role models. Also in this case, her invalidatingexperiences with peers from the host culture might haveforeclosed her to some extent from value-cathecting the valuesand standards from the host culture. In contrast, the sense ofvalidation and belonging she experienced with her peers in theethnic community probably helped reinforce the tradition of herfamily system.But now, the abstract value-cathected belief in arrangedmarriages was being relativized in the face of the experience-near valuing of her present romantic relationship. However, thevalue of her romantic experience was also being relativized by115her loyalty bonds towards her parents and her experienced guiltfor betraying them. The resulting ambivalent feelings whichthreatened the client's sense of self-cohesion, due to beingpulled in opposite directions, triggered the formation of avertical superego split. This compartmentalization of her valuesallowed her to be both, still loyal to her parents and at thesame time continue in her relationship.I also hypothesized that this client was having atransference reaction towards her boss whereby she was to someextent, projecting on to the boss, her feared disapproval fromher father. Also, through the projection she was able todisplace some of the anger she felt towards her parents on to theboss, a relational context in which she allowed herself to beassertive towards a figure of authority.During the course of counselling the boyfriend broke offthe relationship and for a while, the client reverted back to thetraditional mode. However, she gradually shifted back into therealm of value ambiguity but instead of splitting this time, sheheld together in that uncomfortable state, in the cohesionmaintaining structure of the psychotherapeutic context, and beganthe process of integration. In the course of the process shehad some fruitful discussions with her parents, who agreed torespect her choice to have the last say in the choice of amarriage partner, but at the same time, she was committed tostrongly consider prospective choices by her parents. Thus, theclient became a catalyst in the relativization of her parents116values which also lead to increased integration of ethnic andmainstream values in them.As can be seen from the above examples, adolescence isindeed a tumultuous time, especially for cross-culturalteenagers where the sense of cohesion is very fragile due toincreased, developmental, situational, and systemic-institutionalrelativization of values that were previously held as absolutes.This conflictual ambivalence may serve to motivate furtherdevelopment and differentiation of superego structure and egofunctions, but it almost invariably leads to greater or lesserdegrees of superego splitting to manage disintegrative anxietyrelated to the disruptions of self-cohesion. And, while somesplitting might be considered as developmentally advantageous,more severe and persistent splitting can come at a high cost tothe self, where such compartmentalization results in regressionto an earlier stage of development and/or foreclosure to newgrowth in the self.This section has looked at the stage of adolescence in termsof the psychodynamics of value. It has considered the effects ofdevelopmental, situational, and systemic-institutionalrelativization of value that occur in this stage, with particularemphasis on these effects as related to the issue of groupmembership which intensifies in the adolescent period. Thecross-cultural context has also been drawn out in this section,as a situation that graphically highlights this issue of groupmembership in adolescence. Most centrally, this section has117tried to demonstrate in some detail, the functioning of superegosplits in the psychodynamics of value as related to theoccurrences of the relativization of values and standards in theadolescent stage of life.The next section will attempt to look at the stage ofadulthood in terms of the psychodynamics of value.The Adult Stage of Development As discussed earlier, transition into adulthood may bepreceded by a tumultuous adolescent period, where the self feelsvery fragile in the face of developmental, situational andsystemic-institutional relativization of value, especially ifthose relativized values were central in functioning as coreregulators for the maintenance of self-cohesion. This sectionwill attempt to look at the struggles with these types of valuerelativization in adulthood on three different levels: 1) Theindividual adult's experience of challenges to his or her self-cohesion from competing value systems in a complex society. 2)The phenomena of 'within group disjunction' where splittingoccurs along the lines of values and standards within groups asopposed to individuals. 3) And, a broader dimension wheregroups are involved, but the values and standards at issue havebecome visible phenomena at a culturally institutionalized leveland take on, in the words of Gergen, the form of "totalizingdiscourses".118In an ideal world, cultures would provide support systemsfor adolescents on their way to adulthood that would act to'cushion' the discomforting states of ambivalence experiencedduring this process of relativization of value. Such idealcultural support for the new psychic structure building ofadolescence, or any psychosocial transition, would encourageconscious appraisal of previously cathected values and standards,in order to better facilitate psychic integration at new levels.Most importantly, increased conscious cultural support for thesepsychosocial transitions, in the form of critical reflection onthe process and psychological function of valuing itself, asopposed to overfocusing on the more abstract content of valueswould tend to minimize the destructive implementation ofregressive defense mechanisms and superego splitting.In our western culture some privileged individuals have theoption of a 'contained moratorium', that is, a time and placewhere they can compare, experiment with, and reflect on newvalues and standards, in a fairly safe environment such as acollege or university which supports the experiencing ofambivalence, and allows postponement of commitment to the valuesand standards of any particular adult social role (Marcia, 1980).However, for a large number of individuals in our culture thisoption is not feasible, where instead individuals are byexpectation and circumstance required to make a fairly rapidtransition into assuming the responsibilities and values of anadult role before, or, shortly after high school graduation.119Functionally, this may adequately meet basic circumstantial needsrelated to economy, family systems and individual self-cohesion,but may deprive the person of the opportunity for developingtolerance and experience with ambivalence and consequentdisruptions of self-cohesion related to value relativization.From the point of view of the psychodynamics of value, anindividual who has not had positive experience with the toleranceof ambivalence related to value relativization will tend to bemore prone to regressive superego splitting in adulthood.As the young adult separates and individuates from thefamily, she seeks affiliation with new groups to fulfil the needfor belonging and merger to something greater then herself whichmirrors the beginning adult self, and alleviates existentialisolation. This identification with the group functions to give asense of empowerment, safety, and meaning in life, while helpingbind existential anxiety and increase the sense of self-definition and cohesion. However, this need for group membershipwhich functions to support the individuating adult self has auniversal price. The price demanded in any cultural context issome sign of the acceptance of the groups beliefs, values andstandards, in order to maintain self-cohesion of the individualat some new level of integration, as well as maintain thecohesion of the group itself.Once again, from the perspective of the psychodynamics ofvalue, the more rigid a group is about adherence to its valuesand standards, the more it potentially sets an adult up for120superego splitting in order to belong. However, this dynamic ofgroup rigidity priming the individual for superego splittingoccurs