UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The cultural economy of urban development : density and the politics of affordable housing in Toronto… Hyde, Zachary 2021

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata


24-ubc_2021_may_hyde_zachary.pdf [ 2.28MB ]
JSON: 24-1.0395882.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0395882-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0395882-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0395882-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0395882-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0395882-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0395882-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

   THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT: DENSITY AND THE POLITICS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN TORONTO AND VANCOUVER   by  ZACHARY HYDE  B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2010 M.A., University of Toronto, 2012   A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Sociology)    THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)   February 2021   © Zachary Hyde, 2021   ii    The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled:  The cultural economy of urban development: density and the politics of affordable housing in Toronto and Vancouver  submitted by Zachary Hyde  in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology   Examining Committee: Amy Hanser, Associate Professor, Sociology, UBC Supervisor  Amin Ghaziani, Professor, Sociology, UBC Supervisory Committee Member  Nathan Lauster, Associate Professor, Sociology, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Jamie Peck, Professor, Geography, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Elvin Wyly, Professor, Geography, UBC University Examiner Sean Lauer, Associate Professor, Sociology, UBC University Examiner       iii Abstract  In the face of a growing housing crisis, since the early 2000s cities throughout North America have created various policies to encourage urban developers to build affordable housing in exchange for extra density. This phenomenon has produced novel public-private arrangements and prompted some developers to take on a dual identity of luxury condominium builders and partners in solving the housing crisis. Considering this significant shift in the responsibilities of the private sector, how can we understand the new role of developers in providing affordable housing through density? What are the motivations and justification of actors in the industry, government, non-profit, and public sphere in supporting or challenging these arrangements? My dissertation draws on 100 qualitative interviews with politicians, developers, and other actors in the field of urban development in Toronto and Vancouver, two years of ethnographic observation, and frame analysis of over 500 newspaper articles, to address these questions through three standalone yet interrelated papers. Drawing from work in cultural sociology, geography, and anthropology, which emphasizes the role of meaning, symbolism, and different forms of non-market exchange in the economy, I advance an urban cultural economy approach for the study of urban development. First, I argue that the exchange of density between the private sector and the state takes the form of gift-giving and reciprocity and this has a consequential impact on land-use decisions. This finding adds nuance to debates on urban neoliberalization. Second, I argue that giving back through density agreements allows developers to accumulate symbolic capital, which is simultaneously altruistic and profit-oriented. This finding advances understandings of non-economic capital in the field of urban development. Finally, through an analysis of Canadian news media, I show how exchanging density for rental housing relies on cultural understandings of housing tenure and fictional expectations of the future of housing markets. This finding contributes to recent work on the role   iv of narratives and storytelling within the capitalist economy. In addition to advancing theoretical conversations in urban, cultural, and economic sociology, my dissertation also provides suggestions for how to improve urban development policy in Canadian cities.      v Lay Summary  Since the early 2000s private condominium developers have taken on a new role as builders of low-income housing in Canadian cities. They have done so through the policy of density agreements, where the state allows extra height and density on new projects in exchange for units of affordable housing. Based on a study of two cities, Toronto and Vancouver, and additional data on cities across Canada, this dissertation examines the causes and consequences of these policy arrangements. I find that density agreements take the form of reciprocity and gift-giving between the state and private sector and this has important implications for the built form of the city and patterns of housing inequality. I conclude, that in their current form, density agreements have led to trade-offs that do not adequately meet public needs for affordable housing.       vi Preface  This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author Zachary Hyde. All tables and figures, including photographs, are original and belong to the author. The research presented in Chapters 1 and 2 was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H15-00725.       vii Table of Contents  Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary .................................................................................................................................. v Preface............................................................................................................................................ vi Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vii List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. x Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ xi Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... xi Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Developers as the Heroes and Villains of the Neoliberal City ................................................... 1 The Urban Cultural Economy Perspective ................................................................................. 4 A Study of the Role of Culture in Urban Development and Privately Produced Affordable Housing: Themes and Research Question .................................................................................. 8 A Multi-Method Study of the Field of Urban Development in Toronto and Vancouver ........... 9 Qualitative Interviews ........................................................................................................... 10 Ethnography .......................................................................................................................... 12 Documentary Analysis .......................................................................................................... 13 Content Analysis of Newspaper Articles .............................................................................. 15 Outline of the Dissertation: Three Papers on the Economic Sociology of Urban Housing Development ............................................................................................................................. 15 Chapter 1 : Gift-Giving in the Neoliberal City: Polanyi’s Substantivism and the Exchange of Density for Affordable Housing in Vancouver ............................................................................. 17 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 17 Exchanging Density for Affordable Housing: A Form of Urban Neoliberalism? .................... 18 A Substantivist Economics of the City ..................................................................................... 21 A Study of the Politics of Urban Development ........................................................................ 23 Community Amenity Contributions: From ‘Quality of Life’ Services to Affordable Housing 25 Gift, Tax, or Sale? The Enactment of Density Agreements as a Form of Exchange ................ 29 Politicians: Density Agreements as Developer Contributions to the Public......................... 29 Developers: Density Agreements as an Altruistic Choice .................................................... 32 Planners: Density Agreements as Good Planning Versus Selling Zoning ........................... 34 Relationships of Reciprocity in Building Affordable Housing: CACs and the Accumulation of Symbolic Capital ....................................................................................................................... 36 Reciprocity in Exchange for Zoning: CACs versus Campaign Contributions ..................... 37 Building Symbolic Capital through Salient Developments: Westbank and Woodward’s ... 39   viii Gift-Giving and Neoliberalism: Obfuscating the Negative Effects of Funding Affordable Housing through Density .......................................................................................................... 44 Conclusion: Substantivism and the Economies of the City ...................................................... 47 Chapter 2 : Symbolic Capital and ‘Socially Conscious’ Real Estate Developers: The Paradox of Reputation and Accumulation in For-Profit Business .................................................................. 49 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 49 Economy and Culture in the Study of Urban Development: What Motivates Developers? .... 50 Symbolic Capital in Urban Development: The Role of Altruism, Reputation, and Legitimacy ................................................................................................................................................... 55 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 60 Site: The Honest Ed’s Redevelopment in Toronto ................................................................... 61 Economic Distancing: A Development about More than “The Bottom Line” ......................... 64 Public Participation: Producing Legitimacy through Curated Disinterestedness ..................... 68 Housing Tenure Narratives: Symbolic Stigma and the Framing of Renters versus Homeowners ................................................................................................................................................... 75 Gift-Giving: Altruism, Reputation and the ‘Potential’ for Future Profits ................................ 79 Conclusion: Symbolic Capital in the Capitalist Economy ........................................................ 82 Chapter 3 :Framing Affordability: Representations of New-Build Rental Housing in Canadian News Media .................................................................................................................................. 84 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 84 Canada’s Rental Housing History ............................................................................................. 86 Meanings, Expectations and Housing Markets: Housing as a Symbolic System ..................... 89 Data and Methods ..................................................................................................................... 93 The Affordability Frame: A New Supply of Rentals as a Solution to Canada’s Housing Crisis ................................................................................................................................................... 95 The Business Frame: Capitalizing on Unaffordability ........................................................... 102 Assessing Media Discourse in Light of Housing Policy: What is Being Built? ..................... 107 Conclusion: Fictional Expectations, Profits and Housing Markets ........................................ 110 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 112 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 116 Appendix: Methodology ............................................................................................................. 131    ix List of Tables  Table 1.1: Rezonings Granted versus Developer Donations to the City (2012-2017) ................. 38      x List of Figures  Figure 1.1: Social and Affordable Housing in British Columbia (1973-2017) ............................ 28 Figure 1.2: The Woodward’s Towers in the Downtown Eastside ................................................ 42 Figure 1.3: The Luxury Condominium Vancouver House in False Creek ................................... 43 Figure 1.4: Westbank Billboard at the Vancouver International Airport ..................................... 43 Figure 2.1: Honest Ed’s Iconic Façade ......................................................................................... 63 Figure 2.2: Small Retail and Artist Studios in Mirvish Village .................................................... 64 Figure 2.3: Shopping for Bargains Inside Honest Ed’s ................................................................ 64 Figure 2.4: Passerbys Examine the Notice for Redevelopment at Honest Ed’s ........................... 72 Figure 2.5: Westbank’s Community Consultation Walkshop ...................................................... 72 Figure 2.6: Community Outreach Worker Explaining the Development to Locals ..................... 73      xi Acknowledgements  I would like to thank Lily Ivanova for her extensive feedback on all aspects of this dissertation. I would also like to acknowledge the guidance and ongoing support from my supervisor, Amy Hanser, and dissertation committee, Amin Ghaziani, Nathan Lauster, and Jamie Peck, as well as the examiners Aaron Moore, Sean Lauer, and Elvin Wyly. I also benefitted from numerous fruitful conversations with Tom Howard about my research. Portions of this dissertation were presented in the form of talks at the Department of Sociology at the University of British Columbia and at the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto where it received constructive critique from audience members. This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (File Number 752-2013-2348). Finally, I would like to thank all my participants in both Toronto and Vancouver who graciously shared their time and insights with an aspiring researcher.   Dedication                   xii         For my friends from Little Mountain     1 Introduction  With the dismantling of the welfare state and defunding of social housing at higher levels of government throughout the 1990s and 2000s, North American cities have faced growing problems housing low-income people (Desmond 2016; Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Herring 2014; Sullivan 2018). At the same time, new high-end condominium projects in growing and expensive cities like New York City, Toronto and Vancouver have been a consistently profitable and highly sought-after form of development (Graham 2015, 2016; Harris 2011; Leher and Wieditz 2009; Novak 2019; Olds 2002; Peck, Siemiatyki and Wyly 2014; Rosen and Walks 2013, 2015). In this context, a new phenomenon has emerged: local politicians and planners have leveraged their jurisdiction over zoning to trade density for social benefits, such as units of affordable housing (Stabrowski 2015; Stein 2019). Some developers have started to work closely with local governments and non-profit housing organizations to build new low-income housing in cities (Levine 2016; Marwell 2009). As a result, they are taking on a new identity as builders of high-end luxury condominiums and partners in solving the housing crisis. Considering this significant shift in the responsibilities of the private sector, how can we understand the new role of developers in providing affordable housing through density? What are the motivations and justification of actors in the industry, government, non-profit and public sphere in supporting or challenging these arrangements?  Developers as the Heroes and Villains of the Neoliberal City  Development industry professionals have long-suffered from a bad reputation. As symbolic interactionist Lynn Lofland (2004) has claimed, urban development is a quintessential “stigmatized profession,” with negative portrayals of developers in films and books going back at   2 least to the mid-20th century. Developers are associated with greed, anti-social behavior, corruption and insensitivity to local communities. Lofland also suggests, however, that developers are scapegoats for broader processes of urban change, which are inherently disruptive to cities and communities.  In recent years the negative discourse around urban developers, especially in expensive North American cities, has intensified. As the majority of new housing being created is in the form of high-end condominiums, those seeking to live and work in the city have difficulty securing affordable housing and have turned their ire toward those they see as responsible (Manville and Osman 2017; Monkkonen and Manville 2020). It is not uncommon to see graffiti, stencils and impromptu posters on walls and lamp-posts throughout cities like Vancouver criticizing developers in ways that are hard to imagine for other stigmatized professions, like lawyers and marketers (Cohen and Dromi 2018).   While less inflammatory than public critiques, many critical urban academics share a similar orientation towards the development industry, which they see as a symptom of the dysfunctions of capitalist housing markets (see Logan and Moloch 1987).  Within critical urban studies the language is less about developers as “bad people” with “evil intentions,” but more about the structural imperatives of capitalism, and especially neoliberal capitalism, as a system that prioritizes ‘profits over people’ living in cities (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; Stein 2019). As stated by Marxist housing scholars Marcuse and Madden, “Profit seeking without regard for external social consequences is intrinsic to the way [developers] are set up. Residential inequality and crisis will always result from a housing system dominated by these kind of firms” (2016: 51). The suggestion is that developers are constrained by the logics of competition and must seek to   3 maximize profits regardless of the negative outcomes this might entail. The only solution to this problem is a more intensive government regulation of housing.   On the other side of the debate are claims that developers and for-profit urban development can act as a force for good in the city. As I will show in my work, developers themselves have been strong advocates for public-private solutions to the housing crisis, forming partnerships with cities and non-profits and “giving back” through density agreements. They are often willing to include affordable housing in new projects in return for incentives and exemptions from the city (Elsmore 2019; Hyde 2018; Rosen 2017). This has led some developers, such as Westbank– the main developer examined in my study – to publish books, hold symposiums and give media interviews about taking on a new sense of “social responsibility” through their endeavors in affordable housing (Rosenman 2018, 2020).   Urban scholars have also considered the notion that the private and public sector can work together to promote principles of social justice (Clavel 1986; Kohn 2016). Susan Fainstein’s (2014) recent work on the “just city” suggests that both local governments and private developers have some latitude to promote equality and fairness, even within the structural confines of capitalism. Fainstein asks: does ostensibly progressive urban policy-making live up to its stated ideals and aims? In assessing this, she draws on political philosophers writing about justice and fairness, including John Rawls and Iris Marion Young. Within her framework, the claims of developers wanting to “do good” must be taken seriously and assessed, rather than disregarded as impossible under capitalism.   The framing of developers as the ‘problem’ or ‘solution’ to neoliberal urbanism has, however, presented an incomplete picture of their increasing role in building affordable housing. On one side, critical scholars suggest that discussing the morality and ethics of development is   4 irrelevant within the context of neoliberal capitalism. As Madden and Marcuse say, “The solution to the housing problem is not moralism but the creation of an alternative residential logic. Exhorting for-profit real estate companies to act differently . . . is pointless” (2016: 52). On the other side, urban scholars like Fainstein suggest that planners and politicians can and should think about urban development using the tools of political theory and philosophy, and in doing so may realize progressive aims. Through focusing on the structural dynamics of capitalism and abstracted ideals of social justice, both accounts have paid less attention to the existing moral and discursive arguments and practices put forth by developers and other urban actors on the ground in cities (for a recent exception, see Rosenman 2020).  I suggest that by taking the arguments and discourses of developers and urban actors as a source of data we can answer important questions in urban sociology and urban studies. For example, how should we assess the dual claims of development industry professionals that providing social benefits is a way to increase profits and make a positive difference in the city? How do developers and other interested parties, such as politicians, planners and housing activists, make moral arguments about the trade of density for social benefits? And, how do these moral arguments and their framing in the public sphere influence land use decisions in cities? My work addresses these questions through a comparative study of the politics of urban development in Toronto and Vancouver, focusing on the role of private development firms in building affordable housing.   The Urban Cultural Economy Perspective  The theoretical contribution of this study is the introduction and advancement of a new perspective for economic social science and urban studies – urban cultural economy. To build this concept, I draw on the cultural turn in ‘socio-economics’ across various fields including   5 anthropology, sociology, geography and urban planning.1 This substantial body of work shares a core understanding that the economy is a cultural construction (for foundational works see Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Geertz 1973; Polanyi 1971; Sahlins 1972). Following thinkers like Clifford Geertz (1973), I define culture as the shared systems of symbols and meanings that provide the basis for all social life. Therefore, I also maintain that the economy and economic action, including different forms of exchange, are fundamentally spheres of meaning-making. In my work I apply the theories and concepts of cultural economy to longstanding questions and debates within urban sociology and urban studies.    How does my framework of urban cultural economy compare with existing approaches to culture within urban economic research, such as urban political economy?2 There is a long-standing research tradition on the cultural economy of cities, which focuses on the increasing importance of cultural industries within post-Fordist or advanced capitalism. This work focuses on the material and symbolic dimension of the ‘new economy’ – sometimes with normative implications for how cities can increase their competitiveness (Florida 2003); sometimes with a descriptive purpose to measure the role of cultural production, or “the culture industries,” in urban economies (Scott 1997; Markusen 2006); and sometimes with an angle to critique the increasing inequality associated with these trends (Lloyd 2006; Zukin 1996; 2009). To use the language of sociologists studying culture, urban political economy has taken a sociology of culture, or production of culture approach (Peterson and Anand 2004), highlighting material and symbolic                                                      1 The origins of cultural economy can be traced to French structuralist anthropology in the 1960s and 1970s, which instigated a cultural turn across the social sciences. More recently there have been attempts to institutionalize this perspective through the creation of academic journals like the Journal of Cultural Economy in 2008.  2 The term ‘urban political economy’ is used across the urban social sciences. In this work, I mainly engage with urban political economy literature in sociology and geography on urban developers and housing. Research in political science has also taken up the mantle of urban political economy, in particular work on urban regimes inspired by Clarence Stone (1993); this work has focused mostly on local business owners rather than developers.    6 goods as commodities that are produced and consumed within cities. The approach that I am proposing – urban cultural economy – diverges from this focus by suggesting that culture is not only the outcome of economic processes, but rather fundamentally influences and shapes the economy.     In addition to engaging with urban political economy, I situate my framework in relation to existing traditions within urban sociology, including the urban culturalist (Boerer 2006) and political economy of place (Logan and Molotch 1987) perspectives. In his review of urban cultural research, Michael Boerer (2006) claims this body of work (inspired by the work of Durkheimian Chicago School theorist Walter Firey) represents a longstanding and marginalized tradition within urban sociology that emphasizes the role of culture in urban processes. Alongside other contemporary urban sociologists (see Hanser 2020; Ghaziani 2014; Grazian 2005; Wynn 2011), Boerer sees culture as an explanatory factor in urban outcomes and focuses on the role of symbolism, meanings and interactions in cities. As he says, cities should not be seen “simply as places for economic and political confrontations, but also places rich with meaning and value for those who live, work and play in and near them” (2006, p.176). However, the urban culturalist program also separates culture from the economy, relegating the study of the economy to other developed research traditions like political economy (Boerer 2006).  Finally, I situate my work in relation to John Logan and Harvey Molotch’s (1987) political economy of place framework, which also makes room for culture. As with the political economy perspective, however, this approach places culture on the ‘use’ side of the ‘use and exchange value’ dichotomy in Marxist research. Also referencing Walter Firey, they suggest the “sentimental value” of places and homes to those who use them (‘use’ value) may outweigh their economic value (‘exchange’ value). Like the urban culturalist perspective, the political economy of place   7 framework juxtaposes cultural and economic values. In contrast, an urban cultural economy perspective advocates for treating both use and exchange values in urban development as cultural. There is a growing body of work within urban studies, from sociologists, geographers, and planners, that analyzes the economy through the lens of culture. However, researchers have not clearly delineated urban cultural economy as its own subfield. What this work shares is an emphasis on culture as an explanatory factor in the economy of cities. My work also engages with the ideas and concepts of cultural economy theorists who have not typically addressed urban issues. For example, an urban cultural economy perspective includes thinking about the economy of cities by engaging with scholars like Viviana Zelizer, Michel Callon, and Pierre Bourdieu.  While urban cultural economy has not yet coalesced as a movement within the literature, several recent works exemplify this approach. For example, in his study of municipal budgeting, sociologist Josh Pacewitz (2016) draws on Viviana Zelizer’s theories of money and morality to observe that local state officials engage in the “earmarking” of monies for public expenditures. In another study, geographer Rachel Weber (2015) uses Michel Callon’s theory of economic performativity to explain the overbuilding of office towers in Chicago in the 2000s. Weber draws on performativity theory to show how development industry professionals constructed a market for new-build office tower space through speculative, yet economically irrational, financial expectations about the future. Finally, Loic Wacquant (2018) has in recent years advocated for a Bourdieusian approach to urban studies. While some of Bourdieu’s concepts have already had a significant impact on urban research – such as the concepts of cultural capital and habitus in theories of gentrification – Wacquant argues that his master concept of symbolic power, or cultural power, has been underutilized in the study of cities. These various strands in urban studies illustrate   8 that work on urban cultural economy is already underway, even as the boundaries of this subfield have yet to be clearly defined.   A Study of the Role of Culture in Urban Development and Privately Produced Affordable Housing: Themes and Research Question  In developing the urban cultural economy perspective, for my dissertation work I conducted a study of the politics of urban development in two Canadian cities, focusing on the role of private developers in building new affordable housing. Throughout the following papers, I maintain that in order to understand the transformation of urban development in Canada following welfare state withdrawal in the 1990s, we need to examine the meanings, moral discourses, and symbolism that have accompanied these changes. Thus, my dissertation asks: What role does culture play in the privatization of the welfare state in Canada, particularly in the case of private sector density exchanges for publicly-needed affordable housing?    While each of the papers presented here contain their own motivations, research questions, and arguments, they draw from a common base of empirical evidence and converge on several themes. Empirically, each paper focuses on the role of the state in managing zoning as the foundation for new forms of affordable housing policy, including social housing provided by non-profit organizations, affordable housing provided by developers, and rental units. Thematically, the papers all highlight the role of cultural framing, discourse, and moral arguments about the social responsibility of developers in urban development outcomes. Each paper engages with ideas and concepts in cultural economy to think through a range of urban processes that can be seen playing out in North American cities.        9 A Multi-Method Study of the Field of Urban Development in Toronto and Vancouver  My dissertation is a multi-method study of the field of urban development and the politics of urban density and affordable housing in Canada, with a focus on Toronto and Vancouver. The data used to advance my findings and arguments includes 100 qualitative interviews, three years of on-the-ground ethnographic observation, archival and textual analysis of development documents (including permit applications, campaign contributions to political parties, and the value of rezonings), and a content analysis of 503 newspaper articles on new-build rental housing. I began this research in 2015 as a study of a single developer, Westbank Corp, operating in two cities, Toronto and Vancouver, which had become well-known for providing affordable housing in exchange for extra density on their projects. By selecting a single developer, I aimed to develop an in-depth study of several major developments that the firm was undertaking at the time, including Vancouver House and Oakridge in Vancouver, and Honest Ed’s in Toronto, while also allowing for a comparison of the policy process across the two cities.  While my specific interest is in how urban developers are transforming affordable housing provision, my research strategy involves a relational approach to urban development as a “field” of social action (Bourdieu 1986; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Martin 2003). From a field theory perspective, urban development outcomes are the result of different social actors and organizations involved in patterns of co-operation and competition with one another. Therefore, to understand the actions and orientations of developers, we must understand them in relation to state actors, urban planners, housing non-profits, community advocates, and local citizens living near new developments, which shape the development processes. To quote from relational urban sociologist Matthew Desmond, “Housing markets are fields . . .. that have their own semi-autonomous logic and geography – comprising different actors enmeshed in mutual relations of dependence and   10 struggle” (2018: 163).  