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Freeman, Trevor

University of British Columbia

This thesis seeks to explore the internal consistency of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. Smith’s theory of moral judgement has received significant attention. His theory of moral virtue, however, has not. Even less attention has been given to a potential relationship between his two theories and what that relationship might be. This thesis demonstrates the presence of both theories in the text of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and explains the content of both theories. Following the articulation of Smith’s theories of moral judgement and moral virtue, the argument shifts to demonstrating that the two theories are in fact one theory. Finally, the argument is then examined in the light of two 20th century critiques of moral philosophy.

Text

2022-06-07

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

http://hdl.handle.net/2429/81706

Interdisciplinary Studies

University of British Columbia

UBCO

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/