with developmental qualifications. For an adult who hasnot adequately developed self-regulating capacities related tothe maintenance of self-cohesion, we can say that generally, theywill have a stronger need to value-cathect in a less criticalway, the value systems of such a group. For example, in workingwith clients involved in diverse types of "cults" I have observedthat they tend to have a history of traumatic failure related tothe need for maintenance of self-cohesion. In fact, I havenoticed that the time of entry into such a group is oftencorrelated with a personal crisis where self-cohesion has beenseverely disrupted. Here, there may be observed global superegosplits where alternate and previous value systems are repudiatedwholesale, in favour of the group ideology because of thepsychological functions it provides at the critical time.On the other hand, the adult who has had "good enough"experiences related to self-cohesion developmentally, andtherefore is more able to self-regulate challenges to self-cohesion, will be less motivated to value-cathect in any absoluteway narrow group values. This less developmentally desperateadult will in effect, have a higher tolerance for ambivalencerelated to the potential value relativizations of groupmembership, and be more comfortable with the reality of having'contextualized selves' in a complex society such as ours; witha greater ability to maintain self-cohesion at functional levels121while integrating perceived differences in group value systems.For, it is the norm in our complex Western culture that adultsmust adapt to increasing group diversity and specialization, andthe different values and standards each can represent. In short,the healthy adult must be able to integrate to some functionaldegree, while maintaining some minimum level of self-cohesion,these varying value systems, and develop a comfort level with arepitoire of contextualized selves in order to function with anysocial range at all.From the point of view of the psychodynamics of value, wemay extract a principle from the above related to adultfunctioning and group membership: The degree of absolute andglobal value-cathection of group values and standards will tendto covary with the degree of development of self-regulatingcapacities for the maintenance of self-cohesion. And, corollaryto this, destructive superego splitting will tend to occur themore one value-cathects in absolute and global fashion, thedifferent values and standards of different groups.Support for this principle related to adult functioning in acomplex society can be found in many different sources. Forexample, in most present day cultures, the adult world iscomprised of competing groups such as political, religious,consumer-financial and so on, that actively seek new members fromthe adult population. These groups, through the use of emotionalappeal in various forms such as charismatic personalities andimages implying ideal and absolute self-fulfilment are contrasted122with the less than ideal existential realities of its audience.This invokes relativization of the audience's values and takeadvantage of the experienced ambivalence by offering magicalsolutions for fulfilment of basic human drives and needs withinthe dimension of group belonging; while common anxieties andfears are associated with group exclusion and rejection. This,coupled with a charismatic leader promoting such ideal-types, whoprojects self-assuredness and personal power, triggers idealizingtransferences in his audience who may then be more prone tocathect the values he espouses as necessary for group membership.Thus, the resulting identification with the leader and his grouphelps individuals achieve a sense of identity and self-cohesion.For those individuals with developmental vulnerabilities aroundmaintaining self-cohesion, this exposure to competing "culturalselfobjects" in Kohut's words, can result in limiting over-identification with the particular images of what is good andvaluable. An extreme negative example of over-identificationwith "cultural selfobjects" can be seen in the tragedy of 'JonesTown', where parents ended up killing their own children andthemselves under the command of their idealized leader. Clearly,these particular individuals' sense of self-cohesion had becomehostage to an over-valued leader and the abstract system ofbeliefs he and the group stood for; and it is extremely painfulto imagine the degree of superego splitting these parents musthave engaged in, in order to participate in the killing of theirchildren.123As can be seen from the above example, individuals canpotentially develop such great dependency on a group and theirleader for the maintenance of self-cohesion, that they buywholesale the 'culture of value' exemplified by the particulargroup. And, if the group has little tolerance for differentnessamong its members, it interferes with the development of self-differentiation and individual boundaries which can then lead tomember exploitation by unscrupulous leaders.These claims about the degree of rigidity of adherence towithin group values as priming individual members for superegosplitting leads to another level of understanding about themechanism and effects of splitting in a psycho-social context.From the point of view of the psychodynamics of value, thephenomenon of splitting does not only occur within the psychicrealm of an individual, but can also be observed to take placewithin a group at a collective level. Kahn (1991) refers to thisprocess as "group disjunction", and observes the relationshipwith individual psychic splitting. She writes:"Like splitting, disjunction is a mechanism that separatespartly organized sets of experiences from the main bodyof experiences. Intrapsychically and in groups, this maytake the form of a "horizontal split", resulting from therepression of unacceptable ideas and feelings from the realmof consciousness into the unconscious; or a "verticalsplit", which maintains conscious awareness of contradictoryideas and feelings, although not simultaneously... Grotstein(1981) writes that "the ego can split itself off from theperception of an unwanted aspect of itself or can split anobject into two or more objects in order to locate polarizedimmiscible qualities separately"...Repudiated and disavowedideas and feelings in groups may manifest themselves by theformation of discrete subgroups, which become the containersor the symptoms of the disjunction."124This relationship between individual splitting and groupsplitting or disjunction, when seen in the context of superegosplits is particularly important to the psychodynamics of value.For, from the perspective of the psychodynamics of value,superego splits which occur in individuals, but also occur for agroup of individuals along similar lines of values and standards,is a major phenomena of adult life; accounting for a large amountof conflict at this stage of development. Critical to thisphenomena is the fact that the maintenance of individual andgroup cohesion remains tied to splitting within groups, along thelines of shared values and standards.