Outside of urban studies, many of those working within the cultural economy framework advocate for a relational approach to studying the economic action (Bourdieu 1986; Zelizer 2012). Thus, my study examines how the framing and moral and ethical discourses of different, yet mutually-oriented, groups affects urban development outcomes.3  Qualitative Interviews  The primary source of data for my analysis is qualitative interviews with individuals involved in urban development in Toronto and Vancouver. While my study focused on a single developer, the level of analysis was the field of urban development in each city. Therefore, I spoke with a variety of actors occupying different social and organizational positions. I conducted 100 interviews, 54 in Vancouver and 46 in Toronto. Across both cities I spoke with developers (n=15), politicians (n=11), urban planners (n=11), community organizers (n=20), urban experts, including academics and journalists (n=9), as well as local residents and business owners living and working close to the developments (n=34).  Of these groups, my interviews with developers and politicians, while difficult to secure, provided highly valuable data. My approach to recruitment was to target central actors in the field of development who may have particularly extensive or abundant organizational and political insights. This included individuals working in top positions at Westbank Corp. The politicians I spoke with also provided important information and included current and former mayors of Toronto and Vancouver, city councillors in both cities, sitting members of federal parliament, and a former premier of British Columbia. The primary form of recruitment was through emails sent to the professional accounts of my participants. While I was initially uncertain about the response rate I would receive from development professionals and politicians, I received a relatively high                                                         11 response rate of close to 75%. Of the 25% that I was not able to interview, most declined due to time constraints or passed me along to a proxy.   The interviews themselves followed a semi-structured format. Because of the range of participants with varied backgrounds, I chose to avoid using a single interview guide. Instead, I constructed a set of general interview questions for each of the group (see Methodological Appendix). Many interviews diverged from the questions I had prepared, which I expected to happen and was useful for generating further contextual understanding of my cases. I often devised specific questions to ask participants based on information I had garnered in prior interviews, thus building on my base of knowledge throughout my time in the field.   My approach to coding drew from sociologists Tavory and Timmermans’ (2012, 2014) method of abductive analysis, which involves an iterative process of close engagement with data, intensive reading of scholarly literature, and returns to the field to collect further information based on initial impressions. Tavory and Timmermans (2014) also advocate for a constant attention to potentially “surprising” and “unexpected” findings that generate creative insights. As I began to code my data, I looked for keywords and phrases used by my respondents that encapsulated their positionality and orientation towards the field. I also coded my data relationally, paying close attention to instances when actors framed the interests and motivations of those occupying different organizational positions (for example, when developers talked about community advocates).       12 Ethnography  The ethnographic component of my research involved participant observation of development processes in both Toronto and Vancouver. During my fieldwork in Toronto I followed the planning and community consultation process of Mirvish Village, a major downtown redevelopment project proposed by Westbank at the site of a former department store, Honest Ed’s, beginning in the Fall of 2015. From September through December of that year I conducted on-the-ground ethnographic observation of the dynamics of the redevelopment. I also returned to Toronto for one month in December 2016 as the consultation process was wrapping up and the development was going up for a final vote at City Hall. While in Toronto I visited my field site daily, which included the Honest Ed’s department store, still in operation, and Mirvish Village, the street of Victorian homes-cum-artist lofts. I also attended official consultation meetings held by the City of Toronto, discussions held by local community organizations about the project, and developer-led events. Finally, I spent time at a community outreach center organized by Westbank to get a sense of the consultation effort from the perspective of their employees.  My ethnographic observations in Vancouver took place between 2015 and 2018. This included attending City Hall meetings during which councillors voted on rezonings, the City’s design review panel, and events held by housing organizers and activists over several years. I also attended several showcases presented by Westbank, including Gesamtkunstwerk and Unwritten, which doubled as the condominium sales rooms for the Vancouver House and Oakridge developments. In tandem with promotion for these developments, I frequented talks and gala events held by Westbank, as well as meetings of community advocates organizing against them. I was also present at several talks with then-Mayor of Vancouver Gregor Robertson, where he spoke in depth about his decision-making and philosophy on exchanging density for affordable housing.    13  In both cities I relied on my training in ethnographic methods, taking extensive field notes (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011). I transcribed these notes into analytic memos and consulted them alongside my interview data as I was coding. The ethnographic data was particularly useful for making sense of the claims made by my interviewees about urban development processes, when comparing with my own observations of on-the-ground interactions and neighborhood organizing around these new developments.  Documentary Analysis   Given that my research focused on the discourse and framing of new developments and tangible outcomes, documentary analysis was essential for understanding the financial and material aspects of these projects. As has been suggested by qualitative sociologists, researchers should corroborate, or “fact check”, their informants’ accounts to the best of their ability, which is a common practice imported from journalism (Desmond 2016; Dunier 1999). Hence, when analyzing my data, I moved back-and-forth between my interviews and the development applications for projects to see where and how they corresponded and diverged. For example, did developers pay for social services and amenities on projects the way they had said they would? How and why did some projects end up with different heights and densities than were approved by City Hall? The documentary data helped me to answer these kinds of background questions.  My documentary sources were primarily collected from the municipal websites of the City of Toronto and the City of Vancouver (for a list, see Methodological Appendix). Documentary analysis requires the ability to read, engage and interpret formal planning documents, especially rezoning applications on major developments. Because these documents are intended for planners and city councillors, they are filled with jargon and technical terminology. The application packages for large redevelopments are often several hundred pages long and will go through two   14 or three drafts before the project is finally approved. Therefore, I spent considerable time reading through and taking extensive notes on the entire application packages for four major redevelopments undertaken by Westbank: Woodward’s, Mirvish Village, Vancouver House, and Oakridge.   My documentary analysis of the Woodward’s project proved invaluable since those I interviewed about the project were relying on memories of events that had taken place at least 10 years prior (the initial development process for Woodward’s ran from 2003-2005). Thus, I cross-referenced their accounts to the best of my ability by comparing them with all of the documentary evidence I could gather on the project. This included documents provided by the former head of the Vancouver Real Estate Department who oversaw the project, city development applications, a documentary film produced about the development, and a now defunct website which contained materials relating to the consultation process, which I accessed through the internet archive search engine Way Back Time Machine.   While the documents were mainly analyzed through a qualitative lens and methods, I also made use of some quantitative documentary evidence. In the first paper, on the exchange of density for affordable housing in Vancouver, I combine two sources of numerical data, the size and value of major rezonings in the city between 2012 and 2018, as well as the dollar value of contributions from developers to political parties for election campaigns. This numerical data provided me with a broader framework for interpreting my case relative to information about how much affordable housing was being produced through density agreements and what developers were receiving in compensation through these arrangements.      15 Content Analysis of Newspaper Articles  The last method I draw on is a content analysis of 503 articles from major Canadian news outlets published between 2009-2019, which focus on the building of new rental housing. This data, which is used in the third paper of the dissertation, was accessed using the online academic news search engine Lexis Nexus. I generated the sample by entering the search term “rental housing” into the database for each of the top ten Canadian newspapers by circulation, restricting my search to articles published between January 2009 and December 2019. This provided me with a sample of 1206 articles. I read through all of the articles and filtered out those that did not pertain directly to the building of new rental housing, leaving me with a final sample of 503 articles.   I used the qualitative software package NVivo to code the newspaper data. As with my qualitative interviews I relied on an abductive strategy of analysis. During the data collection I noted which sections of the news outlet the articles were drawn from, including the news, opinion and business sections. Through the initial round of coding, I observed the framing of new rental housing varied significantly between the news and business sections. I therefore reorganized the data to create two separate samples, one of the news and opinion articles (n=409) and the other of business articles (n=94). Coding the two samples separately but comparatively exposed new insights and provides the basis for the arguments found in the third paper.   Outline of the Dissertation: Three Papers on the Economic Sociology of Urban Housing Development   The following papers are the product of a single study of the politics of urban housing development and density in Canada, however, are written as academic journal articles with self-contained literature reviews, motivating questions, and arguments. The first paper has received a revision and resubmission decision at the journal Environment and Planning A: Society and Space.   16 The second paper has been written for a generalist sociology journal, and will likely be submitted to Social Problems. The final paper is being prepared for the journal Urban Geography and will be submitted for review in the Fall of 2020. A separate paper using my dissertation data was published in the journal Geoforum in 2018. While not included here, it was the initial articulation of ideas which have been further developed in both the first and second papers of the dissertation. I have also written four other papers based on my dissertation data that are in varying stages of completion.4   Each of the following three papers illustrates the potential for urban cultural economy through an engagement with different thinkers that have developed this approach to studying the economy. The first chapter combines insights from Karl Polanyi and Pierre Bourdieu to illustrate the interaction between market and non-market exchange within neoliberal urban housing policy. The second paper draws again from Pierre Bourdieu to highlight the role of symbolic power in neighborhood conflict over new urban development. The third and last paper draws from narrative-economic theory, including the work of Jens Beckert, to unpack the relation between media accounts of new rental housing and fictional expectations in the market. Cumulatively these papers highlight the potential for urban cultural economy as a new approach for urban sociology and urban studies – a discussion I return to in the concluding chapter of the dissertation.                                                         4 One of these papers focuses on the phenomenon of commercial displacement due to new development. This manuscript engages with a subset of my interview and ethnographic data focusing on residents and business owners, which are not prominently featured in the papers here.   17 Chapter 1 : Gift-Giving in the Neoliberal City: Polanyi’s Substantivism and the Exchange of Density for Affordable Housing in Vancouver   Introduction  In recent years municipal governments in cities across North America have turned to private development firms to fund affordable housing in the context of the rollback of the welfare state. This practice often relies on a policy framework known as density agreements, a form of ‘land-value capture,’ where the local state allows for extra height and density on new condominium projects in exchange for social services from developers. Common in cities like Vancouver, Toronto, New York, and London, density agreements are seen as part of a shift to entrepreneurial, market-driven urban governance (Graham 2015; Leher and Pantelone 2018; Marcuse and Madden 2016; Rosen and Walks 2013, 2015; Stabrowski 2015; Stein 2019). Building on theories of urban neoliberalism, this paper argues that an additional set of economic relationships characterize density agreements – the exchange of gifts between the private sector and the state. Within Vancouver’s field of urban development, for example, prominent developers, housing NGO actors as well as politicians, including the mayor and deputy mayor of the city, construct and enact this policy through ongoing relations of reciprocity. Developers that “give back” by including social housing in their projects can be granted lucrative planning exemptions on their future endeavors, such as with the Oakridge development, a massive multi-tower luxury condo in central Vancouver and one of the largest residential developments in Canadian history.   That the privatization of the welfare state can take the form of gift-giving at the local level expands on theories of urban neoliberalism and the shift to market-oriented logics of city governance (Akers 2015; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; Hackworth 2007; Peck 2010). Drawing from Polanyian substantivist economics (Peck 2013a,   18 2013b; Polanyi 1944, 1971), I develop a framework for the study of urban economic processes that highlights a variety of forms of exchange, including markets, redistribution and reciprocity. Combining Polanyi with thinkers in economic sociology, including Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu, I show how economic exchanges are socially constructed by local state and non-state actors, and how this influences development and land-use outcomes. In advancing a substantivist approach to urban economics, I provide the empirical example of density agreements in Vancouver’s field of urban development. Drawing on in-depth ethnographic and interview-based research, and developer and city data on rezonings for social benefits, I show how urban neoliberalism is advanced through patterns of gift-giving, including non-market mechanisms like status, trust, symbolism, and reputation.   Exchanging Density for Affordable Housing: A Form of Urban Neoliberalism?  One of the most widely discussed findings in urban studies over the past several decades has been the shift towards neoliberal urban governance in cities across the Global North. With the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state, scholars have noted that cities are increasingly subject to market logic and entrepreneurial governance across numerous domains including housing, labour markets, and capital and financial investment (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Hackworth 2007; MacLeod 2011; Peck 2014). For example, density agreements, a form of land value capture, have become an increasingly popular way for cities to fund public goods, especially affordable housing, as welfare state funding has declined. The concept of land value capture maintains that the state influences the value of land, through actions like investment in public infrastructure, zoning, and other forms of regulation (Germán and Bernstein 2018; Wolf-Powers 2012). Therefore, if a private land owner like a developer seeks to rezone their property to allow for   19 additional height and density of a building, a process termed spot zoning, the public should share in the ‘creation’ of that value by ‘capturing’ some of the profits resulting from that increase (Moore 2013, 2016). Some scholars, planners, and policy makers have suggested that this form of land-use policy socializes the economic benefit from densification and works to mediate private market forces (Beasley 2019; Friendly 2017; Punter 2002; Shih and Shieh 2020). In this idealized form, land value capture is seen as a ‘win-win’ between the state and the private sector, who share in the value created by the relaxation of existing zoning rules. However, critical urban scholars have suggested that land value capture policies, such as density agreements, further entrench neoliberalism. These scholars argue that density agreements are a part of “roll-out neoliberalism,” which results in the privatization of services previously provided by the welfare state and the subordination of citizen needs to the market (Peck and Tickell 2002). In particular researchers point to the overrepresentation of density agreement applications in low-income neighborhoods, which fund housing as a part of new gentrifying developments (Graham 2015; Marcuse and Madden 2016; Stabrowski 2015; Stein 2015, 2019). Gillad Rosen and Alan Walks (2013, 2014) argue that density agreements are a part of “condo-ism,” a form of growth boosterism tied to condominium development in North American cities (see also Leher and Pantelone 2018). Writing about Toronto, they state, “Condominium development has increasingly been sought out for the public benefits that have become dependent on it, providing a direct link between the rise of condoism and the neoliberalization of city policy” (2014: 304). In sum, this body of work suggests that density agreements are a part of the privatization of social welfare through the logic of market-oriented growth and urban development.    20 While this work has helped to theorize the shift to market-based forms of urban governance in advanced capitalist countries, there has been much less work that accounts for the persistence of non-market exchange within cities in the context of the re-regulation of the welfare state. Drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi, I investigate how various forms of exchange exist within the context of the shift from redistribution to forms of governance that favor the private housing sector. I use the case of Vancouver, where density agreements have become a pervasive policy over the past twenty years through which to secure social benefits, including low-income housing, to show how these agreements are negotiated by developers, politicians, and planners. Elaborating on the discussion of density agreements and entrepreneurial governance, I find that density agreement transactions are socially constructed as ‘gifts’ through relations of reciprocity and gift-giving between the private sector and the local state. I then illustrate how this enactment of density agreements as gifts influences land-use decisions that increase the profits for private development firms who “give back” through contributions.  This paper builds on existing theories of urban neoliberalism by showing how the downloading of social welfare onto cities has created new patterns of reciprocity between politicians, planners, and the urban development community. A recognition of different forms of exchange illustrates how neoliberalism, rather than working solely through market-based exchange, is also perpetuated through cultural processes such as status, patronage, reputation, gift-giving, and symbolism. A critical understanding of gift-giving also allows us to see how this form of economic exchange can conceal the negative effects of the privatization of affordable housing, revealing an underexamined aspect of state power in facilitating private economic gain in the neoliberal city (see Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009; Hackworth 2007, 2019; Marcuse and Madden 2016; Peck 2010; Stein 2019; Weber 2002).   21 A Substantivist Economics of the City  In recent years Karl Polanyi’s work has been taken by up economic sociologists and geographers and in a number of areas within heterodox political economy (Block and Somers 2014; Burawoy 2003; Dale 2010, 2016a, 2016b; Krippner 2001; Peck 2013a). These movements have centered on bringing Polanyi’s master concept of the social embeddedness of the economy, as well as his unique perspectives on market fundamentalism relating to the commodification of land, labour and money, and the dynamics of protectionist double movements, to bear on contemporary neoliberalism.  While these conversations have helped to clarify the role of culture and institutions in the economy, as well as the power of market fundamentalism as a form of economic ideology, it is only recently that scholars have attempted to revive Polanyi’s broader theoretical and methodological apparatus of substantivist economics. Jamie Peck (2013a, 2014b) highlights the potential of substantivism for economic social science through its emphasis on institutions and various “hybrid” forms of economic exchange. For Polanyi, substantivism is a historicist antidote to the abstract formalism of classical liberal economics, in particular Adam Smith’s (1776) claims that humans have a natural propensity to “truck, barter and exchange” – to engage in market-like behavior. Polanyi (1944, 1971) argued that markets were just one of several “forms of integration” or patterns of exchange that have provided the foundation for economies throughout human history, the others being reciprocity (gift-giving), redistribution (socialism) and house-holding (self-sufficiency). In societies based on reciprocity, exchange takes the form of gift-giving and status through dense and ongoing social ties (Sahlins 1972). In other words, the economy is deeply embedded in culture. Redistributive societies are based on centralization, where goods are transmitted to a central authority (a clan chief or formal administration) and then redistributed on   22 the basis of need. Finally, markets involve one-off transactions based on barter and principles of supply and demand. In his critique of Smith, Polanyi illustrates that experiments with market fundamentalism, or “self-regulating” markets, in the mid-1800s were the first time humans sought to create a society solely based on markets (Somers and Block 2005; Block and Somers 2015).  Peck’s (2013a) interest in reviving substantivism is based in its ability to account for the development of markets by placing them in historical-institutional context and in relation to other forms of exchange. Polanyi believes one form of integration would dominate over others as the central organizing mechanism of an economy, however various forms of integration could still be found in all societies. As put by Peck, “a Polanyian take on markets (like other modes of integration) would be grounded in social ontology: markets are constituted through instituted processes; markets coexist with other forms of integration, usually in awkward and contradictory ways; and to the extent that markets display disembedding tendencies, far from being the prelude to equilibrium or the attainment of ‘purity,’ these are by definition disruptive, providing a range of social and institutional responses” (2013: 1552). Thus, for Peck, Polanyi’s substantivist approach provides theoretical flexibility to account for the various empirical instantiations, both of markets and general economic processes.  This paper also places the ideas of Marcel Mauss (1925) and Pierre Bourdieu (1990) in dialogue with substantivism, to show how gifts operate by creating a fuzzy, incalculable relationship between the giver and receiver that are often heightened by a delay between exchange and reciprocity (Rossman 2014; Lainer Vos 2013; Schilke and Rossman 2018). In turn, these exchanges are enacted through a language of trust, altruism and status. Mauss (1925) saw gifts as a way to gain power over receivers, in particular those who may not be able to immediately reciprocate the exchange. For Bourdieu (1990, 1991, 2000), who drew extensively on Mauss, the   23 gift was central to a theory of symbolic power, which was intertwined with and yet irreducible to economic power. By giving gifts, an ostensibly “voluntary” act (Mauss 1925), individuals promote the appearance of being altruistic and disinterested, while accruing status that may be economically advantageous in future transactions. As Bourdieu puts it, “there is much transmissible power, which derives from the art of delaying transmission and keeping others in the dark about one’s ultimate ulterior motives” (1990: 107).  Polanyi’s framework of substantivism, when combined with economic thinkers such as Mauss and Bourdieu, offers new opportunities to unpack hybrid forms of economic exchange within the neoliberal city. While density agreements take place within Vancouver’s housing market, state actors engage in reciprocal transactions with private developers that are embedded in relations of trust and status, reflecting real estate transactions more generally (Bourdieu 2005; Buzzeli and Harris 2006; Fainstein 1994; Guy and Hennebury 2000; Weber 2015, 2016). Thus, this paper works to integrate Polanyian economic geography and sociology into the study of urban development, land-use, and the privatization of the welfare state. In doing so, it also sheds light on the problems associated with density agreements as a form of social policy, especially when enacted as gift-giving.   A Study of the Politics of Urban Development   My analysis is based on a comparative study of the field of urban development in Toronto and Vancouver. This research includes three years of ethnographic fieldwork in both cities, 100 interviews with developers, planners, politicians and housing advocates, and textual and quantitative analysis of secondary sources such as development applications, city documents about the size and value of rezonings, and campaign contributions from developers. This paper uses the   24 Vancouver case to illustrate the role of gift-giving within the context of welfare state reform. While these findings are common across both cases, the role of reciprocity in density agreements is mediated by the political structures of each city – an at-large system in Vancouver and ward system in Toronto. In addition, Vancouver has used density agreements to produce significantly more units of affordable housing than Toronto.5   I carried out fieldwork in Vancouver between 2015 and 2018, attending City Hall meetings, rezoning application hearings, developer-led events, workshops held by housing advocates, and other community forums. I also conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews (n=54) with actors in the field of urban development, which lasted between half an hour and two hours. My fieldnotes and interviews were transcribed and coded using the qualitative software package MaxQDA. In coding the data, I followed the method of abductive analysis developed by sociologists Tavory and Timmermans (2014), which involves an iterative process of moving between close engagement with the data, academic literature, and follow-up visits to the field to collect additional data based on these impressions. In addition to my qualitative fieldwork, I also analyzed secondary sources obtained through the City of Vancouver’s annual reports on Community Amenity Contributions (CACs) on the size and value of rezoning. This data allows me to compare city documents with the financial outcomes of density agreements for private sector actors who seek rezonings in exchange for affordable housing. Finally, I use data on the campaign contributions of developers to political parties to compare this with city decisions about rezonings.                                                         5 Following Rosen and Walks (2017), I maintain that there is a link between welfare state defunding and the increasing importance of density agreements at the local level to provide important social goods in both Toronto and Vancouver. Toronto does, however, capture a smaller percentage of the land-lift value than Vancouver and has produced less affordable housing through density agreements (Moore 2016).    25 Community Amenity Contributions: From ‘Quality of Life’ Services to Affordable Housing  In Vancouver, the exchange of density for affordable housing is conducted through the policy of Community Amenity Contributions, a form of density-for-benefit agreement (Moore 2013; Punter 2003). Situated in the broader policy framework of land-value capture, CACs allow developers to ask for an increase in density beyond existing zoning if they contribute some of their additional profits to community amenities. As in the cases of Toronto and New York City, in Vancouver density agreements take the form of a negotiation (Moore 2016), where sites can be rezoned on a case-by-case basis. With CACs, as with other forms of density agreements, the process is ideally founded on “good planning principles,” in other words the increase in zoning must first pass through the City’s planning department, which decides whether the increase is appropriate for the site.  The City’s real estate department calculates an estimate of the land-lift of the site (the value of the land before and after the rezoning), and then proposes an in-kind contribution, for example a park, daycare or affordable housing, for the developer to make that amounts to 75 percent of the land-lift (CoV, CAC reports).6 A recommendation is then forwarded from the real estate and planning departments to the ten members of City Council and the Mayor, who vote to either approve or reject the rezoning. This process is thought to produce the most careful and lucrative results for the city, as it estimates the land value of individual sites rather than entire neighborhoods. However, it is also time-consuming and opaque to the public. Socio-legal scholar Mariana Valverde (2012) refers to this form of zoning as “the state of exception as the rule,” arguing that the flexibility of zoning in cities like Vancouver and Toronto in its “very regulatory                                                      6 While the City of Vancouver prefers an in-kind contribution for CACs, they will sometimes accept direct cash transfers as well.    26 architecture, encourages a constant proliferation of site-specific exemptions and legal black holes” (2012: 45). This is further reinforced by policy stating that negotiations for density agreements are protected from Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, based on the justification that disclosing this information could threaten the City’s bargaining power and the developer’s need to protect themselves from competitors.7  CACs were introduced in Vancouver in 1989 as a way for city planners to use density increases to pay for the construction of community services during the large brownfield redevelopment of the formerly industrial False Creek area on the edge of the downtown core (Punter 2003). The use of CACs to provide funding for parks, community centers, daycares and the city’s famous seawall around the perimeter of the downtown peninsula added to Vancouver’s reputation as a well-planned city, crystallizing in the global planning movement known as Vancouverism (Peck, Siemiatyck, and Wyly 2014; Punter 2003).  While CACs were initially intended to provide “quality of life” amenities, in the mid-2000s they became increasingly used by Vancouver’s local government to address a growing housing crisis as a result of the disinvestment from affordable housing by both the federal and provincial governments, and increasing land values and rents in the city (see Figure 1.1 below). The move away from funding affordable housing started in the early 1990s, when a Liberal federal government withdrew from funding 1500 social housing units a year in British Columbia, downloading responsibility onto provinces (Carter 1997; Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Suttor 2016). In British Columbia, which was then governed by a progressive left-leaning New                                                      7 My Freedom of Information requests were denied under section 17(1) and 21(1) of British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Privacy Act. Section 17(1) refers to “disclosures that are harmful to the economic interests of a public body,” in this case, the City, and section 21(1) cites “disclosures that are harmful to the economic interests of a third party,” the developer.      