^Again, a central claim ofthis thesis is that the extent to which one is aware of howintimately their self-cohesion is related to value, they will bepotentially less defensively reactive. For when individualsuperego splitting is triggered collectively in the process ofvalue relativization on wider cultural levels, resulting in groupdisjunctions along shared lines of values and standards, withlittle awareness of this dynamic between self-cohesion andvaluing as a fundamental psychosocial process, the stage is setfor degrees of violent defense of the values at issue which areoften perceived as absolutes. However, this thesis also claimsthat it is this very awareness of the dynamic relationshipbetween self-cohesion and group values that is most missing ingroup conflict.Further support for these claims can be found in ErikErikson's (1989) recent review of his theory of psychosocial125stages, where he makes reference to the phenomenon of communallyshared defense mechanisms that can:"assume an ecological value in the lives of interrelatedpersons and in communal life...are shared orcounterpointed as they become part of the ritualizedinterplay of individuals, and families as well as oflarger units."We can relate Erikson's notion of shared defenses to thedefense of individual and group self-cohesion where he statesthat:"At the same time, only two or more persons sharing acorresponding world image as well as a language can, formoments, merge their "I"s into a "we"."In other words, the original structure of a preoedipalcohesive self, where the cohesion of the infant is maintained bythe symbiotic quality of its relation to the caretaker as objectof positive value, persists into adulthood in the form of adultcohesion being maintained through symbolic symbiosis based onshared views and values. This reality of adult cohesion beingmaintained through such symbolic symbiosis of shared meaning andvalue systems cannot avoid, in a complex society, multiplechallenges from competing meaning and value systems; or asErikson says from competing "sisterhoods and brotherhoods". Mostimportantly, for the psychodynamics of value, this inevitablyresults to what Erikson refers to as "pseudo-speciation".^Thatis :"...that split into imaginary species which has providedadult rejectivity with a most moralistic rationalization ofthe hate of otherness. Such "speciation" has supported themost cruel and reactionary attributes of the superego whereit was used to reinforce the narrowest tribalconsciousness, caste exclusiveness, and nationalistic and126racist identity, all of which must now be recognized asendangering the very existence of the whole species in atechnological civilization."What we see in Khan and Erikson is support for thewidespread effect on human behaviour, of splitting in relation tovalues and standards, on individual, group, and cultural levels;which are always interrelated.This process of pseudo-speciation, which amounts to thedifferential valuing of people and behaviour, can be seen wheregroups have cathected highly abstract values and standards, whichare far removed from human experience, leading to the developmentof within-group disjunctions, and the establishment of systemic-institutionalized relativization of values.For example, twenty years ago when I lived in Mexico girlswere told to deny and devalue their sexuality, which was onlyproper for the purpose of procreating children within a marriage.However, the boys were indoctrinated with "machismo" wheremanliness was equated with sexual conquests. Even though thesemen would go to great lengths to preserve the honour of theirvirginal sisters, they would not hesitate to seduce someoneelse's sister and slander her name afterwards. Thus, the men inthis particular culture exemplified a collective orinstitutionalized vertical split, where behaviours that wereacceptable in one set of circumstances (to seduce a virgin), wasnot tolerated in other contexts (to have a sister seduced). And,we can say that in relation to this institutionalized splitconcerning good and bad women, women were differentially127'speciated' according to their sexual behaviour.That is, in this particular Mexican-Hispanic culture, thefemale image had been dichotomized into two distinct polarimages: a) The asexual-virginal woman that becomes thenurturing, self-sacrificing wife-mother, and, b) The temptressto be outwitted and used. The "machismo" philosophy in my teenyears encouraged men to give the "seduction test" to women andfind out to which category she belonged. The ones that wanted tobe considered "good girls" had to pretend nonarousal in romanticencounters, which then made them desirable as a future wife.While the girls that allowed themselves to be seduced, would bepublicly slandered by the "conquistadores" and would becomecollectively objectified or, 'speciated', as subhuman and lustfulbeings to be used and abused as sexual objects by others. As canbe gathered, the value of sexuality itself was relativizedbetween these two images which had become institutionalized manygenerations earlier and is still to some degree present today.Similarly, as in family systems, disjunctions within groupsare maintained by collective projections and interlockingprojective identifications between subgroups, so that thosesegments act out affects or attitudes that the group as a wholeis unable to acknowledge and integrate. In the above example,the Catholic-Hispanic culture with its highly abstract valuesystem that denied female sexuality, resulted in groupdisjunction, where a subgroup of women became the recipients ofthe disavowed female sexuality.128It has already been discussed how some cultures dichotomizemany other values along gender lines, such as assertivness andindependence being desirable in males, while for femalescompliance and dependence is the cultural ideal, and how bothsexes act out for each other through interlocking projectiveidentifications, the repressed collective horizontal splits inboth sexes, that do not allow the expression of basic humandrives and needs in both men and women.Another example of group disjunction can be observed in theCatholic Church, where the symptom of the disjunction wasexemplified by Catholic priests who sexually abused children.Some of these priests appeared to have acted in collusiveconcert, supporting and covering up the abusive behaviour of eachother, in effect institutionalizing such abuse in orphanages andCatholic schools. The Catholic culture, with its abstract valuingof asexuality by its members at large and the demand of celibacyby its priests, could not contain experience-near humansexuality. And, as Jung pointed out, when the "shadow complex",defined as potential selves that strive for expression, isdenied, it may end up manifesting itself in perverted ways. Atthe individual level, these priests most likely dealt with therelativization of their sexuality between abstract value andexperiential desire, by vertical superego splitting that allowedthem to temporarily suspend their Catholic morals and expresstheir otherwise repressed sexuality in perverted ways.Group disjunction is a phenomenon that can also be readily129observed in the American culture at large, with its variousethnic subgroups, where the "melting pot" ideal has beenunsuccessful to a large degree, and instead, the divergent groupshave become fragmented from each other. The movie "Jungle Fever"exemplifies this beautifully, where we are given a picture of NewYork City that is composed of ethnic groups, each of which havefollowed to a great degree the "separation mode" of cross-cultural encounter to maintain their unique culture, and avoid"contamination" from the others. Again, one could generalizethat individuals who follow the "separation mode" are motivatedto do so when self-cohesion has become, in the course ofdevelopment, heavily invested in ethnic specific "culturalselfobjects".^Here, the "cultural self" has been rigidlystructured around abstract values for maintaining self-cohesion,which in the new cultural context, are held to at the expense offorming a more adaptive contextual self, that is able to tolerateambivalence and integrate abstract values with new experience-near valuing. In the movie, a black man and an Italian womanfall in love, where the experience-near valuing of theirrelationship, relativizes their different abstract ethnic values.However, in the end, their relationship was not strong enough onits own to support enough self-cohesion for either to break awayfrom the loyalty bonds to their respective ethnic groups.Unfortunately, disjunction or splits between ethnic groupsare often cemented with the value-cathection of stereotypicalrepresentations, which serve as the basis for collective130projections from one ethnic group towards the other. Thesecollective projections can then be acted out in the many forms ofdiscrimination where for example, it is felt as an absolute fact,that members of ethnic groups are indeed 'inferior, dirty,untrustworthy, and malicious'. And then, if the recipients ofthese projections are an ethnic minority who lack social-political powers of repudiation, they may internalize and act outthese received stereotypical projections as psycho-socialrealities. This process may be seen as associated with the mostviolent and prolonged types of group conflict.Gergen (1991) observes that when the social atmosphere of agroup is one of "totalizing discourses", such systems will tendt o:"...truncate, oppress, and obliterate alternative forms ofsocial life... and set the stage for schism....Whenconvinced of the truth or right of a given worldview, aculture has only two significant options: totalitariancontrol or the opposition or annihilation of it."From the point of view of the psychodynamics of value, thissupports the view that when abstract value is relied on for themaintenance of self-cohesion without awareness of the intimateconnection between individual and group cohesion and culturalvalues, the most destructive of effects is potentially possible;including as Erikson suggested, annihilation of the human race.These dramatic dynamics at the cultural level are broughtfull circle where we remember the observation of Kohut (1985),which is a central starting point for the psychodynamics ofvalue, that "fanaticism" in groups can be directly linked to131group values functioning as important "cultural selfobjects" inthe regulation of self-cohesion. The self tends to stronglyresist relativization of such values which are experienced as anextension of the self, and therefore, when these values arechallenged, it is experienced by the self as a personal attack,rejection, and narcissistic injury, that leads to disruption ofself-cohesion and consequent defensive feelings of rage and angertowards the challenging object.The narcissistic rage of group members can be powerfullydirected by leaders into the commission of atrocities towardsperceived "outsiders" that are viewed as a threat to the group'ssense of oneness, safety and cohesion. One only has to turn onthe television to see numerous examples of disjunctions withinthe human race, where collective narcissistic rage which isfuelled by perceived threats to cultural selfobjects results inwarring factions. Under the sway of such rage, members objectifythe perceived enemy, and cease to feel an empathic link based ontheir mutual humanity. This is what social psychology refers toas the phenomenon of "social distancing".^Such groups,exemplify a collective split in their code of ethics, wheremembers follow one set of values and standards with groupinsiders, while another set of ethics is applied to perceived"outsiders". This relativization of values in relation to"outsiders" can become institutionalized whose power may persistthroughout many generations.In extreme cases, the group as a whole can regress into a132state of "mob morality" that allows the expression of archaicsexual and aggressive drives against "outsiders", as for example,when soldiers in Vietnam committed atrocities such as the rape,mutilation and killing of innocent Vietnamese children and women.These soldiers exemplified situationally induced verticalsuperego splitting that allowed them to temporarily suspend theirusual morality, and value instead, the gratification of sadisticdrives. Such splitting within each soldier, was not onlytriggered by ambivalent feelings towards the "enemy", but suchextreme objectification of the victims was also facilitated bythe recursive dynamic relationships of each individual inrelation to the leader and the involved group as a whole, whichreinforced regressive splitting at the collective level withinthis group.In our complex modern world, where many sociopolitical-economic structures are in a state of increasing flux, manyindividuals are setup to potentially experience an intensifiedrelativization of their values. As counsellors and therapiststhe most frequent and concrete example of value relativizationwe are likely to encounter in adult populations are clientsundergoing change in social roles. For example, an increasingnumber of adults in our society are having to deal with change inwork roles, due to social-technological change. It is widelyrecognized that such role change can be variably stressful as itdemands adaptation to change in many related but differentdimensions of the persons life. From the perspective of the133psychodynamics of value, one of these central dimensions of theperson stressed by role change involves the sense of self-cohesion as related values and standards are relativized by suchchange. In terms of job change this is true to the degree thatthe individual has highly value-cathected his work role andrelied on it heavily for self-definition and the maintenance ofself-cohesion. As counsellors, we may be in better position tohelp such individuals deal with the stress of change in workroles if we have an awareness of the psychodynamics of value, andso are able to help individuals identify and cope with theambivalence, and potential superego splitting largely related tothe relativization of self-value, that is at issue in suchchange.Conclusion This chapter has attempted to present a model for thedevelopment of the self in relation to values in terms of theprocesses and mechanisms involved in the psychodynamics of value.One central concept here, has been the self's innate tendency tovalue-cathect objects relative to their need-fulfilling function,where perhaps the most basic need is, the maintenance of self-cohesion. It has also been discussed how the self's value-cathexis of objects may vary, and that this relativization ofvalue results in ambivalent tensions, that may be experienced asfeelings of anxiety, rage, guilt, shame, low self-esteem and so134on. The self in an attempt to maintain the threatened self-cohesion as value cathected objects that have come to beassociated with it are relativized, moves development ofintrapsychic structure in three fundamental directions: a) Thedifferentiation of ego functions; b) The development of superegostructure; and c) Defensive splitting of self and objects,including values and standards. The latter will tend to beemphasized, if the ego feels overwhelmed in its attempt tomaintain self-cohesion in the face of the task for integration ofa new and more complex awareness of the relativized object ofvalue.This psychodynamic model of value is initiated early on inthe preoedipal stage within the dyadic relational context ofmother and child leading to self and object constancy, andrepeats itself numerous times, in different forms throughoutdevelopment. Later, nodal points in the relativization of valuesthat were emphasized in this thesis were: a) The oedipal conflictperiod, where relativization is predominantly triadic involvingboth parents and which normally culminates in the consolidationof a superego structure; b) Adolescence, where previously value-cathected objects are predominantly relativized by the peergroup's values and that ideally should lead to the formation of astable identity; and c) Adulthood, where modern man's exposureto competing group values has reached dramatic levels thatrequire the development of a repertoire of contextualized selvesin order to function with any social range at all, while135maintaining self-cohesion at functional levels during attempts tointegrate the perceived varying value systems.This thesis also distinguished three different generic formsof value relativization: a) Developmental, where establishedvalues are relativized within the context of developmentalpressures; b) Situational, where awareness of valuerelativization is brought about by situations; and, c) Systemic-institutionalized, where relativization of value has been carriedover from historic situations in the form of stated or unstateddouble standards, that is, collective splits or groupdisjunctions.As counsellors, we can help clients deal with valuerelativizations by facilitating critical reflection on theprocess and psychological function of valuing itself, rather thenfocusing on the more abstract content of values. And, byproviding a safe therapeutic relational context, that helpssustain functional levels of self-cohesion in the face of valueambiguity. This will enable the client to be better able to avoidthe costs of regressive splitting, and instead, facilitate moreefficient integration and differentiation.136CHAPTER FOURAREAS OF APPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHThe relevance