27 Democratic Party, social housing construction continued at a little over 50 percent of the previous rate, about 900 units a year, throughout the 1990s (Suttor 2016). This also came to an end in 2001, however, as the election of a right-leaning provincial government cut this funding and left the expensive Vancouver region grappling with housing insecurity. After 2001, modest provincial funding was directed toward rent supplements and homeless shelters, rather than building new social housing units (Klein 2013).  In 2008, the citizens of Vancouver elected a recently formed center-left political party, Vision Vancouver, led by social entrepreneur Gregor Robertson, who ran on a platform of housing and environmental justice. After a large-scale “social mix” redevelopment in the low-income Downtown Eastside neighborhood (Blomley 2004; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2013; Vivader 2004), which involved rezoning in exchange for extra social housing, Vision Vancouver began to reorient the CAC program away from quality of life amenities and towards affordable housing (Bula 2009). During their 10-year majority in City Hall between 2008 and 2018, Vision Vancouver continuously leveraged zoning and density to produce several thousand units of affordable housing, about 300 units per year, through 708 million dollars’ worth of contributions (CoV, CAC reports 2018).        28 Figure 1.1: Social and Affordable Housing in British Columbia (1973-2017)   (Based on Carter 1997 and City of Vancouver CAC Report 2019)  While this number is small compared to previous levels of federal funding (Carter 1997), it served an important legitimating function for local politicians who could claim to be the only level of government to provide any low-income housing to Vancouverites. It is also important to note that of the units created, only around 1,000 of the units met the affordability criteria for social housing, while others constituted “affordable” rentals targeted to middle-income renters significantly above low-income tax brackets (CoV, CAC reports 2018).8                                                          8 What constitutes affordable housing is hotly debated in Vancouver, as in other cities throughout North America and Europe. Traditionally, social housing refers to housing where residents pay no more than 30% of their income towards housing, regardless of what that income is (inclusive of those receiving welfare benefits). Affordable housing, on the other hand, has been used by political parties to refer to “below-market” rents. However, below-market rates are often very close to market rates, prompting criticisms of ‘affordable’ housing policies from journalists and citizens.    29 Gift, Tax, or Sale? The Enactment of Density Agreements as a Form of Exchange  Previous research on urban neoliberalism has focused on the role of density agreements in the commodification and marketization of low-income housing provision (Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Madden and Marcuse 2016). However, through my investigations of Vancouver’s field of urban development, I found that the meaning of density agreements and their status as either a market or non-market form of exchange is highly contested.  Politicians, planners, and developers discursively construct CACs as a ‘voluntary contribution’ that is different from either a ‘sale’ or ‘tax.’ CACs therefore are an underdetermined form of exchange (Lainer-Vos 2013); they could be seen as either a redistributive tax or a market-like transaction. They come to be presented, however, as a relationship of reciprocity between the state and the private sector. Therefore, participants in rezoning decisions constantly affirm and reaffirm that that these exchanges are indeed ‘gifts’ through both formal and informal mechanisms. These include statements at public events and city hall hearings, legal directives in policy documents, and private justifications by politicians and developers. I show how density agreements come to be seen as gifts over competing interpretations, such as market ‘sales’ or redistributive taxation, through an ongoing relational process of meaning-making between urban actors. In doing so I uncover an overlooked dimension of urban neoliberalism, that the privatization of social goods are constructed as gifts to the public.   Politicians: Density Agreements as Developer Contributions to the Public  Municipal politicians, particularly from Vision Vancouver, advocated for the use of density agreements to produce affordable housing as a pragmatic solution to the housing crisis. In responding to the constraints of welfare state defunding, they represented density agreements with developers as form of reciprocal exchange between the state and the private sector. They often   30 referred to CACs as gifts or “gift-like”, even as these arrangements were lucrative for developers through increasing height and density on private condominium projects. As was put to me by the deputy mayor of Vancouver and councillor with Vision Vancouver, “CACs are a gift from a developer that is asking for an up-zone, asking for more density and height than is currently allowed within zoning. So, in order for them to achieve that, we have a negotiated a CAC that is geared toward investments in housing” (Politician, Interview 46).  While politicians and city officials did not always explicitly use the word ‘gift’, they often used alternative terms like “contribution,” “offering,” “donation,” or “voluntary.”9 At a public talk in 2018, then-Mayor of Vancouver Gregor Robertson explained to me: “We have a negotiation around what is called the ‘land lift’ and generally we end up with 80 to 85 percent of that land lift which comes to the City that’s for community amenities. It’s called a contribution. It’s not a hard and fast requirement – it’s a negotiated contribution” (Fieldnote 11). Similarly, the former Head of Vancouver’s planning department, Larry Beasley, asserted that CACs “are not requirements. They are expectations” (Planner, Interview 11). That the city collects 80% of the value of the land-lift from rezoning as a CAC is an aspirational number.  Depending on the size of the rezoning and the prospective value of the land, which involves intense negotiations with the planning department, the dollar value of the CAC can vary significantly (see also Weber 2020). This reveals that density agreements are seen as voluntary and involve flexible or negotiated rules regarding the parameters of the exchange, unlike more redistributive transactions, such as a tax.  In addition to the language of gifts and contributions, politicians and city staff often discuss these transactions in evaluative and morally laden terms. This was especially the case with developers who were perceived as wanting to “work with” the city and contributing with little                                                      9 Interviews 25, 27, 31, 41, 43, 45, 53.   31 hesitation. This distinction was articulated by a member of the City’s real estate department, describing their community values: “In my mind there are some very responsible developers. Yes, profit is important to them, but community development is also very important to them. Where they see those benefits coming back to the arts community, or to park dedications, or to non-market housing, they are happy to do it” (Politician, Interview 12) The use of moral language was also common during my observations of City Council meetings and the Urban Design Review Panel, where urban planners vetted rezonings for affordable housing.  For example, during one rezoning hearing a Lead Planner thanked a developer for “all that you’re doing for the city,” before commenting that the rezoning should “sail through” City Council based on the recommendations of the department (Fieldnote 53). Scholarship has often-noted that urban neoliberalism has resulted in a “partnership” model (Pacewitz 2016), where local politics and the private sector converge in their interest in growth and competitiveness. The case of density agreements reveals a new dimension to the dynamic, where politicians and developers are less partners dealing in “business” together than in exchanging gifts with one another. That developers can always “walk away” from providing affordable housing or extra services by not seeking extra density contributes to the impression that providing CAC funding is an altruistic gesture. Developers are by no legal means obligated to pursue rezonings – and in fact since many do not – CACs come to be seen as voluntary transactions. The legal language around CACs (Punter 2003) officially distinguishes them from a “tax” that all developers would be required to pay. According to the Community Amenity Contributions guideline issued by the province of British Columbia, cities must “stay on solid legal footing” by acknowledging they have “no authority to impose such conditions on a rezoning applicant; any contributions must either be at the initiative of the applicant/developer or emerge from rezoning negotiations between the applicant/developer   32 and the local government” (Province of BC, 2018). The use of the term contribution, rather than tax, is also important to notice, as the Oxford English Dictionary defines a contribution as a “gift or payment to a common fund or collection,” whereas a tax is a “compulsory contribution to state revenue.” While the City of Vancouver does collect taxes from developers in the form of Development Cost Levies (DCLs), CACs are only attached to projects where a change in land-use is sought, making them discretionary for the developer. This helps to explain why politicians are careful to avoid any suggestion that they are “taxing” development through CACs, which could result in legal pitfalls.  Developers: Density Agreements as an Altruistic Choice  Similar to politicians, developers framed density agreements in terms of gift-giving, altruism, and “giving-back” to the city. From their perspective, it is even more clear that they are choosing to provide the city with affordable housing by seeking rezonings. Thus, while rezonings can also greatly benefit the developer’s bottom-line, they typically highlight the philanthropic dimensions of CACs. A professional working for a firm that pursues large rezonings in exchange for social benefits and low-income housing stated: “[We] have a mandate to do affordable housing . . . we can contribute our resources and our expertise to something that actually benefits the city over time rather than writing a cheque when you are retiring” (Developer, Interview 24). A second professional spoke about the voluntary aspect of CACs: “We get higher than what was currently allowed for with the zoning because we give back to the city. We give 75 percent of the value to the city. We voluntarily offer the CACs from the higher height” (Developer, Interview 34). Echoing Bourdieu’s (1990, 1991, 2000) theory of symbolic capital, developers highlight the advantages of “being altruistic” as it creates a fuzzy set of expectations that they are “owed” something in return at a future, undetermined time. For example, the same development industry   33 professional went on to say, “I think there is a trust aspect that has to take place with these developments. With each individual project, if you are willing to give more, then theoretically you will get more.” An architect working with the same developer also confirmed this:  “All that is to say that everybody is getting certain intangibles out of it, versus if they did a straight deal at market value. I think that’s the piece that developers are starting to catch on to. It’s more of a relationship with the City over time. Over lot of different projects, we have developed a relationship where they have given a bit to the City and are fairly generous, and then the City is fairly open to different design ideas or different experimental things that we want to do” (Developer, Interview 32).   The notion that CACs are a way to build reciprocity was mentioned numerous times in my interviews. These findings are in line with research on density agreements in Toronto and London (Elsmore 2019; Hyde 2018; Rosen 2017), which notes the tendency of developers to frame density agreements in terms of “social conscience” or “altruism.” This development strategy involves the accumulation of symbolic or reputational capital, which is less quantifiable than economic capital but can influence land-use and zoning decisions, in turn greatly enhancing profit margins. The developers’ narratives highlighted the general benefit of being generous with the city, but also spoke of specific cases where they were granted lucrative rezonings on major condominium projects, including some of the largest in Vancouver’s history.      34 Planners: Density Agreements as Good Planning Versus Selling Zoning  City planners were the innovators and overseers of the city’s CAC program throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, and generally saw it as a prudent approach to funding local amenities. However, this interpretation was contingent on their role in directing this policy and City Council following their recommendations closely. According to Vancouver’s planning community, density agreements should be primarily built on “good planning principles” rather than the need to increase revenue to fund social goods. However, over the course of Vision Vancouver’s tenure in the 2010s, some planners became wary of CACs being “politicized” and subordinated to market forces. Rumors circulated that planners were being informally asked by politicians and their staff members to endorse all projects with an affordable housing component in order to help the city address the housing crisis. If they refused to do so, City Council was willing to go against their recommendations in order to create units of affordable housing.  This spurred the idea that density agreements amount to “selling rezoning” among some planners, who spoke out on the matter in the local media with critiques about the practice being carried out with an overly economic agenda.  Claiming the City was treating these arrangements as a direct exchange or sale was a morally-charged and taboo line of discussion (Rossman 2014). For example, one Senior Planner who felt the City had stopped listening to the advice of planners in their pursuit of affordable housing stated:   “Vancouver has become this giant safety deposit box for world capital. In my view it has become too enticing to perhaps nudge up or even sell zoning because there is such value to be created and through predominately the CAC. I think the CAC is a dilemma   35 because if your entire reason for regulating is selling, it’s creating value through the selling of rezoning” (Planner, Interview 36).   After making this statement, the participant expressed hesitation in being quoted by name, illustrating the sensitivity of speaking about CACs as “selling zoning.”10 In a more overt expression of the same sentiment, the former Head of City Planning during the 1980s penned a series of blog posts and open letters critiquing Vision Vancouver’s approach. In one passage, he writes:   “The more rezonings you have, the more profit there is to be shared . . . If the City becomes over-enthusiastic about their profit, they may begin to rebalance their evaluation systems to prioritize profit in their planning evaluations over other good planning matters; such things as good neighbourliness, view protection or enhancement, overshadowing, sharing daylight, privacy, protecting the public realm like streets and parks, good urban design, even transparency and rigorous rezoning evaluations.” (Spaxman, 2016).  Overall, planners were supportive of the policy format of sharing the wealth from density agreements, as long as these decisions were not reduced to budgetary logistics. Thus, seeing CACs as a tenet of “good planning” is in line with their understanding as ‘contributions’ rather than impersonal, ideal-typical market transactions based on monetary considerations.  This points to                                                      10 I have included this quote under the condition of anonymity the participant requested.   36 the fact that providing social benefits, like affordable housing, is challenged when it is perceived to be an explicitly economic transaction as opposed to a voluntary contribution. By examining the meanings of politicians, developers and planners, I have shown how the exchange of density for affordable housing is understood as reciprocity through a negotiated process that is both morally-laden and politically contested. While density agreements are an underdetermined form of exchange that could be seen as either a gift, a tax, or a sale, their dominant understanding as gifts has a consequential impact for land-use decisions. By examining how these transactions unfold over time we can see the material aspects of reciprocity in the context of urban neoliberalism.   Relationships of Reciprocity in Building Affordable Housing: CACs and the Accumulation of Symbolic Capital  That developers pursue informal, reciprocal relationships with politicians is not a new idea. Urban growth machine theory posits that they enter into preferential relationships, where politicians rely on developers for campaign donations and provide favorable treatment in exchange once elected (Logan and Molotch 1987). While evidence for this claim is mixed (Fleischmann and Stein 1998), citizens and journalists commonly claim that politicians are “beholden” to developers by accepting contributions. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data of campaign and CAC contributions by developers in Vancouver, I illustrate that there is no relationship between campaign contributions and the granting of extra density. I show how the exchange of affordable housing as a “gift” through density agreements has emerged as a more effective model for securing favorable rezoning than campaign contributions as it produces fuzzy and underdetermined   37 expectations for reciprocity (Bourdieu 1990) and lessens the perceived transactionalism between the state and the private sector (Rossman 2014).   Reciprocity in Exchange for Zoning: CACs versus Campaign Contributions  Between 2012 and 2017, the City of Vancouver collected 494 million dollars in CACs from 25 “major” rezonings on large condominium projects throughout the city (CoV CAC reports 2018). Close to half of this money, $228 million, was contributed by a single developer, Westbank, which has gained a reputation for “giving back” and working with the City to provide social services and affordable housing. This number vastly outstrips other developers in the city, with the second closest, Concord Pacific, contributing $41 million in CACs. In return for their large contributions, Westbank has received over five million square feet in extra density on high-end speculative developments, including a starchitect-designed tower, Vancouver House, which sold for roughly $1,500 per square foot – some of the highest prices in Canada. An additional massive rezoning of the shopping center Oakridge, granted to Westbank, is set to become one of the largest redevelopments in Canadian history. Based on a cautious estimate of the prospective value of the land (at least $1,000 per square foot at sale, and the amount of increased density granted by the City), this rezoning could be worth several billion dollars for the developer. As I will illustrate, these exchanges are not one-off transactions but can be traced back to Westbank’s participation in the early 2000s redevelopment of the large public-private social-mix project, Woodward’s, in the low-income Downtown Eastside neighborhood.   Before discussing Westbank’s ongoing relationship of reciprocity with the City, I first investigate whether their favorable treatment on rezoning applications can be linked to campaign contributions to the ruling political party, Vision Vancouver. Using publicly available information,   38 I constructed a data set of all campaign contributions from developers to political parties between the 2014 and 2017 municipal elections in Vancouver (See Table 1.1).11 During this period, Westbank placed near the bottom of the list with a contribution of $30,000 – roughly one-quarter of the donation of the top contributor, Wall Financial Corp. The top three contributors to Vision Vancouver were all on the list of developers granted major rezonings; however, Wall Financial Corp and the third top contributor, Onni, received relatively little through density agreements during this period – at less than 200,000 square feet each. Westbank, on the other hand, was granted 5, 200,000 square feet of extra density, more than seven times the amount received by the developer in second place, Concord Pacific. In sum, there is no apparent relationship between campaign contributions and the amount of extra density a developer receives.   Table 1.1: Rezonings Granted versus Developer Donations to the City (2012-2017)  Rezonings Granted to Developers (sq. ft.)   Developer Donations to Vision Vancouver 1.  Westbank   5,200,000 (7 rezonings)  1.  Wall Financial Corp (Peter Wall) $125,000 2.  Concord Pacific  760,000 (2 rezonings  2.  Holborn      $105,000 3.  Holborn   700,000 (1 rezoning)  3.  Onni         $101,500 4.  Reliance   590,000 (1 rezoning)  4.  Bosa   $101,000 5.  Intracorp   461,000 (1 rezoning)  5.  Amacon  $100,000 6.  Wall Group  176,000 (1 rezoning)  6.  Concord Pacific (Terry Hui)  $93,000 7.  Onni   170,000 (1 rezoning)  7.  Coromandel    $85,000 8.  Credit Suiss  146,000 (1 rezoning)  8.  Rize Alliance    $79,000   9.  Aquilini (Aquilinis)  $60,000   10. Wesgroup  $55,000   11. Solterra  $50,000   12. Reliance    $47,000   13. Polygon (Audain)  $41,000   14. Low Tide Properties  $37,000   15. Westbank (Ian Gillespie)  $31,000   16. Cressy  $25,000                                                       11 Information about contributions accessed at www.cityhallwatch.wordpress.com; information about rezonings accessed via City of Vancouver CAC Reports.   39 That Westbank contributes little to political campaigns can be seen as a practice aimed to reduce the perceived transactionalism between themselves and the state (Schilke and Rossman 2018). Indeed, during my interviews, several development industry insiders and local journalists pointed out that while Westbank is seen as a “favourite” of the City, unlike other developers they contribute very little to political parties. For example, the top Vancouver real estate reporter for the high-circulation newspaper The Globe and Mail, states in reference to Westbank CEO Ian Gillespie: “Some commentators may say he appears so favored by Vision because he gives money to them. For my story I went back and looked at the record and strangely Gillespie gives very little” (Bula 2014). While the data on campaign contributions can rule this out as a key factor, it does not tell us why certain developers have received so much more in rezonings than others. I argue that Westbank’s cultivation of symbolic capital by giving back through density agreements, and especially on highly publicized projects, plays a key role in their success with lucrative rezonings.  Building Symbolic Capital through Salient Developments: Westbank and Woodward’s   Westbank’s relationship with the City began with the development of a public-private social housing redevelopment, Woodward’s, in Vancouver’s low-income Downtown Eastside neighborhood in the early 2000s. The project is located at the former site of the now-defunct department store and neighborhood retail institution Woodard’s, which closed in 1993 and had occupied a square block of prime land in downtown Vancouver. After local activists blocked several attempts to build high-end condos at the site and conducted a high-profile housing squat in 2002, the City purchased the land to build a social-mix high-rise project with both condominiums and social housing (Blomley 2004; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2013). Holding an open call design   40 competition to select a private partner for the development in 2003, the City chose Westbank, which pitched a smaller project that was deemed to be the most “sensitive” to the community. However, after a year of consultations in 2004, Westbank submitted a second proposal that advocated for doubling the density permitted on the site in exchange for more social housing units.   The negotiation over Woodward’s can be seen as a precursor to the City’s approach to rezoning in the coming decade. The much larger building was approved by City Hall and the 536 units of market condominiums sold out in a matter of hours after being offered as presales to the public (Enright and Henriquez 2010; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2013). The decision to increase the density at Woodward’s has become a locus of contention in the Downtown Eastside, as the large increase in private high-end condominiums is believed to have led to gentrification and displacement in the area since the building opened in 2009.   The Woodward’s project was a consequential turning point for both the City and Westbank as a developer. Vision Vancouver party member and Mayor Gregor Robertson, elected in 2008, was mentored by the city councillor in charge of the Woodward’s redevelopment and adopted a similar stance that the city should pursue affordable housing by any means. Westbank, in turn, continued to advance their relationship with the City after building Woodward’s. Reflecting on this approach, an architect who works closely with Westbank and helped design the project, stated, “I think Woodward’s kind of gave us new insight into how we can work with private developers to deliver social goods, so that’s where that started. Since then it’s almost like we are hand-picking projects that are private developments that will do some kind of social good” (Developer, Interview 48).  In an interview at the time of the Woodward’s opening, the CEO of Westbank, Ian Gillespie, refers to the symbolic “currency” accrued through the project, saying:    41 “I think we got some currency out of the project that will only grow when it is finished. It’s hard to put a number on what that goodwill is worth, but I think in the long run it’s worth something . . . we get accused of benefitting from favouritism. But it isn’t favouritism. It’s called trust, and if you earn that trust you should be given more latitude than if you haven’t” (Enright and Henriquez 2010: 110).  The notion that giving gifts through the CAC program is a way to build a reciprocal relationship with the City was also noted by those working in the non-profit housing sector. For example, a representative of the non-profit organization that oversaw the social housing component of the Woodward’s project stated, “All of the developers wanted to do Woodward’s . . . because developers have to have a good relationship with the city. They are obsessed with it” (NGO, Interview 48). Ian Gillespie has often remarked that, while Woodward’s was not the company’s most lucrative project, it was its most rewarding from a reputational standpoint. This relationship was indeed important to Westbank, who highlighted their involvement with Woodard’s as a good deed that should lead to extra “latitude” from the City on their future projects, like Vancouver House and Oakridge. In June of 2014, as part of the Vancouver House rezoning, Westbank acquired a piece of city-owned land on the development site at what was later shown to be a bargain rate (City Council Meeting Minutes, 2014). This sale was approved unanimously by City Council without public consultation or open debate. Similarly, in 2017 a local citizens’ group, the South Vancouver Parks Society, launched a BC Supreme Court Action asserting that the value of the land at the Oakridge – which is 28.5 acres in the center of an expensive neighborhood – was underassessed by over 350 million dollars (SVPS, Affidavit 2017). While the judge ultimately dismissed the case, access to the CAC calculations and the price paid for the land remain   42 undisclosed. These examples highlight a point that was commonly cited in my interviews with city officials and development industry actors, that Westbank’s efforts to build “trust” with the City have indeed benefitted the firm.    Figure 1.2: The Woodward’s Towers in the Downtown Eastside   43  Figure 1.3: The Luxury Condominium Vancouver House in False Creek    Figure 1.4: Westbank Billboard at the Vancouver International Airport     44 Gift-giving and the accumulation of symbolic capital can create high economic returns; however, it is important to note that it is also an inherently risky strategy. In order for gifts to appear altruistic and to prompt equally generous counter-gifts, they must appear disinterested through temporal delay (Bourdieu 1990; Mauss 1925), meaning that the giver cannot be guaranteed to enhance their economic profits. At the same time, while affordable housing constructed by private developers takes the form of a gift, the condominium units received in exchange are sold on the market, illustrating the economic hybridity of density agreements. While Westbank has leveraged gift-giving to become one of the most powerful developers in Vancouver, many other developers choose not to pursue CACs, seeing them as a large commitment to engaging with the City and building relationships, without guaranteed return. There is also the question of the potential expiration date on political “good will” accrued by developers as politicians and planners rotate out of city hall, and how the developer can maintain their reputation during transitions. Finally, the work of enmeshing gifts and disguising profit relations requires skill and patience, which developers seeking a “quick buck” choose to avoid. While other factors, such as location or timing of a development, play a role in rezoning outcomes (Rosen 2017), I have illustrated how development industry actors “giving back” through CACs becomes a successful way to gain favour with politicians and city planners to facilitate future endeavors.   Gift-Giving and Neoliberalism: Obfuscating the Negative Effects of Funding Affordable Housing through Density  The literature on urban neoliberalism outlines the transition of the local state from welfare provision to a more competitive approach to urban governance based on markets (Akers 2013, 2015; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; Hackworth 2007, 2016; Harvey 1989; Merrifeild 2014; Peck 2010, 2012). The case of density agreements in   45 Vancouver reveals the underexamined role of gift-giving and reciprocity in these processes. My findings correspond with Polanyi’s (1944, 1971) dictum that the economy is always constructed and maintained by both the state and social institutions involving hybrid patterns of markets, reciprocity and redistribution. In this sense, density agreements exist alongside broader patterns of market-based neoliberalism. While proponents argue that density agreements are a form of redistribution (Beasley 2019; Friendly 2017; Punter 2002; Shih and Shieh 2020), examining the broader context shows they benefit the private sector over public interest (see also Madden and Marcuse 2016; Stein 2018). Like other researchers, my work shows that these arrangements oftentimes work to deepen inequality. However, I have argued that this require us to expand our conceptual repertoire to include theories of gift-giving.   Density agreement transactions are neoliberal in the sense that their emergence and increasing use is a result of the ongoing downloading of responsibility for social welfare onto cities over the past 20 years (Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Peck and Tickell 2002; Suttor 2016). While politicians and planners argue that density agreements help deliver social goods to citizens, compared to policy mechanisms like redistributive taxation, they make social welfare contingent upon increases in profitability for the private sector. While taxes also accumulate more returns from an increase in profits, in the case of CACs the contribution is dependent on higher density, and its returns, facilitated by the state. Indeed, the legal language around Community Amenity Contributions is careful to stipulate that density agreements are not a “tax” collected by the state (Punter 2003), but rather a voluntary transaction that is pursued by the private sector. This fosters the impression that CACs are an altruistic and disinterested gift from developers who are “giving back” to the city. Not only do these contributions increase profitability on individual projects, but they also work to build relations of give-and-take with the city, which can result in future lucrative   46 land-use and zoning exceptions for developers with “good reputations” (Hyde 2018; Elsmore 2019). These high-end condominium projects, like Vancouver House and Oakridge, tend to be of a speculative nature and targeted towards transnational “luxury-class” housing investors (Graham 2015, 2016).   Second, as other scholars have argued (Stein 2017, 2018; Stabrowski 2015), density arrangements can lead to gentrification, as the provision of affordable housing is contingent upon increases in for-profit condominium density. Increases in density, in turn, oftentimes lead to an increase in land values and rents near socially-mixed projects, resulting in ancillary displacement from previously affordable neighborhoods (Bridge, Butler Lees 2012). This may be the case for Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, where the Woodward’s project contributed 125 units of social housing, while 426 units were lost from nearby SRO hotels up-scaling for higher income tenants in the years following its opening (Swanson and Drury 2012). While a conclusive causal relationship between Woodward’s and SRO housing stocks is difficult to establish, scholars also illustrated a range of negative effects that social-mix policy has on the subjective experiences and daily lives of low-income residents, such as loss of affordable businesses, increased policing and surveillance, and a general sense of exclusion from the neighborhood (August 2014, 2016; Bridge, Butler Lees 2012; Blomley 2003; Butler and Robson 2003). The community organizers and housing advocates I spoke with echoed this sentiment.12 As one long-time Downtown Eastside housing advocate shared: “Woodward’s has been a disaster for the community except for those that got into the housing. My feeling now is that CACs suck. The price that you pay for CACs is always too high in terms of the impacts of gentrification” (Housing Advocate, Interview 29). That                                                      12 Of the 11 housing advocates and community organizers in Vancouver that participated in my study, all expressed criticism of the way the City had utilized CACs, especially in low-income neighborhoods.    47 density agreements are framed as “the only way” to achieve affordable housing has meant progressive politicians continue to support projects that gentrify low-income neighborhoods.   This leads to a final point regarding the fusion of progressive values with high-end condo development that is characteristic of density agreements (see also Stein 2017). Exchanging density for affordable housing both legitimates the progressive claims of politicians, and obscures and socially embeds the ongoing exchange relationship between the state and private sectors. The negotiations over CACs happening behind closed doors between the City’s real estate department and developers adds another layer of obfuscation to these arrangements (Valverde 2012). While campaign contributions are mandated to be publicly available information, as well as direct and quantifiable, density agreements lead to the accrual of symbolic capital, which is diffuse, temporally discontiguous and difficult to trace (Bourdieu 1990; Schilke and Rossman 2018). It has, however, led to the increasing power and influence of developers that have gained a good relationship with the city for providing goods previously supported by the welfare state.   Conclusion: Substantivism and the Economies of the City  This paper has added nuance to debates about funding affordable housing through density agreements by illustrating the relationship between market and non-market forms of exchange within neoliberal urban policy-making. These findings contribute to recent discussions of Polanyian economic geography and sociology by placing them in dialogue with urban studies. As suggested by Peck (2013a, 2013b), substantivism offers a way to theorize different forms of integration, including redistribution and reciprocity, within the context of market societies.  While focusing on the particular policy framework of Vancouver, this is not a trivial or exceptional example. Density agreements are but one instantiation of land-value capture policies   48 which are increasingly used by the state to pay for social welfare and infrastructure. Across their different forms, land-value capture usually involves increases in density and profitability for private developers in exchange for benefits. In 2018, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy launched a large-scale study of land-value capture policies in an attempt to create best practice models for cities (Germán and Bernstein 2018). If these policies are in fact leading to negative outcomes for low-income people, such as displacement and gentrification, an understanding of their formulation as gift-giving is important in order to theorize, critique, and challenge the policy rhetoric that legitimates them.   Finally, this research opens new terrain for the study of urban neoliberalism and economic policy-making in cities. How does gift-giving operate in various policy spheres and urban governance contexts? When cities transfer public land to the private sector, is this constructed as a sale or gift? How do private sector actors build reputational or symbolic capital that has lasting effects beyond changes in ruling governments? As this paper has suggested, viewing the city through the lens of Polanyian social science opens up new questions and facilitates new ways to think about urban policy-making in the context of neoliberalism.       49 Chapter 2 : Symbolic Capital and ‘Socially Conscious’ Real Estate Developers: The Paradox of Reputation and Accumulation in For-Profit Business  Introduction  In the fall of 2014, a major new redevelopment project was announced in Downtown Toronto at the site of a former iconic department store, Honest Ed’s. The large discount store, a long-time destination for low-income shoppers, newly arrived immigrants and local university students, had been the cornerstone of local impresario “Honest” Ed Mirvish’s business empire since the 1950s, and now occupied a square block of prime real estate. In a feature for Canada’s national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, it was revealed that a Vancouver-based development firm, Westbank, would take on the project and intended to build several large rental housing towers on the site (Bozikovic 2014). The story, which ran under the headline “The future of Honest Ed’s: Vancouver-style city building,” included an interview with lead architect for the project, Gregory Henriquez, persuading Torontonians that the cherished site was in good hands. Comparing it to one of his well-known buildings in Vancouver, a mixed-income public-private housing project also developed by Westbank, he stated, “I bring something of a left-leaning social activist component as well as a design component. It starts to temper the economics, and it becomes something really special." The literature in the sociology of urban development reinforces a widespread notion that urban developers seek to maximize profits at the expense of cities and communities (Brenner, Mayer and Marcuse 2012; Logan and Molotch 1987; Madden and Marcuse 2016; Stein 2019; Zukin 2009). In this context, Henriquez’s sentiment points to a counter-intuitive notion: why would a real estate developer claim to want to temper the economics on a large-scale housing development project on a highly valuable piece of land in a major North American city? In other words, what is the relationship between profit and altruism in the for-profit real estate sector? This   50 paper diverges from existing political economy perspectives on urban developers by introducing Bourdieu’s (1990, 1991, 2000) theory of symbolic capital to analyze the relationship between economic and non-economic capital. In doing so I illustrate how developers that are able to illustrate non-economic motivations are able to enhance their profit-making over time.  This paper is based on a study of urban development in Toronto, including ethnography, in-depth qualitative interviews and analysis of textual material. Focusing on the redevelopment of Honest Ed’s, I discuss four cultural strategies used by the developer to accumulate symbolic capital: economic distancing, public participation, housing tenure narratives, and gift-giving. I argue that these strategies, while diverging from profit maximization, enhanced the developer’s reputation, prestige and status within the city, which in turn leads to new opportunities for profit-making. In forwarding these findings I suggest a fundamental reconceptualization of the role of culture and symbolism within the capitalist city. I also illustrate the analytic value of symbolic capital for the study of urban development, the growth of privately funded public participation, and for-profit business, specifically in the context of “ethical capitalism.”   Economy and Culture in the Study of Urban Development: What Motivates Developers?  Since its initial publication, Logan and Molotch’s (1987) Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place has provided the most widely utilized framework for the study of conflicts over urban development and land-use in North America.13 The political economy of place can be situated within the broader intellectual movement of urban political economy in the 1970s and 1980s, led by thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and Manuel Castells, with the aim                                                      13 Based on Google Scholar, as of 2020, Urban Fortunes (1987) and Molotch’s (1976) earlier foundational piece on urban growth machines have been cited 9000 times cumulatively.   51 to reintegrate the work of Karl Marx across the social sciences (see Walton 1993; Zukin 1980). According to Logan and Molotch (1987) conflict over urban development arises from the tension between land as an exchange value, a tradable commodity within real estate markets, and land as a use value, something which has intangible practical and sentimental value to those who live there. Following from this, they argue that property developers act as “place entrepreneurs,” privileging exchange over use value in their efforts to maximize economic profits. This group of actors, which they term “structural speculators,” attempt to manipulate governance and land-use to maximize rents at the expense of the needs and wants of urban citizens. Structural speculators form coalitions of business interests, politicians, developers, and news media, together termed “urban growth machines”, that organize for “value-free development,” against “any intervention that might regulate development on behalf of use values” (1987: 32).   Logan and Molotch draw on Durkheimian Chicago School theorist Walter Firey (1945, 1947) to explain why many urban citizens privilege sentimental use values over exchange values and prefer to keep their homes in desirable neighborhoods even as property values rise. However, their account tends to silo culture on the side of consumption.14 Thus, culture is associated with the intangible aspects of place valued by non-economic actors, the residents, while developers are single-minded in their pursuit of profits. This approach also characterizes the seminal works of Marxist urban theorist Sharon Zukin (1987, 1989, 1996, 2010), who examines how arts and culture are used in gentrification and place branding strategies of business owners, developers and local governments. In her recent work on the co-optation of urban authenticity in New York City, Zukin writes “John Logan and Harvey Molotch said it best: city dwellers want to enjoy the use-values of                                                      14 Conversely those who advocate for “urban culturalist sociology” (see Borer 2006) also attempt to isolate culture from “economic” and “political” factors.    52 their communities and homes, but developers are interested in maximizing exchange-values – in making money” (2010: 227).  More recently, critical urban theory has become the predominant explanatory framework within urban studies for the role of urban developers in the ongoing housing crisis seen throughout the world (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; Graham 2015; Madden and Marcuse 2016; Stein 2019). While linked to a diverse array of factors, the crisis is generally attributed to housing commodification, with the value of housing as real estate preempting its role as shelter for those who live in cities. Developers are painted as one-dimensional actors pursuing profits at the expense of working-class urbanites unable to afford homes. As put by David Madden and Peter Marcuse (2016) in their widely-read book In Defense of Housing, real estate developers, “as entities set up by the legal powers of the state for the sole purpose of economic accumulation are single minded by design. Profit seeking without regard for external social consequences is intrinsic to the way they are set up” (2016: 52).   While critical urban theory focuses more specifically on the structural constraints of capitalist urban development, a body of research in urban studies has taken up questions related to the culture of developers. A starting point here is Susan Fainstein’s (1994) The City Builders, which argues that developers are motivated by a complex range of exogenous variables beyond profit-making, including gender, especially competitive masculinity, and religion (see Weber 1978). Fainstein also suggests that real estate professionals are classic Schumpeterian entrepreneurs (1942) that seek risk and constantly overestimate their chances of success.15 As put by Fainstein, “developers do not merely react to an objective situation but operate in a subjective                                                      15 For accounts of entrepreneurial optimism versus rationality, see Kahneman (2012) in behavioral economics and Beckert (2016) in economic sociology.    53 environment partly of their own creation. They often build projects with little chance of success and press for polices that may not be in the long-term best-interest of their industry” (1994: 7).  The ideas of Fainstein have been carried through in the work of Rachel Weber (2010, 2015, 2016) who explores the overbuilding of Chicago office towers in the early 2000s. Weber argues that that urban development is a form of collective behavior, where group optimism and excitement dominate over risk assessment. Drawing on performativity theory (Callon 1998; Christophers 2014), she suggests “the real estate industry constructs and perpetuates the very markets they seek to accommodate” (Weber 2015: 20). Her approach also draws from institutional analysis (Guy and Hennebury 2000), which starts from the assumption that property markets, and markets in general, cannot function of their own volition and rely on socially constructed norms and regulation from the state (see also Block 2018). However, like Fainstein, Weber’s account focuses on negative outcomes using exogenous motivations to explain why developers pursue irrational business strategies, either through over-building or excessive risk-taking.  A different approach to culture and urban development argues that developers are a stigmatized profession, and this shapes both popular and academic understandings of their motivations and justifications.16 Drawing from Goffman (2009), symbolic interactionist Lynn Lofland (2004) observes the fact that developers are often portrayed as villains in popular culture, in movies, TV Shows and novels, and, as a result, come to be seen as selfish, anti-social and even “evil” by the public. This leads Lofland (2004) to suggest that developers are scapegoats for other structural forces, including local governments that ultimately control land use, and population growth, which are inherently disruptive to communities. She also finds that developers can, at                                                      16 Other examples of stigmatized professions include lawyers (Lofland 2004) and advertisers (Cohen and Dromi 2018).    54 times, espouse and enact ethical values by including environmentally-friendly designs and community contributions.  Lofland’s findings are reinforced in a recent experimental study by Monkkonen and Manville (2019) which shows that opposition to new development, specifically through the  Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) movement, in California results from individuals’ dislike of developers “earning large profits,” rather than opposition to new development per se. In a complementary work, Kimmelberg’s (2011) study of development industry professions finds that those in the industry are acutely aware of their negative public perception and see it as a significant impediment to their day-to-day work. Cumulatively, these studies suggest that popular culture representations, public perception and critical urban scholarship help to explain why developers’ claims of altruism or wanting to “give back” to communities are generally met with great suspicion.  Several recent studies have attempted to account for developer altruism directly; however, they also tend to fall on either side of the culture-profits dichotomy, rather than creating a synthetic model to account for the interrelationship between the two. In his study of variation among condo developers in Toronto, Gillad Rosen (2017) highlights several types of firms, including “socially conscious developers,” that are motivated by principles of fairness and will accept lower profit margins in the name of social objectives (see also Coiacetto 2001). For example, he describes one firm, Daniel’s, as participating in public-private low-income housing development and as being “more generous in its perception of a ‘fair’ contribution to society” (Rosen 2017: 16). Drawing from Hebert Simon’s (1957) concept of bounded rationality, Rosen suggests that developers “satisfice” and make trade-offs between profit maximization and other goals, including promoting the general good.    55 Two other studies on socially conscious developers reach the opposite conclusions of Rosen, by scrutinizing the altruism and ethical behavior of developers. Gordon Douglas (2012) explores the efforts of big-box retailer and condominium developers to enact cultural sensitivity and cultural sincerity by creating projects that “fit” with the ethos of the progressive city Davis, in California. Douglas ultimately reports that such efforts are not done out of a sense of altruism, but are a strategy of developers to use their understanding of community culture to build projects with minimal confrontation. Similarly, Garboden and Jang-Triettian’s (2018) study of Baltimore finds that developers will hire full time community organizers to work with the communities and integrate old-time and incoming residents in gentrifying neighborhoods. However, as with the political economy of place approach, they conclude that “all of the developers’ behaviours described here … can ultimately be reduced to a profit-making strategy” (2018: 17). Having reviewed the literature on the motivations of urban real estate developers, it is clear there are persistent difficulties in theorizing the relationship between economic and non-economic capital urban development. Borrowing from theories in economic sociology, in particular Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, I advance an alternative explanation that helps to address the question: how does non-economic capital relate to profitability within the field of urban development?  Symbolic Capital in Urban Development: The Role of Altruism, Reputation, and Legitimacy  This paper develops a framework that integrates both the symbolic and material aspects of urban development through Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital (1990, 1991, 2000). While Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus is one of the most complex and expansive in all of modern social theory, his concepts of symbolic power and relatedly, symbolic capital, lie at the heart of   56 his approach to the economy. For Bourdieu symbolic capital is any form of capital that is disguised by the denial of interest and appears as legitimate (Swartz 2016). Thus, it is capital that takes on the form of status, trust, honor, prestige and non-economic credit that are irreducible to, but interact with, economic capital. Therefore “symbolic capital is denied capital recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognized as capital” (Bourdieu 1990: 118). However, as with all forms of non-economic capital discussed by Bourdieu (cultural, social), symbolic capital cannot be directly “traded” for economic capital. It must go through a process of “transubstantiation,” or conversion where it confers economic advantage to its holders. For example, having a good name or a good reputation does not have a dollar value per se, but it can lead to opportunities for profit making if one is trusted or seen as high-status.  A key to Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic capital is Marcel Mauss’ (1925) discussion of gift-giving, which the French anthropologist saw as simultaneously altruistic and self-interested.17 Bourdieu argued that gifts are the form of exchange that most exemplifies symbolic capital, because they involve efforts to conceal the economic implications of the transaction. Thus, gifts are predicated on the social ties between individuals rather than the economic ties more characteristic of market transactions. Also, because of the temporal delay between exchange and reciprocity, gifts have a “double truth” – they can seem to be truly “disinterested” and generous at the time of giving, however, can also be used to accrue credit and favors in the future (Rossman 2014; Fridman and Luscombe 2017). The accumulation of symbolic capital does, however, diverge from standard profit maximization, because, in order for gifts to be believable, there is always a                                                      17 While arguably Bourdieu’s master concepts (see Wacquant and Akçaoglu, 2017), symbolic power and capital are only discussed at length in several passages of his key works. In each of these passages Bourdieu draws on Mauss to elaborate the relationship between gift-giving, disinterestedness and symbolic power. For an extended discussion of the evolution of Bourdieu’s thinking on gift-giving and symbolic power, see Sibler 2009.    57 risk that they will go unreciprocated. Therefore gifts, and by extension symbolic capital, are unlike ideal typical market-based transactions where two parties simultaneously exchange goods that are perceived to be equivalent to one another.   This paper introduces Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital to explain the interrelationship between symbolism, culture and power within real estate development.18 The theory of symbolic capital diverges from both the assumptions of critical urban theory and the existing cultural approaches outlined above. Symbolic capital has what Bourdieu refers to as a “fuzzy logic,” and it is within this fuzziness that developers can advance their economic interests in ways they cannot through pure economism, or value-free development.  While the accumulation of symbolic capital doesn’t guarantee favorable economic outcomes, it increases the likelihood of new profit-making opportunities through reputation and prestige. Bourdieu’s theory also corresponds to a general proposition within economic sociology that the symbolic value of goods (Alexander 2011; Becker and Aspers 2011; Fourcade 2011; Zelizer 1994), including land (Firey 1945, 1947; Becher 2014; Pacewitz 2016), interacts with their economic value in consequential yet oftentimes highly paradoxical ways.  My analysis draws on a study of Toronto’s field of urban development including interviews, ethnographic data and documentary analysis. I focus on the neighborhood conflict associated with the redevelopment of an iconic department store at the edge of downtown Toronto into a mixed-use rental housing project. In my analysis I illustrate four different cultural strategies used by the developer to accumulate symbolic capital, including economic distancing, public participation, housing tenure narratives and gift-giving. Ultimately, I argue that the accumulation                                                      18 Bourdieu’s 2005 book The Social Structures of the Economy in fact focuses on the housing development industry in France. However, this work focuses on the neoliberalization of the housing policy at the national level, without explicating the relationship between developer legitimacy and symbolic capital.   58 of symbolic capital, while diverging from profit maximization on particular projects, allows developers to deploy unique resources linked to status and prestige that can enhance their future profit-making.   The first cultural strategy I discuss is economic distancing, based on Bourdieu’s (2000) arguments about the correspondence between disinterestedness and symbolic capital. Through economic distancing developers suggest that, while they might still turn a profit on a particular development, they are not pursuing “profit maximization” due to other considerations. While similar to Rosen’s (2017) suggestion that developers “satisfice” on projects, I argue that economic distancing is a strategy to accumulate symbolic capital or a “good reputation,” which can and does lead to future economic advantages.  The second cultural strategy I identify is public participation through community consultation. While community consultations on new developments have traditionally been the purview of city planning departments, private developers are increasingly organizing public outreach with communities (Garboden and Jang-Triettian 2018). These efforts are in line with the growth of the public participation and public relations firms more generally (Lee 2014; Lee, Walker and McQuarrie, 2015; Levine 2017; Walker 2009), resulting in an ongoing tension between the increase of participatory practices and technologies alongside growing inequality. Thus, scholars have argued that the increase of participation practices has often “done more to reinforce authority than to challenge it” (Lee, Walker, McQuarrie, 2015: 3). This study advances this discussion by highlighting the way public participation is used to accumulate symbolic capital through a process I refer to as “curated disinterestedness.”  Third, I find the use of housing tenure narratives by private developers to convince others that their projects will be “good for the community.” The presence of housing tenure narratives   59 aligns with planning scholar Constance Perin’s (1977) seminal articulation of housing as a symbolic system that organizes and categorizes people within a continuum, or a “ladder of life,” from renting to living in a single-family detached home as the peak form of moral worth. In her recent study of mobile home parks, Esther Sullivan (2018) has shown how the socio-spatial stigma (Bourdieu 1999; Wacquant, Slater and Pereira 2014) associated with these communities, who are at the very bottom of the symbolic hierarchy of housing, helps to justify displacement arising from parks being converted into new developments. In my case, however, I illustrate how developers attach positive evaluation to rental housing in order to frame their projects.  The final cultural strategy I identify is the use of gift-giving by developers to enhance their symbolic capital. Drawing on Mauss and Bourdieu, I suggest that developers who “give back” on certain projects may be able to gain concessions or future favors from cities, highlighting the importance of the temporal delay between exchange and reciprocity in concealing economic motivations. Thus, gifts can be used to “obfuscate” potential gains (Rossman 2014) and the pursuit of self-interest within the context of urban development. However, as with all forms of symbolic capital, gift-giving exhibits a fuzzy logic that cannot be reduced simply to profit maximization, as there is always a risk and uncertainty that they may not be reciprocated.  While this paper focuses on a particular type of business firm, urban developers, the findings can inform research on the role of symbolic capital in for-profit business more generally. I suggest that the paradox of reputation and accumulation is also relevant to the broader study of “socially conscious,” “ethical” or “caring” capitalism (Barman 2016). The overarching argument of this paper is that symbolic capital is relevant to the accumulation of profits within the capitalist   60 economy, a suggestion Bourdieu put forth, however, did not develop empirically in his own work.19   Methods  My empirical analysis is based on a study of the redevelopment of an iconic department store in downtown Toronto into a mixed-use rental housing project by the Vancouver development firm Westbank, one of Canada’s most successful developers, both financially and in terms of prestige. The research for this study involves six months of ethnographic observation of the redevelopment processes over 2015-2016, alongside in-depth qualitative interviews (n=46) with planners, developers, architects, local politicians, and neighborhood community advocates, as well as textual analysis of city planning documents and developer materials. The field work in Toronto included participant observation at developer-led events, community walks and consultations, city planning events, as well as in the neighborhood at the redevelopment site. Both my field notes and interviews were transcribed and coded using the qualitative software package MaxQDA.    My findings from the Honest Ed’s project are part of a broader study on the politics of urban development in Toronto and Vancouver, conducted over four years between 2015 and 2019 and looking at a range of development projects.  This paper, however, provides a close analysis of one project, which allows for a detailed explication of the processes through which developers utilize culture in the accumulation of symbolic capital. My analysis of Honest Ed’s, as a case study, is, however, informed by my findings about the field of urban development in Toronto and Vancouver at large.                                                       19 Bourdieu is somewhat ambiguous on the role of symbolic capital within the capitalist economy. At some points, he suggests that profit-maximization is itself legitimate under capitalism, while at other times alludes to the role of altruism, status, and disinterestedness as being important in for-profit business.    61  Likewise, while focusing on a single redevelopment, I use the findings to inform broader debates on the motivations and justifications of urban developers, including the phenomenon of “socially conscious” developers which has been gaining in numerous cities throughout North America. Thus, this work aligns with recent pragmatist approaches in qualitative research (Small 2009; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), which highlight that ethnographic and case study findings, although not statistically generalizable in the conventional sense, can inform theory-building through being placed in dialogue with existing research in urban and economic sociology. In keeping, I maintain that symbolic capital plays an important and determinant role within urban development processes and that this finding is applicable beyond the case I analyze here.     Site: The Honest Ed’s Redevelopment in Toronto  The Honest Ed’s department store stood at the corner of Bathurst and Bloor on the Northwestern edge of Toronto’s downtown core, a historic area populated by turn-of-the-century brownstone houses close to the University of Toronto. The store was opened in the early-1950s by Ed Mirvish, a charismatic young entrepreneur who would go on to build a business empire in Toronto, which included retail, restaurants and theater houses throughout the city (Mirvish 1993, 1997). Honest Ed’s filled a unique niche in Toronto’s retail ecology, catering to lower-income shoppers, such as university students, working-class Torontonians and recently arrived Portuguese and Eastern European immigrants that populated the nearby neighborhoods (Andrew-Gee 2016). The store itself became an iconic structure in Toronto, with a façade decorated with large carnivalesque lights and hand-painted billboards with playful slogans and aphorisms penned by Ed Mirvish, such as “At Honest Ed’s the only thing crooked are the floors” (Michael 2015). The   62 interior of the store reflected the exterior, with a maze-like floor plan consisting of multiple departments connected by walkways and tunnels spanning across the length of a city block.  While Honest Ed’s was an iconic space in Toronto, Ed Mirvish, the businessman, had a more complex reputation. He was known for acts of altruism toward the community, in the form of famous block parties and “giveaways,” during the holidays such as personally delivering free turkeys off the back of a truck at Christmas. However, he was also seen to be as a cutthroat businessman and employer, paying minimum wage and taking a zero tolerance policy towards employee indiscretions. A local resident offered the example of one of Mirvish’s infamous tirades when an employee was fired after being caught absent-mindedly eating a single slice of pickle while working at a sandwich counter.  In addition to the store itself, the Honest Ed’s site included an adjacent block of Victorian homes turned small art studios, restaurants and craft shops known as Mirvish Village. In the early 1970s, Ed Mirvish purchased the block of housing on Markham Street to convert into off-site parking for the store. However, when this plan was reneged on by City Hall, Mirvish and his wife Ann began renting the houses out at low rents to artists and crafts people, gaining inspiration from Greenwich Village in New York City (Bradburn 2010). Local residents and urbanists valued Mirvish Village for its quirky charm and as an example of one of Jane Jacobs’ (1961) principles of good urbanism – old buildings taking on new uses. Jacobs herself, who lived in the nearby Annex neighborhood for much of her life (Wellman 2006), frequented and commented favorably about the shopping street.  