of a psychodynamic model of value rests on theassumption that the self has the innate tendency to attach anemotionally charged value to its interaction with objects, andthat such "value-signs" can perform psychological functions, andbecome in themselves, powerful motivators in subsequentencounters with people and situations. The model ispsychodynamic because the self is conceived of as a conflictedentity that must continually seek compromises between opposingintrapsychic tensions. This thesis proposes the relativizationof value as a major, developmentally continuous, and thereforeinescapable source of intrapsychic tension; which can be resolvedboth constructively and destructively throughout life. Thispsychodynamic model of value particularly calls for the insightsof psychoanalytic developmental and depth psychology, into thestructuralization of psychological functioning involving value,to be applied to conflicts between values and standardsgenerally. The view of this thesis is that the psychological actof attachment to value, or, value-cathection, always performsmultiple functions; biological, psychological, aesthetic, social,political; and so on, but that most attempts at the resolution ofvalue conflicts only focus on superficial content, as opposed tothe deeper function of the values at issue, in the psychic137economies of the individuals involved. Thus, this thesis hasattempted to formulate a transcultural psychodynamic model ofvalue, the constructs of which are hoped to be found useful inthe understanding and prediction of human behaviour related toconflicts between values and standards.This model does not claim to be absolute and final, butinstead, should be considered open to change in the light of newclinical observations that point to revisions of this model.Rice and Greenberg (1984), refer to this cyclic process as the"discovery oriented approach", where tentative theories aretested against observations which in turn "fine tune" themodels.The proposed psychodynamic model of value may also be testedempirically to establish its construct validity. For instance,the most general inference from this model would be thatindividuals in a situation creating ambivalence towards corevalues will have significantly higher scores on an anxiety scalethan a group that is not in a situation creating ambivalencetowards core values. This could be taken as an operationalizedmeasure of the disruption of the psychological function of self-cohesion maintenance by core values. Such a naturally occurringsituation may be the crosscultural context, where by definition,core values of intersecting cultural groups are open torelativization and therefore, the subsequent experiencing ofambivalence towards them. A specific case within thisnaturalistically occurring research context, for the testing of138hypotheses about the psychodynamics of value, might involve thatof the crosscultural teenager in the process of identityformation. The psychodynamic model of value would predict that ingeneral, crosscultural teenagers would score significantly higherin ambivalence towards values when compared to their mainstreamcounterparts. It would also predict a positive correlationbetween scores of ambivalence towards values and scores onanxiety. One could further hypothesize that for certain ethnicgroups, where filial loyalty is high, ambivalence towards ethnicvalues may also correlate with high scores on a guilt scale.Such empirical research may also help us design programs andservices that reflect the specific needs of our various ethniccommunities, which may potentially help prevent tragic symptomsof crosscultural stress such as suicidal ideation and attempts,clinical depressions and psychosomatic disorders in crossculturalclients.One potential area of application of this model is in theeducational-preventative field. Educating individuals aboutvaluing processes, and helping them develop skills thatfacilitate critical evaluation and selection of competing values,may help in dealing with inevitable conflicts between values andstandards with less dysfunctional effect. Such education, forinstance, could be made part of our school curriculum, wherestudents are educated about the function of values in psycho-social economies, as opposed to being solely focused on thecontent of values. This may promote the ability to examine139values, implicit and explicit, and help develop the capacity tomake less conflicted value choices based on this 'functional'knowledge of the psychodynamics of value, as distinct fromknowledge about the specific content of values. This use of anunderstanding of the psychodynamics of value may haveapplicability to all levels of developmental and social conflict,where confusion between function and content is, in the view ofthis thesis, often an unrecognized basis for values conflict.For example, conflict between ethnic groups might be minimized byexploring with students commonalities in transcultural drives andneeds, and the similar functions that different values play inthe psychic economies of such divergent groups. Such a learningenvironment might facilitate the formation of empathic links andincreased tolerance for the culturally different, and aid in thedevelopment of relational ethics that have a higher degree ofacceptability and integrative power for all parties involved.Another potential area of application of this model is inthe education of parents on the types of relativization of valuethat their children will experience, and the various stages ofdevelopment at which they might most typically experiencedevelopmental, situational, and systemic-instituitonalheightening of ambivalence around value-cathections. Thisdevelopmental knowledge of value may then serve as the basis formaking better choices in childrearing practices that areconducive to helping children develop adaptive and stageappropriate ego functions and superego structures, and minimize140defensive superego splitting.The presented psychodynamic model of value suggests that achild's development of an internal "moral agency" may be affectedadversely if the father and mother differ greatly in theirvalues related to childrearing practices. Such a child, ifmotivated to please both parents, will most likely develop asuperego structure that exhibits vertical splitting, and then,the presence of different external authorities may serve as cuesfor acting-out different values in different contexts; a patternof superego splitting that may persist into adulthood. In otherwords, this kind of a familial context may hinder the child'sdevelopment of a consistent and integrated internal moral agencythat can function in the absence of an external authority. Highrisk groups would include children of cross-cultural marriagesand of divorced parents.In the preventative field, prenatal education couldemphasize the importance of parents practicing discussions wherethey attempt to come to a consensus in relation to theirchildrearing practices. This does not mean that parents have toshare exactly the same values. What is important is that theirfuture child will perceive them, for the most part, as supportiveof each other's value as parents, while modelling a dialogicalprocess that acknowledges distinctions between clarification ofvalue-content and clarification of value-function, as a movetowards establishing a psycho-social ambiance which may helpprevent undue ambivalence and defensiveness in the face if141inevitable value relativization. This kind of a familial contextwould facilitate identification with the parents and theinternalization not only of their specific values and standardsthat will become operative in the superego of the child; butalso, would support internalization of a functional part of thechild's ego-superego structure with the ability regulateintrasystemic conflicts within the superego itself.For parents that are divorcing, services that may help themto clarify the content and functions of values in relation tocontinued, but separate parenting of their children might be auseful adjunct to the divorce process. Such preventativemeasures could minimize the conflict of loyalties and the settingup of double standards in children of divorced parents, andtherefore, provide a conducive environment for the continuingdevelopment of an integrated superego structure without excessivesuperego splitting occurring.As mentioned in chapter three, this model suggests thatvalue is differentially attached to stereotyped sex roles, andthat research on this area may be facilitated with anunderstanding of the psychodynamics of value involved. Where themother is the primary caretaker of young children there aredifferences between male and female children in their experienceof the relativization of the value the mother, in the separation-individuation process, that may have implications for thedevelopment of both sexes throughout the lifecycle. The oedipalstage for example, demands of boys that they renunciate their142early identification with the mother in a more abrupt anddiscontinuous way than girls, and identify with the father orsome other culturally valued male image. For the male thisamounts to a greater degree of relativization of establishedvalue for the primary object of attachment, and not onlyincreases the possibility of superego splitting for boys duringthe oedipal resolution, but also, according to Chodorow(Luepnitz,1988), predisposes males to experience intimacydifferently from women. This, in fact, may be an early basis formisunderstanding between the sexes which is only beginning to beresearched. This thesis suggests that the constructs presentedin the model of the psychodynamics of value may be applicable tothe furthering of such research.Related to using the constructs of the psychodynamics ofvalue to research the developmental structuralization of genderidentity differences is the area of research into differentchildrearing practices, which may help perpetuate stereotyped sexroles that limit the options for both sexes. While it wassuggested above that it would be useful to look at parental'consensus' on childrearing practices, in this context one mightapproach the establishment of a bifurcated culture along genderlines, through an understanding of the psychodynamics of valueinvolved in 'different' childrearing practices themselves, whichserve to maintain and transmit gender differences in values andstandards. When such gender differences are established as acultural context, the expression of basic needs and drives in143both sexes can be subject to patterns of denial and distortion.For example, men may be unable to express dependency needs andwomen may be discouraged from being assertive as a result ofspecific childrearing practices.^These childrearing practicesthen can be seen as amounting to the cultural imposition ofpatterns of repression of basic drives and needs, which then maycreate the conditions for various kinds of superego splitting andprojective processes in both sexes. It follows from thisdiscussion that one way to minimize intrasystemic superegoconflict that can lead to dysfunctional splitting, would be theimplementation of childrearing practices that avoid sex-rolestereotyping and encourage both males and females to share thetask of caring for their young. This would potentially allow forless conflicted cross-gender identifications and would alsocreate an environment that minimizes the differences in earlyrelational experiences for both males and females, resulting inthe development of more similar modes of, and pathways tointimacy. In terms of research questions then, this studysuggests that the whole area of childrearing practices and theirdifferential effects could be fruitfully viewed through theadditional lens of the psychodynamics of value. Childrearingwould be looked at from this perspective, in terms of thefunction of the value attached to different gender roles inmaintaining the psycho-social cohesion of individuals and groups,in order to better understand patterns of gender development andtransmission, as well as change and resistance to change in144gender roles.The model presented here also points to preventativemeasures in the parenting of teenagers that may facilitateintegration of value relativization which is greatly intensifiedduring the adolescent period. For instance, it might be usefulfor parents to know of the set of common developmentalrelativizations which can take place during this period; such asthe likelihood of value-decathection of parents as idealized loveobjects, and rejection of their values in exchange for increasedcathection of peer relationships and values. This knowledge mayhelp minimize feelings of rejection in the parents and allowthem to see the ambivalence towards established value as asignal, rather than a threat, for the need of adjustment in theirparenting skills around their teenager's developmental need forseparation-individuation. And, at this stage, parents shouldavoid the demand for absolute acceptance and adherence tofamilial values; and instead encourage discussion of competingvalues and allow some room for experimentation with them. Thismore flexible attitude towards values by parents avoids creatingsevere loyalty conflicts in the teenager, and minimizesimplementation of defense mechanisms such as superego splittingthat could manifest itself in the form of a global rejection ofparental values or inconsistent superego functioning.Another potential area of application of the model presentedhere is in the mediation field. Conflict resolution might befacilitated by the mediator focusing the adversarial parties on145the common drives, needs, and intrapsychic functions related tothose values; in addition to merely dealing with values contentand differences. This involves identification of implicit valuesthat are held as absolutes by the various parties which arehindering conflict resolution. The mediator would have the taskof facilitating relativization of such values so that anintegration of differences can be worked through; since none ispossible with the absolutization of value.The proposed psychodynamic model of value might be generallyuseful in the clinical process with any individual, marital,family or group issue. This is because conflicts between valuesand standards, either intrapsychically and/or in theinterpersonal realm is universal. Clients as a matter of course,come into therapy because they are experiencing difficulty incoping with the need to restructure their sense of value forsomething either concrete, abstract, or both, due to therelativization of established value, be it through loss ordevelopment. Whether it is due to a broken marriage, an illness,death of a loved one, challenged ideals, changes in social roleor culture; we are all continuously faced with the demand torestructure our attachment to value. Therefore, knowledge of thepsychodynamics of value may have universal applicability to alltherapies at some point in their process.More specifically, the universality of the need torestructure attachment to value may imply a therapeutic techniqueinvolving the fostering of adaptive superego splitting in146clients. For example, clients commonly seek therapy in order todeal with behaviours which were once valued, but which havebecome highly ambivalent; as in the case of addictions and otherhabits that are now interfering with their goals in life. Thus,this model implies that therapeutic change also requires helpingthe client to engage in superego splitting, which wouldfacilitate the restructuring of dysfunctional defensivecompromise formations into more adaptive forms. This wouldinvolve increasing the client's experience of ambivalence towardsa valued behaviour or object, which they have unconsciously overvalued because of defensive functions it performs in maintainingself-cohesion. This may apply in dysfunctional relationships,addictions, fetishes, and so on.The psychodynamics of value implies that one of the initialtasks of therapy is to create a safe and nurturing therapeuticrelationship that will help support any disrupted sense of self-cohesion in the client. This may be best achieved by using aperson-centred approach which is characterized by the counsellorpresenting herself as respectful, empathic and validating towardsthe client. This atmosphere in the therapeutic context maximizesthe chances of the therapeutic