By the early 2000s, Honest Ed’s was increasingly becoming an anachronism in Toronto. As the neighborhood began to gentrify and big-box retailers like Walmart opened nearby, the store became more of a curiosity and tourist attraction than an important site of provisioning for the   63 community. When Ed Mirvish passed away in 2007, his son David inherited the property and announced plans to eventually sell the valuable land to a residential developer. In 2013, after several years of behind-the-scenes negotiations, it was announced that a Vancouver development firm, Westbank, had purchased the site (Kane 2013). Westbank would use Honest Ed’s to launch their entry into the Toronto real estate market and make a name for themselves through the development. Their attempts to generate symbolic capital, in order to break into the Toronto development market, involved a number of strategies, including economic distancing, public participation, housing tenure narratives and gift-giving, which I discuss below.    Figure 2.1: Honest Ed’s Iconic Façade    64  Figure 2.2: Small Retail and Artist Studios in Mirvish Village    Figure 2.3: Shopping for Bargains Inside Honest Ed’s  Economic Distancing: A Development about More than “The Bottom Line”  From the initial stages of the development process, Westbank conveyed to the community that they recognized the symbolic importance of Honest Ed’s and the project was, therefore, not solely about profit-making for the firm. To fortify this claim, they stressed they would not pursue   65 the type of high-end luxury housing they had developed on other sites in Canadian cities. Westbank’s economic distancing was conveyed through their selection of the architect for the site, the price paid for the land, and the firm’s choice to build rental housing over condominiums.   The first aspect of economic distancing on the project came with the initial announcement that Westbank would be working with the firm’s longtime architectural partner Gregory Henriquez. In Vancouver, Henriquez is known primarily for his work on public-private social housing, including the Woodward’s project in the city’s low-income Downtown Eastside neighborhood. This project, also built by Westbank, includes both non-profit housing and condominium tenure and has been pitched as a general model for low-income housing provision. While Woodward’s has been a locus of contention in Vancouver, particularly among some housing activists who see it as source of gentrification in the Downtown Eastside, Henriquez has utilized the project to launch a career in “social justice architecture” (Gould, Henriquez and Enright 2016).    In announcing the redevelopment, the local and national media provided a platform for Westbank’s economic distancing, including in an interview for The Globe and Mail (Bozakovic 2014) where Henriquez’s cited his “social activist” credentials and desire to “temper the economics on the project.” Henriquez and his team also made clear that they were intent on doing justice to Honest Ed’s legacy by listening to what the community wanted to see on the site. Speaking about the project for a book interview, Henriquez stated, “I think that at Bloor and Bathurst, for example, the outcome can be a direct reflection of the values of the community, because the community values are in sync with the profound aspirations of the developer. They are humanist values” (Gould, Henriquez and Enright 2016: 62). Henriquez’s statement makes explicit that he and the company measure their success according to standards other than just profits.   66 While the price paid for the Honest Ed’s site is proprietary information, there was much speculation over the sale of the land within Toronto’s development community and among neighborhood residents.20 Here, a narrative emerged that Westbank was “chosen” by the Mirvish family, not because they were willing to pay the most for the land, but that they were seen as the right fit for the job. This narrative was heightened by the fact that several prominent Toronto developers had made bids for the site, but were rejected in favour of an outsider firm from Vancouver. As was put to me by a Westbank employee, “Ian [Gillespie - the CEO of Westbank] got a bargain for Mirvish Village. Other people offered more money. Mirvish thought we could do good by it and gave us a better price” (Interview 2015). Ian Gillespie himself also encouraged this version of events, for example, in an interview with a journalist who asks, “Why did David Mirvish choose you to redevelop the Honest Ed's site in Toronto?” Gillespie replied, "This is going to sound extremely arrogant, but I can't imagine another developer in Canada being able to do that project justice" (Tanner 2018). Here he suggests explicitly that the reputation of the firm played a decisive factor in securing the sale from the Mirvish family. On the other side of the transaction, the Mirvishes also indicated that it was important to see something they could feel good about on the site of their iconic business. Thus, in this case, the economic distancing was co-produced by both the buyer and the seller of the land.  A final aspect of the early economic distancing on the project was linked to Westbank’s decision to build rental housing rather than condominiums on the site. As with other cities in North America, Toronto has seen very little new purpose-built rental-housing construction since the early 1990s (Walks 2004). There has, however, been a massive boom in condominium tower development (Rosen and Walks 2013, 2015). In recent years, politicians, journalists, planners and                                                      20 The site is estimated to have sold for about 100 million dollars.    67 members of the public in Toronto and throughout Canada, have suggested that developers should return to building for a growing and under-served market of renters.  In the spring of 2015 Westbank held an unveiling gala at an upscale hotel in Downtown Toronto, where guests were served with snacks and cocktails as they listened to the developer plans for the site. Much to the surprise of the packed house of attendees, Westbank announced that the project would take the form of rental housing, with close to 1000 units spread out over several mid-rise towers. In addition, the initial outline for the project included a number of community amenities such as a park, daycare, farmers’ market and a revitalization of Mirvish Village in the form of a retail street with “micro” shopping units. The building of rentals was the center piece of Westbank’s proposal, however, and the firm was apt to highlight that this was a “risky” and “unorthodox” choice for the site, signaling their commitment to the community and the city above turning a quick profit.  The purported “riskiness” of the decision was based on the claim that Westbank would be unable to recoup their investment on an expensive piece of land by using pre-sale condominiums to finance the construction. Westbank also planned to retain ownership of the property and act as landlords, signaling further commitment to the neighborhood. While rental housing is of course a source of surplus profits for landlords and developers, in this case Westbank’s declaration that this was not the quickest or easiest source of profit on the site appeared credible. Through various means, Westbank’s announcement of the redevelopment involved attempts at economic distancing, including through the selection of the lead architect, stories about the price of the land, and the decision to pursue purpose-built rentals over condominiums. While other scholars have argued that this form of developer behavior represents “satisficing” (Rosen 2017), based on a context-specific cost and benefit analysis, I suggest it can be seen as an effort to   68 accumulate symbolic or reputational capital for the firm. Thus, through economic distancing the developer seeks to enhance their reputation, leading to new profit-making opportunities which I discuss in the following sections. Westbank’s initial proposal was, however, only the start of a one and half year community consultation process to garner feedback on the project from the neighborhood and Torontonians at large.  Public Participation: Producing Legitimacy through Curated Disinterestedness   From September 2015 to December 2016, Westbank carried out the largest privately-led consultation process on a development project in Toronto’s history. According to Westbank, their goal was to collect feedback on what Torontonians wanted to see on the Honest Ed’s site to inform revisions to the initial proposal. This involved hiring many of the city’s top urban planning and public consultation firms to staff a permanent outreach center on Markham Street in Mirvish village, organize community events such as consultation “walk-shops,” and go door-to-door canvassing throughout the neighborhood. Westbank’s efforts ran alongside a city-led consultation, as well as the efforts of four local neighborhood associations which formed the Mirvish Village Working Group to oversee the development process. The efforts of Westbank, however, were a clear attempt to gain symbolic legitimacy within the community by illustrating that they cared about more than financial profit from the project. These groups can be seen as occupying different positions and sets of interests within the field of urban development (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). A key to Westbank’s community consultation process was their attempt to create a buffer between the firm and their public outreach workers, which I refer to as “curated disinterestedness”. Here the idea was that neighborhood residents would likely be more honest and open with workers who were hired from consulting firms, as opposed to direct employees of Westbank. Gregory   69 Henriquez, the lead architect for the project, had asked for weekly updates from the consultation that were intended to collect the entire range of sentiments from the neighborhood. Most of these outreach workers were Geography and Planning graduate students recruited from local universities, who possessed a sophisticated and critical understanding of urban development. They also wrestled with their decision to work with Westbank, and if it constituted “selling out.”  However, in my time spent with these outreach workers, they stressed that the company had given them significant latitude to collect honest feedback and even critique aspects of the project. As was put to me by a Master’s student of Urban Planning in his mid-twenties, who was working part-time at Markham House, “Okay, so when we were hired our role was always to be people who facilitated conversation and gathered all of the feedback from the community, whether positive or negative” (Outreach Worker, Interview 8). Similarly, the lead engagement coordinator recounted initial confusion regarding her role, stating:   “Even when I was offered the job, I couldn’t quite understand at first. Somebody had to explain it to me a few times because it didn’t quite click. It was like, you want me to do what? Am I selling condos here? And they were like ‘No, no. You’re going to be neutral. Your position is neutral; you are just getting information from people and feedback and what they feel like, what they want to see here’” (Outreach Worker, Interview 41).  She then reinforced the idea that the consultation could bring people into the planning discussion that were traditionally overlooked in favor the “louder” voices of active homeowners, stating, “So   70 my biggest fear was about who we are leaving out. Because we know that there is always an exclusion of people. Now I don’t feel that as much” (Outreach Worker, Interview 41).  Through the hiring of ostensibly neutral outreach workers, Westbank was able to create a critical distance between themselves as an “interested” party and members of the community. These claims of neutrality align precisely with Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital (1990, 1991, 2000), which stresses how legitimacy is achieved through the denial of interest. Paradoxically, however, it was Westbank’s economic capital which allowed them to curate disinterestedness through the employment of urban planning students to act as neutral agents in the consultation process.   While Westbank’s efforts at public engagement were wide-ranging, they placed special emphasis on liaising with the four local neighborhood associations that had formed a working group to oversee the project. These organizations, representing the four neighborhoods surrounding the Honest Ed’s site, were made up of professional-class homeowners, many with years of experience advocating around development in the area. These groups were also important constituents of the two city councillors, whose wards met at the intersection of Bathurst and Bloor, and who had had taken a keen interest in guiding the process alongside the city’s planning department. These groups also attempted to shape the narrative around Honest Ed’s by employing various forms of symbolic capital to suggest that Westbank was being duplicitous in their engagement with the community. They also engaged in efforts to reframe what type of development would be “good” for the neighborhood.  While the initial interactions between Westbank and the community organizations were largely positive, the relationship turned increasingly adversarial after the first proposal for the site was submitted to City Hall in September 2015. At this juncture, the community organizations   71 began to frame Westbank’s public engagement efforts as “PR” (Public Relations) and a form of “slick marketing.” More specifically they maintained that Westbank was not listening to the main concerns of the community over the size of the development, lack of affordable housing included in the project, and the preservation of the old homes on Markham Street in Mirvish Village.   When I spoke with representatives from the resident associations, they stressed the fact that Westbank and lead architect Gregory Henriquez had made a good first impression by reaching out and suggesting they work together in developing the design for the site. However, this amicability dissolved after Westbank presented their first official proposal to City Hall, which many considered too large and dense to be supported by the current neighborhood infrastructure. As one resident put it, “My number one comment is that Westbank is now in a full-on campaign to woo us. I have heard the word ‘charm offensive’ being used. But when I look back through my notes from the very first meeting until now, there has been absolutely no shift or change in the plan” (Community Advocate, Interview 28). Based on my own assessment of the various iterations of the development application, it was clear that this claim is somewhat unfounded. There were indeed changes to the development, including the addition of significant green space. However, the community organizers were correct in suggesting that some of their most important suggestions were being overlooked.  Community advocates were mainly concerned that Westbank was not being asked to provide more local services, including funding low-income units, in exchange for the increases in height and density they were asking to get for the project.21 As was put by another organizer, “We are talking about a big important piece [of the puzzle] which is affordable housing, and ensuring                                                      21 The current zoning for the site under the Toronto Zoning Plan is four stories, the height of the Honest Ed’s store. Westbank proposed to build several towers ranging from 12 to 18 stories.    72 that there would be accommodation for families moving into the neighborhood and ensuring accessibility. Westbank isn’t really offering any of those things and hasn’t agreed to pay for any of that” (Community Advocate, Interview 23). Westbank’s unwillingness to make what they saw as significant changes to the project and contributions to the community, led the resident association members to increasingly see the community consultation as a “PR stunt.”    Figure 2.4: Passerbys Examine the Notice for Redevelopment at Honest Ed’s    Figure 2.5: Westbank’s Community Consultation Walkshop    73  Figure 2.6: Community Outreach Worker Explaining the Development to Locals  Another point of contention was the preservation of the old Victorian homes-cum-artist-studios on Markham Street. Mirvish Village was cherished by the community as a unique urban space, and also as a living representation of local hero Jane Jacobs’ (1961) aphorism regarding old homes taking on new uses. They were concerned that Westbank, which planned to preserve the homes by attaching them to the front of a new low-rise building, was engaging in “facadism” by only retaining their external structures (Zhang 2013).  The fears of the community regarding the fate of the old homes were affirmed on a community “walk-shop” in November 2016. The event was intended to gather feedback about the revitalization of the street and was well-attended by local community advocates. At one point during the stroll down the street of old homes, one of Westbank’s outreach workers stopped to give a short speech. She suggested that the firm was intent on preserving the “Mirvishness” or the “intangible character” of the site, referring to Ed Mirvish’s irreverent and eccentric approach to arts and culture. The notion of “Mirvishness” was immediately rejected by the walk-shop attendees who pushed back, by stating they were not interested in preserving intangible character, but rather the physical structures, which they saw as being under threat. In my interviews, residents would   74 often become visibly upset when discussing the term, with one stating, “Mirvishness is sleazy crap. They are trying to misconstrue the value of these buildings. It’s like the developer trying to explain their development by how it looks instead of how it works” (Community Advocate, Interview 33). The term became a highly-cited anchor concept used by resident association members to illustrate why Westbank didn’t “get” the site. In line with the findings regarding community consultations led by private companies (Lee, McQuarrie and Walker 2015), it can be argued that Westbank’s efforts to engage the community was inauthentic and a form of PR. However, it would also be mistaken to see the community organizations of middle class homeowners as a powerless group being manipulated by the developer. Westbank employees felt that they were genuinely trying to engage and even felt slighted when they were “left out” of certain community meetings. As one put it, “We were invited to the first meeting before the task force was set up. And after that we weren’t involved or privy to their discussion. So that made it more difficult unfortunately, to engage with the residents more directly” (Westbank Employee, Interview 44) However, it was also clear that some of the strongest material demands made by organizations around the height of the project and affordable housing in the building were not on the table. As another employee explained, “We would be happy to do social housing if the money was there. I just don’t think the money is there for that” (Westbank Employee, Interview 44). And while it is also the case that community organization members were concerned with the lack of affordable housing, they seemed equally irritated by the lack of care around historic preservation. Thus both the developers and community organizations attempted to gain symbolic legitimacy for their positions by arguing what would be “good” for the neighborhood.    75 By the end of Westbank’s community consultation, the company claimed to have spoken with over 10,000 individuals about their plans for the site. This figure is of relevance because it is higher than the number of people living in the census tracts directly surrounding Honest Ed’s (StatsCan 2016). Indeed, Westbank sought to go beyond the usual community voices, the neighborhood advocates that were most keenly interested in the outcomes of the redevelopment. In fact, Westbank’s outreach workers maintained that most of the people they spoke with were supportive of the project. As one employee put it, “We’ve gotten to a point where we have incorporated most if not all comments to the community to the extent that we can. Now we are at the point where 95% of the comments at our house are like, ‘Wow this is amazing, new rental housing. Green space, heritage retention’” (Westbank Employee, Interview 6). This aligned with my own observations that casual observers were generally impressed by the plans for the site and while sad to see Honest Ed’s go, thought that that Westbank was better and more thoughtful than most Toronto developers. Thus, Westbank’s attempts at achieving symbolic legitimacy through community consultation were broadly effective. In the next section I discuss how Westbank employed symbolic capital through housing tenure narratives to discredit community organizations, painting them as regressive and conservative.   Housing Tenure Narratives: Symbolic Stigma and the Framing of Renters versus Homeowners  From the early stages of the Honest Ed’s redevelopment, Westbank utilized the symbolism and meanings associated with different forms of housing tenure to frame the project. These housing tenure narratives at times drew from the symbolic stigma associated with renters in relation to homeowners (Perin 1977). While scholars have noted that developers often use stigmatizing rhetoric to justify the displacement of low-income people to make way for new development   76 (Wacquant, Slater and Pereira 2014), in this case, Westbank used these tropes to suggest they were progressive defenders of renters in the face of regressive neighborhood organizations. Thus, they utilized housing tenure narratives to frame themselves as being economically disinterested and neighborhood organizations as being economically self-interested and only concerned with protecting their property values.   In speaking with Westbank employees, it was clear they understood well the historic stigmatization of renters and their subordinate position on the symbolic hierarchy of housing. Therefore, by building rental housing, Westbank framed themselves as acting in a virtuous manner by serving those without access to the mortgage market and condominium ownership. As put to me by one of Westbank’s senior partners and head of the firm’s Toronto division:   “In Canada and the US too, we have kind of put home ownership on a pedestal as though renting a home is a second-tier choice. But it doesn’t have to be a second-class choice. The nice thing about purpose-built rental, you have a security of tenure that you don’t have when you’re renting someone’s condo or renting the basement suite in someone’s house. So, I’m not saying that it is affordable housing, but I think it’s on the continuum of affordability” (Westbank Employee, Interview 6).  In general, I found Westbank employees frequently drew on the symbolic distinction between homeowners and renters, especially among the outreach workers interacting with the public. This group was apt to frame opposition to the development from neighborhood organizations as a form of “NIMBYism,” arising from anti-renter sentiment among local home owners. As one put it to me:    77 “I just can’t help but think it’s NIMBYism in a lot of ways. Their arguments are like, ‘Oh it’s rental so immigrants are going to move in, or, oh it’s rental so university students are going to be there and what does that mean for our property values.’ You start hearing that sort of ignorant stuff and you can’t help but start resenting them and that strengthens the dualism between residents versus developers” (Outreach Worker, Interview 8).  This common refrain from Westbank’s outreach workers was surprising to me because, in my time spent with the neighborhood organizations, I had not observed any anti-renter sentiment. In fact, the orientation of neighborhood advocates was the opposite: they welcomed new rental housing in the neighborhood, but were concerned the project would be for higher-income tenants and unaffordable for students and immigrants. They were also pressing Westbank to guarantee some units at below-market rates, something which the firm would only agree to if the units were funded by the city. To account for this discrepancy between my own observations and the narratives of the outreach workers, I consulted the Chief City Planner for the area who had been working with the community on the project on a near daily basis for over a year. He confirmed my observations, stating, “I haven’t heard much about the rental thing because it was never on the table. You know tenure hasn’t really come up” (City Planner, Interview 20).   A likely explanation for the outreach workers’ experiences of anti-renter sentiment, bordering on racism, was Westbank’s own extended community outreach efforts. As canvassers went door-to-door and interacted with members of the neighborhood at their open house, they witnessed instances of NIMBYism and denigration of renters. These encounters were then used to   78 characterize opposition to the project from neighborhood organizations, who seemingly had a very different set of concerns.  We do, however, also have to consider the notion that community organizers were being disingenuous in the motivations they expressed and were using concern for low-income people as a cover to try to block the development of a high-density neighborhood, altering development out of conservatism and self-interest.  However, I never heard wishes to “stop” the development wholesale, but rather there were claims that the major increases in height and density on the development should be predicated on the inclusion of low-income housing on the site. The developers, however, suggested that there was no money for such housing and would put too much of a strain on the financials of the project. Perhaps, in knowing this, neighborhood organizers found a way to push for a smaller development without seeming to be anti-renter themselves. This, however, still leaves the question of what the project “gives back” materially to the city. Westbank suggested that any form of rental housing, which may include high-end or luxury rentals, was helping to solve the affordable housing crisis. Regardless of the motivations, stated or unstated, of the community organizations, the idea that Westbank was building a higher-end project using a discourse of affordability seems well-founded.22   Overall Westbank’s symbolic conflation of rental housing with affordable housing proved effective in convincing city councillors, planners and many Torontonians that the project was good for the city. Both ward councillors for the neighborhood eventually voted for the redevelopment in March 2017, even in the face of ongoing concerns from local residents associations. When I                                                      22 In 2019 affordable housing units were added to the project, which are paid for by the federal government and are set at slightly below market rents in Toronto. Therefore, the units will not be affordable to low-income people. Ultimately, we will not know what the rents are for the private units until the project is complete, however, Westbank employees said they will rent at market rates.    79 interviewed the councillors, they cited the fact the project was going to produce “much needed” rental housing as being key to their decision to vote in favor of the project. Thus, they wanted to avoid appearing anti-renter in a city that was actively lobbying for new purpose-built rental housing.   Gift-Giving: Altruism, Reputation and the ‘Potential’ for Future Profits  Taken together, Westbank’s cultural strategies involving the deployment and accumulation of symbolic capital were intended to situate the Honest Ed’s redevelopment as a “gift” to the city of Toronto. Westbank’s employees often highlighted the fact the company could have gone for a “high-end condo” development, however, knew that this would be a bad fit for the site. Instead they decided to build rental housing and provide a number of community amenities including a park, market place and a daycare center. Thus, they demonstrated the type of cultural sensitivity noted by other scholars studying socially conscious urban developers (Douglas 2012; Garboden and Jang-Triettian 2018; Rosen 2017). Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital and Mauss’ theory of the gift, however, I argue that we must take into account the temporality of gift-giving which allowed the firm to be simultaneously disinterested and profit-oriented. While symbolic capital doesn’t guarantee favorable treatment from various state officials, it increases the likelihood of favorable treatment for developers.  Part of Westbank’s motivation in wanting to keep control of Honest Ed’s as the landlords was so the site could act as a symbolic center point and headquarters for their cultural operations in Toronto. Through hosting various cultural events at the site, Westbank planned to continue building their good name and reputation in the city. As was put to me by a senior partner at Westbank:   80 “We are going to want to control that environment. Maybe have festivals and cultural events on Markham Street. If you can design it, all of that is much more possible. We won’t have to fight with twelve different condo corporations that we’ve all sold condos to who are all living above and have issues with noise, or smells or they just don’t like the different cultural events that are happening” (Westbank Employee, Interview 6).  Interestingly, this quote came from the same individual who had previously evoked the symbolic stigma against renters as a justification for building the project. However, here he highlights how the absence of considerations typically granted to outside owners, will allow Westbank to hold events that will likely be disruptive to the tenants in the building. This is not to say that critiques of condo boards, which are known to be quite restrictive, are invalid. However, what the developer is implicitly suggesting is that renters in the building will have little recourse if they object to the smells coming from food trucks for example, or the noise coming from live music performances. In this case, Westbank’s continued “gift-giving” to Torontonians at large was again premised on lack of regard for the immediate community.  I also spoke with various development industry insiders who were familiar with Westbank’s portfolio in Toronto and Vancouver, and they too highlighted the role gift-giving and the temporal delay between exchange and reciprocity as a business strategy for the firm. One insider, an architectural critic who had done curatorial work for Westbank, suggested, “Ian Gillespie is a very unconventional developer. He alternates projects he makes money on with projects that he doesn’t make money on. Alternating utopian projects without recovering their cost, with those that are highly hyped, high profile sell jobs” (Architectural Critic, Interview 21). Another experienced development industry insider argued the Honest Ed’s project served a   81 function within Westbank’s broader strategy to break into the Toronto market: “One thing to look at is the five or six other holdings they have right now in the city. They don’t even have to make money on this. The thing to look at is the satellite sites. They will get a shit load for doing this. It’s smart” (Architectural Critic, Interview 1).   While I found no indication that Westbank was interested in losing money on the Honest Ed’s project, they were highly cognizant that this was one of their “utopian” projects that would “give back” to the city. When I asked whether the company was going to lose money on the site, a senior partner responded in the negative before launching into a highly sophisticated lay explanation of the importance of symbolic capital:  “I don’t think that is quite right. I mean, practically speaking, there is probably an angle to that. If you are strapped for cash, you are probably going to do things a bit more safe. The reality is that Ian [Gillespie] just wants to do good stuff. He only really wants to do the projects that are interesting. If he wanted to just do the projects that make loads of money, he would be doing a different style. I think what Ian’s track record has proven to him and to us is that it pays off to take these risks. It doesn’t always pay off financially in individual projects; it ends up paying off in your reputation and experience that you gain. But also, you have done great work. Maybe it didn’t make as much money as you’d hoped, but you did great work. What we find all the time is that we’ve built a reputation for doing great work that brings us all of these opportunities” (Westbank Employee, Interview 16).    82 In this quote the developer highlights the importance of reputational capital, which is built by illustrating that Westbank cares about more than just the bottom line. However, that same reputation leads to future opportunities for profit making that developers without symbolic capital might not have access to.   Westbank’s efforts at accumulating symbolic capital have helped them to become one of the most prestigious and financially successful developers in Canada. While relatively new to the Toronto market, their strategy of gift-giving has proven highly effective in Vancouver. For example, by carrying out the Woodward’s project in Vancouver’s low-income Downtown Eastside, they illustrated to local politicians and planners that they cared about more than just high-end luxury development. This enhanced their reputation, in turn helped them to attain large increases in density on several other projects in Vancouver, including a starchitect-designed tower which boasts the highest prices per square foot for a condominium tower in Canada, and a massive residential redevelopment of a shopping center which is set to be one of the largest in the country. As suggested by the above quote, developers see “doing good” as being compatible with profit making. The ability to “do good” is, however, linked to the nature of gift-giving, which when practiced effectively, becomes simultaneously disinterested and a strategy for surplus accumulation.   Conclusion: Symbolic Capital in the Capitalist Economy  This paper has provided an alternative approach to the study of socially conscious developers and urban development conflict, illustrating the role of symbolic capital in shaping the built environment. Highly successful developers do not merely chase profits or “value-free development” but work to enhance their status, reputation and legitimacy through various cultural   83 strategies, including economic distancing, public participation, housing tenure narratives and gift-giving. By illustrating how these strategies work to enhance symbolic capital, I have illustrated the relationship between economic and non-economic capital in the field of urban development. However, is important to point out a caveat, based on my broader empirical findings and those of others, that not all developers pursue or deploy symbolic capital. Some developers are much less concerned with their status and reputation and are happy to “chase the bottom line” and pursue value-free development. However, as I argue, developers who successfully accumulate symbolic capital are able to accrue the most prestige and, in tandem, become the most profitable developers in the field.   The findings from this research suggest that more work is needed on the role of symbolic capital in for-profit businesses within capitalist economies. As highlighted by Wacquant (2017), the concepts of symbolic power and symbolic capital, while central to Bourdieu’s theoretical oeuvre, have been under-utilized by researchers. This is perhaps due to the fact Bourdieu himself saw the modern market economy as a sphere in which naked self-interest is seen as legitimate in and of itself. Research is also needed on the linkages between the rise in new public participation and dynamic interplay between symbolic and economic capital within the private sector, and especially in regards to “caring” or “ethical” capitalism. Those concerned about the negative effects of for-profit urban development on neighborhoods and cities need to comprehend the role of symbolism in the economy – developers certainly do.        84 Chapter 3 :Framing Affordability: Representations of New-Build Rental Housing in Canadian News Media  Introduction  In December of 2019, the mayor of the Vancouver suburb Coquitlam, Richard Stewart, made headlines for confronting a public speaker who opposed a new rental housing project during a city council meeting. In his comments to council the local resident stated that the developers of the project “need to think in terms of family ownership . . . the absence of long-term residents results in slummy conditions over time.” In response the mayor reprimanded the speaker and defended the city’s choice to support new rental projects, stating, “Some people in the audience, including myself, are offended by your suggestion that renters will degrade your neighborhood – that it will turn slummy” (Azpiri 2019).   The interaction between the mayor and member of the public is counter-intuitive to those familiar with a classic liberal defense of renters made by left-wing housing advocates and politicians. Stewart is a long-time conservative politician in the province of British Columbia and a member of a political party that has historically defunded affordable housing programs and prioritized homeowners over renters.23 His strong defense of renters is anomalous given his political background. At the same time, Global News, a province-wide and national media platform, deemed this relatively minor interaction newsworthy. Stewart’s morally-charged defense of renters reflects a shift on the political spectrum which has accompanied the building of new rental housing in Canadian cities over the past decade. His defense illustrates that Canadians are                                                      23 During the 2000s Stewart’s party the provincial Liberals cut funding to social housing programs alongside other forms of social welfare that support lower-income people.    85 being asked to re-orient from solely valuing single-family home ownership to both support and take up residence in new build rental housing.   This paper focuses on the moral discourse about rental housing in Canadian cities and the shift towards support and destigmatizing of renters and rentals by politicians, planners, housing advocates and journalists. Academics and lay observers have long-noted that renters and rental housing have been seen as producing a range of social problems by homeowners, neighborhood rate payer associations, conservative politicians and journalists (McCabe 2016; Perin 1977). However, rental housing is increasingly being presented as a solution to an affordable housing crisis across Canada and is being supported through various policies and incentives for the private sector (City of Vancouver, STIR FAQ). At the same time, new groups of actors including condominium developers and financial entities such as private equity firms, pension funds and real estate investment trusts (REITs), have taken on an increasing role in building and operating rental housing (August and Walks 2018; Crosby 2019; Crosby and Hennebury 2015; Fields 2015; Fields and Uffer 2016; Teresa 2016). They too have advocated for building a new supply of rentals on the grounds that it will both solve the crisis and produce solid returns for financial investors.   To study this shift in the moral discourse of rental housing within Canada’s housing market, this paper uses a frame analysis of over 500 news articles published during the 2010 decade. I address the question: how has new-build rental housing been presented to the Canadian public, and what arguments and justifications are used to support the building of new rentals? In doing so I draw from theories in cultural economy to illustrate the way meaning, morality and expectations are involved in the emergence of a revived rental housing market in Canada. My analysis uncovers a tension between two dominant media frames in Canadian news outlets: the affordability frame, which presents the building of rentals to the general public in the news and op-ed sections, and the   86 business frame, which targets investors in the business sections. The affordability frame presents the building of rentals as a solution to the housing crisis by creating a greater supply, lowering rents and making renting a socially acceptable lifestyle choice. In the business frame, the building of rentals is predicated on the notion that rents will stay at high, and potentially burdensome, levels. I suggest that the tension between these frames is reflective of a broader contradiction within capitalist housing markets – the difficulty, and potential impossibility, for rental housing to be both affordable and a good business investment (Desmond and Wilmers 2019; Fields 2015, 2018; Madden and Marcuse 2016; Pattillo 2013; Woldoff, Morrison and Glass 2016). I argue this tension is heightened by the increasing role of financial interests in rental housing markets, which have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits for investors (Charles 2019). To illustrate this point, I also draw on secondary data in the form of rental housing policy documents, which show that – in line with the business frame – new rental housing being produced in Canada takes the shape of mid- to high-end rentals, rather than affordable housing. Finally, this paper contributes to cultural economy theory by considering the relationship between morality, urban housing development and fictional expectations in the market.   Canada’s Rental Housing History  Since the mid-20th century Canada, like its southern neighbor the United States (McCabe 2016; Perin 1977), has upheld strong cultural values around single-family homeownership (Lauster 2015). At the same time, renters make up a significant portion of Canada’s housing landscape: about 30% of the population country-wide and close to 50% in major cities, which is smaller than in Europe, but still significant (Canadian Rental Housing Index 2019). Most of Canada’s existing stock of rental apartment buildings were constructed between the 1950s and the   87 1970s by small-scale developers and local rental companies (Donaldson 2019). However, in the 1970s and 1980s this shifted as the government made a change to the tax code, which began taxing rentals at a higher rate. This period also saw the creation of strata title (Harris 2011; Ley 1997), which introduced a new form of shared property ownership in condominium buildings. In the 1990s and 2000s developers constructed very little new rental housing as Canadian cities saw major booms in condominium development in both the downtown core and suburban centers (Rosen and Walks 2013, 2015). Condominiums became a preferred form of building for developers due to relatively high and quick profit margins and the ability to finance construction through presale units. Hence, most new rental housing in Canada in this period has come in the form of secondary suites in the basements of single-family homes (Mendez and Quastel 2015), alongside a growing rental market in investor-owned condos (Walks and Clifford 2015).   However, beginning in the late 2000s some Canadian cities, particularly Vancouver, began to recognize the current supply of rental housing was becoming strained and started offering incentives to developers to build rentals. The lack of new rentals would become a major public policy issue throughout the 2010 decade as the country experienced an ongoing affordable housing crisis, with land values doubling in some cities and rents increasing well above the rate of inflation (Gurstein et al. 2018). While the causes of the housing crisis in Canada are multifaceted and complex, some of the major factors include changes in lending practices by central banks and the availability of cheap credit for developers and homeowners (Walks 2014; Walks and Clifford 2015; August and Walks 2017), the increased mobility of global capital into Canadian real estate markets (Ley 2011; Moos and Skaburskis 2010), restrictive zoning (Lauster 2016) and the introduction of short-term rentals such as Airbnb (Wachsmuth et al. 2017). The crisis of affordable housing was further exacerbated by the Canadian government funding very little new social   88 housing construction since the early 1990s, when the program was cut during a wave of neoliberal restructuring (Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Suttor 2015; Wolfe 1998).  In this context, building a new supply of market rental housing is portrayed as a potential solution to the affordable housing crisis and supported by local, provincial and federal policies and incentives. What began as a trickle of new rental building in the early 2010s became a growing segment of the housing market as developers began orienting towards rentals en masse. By 2019, 40,000 units were under construction throughout the country (Wong 2019). Most of the units were being built by condominium developers and financial entities such as Real Estate Investment Trusts, private equity firms and institutional investors like pension funds (Aalbers 2016). These builders differed from previous eras when rental buildings were built mostly by small-scale and medium sized developers that specialized in rentals. On the other hand, publicly-traded corporations like REITs own multiple buildings across cities and sell shares in their overall holdings to investors (Chan, Erickson and Wang, 2003; Gotham 2006). REITs have become a major player in Canada and in global rental housing markets, however, they have until recently operated by purchasing foreclosed single-family homes and existing rental buildings (August and Walks 2018; Beswick et al. 2016; Charles 2019; Chilton et al. 2018; Fields 2018; Fields and Uffer 2016; Wijberg 2019). Scholars have illustrated that financial entities acting as landlords result in negative outcomes for tenants, such as rent increases and new hidden fees, renovictions and up-scaling in gentrifying neighborhoods, various forms of tenant harassment and declining services (August and Walks 2018; Beswick and Penny 2018; Crosby 2019; Fields 2015; Teresa 2016). Furthermore, they have attributed the aggressive profit-orientation of REITs to their fiduciary responsibility to investors to continuously increase profit margins on rental buildings (Charles 2019).    89 With the increasing supply of privately-built rental housing in Canada have come efforts to reorient Canadian values from single-family homeownership towards renting. Various groups, including politicians, planners, developers and housing advocates are creating new narratives about housing tenure and what it “means” to be a renter. To understand the narratives of new-build rental housing, I now turn to literature in economic sociology on the role of morality, cultural values and fictional expectations in the market.  Meanings, Expectations and Housing Markets: Housing as a Symbolic System  Cultural economy, an interdisciplinary research tradition originally rooted in anthropology, begins with the premise that the economy is always embedded within cultural systems of meaning making and symbolism (Sahlins 1976; Alexander 2011; Zelizer 1994). Hence, for the economy to function, relational economic actions and exchanges must being “meaningful” to the participants and make sense within their worldview (Zelizer 2012). In addition to this focus on morality and markets, my analysis draws on recent work in cultural economy about the role of creativity and “fictional expectations” within capitalism (Beckert 2016). By combining these strands of work I highlight how narratives about new rental housing and the destigmatization of renting are linked to the expectation of a growing market for new-build rental housing in Canada.   The cultural economy perspective has significant overlap with a small but influential body of research on housing, values and symbolism within urban studies. Particularly, I draw on planning theorist Constance Perin’s 1970s account of housing as a symbolic system, inspired by French structuralism (for an earlier, similar approach see Firey 1947). In her book Everything in Its Place: Social Order and Land Use in America, Perin argues that all matters relating to housing are “value-laden and moral” and that “classifications, definitions, and standards” stemming from   90 land use and zoning “name cultural and social categories and define what are believed to be the correct relationships among them” (1977:3). She outlines a hierarchical system of housing, or a “ladder of life,” where single-family suburban homeownership appears at the top and low-income tenement renting at the bottom.  In her interviews with homeowners and builders in the United States, Perin finds that renters were consistently described as “transient, unstable, not thrifty, without pride, immature, lower class, not full-fledged citizens, indifferent to property maintenance – all opprobrious characterizations” (1977: 56). Theorizing a binary between homeowners and renters, she argues that the stigma of renting also drives the positive associations with homeownership, which is deemed to be the pinnacle of maturity and success in American life (see also McCabe 2016). More recent work in Canada finds high rates of homeownership and a similar value structure around housing tenure. Based on his interviews with residents of Vancouver, Lauster notes “the association of the house with success, adulthood and moral correctness lends it some weight in people’s deliberations about where they would feel most at home” (2016: 14).    Beyond individual meanings and decision-making about tenure, researchers have also shown how renters and low-income neighborhoods are defamed through a process of “territorial stigmatization” (Goffman 1963; Horgan 2018; Wacquant Slater and Pereira 2014). Using stigmatizing rhetoric attached to rental housing, developers and state actors justify the upscaling of low-income neighborhoods leading to displacement and gentrification (August 2014). Drawing on and complicating this work, in my analysis I show that the destigmatization of renting and shift towards the positive moral valuation of renters may also be contributing to gentrification. This is especially the case when the media frames high-end rentals as a net positive for a city’s housing stock even when they are being built in low-income or working-class neighborhoods.    91 In addition to research on housing, morality and markets, I draw on a pragmatist-inspired strand in economic sociology about the role of creativity and expectations within the economy. In a series of recent works, sociologist Jens Beckert (2013, 2016) argues for a new approach to studying capitalist dynamics through the concept of “fictional expectations,” or stories about the future told in the present. According to Beckert, fictional expectations – “the images that actors form as they consider future states of the world, the way they visualize causal relations, and the ways they perceive actions influencing outcomes” – are essential to the functioning of capitalism as an inherently expansionary and future-oriented economic system (2016: 9). Citing literary theory, he draws parallels between stories within the economy and storytelling more generally. He suggests that capitalism relies on as-if assumptions, where economic actors suspend their disbelief and put faith in future outcomes that are fundamentally uncertain, much like we do when engaging with performance or literature.   However, Beckert (2016) claims that fictional expectations are far from an innocent means to cope with an uncertain future, and are linked to power, domination and inequality within capitalism. Referring to this as the “politics of expectation,” he argues that it takes power, resources and status to create narratives that will influence future outcomes and these resources are not equally distributed. Furthermore, stories that economic actors tell about the future do not reflect an impartial reading of the economy. Beckert states, “if it is possible to influence others’ expectations and gain from the decisions they make based on these expectations . . . it seems realistic to assert that fictional expectations may be used instrumentally and advocated despite known flaws and incoherencies . . . to manipulate others’ expectations” (2016, pp. 84). Therefore, fictional expectations are akin to Goffman’s (1974) notion of a “framing,” which allows actors to present a dominant version of reality that occludes other interpretations.    92  This paper uses news data to investigate the moral framing of new-build rental housing, the politics of expectations and the transformation of a segment of the housing market in Canada. News articles provide a way to examine the broader shift in orientation towards rental housing that has taken place within public and political discourse over the 2010 decade in Canada. This paper asks: how is the discourse about new rental housing and affordability presented to a public audience? And, how is the shift towards building new rentals expressed by the business community? In my analysis I highlight a tension between two predominant framings of building new rentals: the affordability frame in the news and op-eds sections, and the business frame in the business and investment sections of Canadian news outlets. In the affordability frame, journalists and their interviewees, such as politicians, planners, and housing advocates, suggest that building a new supply of private rental housing is a key aspect of solving the affordable housing crisis. The expectation of a new supply is accompanied by arguments that rental housing should be destigmatized and reframed as a valid or even virtuous lifestyle choice. Second, I illustrate a paradox between the affordability frame and the business frame, showing that writers in the business section advocate for new rentals as a good investment opportunity, specifically citing that rents are high and are expected to remain so. I argue that this paradox stems from the fact there is a fundamental incompatibility between housing affordability and profit-maximization by financial investors, something which has been noted by other housing researchers (Desmond and Wilmers 2019; Fields 2015, 2018; Madden and Marcuse 2016; Pattillo 2013; Woldoff, Morrison and Glass 2016). I then argue that the business narrative more accurately describes the trajectory of rental housing that has been built under incentive programs in Canadian cities so far – mid- to high-end rentals that are lucrative for developers and financial landlords (August 2020). I conclude by   93 suggesting that the consensus about the destigmatization of renting has been accompanied by a consensus about market-oriented local housing policy across the political spectrum.   Data and Methods  To understand the shifting discourse about rental housing that has accompanied new-build rental housing policy in Canada, this paper uses the method of frame analysis (Bedford and Snow 2000; Goffman 1972) of news articles. While the discourse about new rentals certainly extends beyond the mainstream press, and can be found in city council chambers, online forums, and throughout the community, news outlets serve as a useful form of data as they allow for systematic examination over time. News is also a concentrated medium that shows how new-build rental housing is framed for the public across a large and geographically dispersed country. In addition, news outlets carve out content in sections targeted towards different audiences, such as news articles and opinion editorials geared to the general public, and business articles written for investors. Thus, they allow for an examination of differences in the framing of rental housing that plays out within the pages of the same publication.  The primary data for my analysis consists of 503 news articles on new rental housing from the top 10 Canadian newspapers by circulation, published online or in print between 2009 and 2019. The articles were accessed through the online academic news search engine Lexis Nexus. In collecting the data I entered the search term “rental housing” into the database for each of Canada’s top news outlets by circulation (Calgary Herald, Edmonton Journal, The Globe and Mail, Hamilton Spectator, National Post, Ottawa Citizen, Toronto Star, Toronto Sun, The Vancouver Sun and the Winnipeg Free Press) between January 2009 and December 2019, which produced a sample of 1,206 articles. I then read through each article to assess whether it concerned new rentals   94 specifically, filtering out those that did not. This provided a final sample of 503 articles covering most major Canadian cities.  Using the qualitative software program NVivo, I then coded all of the articles for emergent themes, using the approach of abductive analysis (Tavory and Timmermans 2015). Abduction is an iterative process where the analyst moves back-and-forth between the data and existing research, looking for novel or unexpected findings. Through my coding I found a core narrative presented in the news and opinion sections of news outlets (n= 409), the affordability frame. The first surprising finding came through a consensus about the destigmatization of rental housing, which I found in quotes from politicians from across the political spectrum, as well as from journalists for outlets that were both traditionally liberal and more conservative.24 This finding diverged from expectations in the academic literature that actors like politicians and journalist would promote the value homeownership over rental housing. I also noted how rentals were being discussed in articles from business sections, which was very different from the way it was presented to the public. I therefore created a sub-sample of business articles (n= 94), which I coded separately, discovering the business frame. While the business frame was also rooted in the idea that more Canadians can and should become renters, the discourse went a step further by suggesting this was positive for corporate investors. To mediate between the affordability and business frames, I also draw on rental policy documents for context on the type of housing that is being produced through rental incentive programs.                                                         24 While none of Canada’s main newspapers can be described as left-wing per se, The Globe and Mail, The Vancouver Sun, The Toronto Star, The Ottawa Citizen and The Hamilton Spectator are typically seen as centrist or liberal. The National Post, Calgary Herald, Edmonton Journal, and Toronto Sun are seen as more right-wing and conservative in orientation.    95 The Affordability Frame: A New Supply of Rentals as a Solution to Canada’s Housing Crisis  The affordability frame is the predominant way the building of new rentals is presented to the Canadian public within news articles. This frame involves several interrelated claims, including a supply-side economics approach to solving the housing crisis, and moral claims about the destigmatization of renters and renting. I discuss how this frame presents a solution to the crisis, where supply and destigmatization will help to create greater affordability for renters. It therefore involves the deployment of fictional expectations regarding a new population of renters and the need for policies that support the building of new rentals in Canadian cities.   Within my sub-sample of news and op-ed articles (n=409), many advance the notion that building a supply of privately-owned and operated “purpose-built rentals” is the key to solving the housing crisis in Canada. This idea is found explicitly in 280 articles, making up 70% of my sample. In these articles, journalists and their interviewees suggest that the market for rentals dried up as a result of two factors: the cutting of government subsidies for building rentals, and the condominium boom in cities. For example, a 2009 article in The Vancouver Sun features quotes from then-Mayor of Vancouver, Gregor Robertson:  “Critical to the strategy is the construction of rental housing. ‘We have a huge shortage,’ Robertson said. Vacancy rates in Vancouver continue to hover well below one per cent, sending rental prices soaring . . . most of the units were built in the 1950s, '60s and '70s when federal tax incentives existed to support rental housing construction. That program no longer exists, and rental construction became too expensive for developers to invest in” (Jul 12, 2009).    96 Vancouver was an early adopter of an approach to encourage rentals through incentive programs that would become popular in cities throughout Canada over the course of the decade. In 2009 the city implemented the pilot program Short Term Incentives for Rentals (STIR), which allowed developers to waive development fees, receive exemptions from on-site parking requirements and build beyond existing density if they constructed rentals rather than condominiums (City of Vancouver, STIR Report 2012). Between 2009 and 2019 Vancouver saw 10,000 units of new housing built through STIR and subsequent rental incentive programs. Other cities followed suit by introducing similar programs in the later part of the decade, such as Toronto’s Open Door program.  Those advocating for a new supply of rental housing suggest that it is an important and necessary step, however acknowledge that it is likely insufficient to solve the housing crisis. For example, in an op-ed titled “Purpose Built Rental Properties Urgently Needed,” in The Vancouver Sun the author argues:   “The development of purpose-built, market rentals will not alone solve affordability for renters in the region. It will, however, help to alleviate pressure in the rental market, and provide housing options to many who find themselves in housing that doesn't currently meet their needs. With very little purpose-built rental developed in the past several decades, the addition of new rental housing will put downward pressure on existing rentals, and ultimately will contribute to a healthier housing market” (Jul 15, 2016).    97 This statement reflects the idea that although local governments do not have the resources to build housing for those most in need, they can incentivize new rentals, which will lower rents and contribute to affordability. In addition to the claims that a supply of purpose-built rentals is necessary to solving the affordability crisis are attempts to reframe and reorient Canadian values away from homeownership and towards renting. This involves the use of moral discourse about tenure as well as fictional expectations about the future of housing in Canada. For example, and article from The Toronto Star makes a strong case about the virtues of renting:  “Paul Smetanin, CEO of the Canadian Centre for Economic Analysis, says cities, such as New York, Sydney and Vienna, prove ‘you don't have to own your own home in order to have a great home.’ In Canada, renting is a ‘tainted’ housing choice because home ownership is tied so closely to measuring success. But ownership may have peaked in the Toronto region at 70 per cent, he said on Monday. ‘In Vienna, 60 per cent of that city is rental - beautifully constructed buildings and it's market rental, so people aren't house-poor’” (Nov 29, 2016).   In this excerpt we see a common rhetorical device that comes up in the affordability frame, the citing of exemplar cities like New York City, Vienna and Berlin, to highlight the positive benefits that renting can have on Canadian cities. The attempt to legitimize rental housing is also reflected in the headlines of other articles like The Calgary Herald’s “Renters Rebel Against the Cult of Homeownership,” (Feb 12, 2012) alongside “Politicians Must Stop Propping up the Idea of   98 Homeownership” (Sep 19, 2019) and “The Era of the Single Family Home is Over” in The Globe and Mail (Jul 13, 2019). Equally as important as the use of moral discourse about renting by journalists and opinion editorial contributors, is the symbolic weight of key public figures that advance this position. Mayors of major cities and prominent urban planners have contributed op-ed pieces on the virtues of renting for major newspapers. These stories often “go viral” and are widely shared and debated on social media. In Toronto, a key advocate of new rentals is the former Chief Planner and mayoral candidate in 2018, Jennifer Keesmat, who wrote a series of pieces for the Canadian national newspaper The Globe and Mail. In one article, titled “Let’s Banish the Hoary Myths of Home Ownership,” Keesmat writes:   “We need more housing in Canada, and we could easily have more high-quality, affordable rental homes – but the way our cities are planned strongly suggests we simply don't want more. We haven't valued renting as a housing choice, and so governments have under-built rental housing in Canada through policy frameworks that both echo and reinforce our belief that housing ownership is better than rental housing . . . And with home ownership more and more unattainable for more and more people, we need to stop promoting ownership to those who cannot afford it, and instead reorient our housing market toward high-quality rental homes” (Jul 27, 2019).  