relationship becoming positivelyvalue-cathected by the client and in the process, becomes apowerful motivator for working towards desired change. The'safety net' created by the therapeutic relationship will alsoaid in allowing the client to tolerate the ambivalence related tothe relativization of values, which is the central client147condition necessary for more functional integration of values andstandards.This model points in the direction of specific questionsthat might be useful to explore with clients such as; a) What aresome of the implicit and explicit values involved in theintrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts that the client isexperiencing?; b) What levels of awareness are operating withinthe client in relation to those values?; c) How are these valuesrelated to the client's sense of self-cohesion?; d) Whatfunctions of the self do these values help to regulate?; f) Howdoes the client experience threats to self-cohesion (eg.anxiety,guilt, rage, shame) when identified values that serve asregulators of self-cohesion become relativized?; g) At whatinternal point does the client deal negatively with ambivalencetowards competing values?; h) What are the client's self-capacities for self-cohesion regulation?; i) What are theclient's patterns of defensive superego splitting due to valueconflicts?; j) How are these splits acted out and under whatcircumstances?; k) How is the client integrated in terms of thebalance between abstract and experiential value?; 1) How muchresistance is present in the absolutization of values that keepsthem attached to dysfunctional behaviour?Questions of this nature help the counsellor develop aframework for processing the client's behaviours in terms of thepsychodynamics of value; which identifies underlying values andtheir functioning in the psychic economy. This probing process148in conjunction with assignments such as genograms that identifyfamily values, can all add to valuable information that can beused for the formulation of therapeutic interventions that mightaid in the client's development of superego structure anddifferentiation of ego functions that allow for integration ofthe conflicting values.Analysis of transference reactions can also give usefulinformation about the client's unconscious value conflicts, sincethis model predicts possible externalization of the unconscioussplit-off values through projection on to the therapist. Forexample, a teenager that has through the defense mechanism ofsuperego splitting repressed and disavowed parental values, mightin the transference reaction project those split-off values on tothe therapist and perceive her as an authority figure similar tothe parents. Making clients aware of the transference reactionsand giving them insight into motivating factors that lead to theestablishment of his or her particular defensive compromiseformation for dealing with value conflicts can all be valuablesteps for the process of adaptive intrapsychic restructuring.Most importantly, it is from observations within the clinicalsetting, of the psychodynamics of value related to processes suchas the tranference, that a typology of superego splits may bebegun to be identified. This, in itself may be a significantdirection for research.Once the client has gained some awareness and insight intohis or her individual psychodynamics of value, the next task149becomes helping the client find their own integration of value ata new functional level. This can be achieved in a variety ofways, that can include the use of Gestalt techniques such as'role-playing' and 'two-chair' where the client is asked to havea dialogue with his or her unintegrated superego parts.Psychodrama may also be adapted in a similar fashion, in order toexternalize and help the process of clarification of the functionof values in the individual's life.As this thesis points out, resolution of conflicting valuesand standards involves the development of ego functions andsuperego restructuring. When this metamorphosis is facilitatedby therapy the process will invariably be affected by the'cultural' context of the therapeutic relationship where thevalues of the therapist, whether explicit or implicit play animportant role in the shaping of the client's intrapsychicstructure. As MacKinnon and Miller point out:"Whatever stance the therapist takes, even the stance ofavoiding taking a stance, reflects a political positionwithin the larger system, regardless of the therapistsintentions. Relationships cannot remain neutral, northerapists apolitical in such contexts. (1987)"Since it is impossible to leave the therapist's values outof the therapeutic process, it is important for professionals towork on their own awareness and understanding of their ethicaldimension to minimize countertransference reactions to value withtheir clients. In particular, therapists should have developed a'comfort zone' where their self-cohesion does not feel threatened150with relativizations of their own values in the therapeuticencounter. If the therapist lacks these qualities, there is thedanger of collusive therapeutic relationship formation that isnot conducive to adaptive therapeutic change. For example, it isa well known fact that frequently clients develop idealizingtransferences towards their therapists. This is especially trueof clients that lack a cohesive ego ideal structure and thus lookto an external authority for direction. Such individuals mayperceive their therapist as encompassing all that is 'good, wiseand powerful', and see them as the direction giver of the 'roadto salvation'. Identification with the therapist is usuallyglobal where clients 'buy wholesale', the values perceived in thetherapist. If a therapist has little tolerance for valuerelativization because it threatens his or her sense of self-cohesion, he or she may actually reinforce the globalidentification process, cementing a 'clone' version of themselvesin the client, and bypass the processing of superego splits andother intrasystemic conflicts.Although it is impossible for the therapist to be value-free, it is necessary for her to have a certain degree of openesstowards the relativity of values. This is especially true in thecross-cultural therapeutic encounter where it also essential thatthe therapist have a general knowledge of the client's culturalpatterns in order to avoid misdiagnosis. For instance, a westerntherapist who values individualism might misdiagnose a clientfrom a culture that values interdependence to a greater degree as151'having poor personal boundaries'; or being 'enmeshed withsignificant others'. As theorists of human behaviour we have aresponsibility to increase our awareness of the underlying valuesof our theories and recognize the fact that those constructsmight not necessarily apply to individuals from differingcultures.This in fact, may be where the potential power of the modelof the psychodynamics of value presented here lies. For, thisstudy attempts to provide a step in the direction towards ageneric description of the functioning of value in the psychiceconomy of individuals, groups, and therapists, at atranscultural level. In other words, this study has valuedpursuing the answer to a central question: What is the correctand functional relationship between the universal and therelative in the dimension of human value?Adaptation for survival may depend on the answer to suchquestions, where effective integration of competing value systemswithin the human race as a whole may be becoming more of anecessity.152REFERENCESAtkinson, D.R., Morten, G., & Sue, D.W. (1989). A minorityidentity development model. In D.R. Atkinson, G. Morten, &D.W. Sue (Eds.), Counselling American Minorities (pp. 35-52). Dubuque, IA: W.C. Brown.Becker, E. (1973). The Denial Of Death. New York: The FreePress.Beres, D. (1971). Ego autonomy and ego psychology. In R.S.Eissler et al (Eds.), Psychoanalytic Study of The Child.New Haven:^International Universities Press.Berry, J.W.