Keesmat’s platform for her mayoral run in Toronto included building 40,000 units of rental housing in the city. Her opponent, the conservative incumbent John Tory who was re-elected in the race, also prioritized building rentals in his campaign. An article covering one of Tory’s   99 campaign speeches quotes the mayor saying, “There are many people in Toronto ... whose children can't afford to rent an apartment. And there are young families who have to consider moving outside of Toronto to be able to afford the lives they want to have.” In Vancouver, the current mayor Kennedy Stewart who was elected in 2018 has also made rental housing a key issue in his administration, and often highlights that he himself has been a lifelong renter. In an op-ed for The Toronto Star, Stewart defended his approach to incentivizing a new supply of purpose-built rentals in the city:   “Everyday renters approach me with heartbreaking stories of how close they are to being pushed out of Vancouver . . . when we reject housing we are rejecting the only available housing option for half of our population, we are rejecting our neighbors. But when we say yes to market rental housing something important happens. People move into new purpose built rentals, pressure eases on the older stock they move out of, and it gets a little easier for low-income renters to remain in the neighborhoods they know and love” (Jul 22, 2019).  Stewart’s op-ed and his message that we should not be ‘rejecting’ housing is specially directed towards a group that is framed as exacerbating the housing crisis in news articles, ‘Not-In-My-Backyard’ homeowners, or NIMBYs. Within the affordability frame, neighborhood opposition to new projects came up in 60 of 408 articles (15%). In many of these articles, 77% of articles that refer to neighborhood opposition, NIMBYs are portrayed negatively or as a significant causal factor in blocking new housing supply and leading to greater unaffordability. Articles with headlines like “A Solution to the Toxic Effects of NIMBYism” in The Globe and Mail (Nov 7,   100 2019) and “NIMBY Minded Residents are Getting Louder and More Ridiculous” also in The Globe and Mail (Jul 6, 2019), present NIMBYs as being anti-renter, self-interested and immoral. On the other hand, developers are more often seen to be allies in the fight for affordable housing. For example, a commentator for The Vancouver Sun writes from the imagined perspective of a city councillor:  “‘No matter what we as councillors say, no matter what policies we pass, no matter what support you get from staff, no matter how great the need we acknowledge, none of that really matters. If enough of the residents complain, we will protect the status quo.’ This message is devastating for developers who believed council was sincere in wanting to encourage secure market-rental projects and more choice of housing in existing neighbourhoods” (Jun 6, 2019).   While there is certainly validity to claims that homeowners attempt to block higher density development in North American cities in some cases (Logan and Rabrenovic 1990; Purcell 1997; Shaw 2018), the housing being protested in these cases is often high-end rentals. Thus, blocking this type of rental housing is impeding affordability only if the assumption is that creating high-end housing will in fact improve overall affordability by creating supply. While renter stigmatization and NIMBYism are often framed as causal factors, the role of luxury developers in contributing to the housing crisis is only mentioned in a small minority of articles. Out of 503 articles, 30 (8%), provide a critical assessment of both developers’ role and the state’s response to the housing crisis. A planning professor at the University of British Columbia, Patrick Condon, states, “‘We have been producing a lot of housing, but most of that   101 housing has been of a supply that meets investor preferences’” (2017).  Accounts of developer interests in building rental housing are exceptional, and in the large majority of news articles, they are framed either neutrally or in a positive light.  The statements from journalists and prominent politicians and planners illustrate how the push to build a new supply of rentals in Canada supported by a moral discourse about rental housing and destigmatizing renting as a form of tenure. However, underlying efforts to solve the immediate crisis there is a suggestion that more Canadians can and should become lifelong renters, such as in much of Europe. Based on my analysis there is a general consensus across the left and right of the political spectrum that rental housing should be destigmatized and accompany homeownership as a valid lifestyle choice. These efforts to destigmatize renting function on several discursive levels as they are directed towards different groups within Canadian society, including renters themselves and homeowners near to new-build rental projects. In the first instance, they are targeted towards Canadians, especially young urbanites, to make the case that renting is a financially reasonable and morally worthy way to live. In the second case, they reframe renters as morally worthy subjects to existing homeowners who could potentially hold negative attitudes towards renters and thus block the building of new rentals.   This contrasts with previous findings, which predict a significant push-back against rental housing by conservative and right-wing groups of politicians, homeowners, and journalists. While right-wing groups still support the building of single-family homes, these findings suggest there is a growing openness and reframing of rental housing by political conservatives. On the other hand, left-wing politicians have encouraged market-based supply side arguments that building new rentals will lead to greater affordability for all Canadians.  This moral discourse is accompanied by ‘fictional expectations’ about an expanding segment of the housing market in Canada.    102 I now turn to the business frame, which I found in the business and investing sections of news outlets. This frame shares some of the core fictional expectations of the affordability frame, especially that the private sector can and should build a new supply of rental housing with incentivizing policies from the state, and that more and more Canadians will become renters relative to homeowners in the coming decades. However, the business frame diverges from the affordability frame in a key aspect: suggesting that rents will remain high in Canadian cities and, as a result, produce generous returns for business investors.    The Business Frame: Capitalizing on Unaffordability   Over the course of the 2010-decade, interest in building and operating new purpose-built rental housing grew in the business and development communities. Initially spurred by incentive programs like STIR in Vancouver, by the end of the 2010s these groups came to see rental housing as an emerging and highly lucrative segment of the housing market. This is reflected in the framing of new rentals in the business sections of the news outlets, where stocks from real estate investment trusts (REITs) are presented as one of the best assets to invest in and expectations of the profits are high.   As the number of new rentals under construction in Canada grew steadily throughout the 2010s, actors new to the rental housing market, condominium developers and financial investors, produced many of these buildings. A notable aspect of this new direction in rental housing construction is the increasing partnerships between condominium developers and financial investors (Mah 2016). Condominium developers have historically been interested in buying land for development and then transferring that land to owners (strata boards) when a certain number of units are purchased (Harris 2011: Lipert 2019). Thus, they have focused on a shorter temporal   103 framework for profit-making. Real Estate Investment Trusts, on the other hand, develop rental buildings and then retain ownership for the long-term, making profit from rents. Condo developers have historically shied away from rentals due to a common business model which favors quick profit turn-overs and financing from presale units before construction is underway (Rosen 2017). However, with financial backing from large-scale institutional investors such as pension funds to get projects off the ground, condo developers have begun to turn their attention to building rentals (Dixon 2016). In this configuration developers provide their building and marketing prowess, while REITs and investors focus on the long-term investment and the operations and management of buildings. There are varying configurations of REIT-developer partnerships. Sometimes REITs pay developers to build new rentals and then retain ownership after they are constructed. However, increasingly REITs and developers have entered into profit-sharing arrangements, where developers continue to be investors in new rental projects (Pomeroy and McClelland 2019).   On the demand side of the equation, business articles frame Canada’s rental housing market as tight with high rents and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Business articles suggest that this is owed to a confluence of factors, including high real estate prices, tightening mortgage markets, in-migration to cities, and the understanding that consumers will accept paying a “premium” to live in cities. For example, describing an interview with a real estate analyst, a business reporter for The Globe and Mail writes:   “Mr. Hildebrand believes the market is now taking a longer term outlook. On the one hand, strong rental demand from a continual influx of people relocating to Toronto and people choosing to keep renting rather than owning makes the rental business attractive. On the other hand, he believes rents may have reached a new plateau. ‘The   104 outlook [for the rental market] is very stable. The demand seems to be structural, rather than temporary’” (Mar 15, 2015).  This excerpt refers to the demand for rentals as “structural” and hence unlikely to be met in the short-term through a new supply. Another reporter for The Globe and Mail writes in more detail about these conditions, stating:  “The emerging trend comes in the face of what industry players characterize as a near-perfect storm: The cost of buying older apartment buildings has jumped; financing for new construction is relatively inexpensive due to low interest rates; rental demand and rents are rising; fears of provincial rent control regimes are subsiding; condo markets are weakening; and institutional real estate owners are looking for places to park their money” (Sep 9, 2013).   In the business narrative we see the same set of conditions, which the affordability frame describes as needing a ‘solution,’ as increasing profitability for the private sector. While these goals may not necessarily be in tension – creating a supply could solve affordability while also being profitable – the fictional expectations of the business community suggest a hope for the conditions of the crisis to continue. One of the most common claims within the business frame is that inflation in rents over the course of the 2010 decade has made building new rentals more viable. According to recent statistics, roughly 60% of renters in cities like Toronto and Vancouver are living under conditions of rent burden, meaning they pay more than 30% of their income for housing (Canada Housing Index 2019). That this is presented as a possible “structural” norm in Canada shapes the   105 expectations of investors in rental housing who need to be convinced that it will continue to be a growing and profitable share of the housing market.  Another structural factor discussed by business writers extensively is Canada reaching “peak single-family home ownership,” and the idea that the next generation of Canadians will be priced out of homeownership by soaring real estate values and tightened restrictions on lending. As one analyst for The Globe and Mail states, "Every time Ottawa changes the mortgage rules and makes it tougher to buy a house or a condo, that's going to push people into the rental market" (Sep 9, 2013). In a reversal of examples found in the affordability frame, another reporter for The National Post quotes a development official, stating: “Lobo says as house prices continue to rise, he believes more and more of the population will switch to rental. ‘With housing prices the way they are,’ he says, ‘we are going to lock out people from the market like in New York. In New York, rich people rent because they just can't afford to buy something’ (Mar 7, 2017).  These excerpts illustrate a similar set of fictional expectations as the affordability frame, however renting is framed less as a positive choice, and rather an inevitable reality for many young Canadians who are “pushed” into renting and being “locked out” of ownership. Condominium developers also mention that many of the units they have built over the past 20 years are now investor-owned and being rented out in cities like Toronto and Vancouver. As one representative playfully notes in a The Globe and Mail article, “‘The joke in our office is that in the past 41 years we've built 11,000 units – imagine if we kept all of those as rentals’” (May 4, 2018). In this quote we see how developers recalibrate their fictional expectations based on a “misreading” of where the market was heading in recent years. Developer’s humorously “look back” at a time when building condo units was commonsense and they couldn’t foresee the potential for a lucrative revenue stream given extremely high rents in Canadian cities.    106 That business investors are another key group driving the building of new rentals raises questions regarding the affordability of new housing given the existing research on financialized landlords. REITs have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits for investors, meaning that they must charge a maximum of what the market will bare in rents and also seek out new avenues of profit in existing buildings (Charles 2019). As one writer states in The Toronto Star “Another rental apartment owner is looking to go public, capitalizing on a shortage of rental units in the Greater Toronto Area and a hot market for high-yield stocks. In Canada, this trend has pushed investors into publicly traded real estate companies, because REITs tend to pay distributions worth 5 per cent to 6 per cent annually” (Jan 31, 2015). As August and Walks (2018; August 2020) note, these high returns for investors tend to correlate with negative outcomes for tenants, such as rent increases, renovictions, harassment and declining services in rental buildings.  By comparing the business and affordability frames we find a significant tension: while the former articulates the building of new rentals as a solution to the affordability crisis, the latter aims to both capitalize on and expand the increasingly expensive rental market. In both cases it is important to note that a ‘fictional expectation’ is based on an optimistic outlook (Beckert 2016). Thinking about the business frame, the fictional expectation applied to rental housing is characteristic of expectations for markets on the upswing. There is, of course, the possibility that the fictional expectations in the affordability frame manifest in reality, and that a large supply of new rentals will lower rents and housing providers will be forced to temper their profit-maximizing orientation. However, affordability is not what the private sector is hoping or planning for. And, given research on financial landlords, it is likely they will continue to use tactics for extracting maximum value for shareholders (August and Walks 2018, August 2020). Thus, this fictional expectation presented in the business sections is at odds with the fictional expectations presented   107 in the news and opinion sections, which sees a new supply of rentals lowering the cost of renting for renters.  Thus, through examining the moral discourse and fictional expectations in news articles we see a microcosm of a broader tension within capitalist housing markets: that there is an incompatibility between housing becoming more affordable for citizens at the same time that it is increasing in value as a business investment (Madden and Marcuse 2016). It is also important to situate these media frames within broader housing outcomes in Canada. I will now draw on secondary data to adjudicate between these frames and find that most of the incentivized new rental housing is at the high-end of the market and hence holds minimal promise in addressing affordability.   Assessing Media Discourse in Light of Housing Policy: What is Being Built?  In this section, I compare the discursive framing of rentals to the tangible outcomes of policies designed to incentivize new rental housing in Canadian cities.  Based on a preliminary review of policy documents (see Methodological Appendix) and costs in new rental buildings in two cities with established new-build rental incentive programs, Toronto and Vancouver, I find new rental housing policy has predominantly supported the building of mid- to high-end apartment buildings, rather than low-income and affordable housing.  In Canada, the first major rental incentive program was Vancouver’s STIR, which ran from 2009-2012 and offered fee waivers and extra density to developers if they built any type of rental housing. The policy rationale of STIR was explicitly market supply-oriented. As stated in a brochure for the program, “The STIR program provides City incentives to private sector developers so that building rentals becomes more economically viable. The objective is to achieve   108 rents that are affordable to households in the regular housing market looking for rental housing” (City of Vancouver, STIR Report, 2010).  However, the program came under criticism after it was found to be producing mainly luxury rentals and transit-oriented development (City of Vancouver, STIR Report 2012). Based on these critiques, the city moved to a new policy approach known as Rental 100, which stipulated the maximum rental charges permitted in order to receive incentives. While the city claimed to be producing “affordable housing” through this program, however, the rents continued to be on the high-end of current market rates. There is also a clause within the Rental 100 that allows building under the program to match average market rates in the city (City of Vancouver, Rental 100 Rental Incentive Guidelines, 2016).  For example, in a business article published in 2015 by The Globe and Mail covering the opening of new rental building The Duke in Vancouver, the writer notes: “Developers seeking to have the city's development cost levy waived for a market rental project must meet the city's criteria for affordable rental rates, which is $1,242 per month for a studio unit, ranging up to $2,338 per month for a three-bedroom unit. As for pricing at the Duke, Edgar [the owner] said they'll wait to see what the market would bear.” Based on reviewing The Duke’s website as of March 2020, the price of a studio apartment was $1900, an increase of $600 in four years. These rentals units are in a building which was granted a large rezoning and development fee waivers for its contribution to affordability in the city.  According to policy documents for the Rental 100 program, as of 2019 the City of Vancouver was offering incentives to buildings where studios are rented for a maximum of $1800, one bedrooms for $2100, two bed-rooms for $2700, and three bed-rooms for $3600. These prices are well outside the price range of low- and middle-income Vancouverites, who can afford to pay about $700 to $1000 per month for rent (Canada Rental Housing Index, 2019). Through the Open   109 Door Program, Toronto has recently taken a similar approach of incentivizing what they refer to as “affordable market rentals,” buildings which are not permitted to charge above the median rental rate in the city (City of Toronto, Open Door Affordable Housing Program Guidelines, 2018). However, the median rental rate in Toronto has as much as 60% of city residents living under housing or rent-burdened conditions (Canada Rental Housing Index, 2019).   The affordability frame presents these programs as enhancing affordability by providing new rentals for middle-class citizens and freeing up older low-end housing. The latest version of Vancouver’s rental housing policy, Moderate Income Rental Housing Pilot Program (MIRHPP) started in 2019 does, however, attempt to address these concerns by requiring developers to allocate 20% of the units for moderate income-earners, designated as those making $30,000 - $60,000 a year (City of Vancouver, MIRHHP FAQ, 2019). In return, developers are permitted to build well beyond existing zoning. In the initial round of proposals for MIRHPP, 9 out of the 11 buildings were located in traditionally low-income and working-class neighborhoods and were as high as 13 stories in areas zoned for four-story buildings. While under MIRHPP some are meant to be affordable and for low-income people, the rest of the buildings could be market rate rentals, thus raising concerns about gentrification due to the increase in high-income renters in low-income neighborhoods.   By situating the affordability frame alongside the business frame, as well as the outcomes from rental housing policy, we can see a tension between affordability and profit-making characteristic of capitalist housing markets. Despite the claims made by the affordability frame, building a new supply of rental housing may not be solving the housing crisis, but rather deepening it through compromises made between affordable units and the luxury buildings needed to secure profits for investors.    110  Conclusion: Fictional Expectations, Profits and Housing Markets  This paper has illustrated a growing consensus around new-build rental housing as a solution to the housing crisis in Canada put forth by journalists, politicians and policymakers from across the political spectrum. A key component of this framing is the notion that rental housing must be destigmatized and Canadians need to reorient their values away from single-family homeownership. By taking up residence in the new supply of rental housing, Canadians can be following in the footsteps of exemplary cities throughout Europe and New York City. However, by looking at the business frame and housing policy outcomes we can see the form of housing being produced, predominantly luxury rentals produced by condominium developers and financial investors, is very different from cities like Vienna or Berlin, which have strong protections for ensuring the affordability of rentals.   If not tangible affordability, what, then, explains the shift in orientation towards rentals and policies that support the building of market rental housing throughout Canada? I suggest that the consensus around the destigmatization of renting and perception of the moral virtues of renting across the political spectrum have developed in correlation with market-oriented solutions to the housing crisis on both the left and right side of the political spectrum (for more general discussions of left-wing neoliberalism see Fraser 2017; Mudge 2019; Pacewitz 2016). In Vancouver, for example, the left-leaning party Vision Vancouver incentivized developers through a series of rental housing policies over a 10-year period. It was only after intense criticism that the City of Vancouver made it mandatory to include a small amount of affordable rentals in buildings that are granted large height exemptions in low-income neighborhoods. Thus, we see a fusion of traditionally liberal values about the worthiness of renters,   111 with traditionally more conservative arguments regarding the ability of the market to allocate housing.   In addition to illustrating the shifting discourse around new rental housing, the findings of this paper contribute to discussions in cultural economy about the role of morality and fictional expectations within the market. According to Beckert capitalist economies involve a “politics of expectations,” and the framing of economic phenomenon to the benefit of some groups over others. I have illustrated how the politics of expectations about a new market for rental housing in Canada is linked to destigmatizing rentals and reframing renting as a valid and morally virtuous lifestyle choice. In order for financial interests to continue to see the growth in profits they rely on, an increasing segment of the Canadian population must be “willing” to accept lives as renters either by choice or by fiat. Such a large value shift is difficult to bring about, as many Canadians have deeply internalized beliefs and desires about owning single-family homes. Ultimately, in order to understand how housing markets operate, and whose interests they serve, we must also understand the stories that powerful actors, including journalists, politicians and developers, tell about who should live where and why.      112 Conclusion  With rising levels of housing inequality and homelessness in cities and the dismantling of the welfare state throughout North America, local governments have increasingly turned to private developers to help solve the crisis. Within this context, developers and state actors have constructed new discourses  about the ‘social responsibility’ of the private sector and how exchanging density for social benefits can be a “win-win” for society and business. In accounting for the relationship between culture and morality and the economics and politics of urban development, I have outlined and illustrated urban cultural economy as a new approach to urban studies. Urban cultural economy sees culture as having a causal influence within the economy to shape urban development outcomes. Rather than starting from theoretical claims about what social justice in the city should look like, urban cultural economy begins with the on-the-ground moral claims and discourses made by developers, planners, politicians, and community advocates. As I have shown, the ability to make convincing moral and ethical claims about new forms of urban development has an impact on the shape of the city and new patterns of inequality arising from urban neoliberalism.  Urban cultural economy relates to and builds on the branch of political economy known as critical urban theory. Critical urban theory (Marcuse and Madden 2016) claims housing inequality results from the structural imperatives of capitalism and the moral claims and arguments made by developers are merely superficial packaging. Through an urban cultural economy perspective, however, I argue that moral claims about housing cannot be disentangled from the structures and outcomes of the housing market. Therefore, I see urban cultural economy as complementary yet distinct from critical urban theory. For urban cultural economy to be a critical endeavor, it must also follow how moral discourse and culture uphold power relations and perpetuate inequalities.   113 To do this, urban cultural economy draws on critical traditions in the cultural study of the economy, such as the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.   In developing the urban cultural economy perspective, through my case studies I have contributed new insights to several debates in urban and economic sociology. First, I have illustrated the role of gift-giving within the context of urban neoliberalism, which expands our understanding of non-market exchange within local governance and land-use decisions.  Second, I have shown how non-economic capital, including symbolic or reputational capital, influences urban development outcomes adding to debates on the motivations and justification of developers. Finally, I have discussed how narratives and storytelling advanced in the news media intersect with attempts by the state and business interests to reorient the Canadian housing market.  While each of these contributions is significant, cumulatively they demonstrate the analytical potential of urban cultural economy for the study of urban development. My hope is that other researchers can build on these insights to theorize urban economic processes from a culturally-informed critical framework that builds on traditional critical urban theory.  Beyond its theoretical contributions, the urban cultural economy approach can also offer insights into various dimensions of urban policy-making in the city. I have offered practical insights into the exchange of density for affordable housing, new build rental housing policy, as well as community consultation processes around new development. I have done so by taking seriously and scrutinizing the moral and ethical claims made by the development industry and state actors about new forms of policy-making. For example, by uncovering how density agreements are enacted as gifts, I show how this form of economic exchange obscures outcomes that increase inequality, like prioritizing luxury development and promoting gentrification. Therefore, ethical discourse, such as that of gift-giving, has real impacts on urban development processes and is an   114 important object of empirical research. In addition to its role in examining, assessing and critiquing existing forms of policy-making in the neoliberal city, urban cultural economy can and should also offer solutions and alternatives for progressive urban policy. In the context of the defunding of the welfare state at the national level, local governments find themselves increasingly dependent on private developers to provide social benefits. This position of dependency has resulted in a policy-making pattern where developers are able to gain a lot while giving back relatively little. These negative impacts suggest important changes need to occur in terms of the government’s perception and role in facilitating affordability.  First, the federal government needs to provide funding for affordable housing so cities can achieve independence from trade-odds with business in providing for citizens. My findings are all situated in the context of welfare state retrenchment, where municipal governments have been compelled to forge alliances with private developers. Ultimately, to move away from the model of exchanging density for affordable housing and to keep up with affordable housing needs, the federal government must begin to supply funding for and build social housing at similar levels to their rates in the 1970s. In 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government launched a National Housing Strategy, which gave the impression of large-scale federal funding for housing. However, the National Housing Strategy marked the institutionalization of the polices I have critiqued in this dissertation, including density agreements and socially mixed redevelopments, at the national level. The NHS was unveiled at mixed-use developments throughout the country, including at Woodward’s, which has been a locus for gentrification and displacement in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. The most efficient way for the government to address the affordable housing problem is to use existing policy infrastructure, like taxation, to pay for large amounts of low-income housing. Policies offering incentives to private developers have produced negative   115 outcomes at the local level, and will only become more widespread by being reinforced at the national level.  Second, local governments need to embrace the state power they have over land use and zoning, and make decisions that will substantially benefit the public. This may require a cultural paradigm shift where state actors see themselves as separate from and governing over developers, rather than partners who exchange gifts with one another. Furthermore, while these policies help to increase profits for private developers and speculators, developers also gain symbolic capital through their involvement with affordable housing, which leads to further rezonings that benefit the private sector. Relatedly, municipal governments can and should protect forms of housing that cater to very low-income people in the private market, such as SRO hotels, from increasing rents and displacement.   Finally, my dissertation work strives to solidify the urban cultural economy perspective, a project that is already implicitly underway within urban studies. There is still much potential in bringing classic and contemporary theories in cultural economy into the fold of research on the political economy of cities – from seminal works in economic anthropology to more recent developments in the study of performativity and business ethics. This theoretical work in cultural economy can expand the repertoire of urban researchers to build on and rethink existing understandings of urban economies.      116 Bibliography Aalbers, Manuel B. 2016. “The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis.” Pp. 40–63 in The Financialization of Housing. New York: Routledge. Akers, Joshua. 2015. “Emerging Market City.” Environment and Planning A 47(9):1842–58. Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2011. “Market as Narrative and Character: For a Cultural Sociology of Economic Life.” Journal of Cultural Economy 4(4):477–88. Alexander, Jeffrey and Philip Smith. 2001. “The Strong Program in Cultural Theory: Elements of a Structural Hermeneutics.” Pp. 135–50 in Handbook of sociological theory. Springer. Andrew-Gee, Eric. 2016. “The End of an Era; Toronto Bid’s Farewell to Iconic Honest Ed’s.” The Globe and Mail, December 12. August, Martine. 2014. “Speculating Social Housing: Mixed-Income Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto’s Regent Park and Don Mount Court.” University of Toronto. August, Martine. 2014. “Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization: The Benefits of Concentrated Poverty in Toronto’s Regent Park.” Environment and Planning A 46(6):1317–33. August, Martine. 2016. “Revitalisation Gone Wrong: Mixed-Income Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto’s Don Mount Court.” Urban Studies 53(16):3405–22. August, Martine and Alan Walks. 2018. “Gentrification, Suburban Decline, and the Financialization of Multi-Family Rental Housing: The Case of Toronto.” Geoforum 89:124–36. August, Martine. 2020. “The Financialization of Canadian Multi-Family Rental Housing: From Trailer to Tower.” Journal of Urban Affairs 1–23. Barman, Emily. 2016. Caring Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beasley, Larry. 2019. Vancouverism. Vancouver: On Point Press. Becher, Debbie. 2014. Private Property and Public Power: Eminent Domain in Philadelphia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beckert, Jens. 2013. “Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations in the Economy.” Theory and Society 42(3):219–40. Beckert, Jens. 2016. Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   117 Beckert, Jens and Patrik Aspers. 2011. The Worth of Goods: Valuation and Pricing in the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26(1):611–39. Block, Fred L. 2018. Capitalism: The Future of an Illusion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Block, Fred and Margaret R. Somers. 2014. The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi’s Critique. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Blomley, Nicholas. 2004. Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property. London: Routledge. Borer, Michael Ian. 2006. “The Location of Culture: The Urban Culturalist Perspective.” City & Community 5(2):173–97. Boudreau, Julie-Anne, Roger Keil, and Douglas Young. 2009. Changing Toronto: Governing Urban Neoliberalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000. Pascalian Meditations. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2005. The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge: Polity. Bozakovic, Alex. 2014. “The Future of Honest Ed’s: Vancouver-Style City Building.” The Globe and Mail, September 14. Bradburn, Jamie. 2010. “Historicist: A Village Grows on Markham Street.” Torontoist, August 21. Brenner, Neil and Nik Theodore. 2005. “Neoliberalism and the Urban Condition.” City 9(1):101–7. Brenner, Neil, Peter Marcuse, and Margit Mayer. 2012. Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City. London: Routledge. Bridge, Gary, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees. 2012. Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth? London: Policy Press.   118 Bula, Fances. 2009. “Vancouver Appears to Be Forgoing Parks and Daycare for Affordable Housing.” The Globe and Mail, November 3. Burawoy, Michael. 2003. “For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.” Politics & Society 31(2):193–261. Butler, Tim and Garry Robson. 2003. London Calling: The Middle Classes and the Re-Making of Inner London. Berg Publishers. Buzzelli, Michael and Richard Harris. 2006. “Cities as the Industrial Districts of Housebuilding.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30(4):894–917. Cameron, Ken and Mike Harcourt. 2009. City Making in Paradise: Nine Decisions That Saved Vancouver. Vancouver: D & M Publishers. Carter, Tom. 1997. “Current Practices for Procuring Affordable Housing: The Canadian Context.” Housing Policy Debate 8(3):593–631. Chan, Su Han, John Erickson, and Ko Wang. 2003. Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure, Performance, and Investment Opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Charles, Suzanne Lanyi. 2019. “The Financialization of Single-Family Rental Housing: An Examination of Real Estate Investment Trusts’ Ownership of Single-Family Houses in the Atlanta Metropolitan Area.” Journal of Urban Affairs 1–21. Chilton, Ken, Robert Silverman, Rabia Chaudhry, and Chihaungji Wang. 2018. “The Impact of Single-Family Rental REITs on Regional Housing Markets: A Case Study of Nashville, TN.” Societies 8(4):93. Christophers, Brett. 2014. “Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable Housing Development and the Performative World-Making of Economic Models.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38(1):79–97. Clavel, Pierre. 1986. The Progressive City: Planning and Participation, 1969-1984. Rutgers University Press. Cohen, Andrew C. and Shai M. Dromi. 2018. “Advertising Morality: Maintaining Moral Worth in a Stigmatized Profession.” Theory and Society 47(2):175–206. Coiacetto, Eddo. 2001. “Diversity in Real Estate Developer Behaviour: A Case for Research.” Urban Policy and Research 19(1):43–59. Crosby, Andrew. 2020. “Financialized Gentrification, Demoviction, and Landlord Tactics to Demobilize Tenant Organizing.” Geoforum 108:184–93.   119 Crosby, Neil and John Henneberry. 2016. “Financialisation, the Valuation of Investment Property and the Urban Built Environment in the UK.” Urban Studies 53(7):1424–41. Dale, Gareth. 2010. Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market. London: Polity. Dale, Gareth. 2016. Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. London: Pluto Press. Dale, Gareth. 2016. Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left. New York City: Columbia University Press. Desmond, Matthew. 2016. Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City. Largo: Crown Books. Desmond, Matthew. 2018. “Heavy Is the House: Rent Burden among the American Urban Poor.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 42(1):160–70. Desmond, Matthew and Nathan Wilmers. 2019. “Do the Poor Pay More for Housing? Exploitation, Profit, and Risk in Rental Markets.” American Journal of Sociology 124(4):1090–1124. Donaldson, Jesse. 2019. Land of Destiny: A History of Vancouver Real Estate. Vancouver: Anvil Press. Douglas, Gordon C. C. 2012. “Cultural Expectations and Urban Development: The Role of ‘Cultural Sensitivity’ and ‘Cultural Sincerity’ in Local Growth Politics.” Sociological Perspectives 55(1):213–36. Douglas, Mary and Baron Isherwood. 1978. The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption. Vol. 6. Psychology Press. Duneier, Mitchell and Ovie Carter. 1999. Sidewalk. Macmillan. Elsmore, Sophie. 2019. “Strategies of Responsibilization: Development Contributions and the Political Role of Property Developers.” Urban Geography Online. Emerson, Robert M., Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw. 2011. Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Enright, Robert. 2010. Body Heat: The Story of the Woodward’s Development. Vancouver: Blueimprint. Fainstein, Susan S. 1994. The City Builders: Property, Politics, and Planning in London and New York. London: Blackwell Oxford. Fainstein, Susan S. 2010. The Just City. Ithica: Cornell University Press. Fields, Desiree. 2015. “Contesting the Financialization of Urban Space: Community Organizations and the Struggle to Preserve Affordable Rental Housing in New York City.” Journal of Urban Affairs 37(2):144–65.   120 Fields, Desiree. 2018. “Constructing a New Asset Class: Property-Led Financial Accumulation after the Crisis.” Economic Geography 94(2):118–40. Fields, Desiree and Sabina Uffer. 2016. “The Financialisation of Rental Housing: A Comparative Analysis of New York City and Berlin.” Urban Studies 53(7):1486–1502. Firey, Walter. 1945. “Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables.” American Sociological Review 10(2):140–48. Firey, Walter Irving. 1947. Land Use in Central Boston. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Fligstein, Neil and Doug McAdam. 2012. A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Florida, Richard. 2003. “Cities and the Creative Class.” City & Community 2(1):3–19. Fourcade, Marion. 2011. “Cents and Sensibility: Economic Valuation and the Nature of ‘Nature.’” American Journal of Sociology 116(6):1721–77. Fraser, Nancy. 2017. “The End of Progressive Neoliberalism.” Dissent 2(1):2017. Fridman, Daniel and Alex Luscombe. 2017. “Gift-Giving, Disreputable Exchange, and the Management of Donations in a Police Department.” Social Forces 96(2):507–28. Friendly, Abigail. 2017. “Land Value Capture and Social Benefits: Toronto and Sao Paulo Compared.” IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance 33. Garboden, Philip and Christine Jang-Trettien. 2018. ““There’s Money to Be Made in Community”: Real Estate Developers, Community Organizing, and Profit-Making in a Shrinking City.” Journal of Urban Affairs 1–21. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic books. Ghaziani, Amin. 2014. There Goes the Gayborhood? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Goffman, Erving. 2009. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York City: Simon and Schuster. Gould, Marya Cotton, Gregory Henriquez, and Robert Enright. 2016. Citizen City. Vancouver: Blueimprint. Graham, Stephen. 2015. “Luxified Skies: How Vertical Urban Housing Became an Elite Preserve.” City 19(5):618–45.   121 Graham, Stephen. 2016. Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers. New York City: Verso Books. Grazian, David. 2005. Blue Chicago: The Search for Authenticity in Urban Blues Clubs. University of Chicago Press. Guy, Simon and John Henneberry. 2000. “Understanding Urban Development Processes: Integrating the Economic and the Social in Property Research.” Urban Studies 37(13):2399–2416. Hackworth, Jason. 2007. The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism. Ithica: Cornell University Press. Hackworth, Jason. 2016. “Defiant Neoliberalism and the Danger of Detroit.” Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 107(5):540–51. Hackworth, Jason and Abigail Moriah. 2006. “Neoliberalism, Contingency and Urban Policy: The Case of Social Housing in Ontario.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30(3):510–27. Hanser, Amy. 2020. “Good Food in the City: How Cultural Ideas About Food Shape Street Vending Regulation.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Harris, Douglas C. 2011. “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver.” Law & Social Inquiry 36(3):694–726. Harvey, David. 1989. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 71(1):3–17. Herring, Chris. 2014. “The New Logics of Homeless Seclusion: Homeless Encampments in America’s West Coast Cities.” City & Community 13(4):285–309. Horgan, Mervyn. 2018. “Territorial Stigmatization and Territorial Destigmatization: A Cultural Sociology of Symbolic Strategy in the Gentrification of Parkdale (Toronto).” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 42(3):500–516. Hyde, Zachary. 2018. “Giving Back to Get Ahead: Altruism as a Developer Strategy of Accumulation through Affordable Housing Policy in Toronto and Vancouver.” Geoforum Online. Jacobs, Jane. 1961. The Life and Death of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books. John Walton. 1993. “Urban Sociology : The Contribution and Limits of Political Economy.” Annual Review of Sociology 19(1993):301–20.   122 Kane, Laura. 2013. “Honest Ed’s Sold to Vancouver Developer.” The Toronto Star, October 27. Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York City: Farrer, Straus and Giroux. Kimelberg, Shelley McDonough. 2011. “Inside the Growth Machine: Real Estate Professionals on the Perceived Challenges of Urban Development.” City & Community 10(1):76–99. Klein, Seth. 2013. “BC’s Real Social Housing Numbers.” The Tyee Mar 29th 2013.  Kohn, Margaret. 2016. The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Krippner, Greta R. 2002. “The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the Paradigm of Economic Sociology.” Theory and Society 30(6):775–810. Lainer-Vos, Dan. 2013. “Boundary Objects, Zones of Indeterminacy, and the Formation of Irish and Jewish Transnational Socio-Financial Networks.” Organization Studies 34(4):515–32. Lainer-Vos, Dan. 2013. “The Practical Organization of Moral Transactions: Gift Giving, Market Exchange, Credit, and the Making of Diaspora Bonds.” Sociological Theory 31(2):145–67. Lauster, Nathanael. 2016. The Death and Life of the Single-Family House: Lessons from Vancouver on Building a Livable City. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lee, Caroline W. 2014. Do-It-Yourself Democracy: The Rise of the Public Engagement Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lee, Caroline W., McQuarrie Michael, and Edward T. Walker. 2015. Democratizing Inequalities: Dilemmas of the New Public Participation. New York City: NYU Press. Lees, Loretta, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly. 2013. Gentrification. Routledge. Lehrer, Ute and Peter Pantalone. 2018. “The Sky Is Not the Limit: Negotiating Height and Density in Toronto’s Condominium Boom.” Pp. 127–37 in The Routledge Handbook on Spaces of Urban Politics. Routledge. Lehrer, Ute and Thorben Wieditz. 2009. “Condominium Development and Gentrification: The Relationship between Policies, Building Activities and Socio-Economic Development in Toronto.” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 18(1):140–61. Levine, Jeremy R. 2016. “The Privatization of Political Representation: Community-Based Organizations as Nonelected Neighborhood Representatives.” American Sociological Review 81(6):1251–75. Levine, Jeremy R. 2017. “The Paradox of Community Power: Cultural Processes and Elite Authority in Participatory Governance.” Social Forces 95(3):1155–79.   123 Ley, David. 1997. The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ley, David. 2011. Millionaire Migrants: Trans-Pacific Life Lines. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. Lippert, Randy K. 2019. Condo Conquest: Urban Governance, Law, and Condoization in New York and Toronto. Vancouver: UBC Press.  Lloyd, Richard. 2010. Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City. Routledge. Lofland, Lyn H. 2004. “The Real-Estate Developer as Villain: Notes on a Stigmatized Occupation.” Pp. 85–108 in Studies in Symbolic Interaction. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Logan, John R. and Harvey Molotch. 2007. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, With a New Preface. Berkeley: University of California Press. Logan, John R. and Gordana Rabrenovic. 1990. “Neighborhood Associations: Their Issues, Their Allies, and Their Opponents.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 26(1):68–94. Manville, Michael and Taner Osman. 2017. “Motivations for Growth Revolts: Discretion and Pretext as Sources of Development Conflict.” City & Community 16(1):66–85. Marcuse, Peter and David Madden. 2016. In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis. London: Verso Books. Markusen, Ann. 2006. “Urban Development and the Politics of a Creative Class: Evidence from a Study of Artists.” Environment and Planning A 38(10):1921–40. Martin, Isaac William. 2008. The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax Transformed American Politics. Stanford University Press. Martin, John Levi. 2003. “What Is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology 109(1):1–49. Marwell, Nicole P. 2009. Bargaining for Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepreneurial City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mauss, Marcel. 2002. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London: Routledge. McCabe, Brian J. 2016. No Place like Home: Wealth, Community, and the Politics of Homeownership. Oxford University Press. Mendez, Pablo and Noah Quastel. 2015. “Subterranean Commodification: Informal Housing and the Legalization of Basement Suites in Vancouver from 1928 to 2009.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39(6):1155–71.   124 Merrifield, Andy. 2014. “The Entrepreneur’s New Clothes.” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 96(4):389–91. Michael, Chris. 2015. “Honest Ed’s, Toronto’s Doomed Compendium of Kitch.” The Guardian, June 1. Mirvish, Ed. 1997. There’s No Buisness Like Show Buisness (but I Wouldn’t Ditch My Day Job). Toronto: Key Porter Books. Mirvish, Ed. 1993. How to Build an Empire on an Orange Milk Crate or 121 Lessons I Never Learned in School. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Molotch, Harvey. 1976. “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place.” American Journal of Sociology 82(2):309–32. Molotch, Harvey. 1993. “The Political Economy of Growth Machines.” Journal of Urban Affairs 15(1):29–53. Monkkonen, Paavo and Michael Manville. 2019. “Opposition to Development or Opposition to Developers? Experimental Evidence on Attitudes toward New Housing.” Journal of Urban Affairs 41(8):1123–41. Moore, Aaron A. 2013. Trading Density for Benefits: Section 37 Agreements in Toronto. Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance. Moore, Aaron A. 2016. “Decentralized Decision‐making and Urban Planning: A Case Study of Density for Benefit Agreements in Toronto and Vancouver.” Canadian Public Administration 59(3):425–47. Moos, Markus and Andrejs Skaburskis. 2010. “The Globalization of Urban Housing Markets: Immigration and Changing Housing Demand in Vancouver.” Urban Geography 31(6):724–49. Mudge, Stephanie Lee. 2008. “What Is Neoliberalism?” Socio-Economic Review 6:703–31. Muellerleile, Chris and Joshua Akers. 2015. “Making Market Rule (S).” Environment and Planning A 47(9):1781–86. Novak, Mathew. 2019. “The View beyond Downtown Luxury Towers: Diversity of Condominium Developments in a Contemporary Mid‐sized City.” The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien Online. Olds, Kris. 2002. Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   125 Pacewicz, Josh. 2016. Partisans and Partners: The Politics of the Post-Keynesian Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pacewicz, Josh. 2016. “The City as a Fiscal Derivative: Financialization, Urban Development, and the Politics of Earmarking.” City & Community 15(3):264–88. Pattillo, Mary. 2013. “Housing: Commodity versus Right.” Annual Review of Sociology 39:509–31. Peck, Jamie. 2013. “For Polanyian Economic Geographies.” Environment and Planning A 45(7):1545–68. Peck, Jamie. 2010. Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peck, Jamie. 2012. “American Cities under Extreme Economy.” City 16(December):626–55. Peck, Jamie. 2013. “Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring Polanyian Economic Geographies.” Environment and Planning A 45(7):1536–44. Peck, Jamie, Elliot Siemiatycki, and Elvin Wyly. 2014. “Vancouver’s Suburban Involution.” City 18(4):386–415. Peck, Jamie and Adam Tickell. 2002. “Neoliberalizing Space.” Antipode 34(3):380–404. Perin, Constance. 1977. Everything in Its Place: Social Order and Land Use in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Peterson, Richard A. and Narasimhan Anand. 2004. “The Production of Culture Perspective.” Annual Review of Sociology 30:311–34. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Polanyi, Karl. 1971. Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi. New York City: Beacon Press. Pomeroy, Steve and Duncan McClelland. 2019. Rental Housing in Canada’s Cities: Challenges and Responses. Federation of Canadian Municipalities Report.  Punter, John. 2003. The Vancouver Achievement: Urban Planning and Design. Vancouver: UBC Press. Purcell, Mark. 1997. “Ruling Los Angeles: Neighborhood Movements, Urban Regimes, and the Production of Space in Southern California.” Urban Geography 18(8):684–704.   126 Rosen, Gillad. 2017. “Toronto’s Condo-Builders: Development Approaches and Spatial Preferences.” Urban Geography 38(4):606–25. Rosen, Gillad and Alan Walks. 2015. “Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-Ism as Urban Transformation.” Journal of Urban Affairs 37(3):289–310. Rosen, Gillad and Alan Walks. 2013. “Rising Cities: Condominium Development and the Private Transformation of the Metropolis.” Geoforum 49:160–72. Rosenman, Emily. 2019. “The Geographies of Social Finance: Poverty Regulation through the ‘Invisible Heart’of Markets.” Progress in Human Geography 43(1):141–62. Rosenman, Emily. 2020. “Capital and Conscience: Poverty Management and the Financialization of Good Intentions in the San Francisco Bay Area.” Urban Geography 40(8):1124–47. Rossman, Gabriel. 2014. “Obfuscatory Relational Work and Disreputable Exchange.” Sociological Theory 32(1):43–63. Sahlins, Marshall. 2013. Culture and Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schilke, Oliver and Gabriel Rossman. 2018. “It’s Only Wrong If It’s Transactional: Moral Perceptions of Obfuscated Exchange.” American Sociological Review 83(6):1079–1107. Scott, Allen J. 1997. “The Cultural Economy of Cities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 21(2):323–39. Shaw, Randy. 2018. Generation Priced Out: Who Gets to Live in the New Urban America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shih, Mi and Leslie Shieh. 2020. “Negotiating Density and Financing Public Goods in Vancouver and New Taipei City: A Development Rights Perspective.” Planning Practice & Research 1–16. Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. Hoboken: Wiley. Small, Mario Luis. 2009. “How Many Cases Do I Need?’ On Science and the Logic of Case Selection in Field-Based Research.” Ethnography 10(1):5–38. Somers, Margaret R. and Fred Block. 2005. “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate.” American Sociological Review 70(2):260–87. Stabrowski, Filip. 2015. “Inclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Development: The Politics of ‘Affordable Housing’in North Brooklyn.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39(6):1120–36.   127 Stein, Samuel. 2019. Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State. New York City: Verso Books. Stein, Samuel. 2018. “Progress for Whom, toward What? Progressive Politics and New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing.” Journal of Urban Affairs 40(6):770–81. Stone, Clarence N. 1993. “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach.” Journal of Urban Affairs 15(1):1–28. Sullivan, Esther. 2018. Manufactured Insecurity: Mobile Home Parks and Americans’ Tenuous Right to Place. Berkeley: University of California Press. Suttor, Greg. 2016. Still Renovating: A History of Canadian Social Housing Policy. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP. Swartz, David L. 2013. Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tanner, Adrienne. 2018. “Ian Gillespie: Building Culture.” Nuvo, August 2018. Tavory, Iddo and Stefan Timmermans. 2014. Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research. University of Chicago Press. Teresa, Benjamin F. 2016. “Managing Fictitious Capital: The Legal Geography of Investment and Political Struggle in Rental Housing in New York City.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 48(3):465–84. Timmermans, Stefan and Iddo Tavory. 2012. “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis.” Sociological Theory 30(3):167–86. Valverde, Mariana. 2012. Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Vidaver, Aaron. 2003. Woodsquat. Vancouver: Westcoast Line. Wacquant, Loic, C, Tom Slater, and Virglio Borges Pereira. 2014. “Territorial Stigmatization in Action.” Environment and Planning A 46(6):1270–80. Wacquant, Loïc. 2018. “Bourdieu Comes to Town: Pertinence, Principles, Applications.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 42(1):90–105. Wacquant, Loïc and Aksu Akçaoğlu. 2017. “Practice and Symbolic Power in Bourdieu: The View from Berkeley.” Journal of Classical Sociology 17(1):55–69. Walker, Edward T. 2009. “Privatizing Participation: Civic Change and the Organizational Dynamics of Grassroots Lobbying Firms.” American Sociological Review 74(1):83–105.   128 Walks, Alan. 2014. “Canada’s Housing Bubble Story: Mortgage Securitization, the State, and the Global Financial Crisis.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38(1):256–84. Walks, Alan and Brian Clifford. 2015. “The Political Economy of Mortgage Securitization and the Neoliberalization of Housing Policy in Canada.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 47(8):1624–42. Weber, Rachel. 2002. “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment.” Antipode 34(3):519–40. Weber, Rachel. 2015. From Boom to Bubble: How Finance Built the New Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weber, Rachel. 2016. “Performing Property Cycles.” Journal of Cultural Economy 9(6):587–603. Weber, Rachel. 2020. “Embedding Futurity in Urban Governance: Redevelopment Schemes and the Time Value of Money.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space. Wellman, Barry. 2006. “Jane Jacobs the Torontonian.” City & Community 5(3):217–22. Woldoff, Rachael A., Lisa M. Morrison, and Michael R. Glass. 2016. Priced out: Stuyvesant Town and the Loss of Middle-Class Neighborhoods. New York City: NYU Press. Wolf-Powers, Laura. 2012. “Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context.” Value Capture and Land Policies 217–32. Wolfe, Jeanne M. 1998. “Canadian Housing Policy in the Nineties.” Housing Studies 13(1):121–34. Wynn, Jonathan R. 2011. The Tour Guide: Walking and Talking New York. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zelizer, Viviana A. 1994. Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zelizer, Viviana A. 2012. “How I Became a Relational Economic Sociologist and What Does That Mean?” Politics & Society 40(2):145–74. Zhang, Yue. 2013. The Fragmented Politics of Urban Preservation: Beijing, Chicago, and Paris. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Zukin, Sharon. 2009. Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zukin, Sharon. 1996. The Cultures of Cities. London: Wiley-Blackwell.   129 Zukin, Sharon. 1987. “Gentrification: Culture and Capital in the Urban Core.” Annual Review of Sociology 13(1):129–47. Zukin, Sharon. 1980. “A Decade of the New Urban Sociology.” Theory and Society 9(4):575–601. Zukin, Sharon. 1989. Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change. Rutgers: Rutgers University Press. Newspaper References (Chapter 3)  Azprizi, Jon. 2019. “Coquitlam Mayor Challenges Resident who says Rentals will Bring Slummy Conditions,” Global News December 17th 2019.   Bula, Francis. 2019. “Council Rejects Controversial Shaunessy Townhouse Project,” The Globe and Mail July 27th 2019.   Bula, Francis. 2019. “Developers Wary of Increased Tenant Rights,” The Globe and Mail Oct 4th 2019.   Carrick, Ro. 2017. “Accept it, your Children May Grow up to be Renters,” The Globe and Mail Nov 3rd 2017.   Dingman, Shane. 2018. “Toronto Sees a Surge in Purpose Built Rentals,” The Globe and Mail May 4th 2018.   Gold, Kerry. 2017. “The Folley of Increasing Housing Supply; Long-time Residents Complain their Affordable Units are being Replaced by Luxury Townhouses and Condos that House Fewer People,” The Globe and Mail September 23rd 2017.   Gold, Kerry. 2019. “The Debate Over Trickle Down Housing,” The Globe and Mail August 2nd 2019.   Goodman, David. 2019. “Rental Housing is Surrounded by Perfect Storm of Idiocy; City needs to Increase Supply,” The Vancouver Sun July 31st 2019.   Jeffords, Shawn. 2017. “Ontario Losing Planned Rental Units Report Says,” The Hamilton Spectator September 26th 2017.   Lee, Jeff. 2010. “Rental Housing Project Turns into a Lightening Rod: Program Creates Needed Rental Units City Officials Say,” The Vancouver Sun July 17th 2010.   Lee, Jeff. 2011. “Council Oks Plan to Add Density Near the Canada Line,” The Vancouver Sun May 10th 2011.   Keesmaat, Jennifer. 2019. “Our Housing Market is Built on the Foundation of Faulty Assumptions,” The Globe and Mail May 8th 2019.    130  Kiladze, Tim. 2019. “High Rents, Scorching Market Give Rise to Another Real Estate IPO,” The Globe and Mail Oct 5th 2019.   McFarland, Janet. 2017. “Developers Chafe Over Rent Control,” The Globe and Mail June 14th 2017.   McFarland, Janet. 2019. “Tricon Enters U.S. Apartment Market with 1.4 Billion Deal as it Reworks Investment Focus,” The Globe and Mail April 4th 2019.    Stevenson, Jane. 2018. “Keesmat wants to Raise the Roof: Pushes for 100,000 Units over 10 Years,” Toronto Sun August 8th 2018.   Stewart, Kennedy. 2019. “Rental Woes are Pushing People out of Vancouver; Here’s how to Reverse the Trend,” The Toronto Star July 22nd 2019.   Tuckey, Bryan. 2017. “Keep Developers Interested in Toronto’s Rental Market,” The Toronto Star April 22nd 2017.        131 Appendix: Methodology   Interviews:   Due to confidentiality stipulations in the ethics proposal of my research, the names and identifying information of my participants are part of my private records.   Vancouver:  Residents: 18 Activists: 9 Developers: 7 Politicians: 7 Planners: 7 Misc (Experts): 6  Toronto:  Residents/Business Owners: 16 Activists: 11 Developers – 8 Politicians – 4 Planners – 4 Misc (Experts) – 3   Codes:  Codes for Vancouver Interviews:   Activists: framing, jargon, partnership, hegemony, sham, social enterprise, “win-win,” ultimatums, orchestration, traps, duplicitous, misleading, “honourable compromise,” schemers, liars, phoney, veto, self-righteous, cynical, toxic, collusion, shakedown, lack of accountability, secretive, power players, hypocrites.   Planners: Visions values = laudable, well-motivated, admirable, honourable, not malicious,  General planning values = transparency, autonomy, openness, honesty, trust, confidence. Vision in practice = backroom dealings, dishonourable, broken, underminded, bullies, betrayal.   Politicians: good partners, reasonable, prudent, sophisticated, pragmatic, responsible, aggressive in pursuit of social good, actors not complainers, unified not prone to infighting, good values and ideals, compromise, shrewd, deal makers, top-down.  Developers (Westbank): compromise, flexibility, giving back to city, trustworthy, can deliver, credible, beyond the call of duty, different sectors coming together, heart for social good,   132 enlightened developers, altruism, win-win, community oriented, super transparent, smart growth, solutions based, pragmatic.  Non-Profit (PHS): no camp, non-ideological, activists = “metaphorical,” philosophical,” “politically correct,” providers of infrastructure, get things done, compromise,   Codes for Toronto Interviews:  Residents and Residents Association Members: Westbank using PR = over the top, offensive, manufacturing consent, manipulative, not really listening, scam, trying to woo us, dating metaphors, charm offensive, insulting, capture the process, preconceptions, unaware of local context, self-confident, glitzy, collaborators with Westbank = shills, hype over substance, duplicitous, marketing. Honest Ed’s = wacky, unique, unusual, iconic.   Consultants for Westbank: programmatic development, won’t set precedence, transit-oriented intensification, legacy, activating community voices, WB = collaborators, contributors, not dishonest or disingenuous, not the devil.   Developers (Westbank): complexity, uncertainty, risk, reputation, Henriquez = pragmatic and flexible, adding value through culture, seeing beyond the brick and mortar, leaving a legacy, pushing the envelope, design excellence, city builders, conscientious, doing interesting projects, engaged, trust, good intensions, amazing amenities, not purely about money.   Politicians and Planners: upzone capture, proactive, aggressive on development, M.V. will inform future development, mixed-use, underutilized site, exciting, good planning comes first.   Business Owners: M.V. is “dead,” neither side cares about the artists, buzz words, green washing, anachronism, low-rents, WB as slick, longevity.    Documentary Sources:  Density for Benefit Agreement Documents:  Carnegie Community Action Project - Annual Housing Reports for Downtown Eastside (2008-2019) City of Vancouver – The Vancouver Charter (2019) City of Vancouver - Community Amenity Contributions Annual Reports (2012-2016) City of Vancouver - Community Benefits from Development Report (2017) City of Vancouver - Woodward’s Community Consultation Co-Design Reports – 3 Reports (2005) Province of British Columbia - Community Amenity Contributions Guidelines (2014) City of Toronto – Section 37 Pamphlet (2018) City of Toronto – Official Plan Chapter 5 (2019) Province of Ontario – The Ontario Planning Act (2020)     133 Rezoning and Development Application Documents:  City of Vancouver - Province of British Columbia – The Vancouver Agreement for the Downtown Eastside (2001) City of Vancouver - Woodward’s Steering Committee Design Competition Report (2004) City of Vancouver - Woodward’s Design Development Update for City Council (2005) City of Vancouver - Public Hearing for Woodward’s Redevelopment – City Council Minutes (2006) Westbank – Development Application for Woodward’s Westbank – Development Application for Vancouver House Development (2013) Westbank – Development Application for Oakridge Redevelopment (2013) Westbank – Development Application for Mirvish Village Redevelopment (2015, 2016) South Vancouver Park Society – Affidavit for BC Supreme Court Action regarding Assessment of Oakridge (2017)  New Rental Housing Policy Documents:  City of Vancouver – Short Term Incentives for Rentals FAQ Sheet (2010) City of Vancouver – Rental 100 Program Guidelines (2016) City of Vancouver – Rental Incentives Phase II Report to Council (2019) City of Vancouver – Rental Incentives Phase II Report to Council PowerPoint Presentation (2019) City of Vancouver – Rental 100 Program Clarification to City Council (2019) City of Vancouver – Moderate Income Rental Housing Pilot Program FAQ Sheet (2019) City of Toronto – Open Door Affordable Rental Housing Program Guidelines (2018) City of Toronto – Open Door Affordable Rental Housing Program Call for Applications (2019)     


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items