^(1990). Psychology of acculturaturation. In J.J.Berman (Ed.), Cross-cultural Perspectives. Lincoln,Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.Berman, John J. (1990). Cross-cultural Perspectives. Nebrasca:University of Nebrasca Press.Blos, Peter. (1979). The Adolescent Passage: DevelopmentalIssues. New York: International Universities Press.Bios, Peter. (1974), The genealogy of the ego ideal. In R.S.Eissler et al (Eds.), The Psychoanalutic Study Of theChild. New Haven: Yale University Press.Boszormenyi-Nagy, Ivan. (1987). Foundations Of ContextualTherapy. New York: Brunner/Mazel.Boszormenyi-Nagy, Ivan. (1991), Contextual Therapy. In A.S.Gurman & D.R. Kniskern (Eds.), Handbook Of Family Therapy:Volume II. New York: Brunner/Mazel.Chodorow, Nancy J. (1989). Feminism And Psychoanalytic Theory.New Haven: Yale University Press.Cross, W.E. (1971). The Negro-to-Black conversion experience:Towards a psychology of Black liberation. Black World, 20,13-27.Doi, T. (1986). The Anatomy of Conformity: The IndividualVersus Society. Tokyo: Kodansha.Emde, R. (1988). Development terminable and interminable. In:International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 69, 283-296.Erickson, E.H. (1959). Identity and the Life Cycle. New153York:^W.W. Norton & Co.Erickson, E.H. (1989). Elements of a psychoanalytic theory ofpsychosocial development. In: S.I. Greenspan & G.H.Pollock (Eds.), The Course of Life: Volume 1, Infancy,Madison, Conneticut: International Universities Press.Feather, Norman T. (1980), Values in Adolescnce. In JosephAdelson (Ed.), Handbook Of Adloescent Psychology. New York:John Wiley & Sons.Federn, P. (1952). Ego Psychology and the Psychoses. New York:Basic Books.Freud, S. (1913). The Interpretation Of Dreams. New York: TheMacmillan Company.Gergen, Kennth J. (1991). The Saturated Self: Dilemmas ofIdentity in Contemporary Life. New York: Basic Books.Gray, H.S. (1990), Developmental Issues In Young Adulthood:Psychoanalytic Perspectives. In, Sherman C. Feinstein(Ed.), Adolescent Psychiatry: Developmental And ClinicalStudies, Vol. 17. Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress.Greenspan, S.I. (1989). The Development of the Ego:Implications for Personality Theory, Psychopathology, andthe Psychotherapeutic Process. International UniversitiesPress: Madison, Connecticut.Gurman, A.S., & Kniskern, D.P. (1991). Handbook of FamilyTherapy. New York: Brunner/Mazel Inc.Hall, Edward T. (1976). Beyond Culture. New York: AnchorBooks.Hall, Edward T. (1966). The Hidden Dimension. New York:Anchor Books.Hartmann, H. (1939). Ego Psychology and the Problem ofAdaptation. New York: International Universities Press.Hoffman. Martin L. (1980), Moral Development in Adolescence. InJoseph Adelson (Ed.), Handbook Of Adolescent Psychology.New York: John Wiley & Sons.Hororwitz, M.J.. (1987).^States Of Mind: ConfigurationalAnalysis of Individual Psychology.^New York: Plenum.Jackson, B. (1975). Black identity development. Journal ofEducation Diversity, 2, 19-25.154Jung, C.G. (1939), Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation.in R.F.C. Hull (Trans.), The Collected Works of C.G. Jung,Vol.9, 1968. Princeton: Bollingen Press.Ishiyama, F.I., & Westwood, M.J. (1992), Enhancing client-validating communication: Helping discouraged clients incross-cultural adjustment. Journal of MulticulturalCounselling and Development, Vol.20, 50-63.Ishiyama, F.I. (1989). Understanding foreign adolescents'difficulties in cross-cultural adjustment: A self-validation model. Canadian Journal of School Psychology,5(1), 41-56.Kernberg, 0. (1976). Object Relations Theory and ClinicalPsychoanalysis. New York: Aronson.Khan, Charlotte. (1991), Group Disjunction. In Harry Sands etal (Eds.), Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy: The JournalOf The Post Graduate Center For Mental Health, Vol. 9 (2),151-161.Kohut, H.. (1987). The Kohut Seminars: On Self Psychology andPsychotherapy with Adolescents and Young Adults. New York:W. W. Norton & Co.Kohut, H. (1985). Self Psychology and the Humanities:Reflections on a New Psychoanalytic Approach. New York:W.W. Norton & Company.Kohut, H. (1971). Analysis of the Self. New York:International Universities Press.Kohut, H. (1977). The Restoration of the Self. New York:International Universities Press.Lamb, Doris. (1978). Psychotherapy With Adolescent Girls. SanFrancisco: Jossey-Bass.Luepnitz, Deborah Anna. (1988). The Family Interpreted:Feminist Theory in Clinical Practice. New York: BasicBooks, Inc.MacKinnon, L.K., and Miller, D. (1987). The new epistemology andthe Milan approach: Feminist sociopolitical considerations.Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 13 (2): 139-155.Mahoney, Michael J. (1991). Human Change Processes: TheScientific Foundations of Psychotherapy. New York: BasicBooks.155Mahler, M.S. (1972). Rapprochement subphase of the separation-individuation process, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41, 487-506.Marcia, J.E. (1980). Identity in adolescence. In: J. Adelson(Ed.), Handbook of Adolescent Psychology. New York: Wiley& Sons.Marsella, A.J., DeVos, G., & Hsu, F.L.K.^(1985).^Culture andSelf: Asian and Western Perspectives. New York:Tavistock.Milrod, David. (1990), The Ego Ideal. In A.J. Solnit et al(Eds.), The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. New Haven:Yale University Press.Mishne, Judith M. (1986). Clinical Work With Adolescents. NewYork: The Free Press.Moore, B.E., & Fine, B.D. (1990). Psychoanalytic Terms andConcepts. New Haven: Yale University Press.Parens, H. (1989). Toward an epigenesis of aggression in earlychildhood. In: S.I. Greenspan & G.H. Pollock (Eds.), TheCourse of Life: Volume 2, Early Childhood. Madison,Conneticut: International Universities Press.Pine, Fred. (1990). Drive, Ego, Object, & Self: A Synthesisfor Clinical Work. New York: Basic Books.Rice, L.N., & Greenberg, L.S. (1984). Patterns Of Change:Intensive Analysis of Psychotherapy Process. New York: TheGuildford Press.Sandler, Joseph. (1989), Toward A Reconsideration Of ThePsychoanalytic Theory Of Motivation. In Arnold M. Cooper,Otto F. Kernberg, & Ethel S. Person (Eds.), Psychoanalysis:Toward The Second Century. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress.Sandler, Joseph; and Freud, Anna. (1985). The Analysis ofDefense: The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense Revisited.New York: International Universities Press, Inc.Settlage, C.F. (1990). Childhood to adulthood: Structuralchange toward independence and autonomy. In: R.A. Nemiroff& C.A. Colarusso, (Eds.), New Dimensions in AdultDevelopment. New York: Basic Books.Shapiro, T. & Stern, D. (1989). Psychoanalytic perspectives onthe first year of life: The establishment of the object inan affective field. In: S.I. Greenspan & G.H. Pollock156(Eds.), The Course of Life: Volume 1, Infancy. Madison,Conneticut: International Universities Press.Silverman, L. H. (1982), The Search For Oneness. New York:International Univerities Press, Inc.St. Clair, Michael. (1986). Object Relations And SelfPsychology: An Introduction. Monterey: Brooks/Cole.Stern, D. N. (1985), The Interpersonal World of the Infant: AView from Psychoanalysis Developmental Psychology. NewYork: Basic Books, Inc.Spence, J.T. (1989). Achievement American style: The rewardsand cost of individualism. American Psychologist, 40, 1285-1295.Spitz, R. (1945). Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis ofpsychiatric conditions in early childhood. ThePsychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53-74.Sue, D.W.; and Sue, D. (1990). Counselling The CulturallyDifferent: Theory & Practice. New York: John Wiley &SonsTriandis, H.C. (1990). Cross-cultural studies of individualismand collectivism. In: J.J. Berman, (Ed.), Cross-culturalPerspectives. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of NebraskaPress.Tyson, R.L., & Tyson, P. (1990). Psychoanalytic Theories OfDevelopment. New Haven: Yale University Press.Waxler-Morrison, N., Dinh, D„ and Ganesan S. (1990). Cross-Cultural Caring: A Handbook for Health Professionals inWestern Canada. Vancouver: University of British ColumbiaWolf, E.S. (1988). Treating The Self: Elementsof Clinical Self Psychology. New York: The GuildfordPress.Wurmser, Leon. (1978). The Hidden Dimension: Psychodynamics InCompulsive Drug Use.^New York: Jason Aronson.

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0054080/manifest

Comment

Related Items